Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Contents Articles Overview Weapon of mass destruction

Types

1 1 14

Biological warfare

14

Chemical warfare

26

Nuclear weapon

55

Radiological weapon

76

Proliferation Nuclear proliferation

80 80

Chemical weapon proliferation

103

List of missiles by country

111

Countries

135

Albania

135

Algeria

137

Argentina

139

Australia

141

Brazil

146

Bulgaria

151

Burma

154

Canada

157

China

166

France

179

Germany

189

India

193

Iran

200

Iraq

226

Israel

245

Japan

249

Libya

252

Netherlands

257

North Korea

261

Pakistan

276

Poland

298

Romania

300

Russia

304

Saudi Arabia

311

South Africa

316

Sweden

324

Syria

342

Taiwan

349

Ukraine

352

United Kingdom

358

United States

364

Treaties List of weapons of mass destruction treaties

Ppular Culture Weapons of mass destruction in popular culture

374 374 378 378

References Article Sources and Contributors

381

Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

388

Article Licenses License

392

1

Overview Weapon of mass destruction Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

•

Albania

•

Algeria

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Argentina

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Australia

•

Brazil

•

Bulgaria

•

Burma

•

Canada

•

China

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Egypt

•

France

•

Germany

•

India

•

Iran

•

Iraq

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Israel

•

Japan

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Libya

•

Mexico

•

Netherlands

•

North Korea

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Pakistan

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Poland

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Romania

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Russia

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Saudi Arabia

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South Africa

Weapon of mass destruction

2 •

South Korea

•

Spain

•

Sweden

•

Syria

•

Taiwan

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Ukraine

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United Kingdom

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United States Proliferation

• • •

Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

•

List of treaties

• •

Book Category

• • •

v t

e [1]

A "weapon of mass destruction" (WMD or WoMD) is a nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical or other weapon that can kill and bring significant harm to a large number of humans or cause great damage to man-made structures (e.g. buildings), natural structures (e.g. mountains), or the biosphere. The scope and application of the term has evolved and been disputed, often signifying more politically than technically. Coined in reference to aerial bombing with chemical explosives, it has come to distinguish large-scale weaponry of other technologies, such as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear. This differentiates the term from more technical ones such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN).

Early uses of the term The first use of the term "weapon of mass destruction" on record is by Cosmo Gordon Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1937 in reference to the aerial bombardment of Guernica, Spain: Who can think at this present time without a sickening of the heart of the appalling slaughter, the suffering, the manifold misery brought by war to Spain and to China? Who can think without horror of what another widespread war would mean, waged as it would be with all the new weapons of mass destruction?[2] At the time, the United States (with help from Western Allies) had yet to develop and use nuclear weapons. Japan conducted research on biological weapons (see Unit 731), and chemical weapons had seen wide use, most notably in World War I. Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that ended World War II, and progressing through the Cold War, the term came to refer more to non-conventional weapons. The application of the term to specifically nuclear and radiological weapons is traced by William Safire to the Russian phrase "Оружие массового поражения" – oruzhiye massovovo porazheniya (weapons of mass destruction). He credits James Goodby (of the Brookings Institution) with tracing what he considers the earliest known English-language use soon after the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (although it is not quite verbatim): a communique from a 15 November 1945, meeting of Harry Truman, Clement Attlee and Mackenzie King (probably drafted by Vannevar Bush– or so Bush claimed in 1970) referred to "weapons adaptable to mass destruction".

Weapon of mass destruction That exact phrase, says Safire, was also used by Bernard Baruch in 1946 (in a speech at the United Nations probably written by Herbert Bayard Swope).[3] The same phrase found its way into the very first resolution adopted by the United Nations General assembly in January 1946 in London, which used the wording "...the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction." This resolution also created the Atomic Energy Commission (predecessor of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)). An exact use of this term was given in a lecture "Atomic Energy as an Atomic Problem" by J. Robert Oppenheimer. The lecture was delivered to the Foreign Service and the State Department, on 17 September 1947. The lecture is reprinted in The Open Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955). "It is a very far reaching control which would eliminate the rivalry between nations in this field, which would prevent the surreptitious arming of one nation against another, which would provide some cushion of time before atomic attack, and presumably therefore before any attack with weapons of mass destruction, and which would go a long way toward removing atomic energy at least as a source of conflict between the powers". The term was also used in the introduction to the hugely influential US Government Document known as NSC-68 written in April 1950. During a televised presentation about the Cuban Missile Crisis on 22 October 1962, John F. Kennedy made reference to "offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction.[4] " An early use of the exact phrase in an international treaty was in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, however no definition was provided.

Evolution of its use During the Cold War, the term "weapons of mass destruction" was primarily a reference to nuclear weapons. At the time, in the West the euphemism "strategic weapons" was used to refer to the American nuclear arsenal, which was presented as a necessary deterrent against nuclear or conventional attack from the Soviet Union (see Mutual Assured Destruction). The term "weapons of mass destruction" continued to see periodic use throughout this time, usually in the context of nuclear arms control; Ronald Reagan used it during the 1986 Reykjavík Summit, when referring to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Reagan's successor, George H.W. Bush, used the term in an 1989 speech to the United Nations, using it primarily in reference to chemical arms. The end of the Cold War reduced U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, causing it to shift its focus to disarmament. This period coincided with an increasing threat to U.S. interests from Islamic nations and independent Islamic groups. With the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and 1991 Gulf War, Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs became a particular concern of the first Bush Administration. Following the war, Bill Clinton and other western politicians and media continued to use the term, usually in reference to ongoing attempts to dismantle Iraq's weapons programs.[citation needed] After the 11 September 2001 attacks and the 2001 anthrax attacks, an increased fear of non-conventional weapons and asymmetrical warfare took hold of the United States and other Western powers. This fear reached a crescendo with the 2002 Iraq disarmament crisis and the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that became the primary justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, no WMD were found in Iraq. (Stockpiles of chemical munitions including sarin and mustard agents were found, but none were considered to be in a usable condition due to corrosion.)[5] Because of its prolific use during this period, the American Dialect Society voted "weapons of mass destruction" (and its abbreviation, "WMD") the word of the year in 2002, and in 2003 Lake Superior State University added WMD to its list of terms banished for "Mis-use, Over-use and General Uselessness".

3

Weapon of mass destruction In its Criminal Complaint against the main suspect of the Boston Marathon bombing of 15 April 2013, the FBI refers to a pressure-cooker improvised bomb as a "weapon of mass destruction".

Definitions of the term United States Strategic The most widely used definition of "weapons of mass destruction" is that of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (NBC) although there is no treaty or customary international law that contains an authoritative definition. Instead, international law has been used with respect to the specific categories of weapons within WMD, and not to WMD as a whole. While nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are regarded as the three major types of WMDs,[6] some analysts have argued that radiological materials as well as missile technology and delivery systems such as aircraft and ballistic missiles could be labeled as WMDs as well. The abbreviations NBC (for nuclear, biological and chemical) or CBR (chemical, biological, radiological) are used with regards to battlefield protection systems for armored vehicles, because all three involve insidious toxins that can be carried through the air and can be protected against with vehicle air filtration systems. However, there is an argument that nuclear and biological weapons do not belong in the same category as chemical and "dirty bomb" radiological weapons, which have limited destructive potential (and close to none, as far as property is concerned), whereas nuclear and biological weapons have the unique ability to kill large numbers of people with very small amounts of material, and thus could be said to belong in a class by themselves. The NBC definition has also been used in official U.S. documents, by the U.S. President, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,[7] the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Other documents expand the definition of WMD to also include radiological or conventional weapons. The U.S. military refers to WMD as: Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. Also called WMD. This may also refer to nuclear ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). The significance of the words separable and divisible part of the weapon is that missiles such as the Pershing II and the SCUD are considered weapons of mass destruction, while aircraft capable of carrying bombloads are not. In 2004, the United Kingdom's Butler Review recognized the "considerable and long-standing academic debate about the proper interpretation of the phrase ‘weapons of mass destruction’". The committee set out to avoid the general term but when using it, employed the definition of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, which defined the systems which Iraq was required to abandon: • "Nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any sub-systems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities relating to [nuclear weapons]. • Chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research,development,support and manufacturing facilities. • Ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities."[8] Chemical weapons expert Gert G. Harigel considers only nuclear weapons true weapons of mass destruction, because "only nuclear weapons are completely indiscriminate by their explosive power, heat radiation and radioactivity, and only they should therefore be called a weapon of mass destruction". He prefers to call chemical and biological weapons "weapons of terror" when aimed against civilians and "weapons of intimidation" for soldiers.

4

Weapon of mass destruction Testimony of one such soldier expresses the same viewpoint. For a period of several months in the winter of 2002–2003, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz frequently used the term "weapons of mass terror," apparently also recognizing the distinction between the psychological and the physical effects of many things currently falling into the WMD category. Gustavo Bell Lemus, the Vice President of Colombia, at 9 July 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, quoted the Millennium Report of the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly, in which Kofi Annan said that small arms could be described as WMD because the fatalities they cause "dwarf that of all other weapons systems – and in most years greatly exceed the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki". An additional condition often implicitly applied to WMD is that the use of the weapons must be strategic. In other words, they would be designed to "have consequences far outweighing the size and effectiveness of the weapons themselves".[9] The strategic nature of WMD also defines their function in the military doctrine of total war as targeting the means a country would use to support and supply its war effort, specifically its population, industry, and natural resources. Within U.S. civil defense organizations, the category is now Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE), which defines WMD as: (1) Any explosive, incendiary, poison gas, bomb, grenade, or rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces [113 g], missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce [7 g], or mine or device similar to the above. (2) Poison gas. (3) Any weapon involving a disease organism. (4) Any weapon that is designed to release radiation at a level dangerous to human life.[citation needed] Military For the general purposes of national defense, the U.S. Code defines a weapon of mass destruction as: • any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of: • toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors • a disease organism • radiation or radioactivity For the purposes of the prevention of weapons proliferation, the U.S. Code defines weapons of mass destruction as "chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and chemical, biological, and nuclear materials used in the manufacture of such weapons." Criminal (civilian) For the purposes of US criminal law concerning terrorism, weapons of mass destruction are defined as: • any "destructive device" defined as any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas - bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, mine, or device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses • any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors • any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector • any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life The Federal Bureau of Investigation's definition is similar to that presented above from the terrorism statute: • any "destructive device" as defined in Title 18 USC Section 921: any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas - bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, mine, or device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding

5

Weapon of mass destruction

• • • •

clauses any weapon designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors any weapon involving a disease organism any weapon designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life any device or weapon designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury by causing a malfunction of or destruction of an aircraft or other vehicle that carries humans or of an aircraft or other vehicle whose malfunction or destruction may cause said aircraft or other vehicle to cause death or serious bodily injury to humans who may be within range of the vector in its course of travel or the travel of its debris.

Indictments and convictions for possession and use of WMD such as truck bombs, pipe bombs, shoe bombs, and cactus needles coated with a biological toxin[10] have been obtained under 18 USC 2332a. As defined by 18 USC §2332 (a), a Weapon of Mass Destruction is: • (a) any destructive device as defined in section 921 of the title; • (B) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors; • (C) any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are defined in section 178 of this title); or • (D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life; Under the same statute, conspiring, attempting, threatening, or using a Weapon of Mass Destruction may be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if by death, be punishable by death or by imprisonment for any terms of years or for life. They can also be asked to pay a maximum fine of $250,000. The Washington Post reported on 30 March 2006: "Jurors asked the judge in the death penalty trial of Zacarias Moussaoui today to define the term 'weapons of mass destruction' and were told it includes airplanes used as missiles". Moussaoui was indicted and tried for the use of airplanes as WMD. The surviving Boston Marathon bombing suspect, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, was charged in April 2013 with the federal offense of "use of a weapon of mass destruction" after he and his brother allegedly placed crude shrapnel bombs, made from pressure cookers packed with ball bearings and nails, near the finish line of Boston's most famous race. His alleged terrorist act resulted in three deaths and at least 282 injuries.

Treaties The development and use of WMD is governed by several international conventions and treaties, although not all countries have signed and ratified them: • • • • • • •

Partial Test Ban Treaty Outer Space Treaty Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Seabed Arms Control Treaty Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, has not entered into force as of 2012) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

6

Weapon of mass destruction

7

Use, possession and access Nuclear weapons The only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war is the United States, which dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. There are eight countries that have declared they possess nuclear weapons and are known to have tested a nuclear weapon, only five of which are members of the NPT. The eight are China, France, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Israel is considered by most analysts to have nuclear weapons numbering in the low hundreds as well, but maintains an official policy of nuclear ambiguity, neither denying nor confirming its nuclear status.

U.S. nuclear warheads, 1945–2002

South Africa developed a small nuclear arsenal in the 1980s but disassembled them in the early 1990s, making it the only country to have fully given up an independently developed nuclear weapons arsenal. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited stockpiles of nuclear arms following the break-up of the Soviet Union, but relinquished them to the Russian Federation. Countries with access to nuclear weapons through nuclear sharing agreements include Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. North Korea has claimed to have developed and tested nuclear devices. Although outside sources have been unable to unequivocally support the state's claims, North Korea has officially been identified to have nuclear weapons.

United States politics Due to the indiscriminate impact of WMD, the fear of a WMD attack has shaped political policies and campaigns, fostered social movements, and has been the central theme of many films. Support for different levels of WMD development and control varies nationally and internationally. Yet understanding of the nature of the threats is not high, in part because of imprecise usage of the term by politicians and the media. Fear of WMD, or of threats diminished by the possession of WMD, has long been used to catalyze public support for various WMD policies. They include mobilization of pro- and anti-WMD campaigners alike, and generation of popular political support. The term WMD may be used as a powerful buzzword or to generate a culture of fear. It is also used ambiguously, particularly by not distinguishing among the different types of WMD. A television commercial called Daisy, promoting Democrat Lyndon Johnson's 1964 presidential candidacy, invoked the fear of a nuclear war and was an element in Johnson's subsequent election.

A-bomb blueprint

More recently, the threat of potential WMD in Iraq was used by President George W. Bush as justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Broad reference to Iraqi WMD in general was seen as an element of President Bush's arguments. The claim that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by Coalition forces.

Weapon of mass destruction Over 500 munitions were discovered throughout Iraq since 2003 containing chemical agents mustard and Sarin gas, produced in the 1980s and no longer usable as originally intended. In 2004, Polish troops found nineteen 1980s-era rocket warheads, thwarting an attempt by militants to buy them at $5000 each. Some of the rockets contained extremely deteriorated nerve agent.

Media coverage In 2004, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) released a report[11] examining the media’s coverage of WMD issues during three separate periods: nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998; the US announcement of evidence of a North Korean nuclear weapons program in October 2002; and revelations about Iran's nuclear program in May 2003. The CISSM report notes that poor coverage resulted less from political bias among the media than from tired journalistic conventions. The report’s major findings were that: 1. Most media outlets represented WMD as a monolithic menace, failing to adequately distinguish between weapons programs and actual weapons or to address the real differences among chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons. 2. Most journalists accepted the Bush administration’s formulation of the “War on Terror” as a campaign against WMD, in contrast to coverage during the Clinton era, when many journalists made careful distinctions between acts of terrorism and the acquisition and use of WMD. 3. Many stories stenographically reported the incumbent administration’s perspective on WMD, giving too little critical examination of the way officials framed the events, issues, threats, and policy options. 4. Too few stories proffered alternative perspectives to official line, a problem exacerbated by the journalistic prioritizing of breaking-news stories and the “inverted pyramid” style of storytelling. In a separate study published in 2005, a group of researchers assessed the effects reports and retractions in the media had on people’s memory regarding the search for WMD in Iraq during the 2003 Iraq War. The study focused on populations in two coalition countries (Australia and USA) and one opposed to the war (Germany). Results showed that US citizens generally did not correct initial misconceptions regarding WMD, even following disconfirmation; Australian and German citizens were more responsive to retractions. Dependence on the initial source of information led to a substantial minority of Americans exhibiting false memory that WMD were indeed discovered, while they were not. This led to three conclusions: 1. The repetition of tentative news stories, even if they are subsequently disconfirmed, can assist in the creation of false memories in a substantial proportion of people. 2. Once information is published, its subsequent correction does not alter people's beliefs unless they are suspicious about the motives underlying the events the news stories are about. 3. When people ignore corrections, they do so irrespective of how certain they are that the corrections occurred. A poll conducted between June and September 2003 asked people whether they thought evidence of WMD had been discovered in Iraq since the war ended. They were also asked which media sources they relied upon. Those who obtained their news primarily from Fox News were three times as likely to believe that evidence of WMD had been discovered in Iraq than those who relied on PBS and NPR for their news, and one third more likely than those who primarily watched CBS.

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9

Media source Respondents believing evidence of WMD had been found in Iraq Fox

33%

CBS

23%

NBC

20%

CNN

20%

ABC

19%

Print media

17%

PBS–NPR

11%

Based on a series of polls taken from June–September 2003.[12] In 2006 Fox News reported the claims of two Republican lawmakers that WMDs had been found in Iraq, based upon unclassified portions of a report by the National Ground Intelligence Center. Quoting from the report, Senator Rick Santorum said "Since 2003, coalition forces have recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve agent". According to David Kay, who appeared before the US House Armed Services Committee to discuss these badly corroded munitions, they were leftovers, many years old, improperly stored or destroyed by the Iraqis.[13] Charles Duelfer agreed, stating on NPR's Talk of the Nation: "When I was running the ISG – the Iraq Survey Group – we had a couple of them that had been turned in to these IEDs, the improvised explosive devices. But they are local hazards. They are not a major, you know, weapon of mass destruction."[14] Later, wikileaks would show that WMDs of these kinds continued to be found as the Iraqi occupation continued. Many news agencies, including Fox News, reported the conclusions of the CIA that, based upon the investigation of the Iraq Survey Group, WMDs are yet to be found in Iraq.

Public perceptions Awareness and opinions of WMD have varied during the course of their history. Their threat is a source of unease, security, and pride to different people. The anti-WMD movement is embodied most in nuclear disarmament, and led to the formation of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1957. In order to increase awareness of all kinds of WMD, in 2004 the nuclear physicist and Nobel Peace Prize winner Joseph Rotblat inspired the creation of The WMD Awareness Programme[15] to provide trustworthy and up to date information on WMD world wide. In 1998 University of New Mexico's Institute for Public Policy released their third report on US perceptions – including the general public, politicians and scientists – of nuclear weapons since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Risks of nuclear conflict, proliferation, and terrorism were seen as substantial. While maintenance of a nuclear US arsenal was considered above average in importance, there was widespread support for a reduction in the stockpile, and very little support for developing and testing new nuclear weapons. Also in 1998, but after the UNM survey was conducted, nuclear weapons became an issue in India's election of March, in relation to political tensions with neighboring Pakistan. Prior to the election the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) announced it would “declare India a nuclear weapon state” after coming to power. BJP won the elections, and on 14 May, three days after India tested nuclear weapons for the second time, a public opinion poll reported that a majority of Indians favored the country’s nuclear build-up.[citation needed] On 15 April 2004, the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) reported that US citizens showed high levels of concern regarding WMD, and that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons should be "a very important US foreign policy goal", accomplished through multilateral arms control rather than the use of military threats.

Weapon of mass destruction

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A majority also believed the US should be more forthcoming with its biological research and its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitment of nuclear arms reduction, and incorrectly thought the US was a party to various non-proliferation treaties. A Russian opinion poll conducted on 5 August 2005 indicated half the population believes new nuclear powers have the right to possess nuclear weapons. 39% believes the Russian stockpile should be reduced, though not fully eliminated.

In popular culture Weapons of mass destruction and their related impacts have been a mainstay of popular culture since the beginning of the Cold War, as both political commentary and humorous outlet.

Common hazard symbols Symbol Unicode Toxic symbol

Radioactive symbol

Biohazard symbol

☠ ☢

U+2620

☣

U+2623

Image

U+2622

Radioactive weaponry/hazard symbol The international radioactivity symbol (also known as trefoil) first appeared in 1946, at the University of California, Berkeley Radiation Laboratory. At the time, it was rendered as magenta, and was set on a blue background. It is drawn with a central circle of radius R, the blades having an internal radius of 1.5R and an external radius of 5R, and separated from each other by 60°. It is meant to represent a radiating atom. The International Atomic Energy Agency found, however, that the symbol is unintuitive and can be variously interpreted by those uneducated in its meaning, and that its role as a hazard warning was compromised as it did not clearly indicate "danger" to many non-Westerners and children who encountered it. As a result of research, a new radiation hazard symbol was developed to be placed near the most dangerous parts of radiation sources featuring a skull, someone running away, and using the color red rather than yellow as the background.[16]

Biological weaponry/hazard symbol Developed by Dow Chemical company in the 1960s for their containment products. According to Charles Dullin, an environmental-health engineer who contributed to its development: We wanted something that was memorable but meaningless, so we could educate people as to what it means.

Weapon of mass destruction

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Weapons_of_mass_destruction& action=edit "Archbishop's Appeal," Times (London), 28 December 1937, p. 9. "Weapons of Mass Destruction", New York Times Magazine, 19 April 1998, p.22. Retrieved 24 February 2007. Kennedy JF (1962-10-22). Televised remarks to the American people re "the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba" Munitions Found in Iraq Meet WMD Criteria (http:/ / www. military. com/ features/ 0,15240,103631,00. html?ESRC=coastgnews. RSS), Military.com, report filed by American Forces Press Service, 29 June 2006 [6] Weapons of Mass Destruction (http:/ / www. hampshire. edu/ academics/ 22169. htm) Hampshire College [7] CIA Site RedirectCentral Intelligence Agency (http:/ / www. odci. gov/ cia/ reports/ 721_reports/ jan_jun2003. htm) [8] Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (http:/ / archive. cabinetoffice. gov. uk/ butlerreview/ report/ index. asp) (HC 898), London: The Stationery Office, 2004, §14. [9] What makes a weapon one of mass destruction? – Times Online (http:/ / www. timesonline. co. uk/ tol/ news/ uk/ article1013136. ece) [10] The Free Lance-Star - Jul 14, 1998 (http:/ / news. google. com/ newspapers?id=nPAyAAAAIBAJ& sjid=mQgGAAAAIBAJ& pg=6809,3453874) [11] by Prof. Susan Moeller [12] , PIPA, 2 October 2003 [13] Kay, David. "House Armed Services Committee Hearing", 29 June 2006 [14] Duelfer, Charles. Expert: Iraq WMD Find Did Not Point to Ongoing Program (http:/ / www. npr. org/ templates/ story/ story. php?storyId=5504298) NPR. 22 June 2006 [15] wmdawareness.org.uk (http:/ / www. wmdawareness. org. uk/ ) [16] Linda Lodding, " Drop it and Run! New Symbol Warns of Radiation Dangers and Aims to Save Lives (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ Publications/ Magazines/ Bulletin/ Bull482/ pdfs/ 18RadSymbol. pdf)," IAEA Bulletin 482 (March 2007): 70–72.

Bibliography • Chemical and Biological Weapons: Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Environment (http://www. wagingpeace.org/articles/2001/11/00_harigel_cbw.htm), by Gert G. Harigel, 2001.

Further reading Definition and origin • " WMD: Words of mass dissemination (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2744411.stm)" (12 February 2003), BBC News. • Bentley, Michelle, “War and/of Worlds: Constructing WMD in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 22 (Jan. 2013), 68–97. • Michael Evans, "What makes a weapon one of mass destruction?" (6 February 2004), The Times. • Bruce Schneier, " Definition of 'Weapon of Mass Destruction' (https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/ 2009/04/definition_of_w.html)" (6 April 2009), Schneier on Security. • Stefano Felician, Le armi di distruzione di massa, CEMISS, Roma, 2010, (http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/ IM/CeMISS/Pubblicazioni/Documents/75101_Ricerca_Fpdf.pdf)

International law • United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 • David P. Fidler, " Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Law (http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh97. htm)" (February 2003), American Society of International Law. • Joanne Mariner, " FindLaw Forum: Weapons of mass destruction and international law's principle that civilians cannot be targeted (http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/11/columns/fl.mariner.civilians.war.11.20/)" (20 November 2001), CNN.

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Weapon of mass destruction

Media • Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction (https://web.archive.org/web/20060217212308/http:// www.cissm.umd.edu/documents/WMDstudy_full.pdf) at the Wayback Machine (archived February 17, 2006), by Susan D. Moeller, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 2004. • Memory for fact, fiction, and misinformation (http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal. asp?ref=0956-7976), by Stephan Lewandowsky, Werner G.K. Stritzke, Klaus Oberauer, and Michael Morales, Psychological Science, 16(3): 190–195, 2005.

Ethics • Jacob M. Appel, " Is All Fair in Biological Warfare? (http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/35/7/429)," Journal of Medical Ethics, June 2009.

Public perceptions • Steven Kull et al., Americans on WMD Proliferation (http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/WMDProliferation/ WMD_Prolif_Apr04/WMDProlif_Apr04_rpt.pdf) (15 April 2004), Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks survey.

External links • Journal dedicated to CBRNE issues (http://www.cbrneworld.com) • New Video: A World Without Nuclear Weapons (http://www.ploughshares.org/moment/video?p=423) • United Nations: Disarmament (https://web.archive.org/web/20050624041645/http://disarmament2.un.org/ wmd/) at the Wayback Machine (archived June 24, 2005) • US Department of State (https://web.archive.org/web/20070313232904/http://www.state.gov/t/np/wmd/) at the Wayback Machine (archived March 13, 2007) • Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) (http://www.nti.org/) • Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/index.html) • Federation of American Scientists (FAS) (http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd.htm) • Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/) • GlobalSecurity.org (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/) • Avoiding Armageddon (http://www.pbs.org/avoidingarmageddon/), PBS • FAS assessment of countries that own weapons of mass destruction (http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd_state. htm) • National Counterproliferation Center – Office of the Director of National Intelligence (http://www.counterwmd. gov/) • HLSWatch.com (http://www.hlswatch.com/): Homeland Security Watch policy and current events resource • Office of the Special Assistant for Chemical Biological Defense and Chemical Demilitarization Programs (http:// www.acq.osd.mil/cp/), Official Department of Defense web site that provides information about the DoD Chemical Biological Defense Program • Terrorism and the Threat From Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (https://web.archive.org/web/ 20010429080212/http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/terror.html) at the Wayback Machine (archived April 29, 2001) • Iranian Chemical Attacks Victims (http://www.payvand.com/news/06/dec/1239.html) (Payvand News Agency) • Iran: 'Forgotten Victims' Of Saddam Hussein Era Await Justice (http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/12/ e448bece-def1-4c16-9051-75fa9552a4c8.html)

12

Weapon of mass destruction • Comparison of Chinese, Japanese and Vietnamese translations (http://www.cjvlang.com/Spicks/massweapon. html) • Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (http://www.wagingpeace.org/) • The WMD Awareness Programme (http://www.wmdawareness.org.uk/), Inspired by the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize winner Professor Sir Joseph Rotblat, The WMD Awareness Programme is dedicated to providing trustworthy and up to date information on Weapons of Mass Destruction world wide. • Radius Engineering International Inc. Radius Engineering International Inc, ed. "Nuclear Weapons Effects" (http:/ /www.bomb-shelter.net/nuc table.pdf). Retrieved 20 December 2010. These tables describe the effects of various nuclear blast sizes. All figures are for 15 mph (13 kn; 24 km/h) winds. Thermal burns represent injuries to an unprotected person. The legend describes the data. • Gareth Porter, Documents linking Iran to nuclear weapons push may have been fabricated (http://rawstory.com/ news/2008/IAEA_suspects_fraud_in_evidence_for_1109.html), TheRawStory, 10 November 2008 • Gareth Porter, The Iranian Nuke Forgeries: CIA Determines Documents were Fabricated (http://www. counterpunch.org/porter12292009.html), CounterPunch, 29 December 2009

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14

Types Biological warfare Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

•

Albania

•

Algeria

•

Argentina

•

Australia

•

Brazil

•

Bulgaria

•

Burma

•

Canada

•

China

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Egypt

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France

•

Germany

•

India

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Iran

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Iraq

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Israel

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Japan

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Libya

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Mexico

•

Netherlands

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North Korea

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Pakistan

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Poland

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Romania

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Russia

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Saudi Arabia

•

South Africa

Biological warfare

15 •

South Korea

•

Spain

•

Sweden

•

Syria

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Taiwan

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Ukraine

•

United Kingdom

•

United States Proliferation

• • •

Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

•

List of treaties

• •

Book Category

• • •

v t

e [1]

Biological warfare (BW)—also known as germ warfare—is the use of biological toxins or infectious agents such as bacteria, viruses, smallpox, and fungi with intent to kill or incapacitate humans, animals or plants as an act of war. Biological weapons (often termed "bio-weapons", "biological threat agents", or "bio-agents") are living organisms or replicating entities (viruses, which are not universally considered "alive") that reproduce or replicate within their host victims. Entomological (insect) warfare is also considered a type of biological weapon. This type of warfare is distinct from nuclear warfare and chemical warfare, which together make up NBC, the military acronym for nuclear, biological, and chemical (warfare or weapons), all of which are considered "weapons of mass destruction" (WMDs). None of these fall under the term conventional weapons which are primarily effective due to their destructive potential. Biological weapons may be employed in various ways to gain a strategic or tactical advantage over the enemy, either by threats or by actual deployments. Like some of the chemical weapons, biological weapons may also be useful as area denial weapons. These agents may be lethal or non-lethal, and may be targeted against a single individual, a group of people, or even an entire population. They may be developed, acquired, stockpiled or deployed by nation states or by non-national groups. In the latter case, or if a nation-state uses it clandestinely, it may also be considered bioterrorism. There is an overlap between BW and chemical warfare, as the use of toxins produced by living organisms is considered under the provisions of both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Toxins and psychochemical weapons are often referred to as midspectrum agents. Unlike bioweapons, these midspectrum agents do not reproduce in their host and are typically characterized by shorter incubation periods.[1]

Overview Offensive biological warfare, including mass production, stockpiling and use of biological weapons, was outlawed by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The rationale behind this treaty, which has been ratified or acceded to by 165 countries as of 2011, is to prevent a biological attack which could conceivably result in large numbers of civilian casualties and cause severe disruption to economic and societal infrastructure.[citation needed] Many countries, including signatories of the BWC, currently pursue research into the defense or protection against

Biological warfare

16

BW, which is not prohibited by the BWC. A nation or group that can pose a credible threat of mass casualty has the ability to alter the terms on which other nations or groups interact with it. Biological weapons allow for the potential to create a level of destruction and loss of life far in excess of nuclear, chemical or conventional weapons, relative to their mass and cost of development and storage. Therefore, biological agents may be useful as strategic deterrents in addition to their utility as offensive weapons on the battlefield.[2] As a tactical weapon for military use, a significant problem with a BW attack is that it would take days to be effective, and therefore might not immediately stop an opposing force. Some biological agents (smallpox, pneumonic plague) have the capability of person-to-person transmission via aerosolized respiratory droplets. This feature can be undesirable, as the agent(s) may be transmitted by this mechanism to unintended populations, including neutral or even friendly forces. While containment of BW is less of a concern for certain criminal or terrorist organizations, it remains a significant concern for the military and civilian populations of virtually all nations.

History

Warfare

• • •

v t

e [3]

Rudimentary forms of biological warfare have been practiced since antiquity. During the 6th century BC, the Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with a fungus that would render the enemy delirious. In 1346, the bodies of Mongol warriors of the Golden Horde who had died of plague were thrown over the walls of the besieged Crimean city of Kaffa. It has been speculated that this operation may have been responsible for the advent of the Black Death in Europe. The British Marines used smallpox in New South Wales in 1789, having used it as a weapon earlier when they gave contaminated blankets to the Lenape during Pontiac's War (1763–66) and sent infected civilians with smallpox to the Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War.[4] The advent of the germ theory and advances in bacteriology brought a new level of sophistication to the theoretical use of bio-agents in war. Biological sabotage—in the form of anthrax and glanders—was undertaken on behalf of the Imperial German government during World War I (1914–1918), with indifferent results.[5] The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited the use of chemical weapons and biological weapons.

Interwar period and World War II With the onset of World War II, the Ministry of Supply in the United Kingdom established a BW programme at Porton Down, headed by the microbiologist Paul Fildes. The research was championed by Winston Churchill and soon tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism toxins had been effectively weaponized. In particular, Gruinard Island in Scotland, during a series of extensive tests was contaminated with anthrax for the next 48 years. Although the UK never offensively used the biological weapons it developed on its own, its program was the first to successfully weaponize a variety of deadly pathogens and bring them into industrial production. When the USA entered the war, mounting British pressure for the creation of a similar research program for an Allied pooling of resources, led to the creation of a large industrial complex at Fort Detrick, Maryland in 1942 under

Biological warfare

17

the direction of George W. Merck.[6] The biological and chemical weapons developed during that period were tested at the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah. Soon there were facilities for the mass production of anthrax spores, brucellosis, and botulism toxins, although the war was over before these weapons could be of much operational use. The most notorious program of the period was run by the secret Imperial Japanese Army Unit 731 during the war, based at Pingfan in Manchuria and commanded by Lieutenant General Shirō Ishii. This unit did research on BW, conducted often fatal human experiments on prisoners, and produced biological weapons for combat use. Although the Japanese effort lacked the technological sophistication of the American or British programs, it far outstripped them in its widespread application and indiscriminate brutality. Biological weapons were used against both Chinese soldiers and civilians in several military campaigns.[7] In 1940, the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force bombed Ningbo with ceramic bombs full of fleas carrying the bubonic plague.[8] Many of these operations were ineffective due to inefficient delivery systems, although up to 400,000 people may have died.

Postwar period Shiro Ishii, commander of Unit 731

Considerable research into BW was undertaken throughout the Cold War by the US, UK and USSR, and probably other major nations as well, although it is generally believed that such weapons were never used. In Britain, the 1950s saw the weaponization of plague, brucellosis, tularemia and later equine encephalomyelitis and vaccinia viruses, but the programme was unilaterally cancelled in 1956. The United States Army Biological Warfare Laboratories weaponized anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, Q-fever and others. In 1969, the UK and the Warsaw Pact, separately, introduced proposals to the UN to ban biological weapons, and US President Richard Nixon terminated production of biological weapons, allowing only scientific research for defensive measures. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was signed by the US, UK, USSR and other nations, as a ban on "development, production and stockpiling of microbes or their poisonous products except in amounts necessary for protective and peaceful research" in 1972. However, the Soviet Union continued research and production of massive offensive biological weapons in a program called Biopreparat, despite having signed the convention.[9] By 2011, 165 countries had signed the treaty and none are proven—though nine are still suspected—to possess offensive BW programs.

Modern BW operations Offensive It has been argued that rational people would never use biological weapons offensively. The argument is that biological weapons cannot be controlled: the weapon could backfire and harm the army on the offensive, perhaps having even worse effects than on the target. An agent like smallpox or other airborne viruses would almost certainly spread worldwide and ultimately infect the user's home country. However, this argument does not necessarily apply to bacteria. For example, anthrax can easily be controlled and even created in a garden shed. Also, using microbial methods, bacteria can be suitably modified to be effective in only a narrow environmental range, the range of the target that distinctly differs from the army on the offensive. Thus only the target might be affected adversely. The weapon may be further used to bog down an advancing army making them more vulnerable to counterattack by the defending force.

Biological warfare

18

Anti-personnel Ideal characteristics of a biological agent to be used as a weapon against humans are high infectivity, high virulence, non-availability of vaccines, and availability of an effective and efficient delivery system. Stability of the weaponized agent (ability of the agent to retain its infectivity and virulence after a prolonged period of storage) may also be desirable, particularly for military applications, and the ease of creating one is often considered. Control of the spread of the agent may be another desired characteristic. The primary difficulty is not the production of the biological agent, as many biological agents used in weapons can often be manufactured relatively quickly, cheaply and easily. Rather, it is the weaponization, storage and delivery in an effective vehicle to a vulnerable target that pose significant problems.

The international biological hazard symbol

For example, Bacillus anthracis is considered an effective agent for several reasons. First, it forms hardy spores, perfect for dispersal aerosols. Second, this organism is not considered transmissible from person to person, and thus rarely if ever causes secondary infections. A pulmonary anthrax infection starts with ordinary influenza-like symptoms and progresses to a lethal hemorrhagic mediastinitis within 3–7 days, with a fatality rate that is 90% or higher in untreated patients. Finally, friendly personnel can be protected with suitable antibiotics. A large-scale attack using anthrax would require the creation of aerosol particles of 1.5 to 5 µm: larger particles would not reach the lower respiratory tract, while smaller particles would be exhaled back out into the atmosphere. At this size, conductive powders tend to aggregate because of electrostatic charges, hindering dispersion. So the material must be treated to insulate and neutralize the charges. The weaponized agent must be resistant to degradation by rain and ultraviolet radiation from sunlight, while retaining the ability to efficiently infect the human lung. There are other technological difficulties as well, chiefly relating to storage of the weaponized agent. Agents considered for weaponization, or known to be weaponized, include bacteria such as Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., Burkholderia mallei, Burkholderia pseudomallei, Chlamydophila psittaci, Coxiella burnetii, Francisella tularensis, some of the Rickettsiaceae (especially Rickettsia prowazekii and Rickettsia rickettsii), Shigella spp., Vibrio cholerae, and Yersinia pestis. Many viral agents have been studied and/or weaponized, including some of the Bunyaviridae (especially Rift Valley fever virus), Ebolavirus, many of the Flaviviridae (especially Japanese encephalitis virus), Machupo virus, Marburg virus, Variola virus, and Yellow fever virus. Fungal agents that have been studied include Coccidioides spp..[10] Toxins that can be used as weapons include ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, botulinum toxin, saxitoxin, and many mycotoxins. These toxins and the organisms that produce them are sometimes referred to as select agents. In the United States, their possession, use, and transfer are regulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Select Agent Program. The former US biological warfare program categorized its weaponized anti-personnel bio-agents as either Lethal Agents (Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Botulinum toxin) or Incapacitating Agents (Brucella suis, Coxiella burnetii, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, Staphylococcal enterotoxin B).

Biological warfare Anti-agriculture Anti-crop/anti-vegetation/anti-fisheries The United States developed an anti-crop capability during the Cold War that used plant diseases (bioherbicides, or mycoherbicides) for destroying enemy agriculture. Biological weapons also target fisheries as well as water-based vegetation. It was believed that destruction of enemy agriculture on a strategic scale could thwart Sino-Soviet aggression in a general war. Diseases such as wheat blast and rice blast were weaponized in aerial spray tanks and cluster bombs for delivery to enemy watersheds in agricultural regions to initiate epiphytotics (epidemics among plants). When the United States renounced its offensive biological warfare program in 1969 and 1970, the vast majority of its biological arsenal was composed of these plant diseases.[citation needed] Enterotoxins and Mycotoxins were not affected by Nixon's order. Though herbicides are chemicals, they are often grouped with biological warfare and chemical warfare because they may work in a similar manner as biotoxins or bioregulators. The Army Biological Laboratory tested each agent and the Army's Technical Escort Unit was responsible for transport of all chemical, biological, radiological (nuclear) materials. Scorched earth tactics or destroying livestock and farmland were carried out in the Vietnam war (cf. Agent Orange) and Eelam War in Sri Lanka.[citation needed] Biological warfare can also specifically target plants to destroy crops or defoliate vegetation. The United States and Britain discovered plant growth regulators (i.e., herbicides) during the Second World War, and initiated a herbicidal warfare program that was eventually used in Malaya and Vietnam in counterinsurgency operations. Anti-livestock In 1980s Soviet Ministry of Agriculture had successfully developed variants of foot-and-mouth disease, and rinderpest against cows, African swine fever for pigs, and psittacosis to kill chicken. These agents were prepared to spray them down from tanks attached to airplanes over hundreds of miles. The secret program was code-named "Ecology".[] Attacking animals is another area of biological warfare intended to eliminate animal resources for transportation and food. In the First World War, German agents were arrested attempting to inoculate draft animals with anthrax, and they were believed to be responsible for outbreaks of glanders in horses and mules. The British tainted small feed cakes with anthrax in the Second World War as a potential means of attacking German cattle for food denial, but never employed the weapon. In the 1950s, the United States had a field trial with hog cholera.[citation needed] During the Mau Mau Uprising in 1952, the poisonous latex of the African milk bush was used to kill cattle. Unconnected with inter-human wars, humans have deliberately introduced the rabbit disease Myxomatosis, originating in South America, to Australia and Europe, with the intention of reducing the rabbit population – which had devastating but temporary results, with wild rabbit populations reduced to a fraction of their former size but survivors developing immunity and increasing again. Entomological warfare Entomological warfare (EW) is a type of biological warfare that uses insects to attack the enemy. The concept has existed for centuries and research and development have continued into the modern era. EW has been used in battle by Japan and several other nations have developed and been accused of using an entomological warfare program. EW may employ insects in a direct attack or as vectors to deliver a biological agent, such as plague. Essentially, EW exists in three varieties. One type of EW involves infecting insects with a pathogen and then dispersing the insects over target areas.[11] The insects then act as a vector, infecting any person or animal they might bite. Another type of EW is a direct insect attack against crops; the insect may not be infected with any pathogen but instead represents a threat to agriculture. The final method uses uninfected insects, such as bees, wasps, etc., to directly attack the enemy.[12]

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Biological warfare

Defensive Research and development into medical counter-measures In 2010 at The Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction in Geneva[13] the sanitary epidemiological reconnaissance was suggested as well-tested means for enhancing the monitoring of infections and parasitic agents, for practical implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005). The aim was to prevent and minimize the consequences of natural outbreaks of dangerous infectious diseases as well as the threat of alleged use of biological weapons against BTWC States Parties. Role of public health and disease surveillance It is important to note that all classical and modern biological weapons organisms are animal diseases, the only exception being smallpox. Thus, in any use of biological weapons, it is highly likely that animals will become ill either simultaneously with, or perhaps earlier than humans. Indeed, in the largest biological weapons accident known– the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) in the Soviet Union in 1979, sheep became ill with anthrax as far as 200 kilometers from the release point of the organism from a military facility in the southeastern portion of the city (known as Compound 19 and still off limits to visitors today, see Sverdlovsk Anthrax leak). Thus, a robust surveillance system involving human clinicians and veterinarians may identify a bioweapons attack early in the course of an epidemic, permitting the prophylaxis of disease in the vast majority of people (and/or animals) exposed but not yet ill. For example in the case of anthrax, it is likely that by 24–36 hours after an attack, some small percentage of individuals (those with compromised immune system or who had received a large dose of the organism due to proximity to the release point) will become ill with classical symptoms and signs (including a virtually unique chest X-ray finding, often recognized by public health officials if they receive timely reports). By making these data available to local public health officials in real time, most models of anthrax epidemics indicate that more than 80% of an exposed population can receive antibiotic treatment before becoming symptomatic, and thus avoid the moderately high mortality of the disease. Common epidemiologic clues that may signal biological attack • Large numbers of ill persons with a similar disease or syndrome. • Unusual illness in a population. • Higher morbidity and mortality in association with a common disease or syndrome or failure of such patients to respond to usual therapy. • Single case of disease caused by an uncommon agent (i.e. small pox, viral hemorrhagic fever, pulmonary anthrax). • Several unusual or unexplained diseases coexisting in the same patient without any other explanation. • Disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution (i.e. influenza in the summer). • Illness that is unusual (or atypical) for a given population or age group such as an outbreak of measles-like rash in adults. • Unusual disease presentation such as pulmonary instead of cutaneous anthrax. • Similar genetic type among agents isolated from distinct sources at different times or locations. • Unusual, atypical, genetically engineered, or antiquated strain of an agent or antibiotic resistance pattern. • Stable endemic disease with an unexplained increase in incidence (i.e. plague). • Simultaneous clusters of similar illness in non-contiguous areas, domestic or foreign. • Atypical disease transmission through aerosols, food, or water, which suggests deliberate sabotage. • Ill persons who seek treatment at about the same time.

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Biological warfare • No illness in persons who are not exposed to common ventilation systems when illness is seen in persons in close proximity who have a common ventilation system. • Unusual pattern of death or illness among animals, that precedes or accompanies illness or death in humans. Identification of bioweapons The goal of biodefense is to integrate the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities. Health care providers and public health officers are among the first lines of defense. In some countries private, local, and provincial (state) capabilities are being augmented by and coordinated with federal assets, to provide layered defenses against biological weapons attacks. During the first Gulf War the United Nations activated a biological and chemical response team, Task Force Scorpio, to respond to any potential use of weapons of mass destruction on civilians. The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture, food, and water: focusing on the natural or unintentional introduction of a disease is being strengthened by focused efforts to address current and anticipated future biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, and repetitive. The growing threat of biowarfare agents and bioterrorism has led to the development of specific field tools that perform on-the-spot analysis and identification of encountered suspect materials. One such technology, being developed by researchers from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), employs a "sandwich immunoassay", in which fluorescent dye-labeled antibodies aimed at specific pathogens are attached to silver and gold nanowires.[14] In the Netherlands, the company TNO has designed Bioaerosol Single Particle Recognition eQuipment (BiosparQ). This system would be implemented into the national response plan for bioweapons attacks in the Netherlands.[15] Researchers at Ben Gurion University in Israel are developing a different device called the BioPen, essentially a "Lab-in-a-Pen", which can detect known biological agents in under 20 minutes using an adaptation of the ELISA, a similar widely employed immunological technique, that in this case incorporates fiber optics.[16]

Synthetic BW Theoretically, novel approaches in biotechnology, such as synthetic biology could be used in the future to design novel types of biological warfare agents.[17][18][19][20] Special attention has to be laid on future experiments (of concern) that:[21] 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective; Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents; Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent; Would increase transmissibility of a pathogen; Would alter the host range of a pathogen; Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection tools; Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin

Most of the biosecurity concerns in synthetic biology, however, focused on the role of DNA synthesis and the risk of producing genetic material of lethal viruses (e.g. 1918 Spanish flu, polio) in the lab.[22][23][24]

21

Biological warfare

22

List of BW institutions, programs, projects and sites by country United States • Fort Detrick, Maryland • U.S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories (1943–69) • Building 470 • One-Million-Liter Test Sphere • Operation Whitecoat (1954–73) • U.S. biological defense program (1956–present) • United States Army Medical Unit (USAMU; 1956–69) • U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID; 1969–present) • National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) • U.S. entomological warfare program

• • • • • • • •

• Operation Big Itch • Operation Big Buzz • Operation Drop Kick • Operation May Day Project Bacchus Project Clear Vision Project SHAD Project 112 Horn Island Testing Station Fort Terry Granite Peak Installation Vigo Ordnance Plant

United Kingdom • • • • •

Porton Down Gruinard Island Nancekuke Operation Vegetarian (1942-1944) Open-air field tests: • • • • •

Operation Harness off Antigua, 1948–1950. Operation Cauldron off Stornoway, 1952. Operation Hesperus off Stornoway, 1953. Operation Ozone off Nassau, 1954. Operation Negation off Nassau, 1954-5.

Researchers working in Class III cabinets at the U.S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland (1940s).

Biological warfare

Soviet Union and Russia • Biopreparat (18 labs and production centers) • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Stepnagorsk Scientific and Technical Institute for Microbiology, Stepnogorsk, northern Kazakhstan Institute of Ultra Pure Biochemical Preparations, Leningrad, a weaponized plague center Vector State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR), a weaponized smallpox center Institute of Applied Biochemistry, Omutninsk Kirov bioweapons production facility, Kirov, Kirov Oblast Zagorsk smallpox production facility, Zagorsk Berdsk bioweapons production facility, Berdsk Bioweapons research facility, Obolensk Sverdlovsk bioweapons production facility (Military Compound 19), Sverdlovsk, a weaponized anthrax center

Institute of Virus Preparations Poison laboratory of the Soviet secret services Vozrozhdeniya Project Bonfire Project Factor

Japan • • • • •

Unit 731 Zhongma Fortress Kaimingjie germ weapon attack Khabarovsk War Crime Trials Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department

Iraq (passim) • Al Hakum • Salman Pak facility • Al Manal facility

South Africa • • • •

Project Coast Delta G Scientific Company Roodeplaat Research Laboratories Protechnik

23

Biological warfare

24

Canada • Grosse Isle, Quebec, site (1939-45) of research into anthrax and other BW agents • Experimental Station Suffield, Suffield, Alberta

List of people associated with BW Bioweaponeers:

Writers and activists:

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • •

Kanatjan Alibekov, known as Ken Alibek Ira Baldwin Wouter Basson [25] Kurt Blome Eugen von Haagen Anton Dilger Paul Fildes Arthur Galston (unwittingly) [26] Kurt Gutzeit Shiro Ishii Elvin A. Kabat Vladimir Pasechnik William C. Patrick III [27] Sergei Popov Theodor Rosebury Rihab Rashid Taha [28] Erich Traub Auguste Trillat [29] Baron Otto von Rosen Yujiro Wakamatsu [30] Yazid Sufaat

Leonard A. Cole Stephen Endicott Arthur Galston Jeanne Guillemin Edward Hagerman Sheldon H. Harris Nicholas D. Kristof Joshua Lederberg Matthew Meselson Richard Preston Ed Regis Mark Wheelis David Willman

References [1] [2] [3] [4]

Gray, Colin. (2007). Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. Page 265 to 266. Phoenix. ISBN 0-304-36734-6. Informaworld link (http:/ / www. informaworld. com/ smpp/ content~content=a714004040& db=all) http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:War& action=edit British used bioweapon in US war of independence (http:/ / www. newscientist. com/ blogs/ shortsharpscience/ 2011/ 08/ george-washington-biowarrior. html) [5] Koenig, Robert (2006), The Fourth Horseman: One Man's Secret Campaign to Fight the Great War in America, PublicAffairs. [6] Covert, Norman M. (2000), "A History of Fort Detrick, Maryland", 4th Edition: 2000. (http:/ / www. detrick. army. mil/ cutting_edge/ index. cfm?chapter=contents) [7] Hal Gold, Unit 731 testimony, 1996, p.64-66 [8] Japan triggered bubonic plague outbreak, doctor claims, (http:/ / www. independent. co. uk/ news/ world/ asia/ japan-triggered-bubonic-plague-outbreak-doctor-claims-704147. html) [9] Ken Alibek and K Handelman (1999), Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World Trade From the Inside by the Man Who Ran It, New York, NY: Random House. [10] Potential bioweapons (http:/ / www. sciencedirect. com/ science?_ob=ArticleURL& _udi=B6WCJ-4BVPRTS-1& _user=10& _rdoc=1& _fmt=& _orig=search& _sort=d& view=c& _acct=C000050221& _version=1& _urlVersion=0& _userid=10& md5=853a10899e7fadf68b3c6fd459fa2b4a) [11] " An Introduction to Biological Weapons, Their Prohibition, and the Relationship to Biosafety (http:/ / www. sunshine-project. org/ publications/ bk/ pdf/ bk10en. pdf)", The Sunshine Project, April 2002. Retrieved 25 December 2008. [12] Lockwood, Jeffrey A. Six-legged Soldiers: Using Insects as Weapons of War, Oxford University Press, USA, 2008, pp. 9–26, (ISBN 0195333055). [13] http:/ / www. opbw. org/ new_process/ msp2010/ BWC_MSP_2010_WP8_E. pdf [14] Physorg.com, "Encoded Metallic Nanowires Reveal Bioweapons", 12:50 EST, 10 August 2006. (http:/ / www. physorg. com/ news74433040. html) [15] BiosparQ features (http:/ / www. tno. nl/ content. cfm?context=markten& content=case& laag1=178& item_id=832)

Biological warfare [16] Genuth, Iddo ; Fresco-Cohen, Lucille (13 November 2006). "BioPen Senses BioThreats" (http:/ / www. tfot. info/ content/ view/ 96/ 56/ ), The Future of Things [17] Kelle A (2009) Security issues related to synthetic biology. Chapter 7. In: Schmidt M, Kelle A, Ganguli-Mitra A, de Vriend H (eds) Synthetic biology. The technoscience and its societal conse- quences. Springer, Berlin [18] Garfinkel, M., Endy, D., Epstein, G., and Friedman, R. (2007). In Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance. Available at: http:/ / www. jcvi. org/ cms/ research/ projects/ syngen-options/ overview/ . [19] National Security Advisory Board on Biotechnology (NSABB) (2010). Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to Synthetic Biology. Available at: http:/ / oba. od. nih. gov/ biosecurity/ pdf/ NSABB%20SynBio%20-DRAFT%20Report-FINAL%20(2)_6-7-10. pdf. Retrieved 4 September 2010. [20] M.Buller, The potential use of genetic engineering to enhance orthopox viruses as bioweapons. Presentation at the International Conference ‘Smallpox Biosecurity. Preventing the Unthinkable’ (21–22 October 2003) Geneva, Switzerland [21] Kelle A. 2007. Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness In Europe (http:/ / www. synbiosafe. eu/ uploads/ / / pdf/ Synbiosafe-Biosecurity_awareness_in_Europe_Kelle. pdf) . Bradford Science and Technology Report No.9 [22] Tumpej TM et al. 2005. Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus. Science Vol. 310(5745):77–80 [23] Cello, J., Paul, A. V., and Wimmer, E. (2002). Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural template. Science 297, 1016–1018. [24] Wimmer, E., Mueller, S., Tumpey, T. M., and Taubenberger, J. K. (2009). Synthetic viruses: a new opportunity to understand and prevent viral disease. Nat. Biotechnol. 27, 1163–1172. [25] Ute Deichmann, Biologists under Hitler, trans Thomas Dunlap (Harvard 1996). http:/ / books. google. com. bz/ books?id=gPrtE4K0WC8C& pg=PA173& dq=kurt+ blome& hl=en& ei=P3o3TOLMBMKCnQe39rTVAw& sa=X& oi=book_result& ct=result& resnum=1& ved=0CCYQ6AEwAA#v=onepage& q=kurt%20blome& f=false [26] Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for the American Military Tribunals at Nurember, 1946. http:/ / www. mazal. org/ NO-series/ NO-0124-000. htm [27] "Interviews With Biowarriors: Sergei Popov" (http:/ / www. pbs. org/ wgbh/ nova/ bioterror/ biow_popov. html), (2001) NOVA Online. [28] Paul Maddrell, "Operation Matchbox and the Scientific Containment of the USSR", in Peter J. Jackson and Jennifer L. Siegel (eds) Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society. Praeger, 2005.http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=I3Q3_Ww-5SMC& pg=PA194& dq=erich+ traub& hl=en& ei=DyJ_TPDPI4vEsAOvq_nwCg& sa=X& oi=book_result& ct=result& resnum=10& ved=0CE4Q6AEwCQ#v=onepage& q=erich%20traub& f=false [29] Jamie Bisher, "Baron von Rosen's 1916 Anthrax Mission," 2014 (http:/ / anthrax1916. weebly. com) [30] Yazid Sufaat works on anthrax for al-Qaeda (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ security/ profiles/ yazid_sufaat_works_on_anthrax_for_al-qaeda. htm), GlobalSecurity.org

Further reading • Alibek, K. and S. Handelman. Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World– Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran it. Delta (2000) ISBN 0-385-33496-6 • Appel, J. M. Is all fair in biological warfare? The controversy over genetically engineered biological weapons (http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/35/7/429), Journal of Medical Ethics, Volume 35, pp. 429–432 (2009). • Crosby, Alfred W., Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900 (New York, 1986). • Dembek, Zygmunt (editor), Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare (http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/ published_volumes/biological_warfare/biological.html); Washington, DC: Borden Institute (2007). • Endicott, Stephen and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea, Indiana University Press (1998). ISBN 0-253-33472-1 • Fenn, Elizabeth A. "Biological Warfare in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond Jeffery Amherst," Journal of American History (2000) 86#4 pp. 1552–1580 in JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/stable/2567577) • Keith, Jim (1999). Biowarfare In America. Illuminet Press. ISBN 1-881532-21-6 • Knollenberg, Bernhard, "General Amherst and Germ Warfare," Mississippi Valley Historical Review (1954), 41#3 489–494. British war against Indians in 1763 in JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/stable/1897495) • Leitenberg, Milton, and Raymond A. Zilinskas. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Harvard University Press, 2012) 921 pp • Mangold, Tom and Goldberg, Jeff (1999). Plague Wars: a true story of biological warfare. Macmillan, London. ISBN 0-333-71614-0 • Maskiell, Michelle, and Adrienne Mayor. "Killer Khilats: Legends of Poisoned Robes of Honour in India. Parts 1 & 2.” Folklore [London] 112 (Spring and Fall 2001): 23–45, 163–82.

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• Mayor, Adrienne, Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World. Overlook, 2003, rev. ed. 2009. ISBN 1-58567-348-X. • Orent, Wendy (2004). Plague, The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World's Most Dangerous Disease. Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, NY. ISBN 0-7432-3685-8 • Pala, Christopher (19??), Anthrax Island • Preston, Richard (2002), The Demon in the Freezer, New York: Random House. • Rózsa, Lajos 2009. The motivation for biological aggression is an inherent and common aspect of the human behavioural repertoire (http://www.zoologia.hu/list/motivation.pdf). Medical Hypotheses, 72, 217–219. • Woods, Lt Col Jon B. (ed.), USAMRIID’s Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook (http:// www.usamriid.army.mil/education/bluebookpdf/USAMRIID BlueBook 6th Edition - Sep 2006.pdf), 6th edition, U.S. Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland (April 2005). • Zelicoff, Alan and Bellomo, Michael (2005). Microbe: Are we Ready for the Next Plague?. AMACOM Books, New York, NY. ISBN 0-8144-0865-6

External links • Biological weapons and international humanitarian law (http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/ section_ihl_biological_weapons), ICRC • WHO: Health Aspects of Biological and Chemical Weapons (http://www.who.int/emc/pdfs/ BIOWEAPONS_FULL_TEXT2.pdf) • "Biological Warfare" (http://sis.nlm.nih.gov/enviro/biologicalwarfare.html). National Library of Medicine. Retrieved 2013-05-28. • U.S Army site (http://www.usamriid.army.mil)

Chemical warfare Part of a series on

Chemical agents Lethal agents

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Blood agents • •

Cyanogen chloride (CK) Hydrogen cyanide (AC) Blister agents

• • • • • •

Ethyldichloroarsine (ED) Methyldichloroarsine (MD) Phenyldichloroarsine (PD) Lewisite (L) Sulfur mustard (HD, H, HT, HL, HQ) Nitrogen mustard • HN1 • HN2 • HN3 Nerve agents

G-Agents Tabun (GA) Sarin (GB) Soman (GD) Cyclosarin (GF) GV V-Agents EA-3148 VE VG VM VR VX Novichok agents Nettle agents •

Phosgene oxime (CX) Pulmonary agents

• • • •

Chlorine Chloropicrin (PS) Phosgene (CG) Diphosgene (DP)

Incapacitating agents

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Agent 15 (BZ) Dimethylheptylpyran (DMHP) • EA-3167 • Kolokol-1 PAVA spray Sleeping gas Riot control agents

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Pepper spray (OC) CS CN (mace) CR List of chemical warfare agents

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Chemical warfare (CW) involves using the toxic properties of chemical substances as weapons. This type of warfare is distinct from nuclear warfare and biological warfare, which together make up NBC, the military acronym for nuclear, biological, and chemical (warfare or weapons), all of which are considered "weapons of mass destruction" (WMDs). None of these fall under the term conventional weapons which are primarily effective due to their destructive potential. With proper protective equipment, training, and decontamination measures, the primary effects of chemical weapons can be overcome. Many nations possess vast stockpiles of weaponized agents in preparation for wartime use. The threat and the perceived threat have become strategic tools in planning both measures and counter-measures.

Definition Chemical warfare is different from the use of conventional weapons or nuclear weapons because the destructive effects of chemical weapons are not primarily due to any explosive force. The offensive use of living organisms (such as anthrax) is considered biological warfare rather than chemical warfare; however, the use of nonliving toxic products produced by living organisms (e.g. toxins such as botulinum toxin, ricin, and saxitoxin) is considered chemical warfare under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Under this Convention, any toxic chemical, regardless of its origin, is considered a chemical weapon unless it is used for purposes that are not prohibited (an important legal definition known as the General Purpose Criterion).

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About 70 different chemicals have been used or stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the 20th century. The entire class known as Lethal Unitary Chemical Agents and Munitions have been scheduled for elimination by the CWC.[2] Under the Convention, chemicals that are toxic enough to be used as chemical weapons, or that may be used to manufacture such chemicals, are divided into three groups according to their purpose and treatment: • Schedule 1 – Have few, if any, legitimate uses. These may only be produced or used for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes (i.e. testing of chemical weapons sensors and protective clothing). Examples include nerve agents, ricin, lewisite and mustard gas. Any production over 100 g must be reported to the OPCW and a country can have a stockpile of no more than one tonne of these chemicals. • Schedule 2 – Have no large-scale industrial uses, but may have legitimate small-scale uses. Examples include dimethyl methylphosphonate, a precursor to sarin but which is also used as a flame retardant and Thiodiglycol which is a precursor chemical used in the manufacture of mustard gas but is also widely used as a solvent in inks. • Schedule 3 – Have legitimate large-scale industrial uses. Examples include phosgene and chloropicrin. Both have been used as chemical weapons but phosgene is an important precursor in the manufacture of plastics and chloropicrin is used as a fumigant. The OPCW must be notified of, and may inspect, any plant producing more than 30 tonnes per year.

Technology Chemical warfare technology timeline Agents

Dissemination

Protection

Detection

1914

Chlorine Chloropicrin Phosgene Mustard gas

Wind dispersal

Gas masks, urinated-on gauze

Smell

1918

Lewisite

Chemical shells

Gas mask Rosin oil clothing

smell of geraniums

Projectiles w/ central bursters

CC-2 clothing

1920s 1930s G-series nerve agents

1940s

Aircraft bombs

Blister agent detectors Color change paper

Missile warheads Spray tanks

Protective ointment (mustard) Collective protection Gas mask w/ Whetlerite

Aerodynamic

Gas mask w/ water supply

Nerve gas alarm

Binary munitions

Improved gas masks (protection, fit, comfort)

Laser detection

1950s 1960s V-series nerve agents 1970s 1980s 1990s Novichok nerve agents

Chemical warfare

Although crude chemical warfare has been employed in many parts of the world for thousands of years, "modern" chemical warfare began during World War I - see Chemical weapons in World War I. Initially, only well-known commercially available chemicals and their variants were used. These included chlorine and phosgene gas. The methods used to disperse these agents during battle were relatively unrefined and inefficient. Even so, casualties could be heavy, due to the mainly static troop positions which were characteristic features of trench warfare. Germany, the first side to employ chemical warfare on the battlefield, simply opened canisters of chlorine upwind of the opposing side and let the prevailing winds do the dissemination. Soon after, the French modified artillery munitions to contain phosgene – a much more effective method that became the principal means of delivery. A Swedish Army soldier wearing a chemical Since the development of modern chemical warfare in World War I, agent protective suit (C-vätskeskydd) and nations have pursued research and development on chemical weapons protection mask (skyddsmask 90). that falls into four major categories: new and more deadly agents; more efficient methods of delivering agents to the target (dissemination); more reliable means of defense against chemical weapons; and more sensitive and accurate means of detecting chemical agents. Germany was the first to produce chemical agents.

Chemical warfare agents A chemical used in warfare is called a chemical warfare agent (CWA). About 70 different chemicals have been used or stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the 20th and 21st-centuries. These agents may be in liquid, gas or solid form. Liquid agents that evaporate quickly are said to be volatile or have a high vapor pressure. Many chemical agents are made volatile so they can be dispersed over a large region quickly. The earliest target of chemical warfare agent research was not toxicity, but development of agents that can affect a target through the skin and clothing, rendering protective gas masks useless. In July 1917, the Germans employed mustard gas. Mustard gas easily penetrates leather and fabric to inflict painful burns on the skin. Chemical warfare agents are divided into lethal and incapacitating categories. A substance is classified as incapacitating if less than 1/100 of the lethal dose causes incapacitation, e.g., through nausea or visual problems. The distinction between lethal and incapacitating substances is not fixed, but relies on a statistical average called the LD50. Persistency Chemical warfare agents can be classified according to their persistency, a measure of the length of time that a chemical agent remains effective after dissemination. Chemical agents are classified as persistent or nonpersistent. Agents classified as nonpersistent lose effectiveness after only a few minutes or hours or even only a few seconds. Purely gaseous agents such as chlorine are nonpersistent, as are highly volatile agents such as sarin. Tactically, nonpersistent agents are very useful against targets that are to be taken over and controlled very quickly. Apart from the agent used, the delivery mode is very important. To achieve a nonpersistent deployment, the agent is dispersed into very small droplets comparable with the mist produced by an aerosol can. In this form not only the gaseous part of the agent (around 50%) but also the fine aerosol can be inhaled or absorbed through pores in the skin. Modern doctrine requires very high concentrations almost instantly in order to be effective (one breath should contain a lethal dose of the agent). To achieve this, the primary weapons used would be rocket artillery or bombs and

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large ballistic missiles with cluster warheads. The contamination in the target area is only low or not existent and after four hours sarin or similar agents are not detectable anymore. By contrast, persistent agents tend to remain in the environment for as long as several weeks, complicating decontamination. Defense against persistent agents requires shielding for extended periods of time. Non-volatile liquid agents, such as blister agents and the oily VX nerve agent, do not easily evaporate into a gas, and therefore present primarily a contact hazard. The droplet size used for persistent delivery goes up to 1 mm increasing the falling speed and therefore about 80% of the deployed agent reaches the ground, resulting in heavy contamination. This implies, that persistent deployment does not aim at annihilating the enemy but to constrain him. Possible targets include enemy flank positions (averting possible counterattacks), artillery regiments, commando posts or supply lines. Possible weapons to be used are wide spread, because the fast delivery of high amounts is not a critical factor. A special form of persistent agents are thickened agents. These comprise a common agent mixed with thickeners to provide gelatinous, sticky agents. Primary targets for this kind of use include airfields, due to the increased persistency and difficulty of decontaminating affected areas. Classes Chemical weapons are inert agents that come in four categories: choking, blister, blood and nerve.[3] The agents are organized into several categories according to the manner in which they affect the human body. The names and number of categories varies slightly from source to source, but in general, types of chemical warfare agents are as follows: Classes of chemical weapon agents Class of agent

Agent Names

Nerve

• • • • • • • •

Asphyxiant/Blood

• • •

Mode of Action

Signs and Symptoms

Cyclosarin (GF) Sarin (GB) Soman (GD) Tabun (GA) VX VR Some insecticides Novichok agents

Inactivates enzyme acetylcholinesterase, preventing the breakdown of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine in the victim's synapses and causing both muscarinic and nicotinic effects

• • • •

Most Arsines Cyanogen chloride Hydrogen cyanide

•

•

Arsine: Causes intravascular hemolysis that may lead to renal failure. Cyanogen chloride/hydrogen cyanide: Cyanide directly prevents cells from using oxygen. The cells then uses anaerobic respiration, creating excess lactic acid and metabolic acidosis.

Rate of action •

• • •

Miosis (pinpoint pupils) Blurred/dim vision Headache Nausea, vomiting, diarrhea Copious secretions/sweating Muscle twitching/fasciculations Dyspnea Seizures Loss of consciousness

• • • • • • •

Possible cherry-red skin Possible cyanosis Confusion Nausea Patients may gasp for air Seizures prior to death Metabolic acidosis

Immediate onset

• •

•

Vapors: seconds to minutes; Skin: 2 to 18 hours

Persistency VX is persistent and a contact hazard; other agents are non-persistent and present mostly inhalation hazards.

Non-persistent and an inhalation hazard.

Chemical warfare

Vesicant/Blister

33 •

•

• •

Choking/Pulmonary • • • •

Sulfur mustard (HD, H) Nitrogen mustard (HN-1, HN-2, HN-3) Lewisite (L) Phosgene oxime (CX)

Agents are acid-forming • compounds that damages skin and respiratory system, resulting burns and • respiratory problems.

Chlorine Hydrogen chloride Nitrogen oxides Phosgene

Similar mechanism to blister agents in that the compounds are acids or acid-forming, but action is more pronounced in respiratory system, flooding it and resulting in suffocation; survivors often suffer chronic breathing problems.

• • • • • • •

Powerful eye irritation

• •

Lachrymatory agent

• •

Tear gas Pepper spray

Causes severe stinging of the eyes and temporary blindness.

Incapacitating

•

Agent 15 (BZ)

Causes atropine-like • inhibition of acetylcholine in subject. Causes peripheral nervous system effects that are the opposite of those seen in nerve agent poisoning. • • • •

Cytotoxic proteins

Non-living biological proteins, such as: • •

Ricin Abrin

Inhibit protein synthesis

•

•

Severe skin, eye and • mucosal pain and irritation Skin erythema with large fluid blisters that heal slowly and may become infected Tearing, conjunctivitis, • corneal damage Mild respiratory distress to marked airway damage

Airway irritation Eye and skin irritation Dyspnea, cough Sore throat Chest tightness Wheezing Bronchospasm

Immediate to 3 hours

Non-persistent and an inhalation hazard.

Immediate

Non-persistent and an inhalation hazard.

May appear as mass drug • intoxication with erratic behaviors, shared realistic and distinct • hallucinations, disrobing and confusion Hyperthermia Ataxia (lack of coordination) Mydriasis (dilated pupils) Dry mouth and skin Latent period of 4-8 hours, followed by flu-like signs and symptoms Progress within 18-24 hours to: •

•

Inhalation: nausea, cough, dyspnea, pulmonary edema Ingestion: Gastrointestinal hemorrhage with emesis and bloody diarrhea; eventual liver and kidney failure.

Mustards: Persistent and a Vapors: 4 to contact hazard. 6 hours, eyes and lungs affected more rapidly; Skin: 2 to 48 hours Lewisite: Immediate

Inhaled: 30 minutes to 20 hours; Skin: Up to 36 hours after skin exposure to BZ. Duration is typically 72 to 96 hours.

Extremely persistent in soil and water and on most surfaces; contact hazard.

4-24 hours; see Slight; agents symptoms. degrade quickly Exposure by in environment inhalation or injection causes more pronounced signs and symptoms than exposure by ingestion

There are other chemicals used militarily that are not scheduled by the Chemical Weapons Convention, and thus are not controlled under the CWC treaties. These include:

Chemical warfare

34

• Defoliants and herbicides that destroy vegetation, but are not immediately toxic or poisonous to human beings. Their use is classified as herbicidal warfare. Some batches of Agent Orange, for instance, used by the British during the Malayan Emergency and the United States during the Vietnam War, contained dioxins as manufacturing impurities. Dioxins, rather than Agent Orange itself, have long-term cancer effects and for causing genetic damage leading to serious birth deformities. • Incendiary or explosive chemicals (such as napalm, extensively used by the United States during the Korean War and the Vietnam War, or dynamite) because their destructive effects are primarily due to fire or explosive force, and not direct chemical action. Their use is classified as conventional warfare. • Viruses, bacteria, or other organisms. Their use is classified as biological warfare. Toxins produced by living organisms are considered chemical weapons, although the boundary is blurry. Toxins are covered by the Biological Weapons Convention. Designations Most chemical weapons are assigned a one- to three-letter "NATO weapon designation" in addition to, or in place of, a common name. Binary munitions, in which precursors for chemical warfare agents are automatically mixed in shell to produce the agent just prior to its use, are indicated by a "-2" following the agent's designation (for example, GB-2 and VX-2). Some examples are given below: Blood agents: • •

Vesicants:

Cyanogen chloride: CK • Hydrogen cyanide: AC • Pulmonary agents:

•

Phosgene: CG

Incapacitating agents: •

Lachrymatory agents: • •

Pepper spray: OC Tear gas: CN, CS, CR

Lewisite: L Sulfur mustard: H, HD, HS, HT

Quinuclidinyl benzilate: BZ Nerve agents:

• •

Sarin: GB VE, VG, VM, VX

Delivery The most important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is the efficiency of its delivery, or dissemination, to a target. The most common techniques include munitions (such as bombs, projectiles, warheads) that allow dissemination at a distance and spray tanks which disseminate from low-flying aircraft. Developments in the techniques of filling and storage of munitions have also been important. Although there have been many advances in chemical weapon delivery since World War I, it is still difficult to achieve effective dispersion. The dissemination is highly dependent on atmospheric conditions because many chemical agents act in gaseous form. Thus, weather observations and forecasting are essential to optimize weapon delivery and reduce the risk of injuring friendly forces.

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Dispersion Dispersion is placing the chemical agent upon or adjacent to a target immediately before dissemination, so that the material is most efficiently used. Dispersion is the simplest technique of delivering an agent to its target. The most common techniques are munitions, bombs, projectiles, spray tanks and warheads.

Dispersion of chlorine in World War I

World War I saw the earliest implementation of this technique. The actual first chemical ammunition was the French 26 mm cartouche suffocante rifle grenade, fired from a flare carbine. It contained 35g of the tear-producer ethyl bromoacetate, and was used in autumn 1914 – with little effect on the Germans. The Germans on the other hand tried to increase the effect of 10.5 cm shrapnel shells by adding an irritant – dianisidine chlorosulfonate. Its use went unnoticed by the British when it was used against them at Neuve Chapelle in October 1914. Hans Tappen, a chemist in the Heavy Artillery Department of the War Ministry, suggested to his brother, the Chief of the Operations Branch at German General Headquarters, the use of the tear-gases benzyl bromide or xylyl bromide. Shells were tested successfully at the Wahn artillery range near Cologne on 9 January 1915, and an order was placed for 15 cm howitzer shells, designated ‘T-shells’ after Tappen. A shortage of shells limited the first use against the Russians at Bolimów on 31 January 1915; the liquid failed to vaporize in the cold weather, and again the experiment went unnoticed by the Allies. The first effective use were when the German forces at the Second Battle of Ypres simply opened cylinders of chlorine and allowed the wind to carry the gas across enemy lines. While simple, this technique had numerous disadvantages. Moving large numbers of heavy gas cylinders to the front-line positions from where the gas would be released was a lengthy and difficult logistical task. Stockpiles of cylinders had to be stored at the front line, posing a great risk if hit by artillery shells. Gas delivery depended greatly on wind speed and direction. If the wind was fickle, as at Loos, the gas could blow back, causing friendly casualties. Gas clouds gave plenty of warning, allowing the enemy time to protect themselves, though many soldiers found the sight of a creeping gas cloud unnerving. This made the gas doubly effective, as, in addition to damaging the enemy physically, it also had a psychological effect on the intended victims.

Aerial photograph of a German gas attack on Russian forces circa 1916

Another disadvantage was that gas clouds had limited penetration, capable only of affecting the front-line trenches before dissipating. Although it produced limited results in World War I, this technique shows how simple chemical weapon dissemination can be. Shortly after this "open canister" dissemination, French forces developed a technique for delivery of phosgene in a non-explosive artillery shell. This technique overcame many of the risks of dealing with gas in cylinders. First, gas shells were independent of the wind and increased the effective range of gas, making any target within reach of guns vulnerable. Second, gas shells could be delivered without warning, especially the clear, nearly odorless phosgene– there are numerous accounts of gas shells, landing with a "plop" rather than exploding, being initially dismissed as dud high explosive or shrapnel shells, giving the gas time to work before the soldiers were alerted and took

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precautions. The major drawback of artillery delivery was the difficulty of achieving a killing concentration. Each shell had a small gas payload and an area would have to be subjected to saturation bombardment to produce a cloud to match cylinder delivery. A British solution to the problem was the Livens Projector. This was effectively a large-bore mortar, dug into the ground that used the gas cylinders themselves as projectiles - firing a 14 kg cylinder up to 1500 m. This combined the gas volume of cylinders with the range of artillery. Over the years, there were some refinements in this technique. In the 1950s and early 1960s, chemical artillery rockets and cluster bombs contained a multitude of submunitions, so that a large number of small clouds of the chemical agent would form directly on the target. Thermal dissemination Thermal dissemination is the use of explosives or pyrotechnics to deliver chemical agents. This technique, developed in the 1920s, was a major improvement over earlier dispersal techniques, in that it allowed significant quantities of an agent to be disseminated over a considerable distance. Thermal dissemination remains the principal method of disseminating chemical agents today. Most thermal dissemination devices consist of a bomb or projectile shell that contains a chemical agent and a central "burster" charge; when the burster detonates, the agent is expelled laterally. Thermal dissemination devices, though common, are not particularly efficient. First, a percentage of the agent is lost by incineration in the initial blast and by being forced onto the ground. Second, the sizes of the particles vary greatly because explosive dissemination produces a mixture of liquid droplets of variable and difficult to control sizes.

An American-made MC-1 gas bomb

The efficacy of thermal detonation is greatly limited by the flammability of some agents. For flammable aerosols, the cloud is sometimes totally or partially ignited by the disseminating explosion in a phenomenon called flashing. Explosively disseminated VX will ignite roughly one third of the time. Despite a great deal of study, flashing is still not fully understood, and a solution to the problem would be a major technological advance. Despite the limitations of central bursters, most nations use this method in the early stages of chemical weapon development, in part because standard munitions can be adapted to carry the agents.

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37

Aerodynamic dissemination Aerodynamic dissemination is the non-explosive delivery of a chemical agent from an aircraft, allowing aerodynamic stress to disseminate the agent. This technique is the most recent major development in chemical agent dissemination, originating in the mid-1960s.

Soviet chemical weapons canisters from a stockpile in Albania

This technique eliminates many of the limitations of thermal dissemination by eliminating the flashing effect and theoretically allowing precise control of particle size. In actuality, the altitude of dissemination, wind direction and velocity, and the direction and velocity of the aircraft greatly influence particle size. There are other drawbacks as well; ideal deployment requires precise knowledge of aerodynamics and fluid dynamics, and because the agent must usually be dispersed within the boundary layer (less than 200–300 ft above the ground), it puts pilots at risk.

Significant research is still being applied toward this technique. For example, by modifying the properties of the liquid, its breakup when subjected to aerodynamic stress can be controlled and an idealized particle distribution achieved, even at supersonic speed. Additionally, advances in fluid dynamics, computer modeling, and weather forecasting allow an ideal direction, speed, and altitude to be calculated, such that warfare agent of a predetermined particle size can predictably and reliably hit a target.

Protection against chemical warfare Ideal protection begins with nonproliferation treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, and detecting, very early, the signatures of someone building a chemical weapons capability. These include a wide range of intelligence disciplines, such as economic analysis of exports of dual-use chemicals and equipment, human intelligence (HUMINT) such as diplomatic, refugee, and agent reports; photography from satellites, aircraft and drones (IMINT); examination of captured equipment (TECHINT); communications intercepts (COMINT); and detection of chemical manufacturing and chemical agents themselves (MASINT).

Israel Defense Forces "Yanshuf" battalion soldiers at chemical warfare defense exercise

If all the preventive measures fail and there is a clear and present danger, then there is a need for detection of chemical attacks, collective protection, and decontamination. Since industrial accidents can cause dangerous chemical releases (e.g., the Bhopal disaster), these activities are things that civilian, as well as military, organizations must be prepared to carry out. In civilian situations in developed countries, these are duties of HAZMAT organizations, which most commonly are part of fire departments. Detection has been referred to above, as a technical MASINT discipline; specific military procedures, which are usually the model for civilian procedures, depend on the equipment, expertise, and personnel available. When chemical agents are detected, an alarm needs to sound, with specific warnings over emergency broadcasts and the like. There may be a warning to expect an attack. If, for example, the captain of a US Navy ship believes there is a serious threat of chemical, biological, or radiological attack, the crew may be ordered to set Circle William, which means closing all openings to outside air,

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38

running breathing air through filters, and possibly starting a system that continually washes down the exterior surfaces. Civilian authorities dealing with an attack or a toxic chemical accident will invoke the Incident Command System, or local equivalent, to coordinate defensive measures. Individual protection starts with a gas mask and, depending on the nature of the threat, through various levels of protective clothing up to a complete chemical-resistant suit with a self-contained air supply. The US military defines various levels of MOPP (mission-oriented protective posture) from mask to full chemical resistant suits; Hazmat suits are the civilian equivalent, but go farther to include a fully independent air supply, rather than the filters of a gas mask. Collective protection allows continued functioning of groups of people in buildings or shelters, the latter which may be fixed, mobile, or improvised. With ordinary buildings, this may be as basic as plastic sheeting and tape, although if the protection needs to be continued for any appreciable length of time, there will need to be an air supply, typically a scaled-up version of a gas mask. Decontamination Decontamination varies with the particular chemical agent used. Some nonpersistent agents, such as most pulmonary agents such as chlorine and phosgene, blood gases, and nonpersistent nerve gases (e.g., GB) will dissipate from open areas, although powerful exhaust fans may be needed to clear out buildings where they have accumulated. In some cases, it might be necessary to neutralize them chemically, as with ammonia as a neutralizer for hydrogen cyanide or chlorine. Riot control agents such as CS will dissipate in an open area, but things contaminated with CS powder need to be aired out, washed by people wearing protective gear, or safely discarded.

Members of the Ukrainian Army’s 19th Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Battalion practice decontamination drill, at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait

Mass decontamination is a less common requirement for people than equipment, since people may be immediately affected and treatment is the action required. It is a requirement when people have been contaminated with persistent agents. Treatment and decontamination may need to be simultaneous, with the medical personnel protecting themselves so they can function. There may need to be immediate intervention to prevent death, such as injection of atropine for nerve agents. Decontamination is especially important for people contaminated with persistent agents; many of the fatalities after the explosion of a WWII US ammunition ship carrying mustard gas, in the harbor of Bari, Italy, after a German bombing on 2 December 1943, came when rescue workers, not knowing of the contamination, bundled cold, wet seamen in tight-fitting blankets. For decontaminating equipment and buildings exposed to persistent agents, such as blister agents, VX or other agents made persistent by mixing with a thickener, special equipment and materials might be needed. Some type of neutralizing agent will be needed; e.g. in the form of a spraying device with neutralizing agents such as Chlorine, Fichlor, strong alkaline solutions or enzymes. In other cases, a specific chemical decontaminant will be required.

Sociopolitical climate The study of chemicals and their military uses was widespread in China and India. The use of toxic materials has historically been viewed with mixed emotions and moral qualms in the West. The practical and ethical problems surrounding poison warfare appeared in ancient Greek myths about Hercules' invention of poison arrows and Odysseus's use of toxic projectiles. There are many instances of the use of chemical weapons in battles documented in Greek and Roman historical texts; the earliest example was the deliberate poisoning of Kirrha's water supply with hellebore in the First Sacred War, Greece, about 590 BC.[4]

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39

One of the earliest reactions to the use of chemical agents was from Rome. Struggling to defend themselves from the Roman legions, Germanic tribes poisoned the wells of their enemies, with Roman jurists having been recorded as declaring "armis bella non venenis geri", meaning "war is fought with weapons, not with poisons." Yet the Romans themselves resorted to poisoning wells of besieged cities in Anatolia in the 2nd century BCE.[5] Before 1915 the use of poisonous chemicals in battle was typically the result of local initiative, and not the result of an active government chemical weapons program. There are many reports of the isolated use of chemical agents in individual battles or sieges, but there was no true tradition of their use outside of incendiaries and smoke. Despite this tendency, there have been several attempts to initiate large-scale implementation of poison gas in several wars, but with the notable exception of World War I, the responsible authorities generally rejected the proposals for ethical reasons. For example, in 1854 Lyon Playfair (later 1st Baron Playfair, GCB, PC, FRS (1 May 1818 – 29 May 1898), a British chemist, proposed using a cacodyl cyanide-filled artillery shell against enemy ships during the Crimean War. The British Ordnance Department rejected the proposal as "as bad a mode of warfare as poisoning the wells of the enemy."

Efforts to eradicate chemical weapons Nation Albania

CW Possession Known

Signed CWC

Ratified CWC

January 14, 1993 May 11, 1994

Burma (Myanmar) Possible

January 13, 1993 No

China

Probable

January 13, 1993 April 4, 1997

Egypt

Probable

No

India

Known

January 14, 1993 September 3, 1996

Iran

Known

January 13, 1993 November 3, 1997

Israel

Probable

January 13, 1993 No

Japan

Probable

January 13, 1993 September 15, 1995

Libya

Known

No

January 6, 2004 (acceded)

North Korea

Known

No

No

Pakistan

Probable

January 13, 1993 October 28, 1997

Russia

Known

January 13, 1993 November 5, 1997

Serbia and Montenegro

Probable

No

April 20, 2000 (acceded)

Sudan

Possible

No

May 24, 1999 (acceded)

Syria

Known

No

No

Taiwan

Possible

n/a

n/a

United States

Known

January 13, 1993 April 25, 1997

Vietnam

Probable

January 13, 1993 September 30, 1998

No

• August 27, 1874: The Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War is signed, specifically forbidding the "employment of poison or poisoned weapons", although the treaty was not adopted by any nation whatsoever and it never went into effect.

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• September 4, 1900: The First Hague Convention, which includes a declaration banning the "use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases," enters into force. • January 26, 1910: The Second Hague Convention enters into force, prohibiting the use of "poison or poisoned weapons" in warfare. • February 6, 1922: After World War I, the Washington Arms Conference Treaty prohibited the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. It was signed by the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, but France objected to other provisions in the treaty and it never went into effect. • February 8, 1928: The Geneva Protocol enters into force, prohibiting the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices" and "bacteriological methods of warfare".

Chemical weapon proliferation Despite numerous efforts to reduce or eliminate them, some nations continue to research and/or stockpile chemical warfare agents. To the right is a summary of the nations that have either declared weapon stockpiles or are suspected of secretly stockpiling or possessing CW research programs. Notable examples include United States and Russia. In 1997, future US Vice President Dick Cheney opposed the signing ratification of a treaty banning the use chemical weapons, a recently unearthed letter shows. In a letter dated April 8, 1997, then Halliburton-CEO Cheney told Sen. Jesse Helms, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that it would be a mistake for America to join the Convention. "Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention are not likely to ever constitute a military threat to the United States. The governments we should be concerned about are likely to cheat on the CWC, even if they do participate," reads the letter, published by the Federation of American Scientists. The CWC was ratified by the Senate that same month. Since then, Albania, Libya, Russia, the United States, and India have declared over 71,000 metric tons of chemical weapon stockpiles, and destroyed about a third of them. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States and Russia agreed to eliminate the rest of their supplies of chemical weapons by 2012. Not having met its goal, the U.S. government estimates remaining stocks will be destroyed by 2017.[citation needed]

History

Warfare

• • •

v t

e [3]

Chemical warfare

Ancient to medieval times Chemical weapons have been used for millennia in the form of poisoned spears and arrows, but evidence can be found for the existence of more advanced forms of chemical weapons in ancient and classical times.Wikipedia:Please clarify Ancient Greek myths about Hercules poisoning his arrows with the venom of the Hydra Monster are the earliest references to toxic weapons in western literature. Homer's epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, allude to poisoned arrows used by both sides in the legendary Trojan War (Bronze Age Greece). Textual and literary evidence Some of the earliest surviving references to toxic warfare appear in the Indian epics Ramayana and Mahabharata. The "Laws of Manu," a Hindu treatise on statecraft (c. 400 BC) forbids the use of poison and fire arrows, but advises poisoning food and water. Kautilya's "Arthashastra", a statecraft manual of the same era, contains hundreds of recipes for creating poison weapons, toxic smokes, and other chemical weapons. Ancient Greek historians recount that Alexander the Great encountered poison arrows and fire incendiaries in India at Indus Basin in the 4th century BC. Arsenical smokes were known to the Chinese as far back as c. 1000 BC and Sun Tzu's "Art of War" (c. 200 BC) advises the use of fire weapons. In the 2nd century BC, writings of the Mohist sect in China describe the use of bellows to pump smoke from burning balls of mustard and other toxic vegetables into tunnels being dug by a besieging army. Other Chinese writings dating around the same period contain hundreds of recipes for the production of poisonous or irritating smokes for use in war along with numerous accounts of their use. From these accounts we know of the arsenic-containing "soul-hunting fog", and the use of finely divided lime dispersed into the air to suppress a peasant revolt in AD 178. The earliest recorded use of gas warfare in the West dates back to the 5th century BC, during the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. Spartan forces besieging an Athenian city placed a lighted mixture of wood, pitch, and sulfur under the walls hoping that the noxious smoke would incapacitate the Athenians, so that they would not be able to resist the assault that followed. Sparta was not alone in its use of unconventional tactics in ancient Greece: Solon of Athens is said to have used hellebore roots to poison the water in an aqueduct leading from the River Pleistos around 590 BC during the siege of Kirrha. Polish chronicler Jan Długosz mentions usage of poisonous gas by the Mongol army in 1241 in the Battle of Legnica. However, his report is not firsthand, as he was born in the 15th century. According to Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev, Długosz's chronicle is unclear as to what kind of device or gas was used, giving only a description of a noxious smell. Rather, he suggests, this is a repeat of the trope of the Mongols' bad smell as an excuse for their annihilation of European defenders.[6] Historian and philosopher David Hume, in his history of England, recounts how in the reign of Henry III (r.1216 1272) the English Navy destroyed an invading French fleet, by blinding the enemy fleet with "quicklime," the old name for calcium oxide. D’Albiney employed a stratagem against them, which is said to have contributed to the victory: Having gained the wind of the French, he came down upon them with violence; and throwing in their faces a great quantity of quicklime, which he purposely carried on board, he so blinded them, that they were disabled from defending themselves.[7]

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Chemical warfare Archaeological evidence There is archaeological evidence that the Sasanians deployed chemical weapons against the Roman army in 3rd century AD/CE. Research carried out on the collapsed tunnels at Dura-Europos in Syria suggests that the Iranians used bitumen and sulfur crystals to get it burning. When ignited, the materials gave off dense clouds of choking gases which killed 20 Roman soldiers in a matter of 2 minutes.[8]

Rediscovery During the Renaissance, people again considered using chemical warfare. One of the earliest such references is from Leonardo da Vinci, who proposed a powder of sulfide of arsenic and verdigris in the 15th century: throw poison in the form of powder upon galleys. Chalk, fine sulfide of arsenic, and powdered verdegris may be thrown among enemy ships by means of small mangonels, and all those who, as they breathe, inhale the powder into their lungs will become asphyxiated. It is unknown whether this powder was ever actually used. In the late 15th century, Spanish conquistadors encountered a rudimentary type of chemical warfare on the island of Hispaniola. The Taíno threw gourds filled with ashes and ground hot peppers at the Spaniards to create a blinding smoke screen before launching their attack. In the 17th century during sieges, armies attempted to start fires by launching incendiary shells filled with sulfur, tallow, rosin, turpentine, saltpeter, and/or antimony. Even when fires were not started, the resulting smoke and fumes provided a considerable distraction. Although their primary function was never abandoned, a variety of fills for shells were developed to maximize the effects of the smoke. In 1672, during his siege of the city of Groningen, Christoph Bernhard von Galen, the Bishop of Münster, employed several different explosive and incendiary devices, some of which had a fill that included Deadly Nightshade, intended to produce toxic fumes. Just three years later, August 27, 1675, the French and the Holy Roman Empire concluded the Strasbourg Agreement, which included an article banning the use of "perfidious and odious" toxic devices.[citation needed] In 1854, Lyon Playfair, a British chemist, proposed a cacodyl cyanide artillery shell for use against enemy ships as way to solve the stalemate during the siege of Sevastopol. The proposal was backed by Admiral Thomas Cochrane of the Royal Navy. It was considered by the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, but the British Ordnance Department rejected the proposal as "as bad a mode of warfare as poisoning the wells of the enemy." Playfair’s response was used to justify chemical warfare into the next century:[citation needed] There was no sense in this objection. It is considered a legitimate mode of warfare to fill shells with molten metal which scatters among the enemy, and produced the most frightful modes of death. Why a poisonous vapor which would kill men without suffering is to be considered illegitimate warfare is incomprehensible. War is destruction, and the more destructive it can be made with the least suffering the sooner will be ended that barbarous method of protecting national rights. No doubt in time chemistry will be used to lessen the suffering of combatants, and even of criminals condemned to death. Later, during the American Civil War, New York school teacher John Doughty proposed the offensive use of chlorine gas, delivered by filling a 10 inch (254 millimeter) artillery shell with 2 to 3 quarts (2 to 3 liters) of liquid chlorine, which could produce many cubic feet (a few cubic meters) of chlorine gas. Doughty’s plan was apparently never acted on, as it was probably[citation needed] presented to Brigadier General James Wolfe Ripley, Chief of Ordnance, who was described as being congenitally immune to new ideas.Wikipedia:Avoid weasel words A general concern over the use of poison gas manifested itself in 1899 at the Hague Conference with a proposal prohibiting shells filled with asphyxiating gas. The proposal was passed, despite a single dissenting vote from the United States. The American representative, Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, justified voting against the measure on the grounds that "the inventiveness of Americans should not be restricted in the development of new

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Chemical warfare

43

weapons."

World War I The Hague Declaration of 1899 and the Hague Convention of 1907 forbade the use of "poison or poisoned weapons" in warfare, yet more than 124,000 tons of gas were produced by the end of World War I. The French were the first to use chemical weapons during the First World War, using the tear gases, ethyl bromoacetate and chloroacetone. One of Germany's earliest uses of chemical weapons occurred on October 27, 1914 when shells containing the irritant dianisidine chlorosulfonate were fired at British troops near Neuve-Chapelle, France. Germany used another irritant, xylyl bromide, in artillery shells that were fired in January 1915 at the Russians near Bolimów, nowadays in Poland.[9] The first full-scale deployment of deadly chemical warfare agents during World War I, was at the Second Battle of Ypres, on April 22, 1915, when the Germans attacked French, Canadian and Algerian troops with chlorine gas. Deaths were light, though casualties relatively heavy. A total 50,965 tons of pulmonary, lachrymatory, and vesicant agents were deployed by both sides of the conflict, including chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gas. Official figures declare about 1.3 million casualties directly caused by chemical warfare agents during the course of the war. Of these, an estimated 100,000-260,000 casualties were civilians. Nearby civilian towns were at risk from winds blowing the poison gases through. Civilians rarely had a warning system put into place to alert their neighbors of the danger. In addition to poor warning systems, civilians often did not have access to effective gas masks. To this day, unexploded World War I-era chemical ammunition is still uncovered when the ground is dug in former battle or depot areas and continues to pose a threat to the civilian population in Belgium and France and less commonly in other countries.

Tear gas casualties from the Battle of Estaires, April 10, 1918.

A Canadian soldier with mustard gas burns, ca. 1917–1918.

Football team of British soldiers with gas masks, Western front, 1916

After the war, most of the unused German chemical warfare agents were dumped into the Baltic Sea, a common disposal method among all the participants in several bodies of water. Over time, the salt water causes the shell casings to corrode, and mustard gas occasionally leaks from these containers and washes onto shore as a wax-like solid resembling ambergris.

Chemical warfare

Interwar years In 1919, the Royal Air Force dropped arsenic gas on Bolshevik troops during the British intervention in the Russian Civil War.[10] After World War I chemical agents were occasionally used to subdue populations and suppress rebellion. In 1920, the Arab and Kurdish people of Mesopotamia revolted against the British occupation, which cost the British dearly. As the Mesopotamian resistance gained strength, the British resorted to increasingly repressive measures. Much speculation was made about aerial bombardment of major cities with gas in Mesopotamia, with Winston Churchill, then-Secretary of State at the British War Office, arguing in favor of gas.[11][12] The Bolsheviks also employed poison gas in 1921 during the Tambov Rebellion. An order signed by military commanders Tukhachevsky and Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko stipulated: "The forests where the bandits are hiding are to be cleared by the use of poison gas. This must be carefully calculated, so that the layer of gas penetrates the forests and kills everyone hiding there."[13] During the Rif War in Spanish Morocco in 1921–1927, combined Spanish and French forces dropped mustard gas bombs in an attempt to put down the Berber rebellion. (See also: Chemical weapons in the Rif War) In 1925, sixteen of the world's major nations signed the Geneva Protocol, thereby pledging never to use gas in warfare again. Notably, while the United States delegation under Presidential authority signed the Protocol, it languished in the U.S. Senate until 1975, when it was finally ratified. Use of Mustard Gas in Ethiopia by Fascist Italy 1935 In 1935, Fascist Italy used mustard gas during the invasion of Ethiopia in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. Ignoring the Geneva Protocol, which it signed seven years earlier, the Italian military dropped mustard gas in bombs, sprayed it from airplanes, and spread it in powdered form on the ground. 150,000 chemical casualties were reported, mostly from mustard gas. Germany Shortly after the end of World War I, Germany's General Staff enthusiastically pursued a recapture of their preeminent position in chemical warfare. In 1923, Hans von Seeckt pointed the way, by suggesting that German poison gas research move in the direction of delivery by aircraft in support of mobile warfare. Also in 1923, at the behest of the German army, poison gas expert Dr. Hugo Stoltzenberg negotiated with the USSR to build a huge chemical weapons plant at Trotsk, on the Volga river. Collaboration between Germany and the USSR in poison gas continued on and off through the 1920s. In 1924, German officers debated the use of poison gas versus non-lethal chemical weapons against civilians. Chemical warfare was revolutionized by Nazi Germany's discovery of the nerve agents tabun (in 1937) and sarin (in 1939) by Gerhard Schrader, a chemist of IG Farben. IG Farben was Germany's premier poison gas manufacturer during World War II, so the weaponization of these agents can not be considered accidental.[14] Both were turned over to the German Army Weapons Office prior to the outbreak of the war. The nerve agent soman was later discovered by Nobel Prize laureate The chemical structure of Sarin nerve gas, Richard Kuhn and his collaborator Konrad Henkel at the Kaiser developed in Germany (1939) Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research in Heidelberg in spring of 1944. The Nazis developed and manufactured large quantities of several agents, but chemical warfare was not extensively used by either side. Chemical troops were set up (in Germany since 1934) and delivery technology was actively developed.

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World War II Use of blister agents in China by the Imperial Japanese Army since 1937 Despite the 1899 Hague Declaration IV, 2 - Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, Article 23 (a) of the 1907 Hague Convention IV The Laws and Customs of War on Land, and a resolution adopted against Japan by the League of Nations on 14 May 1938, the Imperial Japanese Army frequently used chemical weapons. Because of fear of retaliation however, those weapons were never used against Westerners, but against other Asians judged "inferior" by the imperial propaganda. According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Kentaro Awaya, gas weapons, such as tear gas, were used only sporadically in 1937 but in early 1938, the Imperial Japanese Army began full-scale use of sneeze and nausea gas (red), and from mid-1939, used mustard gas (yellow) against both Kuomintang and Communist Chinese troops.[15]

Japanese Special Naval Landing Force wearing gas masks and rubber gloves during a chemical attack near Chapei in the Battle of Shanghai.

According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, the chemical weapons were authorized by specific orders given by Emperor Hirohito himself, transmitted by the chief of staff of the army. For example, the Emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions during the Battle of Wuhan from August to October 1938.[16] They were also profusely used during the invasion of Changde. Those orders were transmitted either by prince Kotohito Kan'in or general Hajime Sugiyama.[17] The Imperial Japanese Army had used mustard gas and the US-developed (CWS-1918) blister agent Lewisite against Chinese troops and guerrillas. Experiments involving chemical weapons were conducted on live prisoners (Unit 731 and Unit 516). The Japanese also carried chemical weapons as they swept through Southeast Asia towards Australia. Some of these items were captured and analyzed by the Allies. Historian Geoff Plunkett has recorded how Australia covertly imported 1,000,000 chemical weapons from the United Kingdom from 1942 onwards and stored them in many storage depots around the country, including three tunnels in the Blue Mountains to the west of Sydney. They were to be as a retaliatory measure if the Japanese first used chemical weapons. Buried chemical weapons have been recovered at Marrangaroo and Columboola. The causes of the nonuse of poison gas in World War II by Nazi Germany Recovered Nazi documents suggest that German intelligence incorrectly thought that the Allies also knew of these compounds, interpreting their lack of mention in the Allies' scientific journals as evidence that information about them was being suppressed. Germany ultimately decided not to use the new nerve agents, fearing a potentially devastating Allied retaliatory nerve agent deployment. Fisk, Robert (December 30, 2000), "Poison gas from Germany" [18], Independent Wikipedia:Link rot William L. Shirer, in The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, writes that the British high command considered the use of chemical weapons as a last-ditch defensive measure in the event of a Nazi invasion of Britain. Stanley P. Lovell, Deputy Director for Research and Development of the Office of Strategic Services, reports in his book Of Spies and Stratagems that the Allies knew the Germans had quantities of Gas Blau available for use in the defense of the Atlantic Wall. The use of nerve gas on the Normandy beachhead would have seriously impeded the Allies and possibly caused the invasion to fail altogether. He submitted the queston "Why was nerve gas not used in Normandy?" to be asked of Hermann Goering during his interrogation. Goering answered that the reason gas was not used had to do with horses. The Wehrmacht was dependent upon horse-drawn transport to move supplies to their combat units, and had never been able to devise a gas mask horses could tolerate; the versions they developed would

Chemical warfare not pass enough pure air to allow the horses to pull a cart. Thus, gas was of no use to the German Army under most conditions. Probable use of poison gas in Crimea by the German Wehrmacht 1942 One reported incident indicates the German army eventually used poison gas on survivors of the Battle of Kerch on the Eastern Crimean peninsula. After the battle in mid-May 1942, roughly 3000 soldiers and civilians not evacuated by sea were besieged in a series of caves and tunnels in the nearby Adzhimuskai quarry. After holding out for approximately three months, "poison gas was released into the tunnels, killing all but a few score of the Soviet defenders."[19] Accidental release of mustard gas after the German bombing of Bari 1943 On the night of December 2, 1943, German Ju 88 bombers attacked the port of Bari in Southern Italy, sinking several American ships– among them SS John Harvey, which was carrying mustard gas intended for use in retaliation by the Allies if German forces initiated gas warfare. The presence of the gas was highly classified, and authorities ashore had no knowledge of it– which increased the number of fatalities, since physicians, who had no idea that they were dealing with the effects of mustard gas, prescribed treatment improper for those suffering from exposure and immersion. The whole affair was kept secret at the time and for many years after the war. According to the U.S. military account, "Sixty-nine deaths were attributed in whole or in part to the mustard gas, most of them American merchant seamen" out of 628 mustard gas military casualties. The large number of civilian casualties among the Italian population were not recorded. Part of the confusion and controversy derives from the fact that the German attack was highly destructive and lethal in itself, also apart from the accidental additional effects of the gas (it was nicknamed "The Little Pearl Harbor"), and attribution of the causes of death between the gas and other causes is far from easy. Rick Atkinson, in his book The Day of Battle, describes the intelligence that prompted Allied leaders to deploy mustard gas to Italy. This included Italian intelligence that Adolf Hitler had threatened to use gas against Italy if the state changed sides, and prisoner of war interrogations suggesting that preparations were being made to use a "new, egregiously potent gas" if the war turned decisively against Germany. Atkinson concludes that "No commander in 1943 could be cavalier about a manifest threat by Germany to use gas."

Post-war years The earliest successful use of chemical agents in a non-combat setting was in 1946. Motivated by a desire to obtain revenge on Germans for the Holocaust, three members of a Jewish group calling themselves Dahm Y'Israel Nokeam ("Avenging Israel's Blood") hid in a bakery in the Stalag 13 prison camp near Nuremberg, Germany, where several thousand SS troops were being detained. The three applied an arsenic-containing mixture to loaves of bread, sickening more than 2,000 Nazi troops, of whom more than 200 required hospitalization.

North Yemen The first attack of the North Yemen Civil War took place on June 8, 1963 against Kawma, a village of about 100 inhabitants in northern Yemen, killing about seven people and damaging the eyes and lungs of twenty-five others. This incident is considered to have been experimental, and the bombs were described as "home-made, amateurish and relatively ineffective". The Egyptian authorities suggested that the reported incidents were probably caused by napalm, not gas. There were no reports of gas during 1964, and only a few were reported in 1965. The reports grew more frequent in late 1966. On December 11, 1966, fifteen gas bombs killed two people and injured thirty-five. On January 5, 1967, the biggest gas attack came against the village of Kitaf, causing 270 casualties, including 140 fatalities. The target may have been Prince Hassan bin Yahya, who had installed his headquarters nearby. The Egyptian government

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Chemical warfare denied using poison gas, and alleged that Britain and the US were using the reports as psychological warfare against Egypt. On February 12, 1967, it said it would welcome a UN investigation. On March 1, U Thant, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, said he was "powerless" to deal with the matter. On May 10, the twin villages of Gahar and Gadafa in Wadi Hirran, where Prince Mohamed bin Mohsin was in command, were gas bombed, killing at least seventy-five. The Red Cross was alerted and on June 2, it issued a statement in Geneva expressing concern. The Institute of Forensic Medicine at the University of Berne made a statement, based on a Red Cross report, that the gas was likely to have been halogenous derivatives - phosgene, mustard gas, lewisite, chloride or cyanogen bromide. The gas attacks stopped for three weeks after the Six-Day War of June, but resumed on July, against all parts of royalist Yemen. Casualty estimates vary, and an assumption, considered conservative, is that the mustard and phosgene-filled aerial bombs caused approximately 1,500 fatalities and 1,500 injuries. [citation needed]

Cold War After World War II, the Allies recovered German artillery shells containing the three German nerve agents of the day (tabun, sarin, and soman), prompting further research into nerve agents by all of the former Allies. Although the threat of global thermonuclear war was foremost in the minds of most during the Cold War, both the Soviet and Western governments put enormous resources into developing chemical and biological weapons. There is some evidence suggesting that Vietnamese troops used phosgene gas against Cambodian resistance forces in Thailand during the 1984-1985 dry-season offensive on the Thai-Cambodian border.[20][21][22] Developments by the Western governments In 1952, researchers in Porton Down, England, invented the VX nerve agent but soon abandoned the project. In 1958 the British government traded their VX technology with the United States in exchange for information on thermonuclear weapons; by 1961 the U.S. was producing large amounts of VX and performing its own nerve agent research. This research produced at least three more agents; the four agents (VE, VG, VM, VX) are collectively known as the "V-Series" class of nerve agents. Also in 1952, the U.S. Army patented a process for the "Preparation of Toxic Ricin", publishing a method of producing this powerful toxin. United States chemical respiratory protection standardization In December 2001, the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL), along with the U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC), and the U.S. Department of Commerce National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) published the first of six technical performance standards and test procedures designed to evaluate and certify respirators intended for use by civilian emergency responders to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon release, detonation, or terrorism incident. To date NIOSH/NPPTL has published six new respirator performance standards based on a tiered approach that relies on traditional industrial respirator certification policy, next generation emergency response respirator performance requirements, and special live chemical warfare agent testing requirements of the classes of respirators identified to offer respiratory protection against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agent inhalation hazards. These CBRN respirators are commonly known as open-circuit self-contained breathing apparatus (CBRN SCBA), air-purifying respirator (CBRN APR), air-purifying escape respirator (CBRN APER), self-contained escape respirator (CBRN SCER) and loose or tight fitting powered air-purifying respirators (CBRN PAPR). Current NIOSH-approved/certified CBRN respirator concept standards and test procedures can be found at the webpage.[23]

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Chemical warfare United States Senate report A 1994 United States Senate Report, entitled "Is military research hazardous to veterans health? Lessons spanning a half century," detailed the United States Department of Defense's practice of experimenting on animal and human subjects, often without their knowledge or consent. This included: • Approximately 60,000 [US] military personnel were used as human subjects in the 1940s to test the chemical agents mustard gas and lewisite. • Between the 1950s through the 1970s, at least 2,200 military personnel were subjected to various biological agents, referred to as Operation Whitecoat. Unlike most of the studies discussed in this report, Operation Whitecoat was truly voluntary. • Between 1951 and 1969, Dugway Proving Ground was the site of testing for various chemical and biological agents, including an open air aerodynamic dissemination test in 1968 that accidentally killed, on neighboring farms, approximately 6,400 sheep by an unspecified nerve agent. Project SHAD From 1962 to 1973, the Department of Defense planned 134 tests under Project 112, a chemical and biological weapons "vulnerability-testing program." In 2002, the Pentagon admitted for the first time that some of tests used real chemical and biological weapons, not just harmless simulants. Specifically under Project SHAD, 37 secret tests were conducted in California, Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland and Utah. Land tests in Alaska and Hawaii used artillery shells filled with sarin and VX, while Navy trials off the coasts of Florida, California and Hawaii tested the ability of ships and crew to perform under biological and chemical warfare, without the crew's knowledge. The code name for the sea tests was Project Shipboard Hazard and Defense -- "SHAD" for short. In October 2002, the Senate Armed Forces Subcommittee on Personnel held hearings, as the controversial news broke that chemical agents had been tested on thousands of American military personnel. The hearings were chaired by Senator Max Cleland, former VA administrator and Vietnam War veteran. Developments by the Soviet government There have been numerous reports of chemical weapons being used during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, sometimes against civilians.[24][25] Due to the secrecy of the Soviet Union's government, very little information was available about the direction and progress of the Soviet chemical weapons until relatively recently. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian chemist Vil Mirzayanov published articles revealing illegal chemical weapons experimentation in Russia. In 1993, Mirzayanov was imprisoned and fired from his job at the State Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, where he had worked for 26 years. In March 1994, after a major campaign by U.S. scientists on his behalf, Mirzayanov was released.[26] Among the information related by Vil Mirzayanov was the direction of Soviet research into the development of even more toxic nerve agents, which saw most of its success during the mid-1980s. Several highly toxic agents were developed during this period; the only unclassified information regarding these agents is that they are known in the open literature only as "Foliant" agents (named after the program under which they were developed) and by various code designations, such as A-230 and A-232. According to Mirzayanov, the Soviets also developed weapons that were safer to handle, leading to the development of the binary weapons, in which precursors for the nerve agents are mixed in a munition to produce the agent just prior to its use. Because the precursors are generally significantly less hazardous than the agents themselves, this technique makes handling and transporting the munitions a great deal simpler.

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Additionally, precursors to the agents are usually much easier to stabilize than the agents themselves, so this technique also made it possible to increase the shelf life of the agents a great deal. During the 1980s and 1990s, binary versions of several Soviet agents were developed and are designated as "Novichok" agents (after the Russian word for "newcomer"). Together with Lev Fedorov, he told the secret Novichok story exposed in the newspaper The Moscow News.

Iran–Iraq War The Iran–Iraq War began in 1980 when Iraq attacked Iran. Early in the conflict, Iraq began to employ mustard gas and tabun delivered by bombs dropped from airplanes; approximately 5% of all Iranian casualties are directly attributable to the use of these agents.[citation needed]

Chemical weapons employed by Saddam Hussein killed and injured numerous Iranians, and Iraqi kurdish. According to Iraqi documents, assistance in developing chemical weapons was obtained from firms in many countries, including the United States, West Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France.

Victims of Halabja poison gas attack in 1988.

About 100,000 Iranian soldiers were victims of Iraq's chemical attacks. Many were hit by mustard gas. The official estimate does not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood, lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans. Nerve gas agents killed about 20,000 Iranian soldiers immediately, according to official reports. Of the 80,000 survivors, some 5,000 seek medical treatment regularly and about 1,000 are still hospitalized with severe, chronic conditions. Shortly before war ended in 1988, the Iraqi Kurdish village of Halabja was exposed to multiple chemical agents, killing about 5,000 of the town's 50,000 residents.[27] During the Gulf War in 1991, Coalition forces began a ground war in Iranian soldiers had to use full PPE on the front lines of the Iran-Iraq War Iraq. Despite the fact that they did possess chemical weapons, Iraq did not use any chemical agents against coalition forces. The commander of the Allied Forces, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, suggested this may have been due to Iraqi fear of retaliation with nuclear weapons.[citation needed]

Falklands War Technically, the reported employment of tear gas by Argentine forces during the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands constitutes chemical warfare.[28] However, the tear gas grenades were employed as nonlethal weapons to avoid British casualties. The barrack buildings the weapons were used on proved to be deserted in any case. The British claim that more lethal, but legally justifiable as they are not considered chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, white phosphorus grenades were used.[29]

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Terrorism For many terrorist organizations, chemical weapons might be considered an ideal choice for a mode of attack, if they are available: they are cheap, relatively accessible, and easy to transport. A skilled chemist can readily synthesize most chemical agents if the precursors are available. In July 1974, a group calling themselves the Aliens of America successfully firebombed the houses of a judge, two police commissioners, and one of the commissioner’s cars, burned down two apartment buildings, and bombed the Pan Am Terminal at Los Angeles International Airport, killing three people and injuring eight. The organization, which turned out to be a single resident alien named Muharem Kurbegovic, claimed to have developed and possessed a supply of sarin, as well as 4 unique nerve agents named AA1, AA2, AA3, and AA4S. Although no agents were found at the time he was arrested in August 1974, he had reportedly acquired "all but one" of the ingredients required to produce a nerve agent. A search of his apartment turned up a variety of materials, including precursors for phosgene and a drum containing 25 pounds of sodium cyanide. The first successful use of chemical agents by terrorists against a general civilian population was on June 27, 1994, when Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic group based in Japan that believed it necessary to destroy the planet, released sarin gas in Matsumoto, Japan, killing eight and harming 200. The following year, Aum Shinrikyo released sarin into the Tokyo subway system killing 12 and injuring over 5,000. U.S. Navy Seabees don their MCU-2P gas masks

On 29 December 1999, four days after Russian forces began assault of Grozny, Chechen terrorists exploded two chlorine tanks in the town. Because of the wind conditions, no Russian soldiers were injured.[30]

In 2001, after carrying out the attacks in New York City on September 11, the organization Al-Qaeda announced that they were attempting to acquire radiological, biological and chemical weapons. This threat was lent a great deal of credibility when a large archive of videotapes was obtained by the cable television network CNN in August 2002 showing, among other things, the killing of three dogs by an apparent nerve agent. On October 26, 2002, Russian special forces used a chemical agent (presumably KOLOKOL-1, an aerosolized fentanyl derivative), as a precursor to an assault on Chechen terrorists, ending the Moscow theater hostage crisis. All 42 of the terrorists and 120 out of 850 hostages were killed during the raid. Of the hostages who died, all but one or two died from the effects of the agent. In early 2007, multiple terrorist bombings had been reported in Iraq using chlorine gas. These attacks wounded or sickened more than 350 people. Reportedly the bombers were affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq,Wikipedia:Link rot and they have used bombs of various sizes up to chlorine tanker trucks.Wikipedia:Link rot United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the attacks as "clearly intended to cause panic and instability in the country."

Chemical Weapons Treaties The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, or the Geneva Protocol, is an international treaty which prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. Signed into international Law at Geneva on June 17, 1925 and entered into force on February 8, 1928, this treaty states that chemical and biological weapons are "justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world."

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Chemical Weapons Convention The most recent arms control agreement in International Law, the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, or the Chemical Weapons Convention, outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. It is administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), an intergovernmental organisation based in The Hague.

Chemical weapons destruction

States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Light colored territories are those states parties that have declared stockpiles of chemical weapons and/or have known production facilities for chemical weapons.

India In June 1997, India declared that it had a stockpile of 1044 tonnes of sulphur mustard in its possession. India's declaration of its stockpile came after its entry into the Chemical Weapons Convention, that created the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and on January 14, 1993 India became one of the original signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention. By 2005, from among six nations that had declared their possession of chemical weapons, India was the only country to meet its deadline for chemical weapons destruction and for inspection of its facilities by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.[31] By 2006, India had destroyed more than 75 percent of its chemical weapons and material stockpile and was granted an extension to complete a 100 percent destruction of its stocks by April 2009. On May 14, 2009 India informed the United Nations that it has completely destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons.

Iraq The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, welcomed Iraq's decision to join the OPCW as a significant step to strengthening global and regional efforts to prevent the spread and use of chemical weapons. The OPCW announced "The government of Iraq has deposited its instrument of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention with the Secretary General of the United Nations and within 30 days, on 12 February 2009, will become the 186th State Party to the Convention". Iraq has also declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, and because of their recent accession is the only State Party exempted from the destruction time-line.

Japan During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) Japan stored chemical weapons on the territory of mainland China. The weapon stock mostly containing mustard gas-lewisite mixture. The weapons are classified as abandoned chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention and from September 2010 Japan has started their destruction in Nanjing using mobile destruction facilities in order to do so.

Russia Russia signed into the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993 and ratified it on November 5, 1995. Declaring an arsenal of 39,967 tons of chemical weapons in 1997, by far the largest arsenal, consisting of blister agents: Lewisite, Sulfur mustard, Lewisite-mustard mix, and nerve agents: Sarin, Soman, and VX. Russia met its treaty obligations by destroying 1 percent of its chemical agents by the 2002 deadline set out by the Chemical Weapons Convention, but requested an extension on the deadlines of 2004 and 2007 due to technical, financial, and environmental challenges of chemical disposal. Since, Russia has received help from other countries such as Canada which donated C$100,000, plus a further C$100,000 already donated, to the Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction

Chemical warfare Program. This money will be used to complete work at Shchuch'ye and support the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Kizner (Russia), where the destruction of nearly 5,700 tonnes of nerve agent, stored in approximately 2 million artillery shells and munitions, will be undertaken. Canadian funds are also being used for the operation of a Green Cross Public Outreach Office, to keep the civilian population informed on the progress made in chemical weapons destruction activities. As of July 2011, Russia has destroyed 48 percent (18,241 tonnes) of its stockpile at destruction facilities located in Gorny (Saratov Oblast) and Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) - where operations have finished - and Schuch'ye (Kurgan Oblast), Maradykovsky (Kirov Oblast), Leonidovka (Penza Oblast) whilst installations are under construction in Pochep (Bryansk Oblast) and Kizner (Udmurt Republic).[32] As August 2013, 76 percent (30,500 tonnes) were destroyed, and Russia leaves the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which partially funded chemical weapons destruction.

United States On November 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon unilaterally renounced the use of chemical weapons and renounced all methods of biological warfare. He issued a decree halting the production and transport of all chemical weapons which remains in effect. From May 1964 to the early 1970s the USA participated in Operation CHASE, a United States Department of Defense program that aimed to dispose of chemical weapons by sinking ships laden with the weapons in the deep Atlantic. After the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Operation Chase was scrapped and safer disposal methods for chemical weapons were researched, with the U.S. destroying several thousand tons of mustard gas by incineration at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and nearly 4,200 tons of nerve agent by chemical neutralisation at Tooele Army Depot. The U.S. ratified the Geneva Protocol which banned the use of chemical and biological weapons on January 22, 1975. In 1989 and 1990, the U.S. and the Soviet Union entered an agreement to both end their chemical weapons programs, including binary weapons. In April 1997, the United States ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, this banned the possession of most types of chemical weapons. It also banned the development of chemical weapons, and required the destruction of existing stockpiles, precursor chemicals, production facilities, and their weapon delivery systems. The U.S. began stockpile reductions in the 1980s with the removal of outdated munitions and destroying its entire stock of 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ or Agent 15) at the beginning of 1988. In June 1990 the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System began destruction of chemical agents stored on the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific, seven years before the Chemical Weapons Treaty came into effect. In 1986 President Ronald Reagan made an agreement with the Chancellor, Helmut Kohl to remove the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons from Germany. In 1990, as part of Operation Steel Box, two ships were loaded with over 100,000 shells containing Sarin and VX where taken from the U.S. Army weapons storage depots such as Miesau and then-classified FSTS (Forward Storage / Transportation Sites) and transported from Bremerhaven, Germany to Johnston Atoll in the Pacific, a 46-day nonstop journey.[33] In May 1991, President George H. W. Bush committed the United States to destroying all of its chemical weapons and renounced the right to chemical weapon retaliation. In 1993, the United States signed the Chemical Weapons Treaty, which required the destruction of all chemical weapon agents, dispersal systems, and production facilities by April 2012. The U.S. prohibition on the transport of chemical weapons has meant that destruction facilities had to be constructed at each of the U.S.'s nine storage facilities. The U.S. met the first three of the four deadlines set out in the treaty, destroying 45% of its stockpile of chemical weapons by 2007. Due to the destruction of chemical weapons, under the United States policy of Proportional Response, an attack upon the United States or its Allies would trigger a force-equivalent counter-attack. Since the United States only maintains nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is the stated policy that the United States will regard all WMD attacks (Biological, chemical, or nuclear) as a nuclear attack and will respond to such an attack with a nuclear strike.

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Chemical warfare As of 2012, stockpiles have been eliminated at 7 of the 9 chemical weapons depots and 89.75% of the 1997 stockpile has been destroyed by the treaty deadline of April 2012.[34] Destruction will not begin at the two remaining depots until after the treaty deadline and will use neutralization, instead of incineration.

Notes [1] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Chemical_warfare_sidebar& action=edit [2] Disarmament lessons from the Chemical Weapons Convention (http:/ / www. thebulletin. org/ web-edition/ op-eds/ disarmament-lessons-the-chemical-weapons-convention) [3] Gray, Colin. (2007). Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. Page 269. Phoenix. ISBN 0-304-36734-6. [4] Adrienne Mayor, "Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World" Overlook-Duckworth, 2003, rev ed with new Introduction 2008 [5] Mayor 2003 [6] M. Tynyshpaev, Istoriya Kazakhskogo Naroda, Qazaq Universiteti, Almaty, 1993. p. 219 [7] David Hume, History of England, Volume II. [8] Science Daily, dated January 19, 2009 Sciencedaily.com (http:/ / www. sciencedaily. com/ releases/ 2009/ 01/ 090114075921. htm) [9] "The First World War" (http:/ / www. channel4. com/ history/ microsites/ F/ firstworldwar/ cont_harbinger_3. html) (a Channel 4 documentary based on the book by Hew Strachan) [10] Walter E. Grunden: Secret Weapons And World War II: Japan In The Shadow Of Big Science, Lawrence (Kansas) 2005 , S. 172. [11] Was Winston Churchill really "strongly in favor of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes" from the Churchill Papers 16/16, 12 May 1919 at www.winstonchurchill.org (http:/ / www. winstonchurchill. org/ images/ pdfs/ spectator_article. pdf), accessed 10 September 2013 [12] Libcom.org (http:/ / libcom. org/ history/ 1904-2003-history-of-iraq), Libcom 1804-2003: History of Iraq [13] Nicolas Werth, Karel Bartošek, Jean-Louis Panné, Jean-Louis Margolin, Andrzej Paczkowski, Stéphane Courtois, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, Harvard University Press, 1999, hardcover, 858 pages, ISBN 0-674-07608-7 [14] Corum, James S., The Roots of Blitzkrieg, University Press of Kansas, USA, 1992, pp.106-107. [15] Yuki Tanaka, Poison Gas, the Story Japan Would Like to Forget, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1988, p. 16-17 [16] Y. Yoshimi and S. Matsuno, Dokugasusen Kankei Shiryô II, Kaisetsu, Jugonen Sensô Gokuhi Shiryoshu, 1997, p.27-29 [17] Yoshimi and Matsuno, idem, Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2001, p.360-364 [18] http:/ / www. zmag. org/ hussein. htm [19] Merridale,Catherine, Ivan's War, Faber & Faber: pp. 148-150. [20] "KPNLF says Vietnamese Using Suffocant Gas," Bangkok World, January 4, 1985, p. 1. [21] "Viets Accused of Using Gas Against Rebels," Associated Press, Feb 19, 1985. [22] "Thais Report a Clash with Vietnamese Troops," Associated Press, Feb 20, 1985. [23] CDC.gov (http:/ / www. cdc. gov/ niosh/ npptl/ standardsdev/ cbrn/ ) [24] The Story of Genocide in Afghanistan (http:/ / publishing. cdlib. org/ ucpressebooks/ view?docId=ft7b69p12h& chunk. id=ch013& toc. depth=1& toc. id=ch013& brand=eschol) Hassan Kakar [25] Report from Afghanistan (http:/ / www. paulbogdanor. com/ left/ afghan/ report. pdf) Claude Malhuret [26] Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia - Past, Present, and Future, 1994. ISBN 0-374-18104-7 (see pages 325–328) [27] Death Clouds: Saddam Hussein’s Chemical War Against the Kurds (http:/ / www. dlawer. net/ ?q=node/ 79) [28] The Argentine Fight for The Falklands, Lieutenant-Commander Sanchez-Sabarots [29] Falkland Islanders at war, Bound, Graham, Pen and Sword Books Limited, ISBN 1-84415-429-7. [30] Ксения Мяло. Россия и последние войны XX века: к истории падения сверхдержавы. Глава 5: Чеченский узел (http:/ / militera. lib. ru/ research/ myalo_kg/ 05. html). М.: Вече, 2002 [31] India declares its stock of chemical weapons - India Abroad | HighBeam Research (http:/ / www. highbeam. com/ doc/ 1P1-3987660. html) [32] http:/ / cns. miis. edu/ npr/ pdfs/ tucker41. pdf [33] The Oceans and Environmental Security: Shared U.S. and Russian Perspectives. [34] Army Agency Completes Mission to Destroy Chemical Weapons (http:/ / www. cma. army. mil/ fndocumentviewer. aspx?DocID=003683880), USCMA, January 21, 2012

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References • CBWInfo.com (2001). A Brief History of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Ancient Times to the 19th Century (http://www.cbwinfo.com/History/History.html). Retrieved Nov. 24, 2004. • Chomsky, Noam (Mar. 4, 2001). Prospects for Peace in the Middle East (http://www.countercurrents.org/ chomsky1.htm)Wikipedia:Link rot, page 2. Lecture. • Cordette, Jessica, MPH(c) (2003). Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction (http://www.want2race.net/hper/ Chemical_Weapons_of_Mass_Destruction.ppt)Wikipedia:Link rot. Retrieved Nov. 29, 2004. • Croddy, Eric (2001), Chemical and Biological Warfare, Copernicus, ISBN 0-387-95076-1 • Smart, Jeffery K., M.A. (1997). History of Biological and Chemical Warfare (http://www.usuhs.mil/cbw/ history.htm)Wikipedia:Link rot. Retrieved Nov. 24, 2004. • United States Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session. (May 25, 1994). The Riegle Report (http://www.gulfweb.org/ bigdoc/report/riegle1.html). Retrieved Nov. 6, 2004. • Gerard J Fitzgerald. American Journal of Public Health. Washington: Apr 2008. Vol. 98, Iss. 4; p. 611

Further reading • Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher; The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959; L. P. Brophy, W. D. Miles and C. C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field (1959); and B. E. Kleber and D. Birdsell, The Chemical Warfare Service in Combat (1966). official US history; • Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree; International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation 1991 • L. F. Haber. The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War Oxford University Press: 1986 • James W. Hammond Jr; Poison Gas: The Myths Versus Reality Greenwood Press, 1999 • Jiri Janata, Role of Analytical Chemistry in Defense Strategies Against Chemical and Biological Attack (http:// arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-anchem-060908-155242), Annual Review of Analytical Chemistry, 2009 • Ishmael Jones, The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture, Encounter Books, New York 2008, revised 2010, ISBN 978-1-59403-382-7. WMD espionage. • Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson; Shadows and Substance: The Chemical Weapons Convention Westview Press, 1993 • Adrienne Mayor, "Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World" Overlook-Duckworth, 2003, rev ed with new Introduction 2008 • Geoff Plunkett, Chemical Warfare in Australia: Australia's Involvement In Chemical Warfare 1914 - Today, (2nd Edition), 2013. (http://www.bookdepository.co.uk/Chemical-Warfare-Australia-Geoff-Plunkett/ 9780987427908). Leech Cup Books. A volume in the Army Military History Series published in association with the Army History Unit. • Jonathan B. Tucker. Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (2006)

External links • Chemical weapons and international humanitarian law (http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/ section_ihl_chemical_weapons) • ATSDR Case Studies in Environmental Medicine: Cholinesterase Inhibitors, Including Insecticides and Chemical Warfare Nerve Agents (http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/csem/cholinesterase/) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services • Russian Biological and Chemical Weapons (http://russianbiochemicalweapons.blogspot.com/), about the danger posed by non-state weapons transfers • Gaddum Papers at the Royal Society (http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/page.asp?id=5970)

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Chemical Weapons stored in the United States (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/cw.htm) The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OPCW (http://www.opcw.org/) Chemical Warfare in Australia (http://www.mustardgas.org/) Classes of Chemical Agents (http://sis.nlm.nih.gov/enviro/chemicalwarfare.html#a1) U.S. National Library of Medicine Chemical warfare agent potency, logistics, human damage, dispersal, protection and types of agents (bomb-shelter.net) (http://www.bomb-shelter.net/chemical-weapons) "'War of Nerves': A History of Chemical Weapons" (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId=5390710) (interview with Jonathan Tucker from National Public Radio Talk of the Nation program, May 8, 2006 Chemical weapons in World War II (http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/air/ac-gas.html) "Our Army's Defense Against Poison Gas" (http://books.google.com/books?id=AyEDAAAAMBAJ& pg=PA106#v=twopage&q&f=true). Popular Science, February 1945, pp. 106–111.

Nuclear weapon

The mushroom cloud of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Japan on August 9, 1945 rose some 11 miles (18 km) above the bomb's hypocenter.

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A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission or a combination of fission and fusion. Both reactions release vast quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter. The first fission ("atomic") bomb test released the same amount of energy as approximately 20,000 tons of TNT. The first thermonuclear ("hydrogen") bomb test released the same amount of energy as approximately 10,000,000 tons of TNT.[2] A thermonuclear weapon weighing little more than 2,400 pounds (1,100 kg) can produce an explosive force comparable to the detonation of more than 1.2 million tons (1.1 million tonnes) of TNT.[3] Thus, even a small nuclear device no larger than traditional bombs can devastate an entire city by blast, fire, and radiation. Nuclear weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction, and their use and control have been a major focus of international relations policy since their debut.

Nuclear weapon Two nuclear weapons have been used in the course of warfare, both times by the United States near the end of World War II. On 6 August 1945, a uranium gun-type fission bomb code-named "Little Boy" was detonated over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days later, on 9 August, a plutonium implosion-type fission bomb code-named "Fat Man" was exploded over Nagasaki, Japan. These two bombings resulted in the deaths of approximately 200,000 people—mostly civilians—from acute injuries sustained from the explosions. The role of the bombings in Japan's surrender, and their ethical status, remain the subject of scholarly and popular debate. Since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have been detonated on over two thousand occasions for testing purposes and demonstrations. Only a few nations possess such weapons or are suspected of seeking them. The only countries known to have detonated nuclear weapons—and that acknowledge possessing such weapons—are (chronologically by date of first test) the United States, the Soviet Union (succeeded as a nuclear power by Russia), the United Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Israel is also widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, though it does not acknowledge having them.[4] One state, South Africa, fabricated nuclear weapons in the past, but as its apartheid regime was coming to an end it disassembled its arsenal, acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and accepted full-scope international safeguards. The Federation of American Scientists estimates there are more than 17,000 nuclear warheads in the world as of 2012, with around 4,300 of them considered "operational", ready for use.

Types There are two basic types of nuclear weapons: those that derive the majority of their energy from nuclear fission reactions alone, and those that use fission reactions to begin nuclear fusion reactions that produce a large amount of the total energy output.

Fission weapons All existing nuclear weapons derive some of their explosive energy from nuclear fission reactions. Weapons whose explosive output is exclusively from fission reactions are commonly referred to as atomic bombs or atom bombs (abbreviated as A-bombs). This has long been noted as something of a misnomer, as their energy comes from the nucleus of the atom, just as it does with fusion weapons. In fission weapons, a mass of fissile material (enriched uranium or plutonium) is assembled into a supercritical mass—the amount of material needed to start an The two basic fission weapon designs exponentially growing nuclear chain reaction—either by shooting one piece of sub-critical material into another (the "gun" method) or by compressing a sub-critical sphere of material using chemical explosives to many times its original density (the "implosion" method). The latter approach is considered more sophisticated than the former and only the latter approach can be used if the fissile material is plutonium. A major challenge in all nuclear weapon designs is to ensure that a significant fraction of the fuel is consumed before the weapon destroys itself. The amount of energy released by fission bombs can range from the equivalent of just under a ton of TNT, to upwards of 500,000 tons (500 kilotons) of TNT.[5]

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Nuclear weapon All fission reactions necessarily generate fission products, the radioactive remains of the atomic nuclei split by the fission reactions. Many fission products are either highly radioactive (but short-lived) or moderately radioactive (but long-lived), and as such are a serious form of radioactive contamination if not fully contained. Fission products are the principal radioactive component of nuclear fallout. The most commonly used fissile materials for nuclear weapons applications have been uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Less commonly used has been uranium-233. Neptunium-237 and some isotopes of americium may be usable for nuclear explosives as well, but it is not clear that this has ever been implemented, and even their plausible use in nuclear weapons is a matter of scientific dispute.

Fusion weapons The other basic type of nuclear weapon produces a large proportion of its energy in nuclear fusion reactions. Such fusion weapons are generally referred to as thermonuclear weapons or more colloquially as hydrogen bombs (abbreviated as H-bombs), as they rely on fusion reactions between isotopes of hydrogen (deuterium and tritium). All such weapons derive a significant portion, and sometimes a majority, of their energy from fission. This is because a fission weapon is required as a "trigger" for the fusion reactions, and the fusion reactions can themselves trigger additional fission reactions.[6] Only six countries—United States, Russia, United Kingdom, People's Republic of China, France and India—have conducted thermonuclear weapon tests. (Whether India has detonated a "true", multi-staged thermonuclear weapon is controversial.)[7] Thermonuclear weapons are considered much more difficult to successfully design and execute than primitive fission weapons. Almost all of the nuclear weapons deployed today use the thermonuclear design because it is more efficient. Thermonuclear bombs work by using the energy of a fission bomb to compress and heat fusion fuel. In the Teller-Ulam design, which accounts for all multi-megaton yield hydrogen bombs, this is accomplished by placing a fission bomb and fusion fuel (tritium, The basics of the Teller–Ulam design for a hydrogen bomb: a fission bomb uses radiation to deuterium, or lithium deuteride) in proximity within a special, compress and heat a separate section of fusion radiation-reflecting container. When the fission bomb is detonated, fuel. gamma rays and X-rays emitted first compress the fusion fuel, then heat it to thermonuclear temperatures. The ensuing fusion reaction creates enormous numbers of high-speed neutrons, which can then induce fission in materials not normally prone to it, such as depleted uranium. Each of these components is known as a "stage", with the fission bomb as the "primary" and the fusion capsule as the "secondary". In large, megaton-range hydrogen bombs, about half of the yield comes from the final fissioning of depleted uranium. Virtually all thermonuclear weapons deployed today use the "two-stage" design described above, but it is possible to add additional fusion stages—each stage igniting a larger amount of fusion fuel in the next stage. This technique can be used to construct thermonuclear weapons of arbitrarily large yield, in contrast to fission bombs, which are limited in their explosive force. The largest nuclear weapon ever detonated—the Tsar Bomba of the USSR, which released an energy equivalent of over 50 million tons (50 megatons) of TNT—was a three-stage weapon. Most thermonuclear weapons are considerably smaller than this, due to practical constraints from missile warhead space and weight requirements.

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Fusion reactions do not create fission products, and thus contribute far less to the creation of nuclear fallout than fission reactions, but because all thermonuclear weapons contain at least one fission stage, and many high-yield thermonuclear devices have a final fission stage, thermonuclear weapons can generate at least as much nuclear fallout as fission-only weapons.

Other types There are other types of nuclear weapons as well. For example, a boosted fission weapon is a fission bomb that increases its explosive yield through a small amount of fusion reactions, but it is not a fusion bomb. In the boosted bomb, the neutrons produced by the fusion reactions serve primarily to increase the efficiency of the fission bomb. Edward Teller, often referred to as

Some weapons are designed for special purposes; a neutron bomb is a the "father of the hydrogen bomb" thermonuclear weapon that yields a relatively small explosion but a relatively large amount of neutron radiation; such a device could theoretically be used to cause massive casualties while leaving infrastructure mostly intact and creating a minimal amount of fallout. The detonation of any nuclear weapon is accompanied by a blast of neutron radiation. Surrounding a nuclear weapon with suitable materials (such as cobalt or gold) creates a weapon known as a salted bomb. This device can produce exceptionally large quantities of radioactive contamination. Research has been done into the possibility of pure fusion bombs: nuclear weapons that consist of fusion reactions without requiring a fission bomb to initiate them. Such a device might provide a simpler path to thermonuclear weapons than one that required development of fission weapons first, and pure fusion weapons would create significantly less nuclear fallout than other thermonuclear weapons, because they would not disperse fission products. In 1998, the United States Department of Energy divulged that the United States had, "...made a substantial investment" in the past to develop pure fusion weapons, but that, "The U.S. does not have and is not developing a pure fusion weapon", and that, "No credible design for a pure fusion weapon resulted from the DOE investment".[8] Most variation in nuclear weapon design is for the purpose of achieving different yields for different situations, and in manipulating design elements to attempt to minimize weapon size. Antimatter, which consists of particles resembling ordinary matter particles in most of their properties but having opposite electric charge, has been considered as a trigger mechanism for nuclear weapons. A major obstacle is the difficulty of producing antimatter in large enough quantities, and there is no evidence that it is feasible beyond the military domain. However, the U.S. Air Force funded studies of the physics of antimatter in the Cold War, and began considering its possible use in weapons, not just as a trigger, but as the explosive itself. A fourth generation nuclear weapon design is related to, and relies upon, the same principle as Antimatter-catalyzed nuclear pulse propulsion.[9]

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Weapons delivery Nuclear weapons delivery—the technology and systems used to bring a nuclear weapon to its target—is an important aspect of nuclear weapons relating both to nuclear weapon design and nuclear strategy. Additionally, development and maintenance of delivery options is among the most resource-intensive aspects of a nuclear weapons program: according to one estimate, deployment costs accounted for 57% of the total financial resources spent by the United States in relation to nuclear weapons since 1940.[10] Historically the first method of delivery, and the method used in the two nuclear weapons used in warfare, was as a gravity bomb, dropped from bomber aircraft. This is usually the first method that countries developed, as it does not place many restrictions on the size of the weapon and weapon miniaturization requires considerable weapons design knowledge. It does, however, limit attack range, response time to an impending attack, and the number of weapons that a country can field at the same time.

The first nuclear weapons were gravity bombs, such as this "Fat Man" weapon dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. They were very large and could only be delivered by heavy bomber aircraft

With the advent of miniaturization, nuclear bombs can be delivered by both strategic bombers and tactical fighter-bombers, allowing an air force to use its current fleet with little or no modification. This method may still be considered the primary means of nuclear weapons delivery; the majority of U.S. nuclear warheads, for example, are free-fall gravity bombs, namely the B61.Wikipedia:Manual of Style/Dates and numbers#Precise language A demilitarized and commercial launch of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces R-36 ICBM; also known by the NATO reporting name: SS-18 Satan. Upon its first fielding in the late 1960s, the SS-18 remains the single highest throw weight missile delivery system ever built.

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More preferable from a strategic point of view is a nuclear weapon mounted onto a missile, which can use a ballistic trajectory to deliver the warhead over the horizon. Although even short-range missiles allow for a faster and less vulnerable attack, the development of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) has given some nations the ability to plausibly deliver missiles anywhere on the globe with a high likelihood of success. More advanced systems, such as multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), can launch multiple warheads at different targets from one missile, reducing the chance of a successful missile defense. Today, missiles are most common among systems designed for delivery of nuclear weapons. Making a warhead small enough to fit onto a missile, though, can be difficult.

Montage of an inert test of a NATO Trident SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missile), from submerged to the terminal, or re-entry phase, of the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles

Tactical weapons have involved the most variety of delivery types, including not only gravity bombs and missiles but also artillery shells, land mines, and nuclear depth charges and torpedoes for anti-submarine warfare. An atomic mortar was also tested at one time by the United States. Small, two-man portable tactical weapons (somewhat misleadingly referred to as suitcase bombs), such as the Special Atomic Demolition Munition, have been developed, although the difficulty of combining sufficient yield with portability limits their military utility.

Nuclear strategy Nuclear warfare strategy is a set of policies that deal with preventing or fighting a nuclear war. The policy of trying to prevent an attack by a nuclear weapon from another country by threatening nuclear retaliation is known as the strategy of nuclear deterrence. The goal in deterrence is to always maintain a second strike capability (the ability of a country to respond to a nuclear attack with one of its own) and potentially to strive for first strike status (the ability to completely destroy an enemy's nuclear forces before they could retaliate). During the Cold War, policy and military theorists in nuclear-enabled countries worked out models of what sorts of policies could prevent one from ever being attacked by a nuclear weapon, and developed weapon game theory models that create the greatest and most stable deterrence conditions.

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Different forms of nuclear weapons delivery (see above) allow for different types of nuclear strategies. The goals of any strategy are generally to make it difficult for an enemy to launch a pre-emptive strike against the weapon system and difficult to defend against the delivery of the weapon during a potential conflict. Sometimes this has meant keeping the weapon locations hidden, such as deploying them on submarines or land mobile transporter erector launchers whose locations are very hard for an enemy to track, and other times, this means protecting them by burying them in hardened missile silo bunkers. Other components of nuclear strategies have included using missile defense (to destroy the missiles before they land) or implementation of civil defense measures (using early-warning systems to evacuate citizens to safe areas before an attack). Note that weapons designed to threaten large populations, or to generally deter attacks are known as strategic weapons. Weapons designed for use on a battlefield in military situations are called tactical weapons.

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The now decommissioned United States' Peacekeeper missile was an ICBM developed to entirely replace the minuteman missile in the late 1980s. Each missile, like the heavier lift Russian SS-18 Satan, could contain up to ten nuclear warheads (shown in red), each of which could be aimed at a different target. A factor in the development of MIRVs was to make complete missile defense very difficult for an enemy country.

There are critics of the very idea of nuclear strategy for waging nuclear war who have suggested that a nuclear war between two nuclear powers would result in mutual annihilation. From this point of view, the significance of nuclear weapons is purely to deter war because any nuclear war would immediately escalate out of mutual distrust and fear, resulting in mutually assured destruction. This threat of national, if not global, destruction has been a strong motivation for anti-nuclear weapons activism. Critics from the peace movement and within the military establishment[citation needed] have questioned the usefulness of such weapons in the current military climate. According to an advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in 1996, the use of (or threat of use of) such weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, but the court did not reach an opinion as to whether or not the threat or use would be lawful in specific extreme circumstances such as if the survival of the state were at stake. Another deterrence position in nuclear strategy is that nuclear proliferation can be desirable. This view argues that, unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons successfully deter all-out war between states, and they succeeded in doing this during the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gen. Pierre Marie Gallois of France, an adviser to Charles DeGaulle, argued in books like The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age (1961) that mere possession of a nuclear arsenal, what the French called the force de frappe, was enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the spread of nuclear weapons could increase international stability. Some very prominent neo-realist scholars, such as the late Kenneth Waltz, formerly a Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, and John Mearsheimer of University of Chicago, have also argued along the lines of Gallois. Specifically, these scholars have advocated some forms of nuclear proliferation, arguing that it would decrease the likelihood of total war, especially in troubled regions of the world where there exists a unipolar nuclear weapon state. Aside from the public opinion that opposes proliferation in any form, there are two schools of thought on the matter: those, like Mearsheimer, who favor selective proliferation,[11] and those of Kenneth Waltz, who was somewhat more non-interventionist.[12][13] The threat of potentially suicidal terrorists possessing nuclear weapons (a form of nuclear terrorism) complicates the decision process. The prospect of mutually assured destruction may not deter an enemy who expects to die in the confrontation. Further, if the initial act is from a stateless terrorist instead of a sovereign nation, there is no fixed nation or fixed military targets to retaliate against. It has been argued by the New York Times, especially after the

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September 11, 2001 attacks, that this complication is the sign of the next age of nuclear strategy, distinct from the relative stability of the Cold War.[14] In 1996, the United States adopted a policy of allowing the targeting of its nuclear weapons at terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.[15] Robert Gallucci, president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, argues that although traditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe, Gallucci believes that “the United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not solely on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently lead nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent.”. Graham Allison makes a similar case, arguing that the key to expanded deterrence is coming up with ways of tracing nuclear material to the country that forged the fissile material. “After a nuclear bomb detonates, nuclear forensics cops would collect debris samples and send them to a laboratory for radiological analysis. By identifying unique attributes of the fissile material, including its impurities and contaminants, one could trace the path back to its origin.” The process is analogous to identifying a criminal by fingerprints. “The goal would be twofold: first, to deter leaders of nuclear states from selling weapons to terrorists by holding them accountable for any use of their own weapons; second, to give leader every incentive to tightly secure their nuclear weapons and materials.”

Governance, control, and law Because of the immense military power they can confer, the political control of nuclear weapons has been a key issue for as long as they have existed; in most countries the use of nuclear force can only be authorized by the head of government or head of state.[16] In the late 1940s, lack of mutual trust was preventing the United States and the Soviet Union from making ground towards international arms control agreements. The Russell–Einstein Manifesto was issued in London on July 9, 1955 by Bertrand Russell in the midst of the Cold The International Atomic Energy Agency was War. It highlighted the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and called created in 1957 to encourage peaceful for world leaders to seek peaceful resolutions to international conflict. development of nuclear technology while providing international safeguards against nuclear The signatories included eleven pre-eminent intellectuals and proliferation. scientists, including Albert Einstein, who signed it just days before his death on April 18, 1955. A few days after the release, philanthropist Cyrus S. Eaton offered to sponsor a conference—called for in the manifesto—in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Eaton's birthplace. This conference was to be the first of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, held in July 1957. By the 1960s steps were being taken to limit both the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries and the environmental effects of nuclear testing. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) restricted all nuclear testing to underground nuclear testing, to prevent contamination from nuclear fallout, whereas the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) attempted to place restrictions on the types of activities signatories could participate in, with the goal of allowing the transference of non-military nuclear technology to member countries without fear of proliferation. In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established under the mandate of the United Nations to encourage development of peaceful applications for nuclear technology, provide international safeguards against its misuse, and facilitate the application of safety measures in its use. In 1996, many nations signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits all testing of nuclear weapons. A testing ban imposes a significant hindrance to nuclear arms development by any complying country.[17] The Treaty requires the ratification by 44 specific states before it can go into force; as of 2012, the ratification of eight of these states is still required.[]

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Additional treaties and agreements have governed nuclear weapons stockpiles between the countries with the two largest stockpiles, the United States and the Soviet Union, and later between the United States and Russia. These include treaties such as SALT II (never ratified), START I (expired), INF, START II (never ratified), SORT, and New START, as well as non-binding agreements such as SALT I and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives[18] of 1991. Even when they did not enter into force, these agreements helped limit and later reduce the numbers and types of nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Nuclear weapons have also been opposed by agreements between countries. Many nations have been declared Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, areas where nuclear weapons production and deployment are prohibited, through the use of treaties. The Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) prohibited any production or deployment of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Treaty of Pelindaba (1964) prohibits nuclear weapons in many African countries. As recently as 2006 a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone was established amongst the former Soviet republics of Central Asia prohibiting nuclear weapons. In the middle of 1996, the International Court of Justice, the highest court of the United Nations, issued an Advisory Opinion concerned with the "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons". The court ruled that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate various articles of international law, including the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In view of the unique, destructive characteristics of nuclear weapons, the International Committee of the Red Cross calls on States to ensure that these weapons are never used, irrespective of whether they consider them lawful or not.[19] Additionally, there have been other, specific actions meant to discourage countries from developing nuclear arms. In the wake of the tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, economic sanctions were (temporarily) levied against both countries, though neither were signatories with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. One of the stated casus belli for the initiation of the 2003 Iraq War was an accusation by the United States that Iraq was actively pursuing nuclear arms (though this was soon discovered not to be the case as the program had been discontinued). In 1981, Israel had bombed a nuclear reactor being constructed in Osirak, Iraq, in what it called an attempt to halt Iraq's previous nuclear arms ambitions; in 2007, Israel bombed another reactor being constructed in Syria. In 2013, Mark Diesendorf says that governments of France, India, North Korea, Pakistan, UK, and South Africa have used nuclear power and/or research reactors to assist nuclear weapons development or to contribute to their supplies of nuclear explosives from military reactors.

Disarmament Nuclear disarmament refers to both the act of reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a nuclear-free world, in which nuclear weapons are completely eliminated.

The USSR and USA nuclear weapon stockpiles throughout the cold war until 2005, with a precipitous drop in total numbers following the end of the cold war in 1991.

Beginning with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and continuing through the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, there have been many treaties to limit or reduce nuclear weapons testing and stockpiles. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has as one of its explicit conditions that all signatories must "pursue negotiations in good faith" towards the long-term goal of "complete disarmament". The nuclear weapon states have largely treated that aspect of the agreement as "decorative" and without force.[20]

Only one country—South Africa—has ever fully renounced nuclear weapons they had independently developed. The former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine returned Soviet nuclear arms stationed in their countries to Russia after the collapse of the USSR.

Nuclear weapon Proponents of nuclear disarmament say that it would lessen the probability of nuclear war occurring, especially accidentally. Critics of nuclear disarmament say that it would undermine the present nuclear peace and deterrence and would lead to increased global instability. Various American elder statesmen, who were in office during the Cold War period, have recently been advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons. These officials include Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and William Perry. In January 2010, Lawrence M. Krauss stated that "no issue carries more importance to the long-term health and security of humanity than the effort to reduce, and perhaps one day, rid the world of nuclear weapons".[21] In the years after the end of the Cold War, there have been numerous campaigns to urge the abolition of nuclear weapons, such as that organized by the Global Zero movement, and the goal of a "world without nuclear weapons" was advocated by United States President Barack Obama in an April 2009 speech in Prague. A CNN poll from April 2010 indicated that the American public was nearly evenly split on the issue. Some analysts have argued that nuclear weapons have made the world relatively safer, with peace through deterrence and through the stability–instability paradox, including in south Asia.[22][23] Kenneth Ukrainian workers use equipment provided by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency to Waltz has argued that nuclear weapons have helped keep an uneasy dismantle a Soviet-era missile silo. After the end peace, and further nuclear weapon proliferation might even help avoid of the Cold War, Ukraine and the other the large scale conventional wars that were so common prior to their non-Russian, post-Soviet republics relinquished invention at the end of World War II. But former Secretary Henry Soviet nuclear stockpiles to Russia. Kissinger says there is a new danger, which cannot be addressed by deterrence: "The classical notion of deterrence was that there was some consequences before which aggressors and evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation doesn’t operate in any comparable way". George Shultz has said, "If you think of the people who are doing suicide attacks, and people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by definition not deterrable".

United Nations The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) is a department of the United Nations Secretariat established in January 1998 as part of the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's plan to reform the UN as presented in his report to the General Assembly in July 1997. Its goal is to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the strengthening of the disarmament regimes in respect to other weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons. It also promotes disarmament efforts in the area of conventional weapons, especially land mines and small arms, which are often the weapons of choice in contemporary conflicts.

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Controversy Ethics Even before the first nuclear weapons had been developed, scientists involved with the Manhattan Project were divided over the use of the weapon. The role of the two atomic bombings of the country in Japan's surrender and the U.S.'s ethical justification for them has been the subject of scholarly and popular debate for decades. The question of whether nations should have nuclear weapons, or test them, has been continually and nearly universally controversial.[24]

Notable nuclear weapons accidents • February 13, 1950: a Convair B-36B crashed in northern British Columbia after jettisoning a Mark IV atomic bomb. This was the first such nuclear weapon loss in history. • 7 June 1960: the 1960 Fort Dix IM-99 accident destroyed a Boeing CIM-10 Bomarc nuclear missile and shelter and contaminated the BOMARC Missile Accident Site in New Jersey. • 24 January 1961: the 1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash occurred near Goldsboro, North Carolina. A B-52 Stratofortress carrying two Mark 39 nuclear bombs broke up in mid-air, dropping its nuclear payload in the process. • 1965 Philippine Sea A-4 crash, where a Skyhawk attack aircraft with a nuclear weapon fell into the sea. The pilot, the aircraft, and the B43 nuclear bomb were never recovered.[25] It was not until the 1980s that the Pentagon revealed the loss of the one-megaton bomb. • January 17, 1966: the 1966 Palomares B-52 crash occurred when a B-52G bomber of the USAF collided with a KC-135 tanker during mid-air refuelling off the coast of Spain. The KC-135 was completely destroyed when its fuel load ignited, killing all four crew members. The B-52G broke apart, killing three of the seven crew members aboard. Of the four Mk28 type hydrogen bombs the B-52G carried, three were found on land near Almería, Spain. The non-nuclear explosives in two of the weapons detonated upon impact with the ground, resulting in the contamination of a 2-square-kilometer (490-acre) (0.78 square mile) area by radioactive plutonium. The fourth, which fell into the Mediterranean Sea, was recovered intact after a 2½-month-long search. • January 21, 1968: the 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash involved a United States Air Force (USAF) B-52 bomber. The aircraft was carrying four hydrogen bombs when a cabin fire forced the crew to abandon the aircraft. Six crew members ejected safely, but one who did not have an ejection seat was killed while trying to bail out. The bomber crashed onto sea ice in Greenland, causing the nuclear payload to rupture and disperse, which resulted in widespread radioactive contamination.

Nuclear fallout Over 500 atmospheric nuclear weapons tests were conducted at various sites around the world from 1945 to 1980. Radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing was first drawn to public attention in 1954 when the Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test at the Pacific Proving Grounds contaminated the crew and catch of the Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon. One of the fishermen died in Japan seven months later, and the fear of contaminated tuna led to a temporary boycotting of the popular staple in Japan. The incident caused widespread concern around the world, especially regarding the effects of nuclear fallout and atmospheric nuclear testing, and "provided a decisive impetus for the emergence of the anti-nuclear weapons movement in many countries".[] As public awareness and concern mounted over the possible health hazards associated with exposure to the nuclear fallout, various studies were done to assess the extent of the hazard. A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/ National Cancer Institute study claims that fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests would lead to perhaps 11,000 excess deaths amongst people alive during atmospheric testing in the United States from all forms of cancer, including leukemia, from 1951 to well into the 21st century.[26] As of March 2009, the U.S. is the only nation that compensates nuclear test victims. Since the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990, more than $1.38 billion

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in compensation has been approved. The money is going to people who took part in the tests, notably at the Nevada Test Site, and to others exposed to the radiation.[27][28]

Public opposition Peace movements emerged in Japan and in 1954 they converged to form a unified "Japanese Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs". Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific Ocean was widespread, and "an estimated 35 million signatures were collected on petitions calling for bans on nuclear weapons".[29] In the United Kingdom, the first Aldermaston March organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament(CND) took place at Easter 1958, when, according to the CND, several thousand people marched for four days from Trafalgar Square, London, to the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment close to Aldermaston in Berkshire, England, to demonstrate their opposition to nuclear weapons. The Aldermaston marches continued into the late 1960s when tens of thousands of people took part in the four-day marches.

Women Strike for Peace during the Cuban Missile Crisis

In 1959, a letter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists was the start of a successful campaign to stop the Atomic Energy Commission dumping radioactive wasteWikipedia:Manual of Style/Dates and numbers in the sea 19 kilometres from Boston.[30] In 1962, Linus Pauling won the Nobel Peace Prize for his work to stop the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and the "Ban the Bomb" movement spread.[24] Demonstration against nuclear testing in Lyon,

In 1963, many countries ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibiting France, in the 1980s. atmospheric nuclear testing. Radioactive fallout became less of an issue and the anti-nuclear weapons movement went into decline for some years.[31] A resurgence of interest occurred amid European and American fears of nuclear war in the 1980s.[32]

Costs and technology spin-offs According to an audit by the Brookings Institution, between 1940 and 1996, the U.S. spent $8.75 trillion in present day terms[33] on nuclear weapons programs. 57 percent of which was spent on building nuclear weapons delivery systems. 6.3 percent of the total, $549 billion in present day terms, was spent on Environmental remediation and nuclear waste management, for example cleaning up the Hanford site, and 7 percent of the total, $615 billion was spent on making nuclear weapons themselves.[34]

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Non-weapons uses Civil engineering and energy production Apart from their use as weapons, nuclear explosives have been tested and used for various non-military uses. These have included large-scale earth moving and the creation of artificial bays. Due to the inability of the physicists to reduce the fission fraction of small, approximately 1 kiloton, yield nuclear devices that would have been required for many civil engineering projects, when long term health and clean-up costs from fission products were included in the cost, there was virtually no economic advantage over conventional explosives, except for potentially the very largest of projects. The 1962 Sedan nuclear test formed a crater 100 m (330 ft) deep with a diameter of about 390 m (1,300 ft), as a means of investigating the possibilities of using peaceful nuclear explosions for large-scale earth moving. The 140 kiloton Soviet Chagan (nuclear test), comparable in yield to the Sedan test of 104 kt, formed Lake Chagan, reportedly used as a watering hole for cattle and [35][36] human swimming.

At the peak of the Atomic Age, the United States Federal government initiated Operation Plowshare, involving "peaceful nuclear explosions". The United States Atomic Energy Commission chairman announced that the Plowshares project was intended to "highlight the peaceful applications of nuclear explosive devices and thereby create a climate of world opinion that is more favorable to weapons development and tests". The Operation Plowshare program included 27 nuclear tests designed towards investigating these non-weapons uses

from 1961 through 1973. The Qattara Depression Project, as developed by Professor Friedrich Bassler who during his appointment to the West German ministry of economics in 1968 put forth a plan to create a Saharan lake and hydroelectric power station by blasting a tunnel between the Mediterranean sea and the Qattara Depression in Egypt, an area that lies below sea level. The core problem of the entire project was the water supply to the depression. Calculations by Bassler showed that digging a canal or tunnel would be too expensive, therefore Bassler determined that the use of nuclear explosive devices, to excavate the canal or tunnel, would be the most economical. The Egyptian government declined to pursue the idea.[37]

Map of all proposed routes for a tunnel and/or canal route from the Mediterranean Sea to the Qattara Depression. No route was shorter than 55 kilometers in length.

The Soviet Union's Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy was a program in the Soviet Union that investigated non-weapons uses of nuclear explosions. These included one 30 kiloton explosion being used to close the Uzbekistani Urtabulak gas well in 1966 that had been blowing since 1963, and a few months later a 47 kiloton explosive was used to seal a higher pressure blowout at the nearby Pamuk gas field.[38] The public records for devices that produced the highest proportion of their yield via fusion-only reactions are possibly the Soviet peaceful nuclear explosions of the 1970s, with 98% of their 15 kiloton explosive yield being derived from fusion reactions, a total fission fraction of 0.3 kilotons in a 15 kt device.[39][40] The repeated detonation of nuclear devices underground in salt domes, in a somewhat analogous manner to the explosions that power a car internal combustion engine(in that it would be a heat engine) has also been proposed as a means of fusion power, in what is termed PACER.[41] Other investigated uses for peaceful nuclear explosions were underground detonations to stimulate, by a process analogous to fracking, the flow of petroleum and natural gas in tight formations, this was most developed in the Soviet Union, with an increase in the production of many well heads

Nuclear weapon being reported.

Physics The discovery and synthesis of new chemical elements by nuclear transmutation, and their production in the necessary quantities to allow the studying of their properties, was carried out in nuclear explosive device testing. For example, the discovery of the short lived einsteinium and fermium, both created under the intense neutron flux environment within thermonuclear explosions, followed the first Teller-Ulam thermonuclear device test - Ivy Mike. The rapid capture of so many neutrons required in the synthesis of einsteinium would provide the needed direct experimental confirmation of the so-called r-process, the multiple neutron absorptions needed to explain the cosmic nucleosynthesis (production) of all heavy chemical elements heavier than nickel on the periodic table, in supernova explosions, before beta decay, with the r-process explaining the existence of many stable elements in the universe.[42] The element einsteinium was first In 2008 the worldwide presence of new isotopes from atmospheric testing discovered, in minute quantities, beginning in the 1950s was developed into a reliable way of detecting art following the analysis of the fallout forgeries, as all paintings created after that period may contain traces of from the first thermonuclear atmospheric test. caesium-137 and strontium-90, isotopes that did not exist in nature before 1945. Fission products like Cs-137 and Sr-90 did occur in nature prior to 1945, being produced in the natural nuclear fission reactor at Oklo, but almost all traces of them had long since decayed away before the rise of even the earliest known human painting.

Both climatology and particularly aerosol science, a subfield of atmospheric science, were largely created to answer the question of how far and wide fallout would travel. Similar to radioactive tracers used in hydrology and materials testing, fallout and the neutron activation of nitrogen gas served as a radioactive tracer that was used to measure and then help model global circulations in the atmosphere by following the movements of fallout aerosols.[43] After the Van Allen Belts surrounding Earth were published about in 1958, James Van Allen suggested that a nuclear detonation would be one way of probing the magnetic phenomenon, data obtained from the August 1958 Project Argus test shots, a high altitude nuclear explosion investigation, were vital to the early understanding of Earth's magnetosphere.[44] Soviet nuclear physicist and Nobel peace prize recipient Andrei Sakharov also proposed the idea that earthquakes could be mitigated and particle accelerators could be made by utilizing nuclear explosions,[45][46] with the latter created by connecting a nuclear explosive device with another of his inventions, the explosively pumped flux compression generator, to accelerate protons to collide with each other to probe their inner workings, an endeavor that is presently done at much lower energy levels with non-explosive superconducting magnets in CERN. Sakharov suggested to replace the copper coil in his MK generators by a big superconductor solenoid to An artist's conception of the NASA reference design for the Project Orion spacecraft powered magnetically compress and focus underground nuclear explosions into by nuclear pulse propulsion. a shaped charge effect. He theorized this could focus 1023 positively charged protons per second on a 1 mm2 surface, then envisaged making two such beams collide in the form of a supercollider.[47]

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Underground nuclear explosive data from peaceful nuclear explosion test shots have been used to investigate the composition of Earth's mantle, analogous to the exploration geophysics practice of mineral prospecting with chemical explosives in "deep seismic sounding" reflection seismology. Project A119, proposed in the 1960s, which as Apollo scientist Gary Latham explained, would have been the detonating of a "smallish" nuclear device on the Moon in order to facilitate research into its geologic make-up. Analogous in concept to the comparatively low yield explosion created by the water prospecting (LCROSS)Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite mission, which launched in 2009 and released the "Centaur" kinetic energy impactor, an impactor with a mass of 2,305 kg (5,081 lb), and an impact velocity of about 9,000 km/h (5,600 mph), releasing the kinetic energy equivalent of detonating approximately 2 tons of TNT (8.86 GJ).

Propulsion use Although likely never achieving orbit due to aerodynamic drag, the first macroscopic object to obtain Earth orbital velocity was a "manhole cover" propelled by the detonation of test shot Pascal-B, before sputnik obtained orbital velocity, and also successfully became the first satellite, in October 1957. The use of a subterranean shaft and nuclear device to propel an object to escape velocity has since been termed a "thunder well".[48]

A nuclear shaped charge design that was to provide nuclear pulse propulsion to the Project Orion vehicle.

The direct use of nuclear explosives, by using the impact of propellant plasma from a nuclear shaped charge acting on a pusher plate, has also been seriously studied as a potential propulsion mechanism for space travel (see Project Orion).

Edward Teller, in the United States, proposed the use of a nuclear detonation to power an explosively pumped soft X-ray laser as a component of a ballistic missile defense shield, this would destroy missile components by transferring momentum to the vehicles surface by laser ablation. This ablation process is one of the damage mechanisms of a laser weapon, but it is also the basis of pulsed laser propulsion for spacecraft. Ground flight testing by Professor Leik Myrabo, using a non-nuclear, conventionally powered pulsed laser test-bed, successfully lifted a lightcraft 72 meters in altitude by a method similar to ablative laser propulsion in 2000.[49] A powerful solar system based soft X-ray, to ultraviolet, laser system has been calculated to be capable of propelling an interstellar spacecraft, by the light sail principle, to 11% of the speed of light. In 1972 it was also calculated that a 1 Terawatt, 1-km diameter x-ray laser with 1 angstrom wavelength impinging on a 1-km diameter sail, could propel a spacecraft to Alpha Centauri in 10 years.[50]

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Asteroid impact avoidance A proposed means of averting an asteroid impacting with Earth, assuming low lead times between detection and Earth impact, is to detonate one, or a series, of nuclear explosive devices, on, in, or in a stand-off proximity orientation with the asteroid, with the latter method occurring far enough away from the incoming threat to prevent the potential fracturing of the near-Earth object, but still close enough to generate a high thrust laser ablation effect. A 2007 NASA analysis of impact avoidance strategies using various technologies stated:[53] Nuclear stand-off explosions are assessed to be 10-100 times more effective than the non-nuclear alternatives analyzed in this study. Other techniques involving the surface or subsurface use of nuclear explosives may be more efficient, but they run an increased risk of fracturing the target near-Earth object. They also carry higher development and operations risks.

Artist's impression of the impact event that resulted in the Cretaceous–Paleogene extinction event, which killed the Dinosaurs some 65 million years ago. A natural impact with an explosive yield of 100 teratons of TNT [51] (4.2×1023 J). The most powerful man-made explosion, the Tsar Bomba, by comparison had a yield almost 2 million times smaller - 57 [52] megatons of TNT (2.4×1017 J). The 1994 Comet Shoemaker–Levy 9 impacts on planet Jupiter, the Tunguska and Chelyabinsk asteroid–Earth collisions of 1908 and 2013 respectively, have served as an impetus for the analysis of technologies that could prevent the destruction of human life by impact events.

Analysis of the uncertainty involved in nuclear device asteroid deflection shows that the ability to protect the planet does not imply the ability to also target the planet, which is the case with all non-nuclear alternatives, such as the controversial gravity tractor technology. A nuclear explosion that changed an asteroid's velocity by 10 m/s (±20%) would be adequate to push it out of an Earth-impacting orbit. However, if the uncertainty of the velocity change is more than a few plus or minus percent, there would be no chance of directing the asteroid to a particular target. However, if the need arises to use nuclear explosive devices to prevent an asteroid impact event, it may face the legal issue that presently the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty technically ban nuclear weapons in space.

Notes and references [1] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Nuclear_weapons& action=edit [2] See Trinity (nuclear test) and Ivy Mike. [3] Specifically the 1970 to 1980 designed and deployed US B83 nuclear bomb, with a yield of up to 1.2 megatons. [4] See also Mordechai Vanunu [5] The best overall printed sources on nuclear weapons design are: Hansen, Chuck. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History. San Antonio, TX: Aerofax, 1988; and the more-updated Hansen, Chuck. Swords of Armageddon: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development since 1945. Sunnyvale, CA: Chukelea Publications, 1995. [6] Carey Sublette, Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions: 4.5.2 "Dirty" and "Clean" Weapons (http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ Nwfaq/ Nfaq4-5. html#Nfaq4. 5. 2), accessed 10 May 2011. [7] On India's alleged hydrogen bomb test, see Carey Sublette, What Are the Real Yields of India's Test? (http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ India/ IndiaRealYields. html). [8] U.S. Department of Energy, Restricted Data Declassification Decisions, 1946 to the Present (RDD-8) (http:/ / www. fas. org/ sgp/ othergov/ doe/ rdd-8. pdf) (January 1, 2002), accessed November 20, 2011. [9] http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ News/ INESAPTR1. html [10] Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998. See also Estimated Minimum Incurred Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Programs, 1940–1996 (http:/ / www. brook. edu/ fp/ projects/ nucwcost/ figure1. htm), an excerpt from the book. [11] See page 116

Nuclear weapon [12] Kenneth Waltz, "More May Be Better," in Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, eds., The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Norton, 1995). [13] Kenneth Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better," (http:/ / www. mtholyoke. edu/ acad/ intrel/ waltz1. htm) Adelphi Papers, no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). [14] See, for example: Feldman, Noah. " Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2006/ 10/ 29/ magazine/ 29islam. html)," New York Times Magazine (29 October 2006). [15] Daniel Plesch & Stephen Young, "Senseless policy", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=sgsAAAAAMBAJ& printsec=frontcover#v=onepage& q& f=false), November/December 1998, page 4. Fetched from URL on 18 April 2011. [16] In the United States, the President and the Secretary of Defense, acting as the National Command Authority, must jointly authorize the use of nuclear weapons. [17] Richelson, Jeffrey. Spying on the bomb: American nuclear intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea. New York: Norton, 2006. [18] The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on Tactical Nuclear Weapons At a Glance (http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ factsheets/ pniglance), Fact Sheet, Arms Control Association. [19] Nuclear weapons and international humanitarian law (http:/ / www. icrc. org/ web/ eng/ siteeng0. nsf/ htmlall/ section_ihl_nuclear_weapons) International Committee of the Red Cross [20] Gusterson, Hugh, " Finding Article VI (http:/ / www. thebulletin. org/ web-edition/ columnists/ hugh-gusterson/ finding-article-vi)" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (8 January 2007). [21] Lawrence M. Krauss. The Doomsday Clock Still Ticks, Scientific American, January 2010, p. 26. [22] http:/ / www. stimson. org/ images/ uploads/ research-pdfs/ ESCCONTROLCHAPTER1. pdf [23] http:/ / krepon. armscontrolwonk. com/ archive/ 2911/ the-stability-instability-paradox [24] Jerry Brown and Rinaldo Brutoco (1997). Profiles in Power: The Anti-nuclear Movement and the Dawn of the Solar Age, Twayne Publishers, pp. 191-192. [25] Broken Arrows (http:/ / www. atomicarchive. com/ Almanac/ Brokenarrows_static. shtml) at www.atomicarchive.com. Accessed Aug 24, 2007. [26] Exposure of the American Population to Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests (http:/ / books. nap. edu/ catalog. php?record_id=10621) [27] What governments offer to victims of nuclear tests (http:/ / abcnews. go. com/ International/ wireStory?id=7159303) [28] Radiation Exposure Compensation System: Claims to Date Summary of Claims Received by 06/11/2009 (http:/ / www. usdoj. gov/ civil/ omp/ omi/ Tre_SysClaimsToDateSum. pdf) [29] Jim Falk (1982). Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear Power, Oxford University Press, pp. 96–97. [30] Jim Falk (1982). Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear Power, Oxford University Press, p. 93. [31] Jim Falk (1982). Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear Power, Oxford University Press, p. 98. [32] Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), chapters 16 and 19. [33] Consumer Price Index (estimate) 1800–2014 (http:/ / www. minneapolisfed. org/ community_education/ teacher/ calc/ hist1800. cfm). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Retrieved February 27, 2014. [34] Brookings Institution, "Estimated Minimum Incurred Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Programs, 1940-1996", at http:/ / www. brook. edu/ fp/ projects/ nucwcost/ figure1. htm [35] http:/ / www. guinnessworldrecords. com/ world-records/ 1000/ largest-crater-from-an-underground-nuclear-explosion [36] http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ Russia/ Sovwpnprog. html [37] http:/ / www. miktechnology. com/ pdf/ Qattara%20Depression%20Potential%20Paper-IEEE%20Egypt%20Conference. pdf [38] U. S. Department of Energy contract no.: W-7405-Eng48. [39] Disturbing the Universe – Freeman Dyson [40] The Soviet Program for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions (http:/ / www. bibliotecapleyades. net/ ciencia/ ciencia_uranium27. htm) by Milo D. Nordyke. Science & Global Security, 1998, Volume 7, pp. 1-117. See test shot "Taiga". [41] John Nuckolls, "Early Steps Toward Inertial Fusion Energy (IFE)" (http:/ / www. osti. gov/ bridge/ servlets/ purl/ 658936-fpqpjO/ webviewable/ 658936. pdf), LLNL, 12 June 1998 [42] Byrne, J. Neutrons, Nuclei, and Matter, Dover Publications, Mineola, NY, 2011, ISBN 978-0-486-48238-5 (pbk.) pp. 267. [43] Entangled histories: Climate science and nuclear weapons research (http:/ / pne. people. si. umich. edu/ PDF/ Edwards2012EntangledHistoriesBAS. pdf) [44] https:/ / www. fas. org/ irp/ threat/ mctl98-2/ p2sec06. pdf SECTION VI NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS TECHNOLOGY II-6-28. [45] http:/ / www. freewebs. com/ atomicforum/ tsar3. html [46] http:/ / cwihp. si. edu/ pdf/ bull4b. pdf Viktor Adamsky and Yuri Smirnov. 1994. "Moscow's Biggest Bomb: the 50-Megaton Test of October 1961" Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 4, Fall 1994 [47] https:/ / libraries. mit. edu/ archives/ research/ collections/ collections-mc/ mc572. html [48] http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ Usa/ Tests/ Plumbob. html#PascalB [49] http:/ / link. springer. com/ chapter/ 10. 1007/ 978-0-387-30453-3_17 Laser ablation and its applications, Laser Propulsion Thrusters for Space Transportation.

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Nuclear weapon [50] W.E Mockel, Propulsion by impinging Laser beams. Journal of Spacecraft and rockets. 9, no 12 p 942 (1972). [51] Covey et al. [52] Adamsky and Smirnov, 19. [53] http:/ / neo. jpl. nasa. gov/ neo/ report2007. html Near-Earth Object Survey and Deflection Analysis of Alternatives Report to Congress March 2007

Bibliography • Bethe, Hans Albrecht. The Road from Los Alamos. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. ISBN 0-671-74012-1 • DeVolpi, Alexander, Minkov, Vladimir E., Simonenko, Vadim A., and Stanford, George S. Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold War Weaponry. Fidlar Doubleday, 2004 (Two volumes, both accessible on Google Book Search) (Content of both volumes is now available in the 2009 trilogy by Alexander DeVolpi: Nuclear Insights: The Cold War Legacy available on (http://www.Amazon.com). • Glasstone, Samuel and Dolan, Philip J. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (third edition). (http://www.cddc.vt. edu/host/atomic/nukeffct/) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Available online (PDF). (http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/effects/effects.shtml) • NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations (Part I – Nuclear) (http://www.fas.org/ nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/fm8-9/1toc.htm). Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: Washington, D.C., 1996 • Hansen, Chuck. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History. Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1988 • Hansen, Chuck. The Swords of Armageddon: U.S. nuclear weapons development since 1945. Sunnyvale, CA: Chukelea Publications, 1995. (http://www.uscoldwar.com/) • Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. ISBN 0-300-06056-4 • The Manhattan Engineer District, " The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (http://www. atomicarchive.com/Docs/MED/index.shtml)" (1946) • (French) Jean-Hugues Oppel, Réveillez le président, Éditions Payot et rivages, 2007 (ISBN978-2-7436-1630-4). The book is a fiction about the nuclear weapons of France; the book also contains about ten chapters on true historical incidents involving nuclear weapons and strategy. • Smyth, Henry DeWolf. Atomic Energy for Military Purposes. (http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/ SmythReport/index.shtml) Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945. (Smyth Report – the first declassified report by the US government on nuclear weapons) • The Effects of Nuclear War (http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/7906/index.html). Office of Technology Assessment, May 1979. • Rhodes, Richard. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. ISBN 0-684-82414-0 • Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986 ISBN 0-684-81378-5 • Weart, Spencer R. Nuclear Fear: A History of Images. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-674-62836-5 • Weart, Spencer R. The Rise of Nuclear Fear. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. ISBN 0-674-05233-1

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External links • Current World Nuclear Arsenals (http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/database/nukestab.html) has estimates of nuclear arsenals in the respective countries.

General • Nuclear Weapon Archive from Carey Sublette (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/) is a reliable source of information and has links to other sources and an informative FAQ (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/ Nfaq0.html). • The Federation of American Scientists (http://fas.org) provide solid information on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons (http://fas.org/nuke/) and their effects (http://www.fas.org/nuke/ intro/nuke/effects.htm) • Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues (http://alsos.wlu.edu/)—contains many resources related to nuclear weapons, including a historical and technical overview and searchable bibliography of web and print resources. • Everything you wanted to know about nuclear technology (http://www.newscientist.com/channel/mech-tech/ nuclear)—Provided by New Scientist. • Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports regarding Nuclear weapons (http://digital.library.unt.edu/ govdocs/crs/search.tkl?q=nuclear+weapons&search_crit=title&search=Search&date1=Anytime& date2=Anytime&type=form) • Video archive of US, Soviet, UK, Chinese and French Nuclear Weapon Testing (http://sonicbomb.com/ modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=39) at sonicbomb.com (http://www.sonicbomb.com) • The National Museum of Nuclear Science & History (United States) (http://www.nuclearmuseum.org/ )—located in Albuquerque, New Mexico; a Smithsonian Affiliate Museum • Nuclear Emergency and Radiation Resources (http://www.ibiblio.org/rcip/nuclear.html)

Historical • The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb (http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/mp/index.shtml) at AtomicArchive.com • Los Alamos National Laboratory: History (http://www.lanl.gov/history/) (U.S. nuclear history) • Race for the Superbomb (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/), PBS website on the history of the H-bomb • U.S. nuclear test photographs (http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/photos/default.htm) from the DOE Nevada Site Office • U.S. nuclear test film clips (http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/films/default.htm) from the DOE Nevada Site Office • Recordings of recollections of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (http://www.voshn.com) • The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter. org/program/NPIHP/) or NPIHP is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews and other empirical sources.

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Radiological weapon Weapons of mass destruction

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A radiological weapon or radiological dispersion device (RDD) is any weapon that is designed to spread radioactive material with the intent to kill and cause disruption. One version, known as a dirty bomb, is not a true nuclear weapon and does not yield the same explosive power. It uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive material, most commonly the spent fuels from nuclear power plants or radioactive medical waste. Another version is the salted bomb, a true nuclear weapon designed to produce larger amounts of nuclear fallout than a regular nuclear weapon.

Explanation Radiological weapons of mass destruction have been suggested as a possible weapon of terrorism used to create panic and casualties in densely populated areas. They could also render a great deal of property uninhabitable for an extended period, unless costly remediation were undertaken. The radiological source and quality greatly impacts the effectiveness of a radiological weapon. Factors such as: energy and type of radiation, half-life, longevity, availability, shielding, portability, and the role of the environment will determine the effect of the radiological weapon. Radioisotopes that pose the greatest security risk include: 137Cs, used in radiological medical equipment, 60Co, 241Am, 252Cf, 192Ir, 238Pu, 90Sr, and 226Ra. All of these isotopes, except for the final one, are created in nuclear power plants. While the amount of radiation dispersed from the event will likely be minimal, the fact of any radiation may be enough to cause panic and disruption.

History The professional history of radioactive weaponry may be traced to a 1943 memo from James Bryant Conant, Arthur Holly Compton, and Harold Urey, to Brigadier General Leslie Groves of the Manhattan Project and to a 1940 science fiction story, "Solution Unsatisfactory"[1] by Lt. J. G. Robert A. Heinlein, USN(R). Transmitting a report entitled, "Use of Radioactive Materials as a Military Weapon," the Groves memo states: As a gas warfare instrument the material would ... be inhaled by personnel. The amount necessary to cause death to a person inhaling the material is extremely small. It has been estimated that one millionth of a gram accumulating in a person's body would be fatal. There are no known methods of treatment for such a casualty.... It cannot be detected by the senses; It can be distributed in a dust or smoke form so finely powdered that it will permeate a standard gas mask filter in quantities large enough to be extremely

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damaging.... Radioactive warfare can be used [...] To make evacuated areas uninhabitable; To contaminate small critical areas such as rail-road yards and airports; As a radioactive poison gas to create casualties among troops; Against large cities, to promote panic, and create casualties among civilian populations. Areas so contaminated by radioactive dusts and smokes, would be dangerous as long as a high enough concentration of material could be maintained.... they can be stirred up as a fine dust from the terrain by winds, movement of vehicles or troops, etc., and would remain a potential hazard for a long time. These materials may also be so disposed as to be taken into the body by ingestion instead of inhalation. Reservoirs or wells would be contaminated or food poisoned with an effect similar to that resulting from inhalation of dust or smoke. Four days production could contaminate a million gallons of water to an extent that a quart drunk in one day would probably result in complete incapacitation or death in about a month's time. The United States, however, chose not to pursue radiological weapons during World War II, though early on in the project considered it as a backup plan in case nuclear fission proved impossible to tame. Some US policymakers and scientists involved in the project felt that radiological weapons would qualify as chemical weapons and thus violate international law.

Deployment One possible way of dispersing the material is by using a dirty bomb, a conventional explosive which disperses radioactive material. Dirty bombs are not a type of nuclear weapon, which requires a nuclear chain reaction and the creation of a critical mass. Whereas a nuclear weapon will usually create mass casualties immediately following the blast, a dirty bomb scenario would initially cause only minimal casualties from the conventional explosion. Means of radiological warfare that do not rely on any specific weapon, but rather on spreading radioactive contamination via a food chain or water table, seem to be more effective in some ways, but share many of the same problems as chemical warfare.

October 30, 1943 memo from Drs. Conant, Compton, and Urey to Brigadier General L. R. Groves, Manhattan District, Oak Ridge, Tennessee; declassified June 5, 1974.

Military uses Radiological weapons are widely considered to be militarily useless for a state-sponsored army and are initially not hoped to be used by any military forces. Firstly, the use of such a weapon is of no use to an occupying force, as the target area becomes uninhabitable (due to the fallout caused by radioactive poisoning of the involved environment). Furthermore, area-denial weapons are generally of limited use to an attacking army, as it slows the rate of advance.

Dirty bombs A dirty bomb is a radiological weapon dispersed with conventional explosives. There is currently (as of 2007) an ongoing debate about the damage that terrorists using such a weapon might inflict. Many experts believe that a dirty bomb such that terrorists might reasonably be able to construct would be unlikely to harm more than a few people and hence it would be no more deadly than a conventional bomb. Furthermore, the

Radiological weapon casualties would be a result of the initial explosion, because alpha and beta emitting material needs to be inhaled to do damage to the human body. Gamma radiation emitting material is so radioactive that it can't be deployed without wrapping an amount of shielding material around the bomb that would make transport by car or plane impossible without risking detection. Because of this a dirty bomb with radioactive material around an explosive device would be almost useless, unless said shielding was removed shortly before detonation. This is not only because of the effectiveness but also because this material would be easy to clean up. Furthermore, the possibility of terrorists making a gas or aerosol that is radioactive is very unlikely because of the complex chemical work to achieve this goal. Hence, this line of argument goes, the objectively dominant effect would be the moral and economic damage due to the massive fear and panic such an incident would spur. On the other hand, some believe that the fatalities and injuries might be in fact much more severe. This point was made by physicist Peter D. Zimmerman (King's College London) who reexamined the Goiânia accident which is arguably comparable.[2] and popularized in a subsequent fictionalized account produced by the BBC and broadcast in the United States by PBS.[3] The latter program showed how shielding might be used to minimize the detection risk.

Salted bomb A salted bomb is a theoretical nuclear weapon designed to produce enhanced quantities of radioactive fallout, rendering a large area uninhabitable. As far as is publicly known none have ever been built.

References [1] Full story at publisher's web site (http:/ / www. webscription. net/ chapters/ 0743471598/ 0743471598___5. htm) [2] Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited in Defense Horizons, Feb. 2004, a publication of the National Defense University (http:/ / hps. org/ documents/ RDD_report. pdf) [3] Dirty Bomb (http:/ / www. pbs. org/ wgbh/ nova/ dirtybomb/ )

External links • Annotated bibliography for radiological dispersal devices (RDD) from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues (http://alsos.wlu.edu/qsearch.aspx?browse=warfare/Radiological+Dispersal+Devices+(RDD))

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World map with List of countries with nuclear weaponsnuclear weapons development status represented by color.   Five "nuclear weapons states" from the NPT  Other states known to possess nuclear weapons  States formerly possessing nuclear weapons  States suspected of being in the process of developing nuclear weapons and/or nuclear programs  States which at one point had nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapons research programs  States that possess nuclear weapons, but have not widely adopted them

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Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. Leading experts on nuclear proliferation, such as Etel Solingen of the University of California, Irvine, suggest that states' decisions to build nuclear weapons is largely determined by the interests of their governing domestic coalitions. Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, the governments of which fear that more countries with nuclear weapons may increase the possibility of nuclear warfare (up to and including the so-called "countervalue" targeting of civilians with nuclear weapons), de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of states. Four countries besides the five recognized Nuclear Weapons States have acquired, or are presumed to have acquired, nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. None of these four is a party to the NPT, although North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985, then withdrew in 2003 and conducted announced nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. One critique of the NPT is that it is discriminatory in recognizing as nuclear weapon states only those countries that tested nuclear weapons before 1968 and requiring all other states joining the treaty to forswear nuclear weapons.[citation needed] Research into the development of nuclear weapons was undertaken during World War II by the United States (in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada) Germany, Japan, and the USSR. The United States was the first and is the only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war, when it used two bombs against Japan in August 1945. With their loss during the war, Germany and Japan ceased to be involved in any nuclear weapon research. In August 1949, the USSR tested a nuclear weapon.[1] The United Kingdom tested a nuclear weapon in October 1952. France developed a nuclear weapon in 1960. The People's Republic of China detonated a nuclear weapon in 1964. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and Pakistan tested a weapon in 1998. In 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test.

Nuclear proliferation

Non-proliferation efforts Early efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation involved intense government secrecy, the wartime acquisition of known uranium stores (the Combined Development Trust), and at times even outright sabotage—such as the bombing of a heavy-water facility thought to be used for a German nuclear program. None of these efforts were explicitly public, because the weapon developments themselves were kept secret until the bombing of Hiroshima. Earnest international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation began soon after World War II, when the Truman Administration proposed the Baruch Plan[2] of 1946, named after Bernard Baruch, America's first representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Baruch Plan, which drew heavily from the Acheson–Lilienthal Report of 1946, proposed the verifiable dismantlement and destruction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (which, at that time, was the only nuclear arsenal in the world) after all governments had cooperated successfully to accomplish two things: (1) the establishment of an "international atomic development authority," which would actually own and control all military-applicable nuclear materials and activities, and (2) the creation of a system of automatic sanctions, which not even the U.N. Security Council could veto, and which would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or fissile material. Baruch's plea for the destruction of nuclear weapons invoked basic moral and religious intuitions. In one part of his address to the UN, Baruch said, "Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work out our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let us not deceive ourselves. We must elect World Peace or World Destruction.... We must answer the world's longing for peace and security." With this remark, Baruch helped launch the field of nuclear ethics, to which many policy experts and scholars have contributed. Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international support, it failed to emerge from the UNAEC because the Soviet Union planned to veto it in the Security Council. Still, it remained official American policy until 1953, when President Eisenhower made his "Atoms for Peace" proposal before the U.N. General Assembly. Eisenhower's proposal led eventually to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. Under the "Atoms for Peace" program thousands of scientists from around the world were educated in nuclear science and then dispatched home, where many later pursued secret weapons programs in their home country. Efforts to conclude an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons did not begin until the early 1960s, after four nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France) had acquired nuclear weapons (see List of states with nuclear weapons for more information). Although these efforts stalled in the early 1960s, they renewed once again in 1964, after China detonated a nuclear weapon. In 1968, governments represented at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) finished negotiations on the text of the NPT. In June 1968, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII), and in July 1968, the NPT opened for signature in Washington, DC, London and Moscow. The NPT entered into force in March 1970. Since the mid-1970s, the primary focus of non-proliferation efforts has been to maintain, and even increase, international control over the fissile material and specialized technologies necessary to build such devices because these are the most difficult and expensive parts of a nuclear weapons program. The main materials whose generation and distribution is controlled are highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Other than the acquisition of these special materials, the scientific and technical means for weapons construction to develop rudimentary, but working, nuclear explosive devices are considered to be within the reach of industrialized nations. Since its founding by the United Nations in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has promoted two, sometimes contradictory, missions: on the one hand, the Agency seeks to promote and spread internationally the use of civilian nuclear energy; on the other hand, it seeks to prevent, or at least detect, the diversion of civilian nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown. The IAEA now operates a safeguards system as specified under Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which aims to ensure that civil stocks of uranium, plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies associated with these nuclear materials, are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons

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Nuclear proliferation programs. It is often argued that proliferation of nuclear weapons to many other states has been prevented by the extension of assurances and mutual defence treaties to these states by nuclear powers, but other factors, such as national prestige, or specific historical experiences, also play a part in hastening or stopping nuclear proliferation.[3]

Dual use technology Dual-use technology refers to the possibility of military use of civilian nuclear power technology. Many technologies and materials associated with the creation of a nuclear power program have a dual-use capability, in that several stages of the nuclear fuel cycle allow diversion of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons. When this happens a nuclear power program can become a route leading to the atomic bomb or a public annex to a secret bomb program. The crisis over Iran’s nuclear activities is a case in point. Many UN and US agencies warn that building more nuclear reactors unavoidably increases nuclear proliferation risks. A fundamental goal for American and global security is to minimize the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear power. If this development is "poorly managed or efforts to contain risks are unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous". For nuclear power programs to be developed and managed safely and securely, it is important that countries have domestic “good governance” characteristics that will encourage proper nuclear operations and management: These characteristics include low degrees of corruption (to avoid officials selling materials and technology for their own personal gain as occurred with the A.Q. Khan smuggling network in Pakistan), high degrees of political stability (defined by the World Bank as “likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism”), high governmental effectiveness scores (a World Bank aggregate measure of “the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures [and] the quality of policy formulation and implementation”), and a strong degree of regulatory competence.

International cooperation Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty At present, 189 countries are States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. These include the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) recognized by the NPT: the People's Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, the UK, and the United States. Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, and India (the latter two have since tested nuclear weapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an unacknowledged nuclear weapons state). North Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in January 2003. The legality of North Korea's withdrawal is debatable but as of 9 October 2006, North Korea clearly possesses the capability to make a nuclear explosive device.

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International Atomic Energy Agency The IAEA was established on 29 July 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements to provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are honoring their commitments under the treaty. Though established under its own international treaty, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and United States through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that plutonium which is produced by nuclear reactors not be refined into a form that would be suitable for bomb production.

Scope of safeguards Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the nuclear material being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation. The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities. The system relies on; 1. Material Accountancy – tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, and review and verification of operating records. 2. Physical Security – restricting access to nuclear materials at the site. 3. Containment and Surveillance – use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site. All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records. The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures. While traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium. The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed under safeguards. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process.

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Nuclear proliferation In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement. With North Korea, the promised provision of commercial power reactors appeared to resolve the situation for a time, but it later withdrew from the NPT and declared it had nuclear weapons.

Additional Protocol In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle. Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol. Key elements of the model Additional Protocol: • The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related imports and exports. • IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities. • States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters. • Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States. As of 20 December 2010, 139 countries have signed Additional Protocols, 104 have brought them into force, and one (Iraq) is implementing its protocol provisionally. The IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional Protocol in Taiwan.[4] Among the leading countries that have not signed the Additional Protocol are Egypt, which says it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards,[5] and Brazil, which opposes making the protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing,[6] but has not ruled out signing.[7]

Limitations of Safeguards The greatest risk from nuclear weapons proliferation comes from countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities; India, Pakistan, and Israel fall within this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny. A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements, such as insisted upon by Australia and Canada for sale of uranium, address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT, it is likely to be reported by the IAEA to the UN Security Council, just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions would then be likely. IAEA safeguards, together with bilateral safeguards applied under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium supplied by countries such as Australia and Canada does not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely.

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Nuclear proliferation The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force, will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation.

Other developments The Nuclear Suppliers Group communicated its guidelines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978. These were to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and formal government assurances to this effect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, and strengthened retransfer provisions. The group began with seven members – the United States, the former USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan – but now includes 46 countries including all five nuclear weapons states. The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation is an international project involving 25 partner countries, 28 observer and candidate partner countries, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Generation IV International Forum, and the European Commission. It´s goal is to "[..] provide competitive, commercially-based services as an alternative to a state’s development of costly, proliferation-sensitive facilities, and address other issues associated with the safe and secure management of used fuel and radioactive waste."[8] According to Kenneth D. Bergeron's Tritium on Ice: The Dangerous New Alliance of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power, tritium is not classified as a 'special nuclear material' but rather as a 'by-product'. It is seen as an important litmus test on the seriousness of the United States' intention to nuclear disarm. This radioactive super-heavy hydrogen isotope is used to boost the efficiency of fissile materials in nuclear weapons. The United States resumed tritium production in 2003 for the first time in 15 years. This could indicate that there is a potential nuclear arm stockpile replacement since the isotope naturally decays. In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the production of any further fissile material for weapons. This aims to complement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 (not entered into force as of 2011) and to codify commitments made by the United States, the UK, France and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international verification.[citation needed] On 9 August 2005, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. Khamenei's official statement was made at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. As of February 2006 Iran formally announced that uranium enrichment within their borders has continued. Iran claims it is for peaceful purposes but the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States claim the purpose is for nuclear weapons research and construction.

Unsanctioned nuclear activity

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Weapons of mass destruction

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Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

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Albania

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Algeria

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Argentina

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Australia

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Brazil

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Bulgaria

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Burma

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Canada

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China

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Egypt

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France

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Germany

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India

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Iran

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Iraq

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Israel

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Japan

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Libya

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Mexico

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Netherlands

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North Korea

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Pakistan

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Poland

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Romania

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Russia

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Saudi Arabia

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South Africa

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South Korea

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Spain

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Sweden

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Syria

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Taiwan

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Ukraine

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United Kingdom

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United States

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Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

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NPT Non Signatories India, Pakistan and Israel have been "threshold" countries in terms of the international non-proliferation regime. They possess or are quickly capable of assembling one or more nuclear weapons. They have remained outside the 1970 NPT. They are thus largely excluded from trade in nuclear plant or materials, except for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded facilities. In May 1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear devices underground. This heightened concerns regarding an arms race between them, with Pakistan involving the People's Republic of China, an acknowledged nuclear weapons state. Both countries are opposed to the NPT as it stands, and India has consistently attacked the Treaty since its inception in 1970 labeling it as a lopsided treaty in favor of the nuclear powers. Relations between the two countries are tense and hostile, and the risks of nuclear conflict between them have long been considered quite high. Kashmir is a prime cause of bilateral tension, its sovereignty being in dispute since 1948. There is persistent low level military conflict due to Pakistan backing an insurgency there and the disputed status of Kashmir. Both engaged in a conventional arms race in the 1980s, including sophisticated technology and equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the arms race quickened. In 1994 India reversed a four-year trend of reduced allocations for defence, and despite its much smaller economy, Pakistan was expected to push its own expenditures yet higher. Both have lost their patrons: India, the former USSR, and Pakistan, the United States. But it is the growth and modernization of China's nuclear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear power programme and, reportedly, with missile technology, which exacerbate Indian concerns. In particular, Pakistan is aided by China's People's Liberation Army, which operates somewhat autonomously within that country as an exporter of military material. India Nuclear power for civil use is well established in India. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle, necessary because of its outspoken rejection of the NPT. This self-sufficiency extends from uranium exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and waste management. It has a small fast breeder reactor and is planning a much larger one. It is also developing technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a nuclear fuel. India has 14 small nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, two larger ones under construction, and ten more planned. The 14 operating ones (2548 MWe total) comprise: • two 150 MWe BWRs from the United States, which started up in 1969, now use locally enriched uranium and are under safeguards, • two small Canadian PHWRs (1972 & 1980), also under safeguards, and

Nuclear proliferation • ten local PHWRs based on Canadian designs, two of 150 and eight 200 MWe. • two new 540 MWe and two 700 MWe plants at Tarapur (known as TAPP: Tarapur Atomic Power Project) The two under construction and two of the planned ones are 450 MWe versions of these 200 MWe domestic products. Construction has been seriously delayed by financial and technical problems. In 2001 a final agreement was signed with Russia for the country's first large nuclear power plant, comprising two VVER-1000 reactors, under a Russian-financed US$3 billion contract. The first unit is due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian units are under consideration for the site. Nuclear power supplied 3.1% of India's electricity in 2000 and this was expected to reach 10% by 2005. Its industry is largely without IAEA safeguards, though a few plants (see above) are under facility-specific safeguards. As a result India's nuclear power programme proceeds largely without fuel or technological assistance from other countries. Its weapons material appears to come from a Canadian-designed 40MW "research" reactor which started up in 1960, well before the NPT, and a 100MW indigenous unit in operation since 1985. Both use local uranium, as India does not import any nuclear fuel. It is estimated that India may have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for a hundred nuclear warheads. It is widely believed that the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan used CANDU reactors to produce fissionable materials for their weapons; however, this is not accurate. Both Canada (by supplying the 40 MW research reactor) and the United States (by supplying 21 tons of heavy water) supplied India with the technology necessary to create a nuclear weapons program, dubbed CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor, United States). Canada sold India the reactor on the condition that the reactor and any by-products would be "employed for peaceful purposes only." [9]. Similarly, the United States sold India heavy water for use in the reactor "only... in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes" [10]. India, in violation of these agreements, used the Canadian-supplied reactor and American-supplied heavy water to produce plutonium for their first nuclear explosion, Smiling Buddha. The Indian government controversially justified this, however, by claiming that Smiling Buddha was a "peaceful nuclear explosion." The country has at least three other research reactors including the tiny one which is exploring the use of thorium as a nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. In addition, an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under development. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, the so-called Smiling Buddha test, which it has consistently claimed was for peaceful purposes. Others saw it as a response to China's nuclear weapons capability. It was then universally perceived, notwithstanding official denials, to possess, or to be able to quickly assemble, nuclear weapons. In 1999 it deployed its own medium-range missile and has developed an intermediate-range missile capable of reaching targets in China's industrial heartland. In 1995 the United States quietly intervened to head off a proposed nuclear test. However, in 1998 there were five more tests in Operation Shakti. These were unambiguously military, including one claimed to be of a sophisticated thermonuclear device, and their declared purpose was "to help in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields and different delivery systems". Indian security policies are driven by: • its determination to be recognized as a dominant power in the region • its increasing concern with China's expanding nuclear weapons and missile delivery programmes • its concern with Pakistan's capability to deliver nuclear weapons deep into India It perceives nuclear weapons as a cost-effective political counter to China's nuclear and conventional weaponry, and the effects of its nuclear weapons policy in provoking Pakistan is, by some accounts, considered incidental. India has had an unhappy relationship with China. After an uneasy ceasefire ended the 1962 war, relations between the two nations were frozen until 1998. Since then a degree of high-level contact has been established and a few elementary confidence-building measures put in place. China still occupies some territory which it captured during the

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aforementioned war, claimed by India, and India still occupies some territory claimed by China. Its nuclear weapon and missile support for Pakistan is a major bone of contention. American President George W. Bush met with India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to discuss India's involvement with nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed that the United States would give nuclear power assistance to India.[citation needed] Pakistan Over the several years, the Nuclear power infrastructure has been well established by Pakistan which is dedicated for the industrial and economic development of the country. Its current nuclear policy is directed and aimed to promote the socio-economic development of the people as a "foremost priority"; and to fulfill the energy, economic, and industrial needs from the nuclear sources. Currently, there are three operational mega-commercial nuclear power plants while three larger ones are under construction. The nuclear power supplies 787MW (roughly ~3.6%) of electricity as of 2012, and the country has projected to produce 8800MW electricity by 2030. Infrastructure established by the IAEA and the U.S. in 1950s–1960s were based on peaceful research and development and economic prosperity of the country.

In 2003, Libya admitted that the nuclear weapons-related material including these centrifuges, known as Pak-1, were acquired from Pakistan

Although the civil-sector nuclear power was established in 1950s, the country has an active nuclear weapons program which was started in 1970s. The bomb program has its roots after East-Pakistan gained its independence as Bangladesh after India's successful intervention led to a decisive victory on Pakistan in 1971. This large-scale but clandestine atomic bomb project was directed towards the development of ingenious development of reactor and military-grade plutonium.[citation needed] In 1974, when India surprised the outer world with its successful detonation of its own bomb, codename Smiling Buddha, it became "imperative for Pakistan" to pursue the weapons research. According to leading scientist in the program, it became clear once India detonated the bomb, "Newton's third law" came into "operation", from then on it was a classic case of "action and reaction". Earlier efforts were directed towards mastering the plutonium technology from France, but plutonium route was partially slowed down when the plan was failed after the U.S. intervention to cancel the project.[citation needed] Contrary to popular perception, Pakistan did not forego the "plutonium" route and covertly continued its indegenious research under Munir Khan and it succeeded with plutonium route in early 1980s.[citation needed] Reacting on India's nuclear test (Smiling Buddha), Bhutto and the country's elite political and military science circle sensed this test as final and dangerous anticipation to Pakistan's "moral and physical existence." With Aziz Ahmed on his side, Bhutto launched a serious diplomatic offense and aggressively maintained at the session of the United Nations Security Council: Pakistan was exposed to a kind of "nuclear threat and blackmail" unparalleled elsewhere..... (...)... If the world's community failed to provide political insurance to Pakistan and other countries against the nuclear blackmail, these countries would be constraint to launch atomic bomb programs of their own!... [A]ssurances provided by the United Nations were not "Enough!"... —Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, statement written in "Eating Grass", source After 1974, Bhutto's government redoubled its effort, this time equally focused on uranium and plutonium. Pakistan had established science directorates in almost all of her embassies in the important countries of the world, with theoretical physicist S.A. Butt being the director. Abdul Qadeer Khan then established a network through Dubai to smuggle URENCO technology to Engineering Research Laboratories. Earlier, he worked with Physics Dynamics Research Laboratories (FDO), a subsidiary of the Dutch firm VMF-Stork based in Amsterdam. Later after joining,

Nuclear proliferation the Urenco, he had access through photographs and documents of the technology. Against the popular perception, the technology that A.Q. Khan had brought from Urenco was based on first generation civil rector technology, filled with many serious technical errors, though it was authentic and vital link for centrifuge project of the country.[citation needed] After the British Government stopped the British subsidiary of the American Emerson Electric Co. from shipping the components to Pakistan, he describes his frustration with a supplier from Germany as: "That man from the German team was unethical. When he did not get the order from us, he wrote a letter to a Labour Party member and questions were asked in [British] Parliament." By 1978, his efforts were paid off and made him into a national hero. In 1981, as a tribute, President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, renamed the research institute after his name. In early 1996, Prime minister Benazir Bhutto made it clear that "if India conducts a nuclear test, Pakistan could be forced to "follow suit".[11] In 1997, her statement was echoed by Prime minister Nawaz Sharif who maintained to the fact that: "Since 1972, [P]akistan had progressed significantly, and we have left that stage (developmental) far behind. Pakistan will not be made a "hostage" to India by signing the CTBT, before (India).!" In May 1998, within weeks of India's nuclear tests, Pakistan announced that it had conducted six underground tests in the Chagai Hills, five on the 28th and one on the 30th of that month. Seismic events consistent with these claims were recorded. In 2004, the revelation of A.Q. Khan's efforts led the exposure of many defunct European consortium who defied export restrictions in 1970s, and many of defunct Dutch companies exported thousands of centrifuges to Pakistan as early as 1976.[12] Many centrifuge components were apparently manufactured in Malaysian Scomi Precision Engineering with the assistance of South Asian and German companies, and used a UAE-based computer company as a false front. It was widely believed to have direct involvement of the government of Pakistan. This claim could not be verified due to the refusal of the government of Pakistan to allow IAEA to interview the alleged head of the nuclear black market, who happened to be no other than A.Q. Khan. Confessing his crimes later a month on national television, he bailed out the government by taking full responsibility. Independent investigation conducted by IISS confirmed that he had control over the import-export deals, and his acquisition activities were largely unsupervised by Pakistan governmental authorities. All of his activities went undetected for several years. He duly confessed of running the atomic proliferation ring from Pakistan to Iran and North Korea. He was immediately given presidential immunity. Exact nature of the involvement at the governmental level is still unclear, but the manner in which the government acted cast doubt on the sincerity of Pakistan. North Korea The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (or better known as North Korea), joined the NPT in 1985 and had subsequently signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However, it was believed that North Korea was diverting plutonium extracted from the fuel of its reactor at Yongbyon, for use in nuclear weapons. The subsequent confrontation with IAEA on the issue of inspections and suspected violations, resulted in North Korea threatening to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This eventually led to negotiations with the United States resulting in the Agreed Framework of 1994, which provided for IAEA safeguards being applied to its reactors and spent fuel rods. These spent fuel rods were sealed in canisters by the United States to prevent North Korea from extracting plutonium from them. North Korea had to therefore freeze its plutonium programme. During this period, Pakistan-North Korea cooperation in missile technology transfer was being established. A high level delegation of Pakistan military visited North Korea in August–September 1992, reportedly to discuss the supply of missile technology to Pakistan. In 1993, PM Benazir Bhutto repeatedly traveled to China, and the paid state visit to North Korea. The visits are believed to be related to the subsequent acquisition technology to developed its Ghauri system by Pakistan. During the period 1992–1994, A.Q. Khan was reported to have visited North Korea thirteen times. The missile cooperation program with North Korea was under Dr. A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories. At this time China was under U.S. pressure not to supply the M Dongfeng series of missiles to Pakistan. It is believed by experts that possibly with Chinese connivance and facilitation, the latter was forced to approach North

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Nuclear proliferation Korea for missile transfers. Reports indicate that North Korea was willing to supply missile sub-systems including rocket motors, inertial guidance systems, control and testing equipment for US$ 50 million. It is not clear what North Korea got in return. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. in Jane's Defence Weekly (27 November 2002) reports that Western analysts had begun to question what North Korea received in payment for the missiles; many suspected it was the nuclear technology. The KRL was in charge of both uranium program and also of the missile program with North Korea. It is therefore likely during this period that cooperation in nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea was initiated. Western intelligence agencies began to notice exchange of personnel, technology and components between KRL and entities of the North Korean 2nd Economic Committee (responsible for weapons production). A New York Times report on 18 October 2002 quoted U.S. intelligence officials having stated that Pakistan was a major supplier of critical equipment to North Korea. The report added that equipment such as gas centrifuges appeared to have been "part of a barter deal" in which North Korea supplied Pakistan with missiles. Separate reports indicate (The Washington Times, 22 November 2002) that U.S. intelligence had as early as 1999 picked up signs that North Korea was continuing to develop nuclear arms. Other reports also indicate that North Korea had been working covertly to develop an enrichment capability for nuclear weapons for at least five years and had used technology obtained from Pakistan (Washington Times, 18 October 2002). Israel Israel is also thought to possess an arsenal of potentially up to several hundred nuclear warheads based on estimates of the amount of fissile material produced by Israel. This has never been openly confirmed or denied however, due to Israel's policy of deliberate ambiguity.[13] An Israeli nuclear installation is located about ten kilometers to the south of Dimona, the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Its construction commenced in 1958, with French assistance. The official reason given by the Israeli and French governments was to build a nuclear reactor to power a "desalination plant", in order to "green the Negev". The purpose of the Dimona plant is widely assumed to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and the majority of defense experts have concluded that it does in fact do that.[citation needed] However, the Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny this publicly, a policy it refers to as "ambiguity". Norway sold 20 tonnes of heavy water needed for the reactor to Israel in 1959 and 1960 in a secret deal. There were no "safeguards" required in this deal to prevent usage of the heavy water for non-peaceful purposes. The British newspaper Daily Express accused Israel of working on a bomb in 1960. When the United States intelligence community discovered the purpose of the Dimona plant in the early 1960s, it demanded that Israel agree to international inspections. Israel agreed, but on a condition that U.S., rather than IAEA, inspectors were used, and that Israel would receive advanced notice of all inspections. Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the alleged purpose of the site from the inspectors by installing temporary false walls and other devices before each inspection. The inspectors eventually informed the U.S. government that their inspections were useless due to Israeli restrictions on what areas of the facility they could inspect. In 1969, the United States terminated the inspections. In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at the Dimona plant, revealed to the media some evidence of Israel's nuclear program. Israeli agents arrested him from Italy, drugged him and transported him to Israel, and an Israeli court then tried him in secret on charges of treason and espionage,[14] and sentenced him to eighteen years imprisonment. He was freed on 21 April 2004, but was severely limited by the Israeli government. He was arrested again on 11 November 2004, though formal charges were not immediately filed. Comments on photographs taken by Mordechai Vanunu inside the Negev Nuclear Research Center have been made by prominent scientists. British nuclear weapons scientist Frank Barnaby, who questioned Vanunu over several days, estimated Israel had enough plutonium for about 150 weapons. Ted Taylor, a bomb designer employed by the United States of America has confirmed the several hundred warhead estimate based on Vanunu's photographs.[citation

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Nuclear proliferation needed]

According to Lieutenant Colonel Warner D. Farr in a report to the USAF Counterproliferation Center while France was previously a leader in nuclear research "Israel and France were at a similar level of expertise after the war, and Israeli scientists could make significant contributions to the French effort." [15] In 1986 Francis Perrin, French high-commissioner for atomic energy from 1951 to 1970 stated that in 1949 Israeli scientists were invited to the Saclay nuclear research facility, this cooperation leading to a joint effort including sharing of knowledge between French and Israeli scientists especially those with knowledge from the Manhattan Project.[16][17][18]

Nuclear arms control in South Asia The public stance of the two states on non-proliferation differs markedly. Pakistan has initiated a series of regional security proposals. It has repeatedly proposed a nuclear free zone in South Asia and has proclaimed its willingness to engage in nuclear disarmament and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if India would do so. It has endorsed a United States proposal for a regional five power conference to consider non-proliferation in South Asia. India has taken the view that solutions to regional security issues should be found at the international rather than the regional level, since its chief concern is with China. It therefore rejects Pakistan's proposals. Instead, the 'Gandhi Plan', put forward in 1988, proposed the revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it regards as inherently discriminatory in favor of the nuclear-weapon States, and a timetable for complete nuclear weapons disarmament. It endorsed early proposals for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for an international convention to ban the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, known as the 'cut-off' convention. The United States for some years, especially under the Clinton administration, pursued a variety of initiatives to persuade India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear weapons programs and to accept comprehensive international safeguards on all their nuclear activities. To this end, the Clinton administration proposed a conference of the five nuclear-weapon states, Japan, Germany, India and Pakistan. India refused this and similar previous proposals, and countered with demands that other potential weapons states, such as Iran and North Korea, should be invited, and that regional limitations would only be acceptable if they were accepted equally by China. The United States would not accept the participation of Iran and North Korea and these initiatives have lapsed. Another, more recent approach, centers on 'capping' the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which would hopefully be followed by 'roll back'. To this end, India and the United States jointly sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in 1993 calling for negotiations for a 'cut-off' convention. Should India and Pakistan join such a convention, they would have to agree to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons and to accept international verification on their relevant nuclear facilities (enrichment and reprocessing plants). It appears that India is now prepared to join negotiations regarding such a Cut-off Treaty, under the UN Conference on Disarmament. Bilateral confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan to reduce the prospects of confrontation have been limited. In 1990 each side ratified a treaty not to attack the other's nuclear installations, and at the end of 1991 they provided one another with a list showing the location of all their nuclear plants, even though the respective lists were regarded as not being wholly accurate. Early in 1994 India proposed a bilateral agreement for a 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and an extension of the 'no attack' treaty to cover civilian and industrial targets as well as nuclear installations. Having promoted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since 1954, India dropped its support in 1995 and in 1996 attempted to block the Treaty. Following the 1998 tests the question has been reopened and both Pakistan and India have indicated their intention to sign the CTBT. Indian ratification may be conditional upon the five weapons states agreeing to specific reductions in nuclear arsenals. The UN Conference on Disarmament has also called upon both

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Nuclear proliferation countries "to accede without delay to the Non-Proliferation Treaty", presumably as non-weapons states.

NPT signatories Egypt In 2004 and 2005, Egypt disclosed past undeclared nuclear activities and material to the IAEA. In 2007 and 2008, high enriched and low enriched uranium particles were found in environmental samples taken in Egypt.[19] In 2008, the IAEA states Egypt's statements were consistent with its own findings.[20] In May 2009, Reuters reported that the IAEA was conducting further investigation in Egypt.[21][22] Iran In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had been in breach of its obligations to comply with provisions of its safeguard agreement.[23] In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors voted in a rare non-consensus decision to find Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the UN Security Council.[24][25] In response, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions citing concerns about the program.[26][27][28] Iran's representative to the UN argues sanctions compel Iran to abandon its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to peaceful nuclear technology. Iran says its uranium enrichment program is exclusively for peaceful purposes[29][30] and has enriched uranium to "less than 5 percent," consistent with fuel for a nuclear power plant and significantly below the purity of WEU (around 90%) typically used in a weapons program.[31][32] The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, said in 2009 he had not seen any evidence in IAEA official documents that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. Iraq Up to the late 1980s it was generally assumed that any undeclared nuclear activities would have to be based on the diversion of nuclear material from safeguards. States acknowledged the possibility of nuclear activities entirely separate from those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed they would be detected by national intelligence activities. There was no particular effort by IAEA to attempt to detect them. Iraq had been making efforts to secure a nuclear potential since the 1960s. In the late 1970s a specialised plant, Osiraq, was constructed near Baghdad. The plant was attacked during the Iran–Iraq War and was destroyed by Israeli bombers in June 1981. Not until the 1990 NPT Review Conference did some states raise the possibility of making more use of (for example) provisions for "special inspections" in existing NPT Safeguards Agreements. Special inspections can be undertaken at locations other than those where safeguards routinely apply, if there is reason to believe there may be undeclared material or activities. After inspections in Iraq following the UN Gulf War cease-fire resolution showed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, it became clear that the IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to place all its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But the inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment programme, as well as a nuclear weapons design programme. The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program was the development of technology for electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) of indigenous uranium. This uses the same principles as a mass spectrometer (albeit on a much larger scale). Ions of uranium-238 and uranium-235 are separated because they describe arcs of different radii when they move through a magnetic field. This process was used in the Manhattan Project to make the highly enriched uranium used in the Hiroshima bomb, but was abandoned soon afterwards. The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear research establishment at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, and were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke out,

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Nuclear proliferation only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya, and none at Ash Sharqat. The Iraqis were also very interested in centrifuge enrichment, and had been able to acquire some components including some carbon-fibre rotors, which they were at an early stage of testing. In May 1998, Newsweek reported that Abdul Qadeer Khan had sent Iraq centrifuge designs, which were apparently confiscated by the UNMOVIC officials. Iraqi officials said "the documents were authentic but that they had not agreed to work with A. Q. Khan, fearing an ISI sting operation, due to strained relations between two countries.[citation needed][33] The Government of Pakistan and A. Q. Khan strongly denied this allegation whilst the government declared the evidence to be "fraudulent". They were clearly in violation of their NPT and safeguards obligations, and the IAEA Board of Governors ruled to that effect. The UN Security Council then ordered the IAEA to remove, destroy or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. This was done by mid-1998, but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the UN, so the IAEA withdrew from this work. The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a very far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are intended to achieve. Libya Libya possesses ballistic missiles and previously pursued nuclear weapons under the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi. On 19 December 2003, Gaddafi announced that Libya would voluntarily eliminate all materials, equipment and programs that could lead to internationally proscribed weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles.[34][35] Libya signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1980.[36] In March 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors welcomed Libya's decision to eliminate its formerly undeclared nuclear program, which it found had violated Libya's safeguards agreement, and approved Libya's Additional Protocol. The United States and the United Kingdom assisted Libya in removing equipment and material from its nuclear weapons program, with independent verification by the IAEA. Myanmar A report in the Sydney Morning Herald and Searchina, a Japanese newspaper, report that two Myanmarese defectors saying that the Myanmar junta was secretly building a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction facility with North Korea's help, with the aim of acquiring its first nuclear bomb in five years. According to the report, "The secret complex, much of it in caves tunnelled into a mountain at Naung Laing in northern Burma, runs parallel to a civilian reactor being built at another site by Russia that both the Russians and Burmese say will be put under international safeguards."[37] In 2002, Myanmar had notified IAEA of its intention to pursue a civilian nuclear programme. Later, Russia announced that it would build a nuclear reactor in Myanmar. There have also been reports that two Pakistani scientists, from the AQ Khan stable, had been dispatched to Myanmar where they had settled down, to help Myanmar's project.[citation needed] Recently, the David Albright-led Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) rang alarm bells about Myanmar attempting a nuclear project with North Korean help. [citation needed] If true, the full weight of international pressure will be brought against Myanmar, said officials familiar with developments. But equally, the information that has been peddled by the defectors is also "preliminary" and could be used by the west to turn the screws on Myanmar—on democracy and human rights issues—in the run-up to the elections in the country in 2010.[citation needed] During an ASEAN meeting in Thailand in July 2009, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton highlighted concerns of the North Korean link. "We know there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between North Korea and Burma which we take very seriously," Clinton said.[38] However, in 2012, after contact between American President Barack Obama, Burmese leader Thein Sein renounced military ties with DPRK (North Korea).

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Nuclear proliferation North Korea The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the USSR. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992. During that period, it brought into operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled "Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25 MWt (5 MWe), based on the UK Magnox design. While this was a well-suited design to start a wholly indigenous nuclear reactor development, it also exhibited all the features of a small plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes. North Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe), and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe). They made only slow progress; construction halted on both in 1994 and has not resumed. Both reactors have degraded considerably since that time and would take significant efforts to refurbish. In addition it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant that makes the Magnox spent nuclear fuel safe, recovering uranium and plutonium. That plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although all these facilities at Yongbyon were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT and use the plutonium for weapons. One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear materials in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies which indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more often than the DPRK had declared, which suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required by the IAEA) supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites. In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months' notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special status" with respect to its safeguards obligations. This was rejected by IAEA. Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a "special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor have remained under close surveillance. Following bilateral negotiations between the United States and the DPRK, and the conclusion of the Agreed Framework in October 1994, the IAEA has been given additional responsibilities. The agreement requires a freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK remains uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and has yet to comply with its safeguards agreement. While Iraq was defeated in a war, allowing the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons programme as part of the cease-fire conditions, the DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as trade sanctions. It can scarcely afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either be ineffective or risk provoking war.[citation needed] Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what appeared to be its nuclear weapons programme in exchange, under the agreed framework, for about US$5 billion in energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe light water nuclear power reactors based on an advanced U.S. System-80 design.

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Nuclear proliferation In January 2003 the DPRK withdrew from the NPT. In response, a series of discussions among the DPRK, the United States, and China, a series of six-party talks (the parties being the DPRK, the ROK, China, Japan, the United States and Russia) were held in Beijing; the first beginning in April 2004 concerning North Korea's weapons program. On 10 January 2005, North Korea declared that it was in the possession of nuclear weapons. On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks ended with a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to end its nuclear programs and return to the NPT in exchange for diplomatic, energy and economic assistance. However, by the end of 2005 the DPRK had halted all six-party talks because the United States froze certain DPRK international financial assets such as those in a bank in Macau. On 9 October 2006, North Korea announced that it has performed its first-ever nuclear weapon test. On 18 December 2006, the six-party talks finally resumed. On 13 February 2007, the parties announced "Initial Actions" to implement the 2005 joint statement including shutdown and disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities in exchange for energy assistance. Reacting to UN sanctions imposed after missile tests in April 2009, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks, restarted its nuclear facilities and conducted a second nuclear test on 25 May 2009. On 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion with an estimated yield of 6 to 7 kilotonnes. The detonation registered a magnitude 4.9 disturbance in the area around the epicenter. See also: North Korea and weapons of mass destruction and Six-party talks Russia Security of nuclear weapons in Russia remains a matter of concern. According to high-ranking Russian SVR defector Tretyakov, he had a meeting with two Russian businessman representing a state-created C-W corporation in 1991. They came up with a project of destroying large quantities of chemical wastes collected from Western countries at the island of Novaya Zemlya (a test place for Soviet nuclear weapons) using an underground nuclear blast. The project was rejected by Canadian representatives, but one of the businessmen told Tretyakov that he keeps his own nuclear bomb at his dacha outside Moscow. Tretyakov thought that man was insane, but the "businessmen" (Vladimir K. Dmitriev) replied: "Do not be so naive. With economic conditions the way they are in Russia today, anyone with enough money can buy a nuclear bomb. It's no big deal really".[39] South Africa In 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT, concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and submitted a report on its nuclear material subject to safeguards. At the time, the state had a nuclear power programme producing nearly 10% of the country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea only had research reactors. The IAEA's initial verification task was complicated by South Africa's announcement that between 1979 and 1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear weapons. South Africa asked the IAEA to verify the conclusion of its weapons programme. In 1995 the IAEA declared that it was satisfied all materials were accounted for and the weapons programme had been terminated and dismantled. South Africa has signed the NPT, and now holds the distinction of being the only known state to have indigenously produced nuclear weapons, and then verifiably dismantled them. Syria On September 6, 2007, Israel bombed an officially unidentified site in Syria which it later asserted was a nuclear reactor under construction (see Operation Orchard).[40] The alleged reactor was not asserted to be operational and it was not asserted that nuclear material had been introduced into it. Syria said the site was a military site and was not involved in any nuclear activities. The IAEA requested Syria to provide further access to the site and any other locations where the debris and equipment from the building had been stored. Syria denounced what it called the

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Nuclear proliferation Western "fabrication and forging of facts" in regards to the incident. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized the strikes and deplored that information regarding the matter had not been shared with his agency earlier. United States cooperation on nuclear weapons with the United Kingdom The United States has given the UK considerable assistance with nuclear weapon design and construction since the 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement. In 1974 a CIA proliferation assessment noted that "In many cases [the UK's sensitive technology in nuclear and missile fields] is based on technology received from the United States and could not legitimately be passed on without U.S. permission." The U.S. President authorized the transfer of "nuclear weapon parts" to the UK between at least the years 1975 to 1996. The UK National Audit Office noted that most of the UK Trident warhead development and production expenditure was incurred in the United States, which would supply "certain warhead-related components". Some of the fissile materials for the UK Trident warhead were purchased from the United States. Declassified U.S. Department of Energy documents indicate the UK Trident warhead system was involved in non-nuclear design activities alongside the U.S. W76 nuclear warhead fitted in some U.S. Navy Trident missiles, leading the Federation of American Scientists to speculate that the UK warhead may share design information from the W76. Under the Mutual Defence Agreement 5.37 tonnes of UK-produced plutonium was sent to the United States in return for 6.7 kg of tritium and 7.5 tonnes of highly enriched uranium over the period 1960–1979. A further 0.47 tonne of plutonium was swapped between the UK and United States for reasons that remain classified. Some of the UK produced plutonium was used in 1962 by the United States for a nuclear weapon test of reactor-grade plutonium . The United States has supplied nuclear weapon delivery systems to support the UK nuclear forces since before the signing of the NPT. The renewal of this agreement is due to take place through the second decade of the 21st century.

Breakout capability For a state that does not possess nuclear weapons, the capability to produce one or more weapons quickly and with little warning is called a breakout capability. •

 Japan, with its civil nuclear infrastructure and experience, has a stockpile of separated plutonium that could be fabricated into weapons relatively quickly.

•

 Iran, according to some observers, may be seeking (or have already achieved) a breakout capability, with its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and its capability to enrich further to weapons grade.

Arguments for and against proliferation There has been much debate in the academic study of International Security as to the advisability of proliferation. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gen. Pierre Marie Gallois of France, an adviser to Charles DeGaulle, argued in books like The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age (1961) that mere possession of a nuclear arsenal, what the French called the force de frappe, was enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the spread of nuclear weapons could increase international stability. Some very prominent neo-realist scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, and John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, continue to argue along the lines of Gallois (though these scholars rarely acknowledge their intellectual debt to Gallois and his contemporaries). Specifically, these scholars advocate some forms of nuclear proliferation, arguing that it will decrease the likelihood of war, especially in troubled regions of the world. Aside from the majority opinion which opposes proliferation in any form, there are two schools of thought on the matter: those, like Mearsheimer, who favor selective proliferation,[41] and those such as Waltz, who advocate a laissez-faire attitude to programs like North Korea's.

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Total proliferation In embryo, Waltz argues that the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) should work in all security environments, regardless of historical tensions or recent hostility. He sees the Cold War as the ultimate proof of MAD logic – the only occasion when enmity between two Great Powers did not result in military conflict. This was, he argues, because nuclear weapons promote caution in decision-makers. Neither Washington nor Moscow would risk a nuclear apocalypse to advance territorial or power goals, hence a peaceful stalemate ensued (Waltz and Sagan (2003), p. 24). Waltz believes there to be no reason why this effect would not occur in all circumstances.

Selective proliferation John Mearsheimer would not support Waltz's optimism in the majority of potential instances; however, he has argued for nuclear proliferation as policy in certain places, such as post–Cold War Europe. In two famous articles, Professor Mearsheimer opines that Europe is bound to return to its pre–Cold War environment of regular conflagration and suspicion at some point in the future. He advocates arming both Germany and the Ukraine with nuclear weaponry in order to achieve a balance of power between these states in the east and France/UK in the west. If this does not occur, he is certain that war will eventually break out on the European continent (Mearsheimer (1990), pp. 5–56 and (1993), pp. 50–66). Another separate argument against Waltz's open proliferation and in favor of Mearsheimer's selective distribution is the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Some countries included in the aforementioned laissez-faire distribution could predispose the transfer of nuclear materials or a bomb falling into the hands of groups not affiliated with any governments. Such countries would not have the political will or ability to safeguard attempts at devices being transferred to a third party. Not being deterred by self-annihilation, terrorism groups could push forth their own nuclear agendas or be used as shadow fronts to carry out the attack plans by mentioned unstable governments.

Arguments against both positions There are numerous arguments presented against both selective and total proliferation, generally targeting the very neorealist assumptions (such as the primacy of military security in state agendas, the weakness of international institutions, and the long-run unimportance of economic integration and globalization to state strategy) its proponents tend to make. With respect to Mearsheimer's specific example of Europe, many economists and neoliberals argue that the economic integration of Europe through the development of the European Union has made war in most of the European continent so disastrous economically so as to serve as an effective deterrent. Constructivists take this one step further, frequently arguing that the development of EU political institutions has led or will lead to the development of a nascent European identity, which most states on the European continent wish to partake in to some degree or another, and which makes all states within or aspiring to be within the EU regard war between them as unthinkable. As for Waltz, the general opinion is that most states are not in a position to safely guard against nuclear use, that he underestimates the long-standing antipathy in many regions, and that weak states will be unable to prevent – or will actively provide for – the disastrous possibility of nuclear terrorism. Waltz has dealt with all of these objections at some point in his work; though to many, he has not adequately responded (Betts (2000)). The Learning Channel documentary Doomsday: "On The Brink" illustrated 40 years of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons accidents. Even the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident demonstrated a potential scenario in which Russian democratization and military downsizing at the end of the Cold War did not eliminate the danger of accidental nuclear war through command and control errors. After asking: might a future Russian ruler or renegade Russian general be tempted to use nuclear weapons to make foreign policy? the documentary writers revealed a greater danger of Russian security over its nuclear stocks, but especially the ultimate danger of human nature to want the ultimate weapon of mass destruction to exercise political and military power. Future world leaders might not understand how close the Soviets, Russians, and Americans were to doomsday, how easy it all seemed because

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Nuclear proliferation apocalypse was avoided for a mere 40 years between rivals, politicians not terrorists, who loved their children and did not want to die, against 30,000 years of human prehistory. History and military experts agree that proliferation can be slowed, but never stopped (technology cannot be uninvented).[42]

Proliferation begets proliferation Proliferation begets proliferation is a concept described by Scott Sagan in his article, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?". This concept can be described as a strategic chain reaction. If one state produces a nuclear weapon it creates almost a domino effect within the region. States in the region will seek to acquire nuclear weapons to balance or eliminate the security threat. Sagan describes this reaction best in his article when he states, “Every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons program to maintain its national security” (Sagan, pg. 70). Going back through history we can see how this has taken place. When the United States demonstrated that it had nuclear power capabilities after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Russians started to develop their program in preparation for the Cold War. With the Russian military buildup, France and the United Kingdom perceived this as a security threat and therefore they pursued nuclear weapons (Sagan, pg 71). Iran Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been a frequent critic of the concept of nuclear apartheid as it has been put into practice by several countries, particularly the United States. In an interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour, Ahmadinejad said that Iran was "against 'nuclear apartheid,' which means some have the right to possess it, use the fuel, and then sell it to another country for 10 times its value. We're against that. We say clean energy is the right of all countries. But also it is the duty and the responsibility of all countries, including ours, to set up frameworks to stop the proliferation of it." Hours after that interview, he spoke passionately in favor of Iran's right to develop nuclear technology, claiming the nation should have the same liberties.[43] Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and claims that any work done in regards to nuclear technology is related only to civilian uses, which is acceptable under the treaty.[44] Iran violated the treaty by performing uranium-enrichment in secret, after which the United Nations Security Council ordered Iran to stop all uranium-enrichment.[45] India India has also been discussed in the context of nuclear apartheid. India has consistently attempted to pass measures that would call for full international disarmament, however they have not succeeded due to protests from those states that already have nuclear weapons. In light of this, India viewed nuclear weapons as a necessary right for all nations as long as certain states were still in possession of nuclear weapons. India stated that nuclear issues were directly related to national security. Years before India's first underground nuclear test in 1998, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was passed. Some have argued that coercive language was used in an attempt to persuade India to sign the treaty, which was pushed for heavily by neighboring China.[46] India viewed the treaty as a means for countries that already had nuclear weapons, primarily the five nations of the United Nations Security Council, to keep their weapons while ensuring that no other nations could develop them.[47]

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Nuclear proliferation

References [1] Nash, Gary B., Julie Roy Jeffrey, John R. Howe, Peter J. Frederick, Allen F. Davis, Allan M. Winkler, Charlene Mires, and Carla Gardina Pestana. The American People, Concise Edition Creating a Nation and a Society, Combined Volume (6th Edition). New York: Longman, 2007. [2] The Baruch Plan | Arms Control, Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation | Historical Documents | atomicarchive.com (http:/ / www. atomicarchive. com/ Docs/ Deterrence/ BaruchPlan. shtml) [3] Beatrice Heuser, ‘Beliefs, Cultures, Proliferation and Use of Nuclear Weapons’, in Eric Herring (ed.): Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Special Issue of Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 23 No. 1 (March 2000), pp.74-100 (http:/ / www. informaworld. com/ smpp/ content~db=all~content=a789938481~frm=titlelink); "Proliferation and/or Alliance? The Federal Republic of Germany", in Leopoldo Nuti and Cyril Buffet (eds.): Dividing the Atom, special issue of Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali (Autumn 1998). [4] Additional Protocols to Nuclear Safeguards Agreements (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ OurWork/ SV/ Safeguards/ sg_protocol. html) [5] NTI Egypt Profile (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Egypt/ Nuclear/ chronology_2008. html) [6] When Nuclear Sheriffs Quarrel, The Economist, 30 October 2008. (http:/ / www. economist. com/ research/ backgrounders/ displaystory. cfm?story_id=12516611) [7] Remarks With Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, 5 October 2004 (http:/ / www. state. gov/ secretary/ former/ powell/ remarks/ 36801. htm) [8] Energy.gov/ International Fuel Services and Commercial Engagement (http:/ / energy. gov/ ne/ international-nuclear-energy-policy-and-cooperation/ international-fuel-services-and-commercial) [9] http:/ / www. nci. org/ 06nci/ 04/ Canada-India%20CIRUS%20agreement. htm [10] http:/ / www. nci. org/ 06nci/ 04/ US-India%20CIRUS%20agreement. htm [11] "Bhutto Warns India Against Testing Nuclear Device" Daily Telegraph (London), 6 January 1996, p. 12, by Ahmed Rashid [12] Craig S. Smith, "Roots of Pakistan Atomic Scandal Traced to Europe", The New York Times, 19 February 2004, page A3. [13] http:/ / csis. org/ files/ media/ csis/ pubs/ 090316_israelistrikeiran. pdf [14] Staff writers, ISRAEL : Vanunu's Treason Appeal Is Rejected (http:/ / articles. latimes. com/ 1990-05-28/ news/ mn-15_1_mordechai-vanunu-s-appeal) Los Angeles Times, May 28, 1990 [15] http:/ / www. au. af. mil/ au/ awc/ awcgate/ cpc-pubs/ farr. htm [16] http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ guide/ israel/ nuke/ farr. htm [17] http:/ / www. wisconsinproject. org/ countries/ israel/ nuke. html [18] http:/ / www. wrmea. org/ wrmea-archives/ 95-washington-report-archives-1982-1987/ december-1986/ 694-israels-nuclear-arsenal. html [19] International Atomic Energy Agency: Safeguards Statement for 2008 and Background to the Safeguards Statement (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ OurWork/ SV/ Safeguards/ es/ es2008. html) [20] International Atomic Energy Agency: Safeguards Annual Report (2008) (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ Publications/ Reports/ Anrep2008/ safeguards. pdf) [21] Reuters: High-enriched uranium traces found in Egypt: IAEA (http:/ / www. reuters. com/ article/ idUSTRE54543S20090506) [22] ABC News: IAEA: Weapons Grade Uranium Traces Found in Egypt (http:/ / abcnews. go. com/ International/ wirestory?id=7515795& page=2) [23] GOV/2003/75 (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ Publications/ Documents/ Board/ 2003/ gov2003-75. pdf), Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, 10 November 2003. [24] IAEA Board of Governors: "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran" (September 2005) (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ Publications/ Documents/ Board/ 2005/ gov2005-77. pdf) [25] IAEA Board of Governors: "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran" (February 2006) (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ Publications/ Documents/ Board/ 2006/ gov2006-14. pdf) [26] Security Council demands Iran suspend uranium enrichment by 31 August, or face possible economic, diplomatic sanctions (http:/ / www. un. org/ News/ Press/ docs/ 2006/ sc8792. doc. htm) (UN News Centre Press Release, 31 July 2006) [27] SECURITY COUNCIL TIGHTENS RESTRICTIONS ON IRAN’S PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR (http:/ / www. un. org/ News/ Press/ docs/ 2008/ sc9268. doc. htm). Department of Public Information, UN Security Council. [28] United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1835, Security Council Reaffirms Earlier Resolutions on Iran's Uranium Enrichment, Calls on Country to Comply with Obligations 'Fully and Without Delay' (http:/ / un. org/ News/ Press/ docs/ 2008/ sc9459. doc. htm) [29] AFP:Six powers to meet soon over Iran's nuclear program (http:/ / afp. google. com/ article/ ALeqM5hA01f9zNaIJ4IK_Hcuwqy4zf6MWg) [30] Tehran Times: Iran wants new nuclear fuel talks (http:/ / www. tehrantimes. com/ index_View. asp?code=207020) [31] Council on Foreign Relations: Iran's Nuclear Program (http:/ / www. cfr. org/ publication/ 16811/ ) [32] American Institute of Physics: The gas centrifuge and nuclear weapons proliferation (http:/ / scitation. aip. org/ getabs/ servlet/ GetabsServlet?prog=normal& id=PHTOAD000061000009000040000001& idtype=cvips& gifs=yes)

The most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is the production of fissile material [33] "Documents Indicate A.Q. Khan Offered Nuclear Weapon Designs to Iraq in 1990: Did He Approach Other Countries?" by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein (4 February 2004). (http:/ / www. isis-online. org/ publications/ southasia/ khan_memo. html) [34] Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States (http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ factsheets/ LibyaChronology), Arms Control Association.

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Nuclear proliferation [35] News Update on IAEA & Libya (https:/ / iaea. org/ NewsCenter/ Focus/ IaeaLibya/ libya_timeline. shtml), Chronology of Key Events, (December 2003 - September 2008), International Atomic Energy Agency. [36] GOV/2004/12 (http:/ / iaea. org/ Publications/ Documents/ Board/ 2004/ gov2004-12. pdf), Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 20 February 2004. [37] Searchina, "Reasons for digging tunnels in Burma", August 11, 2009. [38] "Myanmar building nuke reactor, says media report" (http:/ / articles. timesofindia. indiatimes. com/ 2009-08-02/ rest-of-world/ 28184985_1_myanmar-junta-nuclear-reactor-burma). The Times of India, 2 August 2009. [39] Pete Earley, "Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia's Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War", Penguin Books, 2007, ISBN 978-0-399-15439-3, pages 114–121. [40] 6 September 2007 Air strike (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ military/ world/ war/ 070906-airstrike. htm) at globalsecurity.org (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org). Retrieved October 24, 2007. [41] See page 116 [42] Doomsday: On The Brink, The Learning Channel, 1997 [43] Iranian president: No 'nuclear apartheid' (http:/ / edition. cnn. com/ 2005/ WORLD/ meast/ 09/ 17/ ahmadinejad/ index. html), CNN [44] Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (http:/ / www. state. gov/ t/ vci/ rls/ rpt/ 51977. htm), Bureau of Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State, August 30, 2005 [45] UN Security Council Resolution 1737 (http:/ / daccessdds. un. org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ N06/ 681/ 42/ PDF/ N0668142. pdf?OpenElement) [46] Against Nuclear Apartheid (http:/ / www. indianembassy. org/ pic/ js/ js(foreignaffairs). html), Jaswant Singh [47] Options (http:/ / search. ebscohost. com/ login. aspx?direct=true& db=f5h& AN=9611212232& site=ehost-live), Mike Moore, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

External links and references • Ploughshares Fund Video: A World Without Nuclear Weapons (http://ploughshares.org/moment/video?p=423) • National Counterproliferation Center – Office of the Director of National Intelligence (http://www.counterwmd. gov) • Official website of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): http://www.iaea.org/ Organizations • Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http://www.thebulletin.org) – A non-technical public policy and global security magazine that has reported on nuclear proliferation issues since 1945. • Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/topic/3/nuclear_proliferation. html) – Publications from Harvard faculty and fellows on nuclear proliferation. • Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (http://www.cnduk.org/) or CND, is a UK-based non-proliferation movement based in the UK which advocates a complete ban on all nuclear weaponry. • Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Nonproliferation Website (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ npp/) • Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/nuclear/) • Council for a Livable World (http://www.clw.org/policy/nuclearweapons/) • Federation of American Scientists (http://fas.org) • International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (http://www.ippnw.org/) or IPPNW, is a US-based non-proliferation movement advocating amongst other things, a complete ban on all nuclear weaponry. • International Society for the Prevention of Nuclear War (http://www.ispnw.org) or ISPNW, is a US-based non-proliferation movement advocating the full control of the world's nuclear arsenal by a restructured UN. • Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (http://cns.miis.edu)

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Chemical weapon proliferation

103

Chemical weapon proliferation Nation Albania

CW Possession Known

Signed CWC

Ratified CWC

January 14, 1993 May 11, 1994

Burma (Myanmar) Possible

January 13, 1993 No

China

Probable

January 13, 1993 April 4, 1997

Egypt

Probable

No

India

Known

January 14, 1993 September 3, 1996

Iran

Known

January 13, 1993 November 3, 1997

Israel

Probable

January 13, 1993 No

Japan

Probable

January 13, 1993 September 15, 1995

Libya

Known

No

January 6, 2004 (acceded)

North Korea

Known

No

No

Pakistan

Probable

January 13, 1993 October 28, 1997

Russia

Known

January 13, 1993 November 5, 1997

Serbia and Montenegro

Probable

No

April 20, 2000 (acceded)

Sudan

Possible

No

May 24, 1999 (acceded)

Syria

Known

No

No

Taiwan

Possible

n/a

n/a

United States

Known

January 13, 1993 April 25, 1997

Vietnam

Probable

January 13, 1993 September 30, 1998

No

Despite numerous efforts to reduce or eliminate them, many nations continue to research and/or stockpile chemical weapon agents. Most states have joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, which requires the destruction of all chemical weapons by 2012. Twelve nations have declared chemical weapons production facilities and six nations have declared stockpiles of chemical weapons. All of the declared production facilities have been destroyed or converted to civilian use after the treaty went into force. According to the United States government, at least 17 nations currently have active chemical weapons programs. To the right is a summary of the nations that have either declared weapon stockpiles, or are suspected of secretly stockpiling or possessing CW research programs.

Chemical weapon details, per nation

Chemical weapon proliferation

104

Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

•

Albania

•

Algeria

•

Argentina

•

Australia

•

Brazil

•

Bulgaria

•

Burma

•

Canada

•

China

•

Egypt

•

France

•

Germany

•

India

•

Iran

•

Iraq

•

Israel

•

Japan

•

Libya

•

Mexico

•

Netherlands

•

North Korea

•

Pakistan

•

Poland

•

Romania

•

Russia

•

Saudi Arabia

•

South Africa

•

South Korea

•

Spain

•

Sweden

•

Syria

•

Taiwan

•

Ukraine

•

United Kingdom

•

United States

Chemical weapon proliferation

105 Proliferation • • •

Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

•

List of treaties

• •

Book Category

• • •

v t

e [1]

Albania Albania, as a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, declared in March 2003 a stockpile of 16 tons of chemical agents. On July 11, 2007, with the help of the U.S. government's Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Ministry of Defence announced successful destruction of the entire stockpile.

Angola Angola has been accused of using chemical weapons in its civil war.

China According to the testimony Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl W. Ford before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it is very probable that China has an advanced chemical warfare program, including research and development, production, and weaponization capabilities. Furthermore, there is considerable concern from the U.S. regarding China's contact and sharing of chemical weapons expertise with other states of proliferation concern, including Syria and Iran. Chinese government has declared that it had possessed small arsenal of chemical weapons in the past but that it had destroyed it before ratifying Convention. It has declared only two former chemical production facilities that may have produced mustard gas and Lewisite.[1]

Egypt Egypt has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and has long appeared on various lists as having an offensive chemical weapons capability, and is thought to possess production facilities for sarin, VX, mustard gas, and phosgene. Additionally, it is possible that Egypt may possess limited stockpiles of chemical bombs, rockets and shells. The reasons for this belief are several: • Egypt is known to have employed mustard gas in the Yemeni civil war from 1963 to 1967. • In the early 1970s, Egypt is believed to have supplied Syria with mustard gas and nerve agents. • In the 1980s, Egypt supplied Iraq with mustard gas and nerve agents, and related production and deployment technology. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials in 1991, US Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks cited this evidence in identifying Egypt as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor. More recent analyses are more careful by estimation the current status of chemical weapons program in Egypt. Only one facility has been identified as "likely involved" in the offensive activities. Although the offensive program may be still in existence, it does not seem that Egypt has a considerable stockpile of operational weapons.[2]

Chemical weapon proliferation

Ethiopia In 1991 Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Ethiopia as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress. Ethiopia has ratified CWC in 1996 and did not declare any offensive CW program. From that time no evidence has been presented to contradict this statement.

India In 1997, in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Indian government declared that it possessed a chemical weapons stockpile and opened its related facilities for inspection. Also in compliance with the CWC, it has destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile.[3]

Iran Near the end of the Iran–Iraq War, Iran is supposed to have made limited use of chemical weapons, and since that time has been steadily building stockpiles of cyanide (cyanogen chloride), phosgene, and mustard gas. The delivery vehicles Iran possesses includes artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iran currently maintains at least two major facilities for the research and production of chemical weapon agents. Additionally, India is currently assisting Iran in the construction of another major facility at Qazvin, near Tehran, with the purpose of manufacturing phosphorus pentasulfide, a primary precursor for nerve agents. Iran began its production of nerve agents no later than 1994. Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993 and ratified it on November 3, 1997, and denies allegations of having clandestine CW program in violation of CWC. In the official declaration submitted to OPCW Iranian government admitted that it had produced mustard gas in 1980s but that ceased the offensive program and destroyed the stockpiles of operational weapons after the end of war with Iraq.[4]

Iraq Well before Operation Desert Storm or the U.N. inspections that followed it, Iraq had already begun to build chemical weapons. After launching a research effort in the 1970s, Iraq was able to use chemical weapons in its war against Iran and to kill large numbers of its own Kurdish population in the 1980s. During the first Gulf War, there were fears that Iraq would launch chemical-tipped missiles at its neighbors, particularly Israel, but Iraq refrained for fear of U.S. retaliation. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition troops again feared they might be hit with chemical weapons, though this did not come to pass. By 1991, as part of the 1991 Gulf War ceasefire agreement, the United Nations passed Resolution 687 which established its Special Commission (UNSCOM). The UNSCOM was charged with the task of destroying, removing, or rendering harmless "all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities." By the time UNSCOM left Iraq in December 1998, it had eliminated a large portion of Iraq's chemical weapon potential though Iraq still hid most of its WMDs due to the fact they had kicked out most of the UN inspectors many times over the years. UNSCOM had overseen the destruction or incapacitation of more than 88,000 filled or unfilled chemical munitions, over 600 tons of weaponized or bulk chemical agents, some 4,000 tons of precursor chemicals, some 980 pieces of key production equipment, and some 300 pieces of analytical equipment. Notwithstanding these extraordinary achievements, there remained important uncertainties regarding Iraq's holdings of chemical weapons, their precursors, and munitions.

106

Chemical weapon proliferation

Israel As of December 2004, Israel has signed but not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, and according to the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, Israel has significant stores of chemical weapons of its own manufacture. It possesses a highly developed chemical and petrochemical industry, skilled specialists, and stocks of source material, and is capable of producing several nerve, blister and incapacitating agents. In 1974, in a hearing before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, General Almquist stated that Israel had an offensive chemical weapons capability. In 1992, El Al Flight 1862 bound for Tel Aviv crashed outside Amsterdam. In the course of the crash investigation, it was revealed that amongst the plane's cargo was fifty gallons of dimethyl methylphosphonate, a chemical that can be used in the production of the nerve agent sarin. The dimethyl methylphosphonate was bound for the Israel Institute for Biological Research in Ness Ziona, a top secret military installation outside Tel Aviv that was also responsible for producing the poison used in a September 1997 assassination attempt on a leader of the terrorist organization Hamas (Khaled Mashal). According to Israeli officials, the substance was only for defensive research purposes, to test filters for gas masks. The 1993 the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment WMD proliferation assessment [5] recorded Israel as a country generally reported as having undeclared offensive chemical warfare capabilities. In October 1998, the London Sunday Times reported that Israeli F-16 fighters were equipped to carry chemical weapons, and that their crews have been trained on the use of such weapons. According to more recent analyses, there is no evidence of production or stockpiling the chemical weapons by Israel.[6] The offensive CW program almost certainly existed in the past but its current status is unknown.[7]

Japan As of December 1993, Japan has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. Japan ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1995. However, JSDF possess chemical weapons facilities and some samples for use in development of protection against chemical weapons which it said JGSDF Central NBC protection Troop. In 1995, JGSDF admitted possession of samples of sarin.

Libya Libya produced limited quantities of chemical weapons during the 1980s, and is known to have used such weapons in combat at least once when it attempted to use chemical weapons against Chadian troops in 1987.[citation needed] Since then, Libya constructed what is believed to be the largest chemical weapon production facility in the developing world in the Rabta industrial complex. This facility was the cornerstone of the Libyan CW program, and has produced mustard gas, sarin, and phosgene since production began in the late 1980s. In March 1990 a suspicious fire broke out there following accusations by the United States. Strict United Nations sanctions from 1992 to 1999 rendered Rabta inactive. Libya's chemical program was completely abandoned on December 19, 2003 along with their other weapons of mass destruction programs as part of a program to get sanctions lifted and normalize relations with foreign governments. In 2004, between 27 February and 3 March, Libya destroyed 3,200 chemical weapon artillery shells under supervision of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). On March 5, 2004, Libya declared a stockpile of 23 tons of mustard gas as well as precursors for sarin and other chemicals. Libya officially acceeded to the Chemical Weapons Convention in June 2004.

107

Chemical weapon proliferation

Myanmar (Burma) Intelligence regarding Myanmar's chemical weapon status is mixed, and sometimes contradictory. In the late 1990s, US naval intelligence identified Myanmar (then referred to as Burma) as developing chemical weapons capabilities. Later, other officials contridicted that statement, claiming that the evidence supporting Burma's chemical stockpile development was primarily based upon circumstantial evidence.[8] However, in 1991, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials in 1991, US Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Myanmar as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor. Myanmar signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993, but to date has not yet ratified the agreement.

North Korea North Korea did not sign CWC and is believed to have maintained an extensive chemical weapons program since mid-1950s. The program includes research, production, stockpiling and weaponisation of large quantities of chemical agents (perhaps as many as 5000 tons), including blister, nerve, choking, psychoincapacitant, vomiting and riot control agents. Several dozen facilities has been identified as likely involved in the offensive program. The production capability of these facilities is estimated as 4500 tons of chemical agents per year. North Korean armed forces have also large quantities of delivery systems that could carry chemical warheads, including different artillery systems, aerial bombs, mines, tactical ballistic missiles (SCUD), and long-range ballistic missiles (Nodong and Taepodong[9] systems). However, the technological advancement of this program is uncertain, and some sources doubt whether North Korea is able to produce large quantities of nerve agents or to fit the chemical warheads on its long-range ballistic missiles.[10]

Pakistan In 1991 Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Pakistan as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress. However, more recent analyses indicate that although Pakistan, as many other countries with well-developed chemical industry, has technical capabilities for the production of chemical weapons, there is no evidence that it has ever possessed such weapons. Pakistan has ratified CWC in 1997 and did not declare any offensive activities in this area.[11] See also Naela Chohan, First woman and civilian to head the National Authority on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Pakistan.

Russia Russia has destroyed about 25,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, or 62 percent of its 40,000-ton stockpile as of April 29, 2012 - the deadline set by the Chemical Weapons Convention for complete arsenal destruction. Russia has already postponed the completion until 2015, but expects 2020 to be more realistic.

Serbia and Montenegro The former Yugoslavia is known to have produced a variety of chemical weapons (CW). The majority of stockpiled CW is believed to have been inherited by its successor, Serbia.[citation needed] Reports indicate that the former Yugoslavia's Army produced large quantities of sarin (50 tons), sulfur mustard, phosgene, the incapacitant BZ (allegedly a stockpile of 300 tons), and tear gas. At least four chemical warfare production facilities have been identified in Serbia: Prva Iskra in Baric; Miloje Blagojevic in Lucani; and Milojie Zakic and Merima in Krusevic. While the Trajal plant in Krusevic has been shut down, serious questions exist about accounting and previous production and storage of chemical materials there, as well the lack of accounting on the other three sites.

108

Chemical weapon proliferation Yugoslavia used its CW technologies to develop chemical munitions for Iraq prior to the first Gulf War in the "Little Hawk" program and chemical munitions for the Orkan MLRS system under the "KOL15" program. There have been allegations that CW were used in the area of the former Yugoslavia: both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats alleged that Bosnian government forces used chlorine during the conflict in Bosnia; Bosnian Serbs allegedly used BZ against Moslem refugees in July 1995; and the FRY Army may have used BZ against Kosovo Albanians in 1999. Mysterious deaths during the 1999 NATO bombings of suspected chemical facilities have also been attributed to CW production. The former Yugoslavia signed the Geneva Protocol in 1929. In April 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

South Korea Prior to 1997, South Korea was strongly suspected of possessing an active chemical weapons program, and was identified as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor by the United States. On April 18, 1997, South Korea signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and made a secret declaration. It is thought that South Korea is the "state party" referred to in Chemical Weapons Convention materials. There are reports that South Korea is operating a secret facility in Yeongdong County, Chungcheongbuk-do Province for the destruction of chemical agents.

Sudan Some past reports of uncertain credibility indicated that Sudan may have used chemical weapons against the rebels in the southern part of this country. Sudan accessed to CWC in 1999 and did not declare any offensive CW program. U.S. Department of State claims that it lacks sufficient evidence to determine whether Sudan is engaged in activities prohibited by CWC.[12]

Syria On September 14, 2013, the United States and Russia announced an agreement that would lead to the elimination of Syria's chemical weapon stockpiles by mid-2014. Syria officially acceded to the CWC on October 14, but has yet to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is believed Syria first received chemical weapons in 1973 from Egypt in the form of artillery shells.[citation needed] Since then it is thought Syria has one of the most advanced chemical weapons programs in the Middle East[citation needed] Syrias Chemical Arsenal Syria is thought to have amassed large quantities of Sarin, Tabun, Mustard and is currently weaponizing VX.[citation needed] Exact quantities are hard to know although the CIA has estimated Syria to possess several hundred liters of chemical weapons with hundreds of tons of agents produced annually.[citation needed] Production Syria has 4 main production sites. One just North of Damascus, one near Homs, one in Hama and one, al-Safir South East of Aleppo[citation needed]

109

Chemical weapon proliferation

Taiwan U.S. Congress was informed in 1989 that Taiwan could have acquired offensive chemical weapons capability, including stockpiles of sarin. The alleged facilities include Tsishan and Kuanhsi. Taiwanese authorities acknowledged only the existence of defensive research program. Because of Taiwan's non-state status, it cannot join the CWC.[13]

United States The United States has possessed a stockpile of chemical weapons since World War I. It banned the production or transport of chemical weapons in 1969. The U.S. began chemical weapons disposal in the 1960s, first by deep-sea burial. By the 1970s, incineration was the disposal method used. The use of chemical weapons was renounced in 1991 and the U.S. signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993. 89.75% of the treaty declared stockpile was destroyed by January 2012.

References [1] NTI Research Library: country profile: China (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ China/ index. html) [2] NTI Research Library: country profile: Egypt - chemical weapons (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Egypt/ Chemical/ index. html) [3] India destroys its chemical weapons stockpile (http:/ / zeenews. india. com/ news/ nation/ india-destroys-its-chemical-weapons-stockpile_531700. html). [4] Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons: A Critical Analysis of Past Allegations (http:/ / cns. miis. edu/ pubs/ dc/ briefs/ 030701. htm) [5] http:/ / www. anthrax. osd. mil/ documents/ library/ proliferation. pdf [6] NTI country profile - Israel (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Israel/ index. html) [7] NTI country profile - Israel (chemical weapons). (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Israel/ Chemical/ index. html) [8] Report of the Henry L. Stimson Center, “Chemical Weapons Proliferation Concerns”; found online at http:/ / www. stimson. org/ cbw/ ?SN=CB20011220137#myanmar (accessed 20 March 2008). [9] http:/ / toolserver. org/ %7Edispenser/ cgi-bin/ dab_solver. py?page=Chemical_weapon_proliferation& editintro=Template:Disambiguation_needed/ editintro& client=Template:Dn [10] See North Korea's profile on NTI (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ NK/ Chemical/ index. html) [11] NTI Research Library: country profile: Pakistan - chemical weapons (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Pakistan/ Chemical/ index. html) [12] http:/ / www. state. gov/ documents/ organization/ 52113. pdf [13] NTI: country profile Taiwan (http:/ / www. nti. org/ e_research/ profiles/ Japan_overview/ index_2738. html)

Resources • National Counterproliferation Center - Office of the Director of National Intelligence (http://www.counterwmd. gov) • Economist. (May 2, 1997). "Chemical Weapons. Just Checking," The Economist 347, p. 42. • Mahnaimi, Uzi (Oct., 1998). Israeli Jets Equipped For Chemical Warfare. London Sunday Times • Monterey Institute of International Studies. (Apr 9, 2002). Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present (http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm). Retrieved Dec. 21, 2004. • Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1975 Authorization Hearing, Part 5, March 7, 1974 • Shoham, Dany. (1998). Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt. The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Spring-Summer 1998), 48–58. • Russian Biological and Chemical Weapons (http://russianbiochemicalweapons.blogspot.com/), a useful page about non-state weapons transfers with a lot of links to information from CRS, the GAO and NGOs.

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List of missiles by country

List of missiles by country This list of missiles by country displays the names of missiles in order of the country where they originate (were developed), with the countries listed alphabetically and annotated with their continent (and defence alliance, if applicable). In cases where multiple nations have developed or produced a missile, it is listed under each significantly participating nation. Within the lists of each country, missiles are ordered by designation and/or calling name (the latter being especially relevant for Russian/Soviet missiles). In some cases multiple listings are used, in order to provide cross-references for easier navigation. This is not a list of missiles in operational service by a particular country. For an alphabetical list by missile name, see the list of missiles.

Argentina (South America) • • • •

Alacrán AS-25K anti-ship, air-ground ASM Cóndor I (with major contributions of German technology) Cóndor II (in cooperation with several Middle-Eastern countries)

• Cóndor III • Martin Pescador MP-1000 anti-ship, air-ground ASM • Mathogo anti-tank, wire-guided

Australia • Ikara • Malkara (joint Australian/British)

Brazil • • • • • • • • • • •

A-Darter Fifth generation short range infrared homing air-to-air missile (joint South Africa/Brazil) FOG-MPM Fiber Optics Guided Multiple Purpose Missile. AVMT-300 GPS and/or laser-guided long range missile. AV-TM 300 - Cruise missile with a range of 300 kilometers (under development). MAA-1A Piranha Short-range infrared homing air-to-air missile. MAA-1B Piranha Air to air missile, also known as "Piranha II". MSS-1.2 AC Anti-tank guided missile. MSA-3.1 AAé Anti-aircraft guided missile. MAS-5.1 Air-to-ground missile MAR-1 Anti-radiation missile. MAN-1 (MANSUP) Anti-ship missile

111

List of missiles by country

Canada (North America; NATO) • ERYX (joint French/Canadian) • Velvet Glove

People's Republic of China (mainland China) See also entries under #Republic of China (Taiwan).

Republic of China (Taiwan) See also entries under #People's Republic of China. • • • • • • •

Hsiung Feng I (HF-1) (ship-to-ship) Hsiung Feng II (HF-2) (guided multiplatform antiship) Hsiung Feng IIE (HF-2E) (land attack cruise missile variant of HF-2) Hsiung Feng III (HF-3) (antiship and/or land attack cruise missile) Sky Bow I (TK-1) (SAM) Sky Bow II (TK-2) (SAM) Sky Bow III (TK-3) (SAM)

• • • •

Sky Spear (Short range SSBM) Sky Sword I (TC-1) (air-to-air) Sky Sword II (TC-2) (air-to-air) Yun Feng (long-range cruise missile)

European joint-venture (Europe; NATO) • • • • • • •

AIM-132 ASRAAM MBDA Aster MBDA Meteor IRIS-T Martel - Anglo-French: Models AJ 168 and AS.37 MIM-115 Roland Taurus KEPD 150/350

France (Europe; NATO) • • • • • • • • • • •

AASM Aerospatiale AS-12 Apache AS.30 ASMP Crotale surface-to-air missile ENTAC ERYX (joint French/Canadian) HOT (Franco-German) anti-tank missile Exocet Hadès (cancelled)

• M5 • M45

112

List of missiles by country • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

113

M51 Magic Meteor MICA MILAN (Franco-German) anti-tank missile MISTRAL (Multinational) surface-to-air missile Pluton Matra R530 Super 530 ROLAND 2 surface-to-air missile (Germany/France) Scalp EG (Uk-French-Italy) Nord SS.10 Aerospatiale AS.11/SS.11 Nord SS.12

Germany (Europe; NATO) • AS.34 Kormoran 1/2 • MIM-115 Roland (replaced by LFK NG) • ESSM • Eurospike (Israel/Germany) • SM-2 IIIA[1] • • • • • • •

Taurus KEPD 350 AGM Armiger IRIS-T IRIS-T SL IDAS (missile) PARS 3 LR RBS-15 (Sweden/Germany)

• • • • •

GMLRS MEADS RIM-116 RAM LFK NG MBDA Meteor (Multinational)

A modern German Luftwaffe IRIS-T infrared homing air-to-air missile

• HOT (Franco German) anti-tank missile • MILAN

German missiles of WW2 • V-1 flying bomb • V-2 rocket • Enzian missile • Wasserfall missile • Ruhrstahl X-4 missile • • • •

Schmetterling Rheinbote Rheintochter Henschel Hs 293

Model of IDAS of the German Navy.

List of missiles by country

114

• Fritz X • Feuerlilie

Iran (Asia) As of 2009[2], Iran has an active interest in developing, acquiring, and deploying a broad range of ballistic missiles, as well as developing a space launch capability. In mid-July 2008, Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles during military exercises, reportedly including the medium-range Shahab-3. Iran announced other missile and space launch tests in August and November 2008. In February 2009, Iran announced it launched a satellite into orbit and “officially achieved a presence in space.” • Toophan 1 • Toophan 2 • Toophan 5 • Saeghe 1-2 • I-RAAD & I-RAAD-T • Fateh-110 • Fajr-2

Raduga Kh-55 Air-launched strategic cruise missile

• Fajr-3, MIRV • Fajr-5 • Fajr-8, upgrades copy of S-200, Iranian upgrades • Tondar-69 • Oghab • Samid • Qiam 1

SS-N-22 Sunburn Anti-ship missiles

• Shahab-1 • Shahab-2 • Shahab-3 B,C,D • Shahab-4 • Shahab-5 • Shahab-6 • Ghadr-110 • Ghadr-111

P-800 Oniks(SS-NX-26 Yakhont) Anti-ship cruise missile

• Sayyad, upgraded copy of HQ-2, Sayyad-1A has IR tracking. • Shahin I & II, Reverse engineer of MIM-23 Hawk. • R-17E, variant of Russian Scud B • SS-N-22 Sunburn • SS-NX-26 Yakhont • Raduga Kh-55, also called X-55 • Noor • Kowsar • Silkworm, Capable of manufacture the missiles.

SA-2 Guideline Anti-air defense missile

List of missiles by country • Hoot • Saegheh • Zelzal-1 • Zelzal-2 • Zelzal-3 • Ashoura • Sejjil 1, 2 • Nasr-1

Iraq (Asia) • • • • •

Al-Samoud 2 Abadil-100 Al Fahd 300 Al Fahd 500 Al Hussein

• • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Al Hijarah Al Abbas Badr 2000 Project 144 Tammuz-1 Al Abid FROG-7 Scud BM-21 MRL 122 mm ASTROS II MRL 127 mm (60+) BM-13/-16 MRL 132 mm ASTROS SS-30 MRL 180 mm Ababeel-50 MRL 262 mm (50+) ASTROS SS-60 300 mm

Israel (Asia) • • • • • • • • • • •

Arrow missile (Anti-ballistic) Barak 1 (Naval point defense) Barak 8 (Naval area defense) Delilah missile (Cruise missile of several variants: drone, air-to-ground, possible anti-radiation variant as well) David's Sling/Magic Wand (Anti medium range missile) Gabriel missile (Ship-to-ship and air-to-ship variants) Iron Dome (anti-short range rocket) Jericho II IRBM (Ground-to-ground ballistic) Jericho III ICBM (Ground-to-ground ballistic) LAHAT (Guided anti-tank) Nimrod (Guided anti-tank)

• Popeye missile (Air-to-ground cruise missile. U.S. designation AGM-142 Have Nap. Possibly larger derivatives exist as well, including a submarine-launched variant) • Python 5 (Air-to-air, also ground-to-air variant named SPYDER)

115

List of missiles by country • Derby (Air-to-air, also known as the Alto) • Shavit (Space launcher) • Spike/Gil missile (Portable guided anti-tank of several variants including a longer a range tactical ground-to-ground/air-to-ground variant named Spike NLOS or "Tamuz")

Japan (Asia) • • • •

AAM-1 (Type 69 Air-to-Air Missile) AAM-2 (Program was canceled) AAM-3 (Type 90 Air-to-Air Missile) AAM-4 (Type 99 Air-to-Air Missile)

• AAM-4B • AAM-5 (Type 04 Air-to-Air Missile) • AAM-5B (Development) • ASM-1 (Type 80 Air-to-Ship Missile) • ASM-1C (Type 91 Air-to-Ship Missile) • ASM-2 (Type 93 Air-to-Ship Missile) • • • • • • •

• ASM-2B ATM-1 (Type 64 Anti-Tank Missile) ATM-2 (Type 79 Anti-Landing craft and Anti-Tank Missile) ATM-3 (Type 87 Anti-Tank Missile) ATM-4 (Type 96 Multi-Purpose Missile System) ATM-5 (Type 01 Light Anti-Tank Missile) ATM-6 (Medium-Range Multi-Purpose Missile) SAM-1 (Type 81 Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile)

• SAM-1B • SAM-1C • SAM-2 (Type 91 Portable Surface-to-Air Missile) • SAM-2B • SAM-3 (Type 93 Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile) • SAM-4 (Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile) • SAM-4B (Development) • Type 11 Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile • SSM-1 (Type 88 Surface-to-Ship Missile) • • • • • • •

• SSM-1C SSM-1B (Type 90 Ship-to-Ship Missile Missile) SM-3 Block-II/IIA (Joint development with U.S) Type 73 (Type 73 lightweight torpedo) Type 80 (Type 80 heavyweight torpedo) Type 89 (Type 89 heavyweight torpedo) Type 97 (Type 97 lightweight torpedo) Type 07 (Type 07 Vertical Launched ASROC)

116

List of missiles by country

South Korea (Asia) • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Baeksangeo (White Shark) heavyweight torpedo Cheolmae-2 (KM-SAM) surface-to-air missile Cheongsangeo (Blue Shark) lightweight torpedo Chiron surface-to-air missile C-Star ship-to-ship missile Haeseong anti-ship missile Hongsangeo (Red Shark) rocket-based torpedo and anti-submarine missile (K-ASROC) Hyunmoo III cruise missile KM-SAM surface-to-air missile Pegasus surface-to-air missile K-SAAM surface-to-air missile Hyun-Gung anti-tank missile KGGB GPS-guided Air-to-surface missile

Norway (Europe; NATO) • Penguin (U.S. DoD AVD code: AGM-119) • Naval Strike Missile

Russia and the USSR (Europe/Asia) By Russian designation The NATO reporting name of each missile is shown in parentheses behind the proper name. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

2K11 missile (SA-4 Ganef) 2K22 missile (SA-19/SA-N-11 Grison) 3M9 missile (SA-6 Gainful) 4K40/4K51 missile (SS-N-2 Styx) 4K60/4K65 missiles (SA-N-3 Goblet) 9K33 missile (SA-8/SA-N-4 Gecko) 9K37 missile (SA-11/SA-N-7 Gadfly) 9K38 missile (SA-17/SA-N-12 Grizzly) 9K330/9K331/9K332 missiles (SA-15/SA-N-9 Gauntlet) 82R missile (SS-N-15 Starfish) 86R/88R missile (SS-N-16 Stallion) GR-1 Global Rocket fractional orbital bombardment system missile (SS-X-10 Scrag) Igla missile (SA-18/SA-N-10 Grouse) Igla-1 missile (SA-16 Gimlet) K-5 missile (AA-1 Alkali) K-8 missile (AA-3 Anab) K-9 missile (AA-4 Awl) K-13 missile (AA-2 Atoll) KSR-2 (AS-5 Kelt) MR-UR-100 Sotka intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-17 Spanker)

• P-1 missile (SS-N-1 Scrubber) • P-270/Kh-41 long-range anti-shipping missile (SS-N-22/ASM-MSS Sunburn) • P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck)

117

List of missiles by country • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

R-1 theatre ballistic missile (SS-1 Scunner) R-2 theatre ballistic missile (SS-2 Sibling) R-4 missile (AA-5 Ash) R-5M rocket (SS-3 Shyster) R-7 Semyorka intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-6 Sapwood) R-9 Desna intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-8 Sasin) R-11 tactical ballistic missile (SS-1b Scud) R-12 Dvina theatre ballistic missile (SS-4 Sandal) R-13 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SS-N-4 Sark) R-14 Chusovaya theatre ballistic missile (SS-5 Skean) R-15 submarine-launched ballistic missile R-16 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-7 Saddler) R-21 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SS-N-5 Serb) R-23 missile (AA-7 Apex) R-26 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-8 Sasin)

• R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SS-N-6 Serb) • R-27 missile (AA-10 Alamo) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

R-33 missile (AA-9 Amos) R-36 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-9 Scarp and SS-18 Satan) R-37 missile (AA-13 Arrow) R-39 missile (SS-N-20 Sturgeon) R-40 missile (AA-6 Acrid) R-46 intercontinental ballistic missile R-60 missile (AA-8 Aphid) R-73 missile (AA-11 Archer) R-77 missile (AA-12 Adder) R-300 Elbrus theatre ballistic missile (SS-1c Scud) R-400 Oka mobile theatre ballistic missile (SS-23 Spider) RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile (Unknown) [3] RT-1 theatre ballistic missile RT-2 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-13 Savage) RT-2PM Topol mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-25 Sickle) RT-2UTTH Topol M mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-27) RT-15 mobile theatre ballistic missile (SS-14 Scamp) RT-20 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-15 Scrooge) RT-21 Temp 2S mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-16 Sinner) RT-21M Pioner mobile medium range ballistic missile (SS-20 Saber) RT-23 Molodets intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-24 Scalpel) RT-25 theatre ballistic missile S-25 missile (SA-1 Guild) S-75 missile (SA-2/SA-N-2 Guideline) S-125 missile (SA-3/SA-N-1 Goa) S-200 missile (SA-5 Gammon) S-300P missile (SA-10 Grumble/SA-N-6/SA-20 Gargoyle/SA-X-21 Triumf) S-300V missile (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant)

• S-300PMU-1/2 missile (SA-20 Gargoyle) • S-400 missile (SA-21 Growler)

118

List of missiles by country • • • • • • • •

Strela-1 missile (SA-9 Gaskin) Strela-2 missile (SA-7/SA-N-5 Grail) Strela-3 missile (SA-14/SA-N-8 Gremlin) Strela-10 missile (SA-13 Gopher) TR-1 Temp theatre ballistic missile (SS-12 / SS-22 Scaleboard) UR-100 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-11 Sego) UR-100N intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-19 Stiletto) UR-200 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-X-10 Scrag)

By NATO name • • • • • • •

AA-1 Alkali / Kaliningrad K-5 AA-2 Atoll / Vympel K-13 AA-3 Anab / Kaliningrad K-8 AA-4 Awl / K-9 missile AA-5 Ash / R-4 missile AA-6 Acrid / R-40 missile AA-7 Apex / R-23 missile

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

AA-8 Aphid / R-60 missile AA-9 Amos / R-33 missile AA-10 Alamo / R-27 missile AA-11 Archer / R-73 missile AA-12 Adder / R-77 missile AA-13 Arrow / R-37 missile AS-1 Kennel anti-shipping AS-2 Kipper anti-shipping AS-3 Kangaroo nuclear anti-shipping AS-4 Kitchen anti-shipping AS-5 Kelt air-to-surface AS-6 Kingfisher anti-shipping AS-7 Kerry (SA-1 Guild) S-25 missile (SA-2/SA-N-2 Guideline) S-75 missile (SA-3/SA-N-1 Goa) S-125 missile (SA-N-3 Goblet) 4K60/4K65 missiles (SA-4 Ganef) 2K11 missile (SA-5 Gammon) S-200 missile (SA-6 Gainful) 3M9 missile (SA-7/SA-N-5 Grail) Strela-2 missile (SA-8/SA-N-4 Gecko) 9K33 missile (SA-9 Gaskin) Strela-1 missile (SA-10 Grumble/SA-N-6/SA-20 Gargoyle/SA-X-21 Triumf) S-300P missile (SA-11/SA-N-7 Gadfly) 9K37 missile (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant) S-300V missile (SA-13 Gopher) Strela-10 missile (SA-14/SA-N-8 Gremlin) Strela-3 missile

• (SA-15/SA-N-9 Gauntlet) 9K330/9K331/9K332 missiles • (SA-16 Gimlet) Igla-1 missile

119

List of missiles by country • • • • •

(SA-17/SA-N-12 Grizzly) 9K38 missile (SA-18/SA-N-10 Grouse) Igla missile (SA-19/SA-N-11 Grison) 2K22 missile (SA-20 Gargoyle) S-300PMU-1/2 missile (SA-21 Growler) S-400 missile

• • • • • • • • • • • •

SS-1 Scunner / R-1 SS-1b Scud / R-11 SS-1c Scud / R-300 SS-2 Sibling / R-2 SS-3 Shyster / R-5 SS-4 Sandal / R-12 Dvina SS-5 Skean / R-14 Chusovaya SS-6 Sapwood / R-7 Semyorka SS-7 Saddler / R-16 SS-8 Sasin / R-9 Desna SS-8 Sasin / R-26 (mistaken identification by NATO) SS-9 Scarp / R-36

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

SS-10 Scrag / Global Rocket 1 SS-11 Sego / UR-100 SS-12 Scaleboard / TR-1 Temp SS-13 Savage / RT-2 SS-14 Scamp / RT-15 SS-15 Scrooge / RT-20 SS-16 Sinner / RT-21 Temp 2S SS-17 Spanker / MR-UR-100 Sotka SS-18 Satan / R-36M SS-19 Stiletto / UR-100N SS-20 Saber / RT-21M Pioner SS-21 Scarab / OTR-21 Tochka SS-22 Scaleboard / TR-1 Temp SS-23 Spider / R-400 Oka SS-24 Scalpel / RT-23 Molodets SS-25 Sickle / RT-2PM Topol SS-27 / RT-2UTTH Topol M SS-N-1 Scrubber / P-1 missile SS-N-2 Styx / 4K40/4K51 missile SS-N-4 Sark / R-13 SS-N-5 Serb / R-21 SS-N-6 Serb / R-27 SS-N-15 Starfish 82R missile SS-N-16 Stallion 86R/88R missile SS-N-19 Shipwreck / P-700 rocket SS-N-20 Sturgeon / R-39 missile SS-N-21 Sampson / Raduga Kh-55 SS-N-22 Sunburn / P-270 missile

• SS-N-23 Skif / SS-N-23[1] • SS-N-25 Switchblade / Kh-35

120

List of missiles by country • SS-N-27 Sizzler / 3M-54 Klub • SS-X-10 Scrag / Global Rocket 1 / GR-1 • SS-X-10 Scrag / UR-200

Serbia (Europe) • ALAS (Advanced Light Attack System) Long-range multipurpose guided missile

South Africa (Africa) RSA Series • • • •

RSA-1 (Variant of the Jericho II second stage for use as a mobile missile) RSA-2 (Variant of the Jericho II) RSA-3 (Variant of the Shavit) RSA-4 (Upper stages of the Shavit with a heavy first stage)

(Above missiles made by Houwteq)

Other • • • • • • •

A-Darter R-Darter Ingwe Mokopa MUPSOW (Multi-Purpose Stand Off Weapon) Torgos Air-Launched Cruise Missile Umkhonto

(Above missiles made by Denel Dynamics)

Sweden (Europe) • • • • • • • • •

RBS-15 RB 04 Rb 05 RBS 70 RBS 23 Taurus missile BILL 1 BILL 2 Bantam

121

List of missiles by country

Turkey (Asia/Europe; NATO) Turkish Army • • • • • • • • • •

HQ-9[4][5] M270 : 12 T-300 Kasırga : 80 RA 7040 : 24 T-122 Sakarya : 130+ T-107 MBRL : 100+ TOROS Zıpkın PMADS : 80 J-600T Yıldırım : 100 Roketsan Cirit[6]

Turkish Air Force • MIM-14 • MIM-23 • Rapier missile • Atılgan PMADS : 150

United Kingdom (Europe; NATO) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

AIM-132 ASRAAM Bloodhound Surface-to-air Blowpipe Man portable Surface-to-air Blue Steel Nuclear "Stand Off Bomb" Blue Streak Blue Water - surface to surface nuclear Brakemine WWII SAM project Brimstone Fairey Fireflash Air-to-air Fairey Stooge anti-ship missile Fire Shadow Firestreak Air-to-air Green Cheese Javelin Surface-to-air Malkara (joint Australian/British) MBDA Meteor (European) Rapier Surface-to-air Red Dean Red Hebe Red Top Air-to-air Sea Cat Surface-to-air Sea Dart Surface-to-air Sea Eagle

• Sea Skua • Sea Slug Surface-to-air

122

List of missiles by country • • • • • • • • • • • •

123

Sea Viper (Aster Missile) Surface-to-air Sea Wolf Surface-to-air Skybolt ALBM Skyflash Starburst Starstreak Storm Shadow (British-French) Swingfire Ground to ground, anti-tank Thunderbird Tigercat UB.109T - cruise missile Vickers Vigilant

United States (North America; NATO) Missile Design Series (Unified) US DoD 4120 Mission Design Series (MDS) Designators and Symbols for Guided Missiles, Rockets, Probes, Boosters, and Satellites.[7] Status Prefix

Launch Environment

Basic Mission

Vehicle Type

C - Captive

A - Air

C - Transport

B - Booster

D - Dummy

B - Multiple

D - Decoy

M - Guided Missile

J - Special Test (temporary)

C - Coffin

E - Electronic / Communications

N - Probe

M - Maintenance

F - Man-Portable

G - Surface Attack

R - Rocket

N - Special Test (Permanent) G - Surface

I - Aerial/Space Intercept

S - Satellite

X - Experimental

H - Stored and Launched from concrete silo

L - Launch Detection / Surveillance

Y - Prototype

L - Silo Stored, Raised via elevator for Launch M - Scientific / Calibration

Z - Planning

N - Navigation P - Soft Pad

Q - Drone

R - Ship

S - Space Support

U - Underwater

T - Training U - Underwater Attack W - Weather

Sample Missile MDS - "BGM-109G"

List of missiles by country

124

Launch Environment Multiple

-B

Basic Mission

Surface Attack

-G

Vehicle Type

Guided Missile

-M

Design Number

109th Missile Design

- 109

Series

7th Version of the Design - G

The list of U. S. missiles, sorted by ascending MDS number: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

MGM-1 Matador MGR-1 Honest John RIM-2 Terrier MGR-3 Little John MIM-3 Nike-Ajax AIM-4 Falcon MGM-5 Corporal RGM-6 Regulus AIM-7 Sparrow/RIM-7 Sea Sparrow RIM-8 Talos AIM-9 Sidewinder CIM-10 Bomarc PGM-11 Redstone AGM-12 Bullpup MGM-13 Mace MIM-14 Nike-Hercules RGM-15 Regulus II CGM-16 / HGM-16 Atlas PGM-17 Thor MGM-18 Lacrosse PGM-19 Jupiter ADM-20 Quail MGM-21 (French-made) AGM-22 (French-made) MIM-23 Hawk RIM-24 Tartar LGM-25 Titan AIM-26 Falcon UGM-27 Polaris AGM-28 Hound Dog MGM-29 Sergeant LGM-30 Minuteman MGM-31 Pershing MGM-32 Entac MQM-33 BGM-34 Firebee AQM-35 MQM-36 Shelduck AQM-37 Jayhawk

List of missiles by country • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

AQM-38 MQM-39 Cardinal MQM-40 Firefly AQM-41 Petrel MQM-42 Redhead/Roadrunner FIM-43 Redeye UUM-44 Subroc AGM-45 Shrike MIM-46 Mauler AIM-47 Falcon AGM-48 Skybolt LIM-49 Nike Zeus/Spartan RIM-50 Typhon LR MGM-51 Shillelagh MGM-52 Lance AGM-53 Condor AIM-54 Phoenix

• • • • •

RIM-55 Typhon MR PQM-56 MQM-57 Falconer MQM-58 Overseer RGM-59 Taurus

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

AQM-60 Kingfisher MQM-61 Cardinal AGM-62 Walleye AGM-63 AGM-64 Hornet AGM-65 Maverick RIM-66 Standard MR SM-2 RIM-67 Standard ER SM-2 AIM-68 Big Q AGM-69 SRAM LEM-70 Minuteman ERCS BGM-71 TOW MIM-72 Chaparral UGM-73 Poseidon BQM-74 Chukar BGM-75 AICBM AGM-76 Falcon FGM-77 Dragon AGM-78 Standard ARM AGM-79 Blue Eye AGM-80 Viper AQM-81 Firebolt AIM-82

• AGM-83 Bulldog • AGM-84 Harpoon

125

List of missiles by country • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

RGM-84 Harpoon UGM-84 Harpoon RIM-85 AGM-86 ALCM AGM-87 Focus AGM-88 HARM UGM-89 Perseus BQM-90 ASMT[8] AQM-91 Firefly FIM-92 Stinger XQM-93 Compass Dwell GQM-94 B-Gull AIM-95 Agile UGM-96 Trident I AIM-97 Seekbat GQM-98 Tern-R LIM-99

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

LIM-100 RIM-101 PQM-102 Delta Dagger AQM-103 Thunderbolt MIM-104 Patriot MQM-105 Aquila BQM-106 Teleplane MQM-107 Streaker BQM-108 VATOL BGM-109 Tomahawk BGM-110 SLCM BQM-111 Firebrand AGM-112 RIM-113 SIRCS AGM-114 Hellfire MIM-115 Roland RIM-116 RAM FQM-117 RCMAT LGM-118 Peacekeeper

• • • • • • • • •

AGM-119 Penguin (Norwegian-made) AIM-120 AMRAAM CQM-121 Pave Tiger/Seek Spinner AGM-122 Sidearm AGM-123 Skipper AGM-124 Wasp UUM-125 Sea Lance BQM-126 AQM-127 SLAT

• AQM-128 • AGM-129 ACM

126

List of missiles by country • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

AGM-130 Ripper AGM-131 SRAM II AIM-132 ASRAAM UGM-133 Trident II MGM-134 Midgetman ASM-135 ASAT AGM-136 Tacit Rainbow AGM-137 TSSAM CEM-138 Pave Cricket RUM-139 VL-ASROC MGM-140 ATACMS ADM-141 TALD AGM-142 Have Nap (Israeli-made) MQM-143 RPVT ADM-144 BQM-145 Peregrine MIM-146 ADATS

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

BQM-147 Exdrone FGM-148 Javelin PQM-149 UAV-SR PQM-150 UAV-SR FQM-151 Pointer AIM-152 AAAM AGM-153 AGM-154 JSOW BQM-155 Hunter RIM-156 SM-2ER Block IV MGM-157 EFOGM AGM-158 JASSM AGM-159 JASSM ADM-160 MALD RIM-161 SM-3 RIM-162 ESSM GQM-163 Coyote MGM-164 ATACMS II RGM-165 LASM MGM-166 LOSAT BQM-167 Skeeter MGM-168 ATAMCS Block IVA AGM-169 JCM MQM-170 Outlaw MQM-171 Outlaw FGM-172 SRAW

127

List of missiles by country

128

Joint Designation System of 1947 Status Prefix

Launch Environment Target Environment System Designation Developing Service Sequence Number Modification Suffix

R - Research

A - Air

A - Air

T - Training

S - Surface

S - Surface

G - Army

U - Underwater

N - Navy

X - Experimental U - Underwater

M - Missile

A - Air Force

Y - Service Test

Test Vehicle Designations[9] Basic Mission System Designation Developing Service Sequence Number Modification Suffix C - Control

TV - Test Vehicle

A - Air Force

L - Launching

G - Army

P - Propulsion

N - Navy

R - Research

Sequence Numbers: Air Force: Consecutive numerical sequence for each missile mission type. Army: Single numerical sequence until 1948 when the sequence numbers were restarted. Navy: Initially even numbers transitioning to sequential. Sample Vehicle Designation "SSM-A-2 Navaho" Prefix

Not Used

Launch Environment S - Surface

S

Target Environment

S - Surface

S

System Designation

M - Missile

M

Developing Service

A - Air Force

A

Sequence Number

Sequencial Number 2

Modification Suffix

Not Used

Sample Test Vehicle Designation "RTV-G-1 WAC Corporal" Basic Mission

Research

R

System Designation TV - Test Vehicle TV Developing Service G - Army

G

Sequence Number

1

Modification Suffix

Not Used

List of missiles by country

129

United States Air Force Designation Systems United States Air Force Designation System 1947 to 1951 The list of missiles sorted by ascending Air Force 1947-1951 designations.[9] • • • • • • • • •

AAM-A-1 Firebird AAM-A-2 Falcon ASM-A-1 TARZON ASM-A-2 RASCAL LTV-A-1 Doodle Bug PTV-A-1 RTV-A-1 RTV-A-2 HIROC RTV-3 NATIV

• • • • • • • • •

RTV-A-4 Shrike RTV-A-5 SAM-A-1 GAPA SSM-A-1 Matador SSM-A-2 Navaho SSM-A-3 Snark SSM-A-4 Navaho II SSM-A-5 Boojum SSM-A-6 Navaho III

United States Air Force Designation System 1951 to 1955 During this timeframe, the U.S. Air Force treated missiles as pilotless aircraft. Basic Mission

Sequence Number Modification Series

B - Bomber "Ground Attack Missile" F - Fighter "Anti-Aircraft Missile" X - Experimental

The list of missiles sorted by ascending Air Force 1951-1955 designations. • • • • • •

B-61 Matador • B-62 Snark • B-63 RASCAL • B-64 Navaho B-65 Atlas B-67 Crossbow

F-98 Falcon • F-99 Bomarc • F-104 Falcon1 • • • • •

X-7 X-8 X-9 Shrike X-10 X-112 X-122 X-17

1

A version of the Falcon missile was briefly designated the F-104 before it was re-designated as the F-98.

2

The X-11 and X-12 designations were assigned to one and three engine test missiles that would have been used to develop a five engine version of the Atlas missile. United States Air Force Designation System 1955 to 1963 Status Prefix

Basic Mission

H - Hardened

GAM - Guided Air-Launched Missile

Sequence Number Modification Series

R - Reconnaissance GAR - Guided Air-Launched Rocket S - Space

IM - Intercept Missile

T - Training

RM - Research Missile

U - Training

SM - Strategic Missile

X - Experimental

TM - Tactical Missile

Y - Service Test

For all basic missions except GAR (which started at 1) the sequence number started after 67 which was the last bomber designation used for guided missiles. Sample Air Force 1955 - 1963 Designation - "XSM - 73"

List of missiles by country

130

Status Prefix

Experimental

X

Basic Mission

Strategic Missile

SM

Sequence Number

6th non-GAR missile after 67 73

Modification Series Not Used

The list of missiles sorted by ascending Air Force 1955-1963 designations. * • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

TM-61 Matador SM-62 Snark GAM-63 RASCAL SM-64 Navaho SM-65 Atlas GAM-67 Crossbow SM-68 Titan IM-69 Bomarc IM-70 Talos GAM-71 Buck Duck GAM-72 Quail SM-73 Bull Goose SM-74 SM-75 Thor TM-76 Mace GAM-77 Hound Dog SM-78

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

GAM-79 White Lance SM-80 Minuteman RM-81 Agena RM-82 Loki-Dart GAM-83 Bullpup RM-84 Aerobee-Hi RM-85 Nike-Cajun RM-86 Exos GAM-87 Skybolt SRM-88 Rocksonde 200 RM-89 Blue Scout I RM-90 Blue Scout II RM-91 Blue Scout Junior RM-92 Blue Scout Junior IM-99 Bomarc AIM-101 Sparrow

• • • • • • • • •

GAR-1 Falcon GAR-2 Falcon GAR-3 Falcon GAR-4 Falcon GAR-5 Falcon GAR-6 Falcon GAR-8 Sidewider GAR-9 Falcon GAR-11 Nuclear Falcon

United States Navy Designation Systems United States Navy Designation System 1941 - 1945 The list of missiles sorted by ascending Navy 1941 - 1945 designations. Pre-Fix

Basic Mission

X - Experimental BD - Assault Drone

Manufacturer Code D - McDonnell

LB - Bomb Carrying Glider E - Pratt-Read TD - Target Drone

P - Piper T - Taylorcraft

• • • • •

Interstate BDR LBD Gargoyle LBE-1 Glomb LBP-1 Glomb LBT-1 Glomb

United States Navy Designation System 1946 - 1947

List of missiles by country

131

Basic Mission

Manufacturer Sequence Number

Manufacturer Code

KA - Anti-Aircraft

None - First Missile Constructed by Manufacturer D - McDonnell

KD - Drone

2 - Second Missile Constructed by Manufacturer

M - Martin

KG - Ground Attack

3 - 3rd Missile Constructed by Manufacturer

N - Naval Air Material Unit

KS - Anti-Ship

Q - Fairchild

KU - Research and Test

S - Sperry Y - Convair W - Willys-Overland

The list of missiles sorted by ascending Navy 1946-1947 designations. • • • • • • • •

KAM Little Joe KAN Little Joe KA2N Gorgon IIA KA3N Gorgon IIIA [10] KAQ Lark KAS Sparrow KAY Lark KGN Gorgon IIC

• • • • • • • •

KGW Loon KSD Gargoyle KUD Gargoyle KUM Gorgon IV KUN Gorgon IIC KU2N Gorgon IIA KU3N Gorgon III KUW Loon

United States Navy Designation System 1947 - 1963 The list of missiles sorted by ascending Navy 1947-1963 designations. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

AAM-N-2 Sparrow I AAM-N-3 Sparrow II AAM-N-4 Oriole AAM-N-5 Meteor AAM-N-6 Sparrow III AAM-N-7 Sidewinder AAM-N-9 Sparrow X AAM-N-10 Eagle AAM-N-11 Phoenix ASM-N-2 Bat ASM-N-4 Dove ASM-N-5 Gorgon V ASM-N-6 Omar ASM-N-7 Bullpup ASM-N-8 Corvus ASM-N-10 Shrike ASM-N-11 Condor AUM-N-2 Petrel

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

AUM-N-4 Diver AUM-N-6 Puffin SAM-N-2 Lark SAM-N-4 Lark SAM-N-6 Talos SAM-N-7 Terrier SAM-N-8 Zeus SAM-N-8 Typhon LR SAM-N-9 Typhon MR SSM-N-2 Triton (see USS Hawaii (CB-3)) SSM-N-4 Taurus SSM-N-6 Rigel SSM-N-8 Regulus SSM-N-9 Lacrosse SSM-N-9 Regulus II SUM-N-2 Grebe CTV-N-2 Gorgon IIC CTV-N-4 Gorgon IIA

United States Army Designation Systems United States Army Designation System 1941 - 1947

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

CTV-N-6 Gorgon IIIA CTV-N-8 Bumblebee STV CTV-N-9 Lark CTV-N-10 Lark LTV-N-2 Loon LTV-N-4 PTV-N-2 Gorgon IV PTV-N-4 Bumblebee BTV RTV-N-2 Gargoyle RTV-N-4 Gorgon IIIC RTV-N-6 Bumblebee XPM RTV-N-8 Aerobee RTV-N-10 Aerobee RTV-N-12 Viking RTV-N-13 Aerobee 150 RTV-N-15 Pollux RV-N-16 Oriole

List of missiles by country

132

Designation

Function

Period of Usage

BG - Bomb Glider

Glider with explosive warhead

1942 to 1944

BQ - Guided Bomb

Ground-launched remote controlled drone 1942 to 1945

GB - Glide Bomb

Guided Bomb

1941 to 1947

GT - Glide Torpedo Guided Bomb with a torpedo

1943 to 1947

JB - Jet Bomb

1943 to 1947

Missile

VB - Vertical Bomb Guided Bomb

1943 to 1947

The list of missiles sorted by ascending Army 1941-1947 designations. • • • • • • • • • •

JB-1 Bat JB-2 Doodle Bug JB-3 Tiamet JB-4 Project MX-607 JB-5 Project MX-595 JB-6 Project MX-600 JB-7 Project MX-605 JB-8 GAPA JB-9 Project MX-626 JB-10 Bat

United States Army Designation System 1948 - 1955 The list of missiles sorted by ascending Army 1948 - 1955 designations. • • • • • • • • • • • •

RTV-G-1 WAC Corporal RTV-G-2 Corporal E RTV-G-3 Hermes II RTV-G-4 Bumper CTV-G-5 Hermes A-1 RTV-G-6 Hermes B-1 SAM-G-7 Nike Ajax SSM-G-8 Hermes A-3A SSM-G-9 Hermes B-2 RTV-G-10 Hermes A-2 SSM-G-12 Martin Lacrosse SSM-G-13 Hermes A-2

• • • • • • • • • •

PGM-11 Redstone SSM-G-15 Hermes A-1 SSM-G-16 Hermes A-3B SSM-G-17 Corporal SAM-A-18 Hawk SAM-A-19 Plato RV-A-22 Lark SSM-A-23 Dart SAM-A-25 Nike Hercules SSM-A-27 Sergeant

United States Army Designation System 1955 - 1963 Prefix

Army Ordnance Designator Equipment Category Sequence Number Modification Suffix

X - Pre Production M - Ordnance Designator

The list of missiles sorted by ascending Army 1955-1963 designations. • • • • •

M1 Nike-Ajax M2 Corporal M3 Hawk M4 Lacrosse M6 Nike-Hercules

• M8 Redstone • M9 Redstone

List of missiles by country • • • • • • •

133

M13 Shillelagh M14 Pershing M15 Sergeant M16 Hawk M18 Hawk M19 Pershing M50 Honest John

United States Undesignated Missiles The list of undesignated United States missiles sorted alphabetically: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

A-1 Affordable Weapon Alpha Draco ALVRJ Aries APKWS ASALM ATASK Athena Bold Orion Brazo Caleb Caster 4B Cherokee CKEM Cree Crow D-40 Cannonball

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

ERAM ERIS FABMDS Farside FLAGE Flying Bomb GBI HAVE DASH II HEDI Hera HGV HIBEX High Virgo HOE HOPI HTV HVM HyFly

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Jindivik1 Kettering Bug LAM LASRM LOCAAS M30 Guided MRLS NOTSNIK PAM PLV Pogo Pogo-Hi Private Rapier2 RATTLRS RSC-51 Senior Prom Sergent-Hydac Shavetail

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

SIAM Skokie I Skokie II SLAM Spike Sprint SR19/SR19 SRALT STARS Storm T-16 T-22 Talos-Sergeant-Hydac THAAD Trailblazer 2 Wagtail Wizard

1

Australian target missile briefly used by the United States Navy.

2

The United States procured Rapier missile systems for the air defense of United States Air Force Bases in the United Kingdom.

United States Missiles with X Designations The list of X designated United States missiles numerically: • • • • • • • • • • •

X-7 X-8 X-9 Shrike X-10 X-11 X-12 X-17 X-41 X-42 X-43 Hyper-X X-51

List of missiles by country

References [1] http:/ / toolserver. org/ %7Edispenser/ cgi-bin/ dab_solver. py?page=List_of_missiles_by_country& editintro=Template:Disambiguation_needed/ editintro& client=Template:Dn [2] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=List_of_missiles_by_country& action=edit [3] http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ europe/ 6700585. stm [4] http:/ / www. janes. com/ article/ 27579/ turkey-selects-chinese-hq-9-sam-for-t-loramids [5] Turkey to Buy 12 FD-2000 Long-Range Air Defense Systems from China (http:/ / www. deagel. com/ news/ Turkey-to-Buy-12-FD-2000-Long-Range-Air-Defense-Systems-from-China_n000012003. aspx) - Deagel.com, 9 October 2013 [6] http:/ / www. zaman. com. tr/ haber. do?haberno=1316729 [7] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), DoD 4120.15-L Model Designation of Military Aerospace Vehicles, Department of Defense, May 12, 2004 [8] Bridges Derek. (2007) M-Missiles, (http:/ / www. personal. psu. edu/ users/ d/ o/ dob104/ aviation/ us/ missile. html), retrieved December 25, 2007 [9] Andreas Parsch, Pre-1963 Designations of U.S. Missile and Drones, (http:/ / www. designation-systems. net/ usmilav/ old-missiles. html), Retrieved November 17, 2007. [10] Missile's Mission: Picking Off The Strays, October 1950, Popular Science (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=7iwDAAAAMBAJ& pg=PA125& dq=popular+ science+ antitank+ cannon& hl=en& ei=UT65TL7xNsrNngedhcTHAQ& sa=X& oi=book_result& ct=result& resnum=7& ved=0CEgQ6AEwBg#v=onepage& q& f=true) detailed article

134

135

Countries Albania Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

•

Albania

•

Algeria

•

Argentina

•

Australia

•

Brazil

•

Bulgaria

•

Burma

•

Canada

•

China

•

Egypt

•

France

•

Germany

•

India

•

Iran

•

Iraq

•

Israel

•

Japan

•

Libya

•

Mexico

•

Netherlands

•

North Korea

•

Pakistan

•

Poland

•

Romania

•

Russia

•

Saudi Arabia

•

South Africa

Albania

136 •

South Korea

•

Spain

•

Sweden

•

Syria

•

Taiwan

•

Ukraine

•

United Kingdom

•

United States Proliferation

• • •

Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

•

List of treaties

• •

Book Category

• • •

v t

e [1]

Albania once possessed a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. This stockpile of chemical weapons included 16,678 kilograms (36,769 lb) of mustard agent, lewisite, adamsite, and chloroacetophenone. Albania was among the initial countries who signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993.[1] The treaty, which came into force in 1997, requires the declaration of chemical stockpiles, and the destruction of all chemical weapons, delivery systems and production facilities. One of only six nations to declare a stockpile, Albania made its declaration in March 2003,[2] after the discovery, in December 2002, of 600 bulk containers of chemicals in an abandoned bunker. The material was probably acquired by Communist leader Enver Hoxha in the mid-1970s from China although no documentation was found.[3] On 11 July 2007, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) confirmed the destruction of the entire chemical weapons stockpile in Albania,[4] making Albania the first nation to completely destroy all of its chemical weapons under the terms of the CWC. Costs were approximately 48 million U.S. dollars. The United States assisted with and funded the destruction operations under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction.[5]

Biological and nuclear weapons Albania acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention on June 3, 1992, banning biological weapons. It also acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in September 1990.[6] Albania joined the Geneva Protocol on 20 December 1989, banning chemical and biological weapons and deposited its accession to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 23 April 2003. Albanian chemical weapons.

Albania

137

Notes ans references [1] Membership of the OPCW, http:/ / www. opcw. org/ en/ membership_menu. html [2] Kerry Boyd, "Albania Has Chemical Arms; CWC Review Conference Meets" (http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ act/ 2003_06/ cwc_june03. asp), Arms Control Association, June 2003, accessed July 27, 2007 [3] "Albania's Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others", http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-dyn/ articles/ A61698-2005Jan9. html, Joby Warrick, Washington Post, January 10, 2005, accessed July 27, 2007 [4] U.S. Department of State, Albania – First Country to Destroy All Of Its Chemical Weapons (http:/ / www. state. gov/ r/ pa/ prs/ ps/ 2007/ 88378. htm), July 13, 2007, accessed July 27, 2007 [5] Nunn-Lugar Destroys Chemical Weapons Stockpile in Albania, http:/ / lugar. senate. gov/ record. cfm?id=279351& , Press Release of Senator Lugar, July 19, 2007, accessed July 27, 2007 [6] Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, http:/ / disarmament. un. org/ TreatyStatus. nsf/ NPT%20(in%20alphabetical%20order)?OpenView, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), accessed July 27, 2007

Algeria Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

•

Albania

•

Algeria

•

Argentina

•

Australia

•

Brazil

•

Bulgaria

•

Burma

•

Canada

•

China

•

Egypt

•

France

•

Germany

•

India

•

Iran

•

Iraq

•

Israel

•

Japan

•

Libya

•

Mexico

Algeria

138 •

Netherlands

•

North Korea

•

Pakistan

•

Poland

•

Romania

•

Russia

•

Saudi Arabia

•

South Africa

•

South Korea

•

Spain

•

Sweden

•

Syria

•

Taiwan

•

Ukraine

•

United Kingdom

•

United States Proliferation

• • •

Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

•

List of treaties

• •

Book Category

• • •

v t

e [1]

In 1991, the government of the United States said it had unearthed details of the alleged construction of a nuclear reactor in Algeria. The Washington Times accused the country of developing nuclear weapons with the help of the Chinese government. The Algerian government admitted it was building a reactor, but denied any secrecy or military purpose. Surveillance from U.S. satellites also suggested that the reactor would not be used for military purposes. China had secretly made an agreement in 1983 to assist Algeria in developing a nuclear reactor. In November of 1991, succumbing to international pressure, Algeria placed the reactor under IAEA safeguards. Algeria signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 1995, and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention In August 2001, Algeria acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention.

Notes ans references References • Ref. Albright, David; Corey Hinderstein (May–June 2001). "Algeria: Big deal in the desert?" (http://thebulletin. metapress.com/content/t554r07076046724/?p=7fe5a1eb81494649b54eed80d7a914cc&pi=13). Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http://thebulletin.org) 57 (3): 45–52. • http://www.atomicarchive.com/Almanac/Testing.shtml

Argentina

139

Argentina Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

•

Albania

•

Algeria

•

Argentina

•

Australia

•

Brazil

•

Bulgaria

•

Burma

•

Canada

•

China

•

Egypt

•

France

•

Germany

•

India

•

Iran

•

Iraq

•

Israel

•

Japan

•

Libya

•

Mexico

•

Netherlands

•

North Korea

•

Pakistan

•

Poland

•

Romania

•

Russia

•

Saudi Arabia

•

South Africa

•

South Korea

•

Spain

•

Sweden

•

Syria

•

Taiwan

Argentina

140 •

Ukraine

•

United Kingdom

•

United States Proliferation

• • •

Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

•

List of treaties

• •

Book Category

• • •

v t

e [1]

Argentina has a history with the development of weapons of mass destruction. Under the National Reorganization Process, Argentina began a nuclear weapons program in the early 1980s, but this was abolished when democracy was restored in 1983.

Missile systems During the 1980s, the Alacrán (English: Scorpion) and Cóndor 2 (English: Condor) missiles were developed. The Cóndor 2, with a range of around 1,000 kilometres, was reportedly scrapped during the Menem administration under pressure from the United States government. The current status of the Alacrán remains unknown.[citation needed]

Chemical weapons Argentina acceded to the Geneva Protocol on May 12, 1969 and has been active in non-proliferation efforts, ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1979 and the Chemical Weapons Convention on October 2, 1995. In September 1991 Argentina, together with Brazil and Chile, signed the Mendoza Declaration, which commits signatories not to use, develop, produce, acquire, stock, or transfer—directly or indirectly—chemical or biological weapons.

Nuclear weapons Argentina conducted a nuclear weapon research program during the National Reorganization Process regime. Government officials at the time confirmed, in November 1983, that research carried out at the Balseiro Institute's research reactor had yielded the capacity for weapons-grade uranium enrichment.[1] The program was abandoned, however, shortly after the return of democracy, on December 10, 1983. In 1991 the parliaments of Argentina and Brazil ratified a bilateral inspection agreement that created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to verify both countries' pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. On February 10, 1995, Argentina acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. Argentina continues to use nuclear power in non-military roles, and is noted as an exporter of civilian use nuclear technology. In 2010, the government announced that it would start working in the creation of a nuclear submarine.[2] Those types of submarines only use atomic energy for propulsion. The announcement was highly criticized by politicians from opposing parties.[3]

Argentina

141

In accord with three presidential decrees of 1960, 1962 and 1963, Argentina supplied about 90 tons of unsafeguarded yellowcake (uranium oxide) to Israel to fuel the Dimona reactor, creating the fissile material for Israel's first nuclear weapons.

References [1] National Geographic. August 1986. p.243. [2] Promete Garré que se construirá un submarino nuclear en el país (http:/ / www. lanacion. com. ar/ 1271651) [3] La oposición, entre las duras críticas y la ironía (http:/ / www. lanacion. com. ar/ 1271656)

Sources • "The Nuclear Club: Membership has its kilotons" (http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/nuclearweapons/). CBC News Online. April 12, 2006. Archived (http://web.archive.org/web/20060414110321/http://www. cbc.ca/news/background/nuclearweapons/) from the original on 14 April 2006. Retrieved April 2006. • Nuclear Threat Initiative. "Argentina" (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Argentina/index.html). Archived (http://web.archive.org/web/20060419074131/http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/ Argentina/index.html) from the original on 19 April 2006. Retrieved May 1, 2006.

External links • The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter. org/article/npihp-partner-hosts-conference-brazils-and-argentinas-nuclear-history/) Conference on Brazilian and Argentine Nuclear Programs (English)

Australia Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

•

Albania

•

Algeria

•

Argentina

•

Australia

•

Brazil

•

Bulgaria

•

Burma

Australia

142 •

Canada

•

China

•

Egypt

•

France

•

Germany

•

India

•

Iran

•

Iraq

•

Israel

•

Japan

•

Libya

•

Mexico

•

Netherlands

•

North Korea

•

Pakistan

•

Poland

•

Romania

•

Russia

•

Saudi Arabia

•

South Africa

•

South Korea

•

Spain

•

Sweden

•

Syria

•

Taiwan

•

Ukraine

•

United Kingdom

•

United States Proliferation

• • •

Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

•

List of treaties

• •

Book Category

• • •

v t

e [1]

Australia is not known or believed to possess weapons of mass destruction, although it has participated in extensive research into nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the past. Australia chairs the Australia Group, an informal grouping of countries that seek to minimise the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon proliferation. All states participating in the Australia Group are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, and strongly support efforts under those Conventions to rid the world of chemical and biological weapons. As with chemical and biological weapons, Australia does not possess nuclear weapons and is not at all known to be seeking to develop them.

Australia

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Biological weapons Australia has advanced research programs in immunology, microbiology and genetic engineering that support an industry providing world class vaccines for domestic use and export. It also has an extensive wine industry and produces microorganisms on an industrial scale to support other industries including agriculture, food technology and brewing. The dual-use nature of these facilities mean that Australia, like any country with advanced biotechnological industries, could easily produce biological warfare agents. Some disease research laboratories in Australia own strains of the Ebola virus. The Australian Microbial Resources Research Network lists 37 culture collections, many of which hold samples of pathogenic organisms for legitimate research purposes.

History In the wake of the Japanese advance through South East Asia during World War II, the secretary of the Australian Department of Defence, F.G. Shedden, wrote to Macfarlane Burnet on 24 December 1946 and invited him to attend a meeting of top military officers to discuss biological warfare. In September 1947, Burnet was invited to join the chemical and biological warfare subcommittee of the New Weapons and Equipment Development Committee and subsequently prepared a secret report titled "Note on War from a Biological Angle". In 1951 the subcommittee recommended that "a panel reporting to the chemical and biological warfare subcommittee should be authorised to report on the offensive potentiality of biological agents likely to be effective against the local food supplies of South-East Asia and Indonesia". The activities of the chemical and biological warfare subcommittee were scaled back soon after, as Prime Minister Robert Menzies was more interested in trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Australia signed the Biological Weapons Convention on 10 April 1972 and deposited a certificate of ratification on 5 October 1977.

Chemical weapons Australia conducted extensive research into chemical weapons during World War II. Although Australia has never produced chemical weapons, it did stockpile chemical weapons sourced from the USA and Britain. Chemical weapons known to have been stockpiled included mustard gas, phosgene, lewisite, adamsite and CN gas. Some of the stockpiled weapons in the form of mortar and artillery shells, aerial bombs and bulk agents were sent to New Guinea for potential use against Japanese tunnel complexes. No actual use of the weapons was recorded although there were many trials using 'live' chemical weapons (such as shown in the picture to the right).

An observer examining an unexploded 25 pound gas shell following a trial of gas weapons at Singleton, New South Wales in 1943.

After World War II, the chemical weapons were disposed of by burning, venting (for phosgene) or by dumping at sea. Some 21,030 tons of chemical weapons were dumped in the seas off Australia near Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. This has been covered in a Defence report by Geoff Plunkett.[1] A complete history of Australia's involvement with chemical weapons - titled Chemical Warfare in Australia - has been published in book form by the Army History Unit (Defence Department) in 2013 (2nd Edn) [2] [3] Again it is authored by Geoff Plunkett [4]. A stockpile of 1,000 pound phosgene bombs was discovered at Embi Airfield in 1970 and disposed of by Australian Army personnel, and, up to 1990, drums of mustard gas were still being discovered in the bush where they had been

Australia tested. Another stockpile of chemical weapons was discovered at Maxwelton, Queensland in 1989. Australia signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in January 1993 and ratified it with the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act in 1994.

Nuclear weapons Australia does not have nuclear weapons and is not thought to be seeking to develop them, although several federal governments have investigated the idea and may have done some research into the question. Australia investigated acquiring tactical nuclear weapons from the United Kingdom or the United States as early as 1956 when Athol Townley, Minister for Air, wrote to Philip McBride, Minister for Defence, recommending the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons to arm Australia's English Electric Canberra bombers and CAC Sabre fighters.[5][6][7] Air Chief Marshal Frederick Scherger and Minister for Operation Hurricane, a 25kt nuclear test, Monte Bello Islands, Air Athol Townley supported acquiring nuclear Australia weapons, both for international prestige and because of the small size of the country's military. While Scherger's British and American counterparts were encouraging, the Macmillan and Eisenhower governments were not. Prime Minister Robert Menzies' government decided that domestic production would be too difficult due to cost and international politics. Australia hosted British nuclear testing in Monte Bello Islands (Operation Hurricane), Emu Field and Maralinga between 1952 and 1963. Maralinga was developed as a joint facility with a shared funding arrangement. During the 1950s, Australia participated in the development of the Blue Streak missile, a Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) intended for delivery of a nuclear warhead. The Australian HIFAR nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights, Sydney, operated from 1958 to 2006 and has now been replaced by the OPAL reactor in 2006. The new reactor is designed to use low-enriched uranium fuel and an open pool light water system. Australia has substantial deposits of uranium which account for 30% of the world's known reserves. Until 1996 government policy restricted exploitation of uranium deposits to three established mines. A fourth site at Four Mile uranium mine was approved in July 2009. Current policy is to develop the export potential of Australia's uranium industry by allowing mining and export of uranium under strict international agreements designed to prevent nuclear proliferation. Although the RAAF continued to occasionally investigate obtaining nuclear weapons during the 1960s, Australia signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 27 February 1970 and ratified the treaty on 23 January 1973. Sir Philip Baxter first head of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC), now the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and first Vice Chancellor of the University of New South Wales openly advocated Australia acquiring a weapons grade plutonium stockpile and thus nuclear weapons. During the 1970s and 1980s, ANSTO scientists developed centrifuge enrichment technology, claimed to be comparable with the commercial URENCO centrifuge technology of the time. Such technology, if deployed on an industrial scale, would have been capable in principle of producing highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The research lost government funding in the mid-1980s. A commercial-scale enrichment plant would also be capable of producing sufficient highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapons program. An Australian company has been actively developing a novel process for uranium enrichment, Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation (SILEX).

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The then Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard, began a study in 2006 into the issues surrounding an increase in Australia's uranium usage. Amongst the topics of the study will be a domestic uranium enrichment plant for supplying low-enriched fuel for nuclear power reactors, either domestic or foreign.

Delivery platforms Like virtually every other developed nation and most larger developing nations, Australia has weapons systems which could be used to deliver nuclear weapons to its neighbours, if nuclear weapons were developed. The Royal Australian Air Force has 71 F/A-18 Hornet strike fighters and 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet strike fighters. The Royal Australian Air Force is looking at options to purchase a further 18 F/A-18F Super Hornets due to delays in the production and arrivals of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II.

An Australian F-111

Australia previously operated the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk ground-attack aircraft and the English Electric Canberra and General Dynamics F-111C bombers, which were theoretically capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and F-111G tactical bombers which converted from United States Air Force FB-111A strategic nuclear bombers. Prior to the delivery of the F-111C, Australia briefly operated the McDonnell Douglas F-4E leased from the United States Air Force, standard Block 43/44 models capable of delivering nuclear weapons. As part of Air Staff Requirement (Operational Requirement/Air) 36 for bomber aircraft in the 1950s, the Royal Australian Air Force specified a requirement for "an offensive tactical strike capability" and "strategic defence of Australia" with targets "as far north as the Kra Peninsula". The bomber was required to have a range of not less than 4,000 nautical miles (7,400 km) and be capable of carrying at least 20,000 pounds (9,100 kg) of conventional bombs or one BLUE DANUBE nuclear weapon (which had been air dropped at Maralinga on 11 October 1956).[8] Locally manufactured versions of the Avro Vulcan or Handley Page Victor nuclear bombers were some of the options considered.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

http:/ / www. hydro. gov. au/ n2m/ dumping/ cwa/ cwa. htm http:/ / www. bookdepository. co. uk/ Chemical-Warfare-Australia-Geoff-Plunkett/ 9780987427908 http:/ / www. mustardgas. org http:/ / www. smh. com. au/ news/ national/ deadly-chemicals-hidden-in-war-cache/ 2008/ 01/ 19/ 1200620272396. html National Archives of Australia, Department of Defence; A5954 1400/15 Re-equipment of RAAF Bomber and Fighter Squadrons with atomic weapons, 1956 [6] National Archives of Australia, Department of Defence; A1209 1957/4067 Nuclear Weapons for the Australian Forces, 1956-1958 [7] National Archives of Australia, Prime Minister's Department; A1945 186/5/3 Procurement of nuclear weapons for Australian forces, 1957 [8] National Archives of Australia, Department of Defence; A1945 1/501/694 PART 1 Royal Australian Air Force. Air staff requirement (Operational Requirement/Air 36). Bomber aircraft., 1954 - 1958

Further reading • Plunkett, Geoff (2013). Chemical Warfare in Australia: Australia's Involvement in Chemical Warfare 1914 – Today (http://www.bookdepository.co.uk/Chemical-Warfare-Australia-Geoff-Plunkett/9780987427908) (2nd ed.). Leech Cup Books. ISBN 9780987427908.

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Brazil Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

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Albania

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Algeria

•

Argentina

•

Australia

•

Brazil

•

Bulgaria

•

Burma

•

Canada

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China

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Egypt

•

France

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Germany

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India

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Iran

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Iraq

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Israel

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Japan

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Libya

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Mexico

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Netherlands

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North Korea

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Pakistan

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Poland

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Romania

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Russia

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Saudi Arabia

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South Africa

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South Korea

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Spain

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Sweden

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Syria

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Taiwan

Brazil

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Ukraine

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United Kingdom

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United States Proliferation

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Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

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List of treaties

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Book Category

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In the 1970s and 80s, during the military regime, Brazil had a secret program intended to develop nuclear weapons.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7] The program was dismantled in 1990, five years after the military regime ended, and Brazil is considered free of weapons of mass destruction.[8] Brazil is one of several countries that have forsworn nuclear weapons under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty[9] but possess the key technologies needed to produce nuclear weapons.[10][11][12]

Nuclear program In the 1950s, President Getúlio Vargas encouraged the development of independent national nuclear capabilities. During the 1970s and 80s, Brazil and Argentina embarked on a nuclear competition. Through technology transfers from West Germany, which did not require IAEA safeguards, Brazil pursued a covert nuclear weapons program known as the "Parallel Program", with enrichment facilities (including small scale centrifuge enrichment plants, a limited reprocessing capability, and a missile program). In 1987, President Sarney announced that Brazil had enriched uranium to 20%. In 1990, President Fernando Collor de Mello symbolically closed the Cachimbo test site, in Pará, and exposed the military’s secret plan to develop a nuclear weapon. Brazil's National Congress opened an investigation into the Parallel Program. Congress members visited numerous facilities, including the Institute of Advanced Studies (IEAv) in São José dos Campos. They also interviewed key players in the nuclear program, such as former President João Figueiredo and retired Army General Danilo Venturini, the former head of the National Security Council under Figueiredo. The congressional investigation exposed secret bank accounts, code-named "Delta", which were managed by the National Nuclear Energy Commission and used for funding the program. The congressional report revealed that the IEAv had designed two atomic bomb devices, one with a yield of twenty to thirty kilotons and a second with a yield of twelve kilotons. The same report revealed that Brazil's military regime secretly exported eight tons of uranium to Iraq in 1981.[13] In 1991, Brazil and Argentina renounced their nuclear rivalry. On 13 December 1991, they signed the Quadripartite agreement, at the IAEA headquarters, creating the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and allowing fullscope IAEA safeguards of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear installations. Brazil officially opened the Resende enrichment plant in May 2006.[14] Brazil's enrichment technology development, and the plant itself, involved substantial discussions with the IAEA and its constituent nations. The dispute came down to whether IAEA inspectors would be allowed to inspect the machines themselves. The Brazilian government did not allow the inspection of the centrifugal cascade halls, arguing that this would reveal technological secrets (probably relating to the use of a magnetic lower bearing in place of the more common mechanical bearing). The

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Brazilian authorities stated that, as Brazil is not part of any "axis of evil", the pressure for full access to inspection even in universities - could be construed as an attempt to pirate industrial secrets.[15] They also claimed that their technology is better than that of the United States and France, mainly because the centrifugal axis is not mechanical, but electromagnetic. Eventually, after extensive negotiations, agreement was reached that while not directly inspecting the centrifuges, the IAEA would inspect the composition of the gas entering and leaving the centrifuge. Then U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stated in 2004 that he was sure that Brazil had no plans to develop nuclear weapons.[16]

Technological capability It is likely that Brazil has retained the technological capacity and knowhow to produce and deliver a nuclear weapon. Experts at the Los Alamos National Laboratory have concluded that in view of its previous nuclear activities, Brazil is in a position to produce nuclear weapons within three years.[17] If Brazil decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, the centrifuges at the Resende enrichment plant could be reconfigured to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Even a small enrichment plant like Resende could produce several nuclear weapons per year, but only if Brazil was willing to do so openly.[][18] The Brazilian Navy is currently developing a nuclear submarine fleet, and in 2007 authorised the construction of a prototype submarine propulsion reactor. In 2008, France agreed to transfer technology to Brazil for the joint development of the nuclear submarine hull.

Facilities Aramar Experimental Center 23.397°S 47.601°W [19] The Aramar Experimental Center (Portuguese: Centro Experimental de Aramar) located in Iperó in the State of São Paulo, was inaugurated in 1988 as the first uranium-only enrichment plant in Brazil. The facility is run by the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) and the Brazilian Navy. In addition to the Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, the facility also hosts an Isotopic Enrichment Laboratory and several Small Nuclear Centers (Portuguese: Pequenas Centrais Nucleares, or PCNs). The enrichment laboratories are under the National Safeguards control and national inspections are carried out by the Safeguards Division of CNEN.[20]

Cachimbo Test Site 9.3047°S 54.9464°W [21] The Cachimbo test site, officially named Brigadeiro Velloso Test Site (Portuguese: Campo de Provas Brigadeiro Velloso), is located in the State of Pará and covers 45,000 square kilometres, an area larger than the Netherlands. It is within this military area that a 320 meters-deep hole at the Cachimbo Mountain Range was site for nuclear explosives tests. The shaft has been public knowledge since 1986 and was allegedly abandoned in September 1990, when President Fernando Collor de Mello used a small shovel to symbolically seal up the hole.[22]

Brazilian Navy's Nuclear Propulsion Development Facility in July, 2007. This facility produces Uranium hexafluoride gas for Uranium enrichment.

Brazil

Army's Technology Center (Guaratiba) 23.0124°S 43.5639°W [23] The Army's Technology Center (Portuguese: Centro Tecnológico do Exército, or CTEx) located in Guaratiba in the State of Rio de Janeiro is the site of the plutonium-producing reactor facility, known as 'The Atlantic Project', managed by the Brazilian Army's Special Projects Institute – IPE. Reports indicate that the gas-graphite reactor would be capable of producing plutonium for atomic bombs.[24]

Aerospace Technology and Science Department (São José dos Campos) 23.212290°S 45.875120°W [25] The Aerospace Technology and Science Department (Portuguese: Departamento de Ciência e Tecnologia Aerospacial, or DCTA) is a research facility located in São José dos Campos, in the State of São Paulo where nuclear research is also conducted.[26]

Resende (Engenheiro Passos) Nuclear Fuel Factory 22.504°S 44.646°W [27] The Resende Nuclear Fuel Facility (Portuguese: Fábrica de Combustíveis Nucleares, or FCN) is a nuclear enrichment facility located in Resende, in the State of Rio de Janeiro. The plant is managed by the Nuclear Industries of Brazil (Portuguese: Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil, or INB) and by the Brazilian Navy. Currently the plant produces enough HEU for 26 to 31 implosion type warheads.[28][29]

Legislation and conventions Brazil's 1988 Constitution states in Article 21 that "all nuclear activity within the national territory shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by the National Congress".[30] Brazil acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on September 18, 1998, ratified the Geneva Protocol on 28 August 1970, the Biological Weapons Convention on 27 February 1973, and the Chemical Weapons Convention on 13 March 1996. Brazil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, making Brazil a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Brazil is also an active participant in the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, multinational agencies concerned with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapon development.

Notes ans references [1] Brazil: Nuclear Inventory (http:/ / www. reachingcriticalwill. org/ about/ pubs/ Inventory/ Brazil. pdf) Reachingcriticalwill.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [2] Brazil: Nuclear Weapons Programs (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ nuke. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [3] Brazil, IAEA Reach Inspection Agreement (http:/ / www. armscontrol. org/ act/ 2005_01-02/ Brazil) Arms Control Association. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [4] Tracking Nuclear Proliferation - Brazil (http:/ / www. pbs. org/ newshour/ indepth_coverage/ military/ proliferation/ countries/ brazil. html) PBS NewsHour. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [5] States Formerly Possessing or Pursuing Nuclear Weapons: Brazil (http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ Nwfaq/ Nfaq7-4. html) The Nuclear Weapon Archive. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [6] Country Profiles (http:/ / www. gsinstitute. org/ dpe/ countries/ argentina_brazil. html) Global Security Institute. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [7] Countries and issues of nuclear strategic concern: Brazil (http:/ / www. sipri. org/ research/ disarmament/ nuclear/ researchissues/ past_projects/ issues_of_concern/ brazil/ brazil_default) SIPRI. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [8] Life without the bomb (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ americas/ 609279. stm) BBC. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.

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[9] Albright, Lampreia hail Brazil's accession to NPT (http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ control/ npt/ news/ 98091823_llt. html) Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [10] Brazil’s Nuclear Puzzle (http:/ / www. wisconsinproject. org/ pubs/ articles/ 2004/ BrazilsNuclearPuzzle. htm) Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [11] Brazil and the Bomb (http:/ / www. ip-global. org/ archiv/ exclusive/ view/ 1272884882. html) German Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [12] Not-Quite-Nuclear Nations (http:/ / www. newsweek. com/ 2009/ 08/ 27/ not-quite-nuclear-nations. html) Newsweek. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [13] Congressional Report on the "Parallel Program". (http:/ / www. senado. gov. br/ atividade/ materia/ getPDF. asp?t=66808& tp=1) Senate of Brazil. Retrieved on 2012-03-23. . [14] BBC News: Brazil joins world's nuclear club (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ americas/ 4981202. stm) BBC News. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [15] Urânio: Brasil não é contra a inspeção internacional, mas contra aumento da inspeção que pode apropriar-se da tecnologia desenvolvida pelo país (http:/ / www. jornaldaciencia. org. br/ Detalhe. jsp?id=15243) Jornal da Ciência. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. . [16] BBC News: US sure of Brazil nuclear plans (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ world/ americas/ 3715556. stm) BBC News. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [17] Brazil and the Bomb (http:/ / www. defesanet. com. br/ docs1/ ruhle_brazil_nuclear. pdf) German Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on 2011-10-23. [18] Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory (FCN) (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ resende. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [19] http:/ / tools. wmflabs. org/ geohack/ geohack. php?pagename=Brazil_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction& params=23. 397_S_47. 601_W_ [20] WMD Facilities: Aramar Experimental Center, Iperó (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ aramar. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [21] http:/ / tools. wmflabs. org/ geohack/ geohack. php?pagename=Brazil_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction& params=9. 3047_S_54. 9464_W_ [22] WMD Facilities: Cachimbo (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ cachimbo. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [23] http:/ / tools. wmflabs. org/ geohack/ geohack. php?pagename=Brazil_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction& params=23. 0124_S_43. 5639_W_ [24] WMD Facilities: Guaratiba (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ guaratiba. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [25] http:/ / tools. wmflabs. org/ geohack/ geohack. php?pagename=Brazil_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction& params=23. 212290_S_45. 875120_W_ [26] WMD Facilities: São José dos Campos (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ sao-jose-dos-campos. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [27] http:/ / tools. wmflabs. org/ geohack/ geohack. php?pagename=Brazil_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction& params=22. 504_S_44. 646_W_ [28] WMD Facilities: Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory (FCN) (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ brazil/ resende. htm) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [29] INB Activities on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (http:/ / anes. fiu. edu/ Pro/ s5ara. pdf) Americas Nuclear Energy Symposiums. Retrieved on 2010-10-06. [30] Constitution of Brazil: Article 21; XXIII; a (http:/ / www. v-brazil. com/ government/ laws/ titleIII. html) V-Brazil. Retrieved on 2009-09-06.

External links Official sites • Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (http://www.inb.gov.br/english/default.asp) Brazilian Nuclear Industries (English)

• Centro de Desenvolvimento da Tecnologia Nuclear (http://www.cdtn.br/ingles/ingles.asp) Center of Nuclear Technology Development (English) • Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas Nucleares (http://www.ipen.br/sitio/) National Nuclear Energy Research Institute (Portuguese) • Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear (http://www.ien.gov.br/) Nuclear Engineering Institute (Portuguese)

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• Centro Regional de Ciências Nucleares (http://www.crcn-co.cnen.gov.br/) Central-West Nuclear Sciences Regional Center (Portuguese) • Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear (http://www.cnen.gov.br/) National Nuclear Energy Commission (Portuguese)

• Eletronuclear (http://www.eletronuclear.gov.br/ingles/inicio/index.php) Manages Brazil's nuclear power plants (Portuguese) • Associação Brasileira de Energia Nuclear (http://www.aben.com.br/) Brazilian Association of Nuclear Energy (Portuguese)

• Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (http://www.abacc.org/home. htm) (English) (Portuguese) (Spanish) • Campo de Provas Brigadeiro Velloso (http://www.cpbv.aer.mil.br/) Cachimbo Test Site (Portuguese) • Departamento de Ciência e Tecnologia Aeroespacial (http://www.cta.br/) Brazilian Air Force - Aerospace Technology and Science Department (Portuguese) Scientific sites • Jornal da Ciência's article (in Portuguese) (http://www.jornaldaciencia.org.br/Detalhe.jsp?id=15243) Academic Sites • Collection of Archival Documents on the Brazilian Nuclear Program (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ collection/167/brazilian-nuclear-history) hosted by the Wilson Center Digital Archive (English)

Bulgaria Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

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Albania

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Algeria

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Argentina

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Australia

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Brazil

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Bulgaria

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Burma

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Canada

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China

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Egypt

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France

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Germany

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India

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Iran

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Iraq

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Israel

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Japan

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Libya

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Mexico

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Pakistan

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Poland

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Romania

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Russia

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Saudi Arabia

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South Africa

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South Korea

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Spain

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Sweden

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Syria

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United States Proliferation

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Bulgaria has developed weapons of mass destruction, most notably chemical weapons. Chemical weapons production was concentrated in Smyadovo. This indigenous production capability was probably achieved with the help on the USSR.[1] As of 2011 Bulgaria does not possess any weapons of mass destruction.

Bulgaria

Missile program Bulgaria had a significant missile arsenal, including 67 SCUD-B, 50 FROG-7 and 24 SS-23 ballistic missiles.[2] Since the USSR planned to rapidly deploy its own nuclear weapons in Bulgaria in case a war broke out, the missiles were not armed with warheads, but only prepared to launch Soviet weapons. The SS-23 systems had conventional warheads plus a WMD launching capability. The nuclear missile launching pads and equipment were dismantled in 1991. The first missile brigade was created in 1961.[3] In 1994 the country bought 46 conventional warheads for its SCUDs from Russia. All SCUD, FROG and SS-23 missiles were destroyed in 2002. Currently Bulgaria operates a dozen SS-21 Scarab-A launchers, but information over the exact number of missiles is classified. They are all armed with conventional warheads of 160 kg each.

Chemical weapons Information over Bulgaria's chemical weapons is scarce. The only known chemical weapons production facility is located near Smyadovo, which now produces chemicals for civilian purposes. The country ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1994 and dismantled them by 2000.

Biological weapons Bulgaria has signed and ratified the Biological Weapons Convention, and there is no information indicating that the country has ever developed such weapons.

Nuclear weapons Bulgaria has never developed nuclear weapons, although some treaties with the Soviet Union guaranteed the deployment of Soviet warheads on Bulgarian territory in case of a war with NATO. Its SS-23 missiles were nuclear-capable. In the mid-1990s, journalist Goran Gotev investigated a testimony of an anonymous Soviet Army captain published in Komsomolskaya Pravda, who described in detail an alleged Soviet-Bulgarian nuclear weapons facility which hosted 70 warheads for tactical missiles. The site consisted of "four three-storey apartment blocks, barracks, a cafeteria, a sports field, a social club, a store, and a plaza", and had 130 personnel. The unit was disbanded in 1989, the warheads were quickly shipped to Ukraine and all equipment, uniforms and photos that were present at the facility were destroyed. Another Russian Army official later denied the story. However, in the 1980s four Bulgarian Air Force majors received training in the Soviet Union on releasing nuclear weapons from MiG-29BN aircraft. In 2001 the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry denied the "presence" of nuclear weapons in Bulgaria. The country has the potential to establish a military nuclear program, having a nuclear powerplant at Kozloduy with its own plutonium storage facility.[4] A nuclear research facility with a 200 kW pool-type reactor is in operation in Sofia.[5] The reactor of the facility produces some nuclear material, which is stored near Novi Khan.[6] As part of its efforts to safeguard potentially weapons-usable atomic material, the United Nations nuclear watchdog assisted Bulgaria with the removal of highly-enriched uranium stored at the shut-down research reactor in Sofia. The substance, which was 36% enriched and took the form of fresh fuel, was airlifted in December 2003 to Russia, the original supplier, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Agency safeguards inspectors monitored and verified the packaging of the fuel, which Moscow says it will re-fabricate into low-enriched uranium.

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References [1] GlobalSecurity.org - Bulgaria special weapons (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ world/ bulgaria/ index. html) [2] StandartNews.com "Никой не разбра, че горихме ракети през 1973 г. (in Bulgarian) (http:/ / www. standartnews. com/ archive/ 2002/ 08/ 12/ interview/ s3453_2. htm) [3] Duma.bg "България вече е ракетна сила !" (in bulgarian) (http:/ / www. duma. bg/ 2005/ 0805/ 270805/ obshtestvo/ ob-4. html) [4] Ново хранилище за използвано ядрено гориво се открива в АЕЦ "Козлодуй" (http:/ / www. dnevnik. bg/ bulgaria/ 2011/ 05/ 12/ 1087868_novo_hranilishte_za_izpolzvano_iadreno_gorivo_se/ ), Dnevnik, 12 May 2011 [5] Nuclear Scientific and Experimental Centre (http:/ / irt. inrne. bas. bg/ ) [6] Министерство на труда и социалната политика (in bulgarian) (http:/ / www. mlsp. government. bg/ bg/ faq/ faq. asp?qid=26965)

External links • Satellite images of an alleged nuclear facility (http://wikimapia.org/#lat=42.8308273&lon=26.6245133& z=16&l=0&m=b) • Act on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and on Control of Toxic Chemicals and the Precursors thereof (http://www.mi.government.bg/en/library/ act-on-the-prohibition-of-chemical-weapons-and-on-control-of-toxic-chemicals-and-the-precursors-the-119-c25-m258-1. html), a 2002 act banning the production and storage of nuclear weapons in Bulgaria

Burma Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

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Albania

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Algeria

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Argentina

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Australia

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Bulgaria

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Burma (Myanmar) is widely suspected to have initiated a nuclear weapons programme.[1] If such a programme exists, it is expected to be very slow and primitive, due to Burma's financial and technological limitations. Burma has faced persistent accusations of using chemical weapons; however, the NTI has stated there is "no evidence to suggest that Myanmar has a chemical weapons program." Burma is a member of nuclear, but not chemical or biological, non-proliferation treaties.

Burma

Chemical weapons The first[citation needed] public indications of Burma's possible possession of chemical weapons came in testimony delivered to the United States Congress in 1991 by Rear Adm. Thomas Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence of the United States Navy,[2] in which Burma was included on a list of nations that "probably possess" chemical weapons. However, the United States then took Burma off the list of nations with chemical weapons programmes in 1993. In 2005 Belgian photojournalist Thierry Falise reported speaking to two deserters from the Burmese Army who, during their time in service, were "reportedly told to take special precautions because they were handling chemical shells."[3] The deserters described seeing artillerymen wearing masks and gloves to fire the munitions. In a separate report from the same year, Dr. Martin Panter, a physician and the president of Christian Solidarity Worldwide, reported treating injuries of anti-government Karenni rebels that were "consistent with a chemical attack," and claimed that "strong circumstantial evidence exists for the use of chemicals, particularly nerve agents, pulmonary agents and possibly blister agents."[4] In response to the Christian Solidarity Worldwide report, the Burmese government denied the use of chemical weapons. [5] The NTI has stated that "without further investigation it is not clear if the reports refer to agents recognized under international law as chemical weapons or to riot control agents the latter is most likely." Burma signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 but has yet to ratify the agreement.

Nuclear weapons In 2007 Russia and Burma did a controversial nuclear research center deal. According to them, "The centre will comprise a 10MW light-water reactor working on 20%-enriched uranium-235, an activation analysis laboratory, a medical isotope production laboratory, silicon doping system, nuclear waste treatment and burial facilities".[6] According to an August 2009 report published in the Sydney Morning Herald, Burma is working to develop a nuclear weapon by 2014. The reported effort, purportedly being undertaken with assistance from North Korea, involves the construction of a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction facilities in caves tunneled into a mountain at Naung Laing, a village in the Mandalay division .[7] The information cited in the newspaper story reportedly originated from two high-ranking defectors who had settled in Australia. On June 3, 2010, a five year investigation by an anti-government Myanmar broadcaster, the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), found evidence that allegedly shows the country's military regime begun a programme to develop nuclear weapons. The DVB said evidence of Myanmar's nuclear programme came from top-secret documents smuggled out of the country over several years, including hundreds of files and other evidence provided by Sai Thein Win, a former major in the military of Myanmar.[8] A UN report said there was evidence that North Korea had been exporting nuclear technology to Burma, Iran and Syria. Based on Win's evidence, Robert Kelley, a former weapons inspector, said he believed Burma "has the intent to go nuclear and it is... expending huge resources along the way." But as of 2010, experts said that Burma was a long way from succeeding, given the poor quality of their current materials. Despite Kelley's analysis, some experts are uncertain that a nuclear weapons programme exists; for example, ISIS notes ambiguity as to whether certain equipment is used for uranium production, or for innocently producing "rare earth metals or metals such as titanium or vanadium." The U.S. expressed concern in 2011 about possible NPT violations, but by 2012 stated that its concerns had been "partially allayed."

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Notes and references [1] (http:/ / www. smh. com. au/ world/ burmax2019s-nuclear-secrets-20090731-e4fv. html), Sydney Morning Herald, August 24, 2009, Accessed November 17, 2009. [2] Chemical Arms; Navy Report Asserts Many Nations Seek Or Have Poison Gas (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 1991/ 03/ 10/ world/ after-war-chemical-arms-navy-report-asserts-many-nations-seek-have-poison-gas. html), New York Times, March 10, 1991, Accessed August 9, 2009. [3] Burmese junta uses chemical weapons (http:/ / www. timesonline. co. uk/ tol/ news/ world/ article519966. ece), The Sunday Times, May 8, 2005, Accessed August 9, 2009. [4] Burma 'using chemical weapons' (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ world/ 2005/ apr/ 21/ burma. simonjeffery), The Guardian, April 21, 2005, Accessed August 9, 2009. [5] http:/ / www. voanews. com/ burmese/ archive/ 2005-04/ 2005-04-22-voa5. cfm?moddate=2005-04-22 [6] Russia and Burma in nuclear deal (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ asia-pacific/ 6658713. stm). BBC 15 May 2007 [7] Revealed: Burma’s nuclear bombshell (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ world/ 2005/ apr/ 21/ burma. simonjeffery), Sydney Morning Herald, August 1, 2009, Accessed August 10, 2009. [8] Myanmar Nuclear Weapon Program Claims Supported by Photos, Jane's Reports (http:/ / www. bloomberg. com/ news/ 2010-07-21/ myanmar-nuclear-weapon-program-claims-supported-by-photos-jane-s-reports. html), Bloomberg, 22 July 2010

Canada Weapons of mass destruction

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Albania

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Bulgaria

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Burma

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Canada has not maintained and positioned weapons of mass destruction since 1984 as of 1998 and has signed treaties repudiating possession of them. Canada ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1930 and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1970, but still sanctions contributions to American military programs.

Nuclear weapons Introduction With the American emphasis on nuclear deterrence following the Soviet Union's atom bomb test, Canadian cooperation with the US required the alignment of Canadian doctrine with defensive elements of American nuclear weapons doctrine. The first US nuclear weapon came to Canada in 1950 when the United States Air Force Strategic Air Command stationed 11 model 1561 Fat Man atomic bombs at Goose AFB, Newfoundland and Labrador. From 1963 to 1984, Canada fielded a total of four tactical nuclear weapons systems which deployed several hundred nuclear warheads. Throughout the Cold War, Canada was closely aligned with defensive elements of United States programs in both NORAD and NATO. In 1964 Canada sent its White Paper on Defense to U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert

Canada McNamara to ensure he would not, “find anything in these references contrary to any views [he] may have expressed.” Canada withdrew three of the four nuclear-capable weapons systems by 1972. The single system retained, the AIR-2 Genie delivered 1.5 kiloton of force, and was designed to strike enemy aircraft as opposed to ground targets, and may not qualify as a weapon of mass destruction given its limited yield.

Early history: World War II and into the Cold War Canada’s military relationship with the United States has grown significantly since the Second World War. Although the Dominion of Canada came into being on July 1, 1867, Canadian foreign policy was determined in Britain. Canada entered the Great War in 1914 when Great Britain declared war on Germany and the Austria-Hungarian Empire. Canadian foreign policy became independent in December 1931 with the passage of the Statute of Westminster.[1] In 1939 Canada declared war on Germany a week later than Great Britain, on September 10, 1939.[2] The United States did not enter the war until December 7, 1941. One of the first formal agreements for military cooperation was made in August 1940. Known as the Ogdensburg Agreement, it established North American Warning Lines the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Both nations are founding members of the United Nations as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They signed the NORAD Agreement in 1957 and created the North American Air Defense Command to defend the continent against attacks from the USSR. In the 1942 Quebec Agreement, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to develop the "Tube Alloys" Project and created a committee to manage the project which included C. D. Howe, the Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply. This was the code name for the British Uranium Committee project which had worked on a theoretical design for an atomic bomb. One significant contribution was a calculation of the critical mass of uranium. The mass was less than earlier estimates and suggested that development of a fission bomb was practical. "Tube Alloys" was part of a shipment of the most secret scientific research in Great Britain that was sent to the United States for safekeeping when the threat of German invasion was significant. Materials included the cavity magnetron which was essential to RADAR, British information related to the German Enigma machines, Jet Engine designs as well as "Tube Alloys". Canada's only specific role in the Manhattan Project was providing raw material, including uranium ore from a northern mine which may have been used in the construction of the atom bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Canada would continue to supply fissionable material to the US and other allies throughout the Cold War although Canada never developed indigenous nuclear weapons as did NATO allies France and the United Kingdom. Canada was little more than just a third-party supplier of rare materials, with a few exceptions. After briefly allowing nuclear weapons to be temporarily stationed in Goose Bay, Labrador, Canada agreed to a long term lease of the Goose Bay base to the US Strategic Air Command. The Americans were refused permission to stockpile bomb casings for the B-36 at Goose Bay. These bombs would have been armed in wartime with materials brought from the United States. Goose Bay was used as a base for air refueling tankers which were to support the SAC B-47 and B-52 bomber forces. In 1951 the Pinetree Line was established north of the US-Canadian border, and in 1953 Canada built the Mid-Canada Air Warning Line, which was manned by the Canadian military. In 1954 the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) was established jointly by the US and Canada in the Arctic. The Pinetree Line was built to control the

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air battle between the NORAD interceptor forces and manned Soviet bombers. Beginning with Ground-controlled interception updated from the Second World War, the system has been computerized and automated with at least four new generations of technology being employed. It was clear, even in the early years of the Cold War, that on paper, Canada and the US were to be jointly responsible for the defence of the continent. In execution, Canadian investment in air defense has decreased significantly with the decline of the intercontinental strategic bomber threat. In the 1950s the RCAF contributed fourteen squadrons of CF-100 interceptors and this was reduced to three squadrons of CF-101s by 1970. Some of this is due to improved technology but more is due to the decline of the bomber threat and reductions in Canadian military spending.

Inventory of Canada’s nuclear armaments

BOMARC CIM-10; Warhead: W40 7-10 kiloton

Honest John; Warhead W7 8-61 kiloton

CF-104 Starfighter; Warhead: B57 bomb 5-20 kilotons; B28 bomb 70-350 kt; B43 bomb 1 Mt

VooDoo weapons test; Combat Warhead: W25 1.5 kilotons

On New Year's Eve in 1963, the Royal Canadian Air Force delivered a shipment of nuclear warheads to the Bomarc missile site near RCAF Station North Bay. The Government of Canada never publicly admitted to the presence of nuclear weapons on Canadian bases in Canada and Germany but their presence was common knowledge at the time. It is generally understood that the Bomarc missile warheads were delivered on this cold (-13 degrees Celsius) winter night when a group of protesters stood down from a vigil at the gates of the missile site. It was said they assumed that the RCAF would be unlikely to work on this traditional evening of celebration. The delivery was photographed by the press and this revealed to the world that the delivery had taken place. The warheads were never in the sole possession of Canadian personnel. They were the property of the Government of the United States and were always under the direct supervision of a "Custodial Detachment" from the United States Air Force (or Army, in the case of Honest John warheads). Through 1984, Canada would deploy four American designed nuclear weapons delivery systems accompanied by hundreds of US-controlled warheads: • 56 BOMARC CIM-10 surface-to-air missiles. • 4 Honest John rocket systems armed with a total of 16 W31 nuclear warheads the Canadian Army deployed in Germany. • 108 nuclear W25 Genie rockets carried by 54 CF-101 VooDoos. • estimates of 90 to 210 tactical (20-60 kiloton) nuclear warheads assigned to 6 CF-104 Starfighter squadrons (about 90 aircraft) based with NATO in Europe (there is a lack of open sources detailing exactly how many warheads were deployed). In practice, each of 36 NATO squadrons (initially six Canadian squadrons Number 1 Air Division RCAF) would provide two aircraft and pilots to a Quick Reaction Alert facility. The 'Q' aircraft could be launched with an armed US nuclear weapon within 15 minutes of receiving the 'go' order. This arrangement was called the NATO Quick Reaction Alert Force. It provided a dispersed force upwards of 100 strike aircraft for use on short notice. Missions were targeted at troop concentrations, airfields, bridges, assembly and choke points and other tactical targets in order to slow the massive tank formations of the Red Army as they poured into the Fulda Gap and on towards the Rhine River.

Canada In total, there were between 250 and 450 nuclear warheads on Canadian bases between 1963 and 1972. There were at most 108 Genie missiles armed with 1.5 kiloton W25 warheads present from 1973 to 1984. There may have been fewer due to attrition of CF-101s as the program aged and as incoming CF-18s became combat-qualified. In addition, between 1968 and 1994 the United States stored the Mk 101 Lulu and B57 nuclear bombs at Naval Station Argentia, Newfoundland. This number decreased significantly through the years as various systems were withdrawn from service. The Honest John was retired by the Canadian Army in 1970. The Bomarc missile was phased out in 1972 and the CF-104 Strike/Attack squadrons in West Germany were reduced in number and reassigned to conventional ground attack at about the same time. From late in 1972, the CF-101 interceptor force remained as the only nuclear-armed system in Canadian use until it was replaced by the CF-18 in 1984. The CF-18 aircraft is equipped with the AIM-7, AIM-9 and several more advanced air-to-air missiles. All of these employ conventional warheads. These missiles are more reliable, accurate and have longer range than the nuclear-tipped, short-range and unguided Genie. They are also free of the encumbering security procedures and considerable political baggage associated with nuclear warheads.

Cold War relationship with the US Canada’s Cold War military doctrine and fate was inextricably tied with that of the United States. The two nations shared responsibility for continental air defence through NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) and both belonged to NATO and contributed forces in Europe. Should nuclear war with the USSR have broken out, Canada would have been crippled. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s 1987 Canadian White Paper on Defence acknowledged this reality citing that, “Soviet strategic planners must regard Canada and the United States as a single set of military targets no matter what political posture we might assume.” This sums up Canada’s Cold War predicament well, as Canada’s geo-political relationship with the US meant that Canada would inevitably be widely devastated by any US-Soviet nuclear exchange - whether it was targeted or not. It led to a familiar phrase of the time, “incineration without representation". The DEW Line and Pinetree Line radar systems formed the backbone of continental air defence in the 1950s and 1960s. The most likely routes for Soviet aircraft attacking the United States came through Canada. In particular, the Eastern Seaboard of the United States would be approached through the UK-Iceland-Greenland gap and a line of search radars ran down the coast of Labrador and on to Gander Newfoundland. These stations were supported by RCAF CF-101 interceptors at Bagotville Quebec and Chatham New Brunswick, as well as USAF F-102 interceptors stationed at Stephenville Newfoundland (Harmon Air Base). These were presumably equipped with nuclear-armed AIM-26 Nuclear Falcon missiles as this was a standard configuration on the F-102. Canada hosted no intercontinental strategic bombers but the Strategic Air Command base at Goose Bay Labrador hosted a large number of KC-135 air refueling tankers. These were intended to top up the fuel tanks of the outbound B-52 strike force headed for targets in the USSR. They also supported the SAC Airborne Alert Force and would have refueled any surviving bombers returning from the USSR.

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"Incineration without representation" For the Canadian public, "incineration without representation" led to a popular belief that the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) was in Canada’s best interest. MAD was the Cold War doctrine which held that as long as both the US and USSR possessed significant nuclear arsenals, any nuclear war would assuredly destroy both nations, thereby discouraging either state from launching any nuclear offensive. For Canadians, MAD was appealing in this light, as Canada was unlikely to emerge from any nuclear exchange unscathed given its position between the two countries, as any weapons shot down or falling short were likely to fall on Canadian soil.

Nuclear weapon test Apache, 1956

In Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s 1971 Defence White Paper, this dynamic was noted: “One of the most important changes in international affairs in recent years had been the increase in stability of nuclear deterrence, and the emergence of what is, in effect, nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Each side now has sufficient nuclear strength to assure devastating retaliation in the event of a surprise attack by the other, and thus neither could rationally consider launching a deliberate attack.” Even as late as 1987, Prime Minister Mulroney’s Defence White Paper acknowledged that, “each superpower now has the capacity to obliterate the other,…the structure of mutual deterrence today is effective and stable. The Government believes that it must remain so.” Given the prospect of "incineration without representation", Canadians seemed to feel that the doctrine which most encouraged restraint was the strategically soundest one to support. Canadians were still nervous about US foreign policy, however. In 1950, when U.S. President Harry S. Truman announced that Washington had not entirely ruled out the use of nuclear weapons in Korea, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson recalled the remarks caused Ottawa to collectively “shudder”. One Cold War contemporary observer even remarked that, “Canadians often think that their neighbour to the south exhibits wild swings of emotional attachments…with other countries; that it is impatient, is prone to making sweeping judgments, and generally lacks sophistication and subtlety in its approach to the Soviet bloc and the cold war.” However, if Canadian leadership was nervous about US foreign policy, they did not voice their discontent through actions. Canada was consistently and significantly cooperative with the United States when it came to nuclear weapons doctrine and deployments through the Cold War.

Continued cooperation with the US to present The Government of Canada formally agreed to every major North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategic document, including those that implied a US strike-first policy. This may suggest that successive Canadian governments were willing to follow US and NATO doctrine even if said doctrine was counter to the publicly favoured (and politically supported) doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. Professors J.T. Jockel and J.J. Sokolsky explore this assertion in-depth in their article "Canada's Cold War Nuclear Experience". Furthermore, Canada allowed for forward deployment of US bombers and participated actively and extensively in the NORAD

NORAD blast doors

Canada program; as well, Canada cooperated with the US when it came to research, early warning, surveillance and communications. Canada was second only to West Germany in hosting nuclear related facilities. In short, the Canadian Government was thoroughly committed to supporting US nuclear doctrine and deployments through the Cold War, in spite of any popular reservations concerning this dynamic. While it has no more permanently stationed nuclear weapons as of 1984, Canada continues to cooperate with the United States and its nuclear weapons program. Canada allows testing of nuclear weapon delivery systems; nuclear weapon carrying vessels are permitted to visit Canadian ports; and aircraft carrying nuclear warheads are permitted to fly in Canadian airspace with the permission of the Canadian government. There is, however, popular objection to this federal policy. Over 60% of Canadians live in cities or areas designated “Nuclear Weapons Free”, reflecting a contemporary disinclination towards nuclear weapons in Canada. Canada also continues to remain under the NATO 'nuclear umbrella'; even after disarming itself in 1984, Canada has maintained support for nuclear armed nations as doing otherwise would be counter to Canadian NATO commitments.

Chemical weapons During both World War I and World War II, Canada was a major producer and developer of chemical weapons for the Allied war effort. These were used in combat in World War I, but not in World War II. Human experimentation was carried out during World War II, with CFB Suffield becoming the leading research facility. Thousands of Canadian soldiers were exposed to mustard gas, blister gas, tear gas, and other agents, and some were permanently injured as a result. Following both world wars, Canadian military forces returning home were directed to dump millions of tons of unexploded ordnance (UXOs) into the Atlantic Ocean off ports in Nova Scotia; an undetermined amount of these UXOs are known to be chemical weapons.[3] The 1972 London Convention prohibited further marine dumping of UXOs, however the chemical weapons existing off the shores of Nova Scotia for over 60 years continue to bring concern to local communities and the fishing industry. Human testing of chemical weapons such as sarin and VX gas continued in Canada well into the 1960s, and dangerous defoliation agents were tested at CFB Gagetown from 1956 to 1967. Tests at CFB Gagetown of Agent Orange and the more toxic Agent Purple in 1966 and 1967 caused a variety of acute and chronic illnesses among soldiers and civilians working there. These tests left Canada with large stockpiles of chemical weapons. Canada eventually abandoned the use of lethal chemical weapons, and had to devote a great deal of effort to safely destroying them. Since 1990, the Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee has conducted annual site visits and inspections to verify that all remaining military activities involving chemical warfare agents are defensive in nature. Canada ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention on September 26, 1995. Canada still employs Riot control agents which are classified as non-lethal weapons.

Biological weapons Canada had a biological warfare research program in the early to middle part of the 20th century. Canadian research involved developing protections against biowarfare attacks and for offensive purposes, often with the help of the UK and the US.[4] Canada has thus experimented with such things as weaponized anthrax, botulinum toxin, ricin, rinderpest virus, Rocky Mountain spotted fever, plague, Brucellosis and tularemia. CFB Suffield is the leading research centre. Canada says it has destroyed all military stockpiles and no longer conducts toxin warfare research. As with chemical weapons, the Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee has since 1990 conducted annual site visits and inspections at CFB Suffield and elsewhere to verify that all remaining military activities involving biological warfare agents are purely defensive in nature. Canada ratified the Biological Weapons Convention on September 18, 1972. Of particular interest is that Canada's Sir Frederick Banting, the discoverer of insulin, served as an Army Major in World War II. There have been some claims that he was a key biological warfare researcher. Like many of his peers in senior positions during the Second World War, Banting had served as a Medical Officer with the Canadian

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Canada Expeditionary Force in the Great War. This experience would have made clear to him the depths of cruelty inherent in modern warfare. He is credited with raising the alarm about the potential development of biological and chemical weapons by Germany in London in 1939. His influence on members of Churchill's administration may have contributed to a later decision to conduct germ warfare research at Porton Down. Banting was killed in 1941 in the crash of a Hudson bomber just east of Gander, Newfoundland, while en route to England for work related to his research on the Franks flying suit. This was about a year prior to work on Anthrax that took place at Grosse-Île, Quebec beginning in 1942.

Disarmament Canada is a member of every international disarmament organization and is committed to pushing for an end to nuclear weapons testing, reduction in nuclear arsenals, a ban on all chemical and biological weapons, bans on weapons in outer space, and blocks on nuclear proliferation. However, in recent years it has become less vocal on the issue of disarmament; the need for increased border defense, particularly in the Territories, has recently overshadowed other issues in military circles. Canada maintains a division of its Foreign Affairs department devoted to pursuing these ends. It also dedicates significant resources in trying to verify that current treaties are being obeyed, passing much information on to the United Nations. In the 1970s, Canada discussed building a reconnaissance satellite to monitor adherence to such treaties, but these plans were shelved. A public furor arose in 1983, when the Canadian government approved a plan to test cruise missiles in Alberta.[5] Canada continues to promote peaceful nuclear technology exemplified by the CANDU reactor. Unlike most designs, the CANDU does not require enriched fuel, and in theory is therefore much less likely to lead to the development of weaponized missile fuel. However, like all power reactor designs, CANDU reactors produce and use plutonium in their fuel rods during normal operation (roughly 50% of the energy generated in a CANDU reactor comes from the in situ fission of plutonium created in the uranium fuel),[6] and this plutonium could be used in a nuclear explosive if separated and converted to metallic form (albeit only as reactor-grade plutonium, and therefore of limited military usefulness). Accordingly, CANDU reactors, like most power reactors in the world, are subject to safeguards under the United Nations which prevent possible diversion of plutonium. CANDU reactors are designed to be refuelled while running, which makes the details of such safeguards significantly different from other reactor designs. The end result, however, is a consistent and internationally accepted level of proliferation risk. A common accusation is that India used Canadian reactors to produce plutonium for weapons. India owns two licensed CANDU reactors and began nuclear weapons tests shortly after they became operational in 1972. However, international observers have concluded that no plutonium was diverted from the safeguarded CANDU reactors.[citation needed]Wikipedia:Avoid weasel words The plutonium for the initial bombs came from the older CIRUS reactor built by Canada (see Nuclear Weapons above), but the material for India's most recent nuclear test, Operation Shakti, is thought to come from the locally-designed Dhruva reactor. India has also built a number of reactors, not under IAEA safeguards, that were derived from the CANDU design and are used for power generation. These may also be used for plutonium production. Canada has volunteered to help destroy some of the leftover chemical weapons of the USSR. There is also talk of taking Soviet nuclear fuel and using it as fuel in CANDU reactors, but this is controversial.

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Notes and references [1] Final Report of the French Constitutional Drafting Committee, Statute of Westminster, 1931 - Enactment No. 17 (http:/ / www. justice. gc. ca/ eng/ pi/ const/ lawreg-loireg/ p1t171. html) [2] CBC Archives, On This Day, Sept. 10, 1939 (http:/ / archives. cbc. ca/ on_this_day/ 09/ 10/ ) [3] Sea-dumped munitions: An unseen threat (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20090613023230/ http:/ / www. stfx. ca/ research/ polgov/ UnseenThreat. htm) [4] Bryden, John. "Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War 1937-1947". ISBN 0-7710-1724-3. [5] Cruise missile testing coming to Canada (http:/ / archives. cbc. ca/ IDC-1-71-208-1040-10/ conflict_war/ cruise_missile_test/ ) - CBC, July 15, 1983. [6] Rouben, Ben, Introduction to Reactor Physics (http:/ / canteach. candu. org/ library/ 20040501. pdf) - CANTEACH (http:/ / canteach. candu. org), September, 2002.

Further reading • John Clearwater (1998), Canadian nuclear weapons: the untold story of Canada's Cold War arsenal (http:// books.google.com/books?id=0s2V4fxHfS4C&pg=PP1), Dundurn Press Ltd., ISBN 978-1-55002-299-5 • John Clearwater (1999). U.S. nuclear weapons in Canada (http://books.google.com/ books?id=I3_oaypyhB8C&pg=PP1). Dundurn Press Ltd. ISBN 978-1-55002-329-9. • Sean M. Maloney (25 July 2007). Learning to love the bomb: Canada's nuclear weapons during the Cold War (http://books.google.com/books?id=sT5Asq_OKmoC&pg=PP1). Potomac Books, Inc. ISBN 978-1-57488-616-0. • Andrew Richter (2002), Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian military strategy and nuclear weapons, 1950-63 (http:/ /books.google.com/books?id=3HjXd5HJYlwC&pg=PP1), UBC Press, ISBN 978-0-7748-0888-0

External links • Edwards, G. Canada and the Bomb: Past and Future (http://www.ccnr.org/opinion_ge.html) Montreal Gazette. 9 August 1998.

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China

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China China

First nuclear weapon test

October 16, 1964

First fusion weapon test

June 17, 1967

Last nuclear test

July 29, 1996

Largest yield test

4 Mt • •

Atmospheric - 4 Mt (November 17, 1976) Underground - 660~1,000 kt (May 21, 1992)

Total tests

45

Peak stockpile

434

Current stockpile

~240

Maximum missile range

14,000 km

NPT signatory

Yes (1992, one of five recognized powers)

[1]

Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

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Albania

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Algeria

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Argentina

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Australia

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Brazil

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China

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Canada

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China

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Egypt

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United States Proliferation

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Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

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The People's Republic of China has developed and possessed weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. China's first nuclear test took place in 1964 and first hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1967. Tests continued until 1996 when it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984 and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997. The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal is a state secret and is therefore unknown. There are varying estimates of the size of China's arsenal. A 2011 Georgetown University study estimated that China has as many as 3,000 warheads hidden in underground tunnels, whereas China is estimated by the Federation of American Scientists to have an arsenal of about 180 active nuclear weapon warheads and 240 total warheads as of 2009, which would

China make it the second smallest nuclear arsenal amongst the five nuclear weapon states acknowledged by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. According to some estimates, the country could "more than double" the "number of warheads on missiles that could threaten the United States by the mid-2020s". Early in 2011, China published a defense white paper, which repeated its nuclear policies of maintaining a minimum deterrent with a no-first-use pledge. Yet China has yet to define what it means by a "minimum deterrent posture". This, together with the fact that "it is deploying four new nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, invites concern as to the scale and intention of China’s nuclear upgrade".

Chemical weapons China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on January 13, 1993. The CWC was ratified on April 25, 1997.[2] In the official declaration submitted to the OPCW, the Chinese government declared that it had possessed a small arsenal of chemical weapons in the past but that it had destroyed it before ratifying the Convention. It has declared only three former chemical production facilities that may have produced mustard gas, phosgene and Lewisite.[3] China was found to have supplied Albania with a small stockpile of chemical weapons in the 1970s during the Cold War.[4]

Biological weapons China is currently a signatory of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chinese officials have stated that China has never engaged in biological activities with offensive military applications. However, China was reported to have had an active biological weapons program in the 1980s.[5] Kanatjan Alibekov, former director of one of the Soviet germ-warfare programs, said that China suffered a serious accident at one of its biological weapons plants in the late 1980s. Alibekov asserted that Soviet reconnaissance satellites identified a biological weapons laboratory and plant near a site for testing nuclear warheads. The Soviets suspected that two separate epidemics of hemorrhagic fever that swept the region in the late 1980s were caused by an accident in a lab where Chinese scientists were weaponizing viral diseases.[6] US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed her concerns over possible Chinese biological weapon transfers to Iran and other nations in a letter to Senator Robert E. Bennett (R-Utah) in January 1997.[7] Albright stated that she had received reports regarding transfers of dual-use items from Chinese entities to the Iranian government which concerned her and that the United States had to encourage China to adopt comprehensive export controls to prevent assistance to Iran's alleged biological weapons program. The United States acted upon the allegations on January 16, 2002, when it imposed sanctions on three Chinese firms accused of supplying Iran with materials used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. In response to this, China issued export control protocols on dual use biological technology in late 2002.[8]

Nuclear weapons History Mao Zedong decided to begin a Chinese nuclear-weapons program during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–1955 over the Quemoy and Matsu Islands. While he did not expect to be able to match the large American nuclear arsenal, Mao believed that even a few bombs would increase China's diplomatic credibility. Construction of uranium-enrichment plants in Baotou and Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium facility in Jiuquan and the Lop Nur nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending advisers to help in the facilities devoted to fissile material production, and in October 1957 agreed to provide a prototype bomb, missiles, and related technology. The Chinese, who preferred to import technology and components

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China to developing them within China, exported uranium to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets sent two R-2 missiles in 1958. That year, however, Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev told Mao that he planned to discuss arms control with the United States and Britain. China was already opposed to Khruschev's post-Stalin policy of "peaceful coexistence". Although Soviet officials assured China that it was under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, the disagreements widened the emerging Sino-Soviet split. In June 1959 the two nations formally ended their agreement on military and technology cooperation, and in July 1960 all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program.[9] The American government under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson was concerned about the program and studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the aid of Taiwan or the Soviet Union, [citation needed] but Khruschev did not display interest. The first Chinese nuclear test, code-named 596, occurred on 16 October 1964. The Chinese acknowledged that their nuclear program would have been impossible to complete without the Soviet help. China's first test of a nuclear device took place on October 16, 1964, at the Lop Nur test site. China's last nuclear test was on July 29, 1996. According to the Australian Geological Survey Organization in Canberra, the yield of the 1996 test was 1–5 kilotons. This was China's 22nd underground test and 45th test overall.[10]

Size China has made significant improvements in its miniaturization techniques since the 1980s. There have been accusations, notably by the Cox Commission, that this was done primarily by covertly acquiring the U.S.'s W88 nuclear warhead design as well as guided ballistic missile technology.[citation needed] Chinese scientists have stated that they have made advances in these areas, but insist that these advances were made without espionage. The international community has debated the size of the Chinese nuclear force since the nation first acquired such technology. Because of strict secrecy it is very difficult to determine the exact size and composition of China's nuclear forces. Estimates vary over time. Several declassified U.S. government reports give historical estimates. The 1984 Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Estimative Brief estimates the Chinese nuclear stockpile as consisting of between 150 and 160 warheads.[11] A 1993 United States National Security Council report estimated that China's nuclear deterrent force relied on 60 to 70 nuclear armed ballistic missiles. The Defense Intelligence Agency's The Decades Ahead: 1999 - 2020 report estimates the 1999 Nuclear Weapons' Inventory as between 140 and 157. In 2004 the U.S. Department of Defense assessed that China had about 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of targeting the United States. In 2006 a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimate presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee was that "China currently has more than 100 nuclear warheads." [12]

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A variety of estimates abound regarding China's current stockpile. Although the total number of nuclear weapons in the Chinese arsenal is unknown, as of 2005[13] estimates vary from as low as 80 to as high as 2,000. The 2,000-warhead estimate has largely been rejected by diplomats in the field. It appears to have been derived from a 1990s-era Usenet post, in which a Singaporean college student made unsubstantiated statements concerning a supposed 2,000 warhead stockpile.[14][15] In 2004, China stated that "among the nuclear-weapon states, China... possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal," implying China has fewer than the United Kingdom's 200 nuclear weapons.[16] Several non-official sources estimate that China has around 400 nuclear warheads. However, U.S. intelligence estimates suggest a much smaller nuclear force than many non-governmental organizations.

A mock-up of China's first nuclear bomb.

In 2011, high estimates of the Chinese nuclear arsenal again emerged. One three-year study by Georgetown University raised the possibility that China had 3 000 nuclear weapons, hidden in a sophisticated tunnel network. The study was based on state media footage showing tunnel entrances, and estimated a 4 800 km (3 000 mile) network. The tunnel network was revealed after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake collapsed tunnels in the hills. China has confirmed the existing of the tunnel network. In response, the US military was ordered by law to study the possibility of this tunnel network concealing a nuclear arsenal. However, the tunnel theory has come under substantial attack due to several apparent flaws in its reasoning. From a production standpoint, China probably does not have enough fissile material to produce 3,000 nuclear weapons. Such an arsenal would require 9-12 tons of Plutonium as well as 45-75 tons of enriched uranium and a substantial amount of Tritium.[17][18] The Chinese are estimated to have only 2 tons of weapons grade plutonium, which limits their arsenal to 450-600 weapons, despite a 16 ton disposable supply of uranium, theoretically enough for 1,000 warheads. Additionally, the PRC's supply of Tritium limits its stockpile to around 300 weapons. In 2012, A retired Russian officer, Viktor Yesin, stated that the Chinese arsenal was at 1,800 nuclear weapons. Yesin's statements, however, have incited backlash. His claims may have originated from the same Usenet post that previous dubious assertions of 2,000 or more nuclear warheads stemmed from.[19] As of 2011, the Chinese nuclear arsenal was estimated to contain 55-65 ICBM's.[20] In 2012, STRATCOM commander C. Robert Kehler said that the best estimates where "in the range of several hundred" warheads and FAS estimated the current total to be "approximately 240 warheads".[21] The U.S. Department of Defense 2013 report to Congress on China's military developments stated that the Chinese nuclear arsenal consists of 50-75 ICBM's, located in both land-based silo's and Ballistic missile submarine platforms. In addition to the ICBM's, the report stated that China has approximately 1,100 Short-range ballistic missiles, although it does not have the warhead capacity to equip them all with nuclear weapons.

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Nuclear policy China is one of the five nuclear weapons states (NWS) recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which China ratified in 1992. China is the only NWS to give an unqualified security assurance to non-nuclear-weapon states: "China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances." Chinese public policy has always been one of the "no first use rule" while maintaining a deterrent retaliatory force targeted for countervalue targets. In 2005, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a white paper stating that the government "would not be the first to use [nuclear] weapons at any time and in any circumstance". In addition, the paper went on to state that this "no first use" policy would remain unchanged in the future and that China would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China normally stores nuclear warheads separately from their launching systems, unless there is a heightened threat level. Historically, China has been implicated in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program. In the early 1980s, China is believed to have given Pakistan a "package" including uranium enrichment technology, high-enriched uranium, and the design for a compact nuclear weapon.[22]

Delivery Systems Estimates 2010 IISS Military Balance The following are estimates of China's strategic missile forces from the International Institute of Strategic Studies Military Balance 2010.[23] According to these estimates, China has up to 90 inter-continental range ballistic missiles (66 land-based ICBMs and 24 submarine-based JL-2 SLBMs), not counting MIRV warheads. Type

Missiles Estimated Range

Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) ICBM

20

13,000+ km

DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) road-mobile ICBM 24

11,200+ km

DF-31 (CSS-10) road-mobile ICBM

12

7,200+ km

DF-4 (CSS-3) ICBM

10

5,500 km

2

3,000+ km

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles DF-3A (CSS-2 Mod) IRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missiles DF-21C (CSS-5 Mod 3) road-mobile MRBM 36

1,750+ km

DF-21 (CSS-5) road-mobile MRBM

80

1,750+ km

DF-15 (CSS-6) road-mobile SRBM

96

600 km

DF-11A (CSS-7 Mod 2) road-mobile SRBM

108

300 km

54

3,000+ km

12

1,770+ km

Short Range Ballistic Missiles

Land Attack Cruise Missiles DH-10 LACM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles JL-1 SLBM

China

172 JL-2 SLBM

24

Total

478

7,200+ km

2010 DoD annual PRC military report The following are estimates from the United States Department of Defense 2010 report to Congress concerning the Military Power of the People's Republic of China[] Type

Launchers

Missiles

Estimated Range

CSS-2 IRBM

5-10

15-20

3,000+ km

CSS-3 ICBM

10-15

15-20

5,400+ km

DF-5A (CSS-4) ICBM

20

20

13,000+ km

DF-31 ICBM

10,000 km/6,000 mi (M51 SLBM)

NPT signatory

Yes (1992, one of five recognized powers)

Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

•

Albania

•

Algeria

•

Argentina

France

180 •

Australia

•

Brazil

•

Bulgaria

•

Burma

•

Canada

•

China

•

Egypt

•

France

•

Germany

•

India

•

Iran

•

Iraq

•

Israel

•

Japan

•

Libya

•

Mexico

•

Netherlands

•

North Korea

•

Pakistan

•

Poland

•

Romania

•

Russia

•

Saudi Arabia

•

South Africa

•

South Korea

•

Spain

•

Sweden

•

Syria

•

Taiwan

•

Ukraine

•

United Kingdom

•

United States Proliferation

• • •

Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

•

List of treaties

• •

Book Category

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v t

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France

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Nuclear weapons

Background •

History

•

Warfare

•

Arms race

•

Design

•

Testing

•

Ethics

•

Effects

•

Delivery

•

Espionage

•

Proliferation

•

Arsenals

•

Terrorism

•

Opposition Nuclear-armed states NPT recognized United States Russia United Kingdom France China Others India Israel (undeclared) Pakistan North Korea

• • •

v t

e [1]

France is known to have an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. France is one of the five "Nuclear Weapons States" under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; but is not known to possess or develop any chemical or biological weapons. France was the fourth country to test an independently developed nuclear weapon in 1960, under the government of Charles de Gaulle. The French military is currently thought to retain a weapons stockpile of around 300 operational nuclear warheads, making it the third-largest in the world.[1] The weapons are part of the national Force de frappe, developed in the late 1950s and 1960s to give France the ability to distance itself from NATO while having a means of nuclear deterrence under sovereign control. France did not sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which gave it the option to conduct further nuclear tests until it signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 and 1998 respectively. France denies currently

France having chemical weapons, ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1995, and acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984. France had also ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1926.

History France was one of the nuclear pioneers, going back to the work of Marie Skłodowska Curie. Curie’s last assistant Bertrand Goldschmidt became the father of the French Bomb. After WW-II France's former position of leadership suffered greatly because of the instability of the Fourth Republic, and the lack of finance available. During the Second World War Goldschmidt invented the now-standard method for extracting plutonium while working as part of the British/Canadian team participating in the Manhattan Project. But after the Liberation in 1945, France had to start its own program almost from scratch. Nevertheless, the first French reactor went critical in 1948 and small amounts of plutonium were extracted in 1949. There was no formal commitment to a nuclear weapons program at that time, although plans were made to build reactors for the large scale production of plutonium.[2] However, in the 1950s a civilian nuclear research program was started, a byproduct of which would be plutonium. In 1956 a secret Committee for the Military Applications of Atomic Energy was formed and a development program for delivery vehicles was started. The intervention of the United States in the Suez Crisis that year is credited with convincing France that it needed to accelerate its own nuclear weapons program to remain a global power.[3] In 1957, soon after Suez and the resulting diplomatic tension with both the USSR and the United States, French president René Coty decided on the creation of the C.S.E.M. in the then French Sahara, a new nuclear tests facility replacing the C.I.E.E.S. With the return of Charles de Gaulle to the presidency of France in the midst of the May 1958 crisis, the final decisions to build an atomic bomb were taken, and a successful test took place in 1960. Since then France has developed and maintained its own nuclear deterrent, one intended to defend France even if the United States refused to risk its own cities by assisting Western Europe in a nuclear war. In 1986 Francis Perrin, French high-commissioner for atomic energy from 1951 to 1970 stated publicly that in 1949 Israeli scientists were invited to the Saclay nuclear research facility, this cooperation leading to a joint effort including sharing of knowledge between French and Israeli scientists especially those with knowledge from the Manhattan Project.[4][5][6] In 1956 as part their military alliance during the Suez Crisis the French agreed to secretly build the Dimona nuclear reactor in Israel and soon after agreed to construct a reprocessing plant for the extraction of plutonium at the site, cooperation cooled by 1960 coinciding with a successful test with the French asking that Israel submit to international inspections.[7] According to Lieutenant Colonel Warner D. Farr in a report to the USAF Counterproliferation Center while France was previously a leader in nuclear research "Israel and France were at a similar level of expertise after the war, and Israeli scientists could make significant contributions to the French effort. Progress in nuclear science and technology in France and Israel remained closely linked throughout the early fifties. Israeli scientists probably helped construct the G-1 plutonium production reactor and UP-1 reprocessing plant at Marcoule."[8] In 1957 Euratom was created, and under cover of the peaceful use of nuclear power the French signed deals with Germany and Italy to work together on nuclear weapons development.[9] The West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told his cabinet that he "wanted to achieve, through EURATOM, as quickly as possible, the chance of producing our own nuclear weapons".[10] The idea was short-lived. In 1958 de Gaulle became President and Germany and Italy were excluded. France developed its nuclear and thermonuclear bombs without outside assistance. The United States, however, began providing technical assistance in the early 1970s through the 1980s. The aid was secret, unlike the relationship with the British nuclear program. The Nixon administration, unlike previous presidencies, did not oppose its allies' possession of atomic weapons and believed that the Soviets would find having multiple nuclear-armed Western opponents more difficult. Because the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prohibited sharing information on nuclear weapon design, a method known as "negative guidance" or "Twenty Questions" was used; French scientists described to their American counterparts their research, and were told whether they were correct. Areas in which the French received help included MIRV, radiation hardening, missile design, intelligence on Soviet anti-missile defenses, and advanced

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France computer technology. Because the French program attracted "the best brains" of the nation, the Americans benefited from French research as well. The relationship also improved the two nations' military ties; despite its departure from NATO's command structure in 1966, France developed two separate nuclear targeting plans, one "national" for the Force de Frappe's role as a solely French deterrent, and one coordinated with NATO. France is understood to have tested neutron or enhanced radiation bombs in the past, apparently leading the field with an early test of the technology in 1967[11] and an "actual" neutron bomb in 1980.[12]

Testing There were 210 French nuclear tests from 1960 through 1995. Seventeen of them were done in the Algerian Sahara between 1960 and 1966, starting in the middle of the Algerian War. 193 were carried out in French Polynesia.[13][14] A summary table of French nuclear testing by years can be found here: France's nuclear testing series.

Saharan experiments centers (1960–1966) After studying Réunion, New Caledonia, and Clipperton Island, General Charles Ailleret, head of the Special Weapons Section, proposed two possible nuclear test sites for France in a January 1957 report: French Algeria in the Sahara Desert, and French Polynesia. Although he recommended against Polynesia because of its distance from France and lack of a large airport, Ailleret stated that Algeria should be chosen "provisionally", likely due in part to the Algerian War. A series of atmospheric nuclear tests was conducted by the Centre Saharien d'Expérimentations Militaires ("Saharan Military Experiments Center") from February 1960 until April 1961. The first, called "Gerboise bleue" ("blue jerboa") took place on 13 February 1960 in Algeria. The explosion took place at 40 km from the military base of Reggane, which is the last town on the Tanezrouft Track heading south across the Sahara to Mali, and 700 km/435 mi. south of Béchar.[15] The device had a 70 kiloton yield. Although Algeria became independent in 1962 France continued nuclear tests there until 1966 although the later tests were underground rather than atmospheric. The General Pierre Marie Gallois was named le père de la bombe A ("Father of the A-bomb"). Three other atmospheric tests were carried out from 1 April 1960 to 25 April 1961. These four atmospheric tests were carried out at with a forward base at Hammoudia near Reggane. Military, workers and the nomadic Touareg population of the region were present at the test sites, without any significant protection. At most, a shower after each test according to L'Humanité.[16] Gerboise Rouge (5kt), the third atomic bomb, half as powerful as Hiroshima, exploded on 27 December 1960, provoking protests from Japan, USSR, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and Ghana.[17] After the independence of Algeria on 5 July 1962, following the 19 March Evian agreements, the French military moved to In Ecker, also in the Algerian Sahara. The Evian agreements included a secret article which stated that "Algeria concede... to France the use of certain air bases, terrains, sites and military installations which are necessary to it [France]" during five years. The C.S.E.M. was therefore replaced by the Centre d'Expérimentations Militaires des Oasis ("Military Experiments Center of the Oasis") underground tests facility. Experimentations lasted from November 1961 until February 1966. The 13 underground tests were carried out at In Ekker, 150 km/93 mi. north of Tamanrasset, from 7 November 1961 to 16 February 1966. By July 1, 1967, all French facilities were evacuated. An accident happened on May 1, 1962, during the "Béryl" test, four times more powerful than Hiroshima and designed as an underground shaft test.[18] Due to improper sealing of the shaft, radioactive rock and dust were released into the atmosphere. Nine soldiers of the 621st Groupe d'Armes Spéciales unit were heavily contaminated by radiation.[19] The soldiers were exposed to as much as 600 mSv. The Minister of Armed Forces, Pierre Messmer, and the Minister of Research, Gaston Palewski, were present. As many as 100 additional personnel, including officials, soldiers and Algerian workers were exposed to lower levels of radiation, estimated at about 50 mSv, when the radioactive cloud produced by the blast passed over the command post, due to an unexpected change in wind

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direction. They escaped as they could, often without wearing any protection. Palewski died in 1984 of leukemia, which he always attributed to the Beryl incident. In 2006, Bruno Barillot, specialist of nuclear tests, measured on the site 93 microsieverts by hour of gamma ray, equivalent to 1% of the official admissible yearly dose. The incident was documented in the 2006 docudrama "Vive La Bombe!"[20]

Saharan facilities • C.I.E.E.S. (Centre Interarmées d'Essais d'Engins Spéciaux): Hammaguir, 120 km/75 mi southwest of Colomb-Béchar, Algeria: used for launching rockets from 1947 to 1967.[21] • C.S.E.M. (Centre Saharien d'Expérimentations Militaires): Reggane, west of In-Salah, Tanezrouft, Algeria: used for atmospheric tests from 1960 to 1961. • C.E.M.O. (Centre d'Expérimentations Militaires des Oasis): In Ekker, in the Hoggar, 150 km/93 mi from Tamanrasset, Tan Afella, Algeria: used for underground tests from 1961 to 1967.

Pacific experiments center (1966–1996) Despite its initial choice of Algeria for nuclear tests, the French government decided to build Faa'a International Airport in Tahiti, spending much more money and resources than would be justified by the official explanation of tourism. By 1958, two years before the first Sahara test, France began again its search for new testing sites due to potential political problems with Algeria and the possibility of a ban on above-ground tests. Many overseas France islands were studied, as well as performing underground tests in the Alps, Pyrenees, or Corsica; however, engineers found problems with most of the possible sites in metropolitan France. By 1962 France hoped in its negotiations with the Algerian independence movement to retain the Sahara as a test site until 1968, but decided that it needed to be able to also perform above-ground tests of hydrogen bombs, which could not be done in Algeria. Mururoa and Fangataufa in French Polynesia were chosen that year. President Charles de Gaulle announced the choice on 3 January 1963, describing it as a benefit to Polynesia's weak economy. The Polynesian people and leaders broadly supported the choice, although the tests became controversial after they began, especially among Polynesian separatists. A total of 193 nuclear tests were carried out in Polynesia from 1966 to 1996. On 24 August 1968 France detonated its first thermonuclear weapon—codenamed Canopus—over Fangataufa. A fission device ignited a lithium-6 deuteride secondary inside a jacket of highly enriched uranium to create a 2.6 megaton blast.

France

185

Simulation programme (1996–2012) More recently, France has used supercomputers to simulate and study nuclear explosions.

Current nuclear doctrine and strategy French law demands at least one out of four nuclear submarine would be on patrol in atlantic at any given time, which coincides with UK's policy.[22] In 2006, French President Jacques Chirac noted that France would be willing to use nuclear weapons against a state attacking France via terrorist means. He noted that the French nuclear forces had been configured for this option.[23] On 21 March 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that France will reduce its aircraft deliverable nuclear weapon stockpile (which currently consists of 60 TN 81 warheads) by a third (i.e. 20 warheads), thus bringing the total French nuclear arsenal to fewer than 300 warheads.[24][25]

The French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and the American nuclear-powered carrier USS Enterprise (left), each of which carry nuclear-capable fighter aircraft

Anti–nuclear tests protests • By 1968 only France and China were detonating nuclear weapons in the open air and the contamination caused by the H-bomb blast led to a global protest movement against further French atmospheric tests. • From the early 1960s New Zealand peace groups CND and the Peace Media had been organising nationwide anti nuclear campaigns in protest of atmospheric testing in French Polynesia. These included two large national petitions presented to the New Zealand government which led to a joint New Zealand and Australian Government action to take France to the International Court of Justice (1972).[26] • In 1972, Greenpeace and an amalgam of New Zealand peace groups managed to delay nuclear tests by several weeks by trespassing with a ship in the testing zone. During the time, the skipper, David McTaggart, was beaten and severely injured by members of the French military. • In 1973 the New Zealand Peace Media organised an international flotilla of protest yachts including the Fri, Spirit of Peace, Boy Roel, Magic Island and the Tanmure to sail into the test exclusion zone.[27] • In 1973, New Zealand Prime Minister Norman Kirk as a symbolic act of protest sent two navy frigates, HMNZS Canterbury and HMNZS Otago, to Moruroa.[28] They were accompanied by HMAS Supply, a fleet oiler of the Royal Australian Navy. • In 1985 the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior was bombed and sunk by the French DGSE in Auckland, New Zealand, as it prepared for another protest of nuclear testing in French military zones. One crew member, Fernando Pereira of Portugal, photographer, drowned on the sinking ship while attempting to recover his photographic equipment. Two members of DGSE were captured and sentenced, but eventually repatriated to France in a controversial affair. • French president Jacques Chirac’s decision to run a nuclear test series at Mururoa in 1995, just one year before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was to be signed, caused worldwide protest, including an embargo of French wine. These tests were meant to provide the nation with enough data to improve further nuclear technology without needing additional series of tests.[29] • The French Military conducted almost 200 nuclear tests at Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls over a thirty-year period ending 1996, 46 of them atmospheric, of which five were without significant nuclear yield. In August 2006, an official French government report by INSERM confirmed the link between an increase in the cases of thyroid cancer and France’s atmospheric nuclear tests in the territory since 1966.

France

Veterans' associations and symposium An association gathering veterans of nuclear tests (AVEN, "Association des vétérans des essais nucléaires") was created in 2001.[30] Along with the Polynesian NGO Moruroa e tatou, the AVEN announced on 27 November 2002 that it would depose a complaint against X (unknown) for involuntary homicide and putting someone’s life in danger. On 7 June 2003, for the first time, the military court of Tours granted an invalidity pension to a veteran of the Sahara tests. According to a poll made by the AVEN with its members, only 12% have declared being in good health. An international symposium on the consequences of test carried out in Algeria took place on 13 and 14 February 2007, under the official oversight of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. One hundred fifty thousand civilians, without taking into account the local population, are estimated to have been on the location of nuclear tests, in Algeria or in French Polynesia. One French veteran of the 1960s nuclear tests in Algeria described being given no protective clothing or masks, while being ordered to witness the tests at so close a range that the flash penetrated through the arm he used to cover his eyes.[31] One of several veteran’s groups claiming to organise those suffering ill effects, AVEN had 4500 members in early 2009.

Test victims compensation In both Algeria and French Polynesia there have been long standing demands for compensation from those who claim injury from France’s nuclear testing program. The government of France had consistently denied, since the late 1960s, that injury to military personnel and civilians had been caused by their nuclear testing.[32] Several French veterans and African and Polynesian campaign groups have waged court cases and public relations struggles demanding government reparations. In May 2009, a group of twelve French veterans, in the campaign group "Truth and Justice", who claim to have suffered health effects from nuclear testing in the 1960s had their claims denied by the government Commission for the Indemnification of Victims of Penal Infraction (CIVI), and again by a Paris appeals court, citing laws which set a statute of limitations for damages to 1976.[33] Following this rejection, the government announced it would create a 10m Euro compensation fund for military and civilian victims of its testing programme; both those carried out in the 1960s and the Polynesian tests of 1990–1996. Defence Minister Hervé Morin said the government would create a board of physicians, overseen by a French judge magistrate, to determine if individual cases were caused by French testing, and if individuals were suffering from illnesses on a United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation list of eighteen disorders linked to exposure to testing.[34] Pressure groups, including the Veterans group "Truth and Justice" criticised the programme as too restrictive in illnesses covered and too bureaucratic. Polynesian groups said the bill would also unduly restrict applicants to those who had been in small areas near the test zones, not taking into account the pervasive pollution and radiation.[35] Algerian groups had also complained that these restrictions would deny compensation to many victims. One Algerian group estimated there were 27,000 still living victims of ill effects from the 1960–66 testing there, while the French government had given an estimate of just 500.[36]

Non-nuclear WMD France states that it does not currently have chemical weapons. The country ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1995, and acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984. France had also ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1926. During WW-I in August 1914 France was actually the first to use chemical weapons though this was only a nonlethal tear gas attack(xylyl bromide). Once the war had slowed to trench warfare and new methods to attain an advantage were sought the German Army initiated a chlorine gas attack against the French Army at Ypres on 15 April 1915 opening a new type of warfare but failing that day to exploit the break in the French line. In time Phosgene replaced chlorine in use by armies on the western front including France leading to massive casualties on both sides of the conflict though later the effects were mitigated by development of protective clothing and masks.

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France At the outbreak of World War II, France had a stockpile of mustard gas and phosgene but did not use them against the invading Axis army. Testing of chemical weapons occurred at a site called B2-Namous in Algeria though other sites likely existed.[37][38]

Notes and references [1] Table of French Nuclear Forces (http:/ / www. nrdc. org/ nuclear/ nudb/ datab16. asp) (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2002) [2] Origin of the Force de Frappe (http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ France/ FranceOrigin. html) (Nuclear Weapon Archive) [3] Stuck in the Canal, Fromkin, David - Editorial in The New York Times, 28 October 2006 [4] http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ guide/ israel/ nuke/ farr. htm [5] http:/ / www. wisconsinproject. org/ countries/ israel/ nuke. html [6] http:/ / www. wrmea. org/ wrmea-archives/ 95-washington-report-archives-1982-1987/ december-1986/ 694-israels-nuclear-arsenal. html [7] http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ guide/ israel/ nuke/ [8] http:/ / www. au. af. mil/ au/ awc/ awcgate/ cpc-pubs/ farr. htm [9] Die Erinnerungen, Franz Josef Strauss - Berlin 1989, p. 314 [10] Germany, the NPT, and the European Option (http:/ / www10. antenna. nl/ wise/ beyondbomb/ 4-2. html) (WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor) [11] BBC News: Neutron bomb: Why 'clean' is deadly (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ sci/ tech/ 395689. stm) [12] UK parliamentary question on whether condemnation was considered by Thatcher government (http:/ / hansard. millbanksystems. com/ commons/ 1980/ jul/ 16/ french-neutron-bomb) [13] Treize ans après le dernier des essais nucléaires français, l'indemnisation des victimes en marche (http:/ / www. google. com/ hostednews/ afp/ article/ ALeqM5g-1ldRO7kq73hvOjv93wPTGz7j1Q). Hervé ASQUIN, AFP. 27 May 2009. [14] Four decades of French nuclear testing (http:/ / www. france24. com/ en/ 20090324-four-decades-french-nuclear-tests-atomic-bomb-gerboise-bleue-algeria-polynesia). Julien PEYRON, France24. Tuesday 24 March 2009. [15] French Senate report #179: The first French tests in the Sahara (http:/ / www. senat. fr/ rap/ o97-179/ o97-1799. html) [16] La bombe atomique en héritage (http:/ / www. humanite. presse. fr/ journal/ 2007-02-21/ 2007-02-21-846342), L'Humanité, February 21, 2007 [17] 1960: France explodes third atomic bomb (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ onthisday/ hi/ dates/ stories/ december/ 27/ newsid_2985000/ 2985200. stm), BBC On This Day [18] France’s Nuclear Weapons (http:/ / nuclearweaponarchive. org/ France/ FranceOrigin. html) [19] Dossier de présentation des essais nucléaires et leur suivi au Sahara (http:/ / www. defense. gouv. fr/ content/ download/ 60823/ 571529/ file/ SAHARA. pdf) [20] VIVE LA BOMBE! (http:/ / www. ecovisionfestival. com/ edizione2007/ / index. php?option=com_content& task=view& id=337& Itemid=168& lang=english) [21] http:/ / fuseurop. univ-perp. fr/ sahara_e. htm [22] " Nuclear submarines collide in Atlantic' (http:/ / www. theguardian. com/ uk/ 2009/ feb/ 16/ nuclear-submarines-collide)". The Guardian, February 16th, 2009 [23] " France 'would use nuclear arms' (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ europe/ 4627862. stm)". BBC News, Thursday 19 January 2006 [24] Nucléaire : Mise à l'eau du terrible devant Sarkozy - France - LCI (http:/ / tf1. lci. fr/ infos/ france/ politique/ 0,,3784844,00-mise-eau-terrible-devant-sarkozy-. html) [25] "France cuts its nuclear weapons by a third" (http:/ / www. telegraph. co. uk/ news/ main. jhtml?xml=/ news/ 2008/ 03/ 22/ wsarko222. xml). The Daily Telegraph (London). [26] http:/ / www. disarmsecure. org/ publications/ papers/ index. html [27] http:/ / library. bullerdc. govt. nz/ cgi-bin/ library/ liinquiry?acc=00000711 [28] http:/ / www. mururoavet. com/ [29] Les essais nucleaires (http:/ / www. senat. fr/ rap/ o97-179/ o97-1798. html#toc32)—report of the French Senate (in French) [30] Les victimes des essais nucléaires enfin reconnues (http:/ / www. lamontagne. fr/ editions_locales/ montlucon/ les_victimes_des_essais_nucleaires_enfin_reconnues@CARGNjFdJSsHFh8MBxg-. html). Marie-Christine Soigneux, Le Montange (Clermont-Ferrand). 27 May 2009. [31] « J’ai participé au premier essai dans le Sahara » DANIEL BOURDON, 72 ans, de Thourotte (http:/ / www. leparisien. fr/ abo-oise/ j-ai-participe-au-premier-essai-dans-le-sahara-24-05-2009-524072. php). Le Parisien. 24 May 2009. [32] Government earmarks €10 million for nuclear test victims (http:/ / www. france24. com/ en/ 20090324-govt-earmarks-10-million-euros-compensate-nuclear-test-victims-france-algeria-polynesia). France 24. Tuesday 24 March 2009. [33] Court denies nuclear test victims compensation (http:/ / www. france24. com/ en/ 20090522-france-denies-reparations-victims-nuclear-tests-1960s-algeria). France 24. Friday 22 May 2009 [34] Essais nucléaires français au sud de l’Algérie: La France définit six critères (http:/ / actualite. el-annabi. com/ article. php3?id_article=9477). "La voix de l’oranie" (Oran, Algeria). 21 May 2009.

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[35] Nuclear compensation bill falls short of expectations (http:/ / www. france24. com/ en/ 20090527-nuclear-compensation-bill-disappoints-victims-france-justice). France24. Wednesday 27 May 2009 [36] VICTIMES ALGÉRIENNES DES ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES FRANÇAIS. Sur quels critères sera évalué le handicap? (http:/ / www. lexpressiondz. com/ article/ 2/ 2009-05-18/ 63841. html). L'Expression (Algeria), 18 May 2009, p.24 [37] http:/ / firstworldwar. com/ weaponry/ gas. htm [38] http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ guide/ france/ cbw/

Bibliography • (French) Jean-Hugues Oppel, Réveillez le président, Éditions Payot et rivages, 2007 (ISBN978-2-7436-1630-4). The book is a fiction about the nuclear weapons of France; the book also contains about ten chapters on true historical incidents involving nuclear weapons and strategy (during the second half of the twentieth century).

External links • In-depth background of the Development of the French Program (http://www.scribd.com/ doc/56032100/France-and-Greatness-the-Development-of-the-French-Nuclear-Program) • Video archive of French Nuclear Testing (http://sonicbomb.com/modules. php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=112) at sonicbomb.com (http://www.sonicbomb. com) • A Change in the French Nuclear Doctrine? (http://www.isria.com/en/free/0000024.php), Rault, Charles ISRIA, 25 January 2006. • Country overview: France (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/france/index_2701.html) (from the Nuclear Threat Initiative) • Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http://www.thebulletin.org)

• • • •

•

• Nuclear Notebook: French nuclear forces, 2008 (http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/ k01h5q0wg50353k5/fulltext.pdf), September/October 2008. • Nuclear policy: France stands alone (http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/f81x51w723j70458/ ?p=5a349b234b2a4525b6455a8c6ab292b6&pi=11) July/August 2004 • The French atomic energy program (http://books.google.com/books?id=TQkAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA39) September 1962 Greenpeace movie (http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4363730934900311131) (on the French bombing of the Rainbow Warrior, a ship about to protest French nuclear tests) Nuclear Files.org (http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/basics/nuclear-stockpiles. htm) (current information on nuclear stockpiles in France) (French) Archives sur le Centre d'Expérimentations Nucléaires du Pacifique (C.E.P.) à Moruroa, Hao et Fangataufa (http://www.point-zero-penelope.org) Annotated bibliography for the French nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues (http://alsos.wlu.edu/adv_rst.aspx?keyword=french+nuclear+weapons&creator=&title=& media=all&genre=all&disc=all&level=all&sortby=relevance&results=10&period=15) The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter. org/nuclear-history-documents/) The Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project has primary source documents on US-French nuclear relations.

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Though Germany is one of the most technologically advanced countries in the world, since World War II it has generally refrained from using this technology to outfit its own armed forces with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), although it participates in the NATO nuclear weapons sharing arrangements and trains for delivering nuclear weapons. Germany is among the powers which possess the ability to create nuclear weapons but has agreed not to do so (under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as reaffirmed by the Two Plus Four Treaty). Along with most other industrial nations, Germany produces components that can be used for creating deadly agents, chemical weapons, and other WMD. Alongside other companies from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, India, the United States, Belgium, Spain, and Brazil, German companies provided Iraq with precursors of chemical agents used by Iraq to engage in chemical warfare during the Iran–Iraq War.[1]

History World War I As one of the major combatants in World War I, Germany used and developed what we would today describe as weapons of mass destruction. During World War I, Germany developed and used chemical weapons, for instance mustard gas. These kinds of weapon were subsequently also employed by the Allies. The use of chemical weapons in warfare during the Great War was allegedly in violation of clause IV.2 'Declaration concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles with the Sole Object to Spread Asphyxiating Poisonous Gases' of the 1899 Hague Declarations, and more explicitly in violation of the 1907 Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which explicitly forbade the use of "poison or poisoned weapons" in warfare.

World War II During World War II, Germany worked to develop nuclear weapons, though Allied scientists ultimately beat the Germans to this goal - the international team included many displaced émigré scientists from Germany itself; see German nuclear energy project. German scientists also did research on other chemical weapons during the war, including human experimentation with mustard gas. The first nerve gas, tabun, was invented by the German researcher Gerhard Schrader in 1937. During the war, Germany stockpiled tabun, sarin, and soman but refrained from their use on the battlefield. In total, Germany produced about 78,000 tons of chemical weapons. By 1945 the nation produced about 12,000 tons of tabun and 1,000 pounds (450 kg) of sarin. Delivery systems for the nerve agents included 105 mm and 150 mm artillery

Germany shells, a 250 kg bomb and a 150 mm rocket.[] Even when the Soviets neared Berlin, Adolf Hitler was persuaded not to use tabun as the final trump card. The use of tabun was opposed by Hitler's Minister of Armaments, Albert Speer, who, in 1943, brought IG Farben's nerve agent expert Otto Ambros to report to Hitler. He informed Hitler that the Allies had stopped publication of research into organophosphates (a type of organic compound that emcompasses nerve agents) at the beginning of the war, that the essential nature of nerve gases had been published as early as the turn of the century, and that he believed that Allies could not have failed to produce agents like tabun. This was not in fact the case (Allied research into organophosphates had been kept secret to protect DDT), but Hitler accepted Ambros's deduction, and Germany's tabun arsenal remained unused. [2]

Cold War and beyond As part of the accession negotiations of West Germany to the Western European Union at the London and Paris Conferences, the country was forbidden (by Protocol No III [3] to the revised Treaty of Brussels of 23 October 1954) to possess Nuclear, Biological or Chemical weapons. This was reiterated in domestic law by the War Weapons Control Act (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz). During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were deployed in Germany by both the United States (in West Germany) and the Soviet Union (in East Germany). Despite not being among the nuclear powers during the Cold War, Germany had a political and military interest in the balance of nuclear capability. In 1977, after the Soviet deployment of the new SS-20 IRBM, West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt expressed concern over the capability of NATO's nuclear forces compared to those of the Soviets. Later in the Cold War under the chancellorship of Helmut Kohl, the West German government expressed concern about the progress of the nuclear arms race. Particularly, they addressed the eagerness of Germany's NATO allies, the United States and United Kingdom, to seek restrictions on long-range strategic weapons while modernizing their short-range and tactical nuclear systems. Germany wanted to see such short range systems eliminated, because their major use was not deterrence but battlefield employment. Germany itself, straddling the division of the Eastern and Western blocs in Europe, was a likely battlefield in any escalation of the Cold War and battlefield use of nuclear weapons would be devastating to German territory. In 1957 the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was created to promote the use of nuclear energy in Europe. Under cover of the peaceful use of nuclear power, West Germany hoped to develop the basis of a nuclear weapons programme with France and Italy.[4] The West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told his cabinet that he "wanted to achieve, through EURATOM, as quickly as possible, the chance of producing our own nuclear weapons".[5] The idea was short-lived. In 1958 Charles De Gaulle became President of France and Germany and Italy were excluded from the weapons project. Euratom continued as the European agency for the peaceful use of nuclear technology, becoming part of the structure of the European Economic Community in 1967. Germany ratified the Geneva Protocol on 25 April 1929, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 2 May 1975, the Biological Weapons Convention on 7 April 1983 and the Chemical Weapons Convention on 12 August 1994. These dates signify ratification by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), during the division of Germany the NPT and the BWC were ratified separately by the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) (on 31 October 1969 and 28 November 1972, respectively). Before German reunification in 1990, both West and East Germany ratified the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. Germany reaffirmed its renunciation of the manufacture, possession, and control of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In addition to banning a foreign military presence in the former East Germany, the treaty also banned nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon carriers to be stationed in the area, making it a permanent Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The German military was allowed to possess conventional weapons systems with nonconventional capabilities, provided that they were outfitted for a purely conventional role. The United States provides about 60 tactical B61 nuclear bombs for use by Germany under a NATO nuclear weapons sharing agreement. The bombs are stored at Büchel and Ramstein Air Bases, and in time of war would be delivered by Luftwaffe Panavia Tornado warplanes. As well as being a breach of the Protocols to the (revised)

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Treaty of Brussels, many countries believe this violates Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), where Germany has committed: "... not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly ... or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ...". The U.S. insists its forces control the weapons and that no transfer of the nuclear bombs or control over them is intended "unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which the [NPT] treaty would no longer be controlling", so there is no breach of the NPT. However German pilots and other staff practice handling and delivering the U.S. nuclear bombs.[6] Even if the NATO argument is considered legally correct, such peacetime operations could arguably contravene both the objective and the spirit of the NPT. Like other countries of its size and wealth, Germany has the skills and resources to create its own nuclear weapons quite quickly if desired. The Zippe-type centrifuge was, indeed, invented by captured Germans working in the Soviet Union in the 1950s, and URENCO operates a centrifuge uranium enrichment plant in Germany. There are also several power reactors in Germany that could be used to produce bomb-grade plutonium if desired. Such a development is, of course, highly unlikely in the present benign security environment. In 2007, former defence secretary Rupert Scholz stated that Germany should strive to become a nuclear power.[7] In September 2007 the French president Nicolas Sarkozy offered Germany to participate in the control over the French nuclear arsenal. Chancellor Merkel and foreign minister Steinmeier declined the offer however, stating that Germany "had no interest in possessing nuclear weapons".[8]

References [1] Al Isa, I. K. (1-12-2003) Fresh information on the Iraqi chemical program; Iraqi money and German brains cooperated in building chemical weapons. Al Zaman, London. (http:/ / www. fas. org/ nuke/ guide/ iraq/ cw/ az120103. html) Federation of atomic scientists. Referenced 21-11-2006. [2] Paxman, J.; Harris, R. (2002). A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare (2002 Rando edition). Random House Press. ISBN 0-8129-6653-8 pp.82–84. [3] http:/ / avalon. law. yale. edu/ 20th_century/ we005. asp [4] Die Erinnerungen, Franz Josef Strauss - Berlin 1989, p. 314 [5] Germany, the NPT, and the European Option (http:/ / www10. antenna. nl/ wise/ beyondbomb/ 4-2. html) (WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor) [6] Nassauer, O. (2001) Nuclear sharing: is it legal? (http:/ / www. ieer. org/ sdafiles/ vol_9/ 9-3/ nato. html) [7] Tagesspiegel: Ex-Minister: Atomwaffen für Deutschland (http:/ / www. tagesspiegel. de/ politik/ div/ ;art771,2230467) 27 January 2007 [8] Spiegel Online: "Spiegel" - Sarkozy bot Deutschland Beteiligung an Atomwaffen an (http:/ / www. spiegel. de/ politik/ deutschland/ 0,1518,505887,00. html) 15.September 2007

• (http://www.netiran.com/?fn=artd(1585)) • (http://www.homelandsecurityus.net/nuclear.htm) • (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf)

External links • Germany, The NPT, and the European Option (http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/beyondbomb/4-2.html), Matthias Küntzel, WISE • Nerve gases: history (http://www.espionageinfo.com/Mo-Ne/Nerve-Gas.html) at Espionageinfo.com

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India India

Nuclear program start date

1967

First nuclear weapon test

18 May 1974 a

First fusion weapon test

11 May 1998 b

Most recent test

13 May 1998

Largest-yield test

20–60 kt total c

Number of tests to date

6

Peak stockpile

90–110 d

Current stockpile

as above

Maximum missile range

5,000 km e

NPT status

Non-signatory

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a

 Smiling Buddha

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b

 Declared (Pokhran-II) c  Disputed (Pokhran-II)

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d

 2013 estimate [1] e  Agni III

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India is known to possess weapons of mass destruction in the form of nuclear weapons and, in the past, chemical weapons. Though India has not made any official statements about the size of its nuclear arsenal, recent estimates suggest that India has between 90 and 110 nuclear weapons, consistent with earlier estimates that it had produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for up to 75–110 nuclear weapons. As of 1999, India was estimated to have 4,200 kg of separated reactor-grade plutonium, enough for approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons. India is not a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it argues entrenches the status quo of the existing nuclear weapons states whilst preventing general nuclear disarmament.[2] India has signed and ratified both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Biological weapons India has a well-developed biotechnology infrastructure that includes numerous pharmaceutical production facilities bio-containment laboratories (including BSL-3 and BSL-4) for working with lethal pathogens. It also has highly qualified scientists with expertise in infectious diseases. Some of India's facilities are being used to support research and development for BW defence purposes. India has ratified the BWC and pledges to abide by its obligations. There is no clear evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that directly points toward an offensive BW program. New Delhi does possess the scientific capability and infrastructure to launch an offensive BW program, but has chosen not to do so. In terms of delivery, India also possesses the capability to produce aerosols and has numerous potential delivery systems ranging from crop dusters to sophisticated ballistic missiles. No information exists in the public domain suggesting interest by the Indian government in delivery of biological agents by these or any other means. To reiterate the latter point, in October 2002, Indian President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam asserted that India "will not make biological weapons. It is cruel to human beings".

Chemical weapons In 1992, India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), stating that it did not have chemical weapons and the capacity or capability to manufacture chemical weapons. By doing this India became one of the original signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] in 1993,[3] and ratified it on 2 September 1996. According to India's ex-Army Chief General Sunderji, a country having the capability of making nuclear weapons does not need to have chemical weapons, since the dread of chemical weapons could be created only in those countries that do not have nuclear weapons. Others suggested that the fact that India has found chemical weapons dispensable highlighted its confidence in the conventional weapons system at its command. In June 1997, India declared its stock of chemical weapons (1,044 tonnes of sulphur mustard). By the end of 2006, India had destroyed more than 75 percent of its chemical weapons/material stockpile and was granted extension for destroying (the remaining stocks by April 2009) and was expected to achieve 100 percent destruction within that

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timeframe. India informed the United Nations in May 2009 that it had destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons in compliance with the international Chemical Weapons Convention. With this India has become third country after South Korea and Albania to do so. This was cross-checked by inspectors of the United Nations. India has an advanced commercial chemical industry, and produces the bulk of its own chemicals for domestic consumption. It is also widely acknowledged that India has an extensive civilian chemical and pharmaceutical industry and annually exports considerable quantities of chemicals to countries such as the United Kingdom, United States, and Taiwan.

Nuclear weapons As early as 26 June 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to be India's first Prime Minister, announced:

Range of Indian missiles

“

As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, [4] she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal.

”

India's nuclear program started on March 1944 and its three-stage indigenous efforts in technology were established by Dr. Homi Bhabha when he founded the nuclear research center, the Institute of Fundamental Research. India's loss of territory to China in a brief Himilayan border war in October 1962, provided the New Delhi government impetus for developing nuclear weapons as a means of deterring potential Chinese aggression. India first tested a nuclear device in 1974 (code-named "Smiling Buddha"), which it called a "peaceful nuclear explosion." The test used plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, and raised concerns that nuclear technology supplied for peaceful purposes could be diverted to weapons purposes. This also stimulated the early work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. India performed further nuclear tests in 1998 (code-named "Operation Shakti"). In 1998, as a response to the continuing tests, the United States and Japan imposed sanctions on India, which have since been lifted.[citation needed]

India's no-first-use policy India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy and is in the process of developing a nuclear doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence." In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrineWikipedia:Link rot which asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of "retaliation only". The document also maintains that India "will not be the first to initiate a nuclear first strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail" and that decisions to authorise the use of nuclear weapons would be made by the Prime Minister or his 'designated successor(s).'" According to the NRDC, despite the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001–2002, India remains committed to its nuclear no-first-use policy. India's Strategic Nuclear Command was formally established in 2003, with an Air Force officer, Air Marshal Asthana, as the Commander-in-Chief. The joint services SNC is the custodian of all of India's nuclear weapons,

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missiles and assets. It is also responsible for executing all aspects of India's nuclear policy. However, the civil leadership, in the form of the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) is the only body authorised to order a nuclear strike against another offending strike: In effect, it is the Prime Minister who has his finger "on the button." The National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon signalled a significant shift from "No first use" to "no first use against non-nuclear weapon states" in a speech on the occasion of Golden Jubilee celebrations of National Defence College in New Delhi on 21 October 2010, a doctrine Menon said reflected India's "strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence."[5][6]Wikipedia:Link rot In April 2013 Shyam Saran, convener of the National Security Advisory Board, affirmed that regardless of the size of a nuclear attack against India, be it a miniaturised version or a "big" missile, India will retaliate massively to inflict unacceptable damage.

Land-based ballistic missiles The land-based nuclear weapons of India are under the control of and deployed by the Indian Army, using a variety of both vehicles and launching silos. They currently consist of three different types of ballistic missiles, the Agni-I, the Agni-II, Agni-III and the Army's variant of the Prithvi missile family – the Prithvi-I. Additional variants of the Agni missile series are currently under-development, including the most recent, the Agni-IV and Agni-V, which are due to enter full operational service in the near future. Agni-VI is also under development, with an envisioned The Indian Army's Agni II missile on parade. range of 6000–8000 km and features such as Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) or Maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARVs).

Indian land-based nuclear-armed ballistic missiles Name

Type

Maximum range (km)

Prithvi-I Short-range

150

Agni-I

Short-range

700

Agni-II

Medium-range

2,500

Status

Deployed

Agni-III Intermediate-range 5,000 Agni-IV Intermediate-range 4,000 Agni-V

Intercontinental

5,500+

Agni-VI Intercontinental

10,000

Tested successfully

Under development

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Strategic bombing

The Indian Air Force's Jaguar attack aircraft are believed to have a secondary nuclear-strike role.

The current status of India's air-based nuclear weapons is unclear. In addition to their ground-attack role, however, it is believed that the Dassault Mirage 2000s and SEPECAT Jaguars of the Indian Air Force are able to provide a secondary nuclear-strike role.[7] The SEPECAT Jaguar was designed to be able to carry and deploy nuclear weapons and the Indian Air Force has identified the jet as being capable of delivering Indian nuclear weapons.[8] The most likely delivery method would be the use of bombs that were free-falling and unguided.

Sea-based ballistic missiles The Indian Navy has developed two sea-based delivery systems for nuclear weapons, completing Indian ambitions for a nuclear triad. The first is a submarine-launched system consisting of at-least four 6,000 tonne (nuclear-powered) ballistic missile submarines of the Arihant class. The first vessel, INS Arihant, has been launched and will complete extensive sea-trials before being commissioned and declared operational. She is the first nuclear-powered submarine to Conceptual drawing of the INS Arihant. be built by India.[9] A CIA report claimed that Russia provided technological aid to the naval nuclear propulsion program. The submarines will be armed with up to 12 Sagarika (K-15) missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Sagarika is a submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of 700 km. This missile has a length of 8.5 meters, weighs seven tonnes and can carry a pay load of up to 500 kg. Sagarika has already been test-fired from an underwater pontoon, but now DRDO is planning a full-fledged test of the missile from a submarine and for this purpose may use the services of the Russian Navy. India's DRDO is also working on a Surface warships such as the Shivalik class frigates submarine-launched ballistic missile version of the Agni-III (shown) may in future be equipped with the nuclear missile, known as the Agni-III SL. According to Indian defence armed Dhanush ballistic missiles. sources, the Agni-III SL will have a range of 3,500 kilometres (2,200 mi). The new missile will complement the older and less capable Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missiles. However, the Arihant class ballistic missile submarines will be only capable of carrying a maximum of four Agni-III SL. The second is a ship-launched system based around the short range ship-launched Dhanush ballistic missile (a variant of the Prithvi missile). It has a range of around 300 km. In the year 2000 the missile was test-fired from INS Subhadra (a Sukanya class patrol craft). INS Subhadra was modified for the test and the missile was launched from the reinforced helicopter deck. The results were considered partially successful. In 2004, the missile was again tested from INS Subhadra and this time the results were reported successful. In December 2005 of the following year the missile was tested again, but this time from the destroyer INS Rajput. The test was a success with the missile hitting the land based target.

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Indian sea-based nuclear-armed ballistic missiles Name

Dhanush

Type

Maximum range (km)

Short-range 350

Status

Developed, but not deployed

Sagarika (K-15) SLBM

700

Awaiting deployment on INS Arihant

K-4

3,500

Under development

SLBM

International response India is not a signatory to either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did accede to the Partial Test Ban Treaty in October 1963. India is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and four of its 17 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards. India announced its lack of intention to accede to the NPT as late as 1997 by voting against the paragraph of a General Assembly Resolution which urged all non-signatories of the treaty to accede to it at the earliest possible date. India voted against the UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT, which was adopted on 10 September 1996. India objected to the lack of provision for universal nuclear disarmament "within a time-bound framework." India also demanded that the treaty ban laboratory simulations. In addition, India opposed the provision in Article XIV of the CTBT that requires India's ratification for the treaty to enter into force, which India argued was a violation of its sovereign right to choose whether it would sign the treaty. In early February 1997, Foreign Minister I.K.Gujral reiterated India's opposition to the treaty, saying that "India favors any step aimed at destroying nuclear weapons, but considers that the treaty in its current form is not comprehensive and bans only certain types of tests." In August 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved safeguards agreement with India under which the former will gradually gain access to India's civilian nuclear reactors. In September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted India a waiver allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. The implementation of this waiver makes India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the NPT but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world. Since the implementation of NSG waiver, India has signed nuclear deals with several countries including France, United States, Mongolia, Namibia, and Kazakhstan while the framework for similar deals with Australia, Canada and United Kingdom are also being prepared.

References [1] (Second operational test firing by the Strategic Forces Command). [2] US wants India to sign NPT (http:/ / www. business-standard. com/ india/ news/ us-wants-india-to-sign-npt/ 357348/ ) Business Standard, 7 May 2009. [3] [pointer]=49 (http:/ / www. opcw. org/ about-opcw/ member-states/ status-of-participation-in-the-cwc/ ?tx_damfrontend_pi1) [4] B. M. Udgaonkar, India’s nuclear capability, her security concerns and the recent tests (http:/ / www. ias. ac. in/ currsci/ jan25/ articles20. htm), Indian Academy of Sciences, January 1999. [5] Speech by NSA Shri Shivshankar Menon at NDC on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs”: Web-site of Ministry of External Affairs (Govt. of India) (http:/ / www. mea. gov. in/ Speeches-Statements. htm?dtl/ 798/ Speech+ by+ NSA+ Shri+ Shivshankar+ Menon+ at+ NDC+ on+ The+ Role+ of+ Force+ in+ Strategic+ Affairs) [6] NSA Shivshankar Menon at NDC (Speech) : india Blooms (http:/ / www. indiablooms. com/ NewsDetailsPage/ newsDetails211010n. php) [7] Indian Nuclear Forces (http:/ / www. openbriefing. org/ issuedesks/ nuclearissues/ indian-nuclear-forces-2012/ ), 14 July 2012. [8] India plans to impart power punch to Jaguar fighters (http:/ / articles. economictimes. indiatimes. com/ 2012-10-17/ news/ 34525680_1_jaguar-strike-fighters-stealth-fifth-generation-fighter-aircraft-rafale-fighters), October 2012. [9] "Indian nuclear submarine", India Today, August 2007 edition

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External links • Indian nuclear weapons program (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaOrigin.html) at nuclearweaponarchive.org. • At nuclearfiles.org: Nuclear India's nuclear confrontation with Pakistan (http:/ / www. nuclearfiles. org/ menu/ key-issues/ nuclear-weapons/history/post-cold-war/india-pakistan/india-pakistan-conflict.htm)

• • • •

Nuclear weapon stockpiles (http:/ / www. nuclearfiles. org/ menu/ key-issues/ nuclear-weapons/ basics/ nuclear-stockpiles.htm) CIA on India's nuclear program (http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=18265) India's missile testing ranges (http://frontierindia.net/missile-testing-ranges-of-india/) Video interviews taken at the 2008 NPT PrepCom on the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (http://npt-webcast.info/index.php?p=stichworte) Annotated bibliography for India's nuclear weapons program (http://alsos.wlu.edu/adv_rst. aspx?keyword=indian*nuclear*weapons*program&creator=&title=&media=all&genre=all&disc=all& level=all&sortby=relevance&results=10&period=15) at the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues.

• Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ nuclear-history-documents/), including a collection of primary-source documents on Indian nuclear development. • The National Security Archive's "Nuclear Vault" (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/index.htm) features a number of compilations of declassified US government documents related to India's nuclear program.

Iran Weapons of mass destruction

By type • • • •

Biological Chemical Nuclear Radiological By country

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Algeria

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•

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Canada

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China

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India

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Iran

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United States Proliferation

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Chemical Nuclear Missiles Treaties

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List of treaties

• •

Book Category

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v t

e [1]

Iran, officially the Islamic Republic of Iran, is not known to currently possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and has signed treaties repudiating the possession of weapons of mass destruction including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has first-hand knowledge of WMD effects—over 100,000 Iranian troops and civilians were victims of chemical weapons during the 1980s Iran–Iraq War.[1][2] On ideological grounds, a public and categorical religious decree (fatwa) against the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons has been issued by the Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei along with other clerics, though it is approved by some relatively minor clerics. Iran has stated its uranium enrichment program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.[3] The IAEA has confirmed the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran but has also said it "needs to have confidence in the absence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. The IAEA has pointed out that Iran is not implementing the requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and needs to cooperate to clarify outstanding issues

Iran

202 and meet requirement to provide early design information on its nuclear facilities.[4] In 2012, sixteen U.S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA, reported that Iran was pursuing research that could enable it to produce nuclear weapons, but was not attempting to do so.[5] The senior officers of all of the major American intelligence agencies stated that there was no conclusive evidence that Iran has made any attempt to produce nuclear weapons since 2003.[6] In a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, the United States Intelligence Community assessed that Iran had ended all "nuclear weapon design and weaponization work" in 2003.[7] U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated in January 2012 stated that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, but was not attempting to produce nuclear weapons.[8] In 2009, U.S. intelligence assessed that Iranian intentions were unknown.[9] Some European intelligence believe Iran has resumed its alleged nuclear weapons design work. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said he had seen no evidence of any nuclear weapons program in Iran, while Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said Iran was close to having the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Iran has called for nuclear weapons states to disarm and for the Middle East to be a nuclear weapon free zone. After the IAEA voted in a rare non-consensus decision to find Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the UN Security Council, the Council demanded that Iran suspend its nuclear enrichment activities[10] and imposed sanctions against Iran when Iran refused to do so. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has argued that the sanctions are illegal. The IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but not the absence of undeclared activities. The Non-Aligned Movement has called on both sides to work through the IAEA for a solution. In November 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted[11] a resolution against Iran which urged Iran to apply the modified Code 3.1 to its Safeguard Agreement, urged Iran to implement and ratify the Additional Protocol, and expressed "serious concern" that Iran had not cooperated on issues that needed "to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program." Iran said the "hasty and undue" resolution would "jeopardize the conducive environment vitally needed" for successful negotiations and lead to cooperation not exceeding its "legal obligations to the body".

Nuclear weapons

Nuclear power in Iran •

Timeline of nuclear power in Iran

•

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

•

Nuclear facilities in Iran

•

International treaties: • • • •

•

International organizations: • •

•

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Additional Protocol Geneva Accord Comprehensive Accord

International Atomic Energy Agency Non-Aligned Movement

List of United Nations resolutions concerning Iran

Iran

203 •

•

Individuals: •

Iranian nuclear negotiators

• • • •

• Hassan Rouhani • Ali Larijani • Saeed Jalili • Javad Zarif Ali Akbar Salehi Fereydoon Abbasi Mohamed ElBaradei Yukiya Amano

Other articles: • • • •

Operation Merlin Green Salt Project Iran and weapons of mass destruction Iran–United States relations after 1979

Overview In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors, in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions, recalled a previous Iranian "policy of concealment" regarding its enrichment program and found that Iran had violated its NPT Safeguards Agreement. Another IAEA report stated "there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities ... were related to a nuclear weapons program." Iran has claimed that the military threat posed by Israel and the United States is forcing it to restrict the release of information on its nuclear program.[12] Gawdat Bahgat of the National Defense University speculates that Iran may have a lack of confidence in the international community which was reinforced when many nations, under pressure from the United States, rejected or withdrew from signed commercial deals with the Iranian nuclear authority.[13] On 31 July 2006, the Security Council passed a resolution demanding Iran suspend its enrichment program. On 23 December 2006, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Iran, which were later tightened on 24 March 2007, because Iran refused to suspend enrichment. Iran's representative to the UN argued that the sanctions compelled Iran to abandon its rights under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology. The Non-Aligned Movement called on both sides to work through the IAEA for a solution. US intelligence predicted in August 2005 that Iran could have the key ingredients for a nuclear weapon by 2015. On 25 October 2007, the United States declared the Revolutionary Guards a "proliferator of weapons of mass destruction", and the Quds Force a "supporter of terrorism". Iran responded that "it is incongruent for a country [US] who itself is a producer of weapons of mass destruction to take such a decision." Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the IAEA at the time, said he had no evidence Iran was building nuclear weapons and accused US leaders of adding "fuel to the fire" with their rhetoric.[14] Speaking in Washington in November 2007, days before the IAEA was to publish its latest report, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz called for ElBaradei to be sacked, saying: "The policies followed by ElBaradei endanger world peace. His irresponsible attitude of sticking his head in the sand over Iran's nuclear programme should lead to his impeachment." Israel and some western governments fear Iran is using its nuclear programme as a covert means to develop weapons, while Iran says it is aimed solely at producing electricity. For its part in the conflict-ridden Middle East, Israel is a member of the IAEA, but it is not itself a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and is widely believed to currently be the only nuclear-armed state in the region.

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204

History Iran’s nuclear program began as a result of the Cold War alliance between the United States and the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who emerged as an important American ally in the Persian Gulf. Under the Atoms for Peace program, Iran received basic nuclear research facilities from the United States. In return, Tehran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968. Fueled by high oil prices in the 1970s, Iran sought to purchase large-scale nuclear facilities from Western suppliers in order to develop nuclear power and fuel-cycle facilities with both civilian and potential military applications. In March 1974, the shah established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Sensing a heightened risk of nuclear proliferation, the United States convinced western allies to limit the export of nuclear fuel-cycle facilities to Iran. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose revolution displaced the shah's monarchy in 1979 and ruled the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran until his death in 1989, placed little emphasis on nuclear weapons development because it was viewed as a suspicious western innovation. During that time, many of Iran’s top scientists fled the country while the United States organized an international campaign to block any nuclear assistance to Iran. Following the death of Ayotollah Khomeini, the leadership of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei sought to revive Iran’s overt nuclear civilian program and expand undeclared nuclear activities during the 1990s. According to a strategic dossier from International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran turned away from Western suppliers and obtained nuclear assistance from Russian and China in a number of key areas, including uranium mining, milling and conversation, as well as technology for heavy-water research reactors. However, Washington intervened with Moscow and Beijing to prevent Iran from fully acquiring its list of nuclear power and fuel-cycle facilities. The 1990s also saw Iran expand its furtive nuclear research into conversion, enrichment and plutonium separation. “Most importantly, on the basis of additional centrifuge assistance from the A.Q. Khan network, Iran was able to begin the construction of pilot-scale and industrial-scale enrichment facilities at Natanz around 2000.” Full exposure of Iran’s nuclear activities came in 2002, when an Iranian exiled opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) declared the Natanz project in August of that year. Since that time, international pressure on Iran has remained steady, hampering but not halting the country’s nuclear development. Iran remains legally bound to the NPT and states its support for the treaty. There are various estimates of when Iran might be able to produce a nuclear weapon, should it choose to do so: • A 2005 assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded "if Iran threw caution to the wind, and sought a nuclear weapon capability as quickly as possible without regard for international reaction, it might be able to produce enough HEU for a single nuclear weapon by the end of this decade", assuming no technical problems. The report concludes, however, that it is unlikely that Iran would flatly ignore international reactions and develop nuclear weapons anyway. • A 2005 US National Intelligence Estimate stated that Iran was ten years from making a nuclear weapon. • In 2006 Ernst Uhrlau, the head of German intelligence service, said Tehran would not be able to produce enough material for a nuclear bomb before 2010 and would only be able to make it into a weapon by about 2015.[15] • A 2007 annual review the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London stated that "If and when Iran does have 3,000 centrifuges operating smoothly, the IISS estimates it would take an additional 9-11 months to produce 25 kg of highly enriched uranium, enough for one implosion-type weapon. That day is still 2–3 years away at the earliest." • The former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, said on 24 May 2007 that Iran could take between 3 and 8 years to make a bomb if it went down that route. • On 22 October 2007, Mohamed ElBaradei repeated that, even assuming Iran was trying to develop a nuclear bomb, they would require "between another three and eight years to succeed", an assessment shared by "all the intelligence services". • In December 2007, the United States National Intelligence Estimate (representing the consensus view of all 16 American intelligence agencies) concluded with a "high level of confidence" that Iran had halted its nuclear

Iran

205 weapons program in 2003 and "with moderate confidence" that the program remains frozen as of mid-2007. The new estimate says that the enrichment program could still provide Iran with enough raw material to produce a nuclear weapon sometime by the middle of next decade, but that intelligence agencies "do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons" at some future date.[16] Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said 70 percent of the U.S. report was "true and positive," but denied its allegations of Iran having had a nuclear weapons program before 2003. Russia has said there was no proof Iran has ever run a nuclear weapons program. The former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that he had seen "maybe some studies about possible weaponization", but "no evidence" of "an active weaponization program" as of October 2007. Thomas Fingar, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council until December 2008, in reference to the 2007 Iran NIE and using intelligence to anticipate opportunities and shape the future, said intelligence has a "recently reinforced propensity to underscore, overstate, or 'hype' the findings in order to get people to pay attention" and that the 2007 NIE was intended to send the message "you do not have a lot of time but you appear to have a diplomatic or non-military option". A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is the most authoritative written judgment concerning a national security issue prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence. • The U.S. Director of National Intelligence said in February 2009 that Iran would not realistically be able to a get a nuclear weapon until 2013, if it chose to develop one., and that US intelligence does not know whether Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons, but believes Iran could at least be keeping the option to develop them open.[17] Mossad Chief Meir Dagan was more cautious, saying recently that it would take the Iranians until 2014. German, French, and British intelligence say that under a worst case scenario it would take Iran a minimum of 18 months to develop a nuclear weapon if it chose to build one, and it would have to first purify its uranium and weaponize its uranium. An anonymous source in the German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND) whose rank was not provided has gone further and claimed Iran could produce a nuclear bomb and conduct an underground test in 6 months if it wanted to and further asserted that Iran had already mastered the full uranium enrichment cycle, and possessed enough centrifuges to produce weapons-grade uranium.[18] Physicists say that if Iran were to choose to develop a nuclear weapon, it would have to withdraw from the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and expel International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors from the country. George Friedman, head of the global intelligence company Stratfor, has said Iran is "decades away" from developing any credible nuclear-arms capacity. • On 12 February 2010 US think tank expert David Albright, the head of the Institute for Science and International Security, said in a report that Iran was seeking to "make sufficient weapons-grade uranium". His claim was criticized by former chief U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter. • An IAEA report issued 8 November 2011 provided detailed information outlining the IAEA's concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program, noting that Iran had pursued a structured program or activities relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.

IAEA The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an autonomous international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its use for military purposes. On 6 March 2006, the IAEA Secretariat reported that "the Agency has not seen indications of diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ... however, after three years of intensive verification, there remain uncertainties with regard to both the scope and the nature of Iran's nuclear programme". However, the inspectors did find some sensitive documents, including instructions and diagrams on how to make uranium into a sphere, which is only necessary to make nuclear weapons. Iran furnished the IAEA with copies, claiming not to have used the information for weapons work, which it had obtained along with other technology and parts in 1987 and the mid-1990s.[19] It is thought this material was sold to them by Abdul Qadeer Khan, though the documents did not have the necessary technical details to actually manufacture a bomb.

Iran

206 On 18 December 2003, Iran voluntarily signed, but did not ratify or bring into force, an Additional Protocol that allows IAEA inspectors access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual-use equipment, certain military-owned workshops, and research and development locations. Iran agreed voluntarily to implement the Additional Protocol provisionally, however when the IAEA reported Iran's non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council on 4 February 2006 Iran withdrew from its voluntary adherence to the Additional Protocol. On 12 May 2006, claims that highly-enriched uranium (well over the 3.5% enriched level) was reported to have been found "at a site where Iran has denied such sensitive atomic work", appeared. "They have found particles of highly enriched uranium [HEU], but it is not clear if this is contamination from centrifuges that had been previously found [from imported material] or something new," said one diplomat close to the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These reports have not yet been officially confirmed by the IAEA (as of 1 June 2006). On 31 July 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution demanding that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities. In late 2006, "New traces of plutonium and enriched uranium– potential material for atomic warheads– have been found [by the IAEA] in a nuclear waste facility in Iran." However, "A senior U.N. official who was familiar with the report cautioned against reading too much into the findings of traces of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, saying Iran had explained both and they could plausibly be classified as byproducts of peaceful nuclear activities." In 2007 these traces were determined to have come from leaking used highly enriched uranium fuel from the Tehran Research Reactor, which the U.S. supplied to Iran in 1967, and the matter was closed. In July 2007 the IAEA announced that Iran has agreed to allow inspectors to visit its Arak nuclear plant, and by August 2007 a plan for monitoring the Natanz uranium enrichment plant will have been finalised. In August 2007 the IAEA announced that Iran has agreed to a plan to resolve key questions regarding its past nuclear activities. The IAEA described this as a "significant step forward". In September 2007 the IAEA announced it has been able to verify that Iran's declared nuclear material has not been diverted from peaceful use. While the IAEA has been unable to verify some "important aspects" regarding the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear work, the agency and Iranian officials agreed on a plan to resolve all outstanding issues, Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei said at the time. In an interview with Radio Audizioni Italiane the same month, ElBaradei remarked that "Iran does not constitute a certain and immediate threat for the international community".[20] In October 2007, ElBaradei amplified these remarks, telling Le Monde that, even if Iran did intend to develop a nuclear bomb, they would need "between another three and eight years to succeed". He went on to note that "all the intelligence services" agree with this assessment and that he wanted to "get people away from the idea that Iran will be a threat from tomorrow, and that we are faced right now with the issue of whether Iran should be bombed or allowed to have the bomb". In late October 2007, according to the International Herald Tribune, the former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that he had seen "no evidence" of Iran developing nuclear weapons. The IHT quoted ElBaredei as stating that, "We have information that there has been maybe some studies about possible weaponization," said Mohamed ElBaradei, who led the International Atomic Energy Agency. "That's why we have said that we cannot give Iran a pass right now, because there is still a lot of question marks." "But have we seen Iran having the nuclear material that can readily be used into a weapon? No. Have we seen an active weaponization program? No." The IHT report went on to say that "ElBaradei said he was worried about the growing rhetoric from the U.S., which he noted focused on Iran's alleged intentions to build a nuclear weapon rather than evidence the country was actively doing so. If there is actual evidence, ElBaradei said he would welcome seeing it." In November 2007 ElBaradei circulated a report to the upcoming meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. Its findings conclude that Iran has made important strides towards clarifying its past activities, including provided

Iran

207 access to documentation and officials involved in centrifuge design in the 1980s and 1990s. Answers provided by Iran regarding the past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programs were found to be consistent with the IAEA's own findings. However, Iran has ignored the demands of the UN Security council, and has continued to enrich uranium in the past year. The IAEA is not able to conclusively confirm that Iran isn't currently enriching uranium for military purposes, as its inspections have been restricted to workshops previously declared as part of the civilian uranium enrichment program, and requests for access to certain military workshops have been denied; the report noted that "As a result, the agency's knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing". The report also confirmed that Iran now possesses 3000 centrifuges, a 10-fold increase over the past year, though the feed rate is below the maximum for a facility of this design. Data regarding the P-2 centrifuge, which Ahmadinejad has claimed will quadruple production of enriched uranium, was provided only several days before the report was published; the IAEA plan to discuss this issue further in December. In response to the report the US has vowed to push for more sanctions, whilst Iran has called for an apology from the US. In his final November 2009 statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei said the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but that other issues of concern had reached a "dead end" unless Iran were to fully cooperate with the agency. ElBaradei stated it would be helpful if "we were able to share with Iran more of the material that is at the centre of these concerns", and also said it would be helpful if Iran fully implemented the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement and fully implemented the Additional Protocol. ElBaradei said Iran's failure to report the existence of a new fuel enrichment facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. ElBaradei closed by saying international negotiations represented a "unique opportunity to address a humanitarian need and create space for negotiations". On 18 February 2010 the IAEA released a new report on Iran's nuclear program. Ivan Oelrich and Ivanka Barzashka, writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, suggested "the media has seriously misrepresented the actual contents of the report" and that "in fact, no new information has been revealed." They wrote that there was "no independent assessment that Iran is engaged in weapons work" and that this was "hardly the first time that the agency has discussed potential evidence of Tehran's nuclear weapons research". Iran's envoy to the UN atomic watchdog criticized Western powers for interpreting the IAEA report in an "exaggerated, selective and inaccurate" manner. PressTV reported that the report verified the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran and that Iran started enriching uranium to a higher level in the presence of IAEA inspectors. In an April 2010 interview with the BBC, former IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said Western nations were seeking harsher sanctions "out of frustration". "I don't think Iran is developing, or we have new information that Iran is developing, a nuclear weapon today .. there is a concern about Iran's future intentions, but even if you talk to MI6 or the CIA, they will tell you they are still four or five years away from a weapon. So, we have time to engage," he said. ElBaradei further said the building of trust between the parties would "not happen until the two sides sit around the negotiating table and address their grievances. Sooner or later that will happen." Alleged weaponization studies Former IAEA Director General ElBaradei said in 2009 that the agency had been provided with "no credible evidence" that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, but the New York Times reported in January 2009 that the IAEA is investigating U.S. allegations Project 110 and Project 111 could be names for Iranian efforts for designing a nuclear warhead and making it work with an Iranian missile. "We are looking to those suppliers of information to help us on the question of authenticity, because that is really a major issue. It is not an issue that involves nuclear material; it's a question of allegations," ElBaradei further said. ElBaradei has strongly denied reports that the agency had concluded Iran had developed technology needed to assemble a nuclear warhead, when a November 2009 article in The Guardian said the allegations included Iran's weapon design activities using two point implosion designs.[21]

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208 The New York Times article cited classified US intelligence reports asserting that Professor Mohsen Fakhrizadeh is in charge of the projects, while Iranian officials assert these projects are a fiction made up by the United States. The article further reported that "while the international agency readily concedes that the evidence about the two projects remains murky, one of the documents it briefly displayed at a meeting of the agency's member countries in Vienna last year, from Mr. Fakrizadeh's projects, showed the chronology of a missile launching, ending with a warhead exploding about 650 yards above ground – approximately the altitude from which the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was detonated." Gordon Oehler, who ran the CIA's nonproliferation center and served as deputy director of the presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction, wrote "if someone has a good idea for a missile program, and he has really good connections, he'll get that program through.. But that doesn't mean there is a master plan for a nuclear weapon." Outside experts note that the parts of the report made public lack many dates associated with Iran's alleged activities meaning it is possible Iran had a Project 110 at one time, but scrapped it as US intelligence insists.[22] The Washington Post reports that "nowhere are there construction orders, payment invoices, or more than a handful of names and locations possibly connected to the projects." Former IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei said the Agency didn't have any information that nuclear material has been used and didn't have any information that any components of nuclear weapons had been manufactured.[] Iran has asserted that the documents are a fabrication, while the IAEA has urged Iran to be more cooperative and Member States to provide more information about the allegations to be shared with Iran. In August 2009 an article in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz alleged that ElBaradei had "censored" evidence obtained by IAEA inspectors over the preceding few months. ElBaradei has angrily rejected claims from Israel, France and the US that he had suppressed the internal IAEA report, saying all relevant and confirmed information had been presented to member states. ElBaradei said he and the Agency have repeatedly said the rumors of censorship were "totally baseless, totally groundless. All information that we have received that has been vetted, assessed in accordance with our standard practices, has been shared with the Board." On 16 November 2009 the Director General provided a report to the Board of Governors. The report stated "there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." "The Agency is still awaiting a reply from Iran to its request to meet relevant Iranian authorities in connection with these issues", the report said. The report further said, "it would be helpful if Member States which have provided documentation to the Agency would agree to share more of that documentation with Iran, as appropriate." Russia has denied allegations of "continued Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons program" as "totally groundless" and said the November 2009 IAEA report reaffirmed the absence of a military component in Iran's efforts in the nuclear field. In December 2009, The Times claimed that a document from an unnamed Asian intelligence agency described the use of a neutron source which has no use other than in a nuclear weapon, and claimed the document appeared to be from an office in Iran's Defense Ministry and may have been from around 2007. Norman Dombey, professor emeritus of theoretical physics at Sussex University, wrote in that "nothing in the published 'intelligence documents' shows Iran is close to having nuclear weapons" and argued that it is "unlikely that nuclear weapon projects would be distributed among several universities, or weapon parts marketed to research centres." A senior U.N. official who saw the document said it may or may not be authentic, that it was unclear when the document was written, and that it was unclear whether any experiments had ever actually been performed.[23] The C.I.A. did not declare whether it believes the document was real, and European spy agencies also did not give any authentication to the document. Western intelligence agencies said that, if genuine, it was unclear whether the paper provided any new insights into the state of Iranian weapons research. "It's very troubling – if real," said Thomas B. Cochran, a senior scientist in the nuclear program of the Natural Resources Defense Council. The Institute for Science and International Security, said that it "urges caution and further assessment" of the document and noted that "the document does not mention nuclear weapons .. and we have seen no evidence of an Iranian decision to build them." Anton Khlopkov, the

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209 founding director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies, said the media leak may be being used "as a pretext for inciting the campaign against Iran." Former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov has also said after the public publications of the documents "Russia has no concrete information that Iran is planning to construct a weapon". Russia's representative to the IAEA, Alexander Zmeyevskiy, has noted that though the IAEA is in possession of these documents, the IAEA's findings "do not contain any conclusions about the presence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran." Iran pointed out the claims had not been verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency and argued that "some countries are angry that our people defend their nuclear rights." "I think that some of the claims about our nuclear issue have turned into a repetitive and tasteless joke," Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said in response to the documents.

Iranian stance Iran states that the purpose of its nuclear program is the generation of power and that any other use would be a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which it is a signatory, as well as being against Islamic religious principles. Iran claims that nuclear power is necessary for a booming population and rapidly-industrialising nation. It points to the fact that Iran's population has more than doubled in 20 years, the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that burning fossil fuel in large amounts harms Iran's environment drastically. Additionally, Iran questions why it shouldn't be allowed to diversify its sources of energy, especially when there are fears of its oil fields eventually being depleted. It continues to argue that its valuable oil should be used for high value products and export, not simple electricity generation. Furthermore, Iran argues that nuclear power makes fairly good economic sense. Building reactors is expensive, but subsequent operating costs are low and stable, and increasingly competitive as fossil-fuel prices rise. Iran also raises funding questions, claiming that developing the excess capacity in its oil industry would cost it $40 billion, not to speak of paying for the power plants. Harnessing nuclear power costs a fraction of this, considering Iran has abundant supplies of accessible uranium ore.[24] These claims have been echoed [25] by Scott Ritter, the former UN weapons inspector in Iraq. Roger Stern, of John Hopkin's Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, agrees "Iran's claims to need nuclear power could be genuine".[26] Iran states it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT, and further says that it "has constantly complied with its obligations under the NPT and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency". Twelve other countries are known to operate uranium enrichment facilities. Iran states that "the failure of certain Nuclear- Weapon States to fulfill their international obligations continue to be a source of threat for the international community". Iran also states that "the only country that has ever used nuclear weapons still maintains a sizable arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads" and calls for a stop to the transfer of technology to non-NPT states. Iran has called for the development of a follow-up committee to ensure compliance with global nuclear disarmanent. Iran and many other nations without nuclear weapons have said that the present situation whereby Nuclear Weapon States monopolise the right to possess nuclear weapons is "highly discriminatory", and they have pushed for steps to accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament. Iran has criticized the European Union because it believes it has taken no steps to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Iran has called on the state of Israel to sign the NPT, accept inspection of its nuclear facilities, and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Iran has proposed that the Middle East be established as a proposed Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. On 3 December 2004, Iran's former president and an Islamic cleric, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani alluded to Iran's position on nuclear energy: God willing, we expect to soon join the club of the countries that have a nuclear industry, with all its branches, except the military one, in which we are not interested. We want to get what we're entitled to. I say unequivocally that for no price will we be willing to relinquish our legal and international right. I also say unequivocally to those who make false claims: Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons, but it will not give up its rights. Your provocation will

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210 not make us pursue nuclear weapons. We hope that you come to your senses soon and do not get the world involved in disputes and crises. On 14 November 2004, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator said that his country agreed to voluntarily and temporarily suspend the uranium enrichment program after pressure from the European Union on behalf of the United Kingdom, France and Germany, as a confidence-building measure for a reasonable period of time, with six months mentioned as a reference. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has publicly stated Iran is not developing nuclear weapons. On 9 August 2005 Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa that the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that Iran shall never acquire these weapons. The text of the fatwa has not been released although it was referenced in an official statement at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a 2005 speech to the U.N. General Assembly said "We are concerned that once certain powerful states completely control nuclear energy resources and technology, they will deny access to other states and thus deepen the divide between powerful countries and the rest of the international community ... peaceful use of nuclear energy without possession of a nuclear fuel cycle is an empty proposition". On 6 August 2005, Iran rejected a 34 page European Union proposal intended to help Iran build "a safe, economically viable and proliferation-proof civil nuclear power generation and research program." The Europeans, with US agreement, intended to entice Iran into a binding commitment not to develop uranium enrichment capability by offering to provide fuel and other long-term support that would facilitate electricity generation with nuclear energy. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi rejected the proposal saying, "We had already announced that any plan has to recognize Iran's right to enrich uranium". After the Iranian Revolution, Germany halted construction of the Bushehr reactor, the United States cut off supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, and Iran never received uranium from France which it asserted it was entitled to. Russia agreed not to provide an enrichment plant and terminated cooperation on several other nuclear-related technologies, including laser isotope separation; China terminated several nuclear projects (in return, in part for entry into force of a U.S.-China civil nuclear cooperation agreement); and Ukraine agreed not to provide the turbine for Bushehr. Iran argues that these experiences contribute to a perception that foreign nuclear supplies are potentially subject to being interrupted.[27] Iran resumed its uranium enrichment program in January 2006, prompting the IAEA to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. On 21 February 2006, Rooz, a news website run by Iranian exiles (the Fedayeen Khalq [People's Commandos] leftist terrorist group),[28] reported that Hojatoleslam Mohsen Gharavian, a student of Qom's fundamentalist cleric Mesbah Yazdi, spoke about the necessity of using nuclear weapons as a means to retaliate and announced that "based on religious law, everything depends on our purpose". In an interview with the Islamic Republic News Agency the same day, Gharavian rejected these reports, saying "We do not seek nuclear weapons and the Islamic religion encourages coexistence along with peace and friendship...these websites have tried to misquote me." On 11 April 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced Iranian scientists working at the pilot facility at Natanz had successfully enriched uranium to the 3.5 percent level, using a small cascade of 164 gas centrifuges. In the televised address from the city of Mashhad he said, "I am officially announcing that Iran has joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology". In May 2006 some members of the Iranian legislature ("Majlis" or Parliament) sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan threatening to withdraw from the NPT if Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear technology under the treaty was not protected. On 21 February 2007, the same day the UN deadline to suspend nuclear activities expired, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made the following statement: "If they say that we should close down our fuel production facilities to resume talks,

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211 we say fine, but those who enter talks with us should also close down their nuclear fuel production activities". The White House's spokesperson Tony Snow rejected the offer and called it a "false offer". Iran has said that U.N. Security Council sanctions aimed at curtailing its uranium-enrichment activities unfairly target its medical sector. "We have thousands of patients a month at our hospital alone .. If we can't help them, some will die. It's as simple as that," said an Iranian nuclear medicine specialist. An Iranian Jew from California claimed "I don't believe in these sanctions... They hurt normal people, not leaders. What is the use of that?" Vice President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Ghannadi framed the debate as a humanitarian issue, "This is about human beings. . . . When someone is sick, we should give medicine." Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that fuel obtained from Argentina in 1993 would run out by the end of 2010, and that it could produce the uranium itself or buy the uranium from abroad. In February 2010, to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor which produces medical isotopes, Iran began using a single cascade to enrich uranium "up to 19.8%",[29] to match the previously foreign supplied fuel. 20% is the upper threshold for low enriched uranium (LEU).[30] Though HEU enriched to levels exceeding 20% is considered technically usable in a nuclear explosive device,[31] this route is much less desirable because far more material is required to achieve a sustained nuclear chain reaction. HEU enriched to 90% and above is most typically used in a weapons development program.[32] In an interview in October 2011, President Ahmadinejad of Iran said: "We have already expressed our views about nuclear bombs. We said those who are seeking to build nuclear bombs or those who stockpile, they are politically and mentally retarded. We think they are stupid because the era of nuclear bombs is over. [Why] for example, should Iran continue its efforts and tolerate all international treasures only to build a nuclear bomb, or a few nuclear bombs that are useless? They can never be used!"[33] On 22 February 2012, in a meeting in Tehran with the director and officials of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and nuclear scientists, Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei said: "The Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the decision makers in the countries opposing us know well that Iran is not after nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous."[34]

The U.S. stance • In 2005, the United States stated that Iran has violated both Article III and Article II of the NPT.[35] The IAEA Board of Governors, in a rare divided vote, found Iran in noncompliance with its NPT safeguards agreement for a 1985–2003 "policy of concealment" regarding its efforts to develop enrichment and reprocessing technologies. The United States,[36] the IAEA and others[37] consider these technologies to be of particular concern because they can be used to produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. • The United States has argued that Iran's concealment of efforts to develop sensitive nuclear technology is prima facie evidence of Iran's intention to develop nuclear weapons, or at a minimum to develop a latent nuclear weapons capability. Others have noted that while possession of the technology "contributes to the latency of non-nuclear weapon states in their potential to acquire nuclear weapons" but that such latency is not necessarily evidence of intent to proceed toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons, since "intent is in the eye of the beholder". • The United States has also provided information to the IAEA on Iranian studies related to weapons design, activities, including a the intention of diverting a civilian nuclear energy program to the manufacture of weapons, based on a laptop computer reportedly linked to Iranian weapons programs. The United States has pointed to

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212 other information reported by the IAEA, including the "Green Salt" project, the possession of a document on manufacturing uranium metal hemispheres, and other links between Iran's military and its nuclear program, as further indications of a military intent to Iran's nuclear program.[38] The IAEA has said U.S. intelligence provided to it through 2007 has proven inaccurate or not led to significant discoveries inside Iran; however, the US, and others have recently provided more intelligence to the agency. • In May 2003, The Swiss ambassador to Iran sent the State Department a two page document, reportedly approved by Ayatollah Khamanei, outlining a road map towards normalization of relations between the two states. The Iranians offered full transparency of its nuclear programme and withdrawal of support from Hamas and Hezbollah in exchange for security assurances and normalization of diplomatic relations. The Bush Administration did not respond to the proposal, as senior U.S. officials doubted its authenticity.[39] • The United States acknowledges Iran's right to nuclear power, and has joined with the EU-3, Russia and China in offering nuclear and other economic and technological cooperation with Iran if it suspends uranium enrichment. This cooperation would include an assured supply of fuel for Iran's nuclear reactors.[40] • A potential reason behind U.S. resistance to an Iranian nuclear program lies in Middle Eastern geopolitics. In essence, the US feels that it must guard against even the possibility of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. Some nuclear technology is dual-use; i.e. it can be used for peaceful energy generation, and to develop nuclear weapons, a situation that resulted in India's nuclear weapons program in the 1960s. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically change the balance of power in the Middle East, weakening US influence. It could also encourage other Middle Eastern nations to develop nuclear weapons of their own further reducing US influence in a critical region. • In 2003, the United States insisted that Tehran be "held accountable" for seeking to build nuclear arms in violation of its agreements. In June 2005, the US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice required former IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei to either "toughen his stance on Iran" or fail to be chosen for a third term as IAEA head. The IAEA has on some occasions criticised the stance of the U.S. on Iran's program. The United States denounced Iran's successful enrichment of uranium to fuel grade in April 2006, with spokesman Scott McClellan saying, they "continue to show that Iran is moving in the wrong direction". In November 2006, Seymour Hersh described a classified draft assessment by the Central Intelligence Agency "challenging the White House's assumptions about how close Iran might be to building a nuclear bomb. He continued, "The CIA found no conclusive evidence, as yet, of a secret Iranian nuclear-weapons program running parallel to the civilian operations that Iran has declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency," adding that a current senior intelligence official confirmed the assessment.[41] On 25 February 2007, The Daily Telegraph reported that the United States Fifth Fleet, including the Nimitz-class supercarriers Eisenhower, Nimitz and Stennis "prepares to take on Iran".[42] • In March 2006, it was reported that the US State Department had opened an Office of Iranian Affairs (OIA) – overseen by Elizabeth Cheney, the daughter of Vice President Dick Cheney. The office's mission was reportedly to promote a democratic transition in Iran. and to help "defeat" the Iranian regime.Wikipedia:Link rot Iran argued the office was tasked with drawing up plans to overthrow its government. One Iranian reformer said after the office opened that many "partners are simply too afraid to work with us anymore", and that the office had "a chilling effect". The US Congress has reportedly appropriated more than $120 million to fund the project. Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh also revealed in July 2008 Congress also agreed to a $400-million funding request for a major escalation in covert operations inside Iran. • The Bush Administration repeatedly refused to rule out use of nuclear weapons against Iran. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review made public in 2002 specifically envisioned the use of nuclear weapons on a first strike basis, even against non-nuclear armed states. Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh reported in 2006 that the Bush administration had been planning the use of nuclear weapons against Iran. When specifically questioned about the potential use of nuclear weapons against Iran, President Bush claimed that "All options were on the table." According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "the president of the United States directly threatened Iran

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213 with a preemptive nuclear strike. It is hard to read his reply in any other way."[43] • In September 2007, Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, cautioned the IAEA not to interfere with international diplomacy over Iran's alleged weapons program. She said the IAEA's role should be limited to carrying out inspections and offering a "clear declaration and clear reporting on what the Iranians are doing; whether and when and if they are living up to the agreements they have signed." Former IAEA Director General ElBaradei called for less emphasis on additional UN sanctions and more emphasis on enhanced cooperation between the IAEA and Tehran. Iran has agreed with IAEA requests to answer unresolved questions about its nuclear program. ElBaradei often criticized what he called "war mongering," only to be told by Rice to mind his business. • In December 2007, the United States National Intelligence Estimate (which represents the consensus view of all 16 American spy agencies) concluded, with a "high level of confidence", that Iran had halted all of its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and that the program remains frozen. The new estimate says that the enrichment program could still provide Iran with enough raw material to produce a nuclear weapon sometime by the middle of next decade but that intelligence agencies "do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons" at some future date. Senator Harry Reid, the majority leader, said he hoped the administration would "appropriately adjust its rhetoric and policy". • On 2 February 2009, the thirtieth anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iran launched its first domestically produced satellite Omid (meaning "Hope") in to space.Wikipedia:Link rot Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad described the successful launching of the Omid data-processing satellite as a very big source of pride for Iran and said the project improved Iran's status in the world. The United States claimed Iran's activities could be linked to the development of a military nuclear capability and that the activities were of "great concern". The U.S. specifically said it would continue "to address the threats posed by Iran, including those related to its missile and nuclear programs." Despite the U.S. saying it would use all elements of its national power to deal with Tehran's actions, Iran said the launch was a step to remove the scientific monopoly certain world countries are trying to impose on the world. Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubaie said Iraq was very pleased with the launch of Iran's peaceful data-processing national satellite. • In March 2009, Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote that U.S. policy must be thoroughly multilateral and suggested recognizing Iranian enrichment while getting Iran to agree to limits on its enrichment. "In return, some of the current sanctions in place would be suspended. In addition, Iran should be offered assured access to adequate supplies of nuclear fuel for the purpose of producing electricity. Normalization of political ties could be part of the equation," Haass said.[44] In October 2009, Ploughshares Fund President Joseph Cirincione outlined "five persistent myths about Iran's nuclear program": that Iran is on the verge of developing a nuclear weapon, that a military strike would knock out Iran's program, that "we can cripple Iran with sanctions", that a new government in Iran would abandon the nuclear program, and that Iran is the main nuclear threat in the Middle East. • In 2009, Independent U.S. Security Consultant Linton F. Brooks wrote that in an ideal future "Iran has abandoned its plans for nuclear weapons due to consistent international pressure under joint U.S.–Russian leadership. Iran has implemented the Additional Protocol and developed commercial nuclear power under strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards using a fuel leasing approach with fuel supplied by Russia and spent fuel returned to Russia."[45] • A 2009 U.S. congressional research paper says U.S. intelligence believes Iran ended "nuclear weapon design and weaponization work" in 2003. The intelligence consensus was affirmed by leaders of the U.S. intelligence community.[citation needed] Some advisors within the Obama administration reaffirmed the intelligence conclusions, while other "top advisers" in the Obama administration "say they no longer believe" the key finding of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate".[46] Thomas Fingar, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council until December 2008, said that the original 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran "became

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214 contentious, in part, because the White House instructed the Intelligence Community to release an unclassified version of the report's key judgments but declined to take responsibility for ordering its release." • Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, the chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in January 2010 that there is no evidence that Iran has made a decision to build a nuclear weapon and that the key findings of a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate are all still correct.[47] • On 20 July 2011, Frederick Fleitz, a former CIA analyst and House Intelligence Committee staff member, took issue with a February 2011 revision of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear weapons program in a Wall Street Journal op-ed titled "America's Intelligence Denial on Iran [48]." In the op-ed, Fleitz claimed the new estimate had serious problems and underplayed the threat from Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons program much as the 2007 version did. However, Fleitz stated that he was not permitted by CIA censors to discuss his specific concerns about the estimate. Fleitz also claimed the estimate had a four-member outside review board that he viewed as biased since three of the reviewers held the same ideological and political views and two of them were from the same Washington DC think tank. He noted that the CIA prevented him from releasing the names of the outside reviewers of the 2011 Iran estimate. • Several high U.S. military and intelligence officials have stated that the effects of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would not be preventive. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta said in December 2011, and Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, director of National Intelligence, said in February 2012 that an Israeli attack would only delay Iran's program by one or two years. General Michael V. Hayden, former CIA Director, said in January 2012 that Israel was not able to inflict significant damage on Iran's nuclear sites. He said, "They only have the ability to make this worse." In February 2012, Admiral William J. Fallon, who retired in 2008 as head of U.S. Central Command, said, "No one that I'm aware of thinks that there's any real positive outcome of a military strike or some kind of conflict." He advocated negotiating with Iran and deterring Iran from aggressive actions and said, "Let's not precipitate something." General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in August 2012 that a unilateral Israeli attack on Iran would delay but not destroy Iran's nuclear program and that he did not wish to be “complicit” in such an attack. He also stated that sanctions were having an effect and should be given time to work, and that a premature attack might damage the 'international coalition' against Iran. Former Defense Secretary and former CIA Director Robert Gates stated in October 2012 that sanctions were beginning to have an effect and that "the results of an American or Israeli military strike on Iran could, in my view, prove catastrophic, haunting us for generations in that part of the world." • In 2011, the senior officers of all of the major American intelligence agencies stated that there was no conclusive evidence that Iran has made any attempt to produce nuclear weapons since 2003. • In January 2012, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, but was not attempting to produce nuclear weapons. • In 2012, sixteen United States intelligence agencies, including the CIA, reported that Iran was pursuing research that could enable it to produce nuclear weapons, but was not attempting to do so.

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Other international responses United Nations In 2009, the United Nations built a seismic monitoring station in Turkmenistan near its border with Iran, to detect tremors from nuclear explosions.[citation needed] The UN Security Council has demanded Iran freeze all forms of uranium enrichment. Iran has argued these demands unfairly compel it to abandon its rights under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty to peaceful nuclear technology for civilian energy purposes. On 29 December 2009, Zongo Saidou, a sanctions advisor for the U.N., said that as far as he knew, none of the U.N.'s member nations had alerted the sanctions committee about allegations of sales of uranium to Iran from Kazakhstan. "We don't have any official information yet regarding this kind of exchange between the two countries," Saidou said. "I don't have any information; I don't have any proof," Saidou said. An intelligence report from an unknown country alleged that rogue employees of Kazakhstan were prepared to sell Iran 1,350 tons of purified uranium ore in violation of UN Security Council sanctions. Russia said it had no knowledge of an alleged Iranian plan to import purified uranium ore from Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan denied the reports. "Such fabrications of news are part of the psychological warfare (against Iran) to serve the political interests of the hegemonic powers," Iran said. Askar Abdrahmanov, the official representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, said "the references to the anonymous sources and unknown documents show groundlessness of these insinuations."[49] China The Chinese Foreign Ministry supports the peaceful resolution of the Iran nuclear issue through diplomacy and negotiations. In May 2006 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao stated "As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran enjoys the right to peaceful use of nuclear power, but it should also fulfil its corresponding responsibility and commitment". He added "It is urgently needed that Iran should fully cooperate with the IAEA and regain the confidence of the international community in its nuclear program". In April 2008, several news agencies reported that China had supplied the IAEA with intelligence on Iran's nuclear program following a report by Associated Press reporter George Jahn based on anonymous diplomatic sources. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu described these reports as "completely groundless and out of ulterior motives". In January 2010, China reiterated its calls for diplomatic efforts on the Iran nuclear issue over sanctions. "Dialogue and negotiations are the right ways of properly solving the Iran nuclear issue, and there is still room for diplomatic efforts," said Chinese spokesperson Jiang Yu. "We hope the relevant parties take more flexible and pragmatic measures and step up diplomatic efforts in a bid to resume talks as soon as possible," said Jiang. In September 2011 Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported several statements about Iran's nuclear program and China's foreign policy in the Middle East, made by independent Chinese expert on the Middle East who recently visited Israel at the invitation of "Signal", an organization that furthers academic ties between Israel and China. Yin Gang of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has expressed his opinion on China policies toward region, and according to Haaretz he made surprising statement: "China is opposed to any military action against Iran that would damage regional stability and interfere with the flow of oil. But China will not stop Israel if it decides to attack Iran. For all these reasons, Israel and the Middle East need a country like China. Israel needs China's power."[50] In March 2012, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said that "China is opposed to any country in the Middle East, including Iran, developing and possessing nuclear weapons.", adding that Iran nonetheless has the right to pursue nuclear activities for peaceful purposes.

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216 France On 16 February 2006 French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy said "No civilian nuclear programme can explain the Iranian nuclear programme. It is a clandestine military nuclear programme." In January 2007, former French President Jacques Chirac, speaking "off the record" to reporters from The New York Times, indicated that if Iran possessed a nuclear weapon, the weapon could not be used. Chirac alluded to mutually assured destruction when he stated: "Where will it drop it, this bomb? On Israel? It would not have gone 200 meters into the atmosphere before Tehran would be razed." Russia In 2005, Russian Advisor to Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev asserted that "neither the signing by Iran of the NPT, the adoption of the Additional Protocol (which provides for the right of inspection of any facility at any time with no prior notice), placement of nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, nor Russia's and Iran's commitments to repatriate spent nuclear fuel to Russia is seen as a good enough argument by the United States." Ryabev argued that "at the same time, such requirements are not imposed on, for example, Brazil, which has been developing its nuclear power industry and nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment."[51] On 5 December 2007 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said he had seen no evidence of any nuclear weapons program in Iran, no matter how old. On 16 October 2007 Vladimir Putin visited Tehran, Iran to participate in the Second Caspian Summit, where he met with Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[52] At a press conference after the summit Putin said that "Iran has the right to develop their peaceful nuclear programs without any restrictions".[53] In 2009, Russian Major-General Pavel S. Zolotarev argued Iran's security could be partially be assured by supplying Iran with modern missile and air defense systems and offering for Iran to take part in the work of one of the data exchange centers in exchange for "concrete non-proliferation obligations".[54] In May 2009, the EastWest Institute released a joint U.S.-Russian Threat Assessment on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential. The report concluded that there was "no IRBM/ICBM threat from Iran and that such a threat, even if it were to emerge, is not imminent." The report said there was no specific evidence that Iran was seeking the ability to attack Europe and that "it is indeed difficult to imagine the circumstances in which Iran would do so." The report said if Iran did pursue this capability, it would need six to eight years to develop a missile capable of carrying a 1,000 kilogram warhead 2,000 kilometers. The report said Iran ending "IAEA containment and surveillance of the nuclear material and all installed cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plan" might serve as an early warning of Iranian intentions. In December 2009, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the Iran nuclear issue would be resolved by diplomatic methods exclusively. "It is absolutely clear that the problem can be settled exclusively by political and diplomatic methods and any other scenarios, especially use-of-force scenarios, are completely unacceptable," Lavrov said. Yevgeny Primakov, a former Russian prime minister considered the doyen of Moscow's Middle East experts, said he did not believe that Iran had made a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Russia has no concrete information that Iran is planning to construct a weapon. It may be more like Japan, which has nuclear readiness but does not have a bomb," Primakov said. In February 2012, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that Russia opposes Iran developing nuclear-weapons capability. "Russia is not interested in Iran becoming a nuclear power. It would lead to greater risks to international stability.", Putin said.

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217 United Kingdom The United Kingdom is part of the EU3+3 (UK, France, Germany, US, China and Russia) group of countries that are engaged in ongoing discussions with Iran. The UK is therefore one of the countries that has stated that Iran would be provided with enriched fuel and support to develop a modern nuclear power program if it, in the words of the Foreign Office spokesperson "suspends all enrichment related activities, answer all the outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme and implement the additional protocol agreed with the IAEA". The UK (with China, France, Germany and Russia) put forward the three Security Council resolutions that have been passed in the UN. On 8 May 2006, Former Deputy Commander-in-Chief of British Land Forces, General Sir Hugh Beach, former Cabinet Ministers, scientists and campaigners joined a delegation to Downing Street opposing military intervention in Iran. The delegation delivered two letters to Prime Minister Tony Blair from 1,800 physicists warning that the military intervention and the use of nuclear weapons would have disastrous consequences for the security of Britain and the rest of world. The letters carried the signatures of academics, politicians and scientists including some of 5 physicists who are Nobel Laureates. CASMII delegation [55] Israel Israel, which is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and which is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, has frequently claimed that Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.[56] Arguing an "existential threat from Iran", Israel has issued several veiled and explicit threats to attack Iran. Mike Mullen, former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, has cautioned that an Israeli air attack on Iran would be high-risk and warned against Israel striking Iran. George Friedman, head of the global intelligence company Stratfor, has said Iran is "decades away" from developing any credible nuclear-arms capacity and that an attack on Iran would have grave repercussions for the global economy. If Iran ever did develop nuclear weapons, Israeli academic Avner Cohen has observed "that the prospect of a deliberate Iranian first nuclear strike on Israel, an out-of the-blue scenario, is virtually nonexistent... [T]he chances of Iran – or for that matter any other nuclear power – unleashing a nuclear strike against Israel, which has nuclear capabilities itself, strike me as close to zero." Walter Pincus of the Washington Post has written that Israel's stance on nuclear arms complicates efforts against Iran. Gawdat Bahgat of the National Defense University believes Iran's nuclear program is partially formed on the potential threat of a nuclear Israel. Iran and the Arab League have proposed the that the Middle East be established as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. Israel said in May 2010 it would not consider taking part in nuclear weapon-free zone discussions or joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The UN Security Council has also pushed for a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East, and has urged all countries to sign and adhere the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In May 2010, Israel reportedly deployed Dolphin class submarines with nuclear missiles capable of reaching any target in Iran in the Persian Gulf. Their reported missions were to deter Iran, gather intelligence, and to potentially land Mossad agents on the Iranian coast.

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218

Netherlands According to a Dutch newspaper, the Netherlands had launched an operation to infiltrate and sabotage the Iranian weapons industry, but ended the operation due to increasing fears of an American or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.

Muslim countries The A.Q. Khan network, established to procure equipment and material for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program (gas-centrifuge based programme), also supplied Iran with critical technology for its uranium enrichment program, and helped "put Iran on a fast track toward becoming a nuclear weapons power." The 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll, Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in March 2008 noted the following as a key finding. "In contrast with the fears of many Arab governments, the Arab public does not appear to see Iran as a major threat. Most believe that Iran has the right to its nuclear program and do not support international pressure to force it to curtail its program. A plurality of Arabs (44%) believes that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be more positive for the region than negative."

World map with List of countries with nuclear weaponsnuclear weapons development status represented by color.   Five "nuclear weapons states" from the NPT  Other states known to possess nuclear weapons  States formerly possessing nuclear weapons  States suspected of being in the process of developing nuclear weapons and/or nuclear programs  States which at one point had nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapons research programs  States that possess nuclear weapons, but have not widely adopted them

Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim-majority nation and a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council abstained from a vote in March 2008 on a U.N. resolution to impose a third set of sanctions on Iran. It was the only country out of the 10 non-permanent members to abstain. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono speaking at a joint news conference with Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran in March 2008 said "Iran's nuclear program is of a peaceful nature and must not be politicized" Pakistan, which has the second largest Muslim population in the world is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and already possesses nuclear weapons. On 12 May 2006 AP published an interview with Pakistan's former Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan Army General Mirza Aslam Beg In the AP interview, Beg detailed nearly 20 years of Iranian approaches to obtain conventional arms and then technology for nuclear weapons. He described an Iranian visit in 1990, when he was Chief of Army Staff. They didn't want the technology. They asked: 'Can we have a bomb?' My answer was: By all means you can have it but you must make it yourself. Nobody gave it to us. Beg said he is sure Iran has had enough time to develop them. But he insists the Pakistani government didn't help, even though he says former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto once told him the Iranians offered more than $4 billion for the technology. [57] In an article in 2005 about nuclear proliferation he stated "I would not like my future generations to live in the neighborhood of "nuclear capable Israel."" "Countries acquire the (nuclear) capability on their own, as we have done it. Iran will do the same, because they are threatened by Israel."

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219 The San Francisco Chronicle reported on 31 October 2003, that Grand Ayatollahs, like Ayatollah Yousef Sanei, and Iranian clerics led by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have repeatedly declared that Islam forbids the development and use of all weapons of mass destruction. SFGate.com quoted Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as saying: "The Islamic Republic of Iran, based on its fundamental religious and legal beliefs, would never resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction. In contrast to the propaganda of our enemies, fundamentally we are against any production of weapons of mass destruction in any form." On 21 April 2006, at a Hamas rally in Damascus, Anwar Raja, the Lebanon based representative of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a party that achieved 4.25% of the votes and holds 3 out the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council following the election declared: "The Muslim, Iranian, fighting people now possess nuclear capabilities. My brother, the Iranian representative sitting here, let me tell you that we, the Palestinian people, are in favour of Iran having a nuclear bomb, not just energy for peaceful purposes." On 3 May 2006 Iraqi Shia cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Husseini Al Baghdadi, who opposes the presence of US forces in Iraq and is an advocate of violent jihad was interviewed on Syrian TV. In his interview he said: "How can they face Iran? How come Israel has 50 nuclear bombs? Why are they selective? Why shouldn't an Islamic or Arab country have a nuclear bomb? I am not referring to the Iranian program, which the Iranians say is for peaceful purposes. I am talking about a nuclear bomb." "This Arab Islamic nation must obtain a nuclear bomb. Without a nuclear bomb, we will continue to be oppressed," The Baku declaration A declaration signed on 20 June 2006 by the foreign ministers of 56 nations of the 57-member Organisation of the Islamic Conference stated that "the only way to resolve Iran's nuclear issue is to resume negotiations without any preconditions and to enhance co-operation with the involvement of all relevant parties". Qatar and Arab vote against the U.N. Security Council resolution 31 July 2006: The UN Security Council gives until 31 August 2006 for Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment and related activities or face the prospect of sanctions. The draft passed by a vote of 14–1 (Qatar, which represents Arab states on the council, opposing). The same day, Iran's U.N. Ambassador Javad Zarif qualified the resolution as "arbitrary" and illegal because the NTP protocol explicitly guarantees under international law Iran's right to pursue nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. In response to today's vote at the UN, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that his country will revise his position vis-à-vis the economic/incentive package offered previously by the G-6 (5 permanent Security council members plus Germany.) In December 2006, the Gulf Cooperation Council called for a nuclear weapons free Middle East and recognition of the right of a country to expertise in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The Non-Aligned Movement The Non-Aligned Movement has said that the present situation whereby Nuclear Weapon States monopolise the right to possess nuclear weapons is "highly discriminatory", and they have pushed for steps to accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament. On 16 September 2006 in Havana, Cuba, all of the 118 Non-Aligned Movement member countries, at the summit level, declared supporting Iran's nuclear program for civilian purposes in their final written statement. That is a clear majority of the 192 countries comprising the entire United Nations, which comprise 55% of the world population. On 11 September 2007 the Non-Aligned Movement rejected any "interference" in Iran's nuclear transparency deal with U.N. inspectors by Western countries through the UN Security Council.

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220 On 30 July 2008 the Non-Aligned Movement welcomed the continuing cooperation of Iran with the IAEA and reaffirmed Iran's right to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The movement further called for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East and called for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument which prohibits threats of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Biological weapons Iran ratified the Biological Weapons Convention on 22 August 1973. Iran has advanced biology and genetic engineering research programs supporting an industry that produces world-class vaccines for both domestic use and export. The dual-use nature of these facilities means that Iran, like any country with advanced biological research programs, could easily produce biological warfare agents. A 2005 report from the United States Department of State claimed that Iran began work on offensive biological weapons during the Iran–Iraq War, and that their large legitimate bio-technological and bio-medical industry "could easily hide pilot to industrial-scale production capabilities for a potential BW program, and could mask procurement of BW-related process equipment". The report further said that "available information about Iranian activities indicates a maturing offensive program with a rapidly evolving capability that may soon include the ability to deliver these weapons by a variety of means".[58] According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Iran is known to possess cultures of the many biological agents for legitimate scientific purposes which have been weaponised by other nations in the past, or could theoretically be weaponised. Although they do not allege that Iran has attempted to weaponise them, Iran possesses sufficient biological facilities to potentially do so.

Chemical weapons Iran has experienced attack by chemical warfare (CW) on the battlefield and suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties, both civilian and military, in such attacks during the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War. As a result, Iran has promulgated a very public stance against the use of chemical weapons, making numerous vitriolic comments against Iraq's use of such weapons in international forums. Iran is not known to have resorted to using chemical weapons in retaliation for Iraqi chemical weapons attacks during the Iran–Iraq War, though it would have been Iranian soldier with gas mask under Chemical bombardment by Iraqi forces in the legally entitled to do so under the battlefield during the Iran–Iraq War. then-existing international treaties on the use of chemical weapons which only prohibited the first use of such weapons. Following its experiences during the Iran–Iraq War, Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on 13 January 1993 and ratified it on 3 November 1997. In the official declaration submitted to OPCW Iranian government admitted that it had produced mustard gas in 1980s but that ceased the offensive program and destroyed the stockpiles of operational weapons after the end of war with Iraq.[59] A U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report dated January 2001 speculated that Iran had manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons – including blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them. It further claimed that during the first half of 2001, Iran continued to seek production technology,

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221 training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal of having indigenous nerve agent production capability. However the certainty of this assessment declined and in 2007 the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency limited its public assessment to just noting that "Iran has a large and growing commercial chemical industry that could be used to support a chemical agent mobilization capability." Iran is a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans chemical weapons, delivery systems, and production facilities. Iran has reiterated its commitment to the CWC and its full support for the work of the OPCW, in particular in view of the considerable suffering these weapons have caused to the Iranian people. Iran has not made any declaration of a weapons stockpile under the treaty.

Delivery systems Missiles A Shahab-4 with a range of 2,000 km and a payload of 1,000 kg is believed to be under development. Iran has stated the Shahab-3 is the last of its war missiles and the Shahab-4 is being developed to give the country the capability of launching communications and surveillance satellites. A Shahab-5, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a 10,000 km range, has been alleged but not proven to be under development. Iran has 12 X-55 long range cruise missiles purchased without nuclear warheads from Ukraine in 2001. The X-55 has a range of 2,500 to 3,000 kilometers. Iran's most advanced missile, the Fajr-3, has an unknown range but is estimated to be 2,500 km. The missile is radar evading and can strike targets simultaneously using multiple warheads. On 2 November 2006, Iran fired unarmed missiles to begin 10 days of military war games. Iranian state television reported "dozens of missiles were fired including Shahab-2 and Shahab-3 missiles. The missiles had ranges from 300 km to up to 2,000 km...Iranian experts have made some changes to Shahab-3 missiles installing cluster warheads in them with the capacity to carry 1,400 bombs." These launches come after some United States-led military exercises in the Persian Gulf on 30 October 2006, meant to train for blocking the transport of weapons of mass destruction. The Sejil is a two-stage, solid-propellant, surface-to-surface missile (SSM) produced by Iran with a reported 1,930 km (1,200 mi) range. A successful test launch took place on 12 November 2008. According to Jane's Information Group, details of the design other than the number of stages and that it uses solid fuel have not been released. Uzi Ruben, former director of Israel's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, indicated that, "Unlike other Iranian missiles, the Sajil bears no resemblance to any North Korean, Russian, Chinese or Pakistani (missile technology). It demonstrates a significant leap in Iran's missile capabilities." Ruben went on to state that the Sejil-1 " ... places Iran in the realm of multiple-stage missiles, which means that they are on the way to having intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities ..." As a weapon, the Sejil-1 presents much more challenge to Iran's potential enemies, as solid-fuel missiles can be launched with much less notice than liquid-fueled missiles, making them more difficult to strike prior to launch. Sejil-2 is an upgraded version of the Sejil. The Sejil-2 two-stage solid-fuel missile has a 2,000 km range and was first test fired on 20 May 2009. The Sejil-2 surface-to-surface medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) was first tested eight months prior to the actual test launch, which took place in the central Iranian province of Semnan. Improvements include better navigation system, better targeting system, more payload, longer range, faster lift-off, longer storage time, quicker launch, and lower detection possibility.

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222

Iran's Nuclear Capable Missiles Name/Designation

Class

Range (varies with payload weight)

Payload

Status

Fajr-3

MRBM 2,000 km

800 kg

Operational

Shahab-2

SRBM

1200 kg

Operational

Shahab-3

MRBM 2,100 km

990 kg

Operational

Shahab-4

MRBM 2,000 km

2,000 kg

Under Development

Sejil-1

MRBM 1,930 km

Unknown Operational

Sejil-2

MRBM 2,000 km

Unknown Operational

300–2,000 km

Aircraft Any aircraft could potentially be used to host some form of WMD distribution system.[citation needed] Iran has a varied air force with aircraft purchased from many countries, including the United States. Due to sanctions, the Iranian government has encouraged the domestic production of aircraft and, since 2002, has built its own transport aircraft, fighters, and gunship helicopters.

References [1] [2] [3] [4]

[5] [6] [7] [8] [9]

"Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran", Gawdat Bahgat, Iranian Studies Journal, vol. 39(3), September 2006 Center for Documents of The Imposed War, Tehran. (‫)ﻣﺮﮐﺰ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﺎﺕ ﻭ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻘﺎﺕ ﺟﻨﮓ‬ Tehran Times: Iran wants new nuclear fuel talks (http:/ / www. tehrantimes. com/ index_View. asp?code=207020) International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ Publications/ Documents/ Board/ 2010/ gov2010-28. pdf), GOV/2010/28, 31 May 2010. U.S. does not believe Iran is trying to build nuclear bomb (http:/ / articles. latimes. com/ 2012/ feb/ 23/ world/ la-fg-iran-intel-20120224), Los Angeles Times, February 23, 2012. Iran and the Bomb (http:/ / www. richardsilverstein. com/ wp-content/ uploads/ 2011/ 06/ Hersh-6-6-11. pdf), Seymour Hersh, The New Yorker, June 30, 2011. Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (http:/ / www. dni. gov/ press_releases/ 20071203_release. pdf), National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007. Iran Trumpets Nuclear Ability at a Second Location (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2012/ 01/ 09/ world/ middleeast/ iran-will-soon-move-uranium-work-underground-official-says. html?pagewanted=2), New York Times, January 8, 2012. Dennis Blair: Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2009) (http:/ / intelligence. senate. gov/ 090212/ blair. pdf)

We judge in fall 2003 Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities and that the halt lasted at least several years... Although we do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them... develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them. [10] Resolution 1696 (2006) (http:/ / daccessdds. un. org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ N06/ 450/ 22/ PDF/ N0645022. pdf?OpenElement) [11] France24: UN atomic watchdog censures Iran: diplomats (http:/ / www. france24. com/ en/ node/ 4935014)

Of the 35-member board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 25 countries voted in favour of the resolution, diplomats said. Three countries – Venezula, Malaysia and Cuba – voted against the resolution. Six countries – Afghanistan, Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, South Africa and Turkey – abstained. One country, Azerbaijan, was absent from the vote. [12] Iran Defends Nuclear Secrecy (http:/ / www. nti. org/ d_newswire/ issues/ 2007_4_2. html#Iran) [13] " Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran (http:/ / taylorandfrancis. metapress. com/ index/ L368854758H065M1. pdf)", Gawdat Bahgat, Iranian Studies Journal, vol. 39(3), September 2006 [14] No evidence Iran is making nukes: ElBaradei (http:/ / www. news. com. au/ heraldsun/ story/ 0,21985,22664498-5005961,00. html) [15] Iran could have nuclear bomb by 2015 (http:/ / uk. reuters. com/ article/ worldNews/ idUKL242351720061024) Reuters 24 October 2006

Iran

223 [16] U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2007/ 12/ 03/ world/ middleeast/ 03cnd-iran. html?_r=1& hp& oref=slogin) New York Times 3 December 2007 [17] France24: US intelligence unsure of Iran's nuclear weapons intentions: chief (http:/ / www. france24. com/ en/ 20090212-us-intelligence-unsure-irans-nuclear-weapons-intentions-chief) [18] Iran could 'set off a uranium bomb within 6 months' – German media (http:/ / en. rian. ru/ world/ 20090716/ 155542118. html) RIA Novosti. 16 July 2009 [19] Iran made 15-page document available to IAEA inspectors (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ wmd/ library/ news/ iran/ 2007/ iran-070224-irna01. htm), GlobalSecurity.org, 24 February 2006 [20] Tehran not an 'immediate threat' (http:/ / www. dailytimes. com. pk/ default. asp?page=2007\09\22\story_22-9-2007_pg4_14) Daily Times 22 September 2007 [21] Iran tested advanced nuclear warhead design – secret report (http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ world/ 2009/ nov/ 05/ iran-tested-nuclear-warhead-design), Julian Borger, guardian.co.uk, 5 November 2009 [22] Christian Science Monitor: Iran's nuclear disclosures: why they matter (http:/ / www. csmonitor. com/ 2009/ 1017/ p19s01-usfp. html) [23] Forbes: US sees Iran edging closer to nuclear arms knowhow (http:/ / www. forbes. com/ feeds/ ap/ 2009/ 12/ 16/ general-us-us-iran_7218153. html) [24] Saghand Mining Department Website (http:/ / www. aeoi. org. ir/ newweb/ Fuel/ Saghand/ Saghand. htm) [25] http:/ / www. campaigniran. org/ casmii/ index. php?q=node/ 1493 [26] Roger Stern, The Iranian petroleum crisis and United States national security (http:/ / www. pnas. org_cgi_doi_10. 1073_pnas. 06039031), International Journal of Economic Sciences, PNAS, Vol.104, No.1, 2007, pp. 377–382. 04 [27] "Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges (2009). (page 37) (http:/ / books. nap. edu/ openbook/ 12477/ png/ 37. png), (page 38) (http:/ / books. nap. edu/ openbook/ 12477/ png/ 38. png). Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board (NRSB) [28] "Terrorist Organization Profile: Fedayeen Khalq (People's Commandos)" by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism http:/ / www. start. umd. edu/ start/ data_collections/ tops/ terrorist_organization_profile. asp?id=4018 [29] International Atomic Energy Agency: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (http:/ / www. iaea. org/ Publications/ Documents/ Board/ 2010/ gov2010-10. pdf). 18 February 2010. [30] International Atomic Energy Agency: Research Reactor Spent Fuel Status (http:/ / www-pub. iaea. org/ MTCD/ publications/ PDF/ csp_004c/ PDFfiles/ 003. pdf)

Strictly speaking, fuels enriched to 20% 235U are classified as HEU. Since many facilities with LEU cite a nominal enrichment of 20%, we have modified the definition of LEU to be £ 20% U for the purposes of RRSFDB. Since any fuel with exactly 20% enrichment before irradiation will have