Waters Flow of Peace 1527546519, 9781527546516

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Water’s Flow of Peace

Water’s Flow of Peace By

Luis Antonio Bittar Venturi

Water’s Flow of Peace By Luis Antonio Bittar Venturi This book first published 2020 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2020 by Luis Antonio Bittar Venturi All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-4651-9 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-4651-6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ................................................................................. viii Introduction ................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 1 .................................................................................................... 4 Supporting Concepts Water stress ........................................................................................... 4 Natural resources .................................................................................. 6 Renewability and exhaustibility ............................................................ 7 Reproducible resources ......................................................................... 9 Border and trans-boundary rivers ......................................................... 9 Conflict ............................................................................................... 10 Revisiting Malthus .............................................................................. 11 Chapter 2 .................................................................................................. 13 The Existence of the Scarcity-Conflict Paradigm Academic environment ....................................................................... 14 Political authorities ............................................................................. 16 The media ........................................................................................... 17 Opinion makers ................................................................................... 19 Geography textbooks .......................................................................... 20 Chapter 3 .................................................................................................. 24 Characterisation of the Middle East The Middle East in the vision of some classic authors ....................... 26 Other Regionalisations of the Middle East ......................................... 33 National Geographic Atlas............................................................ 33 The State of the Middle East: An Atlas of Conflict and Resolution by Dan Smith ........................................................................... 34 United Nations Organisation ......................................................... 35 The Middle East through the vision of the Arab World ................ 36 Regionalisation of the Arabian Peninsula and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ....................................................................... 38

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Some examples of water appropriation and use of water resources in the Middle East ............................................................................... 42 Underground canals....................................................................... 43 Wells ............................................................................................. 44 Norias ............................................................................................ 45 Impoundments and reservoirs ............................................................. 46 Cisterns.......................................................................................... 48 Interventions in the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers ................................ 49 Chapter 4 .................................................................................................. 52 The Euphrates River Basin General characterisation...................................................................... 52 The Turkish context ............................................................................ 56 The Syrian context .............................................................................. 58 The Iraqi context ................................................................................. 64 Chapter 5 .................................................................................................. 72 The Persian Gulf Regional characterisation .................................................................... 72 The decolonisation process ................................................................. 78 Water in the Persian Gulf .................................................................... 81 Chapter 6 .................................................................................................. 88 Analysis of Variables and Results Sharing ................................................................................................ 88 Agreements ......................................................................................... 88 Maintenance of the Euphrates River ................................................... 94 Analysis of flow rate ..................................................................... 95 Qualitative analysis of water ....................................................... 118 Technology contribution ................................................................... 128 Production of freshwater ................................................................... 129 Replacement of natural sources by desalinated water ....................... 134 The relation between oil and water in the Persian Gulf and the notion of sustainability .............................................. 139 Chapter 7 ................................................................................................ 142 Conclusions: A Refutation of the Water Scarcity-Conflict Paradigm On the variable: “sharing” ................................................................ 142 Indicator: The existence of cooperation agreements ................... 142 Beyond the Middle East .............................................................. 144 Complementary reflections ......................................................... 148

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Indicator: Maintenance of the Euphrates River ........................... 148 On the variable: “technology contribution” ...................................... 151 Complementary reflections ......................................................... 152 Perspectives ................................................................................. 153 Limitations of technology and common criticisms of desalination ............................................................................ 155 Proposition of improvement of the scarcity-conflict paradigm......... 157 New variables for future studies ....................................................... 163 A conceptual adjustment to water resources ..................................... 166 Chapter 8 ................................................................................................ 171 Other Reflections Accumulated knowledge ................................................................... 171 The influence of the common sense and the media power................ 173 Virtual water as an ally ..................................................................... 174 Water solidarity................................................................................. 175 Appendix ................................................................................................ 180 An Update on the Facts References .............................................................................................. 183 Additional Bibliography ......................................................................... 187

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP), for providing financial support to make the research stages feasible in Syria and the United Kingdom and also for the assistance given to this publication. To Professor Bahjat Mohamad, of the Geography Department of Damascus University, for the constant supervision, unwavering interest and skilled collaboration on this research, closely monitoring it. To Mohamad Ali Abdel Jalil, for his prompt commitment to make my sojourn viable in the University of Damascus. To Professor Keith Richards, of the Geography Department of Cambridge University, for his considerate acceptance of having welcomed me in his groups of study. To Luiz Fernando Ary, for his support and expertise in translations of Arabic into Portuguese. To Maria Alice Venturi, for her accurate final revision of texts (Portuguese version). To Eduardo Felix Justiniano, for his outstanding skills on improving the quality in the illustrations in the Portuguese version. To Adriana Tiemi Higuti and Luiz Fernando Ary for the challenging task of translating this book into English. To Professor Sabah Mohammed Khamis Faraj, of the Babylon University, for providing us with information and pictures of the Iraqian stretch of the Euphrates river. “The river reaches the ocean because it circumvents obstacles” Mao Tsé-Tung

INTRODUCTION

The current book emerged from research implemented from 2010 to 2011 at the University of Damascus (Syria), mainly focusing on the analysis of the Euphrates River and water production in the Persian Gulf. When returning to Brazil, we deepened our study, which later became a habilitation thesis, defended in 2012 at the Faculty of Philosophy, Literature and Human Sciences of the University of Sao Paulo, which did not suppress our interest in the subject. During that same year, we conducted new work in the Persian Gulf, visiting desalination plants in the Sultanate of Oman in order to research the desalination process. Between October 2013 and February 2014, a new research stage at the University of Cambridge (United Kingdom) enabled us to make conceptual revisions and gave us access to updated data. It also allowed for the production of two scientific articles in English, not to mention the conversion of the thesis into a book1. Thus, this book is an empirical and conceptual updated version of the original thesis, however, it has fewer theoretical discussions, which responded to the interests of scholars rather than a wider audience2. From the theoretical discussion, we maintained only a number of concepts which support the reading comprehension of the book. Empirical updating was based, on the one hand, on new data collection on the current desalination process, and on the other hand, the current flow rate data of the Euphrates River. Conceptually, the revisions were accomplished by including other authors on the matter, particularly the British researchers, and also conducting group discussions and studies on water from which I currently attend3. Finally, besides the updates, the data gained more accuracy by

1

Both research stages in Syria and in Cambridge relied on the financial support of FAPESP (Research Support Foundation of the State of São Paulo). 2 The original version remains available and open access at: Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015. 3 Water Reading Group and River Basin Governance Group, groups of study coordinated by Professor Keith Richards, of the Geography Department at the University of Cambridge.

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Introduction

undergoing statistical analysis, which was of great help in strengthening the argument proposed, which is detailed in the following chapters. The main objective of this study was to put into question the perspective of conflict resulting from an alleged water scarcity. We analysed the explanatory structure comprised by two variables mutually interfering with unilateral dependency: i.e. the paradigm of water scarcity – conflict, in which the second variable is a consequence of the first. This scheme was chosen due to two reasons: the first arises from the fact that it is being widely disseminated across academic and political communities, in the media and in textbooks, despite being devoid of scientific basis; the second derives from the fact that its influence is negative on public opinion and revives fatalist thoughts already questioned, such as the Malthusian Theory of Population. The choice of the Middle East as the empirical basis of the study was due to the direct association made of the region regarding the two elements of the paradigm: water scarcity and conflicts. Even though these two elements are indeed present in the region, the causal relation attributed to them is questionable. The study, then, was driven towards a general hypothesis, constituted by two variables, in which both hydrographic basin sharing and technology contribution regarding water production would make the relation between scarcity and conflict ineffectual for a full comprehension of the realities elected as the topic of study for this analysis. The first variable emphasised the predominance of sharing water resources, even in an extreme water scarcity scenario, weakening the perspective of conflict. As indicators of this sharing, we investigated specific agreements which have ensured an equitable appropriation of water resources and the resulting maintenance of the fluvial flow and water quality of the Euphrates River. The second variable, referring to technology contribution, proved advances related to freshwater production to be gradually and rapidly reverting the situation of water resource scarcity and therefore the perspective of occasional conflicts due to disputes over resources. As indicators of this process, we analysed the evolution of freshwater by seawater desalination and the gradual substitution of natural sources by such industrial techniques in the Persian Gulf. The analysis on drinking water production on an industrial scale led us to a parallel and specific objective: a conceptual

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revision concerning water resources, since their main definitions, which classify them as a mere renewable resource, lost accuracy before those realities. Thus, a new conceptual proposition concerning water resources was added to the research results in this book. Finally, we concluded by arguing the empirical and conceptual unsustainability of the paradigm which causally relates water scarcity to conflicts and proposed some adjustments, incorporating various other aspects to this relationship.

CHAPTER 1 SUPPORTING CONCEPTS

Scientific concepts are formulated within the universe of reasoning on the basis of a sensitive-world observation; therefore, rendering complete accordance with it. In this regard, such concepts must be continuously adjusted in order to best suit the new contexts constructed by science itself, outlining a pathway of permanent revision. This is particularly what happens with freshwater, for instance, despite its current industrial-scale basis production; it is still regarded as a mere renewable resource. The notion of accuracy is therefore equivalent to the degree of approximation between the concept and the object explained by it. The irrefutability of a given theoretical proposition (a concept, a paradigm, law), contrary to what it might suggest, represents its scientific weakness rather than its strength, taking into account Karl Popper’s perspective, in which it is stated that the scientism of a proposition lies in the possibility of its being refuted. In this respect, we search for conceptual distortions via new experiences based on observational criteria in accordance with the “black swans” theory of Popper (2007) in the search for improved conceptual accuracy. The following concepts shall provide a thorough grounding for the comprehension of this book.

Water stress The concept of water stress was first defined by Malin Falkenmark in 1976, on the basis of natural conditions for water availability of the United Nations member countries. Therefore, there are two aspects to be considered: on the one hand, the quantity of water from natural resources currently in a country; on the other hand, its demographic situation. The ratio cubic metre per inhabitant per year is reached by dividing the total amount of water by the total population. Considering that, a value below the basic needs to sustain a fulfilling quality of life would be underserved, therefore characterised as water stress, a situation in which the availability per capita ranges from 1,000 to 1,700 m³ per inhabitant per year (although these values diverge, according to different sources).

Supporting Concepts

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Aldo Rebouças (2004) warns against the indiscriminate employment of such a concept, since it is commonly addressed to a number of situations where there are water supply problems, which often emerge from poor management rather than an impaired relation between water and population, mentioning the metropolitan region of São Paulo as an illustration of this misconception (p. 69). On this matter, we have also added that both pollution of freshwater springs and leaks in water distribution systems4 contribute to a situation that should be better characterised as managerial water stress rather than natural water stress. Thus, it might be implied that, in compliance with the concept of Falkenmark, which correlates water quantity and population, among the countries comprised by this current study, only Syria and Iraq present no water stress. Nevertheless, as we shall see further on, such countries face more serious water supply problems, including an acute absolute scarcity of water resources than those countries of the Persian Gulf do. By combining the concepts of both Falkenmark and Rebouças, we were drawn to the conclusion that it is therefore unreasonable to consider such an approach as natural water stress. Ecosystems function successfully according to different quantities of current water resources, taking the Amazon and Sahara as extreme examples. Water stress is only characterised when the population is affected by a natural water scarcity (or aridity). If this were to occur, the reasons will always be at the expense of social demands, since decisions on living in either this or that region is a social determinant, as well as the competence of a population to ensure its water supply via already long-established techniques. It is in this social dimension, precisely related to water resource management, that it can be implied, for instance, why supplying the population is assured in the Persian Gulf (characterised by severe water scarcity) whereas the Amazon (where there is the world’s highest amount of freshwater) discloses the lowest indexes on accessibility to drinking water in Brazil5? Therefore, if a population is affected by a deficient water supply, the reasons are always social, i.e., there is only managerial water stress6.

4

According to Rebouças (2004), losses in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo ranges from 30% to 40% of total treated water, while in developed countries these values range from 5% to 15% (p.70). 5 In accordance with the National Water Agency of Brazil (ANA-SNIS). 6 Read more about this at: . Accessed on: Sept. 23, 2015.

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Natural resources The comprehension of what constitutes a natural resource is only possible from a dual perspective: sociological, because the fact of it being something that one resorts to implies the existence of a demand which varies, comes into existence or vanishes according to different historical and socioeconomic contexts; and natural, since in most cases, it is materially comprised by elements that depend on natural dynamics so that they take place and settle on the Earth’s surface. Therefore, a natural resource is an integrating concept and its comprehension requires a geographical analysis, which incorporates both social and natural dimensions in time and space. Natural resources represent thus the main link between society and the natural world. The definition adopted in this book on the concept of a natural resource is as follows: A natural resource can be defined as any element or aspect of nature that is in demand, is either susceptible for use or is currently being used directly or indirectly by mankind as a means of meeting their physical and cultural needs in any time and space […] (Venturi, 2007, p.15).

In the first excerpt of the definition, both “aspect” and “indirectly” enable us to contemplate those non-material resources surpassing the idea of a resource as an extracted and transformed element. Conservation units, for instance, display a list of resources whose uses are indirect, i.e., for contemplation, recreation or environmental education. Other forms of nonmaterial resources are depicted, for instance, by landscape itself (e.g., an ocean view, natural parks, etc.) which are appropriated by real estate marketing and materialised into property value. The relief itself is an indirectly appropriated resource at hydroelectric power plants, which, in turn, harness water as a direct resource, not to mention in agriculture, where the soil is the directly harnessed resource enabled by a flatter relief in some productive models, such as in the agribusiness sector. The term “demand” and the expression “susceptible for use”, play a key role in granting historicity to the concept, insofar as it makes no sense to classify something as a resource if, on the one hand it is not susceptible for use (due to technical limitations, as occurs with the still inaccessible heavy metals in the inner part of the Earth); or, on the other hand, such a resource is not in demand. For Godard (2002), Resources should not be fixed assuredly; the content of what we name resources transforms historically and relies on both environmental

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evolution and the evolution of technical possibilities, and the nature of social and economic conditions as well. (p. 207)

Thereafter, the inclusion of these “cultural necessities” allows us to go beyond the resource-necessity ratio, and thus includes resource appropriation as the satisfaction of demands coupled with cultural motives, such as the appreciation of an ocean view (i.e., it is not a matter of necessity, but a desire instead), the environmental education, and the recreational facilities developed in the conservation unit, among others. Ultimately, the expression “in any time and space” makes the concept universal, which can be applied to primitive (e.g., indigenous peoples), capitalist, socialist or even feudal societies. Natural resources differ from natural wealth due to the fact that the first are not necessarily able to be converted into wealth. This mainly explains why there are resource-rich countries, but with impoverished populations and a low human development index (HDI).

Renewability and exhaustibility Natural resources can also be subdivided into several categories. They are commonly classified into renewable and non-renewable resources, which as a classification is somewhat insufficient. There are a number of variables that may increase or reduce resource renewability, which is not uncommonly related to mere physical characteristics but management and forms of usage as well. An iconic example of it is soil as a resource, which, depending on climatic conditions, presents higher renewability (warm and humid climates); concurrently, depending on the kind of management and use it may deplete more rapidly and thus have its renewability reduced. The concept of renewability is almost imbued with the notion of time. In principle, all Earth’s resources would be renewable, as long as the processes through which they were formed do not cease. However, only those whose renewal rate occurs within the social time scale are the ones which can be regarded as renewable. Therefore, resources such as hydrocarbons, which renew themselves and recover their stocks by natural mechanisms over millions of years, cannot be considered renewable in terms of societal use. Nevertheless, the concept of a resource being naturally renewable within the social time scale is not sufficient to classify it as renewable, since its exploitation rate might be superior to its replacement, thereby making them

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Chapter 1

exhaustible, as occurs with forests, soil and fish, among other resources a priori considered renewable. In short, the concept of renewability can only be understood by linking both natural and social dimensions. Once done, there will be no antagonisms between renewable and exhaustible resources. Such resources, even those naturally renewable, might become exhaustible due to a pace of usage superior to that of its renewal. On the other hand, they can be nonexhaustible, even though they are non-renewable, due to their current stock balance, e.g., water, as we shall see in Chapter 7. In this case in particular, the notion of space (spatial dimensions, occurrence scale) is more important than time itself. Forests, for instance, can be considered as renewable under the perspective of nature, since they are capable of renewing themselves by natural mechanisms. Nevertheless, the incorporation of both human dimensions and notions of time and space may undermine such a classification. With regard to time, the forest as a resource becomes exhaustible if the exploitation rate surpasses its ability for renewal. In relation to space, the forest as a resource loses its renewability capacity in case the deforested surfaces are excessively wide. Chances for a forest to recover tend to be inversely proportional to the extension of the deforested area, particularly in rainforests, in which both soil fertility and air humidity, i.e., renewal conditions, arise from the forest itself. Ultimately, a recurrent misconception consists of considering mineral resources as exhaustible. Such an idea may be refuted if one considers the non-exhaustibility of raw materials (e.g., for civil construction) and sea salt, just to name a few. The latter, besides being a renewable mineral, can be considered as non-exhaustible in time and space. Park (2011) defines a renewable resource as a natural resource (such as freshwater, forests or renewable energy) which is recovered in a pace, at least, as fast as the usage rate, and capable of renewing itself and also be indefinitely obtained under accurate conditions, but can be converted into a non-renewable resource if submitted to overexploitation […]. (p. 378, emphasis added)

Therefore, as the rate of natural renewal is steady, while the exploitation is not; renewability is, to a large extent, linked to resource management. However, the possibility of the exhaustibility of a renewable resource due to its misuse is not restated by Park (2011), when defining an exhaustible resource only as “any non-renewable resource (such as minerals, non-

Supporting Concepts

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mineral resources, fossil fuels) which is present in fixed quantities in the environment” (p. 162).

Reproducible resources Resources can still be reproducible, as proposed by Godard (2002, p. 207), which is, in turn, different from the renewable category. In the latter, the resource renews itself and its stocks are recovered by natural mechanisms; for instance, a forest that recovers itself, a kind of soil that, under favourable climatic conditions, recovers its physical and chemical properties, or even species of animals whose populations are able to re-establish by themselves, etc. However, in case mankind intervenes in the process of renewability in order to accelerate it and to meet social demands, the resource now belongs to the “reproducible” category, as is the case of any crop, forest, aquaculture, and all those resources that reproduce themselves at unnatural rates by human interventios. We shall resume this concept in the conclusion considering that it will be used in the conceptual revision on water resources. In short, the concepts embraced herein always contrast natural time with social time. In general, natural time is slower than social time, but we have to take into account that the existence of a society could be more longlasting than a number of natural resources which may be exhausted before it.

Border and trans-boundary rivers Border rivers are those that form boundaries with two or more countries, such as the Paraná River, which serves as a boundary line between Brazil and Paraguay7. Trans-boundary rivers cross the territory of two or more countries8. Obviously, this same river may have both border and transboundary stretches. The significant increase of nation-states in the twentieth century, whether by decolonisation (e.g., Africa and the Middle East) or by dismemberment processes (e.g., the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union) 7

Glossário de termos referentes à gestão de recursos hídricos fronteiriços e transfronteiriços (Glossary of terms on management of boundary and transboundary water resources - Brazil, 2011). 8 Article 2 from Resolution no. 467, October 30, 2006, National Water Agency of Brazil.

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transformed a number or rivers into trans-boundary ones, broadening their internationality. This is the case of the Danube, which, due to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, now runs through several different nations. Countries sharing trans-boundary rivers would tend to present a greater potential for conflict than those which share border rivers. This would occur due to the fact that, by sharing trans-boundary rivers, downstream countries would, in principle, be more vulnerable than the upstream countries; and to some extent, they would depend on not only the good will of their neighbours but also an accurate sharing policy which ensures flow rate and quality. In turn, upstream countries normally hold greater power to control water resources, mainly by building dams that grant, inter alia, the steering of flow rate, even though not completely. Although the countries which share the same boundary type fluvial course present the same geographical condition in relation to the resource, it may not spare them from conflict; different practices undertaken on each side may lead to an impairment on either the amount of water (erosion, for instance) or its quality (e.g., sewage disposal or widespread pesticide use in farming). The Euphrates River, analysed herein, is characterised as being a transboundary river, because it runs through Turkey, Syria and Iraq, as we shall discuss in greater detail further in this book.

Conflict The term conflict will be widely used in this book, since it is an element of major importance on the paradigm under discussion. Therefore, it is necessary to explain what we consider conflict, since it is a broad term, which can encompass anything from minor diplomatic incidents to belligerent confrontations. Wolf et al. (2003, apud Katz, 2011, p. 2) “[…] mentions the lack of a clear usage of the term ‘conflict’ as a cause that contributes to both confusion and disagreement concerning [the] Water Wars hypothesis”. Katz (2011) proposes a definition that, according to him, is commonly used by both proponents and critics of “Water Wars” hypothesis (p. 2). Thus, conflict is defined as a situation in which there is the use of armed force by political organised groups that dispute, specifically in this context, either the control or access to water resources, in particular freshwater.

Supporting Concepts

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Hsiang, Meng and Cane (2011, p. 2) also associate the idea of conflict with belligerent confrontation, yet defining a minimum number of 25 victims resulting from a conflict between a government and another organised group. In this book, we do not stipulate either the existence or the number of victims, but we comply with the idea of armed conflict. Therefore, among multiple degrees and scales of conflict, we consider herein only the episodes in which two or more countries engaged in armed confrontations, ruling out diplomatic, economic or social disputes. Nor are we considering the internal conflicts, in which groups of the same country may have fought for water resources. This notion of conflict is equivalent to the political approach to war of Aron (2002), who claims interstate conflict as a “perfect war” (p. 223). Such an approach was required in order to enable this current study, because non-military, diplomatic or conflicts from any other nature – or even national internal conflicts to varying degrees – may exist on a general basis. There is no secure database to handle such wide ranging and assorted contexts, and in doing so ensure that water is the main cause of conflict, rather than being regarded as just one of its facets. This notion is justified by the fact that pronouncements under either the paradigm “scarcity-conflict” or “water war” always refer to an international warfare approach more or less explicitly.

Revisiting Malthus Finally, it is necessary to revisit some theoretical aspects of the work of Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), since it can help to understand the logical schema of “scarcity-conflict”. Malthus, a British economist and demographer, developed a wide range of work on themes such as the selfregulation of vegetative growth in face of the limits of both natural resources and means of subsistence. His remarked compendium includes the six volumes of An Essay on the Principle of Population, published between 1798 and 1826 (Malthus, 1985). Malthus formulated some laws that, when combined, would promote – at least logically – the explanation of the existence of starvation. Population growth would lead to a demographic surplus from which unemployment, reduction of proceeds, starvation and progression of disease would take place. Such events would periodically “visit” humankind, teaching them about their growth limits. Therefore, population growth, which is faster than food production, should be controlled; and, to that end, he proposed some laws and moral precepts. Malthus was an Anglican clergyman, who expressed his propositions either in a moralistic or fatalistic tone. Even so, he was highly respected in his time

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and exerted influence over Charles Darwin in his formulation of the theory on the evolution of species. In this book, it is exactly that fatalistic tone from Malthusian theory with which we characterise our paradigm. The heralds of conflict arising from water scarcity do not pay due regard to both technical and planning possibilities for a balanced approach to a population’s water supply problems. Both contexts chosen for our analysis highlight one of these aspects; showing that unlike Malthusian precepts, agreements, technical planning and development can subvert this “natural trend” of the facts.

CHAPTER 2 THE EXISTENCE OF THE SCARCITY-CONFLICT PARADIGM

In the study presented in this book, the paradigm analysed conveys an explanatory scheme based on the causal link between two aspects: the scarcity of water resources and the resulting potential for conflict. This model, though simple, has a nomic-like nature because it would fit in any time and space as a logical scheme: if there is a lack of water, there will be conflicts for its possession or usage. Structurally, such a paradigm lies at the interface of natural and human sciences, because it is comprised of two different dimensions: the first one is more stable, related to water dynamics, which depends on natural laws; and the second one is more interpretative, hermeneutical, which refers to the appropriation of resources and their outcome. The hermeneutical dimension would justify its reinterpretation before the “fads” of contemporary reality, whereas the other dimension, water dynamics, is a constant in the social time scale. The debate over this paradigm thus constitutes an authentic geographical problem. However, its revision is only an adjustment, or rather, making use of Kuhn’s term, “polishing work” (Reale, 2006, p. 177). In times of “normal science”, this revision is possible and is described by Kuhn (1970) as follows: “In the normal change, one can simply either revise or add a simple generalisation while all the rest remains the same. […] Normal science also changes the manner by which the terms bind to nature”. (p. 29) By incorporating the scarcity-conflict paradigm a priori (i.e., before the analytical process takes place), some authors announce conflict frameworks whose object under dispute is water, which is actually disputed due to either its scarcity or insufficient stock availability, falling far short of the demand. This posture, at times dogmatic, is referred to frequently by the media. Ideas such as: “If in the twentieth century conflicts involved particularly oil; in the twenty first century, wars will mostly be over water” and other similar

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Chapter 2

quotes are quite familiar to us, bearing in mind the constancy with which they are broadcasted. Even certain international organisations embrace this fatalistic perspective, although it is the role of these institutions to warn against possible adverse future events. The report of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) envisages that, if current conditions persist, approximately 1.8 billion people will be living in regions with water resource scarcity9. That paradigm herein has a premise-like nature rather than a hypothetical one, so that there will be no supporting effort related to its existence, but only elucidative and illustrative efforts on how it is fed and disseminated by various sources. Their heralds are scientists, politicians, media agents, opinion makers and authors of geography textbooks. For Katz (2011), “predictions of inevitable and eminent wars arising from water scarcity are commonly made by prominent political figures, scholars, journalists and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)”10. As an elucidative and illustrative resource, we have identified and listed statements containing both variables “water scarcity” and “conflict”, even though the latter may appear implicitly. When it is stated that “wars in the twenty first century will mostly be over water”, the idea of scarcity is present, though it is not explicit. The statements listed above also depict a causal relationship and one-sided dependence between the variables, in which water scarcity would be the leading cause. They are coated with a prognostic nature and often refer either to Middle Eastern or global contexts. The following are some examples on the dissemination of the paradigm in the academic environment from political authorities, media, opinion makers and geography textbooks.

Academic environment Various authors from several nationalities predict wars involving water scarcity as Berman and Wihbey (1999), when they state that:

9

Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23,2019. 10 David Katz is a professor at the University of Tel Aviv, and a researcher in economics and natural resources, management of trans-boundary resources and restoration of ecosystems.

The Existence of the Scarcity-Conflict Paradigm

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Mutual confidence over such resources has made water a conflict catalyst. [Turkey and Syria] have been on the verge of war several times. […] The Middle East is about to deteriorate in regional struggles concerning allocation and water access. Nations around the region are drifting towards conflicts over water.

Homer-Dixon (1999)11, professor at the University of Waterloo, Canada, converges towards this perspective of conflict and violence under the proposition that “[…] environmental scarcity will have deep social consequences, encouraging insurgencies, ethnic clashes, urban rebellions and other forms of civil violence, particularly in the developing world”12. Michael Quinion, a British author who published a number of works on terms and expressions13, fosters and disseminates a glossary of English “universal words”, among which is the expression “World Water Wars”: […] a type of conflict […] due to an acute water scarcity for consumption and irrigation. […] Possible foci have been envisaged in the Middle East, in parts of Africa and in a number of the largest river basins in the world, including the Danube14.

Clarke and King (2005), North American researchers, warn in their work entitled The Water Atlas against the risks of twenty first century wars arising from a growing scarcity on the basis of statistical data. At World Water Week, in Stockholm (2005), several scientists warned against the danger of wars over water. Mitsch, from the University of Ohio, United States, stated that: “We had an oil war […]. Such an event took place during our time. Now, there may be wars over water”15.

11 Homer-Dixon develops interdisciplinary research in Economics, Political Sciences, and Geography. He is the author of several books, among them: Environment, Scarcity and Violence (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999). 12 Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2019. 13 Among them, the dictionary: Logisms and isms. London: Oxford University Press, 2002. 14 Available at: Accessed on: Sep. 22, 2015. 15 Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 22, 2015.

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There are also authors in the Arabic academic community, such as Assaman16, who herald wars even in the titles of their books (Water Wars in the Middle East), containing suggestive covers depicting tanks and warplanes and enchained faucets. Such a perspective of water wars is also fostered within the Brazilian academic community, reinforcing it as a paradigm used to interpret those contexts. For Olic (1999), in the twenty first century, wars that break out in the Middle East will presumably have more to do with water than they will with oil. This warning seems increasingly more concrete, and there are even hypotheses on the emergence of hydro-conflict zones, one of them lying within the basins of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers […]. (p. 42)

Political authorities Some international authorities have also prophesied war over water in the twenty first century, for instance, Ismail Serageldin, former President of the Central Bank and World Commission on Water, who stated that: “Wars of the next century will be fought over water” (in Bouguerra, 2004, p. 91). In the same perspective, Wally N’Dow, the UNO’s sector director, declared in 1996: We believe that, by 2010, should massive improvements over obtaining and saving water not have been undertaken, we will be faced with a monumental crisis […]. While wars in the past century were over oil, we strongly believe that a number of political and social conflicts of the 21st century will revolve around water. (apud Bouguerra, 2004, pp.91-2)

N’Dow’s prophecy date is already overdue and there is no evidence of conflicts over water. What we still see is that there are millions of people with no adequate water provision, not due to conflicts between countries; but, rather, almost exclusively to the poor management of water resources often worsened by natural scarcity. Political authorities who exercise great worldwide influence, such as Secretaries General of United Nations Organization (UNO), have also contributed to the dissemination of the paradigm scarcity-conflict. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary General between 1992 and 1996, claimed that 16

We decided to translate and include this work, although the edition is from the author himself and has no dates, as included in the references.

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17

“the Middle East’s next war will be over water”. In 2001, his successor, Kofi Annan (1997-2006), voiced in unison that “the fierce competition for fresh water is very likely to become a source of conflict and war in the future”. That same year, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. More recently, UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, emphasised that “water scarcity has triggered a greater risk for violent conflicts”. Such examples reveal that the hypothesis on water wars lies at the heart of the United Nations, rather than the countless cooperation agreements which involve international river basins, and, thus, assure a cooperation scenario. Émile Lahoud, former President of Lebanon, joined the political group that foreshadows conflicts over water when,in 2001, receiving ministers of Arab countries, he stated: “Water is the new oil of the Arab countries”17. During events which gathered specialists, politicians and NGOs – events given broad media coverage – a number of prognostic statements on wars arising from water scarcity can be registered and the examples could be compiled to exhaustion. At the World Water Forum, Istanbul (March, 2009), the Swiss representative of Amnesty International voiced that “[…] there is no doubt that the twenty first century conflicts will be over raw materials, particularly water, which will be scarce everywhere”18.

The media The media is the most far-reaching advertising vehicle to disseminate the idea of conflict over water. Perhaps, due to commercial reasons, the possibility of conflict is worth more than peace itself. One example of this fact is evidenced by a statement from Professor Benedito Braga in the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de São Paulo. Despite its optimistic content, highlighting agreements and dialogues, the title of the interview depicted otherwise: “Where there is no dialogue, there are conflicts”. There is a contradiction between the pessimistic title of the interview and its content that, actually, reinforces the belief in dialogue and cooperation. The Amazon River Basin is shared with eight neighbouring countries and the Plate River Basin with four more. In Africa, the Nile serves ten more countries. In the Middle East, the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers flow through 17 Journal El Liwa, Beirut, edition of June 20, 2001, p. 6 (apud Bouguerra, 2004, p.99) 18 Statement of Bruno Riesen. Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 22, 2015.

18

Chapter 2 Turkey, Iraq and Syria, a complex region, not only with regard to the point of view of water. There are cooperation agreements in all of these examples […] nowadays; a commission meets on a regular basis in order to discuss policies for the Nile River. […] History has shown that conflicts are rare. Such alleged discussions on wars over water haven’t shown an accurate technical foundation so far19.

The media has also darkly foreshadowed trouble in Canada, a country which is rich in water resources, but in which acid rain accounts for a serious pollution problem in a number of lakes. Bouguerra (2004) highlights the reference to Terence Corcoran, Toronto’s Financial Times editor, to whom water will be “the oil of the 21st century” (p. 73). The author writes: O woe to us! Water, essential for farming, a wealth generator and key point for food self-sufficiency; and, therefore, autonomy, awakens greed. Thus, struggles for power are never far away. Nowadays, water as a factor is a weighty variable in strategical equations. (p. 81)

Even though this French-Tunisian geographer exposes different perspectives on water, he takes no stand in regard to the paradigm being discussed; on the contrary, he is always adopting a different and complementary position, and, at times, leaning towards statements of sorrow and warning. In a magazine article with the suggestive title “Fresh water: the gold of the twenty first century”, the author states: […] overexploitation reduces noticeably the available stocks, but mankind is still reluctant to adopt measures which ensure its preservation. Of all currencies, water is the one which will determine either peace or war among nations of our century20.

In another article entitled: “Water: the war of the future”, the author emphatically remarks: […] data is alarming. The problem is a fact and also real. It surpasses boundaries, but while it does not reach each household tap, scarce water will be problematic for more than a few. It surely is a question of time. We 19

Licensed Professor on Environmental Engineering of Polytechnic School of the University of São Paulo (USP), former President of the Water World Council, organiser of the Water World Forum and Secretary of Sanitation and Water Resources of the State of São Paulo. Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 22, 2015. 20 By Eduardo Arraia. Available at: Accessed on: Sep. 22, 2015.

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are indeed dependent on nature; we should also pay greater attention to this issue, giving due importance not only to health but also the survival of many, by avoiding future wars21.

Both statements: “it surely is a question of time” and “we are indeed dependent on nature” denote a precise Malthusian perspective.

Opinion makers Leonardo Boff, theologist and influential professor in Brazil, winner of a number of international and national awards and author of several books, also reinforces the dissemination of the paradigm scarcity-conflict despite his important influence. In his article “Water Wars”, published on the ALAI (Agencia Latinoamericana de Información) website on January, 28, 2005, Boff reminds us that: […] The World Bank vice-president, Ismail Serageldin, has long truly said that: “if wars in the twentieth century were over oil, the ones from the twenty first century will be over drinking water”. In fact, there are currently fifty conflicts in the world because of lack of water, since 40% of the world’s population lives near 250 river basins. The Tigris and Euphrates River basins are the core of litigation between Turkey, Syria and Iraq; the Ganges and Indo river basins between Bangladesh, India and Pakistan and so are the river basins of the Nile and Zambesi22.

Such quotes hardly ever specify the data source provided above (fifty conflicts, 40% of the population), and are often general and indirect statements. Regarding the latter quote, we are led to believe that there are conflicts occurring between all countries mentioned above, a fact that bears no relation to reality. The term “conflict” is always employed on a general basis. Columnists in Brazilian influential newspapers have also contributed to the dissemination and consolidation of the paradigm. Gilberto Dimenstein, in reference to the Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Istanbul, 1996), wrote an article in the newspaper Folha de S. Paulo (São Paulo Journal) entitled: “Water will be the ignition of the twenty first century’s wars”, on February 7, 1996. In the article, the author declares: 21

By Alexandre Chut. Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 22, 2015. 22 Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 22, 2015.

20

Chapter 2 […] water scarcity in the Middle East and African countries will be the leading cause of wars in the region in the next century. […] conflicts will arise from the dispute over the Nile, Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, responsible for supplying most of water to this region. […] Countries which are more likely to have conflicts are Egypt and Ethiopia (on the Nile River) and Syria and Iraq against Turkey (which dispute the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers). […] A report by the World Bank, published in August, 1995, also warns against the risk of wars over water. “Many of the wars in this current century will be triggered by the fight for water”, according to the report.

In this case, there is even a prediction of where wars shall commence, and the alliances have already been pre-established (Syria and Iraq against Turkey). These precise and sophisticated forecasts are also made by newspaper columnists who are not experts on the issue23, as observed above. At the Sixth World Water Forum, in Marseille (France, March 2012), the president of the World Youth Parliament for Water (WYPW), Bart Devos, stated: “For me, it is no surprise if conflicts over the ‘blue’ gold succeed those ones over ‘black’ gold”, regarding water and oil, respectively. Pope Francis himself, whose pronouncements place him as a prominent opinion maker, has greatly contributed to the paradigm. In June, 2005, the Pope launched the Encyclical entitled Laudato si (Praise Be to You), on the care for our common home, which issues a strong emotional appeal to care for environmental and natural resources. In his New Year message, he reminded us that “it is a compulsory duty that Earth’s resources shall be used in order that everyone can be free of hunger”. With reference to water, the Pontiff reinforces the importance of the universal access to drinking water: “[…] access to safe drinking water is a basic and universal human right, since it is essential to human survival and, as such, is a condition for the exercise of other human rights”. The contribution of Encyclical to environmental issues related to social injustice is unquestionable and it will certainly impact on the faithful awareness of this matter. Nevertheless, the Pontiff ends up, between the lines, strengthening the fatalistic paradigm which we question herein, when in Encyclical he states his fears war over water in this current century: As the quality of water available is gradually deteriorating, in some places, there is a growing trend towards privatisation of such a limited resource

23

Reasons for these warnings on the media will be discussed further, in the Item “Other Reflections”.

The Existence of the Scarcity-Conflict Paradigm

21

[…]. It is expected that the control of water by multinational companies will become one of the main sources of conflict in this century.

A number of examples of this kind presented above provide solid empirical evidence of our paradigm, even though there is no empirical support per se. Moreover, these examples show that most of the pronouncements are made by non-experts and also with no substantial grounds.

Geography textbooks Analysing some collections of geography textbooks approved by the National Textbook Program 2012, named PNLD 2012 (Programa Nacional do Livro Didático24), we found several examples of the dissemination of the water scarcity-conflict paradigm nearly always related to the Middle East and the fatalistic perspective as well. In a collection for secondary school students entitled Território e sociedade no mundo globalizado (Territory and Society in the Globalised World), on the topic “Water geopolitics”, Lucci, Branco and Mendonça (2010) write: Probably, drinking water will be the most disputed natural resource on the planet in this century. Its scarcity in a large number of countries, mainly in Africa, Asia, and particularly in the Middle East, will be the principal cause of wars. (p. 200, emphasis added)

The authors proceed by quoting an excerpt from research by the International Studies Centre, in which it is stated that “many wars in this current century (twentieth century) were the fruit of disputes over oil. Next century (twenty first century) wars will be over water” (p. 200). Thus, the general idea of there being water wars in the world in the twenty first century is disseminated, particularly in the Middle East. In Turkey, the construction of Ataturk Dam and diversion of water for agricultural areas irrigation […] have diminished the volume of the rivers [the Tigris and Euphrates], jeopardizing countries reached by their waters. […] In a war situation, either the destruction or the contamination of dams and aqueducts and water treatment facilities are part of combat strategies. (Lucci, Branco, Mendonça, 2010, p. 201)

24

This programme, developed by the Ministry of Education, assesses textbooks subscribed in them under hundreds of criteria. Books approved and selected by professors are distributed for free at public schools in the country.

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In this excerpt, on top of the paradigm’s dissemination, there is inaccurate information: Ataturk Dam affects only the Euphrates River and it has not diminished the water volume downstream, as we shall see hereinafter25. In the collection entitled Geografia Global (Global Geography, Almeida, 2010), aimed at secondary school students, the author announces that “this type of conflict” known as ‘water conflict’, according to analysts, will likely increase over the twenty first century. Still among the books approved at PNLD 2012, we found other examples of how the idea of conflicts over water scarcity is disseminated, particularly in the Middle East. In the collection named Geografia - Sociedade e cotidiano (Geography – Society and Daily Life), Martins, Bigotto and Vitiello (2010a) make a connection between regions and desalination, also referring to Mesopotamia: On the other hand, countries comprising the Arabian Peninsula, in order to compensate for the lack of freshwater, need to build large seawater desalination plants which demand both major investments and energy costs. Therewith, some conflicts are able to intensify in the region. This is the case of that water shared by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, crossing Turkey, Syria and Iraqi territories. (p. 273)

In this excerpt, students may be biased to connect desalination with an enhancement of conflicts, which, in our current work, we will argue against. Even the collections aimed at elementary school students already bring the fatalistic perspective of water wars. In the textbook for the 9th year students from the collection of Martins, Bigotto and Vitiello (2010b), there is a text entitled Guerra pela Água (War Over Water), in which the authors state that: experts on international politics warn that: freshwater shall be one of the main reasons for conflict in this century. It is well known that nations worldwide have promoted heated battles over the use of natural resources […] in the 21st century, the perspectives might be even worse. (p. 254)

Once more, mention was made to “various experts” in a general way, with neither no specifications nor illustrative examples of real conflicts. Moreover, “heated battles” remain nameless and placeless. Finally, one more collection addressed to elementary school students reinforces the idea that even younger scholars are already subjected to both fatalistic and Malthusian forecasts for water wars. In Geografia crítica - O 25

In Chapter 6, “Maintenance of the Euphrates River”.

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espaço natural e ação humana (Critical Geography – Natural Space and Human Action) (Vesentini; Vlash, 2010), the authors when referring to the Nile, state that, “before reaching Egypt, it flows through Sudan and Uganda. Therefore, if one of these countries builds a dam on the river, there would probably be a political conflict” (p. 175-76). And they add when referring to Mesopotamia: […] the control over rivers flowing along Mesopotamia Peninsula26 – particularly the Tigris and Euphrates – is an issue which must be carefully managed by the countries involved (Syria, Turkey and Iraq); otherwise it might give rise to war over water”. (p. 176)

Hence, we conclude this elucidative effort on the existence, dissemination and subsequent consolidation of the paradigm of the water scarcity-conflict, making it a pre-stated truth, which will be not only questioned but also distorted herein by empirical backgrounds and contradictory evidences.

26

Actually, Mesopotamia is not a peninsula.

CHAPTER 3 CHARACTERISATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST

The regionalisation of the Middle East considered herein includes Egypt, Iran, Turkey and thirteen more countries: Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, and all the countries of the Arabian Peninsula: Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait27. This group of countries accounts for a population of 336,449,529 inhabitants who live in a total area of 7,282,988 kilometres. Although considerably populous, this region is not entirely inhabited, since vast areas are extremely arid such as the inner parts of the Arabian Peninsula or Egypt. Population is concentrated both on the coast and on alluvial plains, though some major agglomerations occur inland where occupancy history is associated with the presence of natural resources, such as in the metropolitan region of either Damascus or Al-Ain (UAE); other hinterland agglomerations originated from either historical-religious factors, such as Mecca and Medina, or from important routes, such as Aleppo (Syria) and Riyadh (Saudi Arabia). The region is commonly the scene of dramatic conflicts which involve the interests of major powers, since in it is concentrated most of the oil reserves currently known worldwide. This fact helps explain why international intervention is stronger in countries such as Iraq (in Libya and Northern Africa), whereas innocuous mediations occur in countries such as Yemen, which is not blessed with such natural resources. Despite some homogenising aspects regarding culture, language, physical aspects and strategic position between Asia, Europe and Africa, the region features strong economic, political and cultural contrasts. For instance, countries bearing some of the highest GDPs per capita in the world (Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait) coexist alongside impoverished countries, which still face many hurdles towards development, e.g., Yemen. In this regional overview, there are countries which endeavour to bind to the West, such as Turkey, which is a persistent candidate to the European Union, and those 27

Other regionalisation will be described in the following section.

Characterisation of the Middle East

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countries who close their borders to non-Islamic foreigners (e.g., Saudi Arabia). There are also countries that, due to historical aspects, have a strong national identity (e.g., Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Turkey) alongside nations which have not been able to either achieve independence as a nation state (e.g., Palestine and Kurdistan) or have experienced external and internal conflicts, such as Iraq and Syria, causing a major migratory flow of refugees. Furthermore, there are regions where tribal traditions remain, as in numerous parts of the Arabian Peninsula, where Bedouin culture is still preserved. Despite all these contrasts, the Middle East is a region which has currently been going through a period of political, economic and social transformation. The countries comprising this region feature, with few exceptions, the absence of Western-based democracy, and, commonly, governments are single-partied and non-laic, coupled with either Islam or any of its branches (Shiite, Sunni, Alawite), not to mention Christian segments in Lebanon (Orthodox and Maronite). Nevertheless, since December 2010, opposition movements have confronted regimes and overthrown dictatorships once considered inexorable (if we include Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen). The so-called Arab Spring encountered difficulties infiltrating high GDP countries, such as Qatar and the UAE, but extensively reached countries in which the population is less favoured and poorly assisted by social health programs, social security and unemployment security, despite the relatively favourable educational levels in for example Syria and Egypt. Pinpointing the consequences of these movements on the exploitation of water resources, sharing of the Euphrates River basin and production, management and water supply in the Persian Gulf would be merely speculative, especially because current internal conflicts are triggered by political and social issues, and are not directly related to water resource management. However, within circumscribed and localised episodes, political and social issues may infringe on water resource management, as occurred in 2011, when the Palestinians residing in Syria crossed the boarders of Golan, or when the rebels of the Islamic State (IS) seized Mosul Dam. In the latter case, the dispute was neither over water nor electricity originating from the dam, but the control over the territory towards the enforcement of Islamic State is what comprised the core issue instead. The analytical contexts chosen for the study provided in this current book are contiguous, yet distinct. The first one is represented by the Euphrates River basin, ranging from the tops of the Anatolian Plateau, Turkey, towards the mouth of Shatt Al-Arab (In English, Arab Beach River) in the Persian Gulf. This river, more commonly mentioned as Waterways (the name we

26

Chapter 3

adopted from now on) is formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in South-eastern Iraq. The second context comprises this mouth, ranging from the whole Gulf towards Oman, but also including the Arabian Peninsula hinterland28.

The Middle East in the vision of some classic authors Sir Laurence Dudley Stamp (1898-1966), a British geographer, defined the region which today is called the Middle East as Arab Asia, delimiting it according to physical and geographical, cultural, functional and historical criteria. On the physical and geographical criteria, Stamp (1959) outlines that: Arab Asia is clearly bounded in the north by mountains of both Asia Minor and the Iranian plateaus –from the Taurus Mountains along its extension towards Kurd scarps, except for the narrow Suez isthmus which separates it from Africa. Arab Asia is embraced by the sea on all its borders: the Mediterranean Sea to the northwest, the Red Sea to the southwest, the Arabian Sea to the southeast, the Persian and Oman Gulfs to the east. (p.106)

We notice the strength of the landscape in the natural references in Stamp’s portrayal the region, particularly those of a structural nature that, due to their rigidity, make the first delimitation more perennial and therefore enable the entry of other elements. By including geographical and cultural aspects, Stamp (1959) blends the first physical delimitation with the Arabic language and ethnicity: “Arab Asia is a convenient term to include that part of Southeast Asia where the Arab race is predominant and the common language is Arabic” (p. 106). The author also considers the role of the region as a delimitation criterion, as shown in the following excerpt: In addition to linguistic homogeneity, there are other characteristics of certain aspects which are convenient when considering the area as a whole. In Arab Asia lie the roads between Asia and Africa. Vast tracts of desert favoured the establishment of routes linking the strict circumscribed area of the “Fertile Crescent” from the Mediterranean to the upstream of the Persian Gulf, enabling countries controlling this area to have strategic importance, out of proportion to their intrinsic values since time immemorial. (p. 106)

28

These two contexts will be described in details in Chapters 4 and 5.

Characterisation of the Middle East

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In this text, Stamp draws attention to the strategic position of the area linking Asia and Africa, particularly between Mesopotamia and the Nile, composing the sub-region named the Fertile Crescent. The author also resumes the physical aspects by relating the development of routes to desert plains. The expression “Fertile Crescent”, borrowed by Stamp, was created by James Henry Breasted (1865-1935), a North American archaeologist and historian, who observed that contiguous fertile areas bathed by the Nile, the Jordan and Orontes (Syria), the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers resembled a crescent moon, as illustrated on Map 3-1. Stamp (1959) also considers some historical aspects on Arab Asia regionalisation when writing: This Fertile Crescent includes within its borders the place of origin and home for some of the most remote civilizations ever recorded in history. The region has also witnessed the rise and fall of three mighty empires: the Assyrian, Sumerian and Babylonian Empires. (p. 107)

Map 3-1 – The Fertile Crescent, defined by Breasted and described by Stamp. Source: Adapted from Breasted, James Henry. Ancient times, a history of the early world: An introduction to the study of ancient history and the career of early man (1916, pp. 100-101).

Chapter 3

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While reading Stamp, we are convinced that this is a complete and wideranging geographical regionalisation which considers various physicalgeographical, social, cultural and historical aspects, granting a strong regional coherence to the area in question. The terms “Arab Asia” and “Fertile Crescent” were also employed by the French geographer Pierre Gourou (1900-1999) in his book L’Asie29. If much of Arab Asia is desert, rains falling on low watersheds are sufficient so that, in normal years, harvesting is feasible without irrigation. This Fertile Crescent favoured relations between Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. (Gourou, 1953, p. 473)

In addition to the Fertile Crescent, another internal regionalisation of Arab Asia is mentioned by Gourou: the Levant (Map 3-2). The term “Levant” regards the Eastern Mediterranean coast, alluding to the side where the sun “rises”. Therefore, this region comprises Gaza, Lebanon, the current Israel, the coast of Syria and part of Turkey’s coast, including Cyprus30. For Gourou (1953), the Levant, which displays the essential characteristics of Arab Asia, is distinguished by its high mountain relief, a typically Mediterranean climate and a historical evolution which have preserved and created unique national entities. (p. 473)

The Western perspective from this regionalisation is indisputable because in order to consider the Levant as a territory to the East, the observer should stand to the West, in the western area. Conversely, the contrary can also occur, and the Levant has its correspondent diametrically opposed. In the vision of Arab peoples, Maghreb31 refers to what is Western, to the West, where the sun “sets”, regarding the most western of the territories conquered by Islam in the seventh century. Currently, the term “Maghreb” alludes specifically to Morocco, although the region comprises also other countries as Western Sahara, Mauritania, Tunisia, Algeria and even Libya. The adjective “Levantine” is derived from the term “Levant”. Levantine 29

This book is one of the volumes of the collection Les cinq parties du monde, published by Hachette, Paris, and written by several authors, among them, Jean Gottman (L’Amérique), Max Derruau (L’Europe), Max Sorre (L’Homme sur la Terre) and Aimé Perpillou (L’Óceans et l’Océanie). 30 Some definitions can still include part of the coastline of Egypt; others, the entire southern coast of Turkey. 31 From Arabic: Ώήϐϟ΍ (algharb), which means “the western” or “the west”.

Characterisation of the Middle East

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landscapes, Levantine peoples, then, refer to both landscapes and inhabitants from the Levant. They are more mountainous landscapes, more humid and, above all, more related to the Mediterranean than the rest of Asia.

Map 3-2 – The region upstream, in the perspective of the Crusades. Source: Adapted from Francis D. An Outline of the Zoogeography of the Levant in Zoologica Scripta (1975, v.4, pp. 5-20).

Referring back to the general regionalisation of the Middle East, the British geographer W.B. Fisher32, in his book The Middle East: A Physical, Social and Regional Geography, interestingly discusses the delimitation of the Middle East. In the introduction, the author emphasises that the very first task of the mapmaker would be to define exactly the term Middle East. Subsequently, he presents some definitions from the division of Asia into Near, Middle and Far East and mentions a number of authors who addressed the issue. Sir P. Loraine, for instance, described the Middle East “[…] as being roughly equivalent to Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and the Arabian Peninsula” (Fisher, 1956, p. 1). E. Jakarta, North American author, defined 32

From the University of Durham (United Kingdom).

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Chapter 3

the Near East as “extending from Afghanistan throughout Crete, including these two countries, but excluding Egypt” (Fisher, 1956, p. 1). He concludes his definition due to lack of consensus and universality on delimiting that region. According to him, it was not until the First World War that the regional definition reached some consensus as it left the academic environment and entered the military field, and the Middle East was defined as the extension from Iran throughout Tripolitania thereafter33. Thus, after being officially sanctioned, the designation Middle East became a standard reference term, widely used for official publications, with no significant objection. The British government, by means of official publication, included up to 21 countries: Malta, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Egypt, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Aden Protectorate, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Somali lands of England, France and Italy and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. (Fisher, 1956, p. 2)

Despite the consensus obtained from the military perspective, Fisher (1956) draws attention to the lack of coherence, stating that “there is insufficient logic in applying the denomination Middle East to countries from the Eastern Mediterranean coast” (p. 2). The author also considers that it would be more appropriate to omit countries South of Egypt, e.g., Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia, and substituting them with Turkey, which would be closely related to the region. On this point, it should be noted that the Northeastern region named the “Horn” of Africa is connected to the Arabian Peninsula by various cultural and physical-geographical aspects. Countries which culturally share both the Arabic language and Islamic religion are: Egypt (official language), Libya and Sudan, as well as other countries mentioned previously where the language is widely spoken. In regards to landscape, all the countries hold in common a desert environment and all the aspects related to it, such as natural water scarcity, specialisation of some crops and livestock which relate to the nomadic lifestyle of the Bedouins. Turkey, in turn, is a contiguous territory to the Middle East and shares particularly the Islamic religion, although both language and mountainous landscape – with abundant springs and countless lakes – are different. Fisher (1956) then continues stating his opinion by supporting the inclusion of countries west of Egypt, since they would represent the natural extension of the desert: “the division could be more accurate between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the 33

The Western portion of modern day Libya, where the city of Tripoli lies.

Characterisation of the Middle East

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latter considered as part of Egypt, and therefore forming the Western Middle East border”. From the Eastern side, there would be no problem in considering Iran, since according to the author’s point of view, despite the relief discontinuities between that country and its Western neighbour (Iraq), it would be economically and culturally closer to its Western neighbours than it would the monsoons of Asia. Thus delimited, Fisher believed to have reached greater coherence in defining the region, in which natural and social aspects in common would be identified. Accordingly, Eurocentric and colonial perspectives on delimiting the Middle East are likely to be noticed. The Eurocentric approach is because the Middle East had the British Empire as a reference, regarding its halfway location towards India. And the colonial approach is because the region was halfway of a broad range of colonies along the Maghreb, from Morocco throughout the archipelagos of Southeast Asia. These facts corroborate the proposition of Edward Said (1990), for those who claim that the East would be an invention of the West. Another piece of evidence that strengthens this assertion is given by the region called the Near East, which comprised regions closer to the empire, such as Anatolia, Syria, Egypt and even Greece. Regionalisations of the Near East and the Middle East which lasted until the dawn of the twentieth century are shown in Map 3-3. In the Atlas historique & géographique by Paul Vidal de La Blache, we observe that the region identified as Western Asia and, despite the slight difference in terms of nomenclature when compared to the previous ones (Arab Asia) is to a great extent in line with them (Map 3-4). La Blanche’s Western Asia covers Afghanistan to the Arabian Peninsula, including Turkey, but obviously excluding African countries. The adequacy of such nomenclature consists of both its objectivity and coherence. If La Blanche preserved the definition of the region as Arabian Asia, it would forcefully exclude non-Arab countries, such as Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey.

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Map 3-3 – Near East and Middle East, according to British meaning in the early twenty century. Source: Adapted from Smith (2008, pp. 8-9). Org.: Venturi (2010).

Map 3-4 – Arab Asia of Paul Vidal de La Blache. Blanchard, Raoul. Asie Occidentale. In La Blache, Paul Vidal (ed.). Géographie Universelle. Paris: Libraire Armand Colin (1929, 8v).

Characterisation of the Middle East

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Other Regionalisations of the Middle East Regionalisation of the Middle East is still a controversial matter, given that it is historically, geographically, culturally and religiously, politically, geopolitically and economically oriented. That fact currently leads to a number of different regionalisations, with each of them reflecting one or more of these aspects at a particular time. We shall further discuss each one of them.

National Geographic Atlas The regionalisation of the Middle East depicted by the National Geographic Atlas is imprecise in accordance with the criteria and the delimitation of the region itself. In the Concise Atlas of the World (2007) there is a text defining the region: “Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula countries comprise the heart of the Middle East region” (National Geographic, 2008, p. 90). This definition corresponds to Map 3-5 (darker area). We observe that such regionalisation covers three continents (Asia, Africa and Europe, including Eastern Turkey and Cyprus, divided by Turkey and Greece); it encompasses non-Arab countries (Iran, Turkey, Israel) and excludes some Arab countries (the entire Northern Africa and Sudan, except for Egypt); it includes non-Muslim (Israel) or partly-Muslim (half of Turkish Cyprus) countries. Through this map (dark-shaded area), we have concluded that the criterion used might have exclusively been not only due to the geographical location of the countries but also its outweighing cultural, religious and geopolitical principles. It is also unclear what lies beyond the “Heart of the Middle East” and under what conditions new countries are included.

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Map 3-5 – Two regionalisations of the Middle East. Source: Adapted from Smith (2008, p.10). Org.: Venturi (2010).

The State of the Middle East: An Atlas of Conflict and Resolution by Dan Smith In this regionalisation, we observed that Israel and Iran were included (Map 3-6). Although Iran is not an Arab-culture country, it is still closely connected to the Arab world due to Islam, whose practise must be exercised in the Arabic language, not to mention the alphabet itself, which is common to both languages (Farsi and Arabic). Israel, in turn, shares neither the religion nor the language34. We are led then to believe that the criterion of simple geographical location was particularly used in this regionalisation. However, through this criterion, there would be no point in excluding Turkey, which, besides being geographically adjacent, also professes Islam as the predominant religion. The author argues that the best way to consider Turkey is as a “meeting point of Europe and the Middle East, not fully a part of either” (Smith, 2008, p. 11).

34 Although a number of cultural and religious similarities can be identified, because Judaism, Christianity and Islam share common origins: they are called Monotheistic Abrahamic religions. The Quran, for instance, incorporates teachings of The Torah and The Bible.

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Map 3-6 – Regionalisation of the Middle East according to The State of the Middle East: An Atlas of Conflict and Resolution (Adapted from Smith, 2008, p. 10) Org.: Venturi (2010).

Nevertheless, if the criterion is geographical and not necessarily cultural, how can one include the whole of Northern Africa, which, although there are cultural bonds (Islam and the Arabic language), is located on another continent? What if the criteria are both geographical and cultural to a certain extent, how come one can exclude Sudan, as an Arab, Islamic, and geographically adjacent country? Should or would the ethnical factor still be taken into account? We have concluded that there are no precise scientific criteria for this regionalisation. The inclusion and exclusion of countries do not comply with regular criteria. Such delimitation is made on the basis of either cultural factors or its mere geographical position, even though there are no cultural affinities. We are likely to assume that this regionalisation is based on – and biased due to – a Western perspective, tending to homogenise nations which may seem different from them.

United Nations Organisation The regionalisation of the Middle East according to the UNO seems to be the least meticulous. It includes both Arab (Libya) and non-Arab countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, and Ethiopia among others); it excludes the rest of Northern Africa, and includes non-Islamic and non-Arab countries (Israel). Ultimately, through the map entitled the Middle East, edited by UNO (Map 3-7), a predominant criterion or any coherence cannot be

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identified, thus signalling an arbitrary logic. The region ends where the chart size ends, without even taking the geographical coordinates into account.

The Middle East through the vision of the Arab world Maps from the Geo-project produced in Arab countries do not consider the existence of Israel and show Palestine before its occupation, which depict strong geopolitical and ideological criteria. Such an example is portrayed on the Middle East (original scale 1:4,000,000 from 2003) and the Arab World (scale 1:10,000,000) maps, the former including Iran and Turkey, and the latter excluding these countries (Maps 3-8 and 3-9). Criteria may also seem unclear through this source because in the full version of the map, we would find various countries from the former Soviet bloc included, e.g., Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (perhaps due to either geographical or religious proximity), as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the African side, as Arab countries from the Northern continent (all of them West of Egypt) are excluded, countries such as Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti are included. In the case of the Arab World maps, produced in the Arab World itself, Sudan is included and Turkey and Iran are excluded, perhaps due to issues related to the official language. The confirmation of a predominant Arab vision on the Middle East would still depend on research of other official sources from those countries.

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Map 3-7 – The Middle East in accordance with UNO. Source: .Access on: Apr. 10, 2010.

Map 3-8 – Fragment of the Middle East Map. Beirut: Geo-projects, 2003. Original scale: 1:4,000,000; Approximated scale: 1:10,500,000. Org.: Venturi (2010)

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Map 3-9 – Fragment of the Arab World map. Beirut: Geo-projects. Original scale: 1:10,000,000; Approximate scale: 1:17,000,000. Org.: Venturi (2010).

Regionalisation of the Arabian Peninsula and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) The aspect that most draws attention to certain regionalisations of the Arabian Peninsula and, particularly in the United Arab Emirates is the somewhat indefinite nature of its borders, represented by dashed lines on some maps and, on others, by their absence. Perhaps this characteristic arises from the fact that there are areas which depict large “empties”, such as Rub’Al-Khali (“Empty Quarter”, in Saudi Arabia, Map 3-10), covered by swept sand and dunes at the whim of the wind. The absence (or mobility) of either natural or human references and the absence of territorial disputes

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are factors which may help elucidate such “fluid borders” (Maps 3-10 and 3-11). However, it is necessary to take into account the fact that borders are alive, i.e., dynamic, historical. Therefore, they can assume other characteristics in the face of recent political events in the Middle East. At the Arabian Peninsula, an occasional growing pressure on the Yemenis crossing towards Saudi Arabia and Oman will certainly reframe these borders. But the apparent fluidity that still characterises such frontiers constitutes a paradox in a region that is often the object of both dispute and conflict, such as the case of those solidly materialised borders, as well as the wall isolating the West Bank, which could be defined as a “solid border”, in clear opposition to the fluid ones (Map 3-12 and Figure 3-1). Nevertheless, this paradox is not a prerogative of the Middle East. Geopolitics teaches us that, in all places, conflict regions tend to present a more controlled border, whereas regions with neither conflict nor demographic pressure would be less controlled. The most prominent feature is the different regionalisations of the Middle East, established by diverse criteria, and expressing divergent world views.

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Maps 3-10 and 3-11 – Fluid borders in the Arabian Peninsula; Dashed lines are observed in the first picture, between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia and between the latter and Yemen, to the South. In Map 11, border fragments are observed between Yemen and Oman, or an absence of lines between the countries is apparent. Sources: The Middle East. Beirut: Geo-projects, 2003. Original scale: 1:4,000,000; approximated scale after reduction: 1:24,300,000. Arab World. Beirut: Geo-projects (n/d). Original scale: 1:10,000,000; approximated scale after reduction: 1:29,000,000. Org.: Venturi (2010).

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Map 3-12 – Solid and materialised borders. Fragments of Central Asia map – The Middle East. EUA: Jimapco, 2001. Original scale: 1: 10,000,000 (as a reference, the distance between Beirut and Damascus is around 100 kilometers); approximated scale: 1:14,800,000.

Figure 3-1 – Concrete wall isolating the West Bank. Source: Ristislav Glinski |Shutterstock.com.

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Some examples of water appropriation and use of water resources in the Middle East The history of occupation in the Middle East is lost in time. An exhibition organised by the National Museum of Syria (January, 2011) revealed traces of human occupation settled on an oasis in the desert of Syria, dating back to 1.3 million years, where today lies the city of Palmyra35 (Figure 3-2).

Figure 3-2 – Panoramic photograph of oasis and remains of the city of Tudmor (Palmyra). Source: Longtaildog | Shutterstock.com.

As well as Palmyra, history of occupation is intertwined with history of appropriation, use and control of water resources, either for storage, distribution and irrigation or flood containment (Lower Mesopotamia). The Euphrates River itself has suffered, particularly on its lower course, countless interventions throughout history (construction of canals, dikes, deviations and flood escapes) that the task to characterise the original condition of its river basins is arduous. Albright (apud White, 1961, p. 98) states that during the Chalcolithic period (4,000 B.C.E. through 3,000 B.C.E.), canals and dikes were built for the purpose of crop irrigation such as wheat and barley. The author calls this period one of “irrigation culture”.

35

Or Tudmor, city situated in Central Syria.

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This is supported by White (1961) himself when pointing out that irrigation had been practised for approximately six thousand years (p. 106). The advent of Islam in the sixth century and its further expansion had the systematisation of the Arabic language as one of its consequences. As a result, much of the knowledge accumulated since then can be organised and published. One of these publications is the book entitled Book of Agriculture, by Al-Alwan (1864). In this two-volume work, organised in 34 chapters36, the author compiles considerable knowledge available so far, particularly of the Nabataeans and Byzantines, focusing on types of soil, fertilisation, types of water, detection techniques for water, shaft and irrigation sinking, cropping, livestock, preparation and preservation of food and beverages among other subjects thoroughly described. That work, written in the late twelfth century was, during the following centuries, the most complete reference for agricultural studies, where the author repeatedly quotes his predecessors. It would be presumptuous our attempting to write about this age-old history on water appropriation even briefly; thus, we chose to present some examples situated in space and time which illustrate human capacity for adaptability, creation and overcoming adversities imposed by natural conditions.

Underground canals The kanats (either karez or feledj) are underground canals which connect shafts and deliver water over long distances under gravity, reducing water loss from evaporation. Such a technique is used throughout the region, from Persia to the Arabian Peninsula, coursing across Northern Africa (where it is called fughara), as well as China, which also holds extensive systems of kanats. Their age, along with other irrigation systems, still remains unclear, according to White (1961, p. 94)37. In Persia, the oldest kanats date back to 3,000 B.C.E.; in the current United Arab Emirates, kanats from 1,000 B.C.E. were found in Al-Ain (central region, settled on an oasis) and even older ones in the Emirate of Sharjah. In mountainous regions that receive

36 The first volume, containing approximately 650 pages (translated version) covers the first sixteen chapters, and the second, the remaining chapters. 37 White (1961) quotes Cressey, who dates the Persian kanats as originating back to more than 2,000 years ago” (p. 98).

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greater humidity from the sea, as in Oman, they are also superficial, maintaining their function of harvesting and delivering water (Figure 3-3).

Figure 3-3 – Ancient feledj (renewed) in thee steeps of Jabel el-Akhdar, Oman. Source: Fonte: Ministry of Information of Oman (2009, p.220).

Wells The origin of the city of Beirut – its emergence date is controversial, ranging from 7,000 to 9,000 years old – would correspond to a hilly coastal site where there were wells (from Arabic bír) and concurrently protecting vessels against marine currents and winds from the South, since the hill lies on the northern part of a high promontory. This original site corresponds to the current Beirut city centre, more specifically between Martys Square and the harbour. In accordance with Kassir (2008, p. 50), the toponym beirút would thus be derived from the plural of bír. Wells perhaps are the most ancient form of both collection and storage of water, since they are widely found in the Middle East and may be dated from distinct periods.

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In the Book of Agriculture, Al-Awan (1864’s translation), in Chapter 3, describes how to prospect water in order to dig wells by using landscape indicators (soil, relief and vegetation), as well as techniques to confirm or show the lack of groundwater occurrence. The author describes the ideal format and dimensions of wells in accordance with environmental conditions, teaching maintenance and recovery techniques – in the face of drying conditions – so as to increase the volume of water from the wells, detect contamination and purify their contents. The book also teaches how to modify the topography surrounding the well in order to channel the course of water for watering and irrigation, not to mention techniques on water collection via norias, buckets and ropes, demonstrating aspects on their installation, dimensions and maintenance thoroughly. The knowledge accumulated and transmitted over the centuries highlights the importance of wells on human settlements in arid regions, which are often crucial for both the viability of the occupation and the use of territory.

Norias The famous norias (Figure 3-4) or waterwheels in the city of Hama, Syria, date back to the eighth century and many of them are still found alongside the Valley of the Orontes River, which crosses the city. White (1961) wrote that “in 1230, Kasar Ibn Abi-Al-Kasin built irrigation works with huge waterwheels on the Orontes River, Syria” (p. 98). Blanchard (1929) also describes the norias of Hama, whose role was to withdraw water from the river for the irrigation of Orontes river flood plains: “In Hama, in order to ensure the flood plain irrigation, three gigantic 25 metre-wide interlinked wheels –the pride of the city –were assembled through necessity” (p. 208). Other norias are still sighted along the Euphrates River and in other sites of the region. Currently, water is drained from rivers through either electric or petrol-powered pumps, and the technology of norias has faded away over time and space, but has endured as witness. Blanchard (1929), when describing Yemen, mentions that, due to climatic conditions, “irrigation imposes itself by means of norias” (p. 175). The author describes wells and underground channels and states that: “there is cultivated with the aid of wells and underground channels similar to those of Persia, watering thicker lines of oases […]”. On Omani underground canals, he says that “[…] at the foothills, a sequence of oases irrigated by underground canals is aligned along the desert […]” (p. 178).

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Figure 3-4 – The giant norias of Hama. Source: Martchan |Shutterstock.com.

Impoundments and reservoirs Throughout the Middle East, we are faced with a number of impoundments from different dimensions, at times, only with some indication of them. A simple journey between Damascus and Homs already reveals a Roman impoundment: the current lake named Lakina, whose original dam was reconstructed to increase the potential of the reservoir. However, there are much more ancient impoundments, and perhaps the most known and emblematic of them lies on the ancient kingdom of Sheba, currently Yemen. The city of Marib, 160 kilometres from the present capital Sanaa38, was the capital of the kingdom of Sheba (seventh century B.C.E. to sixth A.D.) and enjoyed a long period of prosperity, due in large part to the facilities of supply and irrigation, favoured by the construction of a large dam. The sixteen-metre-high and 620-metre-wide construction fostered a reservoir which was able to irrigate vast plains to the right and left of the dam for centuries. Therefore, the current Yemen became known as “Felix Arabia”,

38 In accordance with the calculation made by this author on the cartographic base Yemen, World Map (scale 1:1.500.000). Austria: GeoCenter (n/d).

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given the prosperity of the region39. This designation would have been coined by the Greek geographer Ptolemy when calling Yemen Eudemon Arabia (or Arabia Felix, in Latin). But the dam, which was built in 700 B.C.E., thus, at the beginning of the reign, collapsed after 870 years (570 A.D.), probably due to the lack of appropriate maintenance. The collapse of the dam marked the end of a prosperous period, triggering massive migratory movements. This famous episode is mentioned in the Holy Quran and is interpreted as a divine punishment by the supposed arrogance of that people, who no longer conferred their power to God, but to their own virtues instead. Every inhabitant of Sheba bore a signal in their city: two gardens, one to the right and the other to the left. We said to them: “Eat from the provisions of Allah and give thanks to Him. Beautiful is the land of yours and indulgent is Allah”. But they have no concern. And we poured the water from the dam upon them […].40

Other impoundments associated with the irrigation systems are mentioned by White in the North-western Arabian Peninsula. The Nabataeans, who inhabited the region of Negev (North-western Arabian Peninsula, covering southern Jordan, whose capital was the current city of Petra) since at least the sixth century B.C.E., dominated some water control mechanisms. White (1961), in reference to this people, recorded that The ancient inhabitants of Negev retained a form of agriculture relatively stable controlling rainwater outflow for irrigation of their fields. […] such water control was obtained from the construction of elaborated systems of dams and terracing. (p. 78)

The city of Jerusalem also presents some emblematic examples of water use, as illustrated by Blanchard (1929): “in Jerusalem, Mary’s spring, carefully collected from the flank of the Cedron valley, waters Siloam reservoir, from which a tunnel that has long been working for eight hundred years, delivers water to the city” (p. 192). The Roman period (64 B.C.E. - 330 A.D.) was undoubtedly the one which brought the most infrastructure on water management to the region, thereby 39

Available at: . Accessed on: Jul. 23, 2011. 40 Surah 34 (Saba, in: The Quran. Transl. Mansour Challita. Rio de Janeiro: ACIGI – Associação Cultural International Gibran, 2002).

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increasing cultivated areas. There are a number of construction works that can still be seen in the Middle East landscape. In Syria, there are cisterns, underground reservoirs and impoundments, similar to those of Basra, in the South of the country (Figure 3-5). A reservoir supplied the Roman amphitheatre of Basra, the largest of its kind still existing, and lodged ablutions and baths for pilgrims heading for Mecca.

Figure 3-5 – Roman reservoir of Basra, Syria. Source: Vyacheslav Yakovenko, 2005.

Cisterns Cisterns found in the Middle East depict an improvement compared with the Indian ponds. The latter are shallow and longer, and surface evaporation and infiltration were greater. Whereas in cisterns, these losses diminished, making water storage more efficient. According to Max Sorre (1950), cisterns […] permitted maintenance of vast flourishing oases in Arabia, Sinai, Transjordan, Palmyra, at a time where these regions participated in a general dynamics of life which stimulated their agriculture. (p. 717)

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Many of these cisterns, however, deteriorated over time, were filled with sediments, dried, fractured, and lost their function. In the colonial period (nineteenth and twentieth centuries), when the region was submitted to the European metropolises, the English put considerable effort into recovering all the infrastructures related to both collection and utilisation of water.

Interventions in the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers We are always disconcerted with the habits of this prodigiously mobile element, water –this component which we have to tame, better still, we must make it cooperate with us. (Sorre, 1950, p. 702)

Sir William Willcocks was an English engineer who worked on a number of projects not only in the former British colonies of Asia, particularly in India, but in the Middle East as well. His task was to make the drainage systems, storage and irrigation – often already destroyed, but efficient – more efficient, so that the region could undertake commercial crops which would meet the demand of the British metropolis (cotton for the fabric sector, sugar cane, etc.). Low Mesopotamia, once from a flourishing economy, presented a context of economic decline that needed to be corrected. In accordance with Sorre (1950), Even if catastrophes do not occur, the abandonment of drainage works and the obstruction of canals may ruin regions which have been prosperous for millennia. As is the case of this Mesopotamia, reduced to swamps and steppes, after having been a barn of abundance. (p. 706)

This context illustrates the Roman idea that nature can be dominated by force, but it always returns, reiterated by Sorre (1950) himself, when claiming that “[…] water, present worldwide, is always ready to reclaim its power and extend it” (p. 706). Some historical factors have indeed contributed to the infrastructural irrigation decay of Iraq. Gourou (1953) wrote that “hydraulic works, still well preserved […], were damaged by the Mongols in 1258” (p. 484). On this same episode, White (1961) stated that “the Mongol invasion in 1258 gave the coup de grace to Syrian society” (p. 98). However, external threats were not the only reasons that contributed to the decay of the irrigation system. Periods of political weakening or disorganisation, times of greater soil salinisation, flooding and dam collapse, in addition to wars represent both social and natural factors which impacted agriculture, and, therefore, all infrastructures related to it, impacting directly and negatively on socioeconomic development.

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In the Euphrates River basin, Sir Willcocks was in charge of the construction of the Hindiya Barrage, in Iraqi territory, between 1911 and 1914. This 250-long barrage enabled the irrigation of approximately 14,200 km² (Money, 1917). The facility had the role of, at the same time, controlling the outflow of the Euphrates River by avoiding floods downstream, and enabling irrigation upstream. This type of intervention exemplifies Sorre’s (1950) statement, to whom “water techniques have two different aspects: fighting against water to conquer the soil and water utilization to fertilise it” (p. 700). Stamp (1959) also describes another of Sir Willcock’s outstanding works, the Habbaniya Escape, “designed to carry flood water from the Euphrates River to a wide natural hollow, and thus avoid annual flooding of the rich soils in districts such as Bagdad, Hill and Babylon” (p. 144). The Habbaniya Escape was therefore comprised by an escape canal for floodwater outflow towards hollow areas, so as to avoid inundations41. Blanchard (1929) also appreciatively described Willcocks’s works by listing some of them (certain works were still projects at the time) aiming at either both contention and deviation or at storage and irrigation. The first work will be to protect the country against floods and sediment loads in water, able to pollute the whole network. […] The results of these works would certainly be marvellous. Irrigation would provide 2,500,000 hectares of winter crops and 1,250,000 hectares of summer crops. (p. 226)

However, at the time when Raoul Blanchard (1929) was writing the volume Asie Occidental for the work coordinated by Paul Vidal de La Blanche, Géographie Universelle the situation in Low Mesopotamia was devastating. The present is less bright. […] Babylon was sacrificed, submitted to a rudimentary exploitation; there is not even one twentieth of cropped land. The country is almost exactly in the same conditions from which the Chaldeans had taken it. (p. 227)

Restorations not only occurred at the time of Sir Willcocks, but in different moments of history as well. White (1961) wrote:

41

It is interesting to emphasise that this technique is widely utilised in urban contemporary environments, following the example of “piscinões” (large pools) in the city of São Paulo.

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The reorganization of the administration and the resettlement of rural areas occurred during the Omayad and the early Abbasid periods (650 A.D. - 950 A.D.). Khaled Ibn Abdulla al Qasri was the vigorous governor of Hishan (724 A.D. - 743 A.D.) who restored dams and rebuilt irrigation systems. (p. 108)

In the Cold War period, Syria, as an ally of the Soviet axis, received investments from the former Soviet Union during the 60s and 70s for the development of irrigation infrastructure and also the construction of the biggest dam in the country, Al-Assad, which will be further addressed later in this book. Ancient and new practices for water resource exploitation coexist in the Middle East. Wells, cisterns, irrigation canals, new and ancient dams, which best represent water harvesting history and water utilization in the region, share space with new dams, gigantic desalination plants, electric water pumping widely arranged along the main river channels, new forms of mechanised irrigation, and underground porous hoses, among others. It is the “gradual adaptation of new contributions to very ancient usage” (Sorre, 1950, p. 726). Some remaining works which were described are now merely objects of historical and archaeological interest. Others, however, such as wells and irrigation canals, retain their functions, withstanding in space throughout time. The modern means of appropriation and utilisation of water resources, e.g., impoundments, desalination plants, and irrigation mechanisms, will be discussed later, on the regional characterisation of the Euphrates River Basin and the Persian Gulf.

CHAPTER 4 THE EUPHRATES RIVER BASIN

General characterisation The Euphrates River is usually mentioned together with the Tigris River to designate the region known as Mesopotamia (between the rivers), which has significant importance for the history of civilisation. This region is also locally referred as Al-Jazira (the island), by the fact that the river springs almost connect to each other, which would form an island if they were conected. Downstream of the rivers lie wetlands and complex connections (natural and man-made) which hinder both river basins from having an accurate delimitation. The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers drain a vast depression embedded between the Iranian Zagros Mountains, to the east, and the sedimentary plains from the Syrian Desert and Northern Arabian Peninsula (Nedjed), to the west, bordered in the North by the Taurus Mountains, Turkey. Blanchard (1929) defines the region as the heart of West Asia, due to its strategic position between the East and West, ease of movement and, especially, the presence of the rivers themselves which enabled agricultural development and the establishment of a number of civilisations. On the border of two large structural areas […] extend vast depressions […]; the presence of impressive water courses […] fertile and irrigable soil along deserts, favourable movement areas […]. Mesopotamia therefore lies at the heart of Western Asia, the place chosen by capitals where monarchs who grouped these regions under their domination have settled. (p. 216)

As long as the Euphrates River is the main focus of this book, due emphasis should be placed on its river basin. While the Euphrates is a trans-boundary river, since it crosses Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi territories, the Tigris is both a trans-boundary (crossing Turkey and Iraq) and a boundary river on a small stretch bordering Syria and Turkey. We analysed the Euphrates stretch in Syrian territory, since its geographical situation is doubly important, because, not only does it receive water from Turkish territory but also

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delivers the flow to the Iraqi domain. This fact grants to Syria a mediating role since it is in dialogue with both upstream and downstream countries. The Euphrates River Basin is fully located in the Middle East42 (Map 4-1), between coordinates 300 and 400 North latitude and 370 and 490 East longitude. It covers a total area of 440 thousand km², of which 28% lies in Turkish (123,200 km²), 22% in Syrian (96,800 km²) and 47% in Iraqi (206,800 km²) territories. Even though other countries do not present perennial river courses connected to the Euphrates River system, they are geomorphologically covered by the river basin, such as Saudi Arabia (2.97%) and Jordan (0.03%)43. The river basin houses a total population of approximately 23 million inhabitants, 31% of whom live in Turkey (7.5 million), 25% in Syria (5.69 million) and 44% in Iraq (10.2 million) (UnEscwa, 2013, p. 56). But currently this number must be lesser, given the enormous contingent of refugees who have emigrated from some countries, particularly from Syria. The Euphrates River is born in the Anatolian highlands, North-eastern Turkey, where it receives the contribution of a number of tributaries, in addition to seasonal snowmelt (nival regime). After flowing approximately for 434 kilometres44, it enters Syrian territory from the north, crossing the country in a north-southeast direction, when it gains input from three tributaries. Having flowed approximately 610 kilometres within Syrian territory45, the Euphrates River enters Iraq after the Syrian city of AlBukamal, in an altitude nearly 165 metres above sea level (Un-Escwa, 2013, 42 In case it is considered a regional division which includes Turkey in the Middle East, such as that one of the Middle East Atlas, from National Geographic (Smith, 2008, p. 10). 43 Source: Un-Escwa (2013, p. 49). Although this source does not include Kuwait, we identified, by geomorphologic cartographic analysis that this country is covered approximately less than 0.5% by the basin,which would be discounted from the measurement of the basin in Iraqi territory. 44 Considering only after the confluence between the Rivers Murat and Karasu, also known as Western and Eastern Euphrates, respectively. Calculations: Pablo Napomuceno (2011). Un-Escwa (2013, p. 55) indicates 455 kilometres in extension of the Euphrates River in Turkish territory. 45 This measurement is very variable, according to the year and source. In official sources, such as the Statistical Abstracts (1970-2011), the length of the Euphrates River in Syrian territory ranged from 675 kilometres, in 1970, to 602 kilometres in 1975, 600 kilometres in 1980, 680 kilometres from 1994, reaching up to 610 kilometres in 2009. In Un-Escwa (2003, p.55), the total measurement of the Syrian river stretch is 661 kilometres and the Shat El-Arab is 192 kilometres.

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p. 55). In Iraq, the Euphrates River no longer receives any important tributaries, i.e., its course depends exclusively on the water flowing from upstream and also from a low rate of annual precipitation, as will be shown in more details later. The entire course of the river, from its springs to the confluence with the Tigris River is approximately 2,780 kilometres46, becoming the largest river course of Western Asia. From the confluence of the Euphrates with the Tigris River the Shaft Al-Arab River is formed, which runs about 192 kilometres until it ultimately flows into the Persian Gulf. Prior to this, however, it gains two tributaries on the left bank arising from Iran: the Karkheh and Karun Rivers.

Map 4-1 – Reproduction of the map of the Euphrates River. Source: Un-Escwa –BGR Beirut (2013, p.50-1).

The climatic characteristics of the river basin clearly suggest a tendency towards aridity from the upstream through to the downstream. On the upper course, average annual precipitation can be up to 1,000 millimetres, whereas on the middle course, rainfall indexes are around 250 millimetres, and

46 Considering its major source, the Murat River, the total course of the river would be 2,727 kilometres.

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finally, on the lower course, in Iraqi territory, they are lower than 100 millimetres, as shown in Map 4-2.

Map 4-2 – Annual precipitation averages in the Euphrates River basin. Source: Un-Escwa – BGR Beirut (2013).

Graph 4-1 – Climate graphs of Erzinkan (Turkey), Deir Ez-Zor (Syria) and Basrah (Iraq) illustrating the gradual increase of aridity and drop in precipitation. Source: Un-Escwa (2013, p.56).

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Climate graphs of Turkey, Syria and Iraq support these climatic characteristics of the Euphrates River basin (Graph 4-1). At the Turkish weather station of Ericazan, temperature and precipitation measurements indicate a Mediterranean mountainous climate, with hot and dry summers (June through September) and cold and humid winters. In these mountainous areas, precipitation extends from autumn to spring, going through winter (December to March), when rainfalls and blizzards occur. The influence of Mediterranean climate zones decreases at the downstream of the basin and, in Syrian territory, there are already signs of a transition towards a desert climate which is going to depict the Iraqi river basin portion, when rainfalls become rarer and temperatures can reach up to 50°C. This climatic dynamic internally repeats within Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi territories. Decreased precipitation, increased temperatures and the resulting high evaporation rate –as we will further discuss in detail with relation to the middle course of the river (in Syria) –indicate a natural tendency towards the reduction of flow rate.

The Turkish context The Euphrates River is formed in Turkey after the confluence of the Karasu (known as the West Euphrates) and Murat (East Euphrates, which is born in Lake Van) Rivers, both of which are on the eastern portion of Anatolian plateau, at altitudes higher than three thousand metres above sea level. The Karasu and Murat Rivers converge to form the Euphrates near the city of Keban, where a dam already exists. The region named Anatolia (Map 4-3), or Asia Minor, corresponds to the Asian part of Turkey, extending to the East. The mountainous relief reflects a recent, actively tectonic (subject to seismicity) and structurally complex fold growth, bounded on the South by the Taurus Mountains. Until reaching the Syrian territory, the Euphrates River crosses a mountainous relief, with decreasing altitudes, which confers it a high fluvial gradient47, entering Syrian territory already at an average altitude of up to 500 metres. Within Turkish territory, the Euphrates receives several perennial tributaries, besides presenting a hybrid regime (pluvial and nival), given the seasonal contribution received by snowmelt which covers

47

Fluvial gradient refers to the decline of altitude for each kilometre of river.

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Anatolian hills for over one hundred days per year, beginning to melt in spring, between April and June.

Map 4-3 – Clipping of Western Anatolia, where the Tigris and Euphrates are born. Physical aspects of Anatolia and Mesopotamia. Source: Adapted from National Geographic, 2008, p.92.

The climate in Eastern Anatolia is characterised by an average low temperature (around 9.7°C and between 17°C and 23°C in the hottest month48) and average annual precipitation of 570 mm per year, therefore

48

Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015.

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above the Turkish average of 400 mm per year (slightly varied data according to the source), being able to reach 1,000 millimetres. Such landscape features, particularly the morphological, hydrographic and climatic aspects ensure the Euphrates River flow in its upper course, guaranteeing not only its perennial nature but also its permanent recharge. The mountainous relief, in turn, favours both the snowdrift on hill tops and the impoundment of its waters for energy production and irrigation. Most of the 26 Turkish river basins have their springs within Turkish territory. The country also has more than 120 natural and 570 artificial lakes, in addition to a number of humid areas. Such hydrographic and climatic aspects guarantee a supply in the order of 3,165 m³/in./year (Smith, 2008, p. 132) for a total population of more then 83 million inhabitants49. However, as a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and having a growing dynamic economy, the demand for water resources has increased significantly in Turkey, especially for irrigation projects and energy production. The Turkish GDP is US$ 614.6 billion, in which agriculture contributes a mere 10%. Nevertheless, this activity consumes more than 70% of all available water, which is in line with the world average. In 2006, 208 impoundments were built, rising their total number to 579, a large number of which enable irrigation and expansion of cropped lands. Currently, more than two hundred impoundments are under construction in Turkey, as part of the Gran Anatolian Project50 (GAP). The Ataturk dam, in the Euphrates River, is one of the ten largest dams in the world, with water mirrors of 817 km² and water storage capacity of 48.7 km³. Its filling was completed in 1992 and stirred controversy among the countries covered by the river basin, a fact that will be returned to later.

The Syrian context Syria can be divided into four main geographic areas: a narrow coastal plain to the northwest; a mountainous system running in a north-south direction, parallel to the coast; a lowered and steppe-covered north-east sedimentary plateau; and desert plains in the central-southern and eastern regions of the country. The Euphrates River travels through Syrian territory from north to east, crossing therefore the sedimentary plateau. In the northern part (Map 4-4 and Figures 4-1 and 4-2), the plateau displays increased humidity and

49 50

Available at: . Accessed on: Sep.13, 2019. Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015.

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crops. The closer we get to Iraq, the more crops are narrowed to the river fluvial plain.

Map 4-4 – Map of Syria with highlight on the sedimentary lowered plateau covered by steppes, where the Euphrates River flows. Source: Adapted from Accessed on: Aug. 23, 2011. Org.: Venturi (2010).

Figures 4-1 and 4.2 – (a) Northern Syria, with higher humidity. Photograph from the author, March, 2011; (b) Plateau-plains have contact with the Euphrates; crops on alluvial plains. Photograph from the author, Feb., 2011.

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The Euphrates River course in Syrian territory is of approximately 610 kilometres (Statistical Abstracts, 1970-2011) and is envisaged as a consequent river, in accordance with the classification proposed by Horton (1945, apud Guerra; Cunha, 2011, p. 224)51, since it tracks the dive of sedimentary layers, surpassing altitudes around 500 metres, on the border with Turkey, gradually decreasing until reaching nearly 165 metres on the border with Iraq. These characteristics of relief grant the river a weak fluvial gradient of approximately 47 cm/km. Even so, the narrowing of the river into a sedimentary terrain gives rise to valleys that, in various circumstances, are favourable to impoundments, such as occur along AlAssad Dam. When crossing Syria, the river receives only three perennial tributaries: the Balikh and Khabur Rivers, with average annual flows of 6.7m³/s and 9.3 m³/s, respectively52, both on the left margin, and the Sajur River, with 4.1 m³/s, which is born in Turkey and drains into the Euphrates River on the right margin, in Northern Syria. These sub-basins are, to a lesser or greater extent, shared by two countries, particularly the Sajur and Khabur Rivers, whose springs are born in Turkish territory. At the Syrian path, the Euphrates River formed a two to twelve-metre-wide lengthened and little entailed valley, and fluvial plains reach, on average, 250 metres wide from each margin (Figure 8). The drainage pattern of the river varies according to some constraints: on larger riverbed stretches, which are wider, the river assumes a meandering pattern, according to Bigarella et al. (apud Guerra; Cunha, 2001, p.216). In several stretches, the river is noted to divide into two or more canals, forming various fluvial islands typically covered by dense vegetation. In certain sites, the valley narrows considerably due to the occurrence of magmatic interference, as shown in the central part of Figure 4.3.

51

R. E. Horton, “Erosion development of streams and their drainage basins: Hydrophysical approach to quantitative morphology”. Geological Society American Bulletin, 1945, no. 51, pp. 2,246-59. 52 Flow rate data of 2006. Source: Statistical Abstracts, (1970-2011). Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015.

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magmatic intrusions

fluvial islands meandering pattern

Figure 4-3 – Image of a stretch of the Euphrates River’s middle course (Syria), between the Al-Assad Dam and the city of Deir Ez-Zor. Source: USGS/Nasa. Shades in beige represent desert steppes, dark green represents the vegetation and grayish-blue, the river waters.

The vegetation, in this stretch, is clearly restricted to fluvial plains with a predominance of crops and natural vegetation. Beyond these plains, the vegetal coverage is limited to sparse steppes, becoming scarcer downstream due to the gradual increase of aridity. In addition to agriculture, gravel and lumber are held at fluvial plains, not to mention fishing as well. These practices occur without thorough control, even though the Euphrates plains have been considered an area of relevant ecologic interest for avifauna. The climatic characteristics of Syrian Desert steppes through which the Euphrates flow are consistent with the regional dynamics of the basin. The same alterations which gradually occur from upstream to downstream in the whole basin, e.g., decreased precipitation and air humidity, increased temperature and evaporation, also occur in the Syrian part. In accordance with the Climatic Atlas of Syria (1977), the annual average precipitation of 250 millimetres in the area where the Euphrates River crosses the borders of Syria and Turkey decreases gradually downstream until it reaches a mere 50 mm/year in its journey from Syria to Iraq, which has a typical continental desert climate. Similarly, relative air humidity (annual average) decreases

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in this same stretch from 70% to 40%. Conversely, evaporation potential increases 330 millimetres on the border with Iraq.

Map 4-5 – Annual average precipitation in Syria. Adapted from Mohamad Amin Al-Hariri (2009, p. 48).

The combination of such climatologic and hydrographical aspects (reduction until absence of perennial tributaries), enables a broader comprehension of the landscape which becomes gradually more arid downstream, fact that must be considered as an explanation of an occasional river flow decline. To complete the analysis, however, some due consideration should be made on the appropriation and the exploitation of the Euphrates as a water resource. The Al-Assad Dam (Figures 4-4 and 4-5), the largest in the country, covering 63 thousand/ha, inaugurated in 1978, enabled the expansion of irrigated crops in the Euphrates basin, particularly wheat, cotton, rice, tobacco and

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olive crops. A number of these crops are grown in humid areas of fluvial plains, drained for such an end.

Figures 4-4 and 4-5 – Al-Assad Dam. Source: USGS/Nasa and photograph of Grabielle Mazzali.

In relation to water supply, the 20,911,713 inhabitants who were sheltered by Syria in 2009 –therefore, before the conflicts initiated in 201153– disposed an average of 1,000 to 2,000 m³/in./year (Smith, 2008, p.132). Among the urban population (approximately 53% of the total population), 53 In accordance with the Statistical Abstracts (1970-2011). Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015.

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95% had access to drinking water, whereas 80% of the rural population relied on this service. About 96% of urban households were networked to a sewage system, against only 46% of households in rural areas. Household use consumed around 9% of the total drinking water available. As in Turkey, agriculture was the sector which consumed most of the available water (approximately 70%), although a significant part of irrigation was made with reused water, instead of drinking water. Most of the Syrian population is still concentrated in the metropolitan region of Damascus (3.5 million inhabitants54), consequently, away from the influence of the Euphrates River, being then supplied by other sources. Thus, the Euphrates River basically supplies Aleppo (the second largest city of Syria, which sheltered 1,800,000 inhabitants before the beginning of the conflicts in 2011), mainly through Al-Assad reservoir, and some cities in central Northern Syria, not to mention those riverside cities towards AlBukamal, almost on the border with Iraq. In 2009, the Ministry of Building and Housing, responsible for water supply, had announced a national infrastructural development plan for water supply, involving the construction of dozens of waste water treatment plants through the country that could improve not only water availability (m³/in.) but also the percentage of population with access to clean water. According to Smith (2008, p. 121), nearly 20% of the Syrians would have no appropriate access to quality water. However, due to the civil war that has been sweeping the country since 2011, such estimates have changed significantly, since millions of Syrians have sought shelter in other countries. Nor are we aware of to what extent the infrastructure associated to water supply has been affected due to these conflicts. Such updates will only be possible after normality is restored.

The Iraqi context55 Iraqi territory is divided into four large regions: the highlands of Iraqi Kurdistan to the north, desert plains to the southwest, Upper Mesopotamia 54 Approximated value, prior to current conflicts, calculated from population data of the Damascus Governorate, which includes rural areas. Source Statistical Abstracts (1970-2011). Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015. 55 Referred sources: https://www.britannica.com/place/Iraq and . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015.

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to the centre-north and Low Mesopotamia in the south-southeast, covering alluvial plains which extend towards the Persian Gulf. The Euphrates River crosses desert plains, entering inland at Low Mesopotamia. The desert area comprises the entire south-western portion in the country, through which the Euphrates flows. This is an extension of the Syrian Desert (Figures 4-6 and 4-7), which stretches towards part of Jordanian and Saudi Arabian territories. The region is marked by a vast sandy plain with gradual aridity and salinity towards the southeast, escorting the Euphrates River. On the border with Syria, the plain has an altitude of approximately 165 metres, gradually and slowly decreasing until reaching sea level, about one thousand kilometres downstream. Both Iraqi and Syrian portions present a complex and intricate network of dry valleys, the wadis, through which torrential winter rain waters flow for a short period of time. The radar image (Fig. 4.6) displays the wadis as slots on the surface of the land. Low Mesopotamia extends from Northern Baghdad, near Samarra, to the Persian Gulf. It is characterised by continuous lacustrine-fluvial plains which connect the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers via natural canals and, most importantly, man-made irrigation canals, besides perennial or intermittent lagoons fed by flooding. Blanchard (1929) describes the downward course of the Euphrates River as […] another country. Vegetation, climate, soil, operating conditions, everything changes when one steps into Babylon […] valleys open widely, and cliffs spread until disappearing over the horizon. […] The upper plain, once dug by narrow erosion valleys, was superseded by low lands, alluvial zones. Babylon is no more than a vast delta […]. (p. 222)

Such geomorphologic and hydrographic aspects grant the region the characteristic of a large delta common to both the Tigris and Euphrates, although they are to be clearly merged when crossing the city of Al-Basra, ultimately forming the Shatt Al-Arab Waterways. Before the confluence of the rivers, a large marshland area known as Hawr and Hammar formed. At this point, the waters of the rivers already carry a heavy load of sediment, shaping an internal depositional delta, i.e., before the formation of Shatt AlArab. The surface of this inner delta is expected to have risen about twenty centimetres over the past century as a result of sedimentation. White (1961) also described the surface elevation of the alluvial fan, resulting from the same siltation and deposition processes: “deposits left by flooding have constantly elevated soil level to this day, even in Kish, where the plain surface

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Figures 4-6 and 4-7 – Satellite Image of the Syrian Desert in the Central-Eastern region of the country, next to the border with Iraq (yellow line), extending to this country (approximated location). Landscape next to the city of Palmyra, Syria. Source: USGS/Nasa and Cottage20 | Dreamstime.

lies 25 feet (7.62 metres) above the virgin soil” (p. 76). On account of these sediment deposition processes, Low Mesopotamia is subject to constant and intense flooding. Blanchard (1929) writes that “the power of flooding is another risk: canals can be flooded at all times, especially at delta headwaters” (p. 225). Some sources estimate that the coastline in the Persian Gulf, at the Shatt Al-Arab Delta, might have advanced 250 kilometres offshore over the past five thousand years, as a result of the massive amount of sediment from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers (World Atlas, 1999, p. 195). Dudley Stamp (1959) had already reported this coastline advance in his book entitled Asia: A Regional and Economic Geography, when writing that: “Low Mesopotamia is widely alluvial and the Tigris-Euphrates Delta

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is rapidly extending towards the sea. In the fourth century B.C.E., the site of the current city of Basra was a short distance from the coast” (p. 109). This process was shown by White (1961), two years later (Figure 4-8), in the chapter “Evolution of land use in South-Western Asia”, work coordinated by Dudley Stamp. Blanchard (1929) also emphasised such a coastline phenomenon: “the advance of deltaic alluviums would be at least 25 metres per year on average” (p. 230).

Figure 4-8 – Illustration on the evolution of the Tigris and Euphrates Delta and formation of the Shatt Al-Arab. Source: White, 1961 (p. 95).

White (1961) explains that a widespread erosive process provided materials to form a large alluvial fan causing the coastline advance and that, currently, crops are grown on what would be the former Horizons B and C (subsurface soil layer).

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Chapter 4 In these areas, communities of plants and crops are now growing on Horizons B and C […]. Original soils […] have either been lost in the sea or contributed to new alluvial areas, among which the valleys of the TigrisEuphrates and Indus Rivers are remarkable examples. (White, 1961, p. 68)

When characterising the Low Euphrates plains, he adds: […] flooding and irrigation, practised for approximately six thousand years, have left remarkable effects on the physiographic characteristics of Iraqi alluvial plains. The rivers had their courses altered a number of times […]. (p. 106)

The Arab philosopher and traveller Ibn Battuta described the delta of the Shatt Al-Arab Waterways with enchantment: “the region was gifted with opulence and wealth, by lying on the confluence of two seas, one salty and the other sweet” (in: Bouguerra, 2004, p. 87). Only Pierre Gourou (1953) contests that coastline advance version, stating: It has been long admitted that work on the Euphrates, Tigris and Karun has advanced the coastline for three hundred kilometres over the past 6,000 years. Recent observations though seem to show otherwise, that, at the beginning of History, the coastline was more south-oriented and thus the sea might have taken over land. (p. 483)

Poor drainage, flooding and irrigation make quantities of salt accumulate on upper soil horizons. This salinity increases gradually from Bagdad towards the Persian Gulf limiting agricultural productivity in the region. The natural lake in South-western Bagdad, for instance, is called Bahr Al-Milh (Sea of Salt) due to its high salinity. This saline environment and the intricate canals are also referred in sacred writings: By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat, yes, we wept, when we remembered Zion. On the willows in her midst, we hung up our lyres.56

At the time of these writings, the existence of canals had already been confirmed for at least three thousand years, as shown by Albright when relating the Chalcolithic period to irrigation. Climatic characteristics predominant in Iraqi territory, –high evaporation and low precipitation rates, with 90% of rainfalls concentrated in winter (between December and 56 Psalm 137. In The Bible of Jerusalem. 3rd printing. São Paulo: Paulus, 2004, p. 1.007.

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April), although rivers show a higher flow only after rainfalls (snowmelt in Turkey [after April]) –must also contribute to water and soil salinisation in the lower course of the Euphrates and Tigris. Such a feature grants the fluvial system high annual amplitude, when the flow is even higher at flooding periods compared to those long periods without rain (between September and October). Such processes have been characterised as anomalous for years, when river flows can be nearly tenfold higher than the year before, as those of 1954, which threatened Bagdad when protection dams were on the verge of overflowing. This was also the case with the Syrian stretch when, in 2006, the lowest river flow was 118 m³/s and the highest was 1,762 m³/s57, i.e., fifteen times as much. In this regard, dams bear the advantage of controlling the river flow by buffering the peaks of high and low flows, which might be particularly useful at unusual periods (of heavy flooding or severe drought). It is appropriate to remember that the Euphrates River basin have a long-standing record of flooding, and most work undertaken, particularly in Low Mesopotamia, was intended to contain flooding and redistribute water, as stated by Stamp (1959): “At the time of the Babylonian Empire, a great system of flooding canals utilized and controlled annual flooding and Iraq was a land of outstanding fertility” (p. 142). Iraq, on the ground that is worst affected by concurrent flooding and drought, was the first country to undertake engineering works along the Euphrates River. In 1914, the Hindiyah Barrage was built and its waters were diverted in order to control flooding periods, forming thus Razzaza Lake (see Map 4-1). In 1948, Ramadi Dam was constructed and the flood water was diverted towards Habbaniyah Lake (Habbaniyah Escape). From this lake, waters were led back either to the Euphrates River or Razzaza Lake through the Mujarra Canal, built in 1957. The ultimate and greatest Iraqi work on the Euphrates River is Haditha Dam, which gave rise to AlQadisiyah Lake, bearing an area of 500 km² and storage capacity of 8.2 billion cubic metres [BCM] (Un-Escwa, 2013, p. 63). This reservoir has the task of generating electricity, controlling flow rate and supporting irrigation activities. Another key aspect of the Low Euphrates refers to its subdivision into a number of canals (natural and man-made). The Inventory of Shared Water Resources in Western Asia also describes this characteristic:

57

Statistical Abstracts (1970-2011).

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Chapter 4 Further downstream, the river loses water to numerous desert depressions and some natural and artificial canals. Here, portions of the river are diverted towards canals, some of which drain water to the shallow river of Hammar, while others empty into the Tigris River. (Un-Escwa, 2013, Part 1, p.56)

From the Waterways throughout the Persian Gulf, the speed of flow rate lessens, as well as sediment load and flooding occurrences. These would be the causes, according to Blanchard (1929), “for Mesopotamian settlements to have started downstream and gradually extended upstream” (p. 225). Another important aspect worth pointing out is about the geographic landscape of the Euphrates River basin. Comparatively, the Nile landscape offers a more favourable use of water resources. Its springs lie in a tropical environment and its estuary in a Mediterranean landscape. Thus, flooding in the Nile lasts up to November, followed by Mediterranean winter rainfalls which irrigate crop fields. In the case of the Euphrates, seasonal variability is different and less favourable to crops. The flooding periods end in May/June, after Anatolia’s snowmelt, downstream. This mainly explains the high amplitude of flow rate and means that, there is naturally less water later during a dry summer, when one needs it most, thus gradually increasing the pressure over the resource downstream. All of these changes occurring from upstream to downstream, such as the gradual increase of temperature, evaporation rates (more pronounced with impoundments and sprawls), the reduction of air humidity and precipitation, limitation towards absence of tributaries, the growing need for irrigation due to aridity increase, and a dry summer following the end of a flooding, when integrated, explain the dynamics of the Euphrates River basin landscape and also the possible decline on the river flow downstream. Nevertheless, Iraq, also bathed by the mighty Tigris River, occupies a more favourable position when compared to regional averages, in the matter of water availability per inhabitant, with more than 2,000 m³/in./year. However, almost 60% of the population has no sewage system (Smith, 2008, p. 123) and a number of communities have no access to adequate water provision, or have lost it due to political reasons. At the Low Tigris and Euphrates, several dikes and canals were built either for irrigation or diversion of water courses. During Saddam Hussein’s regime, these works favoured Sunni populations, compelling the Shiites (seen as opponents) to displace their settlements. On the official website of the Iraqi Ministry for Water Resources, the minister Mohamad S. Al-Sady stated that “the former

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regime drained 90% of the original twenty thousand kilometres of swamps, thereby causing massive migrations”. These diversions on fluvial courses, associated with the substitution of natural vegetation on plains (for either cropping or lumber extraction), drainage of fluvial plains and silting resulting from these processes, form an intricately altered environmental framework. Before the first Gulf War, triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, approximately 95% of the urban population and 75% of the rural population had access to drinking water. According to the World Bank, after the conflict, 25% of the urban population was disconnected from a water distribution network and less than 50% of the rural population had access to drinking water; moreover, only 8% of rural households were connected to a sewer system. This situation was due to the fact that treatment stations had been either poorly managed or were out of use, or even because of the lack of electric energy, compelling some communities to use water directly from the rivers. This shows that, beyond natural aspects, water resource availability is closely connected to political and socioeconomic factors, characterising managerial water stress, as previously defined. Given what is currently occurring in Syria , new Iraqi internal conflicts undertaken by extremists of Islamic State have surely changed all these figures. In relation to supply infrastructure, it is unknown to what extent it has been affected.

CHAPTER 5 THE PERSIAN GULF

Man, drink water to make yourself beautiful and contemplate the sky to become big. Tuarege Proverb58

Regional characterisation The region known as the Persian Gulf covers, besides the Gulf itself, the countries partially or entirely located on its coastline, namely: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Saudi Arabia is also considered part of the region, because, although its territory is on the Arabian Peninsula itself and its main cities are located either inland or next to the Red Sea, it has more than 600 kilometres59 of coastline faced towards the Gulf, including some important coastal cities (Ad-Damman, Al-Jubail) and complex connections with Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait. Iran could also be geographically considered as part of the region, since this country granted its name to the Gulf and borders along it to a great extent. However, when reference is made to the “Gulf countries”, Iran is not normally included; this fact might be explained due to historical and socioeconomic reasons. Unlike Iran, which has a long history related to the Persian Empire, countries of the Persian Gulf, once inhabited by both nomadic tribes and fishermen, are distinguished by the fact that they are considered as “new” nation-states, whose independence has occurred in the past five decades. With their economies essentially based on oil exploration, these countries have rapidly become wealthy and modernised, although maintaining closed political regimes. Therefore, the widespread idea in the Middle East regarding the Persian Gulf is related to wealthy countries with 58

Extracted from Bouguerra (2003, p. 232). Calculation made by the author from the letter Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, scale 1:1.3,250,000. Jedah: Farsi Maps (n/d). 59

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a modern infrastructure, but with a still centralised political structured around the figures of emirs and kings. Except for Saudi Arabia, they are countries with small territorial dimensions, as shown in Map 5-1.

Map 5-1 – Map of the countries of the Persian Gulf. Source: adapted from WWF and ESRI.

Geographically, Gulf countries, including the whole of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, comprise the so-called Arabian Peninsula, a range of lands surrounded by water, except for the north-western portion, which borders Jordan, the Syrian Desert and Low Mesopotamia. The Arabian Peninsula landscape is remarkably arid, consisting of flat and sandy sedimentary surfaces, tiny hydrographic system and scarce vegetation coverage, which is limited to oases and some areas which are slightly more humid. A typical hot desert landscape is largely predominant, especially in the central and eastern part of the region, extending towards the Persian Gulf coastline. Some mountainous landscape erupts, breaking the supremacy of the desert plains, particularly in the western part –on the coast of the Red Sea –and in the southern portion – on the coast of the Aden Gulf, on the coast of Yemen –and, further to the east, on the coast of Oman. This boundary of more pronounced relieves is due to the Arabian Peninsula’s settling on a tectonic plate (Arabian Plate) which is pressured by neighbouring plates. The

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western coast, for instance, is constituted by mountainous highlands originating from the tectonic movement of the Red Sea’s opening and enlargement. The same process occurs to the south and east. Blanchard (1929) described the Arabian Peninsula in the volume entitled Asie Occidentale from the work Geographie Universelle, coordinated by Vidal de La Blache and L. Gallois: The Arabia Plateau is enormous, broader than 3,000,000 kilometres, a fragment recently highlighted from the African platform, shows the same climate, the same desert forms and the same human phenomena as observed in the Sahara Desert. However, its borders were significantly displaced and raised […] marginal mountains […] are therefore all over the place, acting as effective barriers between inland and outland. (p. 171)

We observed that, in the 1920s, there was considerable knowledge on tectonic plates, a theory which was only supported decades later. Map 5-2 depicts these pieces of information and other complementary ones.

Map 5-2 – Arabian Peninsula Relief. Source: SRTM/NASA (approximated scale: 1:20.000.000).

These mountainous barriers would split the region into a more humid coast and a drier inland, on a general basis.

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Tracing a topographic profile from the Red Sea throughout the Persian Gulf, we can see a gradually decreasing topography from west to east, as shown in the profile presented by Gourou (Figure 5-1).

Figure 5-1 – Profile of Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea towards the Persian Gulf. Source: Gourou (1953, p. 476). We maintained all original characteristics of the figure (including the numeration), except for the dimension, which was magnified approximately three-fold.

Gourou (1953) describes this profile associating the geological with topographic information: “The Archean block raised to the west and precipitated over the Red Sea, Arabia drops to the east and is covered by recently deposited sediments towards the Persian Gulf” (p. 476). Blanchard (1929) described the Arabian Peninsula’s eastern coast as more favourable for occupation and fishing activities, on the grounds of having a more trimmed and accessible coastline and the absence of mountain chains (that occur only in Oman): The strip towards Iran is more varied and, at times, more favourable […]; the highland ends in smooth slopes until the Persian Gulf depression […]; the desert reaches the sea. (p.177)

The author still observes that the coastline trimmed into bays, straits, islands (e.g., Bahrain) and peninsulas (e.g., Qatar) favoured piracy activities, which, after being eliminated by the British, were replaced by fishing activities and pearl harvesting which attracted Bedouins from inland during summer. In addition to its warm waters, great amounts of alluvial deposition into the Shatt Al-Arab Waterways (Figure 5-2) make the nearby waters shallower, favouring the occurrence of oysters and pearl production. According to Blanchard (1929), such activity involved “over 3,000 boats […] and 70,000 to 75,000 men. Pirates became pearl collectors” (p. 230), and this would endure until the major social and landscape changes which came with the advent of the oil industry.

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Bathymetry (water depth measurement) shows low values that, while able to favour pearling, they hinder the navigation of larger-sized vessels. Gourou (1953) describes the southern Peninsula border, adding some information regarding climatic formations and land use:

Figure 5-2 – Bathymetry of the Persian Gulf in the delta of Shatt Al-Arab. Extracted from Blanchard (1929, p. 230). We maintained all original characteristics of the figure, including numeration, except for the size, which was magnified approximately four-fold. Yemen’s mountains are high [...], craggy and rainy in the summer (500 mm through 1,000 mm per year). Terraces […] are cropped with cereal and fruit trees, and the climate is temperate and tropical. […] Aden, thanks to the protection of two volcanic foundations, has the only appropriate harbour of the whole southern coast, towards Muscat. (p. 477)

Dudley Stamp (1959), in turn, linked the geomorphologic and climatic aspects of the Arabian Peninsula, stating that: “the aridity of the Arabian climate is due to its position at the high pressure belt and its high surroundings which intercept any humidity that may reach the inland area” (p. 109). The Persian Gulf coast, from Kuwait through Oman, presents a flat relief, with altitudes below 200 metres, practically deprived of either natural vegetation or perennial rivers, as described by the English geographer in the

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same work mentioned previously as well as illustrated in Figure 5-3: “there are indeed no perennial rivers in Arabia; instead, there are countless valleys (wadis) which carry water after storms” (p. 134).

Figure 5-3 – Image of some dry valleys of the Arabian Peninsula. Source: ESRI and USGS/NASA.

In Oman, part of the territory shows a more mountainous relief, whose altitudes can exceed one thousand metres at the Arabian Sea coast, due to the tectonic factors previously detailed. The climate in the region is arid,

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with temperatures reaching 50°C, and enabling the occurrence of sand storms. In summer, however, air humidity can reach up to 100%, although the rainfall index remained at a very low level. Such high humidity may be explained by the same aspects as those of inland aridity, since both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea are blocked by the neighbouring relief, thus concentrating humidity. Stamp (1959) explains these climatic characteristics by linking them to both the relief and the waters of the Gulf and the Red Sea: “the heat in the coastline is even tougher than in the inland area because of air humidity caused by the evaporation of the enclosed Red Sea and Persian Gulf” (p. 109). Gourou (1953) had also mentioned these climatic characteristics on the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, explaining: “coastline areas have the most distressing climate; the heat there is weaker, but the relative humidity of the air easily reaches 90%” (p. 476). Through the information herein gathered, we can infer that aridity is a general characteristic of the Arabian Peninsula, with certain exceptions. Unlike other arid parts of the Middle East which still have relevant water resources (Mesopotamia and Egypt), the Arabian Peninsula has no prominent fluvial river course. Conversely, this region is settled on the greatest oil reserves currently known. It is a whim of nature, as we shall discuss more closely.

The decolonisation process The countries of the Persian Gulf became independent in the past fifty years, as a result of a generalised decolonisation process engendered by two main factors. On the one hand, the European imperialist powers, leaving World War I (1914-1918) with territorial gains resulting from the sharing established under the Treaty of Versailles, could no longer afford to exert power on them, given the human and economic expenditures they had to bear due to the conflict (Smith, 2008, p. 28). We added a reorganisation of space to this fact, with the displacement of capitalist power from Europe to the United States and, on the other hand, the emergence of a socialist power, the Soviet Union. Both powers were increasing their influence on the Middle East, a fact that was enhanced after World War II (1939-1945), when the bipolarisation between the United States and the former Soviet Union was expressed worldwide in spheres of influence. In this regard, Syria passed from the British sphere to the Soviet zone, while Iraq shifted to the North-American sphere.

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Furthermore, a growing nationalism characterised the Arab World in the second half of the twentieth century, starting with the Arab League in 1945. This movement was encouraged not only due to the failure of the Arab World to prevent the creation of the Israeli State, three years later, but also to the Egyptian victory during the Suez crisis, when Egypt regained control of the canal, in 1956. This fact made the then president of that country, Jamal Abdel el Nasser, the spokesman of Arab nationalism (Smith, 2008, p. 34). Along with such nationalism, a Pan-Arabism movement which pursued union among Arab countries, conceived as the only way to politically tackle the West, was significantly growing. There were attempts to create an Arab Federation on three different occasions (Map 5-3). The first one regards the creation of the ephemeral United Arab Republic, by Syria and Egypt, which lasted from 1958 to1961. The second one regards the signature of the Tripartite Federation Letter, between Syria, Iraq and Egypt. The third regards a letter of intent on the formation of an Arab Federation, which was signed in 1971 between Syria, Libya and Egypt. The attempts to create an Arab Union failed due to the lack of a common political program and, subsequently, political divergences expressed in a number of moments, such as the bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel (1979), the support of Syria and Libya for a non-Arab country (Iran) against an Arab country (Iraq) in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), or even the support of Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia for the coalition led by the United States against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. All of these facts that occurred in the second half of the twentieth century were accompanied by the creation of different new countries, ex-colonies which became independent in the past fifty years, as shown in Map 5-4.

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Chapter 5 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC MEMBERS (1958 – 1961)

SIGNATORY COUNTRIES OF THE TRIPARTITE ARAB FEDERATION AGREEMENT (1963)

SIGNATORY COUNTRIES OF AN INTENT LETTER IN ORDER TO FORM A FEDERATION (1971)

Map 5-3 – Arab unification attempts between 1958 and 1971. Adapted by the author based on Smith (2008, p.33).

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Map 5-4 – Map fragment of decolonization in the Middle East countries. Adapted by the author based on Smith (2008, p. 19).

Water in the Persian Gulf Water scarcity evidently characterises all countries of the Persian Gulf. Table 5-1 collates natural water availability data with that of supply, including Syria and Iraq, for comparison purposes.

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Table 5-1 – Availability and access to water in a number of countries of the Middle East. Org.: Venturi (2011). Source: Smith (2008, pp. 132-33).

Country

Water availability (natural) per capita(m³/year)

Population with no access to adequate water supply (%)

Saudi Arabia

100 to 499

Less than 10%

Bahrain

Less than 100

Less than 10%

UAE

Less than 100

Not available

Kuwait

Less than 100

Not available

Qatar

Less than 100

Not available

Oman

100 to 499

10% to 19%

Syria

1,000 to 1,999

20% or more

Iraq

2,000 or more

10% to 19%

Observing the table, it can be verified that countries with greater water availability (Syria and Iraq) are those which have inadequate access to water, characterising a managerial water stress, as previously defined. Factors related to water management explain why water access is lesser in Syria and Iraq. Such factors also explain why Gulf countries, although having low natural availability, currently benefit from comfortable water availability per capita. In the Persian Gulf, e.g., the United Arab Emirates, despite the scarcity of natural sources, it is very common to find oasis-like landscapes, with their long lasting green grasses, lying like carpets on surfaces where once lay arid lands, golf courses which demand permanent watering and some other overstatements that “contradict” the natural climatic conditions and pronounced scarcity of water resources (Figures 5-4, 5-5 and 5-6).

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Figure 5-4 – Fountain in the Burj Khalifa Lake, in Dubai. Source: Typhoonski | Dreamstime.com.

Figures 5-5 and 5-6 – Grasses permanently green and flowerbeds always flowered in the central area of Sharja, at the expense of continuous irrigation. Source: Sergei Afanasev | Dreamstime.com and Boggy | Dreamstime.com.

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In the United Arab Emirates, urban irrigation of gardens and plant beds is mostly done underground in order to increase efficiency and avoid evaporation. This underground system is comprised by perforated pipes buried into the ground distributing water in a targeted and controlled manner. Such a technique had already been mentioned by Sorre (1950) as an adequate method for arid areas: “irrigation into the vegetable soil mass, no longer superficial, for instance, by means of porous pipes buried at a convenient depth, permits accurately adapting the appropriation of water according to need” (p. 723). Other wider processes for agricultural irrigation are undertaken in vast regions of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, as shown in Figures 5-7 and 5-8. When Dudley Stamp described the Arabian Peninsula in the 1950s, he stated that natural conditions would enable the use of only 25% of the region for agriculture61. However, the incorporation of modern irrigation technologies considerably increased agricultural productivity and, nowadays, Saudi Arabia is the biggest producer of wheat, besides dates, grapes, and various other fruits and vegetables. Besides irrigation, other uses of water resources, particularly those linked to leisure activities seem to undermine natural dynamics. The United Arab Emirates, for instance, supplied with financial investments and technology in its current momentum, outweighs natural dynamics, going way beyond adaptation between utilisation and natural resources, but creating them and also recreating nature dynamics instead, in some sort of technological and economic determinism (Figures 5-9 and 5-10).

61

Agriculture is impossible in three-quarters of the area (Stamp, 1959, p. 138).

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Figures 5-7 and 5-8 – Mechanised irrigation in Saudi Arabia. Source: ESRI (image of the Arabian Peninsula) and USGS/NASA (Mechanised Irrigation). Org.: Venturi (2015).

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Figure 5-9 – Ski slope on the snow artificially produced in Dubai. Source: Kiev Victor | Shutterstock.com.

Figure 5-10 – Ice skating rink, Dubai. Source: S-F | Shutterstock.com.

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However, this dominance demands sustained and continuous maintenance and control, which leads us to think about its expenditures and economic sustainability. In the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, most of the water used comes from desalination processes, and the region is responsible for 75% of all desalinated water in the world. As we shall see in the results analysis, some regions in the Persian Gulf are practically 100% supplied with desalinated seawater.

CHAPTER 6 ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES AND RESULTS

Sharing In the context of the Euphrates River basin, the variable “sharing”, emphasised by the central hypothesis, was analysed using two indicators: “existence of agreements” and quantitative and qualitative “maintenance” of river water resources.

Agreements Water sharing of the Euphrates River (and also the Tigris) is historical, but this question has re-emerged for a little more than the past two decades, when some large dams temporarily caused a notable decline in their flow rates. As the Euphrates receives a few and modest tributaries in Syria and almost none in Iraq, besides entering a desert environment with few rainfalls, the river flow is upstream-flow dependent, a fact that makes the establishment of agreements more urgent than in other contexts. One remarkable period in this geopolitical context was in the early 1990s, when Turkey built the Ataturk Dam, 169 metres high, one of the largest dams in the world. Its filling process, completed in 1992, forced the diversion of the Euphrates River waters for a month, which was considered an imminent threat by neighbouring countries. In response to this, the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein threatened to bomb the barrage. The generation of a diplomatic conflict of such nature resulted from the failure of shared management and dialogue mechanisms that would have allowed downstream countries to be better prepared (in advance) for the Ataturk filling period. However, a reasonable understanding among the countries before the technical justifications of Turkish government halted the belligerent impulses and circumscribed the episode within the diplomatic dimension.

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Nevertheless, new impoundment and irrigation projects mainly undertaken by Turkey reignited discussions among the Euphrates River basin countries, since they could jeopardise, even temporarily, their main river flow. According to Berman (1999), there could be a decline of up to 40% in the Euphrates River flow in Syrian territory and up to 80% in Iraqi territory with the conclusion of the GAP62 (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi). The issue raised is, though uncertain, because a larger or lesser flow results from the management of barrages and not from themselves. A larger or lesser opening of floodgates is what determines the control of river flow. For the same reason, the prediction that both the management and the Turkish administration will allow only 40% of the water to outflow to Syrian territory is still inaccurate, since this matter would depend on a management decision. Either way, the construction of dams constitutes a main aspect of sharing agreements because they can either favourably or unfavourably alter river regimes for downstream regions. Another aspect which permeates the issue on sharing the basin refers to the Euphrates River’s status. On the one hand, Syria and Iraq claim for the river’s international status, which would compel the three countries bathed by the basin to comply with a common regulation. On the other hand, the Turkish government resists accepting the river’s international nature, alleging that only after the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, at the formation of the Shat Al-Arab, it could be considered so, as in this stretch, it limits the border between Iraq and Iran. In the Turkish vision, the river’s internationality would be attributed by the border configuration of the fluvial course rather than the basin itself. In a press statement, on July 24, 1992, during the crisis arising from the filling of Ataturk Dam, the Turkish position was clear when the then prime minister, Suleiman Demeril (apud Radwan, 2005, Conclusions) declared: Water born in Turkey belongs to Turkish territory, as well as oil seeped in Arab countries, and we neither ask Arabs for oil partnership, nor do we want any partnership with them over our water.

However, since the establishment of the Helsinki Rules in 1966, the notion of the hydrographic basin predominates over that of fluvial course. These rules established that an international water course is a “system of surface

62

The GAP project (The South-eastern Anatolia Project), Syria and Iraq border area, also known as Turkish Kurdistan, predicts 22 new barrages for energy production and irrigation in the Tigris and Euphrates Basins. Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015.

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water and underground water which form, because of their physical relations, a singleton and normally reach a common point”63. From the Syrian side, some authors interpret the filling episode of Ataturk Dam as part of a wider geopolitical issue, which involves the alleged Syrian support to the Kurd separatists of Turkey and the Iskenderun region, claimed by Syria. For Radwan, the interruption of the Euphrates River’s flow would have been a sort of warning, expressed by the statement made in September, 1989 by the former Turkish president Turght Auzal (apud Radwan, 2005, Conclusions): “The waters of the Euphrates River will continue flowing towards Syria, if there is abundance of water and Syria observes some conditions. Among such conditions would be the establishment of a limit for the Kurd separatists of Northern Syria and the exclusion of Iskenderun from Syrian maps, which is depicted on the map as part of its territory. Despite the occasional diplomatic tension periods, we can list varied efforts towards a common understanding which may justify the absence of conflicts over water in the region, in spite of the relative water scarcity. For Smith (2008), “There is a growing structure of international agreements over the Nile, and there is no reason for the same process not to occur over the Tigris and Euphrates” (p. 133). History has shown that a number of agreements and understandings have been established in the region for many decades. In 1927, Turkey signed with the Soviet Union the Treaty on Beneficial Uses of Boundary Waters, where both countries agreed on equally sharing the common water on the borders of Turkey and what is now Armenia and Azerbaijan, besides the Black Sea. On the western side, Turkey and Greece signed protocols after the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) on the control and management of the Maritsa River (Mariç in Turkish), on the border between these two countries. In 1973, new agreements between Turkey and the Soviet Union were signed on the joint construction of Arpaçai (or Ahurhyan) Dam. With regard to the countries sharing the Euphrates River basin, an important step towards water use regulation was established in the Damascus Protocol,

63 The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, resulting from the Law Association International Meeting occurred in 1966. Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015.

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signed in 1987 by Turkey and Syria, which, among other different subjects, reports on the flow of the Euphrates River: During the filling period of Ataturk Dam reservoir through the final allocation of the Euphrates’ waters, among the three riparian countries, the Turkish party commits to release an annual average of over 500 m³/s, five hundred cubic metres per second, on the border between Turkey and Syria and, if the flow rate is lesser than 500m³/s, five hundred metres per second, the Turkish party agrees on compensating the difference during the following month.

According to the protocol, Turkey commits to ensuring a minimum annual average flow of 500m³/s of the Euphrates River, at the point it enters Syrian territory, in the city of Jarablus. Flow rate graphs presented hereinafter, regarding the second sharing indicator (flow rate maintenance and water quality), indicate that this agreement has been accomplished for the majority of the past four decades. River flow was below the average agreed (between 400 m³/s and 500m³/s) just punctually and temporarily through the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 2001, 2002 and 2009 (Graph 1) –on the occasion of the main barrages filling – but it was recovered in the following period. This fact emphasises the association between the indicators (agreements and maintenance of water resources) chosen to support the variable “sharing”. Other initiatives have shown the predisposition for dialogue between the countries of the Euphrates River basin. In 2001, Turkey and Syria signed a joint communiqué which aimed at technological cooperation, missions of study and common projects. In 2008, this tendency for dialogue was manifested during another major event, when Turkey, Syria and Iraq hosted a meeting to create the Water Institute, whose headquarters was in the Turkish Ataturk Dam itself, which once had been the focus of regional political tensions. The Institute has clear cooperation goals, where all the issues involving the Euphrates River sharing are discussed by eighteen experts of each country. More specifically, the objectives of the institute are: sharing information on irrigation and technology for water treatment; mapping water resources in the Middle East; and publishing of reports on water management in each country, with particular attention to impoundments. The institute also conducts studies and designs plans on effective shared development, following the example of the Orontes River Binational Dam (on the border between Turkey and Syria), which outflows water from Syrian to Turkish territories, and also the example of the Peace

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Pipeline Project, which envisages the transposition of Turkish river waters towards other countries in the Middle East64. A number of official visits among the representatives of these three countries anticipated the creation of the institute. The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had already visited Syria. Following that, in January 2008, the Syrian vice-Prime Minister, Abdullah Dardari, visited Turkey, and, in that same month, the Turkish Minister of Environment, Veysel Eroglu, met with Dardari, in Syria. In March of that same year the Iraqi President, Jabal Talabani, and a delegation visited Ankara, on an occasion when the Ministers of Environment of both countries reinforced the proposal for the creation of the Water Institute, already endorsed by Syria. In an interview on Turkish Newspaper Todays Zanan (edition of March, 12 2008), the Minister of Environment of Turkey declared: No war over water resources will burst in the region. Instead of having issues over water with our neighbours, we prefer to develop joint projects. Unlike some people assert, a war over water resources shall not emerge in this region, although people may always find chips to bet on war. We believe that water resources in the region can be effectively used to meet the needs of water. However, we must develop joint projects. (Emphasis added.)

Mutual visits marked a new diplomatic era among these countries, making the perspective of the so called “water wars” increasingly distant. This new phase can be identified by the content of statements that, if once having a threatening tone, now claim for understanding. In 2009, the Turkish-Syrian Strategic Cooperation Council Agreement was signed. It established joint activities aiming at quality water improvement, construction of pumping stations, joint barrages, as well as the establishment of common policies over water.

64 This project of 1987, foresaw displacement of the Seyhan, the Ceyhan and the Euphrates Basins towards countries of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, besides Syria and Jordan via dams and aqueducts. Aqueducts would be 6,550 kilometres long and bearing a transportation capacity of 6,000.00 m³/day. However, the project is far from becoming reality, but it has been a matter of discussion in the Water Institute community.

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In 2010, new summits occurred between Turkey and Syria65, consolidating and amplifying cooperation, covering not only areas such as environment but also comprising the fields on economic agreements, infrastructure, technology, education and tourism. We observed that, in this scope, diplomacy is predominant and quoting Aron (2002) “[…] can be defined as the art of convincing without using strength […]” (p. 73). Even the controversial Turkish Ilisu66 Dam, on the Tigris River, initially contested by Iraq, has become a subject for understanding among the countries involved. However, it has still been evaluated due to issues on social (displacement of communities), cultural (submersion of archaeological sites) and environmental impacts, particularly raised by the sponsoring countries (Switzerland, Austria and Germany) that, considering the mitigatory measures insufficient, withdrew financial support for the barrage’s construction. Although all these issues, the Ilisu dam was accomplished. Even so, the Turkish expert on hydro-politics67 Dursun Yildiz, author of War of Waters, explains that Turkey has adopted an external policy that is, at the same time, active and flexible: “as a first step, it was necessary to minimise the problems with the border neighbours and establish political, economic and cultural relations, and cooperation based on trust and collaboration”.

65

One of these encounters, the Joint Statement of the Second Ministerial Meeting of the High Level took place in October, 2010 in Lattakia (Syria). Additional information is also available on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015. 66 This dam is part of the GAP Project and would alone produce 1,200MW, with a flooded area of 300 km2, submerging a number of villages and towns, including the walled city of Hasankeyf, a cradle of Assyrian civilisation. The dam is a geopolitical and cultural matter due to the forced displacement of Kurd separatist peoples who had inhabited the region for millennia. Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015. 67 The author defines hydro-politics as an interdisciplinary scientific branch which analyses the relation based on the interest for trans-boundary water resource use and assesses the implications of water in order to take socio-economic, political and legal precautions. Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23 2015.

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In 2005, several Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi specialists formed The EuphratesTigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC), in order to promote technical and socioeconomic cooperation. Kibaroglu68 (2011) writes: Today, the three countries interact on multiple levels: from the highest political level to relevant institutions […]. The establishment of a Summit of Ministers, which enables the three governments to work side by side on regional, political, economic and sociocultural decisions, is of key importance in this scope. (p. 1)

In parallel, Iraq and Turkey signed in 2009 another Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Water (there are 48 MoU, according to Un-Escwa, 2013, p. 49), in which the two countries agree on sharing hydrological and meteorological information. Such initiatives emphasise that agreements over water resources can extrapolate the dimension on the equitable use of water, thus promoting wider understandings. The question will be resumed further, in the section “Water solidarity”. In overall terms, several international encounters resulted in inclusive documents and protocols of intents that offer very little concrete guidance on management and sharing for the signatory countries69. This question, which relates to the efficacy of agreements regarding instances in which they were elaborated, represents herein a complementary variable which has not been included in this analysis. Even so, it will be resubmitted as a suggestion of a complementary variable for future studies, in Chapter 7 of this book. Despite a favourable sharing context, messages such as the one of Turght Auzal, conditioning the maintenance of the Euphrates River flow towards Syria, were not uncommon, but always deprived of a technical basis. Technically, Auzal’s threat is an impossible undertaking, since barrages always display storage limits, as we shall see later.

Maintenance of the Euphrates River The maintenance of the characteristics of the Euphrates River was quantitatively and qualitatively analysed. Data provided here refer to the 68 Aysegul Kibaroglu is a Professor at the International Relations Department of the Middle East Technical University of Ankara, Turkey, and a specialist on transboundary waters and political geography. 69 For further information of these principal world encounters, see Ribeiro (2008). Other diverse sources can be consulted with regard to recent encounters.

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second indicator that, in conjunction with the first one (existence of agreements), fulfils the supportive empirical framework of the variable sharing pinpointed by the central hypothesis, supporting its corroboration.

Analysis of flow rate Quantitative assessment on such water resources focused on hydrodynamic data: the evolution of river flow throughout four decades in Syrian territory, i.e., in the middle course of the Euphrates River. We were supported by three parameters of information: literature, statistical data and empirical observation. Information available in literature supported the geographic characterisation of the region, where, for analytical purposes, we divided the river into three sections which correspond to the upper, middle and lower courses. We based this on the classic authors of French and English regional geography, to whom we referred throughout the text. We also included contemporary authors (Arabs or not) and made use of websites in order to provide updated information on the countries involved. Through the characterisation of the geographic landscape elaborated in Chapter 4, it was possible to notice that the Euphrates River basin is ruled by a natural dynamics opposed to that one which characterises most rivers in tropical environments where river always have more water in lower course than upper course. In the Euphrates river, when entering a desert environment, the volume of water naturally tends to diminish downward, rather than increasing, mainly due to the gradual decline of tributaries until they are completely lacking, the gradual decrease of both precipitation and humidity, and the increase of evaporation rates occurring in this direction. To confirm this natural tendency, however, we have to use available flow rate data prior to the construction of dams. Data available in literature prior to barrages are found in Chayeb (1955), who reported an average flow rate of the Euphrates River of 525 m³/s in 1955. In that same decade, Pierre Gourou (1953), when describing Arab Asia, informed us that “the Euphrates has an average flow of 710 m³/s, with a minimum of 260 in September and a maximum of 1,790 in May (p. 483). Prior to this, however, Blanchard (1929) had reported slightly different flow rate data, but when referring to the lower course: “At the height of Baghdad, particularly in Moseib, October flow drops to 400 m³/s (per second), and in late April reaches only 2,750 m³/s and a height of 3,5 metres more than in the drought period” (p. 223).

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These data may confirm a river regime of high annual amplitude, but they are insufficient in corroborating the hypothesis on the flow decline through the years, since they refer to different periods and river stretches. An alleged natural tendency on flow rate decline, settled only on the articulation of landscape components extracted from literature, would be attenuated by the socioeconomic dynamic that, throughout the past four decades, would be increasingly exerting pressure over water resources, in the form of impoundments for energy generation, supply and irrigation. Let us see how human interventions might have influenced the flow of the Euphrates River, based on statistical information. Initially, we shall consider data from the Inventory of Shared Water Resources in Western Asia (UnEscwa, 2013) which divides the river flow into periods and stretches (see Table 6-1). The data show the averages of the Euphrates River flow in different periods, in diverse measurement points, although periods are not the same for each measuring station. The main period division we can recognise refers to that pre-construction period of dams, the so-called natural period, which extends up to 1973, and the post-construction period of dams, after 1973. In the explanatory text, it is stated that “the characteristics of the flow rate measurement changed with the filling of Keban Dam reservoir in Turkey and Assad Lake in Syria in the winter of 1973-1974. This is reflected in the discharge downstream”. […] “Before 1973, the annual average flow rate of the Euphrates on the border between Turkey and Syria (Jarablus) was around 30 BCM [billions of cubic metres], but this figure dropped to 25.1 BCM after 1974 and then to 22.8 BCM after 1990” (Un-Escwa, 2013, pp. 58-59). Despite the fact that the inventory is pointing out a possible contribution of the climate to this phenomenon, besides the construction of dams, it offers no accurate idea of how much each one of these two variables would be adding to the flow rate decline. By asserting that such a decrease would “likely be reflecting a combination of drier climate conditions and the effects of an extensive construction of dams” (p. 59), or that “droughts and the construction of dams explain the decline of flow rate” (p. 59), the inventory leaves this question as an open hypothesis, yet to be verified.

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Table 6-1 – Annual average flow rate of the Euphrates River between 1930 and 2011. Source: Un-Escwa (2013). Measurement station

Period

Average (BMC)

Minimum (BMC)

Maximum (BMC)

CVa [–]

1938-2010

26.6

12.7

56.8

0.33

1938-1973

30.0

15.0

56.8

0.29

1974-1987

24.9

12.7

34.1

0.27

1988-1998

25.5

14.4

50.1

0.42

1974-1998

25.1

12.7

50.1

0.34

1990-2010

22.8

14.4

32.6

0.34

1981-2011

20.0

8.9

47.6

0.44

Hussaybah

1988-1998

22.8

8.9

47.6

0.54

(Iraq)

1999-2010

15.5

9.3

20.7

0.27

1990-2010

16.8

8.9

30.7

0.39

1932-1998

27.1

9.0

63.0

0.36

1938-1973

30.6

15.1

63.0

0.30

1974-1987

23.1

9.3

31.2

0.32

1988-1998

22.4

9.0

46.6

0.51

1974-1998

22.8

9.0

46.6

0.40

1930-1999

17.6

3.1

40.0

0.40

1938-1973

19.8

6.6

40.0

0.35

1974-1987

15.3

3.1

24.1

0.45

1988-1998

13.8

7.7

27.9

0.48

1974-1998

14.7

3.1

27.9

0.46

Jarablus (Syria)

Hit (Iraq)

Hindiyah (Iraq)

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However, the way this data is presented (“this number dropped to 25.1 BCM after 1974”) led us to associate flow rate decline directly and mainly with dams. Indeed, preliminarily, the data made us conclude that there was a flow rate decrease of the Euphrates River and that such a phenomenon was a result of the construction of dams. Nevertheless, if on the one hand, we can visualise this decline, on the other hand, we cannot accept the fact that this would be due to the construction of dams through the data presented for three logical reasons. The first one refers to the fact that, in the period named “natural”, before 1973, the decline in flow rate had already been reported, reinforcing the fact that such a phenomenon was a result of natural mechanisms. Considering only the period from 1938 through 1973, when comparing the average river flow in Jarablus (Syria) with that of Hyndiyah (Iraq), we verified a strong decline, from 30 BCM to 19.8 BCM, respectively, in a period with no construction of dams. The second logical reason which hinders us to directly relate flow rate decline to the construction of dams refers to the fact that the data show periodical averages. Average values can conceal tendencies of flow rate decline which might have already been taking place during each period, either due to natural or human (increase in irrigation use) factors. Therefore, what is regarded as a drop might be gradual decline from one period to the next, a decline that could have already been a natural tendency of fluvial dynamics. The third reason with which we can contest the above data is of an equally logical nature. If both flow rate and dams are consequent variables, i.e., if a change in one (in this case, the construction of dams) results in changing another (flow rate decline), this relation should also occur within an isolated period when a number of dams were built, with no comparison with another period. However, this causal relation does not notably happen if we only consider the period from 1970 to 2010, when all of the most significant Euphrates River dams were built. Statistical data analysis on river flow has shown that a “stationary” temporal series is involved, i.e., one which is developed around an average constant throughout time, reflecting a “stable balance”, even with the construction of dams. On the flow rate rolling chart of the Euphrates River (Graph 6-1), we observed (over an interval of 41 years) some periods of remarkable river

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flow amplitude from one year to the next. We also noticed that soon after a period of steep drop, there is a subsequent flow rate recovery, which led us to suspect that such drops referred to the filling of the main reservoirs that have been constructed throughout the past four decades. The filling of reservoirs is relatively rapid (days, weeks or months, depending on their storage potential), but sufficient to influence the annual flow rate average decline of downstream stretches. When the storage limit is reached, however, barrages must release water and the river tends, gradually, to recover its previous flow rate. To illustrate this proposition, we included – in the flow rate graph –the constructions of the main barrages during the period in question.

Graph 6-1 – Evolution of the Euphrates River flow rates in Syrian territory between1970 and 2010 (annual averages) and the main barrages constructed in the period. Org.: Venturi (2011). Source: Statistical Abstracts (1970 - 2011).

It is necessary to consider that, at times, these figures repeat from one year to the next, such as occurs between 1980 and 1981, and between 1986 and 1987, as well as in 1970, 1971 and 1972. This repetition is apparently, but not necessarily improbable, since barrages allow flow rate control. In any case, this is the official and the only existing data. Regarding the years 1989 (1,590 m³/s) and 1990 (482 m³/s), we observed a one-third flow rate drop, but with a subsequent recovery. This could be initially explained due to the construction of the Ataturk Dam, the largest in Turkey, however, such an idea had to be discarded, because this barrage was concluded in 1992 and it could not have been filled up two years before. In

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addition, it is unlikely that a barrage filling would have caused a low fouryear flow rate. The same occurred in 2001 and 2002 (458 m³/s and 482 m³/s, respectively), with subsequent recovery, a fact that would appear, in principle, due to the filling of Tishrin Dam, in Syrian territory. In all cases, however, it is questionable that the filling of a barrage would last more than one year, or would strongly affect river flow for a long period, since there will always be a storage limit. Either way, all periods of low flow rate were followed by a flow rate recovery. If we consider the average flow rate throughout the period, the resulting value of 778.5 m³/s remains higher than the one reported by Chayeb in 1955 (525m³/s, although the year he referred to is unknown) and also that of Gourou in 1953 (710 m³/s). However, the analysis perspective changed with further confirmation. We observed that flow rate values presented by Syrian statistics do not refer to an annual average of a Syrian stretch, but they result from the measurement of a single point. The measurement point lies in the city of Jarablus, next to the border with Turkey, therefore, upstream from all Syrian dams. Thus, we had to withdraw Syrian dams from the chart, keeping only the Ataturk Dam and inserting other Turkish dams upstream from the measurement point, due to which, influence might indeed be exerted on the flow rate variations shown in the bar graph. Below, this new flow rate-barrages relation after this adjustment can be observed in Graph 6-270. We can observe that, if there is any relation between the construction of dams and changes in flow rate, this occurs only in regard to larger dams – i.e., Keban, Karakaya and Ataturk – built in periods of low flow rate. Furthermore, in these three cases, the flow rate was already low two or three years prior to the conclusion of the works, a fact that cannot be explained by the dam itself. The previous argument regarding the improbability of a barrage strongly affecting the river flow through three to four years is resumed herein, considering the construction period of the three largest dams. Smaller dams, in turn, show no clear relation to flow rate, and were even able to overlap high flow rate periods, as in 1988 and 1989.

70 We could have shown only the chart containing Turkish barrages, since Syrian dams would have not affected the flow rate in the stretch studied. However, we maintained these two stages to illustrate research dynamics, what reflects a didactical concern for readers, among whom there will certainly be scholars and research investigators.

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Graph 6-2 – The Euphrates River flow rates between 1970 and 2010 and Turkish dams upstream from the measurement point (Jarablus, Syria, border with Turkey). Org.: Venturi (2011). Source: Statistical Abstracts (1970-2011) and UnEscwa (2013). *Barrages built in the Euphrates River tributaries.

A second aspect observed, as a continuation of the first one, refers to the fact that, by accepting the causal relation between the construction of the three largest dams and the coincident river flow decline, we should also accept that the subsequent flow rate recovery would result from the conclusion of the work and the filling of reservoirs. And at times, river flow is recovered to levels which are higher than the previous ones, as is the case of Keban and Karakaya Dams. A third aspect that we observed refers to the fact that the average flow rate in the five-year period following the construction of the last barrage (20062010) remains equivalent to the average flow rate in the five-year period prior to the construction of the first barrage (1970-1974). If before the construction of the first barrage (Keban, 1975) the average flow was 677 m³/s, after the construction of the last barrage (Kayacik, 2005) the average flow remained at 615 m³/s, showing the stability described by the statistical analysis that concluded a stationary series. As an additional resource to assess the impact of barrages on the river flow rate, we shall consider the relation between the overall storage capacity of the barrages with the overall flow rate in that period. The Un-Escwa (2013) inventory made the calculations and concluded that “the maximum storage capacity of the largest reservoirs exceeds five-fold the annual natural flow rate volume of

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the river (30 BCM)” (p. 62). Once more, the alarming way that data is shown led us to believe that Turkey and Syria could shut their floodgates and dry the Euphrates River towards Iraq for at least four or five years at any particular time. Furthermore, according to the inventory, the Ataturk Dam alone would be able to store a one-year discharge of the Euphrates River. “Ataturk is large enough to fully store the annual discharge of the Euphrates” (p. 63). However, this conclusion is not supported for two reasons: first, because reservoirs formed from barrages are already full and cannot exceed their storage limits; second, because barrages were built throughout four decades, so these calculations should consider a four-decade flow rate, rather than a one-year flow rate. Therefore, we recalculated – based on Syrian official statistical data – and reached a different conclusion. Considering an average annual flow rate of 778.5 m³/s, we multiplied this value by 86,400 (number of seconds of a single day) and then by 365 (days in one year). As a result, we obtained the value of 24,550,776.000 m³, which is equivalent to an annual flow rate of 24.5 km³, or 24.5 BCM. By multiplying this number by the 41 years of temporal series, we reached a total flow rate of 1,004.5 km³ or 1,004.5 BCM. Adding the maximum storage capacity of the five main Turkish dams in the Euphrates River, we obtained the value of 90.5 km³, or 90.5 BCM, which represents 9% of the entire flow rate within the period. These figures may seem significant, however, it is important to remember that barrages were not built all at once and the filling of each one of them is undertaken only once, while the river flows permanently (except for the short filling periods of large dams). After barrages are filled up, they only regulate their level. A significant flow rate decline could be caused only for a short period of time, by shutting floodgates for a certain time in dry seasons. Even so, depending on the storage capacity of the dam, reopening the floodgates would be urgent.. This mainly occurs because hydrographic basins are connected to larger systems. In such a case, the Euphrates River is connected to a wider climatic dynamic than any engineering work could ever control. We refer to the snow of the Anatolian highlands as the main seasonal power source of the river (nival regime), which occurs due to zonal and even global climatic characteristics, having a territorial scope much wider than the area of the basin.

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According to Professor Rubem La Laina Porto71, the existence of an exceptionally large-sized reservoir would be necessary to change the regime of a river with the characteristics of the Euphrates. According to Porto, only a large increase on consumptive uses, such as irrigation, diversions of course or water transpositions, could represent some flow rate impairment. In the first case, one should consider that part of the water used for irrigation is infiltrated and returned to the basin, even though it is a slow process. In the second case, it would be very unlikely that Turkey had undertaken either a course diversion or a transposition able to irreversibly compromise the flow rate, given the quantities involved, and political, economic, technical and environmental complications resulting from such manoeuvres. The ninety tons of water carried from the Ataturk Dam to dry southern plains (Suruc Tunnel, inaugurated in 2013) were largely infiltrated into the Euphrates’ basin. The Un-Escwa (2013) inventory points out that irrigation of south-eastern areas from the Ataturk Dam would affect the Balikh and Khabur Rivers (tributaries of the Euphrates River) and, indirectly, the middle and low courses of the Euphrates, since they infiltrate and migrate carrying pollutants related to agricultural inputs73. Thus, barrages themselves do not definitely represent consumptive uses, except for an increased evaporation surface. It is also risky to relate reservoirs to irrigation, due to the fact that some dams were built essentially for energy production purposes, such as the Keban and Karakaya Dams. Porto reminds us that barrages, if well designed, permit flow rate control, diminishing the high and low rates according to the seasons of the year, ensuring water availability in dry periods, avoiding floods and, more importantly, producing clean and renewable energy. Seasonal variability of the Euphrates River would not be “naturally” favourable for irrigated crops, as stated by the Inventory of Shared Water resources in Western Asia: Seasonal variability of the Euphrates is inadequate to meet the needs of harvests. Winter crops demand more water during low flow rate season, in September and October. In flood season, frequent flooding in spring puts harvests at risk. Engineering works, however, prioritise the regulation of the

71 Professor at the Hydrology Department of the Polytechnics School of the University of São Paulo. He permitted us to interview him on March 2, 2012, assisting us in analysing the Euphrates River flow rate and the effect of barrages, and suggested a comparison between total river flow rate and the storage capacity of barrages. 73 In this book aquifer recharges and internal nourishment of the basin are not considered, which would demand a change in the focus of the analysis and the inclusion of hydro-geological data.

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Nevertheless, after the construction of Keban Dam (Turkey) and Tabqa Dam (Syria) in the mid-1970s, seasonal variability of the Euphrates River flow rate could be changed in order to lessen the peak and low flow rates, making the regime more regular. The following graph clearly illustrates this change, which can be considered as having a positive impact (Graph 6-3).

Graph 6-3 (a, b) – River regime of the Euphrates River prior to (a) and after (b) the construction of barrages. Source: Un-Escwa (2013, p. 60).

Therefore, barrages can cause a positive impact by making the river regime more regular, bringing the high and low rates closer to the average rate, providing more water in dry seasons and retaining water in flood periods, favouring agriculture. Even so, in the Un-Escwa (2013) a negative tone was given to this fact, stating that hydraulic infrastructure works in Turkey “massively impacted water resources along the basin, modifying the natural river regime of the Euphrates and affecting other standards of riverside uses”, although it had already been recognised that “seasonal variability of the Euphrates is inadequate to meet agricultural needs”. Further on, however, the positive aspects of barrages are at last acknowledged, by stating that, “yet, not all changes are negatives, since the regulation of the Euphrates can protect the countries downstream against destructive floods and droughts, provided that the waters of reservoirs are released” (pp. 63-64).

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Finally, despite the clear influence of barrages on the river regime, the causal correlation between barrages and low flow rate is imprecise, once low flow periods are followed by periods of recovery even when there is no construction of dams, indicating that flow variation is not necessarily and exclusively connected to the barrages. It was necessary, then, to insert another explanatory variable: precipitation. Considering the rolling chart on precipitation, we observe a remarkable variability throughout the period, with some rainier and others less rainy years. Such climatic characteristics had already been observed by Stamp (1959), when describing the climate in the region: “[…] it is interestingly variable year after year, but definitively insufficient for agriculture” (p. 143). Now, comparing these climatic data with flow rate data, we observe, preliminarily, a clear correspondence between them. The peaks and valleys of flow rate temporal series tend to correspond to those of precipitation temporal series. This positive correlation was supported by statistical analysis, which can be an indicator that the river regime, despite human interventions, is predominantly ruled by a natural dynamic, particularly a climatic one. Positioning the two series together, we can better visualise this correspondence (Graphs 6-2 and 6-4).

Graph 6-2 – The Euphrates River flow rate between 1970 and 2010 and Turkish Dams upstream from the measurement point (Jarablus, Syria, border with Turkey). Org.: Venturi (2011). Source: Statistical Abstracts (1970-2011) and Un-Escwa (2013). *Barrages built on the Euphrates River tributaries.

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Graph 6-4 – Annual average precipitation in the medium course region of the Euphrates River (Syria) between 1970 and 2007. Org.: Venturi (2011). Source: Statistical Abstracts (1970-2011).

In some years, the three data slightly coincide, e.g., in 1999, when flow rates and precipitation are low and the Karkamis Dam was concluded. But this is a small-sized reservoir, able to store only 0.1 km³ of water. In 1992, the three data are also slightly consistent, such as in 1985 and 2005. Which factor would most influence the Euphrates River flow rate? It seems that barrages have a weaker influence on flow rate changes than precipitation does. In fact, serial statistical analysis concluded that changes on the Euphrates River flow rates depend more on precipitation changes than on the construction of dams. New comprehensive evidence on this assertion was elucidated when we received flow rate data of the Euphrates River from a ten-year period, obtained at the Husaybah measurement station, Iraq, next to the border with Syria. Comparing Husaybah flow rates to those of Jarablus (Syria, border with Turkey), we verified that between Syria and Iraq there is a decline in the annual average flow rate of 22.9%, which cannot be attributed to barrages, since there were neither the construction of dams nor the filling of reservoirs during this period (see Graph 6-5).

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Graph 6-5 – The Euphrates River flow rate between Syria (Jarablus) and Iraq (Husaybah) from 2000 through 2010. Source: Statistical Abstracts (1970-2011) and Ministry of Iraqi Water Resources.

These factors reinforce what had been stated above, when flow rates between Syria and Iraq diminished during the natural period (before 1973). They show that such decline is indeed more natural than caused by human interventions, because, besides there being no construction of barrages during these two periods (1938-1973 and 2000-2010), the river was entering a desert environment with increased temperature and evaporation and with decreased precipitation and tributary contribution, as previously shown. The importance of this result lies in the fact that any reason for disagreement and conflict is deemed void, since natural dynamics are predominant. Despite this natural decline of 22.9% between Jarablus and Husaybah in the period ranging from 2000 to 2010, flow rate in the Low Euphrates is maintained high, even during the low flow periods, and further downstream, as shown in the picture of the Euphrates River in the city of Hillah, Central Iraq (Figure 6-1).

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Figure 6-1 – The Euphrates River in Hillah, province of Babylon, Central Iraq. March, 2014. Photograph courtesy of Sabah Mohammed Khamis Faraj.

Other variables indeed come into play in the context of natural dynamics, such as evaporation and infiltration rates, as well as all aspects comprising water balance, not to mention snow volume on Anatolian hilltops, data which are not available and therefore not incorporated into the analysis. The access to new data, however, gave us one more variable directly related to river flow rate: the evolution of irrigation in Syrian territory. Irrigation, depending on its extension and intensity, is a factor which could affect the river flow rate, since it makes direct use of water. In territories with more arid climates, it is essential for soil use, despite the relative natural fertility resulting from the concentration of soluble minerals. In the chapter entitled “La formation des techniques d’utilisation du sol – les techniques de l’eau” (The formation of techniques for soil use – water techniques), Sorre (1950) had already reported the need for irrigation despite natural soil fertility in arid regions: […] the concentration of solutions under the effect of evaporation is aimed at the constitution of a renewable reserve of colloidal nutrients. Nitrogen content is always high. Arid soils are naturally fertile when watered. (p. 711)

The author had also discussed the different quantities of water required for diverse crop production:

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Our cereals use over 500 to 750 litres of water to produce one kilo of dry matter […] and 1,350 to 2,215 litres per kilo of grains. […] If we represent the needs for wheat per kilo of dry matter per cent, we find […] 106 for barley, 121 for oat and 142 for rye. (p. 170)

Although at the time when this study was being conducted (2010-2011), predominant crops in Syria, such as wheat and cotton, demanded less water than grain crops, the need for irrigation was permanent, given the high evaporation and low precipitation rates. Sorre (1950) reminds us that, due to climatic characteristics of the region, “the requirements of water for plant growing are higher in arid than in humid climates due to evaporation” (p.170). However, irrigation techniques applied to enable the natural fertility of soil must be well planned, otherwise, irrigation may dissolve salts which are concentrated in the soil and make them draw upwards by capillary forces, which would cause adverse effects on agricultural land-use practices. Such effects have been known for millennia, as described by White (1961): […] the first mention of salt as a destructive crop agent [...] is dated at 2400 B.C.E.,continuing up to 2100 B.C.E., when evidence suggests that salinity sporadically covered most parts of Southern Babylon. (p. 96)

Among the evidence during periods of higher or lower salinity, one should consider, throughout history, the alternation of predominance of more tolerant crops to salt, such as barley, and less tolerant ones, such as wheat. This alternation would be an adaptation of crops to different salinity of the environment. This relationship between irrigation and salinity had also been mentioned by Sorre (1950) when writing that “a disastrous irrigation can increase the danger of this ‘alkali rise’, the wound of arid regions. A poorly conducted irrigation made the salts rise by capillary forces” (p. 172). Still on the topic of the difficulties involving irrigation in arid areas, the English geographer W.B. Fisher (1956), in his book The Middle East: A Physical and Regional Geography, wrote: In the Middle East, irrigation does not merely mean supplying arid areas with water, but also wisely using water with regard to soil deficiencies and climatic conditions. Certain soil types, such as desert marls (calcareous clays) or alluvium, once productive under irrigation, might become saline and sterile because the presence of water can induce chemical reactions which would not occur otherwise. (p. 65)

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In the case of Syria, as different types of irrigation undertaken are unknown, we only considered the irrigated surfaces. Thus, natural resources – soil and water – are completely linked, so that the use of the first is always dependent on the second, by means of irrigation, which, making use of Sorre’s words (1950), is translated into the statement: “only water grants to land all its value” (p. 718). Analysis of the evolution of irrigated areas shows an upward trend, which would be sufficient to consider – to some extent – this variable in the explanation of occasional low flow rate periods, because it is a consumptive and seasonal use – in most cases – as are crops. However, we cannot claim with a sufficient margin of safety that a wider irrigated area would demand more water – because this would require more specific technical knowledge – over efficiency and types of irrigation, which may alter the amount of water employed. We observe in Graph 6-6 a particularly significant period, comprising the years between 2002 and 2004, with a sharp increase in the extension of irrigated areas. Regarding the total Syrian territory, which is currently 185,180 km², in 2002 the country had 20.5% of its territory irrigated (38,000 km²). From the data collected, we cannot accurately explain this highlighted period, but it may be related to the increase in irrigation potential obtained from the construction of the Tishreen Dam, in 1999. Anyhow, we can verify a clear relationship between this period with that of lower flow rate of the Euphrates River, as shown in Graph 1. But this variable had to be ruled out, since the flow rate measurement point lies on the border with Turkey (Jarablus), therefore, upstream of all irrigated areas in Syria. Nevertheless, we maintained the variable irrigation in a latent mode, given its explanatory potential. Moreover, it is consistent with the general logic of the basin, as it gradually becomes more necessary downwards, due to the transition towards the desert environment. Consequently, Iraq contains the most extensive irrigated areas of the basin, covering around 1.3 to 1.5 million hectares (Un-Escwa, 2013, p. 66). The Iraqi Minister for Water Resources declared that “over 90% of available water is used to irrigate 3.25 million hectares of land throughout Iraq”74.

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Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 24, 2015.

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Graph 6-6 – Evolution of irrigated areas in Syria, between 1970 and 2009. Org.: Venturi (2011). Source: Statistical Abstracts (1970-2011).

As a conclusion, the gradual increase of irrigated areas downstream may contribute to enhance a natural tendency to salinity and to flow rate decline. Thus, there is a set of natural and social variables which could affect the Euphrates River flow rate, with predominance of the former. The conclusion of the statistical analysis indicates that the flow rate is primarily affected by precipitation and, to a much lesser extent, by the construction of barrages (the relation to irrigated areas remains dependent on data from the upstream measurement point being taken into account). It also indicates that neither of these two variables alone is sufficient to compromise the Euphrates River flow rate, since the temporal series was shown to be stationary. Let us see how these conclusions can be reinforced by observing the empirical reality in loco. It is needless to attest the importance of fieldwork in geographical studies. In this case, however, redoubled concern has been given to using an empirical basis. Authors who occasionally address the Middle East, without ever having travelled through its lands – and we had no intention to increase this group – are very common. We searched for evidence on the maintenance of the Euphrates River by means of landscape observation at three particular periods. We conducted the first observation in January, 2010 (Figure 6-2) in Deir Ez-Zor, Syria, around 130 kilometres from the border with Iraq.

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Figure 6-2 – The Euphrates River in the city of Deir Ez-Zor. Photograph from the author, January 2010.

Even during a period prior to the Anatolian snowmelt, when the water volume reaches its maximum levels, the river was already mighty. If the level rose up to four meters high, as literature has proved probable, diverse riverside occupations would indeed be flooded,. From February through April, 2011, two more fieldworks confirmed the suspicion which arose during the first observation: that there was no sign of a drought, even in the period prior to high flow rate, which starts in April. When comparing images from the same point taken in 2010 and 2011, we observed exactly the same characteristics in flow rate and apparent water quality (Figures 63 and 6-4). For comparative purposes, despite different angles and scales, Figure 6-5 shows the Euphrates River in the 1920s. From its main course – in the centre of the picture, veering to the left – we would have the same vision as previous photographs.

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Figures 6-3 and 6-4 – The same stretch of the Euphrates River in Deir Ez-Zor, January 2010 and February 2011 (photographs from the author). Arrows indicate the fluvial island sighted from the bridge.

Figure 6-5 – Oblique views of the Euphrates and the city of Deir Ez-Zor in the 1920s (Source: Upper image: Aviation Militaire / BLANCHARD, 1929, p.214; lower image: 39e Régiment d’Artillerie, 1934).

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Around 120 kilometres downstream, next to the border with Iraq, the landscape had no change and the water was still abundant75 (Figure 6-6).

Figure 6-6 – The Euphrates River in the city of Al-Bukamal, ten kilometers from the border of Iraq. Photograph from the author, February 2011.

Comparing this stretch of the Euphrates River with the other over 500 kilometres upstream – therefore, above the main Syrian dams – the landscape is hardly altered, vegetation is practically the same and the river appears as mighty as ever. The clean water is partly due to the existence of barrages which modify sediment transport capacity (Guerra; Cunha, 2011, p.240). Only the relief changes, because in this stretch, the fluvial plain is narrower and its boundaries outline the main riverbed in some stretches, as shown in Figures 6-7 and 6-8.

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The idea of returning after the Anatolian snowmelt was precluded by political events in Syria, which started worsening from March 2010, impairing the journeys around the country, particularly in boundary and river-bathed regions, strongly controlled by the army.

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Figures 6-7 and 6-8 – The Euphrates River near the Syrian city of Jarablus (border with Turkey), photographs taken from the same point in the margins, the first towards upstream and the second, downstream. Photographs from the author, March 2011.

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We observed a great resemblance between the river at this point where it enters the Turkish territory with the point where it leaves the Syrian territory towards Iraq (Figure 6-9 and 6-10). The landscape aspect that changes the most is the fluvial plains’ width. Sometimes farther, sometimes closer to the riverbed, the transition from fluvial plains to sedimentary plateau is nearly always delimited by 50- to 100-meter-altitude cliffs, making the landscape remarkable, particularly in the middle course of the Euphrates River (Figure 32). This landscape had been described by Dudley Stamp (1959): “the borders (of desert) are rigid, rocky plains with portions of sand, and, there are often fifty-to-one hundred-foot-high slopes which clearly mark the beginning of the Euphrates-Tigris plains.” (p. 142)

Figure 6-9 – The Euphrates River relief at its middle course. Photograph from the author, February 2011.

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Figure 6-10 – The green-emerald colour of the Euphrates River waters; Halabia, Syria. Source: Dbajurin | Dreamstime.com.

Indeed, the Euphrates valley, particularly from Deir Ez-Zor, forms an expressive landscape, with sharp transitions between the background of cropped valleys, cliffs and desert, which leave no doubt as to the compartments and the processes through which they were formed, especially the excavation of the river on sedimentary terrain and recent sediment deposition on the fluvial plains. Blanchard (1929) also described this landscape with some poetic tone: From Deir Ez-Zor, in particular, the narrow valley carved between steppes and desert is always a garden copiously watered by river waters lifted by norias […]. A verdant and endless strip of land, thus stretched by the edges of the Euphrates […], terminating on clay banks and the sad cliff walls […]. (p. 221)

This remarkable landscape, having a chute-like format, indicates that part of the water withdrawn from the river for irrigation of the plains remains in the basin system, through an infiltration process, despite the evaporation and absorption of part of it by vegetation. In Al-Bukamal, accounts of residents of the city indicated that the river dynamic presents a similar behaviour on a yearly basis. A local merchant

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stated: “I was born here and I have always lived here. I have never noticed anything different in the river; it always fills up in the same period…declines in the same period”. Despite the technical76 limitation, accounts were extremely valuable, given the impossibility of obtaining empirical data from other sources. Finally, we considered that the maintenance of a high water level is due to the fact that, at this point, the Euphrates River has already received water from its three tributaries: the Sajur, Balikh and Khabur Rivers.

Qualitative analysis of water Qualitative analysis of the Euphrates River water was based on both empirical and laboratorial data. In fieldwork conducted in February through March, 2011, we searched for natural and human indicators of the landscapes, which could highlight water quality maintenance. We travelled the whole Euphrates River basin in Syrian territory, from the city of Bukamal to the city of Jarablus on the border with Turkey, crossing the river at different points. The first direct observation of the river had been made at the city of Deir Ez-Zor, in January of 2010, as previously mentioned. On that occasion, under the sunlight, the colour of water was eye-catching due to its emeraldgreen shades (Figure 6-10). Perhaps, because of this, the city is known as “the emerald of the Euphrates”. The second observation, more systematic, was conducted throughout the stretch between the city of Deir Ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal. Observing the landscape, we could mostly notice agricultural activities and human occupation structured in villages and a number of small towns as well. We expected to find water with a higher degree of pollution in Al-Bukamal, since this stretch lies further downstream and the period visited was prior to flood season, so that a low water level could concentrate pollutant elements and make them more evident. Nonetheless, the water quality found in Al76

The use of script-oriented interview techniques was jeopardised by adverse conditions. In this field, we were followed by the Mukhabarat, the Syrian secret police, which considered excessively strange (to a certain extent) the presence of a foreigner in a boundary city who did not even have a hotel to stay in, mainly in that period of the early Arab Spring in the country. Such an incident represented a technical limitation and required a re-adaptation of the procedure. The reports of residents, though valuable, were compiled in an unsystematic way, taking advantage of a police breach, without the due registration and systematization.

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Bukamal was, apparently, quite similar to that observed three weeks later, hundreds of kilometres upstream, in Jarablus. The sample collected in this area was transparent, clear and odourless. Throughout the landscape, we identified no visible pollutant agents, such as industrial waste disposal and the river water was directly used by riparian communities, withdrawing it using a pumping system. In Deir Ez-Zor, the largest city – and thus potentially more of a polluting influence – some indicators of landscape and use suggested that the water could maintain a certain degree of quality (although we had not analysed samples from this point). Certain uses related to transportation (Figure 611), and leisure activities, such as fishing and diving, indicated that water pollution, if it existed, was maintained at quite an insignificant degree.

Figure 6-11 – Women transporting milk through the Euphrates River, near the city of Deir Ez-Zor. Photograph from the author, February 2011.

Another landscape indicator which could corroborate this assertion was the presence of numerous aquatic animals, such as ducks (Figure 6-12), although some species are more pollution-tolerant.

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Figure 6-12 – Many ducks populate the Euphrates River in Deir Ez-Zor. Photograph from the author, February 2010.

In a number of backwaters, however, we observed accumulation of urban waste, particularly composed of plastic packing, as shown in Figure 6-13. In Jarablus, on the border with Turkey, a landscape observation on the Euphrates River basin was carried out in March, 2011. The water was also shown to be clear, transparent, odourless and, apparently, potable. This perception was reinforced by both the sample collected and some landscape elements. As temperatures were milder, there were families in leisure activities at the riverside, making direct use of the water77. Nor did we find any particular source of pollution, such as industries and waste dumping at this place. There must be sewage discharge derived from occupation along the river, but we cannot ascertain to what degree of intensity. The fact is that, in each stretch we travelled through, the water quality was apparently good, which was subsequently confirmed by laboratorial analysis.

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We – that is, me and the driver, who had escorted me since the city of Aleppo – drank the water from the river, the only water available at certain times. Back in São Paulo, clinical exams detected no contamination.

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Figure 6-13– Plastic waste accumulated in small backwaters in the city of Deir Ez-Zor. Photograph from the author, January 2010.

At all events, any level of water pollution by sewage discharge through this stretch would be an internal issue to be solved by the relevant departments of those in Syrian public office, neither involving its neighbours nor enhancing the general conflict. Water transparency may be partly due to barrages, since these structures retain sediments (pollutants or not). Pumping and redistribution through canals are common in every stretch of the middle course of the Euphrates River, as shown in Figure 6-14.

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Figure 6-14 – Crop irrigated with the Euphrates River waters in Jarablus, Syria. Source: Joel Carillet | Stock.

We systematised the information in Figure 6-15, where observations were scored and localised on the stretch under study. The figure consists of a montage comprised of a map of the stretch travelled through, photographs and its subtitles. The choice of the main observation points (Jarablus and Al-Bukamal) showed to be appropriate, because it allowed us to conclude how the quantity and quality of the Euphrates River waters is maintained in Syrian territory as a whole.

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Figure 6-15 – Illustrative systematisation of fieldwork in the Euphrates River basin in Syria. Photographs and organisation by Pablo Nepomuceno (May, 2011).

Water samples collected in Jarablus and Al-Bukamal were analysed by the Brazilian laboratory78, which elaborated potability reports in accordance with Ordinance Number 518 from the Ministry of Health of Brazil. The reports on Al-Bukamal and Jarablus (Table 6-2) indicate that the two 78

RR Acqua Service, Santo André, São Paulo.

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samples are found according to potability parameters established by the Regulatory Ordinance, which is based on international standards. Of the twenty-four parameters analysed, twelve showed the same rates for the two samples, four minimally more favourable for the Al-Bukamal sample, downstream, and eight slightly more favourable for the Jarablus sample. All the parameters complied with the Ordinance in both samples and all of them showed quite lower rates than those maximums tolerated, which indicate that the Euphrates water, in natura, had good potability at the two collection points; although we expected that downstream it would show an inferior quality, that, fortunately, did not occur. In broader terms, we can affirm that the water quality that enters Syria via the Euphrates River coming from Turkey, in Jarablus, is maintained when the river flows from this country to Iraq, near Al-Bukamal. That means that neither Turkey nor Syria compromises its water quality, assuring good water quality input to Iraq. This fact is reinforced due to the fact that the use attributed to water resources is directed essentially to non-polluting activities, such as irrigation, energy production and supplying small and medium-sized cities. Some landscape characteristics previously mentioned, e.g. the gradual decrease of rainfall and increase of evaporation rates, were supported by laboratorial analyses. The parameters “conductivity” and “total hardness” increase from Jarablus towards Al-Bukamal, from 302 to 651 and from 154 to 214, respectively. Table 6-2 – Conductivity analysis and TDS of water samples of Jarablus and Al-Bukamal. Analysis of the results

Jarablus sample

Al-Bukamal sample

Conductivity

302.0

651.0

TDS (Total Dissolved Solids)

146.0

329.0

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These parameters are related to sodium (Na) contents and corroborate somewhat the upward trend of landscape aridity, and, consequently, the water salinity from upstream heading downstream, as exposed in Chapter 4 (The Euphrates River basin), in the section entitled “The Syrian context”. Graph 6-7 confirms the natural increase in salinity of the Euphrates as it flows downstream.

Graph 6-7 – TDS (total dissolved solids) gradation since Ataturk Dam (Turkey) towards the city of Nasiryah (Iraq). Source: Un-Escwa (2013).

The Un-Escwa inventory, from which this graph was extracted, shows a causal relationship between salinity and human activities, such as irrigation and use of agricultural inputs, besides sewage discharge in natura along the river. Salinity increasing “likely results from upstream pollution arising from Turkish projects on irrigation and Syrian agricultural activities on the Euphrates River’s fluvial plains” (p. 67, emphasis added). Mention has also been made of the concentration of gypsum in Syrian soils, which would favour the mobilisation of salts: “In Syria, the Euphrates flows through areas whose soils are rich in gypsum, a mineral that has a high potential for salt mobilisation and, therefore, contributes to an increase on salinisation” (p. 67). Once more, causal relation between the variables is included as a hypothesis dependent on confirmation. Even so, conclusive-toned assertions are ventured in the inventory, sometimes relating salinity to

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agriculture, such as “salinity often results directly from agricultural activities” (p. 68), sometimes to the decline of flow rates originating from barrage filling: The great peak of TDS (total dissolved solids) observed in Hussaybah in the period from 1989 through 1993 coincides with the reduced flow rate of the Euphrates entering Iraq, possibly due to the filling of upstream reservoirs, such as the Baath Dam (1987) and even the largest dam of Ataturk (1990). (pp. 68-69)

If we can accept the first part of the argument, i.e., that in general terms, the decline of flow rates may increase salinity; the second part already becomes questionable due to two factors: first, because in 1988 and 1989, therefore subsequent to the construction of the barrage in question, the Euphrates River showed the greatest flow rate within a period of 41 years (see Graph 1) in Syria, of approximately 1,590 m³/s. Second, in regard to Ataturk Dam, it is risky to relate low flow rate exclusively to filling, because the Euphrates River had already shown an average annual flow rate of 491 m³/s between 1990 and 1993, i.e., two years before its filling. There is no reason to accept that the filling of a barrage started two years before its conclusion. Thus, we support here that the gradual increase in temperature and evaporation rates, associated with the decline in precipitation, as seen previously, naturally result from the increase in salinity as a consequence of water conductivity, common in desert environments.. Favourable evidence for this natural trend is given by salinity rates prior to the construction of barrages and by major irrigation projects. In 1971, the salinity rate in Tabqa was 333 mg/L and, in Deir Ez-Zor, around 180 kilometres downstream it was 413 mg/L. In 2010, these rates were 277 mg/L and 441 mg/L, respectively. Although the salinisation trend is clear, data pre-and postbarrages are shown to be very similar to support the idea that this increase might have natural causes. Moreover, the trend line on the graph reflects regular continuity and gradation, a characteristic that does not express any impact from human interventions. In 2011, i.e., after all human interventions, the samples of Jarablus and Al-Bukamal were146 mg/L and 329 mg/L, respectively (Table 6-2), taking into account that these two cities are over 400 kilometres apart, so that a higher difference in salinity would be expected. Sewage in natura that reaches rivers is also a polluting source, although there is no precise measurement on this matter. There are neither any big cities nor industrial plants along the Euphrates River. The largest Syrian riverside cities are Al-Raqa (approximately 220 thousand inhabitants), Deir

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Ez-Zor (212 thousand inhabitants) and Al-Bukamal (43 thousand inhabitants – 2004 census) and are distributed over three hundred kilometres. Regarding fertilisers, normally associated with pollution and water salinisation, agricultural activities along the river predominantly use nitrogen-based chemical products with a low lifespan, which lose their characteristics after some metres and some days from infiltration. We can conclude, at this moment, that changes in the quality water of the Euphrates River, from upstream towards downstream, are mainly related to the gradual increase in salinity and this phenomenon results from a natural geographical dynamic, rather than from the impacts of human action. Anyhow, laboratorial analysis of samples did not achieve pollution rates with compromising water potability in the Syrian stretch. In Iraq, all variables were marked: rise in temperature, as well as rising evaporation rates, precipitation decreases etc. The river no longer relies on tributaries and, at the same time, irrigation is essential for crops. Other barrages were built on the Low Euphrates, as previously seen, with different purposes, such as water diversion for flood contention, irrigation, and energy generation. Thus, although we have not had the opportunity to conduct fieldwork in Iraqi territory in order to create an empirical basis of that reality, the analysis of secondary data available and the natural logic that rules the river basin led us to affirming that salinity tends to increase and the flow rate tends to diminish. Similarly to what happens in Syria, we identified no significant changes on the quantity and quality of water in the Euphrates River. If changes are to occur in Iraqi territory, then they might be associated not only with a natural trend but also the diverse and ancient engineering works constructed throughout the twentieth century. The acknowledgment of these facts is important so that occasional tensions among countries are reduced. Also, acknowledging that Turkey has guaranteed 500 m³/s flow rate to Syria and that Syria outflows water with quantities and qualities similar to those received to Iraq is extremely important for the understanding between the three countries. Finally, knowing the water dynamics which rule the basin and their natural trends may create a solid base for an efficient common management. All of these factors open a new path, diverted from the water conflicts perspective. A path based on the ballast of historical and natural facts which rule the Euphrates River basin.

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Technology contribution Water, water everywhere And all the boards did shrink. Water, water everywhere Nor any drop to drink79 Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834)

This epigraph, extracted from the poem “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, romanticises the mariner drama grieving in thirst in the middle of the immensity of an ocean. Indeed, the history of desalination is linked to sea navigation, because of modest-sized vessels and extended trips, it was almost impossible to take drinking water for a ship’s crew members, which would occupy the space of commercial cargos. The technique utilised was the simplest: boil water and condense the vapour, i.e., distil it. Despite this technique, Fenton (1964) mentions that “the basic method is as old as history. Starting with the Ancient Greeks, sailors have distilled seawater through this procedure for over 2,000 years” (p. 29). More evidence that desalination has been long known by mankind dates back to the fifth century B.C.E., to Aristotle’s quote: “salt water, when it turns into vapour, becomes sweet and the vapour does not form salt water when it condenses again”. (apud Camp, 2009, p. 107). With the advent of steamboats, journey times became shorter, but freshwater continued to be an urgent need, exactly in order to produce vapour. According to Fenton (1964, p. 29), in the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom already had patents on seawater desalination through distillation and some English colonies began to produce freshwater via such a process early in the twentieth century. In Curacao, British Antilles, there has been a desalination plant operating since 1928. In Aruba, an island with absolutely no freshwater, the population has been supplied by desalination since 1960. Thus, although this technique is not completely new technology, it has been developed rapidly. According to Camp (2009): World capacity to desalinate water has grown from a single plant producing up to 326 m³ per day, in 1945, up to 10,000 plants able to produce over 35 million m³ per day, in 2004. (P. 200)

Gourou (1953) addressed the difficulty of supplying water in the most populous cities of Saudi Arabia and the use of techniques for desalination 79

Written by Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772 – 1834), English poet, literary, critic, philosopher and theologian.

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and distribution already undertaken in the 1950s. Referring to Mecca and Jeddah, which sheltered, respectively, 200 thousand and 150 thousand inhabitants at that time, the author explains that “supplying these large agglomerations with water is not an easy task; cisterns and wells are not sufficient. In Jeddah, it was necessary to create desalination plants for seawater distillation; a recent aqueduct relieved the situation” (p. 476). Fenton (1964) described Kuwait as a desalination power in the 1960s, an owner of enormous plants which produced water once imported. This technology contribution reversing water scarcity, as one of the variables raised by the central hypothesis, is herein assessed by two indicators: the production of freshwater and the gradual substitution of natural sources by produced water, using the United Arab Emirates as an empirical context.

Production of freshwater The seven emirates comprising the United Arab Emirates are relatively independent in terms of water resource management and data organisation. For our analysis, we chose the Emirate of Dubai, due to the following reasons: it presents a significant historical data series (2001-2012), considering that the country (UAE) has a few decades of formation as a nation state. In addition, in the 2000s, this Emirate witnessed a developmental leap which exerted strong pressure over water resources. Another justification for our choice was due to the fact that Dubai’s data are complete, including information on total freshwater production, consumption, demand, as well as the percentage of the contribution of desalination plants. The first systematisation conducted on this data is about the total water production80 ranging from 2001 to 2012. We can observe in Graph 6-8 a production rolling overview in the Emirate of Dubai.

80

Hereinafter, water production refers to the production of freshwater, drinking water through desalination process. The expression “water production” may sound strange in Brazilian context, where freshwater is just obtained from the environment

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Graph 6-8 – Evolution of water production in the Emirate of Dubai from 2001 through 2012. Source: elaborated by Venturi (2013) from the Dubai Emirate official data, obtained at: . Accessed in: March 2011 and July, 2013.

We observe in this period an increase of 101% in water production, reaching in 2012 a total of 96,380 million imperial gallons (MIG)81, equivalent to 437,998.910 m³ of water from desalination plants. Natural factors which contribute to the occurrence of water resources, particularly precipitation, would not have been altered in the period and a significant change in natural dynamics seemed unlikely. However, this piece of information, as absolute data, will only have explanatory potential when confronted with other pieces of information, especially those related to the population or consumers of produced water. The demographic growth, considered herein as the number of consumers in a general manner, was in the order of 191%. The population almost tripled in the period (Graph 6-9). Although the demographic growth had been

81 An imperial gallon equals 4.5460 litres. Thus, 1 MIG equals 4,546,000 or 4,546 m3. This production would already have surpassed 100 thousand MIG/year, according to information available at: ; Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015.

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higher than water production, these two data maintain a strong statistical relation, with correlation rates of 0.959.

Graph 6-9 – Evolution of total number of Dubai Emirate water consumers from 2001 through 2012. Source: elaborated by Venturi (2013) from the Dubai Emirate official data, obtained at: . Accessed in: March 2011 and July, 2013.

Nevertheless, any conclusion based on these two growth rates can characterise a Malthusian assertive, i.e., that, at some point there will not be sufficient water for everyone, since the population grows more rapidly than water production. Based on these two data (water production and number of consumers), we constructed other pieces of information, related to water availability per capita and occasional surplus. Graph 6-10 shows the evolution of water availability per inhabitant in the period, which was drafted in previous graphs. We observed a decline in availability per capita in the Emirate of Dubai in the period studied. This decline can be derived from two linked factors: an economic impetus that conveyed to an increase of civil construction and infrastructure, demanding more immigrant labour; this fact, associated with the growth of tourism, would create more demand for water resources, diminishing the availability per capita.

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Graph 6-10 – Water availability per capita in Dubai Emirate from 2011 through 2012. Source: elaborated by Venturi (2013) from the Dubai Emirate official data, obtained at: . Accessed in: March 2011 and July, 2013.

Figure 6-16 – New Dubai, a contemporary district under construction, is increasing the demand for water. Source: Sergemi | Shutterstock.com.

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The fact is that, even with a slight decrease in water availability per inhabitant in the period, the Emirate is able to maintain a supply at much higher levels than it would obtain only through natural availability. In the The State of the Middle East: An Atlas of Conflict and Resolution (Smith, 2008), the UAE are among the countries with lower natural water availability (less than 100 m³/in./year), but who ensure, through desalination technology, an average supply of 1,127 m³ of water per in./year, i.e., a relatively comfortable situation, similar to countries like Denmark, with 1,128 m³/in., or South Africa, with 1,154 m³/in. (p. 132). Evidence for this yet favourable situation is expressed by the surplus generated. We obtained this data from the difference between total water production and total consumption, considering as a surplus the water that is produced but not consumed. Graph 6-11 systematises the evolution of water surplus generated in the Emirate of Dubai. The average surplus within the period is 12%, which expresses a safe situation. The variation which is evident within the period covered by the graph was not the object of analysis, but it may, even preliminarily, be associated with fluctuations in the immigrant population, due to the seasonality of works or a stimulus for water production when the surplus reaches lower rates. However, this would seem mere speculation. Anyway, the difference between the original availability of less than 100 m³/in./year to an average of 1,127.3 m³/in./year, with a 12% surplus, is a fact of significant socioeconomic relevance, which contradicts all pessimistic forecasts over water scarcity in this region. Obviously, this model of water production, which will further be resumed, demands major electricity supply generated predominantly by gas- or oilpowered thermoelectric plants.

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Graph 6-11 – Water surplus annually generated in Dubai Emirate from 2001 through 2012. Source: elaborated by Venturi (2013) from the Dubai Emirate official data, obtained at: . Accessed in: March 2011 and July, 2013.

The second indicator is the following: participation of water attained from desalination, in comparison with water from land-based sources in the total production of the Emirate of Dubai.

Replacement of natural sources by desalinated water Natural water sources82 for supplying the Emirate of Dubai have gradually been replaced by desalinated ocean waters. Due to an increasing demand for water resources and scarce underground natural sources, desalination has become increasingly important, with peaks of 99.29% of the total supply in 2005, as shown in Graph 6-12.

82

Rivers, lakes, rainfall, snow and groundwater are the main natural water sources. Here, we are considering only underground sources.

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Graph 6-12– Participation of desalination and underground sources in the total water supply – Dubai Emirate – from 2001 through 2012. Source: elaborated by Venturi (2013) from the Dubai Emirate official data, obtained at: . Accessed in: March, 2011 and July, 2013.

In a preliminary analysis, we can see that there is a trend to eradicate the participation of land-based natural sources supplying the Emirate, which can be understood as being due to two reasons. First, because these sources are exhaustible for social and natural reasons, there is an increasing demand for them, at a higher pace than their natural reposition, since precipitation rates (and underground infiltration) are very low. It is necessary to consider that, on a regional or local scale, renewability of continental waters essentially depends on climatic factors, particularly precipitation, and pace of use. The second explanatory reason of the trend for a complete substitution of natural sources by ocean waters arises from the fact that desalination processes are continuously developed, becoming gradually more efficient and inexpensive. Statistically, we cannot affirm that a total replacement of these sources by desalination processes would occur. But this is not the purpose of the analysis conducted in this book. We intend to show that, currently, a total replacement of natural sources by industrial

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plants would already be possible, and the 2005 data constitute unquestionable evidence on this matter83.

Figure 6-17 – Desalination Plant in Dubai. Source: Shao Weiwei | Shutterstock.com.

In the Arabian Peninsula, several other examples can support the arguments herein presented, which reveals that water scarcity has been overcome by technology. Saudi Arabia leads the world ranking of drinking water production from ocean water desalination (Figure 6-17), producing over 5 million cubic meters per day84, besides being the country having the most ancient plants in the region, according to Gourou (1953). Water produced by desalination from salt water in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea is distributed throughout the country via aqueducts extending for hundreds of kilometres. In 1985, desalination processes contributed to only 5% of the water supply in the country. However, in 2000, the 27 Saudi desalination plants, according to the Ministry of Water and Electricity of Saudi Arabia, already accounted for 70% of freshwater supply. The speed at which the desalination process develops leads us to a perspective on efficiency improvement and cost reduction, which can mean 83 See further details in “The end of natural water scarcity” (Venturi, 2014). Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2019. 84 Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2019.

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that, in the medium term, there will be greater diffusion of this technology even for poorer countries, which also face situations of natural water stress. In the 1960s, a gradual decrease in desalination cost in relation to water obtained from natural sources had already been achieved. At that time, Fenton (1964) stated that “There have already been encouraging signals that the difference between the cost of water produced by desalination and water from conventional sources is decreasing.” (p. 29) In the Sultanate of Oman, 77% of the supply stems from the desalination of seawater85. The country is able to guarantee an average supply of 100 to 130 litres per person per day. This still seems very little, but, by the way the information was presented, we assume that this value refers only to domestic consumption, disregarding other uses that are normally included in the calculation and thus increasing the cubic metre level per inhabitant. Although this interpretation has not been confirmed by the Oman Power and Water Procurement Company (OPWP), the fact that Oman is the only country of the Persian Gulf with natural water availability over 100 m³/in./year leads us to consider that those 100 to 130 litres per day are, indeed, only what each person consumes in the domestic environment. In Oman, final water cost for the consumer was 0.86 OMR (Omani rial) per cubic metre (May, 2012), which is equivalent to R$ 3.82/m³ (real – Brazilian currency). Only for comparative purposes. water fetched from natural sources in São Paulo costs 54% of the same amount of water fetched in Oman, produced by desalination processes. The difference might not seem quite so big if we consider the high cost of desalination plants and the great availability of natural sources in São Paulo. According to the OPWP, there is research being developed on the feasibility of small desalination plants powered by renewable energy, which must be expanded in the foreseeable future. This must make the process more sustainable and reduce the dependency on hydrocarbons. Muscat, the capital of the Sultanate of Oman, is the headquarters of the Middle East Desalination Research Centre (MEDRC), a centre of excellence which has developed research, since 1996, by means of international cooperation between the countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Such research seeks new desalination technologies, reduction of costs and incorporation of renewable energy into the process of water production. The MEDRC develops new cooperation projects together with the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) in desalination and re-uses areas which can 85 Data regarding 2010, provided by the Oman Power and Water Procurement Company (OPWP), via e-mail, on January 9, 2012.

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mitigate the problem of water supply in Palestine. In the Gaza Strip, a population of 1,657,155 inhabitants86 living in an area of only 378 m² represents an enormous pressure on water resources, already scarce in the area. The overexploitation of wells causes the ascension of salt water, in a process named “saline intrusion” (Hirata, 2000, pp. 432-33), making the water of wells gradually brackish. In addition, according to the OPWP, there are neither disputes nor diplomatic incidents between the countries of the Persian Gulf over water resources. On the contrary: what exists is a technological cooperation, mainly through seminars and conferences on water resources and their supply, promoted by the MEDRC. Thus, Oman constitutes one more antagonistic example for the scarcityconflict paradigm, or the hypothesis of war for water. And, in this case, the variables are convergent on corroborating the central hypothesis, because in this country cooperation and technology contribution go hand in hand. Other countries of the Persian Gulf present a similar situation to that of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman. In Qatar, for instance, a single desalination plant is responsible for 50% of the total demand in the country, which has the highest demographic growth in the region87. Despite the increasing demand, the Qatar Electricity and Water Corporation are able to generate a surplus on a yearly basis. No less than 99.9% of the supply is attained by desalination and only 0.1% from underground sources, since there is no superficial water in the territory88. Qatar holds the title of the most arid country in the world. Other countries, such as Bahrain and Kuwait, show similar rates. The latter produces 20 million cubic metres of water per day and, even so, the demographic growth and urbanisation cause increasing and continuous demands89.

86 In accordance with the 2011 census. Data available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015. 87 Ras Abu Fontas Plant. Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2019. 88 Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015. 89 Data available at:

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Thus, the Persian Gulf, except for Yemen, have in common a scarcity of natural water sources, but abundance in oil, enabling countries to heavily invest in desalination processes, from which they are totally dependent in order to guarantee water supply for their populations. This process, however, has already been spread to over 150 nations and supplies more than 300 million people, as we shall demonstrate in further detail later on.

The relation between oil and water in the Persian Gulf and the notion of sustainability Regarding natural resources, water scarcity contrasts with oil abundance. All the countries in the region show water availability less than or equal to 100 m³/in./year (except for Oman) and, at the same time, shelter some of the major oil basins on the planet. The growth of the oil industry has stirred up an increasing demand for freshwater. In the 1940s and 1950s, Saudi Arabia received a lot of foreigners for work, from less qualified labour up to technicians and managers. According to Gourou (1953, p. 504), in 1948, there were 2,600 North Americans (not involving their families) involved in the oil industry. When added up, all immigrants created an extra demand for housing, food, and water. Freshwater import was gradually substituted by seawater distillation, a technique which has been continuously developed rapidly up to the present day, as previously seen. This development, in turn, demanded increased quantities of oil and natural gas, the principal fossil fuels used in thermoelectric plants which generate electric energy required for desalination plants. Thus, a circuit is formed in which the increase on the demand for a resource increases the demand for the other, and so forth. Also, the increase in water production triggers a succession of productive processes involving other resources. Gourou (1953) notes that “oil contributed to the expansion of irrigated surfaces in Arabia (1,200 ha next to Riyadh; projects of El Kharj and Holuf) and the construction of a railroad between Riyadh […] and Damman […]” (p. 505). The author reveals that the creation of urban and sanitation infrastructures reduced mortality and accelerated the population growth and, consequently, the demand for water.

and . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2019.

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There is an essential difference between oil and seawater: The first is exhaustible, whereas the second is not. If freshwater production from seawater desalination depends on oil, the sustainability of the process is linked to oil exhaustibility and the major concern should be to find an energy source which powers this process, rather than water resources themselves. There are also common aspects between oil and oceans, despite the asymmetry represented by the exhaustibility of the first and the inexhaustibility of the second. Both desalination plants and oil refineries include chemical processes, which demand a lot of energy and a complex infrastructure. Although desalination processes have brought autonomy to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman and other countries of the Persian Gulf, they depend on energy sources (particularly electricity) that, regionally, are produced in thermoelectric plants powered by oil or natural gas. Despite the use of nonrenewable sources being increasingly criticised, because it is linked to air pollution and global warming, it is necessary to consider the peculiarity of the context featured by abundance of oil and freshwater scarcity. And obviously, priority is given to this latter resource. The inexistence of other natural sources to supply the water demands would justify the wide use of oil for the production of freshwater in desalination plants, since it is essential to develop many of society’s sectors: agriculture, industry, tourism, commerce etc. It would be unimaginable, in the context of the Persian Gulf, to restrain these water production processes using environmental arguments, particularly those related to global warming, on which there is still uncertainty in a minority of the scientific community. Any person out of this context, who suggested such ideas, would certainly not be taken seriously, because this would be equivalent to relinquishing water, which would generate a social and economic calamity. As such, there are diverse technologies available for water desalination, all of them demanding energy arising from hydrocarbons, essentially for electric energy generation. Electro-dialysis is the technology which demands a high quantity of electricity. The molecule of salt, comprised of one atom of sodium (Na) and one atom of chlorine (Cl), is broken through an electrical current; then the ions generated, with opposing electrical charges, split up. This technique permits the level of desalination to be controlled, which does not occur with distillation, which splits all the salts. The technique of distillation, the most ancient, can still be associated with pressure, so that the process can be accelerated, increasing the production speed. Another technique already quite widespread is reverse osmosis, where water is filtered through a membrane which retains the salts; such a

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procedure can also be done with the use of solar energy. This energy source can still be used in distillation itself, through a process where water is heated into a kind of greenhouse and the vapour produced is condensed. Seawater freezing is another desalination technique. The peoples, who inhabit the Arctic regions when only seawater is available, make use of this technique. As the freezing process splits water salts, the ice crust formed on the surface of a recipient containing seawater is extracted, discarding the remaining water where salts were concentrated. By repeating this process a number of times, these layers are piled up, turning into blocks of freshwater for human consumption. We can, thus, glimpse scenarios of diversification and combination of technologies (hybrid systems) which can become little by little more accessible and environmentally more sustainable. Therefore, a number of investments are intended for the development of more effective and sustainable technologies, either searching in nanotechnology for greater efficiency of water filtration, or incorporating inexhaustible energies into the process.

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS: A REFUTATION OF THE WATER SCARCITYCONFLICT PARADIGM

Before presenting our conclusion and its unfolding, it is useful to resume the objective and the central hypothesis of the study which gave rise to this book. We had proposed that the current reality of the Middle East would highlight the need for a revision over water resources, specifically over the explanatory paradigm which relates the variables ‘water scarcity’ and ‘conflict’ in an associative and causal manner. For this purpose, we elaborated a central hypothesis, through which both the sharing of a hydrographic basin and the technology contribution related to water production would make this relation of scarcity-conflict inefficient for the comprehension of that reality. The first variable – sharing – was supported by two indicators: the specific agreements which have guaranteed the sharing of water resources, and the maintenance of the river flow and water quality of the Euphrates River. The second variable – technology contribution – was also supported by two indicators, related to freshwater production via desalination, and the gradual replacement of natural sources through such a process. We shall see herein what roles these variables and indicators played to corroborate the hypothesis, justifying the theoretical revision and, subsequently, what propositions could be made.

On the variable: “sharing” Indicator: The existence of cooperation agreements The hypothesis was corroborated not only by the existence of agreements but also by the absence or insufficiency of events opposed to it (conflicts). All the questions raised here were supported by specialists.

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Through the results exposed in Chapter 6, we concluded that water resource sharing is predominant in the Middle East. Throughout the history of the region, even with the water scarcity which characterises this area, water has never been at the centre of conflicts. Agreements established between Turkey, Syria and Iraq have brought concrete results from the regional cooperation maintenance, involving not only water sharing of the Euphrates River, but also the creation of infrastructures to strengthen the development within the region. For Professor Bahjat Mohamad (2011): Water distribution between the three countries is now completed, under the laws that were signed by them […]. Henceforth Syria has made efforts to link to these countries commercially aiming at the exchange of commercial benefits and the establishment of political-economic relations which will form a sound basis for a future free from disputes over water resources. The results of these agreements have already appeared in more than one location […]92.

Some of these results refer to the creation of the Water Institute, as previously seen, integrating all three countries, besides common projects regarding irrigation and energy generation. Thus, from water resource sharing, other forms of economic integration are developed. The inventory of Un-Escwa (2013) states: “in a meeting of Strategic Collaboration, in 2009, Turkey and Syria signed 52 agreements on energy, transportation, commerce and security, In the same year, Iraq and Turkey signed a protocol on commerce and security” (p. 79). Historically, the only situation of armed conflict in the region which partially involved the question of water resources occurred in 1967, the SixDay War, when Israeli forces seized the Syrian Hills of Golan, which shelters important springs of the Jordan River basin. Thus, there is no empirical basis to support the relation scarcity-conflict, and this example cannot be generalised for the region, because it is not sufficiently representative. In Palestine, there are also frequent conflicts over the possession and use of water. However, these are more internal than transboundary episodes, according to what has been herein exposed, since there are not two states and two armies. However, even in this potentially bellicose context there are agreements by which the shared management of the Jordan River basin is guaranteed. Even though these examples are always reminded by heralds of water wars, they are, as samplings, well 92 Professor of the Geography Department of Damascus University, in an interview on March 26, 2011.

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below the necessary conditions to gain scientific strength and support an explanatory paradigm. The Israeli author Katz (2011) alerts us to the unsustainability of the water wars hypothesis, ironically stating about the examples normally used: The majority of empirical evidence presented as support for the water wars hypothesis consists of anecdotal evidence and case studies. Among the most popular stunts are Israel bombarding Syrian endeavours to divert the course of the Jordan River springs […] [and] the attempts of the Palestine Liberation Organisation to bombard the Israeli National Water Reservoir […] (p. 2)

Beyond the Middle East Results obtained in the study that we conducted regarding sharing water can be magnified to the whole world. Although the study case have delimited the Middle East, if we surpassed the conclusions regarding the predominance of sharing, we could find more examples which would support the central hypothesis and enable the expansion of results. We may mention the international basins of the River Plate and the Amazon in South America, the Congo-Oubangui-Sangha River and the Nile in Africa, the Danube in Europe and the Mekong River in South Asia. All of these basins have sharing guaranteed and regulated under their respective agreements and there are no reports on conflicts involving the countries bathed by these rivers; instead, there are discussions and disputes within the diplomatic sphere. Rebouças (2004) asserts this predominance of agreement on sharing water when stating a UNESCO report, emphasising that: […] of the total of 1,831 interactions regarding water, approximately 67% […] 1,228 were transformed into cooperation agreements […] and resulted in the signature of 200 treaties for the joint water use and the construction of new dams. (p. 96)

This reveals a worldwide context in which belligerent conflict is an exception and is circumscribed by specific contexts, and, hence, could never support an explanatory paradigm. Some Turkish authors contest the water war hypothesis. Dursun Yildiz stated in an interview that, “when we look at academic production, we can clearly see that the thesis on the occurrence of water wars seems almost impossible. This concept is mostly published in magazines and popular journals.”

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This vision is also shared by European authors, such as Lopes (2009)93, to whom “a number of political and academic decision makers have called the attention towards water scarcity potential to trigger violent national and international conflicts (wars)” (p. 4). There would be clear reasons to disagree with this perspective, among them, a historical reason. According to the author: With respect to water, the last war – in the classic sense of such a term, two armies face to face, with over one thousand dead – reportedly took place between two city states in Ancient Sumer (Umma and Lagash) in 2,500 B.C.E. There has not been any historical report of another war among autonomous political entities triggered or explained by water reasons. (p. 4)

The author concludes, quoting Homer-Dixon (1999), that there is no direct relation between water scarcity and violence, although lack of water can be related to migrations, poverty, economic recession and these facts can aggravate conflicting contexts. Therefore, the relation between water scarcity and conflicts would only be indirect, and even so minimised by the action of political, economic, and social institutions, which have been able to guarantee sharing and avoid confrontations throughout history. The author further supports the conclusions of another author: Aaron Wolf, to whom there are many more international cooperation contexts related to water resource sharing than situations of confrontations. In the Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements94, Wolf (2002) shows a historical overview in which more than three hundred international agreements on water resources are listed and mapped, distributed by continents, countries and basins, as shown in Map 7-1.

93

Professor of International Relations of Coimbra University. Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2019. Aaron T. Wolf. PhD is a Professor and Director of the Geosciences College of Earth, Ocean and Atmospheric Sciences at Oregon State University. 94

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Map 7-1 – Number of international agreements per river basins. Adapted from Wolf (2002, p.14).

Through this map, the Tigris and the Euphrates River basins have from three to six international cooperation agreements. There is greater emphasis on the basins of the Nile in Africa, and the Danube in Europe, which have a greater number of agreements (between sixteen and twenty). By visualising the following map of the main international basins (Map 72), we verified that all of them are contemplated with agreements, and there is a strong correspondence between this map and the previous one.

Map 7-2 – International basins per continents. Modified from Wolf (2002, p.2).

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Comparing these maps with Graph 7-1 on world conflicts over water, we once more produced positive evidence on the predominance of cooperation agreements to the detriment of conflicts involving water resources, even in areas of greater water scarcity.

Graph 7-1– Updated chart on the intensity of events involving water resources. Source: Wolf (2002).

We observed on the graph that there is no report on formal war (-7) involving water resources and misunderstandings are nearly always limited to relatively hostile verbal and diplomatic actions (-4 to -1). On the other hand, we noticed a clear predominance of verbal or official agreements of a cooperative nature (0 to 7). Thus, Aaron Wolf provided quantitative support for the conclusions of our research that addresses the variable of sharing water, showing its strong predominance. Therefore, the scarcity-conflict paradigm has neither any scientific value on the regional scale of the Middle East nor on a global scale, because there is a great deal of opposing evidence. Even if there were some circumstantial evidence of conflict, it would be scientifically insufficient to identify any regularity, constancy, tendency or even casual relationship between the two elements in question (scarcity-conflict).

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Complementary reflections Analysing this model only under a Popperian perspective, a single piece of unfavourable evidence would be sufficient (a black swan, in the example of Popper), i.e., a situation of scarcity where there was no conflict to refute conclusively this explanatory paradigm, or the water war hypothesis (as prefers Katz, 2011). However, such a conclusion is risky, as far as the paradigm is not constituted only by physical-natural elements. On the dynamics of nature, a greater regularity of facts permits us to be more conclusive, either on confirmations and, especially, or on refutations. What occurs, however, is that the paradigm analysed has two combined dimensions: the natural dimension, which is one of the possibilities of water scarcity, and the social dynamic, which refers to the possibility of conflicts. Recapping Thomas Khun, the first dimension is more fixed and the second one, more fluid; the presence of the latter does not allow us to refute the paradigm, which leads us back to a methodological impasse typical of geographical analysis. However, if we cannot be conclusive in refuting the paradigm, through its social dimension, we can more securely corroborate its inefficiency, based on convincing evidence that the predominant trend is that countries located in a scenario of water scarcity remain in situations of cooperation and diplomatic negotiations. If it is not possible to indicate a forecast with the accuracy that natural sciences normally have, that there will be no conflict over water scarcity, we can surely affirm that it is not the trend and it is not probable to happen.

Indicator: Maintenance of the Euphrates River Data from the Un-Escwa report which suggests a causal relation between the flow rate decline of the Euphrates River and the construction of barrages were contested by three logical flaws. The first one related to a decline in the flow rate between Syria and Iraq in the period prior to barrages (19381973); the second one to considering averages of periods, which camouflaged an occasional trend of flow rate decline within each period, spreading the false idea of a drop; and finally, the fact that what was shown as a flow rate decline based on impoundments does not reflect the period analysed (1970-2010) when all main barrages were constructed. Statistical analysis on flow rate data from this period showed that it is a stationary temporal series, i.e., developed around a constant average through time, reflecting a stable equilibrium, even with the construction of

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barrages. The rolling history of flow rates in the studied period of 41 years shows that the river flow remains approximately at an average of 778.5 m³/s. The average flow rate of the following five years prior to the construction of the last important barrage on the Euphrates River (Kayacik, Turkey, 2005) was 614.8 m³/s, slightly lower (62.2 m³/s) than the average of 677.4 m³/s five years prior to the construction of the first large barrage (Keban, Turkey, 1975). Thus, the drop of 62.2 m³/s of the Euphrates River flow rate, although it does not statistically constitute a trend, can be explained by the following physical-geographical aspects: climatic changes from upstream towards downstream, such as an increase in temperature and evaporation rate and decline in precipitation; the geographical situation of the basin, in which the end of the flood season is followed by a dry summer, increasing the pressure over water resources for irrigation when they are most scarce; gradual decline up to a complete lacking of tributaries, as well as the river spreading in different canals downstream, increasing the evaporation surface; and the gradual increase in the need for irrigation downward, given the desert environment that the river enters. In the perspective placed by the Un-Escwa (2013) inventory, these natural characteristics “worsen the harmful effects of pollution arising from human activities” (p. 69). In the perspective herein proposed, human activities are the ones which can only exacerbate natural trends, especially if these last are neglected. All these articulated geographical factors must be considered for the river’s management, overcoming a simple and convenient relation between flow rate and barrages, which showed to have a weak explanatory potential. On the other hand, barrages offer the advantage of controlling the flow rate, being able to either retain or release more water according to seasonal needs, thus controlling the occurrence of floods “in certain periods in which the Euphrates River devastates riverside agglomerations along its course, sowing ruins” (Chayeb, 1955, p. 27). Based on everything that has been exposed so far, despite a relative flow rate decline from upstream to downstream, a fact that we demonstrated as natural, the Euphrates River hardly ever changes when we compare the previously shown photographs of Jarablus (Northern Syria), Deir Ez-Zor (Southern Syria), Al-Bukamal (Syrian-Iraqi border) and Hillah (Central Iraq). See Figure 7-1.

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Figure 7-1 – Sequence of photographs of the Euphrates River, from Jarablus (Syria, border with Turkey) towards Hillah (Central Iraq), showing flow rate maintenance. Photographs from the author. Source: ESRI and Un-Escwa – BGR Beirut (2013).

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Regarding the qualitative aspect of water resources, empirical and laboratorial data showed that the quality of water that enters the Syrian territory from Turkey is equivalent to that flowing from Syria to Iraq, showing a good level of potability throughout the stretch. The empirical experience in Syria showed that riparian communities make a direct use of water for consumption, leisure, transportation or fishing. The absence of industrial cities along the Euphrates River and the predominance of agricultural activities can explain the low degree of water pollution. Due to Syria being bathed by the middle course of the Euphrates, the results related to the quantity and quality of water are very significant, since they reflect the context of the basin upstream and, at the same time, influence the context downstream. As a conclusion, the maintenance of the quality waters of the Euphrates in a relatively scarce environment is contrary to the idea of conflict in the region and supports the initial hypothesis, as far as it can be considered a reflection of an effective sharing. Thus, the two indicators used to ascertain the existence of sharing, although independently analysed, became interdependent, because the first indicator (existence of cooperation agreements) helped to explain the second (maintenance of flow rate and the quality of the Euphrates River waters). Thus, the two indicators converged to support the variable of sharing water, strengthening it to corroborate the central hypothesis, by voiding the perspective of conflict.

On the variable: “technology contribution” The variable which focuses on technology contribution was efficient for the confirmation of the central hypothesis, since it showed the possibility of subverting the contexts of natural water scarcity, contradicting the scarcityconflict paradigm. This conclusion was supported on the analysis of the two indicators. Data from the first indicator regarding the evolution of water production by desalination showed that water production grows in a constant and rapid mode, following the increase in demand and generating even a comfortable surplus, far beyond the one there would be if one depended only on natural sources of water. Data from the second indicator, regarding the gradual substitution of underground sources by desalinated water, showed that there is a clear general trend of a gradual substitution of these sources by processes of desalination for the UAE’s supply. In Qatar, we saw that this replacement has already reached 99.9% of the total water production. Statistically, we cannot set a deadline for a total replacement to occur, and this was not our

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intention. Logically, however, we can predict this fact based on two premises: the increase on demand and finitude (and exiguity) of underground sources in that region. We added to these two premises the logic that technologies, whatever their nature, tend to gradually become less expensive and more efficient. Thus, the results on these two indicators efficiently validate the technology contribution variable and tackle head on the Malthusian logic of the water scarcity-conflict paradigm.

Complementary reflections The context in the Persian Gulf still presents other particularities. Firstly, it is a context of extreme natural water scarcity, which on its own would already invalidate the scarcity-conflict paradigm, since there is no resource to be disputed. Secondly, in this context, a substitution of an abundant resource (oil) by another scarce one (water) is likely to happen, making the countries autonomous regarding water supply, leaving the possibility of water disputes even further behind. Another aspect which must be emphasised refers to the fact that, by comparing the two contexts studied (the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf basins), we verified that the first one, although with a greater natural availability of water resources, shows low rates of water access and sanitation. This fact highlights the social dimension of the question on supply, based on technical and managerial solutions. Thus, there can be contexts not only of natural abundance of water, but with no adequate access to quality water, but also contexts of pronounced scarcity, e.g., the Persian Gulf, where public policies and investments can guarantee quality supply for all inhabitants and sectors of the economy. The questions that one can ask at this moment are whether access to water depends on: a) water availability and/or technology, which demand great investments; and b) adequate distribution management. What can one expect from countries which have neither water resources nor capital to inject into desalination technology? If there is no capital and technological availability for the production and management of water, nor will there be for armed conflicts, since the latter also demands significant investments. Cooperation it will be the only choice. History demonstrates that armed conflicts, although profitable for some sectors, constitute the economic ruin of most countries involved.

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Undoubtedly, conflicts are much more expensive, in any sense, than the search for greater efficiency on the production and distribution of freshwater, supported as it is by more efficient public policies on development and on technology injection into the supply sector. Therefore, the most probable way is that of cooperation, exchange of experiences, research, management, as has happened not only in the Euphrates River basin but also among the countries of the Persian Gulf, e.g., MEDRC, , and among all the main international river basins as previously seen. The idea that the demand over water is increasingly growing and it will lead to conflicts disregards the possibility of technological development, diplomatic channels, and shared management to be able to resolve supply problems. The Malthusian perspective also rules out solidarity among peoples. Also, the contexts of the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf basins show that these factors are able to foster sharing agreements, minimising disputes.

Perspectives There are diverse available technologies (and several combinations among them) under development and improvement. Costs are still relatively high, due to the large scale on which these processes are developed in order to attend to the pressure towards water demand. However, they involve knowledge already disseminated and even less complicated processes than, for instance, the generation of nuclear energy. Thus, desalination, developed over decades in the region, does not necessarily generate dependency on foreign technology, so that countries can have autonomy to guarantee the supply for their population. In Oman, for instance, local institutions associate with large enterprises to produce water, always ensuring a local labour percentage, which in the future will be able to manage the process in an independent manner. Furthermore, there is a constant research effort to make the desalination process faster, more efficient and more sustainable, as Fenton had already identified in the 1960s. Water production sustainability will be determined, in the future, by the quantity and type of energy utilised. We can glimpse greater investment in technologies which demand a lower quantity of energy, besides the use of more sustainable energy sources than oil burning for the generation of electricity. There are many ways which can make the desalination process gradually cleaner, more efficient and more sustainable. On the day that seawater desalination can be completely powered by renewable or inexhaustible energy (such as solar and wind energy), freshwater will definitely be an inexhaustible resource. This day would have already come

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if we consider that, on the western coast of Australia, the desalination plant of Kwinana is completely powered by wind. There, 48 wind turbines generate sufficient energy to produce 40 million gallons per day, which is equivalent to 20% of all water used in the city of Perth (IDA, 2013b). In Bahrain, there are projects in cooperation with Germany for the installation of desalination plants powered by wind energy, which would reinforce the idea of inexhaustibility of freshwater96. In Saudi Arabia, major projects on desalination powered by solar energy are in progress. According to the IDA, in the past twenty years energy reduction on desalination processes was in the order of 50%, which reflected the final cost of water per cubic metre (which currently would be between U$ 0,75 and U$ 1.25)97. According to Michel Morillon (May 30, 2012, personal communication), Chief Engineer of a Desalination Plant in the city of Sur (Oman) the energy required to produce 1m3 of freshwater drop from 15kW to 3.5kW in only ten years, given the technological efficiency increase of the filtration process (reverse osmosis)98. As far as technologies are being combined and developed, they tend to become less expensive and, consequently, more universal. This optimism was already evident decades ago, as once more Fenton (1964) observes: Experiences with new major plants combined with continued research efforts must speed the time which most people in the world who do not have appropriate freshwater sources will be able to have access to the benefits of high quality water produced by desalination plants. (p. 31)

Patricia A. Burke, Secretary General of IDA, declared: […] the desalination industry has done its best to lower the cost of the process developing technologies which reduce the need for energy, implementing practices that reach great operational efficiency and adopting measures to improve environmental management. (IDA, 2013b)

96 Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2019. 97 Available at: . Accessed on: Mar. 28, 2012. 98 Information obtained during a visit to Sur Electric Power Plant in May, 2012.

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As a result, in 2011, desalination was already undertaken in more than 150 countries and the world’s freshwater production from the 16 thousand existing plants already exceeded 66.5 million cubic metres per day. This production supplies totally or partially more than 300 million people (IDA, 2013a)99, which demonstrates a clear process of universalisation. Even in poorer nations there are projects being planned or developed, such as the Gaza Plant, with the capacity to produce up to 180 thousand cubic metres per day. This will produce a positive social impact for that region, which has the highest demographic density in the Middle East, settled in an area of pronounced natural water scarcity. Obviously, water supply for the population of arid regions is not guaranteed only due to technology, but creates the possibility of obtaining it, particularly, from political decisions and planning. But maybe the greatest positive impact that these technologies can generate in all parts of the world will result from the use of filtration membranes for the treatment of water and sewage. This process is much more simple and cheaper than desalination. Perhaps, using desalination experiences in order to adapt them for the treatment and re-use of waters already existing is an important trend to be adopted worldwide. Evidence of this trend is already noticed in São Paulo (Brazil) where, after a recent period of crisis in supply (though not a water crisis itself), new technologies were beginning to be incorporated, such as filtration membranes to make treatment processes faster and more efficient.

Limitations of technology and common criticisms of desalination Technology, as an applied science for the solution of humanity’s practical problems, must neither be underestimated nor sublimated, under the risk of committing the same mistake, creating another dual paradigm (technology = no conflict or technology = supply). Cechin (2010) reminds us that, from the perspective of Karl Marx, “technology would resolve the problem of natural limits […]. Every scarcity would disappear in the future, because humankind would already have the capacity to overcome it and attend to all human needs” (p. 30).

99

Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2019.

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On the other hand, Hanz Morgenthau, in his book of 1946 entitled Scientific Man versus Power Politics, already alerted against a overvaluation of science and technology as the solution of economic, social and political problems. Some expositors of neoclassic economics of the twentieth century go beyond, by considering natural resources only as one more production factor (natural capital), alongside capital goods (capital constructed or manufactured) and human capital. For one of these representatives, Robert Solow (1974), there would be nothing to worry about, since it is the sum of the three types of capital which must be considered and the absence of one can be somewhat compensated by the others. In order to contradict this argument, authors of the green economy, such as Georgescu-Roegen, accuse the neoclassicists of neglecting the biophysical constraints of natural resources imposed over economic growth (Cechin, 2010, p. 100). They deny the idea that natural resources can, by the technological pathway, be substituted by manufactured objects. It would be equivalent to conceiving the economic system as a closed system that did not need the input of matter and energy to be stimulated, functioning in perpetual motion regardless of its nature. Moreover, technology neither solves problems related to the inequitable appropriation of water resources nor guarantees universal access to it. These are questions addressed to political and social dimensions. These factors complement the explanatory limits of the neoclassical perspective of technology overvaluation and help us to understand that there are still populations affected by natural and managerial water scarcity, despite all existing and known technology. The hunger crisis in Somalia, 2012, for instance, worsened by a severe period of drought, shows that there are other factors to be considered in order to explain these contexts and that the technological availability is only one of its facets, although not always the most important one. In that context, besides the lack of financial and technical resources for food production, dominant groups hindered the distribution of humanitarian aid. In the Syria of the 1950s, according to Gourou (1953, p. 488), the misery of peasants did not come from the lack of lands or water, but instead, the rapacity of landowners, who took 60% of land profit, without reinvesting on it. Over 300 thousand hectares could still have been irrigated, in that era, throughout the Euphrates River. Thus, technology, although being an important dimension of the supply challenge and guaranteed in the context of the Persian Gulf, cannot be considered the only and main solution in any other context.

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Among the main criticisms still levelled at desalination, fossil fuel burning is the one that is highlighted the most. It must be emphasised that almost all industrial processes, mostly for the production of non essential goods for human survival, are based on hydrocarbons, either for direct use or the production of electricity. Here, the justification for the use of hydrocarbons comes from the final product itself: freshwater – a much more essential product than most of the artefacts produced by other sectors of industry which also use hydrocarbon burning. Another criticism that often contradicts desalination refers to costs, which would limit this process torich countries. As previously seen, costs have diminished in an inversely proportional manner to the gain of efficiency, so that, currently, more than 150 countries have already developed some form of desalination process. On the other hand, costs are also very high for spring water treatment, usually exposed to pollution sources, and increase proportionally with the degree of pollution. While the average price of treated water in the state of São Paulo, Brazil costs approximately R$ 2.80 per m³, in more polluted regions, such as in the Billings and Guarapiranga reservoirs, in metropolitan areas, this value can multiply100. Regardless of any aspects related to environmental and economic costs, it is necessary to consider the possibility of technological development to help solve part of the supply problems.

Proposition of improvement of the scarcity-conflict paradigm The results of a study are, obviously, the corroboration or not of the hypothesis and the aspects revealed by it, something that has already been accomplished in this conclusion. However, the objectives presented in this book referred to the proposition of two possibilities resulting from the theory: the first proposes the improvement of the paradigm discussed; the second, listed as a specific objective, proposes a conceptual adjustment of water as a resource. Earlier in the conclusion, we corroborated the central hypothesis using two variables: sharing and technological contribution. Since they showed an explanatory potential, we now propose the inclusion of these two variables into the scarcity-conflict paradigm, in order to surpass its dual dimension, thereby making it more comprehensive, from a systemic perspective for the 100

Information produced from a database provided by an employee at the Basic Sanitation Company of the State of São Paulo (SABESP), through analysis of both water bills and the portal of this company.

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integration of other factors. These variables, added to those ones already existing were subdivided into three classes. For instance, the variable water scarcity was divided into the following classes: a) extreme scarcity, b) medium to low scarcity (or medium and low availability), and c) abundance (absence of water scarcity). Classes A and C were excluded from the potential conflict zone of the paradigm. Class A, extreme scarcity, was excluded, due to the fact that it is constituted of contexts in which water resources are virtually lacking, making its relation to a dispute lose its sense. This is the case of countries of the Persian Gulf, for instance, in which each one searches for internal solutions, nearly always meaning strong technology contribution to the natural environment management. In class C, the no-scarcity or abundance also makes the idea of conflict over water lose its sense. This is the case, for instance, in the Amazon Basin. Excluding classes A and C, only B would represent potential conflict areas, e.g., contexts such as the Euphrates River Basin. See Graph 7-2.

Graph 7-2 – First adjustment to the scarcity-conflict paradigm.

Accurate proportions of this graph, which herein indicates one third for each class, are irrelevant at this moment, since it is only a theoretical model. An empirical survey of all regions in the planet of classes A, B and C would be the starting point to a mapping of zones with higher and lower possibility of

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conflict occurrence over water and, indeed, through this model, would be restricted to localised and circumscribed contexts. We now propose the division of class B into two sub-classes, the first one refers to contexts in which there are boundary rivers shared, and the other in which trans-boundary rivers are shared. The first contexts are excluded from the paradigm, since equity is more evident in such cases. Certainly, there is a possibility of one side to pollute or cause siltation more than the other, but, due to the fact of it being a symmetrically shared water resource; the impacts on the fluvial course would affect both sides, so that sharing tends to be more balanced. In these contexts, when the topographic conditions are favourable, water use for energy purposes is common, such as occurs at Itaipu Binational Hydroelectric Power Plant, in Parana River, shared between Brazil and Paraguay. Up to this point, the initial paradigm of a unilateral result between water scarcity and conflict could be refined according to the following pattern presented in Graph 7-3.

Graph 7-3 – Second adjustment to the scarcity-conflict paradigm.

Having excluded the contexts of medium and low availability zones that share boundary rivers, the remaining are those that share trans-boundary rivers, in which some countries are located upstream and others

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downstream. In these contexts, potential conflicts would be higher, due to the trend that downstream countries are more vulnerable in relation to flow rate variation, polluting loads and siltation. This would be the case of the Nile and the Euphrates River basins: zones with a medium to low scarcity and trans-boundary rivers. Among these cases, we could also consider excluding contexts in which the relation supply-demand remains stable, drawing the attention back to situations in which the demand is increasingly growing, as is the case of Turkey, member-country of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCDE). The economic dynamism of Turkey increases the demand over water resources, which is reflected in projects of other diverse barrages. Indeed, in this context, in principle, there would be potential for conflict. But this variable is so fluid that it can sensibly be changed according to economic fluctuations, so that its inclusion would make the paradigm become unstable. However, we also suggest one more division: the contexts of medium to low availability, in which trans-boundary rivers are shared, could be subdivided if we insert one of the variables included in the central hypothesis of the research: technology contribution, within which we can incorporate the appropriate management to guarantee the supply. Thus, we would exclude the zones or countries (in which this variable is evident) from the potential conflict zone. As we previously discussed, scarcity has a double dimension: a natural one, and a social one, the latter is often decisive in guaranteeing the supply, as supply is where planning and management of water resources takes place, not to mention the possibility of technological contribution to be undertaken in order to solve problems regarding lack of water access. See Graph 7-4. Finally, we also propose one last subdivision, by excluding contexts in which cooperation agreements on water resources exist in the potential conflict zone, since this variable was also shown to be efficient in corroboration of the central hypothesis. This would further reduce the potential conflict zones. As shown by Wolf (Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements), there are more than three hundred cooperation agreements on water resources worldwide. Thus, few contexts would remain in which it could be possible to consider the possibility to have disputes over water resources, or water wars, as shown in the new paradigm. See Graph 7-5.

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Graph 7-4 – Third adjustment to the scarcity-conflict paradigm.

Graph 7-5 – Scheme of the proposed paradigm.

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Thus, the potential conflict zone over water scarcity would be restricted to the following combination of variables: they would be medium to low water availability regions, in which trans-boundary rivers are shared, where planning and technology contribution are either inefficient or insufficient, and there are still no diplomatic agreements which guarantee water resource sharing. Therefore, of the “261 hydrographic international basins, involving 145 member-nations of the United Nations” (Rebouças, 2004, p. 96), just a minimum would present this combination of factors101. Neither the contexts of the Euphrates River nor the Persian Gulf fit in this potential conflict zone, according to this new paradigm. The first one because, although lying on a medium to low availability region where the main shared river is trans-boundary, the planning and technological contributions (barrages) do not affect the equitable sharing, and the cooperation is also assured by diplomatic and technological agreements. The context of the Persian Gulf, in turn, can be excluded from the potential conflict zone due to the simple fact of being an ‘extreme scarcity’ region, in which the dispute over water would lose its sense, since there is practically nothing to be disputed. Furthermore, planning and technology contribution strengthen autonomy and guarantee water supply for the population in much higher levels than what would be possible only by natural availability. This case is similar to a situation of absolute scarcity, but it does not generate managerial stress, given the planning and technological contribution. Perhaps only the context circumscribed by the Golan Heights, Syria, in dispute with Israel, would appear, at first, to be within the “orange zone” of the graph 7-5. It is a medium to low water availability region. Some tributaries of the Jordan River are trans-boundary, such as the Yarmuk River. There is neither any joint planning nor agreements between these two countries which would eliminate the tension between the parties over this matter. However, if we consider that there is already strong technology contribution in this region, particularly in Israel, which is also one of the desalination powers, the dependency on Golan’s spring loses its sense, as does the conflict over water; in this case, it is more a dispute over territory than over water. Further downstream, however, the Jordan River, itself a

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The possibility for water to be used as a conflict motto to disguise other intentions is, of course, a potentiality. A false war over water could be politically used to unite a country and legitimise a government against a common external enemy.

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boundary river within Israel and Jordan, is already the subject of cooperation agreements. This revised paradigm herein proposed would be, under the criteria of Popper, closer to reality, because it brings more informative content and, consequently, higher explanatory power. In the words of Bertrand Russell, the expression “adaequatio intellectus et rei means the adequacy of intellect to the thing” (apud Mondin, 1983, p. 267)102. We sought, with these adjustments, to reach greater accuracy, adequacy and coverage than that of the initial dual structured paradigm between water scarcity and conflict which insists on the hypothesis of water wars.

New variables for future studies A quantitative systematisation of international basins and their classification, according to the subdivisions of this revised paradigm, would provide an important empirical ballast for this explanatory theoretical model. This empirical venture, if conducted, could raise new adjustments and even distort them, by emphasising, for instance, international basins which fit into none of those zones proposed. We are already aware of some possible readjustments. One of them is related to contexts in which two classes are present in the same region or in regions very close to each other. For instance, an extreme water scarcity area and another, presenting either abundance or medium availability. This territorial configuration perhaps constitutes a new class of potential conflict zone over water. In order to cope with this possible new class, maybe we should insert a new variable: distance. Water, although vital, has high local value (i.e., it loses value if transported farther); conflicts among remote regions would be very unlikely in comparison to those among contiguous regions. Another possible adjustment would be the insertion of an economic variable. The position of Brazil in the Amazon basin emphasises that other factors, not only the natural ones, must be considered, because, even though the country is downstream from the Amazon basin, its economic position in the region would reduce its vulnerability in relation to its upstream neighbours. Even in medium scarcity contexts, such as the Nile River basin, this logic can be subverted by economic factors, and the case of Egypt is 102

Bertrand Russell, Logic and Knowledge: Essays, 1901-1950 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), p. 197.

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emblematic. Although lying downstream and bearing no important perennial tributaries, its economic influence over the region contradicts an occasional natural vulnerability. We can consider, additionally, a historical variable, such as the colonial legacy that grants to Egypt, downstream from the Nile, greater access to water resources. In future studies the variable ‘price’ of the resources in question will also be able to be considered. We can justify this suggestion. Water, although being irreplaceable for most of its uses, vital for living beings and an essential condition of material reproduction for societies, does not retain the same economic status that other – mainly energy – resources do. These resources, even though replaceable and non-vital, e.g., oil, are economically strategic and hold high prices, a fact that incites disputes over them. Katz (2011) points out that a criticism of the water wars hypothesis refers to the fact that “it is unlikely that the value of water obtained over an armed conflict exceeds the costs of the military preparation and battle, much less the loss of life” (p. 3). Even though water management, is being disputed in private ventures in some regions around the globe, as shown by Ribeiro (2008), this resource still holds a very low economic value, a fact that helps explain why oil is an explicit reason for diverse belligerent conflicts, whereas water is not. Michael Klare (2001) conclusively declares: Of all resources […], none is more likely to incite conflict among states than oil. Oil stands out from other materials […] due to its central role in the global economy and its capacity of intensifying large-scale conflicts. (p. 27)

If we consider the conflicts in Iraq, international interventions in Libya and the constant threats against Iran, all of them great oil producers, it is clear that there is a greater interest in oil. This same commitment of the international community is not verified, for instance, in countries that have no known oil resources, such as Somalia, which constantly affected by long lasting drought and internal conflicts, or even Yemen, the poorest country in the Middle East and one of the countries involved in the so called Arab Spring. This inferior economic status of water is perhaps what makes world forums not produce the same effect as agreements involving great economic interests, such as the Protocol of Montreal, which flagged the ban on the use of chloral-fluorocarbons (CFC) and the resulting obligation of using a

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substitute gas, whose production was undertaken by the oligopoly of major transnational enterprises103. Presumably, international meetings are less efficient and propositive than agreements delineated regionally or locally. This fact is coherent with the local or, at the least, regional nature of the problems over water resource supply and sharing, i.e., the scale of the hydrographic basin itself seems ideal for the establishment of cooperation agreements. Solutions for the questions over boundary waters seem to depend more on bilateral or multilateral agreements between the countries involved than an international general regulation, already existing. Evidence of this fact is illustrated by the relative failure of the world forum on water, especially the fourth, which took place in Mexico (March, 2006), and the fifth, in Turkey (March, 2009). No concrete commitment was signed during these encounters and the final documents are innocuous. In the interpretation of Martin Geiger (WWF – Germany), the result of the Istanbul Forum “[…] is, partly, a compilation of uncommitted commonplaces and not the urgently necessary action plan”104. In the vision of Fernando de Campos, from the National Association of Portuguese Municipalities (ANMP), “since the Forum of Mexico up to this one, the evolution has been insignificant, most conclusions that were made there had no consequence”105. Indeed, by reading the Consensus of Istanbul on Water, produced at that time from the Fifth World Water Forum, we encounter a tiring list of good intentions, often redundant, innocuous and vague. Commitments assumed invoke the signatories to “do their utmost within the range of their competencies and capacities”, establishing goals to be adapted according to the local and regional contexts, in a way that no clear action is demanded. The World Water Forum in March, 2012 (Marseille, France), prompted an article in the journal Europolitics106 with the following headline: “Sixth World Water Forum: scanty results”. About this same event, a journal published the article in a discouraging tone:

103

On this topic, see MOLION, Luis Carlos, O CFC e a camada de ozônio: a farsa (The CFC and the ozone layer: the falsehood). Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015. 104 Available at: . Accessed on: Jan. 15, 2011. 105 Available at: . Accessed on: Jan. 15, 2011. 106 Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2019.

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Chapter 7 The Sixth World Water Forum did not break from tradition. As in its previous editions since 1997, […] after more than a hundred conferences, debates, round tables and shows of presentation of “miraculous” solutions […] “everybody was dissatisfied”, summarises an activist of the British NGO for Food and Water Watch. “Too many words for not enough results”, she estimates.

These examples show the few outcomes resulting from the world forums that led us to question their efficiency in the establishment of concrete policies and goals regarding the universal access to clean water. We also questioned the scope of discussions, considering that the United Nations should arrange these encounters, and not the World Council, since it is a private instance, which permits strong influence from industrial sectors. Despite the existence of several regulation documents for the international sharing of water resources, such as the Helsinki Rules (1966), Water Convention (1992), and New York Convention (1997), such documents do not have sufficient force and their effective application depends on the political will of managers and the disposition to dialogues of the countries involved. The New York Convention, up to 2010, had been signed by no Amazonian countries, except for Venezuela. These facts indicate that water, despite its vital importance and it being an irreplaceable resource, has not reached a political, social and economic status sufficiently important to produce concrete results in the scope of world forums, which could assure to water a ‘human rights status’. Thus, regional politics and agreements locally signed seem more efficient to create pacific sharing contexts.

A conceptual adjustment to water resources The conception of water as a natural water resource engenders a lot of controversies. The first of them consists of considering it as a renewable resource. As previously seen, a renewable resource is that one which restores its stocks by natural mechanisms, at an equal or higher pace than that of its use, or, even, one which either recovers or restores its original conditions by natural mechanisms, such as a forest, or a population of animals. Thus, to consider water resources as renewable, we would have to limit the analysis to continental water resources, or freshwater, superficial or not, disregarding ocean waters that, ultimately, represent the largest source of continental water storage renewal. Park did so in his definition previously presented in which he considers only freshwater. Only this way could we, in principle, conceive water resources as renewable, since meteoric waters, due to precipitation, renew freshwater continental stocks.

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However, there is a scale problem here that must be considered in geographical analysis and that compromises the universality of the concept. Even if we accept the idea that water is a renewable resource, considering only freshwater, in local and regional scales, we will find areas where it does not renew due to climatic factors (black swans, in the conception of Popper). It is the case of areas under desert climates, in which evaporation is much higher than precipitation, not having replenishment of stocks provided that they are utilised. An emblematic example of this non renewability of water on a regional scale was illustrated in Figures 5-7 and 5-8 (page 95), which shows irrigation areas (central pivot) in Saudi Arabia. Some dry circular areas appear in the image almost as “footprints”, witnessing that there was a productive area once, because there was water in it before. Thus, on local and regional scales, water cannot be considered a priori as renewable, even if we limit the analysis to continental freshwater. The acuity of the concept also diminishes on the planetary scale, since quantities of water on the planet do not change according to the human timescale. The amount of water in the Earth, of 1,36 billion km3, has not changed since 2 billion years (Camp, 2009, pp.176-177). Thus, there is no sense to consider “stocks recovery” when the stocks neither diminish nor increase. All the water used by mankind goes back to the system, even if in another state or quality. Camp (2009) emphasises that “[…] almost all the water withdrawn from the hydrological cycle, in the end, returns to the cycle. In fact, almost every use is temporary, so, ‘borrowed’ can be a more accurate description of what happens to water” (p. 162). If water returns polluted to the cycle, this is a managerial problem, and not natural. Considering the planetary hydrological cycle, which includes oceans, glaciers, gases and liquids, water resources acquire a systemic dimension in which each state or phase play their role. This system is dynamic and complex, although it is closed in relation to the cosmos, as far as it does not exchange matter with it, only energy instead. And it will only function as long as there is an energy input (solar). Considering this, i.e., freshwater within a hydrological system and not isolated from it, changes in state and places of water would represent flows within the system, characterising them as recycling on a planetary scale. Every time water returns to the continent, almost with no salt(s), it would be passing through a phase in the cycle, and not renewing or recovering from deterioration. In short, there is no way to define, in any scale, water resources as renewable. And if we consider only freshwater, we would have to accept that all the water which outflows into oceans would have been “destroyed”, or that stocks would be diminishing.

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From the geo-systemic perspective proposed here, it is more appropriate to consider water resources as naturally recyclable, because there is a hydrological cycle, and not a stock renewal. And, as a result, water would be granted the status of the most abundant natural resource on the planet, along with raw materials (rocks and sands) and some other minerals (salt). Even freshwater is inexhaustible once it recovers continuously. In the hydrological cycle, continents receive 8% more water than they loose by evaporation, due to the higher evaporation taxes in oceans (Camp, 2009, pp. 245). This constant surplus of freshwater on continents would only cease if forces and processes which move the hydrological cycle also ceased (gravity, rotation of Earth and input of solar energy). The second conceptual controversy refers to the perspective of water depletion, which feeds catastrophic forecasts for water wars. Accepting the cycle in an integral and systemic manner, water, although not renewable, as shown, is inexhaustible on a human scale. This is because the exhaustibility is not only related to time factors (while stocks last, what pace the replacement would be), but also to the quantities involved. Thus, it would be impossible to imagine the quantitative depletion of ocean waters and, consequently, the freshwater depletion on Planet Earth. Even if we considered only the meteoric water, from atmospheric precipitation, the improbability of the exhaustibility of water resources would still be evident. Camp (2009) states that “approximately 588 cubic miles of meteoric water precipitation fall in the United States each year […] we use around 19% of our water stock potential and almost 81% remains in the hydrological cycle” (p. 162). On the planetary scale, quantities of existing freshwater are much more than enough to supply all peoples, but societies do not always settle where there are sufficient water resources. For this reason, one cannot attribute to water resources themselves the problems of lack of access, which arise mainly from inappropriate planning and management. Even in more arid regions it is possible to guarantee the supply through administrative and technological measures. If the water where there is human concentration is scarce (such as in metropolitan regions) or is plentiful where there are demographic vacuums (such as some parts of the Amazon), this can only be solved with territorial planning since natural dynamics which determine the occurrence and distribution of water resources are relatively fixed. In sum, it is senseless consider the existence of natural water crisis, once it is always derived from planning failures or social incapability to assure water supply. An iconic exemple of that social responsibility is given by the Norther

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Brazil, where lies the Amazon river basin. It is the region in which urban population has less access to drinkable water in Brazil. Exactly where there are more freshwater in the world! Finally, we still need one more conceptual adjustment, because both concepts of renewable resources as and their substitute proposed, the ‘naturally recyclable’, refer to the natural dynamics of water resources. But the current stage of technological development interferes decisively in such dynamics, by subverting it and demanding a new conceptual refinement. Desalination plants in the Persian Gulf countries represent the acceleration of the hydrological cycle, forcing seawater evaporation (thermoelectric plants) and the consequent separation of salts, a fact that would naturally occur with evaporation and precipitation although not at a sufficiently rapid pace to attend social needs. Thus, technology contribution adjusts both natural time and societal time, which is already very common in the exploitation of other natural resources, such as in agriculture, forestry, clay mining, marine salt production, intensive livestock, just to mention a few.. Thus, like these activities, freshwater, once produced through desalination, fall into the category of ‘reproducible resources’, differing from renewable natural resources. Renewability arises from natural recovery of a resource, which does not refer to any of the cases aforementioned. It is common to classify, for instance, sugar cane or eucalyptus as a renewable resource, which is a misconception, since there are no natural processes by which a large sugar cane crop is formed. Natural recovery of a native (therefore renewable) forest, cannot be conceptualised the same way as a eucalyptus forest. Similarly, it would be inappropriate to use the same concept for water obtained from natural sources (superficial or underground sources) and for that gleamed from industrial processes in desalination plants. In this case, there was a strong technological intervention in the natural process which forced us to conceive the same resource differently. Godard (2002, p.207) proposes the differentiation between renewable resources and reproducible resources, which is most appropriate in our case. Therefore, water resources can be classified as naturally recyclable (focusing on the hydrological cycle natural system), inexhaustible and reproducible. Thomas and Goudie (2000), when referring to sustained yield, include water in the following definition: Some resources are, theoretically, renewable. They can be infinitely recyclable by the biosphere and human societies, either because they are basically unaltered by its use (e.g., water) or because they self-regenerate (e.g., plants and animals). (p. 473)

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This definition reveals and reinforces the possibility of water to be naturally and artificially recycled (indefinitely recycled by human socienties). Thus, the production of freshwater from seawater desalination would make it, consequently, inexhaustible. The gradual use of renewable or inexhaustible (solar and wind) energy sources to feed this process would put an end to this conceptual discussion, although the acceptance that water is an inexhaustible resource does not depend on that, since even freshwaters are inexhaustible on a human scale, as exposed previously, given the existing quantities.

CHAPTER 8 OTHER REFLECTIONS

Accumulated knowledge The non-coincidence of human concentrations with water availability is a question that walks alongside mankind, as well as the development of technical adaptations. Throughout history, a number of solutions, the fruit of humanity’s creative spirit, were invented to minimise natural water scarcity, making water capture more efficient and its use more rational, as shown by Ibn Al-Awan (1864) and several other examples of appropriation. Roman aqueducts, the most ancient dams in Yemen, the reservoirs (ΕΎϧ΍ΰΨϟ΍ = alkhazánát) still existing in Syria – all these examples and many others are technical solutions to minimise the discrepancy between human concentrations and natural water availability, normally by storing it and/or transporting it. Similarly, techniques on crop and soil management adaptation have long been known. In the chapter “Domestication of crops” and the one which follows it, White (1961) provides examples of how, from the very dawn of history, people observed and learned about crop adaptations on certain soils and climates, crop rotation, fallow land and fertilization. Referring to the period of Roman occupation in the Middle East, the author reports that, “although there was still the practice of leaving half of the soil to lie fallow, a crop rotation system was disseminated, organic fertilisers spread and terraces were quite evident.” (p. 99). Organic fertilisation and crop rotation are known and have been practiced at least since the Roman Empire. Regarding forms of irrigation, porous pipes utilised in urban landscaping of the contemporary UAE had already been described by Sorre; water diversions from flooding to lower areas had already been constructed by Sir Willcocks (the Habbaniya Escape), as described by Dudley Stamp107. Even 107

These techniques are in the origin of contemporary works in urban areas, such as the piscinões (large pools) that have been built in the city of são Paulo to alleviate the effects of floods.

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desalination, as one of the most modern processes of freshwater production, was already conceived by the Greeks, employed by sailors, through distillation, and by the Inuits, through water freezing. Perhaps the news resides in the technological contribution, which creates new mechanisms, intensifying processes and increasing quantities. Even concepts considered modern, such as “virtual water”, were already being discussed, as shown by Sorre and – many centuries before that – by Ibn Al-Awan, when distinguishing the crops by different quantities of water demanded for irrigation in certain conditions. Despite having all this accumulated knowledge, it is often ignored or underutilised. Soil management and irrigation are often still inefficient, as in Brazil. According to Rebouças (2004): On around 93% of almost three million hectares irrigated in Brazil, the least efficient irrigation methods in the world are still utilised, such as superficial spreading (56%), conventional sprinkling (18%) and central pivots (19%). It must be considered, yet, that these two latter methods, besides being inefficient in terms of water consumption, are practices that require an intensive use of electrictricity, whose production in Brazil also depends on water. (p.42)

On a global scale, Katz (2011) points out that 80% of freshwater is used for irrigation processes worldwide, but still “[…] broad gains in efficiency could be obtained with changes in irrigation technologies and choice of crops” (p. 3). Perhaps modern societies must rescue legacies left by past societies concerning water use and associate them with modern techniques. In short, mankind has accumulated sufficient knowledge in order to rationally appropriate water resources and guarantee the supply for all peoples, even in water scarce regions, where there is a will to do so. Currently, problems in supply lie more in planning and management dimensions, which involve choosing ways to obtain and store water, suitable uses according to the characteristics of sociaetal and natural contexts (e.g. cultivating crops according to soil potentialities). It also involves the development of efficient techniques of treatment and distribution, and also awareness of a wise use of water. But making all of this is more difficult than simply foreshadowing the depletion of water (already demonstrated to be impossible), or blaming nature for water scarcity. This leads to the risk of transferring to nature the responsibility of citizens, companies and gouvernment relieving their exclusive burdens related to an adequate management and use of water to guarantee its universal and quality supply.

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The influence of the common sense and the media power All arguments here presented to demonstrate the inefficiency of the explanatory scarcity-conflict model, or, in other words, the improbability of water wars, is still not sufficient in answering one more question: if the lack of empirical support is so evident, why is this paradigm so widely disseminated and so easily pronounced on a global scale? Obviously, we do not arrogate the role of answering this question, but, given that it is quite disturbing, we searched for some answers in the literature. Aldo Rebouças (2004) considers the question, stating that conflict is “the favourite perspective of ‘specialists’ who address the destiny of mankind as a form of highlighting the importance of their opinions” (p. 156). Katz (2011) is in line with Rebouças by writing: By linking their main causes for the conflict over water, the actors increase their visibility and offer to those who sympathise with their mission one more reason to provide support and undertake actions. […] Making your messages more stringent is a tactic to draw attention […]. Doing so, it increases the potential to gain access to the political arena and the media […] and also expands the possibilities for obtaining more collaboration for research. (pp. 5-6)

The author quotes Mueller (1994), to whom water wars would have come to fill the gap left by the end of the Cold War, and Simon (1980), who lists four factors that would encourage the persistence of the conflict perspective over water resources worldwide. The first denotes greater keenness of funding agencies to support studies which pertain to crises, more than those studies which produce good news. The second factor consists of the fact that bad news sells more journals and books. And, as a result, “several books and articles have the phrase ‘water wars’ in the title, although in the body, the true discussion does not contemplate violent conflicts over water” [...] (Katz, 2011, p. 5). The report previously mentioned, signed by Benedito Braga, in which the content is positive, although the title chosen by the journal is negative “Without dialogue there will be conflicts” is a good example of this second factor. Katz (2011) quotes other emblematic examples, such as the article in the San Francisco Chronicle in which the title warns about water wars: “The future of war will follow the flow rate: water promises to be the trigger” (p. 11), whereas, in the body, the authors affirm the improbability of water conflicts and that this type of fuzz is one more media strategy”. He also adds a declaration by Max Frankel, reporter of the newspaper the New York

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Times, that “conflict is our favourite type of news”. The author still proposes that alarming pronouncements could generate greater mobilisation around environmental issues, surpassing the water dimension. Katz (2011, p. 12) draws the conclusion that there is a mutual reinforcement between these factors and actors, creating an information network among different actors (scholars, politicians, journalists and NGOs) who are the main news feeders keeping the questions regarding water burning in public discourse. Political matters may also be pointed out to fan the flames of such possible reasons. Environmental discourses, particularly the ones which point to dangers, always generate a consensus, and somehow can be used politically, mainly attracting and justifying investments in water infrastructure. This type of discourse can still promote domestic support to national politics, especially when it points to an external threat. Katz reminds us that this type of discourse with political ends is widely utilised in countries which present some tension with neighbouring countries, such as between India and Pakistan. Mutual threats surrounding the Indo River saw it relevant to involve the World Bank in the intermediation. Iraqi threats to Turkey served as a message to the World Bank, which supported the construction of Turkish dams. Still according to the author, in Israel, this type of discourse is utilised to hamper possible concessions to Palestine. We would add that it was also used between Turkey and Syria (e.g., the discourse of the former Turkish president, Tught Auzal, previously mentioned).

Virtual water as an ally When the climatic and soil conditions of a certain country or region hinder cropping certain genres, they can either be obtained via import, or the development of crop adaptation technologies. For instance, Brazil imports wheat from Argentina, whose conditions are more favourable for this crop. Concurrently, studies on the adaptation of wheat crops to the climate and soil of Brazil are being developed108. On the other hand, the Argentineans import from Brazil products that demand more water and heat, such as some tropical fruits. In this case, Argentina would be, through trading, importing water in the form of food, i.e. virtual water. The concept of virtual water was established by Professor J. A. Tony Allan, from King’s College London, winner of the Stockholm Water Prize. He defined the term ‘virtual water’ as being invisible water embedded in traded 108

Such research is developed by EMBRAPA (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation).

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commodities109. And he goes beyond, arguing that water conflicts are improbable, because virtual water trade is able to reduce potential conflicts. Thus, virtual water, as an added value to diverse products, can be traded worldwide, which would be unlikely to happen with water itself, given its low price. This would be the “fourth state of water”. Virtual water has been shown as a great ally in the correction of distortions between supply and demand of water resources. However, a proviso must be made: virtual water is not vital. If Argentina stops buying some Brazilian fruits whose cropping demands more water, this will slightly affect that country, which will be able to substitute this import by other products. Water, that is to say, real water, cannot be substituted by any other element or product.

Water solidarity “Water links us to our neighbour in a way more profound and complex than any other”110 John Thorson

Water is, among all natural resources, the one which presents greater sharing potential, due to a number of reasons. Firstly, is the fact that water resources are a vital for human existence. Depriving a people of access to water would represent condemning it, decimating it, which goes far beyond merely commercial disputes, such as those which involve oil. Groups that deprive others from accessing water tend to be condemned by the international community, since the act violates some of the basic principles of international and humanitarian rights. Another aspect that would relate water to solidarity is the fact that water resources occur, mostly, in hydrographic basins which function as an integrated system, being able to surpass the borders of a country or region. This fact forces governments comprised by an international basin to reconsider the concept of sovereignty, combining it with an integrated management. Unlike a mineral reserve which can occur here or there, locally, so that each country can normally manage their reserves without interfering in the territory of their neighbours, a hydrographic basin which comprises more than one country requires joint action, since it would only work well as an integrated system, favouring that the parties involved 109

Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2015. 110 Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 24, 2019.

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undertake cooperative action(s). We add that, in a few cases, rivers themselves are the principal means of communication among the countries, highlighting their role as a means of integration, such as occurs in the Amazon and Congo basins. Complementarily, we reinforce the role of agreements on the sharing of water resources based on a broader understanding among countries. Solving a conflict regarding the sharing of a vital resource, such as water, can help the consolidation of mutual trust between the peoples involved, creating a solidarity basis which can overflow to other sectors, such as political, economic, technological, amongst others. Thus, water sharing opens paths towards a new perspective of understanding in relation to other questions that occasionally rise. This perspective has also been enhanced by Eric Johnston, the Envoy of the North American President Eisenhower to the Middle East, to whom “[…] the management of the hydrographic basin can, by itself, act as a catalyst for the construction of trust to increase cooperation […]” (apud Oliveira, 2010, p. 6). Furthermore, a sharing agreement over water resources creates the necessary bases for regional trade, opening doors also for technicalscientific cooperation, e.g., such as occurs between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, in which the understanding around the Euphrates River created a context conducive to economic and technological/scientific cooperation. Turkey finds more regional support and solidarity from countries with which it shares the Euphrates River than those which attempt to hinder its entry into the European Union. In the Latin American context, the Treaty of the Amazon Cooperation comprises, from joint management of the basin, economic cooperation (Articles II, IX and others), and technical scientific issues (Article VII) to those related to cultural and ethnic preservation (Article XIV). The treaty of the River Plate basin, which initially was conceived in the middle of geopolitical disputes, is now coated with understanding and cooperation. Regarding electric energy produced at Itaipu Bi-national Hydroelectric Power Plant, Brazil realigned the value of electric energy bought from Paraguay a number of times, only in 2011. Thus, one more chapter of cooperation has been added to the history of the Plate basin. These same characteristics are identified in the agreements on the basins of the Danube, the Congo River and the Nile.

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Wolf111 (2003, apud Lopes, 2009) concluded that “conflicts (violent ones) do not occur more frequently in zones of arid climates as they do in zones of humid climates and that international cooperation actually increases during periods of drought” (p. 6). Lopes (2009) states: Water has been a unifying factor among riparian peoples and entities, where it is verified as a proliferation of international treaties, riparian organizations, transnational technical commissions and common investments, in the sense of generating water resources internationally shared. (p. 6)

The author elaborates that existing institutions or those created to regulate and generate water resources have been able to guarantee the sharing without conflicts. This would be the case of all international cooperation agreements related to international basins and, specifically, the one related to the Euphrates-Tigris basin involving Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Aaron Wolf attests: We are strong proponents that water ignores all separations and borders, except for those of the basin, visible or not. Thus, it offers a means able to group those who share it. Since it regards everything we do and experiment with, water creates a language through which we can discuss our common future. Overstatements regarding water war represent good business for the beneficiaries of conflict and book sales […].112

Dursun Yildiz, a Turkish specialist in hydro-politics, in an interview issued in June 2011 confirmed an optimistic perspective, supporting that cooperation in the region may result in an increase in the standard of living: Water resources of the Tigris and Euphrates River basins may be a question of cooperation and peace in the future. […] Fifty years from now, the standards of

111

WOLF, Aaron. “‘Water Wars’ and other tales of hydro-mythology”. In: MACDONALD, Bernadette; JEHL, Douglas (eds.). Whose water is it? The unquenchable thirst of a water-hungry world, Washington DC: National Geographic, 2003, pp. 109-124. 112 Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2019.

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Chapter 8 living in the Tigris and Euphrates River basins will be much more developed concerning socioeconomic and sociocultural aspects.113

All of these specialists confirm that, from the understandings concerning the sharing of water resources, one can reach broader levels of cooperation comprising other social dimensions. Bouguerra (2004, p. 232), in the chapter “There are reasons for hope”, points out an optimistic perspective, based on cooperation among countries, particularly those of the South-South axes, regarding desalination technology and biotechnology, which could reduce the demand for water in agriculture, a sector where its consumption is the greatest worldwide, and the emergency of a solidarity ethics which would overlap the outdated law of the jungle114. In November, 2011, the Turkish government emphasised that “sanctions shall neither hit nor restrict” the supply from Turkey to Syria, guaranteeing the 500 m³/s of flow rate on the border between these two countries” (UnEscwa, 2013, p. 72). From his side, “the Minister of Irrigation of Syria also confirmed that agreements over water involving the countries bathed by the Tigris and Euphrates River basins are not affected by recent conflicts” (p. 72). These facts and statements demonstrate that even in periods of conflict, water seems to stand as a weight-bearing pillar whose relations are able to standardise and to expand. Thus, we believe that the potential for solidarity involving water is much greater than other resources, such as oil, often coated with heated commercial disputes. The true war which is happening under the gaze of the international community refers to millions of people who have no access to freshwater, high infant mortality rates related to water and food scarcity or diseases associated to poor quality water. Many countries invest more in military equipment for occasional wars neglecting sanitation and agriculture, condemning millions of people to perish due to the lack of access to clean water and food. This is the true enemy against whom the international community must unite, ensuring universal access to freshwater and conditions for food production. This invisible and silent war is able to

113

Available at: < http://www.topraksuenerji.com/firat-ve-dicle/water-sharing-inthe-euphrates-tigris-basin.html >. Accessed on: Sep. 23, 2019. 114 Mohamed Largi Bouguerra, French Tunisian geographer and Doctor in Physical Sciences at the Sorbonne, was a professor in Tunisia and is responsible for the Water Program of the Alliance for a Responsible, Plural and United World.

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produce countless victims across the world, but demands less effort to be beaten than traditional wars. Before all prerogatives aforementioned throughout this book, I shall endorse that water is the main means through which to lead people towards “the flow of peace”.

APPENDIX AN UPDATE ON THE FACTS

Since the research was finished (2014) and the book was almost ready many events have taken off around the world that may reinforce the “water peace perspective” as the main line of reasoning of this book. Firstly, we have seen protracted conflicts in the Middle East that began at the turn of 2010 and 2011 and, rapidly became complex, involving different reasons, forces, countries, and self-proclaimed states, amidst claims they were some of the most intricate conflicts in recent history. However, not once did we see water in the eye of the storm or being the object of dispute. On the contrary, some facts such as political action, meetings, talks, agreements and round-tables seemed to weave a diplomatic fabric over the water sharing issue. Among them, I shall mention a few: Under Iraq’s request, Turkey recently postponed filling up the massive reservoir of the Ilisu dam on the Tigris River in order to alleviate the effects of a severe drought that affected Iraqi farmers. The dam’s reservoir filling should resume only in winter 2018, when seasonal rain starts again. This emblematic action could be considered a clear move towards a cooperative approach for trans-boundary water management in the region. With regard to that episode, the newspaper Daily Sabah published a full page report entitled “Trans-boundary power of waters: nature’s leverage over peace, stability, and trust in the Euphrates-Tigris basin” (July 27, 2018). This kind of cooperative approach had happened mostly in the past, for instance, in 1988 and 1989. Those years were considered the driest ones in the past 50 years and the flow of the Euphrates River dropped to only 100 cubic meters per second115. Despite that natural drought, Turkey could release around 500 cubic meters per second to downstream neighbours, due to reservoirs upstream that permitted water flow control. On the other hand, in the event of a very high flow rate derived from fast snow melting, dams could prevent massive floods. Mihat Rende, Turkey’s former Ambassador of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), said to Daily 115

Which is significantly low, considering the annual average flow of 778m3/sec.

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Sabah (op cit.) that “The combined water potential of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers is sufficient to meet the needs of the three riparian states to achieve sustainable development, provided that water is used in an efficient way and the benefits are maximised through new irrigation systems and technologies throughout the basin, Syria and Iraq included”. Another move towards cooperative water management can be seen in an Iran-Iraq initiative. In July 2018, both countries agreed to build a dam on Shatt Al-Arab (after the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers), which forms part of the border between the two countries, featured by alarmingly low flow rates and high levels of salinity, especially due to high evaporation rates and scarce precipitation, as previously shown in the book. This new dam may help assure water supply and reduce salinity levels on both sides: Basra, in Iraq and in the Iranian province of Khuzestans. Yet, a bilateral protocol between Turkey and Syria was established on behalf of the construction of a shared dam on the Orontes River that began in February 2011, but had to be halted due to Syrian internal conflicts triggered in March of that same year. The concept of hydro-diplomacy has gained force in meetings and scientific congresses on water. This is the case of the 1st Cairo Water Week (October 2018) when Mr. Loic Fauchon, Honorary President of the WWC (World Water Council), asserted during the opening ceremony that “Hydrodiplomacy is the best way to find a way to share equitably while preserving the peace. Hydro-diplomacy is, and shall be, a priority for the WWC”. On December 10, 2018, an international conference held in Paris was titled “Hydro-diplomacy and Climate Change for peace in Mesopotamia”, during which Mr. Dursun Yildiz, President of the HPA (Hydropolitics Association of Ankara) addressed a speech entitled “Water conflicts: a cooperation based on mutual interests”. Mr. Yildiz strongly advocates hydro-diplomacy, as the “best perspective to ensure abundant water of a good quality for future generations in Mesopotamia and to foster a culture of water for peace”. According to him, hydro-diplomacy requires a paradigm shift from a traditional one to an innovative hydro-diplomacy in trans-boundary water management in this century. Yet, Yildiz considers water as the main means to attain peace, by stating that “without resolving the water issue in the Middle East, it is not possible to ensure permanent peace in the region”. Another signal of a peace perspective was represented by the conference of the Iraqi Forum of Intellectuals and Academics, held in Turkey (Istambul,

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August 2018), when water scarcity in Iraq was the main theme and hydrodiplomacy was the subject of speeches. |This meeting can clearly illustrate the paradigm shift aforementioned. “Cooperation for Sustainable Water Management in the Middle East” was another international expert round table meeting organised by the Hydropolitics Association of Turkey and the German-Jordanian University, held in Amman (Jordan) in August 2018, when trans-boundary water management cooperation was one of the leading topics. In other parts of the world this perspective seems to reverberate, as in Brazil, that held the 8th Word Water Forum (July 2018). ‘Sharing Water’ was the overarching theme of this, the biggest meeting on water worldwide. Three years before, the 7th WWF, held in South Korea, had ‘Water as Our Future’ as the overarching theme. In Switzerland in 2017, the Federal Councillor Didier Burkhalter launched the Blue Peace Initiative116 to assist five Central Asian states in developing solutions for managing trans-boundary water management. He asserted that “Reaching an agreement on common structures for water utilisation creates trust and strengthens cooperation”. Yet, he said that “Water is universally recognised as a driver – a ‘river’ – of development. Switzerland’s vision is that water should also be a source of peace”. Not only the Blue Peace Initiative (2017) but also the Global High Level Panel on Water and Peace (2015) were launched in Geneva by the Strategic Foresight Group117. Therefore, we conclude that reaching a fairly adequate management of water, locally, regionally or globally, requires more than dam infrastructures, efficient techniques of irrigation, desalination or water treatment and distribution. It requires mainly a new perspective based on cooperation and diplomacy. And it seems that such concepts are spreading and strengthening rapidly not only in regions that face natural water scarcity, but also around the world. Hydro-diplomacy and cooperation initiatives have been capable of preventing conflicts.

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Available at: . Accessed on: sep. 20, 2019. 117 Available at: . Accessed on: Sep. 20, 2019.

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