Well-Being in African Philosophy: Insights for a Global Ethics of Development (African Philosophy: Critical Perspectives and Global Dialogue) 179363078X, 9781793630780

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Well-Being in African Philosophy

African Philosophy Critical Perspectives and Global Dialogue Series Editors: Uchenna B. Okeja, Rhodes University; and Bruce B. Janz, University of Central Florida Editorial Board: Anthony Appiah, Valentine Mudimbe, Gail Presbey, Achille Mbembe, Robert Bernasconi, Samuel Imbo, Tsenay Serequeberhan, Thaddeus Metz, Katrin Flikschuh, Niels Weidtmann, Christine Wanjiru Gichure, Kai Kresse, Joseph Agbakoba, Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Dismas. A. Masolo, Pedro Tabensky The African Philosophy: Critical Perspectives and Global Dialogue book series aims to promote emerging critical perspectives in different branches of African philosophy. It serves as an avenue for philosophers within and between many African cultures to present new arguments, ask new questions, and begin new dialogues within both specialized communities and with the general public. By merging the critical and global dimensions of thoughts pertaining to important topics in African philosophy, this series beams the lights and rigour of philosophical analysis on topical as well as classical questions reflective of the African and African diaspora search for meaning in existence. Focused on the best of African philosophy, the series will introduce new concepts and new approaches in philosophy both to intellectual communities across Africa, as well as the rest of the world.

Recent titles in the series: Well-Being in African Philosophy: Insights for a Global Ethics of Development, edited by Bolaji Bateye, Mahmoud Masaeli, Louise Müller, and Angela Roothaan African Philosophical Adventures, by John Murungi Beauty in African Thought: Critical Perspectives on the Western Idea of Development, edited by Bolaji Bateye, Mahmoud Masaeli, Louise Müller, and Angela Roothaan Rethinking Sage Philosophy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on and beyond H. Odera Oruka, edited by Kai Kresse and Oriare Nyarwath Odera Oruka and the Human Minimum: An African Philosopher’s Defense of Human Dignity and Environment, by Michael Kamau Mburu Africa beyond Liberal Democracy: In Search of Context-Relevant Models of Democracy for the Twenty-First Century, edited by Reginald M.J. Oduor Menkiti’s Moral Man, by Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe Partiality and Impartiality in African Philosophy, by M. Molefe

Well-Being in African Philosophy Insights for a Global Ethics of Development

Edited by Bolaji Bateye, Mahmoud Masaeli, Louise F. Müller and Angela Roothaan

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www​.rowman​.com 86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE Copyright © 2024 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Bateye, Bolaji, editor. | Masaeli, Mahmoud, 1954- editor. | Müller, Louise (Louise F.), editor. | Roothaan, A. C. M. (Angela C. M.), editor. Title: Well-being in African philosophy : insights for a global ethics of development / edited by Bolaji Bateye, Mahmoud Masaeli, Louise F. Müller and Angela Roothaan. Other titles: African philosophy (Lanham, Md.) Description: Lanham, Maryland : Lexington Books, 2024. | Series: African philosophy: critical perspectives and global dialogue | Includes bibliographical references and index. Subjects: LCSH: Well-being—Africa. | Well-being—Philosophy. | Philosophy, African—21st century. | Economic development—Moral and ethical aspects. Classification: LCC B5315.W45 W35 2024 (print) | LCC B5315.W45 (ebook) | DDC 128.4—dc23/eng/20230801 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023035232 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023035233 ISBN: 978-1-7936-3078-0 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-1-7936-3079-7 (ebook) ∞ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Contents

Acknowledgementsvii Introduction 1 PART I: CONCEPTIONS OF WELL-BEING IN AFRICAN(A) INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY

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1 Human Well-Being in Intercultural Philosophical Perspective: A Focus on the Akan Philosophy of Wiredu, Gyekye and Appiah Louise Müller

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2 This Thing Called Communitarianism, or Why We Should Not Be Afraid of the Community Nimrod Kahn

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3 Being-in-Community as the Basis of Well-Being in African Philosophy Pius Mosima

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4 Personhood, Well-Being and Ethical Maturity in African Philosophy Alloy S. Ihuah

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PART II: WELL-BEING IN AFRICAN CONTEXTS

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5 Social Ethics and Human Well-Being in Igbo Society J. Chidozie Chukwuokolo

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6 Religion, Education and the Well-Being of Citizens in Nigeria Olutoyin Mejiuni and Bolaji Olukemi Bateye

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7 A Non-Individualistic Notion of the Common Good Abdoulaye Ba

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8 The Pursuant of Well-Being in Contemporary Africa Beatrice Okyere-Manu, Ovett Nwosimiri and Stephen Nkansah Morgan

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PART III: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A GLOBAL ETHICS OF DEVELOPMENT 189 9 Ujamaa: Society as Family Martin F. Asiegbu and Simeon Dimonye

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10 African Pre-colonial Accomplishments in Political, Social and Economic Well-Being Andrew Akampurira

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11 A Philosophy of Race in the Melting Pot of Globalisation and Its Implications for Africa Wilfred Lajul

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12 Gilles Paquet’s Hermeneutics of Belongingness: On the Collaborative Ethics of Global Development Stanley Uche Anozie

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Index 271 About the Editors and Contributors

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Acknowledgements

This book, which explores the concept of well-being for a Global Ethics of Development, does so from the perspective of scholars in African Philosophy. The African philosophical perspective has long been underrepresented in Global Ethics discussions on the topic, and this book aims to repair that. The original idea for this book was developed by Mahmoud Masaeli in 2017, when he was a visiting professor of International Development and Global Studies at the University of Ottawa in Canada. He invited Angela Roothaan, associate professor at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and chair of the OZSW African Intercultural Philosophy (AIPh) research network, to be the co-editor of the volume. Angela in her turn enlarged the editorial team, whose names are mentioned on the cover page in alphabetic order, by bringing in Louise Müller (secretary of AIPh) and long-standing research connection Bolaji Bateye. Louise is a senior researcher in African Philosophy and Studies based at Leiden University in the Netherlands and the University of KwaZulu Natal in South Africa, and Bolaji is an associate professor in Religious Studies and African Indigenous Religion at Obafemi Awolowo University in Ile-Ife in Nigeria. Together, we covered the expertise to select and support our authors to produce this volume. Roothaan and Müller formed the core editorial team to keep track of the different versions of the chapters and wrote the introduction, informed by the initial ideas of Mahmoud and inspired by Bolaji’s comments. All members of the team, from across the African, European, and North American continents, collaborated in all stages of the process, reviewing contributions as they were sent in and keeping an eye on the whole process of construing the book. Attention is also to the details. Therefore, to make sure that spelling and grammar were consistent throughout all chapters, Louise carried out a full copy-edit before submission.

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Acknowledgements

We are incredibly thankful that we found Lexington Books willing to take on our book project, and especially want to thank Bruce Janz and Uchenna Okeja, series editors of African Philosophy: Critical Perspectives and Global Dialogue, for believing in the book. We also thank the external reviewers of the manuscript. We thank Jana Hodges, senior acquisitions editor of Lexington Books, for her indispensable support and guidance, even in the disruptions that COVID-19 brought to all of us – the authors, the editors, and the publisher. Last but not least, we thank all the contributing authors for their chapters, internal peer reviews, and collaboration during the entire process. We firmly believe that all input we got during the entire trajectory has made a difference, and hope that Well-being in African Philosophy: Insights into Global Ethics of Development will inspire scholars, students, policymakers and development workers to take a fresh look at the global moral issues concerning well-being and development introduced and discussed by African philosophers in this volume. As editors, we are thankful for the pleasant working atmosphere and the positive attitude of the authors, who collaborated with us to realise this edited volume as a collective work of scholarship.

Introduction

Over the past decades, African philosophers have developed their main ideas on well-being in the context of the articulation of a philosophy of personhood. In contrast to many modern Western dualistic metaphysical ideas of the person as a being with attributes, such as the Cartesian material body and spiritual mind, the majority of African philosophers tend to keep a concept of personhood that is holistic and relational. Philosophers such as John Mbiti, Ifeanyi Menkiti, Segun Gbadegesin, the late Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu have developed their ideas of well-being connected to these communitarian articulations of personhood. A human being is considered to depend greatly on her or his relationship to the community. According to Menkiti and Wiredu, one’s personhood is even totally defined by the community, whereas others, such as Gyekye, put more emphasis on the role of the individual in achieving personhood. In this book, we present the reflections of an established but also a new generation of African philosophers in and outside of the African continent, who give their views on the concept of human well-being in the classical context of personhood and communitarianism but also in the broader field of Intercultural Philosophy and Global Ethics for Development. In the classical communitarian debate in African Philosophy, the main focus is on the question of how the individual African relates to her or his community and the effects of one’s relationship with one’s community members on one’s wellbeing. The debates within Intercultural Philosophy and Global Development Ethics mainly concentrate on the connection of traditional living communities in contemporary Africa with the outside world. To connect to Global Ethics, African philosophers have thus shifted their attention from Personhood Studies, which solely focussed on the relationship between the individual and the community, to Intercultural Philosophy. As 1

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Introduction

we shall see, concepts such as cultural particulars and universals, cosmopolitanism, and anti-centrism have helped to develop African ethics concerning the moral interaction with ‘strangers’, those outside of one’s community or kin group. African philosophers are contemplating new ways to deal with strangers, their ethics and the corresponding development programmes. They believe, however, that it is high time that development workers think about more inclusive ways to connect to all those Africans who live in communities in their rural villages or urban neighbourhoods. African sustainable development can surely become more inclusive, as many of the authors in this book have stressed, when development programmes are more embedded in the ethos of African cultures. With regards to Global Ethics, we would like to remark that instead of measuring development only along lines of justice and economic growth, as is mainstream in this field, the authors have shared their thoughts on how African relational conceptions of well-being rooted in communitarian cultures can be used to build a new critical concept of development that may transform Global Ethics from an African perspective. A genuine Global Ethics can only be developed as the result of two-way traffic. In practice, this means that the developing world should listen to the voices of the new generation of African philosophers as articulated in this book. Development workers, policymakers and ethicists are invited to familiarise themselves with the thought of these African philosophers. Many of them have created a new intercultural understanding of their social and moral realities based on dialogue and exchange with Western philosophers. The insights of these African philosophers are valuable for creating new, more intercultural-oriented development programmes. Hence, for African philosophers, Global Ethics should include local communitarian African norms and values (ethic, in Wiredu’s terms) to repair their longstanding and current marginalisation in this field of study. Therefore, this book will focus on and aim to gain more insight into how African ethic in the plural should be made part of Global Ethics for the development of African communities and the enhancement of the well-being of humanity as a whole. The book is divided into three parts, comprising twelve chapters by authors from ten different countries, the majority of which are to be found on the African continent: Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon, Uganda, South Africa, Canada, the United States, The Netherlands and Israel. The authors and editors come from various fields of philosophy and Religious Studies including Applied Ethics, African spirituality and oral wisdom traditions, the Philosophy of Mind and various sub-fields of African Philosophy that span Francophone and Anglophone philosophical traditions. Included are also insights from the fields of African Indigenous Religions and the study of Christianity and Islam.

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The editors, who live and work in three different continents, Africa, North America and Europe, are all interdisciplinary scholars. They have facilitated the intercultural dialogue between the authors of this book and the creative exchange of their philosophical ideas. They did so by organising several rounds of feedback and providing editorial suggestions to the authors’ written contributions. This book is thus the collaborative result of African Intercultural Philosophy in practice, as the editors centralised the collaboration with and communication between the contributors. Part I, ‘Conceptions of Well-Being in African(a) Intercultural Philosophy’, consists of four chapters. In this part, we discuss the philosophical conceptualisation of human well-being by African philosophers in the context of personhood and African(a) Intercultural Philosophy. We also focus on the contribution of these conceptualisations to the construction of a Global Ethics for Development. In chapter 1, Louise Müller presents all the debates on well-being and global development in this book, such as the Mbiti-Menkiti classical communitarian debate in African Philosophy. She refers to all the other authors in this edited volume for further reading on specific contributions to these debates. She also concentrates on the philosophical contributions of three well-known Akan philosophers to the conceptualisation of human well-being to increase insights into the Global Ethics of Development. These philosophers are the late Kwasi Wiredu (1931–2022), the late Kwame Gyekye (1939–2019) and Kwame Anthony Appiah (1954–). The chapter kicks off with these Akan philosophers’ (implied) contributions to the mentioned ‘classical communitarian debate’, which focuses on the tension between the at times conflicting interests between the individual and her or his community in modern Africa. The debaters have concentrated on the definition of personhood and the extent to which a person is defined by her or his community. They have also argued about either the ‘noumenal’ or ‘processual’ notion of African personhood. The chapter then focuses on how these philosophers broadened their horizons and developed an ethics that goes beyond the notion of personhood and the boundaries of their cultural group by borrowing from the field of Intercultural Philosophy. Finally, it concentrates on the conceptualisation of human well-being by the three Akan philosophers in the context of Intercultural Philosophy. Gyekye, Wiredu and Appiah have contributed significantly to African(a) Intercultural Philosophy and have created constructive openings for other scholars to further develop the field and gain insights into Ethics of Global Development for a Global Ethics of Development. By connecting African cultural values to Global Ethics, they developed intercultural African philosophies for more inclusive development of Africa. The chapter is, above all, an introduction to the debates in this edited volume and shows how the authors in the remaining eleven chapters are positioned within them.

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In chapter 2, Nimrod Kahn explains why we do not have to be afraid that communitarianism is a totalitarian ethic. By focusing on the Ghanaian Akan people’s ethics, he makes the point that communitarianism might seem like totalitarian ethics because of the large impact of community norms and values on the live of individuals within a community. He then shows how Akan proverbs and maxims, as part of the Akan people’s oral tradition, introduce flexibility in speech and how the art of indirect communication prevents their communal ethics to develop as totalitarian. The Akan people’s high context culture requires them to be creative with language and to adjust the interpretations of their maxims and proverbs to continuously changing social situations. Their oral art creates space for individual freedom within the boundaries of their communal ethics. Thus, indirectness in Akan communication and the hermeneutics of Akan ethics operate as a protective mechanism against the development of tyrannical or, as Akan philosopher Gyekye put it, ‘radical communitarianism’. As a practical philosophy, Akan ethics thus aspires to attain human well-being by creating room for interpretation through the method of indirect communication. Kahn’s chapter refers to Gyekye’s criticism of Menkiti, whom Gyekye designated as a ‘radical communitarian’ in the classical communitarian debate. In chapter 3, the intercultural African philosopher Pius Mosima elaborates on the communitarian debate in African Philosophy after concentrating on the way the philosophers involved connect to the earlier developed ideas of Western intercultural dialogical-oriented philosophers, such as Martin Buber, who focused on the mutuality in the relationship between I and Thou. He then stresses that the concept of well-being is closely linked to that of personhood. His main focus is on being-in-community and he explains that among the Bakweri to whom he belongs and among other cultural groups, the idea of personhood is mainly relational. Mosima explains that personhood in traditional African communities is attained by living well together with others. Cultural features and rituals, which celebrate people’s togetherness and their participation in community life, are therefore essential to personhood, and being or becoming a person is central to one’s well-being. In these social settings, being a person expands the minimum definition of being human and implies being-with-and-for-others in the household, family and community. Mosima stresses that in Africa, one cannot achieve personhood without interacting with others and fulfilling one’s social obligations towards them. He aims to enhance understanding of the concept of personhood in African Philosophy by researching the contributions of several renowned philosophers, including the forefathers John Mbiti and Ifeanyi Menkiti, but also the contemporary South-African based philosophers Magobe Ramose and Thaddeus Metz. Furthermore, Mosima shows that in African philosophical debates, personhood and well-being are also discussed in the context of African political

Introduction

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philosophy, such as in Nkrumah’s ‘communalism’, Senghor’s ‘communitybased society’ and Nyerere’s ‘Ujamaa’. Considering the contributions of all these of his African predecessors and also some Western scholars, Mosima concludes that, despite these philosophers’ criticism of (radical) communitarianism, the community is nevertheless of the utmost importance for the preservation of traditional norms and values, which are associated with long life, good health and happiness. The author, therefore, rejects more individualistic notions of well-being in African Philosophy and proposes that African communal traditional values should become an integral and fair part of the philosophy of Global Ethics for Development to enrich this ethics with more humane, other-related feelings than just economic production and growth. Chapter 4 examines personhood in the context of the traditional African cultures of various cultural groups in West Africa: those of the Tiv, the Igbo, the Yoruba, the Ebira,the Bini in Nigeria and the Tallensi and Akan in Ghana. The author, Alloy Ihuah, examines four approaches to the concept of personhood: the inherent theory, which concentrates on the unique inner essence of the person; the capacity-based theory, which posits that the human capacity to think and reason logically defines personhood; the somatic theory that signposts a materialist interpretation of personhood; and the communal theory, which holds that personhood is relationship-based. Ihuah believes that the communal theory, which is prevalent in Africa, both in Menkiti’s radical and Gyekye’s moderate communitarian forms, exaggerates the communal perception of personhood in Africa. Ihuah concludes that ‘For Africans, a person is a person because of his/her intrinsic values that make him/her different from any other being. There cannot be a community without the self (the person), hence it is the goods and skills that the individual brings to the others in the community that contribute to the communal harmony and human flourishing.’ Part II, ‘Well-Being in African Contexts’, consists of four chapters. In this part, the authors have contextualised the conceptions of well-being and the debates on communitarianism dealt with in the first part. They refer to ethnically diverse cultural contexts, such as the practicalities of well-being in traditional and modern Igbo community and society. They also compare the significance in Africa and the Global North attributed to the well-being of the community over the individual to reassess African values and notions of well-being in Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Ghana and South Africa. Finally, they address present-day issues in religious and state education related to wellbeing and ethics in past and contemporary Nigeria. In chapter 5, Jeremiah Chukwuokolo studies human well-being in the context of personhood and social ethics in traditional and modern Igbo community and society. Chukwuokolo emphasises the need to value the Igbo people’s traditional ethics and their corresponding web of social relations. In his view, human

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Introduction

well-being is related to the ethics of duty towards one’s community members and is based on a sense of belonging and rootedness in one’s local culture. The latter manifests itself in Igbo people’s veneration of ancestors and the Earth goddess (Ani), but not in pursuing the goal of increasing their material wealth as the main purpose in life, as global capitalism erroneously propagates.Chukwuokolo believes in the power of connectedness between people and their ancestors as a solution to the feelings of uprootedness of all those Igbo who currently struggle to find their path in the modern capitalist world. In Chukwuokolo’s view, materialism and capitalism are thus merely a threat to the well-being of the Igbo people, while social interactions and respect for one’s ancestors and elders are the cure. The author stresses that the harmonious traditional social ethics in the Igbo community have continued to exist despite colonialism in Nigeria and the attempts by the British to oppress their indigenous ethics, and the influence of violent religious fundamentalist forms of Christianity and Islam. The Igbo people’s traditional ethos is an ethics of duty based on methods of control due to the fear of punishment by the Earth deity, the belief in ancestral spirits (invoked during masquerades), and divination. The author concludes that the modern Igbo adhere to Global Ethics alongside their local Igbo ethic and have succeeded in finding a communitarian lifestyle in modern Africa. The Igbo continue to value their ethnic Africanness and the related sense of belonging to a community, alongside being moral citizens of Nigeria and the world at large. In chapter 6, Olutoyin Meijuni and Bolaji Bateye concentrate on the role of Islam and Christianity and the threats that they pose to the welfare of Nigerians, thereby providing a religious context to human well-being. In their view, the influence of fundamentalism in Islam and Christianity in Nigeria has increased since colonial times. As a result of this influence, the inequality between men and women has increased, and the number of witchcraft accusations against women and children has risen. Besides, the militant Nigerian jihadi group Boko Haram, which has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, is outright dangerous for population groups in Nigeria and surrounding countries. The authors, therefore, propose to separate education and state affairs from religion, which has never been the case in many African countries, including Nigeria and Ghana. They also advise returning to the values of African Indigenous Religions. Since some of these religions’ practices have an emancipatory effect, they can explicitly mitigate the negative impact on women of fundamentalist Islamic and Christian education. The authors thus conclude that, in various spheres of life, the impact of Islam and Christianity and especially their fundamentalist movements, on Nigerians’ well-being have generally been negative. For the enhancement of their wellbeing, especially that of Nigerian women, African political countermeasures will be necessary to decrease the colonial influence of the Middle Eastern and Western world religions on Nigerian society.

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In chapter 7, Abdoulaye Ba questions whether the community is the best frame for individual well-being and shares his experience of the current transition in Senegal from a more communitarian-based to a more Western focussed and individualistic society, albeit in comparison with the West, the Senegalese society has remained more communitarian. According to Ba, African societies were never entirely collective, but in comparison with the West, they have long been more collective than individualistic, even now that they are shifting towards individualism. This relatively high degree of communitarianism has brought Africans a strong sense of belonging and methods of sharing the common good that focus mainly on the needs of African societies as a whole rather than on those of their members. Although Africans have benefited from this collectivism in pre-colonial African societies, the implementation of collectivism on a socialist basis after the decolonisation of several African countries has proven to be problematic. Ba mentions Nyerere’s Ujamaa socialism as a case in point. In many aspects, Ujamaa socialism was a failed experiment in providing a modern communitarian basis for Africa’s traditional collective, predominantly rural cultures. Drawing from this lesson and as a result of globalisation and urbanisation, Ba has observed that in contemporary Senegal, the public space in the minds of its citizens is growing from that of an awareness of one’s community to that of the Senegalese state and the globalised world. Hence, the notions of what is common, what is the common good, and what are the boundaries between what belongs to the community and/or the individual are shifting towards individualism. Only the future can tell, so Ba argues, what this shift, which resonates with that in other African countries, will mean for the well-being of Africans in general and the Senegalese in particular. By all means, the shift implies that African social and political philosophers should contemplate how to implement a communitarian-based better way of living together in a modern urban African and globalised world. In chapter 8, Beatrice Okyere-Manu, Ovett Nwosimiri and Stephen Nkansah Morgan focus on the traditional African understanding of well-being, which is often understood to be a harmonious interconnectedness of the self with her or his community, the natural environment and spiritual beings. The question of which of these three ought to be given primacy has never been a vexation for the traditional African, who naturally understands that her or his well-being, sustainability and progress rely on all of these three simultaneously. Regardless of what well-being is taken to mean, whether happiness or fulfilment, the traditional African finds it in living a shared social life with members of her or his community, in a good human-nature relatedness and in maintaining a cordial relationship with her or his spiritual beings. This understanding of well-being may not be unique to traditional Africa, but it stands in contrast to some Western conceptions of well-being that place the

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individual at the centre of analyses of well-being. The authors’ aim is to show what well-being in contemporary Africa should look like. Their position is that contemporary African societies are more and more embracing Western conceptions of well-being, which is perceived as foreign to the one that has guided Africans from time immemorial. Thus, there is a need for contemporary Africans to reassess their values and perception of well-being if they are to properly address their current needs and reach their aspirations. Part III, ‘Contributions to a Global Ethics of Development’, has four chapters. In this part, the authors articulate the concept of well-being as an African contribution to an inclusive Global Ethics of Development, digging into the (failed) experiment of Ujamaa socialism in African history, the pre-colonial ways of living together, and Africans’ re-connection to their roots and ethics. They also address what lessons to be drawn from it by today’s generation of African philosophers for the pursuit of a communitarian way of living within an African nation-state and a global ethically oriented political development of Africa. Furthermore, this part will concentrate on the debates around globalisation, racism and global ethics, as well as on the development of more equal forms of social organisation for the enhancement of human well-being in Africa. Chapter 9 focuses on Ujamaa as a model of African socialism. In this chapter, Martin Asiegbu and Simeon Dimonye discuss the positive and negative aspects of this socialist model. They clarify that many of the first leaders of postcolonial African countries, including Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, felt that socialism was a good socio-economic theory to embrace as it connected well to Africa’s indigenous religious structures and communitarian ethics. Nevertheless, the Ujamaa experiment failed. Just like in Ghana, the economic results of the rural developments were disappointing, and the agricultural revolution failed to materialise. Despite the improvement of the textile industry, Nyerere did not succeed in his goal to improve the living conditions of all Tanzanians. Notwithstanding its economic failure, the authors believe that Ujamaa was a valuable experiment in the history of African Development Studies. In terms of ethics, ideas about human well-being and the spiritual connectedness of the living to the past and future generations, the early dimensions of Ujamaa in Africa have been a strong inspiration to the modern African. Asiegbu and Dimonye think that these early postcolonial African socialist experiences are of use for the development of communitarianism and communitarian-based ethics in contemporary Africa and the enhancement of Africans’ well-being. In chapter 10, Andrew Akampurira stresses the need for Africans and the world at large to gain a better understanding of Africa’s pre-colonial cultures and religions, which have been marginalised by Western colonial education, religion and culture. Departing from a critical development

Introduction

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perspective, he thinks that Modern Africans’ well-being will improve if they are re-connected to their African cultural-religious heritage. African indigenous religious rituals and ceremonies that are related to birth, puberty, marriage and death, unite people to one another, their locality and the previous generations. Usually, all generations, including the ancestors and the unborn, are part of the African extended family and kin groups. For Africans, respect for nature and the development of a good character are also ways to improve human well-being, whereas individualism and urbanisation increase feelings of alienation and uprootedness. Akampurira suggests promoting African traditional values, as preserved in oral traditions including legends, myths, wise sayings, songs and proverbs, in academic curricula to battle the current cultural and identity crisis among many modern people caused by Westernisation and global capitalism. In his view, human well-being is not emphasised in Western development discourses, such as Western feminism, but in the African indigenous religious values, African traditional ethics and communitarianism. He aims to make development more inclusive by embedding development theories in African traditional cultures and philosophies. The challenge for today’s Africa, he closes, will be to enhance Africans’ well-being by reconnecting to the many traditional African cultures and ethics while participating as responsible citizens in modern nation-states in a globalising world. In chapter 11, Wilfred Lajul researches the link between globalisation and both theological and secular racism. The two major world religions, Islam and Christianity, tend to use their religious scripts – the Bible or the Qur’an – to exclude Africans of other religious convictions on racial and religious grounds. Secular racism in the West has also a long philosophical history of allegedly proving the racial inferiority of Africans. Lajul’s main research question is: ‘Can globalisation break down all barriers to human togetherness including hurdles by theological and secular racism ?’ To Lajul’s mind, globalisation is not the cause of these types of racism, but in the Global South, it seems to awaken racial sentiments. Lajul concludes that neither resisting globalisation nor destroying nationalism is the solutions to racism in the Global South. On the contrary, it should be in consolidating unity and solidarity and meeting people’s socio-economic needs at local and national levels. Thus, their well-being can be improved, and their national values can be brought to the global arena. Globalisation fails to meet human beings’ needs at the territorial level. To combat racism and improve the well-being of Africans, citizenship at the national level should, therefore, become the basis for citizenship at the global level, Lajul closes. The challenge in Global Ethics for Development is thus to raise awareness of the economic unequal mechanisms of globalisation based on racist principles, which harm many Africans in the developing world.

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In chapter 12, Stanley Anozie synthesises the Canadian development philosopher Paquet’s writings on collaborative governance. This type of governance is presented as the result of the transformation of Big-G government to small-g governance and the concomitant more collaborative Ethics of Global Development. Anozie researches how Paquet’s collaborative governance guarantees global development. To achieve that aim, he compares Paquet’s theory of collaborative governance with Gadamer’s intercultural philosophy of the fusion of horizons by the use of dialogue in the context of human development and well-being. He, thereby, stresses that both theories centralise the need for conversation and communication to expand one’s horizons and perspectives, which is necessary for the gradual transition from hierarchical to more horizontal organisations and to make the shift from Big-G government, which is dominating the global discourse, to a more dialogical-oriented collaborative governance. In Anozie’s view, the idea of human well-being is connected to collaboration in a community of relative equals. The enhancement of well-being, therefore, lies in the transformation of organisations from being exceedingly hierarchical to extra-horizontal. For Anozie, Global Ethics for Development thus lies in the adjustment of organisations in Africa to the need of Africans for more equalitarian sociopolitical relationships in political institutions.

Part I

CONCEPTIONS OF WELL-BEING IN AFRICAN(A) INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY

Chapter 1

Human Well-Being in Intercultural Philosophical Perspective A Focus on the Akan Philosophy of Wiredu, Gyekye and Appiah Louise Müller

The main question that arises when one discusses the concept of well-being in philosophy is whose well-being is at stake. Is it primarily the well-being of the individual or that of the community? Does the pointer of the balance between the community and the individual move to liberalism and atomism or holism and communitarianism? This introductory book chapter focuses on the philosophical contributions of three well-known Ghanaian philosophers to the conceptualisation of human well-being to increase insights into the global ethics of development.1 These philosophers, the late Kwasi Wiredu (1931–2022), the late Kwame Gyekye (1939–2019) and Kwame Anthony Appiah (1954–) were all born in Southern Ghana in regions dominated by the Akan people. The Akan are a meta-ethnicity2 living primarily in Ghana and the Ivory Coast. The Asante people, who belong to the Akan, have distinct cultural and linguistic features, but they also share characteristics with other Akan people (Müller 2010, 2013). The chapter’s structure is as follows: It will kick off with these Akan philosophers’ (implied) contributions to the so-called ‘classical communitarian debate’ (see also Mosima 2023, Ihuah 2023, Okyere-Manu, Nwosimiri and Morgan 2023, Ba 2023, and Asiegbu and Dimonye 2023 in this volume), which focuses on the pressing question of how to reach harmony between the interests of the community and the individual in modern Africa. Then, it will focus on how these philosophers developed an ethics that goes beyond the boundaries of their cultural group by borrowing from the field of Intercultural Philosophy. Finally, it will concentrate on the conceptualisation of 13

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human well-being in the context of Intercultural Philosophy as insights into ‘global ethics of development’, but not before introducing ‘ethics of global development’.

THE COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE CONCEPT OF WELL-BEING In modern African social and political philosophy, well-being has been discussed in the context of personhood as part of the so-called ‘classical communitarian debate’.3 The central question in this debate is to what extent a person or individual is defined by the community and thus whose well-being is prevalent: that of the individual as part of the community or that of the individual opposed to that of the community? In the African context, the communitarian debate has its origins in the reaction of Akan philosopher Kwame Gyekye (1997) to the Nigerian philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti’s (1984) opinion on personhood. In Menkiti’s (1940–2019) view, a person is shaped and defined by the community; hence, one’s wellbeing is determined by ‘being-in-community’. Menkiti put the Kenyan Mbiti on a pedestal for his maxim that in Africa ‘I am because we are; and since we are, therefore, I am’ (Mbiti 1969:108).4 In Mbiti’s view of personhood, the significance of social relationships is highlighted. In line with Mbiti, Menkiti stressed that in the African context, a person is not primarily defined in terms of certain individual properties, such as rationality, one’s mind, will or memory. Hence, in Africa, the Cartesian ‘I think, therefore I am’ does not hold. Instead of the Cartesian focus on the ontology of a person, his nature or make-up, Africans focus mainly on their morality and socialisation. In Africa, the main question is, therefore, not ‘what makes up a person’ but ‘how to become’ a person.5 In the Akan philosophy of personhood, however, both the descriptive or metaphysical aspects of a person and her or his relational ones have resulted in long-enduring debates. The three Akan philosophers, Gyekye, Wiredu and Appiah, all described the components of an Akan individual, albeit only Gyekye and Wiredu participated in the debate about this. The author will start with Appiah’s metaphysical notion of personhood and then discuss the Gyekye-Wiredu debate about the metaphysical make-up of a person. Appiah (2004:16–18) describes that in the Akan world, a person is made up of a body (nipadua) through which the blood of one’s mother flows (mogya), which connects a person to the matriclan (abusua or nton, which consists of the matrilineal family; a group with a common ancestress in their grandmother or great-grandmother but, in a wider context, also refers to the seven or eight clans into which all of the Asante are divided). The Asante people also belong

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to a paternal clan (ntoro). The ntoro to which one belongs can be derived from similarities in personality between father and son. Besides a body, a person has two spirits dwelling inside her or him, of which one can fly away during dreams (the sunsum, or personal spirit, which derives from the father at conception), whereas the other (ↄkra) is a life force, a spark of the Sun, that one receives from the High God (Onyankopon).6 A person receives one’s ↄkra, which contains one’s destiny (nkrabea), at birth, and the spirit departs again to Onyankopon only after a person has passed on.7 Appiah (2004:18) refers to both the ↄkra and the sunsum as dual non-bodily entities. He mentions that in the traditional Akan worldview, the nightly journey of one’s spirit (sunsum) in a dream is believed to reflect the real experience of a person, which is a shared one when the dream involves other people. As Appiah put it: ‘Thus if a man dreams of intercourse with a woman, she is assumed to have dreamed of intercourse with him’ (Appiah 1998:2572). For Appiah, a person’s spirit (sunsum) is thus spiritual (a non-bodily entity), but it can nevertheless cause a physical bodily reaction in another person. The dream experience of a person’s sunsum reveals the Akan belief that by their sunsum, or this human spirit, they are strongly connected to other kin group members. The author, who was trained as a philosopher and a historian and who conducted philosophical-oriented historical anthropological fieldwork in Kumasi, saw this understanding of the intuitive nature of the sunsum reflected in the Asante people’s political and metaphysical understanding of the Golden Stool (the Sika Dwa Kofi). Since the eighteenth century, the Sika Dwa Kofi, has been perceived as the Asante symbol of royal authority and as a royal ancestral shrine that contains a collective sunsum.. This sunsum is made up of the individual spirit or sunsum of all Asante people (Müller 2013). Unlike Appiah, who took it for granted that both the sunsum and the wwkra were spiritual, Gyekye and Wiredu were involved in a debate about the nature of these human spirits being either quasi-material (Wiredu 1987:161) or spiritual (Gyekye, who adhered to this view, translated the ↄkra with the word ‘soul’). The controversy between Wiredu and Gyekye derived from their differences of opinion about the nature of the universe. The question is whether the world is dualistic, in recognition of a separation between the spiritual or metaphysical – and the material (or the social or physical worlds) (Gyekye’s stance), or non-dualist or monist (Wiredu’s decolonial and deconstructive point of view). The latter means that there is only one world and hence no other-worldly realm. The difference between Gyekye and Wiredu can be explained by the context in which they operated. Whereas the Manichaean Gyekye lived and worked in Ghana in a (neo)colonial and dualistic Christian-oriented context, the non-dualist Wiredu lived in the United States and worked at a university that allowed him to decolonise the Akan worldview. From his location outside Africa, Wiredu could relatively

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easily develop himself as a leading figure in the conceptual decolonisation of African philosophy (Müller 2008).8 Wiredu thus only recognised ‘one world’, unlike Gyekye and Appiah, who believed that there were two interlinked worlds: the physical and the metaphysical. The debate about the nature of the universe and the human spirits is important for the conceptualisation of personhood because it has an impact on the categorisation of the ancestors. In Gyekye’s (1995) and Appiah’s (2004) views, the ancestors are other-worldly beings, so their nature is spiritual, whereas for Wiredu (1995, 1998), the ancestors are also earthly or ‘quasi-material’, like the human spirits (the ↄkra and the sunsum) and the human mind (adwene).9 To sum up, the three philosophers all had communitarian views, but only Wiredu thought that the ancestors and other spirits are part of the community in the same realm and space as human beings and other living creatures on planet Earth. The question that has now been answered is how the Akan philosophers Gyekye, Wiredu and Appiah thought about the make-up of a person, about her or his metaphysical characteristics and the nature of the entities as either material, spiritual or quasi-material. The remaining question is, ‘how to become a person’? To gain a good understanding of the content of this debate in the context of Akan personhood, the author will first focus on the ideas of the late Ifeanyi Menkiti, a Nigerian philosophy professor at Wellesley College in the United States who wrote his dissertation on the African concept of personhood at Harvard University. In Menkiti’s eyes (1984), personhood is both dynamic and processual, which means that one becomes a person by being initiated into the community and abiding by that community’s set of rules and moral standards. Menkiti used the term ‘incorporation’, to refer to the process or ritual initiation through which a person must embody norms or ethical standards prescribed by the community. He wrote that in Africa, personhood is connected to the morality of a human being and is the result of an individual’s process of socialisation into the community. The formation of one’s personhood or social identity is, in other words, a ‘being-in process’. Abiding by communitarian values is, thereby, more significant than individual moral values. The processual nature of personhood, which Menkiti advocated, implies that the achievement of personhood is related to age. This means that the older one gets, the closer one gets to being a moral person if only one’s moral behaviour allows the title of moral excellence (Menkiti 1984:173). It implies that a human being can also fail to become a person or achieve personhood by not abiding by societal norms. One can become a non-person by behaving badly or immorally, which means that one loses one’s status as a moral subject. Nevertheless, one will always keep one’s basic identity and thus remain human (Menkiti 1984:171–172).

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In summary, Menkiti introduced three notions of personhood: having a personal identity consisting of individual attributes (e.g. rationality, will and mind), having a moral status and being able to obtain moral excellence. Whereas personal identity is the type of personhood that any human being possesses even in one’s it-phase or childhood, one’s moral status (or a minimum of social personhood) and moral excellence (the maximum of one’s social personhood) are the results of ‘incorporation’, which is the process of socialisation of the individual within the community. Hence, Menkiti developed a normative notion of personhood to distinguish the African concept of personhood from that of Western European philosophers, such as Descartes (1596–1650), who primarily defined personhood in terms of one’s attributes. African philosophers, including Menkiti, call this Western concept of the person the ‘descriptive or metaphysical’ notion of personhood. To sum up and repeat, in Africa, unlike in Europe, the main question is not ‘what makes up a person’ (description) but ‘how to become a person’ (norm), for which one’s contributions to the well-being of the community are crucial (see also Akampurira 2023 in this volume). The main difference most often mentioned between the Western and the African notions of personhood is that between the opinion of mainstream Western philosophers in the existence of individuals as separate, anatomic and competitive entities versus that of Africans in relationality, collaboration and the inseparable nature of human beings (Müller, L.F. Kofi Dorvlo, and H.S.C.A Muijen 2021). Not only Western but also African philosophers have, however, challenged this contrast. Gyekye (1997), for instance, has mentioned that for the Akan people, the community is very important but that, nevertheless, individuality has also existed in their culture since pre-colonial times. Nevertheless, most African philosophers that contributed to the classical communitarian debate agree that the community should continue to be significant for the individual than is common in the modern Western world, but on the other hand, they acknowledge that there is an ongoing need in African philosophy to develop a new equilibrium between the importance of the community and the development and well-being of the individual. Another difference between the Western and African notions of personhood, which Menkiti addressed, is that Westerners do not define their ancestors (or Saints, in the Catholic notion of them) as persons; they define them as beings that can still have a significant impact on the lives of the living. Menkiti, on the contrary, included the ancestors in his notion of personhood and defined them as ‘non-physical moral persons’. This way, he distinguished the ancestors from children, who are physically yet to grow into moral persons, and adults, who are physically and allegedly moral persons. In Menkiti’s view (1984, 2006), ancestors, those human beings who have passed on, thus do not lose their status of personhood; they become bodiless but continue to

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be alleged moral persons who remain part of the extended family of the living and have regular significance for them as their consultants. What did Gyekye and Wiredu think of the ancestral spirits concerning personhood? Whereas Gyekye (1995:86) thought ‘that most Akan people believe in the disembodied survival of life after death’, Wiredu stressed that the Akan belief in the reincarnation of persons should not be taken literally. In his eyes, what is most important about ancestral veneration is the idea of reincarnation. The moral narrative about the ancestors helps to motivate the Akan people to cooperate in communal labour and other community projects. According to Wiredu, the ancestors are watching the living, and since it remains important what they think of them, there is a need for the living to show off and do their best for all the members of their community (Wiredu 1992b:143–146). Kwame Gyekye, however, argued against Menkiti’s way of reasoning that a person (onipa in Twi) is entirely defined by her or his community. He felt that it did not do justice to the autonomy of the individual and her or his ability, to a certain extent, to act out of free will and control one’s destiny (Gyekye 1997:54). Gyekye felt that Menkiti undervalued Africans’ individuality and, consequently, did not sufficiently recognise their free will, agency, dignity, rights, and autonomy. In comparison to Menkiti, Gyekye’s notion of personhood was more undetermined (see Kahn 2023 in this volume), hence still in acknowledgement of the cyclical nature of time (meaning that personhood does not cease to exist after a human being’s death but becomes spiritual until the ancestors dwell into new human/baby bodies). Gyekye thought that one is born as a person (an onipa) with certain characteristics and the ability to contribute to the well-being of the community. He believed that becoming an onipa pa (a person of a certain standing) is the result of one’s social interaction with and contributions to the well-being of others, but that it’s not age-related (Gyekye 1992). In Gyekye’s view, when exactly one has become an onipa pa10 is not that well-defined (exceptions are there for royals, who after their appointment can rightly bear this title, Müller 2013). Gyekye felt that Menkiti (1984:171–172) was wrong to assume that personhood was processual because it would mean that older people were automatically more moral than younger ones, which he believed was not the case. Gyekye’s stance has often been referred to as the ‘noumenal’ rather than the ‘processual’ notion of personhood in African Philosophy. Gyekye’s critique of Menkiti’s deterministic notion of personhood as being defined by the community resulted in the label of ‘radical communitarianism’ from Menkiti’s point of view (Gyekye 1997:35–75). Gyekye’s standpoint, in which communal rights are not given primacy over those of the individual, fell under the category of ‘moderate communitarianism’. Gyekye agreed with Menkiti that the community is important for the development of the individual in the pursuit of his life plans and goals. The Akan philosopher stressed that normative communitarian ideals should not subordinate individual rights in support

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of the common good (Gyekye 1997:105). Where Menkiti thus advocated for the primacy of communal rights over individual rights, Gyekye supported a more balanced relationship between the rights of the individual and those of the community. Individual human rights can and have indeed been violated in African communities, and the chances of it happening are higher in the case of isolated communities. Among the Somalis in eastern Ethiopia, for instance, female genital mutilation/cutting is common practice and part of their communitarian ethics, which makes it very difficult for girls not to participate in the corresponding ritual (Adinew: 2017). Gyekye, therefore, stressed the need for intercultural dialogue to open relatively isolated African communities and introduced individual human rights for the enhancement of individuals’ human well-being within certain kin groups. This topic will be further discussed in the second part of this chapter, but let’s first focus now on the late Wiredu’s and Appiah’s contemporary notions of personhood and human well-being. Wiredu thought that Gyekye was wrong in his interpretation of Menkiti’s stance on personhood. He thought that personhood in Africa implied more than just being born and that it was about achieving certain social-ethical standards as one progressed in life. And so, he agreed with Menkiti that personhood is processual (Wiredu 2008). In an interview (Eze and Metz 2015), Wiredu mentioned that he thought that Gyekye had misunderstood Menkiti by implying that Menkiti did not give the individual any standing or room in his conceptualisation of personhood. In Wiredu’s view, Menkiti aimed to distinguish between ‘being human’ and having certain biological attributes – a status that one obtains by one’s birth – and ‘becoming a human person’ by one’s social interactions within the community (1984:162). Only the latter, as Menkiti emphasised in his retrospective statement (2018), refers to one’s morality as being part of the essential core of the definition of a person. To what extent community norms deprive human beings of their individual rights is thus not a topic that Menkiti examined. One could say that it’s an omission in Menkiti’s work to leave this topic unaddressed because connecting personhood to communal ethics and the corresponding customary laws to become a person raises important questions about their impact on the individual and his or her autonomy. As mentioned, Wiredu was more in favour of Menkiti’s notion of personhood than that of Gyekye. Like Menkiti, Wiredu thought that a person is more than one’s natural characteristics, such as having a body and a mind. A person is also an individual who satisfies certain norms, which is a process, and Wiredu, therefore, agreed with Menkiti that being a person is processual and age-related. Also, in Wiredu’s mind, personhood was defined by the community and its system of values, against which the individual was to be judged. In the best-case scenario, a person achieves moral excellence through one’s relationship with one’s community members and is to be praised and commended for his or her moral behaviour by them, Wiredu wrote (2008:336,

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2009:15–17). He thought that moral excellence could be achieved step-bystep by maintaining admirable relationships with others, hence by being reciprocal in one’s behaviour, fulfilling one’s duties, and paying sufficient attention to one’s own well-being but certainly also the well-being and welfare of others in the community (Wiredu 2009:15–16). Kwame Appiah, the only one of the three Akan philosophers still among us, was not involved in the classical Menkiti-Gyekye communitarian debate. Therefore, we don’t know Appiah’s reaction to Gyekye and Wiredu concerning their conceptions of personhood. Appiah’s most significant contribution to the conceptualisation of personhood in Akan thought is that he took some steps in connecting it to interculturality as a universalising ability of the Akan to move out of their clan group consciousness. Appiah (1998:2570–2571) wrote that the Akan prioritise helping members of their kin group, which is an anti-universalising stance. In the same way that most Westerners are inclined to put more effort into helping their family members than strangers, the Akan feel more obliged to help members of their kin group than people outside of that group. Because the Akan and many other Africans belong to an extended family and matriclan (abusua) that is much larger than the average core family of Westerners, their obligations towards others within the group to which they belong also tend to be larger. Among the matrilineal Akan, for instance, children are part of their mothers’ families and raised by their mother and her brother (their so-called ‘maternal uncle’). In his book ‘The Ethics of Identity’ (2005), Appiah expressed his opinion that partiality towards those with whom one shares face-to-face contacts, caring most about the well-being of people belonging to one’s own (extended) family or kin group, is morally acceptable. Since, unlike the state or global political bodies, individuals do not need to treat everyone as equal in terms of rights and obligations we have towards them. It’s all right, in other words, to have special interests for those who are most near a person in terms of social ties, such as one’s wife, siblings, nieces, nephews, auntie and uncles, one’s close friends and other beloved ones. Impartiality should, however, be the norm towards our relationships with ‘strangers’, which are people socially more distant from us. These include both fellow citizens, with whom we often have non-face-to-face interaction, and political Others, those outside of our nation-state. For both groups of strangers, practicaloriented intercultural dialogues will be the way to interact with them. Appiah distinguishes between strangers in the nation-state, towards whom we have more rights and obligations, than towards those outside the nationstate because morally the former is a more significant ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 2006) from the point of view of non-strangers (those subjects inside the community who predominantly have face-to-face contacts with other community members). The Ugandan political theorist Mahmoud Mamdani made clear that since the colonial era, thoughts about nation-states have especially been prevalent within urban areas. Colonial rulers increased the

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divide between rural and urban areas. In the urban areas, the colonial nationstate bound Africans as citizens. In the rural areas, traditional African communities that were ruled by Native Authorities instead bound their members as subjects (Mamdani 1996:3). To sum up, Appiah thinks that it should be morally acceptable to be partial in connection with one’s kins (Mamdani’s subjects) but not in one’s interaction with national and political strangers (Mamdani’s citizens, to whom – according to Appiah – one should be impartial). Appiah felt that the well-being of those who are most near us is morally allowed to matter most to us, but besides that, all human beings must treat all strangers with respect and dignity, a goal that one can only achieve by frequently communicating and interacting with them. In Appiah’s view, connecting to strangers, which are all people outside one’s kin group, requires intercultural competence. His notion of cosmopolitanism is about gaining such competence. In his book ‘Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers’ (2006), Appiah advocates cosmopolitanism as an ethical way to communicate with strangers, who, because of our shared humanity, are never real strangers after all. By communicating with those outside of our cultural or kin group, apprentice cosmopolitans undergo a process of cultural transformation. They leave some of their cultural ethics behind and adopt new ones. In the process, they gain intercultural personhood and, hence, become cosmopolitans.11 Appiah’s ethical theory of how to communicate with strangers differs from that of Gyekye and Wiredu but is not that distinct after all. Gyekye and Wiredu propagated the categorical imperative as universal ethics that were increasingly valid within kin groups. Wiredu (2008) wrote that morality should be impartial in the sense that, as humans, we all need a set of shared strictly ethical rights and obligations, such as keeping one’s promises to one another. In Wiredu’s view, this impartiality in morality exists globally, so he was convinced that the Golden Rule was a universal moral principle. He made the point, though, that besides these universal moral laws, which are valid in and outside one’s kin group, there is another set of laws that enables people in Africa to live together in their community and to comply with the corresponding rights and obligations towards one’s kin. The last-mentioned remark makes it debatable whether Wiredu’s notion of personhood is partial rather than impartial. Wiredu still prioritises one’s connection to kin group members over that of strangers, which is what partialists do. On the other hand, Kantian’s moral theory of impartiality also requires that, especially in the private sphere, we give our friends and family special treatment because our relationships with them are stronger and thus more significant. This implies, as mentioned by Bramer (2008), that treating people closer to themselves different from those at a further (emotional) distance is also part of the Kantian and wider Continental philosophical notion of impartiality.

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Now, as Appiah already noticed, in most cases, the African extended family is just larger than the core family, and so the group for which Africans have special interests (as Wiredu calls it, Appiah prefers the word ‘obligations’) is mostly larger than in the West. In practice, there are thus a lot more people in the West to whom we only have a weak bond than in Africa, also because it’s more often accepted there that special interests to the extended family are expanded to the public sphere. So, in conclusion, there is only a difference in scale and sphere of influence (either private or public) between the Global North and the Global South as to what counts as partiality and impartiality. The terms are, in fact, rather confusing without bringing in an in-depth intercultural philosophical context. Therefore, it is not surprising that, without that context, the three Akan philosophers differed in opinion on the Akan culture and notion of personhood. Wiredu and Gyekye labelled it as ‘impartial’. whereas Appiah thought it was ‘partial’. Meanwhile, all three Akan philosophers mention that in the community, universal laws exist next to communitarian ones. The point is thus that there is only a difference in spheres and the size of the number of people to whom Africans, in comparison with Westerners, are linked in a network of people that require their special attention and for whom kin group rights and obligations are more prominent than universal laws. By the social structure, as compared to Westerners, Africans just have wider partial networks alongside their impartial ones. These partial networks are more often than in the West embedded in public rather than private spheres of influence. The debate about partiality or impartiality in the notion of African personhood shows that an intercultural philosophical understanding is necessary to increase one’s insights into the meaning of these concepts in intercultural contexts. It shows the necessity to introduce another set of concepts derived from the field of Intercultural Philosophy. Intercultural philosophical concepts can help to enhance an understanding of the notion of well-being outside the context of personhood and the classical communitarian debate in African Philosophy. In the remaining part of this chapter, the focus will, therefore, be on human well-being in the context of African(a) Intercultural Philosophy and its’ insights into ethics of global development for global ethics of development. TOWARDS AN AFRICAN(A) INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY12 Intercultural Philosophy as an academic discipline emerged after World War II. The end of this war marked the beginning of a new historical period, in which Continental and African(a) philosophers became aware of the

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detrimental effects of what Appiah (2006, Chapter 9: 249–277) calls ‘counter-cosmopolitanism’. Examples Appiah mentioned of this form of cosmopolitanism are Nazism, the fundamentalist standpoints in Cold War socialism and capitalism, but also the Christian and Islamic religious fundamentalists (see also Wimmer 1998, Stearns 2016 on these forms of cosmopolitanism). In Germany, Nazism propagated the idea that one race, the white or Aryan race, was superior to all others and that many other people in Europe and its imperial powers, such as Jews, Roma, and people of colour, did not matter. These in their eyes unwanted groups of people should, therefore, be systematically exterminated. In the First and Second Reichs, Genocides had already taken the lives of millions of people of colour in the colonies. Two examples are those of the Indian Mutiny in the period 1857–1867 and the mass extermination of the Herero, the Namaqua and the San in German South-West Africa (now Namibia) in the period 1904–1908 (Césaire 2001, Misra 2008). These Genocides were the political consequence of the prevalence of racial theories, such as vulgar or social Darwinism, which influenced the chancellor of Germany, Adolf Hitler (1889–1945). Vulgar Darwinism was based on the belief in biological inequity and the inferiority of handicapped and non-European races. The most radical among their adherents forthrightly promoted the killing of these alleged inferior people to make space for more healthy, morally superior, and intelligent European people to flourish (Weikart 2016:230–233). The Holocaust, a Genocide that took the lives of between five and six million Jews, was the result of institutionalised murder legitimised by vulgar Darwinism as a racial theory and carried out by a totalitarian regime known as Hitler’s Third Reich. These Genocides and other horrific war experiences united European and non-Western philosophers, such as the Germans Franz Wimmer (1998), Heinz Kimmerle (1997), the Indian-born German-based Ram Adhar Mall (2000), and since the 1990s Wim van Binsbergen (2002, 2003), in the strong opinion that one should care about people outside one’s cultural field of orientation or kin group and interact with them to learn from philosophers of cultural traditions other than one’s own. These intercultural philosophers aimed to fight against Eurocentrism and Occidentalism in their approach to non-Western philosophy. They rejected the belief in racial hierarchies and the concomitant attitude of superiority that had characterised the Continental philosophies about non-Westerners, such as those about Africans by Immanuel Kant and George Friedrich Hegel. In ‘Beobachtungen Über Das Gefühl Des Schönen Und Erhabenen’ (‘Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime’), Kant wrote (in German): ‘Die Negers von Afrika haben von der Natur kein Gefühl, welches über das Läppische stiege’ (‘Africans are incapable of having any sensations going beyond the very profane’) (Kant 1764:102, lines 4–6). In Kant’s view,

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Africans were at a much lower stage of spiritual development than Europeans, which is why they venerated objects (fetishes) rather than the divine. In the same book, Kant wrote: ‘Die unter ihnen weit ausgebreitete Religion der Fetische ist vielleicht eine Art von Götzendienst, welcher so tief ins Läppische sinkt, als es nur immer von der menschlichen Natur möglich zu seyn scheint’ (Kant 1764:103, line 2–11).13 In Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte (in English Lectures on the Philosophy of History, the German philosopher wrote the following about ‘Africa proper’, which was the term he invented to mark today’s Sub-Saharan Africa: ‘Jenes eigentliche Afrika ist, so weit die Geschichte zurückgeht, für den Zusammenhang mit der übrigen Welt verschlossen geblieben; es ist das in sich gedrungene Goldland, das Kinderland, das jenseits des Tages der selbstbewußten Geschichte in die schwarze Farbe der Nacht gehüllt ist’ (Hegel 1924:49) (‘Africa proper as far as History goes back, has remained - for all purposes of connecting with the rest of the World - shut up; it is the Gold-land compressed within itself, - the land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of Night’, Hegel 1861:95). About the inhabitants of Africa proper, he wrote: ‘Der Neger stellt, wie schon gesagt worden ist, den natürlichen Menschen in seiner ganzen Wildheit und Unbändigkeit dar: von aller Ehrfurcht und Sittlichkeit, von dem, was Gefühl heißt, muß man abstrahieren, wenn man ihn richtig auffassen will; es ist nichts an das Menschliche Anklingende in diesem Charakter zu finden’ (Hegel 1924: 50) (‘The Negro, as already observed, exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state. We must lay aside all thought of reverence and morality - all that we call feeling - if we would rightly comprehend him; there is nothing harmonious with humanity to be found in this type of character’, Hegel 1861:97). The intercultural philosophers rejected racism and Eurocentrism in these philosophies. They also realised, however, that each centrism brings limitations in the conversation between philosophers of different cultures. They, therefore, rejected all centrism, including the Pan-Africanist socialist political philosophy of Ghana’s first president Kwame Nkrumah (1964, 1965), the Senegalese president Léopold Sédar Senghor’s (1964) and the Martinican poet Aimé Césaire’s (2001, orig. 1950)Pan-Africanist philosophy of Négritude, the Tanzanian’s first president, Julius Kambarage Nyerere’s Ujamaa (1968) and Zambia’s first president, Kenneth David Kaunda’s Humanism (1966). These were all Pan-African theories of the 1960s and 1970s based on the idea that African societies are homogeneous but different from Western ones. Pan-Africanism is Afrocentric and centralises the connection between Africans and people of African descent. These philosophies, which emerged as a reaction against Eurocentrism, stimulated Gyekye, Wiredu, Appiah and other African philosophers to participate in

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intercultural dialogues (Lölke 1997, Kresse 2000) or polylogues (in case of more than two interlocutors). The point of departure in Intercultural Philosophy is to acknowledge that philosophers from the Global South experience the inequality of North-South power relations in their daily lives. Intercultural Philosophy, therefore, aims to create thinking spaces in which the real-political cultural hegemonic unequal power relations are temporarily lifted to enable philosophers to philosophise in a non-centrical and more equal space. A polylogue aims to seek the truth by discussing the differences as expressed most clearly in the boundaries between various philosophers’ traditions. Cultural differences between philosophers are thus perceived as a source of wisdom. They are also believed to be an opportunity to learn from one another and to produce knowledge that is closer to the truth than the knowledge production that emerges from philosophers, who do not interact with colleagues from philosophical traditions other than their own. Whereas many cultural differences regarding clothing, food, and communication, among others, are universally accepted, others cause universal disapproval. Globalisation has increased the number of intercultural encounters between people, and consequently, the abhorrence against practices, such as human sacrifices, honour killings, incest and slavery has become more universal (Gyekye 2004).14 Intercultural philosophers believe that one does not need to allow these practices to be continued based on the idea that cultures are relative and that one can, therefore, not make any judgement about the cultural practices of people of other countries. They reject the point of departure of what Spiro (1986) calls ‘normative cultural relativism’ and allow communities to remain relatively closed worlds in which culturally specific practices can be continued and developed on the basis that they are perceived as being morally acceptable to one’s cultural group. The fact that these practices would be regarded as unacceptable to outsiders doesn’t matter to them because normative cultural relativists believe that cultural groups have their standards, and moral judgements of outsiders can be invalid once they deviate from the norms of those living within the cultural group. This moral relativity permits a practice, such as female circumcision, to be continued because when normative cultural relativism is the prevalent philosophy in a community, its opponents can and do not receive any help from the outside world to stop it (Appiah 2005: 248–249, Spiro 1986: 260–261). The non-Afrocentric philosophies of Wiredu, Gyekye and Appiah are also examples of African(a) philosophers whose contributions are interlinked with many of the aims and goals of Intercultural Philosophy. The African(a) intercultural philosophical endeavours of these philosophers and their development of a concept of human well-being as an insight into global ethics of development will be elaborated on in the following sections.

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WELL-BEING IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY AS INSIGHTS INTO ETHICS OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FOR A GLOBAL ETHICS OF DEVELOPMENT Intercultural Philosophy focuses on the question of the existence of cultural universals. The belief in their existence implies that there is a commensurability of cultures, which enables philosophers to participate in intercultural dialogue (Wimmer 1998, Mall 2000). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights also departs from the belief in cultural universals and interculturality. Domestic and international courts engage in intercultural judicial dialogues when addressing challenges in securing human rights. Judges engage in these dialogues to compare norms in various states to help courts in the interpretation and application of domestic constitutional law and/or international human rights law. They aim to help one another and the courts to find common solutions to human rightsrelated issues (Müller, A., and H.E. Kjos 2017:2–4). For those in Intercultural Philosophy and African(a) Philosophy, holding such dialogues enables and stimulates them to develop a Fanonian ‘new humanity-oriented philosophy’ (Fanon 1952). To that aim, they relativise and deconstruct markers of identity based on social group constructions, which were articulated in colonial regimes, such as gender, race, and ethnicity and emphasise the common humanness of all people (Appiah 2005, 2006, 2018). The belief in the existence of cultural universals implies the conviction that theoretical concepts can be translated into different languages. On this point, intercultural philosophers differ from those, such as the American analytical philosopher Willard Oman Quine (1970), who believed that cultural universals do not exist. Consequently, one can neither translate concepts into different languages nor hold a dialogue with philosophers of traditions outside one’s own. This implies that there are severe limitations to the extent to which we can know ‘strangers’. These are those people outside our cultural or kin group with whom we do not share our cultural particulars. If we cannot gain any knowledge about these strangers, it will become very difficult to take care of their well-being, let alone contemplate ways to do this ethically. Interculturality in philosophy thus implies the belief in the existence of at least some cultural universals, which is a prerequisite for holding intercultural dialogues. Wiredu (1992a, 1996), for instance, stressed that in theory, one can learn every human language, which means that there must be a system of skills of reflective perception, abstraction, and inference necessary to learn a language that is shared by all human beings worldwide. The ability of people to understand the underlying structural patterns of other religions is another piece of evidence for the existence of cultural universals, he argued (Wiredu 1996). Nevertheless, Wiredu also believed that there are limitations to languages’ commensurability in intercultural philosophical communication caused by

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the problem of translation. His decolonisation project focused on creating translations from Twi to English of Akan concepts that were as accurate as possible (such as the Twi term adwene for the mind) and indicating which translation errors European Christian missionaries, social anthropologists, and Western philosophers had made, of which he found many examples. He also concentrated on the wrong categories that were created by outsiders about African cultures, such as the earlier mentioned contrasting pair of a physical and a metaphysical world, which he believed did not exist in pre-colonial African thought. The late Nigerian philosopher Sophie Olúwolé (2014) and the late Ugandan poet and philosopher Okot p’Bitek (1970) shared Wiredu’s opinion that in pre-colonial African thought, the physical – and metaphysical realms belonged to the same world. Wiredu found it essential to get oral Akan culture out of the layers of sand that were sprinkled on it in the colonial era, such as a Western-rooted biworldly philosophy, which had covered the monistic world philosophy that dominated pre-colonial African thought. From a development point of view, he believed it was essential to study the original nature of pre-colonial African thought because he felt that African development should start by knowing and connecting to one’s own (uncontaminated) culture and philosophy. Wiredu thus aimed to culturally develop the Akan people for the enhancement of their human well-being by increasing his and other people’s understanding of the genuine pre-colonial Akan philosophy and culture (Wiredu 2009). After Wiredu’s deconstruction of pre-colonial African thought, the question arises of how he then used intercultural or global dialogue to create a concept of well-being that increases people’s insight into global ethics by offering a moral reflection as common in the field of Ethics of Global Development. I will shortly elaborate on these two academic fields before concentrating on Wiredu’s contributions to them. In Ethics of Global Development, one offers moral reflections on ‘development’, in the meaning of beneficial societal change in an assessment of current situations for the betterment of futuristic scenarios. The field is also known as ‘International Development Ethics’. Development ethicists, for instance, contemplate the question of whether rich countries are obliged to help the poor ones to relieve famine and, if so, how such an operation can best be put into practice. Besides immediate famine relief, the field bends over the question of how poor people can relieve their suffering by developing themselves and improving their institutions (for the latter, see also Anozie 2023 in this volume). Ethics of food aid and ethics of institutions are thus part of the ethics of development (Crocker 2008:1–10). Problematically, the field is dominated by Western scholars, and so African and other non-Western philosophers should more often become involved in projects to contribute to this field by bringing in their ideas. Wiredu has contributed to this field by contemplating ways to improve African institutions for the benefit of all Africans. In his point of view,

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politics in traditional African communities were based on obtaining practical consensus rather than moral consensus or obtaining most of the voices. Albeit in pre-colonial Africa, ‘politicians’/elders could morally disagree on matters, political discussions would go on for days or months until everybody in the village agreed on the best practical solution (not based on what ought to be, but on what is). The advantage of this pre-colonial rooted political system over the democracy of the majority as implemented in many of today’s modern African countries is that by using dialogue for consensus, everybody is involved and all voices have been heard. Consequently, no individuals or groups in society are completely left out. Wiredu believed that the Western-oriented democracy of the majority principle in Africa had been the cause of much mismanagement in development help on the continent. He felt that it was the cause of the exclusion of, at times, large minority groups in Africa from receiving any form of development aid. The implementation of consensus democracy in modern Africa15, based on pre-colonial African values and human relations, could improve the distribution of development help in modern Africa, Wiredu (2001) believed. Global Ethics, an academic field that has been developed since the 1990s, departs from the belief in a common set of fundamental values and principles. These ethics, such as freedom of decision, personal and social responsibility and justice, create a common ground between humans across cultures, religions, political and economic systems, and ideologies. The field of Global Ethics embraces fundamental values and principles as the foundation on which the universal consensus on human rights and sustainable development has been built. A milestone for Global Ethics was ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations’ (1948). As a reaction to the earlier mentioned atrocities of the Second World War caused by racial theories, such as vulgar Darwinism, and their effects, the UN promoted intercultural understanding and Global Ethics. Examples of universal values within this field are human dignity, social inclusivity, freedom, equality, the empowerment of women and culturalethnic minorities, peace and security and responsible and global citizenship. After the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the corresponding global political bipolarity, the search for Global Ethics became linked to economic and political globalisation. The ongoing debates within Global Ethics are on the questions of: (1) How to ethically connect Global Ethics to the field of local ethic(s) in the Global South, considering the unequal power structures between the two (see Chukwuokolo 2023 in this volume), and; (2) How universal (UN) human rights really are (how embedded are all local ethic(s) in Global Ethics; is global not a hidden equivalent for the Global North?) (Stückelberger 2016). Wiredu especially contributed to these debates in Global Ethics by creating an enhanced insight into the meaning of local ethic in Africa.16 According to

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Wiredu (2005:45, 49–50), today’s Global Ethics exist, but they need reinforcement and better practices. His aim was, therefore, to develop Global Ethics that include universal laws which are also based on local ethic of Africans that, as a result of intercultural dialogue, can become part of Global Ethics. Wiredu wrote: ‘It is through global dialogue that consensus will be reached on the rights and wrongs (in the utilitarian sense) of human interaction at a global level’ (Wiredu 2005:50). So, what precisely did Wiredu mean by a local ethic? In Wiredu’s view, this is a series of questions and answers that relate to the life rules about relationships between people in a community. Having a sense of one’s ethic is broader than having a sense of personhood. Whereas personhood only focuses on the relationship between the individual and the community, an ethic also provides an answer to questions of how strangers are to be treated, how humans within the community should relate to the external world, and the extent and significance of mutual aid in human relations should be, among other sets of questions and answers. An ethic differs from ethics in its focus. Whereas an ethic focuses on genuine culturally based life rules that are connected to the special interests of the community, ethics focuses on life rules concerning the universal interests of human beings. Consequently, Global Ethics refers to the life rules concerning the universal interests of human beings in the global community. Wiredu mentions that an ethic can also be global, which is the case when a community is international in terms of the composition of its members. In his view, a global ethic refers to a set of rules governing any global institution, such as the United Nations, the Catholic Church, and the Olympic Games. For his argument, the concepts of alocal ethic and Global Ethics are, however, most important. Introducing the concept of an ethic, enabled Wiredu (2005) to explain that in African communities, having a sense of one’s ethic is necessary to comply with the large set of rules that regulate the daily life between kin members and meet their special interests. In the succession of Appiah (1997, 2001), he moved the discussion about the meaning of well-being out of the context of African personhood into that of Intercultural Philosophy (embedded in Appiah’s cosmopolitanism) and Ethics. Doing so enabled Wiredu to argue that Africans from different communities should hold dialogues with one another and the outside world about their sense of ethic to contribute to the development of a more inclusive concept of Global Ethics. An important point is that Wiredu argued that African community members also have a sense of Global Ethics. They abide by Global Ethical laws that focus on universal interests alongside their ethic, which focuses on special interests. The point he made is that in the current Global Ethics, the voices of Africans are mainly left out. He, therefore, aimed to include their voices in the development of more inclusive Global Ethics. He aimed to do so by developing new African universal laws out of ethic in the plural, which should then

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become a part of Global Ethics. Wiredu stated that using the method of intercultural dialogue, local African ethic in the plural, can pave the way for a more inclusive Global Ethics. Wiredu’s proposed Global Ethics would automatically be one of Development because these Global Ethics would be the result of the development of Africans’ and other non-Westerners’ various ethnic-based individual rights into genuine universal laws and human rights. Like Wiredu, Gyekye was also interculturally and philosophically oriented. Gyekye believed in the existence of cultural universals, which are necessary to enable intercultural dialogues. Unlike the earlier mentioned Pan-Africanists, he believed in the heterogeneousness rather than the homogeneousness of African cultures. Nevertheless, Gyekye thought that the diversity and plurality of cultural values, beliefs and practices did not make them incommensurable. Instead, he believed that traditional African Philosophy was commensurable in terms of the problems and topics raised, because of the existence of a sensus communis (a cultural universal based on common human understanding), which he felt was another necessity for the ability to hold intercultural dialogues (Gyekye 2004: Lecture I). Gyekye and Wiredu both thought that intercultural dialogue between people of different cultures was important. In Gyekye’s opinion, by measuring cultural beliefs and practices along universal lines of their contribution to human welfare and enhancement of human well-being, one could also gain more insight into which practices are not contributing to the increase of people’s well-being and could, therefore, better be abolished. For Gyekye, the main purpose of culture and morality was to enhance human well-being. He, therefore, believed that cultural utterances and practices such as slavery, human sacrifices, and honour killings, which are detrimental to human wellbeing, should be repudiated. Gyekye thought that there are common standards for what counts as a practice that is a human violation or one that improves people’s human well-being. He believed that intercultural dialogues were beneficial to measure all cultures along with the same standards for human values for the enhancement of human well-being. Gyekye distinguished cultural values from human values. He believed that human values were those values that, unlike cultural ones (e.g. concerning the difference in the use of food or clothing), had to be recognised, respected, protected, and promoted by all human beings. Cultural values are, instead, there to be recognised by specific cultural groups that adhere to these values. However, all cultures should be critically evaluated by others outside that culture based on objective human values. Intercultural dialogue about which cultural values should become human values is possible because people already share many common human values, of which human rights are the most fundamental ones. Human values act as a bridge between human beings and enable them to communicate interculturally. In Gyekye’s view,

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humanity can thus flourish by critically investigating one another’s cultural values alongside objective standards based on human values (Gyekye 2004: Lecture I). Gyekye, in line with Wiredu, thus used the method of intercultural philosophy to bring community values (Wiredu’s ethic or Gyekye’s cultural values) into contact with global values (Wiredu’s Global Ethics [of Development] or Gyekye’s human values). What distinguished Gyekye’s philosophy (2004) from that of Wiredu (2005) is that in Gyekye’s thought, human values are objectively created and already universal, whereas Wiredu questioned the objectivity of the creators of these values and their current genuine universality. He, therefore, aimed to use African community values to make them more genuinely universal. Gyekye, instead, aimed to hold intercultural dialogues to abolish those African community values that do not match well with human values. Gyekye’s goal thus differed from that of Wiredu. While Wiredu aimed to transform Global Ethics by including the local ethic in the plural of the Global South, Gyekye’s objective was to transform African community values by eliminating those values that did not match with the current Global ethical standards. Gyekye thus did not develop insights for Global Ethics (of Development) but merely concentrated on developing insights for more universally accepted African community-based cultural values. Thus, Gyekye did not aim to create a concept of well-being to gain a better insight into Global Ethics. Instead, he contributed to the field of Intercultural Philosophy and the development of African community values to enhance the well-being of Africans in mainly rural settings. The focus of Gyekye was, in other words, more on the improvement of the well-being of people in Africa, whereas that of Wiredu – who, unlike Gyekye, lived and worked outside of the continent – was on that of all people, including non-Westerners, by making well-being a more global rather than Western concept. Gyekye (1997) contributed to the field of Intercultural Philosophy by borrowing insights from the intercultural philosophers’ Mall (2000) and Wimmer (2007) on centrism. This term implies that one values one’s way of thinking, terminology, and methods of argumentation above those of other philosophical traditions without taking part in dialogues with philosophers of these traditions. Mall and Wimmer mentioned the avoidance of strong centrisms, such as Eurocentrism or Afrocentrism, as one of the emancipatory goals of the discipline of Intercultural Philosophy. Strong philosophical centres, namely, disable the possibility for philosophers from less dominant cultures to raise their voices and participate on an equal basis in intercultural dialogues or polylogues. Gyekye’s traditional Akan philosophy fell into the category of what the Kenyan philosopher Odera Oruka meant by ‘ethnophilosophy’ (Oruka, 1990), which is distinct from ethnocentrism. An ethnophilosopher, in Oruka’s view,

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attempts to explore and systematise the conceptual world of traditional culture. (S)he is open to the development of a comparative perspective on their traditions. African and non-African traditions are also studied to enhance understanding of their cultural concepts and ideas and to seek shared ones among Africans and non-Africans alike. Ethnocentrism instead assumes that one’s own culture is superior to all others, which are therefore uninteresting and no object of further study. Examples of ethnocentrism are Eurocentrism and the earlier-mentioned philosophy of Pan-Africanism, which is a form of Afrocentrism. Gyekye stressed that ethnocentrism impedes the understanding of other cultures and humanity. A healthier approach to other cultures and philosophies that he shared with Mall (2000) is that all philosophies have positive and negative characteristics. Downplaying the negative aspects of one’s own culture and exaggerating the positive ones, as ethnocentrists do, takes away the opportunities for philosophers to learn from one another’s philosophies as it shuts one’s eyes to the true nature of one’s philosophy. Ethnocentrism also disables the chance to seek commonalities among cultures and philosophies due to cultural borrowings, such as those of the ancient Greek philosophers from the ancient Egyptians, as it perceives cultures as self-contained windowless monads rather than fields of orientation with open boundaries (Gyekye 2004: Lecture III, Van Binsbergen 2002, Müller 2018). Gyekye’s engagement with Intercultural Philosophy is what helped him most to develop a universal concept of human well-being. In Gyekye’s mind (2003), Intercultural Philosophy is based on the idea that human beings worldwide should communicate with one another because they share a moral responsibility for the enhancement of human well-being. For Gyekye, this was an important starting point because, among the Akan, being human (oye onipa) is a moral statement. In Akan thought, the ontology of a person is interlinked with emphatic behaviour towards others and with being responsible for both one’s well-being and that of others. The responsibility for strangers, those outside the Akan kin group, breaks through boundaries created by markers of identity such as race, gender, or ethnicity. This thought is expressed by the Akan maxim ‘Humanity has no boundary’ (honam mu nni nhanoa). The maxim teaches children that strangers are also human beings and should be treated according to universal laws, and that morality does not end at the borders of one’s community. The moral responsibility for the wellbeing of humanity, however, is complementary to one’s rights and duties to the members of one’s kin group (Gyekye 2004: Lecture III). Since cultural values are more prominent in Akan communities than human values, it is especially the positive and negative aspects of the rights and duties towards one’s kin group members that are expressed in Akan oral culture. Another Akan maxim goes that ‘One cannot blow a horn on an empty stomach’ (Yede ayaase na ehyen aben). The maxim implies that it is one’s moral obligation to

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first take good care of oneself before helping others and that there are limitations to one’s means and talents and thus to the extent to which one can be of help. The same moral idea can be found in many proverbs in Swahili, such as ‘one cannot serve a drink from an empty cup’ (mtu hawezi kutumikia kinywaji kutoka kikombe tupu) (Wiredu 1992a, Ngomane 2019), which thus expresses the thought that one should first fill one’s own cup – by self-care, creating a financial buffer, and developing one’s talents – before taking care of others. Other Akan maxims or proverbs are, instead, meant to educate individuals about the positive implications of being part of a community, such as Funtufunefu, denkyemfunefu, wͻn efunu bom baako nanso wo didi a na wo reko, which loosely translates as ‘Siamese crocodiles may have one stomach, yet they fight over food’. Since the food of both crocodiles goes to the same stomach, regardless of who is chewing the food, they both benefit. Ironically, individual greed and selfishness distract the crocodiles from realising that they both eat for a common purpose since they are part of a larger whole.17 Many Akan proverbs or maxims warn against individuals who think that they are fully independent of others (‘the human being is not like the palm tree that is self-sufficient’, nipa nnyɛ abɛ dua na ne ho ahyia ne ho) and instead stress the interconnectivity between community members and the expected reciprocities in rights and duties are the maxim ‘life is mutual aid’ (Obra ye nnoboa) and the proverb ‘the left (hand) washes the right; the right (hand) washes the left hand’ (benkum dware nifa, nifa dware benkum). These examples of moral lessons in Akan traditional culture demonstrate that the Akan people were educated in understanding the advantages and disadvantages of community life. This was done by the elders and royal rulers to increase the support base for the cultural values, the local ethic, and the corresponding Akan rights and duties. While Gyekye accentuated, as mentioned before, the pressing effects of these duties on the individual, Wiredu emphasised the benefits of having community rights. As Wiredu put it, ‘The underlying principle is that one person’s obligations are, reciprocally, another person’s rights. Thus, though we begin with obligations, we end up with a rich harvest of rights’ (Wiredu 2005:48). Both Akan philosophers were, however, convinced that human well-being depends on people’s positive relationships with others, be they members of one’s local homogeneous community, an international community, or the global community. A central focus point in all ethics should, therefore, be the improvement of one’s relationship with others. The emphasis in their conceptualisation of African and/or Global Ethics (of Development) is on the development of relationality within the existing individual ‘universal’ human rights to regulate communitarian life in Africa. Kwame Anthony Appiah, currently a philosophy and law professor at New York University, shared the late Gyekye’s and Wiredu’s concentration on

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relationality in ethics.18 In ‘Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers’ (2006), Appiah developed a non-Eurocentric type of cosmopolitanism, which focuses on how to connect to strangers, which are all those people outside of the Akan kin groups (Ghanaian citizens and those of other nation-states). The author will elaborate on this book’s content, its’ linkages with Intercultural Philosophy, and the conceptualisation of human well-being for insights into a Global Ethics of Development. Appiah developed his philosophy of cosmopolitanism against earlier white European cosmopolitan theories that were based on Western supremacy and the alleged inferiority of Africans and other non-Westerners. He stated that becoming cosmopolitan is also possible for non-Westerners and that it is not income- or class-based but mainly about developing an emphatic and open attitude towards strangers. In his view, cosmopolitanism is linked with the ability to connect without necessarily reaching a consensus about theoretical or metaphysical issues, such as homosexuality, religion, or political points of view. What is important, in Appiah’s view, is the intercultural philosophical awareness that there is an overlap in perceptions in all cultures, the cultural universals, that enable people to communicate and that differences between people are respected and accepted. Appiah agrees with Wiredu that genuine universal values have yet to be developed and that this can best be done in conversations between Westerners and non-Westerners of distinct cultural (kin) groups and nation-states. Holding intercultural dialogues is promoted by Appiah as a core characteristic of cosmopolitanism. Just like Wiredu and Gyekye, he thought that the belief in the existence of cultural universalisms was a prerequisite for holding such dialogues. It’s in Appiah’s notion of non-Eurocentricity in his concept of cosmopolitanism and examples of counter-cosmopolitans that his philosophy overlaps with those of other intercultural philosophers. Appiah’s conceptualisation of the cosmopolitan as a believer in cultural universals alongside community-based cultural particulars coincides, for instance, with the Indian philosopher Mall’s (2000) point of departure in Intercultural Philosophy. In his book ‘Intercultural Philosophy’ (2000), Mall explains that all cultures have overlapping structures and are neither totally different and, therefore, incommensurable nor fully the same. Like Appiah, he believes that intercultural communication (among philosophers) does not need to lead to moral consensus. ‘The absence of consensus is not necessarily the death of communication’ (Mall 2000:49), Mall wrote. Appiah stressed that theoretical disagreement can be overcome by being in constant dialogue with one another to find practical solutions (Appiah 2006). Cosmopolitans are ‘conversable people’, so he said (Yates 2009).19 Is Appiah’s cosmopolitanism in all aspects comparable with the points of departure of Intercultural Philosophy? One assumption struck me as quite

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different. Intercultural Philosophy (Wimmer 1998, Mall 2000) is about the creation of polylogical thinking spaces, which serve as a strategy to overcome vertical violence, such as between oppressor and oppressed, men and women, the rich and poor, white, and black. Intercultural philosophical polylogue is thus a method meant to increase the equality between the philosophers involved by listening to one another’s voices in a relatively non-political arena. Appiah, however, does not discuss the existence of unequal power relations between people with differing points of view. He believes in the skill of cosmopolitans to be in constant, practical-oriented conversations. Appiah (unlike Wiredu) makes it appear as if people – without the creation of specific intercultural philosophical thinking spaces – are equal in each of their daily conversations with others and that, in a good manner, they can agree to disagree with one another and still live together in harmony. The examples he mentioned include remarks that ‘Sometimes what we share is that we have read and admired Goethe in translation or responded with the same sense of wonder to a postcard of Angkor Wat or the Parthenon, or believed, as lawyers with very different training, in the ideal of the rule of law’ (Appiah 2005:272). These practical conversations that can bring people of different cultures or nation-states together are, according to Appiah, part of both the liberal Anglophone and the Akan traditions of cosmopolitanism. Appiah emphasises the non-Western character of his cosmopolitanism as a stance against jet-nomad-based elitist Western cosmopolitanism. He also made the point that non-elitist Akan people, such as a relatively poor Libyan trader that he came to know in Kumasi, can become cosmopolitans, whereas a wealthy and high-status Asante queen mother that he interviewed in this same town is the opposite of and thus definitely not a cosmopolitan. Albeit Appiah thus advocates having developed a non-elitist concept of cosmopolitanism, his philosophy appears elitist-oriented because it departs from the conviction that all people can easily have an open conversation about controversial issues, such as homosexuality, with others, which is more often the case among the (Akan) elite. The fact of the matter is that many people are obliged to hold conversations with a superior or someone else in their surroundings who can exercise power over them. Many people are in a subordinate position towards their interlocutor, which brings limitations to what they can say. Unequal power relations between interlocutors of the Global North and the Global South can also hinder the free flow of opinions on uncomfortable topics in practical conversations. Appiah, however, believes that interacting with strangers is always an opportunity to learn and grow, and so the interaction itself enables the production of new knowledge. By focusing on the encounter with concrete individuals outside one’s kin group, Appiah takes away the abstraction of the

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cultural universal concepts of humanity and human well-being by holding face-to-face conversations with people. On a national level, his communicative attitude towards ‘strangers’ and our moral obligation towards them implies that the governments of rich countries are morally obliged to help the poorer ones because this falls within the economic capabilities of the rich nations without severely impoverishing their citizens. When it comes to Global ethical North-South developmental help, Appiah thinks that the help should be organised by international political bodies for nation-states, such as the United Nations, and NGOs specialising in poverty reduction, such as Oxfam and Novib. Altruistic or heroic individuals should preferably not play a significant role in African development, he wrote. Appiah’s cosmopolitanism is thus a theory meant to enhance people’s well-being through interaction and practically oriented intercultural communication with strangers on a face-to-face level. For a significant development of Global Ethics, one needs national and international non-governmental political bodies (Appiah 2006). Despite Appiah’s lack of emphasis on the effects of Global NorthSouth unequal power relations on people’s daily communication, Appiah’s Non-Western theory of cosmopolitanism is a contribution to the field of Intercultural Philosophy. This is the case because his cosmopolitanism is non-Afrocentric and emerges from a willingness to converse with people from various cultural backgrounds without taking their social prestige as a measure for being able to become cosmopolitan. For Appiah, cosmopolitanism is the competence of Westerners and non-Westerners alike in being able to live with others in harmony and understanding one another’s differences. His cosmopolitanism is not a title reserved for the global upper class to live in a bubble with fellow upper-class members, the nouveau riche, that fly around the world to meet their equals in terms of socioeconomic status and the corresponding prestige (Appiah 1997). In Appiah’s eyes, many of these jetnomad cosmopolitans are not real cosmopolitans because they often happen to be interculturally incompetent. These jet-nomads have not learned the skill to adapt to another culture and simultaneously to stay loyal to their own culture and treasure its roots, wherever they are. In Wiredu’s words, these elitist cosmopolitans abide by a global ethic, but in Appiah’s words, they lack intercultural personhood.

CONCLUSION In Akan’s philosophy, the conceptualisation of human well-being is closely interlinked with the classical communitarian debate and the notion of personhood. One’s well-being depends on one’s congenital character traits and what (s)he does with them to take care of oneself and others. The latter reveals

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that, in the African context, personhood is not only metaphysical but also relational. The classical communitarian debate in African Philosophy is about the nature of that relationality. The debate’s progress demonstrates that most African philosophers think that harmonious relations with others are more significant for a person than one’s achievements, autonomy, and independence. In Akan philosophy, this is reflected in various maxims and proverbs, which stress the need to find a balance in one’s interactions with others, not to move alone but instead collaborate in reaching one’s goals. In African philosophy in general and Akan philosophy in particular, human well-being is primarily a collective affair. The Akan philosophers, Gyekye, Wiredu and Appiah, have a lot in common, but they also differ in opinion on certain aspects of the metaphysical and the relational notion of personhood. Metaphysically, Gyekye and Appiah believe in a body-mind dualism (whereas the body is physical, ‘the mind’, or better yet, the human spirits, are metaphysical) in terms of their make-up, whereas Wiredu thinks that on this point, Akan thought needs to be decolonised. To his mind, in pre-colonial times, body and mind were both (quasi) material entities. In pre-colonial times, the Akan people, namely, used to believe that there was only one world. These differences in Akan philosophy have an impact on the notion of well-being because it matters whether one believes that the ancestors are somewhere above us (in a dualistic mindset) in a different realm or living with us as non-bodily entities in the material world. Most importantly, however, the term quasi-materialism recognises that there are entities that are semi-physical, such as the human spirit, rather than solely physical. In that sense, both Gyekye and Wiredu agree that one’s human spirits, ↄkra (translated as soul by Gyekye), and sunsum are more than just substances in the human body. They are entities that can connect a person to others, including the ancestors (in the case of sunsum) or the life force (in the case of ↄkra) of the universe. The human spirits are thus not locked up in the human body (nipadua) but are there to connect with human beings, the ancestors, and the vital force that connects us all. In Akan thought, personhood thus goes together with an open mindset towards those and the energies around us. The relational part of Akan personhood confirms that the connection with others is significant for the well-being of both individuals and the community. In the communitarian debate in modern African thought, which is about the relationship between the two, Gyekye describes himself as a ‘moderate communitarian’. The term applies to all those thinkers who acknowledge the importance of the distinct needs and rights of autonomous individuals within the Akan community. His counterpart Menkiti – and indirectly also Wiredu who defends him – is labelled as being a ‘radical communitarian’; a thinker who believes that the individual is defined by the community; a stance which puts more emphasis on the voice of the community than the

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individual. Another difference between Gyekye and Wiredu (in a succession of Menkiti) is the undetermined or dynamic and age-dependent nature of personhood of which Wiredu and Menkiti are adherents to a more processual notion of the person. This difference in the understanding of personhood also has an impact on the notion of well-being. Because when personhood is not partly inborn but something to be achieved and becoming a moral human being or person is entirely dependent on one’s incorporation in and one’s corresponding contributions to the community, the emphasis is less on the biological character of the individual. It’s also less on her or his demands for the enhancement of one’s well-being in harmonious relation to that of others. Menkiti’s and Wiredu’s processual moral personhood is thus less about the individual and more about the community than Gyekye’s noumenal notion of the person. Appiah contributed to the relational aspect of the notion of personhood by connecting it to the concept of cosmopolitanism. His ‘Ethics in a world of strangers’ are a guideline for connecting ethically to and living between non-kin group strangers; both citizens and those outside of the nation-state. In this opinion, it’s all right to be partial in one’s behaviour towards one’s cultural group members if one also recognises the human needs of strangers and the universal human rights that one shares with them. By developing the notion of intercultural personhood, Appiah brought the inhabitants of the modern communities of Africa into conversation with the wider globalised world about African and Global Ethics and their implementation in practical, daily life situations. Intercultural Philosophy helped Appiah to develop his non-Western notion of cosmopolitanism, which is based on the intercultural concepts of shared cultural universals and a non-centrist attitude towards cultural others. Both Gyekye and Wiredu also used intercultural philosophical underpinnings to connect the notion of well-being to that of Ethics of Global Development and Global Ethics (of Development). Gyekye interacted with Intercultural Philosophy to share their belief in cultural universals and to distinguish culturally specific values from universally shared human values. He stressed that African cultural values should be brought in line with human values for African communities to develop and enhance their human well-being and that of their members. Wiredu linked up with intercultural philosophers to share in, as Van Binsbergen in line with his predecessors in Intercultural Philosophy put it, their belief in ‘open fields of cultural orientation’. Wiredu developed the concept of a local ‘ethic’ to acknowledge the existence of special interests for one’s kin group members in African communities and their corresponding rights and duties, alongside the existence of universal human rights and their validity within the communities. His notion of human well-being for the enhancement of Global Ethics is to partly base them on the ethic of non-Western communities including those of Africans. Wiredu thus aims for a more inclusive Global

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Ethics to develop African communities by embedding global development programmes into African indigenous cultures. We live in an era of cosmopolitan and counter-cosmopolitan forces. Interculturality as a philosophical method is, therefore, far from self-evident. Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism, which are both characterised by an acknowledgement of racial boundaries, are flourishing philosophies. Both philosophies are centric, introverted, and limited in scope, and they embrace the colour line. The Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah was a Pan-Africanist who joined in the celebration of the African race. He and other Afrocentrists, such as Nyerere, Senghor and Kaunda (the African king-philosophers – as Wiredu called them), believed that Africa could not develop properly without a sense of African brotherhood and sisterhood among Africans in Africa and people of African descent in the African diaspora. The second and third generation of philosophers of the Akan people in Southern Ghana to whom Gyekye, Wiredu and Appiah belong, have become more open and intercultural in their philosophical orientation. Afrocentrists would say that they have betrayed the colour line, but intercultural philosophers would conclude that these African(a) philosophers share many of their points of view. These African (a) intercultural philosophers reject any form of centrism, including Afrocentrism and have shown their willingness and ability to interact with non-African philosophers by participating in intercultural dialogues in meaningful ways. They all focus on human beings rather than race as a marker of identity, and a concept of personhood for the enhancement of the well-being of community members thereby focusing on their common humanity with strangers. To conclude, the classical communitarian debate in African Philosophy was useful to gain an understanding of how to live together in communities in modern African societies. The limitation of the debate is that it solely focussed on life within the communities and one’s cultural or kin group but did not enhance one’s insight on how to live with those outsides of them. The questions of well-being that were raised were all about the well-being of communities or the individuals within them. Appiah’s development of a nonwestern cosmopolitanism, Wiredu’s decolonisation project and Gyekye’s conceptual borrowing from Intercultural Philosophy enabled African philosophers to also raise questions and search for answers on how to live and deal with strangers, such as citizens of a nation-state (instead of the subjects of chiefs and queen mothers within a community) and cosmopolitans. The three Akan philosophers, Gyekye, Wiredu and Appiah, have played a key role in raising important questions in the so-called Mbiti-Menkiti classical communitarian debate in African Philosophy. They have also contributed significantly to African(a) Intercultural Philosophy and have created constructive openings for other scholars to further develop the field and,

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thereby, gain insights into Ethics of Global Development for a Global Ethics of Development. The remaining chapters in this edited volume are the result of conceptual explorations on well-being in African Philosophy and these relatively new academic fields.

NOTES 1. This book is the twin sister of another book in the ‘African Philosophy: Critical Perspectives and Global Dialogue’ series by Rowman and Littlefield titled Beauty in African Thought: Critical Perspectives on the Western Idea of Development, edited by Bateye, B, M. Masaeli, L. F. Müller and A. Roothaan. 2. A meta-ethnicity signifies a larger in-group of distinct ethnic but culturally related groups who identify more closely with each other than they would with outgroup ethnic groups. 3. ‘Communitarianism’ refers to either contemporary African or Western theorising about individuality and community. It differs from ‘communalism’, which designates the traditional social formation in pre-colonial Africa (Wiredu 2008: 335). 4. More about Mbiti the philosopher one can find in Müller, Louise. ‘A Thematic Comparison between Four African Scholars Idowu, Mbiti, Okot p’Bitek, Appiah: What Do They Tell Us About the Existence of “Truth” and a “High God”, and Why Is Their Work Significant ?’ Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy/Revue Africaine de Philosophie 18, no. 1–2 (2004): 109–25. 5. For a more recent social context-related view on well-being in Nigeria, see also Meijuni, Olutoyin and Bolaji Olukemi Bateye. ‘Religion, Education, and the Well-Being of Citizens in Nigeria.’ In Wellbeing in African Philosophy: Insights for a Global Ethics of Development, edited by B. Bateye, M. Masaeli, L.Müller and A. Roothaan. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023. 6. Appiah translates the High God as Nyame but according to the Ashanti that the author interviewed in Kumasi and surroundings, that should be Onyankopon, ‘the creator of all things.’ 7. The Akan peoples belief in a loose connection between body and human spirits is comparable to that of the ancient Egyptians and Greeks, see Müller, L.F. (2018). The Greco-Egyptian Origins of Western Myths and Philosophy. A Transcontinental Career: Essays in Honour of Wim van Binsbergen: Papers in Intercultural Philosophy and Transcontinental Comparative Studies. P. Mosima. Haarlem, PIPTraCS. 24: 251–281. 8. The author acknowledges that in social-anthropological fieldwork, Gyekye’s assumed separation between the material – and the spiritual worlds makes sense. Although this dualistic division between the physical and the metaphysical probably did not reflect pre-colonial Akan thought, many Christians these days adhere to such a dualistic division. Akan thought changed under the influence of proselytising European Christian missionaries in Africa. Müller, L.F. (2013). Religion and Chieftaincy in Ghana. Berlin, Lit Verlag.

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9. The mind (adwene derives from the verb to think) is, however, never listed as one of the constituents of a person, because the Akan people do not believe that thoughts are substantial (which is why Wiredu then characterised them as quasi-material alongside the other two mentioned human spirits). Wiredu, Kwasi. ‘The Concept of Mind with Particular Reference to the Language and Thought of the Akans.’ In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, edited by Fløistad Guttorm. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1987, 159–161. 10. The Twi word pa refers to ‘extra or more.’ 11. An example of a culturally transformed or intercultural philosophical person avant la lettre is the Belgium missionary Placide Tempels (Mosima 2018, Müller 2019). Tempels, who wrote Bantu Philosophy, thought that personhood was dynamic and that the Bantu people had a dynamic concept of personhood (1959: 50–55, 93). 12. More about African Intercultural Philosophy as a field of study can also be found in Müller, Louise, and Meera Venkatachalam. ‘The Notions and Imagination of Space and Time in British Colonial and African Intercultural Philosophical Cinema.’ Filosofie & Praktijk 43, no. 3/4 (2022): 148–65. 13. The religion of fetishes widespread among them is perhaps a kind of idolatry – Götz is a false deity – idol, which sinks as far into the non-sublime as human nature ever seems to allow. 14. However, see also Lajul 2023 on the alleged negative aspects of globalisation on Africans’ well-being. 15. In South Africa, a practical example of consensus democracy is the ubuntu principle-based Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC): a court-like restorative justice body that was brought into existence in 1996 after Apartheid to come to terms with the atrocities of the political system. 16. Italic by the author. 17. For the connection between Akan proverbs and Adinkra symbols, such as the symbol for this proverb, see Müller, Louise, Kofi Dorvlo, and H.S.C.A Muijen. ‘Culture and Tradition at School and at Home.’ In The Adinkra Game: An Intercultural Communicative and Philosophical Praxis, edited by M. Metsärinne, R. Korhonen, T. Heino and M. Esko, 192–224. Rauman Teacher Training School: University of Turku 2021. For the link between Akan folktales and Akan ethics see Dorvlo, Kofi, and Louise Müller. Caught in the Cosmic Web: Ghanaian Folk Tales in the Twenty-First Century. Animal Wisdom Books. Weesp: Quest for Wisdom Foundation, 2022. 18. For an overview of Appiah’s oeuvre, see Riemer and Elze. ‘Identiteit Is Niet Onveranderlijk, Maar Een Sociale Constructie’ [‘Identity Is Not Immutable, but a Social Construction’].’ Volzin, 2019. The article is based on an interview with professor Louise Müller about the philosophical oeuvre of the Ghanaian-born-Americanbased philosophy professor Kwame Appiah. See: https://volzin​ .nu​ /er​ -is​ -iets​ -wat​ -universeel​-is​-en​-ons​-allen​-verbindt​-ons​-mens​-zijn/. 19. Appiah’s theory of cosmopolitans as interculturally competent and conversable people has a lot in common with Wiredu’s earlier mentioned practical consensus democracy. While Appiah focused on consensus politics in Africa on the micro level and in the private sphere, Wiredu focused on the nation-state, which is on the macro level, and the public sphere.

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———. ‘On the Idea of a Global Ethic.’ Journal of Global Ethics 1, no. 1 (2005): 45–51. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/17449620500106636. ———. ‘Social Philosophy in Postcolonial Africa: Some Preliminaries Concerning Communalism and Communitarianism.’ South African Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 4 (2008): 332–39. https://doi​.org​/10​.4314​/sajpem​.v27i4​.31522 ———. ‘An Oral Philosophy of Personhood: Comments on Philosophy and Orality.’ Research in African Literatures 40, no. 1 (2009): 8–18. https://doi​.org/ 10.1353/ ral.0.0128 Yates, J. J. (2009). ‘Making Sense of Cosmopolitanism: A Conversation with Kwame Anthony Appiah.’ The Hedgehog Review 11(3): 42–51. https://go​.gale​.com​/ps​/i​.do​ ?id​=GALE​%7CA214206457​&sid​=googleScholar​&v​=2​.1​&it​=r​&linkaccess​=abs​ &issn​=15279677​&p​=AONE​&sw​=w​&userGroupName​=anon​%7Eed69d045

Chapter 2

This Thing Called Communitarianism, or Why We Should Not Be Afraid of the Community Nimrod Kahn

In this chapter, I wish to explore the concept of personhood within an African and Intercultural context to challenge my Western philosophical concepts. Additionally, I wish to examine whether the West African Akan people’s concept of personhood can help us understand our current communal life and our relationship with private and public institutions. When taking this a step further, can the Akan’s concept of personhood guide us to an alternative understanding of communitarian life, and if so, how? Also, will the analysis of the Akan’s concept of personhood expose a fundamental difference between Western and Akan’s thinking regarding ethical debates within a community, potentially offering a tool for Western policymakers, community leaders and others to approach their ethical debates differently? To answer these questions, I utilise Western philosophical tools to analyse African philosophical concepts. To be more specific, I wish to examine the use of language that surrounds the concept of personhood. It should be noted that the concept of personhood is treated in this chapter as an ethical concept to analyse two very different philosophical traditions, that is Western and African. This chapter’s ‘Western’ pillar is based upon the renowned Wittgenstein scholar Cora Diamond and the philosopher Nelson Goodman, providing us with the methodology to analyse the use of language within a community. This philosophical methodology further allows us to analyse the use of language within the ethical theories of Aristotle and Mill. The African pillar is predominantly (but not exclusively) based on the Akan philosophers Gyekye and Wiredu, firstly because of their central role within the communitarian debate around the concept of personhood (see Müller 2023 and Mosima 2023) and their extensive contributions to the analysis of personhood. 49

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Second, according to Neequaye (2020), both Gyekye and Wiredu claim that achieving personhood within the Akan society brings about human well-being. Gyekye and Wiredu are Ghanaian philosophers of Akan descent, which provides them with a deep insight into this cultural group’s tradition and language. An Akan maxim goes, ‘When a person descends from heaven, he descends into human society’ (onipa firi soro besi a obesi onipa kurom) (Gyekye 1992). According to Gyekye, this maxim reflects two important aspects of the relationship between a person and his or her community within the Akan tradition. First, the community has an ontological priority over the individual. Second, the community plays a central role in bringing about human wellbeing. These interpretations can lead to a philosophical stance that Gyekye named ‘radical communitarianism’. This can be loosely defined as a condition whereby any clash between the individual’s rights and aspirations and one’s obligations to the community results in the individual fully submitting to the community. Gyekye suggests a philosophical stance that he calls ‘moderate communitarianism’ (Gyekye 1992). This moderation is achieved by a dual feature of the self, whereby the individual can fulfil his or her potential, though only within a community. The community, in turn, acknowledges the existence of the individual whilst providing a cultural context. According to Gyekye, this dual feature is creating a shield against the tyranny of the community. This restricted form of communitarianism offers a more appropriate and adequate account of the self than the unrestricted or radical account, in that the former addresses the dual features of the self as a communal being and as an autonomous, self-determining, self-assertive being with a capacity for evaluation and choice. In this chapter, I argue that the tension between the individual and the community is not resolved by an ontological or epistemological debate but by looking at the use of language itself. Put differently, one must not and should not look at anything other than the use of language to see that this tension does not exist. I will argue that the unique use of language within the Akan by itself leads to moderate communitarianism. It is important to note that this chapter is trying to detach the concept of personhood from the actual use of the concept in the Akan’s daily life for the following reasons: I do not speak the local language, and because the debate is very much anchored in an interpretation of some major concepts (e.g. see Gyekye 1992; Menkiti 2004), my contribution in this respect is limited. Moreover, Müller (2010) shows that the Akan by itself is a somewhat artificial concept, and in that sense (and that sense only), it seems to me that any strong attachment to the Akan’s concept of personhood is by itself somewhat fabricated. Lastly, I think that the debate (see, for example, D. Masaka 2018, O.A. Oyowe; 2015 or M. Molefe 2019) regarding the concept of personhood

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among African scholars is distant from the anthropological data (and rightly so, as, after all, we are dealing with philosophy), and so I am humbly following in the footsteps of philosophical giants. The discussion in this chapter is thus based on Gyekye’s understanding of the concept and does not try to base its claims on anthropological data. Moreover, I wish the discussion to stay within the ethical realm, as I think it will allow us to learn general lessons regarding the role of the community in our lives. So far, the reasons for disconnecting the concept of personhood were mainly methodological. The methodology followed here will now be elaborated upon to show my argument for not fearing the community’s ugly face. In her book The realistic spirit (1995), the renowned Wittgenstein scholar Cora Diamond edifies the reader with what she sees as one of Wittgenstein’s most important lessons. Namely, how to do philosophy. She asks the reader to leave the metaphysical spirit behind and use the realistic spirit in a philosophical search (Diamond 1995). In some narrow way, this chapter is trying to achieve exactly that, realistic research regarding the concept of personhood. Let me elaborate, Diamond, in her analysis of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, claims that one of the most important lessons to be learnt from Wittgenstein’s philosophy is how philosophy can liberate us (Diamond 1995, ch. 1). To be set free by philosophy, one must understand the difference between the metaphysical spirit and the realistic spirit. In essence, Diamond characterises the metaphysical spirit as the laying down of philosophical requirements before starting the philosophical work. In other words, the metaphysical spirit is presuming the concepts, methodology, and the verification of the philosophical work before actually ‘doing the work’. Moreover, the metaphysical spirit is assuming that there are metaphysical “facts” out there that we could base our philosophical arguments upon. Put differently, the metaphysical spirit is looking for a lynchpin outside our lives with language to use as an anchor that stabilises our generalities. Diamond puts it as follows: ‘There is nothing out there to make the necessities we have built into our language correctly or incorrectly’ (Diamond 1995, p. 15). It is in the spirit of Diamond’s philosophical attitude that I would like to examine the Akan concept of personhood. Let’s examine the following quote: “The actions and choice of goals of the person emanate from his rational will” (Gyekye 1992, p.113). This quote is an example of laying down requirements before conducting philosophical research. It is to be seen in the words emanate and rational will. The quote is assuming that there is a logic that determines our way of thinking, which ascribes rational will. Without entering the debate about the content of the quote, one can see that Gyekye is laying down metaphysical requirements. Roughly speaking these requirements might look as follows: any debate within ethics must include the rationality of any human as belonging to all

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humans equally. One more quote will clarify this point: “A simple consideration I have urged in this connection is that mind – adwene in Akan – is never mentioned in any enumeration of the entities that unite to constitute a person” (Wiredu 1996, p. 121–123). Once more, we could see that there are metaphysical requirements, that a human is comprised of different entities. In other words, Wiredu presupposes that to talk philosophically about the Akan concept of the mind, one must find corresponding metaphysical categories.1 By laying down these requirements, we are asking our propositions to be stabilised by something external to the propositions themselves, and in this sense, we are presupposing metaphysical requirements. So, how are we to speak, write and research the Akan concept of personhood if any metaphysical anchoring is ruled out before we have even started our journey? Diamond’s answer was hinted at in the quote above, to find some stability in our language, we need not seek metaphysical anchoring outside the necessities we find in the language we use daily. Philosophy will liberate us not by philosophising about materialism versus quasi-materialism or the ontological status of the soul, but rather by understanding the use that creates necessities. I now wish to try to sketch out the kind of ‘looking at the use’ (that Diamond attributes to Wittgenstein) that this chapter wishes to achieve. In the first part, I will attempt to look at the kind of concept that personhood is within the Akans’ ethical tradition. I argue that the Akan concept of personhood is fundamentally different from most Western ethical concepts. To show and exemplify the difference, I would compare it to Aristotle’s understanding of the good life (which can be seen as somewhat parallel to the concept of human well-being). More specifically, I wish to show that the Akans’ concept uses a very specific logic, which is akin to the logic that one uses when thinking about infinity. This logic is dramatically different from the logic that is utilised by Aristotle or Kant’s categorical imperative (Kant 1993). The Zambian president Kaunda praised the former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher as ‘truly a person’ (Wiredu 1992, p. 104). That statement could be compared to Wittgenstein’s claim regarding our understanding of the concept of infinity: ‘an infinite class which is not a class contains more members than a finite one, in the ordinary sense of the word “more”. If we say that an infinite number is greater than a finite one, that doesn’t make the two comparable, because in that statement the word “greater” hasn’t the same meaning as it has in the proposition 5 > 4’ (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 464). It is important to remember that the utilisation of such logic ‘belongs to language itself and not to any particular language game’ (Diamond 1995, p. 287). Therefore, the argument is not only based on anthropological research. It also aims at a more general target, namely, to show that the use of such logic can be a liberating factor in life within the community.

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After having explained the sort of logic that is used by the Akan, I will try to support this in the second part by looking at the Akans’ prolific use of proverbs. The use of proverbs, in my opinion, is not accidental as it is a hallmark of the same kind of logic that I will try to expose in the first part. In other words, proverbs and metaphors are the kind of language we often use when we want our language to do something other than the ‘ordinary’ use of language (Davidson 1978). My analysis of the Akans’ use of proverbs within the ethical debate will be based on Nelson Goodman’s (1976) analysis of metaphors. This analysis will provide us with an insight into the special value that proverbs and metaphors have in our lives with language. More specifically, Goodman’s exposition will show us the ethical freedom that is provided using proverbs. Put differently, I will try to show that the use of proverbs creates room for debate and individuality within the Akans’ ethical framework, thus solving the extreme communitarianism problem by itself.

AKANS’ ENDLESS ETHICS In this part, I shall follow Gyekye’s (1992) supposition that all ethical questions and dilemmas are dealt with within a communal structure. Moreover, it seems important to me to emphasise that Aristotle’s (2009) and Mill’s (2001) arguments are presented as an inverse mirror to my argument. I have done so to support the claim that the Akans’ special use of ethical language can be applied to ANY community and not just that of the Akan people. It seems that even though there are many disagreements regarding the concept of personhood in Akan thought, one can find some common ground regarding that concept without stirring up too much controversy. In African philosophy in general and the view of Akan philosopher Kwasi Wiredu in particular, personhood is something to be achieved. Put simply, one can climb up, so to speak, ‘the ladder of personhood’ and it is something to strive for within the Akan community. In Wiredu’s words, personhood is not an automatic quality of the human individual; it is something to be achieved within the community, the higher the achievement, the higher the credit’ (Wiredu 1992, p. 104). Many, including the Akan philosopher Gyekye, have disagreed with the above statement. According to Ajume (2017), Gyekye thinks that every human can act as a moral agent because all humans have a basic degree of personhood. I think that it would not be far from the consensus to claim that within the Akan community, one is born as a human being but must constantly strive for improvement in one’s ethical stance. In other words, whatever predicates one wishes to attach to Akan ethics, be it in personhood or social status, for all intents and purposes, the practicality of daily life does not change.

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A few questions arise immediately: A. How far can one climb the ethical ladder? B. How far can one fall down the ethical ladder? C. What does one have to do to climb? D. How is one’s success or failure judged? I wish to start by answering questions B and C. There seems to be agreement among Akan researchers that there are limitations to the extent to which a person can fall down the ethical ladder. It seems that whatever one does, one will always retain one’s basic human dignity. These characteristics of Akan’s ethics incite much debate about the essence of the source of that basic dignity (in Twi onipa, meaning ‘human’). The source of that dignity could be uncontrovertibly ascribed to the ↄkra, the Akan’s word for the stable human spirit. This last sentence may cause scholars of the Akan’s philosophy to demand some clarification of the meaning of this word. To do this, in my opinion, would be to fall into the ‘trap’ of the metaphysical spirit. It is insignificant for this chapter whether the status of the ↄkra is quasi-material or spiritual. It is, however, important to understand that whatever one’s background or past deeds that one has or has not done, one is always granted basic human dignity within the Akan community, ‘The normative implication of possession of the ↄkra or the capacity for rationality is that the entity is entitled to an irreducible respect matched by irreducible rights’ (Ajume 2017 para 14). It is important to note that most Akan scholars will agree that the community will always judge the deeds of a person as if (s)he was endowed with the ability to make ethical choices. A good ethical life will endow a person with the term onipa paa, literally ‘extraordinary human’. According to Wiredu and Gyekye (1992), the answer to question C includes two fundamental duties. The first is the duty to one’s family. To be a real person, one must have a family and take care of it. Just having a family does not constitute a sufficient and necessary condition. Second, one must take an active role in the community and fulfil one’s duties to the community. That means that within the Akan community, to gain personhood, one must fulfil one’s duties towards one’s immediate family and the community.2 That ‘You are a true person’ means that you have fulfilled the above duties. It is these very broad duties that provide us with the first hint regarding the uniqueness of the Akan’s ethics. None of these conditions provides a ‘clearcut’ answer to daily ethical dilemmas. I think this is not a coincidence. To explain that last statement, some more needs to be said about our ability to climb the ethical ladder. I wish to dive into the ladder metaphor. Simply put, a ladder is an instrument that helps us reach heights that we could not reach otherwise. In this instance, the metaphor hints towards the enhancement of one’s ethical stance. That metaphor consists of an implicit assumption that being at the top of the ladder is better than being at the bottom. Following the metaphor, one

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must ask oneself how long is the ladder (question A). I wish to compare that metaphor to Aristotle’s opening of ‘Nicomachean Ethics’. In book I, Part 2, Aristotle argues the following: ‘If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good’ (Aristotle 2009). Simply put, Aristotle is arguing that all our actions must end with one goal or insight. The most important part of the argument for the one chief good (the one goal) is in the second set of brackets of the above quote. Aristotle is arguing that the possibility of us acting for the sake of another action leads to infinite regression. That, in turn, will make all our desires empty. Put differently, Aristotle is arguing that we can not say much about ethics if we do not stop the infinite regression. It is important to note what is achieved by this argument. By ‘enslaving’ all actions to one goal Aristotle can define that goal, and hence provide us with a complete argument for his view of what he considers to be ethical. Aristotle is hemming the language in and can therefore define and provide us with ethical rules. In the introduction, Wittgenstein was quoted as saying: An infinite class which is not a class contains more members than a finite one, in the ordinary sense of the word ‘more.’ If we say that an infinite number is greater than a finite one, that doesn’t make the two comparable, because in that statement the word ‘greater’ hasn’t the same meaning as it has said in the proposition 5 > 4. (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 464)

The reason I use this rather lengthy quote again is to yoke Aristotle’s argument to the ideas introduced in the opening of this chapter. Aristotle makes the concept of the chief good as a logical equivalent to the meaning of the proposition 5 > 4. He does so by creating a system where all concepts are fully defined, just like arithmetic. In other words, the concepts within the proposition 5 > 4 could be transferred to and used in other parts of the system as they are transparent; by that, I mean not only that the concepts are fully defined but also that their relation to other concepts is laid bare to anyone who knows the system. Aristotle is creating a language in which syntax and semantics are undisguised by the ambiguous use of language. If one tries to understand the sentence: an infinite number is greater than a finite one, one sees immediately that the word greater is playing tricks on our semantics. Aristotle’s opening of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ aims to prevent that sort of vagueness. In Aristotle’s ladder, one can quite easily answer the question of how far one can climb the ladder; it has a defined end, which one might not be able to ever achieve. It might even be defined as an impossibility,

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but one does have an end in sight, a criterion, a just scale and an ideal to use as a guideline. It might be labouring the point, but Aristotle’s argument shows us how an ethical debate is to be held within a community where all concepts are well defined. A debate is limited by a set of agreed definitions. How far is Aristotle’s logical construction from the Akan’s concept of personhood? In Gyekye’s thought, the Akan ladder is infinite by definition, one can climb and climb and never see the end of the ladder (Ajume 2017). It is infinite in the sense that one’s ethical work never stops. How is that possible? Can one ever become a true person? From Aristotle’s point of view, the Akan are trying to have their cake and eat it, which is a logical impossibility. Let me explain, the Akan are trying to have the cake by allowing a goal, an end to the ladder, which is achieved by putting a criterion for all ethical actions. That goal is to be(come) a true person during one’s lifetime, which is finite unlike the infinite cycle of life, as opposed to a ‘useless person’. The Akan try to eat the cake by never allowing this process to end on the one hand and by not defining exactly what it means to be a true person on the other hand. That means that the logic that the Akan are utilising is akin to saying that an infinite number is greater than a finite one. It means that an argument, like the one Aristotle constructed, is impossible. I must admit that this hallmark of Akan philosophy might be ascribed to many ethical theories it is only now that one adds a lack of a real definition of the concept of personhood that one can grasp the Akans’ uniqueness. According to Wiredu (1996), one can become a person by fulfilling the above-mentioned obligation, but that does not mean that one’s task is finished; in fact, it never is, so one is only able to say one is becoming a true person but not yet be a true person. The notable exception to that might be the queen mothers and chiefs, who can be seen as being true persons; those that achieved personhood (so-called onipa paa, or extraordinary humans). In most cases, however, it seems that Wiredu follows in the footsteps of Menkiti, who mentioned that during a person’s life, personhood is ongoingly processual until (s)he passes on and his or her human spirit transforms into an ancestral spirit (see, the Menkiti-Gyekye debate in Müller 2023). I feel that something was left unsaid, and that something is: in which way the Akan concept remains undefined. Let’s recall the two main duties that will endow a person with the honour of being a true person. The duties are to one’s immediate family and one’s community. We could add to that the duty to defend the state from external attack. One does not need a vivid imagination to advance a scenario where these duties conflict. As one is faced with a dilemma that conflicts with these duties, the Akan theory of personhood does not prescribe a simple, clear-cut solution. In other words, one does not have an ideal to compare current practical issues with. In that sense, one is left to

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one’s own devices on the one hand but is still required to become a true person on the other. It is this endless demand to become a ‘truer person’ and the lack of a definition of that concept that sets Akan ethics apart. To illuminate that last point, I wish to turn to Mill’s utilitarian theory. Mill’s theory is, by its nature, communitarian. At the core of the theory stands the ‘greatest happiness’ principle. Before we dive into that principle and its relevance here, I wish to quote Mill’s understanding of ethics’ role in our lives: ‘It is the business of ethics to tell us what our duties are, or by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty’ (Mill,1863). This quote does not aim to show that Mill’s conceptual framework differs from that of the Akans (that would be falling into the metaphysical trap yet again), but rather to show what Mill thinks ethics does for us. He thinks it formulates rules for us (metaphysics) and tells us how we might know them (epistemology). In that sense, ethics’ job is to set the foundations for our actions. In the context of this chapter, (and only in that context), it could be said that Mill sees the role of ethics as tidying up our ethical debates. Mills claims that happiness is the only goal of all human action (Mill 1868). The principle is formulated as such: ‘The Greatest Happiness Principle holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, and wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness’ (Mill 1863, ch. 2). This does not mean that every man is an island but rather: ‘for that standard is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether’ (Mill 1863, ch. 2). It is important to note that Mill thinks of this principle as being above time and space, or, in other words, absolute (Beauchamp 2016). How far is Mill’s principle from the Akan concept of personhood? It would be fair to ask what ‘the greatest amount of happiness’ means. That question could steer us off the track, as the main reason for bringing up Mill here is to provide a contrast with the Akan view. From Mill’s vantage point, any ethical dilemma should be answered by the greatest happiness principle. For any Akan member that faces an ethical dilemma between her or his duties to the family and the community, Mill would say that (s)he should act to create the greatest happiness. As I have mentioned before, such a timeless single rule does not exist among the Akan people. That means that for the Akans, the bases for thinking about ethical dilemmas must, in practical terms, be fundamentally different. Moreover, one can see the reason why Mill chooses to formulate such a principle. He formulates this rule as this is what, he thinks, ethics does. The question arises about what ethics for the Akan is if they are not about forming timeless rules and goals. To do that, we must examine the language that is used by the Akan people when facing such dilemmas.

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THE USE OF PROVERBS IN THE AKAN SOCIETY In the previous section, I formulated four questions. So far, I have answered the first three. It is now time to answer the last question: how is one’s success or failure judged? Before I turn to the Akan use of proverbs to provide an answer, I wish to briefly explain Goodman’s theory of language, which will clarify my emphasis on the use of proverbs. Before doing so, it would be useful to remind ourselves that this research aims to follow the realistic spirit. This means that the use of anthropological and linguistic data throughout this text (and especially in the following part) is aimed at searching for the actual use of language to find a lynchpin for our philosophical assumptions ‘inside’ our lives with language and its daily use. In other words, if one’s aim is to find philosophical generalities, one cannot do that without diving into the spatial and temporal use of language. In his book, Languages of Art Goodman (1968) illuminates the uniqueness of the language of art. To do so, he suggests five linguistic criteria: syntactic density, semantic density, multiple and complex references, syntactic relatedness and exemplification. I shall discuss the first three criteria as they apply to natural language. Goodman argues that one judges the sort of language that one is faced with by looking at the transparency of the syntax. In mathematics, the syntax is outright clear. Once one has learnt the rules of the language, one can apply them in other places. Moreover, one can easily communicate with other people using the same rules. To exemplify the difference between clear and opaque syntax, Goodman is using the example of the thermometer. A digital thermometer is an example of a clear syntax. Goodman claims that in a digital thermometer, there is (by definition) no more than one-tenth of a degree difference between 37.1 and 37.2. A mercury thermometer, on the other hand, exemplifies an opaque syntax as there are an infinite number of degrees between 37.1 and 37.2. The second criterium (semantic density) refers to the meaning that a language speaker ascribes to the words. Once more, we could look at mathematics to see clear semantics. In mathematics, all definitions must not contain more than one clear meaning. 5 > 4 is an example of clear semantics, as all three symbols are holily defined. Opanyih kye a, ediho, translated as ‘when an elder serves out the dish, it becomes cool’ (Rattray 1916, frag. 380) is a clear example of when meanings become opaque. To be sure, it might be the case that to a native language speaker, those words might not feel opaque. Having said that, this proverb is by any measure, opaquer than meaning than 5 > 4. The last criteria (multiple and complex references) seem almost selfexplanatory. Goodman is arguing that if the symbols used in a sentence refer to other multiple and complex symbols, then, by definition, language must be unclear. As proverbs are very often erected upon metaphors, this is the

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last piece of the puzzle that is missing is Goodman’s analyses of metaphors. ‘Metaphor is an affair between a predicate with a past and an object that yields while protesting’ (Goodman, 1976, p. 69). The above quote by Goodman bundles together most of Goodman’s theory about the use of metaphors. To explain Goodman’s theory simply and briefly, I shall analyse one simple metaphor, which is ‘Love is a journey’. According to Goodman, every predicate must have a meaning that is understandable to the people who are using that language. In this case, the word ‘journey’ is understandable to most people who speak English. Moreover, if one does not know the word, one can find its definition in a dictionary. Simply put, that is what Goodman means by having a past. The object that yields whilst protesting in the above metaphor is ‘love’. By protesting, Goodman means that the predicate must not be part of the same linguistic scheme. For Goodman, any symbol in language belongs to a scheme. One can understand the scheme as a family or topic of symbols. Roughly put, the word ‘love’ belongs to the scheme of emotions, whilst journey belongs to the scheme of travel. By taking a predicate from one scheme and connecting it to another, we create friction, discrepancy and dissonance, which is the source of the protest. By yielding, Goodman means that the metaphor must work. In other words, we must be able to understand how love is like a journey. If I were to say: ‘Love is a computer’, there would be a protest but no yielding. If I were to say: ‘Love is an emotion’ there will be yielding but no protest. This is not to say that yielding is impossible, as, according to Goodman, there are no external limitations laid upon our language but the use of language itself (Goodman 1976). Now let us apply this to some well-known modern Western principles, as quoted below: Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. (Kant 1785, transl. 1993, p.30) First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. (Rawls 1971, p.266) We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. (United States Declaration of Independence 1776)

If one examines the above quotes, one can see the kind of language that was used. In technical terms, those who articulated them sought to create a language that is syntactically and semantically as clear as possible. They

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have avoided complex references and metaphors. No word is taken from one scheme and transferred to another. Put differently, all the above quotes are trying to create a language that allows ethical actions to be judged using the law of the excluded middle. This means that every action can be judged as either right or wrong and nothing else follows each law proposed by each thinker. To be sure, as these commands and maxims must be implanted in everyday life, one can argue that one needs clear language to deal with the untidiness of life. Moreover, one can rightly claim that some concepts (such as happiness, liberty, or law) within these statements must be properly defined before one can understand them clearly. I think it is clear by now that debating concept definitions belongs to a different use of language than a metaphoric debate. How far is this language from the Akans’ use of proverbs? To illuminate the importance of proverbs to the use, the use that determines necessities, I wish to follow Dzobo’s (2005) article: 'Knowledge and Truth: Ewe and Akan Conceptions.’ This article does not deal with ethical or daily issues. It seems like a roundabout way of explaining proverbs, as many anthropological examples exemplify the use of proverbs within the Akan daily life. Not the least is the simple fact that the chief is supposed to speak in a highly contextualised and indirect language (Yankah 1995). One could easily notice whilst reading the article that numerous proverbs are used in the article. For any scholar thought in the Western tradition that is familiar with the epistemic debate around the source of knowledge, that seems slightly odd. The reason for this oddity, I suspect, is the introduction of time and space into the debate around knowledge construction by Dzobo. Let me explain, if we recall Kant’s quote as well as Aristotle’s, Mill’s and Rawls’, one can see that the constructed linguistic structure was aimed at an ethical statement that is akin to saying 5 > 4. In other words, it is the language that is aspiring to be beyond time. It is the most obvious in Kant’s categorical imperative, but it could be seen in the other examples as well. Their use of language is aimed at providing us with a language whose definitions do not change with societies throughout time. For these great thinkers, saying something within the realm of ethics should and ought to amount to mathematical statements. Diamond (1995) would say that this is exactly the laying down of philosophical requirements that we so often do before we start doing the actual work within the realm of ethics. In Dzobo’s article, one could see an attempt to explain the Akan and Ewe’s knowledge in Western terms. However, Dzobo always uses proverbs. Every proverb is followed by the author’s explanation. This is due to the nature of proverbs. A proverb that is not in one’s native language must always be translated, as the metaphors and the references inside it are new and therefore could be misunderstood. I think this is due to the simple fact that proverbs are

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mostly based on a community’s shared spatial and temporal framework. Let me explain with an example: De tsitsi me aha nona translated as ‘You only get palm wine from mature trees’ (Dzobo 2005, p.75). According to Dzobo, the metaphor here is hinting that wisdom requires time and experience to be of higher value. Now, one can see that, according to Goodman, there is no clear semantics here as the tree is used as a metaphor for knowledge. One can easily imagine that a proverb like this could change its meaning very easily if the scheme that trees belong to changes. For example, an enemy army that is using the trees or a disease that only affects mature trees, which means that by using a proverb, you are leaving the option to change the meaning through time. As I think this point is clear by now, I wish to go over one more issue before I connect all threads. The proverbs that are used in the article expose the sort of knowledge that is acceptable within a given debate. I would like to focus on two points that arise from the article. The first is epitomised by these two proverbs: ‘Knowledge is like a baobab tree (monkey-bread tree); no one person can embrace it with both arms’ (Nunya adidoe, asi metune o) and ‘The one who keeps asking never loses his way’ (Obisafo nto kwan) (Dzobo 2005). These two proverbs are emphasising the fact that for the Akan people, no individual can have all knowledge, that it is thus a collective good, and that one, no matter how smart and experienced, must always try and can learn more through one’s interaction with the community. Hence, for the Akan, one cannot create a language that sets impenetrable borders. Such language will inevitably cause one to lose their way, as the metaphor goes. The second property of knowledge could be understood by the following proverb: ‘Knows all, knows nothing’ (Nim, nnim) and ‘One head does not go into council’ (Dzobo 2005). These proverbs also emphasise the community’s role in creating knowledge. To conclude, as knowledge is boundless, one is bound to keep on learning, and as one cannot learn everything, one must learn together with the other members of the community. Therefore, any kind of judgement is based upon an agreement between the users of that language. I think it is important to note here that most Akan scholars note the concept of personhood presupposes our capacity for a moral agency (Ajume 2017). That agency could only be manifested within the community (Gyekye 1992). I wish to go back now to the opening question of this part: How is one’s success or failure judged? It must be clear by now that the Akan do not compare their actions and deeds to timeless, clear and well-predefined rules. A person’s successes and failures are built upon a debate within a practical context. This debate, again, does not refer to timeless rules. This kind of language is alien to a community that understands reality practically, locally and historically above timelessness and universality. I mentioned at the beginning that I think it is no coincidence that the Akan are prolific users of proverbs.

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It is almost a necessity if one believes that knowledge by itself is without boundaries, that no one person can know everything and that language should be highly contextualised. The proverbs are creating opacity in the language and therefore allow much more room for debate. A proverb is asking us to interpret and debate its relevance to the current moment. The Akan are using the proverbs within an ethical debate as they are asking language to do something special in daily life situations to make us think! I wish to end this part with a rather lengthy quote from Wittgenstein that amplifies my last point. ‘We might put it like this: If I am looking for something, I mean, the North Pole, or a house in London – I can completely describe what I am looking for before I have found it (or have found that it isn’t there) and either way this description will be logically acceptable. But when I’m “looking for” something in mathematics, unless I am doing so within a system, what I am looking for cannot be described, or can only apparently be described; for if I could describe it in every way, I would already actually have it’ (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 363). In a sense, Wittgenstein opens a space for us to criticise Kant, Mill, Aristotle and Rawls whilst allowing room for African thinking. The analogy is that Kant, Mill, Aristotle and Rawls are looking to describe ethics as if it were a house to be found, whilst the Akan are trying to look at it as if it were a mathematical but also a practical field of knowledge.

CONCLUSION The main thesis of this chapter proposes that the tensions between the individual and the community are solved not through an ontological or epistemological debate but through the special use of language and concepts that take place within the Akan culture and tradition. The chapter’s title is: ‘This thing called communitarianism, or why should we not be afraid of the community’? So why should we not be afraid of the community? After all, many totalitarian regimes are counting on their members self-enforcing the community rules. It could be claimed that for many Western thinkers, the community must be limited to protect one’s rights and/ or freedom. I think that Gyekye himself is wary of this issue. He thinks that the community has an ontological primacy and that because human beings are social by nature, their actualisation happens within their communities. Gyekye thinks that this ‘may result in pushing the significance and implications of a person’s communal nature beyond their limits, an act that would, in turn, result in investing the community with an all-engulfing moral authority to determine all things about the life of the person’ (Gyekye 1992, p.107).

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Gyekye’s solution to the problem is to adopt moderate communitarianism. Simply put, he thinks that any good theory of the community must ascribe to any individual dual responsibility to the self and the community. A person in that sense is an ontologically communitarian individual. This in turn means that any tension between the two elements must be resolved by the two sides (the individual and the community) recognising these facts. A solution like that is a pure manifestation of the metaphysical spirit. I agree with Gyekye that communitarianism must not entitle communal dictatorship, but I disagree with how it should be achieved. I have tried to show that it is the sort of necessities that we build into our language that will determine our freedom and well-being. To look for personal freedom within the community, one must not investigate the ‘god-like’ concepts, postulate metaphysical truth or venture into long logical deductions regarding the ontological status of the individual or the community. One must not try to fix its concepts on universal, single, clear, timeless truths such as personal actualising or freedom or communal priority. One must not try to fix language by fixating on concepts outside the use of language itself (if that could even be achieved). One must rather look at the use of the language and the sort of logic that the community utilises within the ethical debates. If the Akan can teach us something, it is that one should not postulate metaphysical truth but create a system that encourages ethical thought and flexibility. The Akan can teach us that the well-being, freedom, and flexibility of the individual are not dependent on a ‘god-like’ fixed set of rules and beliefs but rather upon the lessening of concepts. We should according to the Akan, create a communal space where these concepts can and are being debated. As I have tried to show this in turn demands a different sort of language. A language that is culturally contextualised and at the same time loses its intrinsic nature. It is our life within a flexible community, a community that internalises the fact that the true road to communitarian theory is based upon letting go of these concepts and living within the community in the full sense of the word. I will leave it to the reader to try and imagine the kind of global institutions and ethical debate we can build if only we are to adopt the Akan line of thinking.

NOTES 1. I am aware of the fact that the above quote is stretching somewhat the meaning here, but I allow myself this as Wiredu is very often laying down metaphysical requirements. See for example Wiredu 1996. 2. It should be noted that the Akans’ definition of the immediate family might differ from the Western definition of family. For the Akan people, the Western definition

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of family is the ‘core family,’ whereas their African definition of the family refers to ‘the extended family,’ which is defined as a family that includes in one household near relatives (such as grandparents, aunts, or uncles, nieces, and nephews) in addition to a core or nuclear family. In Akan, the extended family is called the abusua. This is also the name for the matriclan of which there are seven or eight in the case of the Asante people. In a matriclan, the descent is organised along female lines.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Ajume, W. ‘Akan Philosophy of the Person.’ In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2017. https://plato​ .stanford​ .edu​ /archives​ / sum2017​/entries​/akan​-person/. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Edited by R Crisp. Vol. I, part II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Beauchamp, T. ‘The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics.’ In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E.N Zalta. https://plato​ .stanford​ .edu​ / archives​/win2016​/entries​/principle​-beneficence. Davidson, D. ‘What Metaphors Mean.’ Critical Inquiry 5, no. 1 (1978): 31–47. Diamond, C. The Realistic Spirit Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. Dzobo, Noah K. ‘Knowledge and Truth: Ewe and Akan Conceptions.’ Multiple Paths to God (2005): 133–45. Goodman, Nelson. Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols. Hackett Publishing, 1976. Gyekye, Kwame. ‘Person and Community in African Thought.’ In Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies I, edited by Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series Ii, Africa, 101–02. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992. Kant, I Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, [orig.1785], 1993. Masaka, Dennis. ‘Person, Personhood and Individual Rights in Menkiti’s African Communitarian Thinking.’ Theoria 65 (2018): 1–14. Menkiti, A.I. ‘On the Normative Conception of a Person.’ In A Companion to African Philosophy, edited by K. Wiredu, 324–31. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2004. Mill, J.S. Utilitarianism. London: Parker, Son & Bourn, West Strand, 1863. ———. Utilitarianism and the 1868 Speech on Capital Punishment. Edited by R. Crisp. Indianapolis: Hacket, 2001 [orig 1863]. Molefe, Motsamai. ‘A Conceptual Mapping of Personhood.’ In Personhood and Rights in an African Tradition, edited by Motsamai Molefe, 17–35. Cham Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Mosima, Pius M. ‘Being-in-Community as the Basis of Well-Being in African Philosophy.’ In Wellbeing in African Philosophy: Insights for a Global Ethics of Development, edited by B. Bateye, M. Masaeli, L.F. Müller and A. Roothaan. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023.

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Müller, Louise. ‘Dancing Golden Stools.’ Fieldwork in Religion 5, no. 1 (2010): 31–54. ———. ‘Human Wellbeing in Intercultural Philosophical Perspective: A Focus on the Akan Philosophy of Wiredu, Gyekye, and Appiah.’ In Wellbeing in African Philosophy: Insights for a Global Ethics of Development, edited by B. Bateye, M. Masaeli, L. Müller and A. Roothaan. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023. Neequaye, George Kotei. ‘Ethical Thought of Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye Ii.’ In The Palgrave Handbook of African Social Ethics, edited by N. Wariboko and T. Falola, 423–35. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Oyowe, O.A. ‘This Thing Called Communitarianism: A Critical Review of Matolino’s Personhood in African Philosophy.’ South African Journal of Philosophy & Public Affairs 4 (2015): 504–15. Rattray, R.S. Ashanti Proverbs: The Primitive Ethics of a Savage People. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916. Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. Wiredu, K. Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996. Wiredu, K., and K Gyekye. Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992. Wittgenstein, L. [Transl A. Kenny, edited by R. Rhees]. Philosophical Grammar. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974. Yankah, Kwesi. Speaking for the Chief: Okyeame and the Politics of Akan Royal Oratory. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995.

Chapter 3

Being-in-Community as the Basis of Well-Being in African Philosophy Pius Mosima

African Philosophy encompasses questions, among others, that have arisen out of the specific shared histories of sub-Saharan peoples. A dominant feature in the debates among moral and political philosophers, including those focussing on this area of African Philosophy, has been how to negotiate the tension between individual and community life. In this chapter, I concentrate on human well-being in sub-Saharan African Philosophy, which is my area of expertise. I argue that being-in-community, or better communitarianism, communalism or ‘Afro-communitarianism’, as seen in the beliefs and practices of the indigenous black peoples below the Sahara Desert, forms the conceptual basis of well-being and happiness in African Philosophy and society. This is in stark contrast to mainstream perspectives of human well-being in Global Ethics of Development, which are inherently Eurocentric, individualistic and anthropocentric. Generally, contributions from the Global South are not embraced or simply ignored (Mosima 2018,2019). Moreover, Global Ethics of Development also limits the concept of development to economic growth and progress. I argue that the African conception of well-being as belonging or relatedness can be used to build a new critical concept of development that may transform global ethics from an African perspective. African traditional thought and its values on being human could enrich current discourses on the global ethics of development, especially on how human persons relate with one another and the rest of nature. This provokes these different but interrelated questions: How have African philosophers articulated – and sustained these debates on being-in-community? What is the epistemic value of these debates in our search for well-being in the present circumstances? Is the communitarian conception of well-being in Africa different from those in other 67

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parts of the world? If it is, how do these worldviews enrich or change the conversation in and beyond African cultural boundaries?

BEING-IN-COMMUNITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES Among philosophers, the relationship between the individual and the community has been of major importance. Since we are concerned with personal relationships implied in being-in- community, it would be insightful to discuss what it takes to become a person. Plato and Aristotle, in their conception of the origin and nature of the polity or political community, stress the importance of being-in-community. It would be instructive to note this preliminary perspective of community as articulated by Plato and Aristotle. This is because the notion of community is deeper than a simple explanation of economic needs and connotes other components like identity, values and culture. In his discussion with Glaucon and Adeimantus on the origin of the foundation of a community at the beginning of Book II of the Republic, Plato argues that no individual is self-sufficient. We all have many needs, and since we all have them, we call on one another’s help to satisfy our various requirements. When we have collected several helpers and associates to live in one place, we call that settlement a polity. So, if one (wo)man gives another what (s)he has to give in exchange for what (s)he can get, it is because each of them finds that to do so is for her or his advantage. Aristotle also argues for the importance of living in the community. He opines that a political community or state is not merely an aggregate of individuals. Rather, it is a largely self-sufficient community arising because of the bare necessities of life and the quest for a good life common to all its members. In so far as the state is a proper extension of simpler social relationships, such as the family, to provide necessities and achieve a good life, it is a natural, not an artificial, entity. Moreover, in so far as individual persons are not entirely self-sufficient, human beings are by nature political animals. To achieve a good life or happiness, individuals need the support of the state. Hence, for Aristotle, there is no necessary antagonism between the individual and the community. Antagonism only arises when the community is organised to serve the private interests rather than the common interest. It is from these insights that Aristotle in ‘Politics’ remarks that ‘He who is unable to live in society or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself is either a beast or a god’ (Aristotle 1941, trans. Jowett). From this, we see the importance of the community for moral life, as it is the normal atmosphere for morality. It is in the community that we test the validity of our moral

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ideas by trying to see if they agree or differ with the moral norms of other people. Even though Plato and Aristotle show us the interdependence of the individual and community, Boethius (1918, orig. c. 500 CE) gives us a more individualistic conception of a person. For him, a person is an individual substance of a rational substance, a substance being, who exists in itself and not in another. This definition greatly influenced scholastic minds like Saint Aquinas and Descartes, the Fathers of Modern European philosophy. Descartes, for example, concludes that cogito ergo sum (‘I think therefore I am’), that is, that the presence of a self of which to speak (an ‘I’) proves its existence to oneself. The power of the individual comes from the mind and soul. He is at pains to prove the existence of others. He remains a solipsist, and as such, the existence of the external world and other person cannot be demonstrated. Consequently, it is the moral worth of the individual with no reference to the external reality that should ground our socio-political outlook on life. In social and political theory, the focus is on the maximum welfare and freedom of the individual, with society existing only for the sake of its members. This line of thought dominated modernist European thinkers such as John Locke and Immanuel Kant, who all stressed the importance of three main components namely, autonomy, mature self-responsibility and uniqueness at all levels of moral and political life. Let me briefly explain each of the main components. (1) Autonomy refers to a person’s capacity for independent thinking, judgement, and survival. According to this aspect, a person defines herself or himself as an autonomous and largely independent agent without references to other people, groups or institutions. It also means that priority is given to one’s aims, decisions and choices. (2) Mature self-responsibility. The second theme emphasises personal responsibility, which accompanies a sense of being a causally effective agent. Mature self-responsibility means that a person accepts responsibility for oneself and one’s actions and has, because of this acceptance, confidence in one’s abilities. (3) Uniqueness. This aspect emphasises a person’s awareness of being unique, ‘only one of its kind’. According to this feature, an individual sees oneself as not being like other people, as being different from others. From the brief sketch above, one quickly notices that much of the modern Western tradition of philosophy is dominated by individualism, with little focus on being-in-community. Perhaps the most influential work in recent Western moral and political philosophy is John Rawls’ (1971) A Theory of

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Justice, which endorsed the liberal tradition. His theory of justice as fairness describes a society of free citizens holding equal basic rights and cooperating within an egalitarian economic system. In his search for the fundamental requirements of a just society, which he argues can foster human well-being and flourishing, Rawls advocates principles such as personal freedom, equal rights and the primary goods for all. He invites us, in his liberal account of justice, to emerge from an ‘original situation’ or ‘initial situation’ chosen by people under a ‘veil of ignorance’, irrespective of one’s identity or history. These two principles of personal freedom and equal rights would ensure that nobody is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by her or his unique circumstances. On the other hand, communitarians are particularly critical of what they take to be the liberal concept of the self and the liberal commitment to universality. The debate between communitarians and liberals was the most prominent in the field of political theory in the 1980s and 1990s. Communitarians argue that liberalism rests on a faulty notion of the self and human nature. They see the liberal self as a detached, atomistic, bearer of rights and freedoms, rational, and a chooser of its values and ends. They view liberalism as creating a society in which disconnected individuals pursuing their projects are fenced in together. Communitarians deny that individuals can flourish in such conditions. They see people as always rooted, situated and deeply influenced by a particular tradition, culture and community which form our identity and are not of our own making or choosing.1 Some deny the possibility of the kind of autonomy that Enlightenment philosophers such as Locke and Kant ascribed to human beings. They reject the ideas and aims of thinking for yourself and making your own decisions, reasoning about what values and ends to pursue, and not relying on the authority of others. They argue that these views and goals are mistaken because they simply ignore that so much is given and is before the individual. They believe that individuals who reject mainstream social norms and values are without bearing, incoherent and lost. Nevertheless, contemporary philosophers, especially existentialists and phenomenologists, accept and insist on the existence of others. It is being with and for others. For them, the world and others are given together with the ‘I’. Existence means being with other people in the world. According to Heidegger, we are ‘thrown in the world’, dasein, which means ‘being-there’. Heidegger rejects the Cartesian notion of the human being as a subjective spectator of objects (Heidegger 1962). Instead, he holds that both subject and object are inseparable but embody a ‘living being’ through their activities of ‘being-there’ and ‘being-in-the-world’. The other is already given to the world. The self, that is, the pour-soi, becomes

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aware of himself through the other, especially through experiences of shame, despair, anguish and so on. For Gabriel Marcel and Martin Buber, the ‘I’ and the other are given together. When I say I’, I necessarily imply the other person or thing. According to Buber, the ‘I’ cannot exist without the other. He conceives of a dialogical relation or existence between the ‘I’ and Thou as beings that can enter into dialogic relations not just with human others but with other animate beings, such as animals, or trees, as well as with the Divine Thou. Buber makes mention of two expressions: The ‘I’-‘Thou’ and the ‘I’-‘It’. The ‘I’-‘Thou’ relates one person to another person while the ‘I’-‘It’ relates a person to a thing. It is in these relationships, in the perpetual quest to encounter the human person in his totality, that we gradually know the human person, who remains a mystery and not a problem (Marcel 1949;1951). In meeting the Other, true meaning and understanding of oneself can only be reached by a meeting with the Other in all its strangeness.

THE COMMUNITARIAN ORIENTATION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY Being-in-community has also dominated debates among African intellectuals. With the publication of Bantu Philosophy by the Belgian missionary Placide Tempels (Orig.1945) and the decline of colonialism in the 1960s, many African scholars began writing about their culture and discussing culturally embedded notions implied in being-in-community (Mbiti 1969; Opoku 1978; Sarpong 1972; Laleye 1974; Kagame 1976). In later years, a new generation of African philosophers but also internationally renowned scholars, such as African and Comparative Philosophy professor Thaddeus Metz from the University of Pretoria, wrote about the topic and were involved in the concomitant debates (Menkiti 1984, 2004; Gbadegesin 1991; Wiredu 1996; Bujo 1998; Gyekye 1997; Ireogbu 2000; Shutte 2001; Metz 2013a; 2013b; 2021; Metz & Gaie 2010). The communitarian orientation of African philosophy and how it can influence human well-being have been a major preoccupation for the past thirty years, with varying interpretations. The Nigerian philosopher Olufemi Taiwo (2016) distinguishes at least three theses of communalism and their proponents;(1) ontological communalism (Menkiti 2004), (2) axiological communalism (Gyekye 1997, Wiredu 1996, Gbadegesin 1991) and (3) epistemological communalism (Ikuenobe 2016). Other African philosophers have revisited the concept of communalism and seem to agree on several themes or theses surrounding it (Hallen, 2009, 138–140). The late Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye (1997), for

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example, draws a line between radical – and moderate communitarianism. Radical communitarianism refers to those thinkers who conceive that the only concept of the person and her or his source of welfare on the African continent is communitarian or community-based. They include the Belgian philosopher and missionary Placide Tempels (1959), the late Kenyan pastor John Mbiti (1969) and the late Nigerian philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984, 2004). They could also be referred to as classical communitarians. If we accept Gyekye’s (1997:49) argument for moderate communitarianism as a way of improving the classical account, as well as his critique of Menkiti, and apply it to the classical account, then we could refer to this entire debate as a classical debate on African communitarianism (see Müller 2023). The term classical African communitarianism, therefore, could be taken to refer to those works of figures considered to be pioneers in the field of African Philosophy and communitarianism (Matolino 2014a:166). Instead, those who criticise this approach, like Gyekye, Wiredu and Masolo can be seen as moderate communitarians. Dismas Masolo does not categorise philosophers as radical – or moderate communitarians but approaches his discussion on communitarianism by outlining the differences and similarities between the Western mode of communitarianism with the African one (Masolo, 2004). The differentiating feature of African communitarianism identified by Masolo, as compared to Western communitarianism, lies in its compatibility with traditional African social and political orders. However, the two types of communitarianism, which predate colonial rule, share origins of resistance against colonial hegemony. A relatively recent issue of Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy / Revue Africaine de Philosophie (vol. 25, nos.1–2, 2011) published selected proceedings of a group of prominent South African philosophers who converged at the Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, to discuss the works of Dismas Masolo (with a ‘Reply to Critics’ by the author himself), and with a special focus on his Self and Community in a Changing World (2010). Notable articles critically engage in the communal orientation of human nature and ethics. Kevin Behrens (2014), for example, notes that the word “personhood” is central in debates in both African ethics and Western bioethics and that in both discourses, personhood is distinguished from mere biological species. He enjoins us to retain both conceptions of personhood, as they could enrich our moral reasoning. Mpho Tshivhase (2014) assesses the African view of personhood and evaluates the role that moral norms and social expectations play in the process of cultivating personhood. She concludes that the African view of the person is too focused on the Other and is thus not compatible with human excellence associated with individual uniqueness. In Two Conceptions of African Ethics, Thaddeus Metz, unlike Masolo, stresses his preference for the community-based conception of sub-Saharan ethics over the welfare-based one. The welfare-based theory says that one

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should share one’s wealth, time, labour and so on at the bottom because doing so is likely to make others’ lives go better. In contrast, the community-based theory prescribes helping others ultimately because doing so would be part of what it is to enter into a community with them or perhaps to foster communal relationships among them. One lives a genuinely human way of life just insofar as one enters into or prizes community with others (Metz 2013b). Bernard Matolino (2014a) thinks it is time to ‘exorcise the communitarian ghost’ as it ‘essentialises’ African thought. Even though he tends to grant that communitarian views have been quite influential in sub-Saharan philosophy, he firmly rejects the idea that a philosophy counts as sub-Saharan only to the extent that it is communitarian. From these debates and interpretations seen above, it is evident that African Philosophy can make significant contributions to the age-old global debates between liberal individualism and communitarianism. Moreover, it seems plausible to sketch out some of the main thinkers in the debates and see their interpretations and approaches to being-in-community.

BEING A PERSON IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE If we want to have a good understanding of the practice of being-in-community, we need to understand the concept of a person in African Philosophy. In African philosophical thought and practice, personhood is measured in terms of how the individual lives with others in the community (Matolino 2014b). What is it to become or be a person? What constitutes and defines a person varies greatly from culture to culture, entailing different rights, duties, kinship bonds and titles. Most attempts to define personhood recognise that the human person must extend beyond a merely biological basis to include some form of consciousness or rationality. The African concept of a person is an intricately interwoven notion that involves issues such as destiny, ancestors, life and death, community and individuality. Among the Bakweri of the Southwest Region of Cameroon, to whom I belong, as in other traditional African societies, life has meaning when there is a sense of belonging and living together. The Bakweri language considers the person as Moto (Wato, plural) and Mot’a Mboa as a person who is with others in the community. The essence of the person (Moto) is to be distinct yet relational as being-with-other persons in the community (Wato). The typical mode of being or existence among a Bakweri person strikes for the dialectic of the ‘I’ (Mba) and the ‘Other’ (Owa). It is from this dialectical balance between the ‘I’ (Mba) and ‘Other’ (Owa) that the Bakweri derive the name Mboa, which means Village or Community. Hence, the human person is always seen in terms of relationship; that is a being-with-and-for-others. The relationship between the individual and community is dialogical, for the identity of the individual and the community is dependent on this constitutive formation. The individual

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is not before the community, and neither is the community before the individual (Eze 2008). In such an interpersonal community, personhood is socially sanctioned through an individual’s participation in one’s respective community and depends largely on one’s ability to fulfil one’s social obligations. Personhood is an essentially social, communitarian concept that is attained through communal relations in that an individual involves herself or himself. If an individual maintains good communal relations with others and is in good standing with her or his community, then (s)he is a full person. If on the other hand, (s)he has poor relations with her or his fellow community members or is selfish, (s)he is seen as a non-person. Being a real person means being-with-and-for-others in the household, family and community. The individual neither questions her or his existence nor the existence of the other. The other is part of her or his existence as (s)he is because of others. The individual who cuts off from the family, clan or tribe cuts off from the community and life. Life has full meaning when it is lived in the community by participating in the life of the community and upholding certain social values. This explains why cultural features and rituals such as the naming of children, initiation rites, marriages and death ceremonies are fundamental or essential to personhood in African societies. Let us throw more light on being with others with the views of African scholars from different cultural contexts. In his Bantu Philosophy, Tempels attributes to the Bantu a collective ontology in which the human being, or person, is defined in terms of the community in which being is conceived as a ‘vital force’.2 The universe is explained as an interrelationship of forces within the entire realm of existence. The dynamic interrelationship of forces can be seen in a perceived hierarchy of beings running down from God, who is the origin of the vital force, through (wo)man (including the dead ancestors and the living community of humans), to the animate and inanimate world. Hence, personhood is sanctioned by some vital force which comes from the Creator to the person and influences her or his behaviour towards others in the community and the entire environment. Tempels explains the status of the ontological relationship within the community in these words: This concept of separate beings, of substance . . . which find themselves side by side, entirely independent one of another, is foreign to Bantu thought. The Bantu hold that created beings preserve a bond with another, an intimate ontological relationship, comparable with the causal tie which binds creatures with the Creator. For the Bantu, there is an interaction of being with being, that is to say, of force with force. (Tempels 1959:58)

Tempels is much more explicit in these words: The living ‘muntu’ is in relation of being to being with God, with his clan brethren, with his family and with his descendants. He is in a similar ontological

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relationship with his patrimony, his land, with all that it contains or produces, and with all that grows or lives on it. (Tempels: 1959:66)

For the Bantu, according to Tempels, (wo)man never appears as an isolated individual. Every (wo)man forms a link in the chain of vital forces, an individual within the group. From Tempels, one can infer that it is in communal interactions that one becomes a real person. An individual can only be with the group because, out of the group, life is devoid of being. ‘To be’ means to be with others. The person is part of the whole, which is essential, a corporate being. The various ways in which the concept of a person has been articulated below by African philosophers could enlighten the argument. The life and existence of the community are what John Mbiti largely ascertains in these words: What then is the individual and where is his place in the community? In traditional life, the individual does not and cannot exist alone except corporately. He owes his existence to other people, including those of past generations and his contemporaries. He is simply part of the whole. The community must therefore make, create, or produce the individual; for the individual depends on the corporate group. Physical birth is not enough: the child must go through rites of incorporation so that it becomes fully integrated into the entire society. These rites continue throughout the physical life of the person, during which the individual passes from one stage of corporate existence to another. The final stage is reached when he dies and even then, he is ritually incorporated into the wider family of both the dead and the living. (Mbiti:1969; 141)

Hence, according to Mbiti, the individual is an essentially communal being who owes his existence, allegiance and whole being to the community and cannot be alone nor without it. He stresses the symbiotic interconnectedness that exists between the individual and the community in these words: Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say: ‘I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.’ This is a cardinal point in the understanding of the African view of man. (Mbiti:1969:141)

In Southern African Philosophy, the maxim umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu – translated as ‘a person is a person through other persons’ (Shutte 1993; Mchunu 2011) – shows that basic respect and compassion for the well-being of others are seen as the defining features of humanity. It not only describes humanity as ‘being-with-others’ but it is also a prescription for how we should relate to others, that is, how ‘being-with-others’ should be practised (Louw 2001). This symbiotic rapport in the African conception of the person is what Engelbert Kofon reports in his study of the Bafut in Cameroon. ‘In Bafut and other parts of Cameroon, (wo)man is conceived as a corporate being. (S)he is a

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particular expression of the clan or community to which (s)he belongs. (S)he is being-with-and-for others. . . . Any young (wo)man who cuts off from her or his family – in the African sense – and becomes a person in what is more or less the Western sense, cuts off from life. (S)he is no longer a person in the Bafut sense’ (Kofon 1974:22). Hence, whereas for the Western mind, the individual or person is found in the same isolated, totally independent, and closed person, the African person is essentially related to the community. This difference is also highlighted by Jomo Kenyatta when he states that ‘Individuality is the ideal of life among the Western peoples while the ideal in African traditional societies is the right relations with and behaviour to other people’ (Kenyatta 1938:118). The late Nigerian philosopher, Ifeanyi Menkiti, in his seminal article, ‘Person and Community in African Traditional Thought,’ provides an account of the community that indicates a view of African communalism and how the social context of the community shapes and accounts for the normative nature of personhood. Menkiti also makes being-in-community central in articulating the African conception of personhood (Menkiti, 1984; 2004). He sees the community not only as constitutive of the person, as Tempels and Mbiti asserted, but as taking ontological and epistemic precedence over the individual. He opines that in traditional African thought, whatever rights an individual claims have to come second to the reality of the community. A community involves individuals that exemplify ‘beingness together’ or “beingness-with-others” (Menkiti 2004:324). A person, Menkiti affirms, cannot be defined by focusing on this or that physical or psychological characteristic of the lone individual as characteristic in Western thought. Rather, (wo)man is defined by the environing community (Menkiti: 1984: 171). Consequently, the Cartesian ‘I think, therefore I am’, which expresses the basis for the Western atomistic metaphysical view of personhood, identity, and autonomy is considered as ‘beingness alone’ (Menkiti 2004:324) as opposed to the African conception, which is ‘beingness together’ (Menkiti 1984:171). The community does not define metaphysical and biological humanness, but it defies social-moral personhood. Personhood is best decided by the community since ‘the reality of the communal world takes precedence over the reality of individual life histories, whatever these may be’ (Menkiti 1984:171). Menkiti states that the Western conception of personhood is minimal, while the African conception is maximal. He rejects the Western minimalist definition of a person, ‘whoever has a soul, or rationality, or will, or memory and describes the African view as ‘maximal”.’ Menkiti uses the word maximal to indicate that the African view of personhood includes other criteria and is not limited to the soul, rationality or one’s will. By this, he means that personhood is acquired through participation in the ‘rituals of incorporation and the overarching necessity of learning the social rules by which the community lives so that what was initially biologically given can come to attain social self-hood’ (Menkiti 1984:173). This is because, in the African context, an individual can be a human being without necessarily being a person. It is

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acquired through group solidarity (Menkiti 2004) that we learn to promote our humaneness with our humanness (Masolo 2009:155) and make us evolve from it-status of early childhood, marked by an absence of moral function, into the person-status of later years, marked by a widened maturity of ethical sense (Menkiti 1984:176). Hence, we become persons when we acquire and develop virtue, which is marked by our concern for the well-being of others and our participation in the socialisation process. Participation in various ceremonies and initiation rituals prescribed by the community marks one’s acquisition and practice of virtue. This is necessary for one to evolve from the it-status of the uninitiated to that of the person. Initiation, for example, not only incorporates one into personhood in the community but also creates a link between the initiated and the community of the ‘living-dead’ or ancestors (Ramose 1999:81,88). Among the Akan in southern Ghana, a person shows commitment to the values of the extensive network of the human (and ex-human) community (Wiredu 1996). The late Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye judged Menkiti’s account of being-in-community as philosophically indefensible. Menkiti’s idea of a person ‘acquiring full personhood’ or ‘becoming more of a person’ is, metaphysically, incomprehensible, unclear, incoherent and confusing, he stated (Gyekye 1997:47). Gyekye brands the communitarian approach of Tempels, Mbiti and Menkiti as ‘radical communitarianism’, and he claims his own as ‘moderate communitarianism’, which ‘acknowledges .  .  . individual responsibility and effort’ (Gyekye 1997:40), which he believes is the better approach. For Gyekye, radical communitarianism does not recognise individual freedom, and it exaggerates the importance of community in the understanding of personhood in African communal cultural orientations. Even though the individual is a social being he is other things as well. His main argument is that social or moral relationships are not essential defining features of personhood; they are instead accidental features that are not intrinsic to a person’s metaphysical ontology. In the individual’s relationship with the community, Gyekye opines that ‘The individual is by nature a social (communal) being, yes; but (s)he is, also by nature, other things as well; that is, (s)he possesses other attributes that may also be said to constitute her or his nature’ (Gyekye 1997:49). Gyekye uses some Akan proverbs to show the primary importance among the Akan people, although the individual is also shaped by the community. One such proverb says: ‘The clan is like the cluster of trees which, when seen from afar, appear huddled together, but which would be seen to stand individually when closely approached’ (Gyekye 1997:40). This proverb indicates ‘the natural sociality as well as the individuality of the human person’ (Gyekye 1997:40). Hence, Gyekye defines personhood as one’s contribution as a human being to the community. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that human beings are not only group members but also individuals and that they contribute to a group as individuals.

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His fellow countryman, the late Kwasi Wiredu, contributes to the debate on being-in-community but differs from the communitarian views in the sense that he does not consider issues like social relations, community rights, obligations and moral achievement as discussed above by Tempels, Mbiti and especially Gyekye. Wiredu (1995) focuses on the African metaphysical conception of personhood in a bid to understand the person as an independent entity that has certain characteristics that distinguish it from other living things. According to Wiredu, the Akan believe that there are basic and essential elements that are required for one to qualify as a person. These are nipadua (body), okra (a life-giving entity), and sunsum (that which gives a person his or her personality, and force)” (1995:132). He also adds the mogya, which is the blood which is derived from one’s mother and is the basis for clan identity, and the ntoro, which is inherited from one’s father and becomes the basis for membership into that clan. Gyekye differs from Wiredu’s interpretation of the okra and thinks that this human spirit is not physical or quasi-physical since this act or mode of seeing is not at the physical or spatial level (Gyekye: 1987:86) (see further Müller 2008,2023).3 Segun Gbadegesin (1991) also grounds his view on personhood in metaphysics. He focuses on the Yoruba of Nigeria and postulates that the eniyan (person) has four main structural components, namely the ara (body), okan (heart), emi (life-giving element) and ori (spiritual head, which is thought to be responsible for human destiny). These components of the person are interrelated in their functions in one person. Moreover, to be a full person, necessitates being-in-community. Gbadegesin explains that: The ‘I’ is just a ‘We’ from another perspective, and persons are therefore not construed as atomic individuals. A person whose existence and personality are dependent on the community is expected in turn to contribute to the continued existence of the community. This is the normative dimension of the concept of eniyan. The crown of personal life is to be useful to one’s community. The meaning of one’s life is therefore measured by one’s commitment to social ideals and communal existence. (Gbadegesin 1991:58)

Hence, even though each individual has these structural and functional elements which make one qualify as a person, they are not privatised but interdependent and linked to the community. The late Cameroonian philosopher Pierre Meinrad Hebga shares a similar view when he asserts that among the Basaa, three main elements make up a person: the Nyuu (body), Mbuu (breath), and Titi (shadow). His anthropological findings show that in some ethnic groups across sub-Saharan Africa, there are other additional elements such as the spirit and the heart (Hebga 1998:9). These components enjoy a certain inter (intra) personal co-presence, which reflects the totality of the person and is not a part or a component of the person. It is in this

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interrelationship, one of relation and separation, that the human person ‘overflows the space circumscribed by his body, and that he can be present and act beyond this one’ (Hebga 1998:152). It is the dynamics of this separation, which is virtual and not substantial, that account for the various phenomena that one often describes as paranormal. Hebga argues that the pluralist conception of the person, as we have seen above, enables us to understand and interpret paranormal phenomena beyond the Western dualist one of body versus soul or mind.

THE IFEANYI MENKITI-KWAME GYEKYE DEBATE ON PERSON AND COMMUNITY: AN OVERVIEW OF DEBATES AND INTERPRETATIONS For a while, major discussions of sub-Saharan African Philosophy on the relationship between the individual and the community have focused on what has become known today as the Ifeanyi Menkiti-Kwame Gyekye Debate on the Person and Community. Michael Eze notes that this debate has become a dominant feature of the epistemic syllabus of African Political Philosophy for almost thirty years (Eze 2018). These debates were at the fore in Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions (Vol. 7. No.2. May–August 2018). In this edition, African philosophers engage in conversations on how to speak or understand an individual and the way (s)he relates with the members of her or his community. Michael Eze (2018) classifies Menkiti and his followers as the processual versus the noumenal positions attributed to Gyekye and his followers. In a bid to go beyond their dualism, Eze disagrees with this ontological dualism and sees the relationship between the individual and community as contemporaneous – neither is prior. Molefi Kete Asante (2018) speaks of the ‘permanence of community’ which can exist without a specific individual. This new conception of community undercuts the classical debate between individual rights and the common good. The point is that this individual versus community dualism has become redundant since the idea of community in Africa is ontologically inclusive. This dichotomy distorts the traditional African conception of personhood (Amato, 2018). Edwin Etieyibo (2020) defends Menkiti’s use of the ‘it’ for the children or ‘it’ for the nameless dead as one animated by depersonalised moral standing or existence. He argues that one has a moral status as far as one lives in the community. And even the dead have a ‘higher weight or valuation’. Kai Horsthemke (2018) opines that Menkiti’s account of personhood is at once too wide and too narrow. He argues that Gyekye cannot completely claim that his communitarian theory is authentically African since it is hardly unique to the African experience.

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Horsthemke goes further by critically reflecting on the implications of African communalism and personhood for non-human animals. Polycarp Ikuenobe (2018) defends Menkiti’s conception of personhood against the criticisms of Bernard Matolini and Gyekye, who opine that Menkiti’s thesis degrades individual rights and autonomy. Ikuenobe asserts that Menkiti’s account of the connection between the community and personhood is a social-moral thesis. Matolino (2018) thinks the Menkiti-Gyekye debate is an old one and beckons philosophers to devote more time to understanding the role of the individual as an active and responsive political agent. He opines that contemplating the communitarian polity will show the shortcomings of Menkiti and Gyekye. Jonathan Chimakonam (2018) takes issue with Menkiti and Gyekye for erroneously endorsing an unqualified version of communitarianism, on the one hand, and Matolino and Eze, who employed the qualified version, but failed to ground it in a non-Western or African logic, on the other. He argues that while the Western or Aristotelian logic grounds the unqualified version making it difficult to defend autonomy and rights within it, an African logic can be used to ground a qualified version of communitarianism to bring out an African cultural value such as complementarity, which affirms the identity of the individual first, to justify communal values such as solidarity and the common good. Ada Agada and Ojah Egbai (2018) seek to synthesise Menkiti’s radical communitarianism with Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism with what they call a ‘transcendental thesis’. They opine that the community and the individual may be contemporaneous, but it is the community that sits over the appeal of the individual. They show how the pro-community perspective of Menkiti and Gyekye can be significant for intercultural philosophy and the continuing advancement of Afro-communitarianism. In the final entry, Menkiti (2018) makes a retrospective statement and reaffirms his original position in the debate. He ascertains that the ‘human’ and ‘person’ in the African moral world are essentially the same and not opposed. In other words, he incites a new articulation and understanding of personhood to what Eze terms a cumulative moral subjective. In another article, Motsamai Molefe (2016) defends Menkiti’s conception of ‘personhood’ as a perfectionist moral theory to the effect that one ought to lead a morally excellent life in a context of ‘being-with-others’. Secondly, he endorses what Menkiti conceives of an African political theory as one that is duty-based. He highlights that Menkiti’s contribution poses a challenge to African philosophers to justify their ontological commitment to rights. He concludes by drawing our attention to the fact that Gyekye, in his latter political philosophy writings, endorses Menkiti’s

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duty-based political theory, that rights take secondary consideration to duties. Menkiti’s articulations of an African conception of personhood have become very influential in African Philosophy and still raise debates and influence African philosophers to this day. Recognising the importance of his philosophical legacy, Edwin Etieyibo and Polycarp Ikuenobe (2020) have edited a book with fifteen chapters titled Menkiti on Community and Becoming a Person. The various contributors show that Menkiti’s account of personhood in the context of community is both fundamental and foundational to epistemological, metaphysical, logical, ethical, legal, social and political issues in African thought systems.

GROUNDING AFRICAN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT ON BEING-IN-COMMUNITY The African conception and practice of personhood as discussed above also served as a basis for nationalist–ideological philosophy among the first wave of post-independence leaders, or nationalist-ideological politicians who also doubled as Africa’s pioneer intelligentsia (Masolo 2004:488), such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (1909–1972), Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal (1906–2001), Ahmed Sékou Toure of Guinea-Conakry (1922–1984), Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (1922–1999), and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (1924–2021). In a bid to foster national construction and freedom from colonial oppression, they elaborated an African political theory based on African communitarianism. They were critical of colonialism for bringing an alien political system intrinsically linked to capitalism and its individualistic foundations into the European context, which is in contradistinction to the way that African traditional life was lived on the continent. Consequently, they produced their political philosophies based on a combination of Marxist-Leninist thoughts on the one hand and their indigenous cultural heritage on the other. They opined that this new orientation of communalism, later known as African socialism, could most authentically suit Africa’s cultural specificities and moral merits. They all relied on traditional African social and political structures to justify their desire to pursue socialism. Those social and political structures assumed a communitarian view of the person, in which the community came before the individual. Hence, it is from these theoretical underpinnings of being-in-community, largely informed by the concept of person, that each of them developed their political ideologies. Nkrumah referred to as ‘communalism’ (1970), what Senghor called ‘a community-based society’ (1964), and what Nyerere referred to as Ujamaa, meaning ‘familyhood’ (1968). From these theories, we notice

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the communitarian understanding of the African person as crucial in the elaboration of their theories and the well-being of the community, because the emphasis is on the connection between community development and individual well-being (Mosima 2018, 2019). Even though we have had discussions between the radical and moderate versions of communitarianism, some African scholars think that being-incommunity is the basis of well-being in African Philosophy. Philosophers like Hountondji and Oruka have, however, explicitly charged these communitarian views as ethnophilosophy, which is a branch of African Philosophy. Hountondji, for example, contends that ethnophilosophy presents itself as that of peoples rather than individuals, the parasitic and unproductive recourse to the thinking of the group. It prefers to hide unproductively behind the thinking of the group by abstaining from taking its own position and from expressing itself on problems to which that thinking of the ancestors reacted in its own way. Ethnophilosophy speaks only of Bantu philosophy, Dogon philosophy and Bakweri philosophy. As such, its scope is collective, tribal, and of the worldview variety: Indeed, Bantu Philosophy did open the floodgates to a deluge of essays which aimed to reconstruct a particular Weltanschauung, a specific worldview commonly attributed to all Africans, abstracted from history, and change and philosophical, through an interpretation of the customs and traditions, proverbs and institutions-in short, various data-concerning the cultural life of African peoples. (Hountondji 1983:34)

Hountondji argues that the main task of the philosopher should be to conquer ethnophilosophy. The heavy obstacle pressed on it by the thesis of obligatory unanimity among all Africans should be removed. This is because ethnophilosophy hinges on the anthropological concept of philosophy; the idea of a philosophy spontaneously understood as a collective system of beliefs has never been thematised clearly. He thinks African socialism was based on ethnophilosophy and Nkrumah, for example, adopted arbitrary metaphysical assumptions. Oruka, on his part, interviewed individual sages and made a distinction between the folk sage and the philosophic sage. The folk sage, according to Oruka, has much knowledge about the popular wisdom of their community, but their thoughts do not go beyond this popular wisdom. The philosophic sage may not know all the popular wisdom of their community as the folk sage does, but they have the potential of making independent critical assessments of what people in their community take for granted. It is the philosophic sage who enjoys a dialectical game with the interviewer or sagacious didactics (Oruka 1991:36).

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To my mind, Hountondji and Oruka need a rethink here. This is because they are so obsessed with classical individual-centred rationality. They do not consider how social institutions and social processes structure and restrain individual consciousness, impose and warp judgement and contaminate it with collective representations. Hountondji’s view of the individual and people is monolithic in that it is full of much consistent rationality in the individual. The notion of African people living in communities, today is full of complexities as advanced by communitarian thinkers above.

CONCLUSION My major concern in this chapter has been to discuss being-in-community as the basis of well-being in African Philosophy. My special focus was on how philosophers have developed their main ideas on well-being as a philosophy of personhood. Personhood is taken to be crucial in debates among African philosophers, as they have tried to articulate how persons ought to live their lives in relation to their community. From the discussions and different perspectives above, we have seen that the individual can only be seen as a part of her or his community as (s)he finds meaning and fulfilment in the way the community lives. I think what comes out of these debates points to the essence of the community, as the well-being of the community implies the well-being of the individual. It is not about just living well; it is about living well together. The complete African person is involved in positive relationships with others. The insufficiently developed individual can hardly attain happiness or prosperity outside of nature and the community. This merging of the individual with the community also brings about obligations and duties towards achieving the common good or general welfare. From this African base, I have also engaged with Western philosophy and argued that traditional African values such as being-in-community could enrich Global Development Ethics with more humane, other-related feelings than just economic production and growth. Understanding the dynamics of being-in-community opens up diverse ways of knowing how humans relate to the rest of nature, how community thrives and how dialogues could be fostered in and beyond those communities. The more we know about beingin-community and that development is culturally determined, the more we can begin to diversify our strategies for the possibility of more fairness and meaningful development across the globe. It is an invitation to look across cultural and historical barriers in a bid to face the global challenges haunting our common future and collective survival.

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NOTES 1. For more on communitarianism and its criticisms of liberalism, see, for example, MacIntyre 1981; Sandel 1982; Walzer 1985. For in-depth essays on the communitarian criticism of the liberal conception of the self, see Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit (1992). 2. For more on ontological communalism, see, for example, Ikuenobe 2006; Menkiti 1984, 2004; Mbiti 1969; Hebga 1998. 3. For an overview of the Akan philosophers’ discussion on the nature of the human spirit—okra, sunsum—see also Müller 2008.

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Nkrumah, Kwame. Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization. New York: Monthly Press, 1970. Nyerere, Julius. K. Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968. Opoku, Kofi Asare, West African Traditional Religion, Jurong, Singapore: FEP International Private Limited, 1978. Oruka, Henry. O. Sage Philosophy. Nairobi: Acts Press, 1991. Plato, [Transl. by Desmond Lee]. Republic. Translated by D Lee. London: Penguin Classics, 2007 [Origin. fourth-century text]. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. Ramose, Mogobe B. African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books Publishers, 2005 [Origin 1999]. Sarpong, Peter K., “Aspects of Akan Ethics,” Ghana Bulletin of Theology, 4, no. 3 (1972): 40–54. Senghor, Léopold Sédar. On African Socialism. Paris: Présence Africaine, 1964. Shutte, A. Philosophy for Africa. Rondebosch: UCT Press, 1993. ———. Ubuntu: An Ethic for the New South Africa. Cape Town: Cluster Publications, 2001. Taiwo, Olufemi. “Against African Communalism.” Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy-Revue de la Philosophie Française et de Langue Française Vol XXIV, no. 1 (2016): 81–100. Tempels, Placide. Bantu Philosophy [Orig. Bantoe-Filosofie]. Paris [orig. Antwerpen]: Présence Africaine [orig. De Sikkel], 1959 [orig.1945]. Tshivase, Mpho. “Two Personhood: Social Approval or Unique Identity?.” Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy/Revue Africaine de Philosophie 25, no. 1–2 (2014): 119–40. Wiredu, Kwasi. “The Concept of Mind.” In Readings in African Philosophy: An Akan Collection, edited by Safro Kwame, 125–45. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995. ———. Cultural Universals and Particulars. An African Perspective. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996.

Chapter 4

Personhood, Well-Being and Ethical Maturity in African Philosophy Alloy S. Ihuah

There are two strands of personhood in African Philosophy; one that encapsulates the communal conception and one that emphasises individual moral responsibility. This chapter examines both strands and interrogates the place of individual rights, capacities and abilities in the evolving human personality. It is argued that personhood in African societies resonates with human existence, combining the individual’s moral, spiritual, economic and physical well-being. A deconstruction of the current debate on personhood in Africa reveals the ontological and epistemological consequences of assuming the primacy of the reality of the communal world over the reality of individual life. I argue that in Africa, each person exists as an interdependent being, and personhood comes as a gift through others, though this does not have ontological and epistemological precedence over individual persons. The individual, on his/her lone level, experiences varying modes of competing epistemologies that activate his/her moral arsenals to evaluate, protest, distance, and effect reform on some features of the community to ingratiate his/ her widely varying needs and interests. A CONCEPTUAL LABYRINTH OF PERSONHOOD Personhood is a concept that elicits plural meanings. Euro-Western scholars have argued that being an actual person in the first place is important, and determining what or who a person is involves setting boundaries. In their reasoned articulation, Baldwin and Capstick (2007) opine that ‘where someone falls concerning those boundaries will determine whether s/he is considered a person or a “non-person”’. Some have argued otherwise and think that personhood equates simply with being a human being. For Africans, the idea of 89

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human fellow feeling has been added as a definition of personhood while also highlighting the importance of the physical body as another quality of personal identity. African scholars, like Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye and Motsamai Molefe, have argued in this direction that, to be a person in Africa, one needs not just to be born of human heritage but to have also achieved certain socio-ethical standards in the community. Accordingly, personhood is not biologically transmitted but acquired by an individual as s/he matures in society. On the strength of this proposition, Menkiti distinguishes between being a human and being a person. Referencing Tempels, Menkiti on the one hand refers to man as muntumutupu (a man of average importance) – and on the other hand, a ‘person’ muntumukulumpe (a powerful man, a man with a great deal of force)’ (Menkiti 1984:172). So, in African Philosophy, many scholars think that it is not enough for one to be merely a human being; more is required, s/he is supposed to become a person – we are supposed to achieve it. For Menkiti and his likes, the notion of a person or personhood includes the idea of excellence and ‘plenitude of force at maturation’ (Gyekye 1984, 2011; Menkiti 1984; Wiredu 1992; Wiredu and Gyekye 1992). This section shall deconstruct these varied approaches to personhood to tease out an integrated view of African personhood. In doing this, I shall appraise the following approaches: The Inherent Theory of Personhood This theory posits that being a person carries with it a sacred and unique appeal to a right sense of reasoning. Understood as such, the human person is an individual of a rational nature that transcends bodily quality. This theory embodies a unique inner essence of the human person that is eternal, beyond the material entity, existing intact underneath all the neurological losses with qualities which include self-transcendence (Nor 2010:41). This theory helps understand the concept of personhood, though it ignores the interdependent element that grows the individual ethical maturity that promotes human well-being. The Capacity-Based Theory of Personhood This theory holds that the ability to think and reason logically is a qualification for personhood. The possession of rationality is argued here as essential to human personality (Cooley 2007:37–44). According to Peter Singer, personhood is the quality of self-awareness. He says, to be ‘persons’ and to deserve moral consideration, beings must be self-aware and capable of perceiving themselves as individuals through time, and that no newborn infants are ‘persons’. He contends further that, some people with lifelong

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cognitive disabilities through injury, Alzheimer’s disease, or other causes cease to be ‘persons’ (Singer 1993). This point has been further clarified by Warren (1973), who defined six criteria for personhood, namely consciousness, reasoning, self-motivating activity, capacity to communicate, presence of self-concept and self-awareness. Indeed, the capacity ‘to perceive oneself as existing over time is considered an important qualification for personhood’ (Buchanan 1988:277–302). This conceptualisation of personhood is not only Western in context and content, but it also excludes human beings that lack the capacity for integrated and goal-directed behaviour. Its understanding is not adequate for the appreciation of the concept of personhood in African societies that is founded on dialogue and reciprocity, where the group priority over the individual defines human well-being and ethical maturity. It sounds more reasonable to hold that a person, without prejudice to any condition, is a combination of both spiritual and material elements created by the ultimate being, or God, in his image and likeness to coexist within the entire organism of humanity. Moreover, rationality is a precondition for personhood, though it is structured within the community to enhance greater self-improvement. The Body Theory of Personhood This theory holds that personhood is bestowed on a particular person whose human existence is linked to a physical body in a particular cultural and historical context. This theory points to the fact that persons are embodied and socially embedded, inter-subjectively involved and historically conditioned agents. This materialist interpretation of the human person views her or him as a being that has concrete, solid and physical (substance) with rationality, consciousness and experience. This matches with Heidegger’s existential denomination of the human being (Dasein), which means ‘being there’, exclusively used to refer to the being that we are. Thus understood, the human person is constitutive of a physical body and mind with the capacity for thought, reflection and communication. Unlike the Cartesian mindbody dualism, the two are a unified form which experiences the world and expresses itself in a bodily form. This theory reveals an aspect of the human person, though it lacks African qualities of personhood such as belongingness, relatedness and those related to communication. The Communal Theory of Personhood This theory reflects a relationship-based understanding of personhood. It supposes that personhood entails an authentic engagement of oneself with others in the community. Kitwood (1967:8) informs us rightly that personhood

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refers to a social standing that is bestowed upon one human being by others in the context of social relationships. This theory is popular among Menkiti, Wiredu, Okere and many other African philosophers for whom community not only implies the growth of the person but also that the origin of the life of its members is sourced from the lives of other members of the community. Accordingly, personhood is acquired ‘‘as one who participates in communal life through the discharge of the various obligations defined by one’s stations’ (Menkiti 1984:196). What is argued is that an individual’s existence makes meaning only to the extent that s/he connects with other members of the community. This means that the individual member of the community is open and available to other of its’ members. This communitarian theory of personhood, like others before it, has failed to give a satisfactory view of the African concept of personhood on the count that it has omitted the very important element of individual identity, moral duty/role to oneself in and within his or her community. While humanity is not made for self-sufficiency but for interdependence and fellowship, it can only be achieved by seeking the whole from the units. Individuals with communal personhood can re-evaluate and refine existing communal goals, values, and practices (Wiredu 2006:21). Communal persons have not only the ability to come up with their moral preferences, which differ from the dominating communal norms, but they can also take a critical look at their community’s normative framework. Individual capacities and abilities are thus important in growing communities, as communal norms help the individual persons to grow into personhood.

PERSONHOOD IN AFRICAN HERITAGE African wisdom literature argues out a philosophy of human well-being with the Tiv people’s (Nigerian) expression, uma ka orjime (a meaningfully lived life is anchored on human fellow feeling). Expressed as such, the oral corpus of African Philosophy presents a way of thinking which holds that African well-being implies solidarity among individuals. The whole existence, from birth to death, is organically embodied in a series of associations, and life thus appears to have full value only in those close ties. This means that we cannot be fully human in isolation. It is in the same spirit that Chinua Achebe writes: A man who calls his kinsmen to a feast does not do so to save them from starving. They all have food in their homes. When we gather in the moonlit village ground, it is not because of the moon. Every man can see it in his compound. We come together because it is good for kinsmen to do so. (Achebe 1959:55)

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This idea of communal living in Africa has intrinsic value, which means that life grows more meaningfully in solidarity with other members of the community. Thus, the human capacity to commune with one another aids in the development of a reliable disposition for character formation and the promotion of long-term relationships and communion of minds. Even ordinary conversations and storytelling under the moonlight are always about people and their existential conditions in life; with hands empty, though, their hearts and minds are full of life-saving solutions. This explains the communal conception of personhood as what is acquired through participation in communal life as the individual persons discharge their various moral obligations in the community. This conceptual frame shall now be interrogated within the precinct of African oral traditions and customs. In names, Africans teach, instruct, motivate and inspire personal identity. Names are warehouses of religious and philosophical truth that aid the development of the person. They reveal our being, our thoughts and aspirations, and express our relationship with our maker. African names also represent our attempt to understand the universe and ourselves, our place in the universe, and our attempt to achieve order in our human midst. One’s name, therefore, constitutes who one is the essence, without which one is no person. To be known by a name is to be dependent and linked with the one who utters it, and to know all a (wo) man’s names is to have a special claim upon him (Kaunda 1967:45). The Shona name purombomunhu (even the poor are human beings) is a classical expression of an African principle of the sanctity of life. This is that life is understood to originate from the Divine Being and that it is not only a core condition of personhood but also defines the equality between human beings, rich or poor, with or without children. Names not only express the dignity of the human person, but they also express life itself. Uma (soul), Ishima (Heart/Life) among the Tiv express a very comprehensive philosophical notion of human life, which on the one hand includes the world, the universe and creation, with all its grandeur, including the non-physical forces which constitute the cosmic reality. Thus, the Ebira sums up this philosophy of life as Ozovehe (oza o vi eheni), meaning ‘‘the human person is life’ (Ehusani 1991:143). Ehusani argues further and pointedly that, Yoruba names like Omololu, that is, ‘children are supreme and lords,’ Omolade that is, children are the crown of life, Owootọmọ, that is, ‘‘Money is not as valuable as children’. This not only resonates with deep human fellow feeling and or an indication of the supremacy of life, but they also indeed define personhood among these ethnic nationalities. Among the Igbo in particular, names like Maduka, that is, the human person is greatest; Ndubuisi that is, ‘‘Human life is first’; Ndubueze that is, ‘‘Human life is King’ most prominently express life as an essential quality of personhood ordained by the Supreme Being. Similarly, the Etsako people have names like Oyone–’the human person is

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greatest’; Oyarebu–’ the human person is strength’; Omoyetse–’children are the essence of life’ (Ehusani 1991:143). Life cannot be quantified or compared with material things, and so any material gain(s) of whatever quantity or quality is not and cannot be a substitute for life. These expressions go a long way in affirming the dignity of the human person whose interaction with his/her fellow human beings discovers his humanness. As the Zulus would say, Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu, which means that a person is a person through other persons (Beight 2007:5). The concept of personhood in Africa is similarly found in proverbs. African proverbs serve as the storehouse and medium of African humanistic heritage. They express people’s observations and reflections in a condensed form on human life, human relationships, human society and human destiny. They depict the attitudes and beliefs of Africans and their outlook on life. They are channels through which human communion and communication are made possible, and hence proverbs are like horses searching for truth and meaning in existence. So it is that human fellow feeling in a relationship is cherished above any quantity and quality of material acquisition. Among the Ebira of Nigeria, therefore, such humanistic expression is found in the following proverbs (Ehusani 1991:156). Irehiondu o dahi hu irehiavutani (a house of fools is better than a house of lizards) Oza o ma siozamoenyi re (one does not use a human being to measure a river). Eyi ozas goro-goro vi uhuo (the very presence of a person is a knife or sword). These proverbs have shown that the person is the measure of all things and incomparable with material things. In Ebira ontology, then, life is worthless and meaningless without other human beings. Personhood is thus measured above all that there is, and the human person is believed to possess something that even the lion and the elephant do not have a spiritual force, a divine spark in him (chi in Igbo, ɔkra in Twi). The Yoruba of Nigeria recognise this human worth by saying, Fi funni owo fun, ko to eniaiyi (Money and material may shine and glitter, but they do not match human worth) and that, Amo rereni Olorun fi mo awoneda (It is good clay that God used in moulding a human being). For the Igbo of Nigeria, life consists of the mutual interdependence between natural and supernatural forces, in which (wo)man must find a peaceful place if (s) he is not to endanger her or his existence. Using the symbolic breaking of the kola-nut, which for the Igbo is life, (wo)man calls all beings and forces to communion by saying: ‘S/he who lives above, the giver of life, we thank you Ani (the Earth Goddess) come and eat kola-nut Amadioha (God of thunder) come and eat kola-nut. May the river not dry up and may the fish not die; we shall live’ (Momoh 2000:372). This idea of life argues that any negative behaviour or action on the part of the individual can affect collective living and spells doom for the entire human race–there is no individual immortality as such, because there is no isolated

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force. But there is the immortality of life force in which the individual life force participates in the advancement of the general well-being of all. The understanding here is that ‘“life is real, more meaningful when we interact very closely with other human beings”. Such is perhaps the informing African philosophical dictum, as expressed by the Kenyan philosopher John Mbiti ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore, I am.’ (Mbiti 1970:141). This most obviously explains why long life is seen as a blessing, and any threat to life is viewed as an aggression against the entire community that must be squarely tackled. The treatment above affords us the philosophical basis for concluding that the foundations of African culture have established that life is foundational to personhood. The Tiv of Nigeria refer to this foundational element as uma (human spirit), also known as ɔkra by the Akan; a constitutive element of the innermost self, the essence of the person; identical with life, which is equated as a divine spark of the Supreme Being. Gyekye (1984:85) informs us here that the presence of this divine essence in a human being may have been the basis of the Akan proverb, “All men are the children of God; no one is the child of the earth”. Thus, personhood is before what an individual has acquired in life. Thus, the person is first of all an individual, unique, unrepeatable reality (Mondin 2007:247). An individual’s being is defined by its intrinsic value more than what one has acquired in material possessions. In Africa, wholeness, which makes the person a related being to the community, does not take away from his/her self-individuality, it only adds to his/ her being to make him/her a communing being, relating and seeing individual self. It only means that each individual sees every other individual member as another self in terms of incorporating ‘‘an organic dimension in the relationship between the component individuals, creating a collectivity in the truest sense’ (Menkiti:178).

PERSONHOOD AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT The breakthrough in technological medicine, communication, and agricultural technology in the last century has brought about the most glamorous civilisation and the best of times in the history of mankind. However, the present age could also be described as the worst of times. This is because of the rate of deterioration in our ecological system and the ever-looming threat of a nuclear Holocaust through wars or accidental detonations, and unethical activities of the scientific and technological community. Consequentially, the twentieth century has seen the emergence of the machine and the dehumanisation of the human person. While technology has eased (wo)man’s drudgery and improved his or her quality of life, a person’s physical and psychical capabilities are either underused or artificialised. The twenty-first century has

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added to this the artificialisation and dehumanisation by inventing life-taking and life-sustaining devices. Above all, technological advancement in nuclear weapons threatens the continued existence of humanity and even the whole range of living things. The suggestion here is that while on the one hand technology has enhanced human existence, on the other hand, it is no doubt an agent of depersonalisation. African ontology teaches that human life has its origin in the High God, or the Supreme Being and that the essence of life remains with this being. This means that the human person transcends the merely physical and material worlds. Endowed with spirituality and more like the creator than other creatures, (s)he maintains a mystical communion not only with the creator but also with the elements of ‘the world in-between’. This dual character and quality of the human person, similarly, demands a developmental attitude that rhymes with it, that is, the employment of the instrument of science with humility, compassion and non-violence. Kim Yersu stretches this point further: Since a human person is possessed of both mind and body, requiring both spiritual and material fulfilment, the pursuit of wealth must be tempered by the cultivation of a mind. Outer satisfactions of a material kind should be enhanced by the inner satisfaction of the mind and spirit, and vice versa. (Yersu 1999:43)

The argued point here is that the individual as a person may attain tranquillity through material and spiritual means, though, to be in a state of wellness; human well-being encompasses harmonious relationships with family and friends and emotional and physical health. Thus, human well-being is achieved through established communion and communicative relationships with community members in a peaceful, corporeal, protective environment that can achieve their social goals and aspirations. This human condition promotes work and recreation, the positive feeling of one’s community, and personal safety in the advancement of one’s material and mental well-being. It is this proactive step that is sure to bring about a definitive solution to the problems of development and environmental degradation that affect human personhood. In a way, this entails ‘the progressive economic and social development of human society through maintaining the security of livelihood for all peoples and by enabling them to meet their present needs, together with a quality of life following their dignity and well-being’ (Sands 1993:102). This is a clarion call not to lose the humanist essence of African culture but to promote and defend the value of and concern for human well-being. This calls for the true meaning and quality of personhood. The questions of who decides the quality of life, whether the present resources match the world’s population, and whether the lifestyles of people from different regions are in accord with the integrity and the nature of creation are all issues of grave

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importance in understanding what human well-being is all about. This calls to mind the question of sustainable human development as a pathway to human well-being. In Africa, the human being is at the apex of cosmogenesis in the hierarchy of beings. This means that (s)he bears in a translucent manner the principle responsible for the process of being. This is supported by an analysis of the concept of Mmadu (Man) in Igbo philosophy and its equivalents ozovehe in Ebira and Or-Che Uma in Tiv cultural philosophies. Variously understood, Mmadu, Ozovehe and Or-Che Uma signify the ‘totality’, ‘beauty’ and ‘essential appreciation of personhood’. For the Africans, this concept indicates that “man is the beauty of life’; the beauty of all that is, therefore the plenitude of cosmic life”. In Africa and for Africans, therefore, life is the defining criterion of all that (wo)man is, materially and spiritually. In addition to the criterion of life, personhood is laced with good deeds; being a rational, moral agent (or-dedo) that is, a good (wo)man who by this definition is ‘a person who is in a harmonious social relationship with the human community’ and other created elements in the promotion of the well-being of the whole person and good neighbourliness (Ihuah 2000:138). This concept of personhood was well acknowledged by Wiredu and Gyekye when they wrote, More than this one is required to make concrete material contributions to the well-being of one’s lineage, which is quite a sizeable group of people. A series of events in the lineage, such as marriage, births, illnesses, and deaths, gives rise to urgent obligations. The individual who can meet these in a timely and adequate manner is the true person. (Wiredu and Gyekye 1992:107)

While arguing that this form of socialisation advances the human personality, it suffices to state that personhood in Africa requires an individual investment in the moral and material development of the human person. It requires first and foremost the individual’s will and his or her critical evaluation of the mores of a given community that are ethically guided to promote and protect life and the well-being of the person.

PERSONHOOD AND ETHICAL MATURITY: BEYOND THE COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE The human person, by its very nature, is a metaphysical being. It goes beyond its immediate material limitations towards ideal self-realisation, and immaterial existence. Thus, we are because there are things in existence. The idea here is that the search of the individual human being to identify himself or

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herself concerning the external realities is a search for his or her well-being. Robert Ulrich articulates the African mind when he says, For the person who thinks and relates himself to the other objects in the world: he extends as it were, his mental aerial outside himself into a universe which is not his own, though he is a part of it. Without this process of ‘going beyond oneself or self-transcendence,’ the individual will be mentally closed in his shell. (Ulrich 2010:37)

As argued above, human well-being presupposes a life lived meaningfully through human fellow feelings and solidarity among persons. Well-being involves social and leisure activities that lead to higher levels of wellbeing. For the African, therefore, personhood exudes an ethic of existence that is organically embodied in a series of associations and activities that portray life as fully valuable only in those close ties. Chinua Achebe recalls this intrinsic quality of African community living as a cord that grows solidarity for human flourishing. The Igbo and Tiv ethnic communities are examples in this regard. He reminiscences the philosophy of these ­communities, thus: ‘We come together because it is good for kinsmen to do so’ (1959:55). Thus, a well-evolved life is engineered by intrinsic goals, such as personal growth or having rich social relationships, more than extrinsic goals, such as acquiring wealth or social recognition. It is not just to have more; rather, it must mean to be more, here understood as human flourishing, achieving the totality of the human person. However, we must now re-evaluate the bifurcation of personhood into the communally induced personality and the individual (moral responsibility) identity by African philosophers such as Menkiti, Gyekye and their likes. In their works, the individual appears more like an accident in the community (essence or substance). Such a strong distinction undermines the conceptualisation of human wholeness and wellness, as it promotes tension and disharmony in human societies, which harm the individual as well as the common good. All forms of tension that occur and manifest between the ‘self’ (the individual personality) and the ‘other’ (other individual personalities) in our societies and the world today are traceable to such a strict and polarised ontology. Tiv ontology Ayatutu philosophy comes in handy as an example of a veritable alternative programme to neutralise this tension and engender a balanced human relationship among diverse cultures and individuals. This African ontology credibly fills that gap by delicately erasing the line between the varied individual personalities and infusing the idea of missing links and complementarity into our understanding, interpretation and practice of human relationships.

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In this regard then, the individual is a dependent agent of the community for the fulfilment of his/her interest as has been succinctly put by Mbiti; In traditional life, the individual does not and cannot exist alone except corporately. He owes his existence to other people, including those of the past generations and his contemporaries. He is simply part of the whole. The community must therefore make, create or produce the individual, for the individual depends on the corporate group. (Mbiti 1990:108)

The informed idea here is that the individual understands and appreciates the meaning of community, as further re-echoed by Mbiti (1990:108–109) that ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore, I am’. What this supposes is that African ideas of personality allude to the ocular fact that humanity is one and should, therefore, see one another as serving a missing link of reality and not as fragments of existence. This will dismantle walls of ethnicity and curb the problems it breeds, namely hatred, division, ethnicity, violence and wars. Thus, every person has a unique personality, though s/he exists for no other reason than to share their unique qualities with other members of the community. In this view, the process of achieving personhood goes beyond mere socialisation. It is a conscious effort by the human person to make oneself who s/he is or is going to be. Humanity must transcend its narrow definitions and beliefs of ‘self’ and ‘other’, ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’, towards the hospitality of humanity for the joy of being. Human beings are not only responsible for their existence and individuality, but also for each other as well as for all things necessary for a genuine state of cohesion, mutual dependence and healthy human existence. This is a state of a morally well-evolved human being, who by this estimation, is in harmony with both his species and the rest of nature; one who is in a social relationship with others and is promoting the common good. Thus, the conceptualisation of personhood as a communal phenomenon that is acquired ‘as one participates in communal life through the discharge of the various obligations defined by one’s stations’ (Menkiti 1984:176) is not wholly acceptable. Construing the community as always before the individual diminishes the individual’s self-determination and tramples on his or her rights. The person encounters moral options and choices that s/he alone can make and accounts for it as an individual member of the community. The Tiv of Nigeria would say; me yav gambe a wam kwagh (think over a matter to be rationally counselled to take an informed decision). Thus, the communal ethos has ontological and epistemological relevance in the socialisation of (wo)man though, to rule out the reality of individual choice; rationality or logical reasoning ability, will or capacity to decide on critical matters that affect his or her destiny is to misappropriate the foundational (metaphysical)

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component of personhood. By making a choice, (wo)man ‘gives birth to oneself’, ceases to be merely a ‘child of nature’ and becomes a conscious personality; a spiritual being, a being that determines itself. Even though some African societies favour a notion of communal personhood, the idea of individual moral autonomy remains a priority for many others. The Yoruba, the Bini and the Tiv ethnic groups of Nigeria are a case in point. They allow room for self-determination (and thereby individual moral responsibility). The case in point here is the allegory of a person’s choice of ori (destiny or inner head) in Yoruba culture. Gbadegesin informs that three unborn friends were warned by their friends to go directly to the house of Ajala, the place where they would choose their ori. Two of the friends followed the advice of their friends, the third one decided to go see his father before choosing his ori. The two who went directly to get their ori received a bad destiny and the third, after having met some divination priests at his father’s place, having followed their advice to perform sacrifices and having overcome some obstacles, received a good ori. (Gbadegesin 1999)

Similarly, the Bini of Nigeria holds the view that human personality is predetermined by the Supreme Being, Osanobuwa. Babatunde informs us rightly that The Bini maintain that before their existence on earth, the individual goes before Osanobuwa, the Supreme Being, to make the main events of her or his life manifest. The Ehi, the spiritual component, is the active participant in this exercise of predestining the self. This individual-in-potency, in awe and reverence, tells Osanobuwa, the Creator, what kind of life (s)he wishes to lead and what fortunes (s)he wants to attend her or his efforts when (s)he gets down to the world of the living, agbon. (Babatunde 1989:276)

As is reflected above, the notion of communal personhood not only accommodates self-determination (and thereby individual moral responsibility) over a notion of communal personhood in which individuals blindly follow communal norms; it is laced with the idea of destiny that is predetermined by metaphysical forces. Among the Bini of southern Nigeria, for example, Osanobuwa, the Supreme Being puts a seal on the chosen wishes of the individual that cannot be changed by communal norms. Here reflected, selfdetermination props up in pair with a mature and reflective way of dealing with communal norms and expectations. This is the proper reading of the African notion of personhood, which argues that ‘‘individuals with communal personhood can re-evaluate and refine existing communal goals, values, and practices outside of the dominating communal norm by taking a critical look at their community’s normative framework’ (Gyekye 2011:21).

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In Africa, therefore, the individual and the community coalesce to grow a moral person that belongs to a category of reality encompassing beings of a certain type: rational, moral agents using language. Menkiti’s thesis that ‘personhood is a quality acquired as one gets older’ rests on an inaccurate analysis of the prevailing currents of thought in African communities. Here, Menkiti, Gyekye, Wiredu, and to some extent Mbiti and others have exaggerated the normative notion of personhood above the metaphysical one and sought to rest the ethnocentric-inspired assumption that there is a way of thinking congenial to all African societies. It may not be out of place to vouch that personhood in the African conceptual scheme is beyond the normative thread of Menkiti and his co-intellectual travellers. Take an example from the Afowa proverb which states, ‘A belief that the child does not know anything made the elders lose a war.’ This saying suggests that knowledge and wisdom have no barriers on account of age and that the youth, like the elders, are equal partners in growing the ethics of the community. To argue as Menkiti (1984:72) does that ‘The older an individual becomes, the more of a person s/he becomes’ and that ‘What an old man sees sitting down, a young man cannot see standing up’ betrays the true African concept of personhood as an acquired quality of life which is not necessarily related to age. In Africa, while the youth may have a different point of view from that of an older individual, both are persons by virtue of their humanity (Ihuah 2010:184). The oral history espoused above signifies that human reasoning is natural and, therefore, more fundamental than artificially constructed culture. The ability not only to judge right from wrong but to make the right choice requires the evaluation of competing values by the individual. It requires rationality and an expression of the will of the individual in a community more than to blindly adherence to unaudited community mores. A process that enables the individual to grow from the stage of an absence of moral obligation into a widened maturity of ethical sense to conquer hour after hour to earn a happy life in the community is more a product of rationality than age and passivity. The Tiv of Middle-Belt Nigeria are quick to point out here that wan ye kaa er I bur yar tiôr (meaning, ‘a young man advised that the Lion be butchered up-side-down’) added to the wisdom of the community to learn the art of butchering the Lion. As argued here, it is a call for individuals to be rationally guided to take responsibility for their own lives (being) instead of relying on communal mores. This is what defines humanity as moral agents, namely, individual self-awareness, which Gyekye says is a precondition of moral reasoning. Gyekye wrote: The person’s ability for autonomous reasoning allows him/her to assess multiple options, s/he can agree on the communal moral preferences, but s/he could also have chosen to disagree with the communal moral understanding. This means

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that, even if the person’s moral preferences are equal to the communal ones, s/ he is individually responsible for her or his actions. (Gyekye 2011:21)

The communal world and how it is before that of the individual notwithstanding, the individual as part of the community shares in its values and practices though, defines himself or herself independent of those cultural givens that are inelegant, un-dignifying or unenlightening and in some cases not only thoughtfully questions, evaluates, affirms and amends or refines existing communal goals, values and practices but also rejects those that are not in tandem with his or her self-evaluation. It is observed here that there is first and foremost the human person, with one’s spiritual individuality, intellectual and practical abilities and skills, character and sensibility, quite different from the community. As rightly alluded to by Gyekye, by reserving for individuals at least the potential for responding to or rejecting the communal consensus, a source of identity that is in some meaningful way independent of any society is located (Wiredu & Gyekye 1992:112). That the individual person is born with the possession of the Imago Dei (the divine spark) has more meaning than Menkiti’s radical conception that personhood is acquired through a refined personality that clothes his or her being in the community. To argue that ‘an individual who has no name will work toward personhood, and at the end of life, that individual loses personhood because s/he has departed for the next world’, as opined by Menkiti (1984:176), is another error of judgement that has no locus in Africa. African societies acknowledge life as the core index of personhood. Menkiti’s radical communitarian thinking on personhood not only gives an erroneous account of the relationship between the individual and the community, but it also fails to give adequate recognition to the individual’s creativeness and inventiveness, much as it fails to give individuals due regard for their human rights (Gyekye 1997:59–62). The individual existed before the community. Thus, personhood is a product of being rather than becoming. The Ebira of Central Nigeria sums up a philosophy of life, and their proverb goes Ozovehe (oza o vi eheni) which means, ‘the human person is life’ (Ehusani 1991:143). Yoruba names like Omololu that is, children are supreme, Omolade, that is, children are the crown of life and the Igbo names like Ndubuisi which means, Human life is first; Ndubueze that is, Human life is King. This most appropriately expresses life as being fundamental and foundational to personhood as instituted by God. Even the dead are accorded the status of personhood. Their transcendent status has not disrupted their membership in the community. They still relate with and partake in the activities of their community; they are ritually incorporated into the wider family of both the dead and the living (Mbiti 1990:108). The Tallensi of northern Ghana are a testimony in this regard. According to Meyer

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Fortes, ‘No one can be certainly known to have been a fully human person until he is shown, at the time of his death, to have been slain by his ancestors and, therefore, to deserve a proper funeral’ (Fortes 1987:257). Menkiti admits that physical death does not spell the end of life for the deceased individual and that the physical death of the individual could be turned to become an ancestor provided the right rituals have been performed (Boon 1996:35; Berglund, 1989:86). The argued point here is that life is central to the concept of personhood. Ehusani succinctly confirms this point and writes: Human life is the ultimate reality and meaning in creation, it is something sacred, something to be loved beyond everything else. The litmus test of all human behaviour and activity is: does it promote life, or does it threaten life? . . . and that human achievement is measured by how much life a person has given, promoted, or protected. Such as the treatment meted out to childless couples and the fear of, and lynching of witches and wizards would generally find an explanation within this preoccupation with human life. (Ehusani 1991:188–89)

The Yoruba notion of individual identity that contrasts sharply with the communitarian concept of personhood is here called into question. It holds that one’s success and achievements are a product of the conscious efforts of the individual self. The most common prayer of the Yoruba is Ki ori inu ma ba tode je fun e (may the inner self not frustrate the efforts of the outer self). This supports the idea that humanity is caught up and is inextricably bound up in communion with a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that they belong in a greater whole. This goes to explain that the conscious mind of the individual; the seat of all feelings, desires and aspirations, is foundational to personhood. The welcoming, hospitable, warm, generous and willing-to-share person is first and foremost an individual. The openness of an individual, his or her availability to others, and willingness to be vulnerable and one’s affirmation of others in the community are all instruments for one’s well-being and the greater whole of the community. This is the essence of being human; the idea that human beings can’t exist in isolation. We are diminished when others are humiliated, oppressed and treated as if they are less than who they are. While our interconnectedness gives us resilience, enabling us to survive and emerge still human despite all efforts to dehumanise them, the intentions and choices of the individual are still the deciding factors that set the community at peace or in pieces. Even though personhood requires an individual with rationality or logical reasoning ability, consciousness, self-awareness, ability to initiate action, moral agency and the ability to engage in moral judgements, the requirements reserved for the living members of the society and the dead (ancestors or the living dead) are also accorded the status of personhood in Africa. This is because their transcendent status has made them members of the community.

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It is thus rightly argued here that good character aligns here as a necessary condition for the general social interest and collective well-being and the common good of the society. It is a rationally compelling state of life, a conscious and progressive effort at good character development – integrity, honesty, kindness, generosity, moral courage and the like. It is about rationally acting in such a way that the measure of one’s actions becomes a universal rule. The ancient Greeks called it arête (excellence of any kind) – moral virtue – a trait or quality of life that is deemed morally good and that can direct a person’s behaviour to achieve moral excellence and ‘human flourishing – a life worth living and dying for, the good life, and a state of well-being’ (Ihuah 2022:12). The communitarian perspective of personhood by Wiredu (1992:111, notes 20) and his cohort not only exaggerates the role of the community, but it also fails to recognise the primary role of rights as a good belonging to an individual qua individual. The ambitions or goals of a person do not add or subtract from that individual’s status as a person. In Wiredu’s words, the individual may fail in his or her strivings and, in the Akan community, may consequently be judged as a ‘useless person’ (onipahun), an opprobrium term. But it must be noted that what the individual would be striving for in all these exertions is some social status, not personhood. The strivings are part of the individual’s self-expression, an exercise of a capacity s/he has as a person. Even if, at the end of the day, s/he failed to attain the expected status, one’s personhood would not for that reason diminish, even though s/he may lose social respect in the eyes of the community. So, it is a social status, not a personhood, at which individuals could fail. An individual is autonomous in her or his own right, so s/he alone can determine at least some of his or her projects and pursue them (Gyekye 1992:112). What this means is that ‘individuals can evaluate, protest, distance and affect reform on some features of the community’ (Motsamai 2016:51). Persons are subject to change and can, therefore, sometimes experience themselves in varying modes of competing epistemologies characteristic of the varying human experiences that are defined by their widely varying needs and interests. This is to say that personhood is more of a self-creating project than a community-created project. It is living a life of integrity by which the individual expresses her or his individuality. It is creating oneself in richer and more sophisticated ways, seeking to understand life on one’s terms and not having one’s views dictated to by an authority or community (Ihuah 2022). CONCLUSION In the foregoing, four approaches to the concept of personhood have been examined. First, the inherent theory argues that the concept of personhood

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embodies a unique inner essence that is eternal, beyond the material entity, existing intact underneath all the neurological losses of dementia with qualities which include self-transcendence. This theory is Eurocentric, inadequate and unacceptable for understanding the concept of personhood in Africa. Moreover, it ignores the interdependent element that is crucial and essential to the promotion of human well-being. Secondly, the capacitybased theory posits that the human capacity to think and reason logically defines personhood. Personhood according to this approach is a quality of self-awareness. Like the inherent theory, the capacity-based theory is not only Western in context and content but also inadequate as it disqualifies newborns and people with lifelong cognitive disabilities. Thirdly, the somatic theory signposts a materialist interpretation of personhood, which views personhood as a being that has concrete, solid and physical (substance) with rationality, consciousness and experience. Like the others, this theory lacks the African quality of being. The African concept of personhood, in addition to recognition of the qualities of a person, s/he is both a belonging and a related being, not a purely isolated individual. Personhood in Africa is not only communicative but also communal. Fourthly, the communal theory holds that personhood is relationship-based. This entails that personhood is acquired as the individual engages with others in the community. I posit here that the concept of personhood, which acknowledges the individual identity, moral duty and rights while still seeking the whole from the units is the way to go. This chapter argues the conclusion that the exaggerated communal conception of personhood underlines certain mental features that hold communal agents individually responsible for their actions. In both the radical and moderate communitarianism of Ifeanyi Menkiti and Gyekye, respectively, there appears to be on parade an exaggerated conception of the community construed to be before the individual. It has been shown in this chapter that this communal conception of personhood has failed to recognise the individuality and rights of the person that naturally belongs to him or her as an autonomous person. Self-determination goes in pair with a mature and reflective way of dealing with communal norms and expectations. Human well-being is thus achieved when individual efforts join with the community to advance from the less human conditions of diseases, hatred, crime, war, tribalism, poverty, oppression, injustice, corruption, faithlessness and hopelessness to the more human conditions of health and love, peaceful coexistence, equity, justice, community fellow-feeling, faith and hope. The radical communitarian perspective of personhood fiercely defended by Ifeanyi Menkiti as the sole authentic view of African thinking on personhood, insofar as it considers the community and the common good to be definitive in the African tradition, not only exaggerates the role of the community but

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also violates the rights of the individual. It is my view that the good belonging to the human person as an individual should be decentred. The human person is prior and independent of his/her acquisitions in the community. Making the community prior to the individual freedom and self-expression seeks excessive human dominion and exposes the overbearing mode of the community on the person. While there is no consensus as to the universal criteria of personhood in Africa, the concept of personhood that connotes the rationality and self-consciousness of a moral agent is more appealing and acceptable. The reality of the communal world is a matter of the social status accorded to each individual. By nature, the inner strength and power of the individual dictate that s/he must first seek to understand life on her or his terms instead of allowing herself/himself to be dictated by the lives of others in the community. In this way, the human, person grows in greater self-improvement and good knowledge as s/he discovers more self-satisfying dimensions of being human to the glory of being a self-defining value. The collective world and all its resources serve as an incubator for an individual to develop to be a mature human being though it is thoughtfully oiled by self-knowledge which together combines to assure human well-being and moral growth for universal beneficence. The subordination of the individual to the community notwithstanding, the individual self continues to promote a feeling of unity and harmony within the community by introducing the potential for the integrity and the humanity of individuals for the sake of the greater good of humanity. Prioritising community over the will of a person is alien to African culture and character for the fact that it jettisons the most cherished African ontological values of human self-determination and self-actualisation. For Africans, a person is a person because of his/her intrinsic values, that make him/her different from any other being. There cannot be a community without the self (the person), hence it is the goods and skills that the individual brings to others in the community that contribute to communal harmony and human flourishing.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Achebe, Chinua. Things Fall Apart. Ibadan: Heinemann, 1959. Babatunde, E.D. ‘‘Bini and Yoruba Notions of Human Personality.’ In The Substance of African Philosophy, edited by C.S. Momoh, 283. Auchi: African Philosophy Project Publications, 1989. Baldwin, Clive, and Andrea Capstick. Baldwin, Clive, and Andrea Capstick. Tom Kitwood on Dementia: A Reader and Critical Commentary. New York: McGrawHill Education, 2007.

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Beight, J.L. Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu: The Ubuntu Philosophy and the AntiApartheid Rhetoric of Desmond Tutu, A Thesis Presented for the B.A Degree from The Department of English University of Michigan, 2007. Berglund, A. Zulu Thought-patterns and Symbolism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. Boon, M. The African Way: The Power of Interactive Leadership. Sandton: Zebra. 1996. Buchanan, A. ‘‘Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (1988): 277–302. Cooley, D.R. ‘‘A Kantian Moral Duty for the Soon-to-Be Demented to Commit Suicide.’ The American Journal of Bioethics 7, no. 6 (2007): 37–44. Ehusani, G. An Afro-Christian Vision, ‘‘Ozovehe’ toward a More Humanised World. New York: the Catholic University of America Press, 1991. Fortes, Meyer. Religion, Morality and the Person: Essays on Tallensi Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Gbadegesin, S. African Philosophy: Traditional Yorùbá` and Contemporary African Realities. New York: Peter Lang, 1999. Gyekye, K. ‘‘Akan Concept of a Person.’ In African Philosophy: An Introduction, edited by R.A. Wright, 201. New York: University Press of America, 1984. ———. ‘‘Person and Community.’ In Person and Community, edited by Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye. Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 101–23. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992. ———. Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. ———. ‘‘Person and Community.’ In Defense of Moderate Communitarianism. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/acprof​:oso​ /9780195112252​.001​.0001. Ihuah, S.A. ‘‘Rethinking an African Ethical System: Between Change and Continuity.’ Humanities Research Forum 2, no. 1 (2000). ———. ‘‘Scientific Technology, African Humanistic Heritage and Personhood.’ In Personhood and Personal Identity: A Philosophical Study, edited by M.F. Asiegbu and J.C. Chukwuokolo. The proceedings of the Biennial Conference and Meeting of the Nigerian Philosophical Association (NPA) University of Calabar, Calabar, 2010. ———. “Interrogating the Concept of Personhood in African Thought: Beyond the Communitarian Debate.” Madonna University Thought and Action Journal of Philosophy. 1(1) (2000), 1–14/ Retrieved from https://www​.tajopmadona​.com​/index​ .php​/mu​-tajop​/article​/view​/maiden7. https://www​.tajopmadona​.com​/index​.php​/mu​-tajop​/article​/view​/maiden7 Kitwood, T. Dementia Reconsidered: The Person Comes First. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1967. Mbiti, John S. African Religions & Philosophy. 2nd ed. Oxford, UK: Heinemann Educational Publishers 1990 (first published 1969).

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Menkiti, Ifeanyi, A. ‘‘Person and Community in African Traditional Thought.’ In African Philosophy: An Introduction, edited by Richard A. Wright, 171–81. Lanham: University Press of America, 1984. Momoh, Abubakar. ‘‘Youth Culture and Area Boys in Lagos.’ In Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, edited by A. Jega, 181–203. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2000. Mondin, B. Philosophical Anthropology. Rome: Urbaniana University Press, 2007. Molefe, Motsamai. ‘‘Revisiting the Menkiti-Gyekye Debate: Who Is a Radical Communitarian?’ Theoria 63, no. 149 (2016): 37–54. Nor, M.Z. ‘‘The Human Peron and Transcendence: The Architectonics for the Radicalisation of Knowledge.’ In Personhood and Personal Identity: A Philosophical Study, edited by M.F. Asiegbu and J.C. Chukwuokolo, 40–47. Enugu: Nigeria Philosophical Association, 2010. Sands, P. (ed) Greening International Law. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1993. Singer P. Practical Ethics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1993. Ulrich, R. ‘‘Philosophy of Self Transcendence.’ In Personhood and Personal Identity: A Philosophical Study, edited by M.F. Asiegbu and J.C. Chukwuokolo: Nigerian Philosophical Association, 2010. Warren, Mary Anne. ‘‘On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.’ The Monist 57, no. 1 (1973): 43–61. Wiredu, Kwasi, and Kwame Gyekye. Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992. ———. ‘‘The African Concept of Personhood.’ In African American Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics, edited by H.E. Flack and E.D. Pellegrino, 104–17. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1992. Yersu, Kim. A Common Framework for the Ethics of the 21st Century. Division of Philosophy and Ethics. Paris: UNESCO, 1999.

Part II

WELL-BEING IN AFRICAN CONTEXTS

Chapter 5

Social Ethics and Human Well-Being in Igbo Society J. Chidozie Chukwuokolo

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between social ethics and human well-being in the Igbo society. In doing this, the author explores what he considers to be the impact of traditional social ethics and values concerning the crass materialistic conception of the contemporary Igbo society to assess what ought to be the moral basis of human well-being and what it ought to be anchored on. It situates the moral values of ethics in humanistic foundations anchored on a web of social relationships that stem from a hierarchy that transcends from the seen to the unseen. The web is anchored in its notion of ethics of duty in contradistinction to the ethics of rights and the common good. The author justifies his claims by positing that the Igbo are still influenced by the dread of the consequences of the wrath of Ani, the Earth deity – who oversees morality – if we fail to bring into fruition the well-being of the people in society. In addition, the chapter tries to espouse what social ethics and human well-being entail in the Igbo society. This helps society to escape from the dislocation of the people from imbibing a sort of materialism alien to the citizenry. This chapter relates to the broad theme of the book by the presentation of my views on the concept of human well-being in the context of personhood anchored on humanism as against global ethics for development measurable on development only along lines of justice and economic growth, as is obtainable in the field of Global Ethics. Thus, I posit that African relational conceptions of well-being rooted in community orientations can be used to build a new critical conception of development that may transform Global Ethics from an African perspective. This enhances the use of Intercultural Philosophy to broaden the understanding of human well-being by making comparative overtures of the traditional and modern eras of the Igbo world. 111

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To address all of the above issues systematically, this chapter is subdivided into the following sections: (1) social ethics: a conceptual labyrinth, community and human well-being, (2) social ethics, well-being and the individual, (3) Ani, the Earth deity, as the root of social ethics and well-being in Igbo societies, (4) social ethics and social control mechanisms in Igbo societies and (5) the well-being of the individual.

SOCIAL ETHICS: A CONCEPTUAL LABYRINTH Sociology, as the study of societal relationships, offers an essential foundation for social ethics because it makes way for understanding the development of the human person, individuals and society to create greater control and harmony in society. This interaction of humans in society predisposes ethics as an instrument capable of helping people to build cohesion, trust and intimate relationships in societies. Society on its own could be seen as a group of people that usually live close together in a communal situation, thereby stipulating bonds of acceptability on how the group lives, works, plays, worships and interacts for their evolution. In this regard, societal factors are created in such a way that they are affected by morality, laws, opinions and an acceptable agreement of regulations. Thus, social ethics could be described as the collection of mores, attitudes, values and behavioural patterns acceptable by a given culture or group of people. There is no doubt that social ethics may differ greatly from culture to culture, but most civilised societies often evince the moral standards given in a bid to control such a society arising from its existential experiences to be a rational society. For instance, the Jewish society encapsulates its social ethics in the Decalogue as enacted by Moses in the Torah. This is the way it is with most civilised societies or cultures that recognise that adultery, murder and theft, for instance, are morally reprehensible acts, whilst the virtues of courage, generosity, kindness and their likes are adjudged as laudable. It appears that there is an inherent universality of moral values that may differ in applicability, but some scholars have used this point as the basis of evidence that humanity was created in the image of God and that His moral code is hidden in the DNA of humans. There is no doubt that the religious beliefs inherent in any culture play a significant role in the creation of its social ethics. In societies where religious beliefs are entrenched in Judeo-Christian values, Buddhism, and/or African Traditional Religions (ATRs), social ethics are generally esteemed. For instance, in societies where Buddhism is prevalent, such as in Japan, the level of corruption is generally very low. There are different virtues enthroned by different religions. In areas where Christianity has dominance, women are

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generally valued better and have more rights ceded to them. For the ATRs, human life is given supreme value, as could be seen from the sort of names that children are given in societies where ATRs are thriving, such as Ndubuisi (life is supreme), Ndukaku (life is better than wealth), Ndubueze (life is king). If we compare cultures influenced by ATRs with those of other religions such as Christianity, we see a vast difference in the value placed on the supremacy of life, sincerity, we-feeling, charity and human freedom. This can account for the level of violence, domination of others, lack of feeling for the other, and unbridled desire for the amassment of weapons of mass destruction obtainable in the Western world – their values have given rise to these monsters that are trying to destroy the Modern world. The influence of religious beliefs on the evolution of social ethics of a people can never be over-emphasised but it is exemplary within Jewish history. Accordingly, when Yahweh – their God – created them unto Himself, He had to enact social laws for them, which since then have influenced their social ethics. Before this era, the Israelites had a proclivity to be influenced by neighbours in their quests for the adoption of immoral and destructive cultural practices. But with the leadership of Moses, a new order, as seen in the enactment of the Decalogue, evinced laws intended to combat the wickedness learnt from their neighbours with new societal ethical orders. The Bible shows vividly how Abraham’s descendants had adopted social ethical principles as they lived in Egypt; thus, immediately after they were liberated from the slavery of Egypt, Yahweh ordered them in the following words: ‘You must not do as they do in Egypt, where you used to live, and you must not do as they do in the land of Canaan, where I am bringing you. Do not follow their practices’ (Leviticus 18:13, 20:23) and (Deuteronomy 6:14). This was the beginning of new social ethics for the Jews. From the foregoing, certain issues spew a fundamentalist foundation that we need to examine. With the kind of instructions that religious orientations give to their followers, there came a supremacy tussle among religionists as to which one is better than the other. This has led to fundamentalism, which is plaguing the world presently – religious terrorism resulting in ‘people killing for God’. Voltaire captures this orientation in the following words: Once fanaticism has corrupted a mind, the malady is almost incurable. . . . The only remedy for this epidemic malady is the philosophical spirit, which spreads gradually, at last, tames men’s habits and prevents the disease from starting. . . . Even the law is important against these attacks of rage; it is like reading a court decree to a reviving maniac. (Voltaire 1962: 268)

From the above, any rational person should be concerned about the level of religious fanaticism and fundamentalism as threats to world peace. The history of the world is bedevilled by heinous crimes orchestrated by religion.

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The twenty-first-century civilisations have changed the dimensions and intensity of religious fundamentalism. For example, on 11 September 2001, an attempt was made by Osama Bin Laden’s fundamentalists to destroy the American civilisation. It is, therefore, pertinent that the time-tested virtue of tolerance of ATRs is adopted to stem the tide of religious fundamentalism in the world. Chukwuokolo corroborates this view: One thing is obvious, i.e., tension exists in society mostly between Christians and Muslims or between Muslims and Muslims but never between ATRs worshippers themselves. The question is why ATRs do not instil violence and intolerance despite their voluntaristic spirit. It should be noted that even though the African tradition manifested a voluntaristic personality, it was not disorderly, and ipso facto, chaos oriented. This results from the fact that there were ethical balances caused by the regulation of the deities in charge of peaceful and harmonious relationships in various communities. This means that the ethical codes of conduct were established, enforced, and maintained by the deities with dire consequences against anybody who transgresses them. It entails that there was a theocratic system where the success or failure of interpersonal relationships in society is dependent on the powers, influences, and dispositions of the deities. (Chukwuokolo 2011:103)

The point at issue is that the sophistication of the social ethics enthroned by ATRs in the anchorage of obedience to the Earth deity has helped in the maintenance of social order in Igbo traditional societies. What then constitutes the social ethical principles of the Igbo people? These principles are rooted in an intricate web of relations that connects the seen to the unseen, where all the beings and elements form an indivisible web of unity. Ndubisi and Ogbuishi capture it thus: The human life – the living, together with other realities – the Supreme Being (Chukwu), ancestors and the living – dead, divinities, spirit, gods, deities, infrahumans; religion, communal ties and relations, cultural and social events; death and after-life is understood in the African worldview as an integral whole and not as distinctively unrelated entities. Hence, the African perception of life is seen in the light of one part of a whole, one which strictly on its own would have an incomplete meaning. (Ndubisi and Ogbuishi 2015:44)

Social ethics is derived from this sort of web of relations that transcend here to the hereafter in a way that ethical principles are dictated by a concourse of the interaction of these forces in creation. Actions are performed in tandem with the will of the gods, the ancestors, the communal ties, and relations and the four elements – water, air, earth and fire – that must be obeyed; otherwise, such an errant character will be eclipsed by the regulator of ethical conducts – the Earth deity. The fear of this eclipse results in compliance with the ethical

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order in society as any defaulter faces fatal consequences; justice and equality are thus maintained in society no matter one’s standing. THE IGBO COMMUNITY AND HUMAN WELL-BEING A community can be defined as a group of people living in a particular place or region that is usually bonded by some common interests. In the traditional Igbo society, these groups of people, in addition to having common interests, also have common descents or ancestry. Such communities in pre-colonial Igbo society existed not in isolated units but were instead embedded in larger politico-commercial and interconnected ritual networks organised in internal structures. The pre-colonial Igbo communities were largely autonomous political entities. The rules defining belonging to a particular community were largely defined from within, primarily in family solidarity. It can be asserted that there is a sense in which the community in Igbo land was communalistic. In this sense, C. B. Nze asserts that: The traditional African has a great asset in its practice of a mode of life called communalism. This used to be the bedrock and the result of the wonderful relationships prevalent in the community as well as the purpose of existence of the community and the African man. (Nze 1989:1)

What Nze’s citation amounts to is that the essence of the community encapsulates the existence of man; this accordingly is anchored on the family and Ani, the Earth deity. Communalism, which is the essence of the community, is captured in the words of J.S. Mbiti: ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am’ (Mbiti 1969). Community in this sense contradicts the classical individualism of the West as seen in the Cartesian dictum of ‘I think, therefore, I am’. It is, therefore, pertinent to note that the Igbo live in an intricate web of co-existence in such a way that, to a reasonable extent, the individual is subsumed by communal will and ethos. To this effect, communalism, deriving from community, connotes a social and political system where priority is given to the community as against the individual, This is not done in a way that the individual is never seen or heard of but sout that the social ethics of society are structured in such a way that collective interest comes ontologically before individual interest. Community, therefore, projects the individual in a sort of spiritual humanism that enthrones spiritual unity. This results from the interacting levels of relations, structures, doctrines, institutions, land use, marriage, kinship, family and rites of passage that mould the individual into an Integrated entity. The community presents the family as the model of traditional African communalism. So far, I have espoused the community as relating to

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communalism where the community is given priority to the individual. Flowing from this, I assert that the sort of social ethics that is prevalent in this sort of society is such that it extols the corporateness of such a society. In effect, the society is built in a way that individuals conform to communal ethos as against individual ethos. What then is well-being in this type of society? There is hardly any univocal perception of what human well-being means. This is because this wellbeing could be identified depending on one’s orientation. For instance, it could be defined as all those things related to the placement of premium on the happiness of members of the society. It relates to what society regards as ultimately good for its members and how a person’s character relates to his or her well-being. Social well-being, as conceived by the World Health Organisation (WHO) relates to a central component, namely the individuals’ overall health. Economics studies social well-being in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which reflects the relative prosperity of communities and societies. Other social research on operationalising social well-being configures it in terms of behaviours that reflect the community and organisational participation, community or group membership, or social capital and social cohesion. According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, the terms ‘happy’, ‘wellness’, ‘satisfaction’, ‘pleasure’, or ‘well-being’ can refer to a series of possible states: reflection on past events moment-to-moment evaluations of happiness by oneself, or with another person inferred from neuroimaging inferred from sensory input (pain, pleasure) inferred from cognitive structure (dysfunctional thinking, delusion) inferred from virtue (is prayer inherently instrumental to well-being?) duration of the experience effect on other factors (e.g., personal agency, power) repetitiveness (is pleasure derived from addiction incompatible with happiness?) objectivity (is ‘healthy eating’ or ‘sex’ always pleasurable?) whether the experience is altruistic or egoistic, whether happiness reflects an emotional state (affect-based account) whether happiness reflects a cognitive judgment (life satisfaction account). (Crisp in Zalta 2017:1)

So far, we have tried to interrogate the meaning of human well-being; social well-being on its own is measurable in good relationships, social stability and peace. This is identifiable in the mutuality of dependence of one on another. This entails relying on others for our well-being and vice versa, such that to be healthy, for instance, we need to love and be loved. This brings to the

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fore the need for belongingness in an interconnected whole. What, then, is social well-being in Igbo society? There are various senses in which one can respond to this question. Going by the notion of community as manifesting in communal interconnectivity, human well-being will be best described as that condition or state of being that will project the whole before the person or individual. In this sense, the well-being of the individual in a society does not revolve around how successful such an individual is in contradistinction to group dynamism. Social ethics aimed at reflecting this notion of human well-being will be such that the individuals in the society are not seen as having happiness at the expense of the collective. Various instances of such behaviour capture the ‘we-ness’ of the wellbeing of society. For instance, in Igbo traditional communities, it was abominable for a woman to engage in adultery. There are various ranges of punishments for a defaulter depending on the community. While in some others, it could result in outright death, in others it is madness; yet in others, it could result in obstructed labour until she confesses. The issue is, why such punishment to women whose ‘personal’ behaviour could be said to be against their husbands? The generators of this mode of punishment for such social ethical behaviour did so because they felt that the behaviour of the individual family members should be in a way that the corporate well-being of the community should be supreme. This is because those who are married to the community should conduct themselves in such a way that they will never compromise the family bloodline. A man is believed to be the one who directs how the family bloodline should progress. Therefore, he must decide how the bloodline should be directed. If he feels that the family needs to get another wife, he informs the first wife before proceeding to marry the second wife; this is the sort of social responsibility expected from him to keep peace in the home. Sometimes, even when the first wife feels otherwise without rational reasons, the marriage goes ahead without her consent. But it is meant that by informing her, she is expected to make her inputs rationally. Many times, the extended family toes her line, and such intended marriages were stopped, and she recommends another person. Chukwuokolo (2019) discusses extensively the rationale for the above view in his notion of the Igbo philosophy of marriage. The critical issue necessary for interrogation at this stage is the place of the individual woman in making her choices of behavioural patterns. Feminists would argue that the traditional Igbo society submerged the rights of women in making their personal decisions on how they wanted to live their lives. For instance, they would argue that women should choose to behave any way they wanted, including aborting their babies at any stage of the pregnancy. This raises the question of the place of the individual in the Igbo communal setting. This issue is akin to the question of holism in Hegel’s philosophy. We

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shall discuss the full import of this in the next section, but suffice it to say that what mattered for the Igbo was the happiness of the community, which captures the very essence of human well-being for them. Thus, social behaviours are usually assessed by weighing them on the balance of the happiness of the entire community and not that of the individual members of the community. From the foregoing, one can appreciate better that it is only in communal settings that the individual manifests his or her fullest potential by attaining one’s social goals, aspirations and human well-being. Thus, communal attainments, greatness and reflections are observable in the values of such communities on their citizens. One can, therefore, assert that the notions of human well-being, order, peace and development are attainable only in communal settings stricto sensu. If life is the highest good, sacred and an integral whole controlled by the Supreme Being; social ethics should revolve around spiritualism. It is a trite fact to note that social ethics in Igbo society are intertwined with the spirituality of the people. The Igbo transcends religion because it is spirituality that controls all that (s)he does for a living. I compare spirituality with religion. While religion entails the relationship between God – a wholly other – and (wo)men, spirituality entails the reflection of the day-to-day living experience of the person in accordance with God’s principles and commitment to esteem human life. Thus, social ethics, which are supremely expressed in communal living in Igbo society, stem from a web of communal cyclism derived from God, the divinities and deities, the ancestors, elders, the community of the living, the dead and the yet-to-be-born, in which each person is held accountable. On a final note, we must observe that a lot has gone underground with the notion of the individual, and social ethics in commonality inherent in the traditional society have changed in these modern times. Individualism has crept in and bastardised the traditional social ethics of the people. This is the root of the crises of morality in which the individual is ensconced inmodern society.

SOCIAL ETHICS, HUMAN WELL-BEING AND THE INDIVIDUAL In the preceding section, we raised the issue of the place of the individual in this sort of holism, where the individual is submerged and not being heard. So how does the identity of the individual still stand out in this sort of community-based whole where social ethics is community-driven? The merit of holism shows when one looks at its attempt at creating organic harmony. This is because it is believed that a whole is always greater than its parts. If this is so, it follows that in any society where there is organic harmony, the society progresses far more than any society where this is not the case. Again,

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holism helps us to subsume the apparent multiplicity of reality into a single whole, a kind of Spinozistic and pantheistic whole. This at least seems more plausible when we consider the apparent irreconcilable multiplicities pervading reality. The human mind may seem more comfortable with the view that reality is one. But when we add a metaphysical tinge to holism, we may start falling into the difficulty of reconciling individualism with holism. This is because individualism has multiple aspects, such as moral and political ones. Martin Hollis brings out the problem of individualism versus holism in the following words: If holism means accepting the line in Marx’s preface, it seems to imply that we are not morally responsible for what we do and that our most cherished forms of political organisation, like a democracy of free individuals, are themselves socially determined and hence rest on an illusion. (Hollis 1999:106)

From the above passage, any belief in holism generally has a deterministic tinge, but determinism, whether social or metaphysical, cannot stand. This is because even when there is an apparent cause for it, it does not negate the exercise of free will in the interlude of making choices. For instance, one may decide for religious reasons to skip one’s meals (fasting) to get a favour from God. During the fast, the pangs of hunger notwithstanding, that person could still exercise her or his will to hold on till the end of the fast. This is a case for the exercise of free will amid a physiologically conditioned state of hunger (see Chukwuokolo 2009: 40). If the above argument negates determinism, it collapses the Hegelian idea that the absolute cunningly employs reason to manipulate the heroes of world history. This is because since such heroes have the will and do exercise it, they are fully responsible for their actions, contrary to the view of Hegel. If certain classes of people that hold decisions that affect the majority are given an ideological or philosophical guarantee that they are above responsibility, they will abuse it, as Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler did. Hegel’s teleological postulations of history entail that the achievements of historic individuals, such as Napoleon, must be made. If there are ungodly aspects of their characters, by being instruments in the hand of the World Spirit, they are justified in behaving in any way they do. This is because if history is a teleological process, an end towards a goal that is determined by the nature of the Absolute Spirit rather than by rational human choices, it appears that all that occurs could be justified by the very fact that it does so. This brings out the view that if world history is the summit of the evaluation of nations, it would appear to be in support of the idea that might is right. But

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this is not so, as individual whims and caprices are important factors in the determination of the course of world history. Again, there is a dispute on the level of ontological individualism and holism. There is the possibility of denying that states are autonomous without having to assert that there is a supervening whole as the international system. This is because some theorists maintain that the behaviour of individuals in a nation-state is a result of its internal bureaucracies and many other institutional agencies, if we take the nation-state as a whole and the bureaucracies as its units. There is further debate about whether the bureaucracy is explainable in terms of the individuals who create and sustain them. Jon Elster’s view captures lucidly the importance of this: ‘The elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interactions of individuals’ (Elster 1989:13). It follows that society grows via the activities of individuals. In every society, there are mavericks whose behaviours form the pattern of things. It is these people that Hegel seems to raise to the metaphysical level of reason and the spirit of the world (Weltgeist). However, the debate between metaphysical holism and individualism can keep raging as they appear like an egg-and-chicken puzzle. At their various levels, strong arguments are employed to buttress their claims that the whole exerts influence on the part and vice versa, respectively. We shall sum up perhaps by saying that we should evolve a sort of individualism where individuals are more critical and self-directed than has yet emerged – a sort of individual holism. By this, we mean a situation where there is mutual interaction between the whole and its parts, devoid of creating any mystique extraneous to the above interaction. At least this has the advantage of accommodating individualism and holism in a single scheme as an interdependent reality. This was what appeared to be obtainable in the traditional Igbo society. A few examples will bring out this notion very clearly. It is a trite fact to note at this stage that the Igbo society does not denigrate the individual because it accepts that for it to attain the kind of development that it wills, the individual is encouraged to express herself or himself in a way that his or her efforts are appreciated. This could be appreciated better when we juxtapose the individual and the community in the attainment of wealth. The Igbo society extols hard work derivable from honest living. Once a person attains wealth through honest means, (s)he aspires to take the Ozo title. S(h)e places himself or herself in a class where (s)he is respected and consigned to such a level of honesty that any contrary behaviour takes his life. S(h)e becomes an Nze – one who avoids all kinds of antisocial behaviours and tendencies. One advantage of the attainment of ozohood in Igbo society is to checkmate those who would have been too powerful for the society. Recall that one of the greatest problems of modern capitalism is the enthronement of

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excessively powerful individuals who, in the neoliberal economy, are created by excessive wealth. The traditional Igbo society had entrenched in its system means and methods of not allowing individuals to become too powerful in the society and thus outgrow societal control. In this regard, the individual retains his or her pride of place while the society is organised on a communal basis. No individual is greater or more powerful than the society, and thus there is the enthronement of a system where the whole interacts with the individual harmoniously so that none diminishes the other.

ANI DEITY AS THE ROOT OF SOCIAL ETHICS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING IN THE IGBO SOCIETY The Igbo people hold the most sacred, the Earth deity (Ani), as the root of their social ethics on which they tread and base their being. It is also their means of sustenance and vital resources such as food, crops, water and morality; a view that is held by the scholar Iwe. Accordingly, Ani is the sustainer of all life and fertility (Iwe 1985:30). Human well-being including happiness is derivable from Ani depending on how we relate to and interact with this deity. This is because it is on Ani’s (land) that we build our houses, and to whom the dead go when they die and are buried. This element of Ani is regarded with such a level of sacredness that anyone who commits any abominable misdemeanour against the community is seen as against Ani and ipso facto does not hope to survive. The Igbo society regards nsọ Ani – abomination against Ani – with dread because it has severe repercussions. Chinua Achebe typifies this in his epic and novel, Things Fall Apart, when Okonkwo had to flee from the village Ụmụọfịa for seven years for committing homicide because the crime was particularly not acceptable to the Earth deity. Because Okonkwo’s homicide was not premeditated, it is regarded as female ọchụ (manslaughter) with a relatively mild punishment. The Igbo regarded Ani greatly as the owner of all (wo)men, living, dead and yet-to-be-born. The Earth deity is responsible for the regulation of public morality, and offences against the law are thus infractions against Ani. Therefore, the Igbo regard Ani as both the regulator and purveyor of social ethics. In awe and respect for Ani, names are given to children reflecting their reverence and connection with Ani; for example, Ani-emeka – the earth has done marvel, and Ani-nwem – the earth owns me. The traditional Igbo held tenaciously to Ani and the entire spirit world, which is regarded as another abode just like the earth on which the people live and derive their sustainability.

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This organic mode of relationship is derivable from the family and consanguinity. The family on its own derives its locus from Ani, that is, the supernatural protector and guardian of the well-being of (wo)men in society. What the effectiveness of the rule of law serves in the West, Ani serves in the traditional African society. The stabilising factor for all socio-legal behaviours was Ani. It punishes and rewards members of society accordingly. As Ike Odumegwu puts it: Ani is recognised as the ‘supernatural protector’ and the guardian of the social well-being, the law, and the morals of the people. As a being that exists at the divine levels of being, divine, spiritual, and material, Ani is seen as symbolising the tangible life that holds all members of the community together. (Odumegwu 2007:3)

Human’s attempt since her and his coming into being is to enhance one’s well-being to attain and maximise happiness in the strange world (s)he found oneself in. To attain this goal, civil government was primarily instituted to help (wo)man attain the best (s)he could for himself- or herself. This entails for the Igbo the maximisation of the summum bonum of the collective. Ani, therefore, is the root of the formation of social ethics and well-being. Social ethics that enthrones welfarist and communal reason in this regard is the rational view that the aim of society should be to maximise the welfare of the social population as a lived experience. In other words, the well-being of the members of society should transcend from theorisation to practicalisation. Above all these, what would be shown clearly is that what guided the thought of the Igbo society was reasoning towards the welfare of the people and the fear of the desecration of the social ethics as enunciated by Ani. To attain the desired level of social rectitude, certain religious practices derivable from Ani were instituted to maintain certain levels of rectitude and to maintain unbroken spiritual observances to maintain high social ethics. The desired level has resulted in certain values that have formed part of the spiritual foundation of the traditional Igbo society. The Igbo society esteems good character, thereby enthroning a very strong belief in life after death. Death is usually prepared by strict living in rectitude to attain befitting life after death, in a new incarnate form as an ancestor. After death, the soul or spirit of the dead wanders around the bush, ethereal, until his or her relations perform the necessary and befitting burial rites. Burial rites serve as the gateway that bridges the waiting stage – called the transitional period of the deceased – before the incorporation of the deceased into the world of the dead announces the deceased for ancestor-ship. The ancestors, the Igbo believe, wield tremendous powers of blessing and the power of the curse. After the internment of a fulfilled elder and burial rites must have been completed, the

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family, through the Okpala (the first male child in the family), mystically creates a shrine and energises an okposi (ọfọ like staff) for the veneration of the spirit of the dead. This is usually done by libations, prayers and sacrifices. It is usually an aspiration that every person tries to attain, and it is derivable from Ani. The Igbo regard these ancestors as the special guardians of morality and create shrines in their honour, as well as creating symbolic references to their existence. Another facet of Ani’s social ethics is the Igbo belief in the concept of ọfọ. The ọfọ is a symbol of justice, righteousness and truth. It symbolises fair play, innocence, trust, good luck, peace, equity, sacredness, good moral conduct, good leadership, accountability and honesty. For Parrinder (1975:30), an African scholar of religion, the ọfọ performs three functions; a social, a political and a religious function. The latter two are most important in that no serious rite or ceremony is performed without making use of ọfọ. The balance of justice is maintained in society by ofo and the poor and the widow take consolation in ọfọ and trust therefrom, especially in land cases, for without the fear of the ọfọ, they may be maltreated by the rich and powerful in the dispensation of justice. Also, from the names taken or given to their children, such as Ọfọbuike (ọfọ is strength), the Igbo regard ofọ very highly. There are variations in ofo types, namely ọfọala (ọfọ for the Earth deity), ọfọụmụnna (ọfọ for the kinsmen), ọfọọzọ (ọfọ for titled men), ọfọdibia (ọfọ for diviners). All these are Ani-derived instruments of justice and maintenance for human well-being and social ethics. Another justice-related mystical symbol derivable from Ani that in most parts of the Igbo land is closely connected with ọfọ is ogu, also a measure of innocence, justice and fairness. Some Igbo use ọfọ and ogu interchangeably, as can be noticed in the expression, ‘eji m ọfọ na ogu-I have ọfọ (justice) and ogu (innocence)’. Ogu is a mystical or spiritual concept that has no physical or objective presence. Ogu also serves as a symbol of the extension of an olive branch in the event of a quarrel between two parties. Accordingly, in the event of such a quarrel , one of the parties can extend the stalk of the ogirisi leaf (uboldia; a sacred plant that is used as ogu) to the family of the other party via an elderly relation of that person as a notification of intent to reconcile with the other. In most Igbo societies, no one acts against an offender without first sending him or her ogu at least three times. This act, which is known as – ịmanyeogu, entails the sending of a note of warning through his or her relation or a close friend that sends signals with the intention of mutual reconciliation. Ogu creates an atmosphere for a peaceful settlement. It is necessary to assert that ogu and ọfọ have psychological effects on the conscience of every Igbo (wo)man as they try to attain well-being by ensuring that appropriate compliance to the dictates of Ani is adhered to in social ethics.

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So far, we have discussed the importance of Ani, the Earth deity, as the root of social ethics and as the purveyor of social well-being. In doing this, we have also related this to the community and social ethics in the Igbo society. I shall end this part by reiterating the fact that ancestorhood and ofo na ogu are spiritual principles necessary for the attainment of happiness in the traditional Igbo society. This cannot be said to be the same in their modern society. Becausethe Igbo can be said to be the most affected hybrid of the interface between Africa and the West, it is doubtful if there is anything stricto sensu Igbo within modern society. This is currently the bane of the dilapidation of the ethical base of the Igbo in modern Africa.

THE SOCIAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL CONTROL MECHANISMS IN THE IGBO SOCIETY In this section, we shall discuss social control and social ethics and how they contribute to the well-being of the Igbo society. The essence of the Igbo people is to maintain a society where the communal status conforms to ensuring that the behaviour of its citizens is such that they consider themselves to be actors, who ontologically value society over themselves as individuals. The Igbo feel that they are bound together by methods of social control. These methods of control in society are structured to enhance the social well-being of its citizens. What then are social control mechanisms, and how do they relate to well-being in Igbo society? Social control consists of mechanisms established to enforce a standard of behaviour for members of the society. These mechanisms may include a variety of components, such as shame, coercion, force, restraint and persuasion. The essence of this is to generate ideas and methods for ensuring that citizens conform to the ethical dictates of society to maintain a level of communal well-being. The mechanisms may include those things that modern society may regard as trials by ordeal, like sending the ethical pervert or defaulter to his or her maternal home for a year or so or outright ostracism. This could be likened to temporal deportation aimed at reforming the defaulter. The penal system of the traditional society was organised in a way that enforcement of punishment was perceived by all parties in dispute that justice was done. For instance, to enforce judicial decisions in the traditional Igbo society, decisions are divided variously as in civil cases, crimes against public security and public morality. They are known as aru, or nso Ani (these are regarded as misdemeanours that are so heinous that they pollute the land or taboos). There were levels of juries that enforced adjudication. At the level of civil offences, the group known as Obododimma (those who make society

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better) gets parties involved, usually without the involvement of priests or ndi-ozo (titled men), to enforce decisions in civil cases. Community organsations and groups enforce decisions on crimes against public security and morality. Although the family unit is a credible source of control, there are several categories of control, such as (1) direct control, where punishments and rewards are deployed to incentivise behavioural patterns; (2) indirect control, which entails the affectionate commendations of individuals who adhere to social mores and norms; (3) organised social control; (4) unorganised social control; (5) spontaneous social control; (6) positive social control and (7) negative social control. The essence of all these mechanisms is that individuals and institutions deploy them to establish social norms, mores, ethics and rules, which are normally exercised by peer groups, family, community and religious organisations as a guide to good or bad conduct.

THE ORGANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL There are several community organs and groups that adjudicate on behalf of the entire community. I shall examine a few of them to espouse their relevance in maintaining and enthroning social order, ethics and human well-being. Ani, the Earth deity, is the supreme court of justice in the Igbo penal system and morality. This Supreme Being stipulates what is good or bad and establishes crimes against god and humanity. Some of the crimes are regarded as nso Ani (abominations against Ani), which may include incest, adultery, murder and manslaughter (female ochu). The Ani deity has priests whose main duty is to serve as a liaison between the sacred and the profane. Once such crimes are committed, appropriate sanctions are prescribed by the chief priest on behalf of this deity. These sanctions may include outright ostracism, nsubenso or ikpuaru (cleansing of the land). It appears that the Igbo believe that the moral order must be kept sacrosanct, and anytime it is violated, the moral order must be restored by performing the appropriate restorative rituals. For instance, if adultery is committed, especially with a close kinsman or woman, there are several ritual processes to be done: first, the woman’s punishment is to send her back to her father’s house, and she is not involved in any other process of cleansing. Some powerful Igbo men believe that women are naturally weak, and as a result, any man who consistently lays sexual siege on them might succeed. It is, therefore, incumbent on any man who commits adultery with any woman to perform the rituals that restore the breach in the ethical order of the society. The man passes through the ordeal of spending a fortune to buy the ritual materials and subsequently faces the process of ikpuaru.

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Dike and Ekejiuba summarise the roles of deities as follows: Some villages had powerful deities which, according to their beliefs, could disorganise internal – and external enemies against possible mischief. In the traditional Igbo society, people feared community deities because of their belief that such deities were capable of mirroring people’s minds. These deities could punish people for mere bad intentions, with or without anti-social or criminal conduct. Some misfortunes that happened to some individuals or groups in those days were seen as havoc brought upon them by deities as punishment for their bad deeds. From this background, the influence of deities and their priests or messengers in the Igbo traditional society was so widespread that it impinged on the psyche of people and constrained their inclination to engage in serious misconduct, thereby working for the community as a potent deterrence against crime. Deities were also used in those days to resolve allegations and claims about criminal conduct, including fraudulent claims to land ownership. A typical example of these dreaded deities was the ‘Ibinukpabi’ oracle, popularly known and referred to as the ‘Long Juju’ of Arochukwu by early European writers. This was the ‘highest court of appeal’ and the supreme religious and judicial institution among the Igbo in the Niger and Cross River basins. (Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:130)

Manslaughter, as I have observed earlier, was typified in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart when Okonkwo had to flee from Ụmụọfịa for seven years only because his (Okonkwo’s) homicide was not premeditated – it was regarded as a female ọchụ (manslaughter) with a relatively mild punishment. Outright murder carries severe punishments ranging from mysterious deaths by the Earth deity – Ani. It could be asserted without contradiction that the fear of the punishment of Ani enforces good conduct. Mmanwu (masquerades): there are levels of masquerades, and they are an important means of enforcing judgements on crimes against public security and those against public morality. This is the first level of masquerade that operates in the daytime and whose main duty is to enforce the decisions of the jury or the other members of the community in adjudication. Some erroneous conceptions are placed on the masquerade as a secret society. For instance, Ifemesia, who is one of those scholars who regard it as a secret society, says this about masquerades: Outside the Aro society, other secret societies included the Odo and Omabe in the Nsukka areas, the masquerade or ‘spirit mask’ (Mmuo or Mmanwu) among the northern Igbo, and Egbele in the Afikpo area, the Oshereji of Oguta, and the Okonko of Ngwa. (Ifemesia 1979:79)

To my mind, it could be regarded as secret because traditionally an Igbo masqueradeis not open to both males and females, but in terms of comparison

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with what else is happening in Nigeria today, one will dismiss the toga of secrecy to the masquerade. At another level of the masquerade, there is the night one that helps at a higher level of social control. This method entails mechanisms of crime investigation and control in Igbo traditional jurisprudence. There are some instances where the nature of an act demands that investigations are conducted or that exposition was given to insidious crimes capable of killing innocent people. For instance, in cases where adultery and incest were committed in secret, if they were not exposed or known, they might have led to fatalities on the part of innocent people. In effect, it was not in every instance that a criminal was caught while perpetrating the ignoble act; such situations would also require the necessity of looking for evidence against him or her or even knowing that such a case exists. At these expository and investigative levels, the night masquerade (achikwwu or ayaka) usually intervenes. In my community–Mmaku–the masquerade used to appear every three nights, and once it (the night masquerade) came out, it would announce that certain hidden crimes or antisocial behaviours were committed by someone in secret. It normally calls out the perpetrators and warns other would-be criminals to eschew such acts as it would expose them. Achikwu was reputed for also settling intricate crises; there was a reported case where two neighbours dragged ownership of an ogbono tree – an economic tree. It was said that the tree was situated at the boundary of their lands, with branches extending to the other person’s land. Achikwu decided to mystically divide the tree into two and extend the parts to the other person’s portion of land. Its justice was such that nobody questioned its fairness because justice was seen as having been executed. Another method of social control was the age-grade system (ogbo). Here, the society is stratified according to one’s date of birth; those within a threeyears gap were regarded as age-mates and were made to maintain order and good conduct not capable of tarnishing the image of the community and the age grade. Usually like the masquerade, they serve as the police in executing judicial decisions and thus ensuring prompt execution of judgements. Other kinds of mystical methods were also applied to social control. Those who refuse to admit culpability or guilt to the allegations of crime or unethical conduct levelled against them are made to follow a mechanism of proof revolving around myths based on traditional religious beliefs. Worthy of note is the impossibility of enumerating all social control methods in traditional Igbo jurisprudence in this work, but suffice it to say that divination, the invocation of the gods (ipa erushi), the council of the oldest women in the village, and the daughters of the land (Umuada) were all very effective methods. Another method of social control is divination. This refers to the practice of the dibia (men or women enwisdomised in the use of the ‘third eye’); any hidden knowledge was penetrated by them. They at times consult oracles and supernatural forces to explain what happened in the past or what will happen

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in the future. In most of the Igbo villages in pre-colonial days, divination was used as the supernatural means of unearthing any mystery surrounding the crime. The Igbo believed that ‘after god was dibia’ (J.A. Umeh 1999). Dibias also invoked the gods of the land to force suspects to take an oath in place of the name of the dreaded gods in situations where suspects refused to confess to their alleged crimes. Should the need arise, the community usually invokes the will and powers of the gods with a petition to expose the perpetrator (s) of heinous crimes where the identities of the offenders could not ordinarily be known. Ifemesia states this point; thus, ‘if the facts of a case were not clear, the Igbo had recourse to an oracle or divination’ to unravel the facts and the circumstances of the case (Ifemesia 1979:24). Accordingly, in situations like this, should any misfortune befall such an individual or a household, it was seen as retribution from the spirit world, signalling culpability. Oath-taking on its own was a major component of social control. Again, in situations of obscure identification of the crimes, the adult members of the community could be made to swear an oath of innocence. Usually, a certain period ranging from seven Igbo native weeks (28 days) to one year was designated as a test period for the innocence or guilt of the accused. Should any serious misfortune occur to such a person during this trial period, the community would see that as evidence of guilt as alleged. But the contrary was seen as evidence of proclamation of innocence, and it was highly celebrated. The council of the elderly women of the community was another effective method of social control. This was usually a council of deterrence for young people in their teenage period. If any misdemeanour was reported to them, usually by the parents of the offender, such an offender was summoned before the council. The council would then mete out some counselling or punishments depending on the imagined consequence of the offence. This method of social control, known as igba uke, was usually a very successful method of deterrence. Further, civil cases, especially those concerning couples, were handled by Umuada, who are the daughters of the land. These daughters adjudicated mostly matrimonial matters to ensure that their family lines were maintained. They used to summon the parties involved, and the palaver ensued. It was believed that their stakes were higher than any other person in the family, and as such, they were believed to mete out justice to the parties in dispute. From the foregoing, it is evident that the various mechanisms for social control were established as a community-minded venture to enhance the collective – and corporate happiness of the citizenry. This is the nexus between social control and the well-being of the people. There was no way that anybody was left out without getting justice. If one contrasts the Igbo traditional society with the modern one, it will be a far cry, as justice is most often for the highest bidder and at other times sacrificed on the altar

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of technicalities. This is very unfortunate in Modern jurisprudence, as it is not the desired outcome. Thus, one can assert that it is the practicality of justice in modern society that raises this problem. Situations abound where armed robbers who were caught in the act were set free either based on a technicality or outright bribery, or some times for want of convincing evidence. Such situations never existed in the traditional setting because society was structured in such a way that it was nearly impossible to pervert justice, as a perversion of justice was at the expense of the life of the perpetrator. However, there is no doubt that modern law has several good aspects in theory but gets out of tune in practice. For instance, the issue of separation of powers in a presidential system of government is one with utmost good intentions in theory but rarely gets practised in Third World countries like Nigeria. This cannot be obtainable if there is a combination of the traditional with modern jurisprudence. It is a trite fact that embezzlements are rife in the modern Igbo society as against the traditional ones because taking the oath of office with the Bible was seen as mere formalities against using the ofo for the same purpose. In the latter, no one can dare to commit such nefarious acts as embezzlement without fatalities. It can be stated that when one juxtaposes the traditional and the modern methods of social control and the pursuit of well-being, as I have stated, the practicality of modern jurisprudence will be questionable.

CONCLUSION I started this chapter by examining the relationship between social ethics and human well-being in traditional Igbo society. In doing this, I explored the notions of community, communalism, social ethics and social control mechanisms as they relate to human well-being in traditional society. I also concentrated on the impact of traditional social ethics and values on the crass materialistic conception of the contemporary Igbo society to assess what ought to be the moral bases on which well-being ought to be anchored. I situated the moral values of ethics in humanistic foundations anchored on a web of social relationships that stems from a hierarchy that transcends from the spiritual to the mundane. In conclusion, I shall add that the high level of social control and compliance obtainable in the traditional society was anchored in its notion of an ethics of duty in contradistinction to the ethics of rights and the common good. I justified these claims by positing that we are still influenced by the dread of the consequences of the wrath of the Earth deity Ani (in charge of morality), in such a way that if we fail to bring to fruition the well-being of the people in the society, fatalities are visited upon the defaulters.

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Duty in this sense is understandable as the necessity to carry out functions and assignments without the intent of immediate reward, but as what one ought to do. Citizens carried on their assignments as though they were divine and needed no monitoring or supervision. It is this sort of commitment that our society lacks now. There are so many entitlements of rights to the carrying out of duties that people have lost the sense of duty. My recommendation is that there should be an intent towards the complementary approach of harmonising the traditional and modern (Western) approaches to social ethics and human well-being in Igbo society. It appears that the difficulty in the transition from traditionalism to modernism is widening as days go by. As I said earlier, the Igbo person is the most affected hybrid of colonial intercourse. S(h)e is neither fully traditional nor modern because what binds him or her with the past is still very strong. There are the escapist tendencies of those with the Abrahamic religion who try to run away whenever they are found guilty of any misdemeanour. Such guilty people would plead trial by ordeal as their escapist strategy and, therefore, run to the government or their religions. However, the modern Igbo people have not fully extricated themselves from the claws, dictates or influences of their tradition.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Achebe, Chinua. Things Fall Apart. Ibadan: Heinemann, 1958. Bowker, J. The Meaning of Death. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Chukwuokolo, J.C. ‘A Critique of Hegel’s Metaphysical Holism.’ Philosophy and Praxis: Journal of the Nigerian Philosophical Association 5 (2009): 30–55. ———. ‘The Evolution of African Culture and the Role of Reason.’ Afrika & Wissenschaft 1, no. 7 (2013a): 25–38. ———. ‘Igbo Philosophy of Marriage: Towards the Revival of Family Values for Veritable Development of Igbo Land.’ Journal of African Studies and Sustainable Development 2, no. 8 (2019): 99–117. Dike, K.O, and F. Ekejiuba. The Aro People of South-Eastern Nigeria, 1650–1980: A Case Study of Socio-Economic Formation in Nigeria. Ibadan: University Press, 1990. Elster, J. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Hollis, M. The Philosophy of Social Science – an Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Ifemesia, C. Traditional Human Living among the Igbo: A Historical Perspective. Enugu Fourth Publishers Limited, 1979. Iwe, N. S. S. Christianity and Culture in Africa. Ibadan: University Publishers, 1985. Mbiti, John S. African Religions & Philosophy. London: Heinemann, 1969.

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Ndubisi, E.J.O., and A.M Ogbuishi. ‘Religion and Perception/Promotion of Life in Africa: Examining the Igbo of South-eastern Nigeria.’ Quest. Journal of Research in Business and Management 3, no. 10 (2015): 42–48. Nze, C.B. Aspects of African Communalism. Onitsha: Veritas Publishers, 1989. Parrinder, E.G. African Traditional Religion. London: Shelton Press, 1975. Roggers, Crisp ‘Well-Being.’ In Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, edited by N. Edward. Zalta, 2017. Umeh, J.A. After God Is Dibia. London: Karnak House, 1999. Voltaire. Philosophical Dictionary. Translated by P Gay. New York: Basic Books, 1962.

Chapter 6

Religion, Education and the Well-Being of Citizens in Nigeria1 Olutoyin Mejiuni and Bolaji Olukemi Bateye

This chapter interrogates the nexus between religion, education and wellbeing in Nigeria. It argues that well-being in the African (Nigerian) philosophical landscape posits morality at its core. Consequently, all the laws, morals, norms and values in society are geared towards sustaining cosmic harmony, which is endangered by their violation.2 In Nigeria, religion pervades the private and public spheres, with individuals and institutions displaying religiosity even at official gatherings and meetings. Nigerians pray in the private sphere, in places of worship, before and after meetings in government offices, and in universities. A variety of religions are practised in Nigeria, but Christianity and Islam predominate (Mejiuni 2006a). Mejiuni (2006a) wrote that engagement in religious activities is a process of socialisation; hence, religions are cultural systems that foster a holistic healthy symbiotic existence and therefore are powerful education agents. In this respect, the author argued that ‘religious beliefs and practices are taught and learned through informal and non-formal education, and whether or not they appear in the curricula of formal educational provisions, they are almost always present as hidden curriculum’ (Mejiuni 2006a:161). At a meeting held in November 2012 at the behest of the UN-Women at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, to assess progress towards gender equality, participants in the subgroup on gender and religion made several observations. These reflections are central to the theme of this chapter. The participants discussed the positive and negative influences of religion on the lives of young and mature women, within and outside tertiary institutions. Overall, the observations of the participants – who were university lecturers, members of civil society organisations and government officials – raised a lot of issues, among which were those about religion and women’s rights; religion and the active agency of women in the education context; religion 133

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and the state; fundamentalisms and the impact on women; religion, abuse of power and exploitation; and many more.3 The import of these observations, made in the latter part of the year 2012, would become clear about a year and a half later, in April 2014.

THE FOCUS OF THE CHAPTER AND SOURCES OF DATA This chapter seeks to explore how religion, education and their intersection impact the well-being of Nigerians. The central theme of Mejiuni’s book Women and Power: Education, Religion and Identity (2013) is thereby relevant. In the book, Mejiuni argued that although women’s possession of formal education is supposed to be an asset and a means to access power resources, religious teaching, and practices (taught through informal and non-formal education processes), incidental learning and other socialisation processes interact with formal education processes to constrain the transformative and emancipatory potentials of formal education. The question then may be asked: Why is religion so influential today in Nigeria and some other countries around the world? Is the influence of religion on education and other measures of well-being so positive that Nigerians and successive Nigerian governments cannot transcend it? These are the questions that will be addressed in this chapter. To answer these, the authors undertake a detailed examination of what religion means to person, how the religions that now predominate in Nigeria and the educational systems associated with them were spread and how these processes laid the foundation for some of the challenges to the well-being of Nigerian citizens today. In the first section, the phenomenon of religion – mainly from insights offered by Moore (1923) – is explored. In the second section, an exploration of the spread of Islam and Christianity in Nigeria, the current map of religious inclinations in the country, and the role of the state in religion is undertaken. In the third section, the authors examine the spread of Islamic and Western forms of education, the role of British colonial administrators in the processes, the predominance of Western Education in Nigeria, and the key explanations Nigerian scholars have proffered for the motives and actions of key actors in these processes. The fourth section explores how the information, maps, and arguments in the preceding sections have set the stage for some of the challenges to Nigerians’ well-being today. An examination of the uncomplimentary roles of religious and political leaders in the state of affairs is undertaken. Finally, the authors posit that religion and education hold the potential to impact the well-being of Nigerians better or more positively if religious

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and political leaders would put aside their personal interests, especially the need to hang on to power (and enjoy the accompanying perks), and relate to Nigerians as persons who should be treated with dignity and respect. The key texts that will guide discussions in the second and third sections are the research studies and reflections reported in Fafunwa (1974), I-IDEA (2000), and Taiwo (2010), which are historical, political, and philosophical analyses (not in any order) of the spread of the two new religions and education in Nigeria and the roles of non-state and state actors in the processes. Quantitative and qualitative data sourced from government websites and other sources will inform discussions in the fourth section, which will be carried out from the perspective of critical thinking. This chapter is, therefore, a representation of the history of the spread and influence of Islam, Christianity and Western education in Nigeria and the role of state and non-state actors in these processes.

RELIGION Religion in one form or another is a universal phenomenon (Moore, 1923). Moore contends that religion is man’s natural response to his environment and experience, an impulse for or a means of self-preservation, and the preservation of the group to which he belongs. Self-preservation is, therefore, a universal motive in religion. Moore posited that in and of itself, there is nothing religious about self-preservation; it is biological, and if the human person were to be placed in a world where (s)he is not exposed to strange perils and was able to satisfy all his needs and desires, (s)he would find no need for religion. In the actual world, however, humans are beset by perils which menace their well-being and very existence and frustrate their efforts to satisfy urgent needs. So, something goes wrong with humanity which people do not understand, so (s)he teaches her or his dependence on or insufficiency concerning a power or powers that (s)he then establishes a relationship with. Moore contended that what gives character to religion is determined by two factors: what (wo)man wants of the powers (s)he has identified and what (s)he thinks about them, which is chiefly determined by what (s)he wants of them. So long as a (wo) man feels the need to satisfy an abundance of material good things with which (s)he can enjoy life, health, wealth, power and pleasure, his or her gods will be purveyors of such things in this world or a continuation of it; and his or her practical religion would be the appropriate means to get plenty of them from the powers which dispense them. Moore also suggested that meaning-making about the worth of a transcendental self is a motive for religion when (wo)men were less concerned with material things. Moore posited that as religions advanced, the human understanding

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of the notion of powers that have been key features of religion changed, and there are also corresponding changes in what humans do to get what they want from the powers. He further argued that although humans evolve new rituals to get what they want from the powers; they retain and perpetuate the old ways. From Moore’s perspective, it could be surmised that adherents of different religions, believe in and establish relationships with something or somebody greater than them, and in the context of the relationship, they expect that their emotional, spiritual and material well-being and that of their group would be catered for. For some other believers, their expectations are different. They seek to understand and make meaning of their world and the hereafter, through their religions. Yet others hold religious beliefs and engage in religious practices for the twin reasons of catering to their well-being and making meaning of life. The well-being of individuals and groups and meaningmaking are, therefore, central motivations in religion.

RELIGION IN NIGERIA Religion is a motive force that instigates characteristic emotions and wellbeing. Unarguably, religious experience, behaviour and expression differ cross-culturally. Before the arrival of Catholicism and Protestantism in the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries and Islam in the fourteenth century CE in the space now called Nigeria, the people of Nigeria held and practised indigenous African religious beliefs. The spread of the new religions into Nigeria took place in two different directions. First, Islam got into the space now called Nigeria through the north: from the Kanuri Empire, with the capital in Bornu, and the Hausa land through Kano and Katsina, with the real Islamisation of Bornu taking place between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Fafunwa 1974). According to Perriera (2005), although Islam had been influential in the north of Nigeria, it was not until Usman Dan Fodio’s jihad of the year 1804 and the subsequent establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate that Islam was established as a pervasive belief system at all levels of society. Second, Christianity came in through the south in two phases, first in the fifteenth century and then in the nineteenth century (Fafunwa 1974), when West Africa (Nigeria being a part of it) witnessed what Taiwo (2010) described as ‘the second wave of evangelisation’ that was ‘part of the evangelical revival and the humanitarian movement,4 especially its abolitionist wing’5 (p.7). The first attempts made at spreading Christianity took place in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. They were based on preReformation6 Christianity and were limited to the royal courts (Taiwo 2010).

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The second wave of evangelisation came through Badagry into Abeokuta in the South, to Ibadan and Lagos and other parts of the present southwestern part of Nigeria, inhabited by the Yoruba. Through the Niger expedition in 1857 and the Niger mission, Christianity reached only the southern parts of north-central Nigeria. At the turn of the century, in 1898, when the missionaries of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) sought and got permission from the colonial authorities, the missions got to the northern town of Zaria. It would be recalled as indicated above, that the Christian missionaries that undertook the evangelisation of the south of Nigeria from the Yoruba areas (much of present-day southwestern Nigeria constituted the Oyo Empire at the time) were also abolitionists. Uthman Dan Fodio’s jihad started just before slavery was prohibited. This happened in the year 1807 when the Houses of Parliament in London enacted legislation prohibiting British subjects from participating in the slave trade.7 The suppression of the slave trade and its substitution for legitimate trade and commerce disrupted the Oyo economy. When the transatlantic market for slaves picked up again after the British prohibited it,8 key Yoruba towns and power centres sought access to the control of trade routes and the supply of slaves, such that the political troubles in Oyo came to a head and the Oyo kingdom began to experience civil war (Johnson 2001; Metz 1991). While the civil war in Yorubaland was on, the Islamic Jihad, which had taken over and consolidated in the northern part of Nigeria, began the push to the south and dismantled Oyo-Ile, the capital city of the Oyo kingdom. At this point, the Yoruba, who were at war with one another, rallied and resisted further pushes by the jihadists. However, Fafunwa (1974) recorded that in 1830, some learned scholars of Islam came to Yorubaland, precisely Ibadan, from the north through Ilorin (north-central Nigeria). Hence, through peaceful means, precisely through education, Islam gained converts in southwest Nigeria.9 Meanwhile, the civil war in Yorubaland did not stop until late in the nineteenth century. The war provided the British with the reason to intervene more frequently in the affairs of communities in the southern part of presentday Nigeria; mainly because the wars were getting in the way of legitimate trade and access to resources. Consequently, full formal colonialism began in the year 1892. The protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria, which were administered as separate entities, were merged in 1914. They gave birth to present-day Nigeria, which fell under the administration of Lord Lugard, a British colonial administrator. The colonial administration encouraged the rulers in the northern part of Nigeria to discourage Christian evangelisation in the north. Instead, the colonial administrative policy acted to promote Islamisation in northern Nigeria (Perreira 2005). In the next section, we will explore the reasons for this religious promotion.

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THE CURRENT MAP OF RELIGIOUS INCLINATIONS IN NIGERIA The foregoing sets the stage for the current map of religious inclinations among the people of Nigeria today. There are six geopolitical zones in the country: the north-east, the north-west, the north-central, the south-east, the south-south and the south-west zones. There is also the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), carved out as Nigeria’s administrative capital, but this is a part of the north-central zone. The Nigerian National Population Commission, for instance, regards Abuja as a part of the north-central zone. The people of the different zones are either Christians or Muslims, generally following the direction of the spread of the two religions. In the northeast (the area now being ravaged by the Boko Haram insurgency), the indigenes of five of the six states are mainly Muslims, with a few pockets of Christian communities. In the north-west, indigenes are predominantly Muslims, with very few pockets of Christian communities in two of the seven northwest states. In north-central Nigeria, the indigenous populations are a mix of Christian and Muslim believers, with some states having more Muslim than Christian communities and others vice versa. Yet others have a mix of the two sets of believers. The people of the southeast are predominantly Christians with a sprinkling of Muslims, while Christianity is the religion that people in five of the six states in the southsouth subscribe to. In one of the six states in the southsouth zone, there are some predominantly Muslim communities. In the southwest zone of Nigeria, the indigenes are a mix of Christians and Muslims, with two of the six states, being mainly Christian communities. In many families, stories are shared of how, in the early/midtwentieth century, Christian and Islamic leaders approached family heads to either participate in their religious and or educational activities. Such family heads decided to distribute, usually sons, among leaders of the two new religions since both made claims to the inherent goodness of their faith and education. This map does not preclude the fact that some individuals and communities all around Nigeria still hold on to their traditional African religious beliefs, sometimes alone but often along with their Christian or Islamic beliefs (Mejiuni 2006a). However, this map excludes Nigerians who work, trade or school or are just seeking opportunities in towns, cities and villages that are not their original homes; so, it is an unrealistic view of the practice of religion in the different parts of Nigeria today. A more representative picture would be to state that except in the rural areas of those states that are either predominantly Christian or Muslim communities, adherents of the two religions would be found (although not in the same proportion) in most urban and suburban communities all over Nigeria as people traded and inter-married and still do.

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THE ROLE OF THE STATE This discussion of religious inclinations in Nigeria has thus far only made a fleeting reference to the role of the state in the spread of the religions, and that was the role of the colonial administration, which was clearly in favour of Islamisation in the north and the prevention of the spread of Christianity to the north of Nigeria (Perreira 2005; Taiwo 2010). Despite the spirited efforts of the colonial administrators, as indicated above, Christians live and work in all parts of Northern Nigeria, just as Muslims do in the South today. In the run-up to independence and after, Christian minorities in the north had complained that the Hausa and Fulani Muslims were contemptuous of them, had called them infidels, and were worried about the implications of the ‘alien’ Muslim district heads that the British had imposed on their communities; these were communities that were neither conquered by the jihad nor incorporated into the Sokoto Caliphate (I-IDEA). This issue later became a central concern in the ethno-religious conflicts that erupted in the north beginning in the early 1980s. In 1986, the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida led Nigeria to ‘officially but surreptitiously join the OIC’ (I-IDEA 2000:73). I-IDEA wrote that the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) was established in 1969 to unify the Muslim Umma all over the world. The organisation moulds the Muslims into a political and economic force, and observer delegates from Nigeria have been attending OIC since its formation. This move created suspicion and anxiety among Christians. As I-IDEA (2000) correctly observed: When the state is generally perceived as serving the interests of one group, it starts losing its legitimacy, and indeed, its authority. As state capacity declines, fear of ‘the other’ rises and inhabitants of the state resort to other levels of solidarity – religious, ethnic, regional, and so on, in search of security. Religious insecurity is particularly insidious and dangerous because it makes people feel threatened, not just in their present lives but also in the hereafter. (I-IDEA 2000:70)

Unfortunately, Nigeria’s entry into the OIC took place in a particular context. First, the oil boom that fetched Nigeria’s petrol dollars in the 1970s and early 1980s ended in the mid-1980s, and economic crises loomed. The then military head of state had declared an economic emergency and flagged off a debate about securing a loan from the International Monetary Fund. In times of economic crises, people become fearful. Second, the same military government had also put on trial several alleged coup plotters, many of whom were Christians from north-central Nigeria (I-IDEA 2000). There was, therefore, an atmosphere of fear from the real or seeming threat posed by economic

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problems, Nigeria’s entry into the OIC, and the fear that the all-powerful presidency was being run by a Machiavellian personality. Recall Moore’s thesis on the birth and growth of religion, that in religion, man seeks self-preservation and self-realisation, being concerned with his well-being and that of his group and being concerned about the supernatural. The fears generated by the action of the military rulers stated above led adherents of the two religions to believe that those of the other religions were threats. Whereas all Islamic and Christian groups were not always cohesive blocks and had internal differences, positions along religious lines began to fossilise when Babangida, the then military head of state, took Nigeria to the OIC. with religious fundamentalism showing up along inter-religion rather than intra-religion lines. Fundamentalism is said to be a description of those who return to what they believe to be the fundamental truths and practices of religion (Bowker 1997). Some thinkers have suggested that fundamentalism is a religion of the marginalised, while others think otherwise. They think it is the religion of people caught off balance. Fundamentalist groups often arise in situations where social, cultural, and economic power is up for grabs, and many arise in post-colonial situations (Brown 1994). Also, Brown (1994) observed that fundamentalism is the religion of the stressed and the disoriented, of those for whom the world is overwhelming. What makes fundamentalism problematic and, in some cases, dangerous is the tendency to aggressively defend truths, and this is manifested in different kinds and degrees of violence. Unfortunately, fundamentalists are known to be consistent in the maintenance of strong and clear social boundaries. They are concerned with social order and social control. Given the patriarchal nature of their religions, the battles that fundamentalists fight in the defence of fundamental ‘truths’ and practices of their religions are fought mainly around and on women’s lives and their bodies.

RECENT HIGH LEVEL OF INSECURITY IN NIGERIA The recent wave of ethno-religious clashes, which began with attacks on Christian communities and reprisal attacks by Christians in Plateau State, has taken a frightening turn. For, among other reasons, the attacks in Plateau State were skilfully executed. Then, in 2008, came the Boko Haram insurgency. Boko Haram is an Islamic fundamentalist organisation that is prohibited. The insurgency, which began in the Borno State, the impact of which has been felt in Abuja (beginning with the bombing of the UN office), has spread to the Nigerian states in the north-east, and some states in the north-west. In April 2014, over two-hundred schoolgirls were taken from their school dormitories

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at night. This daring attack by Boko Haram took place in the Chibok local government area, about 128 kilometres from Maiduguri, which is the Borno State capital and home to military formations. Chibok is a predominantly Christian community. Weeks after a lot of uproar greeted the inhuman behaviour of Boko Haram, the group released a video of some of the girls wearing the veil and reciting what appeared to be verses of the Qur’an. A leader of Boko Haram appeared in the video and, taunting distraught parents, community members and other Nigerians, announced that the girls had been converted to Islam and married off. Given the seeming paralyses in government circles about how to handle the threats posed by Boko Haram, the group got emboldened and enlarged its scope of operation, carrying out daring raids on military formations, government institutions, marketplaces, churches, palaces and people’s homes. They recruit young boys, coarse whole communities into supporting them, carry women and young girls away, and recently, started using young female children, usually not older than thirteen, as suicide bombers. This pillaging, killing and massacre of Christians and Muslims, old and young, are being carried out, unfortunately, in the name of religion, precisely Islam. Whereas there are other forms of insecurity issues in other parts of Nigeria, such as kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, rape and so on, the perpetrators do not claim to carry them out in the name of religion. The criminals, as well as other Nigerians, know that those activities are criminal pursuits. The next section of this chapter will be devoted to an exploration of education in the north and south of Nigeria, the spread of Western and Qur’anic/ Islamic education, along with the map of the spread of the two new religions, and the role of the state in the processes.

EDUCATION IN NIGERIA The map of the spread of the two new religions in Nigeria, Christianity and Islam, is also the map of the spread of Western and Islamic education in the country. Fafunwa (1974) wrote that scholars from the Kanem-Bornu region, large sections of which were in present-day Nigeria, went to Tunisia and Cairo in search of knowledge. Towards the end of the thirteenth century, Kanem became a centre of Islamic learning and ‘Kanem scholars and poets achieved a very high standard in the writing of the classical Arabic language’ (p.53). Fafunwa recorded that the real Islamisation of Bornu took place under the reign of Mai Idris Alooma (1570–1602) and Madrasahs or Islamic schools were established following the pattern in other Muslim countries. Islam was brought to Hausaland in the fourteenth century, first by traders and then by Fulani scholars who migrated to Kano and took books on Islamic theology

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and jurisprudence with them. Also, Katsina had hosted pilgrims from Mecca and several scholars from Sankore University, Timbuktu, who brought books on divinity and etymology with them (Fafunwa 1974). Katsina also produced native scholars, and Fafunwa (1974) cited Hamidu Alkali as saying that learning developed among the Ulamaa (learned men) through centres of learning like Timbuktu. A group of the learned men formed an intellectual harmony; the state of learning was higher among them, and they were organised into a sort of guild, under which a master would grant a recognised certificate (Ijazah) to those students who satisfactorily passed the master’s prescribed course of study. This Islamic education, Fafunwa recorded, gave cultural prestige to Islam. Fafunwa (1974), citing A. R. I. Doi, stated that Islamic learning began with prophetic advice, which states that the best among believers is the one who learns the Qur’an and then cares to teach it. Arabic, the language of the Qur’an, and Islam were taught simultaneously in the north. The elementary Arabic schools in Nigeria were, therefore, called the Qur’anic schools. Two types of Qur’anic schools developed in Hausaland. They were the Makarantar Allo, or ‘Tablet school’. meant for beginners, and Makarantar ‘Ilmi or the higher school’ which embraces all aspects of Islamic studies. Fafunwa stated that in the early stages of the Qur’anic schools, teachers depended on charity for their living; the noble principle, successfully applied in the early stages of the development of Islamic education, reduced the status of a teacher (Mu’allim) to that of a mere beggar, occupying a low social status. ‘He had to wander from place to place, looking for charitable Muslims to patronise him and give him food and shelter. Whenever his efforts were not sufficient to procure the bare necessities of life, he had to send his pupils from door to door asking for charity. They were Muhajirun (emigrants) who had left their homes in search of knowledge’ (p.55). Therefore, a pupil undergoing training under the teacher (Mu’allim) is called Almajiri, a corrupt form of Al-Muhajir. However, Fafunwa wrote that ‘the higher grade of teachers, the ‘ulama’, who were deeply learned in the science of the Qur’an and the Hadith, Islamic theology and etymology were highly respected’ in northern Nigeria, right from the time Islam got into the Kanem-Bornu area and Hausaland. The rulers employed Muslim scholars as administrators. Fafunwa (1974) also recorded that apart from reforming Muslims in northern Nigeria, specifically removing syncretism from the beliefs and practices of Muslims, the most outstanding reform of the Jihad of Shehu Uthman Dan Fodio, a revivalist (Mujaddid), was the education of women. In his strident call for women’s education (in the format that was prevalent and traditional at the time), Uthman Dan Fodio criticised men who taught their students about Islam and left their daughters and wives out as engaging in teaching out of egotism and hypocrisy. His message, Fafunwa wrote, worked so well that

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female education became a matter of pride at the time in northern Nigeria. Dan Fodio’s two daughters were highly educated, and his older daughter gave religious instruction and lessons on Islamic studies, law and jurisprudence, while his younger daughter was a renowned poet. The Shehu (Dan Fodio) allowed women to attend his lectures and preaching in his attempt to practice what he preached. According to Fafunwa (1974), Islam got to the south, precisely Yorubaland, about 1830, from the north, through Ilorin to Ibadan, just after the founding of Ibadan. Ilorin had become a centre of Islamic learning at the time, and eminent scholars who had settled there from the north of Nigeria and other parts of West Africa taught scholars who went from Ibadan for their higher training in Ilorin (in today’s north-central Nigeria). These movements led to the spread of Islamic learning in Ibadan and other Yoruba towns, especially through the trade routes. When scholars returned to their homes, they established Madrasahs, or Qur’anic schools, which were found in towns and villages where there were only a few Muslim families. So implicit and explicit in this narrative is that Islam and Islamic education, even if it was not widespread, was already in Yorubaland by the time the second wave of evangelisation of the southern part of Nigeria by the CMS began. As he did in the case of Islamic education, Fafunwa (1974) detailed the spread of Western education in the south of Nigeria, with the Christian missions, the Methodists, the CMS (or Anglican), the Baptists, the Roman Catholic missions, and the Church of Scotland Mission (or the United Presbyterians), the Qua Ibo of Northern Ireland among others being active participants in the spread of Christianity and Western education. The missionaries taught literacy skills, first in the Portuguese language in the fifteenth century, for commerce and evangelisation. The missionaries who came in the nineteenth century were, as Taiwo (2010) observed, ‘part of the evangelical revival and the humanitarian movement, especially its abolitionist wing’ (p.7). He noted that it was the post-Reformation-inflected Christianity that came back to the West African coast in the nineteenth century. They took the spread of Christianity along with literacy teaching seriously, especially engaging in the conversion of local languages into written forms. They taught literacy along with the Bible so converts could read the Bible. Fafunwa recorded that the Church of Scotland Mission, which sent an exploratory mission to evangelise the Efik in Calabar in 1846 with a group comprising a Reverend, an English printer and his wife, a mullato carpenter and a negro teacher, found that the king and his son were already literate in English and skilled in the use of the three Rs (reading, writing and arithmetic), apparently from the Efik’s long-standing interaction with English-speaking merchants. The first school was established by Mr. and Mrs. de Graft of the Methodist Mission in Badagry, in 1843. In 1846, the CMS, led by Samuel Ajayi

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Crowther and Henry Townsend, reached Abeokuta, setting up a mission house, a Church and a school. According to Fafunwa (1974), while the CMS was consolidating its missions in Abeokuta and Badagry, it was also extending its evangelical programmes to other parts of the country’ (p.82). In December 1858, Samuel Ajayi Crowther opened the first school in Onitsha for girls between the ages of six and ten. The boys often engaged in hunting, rushing into the classrooms to see the activities the girls were engaged in, viewing the reading activities with disdain, and going off. However, upon second thought, a few of the boys returned to the classes to learn the letters. Farm work, particularly in the dry season, made them irregular in classes. The pattern was that girls were the most stable in classes, even if there were not many. The girls were also observed in Isaga, which was an outstation to the west of Abeokuta. The early school curriculum consisted of Bible reading in the local language, Catechism, the story of Jesus, hymns (singing), prayers, sewing for girls and farming for boys. Fafunwa noted that there was no common curriculum among the missions, as each mission followed its devices based on the whims of the teacher in charge, although, in the year 1848, the Methodist Mission on the Gold Coast sent out a timetable to head teachers at the schools under their management. In the initial stages, tuition was free and the missions went on house-to-house admission drives. This was done so that children could attend school. Fafunwa recorded that some parents insisted the missionaries should pay them for their children that they were going to lose to the missionaries; that was a big farmhand gone. Most missions and emigrant parents preferred that children who were going to school lived with the missionaries (see, e.g. Fafunwa 1974, p.89 for reasons), thus encouraging the idea of boarding schools. The missions supported the boarding schools and established funds to enable them to redeem slaves, feed, clothe and educate them. The medium of instruction in those schools was English, since the missionaries did not understand the local language. Even the parents encouraged the use of English because they wanted their children to learn ‘the language of commerce, civilisation and Christianity’. As the missionaries learned the local language, they tended to use it for full comprehension of the Bible. According to Fafunwa, between 1845 and 1865, some of the children in the mission houses were sent to England for various vocational courses, learning about plants, medicine, chemistry, navigation, and so on. Some of the distinguished Nigerians who benefitted from the experience were Revd. T.B. Macaulay, who trained in teaching and became the founder of the CMS Grammar School, Lagos, the oldest secondary school in Nigeria, and Captain James Davis, who studied navigation and Dr James Africanus Horton, who studied medicine. Children in boarding schools thought of themselves as superior to children who remained in the village or town. They preferred

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the food, dress, culture, habits, arts, and so on of the Western World, and the missionaries themselves discouraged things that were African. The Role of the State. Before 1882, the colonial government in Nigeria paid little or no attention to the educational needs in the colonies (the northern and southern protectorates), and in addition to the curriculum earlier highlighted, the missions added vocational training, agriculture, bricklaying, carpentry, ginnery, and so on. The Roman Catholic Mission even established the industrial school for delinquent children in Topo, Badagry. They taught character training along with European ethics and enforced moral codes. Fafunwa stated that the achievements of the missions during the period of the government were indifferent to education and included: Translation of the Bible into the local languages, for example, Yoruba and Ibo, Efik and Nupe; introduction of vocational or industrial education, character-training, use of ‘vernacular’ and English; regulation concerning training, employment, payment of teachers; and establishment of a code of conduct for teachers and pupils. (Fafunwa 1974: 93)

He also highlighted the weaknesses arising from the absence of an official education policy. From 1872, the colonial government in Lagos started assisting the missions in their education efforts, assisting three missions with thirty pounds. In 1899, the first government primary school was founded in Lagos for the education of Muslim children in response to the concerns of the Muslim community in Lagos that by supporting Christian missions to open more schools, their children were being neglected. In 1909, the first government secondary school, King’s College, was founded in Lagos. Fafunwa provides the information that by 1912, there were 59 government primary schools with an enrolment of 3,984 and 91 mission schools with an enrolment of 11,732 pupils. 20,000 pupils attended schools that were not being supported by the government, and 50,000 pupils were attending Qur’anic schools. We do not know whether they attended both religious and formal schools. CMS Grammar School, founded in 1859, was the first secondary school in Nigeria, and by 1913, there were twelve secondary schools in the southern part of Nigeria. One was government-owned, and another was privately owned. The rest were owned by the missions: CMS, Roman Catholic Church, Methodists, Baptists and the Church of Scotland. Fafunwa wrote that the beginning of missionary activities in parts of northern Nigeria was marked by first, the Niger expedition of 1841 (which included Samuel Ajayi Crowther, who was a Nigerian linguist, clergyman, and the first African-Anglican bishop of West Africa), which reached Gbede and Lokoja at the confluence of the rivers Niger and Benue. The expedition established a model farm settlement in this area, which was later abandoned. In 1857, Revd. Ajayi Crowther and his party left Onitsha and journeyed up

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the Niger River. In Iddah and Gbede, Crowther was given land for building mission stations. In 1865, Dr. Baikie of the CMS founded a settlement at Lokoja. A school was opened the same year, and instruction was given in Hausa and Nupe languages from the beginning. So, for the stations in Gbede and Lokoja, there was no missionary station in northern Nigeria before 1900. The Christian mission and Royal Niger Company had established themselves in Lokoja by 1899, when the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria was proclaimed and Sir Frederick Lugard was appointed High Commissioner. According to Fafunwa (1974), the ‘three civilising agents, Christianity, Commerce and Colonialism’ (p.101) allied, often an uneasy one, to open the northern territories. Lugard launched a military campaign where he brought the Kano, Katsina and Sokoto emirates, by force of arms under the authority of the British government. According to Fafunwa, Lugard’s policy on education in 1902 was that the Christian missions should direct their attention to the non-Muslim areas in the north, as ‘he was anxious that the Muslims should not regard missionaries and government officials as fellow agents of administration’ (p.101). The CMS could not penetrate the north from Lokoja, where it had a foothold, until 1898, when Bishop Tugwell sought and received the permission of the colonial administrators. Lugard permitted the SIM at about the same time. The CMS established the Hausa mission in Zaria and then Kano before being ordered out by the Emir. The first schools that were introduced were called ‘Home Schools’, as they were for children of slaves and ex-slaves. The curriculum included vernacular, English and geography, or grammar in different grade levels. Singing, object lessons, drills and scriptures were compulsory at all grade levels. While scripture consisted of identified portions of the Old and New Testaments, religious knowledge covered the Catechism, the life of Christ and certain texts. Unless a pupil passed Religious Knowledge and the three Rs, he could not move up to the next standard. The missionaries intensified their missions. Fafunwa wrote that the SIM whose members were Canadians and whose initial interest was in industrial education, established farms in Pategi, Wushishi and Bida. However, they preached the equality of Europeans and natives, and Lugard would not have it. He maintained that although equality was true from the doctrinal point of view, it was ‘apt to be misapplied by people in a low stage of development and interpreted as the abolition of class distinction’ (p.103). At Bida, the CMS opened a school for mallams which was to be secular, but the mission thought that encouraging mallams to go to school was a missionary activity. In Zaria, in the core north, Dr Miller of the CMS used his friendship with Sir Lugard to promote Christianity in the north of Nigeria. In 1902, Lugard proposed a plan for secular education in the north, but the missionaries had the mission to proselytise and, therefore, kept slipping

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religious content into the curriculum. In 1909, Hans Vischer, a former CMS missionary worker in northern Nigeria who had turned into an administrative officer, was appointed to organise a system of education for the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. He established a boarding school for the sons of chiefs in Kano, and the school had thirty pupils. By 1913, the Nassarawa School, which was secular, had 209 pupils drawn from eleven provinces in northern Nigeria, and the Nassarawa schools comprised two elementary, one primary, one secondary, one technical school and a school farm. By 1913, the missions-owned elementary schools numbered twenty-eight schools and one Freed Slave Home, with a minimum of 339 pupils (the number of pupils in 20 schools was not reckoned). There were twelve government schools with 527 pupils and 19,073 Qur’anic schools with 143,312 pupils. According to these figures, between 1912 and 1913, the ratio of children in schools below the secondary school level in the north in comparison to the south of Nigeria was ratio 1:18, while the ratio of schools was 1:4. The blame game. Unfortunately, Fafunwa (1974) continuously argued that Dr. Miller and the CMS mission in Northern Nigeria lost the opportunity to pioneer secular education in the north at the initial stages. He wrote that ‘their all-consuming preoccupation with the conversion to Christianity of the Northern Nigerians at the initial stage created for a long time among the people a dislike for Western-type schools in general and Christian schools in particular’ (p.105). He then added that ‘this attitude of the Christian missions, more than anything else, was responsible for the slow educational development of the north’ (p.105). On this crucial point, Fafunwa seems alone. Some Nigerian scholars (Odi, cited in Fasokun & Mejiuni 1991; Taiwo 2010) hold that Lugard was interested only in the type of education required for servicing the colonial system, not the type that would ‘open the minds of its recipients to new ways of being human or make them question, with a view to improvement, age-old customs’ (Taiwo 2010). Lugard also held that purely secular education was ill-suited to the level of development of Africans; hence, he supported religious instruction in schools. Lugard said: The examples of India and China, as well as of Africa, appear to demonstrate that purely secular education, and even moral instruction divorced from religious sanction, among races who have not the atmosphere that centuries of Christian ethical standards have produced in Europe, infallibly produces a class of young men and women who lack reverence alike for their parents, their social superiors, their employers, or the government. They lack self-restraint and control, and the foundation on which the best work is based, whether of public usefulness or private effort. . . . It remains more than doubtful how far the African is capable of being restrained by moral precepts divorced from the incentive of religious sanctions, and I am impressed with the belief that the

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African boy requires every force which can be brought to bear if his natural proclivities are to be overcome, and he is to learn self-control and discipline. (cited in Taiwo 2010: 148)

Perhaps then, Fafunwa (1974) did not have the information available to some other scholars? Lugard was not opposed to Christian religious instructions. He was opposed to the S.I.M’s type of Christian evangelisation that preached the equality of Europeans and natives. Even Fafunwa himself recorded this. Lugard’s reasons for this opposition were clear, and Taiwo (2010) captured them. He said that, throughout the period that Lugard was an administrator in Northern Nigeria, the Western-educated elite was made up mostly of returning slaves and indigenous converts to Christianity. They complained, criticised and condemned Lugard’s policy choices, and ‘Lugard and his cohort fully reciprocated their hostility. Lugard’s reaction to them contrasted sharply with his fawning disposition towards the Muslim rulers of the northern parts who had been defeated by the British’ (p.149). Taiwo provides an overview of how Christian-Western education has impacted the south of Nigeria. He said that by the time Lugard was standardising administrative procedures in Nigeria, the western part of Nigeria especially Lagos, Abeokuta and Ibadan – and eastern parts – Onitsha, Calabar and Port Harcourt – were ‘home to a coterie of professionals in law, medicine, the building trades, the press, and education who fancied themselves as deserving of equal treatment with Europeans simply because they had proved their mettle as participants in the new dispensation’ (p.146). Taiwo (2010) cites Echeruo (1977), who attempted to reconstruct patterns of life and thought in Lagos (a key southern Nigerian city) as reflected in the Lagos press in the second half of the nineteenth century, as saying: These Lagosians were usually very conversant with events in Europe and America, especially with the progress and consequences of the American Civil War. They maintained close contact with friends and other descendants of rescued slaves on the West African Coast. They had high hopes for themselves and the Africans, which they were going to help to civilise. They felt deep obligations to the hinterlandand yet considered the civilising influence of British power sufficiently beneficial to justify the gradual control that Britain was gaining over Yorubaland. They wanted a good education for their children and fought to have Government subsidies for schools; they wanted their children to be ‘refined,’ and so they frequently sent them to England. These children had to be in the smart circles of Lagos, so they went into the right professions;law, medicine, and the arts. Educated Lagosians wanted to associate themselves with the usual recreations of a sophisticated Europe, and so went to the Races, to Fancy Dress balls, to the Gymkhana games, and cricket. In the evenings, they went for ‘brisk walks’ or for ‘short rides’. (Taiwo 2010: 150–151)

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Taiwo stressed that Echeruo had indicated that this segment of elites in southern Nigeria was very small, perhaps a tenth of the population, who were also part of ‘the intellectual context’ of Victorian Lagos, and there were debates within the community about the possibilities of Africans adopting European ways of being human and the consequences. So, when Lugard took over as (the administrator) of the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 and denounced Africans who saw value in the new ways of life as engaging in ‘slavish imitation of Europeans’ (Taiwo 2010:147), he failed to acknowledge that for the people of the south of Nigeria who were opposing his policies, especially of indirect rule, his ‘policies represented a clear retrogression from the advances that had been made thanks to missionary education’ (Taiwo 2010:147). The educated elites in the south of Nigeria were horrified by Lugard’s extension of indirect rule, which had become the northern administrative system, to the south. They also vigorously protested his court reforms of 1914 and their implications for the Southern elite’s understanding of the direction their progress should take. These were the reasons Lugard continuously denounced Africans who had acquired Christian-Western education. Odi (cited in Fasokun & Mejiuni) wrote that Lugard urged northern emirs and leaders who had the authority (under the native authority system of administration) to disallow Christian missionaries to operate in the areas under their control. When the missionaries protested to Lugard, he told them to concentrate their efforts in the south, since the animism and fetish of the pagans in the south represented no system of ethics and no principles of conduct. To Lugard, the way to eliminate the animism of the ‘pagan south’ was through Western education. More unfortunately, Lugard held Africans in deep contempt, and declared that the ‘African holds the position of a late-born child in the family of nations and must as yet be schooled in the discipline of the nursery’ (Taiwo 2010:135) and tried to play a sinister game with Nigerians. He caste the Hausa and Fulani as racially superior (because of their kinship to the Aryan or Hamitic stock), to the Nigerians in the south who were challenging him (Taiwo 2010:153). So Fafunwa argued that the Christian missionaries, who insisted on evangelising their wards in schools, caused the North to lag behind in Western education. Besides, Taiwo and Odi argued that it was the colonial administrators, led by and beginning with Lord Frederick Lugard, who restricted the spread of the twin Western education and Christianity because some of their values, equality for instance and the consequences of preaching it, negated the agenda of the colonialists. The question then is: qualitatively, where does this leave Nigerians and their well-being 172 years after the first known school was established in Badagry, 106 years after the colonial government in the north opened the first ‘secular boarding’ schools for the sons of chiefs, 55 years after the end of formal colonialism, 41 years after Fafunwa’s book came

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off the press, stating that the north was lagging behind in formal education and that the Christian missionaries were responsible, and about 20 years after Fafunwa himself (now late) served as the Minister (or chief political head) of education in Nigeria? THE WELL-BEING OF NIGERIANS Earlier in this chapter, the well-being of individuals and groups and meaningmaking were singled out as central to a person’s relationship with that power, which they believe is greater than them. The Oxford Dictionary of Current English describes well-being as the state of being content and healthy. Quickly, one could think of the conditions that could make men, women, children and communities feel contended. The conditions include being or feeling safe and secure; being able to work and feed their families and communities; being healthy; being successful in their pursuit of a better life; being hopeful; and having the ability to think of and work towards boundless possibilities. The concern in this section is to provide an overview of how religion has explicitly and implicitly impacted the well-being of Nigerians. As earlier indicated, the authors use qualitative and quantitative data to support discussions in this section. In the attempt to analyse existing quantitative data that are relevant to the discussions, data for one state each (Anambra, Bornu, Ekiti, Kogi, Rivers, and Sokoto) were retrieved from government websites. These data were purposefully selected from each of the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria and Abuja. However, in describing phenomena from a qualitative perspective, the authors made use of available data from each zone, focusing on phenomena that are peculiar to the different geopolitical zones in the country without restricting analyses to the states earlier chosen. Education, learning and unlearning are key variables in the achievement of the conditions listed above. The discussion in this section, therefore, begins with an examination of a map of education in Nigeria today. THE RECENT MAP OF EDUCATION IN NIGERIA By 2008 figures, the adult literacy rates (in any language) in the states in the northern zones of Nigeria were low when compared with the states in the southern zones, with Bornu taking the rear with a 37 per cent literacy rate (see figure 6.1). Adult literacy rates in Bornu, Sokoto and Kogi States fell below the country zones’ average of 64.89 per cent. Also, in the same year, the youth literacy rates (in any language) in Bornu and Sokoto States in two of the three zones in the north were low, falling below the country zones’

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Figure 6.1  Education-Literacy Level in Any Language for Six States and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja). Source: http://www​.nigerianstat​.gov​.ng/​&http:/​/nigeria​.prognoz​ .com​/en​/Reports.

average, which was 79.94 per cent. Sokoto state was at the rear with 49.20 per cent. Concerning further education or educational attainments, Bornu and Sokoto states in the north ranked low concerning candidates seeking admission into universities and gaining admission into the universities they only performed better than the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. When the number of applicants to Nigerian universities from Sokoto State, the state with the lowest number of applicants (3,186), was compared with the number from Anambra State, the state with the highest number of applicants (65,971), the ratio was 1:20. Concerning those that were admitted into Nigerian universities, Bornu and Sokoto states also performed low, only worse than Abuja. When the number of applicants admitted into Nigerian universities from Bornu State – the state with the lowest number of applicants admitted (112) – was compared with the number from Anambra State, which had the highest number of applicants admitted (7,865), the ratio was 1:70 (see figure 6.2). The implications of these figures for livelihood, employment and health are dire. Unfortunately, it is in these states, where there is the need for a big boost in literacy skills, school attendance and leaps in the education sector, that the Islamic Sect Boko Haram has declared war on Western education and Modernity. The worst hit by Boko Haram are Bornu State and the states in the Northeast of Nigeria. Hauling young girls from their school dormitory, converting them to Islam and marrying them off is a sure sign that this sect has crossed the boundaries of religion, even the fundamentalist strand, to that of hate. A complex spiral of security and socio-economic crises has developed in the north of Nigeria, where the presence of many out-of-formal school children, known as Almajiri, who are said to be in Qur’anic schools,

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Figure 6.2  Education-Application/Admission Status into Nigerian Universities for Six States and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja). Source: http://www​.nigerianstat​.gov​.ng/​ &http:/​/nigeria​.prognoz​.com​/en​/Reports.

lives in poverty and are thought to be easily available for exploitation by the Boko Haram sect. The security crises and humanitarian situation caused by the mayhem unleashed by Boko Haram have rendered many families homeless, turned citizens into refugees in their own country, and sent many children out of school. By their actions, in the long term, Boko Haram would have depleted the ranks of literate youths in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. The question that comes to mind is, Why have the literacy level, in any language, and educational attainments among Nigerians in the north not improved? Even if the missionaries and or the colonial governments set the stage for the current situation, there has been enough time for Nigeria’s indigenous rulers, whether civilian or military, to rectify the situation. Unfortunately, it seems logical to assume that children with low-level literacy skills, who are poor and perhaps also homeless, would be like Tinder in the hands of a sect like Boko Haram. Health According to Bloom, Canning & Jamison (2004), poor health reduces GDP per capita by reducing both labour productivity and the relative size of the labour force. From the census population figure of 2006, the authors of this chapter reckoned the hypothetical average number of persons per healthcare facility in each of Anambra, Bornu, Ekiti, Kogi, Rivers and Sokoto states. While a north-central state, Kogi State ranked first, having the lowest average number of persons to a health care facility (3,666), the other two northern

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states, Sokoto and the Bornu States, had an average of 9,075 and 9,187 persons to each health facility (see figure 6.3). Concerning the percentage of pregnant women registered with clinics in the years 2004 and 2005, the three northern states of Bornu, Kogi and Sokoto ranked fifth, sixth and seventh, respectively. Concerning the number of pregnant women receiving antitetanus injections, the three northern states maintained the same position, and it stands to reason that if the pregnant women did not register with a clinic, they would not have the chance to receive anti-tetanus injections (see figure 6.4). By 2013 figures, the northern states of Kogi, Bornu and Sokoto ranked fifth, sixth and seventh respectively, in the percentage of children between the ages of 12 months and 23 months who had received different types of vaccination. Sokoto recorded 1 percent vaccination, while Bornu recorded 10 percent vaccination. The three states also retained the same ranking in the percentage of children under age five who are stunted (too short for their age) based on 2006 WHO growth standards (see figure 6.5). Stunting is an indicator of nutritional status and continued exposure to infections. The data presented concerning health concerns Nigerian’s ability to access health facilities and maternal and child health. One figure that stands out is that on immunisation, where Sokoto and Bornu States recorded as low as 1 per cent and 10 per cent immunisation respectively. Unfortunately, these two states also recorded low adult and youth literacy rates, and the numbers that sought admission into and obtained admission into Nigerian universities were low compared with the other four states. These low figures might not be unconnected with the controversy around the oral polio vaccine in 2003. Akande & Akande (2006) reported that despite the successes recorded in the Polio Eradication Initiative in Nigeria, between January and

Figure 6.3  Health Care Facilities in Six States and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja). Source: National Bureau of Statitics; http://www​.nigerianstat​.gov​.ng/​&http:/​/nigeria​.prognoz​.com​/en​/Reports.

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Figure 6.4  Indicators of Maternal Health for Six States and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja). Source: National Bureau of Statistics; http://www​.nigerianstat​.gov​.ng/​ &http:/​/nigeria​.prognoz​.com​/en​/Reports.

Figure 6.5  Indicators of Child Health for Six States and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja). Source: Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey, 2013.

July 2003, 75 cases of wild polioviruses (WPV) were confirmed in Nigeria. By 2004, 302 cases of WPV had been confirmed in twenty states. Kano state had the highest number of cases, while Kebbi, Jigawa, Katsina, Zamfara, Kaduna, Sokoto and the Bauchi States followed. These are all states in the northern part of Nigeria. States in the south that have had interrupted polio

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transmission, such as Lagos, Ogun and Edo started reporting cases because of re-infection from the north. Akande & Akande wrote that polio is a highly infectious disease transmitted through the oral faecal route, usually in children less than five years. It has no known cure, and its paralytic effect is irreversible. According to them, ‘unfounded rumours about the alleged adverse effects, vaccine safety, contamination, overdose, as well as promotion of anti-OPV sentiments by political and religious leaders motivated by political sentiments have led to the rejection and or decline in service demand, and the acceptance’ (p.178) of the oral polio vaccine (OPV). They recorded that the controversies around the OPV were always based on information provided by un-named ‘competent’ sources and were usually subjects of religious sermons and editorials of print and electronic media. Again, the facts and the politics in the debate about the safety of the OPV are not clear, because they got mixed up in the complex brinkmanship of state and non-state actors. Unfortunately, the non-state actors included religious leaders. The reason for the low percentage of children immunised in the northwest (which Sokoto State is a part of) is now clear. If the religious leaders say the vaccine is not safe, their followers will probably not take this vaccine and others. Gender Inequality In examining concerns about equality between men and women in Nigeria, we examine two influences on women’s well-being, their labour force participation, theirparticipation in crop farming, and their security and safety within familial and emotional relationships. Employment in Crop Farming From the data presented in figure 6.6, it could be gleaned that women engage alongside men in farming, precisely, crop farming. However, when compared with men and the overall number of person who were engaged in crop farming, more women across the country participated in crop farming as family members. This means that even though they participate in crop farming, they are not paid for their efforts; in other words, they are unpaid labour. This is the case in all the zones in the country, except the Federal Capital Territory and Sokoto State, in the Northwest zone, where the percentage of men involved in crop farming as family members exceeded the percentage of women in the same zone. This kind of data feeds into the general pool that considers women’s labour force participation concerning that of men. It is, therefore, not surprising that in the 2013 Human Development Report, it was recorded that 63.3 percent of

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Figure 6.6  Gender Equality-Employment Status in Crop Farming. Source: National Bureau of Statistics; http://www​.nigerianstat​.gov​.ng/​&http:/​/nigeria​.prognoz​.com​/en​/ Reports.

Nigerian men and 47.9 percent of women were part of the labour force. These figures have implications for women’s earnings (Bateye 2010), their ability to access and control other resources, and, at times, their capacity to resist violence. Spousal Violence From the data presented in figure 6.7, it would be seen that all of the three northern states, Bornu, Kogi and Sokoto States, and the southern Anambra State, recorded low-level spousal violence or less than the country average of 16 per cent in 2013. When placed in the context of the reportage of spousal violence in each zone, it would be realised that the problem of spousal violence in Nigeria is acute. In all zones except the northwest zone, where Sokoto State is located, between 20 and 28 per cent of women reported spousal violence. Except for Sokoto State, a predominantly Muslim State where women reported a low level of spousal violence, spousal violence occurs in Nigerian families, irrespective of religious beliefs and practices. Unfortunately, 34 per cent of women in Rivers State and 22 per cent in Ekiti State reported that they had experienced spousal violence; these states are predominantly Christian States, with high adult literacy rates of 77.50 and 86.80, respectively. Violence against women, especially when it happens within the family, is usually considered a ‘private matter’, and it is not considered a threat to national security, like Boko Haram. Mejiuni (2013), however, pointed out that ‘Physical and verbal coercion of women have adverse implications on women’s physical, psychological, emotional and economic well-being. It affects women’s reproductive rights,

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Figure 6.7  Percentage Distribution of Physical or Sexual Abuse by Husband or Partner. Source: Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey, 2013.

their progress (both at work and in institutions of learning) and their ability to function fully as citizens’ (p.107). Pointing out that irrespective of their literacy level and educational attainments, women experienced violence in the private and public spheres, Mejiuni wrote that all the religious leaders (Christians, Muslims and traditionalists) that she interviewed in the study and reported in her book were opposed to violence against women. She then attempted to show that violence against women is an inevitable consequence of the unequal relations of power between men and women in Nigeria and other societies. She posited that the insistence that women are subordinate to men, as prescribed by Christianity and Islam, and the seeming intolerance of violence against women by the two dominant religions in Nigeria bring up a basic contradiction (Mejiuni 2006b, 2013). Concerning the situation in Ekiti and Anambra States, Mejiuni’s (2017) observation could explain the situation. She observed that some Christian leaders and followers romanticise and long for traditional marriage norms and values while holding on to Christian beliefs and ethos, and they stick with patriarchal views of what a Christian marriage should look like and the roles of a Christian wife in the public and the private spheres. She said these result in tension that gets men (and some women), (including religious leaders) to blame women for everything that goes wrong in their families. Abuse of Children For a country that is inhabited by so many persons who exhibit amazingly high levels of religiosity, the types and justifications of child abuse in Nigeria

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are shocking. The different shades, peculiar to the north and south of Nigeria, do not make any of the abuses or crimes less heinous (see, e.g. Mejiuni, 1991; Odujinrin & Fashina 2000; Bateye, 2010). However, recently, the abuse of children and violence against children have taken sinister turns, with perpetrators citing religion as their motives. Children Deemed Witches In 2008, reports started appearing in the foreign media10 of children deemed to be witches because they were stubborn and recalcitrant, they slept in a particular way at night, their parents used the broom as a cane on them and they reacted in a particular way, or they ran away from home, usually after being abused. These happened, mainly in the south-south geopolitical zone of Nigeria, in Akwa Ibom and Cross Rivers States. Compared with other states in Nigeria, these states are rich. Usually, children were declared witches by the pastors of their churches or by parents or guardians who had ‘learned about’ how to identify child witches in their churches or from DVDs, booklets and leaflets circulated by religious leaders. These children were whipped, scared and deformed physically and psychologically, such that it was reported that the mention of the names of some churches got them running for cover. When non-profit organisations in the two states picked the matter up and the foreign media focused attention on these phenomena, thankfully, Akwa Ibom State, included in the Nigerian Child Rights Act that it had domesticated, that anyone found guilty of branding a child a witch would get up to 12 years in prison. Female Children Suicide Bombers In the middle of the year 2014, as Boko Haram intensified attacks in the northwest zone of Nigeria, there were reports in the Nigerian print and broadcast media that Boko Haram had been targeting public places with young female suicide bombers wearing the Islamic full veil. Nigerians were distressed. When a child aged thirteen who refused to detonate the bomb she had been given was arrested, she told her interrogators that her father had handed her over to the Boko Haram sect, who paid him. She was also threatened. This thirteen-year-old child had a child on her back. Boko Haram allegedly acts in the name of Islam. It seems that the hegemonic discourse of women as inferior and of little value is what would inform a father into handing his daughter over to commit murder (murder herself and others), because that is what it means to be a suicide bomber.11 One could adduce the arguments of the two Ps, poverty and patriarchy (Mejiuni 2013), but this is just an abuse of trust and man’s inhumanity to man.

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CONCLUSION In this chapter, we examined several reasons why religion is influential in Nigeria and around the world. We sought to know whether the influence of religion on education and other measures of well-being is so positive that Nigerians and successive Nigerian governments cannot transcend religion. The chapter specifically interrogated how religion, education and their connections impact the well-being of Nigerian citizens. In this respect, we undertook a detailed examination of how the religions that now predominate in Nigeria and the educational systems associated with them were spread, the role of the state – beginning with the colonial administrators – in the processes, and how these processes laid the foundation for some of the challenges to the well-being of Nigerian citizens today. We made the case that the well-being of Nigerians has been threatened and that there are even further threats to their well-being in the areas of safety and security, safe access to education, and threats to the health of mothers and children. There is also the issue of severe gender inequality and the abuse of children. The authors discovered that many of these threats have their roots in the dysfunctional use of religion. It is also clear that state actors would only be able to excel if they defined and aligned their interests with a clear focus on the future of Nigeria as a potentially great nation. Such moral dedication could be regarded as a euphemism for good governance, a working economy and a less fearful populace, who will be creatively served by education. It is instructive that education, in its holistic dimension, fosters good human relationships. Therefore, harnessing the agencies of religion and education could become the basis of resistance to exploitation and oppression to foster the harmonious well-being of the Nigerian citizenry. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors wish to thank Dr Oluseyi Olanrewaju of the Population and Reproductive Health Program of the College of Health Sciences, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife for the transfer of data to line graphs, vice, 2016. NOTES 1. Reprinted with permission from Springer. Previously published as Olutoyin Mejiuni and Bolaji Olukemi Bateye. ‘Religion, Education and the Well-Being of Citizens of Nigeria.’ In The State of Social Progress of Islamic Societies. Social, Economic, Political and Ideological Challenges, edited by Habib Tiliouine and Richard

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J Estes, 137–58. Switzerland: Springer, 2016. It is pertinent that there are slight modifications to this article in this book chapter to address the philosophical nature of well-being in the present edition. 2. In conversation with A.O. Adekoya, Professor of Literature in English, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. 29 January 2023. 3. Some of the issues participants raised have been documented in: Perriera (2005) who recorded that in 1992, the Katsina State House of Assembly in Northern Nigeria, passed a Bill to expel all unmarried women from the state; http://www​.hrw​.org​/reports​ /2004​/nigeria0904​/5​.htm. Amnesty International provided a comprehensive documentation of discriminatory practices against women following the introduction of the Sharia Penal Code in some states in Northern Nigeria from 2000. In Mejiuni & Obilade’s (2012) report, they recorded that some religious leaders have taken undue advantage of their positions of trust and power to exploit teenage girls and young women. 4. Humanitarian movement represents the early organized efforts to fight injustices and alleviate suffering among the downtrodden. 5. Abolitionist wing represents the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society that advocated an end to the trans-Atlantic slave trade. 6. Pre-Reformation Christianity represents the period before the Protestant/European Reformation. The Reformation was a watershed in Western Christianity being the beginning of Protestantism. 7. Despite the nineteenth century being a time of High Imperialism yet there were a number of factors that led to the abolition of slave trade. Chief among these were travels and testimonies from educated Africans, economic factors, industrialised North Americans were against the use of slaves for farm work. Lastly, slavery was a blight on the American society that prides itself as a land of Democracy as the first statement in the Constitution. 8. Many Yoruba war lords benefitted from the trans-Atlantic slave trade and were eager to continue in the trade despite its abolition. 9. Islam gained significant converts in southwest Nigeria because it was presented in an alluring and attractive garb. The Yoruba polytheist was fascinated with the proclamation of the worship of one God who had no rival. 10. See, for example, CNN and New York Times between 2008 and 2010. 11. Additionally, belief that those who die in the course of jihad go to paradise could also be a factor.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Akande, A.A., and T.M. Akande. ‘Polio Eradication in Nigeria: Controversies and the Way Forward.’ African Journal of Clinical and Experimental Microbiology 7, no. 3 (2006): 175–80. Arinze, F. Sacrifice in Ibo Religion. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1970. Bateye, B.O. ‘United We Fall, Divided We Stand! Feminist Theological Ethics and the Myth of the Nigerian National Consciousness.’ Ife Journal of Religions 6, no. 1 & 2 (2010): 42–58.

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Bloom, D.C., D. Canning, and D.T. Jamison. ‘Health, Wealth and Welfare.’ Finance and Development 41 (2004): 10–15. Bowker, J. The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Brown, K.M. ‘Fundamentalism and the Control of Women.’ In Fundamentalism and Gender, edited by J.S Hawley, 175–201. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Echeruo, Michael J.C. Victorian Lagos: Aspects of Nineteenth-Century Lagos Life. London: Macmillan, 1977. Fafunwa, A.B. History of Education in Nigeria. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974. Fasokun, T.O., and C.O. Mejiuni. ‘Politics in Adult Education.’ In Fundamentals of Adult Education, edited by E.T. Ehiametalor and A.B. Oduaran, 101–107. BeninCity: Nera Publishers, 1991. I-IDEA. Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation-Building. Capacity Building Series 10. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2000. Johnson, S. The History of the Yorubas: From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the Protectorate. Lagos: CSS Bookshops Limited, 2001. Mejiuni, C.O. ‘Educating Adults against Socio-culturally Induced Abuse and Neglect of Children in Nigeria.’ Child Abuse and Neglect: The International Journal 15, no. 1 (1991): 139–45. ———. ‘Confounding or Empowering Women through Non-Formal and Informal Education? Religious Leaders in Ibadan and Lokoja, Nigeria, on Knowledge That Matters.’ In The 25th Annual Conference Proceedings of the Canadian Association for the Study of Adult Education (Casae) edited by L. English and J. Groen, 161–66. Toronto: York University, 2006a. ———. ‘Some Women Are Stubborn: Power, Violence against Women and the Challenges of Religion.’ Codesria Bulletin 1 & 2 (2006b): 38–40. ———. ‘Sustaining Collective Transformative Learning: Informal Learning and Revisions.’ In Transformative Learning Meets Bildung, edited by A. Laros, T. Fuhr and E. Taylor, 205–16. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, B.V, 2017. ———. Women and Power: Education, Religion, and Identity. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa 2013. Mejiuni, C.O., and O.O. Obilade. Unsafe Spaces: Dodgy Friends and Families. IleIfe: Warshe, 2012. Metz, H.C. Nigeria: A Country Report. GPO for the Library of Congress. Washington, 1991. Moore, G.F. The Birth and Growth of Religion: Being the Morse Lectures of 1922. New York: Scribner, C, 1923. Odujinrin, O, and O.M Fashina. ‘The Nigerian Child Victims of Their Culture and Political System.’ In Child Suffering in the World, edited by J.A. Marvasti, 251–69. Manchester: Sexual Trauma Center Publication, 2000. Pereira, C. ‘Domesticating Women? Gender, Religion and the State in Nigeria under Colonial and Military Rule.’ African Identities 3, no. 1 (2005): 69–94. Taiwo, O. How Colonialism Pre-empted Modernity in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

Chapter 7

A Non-Individualistic Notion of the Common Good Abdoulaye Ba

According to Aristotle (1999, orig. c.350 BCE), the establishment of society aims at the advantage of its members, which is the common good. At the very beginning of his ‘Politics’, Aristotle argues that this advantage is to be the highest one, materially and morally. ‘The state is the highest form of community and aims at the highest good’ (p. 31). The highest good is good only under the condition that its pursuit signifies that of the individuals or the society. There is no common good which thrives at the expense of the individual’s well-being. So, how can the well-being of the individual and the aim of the community fit together? Is the community the best frame for individual well-being? I answer these questions from an African (Senegalese) perspective. The common good is a matter of ethos, of concrete living and ethics (derived as a term from this ancient Greek word), be it local or global, whatever the domain it is related to, will not be worthwhile if this concreteness is not considered. Something ethical is something that is necessarily related to people’s everyday life. Wondering whether the common good is what is good for all would be senseless if all of us shared the view that there is no conflict between the common good and the individualistic or selfish interests. As far as the African way of life is concerned, there is a general idea – or belief – that the African continent is a place where the sense of collectiveness is highly developed. Is that true? To what extent can one promote such an idea? In asking these questions, I want to show how that ‘so-called’? sense of collectiveness determines the notion of the common good. I will answer this question along two lines of argument. Firstly, I will analyse some elements likely to make us believe in the existence of that sense of togetherness on which the notion of the common good may be grounded. Secondly, in a more modern and political way, I will note how this linkage between togetherness and the common good appears in modern African societies and communities. 163

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At the same time, I will highlight some prejudices to combat when discussing the relationship between the community and the individual.

THE MEANING OF THE COMMON GOOD IN A COMMUNITY-BASED SOCIETY Let us imagine the following thought experiment: Suppose that you are a Martian explorer who has landed in Senegal, to know how society is shaped. Once out of your shuttle, you realise that you are amid a public square, looking at some people passing by. Then, as a social scientist who is used to making inquiries, you begin to observe what is happening, how those women and men behave, how they walk and how they talk to each other. One of the first things you will notice is this: they tend to salute a lot while walking away, and some even stop, shaking hands. Moving on further, you may be invited to have a cup of Senegalese tea by a group of young people on the threshold of a house, and again, you may be invited in to share a meal, probably with numerous people sitting all around. Now, let me take my chance and tell me, at least in the first remarks, what you have written down in your notebook. You may think of the Senegalese society as community-based. What I mean by this is that you are getting connected with a population with seemingly a strong sense of togetherness. It might be quite abnormal to you how people are easily willing to share their time with you and others. Individuals can even briefly decide to delay their business to respond to someone’s solicitation. Comparing African to Western societies, as we tend to do, shall we establish that the latter mentioned are the individualistic ones and the African ones are non-individualistic? The answer is not clear-cut. The Senegalese philosopher Alassane Ndaw, reflecting on this issue, argues along the following lines. As far as African societies are concerned, the main noticeable feature is that, in every aspect, the community is given more significance compared to the individual. What Ndaw says can be translated as: In fact . . . in the African conception of the human person, there is a tendency to give more importance to the social part. . . . For an African, nothing can be achieved in daily life without leaning on others. (Ndaw 1997:136)

But it does not go one way. I lean on others, who in turn lean on me. A saying in the Wolof language expresses the same idea this way: ‘Human being, is human being’s cure’. Altruism exists, and it is based on reciprocity. Such a society tends to be highly attached to the common good. Indeed, there is a solid ground on which to stand, and that allows us to make an obvious connection between this togetherness and the sense of the common good.

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Bearing in mind this trap of thinking about Africa as a whole, socially and culturally, I will depart from Senegal and possibly have a say in the surrounding West African countries. As far as West African societies are concerned, some clues are showing us a possible existence of a kind of general spirit running through the current differences that goes back to the past. Senegal is known to be the land of Teraanga. In Mali and Guinea, something very similar or equivalent exists, called ndiatiguia, and the root of the same word exists in Senegalese Wolof to figure out the word ‘host’. This implies that the tradition of togetherness on which may be built the sense of the common good is not a myth. If we put apart formal and state institutions and just focus on the day-to-day ordinary lives of people, we have solid arguments in favour of this togetherness. Imagining people with no bind to the state, the general trend is this: they care for each other at the ground level of the communities. There is a social web recognised by individuals in which they participate in variable ways. For example, in modern days, in Senegalese big cities, people from remote areas used to gather in associations very well organised and capable of raising funds to build schools, health facilities and all sorts of other things for the sake of their communities. On numerous occasions, they are even likely to be more efficient than the central state in dealing with local issues. Sociologically, at that level, people have a high sense of belonging that quite ‘determines’ them to always think of what is commonly shared and good for all. In that sense, something remains, coming from old ages and continuing to bind people through strong moral values (Sylla 1994). But when we shift to a general level, considering society, we observe a kind of rift between what every single citizen does and what (s)he should do. Don’t we need, therefore, to follow the statement below? However, to analyse the current social trends in Africa, we need to shift to another paradigm. We need, as a starting point, to comprehend philosophically politics as the domain of the effectiveness of moral reason; and then to understand how African political modernity is generated throughout the innovation and the emancipation of the African subject by highlighting the articulation of the individual and collective principles. (Kouvouama 2000, 11, translated by the author)

Two main ideas seem to arise from this thought. The first is the idea that African societies are completely made out of human solidarity and far away from individual greediness. Challenging the first one, the second invites us to move towards a pragmatic view to consider Africa in its real-time, that time of struggle for living and emancipation for the African subject. Modernity, as one should expect according to the Latin root of the term, just means something new. Even though it is a Western-originated word, I apply it to African societies to stress this not least real fact: Africa has been gripped with

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modernity since its ancient political and social structure was shaken by local struggles and revolutions, aroused by confrontation with the outside world (European or Arab). That goes back centuries, just as we can put it when other areas, Europe for example, are concerned. In many parts of the area of what would be known later as Senegal, the period between the fifteenth and the eighteenth century was full of events that reshaped the political and social structure of the local kingdoms. In central Senegal, the rebellion of the Kajoor people split the Jolof kingdom into two, which marked the beginning of the rise of new nobility and warriors. From northern Senegal, the people from North Africa with religious and economic motives participated, with violent episodes at many times, to shift the social structure. Combined with local-originated changes and the Europeans coming in from the West, these events generated very long-lasting effects that have continued to shape current African societies.

AFRICAN MODERN SOCIETIES, PUBLIC SPACE AND THE COMMON GOOD From a contemporary perspective, the kind of states established in our lands is a very relevant example of what we expect to learn about the notion of the common good in current-day Senegal. Talking about the state in that modern view, we assume the existence of a predefined frame composed of rules and laws in such a way that every single citizen and society might know how to behave in the public space and when to interact. In that sense, the definition of public space implies and determines the definition of the common good. I imagine a linkage between the public space and the common good in the same way I assume it exists between the sense of community and the common good. Most of the sub-Saharan African countries, in the wake of their independence, chose what some prominent leaders of that time called African socialism or the African way of socialism. Colonisation and imperialism were perceived to be connected to capitalism. In the minds of the African elites of the newly independent states pushing back against colonisation amounted to combating capitalism. Those states were then meant to serve the maximum number of citizens possible through a social welfare system hugely inspired by Marxism. That system thrived in such a way that it transformed the innate link between public space and the common good. I view here the public space in a quite broader sense. Public space does not only consist of material things like roads and avenues. It is also about abstract things such as laws and institutions. In a non-corrupt (firstly in the Aristotelian sense) world, the public space reflects, in almost an ethical sense, the value of the common good.

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Roads, avenues and laws are then meant to be the place of the effectiveness of the common good. In ordinary political discourse, the ‘common good’ refers to the facilities – whether material, cultural or institutional – that the members of a community provide to all members to fulfil a relational obligation they all must care for certain interests that they have in common. Some canonical examples of the common good in modern liberal democracy include the road system, public parks, police protection and public safety. (Hussain 2018)

Back to the statement I made about independence, let me ask: What has happened after? My argument is that there has been an encounter full of bright promises at the beginning, but that it has badly materialised. The young modern states of Africa, fed with socialist ideology, were considered to fit the population’s expectations. The average African as well as the elite thought of the existence of a common trend between socialism and the local way of living. Leaders, at a high level, took it so seriously that they talked about the pre-existence of socialism in Africa before it was formulated by Western philosophers such as Karl Marx. Nyerere was one of these African leaders. In a poor country, expecting the state to stand up hugely for its people is quite normal. But in the seventies and eighties of the twentieth century, the Senegalese welfare state began to collapse. Far from the need to act for the common good, a system of retribution emerged, in which what is good remains in the circle of the entourage. No one can say whether it was officially organised from bottom to top or vice versa. However, it jeopardised the establishment of a nationwide shared notion of the common good. Going further, there is a question that arises: Isn’t it too simple to make things begin from the time of independence when talking about the corruption of the notion of the common good? My earlier statements seem to depict some sort of idyllic age in which people appear to be morally better. I must be clear: a golden age has never existed and will never exist! However, as a hypothesis, I suggest the existence of a huge difference between the two timelines: the one before independence and the one coming after. Talking about the latter one, I have already mentioned the deception caused by the governing elite and all the circles of interest connected to the power. What has changed then? I argue that what has changed in the minds of people is not the representation of the common good. What has changed is the rapport with the public space. Formerly, the public space was narrower. The circle of those concerned by the public space was, literally speaking, not vast. At stake were either the small groups of families, villages or towns. A public space of that size is more easily embraced. The notion of the common good is more applicable to individuals and groups concerned. We may think here of David Hume (2011, orig. 1751) or, more effectively, of Darwin. Our sympathy and

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kindness benefit first those people of our surroundings before they extend beyond. Darwin wrote: Firstly, social instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to perform various services for them.  .  .  . Secondly, as soon as the mental faculties had become highly developed, images of all past actions and motives would be incessantly passing through the brain of each individual.  .  .  . Thirdly, after the power of language had been acquired and the wishes of the community could be expressed, the common opinion of how each member ought to act for the public good would naturally become in a paramount degree the action guide. (Darwin [1871], 2006:818)

Reflecting on the modern African states, we can understand the shift that occurred. The public space was largely widened. New states were to be built by concatenating smaller spaces. With no strong collective narratives at the very beginning, those states had to struggle to build a common and shared sense of community beyond or on top of the former belongings. One can easily understand that a nation-state needs to be deeply rooted in history to generate that spontaneous feeling strong enough to raise all those other ones, such as the sense of the common good. So, yes, there is a notion of the common good as far as African societies are concerned, and in the same way, we can find it in every human community. But, as I put it before, let us avoid a common prejudice, which consists of depicting African societies as free of egoism, greediness and individualism. I do neither mean that before independence was celebrated and even long before the ‘clash’ with Westerners, African communities were free of individualism. The shift I evoke is about the scale of awareness and empathy. A disproportion occurred due to the new level of people being invited to raise their awareness of the common good. They considered the common good in daily life, yet there was a lack of global insight susceptible to meeting the national interest. That is the reason why, eventually, African socialism failed. According to some great leaders of the independence movement, African socialism was meant to thrive thanks to the natural accordance with the true African spirit, which is, among other things, a sense of community and acting solidarity. Critics can legitimately be formulated related to this quite ‘idyllic vision of the history of African societies used to show them as shaped by communitarianism’ (Kouvouama 2000:11). Before getting back to it, I want to stress a robust fact that undermined the early efforts in the purchase of the common good at a state level. For that purpose, I will be remembering what happened to some Senegalese leaders in their first efforts to address poverty and a lack of development. During the early sixties, Mamadou Dia, a prominent politician allied to Senghor, set an

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ambitious plan to transform the rural and farming areas of Senegal to make them more efficient and prosperous, to the benefit of the poor peasants. That leader, with his socialistic view, then decided to settle them in the association alongside educational programmes aimed at giving them agricultural basic knowledge and making them aware of how to transform for the better their way of life. That was the thing to do. But it was too much defiance and harm for the established religious ‘bourgeoisie’. Those peasants were their followers, and the ancient way they were gathered and farming was highly profitable to their ‘soul leaders’. What happened was a backlash between leaders with deep and local legitimacy. The very hostile campaign they undertook against Dia brought him down politically. I, let alone the political benefit Senghor, his former ally and friend, gained in encouraging very cleverly the conflict. Among other reasons, it led to what is known in the history of Senegal as ‘the 1962 events and the political end of Dia’. The disproportion I am talking about lies in the lack of coincidence between the elite’s purchasing personal and local interests and the necessity of having a widened one that could reach a national level. The behaviour of that kind thrived so massively that many state-owned businesses collapsed. But there is another line of analysing the disproportion by adopting Abel Kouvouama’s proposition. It goes like this: to seize the social trends occurring currently in Africa, we need to shift to a new way of thinking: It is highly important to depart from a theoretical point of view that can comprehend politics as the effectiveness of an acting reason; and then to consider the African way of producing political modernity by considering the liberation of the African subject, stressing at the same time the strong linkage between the individual principle and the collective one. (Kouvouama 2000:11)

What goes along with these sentences is an invitation to reconsider the relationship in Africa between the individual and the collective. In the early eighties, some social scientists, like Jean-François Bayart, proposed to shed light on how the poor and the law class of individuals and groups of individuals managed to reinvent new political ways to establish the upper spheres of the state in sub-Saharan Africa (Bayart 2008:17). He talked about the concept of Doing politics from the bottom up (‘Le politique par le bas’). I am not denying what I said before. But African societies, especially the Senegalese one I am supposed to know better, are engaged in a general change trend. The frontier between the community and the individual is moving. Africa is getting more and more urbanised. A new culture and way of life thrive along with this phenomenon. The old belongings are no longer as important as they used to be. The typical Senegalese citizen tends to be related to many belongings. For instance, those who happen to be newcomers in the big cities are generally attached to their original and rural communities. But, at the

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same time, they have a sort of skill making them capable of developing new relationships based on economic ties. And, firstly, this new way of expressing themselves makes them relate to each other on economic grounds. Secondly, it creates a layer that separates the levels of civil and political law and of the basic beliefs and convictions that bind those community members together. This gap expresses itself in the way people follow the rules. When they happen to be obliged to do anything, what matters is how they are perceived by their mates. The rule of state is to be considered only after. During trials in the courts, one can witness that conflict. But what would happen if this notion of the common good, founded on the very basic level of the communities, was the right one? Aren’t we facing a worldwide crisis expressing the limits of old economic categories with which we used to handle trade relations? The notion of the common good, that of public space, and the like are more and more ‘in the news’. It is denoting something new: those old categories have their legitimacy (Harribey 2011:98). We can then wonder whether we should not stop taking what I call the national level as the norm to measure the quality of conformity of the citizens with the common good. This new insight may meet ‘Le politique par le bas’ by Jean-Francois Bayart. It is imaginable to conceive a situation in which most of us have reached a sufficient awareness resulting in ‘crisscrossing’ from top to bottom and melting those ancient categories into the current ones to make something else new emerge. Then, citizens may continue to be related to their first belongings, but by the broader society to expand the circle of the common good much more.

CONCLUSION When dealing with the common good, the general line of argument may consist of dividing societies into two kinds. On the one hand, those whose members are focused on the collective and highly engaged in sharing the same pattern at the same level. On the other hand, the ones whose members tend, on the contrary, to be less engaged and rather more individualistic. On which side lay African communities? Spontaneously, they tend to be associated with the former pattern and Westerners with the latter. But, of course, such a division is not easily made. Apart from the fact that the idea of Africa as a unique social and cultural entity is a myth, there is no proof of such a clear borderline. However, to go through my analysis, I focus on this linkage between the sense of community and the notion of the common good, at least in the cultural boundaries of Senegal. Acting for the good of the people demands a feeling of belonging. This is the first thing to bear in mind. Secondly, in the same cultural boundaries, a noticeable thing is the existence of layers of

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belongings that are a limitation to sharing the same pattern. One question is: What can be learned from this African (Senegalese) social organisation? One first thing is that the notion of the common good, whatever its content, is the foundation stone of every human being’s society, as far as we know. I see it as that kind of borderline, slowly but constantly evolving, that shapes the relationship between individuals. In a globalised world, we may expect to see what is common – and so the common good – growing both in its scope and significance. Considering that strong probability may put Africa into an orbit by turning it into an inspirational source for the new world to build. BIBLIOGRAPHY Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by W.D. Ross. Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999 [orig c. 350 BCE]. Aristotle. Politics. Translated by B. Jowett. New York: The Modern Library, 1943. Bayart, J-F., Mbembe, A., Toulabor, C. Le Politique Par Le Bas En Afrique Noir. Paris: Karthala, 2008. Darwin, Ch.R. The Descent of Man. New York: Norton and Company, 2006 [orig.1871]. Harribey, J.M. ‘Le Bien Commun Est Une Construction Sociale. Apports Et Limites D’elinor Ostrom.’ Alternatives Économiques 49 (2011): 92–112. Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. The Essential Philosophical Works. Vol. 4, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 [orig 1751]. Hussain, W. ‘The Common Good.’ In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E.N. Zalta. https://plato​.stanford​.edu​/archives​/spr2018​/entries​/common​ -good: 2018. Accessed February 26 2020. Kouvouama, A. ‘Penser La Politique En Afrique.’ Politique Africaine 77 (2000): 16–43. Ndaw, A. La Pensée Africaine. Dakar: Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines du Sénégal, 1997. Sylla, A. La Philosophie Morale Des Wolof. Dakar: Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar: IFAN, 1994.

Chapter 8

The Pursuant of Well-Being in Contemporary Africa Beatrice Okyere-Manu, Ovett Nwosimiri and Stephen Nkansah Morgan

The concept of well-being has been and continues to be topical and a contested subject among scholars. It has generated different meanings and conversations within disciplines such as Economics, Ethics, Philosophy, Sociology and Psychology. Furthermore, well-being has been more conceptualised within Western literature than African literature. In an attempt to define the concept, Ruggeri et al, say that ‘It is a sustainable condition that allows the individual or population to develop and thrive’’ (2009:2). The definition provided above suggests that the concept goes beyond the conditions of being happy, flourishing, and even the absence of ill-being to anything that helps the individual’s or population’s mental health or helps them to prosper. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has defined positive mental health as ‘a state of well-being in which the individual realises her or his own abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and can make a contribution to his or her community’ (2001). Whereas the Western understanding encapsulates various themes such as happiness, flourishing and mental health with a focus on the individual, the traditional African understanding of well-being is often understood to be a harmonious interconnectedness of the self with the community, the natural environment and the spiritual beings. The question of which of these three ought to be given primacy has never been a vexation for the traditional African, who naturally understands that her or his well-being, sustainability and progress rely on all of these three simultaneously. Regardless of what well-being is taken to mean, whether happiness or fulfilment, the traditional African finds it in living a shared social life with members of her or his 173

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community, in a good human-nature relatedness, and in maintaining a cordial relationship with her or his spiritual beings. However, a critical look at our society today, portrays that a large number of Africans are failing to either achieve or maintain the traditional African notion of well-being. There seem to be two ways of looking at the current situation: The first is to place the blame on colonialism, modernity and the making of Africa and its communities, a capitalist society. Colonialism and modernity as political agendas severely altered the African way of life and promoted Western individualistic norms. The second way of looking at the current situation is to blame it on ourselves. Africans seem to have ignored the important values and principles handed down to us by our forefathers, which define who we are. In this chapter, we aim to show what well-being in contemporary Africa should look like. We contend that contemporary Africans have ignored the essential aspects found in the traditional African understanding of well-being. Thus, there is a need for contemporary Africans to reassess their values and perception of well-being if they are to properly address their current needs and reach their aspirations. We argue that these ignored factors of the African notion of well-being in the traditional social setting could be integrated into the dominating global discourse/Western notion. This could be done to develop a plausible notion of well-being that will suit contemporary African societies.

THE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN UNDERSTANDING OF WELL-BEING This section highlights the African traditional understanding of well-being. The notion of well-being, as we know it, means different things to different people. For example, according to Cernuşcă-Miţariu (2014:125), it denotes ‘a condition of an individual or a group, with reference to the social, economic, psychological, spiritual or medical attention’. Stephen Campbell (2016:402) held well-being to be typically about ‘what makes a life go well or poorly for the one who is living it’. However, from the African perspective, the concept of well-being has been difficult and complex to conceptualise because it is situated in the humanistic and spiritual features of the widely varying African communities. Many times, literature, particularly from the Western perspective, is filled with arguments of contestation and demonisation of African spirituality and well-being (Lois 2007). It is believed that the arrival of colonialism and other religions such as Christianity also contributed to the demonisation of the spiritual features of well-being and replaced the African understanding with a Western perspective. Our concern in this section is to

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briefly highlight the African understanding of well-being. It has no intention of continuing the debate because we think it belongs to an era of post-colonial reckoning. Stephen Nkansah Morgan and Beatrice Okyere-Manu affirm that within the African perspective, well-being is ‘deeply rooted in a shared community life; it is a notion of well-being deeply rooted in the theory of communitarianism’ (2020:23). These authors suggest that the concept places the community at the centre of its analysis. Well-being is embedded in the communitarian philosophical values that are cherished by Africans, and so one cannot talk about well-being in isolation from the communities or societies that take it to be their core value. Kwame Gyekye defines communitarianism as ‘the doctrine that the group (that is, the society) constitutes the focus of the activities of the individual members of the society’ (1995:155). He believes that ‘communitarianism immediately sees the individual as an inherently communal being, embedded in a context of social relationships and interdependence, never as an isolated individual’ (1995:41). Therefore, the right conduct in the community is that which promotes the common good for both the community and the individual well-being (Gyekye 1997:70–5,2004:105–11, Müller 2023 in this volume). This implies that the attainment of well-being is informed by the shared social life with members of the community and the promotion of relational ways seen in the interdependence and interconnectedness of one another in the everyday lives of people (Adams and Dzokoto 2003). Making this interdependence and interconnectedness possible requires each person to show support to others in acts of solidarity, cooperation and assistance to each other in the pursuant of their well-being. Thus, the well-being of a person is only possible if it is linked to that of the individuals in the community. From an African socio-cultural perspective, the nature of being is inherently relational, and all good actions must promote a good relationship with one another (Chilisa, Major and Khudu-Petersen 2017). This suggests that ‘human well-being, peace and order are only achievable in a communal or social setting’ (Agulanna 2010:286). One cannot claim to enjoy well-being on her or his own outside of the community. It is with this understanding that Gyekye sees well-being as the basic moral value for African ethics when he says that ‘The African love of life is a feature of their concern for human wellbeing, which constitutes the warp and woof of their moral life and thought’ (1995:208). In terms of the right ways of relating communally to others, Gyekye says that ‘moral norms and virtues can be said to include kindness, generosity, compassion, benevolence, and respect and concern for others; in short, any action or behaviour conducive to the promotion of the well-being of others’ (1997:50). Hence, well-being constitutes the satisfaction of material, psychological, and social needs (Gyekye 1997:44–6). Gyekye continues that moral behaviour within most African communities suggests doing one’s

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best to satisfy the ‘needs that are basic to the enjoyment and fulfilment of the life of each individual’ (2010:7). Such needs constitute a common good, for they ‘can be said to be commonly-universally-shared by all human individuals and to be essential for the ordinary or basic functioning of the human person in a human society’ (Gyekye 2004:53; 1997:41–7). Therefore, the interaction of these factors is likely to create a holistic approach to well-being for people and communities. The moral norms and virtues that promote the well-being of everyone in the community are what is commonly referred to in the Southern African concept of Ubuntu. In explaining Ubuntu, Munyaradzi Murove says that it ‘implies that humanness is derived from our relatedness with others, not only those currently living but also through past and future generations (Murove 2009:315). The concept of ‘ubuntu’ is derived from the Nguni dictum, Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu that translates to: ‘A person is a person through other persons’ (Chisale 2018:2). The word ubuntu is embedded with rich philosophical and metaphysical principles that have cultural, moral and social connotations (Okyere-Manu and Morgan 2022:27). Mogobe Ramose affirms that it is the root and the basis of African philosophy, filled with African ontology and epistemology. It captures the understanding of what it is to be human and what is necessary for human well-being (2002). Some of its ideals include but are not limited to: ‘the attention one human being gives to another: the kindness, courtesy and friendliness in the relationship between people, a code of behaviour, an attitude to other people’ (Samkange 1980:39). These ideals in African ethics should exist between individuals, and thus everyone ought to prioritise the well-being of her or his neighbour. However, in contemporary society, the pursuant of these moral ideals is slowly diminishing, and in its place, people are prioritising the Western perspective of well-being, which is more individualistic. To this effect, Bénézet Bujo challenges us when he writes that: ‘It must be recalled that African ethics does not define the person as self-realisation or as ontological act; rather, it describes a person as a process of coming into existence in the reciprocal relatedness of individual and community, where the latter includes not only the deceased but also God’ (2003:14). In addition to the above, the African notion of well-being is understood as establishing a cordial relationship with the ancestral and spiritual worlds. The idea here is that the spirits and ancestors can either bestow blessings when they are respected and revered or calamity when they are offended by an individual or the whole community. Therefore, there is ‘a strong moral undertone and either an implicit or explicit indication for individual members of the community to live an “exemplary life” following the ethos of the community’ (Morgan and Okyere-Manu 2020:11). Thus, the attainment of well-being is dependent on adhering to the values and principles that are embedded in revering and

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appeasing the spirits and ancestors at all times (Zulu 2002; Wiredu 2010). It is, therefore, not surprising that the reverence for ancestors and spirits is deeply embedded in the African people’s ontological worldview (Morgan and Okyere-Manu 2020). Gyekye (1995:75) notes that within the African cosmology, there is a hierarchy of beings: God is the Supreme Being; he is followed by the deities, then ancestors, humans and lastly the world of natural objects and phenomena. Wiredu explains the role of the ancestors by saying that The ancestors may be called the extra-mundane guardians of morality; their entire concern is to watch over the affairs of the living members of their families, rewarding right conduct and punishing its opposite, with unquestioned justice, while, at all times, working for their well- being. It is on this ground that the ancestors are so highly venerated. (Wiredu 2010:36)

Therefore, well-being can never be attained without input from the spirits and ancestors. They play an important role in the lives of people. Well-being is also linked to the natural environment of Africa. To this, Lawrence Ogbo Ugwuanyi (2011:112–113) notes that the various aspects of the natural environment, such as hills, forests, rocks, trees, mountains and animals, are perceived as the abodes for the spirits of ancestors and those of other divinities. Whatever people consider to be the home of the spirits is usually set apart as sacred places where the people offer prayers, rituals and sacrifices to the deities, ancestors and God and as such, any damage, abuse or disrespectful acts to these biodiversity resources in nature will anger the spirits and ancestors and thus evoke punishment to oneself and the community. One is, therefore, expected to show reverence to sacred places and animals and is forbidden to kill any of them. Speaking from the Zimbabwean context, Nisbert Taringa (2006:205) says ‘The Shona, like many other African people, recognise that spirits operate in the human world through animals, birds and fish.’ These sacred animals are often perceived as totems representing the various clans in most African communities. Members are often forbidden to either eat or kill such animals. From the above discussion, it is clear that for Africans, well-being involves a good communal relationship with others, maintaining a spiritual connection with her or his gods and ancestors, and having respect for nature. These three aspects of well-being go hand in hand with one’s individual attainment of it. THE DOMINATING GLOBAL CONCEPTION OF WELL-BEING IN AFRICA The dominating global conception of well-being in Africa is more of the Western idea of well-being because the conception gears towards the idea of

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(individual) development. In other words, the dominating global conception of well-being in Africa is synonymous with the Western notion of well-being. It is noticeable in Western literature that the idea of well-being hovers around subjective well-being, psychological well-being and economic well-being. Firstly, subjective well-being is the predominant approach to studying well-being. According to John Chambers Christopher (1999:143), subjective well-being consists of two general components. The first is ‘judgements about life satisfaction’. The second is ‘affective balance or the extent to which the level of positive affect outweighs the level of negative affect in someone’s life’ (Christopher 1999:143). Life satisfaction, Christopher explains, ‘is based on an individual’s subjective cognitive appraisals’. While affective balance ‘uses a notion of well-being that corresponds to the popular usage of the term happiness’ (Christopher 1999:143). Subjective well-being is usually associated with an individual. In other words, this idea of subjective well-being is viewed from the perspective of the individual (or self). It includes happiness, life satisfaction, job satisfaction and so on (Michalos 2007:7). It is also a desired state of affairs where an individual ‘ensures proper development of her or his potential so that (s) he can meet the various demands of her or his environment, and satisfy one’s needs in a socially acceptable manner’ (Sinha 1990:2). The implication is that the individual seeks to possess everything that (s)he wishes for, for instance, ‘good health, profitable job, a nice house, a big family, true friends, etc’ (Fellmann 2018:84). Subjective well-being is usually traced ‘back to classical Greece and the competing philosophies of hedonistic, or happiness and pleasure-based, the well-being of Aristippus .  .  . and eudaimonic, or satisfaction and meaning based, the well-being of Aristotle’ (Atkinson, Fuller and Painter 2012:2). Aristotelian well-being or eudaimonia, involves living well and doing well. This can be achieved by enjoying the goods of the mind and the body and external goods—Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The hedonic pathway can be tracked from Plato’s fourth-century BCE Protagoras ‘through later philosophical contributions of Western philosophers, such as John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, on how to select between alternative individual and collective actions to maximise the greatest happiness or utility for all’ (Atkinson, Fuller and Painter 2012:2). These philosophers’ ideas were rooted in subjective experience and involved a constricted sense of happiness (or well-being). Secondly, well-being is also related to the psychological growth of an individual. This is because (mental) health and one’s adaptation to the environment are essential. This growth includes physical ‘perception, language skills, intelligence, sociability and social sensitivity, emotional maturity, learning enduring aspects of personality and cultural values’ (Sinha 1990:30). Benjamin B. Wolman (1973) also says that psychological well-being is ‘a

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state of relatively good adjustment, feelings of well-being and actualisation of one’s potentialities and capacities’. According to Durgan and Sinha, psychological well-being has to do with one’s (positive) mental health. In the same line of thought, The World Health Organisation (2001) defines positive mental health as ‘a state of well-being in which the individual realises her or his own abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and make a contribution to her or his community’. One’s mental health is of crucial importance because, without the knowledge and understanding of what it means to be mentally healthy and its implications, one will not be able to appreciate its importance. According to Christopher, psychological well-being: Is among the most central notions in counselling. It plays a crucial role in theories of personality and development in both pure and applied forms; it provides a baseline from which we assess psychopathology; it serves as a guide for clinical work by helping the counsellor determine the direction clients might move to alleviate distress and find fulfilment, purpose, and meaning; and it informs goals and objective for counselling-related interventions. (Christopher 1999:141)

Using historical and anthropological evidence, Christopher argues that the dominant theories and measures of psychological well-being are grounded in the cultural values of liberal individualism and that models of psychological well-being conform to the dominant ideology of Western society (1999; see also White 2010:167). He shows that ‘theories and research on psychological well-being are substantively shaped by Western individualist moral visions of the good or ideal person but the area of inquiry, is related to our cultural values and assumptions’ (Christopher 1999:142). Besides the fact that psychological well-being is shaped by Western ideology, it also has to do with one’s mental health, health care, counselling and psychotherapy. Thirdly, there is also an economic aspect of well-being. This is to encourage one to exercise her or his capacity (monetary or financial) to utilise the available resources for one’s well-being. Economic well-being is chiefly about money and the financial standing of an individual. This standing plays a great part in the well-being and quality of life of an individual. Talking about economic well-being, Ed Diener and Martin E. P. Seligman write that: Economics now reigns unchallenged in the policy arena, as well as in media coverage of quality-of-life indicators. News magazines and daily newspapers have a section devoted to money, and the Wall Street Journal covers economic issues on a daily basis. Economists hold prominent positions in the capitals of the world. When politicians run for office, they speak at length about what they will door have done, for the economy. Television presents frequent reports about unemployment, the Dow Jones average, and the national debt. Rarely do

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the news media report on how depressed, engaged, or satisfied people are. In part, policy and media coverage stems from the fact that economic indicators are rigorous, widely available, and updated frequently, whereas few national measures of well-being exist. (Diener and Seligman 2004:2)

Explicating the economic well-being, they further elucidate that: Money, however, is a means to an end, and that end is well-being. But money is an inexact surrogate for well-being, and the more prosperous a society becomes, the more inexact a surrogate income becomes. The measurement of well-being has advanced sufficiently that it is time to grant a privileged place to people’s well-being in policy debates, a place at least on a par with monetary concerns. After all, if economic and other policies are important because they will in the end increase well-being, why not assess well-being more directly? The main argument for using only a surrogate, such as money, is that well-being cannot be measured with the same exactitude as money. (Diener and Seligman 2004:2)

From the above, it is evident that in economic well-being emphasis is placed on money or monetary concerns. In both indentations, we read Diener and Seligman as arguing against economic well-being, because that alone cannot be used to measure the well-being of an individual. Diener and Seligman aim to show that economic well-being has its shortcomings and that other indicators can be considered when talking about well-being. To this, they wrote that Our proposed system of well-being indicators would not supplant economic or other current social indicators but would supplement and enhance their value by placing them within an overarching framework of well-being, underscoring the shortcomings of economic indicators. . . . A national indicator should include several global indicators, such as life satisfaction, but it should also target positive and negative emotions in specific areas, such as work life, health, social relationships, and mental health, and it should be fine-grained, breaking life satisfaction down into its constituent parts. . . . The most important contribution of a national system of well-being indicators would be that they could focus the attention of policymakers and the public specifically on well-being, and not simply on the production of goods and services; one of the main benefits of wellbeing measures is that they add a valuable perspective beyond a cost-benefit market analysis in evaluating society structures and interventions. (Diener and Seligman 2004:2 and 21)

The aforementioned clearly shows that the concept of well-being should include ideas like social relationships, experiences, psychological well-being and subjective well-being. This is why they assert that given that the current measurement of well-being is haphazard, ‘with different studies assessing

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different concepts in different ways’, there is a need for a more systematic approach to the measurement of well-being (Diener and Seligman 2004:4). In addition to the fact that the dominating global discourse of well-being considers issues regarding health (both psychological and social), economics (money and finance – both physical and materials needs), exercising control over the environment and exploiting it for their need, it places the onus of well-being on the individual. The individual alone ‘determines the standards and criteria by which to evaluate her or his life’ (Christopher 1999:143). The individual here takes control of her or his life, exercises control over the environment and exploits it for her or his own use and development. Thus, because of what the individual owns, (s)he will be able to learn or acquire certain skills and abilities that are instrumental in meeting the demands of everyday life and the demands of her or his environment, society and satisfaction of one’s needs (Sinha 1990:2; italics ours). Here, the desire to satisfy one’s needs is of utmost importance, because achieving that will guarantee the well-being of the individual. Moreover, this notion of well-being is also beneficial because it encourages individual creativity and flourishing.

OUR PROPOSED CONCEPTION OF WELLBEING IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA As seen from the discussions thus far, while Western literature concentrates more on the subjective, psychological and economic meaning of well-being, the African notion of well-being is situated in a communal relationship, an atmosphere of spiritual connectedness and a mutual environment. When we contrast the African perspective of well-being with the dominating global discourse/Western perspective of it, we will notice that the dominating global discourse of well-being is more individualistic as opposed to communalistic. In other words, the dominating global discourse of well-being is from the perspective of the individual (or self). This perspective of well-being, as we have seen, is often referred to as ‘subjective well-being’. Although it can be argued that no human society is absolutely communal or individualistic, it suffices to say that (on the aspect of well-being), traditionally Africans are more communitarian, while the dominating global discourse of well-being is more individualistic. In the dominating global discourse/Western perspective of well-being, one’s ability to control and exploit the environment is important. This is to encourage one to exercise her/his capacity (monetary or financial) to utilise the available resources for one’s well-being. But in the traditional African culture, this aspect of control and exploitation of the environment for one’s own good is minimal. It is minimal in the sense that the human person is one

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with her or his environment, and there is a need to develop and maintain a harmonious, interdependent and interconnected relationship with the environment, which is vital to their well-being. In the West, the relationship between humans and their environment is a dichotomic relationship. In other words, the relationship model is that of ‘(wo)man and the environment’. While in the traditional African culture, the human being and the environment are inseparable, there exists an interdependent relationship between both. Like the West, where people’s perspective of well-being is haphazard, the African perspective is more systematic because of the relationships they have with things around them and the cosmos. It is worth mentioning that well-being from the dominating global discourse/Western perspective is ‘viewed as a social process with material, relational, and subjective dimensions’ (White 2010:158). Séverine Deneulin and J. Allister McGregor substantiate this view when they assert that ‘a person’s state of well-being must be understood as being socially and psychologically co-constituted in specific social and cultural contexts’ (2010:501). While the social and cultural contexts of well-being are acknowledged in the Western perspective, its explanation of their importance is not necessarily the same as that of the African. Also, generally, the issues relating to the needs and the health of an individual and the community inexorably come to the fore whenever we talk about well-being as social and psychological. This is not different from that of the African community. In Africa, the concept of well-being is deeply rooted in African communitarianism, or the shared community and social life of the African people, as noted above. This is because the community and social life are a sine qua non for people’s well-being. Individual well-being is only achievable in the community. In other words, the community is essential to achieve individual well-being. In the community, each individual is required to work for the good of all. This imposes a primary duty of care on the individual members of the community. It is this primary duty of care ‘that elevates the notion of duties to a priority status in the whole enterprise of communitarian life’ (Gyekye 1992:118). Thus, as a sign of care, one’s duty in the community is to promote the well-being and common good of everyone in the community. Within their limits, all members must care for the well-being of the others because the community exists for the procurement of the well-being and common good of everyone. Thus, members of the community ‘are expected to show concern for the well-being of one another, to do what they can to advance the common good, and generally to participate in the community life’ (Gyekye 1997:42). To achieve the above-mentioned concern for one another, the community is essential. As noted in the introduction, a critical look at our society today shows that a large number of Africans are failing to either achieve or maintain the traditional African notion of well-being. There are two ways of looking at the

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situation: (1) placing the blame on colonialism and modernity, and (2) blaming it on them/ourselves. Firstly, colonialism is defined as ‘the indescribable crisis disproportionately suffered and endured by the African peoples in their tragic encounter with the European world, from the beginning of the fifteenth century through the end of the nineteenth into the twentieth’ (Eze 1998:213), and it epitomises the encounter between Africa and the West (Nwosimiri 2022a:76). The colonial experience of African people is characterised by the forceful imposition of Western ideologies. This resulted in the endorsement of Western education and ideologies as the ultimate systems in Africa (Nwosimiri 2022a:75). Through colonisation, Western identities were imposed on Africans, and indigenous cultures and traditions were downgraded as inferior to the colonisers (Nwosimiri 2022a:75). Colonialism, in general, imposes modernity on the colonised (the present), thereby forcing Africans to assimilate and transform their way of life (Nwosimiri 2022b). According to Gyekye, the notion of modernity has been very significant for the world’s people for more than a century. Societies in the world have, with no exception, aspired to become modern, and this concept has gained a normative status. This aspiration of becoming modern is visible in the social, cultural and political lives of many. To this, Gyekye argues thus: Western societies generally, from which the notion is said to have emerged, have become the quintessence of modernity, the mecca to which people from non-modern societies go for inspiration and knowledge as to models of thought and action in pursuit of the development of their societies and transition to modernity. (Gyekye 1997:263–264)

Corroborating this view and showing Africa’s involvement in the idea of modernity, Oyekan Owomoyela claims that ‘already evident is the philosophers’ conviction that Africans must discard their traditional ways in favour of modern European (or Western) ways in the name of development’ (1987:161–162). Lewis Gordon argues that the idea of modernity is seen as a state of affairs where ‘one group of people enforced its portrait of reality on others, an antagonistic relationship emerged in which dominated peoples not only resisted what was imposed on them, but also evaluated their presuppositions about the world’ (2014:10). In other words, his idea is that modernity is a portrait that imposes its reality on others and, in this case, creates an agnostic relationship that will, in turn, make the dominated group evaluate their presuppositions about the world. ‘This process took on a dialectical quality to give and take, which led to new problems of value and meaning that also affected the people who dominated them’ (Gordon 2014:11). From this, it is evident that the modern structures and values were imposed upon the people. In this case, it

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becomes ‘modernities, instead of only one modernity and that for the people on whom it is imposed, it often means the catastrophe of a haunted future, of a disruption of time, wherein a new set of problematics of continued existence comes to the fore’ (Gordon 2014:11). Secondly, Africans blame themselves for fully accepting Western ideologies and abandoning some important aspects of their culture. The essence of people indeed exists in their culture, and Africa is losing its essence. Africans accepted and embraced the Western influence, cultural indoctrination and ideologies, and upheld them as the standard that their tradition had to comply with (Nwosimiri 2022a). To this end, African thinkers, like Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (1998a, 2002, 2013), Kwasi Wiredu (1980, 1998), Kwame Gyekye (1995) and many others, sought to combat Western influence and cultural indoctrination. They also sought to examine, question and contest ideas and identities imposed upon them by the West. These thinkers’ arguments and counterarguments against Western influence and cultural indoctrination indelibly mark the beginning of historical and conceptual protests and contestations against the Western hegemony of knowledge (Nwosimiri 2022a:75).

CONCLUSION Given the above, we conclude that Africans today have adopted the Western understanding of well-being which focuses more on what benefits the individual as a unique person. This development has been the result of colonisation and modernity. Thus, we think that well-being in contemporary African societies should be the integration and combination of both the dominating global discourse/Western idea of well-being and that of traditional Africa. Hence, well-being in contemporary Africa should integrate the dominating global discourse/Western notion of well-being with the traditional African notion of well-being, which takes the unity between community well-being, spiritual well-being and environmental well-being seriously. Thus, an integration and combination of these should be a better approach to understanding well-being in contemporary Africa because it takes care of all the needs of the individual and the community as social, spiritual and nature-related beings. Well-being in contemporary Africa should integrate the African idea of well-being, which involves a good communal relationship with others, maintaining a spiritual and mutual environmental connection with one’s gods and ancestors (and having respect for nature), with the Western subjective, psychological and subjective notion of well-being. Questions concerning the way these notions of well-being could be integrated are still a matter of further discussion and research. We propose that ethicists and

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intellectuals from Africa, as well as those concerned for a global enrichment of the notion of well-being, will dedicate their energy to them in the coming years.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Adams, Glenn, and Vivian Afi Dzokoto. ‘Self and Identity in African Studies.’ Self and Identity 2, no. 4 (2003): 345–59. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/714050252. Agulanna, Christopher. ‘Community and Human Well-Being in an African Culture.’ Trames 14 (64/59), no. 3 (2010): 282–98. https://doi​.org​/10​.3176​/tr​.2010​ .3​.05 Bujo, Bénézet. Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality. Kenya: Pauline’s Publications Africa, 2003. Campbell, Stephen M. ‘The Concept of Well-Being.’ In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being, edited by Guy Fletcher, 402–15. New York: Routledge 2016. Chilisa, Bagele, Thenjiwe Emily Major, and Kelne Khudu-Petersen. ‘Community Engagement with a Postcolonial, African-Based Relational Paradigm.’ Qualitative Research 17, no. 3 (2017): 326–39. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​/1468794117696176. Chisale, Sinenhlanhla S. ‘Ubuntu as Care: Deconstructing the Gendered Ubuntu.’ Verbum et Ecclesia 39, no. 1 (2018): 8 pages, a1790. https://doi​.org​/10​.4102​/ve​ .v39i1​.1790. Christopher, John Chambers. ‘Situating Psychological Well-Being: Exploring the Cultural Roots of Its Theory and Research.’ Journal of Counselling & Development 77, no. 2 (1999): 141–52. https://doi​.org​/10​.1002​/j​.1556–6676.1999.tb02434.x. Deneulin, Séverine, and J. Allister McGregor. ‘The Capability Approach and the Politics of a Social Conception of Well-Being.’ European Journal of Social Theory 13, no. 4 (2010): 501–19. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​/1368431010382762. Diener, Ed, and Martin E.P. Seligman. ‘Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being.’ Psychological Science in the Public Interest 5, no. 1 (2004): 1–31. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​.0963–7214.2004.00501001.x. Eleojo, Egbunu Fidelis. ‘Africans and African Humanism: What Prospects.’ American International Journal of Contemporary Research 4, no. 1 (2014): 297–308. Eze, C. Emmanuel. African Philosophy: An Anthropology. Malden: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998. Eze, Emmanuel C. Achieving Our Humanity: The Idea of the Post-racial Future. New York: Routledge, 2013. ———. ‘Answering the Question, What Remains of Enlightenment ?’ Human Studies 25, no. 3 (2002): 281–88. http://www​.jstor​.org​/stable​/20010278. Fellmann, Ferdinand. ‘Well-Being East and West.’ Open Journal of Social Sciences 6, no. 7 (2018): 84–93. https://doi​.org​/10​.4236​/jss​.2018​.67008. Fuller, Sara, Sarah Atkinson, and Joe Painter. ‘Well-Being and Place.’ In Wellbeing and Place, edited by Sara Fuller and Sarah Atkinson, 1–14. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2012.

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Wiredu, Kwasi. ‘African Religions from a Philosophical Point of View.’ In A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, edited by C. Taliaferro, P. Draper and P.L. Quinn, 34–43. West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010. ———. Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. ———. ‘Toward Decolonising African Philosophy and Religion.’ African Studies Quarterly 1, no. 4 (1998): 17–46. https://asq​.africa​.ufl​.edu​/wiredu​_98/. Wolman, B.B. Dictionary of Behavioral Science. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1973. World Health, Organisation. The World Health Report 2001: Mental Health: New Understanding, New Hope. Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2001. Zulu, Edwin. ‘Reverence for Ancestors in Africa: Interpretation of the 5th Commandment from an African Perspective.’ Scriptura: Journal for Contextual Hermeneutics in Southern Africa 81, no. 1 (2002): 476–82. http://hdl​.handle​.net​/10019​.1​ /76401.

Part III

CONTRIBUTIONS TO A GLOBAL ETHICS OF DEVELOPMENT

Chapter 9

Ujamaa Society as Family Martin F. Asiegbu and Simeon Dimonye

According to Nyerere’s Ujamaa model, well-being is tied to the socioeconomic dimension of a society or of a community. Ujamaa emphasises the idea of society as a family, and this is one of the major reasons that impelled Nyerere in 1964 to name his country the United Republic of Tanzania. Ujamaa proposes optimal conditions of well-being for African people and the members of various families. For the individual to experience well-being, the society must be well-ordered. An individual exists within the community, and not in isolation from it. An individual’s well-being, then, is dependent on the community’s well-being. Society must acquire the ‘we’ – attitude. In the family, none of its members competes to overcome and win against other members. Rather, the family members carry everybody along. It is this spirit of solidarity that propels the society to grow from a political society to a humane community. Thus, our argument for Ujamaa does not advocate Ujamaa’s approach exactly as Nyerere modelled it. Rather, we argue that if the idea of the society as a family is inculcated in people, or put into practice, unhealthy competition could be eliminated. This would result in a better conception of human well-being. CLARIFICATION OF TERMS Where the term ‘Ujamaa’ represents ‘familyhood,’ in the Swahili language, the term ‘Africa’ is meaning-laden. Though this term, Africa, is not mentioned in the topic, we do take the term ‘Africa’, the locus of our discourse, for granted when many scholars persist in inquiring into its representations? Although, as Mazrui (1986, 25–29) thinks that the term, ‘Africa,’ most likely has a Semitic and Greco-Roman origin, the ‘application of the 191

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name in more recent centuries has been due almost to Western Europe’. Mazrui continues thus, ‘We should question Europe’s decisions about the boundaries of Africa and the identity of Africans. . . . We must accept the continental definition as presently defined internationally’. It is our view that the questioning to which Mazrui referred above is both a politically and an ethically legitimate project (Ramose 2005, 148). The European political contrivance of that imposition is in no way justifiable, both politically and ethically. Some African states portray the reprehensible nature of such an imposition by their denunciation of similarly imposed names. They manifest their preference for their indigenous names to the Europeanised ones. These two, at least, illustrate the point: ‘Botswana’ in preference to ‘Bechuanaland’ and ‘Namibia’ rather than ‘Southwest Africa’. While the above states unanimously reached an agreement to reject the imposition, others were unable to resolve it amicably. Africans have not yet reached divesting themselves of the name. If at all they bear it meanwhile, it is ‘under protest’ (Ramose 2005, 147). What these African states engaged in – to establish their true identity – African philosophers aim to achieve by ‘rewriting history to set the defective aspects of the historical status quo aright’ (Osuagwu 1999, 25). Historical reconstruction becomes imperative. This is seen in some way in the debate surrounding the preference for the Ki-Swahili term, ‘Afrika’ to ‘Africa’ (Ramose 2005, 148). Further inquiries into the debate fall outside the preoccupation of this chapter. The questioning as well as the reconstruction extend to the demeaning terms associated with the continent and its population. That imposed name furnished an identity for Africans and their continent. Africa is ever ‘developing’ and ‘underdeveloped’, infested with AIDS, and always poor, although its wealth has made others ‘first world’ and industrialised nations (cf. Ogho 2005, 278ff). Its languages are deemed unspeakable, and its religion has been referred to as animism. Unsettling, moreover, is the fact that Africa is still engaged in the struggle to reconstruct its identity in the face of the globalising world. The vision of a progressive and developed Africa constituted the primary focus of premier African leadership. By ‘African leadership’, we refer to the premier African leaders of independent African countries. Known equally as ‘nationalist ideologists’, they propagated the nationalist ideological trend in African philosophy (Bodunrin 1990:164). The search for the ideal society served as the driving motivation for African leadership. They aimed at the reinvigoration of the degenerated African culture, restructuration of the pillaged economy and disfigured political institutions. It was a great honour for African leadership to have opted for the challenge of rebuilding Africa after the ravages that Africa had suffered throughout decades of Trans-Atlantic slavery – man’s worst inhumanity to his fellows, during which millions of

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the African population were forcibly shipped into slavery in the Americas (Byrd 2008; Inikori and Engerman 1992; Manning 1990). Europe’s imperialist colonialism and the West’s supremacist dominance of African ‘physical space, the reformation of the native’s mind and the integration of the local economic histories into Western perspective’ succeeded the trans-Atlantic slave trade (Mudimbe 1988, 2 Italics original). Césaire (1972:23) maintained that: The great historical strategy of Africa has been not so much that it was too late in contacting the rest of the world, as how that contact was brought about; that Europe began to propagate at a time when Europe had fallen into the hands of the most unscrupulous financiers and captains of industry. (Césaire 1972:23)

In a nutshell, these events capture a glimpse of the ravages of the African situation that the African leaders sought to restructure. If those nationalists, like Nyerere, Nkrumah, Mobutu, Senghor and others, failed to successfully realise their vision for Africa and their countries, it does not imply that the philosophies underlying their ideologies and vision were faulty. Rather, it was because the socio-political conditions predominant at the time dislodged the leadership’s vision for Africa and their countries. Not long after the independence of African states, conflicts, coups d’état, the assassination of some premier leaders, and political turmoil suffused the African political scene. Conflicts were ensured among African states over the boundaries that colonial powers had arbitrarily drawn. Conflicts ensued not only for the manner and purpose of the boundaries but also because those boundaries split up ethnic nations and kindred units at will. Again, colonialists guarded their interests in Africa over foreign intruders and helped to install their stooges as leaders of some African states. While the conflict of interests between African leadership and colonial interests led to the assassination of some African leaders, the ineptitude of colonial stooges provoked political upheaval, where some inept politicians held on to power thanks to the surreptitious influences of the ex-colonialists. In these ways, the socio-political conditions prevalent at the time proved inauspicious to various African philosophies and ideologies of African leadership. Initiators of such philosophical views and ideologies were, consequently, prevented from restructuring Africa for development. Indeed, the immediate task facing African nationalist leaders was to find an effective government to address Africa’s multifarious problems. It was a search for an ideal society. Constructing an ideal society recognisable as African, without losing sight of the influence of the West proved a promising avenue for realising such a task. Such a society consisted of integrating African cultural values with the ideals of modern Western development. But for the socio-political conditions

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of the time, African leaders remained true to this objective for the greater part of their leadership. Nearly each of those early political leaders elaborated on some political ideology intending to transform Africa. If Nyerere of Tanzania and Nkrumah of Ghana represent Anglophone Africa, whereas Sékou Touré of Guinea, Mamadou Dia and Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal represent the Francophone, and Amil Cabral stands for the Lusophone, then we would have obviated the long list of premier African leaders and their ideologies. Moreover, such a brief reference has the advantage of portraying a picture of African socialism. In 1962, those African leaders held a Colloquium on the Policies of Development and African Approaches to Socialism in Dakar, where the leaders fell short of producing a precise definition of socialism, much less a combined articulation of the African leadership’s vision of African socialism. Rather, the leaders interpreted African socialism according to the needs of their respective states, hence the differences in their views. Much as Nkrumah’s vision relates closely to Nyerere’s, significant differences abound nonetheless. Quite striking, however, is the unanimity of the early African leaders in upholding the African dimension (African values) of African development, since their lived experience of the struggles of Africans and people of African descent against dehumanisation dates from the fifteenth century to the early twentieth century. It comprehended the discrimination and racist policies against Africans and people of African descent. It comprehended the trans-Atlantic slavery and imperialist colonialism that succeeded in the enslavement of Africans. Africans’ quest for their identity, epitomised in the struggles for their identity and the independence of African states, charted the way for premier African leadership to embrace the rebuilding of Africa: the reinvigoration of African cultural beliefs and values index the identity of the African. The unanimity of African leadership in facing the daunting challenge portrays them as true leaders of Africa.

THE PREMIER LEADERS OF INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES The mentioned nationalist African leaders sought to transform Africa in the light of modern development. Here it is worth our while to specify the content of the term ‘development’. For nationalist African leaders, ‘development’, entailed the reconstruction of Africa and meant founding governance of an ideal society based on African beliefs and values. Those values underpinned the framework of the African world before the intervention of the West. Some of such values include the African ideas of humanism, equity and community. By insisting that the values would be fundamental to the ideal society, African leadership reflected African cultural forms and values in the new

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society. Elaborated during the Enlightenment, ‘development’ for the West meant ‘civilisation’. The intent of the West to ‘civilise’ the Africans, was introduced by the West into Africa. The same quest to ‘civilise’ snowballed into a chain of phenomena, such as the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism. Briefly, the most heinous inhumanity of humankind in Africa were the Trans-Atlantic slave trade and slavery. Lasting for 300–400 years, the Christian Europeans and the Muslim Arabs prosecuted the trade, which harmed black Africans ‘for as long as it profited them’ (Okere 2005). All that became the product of the ‘civilisation’ (development) of Africa. The civilisation pretext funded the contestation of the humanity of Africans, their loss of African identity, and indeed, the denigration of African cultural values and beliefs. In this light, Africans became subject people who possessed no soul to be saved (Mudimbe 1988). Tempels’ book, Bantu Philosophy (1952), acquired prominence because of its title, which acknowledges the fact that the Bantu have a philosophy. Before that, Africans were believed to be ‘prelogical’,according to Lévy-Bruhl (1926/2019) and other Western scholars. All of that depicted the vast dimensions of the Westerners’ notion of development. ‘Civilisation’ (development), therefore, signified the supremacy and dominance of the West! The African notion of development, thus, contrasts sharply with the West’s, and both were at cross purposes. The intervention of the West in Africa forestalled Africa’s development, engendering hostilities and constituting the African as the Other. Consequently, early leaders of independent African states embarked upon the transformation of Africa in all its spheres: economic, socio-political, cultural and even religious. Through this transformation, the leaders aimed to imbue Africa with a new identity and engaged in the rapid development of Africa economically. To achieve such a transformation, those leaders drew from the cultural ‘values and beliefs which give meaning and direction to our (African) political demands and objectives’, like the values of African humanism, equity and community (Fyfe 1968:2). The leaders relied on those values to elaborate the various ideologies for the improvement of Africa. African leaders emphasised the indispensability of those values for African socialist society. In this regard, many questions arise. Currently variously criticised, do the ideologies of the early African leaders possess any attraction for Africa in the era of globalisation? What inspiration need Africa to draw from Africa’s socialist period? Can Africa follow its trajectory independently of the West and others in a global world? African leaders elaborated their understanding of African socialist society in the light of the needs of one’s independent state (Nkrumah’s Consciencism (1970); Senghor’s Négritude (1965); Nyerere’s Ujamaa (1963); Sékou Touré’s Communauté; Mobutu Sese Seko’s Authenticité Zaïroise). Basic to the various interpretations were the values and beliefs of traditional (pre-colonial)

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Africa: Africa’s values of humanism, equity and community. Some leaders, like Nyerere, insisted also on the absence of classes and class struggles, social control, economic transformation and African identity. Those elements are the common themes running through their work. They apply their reflections to their country’s needs. It is worth noting that those specific African countries no longer retained wholly their pristine, pre-colonial existence. They all were already deeply affected, indeed distorted, by the colonial events of the period in different ways. Each had its own imperial or colonial experience – some the French, others the British, yet others the Dutch and the Portuguese. Thus, African leaders’ experiences of the struggles, their interpretations and other underlying influences contributed to the differences in African leaders’ visions of African socialist society. Thus, Senghor, who published a work titled On African Socialism (1965), argued against the West’s and the East’s (Russia) materialism. He contended that such materialism is supplanted by African socialism. Further, he maintained that the socialist African society had better draw its principles from his theory of Négritude. This theory marks the worthwhile nature of black culture and African personalities. Compare Senghor’s interpretation with that of Mamadou Dia of the same country, Senegal, to capture the differences. If Senghor (1965) insisted on the need to draw from his theory of Négritude, Mamadou Dia (1962) maintained that African socialist society was a creation of individualist and socialist values. The consequence of such a blend is the humanist attitude that accords with the Christian and Muslim beliefs. This guaranteed, according to Dia, Africa’s independence to develop in its own way. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana had related closely with the Guinean President Sékou Touré. Nkrumah’s vigorous fight for Pan-African unity made him the father of Africa’s Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU). Unlike Sékou Touré and other leaders, who gave priority to the economic development of the rural population, Nkrumah emphasised the urgent industrialisation of Africa. This differs from Sékou Touré’s vision, which principally focused on the mechanisation of agriculture and market controls. While those leaders differed in the implementation of their visions, they drew their basic values from the values of pre-colonial African society. Significant to our work is the need to distinguish African socialism from Western socialism. Generally, the origins of socialism lie in the West’s industrial revolution. Usually, it is interpreted as originating from a class struggle. As a social and economic position, socialism advocates for a public (state) ownership of property and natural wealth (Saposs 1954). Western socialists insist that the production of a good in which an individual participated gives the person a right to share in it. Indeed, any production undertaken by people belongs to society. It is a social product. Consequently, these socialists maintain that society, in general, owns the means of production and, so, ought to

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have control over it. This is, grosso modo, Western socialism, though it has indeed undergone many mutations (Van Eerde 1959). African socialism emphasises the unity of the society and the public (state) control of natural resources and property. It equally buys into the communalistic lifestyle of traditional African society. The cooperative spirit of the people negates any demarcation between the rich and the poor. No one was either rich or poor. Hence, no member of the community lived in want while a handful few squelches in luxury. Equality of all the members of a community was much pronounced. African socialism was constructed around three principles: (i) work by everyone and exploitation by none; (ii) a fair share of resources jointly produced by people’s efforts and (iii) equality and respect for human dignity (Akinpela 1981:115). African socialism never resulted from class struggle. There are variations, even among the leaders, about African socialism. Nkrumah, for instance, and some other scholars did insist on the class struggle among Africans (Ayittey 1993; Nkrumah 1970). Some argued that the various professions restricted their membership and knowledge of their profession to members of their groups. For example, the healing profession closely guarded knowledge about their activities as ‘hidden’. There exists, further, the problem of the marginalisation of certain groups. Such instances seem evidence of a class struggle, some scholars argue. Largely, most African scholars subscribe to the absence of a class struggle in Africa. Worthy of note is the salient point that we are examining Ujamaa socialism from the position of the younger generation. We shall import the significance of the questions and the debates of the younger generation in so far as they continue the problems of their predecessors. Nyerere’s (1962) own contribution to an ideal society drew from the traditional African society and the West’s modern culture. His attempt, consequently, faces a challenge and a problem: integrating two different cultures to obtain an African contribution to an ideal society. Disputing the foreign idea of socialism (already clarified above) for its alienating features to African culture, Nyerere maintains that the African input would be nothing but African. In this sense, African beliefs and values would underlie his understanding of African socialism. Not only would Nyerere prefer African cultural values, but his contribution would also typify an African cultural phenomenon. In this case, he opted for ‘Ujamaa’. For an outline of our work and still part of the introduction, we break up the work into different sections, showing their relations at the same time. The first section discusses the idea of the African family as a society. It underlines the mesh of relationships and the related values, like the value of interdependence, typifying their relationship to Ujamaa (African) socialism. The next section draws attention to the constituent elements of Ujamaa, especially its goal for Africa’s self-reliance. We maintain that the Nationalisation policy,

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the Ujamaa villages and the villagisation scheme epitomise great moments of Nyerere’s economic transformation of Africa. We argue in this chapter that these values are indispensable to the idea of community and have a lasting impact in the contemporary world. NYERERE’S UJAMAA SOCIALISM Nyerere (1962) affirms that ‘Ujamaa’ is a typical basis of African socialism. As the President of Tanzania, he elaborated policies for the economic, agricultural, and political structures of Tanzania according to his idea of African (or Ujamaa) socialism. Nyerere’s (1962) postulation of ‘Ujamaa lies in his attempt to reply to the question, ‘How (does one) get the benefits of European society . . . and yet retain the Africans’ own structure of society in which the individual is a member of a kind of fellowship?’ Nkrumah’s (1970) attempt to integrate Islamic and Euro-Christian influences with African traditional society is fairly similar to Nyerere’s question. This shows that African leaders battled between two poles – one African, the other non-African. For Nyerere, Ujamaa constitutes the basis of the African contribution to an ideal society. Although Nyerere gives a leeway to consider a foreign culture while articulating the African input to the ideal, in the end, he constructs a type of socialist ideal presumably African because he sources its basis from the traditional African culture. Although Nyerere (1962) argues that such an ideal could, after all, not be realised, ‘and has not been realised’, the ideal, Nyerere maintains, ‘may never be attained’ by any group of people, including Africans (Nyerere 1963; Mohiddin 1968). To realise Ujamaa as African socialism requires greater efforts than did the struggle for independence (Mohiddin 1968:130). Thus, we are considering Nyerere’s model of African socialism. The Ujamaa socialism is an experiment that consists of various aspects: nationalisation policy, the Ujamaa villages and the villagisation scheme. ELEMENTS OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM IN THE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN SOCIETY Ujamaa: Society as an African Family Ujamaa refers to familyhood, neighbourhood and closely-knit family relationships. In this sense, it means extended family, kith and kin, brothers and sisters. In pre-colonial Africa, one’s neighbours were one’s brothers and sisters. In today’s world, any African is a relation. While the extended family may originate from the same ancestor, the family’s population multiplies, and

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sometimes splits to form different kindreds and eventually become towns. It is still the case that the group as a town does still recognises its maze of relations. Thus considered, Ujamaa is pre-colonial Africa’s idea of society. It is held together by a web of relationships. The group comes together as a people and recognises one another of their kind as humans. Society, consequently, is tied to African culture. Thus, Ujamaa is the idea of an African social being, a well-designed society. In terms of Ujamaa, everybody is related, and hardly is there anybody unrelated in the group, although individuals might fail to trace their distant relationships. Hence, when one refers to Ujamaa, one intends the basic relations of African society primarily and the extended larger relations. Indeed, Ujamaa stresses the idea of a relational African society. The family is a fundamental value of society. It is the source of other values – the earliest hearth of human society; one that cares for its members, succours them, nurtures them, and sets them. In Africa, there is no treasure greater than the family. The socialisation of a member within the family adjusts the individual on the way to leading an adequate social life. Within the family, consequently, there is always the unwritten law that the members hand on. None is famished while another lives in plenty, for instance. In other words, there was no contestation for wealth in the traditional African idea of the family. Nyerere’s dependence on the family derives from the socialisation of the individual in the family. The socialisation follows, sometimes unspecified, as an unwritten code of conduct that the member of the family obeys. It is part of the rule to consider a stranger as a human being of the same species as the people. It is different from perceiving the stranger as a number and treating the person as such (Achebe 1958). Nyerere does not restrict the analysis of Ujamaa solely to family relationships. While he did not explicitly mention them, he coded his references with the term, ‘spiritual’ – a term that stands for many realities. The traditional African society cuts across the differently populated worlds, which possess far-reaching implications for African cosmogony. For Africans, these worlds are fraught with a beehive of relationships. The relational is perceived in the conceptualisation of the universe (Ejizu 1989). Family relationships portray the interdependence of the members of the community. Interdependence is considered one of those values that underwrite Ujamaa. It points to the mutual dependence of being, one vis-à-vis the other, and how each complements the other in a multiple-populated universe. Each human being has a dependence relationship that invites another, and so it continues in a concatenation of human relationships. Underlying the web of relationship is the view that ‘to be is not to be alone’ (Asouzu 2013). This is to say that to be is to relate to one another; to communicate with others – human beings and non-humans alike. It entails an encounter in a mutual relationship of interdependence.

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Hence, to be human – the basic, focused goal of socialisation of members in the context of Ujamaa relationships – is to engage in a labyrinth of relations in the world. All it comes to is simply this: fastening, as it were, the knots of significant relationships with human beings and a host of other species in the world, with nature, the spiritual and the underworld. One perceives an allusion to the claim, generally attributed to Mbiti (1969): ‘I am because we are’ – a claim that has been exercised by many African philosophers. While Asouzu (2013) perceives it as a mutual way of interdependence and an affirmation of the Other in a Self-Other relation, Eze (2013:386–399) understands Mbiti’s (1969) statement in the sense of ‘Otherness-dependent subjectivity’. Eze (2013:388ff) insists on the freedom of the individual vis-à-vis the community. Some thinkers like Eze (2013, 386–399; Matolino-Kwindingwi 2013) uphold the individualism of the West over Africa’s community. Before the younger generation began critically addressing Mbiti’s statement and its implications, the statement appeared to capture all there was to human interdependence and the relation of Self to the Other. In the context of the West’s civilisation, it made greater sense to characterise the individual-community relationship in Africa in the light of Mbiti’s (1969) statement. A more critical assessment has thrown up a flurry of debates, where Africans dispute one another on individual-community relationships. The statement became later an object of contention about the freedom of the individual within the community. It called forth several distinctive positions. Memorable among the disputes is the Menkiti-Gyekye dispute (Molefe 2016), which has recently resulted in the Matolino-Kwindingwi (2013) against Metz’ (2014) and Chimakonam’s and Nweke’s (2018) discussions. It suffices here to give such an outline. Asiegbu and Ajah (2020) drew one of the consequences of all-too-restrictive implications of the relationship as a stifling of an individual’s freedom. Nyerere did not take into cognisance the full import of this interpretation of Ujamaa. The theme has become a current problem in African Philosophy. An Attitude of Mind and Values of Traditional Africa The primary outcomes of the socialisation of a family member, according to Nyerere (1962), are the attainment of a certain ‘attitude of mind’, on the one hand and the acquisition of a set of values of ‘equality, unity, and freedom’, on the other. For Nyerere, they are of significant values on which an ideal society is founded. Equality remains significant, according to Nyerere, because people collaborate and face up to their tasks together. The importance of freedom lies in the fact that it makes the individual recognise society as his. Lastly, there is unity, because only as united will the members live in peace, harmony, security and well-being. Without these values, the members

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would be ill-prepared for socialism. Nyerere maintains that the three indispensable values all exist in Africa. In line with Nyerere’s claims, OsabuWe (2000:171) explains that Ujamaa comprehends ‘communal concepts of Africa, like mutual respect, common property, and labour’. Nyerere insists that colonialism and the West’s model of education negatively impacted Africans and that it dispossessed them of their cherished traditional African character and values. The necessities of the colonialist home country determined the concerns of Africans, instead of the Africans shaping their needs according to her values. For Nyerere (1962), Ujamaa – a traditional African institution – constitutes the foundation of socialism. African Classless Society For Nyerere, socialisation rather than class struggle is the essential means for the acquisition of the requisite attitude of mind and the necessary values for socialism. In pre-colonial African society, argues Nyerere (1962), class struggle was non-existent. This claim has generated a big debate, first about its truth claim and, second, about its implications. While some African thinkers give support to Nyerere, there are critics – among them non-Africans – who dispute his claim (Stöger-Eising 2000). Different professions existed: the hunters, the farmers, the diviners and herbalists, there were the royal family administrators, the various age groups and the marginalised groups like women. In pre-colonial Africa, communities existed independently. Internecine wars of superiority to remain in existence prevailed. Was Nyerere, by utilising the claim, attempting to underline the difference between Africa and the West? Much because of the absence of records and the fact that the West finds such a case impossible, thinkers from the West resist the claim about a classless society in pre-colonial Africa. Nkrumah (1967), for one, disputed the claim, insisting that it was unfounded. Referring to the accessible history of Africa, Nkrumah (1967:88) maintained that ‘African society was neither classless nor devoid of a social hierarchy’, since such divisions as feudalism and slavery existed in Africa. The problem has to do with the idea of Western socialism, grounded in a class struggle. Without class competition, there hardly wouldbe a socialist ideal, which is why Nyerere preferred the extended family institution and underlined it as African socialism. Without African values of humanism, equality and community, it is not African. African socialism encodes these together with the idea of a classless society. Nyerere’s contribution consists of his introduction of Ujamaa, which the values encode. The values justify Nyerere’s (1967:70) employment of Ujamaa, a Swahili term, meaning familyhood. Nyerere argued that Ujamaa typifies not just an extended family, but its reference is much richer and could extend beyond the nuclear family and

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kindred relations. For him, Ujamaa could be extended ‘further beyond the tribe, the community, the nation or even the continent – to embrace the whole of mankind. This is the only logical conclusion for true socialism’, Nyerere (1967:70) concluded. Empty as the claim appears to some thinkers, it makes a strong case for socialism that is specifically African.

AFRICAN SOCIALISM: UJAMAA AS THE BASIS The core problem of African socialism is that of safeguarding the indigenous African attitudes and values as encountered in the extended family within the wider socialist society, as Nyerere (1967:165) maintains. This was Nyerere’s greatest challenge – that of integrating trans-regional African values of the modern post-colonial era. In his bid to meet the challenge, he postulated Ujamaa – the focus of his version of African socialism. His Ujamaa socialism as well as the contributions of other nationalist African leaders all constitute ‘a non-existent idyllic vision of a traditional Africa of manifest harmony and communitarianism’ (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003:59–83). In contrast to capitalism, which thrives on ‘exploitation of man by man’ (Nyerere 1968), and doctrinaire socialism – a view that constructs the good of a society on the ‘inevitable conflict between man and man’, Nyerere’s Ujamaa erects the happiness of the African society on the blend of the traditional African society and the modern elements introduced by Western culture. The singularity of Ujamaa derives from its preparedness to make Tanzania, and indeed Africa, a self-reliant society. The Arusha Declaration (1967) was propaedeutic for Ujamaa. Nyerere (1968:239) had, indeed, a low opinion of external aid for one thing – for their ‘weakening and distorting effects’ on Africa. The impact of external aid on Africa often holds Africa down because of the strings attached to the continent. To think that external aid merely ‘weakens’ and ‘distorts’ Africa, as Nyerere argues, makes light of its impact. External aid not only salvages Africa, but it also hamstrings African development more. Regardless of what they are, these gifts, loans, and aid arrive ‘much later than one expects and not always in the form it is wanted’ (Nyerere 1968:39). Above all, foreign aid makes Africa often dependent on foreign donors and bound to follow the conditions, often inimical to Africa. Nyerere’s (1968:319) foremost concern was to diminish the dependence of any society in Africa on foreign aid. He argued against critics who insisted that such a stance was nothing short of isolationism. Rather than uphold such criticism, one had better consider Nyerere’s stance as a move in the direction of self-reliance. Hence Nyerere (1968) writes, ‘For us, self-reliance is a positive affirmation that for our own development, we shall depend upon our resources’. In the Arusha Declaration,

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Ujamaa was a policy for self-reliance through state control of the economy. The major reason for the inauguration of Ujamaa stemmed from the attempt to make Tanzania a self-dependent state. For self-reliance, Nyerere introduced agriculture. The difficulty with Ujamaa socialism derives not from theorising about it. Instead, it lies in the actual practice of Ujamaa socialism.

THE PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS OF UJAMAA SOCIALISM Introduced both as a philosophy, a political and an economic programme of self-reliance, Ujamaa proved an uphill task and quite a challenge for its inauguration. Although critics maintain that Nyerere (1962) had no grounds for seeking the transformation of Africa through Ujamaa socialism, its initial success relates to the development success of Tanzania. Ayittey’s (1993:5) objection is to Nyerere’s ‘misreading of communalism of Africa’. Nyerere (1962), however, insists that capitalism ‘encourages individual acquisitiveness and economic competition’. For Nyerere (1963), capitalism was not only foreign to Africa. He also believed that it could ‘be catastrophic as regards the African family social unit’. Instead of pockets of wealthy individuals à la capitalism, Nyerere preferred Tanzania to be a nation of ‘small-scale communalists’, according to Ujamaa socialism. The constitution of Tanzania’s African National Union (TANU) exposed its socialist foundation when it recognised the following socialist principles: (i) ‘that all human beings are equal’, and assured the people that the government would grant (ii) ‘equal opportunity to men and women’, dismantle (iii) all types of exploitation’ and (iv) ‘prevent the accumulation of wealth which is inconsistent with the existence of a classless society’ (Republic of Tanzania 1967:1). The state of Tanzania’s Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1964–69: xii) outlined three principal profits that would accumulate for the people as follows: (i) the creation of authentic Tanzanian ‘industrial knowhow’ would be much faster than working with foreigners, (ii) the pursuit of an efficient and valuable strategy for the industrialisation of Tanzania, (iii) ploughing back the profits into Tanzania. What it all comes to is that the people’s ownership of the means of production was ‘an antidote to capitalist exploitation’ (Ayitey 1993). Setting out Ujamaa socialism entailed a rejection of capitalism and its prominent proponent – the West. The reason behind the rejection of the West and its capitalist ideal arose in connection with the intervention of the West in Africa and the consequent hostilities it engendered. Capitalism, for quite some African leaders in the ilk of Nyerere, represented an ‘imperialist dogma’ and a luxury that Africa was unable to afford. The pathway to

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Africa’s development, the leaders believed, could only be charted through socialism. The socialist ideal of society would not only lead to Africa’s prosperity, Nkrumah (1967:189) maintained but would also ‘eradicate the colonial structure of the economy’. Nkrumah, whose nickname was the ‘father of socialism’, held the conviction that Africa’s development would be none other than socialist since the traditional African society already possessed the socialist values of freedom, equality and social justice. Nationalisation Policy The constitution of Ujamaa, as a socialist ideal of society, meant the nationalisation of colonial and other foreign institutions of the West. The nationalisation followed three patterns: (i) State-owned economic activities, (ii) Institutions in which the government was a principal shareholder and (iii) Private firms (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003). The policy appeared somewhat hasty to some thinkers. Ayittey (1993) considers the nationalisation policy a failure. This is because, in its supposed objective – to forestall dependence on foreign financial aid and to resuscitate the Tanzanian economy – Tanzania made little or no progress. It seems the case that Shivji (1974) had previously underlined this same point. Neither did the policy of nationalisation succeed in liberating Tanzania from dependence on foreign aid, nor did it promote the Tanzanian economy. Nonetheless, at the initiation of the policy, the government of Tanzania raked in profits from certain sectors of the economy, as Nnoli (1978:218) recounts. The policy – a part of the socialist ideal of society – operated simultaneously with strict government control of the economy. This entailed utter state control of nearly all resource avenues. The policy of nationalisation in terms of government control was inflexible. Ayittey (1993:6) represents the government’s inflexible control of the economy in terms of ‘a battery of legislative instruments and controls. Roadblocks and passbook systems were employed to control the movement of Africans. Marketing boards and export regulations were tightened to fleece the cash crop producers’. The policy failed to yield adequate results in restructuring the state economy. It led to over-bureaucratisation and over-centralisation, whose negative effects became easily reflected in the expanse of corruption, mismanagement of state resources and absolute failure. Villagisation Scheme The scheme was an indispensable aspect of Ujamaa socialism. It was orientated towards the development of the rural region. The Arusha Declaration (1967) listed the scheme as an avenue for self-dependence. While the nationalisation policy was meant for the industries and finance houses, the

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villagisation scheme served rural development. Its principal objective was to generally open up the hinterland areas through the creation of ‘rural economic and social communities’ (Nyerere 1968:337). According to the scheme, Ujamaa villages existed and offered accommodation to villagers willing to participate in the villagisation scheme ‘for the benefit of all’. Ujamaa villages are basic to the success of the villagisation scheme. Different from the village homesteads, the participant village population was usually moved from their homesteads into Ujamaa villages. Nyerere established Ujamaa villages and encouraged the people to abandon their homesteads to inhabit them. In those villages, people lived together and followed a communal mode of life. Social unity prevailed among the occupants of the villages. The housing system followed a specific organisation. Instead of following a disordered house arrangement, the housing formation had a service centre around which all others lived. The villagisation scheme held out a tremendous attraction for the people. Individuals were prohibited from working in the fields and undertaking other agricultural-related processes. Cooperative groups rather than individuals worked the farms. With time, the scheme became fraught with difficulties. There was people’s reluctance to participate in the project. It had lost the attraction of yore. People were disinclined to depart their homesteads for Ujamaa villages. The material inducements to encourage the participation of the village peasants had become prohibitive. The state had recourse to force to populate Ujamaa villages and to promote the villagisation scheme. The government’s use of force graduated from mere enforcement through the compulsion to two-year imprisonment. The refusal of the villagers derived from the fear that they entertained about the government nationalising their ancestral lands. Considering this and given their background – communalism – they developed cold feet towards participating in the scheme. Truly, the government destroyed the homesteads of the participating peasants to prevent the village peasants from returning to their ancestral lands. Moreover, once demolished, the peasants had no longer any claim to their houses. Subsequent government attempts to modify the various methods for populating Ujamaa villages became a failure. Further, the villagisation scheme was a brainchild of the government and not of the poor village population. Despite its short-lived attraction, the scheme elicited no sustained enthusiasm from the peasant population. The villagers maintained a general sceptical stance, the typical sceptical attitude witnessed among the villagers when a government initiates a change in the people’s usual way of life. It was of no importance to the people whether the initiated change profited them or not. This explains largely the people’s opposition and suspicion of the modernised, processes of agriculture. This is the reason why the peasant villages unanimously stood against the scheme (Lofchie 1978:452).

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Bureaucratisation contributed to the failure of the Ujamaa village experiment. The government’s incentives made the villages unnecessarily dependent on the government for almost everything. What eventually killed off the scheme was the corrupt behaviour of the prominent managers and the wellplaced peasants, who, on account of their positions, manipulated the scheme for selfish interests (Shivji 1974; Raikes 1975). The scheme would most likely have been more successful had there been a studied examination of the project, its complicated demands and its expected results. Although some peasants gave unflinching support for the success of the scheme, its’ unforeseen complexities overshot government preparations for the scheme’s initiation. Despite the government’s ‘good intentions’, the colonial exploitative production process still loomed largely. It failed to replace a similar colonial production pattern, geared towards the dependence of the Tanzanians. The improper functioning of the scheme constituted a principal drawback to the investments that the government made in it. As a result, the expected profits, which could have accrued to the state, went downhill at a gallop. The prohibitive costs, which the government expended on the scheme constituted a huge cut in the state’s economy. The Ujamaa village experiment typifies an attempt of the Tanzanian government to establish modern means of production and agriculture. It, however, discountenanced the rural subsistence farming practice rampant in the hinterland and abolished the communalistic setting and power structure. Ujamaa socialism, consequently, rejected the various rural agricultural methods like ‘shifting cultivation and other existing rural practices such as pastoralism, poly cropping’ and others (Scott 1999:239). Again, the Ujamaa was not a contrivance of the peasant farmers, who regarded the experiment as an alienation of their association with farmers, their beliefs and agricultural practices. The beliefs are traditionally based. They include making offerings to the various deities for a bounty harvest. Those things, which had become second nature to them, constituted their tradition for working the fields. It was indeed difficult to uproot those beliefs and practices in preference for a pattern operational in the West. However, outdated methods and practices could have been separated from them with respect and only voluntarily! The Ujamaa way of life respects their organisation and power structure.

EVALUATION We note the enormous literature advancing various interpretations of Nyerere’s Ujamaa socialism. Ibhawoh and Dibua (2003:61) refer to a ‘thriving industry’ for thinkers examining the Ujamaa heritage in the 1970s. Just as varied and conflicting as the literature is, so broad are the interpretations of

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Nyerere’s Ujamaa socialism. This variance in the writings of thinkers who interpret his socialism is perceptible (Cf Hyden 1980; Raikes 1975; Green 1995). The contrasting interpretations are as far apart as Nursery-Bray’s ‘slavish adherence to ideology’ and a more positive outlook on Ujamaa as Nyerere’s strategy for the transformation of Tanzania. Nyerere was renowned both for his theoretical Ujamaa philosophy and the practical project of the villagisation scheme. Like other African leaders of his time, he recognised the necessity to reconstruct Africa, after the ravages of colonialism. While African leadership of the period adjudged it futile to privilege the West’s cultures and values, it did not completely dismiss the values of modern development. Rather, the leadership integrated Western values with African values and beliefs to erect an African socialist society. The experiment would have succeeded if the context of traditional African society remained the same as the context of modern Western society. The values of the two societies differed greatly. Further, it was more difficult for Africans to acquiesce to the kicks and thrills of the traditional African society than to explore the multiple benefits that the Western society held for them. The idea of technology varied in the two worlds. Finally, to maintain these two worlds, one would have to attempt the Japanese experiments of making the two worlds function effectively. While there is always a perspective to the works of thinkers and their contentions, it would be entirely out of place to argue that all there is to the complexities of Nyerere’s Ujamaa socialism is an utter failure. The socialist project in Africa was a colossal failure. Nonetheless, Nyerere’s story began with the traditional African idea of the extended family system – Ujamaa – that gave priority to the communalistic organisation of traditional African society. Again, Nyerere successfully forged, through visionary leadership, a United Republic of Tanzania. He entertained high hopes of uniting the then Organisation of African Union (OAU), now the African Union (AU). In Nyerere’s expression, ‘beyond’ Africa, he made Ujamaa hold out a meaning for the Tanzanians and Africa. The idea of a globalising world may be interpreted in Nyerere’s view as an all-embracing family. The world as it globalises is equally a family, in which case it is a ‘village’. All things considered, the traditional African society consisted of the divine (God), the living-dead, the human, the unborn, nature and the underworld. They all form a family where interactions take place. The idea of an extended family is rarely limited to one’s community. Nyerere intended the larger family to comprehend an ever-widening community – the global world. Disciplined and self-effacing, he was convinced of his vision and sought to translate it into action. His successes are traceable to his character. The transformation of Africa through the socialist ideal of society hit the rocks in all countries that opted for the ideology throughout Africa. If the

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slogan of the 1960s was ‘Only socialism will save Africa’, by the 1980s, one could read another message in Africa – that socialism had massively failed. The presumed African contribution to the socialist ideal of society was criticised as ‘Swiss-bank socialism’, where the ‘head of state and a cohort of ministers’ pillaged the treasures of the state ‘for private Swiss accounts in Swiss and other foreign banks’ (Ayittey 1993:12). This phenomenon is still a constant behaviour of some African leaders. Nyerere’s Ujamaa experiment failed largely because of the attitudes of the bureaucrats, who distorted the Ujamaa socialist ideal for self-serving purposes. Indeed, the transformation of Africa has consistently eluded the continent. The problem of Africa rather consists of the leaders, pitched against Africa’s population. Socialist governments of different African states undertook the nationalisation policy to forestall foreign exploitation of African states. Rather than progressively promoting the African economy, the policy turned into the leaders’ exploitation of their fellow Africans. The state’s restrictive control of nearly all commerce and trade, imports and many others forced some African businesses out of existence. The domineering state constituted the lone competitor in many cases. That was the problem with the devastation, which Tanzanians shouldered during the demise of the Ujamaa village experiment. The production of agricultural products drastically declined. Despite the government’s huge investments in Ujamaa villages, Tanzania suffered a food crisis in 1981. To obviate the starvation of the Tanzanian population, the government became compelled to import a million tons of grain! The crisis affected all agricultural produce. The development strategy of Ujamaa villages did not realise the dreams for which the Ujamaa village experiment was initially undertaken. Foreign governments did not exercise restrictions in granting African countries of the 1960s through 1980s financial assistance and Greek gifts. Despite this stance of the foreign governments, African leaders embarked on wanton, high-flying projects that possessed hardly any economic value. In the 1980s, for instance, Canada financed a gigantic, ultra-modern bakery in Tanzania. However, it was discovered that there was no sufficient flour for it (Ayittey 1993:11). Finally, the initiation of the Ujamaa village experiment did not factor in the African context in much the same way as it paid attention to the modernisation processes and elements. Although there are many criticisms addressed against Nyerere’s policies on development and his political and economic policies, these critics need not overlook some of his rare contributions. For instance, Nyerere inculcated in Tanzanians a sense of national pride and identity. Equally, he established social welfare for his country’s people, ensured political stability among various ethnic nations, and obviated power tussles within the regions. The toll of ethnic cleansing on Rwanda portrays the significance of political stability in Tanzania. Consider for a while the issue of social welfare. The provision

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of such welfare is one of the greatest weaknesses of African leaders. Often, where it is established, it is either for the bureaucrats and their cronies or the welfare exists only in name. Others travel to Europe for one ailment or the other. In this regard, the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the woolly health policies of African states.

CONCLUSION Basic to this discussion is the goal of Ujamaa – that our society becomes a family and the world becomes a global village. Only when this happens does right conduct determine a society’s mode of life and well-being. In this chapter, we discussed the typical model of African socialism on which Nyerere elaborated. Both as a philosophy and a development framework for Tanzania, its planning and eventual execution, to some degree, proved to be the bedrock of a United Tanzania. The African context, indispensable for Ujamaa, aims to turn modern African society into a family, devoid of unhealthy competition and paving the way for adequate well-being for all. In this way, everybody pursues the development of the African state. Even though Nyerere conceived Ujamaa as a promising avenue to transform Tanzania and reconstruct his country’s dependency on financial aid, the poverty of some African states, like Tanzania, required a boost in their economies. The option for the socialist ideal of society, disputed in Africa by some philosophers like Ayittey, the socio-political conditions of the time, as well as the interests of the ex-colonialists reluctant to depart Africa, contributed to the limited degree to which the project developed. In Africa, however, Nyerere’s idea remains priceless and the idea of the society as a family has become a goal of the entire world.

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———. Freedom and Socialism. Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968. Ogho, A.P. ‘Identity and Change in African Culture: The Case of Women.’ In African Philosophy and the Hermeneutics of Culture, edited by J. Obi Oguejiofor and G.I. Igwebuike, 277–96. Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005. Okere, Theophilus I. ‘Keynote Address.’ In The Scramble for Africa: The Scramble Continues, International Symposium Owerri, 23rd–25th September 2004, edited by Chukwudi Anthony Njoku, 6–10. Owerri: Assumpta Press, 2005. Osabu-We, D.T. Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa. Ontario: Press, 2000. Osuagwu, I.M. African Historical Reconstruction. Vol. I, Owerri: Assumpta Press, 1999. Raikes, Phillip Lawrence. ‘Ujamaa and Rural Socialism.’ Review of African Political Economy 2, no. 3 (1975): 33–52. Ramose, M.B. ‘Philosophy: A Particularist Interpretation with Universal Appeal.’ In African Philosophy and the Hermeneutics of Culture, edited by J Obi Oguejiofor and G.I Igwebuike, 145–77. Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005. Scott, J.C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. Senghor, Léopold Sédar. On African Socialism. London: Mall Press, 1965. Shivji, I. The Silent Class Struggle. Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1974. Stöger-Eising, V. ‘Ujamaa Revisited: Indigenous and European Influences in Nyerere’s Social and Political Thought,’ Africa 70, no. 1 (2000): 11–143. doi: 10.3366/ afr.2000.70.1.18. Tempels, Placide. Bantu Philosophy [orig. Bantoe-Filosofie]. Paris [Orig. Antwerpen]: Présence Africaine [orig. De Sikkel], 1952 [orig. 1946, Transl. Collin King]. Van Eerde, K.S. ‘Socialism in Western Europe at Mid-Century.’ Social Research 26, no. 4 (1959): 408–22.

Chapter 10

African Pre-colonial Accomplishments in Political, Social and Economic Well-Being Andrew Akampurira

The beautiful continent of Africa has been portrayed by some foreign scholars and politicians as a place of hunger, famine, war, poverty and misery among others. Due to the different worldviews between Africa and the Western world, the African ethos is misunderstood and often criticised at different levels. In this chapter, I argue that Africa has a different perspective regarding human development and well-being as revealed by various pre-colonial accomplishments. African society in the pre-colonial period was well organised, which made people accomplish a lot of things for themselves and their communities. The chapter gives credit to African traditional values and challenges modern Africans to ensure that Africa is free from cultural erosion and Western cultural domination. I begin by explaining the community-based concept of a person and how it influences both community and individual well-being. I will also describe how religion helps Africans to connect with fellow humans and other non-human creatures. I will also show other important aspects of the African communitarian setting, such as family, which is a basic unit of society; conflict resolution and punishment mechanisms; gender roles and feminism. Furthermore, I will focus on African medicine and health systems, initiation ceremonies or passage rites, and morality and ethics. COMMUNITARIANISM OR COMMUNALISM: A SIGNIFICANT ASPECT IN THE AFRICAN SETTING Communitarianism is a major and common aspect of the African traditional society. African communitarianism can be referred to as a school of thought whereby one’s personality, identity and the general being are seen in the 213

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context of the general community’s well-being and existence. The community has a great effect on human development, it shapes one’s well-being both mentally and physically. Decency, standards, ethics and principles of daily life are embedded in community life to promote society’s well-being and identity. The core aspects and elements of Africa’s communitarianism are seen in various significant values like reconciliation, consensus, commonality, and cooperation (Ugwuanyi 2011:10). African traditional religion is also a fundamental aspect (of communitarianism); it comes from people’s cultures and emphasises respect for (wo)man as an apex of creatures and the living and non-living entities (in the environment). The Kenyan philosopher John Mbiti asserted that God, spirits, human beings, and non-humans exist as a ‘single entity’ and that to destroy one or two modes of such existence affects all of them (Mbiti 1969:51). This communitarian aspect in Africa cannot be reduced to human-to-human relationships only. It includes the relationship of the High God with humans and the general environment. The communitarian approach is holistic in that religion, the common good, morality and respect for nature are interdependent. Communitarianism, from an African perspective, transcends the living and goes to the dead and the unborn. This implies that the community and existence are inseparable (this communion consists of one’s ancestors, contemporaries and future generations). A person is undoubtedly a product of the community, which expects one to be resourceful in it. Mbiti vehemently argues that being born in the society, one’s ‘physical birth’, is not enough because one must pass through several rites of ‘life passages’ to incorporate or integrate into the community (Mbiti 1969:35). In the African traditional societal context, whatever befalls an individual also befalls the community, and vice versa. Africa’s communitarian belief and values are that ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am’ (Mbiti 1969:35) (this is often regarded as a cardinal aspect of man and the community). A community in an African setting influences one’s well-being, which then influences the community. One’s perception of concepts of justice, ethics and morality is often, to a great extent, determined by his or her community. The late Nigerian philosopher Menkiti defended the scholarly opinion that the community plays a dominant role in the individual’s achievement of personhood. The author believes that Menkiti was right and that, as he wrote, indeed an individual ‘cannot be’ without society; the community greatly gives personhood; the community in Africa tends to take epistemic and ontological precedence over individuals (Menkiti 1984:170). Menkiti wrote that one must qualify for personhood after undergoing keen transformations both socially and ritually; the community plays a big role by prescribing certain customs and norms to the individual concerned (Menkiti 1984). These prescriptions are of great relevance in developing an individual in question

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to fully turn out to be an accepted member of the community. Knowledge of this communitarian aspect of culture is passed from one peer group to another through passage rites or ceremonies, systematically and sometimes at random, in daily life through taboos, totems, myths, legends, rebukes, stories, commendations, criticisms, proverbs and praise. Similarly, through active participation, one gains knowledge and skills in doing certain activities (Masolo 2010:241). With this training and preparation from childhood, one’s thinking is closely related to his or her tribe, age and sex thereby making life more meaningful to the individual. Since the African community is a communion of individuals with common goals and interests, one is likely to make ethical and responsible choices. It is, therefore, difficult for one to deviate from the community’s interests. An individual is compelled to contribute to the well-being of the community because communitarianism and individuality are inseparable in African traditional settings. Values of cooperation and teamwork make society better, the better-off share with the less well-off. The naming of children is another sign of the communitarian aspect of Africans. Names and naming signify that man cannot exist alone and be on his own. Names that Africans get show their connectedness to their family, clan, tribe or location. They also show the relationship with their ancestors. Every African name has a clear meaning because naming is ceremonial; an event led by senior citizens or elders. There is a strict criterion that a community follows in the process of naming, which is why names express history, the season of the year and achievement among other expressions. The Belgium missionary Placide Tempels (1959:70) wrote that to an African, ‘The name expresses the individual’s character of the being. The name is not a simple external courtesy, it is the very reality of the individual’. For Mbiti (1969:136), names cut across the kinship, the clan or even the community, which is an implication of the symbiotic and mutual relationship within the community. One’s name identifies a person with his or her community, a collective approach of African communitarianism. This identity partly makes one hearken to his or her community’s norms and customs because an individual is a messenger of one’s community of origin. Because of this identity, an individual is compelled to make ethical choices to avoid bringing his or her community into disrepute. While emphasising communitarianism in Africa, Eze (2008:2) says that a community is made up of ‘a people’ always living together and sharing common histories and ends. It is in helping one another, both materially and immaterially, that Africans improve their well-being. Communitarian spirit is very significant, ‘in the African view, it is the community which defines the person, and not some isolated static quality of rationality, will or memory’ (Menkiti 1984:172). This elucidates the extent to which an individual African cannot exist without a community. Like some other scholars, such as Wiredu (1996:15), Menkiti wrote that the concept of

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a person is premier and that personhood is achieved and not ascribed; it is the community that awards personhood to an individual. An individual is at the centre of the determination of moral values. The individual’s values are intertwined with the community’s values, so it is not easy to tell what comes faster (Maina 2008:194). Generally, most societies in Africa believe personhood is not automatic but attained as one discharges society’s obligations defined by the community. The desire and wish to attain ‘personhood’ in the community compel individuals to fulfil their societal obligations (social responsibilities). Africa’s communitarianism has been affected by Westernisation and modernisation, which promote the creation of classes and neglect of traditional values.

ENVIRONMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE WAY OF LIFE The conception of the Supreme Being makes Africans aware of their natural environment, which in turn they use for practising their religion (Mhazo 2016:67). Religious ceremonies and rites in African culture show much connection or relationship between (wo)man and nature (Mbiti 2001:368). Mbiti (2000:16) wrote that ‘Africans are notoriously religious’. Religion gives African life more meaning, and it is noteworthy that every African activity has a religious element in it, unbelievable but true! Africans know they are not controllers of nature, and such awareness compels them to treat it with respect. Human beings are in union with nature, partly responsible for nature and able to communicate with nature. Africans have myths and legends about creation. What is common among them is that God is believed to oversee all creation, both flora and fauna. This partly shows the extent to which most Africans believe in the existence of a Supreme Being who manifests himself in created beings. That makes Africans perceive certain animals, hills, forests, water bodies and stones among others, to be sacred. This belief in the sanctity or sacredness of various creatures makes Africans conserve the environment, which in the long run promotes their well-being. From an African traditional point of view regarding the ethics of the environment, Mangena (2013:31) postulates that in pre-colonial African society, there was a peaceful simultaneity and interdependence between earth, humans and plants. Chivaura clarifies the question of totemism by saying that a totem-like fish, python, eagle, antelope, elephant, leopard, lion, or crocodile prohibited humans from killing animals they identified as totems (believed to have special significance). It could be a serious offence leading to punishment in case one killed such an animal (Chivaura 2005:235). Terrestrial

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or land-dwelling creatures should live in harmony and mutuality (rocks, soils, water, plants and stones). This implies that (wo)man as a rational and moral creature, should protect, preserve and uphold his or her well-being as well as that of other creatures. Many African communities believe that the Supreme Being and gods and ancestors often manifest themselves in nature. Such credence makes nature respectable (Kaoma 2010:88). For example, the Bachewa people of Zambia and Malawi believe that ancestors live in certain trees, stones, rivers and caves; the Banyankore of Uganda believe that gods live in the forests, water bodies and hills; the Meru of Kenya believe that ancestors stay in the valleys, caves and water bodies; the Dinka of South Sudan believe that their High God lives in the mountains. Though Christianity is interfering with African beliefs, to date (though on a small scale), these places have played important roles in religious observances. All traditions in African culture have religious elements in them; for example, these places in nature, in the valleys or mountains, are hidden treasures, both religiously and environmentally. Tangwa (2006) noticed that there is a frequency of sacrifice and offertory to God, spirits and ancestors to appease them; this shows the communion of the visible – and invisible forces in nature’s well-being. Africa’s mode of thinking and culture is generally humanist, because it spurs humanity to seek a human-centred world; this can confirm the presence of environmental principles in traditional Africa’s daily life (Ugwuanyi 2011:5). This implies that for one to understand the question of environmentalism in Africa, one must understand the African traditional cultures and religions first. For example, lakes, valleys, mountains, and certain animals are regarded as sacred, and through them, the High God reveals himself to his people; so, they are of divine and environmental relevance. We noticed that a person cannot destroy, kill, or eat his or her totem, and then indirectly, animal and plant species are protected. For example, in Zimbabwe, among the Shona people, taboos are very closely related to religion, morality and environmentalism; these prohibitions shape human conduct regarding nature (Mhazo 2016:3). In various African tribes, taboos and totems promote good relationships between people themselves and between people and other creatures. This can explain why the African context of environmental ethics is looked at as an ‘ethics of nature relatedness’ (Mangena 2013:30). Africans acknowledge the role of land, water and air for their well-being, which is why they are regarded as sacred as well as natural (Ogungbemi 1997:208). The philosophy behind these taboos and totems is of environmental – and religious significance. The coming of the white (wo)men affected all this to the extent that some people in Africa today are not aware of these totems and taboos which used to affect their ancestors’ well-being.

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SEXUALITY, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE IN TRADITIONAL AFRICAN SETTINGS Sexuality, marriage and family are considered natural, religious and communitarian elements of African traditional culture. Marriage in the African context is not merely a relationship or connection between two partners; it establishes also certain privileges, duties, and entitlements between their respective families (Kyalo 2012). African traditional ethical teaching, which is dogmatic, reserves all physical sexual expression for married couples. Sexual intercourse outside marriage is seen as evil and a matter of guilt and indignity. Any sexual encounter in traditional settings is expected to be in marriage. Simply, sex is too important and special to be used for momentary pleasure – it must be practised in a permanent relationship unless otherwise. Africans place much emphasis on the physical, emotional, spiritual, and psychological aspects of human sexuality (Ayisi 1997). Virginity before marriage occupies an important position in the cultural setting of Sub-Saharan Africans. Virginity is one of the greatest values that earn respect not only for a virgin but the entire extended family. Marriage is a religious duty and a responsibility of everyone and so it is the responsibility of the individual and the family to help one reach the day of marriage when one is still a virgin (no prior sexual intercourse). Cohabiting is strictly prohibited not even after paying the bridewealth; any sexual act should begin after the wedding not before whatsoever. Sexual intercourse among Africans is seen as a holy and sacred act since it is a source of life. Virginity is a sign of purity, and it builds trust among spouses. Virginity and purity of marriage in African culture are stressed in legends, proverbs, ethics and taboos. For instance, in some tribes, it is not allowed for a mother-in-law and a son-in-law to sit close to one another – this in a way guards against the possibility of having an affair. These partly helped in promoting society’s well-being, for example, reduction of sexually transmitted diseases indirectly (Ayisi 1997). With the intrusion of Westernisation and modernisation, some individuals look at virginity as an outdated phenomenon. Nevertheless, virginity remains of great value in African family life. The strictness on the purpose of human sexuality in African traditional society has reduced the misuse of sex hence promoting their morality and human well-being. Africans’ marriage is seen as having several purposes: control of sexual activity; providing a stable environment for the raising of children; socialising the children, preparing them for their entry into adult society; giving the man and woman emotional support. Africa’s need and individuals’ desire for procreation ensure that historically, the union of a man with a woman has been taken as normative: the begetting of children, and then their upbringing and education, has guaranteed the bond between individual men and women

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and the creation of what we call kinfolk or family (Magesa 1997). From an African point of view, human sexuality inclines towards the permanent union of two people for purposes of mutual support, growth and pleasure. Marriage and family are viewed by Africans as natural, that is, the only proper arrangements for human beings. Polygamy (polygyny) was accepted in African traditional society so that race is propagated much more quickly; for a man, to have many wives and children was a sign of richness because it is expensive to look after a wife and her children. So, if a man can manage to care for many wives and children, then he is big and great! The stability of marriage in African societies was very important in that mutual respect was expected from both a wife and her husband. Like any other human society, there were cases of divorce, but this was of great rarity (Otieno 2016; Makwanise & Masuku 2016). Serious issues like barrenness, witchcraft, charms, unusual illnesses, adultery and uncontrollable disobedience could lead to divorce. For the well-being of an individual or the community, divorce was tolerated but seen as a social evil (a disgrace to one’s family). It would seem to be true whether marriage is natural or conventional, it is meant to last a lifetime, and this is the ideal to be striven for. Africans in the traditional setting regarded marriage as a permanent institution ordained by the Supreme God. And so, we can categorically say that in African traditional society, divorce was just tolerated but not permitted. The stability of African marriage promoted the well-being of the children, couples, and the general community (Hendrix 1998). Due to Westernisation, many changes have occurred regarding the family roles of (wo)men and the general stability of family life. Broken families and singlehood are grossly affecting Africans’ original well-being.

PUNISHMENT, REPRIMAND AND PENALTY IN THE AFRICAN TRADITIONAL SOCIETY Punishment has been practised in most known societies throughout human history for a variety of offences so Africa is not an exception. In traditional African settings, punishment was justified for retributive and deterrence purposes. This implies that there were principles to determine the allocation of punishments to individuals, that is, the appropriate punishment. As a result, that sentencing had to exercise a high degree of care and sincerity to warrant justice. Since in African traditional societies, people of common ancestry lived in communities and clans, it was difficult to have a system that legalised killing ‘capital punishment’ or lifelong imprisonment or detention. African traditional societies conflict resolution has a communal dimension, the idea being to the benefit of both the victim and the perpetrator and to create social harmony. There is an increasing call to return to Africa’s founding values like

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‘ubuntu’. These values promote peaceful ways of conflict resolution rather than adopting the Western value system. The latter is punishment-oriented rather than focused on reconciliation or restoration (Mangena and Chimakonam 2017). The administration of punishments in most postcolonial societies ignores the integrative notion of punishment, which is important to Africa. African moral traditions stress that all human beings are brothers and sisters because of their common humanity. This conviction becomes an important feature in case of sentencing and punishing (Wiredu and Gyekye 1992). Humanism as a doctrine sees human needs and interests as fundamental since it constitutes the foundation of African ethics (Kaunda 1966). Punishing a person must be within the realms of justice since (s)he is a product and part of society. African ethics, which is communitarian, social and duty-oriented, is founded on humanism, the doctrine that considers human well-being as basic (Bewaji 2004). Typical African thinking is portrayed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu (2007:21), who asserts that even if a person is truly guilty, there is a need to rehabilitate and correct him but not to kill; to him, ‘Restoration heals and makes whole while retribution only wounds and divides us further.’ The concern for human well-being may be said to constitute the epicentre of the African axiological helm (Gyekye 2004). This position of African ethics takes its pining, undoubtedly, from the humanistic attitude that typifies traditional African existence and thinking. The decline in African traditional values can arguably be said to have contributed to the increase in criminality in African countries, which indirectly has made their governments retain the death penalty. Rural-urban migration and general social change in African settings breed criminality to a certain extent. Rapid social change in the African setting has contributed to the growth of crime, particularly in urban areas where sharp contrasts are seen between the rich and the poor and where the structures of traditional life have broken down and have not been replaced by new, stable structures. In the African traditional society, a (wo)man was part of the community, and his or her social character was stressed. (S)he shared in a corporate morality, and whatever (s)he did should have obvious effects on the family, the clan and the tribe. Right and wrong were clearly defined and taught to each generation. Wrongdoing could not remain hidden for long, and the general conscience of the community would condemn the wrongdoer for bringing disharmony into the lives of those around him. But with today’s urbanisation, industrialisation and other rapid changes, traditional structures have been weakened greatly (Sibani 2018; Arinze 2006). Many people who live in urban areas are cut off from the communities from which they originally came and have abandoned traditional morality but have not found a new moral code with which to replace it. Most death row convicts are from families characterised by broken marriages, frequent beatings, drunken parents, stepparents, less food

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and others are orphans. Such a situation and lifestyle compel one to go to the streets and start looking for ways to survive, hence criminality (Arthur 1991; UNODC report 2005).

GENDER ROLES IN THE AFRICAN TRADITIONAL SETTINGS Modern ‘women’s emancipation’ which mainly originates from the Western world is somehow a threat to Africa’s family setting and tradition. Due to the intrusion of foreign culture because of colonialism and neo-colonialism (Mafumbate 2019), African culture’s family life is at stake with what has come to be known as ‘women’s emancipation’. The Christian missionaries’ approach to inculcating Western-style family ideals in a different traditional setting became a challenge as they did not think much about why Africans behaved the way they did. Culture and religion are often inseparable, and so religion has a great influence on gender as religious institutions socialise, their members by enforcing group norms that dictate many aspects of everyday life (Mafumbate 2019). This includes what (wo)men wear; how life events are defined and ritualised, and most especially how (wo)men are defined in terms of home, work, childcare, politics and the law. Work in African traditional society was done or divided according to sex; this did not mean that one sex exploited another, but gender complementarity in work relations was part of the social order and organisation. The colonialists did not understand that and thought it was a form of exploitation of women. Like any other society in the world, there were occasions where exploitation by members of the opposite sex existed, but these were the exceptions. Colonialism greatly created a gender imbalance in education and other activities in Africa (Selhausen and Weisdorf, 2016; Sudarkasa 1986). Recruitment of African men for labour in the mines, military, education and urban jobs disproportionately singled out men, leaving many women behind in the villages with less economically useful activities than those they had traditionally maintained. If foreigners believed in gender sensitivity as they claim today, they would have deployed (wo)men equally in their colonial activities. An African traditional woman was mainly responsible for securing food, water and childcare, among others, whereas a man was chiefly responsible for building a house, providing meat (hunting), and clearing land for agriculture and cattle rearing (Nancy 1989). One wonders what an American or European (muzungu) calls exploitation of women in Africa. Women in precolonial settings had rights, and this can be followed in the African wisdom of superstitions, proverbs, myths and stories that have passed on concepts of respect for women. For example, among the Kikuyu tribe of Kenya, there is

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a saying, ‘Too much submission of a wife does not build a family instead it destroys it’; and the Bemba of Zambia say ‘A woman is the strongest pole of a house’. There is a myth among the Banyankore people of Uganda which goes that ‘an adulterous husband produces an adulterous son’, this is a way in which women express their dissatisfaction with adultery in society. Since the pre-colonial period, in Africa, a message was transferred orally from one generation to another; so, for now, we do not expect much-written information. That’s why, to understand African settings, one must live within them. Little is written and what is written is mostly the work of foreigners. Due to this gender imbalance perpetuated by colonialism, generally, women have been absent in socio-economic and political development. African women now feel challenged to verbalise and demonstrate their vision of women’s roles for the future; this calls for research into African women’s history, rights and contributions to development so far ignored and disregarded because of colonialism. It is worth noting that there are good elements in Western feminism which should be embraced; however, African women’s feminism and emancipation should uphold Africanity because of the values therein. African personality and identity should not be lost because of colonial experiences or modernisation.

AFRICAN TRADITIONAL MEDICINE AND HEALING: ‘TREATING, DIAGNOSING AND PREVENTION’ Healing, treating and preventing illnesses, both physical and psychological, existed before the coming of colonialists to Africa. In short, traditional medicine is medicine that was locally used in our cultures and traditions, for example, roots, leaves, the bark – of trees, skins of animals and many other materials. About Africa, it is the type of medicine that was used before the coming of Europeans and Arabs. Traditional medicine had a great role to play in the building of Africa’s health system; traditional healing was a profession which was characterised by long training and ethics. To be a traditional medical doctor, one had to be intelligent and a person of integrity, the senior healers examined one’s ability to qualify for this profession. Despite the efforts and the work on traditional medicine, the colonialists ridiculed, banned and Satanised it to introduce their homemade medicine. This medicine remains strong in Africa to the extent that ‘60–80% of the people rely on African traditional medicine for their primary health care’ (WHO 2005:22). This is often administered by diviners, herbalists, high priests, priestesses and parents. The knowledge and skills of handling traditional medicine are transmitted orally from one generation to another. This traditional medicine cures or treats, but with stigma from colonialists, some Africans (due to foreign influence) to

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date have looked at it as inferior, backward, superstitious and at the worst, labelled it as witchcraft. It becomes somehow cheaper when traditional and Western medicines are complemented. In Africa, where many people are poor, it is difficult for them to depend entirely on expensive Western medicines. It is argued that by complementing them, a poor man in a remote village will be able to buy cheaper Western medicines and then add local roots and herbs instead of remaining untreated or using one type of medicine, which may not be enough or work faster. Another argument is that applying both traditional – and Western medicine gives confidence to sick people. Psychologically, a person can be cured by the placebo effect of medicines alone! This is because some patients believe that in case Western medicines fail then the traditional ones might work. This belief is common among old people, even if they visit hospitals often. They ask for herbs or roots to chew or drink, as they are believed to be catalysts in healing. Some people even believe that Western medicines have more negative side effects in comparison with traditional medicine (obviously, some think the opposite). Traditional – and Western medicines should, therefore, be complemented such that in case Western medicine fails then the traditional one may work and vice versa. However, this should be done with maximum care. This is very important in cases where a disease is difficult to detect. A good number of medical doctors in African hospitals say that mixing sometimes is necessary as they believe both work, but one needs a trained person to administer them with maximum care. Traditional – and modern medicines should be complemented since they work at different rates. For example, kajoka (a local medicine for snakebites) works faster in the case of a snakebite than Western medicine. This herb has helped many people who live in African villages. I have been witnessing this since my childhood. Both traditional – and Western medicines are important in healing different diseases. But the elite class, with the influence of Western culture and beliefs, looks at traditional medicine as backward and outdated. This makes many people in this class to be sceptical about traditional healers, thereby labelling them as magicians or wizards. What is important is not the perception people have about these traditional healers but whether their medicines work. According to various testimonies, traditional medicines work but need maximum care in the way they are administered. Nevertheless, some witch doctors provide medicines that do not work and cause harm to people. This can explain why there are legitimate traditional healing associations that help indigenous Africans to separate the chaff from hearing concerning Africa’s indigenous doctors. Both medicines can cure and be applied at the same time; they can be complimented because each has got its values but there is a need to know that there is an African way of

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doing things, which is completely different from the Western way, and this deserves respect. To sum up, corporate social responsibility remains important in medicine.

INITIATION CEREMONIES AND RITES OF PASSAGE IN AFRICAN CULTURE In the African traditional society, all major changes or developments a person went through were celebrated, in fact from conception to death. Such rites of passage include pregnancy, delivery, naming, childhood to adulthood, marriage and death, among others. These are important for strengthening unity in the community, prestige, self-confidence, motivation, respect, self-esteem and commitment, among others. African life, especially that of the teenager, is dominated by induction into economic and cultural practices considering gender differences. The late Kenyan philosopher Mbiti contended that a person is part of the community and must conform to society’s expectations since (s)he is part of the whole. Since physical birth is not enough, one must pass through certain rites that incorporate and integrate him or her into the community. The last stage is death; even here, one is integrated into the society of both living and dead (Mbiti 1969). This can explain why burial in African culture is never hurried, as a lot of preparation is needed. It is the work of the community to nurture and up bring individuals into socially acceptable manners, and this begins with birth. One of the most important rites is naming, and care must be taken in the process of naming, which is usually gradual. Usually, the values of the community are passed on to others on such important occasions as these since these occasions are well organised. However, there are situations where young people are taught certain values corresponding with their age or status in everyday life in form of praise, rebuke, criticism, proverbs, or stories (Masolo 2010:241). Rites of passage are mainly about the celebration of the main stages of growth, which helps in the personality of individuals. Such rites need not only to be preserved but also promoted. Colonialism created bias about some of these rites, especially regarding marriage and death, which they judged as being satanic. Through these rites, people could gather in large numbers to give extensive guidance and counselling; for example, with the coming of Christianity, any marriage outside the church is regarded as satanic. The church does not give enough counselling to those intending to get married; there is not much trust in such guidance and counselling since the counsellor is not an aunt or uncle of the couple. This brings about instability in the institution of marriage.

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MORALITY AND ETHICS IN THE AFRICAN TRADITIONAL SOCIETY The African morality is communitarian, it is a morality of conduct in that it defines a person by what (s)he does rather than what (s)he is. That is why a human being who conducts himself or herself very immorally and wickedly is not branded a person (Mbiti 2000:70). In contradiction to being human, personhood is earned from a moral viewpoint and not just given at birth. Usually, the degree of mourning in case of one’s death explains the morality (s) he has been exhibiting and one’s social status; little attention is given to his or her political – or economic status. This shows the extent to which ‘one’s moral standing is highly treasured and determines one’s relationship with the entire community’ (Mhazo 2016:36). Gyekye (1997:66), while emphasising communitarian ethics in Africa, says, ‘By responsibility, I mean a caring attitude or conduct that one feels one ought to adopt concerning the well-being of another person or other persons.’ This implies that one must be concerned about the welfare of others to improve the general well-being of the community (moral responsibility and obligations). Each person is expected to exercise a high level of integrity in his or her daily life while inspiring and encouraging others to do the same through his or her example. The ethical values of kindness, camaraderie, mutuality, assistance, love, forgiveness and sympathy must be exhibited. Metz and Gaie (2010:75) observed that the understanding of the morality of people in SubSaharan Africa (black Africa) is different from that of Westerners in that to be human is to relate to others positively. One cannot be a person in solitude, an individual becomes a person through other individuals (persons), in African traditional society one cannot realise true personhood in isolation. Some thinkers may criticise this argument, but it still holds some sense from an African perspective. Metz and Gaie (2010:333) say about African moral thinking that ‘an action is right just insofar as it is in solidarity with groups whose survival is threatened; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to support a vulnerable community. Individuals think about communal well-being’. African morality and ethics emphasise relationships or friendship with one another as a channel to dignify and develop one another. An ethical or moral person in an African context cannot exploit others, but the coming of Westernisation and the concomitant exploitation has become the order of the day. We need to revive some of these important values in our culture. Western culture emphasises personal responsibility, yet in African culture, one’s immorality causes shame to the whole community, implying that it is the community’s responsibility to nurture a person well. With the intrusion of Western individualism, the responsibility of raising children has been left to parents alone, at times who are so busy in offices thereby allocating little time to their children. Raising a child today is a

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parent’s affair. With the increase in individualism, when one loses a dear one, it becomes a personal affair in terms of expenditure and concern; other people are not bothered! This is contrary to African traditional moral values.

CONCLUSION: PRE-COLONIAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOSTERED THE GENERAL WELL-BEING Various pre-colonial accomplishments described above show the extent to which Africans lived a good and fulfilling life. Africa should not just be regarded as the ‘land of problems and misery’ but rather a continent of great innovation and invention. ‘Community life’ is a great feature in traditional African settings and is perceived in various aspects like environmental protection, family preservation, rites of passage, morality, medicine and treatment, gender roles and through punishment and reprimand to maintain social order. These aspects make life meaningful and enjoyable. African values and ethics are portrayed and transmitted from one generation to another through legends, proverbs, sayings, traditions and taboos. As pointed out, in the African context, a person cannot exist without a community, since it is mainly the community that gives personhood. The traditional religion, which is embedded in African culture, is an important aspect that helps people to know and respect their natural, environment which in turn promotes their well-being. Marriage, both religious and communal, is highly encouraged since it promotes continuity and stability in society. The stability of marriage has a great significance on society’s morality, which explains why Africans take marriage seriously. In marriage, there is a division of roles according to gender, and this obliges married couples to carry out their responsibilities effectively, that is, husbands have their familial roles as well as wives. Every family and community needs a good healthcare system, and Africans have their traditional medicine for various diseases and ailments. To participate in various community activities, one is expected to undergo certain rituals or ceremonies, through such rituals, one feels being part of the society and is compelled to respect its values and promote its well-being. In all these activities and aspects, individuals are expected to be ethical and moral in their undertakings. Though several changes have occurred in African customs and norms, mainly due to contact with Western civilisation and urbanisation, these values remain valuable and worthwhile.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Arinze, A. “The Impact of Westernism on Nigerian Culture.” In Readings in Nigerian Peoples

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and Culture, edited by N. Ojiakor and I. Ojih, 114–25. Nigeria: NGIB Publishers, 2006. Arthur, J. “Development and Crime in Africa: A Test of Modernisation Theory” Journal of Criminal Justice, 19, no. 6 (1991): 499–513. https://doi​.org​/10​.1016​ /0047–2352(91) 90062-Z. Ayisi, O. E. An Introduction to the Study of African Culture Nairobi: East African Publishers, 1997. Bewaji, John A. “Ethics and Morality in Yoruba Culture.” In A Companion to African Philosophy, edited by Kwasi Wiredu, 396–403. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. Chivaura, Vimbai Gukwe. “Hunhu/Ubuntu: A Sustainable Approach to Endogenous Development, Biocultural Diversity and Protection of the Environment in Africa.” In Endogenous Development and Bio-Cultural Diversity, edited by Bertus Haverkort and Stephan Rist, 229–39. Leusden: ETC/ Compas, 2005. Eze, M.O. “What Is African Communitarianism? Against Consensus as a Regulative Ideal.” South African Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 4. (2008): 386–99. Gyekye, Kwame. “Person and Community in African Thought.” In The African Philosophy Reader, edited by P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, 317–37. London: Routledge, 2004. ———. Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Gyekye, Kwame, and Kwasi Wiredu. Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992. Hendrix, L. “Marriage.” In Encyclopaedia of Cultural Anthropology, edited by David Levinson and Melvin Ember. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998. Hunt, Nancy Rose (1989). “Placing African Women’s History and Locating Gender.” Social History. 14 (3): 359–379. https://doi:10.1080/03071028908567748 Kaoma, K.J. Ubuntu, Jesus, and Earth: Integrating African Religion and Christianity in Ecological Ethics, PhD. Boston University, 2010. Kaunda, Kenneth D., and Colin Morris. A Humanist in Africa. Letters to Colin M. Morris from Kenneth D. Kaunda. London: Longmans, 1966. Kyalo, P.M. Reflection on the African Traditional Values of Marriage and Sexuality. Nairobi: Nairobi University Press, 2012. Magesa, Laurenti. African Religions: The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997. Maina, M.W. “African Communitarian Ethics in Theological Work of Bénézet Bujo.” Pacifica 21, no. 2 (2008): 192–209. Mangena, F., and J. Chimakonam. The Death Penalty from an African Perspective: Views from Zimbabwean and Nigerian Philosophers. Delaware: Vernon Press, 2017. ———. “Discerning Moral Status in the African Environment.” Phronimon: Journal of the South African Society of Greek Philosophy and the Humanities 14, no. 2 (2013): 25–44. Masolo, Dismas A. Self and Community in a Changing World. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010.

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Mbiti, John S. Introduction to African Religion. 2nd ed. London: Heinemann, 2000. ———. “African Religion and the World Order.” In Toward a Global Civilization? The Contribution of Religions, edited by P.M. Mische and M. Merking, 361–70. New York: Peter Lang, 2001. ———. African Religions & Philosophy. London: Heinemann, 1969. Menkiti, Ifeanyi, A. “African Philosophy: An Introduction.” In Person and Community in African Traditional Thought, edited by Richard A. Wright, 171–72. Lanham: University Press of America, 1984. Metz, T., and J.B.R. Gaie. “The African Ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for Research on Morality.” Journal of Moral Education 39, no. 3 (2010): 273–90. Mhazo, Watadza. A Critical Assessment of African Communitarianism for Environmental Well-Being. Pretoria: University of South Africa, 2016. Makwanise, Ndakaitei, and Mehluli Masuku. “African Traditional Views on Divorce: a Case of the Ndebele in the Vukuzenzele Ward at Esikhoveni, Esigodini.” Oral History Journal of South Africa 4, no. 1 (2016): 1–14. Ogungbemi, Segun. “An African Perspective on the Environmental Crisis.” In Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application, edited by Louis J. Pojman, 330–37. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997. Otieno R (2016), “The Standard” https://www​.standardmedia​.co​.ke​/ureport​/article​ /2000176638​/why​-divorce​-should​-not​-be​-allowed​-in​-kenya, accessed on 2 September 2022. Selhausen, Felix Meier Zu; Weisdorf, Jacob (2016). “A Colonial Legacy of African Gender Inequality? Evidence from Christian Kampala, 1895–2011.” The Economic History Review 69 (1): 229–257. https://doi:10.1111/ehr.12120. ISSN 1468–0289. Sibani, Meesua C. “Impact of Western Culture on Traditional African Society: Problems and Prospects.” International Journal of Religion and Human Relations 10, no. 1 (September 2018). Sudarkasa, Niara. “‘The Status of Women’ in Indigenous African Societies.” Feminist Studies 12, no. 1 (1986): 91–103. https://doi:10.2307/3177985. Tangwa, G. “Some African Reflection on Biomedical and Environmental Ethics.” In A Companion to African Philosophy, edited by Kwasi Wiredu, 387–99. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. Tempels, Placide. Bantu Philosophy [orig. Bantoe-Filosofie]. Paris [orig. Antwerpen]: Présence Africaine [orig. De Sikkel], 1959 [orig.1946]. Tutu, Desmond “The Doctrine of Revenge.” The Guardian, 2007. Ugwuanyi, L.O. “Advancing an Environmental Ethics through the African WorldView.” Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 1st International Technology, Education and Environment Conference, Omoku-Rivers State, Nigeria, 2011. UN. UNODC report on “Crime and Development in Africa”, 2005. https://www​ .unodc​.org › ART_summary_E_screen PDF, accessed 3rd September 2022. Wiredu, Kwasi. Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996.

Chapter 11

A Philosophy of Race in the Melting Pot of Globalisation and Its Implications for Africa Wilfred Lajul

This chapter discusses the philosophy of race in the unfamiliar terrain of globalisation and focuses on the implications of this philosophy for Africa. The research question is: Can globalisation break down all barriers to human togetherness including hurdles created by racism? The question implies the assumption that globalisation is the melting pot of human differences. Scholars are divided on this question. One group says yes; globalisation has already broken down all barriers that divide humans along tribal, ethnic, national or racial lines (Giddens, 1999; Held et al., 2000; Muzoffar, 2002). On the contrary, some scholars have maintained that globalisation has not yet succeeded in melting all the differences among humans (Howes, 1996; Castells, 2005; Jones, 2005 and Calhoun, 2009). The author will argue that both racism and globalisation can affect the well-being of Africans negatively. Racism, in this chapter, is understood as the utilisation of the unfamiliar differences among humans to segregate and subdue one group of humans by another group. When such differences are driven to the extreme, as has ever been done in the history of humankind, human well-being is gravely undermined. Globalisation weakens the grounding ethical principles of human well-being, which are an equitable distribution of goods and services and unbiased respect for one another. Philosophy of race, in this chapter, is understood as the philosophy of the unjustifiable disrespect and abuse of human differences. Wijeyesinghe et al. (1997) distinguish race from racism. ‘Race is a social construct that artificially divides people into distinct groups based on certain characteristics such as physical appearance (particularly skin colour), ancestral heritage, cultural affiliation, cultural history, and ethnic classification’ (1997:88). Racism, on the other hand, is the ‘systemic subordination of 229

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members of targeted racial groups who have relatively little social power, by the members of the agent racial group who have relatively more social power. This subordination is supported by the actions of individuals, cultural norms and values, and the institutional structures and practices of society’ (1997:88–89). To the author’s mind, globalisation at the individual, cultural and institutional levels has exerted this subordinating power over developing countries, especially Africa. Globalisation, as much as race, are social phenomena that exists in modern society. However, racism is more damaging as a deliberate use of these socially constructed differences to systematically dominate one group of humanity over another. Globalisation, in the view of Scholte (2007), is also damaging to Africans’ well-being and has been wrongly equated with internationalisation, liberalisation, universalisation or westernisation. Scholte acknowledges that the concept of globalisation as the spread of trans-planetary or super-territorial social relations is also part and parcel of globalists’ exaggerations. For him, globalisation is a territorial geography that continues to have importance alongside the new supra-territoriality. Scholte’s understanding of globalisation is in line with the author’s thinking in this chapter. For both, globalisation is about the spread of social relations beyond geographical territories, although it is centred on the geographical territories as they get wider territorial permeations. In this sense, globalisation is not the melting pot of territorial boundaries and differences. Instead, it is the consolidation of these territorial boundaries and differences with greater and wider power to infiltrate and find acceptance all over the globe. In support of this understanding, Scholte (2007) describes globalisation as ‘the reductions in barriers to trans-world social contacts’ (2007:11). He continues to say that, through globalisation, people ‘become more able – physically, legally, linguistically, culturally and psychologically – to engage with each other wherever on earth they might be’ (2007:11). The specific question addressed in this chapter is how globalisation has made people in Africa more able – physically, legally, linguistically, culturally and psychologically – to engage with other humans in the world. What Scholte did not ask is the question of how globalisation has made human well-being equitably realisable. Has the encounter with other human beings, as promoted by (economic) globalisation, improved people’s well-being? The answer to these questions seems to be no, since levels of poverty in Africa have not been significantly reduced through globalisation. Bosworth et  al. (2008) also note that despite growing globalisation, there is an over-representation of people from ethnic minority groups; disadvantaged, discriminated against, suspected, incarcerated and marginalised. Africa is part and parcel of this group of humans, which is negatively affected by globalisation in terms of their well-being.

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In his article, Globalisation: Cultural Transmission of Racism (2014), Lori Hale thinks that there are three main theories of globalisation, which are; differentials, convergence and hybridisation. The last-mentioned theory combines differentialsise and convergence by exhibiting an interconnection between the external and internal flows, resulting in a new cultural hybrid. Hale contends that the ‘description of racial bias and the interconnectedness of cultural transmission through globalisation in the form of racial bias can be examined through the use of the mass media’ (Hale, 2014:112). For Hale, hybridisation is counter to the doctrines valuing racial purity and nationalist doctrines. As a result, individuals who have been marginalised in society due to cultural differentials are no longer marginalised, and their culture is now incorporated into society. Contrary to this view, Pieterse (2010) thinks that hybridisation is considered ‘planarization’ because it occurs at the surface level of the culture and not at the deeper, individualised level. For example, cultural components such as food, fashion, arts and entertainment are hybridised. Elements, such as attitudes, values, and ‘structural ensemble of culture’,’ however, remain unchanged and not open to hybridisation (Hale, 2014). The point raised is that globalisation is the hybridisation of cultures, but this takes place at the external and not at the internal levels of human values. At the internal level of hybridisation, elements such as attitudes, values, and ‘structural ensemble of culture’ remain unchanged. This is why Borja and Castells (1997) believe that globalisation can both include and exclude people. As the world globalises at the external level, humans appear to embrace hybrid cultures where everybody feels included. At the internal level, however, attitudes, values and the structural ensemble of cultures remain unchanged. In this way, globalisation excludes one group of people from another. This way, the power of globalisation remains visibly external and inclusive. Yet, it essentially excludes individuals and groups of people living together at the level of attitudes and values, which remain unaffected. Indeed, globalisation is the attempt of the geographical territory to penetrate the global world. As an attempt, it has succeeded in creating a hybrid international culture at the external level, but at a much deeper level, globalisation has failed to melt the deeply divisive attitudes and values of humans that are at the base of racism. In support of this, Bosworth et al. (2008) note, what characterises the new global order is its ability to include and exclude. In the language of Borja and Castells (1997:9), globalisation has ‘its extraordinarily – and simultaneously – inclusive and exclusive nature.’ This implies that globalisation has great potential for both inclusion and exclusion. The included are the great beneficiaries of globalisation, while the excluded are its victims. Bosworth et  al. (2008), draw our attention to some of the reasons for this exclusion.

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While globalisation and its attendant neoliberal economic model may have brought unprecedented opportunities and prosperity to some in the globally connected north, many others in regions that are disconnected from the global flows are ‘moving from the previous situation of exploitation to a new form of structural irrelevance’ (Borja and Castells, 1997). Globalisation, in its new form, has therefore become more insidious. It, namely, favours only the highly connected Global North and leaves the Global South disconnected. Africa is a typical example of this disadvantaged group who are excluded from the global flows of the benefits of globalisation. Pickering and Weber (2006) added that the process of globalisation produces a new global underclass, which serves to provide the imperative for them to be ‘on the move’ and to cross borders in search of physical and economic security. The racial undertones in the discussions and treatment of the migrant workers, which are a direct consequence of globalisation, point to the situation from which the migrants are coming. This is because globalisation has created an imperative to be on the move to survive physical and economic insecurity. Bosworth et al. (2008) insist that the ‘deviancy of the globally dispossessed is typically represented through the transgression of many boundaries – geographical, national, cultural, social and political – as well as the boundary of the criminal law’. When globalisation is seen as a super-territorial and trans-planetary phenomenon, the insinuation is that it is supposed to be good and beneficial for all in reducing racism since it transcends geographical territories. On the contrary, it is in this supra-territoriality and trans-planetary encounters that it transgresses many boundaries – geographical, national, cultural, social and political ones. The victims that try to survive these transgressions are termed criminals, who can be arrested, searched and incarcerated at will by the powerful beneficiaries of globalisation. Bauman noted that there has been a ‘sharp acceleration of the punishment-by-incarceration’ where large sections of ‘the rejects and the waste of globalisation’ are confined to the ‘status of the excluded’, incarcerated in prison . . . and subjected to a variety of ‘techniques of immobilisation’ in a world increasingly characterised by insecurities, uncertainties, and inequalities (Bauman, 1998: 106–14; Bosworth et al., 2008: 265). In this chapter, the author insists that globalisation is a dialectic movement that tries to abolish the walls that divide humans, but at the same time, it is catalysing racism. It aims to investigate the effects of this dynamic relationship between globalisation and racism in Africa with the hope of identifying a philosophical understanding of race in the context of human well-being in this globalising world. Consequently, the author shall investigate the origin of the concept of race, underlying theories in the discourse of race, the underpinning

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discourse on globalisation, and the relationship between globalisation and race. In doing this, the chapter will be critically analytical in its methodology by asking, breaking down, discussing and synthesising the impacts of the dialectical relation between race and globalisation on Africans’ well-being.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF RACE In trying to define the term race, Gordon states that the concept originated from thinking that distinguishes a ‘centred group of human beings counting as truly human versus those who were not fully human’ (2010:1133). The distinction consists of the human potential in the ‘centred group’ and the natural limitation on the ‘outside group’.’ In this sense, the theoretical justification of the ‘centred group’ attributed to humanity versus the ‘outside group’ deprived of humanity is claimed to be based on some limitations in the ‘outside group’.’ Based on this theoretical explanation, ‘the social categories’ (Tajfel et al., 1971) of barbarians and slaves were excluded from the group of citizens in Aristotelian political philosophy. The concept of race has divided philosophers into three groups: the sceptics, the naturalists and the social constructionists. The sceptics think the concept is suspect because it has been ‘used to justify gross forms of injustice: slavery, genocide, colonial subjugation and exploitation, forced segregation and arbitrary civic exclusion, and land and resource expropriation’ (Shelby, 2012:337). The naturalists, on the other hand, think there are sound biological reasons to divide the human species into subspecies units called ‘races’.’ They maintain that racial classification has an explanatory significance in biology (Andreasen, 1998; Kitcher, 1999; 2007). The social constructionists think that ‘race’, though perhaps lacking biological significance, is a meaningful social construction that divides humans into subgroups for both illegitimate and legitimate social purposes (Goldberg, 2002; Mills, 1997, 1998; Haslanger, 2000; Sundstrom, 2002; Taylor, 2004; Somedley and Brian, 2005). In my view, all these philosophical opinions have their limitations. First, the concept of race is not just a justification for gross forms of injustice but is meant to explain away unfamiliar differences among humans. Based on such theoretical explanations, gross injustices were committed against the excluded groups, such as slavery, genocide, colonial subjugation and exploitation. Secondly, the biological explanations of human differences have no scientific proof. Even if there are biological differences among humans, they cannot be used to distinguish between humans and non-humanbeings. Natural limitations commonly occur among all groups of humans, but limitations

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do not make an individual or group of individuals less human. Thirdly, this chapter partly agrees that race is a social construction. The author understands social construction in the constitutive sense, which refers to the construction of concepts and theories, as opposed to the construction in the casual sense. He agrees with Diaz-Leon, who argues that social construction is ‘the current instantiation of certain property, which is taken to be unjust, is contingent upon certain social practices, which should be changed if we want to achieve social justice’ (2013:1149). The fiction in the concept of race lies in theoretical attempts at constructing and trying to justify the overvaluation of the self as opposed to the systematic devaluation of the other (Ignatieff, 1995). Consequently, socially constructed and mistaken self-images together with the inborn tendencies among humans to overvalue themselves, normally lead to the devaluation of others and the subsequent exclusion of one group from another. The concept of race, which implies there are groups of people that are no more or less human than others, is fiction. It has no grounds, but the tendency to make such a distinction is real (Somedley and Brian, 2005). Africa has suffered a lot, as subjects and victims, from such discrimination (Fanon, 1963, 1967). This has greatly undermined the well-being of Africans.

UNDERLYING THEORIES ON THE DISCOURSE OF RACE The philosophy of race is anchored on the view that there are groups of people in this world that consider themselves to be more human than others. From this philosophical underpinning arise two theoretical trends in trying to explain this central difference, both theological and philosophical. The theological theory of race emerged from Christendom as it transformed the ‘centred group’ into one legitimated by theological naturalism, framing the ‘outsiders’ as those who rejected Christianity (Gordon, 2010). In the Iberian Peninsula, this framework took the form of raza, which referred to breeds of dogs and horses and, when referring to human populations, Moors and Jews. Strictly speaking, then, the Italian term ‘razza’ later became ‘race’ as used by Francois Bernier in his 1684 account, A New Division of the Earth. Theologically, race then is a term which originally referred to those outsiders of the central group, which consisted of Christians (Gordon, 2010). The implication is that the ‘centred group’ had a purity of blood on account of the creation story, while the outsiders, the razza, did not have this type of purity. In the Christian view, all other peoples in the world were presumed to have been lost by Hebrew tribes, which lacked the purity of blood. Gordon insists, ‘Because all that was natural emanated from the

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theological centre, these groups stood as a prototypical formulation of the anthropology that took a path through razza (Italian) to the modern term race’ (2010:1134). Islamic theological naturalism, on the other hand, bases the philosophy of ‘otherness’ on the nature of the soul. This is taken from the explanation that living beings differ in the perfection of their souls. Ibn Sῐnă (1974) contends, as Plato (394 BCE) did, that everyone is composed of ‘matter’ and ‘form’. He continues to say that through the form (soul); bodies put forth their actions, bodies differ one from another, and natural bodies get their being (humanity). Ibn Sῐnă himself wrote: The soul is a form; and forms are realised perfections (enteléchia) since through them the features (identities, characteristics) of things become perfect.  .  .  . Again, among natural bodies are those whose design is, among other things, that they produce of themselves manifold animal actions voluntarily, out of their own will; and those whose design is, among other things, not so to produce. (Sῐnă, 1974:29–30)

From the above text, we can see that, according to Ibn Sῐnă, the soul is not only the basis of perfection but also of the differentiation among natural beings. It is here where the soul, as a basis of voluntary actions, distinguishes differentiation among natural bodies in line with their unique designs. Differentiation in the perfection of the soul, as an entity created by God, is the basis on which some humans were perceived as deserving to be slaves since their souls were imperfect. Whether this is distinguished on the account of their inability to perform voluntary actions alone, or also acceptance of Islam by the individuals, or on other grounds, is not clear from this text. However, what is clear is that the practice in Islam that endorses slavery to infidels is rooted in this theological understanding of the gradation in the perfection of human souls. Ward and Lott confirm the practice of slavery among Muslims when they wrote: [. . .] in Islam itself, the notion of Oneness with God seems to lead to that of the equality of all believers. [. . .] Nonetheless, despite certain tendencies within Islam itself, the culture supported slavery and this practice led to ideas of exclusion of certain groups, such as Africans, Slavs and Turks. So, while Islamic law required that ‘conspecifics’ or things having the same genus and species be treated as having the same value and in the same way, slaves were not treated as equal to other human beings with souls. (Ward and Lott, 2002:xiv)

In this text, one can already see another explanation that Africans, among others like Slavs and Turks, were treated as slaves, because they did not share

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a feeling of Oneness with God. Regardless of satisfactory explanations, Africans and others were believed to be possible subjects of slavery. The secular philosophical theories, on the other hand, are anthropological in that they are based on ‘man’s essential make-up’ (Lotz,1972:17). For the secular or natural philosophy of race, the author will look at natural, biological and cultural theories. On the Natural Theory of Race In the natural theory of race, the contention is that ‘human races’ are mutually exclusive, creating an inalterable division within the human species. Besides, ‘human races’ are gradations on a continuum of genetic characteristics (Jensen, 1998). Natural theorists of race believe that the natural differences among humans are independent of human perceptions, so they are objective. ‘Race, for the natural kind theorists . . . , is an objective, biological fact within the human species’ (Tale & Audette, 2001:499). But Tale and Audette argue that ‘no empirical or logical evidence exists to support any claim of mutually exclusive and inalterable genetic differences among populations currently perceived as human races’ (2001:500). Natural race theorists argue that ‘ancestry can provide a valid argument for a natural kind of conception of ‘race’. They argue: (1) that a ‘person cannot change his or her ancestors’ origin – thus making ancestry an inalterable conception’ – and (2) ‘that any geographic location is mutually exclusive from other locations’ (Tale & Audette, 2001:502). Montagu (1964) augments that this means humans in certain regions of the world develop completely independent of other humans based upon the precepts of the Fixity of Species. However, ‘The measure of gene frequency in no way supports notions of genetic mutual exclusivity (because of the . . . genetic variation and random mutations within any population, . . . in addition to the logical precept that differences of degree are not differences of a kind)’ (Tale & Audette, 2001:503). Aristotle (1998, Orig. 350 BCE) brought in the aspect of rational limitations when he added the account of natural slaves as specifying a docile nature combined with deficient intelligence. Aristotle wrote, ‘It is very evident that some men are free by nature, whereas some are slaves and for these slaves, slavery is just as well as expedient’ (1998:1255a1–2). Martìnez interprets this as saying, ‘There are people whose souls are so disordered and so confused that they require someone else to guide them’ (2013:129). The real meaning is that these individuals are limited in their natural capacities. However, when Aristotle wrote, ‘All living beings, even slaves, are composed of form and matter’ (1998:1254a35), he implied that such characteristic is not hereditary, so it is not biological determinism.

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On the Biological Theory of Race The biological theory of race is based on the belief that ‘race is understood to be a fundamental and stable source of division among humankind that is rooted in our biological makeup’ (Williams and Eberhardt, 2008:1033). Socrates, who seems to uphold this theory, began by saying that ‘If something that isn’t a human offspring is born to a human, I don’t think it should be called a human’ (Cratylus, 393c). Ward and Lott interpret this as meaning; ‘When morally deficient sons are born to parents of high virtue, the two must belong to different kinds, or genes, given the difference in virtue’ (2002: xii). The attachment of moral differentiation to genetic composition places Socrates to be the first to insinuate biological racism. Kant, who was one of the most outspoken philosophers of race, maintained a biological concept of race. In the Observations of the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant wrote: ‘The race of the American Indians cannot be educated. It has no motivating force, for it lacks effect and passion. They are not in love; thus, they are also afraid. They hardly speak, do not care for each other, care about nothing and are lazy’ (1784:52). About Negroes, Kant wrote: ‘The race of the Negroes, one could say, is completely the opposite of the Americans; they are full of effect and passion, very lively, talkative and vain. They can be educated but only as servants (slaves), that is they allow themselves to be trained’ (1784:52). Comparing Europeans with other races, Kant believed in the superiority of the European race and the inferiority of blacks and Native Americans (Kant, 1784). He did so since he believed that the American Indians cannot be educated and Africans can only be educated as slaves. Bernasconi thinks that Kant promoted the philosophy of race by subscribing to a fixed biological notion and hierarchy of races. Though Kant supported a monogenetic origin of race, he maintained that existing racial differences were fixed and determinate (Bernasconi, 2002). In more recent times, Cipriani wrote: ‘Within Negroes races, mental inferiority of women is very close to mental deficiency; moreover, at least in Africa, some female behaviours are not human and resemble animal behaviour’ (1935:181). Kiple & Kenneth add that ‘One neat way . . . was a demonstration that Negroes were inherently inferior – so inferior that they were helplessly incapable of survival as free persons’ (1980:214). Refuting this allegation, Cavalli-Soforza et  al. (1994) wrote: ‘There is no scientific basis to the belief of genetically determined ‘superiority’ of one population over another. . . . The claims of a generic basis of a general superiority of one population over another are not supported by any of our findings’ (1994:19–20).

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On the Cultural Theory of Race The cultural theory of race has been described by Durrheim and Dixon (2000) as the insurmountability of cultural differences among humans. By defining culture as a way of life, cultural racists pathologise ‘racial’ groups in terms of their cultural tendencies (e.g. as lazy or dangerous), while at the same time encouraging mobile individuals to shed cultural impediments and assimilate into the dominant culture’ (Durrheim & Dixon, 2000:94). Durrheim and Dixon call this ‘new racism’ (2000:94). Fanon opines that ‘The racism that aspires to be rational, individual, genotypically and phenotypically determined, became transformed into cultural racism. The object of cultural racism is no longer the individual man (sic) but a certain form of existing’ (1967:32). Balibar thinks the preferred target of neo-racism ‘is not the ‘Arab’ or the ‘Black’ but the ‘Arab (as) junky’ or ‘delinquent’ or ‘rapist’ and so on’ (1991:49). This is what Eze (1997) noted as cultural racism when he reported that Kant ‘included expositions on culture, such as the ‘knowledge’ that it is customary to permit theft in Africa, or to desert children in China, or to bury people alive in Brazil, or for the Inuit to strangle them’. For Nietzsche, racial ‘otherness’ can be inborn or acquired. He believes that the Jews have an inborn trait of race, propelling them to the highest level of cultural achievement. Otherwise, we can acquire a characteristic of race because of racial improvement. Inferior races can acquire higher traits, and ‘superior’ races can as well be made (Nietzsche, 1885). Commenting on this, Conway (2002) adds that according to Nietzsche, the only two conditions necessary to do this are to ‘breed’ such a race, like breeding animals and secondly, to oversee that this process goes on well. Nietzsche himself wrote: In your self-interest, you creators, are the precaution and providence of the pregnant! What no one yet has laid eyes on, is the fruit: your whole love shelters and spares and nourishes it. . . . Your work, your will is your ‘neighbour’ – do not let yourself be spoon-fed by any false virtues. (Nietzsche, 1885:236)

The above quotation demonstrates that differences among races are either the result of nature or nurture. While the natural qualities of a race are gifts, acquired racial traits are culturally cultivated, and humans must believe in their power to achieve racial improvement without the aid of others. All forms of racism seem to begin with some distrust and underrating of unknown people. Theologically, anyone who did not originate from one of the biblically known tribes would not be accounted for in the existence of human history. Because such humans were unknown, they became suspects, ‘the other’, and were subjects of exclusion. Equally, for those who did not accept Islam, explanations were given to justify their exclusion from mainstream humanity on the basis that their rejection of Islam was an indication

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of the imperfection of their souls and their dearth of oneness with God. On the secular front, natural, biological or cultural reasons were given to justify such racial exclusions. The Underpinning Philosophy of Globalisation Philosophers are also divided on the concept of globalisation. Some think it is just a rhetorical vehicle for claiming the world is already cosmopolitan and it has the highest ethical aspirations for what globalisation can offer (Howes, 1996; Castells, 2005; Jones, 2005; Calhoun, 2009). Yet Global Expansionists view globalisation as an inescapable development and an ever-increasing momentum due to the intensification of global interactions and the waning importance of national boundaries. They believe that national economies, cultures and policies will integrate into a global network and that territorial and national authority and hence dominance will diminish in favour of a homogenous global economy and culture (Giddens, 1999; Held et al., 2000; Muzaffar, 2002). In trying to strike a balance between these two extreme positions, there is a view called ‘transformationalism’ (Held et al., 2000). This view does not condemn the whole of globalisation; on the contrary, it praises its positive aspects. The transformationalists note that although globalisation imposes a great deal of pressure on territorial economies and cultures, it is possible to transform this threat into an opportunity, thereby resisting being conquered by it. ‘However, social, and cultural movements and strong local identities have instigated a cultural rebirth, a re-elaboration of cultures or even movements (of cultural resistance) against a globalisation that destroys and strips cultures of their characters’, Kaul (2012:343) insists. Kaul describes globalisation as a worldwide cultural phenomenon in which different cultural identities are amalgamated to bring about a homogenous culture throughout the world. Such cultural amalgamation would ‘assist the local beliefs and cultural values to be universalised rather than to be demolished’ (Kaul, 2012:341). But the philosophical thinking behind this global phenomenon is the natural law of liberty, where the individuals and their associations are autonomous and free to travel, associate and compete with whomever they will. This is dialectically opposed to the collective aspirations of the different peoples of the world to determine their destinies freely and by their own interests. In this philosophy, politically, the rights of the individual are taken to be before that of the collective; culturally, the global culture is taken to be superior to that of individual nations; and economically, competition is better than cooperation. From the economic point of view, Adam Smith, in the name of the freemarket economy (1776), initiated what Truu calls the global market economy

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– neo-classical economic philosophy (1987:209); while Buchanan calls it the public choice theory. For Buchanan, this theory is methodologically individualistic: ‘The basic units are choosing, acting, behaving persons rather than organic units such as parties, provinces or nations’ (1984:13). Truu interprets public choice theory as: [. . .] the ‘discovery’ or ‘re-discovery’ that people should be treated as a rational utility -maximisers in all their behavioural capacities. [. . .] because people will tend to maximise their own utilities, institutions must be designed so that individual behaviour will further the interests of the group, small or large, local or national. [This requires] constructing, or reconstructing, a political order that will channel the self-serving behaviour of participants towards the common good in a manner that comes as close as possible to that described for us by Adam Smith concerning the economic order. (Truu, 1987:213)

From this viewpoint, a free-market economy is not considered to be a blockage to public choice and interests, but an avenue for maximising individual behavioural capacities. For this to work, the world and people within it should be allowed to communicate, travel and interact freely, entering in and out of business contracts when sharing goods and services. Adam Smith himself, in 1776, emphasised that good economic law and practice can only be based on natural liberty when he stated, The obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, if he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his way and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men. (Smith, 1776:379)

This implies that the natural law of liberty, as given in the above text, permits four things. First, this law is self-regulating because it establishes itself of its own accord. Secondly, every (wo)man should not violate the laws of justice, though how this is done is not clear. Thirdly, perfect freedom to pursue one’s interests is permitted. Lastly, everyone is allowed to compete freely with others. As given above, the implications of the natural law of liberty brand economic globalisation, which is the main tenet of globalisation, to be selfregulating, just, free and competitive. However, behind this apparent competitive freedom that is self-regulating, there is one underlying philosophising that human nature is characteristically selfish or egoistic. This has been highlighted by thinkers like Machiavelli (1513), Rand (1964), and Hospers (1967). Machiavelli, for instance, was of the opinion that humans are by nature egoistic, aggressive and acquisitive. ‘This egoism explains the stability of a healthy society in which the opposing interests are held in equilibrium’

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(1513:111). Ostensibly, behind the philosophy of competitive freedom that is self-regulating is the theory that human nature is selfish, egoistic and self-regulating. The world is beginning to react to this overwhelming competitive and egoistic economic force of globalisation. To minimise these overpowering and suffocating forces of globalisation, individual nations and peoples within them are beginning to brew parochial, nationalist and at worse, racist sentiments. We need then a new philosophy of globalisation, which is a philosophy of creativity. To the author’s mind, behind any creativity, there is human action, which always takes two directions: one is negative, and the other is positive. Negative creativity seeks opportunities to take for oneself alone the resources of this world; in that way, humans become aggressive, acquisitive, competitive and self-interested. This reality cannot be stamped out of human nature. But in being positively creative, humans seek dialogue, sharing, cooperation, rational social interests, social preservation and the preservation of the weak and the vulnerable. In this lies the solution to a better world order where competition is balanced with cooperation. One may ask how this creativity would work in practice. The author answers that it works by combining how humans try to achieve their wellbeing and goals in life. For one to achieve one’s goal, one does not need to be dormant, waiting for what others will make available. It starts with creative thinking and designing the best ways of arriving at the solutions to one’s problems. Though human problems may be common, the means of arriving at them may not be the same. Some may have to compete with contravening forces to arrive at what they want, while others prefer to combine their efforts with others to get what they want. The mistake of globalisation and the philosophy behind is to prioritise competitive adventures over cooperative strategies. Traditional Africa, with its emphasis on Ubuntu philosophy, prioritises cooperation; while economic globalisation prioritises competition. None of these two strategies is sufficient on their own. Each strategy needs the other, while the philosophical mindset behind their combination is creativity. Several countries and the people within them can no longer find solutions to their socio-economic and cultural problems in these unbearable competitions, on the one hand, and meaningfully make use of the opportunities for enhancing their well-being, on the other hand. So, they are beginning to introvert into their inner and narrower circles by developing features that make it difficult to integrate them into the wide world order of globalisation. The results are intense cultural revivals that are becoming intolerant to foreigners and foreign influences, as seen in the policies of closing borders, rising nationalism, regionalism and at worse, tribalism or racism. While several theoretically oriented authors like Fanon (1967, 2004), Du Bois (1995), Durrheim & Dixon (2000), and Somedley (2005) acknowledge

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the evil of racism in the world today, racial practices are not yet extinct despite growing globalisation. In essence, globalisation is supposed to bring about the unity of humanity, but in practice, amidst such world phenomena, racial tendencies are not decreasing and, in some instances, they are on the increase according to (Bell, 1992; Tatum, 2007; Kazol, 2012) and, to the mind of this author. But one may ask, Can we get rid of racism just by getting rid of racial tendencies? The author’s answer is no. Racial tendencies exist and will continue to exist in the world, but what this chapter condemns is racism, which is the deliberate and systematic subordination of one group of humanity to another. As mentioned earlier, this is often based on certain characteristics that differentiate one group of humans from another. Using such differences, certain groups of humans are subordinated and discriminated against using individual, cultural norms and values, and institutional structures and practices of these societies. Globalisation is part and parcel of these cultural norms and values spreading throughout the world by continuing to promote unfair and unjust institutional structures affecting human well-being in the South and especially in Africa. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GLOBALISATION AND RACE FOR AFRICA We have seen in the foregoing discussions that there is something wrong with racism and the very process of globalisation. It would be wrong to say that globalisation is the cause of growing racism, but the argument is that globalisation is supposed to narrow the gaps among different human communities and the people within them into a harmonious human community, yet this is not forthcoming. The root cause of racism is not globalisation, as we have discussed above, yet globalisation seems to be awakening racial sentiments. This is where the link between the two is prominently evident, and both racism and globalisation have implications for Africa. Globalisation and Cultural Identity The relationship between globalisation and cultural identity is problematic. This is because some scholars believe that globalisation creates a worldwide culture in which identity is amalgamated into a homogenous culture throughout the world. On the contrary, some of them believe that such a cultural incursion is a threat since this openness to foreign content can erode traditional values and indigenous cultural identity (Kaul, 2012). Other scholars extend beyond this dichotomy (Appadurai, 1996).

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Among the supporters of globalisation is Castells (1996), who argues that globalisation is the overcoming of cultural experience, which reduces the socio-religious identity to a global level. Globalisation is the internationalisation of modernity, which is the harbinger of identity. Howes (1996) adds that cultural identity is not likely to be an easy prey to globalisation. Identity is not merely some fragile communal-psychic attachment but a considerable dimension of institutionalised social life in modernity. What we call ‘identity’, Howes (1996) argues, may not be universal but just one modern way of socially organising and indeed regulating cultural experience since globalisation does not inevitably destroy identity. On the other hand, Kaul (2012) explains that globalisation has not only narrowed the gaps between previously exclusive societies and peoples, but equally, it has more significantly increased the anxiety in societies and people regarding the nature of their place and identity in the so-called global village. National identity in the context of globalisation is defined by the space it occupies. Globalisation does not only intermingle with different peoples and identities, but it also penetrates the indigenous space as the locus of national or people’s identities (Kaul, 2012). In the very process of intermingling different peoples and penetrating their spaces and national identities, however, friction is often created. This friction is caused by an imbalance between the indigenous and the foreign, the national and international, in terms of value appreciation and promotion. This creates a crisis to which the indigenous people react by trying to reassert and re-define their identities in the context of globalisation. Even when we take globalisation as a neoliberal phenomenon, which is universalist but subtle as reflected in Hardt and Negri’s (2000) ‘Empire’, it does not change its effects on other humans wherever it spreads. When globalisation is understood as the operation of a neoliberal or late capitalist motif that mobilises mostly postmodern mechanisms of soft economic seductions, de-materiality of space and interactions, interfaces, exchanges and mobilities of transcultural value-systems and digitalised media, it does not make it innocent, since these only show the means it uses to spread across the globe. We can still be fascinated that globalisation is a ‘glocal’ event happening, which creates new conditions and realities of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ in imaginary or actual ‘borderless’ relations, showing the power of its effects. Nevertheless, the kernel of the matter remains the same: globalisation is affecting the well-being of people in the world both positively and negatively. We can even argue that this development is seen as another phase of global domination by the West (including non-Western participants of the Global North) over the ‘other’ cultures or humanity of the Global South, but our point of view is that what it does wherever it spreads affects human well-being. Certainly,

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whatever one understands by globalisation, it has a significant impact on the well-being of many people in the world. One can even say that globalisation is a re-definition of a world order based on the choices that humans make between the indigenous and the foreign, the national and the international. However, the preference for the foreign and the international is not often an expression of freedom of choice but an adaptation to the unavoidable, overwhelming influence from the outside that robs the inside of the sense of security, self-value and meaning in life. This inner conflict encourages disharmony rather than conciliation; it creates identity crises and politicisation of cultural differences without compromise; it breeds totalitarian identity claims by invading dominant international cultures with vague political outcomes, which encroach on national values. The homogenisation aspect of hyper-globalisation might be very significant, and the author thinks that is the very reason that it has a grave impact on human well-being wherever globalisation spreads. This is because there is a distinction between the external and internal aspects of globalisation. From the external viewpoint, there is hyper-globalisation in terms of international movements, trades and communications; but from the internal point of view, there is what the people go through as they embrace globalisation. The external is the influence globalisation exerts on humans wherever it spreads; the internal is the political, social, cultural and economic tensions it creates between and among the people where it spreads. These are the pains, compromises, and sacrifices the receiving communities are making, unfortunately not for their greater glory but for that of the globalists. For instance, to survive in Africa today, both individuals and nation-states require the sale of almost all that they own, like mineral wealth (to the globalists who exploit them because they have the technology and the technical knowledge to extract them), land, water bodies, forests, other resources and at times their very lives, to survive in the so-called highly globalising world. These are no victory stories told at the African traditional fireplaces, but stories of exploitations, losses, pains, humiliations, and compromises in terms of material and immaterial values at personal levels and the levels of their societies. The author’s view is that globalisation is not being promoted on the right principles. Some of these principles are individual liberty, which is claimed to be superior to collective freedom; global culture, which is claimed to be loftier than national cultures; competition, which is taken to be better than cooperation. Because of these, globalisation is brewing negative impacts like nationalism and racism on the world. The well-being of Africans will continue to suffer because of this faulty-principle-based globalisation.

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Globalisation and Nationalism The relationship between globalisation and nationalism is centred on the claim of the primacy of belonging to humanity over that of belonging to a nation (Calhoun, 2009). This claim comes from a belief that paying attention to national belonging and state institutions is a waste of time because it distorts universalism and misleads us about the inequalities embedded in the world. This is because for decades both the neoliberal political right and the anti-authoritarian political left have made an onslaught on the state and its relevance (Calhoun, 2009). Both are marked by the glorification of the free market, a romantic anarchist notion of a self-organising civil society. The fact is that there are no self-organising civil societies in the world. All civil societies are human institutions, founded on well-set objectives and following predetermined principles. Human institutions have concrete human beings and their wishes and desires are behind these institutions. Calhoun draws our attention to Salman Rushdie’s (2000) view on the conflict between ‘the fantasy of Home’ and ‘the fantasy of Away’. Globalisation glorifies ‘the fantasy of Away’, yet this fantasy has reignited ‘the fantasy of Home’ in us – the beauty of the world of face-to-face, the belonging to a nation in contrast to the digital or virtual world belonging to humanity. Calhoun notices how ‘Human nature is indeed contradictory. We seek excitement and security, difference and familiarity, the pleasure of being away and at home’ (2009:210). Yet, ‘the fantasy of Away’ is not contradictory to ‘the fantasy of Home’. Calhoun specifically emphasises that ‘cosmopolitanism, focuses attention away from the political, economic and social questions that matter to an individual. It draws attention towards apparently free-floating ethics and culture’ (2009:233). In this way, cosmopolitanism is wrongly conceived as a transcendence of ‘belonging’ or social ‘solidarity’ (2009:234) from a national to an international locus, yet it should consolidate belonging and solidarity at the national level. Besides, much cosmopolitanism thinking participates in seeing culture as identified with the place and travel as being an escape from its constraints (Calhoun, 2009). Calhoun thinks, as much as Clifford (1992) does, that ‘Indeed, diasporas can and often dramatically produce cultural conservation among the relocated’ (2008:234). ‘Nationalism has often grown stronger where globalisation has intensified’ (Calhoun, 2009:234). Even though Calhoun has hit the nail right on the head by identifying the central problem of globalisation, he has not sufficiently answered our concern in this section, identifying the relationship between nationalism and globalisation. In saying globalisation prioritises the international over the national, the universal over the indigenous (Calhoun, 2009), one does not show how promoting national values would automatically promote global

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values. Globalisation is a process in which national boundaries are losing their normative importance, and by linking ‘localities’ to globalities around the globe, they too show how national boundaries are losing their normative importance. The relationship between nationalism and globalisation, in my view, subsists in the imbalance of economic power between the national and the international, or the global. There is a growing trend in the world whereby globalisation dynamics are beginning to swallow national or indigenous values, but this is happening not because global interests are being preferred against national interests but because real-life situations created by global forces are beginning to bend the will of indigenous communities based on unjust economic systems and practices. The unjust global economic system is backed by the theory that economic competition is always superior to economic cooperation. I want to argue here that the world is globalising fast based on unjust economic systems since it promotes and entrenches an unjust economic system and practice. For instance, according to the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report 2019, the richest 1 per cent people of the world own 44 per cent of the world’s wealth. Besides, by 2018, 26 billionaires of the world had as much wealth as 50 per cent of the world population and 10 per cent of the richest individuals owned more than 50 per cent of national wealth in most countries worldwide (Shorrocks, A., Llubera, R., Davies, J. 2019). Trainer complements that ‘By the late 1990s one-fifth of the world’s population was taking 86 per cent of world income, while the poorest one-fifth was receiving only 1.3 per cent. This ratio of over 60 to 1 has deteriorated from 20 to 1 thirty years ago’ (2002:57). The author believes that this unequal economic division is very objectionable and that the primary beneficiary of any economic activity should be the community within which it is established. Indeed, any economic activity that takes place among humans affects both the population and its environment. These impacts are both positive and negative. My question is why the human population in the Global South should take up 100 per cent of the environmental burdens created through economic activities but should not be allowed to have a fair share of the economic benefits that accrue. Any just economic activity, for that matter, should make sure the primary beneficiary of its economic activity is in the community within which it is established, in as much as they are the primary carriers of the burdens that accrue from such activities. Africa would benefit tremendously if this principle was followed, since most economic activities, of industrial scale, taking place in Africa are owned by multi-millionaire globalists. The implication for Africa is that where economic globalisation is spreading, Africans continue to be exploited, economic values continue to be unjustly distributed, and wealth continues to be expropriated from their environments, leaving African communities perpetually poor. This is precise

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because Africa, a developing part of the world, is a destination for economic globalisation. The developed countries are the sources where these globalising institutions find their origin. So, as globalisation spreads, dialectically the countries of origin will become richer, while Africa, one of the main destinations of globalisation, will become poorer. African well-being will continually decline as globalisation progresses. Naturally, we shall continue to see more reactions from indigenous or national communities where globalisation is spreading. Indeed, where globalisation grows, nationalism and to the extreme, racism will continue to become stronger.

CONCLUSION The research question was; Can globalisation break down all barriers to human togetherness including hurdles created by racism? The author has argued that the answer to this question is no. The main reason is that although globalisation at the external level hybridises different cultures and includes all humans in the world, at deeper or internal levels, it cannot melt the differences in attitudes and values that divide humans and make them exclusive. On the concept of race, the conclusion is that individual differences among humans do exist, whether in terms of culture, biology or natural capacities. The mistake is to translate individual differences into a categorical determinate that is interpreted as making some individuals or groups of individuals less human. The author discussed two theories of racism: those based on theological principles and on natural or secular ones. Theologists, Christians and Muslims alike have created arguments to exclude others and regard them as inferior (human) beings. This alleged inferiority is based on them not being part of their religious community and its concomitant convictions and due to the alleged imperfection of the non-believers’ human soul. Secular or natural racist theorists, such as Aristotle, reasoned that foreigners (barbarians) and slaves were less human and should, therefore, be excluded from the class of citizens. Subsequent generations applied this theory to groups of people and treated others as inherently less rational, therefore less human. As a group of people, as one race, for centuries Africans have been described as less human because they allegedly lacked rationality. On this basis, Africans have been discriminated against, subjugated and enslaved. The philosophy of race became even more exclusionary when the central difference among humans was conceived to be biologically and metaphysically embedded. In this view, groups of people in the world were rated as intrinsically superior or inferior. This belief has been followed by various attempts at providing theoretical justifications for the alleged superiority of some people over others. These justifications undergirded racial practices

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such as mass genocides, perpetrated by European powers on human communities like the Jews in Europe, the Herero in Namibia, the Aboriginals in Tasmania and the many peoples on the American continent, as well as the massive enslavements and abductions of Africans by Arabic and European powers over the centuries. Globalisation has contributed to the spread of racism, but on the other hand, it is a socio-economic philosophy based on human nature as essentially selfish. This means that it is only in allowing this selfishness to blossom that an equilibrium is created in human society that is self-regulating (Adam Smith, 1776). However, for this to happen, it is wrongly assumed that all barriers to free human competition should be dissolved, including national boundaries and borders. In doing this, many humans are getting discriminated against in the world because their well-being in terms of economic, political and social needs and security cannot be met. This system of dissolving boundaries has led to an increase instead of a decrease in racism, sectarianism and parochialism in the world. Africa, a potentially rich continent, has remained one of the poorest in the world because of this socio-economic system. To conclude, the solution to racism is not in destroying nationalism or resisting globalisation. On the contrary, it should be in consolidating unity and solidarity and meeting people’s well-being regarding socio-economic needs at indigenous and national levels to integrate national values into global ones. The dialectic between globalisation and racism is created because globalisation fails to meet human beings’ needs at the territorial level yet annihilates them at the global level. The contrary should become more prominent: the primacy of citizenship at the national level as a basis for citizenship at the global level. The primacy of the economic benefits to the areas where wealth is generated, other than expatriating wealth to countries of origin of the economic institutions, leaving territorial or indigenous communities poor and desperate, as is the case, especially in Africa. In doing the latter, African well-being will not be sufficiently met. There is an interesting Acholi proverb from Northern Uganda which could serve as a basis for this conclusion. This adage says that: Latin pe tuku ki cak ma ii lawote. It means, ‘A kid does not play with the milk that has been taken and is in the stomach of another kid’. Meaning, secure and satisfied kids are more welcoming to play with other kids than those who are hungry, insecure and dissatisfied. Similarly, if humans are to become global by welcoming and opening their doors and borders to foreigners, then globalisation itself should cater for their well-being by making them feel secure and satisfied in their own home countries. Globalisation is built upon an individualistic wrong idea of mankind (anthropology) and thus leads to increasing poverty and exclusion of the weak and the vulnerable in developing countries, especially Africa. Emphasising the cultural externals in terms of trade, communication, dress,

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food, music and dance (to mention some of them) dialectically antagonises cultural internal resistance in terms of attitudes and values. This creates a cultural reaction of self-isolation in poorer parts of the world. Proper globalisation should not only understand the different human attitudes and value systems; it should also make deliberate efforts to practice justice, fairness and equitable distribution of physical, legal, linguistic, cultural and psychological benefits of globalisation. Globalisation is meeting resistance, not because it is a bad idea but because it has a bad effect on the well-being of many in the world, especially those living in developing countries, such as most Africans. The economic effect of globalisation on the communities where it is spreading is at times disheartening. Globalisation should promote economic justice for the citizens of poor and underprivileged countries so that the world will globalise more equitably.

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Kant, I. ‘Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View.’ Translated by L. Beck. In Immanuel Kant: Philosophical Writings, edited by E. [Transl. Lewis Beck] Behler, 249–62. New York: Continuum, 1986 [orig.1784]. Kaul, V. ‘Globalisation and Crisis of Cultural Identity.’ Journal of Research in International Business and Management 2, no. 13 (2012): 341–49. Kazol, J. Savage Inequalities: Children in America’s Schools. New York: Broadway, 2012. Kiple, V., and Kenneth, K. ‘The African connection: Slavery, Disease and Racism.’ Phyton: The Atlanta University Review of Race and Culture. 41, no. 3 (1980): 211–222. Kitcher, P. ‘Does ‘Race’ Have a Future?’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 35, no. 4 (2007): 293–317. ———. ‘Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture.’ In Racism, edited by L. Harris, 87–120. Amherst: Humanity Books, 1999. Lotz, B. J. ‘Anthropology.’ In Philosophical Dictionary, edited by W. Brugger, 16–17. Washington: Gonzaga University Press, 1972. Machiavelli, N. The Prince. Translated by W. K. Marriott. 1513. Martìnez, J. ‘Slavery and Citizenship in Aristotle’s Politics.’Filozofia 68, no. 2 (2013): 124–31. Mills, C.W. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. ———. Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. Montagu, A. ‘The Concept of the Human Species in Light of Genetics.’ In The Concept of Race, edited by A. Montagu, 1–12. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964 [Orig 1941]. Muzaffar, C. Globalisation and Religion: Some Reflections. 2002. http://www​ .islamonline​.net. Nietzsche, F. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. Edited by A. Del Caro and R.B. Pippin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006 [Orig. 1885]. Pickering, S., and Weber, L. (Eds.). Borders, Mobility and Technologies of Control. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006. Pieterse, J. N. ‘Globalisation and Culture: Three Paradigms.’ In Readings in Globalisation: Key Concepts and Major Debates, edited by G. Ritzer & Z. Atalay, 309–318. West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Plato ‘Benjamin. Cratylus.’ Translated by B Jowett. The Dialogues of Plato. Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1893 [orig. 394 BCE]. Rand, A. The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism. New York: Penguin Books, 1964. Rushdie, S. The Ground Beneath Her Feet: A Novel. London: Macmillan Publishers, 2000. Scholte, J. A. ‘Defining Globalisation.’ Clm.economia 10, no. 10 (2007): 15–63. Shelby, T. ‘Race.’ In The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy, edited by D. Estlund, 336–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Shorrocks, A., Llubera, R., and Davies, J. Global Wealth Report 2019, Credit Suisse Research Institute, Zurich, Switzerland, 2019.

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Smith, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of the Nations. 2nd ed. Vol. II, London: Strahan, W, Cadell, T, 1776. Somedley, A., and Brian D.S. ‘Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a Social Problem Is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives on the Social Construction of Race.’ American Psychologist 60, 1 (2005): 16–26. Sundstrom, R. ‘Racial Nominalism’ Journal of Social Philosophy 33, no. 2 (2002): 193–210. Sῐnă, Ibn. ‘Poem of the Soul.’ In Avicenna on Psychology: A Study of His Poem on the Soul, edited by F. Kholeif, 129–31. Beimt: Arab University, 1974. Tajfel, H., Milling, M. G., Bundy, R. P., and Flament, C. ‘Social Categorisation and Intergroup Behaviour’ Journal of Social Psychology 1, no. 2 (1971): 149–78. Tale, C., and Audette, D. ‘Theory and Research on ‘Race’ as a Natural Kind Variation in Psychology.’ Theory and Psychology 11, no. 4 (2001): 495–520. Tatum, B. D. Can We Talk about Race? And other Conversations in an Era of School Resegregation. Boston: Beacon Press, 2007. Taylor, P. Race: A Philosophical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. Trainer, T. ‘Development, Charity and Poverty: The Appropriate Development Perspective’ International Journal of Social Economics 29, no. 1–2 (2002): 54–72. Truu, M.L. ‘Confused Thinking, Intellectual Fashion and Received Knowledge in Economics Today.’ South African Journal of Economics 55, no. 4 (1987): 209–16. Ward, K. J., and Lott, L.T. ‘Introduction.’ In Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, edited by K.J. Ward, Lott, L.T, xi-xxiii. Oxford, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2002. Wijeyesinghe, C. L., Griffin, P., and Love, B. ‘Racism Curriculum Design.’ In Teaching for Diversity and Social Justice: A Sourcebook, edited by M. Adams, L.A. Bell, & P. Griffin, 82–109. New York: Routledge, 1997. Williams, J. M., and Eberhardt, L.J. ‘Biological Conceptions of Race and Motivation to Cross-Racial Boundaries.’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 94, no. 6 (2008): 1033–47.

Chapter 12

Gilles Paquet’s Hermeneutics of Belongingness On the Collaborative Ethics of Global Development Stanley Uche Anozie

The path of the general progress of any society and community is marked by failures and successes, the misunderstanding of reality (failures) and the understanding of reality (successes). We are aware of the evolution of an integrated socio-political economy that demands a continued tinkering or dialectical approach to human well-being and global development. The stage of this process of awareness of the continued tinkering process was advanced by the Canadian economist Prof. Gilles Paquet. He was a professor at the Telfer School of Management and the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. He was also associated with the consulting firm Invenire and animateur of La Maison Gouvernance. According to Paquet, we live in a world of profound actual and potential resources and of the massive distribution of information, and resources “where nobody is in charge” (Paquet:1). Does this mean that in the project of global governance for a genuine human development, no singular person, nor people or culture claims the totality of knowledge and competence in articulating what works for all peoples and cultures of the world and is suitable for their socio-political conditions? Part of the understanding that ‘nobody is in charge’ requires changing the approach to governance and policy-making that is based on a single authority or Big-G model of governance (as significantly seen during the seventeenth-century modernisation of Europe and the West). This model of looking at the world as a capitalist economy, in which a monopoly of Eurocentric categories and ideologies are encouraged 253

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and disseminated, is the albatross of the current global politico-economic situation. This is reflected in the continual crisis of global human inequality. Obviously, in every organisation or system of human development, there should be an order of authorities and responsibilities to guarantee progress. For a genuine progress, following the needs of our time, the acceptance of the individual persons and cultural categories or horizons of others is important for advancing progressive policies of equity in global development. This global development must be powered by integrated or global collaboration, or a collaborative ethics of development. For an effective ethics discourse on achieving human equity in global development, this chapter provides a critical synthesis of Paquet’s Collaborative Governance (what I call the Collaborative Ethics of Global Development or the Hermeneutics of Belongingness) and Social Learning as articulated in Paquet’s Scheming Virtuously: The Road to Collaborative Governance (2009). The main question that will be discussed in this chapter is: How does Paquet’s collaborative governance guarantee our global development and the order of responsibility to the core values of our common humanity? Related questions are: Is any one person or extraordinary leader really in charge despite Paquet’s rejection of such suggestions? If a collaborative ethics of global governance is a programme-in-progress (maybe an idea being advanced or formulated by a research institute on global policy for human integral development), does it mean that it is not a method at all but only a programme-in-progress? Whatever truly leads us to a collaborative ethics of global development must be adopted and propagated, bearing in mind that the core value to address is a collaborative governance for global human development or the notion of human belongingness, or ‘the hermeneutics of belongingness’,1 which ought to be our desideratum (or measure) of global development. There can be no collaborative ethics of global development where the concept of human integral belongingness is deficient, valueless or one-dimensional (in the form of cultural subjectivism or mono-cultural belongingness of the West or Eurocentric concepts and categories) (Serequeberhan: 22–23), or any commodity approach as well as utilitarian perspectives. This is a circular relationship in the general process of understanding. True understanding is achieved when all details harmonise with the whole, and the whole harmonises with the different parts of the text. This process of moving from the whole to parts, going backwards and forwards, only comes to an end when the partners in a hermeneutical dialogue arrive at an understanding. I have identified it as a Collaborative Governance or Hermeneutics of Belongingness (we could relate this to the course of understanding the various perspectives on global development and collaborative ethics).

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WELL-BEING AS PART OF AN EFFECTIVE HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS Development comes because of the pursuit of meaning, data or information gathering and understanding. No true society emerges without the raw data or information about its progress. This information should be readily available for analyses and self-evaluations. Development comes through the dialectic of the present, the past and the emerging present. The consciousness of the historical-hermeneutical situation is effective-historical. It means that we acknowledge historical situations, but the consciousness or awareness of these situations becomes clear through effective historical consciousness. The consciousnessor the awareness, that history is always at work is described as Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein (the consciousness of effective history). This is the same as the effect of history that cannot be completely achieved. Understanding is described as the ‘effect’ of history. Historical consciousness is itself a mode of being that is conscious of its own historical ‘being affected’. It is in the same manner that one understands the present based on the experience of the past. This illustrates the interconnectedness between history and historical events, or the internal dialectics of both. The events of the past provide the necessary background for determining how our present will be. The effects of the Coronavirus pandemic will determine several issues in the years to come. Are we able to put every factor into consideration to understand the urgency of the present? The deliberations of the present will be inadequate without a good consideration of the historical background that gave rise to what communities and scholars grapple with en route to actualising human well-being through global development. The consciousness of the effect of history is that of our finitude as historical beings. The effect of history on our consciousness comes through that which is linguistic. This is because language constitutes the human experience of our world. Effective historical consciousness is made possible through conversation or dialogue. The consciousness of effective history is more about being rather than about consciousness. Now let us take a closer look at the Collaborative Ethics of Governance or Development in a world that desires the fair distribution of resources and that demands understanding the Other (as a way of guaranteeing common well-being as the essence of global development) through relating, listening, and dialoguing and collaborating (Anozie 2017b: 82–88). We will use the philosophical principles of the fusion of horizons and effective historical consciousness to get a better understanding of Others (and their ontological demand for well-being, which should be guaranteed through collaborative ethics of global development orchestrated, or rather continually prompted, by social learning as a form of stewardship to society).

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THE COLLABORATIVE ETHICS OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL LEARNING: AN IMPERATIVE IN STEWARDSHIP The Big-G model of governance (as a parochial or one-dimensional approach to well-being) is defended by several people in leadership positions, especially among the ‘privileged elites’ of both the developed world and the underdeveloped world. The Big-G regime has leadership as an up-down phenomenon. The so-called best of (wo)men commands a kind of mystique in a hierarchical notion of administration or world order of global governance. For Paquet, the attraction of “such notion lies fundamentally with its reassuring power: someone clairvoyant and wise is (or should be) in charge and will take the organisation to the Promised Land” (Paquet:99). This leadership ideology discourages the new complexity of ethics that works in a 360-degree relationships and relational accountability. It often rewards mediocrity and failures (which will include the inability to consider the collaborative capacity of the other and/or contribute to the meaningfulness of the world). For Big-G leadership and a lack of relational accountability to go on, a neurotic state of lack of trust and suspicion needs to be sustained by several powerful supporters and accepted by most of the stakeholders (who likely lack appropriate citizen mind or mindfulness), and in this case, the stakeholders are obsessed with parochial development rather than with global development. It takes a genuine stakeholder (every moral agent with a sound citizen mind) to support a hermeneutics of political belongingness (an institutionalisation of love), which is the basis of sustainable collaborative ethics as well as the ethics of relational accountability for global development (Anozie 2016:82–84; 94–95). The Big-G model of governance as a leadership approach is becoming unproductive, but there is a better option in a highly networked world. In such a world of information and distributed resources, a collaborative ethics of governance and social learning is imperative. It is difficult to govern effectively and efficiently without recognising these resources and their qualities. Recognising that information (understanding) and resources are distributed is an important aspect of the collaborative ethics of governance for global development, in which no one person (or Eurocentric ideologue, who is solely focused on Eurocentric concepts and categories) is in charge, but each person or culture has his, her or its informed perspective to contribute. This situation of collaboration helps to demystify the notion that individual persons are sole leaders who possess all leadership qualities and a ‘universalising’ horizon, perfect and better than all others. With the current level of socio-economic and political needs for global change, a redefinition of accountability and loyalty (not to a person but to the ultimate need of humanity: well-being and

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global development that comes through the hermeneutics of belongingness) is necessary. In Paquet’s opinion, this means that stewardship should replace leadership, especially if the latter is about a one-person control of all things or where a person assumes the extraordinary responsibility of running a monolithic system. Paquet describes leadership as some sort ‘of enlightened guidance capability embodied in the person of the leader’ (Paquet: 99). Stewardship identifies and recognises the diversity of talents, the diversity and inclusivity of perspectives, and the diversity of experiences and excellence. The time of the leadership of charisma, uncommon communication abilities, and the ‘super-talented’ tale should be over. But one can critically argue if it is not possible to have both leadership and stewardship mutually accommodate each other without eliminating leadership. For me, any shift from leadership to stewardship (as mere concepts of the same meaning) may not significantly impact the actualisation of global development and collaborative ethics of development. Considering the collaborative ethics of global development, Paquet is unpresumptuous in explaining his view of stewardship in collaborative governance and global development policy initiatives. He describes it as part of the building blocks for a credible society, leading to certain global developments. Some individuals have great talents in public administration. Paquet emphasises decentralising (mutuality in the fusion of horizons) the perspective of leaders so that the resources of good governance can be seen in all persons (capable of human action) who work in the area. It enables the system to work better, especially with the new digital networks, their communicative opportunities and all the other technological resources we now have. Paquet notes that it is “a world of networks where nobody is in charge and power, resources and information are widely distributed”2 (Paquet:99). Some authors, like Ruth Hubbard in Gomery’s Blinders and Canadian Federalism and Amartya Sen in The Idea of Justice, would agree with Paquet that the basic hypothesis that influences the idea of stewardship is that there is already a wave of change of governance from the Big-G government to small-g governance ‘in all organisations’ (Paquet: 99). It must depend on the nature of the system in place. Paquet calls this the world of Big-G governance that must be replaced – ‘the world of servitude volontaire’ (Paquet:100). It seems that his rejection of the bad effects of Big-G governance is the reason for removing leadership as one of the pillars of Big-G governance. That means the rejection of leadership is to allow for logical consistency because leadership appears to support Big-G governance and does not recognise the knowledge and contributions of many other resourceful people (capable of human action and guided by collaborative ethics of global development).

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STEWARDSHIP AND THE EMERGENCE OF GOVERNANCE REGIME In Paquet’s view, the ‘determining influences on an organisation may emerge from diverse sources, such as random events, culture, systemic gridlock, a multiplicity of sources of innovation, and other sources,that cannot be related to any presumed leader’ (Paquet:99). He describes stewardship as ‘an echo effect of the governance regime’ (Paquet:101). There are three components identified by Paquet: a) the emergence of the governance regime in terms of the attractor, b) the process through which there is or is no support for the emergence of the collaborative ethics of global development and governance. This also includes its legitimacy or not, c) the capacity to generate the required amount of ‘coordination, resilience, innovation, overcoming and accomplishment’ (Paquet:101). He observes that it is an experimentation process, that may work or not. There is no guarantee of success.3 In the Prisoner of War (POW) camps in the 1940s e.g. in Lybia, as studied by the British economist R.A. Radford who stayed in such a camp, the prisoners generated a form of trading among themselves with their standard ration of cigarettes. These cigarettes became the currency for food transactions (Radford 1945). As we say, necessity is the mother of invention. For Paquet, ‘coordination emerges without the need for any personalisation’ (Paquet:101). In this case, it is a stewardship process that emerges through experimentation and coordination. One could ask if the emergence of governance is always successful or if some other structures and systems must be in place for it to survive or succeed. Addressing this concern, Paquet clarifies that in more complex cases, ‘the governance regime emerges in more circuitous ways’ (Paquet:101). The emergence of a collaborative ethics of global development and governance in terms of stewardship depends on the size of society or organisation (primarily aimed at human well-being, not solely profit). A small organisation should crystallise quickly compared to complex organisations. Everybody, including directors, stakeholders, and scholars, undertakes the stewarding function. However, in both small and complex organisations, the logic is the same. What is prevalent at this stage is proper discernment, meaning-making and a clear view of the organisation, its vision and mission (towards human well-being), the nature of transformations, innovations and other reforming or reframing ‘likely to bring the organisation beyond its limits, to renew itself’ (Paquet:102). The effort so far has been to have a focal regime that can address the usual dialectical tension creatively. The focal regime supports the structure and the mechanism for interactions and serves as the visible aspect of the governance regime. Everything must function together: collective intelligence constructed through communication and deliberation (on equity and our political belongingness), and the dual logic of synchronicity (later discussed

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under stewardship and social learning) and cascades. The reliability of the governance regime is not an abstraction. It must be revealed in a practical context. Its ability to be situated and create some positive effects is the basis for its evaluation in terms of a good governance regime. Paquet observes, ‘[I] t is the wave that determines if the governance regime as the surfer has the required capacities’ (Paquet:102–103). To achieve the desired goal of global development, the following principles must be in place: inclusion, subsidiarity, multi-stability and experimentalism. These are relevant reference points. For Paquet, the longitude axis involves inclusion and subsidiarity. The goal is to involve as many stakeholders (moral agents or citizen-minded people) as possible in the decision-making process (inclusion) and to make it possible for those closest to the situation to be able to address the situation (subsidiarity). The purpose is to encourage collective intelligence and collaborative ethics of governance in which nobody is individually in charge, while global development is the targeted goal. The opportunity to involve as many people as possible is part of the social learning process. Paquet adds, ‘[S]uch a participative and distributed governance regime should ensure continuous social learning . . . and the existence of shared responsibility’ (Paquet:103). In other words, there is proper alignment for the organisation in terms of control and accountability, giving way to support and influence. The Latitude axis includes multi-stability and experimentalism. The partition is into sub-systems: a) to immunise the system, especially considering the effect of broad shocks that may cause some destabilising situation; and b) to be able to allow others who are the best able to handle the shock and its effects. That is equally about the subsidiarity principle. Multi-stability supports attentive experimentation and innovation. Paquet notes, ‘[A] good governance regime will be fundamentally experimental, capable of engaging the organisation in new avenues, but safely and prudently’ (Paquet:103). In addition, prevalent among those who find the collaborative ethics of governance and stewardship no option, there could also be a case of governance failure and “ineffective stewardship” (Paquet:104) caused by cognitive dissonance and rejection of the dynamics of self-organisation (arising from self-consciousness).

STEWARDSHIP AS A PROCESS AND AS A FORM OF SOCIAL LEARNING According to Paquet, there is a call ‘for a dynamic sense of stewardship as a process, as the result of ongoing social learning based on individual and collective capacities . . . and innovation’ (Paquet:106).4 Social learning facilitates stewardship as a process. In social learning, there is collective

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intelligence and innovation (developed by the interaction of the We-community; the community of communities) (Anozie 2017b:87). These provide new knowledge and ensure the communication of knowledge. In this way, ideas and competence are encouraged among partners or interlocutors. Social learning is explained in terms of the vertical axis, which is about information codification, clarification and simplification. In social learning, the organisation develops its capacity to learn through its experience, reframes the basic issues affecting the organisation, and faces the generative dynamics of learning. For reflexive governance, the following are important, ‘knowledge integration and learning by doing; capacity for long-run anticipation of systemic effects; adaptivity of strategies and institutions; iterative experimental and participatory definition of broad directions; and interactive strategy development’ (Paquet:109). Paquet observes that there is a need for competence in collaborative governance (actualised through collaborative ethics of development), stewardship and social learning. Stewardship and social learning naturally reject anarchy and subjectivism or dominant control of one person. Collaborative governance requires that people have to be nudged and harnessed to work together based on their competencies. These competencies may be divided into five categories: (i) contextual (this includes embracing uncertainty and error, building bridges, reframing, improvising, adapting and overcoming), (ii) interpersonal (consultation, negotiation, deliberation, conflict resolution, facilitation, brokering, educating, animating and changing roles), (iii) enactment (enabling, empowering, responsiveness and creativity), (iv) systems values (ethics of interconnectedness and interdependence, removing obstacles, freeing others to act better), (v) staying the course while rocking the boat (imagination, experimentation, the responsibility to explore, emphasis on sins of omission, learning by prototyping). The dynamics of the situation determine emerging properties. It is not based solely on the group leaders. It is a collective responsibility, collective intelligence and having a social mind. The whole process is a learning process, or ‘perpetual learning’. It is at the heart of innovation and innovative design for genuine human development. Paquet explains that it is about ‘recognising . . . nudging the organisation in preferred directions, and . . . to tinker with complex non-linear systems’ (Paquet:112). This self-organisation provides insight into governance practice. The recurring questions that need to be conclusively answered are: How do we move from Big-G leadership to stewardship? As we noted above, the Big-G model of governance is a parochial or one-dimensional approach to well-being defended by several people in leadership positions, especially the ‘privileged elites’ of our world. The Big-G regime departs from leadership as an up-down phenomenon. The so-called best of (wo)men commands a kind of mystique in

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a hierarchical notion of administration or world order of global governance. How do we accomplish improved collaborative governance through social learning5 and a symbiosis attitude relevant to self-organisation arising out of self-understanding? Paquet optimistically argues that no matter how daunting the situation might be and how uncertain the chances of success are, we must be bold in facing the issues with which we are dealing, with some fascination and interest in deconstructing our complex6 social phenomena. The objective is to understand the governance regimes with the collaborative ethical approach, the dynamics of social change and self-organisation. Some other people may still suggest a new paradigm or a new toolbox to understand the foundation of stewardship. One new paradigm will be a culture of communication, and will include a moral contract for African development. COLLABORATIVE ETHICS OF GOVERNANCE AND THE MORAL CONTRACT Developing a culture of Collaborative Ethics of Governance and social learning is a gradual process. It is a change from the past (the Big-G governance approach), and it will face levels of opposition or blockages. For a Collaborative Ethics of Governance to be genuinely accepted, it should happen through “conversations and communications in which active agents are experimenting (each in their own way) in the full consciousness . . . that their intended outcomes may differ from the realised outcomes” (Paquet:100). This communication or conversation must be honest and clear in terms of indicating the levels of expectations and concerns about things that we have no certainty about happening. In other words, the notion of an invisible hand is needed to nudge a Collaborative Ethics of Governance and its ramifications into existence. The duty or the burden of governance is something that every stakeholder has a responsibility towards. It is a risky approach because of the uncertainties in advancing the ideas, but there is no other option than experimentation, critical thinking and social learning. Every good process is a learning process. Every step towards a Collaborative Ethics of Governance is a good step. It is a necessary but gradual process guided by an internal, auto-moral binding contract. AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE MORAL CONTRACT (APPLICATION SECTION) In this section, I will apply the above to the issue of African development. To do that, we should discuss different moral contracts as Paquet distinguishes

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them. There are four moral contracts that I will briefly explain below. After discussing how they affect the hermeneutics of collaboration and the fusion of horizons, I will come to how moral imagination works out for the African situation using themes like The Network of Resources and Information, Social Learning and Experimentation, Social Learning and Effective Historical Consciousness, The Fusion of Horizons,Moral Contract,African Development and Moral Imagination. The purpose is to generate entrepreneurial, proactive and balanced loyalty and accountability in public service. Paquet first argues for Moral Contract I, which focuses on a redefinition of mutual responsibilities and obligations among citizens and bureaucrats. Moral Contract II is a professional contract that demands a rethinking of the mutual obligation, trust requirement and group support between politicians, senior bureaucrats and junior public servants. In Paquet’s view, this moral contract advances further to Moral Contract III. At this point, it involves citizens, bureaucrats and politicians at all levels. It focuses on the needs of the citizenry rather than on entitlements. The moral framework must be democratically built on dialogue and deliberation. The ethical conversation must go on until we get to Moral Contract IV, which at this point focuses on tact, civility and trust. Under such a situation the neurotic state of lack of trust can be rehabilitated or restructured. Paquet notes that people should express their views in a “way respectful of those of others” (Paquet:188). It is through this way that we affirm the importance of moral background for self-organisation, self-understanding and social learning. This level cannot be taken for granted or trivialised. The Network of Resources and Information Networking, or the fusion of horizons, implies the adaptation of new ideas and better perspectives to improve a person’s or a community’s well-being. Paquet’s concern for a world of change in governance is based on the availability of resources and information. It is a world in which we are highly hooked up and networked (not in the sense of fake news and distortions) (Anozie 2017a:1). We have accessible information, which is helpful for the daily decisions of life. Thus, no one person provides all the answers to the interpretation of reality. This is what Paquet refers to as the process of social learning and experimentation. This process includes the elimination of errors and partitioning of our tasks and systems (multi-stability) for better handling of our socio-ethical problems and puzzles. The breaking of the situation into small and limited systems helps to analyse the social problems within limited horizons for accessibility, analysis and experimentation. These limited horizons must fuse through a form of sublimation, cancellation, experimentation and preservation.

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Cancellation, consensus and preservation bring us to another level of understanding of reality. Through them (as the process), some inadequate views are integrated into a richer and more comprehensive view. It means that our thinking will not be limited to the premises of our tradition. With the inadequacy of the Big-G notion of governance, the single-authority-based leadership should accommodate some reformulations and nudges to give way to a collaborative fusion of horizons leading to the small-g model of governance. It allows for a change in how we view life. This process (of developing an African Philosophy of development and cosmopolitanism) also involves going back and forth in the re-interpretations of the available information and resources as part of a learning process. Paquet refers to it as the nudging of the whole and its parts into relevance by combining what needs to be combined and separating what needs to be kept apart. Understanding occurs only when the details agree with the whole. As Paquet observes, nothing is irrelevant in the circle of learning or its continuum. Every aspect of the structure of our lives is important. It is an ongoing process of social learning and experimentation. Social Learning and Experimentation In social learning and experimentation, the dialectical and dialogical aspects of interpretation are involved in the pursuit of truth. Like Paquet, there is no end to the dialectics of experimentation and dialogic nudging. One does not foreclose the advantage of understanding other people’s views and approaches. Experimentation is a path to arriving at the suitable truth for society. Through experimentation, as in interpretation, we understand differently when we understand policy texts or socio-economic or socio-political policies communicated to us. Experimentation also allows us to confront other views and assess information resources to find better ones, amend some for better results, or nudge them for better solutions, as Paquet would argue. The results of experimentation and nudging include that each person has a perspective and some assumptions. Also, by experimentation, we are involved with resources and information, for instance, the texts for analysis and the information presented by the interpreter herself. There is the horizon of the interpreter (experimenter) and the horizon of the present and past texts (the present and past resources and information). Experimenting with the horizons of past results or experiences in the making of policies would guide one in the reformulation of policies that are inadequate for public service. It requires that we analyse and dissect, compare, we mediate between the past and the present and between the alien and the familiar to develop a profound understanding of policies and the existential philosophy of stewardship and social learning.

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Profound understanding comes through perpetual learning because there is an infinity of what is not clearly said that needs to be investigated further through experimentation. Understanding could at times involve disagreement. Through experimentation and social learning, we dissociate ourselves from some aspects of our tradition without breaking from the totality of our tradition. There could be modifications of older opinions or policies considering new understanding and new evidence. This is part of the historical contingency of all human thought concerning the world. Experimentation and social learning also play another important role concerning temporal distance. They help us to be acquainted with the past without necessarily overcoming the historical distance between the now and then. The reality of a distant past is seen from a current perspective. The ‘distance’ between generations and the resources is a necessary part of our considerations. Temporal distance deals with the awareness of the various influencing moments of our history. The distance between times does not mean (or require) overcoming time. However, we could overcome the negative consequences of our decision in time (in Paquet’s view, the Westminster model of governance should be a system of the past and its negative effects have raised the need for a change). We cannot overcome the thoughts of the past, but we must constructively advance to a better understanding of our world and reality. Following Paquet’s analysis: ‘How does one interpret the realities of our time?’ The circumstances of the past cannot be compared directly with the present unless we are doing that to learn something from it and not necessarily to consider which is better. As noted above, there is no distance to overcome, but there could be new developments to be considered in building a better world and the formulation of better policies or their application. The available texts for interpretation (Anozie 2020:8) provide information about the progress of our society and the new analyses available by experts in the field, bearing in mind that everyone has something to offer. No one culture or person possesses the sole key to understanding other cultures and all the truths of our historical times. However, we are affected by the various influences in history. This could be referred to as the effects of history or part of the awareness of the effects of history on our ‘realpolitik’. Social Learning and Effective Historical Consciousness We are conscious of our mode of being in history and are always ‘affected’ by the effects of history. These effects involve what happens to us and our awareness of it. The past affects or influences our description and understanding of the present.. Therefore, the model of governance of the past affects the collaborative governance of today and the reflections on an emerging

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Collaborative Ethics of Governance. This is also part of social learning, since we learn to become aware of these effects and make better use of them. The consciousness of effective history is more about being than about consciousness. Being is never fully made manifestand it is never fully understood. Paquet is also concerned about being – because we are knowing beings, and we get better at knowledge. Everyone is capable of many duties and has access to almost infinite information. We are also affected by this information (fake or genuine). The historical consciousness of the effects of history is always connected to social learning, the contextualisation of solutions, and a critical analysis of the situation, or the use of the ‘myth [of] shared value’ (Heath 2003) in a multicultural society (with shared-values philosophy) (Anozie 2017b:91). The Fusion of Horizons and the Moral Contract As a moral being, each rational individual has finite contributions to making society. It is imperative to recognise the dignity of this person and his or her range of vision. We share perspectives or horizons, and so we share values because there is no one perfect value from one culture or tradition. Formulating a functional system for human well-being is a part of global development, and a trial-and-error approach is a more pragmatic solution. There is no one perfect answer or solution. As Paquet says, it is ongoing and involves perpetual social learning. If this process is adjustable to the possibility of finding answers and solutions, it permits a moral contract in the form of openness and dialogue to the horizons of others and respect for the responsibility of those who sign it to contribute to society through a Collaborative Ethics of Global Development. This collaborative ethics is an ethics of openness, diversity, dialogue and dialectics. We acquire useful information through the cross-pollination of ideas and perspectives. There is no per se better perspective, but there is an expansion of perspectives (the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer calls it a ‘higher universality’). We move from one perspective or horizon to another bearing in mind its positive aspects, as we develop to a new level of understanding. The moral contract binds us to ensure the acquisition of a better understanding and interpretation of reality (Anozie:18). It is part of the building blocks for mutual respect and recognition. As an ethical obligation, it demands that we accept the views of others if they provide justifiable arguments in support of their views. There is, however, the play of going back and forth to find out what is better, preferable and justifiable. This play is critical, constructive and creative. Paquet’s moral contract is associated with openness and dialogue. There is practical wisdom that guides the open dialogue. His moral contract in

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dialogue leads to collaboration and relational accountability. There is no special individual or a group of ‘Platonic guardians’ to provide an official standard and better interpretation of reality. The idea of a moral contract here is that the subject matter is beyond the original property or horizon of a person. A new understanding of the subject matter has become the basis for shared values and not merely the singular value of individual cultures. It is on this basis that we are morally interconnected with honest values. As part of this moral contract, ethical values other than openness and dialogue include ‘interconnectedness’, and ‘interdependence’ through the fusion of perspectives. The influences and results of experiments lead to the development of the ethical value of ‘collective responsibility’ or ‘collaborative responsibility’. It is in this general light that we understand Paquet’s idea of moral contracts. Other essential ethical aspects require bringing in the four cardinal virtues of temperance (knowing our limits), fortitude (a capacity to consider contexts and terms), justice (a sense of what is good and going for it), and prudence (a sense of what is practical and rational). The greater part of this would be done through moral imagination.

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL IMAGINATION Moral imagination is relevant if much of our effort toward proper collaborative governance and other ideas would be guided by the contributions of public intellectuals.7 As part of moral imagination, this whole process requires learning by doing and doing by learning. It demands continued tinkering and nudging of the ideas of fusion of horizons and collaborative governance. It also requires trust and working with trusted partners within the moral contract framework. This gives organisational memory the chance to crystallise the positive aspects of what has been accomplished and extend it to other areas of our society.8 Each person is capable and qualified to participate in tapping into this information and resources. There are information networks, resources, perspectives, and horizons that represent cultures, traditions and interpretations of reality. The interpretation and integration of these perspectives or horizons of resources provide the desired conditions for a genuine and more collaborative effort in the ethics of global development and well-being. The fusion of these diverse horizons or perspectives is another word for affirming a culture of collaborative development and shared responsibility. The social values of openness, interdependence, dialogue and dialectics are intrinsically related to Paquet’s understanding of the ethics of the moral contract. As socio-ethical values, they are helpful in the genuine governance of any society and in

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making dependable policies for human well-being. There is no established theory of Collaborative Ethics of Global Development through governance. We must develop one, keep thinking about it, and keep the discourse going until a final solution is accomplished (via holistic purposive nudging) (Anozie 2017b:98).

CONCLUSION We live in a world that is predominantly run using a Big-G model of governance. This model emphasises the extraordinary leadership of the privileged elite, who are leaders and rulers. This Big-G model of leadership has not accepted the place of the diversity of talents, inclusivity of perspectives and collaborative ethics of accountability for global development. Unfortunately, there can be no collaborative ethics of global development where the concept of human integral belongingness is deficient, valueless or one-dimensional (in the form of cultural subjectivism or mono-cultural belongingness of the West or Eurocentric concepts and categories). We need to develop a collaborative ethics of global development or collaborative governance that encourages the excellence of our common humanity and our diverse talents or resources. In the application section of this chapter, we identified the various means of accomplishing collaborative governance by using a network of resources and information, social learning, experimentation (trial and error), a fusion of horizons, a moral contract and imagination to arrive at our human development goals. The purpose of this new approach in support of small-g governance is not necessarily about the assurance and guarantee of success. Instead, success itself is accomplished by trying out possible ways for better governance. Its success lies in the dynamic process. Paquet’s idea of collaborative governance is flexible but elusive because it involves some moral imagination, experimentation and social learning. He cautiously tries to accommodate an essential aspect of the current social economy, which is the surge of resources and information in a world of information-driven technological progress. Our social situation demands a critical, continual reappraisal and reformulation or reframing, ‘in the light of changing circumstances and unintended circumstances’ (Paquet:264). The idea of a collaborative ethics of governance must be honestly accomplished since the very foundational concepts, building blocks, practices and conventions are not free from experimentation and improvement. In other words, these ethics demand continual social learning. The learning process must be monitored and sanctioned through a kind of memorandum of understanding that crystallises into a moral contract. This contract is the binding force of the whole process for successful collaborative governance. In this chapter, critics

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and critiques are not obstacles or forms of blockages to arriving at a better model of governance and development. They are part of the tinkering and experimentation of thoughts about a collaborative ethics of global development. Such ethics and social learning (guided through the commitment to a moral contract) are imperative in changing the socio-economic and political world. Considering the above, philosophical hermeneutic views are important in interpreting Paquet’s notion of collaborative governance (as a collaborative ethics of global development and a philosophy of stewardship) and the massive resources in support of the new model of governance. The fusion of horizons in this chapter shows how valuable sharing our resources and knowledge is in global development. We learn through the influences of effective historical consciousness of resources, meaning and information. There is a vision of a continuously changing world where a person does not possess all the answers to many problems but has something to contribute to a multicultural world. As Paquet affirms, we are in ‘a world where power, resources, and information are widely distributed, and where nobody is in charge’ (Paquet:1). These views are ad rem and imperative in the current demand for governance, global human development and the socio-historical world, or even in a post-colonial world.

NOTES 1. I consider ‘collaborative governance’ and ‘hermeneutics of belongingness’ to have the same meaning . These concepts are important in understanding a pluralist/inclusive philosophy on personhood, stewardship, well-being and global development. 2. In my view, the ideas of stewardship and nobody being in charge give different feelings of understanding although both are made to mean the same. However, I find the idea consistent with the project of collaborative governance and social learning, but the notion of “nobody is in charge” demands more cognitive familiarisation. Ruth Hubbard supports Paquet’s notion of change from leadership to stewardship. 3. In a way, there is a kind of Hegelian perspective in this process of collaborative governance, experimentation, and social learning. In the end, the purpose of this new approach is not necessarily built on the assurance/guarantee of success but success itself is accomplished by trying out possible ways for better governance. Its success is in the dynamic process. 4. Mahmoud Masaeli identified the importance of some comments about Paquet’s views, especially on Paquet’s views being considered as a process model and an outcome model on governance or ethics. Amartya Sen used this model in his criticism of John Rawls’ views on justice.

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5. Paquet gives credit to Resnick for the story about ants taking care of one another by following certain simple rules. This process demands no “foreman-ant.” 6. Several other social scientists have expressed the fact that the complex social phenomena can be demystified, and the foundation of governance understood. They are Thomas Schelling, Leonid Huwicz, among others. 7. Public intellectuals are not required to dominate the discussions, but they would help reframe and facilitate the debate. We remember that the society in question is one in which every person has something to contribute because information and resources are widely distributed. 8. The moral contract must come through a gradual process of experimentation. It can start off as memoranda of understanding and as the basis for monitoring and sanctioning, that lies at the foundation of social learning. For Paquet-it is a contingent project, a reflexive endeavour and redefinition or reconfiguration of the governance approach. It is an auto-poietic process.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Anozie, Stanley Uche. “Ethics of Duty Reassessed: Alan Gewirth’s Community of Rights Critical Perspective.” In Globality, Unequal Development, and Ethics of Duty, edited by Mahmoud Masaeli, 79–110. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016. ———. The Nigerian Government’s War against Boko Haram and Terrorism. Saarbrücken: Omniscriptum Publishing Group / Editions Universitaires Europeennes, 2017a. ———. “Jacques Maritain’s Interpersonal Relations and African Philosophy of Personhood/Community.” In Maritain Studies, Volume XXXIII, edited by N. Zunic. Interpersonal Relations and Community, 78–99. Ottawa: Canadian Jacques Maritain Association, 2017b. ———.Hans-Georg Gadamer and African Hermeneutic Philosophy. Chișinău: Generis Publishers, 2020. Heath, Joseph. The Myth of Shared Value in Canada. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, 2003. Paquet, Gilles. The New Geo-Governance-a Baroque Approach. Ottawa: The University of Ottawa Press, 2005. ———. Scheming Virtuously: The Road to Collaborative Governance. Ottawa: Invenire Books, 2009. Radford, R.A. ’The Economic Organisation of a POW Camp’. Economica 12 (48), 189–201. Serequeberhan, Tsenay. The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse. New York: Routledge, 1994.

Index

abuse, 134, 157–59, 177, 229 adwene, 16, 26, 52 African socialism, 8, 81–82, 166, 168, 194, 196–98, 201–2, 209 African Traditional Religions ATRs, 112–14 Afrocentrism, 31–32, 39 Afro-communitarianism, 67, 80 Akan, 3–5, 13–18, 20, 22, 26–27, 31–35, 37, 39, 49–54, 56–63, 77–78, 95, 104 ancestors, 6, 9, 16–18, 37, 73–74, 77, 82, 103, 114, 118, 122–23, 176–77, 184, 214–15, 217, 236 Ani, 6, 94, 111–12, 115, 121–26, 129 Appiah, Kwame Anthony, 3, 13–16, 20–26, 29, 33–39 Aristotle, 49, 52, 55–56, 62, 68–69, 163, 178, 236, 247 Arusha Declaration, 202, 204 Asante, 13–15, 35, 64

capacity, 5, 50, 54, 61, 69, 91, 93, 99, 104–5, 156, 179, 181, 256, 258, 260, 266 capacity-based theory, 5, 105 Christianity, 2, 6, 9, 112–13, 133–39, 141, 143–44, 146–49, 157, 174, 217, 224, 234 civilisation, 95, 114, 144, 195, 200, 226 collaborative governance, 10, 254, 257, 260–61, 265–68 colonialism, 6, 71, 81, 137, 146, 149, 174, 183, 193–95, 201, 207, 221–22, 224 communalism, 5, 67, 71, 76, 80–81, 115–16, 129, 203, 205 communitarianism, 1, 4–5, 7–9, 13, 18, 50, 53, 67, 72, 77, 80–82, 105, 168, 175, 182, 202, 213–16 cosmopolitanism, 2, 21, 23, 29, 34–36, 38–39, 245, 263

Bakweri, 4, 73, 82 Bantu Philosophy, 71, 74, 82, 195 being-in-community, 4, 14, 67–69, 71, 73, 76–78, 81, 83 Bini, 5, 100 Boko Haram, 6, 138, 140–41, 151–52, 156, 158 Buber, Martin, 4, 71

Descartes, 17, 69 dialogue, 2–3, 10, 19, 25–30, 34, 91, 241, 254–55, 262, 265–66 Diamond, Cora, 49, 51–52, 60 earth deity, 6, 111–12, 114–15, 121, 123–26, 129 Ebira, 5, 93–94, 97, 102 271

272

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education, 5–6, 8, 133–35, 137–38, 141–43, 145–52, 159, 183, 201, 218, 221 environment, 7, 96, 135, 173, 177–78, 181–82, 214, 216, 218, 226, 246 ethic, 2, 4, 6, 28–31, 33, 36, 38, 98 ethnophilosophy, 31, 82 ethos, 2, 6, 99, 115–16, 157, 163, 176, 213 Eurocentrism, 23–24, 31–32, 39 face-to-face, 20, 36, 245 familyhood, 191, 198, 201 Fanon, Frantz, 238, 241 feminism, 9, 213, 222 fundamentalism, 6, 113–14, 140 Gbadegesin, Segun, 1, 78, 100 Gender, 133, 159, 213, 221–22, 224, 226 genocide, 23, 233 Global north, 5, 22, 28, 35–36, 232, 243 Global south, 9, 22, 24, 28, 31, 35, 67, 232, 243, 246 Goodman, Nelson, 49, 58–59, 61 Gyekye, Kwame, 1, 3–4, 13–22, 24–25, 30–34, 37–39, 49–51, 53, 183–84, 200 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 23, 119–20 holistic, 1, 133, 159, 176, 214, 267 humanism, 24, 111, 115, 194–96, 201, 220 human rights, 18–19, 26, 28, 30, 33, 38, 102 Igbo, 5–6, 93–94, 97–98, 102, 111–15, 117–30 incorporation, 16–17, 38, 75–76, 122 indigenous, 2, 6, 8–9, 39, 67, 81, 136, 138, 148, 152, 183, 192, 202, 223, 242–48 individualism, 7, 9, 69, 115, 118–20, 168, 179, 200, 225–26

inherent theory, 5, 104–5 intercultural, 1–4, 10, 13–14, 19–36, 38–39, 49, 80, 111 Islam, 2, 6, 9, 133–37, 141–43, 151, 157–58, 235, 238 jet-nomad, 35–36 jihad, 136–37, 139, 142 Kant, Immanuel, 23–24, 62, 69–70, 237–38 Kaunda, Kenneth, 24, 39, 52, 81 life force, 15, 37, 95 Mall, Ram Adhar, 23, 31, 32, 34 Mbiti, John Samuel, 1, 3–4, 14, 39, 72, 75–78, 95, 99, 101, 115, 200, 214–16, 224 Menkiti, Ifeanyi, 1, 3–4, 14, 16–20, 37–39, 56, 72, 76–77, 79–81, 90, 92, 98, 101–2, 105, 200, 214–15 Mill, John Stuart, 49, 57, 62, 178 moral contract, 261–62, 265–68 myth, 165, 170, 222, 265 nationalism, 9, 241, 244–48 nature, 7, 9, 67, 83, 99–100, 174, 177, 184, 200, 207, 214, 216–17 négritude, 24, 195–96 neo-colonialism, 195, 221 Nkrumah, Kwame, 8, 24, 39, 81–82, 193–94, 196–97, 201, 204 Nyerere, Julius, 8, 39, 81, 167, 191, 193–94, 196–203, 205, 207–9 ọfọ, 123–24, 129 ogu, 123–24 onipa, 18, 32, 50, 54, 56 ontology, 14, 32, 74, 77, 98, 176 Oruka, Henry Odera, 31, 82–83 Pan-Africanism, 24, 32 Pan-Africanist, 24, 30, 39 Paquet, Gilles, 253, 257–63, 265, 268

Index

personhood, 1, 3–5, 14, 16–22, 29, 36– 39, 49–54, 56–57, 61, 72–74, 76–81, 83, 89–106, 111, 214, 216, 225–26 pre-colonial, 7–8, 27–28, 37, 115, 128, 195–96, 198–99, 201, 213, 215–16, 222, 226 proverbs, 4, 9, 33, 37, 53, 58, 60–62, 77, 82, 94, 215, 218, 221, 224, 226 racism, 8–9, 24, 229–32, 237–38, 241– 42, 244, 247–48 Ramose, Mogobe, B., 4, 77, 176 Rawls, John, 59–60, 62, 69–70, 268 relationality, 17, 33–34, 37 religions, 2, 6, 8–9, 26, 28, 112–13, 130, 133–36, 138–41, 157, 159, 174, 217 ritual, 16, 19, 115, 125 Senghor, Léopold Sédar, 39, 81, 168– 69, 193–94, 196 Shona, 93, 177, 217 slavery, 25, 30, 113, 137, 192–95, 201, 223, 233, 235–36 socio-economic, 8–9, 151, 191, 222, 241, 248, 256, 263, 268 somatic theory, 5, 105

273

spirits, 6, 15–17, 37, 176–77, 214, 217 spiritual beings, 7, 173–74 sub-Saharan, 24, 67, 78–79, 166, 169, 218, 225 sunsum, 15–16, 37, 78 sustainability, 7, 121, 173 Tallensi, 5, 102 Technological, 95–96, 257, 267 Tempels, Placide, 71–72, 74, 76–78, 90, 195, 215 Tiv, 5, 92–93, 95, 97–101 Van Binsbergen, Wim, 23, 38 vital force, 37, 74 Wimmer, Franz, 23, 31 Wiredu, 1, 3, 14–22, 24–31, 33–35, 37–39, 50, 52–54, 56, 72, 77–78, 90, 92, 97, 101, 104, 177, 184, 215 witches, 103, 158 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 49, 51–52, 55, 62 Yoruba, 5, 78, 93–94, 100, 102–3, 137, 143

About the Editors and Contributors

EDITORS Bolaji Bateye is an associate professor at the Department of Religious Studies, Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU), Ile-Ife in Nigeria. She also serves as a Resource Person at the OAU Centre for Gender and Social Policy Studies. Dr Bateye co-edited, with Afe Adogame and Ezra Chitando, African Traditions in the Study of Religion in Africa: Emerging Trends, Indigenous Spirituality, and the Interface with Other World Religions (2012). and African Traditions in the Study of Religion, Diaspora, and Gendered Societies (2013). An avid advocate of gender justice and women’s rights, Dr Bateye is highly involved in practical philosophical debates as it concerns women in local-global milieus. Mahmoud Masaeli is currently a professor of Human Rights Studies at Iran Academia (the Hague). Before that, he taught at the University of Ottawa and Carleton University. He is the founder and Honorary Executive Director of Alternative Perspectives and Global Concerns (ap​-gc​.​net). He gained a PhD in Political Science and a second one in Philosophy and held a PostDoc in Ethics and International Relations. His areas of research and teaching interest include human rights (philosophy of HR and international HR law); ethics of global development; humanist approaches in international law and organisations; and the hermeneutics of selfhood. He has a special interest in mystical approaches viewed as natural revelation. His textbook Canada and Challenges of International Development and Globalisation was a finalist for the 2019 PROSE Award, and then second-best in the textbook/Social Science category in North America. Masaeli has published many books including 275

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About the Editors and Contributors

Unequal Development, and Ethics of Duty; Cosmic Consciousness and Human Excellence: Insights for Global Ethics and African Perspectives and Global Development. He also published books in Farsi, such as The Conception of Freedom in International Political Theory and Human Rights and the Common Good in Political Thoughts. He is the author of many scholarly articles, has presented papers at international conferences, initiated and organised over sixty international conferences and seminars, led workshops in local contexts, and is currently focused on a one-year educational programme titled ‘Human Rights, Empowerment, and Democratic Development’ for people of Afghanistan, Iran and Tajikistan. Louise Müller is currently affiliated as a guest scholar with the Centre for the Arts in Society (LUCAS) at Leiden University and a senior research fellow at the University of KwaZulu Natal. She is the secretary of the Dutch OZSW research network in African Intercultural Philosophy. Dr Müller obtained a PhD and an MSc. in African Philosophy and Studies from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. She studied African and Intercultural Philosophy and World History at Erasmus University and Leiden University in the Netherlands. She previously worked at the University of Edinburgh, the African Studies Centre (ASCL), Utrecht University and Leiden University as a Researcher and Lecturer in African Oral Traditions, Philosophy, History, Literature and Film. Louise is currently writing a book titled A New Narrative of Saint Nicholas’ Black Companions, based on African Philosophy, Religion, and World History. In 2013, she published her monograph titled Religion and Chieftaincy in Ghana (Lit Verlag), which focuses on the Asante Religion, History and Philosophy. She co-edited ‘Beauty in African Thought–Critical Perspectives on the Western Idea of Development’ by B Bateye, M. Masaeli, L. Müller and A. Roothaan, Rowman and Littlefield, 2023. She published eight book chapters and nine articles on female African philosophers, critical race studies, feminism, chieftaincy and space and time in African Cinema, ancient Egyptian philosophy, ubuntu and sustainable development, and Akan art and philosophy. Dr. Müller is a reviewer for various Africa-related journals. Angela Roothaan is the author of Indigenous, Modern and Postcolonial Relations to Nature. Negotiating the Environment (2019) and five more single-authored academic monographs in Dutch, among which are her PhD thesis on Spinoza and a study on Nature in Ethics. She is the co-editor, together with Steven C. van den Heuvel and Patrick Nullens, of Theological Ethics and Moral Value Phenomena. The Experience of Values (2018). Roothaan is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, where she teaches Diversifying Philosophy, Political Philosophy, and Intercultural Philosophy. She supervises PhD candidates in African Intercultural

About the Editors and Contributors

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Philosophy and Continental Philosophy and organises the yearly VU graduate winter course on Intercultural Philosophy and Postcolonial Theory or African Philosophy. She is the chair of the Dutch OZSW research network African Intercultural Philosophy. Her current research projects concern the contextualising and textual investigation of Bantu Philosophy (1945) and the Epistemology of Indigenous Knowledge Systems. CONTRIBUTORS Andrew Akampurira, a native of Uganda, has been teaching Philosophy (Ethics) for the last eight years at universities and colleges in Uganda and the University of California, Riverside. He holds a B.A. in Philosophy from Uganda Martyrs University, a Postgraduate Diploma in Teacher Education from Kyambogo University, Uganda, Erasmus Mundus MA in Applied Ethics from Linkoping University, Sweden and the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Recently, Andrew completed a PhD in Applied Ethics at Makerere University Kampala, Uganda. Stanley Uche Anozie is an assistant professor of the Practice at Boston College, where he teaches courses in Person and Social Responsibility, Philosophical Perspectives on Justice, and the Philosophy of Race. He also taught Modern Philosophy at Trent University, Durham GTA, Ontario. In 2017, he taught a course in Indigenous Religions in a Global Context at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, and an Introduction to Philosophy at William Paterson University, Wayne, New Jersey, USA. He obtained his PhD (Philosophy) and MA (Philosophy) from Dominican University College, Ottawa, Canada. He was a contributor to Canada and Challenges of International Development and Globalisation; a book nominated/finalist for the 2019 Prose Award by the Association of American Publishers’ Professional and Scholarly Publishing Division. He is an editorial board member of the International Journal of Philosophy. Martin F. Asiegbu, PhD, is a senior lecturer at the Department of Philosophy in the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He holds a Doctorate Degree in philosophy from the Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve. His areas of specialisation are the Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics, Philosophical Anthropology, Hermeneutics and Philosophy of Culture and African Philosophy. Asiegbu has published over twenty articles in international journals and book chapters and edited several proceedings at many conferences. He is a member of the Nigerian Philosophical Association and the International Society for African Philosophy and Study.

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About the Editors and Contributors

Abdoulaye Ba, PhD, works as a Junior Lecturer at the Department of Philosophy at the University Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar, Senegal. He is a scholar in the fields of Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. His current fields of research include a naturalistic paradigm in the Social Sciences; Social Sciences in Africa; Logic; Formal Semantics; linguistic theories and the Philosophy of Language. Ba is an associate member of the Archives Henri Poincaré-Philosophie et Recherches sur les Sciences et les Technologies, Nancy, France. Bolaji Bateye is an associate professor at the Department of Religious Studies, Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU), Ile-Ife in Nigeria. She also serves as a Resource Person at the OAU Centre for Gender and Social Policy Studies. Dr Bateye co-edited, with Afe Adogame and Ezra Chitando, African Traditions in the Study of Religion in Africa: Emerging Trends, Indigenous Spirituality, and the Interface with Other World Religions (2012). and African Traditions in the Study of Religion, Diaspora, and Gendered Societies (2013). An avid advocate of gender justice and women’s rights, Dr Bateye is highly involved in practical philosophical debates as it concerns women in local-global milieus. J. Chidozie Chukwuokolo obtained his PhD from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka and since then he has worked at Ebonyi State University in Abakaliki, where he is a Senior Lecturer and the Head of the Department of Philosophy, Religion and Peace Studies. Chukwuokolo has published in all branches of philosophy, but his research interests are mainly in the field of the Philosophy of Development. Simeon C. Dimonye, PhD, is a Lecturer at the Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His area of academic interest is social and political philosophy, with a focus on cultural and development studies. His methodological approach to the study of African culture and development stems from critical social theory and the sociology of mind. He has published several articles, conference papers and book chapters both locally and internationally. Alloy S. Ihuah, PhD, is a professor of philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, Benue State University, Makurdi-Nigeria. His academic fields of expertise are those of Ethics, Applied Philosophy and Social and Political Philosophy. He is also the Director of the Centre for Research Management at the same University. In 2017/2018, he was a fellow of the Franklin International Fellowship Exchange of the University of Georgia, Athens, USA. He is married with four children.

About the Editors and Contributors

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Nimrod Kahn has finished his master’s degree in Philosophy at the University of Tel-Aviv in Israel and is currently preparing his PhD research in African Philosophy and Media. His research interests are logic, philosophy of mathematics, aesthetics and ethics. Nimrod’s focus is on connecting these fields through arts, politics and history. For Nimrod, philosophy is a field of creative creation rather than just research. Wilfred Lajul is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at Makerere University, Uganda. Over the years, he published widely in the areas of African Philosophy, Philosophy of Economics, Race, Ethics, and Human Rights. Among his publications are three books, four book chapters, and ten journal articles. Some of his publications are African Values in Global Ethics and the Emerging New World Order (2018); Justice and Post LRA War in Northern Uganda: ICC Versus Acholi Traditional Justice System (2017); African Metaphysics: Traditional and Modern Discussions (2017); and The Market Economy and its Role in Poverty in Africa: Myths and Realities (2016). Olutoyin Mejiuni is a professor of Adult Education and Women Studies in the Department of Adult Education and Lifelong Learning, at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. She authored and co-edited, respectively, the books entitled: Women and Power: Education, Religion and Identity and Measuring and Analysing Informal Learning in the Digital Age. Under the aegis of Women Against Rape, Sexual Harassment and Sexual Exploitation (WARSHE), a not-for-profit organisation that she co-founded in 1998, Olutoyin co-authored the research report entitled: Unsafe spaces: dodgy friends and families. Stephen Nkansah Morgan, PhD, is a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy and Classics of the University of Ghana, Stephen holds a Ph.D. in Ethics Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. His research interests are in Applied Ethics (including Bioethics, Environmental and Animal Ethics, and Ethics of Technology) and African Philosophy. Pius Mosima, PhD, teaches Philosophy at the University of Bamenda, Cameroon. He is an Assistant Chief Examiner for Philosophy at the Cameroon General Certificate of Education Board and a fellow member of the African Studies Centre Leiden community, in the Netherlands. His research interests include African and Intercultural Philosophy, Globalisation and Culture, Moral and Political Philosophy, Gender Studies and Bioethics. His most recent publications include Philosophic Sagacity and Intercultural Philosophy: Beyond Henry Odera Oruka (2016). Pius is the editor of the book A Transcontinental Career: Essays in Honour of Wim van Binsbergen (2017).

280

About the Editors and Contributors

Louise Müller is currently affiliated as a guest scholar with the Centre for the Arts in Society (LUCAS) at Leiden University and a Senior Research Fellow at the University of KwaZulu Natal. She obtained a PhD and an MSc. in African Philosophy and Studies from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. She worked at the University of Edinburgh, the African Studies Centre (ASCL), Utrecht University and Leiden University as a Researcher and Lecturer in African Oral Traditions, Philosophy, History, Literature and Film. Ovett Nwosimiri has a PhD in Philosophy from the University of KwaZulu-Natal where he also lectured in the field of Applied Ethics. He was a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at ACEPS, University of Johannesburg. His research interest is in African Philosophy, African Epistemology, Philosophy of Race, Epistemology, Existentialism and Applied Ethics. He is currently an independent researcher. Beatrice Okyere-Manu is a Professor of Applied Ethics in the School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. She is the Programme Director for Applied Ethics. Her research interest is in Applied Ethics (including Environmental Ethics, Ethics of Technology, and African feminist Ethics) and African Ethics.