Waterfront Blues: Labour Strife at the Port of Montreal, 1960-1978 9781442683259

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WATERFRONT BLUES

Labour Strife at the Port of Montreal, 1960-1978

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WATERFRONT

BLUES

Labour Strife at the Port of Montreal, 1900-1978

Alexander C. Pathy with Marianne Dufour and Curtis Fahey

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

Toronto Buffalo Lon

www.utppublishing.com University of Toronto Press Incorporated 2004 Toronto Buffalo London Printed in Canada ISBN 0-8020-8980-1

Printed on acid-free paper

National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication Pathy, Alexander C. Waterfront blues: labour strife at the Port of Montreal, 1960-1978 / Alexander C. Pathy; with Marianne Dufour and Curtis Fahey. Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN 0-8020-8980-1 1.Strike and lockouts - Stevedores - Quebec (Province) - Montreal History. 2. Montreal, Port of (Quebec) - History. 3. Industrial relations Quebec (Province) - Montreal - History. I. Dufour, Marianne II. Fahey, Curtis, 1951- III. Title. HD8039.L82C36 2004

331.89'0413868'0971428

C2003-904194-8

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support for its publishing activities of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP).

To Mamie, with love

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Contents

Foreword by Alan B. Gold ix Foreword by Brian Mulroney

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Preface xiii Introduction 3 1 'A Great National Emergency' 2 Sound and Fury

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3 The Picard Commission 64 4 After Picard

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5 The Agreement of 1969 118 6 Treading Water 137 7 Hope Deferred

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8 Strike! 194 9 On the Brink 210 10 Hardball

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11 The Force of the Law 12 Getting to Yes 259 Conclusion

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243

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Contents

Notes

285

Index

317

Illustrations follow page 174

Foreword The Honourable Alan B. Gold, OC, OQ, QC, LLD

Plus fa change, plus c'estpareill The more things change, the more they are the same! The problems we faced on the St Lawrence River ports some thirty-five years ago haunt us to this day, not only on the waterfront but throughout our modern industrial society. Only the language has changed. In the turbulent years of the 19605 and 19705 we talked about drastic changes and the shattering effects brought on by M & M - Modernization and Mechanization, not the American confectionary. Today, instead, we talk of outsourcing, contracting out, the sale of a business or enterprise, or in similar legal terms; the words are different, but the effects are the same. Alec Pathy's insider's view and comprehensive history of what one may call, for want of a better phrase, the Industrial Revolution of the maritime shipping industry is not only an engaging and instructive look at the past, it is also a lesson for the future. His story is now in your hands. I am pleased to commend it to you. Alan B. Gold Montreal

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Foreword The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, PC, CC, LLD

A request by Alec Pathy to write a brief foreword to this book brought back a flood of memories for me - memories of exciting days as a young lawyer in Montreal in the mid-1960s and memories as well of turbulent times in Canada's ports and the remarkable cast of characters that grappled with and eventually resolved this complex and intractable challenge. Alec Pathy played a leading and constructive role throughout this industrial drama. Canada's ports are vital to our economic prosperity. For decades they served us well but in the late 19505 and early 19605 they underwent a dramatic change. As old management attitudes began to calcify, labour unrest escalated, productivity declined, and governments watched from the sidelines with a curious attitude of disbelief and helplessness. The ports of Montreal, Quebec City, and Trois-Rivieres were eroding before our eyes and the principal actors were either frozen in opposition both to technological change and to reformed labour practices or actively challenging each other for the role of dominant leadership of decaying institutions. I entered this world in 1966 as a junior associate in Ogilvy Renault, a leading Montreal law firm, at the behest of Paul F. Renault, QC, senior counsel to the Shipping Federation of Canada. I assisted Paul, a talented lawyer with a jovial personality that concealed a razor-sharp knowledge of human nature and a willingness to rough it up with the best of them - including Phil Cutler, a legendary union lawyer who led the legal battle for the International Longshoremen's Association, one that raged in the ports for a decade. Throughout this period I was closely associated with Alec Pathy, a Shipping Federation board member and driving force behind changes - attitudinal, operational, and social - that eventually emerged at the waterfront and transformed the ports into technological powerhouses which recaptured a leading share of North America's maritime traffic. To get there we cooperated with a royal com-

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mission, built a new employers' association, endured bruising litigation, bitter work stoppages, and leadership challenges, and were the object of vivid parliamentary debate and action, before emerging finally on the right side of industrialrelations history and achievements. During this often painful process, I remember an important settlement achieved one Easter Sunday morning in the Unemployment Insurance offices in Verdun, home base of Labour Minister Bryce Mackasey, who had overseen the non-stop negotiations for days. The sun rose over the St Lawrence as the exhausted participants shared a final drink (not their first that night) before staggering home to bewildered wives and children, who themselves were by now more familiar with waterfront jargon than with the lyrics of Easter Parade*. As we chatted, I could see the engaging Mackasey whispering to his loyal executive assistant, Arnie Masters, later to play a leading role as president of the Maritime Employers Association. In my mind's eye I see as well the brilliant and indefatigable Justice Alan B. Gold, special arbitrator, whose integrity was for years about the only thing all parties could agree upon. He was with Phil Cutler and Jean-Marc St-Onge, ILA Local 375 president, and Louis Laberge, powerful president of the Quebec Federation of Labour. St-Onge was a diamond in the rough who tried mightily to lead the union through a period of convulsive change while also attempting to control both his most obstreperous members and his own explosive temper. On many colourful occasions, he was not able to do both. Among the employer representatives present, I remember Bill Brown and Norm Wolfe, friends and competitors in the stevedoring business, and Alec Pathy for the shipowners. In that decade-long journey we all took together, Alec never missed a moment. I remember him well as an intelligent and thoughtful voice of reason, imbued with a great sense of humour and a vision of waterfronts transformed. That they are in fact transformed today is the legacy of many mentioned in this impressive book but I can testify that few, if any, played a more constructive and important role than the author. Brian Mulroney Montreal

Preface

By the early 19605, technological change in the shipping industry had triggered basic instincts of self-preservation in both management and labour on the Montreal waterfront. It was clear to all concerned, employers and longshoremen alike, that change could not be avoided. Ports everywhere were modernizing their operations to keep up with the new technologies and the Port of Montreal had to follow suit. What was far from clear was how to meet the challenge. Each party was overwhelmed with fear: the fear of each other, the fear of losing one's business or one's job, and the fear of the unknown. The challenge facing Montreal and the other St Lawrence River ports - TroisRivieres and Quebec City - was not unique. Important technological advances were being made in all industrial circles. To remain competitive, Canadian employers had to invest in new equipment and reorganize their workplaces accordingly, while unions everywhere confronted the inevitability of job losses to machines. As John Crispo, then director of the University of Toronto's Centre for Industrial Relations (CIR), said in 1966: 'Technological change and consolidation of plant and company operations in recent years have evoked a sense of insecurity among large segments of employees. This has produced demands for greater security of employment and tighter application of seniority rules at a time when employers are seeking to revise seniority procedures to permit a more effective use of new techniques and processes.'1 The fundamental divergence of interest between management and labour over an issue of vital importance to both created a climate of general uneasiness that began manifesting itself in the early 19605 through frequent, lengthy, and difficult strikes in various industries across the country. The Port of Montreal, previously known internationally 'as a port that got things done in a hurry and got them done well/ started coming apart in 1960. Between 1960 and 1965, relations between management and labour deteriorated steadily, with no less than five major legal and/or illegal work stoppages taking place. Further strikes took place in

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1966,1972, and 1975, and, in response, government intervention occurred repeatedly and in a variety of forms, including back-to-work legislation, government inquiries, and conciliation boards. The turmoil was caused partly by fear and intransigence among the longshoremen and their union leaders, and partly by a lack of focus and coherence in the ranks of management. Both parties, moreover, shared a common problem of attitude. As one observer noted: 'The working conditions... are only incidental to the whole problem. The real cause of breakdown in the collective bargaining relationship is that of attitude. The parties lack trust and confidence in one another and until such time as this attitude changes, I fear there is little hope of long-lived industrial peace on the waterfront.'2 Few segments of the transportation industry were as slow to respond to technological change as shipping and longshoring at the St Lawrence River ports. Yet respond they did. In 1978, for the first time in the Port of Montreal's history, management and labour negotiated a collective agreement without a work stoppage or government intervention, an achievement that was replicated in 1981. By then, the port had gone from being a chaotic marketplace with obsolete facilities and wasteful working methods to a highly flexible and efficient worksite capable of handling the largest portion of Canada's container traffic. It is unlikely that there is another port anywhere in the world where changes of this magnitude have taken place in such a compressed time-frame. How did the Port of Montreal move from the unrest and uncertainty of the 19605 to the stability and security of the late 19705? Not without considerable trauma, violent disputes, extensive government intervention, and the infusion of millions of dollars. The story of the Montreal waterfront in the 19605 and 19705 has all the elements to intrigue and entertain: tumultuous relationships, violent strikes, and hints of scandals. There were flamboyant personalities, too: Brian Mulroney, fresh out of law school, who counselled management; Laurent Picard, the inquiry commissioner whose binding conclusions almost tore the waterfront apart while at the same time providing the glue that started to bind it together; Jean-Marc StOnge, the idealistic and aggressive president of the Montreal longshoremen's local until the disastrous 1972 illegal strike cost him his post; Judge Alan B. Gold, mediator/arbitrator to the parties from 1968 to 1975, whom the union would call the 'father of longshoremen' before hanging him in effigy in 1975; Bryce Mackasey, minister of labour during the intense period of change on the waterfront from 1968 to 1972; and Arnie Masters, president of the Maritime Employers Association (MEA) from 1972 to 1988. Other figures, such as Lester B. Pearson, Jack Pickersgill, Louis Laberge, and Louis-Philippe Pigeon, all of whom would leave their mark on Canadian history, make cameo appearances in the story. As a member of a family with a long involvement in shipping - dating to Hungary

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and Egypt in the 19205 -1 was in the thick of the action from the start. My father, Ernest G. Pathy, with his brothers Ladislas and George in New York, had established in 1944 in Toronto the Federal Commerce and Navigation Company, a small shipowning, chartering, and agency company. I became associated with Fednav, as it is now called, in the late 19505. After receiving a BASc in chemical engineering from the University of Toronto in 1955 and then studying law at Osgoode Hall Law School and receiving my call to the Ontario bar in 1959,1 moved to Montreal to join the family company, which by now was managed by my uncles Ladislas and George. As a small and independent firm, Fednav remained an outsider to the Shipping Federation of Canada, the organization representing ship agents, shipowners, and charterers, until 1964. At that time, as a consequence of serious labour unrest at the Port of Montreal, my uncle George suggested to Bill Eakin, president of the Shipping Federation, that I be appointed to the Federation's Labour Committee, thinking that, with my legal training, I would be an asset to the committee while Fednav would benefit from the first-hand knowledge of labour-management issues I would be able to acquire. I participated in my first negotiation on the waterfront in 1964 at the Port of Toronto. In 19651 was named to the Executive Council of the Shipping Federation, while maintaining my involvement in the Labour Committee, and the following year I became a shareholder and director of Fednav when I purchased my mother's interest in the company. As a member of the Federation's Labour Committee, I was closely involved in the events surrounding the thirty-nine-day strike at the St Lawrence River ports in 1966. Subsequently, as part of the settlement of that strike, the Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson appointed Dr Laurent Picard to head a commission of inquiry to examine conditions of employment and job security at the ports. The Shipping Federation retained me as special consultant to prepare its case to the Picard commission. At the same time, I remained a member of the Federation's Executive Council, while also continuing to serve on the Labour Committee. In 1967, in the midst of continuing turmoil at the Port of Montreal, it became clear to me that the major impediment to the establishment of labour-management stability at the ports was not so much a labour problem as a management problem. Before management could expect to reach any meaningful agreements with labour, I concluded, we had to put our own house in order. To do this we had to establish the structure of a single employer in a multi-employer industry. This led me to propose the establishment of a Maritime Employers Association. It took several years before this body became a reality and several more years before labour peace was achieved in the ports. I was the first chairman of the MEA's board of directors, holding the post from 1969 to 1971. In 19721 sold my interest in Fednav to my cousin Laurence (Ladi) Pathy - although I remain a director of the

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company to this day - and I continued to represent Fednav on the MEA board until I left Montreal in 1980.1 was also a member of the Montreal Port Authority from its creation in 1971 to 1980. This has been a work in progress for over twenty years. In 1975 the government of Canada and McGill University jointly sponsored the Second International Conference on Trends in Labour and Industrial Relations and I was appointed the conference's director general. Held in Montreal in advance of the Olympic Game in 1976, the conference brought together academic, labour, and business leaders from fourteen countries with systems of free collective bargaining. After the conference, Professor Paul Weiler of the Harvard Law School, who had been one of the keynote speakers, suggested that I write a book about my experience at the Port of Montreal. I was then working at McGill University's Industrial Relations Centre as director of programs and a member of the advisory committee to the centre's director, Professor Frances Bairstow, a committee that was chaired by Judge Alan B. Gold. I discussed the proposed book with Professor Bairstow and Judge Gold, both of whom encouraged me to follow up on Professor Weiler's suggestion. I began my research. In due course, and on Professor Weiler's initiative, I received an invitation from Quinn Mills, professor of management at the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard University, to join the school as a visiting scholar for the academic year 1980-1, an invitation intended to give me an opportunity to begin writing my book. I accepted, and my wife and I moved to Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the summer of 1980. The following spring, at a meeting in Toronto with the late Professor Noah Meltz, then director of the University of Toronto's Centre for Industrial Relations, he invited me to come to the centre, after my year at Harvard, to continue my research for the book. We also discussed the possibility of my beginning to work towards a PhD in industrial relations at the centre. Before that plan could be finalized, however, I was recruited to join the university, serving first as vice-president/business affairs and later as vice-president/human resources. I was appointed a professor of management and industrial relations and was the university's senior labour negotiator. On retiring from the vicepresidency in 1991,1 began to teach at CIR. While serving as a university vice-president, I had little or no time to devote to the Port of Montreal project. Later, while teaching at CIR, I was able to make some progress on the book, but, even so, I soon reached the conclusion that if I was ever to finish, I would need an assistant. I then had the great good fortune to meet Marianne Dufour, a graduate student at CIR. She became my research assistant.

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After receiving her degree, Marianne moved to Ottawa and subsequently Montreal, taking my many boxes of files with her, and she continued to work on the project, researching and writing first-draft material. In the meantime, I had returned to the family shipping business as managing director of Fednav (Barbados) - a move that made it necessary for Marianne and me to carry on our collaboration by e-mail, supplemented by occasional meetings in Montreal. Marianne was outstanding. She managed her way through my boxes of files and wrote her drafts as though she had participated with me in the negotiations on the waterfront, and she conducted her interviews with experience far beyond her years. I can honestly say that, without her involvement, the book would not have been written. By the spring of 2001, I needed a professional editor to take our somewhat unfinished work and turn it into a manuscript acceptable for publication. I was introduced to Curtis Fahey that summer and he performed wonders. Knowing nothing of ships, longshoremen, stevedoring, or labour relations, Curtis twice worked his way through the manuscript, creating order where there had been confusion, replacing verbosity and ambiguity with brevity and precision. I have gained both a book, which without him would never have been finished, and, I hope, a firm friend. The result is Waterfront Blues. I am also indebted to many other people. The journey along the waterfront would never have begun were it not for the wholehearted support of Professor Frances Bairstow, Judge Alan B. Gold, William P. Kelly, the late Arnold E. Masters, the late Paul F. Renault, and Norman Wolfe, and the initial steps were taken with my first research assistant, Glenna Loerick. I thank them all for their confidence and I regret that I was unable to finish the project in a more timely manner. Of equal importance was the assistance received from a host of individuals: the late Pat Bolger, the late Bill Brown, Deborah Campbell, Jack Chrichton, the late Phil Cutler, Steve Droz, Peter Evans, Kim Gibson, June Gilbert, Manny Gordon, George Haythorne, Bill Harnum of the University of Toronto Press, Gabriele Scardellato (for help with the illustrations), the late Marcel Jette, the late Judge Rene Lippe, Bryan Mackasey, the late Honourable Bryce Mackasey, the late Professor Noah Meltz, Professor Quinn Mills, Carole Moore, James Murray, Lorna NurseBrathwaite, Jean Marc St-Onge, the late Charlie Poirier, Catherine Smith, Anne Spurling, Pauline Sylvain, Jim Thorn, Toni Tiberi, Adrien Tremblay, and Steve Wace. I would also like to thank all those institutions that made the book - and particularly the research that went into it - possible: McGill University (industrial Relations Centre), the University of Toronto (Centre for Industrial Relations, President's Office, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library), Harvard University (Graduate

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School of Business Administration), the Shipping Federation of Canada, the Maritime Employers Association, the Interprovincial Association of Stevedoring Contractors, the Department of Labour of the government of Canada, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and Fednav. And last, but certainly not least, I thank my family: my daughters, Barbara, Carolyn, and Diane, who carried out research, organized files, translated documents and interviews, and fetched and carried as necessary; my sister, Mary, who assisted in keeping the research afloat; and, most important, my wife, Mamie, to whom the book is dedicated, who has maintained our enthusiasm for this project over the past twenty-three years. To anyone I have forgotten: I apologize unreservedly. Alexander C. Pathy Warrens, St Michael, Barbados

WATERFRONT BLUES

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Introduction

Waterways have always played a vital role in Canadian history. The first explorers and settlers penetrated the wild country by boats and canoes and built their homes along the rivers. Water systems were the only window on the world. They carried everything: goods, hunters, travellers, and news. As decades turned into centuries, ports were built in geographically strategic locations and contributed to the development of large cities. Canadians established themselves farther and farther inland. Roads were constructed, carriages, bicycles, and cars appeared, and the usage of waterways shifted from local or national passenger transportation to the shipping of consumer goods. Compared with other modes of national and international transportation, shipping was cheap and dependable and allowed large quantities of products to be carried at once. For years and years, the shipping system remained unchanged and, concurrently, so did the system of employment in the longshoring trade. The Port of Montreal is located on the north shore of the St Lawrence River, approximately 1,000 miles from the Atlantic coast. By the early part of the twentieth century, the natural superiority of Montreal's location had made it one of the world's busiest inland ports and Canada's leading transportation, commercial, and banking centre. The port spread over more than ten miles of shoreline, from the entrance of the Lachine Canal to the east end of Montreal. The facilities included a railway system composed of more than sixty miles of track running alongside sheds, a water- and electricity-distribution system, a dry dock for ship repairs, and a multiplicity of handling and storage facilities for cargo. By the 19505, about twenty-three million tons of waterborne cargo passed through the port each year, a figure that is all the more remarkable in that the port was then inoperative throughout the harsh Quebec winter.1 Ice-related problems in the river appeared insurmountable until the gradual introduction, starting in 1962, of ice-strengthened ships, ice-breakers, ice-control structures, floating ice booms,

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Waterfront Blues

and artificial islands.2 Before the early 19605, winter navigation remained marginal, the level of activity dropping to about 10 per cent of normal and 'sheds and wharves... falling silent like great animals in hibernation.'3 The Players As part of Canada's international and national transportation system, the port is national public property under federal jurisdiction. In 1936 an act of Parliament established a permanent crown corporation called the National Harbours Board (NHB) and charged it with the administration, management, and control of the harbours and properties placed under its jurisdiction.4 These include the ports of Halifax, Saint John, Chicoutimi, Quebec, Trois-Rivieres, Montreal, Churchill, and Vancouver.5 At the time of its creation, the NHB was composed of four members responsible to the minister of transport. The board possessed general powers of management, including the right to hold property, to direct services, and to determine charges applicable to the nine ports that it administered. To carry out these tasks, the NHB relied on port managers and employed a special police force. The NHB leased the dock sheds to shipping companies, which in turn contracted with stevedoring firms to provide labour to move the cargo between ship and shed. Some shipowners had their own stevedoring contractors, known as house stevedores (as opposed to independent stevedores), who handled their parent company's business exclusively. The independent stevedoring contractors travelled from shed to shed in order to fulfil their contracts. Truckers and railway employees would come into the sheds to pick up or deliver cargo. Thus, sheds and wharves were theatres of intense and often little coordinated activity. The result was frequent pilferage and, occasionally, large-scale theft of goods. The Shipping Federation of Canada, constituted in 1903 by an act of Parliament, was (and still is) an association of deep sea and coastal shipowners, agents, charterers, and operators which provided services to and from eastern Canadian, St Lawrence River, Great Lakes, and Arctic ports. In the 19605 and 19705 the majority of members were agents, mostly representing British shipping interests, whose responsibilities were to look after the shipowner's business in the port. In most cases this would include the booking of cargo, and sometimes it would also include the negotiation of stevedoring contracts. Agents earned their income from commission on cargo and fees for looking after the ships while in port. The Federation represented its members in common areas of concern such as port operations, port charges, aids to navigation, pilotage, St Lawrence Seaway operations, toll charges, and so on. Policy decisions were delegated to an executive council composed of fourteen persons elected by the membership, from which

Introduction

5

were elected a president, a vice-president, and a secretary-treasurer for a two-year mandate. Daily affairs were handled by staff consisting of a general manager, an assistant general manager, and a secretary. When the need arose, the Federation formed special committees with volunteer members to deal with matters such as safety, theft and pilferage, pilotage, and public relations. Prior to 1969, one of the main functions of the Federation was to negotiate collective labour agreements with unions representing the workforce at the ports of Montreal, Quebec, Trois-Rivieres, Halifax, Saint John, Toronto, and Hamilton. The Federation did not have any specialized staff with expertise in labour relations, and it was further incapacitated by its diverse array of economic and commercial interests. With consensus difficult to obtain, it struggled rather lamely through periods of collective bargaining. Extensive internal negotiations had to be carried out to arrive at proposals or counter-proposals and these were usually dictated not by sound policy considerations but by the overriding need to reach a general agreement among Federation members. The other principal players on management's side in the longshoring industry were the stevedoring contractors. These were labour brokers who provided the men, the equipment, and the supervision for the loading and unloading of the ships. The charge for cargo handling was usually quoted on a cost per ton of cargo handled, including overhead and profit. Since the stevedoring contractors' costs were passed on to the shipowners, the latter felt that it was their prerogative to negotiate the terms with the unions. In the 19605 there were nine stevedoring contractors operating in Montreal. This group was no more united than the Federation. There existed marked differences in size between companies, and, consequently, in relative influence and power. House stevedores generally ran much smaller operations than independent ones. Eastern Canada Stevedoring was by far the largest stevedoring company, employing in a typical year about half of the total 'gangs,' or longshoremen teams, available on the waterfront. Independent stevedoring contractors tended to look down upon house stevedores, believing that they had more of a 'civil servant' mentality than an 'entrepreneurial' one.6 In 1965 growing dissension between the Federation and the stevedoring contractors owing to increasing labour unrest and the changes in cargo-handling technology would lead the latter to form the Interprovincial Association of Stevedoring Contractors (lASC). The dockworkers were grouped into several locals of the International Longshoremen's Association (lLA) according to their different trades and geographical locations. Based in New York, the ILA was affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), and the Quebec Federation of Labour (QFL). In line with the AFL's basic philosophy the ILA practised 'business unionism' and was opposed in principle to revolutionary and

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Waterfront Blues

radical movements. Nevertheless, it was considered to be extremely militant, especially in New York and, by the 19605, in Montreal. The ILA was the biggest longshoring union in eastern Canada, with locals of varying size in Toronto, Hamilton, Montreal, Quebec City, Trois-Rivieres, Saint John, and Halifax. With a membership consistently hovering around 2,800, Montreal longshoremen's Local 375 was the biggest ILA local in Canada, a position that enabled it to retain much independence from the ILA head office in New York. There was usually more than one local per port, though the longshoremen invariably constituted the largest local and acted as leaders of other related tradesmen grouped into smaller locals. Each union local had an executive committee consisting minimally of a president, a vice-president, a business agent, and a secretary-treasurer who were elected by a majority of the local's members for a one- or two-year mandate.7 Information was dispensed and decisions made on matters related to policies, finances, internal affairs, and relations with management through general membership meetings. Business agents were usually the most visible executive members since they were responsible for solving daily problems that arose between the men and the stevedoring contractors on the docks. The Montreal dockworkers were divided into three main locals: the longshoremen (Local 375), the shipliners (Local 1552), and the checkers (Local i657).8 The longshoremen were responsible for the loading and unloading of vessels. Shipliners were basically carpenters and were responsible for the fitting of ships for the loading of grain and the cleaning of ships. Checkers were responsi ble for checking the cargo and repairing ('coopering') the damaged packages. Thi division of work was generally prevalent in other large ports, though there were only two ILA locals in Quebec City (longshoremen Local 1739, and checkers Loca 1605) and only one in Trois-Rivieres (longshoremen Local 1846). Each local was permitted to negotiate on its own but many negotiations were carried out in joint fashion; the river ports of Montreal, Quebec, and Trois-Rivieres often negotiated together, as did the Maritime ports. On occasion, all five ports were grouped together for the negotiation of monetary issues. However, because of its size and its militancy, Local 375 was the established leader of the river ports. As Judge Ala B. Gold would say in a draft conciliation report of 1969: 'It is common knowledge that if agreement is reached with Local 375 everything else will fall into place without too much difficulty/9 The public perception of dockworkers was decidedly unglamorous. Their lack of education as well as the very nature of their work, which was seen to involve nothing more than brute strength, led many to consider them as inferior members of society. Reinforcing this image were problems of pilferage, gambling, and drinking which were rampant at the Port of Montreal.10 At the same time, the social contrast between the mostly well-to-do members of the Federation and the

Introduction

7

stevedoring contractors on the one hand and the unpolished dockworkers on the other was further accentuated by their respective cultural roots. An overwhelming majority of the former were English Canadians who spoke little or no French while the majority of the latter were French Canadians who spoke little or no English. Though players from both sides allege that there was no overt 'cultural racism' between the English and the French, the difference in social background in the midst of the growing nationalism of Quebec in the 19605 and 19705 could not but taint relations between the parties. Traditional Longshoring Operations Ship loading and unloading was carried out by groups of men called gangs. The number of men required in a gang was entrenched in the collective agreement and depended upon the type of cargo and available handling technology. Gang size could be as low as seventeen men and as high as twenty-four men, plus a foreman. A twenty-man gang would be deployed as follows: three men on the ship's deck (one hatchman and two winch drivers11), nine in the hold (eight working manually and one operating lifters), and the remaining eight off the ship (two on the dock and six in the shed). Stevedoring contractors' manpower needs fluctuated from season to season. Each spring, a company decided on the number of 'regular gangs' - or 'parent gangs/ as they came to be called - it wanted to carry for that season and informed the union. For many years prior to the restructuring of the industry, there was an unwritten agreement between the Federation and the union that ninety-six regular gangs would operate at the Port of Montreal during the navigation season. The union was in charge of administering the labour pool and distributed the ninety-six gangs among the stevedoring contractors at the beginning of the season. Independent stevedoring contractors generally had sufficient work to carry a larger number of gangs and ensure each gang member a decent annual income. Smaller house stevedoring contractors required enough parent gangs to handle the work when ships were in port but they generally did not have enough business to allow their men to earn a livelihood exclusively in their service. The term 'parent' referred to an affiliation rather than to an exclusive employment relationship since gangs could and were employed by stevedoring contractors other than the 'parent' company. Approximately 80 per cent of the longshoremen had to resort to working for more than one employer. When they worked, the longshoremen were given a ticket by their employer of the moment, which they had to present in order to collect their pay. At the end of the week, each longshoreman had to show up at each of the company's offices where he had worked during the week to collect his pay, which was handed to him in cash.

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Waterfront Blues

Once a company knew how many gangs it could employ, it would select an appropriate number of foremen and 'walking bosses' from the ILA membership and register their names with the union. A foreman was in charge of one gang he hired and fired its members and supervised their work - while a walking boss generally supervised and coordinated two, three, or more gangs working on one ship. If a foreman or a walking boss had performed well the preceding year, he would generally be rehired by the same employer. There were no seniority provisions and no effective grievance procedures to protect a longshoreman against dismissal from a gang. However, there existed an unwritten rule that, once a gang was hired, it would remain intact throughout the season although individuals could leave if they wished. It was the foreman's responsibility to provide a full complement of men in his gang, which frequently required last-minute recruiting of gang replacements (fill-ins) since absenteeism rates of 20 to 25 per cent were common in the industry. Gang supplements or extras were also frequently needed owing to varying manpower requirements related to types of cargo. Carrying a gang did not imply a guarantee of employment. Ships came and went and no two days would see the same amount of manpower required on the waterfront. Therefore, regular gangs were 'called in' every day before each of three eight-hour work periods and put to work on the spot - or not. Under the traditional system, gangs could be told to report for work as many as three times in a day without actually being put to work and without compensation. While on some days a longshoreman could find himself unemployed, on other days he might be required to work for sixteen hours straight, and perhaps resume work again at the beginning of the following work period. On such occasions, men slept in the sheds. Between calling times, many men would not bother to return home and instead would go to a tavern or gamble to pass the time. The fact that the longshoremen were paid in cash contributed to the gambling problems. Judge A.I. Smith's 1969 report on labour unrest at the St Lawrence River ports noted that 'the police have received many complaints from the wives of longshoremen who, on being paid their wages, have immediately gambled them away thereby leaving their families destitute.'12 Despite the casualness of work, regular gang members were required to be available seven days a week or they risked losing their place in the gang. The prospect was not appealing: longshoremen who did not become part of a regular gang had to search for work as extras or fill-ins every morning. Since longshoring was considered unskilled work that could be performed by anyone with endurance and physical strength, and since the waterfront was widely reputed to be a good place to make a quick buck, there were plenty of strong-muscled men from all over the city competing with registered longshoremen for these jobs. Between 1959 and 1966, there was consistently a near-equal number of non-union and

Introduction

9

union men working as longshoremen - more or less three thousand of each. Early calling times consequently became an important issue: the earlier longshoremen found out that there was no work available from their parent company, the quicker they could hustle to find work elsewhere as fill-ins or extras along the ten miles of docks. The practice of walking the docks in search of temporary work was referred to as doing la seine. Although each stevedoring company usually tried to equalize earnings among their gangs, the casual nature of the work created substantial differences in earnings between those who were part of a parent gang and those who were not, and between parent gangs of different stevedoring contractors, to the extent that some longshoremen earned double the pay of others. Because of the uncertainty of their financial situation, most longshoremen could not borrow from banks and turned to loan sharks when the need for money arose. It was difficult for many to buy a car or a house or anything else that required long-term financing. Traditionally, the longshoremen accepted this fundamental uncertainty as inevitable and believed that hard work was the best form of job security.13 Since many of the problems of casual employment were linked to the irregular nature of the industry, the longshoremen could not possibly imagine how things could be changed. Attempts to compensate for the casualness of work had taken the form of make-work rules, or 'featherbedding.' For example, restrictions on the weight of sling-loads, ostensibly in place for safety reasons, became a means through which to control the pace of work. Gang sizes corresponding to the manpower needs of handcart operation were maintained to spread the work among more longshoremen than were actually required. Another widespread and informal form of featherbedding known as 'spello' took the form of half the gang working and the other half not but with everyone being paid. The longshoremen saw this as a means of helping each other to cope. However, it evolved from being a brief moment of rest to a form of 'paid absenteeism,' with a free and easy union timekeeper looking the other way, even to the extent of allowing certain longshoremen to be paid for two different jobs in two different locations at the same time. Most stevedoring contractors put up with 'spello/ seeing it as simply part of the system. The casualness of work and the concurrent difficulties involved in exercising managerial control allowed abusive practices to flourish on both sides. Since the foremen had absolute authority to hire and fire at will, it was to a longshoreman's advantage to keep on his good side. As one commentator wrote: 'The way is open to discrimination, favoritism, and arbitrary selection under the guise of measuring "ability" or "merit." The judgment of individual foremen is open to "influence" especially when they are members of the same bargaining unit... Since the foreman in fact does the hiring under the system in use in eastern Canada, he is

10 Waterfront Blues open to bribes and kickbacks for supplying jobs to certain individuals/14 On the other hand, if gang members viewed a foreman or a stevedoring company as unfair or too tough, they would slow down the operations to force compromise. Foremen and walking bosses, who belonged to the same union local as their men, were sometimes fined by the union for taking their managerial responsibilities too seriously for the liking of their gang.15 The casualness associated with the system of employment extended to the casual approach to security. The waterfront was not fenced; anyone could walk the docks, enter the sheds, and handle cargo at will, without being checked for identification. Jules Deschenes would state in his 1967 report on theft and pilferage: 'The system itself creates a propitious climate for all forms of temptation.' Bribes or threats were used to get truckers and watchmen to 'go for a walk' and leave cargo unattended. Some who refused were physically assaulted.16 Whole containers were known to disappear.17 The situation was so bad that it was apparently possible to 'order' a Japanese radio by model number at a certain tavern where dockworkers were known to congregate.18 At the heart of the discipline problems was the union's exclusive jurisdiction over the administration of the labour pool. Judge Smith's 1969 report concluded that 30 per cent of longshoremen and 25 per cent of checkers had a criminal record for indictable offences.19 Management had absolutely no control over the men registered by the union, and little over the men chosen by the foremen as regulars, extras, or fill-ins. Even when union members were caught breaking the law, the casualness of employment made it difficult to exercise effective discipline; if a man was dismissed from a gang by an employer, nothing prevented him from being dispatched to another employer the very same day. Rather than assume responsibility for the maintenance of order, each of the various managerial bodies involved on the docks blamed the situation on others. The NHB, though in charge of administering the port, denied any responsibility to intervene in the relationship between stevedoring contractors and longshoremen to address drinking, gambling, and pilfering problems. It did not issue any kind of receipt for cargo delivery and assumed no responsibility for damages or losses to the shipments. The independent stevedoring contractors did not feel responsible for security in the sheds either since they were not allowed to lease them and so operated out of many throughout the port. The shipowners who did lease the sheds considered it the responsibility of whoever was handling the cargo to see to it that it did not disappear. The harbour came to be seen as 'a vast market place where everyone is free to enter and depart at leisure, to steal, to get intoxicated, to carry on gambling, to fight and generally to carry on as if the harbor of Montreal belonged to no one in particular.'20

Introduction 11 The Collective Bargaining Structure Navigation and shipping, including the longshoring industry, came under the jurisdiction of Parliament by virtue of the British North America Act, while the bargaining relationship between the parties to a collective agreement was defined under the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (iRDIA) of 1948 which in 1967 was consolidated with four others statutes as the Canada Labour Code. The code provides that the parties cannot call a work stoppage on the expiration of the collective agreement before having submitted themselves to conciliation. If no agreement is reached within fourteen days following the appointment of the conciliator, the minister of labour can appoint a conciliation board. The parties gain the right to call a strike or a lockout fifteen days following the report of the conciliator or seven days following the report of the conciliation board.21 It was the shipowners and agents, grouped into the Federation, who acted as management's voice at the bargaining table. Negotiations were carried out by an ad hoc labour committee composed of volunteer Federation members, several of whom were former sea captains used to the strict hierarchy aboard ships. The Federation was reluctant to accept representatives of the stevedoring contractors on the negotiating committee. Because these companies were paid on the basis of their operating expenses, the Federation suspected that they would have no incentive to oppose labour's demands and would settle at any cost to avoid conflict. Further, since some Federation members had subsidiary stevedoring contractors, the Federation believed that there was sufficient 'shopfloor' expertise to exclude the independent stevedoring contractors from the negotiations. In practice, the latter could make their views known through the shipowners or their agents, who were members of the Federation. Generally, negotiations took place simultaneously with all the longshoremen locals of all three river ports. Prior to 1966, negotiations between the English-speaking shipowners and the French-speaking dockworkers took place in English (facilitated by translators) and correspondence between the parties was also in English. The dockworkers' collective agreements usually expired on 31 December, at the end of the shipping season. Most negotiations were carried out between January and March, when the port was shut down for the winter. Once a collective agreement was agreed upon between the Federation and the ILA, every stevedoring company was required to endorse the agreement by signing it. Between negotiations, litigious matters were generally dealt with on an 'unofficial' basis, directly between the union and each employing stevedoring company. Though the Federation acted as management's negotiating agent, in daily operations it had little

12

Waterfront Blues

direct contact with the dockworkers. For this reason, it was thought that daily litigious matters would be best dealt with directly between the employing stevedoring company and the men, through their union representative. In other words, the shipowners and agents negotiated the working conditions of workers they did not employ, and the stevedoring contractors were expected to fulfil the terms and conditions of collective agreements which they had not negotiated. The fact that each stevedoring company dealt with its own labour problems gave rise to many private arrangements and interpretations of the collective agreements, with little concern for homogeneity, precedence, and sometimes even contractual legality. The truth was that the stevedoring contractors often just wanted to resolve the dispute on the spot and without any disruption or delay so that they could do their work quickly.22 As Smith noted in his 1969 report: 'The stevedoring contractors in particular cared nothing about the concept of management-labour cooperation and took full advantage of the fact that their workforce could be kept relatively quiet with higher wages and by management closing their eyes to their employees being involved in all kinds of irregular activities.'23 The lack of uniformity in enforcement and interpretation of the contract generated serious dissatisfaction and tension on both sides. This translated into demands for stricter provisions that would make avoidance of obligations more difficult. Over the years, the parties, clause by clause, shackle by shackle, ended up building a virtual prison for themselves. Occasionally, when a dispute could not be resolved with the employing stevedoring company, the union looked to the Federation to step in as the party with which the collective agreement had been negotiated. In some cases, the Federation's stand would be uncomfortably at odds with that of the stevedoring company involved. From the development of bargaining demands and strategy to the actual negotiation of collective agreements through to their implementation and enforcement, the absence of a single employer made it difficult to identify who was management. This structural 'identity crisis' prevented effective action. To quote Judge Smith again: The stevedoring contractors claim that they must forever refer to the Shipping Federation as the 'theoretical' management when time comes to exercise management prerogatives. They claim that the Shipping Federation, which must in turn look for instruction to principals located in England and other foreign countries, fails to exercise any of such prerogatives, leaving the contractors unable to control properly the workforce. The Shipping Federation, on the other hand, claims that it is the stevedoring contractors who do not exercise properly their authority ... There is no doubt that this division within management, where management is the Shipping Federation, but where the 'de facto' employer is the stevedoring contractor, has

Introduction 13 not only severely divided management, making it incapable of facing a united workforce, but also has bred continuous in-fighting and misunderstanding between the 'employers' (the stevedoring contractors) and management (the Shipping Federation).24

Divisions among management impaired constructive dialogue with the union. Between 1938 and 1960, the formal relationship between management and labour consisted of biannual or annual negotiations between the Federation and the ILA, followed by little or no dialogue during the life of the collective agreements. Dr Laurent Picard, chairman of a commission of inquiry to study job-security and technological matters at the Port of Montreal, remarked in his 1967 report: 'The structure of relations between the various parties, the number of stevedoring contractors that are a party to the contract and the number of shippers who sign a contract give rise to a situation that makes it difficult to manage a collective agreement at a port, especially at a port that is as large as the port of Montreal.'25 Through the 19405 and 19505, there were hardly any work stoppages on the docks. However, almost every time the parties met to negotiate, they eventually had to have the help of a conciliation officer from the federal Department of Labour to come to an agreement. Even in these years of relative labour peace, the Federation was frustrated with the negotiation process, which it perceived as a perpetuation of institutionalized blackmail on the part of the union. As the Federation saw it, the union would table excessive demands, the Federation would protest, the government would send a conciliator, and the Federation would cave in. Until the 19605 there was no imperative for change. For all its flaws, the system worked well enough to keep everyone relatively prosperous and satisfied. The Port of Montreal attracted a regular flow of business which enriched shipowners, stevedoring contractors, and longshoremen alike. By then, however, technological change was holding out the promise of a faster and better mode of work while at the same time placing great stress on the fragile equilibrium provided by the existing structure. For employers, the union's control of the labour pool and over working conditions had become a problem. Clearly, the casual system of employment was incompatible with more mechanized operations; the waterfront had to be 'decasualized.' But, for dockworkers, technological advances held the threat of job losses. To complicate matters still further, there was no base on which to build a new system. There was no register of the workforce, no classification of the men, no formal dispatch procedures, no mechanisms for the equalization of earnings or work opportunities, and no single employer to set out a vision. And when the time came to make difficult decisions, the labour-relations structure bred dissension, leading each actor to blame the other for the persistence of the problems

14 Waterfront Blues and thereby limiting and impairing the dialogue that should have taken place among shipowners, stevedoring contractors, and longshoremen to deal with modernization. Men and Machines Prior to the 19605, technology in various forms - cranes, forklifts, grain-trimming machines,26 hooks,27 and nets - was widely used on the waterfront. However, this technology was complementary to the traditional method of doing work and conducting operations; it did not threaten the fundamental balance of the system, in the same sense that trading in a rock for a hammer does not alter the manner in which to use it. The new technology that emerged in the 19605, in contrast, necessitated a change in operations to make it efficient. Until the 19605, industrialization had been synonymous with mass production for the purpose of mass economies. Cost reductions and the consequent enlargement of consumers' markets had been achieved through bigger and faster production processes. In the 19505, however, businessmen gradually came to realize that this regime of 'more and faster' at the production level had reached saturation. The idea emerged that the principles of bigger quantities and faster processes had to be extended outside the plant and applied to the other components of cost, including transportation. In the shipping sector, the demand rapidly grew for larger ships that could carry more cargo per voyage and for more efficient cargo-handling methods to reduce port time. Until then, cargo had been carried in 'break-bulk' form. The ships were filled with bags, bales, cartons, barrels, and so on and loaded and unloaded by the longshoremen using winches, nets, handcarts, and, above all, brute strength. Labour costs represented around 60 per cent of the total cost of transportation. The way to achieve short turnaround times was for stevedoring contractors to push the men for an acceleration in the pace of work (or 'speed up,' as it was commonly known). Not only did longshoremen deeply resent this, there simply comes a point when a man cannot work any faster. It became obvious that significant time could be saved only by organizing the cargo into a bigger unit load that could be lifted in one piece by a machine. This led to the development of unitized cargo on pallets28 and of the container. Containers were the incarnation of the bigger-unit concept in its ultimate form. A container is a twenty- or forty-foot-long metal box that can hold between eighteen and thirty-six tons of cargo; the cargo remains sealed within the container throughout its journey, having been stuffed at the factory or at the distribution centre. Containers facilitated intermodal transport since they were equally adaptable to air, rail, sea, and truck transport, thereby saving time throughout the whole journey of the cargo

Introduction

15

from shipper to receiver. In addition to being a protection against pilferage, the benefits of containerization included lower freight costs, faster delivery of goods, less cargo damage, lower insurance premiums, and lower handling costs. Containerization could reduce a vessel's turnaround time from six to ten days to fortyeight or even twenty-four hours. The container trend caught fire immediately. New types of ships emerged. Special container ships were designed that could carry 550 containers. The roll-on/roll-off-type ship (RO/RO) was designed to have automobiles and trucks driven on and off through a system of ramps and decks, as opposed to being hoisted on and off the ship. The 'freedom class' ship had foldable decks that allowed it to transport automobiles one way and grain the other, for maximum utilization of a round trip. These new monster ships were restricted in their choice of harbour by the depth of the waterways, the existence of facilities to handle them, and the methods of operations. On shore, a new concept of dockwork emerged by which one operator would be completely responsible for the transfer of cargo from vessels to inland carriers (and vice versa) and assume responsibility for the cargo while in his custody. This marked the advent of terminal operations. Transferring the responsibility for cargo handling to one party resulted in greater control over dockworkers, increased efficiency, and reduced theft or pilferage and cargo damage. World ports were challenged in terms of waterway depth and cargo-handling facilities. Ports had been constructed with the idea that manpower, horsepower, and rail-power would move cargo. Over the years, the increasing volume of cargo and the gradual introduction of machines for dockwork resulted in congestion on the docks. Since the efficiency of the new technologies was rooted in rapid turnaround, the cost of idle time caused by obsolete handling facilities would cancel out the benefits. Thus, ports that were small and where dockwork was slow because of space limitations would be neglected in favour of large ports with facilities that would permit efficient handling of cargo. The pressure for change on the parties in the longshoring industry in Montreal and elsewhere was immense. The shipowners who were building costly modern vessels required faster turnaround in port to make their investments worthwhile. 'Make work' provisions embedded in the collective agreement were increasingly viewed by the Shipping Federation as an unacceptable restriction on productivity. While this was not a new perspective, by the 19605, faced with increasing competition from other ports, the Federation felt a new urgency to get rid of obsolete clauses on such matters as gang size and sling-load limits. The challenge to stevedoring contractors and longshoremen was much more fundamental. As labour brokers, the stevedoring contractors needed to rethink their roles in the industry. So did longshoremen. Despite the fact that technology had the potential of making the work easier, longshoremen were increasingly

16 Waterfront Blues aware that technology could not only complement manpower but replace it altogether.29 Many jobs based upon brute strength would be lost while new jobs requiring mechanical skills would emerge. For a chosen few, technological change would act as a platform into social respectability, but for most it would ultimately mean the axe. Consequently, the ILA wanted to maintain the longshoremen's traditional form of job security through those very featherbedding provisions that the Federation wanted to remove. The ILA's reaction was by no means unique. Longshoremen world-wide were resisting technological change by maintaining featherbedding practices. There were exceptions, a notable one being the longshoremen of San Francisco. There, labour's admission of the impossibility of 'beating the machine' and its desire to prevent a sudden erosion of power had led in 1954 to a 'mechanization and modernization' agreement between the employers and longshoremen which provided that a fund be established to support workers rendered redundant by technological change, until natural attrition and early retirements brought the number of workers to the desired level. The agreement had been extended to locals of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (iLWU) on the Canadian west coast in 1963.3° In Montreal, the union's unofficial recognition that technological change was inevitable did not lead to any constructive problem-solving approach. Employers were as responsible for this state of affairs as the union. The ex-sea captains who represented management at the bargaining table were used to the rigid class hierarchy applied aboard ships and lacked any feel for collective bargaining. At the same time, the union executive in Montreal was faced with an increasingly restless, critical, and demanding membership. Negotiations and industrial peace on the waterfront had always been a matter of money, but increasingly longshoremen were no longer satisfied to see their union executive concentrate solely on wages and ignore other 'real needs' - protection against speed-up and unfair dismissal and workplace amenities such as washrooms and eating areas.31 A younger generation of longshoremen felt that there was a fundamental lack of justice on the docks, and they were starting to resent both the Federation for its apparent indifference and the union leadership for its apparent docility.32 By 1960, longshoremen had had enough. Frustrated with archaic working conditions and worried about the advance of technological change, they used every pretext to walk out or to threaten to do so, whether to further their own interests or in sympathy with other unions or ILA locals.33 These manifestations of labour unrest were extremely worrisome to an industry that had long enjoyed peace and stability. They also illustrated how unfocused the resistance to technological change was. For years, nothing had been done in a systematic, logical fashion to deal with the issue of technological

Introduction 17 change. Anxiety mounted without being intelligently channelled, rendering the trigger mechanism more and more sensitive. And predictably, the bomb went off repeatedly. Within about five years, and despite the previous half-century of peace, the Montreal harbour came to be seen as the kingdom of anarchy. Meanwhile, other ports around the world were adapting to change. 1960: The Lelievre Case and Its Aftermath Of all the ports in the world in 1960, Montreal had one of the best reputations for labour relations, with only a single longshoremen's walkout in the last thirty-four years and none for the last twenty. This period of labour peace came to an end on 22 September of that year. At first, it was a day like any other. The docks were alive with the sounds of hundreds of men shouting. Then, the shouts grew louder and aggressive. Something was wrong at the sheds of the Brown and Ryan stevedoring contractor. A moment later, the gang members of foreman Aurele Lelievre threw down their hooks and walked out. Some said that the men were not doing their jobs and that the foreman had threatened them. Others said that the incident was the culmination of a family dispute between the foreman and his nephew who belonged to the gang. Donat Bibeau, the long-time president of Local 375, had died a few years earlier, leaving Hector Marchand in charge of a workforce that was growing restive. Recently, union leaders, pushed by a younger faction of longshoremen, had made a serious effort to slow down the work. Marchand, under pressure from the new faction, had managed to regain the presidency of the local during elections two weeks earlier by the slim majority of eighty votes and he stood to lose his job if the demands of the membership were not met.34 Yet those demands found no favour in the ranks of the stevedoring companies, particularly Brown and Ryan. An aggressive company that demanded good and steady production from its gangs, Brown and Ryan implemented its approach through its foremen and walking bosses. In the late summer of 1960 the company was not happy with the production of one gang and instructed Lelievre, the foreman, to dismiss certain men in the gang. Lelievre, a member in good standing of Local 375, had been employe by Brown and Ryan as a foreman and, from time to time, as a walking boss supervising the work of several gangs. The mutiny of 22 September was viewed as intolerable and the president of the company, Bill Brown, ordered that all the gang members, with exception of the foreman, be fired. The dismissed men complained to the union on the ground that Lelievre was verbally abusive with his men and required them to work in an unsafe manner. Lelievre was summoned by the union committee to stand 'trial' and respond to the accusations. Halfway through the calling of his witnesses, the

i8

Waterfront Blues

executive declared that 'they had heard enough already' and 'ruled' that Lelievre was forbidden to act as foreman or walking boss for the remainder of the year. Marchand later recognized that the union's demand to have Lelievre demoted might not have been 'quite correct'35 but alleged that the officers had been forced into it by the unrest that prevailed among the men working for Brown and Ryan. The company drove their men hard and they resented it. They had walked off the job partly because the union led by Marchand had never addressed the speed-up problem. Marchand sacrificed Lelievre in order to protect his position. Unfortunately for Marchand, the dispute then escalated much further than he would have liked. Bill Brown was not about to be told by the union whom to employ as a foreman and he flatly refused to demote Lelievre. To longshoremen, Brown's refusal to demote Lelievre illustrated the company's unwillingness to ease the speed-up practices and symbolized the 'oppression' of them all. The union suspended Lelievre from its ranks, which had the direct consequence of making him unemployable as either a foreman or a regular longshoreman since such regular jobs were the privilege of union members only. Brown would not be subdued; he took the position that he did not recognize Lelievre's suspension from the union as valid. Work on the docks came to an abrupt halt and longshoremen harassed Lelievre relentlessly. A truck circulated on the docks flashing a banner which read: 'It is hunting time; we must take down the hare'36 lievre is French for hare. Lelievre's pick-up truck was overturned, his family received anonymous threats, and he was advised by the police to seek refuge elsewhere.37 The Federation was asked to resolve the problem but it was overwhelmed by the turn of events. A minor altercation had blown up into a dispute of major proportions and, since there had not been a work stoppage on the waterfront for a long time, the Federation did not know what to do. The practical imperative was to get ships moving and it seemed that the way to accomplish this was to give longshoremen what they wanted: Lelievre's head on a platter. Consequently, the Federation repeatedly appealed to Brown for him to change his mind and fire Lelievre. Brown refused: 'I didn't back down; I was convinced I was right. I WAS right! Eventually I suppose they [the Shipping Federation] were only holding on through courtesy to me, they didn't know whether it was the right thing or the wrong thing ... eventually, after a week or so, without asking me, they capitulated.'38 The Federation endorsed the executive's decision to suspend Lelievre from the union and prevent him from being hired. Work resumed on the docks but ripple effects from the dispute persisted for some time. Brown had not digested the episode and decided to 'fool them': he hired Lelievre as a walking boss, a job for which one did not necessarily have to be a union member even though the

Introduction 19 practice by tacit agreement had been to hire Local 375 members. As a result, mandatory union membership of walking bosses would become a Local 375 demand in the upcoming negotiation. Lelievre had lost his zest for confrontation and told Brown that he could not go on as a walking boss.39 Brown, however, kept him on the payroll even when there was no work that he could do. He also supported him in a legal action against the union which Lelievre won because the union had refused to hear his full defence. Over the next six years, the case would go all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada, driven by the ILA's determination to get the judgment overturned. It was unsuccessful. The stoppage had lasted only five days but its impact was great. Despite Lelievre's victories in court, the damage had been done on the docks. Lelievre was now a broken man, an exile, and a walking advertisement for foremen and walking bosses to think twice about pushing the men too hard.40 What is more, the longshoremen had tasted their collective power for the first time - and they liked it. Leaders of the industry regarded the whole dispute as well as its compromise solution as a bad portent for the future. As the Montreal Star reported: 'The American locals... on the east coast are extremely disturbed over automation ... their policy recently has been a slower pace of work. There is some appeal for this here ... The fear is that Montreal's waterfront may become the scene of a damaging factional fight within the Union itself and, in the event of a victory by the dissidents, shipping will confront a Union as militant as anything that Brooklyn has known.'41 Further indications of increasing unrest among the rank and file became apparent during collective bargaining for the renewal of the two-year collective agreement expiring 31 December 1960. Generally in collective bargaining, ratification by the membership of a package recommended by the executive is a mere technicality. However, longshoremen in Montreal refused twice to ratify a proposal, recommended by their executive, which provided for a moderate wage increase and minor changes in working conditions. This was in contrast to the longshoremen in Quebec, Trois-Rivieres, Halifax, and Saint John who had accepted the same proposal. The Montreal longshoremen sought improvements in make-work provisions, including increased gang size, lower sling-load limits, and the right to move palletized cargo in the sheds (work that then was done by nonunion men). The Federation agreed to sign a settlement along those lines provided clear disposition was included that employers had the right to remove empty pallets from ships' holds in one lift. Longshoremen rejected the recommended settlement and sent their officers back to the negotiation table with the mandate that 'not more than one pallet be removed from the hold of a ship at a time.'42 Resistance to change was gathering momentum in Montreal, with union politics continuing to play a part. The Federation was of the view that the union

20

Waterfront Blues

negotiating committee had lost the confidence of the membership and Remi Duguette, a federal conciliation officer who had been invited unofficially by Marchand and C.T. (Charlie) Mearns, general manager of the Federation, to meet with the parties, recommended that a conciliation board be set up.43 A one-year collective agreement based on the report of a conciliation board was finally signed in July 1961. It included, among other things, a two-hour guarantee of work for the first call of the day and one hour for recalls; this meant that, irrespective of whether there was work or not, longshoremen called or recalled to the dockside would be paid for showing up, except in the case of bad weather. Soon after, Hector Marchand handed in his resignation as Local 375 president. During that period and for the first time since its creation, the Federation had doubts regarding its ability to deal with labour relations. At that stage, it employed Jean Brisset, who was a respected maritime lawyer but had limited labourlaw experience, as counsel for all legal matters. In July 1961 W.R. (Bill) Eakin, Jr, who was to serve as president of the Federation during the long and difficult strike of 1966, expressed the opinion that the Federation should seriously consider obtaining the services of an experienced labour lawyer on a permanent retainer. Several members supported this suggestion but Ed Strang of Saguenay Shipping, chairman of the Federation's Labour Committee, while recognizing that a labour lawyer's advice could be valuable, felt that 'such assistance might be somewhat over-rated.'44 Strang, an opinionated negotiator with limited experience outside the shipping business who was to become president of the British Columbia Maritime Employers Association when he left Montreal in the mid1960s, gave no quarter in his battles with the union and did not take outside advice with enthusiasm. In November 1963 Eakin again raised the matter and again it was referred to Strang and his committee for their attention.45 This time, the suggestion gained a more favourable hearing and by mid-1964 Paul Renault had been retained to act as the Federation's lawyer. I developed the greatest respect for Paul and worked closely with him throughout 1965 and 1966 as problems between the Federation and the ILA escalated. I considered him my mentor as I got my feet wet in the swamp of industrial relations. As will be seen, when the Picard commission was established in 1966, Renault turned his brief with the Federation over to Brian Mulroney, a junior in his office. 1963-5: Chaos Descends During the early 19605, besides endless internal bickering among the various union officials from the different locals, there was, according to a confidential memorandum from conciliation officer Horace Pettigrove which 'should probably not find a place in a departmental file,' considerable 'intra union intrigue'46

Introduction

21

in Montreal as certain officers attempted to climb up the ILA's hierarchical ladder. Meanwhile, Local 375'$ militancy continued unabated, and in 1963 it focused its fire on the negotiations for the renewal of the collective agreement that had expired the previous December. By now, the local's new president was Paul Asselin, a scar-faced, gravel-voiced dock veteran who had been business agent under the former executive. Between January 1963 and May 1963, Local 375 rejected settlement terms recommended by its negotiating committee, and reached with the assistance of federal conciliation officers C.E. (Charlie) Poirier and Horace Pettigrove, on no fewer than five occasions. The apparent cause of the rejection was rank-and-file dissatisfaction with their pension, welfare, and vacation plans.47 Poirier realized that the membership wanted drastic changes to be made to the benefits plans but he knew that he could not deal with this at the conciliation stage and he recommended that the parties apply for the establishment of a conciliation board. In August 1963, more than eight months after the beginning of the negotiations, management and labour agreed to the establishment of a conciliation board. The board was constituted early in September with lawyer Jean Massicotte as the Federation's representative and Quebec Federation of Labour (QFL) activist Louis Laberge as the ILA's representative.48 The board could not convene before the end of the month because its chairman, Judge Rene Lippe, was unavailable until then. Lippe was a highly experienced mediator who had built a solid reputation by helping solve many disputes for both federal and provincial authorities. His second significant asset was his being French Canadian; it was thought that longshoremen might relate better to him than to an anglophone.49 On the morning of 9 September 1963, deciding that the additional delay was unacceptable, a group of Montreal longshoremen swept across the waterfront, calling to their peers to drop their hooks to attend a meeting in one of the sheds. They had no trouble achieving full attendance. During the meeting, the executive was bombarded with criticism and allegations of incompetence, until President Asselin, completely exasperated, retorted that it was damn easy for them to complain from their spectators' seats. The idea came from the floor to choose fifty men to 'accompany' the officers to the bargaining table and act as the true voice of longshoremen. Asselin said, 'Fine. Let's go. Who is in?'5° Some of the loudest critics were quick to volunteer. Their peers urged other members forward. One of those spectators-turned-actor was Jean-Marc St-Onge, a man who would ascend to the union presidency and become a central figure in the history of the Montreal waterfront. The members of Local 375 elected to stay out until the conciliation board began meeting, and they convinced their 'brothers' of Local 1657 (Montreal checkers), Local 1552 (Montreal shipliners), and Local 1846 (Trois-Rivieres longshoremen) to

22

Waterfront Blues

join in sympathy. They demanded to hear a progress report in two weeks and emphasized that advances had better be made or there would be another walkout. When confronted by the Federation, Local 375'$ officers lamely admitted that the strike was unauthorized by the executive and promised that they would do everything they could to get the men to return to work. However, it was clear that the executive had no leverage at all, and so, in the absence of Lippe, the conciliation board appointed another chairman, Judge Robert Lafleur, so meetings could be held immediately. The longshoremen, momentarily appeased, returned to work after being out two days. On 25 September the board made a unanimous recommendation for a two-year agreement, which was delivered the next day to Allan J. MacEachen, minister of labour in the new Liberal government of Lester Pearson, elected the previous April. It included a request to the minister for an immediate inquiry into the operation of the Shipping Federation-ILA pension plan. The fifty-man worker's committee met on the 2/th and rejected the recommendations. Poirier expected that the strike would occur on 4 October, the end of the seven-day period from the receipt of the conciliation board's report. In a last attempt to bring about a settlement, on 2 October, Labour Minister MacEachen appointed Judge Lippe as an industrial-inquiry commissioner, charging him to endeavour to mediate the issues in dispute between the parties and to make a report in fourteen days. On the 3rd, Lippe met with the ILA representatives; nothing was accomplished. On 4 October 1963, as scheduled, all three river ports began a legal strike. To prevent trouble from spilling over to the city streets, the NHB erected a huge barricade of railway ties and steel fencing. It was an extreme and unprecedented measure: 'Not even during World War II was the port so completely closed down. Police say simply that the action was taken to avoid trouble ... In Montreal, police officers with patrol cars and motorcycles cruised the length of the harbour along Notre-Dame Street augmenting the NHB police force inside the barricade ... The full complement of 100 NHB police officers were on duty, with all leaves cancelled for the duration of the strike. Royal Canadian Mounted Police plainclothes men in unmarked cars also patrolled the waterfront inside the barricade.'51 Even those drastic measures could not contain the longshoremen, who swarmed over the barricades and went on wild rampages. Many serious injuries, including gunshot wounds, were suffered by longshoremen, sailors, freight handlers, and shipping executives who tried to intervene. Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau himself appeared before one longshoremen's meeting to ask, without success, that they release cargo destined for a cultural exposition.52 Meanwhile, mediation proceeded. Judge Lippe told the press that the dispute was 'the most complicated I have ever seen.'53 On the 6th, Lippe met with ILA president T.W. Gleason, of New York, and Phil

Introduction

23

Cutler and the former provided the judge with an outline of what he claimed the ILA members would settle for. Using this information, Lippe was able to obtain a settlement on 14 October. The strike ended and the longshoremen returned to work. The terms included, among other gains for the union, the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the pension fund. The difference between Lafleur's recommendations and the final settlement hardly seemed worth a strike but the longshoremen felt they had won a great battle. To some people, an individual longshoreman - with little education and a lot of brawn - may not have amounted to much, but as a group they had a thunderous voice that would not be ignored. Imagine, the mayor himself had come to beg them for his cargo! The Montreal longshoremen were elated with their new feeling of empowerment and took to going to the well over nothing and everything. And each time, they got their wish. Two weeks after returning to work, the longshoremen threatened to walk out again to obtain from the Federation the retroactive portion of the wage increase immediately.54 In the summer of 1964, they staged another wildcat from 15 to 17 June to protest the slow pace of Judge Lippe's inquiry into the operations of the pension fund. Lippe's report on the pension plan was issued in August and provided for a complete division of the funds between the St Lawrence River ports and the Maritime ports, and for the establishment in the river ports of an additional retirement plan with benefits based on contributions. On 9 November the longshoremen walked out to protest the delay in implementing the report. By then I was a member of the Federation's Labour Committee, and in that role I both observed and shared the shipping companies' mounting frustration over the apparent impunity with which longshoremen repeatedly walked off their job. While many Federation members wanted to bring legal action against the union and make it clear that illegal strikes were unacceptable, others were concerned with damaging relationships further and favoured a more constructive approach, without knowing what that might be.55 Paralysed by this lack of consensus, the Federation was unable to take the bull by the horns and struggled to deal with problems on a case-by-case basis without the safety net of a coherent labourrelations policy. In the midst of this, the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU), the second-largest union federation in Quebec, viewed the ILA's shaken standing with its membership as a golden opportunity to lure the longshoremen into its own organization. It started actively raiding the ILA, thus adding a new divisive issue and creating more pressure on the union executive to regain the membership's trust.56 But a new element was about to enter the picture that would tilt the balance in favour of the ILA. In the fall of 1964, Jean-Marc St-Onge, Local 3/5's new business agent, concluded that longshoremen would retain more autonomy over

24 Waterfront Blues labour-management relations within the ILA's framework.57 He thus chose to snub the CNTU sympathizers and would henceforth concentrate on revitalizing the ILA. In the summer of 1965 the one thousand grainhandlers employed by the NHB and just recently unionized by the CNTU went on legal strike. Unlike the ILA, the CNTU had the flair to couple its muscle flexing with courteous flirting of the press and the public, which prompted high levels of sympathy for its cause. The grainhandlers asked the longshoremen to respect their picket lines but Local 375 president Paul Asselin firmly declined, telling his members that the ILA had nothing to do with the dispute and would not get involved. However, the cell of CNTU sympathizers within the ILA succeeded in getting the longshoremen to stage a one-day sympathy strike. After an embarrassed Asselin assured his members that he sympathized wholeheartedly with the grainhandlers,58 the longshoremen resumed work. The grainhandlers' strike was settled voluntarily in August after a two-month strike. The agreement ending the dispute was a great success in terms both of the monetary package and of the improvements to the quality of life at work, and was eyed enviously by ILA members, to the dismay of their officers. The next walkout occurred in October 1965. Economic Stevedoring, the inhouse stevedoring contractor of Furness Withy, was dissatisfied with the performance of one of its gang foreman, Emery Villeneuve. On 4 October the company's superintendent, Captain Evans, told Villeneuve that he allowed rest periods in excess of what was sufficient and insinuated that his gang seemed to 'seldom work at full strength.' Confronted with a formal warning to correct the situation or face the consequences, Villeneuve requested to meet with a higher-ranking company official 'or his gang would stop work.' Evans retorted that he could take his complaints to the union business agent. Villeneuve apparently threatened Evans with physical violence and was fired on the spot. Unlike the case of Lelievre, Villeneuve was well liked by his men and a handful of them took the initiative of calling off all gangs working on the Manchester Liner vessels handled by Fumess Withy. The Federation's Labour Committee met with Asselin the following morning and we agreed to his suggestion that the case be submitted to arbitration, pending the outcome of which Villeneuve would be reinstated.59 An arbitration board was put together in a rush and hearings commenced a few days later. Meanwhile, the company obtained a temporary injunction against the seven individuals it deemed responsible for the walkout, but the longshoremen simply ignored the court order and were successful in their efforts to maintain the boycott. As a result, Furness Withy filed a claim for contempt of court against the seven ringleaders, with hearings to be held within days. On 12 October, for reasons relating

Introduction

25

to Superintendent Evans's attitude in the matter, the arbitration board cancelled the dismissal but suspended Villeneuve for a month and demoted him to the rank of regular longshoreman for the balance of the season.60 Upon hearing of the decision, a faction of militant longshoremen descended on the docks and attempted to precipitate a port-wide stoppage. Their manoeuvre was only partially successful but it nevertheless created enough fear to warrant an emergency meeting between Local 375 officers and the Federation's Labour Committee. Furness Withy offered to withdraw the court action against the seven men if the union would endeavour to get all men back to work the following morning. The union accepted. At 8 A.M. the next morning, 14 October, everything was back to normal on the waterfront. The partial wildcat strike had lasted ten days. Longshoremen had won again. And so, at the end of 1965, the parties found themselves more disgruntled than ever and facing their biggest challenge so far: technological modernization. By then, containers were no longer a novelty in shipping but a well-established and popular device used by shippers across the globe. The serious labour unrest that had developed on the docks during the last five years had prevented any constructive dialogue between the parties to deal with this challenge. The Federation's president, Bill Eakin, explained: 'There are changes taking place in the shipping industry through the use of containers particularly through United States ports, such as Boston, Portland, New York, which we estimate will create a diversion of twenty to twenty-five percent of Canada's trade through these US ports within the next twelve to fifteen months. If we cannot achieve reasonable working conditions through the principal Canadian ports we will lose this traffic.'61 Eakin was clearly right. If further slippage in the port's competitive position was to be prevented, it was imperative to make way for technological change and to restore labour peace. At the very least, employers had to obtain full productivity using the machines they already had. But in 1965, amidst all the turmoil, nobody could foresee how change would finally come about.

CHAPTER ONE

'A Great National Emergency'

The 1966 negotiations marked a turning point in the process of change on the Montreal waterfront. Through the first half of the 19605, adaptation to technological change was being resisted because neither party had a clear idea of how the old system could and should be adapted, and because neither had much feeling for the other's concerns. Both wanted it all their way. In the end, the failure of the usual tools of dispute resolution to prevent a lengthy, costly, and bitter strike compelled the government of Canada to intervene. Although the parties would agree upon a settlement through government representatives, what each had actually agreed to behind closed doors would come into question and remains nebulous to this day. As a member of the Shipping Federation's Executive Council, and particularly through my membership in the Federation's Labour Committee, I was intimately involved in the events of 1966, which marked my first negotiation with the river port locals. By then, with two years' experience in management-labour relation on the Montreal waterfront, I had grown familiar with the preoccupations of longshoremen as they faced the prospect of technological change. I had also become acutely aware, however, of management's own failings, particularly its frequent insensitivity to labour's concerns and its own inability either to set out a clear vision of the future or to speak with one voice. It was a difficult time for everyone involved in the Port of Montreal, and in my own case, as both observer and participant, I found myself increasingly frustrated both with the intransigence of the other side and with the shortsightedness of my own. Not that I had any magic potion to offer. Generally, I was wary of the hard line favoured by som of my colleagues and promoted instead the value of compromise, but, in terms of the larger picture - how to attain the objectives of port modernization in a manner fair to both sides - I was, at this point, as much in the dark as anyone else.

'A Great National Emergency' 27 First Steps As in previous years, the union locals from the three river ports united for the negotiations, which translated into a nineteen-man negotiating team. Local 375'$ delegation consisted of its president, Paul Asselin, business agent Jean-Marc StOnge, and secretary-treasurer Adrien Lemoine. The union's bargaining goals were influenced partly by the CNTU grainhandlers' settlement and partly by advantageous clauses that it would single out in collective agreements in effect in other ports without giving heed to the concessions made in exchange. The widely publicized collective agreement obtained by the grainhandlers in the summer of 1965 contained a substantial wage increase of fifty cents over two years (almost 30 per cent) as well as many significant improvements in working conditions. The settlement was a tremendous victory for the CNTU. If the ILA was to keep its position as representative of the Montreal longshoremen, the 1966 bargaining committee had to do at least as well. Initial wage demands amounted to an increase of fifty cents an hour (over the current rate of $2.63) for each year of a two-year agreement, an increase of 38 per cent over two years. The union also wanted a four-hour work guarantee for every recall (instead of the current two-hour guarantee), a port-wide gang-rotation system for complete equalization of earnings, and no reduction in gang size during the life of the collective agreement.1 In negotiations, the Federation was represented by its Labour Committee. Besides myself, the members of this committee in 1965-6 were the chairman, Captain Pat Bolger of McLean Kennedy; Peter Evans of Furness Withy; Captain Derry Parsons of Canadian Pacific (CP) Steamships; Captain Norman Reese-Potter of Cunard Steamships; and Herb Colley of Colley Motorships. There was a lot of marine and technical stevedoring talent on the committee. Bolger, Parsons, and Reese-Potter, besides being master mariners (ship's captains), were employed by different house stevedoring contractors and had years of experience between them, although the independent stevedoring contractors made the disparaging claim that they really did not understand the economics of the stevedoring business. Evans was the most experienced shipping man, since he was a senior executive of a large company which, in 1968, became the representative of the first container operator in Montreal. In addition, Evans's company had a house stevedoring subsidiary of its own. Colley was a small businessman who owned his own shipping agency. None of them had any training in labour negotiations. I was the youngest of the committee, with just seven years' experience in the shipping business after graduating from law school, where I had taken a course in labour law. In my short time in the family shipping business, which encompassed shipowning, chartering, and agency work, I had negotiated some stevedoring

28

Waterfont Blues

contracts and I had the support of a family of entrepreneurs who had been in the shipping business for over thirty years. Our mandate as a Labour Committee was to change the face of how stevedoring was to be done in the river ports. The only problem was that we had to get the agreement of a union in disarray to the changes we were seeking, and, on top of this, we were dealing with workers whose first language was French while our committee, including the chairman, was hardly even functionally bilingual. In anticipation of the movement of containers and the increase in unitized cargo, the Federation's principal goal was to increase productivity by modernizing the collective agreement. Although no grand design such as the agreement that had been negotiated on the U.S. west coast was contemplated, a trade-off between the elimination of restrictive practices and substantial wage increases was being considered. The approach was simple and uncomplicated. The new agreement would eliminate restrictive practices and provide for smaller gangs and larger sling-loads coupled with higher wages and improved working conditions. At the time it appeared that the Halifax and Saint John locals were ready to accept the principle of a modernized agreement, and the Federation was determined to have Montreal follow their lead. The existing collective agreements expired on 31 December 1965. Though notice of termination was served by the ILA in mid-October 1965, by the end of January 1966 the parties had not yet met. The Labour Committee was 'keenly aware' that negotiations had to get under way in the river ports as soon as possible but was in 'the difficult position... [of] trying to negotiate with both the Maritimes and the St. Lawrence River ports at once.'2 The river locals quickly lost patience and requested, in late January, the appointment of a bilingual conciliation officer since there was 'no reason to believe' that the parties could come to a rapid settlement otherwise. Labour Minister J.R. Nicholson judged the request premature because the parties had not even met.3 Between 17 February and 25 March the parties met about twenty times without reaching agreement. Every document submitted by one side had to be translated from English to French or viceversa before a response could be issued, which slowed down the process. Still, the situation seemed hopeful. The Federation was willing to offer a wage increase not inconsistent with the union's demands provided working conditions could be updated to increase productivity through the partial elimination of featherbedding. The union seemed receptive to an agreement along those lines, or seemed to be until union politics came to the fore. Enter St-Onge The 1966 negotiations marked the arrival of a new Local 375 official, Jean-Marc

'A Great National Emergency' 29 St-Onge. Fiercely determined, shrewd, and a blunt talker if there ever was one, St-Onge had been a lumberjack and, after marrying, had worked for three years in a shoe factory in Montreal not far from the port. From time to time he met longshoremen and became attracted to their work, and eventually, at the age of twenty-eight, he decided to join the ILA and become a longshoreman because he needed to earn money and the job paid well. He knew it was hard work but he had always worked hard and he was not afraid of it; in fact, he liked strenuous manual labour, regarding it as both invigorating and ennobling. As a longshoreman, St-Onge's first employer was Furness Withy, for whom he worked on the Cairn Thompson Line. He also worked for Cunard and later for CP Steamships, (interestingly, the three companies he worked for were represented on the Federation's Labour Committee.) St-Onge was crazy for money, and he told me that for a while he had a regular routine of working from Monday morning to Wednesday morning without going home. On Monday at 8:00 A.M. he reported to Furness, where he worked the day. He then worked all night from 7:00 P.M. until Tuesday morning for Canadian Pacific on an 'Empress' passenger ship. Tuesday morning would see him back at Furness and Tuesday night again at Canadian Pacific. On Wednesday morning he went home to bed; he stayed there until Thursday morning when he rejoined his gang at Furness Withy. Although the money was good - double time from midnight to 5:00 A.M. and double/double from 5:00 A.M. to 8:00 P.M. - he couldn't keep up that pace for very long and in fact did so only for that one season. St-Onge, who had served on the union executive and negotiating committee of a shoe factory, first became involved in union activity on the waterfront in 1963 when he was elected to the fifty-man committee. In 1964 he was elected business agent, and in this post he immediately showed remarkable political flair as he walked the docks and collected demands for things ranging from drinking cups and first-aid kits to call and recall guaranties, none of which was endorsed by the union bargaining team. His efforts did not go unnoticed. As soon as St-Onge became business agent, things began to change,' longshoremen said years later.4 His understanding of labour-management relations was that, if workers asked for nothing, they would get nothing. The rich were never eager to share their wealth, and sc, because of the previous union officers' docility and lack of vision, longshoremen in 1960 worked under the same unhealthy and hazardous conditions that prevailed in 1930. It was up to workers to fight for what they deserved. St-Onge believed that there was nothing that could not at least be asked for. To the longshoremen, he made everything seem possible. They had found a fearless and stubborn leader. 'Everyone rallied behind him ...'5 Union work stimulated St-Onge. It 'stretched the brain,' he said to me. 'If you don't ever work with your brain, it shrinks.'6 Although Asselin was president of

30

Waterfont Blues

Local 375, another union official, Gerard Tremblay, knew that the real power rested with the new business agent. A quiet revolution was being organized within the union but it would not be until bargaining collapsed in April that the Federation noticed the fundamental change in the bargaining landscape - or StOnge himself. In the 1966 negotiations, his first as an elected Local 375 official, St-Onge sat quietly beside President Paul Asselin, who did most of the talking for the union. As we later found out, St-Onge had willed himself to keep quiet with great difficulty. He was furious with the Federation for demanding gang-size reduction because the previous fall, when the port had become particularly busy, the employers had asked the union to form more gangs for the balance of the season.7 The union had agreed, against St-Onge's wishes, and had increased its membership despite the fact that the Federation had no obligation to provide the new members with work. St-Onge took the Federation's request to cut gang size just months later as confirmation of the employers' indifference regarding whether or not men could make a decent living in the port. But he also had more immediate concerns. He was thinking of the summer months ahead, when business would slow down and more men would have to compete for work. And he was getting increasingly upset with his colleagues' willingness to negotiate away regular gangmember jobs without seeking appropriate protection for the longshoremen involved. St-Onge thought that the Federation's unequivocal determination to negotiate change gave the union a real bargaining chip. But the ILA in Montreal had no idea how to negotiate, nor for that matter did the Federation, as I sensed at the time. The union's only strategy was to dig in its heels and go through the strike route. The conditions for a high-impact strike were perfect: in the spring and early summer of that year, a large quantity of wheat had to be moved from the river ports' grain elevators to the Soviet Union, and substantial cargo was being shipped to Montreal for Expo '67. The successful completion of both endeavours was important for Canada's international image. This reinforced St-Onge's belief that the union could place considerable pressure on the employers and, should negotiations turn sour, on the government. Nobody could have predicted just how sour that would be. The Labour Committee did not know St-Onge and we did not notice any signs of his growing irritation until he blew up. I vividly recall that meeting. It was mid-March and we had been meeting with the union for some three weeks. While an agreement had not yet been reached, the union had accepted our demands in principle, an 'amicable atmosphere'8 prevailed, and we thought that we were close to an agreement. We took a recess and left the union in the large negotiating room. I went to the washroom where I ran into Adrien Lemoine. I said to him, 'Are we close?' or something to that effect, and his

'A Great National Emergency' 31 response was 'Yes.' A short time later, we heard yelling coming from the negotiating room and we were not invited back to continue negotiating. We were subsequently told that it was at this point that St-Onge stood up and effectively took control of the negotiations for the union. The meeting was adjourned and reconvened on 25 March. To the Labour Committee's great surprise, the union arrived with a 'completely new proposal' which actually consisted of a leap backwards to its original demands (an increase of one dollar an hour over two years, no change in gang size, a four-hour guarantee on recalls, and port-wide rotation). The Federation indicated that it would make counter-proposals at the next meeting on 29 March. That day, the union changed its stand again and advanced brand new proposals that included a wage increase from the current $2.63 to $4 an hour (instead of the $3.63 originally demanded), 6 per cent vacation pay on gross wages, time and a half on Saturdays, and double-time on Sundays. More important, the union asked for a guarantee of forty hours a week from Monday to Friday during the regular shipping season and suggested a complete reorganization of deployment whereby work would be equally distributed into two shifts. In return, the union would agree to a sixteenman gang with the distribution left at the discretion of the employer.9 These sudden and drastic changes of bargaining position were our first exposure to what we would come to recognize as St-Onge's signature approach to collective bargaining. St-Onge tended to consider union demands as general goals rather than as specifics and would later explain that things were rather vague in his mind. He thought that the best way to progress through negotiations was to 'throw the ball back to the employers as fast as possible.' Under his leadership, the union's approach to collective bargaining would lead to a series of spontaneous counter-proposals that would be interpreted as incoherent and whimsical by the Federation but were in fact engraved in this particular logic of 'throwing the ball back.' Yet, at the same time, when St-Onge really made up his mind about something, he was as stubborn as a mule and would be willing to stand alone and defy even his fellow officers until he obtained satisfaction. From St-Onge's point of view, he believed that he was being straightforward and honest; from ours, he seemed terribly pig-headed. We never knew whether a particular issue would be subject to his 'throw-the-ball-back' approach or his 'over-my-dead-body' approach. Although we were surprised by the union's sudden reversal in position, we did not interpret it as representing a critical point in negotiations. In fact, I believe that we did not take the demands seriously. St-Onge was a great visionary but, from our perspective, not a very practical one. He proposed to remedy job insecurity by implementing a system whereby, regardless of the number of ships in port and their respective requirements, half the number of gangs (forty-eight) would work one shift of eight hours and then be followed by the remaining forty-eight

32

Waterfont Blues

gangs who would work a shift of eight hours. This seemed completely ludicrous to shipowners at the time since their profit depended on rapid turnaround. To St Onge, however, the matter was simple: the ships belonged to the shipowners, so the shipowners just had to tell their ships to wait for their turn to be loaded or unloaded. The Federation saw no merit to his creativity and assumed that it was either idiocy or provocation that motivated his demands. St-Onge would later reflect that management simply was not ready to negotiate seriously.10 In any case, we requested some time to study the revised demands, and though the union officers reluctantly agreed to a further meeting, they stated that they would apply for conciliation the following morning. We had not realized that the previous possibilities for an agreement had evaporated as St-Onge had asserted himself as leader within the executive. Because the new demands seemed farfetched and because an agreement had seemed within reach just a week earlier, the Labour Committee understood the union's latest demands to be a tactic to push the Federation towards greater concessions. Consequently, on 6 April, we tabled counter-proposals in line with our original position and the union's initially positive response. The union rejected the proposal on the spot and reverted once again to its original demands. The Federation realized that negotiations had definitely taken a new turn, declared the union's position 'quite unacceptable,'11 and left with the understanding that there would be no further meetings. In the meantime, at the request of the ILA, Labour Minister J.R. Nicholson had appointed Charlie Poirier as conciliation officer,12 It only took him one conciliation meeting, held two weeks later on 14 April, to conclude that he could provide no significant assistance to the parties. The parties were worlds apart with respect both to what was desirable and to what was feasible, and their attitude towards each other made the likelihood of reaching agreement virtually non-existent. Unrest was brewing on the docks and Poirier strongly recommended that a conciliation board be appointed immediately to forestall a rumoured wildcat strike over the weekend. The board, under the chairmanship of Judge Claude Prevost, was appointed by Nicholson in the hours following receipt of Poirier's telegram13 but would not be fully constituted before 10 May. By then, the situation had greatly deteriorated, Wildcat Strike On 19 April 1966 the longshoremen in Montreal went on a wildcat strike. The alleged cause was the ticketing of six longshoremen's cars by the NHB police for illegal parking on board property adjacent to cargo sheds. The parking situation was a long-standing bone of contention for the longshoremen. Because of a lack of space on the docks, the NHB had to change parking areas to suit cargo move-

'A Great National Emergency'

33

ment and other operations.14 Longshoremen would drive up to an area reserved for parking the previous day only to find that it was no longer available.15 The longshoremen resented this, feeling that parking was a small matter that the employers could have arranged for them had they wanted.16 Bernard Wilson of the federal Department of Labour, and an eternal optimist, initially reported to his superior, George Haythorne: 'It is not expected that the stoppage will be of long duration and I understand that negotiations are now under way between NHB and representatives of the ILA.'17 But, although Local 375 President Paul Asselin did try to get the men back to work for the night shift, too few responded to his order for full gangs to be constituted. That evening, the Federation met with officials of the NHB to request that they cancel the six parking tickets. When the NHB refused, the Federation decided to pay them 'in the interest of maintaining peace with a view to preventing violence and the maintaining of law and order.'18 But the next morning the wildcat continued. Poirier was called upon for help and worked out a solution whereby the union and the NHB would set up a committee to study the parking question and solve the problem once and for all.19 To the Federation's surprise, though the majority of longshoremen showed up for the evening call, again they were persuaded to leave by a group of their peers.20 While parking was a real issue, the principal reason for the walkout was to protest the slow pace of contract negotiations. Consequently, solutions to the parking problem would not in themselves end the walkout. Wilson reassessed the situation and reported to Haythorne: 'Gerard Tremblay, the ILA Vice-President East Coast District, admits to having no control over the situation. On the issue of parking space, he [Tremblay] has told Poirier that if the NHB grant 200 more spaces, the men will ask 300 and if 300 are granted, they will ask for 500. We cannot estimate yet to what extent the CNTU is causing this trouble.'21 At an emergency meeting convened by the Federation to assess the situation, President Bill Eakin and legal counsel Paul Renault expressed the view that the problem resulted from lack of control on the part of the executive of Local 375 and that the government should be asked to place the local under trusteeship. The government had set a precedent for such action in 1963 by taking over Hal Banks's Seafarers' International Union (sill). Eakin would write the letter. The next morning, 22 April, the longshoremen returned to work. Unknown to the Federation at the time was the fact that St-Onge had been going around the docks telling the men to 'go back to work, save their money and prepare for a lengthy strike ahead over the contract negotiations.'22 Nonetheless, Eakin sent a letter to Minister of Labour Nicholson which read: It is with regret that the Shipping Federation of Canada has concluded from this

34

Waterfont Blues illegal walkout, and past experience, that stability on the Montreal waterfront can only be reestablished through Government intervention and we hereby request that a Government trusteeship of the ILA locals in the port of Montreal be established forthwith and be maintained until such time as responsible Union action can be contemplated ... We believe the majority of the Union membership are decent and sensible people ... but are forced to participate in illegal strikes and stoppages as a result of intimidation and the fear of reprisal... The lack of responsibility on the part of the Union has reached a point where the Federation can see little future in negotiations or conciliation as whatever contract might be concluded is hardly likely to be respected by the Union members owing to the lack of control of the Union's present leadership.23

What the Federation failed to recognize was that, while some of the unrest was caused by a vocal minority, a large part of it was caused by fear of change and genuine dissatisfaction with working conditions. It also failed to understand that it was fuelling the longshoremen's fear by trying to force change down their throats without offering some form of job security. In early May, the minister of labour replied to Eakin's letter. He explained that placing the SIU under trusteeship had been an unprecedented measure taken only after a lengthy inquiry had 'revealed a long history of irregular and illegal activity by officers ...'24 Such was not the case, he believed, with the ILA. The government was keeping a close eye on developments, but, since peace had been momentarily restored on the docks, it would not consider extraordinary measures so long as normal dispute-resolution procedures had not been exhausted. Nicholson concluded: 'It would seem to me that your Federation should convene a meeting with the international and national officers of the ILA in order to air your complaint ,..'25 On 9 May, after NHB police asked several workers to move their cars from areas reserved for cargo, those workers walked out and were rapidly joined by all the longshoremen.26 The strike quickly spread to the Quebec and Trois-Rivieres ports. Shortly after Nicholson made his suggestion to Eakin, the IASC held a meeting to which Captain John Matheson, assistant general manager of the Federation, was invited. After presenting him with the information that had led the stevedoring contractors to conclude that the leadership of Local 375 had lost control of the membership, they urgently recommended that the Federation contact ILA headquarters in New York and insist that the international union investigate the situation in Montreal.27 Taking a cue from Nicholson and the stevedoring contractors, the Federation asked ILA president T.W. Gleason to intervene and instruct

'A Great National Emergency' 35 the men to return to work immediately and to confirm that ships which might be diverted from Montreal because of the illegal work stoppage would be handled at other ILA ports, namely, in the Maritimes and on Lake Ontario.28 Conciliation Board Hearings On 10 May the day following the walkout, the conciliation board was constituted. Although some union officers were trying to get the men back to work, the Federation sent the executive a telegram in which it deplored 'the illegal actions of your membership as well as your lack of responsibility... We hasten to remind you that your Union's further illegal actions are causing our members irreparable harm and the legal consequences thereof will result in heavy claims against your Union.'2? In its reply to the Federation, the union executive insisted that the dispute had been brought on by the Federation's capricious attitude and that it should do its part to find a solution. Negotiations had initially and repeatedly been put off by the Federation, causing great discontent among ILA members, and the Federation's refusal to take the parking issue seriously had exacerbated the longshoremen's irritation. The union stated: On various occasions, we have submitted to you the deep discontent of our members, your employees, with the lack of parking facilities on the Port of Montreal. We regret that your position has always been that this is a matter for the Montreal Harbour authorities. We submit that it was and is as much your responsibility as ours to oblige the authorities to find adequate parking facilities without obliging our members, your employees, to walk great distances to and from work. In any event, it is our belief that the parking problem, although quite serious, is but a symptom of the deeper problem of making thousands of longshoremen and checkers work for months without a contract, thus depriving them of wage increases and improved working conditions that they are entitled to without further delay. We have done everything we can to avoid the present unfortunate situation and are prepared to continue every reasonable and practical effort to solve [itl. Nevertheless, we must advise you that your telegram is rejected as unreasonable and that as employers the members of your Federation share in large part the responsibility for the present situation brought about by delays that should have been avoided. We are prepared to meet with you immediately in order that a Collective Agreement be entered into and that all grievances, including the unfortunate lack of parking facilities, be solved. We are informing our members that work stoppages must be ended or avoided, but we call upon you to do your share in this matter.30

36

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Three days into the stoppage, public pressure for a speedy resolution of the dispute was already considerable. Some 120 ships were immobilized along the St Lawrence in Montreal, Quebec, and Trois-Rivieres.31 One major grain firm complained that his company was receiving some ten telephone calls a day from continental Europe and the United Kingdom protesting delays: 'It is impossible to operate with a steady series of interruptions like this/ it declared. 'This is seriously damaging Montreal's image abroad/32 In the House of Commons, Transport Minister J.W. Pickersgill said that the strike was a matter of 'great national urgency/33 while a Montreal Gazette editorial termed it a 'great national emergency.'34 Hopes that the opening of conciliation hearings would solve the problem were crushed on 12 May when the Federation announced that it would not participate in the proceedings as long as the men were on an illegal strike. At first, the government, or at least Bernard Wilson, thought that longshoremen would end the walkout to allow the conciliation board to proceed.35 But the union officers were not willing to risk issuing a formal back-to-work order only to see it ignored by the membership, as was likely to happen. As a consequence of the Federation's decision to withdraw from the proceedings, the first conciliation board hearing, scheduled for 13 May, was aborted. Judge Prevost scheduled another meeting for 16 May 'in the hope that both parties would be present and willing to continue.'36 The officers of Local 375 denounced the Federation's refusal to participate in conciliation as 'sabotage' and asked the minister of labour to intervene personally.37 Nicholson had already written to President Eakin to say that he 'regretted very much' the position taken by the Federation and to urge that it be reviewed as a matter of 'national interest.'38 In fact, he ought not to have been surprised at the Federation's boycott of the conciliation board since Bernard Wilson had already advised him: 'I am sure that the employers will not participate in Conciliation Board proceedings until work is resumed.'39 While some members felt that the Federation had made its point and should respond to Nicholson's appeal to act in the national interest, the majority, including President Eakin, were in favour of sticking with the boycott.40 My own position was somewhat different. I thought that it was futile to ask the minister to prevail on the men to go back to work. Illegal strikes had become the norm in Quebec and the provincial government had been unable to persuade illegal strikers to return to work; I was sure that the federal government would have no better luck. I also supported the decision not to attend conciliation hearings while the men were on an illegal strike. Apart from the principle involved - an illegal walkout should not be rewarded with government-sponsored conciliation - there was also a practical consideration: considering the complicated nature of the dispute, and considering, too, that six locals from three ports with varying work-

'A Great National Emergency' 37 ing conditions were involved, a judge not familiar with the dispute and sitting in a conciliation hearing from 4:30 in the afternoon, after his normal duties, could not possibly resolve the issues. Instead, I proposed that we advise the minister that we would be prepared to meet with the union in the presence of a senior mediator. But I could not persuade my colleagues. The stalemate continued. Bolger reported that Gleason had told him that he had spoken to Tremblay, and the men had been instructed at their meeting the day before to go back to work. The plea fell on deaf ears. Bolger had informed Gleason that the Federation would not attend the conciliation board while the men were on an illegal strike and Gleason had confirmed that he would advise Tremblay that he was issuing instructions to all other ILA ports to work diverted ships. In the meantime, according to Bolger, the ILA in the Maritimes had already agreed to work all diverted ships regardless of Gleason's instructions. President Eakin told the labour minister that the only solution was for him to prevail on the men to return to work.41 Instead, Nicholson made a statement in Parliament placing the onus for the breakdown of conciliation on the Federation,42 which reinforced the union's conviction that it was in the right while failing to convince the Federation that it was in the wrong. This elicited opposition leader John Diefenbaker's retort that the situation was a 'national crisis' which should be 'met instead of dawdled with' by appointing an administrator in a temporary takeover of the shipping companies.43 The conciliation board hearing of 16 May had to be cancelled. Coming out of the courtroom, an angry Asselin told reporters that he would have been able to get his men back to work had the Federation shown up at the hearings.44 Furthermore, Nicholson's statement gave Gleason the excuse to tell Bolger that 'the men now believe they are in the right. I recommend that the members of the Shipping Federation meet with the union representatives immediately to find a solution to the difficulty in Montreal/45 The next day, Judge Prevost reported that the board was of the unanimous opinion that it could serve no useful purpose and that an official inquiry under section 56 of the IRDIA should be appointed.46 Under the terms of that act, the longshoremen could legally walk out on 24 May, seven days after the date on which the minister of labour received the report of the conciliation board. Nicholson immediately appointed Judge Rene Lippe to chair an inquiry 'in order to provide the parties with a final opportunity to settle the dispute disrupting shipping at the St. Lawrence river ports.'47 Judge Lippe had been involved with the parties in the 1963 negotiations in the benefits dispute and he had a keen understanding of the problems on the docks. A first meeting with Lippe was scheduled for 18 May, and the Federation promised to attend.48

38 Waterfont Blues The Lippe Inquiry The meeting in Lippe's office on 18 May allowed the issues in dispute between the parties to be clarified. The union still demanded a retroactive wage increase of fifty cents an hour for each year of a two-year agreement and no modification of the workload for the duration of the agreement. We took the position that we could not make an offer on hourly wages and other benefits until the issues of gang size and sling-loads had been discussed. We demanded that the basic eighteen-man gang be reduced by two, although many of our members thought that as many as five or six men should be cut. Lippe would say: 'It was easy to determine on that first day that the parties were really too far apart to reach an agreement.'49 The Federation took it for granted that the inability to reach a contract settlement was primarily the result of labour unrest caused by criminal elements within Local 375 and a lack of leadership by union officials. Discussions had already taken place between the Federation and Department of Labour about the possibility of setting up a commission of inquiry to look into the problems of labour unrest on the waterfront. At the first mediation session, Lippe told us that he was looking for proposals based on the extension of the present collective agreement until 31 December 1966, with an increase in the basic wage rate. He suggested that, if the minister of labour would agree to the establishment of an inquiry into unrest on the waterfront, perhaps the Federation would agree to binding arbitration on the question of automation and gang size. We went away to develop a position and report to our members, who gave us a broad mandate to deal with Lippe but not to agree to binding arbitration. Renault had explained that he was opposed to binding arbitration on the grounds that 'it is too great a gamble since the chairman may be unfamiliar with the problems involved.' There was unanimity on this point. To deal with modernization, the Federation would request the appointment of a second and distinct commission which would investigate automation, gang sizes, and related issues. Its report could form the basis of a new contract starting i January 1967. In the meantime, the present contract could be extended to 31 December 1966, with an interim wage increase.50 After meeting with the parties again, Lippe proposed a settlement on 21 May for a one-year agreement which included a wage increase of twenty-five cents from the date of return to work, of which ten cents would be retroactive to i January 1966. To get the attention of the union, he proposed the installation of water coolers with paper cups and four hours' minimum pay for each call, and, in response to our demands, he proposed the immediate appointment by the government of an industrial-inquiry commission to study such matters as gang size.

'A Great National Emergency' 39 Negotiations for new agreements to become effective i January 1967 would commence immediately under the auspices of the commission. Lippe requested all union locals to hold a secret ballot, under the supervision of the Department of Labour, on his proposals. With respect to the second commission on labour unrest, Lippe thought that it would be unwise to refer to it in his proposal for settlement. In any event, we had been told that a recommendation for its establishment would go before the cabinet but there was no guarantee that the cabinet would act on the recommendation. After much discussion, the Federation agreed unanimously to accept Lippe's proposal for settlement.51 As it transpired, the union refused to hold a secret ballot, and on 24 May, the day the strike became legal, it rejected Lippe's proposal by a show of hands. StOnge's pride did not take well to the government telling the union how to run its own meetings: 'The Government doesn't tell the employers to hold a secret vote to see if they all agree ,..'52 Picket lines were set up at key points in the harbour and blocked the movement of grain, which had partially continued during the wildcat strike. Knowing that the union was in turmoil and that the CNTU was raiding its membership, Lippe again requested that 'all Union locals... submit these recommendations to a secret ballot under the supervision of the Department of Labour of the Government of Canada.' That afternoon, the union submitted the report to its members in mass meetings in Montreal, Quebec, and Trois-Rivieres but representatives of the Department of Labour were not invited to attend. The strike was into its third week. Mediation Judge Lippe met with the parties on 25 and 26 May. Discussions centred mainly on gang-size reduction. At one point in the joint meeting, the Federation held a caucus and returned with an offer of a wage increase of forty cents an hour for each year of a two-year agreement, along with the status quo on other items until i January 1967, when the basic gang would be reduced from eighteen to sixteen men. We offered to limit the layoff of men to those who had worked less than 1,000 hours during the previous year. It was the first real effort to take into consideration the other party's concerns; nevertheless, the union flatly refused to negotiate gang sizes. In its response, it maintained its monetary demands, refused to consider any changes to all other items including gang size and sling-loads, and introduced a new demand for an additional $1.50 per hour for handling loaded containers.53 In five months of negotiations, absolutely no progress had been made. Heavier guns were needed; the parties were invited to Ottawa to meet with Labour Minister Nicholson, deputy minister Haythorne, and other members of their staff at the Department of Labour.54

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Waterfont Blues

On Friday, 27 May, the parties travelled to the national capital to hold separate meetings with government representatives. The meetings were adjourned in the early hours of Saturday, were resumed in Montreal on late Sunday afternoon, and lasted until the early hours of Monday, 30 May, without resolving anything. The Federation was now willing to offer job protection to those longshoremen who had worked a minimum of 750 hours the previous year. The union, however, feared that the criteria of hours worked would allow the employers to lay off bona fide longshoremen who had worked for an appreciable length of time for the past twenty years but little the previous year. We did not know what other criteria to apply to differentiate between those who were actually making their living from longshoring and those who were not. Relying on the number of hours seemed like a fair idea since there were no seniority provisions or any other criteria available. To meet both parties' concerns, Nicholson and Lippe suggested that an inquiry could hear the evidence of both sides. The longshoremen would receive a wage increase of forty cents per hour for each year of a two-year agreement; for the second year, the forty cents would be paid on i January 1967 if the commission's recommendations were implemented at that time, or staged during the year if they had not. Thus, along the lines of the Federation's position, a link would be established between productivity improvements and the second portion of the wage increase. Each party did not see its glass half full but half empty. The Federation found the wage increases too high a price to pay without solid guarantees of gang-size reductions. What happened if the commission's recommendations were rejected by the union? Shipowners did not want to find themselves stuck with the same problem in the next round of negotiations. The union, for its part, was not opposed to a commission of inquiry per se but did not want to sacrifice the balance of its minimal demands by agreeing to it at this point.55 Meetings adjourned in the early hours of 30 May without further ones being scheduled.56 Nicholson was displeased with the way things were going. Although no one knew it at the time, he had his deputy minister sound out the possibilities of putting the ILA under trusteeship under the act that had taken this step with respect to the SIU. Haythorne reported that that act's specific references to the SIU would prevent its application to the ILA.57 In the House of Commons, Nicholson clearly indicated that by now his sympathies lay with the Federation. He stated that the Federation had offered 'substantial increases, some would say fantastic increases,' for which in return the Federation had suggested 'and I think properly, that they might expect increased productivity during the second year of the agreement/ He added that the men who had not worked 750 hours the previous year, those whom the Federation wanted to lay off, included 'students, taxi drivers and others' whose first source of income was not longshoring.58 The union

'A Great National Emergency'

41

was quick to react to Nicholson's statement. Gerard Tremblay wrote: 'We disagree with the claim that Shipping Federation has offered to guarantee employment for all regular longshoremen. It is not true that all longshoremen who work 750 or less in navigation season are casual employees. Many of them are longshoremen who are too young to die or to receive a pension [age sixty-five] but too old to work more than 750 hours because of the strenuous nature of the work. Many of these older longshoremen do not work elsewhere. They go home and rest after doing the best they can. These are some of the men that the Shipping Federation would boot out of the port by reducing gangs.'59 NDP leader T.C. Douglas charged that the labour minister was acting as little more than a spokesman for the employers and that his recent statement in the Commons sounded like 'a press release from the Federation.'60 On the docks, the situation was fast deteriorating. Following a mass meeting of longshoremen convened to report on progress and to map out the ILA's strategy regarding a commission of inquiry, disgruntled longshoremen resorted to violence and vandalism to air their frustration.61 A press report noted: 'Fast moving goons went on a rampage causing heavy property damage. The thugs, packed in cars, roamed up and down the waterfront, slashing truck tires, dumping truck loads of grains on the streets and carrying out daylight raids on three offices.'62 Fights erupted between armed policemen and longshoremen. Extraordinary measures were taken to prevent incidents since threats had been received by the NHB police that buses bringing passengers to the port would be overturned: 'More than 500 policemen patrolled Montreal's strikebound waterfront yesterday to protect the Soviet liner Alexander Pushkin and its passengers ... There were fears that striking longshoremen ... might have attacked buses carrying the passengers... One hundred heavily armed RCMP officers accompanied by dogs were hidden in sheds in the area ...'63 The violence fuelled public protest and the pressure for government intervention increased. In the House of Commons, the opposition parties bitterly criticized the alleged inaction on the part of Labour Minister J.R. Nicholson, and John Diefenbaker accused the government of fiddling while Rome burned.64 While the war of words continued in the press and in the House of Commons, and while violence flared on the waterfront, the parties continued to meet separately with Lippe. The debate now centred on the issue of which union members should be considered 'regular longshoremen' and thus be able to receive employment protection.6^ During the previous weekend meetings with Nicholson and his cabinet colleagues, the union had apparently indicated that it would accept a job-security plan covering all longshoremen displaced by gangsize reduction who qualified for welfare payments in 1967, in other words, those who would work 550 hours in 1966. The government thought that the Federation would accept this minimum number of hours because available man-hours in

42

Waterfont Blues

1966 would fall below average levels owing to the strike. This would reduce the number of men qualifying to a level comparable to the number obtained by using 750 hours as a criteria in a regular year.66 The mediator prepared a text in close collaboration with officials of the Department of Labour based on the establishment of a commission of inquiry whose recommendations would be implemented no earlier than i January 1967. The text, while meeting the union's last position, provided the guarantee that we had been seeking regarding the implementation of the findings. The Federation's Labour Committee was meeting with Lippe and Haythorne the subject of discussion being the commission's terms of reference - when the union's representatives arrived unexpectedly and reiterated their uncompromising stand with respect to their minimum demands, which included no changes to gang size through the end of 1967. And so the discussion on the commission's terms of reference was pointless.67 Lippe and Haythorne thought that further mediation was only likely to encourage the union in its position.68 It looked like a strike of attrition, with the next move up to the government. On 4 June the cabinet was reported to be drafting back-to-work legislation which it intended to use unless negotiations resumed soon. The bill was believed to provide for wage increases in keeping with the union's demands but compulsory arbitration on remaining issues. The press reported, however, that such a bill would not be passed without a good fight in the House of Commons, since the government was in a minority position and NDP leader T.C. Douglas had declared his party unequivocally opposed to compulsory arbitration.69 The NDP was advocating a bill that would provide a large wage increase and establish an inquiry - but one without binding powers. Pressure for government intervention was becoming more intense with each day. A huge segment of the transportation industry threatened to be paralysed all at once, since employees of Air Canada, the Seaway Authority, and Canadian National Railways were all nearing their respective strike deadlines. Meanwhile, serious outbreaks of violence continued on the waterfront. In one episode, four automobiles were set ablaze and dynamited and there were reports that strikers prevented firemen from extinguishing the blazes for two hours.70 Importers and small businesses whose cargo was being rerouted to other ports, with a consequent increase in costs, said that they were faced with the prospect not of diminished profits but of bankruptcy.71 Pulp and paper manufacturers' warehouses were filled to capacity and production had to be slowed down to a trickle for lack of space to stock the products. Many countries were threatening to withdraw from Expo '67.72 Agriculture industries and farmers had exhausted their reserves of feed grain and livestock would die of starvation unless deliveries resumed soon.73 The longshoremen momentarily suspended their massive picket-

'A Great National Emergency'

43

ing to allow farmers to pick up their feed grain. This was intended as a gesture of civility but the press was not impressed: 'If anything can touch the heart of a longshoreman, it is the thought of a hungry hog ... Out of context, this might appear as a kindly act. However, coming as it did after two days of violent lawlessness, disregard for property and contempt for public safety, it verged on the absurd.'74 The Montreal Com Exchange, in one of its many strong telegrams, petitioned Prime Minister Lester Pearson to 'override the partisan interests of the Shipping Federation or the ILA' and to 'take a positive step in the direction of trusteeship ...or compulsory arbitration.'75 But Pearson held back, declaring on 9 June in the House of Commons that Judge Lippe was continuing his efforts to achieve a settlement and that he remained hopeful the strike could be settled without resort to compulsory arbitration.76 Progress had been made. The Federation was told on 9 June that the union had agreed to submit the issues of gang size and sling-loads to an inquiry so long as the government legislated the conclusions of the report.77 Nicholson called the parties to his office in Ottawa on 11 June to continue negotiations. Round-the-clock until the early hours of 12 June, the mediator, Labour Minister Nicholson, and, from time to time, other members of the cabinet and of the Department of Labour (Bryce Mackasey, parliamentary secretary to Nicholson; Mitchell Sharp, minister of finance; Jean Marchand, minister of citizenship and immigration; John Turner, minister without portfolio; George Haythorne, deputy minister of labour; Bernard Wilson, the department's director of industrial relations; and Charlie Poirier, conciliation officer) buzzed back and forth between Federation representatives and union officials. The government wanted the dispute settled quickly. The negotiations under way with the Seaway workers were about to be concluded, with the government granting them a 30 per cent wage increase - the figure recommended by a conciliator - that would put them on par with their American counterparts. But Pearson did not want to settle the Seaway dispute just to find himself stuck with the longshoremen's. The government told us that the dispute had to be settled before 15 June (the Air Canada strike deadline) or, at the latest, before 17 June (the Seaway strike deadline). We had two options. We could agree to the union's demands on wages and recalls, in which case the government would take it upon itself to set up a commission of inquiry to study technological change and make its findings binding; or we could refuse the union's demands, in which case the government would legislate longshoremen back to work, grant them the desired wage increase anyway, and establish a commission of inquiry but without binding powers. It would be left to us to negotiate with the union to get the findings implemented. Bill Eakin felt that we could not, in good conscience, agree to a 30 per cent

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Waterfont Blues

wage increase; if the government thought that this was the right signal to send to the business community, it could take it upon itself to legislate it. I, on the other hand, pushed to make the deal because I was convinced this was the only opportunity the port would have to modernize. The 30 per cent increase would be acceptable if it opened the way to technological change. I was certain that, in the absence of legislation to implement the commission's findings, the union would reject the conclusions and we would be back to square one. Ultimately, the Federation agreed to meet the union's demand on wages but not its demand for a four-hour recall guarantee; we thought that the second matter would be covered by the commission of inquiry, and we also wanted to use it as a bargaining chip. However, when the government representatives returned from informing the union of our proposal, they reported that the union would not recommend it in the absence of our agreement on recalls. Our negotiating committee was dumbfounded. It had taken us much internal argument to reach a consensus to put a 30 per cent wage increase on the table, and we were furious at the union's disdain. However, we had fulfilled our end of the bargain and the government representatives told us that rejection by the union would in all likelihood result in back-to-work legislation which would include a commission on productivity, the findings of which would be implemented. The meetings broke up around 5 A.M. in the morning of 12 June and the parties returned to Montreal. The Last Marathon Nicholson called Renault on the morning of 13 June requesting that a committee of five from the Federation be available in Ottawa at 4.30 P.M. that day for further talks. Eakin, Bolger, Evans, Colley, and I drove to Ottawa in Evans's late model Jaguar, at a speed averaging 120 miles per hour. There were three points that remained unresolved and that apparently were the reason for the rejection by Local 375 of the terms of the proposed settlement the previous Saturday: retroactivity on the basis of gross earnings; the four-hour minimum for each call; and calls on Saturday for work on Monday morning. The third point was relatively minor and was cleared up on the afternoon of the i3th when the union gave way. On the other issues, though 'submitted to considerable pressure' to give in, we 'stood firm.'78 That evening a strange parade formed around Prime Minister Pearson's office. A reporter observing the scene described the night of continuous negotiations: Doors swung open and were quickly pulled closed. Cabinet ministers hurried along halls, down stairs, across the lobby and into another office. James Wightman, a press officer to Prime Minister Lester Pearson, led the shipowners' delegation out of Mr.

'A Great National Emergency'

45

Pearson's office, down a side hall, around a corner and out of sight. Hal Doman, who normally spends his time writing speeches for the Prime Minister, stuck his head out of the door leading to Labour Minister J.R. Nicholson's office. Seeing no shipowners, he threw the door open and led the delegation of longshoremen to the Prime Minister's office. As soon as they were out of sight, Mr. Wightman and the shipowners retraced their steps, made a tight left turn and disappeared into Mr. Nicholson's office. No one smiled. The scene was repeated, with variations, several times during the long, tense night of negotiations. Five times the longshoremen entered Mr. Pearson's office and five times they left, a straggle of tired men. Each time they looked a little more haggard and a little more grim.7'

Behind closed doors the government was unable to get either party to crack. We took the position that we would prefer to accept retroactivity rather than the four-hour guarantee. The ILA took the reverse position. Early in the morning of 14 June, the prime minister called us in one last time. Pearson informed us that the union had dropped its retroactivity demand and urged us to accept the fourhour recall on the grounds that this issue would in any case be included in the commission's mandate.We held a caucus and advised the prime minister that we reluctantly accepted.80 It was 2:00 in the morning. At 2.10 A.M. 'the doors to Pearson's office opened and the crowd of reporters and photographers who had been waiting in the corridor all evening were invited in. At 2:15 A.M. the Prime Minister made the announcement. The longshoremen and the Shipping Federation of Canada had reached an agreement that would end the crippling thirty-day strike ...'8l Because of the lateness of the hour, no one wanted to spend any more time drafting final language. Nicholson, however, wished to announce the settlement at the beginning of Question Period in the House of Commons at 2 P.M., and so some decisions had to be made. We were told that the terms of settlement could make no mention of either the commission or its binding mandate for reasons related to union politics. The labour movement was opposed to any form of binding arbitration and, since Canadian Labour Congress president Claude Jodoin had been brought into the mediation process, it would cause him to lose face to have the agreement refer to the commission and its decision-making powers. Furthermore, with the cell of CNTU partisans in the ILA, to ask the membership to agree to binding arbitration might jeopardize the settlement. The union executive needed time and some elbow room to sell the settlement to its members. We had not expected so much secrecy and felt compelled once again to ask the mediation team for reassurance that the union had agreed to the establishment of a commission whose findings would be binding on both parties. We were assured that union counsel Phil Cutler had guaranteed that, if the government

46 Waterfont Blues passed legislation to make the commission's findings binding, his clients would go along with it. The government asked us to take its word that the commission would be set up and a law passed to make its report binding before hearings commenced, but we wanted more concrete evidence of the deal. At our insistence, the settlement read that half of the wage increase of forty cents per hour retroactive to i January 1966 was 'in compensation for improvements in productivity.'82 Another wage increase of forty cents per hour would be applied in 1967, twenty-five cents of which was to be effective i May 1967, also 'in compensation for improvements in productivity.' The last provision of the settlement read: 'The agreements terminating on December 31,1965, shall be amended by incorporating therein the terms of settlement set out above and these amended agreements shall remain in effect until December 31,1967, unless amended by negotiations or otherwise.'83 The words 'or otherwise' were added at our insistence to presage the amendment of the agreement by legislation. The references to the commission were uninformative enough to give the requested elbow to the union executive, yet straightforward enough for one who gave it a second thought: significant improvements in productivity could result only from modernization; and the only way to amend an agreement other than by negotiation was by legislation. Nicholson requested that the parties' legal counsels meet with him and Haythorne at i P.M. to sign the terms of settlement. Unfortunately, Paul Renault was unable to stay owing to an important commitment in Montreal later that morning and he recommended that I attend the meeting and sign the agreement. I accepted, thinking that one or two other members of our team would stay as well. But no one was willing to do so, so I went back to my hotel for a brief nap before meeting with Nicholson, Haythome, and Cutler. Signing should have been a mere formality but a glitch occurred when I pointed out that the four-hour-recall clause had been tampered with to remove the exception in case of rain; Haythorne urged me to sign the settlement as drafted on the grounds that, in any case, the matter would be reviewed by the commission of inquiry. I reluctantly complied. The sense of relief I had expected at signing the agreement eluded me. In the hours that followed, I released some of my frustrations regarding the settlement in a short poem that, for all its humour, carried with it the fatigue and the bitterness that swept over me when I found myself alone. I wrote: Lippe and Haythorne and Nick Helped out by Guy Favreau and Pick Worked hard on the union To end the confusion Created by St-Onge le prick

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Peter and Pat, Alex and Herb, Listened for weeks to the Union's blurb Helped by Buchanan, Gordon and Dewar The union's demands became fewer and fewer Until at last Jean-Marc St-Onge Decided he should take the plunge And insisted the men should all be paid A full four hours for each call made Rene and Nick, George and Pick, Tried their best to turn the trick But the four-hour call defeated them all Until Lester appeared in Parliament Hall. With his smooth oration, the Federation He charmed into total subjugation And when he had done the battle was won For 375 great jubilation.84

The dispute was over; but while the union knew exactly what it had won, we would not know what our money had bought until the commission of inquiry released its report. The Outcome At 2 P.M., as scheduled, Minister of Labour Nicholson announced the settlement in the House of Commons, including the establishment of the commission of inquiry: 'When this situation developed I, as Minister of Labour, several weeks ago announced that I intended to set up a Commission of Inquiry under the IRDIA to inquire into the possibilities of improving productivity, yet at the same time ensuring job security for any members of the Unions concerned who might be directly affected by new methods of operation and technological change. I now wish to confirm that I intend to set up such a commission within the next few days to investigate into the possibilities of improving productivity in the river ports.'85 The Federation held a general meeting on the afternoon of 14 June, while I was still in Ottawa. All the other members of the negotiating team were present to report to the meeting. The general feeling at the Federation was that the settlement was a first but important step towards a reorganization of working conditions on the docks. Although the parties were unable to come to grips with the issue of redundancy, which would be the natural result of mechanization, they

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had agreed for a neutral third party to make the necessary determinations on their behalf. Cumbersome as the process might be, we expected to be operating under new rules in 1967. While some members of the Federation may have thought the price too high, the management group was keen to get on with the preparation of its case to the commission. For the first time, change actually seemed within reach. On the following day, 15 June, the longshoremen ratified the agreement and returned to work. The union reported that its members were 'in a happy frame of mind' as they undertook to clear out the backlog of hundreds of ships in the river.86 The strike was not the longest one in the waterfront's history but would remain engraved in everyone's mind as the most bitter. The press portrayed the long-awaited settlement as an all-out victory for the union, noting that the only gain the Federation seemed to have made was to scale down the union's demands for large increases in welfare and vacation pay. Indeed, since discussions regarding legislative enactment of the commission's findings had been highly confidential, to outside observers the Federation appeared to have lost on all sides, especially with regard to gang size and other technologically related issues that had seemed so dear to its members.87 The union did nothing to correct this impression, riding high on its members' jubilation: 'Spokesmen for the ILA hailed the agreement as a complete victory. They said they had made no concession to the employers' demands that dock crews should be reduced.'88 Observers with a finer nose did not fail to notice the unusual wording of the terms of settlement and speculated that the Federation could allege that it was not bound to pay that portion of the wage increase unless gang-size reduction was allowed. In theory, one reporter concluded, if the commission's findings could not be implemented through negotiations, the government could do so 'otherwise,' by bringing in legislation to make them binding.89 The stage was now set for the next battle, one that took the Federation and the government by surprise and that saw each side accusing the other of not telling the truth. The depth of the mutual incomprehension dividing management and labour on the Montreal waterfront was, it seemed, as great as ever.

CHAPTER TWO

Sound and Fury

Nothing better encapsulates the abysmal state of labour relations on the Montreal waterfront in the 19605 than the controversy over Bill €-125. Following upon the appointment of a commission of inquiry into technological change and related issues at the St Lawrence River ports, this bill specified that whatever recommendations it made were to be binding. The result was a flurry of impassioned arguments over whether or not the government had indicated its intention to introduce just such a measure as part of the settlement ending the bitter strike of 1966, and whether or not the parties had agreed to this course of action. Opposition politicians pilloried the government mercilessly, echoing the claims of labour that government was doing the dirty work of the shipowners. The sound and fury of this debate, unlike the kind Shakespeare had in mind, signified something profound. Divisions aroused by Bill 0-125 complicated the work of the ensuing commission of inquiry and embittered even more - if that was possible - the relations between management and labour. The journey towards the goal of port modernization had gotten off to a shaky start indeed. Parliamentary Fireworks To keep the government focused on the whole agreement, not just what we signed on 14 June, I drafted a letter to Labour Minister Nicholson which Pat Bolger, as chairman of our Labour Committee, signed; this letter reminded the minister of the terms of the agreement and requested his assurance that legislation to implement the findings of the commission would be presented without delay.1 Nicholson had already mentioned several weeks earlier that he would set up a commission to study productivity and job security, and he had confirmed in the House, when announcing the settlement on 14 June, that he intended to set up this commission within the next few days.2 Our letter spelled out that our

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agreement to settle had been based upon the government's undertaking, stemming from Lippe's recommendations, to set up two commissions: one, whose findings would be binding, to study productivity and job security, and the other to study labour unrest. It then went on to review the discussions which I had already had with George Haythorne regarding the terms of reference of the first commission. On 23 June, Nicholson appointed Dr Laurent Picard as head of a commission under the IRDIA charged with investigating and reporting on ways to modernize and improve working conditions at the river ports.3 In tabling copies of Picard's appointment in the House of Commons on 23 June, Nicholson made no mention of his government's undertaking to have the conclusions of the commission implemented by legislation. The preamble to Picard's appointment was also silent on this point, though it did state that the mediator (judge Lippe) had recommended that an industrial-inquiry commission be established. But is that all the mediator recommended? A week later, Nicholson publicly served notice that he would introduce a bill setting out the commission's terms of reference and providing that its conclusions would be incorporated into the collective agreement. Until the last hour, the press retained the impression that this bill would not affect the recent terms of settlement and would come into effect only when the longshoremen's new contract expired on 31 December1967.4 After all, binding arbitration and a voluntary settlement are usually mutually exclusive propositions. But Nicholson's introduction of Bill 0125 on 29 June made it clear that such was not the case here. As he said in the House of Commons: On June 14,1 stated that the settlement [to the longshoremen's dispute] would not have been possible without an assurance by the Minister of Labour or the Government that an industrial inquiry commission would be set up to inquire into working conditions at the three ports. On Thursday last [23 June] I announced that such a commission had been established ... Judge Lippe in his report recommended that such a commission be established. He also recommended in that report that the conclusions of this commission should be implemented by legislative enactment at the earliest possible date. The terms of appointment of the commissioner cover working conditions or what might be referred to as suggested formulae for possible increases in productivity in return for the increases agreed upon between the employers and employees. The purpose of this bill is to ensure that the conclusions of this commission should be implemented, as recommended by the mediator.5

Many opposition MPs criticized the bill, alleging that nothing in the minister's

Sound and Fury 51 declarations during the dispute had led them to anticipate that the findings of a commission of inquiry would be made binding on the parties. Accusations of treachery and deception were made. David Lewis of the NDP asked if Nicholson had informed the parties of his intentions, stressing that he was referring to 'both the Union and the Federation, not just one of those organizations/6 Nicholson replied that both parties were informed. Another member went as far as to accuse the minister of being 'guilty of having ... deliberately misled the House on June i4th.'7 The House adjourned without any light having been shed on the matter. Afterwards, letters and telegrams exchanged between the ILA, the prime minister, and the labour minister only fuelled the confusion. When the House met on 5 July, opposition leader John Diefenbaker asked the prime minister for a response to the claims in the union's telegrams. Pearson stated that he had already replied to the telegrams, denied some of the facts they contained, and refused further questions, declaring, 'There will be ample opportunity to discuss the matter when the bill is introduced and proceeded with, as it will be.'8 On 6 July, Diefenbaker charged again and asked the minister of labour if he was aware of the ILA's claim that Cutler had made clear, in the prime minister's presence, that nothing that was done in the setting up of the commission should in any way bring about final and binding arbitration. The subsequent exchange between Nicholson and Diefenbaker went as follows: Mr. Nicholson: It is hard to take statements out of context but I can say this ... That before the settlement was agreed upon there was an assurance that legislation would be introduced, and the longshoremen had full knowledge of that fact before the settlement was reached. Mr. Diefenbaker. Was it also understood that any decision made by the commission would be binding and irrevocable? Mr. Nicholson: This is part of the difficulty when you get into debate, and this is becoming a debate. I think when the documents are tabled, which I have assured the house will be done within the next 24 hours, I hope, that this will be clear to all hon. Members.9 On 8 July, at the request of David Lewis,10 the correspondence between the ILA and the government was tabled in the House. Among this correspondence was a letter to Nicholson, dated 20 June, enclosing a telegram of 16 June from Cutler's firm to ILA Vice-President Gerard Tremblay. The telegram read in part: With regards to speculations on part of certain persons concerning possible legislation by the Parliament of Canada on gang crew productivity or similar matters, our position is quite clear and unchanged. Throughout mediation with Judge Rene

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Waterfront Blues Lippe, the various Ministers, or the Prime Minister of Canada, it was made clear as to terms that: 1) We have not and are not asking for any legislation since we take the view that productivity in the above ports has continually increased. 2) On the other hand, in the event that the Shipping Federation or others should ask for legislation, we do not join them or support them, either directly or indirectly. 3) Should legislation be introduced in the Parliament of Canada on the request of the employers or otherwise, we will of course study the proposed legislation in order to determine our position. However we will continue to oppose any final and binding arbitration, as we have throughout the negotiations and mediation and as shown in the terms of settlement wherein there is no reference to final and binding arbitration despite the various attempts of the Federation of Canada to include such terms. 4) Should parliament adopt legislation amounting to final and binding arbitration contrary to the 'terms of settlement/ it will be despite our every licit opposition in cooperation with the Canadian Labour Congress policy as stated to the Prime Minister and the other Ministers by President Claude Jodoin ... you will recall that again and again this was stated throughout the negotiations and we will not allow any pretence of a tacit agreement or other hidden understanding between the parties or with representatives of the Government of Canada. There is only one document containing all the terms of settlement and these terms are clear and precise in themselves and cannot be added to or in any way changed.11

Bearing in mind that Nicholson announced Picard's appointment on 23 June without mentioning that his conclusions would be binding, his reply to Cutler, dated 27 June, is revealing because he clearly takes issue with Cutler's account and confirms the agreement apparently reached with Cutler not to make premature reference to the commission or to its binding nature: I stated that, provided the parties reached agreement on all other items in dispute, the government was prepared to establish a IIC [industrial inquiry commission] to carry out an independent and objective study of problems in connection with improvements in productivity, job security and related matters, and to take steps to have the conclusions reached as a result of this independent IIC implemented by legislative enactment ... You made it clear that the ILA was not requesting the establishment of an IIC or that legislation be introduced in that respect. You did say, however, that the ILA would cooperate with the IIC and that, if legislation were passed which provided for the implementation of the conclusions of this commission through legislative enactment, the ILA would not oppose the legislation and that you, as counsel for the ILA, would advise that the law be respected ... It was, as you recall, agreed that there would be no reference in the terms of settlement to the IIC or to

Sound and Fury 53 the mediator's recommendations with respect to its terms of reference or to the way in which its conclusions would be implemented.12

On 30 June, the day after Bill 0-125 was tabled, Cutler's law firm, disregarding what Nicholson said, fired back a telegram, with a copy to the prime minister, which made a number of assertions that seemed at odds with the facts as set out by the government and as understood by the Federation. These included that the ILA had been in constant opposition to binding arbitration; that Jodoin had informed the prime minister and all other ministers present on the night of the strike settlement that any attempts to bring about binding arbitration would be strenuously opposed; that the terms of settlement in the 14 June document constituted all of the settlement and that the ILA did not agree to any other terms; that the ILA had warned that all legislation seeking binding arbitration would be vigorously opposed through every means afforded in law; that Picard's mandate had made no mention of the binding nature of his findings; and, finally, that any inquiry should be the basis for voluntary negotiations for the next collective agreement since any other approach would create a dangerous precedent by disrupting the relationship between management and labour during the life of a collective agreement.13 Nicholson replied by telegram without delay on the same day, refuting all of Cutler's assertions. Among other things, he said: There has been throughout full opportunity for free collective bargaining... and after several months of negotiations, after five weeks of a costly strike and after strenuous mediation efforts, voluntary agreement on .... matters had proved to be impossible. The terms of settlement signed on 14 June contain a reference to amendments to collective agreements being made by negotiations or otherwise. It was clearly understood that these last two words were inserted .... in order to ensure that findings of the commission would form part of the collective agreement... It is a fact that the ILA made it clear during final stages of negotiations that it was not requesting the establishment of an IIC or that legislation be introduced in that respect but Mr. Cutler did assure me and my cabinet colleagues in presence of Union officials that the ILA would cooperate with the IIC which we stated would be established and that should legislation be introduced by Government providing for the implementation of the conclusions of such commission through legislative enactment your clients the ILA though they would not support the legislation would obey the law and that he [Cutler] would so advise them.1*

Prime Minister Pearson replied to Cutler as well, stating simply: 'Referring to your telegram to me of today's date [30 June] in which you refer to your wire to

54 Waterfront Blues Minister of Labour, I have seen his telegram in reply. My own knowledge of the facts fully confirms this reply.'15 The prime minister's telegram prompted Cutler's firm to send back another telegram of its own, in which it emphasized the role Jodoin had played in reaching the final settlement: ' ... it was determined that the question of final and binding arbitration in all its aspects be left to President Jodoin as the spokesman on this issue. At the very first meeting with several of your ministers ... Jodoin emphatically intervened to inform the various ministers present and all others that he, as CLC president, was mandated to reply and to state categorically that the ILA was opposed to final and binding arbitration in any form as a settlement of this dispute.'16 Jodoin's support of the ILA's claim regarding what transpired during the final push for a settlement on the night of 13 June was limited to what was set out in his telegram to Pearson and Nicholson: 'As indicated to you during negotiations ... I wish to reiterate to you that as a firm policy of the CLC is unalterably opposed to any type of legislation indicating compulsory and binding arbitration ,..'17 On 7 July, Nicholson wrote to Jodoin: As you are well aware, most of the issues involved in the recent longshore [sicj dispute were settled by agreement and those directly concerned realized that legislative action was necessary to bring about a complete settlement. There is ample proof of this fact. As one instance, you will recall that on June 13 while you were present the Prime Minister read a prepared statement to the ILA representatives concerning the two issues remaining in dispute in which he suggested that the ILA drop its demand for the application of retroactivity to overtime and that the shipping federation accept the following proposal with respect to the four-hour recall clause: 'that this item be submitted to the commission for examination and that the recommendation of the commission with respect to this item be binding in precisely the same way as the recommendation with respect to gang-size. The four-hour recall would then be dealt with and included or not within the contract in the manner specified by the commission.' You will also recall that also in your presence the suggestions of the Prime Minister in that regard were later accepted by both parties.18

During Question Period on the same day this correspondence was tabled, Diefenbaker asked Nicholson whether he had assured the longshoremen's officials that there would not be any binding arbitration. Nicholson replied that he had made 'the contrary' known to the parties at a meeting which took place in the prime minister's office. Diefienbaker persisted: Mr. Diefenbaker. That statement, summarized, is that there will be compulsory arbitration in the circumstances?

Sound and Fury

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Mr. Nicholson: I think the phrase 'compulsory arbitration' was carefully avoided; but the fact that there would be a binding solution, a recommendation to Parliament that legislation would be introduced to make the terms binding, that is the recommendations of the industrial inquiry commission on certain aspects - there is no question about that, Mr. Speaker.19 At the second reading of the bill on 11 July, Nicholson provided a lengthy, stepby-step account of the negotiations. According to him, the recommendation for a commission of inquiry first arose in Lippe's proposed terms of settlement, submitted to the parties on 21 May and rejected by the union. 'At this time,' he said, 'there was no suggestion of any legislative enactment to make the findings of the Commission binding. The suggestion was that this be a voluntary arrangement between the two parties.' The ILA had taken the position that it would not agree to a commission if the employers did not meet the remainder of their minimum demands. The Federation maintained that it was impossible to discuss wages without having first dealt with the issue of gang size. When it became clear that a voluntary agreement on gang size was impossible, the government began pushing for the parties to agree to a form of binding arbitration. Nicholson explained: ... in late May - or it might have been early June - the unions then stated that they could not go along with the proposal for a commission. They made their position quite clear; they said, 'If the Government wants to establish a commission, it can.' Other alternatives were explored by the mediator and, as shown in his report, on about June 10 or 11 he got in touch with me again and suggested another meeting in Ottawa ... At the meeting on the morning of Saturday June 11, the president of the Canadian Labour Congress, Mr. Jodoin, was present and in the course of the meeting not only I but my colleague the Minister of Transport - at least the two of us - said, 'It looks like there might be a solution if we were to establish a commission and agree that its findings might be made binding on these two points.' Mr. Diefenbaker: Just 'might be'? Mr. Nicholson; Might be made binding. This was a proposal we were putting forward that if they would agree that its findings might be binding, a solution might be found. The president of the Canadian Labour Congress said that the congress was opposed to compulsory arbitration. The legal advisor for the longshoremen's association said that they were opposed... to compulsory arbitration. He also said, 'But if the government does set up a commission and the government is prepared to take the responsibility to make its findings binding, we will obey the law.' Some Hon. Members: Oh, oh. Mr. [Reward] Grafftey:The plot thickens. Mr. Diefenbaker: Mr. Cutler?

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Waterfront Blues Mr. Nicholson: Yes, Mr. Cutler said, 'If this is done, we will obey the law'... Mr. [David] Lewis: May I ask the Minister a very short question?... In reply to a question by the minister as to what the association would do if such legislation was passed, Mr. Cutler said they would obey the law; is that what happened? Mr. Nicholson:... We asked if the longshoremen had any suggestions to make. Naturally they would have liked a contract continuing through to January i, 1968 with an extra 40 cents next year and without commitments on a change in productivity. However, when we asked them to bring forward any suggestions they might have, and they were not forthcoming, there were two occasions at which the Minister of Transport and I said that it had been suggested we establish the commission and that we might make only the findings on these issues binding. Both he and I asked them for their reaction at different times, to which they answered: If you take that responsibility; set up the commission and pass the legislation; we will obey the law. Mr. [1C.] Douglas: Did the minister take that as acquiescence to the proposal? Mr. Nicholson: I will not say we took it as acquiescence at first, because the discussions continued for another 14 hours...

Nicholson contended that he and other government officials had then met with the Federation delegates and extracted the wage-increase offer in return for the commission of inquiry. The government officials then met once more with the longshoremen's representatives: When we came back and told the longshoremen that the employers were prepared to use a colloquialism - to buy a pig in a poke and take their chances on the findings of a commission, I can assure you that several of them ... expressed to me their sincere appreciation for what we had been able to do in that regard. The negotiations continued for several hours ... but at the very last minute the negotiations broke down partly on the question of recalls... We broke up at 5.30 A.M., all of us tired and disappointed. And no one was more disappointed than the minister - unless it was the longshoremen, who had hoped that there was going to be a settlement reached, based on what the Federation had agreed to.20 When the debate on second reading resumed on 14 July, Nicholson said that 'the mediator [Lippe] said to me that in his opinion and that of my deputy minister [Haythorne]... there was no chance of the parties reaching an agreement without some definite assurance to the Shipping Federation, the employer, that they might expect, or might hope at least, for increased productivity, not in 1966 but in 1967, in return for the substantial increases and the assurances of job security that the longshoremen were insisting upon and that he felt that parliamentary action might be necessary...' Nicholson and his colleagues met with the

Sound and Fury 57 union to make clear that the deadlock had to be resolved and that the government intended to set up a commission of inquiry to look into the working conditions at all three ports. 'I further suggested/ Nicholson said, that a way out of the deadlock might be found in legislation making the findings of the commission on increased productivity and related matters binding ... I stressed the fact that the strike had been on for over a month and that an early solution must be found even if that solution lay in referring the matter to parliament... Mr. Jodoin, the president of the CLC, stated he was opposed to compulsory arbitration... I might say that Mr. Cutler, legal advisor of the longshoremen's association, also stated that his clients were opposed to any legislation that would make the findings of the commission binding. I then put a question to Mr. Cutler in the presence of my colleagues, the deputy minister, Judge Lippe and others. I asked him what would happen if the government were to decide to make the findings of the commission binding in regard to the three or four remaining points... Mr. Cutler then said clearly and unequivocally that while his clients were opposed to binding legislation, we could rest assured that they were Canadians and would cooperate if the Government set up a commission. He then said he would advise them on any legislation that might be passed and that they would obey it. There was no question about that... Mr. McCleave: But he did not agree. Mr. Nicholson: True, he did not agree. He told me they were not in favour of legislation which makes anything binding, that it is not in keeping with the principles of democratic labour organizations, or words to that effect. I understood his position. We invited ideas for any solutions and when they were not forthcoming I reiterated that legislation might be the answer. I might say that after a full month of crippling strike ... we felt as a government ... that we had no alternative but to accept our responsibility as a government and to recommend legislation to parliament if the parties, as I have said, could agree to the wages and these other items ... I want to say to this house in unequivocal terms that in my view and in the opinion of those of my colleagues who were present during the final stages of negotiations, there is not the slightest doubt but that the Shipping Federation would not have agreed to a settlement along those lines, which some of the union members later referred to as fabulous, had we not made to them a clear and positive commitment of the nature to which I have referred... Our whole course of action.... on Saturday morning and early Sunday was predicated on the fact that the Shipping Federation and the longshoremen's association knew what we had in mind ... I might say again ... that though the union representatives did not join in the request for a commission, nor did they formally agree to having the representations implemented by legislation ... they led us to believe that, if agreement could be

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Waterfront Blues reached on [wages and recalls], they would cooperate with the commission and that they would obey any law that parliament might pass making these findings binding.

Nicholson recalled the Very jovial, happy occasion' when the terms had been agreed upon and explained that his deputy minister, Haythorne, had taken it upon himself to draft terms of settlement to be submitted to the parties' representatives for signature the following day. Nicholson contended that he had raised the question of having a reference to the binding commission in the terms of settlement but it was decided that this reference should be indirect: Mr. Nicholson: ... Therefore, the words 'or otherwise' ... were inserted to cover that situation; there is not the slightest question about that. Mr. Cutler himself discussed the words with me, as did Mr. Pathy representing the Federation... Mr. Douglas: They were delightfully uninformative. Mr. Nicholson: I will tell you why, just to be clear on this for my hon. friend. The longshoremen's association had taken the position that they did not want to commit themselves to something that had binding legislation in it. But it was definitely understood that the words 'or otherwise' covered that situation, and that was the purpose of putting them in ... The only other way you can change a binding agreement, except by agreement, is by legislation ... It has been suggested by the hon. Member for Skeena [Frank Howard] that I should have advised the house at that time [when Nicholson announced the establishment of a commission of inquiry on 14 June] that the government intended to introduce legislation along the lines of the present bill. Originally, such a statement was included in the notes that I subsequently used in the house. As a matter of courtesy and fair dealing, I showed it to the legal advisor for the longshoremen. He said: T hope, Mr. Minister, that you will not have to refer to binding legislation when speaking in the house because, acting for the longshoremen, my clients should have an opportunity to explain the settlement to their members and they might get a mistaken idea if you make reference to the legislation aspect in the house.' I amended the notes accordingly... Nicholson concluded his presentation by saying that the passage of Bill €-125 was both advisable and necessary in order to fulfil the undertaking which the government, 'with the knowledge though perhaps not the consent of the unions/ had given to the Federation. The opposition had a field day attacking the labour minister. David Lewis declared that Nicholson had attempted to put together two statements made in different circumstances, namely, that the union knew there would be a commission of inquiry (without it being binding) and that the union would cooperate with a binding commission (as law-abiding citizens), to give the false impression

Sound and Fury 59 that the union had agreed to a binding commission. Further, he claimed that the bill 'is an evil yielding to the pressure of one side in the dispute. It is giving [in] to the Shipping Federation which is a rather tough outfit... Throughout his feeble defence of this bill, the minister has been trying to place the responsibility for it in part on his contention that the Union, if it did not actually agree, may have acquiesced and that if it did not actually acquiesce it at least knew it was coming ...' Another speaker, Michael Starr, the former minister of labour in the Diefenbaker government, declared: 'I say that all the statements which have been cited by the Minister of Labour as having been made by the president of the CLC and the representatives of the ILA are emphatic statements of opposition to compulsory arbitration. In view of these emphatic statements, was it not obvious at the time and is it not obvious now to the government that compulsory arbitration was not and is not acceptable? Yet the government goes ahead because of a commitment to the shipping companies ...'21 Despite all protests and after long and impassioned debate, Bill €-125, the St Lawrence Ports Working Conditions Act, was passed by Parliament and assented to at the closing of the session on 14 July 1966." A first step towards port modernization was taken, but the circumstances surrounding it made it a hollow victory for the Shipping Federation and the government alike. Further Thoughts and Speculation Were the union's protests genuine or strategic? Thirty-five years later, for all my efforts to understand what had happened, I remain uncertain. One thing is clear, however: the government was under tremendous pressure to put an end to the strike. George Haythorne would recall that Pearson was reluctant to enact backto-work legislation.23 With labour militancy at its peak, such legislation was deemed risky since there was a good chance that the longshoremen would defy it. In addition, the government believed that back-to-work legislation would not provide a long-term solution to the problems of the river ports. Such legislation would do nothing to promote modernization, which the government, like the Federation, believed was essential; instead, if it resembled other such legislation, it would merely provide a wage increase as high as the best managerial offer and refer other issues to binding arbitration. Also, a regular arbitration board would not have the power to conduct the kind of objective, independent study that a commission of inquiry could undertake. And so, if back-to-work legislation was not an option, the only other way to persuade the longshoremen to return to work was through a voluntary settlement. The challenge was straightforward but daunting nonetheless: the Federation had to agree to the wage increase and four-hour recall, and the union had to agree

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to the binding commission. The government drafted an emergency bill the purpose of which was not only to pacify the parliamentary opposition, whose calls to end the strike were mounting in intensity, but to threaten the Shipping Federation: we were told that we could either give the wage increase and obtain a binding commission, or the government would pass the emergency bill, which would grant the longshoremen the desired increase but without any guarantee of the commission's findings being binding. Cornered, the Federation gave in. The government was half-way there. The next step was to convince the union that increased productivity was necessary and that a binding commission of inquiry was a fair solution. It also presented the distinct advantage of allowing the union officers to save face and to blame the commission for inevitable but unwelcome changes made in work practices. Through Claude Jodoin, the union stated that the labour movement was opposed to binding arbitration. That was for public consumption. Jodoin was not a member of the union delegation and had been on the scene only for a brief cameo appearance in Ottawa. The government made its proposal to Local 375'$ spokesman, Phil Cutler, who also stated that his clients were opposed to binding arbitration. Fine, I understand your position, said Nicholson, but what would happen if the government legislated the conclusions of the commission? We would obey the law, Cutler said. Twice, the government asked; twice, the union responded, 'We are against it but if you do it anyhow, we will obey the law.' At that point, the government had to make a choice: seek a firm agreement from the union or decide that having the longshoremen obey the law would be good enough, From the Federation's point of view, it was clear that the government would not be able to obtain the union's formal agreement to a commission of inquiry; however, the Labour Committee insisted on receiving assurance that the union agreed implicitly to the creation of a binding commission, or there would be no settlement. Some of us - and I include myself in this number - felt that a 30 per cent wage increase in return for possible productivity improvements was a huge risk, even if the commission's findings were binding and implemented; we would have never gone along with the settlement if we had thought that the union wanted nothing to do with the commission. The government made its choice. It stretched Cutler's 'we will obey the law' to assure us that the union agreed. A settlement was reached. Years later, in an interview with me, Cutler said that Diefenbaker had telephoned him to ask him directly whether or not the union had agreed to the commission. Diefenbaker was offering himself as an ally, yet Cutler gave him the same non-committal answer that he had given Nicholson: Parliament could pass whatever legislation it wanted and the union would obey the law.24 Moreover, he said exactly the same thing to me when I posed the question. In the context of

Sound and Fury 61 negotiations, where each word is weighed carefully, Cutler's sphinx-like answer might very well have been meant to encourage the government to pass the law and let the union off the hook. Whether all union delegates understood the strategy is less certain. The government explicitly told the Federation that the ILA did not want any reference to the binding commission in the settlement because it wanted to have time to explain the issue to its members. At the time, this appeared a reasonable demand, but in retrospect I have no doubt that we were being far too optimistic about the union's intentions. In any case, the discreet language of 'or otherwise' and wage increases 'in return for productivity improvements' was inserted to make allowance for the report of the commission amending the agreement. Even after admitting that the union had not explicitly agreed, the government maintained that the union knew of its intentions and fully understood the meaning and purpose of the words. The union claimed the opposite, that it was never told of the purpose of the words. The truth would appear to lie somewhere between the two versions. Recently released cabinet documents confirm that the government had a clear view of what it believed the union had agreed to, though they do not provide conclusive proof that the union looked at matters the same way. Nicholson told the cabinet that Cutler, 'who earlier had favoured a government inquiry into the productivity issue, was now understood, on direction from ILA headquarters, to be advising the union against agreeing voluntarily to such an inquiry. The ILA was understood to be afraid that any industrial inquiry commissioner was likely to report that there was substantial feather-bedding in the Montreal docks.' Nicholson further reported, with reference to the inquiry into productivity, that 'the Union was refusing to be bound by any report by such commissioner... the Union lawyer [Cutler] took the position that the Union could not acquiesce in any such settlement unless it were imposed by legislation ... the Union would be unlikely to oppose such legislation actively, but could not afford, in the face of the rivalry of the Confederation of National Trade Unions, to appear to acquiesce in any way in a reduction in the strength of work gangs.' At the same cabinet meeting, the minister of citizenship and immigration, Jean Marchand, said that 'what seemed to be involved was the need on the part of the Union for a face-saving device, which would be provided by legislation establishing compulsory arbitration on the productivity question, in effect absolving the Union from any share of responsibility for any subsequent reduction in the work gangs.' At another cabinet meeting, on the 13*, Prime Minister Pearson reported the government's intention 'to establish through legislation a Commission of Inquiry which would deal with the question of productivity and automation, including the size of work gangs. The findings of the commission would be made binding by the legislation. The unions intimated that, while they could not accept such findings as

62 Waterfront Blues binding as part of the voluntary settlement, they would obey the law if the Government legislated that these findings should be binding.' The next day, after the parties had reached an agreement, Nicholson told cabinet that he 'would have a short statement to make in the House that afternoon announcing the agreement. It would also be necessary to introduce legislation to provide for binding arbitration on the question of increased productivity, but this could not be announced immediately. The Union leaders had asked that they be permitted to inform their members of the government's intention to introduce such legislation, in the course of announcing the terms of settlement.' To this, Pearson added that, 'during his discussions with the parties to the dispute, he had made quite clear the government's intention to introduce such legislation. Although the parties were not asked to concur in this intention, it was in fact pan of the understood basis on which the agreement had been reached.'2^ All this said, there is substantial evidence to support the view that the government did not make its intentions as clear to the union representatives as it claimed. Proposals of legislation were put to the union in a hypothetical form ('what if we pass legislation ...'). Under intensive questioning in Parliament, the labour minister admitted that the words 'compulsory arbitration' had been 'carefully avoided' in discussions.26 Quite obviously, the government said something to the union that was radically different from what it said to the Federation. Yet, even so, it is unlikely that the union was as innocent and unaware as it claimed to be. That the union knew there would be a commission of inquiry is indisputable. The government's desire to pass legislation making a commission's findings binding is also clear. Furthermore, I have in my possession three proposed terms of settlement which, although undated, can be put in a chronological order through the evolution of the monetary provisions. The first version reads: 'Conclusions of Commission of Inquiry to be binding and implemented when made.' The second version reads: 'Both parties agree that the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry are to be implemented when made ...' The third version reads: 'The government agrees to establish a Commission of Inquiry into gang sizes, sling-loads, strapping of cargo and other related matters and the findings of such Commission to be implemented as soon after being handed down as possible.' The final version signed on 14 June makes no direct reference to the commission. Considering the documents in a vacuum, one could argue that the changes in wording represented changes in intentions. However, in view of the discussions that took place during the last few days of negotiations, with Nicholson repeatedly asking Cutler about the union's reaction to legislation, it should have been clear to the union that the government's intent had not changed, only the wording. Nicholson wrote to Cutler on 27 June: 'The absence of any reference to the IIC in the terms of settlement must not be interpreted, and this was made clear to you and to the members of the ILA during our meetings, as an indication of any change in the

Sound and Fury 63 understanding which was reached with both parties with respect to this commission including the manner in which its conclusions would be implemented.'27 In the House of Commons, Nicholson reported that Cutler had specifically asked him not to announce the binding legislation in the same breath as the settlement.28 Not only is it repugnant to think that Nicholson would have made this up from scratch, but Cutler never directly denied the claim. That Cutler knew the law was coming is likely. Beyond that, no one knows for sure. The worse part of the controversy is that at the time neither party fully understood what had happened. Jean-Marc St-Onge, who was about to be elected president of Local 375, was in Ottawa during the mediation but was not one of the union officials present during Cutler's discussions with the minister. This was odd - as Local 375'$ business agent, he should have been present - but he may have been kept out of the loop because of fears that he would oppose any deal such as the one Cutler was negotiating. Whatever the reasons for his exclusion from the talks, St-Onge personally believed that the government had played a dirty trick on the union, and he was convinced that the Federation was 'in on it.' On our side, we never believed for one second that the union's protest was genuine. We concluded that the ILA's attitude was part of its strategy to stall technological change and attract sympathy. It was not until 1980, when I interviewed St-Onge, that I came to believe that the union, or at least St-Onge, might have been telling the truth when it spoke about feeling double-crossed. He told me: 'The employers knew it [that the Union was not told]! Because it was impossible for them to think that we would have accepted.'29 There is no reason to think that he would fake this indignation twenty years after the fact. Clearly, the rank and file - the men who handled the cargo, the men who could walk out, the very men who would have to cooperate to implement the commission's findings - always believed that the union had been victimized. As for St-Onge, I am convinced that Phil Cutler and Gerard Tremblay were aware of the government's commitment to the Federation to establish a commission of inquiry and to make its conclusions binding. What remains uncertain is what they told St-Onge and the union membership. And so it happened that the parties emerged from the 1966 negotiations even more alienated from one another than they had been when they had started, each believing that the other was the biggest hypocrite to walk the face of the earth.

CHAPTER THREE

The Picard Commission

Forcing parties to arbitration when they are either reluctant to appear or ill prepared to present a case makes the adjudicator's task difficult. Furthermore, a commission of inquiry is much more complicated than an arbitration hearing, because the former has a mandate to investigate that the latter lacks. In the case of the Picard commission, which was to inquire into and report on various matters related to the system of employment, methods of work, and job security at the St Lawrence River ports, the task was made all the more daunting by the profound lack of trust between the parties and the complicated nature of the issues involved. Representing the union throughout the hearings was Phil Cutler, who had been the union's principal spokesperson since the beginning of the strike in May and who, as we have seen, was at the centre of the controversy over Bill €-125. On the other side, making his debut in a public forum as counsel for the Federation, was Brian Mulroney. Then a young lawyer, fresh out of law school and working in Paul Renault's law firm, he was at the right place at the right time to launch a career that was to take him to the pinnacle of Canadian politics as prime minister. Renault, a distinguished member of the bar with an excellent reputation and much in demand by the corporate community, had represented the Federation since 1964 and had participated in the recent mediation efforts of Lippe and Nicholson. At the time of the creation of the Picard commission, no one could have guessed that the hearings would last until the second half of 1967 and that the commissioner's report would not be ready until November 1967. Even then, however, Renault knew that, as a senior partner of his firm, he could not afford the time to take personal charge of the Federation's case before the commission, and so he brought in Mulroney. Though he likely did not intend to relinquish the file completely, a combination of his own ill health and Mulroney's outstanding performance over the next year and a half resulted in the future prime minister taking over the Federation file on a permanent basis.

The Picard Commission 65 From the start, it was clear that Mulroney was well suited for his new responsibility. He was bilingual, had the 'gift of the gab/ and was a formidable debater whose skills were put to the test in the courtroom setting of the commission's hearings - a perfect training ground for a career in politics. Proving a formidable opponent of Phil Cutler, Mulroney succeeded to a remarkable degree in keeping the ILA counsel under control, thwarting most of his efforts to browbeat and dictate to Picard. Young and inexperienced he may have been but he had all the right stuff to battle a seasoned labour lawyer to a draw. He also won a great deal of admiration for his dogged perseverance in keeping the hearings on track, ever mindful of the need for the commission to conclude its work in time for Picard to write his report and deliver it before the end of 1967. And there was still more to his contribution. Though he began with no knowledge of the shipping industry, and relied initially on facts and arguments given him by the Federation, he showed himself to be a quick study, mastering the essentials of the business from scratch and displaying an immediate recognition of the importance of unity on the employers' side. In subsequent negotiations, Mulroney's increasing talents in the art of mediation would become apparent, and in the early days of the Maritime Employers Association, when the fledgling body was suffering from serious teething troubles, he would be a tower of strength both to me and to Arnie Masters, the association's president. There can be little doubt that Mulroney's work for the employers on the Montreal waterfront caught the eye of Premier Robert Bourassa, who in 1974 appointed him to the Cliche commission of inquiry into Quebec's construction industry, another stepping-stone in his successful ascent to the office of prime minister. I myself played a significant role in the proceedings of the Picard commission. Since I had served for two years on the Federation's Labour Committee and had a legal background, President Eakin of the Federation asked me if I could take a leave of absence from my company, Federal Commerce and Navigation, to prepare our case and act as intermediary between the Federation and the commission's legal counsel, and also between the Federation and the IASC. Accordingly, in June 1966, with the full support of Fednav, I was appointed special consultant to the Federation and remained in this capacity for the duration of the hearings, while also continuing to serve as a member of the Labour Committee. The Union's Position Although both the government and the Federation were surprised by the ILA's opposition to Bill 0125 as it was being debated in the House of Commons, we anticipated that the union would participate in the hearings once they opened. After all, as Nicholson had assured the House, Cutler had said that the ILA would cooperate and obey the law if the government set up a commission. Initially,

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however, that was not to be. The union said that it would have nothing to do with the commission and asked Picard to withdraw. It also initiated legal proceedings to have Bill €-215 declared ultra vires and to disqualify Picard from serving as commissioner on the grounds of a previous professional relationship with the Aluminum Company of Canada, which was affiliated with Saquenay Shipping, a member of the Federation. The union was adamant that there should be no changes to working conditions prior to the expiry of the collective agreement on 31 December 1967, and that any changes to be effected thereafter should come about not via a government commission but through the collective-bargaining process. There were several reasons why the ILA took this position. First, it felt that the legislation was an assault on its contractual rights since, in its view, a collective agreement had been entered into for a period of two years and was to remain untouched until it expired. Whatever Cutler and others believed about the government's intentions prior to the introduction of Bill C-125, it is clear that when the ILA locals ratified the settlement on 15 June they were unaware that they would be facing binding arbitration on the very issues that had been at the centre of their strike and that they thought had disappeared with the settlement. Furthermore, the ILA viewed the government's support for technological change as amounting to sympathy for the Federation's position, and thus it could not foresee a fair hearing from a commission which it regarded as an extension of government. During the negotiations, St-Onge had given the impression of being a nonnegotiator whose way was the only way. In fact, however, St-Onge prided himself on being a man who did not 'sit and just say no' to change. He believed that anything could be discussed. He was not unalterably opposed to gang-size reduction but he insisted on protecting union jobs. He deplored the casualness of labour and recognized the merits of trading job security for technological change. And he believed that technological innovation was necessary. Yet, all that said, StOnge recognized that transferring these issues to the jurisdiction of a third party deprived the union of its traditional bargaining tactic of relying on the threat of a strike to obtain concessions. Though the issues of gang size, sling-loads, and job security were within the framework of the inquiry, they were not as subject to trade-off as they might have been in negotiations. The determining factor for the commission would not be what each party wanted but what made sense. StOnge's negotiating strategy was demolished. Nevertheless, the union, like the proverbial leopard, could not change its spots: loud and militant it had been and loud and militant it would remain. Besides, the executive was in a delicate position vis-a-vis the membership. After repeatedly stating that the ILA was opposed to binding arbitration, that it would oppose Bill C-125 and the inquiry, it had no

The Picard Commission 67 choice but to carry out its threat if only to save face and retain credibility, not only with its membership but with other unions, the government, the Federation, and the public. For all these reasons, the union set out to undermine the inquiry. Ideally, the goal was to prevent the inquiry from taking place altogether through legal action, and if this failed, as it was likely to, a secondary goal was to stall the hearings and prevent a report from being issued before the expiration of the collective agreement on 31 December 1967. The union realized that, if the latter occurred, there would be no amendments to the collective agreement and changes to working conditions would have to be negotiated by the parties through the traditional bargaining process. The Federation's Position Having granted the longshoremen a wage increase of 30 per cent with the understanding that half would be in return for increased productivity, the Federation was eager for the commission to get on with its work. In agreeing to the settlement in June, we expected to reap the benefits of the commission for the second year of the labour contract in 1967. Faced suddenly with the union's opposition to the commission, the Federation could clearly see the possibility that if the commission's report were to be delayed, little or nothing would be received in return for the large wage increase. Time was therefore of the essence. But we had problems of our own. To assist me in the preparation of the Federation's case, a special advisory committee had been struck, consisting of Federation and IASC representatives. The two groups had submitted briefs to me on their respective objectives and remedies and it was obvious that a united management brief would be difficult to put together. There was common agreement on ends, namely, that every effort must be made to increase productivity without impairing safety and job security. Both groups recognized that, unless the workforce was stabilized, there could be no progress towards establishing reasonable job security or eliminating manpower-utilization problems. On the means to be used to achieve our ends, however, the Federation and IASC committee members differed. Both parties agreed to appeal to the commission for the elimination of slingload limits and complete flexibility regarding the movement of gangs, but the shipowners and stevedoring contractors disagreed on the fundamental issue of gang size and gang rotation. In general, the Federation was in favour of radical changes in equipment and work methods and was willing to implement job security with port-wide rotation of smaller gangs made up of ten to twelve men, supplemented as necessary with extras from the labour pool. But the stevedoring

68 Waterfront Blues contractors were reluctant to make the shift from a labour-intensive industry to a capital-intensive one. Arguing that cutting and rotating gangs would actually reduce the men's productivity, they wanted to maintain control over their own parent gangs. In addition, they were reluctant to invest in costly equipment since they were not yet allowed to lease facilities on the waterfront and, therefore, they wanted gang size to remain close to the current level of seventeen to nineteen men and the parent-gang system to remain in place. It was not until stevedoring contractors became terminal operators with large investments of their own in shore-based cargo-handling gear that they obtained all the benefits of reduced manpower. Finally, the stevedoring contractors were not persuaded that cutting and rotating gangs was the key to increased productivity. They believed that the fundamental reason for low productivity was management's inability to deal with the lack of discipline on the waterfront. This in turn stemmed partly from union control of the workforce and partly from the Federation's role as the sole representative of management, to the exclusion of the actual employers, the stevedoring contractors. In the existing multi-employer management structure, it was difficult to reconcile the differing views. I remember my concern, prior to the first hearing of the commission, that management risked making a fool of itself if it did not know what changes to ask for after claiming so loudly that major changes were necessary. The Hearings The first hearing of the commission took place in Montreal on 19 August 1966. Louis-Philippe Pigeon (later Mr Justice Pigeon of the Supreme Court of Canada) and Luc Parent were legal advisers to the commission. The commissioner, Dr Picard, appointed experts to assist in the investigation. Pierre Dufresne, industrial engineer, was appointed technical adviser; Pierre Harvey, economist, was appointed to study problems of job security; and Drs M. Becklake and J.C. McDonald were appointed to examine physiological problems, including occupational fatigue. Although the latters' terms of reference were broad, in fact they were asked only to consider the effects of grain-trimming machines on the workers' health. At the first hearing, as expected, the union attacked the commission and indicated its intention to oppose the law. The Federation, for its part, said in its opening statement that it must be the aim of the Shipping Federation and the I.L.A. to work together towards achieving labour stability and improvements in productivity. Both the Federation and the union have a common objective in promoting the interests of our ports with a view to increasing cargo traffic which will result in greater earnings for

The Picard Commission

69

the work force. Improvements in productivity cannot be achieved by clinging to working conditions which do not recognize that new concepts of cargo-handling, revolutionary ship design, large scale use of containers and bulk movement of cargo, the introduction of strapped loads and numerous other devices are being introduced in the industry; and labour stability cannot be achieved as long as men resist change through fear of unemployment.1 The Federation then added that it 'recognizes that any long-term solution to the problem of changing techniques must include on the one hand flexibility of manpower utilization which will enable shipowners to continue to improve equipment and develop more efficient methods of operation; and, on the other hand, the gradual decasualization of the waterfront industry with provisions for security of employment which will establish a stable, reliable and well-paid work force, with the whole being consistent with national objectives and international trade.'2 If we thought that these conciliatory words would bring the union around to our point of view, we were sadly mistaken. Although the union faithfully attended all the hearings, despite having taken the commission to court,3 Cutler vigorously and at considerable length cross-examined each witness for the Federation and the IASC. Our strategy had been to present a number of witnesses representative of the industry, each of whom would tackle a particular phase of the business which was well understood by him. By restricting the scope of evidence to be given by each witness, we expected to limit the cross-examination of each witness by Cutler and we thought that by doing this we could speed up the inquiry. Unfortunately for us, commission counsel, over the objections of Mulroney, applied the rules of procedure set out in the Civil Code, which allowed counsel to cross-examine on all matters covered by the commission. This had the effect of allowing Cutler freedom to roam over many areas with each witness and to take up an inordinate amount of time. A more serious setback to the Federation was that several proposed witnesses would no longer agree to take the stand for fear of looking foolish under Cutler's barrage. His strategy was simultaneously to weaken the testimony of the witness, to waste as much time as possible, and to elicit as much evidence as possible to sensitize the commissioner to the longshoremen's problems. For its part, the Federation was struggling with increasing IASC dissatisfaction concerning management's presentation to the commission. The fact that the commissioner's decisions would likely have a major and lasting impact on the waterfront's operations reinforced each stevedoring contractor's desire to present its own point of view. The stakes were just too high for them to stay on the sidelines and listen to the Federation unilaterally ask for changes to the system of

70

Waterfront Blues

employment and work practices. And so the core problem rose to the surface. If management could not agree on the nature of the changes to be implemented, how was it to convince a commission that such change was necessary? Management was once again divided in a time of crisis. Threatened on the one hand by the views of the Federation on what manpower practices were desirable, and on the other hand by Cutler's aggressive tactics, the IASC decided shortly after the hearings began to appoint David Angus (whom Mulroney would later appoint to the Senate) as its legal counsel. On most issues, Angus's interventions proved more complementary to than contradictory of the Federation's position; the fact that Federation members ended up paying the bills of stevedoring operations still gave them a powerful voice. Nevertheless, the shifting positions of the Federation and IASC led the lawyers to make opposing arguments from time to time. This inevitably led to confusion as to which group, the Federation or the IASC, represented management. There were two issues of special concern to the Federation: sling-load limits, which prevented management from operating machines to capacity; and strict gang-size and deployment rules, which allowed a number of men in gangs to remain idle (but be paid regardless) during operations for which they were not needed, even though they could have been used elsewhere. The Federation was willing to consider that some sort of job-security plan might be necessary to compensate workers for the effect of automation on man-hours. The union, however, denied that there was excessive manning, opposed any reduction in gang size, and stressed inadequate safety rules, the lack of job security, and the great differentials in earnings between union members. It claimed that the parent-gang system was responsible in large part for the inequalities in earnings and opportunities of work between gangs of different parent companies, and it asked for a port-wide rotation scheme to achieve equalization. Members of the Federation were prepared to consider some form of rotation to equalize earnings but the stevedoring contractors were strongly opposed to gang rotation and emphasized the importance of the employer-employee relationship as a motivational factor. On the issue of productivity, the union took the position that the men gave an honest day's work and had no incentive to be more productive than that. In view of the lack of job security, management could not reasonably expect longshoremen to be the instrument of their own demise by doing more work in less time with fewer men. To increase productivity and allow more work to be done with machines, the men had to be protected from the resulting job losses. The union asked for a weekly job-security plan under which each union member would be paid the equivalent of forty hours a week at the regular rate whether they worked or not. This solution, they argued, would ensure that technological innovation and increased productivity would not put longshoremen out of work. The Federa-

The Picard Commission

71

tion argued that, given the vagaries of the shipping industry, any job-security plan would need to be based on a seasonal guarantee.4 Other concerns expressed by the union attracted immediate sympathy from the commission. The harbour lacked basic facilities like toilets, showers, locker rooms, changing rooms, bathrooms, canteens, and so on. Longshoremen described how they had to drink water from the same bottle as all other men from a gang because of a lack of drinking cups. They called the harbour a 'death trap' and bitterly complained of the lack of a first-aid station throughout the harbour despite the great number of accidents. According to Dufresne, St-Onge told him that many of the longshoremen wished to take advantage of the newly built Metro but, because of their appearance after working long hours in the hot sun or in dirty cargo, they were either refused admittance or were too embarrassed to use public transportation.5 About two months into the hearings, on 2 November 1966, an off-the-record meeting had been convened in great secrecy by Cutler through the good offices of Judge Lippe. ILA vice-president Gerard Tremblay met with Renault and me at a dinner hosted by the judge. Also in attendance, at Lippe's request, was John Howard, a lawyer who had worked with the judge at the Seafarers' International Union after it had been placed under trusteeship.6 Discussions were frank and good-natured but nothing new came out of them. Cutler stated that three issues would have to be addressed before restrictive labour practices could be eliminated: safety, job security, and protection of the workers against speed-up. He explained that, if an acceptable job-security program could be initiated together with a real effort of all concerned to reduce accidents and satisfy the union that the employers were not trying to accelerate the longshoremen's pace of work, all other matters should be rather easy to reconcile. I suggested that, if a job-security plan could be worked out, it should be easier to agree on gang size and other matters of concern to management. Tremblay admitted that reduced gangs were inevitable but stated that the rank and file would oppose any changes before 1968. Cutler was visibly annoyed at Tremblay's mention of the time-frame and said that it could be done sooner. But they both admitted their inability to state how far they could speak for the membership of Local 375, particularly since they were not aware of St-Onge's position and it was expected that he would shortly be elected president of the local. It was suggested that further meetings might be useful when these elections were concluded. There were not going to be any further management-union dinner meetings. As a result of the union elections, Jean-Marc St-Onge resigned his position as business agent to become president of Local 375. His militancy and popularity on the docks made him a strong and forceful leader. Indeed, even with the limited responsibilities and powers of business agent, his influence over the longshore-

72

Waterfront Blues

men and the rest of the union officers had been substantial. He had set out negotiating demands for a variety of improvements in working conditions and safety measures that had always been neglected by union officers in favour of large wage increases, and by doing so he won the trust and loyalty of most longshoremen. As union president he would be a formidable adversary. With St-Onge's election, a raging idealist was facing pragmatic and costconscious managers and it was inevitable that their respective priorities and approaches would exasperate the other. Every discussion bogged down in restrictions and exceptions and reaching agreement on the simplest of issues became enormously frustrating. For example, in November, with winter approaching, StOnge demanded of two stevedoring companies that an extra deckman be employed as a relief man with each gang. The demand was rejected, since this had never been a practice in the port and there was no provision for additional manning in the collective agreement. The result was work stoppages ranging from a brief fifteen minutes to a couple of hours. In the interest of compromise, the Federation stepped in and said that it would agree to one extra man for every two gangs when the temperature was 20° Fahrenheit or lower at 7 A.M. in the morning. St-Onge was angry at the Federation's insistence on these details, which complicated the process by making it necessary to check the temperature every morning before calling for relief men. But the Labour Committee, ever suspicious of St-Onge's real motives, wanted to protect itself by designing parameters that would prevent paying relief men on mild days. Each party feared abuse from the other. St-Onge was convinced that the Federation cared little about the longshoremen's working conditions and the employers were no less certain that St-Onge cared little about productivity. November rolled by and the commission adjourned for Christmas with no end of the hearings in sight and the Federation still wondering when it might expect to receive the productivity improvements paid for in the June settlement. I took advantage of the adjournment to prepare an in-depth memorandum to the Executive Council of the Federation. My work in preparing the Federation's case for the commission had led me to the conclusion that our greatest problem was not a labour problem but a management one. In addressing the divisions that had clearly surfaced between the members of the Federation and the IASC, I suggested that the two bodies set up a single labour-relations department run by a full-time staff, which should be headed by the best person available. Furthermore, a board representing all interests including the stevedoring contractors as well as the shipping companies should make all policy decisions. Here was the germination of my idea for the formation of an employers' association, which was to come into existence in a few years. At the time, my views were at odds with the traditional attitude with regard to labour relations at the St Lawrence River ports. Nevertheless, the idea of hiring

The Picard Commission 73 professional staff to deal with labour relations was deemed excellent, not only to add a measure of professionalism but because the volume of work imposed on the small Federation office staff (three people in total) and the Labour Committee had increased exponentially. Steps would soon be taken to implement this proposition, though in a limited fashion. I do not know whether the union was aware of the extent of internal discussions along these lines, but some innovations made it obvious that winds of change, if not exactly blowing, were at least stirring within the Federation. Another, and more visible, change was the growing presence of French-speaking personnel at the Federation. In the fall, the Federation had hired Commodore Marcel Jette, a French Canadian, as executive director in the hope that bridging the culture gap between the longshoremen and the Federation would be beneficial to the parties' relationship.7 And then, in the spring of 1967, as a result of my suggestion to have professionals placed in charge of labour relations, the Federation created the position of director of labour relations and appointed Denis Pronovost, another French Canadian, to the post. In fact, Pronovost was not as powerful as his title suggested since the structure of the Federation did not allow for much discretionary authority to be devolved to staff members. Moreover, in the end, Pronovost was probably hired more for his ability to speak French than because the Federation really wanted an expert to take charge of its labour relations. Still, it was a start; at least now the Federation and the ILA could speak to one another without translators and the associated discomfort. After reconvening in January 1967, the inquiry continued at a turtle's pace. By February, the commission was preparing to hear the testimony of expert witnesses, after which it would proceed to the ports of Quebec and Trois-Rivieres.8 The Federation was growing frantic. In March 1967, seven months into the hearings, the Federation issued a press release in which its president, Bill Eakin, emphasized the importance of an early report from the Picard commission; he noted that the Federation had agreed to a substantial wage increase in exchange for increased productivity, but so far the union had not delivered on its part of the bargain.9 The ILA was not moved by this complaint nor by Eakin's threat that, unless eastern Canadian ports implemented containerization, ships would prefer the American ports. The inquiry had been set up at the request of the Federation, not the union, and the union would certainly not be pressured into speeding up its presentation to Picard. Furthermore, while it had become increasingly apparent to the Federation and the commission that the river ports' administrative structures were inadequate, Eakins's press release implied that the union alone was responsible for the ports' problems. St-Onge greatly resented the Federation's attempt to portray the longshoremen as the bad guys. Responding to Eakin by going straight to Commissioner Picard, the ILA stated that it was unacceptable for one party to urge the commission to hurry up, and for the commission to tolerate

74 Waterfront Blues such tactics. The Federation seemed to assume that the report's recommendations would agree with its initial proposals, such as gang-size reduction and the lifting of restrictive labour practices. Its confidence annoyed the ILA, which emphasized that these issues were being investigated objectively and that the findings might well result in the status quo or even in gang-size increases. Finally, in regard to the allegation that there had been no improvement in productivity, the union responded that whether or not there were productivity increases was for the commission to determine; it was not a matter that the Federation should treat as a fait accompli.10 Despite spats of this kind and entreaties from the Federation to move more quickly, the hearings continued at a slow pace. Throughout the presentation of its case, the union had been sending subtle and not-so-subtle messages to Picard that he should maintain the status quo. One of the less subtle messages was delivered by President T.W. Gleason of the ILA and would be widely used in subsequent Federation communiques to illustrate the union's bad faith. Under examination by Cutler, Gleason declared that any attempt 'to force a decision on the membership' would result in 'a complete rebellion.' Of course, Gleason's testimony was a raw, unsophisticated threat, the grossness of which rendered it almost laughable. It was a reminder, however, that the river port locals were still adamantly opposed to accepting any imposed changes to the collective agreement, notwithstanding the agreement of June 1966 and the subsequent legislation, and they were telling Picard to back off. The summer had come and gone, and though all parties felt that the end was approaching, there was still no report in sight. A full year had passed since the bitter 1966 strike. The hearings were as controversial as ever, as both parties doubled their efforts to rally the commissioner to their respective points of view regarding gang size, job security, and working conditions. The union was inflexible on the docks and disputes involving interpretation of some provisions of the 1966 agreement were once again giving rise to localized work stoppages, despite some sporadic conciliation attempts by the Department of Labour. The Federation, meanwhile, was continuing its reorganization. In August 1967 it appointed John Paul Martin, a bilingual former sea captain and an employee of Saguenay Shipping, to be chairman of a revamped Labour Committee, which, for the first time, would include two representatives of the IASC.11 The Federation was finally acknowledging that the absence of the independent stevedoring contractors from management's team was a weak link that had to be tightened. Its efforts in this direction, however, proved to be too little and too late. A fatal blow to management's case before Picard in regard to gang size came from within its own ranks when John Greene, principal owner and chairman of Eastern Canada Stevedoring Company (ECS), by far the largest stevedoring contractor in Montreal at the time, appeared as a witness before the commission. He

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claimed to be appearing as an 'interested citizen' and not as representative of the ECS or of the IASC, though he also noted that, as an employer on the docks, he had first-hand knowledge of the issues being discussed. Obviously, his opinion would carry considerable weight, whether he voiced it as a citizen or as an employer. Greene, to the astonishment of the Federation and the joy of the union, testified that he was reluctant to cut gang size because sometimes gang sizes at the present level would be necessary. This view was completely opposed to that of the Federation, which hastily moved to dissociate itself from Greene and urged the IASC to do the same. But Greene's point had made an impact on Commissioner Picard, who felt that it added great credibility to the ILA's case. After all, was it not the stevedoring contractors who organized the work every day, and not the shipowners? The union could not have hoped for a stronger ally. The Federation was disgusted. On 27 September 1967, more than a year after it had started its work, the last hearing of the commission took place. In his final plea, Cutler urged the commission to be moderate in its recommendations, requesting that nothing be done on the flexibility and job-securities issues until a safety code had been agreed upon and amenities for the men provided in the dock area.12 Mulroney counter-argued that time was running out and reminded the commission of the loss of productivity and the dangerous position the ports were facing in regard to their competitive capacity. And with those final appeals, the hearings were over. Picard retired to deliberate. Each party clearly had well-founded grievances. Over the years we had imposed upon each other conditions that derived from an outdated concept of longshoring. This situation might have corrected itself if the parties' approach to labour relations had evolved at all. But in the mid-igbos they were still little interested in discussing issues together. In fact, their respective stubbornness in negotiations was less an expression of truly irreconcilable differences than a function of their staking out positions. Labour did not recognize management's right to manage, and we in management did not recognize our responsibility to provide security of employment. I detected no appreciation on our side that the welfare of longshoremen should not be sacrificed in favour of productivity; nor, on the other side, did the union appreciate that it had an obligation to abide by negotiated collective agreements. It was as if both parties were locked in a dark room where the light of reason never entered. We hoped that Picard could find the keys to open the doors. The Picard Report Picard's recommendations would amend the collective agreement before its expiry on 31 December 1967. Negotiations for a new collective agreement which

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would in turn most probably amend the collective agreement amended by Picard would have to start soon. In the meantime, labour unrest was on the rise, as disputes arose constantly and grievances piled up. By the end of October, everyone's nerves were on edge with anticipation. We found the general unrest agonizing in view of Picard's pending report and the upcoming negotiations. The Labour Committee's chairman, John Paul Martin, wrote a memorandum to the Federation's Executive Council in which he said: 'Pressure is building up and the union leadership is becoming more and more irritant. They pile up grievances and yet, they are not at all keen to find ways and means by which these grievances can be solved. They appear to be determined to force the employers into a showdown.'13 On i November 1967, after 14 months of hearings, 95 days of intensive examination and cross-examination, 12,528 pages of testimony, 309 tabled documents, and 134 witnesses, Picard's report was tabled in the House of Commons.14 In essence, the report and amended collective agreement gave to the members of Local 375 a weekly wage guarantee tied to productivity. In return, the report sought to give the employers flexibility to make the maximum use of manpower and technology consistent with safety. On the much debated and central issue of gang size, Picard decided that gangs were to be reduced by only two men, down to sixteen plus a foreman, a number still well above the Federation's expectations of eleven. He based his decision on the testimony of Local 375 president Jean-Marc St-Onge and of John Greene, president of the ECS, even though Greene claimed to be testifying in his own name, and on a report by the commission's engineering consultant. With Picard's report, Greene's 'treason' was recorded for all to remember. It became an indelible black mark in the history of employer relations on the waterfront, a cruel testimony to managerial division and a sharp rebuke to the Federation, which would find it hard to forgive and forget. Included in the sixteen-man basic gang were two relief men, an innovation primarily aimed at eliminating 'spello.' Picard stated that the 'designation of relief men makes rest periods for dockers official and legitimate for the first time in all three ports.'15 It was overly optimistic to believe that this innovation would convince longshoremen to abandon their traditional relief system, but legitimizing the concept of relief was an important step forward in improving working conditions. To ensure efficient use of manpower, Picard introduced provisions that allowed employers to require all men in a gang to perform any work for which they were qualified, to move men in the basic gang from the hold to the shed (and vice versa), and to move gangs from one hatch or ship to another within a work period.16 No penalty could be imposed on employers for allowing ship crews to open hatches or prepare equipment for work. The report also provided that longshoremen could no longer refuse to work the four corners of a hold

The Picard Commission 77 simultaneously, a practice that had contributed to great discrepancies in productivity.17 As a means of allowing for the maximum use of machines and innovations, Picard abolished the arbitrary limits on sling-load limits and provided that slingloads should be 'reasonably established' on the basis of three criteria: 'a) regulating the work of stevedoring the ship as to best attain an orderly, safe and efficient movement of the cargo in and out the vessel; b) protecting the safety and health of the workers; and c) making the best use of the skill and aptitude of the workers, applying available mechanism and motor power to minimize wasteful manual work.'18 Safety issues were to be under the jurisdiction of a joint managementlabour safety committee assisted by hired engineers. Picard ordered that the use of more than one forklift truck in the hold be allowed, responding to the union's allegations regarding toxic fumes by the inclusion of an article compelling employers to check hourly for carbon-monoxide emissions.19 He allowed for cargo to be strapped, palletized, or containerized in the shed, on the dock, or in the hold, declaring, 'There is no valid reason for refusing to handle unitized cargo that is made up in the shed while unitized cargo coming from a factory is accepted. Every method capable of insuring greater flexibility and a more efficient use of labour should be allowed provided the health and safety of workers are safeguarded.'20 Picard stressed that increased productivity was in everyone's best interest but that efficiency could never be pursued without giving prime consideration to safety. On the issue of job security, Picard had come to believe that much of the difficulty in implementing technological change was due to labour's valid concern about job loss. Hence his solution, a job-security plan that would draw on the increases in productivity to provide an incentive for the longshoremen to welcome technological change. The plan provided for the creation of a fund which would guarantee that each Montreal longshoreman who had worked at least 550 hours in 1966 would be paid for 40 hours a week, subject to maintaining a certain level of productivity, over 37 weeks (the job-security season), starting on the first Sunday in April in each year. Under these terms, about 2,550 members out of more than 3,000 from Local 375 were covered. The Federation had argued that eligibility should be based on 1,000 hours worked in 1966, on the grounds that any longshoreman having worked less could hardly be considered as having earned his livelihood wholly or mainly from longshoring. Though Picard agreed that less than a thousand hours of work a year made for a meagre livelihood, he concluded that there was no way of measuring each longshoreman's revenues from longshoring in proportion to his total annual income. Since 550 hours of work was the same eligibility requirement as that in the benefits plan, Picard decided that this figure was appropriate. Local 375*5 new job-security plan was the only one in

78 Waterfront Blues effect in a North American port that provided for a guarantee on a weekly basis. The Quebec and Trois-Rivieres union local members were given a seasonal guarantee of thirty-nine weeks since study of their particular situations had determined that weekly variations of work were too great in these ports to allow for a weekly guarantee, an argument that the Federation had presented to object to weekly guarantees in all the river ports. In order to tie the Montreal job-security plan to the port's performance and thus to its ability to pay, the guarantee was linked to a productivity index based on the year 1964. Believing that productivity had declined over the years, Picard chose 1964 as a base from which to increase productivity levels. Should productivity fall below this level in any year, the standard forty-hour work-week payment would be reduced accordingly but never below thirty-five hours a week. Based on the productivity index, the weekly job-security plan for 1967, with just over a month remaining in the job-security season, would guarantee thirty-five hours of pay per week. If a Montreal longshoreman refused work made available to him, his guaranteed payment for the given week would be reduced by the amount of hours his gang had worked that call. A longshoreman ceased to be eligible for the plan if discharged for cause, or at the end of a given year during which he refused work made available to him in excess of 20 per cent of the amount of hours guaranteed to him.21 In other words, for a year where the guarantee was at its maximum of forty hours per week for thirty-seven weeks, each longshoreman could refuse up to 296 hours of work without being disqualified for the plan. With these provisions, Picard sought not to disturb too drastically the traditional right of longshoremen not to work, all the while ensuring that not working out of personal choice would not be compensated by the job-security fund. Picard concluded: 'The longshoremen covered by the Act will henceforth receive full protection so there will no longer be any reason for the unions to fear and to oppose technological improvements. On the contrary, technological improvements and increased productivity will, in the long run, enable the ports to maintain their competitive position while offering maximum job security.'22 The plan was to be financed by way of assessment on tonnage. A fund was to be created for all three ports into which each employer would have to pay fifteen cents per equivalent ton entering into the computation of the productivity index.23 The fund was to be administered by the board of trustees that had been established by agreement between the ILA and the Shipping Federation in September 1965 to administer the pension plan and that was made up of four representatives of each party. In order to equalize work opportunities and earnings, gangs were to be rotated port-wide. In effect, there could be no job-security scheme under a system of

The Picard Commission 79 employment that generated large inequalities in work opportunities. Under the parent-gang system, gangs of the smaller stevedoring contractors often worked fewer hours than gangs of the larger contractors. If the old system were to be left in place, while guaranteeing everyone an equal weekly guarantee, it would result in the same gangs running out of work and being paid out of the fund. Not only would this be unfair to the gangs that continued to work, it would also put a substantial drain on the fund. The stevedoring contractors had been adamant, however, that complete rotation would sever the employment relationship between an employer and its regular gangs and thus reduce productivity. To address these concerns, Picard devised a system of rotation under which a contractor could work its own gangs until they had reached the guaranteed hours of work. At that point, the contractor had to replace those gangs with the gangs of other contractors who were not working and had yet to reach their guaranteed hours. The commissioner justified his decision by saying: 'This system seems to solve the major difficulties of stevedoring companies in this respect for they will keep control of their gangs as long as they have work for them and as long as their gangs have not worked their guaranteed number of hours. The loyalty of gangs to their employer, the ... relations between shippers and their gangs will therefore be safeguarded in large measure by this mitigated rotation though it may not be to the same degree as present.'24 Reactions The new terms and conditions of employment, which included the smaller gang size, the rotation of gangs, the elimination of sling-load limits, and the jobsecurity plan, were all to come into effect on Sunday, 5 November 1967. The Federation's Labour Committee held a meeting with the union executive on 3 November and requested cooperation in the implementation of the report. The union executive asked that the report be tabled until the end of the year when the collective agreement was to expire - a position that was consistent with what it had been saying ever since the legislation was adopted by Parliament in the summer of 1966, namely, that there should be no changes to the collective agreement until after 31 December 1967. The Federation could not agree to this. As Mulroney had stated many times, since taking over as Federation counsel in 1966, the legislated amendments to the collective agreement had to be implemented prior to the expiration of the agreement if they were to have any weight in the forthcoming negotiations. Furthermore, the Federation, having waited patiently for Picard's report in order to get some return for the higher wages paid after the 1966 settlement, was in no mood to wait any longer. At the meeting of 3 November, the Labour Committee set out our interpretation of the report,

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following which Cutler put forward an interpretation of the report's recommendation concerning the weekly guarantee which, in our opinion, had no foundation whatsoever. Cutler asked for a forty-hour weekly guarantee and ignored the productivity index set out by Picard. The meeting broke up with no agreement on the part of Local 375 to cooperate, although agreement to that effect was secured from the executive of locals 1657 (checkers) and 1552 (shipliners) in Montreal. Local 375's executive, however, requested that no work be ordered on Sunday, 5 November, so that the report could be explained to its membership. We agreed to this request, which meant that the report would now come into effect on Monday the 6th. We held a second meeting with Cutler and the executive of Local 375 on 4 November, when the union made it absolutely clear that it would not cooperate in the implementation of the report based upon the Federation's interpretation of it. The next day a general membership meeting of Local 375 was convened. There, St-Onge, as president, stated that the longshoremen were to receive a guarantee of forty hours per week and that longshoremen cut from existing gangs could stay at home until called to report for work. This flew in the face of what the Labour Committee had stated at the meetings held on 3 and 4 November - that the weekly guarantee was tied to productivity and that for the year 1967 it amounted to a guarantee of thirty-five hours per week. On Monday, 6 November, the gangs, now made up of sixteen men, forming the basic gangs called for in the Picard Report, turned up for work but without the extra men, required in certain cases, and without the replacements for absent men. The extras and replacements were ordered by the stevedoring contractors from the union hall in the customary manner. Some extras did turn up but they were subsequently instructed by the union to go home. Meetings were held with St-Onge and his fellow officers of Local 375 on 6 and 7 November, but they refused to accept any responsibility on the part of the union to dispatch extra men or replacements to the basic gang or to dispatch special gangs as provided in the Picard Report. They took the view that it was up to the employer to call the men at their homes. Also on 6 November, a concerted slowdown began to take place, organized by the executive of Local 375. In fact, the men had been told by St-Onge at the Sunday meeting that 'the weather is cold now so don't get your shirts wet; you might catch a cold.' Furthermore, when the employers attempted to increase sling-loads in accordance with the Picard Report, the men, on orders from the executive, refused to handle sling-loads in excess of those prevailing prior to the report. In the evening of 6 November, a Federation and IASC delegation (including me) met with Deputy Minister of Labour George Haythorne in Ottawa and explained to him that Local 375 obviously had no intention of complying with the Picard Report.

The Picard Commission 81 Haythorne suggested that the Federation could agree to transitional arrangements pending full implementation of Picard's report, and that it would not be overly costly to agree to a forty-hour weekly guarantee to the end of the jobsecurity season on 16 December. This seemed a strange suggestion and Eakin responded to it on behalf of the Federation, noting that such a step would be a dangerous precedent since Picard had established an essential correlation between the job-security guarantee and productivity, and expressing the hope that the government would be prepared to take appropriate action in the face of violations of an act of Parliament.25 Meanwhile, in order to set up a rotation scheme, in accordance with the Picard Report, so as to provide daily work opportunities to the extra men and to keep track of guarantee obligations, it was essential that the men make themselves available daily at a central dispatching service. Such systems of central dispatching were in existence at every ILA port in the United States. Under the system of employment in place before Picard, when there was no obligation on the part of the employers to provide any job security or equalization of earnings, an organized dispatch centre was not needed. The union ran a hall and it dispatched men as required or they were picked up from among those doing la seine along the waterfront. Now, in the face of the union's refusal to continue this practice - it maintained that providing extras was no longer its responsibility - the Federation decided to assume the dispatching function. With the stevedoring contractors we worked out a system that would allow extra men to register for job-security benefits and thereafter be dispatched on a daily basis from a central hall. The necessary facilities were quickly set up in the Catholic Sailors' Club. A staff was hired and the longshoremen were advised by telegram to report for registration in the early morning of 10 November. St-Onge informed us that he was willing to let the system run for a week during which the parties could come to a definite agreement on an appropriate joint-dispatching system. Unfortunately, on the morning of 10 November, less than four hundred men had been registered and seventy dispatched before a fight broke out over allegations of favouritism. The dispatcher had called the name of the only man who was known by the employers to be capable of operating a specific machine belonging to a particular stevedoring company. Union officers who were supervising the process found the preference unjustified and the union immediately ordered all its men back to the union hall and sent a wire to the Federation that the men were ready for work. The Federation interpreted the union's message as meaning that all subsequent calls should be made to the longshoremen's homes and the centre was closed down for fear that its continued operation would lead to only more and possibly dangerous disturbances. In light of the union's action, Martin, on behalf of the Federation's Labour Committee, requested the government to name an adminis-

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trator to conduct the dispatching system on an ad hoc basis pending an agreement by the parties.26 All this time, the slowdown continued, productivity continued to decline, and the employers were unable to put into effect any of the changes brought about by the Picard Report other than the use of a basic sixteen-man gang. They could not organize smaller gangs for use in instances clearly indicated in the report because the men refused to respond to a call through the old union hall. Nor could they supplement the basic gang as set out in the report because the union prohibited the foreman from hiring extra men under penalty of fine and it refused to dispatch such extra men from the hall. Furthermore, some men who did turn out for work on their own were threatened and told to go home. And as if all this were not enough, in several cases less than sixteen men turned up in a gang and the employers were unable to obtain replacements from the union hall although there were always men available there. Because of the slowdown and consequent loss of production, the IASC notified the Federation that its members would carry out all loading and discharging operations on the basis of actual cost plus overhead - the terms to be retroactive to 8:00 A.M., 6 November, and to remain in effect until further notice. Norman Wolfe, representing the stevedoring contractors at a meeting of the Federation to which he had been invited, said that the increased cost per ton, due to the slowdown, would be from three to fifteen dollars a ton depending upon the commodity handled.27 Wolfe expressed the support of the IASC for the full implementation of the Picard Report. Its members, he said, would continue to employ labour and work vessels, in the face of the union's harassment, to the best of their ability until otherwise instructed.28 On Saturday, 11 November, the union began arbitrarily stopping gangs from working when they had reached about forty hours of work in a week. A wildcat stoppage took place when, at about 3:15 P.M., roaming gangs drove off the longshoremen then working. During the following week, Local 375*5 executive, on its own initiative, began replacing regular gang members by extra men. The employer could not obtain extra men to supplement his basic gang of sixteen although the union was dispatching the men as substitutes to replace the regular members of the gang. Instances were recorded where a foreman turned up on the job with only twelve men who had never worked together as a gang. In other recorded instances, the foreman turned up without any men whatsoever. With equipment being deliberately sabotaged, Martin notified Nicholson of the union's continuing harassment and reiterated his request for the appointment of an administrator.29 In a surprising development, however, Nicholson suggested that the parties agree to the appointment of an arbitrator, chosen by the minister, who would be authorized to make final and binding decisions on

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the issues in dispute, decisions that would remain in effect until 31 December 1967. He stated in a telegram that 'it is imperative that full waterfront operations resume at the earliest time. I would appreciate your immediate advice so that arbitration can proceed.'30 In response, Eakin reminded the minister that Picard had effectively arbitrated the issues involved, having conducted an exhaustive inquiry into these matters and, after fourteen months of research and public hearings, produced a report whose conclusions were deemed to be incorporated into the existing collective agreement. Surely management had the right to implement the changes, and if the union claimed a violation of the agreement, it could exercise its right to file a grievance. In the present case, however, the union had not permitted management to act and consequently there had been no violation and the union had not filed a grievance. Eakin went on to say that the ILA's court action against the Picard commission and Gleason's testimony to the inquiry had made it 'crystal clear' that the union had no intention of respecting binding arbitration. Eakin concluded: 'In the light of the foregoing, you will understand I am sure why arbitration as understood by the ILA is absolutely meaningless and is but another tactic in their concerted attempt to bring about Mr. Gleason's prediction of June ist. In view of Mr. Gleason's statement which has been corroborated by ILA action in recent days, it should be quite evident why we cannot be expected to consent to arbitration in these circumstances.'31 Since the parties were unable to agree on the urgent problem of dispatch, however, the Federation declared itself willing to accept Judge Rene Lippe as a temporary administrator of the dispatching system in Montreal. Nicholson did not think that this was much of a solution and urged the Federation to reconsider its position on arbitration: 'It is evident from the present situation ... that there are grievances on both sides, real or imagined, and an arbitrator would decide whether or not they have merit. I do not feel that the employers or the union can assume that the interpretation or application of the Picard Report which is now part of the agreement is beyond question. The appointment of an administrator on the limited basis you propose will not settle the present impasse. You should reconsider your position immediately, as I very much fear that the situation will worsen.'32 Nicholson was right: the situation did worsen. On 15 November the union unilaterally withdrew the services of nineteen basic gangs employed by one member of the IASC and dispatched nineteen other gangs made up of sixteen men each picked from the extras. In fact, work had been available for these extra men since 7 November but the union had prevented the men from reporting. Eakin pointed out to Nicholson that, at all leading North American ports where a wage guarantee was in effect, the extra men had to report to a central hall every morning to be eligible for a guarantee. This obligation, he

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went on to say, had been readily accepted by the ILA everywhere, including New York. Eakin wrote: 'Assuming that there are grievances on both sides, real or imagined and assuming that the interpretation or application of the report is not beyond question as you said in your telegram we firmly believe that there is only one man who can so interpret and apply the report and that is Dr. Picard himself. Dr. Picard spent fourteen months studying the problem and only he can speak to the charges and countercharges now being bandied about.' He went on to suggest that Picard be approached to interpret and instruct on the application of his report until 31 December igbj.33 In a most bizarre response, Nicholson, I am sur on instructions from Haythorne, took Eakin's telegram to mean that the Federation agreed to proceed to arbitration on the basis of his (Nicholson's) telegram of 13 November and that he would select the arbitrator. 'While I concur in your views concerning the qualifications of Dr. Picard you will appreciate that unless both parties agree on an arbitrator the Minister of Labour ... must be left free to select one who is willing and ready to act.'34 This telegram begs the question whether Nicholson had asked the union if it would accept Picard and the union had replied in the negative. At a meeting of the Executive Council held on the evening of 17 November Martin, speaking on behalf of the Labour Committee, reiterated our opinion against the appointment of an arbitrator and recommended that the time had come to play hardball with the union - the employing companies must take a firm stand and exercise their management rights and dismiss gangs and/or men for cause whenever appropriate. He reported that the IASC was in agreement and its members were in a meeting at that moment determining what actions would be considered cause for dismissal. Some members of council had reservations concerning such a policy, without a final effort to resolve the points in dispute with the union, since it was bound to result in the closure of the port in a matter of a few days.35 On 20 November, the Labour Committee met again with the executive of Local 375 to try and reach a sensible agreement for the implementa tion of the Picard Report; however, the meeting ended when St-Onge walked out over our continued suggestion that longshoremen wishing to qualify for the jobsecurity guarantee must make themselves available at a central dispatching hall. Later that day, at 4 P.M., the Executive Council reconvened, with Mulroney present. After adopting the Labour Committee's recommendation of 17 November, the council agreed to send a letter to the stevedoring contractors, saying, 'The Federation has received a report from its Labour Committee regarding the continuing slowdown in the Port of Montreal together with a report of all its attempts to obtain Union cooperation to remedy the situation and implement the findings of the Picard Commission. In view of said report, the Federation hereby requests that employing companies exercise their management rights - including their right to discharge men for cause - with a view to prompt implementation of

The Picard Commission 85 the binding recommendations of the Picard Report.'36 Then, at a hastily called meeting of the members of the Federation held at 5:30 P.M., Eakin summarized the relations between the Federation and Local 375 since the Picard Report was issue and the situation then prevailing on the waterfront. He advised the membership of the resolution passed by the council at its earlier meeting and read the proposed letter. On a show of hands, the meeting decided unanimously to dispatch the letter. Two days later, in a memorandum reviewing the many attempts made by the Federation to reach an accommodation with the union, Martin advised the minister that gangs and members of gangs refusing to comply with management directives with regard to sling-loads and methods of work were being discharged, and that as of 22 November thirty gangs had been dismissed for cause and the employing companies were continuing to exercise their rights under the collective agreement as amended by Picard.37 Within three days, every single regular longshoreman had been fired and all activity in the Port of Montreal had come to a halt. The House of Commons met in an emergency session to debate the issue but little was accomplished; most of the session was taken up with the opposition using the dispute to political advantage. One member called the labour minister irresponsible and asked for his resignation.38 Another pointed out that the government repeatedly let troubles in Montreal reach the point of crisis before intervening and that it was no wonder separatism was on the rise in Quebec.39 Still another took the opportunity to say that the ports of Halifax and Saint John had been functioning under principles similar to those contained in the Picard Report for two years and that he could 'tell the world that if it wants stability, to send its goods to Halifax and Saint John.'40 Many members insisted that the present situation was a direct result of the government's ineptness in dealing with the 1966 strike and its enacting of Bill 0125, and that consequently it had an indisputable responsibility to act. Nicholson responded that there were no legal grounds for him to act since the parties were under the terms of a contract and not engaged in negotiations. All he could do was to name an arbitrator if both parties agreed, which was currently not the case. An embarrassing disagreement arose between the minister and his parliamentary secretary, Bryce Mackasey (soon to be minister of labour himself), when the latter declared that Picard had a moral obligation to clarify his report. Nicholson said that the union clearly disagreed with that solution. Mackasey bluntly replied: 'I do not care whether the unions accept it. Mr. Picard should make his report so clear that whether or not the unions accept it there would be no difference in the opinion of the parties as to what the report is all about. If the unions did not accept it then they would be failing the spirit of Bill 0125 and accepting a pay increase under false pretence ... Once these points are clarified, I think labour and management have an obligation to sit down together and thrash out their differences under the provisions of

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the bill/41 Nicholson reiterated that his hands were legally tied until the parties could agree on an acceptable course of action, and the debate came to a close without a solution in sight. Within days of management's concerted firing effort, the union obtained a temporary injunction ordering the Federation, among other things, to rehire the men, make the job-security payments that were due, and submit the issues of availability and sling-load limits to arbitration under the grievance procedures set out in the collective agreement. The ILA was ordered to dispatch extras as needed, which it did, at least for a while. The Federation filed the grievances but the parties remained unable to agree on an arbitrator. We insisted on Picard, and the union refused to accept him. Safety engineers were hired but only for one month. Following the injunction, work resumed on the waterfront but the underlying causes of the dispute still simmered. In fact, the injunction itself spawned new problems. Instead of filing grievances over interpretation, the union instructed its members to refuse to follow orders. When the employers exercised their only sanction, to dismiss the men, the union obtained another, temporary injunction preventing the implementation of the new agreement. In an odd twist, the court ordered the Federation to file grievances on the application of the new rules being challenged by the union. Unfortunately, the parties could not agree on an arbitrator and the matter dragged on to end of the year. Mulroney advised us that, with the expiration of the collective agreement, the injunction no longer had force. This was small consolation since we were still unable to apply the new rules, which would have allowed for an increase in productivity for which we had been paying increased wages for a year and a half. And so the matter rested until the spring of 1968. One other issue that exacerbated the stormy relationship between the parties was related to Picard's determination that amenities such as washrooms, showers, canteens, and benches be provided on the waterfront. This represented an important gain for workers but Picard did not say how such facilities were to be built, nor who was to pay for and manage them. At one of the early meetings between the parties when St-Onge enquired about these matters, Federation representatives said that it would be the responsibility of the NHB to provide and manage the facilities. In the context of the total antipathy between the parties, it is not surprising that they were unable to develop a joint approach to the NHB and StOnge took the Federation's response as a further indication of its disinterest in the welfare of the longshoremen. Results In his report, Picard was moderate in most areas and treaded carefully to ensure

The Picard Commission 87 that one party's gain did not become the other's loss. He tried to satisfy every party involved. 'The decision of the Commission/ he said, 'when compared to the demands of the various parties... [was to] grant each party the major part of what it asked for.'42 Bridging efficiency and equity could not but result in some type of middle-range solution. He explained: Each party must pay the price of [the ports maintaining their competitive position while offering maximum job security]. Employers will have to contribute to a job security fund and endure a partial rotation of the work gangs that will give rise to a certain number of problems. Longshoremen will have to accept a reduced basic gang and consent to the suppression of certain restrictive practices. It seems important to emphasize that if both parties wish to enjoy the benefits accruing from the rationalization of operations and the stabilization of the workforce in the three ports involved, they will have to surrender certain privileges which are related to an obsolete conception of longshoring.43

The commissioner did not have the luxury of resorting to simple answers. Determining the optimal magnitude of the innovations and making significant change without disturbing existing traditions too radically was an extremely difficult task. Drastic changes would have been hasty and impractical since such changes would necessitate considerable investment and administrative reorganization while it was still unclear what kind of benefits could be expected from what kind of change. In addition, in view of the terrible atmosphere reigning between the parties, highly sophisticated and complex changes would have been impossible to implement. For the system to work, both parties had to want to make it work. This implied giving each a portion of what they wanted most and linking the parties together in a tight relationship that would force each to take the other's concerns into consideration. As a whole, it appears that the commissioner did not count on much goodwill from management or labour. He attempted with praiseworthy care to design mechanisms that would be as objective as possible and devoid of discretionary latitude in favour of either party. Determination of the weekly-wage guarantee v/as to rely on precise figures, which were supposed to leave no room for argument. Moreover, besides agreeing with St-Onge's testimony concerning gang size, Picard indicated that he shared the union leader's preference for a preventive approach to manning. St-Onge had explained that, in some cases, four men in the hatch might not be enough, but extra men could always be supplemented at the request of the contractors should the need be felt. The fact that Picard used the criteria of 'some cases' to determine an acceptable minimum as opposed to 'most cases' reveals that he suspected the contractors would not of their own

88 Waterfront Blues volition supplement the men in a gang for safety reasons. Perhaps Picard preferred taking a chance at leaving residues of redundant manning rather than allowing what he considered might be dangerous working conditions to develop. And while Picard lifted sling-load restrictions, saying only that employers had to ensure that this caused 'no prejudice to safety norms/ he removed the safety issue from managerial discretion, handing it over instead to a joint safety committee. Picard's mistake, if it can be called a mistake, was to assume that the parties would be able to work out the systems necessary to carry out the changes called for in his report regarding rotation and job security. It would have been beyond Picard's mandate to prescribe the mechanics to manage the new system. Nevertheless, the absence of such details would soon be used by each party to stall the implementation of provisions they viewed as costly, undesirable, or unrealistic, which in turn would embitter relationships further and render implementation of the whole report even more difficult. The Picard commission was established and its report legislated by the government at management's insistence as a result of the parties' inability to negotiate change together. The lack of recognition of common interests between the parties fed the mistrust and animosity, which prevented them from reaching mutually satisfactory agreements since each refused to compromise on their positions. Their biggest problem was one of attitude and, unless their views of each other changed, whatever innovation might be introduced by a third party would not go far. Another important factor in the parties' inability to implement the report was the timing of its release. The report appeared only two months before the expiry of the 1966 agreement that it was to amend. If it had been issued in the spring or even the summer, as had been intended, the parties might have had the time to evaluate it without the pressure of pending negotiations bringing tensions to the boiling point, and it might have been easier for them to agree on implementation. The timing could hardly have been worse. On the one hand, the Federation was obsessed with the need to implement the report before the expiration of the collective agreement, whereas on the other the union was determined not to accept any changes that it had not negotiated. The proximity of negotiations tainted the parties' every move with strategic concerns. The historical context of antagonism combined with the prevailing context of strategic positioning explains why the stage was set for failure. Was the report still significant? The answer is yes. Though Picard had not provided a miracle solution, his report did mark a turning point in the history of the technological revolution on the waterfront. While the system he described would never be implemented in toto, its fundamental principles eventually would. The report stressed the necessity to give both equity and efficiency equal and central importance in the determination of the system of employment. It would take some time before the

The Picard Commission 89 parties could let go of their old ways and come to accept each other's interests as legitimate. But, with the principle of balance between technological change and job security spelled out, the parties found themselves one step closer to accepting it. The report broke down historical barriers with regard to cargo handling by emphasizing that gang size, sling-load limits, and other restrictive practices that had prevented management from taking full advantage of the revolution in cargo-handling methods should not be cast in stone. And it gave a clear message to the union that security of employment was a fair trade-off for accepting change. Management now had the incentive to modernize and mechanize the ports and the union had the incentive to negotiate seriously for the decasualization of the waterfront. The only question that remained was whether the parties were up to the task.

CHAPTER FOUR

After Picard

In August 1967, as the Picard hearings were nearing their end, the Federation took stock of its collective-bargaining agenda. There was a lot of planning to do. With the experience of the Picard commission still fresh in our minds, we now understood the need to have representatives from the independent stevedoring community on the Federation's Labour Committee and also to hire full-time Frenchspeaking staff and to create a separate labour-relations office. As a first step, the Federation appointed a new Labour Committee, whose members, besides myself, were Captain John Paul Martin, of Saquenay Shipping, as chairman; Mike Woodall of Furness Withy (replacing his boss, Peter Evans, who had served for several years); Fred McCaffrey, who was president of his own agency company and had served as chairman of the labour advisory committee that assisted me in the preparation of the Federation's case before Picard; two experienced stevedoring contractors, Norman Wolfe of Wolfe Stevedores and Marcel Pinsonneault of Brown and Ryan; and labour-relations officer Denis Pronovost. As the year-end approached, we turned our attention to the negotiation of a new agreement. On 13 December, Marcel Jette, the Federation's new executive director, advised us that St-Onge had asked to start negotiations and Jette had invited Local 375 to meet with us on 21 December. When the union delegation arrived, we were astounded that it consisted of representatives from each of the six St Lawrence River port locals and Gerard Tremblay, ILA Atlantic Coast District vice-president. Martin expressed his surprise since arrangements had been made between St-Onge and Jette for a meeting with only Local 375. Norman Quigley, president of the Trois-Rivieres local, said that monetary issues would be negotiated jointly but specific working conditions should be negotiated separately. Tremblay said that our view of individual local bargaining had been a dead issue for fifteen years and, on this point, the union had entered the room united. That was that. He turned to me and asked me to confirm that, in the past, negotiations with all the locals had been conducted at once. I confirmed that I had experi-

After Picard 91 enced such bargaining in 1966, but I then added my opinion that the practice had been both fruitless and frustrating. Tremblay reiterated that they had decided that Quebec locals constituted a bargaining unit and they would negotiate as such. St-Onge asked if we would seriously consider opposing the firm views of the ILA locals. Martin's response was clear: 'No negotiations will be conducted in the presence of all locals; however, Mr. Tremblay as A.C.D Vice-President was welcome to act as liaison between locals.' Disregarding Martin's statement, St-Onge asked if he could start the negotiations on behalf of Local 375. When Martin said no, the union delegation abruptly left.1 Later in the day, we decided that we would instruct Mulroney to serve notice of our request for conciliation. Also on that day, most likely as a retaliatory action, the union obtained a court order against the Federation and its members for contempt in connection with the injunction of 27 November, ordering us to appear before a judge on 8 January 1968. We had not yet filed our grievances as ordered by that injunction. The next day, the 22nd, with more than twenty ships in port, gangs of longshoremen began walking off at noon. By 6:00 P.M., work in the port was at a virtual standstill, and it would remain so until the first week of January. After the holiday, in a review of events presented to the Federation's Executive Council on 3 January, Martin said: A strike or lockout may well be inevitable between now and spring and we ask you to prepare for it right now. If you agree to prepare for it then you must also resolve to see it to the bitter end. Otherwise, neither this committee nor any other body will ever be successful in preserving the best of Picard for both employers and employees and return to management its right to manage its affairs without constant interference from either a leaderless Union or from irresponsible Union leaders.'2 In another memorandum, Martin presented a lengthy status report prepared by the Labour Committee. In it we wrote: 'The Federation will not be approaching the negotiating table as if it were afraid of the Union or as if it were obliged to give in to their every demand for increased wages or for better working conditions or again to bargain away some of our management rights and prerogatives... If to survive, if to remain competitive, we must have an all-out fight with the Union, then let's have it now and let's have it on our grounds, on our own terms, not on those determined by the Union.'3 At the same meeting, Mulroney gave his opinion that the injunction was no longer in effect owing to the ILA's failure to provide men over the Christmas and New Year's holiday. He also reported that the injunction hearing scheduled for 8 January had been postponed because of the illness of the judge. In the meantime, as planned, we instructed Mulroney to apply for conciliation at all river ports. Conciliation On 16 January, Charles Poirier was appointed conciliation officer, as he had been in

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every negotiation since 1963. Two days later, he held the first of four meetings with the officers of Local 375, ILA Atlantic coast vice-president Gerard Tremblay, and our Labour Committee, While these meetings achieved little, there were two developments that forever changed the face of negotiations at the river ports. For the first time, the main language of the negotiations was French, although no one objected when English was spoken; and, also for the first time, representatives of the stevedoring contractors were present and active participants. As Tremblay said, part way through the first morning, 'I am so happy to speak my own language for the first time in such negotiations.'4 With neither party having firm proposals to exchange, Poirier pointed out that we were to deal with the old collective agreement as amended by Picard. St-Onge, however, presented his plan for a two-shift system, the same plan that he had mentioned at the eleventh hour in May 1966 before the strike. I was the only one on the management side who had heard of his proposal, since I had been present throughout the previous negotiation. St-Onge was asked to explain. In essence, he was suggesting two shifts of straight time from 8 A.M. to 4 P.M. and 4 P.M. to midnight. His aim was to have two-thirds of the workforce working on days and one-third working on nights, or one-half and one-half if that was more suitable. He proposed a new wage rate factoring in the previous overtime rates, and he wanted extras to report in the same proportion as gangs. Premium rates would remain on weekends. In response to a question from Wolfe as to what would happen if all gangs were required at 8 A.M. to deal with the November rush, StOnge explained, naively, that under his system the fall rush would be eliminated since more ships could be worked in summer. There was also the problem, which St-Onge had not considered, of synchronization with other trades on the docks. Notwithstanding our scepticism, Martin said that we would study the proposal. Later that day, we spelled out our own proposals to implement Picard and add clauses dealing with, among other things, management rights and the parties' respective responsibilities. At the next meeting, on 31 January, we pointed out in response to St-Onge's plan that Picard had studied the two-shift system and had discarded it as impractical. While we would look at it again, we were not prepared to consider it for 1968. Martin suggested that we exchange written proposals. This was done and the parties met for the last time the next day. Although St-Onge gave us a paper describing his two-shift system, the union's proposed memorandum of agreement incorporated the most restrictive clauses of the old collective agreement with respect to such matters as gang size (twenty-two men), slingloads, and the 'stuffing and unstuffing' (trade parlance) of containers. Cherry picking from Picard, the union proposed a job-security plan of forty hours a week Monday to Friday, and it added eighteen paid days for sick leave, double and triple time for Saturday and Sunday, a large wage increase - the list went on and on.

After Picard 93 Martin rejected the union proposals out of hand, describing them as a complete negation of the Picard Report. As if on cue, Tremblay said that the same applied to our proposals and the ILA would not consider them. It was abundantly clear that the negotiations with Poirier as conciliator had run their course and the parties agreed to the appointment of a conciliation board. Poirier doubted that the minister would establish a board only for Local 375 and he wanted to conclude conciliation meetings with the locals in the other ports. This transpired over the next twelve days, during which all the locals made it plain that they had the same mandate as Local 375. Meetings had already been held with the checkers and shipliners at Montreal, and although they had expressed no interest in St-Onge's two-shift system, they were not inclined to make a deal on their own. Poirier submitted his report to the minister on 12 February, recommending the establishment of a conciliation board. After the Labour Committee submitted a pessimistic assessment of the situation in early January, the Federation advised its members to inform all shipowners who normally used St Lawrence River ports that labour might not be available at the opening of navigation and that they should protect themselves against the disastrous cost of an extended tie-up by providing for the utilization of other ports.5 The Federation's Executive Council held a series of meetings with various organizations vitally interested in the continued well-being of the ports, including the Shippers Council, the Canadian Exporters Association, the Canadian Importers Association, the Montreal Corn Exchange, and the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, so that all companies involved in import and export could be made aware of the dangers inherent in the situation and thus enabled to protect their individual interests insofar as possible. Meetings were also held with various local organizations such as the Montreal Port Council,6 the Chambre de Commerce de Montreal, and the Montreal Board of Trade. Labour Minister J.R. Nicholson acted quickly to establish the conciliation board, and the parties had appointed their representatives by 15 February: William Bake for the Federation, and QFL president Louis Laberge for the union. Predictably, they could not agree on a chairman and thus turned to Nicholson to decide for them. No one had much faith in the negotiation process. The city of Montreal had already signified that it would intervene in the most direct way should the situation become chaotic.7 The Labour Committee was counting the days to a strike and had calculated that, if each delay prescribed for each step of the conciliation procedure was taken in full, a legal strike could commence on i April.8 Into this impending chaos a new player emerged who was to have a lasting influence on the history of the St Lawrence River ports. Judge Alan B. Gold was appointed chairman of the conciliation board on 9 March 1968. He quickly real-

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ized that he had a lot on his hands, for positions had hardened to such a degree that the possibility of reaching a new collective agreement before the opening of the season in April was extremely remote. Moreover, a quick check of the horizon revealed that the storm was not confined solely to the negotiation chambers. Everywhere Gold looked, he saw tension that could not but handicap the negotiation process. One source of tension was the debate that raged between the Federation and the IASC regarding the funding of the job-security plan. In his report, Picard had stated that the job-security plan should be financed by way of an assessment on tonnage. He specifically wrote that 'each employing company '9 was to pay into the job-security fund the sum of fifteen cents per equivalent ton. Since Picard had used the word 'employers' throughout the introductory section of his report to refer to 'stevedoring contractors,' the Federation assumed that mention of 'employer or employing company' in the remainder of the report was a reference to the stevedoring contractors, whether house or independent. Accordingly, it was of the opinion that these companies were now responsible for the job-security fund and how they raised the money was up to them. Needless to say, the IASC objected strenuously to this interpretation and wanted no responsibility for a fund they had not negotiated. They argued that, because they were not part of the Federation or the bargaining process, they were not legally bound by the Picard Report. They had no intention of paying into a fund they did not administer and in any event were of the opinion that the charge should be assessed on ships rather than on tonnage.10 The question of responsibility for the funding of the job-security plan would remain a matter of debate until the formation of the Maritime Employers Association a few years later. In the interest of cooperation with the Federation, however, the IASC agreed to pay the charge on the understanding that this was an assessment against cargo which would be recovered by the Federation from owners, operators, and agents. Meanwhile, another inquiry covering the St Lawrence River ports was about to get under way. In his report to the minister of labour which gave rise to the Picard commission of inquiry, Judge Lippe had recommended the establishment of a second inquiry dealing with labour unrest. The creation of this inquiry had been delayed by the minister to avoid a potential conflict with the Picard hearings. Now that Picard had finished his work, Nicholson announced the appointment of Judge Arthur Smith to head a commission of inquiry into 'certain causes of labour unrest existing' at the river ports.11 The problem of theft and pilferage had been a long-standing concern of the Federation as well as of other constituencies that had business interests in the port. Several studies had already been commissioned and recommendations produced but little had been done. One report had been commissioned by the

After Picard 95 Montreal Port Council in 1966, and its author, Jules Deschenes, was about to submit his findings. During the 1966 strike, the Federation had been of the view that labour unrest was caused by union activity, and so it began lobbying the minister of labour to establish an inquiry into the ILA along the lines of the Morris commission, which had resulted in Hal Banks's SIU being placed under trusteeship. The Federation expected that the terms of reference of the Smith commission would be as broad, but in this it was profoundly disappointed: the commission's mandate specifically excluded inquiry into 'normal trade union activities.'12 Federation President Bill Eakin said in his last annual address that, 'although the problems which prompted our request for this Commission still persist, the delay of almost two years involved in its appointment and the restriction imposed by the terms of reference leaves me with considerable doubt concerning its efficacity as an instrument to uncover and cure the causes of waterfront unrest.'13 The Federation more or less lost interest in the commission although it decided unenthusiastically to present a brief nonetheless.14 Some of us, myself included, never looked at the Smith commission for a solution to our labour problems since we had come to the conclusion that these problems could be resolved only through a strong employers' association and dialogue with the union. Unfortunately, the IASC was to use the platform of the Smith commission to argue for an employers' association made up only of the direct employers of waterfront labour, thereby opening a new wound in management relations. It was into the middle of such controversies - between management and labour and within the ranks of management itself - that Judge Gold landed. The Gold Cure By 1967, Alan B. Gold was one of the country's leading jurists, with a solid reputation for expertise in labour relations. Appointed a district judge in 1961, at the age of forty-four, he was elevated to the Quebec Provincial Court as associate chief justice in 1965 and shortly afterwards was made the first vice-chairman of the Quebec Labour Relations Board. Though he knew little about what was actually going on in the province's ports, anyone living in Quebec at the time and involved in labour relations knew that serious problems existed there. In his own words, 'the situation was rotten.'15 When the federal government asked for Gold's services in resolving the troubles at the Port of Montreal, it briefed him on the situation and told him that nobody expected a miracle, that a strike was likely inevitable, and that the conciliation board was a necessary delaying operation. 'So I was sort of sent as a sacrificial lamb/ Gold said years later, but 'at least the parties gave me a good board.' Gold had known Louis Laberge for many years. Laberge had appeared

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before Gold as a union representative when Gold was vice-chairman of the Quebec Labour Relations Board in 1961. 'He thought that I was a pretty straight shooter and I thought that he could be helpful' in the longshoremen's dispute, Gold said.16 Gold did not know Baker but respected him as an experienced human-resources executive, though one with no knowledge of shipping and no real influence over management. Gold also knew the lawyers involved. Cutler, before entering the legal profession, had become familiar with Gold through the trade union movement, and when he decided that he wanted a career in the law, he asked Gold, by then a senior lawyer, for advice. Years later, by coincidence, Gold would mark his bar examination. Once in practice, Cutler joined Gold on some cases. They respected each other. Gold also trusted Cutler, but only to a point. 'I was always a little cautious in accepting what Phil said to me/ Gold said.17 On the other side, Gold knew Renault much better; in fact, they were old friends. Although by now Mulroney was head of the Federation's legal team, Renault, as senior partner, had remained familiar with the case. On the appointment of Gold as chairman of the conciliation board, Renault, in Mulroney's absence, attended a special meeting of our Labour Committee and briefed us on Gold and advised us on strategy for the hearings. This was not necessary, however, because Gold had other plans. Having noted that the Canada Labour Code had a provision that allowed the parties, if they so wished, to convert the conciliation board into an arbitration board, he called the members of his board together and said, 'Do you think there is any chance of getting them [the parties] to agree to arbitration because it is obvious that if we just go through hearings, there will be a strike.' Baker did not think that voluntary arbitration was possible; Laberge said that he did not know one way or the other. In the end, however, they agreed that Gold could float the idea with the lawyers. Surprisingly, given the labour movement's objection to binding arbitration, Cutler was optimistic while Renault said that he would speak with the Federation.18 Mulroney then discussed the idea with us. The Federation's objective was to get Picard's findings implemented; we were not keen to arbitrate his report, which itself was an arbitration, but, that said, we could not avoid the reality that the ILA and the Federation had serious disagreements over the interpretation of some of the report's provisions. We also met with Bryce Mackasey, then minister without portfolio but soon to become the minister of labour (July 1968), succeeding Nicholson. Mackasey, who would be at the eye of the next storm, urged us to have an open mind. If we refused Gold's suggestion and went through the usual motions, there would surely be a costly strike and quite possibly back-to-work legislation that would provide for compulsory arbitration - a prospect that neither the Federa-

After Picard 97 tion nor the IASC relished. The union, for its part, had every reason to look favourably upon Gold's proposal, since it offered the possibility of reinterpreting the Picard Report, and the collective agreement that incorporated the report's provisions, in a manner more to its liking. The result was that, within a short period of time, and after adjustments to accommodate requests by both union and management, Gold had succeeded in extracting a coherent, reasonable mandate. By late March, an agreement on how to proceed was in place. Discussions between Gold and the lawyers had resulted in a novel idea which was accepted by the Federation - although not by all members of the Labour Committee (the dissenters being Fred McCaffrey and John Paul Martin) - and which received the support of the union. The collective agreement, as amended by the Picard Report, would be extended for a year, until 31 December 1968, and the conciliation board would render preliminary but binding decisions on the outstanding issues, including wages and other monetary items. After rendering these decisions, the board would continue to sit as a conciliation board until 31 March 1969. The purpose of the three-month delay between the expiration of the agreement and the end of the board's term was to allow time for the board to assist the parties in the negotiation of the next collective agreement. Furthermore, the parties agreed that, during the whole period from the signing of the agreement to 31 March 1969, there would be no strike, work stoppage, or lockout and the board would rule upon all disputes arising from the interpretation and/or application of the agreement. In other words, a normal grievance regime would be in place for the duration of the agreement, with the board acting as mediator and arbitrator. The preliminary issues to be arbitrated, left over from the aborted attempt at implementing the Picard Report in December 1967, included calls and recalls (responsibility for dispatching), sling-loads, the number of work gangs, and the number of hours in a normal work week (having to do with job security). This thorough clarification of the parties' respective rights and responsibilities, it was hoped, would provide a solid base for negotiations in 1969. The ILA agreed to suspend all court proceedings against the Federation, and Judge Gold forcefully warned the parties to keep away from the media. The problems had to be solved, he said, not theatrically exposed under public spotlights. The truce was a welcome relief to both management and labour, each of whom now saw its glass as half full: gang size was reduced, since the union had accepted the principle of smaller gangs; and job security was in place, since the employer had agreed to pay a weekly guarantee over the duration of the navigation season. In retrospect, it may appear surprising that the parties, fully ready for a showdown, would have agreed to hang up their swords temporarily. Paradoxically, it was the intensity of the fight that led them to agree to a truce. Management and

98 Waterfront Blues labour had exhausted themselves in the prior rounds. The release of the Picard Report so close to the expiration of the collective agreement had forced the parties to push ahead with change too quickly and their respective demands were not well thought out. Like boxers leaning against one another to catch their breath, amidst a particularly brutal match, they had to provide themselves with a break before being able to continue. This was a key phase in the process of change, since it gave the parties an opportunity not only to calm down but also to learn to deal with each other in a more orderly fashion and to practise the art of dispute resolution. Though in practice nothing had yet changed on the docks, the agreement was a remarkable and unexpected achievement. It was almost inconceivable that the parties would agree to binding arbitration when that very thing - in the form of the Picard commission - had led to an unprecedented and sustained level of animosity between them. The new forum, however, was different. Both parties had agreed on the issues to be arbitrated and both were represented on the board. The latter's mandate was framed not only in terms of issues to be resolved but also within a specific time period: for a whole year, the parties could breathe a little easier without fearing a low blow that could come in any shape at any time, since disputes would be adjudicated by the same board. Most important, they had both been asked if this solution was acceptable and under what conditions. Spring was in the air. Would 1968 go down in the docks' history as the year a breakthrough was achieved? It was too soon to tell, but the months ahead suddenly seemed full of potential. Getting to Work The conciliation board lost no time in beginning its work, but it knew that it had to tread carefully. While its immediate concern may have been to make fair rulings on preliminary issues arising directly from the Picard Report, its ultimate goal was to help the parties reach a collective agreement, if only a year later. Its role would change to that of an active conciliator/mediator in the negotiations, for which the judge would need the parties' trust. On the one hand, having a full year to develop a relationship with the parties gave the board an advantage that earlier conciliators had not enjoyed; on the other, the board's decisions were bound to displease one or other of the parties and this might make it difficult to gain the confidence of both. But the board had ingenuity on its side. Of the preliminary issues to be decided, six were monetary and four related to interpretation and/or application of the labour agreement as amended by the Picard Report. At the board's first sitting, it was obvious that several issues remained a source of disagreement between the parties' representatives. Ordinarily,

After Picard 99 the chairman of the board would simply side with one representative and officially file the other's dissent. But Laberge realized that a dissenting decision would not distinguish the board as a reliable entity but would rather make the process seem like a simple mirror of the parties' disagreements. If only for symbolic reasons, a unanimous decision would have a much more significant and favourable impact on the parties' attitudes. Laberge shared his thoughts with Gold and Baker, who were quick to see the merit of his reasoning. Thus, the board decided to hand down a decision that would cover only the issues on which its three members were in agreement, stating that more time would be needed to study the complex remaining points. It seemed like a miracle: the first decision of the board was unanimous. 'We came out smelling like roses/ Judge Gold would later recall with a grin. When grievances were filed, and there were many, Gold's approach was radically different from that of a traditional arbitrator. He was not afraid of actively intervening with creative solutions, nor was he afraid to ruffle the parties' feathers. Throughout the process, he kept the threat of trusteeship very much alive as a way of forcing both parties to 'play ball' with each other: 'It scared the living daylights out of everybody,' he would say. 'I don't know whether the threat was real or merely my imagination but it worked. I kept that hanging over their heads all the time. I said: "Look, you got me. You trust me. And I will help you. But goddamn it, if I get fed up or if you betray me, I am leaving and if I leave, chum, you are not gonna go back to the good old days. The good old days are the bad old days. You are gonna have a dock board and you are just gonna tow the line." So they listened to me.' Gold wanted to change things. As he became increasingly familiar with the port's situation, he was upset by conditions and practices which he perceived as dating from the eighteenth century. T was shocked by that, distressed by it and I was unhappy with it and I told that not only to the union but to management.' While the judge found that the union often acted in an unreasonable manner, he believed that its conduct was largely caused by management's attitude. The cycle had to be broken. Gold recalled telling the union: 'Look, if you do things right, you'll end up with a trade. Call it a profession even. You'll get a decent pension fund, a decent salary, safety precautions, but for that, you have to give up all these stupid featherbedding practices, these "Don't get your shirts wet," all these things that you're doing wrong.'19 The longshoremen lent an attentive ear; they glimpsed the prospect of a better life in Gold's appeal. St-Onge, who detected in the judge a faint hint of the missionary zeal that he possessed himself, was willing to give Gold a chance. Judge Gold came to believe that the contract language was not the major problem and that a real solution would not be limited to clarifying wording; a

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significant part of his work would be to get the parties to learn how to talk with each other. He also realized that the parties had to learn to exercise responsible leadership over their respective members. Both the union and management had to understand that it was crucial that they convince their members to abide by the agreements and that they sanction delinquents, instead of using them as an excuse to say that the situation - whatever it was at the time - was out of their hands. Gold put the matter bluntly: 'If you have no self-discipline, you will have to put up with mine.'20 His approach was unorthodox. His rulings were often excessively brief, repeating in a sentence the position of the party that had won the support of the majority of the board. In some cases - for example, the sling-load dispute - a decision was brought back to arbitration again as though one of the parties was asking, 'Are you really sure?' Invariably, the judge patiently reiterated his first ruling; 'Yes, I am sure.'21 Gold relentlessly repeated to the ILA and the Federation that they had to obey the contract even though they did not like it. Not liking it was beside the point. If they did not like it, they would have to live with it until they could renegotiate it. In the meantime, they were bound by the existing provisions. He told the parties to talk things through and he acted as a catalyst to help develop a working relationship between Pronovost and St-Onge. On six or seven occasions, Gold sat alone at the request of the parties. He held many 'quick and dirty' grievance hearings, sitting alone at the request of the parties, with the understanding that his oral decisions as mediator would be binding on both parties. In one of these decisions he fined the captain of a ship $5,000, which he clearly did not have the authority to do, for having used his own crew to perform longshoremen's work, and the parties respected the order. When the parties had radically different interpretations and came running to Gold, he sometimes turned them away and told them to talk about it first. In one case, faced with a disagreement regarding the distribution of gangs in the port, Gold actually ordered the parties to negotiate. His ruling read: 'I order and direct Denis Pronovost and Jean-Marc St-Onge to meet and decide jointly. Any such decision taken jointly shall be binding on all parties and have the binding force as a decision by the undersigned.'22 Such a declaration, like a fatherly benediction, held mostly symbolic value but it was also a fine strategic move on the judge's part. Though Gold's mandate, which he was concerned not to overstep, consisted solely of interpreting disputes arising out of the collective agreement as amended by Picard, he had a secondary goal: namely, to make the parties aware that managing the collective agreement was their privilege and responsibility, not his and certainly not the government's. He used his decisive power to hand back to the parties the responsibility that they had historically dumped on others. At his request, the parties agreed to write out their disputes in the form of questions,

After Picard 101 which, from time to time, he would answer only with a yes or a no; for example, in such and such a case, are the employers allowed to do this or that? This methodology forced the parties to understand more fully their complaints and had the merit of expediting proceedings considerably. Gold's methods were not equally appreciated by all. Some management representatives felt that he gave in to the union much too often in order to avoid being written off by them. Others whispered that his expeditious verbal awards, which did nothing to clarify the contract in the long run, must have been lucrative for the judge since he would bill for his services by the half-day or by the day. One charged that the judge was completely amoral, that all he cared about was to get the parties to agree on something, anything. True enough, if the parties agreed, Gold readily admitted that he did not care much about what they agreed on: 'My philosophy has always been in this business I don't care what the parties agree on as long as it is legal. If that is what they agree on, then that is their business. I am not in the business of telling people how to run a port.' It is also true that Judge Gold did not think principles had anything to do with industrial relations: 'Anybody who has dealt with me no longer says to me "Judge Gold, this is a matter of principles," you know, because I tell them the same thing I tell anybody: "Yeah, how much is it gonna cost?"... Because there are no principles in labour relations.'23 Gold voiced his opinions quite liberally, which did not win him everyone's affection, but on the whole he seemed well respected. For a while, the union idolized him. Cutler told Gold that he was the only non-union person who could walk the docks safely at night because dockworkers would protect him. Longshoremen came to call him 'the father of the longshoremen' and asked if they could have his portrait done so they could hang it on the wall of the ILA Montreal office. Detecting at once the shadow of dependency, the judge suggested instead that they provide a scholarship to the daughter or son of a longshoreman. As much as he wanted to do something for the longshoremen as members of a trade too often scorned, he did not want to be their father. He was just doing his job as a labour-relations specialist in preparing the field for the next negotiations. He wanted the parties to come to an agreement in 1969. Hearings began in April 1968 to resolve the agreed-upon preliminary issues that had been awaiting clarification since December 1967, together with the monetary issues. The board dealt expeditiously and unanimously with calls and recalls, dispatch, equalization of work, and rotation. On the matter of sling-loads, the union argued that it was the responsibility of both parties to reach an agreement on ways of determining the weight in accordance with the criteria of safety and efficiency, while the Federation contended that it had the right to establish the sling-load unilaterally as long as the criteria were applied reasonably. The board

102 Waterfront Blues ruled (Laberge dissenting) that the determination of sling-loads was the exclusive privilege of the employer subject to the criteria of safety and efficiency spelled out by Picard. With regard to job security, the board ruled (again Laberge dissenting) that the weekly guarantee was tied to a productivity index, as the Federation had contended, and for 1968 it was thirty-five hours per week and not, as claimed by the union, forty hours. On the subject of the wage rate for 1968, the longshoremen were granted (Baker dissenting) an increase of 9 per cent fully retroactive to i January 1968. The board would dispose of hundreds of grievances during the year: between March 1968 and April 1969, it held no sessions, of which 20 were devoted to arbitration decisions. But written rules were not easy to translate into practice. As Judge Gold would say: 'It is hard to change the mentality of the people and you know it is hard to change habits. You cannot, by writing an agreement or by putting papers down, change the way people think or change the way people act.'2* Towards Employer Unity: Opening Moves Along with the question of attitude, important functional problems impaired the implementation of change. Each of the three parties - the union, the Federation, and the IASC - had different views about the changes designed by Picard and interpreted by Gold's conciliation board. These divisions were as deep within management's ranks as they were between management and labour. As exemplified by uneven application of collective agreements or John Greene's intervention before Picard, the lack of managerial unity had long caused serious trouble. Yet there might have been insufficient incentive for organizational change had not the Picard Report made it virtually impossible to maintain the status quo. Differences of opinion between the Shipping Federation and the IASC over the Picard commission's recommendations concerning the job-security fund, dispatch, rotation, and equalization of earnings made the creation of a new, more unified management structure a matter of urgency. The Canada Labour Standards Code, now part of the Canada Labour Code, also caused concern. Parts of the code were ill-conceived for the longshoring industry, especially those relating to vacations and maximum hours of work, and presented great administrative difficulties. They also could produce inequitable results in view of the multiple-employer arrangement existing in the industry. This arrange ment made it impossible for a number of employees to meet the code's eligibility requirements, that is, employment by one employer during at least fifteen days in the thirty days preceding any general holiday.25 The government's recognition of these difficulties had led it to pass an order-in-council in December 1966 to cover

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employees in 'multi-employer employment.' The regulations empowered the minister of labour to designate any association of employers as a multi-employer unit provided some conditions were met. These included the setting up and administration of a central pay office to record employment data and the paying of wages by the association on behalf of its members to the said employees.26 Until the longshoring industry met these criteria and became a multipleemployer unit, 3 per cent of wages per man-hour worked was to be paid to all workers in lieu of general holidays. The need for a central pay office was even more acute as a consequence of the establishment of the job-security plan and the equalization of earnings, which required accurate record keeping and increased the number of cheques each employer had to issue. Reorganizing management into a multiple-employer unit was a clear necessity. On 12 December 1967, in the midst of great labour turmoil and with less than two weeks to go before the expiry of the collective agreement, the Labour Committee, acting on my initiative, proposed to the Federation's Executive Council the immediate establishment of a committee to study the feasibility of setting up an employers' association at eastern Canadian ports. The model we had in mind was the British Columbia Maritime Employers Association, which included representatives of shipowners, operators, agents, and stevedoring contractors. The Labour Committee felt that such an association was required as soon as possible, not least of all because the volume of work generated by the Picard Report and the Gold conciliation board was proving too great for the volunteer members of the committee. A permanent staff was desperately needed. We also stressed that the stevedoring contractors, as the direct employers of labour, had to be part of any new association. The IASC was receptive to the idea of direct involvement in labour relations and declared itself willing to discuss seriously with the Federation the creation of such an association in the near future. In order to explore the feasibility of establishing an employers' association, the Executive Council of the Federation immediately appointed Mel Angus, Peter Evans, and me, together with our executive director, Marcel Jette, to serve on a joint committee with IASC representatives. The next day, the IASC appointed its president, Henry Belle, along with Bill Brown, Ken Monks, and Henry Cullen. Although the committee would start meeting soon, it would be almost a year before an official agreement was reached. Both groups knew that coming to an agreement would be difficult. Right from the beginning, many factors interfered with the process and made discussions tense. Not everyone was in favour of an association. In a multi-employer unit the interest of the majority takes precedence and the largest employer generally stands to lose the most. Several contractors were reluctant to give up their independence. Some thought that belonging to an employers' association was

104 Waterfront Blues too much of a responsibility and that the Federation might as well continue to deal with labour since the contractors could in any event pass on the costs to shipowners.27 Some contractors were fed up with being told what to do by people 'who didn't know what they were doing' and were in favour of establishing an association without the involvement of the Federation.28 There was considerable scepticism among the contractors regarding the Federation's motives for wanting a new association and many were 'doubtful about the voting powers' they suspected the Federation would want.29 Within the Federation, similarly, there was considerable concern regarding the amount of influence to be given the stevedoring contractors. Although some trust had developed between the Federation and the IASC, an element of ill will remained as a result of Greene's testimony before the Picard commission. Greene's intervention, indeed, was not far from the minds of the members of the joint committee as they began to wrestle with the question of a new association and how and by whom it was to be controlled. The discussions were further complicated by opposing views concerning the establishment of a central pay office to keep records and support the administration of payroll and other benefits. The idea of a central pay office had first been suggested to the Federation in the spring of 1966 by the Quebec Department of Revenue and by Revenue Canada following employer overpayments to the Quebec and Canada pension plans. A committee composed of representatives of both the Federation and the IASC had studied the idea and recommended in a report dated 3 February 1967 that such an office be established. Longshoremen had signified that they were in favour since they found it irritating having to collect weekly paycheques from each company that had employed them during the week. Yet, two months later, IASC President Henry Belle had written to the Federation stating that his association could not see sufficient advantage in the establishment of a central pay office. The Federation suspected this reversal to be due to the influence of Greene. Belle was a vice-president of Greene's ECS and the company already had an operational data-processing centre equipped with computers. Greene probably did not want to invest in another organization with the same purpose. He was willing to make his facilities available to other employers but not to turn them over to the Federation, nor to participate in any new association where the Federation would have control.30 Since most contractors were reluctant to give the Federation access to the necessary data, it was easy for Belle to rally support from other IASC members. The Federation persisted in trying to appeal to the stevedores' 'common sense' and tabled a report which estimated that there would have been savings of about $350,000 had a central pay office been in operation for the eighteen months between i July 1965 and 15 December 1966. Nevertheless, the IASC refused to cooperate in the establishment of a central pay office that would be administered by the Federation.

After Picard 105 The lack of support from the IASC contributed to the unease felt by the Federation members as negotiations began for the establishment of an employers' association. The joint lASC/Federation committee began meeting in January 1968, and it soon became apparent that many areas of disagreement remained. Recognizing that centralization was a necessity was not in itself sufficient for each group to be willing to compromise. While there was consensus that the board should consist of representatives of both the Federation and the IASC, heated arguments remained over the issues of control, membership, and financing. Indeed, there were almost as many conceptual models of what the organization should look like as there were persons discussing the subject at any time. Not surprisingly, the issue of who would control the new association rapidly became the main focus of discussions. The Federation put forward a position in early February that called for an association in which each employing company (independent stevedoring contractors and house stevedores) would be eligible for membership, while the Federation itself would be a member as a constituent body (represented by one person with only one vote). The association's affairs would be run by a board of directors composed of four representatives of the general membership (consisting of the stevedoring contractors and the Federation), one of whom would be a house stevedore (owned by a member of the Federation) and the other three independent stevedoring contractors, and three representatives appointed by the Federation. Day-to-day relations with the union, including negotiations, the handling of grievances, and the administration of the collective agreements, would be the function of a permanent staff reporting to the board of directors. This proposal reflected the Federation's desire to maintain control of the board. The IASC had concerns about this proposal not only because the Federation would continue to control the decision-making apparatus but also because it interpreted Federation constituent membership to mean that its board appointees would be obligated to take instructions from the Federation. Discussion yielded the unanimous conclusion that, for the association to be effective and useful, the directors needed full authority to make decisions that would bind all members of the association, as well as members of the Federation, without having to refer to their constituencies. Functioning otherwise would simply be creating a new forum for clashes along party lines. The committee did not meet again until i April when the IASC indicated that it did not wish to have a majority on the board but rather wanted a veto over the board's decisions. There was an obvious inconsistency here. During discussions it became clear that the stevedores' concerns were mostly related to the question of how the new association was to be financed. The IASC was of the opinion that assessments should be levied against cargo - a stand that, in my view, derived

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from the highly competitive market in which the stevedoring contractors found themselves: the contractors, I thought, were opposed to an assessment based upon a percentage of payroll since this might result in price cutting by any of the contractors who might decide to absorb the charges. I had not drawn this conclusion out of thin air, for I had attended most of the meetings of the joint committee, and those meetings had left little doubt in my mind about the lASC's concerns. As it was, stevedoring contracts at Montreal changed with some frequency until the early 19705, when Montreal adopted terminal operations and the stevedoring contractors became terminal operators. On the other important issues, all members of the joint committee agreed that a professional staff should be employed to negotiate and administer the contracts and that this staff would report to the board, the members of which would be expected to act without reference to their constituencies. What was still not clear was the size and make-up of the board. At the next meeting of the committee on 10 April, we discussed, for the first time, how best to deal with a delinquent shipowner refusing to pay his assessment or a stevedoring contractor acting in contravention of the collective agreement. This discussion reflected our realistic view that, in adapting to a multi-employer unit which operated with a common labour pool, the interests of the individual members might not always be the same, and that, in our dealings with labour, it would be essential to speak with one voice and to follow the directions of the majority decision. In fact, some years later the MEA would be required to deal with a member whose actions were found to be inimical to its interests. Progress towards the establishment of the new association now moved rapidly. On 14 May the Federation, upon the unanimous recommendation of the joint committee, agreed to the creation of a labour-administration fund, through a levy of five cents per equivalent ton of cargo handled, to pay for the administration of the job-security program and the hiring of additional permanent staff. Furthermore, in the interests of compromise and with a view to the early establishment of the association, the Federation also accepted our recommendation, subject to examination of the by-laws, to accept a minority position on the board. Jim Thorn, Peter Evans, and I were then appointed to a new joint committee with the IASC which would proceed with the creation of the association on the basis agreed upon.31 The first phase of the long and often times bitter struggle to create the employers' association was now at an end, or so we thought. After some four months of formal discussions between shipowners, agents, house stevedores, and independent stevedoring contractors operating in eastern Canada, a formal decision had been taken by the two organizations representing all the players on the management team to establish an employers' association to deal with shore labour at the relevant ports. As it turned out, however, events were already taking

After Picard 107 place that would short-circuit the agreement between the IASC and the Federation and force another change in the structure of the new association. Conflict The job-security fund was in trouble, for a few reasons. Assessment income was reduced because tonnage levels were down and because expenses had increased as the fund was used in ways that it should not have been - for legal expenses, dispatch operations, and payments to some longshoremen who should have been called to work instead of others. There was also a delay in the collection of assessments, which affected the cash flow. Unless something was done, the fund would be dry within two weeks. When the Federation's Executive Council met on 28 May to find ways to deal with the problem, we learned that the stevedoring contractors, frustrated by the inefficiency of the dispatch system, were obtaining extras and fill-ins through la seine and from the union hall rather than by calling men at home.32 This created a drain on the job-security fund since the guarantee had to be paid out to the longshoremen at home who should have been doing the work performed by the men recruited from the docks. The Federation ordered the stevedoring contractors to stop the practice immediately, but the stevedores did not share our view of the problem and were not willing to cooperate. The Federation met the shortfall in the fund through a bank loan of $40,000 for the week of 22 May. And then, on 28 May, each member of the Executive Council advanced $2,000 to keep the fund afloat without any guarantee that the sums could ever be recovered.33 By 31 May, the fund had run dry. In the midst of this financial crisis, disagreements among management interests were quick to resurface. It had become obvious that there existed serious differences of opinion between the stevedoring contractors and the Federation regarding the source of the drain. The owners and agents believed that the problem lay with the application of the new contractual provisions, while the contractors believed that it lay with the provisions themselves. The latter argued that the weekly guarantee designed by Picard was simply not viable because too many men were covered by it. Declining tonnage levels and more efficient cargohandling equipment required fewer men. The reliance on la seine and the union hall was largely due to high rates of absenteeism which left the companies in need of replacements at the last minute, a situation that the current transitory dispatch procedures were completely unable to address efficiently. The stevedoring contractors alleged that the high absenteeism was a direct result of the longshoremen's profound dissatisfaction with the rotation scheme, a feeling that the contractors themselves shared. Longshoremen lost lucrative overtime to gangs that had not yet worked their quota, and some resented the arrangement whereby extras and

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fill-ins could sit at home and be paid a guarantee without working. Norman Wolfe, one of the contractors, proposed reducing the number of idle men by raising the job-security eligibility criteria from the 550 hours determined by Picard to 1,000 hours and by changing the guarantee from a weekly to a seasonal one.34 This was a difficult thing to accomplish in the middle of a contract year. Some of the stevedores' arguments made sense and deserved study. Labour Committee Chairman John Paul Martin submitted a report to the Executive Council on 4 June. His conclusion was that, based on the comparison between the number of hours worked through the month of May and the number of eligible men, the fund should have been sufficient. The fault clearly lay with the application mechanisms of the rotation scheme. Each of the ninety-six regular gangs had effectively worked their thirty-five guaranteed hours and thus had not cost the fund a single penny. On the other hand, none of the eligible extras had worked the guaranteed number of hours. In sum, the drain on the fund originated from the failure to provide the eligible extras with available work, which was being given instead to men recruited from la seine or the union hall. The solution was crystal clear: the extras had to be effectively rotated and dispatched in a manner that would also provide for last-minute replacements. Since dispatch procedures were obviously faulty, the Executive Council, over the objections of the contractors, gave the Labour Committee three weeks to institute improvements to the job-security system, during which time the Federation would keep the fund liquid by providing the moneys in excess of the fifteen cents per ton necessary to meet the payments. The improvements were to be based on the classification of the workforce, the establishment of an accurate list of men entitled to job security, and, most important, stricter gang rotation and the establishment of a dispatch centre that would allocate extras and eliminate the problem of redundant wage payments created by the use of la seine as a source for extras and fill-ins. It was suggested that such a hall for extras could be in operation as early as the following Monday by using the Catholic Sailors' Club as the headquarters of the operation.35 The union, well informed about the state of the fund, had agreed to cooperate fully.36 It was clear to all concerned that a stricter rotation scheme meant the end of the already weakened parent-gang system. Although the stevedoring contractors hated the idea, the choice between parent gangs and weekly job security was an easy one for longshoremen. They preferred the weekly guarantee. In an unexpected twist, the Federation and the union thus found themselves allies of sorts in a plan to salvage the weekly guarantee. It worked this way. The Federation set up a dispatch system using tape recorders hooked on a series of telephones (code-a-phones). Longshoremen would cal in the evening to receive assignments for the next day depending upon the work

After Picard 109 available. Gangs would be assigned by the name of the foremen to worksites and individual longshoremen would be assigned either as extras to join specific gangs or as fill-ins to report to the dispatch hall in the morning. Longshoremen reporting to the dispatch hall might be dispatched asfill-insto replace men absent from the gangs. The roster of gangs was established by the Federation based upon relative earnings between the gangs and the relationship to the weekly guarantee. The actual dispatchers would be appointed by the union. One of these was Adrien Tremblay, a vice-president of Local 375 who would one day replace St-Ong as president. The stevedoring contractors were profoundly unhappy since they still believed that gangs attached to a particular company were more productive, that la seine was the most efficient way to get extras without delay, and that the best solution was to shift to a seasonal guarantee. They were probably right and the Federation might have abandoned the scheme except that most of us who had to make the tough decisions did not want to risk losing the broader benefits to be gained from the Picard Report. The fragile harmony that had been reached during prior months was threatened once again because of financial difficulties and managerial divisions. The relationship between the LASC and the Federation was further shaken by another intervention by John Greene of ECS. Greene was unwilling to change a system which had allowed him to build the largest and most profitable stevedoring company in Montreal. On 11 June he wrote a biting letter to the Federation i which he claimed that the 'Port rotation of gangs is economic suicide ... surely a worker has the right to select his employer as well as the employer has the right to select his employee. Rotation eliminates incentive and eliminates proper employer/employee relationship, results in lowering the efficiency of the most capable gangs to that of the least.' While conceding that 'the Wage Guarantee Plan directed by the Picard Report is unorthodox, expensive, impractical,' he argued that 'to endeavour to alleviate this situation by application of a further inefficient plan [rotation on top of the weekly guarantee] is only adding to the owner's cost and will ultimately lead to tonnage starvation in the Port of Montreal.'37 In my view, Greene's attack on the port rotation of gangs was driven by his concern that the system which had allowed him, through his entrepreneurial skills, to establish ECS as the largest stevedoring company in Montreal was now being changed; restrictions were being imposed upon his method of operations and his profits were going to be reduced in the process. He either did not want or could not play by the new rules and, as it happened, he would sell his company within two years. Greene's letter was followed by another, from the IASC, urging that steps be taken 'to protect the future of conventional cargo handling.' We doubted that stevedoring contractors realistically believed that conventional cargo handling

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had any future whatsoever and suspected that they merely sought short-term relief from the difficulties created by the new collective agreement. Whatever the reasons for their attitude, the interventions by Greene and the IASC caused Martin to reverse his stand regarding the composition of the board of directors of the proposed employers' association. Martin was spending all his time with Pronovost either in negotiations with the union or at meetings of the Labour Committee, on which sat two members of the IASC. The fact that ECS and the IASC had both chosen not to speak through thei representatives on the Labour Committee led Martin to suspect that stevedoring representatives on the board of directors of any new employers' association would not play a constructive role. The IASC had no staff whatsoever and hardly any resources that would allow it to design new systems or propose coherent reforms, and Martin resented that the contractors seemed to do little more than complain about what they did not like. He decided that their presence was more trouble than it was worth and wrote an internal memorandum strongly recommending that the Federation retain control of labour relations by providing itself with a staff to carry on the job without the benefit of advice from the contractors. He also scorned Greene's allegation that there ever had been productive employer-employee relationships in the old system: 'I would like Mr. Greene to tell me when the employers in this port bothered about the right to select their employees.' Martin remarked that, through 1966 and 1967, the companies had full control over gangs which worked only for their parent companies, yet, as revealed by the Picard commission, productivity between those two years had dropped by 24 per cent. 'Where were all the noble sentiments during those years?' he asked. Martin's memorandum also contained some proposals for the next round of negotiations, ideas that seemed radically different from the approach being taken by the Federation: '[The Federation's staff] must prepare itself for the forthcoming negotiations by looking at systems such as the two-shift system so often recommended by the Union... there must be willingness on the part of Management to increase its labour cost by establishing greater pension, welfare and retirement benefits, to accept possible loss of man hours due to modernization and make the industry more effective on a permanent basis with regard to workers.'38 These ideas seemed so union-friendly that the Federation was unsure of what to make of them, or of Martin himself. Indeed, the objectivity of both Martin and Pronovost, who also had defended some of the union's positions, was being questioned by some members of the Federation's Executive Council. Yet, in truth, Martin was not really speaking for himself although he certainly believed what he wrote. His boss was John (jack) Eyre, the progressive, outspoken chief executive officer of Saguenay Shipping and a member of the Executive Council. Eyre did no hide his frustration with the unconvincing arguments of the IASC. He had no

After Picard m confidence whatsoever that the stevedoring contractors had the determination to bring about change and the latest intervention by Greene propelled him to speak through his mouthpiece, Martin. In general, I agreed with Eyre's progressive views and he was a strong supporter of my initiative to establish an employers' association. At the same time, however, his antagonism towards the stevedoring contractors occasionally made it difficult for me to find grounds for compromise. Eventually, his attitude would cost him a seat on the board of the employers' association. Pronovost, as noted, had been hired less because of his expertise than because, as a French Canadian, he was seen as someone who could establish a dialogue with the longshoremen. Yet, during his employment by the Federation, he was always suspected of being too close to the union and, like Marcel Jette, was seen as a man whose first loyalty was to his French-Canadian roots rather than to the Federation. This perception was evidence of the Federation's inability to conceive of labour relations as an effort to bridge the gap between competing interests in order to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. In fact, Pronovost's ability to understand the union's position was probably more a function of his training as a labour-relations professional than of his ethnic origin. Both he and Jette were shocked by some of the working conditions on the docks;t they believed tha longshoremen deserved to be 'treated as human beings' and that employers were unnecessarily resistant to making changes at that level. Some of the Englishspeaking members of the Federation's Executive Council sensed Pronovost's disapproval and seldom asked his opinion, while he, in turn, felt ill at ease with them. Relations between Pronovost and his Federation critics did not improve until after the creation of the employers' association. Progress Despite persistent and considerable tension among management, by 27 June the effort to reduce the drain on the job-security fund had been successful, owing to improved dispatch procedures.39 On 8 August the Federation reported that the fund was approaching self-sufficiency and should stay afloat provided the amount of cargo handled remained at current levels.40 Elated by the success of this joint union-management effort, the Federation declared itself convinced of the viability of the weekly guarantee at the current rate of assessment. The phoenix was emerging from its ashes, but alarmingly high rates of absenteeism persisted: 38 per cent for extras and 63 per cent for fill-ins.41 Despite the fact that the impact of absenteeism on the fund was being contained by better dispatching procedures, we knew that we needed a provision in the next contract that would allow us to take effective action against those abusing the system.42

112 Waterfront Blues Meanwhile, a copy of Martin's acidic memorandum had somehow fallen into the hands of the IASC. Soon afterwards, the IASC wrote to the Federation in reference to the ongoing negotiations for the creation of an employers' association, and, with Martin's position on control of the new body obviously in mind, it declared: '[The IASC] hopes that the Federation will not change its policy in this regard because ... this [the current plan for the make-up of the new association's board] is the best vehicle for protecting the legitimate rights of both the members of the Federation and the members of the Association/43 The next three months saw continuing skirmishes between the Federation and the IASC over the question of control of the proposed association. Martin's memo and the IASC response were considered at a meeting of the Federation's Executive Council on 16 July and Jim Thom, speaking as chair of our team on the joint committee, reminded the meeting that we had earlier agreed that the employing companies would be in control of the new association's board of directors. He then went on to express his personal view, however, that control should be retained by the Federation.44 During the course of the next few weeks, several meetings of the joint committee were held and the proposed by-laws were discussed. On behalf of the Federation, we proposed an increase in the board from nine to eleven, to be made up of five representatives from the contracting stevedores, one from the house stevedores, one from the terminal operators, and four from the Federation. The IASC was not agreeable to this and insisted that its members be in control of the board. At the next meeting of the Federation's Executive Council on 8 August, Mulroney was asked for his views on the establishment of the association. He was firmly of the view that the stevedoring contractors represented a service industry only and were labour brokers whose interest in the port was much smaller than that of the shipping companies. If control over labour relations in the port was turned over to the stevedoring contractors, he said, the Federation would be doing itself a disservice. He stated that he was firmly and irrevocably opposed to the control of shore labour being turned over to the IASC and that the new association must be under the control of the Federation. We then asked Mulroney what would happen, in the event the Federation and the IASC were unable to reach agreement on control of the association, if the latter applied to the Canada Labour Relations Board for decertification of the Federation. He replied that the IASC could apply but with little chance of success, because the Picard Report and Judge Gold's interpretation with respect to dispatch gave effective control of the workforce to the Federation.45 It was then agreed that the Federation team would continue our discussions with the IASC members of the joint committee on the basis that the Federation must have full and effective control of the association and that, to safeguard this principle, any appointees to the board representing

After Picard 113 terminal operators and house stevedores were not to be considered as Federation appointees.46 On 19 August the IASC wrote to the Federation delegates on the joint committee that 'the Unions have for many years been able to divide and rule by using to their advantage the divergence of power between the bargaining agent with whom they negotiate and the direct employers of their members.'47 The obvious solution to this problem, it said, was to empower the direct employers to negotiate collective agreements. When the committee next met on 23 August, we advised our IASC counterparts that their position was unacceptable and that the Federation intended to retain control, with five Federation delegates to four from the IASC.48 In its response, dated 28 August, the IASC urged us to reconsider our position but, in recognition of the need to make a start in the establishment of the association, agreed to our demand regarding control of the board, provided certain matters would require a vote of not less than 75 per cent of the directors present.49 Thorn explained to the Executive Council on 29 August that, while we were not prepared to recommend acceptance of a veto in all instances proposed by the IASC, this was a matter for further negotiations; he proposed, and council agreed, that as a compromise a minimum of one of the five Federation directors on the board would be from a member company engaged in the stevedoring business in eastern Canada.50 Thorn's letter of 3 September to the IASC set out our revised position and suggested that Mulroney and Stanley Hartt, the legal counsel of the IASC,51 meet to discuss proposed by-laws and organization, with a target date for completion of 15 September. Thorn also suggested that the association be formed on the basis of two constituent bodies, the Federation and the IASC, leaving the door open for the admission of such other companies or bodies who were not then members of either group.52 The IASC did not agree with a nine-person board controlled by the Federation, and Hartt, opposed to the constituency approach to membership, preferred to have the general membership of the association limited to those companies engaged in the employ of longshoremen. Mulroney suggested that we reconvene the joint committee and review the situation, with particular emphasis on the IASC letter of 28 August.53 Clearly, Hartt was advising his client to retain control, just as Mulroney was doing with the Federation. Yet Hartt had also succeeded in convincing the IASC of some important potential problems with the constituency approach. In a letter to his client on 9 October setting out his reasons for not favouring the idea of forming the new employer's association on the basis of two constituent bodies, Hartt said that 'the obligation to pay is more clearly and directly provided for if employers of labour are obliged in their own names to pay assessments, which they, by the contracts they make with their customers, may

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pass on to such customers. In this way, the Association has a direct lien de droit with the shipowner or agent paying the costs of the Association, which is not the case where each constituent body would have to levy assessments from its membership ,..'54 In addition, and more important, the present constitutions and bylaws of the constituent bodies did not include proper means to deal with delinquent members. Direct membership would make sanctioning much easier. Hartt said: 'Perhaps the strongest reason for my desiring direct membership on the part of the employer companies would be the direct control that the new Association would thus gain over any disloyal activities by members, without which the new Association is surely doomed.'55 Even Hartt, then, foresaw the possibility of delinquent members among the stevedoring contractors. Compromises were made and the lawyers were instructed to prepare documents for a working paper. The constituent-member approach was dropped. Instead, four classes of members were proposed: independent stevedores, shipowners and agents, terminal operators, and house stevedores. The majority of the board (five) would be elected from shipowners and agents, but no question could be decided by a vote of less than 75 per cent of the directors present. While this would have the effect of giving a veto power to the stevedores, we might have agreed were it not for a new fact that came to light on 24 October. At a meeting between the Labour Committee and St-Onge and two other officers of Local 375, Jette was advised that three stevedoring contractors (ECS, Brown and Ryan, and Empire) had entered into sideagreements with the union regarding gang size in relation to sling-loads. St-Onge explained that the idea was his and he seemed to see nothing wrong with it. He said that it was an attempt to try new ways of doing things and that such experiments had always taken place with the stevedoring contractors. As it happened, the experiment had been a complete fiasco and was abandoned. Nevertheless, the contractors surely were aware that it was not proper for them to enter into such side-agreements. This kind of action prejudiced the work of the Labour Committee and impaired the negotiations with the IASC for the formation of an employers' association. Furthermore, the provisions of the side-agreements ran completely contrary to Picard's recommendations and to what the Federation had been fighting for, namely, to rid the ports of restrictive practices. The Federation's Executive Council convened an emergency meeting on 29 October to consider the allegations and whether or not the Federation would proceed with negotiations to establish an employers' association. The IASC strongly denied the allegations and it was their word against written evidence that sideagreements had been secretly entered into. In the end, we decided to continue negotiations for an association but to insist on the removal of the IASC veto powers contained in the draft by-laws.

After Picard 115 On 6 November 1968 the joint committee reached agreement on the composition of the board of directors, without the 75 per cent voting rule.56 The IASC members of the committee proposed the immediate establishment of a shadow board of directors so that the association could start assuming responsibility for labour relations pending its formal incorporation. I felt that continuity in the upcoming labour negotiations was essential and, at the next meeting of the Executive Council, presented guidelines for quick and efficient establishment of the association. The council approved my plan and instructed me to proceed with its implementation through the joint committee. In brief, my proposed guidelines were: that the Federation nominate five persons and that the IASC nominate four to constitute the initial board; that the board finalize by-laws and work out administrative matters (establishing a central pay office, hiring permanent staff, and so on); that the services of Marcel Jette and Denis Pronovost be transferred from the Federation to the MEA, as chief executive officer and director of labour relations respectively, although the shadow board would appoint an advisory labour committee to work with Pronovost; that Mulroney's law firm be appointed counsel to the MEA; and that the Federation assume the burden of financing the association for at least a year (an attempt to allay the lASC's concern that Federation control would result in financial arrangements adverse to its interests). The guidelines were prepared in the form of a memorandum of agreement and discussed by the IASC on 19 November. Although Hartt had serious reservations, the IASC decided unanimously to accept the letter as a memorandum of agreement and appointed Henry Belle, Bill Brown, Norm Wolfe, and Ken Monks to the new board of directors. The Federation's Executive Council followed suit on 26 November; James Thorn, Peter Evans, Jack Eyre, Fred McCaffrey, and I were appointed to the board, and I was subsequently elected its first chairman. The new shadow board was to supervise the labour negotiations which had tentatively begun two weeks earlier with the tabling of the union's demands. After a full year of negotiations, it looked as though we had finally created a new employers' association. In fact, however, it would take another two and a half years for the complete carrying out of the agreement. The MEA would be incorporated a year later, with letters patent dated 27 August 1969, but it was only in March 1970 that its elected directors would meet for the first time; even then, not all employers would be represented. And it was not until March 1971 that all independent stevedoring companies would be members - thereby transforming, at long last, the MEA into what it claimed to be: a multi-employer unit representing management at the St Lawrence River ports of Montreal, Trois-Rivieres, and Quebec and the ports of Hamilton and Toronto on Lake Ontario and Saint John and Halifax.

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Conclusion If the establishment of an employers' association had taken place during a period of stable industrial relations, the argument over the question of control would have been secondary. Indeed, as the MEA became more professional and as labour relations started to stabilize in the 19705, the question of control of the board of directors lost its significance. That said, however, without labour unrest and new administrative requirements brought on by the changed system of employment, there might not have been sufficient motivation for the parties to create an employers' association and renounce their individual freedom. Each company, despite efforts towards institutional unity through the creation of the MEA, was still desperate to protect its own interests. In fact, the MEA, though a step in the right direction, would have considerable difficulty speaking with one voice. There remained a mountain of fundamental issues related to the desirability of manpower changes on which the Shipping Federation and the IASC disagreed. Although no one expected that a single year would erase a history of antagonistic feelings and habits, the truce of 1968 had had positive effects on the relationship between management and labour. As a whole, the parties were able to identify with each other a little more than before, which was an important step in developing some basic trust. Gold's conciliation board had begun a rehabilitation process by confirming the supremacy of collective agreements and by familiarizing the parties with orderly and rigorous dispute resolution. The fact that the Federation and the union had joined hands to salvage the job-security fund was an eye-opening exercise for both: each had a chance to see the other in a favourable light and learned that cooperation could yield results quickly and painlessly. For the first time, it was conceivable to talk with the other party without going through lawyers. As I said at the time - the statement found its way into the Montreal Gazette's quotes of the week - 'labour relations improve in inverse ratio to the decline of lawyers' fees.'57 The formation of the MEA could not have come at a more propitious time. In a year-end interview with the Globe and Mail, Laurence Pathy, Fednav's executive vice-president, offered a sobering message: 'The competitive position of the Port of Montreal is in jeopardy... Deterioration of the port's position has been brought about by spiralling stevedoring costs, an inefficient labour force, antiquated employer attitudes... Undoubtedly, part of the blame for the deterioration must rest with management ...The Shipping Federation of Canada ... is an antiquated body ... Interjected into this situation are the stevedoring contractors who have no fixed investment, or relatively little, to protect and are simply interested in operating from day to day. Without question these factors have contributed to the breakdown in labour relations during the past ten years.'58

After Picard 117 The 1969 negotiations would surely be difficult, since many problems remained to be solved for both parties. Yet, as the year 1968 drew to a close, all of us were looking forward to what we hoped would be a more harmonious and productive future.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Agreement of 1969

The 1966 agreement, extended on an interim basis, was due to expire on 31 December 1968. Much progress had been made in 1968 to implement the changes recommended by the Picard Report: canteens, washrooms, and rest-benches had been built, as was the first container terminal in Canada, scheduled to go into operation in the spring; a basic dispatch system using tape recorders hooked on a series of telephones (code-a-phones) was being run jointly with the union from Federation premises; and the rotation system had been tightened and improved. Nevertheless, as the time for negotiations approached, tensions started rising and grievances were piling up. When negotiations began, old attitudes resurfaced in full force and the usual conflicts, exacerbated by the negotiations' dynamics, threatened to derail the process once again. Yet, ultimately, what the parties had begun to learn and accept under Judge Gold's tutelage supplanted the old antagonistic reflexes: the parties settled voluntarily and signed an agreement in which the principle set out by Picard - of a fair balance between equity and efficiency, between labour's and management's respective interests - was accepted in principle for the first time. The agreement of 1969, certainly, would not have come about if government had not brought its influence to bear, nor did it usher in an era of uninterrupted labour peace. Still, the agreement is noteworthy for what it revealed about management's and the union's evolving thinking on matters of labour relations. At long last, one could glimpse a future in which negotiation rather than confrontation would be the norm. Context While the parties in Montreal had postponed negotiations for a year, the ports of Halifax, Saint John, Toronto, and Hamilton had negotiated new labour contracts

The Agreement of 1969 119 that were now in effect and that provided employers with much unilateral decision-making power with regard to deployment and the movement of containerized cargo. The opposite tendency was being manifested in New York, however, where longshoremen were currently trying to negotiate for a container 'stuffing and unstuffmg' clause. In practical terms, they demanded that any container being loaded or unloaded in New York would have to be emptied of its cargo and then filled back up by longshoremen. The demand amounted to nothing more than an upgrading of featherbedding practices to match new technology and would perpetuate excessive manning, interrupt the speedy unloading that the metal boxes had been designed for, and generally defeat the purpose of containerization altogether. Both labour and management in Montreal kept a close eye on New York, the ILA because acceptance of the clause would give it a platform on which to base a similar demand, and management because it feared that such a provision would have catastrophic effects on the Montreal waterfront. Many shipping companies had emerged from the year 1968 with light wallets owing to a strike by Seaway workers that had trapped seventy-six ships in the Great Lakes system for a month, costing shippers thousands of dollars for every day lost. They could not afford an excessively costly settlement. Furthermore, despite added container traffic in Montreal through the Furness Withy terminal, the competitive position of the port had been steadily slipping. Many shipping companies were closing shop and moving their operations elsewhere or planning to do so in the near future.1 Penalizing the use of technological change and preventing cost-efficiency held the very real threat of condemning the Montreal port to a slow death by tonnage starvation. In order to keep the port in the race, the NHB had just announced its intention of converting the port to full terminal operations by the spring of 1970. The concept of terminal operations was based on the centralization of responsibility for the cargo, from storage to ship and vice versa, into the hands of a single party. This represented a major organizational shift in Montreal where railways, road transport, stevedoring contractors, security services, and steamship agents all had separate areas of responsibility inside sheds. Partly for this very reason, the concept of terminal operations, while a topic of discussion for some years, had long remained on the drawing board so as not to upset existing interests. But, as the lack of organization and the concomitant pilferage caused losses that exporters and importers increasingly viewed as intolerable, the port decided to move ahead at once. This development would not have a direct impact on negotiations but would become a central issue soon afterwards as employers and unions struggled to reorganize themselves accordingly. By late 1968, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau had succeeded Lester Pearson as prime minister and Bryce Mackasey had become the new labour minister.

120 Waterfront Blues Mackasey, who would hold the post through 1971, was a street fighter, a down-toearth politician with a knack both for delivering hard-hitting speeches and for devising shrewd strategy. During the 1966 strike he had served as parliamentary assistant to Nicholson. This was a good appointment since Mackasey was from Verdun in Montreal, spoke French, and had an empathy with workers (it also helped that a number of the checkers of Irish extraction lived in Verdun). We saw little of him during the 1966 mediation efforts in Ottawa but he did spend more time with the union delegation. Although he later came to be seen as rather gruff and unpolished, he was in fact a sensitive person, as was made clear in 1966 when he was excluded from the final hours of negotiation during the night of 13-14 June in Pearson's office. Guy Favreau and other Quebec ministers were present but not Mackasey, whose feelings were seriously hurt as a result. He later told me that he had probably been left out because his views coincided a little too much with the union's and those of Bernard Wilson, the assistant deputy minister of labour,2 He also told me that Pearson had an abnormal fear of strikes and that he 'never really understood the process and would do anything to buy peace.'3 In his role as minister of labour during the 1969 negotiations, Mackasey would show his true colours as a skilful politician. He was both cunning and devious. He wanted the problem solved and did not want trouble on his beat. Once, while we were engaged with Judge Gold in serious mediation and the newly formed MEA was hanging tough with no agreement in sight, I walked into the hotel room where Mackasey was meeting with the stevedoring contractors, in the absence of the Federation members of the MEA, trying to split the employers with a view to getting an agreement. When discovered playing his game, he graciously backed off. All in all, Mackasey had a good understanding of the problems facing the port. He knew that the parties had to find a way of working together to handle the challenge of containerization. The union had to understand that this meant the disappearance of featherbedding and the reduction of the workforce, and employers had to come to a realization that their industry faced obsolescence unless they changed their attitude and accepted some form of job security.4 While a fervent believer in free collective bargaining, Mackasey had no patience for work stoppages that would seriously affect outsiders. This made for a fine line on which to walk as a government representative empowered - and expected - to oversee negotiations; the new labour minister knew that he would be facing an important challenge, particularly since he had yet to prove himself. In 1969 Mackasey fully expected the government to be called upon to intervene in the negotiations at one point or another, and past experience made him realize that he could be in for a rough ride. From 1966 to 1968, Nicholson had been harassed left and right by political opponents, the press, and the public alike, and

The Agreement of 1969 121 his complicated explanations had allowed his opponents to pounce on any semblance of contradiction, allowing criticism to grow and pressure to settle the matter to rise. If Mackasey had learned anything from these events, it was that the waterfront's problems were better kept out of public scrutiny and that constrictive laws were more efficient as threats than as actual solutions. Gold said that having the prime minister himself intervene in a labour dispute was no way to settle it 'for the simple reason that it is only labour relations. It is not a political issue, and it shouldn't be a political issue.'5 Mackasey took the same point of view and would live by it, keeping a tight lip in the House of Commons and confining his comments to the bare minimum. As negotiations got under way, Mackasey looked on from the sidelines with his new executive assistant and old friend, Arnold E. Masters, ready to send him in on a moment's notice. When Mackasey had been appointed minister, he had asked Masters - Arnie to friends - to join him in Ottawa. Masters had agreed and left his position in the oil industry in Montreal after more than twenty years of service. He knew little about labour relations per se but had an incisive mind, a forceful personality, and a natural ability to diagnose problems and find creative solutions. The Same Old Tunes In the initial stage of the negotiations - the setting of demands - no one expected many surprises. This round was largely the one that had been suspended the previous year because of the numerous difficulties with the interpretation of the Picard Report. The conciliation board dealing with the issues had only swept the track clear for the race: it was not expected to have had much effect on the parties' main negotiating goals, and, indeed, it did not. In mid-November, the union presented its main demand, which, as expected, remained an employment system based on two shifts of eight guaranteed hours of work, five days a week. Though St-Onge was eager to discuss this idea and reluctant to bring up any other demands that might sidetrack it, the Federation's bargaining committee6 was not ready to respond. St-Onge encouraged a dialogue by saying that the union was flexible and that all aspects of the idea were negotiable, but, despite his efforts, management remained silent.7 Mulroney, however, did identify our priorities: individual contract negotiations for each local; exclusion of foremen and walking bosses from the bargaining unit; inclusion of a management's rights clause, a discipline clause, and a clause providing for more expeditious arbitration proceedings; and preservation of the Picard amendments, particularly those defining the relationship of job security to productivity. The absence of a reply to the union's demand on employment arrangements annoyed Judge Gold, who warned management's negotiating team that

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they had better be ready to negotiate the two-shift system in earnest at the next bargaining session, deaf to their protest that it would be difficult to do so because of the pending establishment of the MEA.8 Notwithstanding these express instructions, at the next meeting, the Federation still would not take a stand in regard to the union's demand. Gold would later write: 'To put the matter bluntly, it [the Federation] dragged its feet. I do not know why; it can't be that it was surprised by the demand because this was the very issue that had been raised by the Union on many previous occasions.'9 Management had indeed expected the two-shift demand to resurface; the problem was that the Labour Committee could not devise a response. The Federation itself was not opposed to two shifts in principle, although St-Onge's scheme had been neither analysed nor costed; the idea had first been proposed by an expert before the Picard commission, who had demonstrated that such a system was possible under certain conditions. But two months earlier, the IASC had circulated a memorandum that categorically rejected the idea on the grounds that the change would be too costly and would sever the link between job security and productivity. Despite St-Onge's suggestions for flexibility within the two shifts, the IASC had not changed its position, and while the Federation was still the certified bargaining agent, it did not want to frustrate the IASC when they had just barely been able to agree on a structure for managerial unity. Since the newly formed shadow board would be assuming responsibility for the negotiations in the upcoming meetings, it was necessary to take the LASC's positions seriously. But, because the union refused to table other demands until management made its position known, the negotiations stalled. Recognizing that the negotiations were deteriorating into an exercise in futility, Gold ordered a recess. Understandably, St-Onge became irritated. When Gold asked the parties when they would next meet to negotiate, St-Onge exploded. Pronovost recalled the episode in his report to the members of the negotiating committee: We immediately agreed to meet at the Judge's convenience but Mr. St-Onge disagreed; he expressed his views about the lack of purpose of such negotiations with a party (ourselves) who had proven to be untrustworthy. He went on for about thirty minutes on a violent diatribe typical of his mentality and personality. He told the judge that he felt the Federation to be the same as it was in previous years when matters had to be settled by a third party. He also said that he couldn't care less if anyone thought of a legislative solution; Ministers in Ottawa can make laws, he said, but the cargo on the docks is moved by hands, not by laws!10

The problem was that our committee was just not ready to engage in a serious negotiation of St-Onge's two-shift system: our costing of the demand was not yet

The Agreement of 1969 123 complete, there still had been no reaction from the union to any of our priorities, and we were on the verge of creating a new employers' association. Mackasey was far from considering special laws at this point, but, because he wished to avoid last-minute intervention, he dispatched his assistant, Arnie Masters, to act in his name and keep him closely informed. Masters left for Montreal, joined by Bill Kelly of the Department of Labour's mediation and conciliation branch. The MEA shadow board held its first meeting and, after electing me chairman,11 took note both of a letter from Henry Belle regarding the two-shift system and of a cost study of that system prepared by the Picard commission's consulting engineer, Pierre Dufresne. In his letter Belle reminded us that Gold had told our negotiating committee, at a meeting held on 31 December, that it was incumbent upon us to evaluate thoroughly the union's two-shift proposal for the purpose of convincing him that it was unworkable. He also expressed his own views on the two-shift system: First, we feel the present labour force is not sufficiently stable to warrant the belief that they will present themselves with the precise regularity that the system will require and the history of the port, we think, fully substantiates this view; second, the two shift system contemplates, if it is not going to cost the industry an arm and a leg, a virtual limitation on the longshoreman's earnings which we don't think he will stand for; third, the job security burden will increase materially...; fourth, the system will put more work into the evening and night-time which we feel is detrimental to production and as no premium will be paid absenteeism will be very high.12

Dufresne, for his part, supported Belle's contention that St-Onge's scheme would prove to be extremely costly. Over the next two days, Dufresne presented an alternative plan for a two-shift system based upon four categories of longshoremen and overlapping shifts. After study, it was unanimously agreed to add this idea to our proposals at the next negotiating meeting before Gold. At the next meeting of the MEA board, a new negotiating committee was appointed, composed of Jette, Pronovost, Mulroney, and Dufresne.13 A further concern arose when we learned that the labour contract signed in New York included a restrictive container 'stuffing and unstuffing' clause. We suspected that the ILA in Canada would be pressured to go along with whatever was established in the United States. We were right. Judge Gold had asked both parties to prepare and exchange drafts of their complete package of proposals in the hope that attitudes would soften and common ground could be found. But, as we had feared, Local 375'$ draft contained a 'stuffing and unstuffing' clause.

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Produced in mid-February, this draft included the following demands: a two-shift system; the mandatory 'stuffing and unstuffing' of containers by Local 375 members; wage increases in 1969 and 1970 of 33 per cent and 10 per cent respectively; a longer job-security season, from thirty-seven to thirty-nine weeks; the elimination of the job-security assessment in favour of an obligation for employers to guarantee the solvency of the fund by putting in whatever money was required; the reintroduction of restrictive work practices eliminated by Picard (gangs, slingloads, and others); and jurisdiction over all shed work.14 The union's demands were deemed 'extravagant, indeed exorbitant and outrageous' by Gold and 'completely unrealistic' by the MEA, which, as Gold would later recall, 'reacted like an outraged maiden defending her virtue with cries of anguish, and took some considerable time to present its own draft.'15 The MEA's draft proposals basically consisted of a rejection of all union demands on the one hand, and, on the other, a reassertion of management's rights, including reinforcement of disciplinary measures. Among the other proposals were: the eligibility threshold for the job-security plan to be raised from 550 hours to 1,000 hours of work the prior year; an overlapping shift system with four categories of longshoremen, only one of which was to have weekly job-security guarantees, the rest getting a three-hour guarantee per call; and the exclusion of foremen and walking bosses from the bargaining unit. The exchange of these draft proposals in February resulted in a confrontation which, as Gold put it, 'was not unexpected but most distasteful nonetheless as tempers mounted and recriminations abounded.'16 As if this were bad enough, although the fledging MEA had managed to produce a list of demands, it was about to be dealt another blow that would threaten its ability to say it was speaking for management as a whole. The IASC Goes Astray Again On 13 February the IASC announced to the Federation that it was setting up a central pay office on its own despite the fact that this issue was supposed to be decided upon by the MEA's Board of Directors.17 Some IASC members had long been discussing the matter among themselves. In the fall of 1968, Brown and Ryan, Saint John Stevedoring, Furness Withy, and ECS had secretly hired IBM to compute all of their employee income-tax receipts to determine how much would have been saved if the four companies had operated a collective pay system. The conclusion confirmed the view already reached by the Federation, namely, that savings would have in large part financed the operation of a central pay office. The four stevedoring companies had prepared a report, the figures of which had impressed the IASC enough that it decided to take over ECS's compu-

The Agreement of 1969 125 ter and staff, with or without the Federation's approval and even though some of the stevedores responsible for this decision were also on the MEA's Board of Directors. On top of this, the IASC had decided to make its own submission to the Smith commission. Smith had met the parties' respective lawyers on 10 January to indicate that he was 'most unhappy' that none of the groups had submitted briefs. Both the IASC and the Federation had agreed to present a joint submission through the MEA, one that I was mandated to prepare with the assistance of David Angus, legal counsel for the IASC and ECS. When I contacted Angus on 14 February, however, he advised me that the IASC had in the meantime arranged with Judge Smith to submit a brief on its own behalf. Incredulous, I wrote to the members of the MEA board that, 'in view of this development, I can see no purpose in the MEA preparing a brief/ and I added that 'I continue to regret the inability of management to speak with one voice with respect to labour-management.'18 I was much blunter in my memorandum to the Federation. Perhaps too hastily, though certainly reflecting the frustration I felt at the time, the memorandum concluded that the MEA was 'doomed to failure due to the varying interests of its Board members. Unanimity on basic issues of policy seemed impossible to achieve.' I therefore suggested that 'perhaps it would be much more logical for the direct employers to be certified as the bargaining agents.'19 Letting the stevedores take over the Federation's certification as bargaining agent implied our complete withdrawal from negotiations and from the MEA, and it was a drastic solution which the Federation, fortunately, was not ready to accept at this point. Labour-management relations, meanwhile, were taking their usual course. At the request of his boss, Jack Eyre of Saguenay Shipping, John Paul Martin, former chair of the Labour Committee, wrote to Jette on the union's position: 'The main issues are eligibility to job security and the two shift system. All the rest is window dressing ... The two sides are so far apart that the present situation is one of total frustration and indicative that we are once again progressing along all familiar paths towards the last-minute bargaining followed by an inevitable shut-down.'20 The Federation fell into a lethargic melancholy and waited for the government's next move. One editorial, dramatically entitled 'Don't let them kill the port!' pointed to the dramatic drop in productivity and the possibility that cargo would increasingly slip away from Montreal in favour of more efficient ports. It stated: That this would be a disaster seems clear enough. But it's been shocking to our people doing the rounds for this particular shipping issue to find people prepared to let it happen. They talk dispassionately about the closure of a port as they might the weather. Some say that perhaps it would be better if the port died; to be reborn again under different circumstances and possibly further downstream. How does that grab

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you? We let the patient die and then hope that something can be done to revive it. Of course, in the meantime, cargo goes to other ports that are hungry for it and who won't relinquish it again without a fight.21 Arnie Masters, who had been observing the proceedings and assisting Gold, would later explain: 'I think the shipping industry became aware that there could not be a settlement and, indeed, ships would not be arriving during the course of the negotiations. This led the employers' committee to the belief that a lockout was inevitable - or a lack of ships being the same as a lockout in this industry and everybody sat back to see what would happen/22 But the government had no intention of sitting back and watching a shutdown occur. It was time, once again, for ministerial action. Bringing Pressure to Bear On 17 February Labour Minister Bryce Mackasey warned the parties through the press that he would not hesitate to intervene decisively if a settlement could not be reached: 'I don't want anyone to go home thinking that we will hesitate to use compulsory arbitration if the vital interest of the economy is affected.'23 Mackasey knew that the words compubory arbitration had become particularly loaded on the Montreal waterfront. Arbitration through Picard had thrown the parties into a whirlwind of disputes that had taken Gold and his board almost a year to untangle, all the while postponing negotiations and all hopes for further advances. A spokesman for the Montreal Port Council had said, in reference to the situation in the harbour in October 1968: 'It is impossible to avoid observing that too many inquiries have created confusion because there is an obvious conflict of ideas when it comes to implementing recommendations. To quote Alexander the Great: '"I am dying with the help of too many physicians."'24 This was a view with which management was in complete agreement. There was no point in having a third party decide on provisions that the parties found themselves unable to implement. The union and the MEA just had to fight it out between themselves. Two days later, the MEA passed a resolution which stated: 'In view of the past history of Government intervention in waterfront disputes, including the Picard Commission of 1966/67, the Smith Commission of 1968/69, the Arbitration/Conciliation Board of Judge Gold in 1968/69, it is hereby resolved that the MEA is not in favour of Government intervention should the current negotiations between Management and the ILA in the St. Lawrence Ports not result in a contract by March 3ist 1969, and the MEA hereby affirms its belief in allowing the process of free collective bargaining to run its course, including the right to strike or lockout associated therewith.'

The Agreement of 1969 127 Gold was expected to issue his conciliation report by 31 March 1969, seven days after which a work stoppage would be legal. At a general meeting on 27 February, the Federation decided to recommend to its principals that no arrivals at Montreal should be advertised after 31 March.25 Traffic was already slowing to a trickle and negotiations continued painfully. While threats could be useful catalysts, Masters was further instructed to become actively involved in trying to crystallize the parties' respective positions and in proposing solutions. He obliged and attempted to interest management, through Mulroney and me, in different forms of manning formulas dealing with the number of men on the workforce, but he was confronted with the problem of management knowing what it did not want but not what it wanted.26 Having seen no progress, the conciliation board concluded that some outside force would be needed to soften the parties' positions. Judge Gold recommended that public hearings be held 'under the glare of television cameras and the continuous scrutiny of the press and other communication media'27 in the hope that the parties could be shamed out of the rigidity of their positions. Bryce Mackasey, however, made it known that he disapproved of the public hearings scheduled by Gold;28 he wanted to remain in control of the information released through the media and would be unable to do so with negotiations becoming open to the public. Mackasey would be proven right on this point, as Gold attested: 'The results, alas, were not what we had hoped for. Instead of a softening of attitudes there emerged a further hardening of positions. Each side took the stand that its cause was just and worthy of public support.'29 While the hearings were under way in early March, the labour minister came to Montreal to sound out the position of the parties. Little was achieved as both stubbornly stuck to their party line. Not that the party line was always clear. Sometimes ILA counsel Phil Cutler and Local 375 president Jean-Marc St-Onge dropped opposite hints. At one point, a serious confrontation occurred between Arnie Masters and Phil Cutler. Masters had reported to Mackasey that Cutler believed a settlement on job security was close. When Gold approached Cutler to follow up on this, the latter denied ever having implied what Masters said he had. Masters would recall: Gold came back to Mackasey and said, 'There is nothing to do, there is a problem.' And Mackasey said: 'What is the problem?' Gold explained the problem and the problem was me. According to Cutler, I had misrepresented his position. So Mackasey called the parties together and me. Gold had asked to be absent and anyway ... I remember being asked point blank did I say this? And I said, 'No I didn't say that but it could have sounded like that.' Cutler went nuts, I went nuts, and Mackasey went bananas. At that stage of the game, St-Onge realized that he better back off because

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this was no longer a fight between the parties, it was a question of credibility, truth and all that. And that blew up and we gave it back to Gold.30

A furious and bitter Cutler declared that he would never deal with Bryce Mackasey or Arnie Masters again, and later that year he turned over the day-to-day representation of the union to a lawyer from his office, Gino Castiglio. Needing something solid to work with, Gold, Masters, and Mackasey met with Louis Laberge to ask him to pressure St-Onge into revealing the union's bottom line, which was probably known only to him: for bargaining purposes, he was the union. Laberge was reluctant to take on this dirty job even though he concurred that every effort had to be made to avoid a strike. Management was not being asked to reveal how much money it was actually willing to spend on this contract. Persuading St-Onge to confess his true wishes without having management do the same was hardly fair. Laberge needed to think about it. Mackasey gave him time to ponder but he also let it be known in the House of Commons that he was unimpressed by the parties' behaviour and that, if the effects of a shutdown were limited to the parties themselves, maybe closing the port for a year would get them to think straight.31 The public hearings had drawn to a close without any progress having been made. The mandate of the conciliation board would expire on 31 March and people wondered what Mackasey would and could do if twelve months of continuous conciliation had failed to bring about an agreement. Despite the precariousness of the situation and the bombardment of questions he faced, Mackasey cooly declared in the House of Commons: 'Mr. Speaker, a lot of people would like to know what the Minister of Labour intends to do after March 3ist. They will have to wait.'32 Yet, in the backrooms, away from public scrutiny, Mackasey was getting ready to meet a work stoppage with emergency legislation. A legal strike would in all probability be called on 7 April, after the mandatory waiting period of seven days following the report of the conciliation board, because of 'the complex nature of the issues in dispute, the general attitude of the parties and the fact that there are a large number of employers with conflicting interests and a lack of administrative cohesion.' The minister was strongly against allowing a work stoppage to take place. He wrote in a confidential memorandum to cabinet: A strike or lockout at the beginning of the season would have serious effects on the shipping situation and, more important perhaps, on the reputation and future prospects of the St. Lawrence ports, which have already been adversely affected by an extended period of labour unrest.' In the event of a strike, Mackasey recommended a bill providing for the appointment of a port administrator or controller, the return to work, the resumption of negotiations, and the appointment of an arbitrator, if needed, after the controller had been in place for a

The Agreement of 1969 129 month. He also recommended that he be authorized to indicate to the parties, in the course of his mediation efforts, that the government would be prepared to propose emergency legislation along these lines.33 The Ninety-Six-Hour Marathon On Friday, 28 March, in a desperate attempt to achieve an agreement before the expiry of its mandate on the 3ist, the conciliation board called round-the-clock bargaining sessions at the Martinique Hotel in Montreal, which would continue until agreement or total deadlock was reached. Members of the MEA board were in and out of our hotel suite all weekend. Gold, flanked by Baker and Laberge, prepared a working draft agreement covering all topics, from recognition of managerial rights to washrooms, in the hope that it could serve as a basis for compromise. At the outset of these sessions, the parties were intransigent, but, in time, they worked their way through many of the board's recommendations and also agreed in principle to refer to arbitration the issues that they would be unable to agree upon. That cleared the path for the showdown. The issues remaining in dispute were numerous. The union maintained that a two-shift system was essential while management stood firm that it was too rigid and would be financially disastrous. Masters did not believe in the merits of the two-shift system and kept telling the union to drop the demand, not only because management would never agree to it but because it was not the solution the union believed it to be. In an attempt to demonstrate the impracticality of the idea, we tabled a study by Pierre Dufresne which estimated the cost of St-Onge's two-shift proposal at an additional $4.8 million annually.34 St-Onge refused to budge. The union wanted all of its 2,100 members to be eligible for job security while the MEA was willing to cover only 1,593. The union demanded container 'stuffing and unstuffing' privileges or, alternatively, the payment of a royalty.35 We agreed to neither. The ILA wanted a 47 per cent increase in base pay over the course of 1969 and 1970, as compared to management's offer of 15 per cent over three years. The MEA insisted upon full flexibility in the make-up and deployment of gangs, which the union was willing to accept but only in exchange for the two-shift system and other concessions. Mackasey, who almost lived in the hotel over the weekend, told us the exact contents of the emergency legislation he had in mind. To make government intervention as repugnant as possible, he coupled the threat of this legislation with a clear message that the kind of binding arbitration employers would receive was not the kind that would allow us the luxury of falling back to square one. On 29 March, however, Bill Kelly released a telegram in which Mackasey said: 'Despite today's headlines in Montreal newspapers the Minister of Labour has no inten-

130 Waterfront Blues tion of entering into the dispute concerning Port of Montreal with any compromising solution that is not completely agreed to by Judge Gold. The Minister of Labour suggests to both parties that it is in their best interests to follow guidance and recommendation of Judge Gold because any subsequent action by the Minister of Labour will be based on the findings of Judge Gold. Please feel free to use this telegram publicly.'36 There were no significant changes in the parties' positions until three o'clock on the morning of Monday the 3ist, when St-Onge declared 'with tears in his eyes'37 that, while he still believed the two-shift system to be of great merit for all parties involved, he was prepared to abandon this demand to break the impasse. That night, there was a party atmosphere at the Martinique Hotel. The MEA directors now felt confident that the union had abandoned its major demand, but Masters had a hunch that the celebration might be premature. He later told me: 'I remember you guys all sitting around the table. Kelly and I were sitting in the corner and the union had left, they had stormed out of the hotel. You guys were having a drink, everybody was happy, it was over. The war had been won. I remember saying to you, "Not a big victory, Alec. Be careful. You just told this guy [St-Onge] how much money to come after. He just saved you 4.8 million dollars. You didn't have that bill."'38 Masters was both right and wrong. The following morning, St-Onge arrived to say that there was going to be a price to pay for the abandonment of the two-shift system. The union wanted the balance of its demands met, along with improvements in the weekly guarantee and a long list of monetary increases. The ILA, however, would lower its wage demands for 1969, 1970, and 1971 and, more important, would abandon its demand for 'stuffing and unstuffing' in favour of royalties. Although Gold found the demands exorbitant, he also believed that for the first time there was a real glimmer of hope for a settlement. St-Onge also felt that his latest proposal represented a decent effort at compromise; he told the press, 'As long as we don't hold each other's hand, we won't be able to do much. Judge Gold said the situation was like that of marriage. The boss and the worker are like husband and wife: if they don't work together, all hell breaks loose! What we want to do is to collaborate with the shipowners for the greater good of Montreal.'39 Masters thought the whole thing ludicrous. True, the union had abandoned its most central demand, but its sacrifice was mostly illusory since it never had the things it was now proposing to give up. But Gold disagreed and deplored management's lack of responsiveness: 'My own view is that, if management had wanted to settle, it could have done so within the next twelve hours by making any reasonable sort of counter-proposals. Instead, management chose another route: rather than moving even the slightest degree forward, it retreated and took the

The Agreement of 1969 131 greatest part of Monday to do so. It was only in the late evening of that day that I received and was able to transmit to the Union what turned out, because of the lateness of the hour, to be management's final offer. 4° At 10:30 that night, the MEA tabled its final offer. The major innovation in its position was the establishment of a Technological Displacement Fund (TDF to provide for the early retirement of workers who found themselves displaced or made redundant by modernization. Management was ready to pay $750,000 each year into the TDF during the three years of the contract. Because the offer was tabled just two hours before the conciliation board's mandate expired, the union lacked sufficient time to assess it. In any event, it was too little too late. 'It is my view/ said Gold, 'that this was probably the only real bargaining between the parties during the whole of our mandate, and even then I have my doubts whether it was really bargaining at all. For, in fact, the parties did not at any stage confront one another but merely dealt through the Board as an intermediary.'41 The union rejected the offer and, at midnight, the conciliation board's mandate expired. After fifteen months of work, it had failed. Gold could not believe it. Furious, he went home and scribbled a draft report, which began: 'If it is true that an employer gets the Union it deserves, a Union gets the employer it deserves. This is the case here. The parties richly deserve one another and were it not for public interest involved in the dispute, I would be tempted to limit this report to Mercutio's dying words, "A plague on both your houses..." I don't know who i more to blame in this matter, labour, intransigent and unreasonable, or management, divided and inept, and I will say no more on this subject lest the very faint spark of goodwill that has of late appeared - and here I speak as an unrepentant optimist - be extinguished by the rain of recriminations that a detailed recital of the real or fancied grievances would bring on.'42 The next day, Mackasey, at the request of the parties to the dispute, asked Gold to act as a special mediator. It helped that the House of Commons was to adjourn on 2 April until the i4th for Easter; in effect, this would prevent the House from examining the breakdown in negotiations - and criticizing the minister's handling of the situation - until it reconvened, thus providing Mackasey with two weeks of elbow room, free of political pressure. He had every intention to have the waterfront dispute cleared up by that time. Mackasey's Intervention Mackasey ordered the parties to report to his Verdun office on 5 April for continuous mediation. He wanted to know the union's bottom line, immediately. Under pressure from him and Judge Gold, Louis Laberge agreed to ask St-Onge for the

132 Waterfront Blues ILA's minimal demands in writing; he was told that the demands had better be reasonable and not contain any penalties on containers. Royalties, although a reality in American ports, did not exist anywhere in Canada and, according to Mulroney, would put 'the kiss of death to much needed investment in this entire area.'43 Masters would recall that Mackasey told St-Onge: 'Look. Just so that we understand each other. I am the Government of Canada, and the Government of Canada insist there be no encumbrance in container traffic in Montreal. Now, St Onge, do what you want to get job security, but if you make royalties an issue, the Government is against you. You've got job security and no one else has got it, so you don't get royalties.'44 On the morning of 5 April, Laberge showed up with a handwritten note that StOnge had written on the corner of his kitchen table spelling out Local 375'$ bottom line. Wage and benefits demands were lowered to levels that the MEA had previously indicated were acceptable. The job-security demand had changed little - the goal was still to protect about 2,100 longshoremen - except that StOnge now agreed to keep the formula of financing based on tonnage assessment instead of insisting on unlimited liability; the union, however, wanted the contribution to be almost doubled. Money left over at year end would be transferred into the TDF. The union would agree to extra gangs being formed unilaterally by the Federation so long as they were formed according to seniority, remained intact for at least one week, and were rotated in the manner of regular gangs. But the most important concession was the ILA's abandonment of its demand for container royalties, a move that, along with the abandonment of a two-shift system, was made 'in the interest of reaching a settlement.'45 While only Furness Withy currently operated a container terminal, two other firms indicated that they would move into container operations as a result of the union's withdrawal of restrictive demands on containers.46 The government representatives were satisfied with the union's concessions. Mackasey 'vigorously endorsed'47 St-Onge's belief that an agreement along the lines proposed would motivate the men to achieve higher productivity, and he instructed Masters to pressure the MEA to take its turn moving forward on the grounds suggested by the union. Basically, Masters proposed to freeze the workforce and grant whatever degree of job security management could afford to those employees, while working over the years to reduce their number; however, the MEA itself was still holding fast to a position that would have us guarantee jobsecurity eligibility for just over 1,500 men. The round-the clock mediation was well into its second day with no apparent advances being made when I suddenly realized that we could not reasonably expect union members to ratify a contract that would have the effect of making a good portion of them lose their eligibility for job security and thereby become second-class citizens. If management knew

The Agreement of 1969 133 anything about the union's philosophy, it was that every longshoreman had to have the same rights and privileges. Management would never be able to get the union to bargain away its most basic principle in the application of job security. I passed a note to Arnie Masters saying: 'I think you are right and we are wrong; if you tell everybody to go home, you and I can put a position together.' Masters complied and we stayed behind to brainstorm on possible formulas. Soon, by agreeing to St-Onge's figure for the number of longshoremen to be eligible for job security, we were able to reach an agreement. Our meeting of minds marked a turning point in negotiations and in the managerial approach to the process of change on the waterfront. For the first time, it was dawning on management that we had to reduce the workforce humanely, without trying to keep our obligations to a minimum. I argued and eventually convinced my colleagues in the MEA that only a solution along those lines was reasonable. Within two days, a memorandum of agreement for a threeyear contract was agreed upon voluntarily by the parties and signed. The date was 8 April. The Globe and Mail roared its approval: 'It was a night of agony for Labour Minister Bryce Mackasey and Associate Chief Judge Alan B. Gold, but dawn brought elation and triumph and hope that a new period of stability may lie ahead for the long troubled port of Montreal... The Labour Minister and Judge Gold had been riding a tiger for almost 84 hours before taming it and displaying a signed document as evidence of their success.'48 Of Mackasey's contribution, the same newspaper stated that this dispute 'was probably the most difficult ... he has encountered since becoming minister. Critics of his practice of personal involvement in mediation of major disputes such as those involving the airlines and railways have been waiting for him to fall flat on his face. Instead, he pulled it off again and was able to leave last night for a vacation ,..'49 Mackasey had overseen a tight operation far from the House of Commons, which would reconvene from its Easter break without ever discussing the negotiations and without even seeing Gold's final report. In fact, to this day, no one, including Gold himself, is sure whether the draft report he did write was ever turned into a final document. Since an agreement had been reached, the conciliation board had no reason to write a report. In any case, Gold's draft report remains a reminder of just how acrimonious the negotiations had been and how close we came to another major strike at the Port of Montreal. On the morning of 8 April, nobody cared anymore whether a report was filed or not. A strike had been avoided; a labour contract had been signed voluntarily. Cameras were flashing, hands were being shaken, bottles were being popped open, and the waterfront people were feeling fine. The Financial Times of Canada reported: 'Hopes about the future of Montreal as a major shipping centre have never been higher in the past six years ...'5°

134 Waterfront Blues The Agreement The 8 April agreement51 was based largely on St-Onge's minimal demands, many of which were met to a substantial degree, including wage increases from $3.75 to $4.60 over the course of three years, improved vacation pay, and an increase in social-security benefits. The MEA agreed to make eligible for job security those longshoremen who had worked 800 hours the previous year, which represented about 2,000 men. The remaining two hundred or so men, most of whom were seventy years of age or older, would be casual workers with less stringent eligibility requirements. The job-security season remained thirty-seven weeks but the productivity index was removed to allow for a fixed guarantee of forty hours weekly. Furthermore, the guarantee per call was changed from four hours to eight hours, Monday to Saturday. All hours worked in this interval would be assessed against the forty hours guaranteed but the men could refuse work on the weekend ('no call days') without being penalized. In other words, if the men had not worked forty hours by Saturday, they could refuse work offered on the weekend and still be entitled to the difference from the job-security fund. Longshoremen were never to be penalized for hours lost because of work-related sickness or accidents; these hours were to be counted as worked for eligibility purposes. To freeze the workforce covered by the job-security system, it was provided that all extras hired after the coming into effect of the agreement, on i January 1969, were not eligible for the plan. Reduction of the workforce during the three-year contract was to be limited to the effects of natural attrition (retirement, quitting, death, and so on), with no one being forced to retire during the life of the agreement. The financing of the fund was still to rely on a fifteen-cents' assessment on tonnage, but a TDF would be created with an additional assessment of fourteen cents per ton to serve as a backup to the job-security fund and to indemnify longshoremen dropped from the rosters after the contract expired. The TDF would be administered by a board of trustees composed of a representative of each party and an independent chairman. It was expected to provide a supplementary incentive for increased productivity according to the same logic as the job-security fund: the more tons handled, the thicker the cushion. Paycheques and job-security cheques were to be issued at the same time from the same place every week, but the union agreed to management's request for a delay of six months to allow it to set up the necessary facilities. Though the stevedorecontrolled Maritime Data Centre (MDC) was ready to issue cheques, the MEA had not yet decided how it would react and still entertained the thought of somehow setting up its own central, integrated pay office. Extra gangs could be formed unilaterally by the MEA so long as they respected

The Agreement of 1969 135 seniority, remained intact for at least one week, and were rotated with regular gangs, and so long as the union was advised of their formation three days in advance. The matter of tabulating seniority remained to be negotiated. Management finally obtained a provision which forbade the ILA from placing penalties on foremen and walking bosses as a consequence of their exercising management prerogatives, though the MEA wisely resolved to enforce its new rights gradually so as not to upset the dock culture too drastically. The agreement made provision for the parties to negotiate the yet unresolved issues within a set time-frame, failing which Judge Gold would arbitrate in all three ports.52 The voluntary signing of an agreement based on substantial compromises by both parties was a remarkable achievement. The parties' initial reflex of engaging in a head-on collision gave way to a softening up of positions at the last hour and the settling of problems in a manner which proved that something had changed in their relationship. Determining what exactly had changed is difficult. The parties might have felt a certain pressure to fight a war without casualties in order to maintain face in front of their respective memberships. Failure by the negotiating committees to reach an agreement again, after the 1966 fiasco and the 1968 abortion of negotiations, could threaten not only their leadership within their respective constituencies but also each group's structural integrity. The fledgling MEA had everything to prove to stevedores and shipowners still doubtful about its capacity to be a 'normal' employer. As for the union, while it had amply proven its militancy over the last few years, it had yet to show to its membership that it could get things done without having to call a strike. The parties' budding dispute-resolution skills might not have overcome their old instincts had it not been for third-party efforts. After a year spent with Gold's conciliation board, both management and labour knew that they could not 'play' the judge, with his sharp tongue, iron grip, and little tolerance for foolishness. The fact that he remained present to help them negotiate might have contributed to the union making the first concessions instead of trying to keep face at all costs. Similarly, Labour Minister Bryce Mackasey and his executive assistant, Arnie Masters, could take much credit for the provision on containers and job security, without which the negotiations might not have ended so soon or so harmoniously. The government representatives prepared a path for the parties to travel, while guiding them with strong opinions on what kind of demands were reasonable. They cut off escape routes by threatening legislation that would enact Judge Gold's recommendations (over which they obviously had influence) and by keeping a tight control over what information was released to the public. Mackasey himself was not one to downplay his contribution. When the settlement was announced, he walked into the glare of the cameras with his arm around Judge Gold, basking in the success of the negotiation. But what role did he really play in

136 Waterfront Blues helping the parties reach agreement? Gold said his role was a minor one,53 but the truth is somewhat different. While Masters probably deserves the bulk of the credit for the last-minute settlement, he was working for Mackasey and with Mackasey's approval. Their efforts might have been less successful had each party not kept an open mind. On the union's side, when the time came for decisions, St-Onge proved himself to be both a progressive and a practical union leader, able to admit the importance of productivity while reaching out his hand in the interest of progress by making the first and major concession. On management's side, I feel that I can take some credit for the realization that our stand on what was reasonable had to go beyond costs to take into consideration the union's interests. I said in an address shortly after the agreement was reached: 'Had anyone suggested December last that a 3 year contract would be signed between the Employers' Association and the ILA by April 8th without a strike or lock-out, I would have said he was crazy... What has obviously happened, however, is an awareness by labour that to fight automation is self-defeating because the ships can go elsewhere and an understanding by management that the effects of technological change on the labour force must be taken into consideration in collective bargaining.'54 Once each party accepted the legitimacy of the other's concerns and adjusted its demands accordingly, coming to an agreement was only a matter of time. The 1969 negotiations marked a turning point in the waterfront's history of labour relations because they bridged tradition and modernization, the old and the new, as much in terms of work conditions and structural changes as in terms of attitudes. There would still be much difficulty in pushing ahead with change. But at last the parties had decided to stop running from the beast and to tame it instead, while also understanding that they had to do it together.

CHAPTER SIX

Treading Water

The agreement of 8 April 1969 was based on both parties' acceptance of the notion that technological change was acceptable so long as workers did not suffer from it. Afterwards, flying high on their success, management and labour made a serious and sincere effort to negotiate yet unresolved issues. But, while the idea that technological change should not penalize workers was fine in principle, its application was another matter. As the parties attempted to devise solutions to unresolved issues, they ended up designing an extravagantly onerous contract that did not foster increased productivity. In the midst of all of this, Local 375 undertook a determined, and ultimately successful, campaign to extend its reach into areas that had previously fallen under the jurisdiction of other locals or unions. The result was a still stronger union, at the very time when management, despite the fledgling MEA, remained deeply divided over a host of issues. Gradually, management, too, would get its act together, driven in large part by the necessity of responding with one voice to what in our view were the ill-conceived recommendations of the Smith commission on the causes of labour unrest on the waterfront. But, before that day arrived, internal disunity remained a millstone around our neck, preventing us from accomplishing much of anything and, what was just as serious, heightening our vulnerability to an increasingly formidable Local 375. Job Security and Productivity In May, despite the settlement of 8 April, ships had not yet returned to the port. Hardly any assessments against tonnage were going into the job-security fund while massive sums had to be paid out to longshoremen sitting at home waiting for work. By 10 May, payments due in the three river ports were two weeks outstanding and totalled $260,000. The MEA tried to use the situation as a nego-

138 Waterfront Blues tiation incentive, promising to advance money to the fund if the union accepted its proposals, but St-Onge refused and, as provided in the 8 April agreement, the outstanding issues were referred to Judge Gold for arbitration. While awaiting his award, the parties continued to meet to find an immediate solution to the insolvency of the fund. They were well aware of the drainage that occurred when work opportunities were poorly distributed between regular gang members and the others of Local 375 (extras, fill-ins, and non-eligible members). The fund, however, was also used to pay guarantees to shipliners (Local 1552) and checkers (Local 1657) and the MEA thought that interchangeability arrangements between the different locals could help reduce the drain by ensuring that union members eligible for the job-security plan were employed before non-eligible members, regardless of their respective locals. By 2 June, the union and the MEA had agreed on certain revisions to the job-security plan and the 8 April agreement. The new agreement clarified who was covered by the plan, an issue that had arisen as a result of the divergent results obtained in tabulating hours worked the prior year (hardly a surprising outcome in an era of manual record-keeping). It indicated that the list submitted by the ILA (which included 76 more names than the MEA's, for a total of 2,ioi1) would have precedence but that, in the future, the list would be based on records computed by the Central Records Bureau. All work covered in the collective agreements of all ILA locals would be reserved for union members eligible for the plan. Only when all eligible men of a local and all eligible men of another local allowed to replace them had been called could non-eligible members be called. To freeze the workforce as a whole rather than local by local, it was agreed that instead of vacancies in a particular local being filled by hiring new workers, an eligible worker from another local would get the job if sufficiently qualified.2 As soon as the agreement was signed, a bank loan was taken to pay outstanding job-security dues, with the TDF as collateral.3The agreement set the stage for further interchangeability arrangements that would eventually culminate in mergers of locals to resolve the jurisdictlonal disputes that would intensify as technological change reduced manpower requirements. A week later, on 11 June, Judge Gold handed down his award. Written as a collective agreement, it was undoubtedly the most explicit and thickest set of rules ever to bind the parties. It consecrated what had been agreed by the parties on 2 June, namely, that all work covered by the collective agreement was exclusively reserved for members of Local 375 and those allowed to fill in, except if such work was covered in part or in full by the contracts of other unions or locals. These clauses would soon cause a commotion since the rights created by the award conflicted with existing practices that other parties - labour groups and managerial interests alike - were unwilling to abandon. All men would be classified by a joint committee for each existing job category. If all gang members were not required to perform an operation, the employer could assign the surplus men

Treading Water 139 to any other work covered by the agreement. Seniority, established on the basis of years of registered union membership and regular employment, would be the deciding factor in promotions and demotions for candidates of equal competence. Every day, each company would give preference to the gangs with the lowest earnings of the current week. Rotation would be extended to double-time on weekends and holidays. Longshoremen suspended or discharged by a company could not be dispatched to any other company unless reinstated by agreement or arbitration. Management's right to use containers without any restriction was explicitly spelled out. The arrangement devised in November 1968 between the ILA and Furness Withy, so far the only container-terminal operator in Montreal, remained in effect, whereby the company's longshoremen were exempt from rotation and were paid their job security by the company rather than by the fund. A joint committee of six would hear grievances and, failing resolution, refer them to an arbitrator chosen from a list of four, with Judge Gold receiving preference. Another joint committee of six chaired by an impartial person would take charge of safety issues. A worker who alleged unsafe working conditions and refused to work would be immediately met by one of these safety officers, who would decide upon the validity of the claim and instruct the worker accordingly, thus solving problems before a work stoppage would occur. Gold's award also provided that the Federation would create and administer a central pay office where the files of all employees and employers would be kept and which would issue paycheques from the moneys collected from each employing company. This clause was introduced despite the fact that the Maritime Data Centre (MDC), incorporated on 12 March, had been performing this function for a few months. It foreshadowed an escalating feud between the Federation and the IASC which would come close to destroying the MEA. Hardly a month had elapsed since the signing of the latest agreements before employers were warning that major productivity problems persisted on the waterfront and, more important, that incremental improvements would be insufficient to remedy them. Jack Eyre, president of Saguenay Shipping and a member of the MEA board, sent a letter to St-Onge and me to 'philosophize' about the problem (a copy was sent to Mackasey). 'We are headed for trouble,' Eyre said. 'During the first several weeks or month after the signing of the current contract, we were happy. On several occasions, with our (two) palletized ships, we watched cargo go aboard at the rate of 50 to 53 tons per gang hour. We began to hope that the problems of the port might be over. However, the honeymoon is over. We are now down to some very sorry productivity figures.' Low productivity, he believed, was only the symptom of a much deeper problem rooted in the unrealistic concepts underlying the contract. 'I am told that everything in our contract evens out the good and the bad in such a way that there is no real point in being good.'4

140 Waterfront Blues The fact that productivity was definitely on a downward trend despite the considerable concessions made to labour clearly showed that management's efforts to negotiate a win-win situation was a failure. Norman Wolfe, another member of the MEA board and the president of Wolfe Stevedores, also wrote to the board declaring that he felt 'most strongly that our responsibility as Directors of the MEA is such that we can no longer afford to postpone dealing with this cancer eating at the vitals of the port of Montreal/ In his 'plea for recognition of reality/ Wolfe pointed out that, as a result of wage increases and mandatory contributions to the job-security fund and the TDF, the cost of a man-hour had increased by more than 70 per cent in three years. Nevertheless, productivity was still dropping. Wolfe's diagnosis was the same as Eyre's: 'If we examine some of the generally accepted factors which motivate the working man to produce, it becomes readily apparent that these incentives do not exist in our situation, or even worse, that many features of our contract are counter-productive.' Fear of discipline was non-existent. With the introduction of equalization and seniority provisions, the traditional belief that 'hard work was the best form of job security' had disappeared completely. Continuity of work and the development of a certain familiarity with a company's equipment, two elements that might contribute to higher productivity, were circumvented by rotation rules. Because of the job-security fund's insolvency, it was actually to a man's advantage to work slower rather than faster - and so be paid from payroll - rather than be owed money from an empty job-security fund.5 While most of management was seriously concerned about the contract's high costs and low returns, the union would not even admit that productivity levels were down. Ships had returned and all operations appeared to be running as usual, which caused St-Onge to believe that management's pleas were driven by an insatiable hunger for profit. He was upset at questions regarding a possible slowdown and assumed that management remained paranoid following his harangue to longshoremen, two years earlier, about not getting their shirts wet. He could not or would not believe that the job-security fund was not being kept afloat with the existing contribution and decided that employers had to be lying about the amount of cargo handled to avoid paying. Roaming the docks, he looked for cranes straining to lift containers that they should have been able to handle easily. Management argued with him in vain that stevedores charged their customers on tonnage handled and would have been shooting themselves in the foot by declaring less than the actual amount handled; St-Onge did not listen, refusing to admit the obvious: that the weekly job-security system was clearly not viable under the existing conditions. Management knew that the best it could do until the following negotiations was to try to keep everything pieced together with whatever improvements it

Treading Water 141 could make within the limits of the current contract. An agreement was reached in September allowing eligible longshoremen to be dispatched as extra or fill-in checkers. The arrangement made both checkers and longshoremen uneasy. Each group considered itself superior to the other and some would probably have preferred not working at all than working on the other's turf. Nor were the employers necessarily pleased; although there was the rare note of praise, many employers complained on the grounds that longshoremen arrived for their assignments hours late, often could not read or write enough to understand instructions, did not 'dress appropriately,' and were often called back to their gangs the next period, which created all kinds of difficulties. To lay the grounds for reform, the MEA commissioned the firm Hickling Johnson to 'review the dispatch cycle in the ports of Montreal, Trois-Rivieres, and Quebec City for the purpose of recommending modifications which would improve the effectiveness of dispatch procedures, eliminate unwarrantable claims on the job security fund and rationalize the various inter-related functions in the dispatch cycle.' Issued in early November, this report described the manualdispatch system as an awkward patchwork of 'cumbersome and inefficient,' 'duplicated and self defeating'6 processes. The dispatch centre, which operated as a department of the Shipping Federation, was open only five days a week, nine hours a day, while the port operated seven days a week and around-the-clock. As for the dispatch hall, where longshoremen congregated before being dispatched, it was 'a shell of a building, inadequately equipped and poorly located for dispatching men over the entire waterfront area,'7 run by two employees chosen from the union ranks and paid by the Federation. The hall was insufficiently staffed to ensure discipline. From their office, the two dispatchers were unable to see, let alone control, what transpired in the hall. They could not prevent crap games nor could they ensure that a man dispatched left the hall immediately and on a direct route to his assigned job site. It was difficult to establish whether the long delays between the time some men were sent from the hall and showed up on site were due to ill will or to the lack of a transportation system over the eleven miles of docks. Errors regularly resulted in absurdities such as men being ordered to three different sites at once. In addition, there was no way to determine or confirm an extra's classification. The dispatcher would merely ask a man if he could operate a certain machine and dispatch him accordingly. Longshoremen could therefore choose their work each call without necessarily being very good at it. There was no procedure to discipline men who might decide unilaterally to quit their jobs before the end of the period. Neither was there any obligation for men to advise the centre of their unavailability for a certain period prior to the calls being recorded on the phone lines. Unsurprisingly, compensatory measures had developed in reaction to the dis-

142 Waterfront Blues patch problems. When men were missing from the gang at the beginning of a work period, the holdmen (those longshoremen who worked in ships' holds) present would begin the work with a view of leaving at mid-shift, when the fill-ins who had arrived would take over. All would be paid for the full shift nonetheless. It was difficult to count and identify gang members at any point in time, and the redundant ones drifted in and out of holds, on and off ships, without anyone keeping tab. The relief system that provided for extra men in certain situations did not specify a reasonable amount of off-time. Working men were never to leave their post without specific authorization by the foreman, who was supposed to know who was on relief and who was not, but the most superficial inquiries clearly revealed that such was not the case. Gangs or extras who reported to a site might leave and report to the hall in the hope to be redispatched as fill-ins. Foremen or walking bosses calling the dispatch centre for fill-ins would identify absentees by name, union number, and classification. When the centre relayed the call to the hall, however, it would indicate only the number offill-insrequired by each particular foreman. Thus, absentees who had shown up at the hall might be redispatched. Faulty dispatch procedures put strain on the job-security fund. Men ordered to the hall for the first call had to be there by 8 A.M., but if they arrived late and missed their calls, they were still present for the availability check which took place after the actual dispatching and which enabled them to collect job security (eight hours per call). Saturdays were 'free call' days, meaning that whoever wanted to work the lucrative double-time shifts could show up at the hall for dispatch. While these hours were counted for job-security purposes, no method existed to ensure that eligible members not having reached their forty hours or members with the lowest earnings would be given preference in dispatch order. The majority of union members who reported regularly to work complained bitterly that they were the ones who worked to replenish the job-security fund from which slackers were collecting. The Hickling Johnson study made clear that the work system in Montreal relied on the good faith of longshoremen. Some recommendations, such as changes in the right to refuse work and in rotation mechanisms, would require changes in the collective agreements and would emerge as demands in the following round of negotiations. Others, such as additional phone lines and staff, would be incrementally implemented over the next two years. Still others, such as disciplinary measures, would meet fierce resistance at the implementation stage and have limited success. It was the hard-headed employers, such as Norman Wolfe, who won the advances in managerial rights that all others would benefit from. Wolfe wrote to the MEA demanding the establishment of sanctions for flagrant instances of poor productivity and the treatment of the gang as a unit by punishing

Treading Water 143 the innocent along with the guilty: 'This is what might be called the stick approach but unfortunately we do not seem to have any carrots left/8 His proposition met with a lukewarm response from the MEA; defining what constituted poor productivity would be difficult and might lead to managerial abuse and labour unrest. So as not to rock the boat, Wolfe's suggestion was shelved and forgotten, except by Norman himself, who took matters into his own hands and dismissed a gang in mid-shift for lack of productivity. In response to a grievance filed against Wolfe's company, Gold stated that 'an employer who is not satisfied with the work of his employees has the right to stop them from working.'9 His award provided some relief to employers who, despite a neatly composed management-rights clause, had felt that the new employment and rotation rules deprived them of the ability to get rid of bad workers. The Hickling Johnson recommendation that towered over all others, however, was the one that emphasized the urgent need for 'more sophisticated/ integrated operations that might 'only be achieved within the framework of a strong central organization/10 At the time, virtually all managerial functions were duplicated. The Shipping Federation collected moneys for the job-security and technologicaldisplacement funds, as well as for the benefit plans, which it sent to the Central Records Bureau. For its part, the dispatch centre sent all the time sheets, with a list of deductions to be made, to the Montreal Stock Exchange, and the Exchange, which had a contract with the dispatch centre for this purpose, computed and returned a list of hours worked, refused, and owed in job security for each worker. The dispatch centre relayed the list to the Central Records Bureau, which issued job-security cheques on instruction from the Federation. The Maritime Data Centre received time sheets from timekeepers and computed and issued each worker's weekly pay cheques. The scattering and duplication of functions was largely due to the ongoing power struggle between the IASC and the Federation, which many - including me - believed could be resolved only through the forum provided by the MEA. Unfortunately, we still had not resolved our old conflicts. For all the recent accomplishments and goodwill in negotiations, management remained limited in its ability to respond to issues with one voice. This was especially worrisome given that considerable changes were yet to come through the complete transformation of the harbour into terminal operations, a development sure to cause labour upheaval. Terminal operations grew out of the notion that too many cooks spoiled the broth - or, in this case, that too many parties involved in cargo handling made for big losses and horrid insurance rates. The numerous unions representing workers involved in part of the operations were pitted one against another in a fight that would determine who was to be able to work in the terminals. I had long seen the

144 Waterfront Blues writing on the wall, warning in May 1969 that 'the fragmented state of the industry, the jurisdictional feuds between the plethora of transport unions, the maze of private and public authorities responsible for planning' would have to 'give way to new forms of cooperation and mergers.'11 On the union side, St-Onge was clearly not the kind of dog to share his bone, and the rivalry between Local 375 and other workers was bound to have an adverse effect on management. Local 375 on the March When work had been mainly manual, the different unions and locals active in the harbour had shared the load harmoniously, each having enough work to keep to its own backyard. With the advent of more technology on the waterfront, however, Local 375 sought to protect itself by extending its jurisdiction over other jobs previously performed by non-longshoremen. Smouldering feuds with other labour groups were fuelled by the NHB announcement that it intended to transform the harbour into fully integrated terminal operations by the spring of 1970. As things then stood, road-transport firms, stevedoring contractors, security services, and steamship agents, all of whom had their separate areas of responsibility inside sheds, employed workers from separate labour pools that belonged to different unions and different union locals. For an unloading operation, longshoremen (Local 375) unloaded cargo on the docks; members of small ILA locals attached to particular stevedoring companies (locals 1925 to 1930) piled it into the sheds; checkers (Local 1657) counted the number of boxes to verify with the bill of lading that the cargo was all there; and freighthandlers from the National Brotherhood of Freighthandlers,12 along with truckers and their helpers from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters/3 came into the sheds to find their respective cargo and load it onto vehicles, railway cars for the former and trucks for the latter. Many freighthandlers contracted with a company called Lapalme Trucking, which owned about forty lift trucks and employed its own lift-truck drivers. This constant movement of people in and out of sheds, coupled with the impossibility of verifying whether they had any legitimate business being there, led to delays, theft, general confusion, and irresponsible handling of goods. Under the traditional system, there was no one who could be held accountable. Importers and exporters paying exorbitant insurance premiums denounced this state of affairs with increasing indignation, and they found echoes of support in the press which carried stories of Vichy water being dumped on the wharves in freezing weather and steel shipments being dropped in November mud and becoming frozen-in all winter.14 The Canadian Importers Association described the gross inefficiency of the harbour as a 'tragedy': 'Errors are compounded, problems seem purposefully created and port efficiency and reputation sizzle downward to ob-

Treading Water 145 livion... The association says the situation at the port is beyond belief. Dedicated, hard-working members of the National Harbours Board's operational and security staffs, the Montreal Port Council and most members of the unionized work force are attempting to perform their work under a blanket of jurisdictional disputes, commissions, inquiries, ministerial intrusions and union back biting.'15 The general view that putting goods in the harbour was like 'putting chips on a roulette table'16 was unnerving to port manager Guy Beaudet. Deciding to bite the bullet, he proposed, in the spring of 1969, that the work of taking the cargo to and from sheds and vehicles be performed by 'terminal staff.' Mostly everyone concerned agreed with the principle of terminal operations and the consequent centralization of labour within a terminal as a step towards the restoration of dependable service in Montreal, but the NHB's approach and timing left much to be desired and had many worried. Any changes in an established structure, especially one of the magnitude of terminal operations, implied radical alterations in different groups' rights and jurisdiction and, therefore, power. The fact that the NHB had issued a general plan and set a short time-frame for its implementation without consulting any of the groups which would be affected by it made everyone unsure of where they could expect to end up in the shuffle. Each group who saw an opportunity in terminal operations was matched by another who saw danger. On management's side, shipping agents and independent stevedores anticipated changes in shed-leasing arrangements, the former with fear and the latter with hope. The one party in control of the whole handling process would have to be the employer of the men working in the terminal, which would automatically eliminate the practice of independent stevedoring contractors bringing their gangs and equipment to their customer (the shipowner or agent) from one shed to the next. The direct employers of labour hoped to obtain the right to lease sheds that had traditionally been reserved exclusively to agents. In the current system, independent contractors had to wait for shipowners or agents to obtain a shed before approaching them with offers of services. The restriction had been a substantial competitive disadvantage for independent stevedores in their race for business with house stevedores, who sought out 'filler' contracts to make the best utilization of their parent company's shed and equipment.17 For years, many independent stevedoring contractors had been demanding the right to rent sheds, and they resented those who overtly put up with the restriction while covertly making private deals with agents to be the exclusive labour supplier of all their customers. The ones with private deals dared not come out in support of change: 'They were playing footsy with agents and didn't want to stir up the animals.'18 As for the agents, they, too, were deeply concerned about the possibility of losing their exclusive rights over shed-leasing and the lucrative profits made therefrom. Landlords without responsibilities,

146 Waterfront Blues who leased sheds from the NHB and charged shipowners for the use of the space on a tonnage basis, they responded to the NHB's proposal by sternly warning that if terminal leases were to be 'thrown wide open at an auction and made available to the highest bidder/ they were against the conversion to terminal operations.19 The various labour groups involved also faced an unknown fate and their members bore the weight of this uncertainty with varying amounts of stoicism. It was clear that all current divisions of work jurisdictions inside sheds would disappear in favour of a single group of employees bound to the terminal operator. Since the bulk of longshoring work would shift from docks to sheds, Local 375 would lose much ground unless it expanded its jurisdiction, but other unions and locals had no intention of letting themselves be bulldozed over. This labour problem was sure to become management's. I warned the industry at a conference that we had to be ready and willing to get involved in labour's struggle not only because it might degenerate into something ugly otherwise but also because it was everyone's responsibility to help build a cohesive work system for the future: 'We must make sure that any fundamental changes being made now will not create problems of a worse nature than presently exist. If terminal operations mean progress, then labour should not stand in the way of such progress. But somebody had better start talking about the situation to all interested parties... It is too much to expect one union or one local to give up any acquired rights to any other union or local. And it is too much to expect any company to give up acquired rights... It would be a tragedy indeed if insufficient planning resulted in major labour unrest because of jurisdictional disputes not being considered in advance.'20 The Federation held many meetings with the NHB to present its views and emphasize the urgency of redefining labour jurisdictions before any other issues could be decided upon, but it was met with a non-committal response.21 The issue, however, could not be avoided indefinitely. As a result of contractual rights granted to Local 375 in Judge Gold's award of 11 June, it quickly came to a head. In his award, Gold had composed an all-encompassing work-jurisdiction clause (1.10) which read: 'Any handling of goods in the Port of Montreal, any loading or unloading of containers, any loading or unloading of trucks, as well as any handling of goods to be loaded on ships, as well as related operations such as, but not restricting, the pilling [sic] in the shed, strapping of cargo, cleaning and sweeping of sheds in which cargo is placed, maintenance of water closets and waiting rooms, transportation of all kinds of gear, including gasoline, by truck, mechanics and assistant mechanics operations, as well as the maintenance of heavy-lift equipment, must all be performed by members of the local [375].'22 In an acknowledgment that some of this work was currently performed by other labour groups, Gold had written clause 1.11, which stated that 1.10 did not apply when other unions or locals were certified to perform the said work or any part thereof.

Treading Water 147 The MEA's counsel, Brian Mulroney, had been horrified by Gold's imposition of these provisions, which, he argued, usurped the power of the Canada Labour Relations Board in labour-certification issues and so were illegal. When confronted, Gold had casually conceded that Mulroney was probably correct, but he pointed out that the MEA would be ill-advised to contest the clause, anger Local 375, and leave the problem unsolved. Whether clause 1.10 actually solved anything was certainly a matter of perspective. What it did was give St-Onge a legal platform to justify attempts to take over work performed by others. There were two main types of work that Local 375 intended to take over based on clause 1.10: shed work (including, when required, the stuffing and unstuffing of containers) and the loading and unloading of trucks. The former type of work was mainly performed by small ILA locals, the members of which also operated lifters and fixed equipment and performed other 'mechanical' tasks. Each of these locals 'belonged' to a particular independent stevedoring contractor and had indeed been established with the help of the contractors in an effort to avoid the employment of longshoremen from Local 375. The members of these small locals, who benefited from regular employment with a single stevedoring contractor, were not interested in handing their work over to Local 375, nor were they interested in a fusion that would cause them to melt into an anonymous mass of longshoremen. Their employers were also ferociously opposed to a transfer of jurisdiction that would subject shed work to rotation and other cumbersome employment rules. Having to deal with the employers to get to the small locals loaded the game with managerial politics and turned the situation into a Pandora's box which no one, except Local 375, was eager to open. The loading and unloading of trucks was currently performed by the truckers or their helpers, most of whom were Teamsters members. As was later pointed out, if jurisdiction was to change hands, between one hundred and five hundred men permanently stationed beside sheds to await trucks would become useless and probably lose their jobs.23 Although truckers had performed the work of loading their own trucks 'since the horse cart,'24 their certification did not specifically cover that work and so St-Onge was able to claim it for Local 375 based on clauses 1.10 and 1.11. Lapalme Trucking, however, had no intention of being closed down. In August 1969, two months after the problem of work jurisdiction had been brought to the forefront of discussions on terminal operations, nothing had been done to resolve it, which made St-Onge increasingly aggressive. The employers of the small locals organized a fierce resistance that would have been beyond the capacity of those locals themselves. Pointing out that the collective agreement reserved the work of loading and unloading cargo in containers to 'ILA labour only' but not to Local 375 specifically, they took the position that if Local 375 did not agree with this interpretation, it could file a grievance; otherwise, any inter-

148 Waterfront Blues ference by the union would trigger strong legal action. In fact, Local 375 was filing not one but hundreds of grievances with regard to the application of clause 1.10. The Federation wrote repeatedly to Judge Gold, the minister of labour, and the NHB, stressing the urgency of the situation and urging them to accept some responsibility for resolving the problem.25 When no reaction was forthcoming, the MEA took it upon itself to file a grievance concerning the interpretation of the clause with reference to container stuffing and truck loading. Gold's ruling was issued on 12 September. It made clear that the stuffing and unstuffing of container cargo and the loading and unloading of trucks was 'rightfully' Local 3/5's, but it left the parties to figure out what to do with the small locals and how to get the truckers and stevedoring contractors to accept the decision. St-Onge was angry that the judge would wash his hands of the implementation of a clause he had chosen to introduce in the contract. His anger was further fuelled by the fact that, despite continuous efforts to develop new interchangeability rules and tighter dispatch procedures,26 the job-security fund was again running a deficit. Under the terms of the n June award, the money left in the TDF following the repayment of the bank loan could not be used to bolster the job-security fund until an impartial chairman was appointed by the labour minister. In the meantime, no job-security payments were issued. St-Onge was getting sick of Gold, Mackasey, and their people; in his eyes, they were quick to bring in laws and awards and push the parties around when it suited them, but when the time came for them to get involved in helping to implement these decisions, they were of no help - their attitude seemed to be, 'Deal with it as you see fit.' And so, St-Onge concluded, this is exactly what they would do. On Monday, 20 October, St-Onge halted all shed work and demanded that his local be given the job of loading and unloading trucks. The MEA consulted Gold, who stated that he would not discuss the longshoremen's grievances until they returned to work. When Gold met with the two sides that evening, he told St-Onge to order the men back to work and provide him with a list of grievances. St-Onge replied that Local 375 would take over truck loading and unloading on its own initiative whether that work was currently performed by unionized workers or not. Gold reacted by tendering his resignation as the senior arbitrator under the collective agreement.27 On 21 October the members of Local 375 attempted to carry out St-Onge's threat. Truck operators resisted and motor-vehicle pick-up and delivery service halted in the harbour area. The Quebec Trucking Assocation (QTA), on behalf of its affected members, later in the day obtained an injunction restraining the longshoremen, and the next day truck loading and unloading activity returned more or less to normal.28 In the meantime, we had contacted Mackasey and he

Treading Water 149 arranged for Charlie Poirier to speak with St-Onge; the union agreed to call off the work stoppage in the sheds and both parties undertook to present their grievances to Gold. Although Gold had tendered his resignation, Mackasey persuaded him to change his mind. The judge now agreed to hear the grievances over the next ten days. When I reported on these events to a joint meeting of the general membership of the Federation and the IASC on 25 October, one shipping agent was of the opinion that the collective agreement had proven useless and that shipowners should be advised to avoid Montreal for the balance of the season. I took the position that perhaps the union had been justified in its actions. Management was far from blameless and had contributed to undermining the contract. I also argued that the time had come for labour relations in our industry to be handled by professionals, since management was too big, too unwieldy, and too slow. The meeting agreed that the ten-day exercise in front of Gold should proceed, in the hope that an agreement would settle all serious problems for the duration of the contract.29 The parties started meeting the following day. Mackasey applied pressure by leaking unconfirmed reports that he was expected to seek cabinet approval for a series of radical measures to clean up the waterfront's labour-relations problems once and for all. The rumours played on the parties' nerves and they attempted to negotiate a resolution to the jurisdiction problem with renewed goodwill. One condition, however, was non-negotiable for the union: to reach an agreement, all job-security payments had to be paid by 30 October. The deficit of the job-security fund now totalled $84,000 and the only way to get that kind of money was through another bank loan. Since the level of shipping activity always increased near the end of the season, I believed that the loan could be repaid within a month through the existing assessments if there were no further traffic disruptions.30 The Federation's Executive Council resolved to borrow up to $120,000 for advances to the fund contingent upon the signing of an agreement.31 Armed with this promise of payment, we met with the ILA. Within three days, we had an agreement. On 30 October the parties signed an agreement addressing work jurisdiction and job security. All outstanding dues would be paid by 6 November, after which management would take it upon itself to ensure that payments would be made every Thursday as prescribed by the collective agreement. A tripartite committee chaired by Charlie Poirier would be formed to study and make recommendations regarding the monthly guarantee in force in Quebec and Trois-Rivieres. In terms of work jurisdiction, the case of the railway freighthandlers, who previously had been destined to be fired, was resolved by the railway's decision to absorb them. The status quo for loading and unloading trucks would be maintained until the opening of the 1970 navigation season and until agreements had been worked out

150 Waterfront Blues with the Teamsters union. The small mechanical locals would be fused with Local 375. The independent stevedoring companies that employed them (ECS, Brown and Ryan, Empire Stevedoring, and Wolfe Stevedores) and that acted as their spokespersons put up quite a fight; however, a compromise was reached whereby, despite the merger with Local 375, stevedoring contractors would keep workers permanently stationed in sheds to carry out 'mechanical' work.32 On the strength of these agreements, the parties agreed to recommend to the NHB the prompt establishment of terminal operations, and the NHB's terminal operations committee began designing new rules to deal with tariffs, shed allocation, and other such matters. Managerial Division While Local 375 was extending its reach and becoming ever more powerful, management continued to struggle to turn the MEA into an effective entity. A particularly troublesome issue in this regard was the familiar one of organizational control. In May 1969 stevedoring contractor Bill Brown wrote to me saying that he could not help but think that the MEA board should be controlled by direct employers since shipowners and agents operated in many ports and thus had little vested interest in any particular one. But, he added, 'just as the employers association should not be a carbon copy of the Federation, neither should it be merely the expansion of the IASC,'33 and he suggested that owners and agents should remain represented on the Board of Directors in a proportion of three directors out of nine (instead of five). The MEA's nine-man shadow board discussed the letter and concluded that perhaps the structure that Brown proposed made the most sense; the mere fact that the control issue kept coming up after we thought it had been resolved was a sign that the current structure was untenable. Besides, a structure dominated by the stevedoring contractors was what the steering committee had initially recommended in May 1968. But when I reported to the Federation's Executive Council, on 21 May, that the MEA was not working out and that the board believed it might be preferable to remodel the representation ratios in favour of independent stevedoring contractors, I met with obvious unease and resistance. The discussion was recorded in the minutes as follows: Our principal fear in relinquishing control of shore labour negotiations to the stevedoring contractors has historically been that as labour costs are paid by the ship owners, he has the most at stake and, therefore, the most to lose should such costs increase unduly. It has always been felt that the stevedore's prime interest in negotiations would be to obtain a contract and keep the ports working with costs involved

Treading Water 151 being a secondary consideration. He [Pathy] felt personally that this fear was unfounded, particularly now when stevedores were required to equip themselves with quite expensive modern cargo handling machines requiring the investment of large sums of money. There would also be checks on irresponsible collective bargaining through the agents/employer members of the MEA and through the stevedores contracts with their principals. Under the proposed re-constitution of the MEA, the fear was expressed that the achievement of port-wide rotationof gangs, a system favoured by a majority of Federation members, would be more difficult to attain as the larger stevedores favour the parent gang system which precludes true port-wide rotation. Mr. Pathy recognized this but felt port-wide rotation was inevitable despite stevedore objections.34 Unsurprisingly, on 26 June, in my absence, the council rejected the proposal and voted for the status quo. I was informed of the Federation's decision through a letter, addressed to me as chairman of the MEA, which suggested that the association should proceed as quickly as possible with its formal creation as a legal entity and the hiring of professional staff.35 Throughout the summer months the MEA board, flanked by legal counsels and staff members, intensified its efforts to define by-laws, organizational structures, operating procedures, and budgets and to hire supplementary staff. By early July, candidates had been interviewed and offers made despite the fact that the association remained inoperative and still largely undefined. The new chief executive officer was found in late August in the person of Hubert Benoit, whose forthrightness in demanding full authority to implement the board's policies and the collective agreements convinced us that we had found the right man for the job. Benoit wanted a ten-year contract, starting on i November 1969, and one year's worth of salary if the MEA decided to terminate his employment. I could not blame him for asking for guarantees and I pushed to make the deal against marked reluctance on the part of many board members, an action that I would come to regret. Another issue bedevilling the MEA was no less familiar: the organization's financing. In the 1968 terms of agreement with the IASC, the Federation had agreed to assume the costs of the MEA until things could be worked out, but this arrangement was to expire on 31 December 1969. As that deadline approached, the Federation was increasingly anxious about the lack of progress in developing a new financial structure, and it had no intention of being saddled with the MEA's costs indefinitely.36 In early December, Colley reminded me that the Federation had undertaken to finance the MEA only until 31 December and he wanted to know when we would be ready to take over all legal and financial responsibility for labour relations.37 On 18 December the Federation passed a resolution whereby the MEA was to take over legal and financial responsibilities for labour relations

152 Waterfront Blues by i January 1970, with a postponement being allowed only on the grounds of technical difficulties. The resolution also expressed the Federation's expectation that the MEA would 'assume its full responsibilities in the administration of a Central Pay System and in the development of other data for the administration of shore labour contracts and for shore labour negotiations/38 While providing a certain element of pressure, the resolution did not bridge the differences of opinion which persisted between the IASC and the Federation. Less than a week later, it was the lASC's turn to pass a resolution with regard to the MEA. The first part of this resolution was similar to the Federation's statement; the second paragraph, however, noted that 'in the adoption of the foregoing, the Interprovincial Association of Stevedoring Contractors will expect the Maritime Employers Association to support the continued use of the Maritime Data Centre, already a properly constituted Multi-Employer Unit, in fulfilling the responsibility of management to provide a single pay system, which has been successfully accomplished through the Maritime Data Centre since May ig6g.'39 With this problem still squarely on the table, the year 1969 came to an end; the resolution providing that the MEA was to have assumed all responsibility for labour relations as of i January had no effect. Although frequent meetings were held where the Federation insisted that it could not continue assuming the MEA's financial burden for much longer, there seemed to be no realistic alternative. The Federation continued paying out the money needed but only as a loan that the MEA was expected to pay back once it became fully operational. Soon afterwards, the MEA board voted to finance its operations by levying an assessment on cargo and payroll, starting i April 1970. Issues of policy continued to be held in deadlock mainly because of the question of the Maritime Data Centre. In a letter dated 14 January 1970, the IASC reiterated its position that the MDC should remain separate. It argued that the MDC had been accepted by the ILA and was now well established, having obtained multi-employer status as early as 6 September 1969. Furthermore, the MDC had made long-term commitments on the assumption that it would operate undisturbed for an extended period of time. Since it was legally impossible for the MEA to take over the MDC, any shift to a new central pay office would mean starting over from scratch, which the IASC deemed wasteful One possible solution was to invite the independent stevedores who sat on the MEA's board to represent the MEA on the board of the MDC. The MDC could easily take over the functions currently performed by the Central Records Bureau, thus eliminating redundancy and providing the MEA with all the processing services required. The savings directly attributable to the MEA's patronage would be applied against the price charged for the services. At an MEA board meeting on 30 January 1970, however, it rapidly became clear that positions had hardened to

Treading Water 153 the point that no agreement was possible. Divisions began appearing among people who had previously seemed to be of one mind. Hubert Benoit, the MEA's new chief executive officer, aggravated these differences by blaming the failure to come to an agreement on the inflexibility of others, particularly Jack Eyre and me - who, on the Federation's side, forcefully insisted that the MDC should be integrated into the MEA - and Henry Belle and Norman Wolfe, who, from the LASC's trenches, argued the opposite just as forcefully. Because discussions yielded nothing constructive and threatened to create ugly confrontations, the Federation's Executive Council, in early February, decided to shelve the matter until the release of the Smith Report. The Smith Report This report had been ready since October 1969 but the government withheld it from circulation until 4 February 1970, possibly because of what were rumoured to be its 'highly devastating'40 contents. Before its release, the Montreal Gazette claimed that the report 'contains scalding indictments of employer groups operating in the port of Montreal and of several of the unions... in operation on the waterfront, many of them working at cross purposes... The document also contains some of the most radical solutions ever proposed for dealing with the harbour situation. The mood in the Government at the moment appears to favour proceeding with drastic reforms and the Smith report could serve as the basis for legislation.'41 In fact, the report brought nothing new to light and offered few suggestions that had not yet been considered. Some had even already been implemented by the time the report was released. What the report did do, however, was to focus attention on what was by now an all-too-familiar issue which body, the Federation or the IASC, was to have control over labour relations? - and drag it before the MEA, the very institution whose creation had been intended to resolve it. As already explained, the Smith commission had been an integral part of the understanding between the government and the Federation which had led to the voluntary signing of a collective agreement by the Federation and the ILA on 14 June 1966. The Picard commission had been appointed to prepare the way for technological change whereas, in the eyes of management, the Smith commission initially held the promise of unveiling illegal union activities (such as coercion and intimidation) which could be grounds for trusteeship or even decertification based on the precedent set by the Norris inquiry into Hal Banks's SIU in 1963. The Smith commission had been put on hold while the Picard inquiry was under way, to avoid overlap. By the time the government was finally ready to allow Smith to begin his work, in early 1968, management's hopes regarding the

154 Waterfront Blues usefulness of the commission had faded with the realization that its mandate excluded 'normal trade union activities/ The commission had become just another study on theft, pilferage, gambling, and other disciplinary problems.42 The Federation lost interest in the commission and was uncertain whether the legal costs involved in participating in it were worthwhile. In January 1969, in response to Smith's repeated requests, the Federation had finally agreed to participate but only through the newly formed MEA, which would formulate recommendations for management as a whole.43 Unfortunately, as we have seen, dissension between shipowners/agents and independent stevedoring contractors soon surfaced in the MEA, and, as had been the case with the Picard commission, management ended up appearing before Judge Smith as two separate groups; the IASC was represented by David Angus and the Federation by Yves Fortier, whose distinguished legal career in subsequent years, particularly during Mulroney's term in office as prime minister, would include a number of high-profile arbitration and negotiation assignments on the international stage. Since the whole purpose of the Smith commission was to scrutinize labour unrest and its causes, the ILA equipped itself with three counsels: Phil Cutler, Gino Castiglio, and Antonio Lamer (later a chief justice of the Supreme Court).44 Both the ILA and the Federation declined to submit written briefs to Smith because of a fear of leaks, which could undermine their position in other labour-relations matters, such as bargaining and arbitration, and, in the Federation's case, because its members were unable to agree on the contents of a submission.45 In that context, the IASC, only too willing to pour its heart out to Smith, emerged as the darling of the waterfront actors. If fairness consists in blaming everyone equally, Smith was fair. He profusely showered all actors involved with bilious criticism and exposed conflicts which had appeared to be a thing of the past. Despite the progress made in establishing a relationship with the union, 'a large number of management representatives' remained deeply hostile to some people involved in the ILA and had told Smith that 'the one solution to the present labour difficulties was a complete clean-up of the Union ...[which] was harbouring organized crime.'46 Although Smith admitted that some workers were known offenders and that some coordination was necessary to carry out large cargo thefts, he rejected allegations of corruption and Mafia connections in the union executive and blamed instead the inertia of the NHB, the ILA, the Federation, and the stevedoring contractors in dealing with delinquent individuals.47 Smith wrote that the overall role of the NHB, which exercised no authority on individual companies whatsoever, was little more than that of a 'disinterested bystander.' He criticized the government for having adopted a curative rather than a preventive approach to the waterfront's problems and for letting crisis after crisis develop instead of providing ongoing guidance. He de-

Treading Water 155 plored the lack of communication between management and labour and declared that dialogue seemed to take place solely through legal counsels or in the course of a confrontation before a third party. Moreover, he felt that no attempts were being made to provide means by which consultation and dialogue might be promoted. Overall, he said, most of the blame for labour unrest should be attributed to management, whose inability to work together was a serious problem: 'The Shipping Federation appears to be unable to give a complete mandate to its own employees who conduct the collective bargaining and the implementation of the agreement. When this is parallelled with the rivalry that exists between the stevedoring contractors as such (which makes one reluctant to take measures which might put him at a disadvantage in relation to others) and the important members of the Shipping Federation, the end result is usually frustration on all sides. Individual suggestions are made, plans are put forward for unity of action but the end result is lack of cohesion and consensus.'48 Smith was well aware that the newly formed MEA had been created expressly to provide management with a tool to take a unified position towards labour. However, he did not believe in the MEA, which was still often referred to in the press as an 'offshoot'49 or a 'sub-agency'50 of the Federation. The judge was 'given to understand' that there still existed 'rather seriously divergent points of view between the constituent members of the association/ to the extent that it remained 'a matter of grave doubt' whether the MEA would continue to speak for management.51 Smith doubted that effective unanimity on the part of shipowners, agents, and stevedoring contractors was possible. His solution echoed the views expressed by independent stevedores: the Federation should renounce its involvement in labour relations altogether or, alternatively, let the direct employers control the MEA: 'Why ... should the ship owner or agents, neither of whom contribute to the operation of loading or unloading cargo (or have any interest in the operation of the port beyond the profit they respectively derive therefrom), but both of whom seriously complicate the labour-management relationship, participate in, much less dominate the negotiation of collective labour agreements, the terms of which are binding upon the stevedoring contractors?'52 If the Federation was unwilling to step aside gracefully, Smith was in favour of forcing it to: 'The plain fact is that time has run out and unless the unanimity which is essential is achieved very soon ... some external authority may have to intervene to resolve the difficulty.'53 It was plain to see that Smith's 'grave doubt' about the possibility of a unified MEA had been spoon-fed to him by the IASC,54 and it was a bitter disappointment to the Federation that, despite all the dialogue and compromises made over the past two years, independent stevedores remained stuck on their initial position. Smith recommended a multiplicity of changes, many of which had been

156 Waterfront Blues proposed before. These included the integration of small locals from the same union into one big local; the exclusion of foremen and walking bosses from the bargaining unit; the conversion from existing cargo-handling operations to terminal operations; and the development of security measures (police, fences, identification, and so on). His main recommendation, which was original to him, was the establishment of a dock board composed of management and labour appointees and chaired by a government representative. The board would be empowered to arbitrate disputes and conduct local administration of the port, in place of the NHB. It would also be charged with managerial and administrative functions, including the administration of the collective agreement, the enforcement of discipline, the hearing of grievances, and the arbitration of litigious issues. There currently existed a tripartite board chaired by Judge Gold and charged with arbitration duties. But the idea of giving an arbitration board a mandate to exercise managerial functions and discipline seemed to entail, at least theoretically, a conflict of interest. How could the body charged with decision making in management and discipline matters also be responsible for arbitrating disputes arising out of the application of these decisions? Another important recommendation of the Smith commission called for the establishment of a permanent planning committee. This was a sound idea in principle, but Smith wanted the committee staffed with hired professionals who would have the power to make decisions that would bind the parties and anyone else having business with the port. In effect, this was as absurd as having hired staff - maids, butlers, and gardeners - running the household and telling the people who paid them what to do. How could staff take over the long-term planning of a unionized industry where management and labour have to agree on change and working conditions? While Smith had done a decent job of identifying weak spots, the reasoning behind his two main recommendations seemed mind-boggling. Intelligent ideas seemed to be cut and thrown up in the air like pieces of a puzzle and left to fall where they may. What was his motivation? Had he wanted to set himself apart from others who had preceded him in studying the waterfront's problems? Did he seek to prepare the way for a government crackdown that would enjoy public approval? His report left us baffled. In any case, the press had a field day quoting Smith and the NHB's outraged responses. The NHB accused the commission of perpetrating 'falsehoods, omissions and ineptness'55 and charged that Smith had neglected to report on issues included in his mandate while exceeding his mandate on other issues, particularly that of port administration. The board further declared that the report did little more than repeat the findings of other inquiries and studies'56 which had been commissioned by the NHB itself and which had already been acted upon, for example, the setting up offences and the reorganiza-

Treading Water 157 tion of the NHB police force. Both ILA and Federation spokespersons initially withheld comment on the grounds that they had not yet read the report; however, one did not have to be a genius to realize that the parties had little incentive to adopt Smith's recommendations willingly. As for the labour minister, Mackasey, with his usual restraint, called the report 'a sobering document' and declared in the House of Commons that he would implement as soon as possible any of Smith's recommendations which he thought would improve labour relations in the river ports.57 The Smith Report and the MEA The dispute between the IASC and the Federation members of the MEA board concerning the status of the Maritime Data Centre had not been resolved on the eve of the release of the Smith Report, although the parties had tentatively agreed on a method of financing the MEA for the opening of the job-security season on i April 1970. Meanwhile, the day before the report was scheduled for release, Mackasey granted the MEA directors an interview to discuss the Smith Report, but he asked that no press statement be given by the industry for at least fortyeight hours and he warned that differences within the industry must be settled quickly or government action would be taken.58 In the wake of the Smith Report, the Federation's Executive Council agreed that any proposal to Mackasey would be difficult to formulate until the MEA's status was decided upon and its future plan delineated. I expressed the view that Mackasey would have to be presented with a united management through an operational MEA before he could be persuaded to leave the industry in its hands.59 But the report dealt a severe blow to hopes for a viable MEA. The air was charged with tension as the Federation reflected on Smith's acceptance of the lASC's argument that the negotiation and signing of collective agreements be left to the de facto employers on the one hand and the ILA on the other, and on his recommendation that 'as soon as possible' a local dock board be Vested with the authority to enforce the collective agreements and with wide supervisory and disciplinary power and fully capable of exercising same summarily and on the spot.'60 Mackasey strongly believed that, in labour relations, the role of the government should not be to rule over the parties but rather to help them rule themselves through the collective-bargaining process. Mackasey's views aside, however, any government would think twice and then some before intervening in such a drastic manner in an industry when such intervention was unsolicited, when no real crisis existed, when changes were actually being carried out, when a new and publicly acclaimed collective agreement had been voluntarily signed,

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and when the industry in question was longshoring in the Port of Montreal. In any event, on 18 February, the MEA Board of Directors met to discuss the Smith Report. Predictably enough, the IASC representatives announced that they found the report acceptable, though Henry Belle, IASC president, suggested that he wanted greater representation of independent stevedoring contractors on the MEA board. He assured the board that, once the restructuring had been carried out, the MDC question would become secondary, 'one of mechanisms really.'61 Two days later the board met again and received a formal request from Belle to restructure the board so as to have it contain six stevedoring contractors and three representatives of the Federation. In a reversal of a position he had taken the previous year, but now having the Smith Report to hide behind, Belle argued that the stevedoring contractors should be responsible for labour relations since they were the ones who were affected first when things went wrong. This was not entirely true because it was the shipowner who was affected immediately when work stopped and who ultimately paid the price. In response to a question from Fred McCaffrey, Belle said that his group would be ready to assume financial responsibility for the contract commensurate with the 6/3 participation on the board. This was hardly a position to solicit support. In response to another question, he said that he would have no objection if terminal operators were represented on the board.62 When the IASC proposal was put before the Federation's Executive Council on 23 February, it was rejected handily. Mulroney attended the meeting and strongly recommended against allowing control of the MEA to fall into the hands of the stevedoring contractors. A compromise was sought and Jim Thorn, acting as president of the Federation in Herb Colley's absence, was authorized to inform Belle that of the five shipping company nominees on the board, two would be direct employers of labour (terminal operators who were members of the Federation). Mulroney was instructed to meet with the IASC counsel to formulate bylaws on that basis.63 One council member, Bill Eakin, Jr, felt that this position could be dangerous, fragmenting the industry and resulting in trusteeship through Smith's dock board. As others pointed out, however, nothing indicated that Mackasey would support the stevedores in their stand, and Mulroney stated that Gold had told him the previous day that he, too, favoured the status quo of 5/4-64 In considering the actual risk of creating a dock board, we remembered that Mackasey had publicly declared that he would implement all recommendations that would serve to solve labour-relations problems. We did not for a moment believe that the report's recommendations would accomplish that goal and we were sure that Mackasey's instincts would lead him to the same conclusion. The parties had made so much effort to resolve their problems on their own; Mackasey knew this as well as anyone. And if Gold did not think much of the Smith Report,

Treading Water 159 the Federation had an important ally in him, while all the stevedores had was a stack of paper which had so far done little else than create a media circus. When all that needed to be said was said, the directors' recommendation to maintain the status quo was put to a vote: seven were in favour and one against. Jim Thorn, as acting president, was charged to inform Norman Wolfe, the IASC secretary, of the council's decision in writing. Two days later, in response to Thorn's letter, the IASC stated politely but unambiguously that it had not changed its position: Naturally we are most disappointed with your decision... As you well know, we have given long and careful thought to this entire question and have made every endeavour to make our views known to you in a reasonable and conciliatory manner ... At present, there is nothing constructive to add other than to state that our members surely will participate in a Maritime Employers Association, whatever form it takes, but will not furnish directors for any MEA which has a Board controlled by other than representatives of the stevedoring industry. In conclusion, we understand that a suggestion has been made to the effect that we are still bound by the Memorandum of Agreement of November 26th 1968 respecting the establishment of an MEA. As far as we are concerned, that agreement has been without effect for some time now, to the knowledge of both parties. However, lest there be any thought that the agreement is still in force, we hereby render formal notice of termination.65

Nevertheless, the Federation decided to proceed with the effort to breathe life into the MEA, the hope being that we might be able to lure back the stevedoring contractors if the organization was effective. On 10 March, Jack Eyre, Peter Evans, Jim Thorn, Fred McCaffrey, and I were officially elected as the first directors of the association; I was also elected chairman of the board. Hubert Benoit was officially appointed president.66 Membership applications filled by the shipping companies represented on the MEA board were approved. And so the first official board meeting ended. The MEA, no longer a mere shadow body but rather a fully operational entity, now had an amputated Board of Directors and a membership consisting solely of representatives of the directors' shipping companies, for a grand total of five: Federal Commerce and Navigation (the author), Saguenay Shipping (jack Eyre), Furness Withy (Peter Evans), Montreal Shipping (Jim Thorn), and Shipping Limited (Fred McCaffrey). The directors would reconvene often in the following weeks to approve bylaws, letters patent, membership fees, financing (including budgets), and the like. The fact that the task was easier without the stevedores' input was not much of a consolation. The official opening of the shipping season was nearing and the

160 Waterfront Blues vacillating MEA now bore alone the responsibility to make decisions and administer labour relations. Although the stevedoring contractors had willingly exiled themselves, the decisions made without them had to be the right ones, acceptable to those concerned, especially in view of the uncertainty regarding the government's response to the Smith Report. The industry had to prove that it could take care of itself, and it was difficult for the MEA to look convincing when its very purpose, giving all of management a single voice, had been undercut by the direct employers' withdrawal. The independent stevedores believed that their resignation would force the government to the inescapable conclusion that unity on the Federation's terms was impossible and that the only options were to implement a dock board or to force the Federation to relinquish control of the MEA. The MEA needed a chance to show what it could do. Soon, it would be time to negotiate the working conditions of terminal work with the ILA. If the MEA could achieve a good agreement, the government and LASC's own members might question the desirability of supporting the IASC position in the matter of control. It all boiled down to Mackasey's intentions with regard to the recommendations, yet to be made public, of the Smith commission. These intentions remained uncharted territory. Until the sphinx chose to speak, the parties played tug-of-war cautiously, looking for hints and vying for his favour.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Hope Deferred

The government could not avoid taking a position in the MEA dispute because the issue of control over the association had figured prominently in the report of the Smith commission, which the government itself had created. Convinced that the government would support the report's recommendations, the IASC demanded a restructuring of the MEA board, a demand that the Federation, which was equally convinced that the government would not intervene, rejected. With the lASC's withdrawal from the MEA, the parties brought the matter to a head. Mackasey took his time responding. His first concern was the port's prosperity and his first priority, before solving any schoolyard feuds, was to oversee the implementation of terminal operations. Then, and only then, would he turn to the vexed matter of the MEA - and, when he did, the MEA would never be the same again, nor would the Montreal waterfront. As a result of his intervention, the IASC, head down and tail between its legs, came back to the MEA, and management finally achieved the effective institutional vehicle it had long desperately required. I, and many others, could finally breath a sigh of relief as we surveyed the results of the FederationIASC battle and contemplated the prospect of management, at long last, speaking with one voice. This was definitely progress, but we were still not out of the woods. There still remained the challenge of overcoming the persistent problem of low productivity, and, as it turned out, this issue would be at the centre of the negotiations in 1971-2 for a new collective agreement. To everyone's great joy, we were able to reach an agreement without government intervention - something that had not been done in almost two decades - but our sense of triumph proved short-lived. At the Port of Montreal, emotions had a way of veering from hope to despair in an instant, and this pattern was to continue for some time yet. The trigger in 1972 for a collapse of labour peace would not be what we expected - the new rules put in place to address low productivity - but something much more mundane: forklifts.

162 Waterfront Blues Terminal Operations and Working Conditions On 10 March, Don Jamieson, the federal minister of transport, delivered a speech in which he announced dramatic changes relating to terminal operations and port administration. He stated: With the advent of other new technological developments in the field of transportation such as larger and faster aircraft, unit trains and larger vessels, the conventional approach towards handling of merchandise is no longer efficient. New methods are being developed to take advantage of the efficiencies and economics expected of these innovations. I am referring to a whole new concept of terminal operations especially suited for the densely populated urban areas which generate the most traffic... The principle of terminal operations envisaged could be a major progressive step towards improving the general operating efficiency... It is evident that there are two major concerns; first, the question of cost, and secondly, the distribution of labour.1

This was a rational response to two developments in the fall of 1969. The first of these occurred on 12 September, when Judge Gold, in explaining the arbitration award he made in June, decided that in accordance with article 1.10 of the collective agreement, all loading and unloading of trucks in the Port of Montreal fell under the jurisdiction of Local 375 when no certificate was in force covering this work in the port.2 The second development was Judge Smith's recommendation that cargo-handling at the Port of Montreal be converted to terminal operations, with the operator of the terminal assuming responsibility for the handling and safekeeping of goods until delivery to the consignee, and that the NHB adopt proper regulations ensuring tailgate delivery to consignees.3 The establishment of terminal operations - the government's first priority at this time - necessitated the rearrangement of work jurisdictions inside the sheds and the creation of mechanisms for control of cargo. On this front, management was particularly keen to adopt the tailgating system, which had originated in industries with pick-ups and deliveries and which had already been adopted by ports that had converted to terminal operations. Traditionally, as previously explained, ILA dockworkers had brought the cargo from ship to shed where they piled it up, sometimes with little care or order. The truckers drove into the sheds with helpers, found their cargo, loaded it onto the trucks with their own forklifts (or those rented from Lapalme Transport), and drove away. The tailgating system, on the other hand, involved truckers bringing their trucks to the shed entrance and receiving their cargo from the shed lessee. The term tailgate referred to the rear end of the truck (tail) becoming the frontier (gate) between jurisdiction over

Hope Deferred 163 work: all the work involved in getting the cargo to the 'tailgate' of the truck was the jurisdiction of longshoremen; the rest belonged to the truckers. On 6 March the NHB, under the chairmanship of Guy Beaudet, met with twenty-one shipping and stevedoring companies to discuss the details of port operations for the forthcoming season of navigation. Proposed regulations for the loading and unloading of trucks were discussed and those present were advised by Beaudet that the matter was confidential and must not be discussed outside the room.4 A week later, the NHB released the regulations governing the loading and unloading of trucks. Except for cargo stored on the second floor of a shed, 'no trucks shall be allowed to enter transit sheds for the purpose of loading or unloading goods.'5 The shed operator would remain responsible for goods from the time they left the ship to the time they reached the tailgate of the truck and vice versa. A new system of harbour surveillance would be implemented, with four pier supervisors solving disputes on whether or not a truck should be allowed to enter a shed. Tariffs for tailgating services would be determined by each terminal operator and subject to approval by the NHB. The regulations would be effective at 8 A.M. on 20 April ly/o.6 As soon as the plan was issued, the ILA began meeting with the Quebec Trucking Association to iron out details regarding tailgating, and with the MEA to negotiate working conditions in the new terminals. If the first day was any indication of what could be expected, the results were less than encouraging. There were three- or four-hour delays for trucks waiting to be serviced, with some being confused as to who was supposed to pay for what. Some shipping clerks described the situation as 'chaotic' and 'terrible' and told the press that 'the teamsters worked twice as hard - no, three, four times, five times as hard' as the ILA longshoremen, to which St-Onge responded that his men worked 'hard enough.'7 Nevertheless, the truckers promised that they would give the system a fair chance on the basis that growing pains were to be expected while a new system was being implemented. On 15 May the parties reached an agreement on working conditions governing the employment of permanent shedmen and operators. A new clause was added to the collective agreement in force whereby, at the beginning of the job-security season, each terminal operator would decide on the number of permanent employees he would need for the duration of the season and become responsible for the payment of the weekly guarantee throughout the season (as per the container agreement entered into with Furness Withy). Permanent employees would be chosen from eligible Local 375 men on the basis of seniority, provided they possessed the necessary skills. Although permanent employees were to be rotated only within their own terminal, an operator could employ surplus employees from another terminal in accordance with the equalization of earnings provision,

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or obtain supplementary men from the pool of extras through the dispatch hall (also similar to the Furness Withy agreement). Up to three relief men would be employed depending on the number of men working in the shed. Employees could be laid off provided they were given seven days' notice, such layoff remaining in effect for the remainder of the season and relieving the operator from any obligation to pay the weekly guarantee. If men were needed again after the reduction of the permanent staff, manpower orders were to be channelled daily through the dispatch centre.8 In a supplementary agreement, Task Terminals, a subsidiary of the container operator Cast North America, undertook to employ fifteen machine operators as permanent men, to whom it guaranteed forty hours a week and three-week vacations each year. Clause 37 on terminal operations, and the supplementary conditions for Task Terminals, were incorporated into the collective agreement, which was finally signed on 15 May. Not surprisingly, the agreement on working conditions entered into by the MEA and the ILA did not suit the stevedoring contractors at all. Tug-of-War While negotiations had been taking place, the MEA and the IASC had continued at loggerheads. Herb Colley, president of the Shipping Federation, wrote to the IASC stating his deep regret that the stevedoring contractors had decided to resign from the MEA's Board of Directors, especially after all the efforts the board had made over the last year and a half to represent management as a whole in labour matters. He underlined that all the legal procedures required for the formation of the MEA had been completed and that its directors were actively engaged in recruiting staff and making the association operative. Colley concluded: 'We feel that the active participation of members of your group in the MEA is essential if the full benefits of this association are to be achieved for the shipping industry and it is therefore our sincere hope that you and your confreres will again in the near future join in a common cause of vital importance to us all.'9 Colley's amicable letter was sent, along with application forms and copies of the by-laws, to all IASC members in an attempt to get them to rally to the MEA despite the lASC's official opposition. The MEA had initially considered charging shipowners and agents an initiation fee of $1,000 and an annual fee of $500, and charging stevedoring companies, terminal operators, and other employers of labour an initiation fee of $3,000 and an annual fee of $1,500. As a result of the current difficulties in making the association operative, however, we had decided not to charge an initiation fee and to set the annual fee for all members at a symbolic $25.10 Each MEA director talked to its own stevedoring contractor and to colleagues in other shipping companies, with the gratifying result that, by 19 May,

Hope Deferred 165 six more shipping companies, two more stevedoring contractors (both members of the lASC), and three terminal operators had been accepted as members.11 Simultaneously, the IASC jazzed up its own recruiting efforts and undertook to alter its by-laws to permit the admission of terminal operators as members.12 Following the Smith Report, independent stevedoring contractors had hurriedly written to the labour minister telling him that they fully endorsed Smith's views with regard to their right to control labour relations. So far, however, they had not gotten much of a reaction. In June 1970 the IASC received the results of a productivity survey which it had commissioned and which gave it the opportunity to show the government that it was actively looking into the port's problems.13 The trend was indisputable: with the exception of steel and containerized cargo, productivity in the Port of Montreal had steadily been slipping since 1964 despite unitization, better handling methods, elimination of sling-load limits, better sheds with more space to manoeuvre, improved packaging, reduction in gang size, and so on. Under cover of a letter dated 23 June, the IASC forwarded the survey to Benoit at the MEA, with copies to the minister of labour, the minister of transport, the vice-president of the NHB, the port manager of Montreal, Judge Gold, and the president of the Montreal Port Council, and it offered to make specific recommendations with respect to the decline in productivity.14 The letter elicited not one reply but two, and they were not what the IASC expected. The first was a letter from Pierre Camu, administrator of the Canadian Marine Transportation Administration, on behalf of the minister of transport. It said that the issue of productivity should be dealt with by the committee which had been set up by Mackasey and which had already received a copy of the report.15 The second reply came via a telephone call from Arnie Masters, as Bill Brown, secretary of the IASC, reported to the lASC's officers: I have reported the two most recent conversations I have had with Arnie Masters. As you know, on both occasions he called me and I remind you of his theme: 'The problems in the port of Montreal and the causes of poor productivity are due to the fact that management is divided, there is a power struggle going on between the stevedoring companies and the shipping companies, and the stevedoring companies in resigning from the MEA have abandoned their responsibilities... I think nothing of a useful nature can be obtained on our behalf by further alienating the Minister of Labour ... I will think of you as I am walking off the 15th green in disgust having just stick-handled my way to a triple-bogey.'16

If any doubts remained, the Department of Transport (DOT), which had been sent a copy of the productivity report, provided further confirmation that the

166 Waterfront Blues government would not give the ISAC the time of day so long as it persisted in refusing to work through the MEA. The DOT representative thanked the IASC for writing and sending the survey, reminded it that the Department of Labour had already set up a committee to study the matter of productivity in collaboration with the union and the current MEA, and politely concluded that the information would surely 'be of great value to the Department of Labour Committee.'17 With that brush-off, the IASC realized that, as long as it refused to join the MEA, it would be given no voice in labour matters whatsoever despite Smith's unequivocal opinion that it should have sole control. Mackasey and the Smith Report Mackasey had not told the press of his views, but, privately, he did not think that Smith's recommendations would necessarily yield improvements in labour relations. He believed that the concept of forcing harmony on the parties was inherently contradictory and he had more faith in free bargaining than in imposed solutions when it came to achieving long-term results. Besides, nothing new had come out of Smith's study; everything he had vehemently denounced had been denounced many times before, and many of his solutions had been suggested previously either by the parties or by experts and had already been enacted or were soon to be. In any event, the parties were well on their way to solving many of their problems, this being illustrated by the plain fact that they had been trying to. They were getting in the habit of sitting down together instead of turning to third parties, and though functional difficulties remained, this was a relatively small problem if they were willing to talk about them. Attitudes had long been the root of the trouble on the waterfront, but, insofar as Mackasey was concerned, these attitudes were changing for the better, and he was not about to screw up the process by charging in with a dock board. Furthermore, Mackasey had not created the Smith commission and in fact he had been critical of it from the beginning. It had been an unwelcome goodbye present from his predecessor, J.R. Nicholson, his very last act in his capacity as labour minister being to sign an order forming it. The next day, Mackasey took over, learned of Nicholson's action, and was furious. Masters recalled: 'Things had changed, things were coming along. He [Mackasey] felt you needed the Smith commission like you needed a hole in the head. Now that so much work had been done, we didn't need Smith telling us something different. He felt we were getting back to a normal employer-employee relationship and the Smith commission would be disruptive.'18 Mackasey had withheld the report from circulation from October 1969 to February 1970 for that very reason, and, if he could have had his way, it would have

Hope Deferred 167 lain forgotten in a drawer. While he eventually released the report and offered appropriate comments to the press and the House of Commons, he believed that the publicity it was attracting would slowly die down - it did - and that the parties would continue to make progress at their own pace, with the Department of Labour providing assistance when needed. The biggest problem that remained was for management to clean up its house. And so, when the IASC approached him and said that it would cooperate towards the establishment of a dock board, Mackasey, through Masters, told it to join the MEA instead.19Masters recalled: 'We knew, Mackasey and I, that it [the MEA] had to be put together. So I sat down - I'll never forget it - at the Diligence [pub] with Bill Brown and I said to them "The MEA has to work, there is no other way. And you are going to get your sheds, you're going to get your terminals, but the MEA has to work. You are going to have to join the MEA." And they ... understood but... they didn't like it... They had a lot to say.'20 These conversations with the government did not lead the independent stevedoring contractors to give up the battle for control of the MEA but it did change their understanding of their position and led them to set the Smith Report aside. In the end, unlike the Picard Report, which mostly everyone involved in labour relations had read and kept on their shelves, the Smith Report would fall into obscurity. The few recommendations that were adopted concerned such things as the fusion of union locals when possible, the establishment of terminal operations, better security measures, and so on, which the parties would have implemented in any case. St-Onge had been one of the few to remain completely unfazed by the report when it came out, and he had summed it up in the press as early as March: 'The Smith report? A lot of money spent for nothing.'21 By now, however, the MEA knew that it had the government on its side. Some Federation members, including me, had reached the end of their patience with the IASC. Belle and ECS, by far the largest stevedoring company in Montreal, effectively pulled the lASC's strings. Since Mulroney maintained contact with ECS people, I wrote to him so that he would pass along my view that I had been 'appalled at the lack of common sense exhibited by this large employing company' and that ECS should immediately take steps to 'join the MEA [and] resign from the IASC or put the IASC into moth balls for a year or two.' I continued: 'There is no bigger threat to the position of all employers in the port and, in my opinion, to Eastern Canada Stevedoring, than the continuation of the IASC at this time. In a nutshell, what I am saying is that ECS should not hide behind the skirts of the small stevedoring companies in Montreal but should stand up as the largest employer and sit around the table with those of us who, in good faith, have been trying to bring about long-term solutions to the difficult problems of waterfront work.'22

168 Waterfront Blues Whatever message actually reached Belle, he was not willing to let go. Discussions regarding the matter of control resumed, even though, as a sign of good faith, the MEA invited an IASC representative to sit on the productivity committee in the meantime. We then reiterated our position that the board remain basically unchanged - four directors from the stevedore group and five directors from the shipowners and agents group. However, picking up a suggestion from the IASC, we set out the parameters for the establishment of a labour advisory committee consisting of people with practical day-to-day waterfront experience who would be available at all times to meet with the president and any other members of the staff.23 The fact that some stevedoring contractors had already joined the MEA was supposed to make it more appealing for others to follow suit, especially since most were also members of the IASC. Yet the truth is that some of those who joined did so under pressure from their clients - the shipping companies - which hardly disposed them towards encouraging their colleagues to follow their lead. Brown and Ryan had been told by its largest client, Saguenay Shipping, to join or lose its business. While Bill Brown bit his tongue and did as he was told, his bitterness would smoulder, and the result was that Saguenay's president, Jack Eyre, a founding director of the association, would not be renominated to the board the following year. That issue aside, the IASC took our proposal as a positive sign and responded in writing, abandoning its long-held commitment to direct control of the board by the stevedoring group and suggesting again a board with equal representation of the two classes of members, with the president of the MEA having a casting vote, or, alternatively, having the MEA consist only of one class of members who would elect a board of nine and with no guarantee of any given number of seats to the stevedoring group. This letter, dated 2 September, was signed by seven of the eight IASC members.24 The eighth member, Ceres Stevedoring, bolted ranks and joined the MEA. We were hopeful that the tide had turned and Benoit replied to the latest IASC missive on 29 September: 'The MEA directors have recently met and carefully considered your two suggestions. They have asked me to advise you that they cannot accept these proposals. I can assure you however that they sincerely wish that the stevedoring contractors who have not yet joined the MEA will soon do so, and that the two groups will thus be united in the common task of promoting sound labour relations in the Eastern ports.'25 It was urgent that the matter of control be resolved so that operational decisions could be made. The flipside to the MEA's recruiting success was that new members expected to be serviced, which the MEA could not then do despite continuous efforts to establish the association legally. As an association still strug-

Hope Deferred 169 gling to function in the most basic sense of the word, we were not yet making the adjustments that would allow the MEA to function well. Legal proceedings were under way, however, and in early September a joint petition was drawn up by the ILA and the Federation requesting a transfer and redefinition of bargaining units to correspond to the 'new ILA' which had merged with small locals and the MEA. Each member granted the MEA, by way of formal resolution, the authority to act as an employer under the Canada Labour Code. The Shipping Federation finally transferred all the funds required by the MEA to discharge the liabilities emanating from the administration of the contracts between management and labour at the seven eastern Canadian ports. By mid-October, most major issues had been addressed, except for data processing and the relationship between the MEA and the MDC. In contemplating its options, the Board of Directors could see three possible courses of action: the first would be to examine under what conditions the MDC would take the MEA as a client; the second was to acquire the MDC in toto; the third was to go into the data-processing business itself. With insufficient information to reach a sound decision, a task force was appointed to determine the data-processing needs of the MEA and to approach the MDC with this information before reporting to the board.26 Benoit's Farewell By the end of October, more than 130 grievances were waiting to be dealt with, most concerning the application of clause 1.10 on work jurisdiction. The lot was estimated to represent in excess of $28,000. Amassing grievances was part of the union's regular economic activity, and those relating to clause 1.10 were a particularly easy way of making money. Masters explained: The whole issue here [labour relations as a whole] is purely commercial. You think of a collective agreement as some rational way to put out labour and save money for the ship owners. Maybe, maybe. But every collective agreement is also an instrument for making money... The grievance system was a huge liability. The ILA had a guy called Kid Kodak, and Kid Kodak would gain $17 to put up a grievance. He'd go down on a ship and he would say to one of the crew guys, 'Pick up the broom, I want to give a picture to my son.' And the guy would pick up the broom, he'd take a picture. The next day, you go before an arbitrator and say, 'See this picture? The crew man is sweeping, it is Local 375 work.' He says, 'Bring me the crew member,' but the ship is gone. It is a complicated world.27

Bringing all grievances to arbitration would be lengthy and costly, and Charlie

170 Waterfront Blues Poirier, who was chairing the tripartite grievance committee created in October 1969, suggested that we settle them all at once by paying the union a percentage of the estimated value of the grievances. The cost would probably run between $18,000 and $20,000. In discussing this idea, the MEA quickly found itself divided. I thought that the proposal made sense but Benoit was against it. Poirier asked Arnie Masters to put the weight of his opinion in the balance. He obliged. Masters recalled: 'I got a call from Poirier who said, "Listen, we have a chance to fix all these problems and everything. Can you help me, because Pronovost tells me we are not going to get anywhere with the MEA." So I gave you [Pathy] a sales pitch, and you said, "I'll let you know, I understand what you are saying." And you and I had developed a very good relationship over the [1969] negotiations and so on ... And anyway, you did it, you authorized it, and it was done/28 I gave authority to clear out the grievances for an amount not exceeding 65 per cent of the estimated total cost. Benoit was furious. On 27 November he called a meeting of the Board of Directors upon twenty-four hours' notice. I was unable to attend but was subsequently informed that the meeting was about me. A quorum consisting of Eyre, McCaffrey, and Thorn was present. Benoit declared that I had exceeded my mandate as chairman, and he issued an ultimatum: I was to resign from the board, or he would resign as president and chief executive officer. The directors present adjourned the meeting, and, since a regular meeting had already been scheduled for i December, no other meeting was arranged. Jack Eyre suggested to me that I convene a meeting of the board in the absence of the president, who was not a board member, to discuss the ultimatum. On 30 November, Jack Eyre, Peter Evans, Jim Thorn, and I met to decide upon a course of action. I was pleased but not surprised that the immediate consensus was that there would be no resignation by any of the directors. After we adjourned, I telephoned Benoit to inform him of the directors' decision and to tell him that, should he reconsider his position and decide not to resign, he was to present his first annual report - which was several weeks late - at the next board meeting, on i December. When Benoit joined the meeting, it became obvious that he had not believed me over the telephone because he asked to hear the board's decision from the other directors. Peter Evans spoke up, telling him that the directors would stand together. Benoit fumed and threw around some accusations before declaring that he was hereby resigning. As he walked out, no one called after him or made any move to hold him back. Although he had performed his job adequately, he had not done anything particularly impressive and could depart without leaving much of a void. Some had felt that he did not understand the power politics of the industry and was not strong enough, physically or mentally, to command respect from St-Onge.29 The MEA had no obligation to

Hope Deferred 171 make a severance payment but we did not want to take advantage of his resignation and instructed Mulroney to negotiate a financial settlement.30 Finding a permanent replacement became a top priority of the MEA, pending which Fred McCaffrey, a board member since the inception of the MEA and a member of the Federation's Executive Council, would fill the post. With that, the year 1971, which would mark the turning point in the consolidation of the MEA, dawned on the waterfront. Enter Masters While most IASC and Federation members had joined the MEA, there remained a few important pockets of resistance in both groups. McLean Kennedy Inc., a bulwark of the Federation for fifty years, snubbed the new association, as did its house stevedoring subsidiary, Montreal and Saint John Stevedoring.31 The IASC members who had led the debate were still holding out, including ECS, Empire Stevedoring, Wolfe Stevedores, Albert G. Baker, J.C. Malone, and Cullen Stevedoring. In February 1971 we decided to try a more direct, one-on-one approach with the biggest and toughest fish of all. Acting president Fred McCaffrey was dispatched to have lunch with ECS's new president, Roy Illing, Henry Belle's successor, to ask him to join the MEA. Although they parted with tiling's promise that ECS's membership application was forthcoming,32 weeks passed without the mailman bringing any news. McCaffrey wrote more letters33 while Masters kept 'working on' the remaining IASC members in Montreal, without success. The reluctant stevedoring companies would probably have held out a good while longer had not Judge Gold, perhaps coaxed by Mackasey, Masters, agents, and shipowners, squarely slapped them in the face with one of his biting awards. The new provisions for 'off' time - coffee breaks and so on - had received a twisted application, with the result that 'spello,' rather than being a thing of the past, had been incorporated into the new system. Stevedoring contractors who had had enough banded together in a concerted attempt to force all sixteen men to work at once. They systematically dismissed incomplete gangs and were showered in grievances for their efforts. As Masters recalled, Illing was sure that they would win the arbitration: 'I was telling Illing, "Join the MEA. You guys are not able to defend yourself as an individual company, you cannot do it." The employers got together and Illing said, "We can win this arbitration." I said, "I doubt it." "Impossible," he said, "I have this lawyer..." Dadada. Anyway, he [Illing] went down to the event.'34 Various stevedoring contractors testified before Judge Gold and were feeling positive about the way things were going until a representative of Empire Stevedoring took the stand for the ILA. Empire allowed 'spello' - thereby violat-

172 Waterfront Blues ing the collective agreement - and testified in favour of it. As a result, Gold found for the union and made the deeply humiliating demand that stevedoring contractors pull out their chequebooks and pay the union on the spot. Masters recalled: 'It was a very dramatic issue and each company was assessed fairly large amounts of money. Certainly in one case it was in excess of $25,000 and these checks were made payable in the presence of all parties to the union. It was a rather classic drama with very, very deep bitterness... When Illing walked out and back to his office, he was absolutely livid. He phoned me at home. I remember picking up the phone and him saying, "You're right." I said, "Who is this?" "Roy Illing. Arnie, you're right. It's a goddamn mess, it's a disgrace, it's dishonest and that goddamn union, there is no way any employer no matter how hard we tried in the last months can possibly win this argument. We're joining the MEA." I said, "Good to hear but don't talk to me. You know what you have to do." Once we had Illing [in the MEA], Bob's your uncle as far as I was concerned.'35 On 9 March, ECS, Cullen Stevedoring, and Wolfe Stevedores were officially granted the status of MEA members.36 By-laws were altered to permit once again the admission of four directors from the stevedoring group. The quorum was set at seven directors, four of whom had to be from the Federation faction.37 Nominations for new directors were gathered, which created a bit of a stir. The nominating committee had chosen not to renominate Jack Eyre, a founding member, because of the resentment of Brown and Ryan over Eyre's role in forcing it to join the MEA. Eyre felt betrayed and threatened to challenge the validity of the proposed board in court on the grounds that some nominees, contrary to MEA by-laws, had corporate affiliations with each other. I was sent to talk him out of it but time would prove a more successful bairn than whatever words of wisdom I could come up with.38 On 31 March the MEA held its first annual general meeting, with twenty-two representatives of member companies present. The new officially elected directors included Joe Carton, Peter Evans, Fred McCaffrey, Jim Thorn, and me for class i (shipowners and agents) and Pat Bolger, Bill Brown, Roy Illing, and Norman Wolfe for class 2 (stevedoring contractors). As chairman, I then announced a much-awaited piece of news: Arnold E. Masters had agreed to become the MEA's new president and chief executive officer as of i May 1971. On 29 April I chaired my last meeting of the board. Masters was elected president, Jette was elected executive secretary and treasurer, and Peter Evans was elected the new chairman. Everyone was delighted with Masters's appointment. His forthrightness had much impressed us during the mediation of April 1969 and his subsequent involvement with waterfront issues. All through 1969 and 1970, while the MEA had wrestled with its growing pains as well as with St-Onge's demands for increased jurisdiction, the port's appeals for better control systems, and the employers'

Hope Deferred 173 complaints about productivity, Masters had displayed amazing energy and resourcefulness in devising solutions. Luckily for us, by 1971, Masters was looking for a change. He had been in Ottawa for just over two years and wanted to return to Montreal, his home. Besides, although he had enjoyed working with Mackasey, he had come to the conclusion that bureaucracy was not for him. So, when Mulroney approached him on our behalf with an offer that might have prompted others to run the other way, Masters gave it serious consideration. Though he was only too aware that the MEA was still plagued with internal dissension and inefficiently organized, he was not faint of heart. He was confident that he could deal constructively with St-Onge and with employers, given certain conditions: 'the right approach, a very strong Board of Directors and reasonable budgets to provide the staffing required.' Masters laid out his terms. He telephoned each and every one of the big players in both groups - Wolfe, Brown, Bolger, Illing, McCaffrey, Evans, Carton, Thorn, and me - to say that he would take the job only with their personal assurance that they would sit on the Board of Directors themselves, rather than delegate the job to junior people in their companies. He also wanted assurance that he and a staff of his choosing would have full autonomy in labour-relations matters.39 The directors had always felt that the administration of the labour agreements and all related matters including negotiation should be left entirely to the president and his staff, but they had never found a person whom they trusted enough to surrender their control. Masters, they trusted. The board readily agreed that he would be completely free to put together his team and given a proper budget. On 3 May, Masters started his new job. Masters visited MEA members to get their views on various problems and immediately began to recruit staff to get the association up and running. His first appearance at a board meeting, on 19 May, a mere two weeks after he had been hired, gave us a jolt. After quickly thanking the directors for their welcoming words, he told us point blank: 'Looking internally here at the MEA there is no doubt in my mind that it is very much of an ivory tower approach - nonoperational things not directed to the operational side of the industry. This has to be corrected ...4° Masters then continued in the same tone, briskly sailing through issues and pinpointing problems, strategic concerns, and possible solutions with deadly accuracy, while we sat astonished. He then concluded with merciless simplicity: 'There is an inability here to analyse [different] views ... I submit that we really do not know where we are going.'41 Masters's presentation unleashed a spirited debate, and when the meeting finally adjourned, the directors walked away dizzy with the intensity of the brainstorming but full of faith that the situation in Montreal could be completely turned around. The first significant indication that Masters was indeed the person for the job was that, as soon as he

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came on board, the issue of control over the MEA was relegated to the backburner where it was eventually forgotten. Masters had hit the ground running. Within months, the MEA had become a whole different place. To head the operations division, which dealt with the stevedoring contractors and the union on the docks, he hired Jacques Belanger, who would draw on the advice of people from the companies with shopfloor expertise in various aspects of the work. Denis Lafrance and Bob Paquette became the nucleus of a contract-administration branch separate from labour relations and administration. Masters explained: The uneven application of the collective agreement is to me one of the major problems of such associations. Once a collective agreement is reached, companies which have just concluded negotiations through their association often administer the agreement in such a way as to satisfy their own individual interests; regardless of the effect it may have on other members of the association or groups bargaining, and oblivious to the tensions they create which in the final analysis are reflected at the next round of negotiations. The point I am trying to make very clear is that the administration of a collective agreement is in my view equally if not more important than the original negotiation of the agreement.42 Bryan P. Mackasey, Bryce's son, joined Denis Pronovost and Steve Wace to form the labour-relations division.43 Administration and finance divisions were created, with secretaries hired and equipment bought. After four years of struggle, the MEA was becoming a reality. Manpower and Job Security In April 1971, as the MEA prepared to take on the explosive issue of gangs, I relinquished my position as chair of the board of directors, in accordance with the agreement negotiated with the stevedoring contractors whereby the chairmanship of the association would change yearly. But I remained close to the action nonetheless. Besides continuing to sit on the Federation executive, I was made a member of the MEA's budget committee and given the responsibility of negotiating a line of credit for the association. Keeping the banks happy was to be one of my main preoccupations for the next few years, during which I also served as chair of a new MEA finance committee. There were reasons for optimism at this time. From the beginning of 1969 to the end of 1971, the parties had made enormous efforts to develop structures to support the application of the collective agreements. Terminal operations and tailgating had been established; shipliners and the small mechanical locals had

The Montreal Stock Exchange Tower and the upper harbour of the Port of Montreal. The author's office was on the 38th floor overlooking the port. (Courtesy of the Montreal Port Authority)

Montreal longshoremen gathering around Saint-Paul and Jacques Carrier Square, 9 September 1963 (courtesy of the Montreal Gazette)

Phil Cutler, left, the union's legal counsel, and Paul Asselin, president of Local 375, in the early morning after talks with the Shipping Federation broke down, 4 October 1963 (courtesy of the Montreal Gazette]

Paul Asselin explaining the union's position during the ILA's one-day work stoppage in sympathy with the CNTU grainhandlers, July 1965 (courtesy of La Prase)

ILA Locals 375 and 1657 going on a wildcat strike at the Port of Montreal, 10 May 1966 (courtesy of Canadian Press)

Teddy Gleason, seated left, president of the ILA (New York), conferring with Paul Asselin seated, president of Local 375, and Adrien Lemoine, secretary-treasurer of the local, during mediation talks, 27 May 1966 (courtesy of the Montreal Gazette]

Violence on the Montreal waterfront, 31 May 1966 (courtesy of Canadian Press)

Ships waiting in the St Lawrence River, 4 June 1966, during the longshoremen's strike that shut down the ports of Montreal, Quebec, and Trois-Rivieres (courtesy of the Montreal Gazette]

'At least Nelson Eddy had a horse.'

Prime Minister Lester Pearson rides to the rescue, 10 June 1966. (Cartoon by John Collins, courtesy of the McCord Museum, Montreal, M965.i9g.88o)

Paul Asselin, left, president of Local 375, and Gerard Tremblay, St Lawrence River ILA vicepresident, announcing that the union had turned down the latest Federation offer, 13 June 1966 (courtesy of the Montreal Gazette)

'An axe comes in handy sometime too,'

Prime Minister Pearson considers compulsory binding arbitration to end the strike, 14 June 1966. (Cartoon by John Collins, courtesy of the McCord Museum, Montreal, 6/1965.199.879)

Prime Minister Pearson announces that the strike has been settled. In the background from left to right: Guy Favreau, president of the Privy Council; Judge Rene Lippe, mediator; Jacl Pickersgill, minister of transport; J,R. Nicholson, minister of labour, and Claude Jodoin president of the Canadian Labour Congress, 15 June 1966 (courtesy of Canadian Press)

Smiles from the executive of Local 375 after ratification of the memorandum of agreement with the Shipping Federation, 15 June 1966. From left: Gerard Tremblay, St Lawrence River ILA vice-president; Paul Asselin, president of Local 375; an unidentified longshoreman; Adrien Lernoine, secretary-treasurer of Local 375; and Phil Cutler, the union's legal counsel (courtesy of Canadian Press)

Signing the memorandum of agreement, 8 April 1969. Seated from left: Judge Alan B. Gold chairman of the conciliation board; Bryce Mackasey, minister of labour; the author, chairman of the MEA; Jean-Marc St-Onge, president of Local 375. Standing from left: Brian Mulroney, legal counsel for the MEA/Federation; and (minus his head) Charles Poirier, conciliation officer of the Department of Labour (courtesy of Judge Alan B. Gold)

'Dear Alan, What a team! Regards Bryce': the successful mediators, 8 April 1969. From left: Bryce Mackasey; Judge Alan B. Gold, chairman of the conciliation board; and Charles Poirier (courtesy of Judge Alan B. Gold)

Arnold E. Masters, president of the MEA, 1971 (courtesy of the Montreal Port Authority)

Some members of the newly created Montreal Port Authority at their inaugural meeting, 25 November 1971. From left: Joe Carton, March Shipping; Richard Strauss, Agro Company of Canada; Roger Beauchemin, chairman, Beauchemain, Beaton, Lapointe; Jean-Marc St-Onge, president of Local 375; Yvon Lamarre, city of Montreal; the author, Federal Commerce and Navigation; and Arnold E, Masters, president of the MEA (courtesy of the Montreal Port Authority)

Longshoremen members of Local 375 showing solidarity with their leadership during an illegal strike, 31 May 1972 (courtesy of La Presse]

Judge Alan B. Gold arriving for the arbitration hearing, 27 June 1972 (courtesy of La Presse]

The union refused to participate in the arbitration hearing, 27 June 1972. Judge Alan B, Gold arbitrator, listens as Brian Mulroney, the MEA's legal counsel, presents the MEA's case. MEA staff from left; Denis Pronovost, labour-relations officer, and Arnie Masters, president of the MEA (courtesy of La Presse]

The port is closed. Members of longshoremen's Local 375 picketing at the McGill entrance to Montreal harbour, April 1975 (courtesy of la Presse)

Longshoremen demonstrating on Parliament Hill, 24 April 1975 (courtesy of Canadian Press)

Longshoremen picketing the passenger vessel Stefan Baton/, 25 April 1975 (courtesy of Canadian Press)

Judge Alan B, Gold hanged in effigy by the ILA, 28 April 1975 (courtesy of La Presse)

Hope Deferred 175 been merged with Local 375; most employers in Montreal had joined the MEA, which, under the leadership of Arnie Masters, had a chance at a brighter future; the MDC was functioning well; efforts were ongoing to improve the dispatch centre; and joint committees (on such matters as productivity, grievance, safety, dispatch, and allocation) had been created with the help of industry specialist Charlie Poirier to supervise the smooth implementation of the 1969 contract. Continuous dialogue had enabled the parties to address various problems and negotiate successfully many incremental adjustments to basic conditions contained in the contract. What they could not agree on, Gold had arbitrated. These were positive years, as most of the players would later recall. Even St-Onge would admit: 'During the years 1969, 1970, 1971, there were good relationships and dialogues. We did not always agree but there were settlements.'44 The collective agreements negotiated under the aegis of Gold's conciliation board in 1969 were to expire on 31 December 1971. Overall, the port had done well in 1971, and it was thought that 1972 might be even better.45 The acting port manager, Nick Beshwaty, soon to be formally appointed to the post, was assuring journalists that he foresaw no problems in the upcoming negotiations between the ILA and the MEA, and while his optimism was part of marketing efforts to redeem the port's reputation, there was reason to be hopeful.46 Yet Masters was not satisfied. As he reflected on the maze of problems persisting on the waterfront, he concluded that the root causes of low productivity - featherbedding, restrictions in deployment, lack of discipline, and so on - grew out of the gang structure. The cure for this disease was simple: gangs, forever considered the key to the employment relationship in the longshoring industry, had to be dismantled. The concept of gangs, based on the idea of strength through unity, was increasingly incompatible with the emergence of a capital-intensive organization of work. Technology created differentials between each worksite that previously did not exist, various types of ships and of cargo-handling equipment required different numbers of men and different combinations of skills, and the importance of group effort and collaboration was becoming secondary to individual abilities. The gang system allowed men to be added but not subtracted from the basic sixteen-man unit. Although agreement had been reached for the handling of containers from container ships at container terminals, there was no provision to deal with unitized cargo, which also could be handled with substantially fewer men, or for the handling of containers at other than container terminals. In the years 1969,1970, and 1971, the ratio of container cargo to total tonnage at the Port of Montreal rose from 14 per cent to 30 per cent.47 Since a shipment of unitized cargo hardly required a full gang per hold, gang size was fast becoming the central issue to be addressed.

176 Waterfront Blues There was another problem with gangs. Deployment rules traditionally developed to preserve the basic gang structure created inefficiency. Even though men had been individually classified, the 1969 contract retained provisions which held that gang members could be dispatched only as a unit and could do only ship work. These restrictive rules prevented a fair distribution of increased work opportunities on the docks and in sheds between gangs and non-gang members, a situation that, in turn, created illusionary shortages of labour and artificially high job-security costs. From April until June 1971, the MEA had been forced to employ non-eligible longshoremen for 2,500 man-days while members of regular gangs sat at home being paid out of the job-security fund.48 To exacerbate matters further, 'spello' was increasing with the advent of mechanization. The foundation of industrial work is that wages are paid in return for work; 'spello,' however, implied that 50 per cent of the total payroll was not earned. To Masters, that was unforgivable: 'The insulting thing was that if the payroll was say, 24 million dollars for the Montreal Local 375, you only had 12 million's worth of people that worked. That's a fact. To me, that was insulting. Absolutely. Because what it meant was that the union was the employer, not the employer. Because if you were managing, you would not allow 50 per cent of your staff to be paid at home and 50 per cent at work.'49 While Picard's approach had been to provide some flexibility in deployment within the gang system, Masters felt that the most straightforward way to get the desired flexibility was plainly to break up the gangs. Dispatching would aim to assign the right man to the right job, with complete flexibility on site and with rotation taking place within classifications only. Since deploying 2,500 individuals efficiently and on a daily basis would be virtually impossible manually, it would be necessary, as reported by Hickling Johnson in 1969, to computerize the operation. A computer would give easy access to detailed personnel records (discipline, hours of work, skills, and so on) and be able to match need and skill faster than any dispatch operator, without favouritism and, it was hoped, without mistakes. A computerized dispatch system had been developed in the early 19605 in Vancouver, only to be abandoned by the employers' association there in the face of strong resistance by the longshoremen. The president of that association, Ed Strang, provided Masters with access to the system's technology, and, with the help of expert consultants, a plan for the St Lawrence River ports was developed.50 It was not easy to convince MEA members that gangs should be broken up. The number of gangs had forever been the stevedoring contractors' marketing weapon to guarantee to their customers that they could get the work done fast. The contractors had always feared losing control of their gangs. While they had relinquished more and more of that control over the years, breaking up gangs was the ultimate step in bringing down the pillars of the traditional system under

Hope Deferred 177 which stevedoring contractors had built their businesses. Countless arguments took place before Masters was able to rally the employers to his views, and even then they did so reluctantly and with great misgiving. Masters remembered: 'Everybody agreed, [but] I don't think very happily... Under this scheme of things, [stevedoring contractors] were putting more in the hands of a computer. It was unknown. There were lots of unknowns ... And could we make it all work? I thought so but I didn't know/51 Masters never had to convince me. I agreed wholeheartedly with him that, to modernize stevedoring and keep up with the changes taking place in the new capital-intensive shipping industry, it was essential to break up the old gang structure and reorganize the workforce. The increasing movement of containers, unitized and palletized cargo, and steel and automobiles, coupled with new ship design and cargo-handling gear, meant that manpower requirements for loading and discharging were changing. Productivity was the issue and the new objective was to deliver to each worksite exactly the number of properly classified longshoremen as were required to do the work. The workforce would be smaller but the trade-off was that those remaining would be better paid and better trained and have some form of job security. The MEA also had to struggle with a related problem. The lack of continuity of work in relation to the current daily rotation system had the effect that seldom did a gang return to the same ship with any regularity, let alone for any two consecutive periods. Furthermore, rotation increased in line with the decrease in the total volume of work; thus, the less work there was, the more inefficient it became. The most drastic way to improve continuity would be to redesign the workday into two periods of eight hours, with four-hour-long extensions possible (rather than the current four periods of four hours), and to divide and rotate the workforce between the two shifts. When Masters suggested this to the board, we were dumbfounded. Here, it seemed, was a remodelled version of the two-shift system demanded by St-Onge in the 1968-9 negotiations which management had rejected as unrealistic. St-Onge would surely not miss the opportunity to humiliate the MEA for coming back with the same idea. But Masters was unfazed. 'So much the better if they asked for it before, they'll have a hard time saying no.' The directors reluctantly agreed and the two-shift system became a managerial demand. In fact, however, Masters's two-shift system bore little resemblance to the one envisaged by St-Onge. Masters proposed two work periods of eight hours each plus overtime. Only as many men as required would be employed during each period. St-Onge's system had half the gangs working for twelve hours and half the gangs working the other twelve hours regardless of the amount of work actually available. Increased flexibility in deployment and improved continuity of work would

178 Waterfront Blues patch the leak in the job-security fund by limiting the instances when eligible longshoremen would be idle even though work was available. Masters wanted to make the plan true to its original intent of compensating longshoremen for work lost owing to increased productivity and technology. Current provisions were completely inconsistent with this intent, particularly those that allowed longshoremen to refuse work. The right not to work was rooted in traditions developed when longshoring was casual and had been incorporated into the present system despite the fact that it was grossly incompatible with job security. A longshoreman could refuse as much as 20 per cent of the guaranteed 40 hours a week for 37 weeks (thus up to 8 hours a week), for a total of 296 hours a year, without having to justify his refusal and without penalties beyond that of not being paid. And that was without counting hours refused on Saturdays and Sundays, which were considered 'no-call' days. Hours worked on Sunday were not even assessed against the guarantee even though Sunday work was paid doubletime. The combined effect of these provisions was that a man could earn forty hours of pay or more from the payroll but still get a payment from the jobsecurity fund. Management did not have a clear idea of the actual amount of waste involved, but even if it had been established that the resulting drain was minimal, or nil, Masters believed that it was utterly absurd that workers had the right to refuse available work. He wanted to end the arrangement, part of the Picard regime of job security, whereby longshoremen could turn down work assignments without penalty; he also wanted absenteeism without just cause to be treated as a disciplinary offence, as it was in New York, punishable by deductions in the weekly job-security guarantee. All hours paid beyond the base rate would be converted to regular hours for tabulation purposes, with all hours refused being deducted from hours to be equalized. Then job security would make a little more sense. Another goal - reducing the size of the regular workforce - had been at the top of management's agenda ever since Picard had imposed the obligation to guarantee longshoremen a certain amount of work or pay. In 1967 it had been thought that the eligible workforce would shrink by natural attrition, through death, retirement, quitting, and loss of eligibility for the job-security plan under the penalties imposed in the contract. It had not happened. In 1969 management had once again waived its right to determine the size of the workforce it wished to maintain in exchange for flexibility in gang formation and freedom in the movement of containers. Thus, by the end of 1971, there had been no workforce reduction to match the steady decline in available man-hours. The fact that employers had no control over the number of workers they had to pay was ludicrous to Masters. After four years of job security, he felt that management had paid its debt and amply fulfilled its obligation to be socially responsible in intro-

Hope Deferred 179 ducing technology. It was time to establish a purely rational relationship between the fund and the size of the workforce and to introduce good pension plans, mandatory retirement at sixty-five, and the right for management to lay off workers it did not need. These demands represented radical changes from anything previously undertaken by management on the waterfront and would be hard to sell. American labour contracts expired on 30 September 1971 and T.W. Gleason, still hoping to centralize the negotiations of all ILA locals in North America, had instructed Canadian locals to delay their negotiations to stay in line with New York's. Toronto longshoremen had disregarded Gleason's plan and signed a new collective agreement but it yet had to be seen how the river port locals would react. Masters hoped that 'the nationalistic tendencies of local 375, together with the precedent established in Toronto,' would allow the parties to sign an agreement with 'a minimum spill-over from the American pressures/ and he strongly recommended that 'the MEA embark on a negotiation strategy which would enable a collective agreement to be signed prior to the end of September.'52 Masters knew how to turn a problem into a strategic advantage; if the current job-security trend continued, the fund would be broke by September. There was no obligation to make job-security payments if there was no money in the fund. St-Onge would tell the MEA that no agreement would be signed until job-security payments were up to date. The MEA would tell him the reverse, that no payments would be made until an agreement was signed. St-Onge would probably request that the TDF be used to make job-security payments. Masters would tell him that management intended to use that money for its original purpose, which was to lay off men rendered redundant by technology. Masters could pull out figures proving that about two hundred longshoremen immediately qualified for technology-related lay-off. St-Onge would obviously lose if he brought the matter to arbitration. For management to find money for job security, St-Onge would have to sit at the bargaining table and sing the tune Masters wanted to hear. If that was not enough, by paying for vacations in a lump sum in December, management could legally create a seven-week delay before longshoremen would be allowed to receive unemployment insurance. Longshoremen would be furious, St-Onge would panic, and Masters would wait for him at the negotiation table with management's demands in one hand and money in the other. Masters could see it clear as day." Showdown Notice to commence negotiations would be served on the union on 30 September, ninety days before the expiration of the collective agreement. Even if the

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parties advised the labour minister that negotiations had failed on the very same day and even if the minister decided not to intervene, which was most unlikely, there could be no strike before 7 October. More realistically, if the minister prescribed the usual conciliation procedures, the minimal delays would push back the possibility of a strike to 7 December at the earliest. By then, the season would be almost over, and with no welfare cheques in sight, the union would be ill-advised to call a strike. In theory, Masters's strategy was almost flawless. The money contained in the job-security fund was slowly trickling away like sand in an hourglass, each grain bringing Masters closer to forcing St-Onge to his knees. Of course, Masters could not foresee that a September strike in New York would lead to cargo being diverted to the river ports and to large amounts of money being poured into the job-security fund. St-Onge, for his part, saw a system where work would be plentiful and consistent enough to allow job security to be extended year-round to everyone in the workforce. Well aware that there were currently too many men for the amount of work available, St-Onge had a twofold solution: first, create incentives to retire, and second, create more work. With his sensitivity to retirement issues increasing with every new gray hair, St-Onge believed that natural attrition was the only decent approach to reducing the size of the workforce. Closing the gap between the benefits attached to each of the two options, working or retiring, would give longshoremen a real choice and yield better results than mandatory retirement. With technology always on the rise, the union leader was perfectly aware that the number of retirements that could be expected would be insufficient to prevent the job-security fund's insolvency. Clearly, more work had to be found for longshoremen in the port: he thought of snow removal, food delivery to crews and passengers, baggage handling, maintenance of washrooms and waiting rooms, office maintenance, the operation of heavy-lifting equipment, welding, timekeeping, training, and so on. St-Onge was not picky. So long as all these jobs were paid the same base wage rate as longshoring and so long as management provided appropriate clothing, he was sure that men would be willing to do them. St-Onge could not care less if other workers were currently performing the jobs he was eyeing; to him, longshoremen made the port operate and could rightfully claim preferential treatment over any other labour group. If Local 375 could regain jurisdiction over work relinquished in the past, obtain work related to modern ships and equipment, reintroduce restrictive weight, speed, and other limits on handling methods, restrict deployment, and increase the basic gang size, there would be plenty of work for anyone who wanted it. In effect, St-Onge sought to transform the port into a normal factory-style workplace. The job-security plan itself would have to be changed to remove the sizable irritant of insolvency. From the union's perspective, it was not that the fund could

Hope Deferred 181 not bear the cost, but that it was not bearing the cost. The fact that the MEA had always managed to put up the difference between the money available in the fund and payments due was sufficient proof that management could bear the jobsecurity costs if it wanted to. Management's obligation was currently limited to contributing twenty-nine cents per ton of cargo handled. What was needed was an unlimited liability whereby the MEA would be required to meet all payments due. St-Onge looked to New York for cues on monetary issues. The New York port had royalties on containers as well as a job-security plan, although a very different one from that of Montreal, and St-Onge saw no reason why the two should be mutually exclusive in the river ports. Among other things, the union would be looking for a $2 royalty per ton on container cargo and a wage increase of 33 per cent over three years. As for strategy, the ILA would just go with the flow. St-Onge thought that this approach had served them well in the past and, as the saying goes, if it ain't broke, don't fix it. Meetings began on 2 August between MEA and ILA representatives from all St Lawrence River ports. The parties agreed that an agreement would have to be reached by 15 September, by which time the job-security fund would be dry.54 If either was shocked at the sight of the other's proposal, it did not show - save for St-Onge laughing at the MEA for wanting a two-shift system.55 Over the course of the first few weeks of meetings, exchanges were informative as both parties made a real effort to put themselves in the others' shoes and to listen to their arguments.56 But, while dialogue was encouraging in itself, the parties remained unable to find a stable base on which to begin building an acceptable contract. For management, that base had to be the break-up of gangs, a demand to which St-Onge remained stubbornly opposed despite the fact that redundant men would still benefit from job security and suffer no economic loss. St-Onge fumbled, lamely arguing that gangs had to be preserved 'for the good of the port and for historic reasons' while also accusing management of wanting 'to remove the union from everything.'57 The gang structure was the symbol of what the union stood for: unity, cooperation, solidarity, equality. The perpetuation of group work in small units ensured the maintenance of strong links between members and reminded them that each was part of a bigger whole. Convincing St-Onge that breaking up the gangs was actually a good idea was a sizeable challenge. Masters, after almost a month of meetings, decided that it was time for a little magic. In 1971 computers remained an oddity, a little-known and little-understood novelty with data-handling capabilities that had been beyond most people's imagination just a decade before. Masters had a feeling that St-Onge, when seeing the machine in action with his own eyes, would be unable to refrain from getting a thrill out of its speed and power. He waited for the right question, forever the

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patient fisherman going for the big catch, until finally St-Onge asked: How could you break up gangs and allocate men on an individual basis? Masters casually proposed a computer demonstration for the afternoon of 11 August. St-Onge di not hide his surprise. His curiosity aroused, he accepted.58 St-Onge's team faithfully showed up at the specified time and were brought to the computer. Each gang member had been classified and given an acronym (a carpenter was CARP, a slingman SLING, and so on), Masters punched in the names and addresses of the members of the union's negotiating committee and designated classifications for each. The simulation of a dispatch operation began. In a matter of seconds, the computer 'knew' where there was work, who could do it, and who should get preference according to the rotation list. To find out one's employer, worksite and time period, the type of work, and the ship's specifications, all a longshoreman would have to do was call the dispatch center (as was already the practice since 1969). Masters recalled: Some of them sat and played the machine. And all this stuff came out. My God! They were impressed, St-Onge was really impressed. And I said to him: 'You know, for someone that believes that everybody should make the same amount of money [equal work opportunities], how could you fight this? For someone that doesn't want to get out of his driveway when it's full of snow and when there is no work, how could you fight this?' And he said to me: 'You know, this is the solution. We can't buy it, but it's the solution.' I think that it cinched it for him.59 While St-Onge was properly impressed, he also said that computer dispatch would not be considered unless the MEA agreed to remove the cap on jobsecurity assessments and replace it with a responsibility to meet payments when due.60 The MEA replied that the demand might be considered in exchange for complete flexibility in deployment. Weeks passed and each party refrained from making firm commitments. Meanwhile, the deadline was drawing near. In theory, the job-security fund was supposed to be drying up and acting as a negotiation catalyst. In practice, however, labour unrest in New York over irreconcilable negotiation positions was leading cautious shippers to send their cargo to the river ports. By 15 September, the St Lawrence ports' job-security fund was doing just fine. This financial recovery wiped out the strategic advantage that the MEA had thought would enable it to obtain concessions from the ILA.01 And so the fall months, rather than being the last leg of the journey before an agreement was reached, witnessed frustrating circular discussions where the initial momentum was lost and replaced by doubt and indecision. I cannot say that I was surprised. Though I, like everyone else, could not have predicted the circumstances that led

Hope Deferred 183 to the revival of the job-security fund, I certainly was not under any illusion that a collective agreement could be reached, easily and painlessly, before the expiry of the old one on 31 December. It was worth the effort of course, but I always thought that, at some point, the ILA would pull the plug. On 22 September the ILA served notice of termination of the collective agreement.62 Under the Canada Labour Code, from this point on the parties could at any time advise the labour minister that negotiations had failed and put their fate in his hands. The minister would decide which of three conciliation measures (an officer, a commissioner, or a board) to prescribe, if any. On 31 September the eastern ports of the United States were finally hit by a strike, which further increased the diversion of cargo into the St Lawrence River ports. With the job-security fund overflowing, St-Onge became more determined than ever while the MEA grew increasingly timid since Masters's mandate was limited to offering a finite job-security fund. On i November, the MEA applied unilaterally for conciliation.63 Charlie Poirier was appointed conciliation officer. With the help of his colleague Rene Lacas, he succeeded in having some seventeen clauses signed without, however, solving the most problematic issues. On 10 December, Poirier concluded that the parties had reached a final impasse and recommended the appointment of a conciliation board. Judge Gold was appointed chair and the parties nominated their respective legal counsel, Mulroney for the MEA and Gino Castiglio for the ILA, as nominees to the board. In an honest effort to bridge their differences, the parties continued to meet in December and January and the shape of possible compromises grew clearer. But, since St-Onge continued to maintain that nothing was possible if the payment of job security did not become an unlimited liability, and since the MEA countered that an unlimited fund was 'entirely out of the question,'64 the deadlock persisted and the board proceeded. As far as Masters was concerned, Judge Gold did not comprehend the kind of manpower waste that went on daily on the docks. Masters was 'not a great fan'65 of the judge and believed that, as long as Gold did not grasp the extent of featherbedding, it would be impossible for the MEA to have its demands understood. Gold needed a shock treatment. Because a picture is worth a thousand words, MEA staff members were sent out to gather visual testimony of 'spello.' More than a thousand photographs and slides were taken of gangs 'at work.' When Gold opened the conciliation board's hearings, Masters declared that the MEA's participation was conditional upon the judge allowing it one afternoon to show the slides. Gold was deeply insulted and angrily replied that he did not need to be shown any pictures since he had been intimately involved in labour relations on the waterfront for four years and knew everything there was to know about the situation. Nevertheless, he agreed to look at the pictures.66

184 Waterfront Blues It was not a pretty sight; the overall effect of one thousand pictures of men lounging about gave an impression that not working was the rule rather than the exception. After the last slides appeared on the screen, Masters argued that as long as men had job security, there could be no reason for the union to insist upon a gang system 'unless the reason for such a gang system is to perpetuate the cancer of spello which has existed too long in the port of Montreal/67 Gold had shock and anger painted all over his face. To think that he had been a central figure on the waterfront for so long without seeing the extent of featherbedding was deeply humiliating. And the self-satisfied look on Masters's face did nothing to soothe the sting. Gold had long believed that longshoremen were a sorry lot, victims struggling for survival in an unforgiving employment relationship. They had called him 'the father of longshoremen.' The gullible father indeed! He would not be played the fool again. The next time the parties were invited to exchange proposals, the union made the silly demand of a wage increase of $1.50 an hour with no change to working conditions. Gold, his patience at an end, declared that the union had forty-eight hours to come up with an acceptance of the MEA's proposal or face the consequences of a conciliation report.68 While the union prudently adjusted its aim, Gold was now in a frame of mind clearly favourable to management and a few more of his biting remarks led the union to storm out of the meeting on 25 February. But the judge was proud and did not want the board to fail. He convinced St-Onge to stick with the process and work towards a straight exchange of the break-up of gangs for unlimited job security. Masters was ready for the exchange but met with fierce opposition from the MEA board. If the job-security fund had been financially stable, taking full responsibility for meeting payments would have been conceivable. But here was a system with unstable costs that had almost quadrupled in four years, from about $600,000 to more than $2 million.69 And while mandatory retirement, the breakup of gangs, and deployment flexibility were supposed to reduce excessive payments, the kind of money involved in financing the job-security plan was much too substantial to put one's head in the noose on the basis of suppositions. Yet, after endless discussions, the board decided to agree provided the directors could not be held personably liable if the MEA failed to make payments. We also resolved to seek a $2-million line of credit from the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) to finance possible temporary deficiencies,70 and I was given the job of negotiating the agreement with the bank. Talks resumed with the union to find ways to make unlimited job security functional, The parties toyed with numbers and charts but could not agree on concrete mechanisms. Quite plainly, the task was difficult. To come up with a contract on the basis proposed, the parties had to plan the unknown and predict the unpredictable. At their request, conciliation officers Poirier and Lacas joined

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the round-the-clock meetings at the Queen Elizabeth Hotel in Montreal. St-Onge recalled: 'We had a stack of papers this high. We worked really hard, trying not to make mistakes, not to forget anything, not to leave anything that we could get screwed over. You have to work really hard to come up with a collective agreement like that, with all these major changes, all this new stuff, and you try to do it so that it will be cohesive.'71 On 10 March 1972 an acceptable memorandum of agreement was on the table which included flexibility in deployment for the MEA and an unlimited jobsecurity fund for the ILA. Every single issue seemed to be resolved in a manner that both parties found satisfying, except for a couple of small details: St-Onge wanted electric forklifts in the holds and sandwiches delivered to the worksites during breaks. This should have been easily resolved. Not in the Port of Montreal. Electric Forklifts and Sandwiches St-Onge had been convinced for years that exhaust emanating from conventional forklifts posed a serious health hazard to holdmen.72 The rebel in him did not believe the inconclusive findings of studies on the subject, and with good reason: a report on carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, conducted for the MEA by McGill University, indicated that no problems were encountered in holds where only one lifter was employed but that, with two lifters, it was a different story.73 The cost of scrapping old forklifts and buying electric ones was high and employers had strongly resisted the demand on the grounds that electric forklifts, because of their design, could not manoeuvre around corners in the hold. The issue had resurfaced in this round of negotiations and we had made little progress with it by the time the complete memorandum of agreement was ready to be signed. At that point, St-Onge declared that the matter of electric forklifts had to resolved. There is confusion regarding the nature of the dispute. Masters maintains that he told St-Onge that the MEA would never make electric forklifts mandatory.74 But, according to St-Onge and ILA counsel Gino Castiglio, Masters had actually agreed to the gradual introduction of electric forklifts during negotiations; where they disagreed was the number of holdmen who should be used.75 After some fiery exchanges, St-Onge warned the MEA's bargaining committee that the union would go on strike over the issue. It seemed an over-reaction given that all the major questions had been agreed upon, but St-Onge had his own sense of such things. Poirier said of him: 'Sometimes, St-Onge could not back up a little even to go forward a lot.'76 This was one of those times. Gold threw up his hands in despair. He declared that negotiations were obviously not going anywhere and prepared a draft conciliation report in front of the

186 Waterfront Blues parties' counsels and the two federal conciliation officers. In the meantime, the union had retired to caucus in another room. Gold was about to telex his report to the minister of labour - by now Martin O'Connell had succeeded Bryce Mackasey in this post - when Poirier pleaded for the judge to hold off for a moment since he had just been called to attend an urgent meeting with the union officers. Gold agreed, secretly relieved. When Poirier reached the union caucus, he discovered that the union executive was not of one mind regarding the mandatory use of electric forklifts. St-Onge argued that management would surely give in rather than delay the opening of the shipping season, but the other officers were not so sure. Poirier did his best to calm them down and proposed to put the issue to a vote. The executive agreed, and all officers except one voted in favour of dropping the demand and signing the settlement. It was a dramatic moment; for the first time, St-Onge's leadership had been questioned and his judgment challenged. The union leader was shaken and hurt: 'It was five o'clock in the morning and I was crying because I was so enraged. I had lost my point.' The union was making its way back to the main negotiating room with a rankled St-Onge in tow to sign the agreement when, according to St-Onge, Masters pulled him aside. He recalled: Then my friend Masters did his show. He told me, 'I would rather not write in the collective agreement that there will be electric forklifts in the holds.' Charlie Poirier was there, he is a responsible man, a Government guy, a federal mediator. Masters said, 'I am in a bad spot with those lifters, I will make a deal with you.' He wanted an arbitrator to decide for him. He could not face the stevedoring contractors with it, it was too much of a radical change. He said, 'I will write a letter that I will put in the vault at the Ministry of Labour. Do you trust Charlie?' I said, 'Yes, I trust Charlie.' He said, 'When the season opens, we will ask judge Gold to arbitrate the issue of electric lifters. Since there will be a letter in the vault confirming that I agree to the lifters, Gold will rule in your favour because we will have agreed in advance.' In other words, he was pulling a fast one on the stevedores. I say yes to him but I don't want them to know that I said yes. 'I will write it here and it will remain confidential between the three of us.' Me, the fool, I believed him.77

St-Onge, Poirier, and Masters went back into the main room where the others waited expectantly, tensed and tired. They were informed that the matter would be resolved by adding a supplementary clause to the contract stating that 'the parties agree that their respective propositions as put forth during negotiations, which concern the use of electric forklift trucks in ship's hold and the number of men required in such a case, will be subject to arbitration before Judge Alan B. Gold whose decision in said matter will be final and binding to both parties.'78

Hope Deferred 187 Only Masters, Poirier, and St-Onge knew what had been said in the hallway regarding the true nature of this arbitration. The meeting was heavy with emotion when both parties picked up their pens and finally signed the memorandum of agreement. Between the time the memorandum was signed and the time it was due to be ratified, the issue of sandwiches being available on worksites during lunch and coffee breaks came into dispute. During the negotiations, St-Onge had argued that if management shortened the lunch period, there were so many men for so few restaurants that many would not have time to eat. In response, Mulroney had offered to have coffee and sandwiches delivered to the worksites. St-Onge was delighted. But when Mulroney told Masters that he had offered sandwiches to the union, Masters was furious.79 Mulroney was sent back to confess that he had not been given the authority to make the proposal, but the ILA decided that management was nevertheless accountable for its counsel's action and was stuck with the provision, a view that Judge Gold shared. Masters was determined to get rid of the item before the contract was to be signed. In Quebec City he simply said that the sandwich idea was bad, that they would have more strikes over food than over working conditions, but 'everyone laughed'80 and the issue was dropped. In Trois-Rivieres, Masters had to trade the withdrawal of the sandwich clause for wage parity of checkers with longshoremen. In Montreal, it would take Masters three weeks of negotiations and the addition of fifteen more men to the jobsecurity list to get St-Onge to drop the sandwiches. The Agreement The memorandum of agreement was finally signed on 29 March 1972 and ratified on 4 April by a spectacular majority of the ILA membership in Montreal, with 2,200 in favour to 6 against.81 The contract was portrayed as a symbol of sound labour-management relations in the port, a triumph of preventive mediation in North America, and the tool that would allow 'the passage from archaic methods of work to conditions unequalled anywhere in ports around the world.'82 Management boasted that it would 'revolutionize the work methods of the men and at least double their productivity.' The union congratulated itself on obtaining 'one of the best pension plans in the world'83 and a plethora of other exceptional benefits. This collective agreement was the most rational and comprehensive one ever devised on the waterfront. Both parties pointed out that it was the first contract signed in Montreal in eighteen years without government intervention, although it had taken three years' worth of preventive mediation with Judge Gold, Charlie Poirier, and other Department of Labour officers to obtain that result.84 Further,

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the union's voluntary signing of an agreement containing changes of great magnitude was in sharp contrast to the intensity of labour unrest elsewhere in Canada; 27,000 employees had been involved in 77 work stoppages since January, causing a sharp 30 per cent increase in man-days lost over last year.85 In Quebec, negotiations in the provincial public sector had turned sour and culminated in a general strike starting 6 April.86 Great battles were currently being fought over job security and labour flexibility by U.S. locals of the ILA on the east coast and by the ILWU on the west coast.87 In that context, the parties in Montreal had something to be proud of. Guy Beaudet, former port manager and now vice-chairman of the NHB, sent a telegram to Masters congratulating him on a 'job extremely well done.'88 Masters passed on the compliments to Department of Labour specialists Charlie Poirier and Rene Lacas, assuring the press that 'there is no way we could have achieved the kind of dialogue we did without [their] help.' Poirier extended the credit to the entire department, where longshoremen 'feel at home in discussing their problems.'89 One happy family. The new efficiency-oriented system was based on the break-up of gangs. Men would be dispatched according to need, each longshoreman being registered for each of the thirty-five classifications that he could perform, with his job as of 31 December 1971 being his primary classification. Management would set up and administer a training program and ensure that enough men were trained in advance so that non-union labour would never be required for work covered by the agreement. Candidates would be chosen by seniority but would be required to prove their physical ability and aptitudes to a joint committee established for selection purposes. Although wage rates would remain the same between classifications, incentive to train would be provided by limiting rotation within each classification: thus, the more types of work one could perform, the more work opportunities one would get. The number of men in each primary classification would be relatively equal, which, in conjunction with the fact that jobs would first be offered to longshoremen with that primary classification, would ensure equalization of earnings. Vacancies occurring in primary groups would be filled on a volunteer basis in order of seniority, providing the classifications requirements were met. Should a disagreement arise regarding a person's ability, management would have the burden of proof. If it was proven that a longshoreman did not meet the requirements, he would be given the opportunity to follow the classification's training course. The dispatch operation would be computerized, a 'revolutionary innovation' that, Masters said, would 'assign men to jobs all along the waterfront within 'four seconds flat.'90 The computer would select men based on classifications and the number of hours worked and offered during the year, and, if the foregoing were equal, seniority would be the decisive factor. These criteria could be broken down

Hope Deferred 189 into various subcategories (for example, hours of overtime offered so far in a week, hours in primary and secondary classifications, and so on), which would result in a degree of sophistication in dispatch that no manual system could ever equal. The selection by classification would be done once a week, each man retaining his relative position for that week. From 11:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M. each day, stevedoring contractors and terminal operators would telephone the MEA's office and state their specific manpower requirements for the following day through pre-arranged codes. This information would then be 'mixed' with longshoremen's personal records and position for that week, and matched accordingly. Between 6:00 P.M. and midnight, the men would have to telephone the dispatch centre to obtain their assignment for the following day. A telephone operator would punch in the caller's identification number and provide him with the information appearing on the screen, including the employer's name, the time, the place, the job's classification, the foreman's and the walking boss's names, and the name of the vessel and the hatch. Wallet-size plastic cards with the dispatch centre's telephone number and procedure would be printed and distributed to all longshoremen, with space provided for writing the day's assignment information. Longshoremen eligible for job security and covered by the equalization plan would have to be available seven days a week either at the worksite or at the dispatch hall or face a reduction of guaranteed hours equivalent to the amount of hours guaranteed for the call. Men who could not report to work for legitimate reasons had to advise the dispatch centre at least one hour before the start of their work period. Failure to do so would entail a maximum one-day suspension for each unreported absence. All calls would be taped to allow for reviews if mistakes occurred. Between Monday and Friday, longshoremen assigned to their primary classification would work on their assigned ship until completion of the specific job or until they had completed their forty-hour week. Individual longshoremen could be transferred from one ship to another, from one hatch to another, and from hold to shed (and vice versa) during a work period. A half-hour coffee break would be provided after every four hours of work, each foreman delegating a longshoreman to obtain food and beverages for the crew. The terminal's 'permanent employees' of the 1969 contract - the employees in the small locals which merged with Local 375 - were 'replaced' by maintenance men subject to particu lar conditions within a shift system. They would be divided in four groups, which rotated between two or three shifts of eight hours, seven days a week, for the duration of the season. Because of this fixed schedule, they would not be covered by the job-security plan. On the monetary front, a wage increase of fifty cents an hour over three years, from the current $4.60 an hour, along with changes in overtime provisions would

190 Waterfront Blues allow a longshoreman to earn on average about $11,000 to $12,000 a year. A new pension regime would be implemented over three years, during which management would contribute $1 per man per hour (approximately $4.5 million) to a registered fund administered by the union. Whereas the old plan provided retirees with a maximum of $1,500 a year, the new plan would give up to 120 per cent o the retiree's annual salary provided he had more than twenty years of service. Thus, a longshoreman who was now forty-five years old would get the equivalent of about $15,000 at age sixty-five, ten times as much as under the old plan.91 Once again, management agreed that no ILA member would be laid off because of technological change. The new version of the job-security plan guaranteed forty hours of work a week for thirty-seven weeks to 2,296 men out of about 2,330.92 Longshoremen hired after the signing of the contract would not be eligible for the plan. The men who wanted winter work would be selected by management based upon their seniority and classification. The normal work week was designated between Monday and Friday inclusively (instead of Saturday). The right to refuse 20 per cent of guaranteed hours was removed from the contract but weekends would remain 'no call days' where hours refused would not be deducted from the guarantee. However, all hours paid, including those on weekends, would be counted as hours worked. The MEA was responsible for job-security payments. This had been agreed to after serious study had yielded the conclusion that meeting payments should be feasible with more efficient dispatch so long as the port remained stable. The MEA had insisted upon a clause providing that job security was in no way the personal responsibility of the administrators or of the members of the association. Although management could increase assessment levels in line with job-security costs, in reality assessments could be increased only so much before they had a negative impact on tonnage. Hence, another clause provided that the assessment 'must not be of the nature that it will favour other ports to the detriment of the ports on the St. Lawrence.'93 The clause purposefully refrained from providing any measure of what assessment could constitute a 'disadvantage' to the river ports. The clause was also included because of the agreement being negotiated with the CIBC to obtain the $2-million line of credit. The bank wanted the right to order an assessment increase if the MEA appeared unable to meet its repayment schedule. The MEA agreed but wished to guard against increases that would suit the bank but kill the port. Management also wanted protection against the possibility that something would happen to cause ships to be unable to reach the river ports and halt the collection of assessments. A provision was therefore included whereby all of management's obligations with regard to job security would be suspended should a major crisis occur which would prevent all ships from reaching their

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destination. To prepare for the possibility of assessments being insufficient to meet payments, the MEA would build up a reserve fund for 1973 and 19/4,94 and the TDF was discontinued. Walking bosses, but not foremen, were finally excluded from Local 375'$ membership. While work jurisdiction was extended, St-Onge's extravagant idea to have longshoremen remove snow and deliver food was abandoned, in favour of work more in line with longshoring such as the unlashing of cargo, the handling of dunnage used in the holds or on deck,95 and all work related to shiplining previously reserved to Local 1552, whose members had become part of Local 375. All repairs to machinery or pallets had to be done by Local 375 members. The demand for royalties on the movement of containers was abandoned; however, where containers required stuffing or unstuffmg before shipment or trans-shipment, the work was to be reserved for Local 375. Both associations made a pledge of exclusivity to the other: the MEA would employ only ILA members and the ILA would work only for members of the MEA, which forced the remaining dissidents, including Cast North America, Task Terminals, and Moorings, to join the MEA.96 The MEA further reinforced its powers as management's representative by having included in the contract a discipline code which explicitly empowered it to make all decisions concerning disciplinary action (instead of this privilege remaining with individual employers). French was recognized as the official language of the contract and of all official written communication. It was agreed that the whole of the new and more productive system would come into effect when the computerized dispatch system was ready, probably in September. In the meantime, transitional arrangements would prevail and certain clauses of the expired 1969 contract would remain in effect. However, a supplementary memorandum signed on 3 April stated that the new article 9 dealing with flexibility of deployment was to come into effect immediately, except for section 9.05, which provided for the ordering of men of various classification for different types of operations. Effectively, section 9.05 dealt with the ordering of men as opposed to the ordering of gangs, to do the work formerly done by gangs, and it could not be implemented until computer dispatch was available. The new agreement was expected to cost $5 million per year, of which $3 million would be related to job security and the establishment of a reserve fund and $2 million to administration. The MEA rejected the idea of increasing the symbolic membership fee of $25 to raise funds in favour of financing the contract entirely through assessments on cargo. The $2-million line of credit sought from the CIBC was intended as a purely preventive measure, to finance possible temporary shortcomings of the fund.

192 Waterfront Blues Under the previous collective agreement assessments collected for the jobsecurity fund, the TDF, social security, and labour administration were considered distinct from each other. The total assessment stood at 42.5 cents per equivalent ton and everyone paid the same. With the new collective agreement, the MEA revised the assessment levels for job security to reflect the principle that employers making the most use of modern technology, and thus needing the least number of men, should assume more of the burden of job-security payments. Jobsecurity assessments for conventional and container cargo were then established; the total assessment was raised to sixty-five cents per equivalent ton for conventional cargo and to $1.20 per equivalent ton for container cargo. No one put up much of a fight; we were all still high over the success of negotiations. On 25 April, a week after the collective agreement was signed, an agreement was concluded between the CIBC and the MEA.97 The CIBC agreed to finance the job-security program as long as the MEA undertook to collect an assessment on all cargo handled by its members in the three river ports, with a view to collecting $3 million in 19/2.98 Only $2 million was expected to be needed to pay for job security; the remaining million would constitute a reserve and additional security for the repayment of the loan. The debt was in no way the personal responsibility of individual MEA members or directors. If the reserves were not available at the end of 1972, the bank could prescribe an assessment increase that was to take effect immediately99 The loan would be repaid over three years (by 1975) according to a defined schedule attached to the banking contract. To advise the MEA's Board of Directors on financial matters, which were assuming a new proportion and complexity with the onerous contract, a subcommittee was to be formed under my chairmanship.100 The MEA board was genuinely delighted that a new collective agreement had been reached without a strike. The faith we had placed in Masters had been rewarded. And yet there was concern. We all had some misgivings about unlimited job security; we feared that the cost might prove to be too great and that the port might become uncompetitive as a result. At the same time, it was clear to me and others that the stevedoring contractors were not ready for the challenge of managing the new order, while the longshoremen were unsure about what exactly was expected of them. Discipline was not a word that had been used on the waterfront. Though the new collective agreement was signed in March, the break-up of the gangs was not to occur until September. There might have been time to adjust to this major change if other events - of which more will be said later - had not intervened. Yet, even if the reorganization of the workforce had unfolded in as orderly a fashion as had been anticipated, and time had been allowed to act as a healing agent, it is unlikely that everyone would have welcomed the new era.

Hope Deferred 193 Change is always difficult to accept. For example, in mid-April, barely two weeks after the signing of the contract and before any significant operating changes had taken place, one manager, Gert Vreeken of Federal Terminals, wrote: 'The general feeling of the superintendents, managers located on the waterfront and even a contract administrator is one of hopelessness. Personally I feel that Arnold Masters has created a "Frankenstein."'101 Sounding very much like the employer that he was, Vreeken said that, in return for the contract, 'we got very little if anything at all. It looks maybe good on paper and Masters will say let us wait till September when the computer starts to operate. The fact however is that labour has been getting away with murder for 3 years and will not change their attitude because they get $1 per hour in a pension fund.' Coming from Federal Terminals, one of the group of companies I was representing on the MEA, Vreeken's diatribe made me distinctly uncomfortable. But I remained in an upbeat mood and felt that we were moving in the right direction. There was always going to be criticism from those not close to the bargaining table. That was to be expected. All the elements seemed to be in place for a new order: a revolutionary and well-balanced contract, a vastly improved relationship between the parties, a solid management association, and money to make the whole go round. And then the worst happened. A dispute arose regarding the timing of the implementation of certain provisions in the new collective agreement and St-Onge learned that there was no letter on electric forklifts in the vault at the Department of Labour. Within less than two months, the three river ports would be paralysed by a crippling strike that would be deemed in Parliament 'the worst... in Quebec's history.'102

CHAPTER EIGHT

Strike!

The first indication of trouble ahead came when St-Onge realized that Arnie Masters had not put a letter in the vault at the Department of Labour in Ottawa. I am not certain when or how St-Onge found out that Masters had not kept his promise regarding this matter, nor indeed can I be certain that any such deal was ever made. Masters, for his part, adamantly denied any secret agreement and maintained that the only deal consisted of bringing the issue to arbitration, as provided in the addendum to the collective agreement. He told me that he knew nothing about the letter. The truth is impossible to verify. Yet St-Onge certainly believed that he had been double-crossed by Masters. Both Gino Castiglio, Local 375'$ lawyer, and Adrien Tremblay, its vice-president, tended to concur. Tremblay would say that StOnge's only mistake in 1972 was to have trusted somebody he should not have.1 When interviewed for this book ten years later, St-Onge still grew agitated when discussing forklifts. He told me: 'I am ashamed to talk about it... What can I say. You only trust someone once. I trust a man once but when he cheats me, it is over. I will see him in twenty years and I will remember ... I don't mind if you put it in your book but it is embarrassing for me. To be taken like that, I am not proud of myself... Ah, but there has to be some trust. I could have said: write the letter in front of me and we will put it in the vault now. Too dumb to do it. I trusted him... He made me believe he wanted to go behind his members' back but it was me he was trying to screw. Too stupid to realize it ...'2 I knew Masters much better than I knew St-Onge and it was not in Masters's character to be dishonest in his dealings with the union. He was tough-minded and pugnacious but I cannot believe that he purposely misled St-Onge. That said, there can be no doubt that there was a serious misunderstanding over a minor issue in the overall scheme of things and that this misunderstanding was to have profound repercussions.

Strike! 195 Confrontation In my opinion, St-Onge's perception of the incident had a substantial impact on later decisions that would prove unequivocally catastrophic for the union. As soon as he understood that there was no secret letter, his confidence in the MEA evaporated and he was overcome by a dark resentment that sunk deep into his heart. Perhaps he would have eventually put the whole episode behind him had everything else gone according to plan. On the other hand, maybe he regretted his agreement to break up the gangs and was looking for a reason to repudiate the collective agreement. In any event, everything did not go according to plan. The first spark was a one-day walkout in support of a province-wide general strike to protest the jailing of the three most important union leaders in Quebec. This walkout would leave longshoremen wound up and ready for a showdown. In the spring of 1972, Quebec's three principal unions - the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU), the Quebec Federation of Labour (QFL), and the Quebec Teachers' Corporation (QTC) - formed a 'Common Front' to negotiat working conditions for Quebec's public-sector employees. Short general walkouts had been called in March and April, with more than 220,000 public-sector employees responding to the rallying cries of their leaders, Marcel Pepin (CNTU), Louis Laberge (QFL), and Yvon Charbonneau (QTC). The second walkout created a crisis situation in hospitals across the province, and so the government of Quebec obtained injunctions to force the workers back to work. But a large number of civil servants ignored the order, encouraged by Pepin, Laberge, and Charbonneau. On 19 April nineteen local union leaders were imprisoned and fined for their role in supporting the illegal strike. Two days later, Bill 19 was enacted to order a return to work, under the threat of steep fines, and to fix working conditions for the next two years if the parties were unable to reach agreement. The collective membership of the Common Front was divided, with only 60 per cent of members in favour of pursuing the strike. The leaders, judging the risks of defiance too high, took the difficult decision to accept the back-to-work order and to resume negotiations. Many union members, bitterly disappointed, saw their leaders' decision as treason and tore up their membership cards. This division would culminate in the loss by the CNTU of some 25,000 to 30,000 members who would form a new umbrella union, the Centrale des Syndicats Democratiques.3 The conflict might have ended there but for the decision of the Quebec minister of justice, Jerome Choquette, to prosecute the three leaders for disobeying the injunctions. On 8 May they were sentenced to one year in jail. Labour movements across the province roared in indignant protest, and employees from all sectors, including longshoremen from Local 375, walked out the following day to show their support. Construction sites, mines, factories, schools, and hospitals

196 Waterfront Blues were closed in many parts of the province.4 All in all, fifty-two union leaders would be fined and sentenced to jail terms of up to six months.5 It would be weeks before walkouts and demonstrations throughout the province ceased. When the longshoremen walked out on 9 May, the MEA immediately obtaine an injunction to order the men to return to work the following day.6 We did so more as a matter of principle than because we thought an injunction would actually be needed; the port was just another victim of circumstances in the big picture and the MEA did not expect further trouble once the longshoremen were finished showing sympathy. And, indeed, longshoremen did return to work as planned on 10 May. But the walkout had fired them up and only a spark was needed to send them out again. That spark was a dispute over the implementation of a new clause in the collective agreement. Twenty-four hours later, the port was closed. On 11 May my company, Fednav, decided to make use of the new clause 9.11 t split a gang and send the men not being used in the hold to work in the shed. To ensure that we were proceeding in accordance with the contract, we called an MEA contract administrator, Denis Lafrance, for advice. Lafrance told us that all we had to do was to relay the orders through the walking boss and foremen, which we did. The men obliged but were upset with the order and requested that an ILA business agent be called. It smelled like trouble. Two business agents, Robert Paquin and Theo Beaudin, showed up during the coffee break, as did two more contract administrators called by Lafrance as reinforcements. After the coffee break, the walking boss once again split the gang between hold and shed. The business agents went straight to the shed to tell the longshoremen that breaking up the gang was not allowed under the interim arrangements and to return to the ship's hold, which they did before the eyes of startled contract administrators. The dispute then escalated. Still riding high from their recent sympathy strike, the longshoremen threw down their gear and walked off the job, quickly picking up supporters from other sheds. A similar incident took place in the afternoon at a ship being worked by Brown and Ryan, with two gangs out of four refusing to obey orders. Jean-Baptiste Tremblay, another Local 375 business agent, came to the worksite and threatened Peter Brown that unless he reversed his order, he would stop the work currently being done on all four of the contractors' ships. Brown refused and all work stopped within minutes. The issue was whether gangs could be split in this manner before computer dispatch was implemented. Interim arrangements agreed upon by the parties provided that clause 8.01 of the old (1969) agreement - which read, A foreman and 16 men, including a hatchman, two winch drivers and one or more truck drivers, shall constitute a basic gang for all loading and unloading'7 - remained in

Strike! 197 effect until such time as computer dispatch was in place. Under computer dispatch, when implemented, clause 8.01 would be replaced by clause 9.05, which set out the number of men required in the hold depending upon the type of cargo being handled. However, the remainder of the new clause 9 took effect immediately, including clause 9.11, which stated: 'The men may be displaced from the hold of a ship to the shed and vice-versa, or from a hatch to another, or from a ship to another, during a work period.'8 This replaced the 1969 clause, which spoke of 'moving a gang/9 The heart of the dispute was the relationship between the old clause 8.01 and the new clause 9.11 during the interim period. The union felt that, until the computer system was operational, gangs remained indivisible units (8.01) and that the transfer of 'men' from hold to shed referred to in clause 9.11 applied to the gang and not to individuals. It was our position at the MEA that, while the dispatching of men (clause 8) remained on a gang basis until the computer system was set up, the deployment of the men once they were at their respective worksites was permitted, in order to provide immediate flexibility, under the new clause 9:11. Poirier blamed both parties for the walkout, referring to 'overzealous management giving its own interpretation of clause 9.11, and overzealous union representatives who, without consulting their president, illegally reacted to said management interpretation.'10 It made little difference that ILA officers had failed to consult with St-Onge before provoking the walkout, however, because St-Onge was all in favour of it. Following the electric-forklift episode, he had lost his respect for Masters, and when informed of management's interpretation of clause 9.11, he thought that it was another example of Masters's duplicity and was looking for a fight. When MEA representatives met with him, he was in a terrible mood and threatened to close the port if we did not agree to his views on certain clauses but in particular clause 9.ii.u In response, we decided to stand firm and the MEA instructed all companies to implement 9.11 on 12 May, meaning to split the gangs as and when required. The men walked out again, only to return on 14 May. At St-Onge's request, Poirier convened a joint meeting to clarify the parties' respective positions. Later, Denis Pronovost of the MEA would recall: 'It turned out to be a tumultuous meeting. The dialogue was most toilsome. Mr. St-Onge began by telling us that, if we thought that we could do what we wanted, he had a surprise in store for us. The surprise would be that the port would close down. This was said through other words, of the type "calisse de tabernacle." I do not wish to say more here. Mr. Poirier intervened to ask Mr. St-Onge to calm down so that different opinions could be discussed.'12 And Jacques Belanger, another MEA staff member, recalled St-Onge's words at the same meeting: 'What you saw in '65 or '66, when I told the men not to wet their shirts, you'll see something else now ... You ain't seen

198 Waterfront Blues nothing yet. Christ, you'll see something else. Picard and all that stuff will look like nothing in comparison, it will look like child's play.'13 St-Onge refused the MEA's offer of having Gold arbitrate the matter first thing in the morning.14 Gold's sharp tongue and paternalistic roughness, which had so enticed the union leader in the early months of his involvement with the judge's conciliation board, had lost much of its appeal. According to Pronovost, in StOnge's testimony before Gold, he said that he was not interested in arbitration. He didn't give a damn about arbitration awards, courts of law, injunctions, judges, and all the rest. If we continued to move men around, he would see to it that the port would close. He kept his word. Was St-Onge just unreasonably stubborn and bent on punishing the MEA for its hypocrisy? Had he rallied to the jailed union leaders' belief that workers had no hope of getting justice from the courts? Or was he of bad faith, trying to ignore the terms of the contract and resisting arbitration because he thought that the union would lose? Maybe a little bit of each. St-Onge believed that Masters was looking for a fight with the union, and by God, he wanted nothing more than to give him the beating of his life. When told that the ILA would close the port, Masters did not wince. He had known that this was coming and was ready for it. Most members of the MEA did not want a strike and his phone had been ringing off the hook with members telling him to give in and postpone the break-up of gangs until September. But Masters was in no mood to retreat in the face of intimidation tactics. It was time to go to war with St-Onge. The stakes were clear: control of the waterfront, and management's right to manage. If the MEA was ever going to be taken seriously by the union, its members, and the public, it had to show what it was capable of. Masters secured his members' commitment to stand firm and united if Local 375 followed through with its threat, and he told St-Onge that if he shut down the ports there would be no ships around when they decided to come back. In response, St-Onge said, as he often had in the past, 'As long as there is water in the river, there will be ships in the port.'15 And thus war was declared. Walkout The following morning, 16 May, the Montreal longshoremen walked out along with the Trois-Rivieres longshoremen. The MEA immediately sent a telegram to Labour Minister Martin O'Connell requesting permission to prosecute the union for breach of contract since work stoppages were prohibited during the life of the collective agreement. O'Connell denied the request on the grounds that the contract provided a mechanism to solve the dispute, and he did not believe that prosecution of the union would serve a useful purpose.16 The following day,

Strike! 199 17 May, the Quebec longshoremen joined in the strike and all three river ports found themselves at a standstill again, for the first time since the bitter 1966 strike which had led to the Picard commission. In total, almost 3,200 longshoremen were involved. The MEA obtained another injunction ordering a return to work. When the union ignored it, the MEA filed a claim for contempt of court. Poirier thought that the walkout might be a protest against the first injunction and proposed to the ILA to agree to arbitration in return for which he would persuade the MEA to drop the charges. The ILA refused. The governmen proposed to set up an inquiry to study the issue but the MEA was not interested. Not only would it take time but there was no guarantee that the results would be accepted by the union. What the employers wanted was to get their ships serviced as soon as possible. By 24 May (about two weeks into the strike), thirtyfour ships stood idle in the port and at least a dozen had already left Montreal to unload in the Maritime ports or Toronto.17 The MEA estimated that each day of the strike was costing the port $1 million, but there was more to the damage than that. Here were the river ports plunged into the kind of labour troubles they had suffered through most of the 19605, with the parties adopting the same intransigent attitude towards each other that rendered the possibilities of a negotiated solution almost nil. The effect of the strike on the Port of Montreal's image could not be overestimated. Observers speculated that this might be the last straw for those shippers who had continued to use the Montreal port despite the labour unrest of previous years. 'It will take a hell of a long time to recuperate from this,' one Department of Labour official said.18 Still, both parties resisted filing for arbitration. A particular difficulty for the MEA at this time was that the job-security fund was empty because we had lost an important portion of the fund's projected revenue as a result of the illegal strike. If the strike was settled immediately, it would be some time before ships returned and before the fund could be built up again. In the meantime, job-security payments would be due. A preliminary look at the job-security forecast in relation to the impact of the strike indicated that, even if men returned to work immediately, the fund would suffer a shortfall in the six-figure range. To meet payments, the MEA would have to increase assessments even though they had just been increased and were already regarded as too high. As soon as the board understood the situation, we withdrew our injunction ordering the men back to work and suspended all longshoremen indefinitely, in effect topping the strike with a lockout.19 The date was 30 May. On 7 June, five weeks into the strike, the Quebec and Trois-Rivieres longshoremen divorced themselves from Montreal and returned to work, requesting help from conciliation officers to negotiate a return-to-work protocol. The Montreal local was on its own but its officers gave no sign of fatigue nor did they show any

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interest in finding a solution. One editorialist summed it up as follows: The conflict is so pointless, so subtle, that no one really knows how to interpret it. No one knows either who is wrong and who is right. The employers interpreted in their own way the terms of the labour agreement on the constitution of the unloading crews. The union members countered and quit work. The employers retaliated and everyone was fired. The courts before which the case stands wonder what to do and the federal department of labour refuses to grant the employers in the three ports of the St. Lawrence the right to take the longshoremen's union before the courts. Arbitration should therefore be resorted to, to settle the conflict, but both sides attempt to lose themselves in a judicial jungle which camouflages the basic truths of the problem. In other words, no one will budge.20

Day after day there were rumours that ILA members wanted the strike to stop. One MP reported that he had spoken with distressed longshoremen who were unable to collect social-welfare or unemployment insurance while on strike and were depending on benevolent societies to feed their families.21 Social Credit Party leader Real Caouette urged longshoremen to support his efforts to persuade the government to intervene. One longshoreman, Caouette said, 'was almost crying while describing the terrible situation in which the longshoremen find themselves at present and told me that this whole dispute could have been avoided from the beginning in less than 24 hours if only the parties had been willing to meet.' Caouette then declared: 'Let nobody think that all longshoremen approve their Union leaders' statements. Last Monday morning, it was a shame to see the longshoremen gathered at the Paul Sauve Centre in Montreal willing to go back to work while another group insisted on picketing. And labourers working on the same sites were fighting like cats and dogs and trying to break each other's legs... At the present time, there is undeserved misery in Montreal, and everybody complains about it.'22 More demands for government intervention came from workers and employers in related industries that were either operating at minimum capacity or stalled completely because of the strike. Yet O'Connell still refused to intervene beyond urging the parties to go to arbitration, arguing that mediation would be equivalent to reopening negotiations and would send the message that any group dissatisfied with its contract could resort to illegal action to obtain the renegotiation of the terms in dispute.23 The MEA felt that it was not its place to file the grievance. Masters had taken the position that, if the union was dissatisfied with the interpretation management had given to the agreement, it should file the grievance. To some, it seemed a stubborn stand to take but Masters thought that a basic principle of sound labour relations was at stake - management manages and

Strike! 201 the union grieves - and he wanted to adhere to it at all costs. After all, the union was the one that had called the strike. Bryce Mackasey agreed and, as acting labour minister, stated in the House of Commons that the union leaders were not acting in the best interest of their members by refusing to file a grievance.24 The parties were certainly not making it easy for O'Connell to stay out of it. Both still refused to initiate arbitration, and if an unreasonable stand on the union's part was almost tolerable, many government representatives thought that the MEA should know better. Deputy Minister of Labour Bernard Wilson was among those who put tremendous pressure on the MEA to file a grievance. Masters recalled: 'I had worked with him and I knew him well, but he was definitely a biased individual in terms of labour relations. He was pro-union 100 per cent... He could not understand why we would not acquiesce to the union on this point [that the MEA file a grievance]... He could not understand and he came to the conclusion that it was because I was pigheaded or something. And we had some major battles here. They brought us to Ottawa. We wouldn't give in.'25 Not only would the MEA not give in but we further decided that we would agree to clause 9.11 being arbitrated only if job security was suspended.26 Government representatives were appalled at the suggestion but the magnitude of the financial crisis gave the MEA a lot of bargaining power. Masters made it known that, if the government passed back-to-work legislation without suspending job security, the MEA would file for bankruptcy the following morning.27 In exchange for the arbitration of clause 9.11, then, the MEA demanded the suspension of the job-security plan until September and its subsequent renegotiation. Other conditions included: the reduction of holiday benefits to match Labour Code standards (and the cancellation of all vacations); and a personal guarantee by union officers that they would never interfere in the progress of the work, contravention of which would result in their elimination from the job-security plan for life. Meanwhile, the MEA would continue with its legal efforts to obtain contempt-of-court charges against the union for disregarding the injunction.28 This position represented an unprecedented intrusion into the collective agreement, and while the union may arguably have brought the MEA's wrath upon itself by staging an illegal walkout, the government was not going to force such conditions down the union's throat. It did everything it could to hold off legislation and avoid breaking the lockout. Those not aware of what was happening backstage - namely, the public, opposition members in the Commons, and other concerned groups - interpreted O'Connell's legalistic stand as a sign of weakness and incompetence. The Quebec minister of labour, Jean Coumoyer, criticized the federal government's inaction and was quoted as saying that, although the port was not under provincial jurisdiction, he would intervene himself unless something was done soon.29 In Parliament, the leader of the opposition, Robert Stanfield,

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challenged O'Connell 'to intervene actively, personally ... rather than simply stand up here and preach.'30 The Conservative Party introduced a motion to have the government give the parties a forty-eight-hour deadline to start the arbitration procedure, spokesman Georges Valade arguing: Mr. Speaker, I do not at all understand why each time that some conflict has arisen with serious consequences for Quebec... as well as for the entire Canadian economy, the Minister has fallen into the nasty way of taking refuge by saying: the minister cannot interfere, the parties must get together and come to an agreement. We cannot interfere ... If we were seeking to permanently destroy the harbour system which is still vital for the maintenance of Quebec's economic prosperity, we would not act differently ... Notwithstanding this procedure provided in the collective agreement in cases of grievances, none of the interested parties has indicated its willingness to use it so far. This is ridiculous and unjustifiable. It is a matter of mutual pouting, Mr. Speaker, between the parties concerned, where the government and the Minister of Labour find themselves in a moral and political obligation to intervene in this conflict... The predecessor of the present Minister of Labour, the hon. member for Verdun [Bryce Mackasey], would certainly not have taken this matter so lightly had he still been in office.31

But O'Connell stood firm. He stated: Mr. Speaker, this is not an ordinary collective agreement. Its provisions promise to set labour management relations on the docks at Montreal on an entirely new course. They promise to set the port of Montreal in the forefront of world ports. This agreement coped with the impact on dock workers of the rapid technological changes which have come about at docks all over the world in the methods of working ships, in loading and unloading, in the use of mechanized equipment... That was one of the best agreements, certainly in North America, to regulate the relations between employers and employees in any dock system in North America. It is very important, therefore... that the steps the parties take, particularly the steps which the Minister of Labour takes at this time, confirm and support that agreement and do not in fact undermine the long term interests of the port of Montreal. This agreement provided very significant improvements in pension benefits. It coped with security of longshoremen with a guarantee of 37 weeks of pay per annum, and it provided for the new and essential levels of productivity required by the employers to pay the enhanced benefits to the workers and to attract and hold business in the port of Montreal. Increased productivity levels required the break up of established work gang systems, and the introduction of new methods of work assignment related to the introduction of a computer. Productivity by the men was the exchange for the

Strike! 203 job security and the pension and wage benefits. That was a breakthrough in industrial relations at this port.32

Montreal Liberal MP Warren Allmand countered that, while he would normally agree, in this case at this time he believed that the collective agreement 'has been undermined if not completely destroyed ... It seems ludicrous to me that as Montreal goes down the drain, the government, which is to protect the public interests, clings to principles which have already been thrown out by those whom they are meant to serve.'33 The general feeling in the House seemed to be that the parties 'would rather be mad at each other than to get together and solve the problem.'34 On 19 June, O'Connell gave in and delivered an ultimatum: either the parties agreed to arbitration or a commission of inquiry would be appointed. The ILA in all three ports gingerly agreed to cooperate with such a commission. St-Onge told the press, perhaps half-hopefully, that 'the Government would perhaps decide to knock them down with some legislation.'35 Legislation would take the union off the hook but an inquiry would do just as well. The MEA, however, felt that an inquiry would take too long without any guaranteed results, and, after weeks of resistance, it finally agreed to file a grievance with Judge Gold concerning the grievance procedure, the no-strike or lockout clause, and clause 9.11. On 23 June, Gold served notice to the parties that the litigious issues would be arbitrated a week later irrespective of the ILA's wish to avoid arbitration in favour of a federal inquiry.36 On the morning of 27 June, MEA representatives and Judge Gold sat in the courtroom waiting for St-Onge and his team. As thumbs twiddled and hopes faded, Mulroney asked the judge to proceed ex-parte (without one party). As Gold chewed over the request, he was brought a telegram informing him that the ILA would not be appearing before his court. Gold was deeply unenthusiastic about proceeding without the union, and he adjourned the proceedings until the next day in the hope that St-Onge would come to his senses. But St-Onge was stubborn and when the courtroom doors opened, the MEA's representatives stood alone before the judge. Gold reluctantly declared the hearings open and had already heard the testimony of Pronovost, Belanger, and Masters when word came to him that Phil Cutler had been urgently trying to get him on the telephone. Gold hurried out to call Cutler, who told him that the union team was on its way and could the judge please wait? Gold was relieved that the ILA had decided to appear and responded positively. When the union arrived, Cutler began by arguing that the grievance was not arbitrable, which Gold easily refuted. The judge was ready to proceed on content when the union officers left the room, leaving Cutler to explain lamely that his mandate was now limited to continuing to raise the point of arbitrability,

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which he did mechanically as Mulroney sailed through the MEA's complaints without any opposition. The union's attitude boggled the mind since it left Gold with no option other than to rule in favour of management. He did so on 29 June, and he also took care to point out that, in his opinion, ... article 9.11, the issue at the root of the dispute, is in a sense irrelevant in view of the larger issues involved, for even if the Union were right in its pretension - which I do not believe - it was wrong to act as it did. It should have had recourse to the grievance procedure, the accepted method of dispute settlement under the collective agreement and the law. The fact is, however, that on the merit of the question the union is wrong. If there is an ambiguity between article 8 of the old agreement and article 9.11 of the new, it is readily dispelled by the clear terms of the memorandum of April 3rd 1972. Upon the proper construction of the new agreement and the memorandum, I must conclude that management's stand was correct. Whatever the practice may have been before, it is clear that under the new regime [including the transitional period awaiting the installation of the computerl the practice was to be changed.

For lack of authority in the matter, Gold turned down Mulroney's request to suspend union officers for five years and remove them from the job-security plan for life for their role in orchestrating the strike, although 'the conduct of these gentlemen undoubtedly merits the severest sanctions.'37 The MEA doubted that St-Onge would order the men back to work but did not care much if he did not. By holding out, St-Onge would just be stepping further into quicksand. The Globe and Mail reported: 'Mr. Mulroney said last night that the employers "hope that the finding is going to be respected and if it is not respected, we anticipate that the government will act."'38 In Ottawa, MPs were eager to adjourn for the summer recess but were sceptical that Gold's award would send the longshoremen back to work and irritated at the prospect of having to reconvene to deal with it. One Conservative member suggested the immediate introduction of back-to-work legislation so that Parliament would not have to be recalled for that purpose, to which Labour Minister O'Connell replied that a law ordering Canadians to do that which they were required to do by law did not seem pertinent. Real Caouette asked whether it was not time to 'teach Mr. St-Onge that the Canadian Government is more important than the president of the union?'39 O'Connell declined to answer. A general union meeting was called to discuss the content and implications of Gold's award the day after its release. Although St-Onge suspected that he had lost his grip on the membership, he had not, until now, realized the extent of the internal damage brought about by the dispute. A group of dissidents led by

Strike! 205 longshoreman Yves Dufour had come together to contest St-Onge's leadership and to study the new collective agreement for themselves. Dufour's group was extremely vocal and charged the union executive with dishonesty, mismanagement, and incompetence as well as with not having the longshoremen's interests at heart. St-Onge was accused of selling the members down the river. Dufour's committee demanded the immediate resignation of all officers of the local. StOnge, shocked and depressed, did nothing to defend himself but rather urged the membership to keep the internal battles for later and concentrate on the dispute with management. While Dufour, on the one hand, insisted upon an immediate return to work, on the other he charged that Gold had been bought by management. The 2,000 Montreal longshoremen present voted unanimously to extend their forty-five-day walkout and to contest Gold's decision in the Superior Court.40 Upon being informed of the ILA's decision to remain on strike, government House leader Allan MacEachen postponed Parliament's summer recess indefinitely to loud groans and a distinct 'To hell with you too!' from Conservative member Patrick Nowlan.41 O'Connell immediately dispatched Bernard Wilson and his assistant, Bill Kelly, to Montreal to mediate conditions that would enable the port to reopen. For four days, Wilson and Kelly, flanked by conciliation officers Charlie Poirier and Rene Lacas, met separately with the parties. By 3 July, they thought that a solution was at hand if the MEA lifted its suspension of longshoremen and allowed a return to work, steps to be coupled with the issuing of vacation paycheques and the setting of a date for the resumption of the jobsecurity plan agreed upon, 15 October being suggested.42 The proposal was accepted by the Quebec and Trois-Rivieres longshoremen but, to everybody's astonishment, longshoremen in Montreal rejected it flatly. A candid St-Onge, apparently completely oblivious to the fact that the union had little bargaining power in this affair, wrote to the labour minister: Mr. Minister ... While accepting the principle of returning to work as soon as possible, the members of the association have unanimously decided to reject the recommendation concerning the suspension of job security plan until October 15,1972, a date which was deemed totally unacceptable. The members have set as a condition for returning to work that the job guarantee be restored approximately one week after the activities have resumed in the port of Montreal and that management give up the idea of any legal proceedings and actions against the Union and its officers. The officers of the association are available to meet you at any time in order to reach a satisfactory agreement whereby work can be resumed as soon as possible.43

The press was baffled by the Montreal longshoremen's action and failed to see what they hoped to achieve from continuing the confrontation.44 The strike had been costly for longshoremen. Just a few days earlier, the rank and file had

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accused the executive of costing each of them $3,600 in lost wages during the strike,45 with total losses incurred by workers estimated to be as much as $8 million.46 Yet, illogically enough, it was because the strike had been so costly that longshoremen could not bear going back without gaining something big. A union member told the Globe and Mail, in a declaration that clearly illustrated that the longshormen's goal had shifted from obtaining a delay in implementation to achieving a renegotiation of the contract: 'We have lost. They are going to be able to break up the gangs and we have lost nearly eight weeks' pay. We just want our executive to get us the best deal possible.'47 The Montreal longshoremen seemed to think that mediation would go on until they obtained what they wanted or at least until O'Connell became personally involved. After all, they had met with Nicholson in 1966 and Mackasey in 1969. But this labour minister had no intention of dragging it on any longer. The voices of other parties affected by the catastrophic crisis had become impossible to ignore, and continuing to avoid legislation would be irresponsible and in direct conflict with the interests of the public and the national economy. On 5 July 1972, back-to-work legislation - Bill €-230 - was introduced in the House of Commons. All three opposition parties agreed to support the bill while, in light of the longshoremen's indifference to law and order, doubting its usefulness 48 The Fall of Jean-Marc St-Onge Bill C-230, the St Lawrence Ports Operations Act, received royal assent on 7 July. It ordered longshoremen to return to work and comply with management's dispatch directives as of the following day, and suspended job-security payments until such time deemed appropriate by an arbitrator who was also empowered to modify the plan and related provisions. Any dispute between the parties, which they failed to settle in a reasonable amount of time, could be referred to arbitration by the minister of labour at his discretion. The act would remain in force until the expiration of the collective agreement or until a date fixed by proclamation. The bill did not provide for specific penalties for disobedience, in the hope, said O'Connell, that this would help 'to restore and continue a constructive relationship' between the MEA and the ILA.49 Refusal to comply with the act would leave the longshoremen and the ILA liable under the Criminal Code (up to two years' imprisonment or fines) and the Canada Labour Code (fines for individuals and associations from $150 to $500 a day). Though O'Connell had finally acted to stop the conflict, he received little praise for his work. Opposition members called him, among other things, passive, indifferent, and vague. Biting references were made to his unconcern, incompetence,

Strike! 207 misunderstanding of the situation, inconsistencies, contradictions, inability to understand his duties, and even cowardice,50 qualities that stood in marked contrast to the virtues of his predecessor, Bryce Mackasey, who, it was said, would not have allowed such a disaster to occur. When the next minister of labour, John Munro, would be faced with a longshoring dispute in 1975, he would remember the public beating endured by O'Connell and promise himself that he would not allow that to happen to him. In hindsight, O'Connell was probably the most intelligent labour minister of the period. His objective was to protect at all costs the integrity of our system of free collective bargaining. He understood that every intervention by government makes it easier for the next intervention and so on until faith in our bargaining system is destroyed. Men were available for work by 10 July, but Norman Wolfe, now chair of the MEA, cautioned: 'When work at the ports first resumes only about 20 per cent of the 3200 striking longshoremen will be called to work.'51 Nor was the situation expected to change any time soon. Alternative routes had been used during the illegal strike and many shippers had become fed up with the Montreal port. The walkout had lasted fifty-two days, almost two weeks more than the bitter 1966 strike. And there were other differences between the two disputes. In 1966 the union had called a strike during negotiations as a pressure tactic to support their negotiation goals: in this sense, the strike of 1966 could be justified. In contrast, the strike of 1972 had been called after the contract had been signed because the union did not agree to the interpretation management was giving to provisions regulating working conditions during a transitional period. Its purpose was not to gain a change but to protest the manner in which management was implementing a change already agreed upon. The only thing the union could hope to win was a delay of three and a half months. Objectively, it was hardly worth it but calling the strike had nothing to do with objectivity. It had to do with St-Onge's hatred of Masters and his personal desire for revenge: 'Arnie Masters hit me twice below the belt and everybody paid for it. Us as well. I was stubborn when maybe I should not have been. This is one of those faux pas that you make in life and that you cannot repair after.52 At the conclusion of the 1972 strike/lockout, employers had proven that they stood united and that the days of dealing with labour-management relations in an ad hoc fashion were over and replaced by a new era of professionalism. A bewildered St-Onge would later confide to Charlie Poirier that he never thought Masters could hold the industry together. Though this important dispute established the MEA as a force equal to the union, it did not necessarily imply that peace would follow. What it did mean, however, was that the union's assessment of the MEA's capacity to deal with a strike would no longer rely on the basic assumption that the employers would be unable to stand together. This represented the

zo8

Waterfront Blues

laying of another brick in a new system of industrial relations in the port. All wars have their casualties and this one was no exception. Even if all the longshoremen had been in favour of walking out to show their dissatisfaction with clause 9.11, most could not afford to stay out for long and they began to resent St-Onge for refusing to call off the stoppage. A few weeks later, nothing would seem a satisfactory solution to them. Contrary to the union executive's expectations, which were based upon prior experience, it was not management that became divided but the ILA. Masters won his war and St-Onge was crushed in the process. The union leader's strategy had always been like that of a tank. You drive in at full power, bulldoze over all obstacles, and worry about rebuilding once victory was secured. St-Onge did not know how to do otherwise. He yelled, cursed, and threatened and everyone always knew where they stood. Even Mas ters recognized that 'St-Onge was a guy with great native intelligence... He took a cannon to kill a fly but he was smart and honest.'53 St-Onge did not consider himself to be unreasonable. While not rejecting change in principle, he did have to be convinced on his own terms. Throughout all four rounds of negotiations he participated in (1966,1968,1969, and 1972), his basic approach was always that everything was possible if management asked nicely and paid well: respect and compensation, simple as that. In the 19605, JeanMarc St-Onge was the best thing that could have happened to longshoremen. They needed to be brought out of the past and he had accomplished that task almost single-handed, showing vision and leadership that set him apart from his predecessors. St-Onge himself said: 'With all the changes that happened in that port in so little time, they [the employers] were lucky to have someone who could talk, who wasn't embarrassed of saying what was on his mind once in a while. We did not just say no, we found solutions ... They can thank me that there was a dialogue, not always on friendly terms, but there was a dialogue.'54 Furthermore, if he had not been so tough, the employers might not have been able to put aside their differences to speak with a single voice. St-Onge was a driving force in the centralization and professionalization of management, but his failure to recognize this change led to his downfall. The profile of the port was no longer that of a 'giant marketplace'55 where distinct companies with varying interests and methods dealt with their own labour problems, everyone minding their own business and looking out for themselves. Control and direction of the workforce had been centralized under the MEA's umbrella in all aspects of the employment system. Labour relations, previously conducted by industry volunteers unable to speak to the union representatives without a translator, was now the primary purpose of the MEA. The waterfront scene had changed and the game had moved up to a level where St-Onge's style no longer fit. St-Onge might have been able to swallow this defeat if the membership had

Strike! 209 limited its criticism to the fact that he had made a bad decision by calling the strike. But it went way beyond that. They condemned the contract, explained StOnge: 'They said that the contract was bad and that we had sold them short.' And they condemned him. St-Onge's felt that his days as leader were numbered. No longer did he seem invincible, no longer did people believe that he could carry the world on his shoulders. St-Onge was tired. He could take a lot of abuse but he could not take the membership's questioning of his integrity and devotion. By the time Bill €-230 was passed, St-Onge had already decided to retire from the labour scene after eight flamboyant years: 'When your members say that about you, it is time for you to leave. I stayed until 1974 not to drop this contract halfway through, because it would have been easy to interpret it all wrong. You know, the guys that replace you, they don't care as much about it, they say bah! these other guys did it. It was important to me to ensure this contract was respected, but it was obvious to me that I would not sign a new one.'56 Though St-Onge stayed on for another two years, he was no longer the same man. And apparently he never directly spoke a word to Masters again.57

CHAPTER NINE

On the Brink

Sophisticated mechanisms can be thrown off balance easily and are expensive to repair, and so it was with the system built into the new collective agreement. The MEA's calculation that unlimited job security was sustainable had been based on the assumption that business would be stable and work uninterrupted. The strike had destroyed this assumption and broken down the balance between revenues and expenses necessary for the system to work. The work stoppage caused cargo to be diverted to other ports, some of which would not come back, and the loss of available man-hours coupled with an accelerated shift to containerization would increase job-security costs well beyond the MEA's projections. As well, tonnage assessments would be raised to levels high enough to create important internal problems for the MEA but too low to restore the fund's financial health. Withi months, the MEA found itself in the eye of a financial whirlwind which threatened to destroy the port's capacity to operate. The Worst of Times Bill 0-230 empowered an arbitrator to set a resumption date for the job-security plan and to modify the plan if needed. For the longshoremen, job security had become the very heart of the employment relationship and they were terrified at the thought that the matter could be handled by a stranger insensitive to the situation on the waterfront. Since Gold, for all his flaws, knew the parties, the importance of job security, and the irregular nature of cargo flow in the port, and since he would be in a better position to assess the validity of the MEA's figures than other arbitrators, the ILA asked the judge in August 1972 to be the one to arbitrate the job-security issue. He was unavailable until October, however, which meant that, with him in charge, the job-security reactivation date would be pushed too far back for the union's liking. And so the ILA decided to take its

On the Brink 211 chances with a stranger. Judge Elphege Marier, one of four judges listed in the collective agreement as preferred grievance arbitrators, heard the case between 6 and 20 September and handed down his decision on the 28th. In the absence of clear evidence that a new job-security plan was absolutely necessary, Judge Marier did not want to develop such a plan for an industry with which he was unfamiliar. And the evidence submitted by the MEA was not doing the trick. The union contended that it was business as usual in the port and that there were no reasons why job security should not be reinstated immediately or, at the latest, by 15 October. The MEA alleged that traffic had decreased by onethird, which invalidated the calculations that had served as a basis for the revised job-security plan. Current assessments were clearly insufficient to support the plan but the substantial increase that would be necessary to reactivate the plan would destroy the port's capacity to compete. From the MEA's point of view, the only viable solution was to introduce layoff provisions or to change the jobsecurity plan from a weekly to an annual guarantee. But Marier, finding it impossible to predict future levels of business, decided to be optimistic. On 28 September he ruled that job security should resume on 15 October. To alleviate management's financial burden without affecting the longshoremen's guarantee, Marier modified the contract provision under which management had to build up a reserve fund of $2.5 million over two years, payable to the union in the event of an economic disaster, reducing the figure to $1.25 million. Insofar as the judge was concerned, this reduction should be sufficient relief. When Judge Marier issued his ruling, the MEA knew that the financial crisi that we had feared would soon be upon us. What Marier had not taken into consideration was that the MEA had been wrong in July to think that reinstating job security on 15 October was financially feasible. While we could make do unti the end of the job-security season in December, the 1973 season was an entirely different matter. We warned the government and the ILA that we would be unable to start the 1973 season under the current terms of the job-security plan but this was interpreted as little more than a manifestation of unhappiness with Marier's decision. On 15 October, the same day that the computer-dispatch program was initiated, the job-security plan was reactivated. By November, ships had still not returned in any significant number. Week after week saw more than a thousand men a day remaining idle during what was usually the peak period of the year. The shortage of work led to a huge increase in job-security costs which the fund lacked the capacity to pay. This painfully familiar situation was exponentially worsened by the terms of the new contract. Computer dispatch and the break-up of gangs reduced the need for longshoremen much more drastically than had been anticipated, with the consequence that about five hundred men with job security, almost a quarter of the workforce, were

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redundant. Faced with this enormous manpower surplus, the MEA, which had once again relinquished its right to lay off employees in Montreal as part of the 1972 collective agreement, had its hands tied. Revised projections as of 22 November were ominous. If current trends continued, job security would cost $6.3 million in 1973 instead of the $2 million expected when the contract had been signed. Tonnage assessments were expected to raise substantially less than the $5 million initially anticipated. With the money needed for the reserve and a deficit carried forward from 1972, the MEA could expect to face a total deficit of close to $5 million by the end of 1973. The banking agreement provided that the CIBC could request assessment increases to ensure that the MEA would meet its financial obligations. If the bank decided to exercise this right, the MEA would have to raise assessments by an additional dollar per equivalent ton, over the present average of 63 cents, to $1.68. And just when it seemed that things could not get worse, revised forecasts drew an even bleaker picture. The tonnage handled between 1970 and 1972 had decreased by 27 per cent and the tonnage projections for 1973 indicated a further downward trend of as much as 23 per cent. By 14 December, it was calculated that tonnage assessments would have to be increased by 325 per cent to cover the deficit.1 It was plain to see that this would signify the death of the port. Something had to be done rapidly but the MEA's legal options hardly provided solutions. At an MEA Board of Directors meeting in late November, Masters tabled a number of estimates which demonstrated that the job-security plan would not be viable in 1973.2 Although Quebec and TVois-Rivieres could probably survive because of permitted layoffs under the plan, this was not the case in Montreal. Masters estimated that there were approximately five hundred excess longshoremen in Montreal. He then proposed five options. First, the MEA could invoke article 15.04 of the collective agreement, which blocked the imposition of excessive assessments at the river ports. But even if the MEA could prove that a certain level of assessments would be detrimental to the ports and thus prevent the bank from forcing an increase, it did not directly follow that the MEA would be discharged from its obligation to pay the weekly guarantee to longshoremen under the job-security plan. To achieve that result, we would have to argue that the spirit of clause 15.04 was to establish a link between ability to pay and jobsecurity costs. Masters had received legal advice that we would have to arbitrate clause 15.04 and we decided to instruct Price Waterhouse to put together documentation for such an eventuality, though we thought that this option would be a last resort since success was far from certain.3 The second option was to invoke clause 15.06, by which the MEA would allege an economic crisis, give $1.25 million to the union, and be discharged from it obligation to pay job security. The problem was that the union would also be discharged from its obligation to provide labour, and the parties would therefore

On the Brink 213 wake up the next day without a collective agreement and without any way to operate the port. Besides, the MEA did not have the money needed, and it could not take out a loan because the collective agreement specified that the jobsecurity fund had to be generated through tonnage assessments. This option did not receive any serious consideration. The third option was for the MEA to declare bankruptcy. It would be easy to fold the tent and let someone else pick up the pieces, but most of us felt that we had a collective agreement which was ahead of its time and we wanted to see it through. Not only was giving up a repugnant thought, it was also a short-term solution. The need for an association such as the MEA was real, and if we threw in the towel, we would eventually have to pick it up again and start anew. Or if we let the government take over, we would lose all control over matters of vital interest to us. The fourth option was to persuade the government to become involved in a rescue effort. The board saw this as the best plan, but, unfortunately for us, the government was not interested. Masters and Mulroney did travel to Ottawa in November to meet with the new labour minister, John Munro, to get a feel for the government's position on the problem. They were told that nothing could be done. That left the fifth and last option: to scrap the present agreement and try to negotiate a better deal with the union. As things now stood, however, there was little chance that St-Onge would agree to reopen negotiations with a view to cutting job-security benefits. While the ILA's appetite for battle had diminished, it had been replaced by a kind of apathy that made dialogue impossible at the very time when the MEA needed collaboration the most. Meetings held in January 1973 to discuss the problem of excessive manpower and its impact on job security proved fruitless, St-Onge rejecting each and every solution proposed by the MEA.4 Masters was furious. As he saw it, had the union not gone on strike, there would have been enough money to pay job security. As the union saw it, the MEA had realized that the contract was more expensive than anticipated and was using the strike as an excuse to try to wiggle out of it. By February 1973, the MEA was stuck in a downward spiral without any help or solution in sight. The job-security season would start in less than two months and we would never be able to bear the costs of the plan for the number of longshoremen covered. There could be no layoffs in Montreal and the mandatory-retirement provisions in the contract would come too late to save the day. And then we had an idea. The MEA would buy the early retirement of surplus longshoremen. Buy-out There were a couple of precedents in the transportation industry where surplus employees had been bought out. In 1958, as railways shifted to diesel engines,

214 Waterfront Blues thereby making redundant the firemen employed on old locomotives, the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) tried unsuccessfully to negotiate their termination. A royal commission was appointed to settle the dispute and Justice Roy L. Kellock of the Supreme Court ruled that the workforce should be reduced only by natural attrition. When someone suggested giving individual firemen the sum of $25,000 in exchange for voluntary resignation, the railway, intimidated by the huge costs involved, rejected the idea and resolved to let natural attrition take its course. Ten years later, in 1969, attrition still had not resulted in any significant reduction of the workforce, and the CPRfinallyaccepted the idea of a buy-out - though i offered the firemen only a small, $2,000 lump-sum payment or $50 a month for two years. It was nowhere near their current wages and only a hundred firemen took up the offer. Four years later, in 1973, the CPR still had 1,000 redundant firemen drawing paycheques. At that point, it realized that the idea to buy out the firemen with a generous settlement, which it had rejected fifteen years earlier, had been a good one after all.5 A more encouraging precedent involved the longshoring industry at the port of London, England, where in 1968 large severance and benefit packages were offered to men over the age offifty-five.The response had been so positive that the London offer had become the blueprint for a national scheme which had 'played an invaluable part in getting the docks industry through one of the biggest crisis in its history.'6 The final cost had totalled about £50 million but the parties agreed that the results were well worth it since the workforce was reduced by half without work stoppages. The MEA now saw no reason why such a success story could not be repeated in the river ports. In February the MEA approached the NHB, the Department of Labour, the CIBC, and the ILA to discuss the possibility of a buy-out in Montreal. All were cautiously receptive to the idea but the CIBC wanted a guarantee that the NHB would pay off the MEA's debt if the association proved unable to meet its obligations on schedule.7 Of course, the NHB was not eager to become involved in the MEA's financial mess and resisted making a firm commitment to guarantee the huge bank loan. The fact was that default on the part of the MEA seemed an all-too-real possibility. We depended on revenues derived from assessments on cargo over which we had little or no control and we were stuck with equally unpredictable expenses related to the weekly job-security plan, which had a history of being insolvent. Under these circumstances, it would be surprising if the MEA did not fail to meet its banking obligations. So the NHB stalled, which in turn prevented any progress being made with the CIBC. At that point I was asked to approach the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) to explore the feasibility of a consortium of banks assuming the risk of a $io-million line of credit.81 vividly remember Masters, Mulroney, and me

On the Brink 215 meeting with RBC vice-president Jacques Finlayson in his office in Place Ville Marie, from where we could see a portion of the harbour. He asked: 'What is the security?' We did not have any security of the type he was looking for, but, as StOnge always said, there was water in the river. I said to him, 'Look out the window. Your security is the port. As long as the port is here, you will get your money back.' The RBC agreed to consider the proposal but requested more dat on tonnage and expressed the wish to speak with several more representatives of the MEA. On 16 March the CIBC declared that the loan was unacceptable without a guarantor and, furthermore, that assessments would have to be increased to maintain the job-security line of credit. On the same day, however, the RBC came back to us and said that it and the CIBC would jointly agree to finance the buy-out over a two-year period as long as the MEA agreed not to decrease assessments without the bank's consent.9 For all the difficulties encountered, the MEA did not have much choice but to try to bring the buy-out solution to completion. Bankruptcy might take the association off the hook but it would not erase the employers' problem. The inescapable truth was that it would always be impossible to run the current job-security plan with the current workforce in a financially responsible manner. Unless the workforce was permanently and substantially reduced, the industry would be facing a problem of critical proportions when it came time to renegotiate the collective agreement in December 1974, whether the MEA was still alive by then or not. With that knowledge in hand, and confident that an NHB guarantee would be forthcoming, we decided to proceed. Masters met with St-Onge and the offer was made. Local 375 members covered by job security and not subject to mandatory retirement during the lifespan of the contract would be offered a lump-sum payment of $12,000 to resign voluntarily from the workforce and relinquish all rights to employment as longshoremen. If the port underwent a miraculous recovery, they would be given opportunities to work after all eligible men had been dispatched. The offer was contingent upon its acceptance by at least 500 men (approximately 20 per cent of the workforce) or any smaller number that was acceptable to management. The MEA would pay the union $475,000, which represented the amount that had been left in the TDF, eliminated by the new agreement. Management had originally agreed to turn over this money to the ILA, but subsequently it had ended up using most of it to pay the checkers, members of Local 1657, during the strike. As a consequence, Local 375 had initiated legal proceedings against the MEA to obtain payment of the money. In addition to now paying this money, the MEA would withdraw from the contempt of court counter-appeal and from the $2.8-million damage claim against the union. The offer was a non-negotiable package deal that stood until 5 P.M. on

216 Waterfront Blues 30 March 19/3-10 All the union had to do to fulfil its end of the bargain was to present it to its membership. If the union refused to cooperate, the offer would be communicated directly to the men without any compensation for the ILA. StOnge had forty-eight hours to accept. We did not have to wait long for a reply. The union was smart enough to know what was good for it and agreed to the proposal provided management promised not to make any more offers relating to early retirement in 1973 irrespective of the longshoremen's willingness to accept.11 The deal was done. The $12,000 offer was relayed to longshoremen on 21 March. We waited for the response with consider able apprehension. While a lump-sum payment of one year's wages sounded appealing, it was relatively little considering the income level and security that longshoremen enjoyed, and many in the MEA did not believe that the plan would work. Masters - and I agreed with him - thought otherwise. A former secretarytreasurer of Local 375, Arthur Cadotte, was now in charge of hiring at the Olympic Stadium construction project, and Masters believed that young dockers would gladly pick up their buy-out cheque and convert to a new career. But by 27 March, his confidence had faded: with three days left before the deadline, only 137 longshoremen had shown interest. Hours later, the NHB announced that it would not guarantee the MEA's early-retirement loan. We had exhausted all of our options. The very last hope that remained was that the government of Canada would come to our assistance, its previous statements notwithstanding. It had money and had often said that the operation of the port was a matter of national interest. Masters had an encouraging meeting with the minister of transport, Jean Marchand, which yielded the promise of a definite answer within forty-eight hours. While we patiently waited, the days passed. On 30 March, with still no word from the government, the buy-out proposal lapsed owing to a lack of interest - fewer than two hundred and fifty longshoremen had accepted it.12 Within an hour of the plan's failure, the MEA doubled assessments on tonnage, the increase to become effective on 15 April 1973. The MEA knew that the increase would raise a howl of protest and was indeed counting on it. As Masters explained, surely the government would not stand by and watch the port go to hell as a result of large assessments. Yet it was not a unanimous decision. Peter Evans of Manchester Liners and Maurice van der Veen of Cast North America, the two container operators represented on the board, voted against. But while we all agreed that the increase was steep and placed us at a definite competitive disadvantage, we did not have much of a choice if the MEA was to fulfil its legal obligations towards the CIBC and the longshoremen. A sombre warning was registered in the minutes that those who failed to pay the assessment would be denied labour.13 Mayhem was soon the order of the day. W.J. Stenason, the president of Cana-

On the Brink 217 dian Pacific Steamships, writing on behalf not only of his firm but also of Cast North America and Furness Withy, the two other container operators using the St Lawrence River ports, threatened to commence legal proceedings unless the assessments were rolled back and reissued on a different and equitable basis, Furthermore, he stated that CP would not pay the proposed increased assessment.14 At the next meeting of the MEA Board of Directors, Peter Evans demanded a tariff revision based on a uniform rate for all categories of members.15 Letters of protest from members and third parties affected by the increase poured in, blaming the MEA for having negotiated the collective agreement which was putting them in this situation. Shipowners and terminal operators in the ports of Quebec and Trois-Rivieres took the stand that they had no intention of paying for the problems of the Port of Montreal. Against this mutinous background, we watched the implementation date draw nearer with mounting nervousness. On 13 April, Masters reported on discussions which he had held with an economist from the NHB and a financial expert from the Department of Transport on the subject of another buy-out, this one including all three St Lawrence River ports with the emphasis on Montreal. Masters also reported that, at the request of Jean-Marie Chabot, chairman of the Montreal Port Authority, he had been asked to write a letter giving his opinion of the problems at the port and to meet with a subcommittee of the Port Authority on 16 April.16 On 15 April 1973, when the new assessments came into effect, CP flatly refuse to pay. In retaliation, the MEA refused to provide labour. Twenty-four hours passed. Almost two hundred trucks stood lined up outside CP's Quebec City terminal.17 CP obtained a temporary injunction from the Quebec Superior Court to force the MEA to provide labour before irreparable damage was done to the company, but while the MEA obeyed the order, it suspended CP for refusing to pay assessments.18 Two other firms, Cast and Furness, agreed to pay the increased assessments under protest. The NHB, which had attempted to help by reducin space-rental charges to offset the effect of the assessment increase, now decided to get into the act. On 17 April, at a meeting of directors held at 9 A.M., Masters reported that he had explained in his letter to Chabot that the problems in the port stemmed from the presence of too many longshoremen. He had met with the Port Authority subcommittee, which had included Beaudet, Port Manager Beshwaty, Chabot, and St-Onge, and had been advised that government actuaries were preparing different packages that might be offered to the longshoremen. Masters then met with NHB Chairman Del Taylor and Vice-Chairman Guy Beaudet and explained the theory of the buy-out.19 Later in the day, Taylor and Beaudet met with us. Taylor, who now wanted the NHB to become involved, told us that if the MEA would be prepared to roll back

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the assessments, which he acknowledged were onerous and could prove detrimental to business in the port, the NHB would be prepared to intervene with the banks and to discuss with CP Steamships the consequence of their legal action. The NHB would not guarantee the MEA's bank loan, however; instead, if the NHB were to become financially involved in a reduction of the workforce, it would demand a 'watching brief over the operations of the association.20 This, it was thought, would satisfy the banks. We agreed and immediately scaled back the increased assessments by about one-half.21 A great deal happened over the next forty-eight hours which created momentum towards another attempt to reduce the workforce. Masters and Taylor, independently of each other, spoke with Stenason of CP Ships, and the following day CP agreed to cancel its injunction if the MEA reviewed the alleged discriminatory basis of the assessments vis-a-vis container and conventional cargo. The MEA acquiesced and peace was restored, at least temporarily. CP would pay outstanding assessment dues on i June 1973 but under protest and with the intention of recovering these amounts via the courts. The dispute continued well into July. CP threatened the MEA with court action unless assessments were adjusted to provide a uniform rate. The MEA replied that its democratic structure ensured that the wishes of the majority were respected and that the costs of the collective agreement were hardly surprising in view of the tremendous flexibility and other advantages the MEA had successfully negotiated for its members, particularly the container operators. CP eventually backed down. The MEA versus the NHB In a letter to Masters on 19 April, Taylor again made mention of the NHB's 'watching brief over the MEA's affairs 'during the period when major loan obligations would be outstanding to the Banks.'22 This letter discussed the 'watching brief only in general terms, but, in another letter of the same date to the banks, Taylor spelled out in detail what he meant.23 In due course and before the buy-out loan agreement was executed in May, the MEA board approved the undertakings demanded by the NHB. These included: that Beaudet be available for consultation by the MEA; that the internal auditors of the NHB meet with the staff of the MEA to establish certain 'benchmarks' for guidance and future general review; that the administrative and management structure of the MEA be reviewed with the NHB; that the monthly cash flow and financial reports available to the banks also be available to the NHB; and that Taylor and Beaudet meet with the MEA at least quarterly. Given that the NHB was not putting up a penny, Masters was not pleased with what he saw as Taylor's bureaucratic meddling - he just did not like having to explain to anyone else what he was doing and why. On the other hand,

On the Brink 219 the NHB was getting us the money we needed and there was really nothing onerous in its demands. By now, the need for the reducing the size of the workforce was becoming more critical. The MEA's staff, under the direction of comptroller Bryan Mackasey, undertook an analysis of the factors necessitating the increase in assessments, and its conclusions pointed squarely at the problem of surplus manpower.24 Faced with this report, we knew that something had to be done to achieve a smaller workforce. Masters, unfazed by the fate of the March buy-out, was determined to try again. As always, the problem was to wrestle the money needed from the banks. Though angry with Taylor for not agreeing to a guarantee, Masters was now hopeful that, with the NHB's letter to the banks, the financing period could be extended. He hired several actuarial firms to provide us with advice on the retirement options available. Different payment options were designed to meet the varying needs of longshoremen: a lump sum given immediately or in thirty-two weeks, monthly instalments over a period of three, five, or ten years or for life, or bimonthly pension benefits upon retirement. With the ILA's collaboration, discussions were initiated with the Unemployment Insurance Commission and Revenue Canada to negotiate a preferential tax deduction on the payment and to determine the layoff date that would yield maximum unemployment-insurance benefits. The union agreed to relay the offer once again but the MEA also sent a letter directly to longshoremen outlining the conditions that applied and the various payment options.25 Agreement was reached with Local 375 on i May and the offer was forwarded to all longshoremen on the /th. It was subject to acceptance by 500 or a lesser number of longshoremen agreed to by the MEA, and it would remain on the table until 5:00 P.M. on the zist. Many were sceptical that the second buy-out offer would be any more successful than the first but Masters remained stubbornly confident. A number of longshoremen had debts and could not afford to refuse a payment of $12,000. So the first thing that Masters did was to have the offer trumpeted through the media: 'When you announce [publicly] that 2,500 people are eligible for $12,000, every shylock in town knows it, so it is not long before a lot of people are forced to pay their debts.'26 Masters was proven right. When the final tally was made, the MEA accepted the applications of 494 longshoremen to take early retirement and we acceded to the requests of 30 more, due to retire in January 1974, to leave the workforce immediately.27 This was the easy part. The buy-out was the most significant step ever taken to match the size of the workforce with the amount of work available in the port. True, the surplusmanpower problem was relatively recent. The employers never had to concern themselves with the number of longshoremen before 1967, when they became

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responsible for paying men when there was no work. The successful reduction of the workforce bought the port a chance at a competitive future, which pleased government, business people, and workers alike. Still, there was only one party stuck with the bill. That was the MEA. And the bill was a large one. Taylor told the MEA board that he would write to the banks in support of our borrowing the $7.2 million for the buy-out, to be repaid over three years. As expected, there were strings attached. The MEA had to accept the undertakings demanded by Taylor so the NHB could have its 'watching brief/28 The next day he wrote to the banks - not a letter of guarantee, as they had been demanding, but a letter pledging that the MEA (or a similar body) would continue to collect assessments on cargo handled in the ports. He went on to write: 'In the event however if difficulties makes it impossible for the MEA to fulfill its obligation the NHB would notify government and make appropriate recommendations.'29 The banks were satisfied. On 25 May the CIBC and the RBC signed an agreement providing the MEA a total sum of $10.2 million, divided into a first line of credit of $3 million terminating on 31 December 1973, to fund temporary deficiencies under the job-security plan (the 'operational loan'), and a second line of credit of $7.2 million, repayable over a three-year period, to finance the buy-out of ILA members (the 'early retirement loan'). As with the original $2-million line of credit with the CIBC, the MEA was to set assessments at levels sufficient to enable us to repay the loans on a schedule based upon projections laid out in an appendix forming part of the agreement. The banks were empowered to order the MEA to increase tonnage assessments if we were falling short of the projections. At the time, the MEA fully expected to meet its obligations on schedule. Hardly two months later, however, we knew that we would never be able to meet the deadline. Projections of cargo flow made in May, and given to the banks and the NHB at the time, indicated that, based upon existing assessments, sufficient revenue would be collected to cover job-security costs for the balance of 1973, to pay down the operational loan by the end of the year, and to retire two-thirds of the earlyretirement loan by the end of the current collective agreement on 31 Decembe 1974. By 30 July 1973, however, it had become apparent that these objectives would not be met. Job-security costs in Montreal were now expected to increase from $2.1 million to $2.8 million in 1973 owing to a slight tonnage reduction and revised productivity index on conventional cargo (which in turn probably resulted from a shift in the cargo mix). In Quebec it was a far different situation. There, conventional cargo was projected to decline by 19 per cent and container tonnage by 26 per cent, and the changed projections now estimated job-security costs at $2.2 million. In Trois-Rivieres a decrease of 13 per cent in projected genera cargo for the year increased the cost of job security by $600,000. Analysing these

On the Brink 221 numbers, the MEA staff concluded that the 1974 projections also needed revision. In the result, a study was presented to the board which indicated that the shortfall in the job-security plan by March 1975, the end of the winter navigation season, would likely reach about $7.5 million.30 For the MEA to meet its obligations to the banks, we clearly would require either a substantial increase in assessments or a refinancing of the MEA's indebtedness over a long period of time, as well as an early-retirement plan for Quebec and Trois-Rivieres, where it was now plain that there were too many longshoremen. The problem with trying to mount another buy-out, however, was that it would require financing. Taylor was furious and said that he would not help with the banks unless the NHB took over management of the MEA.31 Masters ignored him and the board appointed a subcommittee consisting of Bob Scott, the current chairman of the MEA, Mike Woodall, and me to speak with the NHB and the banks.32 We met with T.P.G. Morris of the CIBC on 15 August and broached the subject of a loan to bring about a buy-out at Quebec and Trois-Rivieres. He was sympathetic and promised to speak with the RBC when our formal proposal was received. The next day Masters received a statement from Jette that showed we were perilously close to using up our operational line of credit. Something had to be done. On 20 August the board decided on a two-tiered assessment increase, the first on i November 1973 and the second on i April 1974, in an amount to be decided, subject to any positive development from our meeting with Beaudet to be held later that week. On 28 August we reported to the board. Beaudet had concurred with our view that assessments had to remain at a reasonable level and for that reason the loans must be financed over a longer period, but he was not in a position to make a commitment that the NHB would help us bring that about. The board then decided that, in the absence of such refinancing, the cargo assessments would increase by fifty cents a ton on i November 1973 and another fifty cents a ton on i April 1974. It was agreed that Scott and I would meet with Taylor and Beaudet.33 We were having difficulty setting up a meeting with Taylor possibly because of a meeting Masters had with Transport Minister Jean Marchand, Taylor's boss, in Ottawa.34 Masters chose his words carefully: I said, 'Now I have a problem and I would like a straight answer from you. The National Harbours Board and the Government of Canada are willing to invest millions in buildings, equipment and in methods to reduce labour and so on and so forth ... What I want to know is if there is any possibility that you would be interested in investing in human beings. Because you see, that is my problem. We have all the buildings, all the equipment, but unless somebody is willing to invest in people, we are dead. So it is a matter of principles. If you say that as a matter of principle, "I am not prepared to invest in people" ... well, you understand,' He said, 'With my back-

222 Waterfront Blues ground, you think I would say that?' I said, 'Don't tell me, Jean! Tell Del Taylor, he's an accountant.'35

Masters reported to the board on 18 September that he had met with Marchand and he hoped that, when Scott and I eventually met with Taylor, we would have some more encouraging news. Scott sent Taylor a telegram emphasizing the importance of our meeting.36 In the meantime, after our decision to raise the level of assessments, new projections dated 29 August had been forwarded to the banks, which then agreed to extend our operational loan.37 We remained alive, but just barely. Our discussions with Taylor and Beaudet now had to focus on three issues: the extension of the operational loan beyond 31 December 1973 and the earlyretirement loan beyond May 1975; an additional loan to enable us to offer an earlyretirement plan in Quebec and Trois- Rivieres; and another line of credit, since we would likely require further assistance to cover weekly job-security costs. After a series of meetings which included the NHB, the banks, and the MEA, Taylor backed down but did not stop growling. The NHB's promise to support a restructuring of the loans initially translated into a lukewarm endorsement that was hardly appealing from the bankers' point of view. Without a guarantee, the NHB expected the banks to extend the repayment period to ten years. For its part, the NHB would seek government authorization to guarantee financial arrangements with the banks for an additional amount of $2.4 million to cover a buy-out in Quebec and Trois Rivieres and a further $250,000 guarantee to cover additional weekly job-security loans in October and November. However, Taylor affirmed that the NHB would seek the necessary authorization for a guarantee of the $7.2 million 'if in the opinion of the Board, circumstances, terms and conditions surrounding such request warrant this action.'38 One really had to wonder what Taylor's ultimate strategy was. In the absence of increased assessments, the cupboard was bare. The ports were working well, productivity was rising, and the MEA was trying to live up to its bargaining commitment and pay job-security guarantees which provided all longshoremen with full pay whether they worked or not. The ports were a national asset and essential to the domestic and foreign trade of the country. Increasing the assessments would pay off the debts incurred by the MEA but at what risk to cargo flow? Ships could go elsewhere and if they did the revenue from cargo assessments would be insufficient to pay down the debt. Why was Taylor not immediately seeking authorization for a guarantee in order to extend the period of the loans? Was his real goal to have the NHB take over the MEA? Masters laid it out bluntly to Taylor. The NHB could take over and run the port if it so pleased but not through the MEA, which would be dissolved. Every longshoreman would become a civil servant. Of course, being the landlord as well as the employer might cause problems since the terminal companies who rented

On the Brink 223 the facilities also paid for the labour but would lose all control over working conditions and labour-related issues. And, of course, there would still be too many longshoremen, but the NHB could always buy them out too. Masters remembers telling Taylor: 'You [the NHB] can take this whole goddamn thing and away you go. But there is no halfway house here. Either use us [the MEA] to finance the longshoremen and buy them out, or take them over. Take your pick.' Masters would remark that 'we had lots of bargaining power. Loads of it And that's what infuriated the NHB ... they were caught.'39 Between 25 October 1973 and the end of the year, the MEA borrowed a further $940,000 from the NHB to finance job-security payments and early-retirement plans.40 Masters, Mulroney, Scott, Norman Wolfe, and I were delegated again to meet with the banks and the NHB to find the right way to extend the repayment of the loans and to begin to look at the numbers for 1974. After all, we still had another year left in our collective agreement with the ILA before we could seriously consider changing the weekly job-security plan. The costs of job security from January to December 1973 had totalled $9.2 million. At the beginning of th year, before the early retirement of some 500 men, it had been estimated that the costs would amount to a little over $7 million. With the early retirement of the 500 men, it had been estimated that the cost would be reduced to about $3 million. The fluctuating numbers resulted from a 10 per cent decline in tonnage, which reduced assessment revenue, and a 20 per cent decline in hours. Despite the horrific battle with dollars, the MEA remained in business at the end of the year. Furthermore, productivity had increased, there were no major disputes along the waterfront, and the workforce had been reduced. The year 1973 had been a difficult one for the MEA not only in the St Lawrenc River ports but also in the Maritime ports. Negotiations in Halifax had resulted in a twenty-one-day lockout before a three-year collective agreement was signed. Concurrent negotiations at Saint John culminated in a three-week strike by longshoremen and then a ten-day strike by checkers before a thirty-month agreement was signed. Ottawa to the Rescue At our first board meeting in 1974, we reviewed current projections before going off to meet with the banks. It was clear that, based upon 1973 tonnage figures, we would incur a substantial deficit in 1974 in the absence of another buy-out and an increase in assessments.41 After each of the banks had studied the projections, they agreed with our conclusions and wrote Taylor separate letters which, in almost identical words, indicated that we would need to increase assessments and decrease the workforce.42

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It finally became clear that someone in Ottawa was paying attention when, in mid-February, Guy Lavigueur, assistant deputy minister of finance, turned up at one of our meetings to discuss the details of a loan restructuring.43 His participa tion may have been as a result of a telephone call that Mulroney had made to John Turner, the minister of finance. At one of the many meetings I had with Masters in his office developing our strategy, we were in a particularly depressed mood because the next day the MEA had to meet a job-security payroll and we did not know where the money was going to come from. The NHB was being difficult The House of Commons was in session and Mulroney, who had joined the meeting late in the day, called the House and had Turner brought to the phone. I recall Mulroney saying something like, 'John, tomorrow the Port of Montreal is going to close because we can't pay the longshoremen their job security and we are going to blame the Government.' Needless to say, the NHB gave us the advance we needed. And now the minister of finance was involved. Events then moved fairly quickly. At a series of meetings between the NHB (l attended as chair of the finance committee) and the various other players, with Lavigueur representing the Department of Finance, our respective lawyers hammered out a deal which became a letter of understanding on 17 April44 and a fina agreement on 17 May 1974-45 Outstanding loans would be restructured so that th government would give the MEA $7.2 million to pay off the loans contracted with the banks in 1973, hence becoming the prime lender. New loans of $4.8 million would be provided by the government to conduct more buy-outs in the river ports; the retirement package and the number of early retirements would be subject to the minister of transport's approval. The interest rate for these loans would be 2.25 per cent above the rate of long-term loans to crown corporations. For their part, the banks would provide the MEA with an additional separate loan of $1.2 million to repay advances made by the NHB, such loan being guaranteed by the government. The banks would forego repayment of the principal during 1974 save for the $7.2 million to be repaid from the government loan. The repayment schedule for the remaining $3.6 million operational loan would be restructured over ten years, along with any additional job-security loans, which were not to exceed $7.2 million in 1974. The banks would not exercise their right to demand increases in cargo assessments without written approval from the NHB during 1974. However, the MEA was to raise cargo assessments by forty cents a ton effective i May 1974, half of which would be applied monthly to the repayment of the bank loans and the other half to the repayment of the government's loan. Payments towards the latter could be deferred with the government's permission if it was deemed necessary to enable the MEA to repay the bank loans. All books and records wer to be available to the government and the banks for inspection at any time.

On the Brink 225 As soon as the letter of understanding was signed, a new buy-out effort was undertaken in the three river ports. To 'create a quick reduction in the workforce/46 a direct link was established between the sum offered and the resignation date: those who registered between 25 April and 17 May would receive the full $12,000; those who retired between 18 and 31 May would receive only $7,500; those who waited until 30 June would receive $6,000; and those who made up their minds only in July or August would receive $4,500.47 This time the MEA would not involve the union in the buy-out. It did not need to: plenty of longshoremen would take the offer, whether the ILA supported it or not. At the time, MEA-ILA relations were as bad as ever; in February 1974, at a meeting of management and labour convened by Judge Gold to discuss certain problems with the dispatch procedure, the MEA representatives had walked out because of insults hurled by St-Onge.48 And so, rather than meeting with the union executive to present the buy-out offer, the MEA sent a letter explaining it directly to longshoremen's homes. The letter emphasized that longshoremen should not delude themselves into thinking that the current job-security plan would be perpetuated ad infinitum. The MEA would 'respect its obligations for the term of the collective agreement. However, when the collective agreement comes to an end, this will also mark the end of the Job Security Plan currently in force.'49 Clearly implied was the MEA's intention not to negotiate a weekly plan for the next collective agreement. All discussions within the MEA on the subject of the buy-out had been carried out in the utmost secrecy and it was only a few days after the letter had been sent to longshoremen that the ILA became aware of it. Understandably, the union was angered by the MEA's initiative. Whatever the MEA chose to pretend, the buy-out was not strictly a private matter between management and its employees in a unionized environment since any reduction of the workforce created a proportionate reduction in the union's income. The checkers' local protested the MEA's refusal to negotiate the matter with the ILA and designed penalties to discourage checkers from accepting the offer.50 Local 375 officers chose a more politically cautious route, informing their members that the union had not been consulted and that they most certainly intended to perpetuate the present plan in the next round of negotiations: 'It is up to each member to make his decision in all freedom. We cannot advise you in either way... [As for job security], your officers have no intention to accept a diminished job security guarantee in the following collective agreement... To the contrary, we have the intention, with your support, to improve upon the current guarantee, as we have always done in the past.51 Despite the union's caution, many longshoremen were interested in accepting the offer, which was to close on 24 May 1974. By 30 May, a total of 898 ILA members,52 80 per cent of whom were from Local 375, had retired from the

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industry. The early-retirement program had been a complete success. It had cost the MEA $11.2 million, however, and the outstanding bill for the job-security program stood at $5.8 million. It now remained to be seen whether the MEA could follow through and negotiate a changed job-security plan in a new collective agreement, while also paying down its debt in accordance with its agreement with the banks and the government of Canada.

CHAPTER TEN

Hardball

As the three-year collective agreement negotiated in 1972 was drawing to a clos in 1974, after an illegal strike that had almost brought the Port of Montreal to its knees and resulted in the buy-out of some nine hundred dockworkers in the three St Lawrence River ports, the MEA was left with a debt approaching $17 million of which $5 million was owed the government. Although Del Taylor had told Masters, on two occasions in 1974, that the NHB's financial involvement was conditional upon the MEA's commitment never again to agree to the type of job-security plan currently in effect, no such restrictive covenant was written into the financing agreement. Yet, having learned a hard lesson, we had no intention of perpetuating the plan in its current format. Given the vagaries of the shipping industry and the competitive environment in which it operated, the MEA was not about to enter into another collective labour agreement with a blank cheque to pay a weekly wage guarantee. The 1972 strike coupled with some unforeseen effects of the collective agreement had created a chain reaction which, in a three-year span, completely disfigured the Montreal waterfront and left both the MEA and the ILA scarred Consequently, the parties once again approached negotiations in a frame of mind hardly conducive to smooth progress. The MEA was poised to present a position to the union as early as August 1974 but the whole summer went by with the ILA contending that it was not yet ready. On the MEA's side, the possibility of an industrial-inquiry commission to look at the costs of the job-security plan had been the subject of discussion between the association and officials of the Department of Labour in early 1974 and again in June, and Masters raised the issue again with Labour Minister John Munro in October. Although the minister remained non-committal, Masters felt that the union would get little or no sympathy from the government if it refused to cooperate with such an inquiry were it established.1

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When a first negotiation meeting was held with all three ports' representatives on 28 October, it was clear that St-Onge, one month away from stepping down as president of Local 375, was not prepared to consider the abandonment of the weekly job-security plan. He had not changed his mind about resigning the presidency of the local and he recognized that he would not be part of the signing of a new agreement, but he was prepared to stick to his principles nonetheless. We decided to suspend meetings until a new union executive was elected, in the hope that St-Onge's successor would be more reasonable.2 On i December, Jean-Marc St-Onge removed his crown and slipped quietly back into the anonymous mass of longshoremen from whence he had come almost ten years earlier. Adrien Tremblay, a longshoreman since 1947 and StOnge's first vice-president, was elected as the new president of Local 375. A rather soft-spoken man, he had worked as an MEA dispatcher and as such had some close contacts at the MEA. He was well liked by the MEA staff and by his own colleagues but he was neither a leader in the tradition of St-Onge nor a model of flexibility. When negotiations resumed on 2 December, the MEA and the ILA continued to lock horns. The union demanded that, minimally, the status quo had to be preserved. This included wage increases at least equivalent to the costof-living index, the continuation of the current weekly job-security plan with unlimited liability on the part of the employer, the extension of Local 375 jurisdiction, the tightening up of existing deployment provisions, and the maintenance of the no-layoff clause. A union officer told a Montreal Gazette reporter: 'We have to get a better deal this time than last or we won't survive. We have to make sure we keep our jobs and that our salaries go up with inflation. These things are basic.'3 As the deadlock persisted, the parties, on 20 December, jointly requested the appointment of a conciliation commissioner by the Department of Labour. Judge Gold landed the job. Calling a meeting for 31 December, Gold informed the parties that it was his intention to appoint economist Diane Bellemare to investigate and report on the job-security aspect of the collective agreement, and he requested that we each submit our positions on the issue. At a meeting held on 10 January 1975, the MEA's directors reviewed a paper analysing job security and agreed that the only viable plan for the future must be based upon a seasonal guarantee including all hours worked. It was also agreed that an escape clause must be included in recognition of possible economic disasters. We were so convinced that the plan had to be changed that we agreed to endure another strike rather than have the present plan continued in the next collective agreement. Over several conciliation meetings, Gold tried to get Local 375 to consider a seasonal guarantee but to no avail. Bellemare's interim report indicated that 50 per cent of the high cost of job security could be attributed to a weekly rather

Hardball 229 than a seasonal guarantee: 25 per cent to the inflexibility of the plan, and 25 per cent to the provision excluding weekend work from the plan's calculations.4 But her conclusions made no impact on the union. In the face of all the evidence establishing the economic impracticality of continuing with a weekly guarantee, the Montreal local stubbornly refused to budge. By the middle of February, conciliation meetings with Gold had ended and he was expected to submit his report to the minister in short order. There had been many times in the past when the union's lack of professional staff had led its officers to make important strategic mistakes but never had it appeared so incompetent as during the 1975 negotiations. Adrien Tremblay had been a witness to the turmoil and battles of the 19605. He knew that the Picard commission had been legislated by the government as a result of the union's refusal to negotiate change when the status quo was clearly unsustainable. He had felt the sting of defeat when the government had sent longshoremen back to work in 1972 after an illegal strike of fifty-two days, a strike that had accomplished nothing and nearly brought the MEA to bankruptcy. He had seen the erosion of Local 375 as a result of buy-outs, which the union had been unable to prevent in the face of spiralling labour costs. Time after time, the union had refused to take into consideration the economic imperatives related to working conditions, content to pout and gaze at its navel. And time after time, Local 375 had been rudely awakened by some form of government intervention or legal proceeding, most often losing its point, some money, and some popularity with the rank and file. Gold tried until the last hour to make the union officers realize that they were making an important mistake but to no avail: 'In the course of attempting to get movement from them, I would say to them, "We have gone too far not to make a breakthrough, there is a future for you and goddam it, if you do not listen to me and make a move, I am going to make a report on what I think is right and it is possible and indeed likely that my report will not be to your liking." Now that is normal mediating techniques. I said the same thing to management. I have said the same thing to everybody whenever I am mediating. But they did not believe me at that time, you see. As a matter of fact, they told me afterwards that they did not believe me.'5 Gold had been involved with the longshoremen since 1968. Over this eightyear period, there had been times when he had clearly been in favour of management's position, but, in the end, he had never let the longshoremen down. This was not just any conciliation commissioner: this was Judge Gold, 'the father of longshoremen.' The union and the longshoremen had a relationship with him. They had told him that he was the only man who could walk the docks safely at night because they would ensure his protection. They had wanted to have his portrait painted and hung on the wall of the union hall. As they would later

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explain, the union's officers were convinced that, whatever the judge said now, when he wrote his report he would propose a fair compromise that longshoremen could live with: 'Hundreds of times the Honourable Judge had "put us in our place" in the past and just as many times he had stopped the flow of tears shed by the employers who had tried in vain to "make him cry." We expected, as was his custom, that he would take the parties in hand and come to a reasonable solution of compromise.'6 But Gold believed that the sort of compromise that the union had in mind one based upon weekly job security - was unrealistic. If the 1972 plan were perpetuated, the chance at recovery that to date had cost the MEA $17 millio would be lost, and with it the jobs of more longshoremen. The judge also knew that the type of compromise that did constitute a viable solution - seasonal job security - would not be acceptable to the union. Yet, by failing to offer a compro mise of its own, the union left it up to him to make the decision. Gold would say: 'Then I had the hard choice to make. The choice I had to make was whether I was going to take the easy way out and write a report which was sort of namby-pamby and innocuous, knowing they would go on strike and be sent back to work by legislation which would then appoint an arbitrator and let the arbitrator decide and to hell with everything else, good or bad for the port; or do what I thought was right after I had spent so many years learning and whether I had the courage in my own convictions knowing that it would create some sort of problem. And I did what I thought was right at the time.'7 Gold picked up his pen and wrote a conciliation report in the form of a complete collective agreement between the MEA and Local 375, which he released to the minister of labour on 14 March 1975.® On the same day, the report was released to the parties. Under the Canada Labour Code, management and the union would have the right to call a lockout or strike seven days later. The Gold Report of 1975 The Gold Report was long - over one hundred pages - detailed, and radically different from any other collective agreement that the parties had operated under. From a longshoreman's point of view, it was also harsh. While maintaining a job-security regime, Gold reduced the advantage to be gained from not working and increased the advantage from working by substantially increasing wage rates. He proposed increasing the basic wage rate by 57 per cent over three years, to $8.00 an hour, and adding a supplementary statutory holiday (Good Friday) for a total of nine holidays a year. He recommended changing the job-security plan from a weekly guarantee of 40 hours, 5 days a week for 37 weeks (a total of 1,480 hours) to a seasonal guarantee of 1,600 hours over 40 weeks. This minimum

Hardball 231 guarantee would be reduced by all hours refused (including overtime) or lost as a result of a disciplinary measure as well as by all statutory holidays and vacations. Longshoremen eligible for job security were those included on the list submitted by the MEA, which corresponded to the men eligible as of 20 December 1974. Jobsecurity payments would still be made on a weekly basis and in an amount equivalent to forty hours of work, but these payments would constitute only an advance on wages. For calculation purposes, one hour worked or offered, whether at overtime or at straight time, was considered one hour and counted in the determination of the guarantee. Advances were cumulative week after week and would be deducted from a longshoreman's paycheque any week in which he was offered more than forty hours of work. If a longshoreman received weekly advances during the season that he did not later make up, and if the total exceeded the adjusted annual guarantee, he would owe the fund for the excess number of hours at the end of the season. He would then be obliged to make a refund in a lump sum. A longshoreman's year-end debt could be met by the MEA withholding vacation pay or other money owing. The force majeure clause was amended to give a broader definition of the types of crisis that would release the MEA from its obligation to pay job security. The old clause defined force majeure as any major crisis which had the effect of preventing all ships from reaching their destination. The new clause said all or substantially all. The MEA had requested this change as the result of a pilots' strike in the spring of 1974, which had prevented all but three ships from reaching their destination. Management had interpreted the crisis as a force majeure and suspended job security for some two weeks, only to be later told by Judge Gold, in a grievance arbitration, that under a strict interpretation of the clause the MEA owed longshoremen $600,000 in job-security payments. Gold introduced a layoff clause which would allow temporary reductions in the size of the workforce in the event of economic inactivity. This amendment also stemmed in large part from the pilots' strike, which had resulted in reduced tonnage in the river ports and high job-security payments.9 Using 1974 as a base year, Gold proposed giving the employers the right to lay off part of the workforce any time that the accumulated man-hours in the year to date fell below 70 per cent of those of the base year.10 A supplementary unemployment-benefit plan was included by which employers would complement the federal government's unemployment-insurance program to provide laid-off employees with 100 per cent of the basic remuneration. Rehiring would take place when the cumulative number of man-hours reached 85 per cent of those of the base year. Local 375's jurisdiction was reduced and redefined to allow certain equipment to be operated by workers other than longshoremen. Various tasks were completely removed from Local 375's jurisdiction. These included the maintenance of

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water closets, restrooms, and heavy-lifting equipment, the performance of all tasks involving mechanics and assistant mechanics, the handling of dunnage on deck or in the holds, the washing and cleaning of the ship's hold and large tanks, and any cleaning using specialized equipment. The discipline code was revised to provide for more severe sanctions, longer suspension periods, and speedier discharge following a lesser number of offences. The concept of no-call days, the last remains of the longshoremen's traditional right not to work, was abandoned, which implied that longshoremen would have to be available seven days a week. All longshoremen eligible for job security would have to call the dispatch centre every day between 6 P.M. and midnight to obtain the following day's work assignment and classification. All calls made would be registered. Refusal to work or failure to call the dispatch centre to get one's assignment would not only lead to a reduction of eight hours in the seasonal guarantee but would also be treated as a disciplinary offence meriting a suspension of up to four days. Failure to appear at the worksite would be punished even more severely: up to one-month's suspension for the fifth and subsequent offences. Should a longshoreman be absent from work for more than five days, even for just cause such as work-related sickness or accident, he could be dismissed. In order to return to work and benefit from job security, it would be incumbent on him to prove that he was able to resume his duties and perform all work related to his classifications. Employers were granted the right to select foremen and walking bosses as part of their permanent staff not subject to rotation. They were also given the right to create new classifications based on the needs of individual companies. There would be two regimes of work for the employers to choose from or to use in combination as required - a regular system and a shift system. Reactions For ten days after the release of the report on 14 March, the MEA agonized over what to do. On the one hand, Gold's proposed seasonal rather than weekly jobsecurity guarantee was exactly what we had demanded and our analysis of revenue and expenses of the revised plan led us to the conclusion that cargo assessments for the year 1975 would not need to be raised from the 1974 level. Furthermore, the nuts and bolts of Gold's collective agreement also responded to our needs. On the other hand, it would be a costly settlement, with basic wages increasing by 57 per cent over the term of the collective agreement and the jobsecurity season expanded from thirty-seven weeks to forty weeks. The MEA calculated that the average longshoreman working only the forty-week season would receive approximately $16,140 annually, including winter unemployment-

Hardball 233 insurance benefits, while the remaining 30 per cent of the dockworkers who also worked the winter season would earn $20,000 inclusive of vacation and pension pay. These estimates were exclusive of the substantial overtime payments which would be earned.11 We were also concerned that, notwithstanding the large wage increase, the longshoremen would find the pill difficult to swallow, although a seasonal guarantee was the same as that developed by the ILA in New York and that the American longshoremen were proud of. Taking everything into consideration and hoping for uninterrupted operations at the port, Masters advised Labour Minister Munro on 24 March that the MEA would accept Judge Gold's recommendations for settlement. We issued a press release which emphasized the substantial wage increase and pointed out that other recommendations in the proposed settlement would enable the ports to attract tonnage and ensure an essential degree of stability in terms of economic growth and development.12 Then we waited to hear the results of Local 375'$ general meeting on 27 March. At that meeting, to no one's surprise, the longshoremen bitterly condemned what they saw as a pro-MEA report. From the ILA's point of view, many provisions that superficially appeared like equitable compromises constituted important setbacks that they could not reasonably be expected to accept. Even the wage increase was judged illusory. According to the ILA's calculations, 50 per cent of Gold's recommended wage increase represented nothing more than the increase in the cost of living over the previous three years, for which no adjustment had been made in the prior collective agreement. But the real problem was, of course, Gold's job-security formula of a seasonal guarantee to replace the existing weekly plan. Although the number of guaranteed weeks, 40, was an increase over the 37 of the expired agreement, the 1,600 hours (40 weeks at 40 hours) now included hours that had never been previously counted, such as statutory holidays and vacations. Accordingly, the union calculated that the 'real' number of hours guaranteed was only i,436.13 Furthermore, under a seasonal guarantee, a longshoreman who had worked substantial overtime hours early in the season might find himself cut from dispatch lists well before the end of the season. Of course, that was the principle behind a seasonal guarantee: once a person had earned his guarantee, he gave way to another. But the union did not want to give up something it had fought hard to win despite the knowledge that it was uneconomical and would prove the death of the port. Nor were the longshoremen prepared to accept the concept that, at the end of the season, they might owe money to the MEA if their advances exceeded the guarantee. Another complaint concerned the availability provisions. Under the old system, the normal forty hours of work ran from Monday to Friday. Although hours worked on the weekend counted as such, hours refused on Saturday and Sunday

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did not affect the guarantee. Under Gold's proposal, longshoremen would in theory be required to be available seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day, with any refusal to work, including overtime hours, resulting in a reduction of the number of hours guaranteed. The last straw for the longshoremen was Gold's extensive discipline code, which constrained their traditional freedom. From their point of view, the proposals amounted to a Veritable slave regime.'14 In return for every right relinquished, demand abandoned, and restriction accepted by the union over the past few years - the break-up of gangs, the abolition of sling-load limits, operational flexibility, computerized dispatch, mandatory retirement, no royalties on containers, continuity of work, and a host of other high-productivity provisions - longshoremen had achieved a weekly jobsecurity program that was nothing short of the best in all of North America. They were now being asked to give it up. Their response was immediate and unequivocal. At the end of the general meeting, the union membership voted overwhelmingly in favour of rejecting 'every clause' of the Gold Report and authorizing a strike action. The executive instructed longshoremen to send their copies of the report, of which fifteen hundred had been distributed, back to the judge, and it conveyed the membership's rejection of the Gold Report to the MEA and th labour minister together with a request for further meetings to continue negotiations. At a press conference held the next day, Norman Ouigley, ILA International vice-president, denounced the report as '99.9% managerial,' 'absolutely unacceptable,' and 'a retreat into a sad past.' He claimed that the report was simply designed to eliminate from the workforce as many longshoremen as possible and sneered that 'the Judge must have had a bad dream.'15 Gold would later say that he was stunned by the turn of events: I miscalculated in one respect... I miscalculated that the union would not accept [the reportl... I thought the union would be disappointed. That, I knew enough. After all I was not naive. But I thought they would then say, well, we accept the report if there are a few changes, you know, because there was room for manoeuvring. I had left some concessions that I could ring for management if I had to for a contract... The union, instead of taking advantage of these things, decided that the whole bloody thing was gone. I was distressed that they had not made one final effort... If they had come to me and said to me, is there any more juice in the lemon? I might have been able to say, yes, because after all, a report is only a report. Once they disavowed me, as it were, it was obviously impossible for me to do anything more for them.16

In retrospect, Gold may have underestimated the determination of members of Local 375 to maintain the weekly job-security plan. During his private meetings with the union's negotiating team, as well as when the parties met face to face, he

Hardball 235 may not have heard what the union was saying. He was sure that he would be able to persuade the union that what he was going to propose was in their best interest and represented the only real option for agreement. On our side of the table, it seemed inconceivable that the union had failed to get the message that continuation of a weekly job-security plan was not possible. Yet we should not have been surprised by the turn of events, for our experience with St-Onge had shown that it was as difficult for the union to practise realistic bargaining as it had been for management before the establishment of the MEA. Gold's decision to write a report in the form of a complete collective agreement made a great deal of sense to him and was based on a cogent and objective assessment of possible scenarios regarding subsequent events. In the first place, he wanted the ILA to come to its senses and to realize that it was playing a dangerous game with no chance of winning if it insisted on perpetuating the weekly job-security guarantee. Furthermore, he knew that, if the union persisted in its uncompromising stand and called a strike, the government would respond with legislative action, and he wanted to provide the government with a basis upon which to act as an alternative to arbitration. Gold believed that, after seven years of mediating, conciliating, and arbitrating between the employers and the unions, he understood the problems on the docks better than an anonymous arbitrator ever could and he did not want his expertise to go to waste. He was providing the government with a collective agreement which could be legislated as a whole. Right or wrong, Gold thought that he knew better than the longshoremen what was good for them in the long run. Although it might be the end of him as a waterfront icon, the judge felt that he had a moral obligation to set them on the right track. The strange thing is that the union understood Gold's strategy, or at least half of it. The union leaders explicitly accused Gold of conceiving a provocative report purposefully, in order to pave the way for an emergency bill which would be enacted if the union called a strike. Yet they failed to recognize the other face of the report, namely, that of a gift in disguise, a sign at the crossroad warning them about what lay at the end of one path and, concurrently, inviting them to choose the other path, that of freely negotiating change. But far from adjusting their aim, the ILA officers requested the resumption of negotiations on job security on the basis of a weekly guarantee of eight hours a day, five days a week over fifty-two weeks.17 Masters Plays for Keeps The day before Quigley's press conference, on 27 March, Masters received a telegram from Quigley advising him of the longshoremen's rejection of Gold's

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report and requesting a recommencement of negotiations. At a meeting of the MEA directors that afternoon, we decided that the MEA, as already communicated to the minister of labour, would maintain its support of Gold's recommendations. Nevertheless, we could not flatly refuse to negotiate without appearing to be in bad faith. Nor did we want to declare a lockout although we were legally in a position to do so. Masters was of the view - and the board was fully behind him - that now was the best time for a strike to take place although, despite the union's huffing and puffing in the press, he did not think that it would happen. A strike would cost the majority of longshoremen their unemployment benefits, and those who had been registered for winter work would lose their wages and winter job-security payments. Moreover, the effect of a strike on the MEA would be minimal at this time of year, with traffic in the river only slowly resuming and few ships in port. In this context, the cost of a strike would be much more substantial for longshoremen than for the MEA, and both parties knew it. In one of those ironic twists, the opportunity to avoid further negotiations without actually appearing to refuse to negotiate was handed to management on a silver platter by a union representative the day following Quigley's press conference. On the morning of Saturday, 29 March, MEA contract administrators caught a union business agent instructing a number of gangs to refuse to work. Masters saw his chance to pounce.18 He sent a telegram to all MEA members in Montreal to the effect that no labour was available until further notice, while also issuing a press release which stated that a strike had been called in Montreal by Local 375. The press release read: 'During a press conference yesterday, M. Norman Quigley, International Vice-President, ILA, had declared that longshoremen were poised to strike when the time was right. It would appear, says management spokesman A.E. Masters, the union decided that the right time was today. It is a profoundly unfortunate event for all, declares Mr. Masters, especially for the port's future and for all of those who earn their living there.'19 On Sunday, the employers did not call longshoremen to work and sent a telegram to Labour Minister Munro, who immediately appointed veteran conciliator Charlie Poirier to mediate talks between the parties.20 The union was quite confused as to what was going on. The only thing that the officers knew was that they had sent a telegram to the MEA two days prior to request further negotiation meetings. Was there a rank-and-file upheaval going on that they did not know of? Masters recalled: 'They didn't want to go on strike ... We issued a press release saying that they had gone on strike. When they came back [on Monday], they couldn't figure out what was going on ... And when they had a meeting to figure out what was going on, they said, "Goddam right we're on strike!" ... They got so mad!'21 That Monday, following union meetings in all three ports, the ILA publicl

Hardball 237 declared that the longshoremen in the river ports were indeed on strike.22 Local 375 president Adrien Tremblay made a point of explaining, however, that the strike had not been called on Saturday as alleged by the employer. Although MEA representatives confirmed that management had interpreted Saturday's partial stoppage as a strike and restrained from calling longshoremen to work the following day, few newspapers bothered to report the supposed misunderstanding, which they saw as mere logistics, except for Montreal's Le Devoir, which justly remarked: 'By doing so, maritime employers were taking away from the union the possibility of pressuring them with a strike threat while mediation proceedings got under way with Charles Poirier.'23 Once again, Masters burst into a fully controlled environment where he had the upper hand. The MEA maintained a virtuous front, assuring the press that efforts to find an immediate back-to-work solution would take top priority.24 Masters gravely declared that the strike would not only financially compromise shipowners but also threaten the river ports' reputation in the industry.25 He publicly explained that the MEA had thought that Gold's proposed wage increase could be sustained with better and more flexible working methods so long as there were no work stoppages. In private, Masters had full confidence that the government would not allow the strike to go much beyond 5 April, at which date the job-security season would begin. The Trudeau government had often settled strikes through legislation. Just the week prior, on 24 March, Parliament had stepped in to put an end to a twenty-three-day longshoremen's strike in British Columbia, a strike that had followed the rejection by the union membership of a mediated settlement accepted by their executive.26 In the case of the St Lawrence River ports, moreover, the government was only too aware that whatever financial troubles the MEA found itself in as a result of a lengthy strike would land on its doorstep. After the eight-week illegal strike of 1972, it had taken no less than eighteen months for the Port of Montreal to regain its lost cargo. It was unlikely that the government would allow the port to be dealt another blow of that kind. All the MEA had to do was sit tight and let events unfold. A mere twenty-four hours after the ILA's official strike announcement, ships headed for the river ports were already changing course and heading to Saint John, Halifax, and Boston.27 As some of those already in Montreal headed for the St Lawrence Seaway, the Great Lakes, and non-ILA ports on the St Lawrence, reporters gloomily predicted a lengthy and costly battle.28 One was fast off the mark in suggesting the need for back-to-work legislation: 'The ports of Montreal, Trois-Rivieres and Quebec City may be in for a long strike unless the federal Government steps in as it did in the British Columbia ports strike.'29 The MEA made full use of the press's interest in the dispute. Masters declared that the employers had no intention of 'giving in to a hold-up'30 and that the MEA would

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not settle for anything other than the 'unqualified acceptance of the Gold report in its entirety.' He praised Gold's job-security proposal as 'the most generous... of any port in the world.' The ILA, however, criticized the Gold Report as much as management praised it. To critics who pointed out the sizeable 60 per cent wage increase, Norman Quigley replied: 'What the judge gave us with one hand, he took away with the other.'31 Although the ILA's position seemed to attract little sympathy from the media, the longshoremen obtained considerable support from their colleagues in the ports of Saint John, Halifax, and Hamilton, who refused to work diverted ships. It was the first time that Canadian Atlantic coast longshoremen staged a boycott to support strikers in other ports.32 Rumour had it that this unprecedented action resulted from directions from ILA headquarters in New York, which prompted Bryce Mackasey, now postmaster general, to comment that International ILA president Thomas Gleason wanted to close down ports in eastern Canada to divert cargo ships to his New York home port. He angrily told Gleason: 'Stay home and mind your own business!'33 Mediator Charlie Poirier first attempted to maintain an optimistic attitude and assured reporters that, while the situation was complex, 'everyone [is] available to talk and we are talking"34 But he switched gears within twenty-four hours, suspending mediation talks on 2 April because he had concluded that they were 'an exercise in futility.'35 Forty-eight hours after the strike had been called, reporters were already saying it was 'dragging on.'36 Yet, for all the noise, the impact of the strike was limited that first week as local traffic and grain movement continued unhampered. On 8 April, longshoremen in Quebec and Trois-Rivieres started blocking grain elevators; surprisingly, however, Montreal longshoremen voted to allow grain transport to continue, although representatives of Local 375 told the press that 'they [the members] might change their minds.'37 It was an uncharacteristically wise decision. Government intervention in dock strikes had almost always been justified by the crisis created by lack of feed grain for the nation's livestock. Allowing feed grain to move enhanced the longshoremen's public image and made the dispute similar to one in private industry by limiting its direct impact on the country's well-being, though not on the health of the MEA. If the ILA wanted to buy time and pursue the route of direct negotiations, allowing feed grain to move unimpeded was the way to do it. By now, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was showing signs of impatience with the extent of labour unrest in the country. On 9 April he issued a public warning to labour and management in all sectors of the economy to cut down on work stoppages or face government intervention: 'Time after time, failure by management and labour to reach agreement brings some part of our economy to a stop.

Hardball 239 The port of Vancouver is paralysed one week, the St. Lawrence ports the next, the airlines, the construction industry, the postal service - even the schools and hospitals... [Collective bargaining] will not remain as free if it cannot be made less destructive than it is in Canada today.'38 Still, it was clear that, in the government's mind, the situation with regard to the longshoremen's strike did not yet warrant any kind of intervention. Agriculture Minister Eugene Whelan reassured those members of Parliament speaking on behalf of worried farmers that, as long as grain was circulating, there was no cause for alarm.39 Days passed without any indication that mediation talks would be reopened. When the ILA realized that there would be no further negotiations, it concluded that the only way to have the dispute settled was through government intervention. Starting on 11 April, longshoremen bolstered their picket lines and cut off all commercial access to the port despite injunctions obtained by various companies. Trucks coming to pick up feed grain and other cargo were turned away.40 The union waited for the government to react. The ILA's strategy to block grain was obviously based on the underlying assumption that government intervention, whether in the form of further mediation or legislative action, would be an improvement over the Gold Report. The union was thinking that Parliament's role was not to prescribe the terms of a settlement but to end the dispute and provide a forum for its resolution. Back-towork legislation usually extended the expired collective agreement and referred all outstanding issues to arbitration. This was the type of law that had recently been used in sending the west coast longshoremen back to work. Although the Trudeau government, in another case, had set a precedent in October 1974 by sending west coast grainhandlers back to work under the terms of a conciliation commissioner's report, the grainhandlers had accepted the report in question. Never had a government imposed a conciliation report that had been rejected almost unanimously by the union membership. Once more the ILA failed to factor the government's interests into its calculations. Bill Kelly, the assistant deputy minister of labour, was the Ottawa point man on the case, and he had been in close contact with Judge Gold during the conciliation proceedings. In view of the parties' respective positions, it had not taken Kelly long to come to the conclusion that these negotiations would not result in a voluntary settlement. He knew what Gold was going to propose and that it was highly unlikely that the parties would voluntarily agree to negotiate a seasonal job-security regime, which was essential if the MEA were to fulfil its contractual financial obligations without further government intervention. He saw the certainty of a strike and the likely need for legislation to end it. He talked to Gold about this and suggested that he write his report in the form of a

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collective agreement.41 It was not a coincidence that Poirier had suspended mediation since Kelly, his boss, did not want mediation to 'mess around' with the report's content.42 Shortly after the commencement of the strike, Labour Minister Munro had asked Kelly to prepare a memorandum of legislative options in the event the government decided to legislate a termination of the strike. In response, Kelly laid out the following scenarios: First Option - Legislate the report of the Conciliation Commissioner which is set out in contractual language ... Second Option - Extend the collective agreement by legislation referring all issues in dispute to an arbitrator... Third Option - Extend the collective agreement by legislation referring all issues in dispute to an arbitrator, but specifically empower the arbitrator to suspend, if he sees fit, the payments required under the existing job security arrangements for a period to be determined by him... The first option runs contrary to the philosophy that Parliament does not prescribe a settlement, but merely terminates the work stoppage and establishes machinery for settlement of the dispute. The second option meets strong resistance from the MEA as it would place the entire registered work force on the payroll from the moment legislation is enacted, with few ships in port and according to their position, no funds to meet the payroll. They could declare bankruptcy which would mean the government would have to identify an employer. The third option maintains the status quo placing the parties on equal footing before the arbitrator with the exception of immediate payment of job security and would serve to keep the MEA intact as an employer.43

The problem was the job-security plan. A number of people in the department believed, as Kelly explained, that if the existing agreement were extended the MEA would declare bankruptcy and the government would be left negotiating with longshoremen. While the third option was the honest one, it still held the same risk as the second and so the first option was the right one in the circumstances.44 And so the writing had been on the wall from the beginning of negotiations: the new collective agreement would be based on seasonal job security, and if this was not freely negotiated, it would be by legislation. Yet Ottawa could not declare a national emergency only four days into the grain blockade.45 Bill Kelly had to call Arnie Masters to explain almost apologetically that many ministers did not feel pressured to step in.46 Nevertheless, politics being what it is, there was no need for a grain crisis for the opposition to ring alarm bells and, on 16 April, an emergency Commons debate was held at the insistence of the Social Credit Party.

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Since Agriculture Minister Eugene Whelan, Labour Minister John Munro, and Transport Minister Jean Marchand were not in attendance, the debate was onesided. Over the course of seven hours, opposition members took turns reporting stories of hogs devouring each other, cattle being brought en masse to the slaughterhouse before they had reached maturity, farmers driving miles to find grain and crying with joy as they managed to get their hands on a few bags of oats. True to his controversial self, Bryce Mackasey joined his voice to that of the opposition and declared that peace between two private parties was of secondary importance to peace in the country: 'Mackenzie King ... said that when private rights become public wrongs, then it is time for members of parliament to act on behalf of the public, even if temporarily it removes the rights of private groups, in this case the MEA and the longshoremen.'47 As the emergency debate continued, other Liberal MPs intervened to defend free collective bargaining and to say that the longshoremen had not been given much of a chance to exercise their right to strike. Consumers Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet, speaking for Agriculture Minister Whelan, maintained that there was no crisis and enumerated the measures taken by the government to ensure that grain reached eastern farmers. He explained that ships carrying grain were being re-routed to the port of Prescott where access by millers and farmers would be unhindered. A transportation service had been established which loaded hopper cars in Thunder Bay to bring grain to eastern Canada. Certain trucking regulations had been suspended by way of agreement with the Quebec government to allow trucks to carry full loads of grain. There were almost two million bushels of grain stored in Trois-Rivieres and Quebec port elevators which remained partially accessible. In conclusion, there was grain in sufficient quantities for about a month and there was no reason for the government to legislate longshoremen back to work at this point.48 On the following day, just as the MEA was filing damage claims of $500,000 against the ILA, the checkers and cargo repairmen in Montreal and Quebec joined the strike.49 Grain remained blocked. On 22 April the government decided that the pressure for intervention had reached the necessary level for back-to-work legislation based on the Gold Report to be passed without any serious opposition. According to Bill Kelly, Labour Minister Munro was a little skittish about going ahead with the plan but he did not feel that he had much of a choice. The majority opinion in Ottawa at the time was that conventional back-to-work legislation would lead the MEA to declare bankruptcy, which would leave the government stuck with the administration of the river ports and, more important, with an outstanding bill from the banks of $12 million as well as the debt t the government itself of $5 million,50 In theory, sending the unresolved issues to arbitration while suspending job-security payments would neutralize the danger

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of such payments draining the MEA's bank account in the interim. The government believed, however, that an arbitration that would yield anything other than Gold's plan might still lead the MEA to pull the plug and leave the government stuck with the mess. Undoubtedly, Arnie Masters had fostered this belief. In the past three years, he had never missed an opportunity to remind the government that weekly job security was the direct result of government intervention in 1966 and in 1972, when a government-appointed arbitrator had perpetuated the plan despite the MEA's warnings that it would be unable to sustain it. Since the MEA could declare bankruptcy at any time when it felt that it had no other choice, its desires had to be taken into consideration. And Masters made sure that the government understood that what the MEA desired above all was the implementation of the Gold Report. On 22 April a Gazette reporter broke the news that one of the options being considered was the legislation of the Gold Report. The ILA received the news like an electric shock. Local 375 president Adrien Tremblay cautiously declared: 'My position is always to obey any law. But it all depends on what the members will say and what the legislation contains.'51 Other ILA officers showed no such sensibility. In an attempt to turn the tide, Norman Quigley telephoned Charlie Poirier to raise hell and say that longshoremen would 'turn the ports into a giant marina'52 before obeying a law based on the report. The president of the checkers local in Montreal, Leo Taylor, told reporters: 'I would go to jail before I would order the men back to work'53 under those terms. The stage was set for government intervention.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Force of the Law

On 23 April Labour Minister John Munro introduced Bill 0-59 in the House of Commons. The bill sent back to work the longshoremen and checkers and repairmen on legal strike in all three river ports and provided that Judge Gold's report would become the collective agreement for the next three years. A referee would decide upon the interpretation to be given to any section of the Gold Report upon which the parties disagreed.1 Munro declared that the necessity for the government to intervene was brought about by the longshoremen's decision to block access to feed grain. He also announced that Bill €-59 could be taken as a warning to all parties to collective bargaining in Canada that dragging Parliament into their labour disputes might yield more than what they were aiming for: 'I want to serve notice on the parties in this dispute, and on the parties in any dispute that may take place in the future, that there is no certainty as to this Government's course of action with respect to intervention or the nature of the legislation itself. The parties should not look upon Parliament as being part and parcel of the bargaining system, the place where they go to get an extra concession which they could not negotiate at the bargaining table. This is far too often the attempt of one side or the other. Those who attempt to use Parliament in this way will be sorely disappointed.'2 Fireworks Although both the Conservative Party and the NDP favoured sending longshoremen back to work, they questioned the wisdom of Parliament taking on the role of arbitrator. The NDP's Les Benjamin claimed that the alleged grain crisis was 'as phoney as a three-dollar bill': 'There are other reasons why the Government feels it has to legislate and other reasons why members of Parliament feel we are now faced with a situation in respect of which we have to do something; but as far as I

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am concerned those reasons have nothing to do with grain movement.' Benjamin did not go into the nature of those 'other reasons' but advocated a bill similar to the one that had sent the west coast longshoremen back to work a few months prior, that is, one that would prescribe the wage settlement but refer the other issues, or at least job security, to binding arbitration. He warned that, if past experience was anything to go on, imposing the Gold job-security plan would create a crisis of far greater magnitude than what had been endured so far in the ports: 'Failing that, and if the legislation as it now stands is passed, then mark my words: if you think you have a mess now in these three ports, just wait a few more months ... we will have greater industrial strife at these three harbours in the months ahead.'3 The Conservative Party and the Social Credit Party maintained that the crisis illustrated the inadequacy of the legal framework for disputes in industries of national interest and that serious work should be undertaken to change the system.4 Neither party questioned or protested against the specifics of the bill, unlike the NDP, which made energetic attempts at introducing amendments. Munro firmly defended his bill, emphasizing that the job-security problem in the river ports had to be solved and that Judge Gold was the most qualified person to solve it. It was highly unlikely, said Munro, that an arbitrator could be found who would have the competence of Judge Gold to deal with the issue.5 In the same vein, almost all speakers in the debate praised Gold effusively: 'a highly competent man/ 'the best brain as far as port problems are concerned,' and so on. In fact, it is unlikely that the solution favoured by the government would have been possible if it had not hinged upon Gold's involvement. It was not until second reading of the bill that one member, Conservative Mike Forrestall, alluded to the financial dynamics behind the government's decision. Forrestall said that there were a few things that he 'wanted to get off his chest' before the bill was passed. He explained: It [the government] is party to a guarantee to secure to the banks certain amounts of money -1 think the total amount owed by the MEA is now some 18 million dollars... The situation is not without conflict and this conflict arises when it becomes apparent to those who are familiar with the financial obligations undertaken by the government ... that the government is committed to honouring a debt of the Maritime Employers Association... I suspect that the urgency of this matter is not the national interest but that much narrower concern ... I hope that members of the unions involved, particularly the member companies of the MEA, do not sit too comfortably in their chairs tonight... laughing at some of

The Force of the Law 245 us because, in their opinion, they feel we have been dupes or pawns, unaware of some of the ramifications of what lies behind the action of this Parliament in ordering men back to work on the basis of a conciliation report.

Forrestall also stated that the fact that no real efforts had been made to bring the two sides together through mediation was 'suspicious.' No one else, either in the parliamentary debate of 23 April or in the weeks that followed, touched the can of worms that Forrestall had opened; not one word was said, not one allusion made, about anything related to the nature of the relationship between the MEA and the government. Forrestall himself continued to bring the matter into the public eye by asking questions regarding the MEA's debt and the government's obligation towards it.6 It was a lonely crusade. Not a single newspaper even reported his comments.7 The bill passed the Commons in its original form on the same day that it was introduced, at around 10:30 P.M. Immediately afterwards, Local 375 president Tremblay, who had not yet seen the bill, called Masters to suggest that the return to work be suspended until Monday morning in order to give the executive time to review the bill and talk with the members. Since legislation had come too late to set up the dispatch system in time for Friday (25 April) calls in any case, Masters readily agreed. Tremblay's request created a glimmer of hope that he would urge the longshoremen to resume work without further delay. But the union membership was not so favourably disposed. That night, a Molotov cocktail was thrown through a window in the hiring hall in Quebec City.8 Much of the equipment was severely damaged or completely destroyed, including the expensive computerdispatch equipment installed in 1973. On Thursday, 24 April, while the Senate was meeting to consider the bill, a group of longshoremen gathered on Parliament Hill to protest 'the thoughtlessness of deputies who removed the longshoremen's acquired rights to the profit of rich ship owners.' Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers guarded the Parliament Buildings' main doors while security was increased inside. On the Hill, longshoremen denounced the attitude of Quebec fanners who claimed that their livestock were starving and pressured Parliament for intervention while never seeking to work out an agreement with the ILA for moving grain. Gold, the puppet responsible for the carnage, was vigorously attacked. Effigies of the judge and of other government officials including Bryce Mackasey and, of course, Labour Minister John Munro were lit into a huge bonfire to loud cheers from union members.9 Meanwhile, the Stefan Baton/, a Polish vessel carrying more than seven hundred immigrants, docked in Montreal in the afternoon of the 24th after being stranded for a whole day on the river. Approached by the press on the subject,

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Local 375 secretary-treasurer Fernand Boudreau declined responsibility, saying that the vessel had been unable to dock earlier because harbour pilots were refusing to work out of sympathy with the ILA strike.10 Whatever the official position of the union, the press reported that the vessel docked only to face a mob of angry picketers intent on preventing anyone from disembarking. Some daring custom officers tried to force their way onto the ship but soon realized that the longshoremen were serious and retreated to safety. Riot police were called to maintain order.11 In acknowledgment that longshoremen obviously found the law difficult to swallow, the MEA decided that no disciplinary measures would be taken against those who failed to show up on Monday. Late on 24 April, notwithstanding the concerns of some senators that the measure would prove damaging to the long-term relationship between the parties, the Senate passed Bill €-59, which subsequently received royal assent as the St Lawrence Ports Operations Act, 1975. On the 25th, ILA union officers announce they would study the bill over the weekend and convene a general meeting on Sunday night to decide 'what kind of response would be made regarding the law.'12 Defiance On the docks, a nucleus of the union's membership continued to hold the port hostage. About one hundred longshoremen manned picket lines that night, allowing no one in and out of the port. Since the arrival of the Baton/, family members and friends of stranded passengers had gathered to do some picketing of their own and to request the release of their loved ones, without success. At dawn, while sixty riot policemen kept picketers at the McGill Street entrance in check, thirty-five school buses, brought in through another and temporarily deserted entrance, whisked past with the Batory's passengers on board. Disruptions continued throughout the day, with incidents such as the throwing of Molotov cocktails into empty railway boxcars and the hassling of passengers attempting to board the Eatory for the outbound trip. Some longshoremen were arrested following a sit-down at one of the port's entrances. By Saturday night, policemen had succeeded in dispersing most of the picket lines by showing copies of Bill €-59, which clearly prohibited the practice, to longshoremen. Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour Bill Kelly hoped that the unrest would now end. Tremblay had telephoned him after the bill had been passed and Kelly had endeavoured to convince him that it was in the longshoremen's best interest to go back to work as ordered. He also warned him that, if longshoremen stayed out on strike, they would be in the wrong and end up losing their jobs. Kelly believed Tremblay to be a decent man. Whether he would have the will, the courage, and

The Force of the Law 247 the leadership to keep the longshoremen in line, however, was another matter.13 On Sunday, as scheduled, a general membership meeting was convened by Local 375 to discuss Bill 0-59. The position of the union executive was laid out and distributed to members in a flyer. The ILA officers did inform their members, as they were required to do by the terms of the bill, that the law removed their right to strike, but they declared that they would not take a position on a return to work. Union members were told that the ILA's legal counsel was to bring the matter to court on the basis that the bill was 'anti-union and anti-social but also anti-constitutional and illegal,' with a view to having it declared 'mil and, in any case, nullified.' The document contained no explanations in support of the officials' claim that the law was 'legally invalid because of its own terms' other than that the text was 'confusing.' The Montreal Gazette reported: 'ILA officers said Sunday they will not order members back to work but those wanting to work will be free to do so.'14 Unsurprisingly, on Monday morning, 28 April, only two longshoremen showed up for work. Others called in and alleged that they had contracted a mysterious sickness resembling a nervous breakdown. Yvon Labbe, organizer of the now dissolved ILA strike committee, spoke to the press: 'It may be a new industrial sickness, advanced M. Labbe with dry humour, or maybe a disease from overseas brought to us by the Batory. In the same vein, M. Labbe explained that the longshoremen, in attempting a self-diagnosis of the ailment, had concluded that it was related to the great deception they had known these last few days.'15 This provocation notwithstanding, the MEA decided not to do anything that might fuel the fire; it would wait for the government to take action and refrain from using the press to promote the Gold Report.16 Some disorganized picket lines persisted in the three ports and one bold TroisRivieres trucker had his windshield smashed and his tires slashed to shreds.17 When informed of these developments, Munro told journalists and members of the House of Commons that although he would not tolerate open defiance of the law for long, the government would take action only after a complete report from the Department of Justice firmly established whether the longshoremen were refusing to obey the legislation. Depending on the results of the report, there were three courses of action possible. First, direct charges could be laid under the Criminal Code, which provided that individuals found guilty of disobeying a federal law could be jailed for up to two years. Second, charges could be laid indirectly, through Bill 059, which provided that either side could ask for an injunction in Quebec Superior Court to have the bill respected. If such an injunction was ignored, contempt-of-court charges could be laid against the guilty party, which could be punished by a fine of up to $50,000 a day and/or imprisonment.

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Third, and of a lesser scale, charges could be laid under the Canada Labour Code for striking during the life of a collective agreement, an offence punishable by fines of up to $1,000 a day. Munro told the press that, should Bill C-59 contain the flaws alleged by ILA counsel Phil Cutler, amendments would be introduced.18 The ILA did not appear to be intimidated by the threats of legal action. Norman Ouigley told the press that the union would hold meetings to attempt to persuade members to return to work but that he doubted success was possible: 'I don't think they [the members] are afraid of anything right now. They would rather go to jail than to go back under these terms.'19 Most of the media were indignant. No longer were the longshoremen just a group of strikers causing inconvenience to Quebec farmers; they were defying the law. A Globe, and. Mail editorial of 29 April declared: 'The longshoremen strikers have turned their backs on the law of the land as expressly framed to deal with their own situation. They have rejected the country's ultimate authority, Parliament ...They are not fighting for a new system of government, for a new social order, for a new political structure. They are disobeying the law because they do not think Parliament has given them their fair share of the pie ... Even if the number of offenders is large, enforcement of the law is essential. If the strikers were allowed to continue their strike against Parliament, against Canada, then it would be nothing but an invitation to anarchy.'20 Le Devoir reported in a more moderate vein that the prevailing feeling in Ottawa appeared to be that the longshoremen's unwillingness to return to work should be interpreted not as defiance of Parliament but rather as an expression of shock from which they would recover in due course.21 And what if the longshoremen remained 'sick'? Munro told reporters that the government would act but added, 'Don't try to tie me down to any specific date.'22 That night, 29 April, a two-hourlong meeting was held between Munro and representatives of Local 375. The ILA had requested the meeting 'so that you [Munro] can be aware of all aspects of the present ports dispute so that the earliest possible solution may be found.'23 All that the press was told the following day was that the meeting had ended 'inconclusively.'24 Munro had nothing new to offer the ILA, save for a personal appeal to the union officers to order the men back to work. Apparently, Munro had told the union that 'even if the Government had made a mistake, a law was now in effect which had to be obeyed.'25 This was not what the union had wanted to hear, and the illegal strike persisted the following day. At an MEA board meeting held on 30 April, Masters informed the directors that Quigley had called him to request a meeting to discuss the job-security aspects of the Gold Report. We considered whether or not there was a possibility to negotiate but concluded that a meeting with Quigley was unnecessary unless he was willing to discuss only the mechanisms of the plan, not its principles. At the same

The Force of the Law 249 time, we were concerned about the government's lack of reaction to the longshoremen's defiance of the law. The strike had already skewed the premise that 1975 tonnage levels would reach 1974 levels, which had been our assumption when calculating that assessments would not need to be raised to meet jobsecurity obligations. Each passing day further eroded the economic advantages promised by the Gold Report. Then there was the growing discontent within our own ranks. Throughout April, some members, including Cast North America, Manchester Liners, and Halterm (based in Halifax), had been sending telegrams questioning the competence of the MEA, complaining that they were not being kept properly informed, and requesting permission to attend board meetings where the strike was being discussed. The latest of Cast president Klaus Glusing's abrasive telegrams, dated 29 April, demanded that the MEA arrange meetings with the ILA to discuss possible amendments to the Gold Report.26 If Cast rallied other employers to its position and if the ILA got wind that some employers were in favour of making concessions for the sake of peace, the MEA could be in trouble. At our request, a meeting was scheduled with Labour Minister Munro in order to review the continuing defiance of Parliament by the longshoremen and to obtain some information regarding the kind of action that we could expect. Masters, Mulroney, Bill Brown (the current MEA chairman), and I went to Ottawa to meet with the minister on the afternoon of 30 April. Four department officials accompanied Munro, and they at first received us as representatives of 'foreign shipping.' This was a perception left over from the days when the Shipping Federation acted as bargaining agent for the employers, and it showed us how little real progress we had made in explaining the make-up of the MEA. After we had clarified that our delegation represented Canadian companies, and the point had been acknowledged by the minister and his officials, Munro told us that he had replied to the union's plea for a change in job security by telling it to get the men back to work. He had allowed that discussions could resume at a later date, once a normal work rhythm had been restored. Munro explicitly instructed us to leave the door open to the union for the discussions' but cautioned that 'these discussions were not to involve Job Security.'27 On our side, standing firm with regard to the job-security plan required that the MEA resist pressure not only from the union but also from some of our own members. We were willing to do all we could to keep our ranks in line but the government had to do its share and intervene to force obedience to the law that it had passed. We were not told of Munro's intentions in any detail but he did assure us that action was forthcoming. We returned to Montreal to find out that information regarding Munro's stand did not trickle far down the Department of Labour's hierarchical ladder. That night, in speaking with Charlie Poirier, Masters discovered that Poirier assumed

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that discussions regarding changes in the job-security plan could be initiated once the men went back to work. It was unknown whether Poirier had been relaying this message to the union but Masters set the record straight and told Poirier that 'there was no possibility of any kind of a move in the Job Security plan.'28 We would have to wait for the government's move and we hoped that it would come soon. The following day, we found out that we would have to hold on for a while longer. In Court On i May, Munro announced in the House of Commons that officials of the Justice Department were examining the facts of the situation, which 'hopefully will establish what I strongly suspect is defiance of the law.' He then added that 'I believe there will be an application for an injunction.'29 This application was filed. Around the same time, ILA checkers Local 1657 filed an injunction application to have Bill €-59 declared unconstitutional. Judge Jules Deschenes of the Quebec Superior Court would hear both actions on 8 May. On 4 May, Montreal longshoremen and checkers were summoned to a general meeting to vote on a return to work. Both groups voted massively to stay off the job. Reporters who pointed out to ILA officers that the back-to-work law was currently in effect were met with a shrug. Checkers' president Leo Taylor said: 'We didn't recommend anything to the men; we just read them the law. The men want to wait for the results of court hearings being held this week.'30 This renewed refusal to return to work created a second massive wave of criticism of Labour Minister Munro, although he did say that charges would be laid 'in the fairly near future.'31 John Diefenbaker said that the longshoremen's contempt of Parliament was 'flagrant' and that by now 'even a blind man' would have gathered enough evidence for court charges.32 The labour minister absorbed the torrent of abuse without flinching, counting down the days to the Superior Court hearings which, he hoped, would add the force of a court order to Bill 059. This was to be followed, he said, by individual charges under the Canada Labour Code and 'possibly the Criminal Code.'33 Almost two weeks had elapsed since the passing of Bill 059 and the longshoremen's resolve was gnawing more and more at the MEA's fragile unity. The boycott of diverted ships continued in full at Halifax and partially at Saint John and Hamilton.34 MEA members operating in the Maritimes were becoming aggressive towards the head office, which they accused of making no effort to keep its local branches informed and to consult with them regarding possible solutions to the dispute even though they were directly affected by it. Meanwhile, another telegram had been received from Cast in which Glusing laid out in detail various job-security alternatives that the MEA should consider and discuss with the

The Force of the Law 251 union.35 Moreover, the Shipping Federation itself had let it be known that it was not happy with the communications received from the MEA regarding the striked6 In view of these developments, it was agreed to abandon the policy of keeping information inside the Board of Directors and to issue newsletters regarding the strike almost daily. To those who were urging a move on the part of the MEA, we sent short notes to the effect that the matter was currently before the court.37 On 8 May, Judge Deschenes opened the long-awaited hearings, which were held in the largest room of the Palais de Justice before an audience of more than eight hundred longshoremen.38 For the attorney general to establish that the union had failed in its obligations, he had to demonstrate that the men had refused to work with the union's consent and that union officers had not 'exercised all the diligence' in trying to get the men to return to work. If it was established that the bill was valid and that the officers had not fulfilled their obligations, they would be liable to fines and prison terms under the Criminal Code for wilful defiance of an act of Parliament. The judge issued his ruling to a packed courtroom on 10 May. On the question regarding the constitutionality of Bill C-59, Deschenes ruled that the bill was valid and had to be obeyed. Whether it was anti-union and anti-social was basically irrelevant, he said, since a law's constitutionality did not depend on the feelings of the legislator and the citizens. Regarding the union officers' claim that they had fulfilled their duties, Deschenes declared that the document distributed to members by the ILA officers did not respond to the legal imperative by which the union had to do everything in its power to ensure that the law was obeyed. To the contrary, the judge noted that one would not have acted differently had the intention been to induce a hostile attitude towards the law and encourage defiance of it without explicitly saying so. Deschenes concluded: It is worthy to note that through this unusual award, the Court will order the union locals to obey the law, although it is the first obligation of every citizen and there should be no need to recourse to courts of law. We are told that here is the first example in the history of Canada where a social group decides to defy the law of the land and refuses obedience to an order of Parliament. It is a very serious and alarming situation; it is a path on which no country can risk getting dragged into ... It is not up to a citizens' group, no matter how convinced that it is in the right, to take the law into its own hands, to rise against Parliament and to refuse to obey the legislator. Acting in such a manner creates a situation of confrontation that is the immediate prelude to anarchy. It is an attitude that the country cannot tolerate and that the courts are obligated, in conformity with the law, to correct.39

Deschenes's decision was met by hoots from the longshoremen assembled in the courtroom. Afterwards, Masters reported that he expected to meet with Tremblay

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to discuss the integration of the Gold Report with the old collective agreement, but the rank and file of Local 375 was clearly not prepared to lay down its weapons graciously.40 Denouement Although the longshoremen at the three ports decided to return to work, the three union locals' presidents publicly declared that they would never sign the contract imposed by Bill 0-59 and expressed doubts regarding the membership's willingness to obey the decision: 'They are supposed to [return to work] but we will just have to see if they will or not.' Another told journalists that, even if they did return, sparks should be expected since the men were always creative in designing pressure tactics.41 ILA lawyer Phil Cutler reported that the union would appeal the ruling.42 This was not encouraging news. Money was another problem. With the passage of Bill €-59 and the expected return of the longshoremen under the new seasonal job-security provisions, the directors had turned their attention to the association's finances. Estimates that we were shown indicated that the expected amount of activity at the Port of Montreal for the pay period ending 8 May would be 10 per cent of the usual level, rising slowly to 80 per cent by late June. To finance the initial shortfall in the jobsecurity program, the MEA would require a line of credit for the year 1975 in the amount of $2.5 million.43 These projections had been forwarded to the banks and, after discussing the situation with Masters, I held a meeting with them and was encouraged by the reception I received.44 Within two weeks, however, as the ILA defied the back-to-work legislation, the situation changed. The banks were now leery of the whole situation, and, on top of this, Masters did not think that the government would provide the funds in 1975 as it had in 1974. We continued to discuss the matter with the banks but we could not arrange for any financing as long as the labour situation in the ports remained unstable. Masters endeavoured to reassure the banks that the men were returning to work under an act of Parliament which provided recourse to the Criminal Code for violation. Furthermore, he argued, the contrast between our tonnage-assessment revenue and our job-security costs in the old contract and under the Gold Report was like night and day. Given identical situations, in 1974 we paid $6,700,000 in job-security costs under the old agreement, whereas we would have paid $475,000 under the Gold formula. Accordingly, the plan should be sustainable even if tonnage remained well below 1974 levels.45 Masters's letter to the banks was permeated by an optimism that masked his real feelings. Job-security payments would resume when men went back to work and would probably be quite high since it would take some time before ships returned. The MEA did not have the

The Force of the Law 253 necessary funds and had asked the government to forego, at least temporarily, the portion of the assessment which was supposed to be directed to the NHB.46 Although no definite answer had been received, it appeared that the government considered that it had done its share to help the association deal with its outstanding debt by legislating the Gold Report. Helping the MEA to survive through the remainder of the onerous 1972 collective agreement was one thing; paying for the 1975 agreement, which was clearly in favour of management and which had been forced down the union's throat by an act of Parliament, was quite another. The employers had obtained the contract that they had asked for. It was now up to the MEA to make the machine work. But unless operations resumed and the banks provided the required $2.5-million line of credit, we would be in deep trouble again. On the morning of 13 May, longshoremen in all three ports resumed work. Within a few days, during which a general refusal of overtime work was in place, life was back to normal. Discussion regarding financing with the banks and the government continued. On 15 May, Transport Minister Jean Marchand told the House of Commons: 'I know that in about a week the MEA will probably have to refinance its organization because otherwise they might not be in a position to meet their obligations. What we are now doing is to look at the structure of the MEA and the kind of relationship they have with the union. The first priority is to maintain payments to the workers up to the end of June and after that, we will have to move one way or another/47 It looked as though Tremblay's efforts to keep the men at work were bearing fruit and the situation appeared to be under control on the docks. Munro had informed Masters that conciliation officers Charlie Poirier and Rene Lacas would meet with the parties in order to integrate the Gold Report with the old collective agreement. Meetings began on 16 May.48 On the same day that Masters was meeting with the union and the conciliation officers, Brown, Bryan Mackasey, and I met with the banks and government representatives. The former advised us that additional funds would not be made available unless the loan was fully secured, while the latter stated that it would not guarantee the loan and that no money was available from the Department of Transport - something that came as quite a surprise given what we understood Marchand had said in the House the day before. The MEA's directors met later the same day and different possibilities, including voluntary bankruptcy, were discussed. In the end, we turned to Masters, who said that he would try to apply some political pressure but that we should not expect any solution for a few days. Finally, on 20 May, Masters received a call from the solicitor for the Department of Transport with the news that arrangements for financing the MEA had been approved by the government. In effect, the agreement of 17 May 1974 was being

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extended by one year and amended accordingly.49 The necessary line of credit was being made available. The worst of the crisis seemed to be over. And then, on 21 May, a small group of hard-core union dissidents succeeded i stopping overtime work again. The MEA, which had so far refrained from responding to all of the longshoremen's disciplinary breaches, decided that enough was enough. Starting on 22 May, the new discipline code was enforced, with all those failing to show up when called being notified that they were suspended for three days effective at management's discretion. Within forty-eight hours, evening work had returned to normal, with more than two hundred longshoremen subject to serving suspensions in the near future.50 Meanwhile, the parties continued to meet in the presence of Poirier and Lacas in order to arrive at modifications to the Gold Report where possible and to determine whether the contract for each local could be finalized without the services of a referee. Meetings were held at the Department of Labour with all three ports' representatives from mid- to late May. The MEA agreed to explore the possibility of tempering the longshoremen's obligation to telephone the dispatch centre on weekends (clause 7.03), of including certain men on the eligibility list, and of softening the requirements relative to the reinstatement of a longshoreman absent for illness or accident. Everything indicated that the parties were trying to leave the strike behind and work towards making the next three years viable. Then the longshoremen received their pay and job-security cheque for the second week of work after the new contract came into effect, and the economics of the Gold Report could now be seen in black and white.51 In the immediate aftermath of Bill €-59, activity at the Port of Montreal was light. The paycheque after the first week of work following the contract would have alerted any who had not actually worked forty hours that they were receiving an advance and owed hours to the system, and the paycheque for the second week could actually have taken a deduction or indicated an increased amount owing. Either way this would have been an entirely new development for longshoremen who, under the weekly guarantee, were quite comfortable with being paid for not working. Those days were now over. On 28 May, at a meeting with Poirier and Lacas, the Quebec City representatives showed up with a brand new proposal which they claimed they had the power to sign without reference to the membership if the employer agreed to it in full. Masters cautiously replied that we would examine the proposal and respond within a week, and then he asked Local 375 representatives for their position. Tremblay appeared as uncertain as the MEA regarding what was going on. He informed Masters that a meeting had been scheduled for 30 May and suggested that they meet again on 2 June to assess the situation. Masters agreed. The following day, Tremblay, accompanied by Raymond Desgagne, a business agent, asked Masters to cancel the suspensions given the dissident longshoremen.

The Force of the Law 255 Masters told him to advise the membership that the MEA would agree to lift the sanctions provided evening work continued uninterrupted. Since some suspensions had been scheduled for 2, 3, and 4 June, Masters delayed their implementation owing to the proximity of the union meeting on the 30th.52 Apparently, the union meeting had been requested by a small number of longshoremen to discuss the new collective agreement and the job-security plan in particular. The issue of suspensions was not even discussed at the meeting. Longshoremen who were working or waiting to be called were not supposed to attend - since this was not a meeting sanctioned under the collective agreement - and only about two hundred longshoremen appeared before an apprehensive Tremblay when the proceedings opened at 8 A.M. The longshoremen in the room represented the most militant faction of Local 375 and soon became so loud and aggressive that Tremblay adjourned the meeting. Fearing that the militants would descend on the waterfront and cause a major confrontation, he further decided to take the bull by the horns and have the inevitable confrontation within the forum of a general union meeting and with the proper procedures. The union officers went to the port to ask longshoremen who were working or on call to make their way to the meeting, which had been reconvened. At that point, Tremblay telephoned Masters and told him that he was stopping work to hold a meeting and make a decision. Within an hour, longshoremen had stopped work and made their way to the meeting. The debate on the new job-security plan resumed with a majority of members present. The meeting was soon on fire. Anger and frustration poured out of the men, who made passionate interventions regarding the unfairness of the Gold Report and the hypocrisy of the government and the MEA. The discussion was not going the way that Tremblay had hoped it would. When the time came to vote, the question was no longer what changes should be sought to the Gold Report but rather whether the men should return to work or not while negotiations continued. Until the last second, Tremblay believed that the majority of the men would not want to call another strike and he ordered the vote to be taken by secret ballot to ensure that intimidation would not skew the results. When the ballots were counted, Tremblay's world crumbled before his eyes. The majority of the men did not want to work under the terms of the new collective agreement and would not do so unless the old job-security plan and discipline code were reinstated.53 The meeting ended and the longshoremen went home. Tremblay picked up the telephone and informed Masters of the results of the meeting. He also called Poirier to notify him officially that longshoremen had struck the Port of Montreal.54 Masters immediately convened a meeting of our board. Although Tremblay almost inspired pity, we decided to take a hard stand and to inform the union that the men must return to work under the conditions

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set in the legislation, without negotiations. Masters sent a telegram to Justice Minister Otto Lang that read: 'What will the Government of Canada now do to ensure respect of its own legislation? What will the Government of Canada now do to end the state of anarchy at the port of Montreal brought about by men who operate with impunity in massive contempt of parliament and its law? As the certified employer group at the port of Montreal we must now know by return of your intention in this regard as the very life of the port is in grave and possibly irreversible jeopardy.'55 Copies of the telegram were sent to our members to inform them of events and to quiet those few who would jump at the opportunity to criticize the MEA. On 2 June, Masters received a delegation from Local 375 which demanded the reinstatement of the old discipline code and job-security plan, while also noting that they would agree to be available seven days a week (instead of the five under the old plan) and thus have all hours offered, worked, or refused tabulated in the guarantee.56 If these conditions were not met, the Montreal longshoremen would remain on strike. Meanwhile, the Quebec City local, which had sparked the latest fuss by proposing a brand new agreement, was continuing to meet with the MEA to negotiate amendments to the Gold Report. While the parties were meeting in Montreal, the House of Commons was discussing the situation. All Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau would say was that the unexpected walkout of Montreal longshoremen had heavy economic consequences and that a legal remedy was being considered and evidence gathered. Although the government refused to divulge the kinds of actions being contemplated, it was rumoured that they might include such charges as contempt of court and contempt of Parliament. Also rumoured possible were an injunction ordering a return to work, a series of amendments to Bill 059 to provide penalties for noncompliance, and the imposition of trusteeship upon the union. Trudeau's appeal for public support seemed to confirm the speculation that the government's reaction would be decisive: 'Beyond the legal decisions... I am trying to ensure that the responsible authorities in Quebec, and indeed public opinion itself, understand the seriousness of the situation and that we will have very strong public support in whatever action we take.57 It was only after consulting with their counsel, Phil Cutler, and meeting with Bill Kelly and a delegation from the Canadian Labour Congress in Ottawa on 3 June, that Local 375 officers realized they might have made a serious mistake. Legally, the union executive should have officially ordered a return to work. It should never have allowed a vote to take place on a return to work which could result in an illegal strike contrary to the Labour Code, to an act of Parliament, and to the collective agreement in force by way of this act of Parliament. The fact that Tremblay expected the result to be positive was no defence. Kelly sympathized

The Force of the Law 257 with Tremblay, who was visibly in over his head. Tremblay said that he would call another union meeting to order a return to work but he confided in Kelly that everything was out of control and that the men might not listen to him.58 He mentioned that lifting the suspensions might facilitate the return to work, and Kelly promised that he would explore the possibilities with us after consulting with the labour minister. Ultimately, however, the extra incentive required for the men to listen to their president came not from the MEA but from the Department of Justice. The government had made up its mind and the ILA's latest strategic mistake was one too many. The situation had degenerated to the point where it was no longer a labour dispute but a test of will between the longshoremen and Parliament. There was only one possible outcome. On 3 June the government made public the steps that it would take. Those who favoured a drastic intervention were not disappointed. For the first time in more than a century, the federal government brought down its fist on a labour organization by suing both the ILA and its officers Adrien Tremblay, Georges Lagace, Raymond Desgagne, Robert Gosselin, and Patrice Gervais - for contempt of court arising from the defiance of the back-to-work injunction issued by Judge Deschenes.59 If found guilty, each could be fined up to $1,000 per day. The officers were also to appear as representatives of the ILA on 6 June to respond to criminal charges for defying a federal order (Bill €-59), an offence punishable by fines against the union of between $1,000 and $10,000 per day. Some longshoremen would in all likelihood be prosecuted under the Canada Labour Code for encouraging the illegal strike. When a Conservative Party member asked whether Munro envisioned another meeting with union leaders, the minister said he would most certainly not meet with them while they were in direct contravention of laws passed by Parliament.60 As it was publicly brandishing the stick, the government privately asked the MEA to provide a bit of a carrot and to withdraw the disciplinary suspensions. We agreed.61 On 4 June, longshoremen gathered before their executive, who told them that it was time to return to work. Bitterness permeated the room and, although the outcome of the meeting was inevitable, the debate went on for hours. A longshoreman with twenty years' service commented that he had seen many strikes in the Port of Montreal but never one as bizarre as the one currently under way. Without even holding the secret-ballot vote that was planned, the membership decided unanimously to resume work because there simply was nothing else to do.62 On 5 June, operations resumed. In Retrospect Although the longshoremen were partly the architects of their own fate, it is

258 Waterfront Blues difficult not to feel some sympathy for them. They had been blissfully unaware of the undercurrents at work in the 1975 negotiations, the outcome of which had been planned long ago. Unless the union was prepared to accept the premise that the weekly job-security plan had to be replaced by a seasonal guarantee, there was little possibility of any real negotiations between the parties. The longshoremen took the position that the fundamental change in the plan, from a weekly to a seasonal guarantee, was regressive; they failed to see that there might actually be some mutuality of interest in the new arrangement. Gold gave them the chance when he pleaded the case for the viability of the port. When the union turned a deaf ear, the government's eventual reaction was inevitable. The nature of the imposed settlement was certainly extraordinary. As Claude Ryan of Le Devoir wrote in an editorial on 6 June: 'Usually, a new contract brings improvements to working conditions of the workers concerned. In this case, the longshoremen are being afflicted with a step backwards that no other group of workers would have accepted ...The Gold formula, directly transposed into bill 0-59 by the federal parliament, changes conditions regulating remuneration of longshoremen so drastically that they would have needed to be completely devoid of realism and sensitivity to react otherwise than they did.'63 Would the government have adopted this solution had it not been directly bound to the MEA's huge debt? Probably not. But was there an alternative? Probably not. A continuation of a weekly guarantee, under which longshoremen in effect were paid for not working, would have resulted in the total paralysis of the Port of Montreal and no government could allow that to happen. Although the longshoremen's bitterness would endure for some time, their hatred of the job-security plan itself would slowly subside as they were provided with the opportunity to influence change. In 1978 the union's negotiating committee initially approached the table with a demand for the reinstatement of a weekly plan, but they rapidly adjusted their aim and concluded a voluntary agreement with the MEA on the basis of a seasonal plan. While government representatives contributed to steering the ILA in that direction, little more than a gentle nudge was needed. On the whole, it seems fair to say that Bill €-59 and the enforcement measures that followed were of great value in the restoration of a long-term equilibrium in the system of industrial relations on the Montreal waterfront.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Getting to Yes

Pursuant to section 14 of the St Lawrence Ports Operation Act, 1975, Roland Tremblay (no relation to Local 375 president Adrien Tremblay) was appointed as referee to determine the interpretation to be given to provisions in dispute and the manner in which amendments would be incorporated into the collective agreement.1 Since the ILA continued to challenge the merits of the agreement, Labour Minister Munro coupled Tremblay's first appointment with a second mandate as an industrial-inquiry commissioner to investigate the union's complaints with regard to job security and discipline and report back to him. As hearings got under way in the summer of 1975, the MEA's power struggle with some of its members - notably Manchester Liners and Cast North America intensified. Given that Cast's container business accounted for a substantial portion of the tonnage assessments that funded the job-security plan, the company considered that this gave it some special influence over MEA's activities as bargaining agent for the industry. Glusing wrote to Masters: 'No doubt you will appreciate our profound concern over the Maritime Employers Association's apparent and continued inability to reach a negotiated labour settlement with the locals of the ILA ... During the past two months, we have endeavoured to communicate to you our restlessness and general discontent over the manner in which labour relations were allowed to wander ... From what we understand, labour's present discontent is mainly directed at bill 059 which is somewhat ambiguous and which will hardly provide the peace so much required by us over the next 2 years... It is our view that unless the industry agrees on an improved job security formula, we will be facing continuous harassment by the union ...'He then offered a number of proposals to this end, including a monthly job-security guarantee.2 The MEA saw Glusing's letter as little more than an attempt to pursue his own agenda by gaining some control over the association's bargaining strategy. During

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negotiations, all members of the MEA had been kept informed of the MEA's bottom line within the boundaries of confidentiality. Cast, in fact, was better informed than most because its subsidiary terminal/stevedoring company, Task Terminals, was a member of the contract advisory committee. We responded to the claims of both Cast and Manchester by explaining that the MEA had determined 'potential areas of movement' which did not envision large assessment increases. As long as there was no assessment increase, Cast and Manchester had no business interfering.3 Glusing's reply indicated that Cast had decided that it was time for a showdown with the MEA. He wrote that the company was 'no longer willing to accept policies decided upon by the MEA which continuously result in work stoppages in this port of Montreal' and that 'this company is prepared to face added assessments.' He then warned that 'continued detrimental actions by the Board and Management of the MEA' could constitute grounds for damage action against the association.4 If the MEA was to retain any kind of credibility, it could not conduct a dialogue with a member seeking special status on the basis of threats. By circulating the information that it was willing to pay for better job security, Cast was putting in jeopardy the MEA's current dialogue with its bankers and the unions. The Board of Directors decided that Glusing's letter amounted to 'conduct inimical to the Association' and we instructed our counsel, Brian Mulroney, to point out to Cast that the by-laws of the association contained a provision that companies could be suspended from the MEA for such behaviour.5 Although this warning salvo was sufficient to quiet Cast for the time being, the company did not give up on its quest for power and would seize every opportunity to interfere again in the months ahead. The merit of Cast's complaints concerning the consultation process might have been completely overlooked had there not been other companies requesting change. As a new round of collective bargaining was approaching in the Maritime ports of Saint John and Halifax, Halterm, a container terminal operator based in Halifax, requested increased involvement and veto powers in the negotiations. On 25 June, following a series of unsuccessful discussions regarding the respective roles of the MEA and of the operators in those ports, Halterm resigned from the MEA. This action coupled with the continual complaints of Manchester and Cast led us to initiate a complete study and revision of the consultation process.6 At the conclusion of the study in the fall of 19757 the decision-making apparatus was refined. A new class of members was formed for container terminal operators. In addition, the number of directors on the board was increased from eleven to thirteen and the board's make-up was changed so that it would consist of six shipowners and agents, of whom one had to be from Saint John and one from Halifax; four stevedoring contractors; and three container terminal operators, of whom one had to be from the Maritimes. The quorum for meetings was increased

Getting to Yes 261 to five. Furthermore, although this was not part of any official policy, representatives of the local port committees engaged in collective bargaining would often be invited to MEA board meetings where labour negotiations were discussed. With these changes, Halterm revoked its resignation and rejoined the MEA in November 1975-8 Iremblay's Inquiry By October 1975, Tremblay had concluded hearings and issued an arbitration award establishing that longshoremen had to call in every day of the week to pick up their work assignments but would be subject to disciplinary sanctions only if their failure to call caused harm to the employers (that is, if those who failed to call were actually scheduled for work). This removed an important irritant for the union. Tremblay also clarified the system of job-security advances and clearly established the principle that benefits were contingent upon one's personal decision to accept or refuse available work.9 His award did not provoke much reaction from the parties since they were saving their breath for the industrial-inquiry commission which would examine the merits of the job-security plan and the discipline code.10 Hearings began in January 1976. The ILA did not deny that the weekly jobsecurity plan had been expensive but argued that it had not been excessively expensive given what management had obtained in return: the concessions granted by the union for weekly job security over the years had enabled the port to catch up and secure a comfortable position in the race for containerized cargo: In 1969, the longshoremen sacrificed the sling loads, the control of the workforce, the control of the job security. In 1972, the longshoremen sacrificed the work gangs; they accepted assignment by computer; they accepted compulsory retirement at age 65 ... This consent was acceptable only on the express condition that job security would remain intact and guaranteed ... [a condition without which] no consideration whatsoever would have made us sacrifice any part of this security. In 1973 and 1974, 900 longshoremen left their job security in exchange for $12,000 ... During this collective agreement which ended on December 3ist 1974, at a time when unions everywhere in Canada were striking for the cost of living allowance, not a single minute of work was lost in the River ports... This is what the longshoremen paid to obtain and maintain a weekly guarantee which was withdrawn by a special law ... By a single stroke of a pen, Commissioner Gold destroyed [the weekly job-security plan which] had been granted to us by Commissioner Picard. To the union, the MEA's complaints were 'like someone driving a Cadillac and

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complaining about the cost of gasoline/ But, in fact, the ILA's grief was as much about the Gold plan having been imposed as it was about its economics. Accordingly, its brief was saturated with personal attacks upon the MEA, Judge Gold, and the government of Canada. The union further denounced the 1975 negotiations as a masquerade staged to give the impression that negotiations were taking place when in fact the outcome had been planned: Apparently, the MEA had become the negotiating agent for the government from whom it had received formal instruction to recuperate the sums loaned by the banks... The whole thing was premeditated for all its phases of operations... Bill €-59 has no other aim in reducing the job security of longshoremen than to allow the MEA to reimburse its bankers as soon as possible and .,. giving to a prosperous industry extra and camouflaged grants... this to the detriment of longshoremen who prefer to work on the piers... This is the real significance of Bill 059 as prepared by the MEA, endorsed by the Conciliator-Commissioner, confirmed by the Minister of Labour, approved by the Cabinet and legislated by the House of Commons which was half-empty.

Although the union condemned the negotiation process and its result, it was willing to consider any solutions between a weekly plan and the perpetuation of Gold's plan minus the new penalties. While we found this encouraging, the ILA continued to dismiss management's concern with costs on the ground that MEA members did not pay out of their own pockets.11 The MEA replied that port users who paid job security through cargo assessments could always choose to use other ports where labour costs were not as unstable and high as those in Montreal. If longshoremen wanted to keep their jobs in the long run, they had better be concerned with costs. For all their complaints, Montreal longshoremen were still protected by a job-security plan which remained among the best in North American ports.12 In his report to the minister, released on 13 August 1976, Tremblay stated that a job-security plan that significantly affected the port's ability to compete could not be condoned, no matter how advantageous it was from the longshoreman's point of view. Job satisfaction came in far behind the port's ability to pay and, ultimately, the nation's ability to compete with other world ports in the water-transportation industry. Tremblay wrote: 'It is obvious that the Picard regime is more advantageous for longshoremen who are paid for not working, but it is equally evident that the cost of longshoring is higher to the point of influencing a decrease in tonnage, 38.3% for the years 1972,1973, and 1974. Job security exists to guarantee longshoremen a certain income, not to pay them for not working.' Tremblay felt that the Gold Report had to be given a chance but perhaps a compromise could be agreed upon whereby longshoremen would have the possi-

Getting to Yes 263 bility of refusing a certain amount of overtime and weekend work without their guarantee being affected by such refusal.13 His investigative report was not binding on the parties; rather, its purpose was to provide a basis for discussion, and it was then up to the parties to decide whether or not to amend the collective agreement. Mediation yielded agreements on a number of items, including weekend work and the elimination of the provisions in the discipline code that tied the degree of punishment - ranging from suspension to dismissal - to the number of infractions.14 Adrien Tremblay was not part of this process. The grand fiasco of the 1975 strike combined with health problems had discouraged him from pursuing his career as union leader, and so it was mostly under the leadership of his successor, Marcel Lagace, assisted by basically the same group as before, that the mediation took place. In October 1976 Tremblay quietly resigned and took up his former position as dispatcher with the MEA, satisfied to keep far from any negotiation table and from the front stage of union meetings. He would eventually be laid off in a portwide restructuring although he never believed that restructuring was the real reason.15 Meanwhile, having reached working agreements on the job security and discipline system, the parties trudged along through the winter season of 1976-7. Wrestling with Cast The year 1976 had begun positively with regard to the MEA's internal affairs. There had not been any signs of serious dissension since the reforms to our consultation process in the fall of 1975. Moreover, based upon the job-security analysis for 1976, prepared by the MEA in late December 1975, the government, banks, and MEA reached agreement at the end of January that the MEA would increase assessments on conventional cargo by thirty-eight cents a ton and on container cargo by thirty-seven cents a ton, effective 22 March 1976.l6 It had been two years since the last increase and the decision did not generate much protest. The increase was an integral part of an agreement, signed on 5 May, under which the banks agreed to provide temporary working capital loans to the MEA until i April 1977 and the long-term loans with the government and the banks were restructured, with the interest rate on the outstanding government loan set at 10.37 Per cent- This change, which according to Masters was no bargain at the time, would turn out to be a blessing as interest rates steadily climbed to more than 20 per cent in the i98os.17 A condition of the agreement was that an observer from the Department of Transport or the banks could attend directors' board meetings. By the end of 1976, the MEA had met all its ongoing financial obligations and even had a cash surplus, making 1976 the first successful year under the loan

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agreements since their inception in 1973. Yet difficulties remained. Tonnage levels remained short of 1974 levels by 18 per cent; the MEA's debt remained excessive ($16.5 million); and more than one thousand longshoremen owed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the job-security fund and systematically refused to reply to the MEA's letters. In addition, in 1976 the MEA ignited another controversy - this time in its own ranks - by changing the way cargo was measured and assessed. The old formula required that conventional or containerized cargo assessments be paid based on an MEA ton, which was defined as 2,000 Ibs. of cargo or 40 cubic feet of volume of such cargo if weighing less that 50 Ibs. per cubic foot. In 1976 we decided that the MEA ton of conventional cargo would continue to be computed on a weight or measurement basis and would conform to the NHB wharfage ton. However, with respect to container cargo, the current formula did not allow verification of the amount of such cargo handled with NHB records and had given rise to some major inequities. Accordingly, the board decided that the definition of a containerized ton would be changed to a weight-only ton. This change required that the container-assessment level be increased to ensure the collection of the same total revenue from container cargo. Accordingly, the assessment on container cargo, effective from 17 January 1977, was increased by forty-four cents per ton. The assessment on conventional cargo stayed the same.18 Predictably, this news was not well received by container terminal operators. Cast calculated that the MEA's new definition of a ton would cost it an additional $300,000 and flatly refused to pay. Legal counsel for the company wrote to the MEA that this 'most recent attempt to further penalize our client' had Cast 'exploring its legal recourse to have the entire assessment authority and practices of the MEA judicially reviewed.' He concluded that Cast's 'continued membership in your association' was Very much in question/19 More resistance came from Canadian Pacific, whose container terminal was at Quebec City, although the company paid the increase under protest while waiting to see how the MEA would react to Cast's threats. We found its attitude galling, considering that one of CP's senior employees, H.L. Booth, sat on the board of the MEA. Again, if the MEA was to have credibility as a collective voice, it could not afford to be pushed around by any of its members. According to our legal counsel, we had four options in dealing with recalcitrant members: we could suspend, expel, fine, or refuse to supply manpower. We chose what we thought was the best course of action for the industry's long-term interests: Cast was expelled. To Booth's credit, he agreed with the board's decision, thereby making it unanimous, and CP withdrew its protest against the payment of the assessment increase. Cast's subsidiary stevedoring company, Task Terminals, was warned that it would not receive ILA labour unless it paid the adjusted assessment for all cargo loaded or discharged for and on behalf of Cast in the Port of Montreal. Task agreed.20 Cast stood defiantly alone.

Getting to Yes 265 In late February, Glusing registered an appeal of the board's decision in conformity with the by-laws. A special meeting of all members was scheduled for 7 March. On the 3rd, Cast publicly announced that it was considering moving its operations to Halifax. MEA members chewed on the news as they gathered to hear Cast's appeal. In view of the company's control over a large amount of cargo, the move would cause the association a substantial loss of revenue, in six figures, from cargo assessments. With this threat colouring the background, Glusing demanded that a committee be formed to study the rate structure and come up with a new rate and that Cast be able to influence board decisions. His appeal was rejected but he was asked to reapply for membership and serve on a committee that would be established to review and make recommendations to the board with respect to container assessments.21 Glusing declined to reapply. Over the following months the MEA would suggest a myriad of compromises. Cast turned down all our offers and further asked for a committee that would examine the MEA's overhead costs and apply reductions to assessments on containers. We felt, and we had the support of the banks, the NHB, and the government, that the association could not agree to Cast's conditions for membership without seriously endangering our integrity. It appeared that the majority of members were also satisfied with the board's position and so we stuck to our guns.22 As a result, in July 1977, Cast North America folded its tent and moved most of its operations to the Port of Halifax.23 Coincidentally, on the i8th of the same month, the Labour Relations Board finally confirmed that all employers had complied with its 15 February decision to recognize the MEA as the sole official representative of employers for negotiations with the various locals of the ILA employed in the St Lawrence River ports.24 Years after our application, we were finally recognized as management's official voice. Cast's departure caused a huge drop in cargo and forced the MEA to conduct layoffs in accordance with the collective agreement.25 We were ready to tighten our belts and endure another period of famine but, to our great surprise, Cast returned to Montreal within a few months.26 After all the tension that had built up around the threat of moving and then the move itself, Cast's return was anticlimatic to say the least. We never found out the reasons for it. However, as the 1978 negotiations got under way, we would realize that Cast had not abandoned its quest for power. Breakthrough For the first time in at least fifteen years, the ILA in Quebec City and Trois-Rivieres decided to negotiate separately from Montreal. Within weeks, new collective agreements based on seasonal job security were signed in both ports without the

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help of third parties and before the old agreements had expired.27 We were elated by the ease with which labour and management were able to conclude these contracts. Quite simply, we had never experienced this kind of meeting of minds in our relations with the ILA. By contrast, in Montreal the union executive led by Marcel Lagace approached the negotiating table with a demand for weekly job security on the basis of forty hours of work a week, Monday to Friday from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., under the same mechanisms as those of the 1972 contract but for fiftytwo weeks instead of thirty-seven. Attached was a long list of monetary benefits, various make-work provisions, and other demands, including a mandatory container stuffing and unstuffing clause and the abandonment of all disciplinary sanctions in cases of absence from work.28 Our familiar feeling that labour and management lived on two different planets returned. We knew, although we could not understand it, that many longshoremen had not digested the advance system and viewed it as a way for management to keep them in debt to the association. In a television show, a longshoreman had told the public: 'They [the MEA] lets them sit at home and get paid to get them in debt. No more, no less, to impose the system, to attack the men's morale, because a man kills himself if he is without morale. If you want to kill someone, play with his mind, it is through the spirit, that is what they are playing us with ... Our employer is a pig ... We are set up this way since 1974. We are belittled, we're robots in the port. It sounds crazy but that is where we are at.'29 This deep resentment baffled us. Of the 50,000 ILA members employed in 34 North American ports, none enjoyed the advantages of the Montreal job-security plan whether in terms of eligibility rules, availability rules (including penalties), and extent of the guarantee. Understandably, an advance system giving the MEA the role of the banker and putting it in the position of having to deduct money around vacations, Christmas, and New Year was bound to create hostility.30 But we could not understand what the union hoped to achieve with its demands. It should have been obvious that neither the MEA nor any third party would restore a plan which had been condemned as untenable by Judge Gold in 1975 and again by Commissioner Tremblay in 1976. Furthermore, the Anti-Inflation Board (AIB), then in place under federal legislation, permitted only a 4 per cent monetary increase for 1978 and had already informed the ILA that this included job-security benefits. On 20 January 1978, in response to the MEA's request for third-party intervention, Labour Minister Munro appointed Roland Tremblay as conciliation commissioner.31 His appointment was not coincidental. Tremblay had already approved the plan in principle in his 1976 inquiry and the government could count on the fact that he would take a position in line with his previous report. The union's expectations continued to puzzle us until Cast provided the missing link. Bound

Getting to Yes 267 by the shared purpose of weakening the MEA, our two adversaries had become temporary allies. Since Cast had returned to Montreal, the MEA's nominating committee had been looking for a way to enable the company to be represented on the board without anyone currently sitting having to resign. When contacted to discuss the matter, Cast informed the nominating committee that it was no longer interested in participating in the MEA since it had made its own deal with the union. In the event of a strike, the ILA would provide labour to Cast, and Cast would make appropriate job-security payments until a new contract was negotiated. This in effect set up a strike fund for the union and operated directly against the interests of the MEA. It was also illegal under both the collective agreement, which stipulated that labour could be obtained only through the MEA, and the Canada Labour Code, which forbade any interference by employers in union affairs and vice versa. While we were perplexed as to why Cast would admit to such an arrangement, the arrangement itself certainly shed some light on the union's position. The ILA's strategy was to make reference to this deal in its brief to Tremblay.32 Presumably, Cast was hard at work trying to convince other employers to enter into the same kind of deal with the union. Although we could sue both the ILA and Cast under the Canada Labour Code, court action would be a slow process with doubtful chances of success because Cast and the ILA had refrained from actually signing an agreement.33 Since rumours that Task Terminals was a party to the illegal agreement had proven true, our second option was to expel Task from the MEA on the basis of conduct contrary to the association's best interests. Task's expulsion would immediately prevent it from supplying labour to Cast, because only MEA members could employ labour. However, the Canada Labour Code provided that an ex-member of an association acting as bargaining agent might negotiate on its own. In effect, then, expelling Task might serve to validate the company's side agreement with the union. The MEA did not want to test the courts on this point. It occurred to us that the wisest course might be to refrain from doing anything. From past experience, the union knew that it always took some time for cargo to return after a strike, and under the job-security plan's advance system the loss of cargo that would follow a strike would leave longshoremen indebted far into the season. The union would go on strike only if it believed that Cast's separate deal would lead the MEA to change its stance with regard to job security. All things considered, our best weapon was our ability to make it clear to the ILA and Cast that our position was firm. As a fall-back position, we could always respond to a strike with a lockout, which would prevent Task from providing labour to Cast. The parties were asked to present their positions to Tremblay on 10 February The MEA's brief contained an analysis of the job-security program in the three St

268 Waterfront Blues Lawrence River ports, a comparison of our program with those in other unionized North American ports, and a dissection of the demands of Local 375. We had large numbers of statistics to demonstrate that the union's job-security demands were untenable. Although longshoremen had to be available seven days a week at all time, they were not 'enslaved' to the industry as they claimed to be since only 9 per cent of hours were worked after 6 P.M. Monday to Friday. Rarely did weekend work require more than 20 per cent of the workforce. While the availability clauses might superficially appear to imply a loss of freedom, the new collective agreement rendered work schedules so predictable that in reality longshoremen now had more freedom than ever. A longshoreman cognizant of his relative position on the rotation list and of the number of ships in port was able to determine quite accurately whether or not he would be required to work. It was common for longshoremen to telephone the computer from their preferred vacation spot, some straying as far as Florida. On the other hand, 60 per cent of the total workforce had refused or failed to show up on the job three or more times during 1977. In New York, all those longshoremen would have become ineligible for job security in the calendar year 1978. The MEA concluded: We have heard much over the duration of the last collective agreement concerning the harshness of the penalties imposed on employees who absent themselves from work opportunities without valid excuses and those who refuse to take assignments which they would rather not perform ... Imagine the pandemonium that would result in a legal office if the secretary decided to absent herself on all those days on which she knew she might have to type a factum for the Supreme Court of Canada... While the employer certainly has responsibilities and obligations to treat his employees fairly and to pay them in conformity with the terms and conditions of the collective agreement, surely the employee himself has a moral obligation to present himself for work and to perform to the best of his ability for the duration of his employment.34

For some obscure reason, the union decided to write its submission without the help of a counsel, and, furthermore, its counsel were absent when it appeared before Tremblay. In contrast to the MEA's loo-page presentation, the ILA deposited a nine-page memorandum which, Tremblay said, could be 'summarized in two sentences: local 375 contends that all tax revenues must be used to pay job security in Montreal Harbour only ... [and] all revenues on tonnage should be redistributed between checkers and ... Local 375 according to a percentage of the hours worked by each of these two groups.'35 If there was a deadlock, it was because of the MEA's refusal to negotiate on the basis of the revenue available. In an effort to give the union a chance to oppose the MEA's position with some intelligent arguments, Tremblay extended hearings and tried to explain to the

Getting to Yes 269 officers that they were putting the cart before the horse by thinking that fair job security depended on revenue. But Lagace and his fellow union officers would not budge from their position, and on i March 1978 both parties indicated that they rested their case. Tremblay was keenly aware that the issuance of his report would mark the seven-day countdown for a strike and he tried one last time to make the union see reason. It almost worked. On 14 March the union suggested a seasonal job security plan of thirty-two hours a week, eight hours a day from Monday to Friday, with weekend work not counting. The MEA accepted, provided the eighthours-a-day disposition was removed and management was given the right to conduct layoffs at its own discretion, without the 70 per cent rule (under which, if hours of work in a year fell to less than 70 per cent for the same period of the base year, the MEA could institute layoffs and reduce its job-security costs). According to Tremblay, 'when the union learned that its proposal had been accepted by the employer, it began reconsidering its position.'36 Lagace returned to the table demanding that overtime be solely on a volunteer basis and that the guarantee be the seasonal equivalent of forty hours a week for fifty-two weeks. Tremblay gave up. His report was completed on 31 March and released to the parties on 3 April. In it, he noted that although various job-security options existed, a weekly plan was not one of them: 'If the old system of weekly job security was re-established, the costs would double and any surplus would quickly be exhausted. The assessment level would be increased, ships would again avoid the ports resulting in a further increase in job security costs and the continuing vicious circle. The ports of Quebec must not be subjected to such an unfortunate repetition of history.'37 Tremblay thought that the most irritating aspect of the seasonal plan was the obligation to reimburse advances. His solution was to reduce the guarantee, and thus the weekly advance, to the equivalent of thirty-two hours a week, eight hours a day, a solution that the union itself had suggested before falling back to its initial position. Although hours worked and offered on weekends and holidays would not count in the guarantee, they would be deducted when refused. The reimbursement of advances could be taken from regular hours only so that all earnings resulting from hours in excess of eight hours a day from Monday to Friday would be shielded from deductions. Tremblay also suggested that overtime during the week remain mandatory but that longshoremen be entitled to refuse up to fifty hours over the season. Longshoremen could be separated into two rotating groups for weekend work to ensure that each longshoreman would have one weekend off out of two. Tremblay accepted the 70 per cent rule for layoffs but proposed that the base year be changed from 1974 to 1977. Finally, he recommended wage increases equal to those offered by the MEA, even though employers had clearly indicated that the offer was conditional on complete availability of longshoremen and the removal of restrictions on layoffs.38 With encouragement from their officers, ILA members rejected Tremblay's

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report.39 However, a few days later, after another mediator had convinced the officers to accept the basics of Tremblay's report and sign a memorandum of agreement, they were unable to get the membership to ratify it. On 22 April, deaf to their officers' appeals, the rank and file rejected another proposal by a show of hands and instructed the negotiators 'not to call another meeting until their [revised] proposal had been agreed to.' While there were some extravagant demands, the union would accept seasonal job security for thirty-nine weeks with weekend hours not counting either as worked or as refused. The MEA, fearing that the exclusion of weekend work might motivate longshoremen to lower their productivity during the week so that they could work weekends at double time without their guarantee being reduced, rejected the proposal. Already there were few ships in port and some shipping officials were making predictions to the press that the port would soon be 'as silent as a graveyard.'40 We could not afford to let the situation degenerate into another circus and Masters cracked the whip. On 27 April newspapers, quoting an 'unidentified' member of the MEA board, indicated that job-security payments to longshoremen would be withdrawn as of midnight on 30 April and the port would operate on a payment-for-time-worked basis.41 When questioned by the ILA, Masters confirmed the accuracy of the report and pointed out that the MEA's inability to continue issuing job-security payments was a direct consequence of the longshoremen's capricious 'negotiations by rejection.'42 The union officers smartly informed Masters that they had an open mandate to call a strike and that they were not afraid to act upon it. Masters was unfazed. Two days later, on 29 April 1978, the membership of Local 375 held a second vote, by secret ballot this time, on the mediator's proposals. Remarkably, they were accepted by a margin of 553 to 233.43 The reasons for this volte-face on the part of the union were several, and Bill Kelly spelled them out in a memorandum to Labour Minister Munro on i May. In this document Kelly, ever the quintessential civil servant, gave perhaps too much credit to his minister and the government and too little to Arnie Masters and the MEA. Yet, that aside, he certainly pinpointed one of the main factors that produced the success of April - government resolve. After noting that the vote in favour of Tremblay's proposals resulted from 'the combination of no ships in port and the threat of withdrawal of job security as of midnight Saturday with no signs of concern or activity on the part of government,' Kelly provided a fuller explanation that reached back in time to 1974: I view this particular dispute as commencing in July, 1974, and finally terminating in April of 1978 with the parties voluntarily reaching a reasonable and equitable settlement. From 1974, there was basically only one issue involved. The issue being as to

Getting to Yes 271 whether or not job security provisions would be on a 'weekly' basis or in the form of a seasonal concept as recommended by Judge Gold in March of 1975 and incorporated in the St. Lawrence Ports Operation Act, 1975, in April of that year. You will recall that the ILA forced the government to intervene in 1975 when through illegal picketing, they choked-off the supply of feed grains in the province of Quebec ... The strategy of certain officers of the ILA at the time, was to force the government to intervene on the expectation, based on past performance, that through government action they would maintain the status quo of a weekly guarantee regardless of the dire financial consequences and its impact on the Port of Montreal. Government acted decisively and legislated the recommendations of Conciliation Commissioner Alan B. Gold as the terms of the collective agreement... [This action], based on your recommendations, was the correct one, and its long-term implications are now bearing fruit. Over the past decade labour relations in the Port of Montreal have been conducted through innumerable industrial inquiry commissions and government intervention through legislation. The strategy of the ILA, and who can blame them, was to reject any solution recommended by a conciliator, pressure the government into acting and obtain a more favourable settlement. While it came as a shock and surprise in 1975, there was a realization that the government could act in a manner other than anticipated by the parties. This action, in my view, broke the long-established pattern and set the stage for a peaceful renewal of the collective agreement in 1978. The maintenance of stable labour management relations in ports is a worldwide problem. Several factors contribute to this difficulty. There is a long-held tradition instilled in longshoremen whereby they resolve all their problems by 'dropping the hook' or shutting-down the port. This has changed dramatically in Canada where collective agreements are for a set term. Methods of cargo handling are changing rapidly, and the complex and restrictive work rules of yesterday are being changed to meet the requirements of today. Changing work rules and procedures can be traumatic in an industry steeped in tradition. Elimination of restrictive work rules and changing cargo handling methods result in fewer jobs. Longshoremen are entitled to press for adequate job security and this they certainly have accomplished in the Port of Montreal... The resolution of conflicts in labour-management disputes involving our seaports will always be difficult. However, it is my fervent hope and expectation that the selective action of the government in 1975 ..., combined with the policy of nonintervention in 1975, will set the stage for a new era of labour relations in the St. Lawrence River Ports.44 And so a collective agreement was born. Both parties' representatives signed the memorandum on the afternoon of 29 April. A significant gain for employers

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was a change in the right to lay off: in the new contract, the 1974 peg was removed, enabling the MEA to decide when work was insufficient. The longshoremen got an immediate 50-cent raise retroactive to i January 1978 and were promised further 75-cent increases on i January 1979 and i January 1980 (taking the hourly wage to $10.00). They were guaranteed 40 hours a week over 40 weeks, for a total of 1,600 hours.45 A few months later, Cast filled in the standard application form to join the MEA and was accepted as a member with no special privileges. Still, we had to request twice in writing that Cast fill in the supplementary form appointing the MEA as Cast's bargaining agent.46 Some years down the line, Cast filed for bankruptcy. The importance of a voluntary agreement based on the viable economics of seasonal job security cannot be overestimated. Not all of it may have been liked by all of the players, but, on the whole, it was seen as fair. Even at the time, there was a sense of history, a feeling that the pieces of the puzzle had finally fallen into place. At the MEA's annual general meeting, Masters declared that '1978 was a year in which the job security debate with the St. Lawrence River locals... was resolved.' According to MEA chairman Bill Brown, who, together with me, had witnessed all the ups and downs on the waterfront since the strike of 1966, there was no doubt that 1978 was 'the most positive year in the history of the Maritime Employers Association.'47

Conclusion

The late 19705 and early 19805 were a time of optimism and success for the Port of Montreal. Despite the budding recession, container cargo traffic was still on the rise, which allowed the MEA to maintain stable assessments and even to roll them back.1 The docks, now fenced and well policed, were practically theft-free, making the port's reputation, in the words of one shipper, 'as good as it once was bad which makes it pretty good indeed.'2 As interest rates rose as high as 19 per cent, the fixed interest rate of 10.37 per cent on the MEA's loans with the government allowed the association to begin earning some money, so much so that the press began referring to our 'embarrassing jackpot.' The Globe and Mail reported: 'Years after it borrowed heavily to put 1000 of its workers on pension, an employers' organization at the port of Montreal is making a profit on its federal loan.'3 Although the fixed rate had been no gesture of charity at the time, and we felt that we had nothing to be embarrassed about, we decided to repay the remaining $5 million while we had it and be rid of the debt once and for all. Against those sunny skies, I decided that it was time for me to move on. In one way or another I had been involved in every negotiation held between 1964 and 1978.1 signed the memorandum of agreement reached in Prime Minister Pearson's office on 14 June 1966. I had a direct involvement in the preparation of the Federation's and later the MEA's briefs to Dr Picard, Judge Smith, Judge Gold, and several others. I was the instrument behind the creation of the MEA, which I believed was the only hope for the industry to achieve a rational relationship with the union and to steer the port through the waves of change. I felt that I had done enough. After my leaving the MEA, not surprisingly, life there continued without me. The Post-1978 Port of Montreal To keep an ageing workforce up to date with constantly evolving equipment,

274 Waterfront Blues almost one hundred different training programs were designed in all ports managed by the MEA. Buy-outs were sporadically conducted (in 1980 in the Port of Quebec and again in 1984 in Montreal) to maintain the average age of the workforce below fifty-five. Negotiations undertaken in 1981 and 1984 were long (ten to twelve months) and necessitated the assistance of conciliators, including Dr Laurent Picard (the very same), but they did give birth to settlements that improved operational flexibility, monetary benefits, and quality-of-life provisions on the basis of the existing system of employment. In the mid- and late 19805, despite certain financial and operational successes, the criticism that non-Montreal members had always showered upon the MEA grew into a clear secession movement in favour of a return to regional autonomy. On the other side of the fence, Local 375 made efforts to expand its now meagre membership of 700 and, to this end, also took steps in 1986 to merge with the union local representing coastal longshoremen. These developments had a disastrous effect on the bargaining process. While there was no work for the new members, they now had voting rights at union meetings and would make the difference between an agreement and a strike. Direct negotiations commenced in early December 1986 and, in light of the local having taken in some 277 new members, the union's proposals were directed to adding them to the job-security list. Over the course of 1987 the parties met fifteen times with a conciliation officer and then a further thirty-two times either jointly or individually with a conciliation commissioner in an exhaustive exploration of all matters in dispute as raised by both parties. In November 1987 the commissioner submitted his report to the minister of labour, Pierre Cadieux, who released it to the parties on 2 December, almost exactly a year to the day that negotiations had began. The MEA was prepared to accept the report but it was rejected in its entirety by Local 375. As the year came to a close, the union requested the appointment of a mediator and the MEA concurred.4 It was at that time, in December 1987, that Arnie Masters, perhaps the figure who had simultaneously attracted the most hostility and the most respect in the history of the Montreal port, decided to leave the MEA. Bryan Mackasey, the son of former minister of labour Bryce Mackasey, became president. Masters's cutting edge had won him a host of fans and the accuracy of his strategic timing could not fail to impress even those on the losing side. As a manager, he was a bit of a superman: indomitable, clear-headed in the worst crises, and tough to the core. In 1971, when many would have reacted with horror to the idea, Masters agreed to become president of the MEA, then a ship still floundering after its launch, and he turned it into a large, efficient, mostly cohesive, and powerful organization. After sixteen years, Masters could leave with his head held high. I, for one, would clap all the way.

Conclusion 275 In January 1988 the minister appointed Laurent Picard as mediator and his recommended settlement was accepted by the MEA but rejected by the union. Subsequently, the parties returned to direct negotiations and in August 1988 signed a three-year collective agreement without the aid of a third party. The number of job-secure longshoremen was increased from 700 to 830 and, building upon Picard's mediation suggestions, a back-up pool of skilled labour was formed to ensure that the industry demand for supplementary manpower at peak periods was met. The monetary settlement saw a substantial increase in pension and welfare payments, an early-retirement program for all employees sixty years of age, and a freeze in the basic wage rates for the duration of the collective agreement^ Bryan Mackasey reported in his first annual report as president: 'The year 1988 saw the culmination of one of the most turbulent and exhaustive negotiations that the MEA has experienced since 1975/6 Without much ado, all the provisions relating to the recovery of job-security advances were removed, which, in effect, transformed the seasonal plan into a weekly guarantee once again. Such a reversal would have seemed impossible ten years earlier, but in truth the issue of a weekly versus seasonal guarantee was no longer relevant because of the limitation on the number of hours a man could work in a day. With three eight-hour shifts and a longshoreman restricted to one shift a day, overtime during the week was virtually eliminated, with the exception of the rare two-hour extension to finish work on a vessel. Although still operating with a seasonal plan in which all hours worked during the week counted, there was now little if any overtime pay that could be recouped and the increased cost to the job-security fund was only about $400,000, on a total bill of around $10 million.7 In that context, the advance system had become an irritant that could no longer be justified by the small savings that it might generate. In a word, with the new employment rules and the altered organization of work, a weekly or seasonal plan gave much the same results. In 1990, after almost a year of active raiding, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) won the favour of the majority of longshoremen and ousted the ILA in Montreal. Delayed negotiations resumed under a new executive and were concluded, no less than eighteen months after they had begun, with the voluntary signing of an agreement based on the formation of ten-men gangs for conventional cargo. By 1992, Montreal was subsidizing Quebec City. That is to say, the assessment on cargo handled at Quebec City was inadequate to pay the costs of job security and administration at that port, and the funds collected in Montreal had to be used. When the MEA board decided that Quebec City had to pay its own way, that port's members of the MEA resigned and established their own employers' association. A few years later, the MEA lost members in the Maritimes. The Port of Halifax

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had grown substantially over the last decade, and the major operators there, led by Halterm, came to the view that they were being exploited by Montreal. Saint John, for its part, was handling predominantly forest products for the K.C. Irving interests and had nothing in common with Montreal. As a result, in 1996, Halifax and Saint John each established an employers' association. The MEA board was trimmed from fifteen to eleven persons and continued to represent employers in Montreal, Trois- Rivieres, and the Great Lakes ports of Toronto and Hamilton. Meanwhile, the recession of the early 19905 had taken its toll on general cargo traffic at the Port of Montreal. Without a doubt, 1993 was the worst year for tonnage in thirty years; only 1.7 million tons were handled whereas the port usually saw more than 4 million pass through.8 Against this uncertain background, the negotiations that stretched out over one year with a new, moderate union executive yielded a memorandum of agreement in December 1993 based on a reduction of the workforce through natural attrition and early-retirement programs. But the militant rank and file, dissatisfied with the modesty of the settlement, rejected it against their officers' recommendation, which led the latter to resign.9 It was only in March 1994 that negotiations started over with a new executive and the help of a conciliation officer. One year after conciliation had run its course, there was still no agreement in sight, and the parties were in a legal position to call a strike or lockout. CUPE organized a series of one-day study sessions culminating in a strike which started on 8 March and lasted twenty-one days. After a great deal of pressure from the government, the parties agreed to return to work without a contract and Minister of Labour Lloyd Axworthy appointed Pierre Dufresne as mediator. Dufresne had first become involved in the waterfront in 1967 when he prepared a report on productivity for Picard's commission of inquiry. After ninety-three days of being 'locked' in a hotel room, 'watching the building of the Molson Centre' (as Bryan Mackasey put it), the two sides reached a collective agreement based on the buy-out of 146 longshoremen at $1,800 per year of service (on average approximately $70,000) and small wage' increases (o per cent in 1994 and 2 per cent in 1995,1996, and 1997). Afterwards, traffic at the port soared, especially with regard to containers. Assessments were cut by almost half, down to levels unseen since the mid-1970s. Feeling prosperous, the MEA rebated almost $4 million to its members, perhaps hoping to demonstrate to the secessionists the error of their ways. It was against this background of success that negotiations were undertaken in 1998. These negotiations dragged on through 1998 and 1999. Six sets of demands, each one worse than the previous, and no less than three union executives later, the MEA tired of the game and took CUPE to court for bargaining in bad faith. The Canada Industrial Relations Board ruled in management's favour in August 1999 and ordered the union to roll back its demands. An agreement was then reached on

Conclusion 277 the basis of eliminating coffee breaks during work periods, in order to do away with lost time in mid-shift, and opening of terminals at 6 A.M. instead of 8 P.M. to solve the problem of trucks having to fight urban traffic to make their pick-ups or deliveries. A large sum ($2.2 million) was dumped into the union's pension and welfare funds in addition to an extra 91 cents per hour, and wages were increased (by 2-3 per cent) for each year of a six-year agreement retroactive to i January 1998. Frustrating as the 1998-9 negotiations were, they did not lead to work stoppages nor did they have any impact on cargo traffic. The port continued to register record highs each year until 2001, when another recession began slowing down the flow of steel and container traffic, leading management to anticipate a total drop of traffic of about 5 per cent by year-end. Nevertheless, MEA's headquarters today remains buoyant. Bryan Mackasey said to me in December 2001: 'With money in the bank, labour peace ensured until 2003 and enough experience to remain calm in the face of sluggish traffic, we believe it will be smooth sailing until we are given reasons otherwise.' The secession of the Maritime ports has resolved all the internal disputes within the MEA, and the unity so desperately needed among the employers in the 19605 and 19705 is now a reality. If any of the remaining MEA ports want to become independent, their departure will have little impact on the whole. Overall, the Port of Montreal is doing fine. Last Words The story of labour/management conflict at the Port of Montreal in the 19605 and 19705 yields, I believe, several lessons for industrial relations in general. I would highlight the following four, which appear obvious now but remained elusive throughout the period under review: negotiated settlements are always preferable to imposed settlements; management and labour must each speak with one voice if the collective-bargaining process is to work; technological modernization is inevitable and the manpower implications that flow from it have to be planned for in such a way as to meet the needs of both management and labour; and the parties have to talk - and listen - to each other during the life of collective agreements in order to build the trust that will be needed during negotiations. Let us now elaborate on these lessons in the specific context of the Port of Montreal. My fundamental premise in this book is that an industrial-relations system, established within an environment of laws and regulations, is subject to external pressures such as labour and commodity markets, technological advances, social trends, competition, inflation, and so on, as well as internal pressures such as the age of the workforce, health and safety issues, the quality of leadership, and the ideologies of its actors. For the system to be relatively stable,

278 Waterfront Blues management and labour must share the belief that the balance between the work that has to be performed and how it is to be carried out, on the one hand, and the corresponding compensation, on the other, is essentially fair. Perceived fairness of employment conditions is a central pillar of any industrial-relations system. The division of responsibilities and economic benefits between management and labour does not stand a chance if it is not perceived as fair: people will fight or leave the system, making it anything but stable. Prior to the 19605, management and labour at the Port of Montreal had a common ideology which resulted in a stable relationship, more or less. While, objectively speaking, many employment conditions were archaic, unhygienic, sometimes abusive, and often unsafe, longshoremen accepted them as fair in relation to the compensation they received and the freedom they enjoyed in deciding when and where to work. They tacitly accepted being responsible for their daily welfare. For their part, employers felt that it was fair to push the men as hard as possible and they accepted the fact that longshoremen would give them little loyalty. Because the work relied more on manpower than machines that is, it was labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive - and their investment was minimal (terminal operations were yet to come), the employers were satisfied to leave the bargaining to the shipowners and agents. In any event, the latter group, because they paid the bills, wanted to remain in control of collective bargaining. While the parties might have complained, they limited themselves, from the 19305 to the 19505, to negotiating incremental improvements within the basic framework. To be sure, there were pressures for change in this period. As an ever-evolving organism, the system was shifting under the weight of various external and internal forces, including a workforce infused by a younger generation with new expectations and the introduction of technological innovations such as forklifts, pallets, cranes, and trimming machines - all pre-dating the introduction of containerization. The manner in which the system adapted to these pre-container technologies was to integrate them within existing structures and practices. In other words, machines were brought in but restricted in their efficient use, sometimes to protect the health and safety of longshoremen but mostly to limit their impact on the amount of work available. Soon, labour's idea of what was fair fell behind evolving operational realities and began being questioned by employers. The increasing discrepancy between old work methods and new business requirements strained the system's capacity to adapt to further innovations and steered it into a dead end. Thus, when competitive imperatives fuelled by the new generation of cargo-handling technology began to make themselves felt, the system capsized. In the wake of the container revolution, the parties, having no experience of

Conclusion 279 dialogue and indeed no common language, found themselves seized with the challenge of redesigning their world to fit an unknown future. Exactly what and how much work would be gained and lost with the introduction of containers and unitized cargo? How many longshoremen would be replaced? How much freedom of choice would the individual longshoreman lose? Management claimed the adoption of new technology as its right and pushed to have labour accept it. But on what terms? Reaching agreement voluntarily on implementing inevitable change became impossible. The government was forced to step in, repeatedly. The 1966 negotiations were concluded with the appointment of the Picard commission. Then, when working conditions were imposed at the end of 1967, the parties were unable to agree and that led to the establishment of Judge Gold's conciliation board in 1968. It was only after the actual introduction of containers and other technologically advanced cargo-handling methods that an assessment of what was possible and fair could be made. And it was necessary to include the employers, now partners in the new capital-intensive stevedoring industry, as principal actors in this process. The voluntary agreements of 1969 and 1972 were steps forward, but they were undone mostly by faulty mathematics compounded by accusations of bad faith. These agreements attempted to balance management's and labour's respective gains - improvements in management's ability to deploy and control the workforce on the one side and increased job-security benefits on the other. But the economics of the system were fundamentally flawed. Since no provisions were made to allow for a reduction of the workforce in line with reduced manpower requirements, the job-security improvements became financially untenable. And subsequently, when the workforce was reduced through the voluntary early-retirement programs of 1973 and 1974, it turned out not to be enough to save the weekly job-security plan awarded the union first in 1966 and then negotiated in 1969 and 1972. The attempt to rebalance the equation under Judge Gold in 1975 failed and once again legislation was required to impose a settlement. Then, however, in 1978 - after twelve years of waterfront blues - the actorsfinallywere able to agree on a new balance between their respective interests. In any industrial environment, stability depends on the degree of trust between employers and workers. In the case of the Montreal waterfront, Judge Gold had diagnosed the port's problem as one of attitude as early as 1969: It is clear that the parties are really not able to negotiate in the usual way. There remains such a residue of mistrust, suspicion and even fear - unhappy heritage of the past - that they are almost incapable of discussing matters, let alone solving them. Instead, they prefer to work through the Board or its Chairman, satisfied to allow the matter to be decided by someone else. There are, of course, many reasons for this...

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Part of the problem is what the parties have learned from the past. Always 'taken off the hook' when the time came, in the public interest, they have not developed the necessary incentive to take their own responsibilities at the bargaining table but are content to wait for an imposed solution, prepared to blame everyone else but themselves if they do not find it to their taste.10

Bill Kelly, who was closely involved in the many rounds of negotiations on the waterfront as assistant deputy minister and director of the Conciliation and Arbitration Branch of the federal Department of Labour, made the same point: 'It is evident that Government has been called upon to play a major role in the settling of labour-management relations in the St. Lawrence ports. In the port of Montreal, the pattern has been for both union and management to take fairly irreconcilable stands and then seek a Conciliation Board or Commission solution to their problems. Both parties to the collective bargaining process in the ports must accept some responsibility for the lack of progress which was made in direct bargaining relationships in the late i96o's and early ig/o's. A lack of coherence and consistency in policy among both groups has existed in the past.'11 Few multi-employer industries have relied on third-party intervention to the extent that the longshoring industry in the St Lawrence River ports did between 1965 and 1975. The actors began expecting intervention and developing negotiation strategies based on that premise, which, of course, bred further intervention. But, over the 19703, a fundamental change occurred: the federal government turned from being an interested overseer to being the guarantor of the MEA's multimillion-dollar loan, which it justified in the context of keeping the Port of Montreal viable. The result, of course, was that the government became vitally interested in ensuring the implementation of financially sound employment conditions. And, in the end, it had its way. Legislating Judge Gold's report in 1975 was extremely unpalatable to the union and dampened the ardour of the parties for more government intervention. The ILA's subsequent decision to take respon-' sibility for negotiating collective agreements forced it to define a sustainable position on basic fairness that met management's views half way, rather than simply to continue rejecting the other side's views in toto. The 1978 voluntary agreement created a new standard and enabled a new cycle to begin. As Bill Kelly said in an address at 'Port of Montreal Day' in 1979: I have long held the view that government intervention is not the answer to labour relations problems. Government intervention breeds further government intervention by demand of the public and abdication of responsibility by the parties... The settlement reached in 1978 is concrete evidence of the change of attitude and approach to labour relations in the port of Montreal. While the agreement did not

Conclusion 281 come easy, it is of particular significance that this comprehensive three-year collective agreement was arrived at voluntarily by the parties. I hardly need to emphasize the obvious that the best agreement is an agreement worked out by the parties and it is my further hope and expectation that the era of confrontation and imposed agreements has been ended... However, I have been a practitioner of labour relations too long to expect continuous harmony in any given situation or relationship. There will be times when the parties will require assistance in the form of mediation and conciliation in helping them to arrive at solutions to certain problems. This is quite normal and expected. [But] I do not expect situations where one or both parties abdicate their responsibility, precipitate a confrontation and wait for the government to resolve their problems through imposed solutions.I2

The new equilibrium between management and labour achieved in 1978 became a work in progress in which pieces could be added, subtracted, or transformed while leaving the framework untouched. Conflict was not completely a thing of the past; on the contrary, interviews with longshoremen in 1980 yielded the discovery that there was real paranoia about the MEA, which was thought to 'bug' union meetings in order to identify individuals and exercise repression.13 Nor was this strange; as in all employment relationships, there was an inherent tension between the parties over how the wealth generated by their efforts was to be shared. Furthermore, while both parties had a vested interest in ensuring the prosperity of the industry, there were institutional, individual, and even personal beliefs that were prone to clash at the best of times. In other words, the employers and workers were only human. That said, however, the agreement of 1978 meant that the boundaries within which this conflict occurred were accepted, if grudgingly, by the parties. Thus, the longshoremen ultimately agreed that it was fair for them to lose some personal freedom in exchange for guaranteed earnings, while in return they offered the employers guaranteed availability and acceptance of an efficient and practical employment system. Conflicts and differences of interest would persist throughout the years, but these would be related to incremental adjustments to the basic system and would not threaten its fundamental balance. I have spoken of attitude but not of the ability to negotiate. Paramount is the question of cohesion. Each party in any industry is an aggregation of many subgroups with various views and is subject to their pressures. On the Montreal waterfront, the majority group in power within both management and labour were constantly confronted with dissident factions, which they had to respond to and take into consideration strategically. Ongoing efforts by some large companies to seize control of the MEA and the negotiating process to the detriment of smaller companies is an indicator of the kind of competition that probably would

282

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have reigned supreme without a regulating body. In addition, no amount of good will on the part of the union would have yielded important changes had employers remained disorganized and unable to put forward a comprehensive agenda and to centralize resources. In the mid-1970s, a longshoreman with thirty-five years of service on the docks told the press: 'If you ask me, the beginning of the end came in 1970 with the advent of this Maritime Employers Association.'14 He was largely right, but he meant it in a negative sense and I view it positively. What we had perceived as a labour problem was first and foremost a management problem, and until we could put our house in order we were unable to meet the union on equal terms at the bargaining table. Led by strategist Arnie Masters and staffed with professionals, the MEA had the resolve to bargain with one voice. And, in these terms, the MEA indeed marked the beginning of the end of the ILA's reign by obstruction. The essence of the MEA was an understanding by individual companies that their future lay in giving up some of their independence in return for benefits greater than those they could achieve alone. Employers surrendered their individual freedom in decision making over hiring, firing, and contract administration, and in exchange they received a central and efficient employment system, more control in disciplinary matters, and more consistent dialogue with the union. Similarly, longshoremen gave up their individual freedom to choose when and where to work, and what kind of work they would do, in return for guarantees that could be applied only to a group, depending as they do on equalization of earnings, availability, and deployment flexibility. The destructive division among management that made the MEA a necessity impeded its creation for a long time and, once it was established, hampered its functioning. Eventually, however, it prevailed. I was one of its pioneers and it remains one of the accomplishments in my career that I am most proud of. Local 375, for its part, never seemed to achieve much institutional unity. Except for Jean-Marc St-Onge, president from 1966 to 1974, most officers of Local 375 showed a sorry lack of realism on the one hand and of imagination on the other. They were both the architects and the victims of their inability to exercise leadership over a highly critical membership. The most militant would fall from grace after failing to win big concessions from the MEA and the most moderate would see their proposals rejected by the membership and sometimes quit. In any case, none after St-Onge seemed to last long. The union's leadership difficulties were matched by its lack of vision. Wrapped up in nostalgia and lacking professional staff, the ILA had a difficult time imagining profound changes in the distribution of rights and responsibilities. It could not accept the inevitability of losing man-hours to mechanization and kept on asking for unlikely additional jurisdiction rather than negotiating workforce re-

Conclusion 283 duction. Moreover, the union long resisted giving up traditional casual employment in exchange for stability and guaranteed minimum earnings; it demanded to have all that was beneficial in the past extended into the future without giving up what was necessary to make the system viable. For a while, we on management's side shared the same dream, trying in 1969 and 1972 to create a world where we could all have our cake and eat it too. The results were disastrous. By the late 19705, the Montreal waterfront had undergone a transformation. The workforce had shrunk by a third from its heyday in the early 19605 but it handled the same tonnage in less than half the time. In effect, technological change and improvements in the system of employment had tripled the productivity of each man. In these decades, longshoring went from being completely casual - with institutionalized featherbedding, favouritism, and unfairness (men often reported for work in vain, and when they did find work, they toiled for excessively long hours in dire conditions) - to being completely decasualized and performed by a highly trained, flexible workforce, with one man per job and each man in the right place, and both workers and employers being accountable for their actions. Once Vagabond workers'15 who were widely seen as thugs, alcoholics, gamblers, and bums, who slept in sheds, drank from a common bucket, responded to the calls of nature wherever they could in the absence of restrooms, lacked the long-terms financial resources necessary to buy a car or a house, and were too shabby in appearance to feel comfortable riding the subway, longshoremen became tradesmen skilled in the operation of complex machinery, with stable and lucrative employment, decent clothes, and the ability to afford nice cars and cottages in the country. Of course, while some things were gained, others were lost - among them, personal freedom. In general, longshoremen disliked the computer-dispatch system. Yet those who complained the least were old-timers who remembered the days of showing up three or four times a day without being paid.16 In any case, integrating new cargo-handling technology was not a choice but an imperative. Under the circumstances, the parties did the best they could with what they had. That the port survived the crisis and prospered in the new mechanized shipping industry is a tribute to those leaders in management and labour who mobilized their efforts, their ingenuity, and their courage to face the challenge, making an important contribution to the Canadian economy in the process. I like to think that I was among them.

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Notes

In preparing this book, I have drawn on a wide variety of sources. These include my own files, dating to the period of my involvement with the Shipping Federation of Canada and the Maritime Employers Association; interviews conducted by me and Marianne Dufour with a number of the individuals involved in the story; House of Commons Debates; various newspapers (principally the Montreal Gazette, La Presse, and the Globe and Mail); various court decisions; the proceedings and reports of numerous commissioners, arbitrators, and conciliators; and several boxes of assorted documents, originals and copies, belonging to the SFC and the MEA, the Interprovincial Association of Stevedoring Contractors, the International Longshoremen's Association/Montreal, the National Harbours Board, the federal Department of Labour, Herb Colley, Judge Alan B. Gold, Charles Poirier, and the law firms Ogilvy, Renault and Beauregard, Brisset, Reycraft. Translations of documents and interviews from French to English have been done by Marianne Dufour and Carolyn Pathy. Preface 1 Wilfred List, 'Labour 1966: A most demanding year,' Globe and Mail, 2 June 1966. 2 Ibid. Introduction 1 National Harbour Board, The Port of Montreal in the Province of Quebec: General Information (January 1967). 2 Among the ice-control structures were floating ice booms that held back the ice which formed upstream. Artificial islands served to stabilize shore ice. See Port delof Montreal Bulletin, vol.i, no.i (winter 1975-6).

286

Notes to pages 4-11

3 Ibid. 4 In 1983 the National Harbours Board became the Canada Ports Corporation. 5 Other Canadian ports were nominally the responsibility of the minister of transport but were essentially self-administered. B. Brouillette, 'Le port de Montreal, hier et aujourd'hui/ Revue de Geographie de Montreal, vol.2i, no.2 (1967), 229. 6 Author's interview with Norman Wolfe, Wolfe Stevedores, i Feb. 1980. 7 'Constitution and By-laws of International Longshoremen's Association Local 375, adopted March ist 1942 ... Montreal, Canada.' 8 There were also a few small locals composed of machine drivers and shed workers. These locals were attached to particular stevedoring contractors and generally considered under their control. 9 Judge Alan B. Gold, 'The Report of the Board of Conciliation and Investigation in the Matter of the Shipping Federation of Canada and the International Longshoremen's Association Locals 375,1552, and 1657, Montreal; Local 1846, Trois-Rivieres; Locals 1605 and 1739, Quebec City,' (draft) report, April 1969, i. No final report was issued since the parties reached agreement. Judge Gold turned over to the author the draft report as well as all other papers related to his work at the Port of Montreal. 10 Arthur I. Smith, Report of Inquiry into Certain Conditions, Conduct and Matters Giving Rise to Labour Unrest at the Ports of Montreal, Trois-Rivieres and Quebec, P.Q., 2 October 1969 (Pursuant to Section 56 of the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act) (Ottawa: Department of Labour 1969), 165. 11 A ship had a number of holds loaded with cargo, each closed with a hatch; a hatchman stood at an open hatch and signalled between the men in the hold and the winch drivers - operators of the cranes that lifted cargo into and out of the holds. 12 Smith, Report, 161. 13 Tony Tiberi's interviews with longshoremen, 10 July 1980, conducted at the author's request. 14 Stephen T. Wace, 'Unpublished Study Prepared for the Task Force on Labour Relations' (Ottawa: Privy Council Office 1968), 111,130. 15 Smith, Report, 45. 16 Jules Deschenes, 'Report Submitted to the Montreal Port Council on the Matter of Thefts and Pilferage in the Port of Montreal' (Montreal, 30 Dec. 1967), 40,165. 17 Marianne Dufour's interview with Judge Alan B. Gold, 16 July 1966; author's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 18 Author's interview with Norman Wolfe, i Feb. 1980. 19 Smith, Report, 29. 20 Ibid., 60. 21 The statutes consolidated in 1967 as the Canada Labour Code were the Canada Fair Employment Practices Act, the Female Employees Equal Pay Act, the Canada Labour Standards Code, the Canada Labour (Safety) Code, and the IRDIA.

Notes to pages 12-21 22 23 24 25

287

Author's interview with Norman Wolfe, 21 May 1980. Smith, Report, 40. Ibid., 10-11. LA. Picard, Report of the Inquiry Commission on the St. Lawrence River Ports Pursuant to Section 56 of the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, Department of Labour (Ottawa: Department of Labour, October 1967), 22. 26 Grain-trimming machines are used to spread grain to the far reaches of the hold. Before these machines came into use, the grain had to be shovelled around. 27 Prior to the advent of palletized cargo, when longshoremen dealt with individual bags, boxes, or packages, hooks were used to dislodge the items from stowage. 28 Pallets are the wooden platforms on which cargo is lowered into or taken out of the hold. When bags or boxes are strapped to pallets in such a way as to constitute one 'unit,' the load becomes known as a 'unitized' 'palletized/ or 'strapped' item of cargo. 29 Tony Tiberi's interviews with longshoremen, 10 July 1980. 30 John Bellamy Foster, 'On the Waterfront: Longshoring in Canada,' in Craig Heron and Bob Storey, eds., On the Job: The Labour Process in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1985), 292. 31 Tony Tiberi's interviews with longshoremen, 10 July 1980. 32 Ibid. 33 Author's interview with Adrien Tremblay, a former president of Local 375, 7 Nov. 1979. 34 'Why the stevedores walked out/ Montreal Gazette, 27 Sept. 1960. 35 Author's interview with Adrien Tremblay, 7 Nov. 1979. 36 'C'est le temps de la chasse; il faut abattre Lelievre.' Decision de 1'Honorable Juge IgnaceJ. Deslauriers dans I'affaire Aurele Lelievre, demandeur, vs I'Association Internationale des Debardeurs local 375, defendeurs-intimes, Cour Superieure No. 537,014, Montreal, June 29$ 1962,14. 37 Ibid. 38 Author's interview with Bill Brown, 25 Sept. 1979. 39 Author's interview with Bill Brown, 16 April 1980. 40 Ironically, some ten years after the initial incident (March 1971), Local 375 would file a grievance against the stevedoring contractor Furness Withy for its refusal to rehire Lelievre, who had been sick. It was successful. 41 'Stevedores load cargo, clear port/ Montreal Star, 28 Sept. 1960. 42 Remi Duguette to Bernard Wilson, 14 April 1961. 43 Ibid. 44 Shipping Federation of Canada (hereafter SFC), General Meeting Minutes, 12 July 1961 and 14 Nov. 1963. 45 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 14 Nov. 1963. 46 Horace Pettigrove to Bernard Wilson, 31 May 1963. 47 In 1953, in accordance with recently negotiated collective agreements at the five ports,

288

Notes to pages 21-7

the ILA and the Federation had entered into a 'master agreement' to provide pension, welfare, and vacation benefits to the union members. A Board of Trustees was appointed and its powers defined. Because there was then no ILA local at the port of Trois-Rivieres, only four union trustees were appointed, representing the locals at the ports of Montreal, Quebec, Halifax, and Saint John, while the Federation designated a similar number of trustees. The master agreement provided that the contributions of the employers under the collective labour agreements in respect of pension, welfare, and vacation benefits would constitute a 'trust fund' vested exclusively in the trustees, and provision was made for the establishment of a Central Records Bureau, responsible to the trustees, to administer the respective benefit plans. The master agreement of 1953 stipulated that it could be renewed from year to year concurrently with the renewal of the collective labour agreement which gave it birth, and, in fact, it was renewed thereafter from year to year or every two years at the same time as the collective labour agreement. Originally, the master agreement specified in what proportion the employers' contribution would be earmarked for each plan, but by amendment in 1956 such proportion was left to the trustees to determine. Under the collective agreement that expired on 31 December 1962, the contribution was set at twenty-nine cents per man-hour. 48 The following year (1964), Laberge would be elected president of the QFL. In this capacity, he retained strong ties with the ILA in Montreal and acted as their representative in important disputes. 49 Bernard Wilson to George Haythorne, i Oct. 1963. 50 Author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Sept. 1980. 51 'Barricades seal entire harbour for the first time in Montreal's history,' Montreal Star, 4 Oct. 1960. 52 'Mayor visits strikers,' Montreal Star, 9 Oct. 1963. 53 'Barricades seal entire harbour.' 54 'Firms to pay longshoremen,' Montreal Star, 8 Nov. 1963. 55 This dilemma was first evident in the Lelievre dispute of 1960 and endured until the MEA was firmly in place as management's representative on the waterfront. 56 Author's interview with Phil Cutler, 8 April 1980. 57 Author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Sept. 1980. 58 'Grainmen still out - ILA back,' Montreal Star, 14 July 1965. 59 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 12 Oct. 1965. 60 Ibid. 61 W.R. Eakin, Jr, 'Statement of Shipping Federation Position' [press release], 27 May 1966. Chapter i: 'A Great National Emergency' i There already was a limited gang-rotation system called the 'pick-gang system.' It had been set up as a result of the 1963 negotiations and provided that preference of work

Notes to pages 28-36

289

was given to the gang lowest on an employer's earning list on Monday morning. This mechanism hardly helped equalization, not only because large differentials between gangs of different companies persisted, but because the picked gang got preference only for the first call (four hours) of the week. 2 SFC, Minutes of Joint Meeting of Executive Council and Labour Committee, 11 Feb. 1966. 3 J.R. Nicholson to Gerard Tremblay, 7 Feb. 1966. 4 Tony Tiberi's interviews with longshoremen, 10 July 1980, conducted at the author's request. 5 Author's interview with Bill Brown, 25 Sept. 1979. 6 Author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Sept. 1980. 7 Ibid. 8 SFC, General Meeting Minutes, 16 March 1966. 9 SFC, Minutes of Joint Meeting of Executive Council and Labour Committee, 30 March 1966. 10 Author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Sept. 1980. 11 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 6 April 1966. 12 Bernard Wilson to C.E. Poirier, 4 April 1966. 13 Bernard Wilson to C.T. Meams, 15 April 1966. 14 'Longshoremen's harbour walkout settled again,' Montreal Gazette, 22 April 1966. 15 'Port strike settled; dockers return today,' Montreal Gazette, 21 April 1966. 16 Tony Tiberi's interviews with longshoremen, 10 July 1980. 17 Bernard Wilson to George Haythorne, 19 April 1966. 18 Quote from W.R. Eakin, Jr, in 'Dockers stage wildcat strike,' Montreal Gazette, 20 April 1966. 19 'Port strike settled; dockers return today.' 20 'Longshoremen's harbour walkout settled again.' 21 Bernard Wilson to George Haythorne, 20 April 1966. 22 Extracts from minutes of LASC meeting, 11 May 1966. Captain John Matheson, assistant general manager of the Federation, was an invited guest at the meeting, as noted below. 23 W.R. Eakin, Jr, to J.R. Nicholson, 26 April 1966. 24 J.R. Nicholson to W.R. Eakin, Jr, 6 May 1966. 25 Ibid. 26 'Hurried meeting called,' Montreal Gazette, 10 May 1966. 27 Extracts from minutes of IASC meeting, 11 May 1966.. 28 Telegram, C.T. Mearns to Paul Asselin, 10 May 1966. 29 J.R. Nicholson to W.R. Eakin, Jr, 6 May 1966. 30 ILA Local 375 officials Paul Asselin, Adrien Lemoine, and J.-M. St-Onge to C.T. Mearns, 10 May 1966. 31 'Ultimatum issued,' Montreal Gazette, 14 May 1966.

290 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Notes to pages 36-40

'Port idle as conciliation begins/ Montreal Gazette, 13 May 1966. House of Commons Debates, 11 May 1966, 5010. 'Great national emergency/ Montreal Gazette, 14 May 1966. Bernard Wilson to J.R. Nicholson, 10 May 1966. Judge Claude Prevost to Bernard Wilson, 13 May 1966. Telegram, ILA Local 375 to J.R. Nicholson, 15 May 1966. Telegram, J.R. Nicholson to W.R. Eakin, Jr, 13 May 1966. Bernard Wilson to J.R. Nicholson, 10 May 1966. SFC, Minutes of Joint Meeting of Executive Council and Labour Committee, 16 May 1966. 41 Telegram, W.R. Eakin, Jr, to J.R. Nicholson, 16 May 1966. 42 J.R. Nicholson, House of Commons Debates, 16 May 1966, 5165. 43 House of Commons Debates, 17 May 1966, 5214. 44 'Judge sends dispute back to Ottawa for action/ Montreal Gazette, 17 May 1966. 45 Telegram, T.W. Gleason to Pat Bolger, 17 May 1966. 46 Judge Claude Prevost, 'Report under Section 35 of the IRDIA Chapter 152 to Hon. J.R. Nicholson Minister of Labour, in the Matter of the IRDIA and a Request for the Appointment of a Conciliation Officer in a Dispute Affecting the ILA (Montreal, Quebec, Trois-Rivieres) Applicants, and the Shipping Federation of Canada, Respondents/ Montreal, 17 May 1966. 47 Telegram, J.R. Nicholson to W.R. Eakin, Jr, 18 May 1966. 48 Telegram, W.R. Eakin, Jr, to J.R. Nicholson, 17 May 1966. 49 Judge Rene Lippe, 'Report to the Hon. J. Nicholson, Minister of Labour, in the Matter of the IRDIA and a Dispute Affecting the Shipping Federation of Canada Inc., and the International Longshoremen's Association (locals 375,1657,1552, Montreal; local 1846, Trois-Rivieres; and locals 1739 and 1605, Quebec City)/ Montreal, 23 June 1966. 50 Ibid. 51 SFC, General Meeting Minutes, 23 May 1966. 52 Author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Sept. 1980. 53 SFC, General Meeting Minutes, 26 May 1966. 54 The composition of the government party fluctuated but included at one time or another Guy Favreau, president of the Privy Council; C.M. Drury, minister of industry; George Haythorne and members of his staff, including Charlie Poirier; Bryce Mackasey, parliamentary secretary to Labour Minister J.R. Nicholson; J.W. Pickersgill, minister of transport; and Allan J. MacEachen, minister of national health and welfare. 55 Nicholson, House of Commons Debates, 11 July 1966, 7521. 56 'Walkout in 4th week/ Montreal Gazette, 30 May 1966. 57 E.A. Driedger (deputy attorney general) to George Haythorne, and George Haythorne to J.R. Nicholson, both dated 30 May 1966.

Notes to pages 40-8 58 59 60 61 62

291

House of Commons Debates, 30 May 1966, 5675. Telegram, Gerard Tremblay to J.R. Nicholson, 31 May 1966. House of Commons Debates, i June 1966, 5832. 'Lippe calls meeting this morning,' Montreal Gazette, i June 1966. 'Office ransacked - no one hurt,' Montreal Gazette, i June 1966. See also '500 police protect Soviet liner in Montreal/ Globe and Mail, 2 June 1966; 'Gangs on dock rampage, 50 RCMP with dogs sent in,' Globe and Mail, u June 1966. 63 '500 police protect Soviet liner in Montreal.' 64 House of Commons Debates, i June 1966, 5834. 65 'Lippe calls meeting this morning.' 66 George Haythorne to Judge Rene Lippe, 31 May 1966. 67 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 3 June 1966. 68 Ibid. 69 'Ottawa may ask power to end dockers' strike,' Globe and Mail, 4 June 1966. 70 'Violence at the dockside,' Globe and Mail, 9 June 1966. 71 'Dock strike becomes "critical" for Expo,' Montreal Gazette, 9 June 1966. 72 Ibid. 73 'Dock strike starts to threaten price levels,' Montreal Gazette, 10 June 1966. 74 'Violence at the dockside.' 75 'Dock trusteeship petition sent to Pearson,' Montreal Gazette, 7 June 1966. 76 'PM hopes to avoid arbitration,' Montreal Gazette, 9 June 1966. 77 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 12 June 1966. 78 SFC, General Meeting Minutes, 14 June 1966, 3:30 P.M. 79 'Negotiations to end dock strike,' Globe and Mail, 15 June 1966. 80 SFC, General Meeting Minutes, 14 June 1966. 81 'Negotiations to end dock strike.' 82 'Terms of Settlement for Two-Year Collective Agreement between the International Longshoremen's Locals in Montreal, Trois-Rivieres and Quebec and the Shipping Federation of Canada/ Ottawa, 14 June 1966. 83 Ibid. 84 Pick = J.W. Pickersgill; Peter = Peter Evans; Pat = Pat Bolger; Alex = author; Herb = Herb Colley; Rene = Rene Lippe; Nick = J.R. Nicholson; George = George Haythorne; Lester = Lester Pearson. Buchanan and Dewar are not people but Scotch whiskeys, while Gordon is gin. 85 House of Commons Debates, 14 June 1966, 6367. 86 'Harbour bustles again/ Montreal Gazette, 17 June 1966; 'After the long dock strike, operation clean-up begins/ ibid., 16 June 1966. 87 Hans Grottke, 'On the waterfront/ Montreal Gazette, 22 June 1966. 88 'Dockers strike ends but key issues remain/ Globe and Mail, 16 June 1966.

292

Notes to pages 48-59

89 Ibid. Chapter 2: Sound and Fury

1 Pat Bolger to J.R. Nicholson, 17 June 1966. 2 House of Commons Debates, 14 June 1966, 6368. 3 'In the Matter of an Inquiry Pursuant to the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act into Certain Matters Connected with the Settlement of a Dispute Affecting Longshoring Operations and Related Trades in the Ports of Montreal, TroisRivieres and Quebec, Minister of Labour, Ottawa,' House of Commons Debates, 23 June 1966, 6785. 4 'Dock bill expected today/ Montreal Gazette, 29 June 1966. 5 House of Commons Debates, 29 June 1966, 7002. 6 Ibid., David Lewis, 7019. 7 Ibid., Frank Howard. 8 Ibid., 5 July 1966,7184. 9 Ibid., 6 July 1966, 7271-2. 10 Ibid., 5 July 1966, 7184. 11 Telegram, Cutler, Lamer, Bellemare, Burns and Robert to Gerard Tremblay, 'Legal Opinion re: Terms of Settlement as between ILA St. Lawrence River Ports Locals and the Shipping Federation of Canada,' 16 June 1966, House of Commons Debates, 8 July 1996, 743712 J.R. Nicholson to Cutler et al., 27 June 1966, ibid., 8 July 1966, 7438-9. Emphasis added. 13 Telegram, Cutler et al. to J.R. Nicholson, 30 June 1966, ibid., 8 July 1966, 7439-41. Emphasis added 14 J.R. Nicholson to Cutler et al., 30 June 1966, ibid., 7440-1. Emphasis added. 15 Telegram, Prime Minister Pearson to Cutler et al., 30 June 1966, ibid., 8 July 1966,7442. 16 Telegram, Cutler et al. to J.R. Nicholson and Prime Minister Pearson, 30 June 1966, ibid., 8 July 1966, 7442. 17 Telegram, Claude Jodoin to Prime Minister Pearson and J.R. Nicholson, 6 July 1966, ibid., 8 July 1966, 7444. 18 Telegram, Nicholson to Claude Jodoin, 7 July 1966, ibid., 8 July 1966, 7444. 19 House of Commons Debates, 8 July 1966, 7387. 20 The above excerpts from the parliamentary debate of 11 July can be found in House of Commons Debates, 7521-4. 21 The above excerpts from the debate of 14 July can be found in House of Commons Debates, 7667-76. 22 Bill C-215, 'An Act respecting Certain Conditions of Employment of Dock Workers at the Ports of Montreal, Trois-Rivieres and Quebec.' The bill was passed by a vote of sixty-one to thirty-nine.

Notes to pages 59-75 293 23 Author's interview with George Haythorne, 23 Jan. 1980. 24 Author's interview with Phil Cutler, 8 April 1980. 25 National Archives of Canada, RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5a, vol.632i, 'Cabinet Conclusions, Business of the House, Strike Situation,' 10 June 1966, 2-4; 'Cabinet Conclusions, Business of the House, Strike Situation,' 13 June 1966, 2-3; and 'Cabinet Conclusions, Business of the House, Longshoremen's Strike,' 14 June 1966, 2. Emphasis added. 26 House of Commons Debates, 8 July 1966, 7387. 27 Nicholson to Cutler, 27 June 1966, ibid., 7437-8. 28 Ibid., 14 July 1966,7672. 29 Author's interview with J-M St-Onge, 24 Sept. 1980. Chapter 3: The Picard Commission 1 2 3 4

SFC's opening statement to the Picard commission, 19 Aug. 1966. Ibid. The case before the Superior Court was dismissed and the appeal was rejected. The navigation season in Montreal normally ran from about early April to midDecember. As a result of the Picard commission, this period became known as the 'job-security season' and lasted thirty-seven weeks. Against the union's demand for a 'weekly guarantee' - forty hours of work for each week of this period - the Federation preferred a 'seasonal guarantee' which would spread the guarantee over the entire job-security season. In Montreal, as we shall see, Picard accepted the union's position, though he made a slight modification in the formula to acknowledge the decrease in productivity over the preceding years. Because there was much less work in Quebec and Trois-Rivieres, Picard granted the longshoremen in those ports a seasonal rather than weekly guarantee. In 1975 the report of the Gold conciliation board, which was legislated by Parliament, abolished the weekly guarantee and the longshoremen were awarded instead a guarantee of 1,600 hours spread over a lengthened forty-week jobsecurity season. 5 Author to SFC's Executive Council, 8 Dec. 1966. 6 Ibid. 7 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 2 Nov. 1966. 8 Ibid., i Feb. 1967. 9 Montreal Gazette, 16 March 1967. 10 Cutler, Larmer, Bellemare, Robert and Desaulniers, 'An Application for a Subpoena Duces Tecum and to Bring Certain Other Matters to the Attention of the Commission,' 16 March 1967. 11 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 2 Aug. 1967. 12 Ibid., 4 Oct. 1967.

294

Notes to pages 76-86

13 Ibid., 18 Oct. 1967. 14 LA. Picard, Report of the Inquiry Commission on the St. Lawrence River Ports Pursuant to Section 56 of the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, Department of Labour (Ottawa: Department of Labour, October 1967). 15 Ibid., 67. 16 Ibid., 93. 17 Ibid., 75. 18 Ibid., 95. 19 Ibid., 75. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., 102. 22 Ibid., 90. 23 Ibid., 105. Picard devised the concept of 'equivalent ton' to measure employer contributions to the job-security fund. He wrote: 'Since it is necessary to create a fund to guarantee job security... the Commission has decided that the amount of $0.15 per ton shall be contributed by employers to constitute this fund. Because the handling of grain and other bulk solids requires fewer hours per ton, it is provided that for purposes of this contribution, 30 tons of grain shall count for one corrected ton and 10 tons of other bulk solids shall count for one corrected ton' (Report, 84}. Further, rule 68 of his report specified that 'equivalent ton' meant: '30 tons of bulk grain or soya beans, 10 tons of bulk sugar or other bulk solids handled mechanically, 2,000 pounds of other cargo (except bulk liquids) or 40 cubic feet of volume of such cargo if weighing less than 50 pounds per cubic foot.' 24 Ibid., 89. 25. W.R. Eakin, Jr, to George Haythome, 8 Nov. 1967. 26 Telegram, J.P. Martin to J.R. Nicholson, 10 Nov. 1967. 27 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 7 Nov. 1967. 28 Ibid. 29 Telegram, J.P. Martin to J.R. Nicholson 11 Nov. 1967. 30 Telegram, J.R. Nicholson to W.R. Eakin, Jr, 13 Nov. 1967. 31 Telegram, W.R. Eakin, Jr, to J.R. Nicholson, 13 Nov. 1967. 32 Telegram, J.R. Nicholson to W.R. Eakin, Jr, 14 Nov. 1967. 33 Telegram, W.R. Eakin, Jr, to J.R. Nicholson, 15 Nov. 1967. 34 Telegram, J.R. Nicholson to W.R. Eakin, Jr, 16 Nov. 1967. 35 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 17 Nov. 1967. 36 Ibid., 20 Nov. 1967. 37 J.P. Martin to J.R. Nicholson, 22 Nov. 1967. 38 Gilles Gregoire, House of Commons Debates, 24 Nov. 1967,4661. 39 Raymond Langlois, ibid., 4663. 40 J.M. Forestall, ibid., 4665. 41 Bryce Mackasey, ibid., 4680.

Notes to pages 87-103 295 42 Picard, Report, 90, 43 Ibid., 91. Emphasis added. Chapter 4: After Picard

1 2 3 4 5 6

Denis Pronovost, minutes of negotiating meeting, 21 Dec. 1967. J.P. Martin to Executive Council, 3 Jan. 1968. SFC, Labour Committee to Executive Council, 15 Jan. 1968. Pronovost, minutes of negotiating meeting, 18 Jan. 1968. SFC, 65th Annual Report for the Year Ended December 3ist 1967. Ibid. The Montreal Port Council included representatives from the Chambre de Commerce, the city of Montreal, the National Ports Council, the Canadian Importers Association, the Canadian Exporters Association, the Cana-dian Manufacturers' Association, the Canadian Truckers Association, trucking and rail companies, shipping companies and agencies, operating terminals, and the public. It would be replaced by the Montreal Port Administration in 1971. 7 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 24 Jan. 1968. 8 SFC, Labour Committee Minutes, 19 Feb. 1968. 9 Emphasis added. 10 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 3 Nov. 1967. 11 Arthur I. Smith, Report of Inquiry into Certain Conditions, Conduct and Matters Giving Rise to Labour Unrest at the Ports of Montreal, Trois-Rivieres and Quebec, P.Q., 2 October 1969 (Pursuant to Section 56 of the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (Ottawa: Department of Labour 1969). 12 Ibid. 13 SFC, General Meeting, president's address, Montreal, 20 March 1968. 14 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 6 March 1968. 15 Marianne Dufour's interview with Judge Alan B. Gold, 16 July 1996. 16 Conversation with author, 4 Dec. 2001. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Conciliation board ruling, 14 Nov. 1968. 23 Marianne Dufour's interview with Judge Alan B. Gold, 16 July 1996. 24 Ibid. 25 Address of SFC President W.R. Eakin, Jr, at the annual general meeting held in Montreal on 15 March 1967. Reprinted in SFC, 64th Annual Report for the Year Ended December 3ist 1966,11. 26 Ibid.

296 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

Notes to pages 104-19

Author's interview with Peter Evans, i Aug. 1980. Author's interviews with Bill Brown, 25 Sept. 1979, and Norman Wolfe, 21 May 1980. Author's interview with Norman Wolfe, 21 May 1980. Ibid. SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 14 May 1968. Ibid., 28 May 1968. Ibid. Ibid., 31 May 1968. Ibid., 4 June 1968. Ibid. John Greene to SFC, 11 June 1968. SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 16 July 1968, J.P. Martin to Executive Council, 26 June 1968. SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 27 June 1968. Ibid., 8 Aug. 1968. Ibid., 24 July 1968. Ibid., 8 Aug. 1968. IASC to Herb Colley, 12 July 1968. SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 16 July 1968. Ibid., 8 Aug. 1968. Ibid. IASC to Peter Evans, Jim Thorn, and author, 19 Aug. 1968. SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 23 Aug. 1968. IASC to SFC, 28 Aug. 1968. SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 29 Aug. 1968. Much later, after Mulroney became prime minister, he would appoint Hartt chief of staff of the Prime Minister's Office and, subsequently, deputy minister of finance. James L. Thom to Norman Wolfe, 3 Sept. 1968. Brian Mulroney to James L. Thom, 26 Sept. 1968. Stanley Hartt to Henry Belle, 9 Oct. 1968. Ibid. SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 6 Nov. 1968.

57 Montreal Gazette, 21 Dec. 1968. 58 Globe and Mail, 12 Dec. 1968, Report on Business. Chapter 5: The Agreement of 1969 i CP Steamships of London had decided to locate its new container ship services, starting in April, in Quebec City rather than Montreal; Hamburg-Chicago Lines was terminating its services in Montreal at the end of the season; Saguenay Shipping was abandoning

Notes to pages 120-7

2

97

its continental sailings from Montreal to resume its operations in Quebec City or Port Alfred. See John Rolfe, 'Montreal harbour claimed losing competitiveness,' Globe and Mail, 12 Dec. 1968, Report on Business. 2 Author's interview with Bryce Mackasey, 14 Sept. 1979. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Marianne Dufour's interview with Judge Alan B. Gold, 16 July 1996. 6 Initially, management's negotiating committee was composed of representatives of the Federation's Labour Committee and of the IASC, along with Federation staff Marcel Jette and Denis Pronovost. At its first meeting on 12 January 1969, the MEA's shadow board, composed of Jim Thorn, Peter Evans, John Eyre, Fred McCaffrey, and the author from the Federation, and Henry Belle, Bill Brown, Norman Wolfe, and Ken Monks from the IASC, designated a smaller negotiating committee composed of Jette, Pronovost, Brian Mulroney, and industrial engineer Pierre Dufresne. 7 SFC, Labour Committee Minutes, 12 Nov. 1968. 8 Ibid., 20, 26 Nov. 1968. 9 Judge Alan B.Gold, 'The Report of the Board of Conciliation and Investigation in the Matter of the Shipping Federation of Canada and the International Longshoremen's Association Locals 375,1552, and 1657, Montreal; Local 1846, Trois-Rivieres; Locals 1605 and 1739, Quebec City/ (draft) report, April 1969, 6. 10 Denis Pronovost to members of the negotiation committee, 18 Dec. 1968. 11 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 10 Jan. 1969. 12 Henry Belle to MEA Board of Directors, 10 Jan. 1969. 13 14 15 16 17

MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 6 Feb. 1969. SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 20 Feb. 1969. Ibid.; Gold, draft report, 7. Gold, draft report, 8. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 13 Feb. 1969.

18 19 20 21

Author to MEA Board of Directors, 19 Feb. 1969. SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 27 Feb. 1969. J.P. Martin to Marcel Jette, 17 Feb. 1969. En Vilk/The Business Family Paper, 31 March 1969.

22 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 23 Wilfred List, 'Quebec longshoremen warned that compulsory arbitration not out,' Globe and Mail, 18 Feb. 1969, Report on Business. 24 Editorial, 'Too many physicians,' Financial Post, 26 Oct. 1968. 25 Ship arrival and sailing dates were advertised weekly in the local press. 26 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1966. 27 Gold, draft report, 8. 28 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 12 March 1969.

298

Notes to pages 127-38

29 30 31 32 33

Gold, draft report, 8. Author's and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. House of Commons Debates, 16 and 19 March 1969,6745,6814. Ibid., 19 March 1969, 6815. 'Memorandum to Cabinet': 'Re: Labour Dispute - Port of Montreal and other St. Lawrence Ports,' 26 March 1969; National Archives of Canada, RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series A~5a, vol. 6340, 'Cabinet Conclusions, Business of the House - Labour Situation in the Port of Montreal,' 27 March 1969,5-6. 34 Dufresne, McLagan, Daigneault, 'Monetary Evaluation of the Proposed Collective Agreement Submitted by the ILA Local 375,' 21 March 1969. 35 By 'royalty/ the union meant a certain amount of dollars per container, or cents per ton of cargo in the container. 36 Telegram, Bryce Mackasey to Bill Kelly, 29 March 1969. 37 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 38 Ibid. 39 'Les debardeurs veulent la securite d'emploi,' En Ville/The Business Family Paper, 31 March 1969, 7. 40 Gold, draft report, 12. 41 Ibid, 42 Ibid., 9. 43 Brian Mulroney, opening statement to the conciliation board, November 1968. 44 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 45 St-Onge's handwritten minimal demands, 5 April 1969. 46 Globe and Mail, 10 April 1969. 47 Brian Mulroney to author, 22 July 1969. 48 Globe and Mail, 9 April 1969. 49 Ibid., 10 April 1969. 50 'Container clause ruled out as Montreal dockers settle,' Financial Times of Canada, 14 April 1969. 51 The final text of the collective agreement was signed on 15 May. 52 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 8 April 1969. 53 Marianne Dufour's interview with Judge Alan B. Gold, 16 July 1996. 54 'The Montreal Scene,' in Transportation Symposium: Economic Imperative and Administrative Challenge, McGill University, 29 May 1969. Chapter 6: Treading Water 1 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 23 April 1969. 2 Vacancies in the Montreal checkers' Local 1657 would first be filled from a list of twenty-five members of that same local currently ineligible for the plan.

Notes to pages 138-49 299 3 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 23 May 1969. On the role of the Central Records Bureau, see 287-8^7. 4 John Eyre to author, 21 July 1969. 5 Norman Wolfe to MEA Board of Directors, 4 Aug. 1969. 6 Hickling Johnson Management Consultants, Report, 'Dispatch Cycle, St. Lawrence River Ports,' November 1969, 4. On the role of the Central Recoreds Bureau, see 287-8n47_ 7 Ibid., 8. 8 Norman Wolfe to MEA Board of Directors, 4 Aug. 1969. 9 Judge Alan B. Gold, decision on Local 375 grievance, 19 Nov. 1969. 10 Hickling Johnson, Report, 34. 11 'The future promises stiff struggles/ Montreal Star, 30 May 1969. 12 The full name of this union was the National Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freighthandlers, Express and Station Employees. 13 This union's full name was the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. 14 Montreal Gazette, 2 June 1969. 15 'Drapeau urged to seek order in waterfront confusion,' Globe and Mail, 30 Oct. 1969. 16 Montreal Gazette, 2 June 1969. 17 Author's interview with Peter Evans, i Aug. 1980. 18 Author's interview with Norman Wolfe, 21 May 1980. 19 'NHB drafts second report on Montreal, other east ports as full terminals,' Globe and Mail, 2 Oct. 1969, Report on Business. 20 The future promises stiff struggles.' 21 22 23 24

SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 4 June 1969. Judge Alan B. Gold, arbitration award, clause 1.10,11 June 1969. 'Trucker-docker dispute is far from settled,' Montreal Gazette, 15 April 1970. Montreal Gazette, 15 Feb. 1970.

25 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 6, 22 Aug. 1969. 26 In September, an agreement was reached between Local 375 and checkers' Local 1657 by which longshoremen eligible for job security could be dispatched as extra and fillin checkers. Around the same time, the Federation resolved to have all manpower requirements (extras, fill-ins, and regular or supplementary gangs) for all ILA locals ordered exclusively through the dispatch hall. 27 'Supreme Court order restores truck loading on Montreal docks,' Globe and Mail, 23 Oct. 1969, Report on Business. 28 Ibid. 29 Minutes of Joint Meeting of General Membership of SFC and IASC, chaired by the author, 25 Oct. 1969. 30 Fifteen cents for the job-security fund and fourteen cents for the TDK

300

Notes to pages 149-58

31 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 27 Oct. 1969. 32 SFC, 'Memorandum of Agreement/ 30 Oct. 1969, between ILA Local 375 and the Shipping Federation, Eastern Canada, Brown and Ryan, Empire Stevedoring, and Wolfe Stevedores. 33 Bill Brown to author and the MEA Board of Directors, 7 May 1969. 34 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 21 May 1969. 35 Ibid., 26 June 1969. 36 Ibid., 5 Nov. 1969, 3 Dec. 1969. 37 Ibid., 3 Dec. 1969. 38 Ibid., 18 Dec. 1969. 39 Resolution passed at a meeting of the IASC Board of Directors, 24 Dec. 1969. 40 'Port of Montreal: lots of problems," Montreal Gazette, 2 Jan. 1970, Business Review. 41 'Mackasey to press radical plan,' Montreal Gazette, 24 Oct. 1969. 42 The NHB had commissioned at least three studies on these exact matters, in 1963, 1965, and 1966, as had the RCMP in 1967 (Cassidy Report) and the Montreal Port Council the same year (Deschenes Report). 43 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 8 Jan. 1969. 44 Smith, Report, iii. 45 Ibid., ix. 46 Ibid., 34. 47 Ibid., 35. 48 Ibid., 18,172. 49 'Port of Montreal: lots of problems.' 50 'Judge finds NHB ineffective: Harbour shake-up urged,' Montreal Gazette, 5 Feb. 1970. 51 Smith, Report, 217. 52 Ibid., 219. 53 Ibid., 220. 54 'Confidential Brief Submitted on Behalf of the Interprovincial Association of Stevedoring Contractors to the Industrial Inquiry Commission into Labour Unrest at the Ports of Montreal, Quebec and Trois-Rivieres,' 20 March 1969. 55 'Harbors board rips into Smith report,' Montreal Star, 4 Feb. 1970. 56 Ibid. 57 'Take ports out of NHB hands: Smith/ Montreal Star, 4 Feb. 1970. 58 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 4 Feb. 1970. 59 Ibid., 11 Feb. 1970. 60 Smith, Report, 185, 220. 61 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 18 Feb. 1970. 62 Ibid., 20 Feb. 1970. 63 SFC, Executive Council Minutes, 23 Feb. 1970.

Notes to pages 158-70

301

64 Ibid., 3 March 1970. 65 Norman Wolfe to Herb Colley, 6 March 1970. 66 In September, Marcel Jette was appointed executive secretary and treasurer. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 21 Sept. 1970. Chapter 7: Hope Deferred 1 Donald C. Jamieson, Address to Shippers Council, 10 March 1970. 2 Judge Alan B. Gold, arbitration award, 12 Sept. 1969. 3 Arthur I. Smith, Commissioner, Report of Inquiry into Certain Conditions, Conduct and Matters Giving Rise to labour Unrest at the Ports of Montreal, Trois-Rivieres and Quebec, P.Q., 2 October 1969 (Ottawa: Department of Labour 1969), 151,155. 4 NHB, Internal Correspondence, notes on meeting held on 6 March 1970. 5 NHB, 'Regulations Governing the Loading and Unloading of Trucks,' 11 March 1970. 6 Ibid. 7 'Tailgating delays port work, truckers will give it a chance,' Montreal Gazette, 21 April 1970. 8 'Memorandum of Agreement Made at Montreal as of the i5th of May 1970 between the Shipping Federation of Canada and the ILA Local 375,' clause 37. 9 Herb Colley to Norman Wolfe, 3 April 1970. 10 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 4 May 1970. 11 Ibid., 19 May 1970. 12 Notes by Hubert Benoit, 7 May 1970. 13 Dufresne, McLagan and Daigneault, 'Survey on Productivity of Eastern Canada Conducted for the IASC/ June 1970. 14 IASC to Hubert Benoit, 23 June 1970. 15 Pierre Camu to Henry Belle, 30 July 1970. 16 Bill Brown to Norman Wolfe and Henry Belle, 17 June 1970. 17 Department of Transport to IASC, n.d. 18 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 'Le rapport Smith selon les debardeurs,' En VillelBusiness Family Paper, 30 March 1970. 22 Author to Brian Mulroney, 14 July 1970. 23 Hubert Benoit to Henry Belle, 25 Aug. 1970. 24 IASC to Hubert Benoit, 2 Sept. 1970. 25 Hubert Benoit to Henry Belle, 29 Sept. 1970. 26 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 14 Oct. 1970. 27 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 28 Ibid.

302

Notes to pages 170-83

29 Author's interview with Marcel Jette, 27 May 1980. 30 Author to Brian Mulroney, 3 Dec. 1970. 31 McLean Kennedy would join on 3 Dec. 1970 and Montreal and Saint John Stevedoring on 17 March 1971. 32 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 24 Feb. 1971. 33 ED. McCaffrey to Roy Illing, 2 March 1971. 34 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 35 Ibid. 36 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 9 March 1971. 37 Ibid., 22 March 1971. 38 Ibid., 29 March 1971. 39 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 40 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 19 May 1971. 41 Ibid. 42 Speech by A.E. Masters, undated but likely circa 1974. 43 Bryan Mackasey would in due course succeed Masters as president while Wace would go on to head a successful management-consulting firm bearing his name. 44 Author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Oct. 1980. 45 '1971 good for the port of Montreal; 1972 may be better,' Montreal Gazette, 17 Dec. 1971. 46 'Fine '72 forecast for Montreal Port,' Montreal Star, 17 Dec. 1971. 47 MEA data. 48 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 16 June 1971. 49 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 50 Strang was familiar with the Port of Montreal; he had lived in the city and worked for Saguenay Shipping and served as chair of the Federation's Labour Committee. 51 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 52 A.E. Masters to MEA Board of Directors, 17 May 1971. 53 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 54 'Negotiation Notes,' 2 Aug. 1971. 55 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 56 'Negotiation Notes,' 19 Aug. 1971. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., 10 Aug. 1971. 59 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 60 'Negotiation Notes/ 13 Aug. 1971. 61 'Notes on Staff Meeting of the MEA,' 20 Sept. 1971. 62 'Notice of Termination of the Collective Agreements of ILA Locals 375,1846,1739, 1605,' 22 Sept. 1971. 63 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, i Nov. 1971. 64 Ibid,, 21 Jan. 1972.

Notes to pages 183-91 303 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93

94 95 96

Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. Ibid. Masters's presentation to the conciliation board. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 17 Feb. 1972. SFC and MEA data. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 30 March 1972. Author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Oct. 1980. Ibid. 'Notes on Staff Meeting of the MEA,' 15 Feb. 1971. Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. Author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Oct. 1980. Author's interview with C.E. Poirier, 8 Feb. 1980. The above account of the dispute over electric forklifts draws upon the author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Oct. 1980. 'Collective Agreement Signed at Montreal on March 29th 1972 between the MEA and the ILA Local 375,' annex D. Author's interview with A.E. Masters, 19 Nov. 1980. Ibid. 'Dock pact brings peace on river/ Montreal Star, 5 April 1972. 'Les debardeurs signent une convention sans egale/ Le Devoir, 5 April 1972. 'Dock pact brings peace on river,' Montreal Star, 5 April 1972. 'Les debardeurs signent une convention sans egale.' 'St. Lawrence ports labour pact points to peace in troubled waters/ Globe and Mail, 5 April 1972. Jacques Rouillard, Histoire de la CSN1921-1981 (Montreal: Boreal Express/Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux 1981), 216-93. 'St. Lawrence ports labour pact points to peace in troubled waters.' Telegram, Guy Beaudet to A.E. Masters, 5 April 1972. 'St. Lawrence ports labour pact points to peace in troubled waters.' 'Dock pact brings peace on river/ Montreal Star, 5 April 1972. 'St. Lawrence ports labour pact points to peace in troubled waters.' 'Job security, end to featherbedding bring peace to Quebec ports/ Globe and Mail, 5 April 1972. '1972 Collective Agreement between the International Longshoremen's Association, Local 375, and the Maritime Employers Association, Signed at Montreal on March 29th 1972,' clause 15.04. Ibid., clause 15.06. Dunnage consisted of pieces of wood stowed under or in the midst of cargo to prevent wetting or chaffing or to provide balance. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 4 May 1972.

304

Notes to pages 192-8

97 'Agreement Entered into this 25th Day of April between the Maritime Employers Association and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.' 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 4 May 1972. The Finance Committee would not be created until November (MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 22 Nov. 1972) and would consist of Al Jewell of Task Terminals - later replaced by his president, Maurice van der Veen - David Sloan (Canadian Pacific Steamships), Mike Woodall (Fumess Withy), Bob Scott (Saguenay Shipping), and me (as chair). Its mandate ran only for the period during which the current Board of Directors was in place. 101 Gert Vreeken to Laurence Pathy, 17 April 1972. 102 Raymond Rock, House of Commons Debates, 16 June 1972, 3222. Chapter 8: Strike! 1 Author's interview with Adrien Tremblay, 7 Nov. 1979. 2 Author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Oct. 1980. 3 Jacques Rouillard, Histoire de la CSN1921-1981 (Montreal: Boreal Express/ Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux 1981), 216-93. 4 'Strike spreading in Quebec, crisis within cabinet is eased,' Globe and Mail, 12 May 1972. 5 '33 more trade union leaders report for prison but turned away because paperwork not ready,' Globe and Mail, 17 May 1972 6 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 11 May 1972. 7 'Memorandum of Agreement Made at Montreal as of the 15th of May 1970 between the Shipping Federation of Canada and the ILA Local 375,' clause 8; the remainder of clause 8 dealt mainly with relief men and special gangs. The agreement was reached in April 1969 but the formal memorandum of agreement was not signed until 15 May 1970. 8 'Collective Agreement Signed at Montreal on March 29th 1972 between the MEA and the ILA Local 375,' clause 9.11. 9 'Memorandum of Agreement,' clause 9.04. 10 Author's interview with C.E. Poirier, 8 Feb. 1980. 11 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 15 May 1972. 12 Judge Alan. B. Gold, 'Decision in the Matter of the MEA and the ILA Local 375 re.: Grievance on Art. 5.01, 6 and 9.11, 29 June 1972.' 13 Ibid. 14 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 15 May 1972. 15 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 16 House of Commons Debates, i June 1972, 2686.

Notes to pages 199-207 305 17 'Ships begin to bypass St. Lawrence ports/ Globe and Mail, 24 May 1972. 18 'Peace pact between labour and management doesn't live long on Quebec waterfront/ Globe and Mail, 30 May 1972. 19 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 29 May 1972. 20 Editorial, Journal de Montreal, 5 June 1972, as translated and cited in House of Commons Debates, 16 June 1972, 3207. 21 Georges Valade, House of Commons Debates, 16 June 1972, 3211. 22 Ibid., 14 June 1972, 3213; 16 June 1972, 3214. 23 Ibid., 16 June 1972, 3215-17. 24 Ibid., 30 May 1972, 2675-6. 25 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 26 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 8 June 1972. 27 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 28 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 14 June 1972. 29 Georges Valade, House of Commons Debates, 16 June 1972, 3209. 30 Ibid., 14 June 1972, 3124. 31 Ibid., 16 June 1972, 3208, 3210. 32 Ibid., 16 June 1972, 3215-16. 33 Ibid., 16 June 1972, 3222. 34 Ibid., 16 June 1972, 3224. 35 La Presse, 20 June 1972. 36 'Union bid is rejected in Quebec ports tie-up/ Globe and Mail, 29 June 1972. 37 Gold, 'Decision/ 38 Walkout by Quebec dockers ruled illegal/ Globe and Mail, 30 June 1972, Report on Business. 39 House of Commons Debates, 30 June 1972, 3693. 40 'Dockers challenge arbitrator's ruling/ Globe and Mail, i July 1972. 41 'MPs' summer break delayed as Quebec ports stay closed/ Globe and Mail, i July 1972. 42 'Formula for ending St. Lawrence ports tieup to go to union members today/ Globe and Mail, 4 July 1972. 43 Telegram, J.-M. St-Onge to Martin O'Connell, cited in House of Commons Debates, 5 July 1972, 3795. 44 'La greviculture rapporte peu/ editorial, La Presse, 5 July 1972. 45 'Dockers challenge arbitrator's ruling/ Globe and Mail, i July 1972. 46 'La greviculture rapporte peu.' 47 'Dockers reject new proposals at Montreal/ Globe and Mail, 5 July 1972. 48 'Ottawa moves to force end to stevedore strike/ Globe and Mail, 6 July 1972. 49 Ibid. 50 Charles-Eugene Dionne and Raymond Rock, House of Commons Debates, 5 July 1972, 3805-10.

306 Notes to pages 207-18 51 52 53 54 55

'Ottawa moves to force end to stevedore strike.' Author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Oct. 1980. Author and Marianne's Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 19 Nov. 1980. Author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Oct. 1980. Arthur I. Smith, Report of Inquiry into Certain Conditions, Conduct and Matters Giving Rise to Labour Unrest at the Ports of Montreal, Trois-Rivieres and Quebec, P.Q., 2 October 1969 (Pursuant to Section 56 of the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act) (Ottawa: Department of labour 1969), 60. 56 Author's interview with J.-M. St-Onge, 24 Oct. 1980. 57 Author's interview with Adrien Tremblay, 7 Nov. 1979. Chapter 9: On the Brink 1 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 14 Dec. 1972. 2 Ibid., 22 Nov. 1972. 3 At a meeting of the Board of Directors on 6 Feb. 1973, Masters presented documents prepared by Price Waterhouse, and, after considerable discussion, it was unanimously agreed that we would not proceed any further with the arbitration of clause 15.04. 4 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 12 Jan. 1973. 5 'Payoffs along the waterfront,' Financial Times of Canada, 13 Aug. 1973. 6 M. Guy, 'Severance - a human success story/ Port of London, April 1973. 7 T.P.G. Morris (CIBC) to A.E. Masters, 6 March 1973. 8 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 9 March 1973. 9 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 16 March 1973. 10 Ibid., 27 March 1973. 11 'Lettre d'entente entre local 375 et 1'AEM concernant I'lnterpretation et 1'application de la proposition en date du 20 mars 1973.' 12 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 30 March 1973. 13 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 30 March, 3 April 1973. 14 W.J. Stenason to A.E. Masters, 6 April 1973. 15 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 11 April 1973. 16 Ibid., 13 April 1973. 17 Author's interview with A.E. Masters, 19 Nov. 1980. 18 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 17 April 1973. 19 Ibid., 17 April 1973, 9 A.M. 20 Ibid., 17 April 1973, 4 P.M. 21 Included in the assessments were the administrative charges to run the MEA - sixteen cents per ton on container cargo and thirty-two cents per ton on conventional cargo. 22 Del Taylor to A.E. Masters, 19 April 1973. 23 Del Taylor to T.P.G. Morris (CIBC) and N.H.P. Hardinge (RBC), 19 April 1973.

Notes to pages 219-25 307 24 Report presented to MEA Board of Directors, 15 May 1973, minutes of same date; emphasis added. 25 A.E. Masters to all longshoremen, 7 May 1973. 26 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 27 'Montreal dock employers accept offer of 524 to retire early,' Globe and Mail, 26 May

46

1973MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 24 May 1973. Del Taylor to T.P.G. Morris and N.H.P. Hardinge, 25 May 1973. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 30 July 1973. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 28 Aug. 1973. Jean Marchand, one of the first graduates of Laval University's social-sciences program, became actively involved in the labour movement in the 19505 and was president of the CNTU from 1961 to 1965, when, with Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Gerard Pelletier, he joined the federal Liberal Party (the 'Three Wise Men'). Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 18 Sept. 1973. Ibid., 21 Sept. 1973. Del Taylor to T.P.G. Morris and Jim Walker, 19 Oct. 1973. Emphasis added. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 24 Oct. 1973; Masters to Taylor, telex, 24 Oct. 1973; author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 25 Oct. 1973, Agreement between MEA and NHB.' Ibid., 14 Jan. 1974 T.P.G. Morris to Del Taylor and Jim Walker to Del Taylor, 23 Jan.i974. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 22 March 1974. 'Letter of Understanding between Minister of Transport, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada and the Maritime Employers Association,' 17 April 1974Agreement Made This 17th Day of May 1974 between the Government of Canada Represented Herein by the Minister of Transport, Party of the First Part, and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Party of the Second Part, and the Royal Bank of Canada, Party of the Third Part, and the Maritime Employers Association, Party of the Fourth Part, at the City of Montreal in the Province of Quebec.' A.E. Masters, 'Very Very Confidential Memorandum to the Board of Directors,' 2 April

47 48 49 50

1974MEA to all longshoremen, 25 April 1974. MEA, Board of Director Minutes, 8 Feb. 1974. MEA to all longshoremen, 25 April 1974. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 9 May 1974.

28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45

308

Notes to pages 225-37

51 'Mise au point a 1'attention de tous les membres du local 375, Montreal, 28 avril 1974.' 52 'Figures on 1973 and 1974 buy-outs' (n,d.). Chapter 10: Hardball 1 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 10 Oct. 1974. 2 Ibid., 12 Nov. 1974. 3 'Longshoremen, management talks on new contract open,' Montreal Gazette, 29 Oct.

19744 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 14 Feb. 1975. 5 Marianne Dufour's interview with Judge Alan B. Gold, 16 July 1996. 6 'Memorandum concerning the Job Security and the Discipline Code Imposed by Bill C-59, Presented to M. Roland Tremblay, Q.C., Sole Arbitrator, by the International Longshoremen's Association, Local 375, Montreal, January 30,1976' (MEA translation), i?7 Marianne Dufour's interview with Judge Alan B. Gold, 16 July 1996. 8 Gold also wrote collective agreements covering the longshoremen in Quebec and Trois-Rivieres and the checkers in Montreal. 9 MEA, General Meeting Minutes, 26 March 1975. 10 The number of man-hours in 1974 was the lowest since at least 1960, with 2.4 million hours worked. The average number of hours worked yearly between 1966 and 1974 was 4.1 million hours. Thus, from management's point of view, this layoff clause guarded against the consequences of a rather pessimistic scenario and did not really constitute a buffer against the 'normal' cargo-traffic fluctuations that would affect jobsecurity costs. 11 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 17 March, 24 March 1975. 12 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 24 March 1975. 13 'Le rapport du conciliateur Alan Gold: un recul que les debardeurs jugent inacceptable,' Le Devoir, 29 March 1975. 14 'Longshoremen poised to strike,' Montreal Gazette, 29 March 1975. 15 Ibid.; 'Le rapport du conciliateur Alan Gold'; author's interview with Adrien Tremblay, 7 Nov. 1979. 16 Marianne Dufour's interview with Judge Alan B. Gold, 16 July 1996. 17 'Longshoremen poised to strike.' 18 Author's interview with A.E. Masters, 19 Nov. 1980. 19 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 29 March 1975. 20 'Port closed: talks set with striking dockworkers,' Montreal Gazette, 31 March 1975. 21 Author and Marianne Dufour's interview with A.E. Masters, 12 Nov. 1996. 22 'Hold-up/ Le Devoir, i April 1975. 23 Ibid.

Notes to pages 237-43

3°9

24 'Port closed.' 25 'Hold-up.' 26 House of Commons Debates, 24 March 1975, 4423. 27 'Employers say dockers' bid won't be met,' Globe and Mail, i April 1975. 28 'Dock strike drags on as mediation collapses,' Montreal Gazette, 2 April 1975, and 'Long strike appears likely at Quebec's major ports/ Globe and Mail, i April 1975. 29 'Long strike appears likely.' 30 'Employers say dockers' bid won't be met.' 31 'Dock strike drags on.' 32 'Maritimes back dock strike: ship face coast boycott,' Montreal Gazette, 5 April 1975. 33 House of Commons Debates, 16 April 1975, 4889. 34 'Employers say dockers' bid won't be met.' 35 'Mediation fails as ships' boycott hits dock woes/ Montreal Gazette, 3 April 1975. 36 'Dock strike drags on.' 37 'Ottawa denies threat to farms in dock strike/ Montreal Gazette, 9 April 1975. 38 'Bargaining process may not stay as free/ Montreal Gazette, 10 April 1975. 39 'Ottawa denies threat to farms in dock strike/ 40 'Blockade by dockers ignores court orders/ Montreal Gazette, 12 April 1975. 41 Author's interview with Bill Kelly, i May 1981. 42 Ibid. 43 'Confidential Memorandum to Honourable John Munro from W.P. Kelly, re.: Dispute MEA and ILA, St. Lawrence River Ports, April 4,1975.' 44 Ibid. 45 'Ottawa: grain action unnecessary/ Montreal Gazette, 15 April 1975. 46 47 48 49 50 51

MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 15 April 1975. House of Commons Debates, 16 April 1975, 4899. Ibid., 4895-6, 4886. 'No Gold plan rush as repair cargo workers join strike/ Montreal Gazette, 18 April 1975. Author's interview with Bill Kelly, i May 1981. 'Another chance given dockers, management/ Globe and Mail, 23 April 1975, Report on Business.

52 Author's interview with Bill Kelly, i May 1981. 53 'Back-to-work legislation/ Montreal Gazette, 23 April 1975. Chapter 11: The Force of Law 1 Bill C-59, An Act to Provide for the Resumption and Continuation of Longshoring, Checking, Cargo Repairing and Related Operations at Certain Ports in the Province of Quebec, as Passed by the House of Commons 23rd April 1975, clause 14 (i). 2 House of Commons Debates, 23 April 1975, 5122.

310 3 4 5 6 7

Notes to pages 244-50

Ibid., 5127-30,5146. Ibid., 5125. Ibid., 5123. Ibid., 5144-5; ibid., i May 1975, 5360. Forrestall likely had an agenda of his own. As the MP for Dartmouth-Halifax East, he had the Port of Halifax in his backyard and so he may well have been out to embarrass the MEA and, as an opposition politician, the government at the same time. Any troubles at Montreal were bound to have a positive effect on cargo tonnage moving to Halifax, while, conversely, large infusions of money into the Port of Montreal, or loans to prop up the MEA, would do nothing for the Halifax Port and in fact might adversely affect it. Yet another consideration that may have gone into Forrestall's calculations concerned the difficult relationship between the Maritime and St Lawrence River ports. As discussed further in the next chapter, Halterm, a large terminal company in Halifax, was at odds with the MEA and would resign from the association in 1975. It rejoined a few months later, but, as noted in the Conclusion, continuing divisions between the employers' associations in the two regions would lead to a formal split in 1996. Forrestall's remarks about Bill 0-59 have to be seen in this context. 8 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 25 April 1975. 9 'Les dockers sur les pelouses,' Le Devoir, 24 April 1975. 10 'Longshoremen protest back-to-work legislation by Ottawa,' Globe and Mail, 25 April !97511 'Personne n'a pu quitter le Batory/ La Presse, 24 April 1975, 12 'Dockers defy federal orders/ Montreal Gazette, 26 April 1975. 13 Ibid; author's interview with Bill Kelly, i May 1981. 14 'Ottawa readies to assert the law in dock walkout/ Montreal Gazette, 29 April 1975. 15 'Depression nerveuse/ Le Devoir, 29 April 1975. 16 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 28 April 1975. 17 'Ottawa evalue le cas des debardeurs recalcitrants/ Le Devoir, 29 April 1975. 18 Ibid. 19 'Longshoremen refusing to obey legislation: Ottawa seeks ways to get dockers back to work/ Globe and Mail, 30 April 1975. 20 'Dockers in defiance/ Globe and Mail, editorial, 29 April 1975. 21 'Ottawa evalue le cas des debardeurs recalcitrants.' 22 'Longshoremen refusing to obey legislation.' 23 'Ottawa readies to assert the law in dock walkout.' 24 'Longshoremen refusing to obey legislation.' 25 'Les debardeurs rentrent et passent a la guerre froide/ La Presse, 13 May 1975. 26 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 30 April 1975. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., i May 1975.

Notes to pages 250-4 311 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

House of Commons Debates, i May 1975, 5360. 'Vote to defy federal order: Montreal dockers to stay out/ Globe and Mail, 5 May 1975. 'Dockers to be charged soon, Munro says/ Globe and Mail, 8 May 1975. Ibid. Ibid. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 5 May 1975. Ibid., 5 May 1975, telegram, Klaus Glusing to A.E. Masters, same date. Ibid., 5 May 1975. Ibid. 'Debardeurs: les chefs ont-ils rente de faire respecter la loi?' La Presse, 9 May 1975. C.S. Que, 'Le procureur general du Canada ... vs la section 375 ... la section 1739 ... la section 1846 ... la section 1605 ... et la section 1657 de 1'Association Internationale des Debardeurs/ nos. 05-007, 053-752,10 May 1975. 40 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 12 May 1975. 41 'Les debardeurs rentrent et passent/ La Presse, 13 May 1975; 'Quebec dockers to end defiance but other labour strife continues/ Globe and Mail, 13 May 1975. 42 'Quebec dockers to end defiance/ 43 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 24 April 1975. 44 Ibid., 30 April 1975. 45 A.E. Masters to Jim Walker, Royal Bank of Canada, 12 May 1975, annexed to MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 14 May 1975. 46 House of Commons Debates, 13 May 1975, 5729. 47 Ibid., 15 May 1975, 5817. 48 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 16 May 1975. 49 Ibid., 20 May 1975. 50 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 3 June 1975, telegram, A.E. Masters to Bill Kelly, 2 June 1975. 51 Under the previous weekly job-security system, a longshoreman had received a guarantee of forty hours of work each week for thirty-seven weeks or pay in lieu thereof (at a rate of $5.10 an hour). Hours worked or offered during the week counted, but the week consisted of only five days; any work done on the weekend was above and beyond the guarantee. Each week stood by itself, and so there was no going backward or forward to balance out the guarantee. In contrast, under the Gold system of a seasonal guarantee, a longshoreman was guaranteed 1,600 hours of work during a year, spread out over a period of forty weeks, or pay in lieu thereof (at a rate of $6.00 an hour). Each time he worked a certain number of hours, whether during the week or on the weekend, these hours were deducted from the total of 1,600 hours. Furthermore, the hours offered to a longshoreman were counted as hours worked and also deducted from the 1,600 hours. Thus, the guarantee of 1,600 hours over a period of forty weeks diminished progressively in

312

52 53 54 55 56 57 58

Notes to pages 255-61

accordance with the hours worked or offered. The longshoreman was also guaranteed advance cash payments against the hours worked or offered. Accordingly, the longshoreman could each week receive maximum advances equivalent to forty hours' work, advances that he would have to pay off when he worked in subsequent weeks. If he worked his week of forty hours, he would have received his salary for forty hours and this would not involve a cash advance. Once the longshoreman worked his guaranteed 1,600 hours, he would no longer receive advances and would be paid only for the hours actually offered and worked. The end result was that, if a longshoreman, worked, for example, thirty-two hours during the week and not been offered any more work, he would be paid forty hours, his guarantee would be reduced by thirty-two hours, and he would owe eight hours to the system of advances. If, during the following week, he worked forty hours and did not refuse any hours offered, he would have been paid his forty hours, his guarantee would have been reduced by forty hours, and he still would have owed eight hours' pay A.E. Masters to Bill Kelly, 2 June 1975. MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 30 May 1975. Ibid. Ibid,, 30 May 1975, telegram, A.E. Masters to Otto Lang, same date. Ibid., 2 June 1975. House of Commons Debates, 2 June 1975, 6318. Author's interview with Bill Kelly, i May 1981.

59 'Ottawa frappe le syndicat des debardeurs,' Le Devoir, 4 June 1975. 60 Ibid.

61 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 3 June 1975. 62 'Les debardeurs rentrent et comparaisent demain/ Le Devoir, 5 June 1975. 63 'Oue s'est-il passe chez les debardeurs?' Le Devoir, 6 June 1975. Chapter 12: Getting to Yes

1 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 2 July 1975. 2 Ibid., Klaus Glusing to A.E. Masters, 12 June 1975. 3 Ibid., A.E. Masters to Klaus Glusing, 14 June 1975. 4 Ibid., Klaus Glusing to A.E. Masters, 25 June 1975. 5 Brian Mulroney to Klaus Glusing, 11 July 1975. 6 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 21 Aug. 1975. 7 The author was appointed chairman of the subcommittee concerned with the restructuring of the regional committees and with the resulting amendments to the by-laws of the MEA. Ibid., 14 Oct. 1975. 8 Ibid., 6 Nov. 1975.

Notes to pages 261-6 313 9 Roland Tremblay, 'Arbitration Award between ILA Local 375 and Maritime Employers Association, Saint-Jean, P.Q./ 20 Oct. 1975. 10 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 6 Nov. 1975. 11 'Memorandum concerning the Job Security and Discipline Code Imposed by Bill 059, Presented to M. Roland Tremblay, O.C., Sole Arbitrator, by the International Longshoremen's Association, Local 375, Montreal,' 30 Jan. 1976,12,14, 20-2, 25, 30-2, 3912 MEA, 'Reply to Brief Presented by ILA Local 375 to Mr. R. Tremblay,' 5 July 1976, i.

13 Tremblay, 'Arbitration Award,' 16. 14 'Mediator's Suggestion to Settle the Items under Dispute between Local 375 of the ILA and the MEA,' 18 April 1977. 15 Author's interview with Adrien Tremblay, 7 Nov. 1979. 16 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 3 Feb. 1976. 17 Ibid., 19 May 1976; 'Agreement between Government of Canada and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Royal Bank of Canada and MEA,' 5 May 1976. Under the banking agreement, if the MEA were unable to meet payments on schedule, a system of partial payments based on tonnage assessments would be instituted. If any surplus showed upon payment of an instalment, the banks and the government could request accelerated payments. The banks' ability to request an assessment increase was made permanently subject to the approval of the minister of transport. Should the MEA be unable to repay the $2-million loan, the government would purchase the notes from the MEA or make a loan to the MEA for the amount due. See also 'Montreal port employers' loans turn into embarrassing jackpot,' Globe and Mail, 5 Dec. 1981. 18 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 16 Dec. 1976. 19 Ibid., 26 Jan. 1977, Roger Beaulieu (lawyer for Cast North America) to MEA, 2 Jan. 1977. 20 Ibid., 14 Feb. 1977, Paul Renault to Marcel Jette, 25 Jan. 1977; telegram, A.E. Masters to Maurice Van der Veen, Task Terminals, 15 Feb. 1977; A.E. Masters to A.J. Ford, Cast North America, 15 Feb. 1977. 21 Ibid., Special General Meeting, 7 March 1977. 22 Ibid., 17, 24 March 1977; MEA, General Meeting Minutes, 30 March 1977. 23 MEA, Board of Directors Minutes, 5 July 1977. 24 Canada Labour Relations Board to Ogilvy, Cope, Porteus, Montgomery, Renault, Clarke and Kirkpatrick, 18 July 1977. 25 'In the Scope of the Negotiations for the Renewal of the Collective Agreement between the MEA and the ILA Local 375 - Brief Submitted by the MEA to Mr. Roland Tremblay, Conciliation Commissioner/ 10 Feb. 1978, 63. 26 'Port traffic at Montreal on upswing,' Financial Times of Canada, 28 Nov.- 4 Dec. 1977. 27 'Year in Review: Labour Relations and Contract Negotiations,' MEA 1977 Annual Report. 28 'Draft Collective Agreement Project Submitted by Local 375 to the MEA,' 31 Oct. 1977.

314 Notes to pages 266-75 29 Transcript from 'Le 6os,' with Andre Payette, 29 April 1977. 30 In contrast, the Port of New York had a system whereby longshoremen were advanced only 75 per cent of their total adjusted guarantee, the remainder being placed in a reserve from which amounts owed were deducted. The individual acted as his own banker and any 'overages' - money owed to the advance fund - were deducted from his reserve bank account. 31 'MEA Circular Letter No. 383 to All Members of the MEA,' 23 Jan. 1978. 32 Peter Walsh to A.E. Masters, 10 Feb. 1978, with attached memorandum from Walsh to Gerard Rochon. 33 'Strictly Private and Confidential Memorandum to All Members of the Board of Directors/ 21 Feb. 1978. 34 'In the Scope of the Negotiations,' 82, 87. 35 'In the Matter of the CLC part V-IR and a Dispute Affecting the MEA, Port of Montreal, Quebec Employers, and the ILA Local 375, Mr. Roland Tremblay, ConciliationCommissioner, Saint-Jean,' 31 March 1978. 36 Author's interview with Adrien Tremblay, 7 Nov. 1979. 37 'In the Matter of the CLC.' 38 Ibid. 39 'Montreal stevedores reject memorandum,' Montreal Gazette, 18 April 1978. 40 'Shippers reluctant to sue Montreal's port,' Montreal Gazette, 18 April 1978. 41 'Employers expected to withdraw longshoremen's job security,' Globe and Mail, 27 April 1978. 42 Telegram, A.E. Masters to Marcel Lagace, 22 April 1978. 43 Memorandum, 'Dispute between Maritime Employers Association, Port of Montreal, and International Longshoreman's Association, Local 375,' W.P. Kelly to Labour Minister John Munro, i May 1975. 44 Ibid. 45 'Longshoremen favour three-year contract,' Montreal Gazette, i May 1978; 'Memorandum/ Kelly to Munro, i May 1975. 46 Marcel Jette to Klaus Glusing, 20, 27 Sept. 1978. 47 MEA, General Meeting Minutes, 28 March 1979. Conclusion 1 MEA, General Meeting Minutes, 25 Sept. 1979. 2 'The lure of the waterfront/ Montreal Gazette, 15 Sept. 1979. 3 'Montreal port employers' loan turns into embarrassing jackpot/ Globe and Mail, 5 Dec. 1981. 4 MEA Annual Report, 1987. 5 MEA Annual Report, 1988.

Notes to pages 275-83 315 6 Ibid. 7 Bryan Mackasey to the author, 7 May 2002. 8 'Les debardeurs rejettent une entente de principe/ La Presse, 12 Jan. 1994. 9 Ibid. 10 Judge Alan B. Gold, 'The Report of the Board of Conciliation and Investigation in the Matter of the Shipping Federation and the International Longshoremen's Association Locals 375,1552, and 1657, Montreal; Local 1846, Trois-Rivieres; Locals 1605 and 1739, Quebec City/ (draft) report, April 1969. 11 'An Address by William P. Kelly, Assistant Deputy Minister, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Labour Canada, at the Port of Montreal Day, Monday, June 4, !979-' 12 Ibid. 13 Tony Tiberi's interviews with longshoremen, 10 July 1980, conducted at the author's request. 14 'The decline and maul of the Montreal waterfront,' Montreal Gazette, 3 April 1975. 15 Author's interview with Adrien Tremblay, 7 Nov. 1979. 16 Tony Tiberi's interviews with longshoremen.

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Index

Air Canada, 42, 43 Albert G. Baker (stevedoring firm), 171 Allmand, Warren, 203 Aluminum Company of Canada, 66 American Federation of Labor (AFL), 5, 27 Angus, David, 70,125,154 Angus, Mel, 103 Anti-Inflation Board (AIB), 266 Asselin, Paul, 29-30, 289^0; and 1963 negotiations, 21; and 1965 grain handlers' strike, 24; and 1965 walkout, 24; and 1966 strike, 33, 37 Axworthy, Lloyd, 276

Baker, William, 93, 96, 99,102,129 Banks, Hal, 33, 95,153 Beaudet, Guy, 145,163,188, 217-18, 221-2 Beaudoin, Theo, 196 BeckLike, M., 68 Belanger, Jacques, 174,197, 203 Belle, Henry, 103-4,115' 123< 1 53- 1 5%> 167-8,171, 297n6 Bellemare, Diane, 228 Benjamin, Les, 243-4 Benoit, Hubert, 151,153,159,165,168, 169-70

Beshwaty, Nick, 175, 217 Bibeau, Donat, 17 Bill 19,195 Bill C-59 (St Lawrence Ports Operations Act, 1975), 243, 246-8, 250-2, 254, 256-9, 3ion7 Bill C-125 (St Lawrence Ports Working Conditions Act), 49, 50, 53, 58,64-6, 85. See also Nicholson, J.R.; Picard commission Bill C-230 (St Lawrence Ports Operations Act), 206, 209-10 Bolger, Pat, 27, 37, 44, 49,172-3, 29^1184 Booth, H.L., 264 Boudreau, Femand, 246 Bourassa, Robert, 65 Brisset, Jean, 20 British Columbia Maritime Employers Association, 20,103 Brown, Bill, 103,115,150,165,168,172-3, 249,253, 272, 297n6; and Aurele Lelievre affair, 17-19 Brown, Peter, 196 Brown and Ryan (stevedoring contractor) 17, 90,114,124,150,168,172,196; and Aurele Lelievre affair, 17-19 buy-outs: March 1973 offer, 213-16; May

318

Index

1973 agreement, 218-20, 279; May 1974 agreement, 225, 227,279; 1980 and 1984 agreements, 274; 1994 agreement, 276 Cadieux, Pierre, 274 Cadotte, Arthur, 216 Caim Thompson Line, 29 Camu, Pierre, 165 Canada Fair Employment Practices Act, 286n2i Canada Industrial Relations Board, 276 Canada Labour Code, 11, 96,102,169,183, 201, 206, 230, 248,250, 256-7, 267, 286n2i Canada Labour Relations Board, 112,147, 265 Canada Labour (Safety) Code, 286n2i Canada Labour Standards Code, 102 Canada Ports Corporation, 286n4 Canadian Exporters Association, 93,295n6 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), 184,190-2, 212, 214-16, 220-1 Canadian Importers Association, 93,144, 295n6 Canadian Labour Congress, 5, 45, 256 Canadian Manufacturers' Association, 295n6 Canadian Marine Transportation Administration, 165 Canadian National Railways (CNR), 42 Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), 214 Canadian Pacific (CP) Steamships, 27, 29, 216-18, 264, 296111, 304moo Canadian Truckers Association, 295n6 Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), 275-6 Caouette, Real, 200,204 cargo assessments: 78,94,105-7, in, 11314,137-8,149,152,182,190-2,199, 21024, 232,248-9, 252-3, 259, 260, 262-5,

269, 273,275, 276, 3o6n2i, 3i3ni7. See also Canadian Pacific (CP) Steamships; Cast North America; job-security fund; Maritime Employers Association Carton, Joe, 172-3 Cassidy Report, 300^2 Cast North America, 164,191, 216-17, 24950, 259-60, 264-7, 272 Castiglio, Gino, 128,154,183,185,194 Catholic Sailors' Club, 81,108 Central Records Bureau, 138,143,152, 2878n47, 299n3 Centrale des Syndicats Democratiques, 195 Ceres Stevedoring, 168 Chabot, Jean-Marie, 217 Chambre de Commerce de Montreal, 93, 295n6 Charbonneau, Yvon, 195 Choquette, Jerome, 195 Cliche commission, 65 collective agreements: of 1969,118,134-7, 164, 279, 283, 304n7; of 1972,187-93, 210, 213, 217, 227, 279, 283; of 1975, 255; of 1978, 270-2, 279, 280-1; of 1988, 275; of 1990,275; of1994,276; of 1999,276-7 Colley, Herb, 27, 44,151,158,164, 29^184 Colley Motorships, 27 Conciliation and Arbitration Branch (Department of Labour), 280 conciliation board: of 1961,20; of 1963, 21; of 1966, 35-7; of 1968-9, 90,98. See also Gold, Alan B. Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU), 23-4, 33, 39,45,195,307^4; and 1965 grainhandlers' strike, 24, 27 containerization: advent of, 14-15; advantages of, 15 Coumoyer, Jean, 201 Criminal Code, 206, 247, 251, 252 Crispo, John, xiii

Index Cullen, Henry, 103 Cullen Stevedoring, 171-2 Cunard Steamships, 27, 29 Cutler, Phil, 101: and A.B. Gold's 1968-9 conciliation board, 96; and controversy over creation and mandate of Picard commission, 51-4,60-3,65; and 1963 strike, 22-3; and 1966 strike, 45-6; and 1969 negotiations, 127-8; and 1972 strike, 203; and 1975 strike, 248, 252, 256; and Picard commission, 64-6,6971, 74-80; and Smith commission, 154 Department of Finance, 224 Department of Justice, 247, 250, 257 Department of Labour (federal), 13, 33, 38, 39, 42-3, 74,123,166-7,187-8,193-4, 199,214, 227-8, 249, 254, 280 Department of Transport (DOT), 165-6, 217, 253, 263 Deschenes, Jules: on 1975 strike and Bill C-59, 250-1, 257; on waterfront security, 10,94 Deschenes Report, 300^2 Desgagne, Raymond, 254, 257 Diefenbaker, John, 37, 41, 51, 54-5, 59-60, 250 Douglas, T.C., 41, 42, 56, 58 Drapeau, Jean: and 1963 strike, 22 Drury, C.M., 290^4 Dufour, Yves, 205 Dufresne, Pierre, 68, 71,123,129, 276, 297n6 Duguette, Remi, 20 Eakin, W.R. (Bill), Jr, 20, 25; and 1966 strike, 33-7,43-4, 65; and Picard commission, 73, 81, 83-5; and SFC-IASC differences over control of MEA, 158; and Smith commission, 95

319

Eastern Canada Stevedoring (ECS), 5,74-6, 104,109-10,114,124-5,15°' it>7> I7l> 172 Economic Stevedoring: and 1965 walkout, 24 electric forklifts: controversy over, 185-7, 194-5,197, 303n77 Empire (stevedoring contractor), 114,145, 1/1 Evans, Captain: and 1965 walkout, 24-5 Evans, Peter, 26,44,90,103,106,115,159, 170,172-3, 216-17, 29in84, 297n6 Expo '67, 42 Eyre, John (jack), 110-11,115,125,139,153, 159,168,170,172, 297n6

Favreau, Guy, 120, 290^4 featherbedding, 9, 28,175,183-4, 283. $ee also gangs; productivity; 'spello' Federal Commerce and Navigation (Fednav), 65,116,159,196 Federal Terminals, 193 Female Employees Equal Pay Act, 286n2i Financial Times of Canada, 133 Finlayson, Jacques, 215 foreman (longshoremen): power of, 9; responsibilities of, 8; and unions, 10 Forrestall, Mike, 244-5, 3lon7 Fortier, Yves, 154 Furness Withy, 27, 29, 90,119,124,132,139, 159,163-4, 217' 2871140, 30411100; and 1965 walkout, 24-5 gangs (longshoremen): as issue in management-labour relations, 15,19,28,31, 38-43, 48, 55,66-7, 70-1,74-6,78-9, 82,89,97,114,123,129,132,134,138,165, 174-7,178< 180-4, *88,191-2,195-8, 211, 234; structure and work of, 7,288-9111. See also Masters, Arnold E.; Picard commission

320

Index

Gervais, Patrice, 257 Gleason, T.W., 179; and 1963 strike, 22-3; and 1966 strike, 35,37; and 1975 strike, 238; and Picard commission, 74,83 Globe and Mail, 116,133,204,206,248,273 Glusing, Klaus, 249-50, 259-60, 265 Gold, Alan B., 95,101,120-1,148,156,165, 171-2,175, 210, 225,244, 273, 3o8n8; approach as conciliator/arbitrator, 99102; and expansion of Local 375'$ jurisdiction, 146-9,162; and 1968-9 conciliation, 93,95-8,100,103,112,116, 118, 279, 286n9; and 1969 arbitration award, 138-9; and 1969 collective agreement, 135-6; and 1969 negotiations, 122-4,126~3i, 133; and 1971-2 negotiations, 183-7; and 1972 arbitration, 203-5; and 1972 strike, 198; and 1974-5 conciliation, 228-30; and 1975 report, 230-9,241-3,247-9,252-6,258, 262, 266, 279-80,293n4, 3o8mo, 311I2n5i; on power of Local 375,6; on problems of productivity, 143; reactions to 1975 report, 232-5,245; and relationship with ILA, 101; on root causes of labour unrest in St Lawrence River ports, 279-80; and Smith commission, 158 Gosselin, Robert, 257 Greene, John, 74-6,102,104,109,110-11 Halterm (container terminal firm), 249, 260-1, 276,3ion7 Hamburg-Chicago Lines, 296-7™. Hartt, Stanley, 113-15, 296^1 Harvey, Pierre, 68 Haythorne, George: and controversy over creation and mandate of Picard commission, 56,58,59; and 1966 strike, 33, 39-40,42-3,46,49, 29on54,29in84; and Picard Report, 80-1, 84

Hickling Johnson, 141-3,176 house stevedores, 4,11 Howard, John, 71

IBM, 124 Illing, Roy, 171-3 independent stevedores, 4,11 Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (iRDIA), 11,37,50,286n2i. See also Canada Labour Code International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 144,147,150,299ni3 International Longshoremen's Association (ILA), 5,6,11,13,21, 23-4, 27-8,30,345, 37,40-1,65, 73-4, 78,81,84,90-1,93, 95-6,127,138,144,147,160,163-4,169, 171, 175, 179, 196, 208, 210-11, 213-15,

219, 227, 234, 248, 250, 252, 265, 280, 282,

287-8n47, 288n48, 289^0; and A.B. Gold's 1968-9 conciliation board, 100; and A.B. Gold's 1969 arbitration award, 139; attitude towards technological modernization, 16; and Bill €-230, 206; and buy-outs, 216, 220,225; and controversy over creation and mandate of Picard commission, 51,53-5,61,63, 65; and Gold Report, 1975,262; and job security, 149,233, 235, 258, 262; and 1966 strike, 45; and 1967-8 negotiations, 97; and 1969 collective agreement, 135; and 1969 negotiations, 119, 123,129-31; and 1971-2 negotiations, 181-3, !85» 187-8; and 1972 collective agreement, 190-1; and 1972 strike, 197200,203,205; and 1974-5 negotiations, 228,233-4;anc' X975 collective agreement, 259; and 1975 strike, 236-9,2412,245-9,251-2' 257> and 1976 industrial inquiry, 261-2; and 1978 negotiations, 265-70; ousted by CUPE in Montreal,

Index 321 275; philosophy of, 5-6; and Picard commission, 66,73,75; and relationship with A.B. Gold, 101; and relations with MEA, 225; and relations with SFC, 16, 74,157; and Smith commission, 1534,157. See also Local 375 International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (iLWU), 16,188 Interprovincial Association of Stevedoring Contractors (lASC), 74-5,122,149,159, 165, 297n6; and A.B. Gold's 1968-9 conciliation board, 97; and central pay office as issue in IASC-SFC relations, 104-5,124' 152-3, 157> creation of, 5, and creation of MEA, 103-7,110' 112-16; and financing of MEA, 151-2; and 1966 strike, 35; and Picard commission, 67, 69-70, 80,82-4; and relations with SFC, 67-70, 72, 94-5,102,104-7,109-10,11216,124-5,139.143-153' 157.159' 160-1, 164-8,171; and Smith commission, 95,125,154-5, *58; and struggle with SFC for control of MEA, 105-7,112-16, 159-61,164-8,171. See also Maritime Employers Association Irving, K.C., 276 Jamieson, Don, 162 J.C. Malone (stevedoring firm), 171 Jette, Marcel, 73, 90,103,111,114-15,123, 125,172, 221, 297n6, 30in66 Jewell, Al, 30411100 job security, 81, 89,176-8,184-5; A-BGold's 1975 recommendation of seasonal guarantee, 230-3,238-9, 244, 248, 3ii-i2n5i; implementation of seasonal guarantee, 1975, 258; as issue in management-labour relations, 66, 70-1, 74, 84-5, 92, 94, 97,102,106,1212,124,129,132-5,187-9, 228-30, 234,

249-50, 254, 259, 261, 265-6, 269-70, 299m6, 3i4n3o; MEA's drive for seasonal guarantee of, 225-7, 240, 242; Picard commission's plan for weekly guarantee of, 77- 8,79-81,87-8, 293^; SFC's preference for seasonal guarantee of, 78, 228. See also Picard commission job-security fund, 111,116,134,143,176, 178,182-3,l89, 294n4, 30on3o; and 1969 collective agreement, 279; and 1972 collective agreement, 190-2, 279; and 1975 collective agreement, 255, 259; and 1978 collective agreement, 272; and 1988 collective agreement, 275; problems surrounding, 137-40,142,148-9, 178-81,184,199, 201,204-6, 210-15, 220-6, 240-2, 249-50,252,264; and SFC-IASC relations, 107-8. See also Maritime Employers Association Jodoin, Claude, 45, 53-4, 60 Kellock, Roy L., 214 Kelly, Bill: on history of labour negotiations in Port of Montreal, 270-1, 280-1; and 1969 negotiations, 123,129; and 1972 strike, 205; and 1974-5 negotiations, 1975 Gold Report, and 1975 strike, 239-41, 246, 256-7 Labbe, Yvon, 247 Laberge, Louis, 21,93,95-6,99,102,128-9, 131-2,195, 288n48 Lacas, Rene, 183-4, l88, 205, 253-4 Lafleur, Robert: and 1963 conciliation board, 22-3 Lafrance, Denis, 174,196 Lagace, Georges, 257 Lagace, Marcel, 263, 266, 269 Lamer, Antonio, 154 Lang, Otto, 256

322

Index

Lapalme Trucking, 144,147 Lavigueur, Guy, 224

Le Devoir, 237,248 Lelievre, Aurele, 17-19,287^0,288n55 Lemoine, Adrien, 27,30, 289^0 Lewis, David, 51, 56, 58 Liberal Party, 307^4 Lippe, Rene: as industrial-inquiry commissioner, 1963, 56,64,71,83,94; and 1963 conciliation board, 21-2; and 1963 strike, 22-3; and 1966 industrial-inquiry commission, 37-50, 55,291^4 Local 375 (longshoremen, Montreal), ILA, 6,17,19-23, 27-8, 30,33,35,38,71, 76-7, 93,109,114,127,138,163,175, 189,194-6,216,228-9,242' 245' 2%2> 289^0, 299n26; and Aurele Lelievre affair, 19, 287^0; and buy-outs, 215, 219,225, 229; and controversy over creation and mandate of Picard commission, 60,63; and enlargement of membership in 19803, 274; and expansion of jurisdiction, 137-8,144, 146-50,162,180,191, 228; and job security, 228, 234-5; militancy of, 21; and 1963 negotiations and strike, 22-3; and 1965 grainhandlers' strike, 24; and 1965 strike, 25; and 1966 strike, 36; and 1967-8 negotiations, 90-3; and 1969 negotiations, 123,132; and 1972 strike, 198; and 1974-5 negotiations, 230, 233; and 1975 strike, 238,247-8, 252, 254-6; and 1978 negotiations, 268; and 1986-8 negotiations, 274-5; and Picard Report, 79-86; and reduction of jurisdiction, 231-2. See also International Longshoremen's Association (lLA) Local 1552 (shipliners, Montreal), ILA, 6, 21,80,93,138,192 Local 1605 (checkers, Quebec City), ILA, 6

Local 1657 (checkers, Montreal), ILA, 6, 21, 80,93,138,144,250,299m, 299m6, 3o8n8 Local 1739 (longshoremen, Quebec City), ILA, 6, 3o8n8 Local 1846 (longshoremen, Trois-Rivieres), ILA, 6, 21 longshoremen: and working conditions, 8-9; and gambling, 8 MacEachen, Allan}., 205; and 1963 negotiations, 22; and 1966 negotiations, 29on54 Mackasey, Bryan P., 174, 219,253; on 1988 collective agreement, 275; and 1994 collective agreement, 276; on Port of Montreal today, 277; replaces A.E. Masters as MEA president, 274, 302n43 Mackasey, Bryce: 43, 96,148-9,165,171, 173-4,1^6,202, 206, 245, 274; appointment as labour minister, 119; approach to labour relations, 120-1,157,166; and MEA, 161,167; and 1966 negotiations, 29on54; and 1969 collective agreement, 135-6; and 1969 negotiations, 123,1269,131-3; and 1972 strike, 200; and 1975 strike, 238,241; and Picard commission, 86; and Smith commission, 157-8,160, 166 Manchester Liners, 24,216, 249,259-60 Marchand, Hector, 20; and Aurele Lelievre affair, 17-18 Marchand, Jean, 43,61, 216, 221-2, 241, 253,307n34 Marier, Elphege, 210 Maritime Data Centre, 134,139,143,152-3, 157-8,169,175 Maritime Employers Association (MEA), 65,94,106,120-1,124-5, !34< 141-2,147,

Index 323 151,153,165,170-1,173-7, l&2> i&5' !&9' 193,195, 207-8, 217, 219, 223, 227-30, 234-5, 2 45> 258< 261-4, 273-4' 277- 2802, 2881155,297116, 306021, 31207; and A.B. Gold's 1975 report, 232-3; and Bill 0-59, 31007; and Bill €-230, 206; and buy-outs, 214, 216, 219-21, 225-6; and central pay office as issue in SFC/IACS relations, 152-3,157,169; and difficulties with Cast North America, 259-60, 2645, 267, 272; early years of, 151,159-60; and expansion of Local 375'$ jurisdiction, 147-8; financing of, 151-2,169; and increases in tonnage assessments, 21618, 264; and job security, 137-8,179,181, 190-1,199, 210-13, 221, 224-8, 231, 23940, 242, 252-3, 262, 267-70; and 1969 collective agreement, 135; and 1969 negotiations, 123-4,12^> 129~33; and 1971-2 negotiations, 181-5; and 1972 collective agreement, 190-2; and 1972 strike, 196,197-201, 203-4, 205, 207; and 1974-5 negotiations, 228, 230, 236; and 1975 strike, 237-8, 241-2, 246-51, 254-7; and 1978 collective agreement, 272; and 1978 negotiations, 266-9; and 1986-8 negotiations, 274-5; 9~6o, 2645, 267, 272; and 1998-9 negotiations, 276-7; and negotiations for financial assistance from banks, NHB, and government, 214-16, 218, 220-4, 227> 253, 263, 3131117; origins of, 102-17,137, 139-40,143,163-4, 169;and problems of productivity, 143; and relations with ILA, 225; and relations between SFC and LASC, 102-7,125,139,150,153,157, 159; and secession of Quebec City and Maritime ports, 275-7;and Smith commission, 125,154-5,157-61; and struggle between SFC and LASC for

control of MEA, 105-7,112-16,159-61, 164-5,167-8,171-2 Maritime Employers Association (MEA), Finance Committee, 304moo Martin, John Paul, 74,76, 81-2, 84-5, 903,97,108,110-12,125 Martinique Hotel, 129,130 Massicotte, Jean, 21 Masters, Arnold E. (Arnie), 65,165-7,16970,175,177-8,197, 207, 218, 259, 270, 282; and abolition of gangs, 175-7,184; appointment as president and chief executive officer of MEA, 172-3; and buy-outs, 215-17, 219; and controversy over electric forklifts, 185-7, *94;as executive assistant to Labour Minister Bryce Mackasey, 121; on Jean-Marc StOnge, 208; and job security, 179-80, 212-13, 227; managerial style of, 173-4; and negotiating financial assistance for MEA from banks, the NHB, and government, 214-15, 218-19, 221-4, 227, 252-3, 263; and 1969 collective agreement, 135-6; and 1969 negotiations, 123,126-30,132-3; and 1971-2 negotiations, 175-84,187; and 1972 collective agreement, 188,192; and 1972 strike, 198, 200-1, 203, 207; and 1974-5 negotiations, 233, 235-6; and 1975 strike, 237-8, 240, 242, 245, 248-51, 253-6; and 1978 collective agreement, 272; and 1978 negotiations, 270; and reduction of workforce, 178-9; resignation as MEA president, 274, 302^3; and SFCIASC struggle for control of MEA, 1712; and 'spello,' 176 Matheson, John, 35,289n22 McCaffrey, Fred, 90, 97,115,158-9,170-3, 297n6 McDonald, J.C., 68

324

Index

McGill University, 185 McLean Kennedy Inc., 27,171,302^1 Meams, C.T. (Charlie), 20,289^0 Monks, Ken, 103,115,297n6 Montreal Board of Trade, 93 Montreal Corn Exchange, 43,93 Montreal Gazette, 36,116,153, 228, 242, 247 Montreal Port Administration, 295n6 Montreal Port Authority, 217 Montreal Port Council, 93-4,126,165, 295n6,30on42 Montreal and Saint John Stevedoring, 171, 302n3i Montreal Shipping, 159

Montreal Star, 19 Montreal Stock Exchange, 143 Moorings (stevedoring firm), 191 Morris, T.P.G., 221 Mulroney, Brian, 20,70,79,91,154,171, 173, 260, 296n5i, 297n6; and creation of MEA, 112-13,115; and expansion of Local 375's jurisdiction, 147; and jobsecurity fund, 213; and negotiating financial assistance for MEA from banks, the NHB, and government, 21415,223-4;an^ 1969 negotiations, 121, 123,127,132; and 1971-2 negotiations, 183,187; and 1972 strike, 203-4; and 1975 strike, 249; and Picard commission, 64-5,69,75,84, 86; and SFC-IASC relations, 112-13; and SFC-IASC struggle for control of MEA, 158,167 Munro, John, 213, 227, 270; and 1975 strike, 207,233,236, 240-1, 243-5, 247-50,253, 257; and 1975 strike's aftermath, 259; and 1978 negotiations, 266 National Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freighthandlers,

Express and Station Employees, 144, 299ni2 National Harbours Board (NHB), 4,32-4, 41,86,146,148,162-3,165,188, 264-5, 286n4; and A.B. Gold's 1968-9 conciliation board, 96; and financial assistance to MEA, 214-24,227,253; and 1963 strike, 22; and Smith commission, 154, 156-7; and terminal operations, 119, 144-6,150; and waterfront security, 10, 30on42 National Ports Council, 295n6 negotiations: of 1966,26-48,279; of 19689,90-117,177; of 1969,118-33,13&'> °f 1971-2,161,179-93; of 1974-5,228-42; of 1978, 265-72; of1981 and 1984,274; of 1986-8, 274-5; °f !993~4' 276; of 1998-9,276-7 New Democratic Party (NDP), 41-2, 51, 243-4 Nicholson, J.R., 96,120,206: controversy over creation and mandate of Picard commission, 50-65; and creation of Picard commission, 1966, 50; and 1966 strike, 28, 32-7, 39-41,43-7,49, 29on54, 29in84; and 1967 negotiations, 93; and Picard Report, 82-5; and Smith commission, 94,166. See also Picard commission; Smith commission Norris commission, 95,153. See also Banks, Hal Nowlan, Patrick, 205 O'Connell, Martin: and 1972 negotiations: 186; and 1972 strike, 198,200-7 Ouellet, Andre, 241 Palais de Justice, 251 Paquette, Bob, 174 Paquin, Robert, 196

Index 325 Parent, Luc, 68 Parsons, Derry, 27 Pathy, Alexander C., 173, 297n6; and abolition of gangs, 177; on A.E. Masters, 274; and Bill 0-125, 49; and buy-outs, 216; as chair of MEA Finance Committee, 192, 304:1100; and controversy over creation and mandate of Picard commission, 50,60-2; and creation of MEA, 103,105-6,115; and differences with Hubert Benoit, 170; as director and chairman of MEA, 159,172; on fragmentation of workforce, 143-4, 146; as member of SFC's Labour Committee, 23, 26,90; on need for professional labour-relations staff in SFC, 73,149; on need for unity in management ranks, 68,72,125,143; and negotiating financial assistance for MEA from banks, the NHB, and government, 174,184, 214-15, 221-4, 252-3; and 1966 negotiations, 36-7,44, 46-7, 29in84; and 1967-8 negotiations, 90; and 1969 collective agreement, 136; and 1969 negotiations, 127,132,136; and 1971-2 negotiations, 182-3; and 1972 collective agreement, 193; and 1975 strike, 249; and Picard commission, 67, 71, 75, 80, 86-9; resignation from MEA, 273; and restructuring of MEA, 3i2n7; and SFC-IASC struggle for control of MEA, 151,153,167; and Smith commission, 157; views on labour relations, 26, 34> 75.136 Pathy, Ernest G., xv Pathy, George, xv Pathy, Ladislas, xv Pathy, Laurence (Ladi), xv, 116 Pearson, Lester, 22,119-20; and controversy over creation and mandate of

Picard commission, 1966, 51, 53-4,59, 61; and 1966 strike, 43-5, 273, 29^184 Pelletier, Gerard, 307^4 pension, welfare, vacation benefits: and 1953 collective agreement, 287-8^7 Pepin, Marcel, 195 Pettigrove, Horace, 20-1 Picard, Laurent, 20: as conciliator in 19805, 274-5; an£i management-labour relations, 13; named as head of commission of inquiry, 1966,50, 65. See also Picard commission Picard commission, 76,90,92-4,96-8, 100,102-4,107-10,112,114,118,121,1234,126,153-4, ^7' 17^> 17&> L99' 229' 273' 276, 279, 293n4, 294n23; controversy over creation and mandate, 45-8,4963; proceedings of, 64-89; reactions to report of, 79-86; report of, 75-86, 86-9; results of, 86-9. See also Picard, Laurent Pickersgill, J.W., 36, 291^4 Pigeon, Louis-Philippe, 68 Pinsonneault, Marcel, 90 Place Ville Marie, 215 Poirier, C.E. (Charlie), 169-70,175, 207; and expansion of Local 375'$ jurisdiction, 149; on Jean-Marc St-Onge, 185; and 1963 negotiations, 21-2; and 1966 negotiations, 32-3, 43, 290^4; and 1967-8 negotiations, 91-3; and 1971-2 negotiations, 183-4,186~7; and 1972 collective agreement, 188; and 1972 strike, 197,199, 205; and 1975 mediation, 236, 238, 240; and 1975 strike, 242, 249-50, 253-4 Prevost, Claude: and 1966 conciliation board, 32, 36-7 Price Waterhouse, 212,3o6n3 Privy Council, 290^4

326 Index productivity: problem of, 139,161,165-6, 175-177 Progressive Conservative Party, 202, 243-4, 257 Pronovost, Denis, 73,90,100,110-11,115, 122-3, X74' 197~8,203, 29/n6 Quebec Department of Revenue, 104 Quebec Federation of Labour (QFL), 5, 21, 93,195, 2881148 Quebec Labour Relations Board, 95-6 Quebec Provincial Court, 95 Quebec Superior Court, 205, 247,250, 293113 Quebec Teachers' Corporation (QIC), 195 Quebec Trucking Association (QTA), 148, 163 Queen Elizabeth Hotel, 185 Quigley, Norman, 90, 234-6, 238, 242, 248 Reese-Potter, Norman, 27 Renault, Paul, 20,71; and A.B. Gold's 19689 conciliation board, 96; and 1966 strike, 33, 38, 44, 46, 64 Revenue Canada, 104, 219 roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships, 15 Royal Bank of Canada, 214-15,220-1 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 245, 30on42 Ryan, Claude, 258 Saguenay Shipping, 66,74,90, no, 125, 139,159,168,297m, 3O2n5o, 30411100 Saint John Stevedoring, 124 St Lawrence Seaway Authority, 42-3,119 St-Onge, Jean-Marc, 21,71,76,109,114, 163,170,173,175,177,215, 217,228, 235, 282,289^0; and A.B. Gold's 1968-9 conciliation board, 99,100; and A.E. Masters, 194-5,197, 207, 209; approach

to labour relations, 29, 31,32,66-7,72, 208; as business agent of Local 375, 23, 27,29-30; and buy-outs, 215-16; challenge to power of, 205; and controversy over creation and mandate of Picard commission, 63; and controversy over electric forklifts, 185-7,193-5; early work experience, of, 28-9; elected president of Local 375,71; and expansion of Local 375's jurisdiction, 144, 147-9,172> !8o, 192; fall of, 208-9;an^ job-security fund, 138,140,148,179, 180-2,213; and 1966 negotiations, 30, i; and 1967-8 negotiations, 90-3; and 1969 collective agreement, 134,136; and 1969 negotiations, 121-3,127> 129,130-3; and 1971-2 negotiations, 179-85; and 1972 strike, 195,197,198, 203-5,207; and Picard commission, 73; and Picard Report, 80-1,84, 86-7; positive contribution of, 208; and reduction of workforce, 180; and relations with A.B. Gold, 99,198; and relations with MEA, 225; and relations with SFC, 30, 72, 74; steps down as Local 375 president, 228; views on job security, 84 Scott, Bob, 221-3, 304nioo Seafarers' International Union (SIU), 33-4, 40, 71, 95,153 Sharp, Mitchell, 43 Shippers Council, 93 Shipping Federation of Canada (SFC), 13, 21-3,25-A 33-4- 59' 64,66-7,73,75-6, 78, 82, 90-1,

96, 101-2, 107, 111, Il6, 120,

141, 143, 149, 153, 171, 174, 249, 287-

8n47, 2&9n22, 297*16, 2991126,302^0; and A.B. Gold's 1968-9 conciliation board, 97,100; and Aurele Lelievre affair, 18; and central pay office as issue in SFC-IASC relations, 104-5,124-5,152~

Index 327 3,157,169; and controversy over creation and mandate of Picard commission, 47-8, 53, 55-6, 58-9,60-3; creation of, 4; and creation of MEA, 103-7, no, 112-16,169; and establishment of centralized dispatch system, 108-9;anon dock board, 156; on gambling among longshoremen, 8; on IASC control of MEA, 155,167; and management-labour relations, 12-13; and the MEA, 157-60,166; and 1967-8 negotiations, 94-5; on terminal operations, 156,162; on waterfront security, 10; on weakness of management, 154-5 Social Credit Party, 200, 240, 244 'spello,' 9,76,171,176,183 Stanfield, Robert, 200-1 Starr, Michael, 59 Stefan Baton/, 245-6 Stenason, W.J.. 216, 218 Strang, Ed, 20,176, 302^0

328

Index

strikes and walkouts: of 1963,21-2; of 1965,24-5; of 1966,32-48; of 1972,194209,227; of1975,236-57 Supreme Court of Canada, 68,154, 214; and Aurele Lelievre affair, 19

industrial inquiry, 259,261-3, 266; and 1978 conciliation, 266-70 Trudeau, Pierre Elliott, 119,237-9,256, 3071134 Turner, John, 43,224

tailgating system, 162-3,174. See also terminal operations Task Terminals, 164,191,260,264,267, 30411100 Taylor, Del, 217-23,227 Taylor, Leo, 242,250 Technological Displacement Fund (TDF), 131-2,134,138,140,143,148,179,191-2, 215,30on3O technological modernization: beginnings of, 14; and Picard commission, 89 terminal operations, 15,143-6,150,162, 167,174. See also National Harbours Board Thorn, Jim, 106,112-13,115,158-9,170, 172-3,297n6 Tremblay, Adrien, 109,194, 228-9, 237> 242,245-6, 251,253-7,259' 263 Tremblay, Gerard, 30,33,37,41,51,63,71, 90-3 Tremblay, Jean-Baptiste, 196 Tremblay, Roland: and 1975-6 arbitration/

Unemployment Insurance Commission, 219 Valade, Georges, 202 Van der Veen, Maurice, 216,30411100 Villeneuve, Emery: and 1965 walkout, 24-5 Vreeken, Gert, 193 Wace, Steve, 174, 302^3 walking bosses (longshoremen): responsibilities of, 8; and unions, 10 waterfront security, 10 Whelan, Eugene, 239,241 Wilson, Bernard, 120: and 1966 strike, 33, 36,43; and 1972 strike, 201,205 Winnipeg Grain Exchange, 93 Wolfe, Norman, 82,90,92,108,115,140, 142-3,153,159,172-3, 207,223,297n6 Wolfe Stevedores, 90,140,145,171-2 Woodall, Mike, 90,221,304moo

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Waterfront Blues: Labour Strife at the Port of Montreal 1960-1978 was set in 10 pt. Carrier Book on a 12 pt. leading. Rob McDonald designed this typeface in 2000. It is based upon Canada's first typeface, Carrier, created by Carl Dair in 1966.