Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Law 0814726437, 9780814726433

Citation preview

Was Blind, But Now I See

Critical America GENERAL EDITORS : R I C H A R D D E L G A D O AN D JEA N STEFANCI C White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race IAN F . HANE Y LOPE Z

Cultivating Intelligence: Power, Law, and the Politics of Teaching LOUISE HARMO N AN D DEBORA H W . POS T

Privilege Revealed: How Invisible Preference Undermines America STEPHANIE M . WILDMA N WITH MARGALYNN E ARMSTRONG , ADRIENN E D . DAVIS , AND TRIN A GRILL O

Does the Law Morally Bind the Poor? or What Good's the Constitution When You Can't Afford a Loaf of Bread? R. GEORG E WRIGH T

Hybrid: Bisexuals, Multiracials, and Other Misfits under American Law RUTH COLKE R

Critical Race Feminism: A Reader EDITED B Y ADRIE N KATHERIN E WIN G

Immigrants Out! The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse United States

in the

EDITED B Y JUA N F . PERE A

Taxing America

EDITED B Y KARE N B . BROW N AN D MAR Y LOUIS E FELLOW S

Notes of a Racial Caste Baby: Color Blindness and the End of Affirmative Action BRYAN K . FAI R

Please Don't Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation of Church and State STEPHEN M . FELDMA N

To Be an American: Cultural Pluralism and the Rhetoric of Assimilation BILL ON G HIN G

Negrophobia and Reasonable Racism: The Hidden Costs of Being Black in America JODY DAVI D ARMOU R

Black and Brown in America: The Case for Cooperation BILL PIAT T

Black Rage Confronts the Law PAUL HARRI S

Selling Words: Free Speech in a Commercial Culture R. GEORG E WRIGH T

The Color of Crime: Racial Hoaxes, White Fear, Black Protectionism, Police Harassment, and Other Macroaggressions KATHERYN K . RUSSEL L

The Smart Culture: Society, Intelligence, and Law ROBERT L . HAYMAN , JR .

Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Law BARBARA J . FLAG G

Was Blind, But Now I See White Rac e Consciousnes s & th e La w

BARBARA J . FLAG G

N E W YOR K U N I V E R S I T Y PRES New York and London

S

NEW Y O R K U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S New Yor k an d Londo n

S

Copyright © 199 8 b y Ne w Yor k Universit y All right s reserve d Library o f Congres s Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Dat a Flagg, Barbar a J. , 1947 Was blind , bu t no w I se e : white rac e consciousnes s an d th e la w / Barbara J . Flagg . p. cm . Includes index . ISBN 0-8147-2643- 7 (clot h : alk. paper ) 1. Afro-Americans—Lega l status , laws , etc . 2 . Rac e discrimination—Law an d legislation—Unite d States . 3 . Unite d States—Race relations . I . Title . KF4757.F59 199 8 346.7301'3—dc21 97-2116 2 CIP New Yor k Universit y Pres s book s ar e printe d o n acid-fre e paper , and thei r bindin g material s ar e chose n fo r strengt h an d durability . Manufactured i n th e Unite d State s o f Americ a 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

1

To my mentors Ruth Bade r Ginsbur g Herma Hil l Ka y

Amazing grace! How sweet the sound, That saved a wretch like mel I once was lost, but now am found, Was blind, but now I see, —John Newton

John Newto n (1725-1807 ) wa s captai n o f a slav e shi p fro m 1750 t o 1754 , bu t a religiou s conversio n graduall y le d hi m to repudiat e hi s forme r occupatio n an d eventuall y t o writ e an antislaver y pamphle t title d "Thought s upo n th e Africa n Slave Trade. " Newton' s accoun t o f th e realitie s o f th e slav e trade wa s perhap s th e mos t detaile d the n i n circulation . I t contributed greatl y t o th e succes s o f th e Englis h Abolitionis t movement.

Contents

Acknowledgments / xiii 1. Introduction/ 1 2. A n Overvie w o f Rac e an d Racis m / 1 9 3. Th e Constitutiona l Requiremen t o f Discriminator y Intent / 39 4. Constitutiona l Qualm s / 66 5. Disparat e Impac t unde r Titl e VII / 8 3 6. Statutor y Interpretation / 11 7 7. Notes o n Doctrina l Refor m / 12 9 Notes / 14 9 Index/ 18 3 About th e Autho r / 18 9

XI

Acknowledgments

Many peopl e hav e contribute d t o thi s project , a t variou s stages, throug h inspiration , encouragement , thoughtfu l dis cussion o f m y idea s an d theories , an d carefu l readin g o f numerous drafts. I would like to thank al l of them, especially Fran Ansley, Susan Appleton, Kate Bartlett, Martha Chamal las, Ruth Colker , Neil Gotanda , Ia n Haney Lopez , Margare t Johnson, Dan Keating, Pauline Kim, Richard Lazarus , Helan Page, Rober t Post , Pete r Wiedenbeck , an d Stephani e Wild man. M y thanks a s well to th e student s i n my constitutiona l law an d critica l jurisprudenc e courses , mos t particularl y members o f m y Critica l Rac e Theor y semina r i n 1992 . Th e social scienc e material herei n benefite d greatl y fro m th e very able research assistance of Loretta Haggard . There are two individuals without whom this book simpl y would no t hav e bee n possible . M y frien d an d colleagu e Ka thy Goldwasse r helpe d m e i n al l o f th e way s mentione d above; her insightfu l commentar y o n endless drafts an d revisions kep t m e steadil y o n cours e a s thi s projec t unfolded . Finally, an d certainl y no t least , I coul d no t hav e complete d any part of this work without the tireless encouragement an d support, conversatio n an d commentar y o f m y lif e partne r Dayna Deck . **

*

This boo k draw s fro m severa l previousl y publishe d articles . See Barbar a J . Flagg , "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Xlll

Acknowledgments I xiv

Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 9 1 Mich. L. Rev. 953 (1993); Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 8 2 Calif. L . Rev . 93 5 (1994) ; Barbar a J . Flagg , Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 10 4 Yal e L.J . 200 9 (1995) ; Barbar a J . Flagg , Changing the Rules: Some Preliminary Thoughts on Doctrinal Reform, Indeterminacy, and Whiteness, 1 1 Berkele y Women's L.J. 250(1996).

[1] Introduction

T

HE MOST STRIKING characteristic of whites' consciousness o f whitenes s i s tha t mos t o f th e tim e w e don' t have any . I call thi s th e transparency phenomenon: th e ten dency o f whites not to think abou t whiteness. Instead, whit e people externalize race. For most whites, most of the time, to think o r spea k abou t rac e i s to thin k o r spea k abou t peopl e of color , o r perhaps , a t times , to reflec t o n onesel f (o r othe r whites) i n relatio n t o peopl e o f color . Bu t w e ten d no t t o think o f ourselve s or ou r racia l cohort a s racially distinctive . Whites' "consciousness " o f whitenes s i s predominantl y unconsciousness o f whiteness . W e perceiv e an d interac t wit h other white s a s individual s wh o hav e n o significan t racia l characteristics. In the same vein, the white person i s unlikely to se e o r describ e himsel f i n racia l terms , perhap s i n par t because his white peers do not regard hi m as racially distinctive. Whiteness i s a transparent qualit y whe n whites interac t with white s i n th e absenc e o f peopl e o f color . Whitenes s attains opacity , become s apparen t t o th e whit e mind , onl y 1

Introduction 12

in relatio n to , an d i n contras t with , th e "color " o f non whites. This i s no t t o sa y tha t whit e peopl e ar e obliviou s t o th e race of other whites. 1 Race is undeniably a powerful determi nant o f socia l statu s an d s o is always noticed , i n a way tha t eye color, fo r example , may no t be . However, whites 5 socia l dominance allow s us to relegate ou r ow n racial specificit y t o the real m o f th e subconscious . Whiteness i s the racial norm . In this culture the black person, not the white, is the one who is different. 2 Th e black , no t th e white , i s racially distinctive . Once a n individua l i s identifie d a s white , hi s distinctivel y racial characteristic s nee d n o longe r b e conceptualize d i n racial terms ; h e become s effectivel y raceles s i n th e eye s o f other whites . Whiteness i s alway s a salien t persona l charac teristic, bu t onc e identified , i t fade s almos t instantaneousl y from whit e consciousness into transparency . The bes t "evidence " fo r th e pervasiveness o f the transpar ency phenomenon wil l be the white reader's own experience : Critically assessing our habitual way s of thinking abou t our selves an d abou t othe r whit e peopl e shoul d brin g transpar ency int o ful l view. 3 Th e question s tha t follo w ma y provid e some direction fo r th e reader's reflections. I n what situation s do yo u describ e yoursel f a s white ? Woul d yo u b e likel y t o include "white " o n a lis t o f thre e adjective s tha t describ e you? 4 D o yo u thin k abou t you r rac e a s a facto r i n th e wa y other white s trea t you ? Fo r example , thin k abou t th e las t time som e whit e cler k o r salesperso n treate d yo u deferen tially, or the last time the first taxi to come along stopped fo r you. Di d yo u think , "Tha t wouldn' t hav e happene d i f I weren't white"? Are you conscious of yourself a s white when

Introduction 13

you find yoursel f i n a roo m occupie d onl y b y white people ? What i f there ar e people o f colo r present ? Wha t i f the roo m is mostly nonwhite ? Do yo u attribut e you r successe s o r failure s i n lif e t o you r whiteness? D o yo u reflec t o n th e ways your educationa l an d occupational opportunitie s hav e bee n enhance d b y you r whiteness? Wha t abou t th e lif e course s o f others ? I n you r experience, a t th e tim e o f Justic e Souter' s nomination , ho w much attentio n di d hi s rac e receiv e i n conversation s amon g whites abou t hi s abilitie s an d prospect s fo r confirmation ? Did yo u o r you r whit e acquaintance s speculat e o n th e way s his whiteness migh t hav e contributed t o hi s success, how hi s race may have affected hi s character an d personality, o r ho w his whiteness might predispose hi m to a racially skewe d per spective on legal issues? If you r love r o r spous e i s white , ho w frequentl y d o yo u reflect o n tha t fact ? D o yo u thin k o f you r whit e friend s a s your whit e friends , othe r tha n i n contras t wit h you r friend s who ar e not white? D o you try to understan d th e ways your shared whitenes s affect s th e interaction s between yoursel f and you r whit e partner , friends , an d acquaintances ? Fo r ex ample, perhap s yo u hav e becom e awar e o f th e absenc e o f people of color on some occasion. Did you move beyond tha t moment o f recognitio n t o conside r ho w th e group's unifor m whiteness affecte d it s interactions , agenda , process , o r deci sions? D o yo u inquir e abou t th e way s whit e person s yo u know hav e deal t wit h th e fact , an d privilege , o f thei r white ness? Imagine that I am describing to you a third individual who is not known to you. I say, for example , "She' s good looking,

Introduction 14

but rather quiet, " o r "He' s tall, dark, an d handsome." If I do not specif y th e rac e o f th e perso n s o described , i s i t no t culturally appropriate , an d expected , fo r yo u t o assum e sh e or he is white?5 i'r *

*

Transparency casts doubt on the concept of race-neutral decisionmaking. Th e criteri a upo n whic h whit e decisionmaker s rely whe n makin g a decisio n ma y b e a s vulnerabl e t o th e transparency phenomeno n a s i s th e rac e o f whit e peopl e itself. A t a minimum , transparenc y counsel s tha t w e no t accept seemingl y neutra l criteri a o f decisio n a t fac e value . Most white s liv e an d wor k i n setting s tha t ar e wholl y o r predominantly white . Thu s white s rel y o n primaril y whit e referents i n formulatin g th e norm s an d expectation s tha t become th e criteri a use d b y whit e decisionmakers . Give n whites' tendenc y t o b e unawar e o f whiteness , it' s likel y tha t white decisionmakers mistakenly identify a s race-neutral per sonal characteristics , traits , an d behavior s tha t ar e i n fac t closely associate d wit h whiteness . Th e way s i n whic h trans parency migh t infec t whit e decisionmakin g ar e man y an d varied. Consider the following story . A predominantly whit e Nominatin g Committe e i s considering the candidacy of Delores, a black woman, for a seat on the majorit y whit e Boar d o f Director s o f a nationa l publi c interest organization. Delores is the sole proprietor o f a small business tha t supplie s technica l compute r service s t o othe r businesses. Sh e founde d th e compan y eleve n year s ago ; i t now grosse s ove r a millio n dollar s annuall y an d employ s seven people in addition t o the owner. Delores ' resume indi-

Introduction 15

cates that she dropped ou t of high school at sixteen. She later obtained a G.E.D . bu t di d no t atten d college . Sh e was abl e to ope n he r busines s i n par t becaus e o f a stat e progra m de signed t o encourag e th e formatio n o f minorit y busines s enterprises. Delores' resum e als o reveal s man y year s o f participatio n at th e loca l an d stat e level s i n a variet y o f civi c an d publi c interest organizations, including two that focus o n issues that are o f centra l concer n fo r th e nationa l organizatio n tha t i s now considerin g her . I n fact , sh e cam e t o th e Committee' s attention because she is considered a leader on those issues in her state. During Delores ' intervie w wit h th e Nominatin g Commit tee, severa l whit e member s questio n he r closel y abou t th e operation o f her business . They see k detaile d financia l infor mation tha t sh e become s increasingl y reluctan t t o provide . Finally, the questioning turns to her educational background . "Why," on e whit e committe e membe r inquires , "didn' t yo u go to college later, when you were financially able to do so?" "Will yo u b e comfortabl e o n a Boar d wher e everyon e els e has at least a college degree?" another asks . Delores, perhaps somewhat defensively , respond s tha t sh e i s perfectl y abl e t o hold he r ow n wit h colleg e graduates ; sh e deal s wit h the m every day in her line of work. In any event, she says, she does not se e that he r pas t educationa l histor y i s as relevant t o th e position fo r whic h sh e i s bein g considere d a s i s he r presen t ability to analyz e th e issue s confronting th e nationa l organi zation. Why don't the y ask her hypothetical polic y question s of th e sor t th e Boar d regularl y addresse s i f the y wan t t o se e what sh e can do?

Introduction 16

The interview concludes on a tense note. After som e deliberation, th e Committe e forward s Delores ' nam e t o th e ful l Board, bu t wit h stron g reservations . "W e foun d he r t o b e quite hostile, " th e Committe e reports . "Sh e ha s a soli d his tory o f workin g o n ou r issue , bu t sh e migh t b e a disruptiv e presence at Board meetings." At leas t thre e element s o f th e decisionmakin g proces s i n this stor y ma y hav e bee n influence d b y th e transparenc y phenomenon. W e ca n examin e th e first o f thes e onl y i f w e assume tha t th e whit e committe e member s woul d questio n every Boar d candidat e wh o operate s a smal l busines s i n ex actly th e sam e manne r the y querie d Delores . (I f the y hav e subjected he r t o mor e intens e inquiry , perhap s reflectin g un conscious skepticis m concernin g a blac k woman' s abilit y t o establish an d manag e a successful , highl y technica l smal l business, the situation ough t to be analyzed a s an example of stereotyping rathe r tha n transparency). 6 Assumin g n o suc h racial (or , for tha t matter , gender) stereotypin g was at work , so tha t th e questionin g wa s i n fac t unifor m fo r blac k an d white candidates, it still does not follow that those candidates would interpret the inquiries in the same way. It's predictable that a blac k interviewe e migh t tak e exceptio n t o suc h a lin e of questioning becaus e of the common white image of blacks as not ver y intelligent ; give n tha t th e candidat e ha s no prio r knowledge o f he r whit e interviewers , sh e migh t reasonabl y wonder whethe r th e question s aris e from tha t image , even if they i n fac t d o not . A white candidate , o n th e othe r hand , would com e t o th e intervie w withou t an y histor y o f bein g viewed in that way , and s o should b e expected t o respond t o the lin e o f questionin g wit h greate r equanimity . Transpar -

Introduction 1 7

ency—here, th e unconsciou s assumptio n tha t al l interview ees will, or should, respond t o a given line of questioning th e way a white candidate (o r the interviewers themselves) woul d respond—may accoun t for the white questioners' inability to anticipate th e mor e subtl e implication s thei r querie s migh t have for th e nonwhite interviewee . Second, th e whit e committe e member s ma y b e imposin g white educationa l norm s a s well . Anyon e smar t enoug h t o attend colleg e surely would d o so , they might assume . How ever, white s atten d colleg e a t a higher rat e tha n blacks . The committee members ' assumptio n take s int o accoun t neithe r the realitie s o f th e inne r cit y school s thi s woma n attended , nor th e persona l an d cultura l influence s tha t cause d he r t o decide t o dro p ou t o f hig h school , no r th e way s th e cost benefit analysi s o f a college education migh t appea r differen t to a blac k perso n tha n t o a whit e person . Delores ' busines s success suggest s tha t sh e mad e a rationa l an d effectiv e deci sion t o develo p he r busines s rathe r tha n divid e he r energie s between th e busines s an d school . Transparenc y ma y blin d the white committee member s to the whiteness o f the educa tional norm s the y an d thei r organizatio n appea r t o tak e fo r granted. The mos t troublin g an d perhap s leas t obviousl y race-spe cific aspec t o f the stor y i s the ultimat e assessmen t o f Delore s as "hostile. " Thi s seemingl y neutra l adjectiv e i s in fac t race specific in this context insofar a s it rests on norms and expectations tha t ar e themselve s race-specific . T o characterize thi s candidate's response s a s hostile i s to judg e the m inappropri ate. Suc h a judgmen t presuppose s a n unstate d nor m o f ap propriate behavio r i n tha t setting , on e tha t reflect s whit e

Introduction 18

experience, priorities , an d lif e strategies . Th e committe e members' expectation s di d no t tak e int o accoun t som e o f th e realities o f blac k lif e i n th e Unite d State s tha t for m par t of th e contex t i n whic h th e blac k candidat e operates . Th e transparency o f whit e experienc e an d th e norm s tha t flo w from i t permitte d th e Nominatin g Committe e t o transmut e the appropriat e response s o f a blac k candidat e int o a seem ingly neutra l assessmen t o f "hostility. " **

*

Transparently whit e decisionmakin g i s on e for m o f institu tional racism , define d a s an y institutiona l practic e tha t sys tematically create s o r perpetuate s racia l advantag e o r disad vantage. Thi s conceptio n o f racis m differ s fro m one s tha t revolve aroun d notion s o f individua l prejudic e an d hostility , and i n fac t carrie s n o requiremen t tha t th e individual s wh o created th e institutio n i n questio n o r wh o participat e i n i t harbor an y consciou s dislik e of , o r animu s toward , non whites. I t i s th e thesi s o f thi s boo k tha t eve n seemingl y "be nign" participatio n i n raciall y unjus t institution s full y impli cates individual s i n th e maintenanc e o f whit e supremacy . Those wh o wis h t o clai m a nonracis t whit e identit y mus t find activ e way s o f dismantlin g existin g system s o f racia l privilege. One availabl e strateg y i s t o challeng e insistentl y ever y ex ample o f transparenc y i n whit e decisionmaking . W e ca n work t o revea l th e unacknowledge d whitenes s o f faciall y neutral criteri a o f decision , an d w e ca n adop t strategie s tha t counteract th e influenc e o f unrecognize d whit e norms . Thes e approaches permi t whit e decisionmaker s t o incorporat e plu -

Introduction 19

raiist 7 mean s o f achievin g ou r otherwis e nonracis t aims , an d thus t o contribute t o th e racial redistribution o f socia l power . Law migh t assis t i n thi s endeavor , bu t a t presen t rac e discrimination la w i s unresponsiv e t o th e transparenc y phe nomenon. Existin g law s embod y to o narro w a concep t o f race discriminatio n t o includ e nonobviou s form s o f institu tional racism. 8 Consequently , rac e discriminatio n la w doe s not currentl y provid e an y lega l remedie s fo r discriminatio n that take s th e for m o f transparentl y whit e decisionmaking . In effect , today' s rac e discriminatio n la w i s itsel f a for m o f institutional racism : B y failin g t o addres s transparency , i t contributes t o th e maintenanc e o f a raciall y unjus t statu s quo. This boo k explore s th e contributio n a transforme d rac e discrimination la w migh t mak e t o rectifyin g th e effect s o f th e transparency phenomenon . I procee d o n th e premis e tha t recognizing, analyzing , an d devisin g response s t o transpar ently whit e decisionmakin g i n everyda y setting s an d i n la w is a synergisti c enterprise . Ou r understandin g o f th e way s transparency play s itsel f ou t i n lif e ca n infor m ou r critiqu e o f antidiscrimination law , and , conversely , th e projec t o f as sessing th e theoretica l foundation , symboli c import , an d practical effect s o f antidiscriminatio n la w ca n serv e a s a con text i n which t o reexamin e wh o we , a s whit e people , ar e an d want t o be . Accordingly , thi s boo k criticall y analyze s tw o central example s o f rac e discriminatio n la w with th e ultimat e objective o f explorin g th e implication s o f transparency-con scious doctrina l reform , reciprocally , fo r la w an d fo r whit e race consciousnes s itself . The antidiscriminatio n provision s unde r examinatio n her e

Introduction 110

are the Equa l Protectio n Claus e o f th e United State s Consti tution, which requires government t o extend "th e equal protection o f th e laws " withou t regar d t o race , and Titl e VII of the Civi l Rights Act of 1964 , which proscribes rac e discrimination i n employment. Th e specifi c focu s o f the analysi s will be the Equal Protection an d Title VII rules governing the use of seemingl y neutra l criteri a o f decisio n that , eve n whe n applied evenhandedly , hav e raciall y skewe d effects ; thes e rules ar e single d ou t becaus e transparenc y i s a phenomeno n that manifests itsel f in facially neutral forms. In Equal Protection jurisprudenc e ther e i s a requiremen t o f discriminator y intent: a judicially create d rul e that governmen t bear s a bur den of justification wit h regard to a practice carrying raciall y disparate effect s onl y when i t can b e shown that th e practic e was adopte d wit h discriminator y intent . A s is perhaps obvi ous, th e requiremen t o f discriminator y inten t operate s a s a n absolute barrie r t o recognitio n o f unconsciou s discrimina tion, an d s o fail s t o provid e an y foothol d fo r attackin g th e transparency phenomenon . On e migh t wonder , then , whether jettisonin g th e inten t requiremen t woul d produc e more satisfactor y results . Titl e VI I provide s a n exampl e o f that approach, as it places a requirement of justification upo n an employer solely upon proof o f disparate effects. However , careful examinatio n reveal s that Title VII too falls shor t wit h respect to transparently white decisionmaking . Chapter 2 provide s a foundatio n fo r th e analysi s o f ex isting Equal Protection and Title VII rules, and for the formu lation o f mor e satisfactor y lega l doctrines , b y sketchin g th e general contours o f the universe o f racism's various manifes tations an d locatin g transparentl y whit e decisionmakin g o n

Introduction 111

that conceptua l map . It then surveys possible antiracist strat egies, again wit h particula r emphasi s o n antiracis t response s to transparently white decisionmaking. This chapter explain s how transparently whit e decisionmakin g migh t b e countered by adoptin g a thoroughgoin g skepticis m regardin g th e neu trality o f seemingl y race-neutral decisio n criteria . Suc h skepticism amount s t o a presumptio n against the rac e neutralit y of apparentl y neutra l criteri a o f decision , an d thu s provide s an openin g fo r th e formulatio n o f criteri a mor e capabl e o f effecting distributiv e racia l justice . The skeptica l stanc e pro vides a benchmark fo r th e critique of antidiscrimination law . Chapter 3 scrutinize s th e constitutiona l requiremen t o f discriminatory inten t an d conclude s tha t i t doe s not provid e any poin t o f contac t fo r grapplin g wit h th e transparenc y phenomenon i n decisionmaking. It then proposes a n alterna tive approac h t o disparat e effect s case s tha t woul d incorpo rate th e thoroughgoin g skepticis m jus t described : Rac e dis crimination la w ough t t o incorporat e a presumptio n tha t ostensibly race-neutra l criteri a o f decisio n ar e i n fac t race specific, an d thu s ough t t o provid e a legal remedy fo r trans parently white decisionmaking, in the absence of a persuasive justification fo r th e challenged practice . Clearly, the concept s o f transparentl y whit e decisionmak ing, institutiona l racism , an d deliberat e skepticis m tha t in form thi s analysi s ar e no t universall y share d i n American culture. Constitutional interpretatio n alway s is a complicated subject, an d it is especially so with respect to contested socia l values. Many legal commentators hold that it is improper fo r judges t o superimpos e thei r ow n visio n o f desirabl e socia l policy o n th e constitutiona l text ; accordingly , i n thei r view ,

Introduction 112

constitutional interpretatio n i s performe d bes t whe n i t i s a n exercise i n judicia l restraint . Thi s contentio n i s the subjec t o f chapter 4 . Chapter 5 explore s th e lega l regim e o f Titl e VII , i n whic h seemingly neutra l criteri a o f decisio n tha t produc e raciall y disparate effect s ar e subjec t t o justificatio n eve n withou t proof o f discriminator y intent , an d conclude s tha t eve n unde r this approac h ther e ar e substantia l barrier s t o recognitio n of , and lega l redres s for , transparentl y whit e decisionmaking . This chapte r set s fort h tw o alternativ e proposals , eithe r o f which promise s t o b e mor e effectiv e i n combattin g transpar ency tha n th e curren t rules . Thes e proposal s i n tur n giv e ris e to anothe r se t o f concerns : Even i f it is desirable fo r individu als t o acknowledg e transparenc y b y adoptin g a skeptica l stance regardin g thei r ow n decisionmakin g (an d fo r govern ment voluntaril y t o d o th e same) , it may b e inappropriate fo r government t o requir e individua l employer s t o d o so . Thes e concerns wil l b e addressed i n the cours e o f chapte r 6' s discus sion o f th e foundatio n an d scop e o f Titl e VII . The boo k conclude s wit h a discussion , i n chapte r 7 , o f several jurisprudentia l an d large r implication s o f th e trans parency-conscious proposal s se t fort h i n chapter s 3 throug h 6. First, I describe th e ways i n which thes e modifie d doctrine s reflect a discours e o f responsibilit y rathe r tha n a discours e o f blame; I argu e tha t th e forme r approac h i s mor e productiv e of th e goa l o f racia l remediatio n tha n th e curren t one , whic h carries connotation s o f criminalit y an d ofte n promote s n o more tha n whit e guil t an d paralysi s (and , a t times , anger) . Second, I addres s th e proble m o f lega l indeterminacy — that is , th e thesi s tha t doctrin e alon e doe s no t decid e lega l

Introduction 113

outcomes. If legal doctrine does not genuinely constrain lega l decisionmakers, th e reform s propose d her e canno t hav e an y practical effect, an d thus the project o f doctrinal reform i s an empty one . I respon d t o lega l indeterminac y b y conceivin g doctrine a s a sor t o f promise . A promiso r bind s hersel f t o behave differently tha n would have been the case had she not promised, eve n wit h respec t t o gratuitou s an d vagu e prom ises. At a minimum, legal doctrine can be analogized to vague promises, and perhaps to gratuitous promise s as well, and s o constrains in the same way that an y such promises constrain . Because promises constrain, differen t promise s constrai n dif ferently, an d s o there i s value i n promising mor e rathe r tha n less. Third, I describe ho w evaluatin g an d enlargin g th e prom ises made by whites to nonwhites in the form o f antidiscrimi nation la w can benefi t th e larger project o f reconstructing a n antiracist whit e identity. 9 Transparency-consciou s rac e dis crimination laws would be one way of employing white privilege—here, th e privileg e o f controllin g th e formulatio n o f legal doctrine—t o th e advantag e o f nonwhites . Th e ke y t o making thi s strateg y a meaningful on e i s for white s t o mak e and kee p promise s tha t genuinel y foste r distributiv e racia l justice. **

*

Every projec t suc h a s thi s ha s it s ow n poin t o f departure ; I would lik e t o acknowledg e expressl y som e premise s upo n which thi s wor k proceeds . First , thoug h discussion s o f rac e discrimination ofte n begi n with , o r mov e quickl y to , ques tions abou t discriminatio n agains t whit e people , tha t i s no t

Introduction 114

of concer n here , becaus e th e presen t topi c i s th e struggl e against whit e supremacy. 10 Severa l additiona l point s meri t more extende d discussion : Thi s projec t assume s tha t i t i s appropriate fo r la w t o foste r racia l redistribution , i t assume s that subtl e form s o f institutiona l racis m ar e worth y o f fo cused attention , an d i t assume s tha t doctrina l refor m i s a n enterprise i n whic h everyon e ca n participate . Some lega l theorists conten d tha t redistributio n neve r i s a n appropriate objectiv e fo r th e la w t o pursue ; tha t la w a t mos t ought t o interven e i n societ y t o secur e th e precondition s o f autonomous action , suc h a s persona l security , and/o r t o cor rect "marke t f a i l u r e s . " 1 1 Someof thes e theorist s migh t iden tify th e existin g racia l maldistributio n o f socia l powe r an d material good s a s evidenc e o f a "marke t failure, " bu t other s would not . I n eithe r case , disapprova l o f redistributio n through la w i s a politica l position , on e whic h thi s projec t does no t share . I t i s th e premis e o f thi s book—an d perhap s an appropriat e subjec t fo r debat e elsewhere—tha t racia l in equality i s to o pressin g a proble m t o allo w an y possibl e too l of remediation , includin g th e law , t o b e discounte d o r se t aside. Mor e specifi c contention s tha t th e particula r antidis crimination measure s unde r consideratio n here—th e Equa l Protection Claus e an d Titl e VII—ar e no t intende d t o hav e a redistributive focu s wil l b e addresse d a s eac h i s presente d i n turn. Second, thi s projec t ma y b e criticize d a s elitis t i n it s em phasis o n subtl e form s o f institutiona l racism : Wha t abou t real-world problem s suc h a s povert y an d disease , an d gar den-variety racia l hostility ? Thoug h I acknowledg e tha t th e problems addresse d her e constitut e bu t on e smal l portio n o f

Introduction I IS

the ways racism manifests itself , they are not unimportant . I t seems fair t o say that the transparency phenomenon, becaus e it concerns discretionar y decisionmaking , ha s its greatest im pact o n the lives of relatively well-positioned nonwhites . It is just thi s characteristi c tha t make s i t significant , however . A reduction i n th e quantu m o f transparentl y whit e deci sionmaking woul d resul t i n mor e nonwhite s gainin g posi tions o f authorit y withou t havin g t o assimilat e t o whit e norms. On e ca n hop e tha t suc h a redistributio n o f deci sionmaking power would in the long run benefit the less wellpositioned nonwhit e a s well. Finally, I emphasize tha t thi s project, fosterin g a n antirac ist whit e identit y b y adoptin g lega l doctrine s tha t promis e racial redistribution, i s one in which there is a role for every one. Certainly, all participants i n the legal system have a part to pla y i n law' s evolution , an d eac h o f the m wh o i s white i s as well-positioned t o take responsibility fo r whit e supremac y as any other white person. However, it should be emphasized that ther e ar e way s individual s wh o d o no t participat e for mally in the lega l system als o can contribut e t o th e transfor mation o f race discrimination law . It i s no t difficul t t o envisio n th e rol e judge s ca n pla y i n doctrinal reform. Becaus e constitutional la w has its source in relatively opened-ende d constitutiona l text s (suc h a s "th e equal protection o f the laws"), its practical conten t i s largely a matter o f judicial interpretation . Eve n statutes, which hav e their sourc e eithe r i n a legislatur e o r directl y i n th e popula r will (i n the case of laws enacted b y initiative o r referendum) , are subjec t t o interpretatio n b y judges when the y appl y stat utes t o particula r cases . To the exten t a give n constitutiona l

Introduction 116

text o r statut e permits , then , doctrina l refor m i s well withi n the powe r o f judge s t o accomplish . Indeed , on e finds clea r examples o f thi s powe r i n th e area s o f la w examine d here : Both th e requiremen t o f discriminator y inten t i n constitu tional la w an d th e rule s fo r establishin g disparat e impac t under Titl e VI I ar e judiciall y created . Thu s judge s could , i f persuaded b y the arguments here, institute those reforms i n a straightforward manner . It i s equally clea r tha t legislator s hav e th e power t o effec t doctrinal reform, certainl y with respect to statutes (subjec t t o constitutional limitation s and , i n som e jurisdictions , revie w by referendum) , an d th e powe r t o propos e constitutiona l reform b y way o f constitutional amendment . Moreover , Section 5 o f th e Fourteent h Amendmen t grant s Congres s th e authority t o "enforce , b y appropriate legislation , th e provisions o f thi s article, " whic h sometime s ha s bee n interprete d as grantin g Congres s th e powe r t o expan d th e scop e o f it s protections.12 Thus Congres s certainly could clarif y th e rules governing Title VII disparate impac t cases in a transparency conscious manner , an d perhap s coul d find ways , unde r Sec tion 5 , to exert pressure o n the constitutional requiremen t o f discriminatory intent . Litigants an d thei r attorney s als o pla y importan t role s i n the proces s o f doctrina l reform , b y bringin g case s tha t pre sent courts with the opportunity to adopt more transparencyconscious doctrines, and b y providing those courts with legal analyses tha t woul d facilitat e th e desire d doctrina l results . The foundatio n o f today' s constitutiona l rac e discriminatio n law—this century' s Equal Protection case s up to an d includ ing Brown v. Board of Education—as wel l as most of today's constitutional se x discriminatio n doctrine , fo r example , ar e

Introduction 117

the products of concerted an d sustained litigatio n efforts tha t were markedly successful i n changing the law. 13 Finally, la w professor s to o hav e a par t t o pla y i n th e process of doctrina l reform , i n their capacitie s a s both schol ars an d teachers . A s scholars , w e ca n propos e doctrina l re forms i n the hope that judges and othe r lega l actors will take them t o heart , an d w e sometime s provid e th e theoretica l foundation tha t facilitate s suc h change . A s teachers, w e ca n present lawyers-to-b e wit h a visio n o f doctrin e tha t i s no t limited t o th e wa y thing s ar e today , an d encourag e the m t o take on an active role in the process of doctrinal transforma tion. Conversely , students can request an d expec t institution s of lega l educatio n t o provid e trainin g i n th e proces s o f lega l change, alongside training in the legal status quo. Undoubtedly, thos e whos e live s enmes h the m i n th e lega l system—whether a s parties , judges , legislators , attorneys , professors, o r students—ar e mor e likel y t o com e i n contac t with th e possibilit y o f workin g fo r doctrina l refor m tha n those whos e live s are les s intimately connecte d wit h th e law . We shoul d no t conclude , however , tha t th e projec t o f re forming rac e discriminatio n la w i s on e i n whic h th e latte r cannot participate. First, in this society law ostensibly reflect s the wil l o f th e people . Everyon e ca n joi n i n workin g fo r legislative change , i n th e usua l politica l manner . Wer e ther e a whit e consensu s o n th e nee d fo r transparency-consciou s legislation, i t likel y woul d appea r i n relativel y shor t order . More subtly , la w i s a n embodimen t o f society' s norms , an d so a transforme d whit e rac e consciousnes s woul d mak e it s way int o judiciall y create d lega l doctrine s a s well , thoug h perhaps in a less immediate manner . Moreover, ther e i s a dua l objectiv e t o b e serve d b y th e

Introduction 118

examination o f rac e discriminatio n la w undertake n here : t o transform whit e rac e consciousnes s a s wel l a s t o transfor m the law . Developing a n antiracis t whit e identit y i s to b e valued fo r it s ow n sake , whethe r o r no t i t finds expressio n i n reformed lega l doctrines . A transforme d whit e rac e con sciousness i s instrumentally valuabl e becaus e o f it s potentia l impact o n al l form s o f individua l an d institutiona l racism . Additionally, constructin g a n antiracis t whit e identit y i s intrinsically valuabl e becaus e i t i s morally th e righ t thin g t o do. The tw o objectives—doctrina l reform an d transformin g white rac e consciousness—reinforc e on e another . Th e mor e conscious whites becom e o f the myriad form s o f white privilege, th e bette r positione d w e ar e t o renounc e it , includin g renunciation tha t take s th e for m o f redistributiv e lega l doc trines. Conversely , understandin g existin g la w an d th e dis tance between i t an d a raciall y jus t lega l regim e contribute s to an enhanced understandin g o f white privilege. Indeed, th e two objective s ar e mutuall y interdependent : I n th e en d i t i s impossible to imagine a genuinely racially redistributive lega l regime i n th e absenc e o f a develope d antiracis t whit e racia l identity, an d i t i s equally impossibl e t o envisio n a n authenti cally antiracis t whit e identit y tha t doe s no t giv e up concret e forms o f social and material power .

[2] An Overvie w o f Rac e an d Racis m

T

HOUGH TH E TRANSPARENC Y phenomeno n itsel f should b e easil y recognizabl e t o white s i n thi s soci ety, th e propositio n tha t i t i s a for m o f racis m ma y no t b e equally uncontroversial . Thi s chapte r provide s a framewor k for understandin g th e rol e o f transparenc y a s a too l o f whit e supremacy. First , I explor e th e concep t o f rac e a s a socia l process, rathe r tha n biologica l "fact. " Second , I locat e th e transparency phenomeno n o n a conceptua l ma p o f racism , with th e objectiv e o f examinin g usefu l strategie s fo r combat ting racis m i n it s various form s an d manifestations . I n partic ular, th e techniqu e o f skepticis m tha t emerge s a s a n appro priate an d effectiv e devic e fo r addressin g transparenc y provides a benchmar k fo r th e evaluatio n an d refor m o f rac e discrimination law . 19

An Overview of Race and Racism 120

What Is Race? For mos t people , I suspect , an d almos t certainl y fo r mos t whites, race carries a pervasive biological connotation, muc h like a n individual' s sex . One' s rac e i s thought t o b e a matte r of inheritanc e o r descent , an d thu s outsid e th e individual' s and society' s control . O f course , w e d o recogniz e tha t rac e has socia l implications ; fo r example , man y whit e liberal s hold tha t rac e shoul d no t matte r i n the distributio n o f socia l goods, a s i t doe s i n today' s society . Tha t i s effectivel y a n acknowledgment tha t rac e has a social component; i t clearl y might hav e a socia l meanin g differen t fro m it s presen t one . Nevertheless, thi s socia l aspec t o f rac e i s considered second ary and contingent , while its biological roots ar e regarded a s primary and immutable . However, i t ca n b e argue d tha t thi s conventiona l under standing o f rac e i s inverted : Rac e i s primaril y a socia l phe nomenon, an d onl y secondaril y a biologica l "fact. " Thre e lines o f argumen t converg e t o suppor t thi s conclusion . First , there n o longe r ar e (i f ther e eve r were) clea r line s o f descen t to groun d a biologica l conceptio n o f race . Second , racia l categories exhibi t extrem e variabilit y acros s cultures . Third , racial categorie s shif t rapidl y withi n cultures . Conside r eac h of these contentions i n turn. Much scientifi c evidenc e no w indicate s tha t ther e i s n o such thin g a s "racia l purity. " Everyon e carrie s a n admixtur e of geneti c materia l traceabl e t o severa l "racia l groups" : n o one ca n clai m a n unequivoca l racia l identity. 1 Geneti c re search show s tha t variation s withi n "racia l groups " ofte n exceed variation s between suc h groups . Thu s th e individua l

An Overview of Race and Racism 121

cannot meaningfull y b e ascribe d a singl e biologica l racia l identity; sh e ha s geneti c link s wit h othe r group s a s stron g a s or stronge r tha n th e link s wit h th e grou p wit h whic h sh e i s conventionally identified . Given tha t rac e canno t b e linke d t o geneti c composition , the theoris t wh o wishe s t o defen d th e propositio n tha t rac e i s fundamentally biologica l migh t tur n t o appearanc e a s th e definitive racia l characteristic . Bu t thi s approac h founder s o n the recognitio n tha t a n individua l i s ofte n assigne d a racia l identity inconsisten t wit h hi s o r he r appearance . Home r Plessy, fo r example , wa s denie d a sea t (i n 1892 ) i n a "white " railroad ca r i n spit e o f hi s "white " appearanc e becaus e th e railway conducto r "knew " hi m t o b e "black." 2 Racial categorie s ma y b e mor e flui d tha n conventiona l wisdom realizes . System s o f racia l classificatio n var y acros s cultures. Som e othe r culture s recogniz e differen t an d mor e numerous racia l categorie s tha n doe s ours . I n Brazil , fo r example, on e researche r identifie d fort y distinc t racia l classi fications.3 Moreover , membershi p i n a particula r categor y i s not alway s immutable . Again , Brazi l provide s a n example : "Brazilians sa y 'Mone y whitens, ' meanin g tha t th e riche r a dark ma n get s th e lighte r wil l b e th e categor y t o whic h he wil l b e assigne d b y hi s friends , relative s an d busines s associates." 4 Racial categorie s als o var y withi n a give n cultur e ove r time. I n th e Unite d States , th e syste m o f racia l classificatio n has change d mor e ofte n an d mor e rapidl y tha n man y realize . In th e 1800s , Lati n American s ofte n wer e describe d bot h b y nationality an d b y race . Fo r example , a Mexica n migh t b e white, Indian , black , o r Asian. 5 Thu s ther e wa s n o analogu e

An Overview of Race and Racism 122

to today's "racial " categor y "Hispanic. " Anothe r exampl e is to b e foun d i n th e perception , durin g roughl y th e sam e pe riod, that Chines e immigrants were racially similar to blacks; today's racial imagery sees those groups as quite distinct. 6 Race, then , i s a plastic , sociopolitica l phenomenon ; it s meaning respond s t o change s i n time , place , an d circum stance.7 What doe s it mean for th e study of racism to give up the concep t tha t racia l identit y i s a n immutabl e biologica l fact? Som e might argu e tha t recognizin g th e socia l construc tion o f race lends additional forc e t o the argument fo r color blindness a s socia l an d lega l policy : Becaus e rac e turn s ou t not t o b e "real " (i.e. , biological), it ought no t to b e afforde d legal or social significance. However , colorblindness progres sively reveal s itsel f t o b e a n inadequat e socia l polic y i f th e ultimate goal i s substantiv e racia l justice . Black s continu e to inhabi t a ver y differen t Americ a tha n d o whites . The y experience highe r rate s o f povert y an d unemployment 8 an d are mor e likel y t o liv e i n environmentall y undesirabl e loca tions than whites. 9 They have more frequent an d more severe medical problems , highe r mortalit y rates , an d receiv e les s comprehensive healt h car e tha n whites. 10 Black s continu e disproportionately t o attend inferio r an d inadequate primar y and secondar y schools. 11 Proportionatel y fewe r black s tha n whites complet e college , an d thos e wh o d o s o stil l confron t the "glas s ceiling " afte r graduation. 12 Black s ar e n o bette r off b y man y o f thes e measure s tha n the y wer e twent y year s ago,13 and in the recent past even the colorblindness principl e itself, onc e see n a s a promise o f a brighter futur e fo r blacks , has bee n deploye d instea d t o bloc k furthe r blac k economi c progress.14

An Overview of Race and Racism 123

Recognizing th e socia l constructio n o f race , I believe, impels on e i n quit e a differen t directio n fro m th e dead-en d policy of colorblindness. It means that individuals , especiall y privileged individuals , an d groups , especiall y privilege d groups, hav e mor e o f a n opportunit y t o tak e responsibilit y for th e meanin g o f racia l identit y tha n migh t otherwis e ap pear t o b e the case . The fac t tha t rac e i s not inevitable call s for specia l consideratio n o f th e significanc e afforde d i t i n a given culture. In thi s society , rac e i s a n elemen t o f socia l stratification . That is , one' s socia l statu s depend s i n par t o n one' s racia l identity. Moreover , rac e i s independen t o f othe r stratifyin g characteristics, suc h a s sex , wealth, age , religion, sexua l ori entation, physica l disability , education , o r nationa l origin , though it s specifi c impac t varie s wit h thes e othe r factors . Thus th e socia l meanin g o f bein g whit e i s differen t i f on e i s female o r male, old or young, straight o r gay, and s o on, and the same is true for ever y other racial category. However, th e absence o f an y singl e essenc e o f whitenes s (o r an y othe r racial classification ) doe s no t mea n tha t rac e i s reducibl e t o any othe r characteristic . Rac e plays a n independent , thoug h complex, role in the process of social stratification . That rac e i s sociall y constructe d thu s impel s reexamina tion o f whitenes s itself . I t i s indisputabl e tha t i n th e Unite d States white s occup y th e uppermos t positio n o n th e racia l dimension o f socia l stratification, a reality that togethe r wit h the plasticit y o f rac e lead s u s t o as k whethe r white s ca n o r should b e comfortabl e wit h a racia l identit y compose d al most entirely of social privilege. Assuming that the answer t o that questio n i s negative, seein g rac e a s sociall y constructe d

An Overview of Race and Racism 124

provides a framewor k i n whic h t o recas t whitenes s a s th e dismantling o f privilege, rather than its realization. Law play s a rol e i n th e socia l constructio n o f race . Som e laws have a direct and obviou s impact, such as laws incorporating racia l classifications . Unti l 1952 , fo r example , white ness was a prerequisite fo r becomin g a naturalized citize n of the Unite d States. 15 Ia n Hane y Lope z ha s describe d a serie s of case s i n whic h court s wer e calle d upo n t o constru e thi s racial requirement ; i n thes e case s "commo n knowledge " gradually supersede d "scientific " knowledg e a s the standar d by whic h a n individual' s racia l identit y wa s t o b e estab lished.16 Thu s th e statutor y racia l prerequisit e bot h reflecte d and reinforced sociall y constructed racia l categories. It is worth notin g that lega l definitions o f racial categorie s are not entirely a thing of the past. In 197 0 Louisiana passe d a la w tha t i n effec t define d a s "white " a perso n havin g on e thirty-second o r les s o f "Negr o blood." 17 Thoug h tha t la w was repeale d i n 1983 , i t wa s relie d upo n i n a 198 7 cas e i n which several siblings sought to compel the state Departmen t of Healt h an d Huma n Resource s t o chang e thei r birt h cer tificates, which designated thei r parents as "colored." On e of the plaintiffs, Susi e Guillor y Phipps , who regarde d hersel f a s white, testified tha t she was "sic k for three days" upon learn ing that he r birt h certificat e classifie d bot h o f he r parent s a s colored.18 Just as a government act—th e racia l identificatio n of he r parent s o n he r birt h certificate—ha d create d he r "problem," sh e sought a remedy through a legal reclassifica tion of her parents' race. Law als o shape s th e socia l meanin g o f rac e throug h it s impact o n socia l interaction , whic h i n turn affect s morphol -

An Overview of Race and Racism 125

ogy itself . Miscegenatio n law s an d Ji m Cro w segregatio n laws, fo r instance , enforce d racia l separatio n i n way s tha t affected individuals ' socia l experience . On e ca n onl y con clude tha t thes e law s ha d som e effect ; interracia l marriag e almost certainl y woul d hav e bee n mor e commo n ha d suc h laws never been enacted. Moreover, reduced contact betwee n races must serve to enhance the ideology of racial difference . Antidiscrimination law s bea r a somewha t differen t con nection to the social meaning of race than do racial classifica tion law s o r law s regulatin g th e term s o f socia l interaction . First, antidiscriminatio n law s reflec t whites ' conceptio n o f race an d racism . Thoug h existin g rac e discriminatio n law s tend to embody limited conceptions of "rac e discrimination, " a broade r understandin g o f discriminatio n ma y b e gained b y examining th e processe s b y whic h rac e i s sociall y con structed, an d tha t mor e comprehensiv e visio n migh t find meaningful expressio n i n revise d antidiscriminatio n doc trines. Second , antidiscriminatio n la w ca n pla y a significan t role i n th e socia l constructio n o f whiteness . Becaus e la w i s coercive, it can effect redistributio n o f social goods, and thu s can serv e a s a vehicle fo r th e dismantlin g o f whit e privilege . Accordingly, suitably reformed doctrine s might aid the social reconstruction o f white identity in an antiracist direction. 19

What Is Racism? "Racism" i s used i n a number o f related ways , which gener ally revolv e aroun d th e notio n o f a disapprove d recognitio n of race . W e sa y tha t someon e i s racis t whe n h e o r sh e ha s

An Overview of Race and Racism I'26

afforded rac e a significanc e w e thin k i t ough t no t t o have , either wit h respec t t o characterizatio n o r consequence . Tha t is, i t ca n b e considere d "racist " t o thin k o r sa y tha t blac k people ar e inferio r t o whites , that Asian s ar e inscrutable , o r that Nativ e American s ar e lazy . However , maintainin g a n institution tha t systematicall y disadvantage s blacks als o ca n be characterized a s racist. I t has i n commo n wit h th e earlie r examples th e featur e tha t rac e matters , i n a wa y tha t i s disapproved b y the person employin g th e label "racist. " Th e varieties of racism call for close r examination . The mos t commo n usage s o f th e ter m "racism " implicat e individual, psychological concepts. For example, hostility toward, o r dislik e of , person s o f anothe r rac e i s perhap s th e most widely recognized conception of racism. Along the same lines, persons who regard individual s o f another rac e as inferior beings , or who believ e that thei r ow n cultur e i s superior to that o f other races, often ar e characterized a s "racist. " Such racia l attitude s ma y b e consciou s o r unconscious . Some social scientists acknowledg e thes e two possibilities b y differentiating betwee n prejudic e an d stereotyping. 20 Preju dice consist s o f consciou s beliefs , proposition s tha t a n indi vidual knowingl y accept s a s true . Stereotypes , o n th e othe r hand, consis t o f attitude s acquire d earl y i n lif e and , i n thi s use o f th e term , generall y functio n outsid e one' s consciou s control. Fo r instance , som e person s wh o gre w u p i n th e South report feelin g "squeamish " upo n touching the hand of a black person, even though they harbor n o conscious ill will toward blacks. 21 Of course , this definitio n o f "stereotype " depart s i n som e respects fro m commo n usage , whic h recognize s a s wel l th e

An Overview of Race and Racism 127

existence o f consciou s generalization s abou t racia l groups , and sometime s label s suc h belief s "stereotypes. " Moreover , some suc h consciou s belief s appea r no t t o b e negative , a s when a whit e perso n consciousl y entertain s th e vie w tha t "blacks ar e bette r athletes. " However , furthe r analysi s re veals tha t suc h belief s almos t alway s incorporat e a negativ e subtext, suc h a s "black s ar e bette r athletes , bu t the y aren' t as smart." 22 Thu s a whit e person' s conscious , superficiall y positive stereotyp e o f nonwhite s mos t likel y reflect s a n un conscious negativ e image , an d s o will b e included unde r th e heading of unconscious negative personal attitudes . Social scientist s describ e a s "hig h prejudiced " person s whose conscious personal beliefs are congruent with negative cultural stereotype s o f black s an d othe r member s o f racia l minority groups.23 "Low prejudiced" persons are those whose conscious persona l belief s diverg e fro m th e negativ e stereo types tha t the y to o carry. 24 Thes e term s sugges t tha t uncon scious negativ e attitude s towar d person s o f othe r race s exis t relatively independently o f consciou s racia l beliefs . That fea ture of individual racism has implications for the ways racism may be combatted an d controlled, as will be described below. "Racist" als o ma y b e use d t o characteriz e a n institutio n that systematicall y create s o r perpetuate s racia l advantag e and disadvantage. Institutional racism (define d b y the racially skewed effect s o f institutiona l practices ) function s unde r th e wing o f a variety o f ideological devices . In some cases, more common i n th e pas t tha n today , socia l institution s ar e th e overt expression of racial hostility, or of widely shared belief s in racial and/o r cultura l inferiority . Jim Cro w social arrangements provid e a n example ; the y reste d o n a n undisguise d

An Overview of Race and Racism 128

"racist" ideology . However, institutiona l racis m als o may be supported b y an egalitarian ideolog y that operate s in defens e of racia l advantage , bu t superficiall y endorse s racia l equal ity.25 For example, a job requirement o f a high school educa tion, adopte d i n a n er a an d a locatio n i n whic h almos t n o blacks attaine d a hig h schoo l diploma , woul d functio n t o disadvantage black s whil e appearin g t o res t o n a nonracia l conception o f job qualifications . Individual participant s i n racis t socia l institution s ma y b e located a t an y poin t o n th e continuu m o f individua l racism . In th e cas e o f a n institutio n tha t i s superficiall y egalitarian , individual participatio n migh t b e th e consequenc e o f dis guised o r undisguise d hostilit y o r prejudice , bu t i t migh t equally b e th e produc t o f inattention , indifference , o r igno rance. Som e "lo w prejudiced" person s migh t eve n find comfort i n a n "egalitarian " institutiona l settin g tha t perpetuate s racial advantag e precisel y becaus e th e outcome s confor m t o unexamined racia l stereotypes , while the prevailing ideolog y coincides with the individual's own nonprejudiced beliefs . Numerous superficiall y egalitaria n institutiona l practice s result i n racia l injustice . Thes e include , fo r example , pro cesses of marginalization an d tokenism that permit an institution t o appea r inclusive , bu t effectivel y distanc e nonwhite s from position s o f power , authority , an d security. 26 A second category o f seemingl y benig n institutiona l practice s encom passes ostensibl y race-neutra l decisionmaking . Th e hig h school diplom a requiremen t cite d abov e provide s a n exam ple, a s d o high unio n initiatio n fee s (becaus e o f blacks ' rela tively weaker economi c situation ) an d th e practic e o f adver tising job opening s onl y i n major newspaper s (becaus e thes e

An Overview of Race and Racism 129

papers ofte n ar e no t a s easil y accessibl e i n "black " part s o f town, and so are not equally available to black job seekers as to whites). 27 Eac h o f thes e examples illustrate s a deci sionmaking criterio n tha t disadvantage s nonwhite s becaus e of th e effect s o f othe r socia l institution s an d realities . An other for m o f institutiona l racis m involve s multipl e criteri a of decisio n tha t permi t a decisionmake r t o selec t a t wil l on e of severa l base s for a particular decision . In the employmen t setting, for example , leadership potential, education, an d ex perience withi n th e organizatio n migh t constitut e coequa l grounds fo r promotion . Thes e paralle l criteri a provid e a n avenue for th e operation o f unconscious racial bias, hostility, or stereotyping, because they can offer a plausible foundatio n for eac h o f severa l outcomes . Thi s sor t o f decisionmakin g represents a n instanc e o f institutiona l racis m i f i t actuall y results i n disadvantagin g nonwhites ; i t i s institutiona l because it is the institution tha t make s the choice to implemen t a regime of multiple, potentially shiftin g decisio n criteria . The transparency phenomenon play s yet a third role in the formation o f egalitaria n institutiona l racism , insofa r a s i t fosters white s decisionmakers ' tendenc y t o adop t an d appl y transparently white criteria of decision. These criteria systematically favo r whites , an d thu s institution s tha t rel y o n suc h ostensibly race-neutra l criteri a affor d substantia l advantage s to white s ove r nonwhite s eve n whe n decisionmaker s inten d to effect substantiv e racial justice. Among th e variou s form s racis m ma y take , thi s boo k i s primarily concerne d wit h th e latte r for m o f ideologicall y egalitarian institutiona l racism , an d specificall y wit h antidis crimination law' s response to it. I place a special emphasis on

An Overview of Race and Racism 130

the role transparently white decisionmaking plays in structuring and maintainin g seemingl y egalitaria n racis t institutions , and I explore lega l doctrine s tha t migh t b e mor e productiv e antiracist tool s than thos e in effect a t present. Before turnin g to th e lega l realm , however , i t migh t b e usefu l t o examin e nonlegal methods o f combatting racism .

Combatting Racism Return t o the hypothetical cas e of Delores, introduced a t th e beginning of chapter 1 . Under consideration fo r a seat on the Board o f Directors o f a national public interest organization , she is about t o b e interviewed b y a Nominating Committee , a subdivisio n o f th e Boar d o f Directors , bot h o f whic h ar e predominantly white . Suppos e tha t ther e i s a representativ e individual wh o harbor s eac h o f th e form s o f individua l rac ism on the Nominating Committee . The individual who i s a conscious an d over t racis t will, of course, simpl y argu e tha t ther e i s n o plac e o n th e Boar d o f Directors for blacks , either becaus e they are unpleasant t o be around, the y ar e incapabl e o f performin g th e task s require d of a Boar d member , o r becaus e the y "hav e value s differen t from ours. " Thes e views , however , ar e disapprove d i n sub stantial segment s o f today' s society , an d s o a perso n wh o endorses on e o r mor e o f thos e proposition s mor e likel y would no t expres s them , bu t woul d consciousl y see k othe r ways t o subver t Delores ' candidacy . Suc h a n individua l would b e a covert individual racist . By definition, consciou s racists hav e n o reaso n t o comba t

An Overview of Race and Racism 131

racism; the y approv e it . However , th e nationa l organizatio n might choos e t o adop t antiracis t policies . Wit h respec t t o overtly racis t Boar d members , bot h identificatio n an d remed y are relativel y straightforward . Th e nationa l organizatio n might expres s it s antiracist positio n b y immediately removin g from th e Boar d an y membe r wh o expresse s overtl y preju diced sentiments . The proble m o f formulatin g a n antiracis t polic y i s some what mor e complicate d i n th e cas e o f th e cover t individua l racist, becaus e th e tas k o f identificatio n i s mor e difficult . A pattern o f votin g agains t minorit y candidate s woul d b e on e significant indicato r o f th e presenc e o f cover t racism . Thu s the organizatio n migh t adop t som e procedur e fo r evaluatin g the continue d presenc e o n th e Boar d o f a n individua l wh o exhibited suc h a voting pattern . A procedure t o ferre t ou t th e covert bu t consciou s racis t woul d b e designe d t o differentiat e between a patter n o f negativ e vote s motivate d b y race , an d a similar patter n actuall y motivate d b y nonracia l concerns . The final variet y o f individua l racis m represente d o n thi s Nominating Committe e i s the "lo w prejudiced " person , wh o endorses n o racis t persona l belief s bu t wh o a t time s act s o n unconscious racia l stereotypes . Durin g Delores ' interview , this perso n question s he r closel y abou t th e operatio n o f he r business. Th e committe e membe r seek s unusuall y detaile d financial information , i n a manne r tha t suggest s skepticis m concerning thi s blac k woman' s abilit y t o establis h an d man age a successful , highl y technica l smal l business . Social scientist s wh o defen d th e distinctio n betwee n preju dice an d stereotypin g explai n tha t eve n a n individua l wh o holds n o prejudice d belief s ma y ac t o n th e basi s o f ingraine d

An Overview of Race and Racism 132

and habitua l attitudes , suc h a s th e stereotypica l judgmen t that black s ar e incompetent . I f th e stereotyp e ha s a longe r history an d i s mor e frequentl y reinforce d (fo r example , i n media image s of blacks) tha n th e incongruent persona l belie f that black s ar e a s capable a s whites, the stereotyp e wil l prevail i n determinin g th e individual' s respons e t o a blac k sub ject. In chapter 1 I set aside the possibility tha t thi s close questioning wa s a n expressio n o f unconsciou s stereotyping , in stead analyzin g i t a s a n exampl e o f applyin g a transparentl y white nor m regardin g appropriat e topic s an d style s of infor mation-gathering. I n reality , whethe r a particula r episod e ought t o b e characterize d a s a cas e o f stereotypin g o r o f transparency depend s o n whether th e actor treat s blacks an d whites similarl y o r differently . Stereotypin g involve s th e ap plication of unconscious attitudes about blacks-, it will engender differen t treatmen t o f blacks an d whites , becaus e white s will no t b e viewe d throug h th e sam e len s a s blacks . I n con trast, transparently whit e decisionmaking consist s of the uniform application o f a nor m o r expectatio n tha t i s i n fac t white-specific; i t too disadvantage s nonwhites , but i t does so in spite of even-handed treatment . Thus, th e questionin g Delore s underwen t regardin g he r financial situatio n ough t t o b e seen a s a n exampl e o f stereo typing i f the questione r woul d hav e behave d differentl y i f he or sh e ha d bee n interviewin g a whit e candidate . Th e sam e behavior shoul d b e analyze d a s a n instanc e o f transparentl y white decisionmakin g i f th e interviewer i n fac t woul d hav e proceeded i n th e sam e manne r eve n ha d th e candidat e bee n white.

An Overview of Race and Racism 133

The strategy for combattin g stereotypin g follow s fro m th e analysis se t fort h above : The individua l shoul d see k way s t o inhibit th e stereotypica l respons e an d t o activat e a respons e based o n his nonprejudiced beliefs , which would result in his treating blac k an d whit e person s i n the sam e way. The basi c ingredients of this strategy are the recognition of race and the conscious reevaluatio n o f learne d stereotypes . Tha t is , th e unconscious discriminato r ma y comba t stereotypica l think ing b y remindin g himsel f tha t h e i s interviewin g a black candidate, an d the n b y askin g himsel f wha t stereotype s o r generalizations tha t fac t carrie s fo r him . Th e organizatio n itself migh t promp t th e sam e reflections , sa y b y includin g similar point s i n a handbook containin g guideline s fo r inter viewing Board candidates. **

*

In general, strategies for combattin g institutional racis m mirror strategie s fo r combattin g individua l racism . Institution s that reproduc e racia l hierarchy an d ar e supported b y overtl y racist ideology ar e analogous to conscious individua l racism , and ideologicall y egalitaria n racis t institution s ar e analogou s to th e "lo w prejudiced " unconsciou s racist . Wit h respec t t o ideologically racis t institutions , th e onl y feasibl e cours e i s sanction an d control; no internal antiracis t impetus operates. Just as with the individual unconscious discriminator, consciousness-raising i s the stronges t antiracis t strateg y wit h re gard t o ideologicall y egalitaria n institutiona l racism . Soun d antiracist strategie s includ e consciousness o f race, consciousness o f race-specifi c outcomes , tha t is , of th e racia l distribu tion o f good s produce d o r distribute d b y th e institutio n i n

An Overview of Race and Racism 134

question, an d consciousnes s o f th e processe s tha t produc e inequitable racia l outcomes . I n addition , o f course , on e mus t be willing t o alte r th e offendin g processe s i n orde r to , an d i n ways tha t reall y do , produc e raciall y jus t results . Th e sys temic natur e o f institutiona l racis m ofte n demand s a collec tive response . However, transparentl y whit e decisio n criteri a pos e a spe cial difficulty . On e ma y b e tempte d t o conclud e tha t wha t i s needed i s a mor e reliabl e techniqu e fo r distinguishin g genu inely race-neutra l criteri a o f decisio n fro m thos e tha t onl y appear neutral . Th e analyse s i n chapte r 1 o f th e Nominatin g Committee members ' failur e t o recogniz e white-specifi c norms migh t demonstrat e onl y tha t they—an d we—ca n d o better. Perhap s w e coul d us e this an d simila r storie s a s point s of departur e fo r a n attemp t t o correc t whit e misperception s of white-specifi c criteri a o f decision . Three considerations , however , counse l agains t attemptin g to formulat e a "rule " tha t woul d distinguis h transparen t from authenticall y race-neutra l decisio n criteria . First , Delo res' stor y present s onl y rudimentar y example s o f transpar ently whit e norms . Doubtles s mor e comple x an d subtl e sto ries o f transparenc y migh t b e told , fo r whic h th e tas k o f recognition an d analysi s would b e significantly mor e difficult . At th e sam e time , whit e decisionmaker s mak e th e relativel y simple error s illustrate d b y thi s stor y quit e frequently , an d some white s wil l resis t o r rejec t (o r both ) eve n th e analyse s I have proffered . White s a s a grou p lac k th e experienc e neces sary eve n t o begi n t o construc t th e analyti c tool s tha t woul d ground a comprehensiv e theor y o f transparency . Second, transparenc y probabl y attache s mor e t o wor d us -

An Overview of Race and Racism 135

ages tha n t o th e word s themselves . Fo r example , "hostility " may no t hav e a race-lade n connotatio n i n ever y instanc e i n which a whit e decisionmake r employ s it . Th e contex t o f use—the combinatio n o f speaker , audience , decisionmakin g process, an d purpose—mor e likel y supplie s th e racia l con tent o f th e ter m "hostile " a s applied . Thus , a general analysi s of transparenc y migh t hav e t o be , paradoxically , situatio n specific, thereb y exponentiall y increasin g th e complexit y o f the theoretica l task . Finally, th e assumptio n tha t w e ca n ge t bette r a t identi fying genuinel y race-neutra l decisionmakin g presuppose s that suc h a thin g i s possible . However , placin g an y confi dence i n th e concep t o f rac e neutralit y i s prematur e a t best , because littl e support s i t othe r tha n whites ' subjectiv e experi ence, itsel f subjec t t o th e transparenc y phenomenon . Th e available empirica l evidenc e point s i n th e opposit e direction . Social scientists ' wor k show s tha t rac e nearl y alway s influ ences th e outcome s o f discretionar y decisionmakin g pro cesses, includin g thos e i n whic h th e decisionmake r relie s o n criteria though t t o b e race-neutral . Ther e is , o f course , n o conclusive evidenc e tha t n o instance s o f genuin e rac e neutral ity exist , bu t neithe r i s ther e conclusiv e evidenc e t o th e con trary. Th e pervasivenes s o f th e transparenc y phenomeno n militates agains t a n unsupporte d fait h b y whites i n th e realit y of race-neutra l decisionmaking . I recommen d instea d tha t white s adop t a deliberat e an d thoroughgoing skepticis m regardin g th e rac e neutralit y o f ostensibly neutra l criteri a o f decision . Thi s stanc e ha s th e potential t o improv e th e distributio n acros s race s o f good s and powe r currentl y controlle d b y whites . I n addition , skep -

An Overview of Race and Racism 136

ticism ma y hel p t o foste r th e developmen t o f a n antiracis t white racial identity that doe s not posit whites as superior t o blacks. Operating fro m a presumption tha t seemingl y neutra l de cision criteri a ar e i n fac t white-specifi c ma y promp t whit e decisionmakers t o engag e i n th e sor t o f analysi s presente d earlier, when they would not otherwise have done so. Heightened awarenes s o f formerl y overlooke d rac e specificit y may , in turn , lea d t o formulatio n o f modifie d criteri a o f decisio n that ar e mor e attune d to , an d mor e productiv e of , distribu tive racia l justice . Ha d th e whit e Nominatin g Committe e members bee n awar e o f th e race-specifi c dimension s o f thei r questions concerning Delores' business enterprise an d educa tional background , the y mos t likel y woul d no t hav e aske d those questions . Perhap s the y woul d hav e gon e s o fa r a s t o adopt th e cours e suggeste d b y Delore s herself—t o pos e fo r her hypothetica l polic y issues , he r response s t o whic h likel y would hav e bee n mor e revealin g o f th e contribution s sh e would make as a black Board member . Even whe n h e look s fo r it , however , th e whit e deci sionmaker ma y no t alway s b e abl e t o uncove r th e hidde n racial conten t o f th e criteri a h e employs . I n thos e instances , the skeptica l stanc e ma y functio n t o promot e distributiv e justice i n tw o differen t ways . First , th e skeptica l deci sionmaker may opt to temper his judgment with a simultaneous acknowledgment o f hi s uncertainty concernin g nonobvi ous racia l specificity . Thus , i n th e Nominatin g Committe e example, th e decisionmaker s woul d hav e forwarde d th e nomination wit h a recommendatio n somethin g lik e th e fol lowing: "W e experienced thi s candidate a s somewhat hostile ,

An Overview of Race and Racism 137

but we are not sur e whether ther e is some racial element tha t we d o no t full y understan d influencin g ou r judgment. " Th e impact o f whitenes s o n th e final decisio n ma y thu s b e miti gated eve n in the absence o f a complete analysi s of transpar ency. Delores i s more likel y t o b e accepted b y the ful l Boar d on a recommendatio n tha t doe s no t unequivocall y describ e her a s "hostile. " Eve n assumin g sh e winds u p seate d o n th e Board i n eithe r scenario , sh e certainl y woul d b e i n a bette r position t o hav e her view s heard an d fairl y considere d i f sh e arrived withou t th e unqualifie d labe l o f hostilit y attache d t o her in advance. Second, whit e decisionmaker s migh t choos e t o develo p pluralistic criteria of decision as a prophylactic against covert white specificity . I n thi s approac h th e Committe e woul d allow a nomine e t o characteriz e th e qualifications , perspec tive, and experienc e sh e would brin g to the Board i f selected , with whateve r emphasis sh e migh t choos e t o plac e o n th e fact tha t sh e woul d b e a nonwhit e membe r o f a predomi nantly whit e group . Th e Committe e woul d the n repor t th e candidate's assessmen t o f he r qualification s t o th e full Boar d and allo w tha t policymakin g bod y t o decid e whethe r th e organization's ultimat e goals might b e furthered b y the addition o f thi s candidate . Thi s strateg y seek s t o minimiz e th e effect o f transparently race-specific decisio n criteria by substituting, wheneve r possible , criteri a formulate d b y th e non white candidate. The skeptical stance may contribute to the development of an antiracist white racial identity by relativizing white norms. Even white s wh o d o no t harbo r an y consciou s o r uncon scious belie f i n the superiorit y o f white people participate i n

An Overview of Race and Racism 138

the maintenanc e o f whit e supremac y wheneve r w e impos e white norm s withou t acknowledgin g thei r whiteness . An y serious effor t t o dismantl e whit e supremac y mus t includ e measures t o dilut e th e effec t o f whites ' dominan t status , which carries with it the power to define a s well as to decide. Because the skeptica l stanc e prevents th e unthinking imposi tion o f whit e norms , i t encourage s whit e decisionmaker s t o consider adoptin g nonwhit e way s o f doin g business , s o tha t the formerly unquestione d white-specific criterio n of decision becomes jus t on e optio n amon g many . Th e skeptica l stanc e thus ca n b e instrumental i n the developmen t o f a relativize d white rac e consciousness , i n whic h th e whit e decisionmake r is consciou s o f th e whitenes s an d contingenc y o f whit e norms. Most whit e peopl e hav e n o experienc e o f a genuin e cul tural pluralism, one in which whites' perspectives, behavioral expectations, an d value s ar e no t take n t o b e th e standar d from which all other cultural norms deviate. Whites therefor e have no experiential basis for assessing the benefits of participating in a pluralist society so defined. Assuming that prevailing egalitarian mores preclude white supremacy as a justification fo r th e maintenanc e o f th e statu s quo , adoptin g th e skeptical stance in the interest of exploring cultural pluralis m seems th e mos t appropriat e cours e o f actio n fo r an y whit e person who acknowledge s the transparency phenomenon .

[3] The Constitutiona l Requiremen t o f Discriminatory Inten t

T

HE EQUAL PROTECTION Claus e o f th e U.S . Constitu tion proscribe s rac e discrimination , an d accordingl y is th e provisio n t o whic h on e shoul d loo k fo r lega l redres s when governmen t engage s i n transparentl y whit e deci sionmaking. Becaus e transparenc y involve s faciall y neutra l criteria o f decision , the specifi c doctrine s o f interes t her e ar e those tha t appl y whe n governmen t adopt s a rule o r makes a decision tha t i s neutral o n it s fac e bu t carrie s raciall y dispa rate effects . Thi s chapte r describe s th e la w currently govern ing constitutiona l disparat e effect s cases , conclude s tha t i t is inadequat e t o th e tas k o f challengin g th e transparenc y phenomenon, an d propose s a n alternativ e framewor k tha t might b e more satisfactory . The Requirement of Discriminatory Intent

The Fourteent h Amendment' s Equa l Protectio n Claus e man dates tha t "N o Stat e shal l . . . deny t o an y perso n withi n it s 39

The Constitutional Requirement 140

jurisdiction th e equa l protectio n o f th e laws. " B y its terms , then, i t applie s t o th e individua l state s o f th e Unite d States ; the U.S. Supreme Cour t als o has held that it applies, through the Fifth Amendment , t o th e federal government. 1 However , the constitutiona l guarante e o f equa l protectio n doe s no t encompass the discriminatory conduc t o f private actors. In 1954 , i n Brown v. Board of Education, 2 whic h hel d public school segregatio n unconstitutional , th e U.S. Supreme Court rule d tha t race-specifi c governmen t conduc t disadvan taging blacks violates the Equal Protection Clause . However, it was no t unti l 197 6 tha t th e Cour t mad e clea r th e circum stances unde r whic h a faciall y race-neutra l governmen t ac t or rul e tha t ha s raciall y disparat e effect s woul d constitut e a similar violation . That yea r Washington v. Davis 3 mad e it s wa y t o th e Su preme Court . Davis addresse d th e constitutionalit y o f "Tes t 21," a written examinatio n develope d b y the U.S . Civil Ser vice Commissio n an d administere d t o applicant s fo r posi tions as officers i n the Metropolitan Police Department o f the District o f Columbia . Tw o rejecte d blac k applicant s argue d that Test 21 was racially discriminator y i n that it s effect wa s to disqualif y blac k applicant s a t approximatel y fou r time s the rat e o f whit e applicants ; th e plaintiff s di d no t alleg e intentional discrimination. The challengers lost in the District Court bu t were, temporarily, mor e successfu l o n appeal: The Court o f Appeal s fo r th e D.C . Circui t conclude d tha t th e applicable constitutiona l standar d shoul d b e borrowed fro m Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 4 a 1971 Title VII case.5 In Griggs, as i t wa s the n understood , th e Suprem e Cour t ha d rule d that disparat e impac t alone , without proo f o f discriminator y

The Constitutional Requirement 141

intent, woul d b e adequat e t o suppor t th e findin g o f a statu tory violatio n absen t proo f b y the employe r tha t th e faciall y neutral criterion in question was related to job performance. 6 Though th e District o f Columbi a petitioner s challenge d onl y the Cour t o f Appeals ' applicatio n o f th e Griggs approach , not th e standar d itself , th e Suprem e Cour t viewe d th e lowe r court's reliance on Griggs as plain error and set itself the task of correctin g th e mistake . The constitutiona l rule , the Cour t said, i s tha t "th e invidiou s qualit y o f a la w claime d t o b e racially discriminatory mus t ultimately b e traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. " 7 In this context, "invidiousness " doe s not entai l automati c invalidation. Proo f tha t a statut e wit h raciall y disparat e ef fects was enacted becaus e of a racially discriminatory motiv e would trigger "stric t judicial scrutiny" o f the enactment: The statute woul d b e upheld if , an d onl y if, th e stat e could sho w that i t ha d a "compelling " reaso n fo r adoptin g th e legisla tion, an d tha t th e chose n mean s wa s "necessary " t o achiev e that objective . However , i n rac e discriminatio n case s "stric t scrutiny" generall y i s "fata l i n fact." 8 Moreover , i n th e spe cific contex t o f disparat e effect s case s it is especially unlikel y that a challenged statut e could survive strict scrutiny, because under th e Davis rul e stric t scrutin y i s applie d onl y i f th e constitutional challenge r alread y ha s show n tha t th e legisla tion i n questio n wa s adopte d wit h a discriminator y intent , which i s a n impermissibl e purpos e unde r an y standar d o f review. Justice White' s opinio n fo r th e Davis Cour t reste d th e intent requiremen t principall y o n tw o arguments . First , th e Court rejected a "grou p rights" approach t o race discrimina -

The Constitutional Requirement 142

tion. Notwithstandin g tha t th e failur e rat e fo r black s a s a group was higher than for whites, individual black applicant s who faile d th e faciall y neutra l test , th e Cour t said , "coul d no mor e successfull y clai m tha t th e tes t denie d the m equa l protection tha n coul d whit e applicant s wh o als o failed." 9 Second, th e Cour t expresse d concer n tha t a rul e mandatin g strict scrutiny i n all disparate effect s case s would engag e it in far-ranging economi c redistribution . Suc h a rul e "woul d b e far reachin g an d woul d rais e seriou s question s about , an d perhaps invalidate , a whol e rang e o f tax , welfare , publi c service, regulatory , an d licensin g statute s tha t ma y b e mor e burdensome to the poor an d to the average black than to th e more affluent white." 10 The Davis rule i s not limite d t o employment . I n 197 7 th e Supreme Court elaborate d th e requirement o f discriminator y intent i n Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. u I n that case the constitutional challenger was a developer who sought to build low- and moder ate-income housing in the city of Arlington Heights, a suburb of Chicago ; the cit y refuse d t o alte r th e zonin g classificatio n of th e propert y i n questio n t o permi t th e development . Th e Supreme Cour t accepted , a t leas t fo r th e sak e o f argument , the propositio n tha t denyin g permissio n fo r th e projec t would hav e a raciall y disproportionat e impact , becaus e mi norities wer e overrepresente d i n th e incom e group s tha t would b e eligibl e fo r th e ne w housing , relativ e t o thei r pro portion o f the nearby population. 12 However , the Court concluded tha t th e challenger s ha d no t demonstrate d th e pres ence o f a discriminator y motive behin d th e decisio n no t t o rezone.13

The Constitutional Requirement 143

Arlington Heights se t fort h relativel y stringen t require ments fo r proo f o f discriminator y intent , focusing o n factor s such a s the specifi c sequenc e o f event s leadin g u p t o a challenged decision , departure s fro m usua l decisionmakin g pro cedures, an d departure s fro m substantiv e factor s normall y taken int o accoun t i n decision s o f th e sor t unde r review. 14 However, i n othe r setting s th e Cour t ha s articulate d mor e relaxed standard s fo r establishin g discriminator y intent . I n the contex t o f jur y selection , fo r example , th e rul e appear s to b e tha t a patter n o f raciall y skewe d outcome s plu s a decisionmaking procedur e tha t i s "susceptibl e o f abuse," 15 or on e tha t inherentl y provide s a n opportunit y fo r discrimi nation, raise s a n inferenc e o f discriminator y intent. 16 Wit h respect t o votin g rights , the rul e seem s eve n mor e lenient : A pattern o f raciall y disparat e effect s plu s " a showin g tha t th e jurisdiction ha s engage d i n othe r type s o f discriminatio n i n the past" seem s adequate to establish discriminatory intent. 17 In short, th e difficult y a constitutional challenge r wil l face i n attempting t o prov e tha t governmen t acte d wit h discrimina tory inten t varie s wit h th e sor t o f interes t a t stake : I t i s more difficul t t o accomplis h wit h respec t t o housin g an d employment, an d somewha t les s difficul t i n th e contex t o f jury selection or voting rights. Nevertheless, non e o f th e discriminator y inten t case s departs fro m a cor e conceptio n o f discriminator y intent , on e that carrie s ver y stron g connotation s o f consciou s desir e t o do harm . I n Washington v. Davis Justice Steven s joine d th e majority opinion , but also wrote separately to explain that in his vie w th e distinctio n between discriminator y impac t an d discriminatory purpos e wa s no t a s brigh t a s i t migh t a t first

The Constitutional Requirement 144

seem, becaus e "[frequentl y th e mos t probativ e evidenc e o f intent wil l b e objectiv e evidenc e o f wha t actuall y happene d rather tha n evidenc e describin g th e subjectiv e stat e o f min d of th e actor . Fo r normall y th e acto r i s presume d t o hav e intended th e natura l consequence s o f hi s deeds." 18 Th e Court addressed, and declined to adopt, Justice Stevens' position in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 19 a sex discrimination case. Feeney challenged a Massachusetts statut e grantin g a nearly absolute preference i n state civil service employment to veterans ; she contended tha t becaus e the clas s o f veteran s was overwhelmingly male, the preference inevitabl y and fore seeably operate d t o exclud e wome n fro m th e civi l service . The Cour t rejecte d Feeney' s argument , an d wit h i t Stevens ' foreseeable effect s approach , embracin g instea d th e rule tha t discriminatory inten t mean s tha t th e decisionmake r chos e a challenged faciall y neutra l cours e o f actio n " 'becaus e of, ' not merely 'in spite of,' it s adverse effects upo n an identifiabl e group." 20 Thi s languag e ver y strongl y suggest s a mode l o f conscious desire to cause the disadvantageous effects . After Davis an d Feeney, a stat e o r federa l criterio n o f decision tha t ha s disproportionat e racia l effect s bu t i s no t shown t o hav e been enacted "becaus e of " thos e effects , trig gers onl y rationa l basi s review . This is a deferential mod e of review, which require s onl y tha t th e measur e i n questio n b e "rationally relate d t o a legitimat e stat e interest. " I n effect , rational basi s revie w afford s th e government' s practice s a presumption o f constitutionality , an d constitutiona l chal lenges resolve d unde r th e "rationa l basis " standar d rarel y succeed. Very shortl y afte r Davis wa s decide d th e Suprem e Cour t

The Constitutional Requirement 145

settled o n an intermediate leve l of scrutiny i n sex discrimina tion cases. This is a form of scrutiny that is neither deferentia l nor "fata l i n fact" ; i t require s th e stat e t o sho w tha t a chal lenged measure is "substantially related to an important government objective." 21 Intermediat e scrutin y ha s the virtue of engaging th e reviewin g cour t i n a n explici t examinatio n o f the constitutiona l value s a t stak e i n a particula r case , bu t affords governmen t a meaningfu l opportunit y t o justif y a challenged practice .

Discriminatory Intent and Transparency It i s apparen t tha t th e requiremen t o f discriminator y inten t fails t o provid e an y remed y a t al l fo r transparentl y whit e decisionmaking. Though transparentl y whit e criteria o f decision inevitabl y produc e raciall y disparat e consequences , i t would b e inconsisten t wit h th e notio n o f "transparency " t o suppose tha t thos e criteri a o f decisio n wer e chose n because of their raciall y skewe d effects . Thus , by definition, i t woul d be impossible to show discriminatory inten t in a genuine case of transparently white decisionmaking . The threshold requiremen t tha t th e constitutional plaintif f prove discriminatory inten t operate s to draw a sharp distinction betwee n faciall y neutra l bu t unconsciously race-specifi c instances o f white decisionmaking , o n the on e hand, an d th e deliberate us e of race , whether over t o r covert , o n the other ; only th e latte r i s constitutionall y impermissible . However , relying on a distinction amon g discriminators' state s of mind seems a curiou s strateg y fo r implementin g th e Brown v.

The Constitutional Requirement 146

Board of Education principl e tha t th e us e o f rac e a s a criterion o f decisio n i s what constitute s th e constitutiona l harm , because rac e i s equall y th e dispositiv e facto r eve n whe n th e process tha t bring s i t t o bea r i s unconscious . Indeed , th e discriminatory inten t requiremen t appear s mor e suite d t o drive th e rac e specificit y o f whit e decisionmakin g under ground—out o f whites ' awareness—tha n t o eradicat e i t al together.22 Nevertheless, the intent requirement might rest on either o f tw o assumption s that , couple d wit h th e perceive d institutional cost s of heightened scrutiny , * provide ostensibl e justification fo r th e decisio n t o disapprov e onl y the purpose ful us e of race in government decisionmaking . These founda tional assumption s are , first, that unconsciously race-specifi c decisionmaking i s relativel y rare , or , second , tha t th e con scious us e o f rac e a s a facto r i n decisionmakin g i s mor e blameworthy tha n it s unconscious use. The Belie f i n the Rarit y o f Unconsciou s Race Discriminatio n The Suprem e Court' s decisio n t o adop t a discriminator y intent rule that does not reach unconscious race-specific deci sionmaking might res t on a belief tha t suc h discriminatio n i s uncommon. Suc h a belief is, perhaps, the natural corollary of whites' widespread fait h i n the pervasiveness o f race-neutral ity. Whites see m to believ e that mos t interaction s an d event s * "Heightened scrutiny " i s a generi c ter m tha t encompasse s al l form s of nondeferentia l judicia l review—tha t is , both intermediat e an d stric t scrutiny.

The Constitutional Requirement 147

are untainte d b y racia l considerations ; w e ten d t o see , fo r example, Klan an d othe r overtl y white supremacis t attitude s as extreme , perhap s pathological , deviation s fro m th e (race neutral) nor m o f whit e though t an d behavio r (a s i f whit e supremacist attitude s ca n b e comprehended i n complet e iso lation fro m th e cultur e i n whic h the y ar e embedded) . Simi larly, white s ten d t o adop t th e "thing s ar e gettin g better " story o f rac e relations , whic h allow s u s t o suppos e tha t ou r unfortunate histor y o f sociall y approve d rac e discriminatio n is largel y behin d us . This nexu s o f whit e confidenc e i n rac e neutrality migh t dictat e tha t th e la w shoul d trea t th e uncon scious us e o f nonobviousl y race-specifi c criteri a o f decisio n as nothing mor e tha n th e occasiona l deviatio n fro m th e prevailing practic e o f race-neutra l governmen t decisionmaking . From thi s perspective , give n tha t significan t institutiona l costs are associated with judicial intervention,** unconsciou s race specificity seem s too rare to justify heightene d review . The transparenc y phenomeno n provide s tw o argument s against th e view that unconsciou s rac e specificit y i s unusual. At minimum, i t counsels that w e hesitate to acquiesc e in an y view tha t accept s rac e neutralit y a t fac e value , whether a s a matter o f fac t o r o f frequenc y o f occurrence . Second , trans parency support s th e stronger, affirmativ e argumen t tha t un conscious race-specifi c decisionmakin g i s so commo n tha t i t is in fact th e norm for whit e decisionmakers . The belie f tha t race-neutra l decisionmakin g i s relativel y common an d unconsciousl y race-specifi c decisionmakin g rel-

** These institutiona l cost s ar e examined a t som e lengt h i n chapter 4 .

The Constitutional Requirement 148

atively uncommon stand s analytically distinc t from th e belief that an y particula r instanc e o f faciall y neutra l decisionmak ing i s i n fac t wha t i t seems . Eve n i f th e unconsciou s us e o f race wer e extremel y rare , white s stil l coul d misperceiv e th e true character o f every one of the few instances in which race in fact wa s a factor i n the decision . Conversely , th e fac t tha t whites frequentl y ar e unawar e o f th e white-specifi c factor s that ma y b e use d i n whit e decisionmakin g doe s no t dictat e one conclusio n o r anothe r regardin g th e frequenc y wit h which suc h factor s actuall y ar e employed . Thi s analyti c dis tinction notwithstanding , transparenc y counsel s skepticis m with respec t to the frequency o f race-neutra l decisionmakin g as well. Because th e transparenc y phenomeno n create s a risk tha t whites wil l misapprehen d th e race-specifi c natur e o f appar ently race-neutra l decisionmaking , i t simultaneousl y create s a risk that we will systematically underestimat e th e incidence of suc h decisionmaking . Eac h circumstanc e i n which w e fai l to perceiv e accuratel y th e racia l conten t o f ou r decision s contributes t o th e overal l perceptio n tha t rac e neutralit y i s the more common way of doing business. Thus, even though the conclusio n tha t rac e specificit y i s th e nor m doe s no t necessarily follo w fro m transparenc y alone , w e ough t t o adopt a healthy skepticis m toward , rathe r tha n a blin d fait h in the pervasiveness of , rac e neutrality, i f we wish to b e able to asses s mor e accuratel y th e rol e o f rac e i n whit e deci sionmaking. Transparency als o lend s suppor t t o th e stronge r positio n that unconsciou s race-specifi c decisionmakin g i s so commo n that i t i s i n fac t th e norma l mod e o f whit e decisionmaking .

The Constitutional Requirement / 49

This argument rests in part on an analysis of the outcomes of discretionary whit e decisionmaking . Numerou s studie s indi cate that whites receive more favorable treatmen t than blacks in virtuall y ever y are a o f socia l interaction. 23 Th e weigh t o f the evidence supports the conclusion that rac e affects whites ' discretionary decisionmaking in areas as diverse as hiring and performance evaluation s in employment settings; 24 mortgage lending, insurance redlining , an d retai l bargaining; 25 psychi atric diagnoses; 26 response s t o patien t violenc e i n menta l institutions;27 an d virtuall y ever y stag e i n th e crimina l la w process: arrest, 28 th e decisio n t o charge, 29 imprisonment, 30 and capital sentencing. 31 Studies o f th e impac t o f rac e o n whit e decisionmakin g nearly alway s explai n disparat e rac e effect s b y focusin g o n negative assessment s of , o r undesirabl e outcome s for , non whites, rathe r tha n positiv e result s fo r whites . Tha t is , the y adopt a conceptua l framewor k i n whic h unconsciou s rac e discrimination tend s to b e associated wit h prejudice o r stereotyping rathe r tha n transparency . A t th e sam e time , eac h o f the studie s cite d abov e control s th e dat a fo r race-neutra l variables, so that th e influence o f race on the decisionmakin g process ca n b e assesse d i n isolatio n fro m othe r factors . Th e transparency phenomenon suggest s that the selected indepen dent variable s ma y i n fac t b e transparentl y white-specific . When the y are , additiona l rac e effects , thoug h differen t i n kind fro m thos e conceptualize d b y the researchers , ar e present as well. In sum , th e socia l scienc e literatur e indicate s tha t rac e impacts most white decisionmaking most of the time, and the researchers' ow n susceptibilit y t o transparenc y suggest s tha t

The Constitutional Requirement 150

unconscious discrimination may be even more prevalent tha n the studies acknowledge. It follows that faith i n the commonality of race-neutral decisionmakin g i s a component o f whit e race consciousness that lack s any solid empirical support . The Belie f Tha t Consciou s Discriminatio n I s Mor e Blameworthy Tha n Unconsciou s Discriminatio n A secon d foundationa l belie f tha t migh t b e proffere d t o justify th e line drawn b y the discriminatory inten t rule is that the conscious us e of race-specifi c criteri a o f decisio n i s more blameworthy tha n th e unconsciou s us e of race . That vie w is consistent wit h th e familia r lega l principl e tha t conduc t in tended t o cause a specified harmfu l resul t is more blamewor thy tha n conduc t tha t cause s th e sam e har m inadvertently . In othe r words , th e la w commonl y recognize s degree s o f culpability associated wit h differen t state s o f mind . I n th e criminal law , fo r example , th e Mode l Pena l Cod e distin guishes, an d rank s hierarchically , fou r kind s o f culpability , based o n acts done purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.32 By analogy, if the harm o f race discrimination lie s in the us e of rac e a s a criterion o f decision , the levels-of-culpa bility mode l woul d see m t o sugges t tha t th e consciou s o r purposeful us e o f rac e a s a criterio n o f decisio n shoul d b e deemed more blameworthy tha n the unconscious use of race. In th e Washington u Davis opinion , th e Suprem e Cour t implicitly framed th e issue as whether a showing of a racially disparate impac t woul d trigge r stric t scrutin y o r rationa l ba sis review. Thus, adopting th e rul e that stric t scrutin y woul d apply onl y upo n proo f o f discriminator y inten t mean t tha t

The Constitutional Requirement 151

government actions reflecting onl y unconscious race discrimination—in whic h discriminator y inten t i s absent—woul d enjoy th e presumptio n o f constitutionalit y associate d wit h rational basi s review . T o whatever exten t an y constitutiona l doctrine is founded on , or is designed to reflect, a conception of mora l blameworthiness , th e clea r implicatio n i s tha t un conscious racis m i s no t merel y les s blameworth y tha n it s purposeful counterpart , bu t is not blameworth y a t all. Clearly, lega l rule s d o no t determin e th e mora l statu s o f the conduc t the y proscrib e o r permit . Fo r example , th e "n o duty to rescue" rul e receives nearly universa l criticism fo r it s failure t o impos e liabilit y fo r conduc t commonl y though t t o be morall y blameworthy. 33 O n th e othe r hand , lega l doc trines do carry normative messages , more insistently i n som e contexts tha n i n others . W e ough t t o tak e th e normativ e dimension o f th e discriminator y inten t rul e quit e seriousl y for a t least two reasons. First, the Supreme Cour t itsel f ha s emphasized th e norma tive dimensio n o f it s constitutional liabilit y rule s b y increas ingly craftin g "stat e o f mind " requirement s reminiscen t o f the discourse of criminal liability. In addition to the Washington v. Davis rul e itself , th e Cour t ha s hel d tha t neithe r a n Eighth Amendment nor a Due Process violation may be predicated o n negligen t conduc t alone, 34 ha s formulate d goo d faith exception s t o th e exclusionary rul e an d t o th e constitu tional guarante e o f a crimina l defendant' s acces s t o evi dence,35 an d ha s fashione d a qualifie d immunit y doctrin e that partiall y insulate s governmen t actor s fro m sectio n 1983 36 an d Bivens 37 liability. 38 Eve n thoug h thes e require ments o f inten t o r "ba d faith " ten d t o b e tested b y objectiv e

The Constitutional Requirement 152

standards, an d therefor e ar e no t literall y "stat e o f mind " requirements, the larger messag e is that ther e i s a culpabilit y element t o (some ) constitutiona l violations , whic h strength ens the analogy to criminal conduct . Second, white s shar e n o apparen t consensu s concernin g the morality o f unconsciou s rac e discrimination . Indeed , th e transparency phenomenon suggest s that no such consensus is attainable at present because unconscious discrimination tha t takes the form o f transparently white-specific criteri a of decision i s b y definitio n unsee n b y th e whit e discriminator . Against thi s background , th e manne r i n whic h th e Cour t chooses to address unconscious discrimination inevitabl y will have a powerfu l normativ e effect , eithe r t o legitimat e o r t o challenge accepte d bu t unexamine d whit e way s o f thinkin g about race . The messag e tha t unconsciou s discrimination , i f it exists, is not (very ) blameworth y make s it more likely tha t whites wil l continu e t o den y th e existenc e o f unconsciou s discrimination. In eschewin g heightene d scrutin y fo r raciall y disparat e ef fects absen t proo f o f discriminator y intent , th e Cour t send s two message s tha t operat e t o legitimat e unconsciou s rac e discrimination. First , the discriminator y inten t rul e recreate s transparency a t th e leve l o f constitutiona l doctrine , fo r i t affords a presumptio n o f rac e neutralit y t o faciall y neutra l criteria o f decisio n withou t regar d t o th e possibilit y tha t those criteria i n fact reflec t white-specific characteristics , attitudes, o r experiences . The rul e tend s t o reassur e white s tha t all i s wel l s o lon g a s w e avoi d th e consciou s us e o f race specific base s for decision . The requiremen t o f discriminator y inten t als o legitimate s

The Constitutional Requirement 153

unconscious rac e discriminatio n b y reinforcin g a popula r white stor y abou t progres s i n rac e relations . Th e centra l theme o f thi s stor y i s tha t ou r societ y ha s a n unfortunat e history of race discrimination tha t is largely behind us . In the past, th e stor y goes , som e unenlightene d individual s prac ticed slaver y an d othe r form s o f over t oppressio n o f blac k people, but th e belie f i n the inferiorit y o f blacks upon whic h these practices were premised has almost entirely disappeare d today. We, aside from th e exceptional fe w who remain ou t of step wit h th e times , thin k o f blacks a s th e equals o f white s and thu s n o longe r accep t rac e a s a permissibl e basi s fo r different treatment . Th e Court' s discriminator y inten t rul e contributes t o thi s dominan t stor y insofa r a s i t treat s a s blameworthy th e for m o f rac e discriminatio n mos t commo n in th e pas t bu t refuse s t o regar d wit h suspicio n th e uncon scious discriminatio n tha t i s at leas t a s significant a cause of the oppression o f black people today.

Transparency-Conscious Scrutiny I no w se t fort h a constitutiona l disparat e impac t rul e de signed t o addres s th e consequence s o f th e transparenc y phe nomenon a s i t affect s governmen t decisionmaking . I recog nize that not all government action s that arguably violate the Equal Protectio n Claus e ar e product s o f transparency , an d I emphasize that thi s proposal doe s not foreclos e finding some government decision s unconstitutiona l becaus e motivated b y racial animus . Othe r conduc t migh t properl y b e invalidate d because animate d b y racia l stereotyping . Accordingly , th e

The Constitutional Requirement 154

disparate impac t rul e I propose woul d b e onl y on e piec e i n a complete equa l protectio n jurisprudence . Thi s proposa l aim s specifically a t governmen t decision s tha t carr y raciall y dispa rate consequence s an d likel y woul d no t hav e bee n adopte d but fo r th e transparenc y phenomenon . In outline , th e propose d rul e call s fo r heightene d scrutin y of governmenta l criteri a o f decisio n tha t hav e raciall y dispa rate effects . First , th e constitutiona l challenge r mus t sho w that a faciall y neutra l criterio n o f decisio n ha s a dispropor tionate racia l impact . Onc e disparat e impac t i s proven , gov ernment mus t articulat e th e purpose s behin d th e challenge d rule o f decision . Th e reviewin g cour t ough t t o interpre t gov ernment's asserte d purpose(s ) i n a s pluralis t a manne r a s possible, bu t governmen t ha s th e optio n o f resistin g tha t interpretation i n favo r o f a n assimilationis t constructio n o f its goals . I n tha t event , governmen t wil l bea r a burde n o f justification simila r t o tha t impose d unde r traditiona l inter mediate scrutiny . Finally , whether governmenta l purpose s ar e construed pluralisticall y o r i n a n assimilationis t manner , th e constitutional challenge r ha s th e obligatio n t o brin g forwar d alternative mean s o f achievin g government' s goals . Govern ment mus t implemen t th e challenger' s proposal s unles s i t can demonstrat e tha t thos e alternative s provid e les s effectiv e means o f implementin g it s goal s tha n th e criteri a o f decisio n originally employed . The thoroughl y skeptica l whit e decisionmake r regard s al l facially neutra l criteri a o f decisio n a s presumptivel y white specific; th e existenc e o f raciall y disparat e effect s onl y con firms wha t hi s skepticis m alread y counsels . Thus, the individ ual decisionmake r wh o take s transparenc y seriousl y ha s n o

The Constitutional Requirement 155

need fo r a rul e tha t treat s faciall y neutra l criteri a o f decisio n with raciall y disparat e effect s differentl y fro m faciall y neutra l criteria i n general . However , tha t stanc e i s unworkabl e a s a constitutional rul e becaus e i t woul d requir e heightene d judi cial scrutin y o f virtuall y ever y governmenta l decision . A rul e that require s a showin g o f disparat e effect s a s a predicat e fo r heightened scrutin y i s a satisfactor y alternativ e becaus e i t provides fo r judicia l interventio n wheneve r th e presume d transparency phenomeno n ha s produce d concret e racia l con sequences. Because i t i s the issu e tha t trigger s heightene d scrutiny , th e constitutional challenge r mus t demonstrat e th e existenc e o f racially disproportionat e effects . However , th e histor y o f Ti tle VI I disparat e impac t litigatio n reveal s a potentia l hazard . As i s th e cas e unde r th e constitutiona l rul e propose d here , a Title VI I plaintiff' s proo f o f disparat e impac t alon e place s a burden o f justificatio n o n th e defendant ; i n th e Titl e VI I context th e ensuin g evidentiar y warfar e ha s bee n intens e an d highly technical. 39 Whil e th e Washington v. Davis rul e pro vides n o simila r incentiv e fo r constitutiona l defendant s t o search ou t way s t o contes t plaintiffs ' factua l claim s o f dispa rate effect s (becaus e plaintiff s alread y bea r th e burde n o f proving discriminator y intent) , th e propose d rule , mandatin g heightened scrutin y upo n disproportionat e effect s alone , clearly carrie s th e potentia l fo r simila r litigatio n strategies . Accordingly, th e propose d rul e anticipate s th e nee d fo r evidentiary guideline s concernin g proo f o f advers e effects , and i t permit s th e constitutiona l challenge r t o mak e suc h a demonstration b y relyin g o n a statistica l disparit y betwee n the racial compositio n o f th e group selecte d b y the challenge d

The Constitutional Requirement 156

criteria o f decisio n an d tha t o f th e genera l population . Tha t is, th e challenge r nee d sho w onl y tha t th e criterio n i n ques tion occurs, or is based on a characteristic that occurs , differ entially acros s races.*** This a relatively broa d approac h t o the questio n o f proo f o f disparat e effects ; i t effectivel y re quires governmen t t o justif y it s practice s regardles s o f wh o or wha t cause d a give n disparity . Thi s i s a desirabl e featur e of th e propose d rule . Mandatin g heightene d scrutin y i n more, rather tha n fewer , case s plausibly characterize d a s exhibiting disparat e effect s i s consisten t wit h th e skepticis m regarding rac e neutralit y awakene d b y consciousnes s o f th e transparency phenomenon : I f w e ar e t o ferre t ou t transpar ently white-specifi c criteri a o f decision , governmen t shoul d bear the task o f justification mor e rather tha n les s frequently . Once th e constitutiona l challenge r ha s prove d th e exis tence of racially disparate effects, governmen t shoul d have to articulate the purpose o r goal of the challenged criteria . This simply assure s tha t th e challenge r wil l no t b e require d t o guess a t government' s policie s o r purposes . However , trans parency can infec t government' s purpose s a s readily as it can affect chose n means , s o th e interpretatio n o f government' s articulated purpos e is critical. Heightened, transparency-consciou s scrutin y o f govern mental purpose s require s th e reviewin g cour t t o constru e

* * * This proposa l i s functionall y equivalen t t o th e wa y disparat e im pact woul d b e establishe d unde r th e "foreseeabl e effects " approac h t o Title VII set forth i n chapter 5 . That chapte r als o includes discussio n o f many o f th e technica l issue s tha t hav e arise n i n Titl e VI I disparat e impact cases .

The Constitutional Requirement 157

those purpose s i n a manne r tha t doe s no t perpetuat e th e covert impositio n o f whit e norms . On e wa y t o avoi d th e reintroduction o f transparenc y i s for court s t o interpre t gov ernment's goals in as culturally pluralist a manner as possible. That is , the reviewin g cour t shoul d inquir e whethe r an d t o what exten t government' s articulate d goal , viewe d a t a n ap propriate leve l of generality, may b e construed t o encompas s objectives tha t nee d no t b e understood a s white-specific. Fo r example, i n Fragante v. City & County of Honolulu*® a Filipino jo b applican t wh o achieve d th e highes t scor e o n th e applicable civi l servic e examinatio n wa s rejecte d fo r a posi tion a s a clerk a t th e Departmen t o f Moto r Vehicle s becaus e he spok e Englis h wit h a heavy Filipin o accent . Ha d th e cas e been litigate d a s a constitutional challeng e t o a faciall y neu tral rul e requirin g clerk s t o spea k "unaccented " English , the government mos t likel y would hav e identifie d effectiv e com munication with the public as the purpose behin d the rule. The transparenc y o f th e nor m o f "unaccented " speec h should b e obvious . Fragante' s speec h wa s perceive d a s "dif ficult" by individuals who, consciously or unconsciously, preferred th e speech of people with accents more nearly like that of whit e Americans. 41 Thi s cas e als o illustrate s th e tempta tion fo r governmen t t o attemp t t o justif y a transparentl y white criterion of decision with an equally white-specific pur pose. Fro m tha t perspective , th e centra l proble m o f th e cas e is the suppresse d whitenes s o f th e notio n o f "effectiv e com munication" wit h th e public, government's proffere d "legiti mate, nondiscriminatory reason. " Under th e disparat e impac t analysi s propose d here , a re viewing cour t ough t t o constru e government' s purpose , i f

The Constitutional Requirement 158

possible, i n a manne r tha t woul d no t advantag e whites . Tha t is, th e cour t woul d hav e t o presum e th e "public " t o b e a diverse communit y an d giv e "effectiv e communication " th e broadest possibl e reading . I f th e cour t unconsciousl y inter preted "effectiv e communication " t o mea n "effectiv e com munication wit h whites, " i t woul d hav e reintroduce d trans parency i n a manne r tha t woul d defea t th e underlyin g goal s of heightene d scrutiny . On th e othe r hand , governmen t ough t t o hav e th e optio n of insistin g o n a constructio n o f it s purpos e tha t i s white specific, whe n i t ha s goo d reason s fo r doin g so . O n occasion , context ma y provid e a goo d reason : If , fo r example , al l o r nearly al l o f th e person s wit h who m Mr . Fragant e woul d come int o contac t wer e i n fac t white , governmen t shoul d b e permitted t o see k "effectiv e communication " wit h tha t group, eve n i f it s purpos e i s thu s effectivel y white-specific . However, a rul e o f genera l applicabilit y woul d requir e a more thoroug h evaluatio n o f government' s goals . Suppos e government argue d tha t "effectiv e communication " shoul d be construe d i n a white-specifi c manne r fo r th e sak e o f uni formity an d tha t a whit e nor m ha d bee n adopte d becaus e whites ar e th e dominan t grou p i n thi s society . A t thi s stag e the reviewin g cour t woul d rever t t o a mor e traditiona l for m of scrutiny , balancin g government' s interes t i n uniformity an d whiteness agains t th e burde n th e adoptio n o f a white-specifi c rule woul d plac e o n nonwhites . T o prevai l unde r thi s "mid level" scrutiny , government' s chose n purpos e mus t b e "im portant." A t minimum , a n asserte d interes t i n administrativ e convenience woul d no t b e sufficient. 42 Once th e questio n o f purpos e ha s bee n settled , whethe r i n

The Constitutional Requirement 159

an assimilationis t o r a pluralis t manner , th e challenge r mus t introduce mean s o f achievin g tha t purpos e tha t d o no t dis proportionately disadvantag e nonwhites . I n th e Fragante sit uation th e challenge r migh t propos e on e o r mor e functiona l tests fo r "effectiv e communicatio n wit h th e public " tha t would measure , fo r example , the actua l abilit y o f the relevan t set o f listener s t o comprehen d Mr . Fragante' s speech . Thi s "relevant set " o f listener s woul d b e determine d b y the court' s construction o f th e governmenta l purpose . A n assimilationis t interpretation woul d defin e th e relevan t grou p a s bein g com pletely o r essentiall y white ; a pluralis t interpretatio n woul d envision a mor e divers e audience . I n eithe r case , th e chal lenger woul d hav e th e opportunit y t o propos e alternativ e criteria o f selectio n tha t woul d effectuat e government' s goal . The challenge r shoul d b e allowe d a t thi s stag e t o propos e measures tha t woul d operat e t o th e advantag e o f nonwhit e applicants, a s wel l a s criteri a o f selectio n tha t woul d b e racially neutra l i n effect . Finally, governmen t mus t sho w tha t th e challenger' s pro posed alternative(s ) woul d b e les s effectiv e i n achievin g it s purpose, a s interprete d b y th e court , tha n th e criteri a o f decision employe d b y th e government . I f governmen t fail s to carr y it s burde n here , i t wil l b e require d t o emplo y th e challenger's criteri a o f decisio n eithe r a s a substitut e for , o r in paralle l with , th e criteri a previousl y i n use . In th e abstract , parallel us e o f alternativ e criteri a o f decisio n would b e prefer able i n case s i n whic h th e challenger' s propose d criteri a o f selection operat e t o advantag e nonwhites , an d substitutio n would b e appropriat e i f the proffere d alternativ e ha d raciall y neutral effects . Fo r example , i n th e Fragante scenario , a func -

The Constitutional Requirement 160

tional, actual-ability-to-be-understoo d tes t woul d no t sys tematically advantag e nonwhite s ove r whites , and s o substi tution o f tha t tes t fo r th e hypothesize d requiremen t o f "unaccented" speec h would b e preferable . Like the traditional forms o f heightened scrutiny employed in equa l protectio n analysis , th e disparat e impac t rul e pro posed her e place s increase d burden s o f justificatio n o n gov ernment wit h respect bot h t o it s purposes an d it s means, bu t the rul e doe s s o wit h specia l attentio n t o th e transparenc y phenomenon. Thus , where traditiona l heightene d revie w re quires that government' s purpos e b e unusually weighty (and , arguably, tha t i t b e contemporaneou s wit h th e challenge d rule o r decisio n an d adequatel y supporte d i n fact), transpar ency-conscious scrutin y require s governmen t t o articulat e purposes tha t ar e neithe r overtl y no r transparentl y white specific. Governmen t ma y impos e norm s tha t ar e effectivel y white, bu t i t mus t announc e it s choice candidly , an d i t mus t bear a substantia l burde n o f justificatio n whe n i t wishe s t o do so . Traditional heightene d scrutin y the n demand s a suffi ciently tigh t "fit " betwee n government' s goal an d it s chose n means; the proposed rul e requires the use of alternative criteria o f decisio n tha t hav e n o raciall y disparat e impac t when ever doin g so will not negativel y affec t government' s permis sible purposes. The Washington v. Davis facts provide another, more challenging application o f the proposed rule . The Davis facts ar e analyzed her e as raising a problem o f dialect , while Fragante concerned accen t discrimination . A dialec t i s a varian t o f a language; accent refers t o manner o f pronunciation. On e can speak an y dialec t i n a variet y o f accents . I n particular , th e

The Constitutional Requirement 161

dialect know n a s "standard " Englis h ca n b e spoke n wit h a Filipino accent , a n Africa n American accent , o r th e accen t known a s "Genera l American." 43 Th e analysi s tha t follow s assumes, for th e sak e o f discussion , tha t a t leas t som e o f th e unsuccessful Davis applicant s wer e mor e proficien t i n th e dialect know n a s Blac k Englis h (sometime s labele d "Ebon ics") tha n i n "standard " (White ) English . I n thi s respect , I depart from th e more common hypothesis that the difficultie s experienced b y the actual Davis plaintiffs ha d bee n the result of inferior , segregate d education . Blac k Englis h i s a full y developed language. 44 M y intuitio n i s tha t ther e i s a differ ence betwee n accen t an d dialec t here : Whites ar e mor e will ing t o tolerat e an d accommodat e (some ) accen t pluralis m than we are dialect variation . In Washington v. Davis the challenged criterion of decision was "Tes t 21, " a writte n tes t o f "verba l ability , vocabulary , reading an d comprehension. " Tes t 2 1 ha d a n undispute d disparate racia l impact : Blac k applicant s faile d i t a t fou r times th e rat e o f whit e applicants . Government' s articulate d purpose wa s "modestl y t o upgrad e th e communicativ e abili ties o f it s employee s . . . particularly wher e th e jo b require s special ability to communicate orall y and in writing." 45 At th e stag e o f purpos e analysis , th e reviewin g cour t would begi n wit h th e presumptio n tha t governmen t ha d no t set out to foster i n all its police officers onl y the "communica tive abilities " o f white persons , though governmen t could , if it wished , mak e th e cas e tha t tha t wa s precisel y wha t i t ha d intended. Th e underlyin g agend a o f thi s sor t o f purpos e re view i s t o requir e governmen t t o clarif y it s goals , an d con comitantly t o expos e transparentl y white-specifi c govern -

The Constitutional Requirement 162

mental purposes . I f governmen t wa s seekin g officer candidates abl e t o communicat e effectivel y wit h a diverse — in Washington , D.C. , a majorit y black—public , a pluralis t interpretation o f it s purpos e woul d b e mos t appropriate . O n the othe r hand , i f governmen t wa s pursuin g a degre e o f language standardization , sa y wit h th e inten t t o "profession alize" th e polic e department , i t woul d b e eviden t tha t "pro fessionalization" ha d bee n implicitl y define d b y referenc e t o white norms , an d s o furthe r justificatio n o f tha t goal , an d o f the whit e languag e standar d i t incorporates , woul d b e i n order. 46 Judg e Robb , wh o dissente d fro m th e Cour t o f Ap peals decisio n tha t hel d Tes t 2 1 unconstitutional , articulate d government's bes t cas e fo r languag e standardization : [MJodern la w enforcemen t i s a highl y skille d professiona l service . In schoo l an d thereafte r i n practic e a policema n mus t lear n an d understand intricat e procedures . H e mus t understan d a myria d o f regulations, statutes an d judicial rulings, and he will be called upo n to apply them in his daily work. He mus t b e abl e t o presen t relevan t fact s i n literate , clea r an d precise reports. When he testifies i n court h e must b e articulate. He cannot achiev e thes e goal s unles s h e ha s a basi c understandin g o f the Englis h languag e an d th e meanin g o f word s an d th e abilit y t o perceive the import o f written sentences. 47 In short , polic e officer s mus t b e abl e t o comprehen d an d t o speak Whit e Englis h becaus e i t is the languag e o f la w an d th e courtroom. Whether languag e standardizatio n constitute s a n "im portant" governmen t purpos e i n thi s contex t i s a clos e ques tion. Arguably , languag e standardizatio n i n th e polic e forc e

The Constitutional Requirement 163

(and i n th e courts , an d governmen t generally ) implicate s more tha n mer e "administrativ e convenience. " M y ow n sense i s that a reviewing cour t woul d dee m i t "important" ; i f so, it would surviv e judicial scrutin y unde r th e proposed rule . At issu e i s the abilit y o f th e whit e majorit y t o gover n itsel f i n its ow n language , and , i f ther e i s goin g t o b e a limi t t o cultural pluralis m anywhere , i t wil l mos t likel y b e locate d a t or nea r th e sea t o f government . Pu t somewha t mor e posi tively, th e majorit y whit e governmen t i s entitle d t o requir e that th e officer s i t engage s t o enforc e th e la w ar e abl e t o comprehend it s commands. O n th e othe r hand , i t als o ca n b e said tha t governmen t ha s a dut y t o articulat e it s command s in way s tha t ar e comprehensibl e t o it s citizens ; henc e th e conclusion tha t thi s i s a clos e question . In whateve r manne r government' s purpos e i s finally con strued, th e challenger s ma y the n formulat e an d propos e alter native mean s o f achievin g government' s goal s tha t the y be lieve wil l no t disadvantag e blac k applicants . If , fo r example , communication wit h th e (raciall y mixed ) publi c wa s th e sought-after skill , the challenger s migh t com e u p wit h a "Tes t 2 2 " tha t woul d measur e languag e skill s appropriat e t o on e or mor e nonwhit e segment s o f th e community . The y migh t then propos e tha t al l applicant s b e require d t o achiev e a minimum combine d scor e o n Tes t 2 1 an d "Tes t 2 2 , " o r t o receive som e minimu m scor e o n eithe r test . Envisioning pluralis t mean s o f implementin g a govern ment goa l tha t ha s bee n give n a monocultura l interpretatio n is more difficult . Perhap s th e ingeniou s challenge r coul d iden tify som e sor t o f languag e acquisitio n tes t tha t woul d selec t applicants wh o coul d b e expecte d t o hav e a relativel y eas y

The Constitutional Requirement 164

time acquirin g th e require d skil l i n "standard " English ; bu t perhaps no suc h test is available. If none is, heightened scru tiny would have functioned t o identify a n area of government decisionmaking i n which assimilationis m i s permissible. Th e increase i n candor associate d wit h acknowledgin g th e whiteness o f formerl y transparen t whit e norm s woul d i n itsel f constitute a n advance in race relations. If th e challenger s propos e alternativ e selectio n criteria , government must demonstrate that adoptio n o f the proposed alternative to the sole use of Test 21 would imped e its search for officer s wit h "upgrade d communicativ e abilities, " as construed a t th e stag e o f purpos e analysis . I f i t canno t sustai n that burden , government mus t adop t th e challengers' recom mendations. Continue d us e o f Tes t 2 1 alon e would , unde r those circumstances , constitut e a n unjustifiabl e refusa l t o take transparency seriously . The deepe r desig n o f th e propose d rul e i s t o foste r con structive dialogu e concernin g th e necessit y an d appropriate ness o f assimilationis t governmenta l purpose s an d means . The transparenc y phenomeno n mean s tha t blacks evaluate d under "faciall y neutral " norm s i n fac t ofte n fac e a choic e between assimilatio n an d exclusion . Th e propose d rul e i s intended t o counterac t th e assimilationis t forc e o f transpar ency and to require government to confront th e possibility of greater opennes s t o cultura l diversit y i n th e formulatio n o f public policy and the exercise of governmental power. At the same time, the constitutional challenge r become s responsibl e for proposin g alternativ e mean s o f achievin g government' s articulated goals . Thi s requiremen t operate s t o reliev e a white-controlled governmen t o f some of the burde n o f diver -

The Constitutional Requirement 165

sification; i t doe s no t requir e white s suddenl y t o b e abl e t o envision remedie s fo r a phenomeno n tha t ha s to o ofte n es caped ou r awarenes s altogether . Ther e i s a dange r her e o f permitting whit e decisionmaker s t o evad e responsibilit y fo r transparency, because the burden is on challengers to propose alternatives t o faciall y neutra l bu t white-specifi c criteri a o f decision. Whit e peopl e shoul d no t alway s rel y o n blacks t o explain racism to us. 48 Nevertheless, in the interest o f settin g forth a proposa l tha t i s withi n whites ' reach , I settle d o n the requiremen t tha t nonwhite s wh o challeng e transparentl y white-specific governmenta l criteri a o f decisio n mus t take a n active role in reformulating them .

[4] Constitutional Qualm s

I

BELIEVE THE PROPOSAL se t fort h i n chapte r 3 i s adopt able, i n th e sens e tha t i t i s consistent wit h Equa l Protec tion principle s an d wit h wha t w e kno w abou t transparentl y white decisionmaking , th e proble m i t wa s designe d t o ad dress. However , som e constitutiona l scholar s woul d disagre e with th e first o f thos e propositions , an d i n additio n migh t argue tha t thi s proposa l i s inconsisten t wit h a principl e o f judicial restrain t tha t toda y affect s virtuall y al l constitutiona l analysis. Thi s chapte r addresse s i n tur n thes e tw o source s o f resistance t o th e propose d transparency-consciou s rule .

The Meaning of Equal Protection The propose d rul e clearl y abandon s th e colorblindnes s prin ciple, whic h disapprove s an y us e o f a race-specifi c criterio n of decision , n o matte r wha t th e rac e o f th e decisionmake r o r of th e person s respectivel y advantage d o r burdene d b y tha t 66

Constitutional Qualms 167

criterion. First , th e propose d rul e i s founded o n th e presump tion tha t faciall y neutra l criteri a o f decisio n employe d b y white decisionmaker s ar e i n fac t race-specific ; th e rule a t leas t challenges th e assumptio n o f th e colorblindnes s perspectiv e that suc h a thin g a s a raciall y neutra l criterio n o f decisio n i s possible. Second , the rul e permits governmen t t o tak e respon sibility fo r disparat e racia l effect s b y adoptin g paralle l race conscious criteri a o f decisio n i n appropriat e instances . Fi nally, thoug h th e propose d rul e doe s resembl e colorblindnes s insofar a s i t mandate s heightene d scrutin y i n th e interes t o f mitigating th e race-base d effect s o f som e covertl y race-spe cific criteri a o f decision , i t doe s s o onl y whe n thos e effect s flow fro m transparentl y white-specifi c base s o f decision . Tha t is, th e rul e contemplate s heightene d judicia l scrutin y onl y when ostensibl y neutra l criteri a formulate d o r deploye d b y white governmenta l decisionmaker s operat e t o disadvantag e nonwhites. I t i s no t symmetrical ; heightene d scrutin y i s no t appropriate whe n blac k governmenta l decisionmaker s for mulate an d appl y faciall y neutra l criteri a tha t negativel y im pact whites . A transparency-conscious disparat e impac t rul e shoul d no t be symmetrica l becaus e transparenc y itsel f i s a white-specifi c phenomenon. I n ou r societ y onl y white s hav e th e socia l power tha t render s ou r poin t o f vie w perspectiveless , tha t elevates ou r expectation s t o th e statu s o f "neutral " norms , and tha t permit s u s t o se e ourselve s an d ou r race-specifi c characteristics a s raceless . Assumin g ther e are , o r ca n be , meaningful instance s i n whic h nonwhite s gai n th e powe r t o formulate a s well a s to appl y governmenta l rule s o f decision , the existence o f an y disparat e negativ e effec t o n white s woul d

Constitutional Qualms 168

trigger at minimum a n immediate inquiry, by whites, into the possible racia l component s o f suc h faciall y neutra l rules . Thus, in this society, nonwhite decisionmakin g neve r benefit s from transparency . Nevertheless, colorblindness i s such a powerful nor m tha t many wil l se e it s abandonmen t a s a seriou s defec t o f th e proposed rule . Further reflectio n wil l demonstrate , however , that colorblindnes s i s a highl y problemati c constitutiona l principle. Justic e Scalia , th e strictes t adheren t t o th e color blindness principl e currentl y o n th e Suprem e Court , stake d out hi s positio n i n th e word s o f Alexande r Bickel : "Th e lesson o f th e grea t decision s o f th e Suprem e Cour t an d th e lesson o f contemporar y histor y hav e bee n th e sam e fo r a t least a generation : discriminatio n o n th e basi s o f rac e i s illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherentl y wrong , an d destructive of democratic society." 11 address in turn the claims that colorblindnes s i s an establishe d constitutiona l principle , that i t i s morall y self-evident , an d tha t i t i s instrumenta l t o the attainment o f racial justice. The availabl e evidenc e suggest s tha t it s framer s di d no t understand th e Fourteent h Amendmen t t o constitutional ize a n abstrac t colorblindnes s principle . First , th e serie s o f race-conscious Freedmen' s Burea u Act s adopte d i n th e sam e period a s th e Fourteent h Amendmen t support s th e conclu sion tha t th e framer s di d no t oppos e race-consciou s legisla tion pe r se. 2 However , th e argumen t tha t thos e Act s wer e directed exclusivel y a t aidin g th e actua l victim s o f prio r dis crimination dilute s th e inferenc e tha t th e framer s supporte d race-conscious measures. 3 Th e stronge r cas e agains t th e colorblindness interpretatio n rests , ironically, on the work o f

Constitutional Qualms 169

Alexander Bickel , who reached th e conclusion tha t th e fram ers di d no t inten d t o outla w segregate d publi c education , antimiscegenation laws , or the exclusio n o f blacks from jur y service an d th e vote. 4 Bicke l conclude d tha t th e framer s lef t open th e questio n o f givin g "greate r protection " tha n th e Civil Right s Ac t o f 1866 , which fo r hi m woul d hav e mean t extending th e prohibitio n agains t race-consciou s measures , "to b e decide d anothe r day." 5 Th e colorblindnes s principl e has becom e entrenched i n constitutional doctrine , but rathe r gradually. As a matter o f constitutiona l precedent , i t is quit e the new arrival on the block. 6 Contemporary commentator s sa w n o unequivoca l com mitment t o colorblindness i n Brown v. Board of Education, 7 though som e argue d tha t th e serie s o f pe r curia m decision s that followe d i t compelled th e conclusion tha t Brown reste d on colorblindness afte r all. 8 However, subsequen t desegrega tion decision s cu t th e othe r way ; the y tende d t o rel y o n racial balancing as a proxy for desegregation and on occasion suggested tha t race-consciou s measure s migh t b e permissibl e outside th e remedia l context. 9 Thoug h th e Cour t di d adop t one rule embodying the colorblindness perspective in 1976 — the requiremen t o f discriminator y inten t itself—i t decline d to d o th e sam e i n th e mor e controversia l contex t o f race specific affirmativ e actio n whe n opportunitie s aros e i n 1974 10 an d 1978. n Th e Cour t di d no t settl e o n a n explici t doctrine requiring stric t scrutin y o f all race-specific measure s until 1989. 12 The evolutio n o f th e rol e o f colorblindnes s i n Equa l Pro tection discours e i s enlightening . Colorblindnes s wa s no t i n itself especiall y controversial i n the early post-Brown era . Its

Constitutional Qualms I 70

significance lay in its potential to resolve a process-theoretical difficulty Herber t Wechsle r ha d understoo d Brown t o pose : In his view, Brown ha d faile d t o articulat e a "neutra l princi ple" supporting its holding.13 Some commentators saw colorblindness as such a principle. As one might expect, the colorblindness principl e becam e a n ite m o f contentio n i n it s ow n right a s th e debat e ove r affirmativ e actio n heate d up . How ever, it shed its ties to process theory at the same time, largely because process theory, as refined b y John Ely, found anothe r approach to , an d resolutio n of , th e questio n o f affirmativ e action: Stric t scrutin y i s no t appropriat e whe n th e whit e majority decide s t o favo r nonwhite s a t it s ow n expense. 14 Increasingly, colorblindnes s wa s defende d i n mora l an d substantive terms, featuring, fo r example , instrumental argu ments tha t race-consciou s measure s woul d ultimatel y ex acerbate racia l tension s o r tha t the y inevitabl y stigmatiz e blacks.15 This shift i n theoretical perspective, from th e search for "neutrality " t o th e avowedl y substantive , coincided , o f course, wit h th e conceptualizatio n o f th e "innocent " whit e "victim" o f affirmativ e action. 16 Th e current preeminenc e o f the colorblindnes s principl e i n constitutiona l discours e thu s appears, at least in part, attributable to its utility in defendin g white privilege. Turning from th e legal to the moral realm , the foundatio n of colorblindnes s seem s t o li e i n it s enormou s intuitiv e ap peal. To "judg e a person b y the color o f hi s skin" jus t seem s wrong. 17 Thi s mora l insigh t ma y b e the viscera l rejectio n o f its equally visceral opposite, the tendency of human being s to react negativel y t o person s o f a differen t colo r tha n them selves. However , distributiv e racia l justic e ha s a t leas t a s

Constitutional Qualms 171

strong a claim to center stag e as a guiding moral principle in the abstract , and , I would argue , emerge s a s the compellin g lodestar fo r mora l conduct i n a society such as this one, with a histor y o f slavery , apartheid , an d ongoin g racia l oppres sion. The colorblindnes s principl e ma y als o appea r morall y de sirable by virtue o f its relation t o the liberal value of individ ual autonomy . Colorblindnes s ofte n i s seen a s an expressio n of autonomy, which require s in part that person s not b e held responsible o r judge d fo r persona l characteristic s no t withi n their ow n control . Individual s ough t t o rea p th e fruit s o f their ow n industry , bu t the y ough t neithe r t o benefi t no r t o be disadvantaged becaus e o f characteristic s lik e race o r gen der that ar e a matter o f birth . However, colorblindness i s at bes t a paradoxical mean s of implementing autonomy values. On the one hand, autonom y is no t serve d whe n th e individua l i s pigeonhole d b y race ; certainly th e whol e perso n i s muc h mor e tha n th e colo r o f her skin . O n th e othe r hand , individua l autonom y ough t to includ e th e powe r o f self-definition , th e abilit y t o mak e fundamental valu e choice s an d t o selec t lif e strategies t o implement them . Suc h choices ar e not unbounded ; fo r man y individuals, to b e oneself i s to shar e i n the cultura l value s of a community to which one belongs by birth. Thus, for exam ple, for many black people embracing blackness as an explicit and positive aspect of personal identity is an essential component in the process of self-definition. 18 Here agai n th e Washington v. Davis fact s ar e illustrative . Some blac k applicant s almos t certainl y ha d grow n u p an d continued t o liv e i n blac k neighborhood s i n whic h Blac k

Constitutional Qualms 172

English wa s th e primar y spoke n dialect , an d i t wa s equall y likely that som e o f those would prefe r t o us e that dialec t o n the jo b a s well . Tes t 21 , however, measure d proficienc y i n "standard" (White ) Englis h an d likel y signale d th e inten t o f the police departmen t t o requir e th e us e o f Whit e Englis h i n the workplace . Eve n th e Blac k Englis h speaker s wh o passe d Test 21 must have experienced som e loss, or displacement, of self o n th e job ; th e unsuccessfu l tes t taker s essentiall y wer e told tha t the y coul d no t occup y th e powerfu l pos t o f polic e officer i f they remained monolingua l i n Black English. Proponents o f th e existin g requiremen t o f discriminator y intent appea r t o believ e tha t individua l autonom y i s serve d when decisionmaker s "ignore " th e rac e o f thos e affecte d b y their decisions , bu t th e transparenc y phenomenon , whic h suggests that colorblindnes s ma y operate instea d a s a vehicle for th e unthinkin g impositio n o f whit e norm s an d expecta tions, belie s tha t view . Th e propose d rul e take s a broade r view of personal autonom y an d take s seriously the centralit y of rac e t o man y individuals ' self-definition . Fo r thos e wh o have t o choos e betwee n th e language , customs , hairstyle , dress, o r lifestyl e o f thei r ow n communit y an d a desirabl e job o r othe r governmenta l benefit , th e autonom y cost s o f transparently whit e norms are considerable. The final categor y o f argument s purportin g t o suppor t the colorblindness principl e may be characterized, loosely , as exemplifying antisubordinativ e concerns . Rac e conscious ness—the explici t us e o f racia l classification s a s a mean s o f disadvantaging nonwhites—ha s bee n th e primar y vehicl e of racial subordinatio n unti l quit e recently. 19 Th e ideolog y o f opposition t o racia l hierarchy evolve d i n reaction t o th e spe-

Constitutional Qualms I 73

cific form s i n whic h racia l oppressio n ha d manifeste d itself . Rejecting racia l distinction s seeme d th e natura l avenu e t o reversing that histor y o f oppressio n an d achievin g racial justice, especiall y durin g th e "Secon d Reconstruction " o f th e 1950s an d 1960s ; colorblindnes s appeare d t o b e th e exac t antithesis of the form o f race consciousness that had been the root caus e o f racia l subordination. 20 I f "color " ha d marke d an individua l a s inferior , the n th e refusa l t o recogniz e "color" woul d b e the way to elevate him to equal status with whites. I n effect , colorblindnes s becam e th e rule-lik e prox y for a n underlying , historicall y base d antisubordinatio n prin ciple.21 The proble m wit h th e colorblindnes s principl e a s a strat egy for achievin g racial justice is that it has not bee n effectiv e outside th e socia l contex t i n whic h i t arose . Lik e al l rules , colorblindness i s bot h over - an d underinclusiv e wit h respec t to th e underlyin g policy—antisubordination—i t i s intende d to implement . I t is underinclusive becaus e the explicit us e of racial classification s i s n o longe r th e principa l vehicl e o f ra cial oppression ; structura l an d institutiona l racism , o f th e sort illustrate d b y th e transparenc y phenomenon , no w ar e the predominan t cause s o f blacks ' continue d inabilit y t o thrive i n thi s society . Colorblindnes s i s overinclusiv e insofa r as it regards the explicit use of racial classifications t o advan tage black s a s equall y blameworth y a s th e historica l us e o f such classification s t o disadvantag e them . I n eac h respec t colorblindness fail s t o implemen t racia l justice ; tha t i t i s a failed socia l policy is evident from th e statistics revealing that blacks are scarcely better off toda y than they were before thi s ideology took hold in the 1950 s and 1960s. 22

Constitutional Qualms 174

Whites wh o wis h t o implemen t th e goal o f racia l justic e should giv e u p th e colorblindnes s principl e i n favo r o f a functional analysi s o f propose d mean s o f achievin g thos e ends. The proposed rule offers a better prospect for achievin g racial equit y becaus e i t permit s nonwhite s t o engag e white controlled governmen t i n a dialogue concernin g the scop e of government's goal s an d th e rang e o f mean s tha t migh t b e effective i n attainin g them . I t require s governmen t t o defin e its goal s i n way s tha t d o no t systematicall y favo r whites , and i t als o require s governmen t t o utiliz e divers e mean s o f achieving it s goal s wheneve r possible . Unlik e th e inflexible , acontextual, an d ahistorica l colorblindnes s principle , th e proposed rul e offer s th e opportunit y fo r governmen t t o tak e responsibility fo r racia l justice.

The Principle of Judicial Restraint This tradition hold s that the judiciary ought to defer t o legislative polic y choices , absen t specia l justificatio n fo r judicia l intervention. Fo r th e mos t part , i t ca n b e trace d t o reactio n against the Supreme Court's performance durin g the Locbner era, a period o f unparallele d judicia l activis m betwee n 189 9 and 193 7 durin g whic h th e Cour t invalidate d almos t tw o hundred stat e an d federa l statute s an d regulations. 23 Th e Court's activist stance generated intense political and intellectual opposition . Politically , th e Court' s invalidatio n o f ke y New Dea l legislatio n threatene d emergin g Roosevel t admin istration policies. 24 Thi s aspec t o f th e proble m wa s resolve d in relativel y shor t order , however . Th e "switch-in-time" 25

Constitutional Qualms 175

that signale d th e clos e o f th e Lochner er a wa s followe d b y a series o f Roosevel t appointments 2 6 tha t effectivel y foreclose d any possibl e resurgenc e o f th e Lochner approach . On th e intellectua l front , tw o distinc t account s o f th e errors o f th e Court' s Lochner er a jurisprudenc e emerged . On e challenged th e substantiv e premise s o n whic h th e decision s of tha t perio d ha d rested , wit h particula r emphasi s o n th e Court's failur e t o engag e i n a meaningfu l analysi s o f existin g unequal distribution s o f wealt h an d power. 2 7 Th e secon d criticism wa s a n institutiona l one : The Cour t shoul d no t hav e substituted it s judgment fo r tha t o f the legislature with regar d to controversia l valu e choices. 28 Th e latte r understandin g o f the Lochner er a ha s com e t o dominat e constitutiona l theor y and doctrine. 29 The institutiona l criticis m o f th e Lochner Cour t dre w upon a preexistin g lin e o f argument s advocatin g judicia l re straint. I n 1893 , Jame s B . Thaye r argue d i n hi s influentia l paper The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law 30 tha t court s shoul d exercis e th e powe r of judicia l revie w onl y "whe n thos e wh o hav e th e righ t t o make law s hav e no t merel y mad e a mistak e regardin g consti tutionality, bu t hav e mad e a ver y clea r one,—s o clea r tha t i t is no t ope n t o rationa l question." 3 1 I n Thayer' s view , th e constitutional tex t i s ope n t o a variet y o f interpretations . While eac h o f th e politica l branche s ha s a n obligatio n t o make a judgmen t concernin g th e constitutionalit y o f it s ow n behavior, th e coordinat e branche s o f governmen t woul d b e unable t o functio n togethe r unles s eac h respecte d th e author ity o f th e other s t o ac t upo n reasonabl e interpretation s o f their constitutiona l mandates . Therefore , a legislativ e judg -

Constitutional Qualms 176

ment tha t a particula r enactmen t i s constitutiona l i s entitle d to judicia l respec t unles s the legislature' s assessmen t i s clearl y erroneous. I n addition , Thaye r suggeste d tha t legislature s were mor e competen t tha n court s t o mak e policy , an d tha t too frequen t invalidatio n o f legislativ e act s migh t undermin e the legislature' s wil l t o engag e seriousl y wit h "question s o f justice an d right." 3 2 Thayer's principl e o f judicia l restrain t exerte d a profoun d influence o n th e judicia l philosophie s o f Justice s Holmes , Brandeis, an d Frankfurter. 33 Thei r writte n opinion s a t time s reflected a n additiona l argumen t i n favor o f judicia l restraint : the imag e o f the judiciary a s a "nondemocratic " institution. 34 For example , i n 194 9 Justice Frankfurte r contende d that : In th e day-to-da y workin g o f ou r democrac y i t i s vita l tha t th e power o f th e non-democrati c orga n o f ou r Governmen t b e exer cised wit h rigorou s self-restraint . Becaus e th e power s exercise d b y this Cour t ar e inherently oligarchic , Jefferson al l of his life though t of th e Cour t a s "a n irresponsibl e body " an d "independen t o f th e nation itself." The Court is not saved from bein g oligarchic becaus e it professes t o act in the service of humane ends. 35 This versio n o f th e principl e o f restrain t ha s bee n develope d more full y i n th e academi c literature . I n Alexande r Bickel' s classic statement , fo r instance , th e powe r o f judicia l revie w should b e exercise d wit h cautio n becaus e o f th e "counter majoritarian" characte r o f th e judiciary : "Whe n th e Suprem e Court declare s unconstitutiona l a legislativ e ac t o r th e actio n of a n electe d executive , i t thwart s th e wil l o f representative s of th e actua l peopl e o f th e her e an d now ; i t exercise s control , not i n behal f o f th e prevailin g majority , bu t agains t it. " 3 6

Constitutional Qualms I 77

Taken together, these arguments constitute a case for judi cial restrain t tha t dominate s th e landscape s o f mainstrea m constitutional theory and doctrine to this day. In both realms, advocates o f judicia l revie w generall y perceiv e a nee d t o confront an d overcom e th e "legitimacy " question. 37 Fro m this perspective , constitutiona l analysi s begin s wit h a pre sumption o f legislativ e regularity : Som e special circumstanc e is required t o validat e a stanc e othe r tha n judicia l deferenc e to th e legislature' s judgment . Doctrinally , thi s "deference and-departure" framewor k finds it s expression i n the notio n of different "levels " of review. Nondeferential judicia l review is generally labeled "heightene d scrutiny, " a term that under scores its status as a departure from th e norm. This concern over—some might say preoccupation with — the legitimacy of judicial review finds doctrinal expressio n i n at leas t thre e aspect s o f rac e discriminatio n law. 38 First , i t exerts pressur e i n th e directio n o f society' s mainstrea m o r "traditional" values . I n th e contex t o f rac e discriminatio n law, heightene d scrutin y ca n b e expecte d t o b e mor e palat able if it targets generally recognized forms o f discrimination , than i f it aims at redressing less widely acknowledged ones . The discriminator y inten t requiremen t adopte d i n Washington v. Davis diverge d fro m th e Court' s contemporaneou s interpretation o f Titl e VII . I n Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 39 the Cour t ha d rule d tha t a showin g o f raciall y disparat e effects alone , without proo f o f discriminator y intent , woul d be sufficien t t o suppor t th e finding o f a Titl e VI I statutor y violation absen t proof b y the defendant tha t the facially neu tral criterio n a t issu e wa s relate d t o jo b performance . Th e Court o f Appeal s i n Davis ha d applie d th e Griggs standar d

Constitutional Qualms 178

in th e constitutiona l context, 40 bu t thi s approac h wa s re jected b y th e Suprem e Cour t withou t meaningfu l explana tion.41 The principl e o f judicia l restrain t ma y accoun t fo r th e Court's differen t stanc e in Title VII and constitutiona l dispa rate impac t cases . Conside r thes e argument s tha t th e inten t requirement reflect s a distinctively whit e manner o f thinkin g about rac e discrimination : First , whit e peopl e ten d t o vie w intent a s a n essentia l elemen t o f racia l harm ; nonwhite s d o not. Th e whit e perspectiv e ca n be , an d frequentl y is , ex pressed succinctl y an d withou t an y apparen t perceive d nee d for justification : "[W]ithou t concer n abou t pas t an d presen t intent, raciall y discriminator y effect s o f legislatio n woul d b e quite innocent." 42 Fo r blac k people , however , th e fac t o f racial oppression exist s largely independent o f the motives or intentions o f its perpetrators. 43 Second , both in principle an d in application , th e Davis rul e presuppose s th e existenc e o f race-neutral decisionmaking . Whites ' leve l o f confidenc e i n race neutralit y i s muc h greate r tha n nonwhites' ; a skepti c (nonwhite, more likely than not ) would no t adop t a rule that presumes th e neutralit y o f criteri a o f decisio n absen t th e specific inten t t o d o racial harm . Finally , retaining th e inten t requirement i n the face o f its demonstrated failur e t o effectu ate substantiv e racia l justic e i s indicativ e o f a complacenc y concerning, o r eve n a commitmen t to , th e racia l statu s qu o that ca n onl y be enjoyed b y those who ar e its beneficiaries — by whit e people. 44 Thu s th e requiremen t o f discriminator y intent represent s th e dominant , an d i n that sens e traditional, way of thinking about race discrimination . A Cour t responsiv e t o th e judicia l restrain t principl e would b e more hesitant to depar t fro m thi s dominant under -

Constitutional Qualms 179

standing o f discriminatio n whe n interpretin g th e Constitu tion tha n whe n interpretin g a statute , becaus e i n th e latte r instance majoritaria n correctio n woul d b e more readil y avail able. Thus , thoug h th e Cour t apparentl y di d diverg e fro m the prevailin g intent-base d conceptio n o f rac e discriminatio n when interpretin g Titl e VI I i n Griggs, th e explanatio n fo r it s different positio n whe n confronte d wit h a constitutiona l case, no t foun d i n Davis, ma y b e institutional . Indeed , th e Davis opinio n contain s a suggestio n o f thi s consideration : "[I]n ou r view , extensio n o f th e rul e beyon d thos e area s where i t i s alread y applicabl e b y reaso n o f statute , suc h a s in th e fiel d o f publi c employment , shoul d awai t legislativ e prescription." 4 5 I n thi s way , then , concer n ove r th e legiti macy o f judicia l revie w seem s t o hav e playe d a rol e i n tai loring th e substantiv e contour s o f Equa l Protectio n doctrin e to confor m t o wha t i s "traditional " i n ou r society . A secon d effec t o f th e pervasiv e principl e o f judicia l re straint i s the Court' s concer n wit h th e "bottom-line " implica tions o f particula r doctrines . I n Washington v. Davis th e Court reasoned : A rule tha t a statut e designe d t o serv e neutra l end s i s nevertheles s invalid, absen t compellin g justification , i f i n practic e i t benefit s o r burdens on e rac e mor e tha n anothe r woul d b e fa r reachin g an d would rais e seriou s question s about , an d perhap s invalidate , a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes tha t ma y b e mor e burdensom e t o th e poo r an d t o th e average black than to the more affluent white. 46 One readin g o f thi s passag e understand s i t t o asser t tha t applying stric t scrutin y i n al l disparat e impac t case s woul d engage th e court s to o extensivel y i n overseein g socia l policy .

Constitutional Qualms 180

Such activity arguably would b e institutionally inappropriat e solely by virtue o f the volume o f decision s involved; it is not seemly fo r th e Cour t t o appea r t o hav e a hand i n managin g such a wid e rang e o f polic y choices . Fro m th e perspectiv e of judicia l restraint , a n "effect s test " woul d contraven e th e principle favoring limite d use of the power o f judicial review. Another interpretatio n o f the above passage illustrates th e third wa y i n whic h th e principl e o f judicia l restrain t ha s affected rac e discrimination law . On this reading, the quote d language expresse s a concer n tha t a disparat e impac t ap proach migh t requir e th e court s t o engag e i n a for m o f economic redistribution . Thi s concer n partiall y dovetail s wit h the first : Becaus e economi c redistributio n i s no t a widel y shared value , courts sensitiv e t o issue s o f institutiona l legiti macy ar e doubly wary o f adoptin g a doctrine tha t seemingl y has such redistributive effects . Though th e principl e o f judicia l restrain t explain s th e Court's adoption o f the requirement of discriminatory intent , it does not i n the final analysis constitute a compelling argu ment agains t abandonin g tha t requirement , a s does , fo r ex ample, th e propose d transparency-consciou s constitutiona l rule. First , th e proble m o f legitimac y i s les s pressin g whe n judicial revie w i s predicate d o n a n explici t constitutiona l text, such as the Equal Protection Clause. 47 Accordingly, on e might hav e though t tha t rac e discriminatio n doctrin e woul d be relativel y insulate d fro m th e concer n ove r th e legitimac y of judicia l review . On e explanatio n fo r th e degre e t o whic h the latter does exert an influence i s that focusing o n problems of judicial rol e deflect s discussio n o f th e difficul t substantiv e issue discussed i n the preceding section : whether th e guaran -

Constitutional Qualms 181

tee of equal protection embodie s a colorblindness o r antisubordinative principle. 48 However , discomfor t wit h th e task o f engaging in a candid consideration o f constitutional value s is no justification fo r no t doing so. Perhaps, then, the most pressin g implication o f the principle o f judicia l restrain t i s th e final one : A disparat e impac t approach migh t requir e court s t o engag e i n a for m o f eco nomic redistribution . O f course , the propose d transparency conscious rul e woul d no t cu t s o deepl y int o th e economi c status qu o a s woul d th e alternativ e rejecte d b y th e Davis Court: stric t scrutin y o f al l rule s wit h raciall y disparat e ef fects. Becaus e th e propose d rul e impose s a lowe r leve l o f scrutiny o n a finding o f disproportionat e impact , government's burden of justification woul d be more easily sustained, and thu s ther e would b e fewer instance s o f judicia l invalida tion with which to be concerned. Nevertheless, the proposed rul e does have, and is intended to have , some racially redistributiv e effects . Th e Davis argument points out a core dilemma in liberal egalitarian rhetoric: While we approv e an d ar e willin g i n som e respect s t o foste r racial equality , w e endors e n o simila r economi c egalitarian ism. Indeed, th e mainstream vie w i n this societ y seem s to b e that "equa l stratification"— a proportionat e representatio n of nonwhite s a t eac h economi c level—woul d achiev e racia l equality.49 Thus, because our history o f the overt and covert , intentional an d thoughtles s oppressio n o f blacks b y white s has placed the former i n a relatively disadvantage d economi c position, an y attemp t a t racia l refor m run s afou l o f ou r a t least equall y stron g resistanc e t o interventio n i n th e existin g distribution o f economic goods, a resistance that i s especially

Constitutional Qualms 182

acute whe n th e federa l judiciar y assume s responsibilit y t o alter the status quo. The solutio n t o th e dilemma , I think, i s fo r whit e peopl e to acknowledge that taking responsibility for race discrimination doe s an d shoul d cos t something. 50 Implementin g "Tes t 22" wil l indee d mea n tha t fewe r whit e officer s wil l b e hire d onto th e D.C . polic e force ; employin g criteri a o f selectio n that plac e mor e blacks i n policymakin g position s ma y wel l mean tha t governmen t expend s fund s differentl y tha n befor e and expend s relatively less to benefit whites . If the status qu o results fro m a lon g histor y o f th e systemati c privilegin g o f whites, a s i t surel y does , the n on e ca n onl y expec t tha t a more raciall y jus t societ y woul d se e a different , an d mor e equal, distribution o f societal goods. The proposed rul e in fact ha s relatively modest redistribu tive effects . I t doe s n o mor e tha n requir e governmen t no t to pursu e thoughtlessl y goal s tha t advantag e whites , an d i t permits nonwhites to propose inclusive means of accomplish ing permissible goals ; it doe s not mandat e absolut e distribu tional equality . I t lay s som e o f th e burde n o f formulatin g more inclusiv e strategie s a t th e fee t o f nonwhites , bu t i t requires government t o adop t thos e strategie s whenever pos sible. T o tha t extent , th e propose d rul e mandate s a modes t transfer o f powe r a s wel l a s a somewha t mor e raciall y jus t distribution of benefits and burdens. We whites should expect no les s fro m an y rul e tha t attempt s seriousl y t o addres s th e structural racism of which transparency i s one manifestation .

[5] Disparate Impac t unde r Titl e VI I

T

ITLE VII OF the Civi l Right s Ac t o f 196 4 governs dis crimination i n employment, an d currentl y includes a doctrine tha t predicate s liabilit y upo n proo f o f disparat e im pact alone , withou t requirin g th e plaintif f t o establis h dis criminatory intent . Eve n i n th e absenc e o f tha t requirement , however, existin g Titl e VI I doctrin e require s modificatio n i f it i s t o provid e a remed y fo r transparentl y whit e deci sionmaking. Afte r explorin g th e deficiencie s i n th e curren t rules, thi s chapte r propose s tw o transparency-consciou s al ternatives, paying specia l attentio n t o th e fac t tha t Titl e VII, unlike the Constitution, regulates private conduct .

Two Hypothetical Cases Goodson, Ba d win & Indif f i s a majo r accountin g firm em ploying more tha n five hundred person s nationwide . Amon g its twent y blac k accountant s i s Yvonn e Taylor , wh o a t th e 83

Disparate Impact under Title VII184

time thi s stor y begin s wa s thirty-on e year s ol d an d poise d t o become th e firs t blac k regiona l superviso r i n th e firm's his tory. Yvonn e attende d Princeto n Universit y an d receive d a n M.B.A. fro m th e Kellog g Graduat e Schoo l o f Managemen t a t Northwestern University . Whil e employe d a t Goodson , sh e was ver y successfu l i n attractin g ne w clients , especiall y fro m the blac k busines s community . I n al l othe r respect s he r per formance a t th e firm wa s regarde d a s exemplar y a s well . Yvonne alway s wa s comfortabl e conformin g t o th e norm s of th e corporat e cultur e a t Goodson , an d i n fac t ha s bee n comfortable wit h "white " norm s sinc e childhood . He r man ner o f speech , dress , an d hairstyle , a s wel l a s man y o f he r attitudes an d beliefs , fal l wel l withi n th e bound s o f whites ' cultural expectations . However , Yvonn e ma y hav e adapte d to th e corporat e cultur e to o well . I t i s commo n practic e a t Goodson t o b e less than absolutel y precis e i n keeping record s of one' s billabl e hours . Instead , accountant s generall y esti mate tim e spen t o n clients ' account s a t th e en d o f eac h day , and ten d t o er r o n th e sid e o f over - rathe r tha n underbilling . On th e rare occasion s thi s practice i s discussed, i t is explaine d in term s o f th e firm's prestig e i n th e busines s community ; th e subtext i s tha t client s shoul d conside r themselve s fortunat e to b e associate d wit h Goodso n a t all . Lik e othe r youn g ac countants, Yvonn e a t first attempte d t o kee p meticulou s re cords, bu t sh e soo n realize d tha t other s wer e surpassin g he r in billabl e hour s withou t spendin g mor e tim e actuall y a t work. Consequently , an d consisten t wit h he r genera l patter n of conformin g t o prevailin g norms , sh e graduall y adopte d the les s precise method . Under Goodson' s promotio n procedure , th e decisio n

Disparate Impact under Title VII185

whether t o promot e a n accountan t t o regiona l superviso r rests o n senio r partners ' evaluation s o f th e candidate' s ac counting knowledg e an d skill s and , t o a lesse r extent , o n assessments o f he r interpersona l skill s solicite d fro m client s and fro m peer s in the offic e i n which sh e works. The report s on Yvonne' s accountin g skill s wer e uniforml y excellent . Comments fro m som e peer s ha d overtone s o f distanc e an d mild distrust suggesting that they were somewhat uncomfort able with Yvonne as a black woman, bu t these comments fel l far belo w th e leve l necessar y t o rais e seriou s doubt s abou t her interpersona l skills . However, severa l of Yvonne's client s took th e occasion t o register complaints abou t possible over billing. Th e firm launche d a n extensiv e investigatio n an d eventually reache d th e conclusio n tha t Yvonn e ha d bee n careless i n he r recordkeepin g an d tha t therefor e sh e shoul d not b e promote d a t tha t time . A s a practica l matter , thi s episode ended Yvonne's prospects fo r advancemen t a t Good son; th e firm has a n informa l polic y o f no t reconsiderin g a n individual onc e she has been passed ove r for promotion . Yvonne ha s a younge r siste r who , sometim e durin g col lege, legall y change d he r nam e fro m Debora h Taylo r t o Keisha Akbar . A s her decisio n t o chang e he r nam e suggests , Keisha place s a n emphasis o n he r Africa n heritag e tha t Yvonne doe s not, an d sh e has adopted speec h an d groomin g patterns consisten t wit h tha t cultura l perspective . Fo r exam ple, Keish a ofte n wear s clothin g tha t feature s Africa n style s and materials , frequentl y braid s he r hai r o r wear s i t i n a natural style, and at times speaks to other blac k employees in "Black English, " thoug h sh e always use s "standar d English " when speakin g wit h whites . Keish a majore d i n biolog y a t

Disparate Impact under Title VII186

Howard University , an d afte r graduatio n wen t t o wor k a s the onl y blac k scientis t a t a smal l research fir m dedicate d t o identifying an d developin g environmentall y saf e agricultura l products fo r commercia l uses . Like Yvonne, Keisha excelle d at th e technica l aspect s o f he r work , bu t sh e brough t t o i t a much les s assimilationist persona l style . At first , he r cultura l differences ha d no particular impac t on her job performance . This changed , however , whe n th e once-smal l fir m bega n t o grow rapidl y an d reorganizatio n int o researc h division s be came necessary. For the most part, the firm planned to elevate each o f th e origina l member s o f th e researc h tea m t o posi tions as department heads , but Keisha was not aske d to head a departmen t becaus e the individuals responsibl e fo r makin g that decisio n fel t tha t sh e lacked th e personal qualitie s that a successful manage r needs . They saw Keisha as just too differ ent fro m th e researcher s sh e woul d supervis e t o b e abl e t o communicate effectivel y wit h them . The firm articulate d thi s reasoning b y assertin g a nee d fo r a departmen t hea d wh o shared th e perspective s an d value s o f th e employee s unde r her direction . Whe n Keish a raise d th e possibilit y tha t he r perceived difference s migh t b e race-dependent , th e deci sionmakers replie d tha t the y woul d appl y th e sam e confor mity-related criteri a t o whit e candidate s fo r th e positio n o f department head . Thus, i n spit e o f th e diametricall y differen t cultura l style s adopted b y Yvonne an d Keisha, 1 thei r storie s hav e th e sam e ending: Each encountered the glass ceiling at a relatively early stage o f wha t shoul d hav e bee n a ver y successfu l career. 2 A case ca n b e mad e tha t bot h wer e disadvantage d becaus e o f race. Yvonne would argu e that ther e i s no nonracial elemen t

Disparate Impact under Title VII187

of her performance o r her personal characteristic s tha t coul d account for the way her recordkeeping practices were singled out fo r specia l scrutiny , an d therefor e tha t rac e i s left a s th e most plausibl e explanatio n o f th e differen t treatmen t sh e received. Eve n i f th e basi s fo r th e specia l treatmen t wa s un conscious, thi s i s a relativel y easil y understoo d for m o f dis crimination: Yvonne' s contentio n woul d b e tha t sh e wa s treated differentl y fro m similarl y situate d colleague s becaus e of her race. Keisha, o n th e othe r hand , arguabl y wa s give n th e sam e treatment tha t woul d hav e bee n afforde d anyon e wh o wa s perceived a s unabl e o r unwillin g t o fi t smoothl y int o th e corporate culture . Nevertheless, it can be argued tha t sh e too was disadvantage d becaus e o f he r race , i n tha t th e persona l characteristics that disqualifie d he r from a management position intersec t seamlessl y wit h he r self-definitio n a s a blac k woman. I n effect , sh e wa s subjecte d t o transparentl y whit e decisionmaking; Keish a woul d argu e tha t sh e wa s no t pro moted becaus e he r persona l styl e wa s foun d wantin g whe n measured agains t a nor m tha t wa s i n fac t transparentl y "white." Because thes e race-specifi c act s occurre d i n employmen t contexts, bot h Yvonn e an d Keish a woul d tur n t o Titl e VI I for lega l relief . However , eve n thoug h Titl e VI I provide s a caus e o f actio n fo r advers e employmen t decision s take n "because of " race, 3 Keish a an d Yvonn e woul d find them selves in quite different position s under existing judicial interpretations o f tha t statute . Yvonn e woul d hav e a relativel y easy time framing a disparate treatment clai m (thoug h that is not to say that she necessarily would prevail), but as a practi-

Disparate Impact under Title VII188

cal matte r Keish a woul d hav e difficult y gettin g beyon d th e initial pleadin g stag e becaus e th e for m o f discriminatio n sh e encountered canno t easil y b e addresse d unde r eithe r th e dis parate treatmen t o r th e curren t disparat e impac t model . Afte r describing thes e tw o approache s t o Titl e VI I liability , I wil l examine th e strength s an d weaknesse s o f tw o alternative s that woul d provid e a remed y fo r transparentl y whit e deci sionmaking.

Existing Models of Title VII Liability The rul e governin g Titl e VI I disparat e treatmen t case s ini tially wa s se t fort h i n McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 4 The plaintif f mus t establis h a prim a faci e cas e o f discrimina tion, whic h ma y b e mad e by showin g (i ) tha t h e belong s t o a racia l minority ; (ii ) tha t h e applied an d wa s qualifie d fo r a jo b fo r whic h th e employe r wa s seeking applicants ; (iii ) that , despit e hi s qualifications , h e wa s re jected; and (iv ) that, afte r hi s rejection, th e position remaine d ope n and th e employe r continue d t o see k applicant s fro m person s o f complainant's qualifications. 5 The element s o f th e prim a faci e cas e ma y b e modifie d t o sui t employment setting s tha t diffe r fro m th e fact s o f McDonnell Douglas. The burde n the n shift s t o th e defendan t t o articulat e a legitimate, nondiscriminator y explanatio n fo r th e advers e employment action . Thi s i s only a burde n o f production , an d not o f proof ; th e burde n o f persuasio n remain s a t al l time s with th e plaintiff. 6 I f suc h a n explanatio n i s advance d b y th e

Disparate Impact under Title VII189

defendant, th e plaintif f mus t prov e tha t th e proffere d reaso n was no t th e rea l reaso n fo r th e challenge d action . Th e plain tiff mus t demonstrat e no t onl y tha t th e articulate d reaso n i s not credible , bu t tha t i t i s a pretex t fo r discrimination . Tha t is, th e plaintif f mus t no t onl y disprov e th e employer' s legiti mate, nondiscriminator y explanation , bu t als o mus t sho w that rac e wa s th e rea l reaso n fo r th e advers e action. 7 If Yvonn e wishe d t o pursu e a Titl e VI I claim , sh e woul d frame i t a s a cas e o f disparat e treatment , arguin g tha t simi larly situate d whit e accountant s wh o followe d th e sam e prac tice o f imprecis e recordkeepin g wer e no t denie d promotion s because o f it . Thi s woul d b e a questio n o f fac t tha t woul d turn o n evidentiar y issue s beyon d th e scop e o f thi s discus sion. Th e significanc e o f Yvonne' s cas e fo r presen t purpose s is tha t i t fit s easil y withi n th e conceptua l framewor k o f ex isting Titl e VI I cas e law , an d s o sh e woul d hav e a t leas t th e opportunity t o reac h th e factua l questio n whethe r sh e wa s treated differentl y fro m similarl y situate d whit e accoun tants. 8 Keisha's complain t i s conceptuall y distinc t fro m a dispa rate treatmen t claim , whic h center s o n th e notio n tha t th e employer treate d th e plaintif f differentl y fro m similarl y situ ated others . I n contras t t o Yvonne' s claim , Keish a woul d argue tha t thoug h sh e wa s treate d i n th e sam e manne r a s others, th e standar d applie d t o al l employee s i s on e tha t systematically advantage s whites . On e migh t suppose , then , that he r clai m migh t b e frame d unde r th e disparat e impac t theory o f liability . However , a carefu l revie w o f th e require ments o f a disparat e impac t clai m reveal s tha t Keish a woul d not far e wel l unde r tha t approach , either . In a Titl e VI I disparat e impac t case , th e plaintiff' s prim a

Disparate Impact under Title VII190

facie cas e requires a showin g tha t a facially neutra l employ ment practic e ha s a disproportionatel y advers e impac t o n a protected class. Once that threshold i s reached, the burden of persuasion shift s t o th e employe r t o demonstrat e tha t th e challenged practic e i s job-relate d an d justifiabl e a s a matte r of busines s necessity. Finally, the plaintiff ha s an opportunit y to prov e tha t ther e exist s a n alternativ e practic e tha t woul d serve th e employer' s objective s equall y wel l bu t hav e a les s severe adverse effect. 9 The disparat e impac t approac h t o Titl e VI I liabilit y ha s been deeply affected b y the Civi l Rights Act of 1991. 10 First , the Ac t finally place d disparat e impac t analysi s o n a secur e statutory foundation. 11 Second , Congress overruled som e aspects o f Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 12 a 198 9 cas e that provide d a goo d par t o f th e motivatio n fo r th e 199 1 Act. I n Wards Cove, th e Suprem e Cour t ha d announce d a series o f change s i n disparat e impac t doctrine . Most notabl e among thes e pronouncements wer e a new rule tha t th e issu e of busines s necessit y wa s no t t o b e see n a s a n affirmativ e defense, bu t rathe r a s par t o f th e plaintiff' s case , an d a re definition o f th e concep t o f busines s necessit y t o becom e more a notion o f reasonable justificatio n tha n o f necessity. 13 In th e 199 1 Act , Congres s mad e i t clea r tha t th e burde n o f persuasion o n th e questio n o f busines s necessit y rest s o n the employer , rathe r tha n th e plaintiff. 14 Moreover , th e Ac t reinstated judicia l interpretation s o f "consisten t wit h busi ness necessity " an d "jo b relatedness " tha t predate d Wards Cove. The first element o f a disparate impac t cas e is the requirement tha t th e plaintif f prov e tha t a particula r employmen t

Disparate Impact under Title VII191

practice actually has an adverse impact on a protected group . The issue s tha t ma y aris e a t thi s stag e includ e th e choic e o f comparison groups—e.g. , genera l populatio n versu s quali fied labo r force 15 —the geographi c regio n an d tim e fram e within whic h th e compariso n i s made, th e degre e o f dispro portion between th e compare d groups , th e accurac y o f th e relevant data , an d the statistica l method s employe d t o asses s the significanc e o f identifie d disparities. 16 On e Wards Cove ruling left virtuall y untouched b y the 199 1 Act is the requirement that the plaintiff identif y a particular employment practice (o r inseparabl e cluste r o f practices ) claime d t o hav e caused the disparate effect. 17 Once th e plaintif f ha s establishe d th e existenc e o f dispa rate effects , th e burde n o f persuasio n shift s t o th e defendan t to sho w tha t th e challenge d practic e i s job-related an d justi fied a s a matte r o f busines s necessity . Th e natur e o f thi s burden remain s somewha t unclear . I n th e cas e tha t first se t forth th e disparat e impac t approach , Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,18 th e Cour t sai d tha t th e defendan t mus t sho w tha t a challenge d practic e ha s " a demonstrabl e relationshi p t o successful performanc e o f th e job s fo r whic h i t [is ] used." 19 This rather vague formulation leave s unresolved a number of important question s regardin g th e busines s necessit y justifi cation: th e kin d o f purpose s tha t suffic e a s justification , th e kind o f proo f necessar y t o establis h a relationshi p betwee n the purpos e an d th e challenge d practice , th e requisit e strength o f that connection, the importance of the employer' s asserted purpose , an d th e relationshi p between th e concept s of busines s necessit y an d jo b relatedness. 20 Non e o f thes e issues has been definitively resolve d b y the Supreme Court .

Disparate Impact under Title VII192

Finally, even if the defendant succeed s in establishing business necessity, the plaintiff ma y prevail b y demonstrating th e existence o f a n alternativ e selectio n criterion wit h no , or less severe, disparate effects , i f the employe r refuse s t o adop t th e alternative practice. 21 I t remain s t o b e see n whethe r "refus ing" to adop t a n alternativ e criterio n mean s onl y a failure t o use it, or requires knowledge of its existence as well. Disparate impac t theor y ha s undergon e severa l change s during th e pas t fe w years . Th e languag e i n Griggs v. Duke Power Co. seemed to make it clear that discriminator y inten t was no t a necessar y componen t o f a Titl e VI I disparat e im pact case. 22 However, the Court gradually moved toward th e view tha t disparat e impac t wa s t o b e see n a s nothin g mor e than a n indirec t metho d o f provin g discriminator y intent . The Cour t bega n thi s drif t i n Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,23 th e first disparat e impac t cas e t o reac h th e Cour t after Griggs. I n Albemarle, th e Cour t borrowe d fro m th e structure o f disparat e treatmen t analysi s to establis h a parallel framework fo r disparat e impact cases. That is, under bot h theories ther e wa s t o b e a tripartit e orde r o f proof : Th e plaintiff woul d mak e ou t a prim a faci e case ; th e defendan t would hav e a n opportunit y t o provide a neutral explanatio n or justification ; an d th e plaintif f woul d the n attemp t t o dis credit the neutral explanatio n o r justification. Thi s structura l symmetry lai d th e foundatio n fo r deepe r theoretica l convergence. In discussin g th e thir d stag e o f analysis—th e plaintiff' s opportunity fo r rebuttal—th e Cour t i n Albemarle employe d language tha t strongl y suggeste d a n intent-base d interpreta tion o f disparate impact liability :

Disparate Impact under Title VII193

If a n employe r doe s the n mee t th e burde n o f provin g tha t it s test s are "jo b related," it remains open to the complaining party to show that othe r tests or selection devices , without a similarly undesirabl e racial effect , woul d als o serv e th e employer' s legitimat e interes t i n "efficient an d trustworth y workmanship. " Suc h a showin g woul d be evidence tha t th e employe r wa s usin g its tests merely a s a "pre text" fo r discrimination. 24 Similar "pretext " languag e appear s i n tw o o f th e othe r thre e leading Suprem e Cour t disparat e impac t decisions. 25 Th e im plication, o f course, is that th e plaintiff's ultimat e objectiv e i n a disparat e impac t clai m i s to demonstrat e tha t th e defendan t intentionally employe d a faciall y neutra l criterio n o f decisio n because of its discriminator y effects. 26 This implicatio n wa s strengthene d b y anothe r post - Griggs change i n th e Court' s position . Fo r severa l year s afte r Griggs, the Cour t seeme d t o adher e t o th e vie w tha t th e defendan t bears th e burde n o f persuasio n o n th e questio n o f busines s necessity. However, i n Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust 17 a plurality o f the Justices suggeste d tha t th e burde n o f persua sion o n thi s issu e ough t t o res t wit h th e plaintiff, 28 an d i n Wards Cove a majorit y o f th e Cour t too k thi s position. 29 A s Justice Steven s explaine d i n dissent , th e Court' s forme r vie w that busines s necessit y i s a n affirmativ e defense—wit h th e burden o f persuasio n fallin g o n th e defendant—presuppose s an understandin g tha t disparat e impac t liabilit y i s not linke d to motiv e o r intent. 30 B y implication , then , placin g th e bur den o f persuasio n o n th e plaintif f signal s rejectio n o f tha t conception o f disparat e impac t liabilit y an d indirectl y con firms th e vie w tha t disparat e impac t i s n o mor e tha n a n indirect mean s o f establishin g discriminator y intent . How -

Disparate Impact under Title VII194

ever, i n th e Civi l Right s Ac t o f 1991 , Congress reallocate d the burde n o f persuasio n t o th e defendan t o n th e issu e o f business necessity , an d i n s o doin g mad e i t clea r tha t th e disparate impac t theor y o f liabilit y i s no t tie d t o th e notio n of discriminatory intent . It should b e apparent that Yvonne has no disparate impac t claim; th e essenc e o f he r complain t i s tha t sh e wa s treate d differently fro m other , similarl y situate d accountants . On e might suppose, however, that Keisha would be able to pursue a Titl e VII claim unde r th e disparat e impac t theor y o f liabil ity, contendin g tha t sh e wa s disadvantage d b y th e us e o f a facially neutra l criterio n o f decisio n tha t inevitabl y wil l hav e an advers e effec t o n blacks a s a group . Thi s suppositio n might b e correct i n theory , bu t i t would no t b e borne ou t i n practice. Keish a woul d encounte r severa l technica l barrier s that would, in practical effect , foreclos e he r claim. First, th e disparat e impac t plaintif f mus t hav e statisticall y significant evidenc e o f racia l imbalanc e i n the workforce . I n addition to the usual problems of choosing appropriate base s for comparison , Keisha' s abilit y t o mak e ou t a prim a faci e case woul d b e impede d b y th e relativel y smal l siz e o f th e workforce a t he r plac e o f employmen t an d th e eve n smalle r number o f blac k person s employe d there . Inference s base d on small samples can be misleading because they may suggest short-term result s tha t wil l no t hol d tru e ove r a longe r pe riod; or, to put it somewhat differently , th e effect o f a particular employmen t practic e o n tw o individual s ma y no t loo k the sam e a s th e effec t o f tha t practic e o n tw o hundre d per sons. Courts , therefore, ofte n ar e reluctant t o accep t statisti cal proo f base d o n smal l samples. 31 Th e smal l sampl e siz e

Disparate Impact under Title VII195

problem ma y b e exacerbate d b y th e EEOC' s "four-fifths " rule, whic h state s tha t a selectio n rat e fo r member s o f a protected grou p tha t i s les s tha n 8 0 percen t o f th e selectio n rate for th e most successful grou p will be deemed evidence of an adverse impact. 32 Suc h a rule, of course, is highly unrelia ble as applied to small samples. 33 Keisha migh t hav e bee n employe d a t a compan y larg e enough to provide a basis for th e requisite statistical compar isons an d s o migh t evad e th e proble m o f smal l sampl e size . But eve n unde r thes e circumstances , sh e migh t confron t a second hurdle, a variant o f the "bottom-lin e problem, " i f the company employe d a n adequat e numbe r o f "Yvonnes " t o counter he r clai m tha t black s wer e underrepresente d i n th e relevant employe e pool . While thi s issue ough t t o b e consid ered resolve d b y th e Court' s reasonin g i n Connecticut v. Teal,34 Keisha' s cas e require s applicatio n t o a ne w context . Teal aske d whethe r a n employe r coul d justif y it s us e o f a criterion tha t adversel y impacte d a racia l grou p b y pointin g to th e absenc e o f disparat e effect s a t th e "botto m line" ; th e defendant argue d tha t us e o f a criterio n tha t overselecte d blacks a t a late r stag e o f a decisionmakin g proces s shoul d defeat a challenge to the use of a criterion tha t underselecte d blacks a t a n earlie r stage , i f th e bottom-lin e result s showe d no racia l disparity . The Cour t rejecte d thi s lin e of argument , elevating th e procedura l right s o f th e individua l ove r th e group interes t i n ultimat e outcomes . B y analogy , Keisha' s individual righ t no t t o b e disadvantage d b y a n unjustifie d criterion o f decision that negativel y affect s blac k persons like her should not be undercut b y the fact that the same criterion would not have a similar impact o n people like Yvonne.

Disparate Impact under Title VII196

A thir d hurdl e Keish a woul d hav e t o surmoun t i s som e courts' indecisio n ove r th e questio n whethe r th e plaintif f must prove the existence of a disparate impact in the employer's workforce . I n EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 35 th e Third Circui t hel d tha t workforc e statistic s ar e a necessar y element o f a disparate impac t claim. 36 However , i n Dothard v. Rawlinson37 th e Suprem e Cour t appeare d t o accep t proo f of a disparat e effec t i n the for m o f nationa l statistic s o n th e average height and weight of men and women; the Court di d not requir e a showing that th e employer' s heigh t an d weigh t requirements ha d a negative impac t o n th e representation o f women i n th e employer' s ow n workforce. 38 I believ e th e Court's vie w i n Dothard i s th e correc t on e eve n unde r ex isting disparat e impac t analysis , wit h respec t t o immutabl e characteristics that on e can expect to be evenly distributed i n the general population, suc h as height and weight. However , in the case of characteristics tha t ar e perceived t o be mutable and tha t ar e no t evenl y distributed , on e ha s t o acknowledg e that ther e is some force t o the argument tha t abandonin g th e workplace requiremen t coul d unfairl y impos e liabilit y o n a n employer whos e practice s ha d no t i n fac t create d a raciall y imbalanced workforce . Groomin g standard s woul d provid e an example : Suppos e tha t a n employe r prohibite d th e wear ing o f "dredlocks, " an d suppos e tha t i t coul d b e establishe d that suc h a requirement would hav e a negative impact on the class o f blac k employee s generally . I t woul d no t follo w tha t the employer' s prohibitio n actuall y ha d a negative impac t i n his workplace , an d s o imposin g liabilit y fo r wha t merel y might happen could b e said to be unjust. Thu s the workforc e requirement canno t b e dismissed lightly .

Disparate Impact under Title VII197

Once th e plaintif f establishe s th e existenc e o f a raciall y disproportionate distribution , sh e must prove causation; tha t is, she must identify a specific employmen t practice (o r inseparable grou p o f practices ) responsibl e fo r th e identifie d dis parity and demonstrate a causal connection betwee n the two. Here, th e subjectiv e natur e o f th e decisio n make s i t unlikel y that th e transparenc y plaintif f wil l b e abl e t o identif y th e precise reason s fo r th e advers e decisio n i n he r case , o r t o document th e criteri a employe d i n othe r case s i n which can didates fo r promotio n wer e successful. 39 Moreover , becaus e of th e inheren t indeterminac y o f subjectiv e criteria , eve n i f the plaintiff ca n name the criteria actuall y employed, she will have a n extremel y difficul t tim e showin g tha t thos e criteri a caused the disparate impact in question . A secon d aspec t o f th e causatio n issu e i s th e proble m o f choice. Courts have frequently take n the view that a particular employmen t practic e canno t b e sai d t o hav e a raciall y disproportionate effec t i f the disadvantaged employee s coul d have chose n t o confor m thei r conduc t t o th e employer' s re quirements.40 The cleares t instance s o f thi s reasoning ca n b e found i n th e groomin g an d languag e cases . I n Rogers v. American Airlines, 41 a blac k woma n plaintif f whos e hai r was style d i n "cornrows " challenge d a prohibitio n agains t wearing braide d hai r o n th e job . The cour t refuse d t o credi t the policy' s disproportionatel y negativ e impac t o n blac k women employees , an d als o expresse d th e vie w that th e em ployer shoul d no t b e held liabl e fo r th e allegedl y discrimina tory decisio n becaus e i t resulte d fro m th e employee' s ow n grooming choice. For similar reasons , most cases considerin g English-only workplace rules have come down in favor o f the

Disparate Impact under Title VII198

employer.42 Keisha' s cas e migh t fal l pre y t o th e sam e ratio nale, a s on e ca n argu e tha t th e existenc e o f wome n lik e Yvonne illuminate s th e contingen t natur e o f th e persona l choices Keisha has made. None o f thes e barrier s i s absolute ; fo r each , i t ca n b e argued tha t a plaintiff lik e Keisha shoul d b e able to se t fort h a prim a faci e cas e unde r existin g disparat e impac t analysis . Nevertheless, th e cumulativ e effec t o f thes e obstacle s i s sig nificant. Wit h respect to each of them except the documenta tion problem , court s ma y rul e tha t Keish a canno t prevai l regardless o f th e strengt h o f th e evidenc e sh e ca n produce . Since the plaintif f bear s the burde n o f persuasion o n eac h of these points , the likelihoo d tha t sh e will b e abl e t o establis h a prim a faci e cas e diminishe s exponentiall y wit h eac h addi tion to the list of problematic points of law. It is important t o recognize that thes e technical difficultie s are no t rando m o r accidental ; the y ar e linke d t o th e natur e of Keisha' s claim . Transparentl y whit e decisionmakin g con sists o f th e unconsciou s us e o f criteri a o f decisio n tha t ar e more strongl y associated wit h white s tha n wit h nonwhites . This phenomeno n i s mos t likel y t o occu r i n setting s wher e nonwhites ar e tokens ; tha t is , wher e the y represen t a ver y small percentag e o f th e workforce. 43 I n a mor e diversifie d environment (assumin g on e tha t i s no t raciall y stratified) , i t is muc h mor e likel y tha t criteri a o f decisio n ar e consciou s and perhap s contested . The smal l sample size and workforc e problems ar e likel y t o occu r i n those sam e setting s i n whic h transparently whit e decisionmakin g i s mos t likel y t o tak e place—that is , workplaces with very few nonwhites. In addition, the transparency phenomenon unde r consideration her e involves subjectiv e criteri a o f decision , whic h alway s rais e

Disparate Impact under Title VII199

the problems of documentation an d choice. Thus, while these problems occu r i n a broade r categor y o f case s tha n thos e implicating transparency , the y ar e inevitabl y presen t i n any transparenc y cas e wit h whic h thi s discussio n i s con cerned. Because th e impositio n o f transparentl y whit e norm s amounts t o a requiremen t tha t nonwhit e employee s assimi late t o whites ' cultura l expectations , anothe r wa y t o fram e the fundamenta l issu e raise d b y Keisha' s cas e i s t o as k whether ther e ough t t o b e a Title VII remedy fo r a n employ er's failure t o create a culturally pluralistic workplace. Attention t o th e transparenc y phenomeno n an d th e circumstance s in which i t i s most likel y t o occu r shoul d guid e formulatio n of a n alternativ e conceptua l framewor k i n whic h Keish a would hav e a reasonabl e chanc e t o succee d i n a Titl e VI I claim.

Two New Models of Liability Each of the two models presented her e implements Title VIFs proscription o f employmen t decision s take n "becaus e of " race mor e effectivel y tha n th e existin g disparat e impac t model, a s applie d t o transparentl y whit e decisionmaking . The foreseeabl e impac t mode l parallel s th e structur e o f cur rent disparat e impac t analysis , bu t substitute s proo f o f fore seeable effect s fo r th e curren t requiremen t tha t th e plaintif f establish th e existenc e o f a n actua l disparat e effect . Th e second model, labeled the alternatives approach, takes the structural contex t o f employe r decisionmakin g a s it s poin t o f departure.

Disparate Impact under Title VII1100

The Foreseeabl e Impac t Mode l The foreseeabl e impac t mode l track s traditiona l disparat e impact analysis , bu t institute s modification s a t appropriat e points i n the analyti c structur e i n orde r t o accommodat e th e unique features o f Keisha's transparency claim . In particular , this approac h adopt s a new method o f establishin g th e existence o f a disparat e effec t an d emphasize s th e proble m o f assimilationism throug h it s analyse s o f th e employer' s busi ness necessit y defens e an d th e plaintiff' s presentatio n o f les s discriminatory alternatives . The first stag e o f a disparat e impac t cas e i s the plaintiff' s proof that an identified criterio n of decision (or set of criteria, if th e component s ar e inseparable) 44 ha d a statisticall y sig nificant differentia l impac t o n th e racia l compositio n o f th e workforce a t he r plac e o f employment . A s describe d above , under existin g disparat e impac t analysi s Keish a woul d en counter (a t least ) five distinct difficultie s i n settin g fort h he r prima faci e case . I n combination , thes e doctrina l hurdle s present a formidable obstacl e to the succes s of an y transpar ency claim . Curren t doctrine' s focu s o n actua l effect s ca n render i t a ver y effectiv e too l fo r addressin g man y form s o f discrimination.45 However , Keisha's case calls for a n empha sis o n foreseeable , rathe r tha n actual , disproportionat e ef fects. Th e essenc e o f he r clai m i s tha t th e applicatio n o f culturally whit e norm s necessaril y operate s t o th e disadvan tage o f nonwhites , give n th e existin g socia l constructio n o f race an d concomitan t racia l hierarchy. On e ha s onl y t o un derstand th e racia l structur e o f America n societ y t o b e abl e to conclud e tha t employin g criteri a o f decisio n formulate d

Disparate Impact under Title VII1101

against th e backgroun d o f whit e paradigm s wil l hav e a n inevitable an d negativ e impac t o n th e employmen t prospect s of nonwhite s a s a group . The nex t question , then , i s how on e migh t structur e proo f of foreseeabl e disparat e effects . Fro m th e perspectiv e o f th e transparency phenomenon , th e proble m i n Keisha' s cas e i s the applicatio n o f norm s whos e conten t i s i n som e sens e white-specific; i t follow s tha t conformit y t o thos e norm s i s inherently mor e problemati c fo r he r tha n fo r a whit e person . The difficulty , o f course , i s t o distinguis h faciall y neutra l criteria o f decisio n tha t ar e i n fac t white-specifi c fro m thos e that ar e genuinel y race-neutral. 46 I n outline , th e factor s tha t differentiate a white-specifi c criterio n ar e (1 ) tha t th e crite rion b e associate d wit h white s t o a greate r exten t tha n wit h nonwhites, an d (2 ) tha t i t b e favorabl y regarde d b y whites. 4 7 More generally , i t i s th e norm underlying a judgmen t tha t must b e associate d wit h white s an d positivel y regarded ; i n some instance s th e labe l actuall y ascribe d t o th e individua l who i s bein g evaluate d carrie s negativ e import , a s whe n De lores (th e Boar d candidat e i n chapte r 1 ) was characterize d a s "hostile." The first requirement , tha t a faciall y neutra l criterio n b e associated mor e closel y wit h white s tha n wit h othe r racia l groups i f i t i s t o b e considere d white-specific , i s a broa d requirement tha t implicate s a wid e rang e o f characteristic s that migh t b e distribute d unevenl y acros s races . I t include s criteria tha t ar e biologica l i n origi n (fo r example , blon d hai r and blu e eyes) , but extend s equall y t o characteristic s tha t ar e associated wit h white s a s a consequenc e o f th e existin g socia l hierarchy o f race , a s wel l a s t o difference s tha t ar e mor e

Disparate Impact under Title VII1102

purely cultura l i n origin . Th e requiremen t i s easil y satisfied ; one need onl y show that the criterion o f decision in questio n is one that occurs more frequently amon g whites than amon g other racial groups. The secon d requirement , th? t th e criterion a t issu e b e one that is favorably regarde d b y whites, is directed more towar d the transparency thesis than toward th e notion of white specificity pe r se . Becaus e transparenc y analysi s target s th e un conscious us e o f white-specifi c criteri a t o disadvantag e non whites, i t woul d no t mak e sens e t o b e concerne d wit h characteristics tha t ar e associate d wit h whit e peopl e bu t viewed negatively. 48 Th e sam e consideratio n applie s t o th e foreseeable impac t analysi s under developmen t here , because the plaintiff i n a foreseeable impac t cas e would o f cours e b e required t o show a negative impact on nonwhites. Thus th e first stag e o f a foreseeabl e impac t clai m woul d require the plaintiff t o demonstrat e onl y that a n unfavorabl e employment decisio n wa s base d o n lac k o f a characteristi c more frequentl y possesse d b y whites tha n b y nonwhites; 49 i t would follo w withou t furthe r proo f tha t us e of that criterio n would hav e a negative impac t o n th e employmen t prospect s of nonwhite s a s a group . Keisha , then , woul d onl y hav e t o show tha t he r employer' s conformit y requiremen t implicitl y incorporated characteristic s mor e ofte n foun d i n whites tha n in nonwhites. This approach to disparate impact cases would circumvent mos t o f the difficulties describe d earlier . It would avoid al l of the problems associate d with the current require ment tha t a disparate impac t plaintif f prov e actua l disparat e effects (tha t is , th e problem s o f smal l sampl e size , bottom line impact , an d workforc e statistics) . I n addition , i t woul d

Disparate Impact under Title VII1103

mitigate th e problem s o f causatio n an d choice . Thoug h th e issue of documentatio n woul d remain , a plaintiff i n Keisha' s position woul d b e abl e t o procee d solel y o n th e basi s o f th e criterion offere d b y her employe r t o explai n th e advers e ac tion taken agains t her; she would no t hav e to make comparisons eithe r wit h actua l decision s o r wit h th e criteri a applie d to othe r employees . Similarly , th e proble m o f choic e woul d be diminished. A showing that nonwhite s a s a group ar e less likely than white s to possess the desired characteristi c woul d tend to divert attention fro m th e individual to the differentia l distribution itself . That is , the assumptio n tha t th e plaintiff' s personal attribute s ar e a produc t o f individua l choic e coul d be supplanted , a t leas t i n part , b y attentio n t o th e societa l structures that constrain an d condition individua l will. 50 The foreseeabl e impac t framewor k woul d retai n busines s necessity a s an affirmativ e defense , an d thu s would plac e th e burden o f persuasio n o n th e employe r t o sho w jo b relat edness and busines s necessity. 51 Becaus e the focus her e is the problem o f assimilationism , thi s defens e shoul d b e interpre ted narrowl y t o exclud e justification s tha t reproduc e assimi lation i n anothe r form . I n Keisha' s case , fo r example , th e employer shoul d no t b e abl e t o prevai l o n th e basi s o f a n argument tha t a homogeneou s workforc e i s inherentl y a more productiv e one . On th e othe r hand , thi s proposal doe s not rul e ou t assimilationis t defense s altogether . Thi s discus sion focuses o n the application o f Title VII to private employers (thoug h i t applie s t o governmen t employer s a s well) , and I d o no t assum e tha t suc h employer s hav e a n absolut e obligation t o pursue pluralis t objective s o r t o emplo y plural ist mean s o f attainin g permissibl e goals . Thu s thi s situatio n

Disparate Impact under Title VII1104

differs fro m th e constitutional context , becaus e I believe tha t government doe s hav e a genera l obligatio n t o procee d i n a pluralist manner . Consequentl y th e burde n o n privat e em ployers ough t t o b e somewha t lighte r tha n tha t place d o n government i n chapte r 3 . Eve n so , th e boundar y between what constitute s permissibl e assimilationis m i n th e Titl e VI I context an d wha t doe s no t i s difficul t t o defin e i n th e ab stract. A good startin g poin t migh t b e th e propositio n tha t an employe r ma y requir e assimilatio n onl y whe n necessar y to preserve the essence of the business. 52 A foreseeable impac t analysis would raise issues not implicated b y th e curren t actua l impac t approach . Som e o f thes e would b e familiar, i n the sense that simila r question s aris e in other lega l contexts . Fo r example , th e foreseeabl e impac t plaintiff woul d b e required to show that the characteristic, or norm, tha t i s th e basi s fo r a n advers e decisio n i s white specific i n th e sens e describe d above ; sh e woul d hav e t o introduce admissibl e evidenc e o f differentia l distributio n o n a society-wid e basis. 53 Tha t woul d almos t certainl y requir e sociological evidence , whic h woul d rais e th e evidentiar y is sues generall y presente d b y th e introductio n o f exper t testi mony. Some o f th e issue s presente d b y th e foreseeabl e impac t framework, however , woul d b e uniqu e t o thi s analysis . Fo r example, a defendant migh t challenge the plaintiff's clai m of differential distributio n o n th e basi s o f rac e b y introducin g evidence o f a differentia l distributio n amon g subgroup s o f nonwhites, accompanied b y a showing that the characteristi c in questio n occur s i n th e plaintiff' s subgrou p wit h approxi mately the same frequency i t does among whites. In turn, this

Disparate Impact under Title VII1105

argument would , o r ough t to , rais e th e questio n whethe r the subgrouping s chose n b y th e defendan t exis t becaus e o f assimilationist pressures . Whe n tha t i s th e case , th e sub grouping approac h ough t t o b e disapprove d a s a mean s o f defending agains t th e plaintiff' s proo f o f society-wid e differ ential distributio n becaus e i t function s t o reinstat e assimila tionism. Thus, Keisha' s employer s migh t argu e tha t thei r "confor mity" requiremen t woul d no t disadvantag e blac k scientists , even though i t would hav e a differential impac t o n the blac k population generally . The y woul d clai m tha t blac k peopl e who are trained a s scientists are as likely as whites to possess the cultural characteristics they seek. However, this argument simply overlooks the assimilationist pressure s o n blacks wh o choose to enter scientific (an d other professional) fields. Thus this sort of defense ough t not to succeed . In spit e o f thes e nove l difficulties , on e migh t conclud e that th e issue s presente d b y a foreseeabl e impac t approach , formidable a s they appear a t first, are in reality n o les s manageable tha n th e statistica l issue s tha t hav e t o b e resolve d under current actua l impact doctrine. Surely the courts' demonstrated abilit y t o negotiat e th e hypertechnica l terrai n o f statistical proo f counsel s tha t on e ough t no t rejec t prema turely th e possibilit y o f developin g a workabl e framewor k for foreseeabl e impac t cases. However, ther e i s a deepe r fla w i n th e foreseeabl e impac t approach, on e that i s not a s amenable to practical resolutio n as the technical matters just described ma y be. This difficult y lies in the fact that the foreseeable impac t model posits differ ences betwee n white s a s a group an d nonwhite s a s a group .

Disparate Impact under Title VII1106

Even i f the propositio n tha t ther e ar e suc h racia l difference s turns ou t t o b e descriptivel y accurat e wit h respec t t o on e o r more challenged criteria of decision, relying on this differenc e model a s th e foundatio n fo r lega l analysi s ma y b e norma tively problemati c i n tw o respects . Fo r some , th e ascriptio n of racia l differenc e woul d b e inconsisten t wit h th e nor m o f colorblindness. Fro m thi s perspective , i t woul d b e undesir able, an d perhap s necessaril y unworkable , t o ancho r a lega l doctrine o n a premis e s o a t odd s wit h th e fundamental , i f aspirational, value s o f society . Fo r others , th e ascriptio n o f difference migh t no t b e troublin g i n itself , bu t predictabl e social processes virtually would assur e that attribute s associ ated wit h white s woul d b e see n a s th e norm , an d tha t attri butes associated wit h nonwhite s woul d b e perceived a s deviant.54 Fo r thes e critics , this aspec t o f th e foreseeabl e impac t approach comes too close to a connotation o f inherent inferi ority to be normatively acceptable . I believe that these disturbing normative implication s aris e because th e foreseeabl e impac t approac h treat s whit e speci ficity a s an issue of fact, in the sense that a particular criterio n of decisio n eithe r i s white-specific, o r i t i s not ; i n turn , tha t question depend s o n th e existenc e vel non o f som e "rea l difference" between racia l groups . I think , however , tha t i t is muc h mor e accurat e a descriptio n o f socia l dynamic s t o characterize a conclusion regardin g whit e specificit y a s con textual an d therefor e contingent . Tha t is , it i s not th e crite rion i n the abstract tha t i s white-specific, bu t th e criterion i n the contex t o f it s usage . This insigh t suggest s anothe r statu tory avenue for implementing liability for transparently white decisionmaking—one tha t focuse s o n contex t rathe r tha n content.

Disparate Impact under Title VII1107

The Alternatives Mode l This mode l depart s fro m th e existin g disparat e impac t framework i n favo r o f a n approac h tha t mor e directl y cap tures the structural nature of the discrimination Keish a experienced. I n outline , analysi s o f a nonwhit e plaintiff' s clai m regarding a n advers e employment decisio n would procee d a s follows. Th e plaintiff' s firs t ste p woul d b e t o analyz e th e racial structure of her workplace. 55 A showing that the plaintiff's plac e o f employmen t i s predominantly white , o r struc tured i n suc h a way tha t white s predominat e i n position s o f authority, woul d trigge r a presumptio n tha t th e advers e ac tion reste d o n white-specifi c criteri a o f decision . However , that showin g alone would no t shif t th e burden o f persuasio n to th e defendant . Th e employe r woul d hav e to articulat e th e criterion employe d i n reachin g th e challenge d decision , an d the objective s serve d b y it , bu t th e plaintif f woul d bea r th e burden of proposing an alternative criterion that would serv e the employer' s objectiv e equall y well , and i n a manner satis factory t o th e plaintiff. Finally , the defendant woul d hav e a n opportunity t o persuad e th e cour t tha t adoptin g th e pro posed alternativ e would require unreasonable measures . Like th e foreseeabl e impac t approach , th e alternative s model i s grounde d i n th e disparat e impac t provisio n o f th e Civil Rights Act of 1991 . That provisio n i s structured i n this way: A disparate impact violation is established onl y if (i) the plaintiff demonstrate s the existence of a disparate impact an d the employe r fail s t o demonstrat e jo b relatednes s an d busi ness necessity; o r (ii ) the plaintiff demonstrate s th e existenc e of a n alternativ e practic e an d th e employe r refuse s t o adop t it.56 There are three possible interpretations o f this structure .

Disparate Impact under Title VII1108

Upon plaintiff's demonstratio n o f disparate impact, interpre tation (A ) understands the plaintiff's proo f o f less discriminatory alternative s t o com e int o pla y onl y i f th e defendan t establishes business necessity, while interpretation (B ) permits the plaintiff t o move directly from impac t to consideration of alternatives, an d thu s t o circumven t th e busines s necessit y stage.57 Finally, interpretation (C ) sees the Act as stating tha t proof o f a disparate impac t i s not necessar y whe n th e plain tiff can demonstrate the availability of an alternative practice. Of course , interpretatio n (C ) follow s th e structur e o f th e statutory language . However, th e 199 1 Act als o adopt s pre Wards Cove precedents in regard t o the meaning of "alterna tive employmen t practice. " Becaus e thos e precedent s al l in volve cases in which th e existence o f a disparate impac t wa s regarded a s a prerequisit e fo r consideratio n o f th e alterna tives issue , i t mus t b e conclude d tha t th e 199 1 Ac t di d no t intend to create structure (C) . The alternative s approac h follow s interpretatio n (B) , an d wholly discard s th e questio n o f busines s necessity , substitut ing a n inquir y int o th e existenc e o f les s assimilationist alter natives t o a challenged busines s practice . Moreover, thi s ap proach infer s th e existenc e o f a disparat e impac t fro m th e confluence o f tw o line s o f reasoning . First , ther e i s a struc tural analysis : Norm s formulate d i n a dominantl y whit e workplace are presumed to be white-specific an d thus to have an advers e effec t o n nonwhites . Second , thi s mode l require s the plaintif f t o formulat e a n alternativ e tha t wil l no t disad vantage nonwhite s a t all , o r on e tha t wil l no t disadvantag e them a s severel y a s th e employer' s challenge d practice . Th e plaintiff wil l b e able to d o so only if the challenge d criterio n

Disparate Impact under Title VII1109

has som e disparat e effect . Thus , unde r th e alternative s mode l disparate impac t i s not abandoned , bu t inferred . The alternative s mode l mirror s th e institutiona l natur e o f some form s o f rac e discrimination . Keisha' s claim , fo r exam ple, i s structura l i n th e sens e tha t i t i s th e consequenc e o f a particular workforc e compositio n an d th e natur e o f whit e race consciousness . Therefore , i t seem s onl y natura l t o con struct a doctrina l framewor k tha t reflect s th e structura l char acter o f thi s theor y o f liability , an d thu s disavo w th e intent like connotation s o f th e existin g disparat e impac t approach . The alternative s mode l permit s th e plaintif f wh o ha s bee n disadvantaged b y institutionall y race-specifi c feature s o f th e workplace t o rel y o n genera l knowledg e abou t thi s for m o f race specificity , an d t o procee d directl y t o th e exploratio n o f more inclusiv e employmen t practices . The first issu e to b e addressed unde r th e alternative s mode l is whethe r th e nonwhit e plaintiff' s workplac e i s predomi nantly white . Suc h workplace s fal l int o thre e categories . First, an y circumstanc e i n whic h nonwhite s constitut e les s than roughl y fifteen percen t o f th e workforc e shoul d qualif y for thi s characterization. 58 I n addition , an y workplac e tha t i s racially stratified , wit h white s occupyin g al l o r nearl y al l o f the upper-leve l positions , shoul d b e considere d a predomi nantly whit e workplace . Finally , there ma y b e som e instance s in whic h a significan t percentag e o f ostensibl y manageria l positions ar e occupie d b y nonwhites , bu t i n whic h white s wield mos t o r al l o f th e ultimat e policymakin g authority ; these to o shoul d b e identifie d a s predominantl y whit e work places. The secon d componen t o f th e alternative s mode l i s th e

Disparate Impact under Title VII1110

plaintiff's obligatio n t o formulat e mor e raciall y inclusiv e means o f accomplishin g th e employer' s state d objectives . O f course, ther e mus t b e som e constraint s o n th e rang e o f per missible objectives , o r th e approac h wil l hav e n o impac t a t all o n assimilationis t employmen t practices . Th e scop e o f permissible objective s shoul d b e broa d enoug h t o includ e legitimate financial motives , bu t narro w enoug h t o exclud e matters o f tast e tha t ar e unnecessar y fo r th e attainmen t o f those financial goals. 59 Moreover, the preferences o f custom ers an d client s tha t implicat e th e categorie s protecte d b y Title VI I shoul d no t b e invoke d a t thi s stage , eve n i f thos e preferences indirectl y affect financial outcomes. 60 Finally, at the heart o f the alternatives model lies the question o f wha t sor t o f alternative s th e transparenc y plaintif f might put forward . Becaus e the focus o f this model is institutional discrimination , th e rang e o f alternative s availabl e t o the plaintif f shoul d no t b e limite d t o alternativ e criteri a o f decision and, of course, the nature of an appropriate alterna tive will be highly case-specific. I n Keisha's case, the proble m is a white-specifi c visio n o f th e characteristic s neede d i n a scientific department head. In this sort of case, diversity training for whit e employee s who ar e to b e under Keisha' s super vision, combine d wit h clea r indication s o f th e firm's suppor t for her , ma y b e enoug h t o solv e th e proble m fro m he r per spective.61 T o reduc e th e proble m o f whit e specificit y i n th e future, th e company als o might provide diversity training fo r the individuals who were the decisionmakers in Keisha's case. In othe r cases , mor e drasti c measures , suc h a s restructurin g chains o f command , o r reallocatin g decisionmakin g author ity, might be in order .

Disparate Impact under Title VIII 111

Under th e alternative s model , th e employe r coul d defen d by arguin g tha t adoptin g a propose d alternativ e woul d no t be reasonable. Thu s th e alternative s mode l woul d resolv e th e ultimate questio n o f th e exten t t o whic h a n assimilationis t workplace i s permissibl e unde r a n analysi s ver y simila r t o established concept s o f reasonabl e accommodation , rathe r than busines s necessity . A s wit h th e foreseeabl e impac t model, however , th e lin e i n questio n i s very difficul t t o dra w in th e abstract . Like th e foreseeabl e impac t approach , th e alternative s framework implicate s som e concept s tha t ar e relativel y unfa miliar i n lega l analysis . Indeed , th e approac h i s founde d o n the unusua l propositio n tha t norm s develope d i n predomi nantly whit e setting s ar e presumptively white-specific . O n th e other hand , th e alternative s mode l present s fewe r technica l problems tha n th e foreseeabl e impac t framework . Moreover , on on e leve l i t i s less normatively problematic . I t represent s a direct, structura l respons e t o a structura l problem , an d ad heres t o th e skepticis m preferre d b y transparenc y theory . Thus, i f one accepts the premises o f the transparency analyse s presented i n chapter s 1 an d 2 , th e alternative s approac h would appea r t o b e th e mos t fitting doctrina l framewor k fo r implementing a remedy . The weaknes s o f th e alternative s mode l lie s i n it s substitu tion o f skepticis m fo r a fact-oriente d approac h t o th e ques tion o f disparat e effects . Fo r thos e incline d t o regar d th e question o f whit e specificit y a s a resolvabl e questio n o f fact , the alternative s approac h ma y see m overinclusive . I t threat ens to impos e liability , through th e presumption o f rac e speci ficity, o n employer s whos e criteri a o f decisio n ar e no t i n fac t

Disparate Impact under Title VII /112

race-specific. Thi s resul t seem s inconsisten t wit h th e notio n that Titl e VI I aim s t o preserv e a real m o f autonom y fo r private employers.

Comparing the Foreseeable Impact and Alternatives Models The approache s examine d her e diffe r i n tw o respects . First , they diverge with regard to the way "disparat e impact"—th e employer's use of white-specific criteria—ma y b e established. The foreseeable impac t model focuses o n the content of challenged criteria o f decisio n an d treat s the existence vel non o f white specificity a s a resolvable questio n o f fact. The alterna tives mode l emphasize s th e contex t i n whic h a challenge d decision i s mad e an d view s decisionmakin g i n a predomi nantly whit e environmen t wit h skepticism. Accordingly , thi s model presume s th e rac e specificit y o f decisionmakin g i n such a n environment . Thi s presumptio n i s merel y a trigge r for furthe r analysis , however; the alternatives model is agnostic o n th e questio n whethe r ther e ar e i n fac t an y faciall y race-neutral criteri a o f decisio n i n a predominantl y whit e decisionmaking context . The tw o model s als o diffe r regardin g th e framewor k i n which th e issu e o f justificatio n i s t o b e resolved . Unde r th e foreseeable impac t model , thi s questio n arise s unde r th e heading o f th e busines s necessit y defens e or , i f the employe r makes the case that th e assimilationist practic e is a matter of business necessity , th e plaintif f ma y propos e a n alternativ e that is not assimilationist bu t serves the employer's legitimat e

Disparate Impact under Title VII1113

business objective s equall y well . A t bottom , thes e analyse s turn o n th e questio n o f th e exten t t o whic h assimilatio n ought t o b e considered a matter o f busines s necessity. Unde r the alternatives model, the plaintiff propose s alternative business practices withou t first confrontin g th e questio n o f busi ness necessity . This mode l supplant s th e concep t o f busines s necessity wit h a notio n o f reasonabl e accommodation . Ulti mately, however , eac h o f thes e analyti c scheme s recognize s that i n the real m o f employmen t decisionmaking , criteri a o f selection tha t requir e assimilatio n t o white-specifi c norm s constitute "built-i n headwinds" for nonwhite employees, and thus violat e Titl e VIP s proscriptio n o f employmen t action s taken "becaus e of " race. 62 Becaus e thi s fundamenta l statu tory objective must inform eac h model, and because the same notion o f assimilation animate s both approaches , one should not anticipat e differen t final outcome s du e t o difference s i n the way the two doctrines are framed . The foreseeabl e impac t mode l embodie s a categorica l ap proach to the problem o f transparently whit e subjective deci sionmaking wit h regar d t o bot h stage s o f th e analysis—th e questions o f disparate impac t an d busines s necessity. That is, the decisionmake r mus t decid e whethe r ther e is o r is not a foreseeabl e impact , an d whethe r a prove n assimilationis t practice is or is not justifie d a s a matter o f business necessity. This categorica l styl e i s attractiv e becaus e i t i s conceptuall y familiar. I t i s a commo n for m o f lega l analysis , an d i n th e context o f Titl e VI I ma y gai n som e credibilit y becaus e it s structure parallel s existin g disparat e impac t doctrine . O n th e other hand , th e weaknes s o f th e categorica l approac h i s th e way i t implicitl y categorize s group s a s wel l a s criteri a o f

Disparate Impact under Title VII1114

decision. Proo f tha t a particula r criterio n o f decisio n i s i n fact associate d mor e closel y wit h white s tha n wit h othe r racial group s seem s inevitabl y t o requir e a showin g tha t th e groups diffe r fro m on e anothe r i n relevan t respects , whic h i n turn ma y implicat e connotation s o f inferiority . In contras t t o thi s categorica l style , the alternative s mode l reflects a skeptica l an d accommodationis t attitude . I t pre sumes th e existenc e o f raciall y disparat e effect s whe n certai n structural condition s ar e met , an d i t impose s a requiremen t of reasonabl e accommodatio n tha t doe s no t requir e categori cal evaluatio n o f wha t i s o r i s no t a matte r o f busines s necessity. Th e skeptica l aspec t o f th e alternative s mode l i s relatively unfamilia r a s a styl e o f lega l analysis , thoug h i t does hav e th e virtu e o f respondin g i n a fairl y direc t wa y t o the transparenc y phenomenon . The principa l advantag e o f th e foreseeabl e impac t mode l is tha t i t doe s a bette r jo b o f preservin g employe r autonom y than doe s th e alternative s model . Th e latte r appear s t o re quire (possibl y radical ) restructurin g o f an y white-dominate d workplace wheneve r a nonwhit e employe e i s adde d t o th e workforce. Becaus e i t i s the workplac e structur e tha t trigger s analysis o f assimilationism , an y nonwhit e employe e ha s th e power t o presen t alternativ e way s o f doin g thing s t o whic h the employe r mus t respond. 63 Thi s relativel y radica l conse quence ma y b e mitigate d somewha t b y th e fac t tha t i t i s th e plaintiff, rathe r tha n th e employer , wh o mus t formulat e th e alternatives t o b e pu t o n th e tabl e fo r consideration , bu t in th e en d ever y whit e employe r i n a predominantl y whit e workplace woul d b e force d t o tak e seriousl y nonwhit e em ployees' proposals fo r change . Because the foreseeable impac t

Disparate Impact under Title VII1115

model doe s no t allo w th e plaintif f t o rel y o n a structura l analysis o f the workplace, bu t rathe r require s her t o demon strate th e existenc e o f foreseeabl e disparat e effects , i t doe s not intrud e a s deepl y int o employe r prerogatives . Thos e at tracted to the view that it is important to maintain a realm of private autonom y relativel y insulate d fro m publi c intrusio n may favo r th e foreseeabl e impac t approac h becaus e i t doe s not threate n potentiall y overinclusiv e impositio n o f liability , as does the alternatives model . On th e othe r hand , th e alternative s mode l als o ha s it s strengths. It doe s no t carr y th e troublin g mora l implication s of th e foreseeabl e impac t model' s ascriptio n o f racia l differ ence. Moreover, th e alternative s approac h avoid s a n institu tional difficult y presente d b y th e foreseeabl e impac t model . Even i f on e overcome s one' s resistanc e t o th e propositio n that ther e ar e cultura l difference s tie d t o rac e tha t ough t t o be taken int o accoun t unde r Titl e VII, as I believe shoul d b e done, it is another matter to expect courts to resolve cases on the basi s o f a factua l finding tha t suc h difference s exist . Those wh o ar e especiall y concerne d abou t eithe r th e mora l or institutiona l problem s o f th e foreseeabl e impac t mode l may prefe r th e alternative s model . I n sum , th e tw o ap proaches present a normative dilemma : Should on e prefer a n approach tha t preserve s a real m o f decisionmakin g auton omy fo r privat e employers , a t th e cos t o f institutionalizin g the idea that there are significant cultura l differences betwee n the races, or shoul d on e op t fo r a n approac h tha t avoid s th e ascription o f difference , a t th e cos t o f greate r intrusio n o n employer prerogatives ? M y ow n conclusio n i s tha t institu tional racis m canno t b e eliminate d i f th e privat e secto r i s

Disparate Impact under Title VII1116

permitted to persist in excluding nonwhites from position s of power an d authority ; thu s measure s tha t "intrude " int o th e realm of "th e private" are necessary if there is to be meaningful racia l redistribution . Fro m thi s perspective , then , th e threatening countenance of the alternatives model may be the face o f mora l necessity . I leave i t t o th e reader , however , t o consider the question fo r herself .

[6] Statutory Interpretatio n

B

ECAUSE THE PROPOSALS discussed i n chapte r 5 impli cate interpretatio n o f a statute—Titl e VII—the y raise issues somewhat different fro m those addressed in chapter 4 concernin g constitutiona l interpretation . However , there ar e som e parallel s a s well . Befor e implementin g eithe r of th e alternativ e model s o f Titl e VII liability, a court woul d have t o b e persuade d tha t th e statute' s fundamenta l polic y regarding rac e discriminatio n encompasse s discriminatio n i n the for m o f transparentl y whit e decisionmaking . Moreover , some might argu e that ther e i s an issu e o f judicia l rol e t o b e addressed her e too , thoug h i t doe s no t loo m nearl y a s larg e as in the constitutional realm .

The Meaning of Title VII Title VI I prohibit s "discrimination, " bu t th e statut e leave s obscure th e precise meanin g o f tha t term . It s possible mean 117

Statutory Interpretation 1118

ings are most easily explored vi a a corollary—the concep t of equality. That is, I understand "discrimination " a s the failur e to ac t i n a manne r consisten t wit h workplac e equality ; th e various sense s o f "discrimination " therefor e correspon d t o the various sense s of "equality " employe d i n this discussion . In outline , I argu e her e tha t Titl e VII , a s amende d b y th e Civil Right s Ac t o f 1991 , i s n o longe r susceptibl e t o wha t might b e characterize d a s extrem e "right-wing " an d "left wing" interpretation s tha t res t respectivel y o n symmetry based and distributiv e conceptions of equality. By placing the disparate impact approach o n a statutory foundation distinc t from disparat e treatmen t analysis , th e 199 1 Ac t implicitl y ratified a n equalit y principl e that i s more expansiv e tha n th e notion o f symmetrica l treatment . A t th e sam e time , anothe r provision adde d b y the 199 1 Act, which prohibit s th e us e of race-normed employmen t tests , underscore s Congress ' long standing rejectio n o f a purel y distributiv e conceptio n o f equality.1 This stance can be traced bac k to section 703 ( j) of the 196 4 Act , whic h insulate d employer s fro m liabilit y fo r failure t o maintain a racially balance d workplace. 2 Thus, the theoretical underpinning s o f disparat e impac t liabilit y mus t be foun d i n th e are a betwee n thes e tw o extremes— a regio n frequently describe d a s implicatin g a n "equa l opportunity " notion o f equality . However, the concept of equal employment opportunit y is itself subjec t t o tw o interpretations , on e pluralis t an d th e other assimilationist. While the statute does not directly indicate whic h o f thes e i s th e intende d conceptio n o f equa l op portunity, th e general objective s o f race neutrality an d remedial redistributio n tha t permeat e th e statutor y schem e d o provide indirect guidance. I argue that a pluralist understand -

Statutory Interpretation 1119

ing of equa l opportunit y mor e full y implement s th e underly ing policies of Title VII than does the alternative, an assimila tionist interpretation o f equal opportunity . As note d earlier , th e disparat e impac t approac h t o Titl e VII liabilit y wa s create d throug h judicia l interpretatio n i n Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 3 Th e Suprem e Cour t lai d th e theoretical foundatio n fo r thi s ne w approac h a s follows : "The objectiv e o f Congres s i n the enactmen t o f Title VII . . . was t o achiev e equalit y o f employmen t opportunitie s an d remove barrier s tha t hav e operate d i n th e pas t t o favo r a n identifiable grou p o f whit e employee s ove r othe r employ ees." 4 Th e Cour t the n capture d thi s genera l notio n o f equa l opportunity i n the image of " 'built-in headwinds' for minor ity groups." 5 Late r doctrina l shift s tha t blurre d th e lin e be tween disparat e impac t analysi s an d proo f o f discriminator y intent ma y b e understoo d a s a n attemp t t o rescin d Griggs' opportunity-oriented theor y i n favo r o f a symmetry-base d conception o f equality . Accordin g t o th e latter , discrimina tion occur s if, an d onl y if, som e employees are treated differ ently from other s becaus e o f race. Under thi s view, disparat e impact analysi s woul d b e see n a s a n evidentiar y mechanis m designed t o ferre t ou t cover t disparat e treatment , includin g the pretextua l us e o f faciall y neutra l proxie s fo r race . How ever, th e purel y symmetry-base d interpretatio n o f Titl e VI I has bee n rendere d implausibl e b y Congress ' clea r endorse ment o f disparat e impac t a s a distinc t theor y o f liability , it s finding tha t th e Wards Cove decisio n "weakene d th e scop e and effectiveness o f Federal civil rights protections," 6 an d it s concomitant rejectio n o f th e Wards Cove ruling o n th e busi ness necessity defense. 7 At th e opposit e extreme , i t i s evident tha t Congres s neve r

Statutory Interpretation 1120

has endorse d a purel y distributiv e conceptio n o f equalit y i n the workplace . Th e origina l versio n o f Titl e VI I contained a provision protectin g employer s fro m liabilit y fo r failur e t o achieve racia l balanc e i n th e workplace , an d t o dat e i t ha s not bee n modifie d i n an y significan t way. 8 Th e existenc e o f this provisio n ma y accoun t fo r wha t ha s bee n describe d a s the Court' s compromis e i n Griggs: The plaintif f ma y mak e out a prima faci e cas e o f discriminatio n b y demonstratin g a racial imbalance, but the employer may show that the imbalance i s justified b y proving tha t th e criterio n responsibl e fo r the disparat e effec t i s relate d t o jo b performance. 9 O n a purely distributiv e conceptio n o f equality , o f course, no suc h justification woul d b e permitted . Moreover , th e 199 1 Act' s prohibition agains t race-norming standardized test s strengthens the conclusio n tha t undilute d distributiv e equalit y i s no t the objectiv e a t whic h th e statut e aims ; race normin g woul d promote distributiv e equalit y b y ensurin g tha t a standard ized tes t woul d no t hav e a disparat e impac t o n th e basi s o f race. The foundation o f the disparat e impac t approach , then , is neither th e concep t o f symmetrica l treatmen t no r a pur e theory o f distributiv e justice ; i t ca n b e foun d instea d i n th e notion o f equa l access . An employmen t practic e tha t ha s a n adverse impac t o n member s o f minorit y group s an d tha t i s unrelated to job requirements o r business necessity creates an unnecessary barrie r fo r member s o f those groups. This equa l opportunity conceptio n o f equalit y differ s fro m th e equality as-symmetry approac h i n tha t i t recognize s tha t sam e treat ment ma y no t alway s remov e race-specifi c barrier s t o achievement, and it diverges from th e distributive conceptio n

Statutory Interpretation 1121

of equalit y b y ratifyin g disparat e outcome s i f the y ar e th e result of a process necessary to maintain business operations. Like th e othe r tw o equalit y principles , however , th e notio n of equa l opportunit y i s consisten t wit h Titl e VIF s proscrip tion of employment practices that adversely affect individual s "because of" race . The proposition tha t a n opportunity-oriente d principl e o f equality bes t explains the disparate impac t theory o f liabilit y does no t resolv e th e questio n whethe r Titl e VI I ough t t o b e read t o provid e a remed y fo r a n employer' s failur e t o tak e cultural diversit y int o accoun t i n makin g employmen t deci sions. Equa l opportunit y migh t b e understoo d a s n o mor e than the right of a nonwhite employe e to play on a n existin g field, so that Keish a woul d hav e n o cognizabl e complain t a s long a s sh e ha d th e opportunit y t o confor m t o prevailin g norms at her workplace. O n the other hand, on e might inter pret equa l opportunit y a s requiring alteratio n o f th e playin g field itself in order to accommodate equally able players with diverse playin g styles . O n thi s interpretation , Keish a coul d argue that he r employe r shoul d attemp t t o modify th e work place environment t o conform t o some degree to her cultura l style, rather than placing the onus of adaptation o n Keisha. Of course , Congress ha s no t explicitl y state d whic h o f these conception s o f equa l employmen t opportunit y i s th e correct interpretation o f Title VII. However, consideration of two commonl y recognize d objective s o f Titl e VI I support s the conclusio n tha t th e pluralis t interpretatio n i s superior t o the assimilationist approach . First, adopting the assimilation ist interpretation—that equalit y means only an equal oppor tunity t o compet e o n a preexistin g field—fails t o captur e

Statutory Interpretation 1122

Title VIF s genera l goa l o f eliminatin g rac e a s a facto r i n employment. Second , th e pluralis t conceptio n o f equa l op portunity, whic h woul d requir e tha t th e field b e altere d i n order t o accommodat e cultura l differences , i s mor e full y aligned with the remedial goals of Title VII than is the assimilationist interpretation . Under the assimilationist conceptio n o f equal employmen t opportunity, Keish a woul d b e require d t o confor m t o th e prevailing cultural norms in her dominantly white workplac e at leas t t o th e exten t tha t thos e norm s implicat e characteris tics withi n he r control . Fo r example , groomin g i s generall y thought t o b e a matter o f persona l choice , and t o th e exten t that it is, each employee has an equal opportunity to confor m to a n employer' s groomin g code , regardles s o f race . Th e decisionmakers i n Keisha' s cas e coul d argu e tha t sh e ha d been afforded a n equal opportunity to conform t o analogous, but more subtle, cultural norms. This assimilationis t positio n rest s o n a fals e dichotom y between rac e an d individua l choice . Fo r Keisha , th e tw o are inextricabl y intertwine d becaus e th e aspect s o f persona l identity implicate d i n th e decisio n no t t o promot e he r ar e race-dependent. Thu s the "choice " with which sh e is faced i s in effec t a choic e t o retai n he r racia l identit y a s sh e under stands it , o r t o renounc e it . Sh e woul d describ e hersel f a s having t o she d o r disavo w crucia l facet s o f blackness , i f sh e wants to get ahead in her place of employment . One might well argue in response, as could Keisha's supervisors, that eve n i f Keish a experience s he r persona l qualitie s as linke d wit h he r race , i n realit y sh e ha s no t bee n denie d employment opportunity o n the basis of race because she had

Statutory Interpretation 1123

the sam e chanc e a s an y whit e candidat e t o confor m o r b e denied advancement . On e cannot measure the subjective dis comfort entaile d b y suc h a choice , th e argumen t woul d go , and in any event subjective experience should not be relevant. Individuals mus t mak e al l sort s o f choice s i n life , includin g the choice whether to "fi t in" to a particular environment . So long a s th e sam e demand s ar e place d o n al l employee s re gardless o f race, the argument continues , one should no t sa y that rac e i s a facto r i n a decisio n adversel y affectin g th e individual who chooses not to conform . The foregoin g argumen t i s problemati c becaus e i t reiter ates th e transparenc y error . Becaus e i t underestimate s th e centrality o f rac e t o persona l identit y fo r peopl e wh o ar e not white , i t incorrectl y assume s tha t th e identit y cost s o f conformity t o th e norm s o f a whit e cultura l settin g fo r a black perso n ar e commensurat e wit h th e identit y cost s in curred b y a whit e perso n require d t o confor m i n th e sam e setting. Racial identit y i s no t a centra l lif e experienc e fo r mos t white people , becaus e i t doe s no t hav e t o be . Lik e member s of any socially dominant group, white people have the option to se t asid e consciousnes s o f th e characteristi c tha t define s the dominan t class—i n thi s case , race . Thu s whitenes s i s experienced a s racelessness , an d persona l identit y i s con ceived in a race-neutral manner . However , rac e plays quite a different rol e i n the live s of peopl e o f colo r i n this society . It is, agai n a s a consequenc e o f existin g socia l structure s tha t define an d giv e meanin g t o racia l identity , a centra l face t o f life. On e blac k feminist , bel l hooks, describes he r experienc e of race:

Statutory Interpretation 1124 I ofte n begi n course s whic h focu s o n African-America n literature , and sometimes specifically blac k women writers, with a declaration by Paul o Freir e whic h ha d a profoun d liberator y effec t o n m y thinking: "W e cannot ente r th e struggl e a s objects i n order t o late r become subjects. " Thi s statemen t compel s reflectio n o n ho w th e dominated, th e oppressed , th e exploite d mak e ourselve s subject . How d o we creat e a n oppositiona l worldview , a consciousness, a n identity, a standpoin t tha t exist s no t onl y a s tha t struggl e whic h also oppose s dehumanizatio n bu t a s that movement whic h enable s creative, expansive self-actualization ? Oppositio n i s not enough. In that vacant spac e after on e has resisted ther e is still the necessity t o become—to mak e onesel f anew . Resistance i s that struggl e w e can most easil y grasp. Even the most subjecte d perso n ha s moments of rage an d resentmen t s o intense that they respond, they ac t against . There i s a n inne r uprisin g tha t lead s t o rebellion , howeve r short lived. I t ma y b e onl y momentar y bu t i t take s place . Tha t spac e within onesel f wher e resistanc e i s possibl e remains . I t i s differen t then t o tal k abou t becomin g subjects . Tha t proces s emerge s a s one comes t o understan d ho w structure s o f dominatio n wor k i n one' s own life , a s on e develop s critica l thinkin g an d critica l conscious ness, a s on e invent s new , alternativ e habit s o f being , an d resist s from tha t marginal spac e of difference inwardl y defined. 10 Thus, Keisha' s employe r i s simpl y wron g i n thinkin g tha t its conformit y requiremen t i s race-neutral ; th e standar d places quit e a differen t burde n o n nonwhite s tha n i t doe s o n white employees . Moreover , thi s differenc e i s no t subjective , but structural . Th e socia l significanc e o f race—th e existenc e of a racia l hierarchy—guarantee s tha t rac e wil l intrud e o n the self-consciousnes s o f nonwhite s t o a n exten t tha t mos t whites neve r wil l experience . Thu s a "similarl y situated " white candidat e fo r promotio n i s unlikel y t o experienc e a s race-dependent th e persona l attribute s calle d int o questio n

Statutory Interpretation 1125

by he r employer' s workplac e conformit y rule . Eve n i f sh e does experience these attributes a s associated wit h race, they are no t likel y t o b e for that reason central t o he r self-defini tion. For Keisha, on the other hand , conformit y i s excruciat ingly difficult precisel y because it calls her racial identity int o question. Once on e sees that rac e is inevitably implicate d i n matter s of "persona l choice, " i t become s apparen t tha t th e assimila tionist interpretatio n doe s no t trul y reflec t a conceptio n o f race-neutral employmen t opportunity . Unde r th e assimila tionist interpretation , th e mandat e o f equalit y i s satisfie d i n Keisha's cas e becaus e sh e could , i n theory , confor m t o th e employer's expectations , eve n thoug h doin g s o necessaril y would lev y cost s o n he r tha t ar e inseparabl y linke d t o he r race. The pluralist conception o f equal opportunity embodie s a mor e thoroughgoin g notio n o f rac e neutrality . Thi s inter pretation o f equalit y woul d no t hol d th e requirement s o f equal opportunity t o b e satisfied unles s the employer a t leas t explored way s o f accommodatin g diverse , race-dependen t means o f achievin g legitimat e busines s objectives . Thu s onl y the pluralis t interpretatio n o f equa l opportunit y ca n captur e fully th e visio n o f a workplace i n whic h rac e doe s no t mat ter—in Titl e VII' s language , a workplace i n whic h th e indi vidual is not disadvantaged "becaus e of" race . Of course , Titl e VII' s visio n o f rac e neutralit y i s closel y tied t o th e redistributiv e objectiv e o f improvin g th e relativ e economic positio n o f black s an d othe r racia l minorities . However, redistributio n i s not a n end i n itself; it is desirable because of a history of intentional discrimination and societa l deprivation.11 Thus, to the extent that Title VII aims at redis-

Statutory Interpretation /126

tribution a t all , i t doe s s o becaus e o f a remedia l objective . Here too , th e pluralis t interpretatio n o f equa l opportunit y emerges as a clearer expression of the Act's generic goals than does the assimilationist approach . One consequenc e o f tw o centurie s o f discriminatio n an d disadvantage i s that white s hol d a disproportionat e shar e of business ownership and decisionmaking power within corporate structures. 12 The assimilationist conception o f equal employment opportunit y doe s no t addres s thi s persisten t in equality, becaus e i t deem s "equal " th e opportunit y t o compete on this existing, though white-dominated, field. The pluralist interpretatio n o f equalit y i s a muc h mor e effectiv e remedial too l becaus e i t require s a n employe r t o restructur e the workplace i n ways that mitigat e the effects o f preexistin g white dominance . In sum , th e tw o objective s o f Titl e VI I tha t ofte n ar e perceived t o conflic t i n th e are a o f race-consciou s "affirma tive action " converg e wit h regar d t o th e concep t o f equa l employment opportunity . Bot h rac e neutralit y an d remedia l redistribution ar e mor e completel y realize d b y interpretin g equal employmen t opportunit y i n th e pluralist , rathe r tha n assimilationist, sense . I t seem s fair , then , t o conclud e tha t fashioning a framewor k fo r assessin g liabilit y tha t woul d effectively accommodat e Keisha' s clai m i s consisten t wit h Title VII as written.

The Principle of Judicial Restraint Some migh t argu e tha t askin g th e judiciar y t o implemen t either of the proposals set forth i n chapter 5 is tantamount t o

Statutory Interpretation /127

asking the courts to repeat a crucial error embodied in Griggs itself—the erro r o f judicia l policymaking . I n outline , thi s argument contend s that th e disparate impac t mode l o f liability was a judicial creation not authorized b y the statute itself; such expansiv e interpretatio n take s th e judiciar y beyon d it s proper role into a realm that should b e the exclusive province of the legislature—policy formation. 13 Clearly , this argumen t has a goo d dea l i n commo n wit h th e contentio n tha t th e courts ought to exercise restraint in constitutional interpreta tion becaus e they are a "nondemocratic " institution. 14 However, ther e ar e severa l significan t difference s betwee n the statutor y an d constitutiona l contexts . First , whe n inter preting statutes courts generally have as their point o f depar ture a text that i s much more specific, much less open-ended , than a constitutiona l provision . Thu s ther e i s a framewor k for interpretiv e debat e tha t lead s mor e directl y bac k t o th e "framers"—the legislature , in the case of statutes. Second, at least i n th e cas e o f Titl e VII , on e doe s no t hav e t o spa n a period o f mor e tha n a centur y i n th e attemp t t o discer n th e "framers' " intent; the relevant grou p o f initial policymaker s is more o r les s the interpreters ' contemporaries . Finally , an d perhaps most significantly, courts ' possible misinterpretation s of statute s ar e mor e easil y correcte d b y legislativ e actio n than ar e putativ e constitutiona l mistakes , whic h requir e th e laborious process of constitutional amendment . It als o mus t b e note d tha t th e presen t proposal s d o no t implicate th e sam e degre e o f judicia l "activism " a s di d cre ation o f th e disparat e impac t theor y o f liabilit y i n Griggs. Title VII , a s amende d i n 1991 , no w clearl y authorize s th e disparate impac t theor y o f liability ; th e proposal s se t fort h here merely flesh out th e evidentiary mean s through whic h a

Statutory Interpretation 1128

disparate impac t cas e migh t b e mad e i n a cas e involvin g transparently whit e decisionmaking . Moreover , th e statute' s history an d structur e provid e som e theoretica l guidance . A s argued in the preceding section, they make it clear that dispa rate impac t liabilit y canno t b e premise d o n eithe r a purel y symmetrical o r a purel y distributiv e conceptio n o f equality ; the sole plausible candidate to fill the gap is a notion of equal opportunity. Thus , th e curren t statut e i s unclea r o n onl y one poin t relevan t t o th e presen t question—whethe r equa l opportunity shoul d b e understood i n a pluralist o r an assimilationist sense. Finally, Title VII addresses an area in which the legislatur e seems to have invited a degree of judicial "activism. " Thoug h disapproving Wards Cove, the 199 1 Act relies on othe r judi cial interpretation s o f Titl e VII , suggestin g tha t o n balanc e the legislature remains content to allow the judiciary to fill in gaps in the legislative scheme. The proposed interpretation of the Act—that Titl e VII should b e read t o incorporat e a pluralist notio n o f equa l opportunity—woul d constitut e jus t such a n interstitia l enterprise , i f undertake n b y a court . Moreover, thi s interstitia l interpretatio n doe s no t res t o n a court's own view of "soun d public policy," but on the generic policies underlyin g th e Ac t itself . Th e propose d pluralis t in terpretation o f equa l employmen t opportunity , then , ough t to b e see n a s a n exercis e i n mainstrea m statutor y inter pretation.15

[7] Notes o n Doctrina l Refor m

1

HE PROPOSED TRANSPARENCY-CONSCIOUS modifica tions o f Equa l Protectio n an d Titl e VI I doctrine s give rise to severa l jurisprudentia l considerations . First , the y embody a mor e constructiv e discours e o f responsibility , i n place o f th e existin g discours e o f blame . Second , the y impli cate the problem o f legal indeterminacy: I f doctrine doe s no t genuinely constrai n lega l decisionmakers , doctrina l refor m seems a n empt y exercise . Finally , th e projec t o f reformin g race discriminatio n la w ca n benefi t th e large r enterpris e o f constructing a n antiracist white identity.

Blame and Responsibility Both of the doctrines under examinatio n here—th e constitu tional requiremen t o f discriminator y inten t an d Titl e VIP s existing disparat e impac t rule—reflec t a practice o f blamin g "violators" fo r discriminator y practices . However , th e dis 129

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1130

course of blame and punishment is not well suited to the task of racia l remediation . A n alternativ e mor e likel y t o hav e salutary consequence s i s a discours e o f responsibility ; tha t framework provide s a theoretica l foundatio n fo r th e doc trinal proposals that have been presented here . As I us e i t here , th e notio n o f "blame " ha s tw o compo nents: A n ac t i s blameworth y i f i t i s bot h morall y wron g and divergen t fro m norma l practice . Thus th e constitutiona l requirement o f discriminator y inten t implicate s "blamewor thiness" insofa r a s i t carrie s connotation s o f crimina l liabil ity: Heightene d scrutin y i s triggere d onl y i f ther e i s a "ba d actor" wh o ha s selecte d a cours e o f actio n because of it s adverse impac t o n nonwhites . I n mainstrea m (libera l white ) discourse today , deliberatel y settin g ou t t o disadvantag e members o f racia l minorit y group s i s bot h morall y wron g and not the usual practice. It i s perhap s no t equall y obviou s tha t existin g Titl e VI I disparate impact rules participate too in a discourse of blam ing. However, when on e looks at the requirements fo r estab lishing th e existenc e o f disparat e effects , on e ha s th e sens e that the courts want to be shown that a particular employer's particular criterion of selection is the cause of a demonstrated disparate effect . Th e constellatio n o f requirement s centerin g on actua l disparat e effect s an d tigh t line s o f causatio n ar e quite reminiscen t o f th e "intent " mode l o f liabilit y tha t i s embodied i n th e constitutiona l rule . I n thi s way , Titl e VI I does incorporat e th e notio n tha t lega l liabilit y i s t o b e im posed onl y upon thos e who have stepped outsid e the bound s of accepted an d acceptabl e practice. Blaming i s no t a n effective , empiricall y well-founded , o r

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1131

prudent wa y o f addressin g th e complet e rang e o f contempo rary manifestation s o f rac e discrimination . Th e ineffec tiveness o f blamin g become s clea r whe n on e focuse s attentio n on unconsciou s discriminatio n (o f whic h transparentl y whit e decisionmaking i s on e form) . I n a simplifie d univers e o f onl y conscious an d unconsciou s discrimination , ther e ar e thre e plausible approache s t o assignin g blameworthiness : societ y might labe l conscious , bu t no t unconscious , discrimination , blameworthy; labe l bot h blameworthy ; o r labe l neithe r blameworthy. Brie f reflectio n reveal s tha t non e o f thes e ap proaches i s likely effectivel y t o addres s contemporar y Ameri can form s o f racia l discrimination . The positio n tha t consciou s discriminatio n i s blameworth y but unconsciou s discriminatio n i s not , i s counterproductiv e of th e ultimat e goa l o f racia l justice . Disapprovin g onl y con scious racis m provide s a n incentiv e fo r white s t o repres s an d deny whateve r racis t attitude s the y i n fac t harbor . A s Charle s Lawrence ha s explained , psychoanalyti c theor y posit s tha t individuals respon d t o conflict s betwee n socia l norm s tha t condemn racis t attitude s an d belief s an d thei r ow n racis t ideas b y excludin g th e latte r fro m consciou s recognition. 1 Thus, norm s tha t labe l onl y consciou s discriminatio n a s blameworthy ma y b e counterproductive, a s they ma y operat e primarily t o perpetuat e racis t attitude s i n a relativel y intrac table form . I n addition , focusin g disapprova l o n th e mor e blatant form s o f discriminatio n ma y creat e a climate o f back lash an d denial : " I certainl y a m no t a racist : I woul d no t d o these things." 2 To hol d bot h unconsciou s an d consciou s rac e discrimina tion equall y blameworth y i s als o unlikel y t o produc e desir -

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1132

able consequences . First , blamin g individual s fo r uncon sciously hel d attitude s ma y produc e paralyzin g guil t whe n the racist character o f those attitudes comes to light. Further more, condemnin g th e individua l fo r matter s no t withi n hi s conscious contro l seem s inconsisten t wit h th e concep t o f moral wron g associate d wit h blaming . Finally , assessin g blame fo r what , i n effect , nearl y ever y whit e perso n doe s seems equally incongruous ; i t is inconsistent wit h th e notio n that blam e may attac h onl y to action s outsid e the bound s of common practice . The final optio n i s t o regar d bot h consciou s an d uncon scious rac e discriminatio n a s morall y acceptable . Ther e i s merit i n th e propositio n tha t rac e neutralit y i s a t leas t a n overblown norm ; rac e consciousnes s ma y no t b e th e over arching evi l i t ofte n seem s t o be . Bu t ther e shoul d b e n o doubt abou t th e mora l statu s o f th e en d t o whic h rac e con sciousness historicall y ha s bee n directed : whit e supremacy . To dismis s to o easil y th e immoralit y o f race-consciou s deci sionmaking, in a framework i n which concepts o f blame an d innocence remai n operative , would b e to allo w the inferenc e that whit e dominatio n o f blacks i s an acceptabl e socia l out come. Blaming i s no t a n empiricall y well-founde d practic e i n the context o f modern rac e discrimination. Th e transparenc y phenomenon casts doubt on a fundamental presuppositio n of the discours e o f blame : tha t ther e exist s a nonblameworth y alternative to the conduct for which blame is assessed. To say that eithe r th e consciou s o r unconsciou s us e o f race-specifi c criteria o f decisio n i s blameworth y i s t o suppos e tha t som e race-neutral alternativ e cours e o f actio n migh t hav e bee n

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1133

pursued instead . The lesson of transparency, however, i s that in al l likelihood rac e alway s i s a factor influencin g decision s that affec t persons . T o labe l on e cours e o f conduc t blame worthy whe n ther e i s n o availabl e "innocent " alternativ e seems simply unjust . Finally, judicia l relianc e o n unstate d notion s o f blame , violation, and remedy is imprudent becaus e the aura of criminality surroundin g thes e concept s undoubtedl y increase s courts' resistanc e t o imposin g liabilit y i n circumstance s tha t otherwise migh t cal l fo r it . Wit h respec t t o constitutiona l doctrine, federa l court s understandabl y hesitat e t o sugges t that anothe r branc h o f governmen t ha s engage d i n crimina l conduct. Wit h regar d t o Titl e VII , ther e i s a similar , i f per haps less stubborn, reluctance to impose liability on a private employer who i s not the sole cause of a given racially disproportionate outcome . However, suc h hesitation contribute s t o the maintenance of an unjust racia l status quo. In a nonblaming framework , court s migh t becom e mor e effectiv e partici pants i n the effor t t o addres s an d eradicat e al l forms o f rac e discrimination. The alternativ e t o a discours e o f blamin g i s a discours e of responsibility . I n thi s model , on e take s responsibilit y fo r correcting undesirabl e state s o f affair s withou t thereb y ac cepting eithe r blam e for , o r eve n a causa l connectio n with , the circumstance that requires correction : Notice first tha t t o tak e responsibilit y fo r a stat e o f affair s i s no t t o claim responsibilit y fo r havin g cause d it . So , fo r example , i f I tak e responsibility fo r cleanin g u p th e kitche n I a m no t thereb y admit ting t o an y rol e i n creatin g th e mess ; the stat e o f th e kitche n ma y b e the consequenc e o f action s quit e independen t o f me. 3

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1134

The kitche n exampl e i s ap t fo r th e dimensio n o f faul t a s wel l as causation : Eve n i f I hav e ha d a han d i n creatin g th e mess i n th e kitchen , th e blameworthines s vel non o f m y pas t conduct i s no t relevan t t o th e commitmen t t o chang e th e existing stat e o f affair s tha t takin g responsibilit y entails . Any white decisionmake r ca n choos e t o tak e responsibilit y for th e for m o f unconsciou s rac e discriminatio n "transpar ency" describe s b y adoptin g a skeptica l stanc e wit h respec t to seemingl y race-neutra l criteri a o f decisio n sh e employs . Deliberate skepticis m regardin g rac e neutralit y permit s th e decisionmaker t o ste p outsid e th e framewor k o f blam e an d guilt tha t rarel y offer s mor e tha n a choic e betwee n legitima tion o f th e statu s qu o an d paralysis. 4 Fo r governmen t an d private-employer decisionmakers , legall y impose d deliberat e skepticism provide s a n avenu e fo r addressin g unconsciou s discrimination whil e circumventin g th e problem s o f blamin g described above . The constitutiona l proposa l se t fort h i n chapte r 3 state s that a specia l for m o f heightene d scrutin y shoul d b e triggere d by any governmen t actio n wit h raciall y disparat e effects . That scrutin y focuse s o n whethe r governmen t wishe s t o jus tify a particula r cours e o f actio n b y referenc e t o a n assimila tionist objective , and , i f tha t i s no t th e case , whethe r ade quately pluralis t mean s ar e employe d i n pursui t o f a nonassimilationist goal . Thi s proposa l implement s govern ment responsibilit y fo r rac e discriminatio n i n two ways . First , it send s th e messag e tha t governmen t i s unwilling t o leav e th e racial "kitchen " i n a mess , whethe r o r no t th e mes s i s th e government's creation . Thoug h th e propose d rul e pressure s government t o behav e i n a nonassimilationis t manner , i t i s

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1135

not a matte r o f externa l coercion : Adoptin g th e propose d rule amount s t o on e branch—th e judiciary—bindin g th e other branche s (and , presumably , itself ) t o a pluralis t inter pretation o f th e guarante e o f equa l protection . Thi s scenari o is mos t lik e on e i n whic h a grou p appoint s on e membe r t o assign individua l responsibilities ; th e designate d deci sionmaker the n conclude s tha t eac h o f th e member s (includ ing herself ) ough t t o clea n th e kitche n wheneve r i t i s a mess . In a sense , th e entire group ha s take n responsibilit y fo r kitchen messes . Second, th e propose d constitutiona l rul e implement s gov ernment responsibilit y fo r rac e discriminatio n wit h respec t t o the botto m line : On e ca n expec t mor e pluralis t decisionmak ing in a regim e governe d b y the propose d rul e tha n unde r th e existing requiremen t o f discriminator y intent . A t a minimum , the proposa l transfer s som e decisionmakin g authorit y t o members o f racia l minorit y groups : The y ma y se t fort h means o f achievin g government' s articulate d goal s tha t must be adopte d unles s governmen t ca n sho w the m t o b e les s effective tha n th e mean s governmen t woul d prefe r t o employ . One ca n onl y assum e tha t governmen t wil l b e unabl e t o mee t that standar d som e o f th e time , an d s o wil l b e require d t o alter it s otherwis e desire d cours e o f action . Thi s constitute s an instanc e o f governmen t responsibilit y fo r racis m if , an d t o the exten t that , i t actuall y result s i n racia l redistribution , jus t as takin g responsibilit y fo r cleanin g th e kitche n i s somethin g that ha s take n plac e onl y if , an d t o th e exten t that , th e kitchen end s u p clean . In the Titl e VII realm, i t i s not a s clea r tha t adoptin g eithe r the foreseeabl e effect s o r alternative s model s o f disparat e

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1136

impact liabilit y can b e analogized t o the situatio n o f a n individual wh o take s responsibilit y fo r a kitche n mes s sh e di d not create , because here it cannot b e said that governmen t i s binding itself. As applied t o private employers, an interpreta tion o f Titl e VI I tha t mandate s pluralis t decisionmakin g i n the workplac e constitute s governmen t coercio n o f privat e conduct. I t might see m that th e private employer i s forced t o clean a kitchen mess that may have been made by others. Nevertheless, th e situatio n o f th e privat e employe r re quired b y Titl e VI I t o emplo y pluralis t criteri a o f decisio n can b e understoo d a s a n instanc e o f takin g responsibility — collective responsibility—fo r institutiona l racism . First , be cause the propose d model s o f liabilit y ar e not linke d t o cau sation an d actua l disparat e effects , the y depar t fro m th e cur rent rule' s connotatio n o f blameworthiness . Second , becaus e whites are the dominant grou p in this society, there is a sense in whic h an y la w tha t benefit s peopl e o f colo r amount s t o whites constraining ourselves. Here members of a group bind themselves in a manner tha t encompasse s eve n those individ uals wh o otherwis e migh t no t b e incline d t o tak e a rol e i n cleaning th e kitchen . White s a s a grou p canno t b e sai d t o have take n responsibilit y fo r whit e privileg e i f we endors e a regime tha t leave s som e white s fre e t o continu e t o benefi t from tha t privilege . Third, as noted with respect to the constitutional proposal , the core of the notion o f responsibility i s practical outcomes ; (some)one has taken responsibility if , an d onl y if, th e kitchen ends u p clean . Lik e th e constitutiona l proposal , th e foresee able effect s an d alternative s model s o f Titl e VII liability ai m at racia l redistribution , regardles s o f wha t force s i n fac t ac -

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1137

count fo r th e existin g inequitabl e stat e o f affairs . T o tha t extent, the y to o implemen t a responsibility-base d approac h to antidiscrimination law . Suppose, then, that on e asks this question: Even acceptin g that takin g responsibilit y fo r racia l injustic e i s a good thing , what i s th e justificatio n fo r makin g suc h responsibilit y a matter o f law? I think there are two answers to this question . First, law embodies a society's norms. Thus rules that impos e responsibility o n governmen t an d privat e employer s fo r transparently whit e decisionmakin g woul d sen d a messag e that w e ar e n o longe r willin g t o overloo k tha t vehicl e o f racial oppression . Mor e generally , tha t cours e o f actio n would sen d a messag e tha t w e expec t individual s a s wel l a s government t o tak e responsibilit y i n matter s o f racia l injus tice. Second , an d i n m y vie w mor e importantly , rule s disap proving transparentl y whit e decisionmakin g hav e th e poten tial t o alte r th e existin g distributio n o f socia l an d materia l wealth. We ask everyone to take responsibility for this particular mes s s o that , n o matte r wha t th e actua l cause , i t reall y does get cleaned up.

Does Doctrine Constrain? The proposition that the doctrinal reforms propose d i n chapters 3 and 5 could assis t i n the racial redistributio n o f socia l goods depend s i n part o n a n assumptio n abou t th e abilit y of legal doctrine s generall y t o determin e lega l outcomes . Tha t is, the enterpris e o f doctrina l refor m apparentl y presuppose s belief i n th e efficac y o f doctrin e itself ; i f doctrin e doe s no t

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1138

determine outcomes , the n i t make s n o sens e t o modif y doc trine i n an effor t t o achiev e a set of outcome s differen t fro m those currently available. The thesi s tha t la w i s radicall y indeterminate—tha t doc trine alon e neve r i s dispositiv e o f lega l outcomes , suc h tha t any resul t i s possibl e i n an y case—generall y i s associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement. 5 In brief, the indeterminacy thesi s contend s tha t th e lega l decisionmake r al ways ha s availabl e a rang e o f culturall y plausibl e rationale s that woul d suppor t contrar y outcomes . Th e specifi c argu ment techniques that make such outcomes possible vary fro m case to case. In one instance, conflicting, norms or fundamen tal principle s migh t com e int o play , i n anothe r th e deci sionmaker migh t hav e a choice t o mak e betwee n competin g policies o r rules , o r a rul e an d it s exceptions . I n som e lega l settings competing techniques o f interpretation ar e available; they too provide an avenue for th e formulation o f legal analyses reachin g diametricall y opposit e conclusions . I n an y event, th e indeterminac y thesi s claims , there alway s i s available som e analyti c maneuve r tha t woul d mak e an y desire d result seem respectable. The doctrine s examine d i n thi s boo k provid e a n illustra tion o f th e indeterminac y thesis . I argue d i n chapte r 3 tha t the constitutiona l requiremen t o f discriminator y inten t fail s to respond t o the transparency phenomenon , an d tha t a rule applying heightened , transparency-consciou s scrutin y t o al l government action s that have racially disparate effects woul d be a more satisfactor y lega l approac h t o th e problem . How ever, ther e i s n o inheren t guarante e tha t th e propose d rul e would achiev e its intended objective . As noted earlier, absen t

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1139

vigilant attentio n t o th e transparenc y phenomenon , th e pro posed rul e coul d permi t reinstitutio n o f transparenc y i n an other form b y validating transparently white, or assimilation ist, government purposes. 6 Moreover, eve n supposin g thi s pitfal l wer e avoided , th e operation of disparate impact analysis in the Title VII context reveals anothe r se t o f peril s connecte d wit h th e proo f o f disparate effects . A s Keisha' s cas e shows , suc h rule s ca n evolve i n way s tha t limi t thei r effectivenes s a s a remed y fo r transparently whit e decisionmaking . Thus , in chapter 5 I set forth tw o alternative s tha t woul d avoi d o r ameliorat e mos t of th e weaknesses i n the existin g rules . Eve n here , however , there ar e hazards. For example , an employer migh t contest a claim o f differentia l impac t b y pointin g t o a subgrou p o f nonwhites havin g roughly th e sam e distribution a s whites of the relevan t characteristic. 7 Suc h a n approac h agai n woul d function t o reinstate assimilationism . In sum , neithe r adoptin g a disparat e effect s approac h t o transparency-driven discrimination , no r an y particula r method o f proving disparate effects , provide s absolute assur ance tha t transparentl y whit e norm s wil l b e displace d i n practice. Fo r man y commentators , thi s degre e o f lega l inde terminacy i s not problematic , though fo r other s i t presents a challenge t o th e legitimac y o f th e lega l syste m a s a whole. 8 However, th e significanc e o f the indeterminacy thesi s for th e present projec t i s mor e limite d an d mor e pragmatic : Wha t value i s there i n proposing ne w doctrina l approache s i f the y carry no assurance of efficacy ? I respon d t o th e indeterminac y difficult y b y conceivin g legal doctrin e a s a sor t o f promise . Webster' s dictionar y de-

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1140

fines a "promise" as "a declaration that one will do or refrai n from doin g something specified," an d indicates as well that a promise i s " a declaratio n tha t give s the person to whom i t is made a righ t t o expec t o r t o clai m th e performanc e o r for bearance o f a specifie d act." 9 Thu s whe n I promise t o mo w the law n thi s Saturday , I a m assurin g th e promise e tha t I intend to mow, and creating the expectation that I will indeed do so. Here, I rely upo n th e mode l o f th e gratuitou s promis e ( a promise mad e i n th e absenc e o f an y reciproca l promis e o r expectation o f return), rather than contract (i n which there is a bargained-fo r exchange) . The difference , o f course , i s tha t the former , unlik e th e latter , i s no t legall y enforceable . In deed, I hav e i n min d th e sor t o f gratuitou s promis e whos e breach carrie s n o advers e consequence s a t al l t o th e promi sor, othe r tha n th e weight o f mora l failur e and/o r th e disap pointed expectation s o f th e promise e ( I assum e ther e ha s been n o detrimenta l relianc e o n th e par t o f th e promisee) . Even in this case, promising i s possible, and i t is this circumstance tha t pose s mos t clearl y th e questio n whether , an d i n what sense , promising constrains the promisor . Consider agai n th e law n mowin g example . I f I mak e n o declaration a t all , I create n o expectatio n regardin g whethe r or whe n I wil l mow . Th e natur e o f promisin g i s suc h tha t saying " I promis e . . ." alter s th e situatio n a t leas t t o th e extent tha t a n expectatio n ha s bee n created . Moreover , dif ferent promise s creat e differen t expectations . I migh t hav e promised t o d o som e yard wor k o n Saturday , without speci fying precisel y wha t task s I would perform , o r I might hav e promised t o mo w "sometime, " o r "nex t weekend, " withou t

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1141

being more exact abou t th e date. From the perspective o f the promisee, i t matter s tha t I hav e promised , an d i t matter s what I have promised. Of course , gratuitou s promise s tha t d o no t induc e detri mental reliance make a difference t o the promisor onl y to the extent h e o r sh e feel s boun d t o kee p hi s o r he r promises . But languag e analyst s ofte n hav e note d tha t th e practic e o f promising would not exist were it common for promisors not to kee p thei r word. 10 Thu s i t i s intrinsi c t o th e notio n o f promise tha t promisin g constrain s th e futur e actio n o f th e promisor. Becaus e promisin g constrains , differen t promise s constrain differently . Legal doctrin e ca n b e conceive d a s a sor t o f promise . Government i s th e promisor ; individual s ar e th e promisees . In general , bot h crimina l an d civi l laws can b e thought o f i n this way , thoug h the y d o no t necessaril y confor m t o th e "promising" mode l i n ever y respect . I n a sense , governmen t promises freedo m fro m prosecutio n t o person s wh o d o no t violate it s crimina l statutes ; similarly , governmen t promise s intervention o r no t i n individuals' affair s i n accordanc e wit h the civi l laws . Whe n peopl e for m expectation s becaus e of , and confor m thei r conduc t to , lega l rules , the y ar e i n muc h the same position a s any ordinary promisee . But, one might object , government' s promise s ar e enforce able, an d thu s ar e unlik e th e gratuitou s promise s describe d above. However, even if one accepts the idea that the relation between th e governmen t an d th e individua l i s mor e lik e a contract tha n a gratuitous promise , the fac t o f lega l indeter minacy cast s doub t o n th e thesi s tha t individual s genuinel y have remedie s whe n governmen t fail s t o kee p it s promises .

Notes on Doctrinal Reform /142

Legal indeterminac y mean s tha t law s ar e simila r t o vagu e promises (tha t is, promises whose content i s unclear). A legal claimant alway s face s a ris k tha t th e law' s interprete r wil l construe government' s promis e differentl y tha n doe s th e claimant; in effect, th e interpreter declares , "Wha t you as k is not what was promised." Thus , by virtue o f inherent linguistic indeterminacy , governmen t indee d i s i n a positio n muc h like tha t o f th e gratuitou s promisor : Th e consequence s o f breach are limited to the promisor's own sense of responsibility and the promisee's disappointed expectations . Do vague promises constrain? Certainl y ther e is a point a t which a n assuranc e o f futur e conduc t i s so vague a s to pro vide n o "righ t t o expec t . . . performance. " I labe l suc h a declaration a n empt y promise . Fo r example , "I'l l mo w th e lawn sometime " ma y b e an empt y promise i n the absenc e of implicit qualification s suc h a s "befor e it' s a foo t high. " Bu t there i s a continuu m o f indefiniteness , an d othe r promise s may b e subjec t t o varyin g interpretatio n an d ye t constrain . For instance , peopl e us e "nex t weekend " differently : O n Wednesday, "nex t weekend" ma y refer t o the first succeeding weekend, o r t o th e second . Thu s "I'l l mo w nex t weekend " may no t b e quit e clea r o n it s face , bu t i t i s specifi c wit h respect to any given interpretation o f "next, " an d so a promise has bee n made . Indeterminate conten t doe s not necessar ily defeat th e claim that promises constrain . One nee d no t resolv e the questio n whethe r an y particula r doctrine i s i n fac t empty—s o vagu e a s t o b e meaningless — or merel y indeterminat e t o find valu e i n th e enterpris e o f doctrinal reform . Th e notio n o f doctrin e a s promis e envis ages legal rules as relational; assessing the content of doctrin e

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1143

requires considering bot h the respective points of view of the promisor an d th e promisee . I f a give n rul e i s susceptibl e t o multiple interpretations, comparing these points of view may provide a means o f selectin g the interpretation tha t ough t t o control. Eve n i f on e accept s th e contentio n o f som e Critica l Legal scholars that some—o r all—doctrine s ar e tantamoun t to empty promises, the notion of promising provides a framework in which to argue that it's possible to do better. In daily life, promisors are capable of making promises they can keep, and of articulating those promises in relatively clear, comprehensible term s tha t provid e a reasonabl e basi s fo r expecta tion. I don' t believ e i t ha s bee n demonstrate d tha t law' s creators and interpreters ar e inherently unable to do as well. The notio n o f doctrin e a s promis e situate s th e enterpris e of doctrinal reform a s an exercise in sorting out what was (or should be ) promise d b y who m t o whom , an d thu s wha t i t means t o kee p a particula r promis e a s embodie d i n lega l language. Such promises may be seen as gratuitous an d ofte n vague, but they nevertheless constrain the responsible promisor i n much the same way that everyda y promise s constrain . Doctrinal refor m matter s becaus e th e conten t o f eve n unen forceable promise s matters. The constitutiona l requiremen t o f discriminator y inten t promises littl e i n th e wa y o f addressin g rac e discrimination , because i t single s ou t a relativel y smal l segmen t o f th e ful l spectrum o f racis t behavior . Moreover , becaus e i t i s ver y difficult t o establis h tha t governmen t acte d wit h discrimina tory intent—i t mus t hav e selecte d a cours e o f conduc t "be cause of , no t merel y i n spit e of " it s raciall y disparat e ef fects—the promis e t o provid e a lega l sanctio n fo r rac e

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1144

discrimination i s i n thi s instanc e tantamoun t t o a n empt y promise. Title VII promises somewha t more , in that i t does provide a remed y fo r disparat e impac t discrimination . However , th e complexity o f existin g rule s regardin g proo f o f disparat e ef fects means that the implicit promise to provide a remedy fo r unconscious discrimination, and specifically fo r transparentl y white decisionmaking , i s i n practic e unlikel y t o b e kept . I n effect, th e apparen t promis e o f Titl e VI I disparat e impac t analysis is a little white lie. In contras t t o th e existin g constitutiona l an d Titl e VI I rules, the proposals se t forth her e promise more: They promise to creat e a pluralistic governmen t an d workplace , an d i n so doin g the y carr y a promis e tha t white s wil l shar e th e goods associated wit h a privilege d positio n i n society . O f course, the indeterminacy thesi s say s that thes e promises to o may no t b e kept ; tha t ther e i s n o wa y t o construc t a lega l doctrine tha t ca n guarante e deliver y o n th e promise s i t makes. Nevertheless, I find a value in promising mor e rathe r than less.

Doctrine and White Identity White privilege is a "package of unearned assets . .. a n invisible weightles s knapsac k o f specia l provisions , assurance , tools, maps , guides , codebooks , passports , visas , clothes , compass, emergenc y gear , an d blan k checks." 11 Transpar ency is one aspect o f white privilege: It is the privilege o f no t having t o notic e one' s privilege. 12 I f transparenc y define s whiteness, the whiteness it defines i s privilege unmodified .

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1145

An antiracis t whit e identit y i s on e tha t (amon g othe r things) i s awar e of , an d attempt s t o renounce , whit e privi lege. I believe the first ste p i n the process o f developin g suc h an identit y i s to overcom e th e habi t o f transparency ; tha t is , to develop the habit o f seeing oneself a s explicitly white, an d of identifyin g seemingl y neutra l norm s a s white. Admittedly , because transparentl y whit e norm s carr y positiv e connota tions, th e mov e t o becom e consciou s o f whitenes s coul d b e perilous: I t risk s reinforcin g "negative " stereotype s o f non whites.13 Nevertheless , firm attentio n t o th e ultimat e objec tive o f a n antiracis t whit e identity—racia l redistribution — should reduce that peril. A genuinely antiracist white identit y is pluralist; it demands that on e value nonwhite racia l identities as well. The examinatio n o f rac e discriminatio n la w undertake n here shed s ligh t o n whit e privileg e b y exposin g th e assump tions upo n whic h existin g rac e discriminatio n la w rests . A s described earlier , bot h th e constitutiona l requiremen t o f discriminatory inten t an d Titl e VIFs disparate impac t rul e envision racism a s a blameworthy departur e fro m a normal stat e of affairs i n which race plays no role. This vision is characteristically white; it embodies the white privilege of accepting as a baselin e fo r though t an d actio n th e propositio n tha t rac e does not matter. Similarly, the failure o f Equal Protection la w and Titl e VI I to tak e accoun t o f th e transparenc y phenome non reflect s th e whit e attitud e tha t wha t appear s t o b e rac e neutral mus t b e s o i n fact . Thi s face t o f rac e discriminatio n law illustrates definitiv e whit e carelessness abou t the salienc e of race. Even if one does not undertak e a n activ e role in the effor t to chang e antidiscriminatio n law , reflection o n transparenc y

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1146

in th e contex t o f thes e lega l doctrine s ca n contribut e t o th e development o f a n antiracis t whit e identity . Contemplatin g the way s existin g la w reflect s an d reinforce s whit e privilege , and the ways it might be modified t o contest that privilege, is one par t o f a larger projec t o f awarenes s tha t i s an essentia l element of antiracist whiteness. We cannot combat structure s of privileg e o f whic h w e ar e unaware , an d i n som e circum stances awareness itself erode s privilege. However, thoug h raisin g one' s consciousnes s o f whit e privilege is a necessary ingredien t i n developing a n antiracis t whiteness, it is not nearly sufficient. Acquiescin g in the statu s quo ha s th e existentia l effec t o f constructin g th e sel f a s a white supremacist , thoug h perhap s on e wh o occupie s tha t position unconsciously . Whit e peopl e mus t mak e concret e efforts t o renounc e whit e privileg e an d t o foste r racia l redistribution. W e mus t find way s t o shar e wealth , power , an d prestige wit h nonwhites . Th e plac e t o begi n constructin g a genuinely nonracis t whit e identit y i s a t th e poin t wher e whites really give up something . Systems o f privileg e ar e s o comple x an d interwove n int o society tha t i t i s no eas y matter t o formulat e effectiv e redis tributive strategies . Som e commentators , includin g Ia n Ha ney Lopez , recommen d tha t whit e peopl e abandon white ness.14 However , thi s proposa l assume s a capacit y th e privileged ma y no t have . Becaus e privileg e i s conferred , no t adopted o r earned, it cannot b e abandoned unilaterally . Thus a strategy of abandonment ma y be more symbolic than real. It seem s t o m e tha t on e alternativ e i s t o consciousl y em ploy whit e privileg e t o th e advantag e o f nonwhites . (O f course the individual o r grou p doin g s o must no t see k grati-

Notes on Doctrinal Reform /147

tude o r return , o r th e ac t coul d no t foste r racia l redistribu tion.) Fo r example , white s i n a positio n t o d o s o migh t appoint a s judge s onl y peopl e o f color . Analogously , white s who hav e inpu t int o th e proces s o f doctrina l formatio n ca n advocate lega l rule s tha t migh t effec t greate r racia l justice , such a s th e proposal s se t fort h here . This approach—usin g privileg e i n a n antiracis t manner — must b e adopte d wit h extrem e caution . Retainin g privileg e i s too attractive , to o comfortable , t o provid e assuranc e tha t th e privileged ar e i n a goo d positio n t o evaluat e whe n an d whether renouncin g privileg e i s a realisti c option . Thus , i t might b e argue d tha t th e conceptio n o f th e whit e perso n a s the promisor , th e autho r o f rac e discriminatio n law , i s no t well considered , becaus e i t sustain s th e imag e o f white s a s those wh o wiel d powe r i n society . B y wa y o f comparison , doctrinal proposal s tha t mak e nonwhite s th e final arbiter s o f legal outcome s offe r a mor e complet e transfe r o f powe r an d authority. 15 However, th e realit y i s tha t whit e peopl e d o contro l th e formation an d applicatio n o f lega l doctrine s a t thi s time . I s renunciation o f tha t statu s possible ? Th e mos t direc t metho d would b e simpl y t o han d t o nonwhite s authorit y ove r doc trinal formulatio n an d interpretation , bu t thi s approac h likely woul d entai l to o muc h chang e to o quickl y eve n fo r most white s o f goo d will . A less complete, bu t arguabl y mor e feasible approac h woul d follo w th e strateg y sketche d here : that w e develo p lega l doctrine s tha t creat e lega l remedie s fo r all th e form s i n whic h institutiona l racis m manifest s itself . Creating effectiv e lega l measure s t o counterac t transparentl y white decisionmakin g i s on e par t o f tha t agenda . Thoug h th e

Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1148

power t o impos e whit e norm s o n nonwhites , eve n unwit tingly, i s surel y no t th e sol e for m o f powe r white s shoul d relinquish, yielding that power is an important component of any antiracist white agenda. Constructing legal doctrines that promise t o brin g th e pressur e o f governmen t t o bea r agains t the practic e o f transparentl y whit e decisionmaking , then , i s an exercise in binding ourselves to give up one facet o f white supremacy.

Notes

NOTES T O CHAPTE R I

1. Nei l Gotand a call s this the technique o f nonrecognition. Racia l identity mus t firs t b e recognized, the n suppressed , s o that rac e i s "noticed, but not considered." Nei l Gotanda , A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind/' 4 4 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16-18 (1991). 2. I focus o n blacks a s the group mos t centrall y affecte d b y white supremacy fo r tw o principa l reasons . First , th e dynamic s o f blacks ' oppression ar e unique, as evidenced, for example, by the institutions of slavery an d racial apartheid , whic h provid e th e core definitio n o f rac e discrimination i n this society . Second , I would lik e to encourage whit e readers t o reexamine ou r habit o f thinking o f race discriminatio n a s a monolithic phenomenon , an d to reflec t o n the different form s i t may take wit h respec t t o differen t nonwhit e racia l groups , issues , an d circumstances. T o remin d th e reade r tha t some , bu t certainl y no t all, of wha t I sa y abou t black s applie s equall y t o othe r racia l groups , I intermittently wil l substitut e nonwhit e fo r blac k i n the text. Se e Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal History, 8 5 COLUM . L. REV . 118 6 (1985 ) (reviewin g PETE R IRONS , JUSTIC E A T WA R (1983) )

(arguing that analysi s of issues as they affec t nonblac k racia l minoritie s should diffe r fro m analysi s with respec t to blacks). I have chosen not to capitalize black , for reasons tha t are , paradoxi cally, relate d t o Ki m Crenshaw' s reaso n fo r doin g so . I n he r view , "Blacks, lik e Asians , Latinos , an d other 'minorities, ' constitut e a spe cific cultural grou p and , a s such, require denotatio n a s a proper noun. " Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 10 1 HARV. L . REV. 1331, 133 2 n.2 (1988). However , par t o f the agenda fo r this articl e is to encourag e white people to break fre e fro m ou r tendency to associat e race wit h peopl e o f color , an d t o develo p instea d a positiv e racia l 149

Notes to Chapter 1/150 awareness o f whiteness. Accordingly , I think i t most appropriat e her e either t o capitalize bot h blac k an d white , or to capitalize neither , and , in th e interest o f defusin g potentia l charge s o f essentialism , I hav e opted fo r th e latter . 3. Som e socia l scientist s hav e recognize d an d discusse d thi s phe nomenon. Se e Robert W . Terry, The Negative Impact on White Values, in IMPACT S O F RACISM O N WHIT E AMERICAN S 119 , 12 0 (Benjami n P .

Bowser 8 c Raymond G . Hun t eds. , 1981 ) ("T o b e whit e i n America is not t o have t o think abou t it." ) (emphasi s omitted) ; Jud y H . Katz 6c Allen Ivey, White Awareness: The Frontier of Racism Awareness Training, 55 PERSONNEL & GUIDANC E J . 485, 48 6 (1977 ) ("Whit e peopl e do no t see themselves a s white.") (emphasi s omitted) . Jane t Helm s concludes: "i t appear s tha t mos t White s hav e n o consisten t conceptio n of a positive White identit y o r consciousness. As a consequence, Whites may fee l threatene d b y the actua l o r presupposed presenc e o f racia l consciousness i n non-White racia l groups. " Jane t E . Helms , Toward a Model of White Racial Identity Development, i n BLAC K AN D WHIT E RACIAL IDENTIT Y 5 0 (Jane t E . Helms ed. , 1990) . However, I d o not rest m y implicit clai m tha t th e transparenc y phenomenon i s "real"—a goo d wa y o f conceptualizing things—pri marily o n the authority o f social scientists , i n part becaus e the y too must rel y at bottom o n th e reporte d experienc e o f white people . Mor e importantly, I believe we ar e mor e likel y to tak e transparenc y seriousl y if we recogniz e it in our ow n live s than if our onl y acquaintanc e wit h it is third-hand "empirical " evidence . 4. Pa t Cain report s tha t i n her experience whit e wome n neve r include whitenes s a s one o f the thre e adjectives . Se e Patrici a A . Cain , Feminist jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELE Y W O M EN'S LJ . 191,208(1989-90) . 5. Rut h Frankenber g collect s an d describe s white women' s experi ence o f whitenes s i n RUT H FRANKENBERG , WHIT E WOMEN , RAC E MAT TERS: TH E SOCIA L CONSTRUCTIO N O F WHITENES S (1993) .

6. Thi s distinctio n i s described i n more detai l in chapter 2 . 7. O n pluralism, se e Gerald Torres , Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Idea; and the Hope of Plural Justice —Some

Notes to Chapter 2/151 Observations and Questions of an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN . L. REV . 99 3 (1991) . 8. Som e racis t institution s ar e based overtl y o n racial hostility ; others ar e base d o n egalitaria n norm s bu t nevertheles s produc e raciall y skewed results . Institutiona l racis m i s describe d mor e completel y i n chapter 2 . Because existing laws d o recognize animus-based discrimina tion, the y ca n provid e som e relie f fro m institutiona l practice s tha t ar e the product o f racial animus . 9. Se e Richard Delgado , The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want? 2 2 HARV . C.R.-C.L . L . REV . 301, 315 (1987 ) (" A societ y that enact s rules and provide s structures to cur b racism announce s tha t racis m i s unacceptable behavior . B y committin g ourselves to norm s of fairness w e becom e faire r people." ) 10. Especiall y helpfu l analyse s o f "affirmativ e action " includ e Cheryl Harris , Whiteness as Property, 10 6 HARV . L . REV . 170 7 (1993) ; Thomas Ross , Innocence and Affirmative Action, 4 3 VAND. L . REV . 297 (1990) . 11. See , e.g. , RICHAR D A . EPSTEIN , SIMPL E RULE S FO R A COMPLEX

WORLD (1995) .

12. Katzenbac h v . Morgan, 38 4 U.S. 641 (1966) . 13. Se e RICHAR D KLUGER , SIMPL E JUSTICE : TH E HISTOR Y O F BROWN V.

BOARD OF

EDUCATION AN

D BLAC K AMERICA' S STRUGGL E

FOR EQUALIT Y (1975) ; Rut h Bade r Ginsbur g & Barbara Flagg , Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 198 9 U . CHI . LEGAL F . 9.

NOTES T O CHAPTER 2

1. Masatosh i Nei 8 c Arun K . Roychoudhury, Genetic Relationship and Evolution of Human Races, 1 4 EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOG Y 1 , 11 (1982); L . KAMIN , R . LEWONTIN , &C STEPHE N ROSE , N O T IN O U R GENES: BIOLOGY , IDEOLOGY , AN D HUMA N NATUR E (1984) ; Ala n Alm -

quist &C John Cronin , Fact, Fancy and Myth on Human Evolution, 2 9 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOG Y 52 0 (1988) .

2. Th e U.S . Suprem e Cour t uphel d th e law requirin g segregate d

Notes to Chapter 2/152 railroad cars , an d the doctrine o f "separat e bu t equal," i n Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 3 U.S. 537 (1896). It is not certain whethe r th e conductor recognized Pless y or had been told abou t him ; Richard Kluge r suggest s that th e encounter wa s prearranged t o tes t th e segregation statute . RICHARD KLUGER , SIMPL E JUSTICE : TH E HISTORY O F BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AN

D BLAC K AMERICA' S STRUGGL E FO R EQUALIT Y 7 3

(1975). 3. MARVI N HARRIS , PATTERN S O F RACE I N THE AMERICAS 58-5 9

(1964). 4. Id. at 59. 5. Ia n R Haney Lopez , The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 2 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L . L. REV . 1,28(1994) . 6. Id. a t 44-45. 7. Fo r contemporar y account s o f race' s plasticity , se e JUD Y SCALES-TRENT, NOTE S O F A W H I T E BLAC K WOMAN : RACE , COLOR ,

COMMUNITY (1995) ; PATRICI A J . WILLIAMS , On Being the Object of Property, i n TH E ALCHEM Y O F RACE AN D RIGHTS : DIAR Y O F A LA W

PROFESSOR 21 6 (1991) . 8. ANDRE W HACKER , TW O NATIONS 93-10 6 (1992) ; U.S . BUREA U OF TH E CENSUS, STATISTICA L ABSTRAC T O F THE UNITED STATES : 1991,

at 38 , 386(1991) . 9. Se e Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 8 7 Nw. U. L. REV . (1993). 10. Hacker , supra not e 8 , at 231. 11. Se e JONATHA N KOZOL , SAVAG E INEQUALITIES : CHILDRE N I N AMERICA'S SCHOOL S (1991) .

12. Hacker , supra not e 8 , at 107-12, 234. 13. See , e.g., STATISTICA L ABSTRACT , supra not e 8 , a t 45 4 (re-

porting that media n incom e of whites increased almos t 1 0 percent fro m $32,713 i n 1970 to $35,975 i n 1989; for black s th e 1970 media n was $20,067 an d in 1989 onl y $20,209 , an increase of less than 1 percent). 14. Se e Adaran d Constructors , Inc . v . Pena , 51 5 U.S . 20 0 (1995)(applying stric t scrutiny to all race-specific classifications , includ -

Notes to Chapter 2/153 ing those designe d t o remedy pas t discrimination) ; see also DERRIC K A. BELL, JR. , AN D W E ARE N O T SAVE D 123-3 9 (1987) . 15. IA N F. HANE Y LOPEZ , W H I T E B Y LAW: THE LEGA L CONSTRUC -

TION O F RAC E 43-4 4 (1996) .

16. Id. at 5-9. 17. "I n signifying race , a person havin g one-thirty secon d o r less of negro bloo d shal l no t b e deemed , described , o r designate d b y an y public officia l i n th e stat e o f Louisian a a s "colored, " a "mulatto, " a "black," a "negro, " a "griffe, " a n "Afro-American, " a "quadroon, " a "mestizo," a "colore d person " o r a "perso n o f color." LA . REV. STAT. ANN. 42:26 7 (Enacte d 197 0 La. Acts No . 46, repealed 198 3 La. Acts No. 441) . 18. Calvi n Trillin , American Chronicles: Black or White, N E W YORKER, Apri l 14 , 1986 , a t 62 .

19. Thes e themes ar e elaborated i n chapter 7. 20. Patrici a G . Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56

J . PERSONALIT Y &C SOCIAL PSYCHOL -

OGY 5 (1989). 21. Dr . Thoma s Pettigrew , quote d i n Danie l Coleman , "Useful" Modes of Thinking Contribute to the Power of Prejudice, N.Y . TIMES , May 12 , 1987 , at C I, CIO . 22. Charle s Lawrenc e describe s thi s typ e o f thinkin g a s "represse d hostility." Charle s R . Lawrence III , The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 3 9 STAN . L . REV . 31 7 (1987). 23. Patrici a G . Devine et al., Prejudice with and without Compunction, 6 0 J. PERSONALIT Y SC SOCIAL PSYCHOLOG Y 817 , 817-1 9 (1991) .

24. Id. 25. Davi d Wellma n contend s tha t a n egalitaria n ideolog y ma y be an integra l componen t o f institutiona l racism . DAVI D WELLMAN , POR TRAITS O F WHIT E RACIS M 54-6 2 (2 d ed . 1993) .

26. Se e Robert Friedman , Institutional Racism: How to Discriminate without Really Trying, i n RACIA L DISCRIMINATIO N I N THE UNITE D

STATES 384, 388-91 (Thoma s F . Pettigrew ed. , 1975). 27. Id. at 392-93.

Notes to Chapter 3/154

NOTES T O CHAPTE R 3

1. Boilin g v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) . 2. 34 7 U.S. 483(1954). 3. 42 6 U.S . 229 (1976) . 4. 40 1 U.S. 424 (1971) . 5. Th e Cour t o f Appeal s decisio n i s reported a t Davi s v . Washington, 51 2 F.2 d 956 (D.C . Cir . 1975) , rev'd., Washingto n v . Davis , 42 6 U.S. 229 (1976) . The Cour t o f Appeal s opinio n ha s a s a n appendi x th e full tex t o f Tes t 21. 512 F.2 d a t 967-76. 6. Th e Griggs opinio n reads : "Th e Ac t proscribe s no t onl y over t discrimination bu t als o practice s tha t ar e fai r i n form , bu t discrimina tory i n operation . Th e touchston e i s busines s necessity . I f a n employ ment practic e whic h operate s t o exclud e Negroe s canno t b e show n t o be relate d t o jo b performance , th e practic e i s prohibited." 40 1 U.S . a t 431. Th e Cour t elaborated : "[G]oo d inten t o r absenc e o f discrimina tory inten t doe s no t redee m employmen t procedure s o r testin g mecha nisms tha t operat e a s 'built-i n headwinds ' fo r minorit y group s an d ar e unrelated t o measurin g jo b capability. " 40 1 U.S . at 432 . Th e languag e seems reasonabl y straightforward : Inten t i s n o par t o f a disparat e impact claim . However , chiefl y becaus e th e fact s o f th e cas e strongl y suggested tha t th e employer ha d adopte d th e challenged faciall y neutra l job requirement s a s a pretex t fo r discrimination , som e hav e rea d th e Griggs disparat e impac t approac h t o provid e n o mor e tha n a n indirec t method o f provin g discriminator y intent . Th e interpretatio n o f Griggs will b e addressed i n greater detai l i n chapter 6 . 7. Davis, 426 U.S . at 238 . 8. Thi s phras e originate s wit h Geral d Gunther , Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 8 6 HARV . L . REV . 1 , 34 (1972) . 9. Davis, 42 6 U.S . at 246 . 10. Id. a t 248 . 11. 42 9 U.S . 252(1977). 12. Id. a t 269 . 13. M a t 269-70 .

Notes to Chapter 3/155 14. Thi s list is not exhaustive; the Court als o mentioned th e histori cal backgroun d o f th e decisio n an d it s legislativ e o r administrativ e history. Id. a t 267-68 . I n addition , th e Cour t note d tha t disparat e impact alon e migh t suffic e t o establis h discriminator y intent , if the disparate patter n wa s not explainable o n grounds othe r tha n race . Id. at 266 . 15. Castaned a v . Partida , 43 0 U.S . 482, 494 (1977) . Thi s cas e invalidated a "key-man " syste m fo r selectin g gran d jur y venires , i n which juror s wer e recommende d t o th e court b y jury commissioner s who wer e ke y persons i n the community. Se e also Alexande r v . Louisiana, 40 5 U.S . 625 (1972) ; Carte r v . Jur y Comm'n , 39 6 U.S . 320 (1970); Hernandez v . Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 16. Batso n v . Kentucky, 47 6 U.S. 79 , 96 (1986)(peremptor y chal lenges permi t "thos e t o discriminat e wh o are of a min d t o discrimi nate," quotin g Avery v. Georgia, 34 5 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). 17. Danie l R . Ortiz , The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 4 1 STAN. L. REV. 1105 , 112 7 (1989)(describin g Roger s v. Lodge, 458 U.S . 613 (1982)) . 18. Davis, 42 6 U.S. at 253 (Stevens , J., concurring). 19. 44 2 U.S. 256(1979). 20. Id. at 278-79. 21. Crai g v. Boren, 429 U.S . 190 (1976). 22. Se e Janet W . Schofield, Causes and Consequences of the Colorblind Perspective, i n PREJUDICE , DISCRIMINATION , aN D RACIS M 231,

248-50 (Joh n F . Dovidio 8 c Samuel L . Gaertner eds. , 1986 ) (reportin g that i n a n integrate d schoo l wit h stron g emphasi s o n a colorblin d norm, man y teacher s faile d t o use biracial o r multicultural materials) ; Charles R. Lawrence III , The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 3 9 STAN. L. REV. 317 , 335 (1987)(as overtly racis t attitude s becom e culturall y unacceptable , th e individual must "repres s o r disguise racist ideas when the y see k expression") . 23. See , e.g., Jack Citri n e t al. , White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter? 5 4 PUB. OPINIO N Q . 74 (1990) ("[Ra cial attitude s wer e a significan t influenc e o n th e votin g decision s o f whites . . . . " ) ; Nichola s P . Lovrich, Jr. , e t al. , The Racial Factor in

Notes to Chapter 3/156 Nonpartisan judicial Elections: A Research Note, 4 1 W . POL . Q . 80 7 (1988) ("[RJac e i s importan t i n judicia l election s . . . ."). But se e Jan e A. Piliavin , Age, Race, and Sex Similarity to Candidates and Voting Preference, J . APPLIE D SOC . PSYCHOL . 351 , 366 (1987 ) ("[A]geis m i s . . . a far stronge r effec t tha n eithe r racis m o r sexism." ) 24. Se e Nyla R . Branscomb e &c Eliot R . Smith , Gender and Racial Stereotypes in Impression Formation and Social Decision-Making Processes, 2 2 SE X ROLE S 627 , 64 5 (1990 ) ("Ou r result s als o sugges t tha t stereotypes ma y hav e a n impac t b y shapin g th e criteri a use d t o reac h decisions. Wit h minorit y candidates , mor e confidenc e ma y b e desire d in orde r t o mak e a decision , leadin g t o solicitatio n o f additiona l infor mation."); William G . Doerne r e t al. , An Analysis of Rater-Ratee Race and Sex Influences upon Field Training Officer Program Evaluations, 17 J. CRIM . JUST . 10 3 (1989 ) (reportin g rate e rac e effect s observe d i n earlier phase s o f trainin g program ; late r diminutio n o f effect s ma y b e attributed t o attrition) ; Kurt Kraige r 6 c J. Kevin Ford, A Meta-Analysis of Ratee Race Effects in Performance Ratings, 7 0 J. APPLIE D PSYCHOL . 56 (1985 ) (statin g tha t rac e effect s declin e a s percentag e o f black s i n workgroup increases) ; Kathryn M . Neckerman &c Joleen Kirschenman , Hiring Strategies, Racial Bias, and Inner-City Workers, 3 8 Soc . PROBS . 433, 44 5 (1991 ) ("Ou r evidenc e suggest s tha t negativ e preconception s and straine d rac e relations bot h hampe r inner-cit y blac k worker s i n th e labor market.") ; Davi d A . Waldma n 6 c Bruc e J . Avolio , Race Effects in Performance Evaluations: Controlling for Ability, Education, and Experience, 16 J . APPLIE D PSYCHOL . 897 , 89 9 (1991 ) ("Result s con firmed ou r predictio n tha t rac e effects woul d b e obtaine d fo r rate e rac e ....-). 25. Se e Glen n B . Canne r e t al. , Race, Default Risk and Mortgage Lending: A Study of the FHA and Conventional Loan Markets, 5 8 S . ECON. J . 249 , 25 1 (1991 ) ("[A]fte r controllin g fo r househol d an d locational defaul t risk , findings furthe r sugges t tha t minorit y house holds ar e somewha t les s likel y t o obtai n conventiona l financin g tha n whites."); Gregor y D . Squire s &C Willia m Velez , Insurance Redlining and the Transformation of an Urban Metropolis, 2 3 URB . AFF . Q . 63 , 63 (1987 ) ("I n analyzin g th e distributio n o f homeowner s insuranc e

Notes to Chapter 3/157 policies, a stron g bia s i n favor o f suburba n an d white neighborhood s and agains t inner-cit y an d minority communitie s wa s found."). 26. Se e Harold W . Neighbors e t al., The Influence of Racial Factors on Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Review and Suggestions for Research, 25 COMMUNITY MENTA L HEALT H J . 30 1 (1989 ) (discussin g tw o differen t

and inconsisten t assumption s underlyin g researc h o n observe d rac e differences i n psychiatric diagnosis) . 27. Se e Charle s F . Bond , Jr. , e t al. , Responses to Violence in a Psychiatric Setting: The Role of Patient's Race, 1 4 PERSONALIT Y 8C Soc. PSYCHOL . BULL . 44 8 (1988 ) (reportin g tha t whit e hospita l staf f restrained violen t nonwhit e patient s fou r time s a s ofte n a s similarl y violent whites) . 28. Se e Douglas A . Smith e t al., Equity and Discretionary justice: The Influence of Race on Police Arrest Decisions, 75 J. CRIM . L . &: CRIMINOLOGY 23 4 (1984) (statin g tha t polic e ar e more responsiv e t o white victims of crime). 29. Se e Cassia Spoh n e t al., The Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLOG Y 175 , 175 (1987) ("Hispani c male s are most likel y to be prosecuted fully , followe d b y black males , Anglo males, and females of all ethnic groups.") . 30. Se e George S . Bridge s 8 c Rober t D . Crutchfield , Law, Social Standing and Racial Disparities in Imprisonment, 66 Soc. FORCE S 699, 699 (1988 ) ("Black s ar e more likel y tha n white s t o b e imprisoned i n states wher e th e blac k populatio n i s a smal l percentag e o f th e tota l population an d predominantly urban.") . 31. Eac h o f the following studie s foun d significan t racia l disparitie s in capita l sentencing ; al l foun d tha t impositio n o f th e deat h penalt y was mor e likel y i f the victim wa s white, an d some als o foun d i t mor e likely i f the offender wa s black: Davi d C . Baldus e t al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 7 4 J. CRIM . L . be CRIMINOLOG Y 66 1 (1983) ; Sheldo n Ekland Olson, Structured Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty: The First Decade after Furma n in Texas, 6 9 Soc . Sci . Q . 853 (1988) ; Thomas J . Kei l &c Gennaro F . Vito , Race, Homicide Severity, and

Notes to Chapter 3/158 Application of the Death Penalty: A Consideration of the Barnett Scale, 27 CRIMINOLOG Y 51 1 (1989 ) (Kentucky) ; M. Dwayne Smith , Patterns of Discrimination in Assessments of the Death Penalty: The Case of Louisiana, 1 5 J. CRIM . JUST . 27 9 (1987) .

Additional literatur e examinin g th e effec t o f rac e o n discretionar y decisionmaking i n th e crimina l proces s i s collecte d an d discusse d i n Sheri Lyn n Johnson, Black Innocence and the White jury, 8 3 M I C H. L . REV. 161 1 (1985) ; Sher i Lyn n Johnson , Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 9 3 YALE L.J. 214 (1983); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 7 3 CORNEL L L . REV . 101 6 (1988). 32. M O D E L PENA L C O D E § 2.0 2 (1985) . 33. See , e.g. , W . PAG E KEETO N E T AL. , PROSSE R AN D KEETO N O N

THE LA W OF TORTS § 56 (5t h ed. 1984 ) (commentin g tha t th e law' s refusal t o impos e a n obligatio n t o g o to th e aid of anothe r wh o is in danger i s "revolting to any moral sense") . 34. Se e Daniel s v . Williams , 47 4 U.S . 327, 328 (1986 ) (holdin g that "th e Due Proces s Claus e i s simpl y no t implicated " b y negligen t deprivations of property o r liberty); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986) ; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976 ) ("deliberat e indifference" a prerequisit e fo r a n Eight h Amendmen t violation) . The Court has left ope n the possibility tha t "somethin g les s than intentiona l conduct, suc h a s recklessness o r 'gros s negligence, ' i s enough t o trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Daniels, 474 U.S. a t 334 n.3. 35. Se e Arizona v . Youngblood, 48 8 U.S. 51, 58 (1988 ) ("[U]nles s a crimina l defendan t ca n sho w ba d fait h o n th e par t o f th e police , failure t o preserv e potentiall y usefu l evidenc e doe s no t constitut e a denial o f du e process o f law.") ; Unite d State s v . Leon , 46 8 U.S. 897 (1984); Massachusett s v . Sheppard, 46 8 U.S. 981 (1984) (holdin g tha t evidence obtaine d i n reasonabl e relianc e o n a searc h warran t subse quently determine d t o be invalid shoul d no t be excluded). 36. Sectio n 198 3 provides : Every perso n who , under colo r o f any statute, ordinance , regula tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory o r the District of Columbia, subjects , o r causes t o be subjected, an y citizen o f the

Notes to Chapter 3/159 United State s o r other perso n withi n th e jurisdiction thereo f to the deprivatio n o f any rights, privileges , o r immunities secure d by the Constitution an d laws, shal l b e liable to the party injure d in an action at law, suit in equity, or other prope r proceedin g for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). 37. Biven s v . Six Unknown Name d Agent s o f the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 40 3 U.S. 388 (1971) (creatin g a cause o f action analogou s to § 1983 claims applicable to federal officials) . 38. Se e Harlow v . Fitzgerald, 45 7 U.S. 800 , 818 (1982) (holdin g that immunit y i s to b e granted unles s a federa l officia l "violat e [d] clearly establishe d . . . constitutional right s o f which a reasonable per son woul d hav e known") . Thoug h th e qualified immunit y doctrin e is not itsel f a constitutional rule , it affects d e facto whethe r th e individual will be held liabl e for a constitutional violation . 39. See , e.g. , DAVI D C . BALDU S & JAME S W . L . COLE , STATISTICA L PROOF O F DISCRIMINATIO N (1980) ; STATISTICA L M E T H O D S I N D I S -

CRIMINATION LITIGATIO N 69-20 9 (Davi d H . Kaye & Mike l Aicki n eds., 1986) . 40. 88 8 F.2d 591 (9t h Cir. 1989) . 41. Thi s point , alon g wit h a n insightful analysi s o f several othe r aspects o f the Fragante case , can be found i n Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 10 0 YALE L.J. 132 9 (1991). 42. Frontier o v . Richardson, 41 1 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (pluralit y opinion). 43. Se e William R. Van Riper, General American: An Ambiguity, i n DIALECT AN D LANGUAG E VARIATIO N 12 3 (Harold B . Allen & Michae l

D. Lin n eds. , 1986) . 44. I t i s describe d i n J . L . DILLARD , BLAC K ENGLISH : IT S HISTOR Y AND USAG E I N THE UNITED STATE S (1972) ; GENEV A SMITHERMAN , TALKIN AN D TESTIFYIN : TH E LANGUAGE O F BLACK AMERIC A ( 1 9 7 7 ) .

45. Davis, 42 6 U.S. at 246. 46. Historically , educatio n ha s bee n th e centerpiece o f the move ment t o professionalize th e police. Georg e D . Eastman &c James A. McCain, Education, Professionalism, and Law Enforcement in Histori-

Notes to Chapter 4/160 cal Perspective, 9 J. POLICE SCI . 5C ADMIN. 11 9 (1981). Differing view s exist regardin g the relation betwee n highe r educatio n an d police work . Compare, e.g., Daniel J. Bell, The Police Role and Higher Education, 7 J. POLIC E SCI . 6C ADMIN. 46 7 (1979) (approvin g crimina l justic e pro grams i n colleges an d universities) an d Roy R. Roberg, An Analysis of the Relationships among Higher Education, Belief Systems, and Job Performance of Patrol Officers, 6 J. POLICE SCI . 5C ADMIN. 33 6 (1978) (arguing tha t highe r educatio n foster s les s dogmati c belie f systems , which improv e jo b performance) wit h Lott e E . Feinberg 8 c Arthur S . Pfeffer, "EOTWY" Meets Plain English: A Case Study of Writing in the NYPD, 1 0 J. POLIC E SCI . 5C ADMIN. 10 1 (1982 ) (arguin g tha t liberal art s writin g style s ar e no t suite d t o polic e needs ) an d Jon Miller 5c Lincoln Fry , Reexamining Assumptions about Education and Professionalism in Law Enforcement, 4 J. POLIC E SCI . 5C ADMIN . 18 7

(1976) (questionin g whethe r educatio n ca n increase polic e profession alism). I n th e contex t o f th e Davis hypothetical , Tes t 2 1 migh t b e viewed a s a proxy for educational attainment . 47. Davis, 51 2 F.2d at 966 (Robb, J., dissenting). 48. Se e Trina Grill o 5c Stephanie M . Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons between Racism and Sexism (Or Other-Isms), 199 1 DUK E L.J . 397 , 401-0 8 (discussing proble m o f whites who want peopl e o f color t o teach the m about racism) . NOTES T O CHAPTE R 4

1. Cit y of Richmond v . J.A. Croso n Co. , 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989 ) (Scalia, J. , concurring ) (quotin g ALEXANDE R M . BICKEL , TH E MORAL ITY O F CONSEN T 13 3 (1975)) .

2. Se e Eric Schnapper , Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 1 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985). 3. Laurenc e H . Tribe, "In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Color-blind?" 2 0 J . MARSHAL L L . REV . 201, 20 4 n.1 9

(1986) (attributin g this point to the Brief o f the United State s as Amicus Curiae Supportin g Petitioner s a t 14-15 , Wygan t v . Jackso n Bd . of

Notes to Chapter 4/161 Educ, 47 6 U.S. 267 (1986)). The argument se t forth i n this paragrap h generally follow s tha t mad e b y Tribe, supra. 4. Se e Alexander M . Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 6 9 HARV . L . REV. 1, 58 (1955) . An earlier wor k by Frank an d Munro reache d a similar conclusio n bu t stated th e point less conclusively . Se e John P . Frank 8 c Robert F . Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 5 0 COLUM . L . REV . 131, 167-6 8 (1950 ) (expressin g reservation s abou t th e conclusion tha t the framer s intende d t o prohibi t segregate d school s an d describin g evidence o n questio n o f miscegenatio n a s unclear). Severa l prominen t scholars who , like Bickel , ar e strong proponent s o f the colorblindnes s principle als o conced e tha t i t cannot b e located i n the framers' intent . See, e.g. , Robert H . Bork , Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 4 7 IND . L.J . 1 , 1 4 (1971) ; Richar d A . Posner , The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 197 4 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21-22; Willia m Va n Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 4 6 U. CHI. L . REV. 775, 776 (1979). 5. Bickel , supra not e 4, at 63. 6. O f course, Justice Harla n articulate d a colorblindness principl e in Pless y v . Ferguson, 16 3 U.S. 537 (1896), bu t he stated th e proposition in dissent. See 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 7. 34 7 U.S. 483 (1954) . Th e leading exponent s o f th e view tha t Brown di d no t enac t colorblindnes s wer e PAU L G . KAUPER , FRONTIER S

OF CONSTITUTIONA L LIBERT Y 217-1 9 (1956 ) ("Thi s decisio n admitte d of a variety o f interpretations."), Charle s L . Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960) (prohibitio n of segregatio n supportabl e o n ground tha t i t disadvantaged blac k chil dren), an d Herbert Wechsler , Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 7 3 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (1959) ("Th e Court di d not declare . . . tha t th e fourteent h amendmen t forbid s al l racia l line s i n legisla tion."). Bu t see , e.g. , ALBER T P . BLAUSTEI N & CLARENC E C . FERGUSON , JR., DESEGREGATIO N AN D THE LAW: THE MEANING AN D EFFECT O F TH E

SCHOOL SEGREGATIO N CASE S 14 5 (1957 ) (concludin g tha t th e Cour t

had "declare d tha t al l classification b y race is unconstitutional pe r se").

Notes to Chapter 4/162 8. Gayl e v . Browder, 35 2 U.S . 903 , affg. per curiam 14 2 F . Supp. 707 (M.D . Ala . 1956 ) (three-judg e court ) (buses) ; Holme s v . Cit y o f Atlanta, 35 0 U.S . 87 9 (1955) , vacating per curiam 22 3 F.2 d 9 3 (5t h Cir. 1955) , overruled by McDermot t Intl . Inc . v . Wilander , 49 8 U.S . 337 (1991 ) (municipa l gol f courses) ; Mayo r o f Baltimor e v . Dawson , 350 U.S . 877 , affg. per curiam 22 0 F.2 d 38 6 (4t h Cir . 1955 ) (publi c beaches an d bathhouses) . The argumen t tha t th e per curiam decision s compe l th e inferenc e that Brown reste d o n colorblindnes s i s se t fort h i n som e detai l i n Andreas Auer , Public School Desegregation and the Color-Blind Constitution, 2 7 Sw . L.J. 454, 458-59 (1973) . 9. See , e.g. , Swan n v . Charlotte-Mecklenbur g Bd . o f Educ , 40 2 U.S. 1 , 1 6 (1971) ; Auer , supra not e 8 , a t 468-7 7 (statin g tha t Cour t failed t o clarif y exten t o f governmen t responsibilit y fo r d e fact o segre gation); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN . L . REV . 1049 , 1099-10 2 (1978 ) (describin g "er a o f contra diction," i n whic h th e Cour t retaine d forma l adherenc e t o th e "perpe trator" perspectiv e whil e achievin g result s mor e consisten t wit h th e "victim" perspective) . 10. Se e DeFuni s v . Odegaard , 41 6 U.S . 31 2 (1974 ) (dismisse d a s moot). 11. Se e Regents o f th e Univ . o f Cal . v . Bakke, 43 8 U.S . 265 (1978 ) (no majority o n constitutiona l standard) . Eve n absen t a majority opin ion, Bakke wa s th e landmar k cas e o n affirmativ e actio n fo r severa l years. Th e Cour t wa s a t leas t equall y badl y divide d i n five othe r case s that precede d an d followe d Bakke. Se e Unite d Jewis h Orgs . v . Carey , 430 U.S . 14 4 (1977 ) (fragmente d 7- 1 decision) ; Fullilove v . Klutznick , 448 U.S . 44 8 (1980 ) (6- 3 decision ; tw o three-membe r pluralities) ; Wygant v . Jackson Bd . o f Educ , 47 6 U.S . 26 7 (1986 ) (5- 4 decision ; only fou r Justice s specifyin g leve l o f review) ; Loca l 28 , Shee t Meta l Workers Intl . Assn . v . EEOC , 47 8 U.S . 42 1 (1986 ) (o n constitutiona l issue, five Justices finding n o violation , fou r withou t specifyin g leve l of review; remaining Justices not reaching constitutional question) ; United States v . Paradise , 48 0 U.S . 14 9 (1987 ) (5- 4 decision ; n o specificatio n of standar d o f review) .

Notes to Chapter 4/163 12. Cit y of Richmon d v . J.A. Croso n Co. , 488 U.S . 469 (1989) . 13. Wechsler , supra not e 7 , a t 31-34 . Fo r a descriptio n o f th e process difficultie s o f Brown, se e Gar y Peller , Neutra l Principle s in the 1950% 2 1 U . M I C H . J . L . REF . 56 1 (1988) . Commentator s wh o understood colorblindnes s a s a neutra l solutio n t o Wechsler' s puzzl e include Bork , supra not e 4 , a t 14-15 , an d Loui s H . Pollak , Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U . PA . L. REV . 1 (1959) . Th e collegia l ton e o f th e discussio n i s exemplified b y Charle s Black' s commen t tha t Pollak' s colorblindnes s interpretation, whic h wa s markedl y distinc t fro m Black' s ow n ap proach, seeme d t o hi m " a soun d alternativ e groun d fo r th e desegrega tion holdings. " Black , supra not e 7 , at 42 1 n.2 . 14. Joh n H . Ely , The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 4 1 U. CHI . L . REV . 723 , 727 (1974) . 15. Opponent s o f affirmativ e actio n wh o rely , a t leas t i n part , o n instrumental rationale s includ e Morri s B . Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 9 9 HARV . L . REV . 1312 , 1321-2 2 (1986) (arguin g tha t affirmativ e actio n lead s t o politica l struggl e an d stigmatizes beneficiaries) ; Posner , supra not e 4 , a t 1 2 (arguin g tha t affirmative actio n encourage s bigotry) ; William B . Reynolds, Individualism v. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown , 9 3 YAL E L.J. 995 , 1002 03 (1984 ) (arguin g tha t mandator y busin g harm s publi c education) ; Antonin Scalia , The Disease as Cure: "In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race, 33 79 WASH . U . L.Q . 147 , 14 9 (1979) (arguin g that affirmativ e actio n wil l requir e hirin g les s qualifie d persons); Va n Alstyne , supra not e 4 , a t 80 8 (arguin g tha t affirmativ e action exacerbate s racia l tensions) . 16. Se e France s L . Ansley , Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class, and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNEL L L . REV . 993 , 1005-2 3 (1989) (describin g chang e i n ton e o f discours e an d analyzin g th e con cept o f th e "innocent " whit e affirmativ e actio n "victim") ; Thoma s Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 4 3 VAND . L . REV . 29 7 (1990 ) (exploring th e connectio n betwee n th e rhetori c o f innocenc e an d racism). 17. " I hav e a drea m tha t m y fou r littl e childre n on e da y wil l liv e i n a natio n wher e the y wil l no t b e judge d b y th e colo r o f thei r skin , bu t

Notes to Chapter 4/164 by th e conten t o f thei r character. " CORETT A SCOT T KING , M Y LIF E

WITH MARTI N LUTHE R KING , JR . 239 (1969) (quotin g Marti n Luthe r

King, Jr., Aug. 28, 1963). 18. Se e Janet E . Helms , An Overview of Black Racial Identity Theory, i n BLACK AN D WHIT E RACIA L IDENTIT Y 9 (Jane t E . Helm s ed.,

1990). 19. Se e GILBERT T . STEPHENSON, RAC E DISTINCTION S I N AMERICAN

LAW 348 (1910 ) (nearl y every state and territory had some race-specifi c classifications). Fo r a descriptio n o f the pre-Civil Wa r attitude s of white American s towar d blacks , se e WINTHRO P D . JORDAN , WHIT E OVER BLACK : AMERICA N ATTITUDE S TOWAR D TH E NEGRO, 1550-181 2

(1968). 20. Gar y Peller, Race Consciousness, 199 0 DUK E L.J . 758, 836 . 21. What i s this bu t declaring . . . tha t n o discrimination shal l be made agains t [blacks ] becaus e o f their color ? Th e words o f the amendment, i t is true, ar e prohibitory, bu t they contai n a necessary implicatio n o f a positive immunity , o r right, mos t valuabl e to th e colored race,—th e righ t t o exemptio n fro m unfriendl y legislation agains t the m distinctivel y a s colored,—exemptio n from lega l discriminations , implyin g inferiorit y i n civil society , lessening th e security o f thei r enjoymen t o f the rights whic h others enjoy , an d discriminations whic h ar e steps towar d reduc ing the m t o the condition o f a subjec t race . Straude r v . West Virginia, 10 0 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879) . 22. Se e sources cited in chapter 2 , notes 8-13. 23. LAURENC E H . TRIBE , AMERICA N CONSTITUTIONA L LA W 567 &

n.2 (2 d ed. 1988). Trib e notes , however , tha t a n even greate r numbe r of regulation s survive d revie w durin g thi s period . Id.; see also Morto n J. Horwitz , History and Theory, 96 YAL E L J . 1825 , 182 7 (1987 ) (pointing ou t that th e substantive premise s o f the Lochner er a were entirely consistent wit h earlie r constitutiona l ideology) . For overview s o f this period , se e PAU L L . MURPHY , TH E CONSTITU TION I N CRISI S TIME S 1918-1969 , a t 41-6 7 (1972) ; BENJAMI N F . WRIGHT, TH E GROWT H O F AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONA L LA W 153-7 0

(1942).

Notes to Chapter 4/165 24. Durin g 193 5 an d 1936 , th e Cour t announce d eleve n decision s in whic h crucia l federa l legislativ e provision s wer e hel d unconstitu tional. Wright, supra not e 23, at 180-8 2 &c nn. 1-13 . I n 193 7 Presiden t Roosevelt propose d t o Congres s a "Court-packing " pla n tha t woul d have adde d t o th e tota l numbe r o f Justice s o n th e Suprem e Cour t on e additional Justic e fo r eac h sittin g Justic e wh o ha d reache d th e ag e o f 70, ostensibl y o n the ground tha t th e olde r Justices were unable t o kee p up wit h th e Court' s workload . Th e pla n wa s generall y understoo d t o be designe d t o creat e a Cour t majorit y wh o woul d vot e t o uphol d Roosevelt's Ne w Dea l legislation . Willia m E . Leuchtenburg , The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 196 6 SUP . CT. REV. 347 , 387-400 . 25. Justic e Roberts , wh o provide d th e fift h vot e t o uphol d a mini mum wage statute i n West Coas t Hote l v . Parrish, 30 0 U.S. 379 (1937) , is ofte n though t t o hav e change d hi s view s i n respons e t o th e Court packing plan . However , a memorandu m writte n b y Justic e Robert s shows that a n initia l vote i n West Coas t Hote l wa s take n severa l week s before th e President' s pla n wa s announced . Se e Feli x Frankfurter , Mr. Justice Roberts, 10 4 U. PA . L. REV . 311 , 313-15 (1955) . 26. B y th e en d o f 1939 , Presiden t Roosevel t ha d nominated , an d the Senat e ha d confirmed , fou r ne w Justices: Hugo L . Blac k (replacin g Willis Van Devanter, wh o retire d i n 193 7 during Congress ' debat e ove r the Court-packin g plan) ; Stanley F . Reed (replacin g Georg e Sutherland , who retire d i n 1938) ; Feli x Frankfurte r (replacin g Benjami n N . Car dozo, wh o die d i n 1938) ; an d Willia m O . Dougla s (replacin g Loui s D . Brandeis, wh o retire d i n 1939) . Roosevel t late r name d t o th e Cour t Justices Murph y (1940) , Byrne s (1941) , Jackson (1941) , an d Rutledg e (1943), and h e nominated Justic e Harla n F . Stone to b e Chie f Justice i n 1941. 27. See , e.g., Morri s R . Cohen , Property and Sovereignty, 1 3 COR NELL L.Q . 8 (1927) ; Rober t L . Hale , Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 3 8 POL . SCI . Q . 47 0 (1923) ; Rosco e Pound, Liberty of Contract, 1 8 YAL E L.J. 454 (1909) ; see also Horwitz , supra not e 23, at 1829 . 28. Horwitz , supra not e 23 , at 1829 ; see , e.g., Ferguso n v . Skrupa , 372 U.S. 726, 728-31 (1963) ; Williamson v . Lee Optical o f Oklahoma ,

Notes to Chapter 4/166 Inc., 34 8 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ; Lochne r v . New York, 19 8 U.S. 45 , 74-76 (1905 ) (Holmes , J., dissenting). 29. Se e Cass R . Sunstein , Lochner's Legacy, 8 7 COLUM . L . REV . 873, 87 4 (1987). 30. Jame s B . Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 12 9 (1893). 31. Id. at 144. 32. Se e id. at 152, 155-56. 33. Wallac e Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 3 1 VAND . L . REV . 71 (1978). Each of these Justices acknowledge d Thayer' s role . Id. at 73. 34. Historian s hav e attribute d thi s argument , an d the insistence with which it was advanced , to the political influenc e o f the Progressiv e movement. Se e M O R T O N J . HORWITZ , TH E TRANSFORMATIO N O F

AMERICAN LAW , 1870-1960 , at 261 (1992) ; Murphy, supra not e 23 , at 70-82; Horwitz , supra not e 23 , at 1830. Th e democracy-based argu ment fo r judicial restrain t als o ha s been characterize d a s a response to the ris e of fascism i n Europe. Se e EDWARD A . PURCELL , JR., TH E CRISI S OF DEMOCRATI C THEOR Y 218-3 1 (1973) .

35. America n Fed' n o f Labor v . American Sas h 6 t Door Co. , 33 5 U.S. 538 , 555-56 (1949 ) (Frankfurter , J. , concurring ) (footnote s omitted). 36. ALEXANDE R M . BICKEL , TH E LEAST DANGEROU S BRANCH : THE

SUPREME COUR T A T THE BA R OF POLITICS 16-1 7 (1962) . Bicke l saw

Thayer's rul e of restraint a s "aiming at accommodation wit h the theory of representativ e democracy, " id. at 40, but Bickel's readin g seem s to be mistaken, i f he means to attribute th e "counter-majoritarian" argu ment to Thayer. 37. See , e.g. , JESS E H . CHOPER , JUDICIA L REVIE W AN D THE N A TIONAL POLITICA L PROCESS : A FUNCTIONA L RECONSIDERATIO N O F TH E ROLE O F THE SUPREME COUR T 4-5 9 (1980) ; JOH N HAR T ELY , DEMOC RACY AN D DISTRUST: A THEOR Y O F JUDICIAL REVIE W 4 - 7 (1980) ; MICHAEL J . PERRY , TH E CONSTITUTION, TH E COURTS, AN D HUMAN

RIGHTS 2- 4 (1982) . O f course , rights-base d constitutiona l theorie s minimize o r reject th e importance o f the "counter-majoritaria n diffi -

Notes to Chapter 4/167 culty." See , e.g., Paul Brest , The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 9 0 YALE L J . 1063 , 1064-6 5 (1981) ; G . EDWAR D WHITE , Chief Justice

Marshall, Justice Holmes, and the Discourse of Constitutional Adjudication, i n INTERVENTIO N AN D DETACHMENT: ESSAY S I N LEGAL HISTOR Y

AND JURISPRUDENC E 23 8 (1994 ) (describin g "Marshallian " an d "Holmesian" approache s to constitutional interpretation) . 38. Thi s concer n wit h th e legitimac y o f judicia l revie w seem s t o recede i n th e context o f race-specifi c "affirmativ e action. " Se e David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices? 9 1 COLUM . L . REV. 79 0 (1991). 39. 40 1 U.S. 424 (1971). 40. Davi s v. Washington, 51 2 E2d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Washington v . Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 41. Th e Cour t sai d only : "W e have neve r hel d tha t th e constitu tional standar d fo r adjudicatin g claim s o f invidiou s racia l discrimina tion i s identica l t o th e standard s applicabl e unde r Titl e VII , and we decline to do so today." Davis, 42 6 U.S. at 239. 42. Rober t W . Bennett , "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 6 7 CAL . L. REV . 1049, 107 6 (1979). 43. Se e Frances L . Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 7 9 CAL . L. REV . 1511, 1557-5 8 n.13 1 (1991); Charle s R . Lawrence III , The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 3 9 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319-2 0 (1987) . 44. Derric k A . Bell , Jr. , Brow n v . Boar d o f Educatio n and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 9 3 HARV. L . REV. 518, 522-23 (1980) . 45. Davis, 42 6 U.S. at 248. 46. Id. 47. "Ther e ma y be narrower scop e fo r operatio n o f the presump tion o f constitutionalit y whe n legislatio n appear s o n it s fac e t o b e within a specifi c prohibitio n o f th e Constitution. " Unite d State s v . Carolene Prods . Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938). 48. Fo r commentary critica l o f the Court's preoccupatio n wit h the

Notes to Chapter 5/168 problem o f judicial revie w i n the context o f equal protectio n analysis , see Chang, supra not e 38 ; Kenneth L . Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 1 HARV. L . REV. 1, 3-4 (1977); Kenneth L . Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 1 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L . L . REV. 7 , 21-24 (1979) . 49. Se e Alan D . Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 9 0 YALE L.J. 1880 , 189 5 (1981 ) (reviewin g DERRIC K A . BELL , JR., RACE , RACIS M AN D AMERICA N LA W (2d ed. 1980)) . O n the weak-

nesses of this vision, se e Ansley, supra not e 16 , at 1048-50. 50. Se e Derrick A . Bell , Jr. , Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current Conditions, 5 2 NOTRE DAM E LAW . 5 , 6 (1976 ) ("[W]hite sel f interes t wil l prevai l ove r blac k right s . . . ."). With respect to the desegregation cases , Mary Dudzia k ha s provided historica l documentation t o suppor t Bell' s descriptiv e thesi s tha t white s adop t antiracist measure s onl y whe n self-interes t s o directs . Se e Mary L . Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 4 1 STAN. L . REV . 61 (1988) .

NOTES T O CHAPTER 5

1. Fo r discussions o f differin g cultura l style s withi n th e blac k community, se e LUR E AN D LOATHING: ESSAY S O N RACE , IDENTITY ,

AND TH E AMBIVALENC E O F ASSIMILATION (Geral d Earl y ed. , 1993)

(containing essay s b y black intellectual s an d writers o n black people' s struggle betwee n nationalisti c an d assimilationist model s o f collective identity); Jerome McCrista l Culp , Jr., The Michael Jackson Pill: Equality, Race, and Culture, 9 2 M I C H . L . REV . 2613 (1994 ) (imaginin g colloquies amon g professors , judges , an d citizens o f various politica l orientations o n the subject o f a fictional "Michae l Jackson Pill, " whic h would remov e all "blackness" fro m blac k people) . 2. O n the many difficultie s face d b y blacks in the corporate world , see GEORG E DAVI S 8 C GLEG G WATSON , BLAC K LIF E I N CORPORAT E AMERICA: SWIMMIN G I N THE MAINSTREAM (1982) .

3. Titl e VII states in part:

Notes to Chapter 5/169 It shall b e an unlawfu l employmen t practic e fo r a n employer — (1) t o fai l o r refus e t o hir e o r t o discharg e an y individual , o r otherwise t o discriminat e agains t an y individua l wit h respec t t o his compensation , terms , conditions , o r privilege s o f employ ment, becaus e o f suc h individual' s race , color , religion , sex , o r national origin ; or (2) t o limit , segregate , o r classif y hi s employee s o r applicant s for employmen t i n an y wa y whic h woul d depriv e o r ten d t o deprive an y individual o f employmen t opportunitie s o r otherwis e adversely affec t hi s statu s a s a n employee , becaus e o f suc h indi vidual's race , color, religion , sex , o r nationa l origin . 4 2 U.S.C . § 2000e-2(a) (1988) . 4. 41 1 U.S. 792(1973) . 5. McDonnell Douglas, 41 1 U.S. at 80 2 (footnot e omitted) . 6. Texa s Dep' t o f Communit y Affair s v . Burdine , 45 0 U.S . 248 , 256 (1981) . In addition , Title VII provides fo r a bona fid e occupationa l qualification defens e t o som e disparat e treatmen t claims , bu t i t i s no t available i n rac e discriminatio n cases . Se e 4 2 U.S.C . § 2000e-2(e ) (1988). 7. Se e St . Mary' s Hono r Ctr . v . Hicks, 50 9 U.S . 502 , 51 1 (1993 ) (stating tha t th e ultimat e questio n fo r th e trie r o f fac t i s whethe r th e plaintiff ha s proved discriminatio n o n th e basi s of race) . 8. Th e realit y ma y b e mor e comple x tha n m y hypothetica l cases , which focu s o n th e compariso n betwee n Yvonn e an d Keisha , suggest . The perception s o f Yvonne' s clients an d colleague s tha t sh e inflated he r billable hour s ma y hav e bee n distorted ; structuralist s conten d tha t misperception o f token s i s no t uncommon . Se e ROSABET H MOS S KANTER, M E N AN D WOME N O F TH E CORPORATIO N 211 , 230-3 7 (rev .

ed. 1993) . Moreover , th e evidentiar y foundatio n fo r a disparat e treat ment cas e i s no t alway s eas y fo r a plaintif f t o establish , becaus e i t requires showin g tha t th e individual s wit h who m th e compariso n i s t o be made were simila r t o th e plaintiff i n relevant respects . 9. Albemarl e Pape r Co . v . Moody , 42 2 U.S . 405 , 42 5 (1975 ) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)) . Disparat e

Notes to Chapter 5/170 impact, a s wel l a s disparat e treatment , analysi s ma y b e use d i n case s involving subjectiv e criteri a o f decision . Watson v . Fort Wort h Ban k &c Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988) . 10. Pub . L . No . 102-166 , 10 5 Stat . 107 1 (codifie d a t 4 2 U.S.C . § 2000e-2 (Supp . V 1993)) . 11. Th e 199 1 Act adde d th e followin g provision : An unlawfu l employmen t practic e base d o n disparat e impac t is establishe d unde r thi s titl e onl y if—(i ) a complainin g part y demonstrates tha t a responden t use s a particula r employmen t practice tha t cause s a disparat e impac t o n th e basi s o f race , color, religion, sex , or nationa l origi n an d th e respondent fail s t o demonstrate tha t th e challenge d practic e i s jo b relate d fo r th e position i n question an d consisten t with busines s necessity; or (ii ) the complainin g part y make s th e demonstratio n describe d i n subparagraph (C ) wit h respec t t o a n alternativ e employmen t practice an d th e responden t refuse s t o adop t suc h alternativ e employment practice . Civi l Rights Act of 1991 , Pub. L. No. 102 166, § 105(a) , 10 5 Stat . 1071 , 107 4 (codifie d a t 4 2 U.S.C . § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (Supp . V 1993)) . Subparagraph (C ) provides: "Th e demonstratio n referre d t o b y sub paragraph (A)(ii ) shal l b e i n accordanc e wit h th e la w a s i t existe d o n June 4 , 1989 , wit h respec t t o th e concep t o f 'alternativ e employmen t practice.' " 42 U.S.C . § 2000e-2(k)(l)(C) (Supp . V 1993) . Prior t o passag e o f th e 199 1 Ac t ther e wa s considerabl e debat e among scholar s a s t o whethe r th e disparat e impac t theor y o f liabilit y was authorize d b y the statute. See, e.g., Alfred W . Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co . and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 7 1 M I C H . L . REV . 59 , 69-7 0 (1972) ; Georg e Ruther glen, Disparate Impact under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 7 3 VA . L. REV . 1297,1299-31 1 (1987) . 12. 49 0 U.S . 642(1989) . 13. Wards Cove, 49 0 U.S . a t 659-60 . Th e Cour t als o state d tha t disparate impac t plaintiff s mus t identif y th e specifi c employmen t prac tice allege d t o b e the caus e o f a disparate effect , an d tha t the y ma y no t challenge a multicomponen t selectio n proces s a s a whole . Id. a t 657.

Notes to Chapter 5/171 Congress modifie d thi s rul e onl y slightl y i n the 1991 Act, by providing that a plaintif f ma y challeng e a multicomponen t proces s i f sh e can establish tha t it s elements "ar e not capable o f separation fo r analysis." 42U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i). 14. Sectio n 10 5 of the 1991 Act provides tha t a violation i s established if the complaining part y "demonstrates " th e existence of a disparate impac t an d th e responden t "fail s t o demonstrat e tha t th e chal lenged practic e is job related fo r the position i n question an d consistent with busines s necessity. " Civi l Right s Ac t of 1991 , § 105(a), 10 5 Stat, at 107 4 (codified a t 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i)). Accordin g t o § 104, "[t]h e term 'demonstrates ' mean s meets the burdens of production and persuasion. " Id. § 104(m), 10 5 Stat, at 1074 (codifie d a t 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m)) . 15. Wards Cove rejecte d workforc e stratification—overrepresenta tion o f white s i n highe r jo b classifications an d overrepresentatio n o f nonwhites a t lowe r levels—a s a metho d o f provin g disparat e impact . Wards Cove, 49 0 U.S . at 655. Thi s aspec t o f Wards Cove wa s not affected b y the 1991 Act. 16. Se e Elaine Shoben , Defining the Relevant Population in Employment Discrimination Cases, in STATISTICA L METHOD S I N DISCRIM -

INATION LITIGATIO N 55 (D . H . Kay e & Mike l Aicki n eds. , 1986) ; Elaine W . Shoben , Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEX . L . REV. 1 (1977). 17. Th e statute provides : With respec t t o demonstratin g tha t a particula r employmen t practice cause s a disparat e impac t a s described i n subparagrap h (A)(i), the complaining party shal l demonstrate tha t eac h particu lar challenge d employmen t practic e cause s a disparat e impact , except that if the complaining part y can demonstrate t o the court that th e element s o f a respondent' s decisionmakin g proces s ar e not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking proces s may be analyzed a s one employment practice . Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub . L. No. 102-166 , § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071,107 4 (codi fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i) (Supp . V 1993)).

Notes to Chapter 5/172 There i s an additiona l exception : "Whe n a decision-makin g proces s includes particular , functionally-integrate d practice s whic h ar e compo nents o f th e sam e criterion , standard , metho d o f administration , o r test, suc h a s th e heigh t an d weigh t requirement s designe d t o measur e strength i n Dothard v . Rawlinson, 43 3 U.S . 321 (1977) , the particular , functionally-integrated practice s ma y b e analyze d a s on e employmen t practice." 13 7 CONG . REC . S15,27 6 (dail y ed . Oct . 25 , 1991) . Th e recognition tha t som e cluster s o f employmen t practice s ma y no t b e "capable o f separatio n fo r analysis " represents a minor modificatio n o f the Wards Cove position . 18. 40 1 U.S. 424(1971). 19. Id. a t 431. Th e Griggs Cour t sai d a s well that "[t]h e touchston e is business necessity. " Id. Th e relatio n betwee n th e jo b relatednes s an d business necessity requirement s remain s unclear . 20. Juli a Lamber , Alternatives to Challenged Employee Selection Criteria: The Significance of Nonstatistical Evidence in Disparate Impact Cases under Title VII, 198 5 Wis. L. REV . 1 , 34-35. 21. Unti l 1991 , a plaintiff's introductio n o f a n alternativ e selectio n criterion wit h a les s discriminatory impac t wa s see n a s a way o f rebut ting th e defendant' s clai m o f busines s necessity . See , e.g. , Albemarl e Paper Co . v. Moody, 42 2 U.S . 405, 425 (1975) , quote d a t tex t accom panying not e 24 . However , th e 199 1 Ac t migh t b e rea d t o permi t a plaintiff t o circumven t th e busines s necessit y issu e b y introducin g a n alternative employmen t practice , an d eve n t o permi t th e plaintif f t o proceed b y bringin g forwar d a les s discriminator y alternativ e withou t first showin g th e existenc e o f a disparat e impac t a t all . See 42 U.S.C . § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (Supp . V 1993) , reproduce d supra not e 11 . Thes e readings o f th e Act will b e explored furthe r late r i n this chapter . 22. Th e contras t betwee n th e constitutiona l standar d an d th e Titl e VII rule was describe d i n chapter 3 . 23. 42 2 U.S . 405(1975). 24. 42 2 U.S . at 425 (citation s omitted) . 25. Connecticu t v . Teal , 45 7 U.S . 440 , 44 7 (1982 ) ("[Eve n i f th e defendant demonstrate s jo b relatedness], the plaintiff ma y prevail , if h e shows tha t th e employe r wa s usin g th e practic e a s a mer e pretex t fo r

Notes to Chapter 5/173 discrimination."); Ne w Yor k Transi t Auth . v . Beazer , 44 0 U.S . 568 , 587 (1979 ) ("Th e Distric t Court' s expres s finding tha t th e rule was no t motivated b y racia l animu s foreclose s an y clai m i n rebutta l tha t i t was merel y a pretex t fo r intentiona l discrimination.") . I n Dothar d v . Rawlinson, 43 3 U.S . 32 1 (1977) , th e Cour t di d no t us e "pretext " language an d instea d state d tha t "[i] f th e employe r prove s tha t th e challenged requirement s ar e jo b related , th e plaintif f ma y the n sho w that othe r selectio n device s withou t a simila r discriminator y effec t would als o 'serv e th e employer' s legitimat e interes t i n efficien t an d trustworthy workmanship. ' " Id. a t 32 9 (citatio n an d interna l quota tion marks omitted) . 26. Simila r pretex t languag e appear s i n Watso n v . For t Wort h Bank & Trust , 48 7 U.S . 977 , 99 8 (1988 ) (pluralit y opinion) , an d commanded a majority i n Wards Cov e Packin g Co . v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660-6 1 (1989) . 27. 48 7 U.S. 977(1988) . 28. Id. a t 997. 29. Wards Cove, 49 0 U.S. at 659 . 30. Id. a t 67 0 (Stevens , J., dissenting) . 31. Fo r a muc h mor e sophisticate d discussio n o f thi s problem , see DAVI D C . BALDU S SC JAME S W L . COLE , STATISTICA L PROO F O F

DISCRIMINATION § 9.1 (1980) . Baldus an d Col e sugges t tha t statistica l significance technique s ca n mitigat e th e difficultie s associate d wit h small sampl e size , a t leas t i n som e instances , bu t als o not e tha t court s often ar e "preoccupied " wit h th e smal l sampl e problem . Id. a t 30 0 n.21; se e als o RAMON A L . PAETZOL D & STEVE N L . WILLBORN , TH E STATISTICS O F DISCRIMINATION : USIN G STATISTICA L EVIDENC E I N D I S -

CRIMINATION CASE S 4-3 6 &c n.114 (1994 ) (citation s omitted) . Exam ples o f thi s phenomeno n includ e Mayo r o f Philadelphi a v . Educationa l Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 621 (1974 ) (statin g that the trial court' s concern regardin g th e "smallnes s o f th e sampl e presente d b y th e 13 member Pane l wa s . . . wel l founded") ; Waisom e v . Por t Auth. , 94 8 F.2d 1370 , 1376-7 7 (2 d Cir . 1991) ; Bryan t v . Wainwright , 68 6 F.2 d 1373, 137 7 (11t h Cir . 1982) ; Eubank s v . Pickens-Bon d Constr . Co. , 635 F.2d 1341 , 1347-48 (8t h Cir . 1980) .

Notes to Chapter 5/174 32. Th e EEO C guidelines state : A selectio n rat e fo r an y race , sex , o r ethni c grou p whic h i s les s than four-fifth s (4/5 ) (o r eight y percent ) o f th e rat e fo r th e grou p with th e highes t rat e wil l generall y b e regarde d b y th e Federa l enforcement agencie s a s evidenc e o f advers e impact , whil e a greater tha n four-fifth s rat e wil l generall y no t b e regarde d b y Federal enforcemen t agencie s a s evidenc e o f advers e impact . Equal Employmen t Opportunit y Comm'n , Unifor m Guideline s on Employe e Selectio n Procedures , 2 9 C.F.R . pt . 1607.4(D ) (1994). 33. Se e Paetzold 8 c Willborn, supra not e 31, at 5-10 t o 5-11. These authors not e tha t th e problem o f smal l sampl e siz e may b e ameliorate d by statistica l significanc e techniques . Id. a t 4-3 6 8 c n.115; se e als o 2 9 C.F.R. pt . 1607.4(D ) ("Greate r difference s i n selectio n rat e ma y no t constitute advers e impac t wher e th e difference s ar e base d o n smal l numbers an d ar e not statisticall y significant . . . ." (emphasi s added)) . 34. 45 7 U.S. 440 (1982) . 35. 63 5 F.2 d 18 8 (3 d Cir . 1980) . 36. Id. a t 19 2 ("[N] o violatio n o f Titl e VII can b e grounded o n th e disparate impac t theor y withou t proo f tha t th e questione d polic y o r practice ha s ha d a disproportionat e impac t o n th e employer' s work force."). Greyhound Lines involve d a blac k mal e wit h th e ski n condi tion pseudofolliculiti s barba e (PFB) , which predominantl y affect s blac k men an d i s sever e enoug h t o preven t shavin g i n approximatel y hal f o f the grou p affected . Th e plaintif f argue d tha t Greyhound' s polic y o f prohibiting beard s fo r employee s i n publi c contac t position s ha d a negative impac t o n blac k males . Th e Thir d Circui t conclude d tha t the plaintif f ha d no t demonstrate d a n actua l disparat e effec t a t th e Philadelphia termina l wher e h e wa s employed . Id. a t 191 . The Eight h Circuit recentl y too k th e contrar y vie w i n anothe r PF B case. Bradley v . Pizzaco o f Neb. , Inc. , 92 6 F.2 d 714 , 71 6 (8t h Cir . 1991 ) ("Genera l population statistic s ar e highl y significan t wher e ther e i s n o reaso n t o believe th e disqualifyin g characteristi c potentia l jo b applicant s posses s differs markedl y fro m th e national population.") . 37. 43 3 U.S. 321 (1977) . 38. Id. a t 330-31 ; se e als o Chamber s v . Omah a Girl s Club , Inc. ,

Notes to Chapter 5/175 834 F.2 d 697 , 70 1 (8t h Cir . 1987 ) ("becaus e o f th e significantl y highe r fertility rat e amon g blac k females , th e rul e bannin g singl e pregnancies woul d impac t blac k wome n mor e harshly, " quotin g Chambers v . Omah a Girl s Club , Inc. , 62 9 R Supp . 925 , 94 9 (D . Neb . 1986)). 39. Cf . Albemarl e Pape r Co . v . Moody, 42 2 U.S . 405, 43 3 (1975 ) (discussing difficult y i n identifyin g criteri a actuall y use d b y supervisor s in ranking employee s subjectively) . 40. See , e.g., Faga n v . National Cas h Registe r Co. , 48 1 F.2 d 1115 , 1125 (D.C . Cir. 1973) ; see also Peter B . Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination under Title VII, 2 0 U.C . DAVI S L . REV. 769, 77 1 (1987 ) (notin g tha t court s hav e hel d tha t "Titl e VI I simply doe s no t prohibi t discriminatio n linke d t o mutabl e characteris tics"). 41. 52 7 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y . 1981) . 42. Se e Garci a v . Spu n Stea k Co. , 99 8 F.2 d 1480 , 148 7 (9t h Cir . 1993), cert, denied, 51 2 U.S . 122 8 (1994) ; Garci a v . Gloor , 61 8 F.2 d 264, 27 0 (5t h Cir . 1980) , cert, denied, 44 9 U.S . 111 3 (1981) . Bu t se e Gutierrez v . Municipal Court , 83 8 F.2 d 1031 , 1039-40, 104 5 (9t h Cir . 1988) (affirmin g preliminar y injunctio n agains t English-onl y rul e i n court offices) , vacated as moot, 49 0 U.S . 1016 (1989) . 43. Th e ter m "token " describe s th e percentag e o f nonwhite s i n a particular workplace , no t th e employer' s stat e o f mind . Se e Kanter , supra not e 8 , at 206-12 . 44. 4 2 U.S.C . § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i ) (Supp . V 1993) , reproduce d supra not e 17 . 45. Fo r example , th e existenc e o f a n actua l disparat e distributio n could b e th e consequenc e o f factor s a s divers e a s th e employer' s us e of culturall y biased , objectiv e criteria , th e differentia l availabilit y o f opportunities beyon d th e employer' s control , o r difficult-to-prov e dif ferent treatmen t withou t discriminator y intent , stereotyping , o r cover t hostility. 46. I argued i n chapter 1 that a policy o f skepticis m i s preferable t o the attemp t t o distinguis h "genuinely " race-neutra l criteri a o f decision . Nevertheless, th e latte r i s explore d her e i n th e interes t o f thoroug h investigation.

Notes to Chapter 5 1176 47. Se e Barbar a J . Flagg , Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 8 2 CAL . L . REV . 935 , 969-76 (1994) . 48. Ther e ma y no t b e any white-specifi c negativ e characteristics . Qualities tha t occu r mor e frequentl y i n white s ma y tak e o n positiv e connotations fo r tha t reaso n alone . 49. Th e sam e analysi s woul d appl y i n th e cas e o f a n unfavorabl e employment decisio n base d o n th e existenc e o f a characteristi c pos sessed les s frequently b y whites. 50. Se e Ian F . Haney Lopez , The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 2 9 HARV . C.R.-C.L . L. REV . 1,46-53(1994) . 51. Th e plaintif f woul d hav e a n opportunit y t o rebu t th e defen dant's clai m o f busines s necessit y b y introducing a n alternativ e practic e that woul d hav e a less discriminatory impact . 52. Tha t is , th e analysi s o f necessit y shoul d confor m mor e t o th e tone o f Dothar d v . Rawlinson, 43 3 U.S. 321, 322 n.1 4 (1977 ) (holdin g that challenge d practic e "mus t b e show n t o b e necessar y t o saf e an d efficient jo b performance") , tha n t o Ne w Yor k Cit y Transi t Authorit y v. Beazer , 44 0 U.S . 568 , 58 7 n.3 1 (1979 ) (holdin g tha t th e busines s necessity requiremen t i s satisfied b y showin g tha t "goal s [o f safet y an d efficiency] ar e significantl y serve d by—eve n i f the y d o no t require — [the defendant's ] rule") . 53. Thus , th e foreseeabl e impac t plaintif f ha s t o depen d o n th e existence o f relevan t sociologica l studies . This is analogous t o Yvonne' s dependence o n the availability o f evidence of different treatment , whic h can b e difficult t o obtain . The paper trai l present i n Ann Hopkins' case , for example , may have bee n unusual . Se e Price Waterhouse v . Hopkins, 490 U.S . 228, 232-35 (1989) . 54. Thi s aspec t o f differenc e i s thoroughl y explore d i n MARTH A MINOW, MAKIN G AL L TH E DIFFERENCE : INCLUSION , EXCLUSION , AN D

AMERICAN LA W 173-22 4 (1990) . 55. Lik e th e foreseeabl e effect s approach , thi s mode l woul d appl y to a whit e plaintif f i n an y situatio n i n whic h nonwhite s predominat e and hav e final authorit y ove r th e managemen t o f th e business , becaus e by it s term s Titl e VI I applie s t o an y discriminatio n becaus e o f race .

Notes to Chapter 5/177 However, I think i t exceptionall y rar e fo r white s t o find themselve s i n the positio n jus t described . Bu t se e Ra y v . Universit y o f Ark. , 86 8 F . Supp. 110 4 (E.D . Ark. 1994 ) (involvin g clai m b y sol e whit e office r o n campus police force o f University o f Arkansas a t Pine Bluff) . 56. Th e statutor y languag e i s reproduced supra a t not e 11. 57. I n general, interpretation (B ) would permi t consideratio n o f th e business necessit y issu e i n appropriat e cases ; interpretatio n (A ) woul d require consideratio n o f tha t issue . On e coul d argu e tha t becaus e th e statute use s "or, " (B ) is the bette r interpretation . However , th e foresee able impact mode l follow s interpretatio n (A) . 58. Throug h empirica l research , Kante r identifie d thi s percentag e as th e uppe r boundar y o f "skewe d groups, " i n whic h th e dynamic s o f tokenism—including heightene d visibility , contrast, an d stereotyping — appear. Se e Kanter, supra not e 8 , at 206-42. Though Kanter' s principa l focus wa s o n (white ) women' s fortune s i n th e workplace , sh e regarde d her theory a s applicable t o racial tokenism a s well. Id. a t 207 . 59. Thi s analysi s i s ver y simila r t o wha t woul d tak e plac e a t th e business necessity stag e under th e foreseeabl e impac t model . 60. Jus t a s custome r preferenc e i s no t a bon a fide occupationa l qualification unde r disparat e treatmen t analysis , i t shoul d no t satisf y the business necessity requirement. Se e Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2 d 38 5 (5t h Cir.) , cert, denied, 40 4 U.S . 950 (1971) ; Wilson v. Southwest Airline s Co. , 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D . Tex. 1981) . 61. Similarly , additiona l corporat e suppor t migh t hav e averte d th e harm an d ensuin g litigatio n i n Thoma s v . Digita l Equip . Corp. , 88 0 F.2d 148 6 (1s t Cir . 1989 ) (involvin g defendan t firm tha t facilitate d complaints b y India n mal e plaintiff' s subordinate s an d failed t o tak e remedial step s whe n wor k relationshi p suffere d fro m complaints) , an d Lopez v . Schwan's Sale s Enter., Inc. , 84 5 F . Supp. 144 0 (D . Kan. 1994 ) (concerning Mexica n America n salesma n wh o receive d numerou s cus tomer complaints , arguabl y becaus e o f cultura l style) . 62. Thi s portion o f Title VII is reproduced supra a t note 3 . 63. However , th e alternative s mode l doe s no t implemen t a purel y distributive conceptio n o f equality . Onc e a workplac e ha s bee n rede signed i n a pluralis t manner , applicant s an d employee s woul d no t b e

Notes to Chapter 6/178 able to formulat e les s assimilationist employmen t practice s becaus e th e workplace woul d n o longe r b e (transparently ) white . Pu t simply , a pluralist workplace i s one in which qualifie d person s like Keisha, whose personal styl e differ s significantl y fro m whites ' cultura l expectations , have significan t decisionmakin g an d policymakin g authority , includin g authority ove r whites . NOTES T O CHAPTE R 6

1. Sectio n 10 6 provides : It shal l b e a n unlawfu l employmen t practic e fo r a respondent, i n connection wit h th e selectio n o r referra l o f applicant s o r candi dates fo r employmen t o r promotion , t o adjus t th e score s of , use differen t cutof f score s for , o r otherwis e alte r th e result s of , employment relate d test s on the basi s of race, color, religion, sex , or nationa l origin . Civi l Right s Ac t o f 1991 , Pub. L . No . 102 166, § 106, 10 5 Stat. 1071 , 1075 (codifie d a t 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(1) (Supp. V 1993)) . 2. Sectio n 703 ( j) of the 196 4 Act reads: Nothing containe d i n thi s subchapte r shal l b e construe d t o re quire an y employe r . . . t o gran t preferentia l treatmen t t o an y individual o r t o an y grou p becaus e o f th e race , color , religion , sex, o r nationa l origi n o f th e individua l o r grou p o n accoun t o f an imbalanc e whic h ma y exis t wit h respec t t o th e tota l numbe r or percentag e o f person s o f an y race , color , religion , sex , o r national origi n employe d b y an y employe r . . . i n compariso n with th e tota l numbe r o r percentag e o f person s o f suc h race , color, religion , sex , o r nationa l origi n i n an y community , State , section, o r othe r area , o r i n th e availabl e wor k forc e i n an y community, State , section, o r othe r area . 4 2 U.S.C . § 2000e-2(j ) (1988). This provision wa s modified i n very minor respect s i n 1972 . 3. 40 1 U.S. 424(1971). 4. Id. a t 429-30 . 5. Id. a t 43 2 ("[G]oo d inten t o r absenc e o f discriminator y inten t

Notes to Chapter 6/179 does no t redee m employmen t procedure s o r testin g mechanism s tha t operate a s 'built-i n headwinds ' fo r minorit y group s an d ar e unrelate d to measurin g job capability.") . 6. I n § 2 o f th e Civi l Right s Ac t o f 1991 , Congres s se t fort h th e factual findings tha t undergir d th e statute : (1) additiona l remedie s under Federa l la w are needed t o dete r unlawful harassmen t an d intentiona l discriminatio n i n the work place; (2) th e decision o f the Supreme Cour t i n Wards Cov e Packin g Co. v . Atonio, 49 0 U.S . 642 (1989 ) ha s weakene d th e scop e an d effectiveness o f Federa l civi l rights protections ; an d (3) legislatio n i s necessar y t o provid e additiona l protection s against unlawfu l discriminatio n i n employment . Civi l Right s Ac t of 1991 , Pub. L. 102-166 , § 2, 10 5 Stat . 1071 , 1071. The purposes o f the 199 1 Act were: (1) t o provid e appropriat e remedie s fo r intentiona l discrimi nation an d unlawfu l harassmen t i n the workplace ; (2) t o codif y th e concept s o f "busines s necessity " an d "jo b related" enunciate d b y th e Suprem e Cour t i n Grigg s v . Duk e Power Co. , 401 U.S. 424 (1971) , and i n the other Suprem e Cour t decisions prio r t o Ward s Cov e Packin g Co . v . Atonio, 49 0 U.S . 642 (1989) ; (3) t o confirm statutor y authorit y an d provide statutor y guid ance fo r th e adjudicatio n o f disparat e impac t suit s under titl e VII of the Civi l Rights Act of 196 4 (4 2 U.S.C. 2000e e t seq.); and (4) t o respon d t o recen t decision s o f th e Suprem e Cour t b y expanding th e scop e o f relevan t civi l right s statute s i n orde r t o provide adequat e protectio n t o victim s o f discrimination . Civi l Rights Act of 1991 , Pub. L. No. 102-166 , § 2(2), 10 5 Stat. 1071, 1071. 7. Se e supra chapte r 5 , note 14 . 8. Se e 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2( j) (1988) , reproduced supra not e 2 . 9. Grigg s v . Duk e Powe r Co. , 40 1 U.S . 424 , 43 1 (1971 ) ("Th e touchstone i s business necessity . If an employmen t practic e whic h oper ates t o exclud e Negroe s canno t b e show n t o b e relate d t o jo b perfor -

Notes to Chapter 6/180 mance, th e practice i s prohibited."). Thi s formulatio n leave s unclea r the relationship betwee n busines s necessity an d job relatedness. 10. BEL L HOOKS , The Politics of Radical Black Subjectivity, i n YEARNING: RACE , GENDER , AN D CULTURAL POLITIC S 1 5 , 1 5 (1990) .

11. Se e Michael J . Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 12 5 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 557-58 (1977 ) (identi fying government' s remedia l obligation s arisin g fro m historica l injus tices). Redistributio n a s an end in itself woul d conflic t wit h capitalis t values. Se e Frances L . Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 7 4 CORNEL L L . REV. 993, 1031-3 5 (1989) (discussin g th e tension betwee n affirmativ e action' s method s and a n "anti-redistributionist" ideolog y tha t i s prevalent i n the United States). 12. A s of 1991, 13 percent o f white household s bu t only 4 percent of blac k household s hel d a financial interest in a business or profession ; the median valu e of such asset s was $10,352 fo r whites and $3,444 for blacks. U.S . BUREA U O F THE CENSUS , STATISTICA L ABSTRAC T O F TH E UNITED STATES : 1994 , a t 48 2 (1994) .

13. Th e essentials of the classic debate regardin g the creation of the disparate impac t doctrin e i n Griggs appea r i n Michae l Eva n Gold , Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL . L.J. 429 (1985); Katherine J. Thomson, The Disparate Impact Theory: Congressional Intent in 1972—A Response to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL . L.J. 105 (1986); Michae l Evan Gold , Reply to Thomson, 8 INDUS . REL . L.J. 11 7 (1986); and Alfred W . Blumrosen, Grigg s Was Correctly Decided —A Response to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL . L.J. 443 (1986). 14. Se e chapter 4. 15. Th e interpretive strateg y employe d her e mos t closel y resemble s that propose d b y Har t an d Sacks. Se e HENR Y M . HART , JR . & ALBER T M. SACKS , THE LEGAL PROCESS : BASI C PROBLEM S I N THE MAKING AND

APPLICATION O F LAW 1374-80 (Willia m N . Eskridg e & c Philip P . Frickey eds. , 1994) .

Notes to Chapter 7/181

NOTES T O CHAPTE R 7

1. Se e Charles R. Lawrence III , The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 3 9 STAN. L. REV. 317, 33 5 (1987). See also source s cite d in chapter 2, notes 20 and 23. 2. Se e Katharine T . Bartlett 6 t Jean O'Barr , The Chilly Climate on College Campuses: An Expansion of the (( Hate Speech" Debate, 199 0 DUKE L.J . 574 , 583 . 3. JOYC E TREBILCOT , TAKIN G RESPONSIBILIT Y FO R SEXUALITY 2

(1983). 4. Se e Joan B . Karp, The Emotional Impact

and a Model for

Changing Racist Attitudes, i n IMPACT S O F RACIS M O N WHITE AMERI -

CANS 87 , 8 9 (Benjami n P . Bowse r S t Raymon d G . Hunt , eds. , 1981). 5. Fo r an overview o f the indeterminacy thesis , se e John Hasnas , Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 4 5 DUKE L.J . 84 (1995). 6. Se e chapter 3. 7. Se e chapter 5. 8. See , e.g., Mark Tushnet , An Essay on Rights, 6 2 TEX. L. REV . 1363 (1984) . 9. WEBSTER' S THIR D N E W INTERNATIONAL DICTIONAR Y O F TH E ENGLISH LANGUAGE , UNABRIDGED 1815 (1986) .

10. See , e.g., R. M. Hare, The Promising Game, i n THEORIES OF ETHICS 115 , 124-2 5 (Philipp a Foo t ed. , 1967) . 11. Pegg y Mcintosh , White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies 2 (Wellesley Colleg e Cente r fo r Research o n Women, Working Pape r No . 189 , 1988) . 12. Se e Martha R . Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 14 3 U. PA. L. REV. 1659 , 1665-66 (1995) . 13. Se e IA N F. HANE Y LOPEZ , WHIT E B Y LAW: TH E LEGAL C O N STRUCTION O F RACE 17 2 (1996) .

14. Se e id. at 183-90.

Notes to Chapter 7/182 15. Mar i J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 2 2 HARV . C.R.-C.L . L . REV . 32 3 (1987) . Not e tha t there's a sligh t disanalog y here : The notio n o f promisin g i s intended t o provide a standar d agains t whic h t o measur e specifi c doctrines ; it's no t a doctrina l proposa l pe r se .

Index

Abram, Morris B., 163 n. 1 5 accommodation, 111 , 113, 114 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Fena, 152 n. 1 4 affirmative action , 69, 70, 126 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 92 93, 16 9 n. 9, 17 2 n. 21, 17 5 n. 39 Alexander v. Louisiana, 15 5 n. 15 Almquist, Alan, 15 1 n. 1 alternatives model, 107-12 , 135 36. See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196 4 American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 16 6 n. 35 Ansley, Frances L., 16 3 n. 16, 167 n. 43, 168 n. 49, 180 n. 1 1 antiracist white identity, 13 , 18, 25, 36, 37-38, 145-48. See also white privilege antisubordination, 72-73 , 8 1 Arizona v. Youngblood, 158 n. 35 assimilationism, 57-59, 62-63, 64 , 99, 103-05 , 110-11, 112-13 , 114,121-26,134-35,139 Auer, Andreas, 16 2 nn. 8 , 9 autonomy, 71 , 72, 122-2 5 Avolio, Bruce J., 15 6 n. 24 Baldus, David C , 15 7 n. 31, 159 n. 39, 17 3 n. 31 Bartlett, Katharine T., 181 n. 2 Batson v. Kentucky, 15 5 n. 16 Bayer, Peter B., 175 n. 40 Bell, Daniel J., 16 0 n. 46 Bell, Derrick A., Jr., 15 3 n. 14, 167 n. 44, 168 n. 50 Bennett, Robert W., 167 n. 42

Bickel, Alexander, 68 , 69, 76 biological race. See race, social construction of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 51 Black, Charles L., Jr., 16 1 n. 7, 163 n. 1 3 Black English, 61,72, 8 5 blaming, 12 , 50-52, 129-3 7 Blaustein, Albert R, 16 1 n. 7 Blumrosen, Alfred W. , 170 n. 11, 180 n. 1 3 Boiling v. Sharpe, 154 n. 1 Bond, Charles R, Jr., 15 7 n. 27 Bork, Robert H., 16 1 n. 4, 16 3 n. 13 Bradley v. Fizzaco of Neb., Inc., 174 n. 36 Brandeis, Louis D., 76 Branscombe, Nyla R. , 15 6 n. 24 Brest, Paul, 16 7 n. 3 7 Bridges, George S., 157 n. 30 Brown v. Board of Education, 16 , 40, 45-46, 69 Bryant v. Wainwright, 17 3 n. 3 1 business necessity, 90, 91, 93-94, 103-04, 108 , 112-13. See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196 4 Cain, Patricia A., 150 n. 4 Canner, Glen n B., 156 n. 25 Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 15 5 n. 1 5 Casteneda v. Fartida, 155 n. 1 5 Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 17 4 n. 38 Chang, David, 16 7 n. 38, 168 n. 48

183

Index/184 Choper, Jesse H., 16 6 n. 3 7 Citrin, Jack, 15 5 n. 23 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 16 0 n. 1 , 163 n. 1 2 Civil Rights Act of 1866 , 69 Civil Rights Act of 1991 , 90, 94, 107-08,118,120,128 Cohen, Morris R., 16 5 n. 27 Cole, James W. L., 15 9 n. 39, 173 n. 3 1 colorblindness, 22, 66-74, 81 , 106, 161 n. 7 Connecticut v. Teal, 95 , 172 n. 25 conscious racism. See racism, individual consciou s constitutional requiremen t o f discriminatory intent . See discriminatory intent, constitutional requirement of Court-packing plan, 16 5 n. 24 Craig v. Boren, 15 5 n. 21 Crenshaw, Kimberle W., 149 n. 2 Critical Legal Studies, 138, 143 Cronin, John, 15 1 n. 1 Crutchfield, Rober t D., 157 n. 30 Culp, Jerome McCristal, Jr., 168 n. 1 cultural pluralism, 38, 57, 59 , 6 364, 103-04 , 121 , 122, 125-26, 134-35, 136 , 144, 14 5 Daniels v. Williams, 158 n. 34 Davidson v. Cannon, 15 8 n. 34 Davis, George, 16 8 n. 2 Davis v. Washington, 62, 154 n. 5, 160 n. 47, 167 n. 40 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 162 n. 1 0 Delgado, Richard, 15 1 n. 9 Devine, Patricia G. , 15 3 nn. 20, 23, 24 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 17 7 n. 60 Dillard,J. L. , 159 n.44 discretionary decisionmaking , 15; and race, 49

discrimination. See racism; transparency phenomeno n fliscrimination i n employment , 117-18; and transparency phenomenon, 83-88 , 94-9 9 discriminatory intent : constitutional requirement of , 10 , 39-45, 130, 143 ; defined, 43-44 ; principle of, 78 ; and transparency phenomenon, 45-5 3 disparate effects : proof of , 55-56, 90-91, 94-98 , 100-03, 107, 108-09, 112 , 113-14. See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196 4 distributive equality, 118 , 120-21 , 177 n. 63 doctrine as promise. See promising Doerner, William G. , 15 6 n. 24 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 96, 17 2 n. 17, 17 3 n. 25, 176 n. 52 Dudziak, Mary L., 16 8 n. 50 Eastman, George D., 159 n. 46 economic redistribution, 80 , 81. See also redistribution EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 96 Ekland-Olson, Sheldon , 15 7 n. 31 Ely, John H., 16 3 n. 14 , 166 n. 3 7 employment discrimination , 117 18; and transparency phenome non, 83-88 , 94-9 9 English-only rules , 97-9 8 Epstein, Richard, 15 1 n. 1 1 equal opportunity i n employment , 118-26; and transparency phe nomenon, 123-2 5 Equal Protection Clause , 10, 3940, 53, 80 Estelle v. Gamble, 15 8 n. 34 Eubanks v. Pickens-Bond Constr. Co., 17 3 n. 3 1

Index/185 facially neutra l criteria o f decision, 28-29, 34-35, 46-50, 67, 78, 98-99. See also transparency phenomenon Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 17 5 n. 40 Feinberg, Lotte E., 160 n. 46 Ferguson, Clarence C , Jr. , 16 1 n. 7 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 16 5 n. 28 Ford, J. Kevin, 15 6 n. 24 foreseeable impac t model, 100-06 , 135-36. See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196 4 Fragante v. City & County of Honolulu, 57, 59, 60 Frank, John P., 161 n. 4 Frankenberg, Ruth, 15 0 n. 5 Frankfurter, Felix , 76, 165 n. 25 Freedmen's Bureau Acts, 68 Freeman, Alan D., 162 n. 9, 16 8 n. 49 Friedman, Robert, 15 3 nn. 26, 27 Frontiero v. Richardson, 15 9 n. 42 Fry, Lincoln, 16 0 n. 46 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 16 2 n. 1 1 Garcia v. Gloor, 175 n. 42 Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 17 5 n. 42 Gayle v. Browder, 16 2 n. 8 Ginsburg, Ruth Bader , 15 1 n. 1 3 Gold, Michael Evan, 18 0 n. 1 3 Gotanda, Neil, 14 9 nn. 1 , 2 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 40-41 , 77,79,91,92,93,119,120, 127, 15 4 n. 6 Grillo, Trina, 16 0 n. 48 grooming standards, 96, 97 , 122 Gunther, Gerald , 15 4 n. 8 Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 175 n. 42 Hacker, Andrew, 15 2 nn. 8 , 10 , 12 Hale, Robert L. , 16 5 n. 27

Haney Lopez, Ian E, 24, 146, 152 nn. 5, 6, 153 nn. 15 , 16, 176 n. 50, 181 n. 1 3 Hare,R.M., 18 1 n. 1 0 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 15 9 n. 38 Harris, Cheryl, 15 1 n. 1 0 Harris, Marvin, 15 2 n. 3 Hart, Henry M., Jr., 18 0 n. 1 5 Hasnas, John, 18 1 n. 5 heightened scrutiny , 46, 54-55, 56, 60, 64, 67, 77, 130 , 13 4 Helms, Janet E., 150 n. 3, 164 n. 18 Hernandez v. Texas, 155 n. 1 5 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr., 76 Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 16 2 n. 8 hooks, bell, 123-2 4 Horowitz, Harold W., 168 n. 48 Horwitz, Morton J., 16 4 n. 23, 165 nn. 27, 28, 166 n. 34 indeterminacy. See legal indeterminacy individual autonomy . See autonomy institutional racism , 8, 27-29, 3 334,109,110,136,147 intermediate scrutiny , 45, 46, 54, 58 Ivey, Allen, 15 0 n. 3 Johnson, Sher i Lynn, 15 8 n. 3 1 Jordan, Winthrop D., 164 n. 1 9 judicial restraint, 74-82 , 126-2 8 Kamin, L., 15 1 n. 1 Kanter, Rosabeth Moss , 16 9 n. 8 , 175 n. 43, 177 n. 58 Karp, JoanB., 18 1 n. 4 Karst, Kenneth L. , 168 n. 48 Katz,JudyH., 15 0 n. 3 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 15 1 n. 1 2 Kauper, Paul G., 16 1 n. 7 Keeton, W. Page, 158 n. 3 3 Keil, Thomas J., 15 7 n. 3 1

Index 1186 King, Coretta Scott , 16 4 n. 1 7 Kirschenman, Joleen, 15 6 n. 24 Kluger, Richard, 15 1 n. 13 , 152 n. 2 Kozol, Jonathan, 15 2 n. 1 1 Kraiger, Kurt, 15 6 n. 24 Lamber, Julia, 17 2 n. 20 Lawrence, Charles R., Ill, 131, 153 n. 22, 155 n. 22 Lazarus, Richard J., 15 2 n. 9 legal indeterminacy, 12-13 , 137-4 4 Leuchtenberg, William E., 16 5 n. 24 Lewontin, R., 15 1 n. 1 Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Assn.v.EEOC, 16 2 n. 1 1 Locbner era, 74-75 Lochner v. New York, 166 n. 28 Lopez v. Scbwan's Sales Enter., Inc., 177 n. 61 Lovrich, Nicholas R, Jr., 15 5 n. 23 Mahoney, Martha R. , 18 1 n. 12 Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 158 n. 35 Matsuda, Mari J., 15 9 n. 41, 182 n. 1 5 Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 162 n. 8 Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 173 n. 31 McCain, James A., 15 9 n. 46 McDermott Intl. Inc. v. Wilander, 162 n. 8 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 88 Mcintosh, Peggy, 181 n. 1 1 Mendelson, Wallace, 166 n. 33 Miller, Jon, 16 0 n. 46 Minow, Martha, 17 6 n. 54 Munro, Robert R, 16 1 n. 4 Murphy, Paul L., 16 4 n. 23

Neckerman, Kathryn M., 15 6 n. 24 Nei, Masatoshi, 15 1 n. 1 Neighbors, Harold W, 15 7 n. 26 New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 173n. 25 , 176n.5 2 O'Barr, Jean, 18 1 n. 2 Ortiz, Daniel R., 15 5 n. 1 7 Paetzold, Ramona L. , 173 n. 31, 174 n. 33 Peller, Gary, 16 3 n. 13 , 164 n. 20 Perry, Michael J., 16 6 n. 37, 180 n. 11 personal autonomy . See autonomy Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 44 Pettigrew, Thomas, 15 3 n. 21 Pfeffer, Arthu r S. , 160 n. 46 Piliavin, Jane A., 15 6 n. 23 Plessyv.Ferguson, 152 n.2,161 n. 6 pluralism. See cultural pluralis m Pollak, Louis H., 16 3 n. 1 3 Posner, Richard A., 16 1 n. 4, 163 n. 1 5 Pound, Roscoe, 16 5 n. 27 prejudice, 26, 27, 31-3 2 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 176 n. 53 privilege. See white privilege process theory, 70 promising, 13 , 137-44 Purcell, Edward A., Jr., 16 6 n. 34 race: and discretionar y decisionmaking, 49; and law, 24-25; social construction of , 20-2 4 race-neutral decisionmaking . See facially neutral criteria o f decision; transparency phenomeno n racial classification, 21-22 , 24 racial redistribution, 14 , 15, 18, 70-71, 78 , 81-82, 135 , 136, 137, 145 . See also redistribution

Index/187 racism: defined, 25-26 ; individual social stratification, 2 3 conscious, 26, 27-28, 30-31 , Spohn, Cassia, 15 7 n. 29 131-32; individual unconscious , Squires, Gregory D., 156 n. 25 26-27, 31-32, 131-32 ; institu"standard" English , 61, 64, 72, 85 tional, 8 , 27-29, 33-34, 109 , Stephenson, Gilber t T, 16 4 n. 1 9 110,136,147 stereotyping, 6, 26-27, 31-3 3 Stevens, John Paul, 43, 44, 93 rational basi s review, 44 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, Ray v. University of Ark., 17 7 n. 169 n. 7 55 Strauder v. West Virginia, 164 n. reasonable accommodation, 111, 21 113,114 redistribution: economic, 80, 81; ra-- stric t scrutiny, 41, 46, 69, 70, 79, cial, 14, 15, 18, 70-71, 78 , 8 181 82, 135 , 136, 137, 145; remesubordination. See antisubordinadial, 125-2 6 tion Sunstein, Cass R., 16 6 n. 29 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bakke, 16 2 n. 1 1 remedial redistribution, 125-26 . Bd. ofEduc, 16 2 n. 9 See also redistribution symmetry, 67-68, 118, 119, 120 responsibility, 12 , 129-3 7 Reynolds, William B., 163 n. 1 5 taking responsibility. See responsibility Roberg, Roy R., 16 0 n. 46 Terry, Robert W., 150 n. 3 Rogers v. American Airlines, 97 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs Rose, Stephen, 15 1 n. 1 v. Bur dine,16 9 n. 6 Ross, Thomas, 15 1 n. 10 , 163 n. Thayer, James B., 75-76 16 Thomas v. Digital Equip. Corp., Roychoudhury, Arun K., 15 1 n. 1 Rutherglen, George , 17 0 n. 1 1 177 n. 61 Thomson, Katherine J., 18 0 n. 1 3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of Sacks, Albert M., 18 0 n. 1 5 1964, 10 , 83, 87, 118, 144; alterScales-Trent, Judy, 152 n. 7 natives model, 107-12 , 135-36 ; Scalia, Antonin, 68 , 163 n. 1 5 disparate impact liability under , Schnapper, Eric, 160 n. 2 89-94, 130 ; disparate treatmen t Schofield, Janet W., 155 n. 22 liability under, 88-89 ; establishSecond Reconstruction, 7 3 ing business necessity, 90, 91, Shoben, Elaine, 171 n. 16 93-94, 103-04 , 108 , 112-13; skepticism, 11 , 19, 35-38, 48, 54foreseeable impac t model, 100 55, 111 , 112, 114, 134, 175 n. 06, 135-36 ; proving disparate ef 46 fects, 90-91 , 94-98 , 100-03, Smith, Douglas A., 157 n. 28 107,108-09,112,113-14 Smith, Eliot R., 15 6 n. 24 Torres, Gerald, 15 0 n. 7 Smith, M. Dwayne, 15 8 n. 3 1 transparency-conscious doctrines , Smitherman, Geneva , 15 9 n. 44 16, 53-65, 100-1 2 social construction o f race, 20-24

Index/188 transparency phenomenon: an d constitutional requiremen t o f discriminatory intent, 45-53; defined, 1-4, 144 ; and discrimina tion in employment, 83-88 , 9499; and equal opportunity, 123 25; transparently white decisionmaking, 4- 8 transparently white criteria o f decision: defined, 101-0 2 Trebilcot, Joyce, 181 n. 3 Tribe, Laurence H., 16 0 n. 3, 164 n. 23 Trillin, Calvin, 15 3 n. 18 Tushnet, Mark, 18 1 n. 8 unconscious racism. See racism, individual unconscious; transparency phenomenon United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 162 n. 1 1 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 16 7 n. 47 United States v. Leon, 15 8 n. 35 United States v. Paradise, 162 n. 1 1 Van Alstyne, William, 16 1 n. 4, 163 n. 1 5 Van Riper, William R., 15 9 n. 43 Velez, William, 15 6 n. 25 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 42-4 3 Vito, Gennaro E, 15 7 n. 31

Waisome v. Port Auth., 17 3 n. 31 Waldman, David A., 156 n. 24 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 90, 91, 93 , 108, 119, 128, 170 n. 13, 17 1 n. 15 , 173 n. 26 Washington v. Davis, 40-42, 43, 44, 50-51, 55, 60 , 61, 71-72, 77, 79, 81 Watson, Glegg, 16 8 n. 2 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 93, 170 n. 9, 173 n. 26 Wechsler, Herbert, 70 , 161 n. 7 Wellman, David, 15 3 n. 25 White, Byron R., 4 1 White, G. Edward, 16 7 n. 37 White English, 61, 62, 72 white identity. See antiracist whit e identity white privilege, 13 , 18, 70, 144 48. See also antiracist white identity Wildman, Stephanie M., 16 0 n. 48 Willborn, Steven L., 173 n. 31, 174 n. 3 3 Williams, Patricia J., 15 2 n. 7 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 16 5 n. 28 Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 177 n. 60 Wright, Benjamin E , 16 4 n. 23, 165 n. 24 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc, 162 n. 1 1

About th e Autho r

Barbara Flagg is a Professor o f Law at Washington University School of Law in St. Louis. She received her J.D. degree fro m Boalt Hal l Schoo l o f La w a t th e Universit y o f California , Berkeley, in 1987, and her bachelor's degree from th e University of California , Riverside , in 1967 . She spent the interven ing year s followin g a wanderin g vocationa l pat h tha t in cluded th e Peac e Corps , photographi c printing , bicycl e repair, philosophy, and stereo sales and repair . After la w school , Flagg served a s law clerk t o then-Cour t of Appeals Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and joined the Washington University faculty th e following year . She teaches constitutional la w an d critica l jurisprudence . He r publishe d work addresse s issue s o f whit e identit y an d law , constitu tional discourse, and essentialism .

189