War and revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: occupation and collaboration 9780804736152

Citation preview

War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945

Occupation and Collaboration

BLAN {PACH LAL K. IA

War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945

ue ee OCCUPATION AND

COLLABORATION

aun ee

JOZO TOMASEVICH

Stanford University Press | |

Stanford, California ee }

© 2001 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

| Tomasevich, Jozo. ,

War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: occupation and collaboration / Jozo Tomasevich.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. , ISBN 0-8047-361 5-4 (cloth : alk. paper)

1. Yugoslavia—History—Axis occupation, 1941-1945. 2. World War, 1939-1945— Yugoslavia. I. Title.

DR1I298.T66 2001

940.53'497—dc21 © 2001020024 This book is printed on acid-free, archival-quality paper. Original printing 2001

Last figure below indicates year of this printing: , Io. 09 «©08 «€©07:«€~=060«€~=0§: «604: «203.0 SO02-sCOO

Designed and typeset at Stanford University Press in 10/13 Sabon by John Feneron.

Contents

ee te

Preface 1x

Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Materials XV

1 Yugoslavia Between the Wars I Historical Background, 1 The Unification Act of December 1, 1918, and the Constitution of June 28, 1921, 9 Early Political Emigration, 17 Political Developments from 1923 to 1934, 21 The Early Stages of the Ustasha Movement, 30 Political Developments in the Late 1930’s, 39

2 The Partition of Yugoslavia 47 The Establishment of the Independent State of Croatia, 47. The Partition of the Country, 61 The German System of Occupation in Serbia, 64

3. Germany and Italy Divide Slovenia 83 German Occupation of Northern Slovenia, 83 Italian Annexation of the Ljubljana Province, 94 German Occupation of the Ljubljana Province, 121 Collaboration Leads the Anti-Partisan Forces to Defeat, 126

4 Foreign Annexation of Yugoslavia 130 Italian Rule in the Annexed Part of Dalmatia, 130 Italian and German Occupation of Montenegro, 138 Italian-Albanian Rule in Kosovo and Western Macedonia, 148 Bulgarian Rule in Parts of Macedonia and Serbia, 156 Hungarian Rule in Parts of Yugoslav Territory, 168

5 The Puppet Government of Serbia 175 The Establishment and Reorganization of the Puppet Government, 177 German Auxiliary Forces in Serbia, 186 The Bulgarian Army in Serbia, 195 The Special Occupation Regime in the Banat, 201 The Difficulties of the Nedi¢ Government, 209 The Serbian Political Parties During the War, 228

Quasi Protectorate 2.33

6 The Independent State of Croatia: An Italian-German

The Italian-Croatian Treaties of Rome of May 18, 1941, 234 German-Italian-Croatian Relations, 241 Italian Rule in Croatia, 246 The Independent State of Croatia and International Law, 268 German Rule in Croatia, 274 The Italian Surrender, 294

Vi CONTENTS 7 The Independent State of Croatia: Under German Dominance 303 The German Role in Military Affairs, 303 The German Role in Political Affairs, 315 German Inconsistencies, Croatian Grievances, 323 Approaching the End, 328

8 The Independent State of Croatia: Internal Problems and Policies 335 The Ustasha Program and Party, 336 The Ustashas as a Political Group, 342 The Narrow Popular Base of the Ustasha Regime, 3 51 The Croatian Peasant Party During the War, 356 The Ustasha Regime and the Roman Catholic Church, 368 The Ustashas Convoke the Croatian Diet, 372 Croatian “Ethnic and Historical Territory,” 376

and Terror 380

9 The Independent State of Croatia: The Rule of Lawlessness

The Political and “Legal” Foundations of Lawlessness and Terror, 380 The Ustashas’ Case Against the Serbs West of the Drina River, 387 The Mass Expulsion of Serbs, 392 The Mass Killing of Serbs, 397 Other Population Shifts, 409 Ustasha Terror Engenders Armed Resistance, 412

to. The Armed Forces of the Independent State of Croatia 416 Formation and Organization, 416 The Weaknesses of the Army, 424 Conflicts Between the Army and the Ustashas, 434 The Removal of the Kvaterniks, 439 Croatian Peasant Party Plans for the Army, 442 The Unification of the Army and the Ustasha Militia, 456

11 The Independent State of Croatia: The Bosnian Muslims 466 Historical Background, 468 The Bosnian Muslims in the Independent State of Croatia, 488

12 The Churches During the Occupation and Revolution 511 The Serbian Orthodox Church, 511 The Catholic Church in Slovenia, 517 The Catholic Church in the Independent State of Croatia, 522 The Killing of Priests Throughout Yugoslavia, 568 Conclusion, 575 Appendix: Was the Archbishop’s May 1943 Report

to the Pope Genuine?, 576

13 The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Yugoslavia 580 Introduction, 580 The Destruction of Jews Outside the Ustasha State, 585 The Destruction of Jews in the Independent State of Croatia, 592 Jews in the Yugoslav Partisan Forces, 605 Conclusion, 606 Appendix: The Destruction of the Yugoslav Gypsies, 608

14 Axis Exploitation of the Yugoslav Economy: Part I , 611 Yugoslavia’s Economic Relations Before the War, 611 German Control of the Wartime Economy, 617. Economic Components Exploited by Germany, 623 Italy’s Share of Yugoslav Economic Spoils, 660

CONTENTS Vil 15 Axis Exploitation of the Yugoslav Economy: Part II 665 Payments for Axis Military Forces, 665 Foreign Economic Relations as an Instrument of Exploitation, 684 Conclusion, 696

16 Further Economic Consequences of War and Exploitation 699 Inflation in Serbia and Croatia, 699 Fiscal Policies in Serbia and Croatia, 706 The Food Economy in Serbia and Croatia, 707 The Country’s Material Losses at War’s End, 714

17 Alleged and True Population Losses 718 Exaggerated Claims of Losses, 720 Scholarly Research, 729 The Reasons for Exaggerated Claims, 739 The Reasons for Excessive Human and Material Losses, 744

18 The End of the Collaborationist Regimes in Yugoslavia 751 The Final Days of the Ustasha Forces, 751 The Deterioration and End of the Legionnaire Divisions, 768 The End of the Slovene Collaborationist Forces, 771 The Fate of Some Nedi¢ and Chetnik Forces, 775 Concluding Observations on the Independent State of Croatia, 778

Index 821

Bibliography 789

eee

Maps and Tables

MAPS

1. The Partition of Yugoslavia, 1941 | 62

2. The Partition of Slovenia, 1941 , 84

3. Occupied Serbia, 1941-1944 176

4. The Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945 236

Herzegovina, 1931 480

5. The Confessionally Intermixed Population of Bosnia and

6. Concentration Camps for Jews in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945 584 7. Important Communication Lines in Wartime Yugoslavia 628

8. Mineral Resources in Wartime Yugoslavia 634 TABLES

1. Army Corps and Divisions of the Croatian Armed Forces, Late

December 1944/Early January 1945 459

Killed, 1941-1945 572

2. Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Roman Catholic Bishops and Priests 3. Jews in Yugoslavia: Membership in Religious Communities, 19391940, by Political Units Established in April 1941, and Distribution

by Historical Province, 1941 583

4. The Jewish Population in Yugoslavia, 1941, and Jewish Losses,

1941-1945, by Historical Province , 607

5. Nonferrous Metal Shipments to the Greater Reich from Serbia and

Bulgarian-Annexed Yugoslav Areas, 1942—-August 1944 639 6. Deliveries of Industrial Products to the Military Economic and Armaments Office from Southeast European Countries, June 1941; by Six-Month Period, July-December 1941 to January-June 1944;

and July 1944 645

7. Monthly Occupation Costs Paid by Serbia to Germany, April 15,

1941-September 30, 1944 667

1944/April 1945 704

8. Wholesale and Retail Prices in Zagreb, April 1941-December

9. Estimated Demographic and Real Loss of Population in Yugoslavia,

1941-1945, by Socialist Republic and Nationality 738

en Preface

This is the second volume of my three-volume study on war and revolution in Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1945. It is organized around the complementary themes of occupation and collaboration, and comes after the first volume, which dealt with the Chetniks, and before the third volume, which will be devoted to the Partisans. All the actors and events described here shared three common circumstances. First, all events took place within Yugoslav territory during the Second World War. Second, all the forces discussed here—foreign and domestic—were opposed to Yugoslavia as a common state of South Slavic peoples, or at least accepted its partition. As I noted in the preface to the first volume, the attitude of various domestic forces toward the existence of the Yugoslav state has provided the organizing rationale for this entire study. And third, everything described here occurred against the backdrop of Nazi Ger-

many, which held sway over the whole of southeast Europe and directed, shielded, and exploited it. Fascist Italy was an additional element of the foreign backdrop until its surrender in September 1943, when Germany stepped into the breach and took over all earlier Italian-controlled areas in the Balkans and that part of Italy not yet in Allied hands. Occupation by conquering peoples and collaboration (or cooperation) with them have been a familiar part of the history of all South Slavic nations for centuries. This is because of their small size in comparison to their neighbors, and because of their geopolitical location on the Balkan Peninsula, astride the paths of expansion of large empires, great religions, and competing cultures and ideologies. There were always strong and weak forces, victors and vanquished,

and collaboration under conditions of occupation was a way for those who were conquered to survive in, adjust to, or even profit from the given circumstances.

The principal reasons for collaboration in Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1945 can be traced to the national and religious composition of the first Yugoslav state in 1918 and the way it was governed in the interwar period. Because of the new state’s eminently multinational and multiconfessional character—it con-

sisted of historically well-defined national units with different backgrounds

xX PREFACE and competing religious traditions, which had never before been under one po-

litical system—a federally organized state would have been its appropriate form. Disregarding historical and political logic, however, the Serbs from the outset ruled as the dominant nation. This engendered resentment and opposition among the Croats; a pro-Bulgarian stance among some Macedonians, who were not recognized as a separate nation; and a desire for union with the mother country among many of the large and small national minorities (Albanians, Germans, Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, and Italians). The dissatisfaction of the separate nations and national minorities, the historical legacy of competing churches and religious communities, and the competition among European powers for territory and influence in the Balkans, undermined what little

political cohesion was achieved. Under such circumstances, collaboration during the short War of April 1941 and the occupation that followed was bound to occur, take many forms, and be marked by many despicable features. I begin by briefly describing the establishment of Yugoslavia in 1918 and its internal policies during the interwar period, which created great political instability and fostered a political emigration that worked against the territorial integrity of the country from without. Then I deal with the breakup of the state in April 1941, the annexation or occupation of parts of its territory by its neighbors, and the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia as a German-

Italian quasi protectorate, together with its policies and the problem of the Bosnian Muslims. Next I turn to the role of the churches during the occupation, the destruction of the Yugoslav Jewish community, and the economic exploitation of Yugoslav territory by the Axis powers, especially Germany. I conclude with a discussion of the wartime population losses of the country and the fate of the collaborationist forces. At the end of the war, the pre-1941 boundaries of the states of southeast Europe were restored, with some later important territorial adjustments in favor of Yugoslavia. But a fundamental political change had occurred: the Soviet Union had become the dominant superpower in the region, except in Greece. Two important issues not dealt with fully here, though they were an integral part of the Axis presence in Yugoslavia and of the collaborationist regimes, are wartime military operations and, as a complement to them, the systematic use of mass terror against the civilian population. They are reserved for a fuller discussion in the volume on the Partisans. This is because most military operations

in Yugoslavia during the war were undertaken by the Partisans or directed against them, and because a great deal of mass terror was used against the Partisans and their sympathizers or practiced by the Partisans themselves. However, I do briefly describe military operations when they are needed to explain other topics under discussion. And I discuss quite fully the use of mass terror as an element of the political program of the collaborationist regimes and groups

against their respective domestic enemies and rivals. The bloody confrontations among the various nations, national minorities,

PREFACE X1 and religious groups in Yugoslavia during the war often had their roots in antagonisms that reached deep into the past. Consequently, I have also provided historical discussion when it was necessary for an understanding of wartime events. It should be noted that in this volume I discuss only openly collaborationist

regimes and groups in various parts of the country. This does not include the Serbian Chetniks of General Draza Mihailovi¢. As shown in the first volume of this study, the Chetniks started as a resistance group against the Axis powers. But once they realized that the Partisans were Communist-led and their chief competitors for power after the war, they become a collaborationist force with

the Axis against the Partisans. Their double role was unique in occupied Europe.

My purpose here is to present a general picture of the development and policies of the occupation systems and collaborationist forces in Yugoslavia during the Second World War. I include a great amount of detail, partly for reasons of completeness and partly for the light that it throws on the main events that I am trying to reconstruct and explain.

The topics dealt with in the volume on the Chetniks as well as those reserved for the final volume on the Partisans have been intensively studied and written about—though to my mind not satisfactorily, nor with sufficient objectivity—both in Yugoslavia and elsewhere during the past fifty years. The topics analyzed here, however, have for the most part received much less attention in Yugoslavia, and, with few exceptions, very limited attention outside it. If anything, the events presented here are even more controversial and emotion-laden than those dealing with the Chetniks and the Partisans. In particular, very little writing in Yugoslavia has been devoted to the economic contribution of the country to the Axis, and especially German, war machine, that is, to the exploitation of the Yugoslav state and population by the Axis powers for their respective war economies. And these matters have never been touched upon by Yugoslav political émigrés. Consequently, I felt impelled to fill this gap as far as possible within the scope of this study. All the historical literature on the Second World War, both from Yugoslavia and from Yugoslav political émigrés, shows distinctive biases and, on certain topics, gross omissions. Mass terror is a good example. In Yugoslavia until the early 1980’s, almost nothing was written about Partisan terror, while a great deal was written about German, Ustasha, and Chetnik terror. In a similar fashion, Croatian political exiles with Ustasha leanings have written very little about Ustasha terror, but very much about Partisan and Chetnik terror. And Serbian exiles have written only about Ustasha and Partisan terror. The collaboration of various domestic groups with the occupation forces is another delicate issue that has produced very biased writing. While self-serving writing by the various parties is quite understandable, it does not help establish historical truth, but only distorts it for ulterior purposes.

XII PREFACE _ My chief sources of information were captured German and Italian wartime documents available on microfilm; published collections of Yugoslav, - German, and Italian documents; and unpublished wartime Yugoslav, British, American, and German documents available in various depositories in Yugoslavia, Great Britain, the United States, and Germany. I am grateful for the help with microfilmed and xeroxed documents that I obtained from the following institutions: the United States National Archives, Washington, DC; the Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California; the Public Record Office, London; the Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg i. Br. and the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Germany; and the archives of the Institute of Military History, Belgrade, the National and University Library, Zagreb, the Institute for the History of the Workers’ Movement of Croatia, Zagreb, and the Institute for the History of the

, Workers’ Movement of Slovenia, Ljubljana. All my efforts to obtain additional documents from the Vatican and the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy in Yugoslavia, beyond those already published by them and by authors with spe-

cial connections to them, were fruitless.

Students of the German side of the war are well aware of the huge gaps that exist in German wartime documents, especially those relating to the last six to

eight months of the conflict. As early as September 1944 German military authorities issued orders for the destruction of many confidential files, with the

result that one rarely finds important German documents dated later than January 31, 1945. The only German documents that I was able to find for the period from January to May 1945 concerning activities in southeast Europe are deposited in the archives of the Institute of Military History in Belgrade or in

the archives of the Institute for the History of the Workers’ Movement of Slovenia in Ljubljana. On the other hand, Yugoslav and British documents on Operations in southeast and central Europe during that period and from the first few months after the war are available in large numbers. Documents on some sensitive problems, particularly Yugoslav documents on the mass liquidation of captured collaborationist forces by the Communists at the end of the war, have not yet been released. Some of them have reportedly been destroyed. Very large gaps also exist in the documents of the Independent State of Croatia, especially those dealing with the Ustasha movement and the Ustasha government. A high Catholic Church dignitary in Zagreb told me in July 1967 that during the last two or three weeks before the Ustasha government fled Zagreb in early May 1945, the whole city reeked of burning papers. Not only government and Ustasha Party offices, but also the Kaptol (the seat of the archbishopric), were burning documents. And according to an eyewitness, a large part of the files of the Croatian General Staff taken to Austria with the fleeing Ustasha government were burned there when Ustasha forces were forced to surrender to the Partisans. Since about half of this volume deals with the Independent State of Croatia, I endeavored to consult all of the wartime and postwar writings of its political

PREFACE XI and military leaders who escaped to the West at the end of the war. Unfortunately, very few of the latter have felt duty bound to give an account of their wartime activities or to present in a reasonably realistic and objective way the record and major policies of that state. The writings of these men, as a rule of a self-serving nature, will be noted in the appropriate places. All of these former high Ustasha dignitaries and generals, as well as scores of former Ustasha and pro-Ustasha Clericalist and Frankist intellectuals who fled to the West in the closing stages of the war, seem to believe that the less that is written about the Independent State of Croatia and the Ustasha movement, the better. But one topic on which they have chosen to write extensively is the end of the Ustasha state in May 1945, with the attendant surrender of its forces and accompanying refugees to the Partisans and their subsequent liquidation. Although my personal collection of source material gathered over a period

of more than five decades was the principal foundation for this work, I also used to great advantage the collections of the Hoover Institution and the Green Library at Stanford University and the collections in the libraries of San Francisco State University and the University of California at Berkeley. I express my

sincere thanks to the staffs of these institutions. I also thank those personal friends and colleagues in this country and abroad who helped me with rare literature and documents from their personal collections.

Some of my information came from interviews or correspondence with people in Yugoslavia, Great Britain, the United States, Argentina, and Australia. Whenever I am free to do so I identify these sources in the text, and both to those whom I identify and to others who prefer to remain anonymous, I express my sincere thanks.

A number of friends have read parts or all of the manuscript at various stages and made many constructive comments and suggestions: Professor Ivo Banac of Yale University, the late Professor Robert F. Byrnes of Indiana University, the late Colonel Vojmir Kljakovié of the Institute of Military History in Belgrade, Professor Barisa Kreki¢ of the University of California at Los Angeles, and the late Dr. Ante Smith Paveli¢ of the pre-1945 Yugoslav diplomatic corps. Their recommendations have greatly improved my study, and to all I express my sincere gratitude. I have also benefited from the comments of Phyllis Auty, the late Jozo Bajurin, Dusan Biber, Dusan Bilandzi¢, Ljubo Boban, F. W. Deakin, Tone Ferenc, the late Ivan and Fikreta Jeli¢-Butic, Svetolik Lazarevic¢, Ivo Perisin, Stanislav Rapotec, the late Bojan Ribnikar, Vladimir Stipeti¢, and Ivo Vucicevic. I alone, however, bear full responsibility for the final text. The editing of the manuscript was done primarily by Shirley Taylor, with some additional aid from my daughter Neda Ann. The maps were prepared by Bill Nelson. The typing was done by Mary H. Johnson. To all of them I express my sincere thanks. I also express my thanks to Stanford University Press and its former associate director and editor, J. G. Bell, who throughout gave me the benefit of his expert editorial knowledge.

X1V PREFACE I am grateful to the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council for grants-in-aid that helped to cover expenses in connection with the last phases of work on this volume. For general support and understanding, I thank my whole family, but espe-

cially myOO wife Neda. , a | . Jozo Tomasevich POSTSCRIPT TO THE PREFACE

Jozo Tomasevich, my father, died on October 15, 1994. This manuscript was almost completed at his death. Since then, I have put it on computer, polished the final drafts of the last three chapters, and edited the whole to make it easy to read and stylisticaily consistent. The text is entirely his; I have added at the most a sentence or two needed for transition from one section to another. , I would like to thank Norris Pope, the director of Stanford University Press, for supporting my efforts to bring this manuscript to publication. I would also like to thank the late Professor Robert F. Byrnes of Indiana for his unfailing encouragement of and assistance in this work. Finally, my mother has provided the economic wherewithal and the workspace to complete this project, and without these and her loving support and commitment, it would not have been

brought to completion. , | , , Neda A. Tomasevich July 2000

Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Materials

te ee

Brzopisni zapisnict Croatia, Independent State of. Brzopisni zapisnici Prvog zasjedanja Hrvatskog drzavnog sabora u Nezavisnoj Drézavi Hrvatskoj godine 1942. Zagreb, 1942.

DGFP United States, Department of State. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Series D, vols. 11-13. Washington, D.C., 1960-64.

Dokumenti o pro- Horvat, Joza, and Zdenko Stambuk, eds. Dokumenti o protunarodnom radu tunarodnom radu i zlocinima jednog dijela katolickog klera. Zagreb, 1946.

F.O. __ United Kingdom, Foreign Office. __. Greueltaten Croatia, Independent State of, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Greueltaten und Verwiistungen der Aufrithrer im Unabhangigen Staate Kroatien in den ersten Lebensmonaten des kroatischen Nationalstaates. Zagreb, June 1942.

Hronologija 1941-1945 Yugoslavia, F. P. R. of, Vojnoistorijski institut. Hronologija oslobodilacke borbe naroda Jugoslavije, 1941-1945. Belgrade, 1964.

Kriegstagebuch Germany, Wehrmacht, Oberkommando. Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Webhrmachtfiibrungsstab), 1940-1945. 4 vols. in 7 pts. Frankfurt am Main, 1961-65. Micr.__, Roll__, Fr.__ — United States, National Archives. Microcopy __, Roll __, Frame _.

Naprijed 19.43 Communist Party of Croatia. Dokumenti historije Komunisticke partije Hrvatske. Vol. 3, bk. 1, Naprijed 1943. Reprint, Zagreb, 1951. Narodnoosvobodilna Yugoslavia, F. P. R. of, Military History Institute of the Yugo-

vojna slav People’s Army and the Institute for Historical Events in Ljubljana. Narodnoosvobodilna vojna na Slovenskem, 1941-1945. Zdravko Klanjs¢ek, ed. 2nd ed. Ljubljana, 1977.

“Neuhausen |” United States, National Archives. Microcopy No. T-120, Roll 5796. “Bericht des Generalbevollmachtigten fiir die Wirtschaft in Serbien tiber die Zeit von Mitte April bis Ende Juli 1941.”

XVl ABBREVIATIONS , “Neuhausen II” United States, National Archives. Microcopy No. T-75, Roll 69. “Zweiter Gesamtbericht des Generalbevollmachtigten fiir die Wirtschaft in Serbien, Juli 1942.”

“Neuhausen III” United States, National Archives. Microcopy No. T-501, Roll 260, Frames 320-417. “Die Wirtschaftslage im Bereich des Kommandierenden Generals und Befehlshabers in Serbien” [March 16, 1944].

Proces proti Rupniku Yugoslavia, F. P. R. of, [People’s Republic of Slovenia]. Proces proti vojnim zlocincem in izdajalcem Rupniku, Rosenerju, Rogmanu, Kreku, Vizjaku, in Hacinu. Ljubljana, 1946.

Proleter Reprint Yugoslavia, F. P. R. of, Institute for the Study of the Workers’ Movement. Proleter: organ Centralnog komiteta Komunisticke partije Jugoslavije, 1929-1942. Reprint, Belgrade, 1968.

Ouellen Ferenc, Tone, ed. Quellen zur nationalsozialistischen Entnationalisierungspolitik in Slowenien, 1941-1945. Maribor, 1980.

RG __ United States, National Archives. Record Group __. | Das Schicksal der Deut- Germany, Federal Republic of, Bundesministerium fiir Verschen in Jugoslawien triebene, Fliichtlinge und Kriegsgeschadigte. Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa. Vol. 5, Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien. Dusseldorf, 1961.

Sudjenje... Stepincu Stanié, Milan, ed. Sudjenje Lisaku, Stepincu, Salicu i druzini, Ustasko-Krizarskim zlocincima i njibovim pomagacima. Zagreb, 1946.

W.O. __ United Kingdom, War Office. __. YA, Mil. Hist. Yugoslavia. Archives of the Institute of Military History, Belgrade.

—~Commission on —Documents of Commission for Ascertainment of

Crimes Crimes... by Occupiers and Their Helpers —Croatia Docs. —Independent State of Croatia Documents —Enemy Units —Documents of Enemy Units

—German Docs. —German Documents

—Nat’l. Lib. War —Documents of National Liberation War —Nedi¢ Govt. Docs. —Nedi¢ Government Documents YA, Wkrs. Mvmt., Yugoslavia. Archives of the Institute for the History of the

Com. Party. Workers’ Movement of Croatia. Communist Party Documents.

ZAVNOH dokumenti Yugoslavia, F. P. R. of, Institute for the History of the Work-

1943 [1944] ers’ Movement of Croatia. Zemaljsko antifasisticko vijece narodnog oslobodjenja Hrvatske. Zbornik dokumenata, 1943. Zagreb, 1964. Zbornik dokumenata, 1944. Zagreb, 1970.

Zbornik DNOR Yugoslavia, F. P. R. of, Vojnoistorijski institut. Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilaékom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda. 1§ vols. in over 173 bks. to date. Belgrade, 1949-.

ABBREVIATIONS XVI Zbornik zakonainare- Croatia, Independent State of, Ministry of Justice and Relidaba NDH, 1941 [1942, gion. Zbornik zakona i naredaba Nezavisne Drzave Hrvat-

1943,1944] ske.

1941. Zagreb, 1942. 1942. 2 vols., consecutively paginated. Zagreb, 1942. 1943. Zagreb, 1943. 1944. Zagreb, 1944.

BLANK AGI

War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945

Occupation and Collaboration

BLANK. 2 AGE ls

CHAPTER I

esp

Yugoslavia Between the Wars

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929, was established on December 1, 1918. It united the Kingdom of Serbia, which a few days earlier had joined with the Kingdom of Montenegro, and the one-month-old State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, whose peoples up to that time had lived under the newly defunct Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The new kingdom included five different nations: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. The latter two were not recognized as separate nations in the new state, but were claimed by Serbs as Serbs. These five peoples lived in six historically fairly well defined contiguous territorial units:

Serbia, Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, and two areas historically not well defined, Slovenia and Vojvodina. All these territorial areas and their peoples had quite different histories and had never before lived within the same state. Furthermore, with the exception of Serbia and Slovenia, their populations were nationally and confessionally intermixed. In addition to the five nations, the new state also had many national minori-

ties. Germans, Hungarians, Albanians, and Turks were the most important. Italians, Romanians, Gypsies, and Ruthenes, as well as several other minorities, were also present, though in smaller numbers. Conversely, close to half a million Croats and Slovenes lived in territory that went to Italy after 1918, and a small Slovene minority lived in part of Carinthia, which remained under Austria. The new state was also multiconfessional. Serbs, Montenegrins, and Mac-

edonians were Eastern Orthodox; Croats, Slovenes, and most Germans and Hungarians were Roman Catholic. More than one-third of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina were Muslims of South Slavic blood, while the Muslims of the Kosovo region were Albanians and those of Macedonia were either Albanians or Turks. Finally, the various geographical parts of the new kingdom exhibited very uneven levels of economic and educational development, the whole representing economically a complex case of the North-South syndrome.

2 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS The new Yugoslav state arose on the ruins of two old multinational empires, the Ottoman and the Habsburg. By 1912, the Ottoman Empire, after a long period of decline, retained only a toehold in the eastern Balkans, but the Habsburg Monarchy appeared strong and was determined to expand southward toward Salonika. The two dominant nations of the monarchy, the Austrians and the Hungarians, often pursued policies that totally disregarded the legitimate interests of the other constituent nations, which were discriminated against in many ways on the political, economic, and cultural planes. With the spread of the ideas of nationalism and democracy from the time of the Napoleonic wars, the opposition of Croats, Czechs, Poles, Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks, and Slovenes to their subordinate position in the monarchy gradually grew to undermine its very foundations. This was so even though certain groups in all these nations, such as government officials, military personnel, and a part of the bourgeoisie, were loyal to the monarchy. The introduction of

| dualism in 1867 largely removed the difficulties between Austria and Hungary, but it failed to improve the position of the other nations in the two halves of the monarchy to any appreciable extent. Major difficulties also remained between Hungary and Croatia even after the conclusion of their own accord in 1868. Both as a protest and a defense against Germanization and later Magyarization, Illyrianism arose among Croats in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. It originally developed as part of the Croatian national renaissance,

that is, in the process of cultural identification and the building of a national consciousness among Croats. Illyrianism subsequently served as the basis for Yugoslavism, whose adherents advocated a common Yugoslav state of all South Slavs, including Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes in the Habsburg Monarchy, as well as Serbs in Serbia, Montenegrins in Montenegro, and according to some extreme advocates even Bulgarians. In such a state, free from foreign domination, all South Slavs would enjoy full freedom and equality.’

But other nations had alternative plans for the unification of the South Slavs. In 1844, Ilija GaraSanin, a Serbian minister, formulated the Nacertanije, a proposal for a South Slavic state that Serbia would lead and dominate.’ The 'Of the many individuals involved in the development of the Illyrian and Yugoslav ideas, I will mention only two: Ljudevit Gaj and Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer. The Yugoslav idea evolved over time and meant different things to different people. I am not aware of a study that treats the matter satisfactorily. See, however, V. Novak, Antologija jugoslovenske misli, and Sisi¢, Jugoslovenska misao. While the literature on various aspects of Yugoslav politics and ideology since the establishment of the Yugoslav state in December 1918 is voluminous, there is no meritorious study of the failure of the Yugoslav idea as an operative political program. During the interwar period, it was used by the Serbian-dominated regime in Yugoslavia as a cloak for Greater Serbianism and consequently became totally discredited. The Yugoslav idea was redefined and revitalized and successfully used by the Yugoslav Communists during the war and revolution, but again became largely discredited after 1945. Banac’s book The National Question is a very successful first step in the critical analysis of the Yugoslav idea and the national question in Yugoslavia in general. For the text of the Nacertanije, see V. Novak, Antologija jugoslovenske misli, pp. 101-3.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 3 nineteenth-century Serbian ethnographer and lexicographer Vuk Stefanovié Karadzi¢c lent support to this approach by claiming that all Croats who spoke the Stokavian dialect—the majority—were in fact Serbs.’ In reaction both to Illyrianism and later Yugoslavism and to Greater Serbi-

anism, as well as to the severe Austrian absolutism of the 1850's, pure Croatism arose in Croatia in the 1850’s and 1860’s. Its author was a disappointed former Illyrianist, Ante Starcevic, a theologian and philosopher who worked as a writer, newspaperman, politician, and political ideologist. Staréevic’s ideology had two basic tenets, one defining the name and geographical extent of the Croatian people and the other the political content he sought. First, he rejected all other terms such as “Illyrian” or “Yugoslav” and insisted on the name “Croatian” for his people. Disregarding both historical and political facts, he also claimed that there were only two South Slavic nations, the Bulgarians and the Croats. For him, Croatia included all the territory from the Alps in the north to Macedonia and the Bulgarian border in the south. The Slovenes he called Alpine Croats and the Serbs he simply appropriated as Croats. Therefore, at the beginning of this century, some authors, such as the Serbian literary critic Jovan Skerli¢, claimed that under Croatism Star¢éevi¢c in

fact preached the ideology of Yugoslavism. Second, Starcevi¢ claimed that Croatia was only in personal union with Austria and because this union was not serving Croatian national interests, Croatia should be free and independent. Consequently, he was vehemently anti-Austrian and anti-Habsburg, as well as anti- Hungarian, though he never advocated the use of force against the existing order. He based his claim for independence on Croatian state right, evidenced by such facts as the election of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria as Croatian king in 1527. There was only one Croatian state right and it belonged to the Croatian people. This concept became the central constituent of his whole ideology and of the political party he founded, the Croatian Party of [State] Right. In fact, after Starcevi¢, this concept became the central element of every Croatian national ideology. In the polemics of the 1850's, Starcevic also coined a misleading term— “Slavoserb,” derived from the Latin words “sclavus” and “servus”—to denote persons ready to serve foreign rulers against their own people. He applied it to ’The Serbo-Croatian language, which includes both Croatian and Serbian, is linguistically one language. Three dialects are spoken by Croats—the stokavian, kajkavian, and ¢akavian—depending on the form of the word what—that is, Sto, kaj, and ¢a—that is used. In the 1830's, Stokavian became the literary language, and it is spoken by a majority of Croats and all Serbs. Many people claim that Croatian is linguistically different from Serbian, but others disagree. The language policy in both royal and Communist Yugoslavia went against Croatian interests, greatly exacerbating the Croat-Serb problem. As a result, many Croats and Serbs emphasize the differences between the Croatian (western) and Serbian (eastern) variants of the language. In time, two different literary languages, Croatian and Serbian, may develop. On the influence of language on the development of nationalism among the South Slavic nations, see Banac, The National Question, pp. 77-78, 210-11.

4 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS such well-known Croats as Ljudevit Gaj and later Bishop Strossmayer and Ban Ivan Mazuranic¢, as well as to some Serbs. His ardent anti-Serbian followers later stretched the term to include the whole Serbian nation, although according to Starcevic, the Serbs were in fact Croats.‘ _ Despite his many exaggerations, inconsistencies, and gross mistakes of fact,

Starcevi¢ was by far the most important political thinker and ideologist in Croatia during the second half of the nineteenth century and contributed more than anyone else to the rise of national consciousness in the modern Croatian state. His influence on Croatian nationalists is strong even today. Toward the end of Staréevic’s life (in 1896), a split occurred in the Party of Right. Its chief offshoot, the Pure Party of Right, which until 1911 was headed

by Josip Frank, a Jew born and baptized in Croatia but of German cultural background, completely renounced Starcevi¢’s anti-Austrian and anti-Hungarian stance and became an instrument of Austrian and occasionally Hungarian anti-Croatian policies. The Austrians and Hungarians followed a policy of “divide and rule” in Croatia, attempting to divide the Croats among themselves and especially the Croats from the Croatian Serbs, and Frank was in their service. His party became extremely anti-Serbian and anti- Yugoslav.’ On the Croatian political scene, Frank’s followers, the Frankists (Frankovci), vehemently opposed any collaboration with the Serbs and therefore any common state of South Slavs. Their name and ideology lasted until the Second World War, when

they were gradually displaced by the Ustashas, who with respect to antiSerbian and anti- Yugoslav ideology were their true heirs. , In spite of the existence of exclusively Serbian and Croatian nationalist ideologies, however, the idea of a broader, more nationally inclusive Yugoslav state persisted and spread. It became the preoccupation of various political organizations in the South Slavic parts of the Dual Monarchy, especially after the beginning of this century. In Serbia, too, various political parties and groups, as well as secret societies dominated by army officers, advocated and worked for a

common Yugoslav state, though of a Pan-Serbian character. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Young Bosnia society, made up of mostly Serbian but also some Croatian and Muslim youths, was especially prominent. Terror became one of its modes of operation. With the success of Serbian forces in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the prestige of Serbia among many Croats and especially among the Serbs of the Dual Monarchy greatly increased. Serbia was thus cast ‘For Star¢evi¢’s multifaceted personality, activities, ideas, and writings, and his influence

on Croatian political ideas and politics during his life (1823-96), see Bogdanov, Historija politiékih stranaka, pp. 729-68; Ladan’s foreword to his selection of Staréevi¢’s political writings, Politicki spisi, pp. 7-75; Gross, Povijest pravaske ideologije, pp. 1-8; and Banac,

The National Question, pp. 85-89. | *‘Bogdanov, Historija politickih stranaka, pp. 760-66; Gross, Povijest pravaske ideologija, especially pp. 337-66.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 5 in the role of the Yugoslav Piedmont, that is, as the strongest force working toward the unification of all South Slavs into one state. Authorities in the Dual Monarchy were aware of these developments within their territories as well as in Serbia. Some officials in Austria, Hungary, and especially Croatia contemplated a reorganization of the monarchy, in which the

South Slavic lands would form a third unit equal with Austria and Hungary. But states, especially old empires, do not undertake basic organizational changes except in response to great crises. Thus the Dual Monarchy continued on its way, disregarding the justified aspirations of its many dissatisfied nationalities. On the other hand, the pro-Yugoslav nationalist forces in the South Slavic lands of the Dual Monarchy and the pro-Greater Serbian nationalist forces in Serbia steadily gathered strength. With a view to promoting the cause of South Slavic unity, members of the Young Bosnia society, with assistance from secret societies of military officers

in Serbia, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the AustroHungarian throne, in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. This gave Austria-Hungary the opportunity it had been looking for. When its demeaning ultimatum to Serbia was not unconditionally accepted, it declared war on the small state. Austro-Hungarian authorities thought that they were undertaking only a brief punitive action, but their move quickly drew in the other European powers and became the opening salvo of the First World War. From the beginning, however, Serbia viewed the conflict in different terms. The Serbian government, which was unable to maintain itself in Belgrade and had temporarily relocated to Nis, submitted a declaration to the National Assembly on December 7, 1914, asserting that “the royal government considers as its foremost, and in these fateful moments the only, task to secure a successful conclusion of this great war, which from the moment it started had also become a struggle for the liberation and unification of all our subjugated brother Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.” The declaration was adopted with jubilation.® In the course of the First World War, many politicians and prominent artists and scientists from the dissatisfied nations of the Dual Monarchy who were abroad organized political committees in the Allied world. These committees

embarked, first, on a propaganda and lobbying campaign against the Habsburg Monarchy and for the liberation of their respective nations and, second, on a campaign to organize volunteer units of prisoners of war from AustriaHungary in Russia and Italy and of emigrants in the overseas countries to fight against the Central Powers. Thus, similar to the committees established by representatives of the Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles, representatives of the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes from areas in the Dual Monarchy established the Yugoslav Committee (Jugoslavenski odbor) on April 30, 1915, under the leadership of ‘Sisi¢, Dokumenti, p. Lo.

6 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS Ante Trumbic, a Croatian politician from Dalmatia. The committee received both financial and political help from the Serbian government and was active in mobilizing public opinion in England, France, Imperial Russia, and the United States in favor of a common South Slavic state after the war. In overseas countries it also mobilized support among the many emigrants from the South Slavic areas of the Dual Monarchy. On July 20, 1917, the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government, at that time in exile on the Greek island of Corfu, issued the Corfu Declaration, a statement of common political aims whose basic objective was the establishment of a unified state under the Karadjordjevié dynasty embracing all South Slavic nations except the Bulgarians.’ While Serbia struggled to attain its maximum war objectives as laid out in the Nis declaration of December 1914 and the Yugoslav Committee worked in the Allied world for a South Slavic state after the war—both of them assuming that the Habsburg Monarchy would be defeated and disintegrate—the polliticians in the Croatian Diet remained completely loyal to Austria-Hungary. For

most of the war they were confident that it would survive and be victorious. This view was buttressed by the fact that the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire was not among Allied war objectives. After mid-1917, some voices from the opposition began to argue that at the end of the war a revision of the constitutional setup of the monarchy in a trialist mode should be made or that at least the Hungarian-Croatian Accord of 1868 should be revised. Soon afterwards there were also isolated calls for the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs of the monarchy to form an independent state of their own. As the collapse of the monarchy became more certain, such demands became more pronounced and acquired

more and more supporters.” |

This gradual change in the opinion of Croatian Diet members was closely related to the worsening military position of the Central Powers, especially the Dual Monarchy. Tiring of the war and influenced by domestic and foreign antimonarchy propaganda and then by revolutionary ideas coming from Russia, Austro-Hungarian soldiers of South Slavic nationalities on the Russian and Italian fronts began to desert en masse. During the last months of the war largescale desertions and the formation of “green cadres” occurred, as well as the | widespread refusal of soldiers to return to their units from regular leave. Com_ bined with growing antimonarchy feeling and political activity among the nonAustrian and non-Hungarian nationalities of the Dual Monarchy, these developments steadily weakened the monarchy’s ability to successfully prosecute the war. Conversely, the opposing countries were able to mobilize a sizable number of prisoners of war from Austria-Hungary to help fight the Central Powers.’ _ 7A huge literature exists on the activities of the Yugoslav Committee during the First World War. For a brief orientation, consult Sepi¢, “Croatian Politics,” pp. 373-404, with its valuable historiographical review on pp. 405-16.

*Krizman, “Political Parties,” pp. 375-90. } |

°A division of 18,000 volunteers was formed from Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war of

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 7 Toward the end of the war, the political representatives of different Slavic nations in the Dual Monarchy formed national councils to articulate their political objectives. On March 2-3, 1918, in Zagreb, a group of Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene politicians from the South Slavic parts of Austria-Hungary

accepted a resolution demanding a concentration of political parties and groups that stood for the principles of national unity and self-determination and the establishment of an independent, democratically organized state of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. By the following fall, anticipating the imminent collapse of the Dual Monarchy and following the example of Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles, representatives of the South Slavic political parties and groups established the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs on October 5-6, 1918, in Zagreb with the same objectives proclaimed at the March meeting. On October 11, the largest political group in Croatia-Slavonia, the CroatianSerbian Coalition, which had a majority in the Croatian Diet, joined the National Council and obtained a majority in it. On October 16, 1918, Emperor Karl of Austria-Hungary declared that all peoples of the monarchy would be able to satisfy their political objectives within the monarchy, which would be reorganized as a federal state. But the National Council rejected this declaration. Between October 17 and 19 it constituted itself a sovereign independent body and on October 19 declared that “from that moment on, on the basis of powers granted to it by all national political parties and groups, it was taking into its hands the conduct of national policy.” The National Council also formulated a series of fundamental demands, the principal one being for the unification of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs into a united sovereign state without regard to any provincial or state frontiers then in existence. After the government of Austria-Hungary asked for a separate peace on October 28, the Croatian Diet broke all ties with Austria and Hungary on October 29 and proclaimed Croatia-Slavonia with Rijeka (or Fiume, up to that time a corpus separatum in the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy) and Dalmatia an independent state, which “according to the modern principle of nationality South Slavic nationalities in Russia and sent to Dobruja in September 1916 to fight the Central Powers. It soon lost about half of its men. A Serbian Volunteer Corps of about 43,000 officers and men was formed from other South Slavic prisoners of war in Russia. But because, among other reasons, the Serbian commanders opposed designating the corps as a Yugoslav unit, it could not hold its troops. Its remaining manpower was sent by ship from Archangel via Great Britain and France to the Salonika front, where about 12,000 joined the Serbian forces. In addition, another 3 5,000 to 40,000 South Slavic prisoners of war in Russia participated in the Bolshevik revolution, with many individuals and units achieving great distinction. Italy allowed Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war of South Slavic nationalities to form volunteer units for the Salonika front only after the breakthrough there in September 1918, so that only a contingent of 235 officers and 80 men eventually arrived, most after the war had

ended. A battalion of about 1,000 volunteers from Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war fought with the Italian forces against Austria-Hungary. About 11,000 volunteers from South Slavic immigrants in the United States and Canada also went to the Salonika front. Yugoslavia, Vojna enciklopedija, 2nd ed., 2: 496-97.

8 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS and on the basis of the national unity of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, enters into the common national sovereign State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs.” Thus as a

consequence of the military victory of the Allied powers and the internal actions of the subjugated nations, the Habsburg Monarchy disintegrated and the Habsburgs, rulers of Austria since 1282 and of Hungary and Croatia since 1527, passed from the scene. The Croatian Diet also decided that “the general Constituent Assembly of the entire unified nation of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs will decide with a qualified majority determined in advance, which completely protects against any domination, both the form of government and the internal organization of our state, founded on the complete equality of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs.” At the same meeting the Diet declared that it considered the statement of the National Council of October 19 binding on itself-and that it recognized the supreme power of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. On October 31, the National Council informed the Allied powers of the establishment of the new state and declared that it was ready to unite with the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, that it was not at war with the Allied powers but rather considered them friendly, and that it expected aid from them to ensure the sovereignty of the new state.” There is no doubt that the desire for a united state of all South Slavs was widespread in the South Slavic lands of the Dual Monarchy by the end of the war.'' The only question was whether the politicians in these areas and in Serbia—Montenegro played only a minor role—would be wise enough to carry out the unification in a historically and politically logical and intelligent manner or whether aggrandizing national proclivities and personal ambitions, a lack of appreciation for historical and political reality, short-term instead of long-term considerations, and naiveté or outright political blundering would spoil everything.

During November 1918, the National Council, as the government of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, debated how to proceed with unifying the new state with the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. While most members of the Council were for unification, opinions were strongly divided between those who wanted to achieve the fastest possible unification without any conditions and those who preferred a cautious approach with carefully defined safeguards for the rights of individual areas. The first group was impressed by the great military and diplomatic achievements of Serbia during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and the First World War and was eager to enter into a unified state 0Sisié, Dokumenti, pp. 170, 189-217, especially pp. 196, 198-201, 216-17. See also Sepic, “Croatian Politics,” pp. 396-400. "Under the influence of pro-Yugoslav propaganda and the general euphoria following the end of the First World War and the establishment of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, there was a great deal of talk about one Yugoslav nation with three nationalities— Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. This was naive thinking, because the three groups, although related, were three distinct nations, each with its own separate political and cultural history and national ethos.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 9 with it as soon as possible. This group used two arguments to support its views: the threat of Italian encroachment on Slovene and Croatian territory, which Great Britain, France, and Imperial Russia had promised to Italy by the secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, as an inducement to enter the war on the

Allied side, and the danger of a Bolshevik revolution. The most outspoken member of this group was Svetozar Pribicevi¢, a Serb from Croatia and a leading member of the Croatian Diet and the Croatian-Serbian Coalition. Through

his actions and influence over others, Pribicevic contributed more than any other politician from Croatia to the outright calamitous process by which the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs united with the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro to become the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes on December 1, 1918, the way in which the new state was run until 1925, and the exacerbation of relations between Serbs and Croats. The main representative of the other view was Stjepan Radic, the leader of the Croatian People’s Peasant Party, which had acquired new strength due to the political awakening of the Croatian peasantry.” During the formative years of the new state, Radi¢ changed his mind several times about the type of state organization the party would support. When the National Council in Zagreb debated the issue of unifying the new State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs with the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, he was in favor of unification, but in

a manner guaranteeing the organization of the unified state on truly federal principles. When the National Council proclaimed the unification on November 24, 1918, and adopted a directive for the delegation that would go to Belgrade to consummate the act of unification, Radi¢ had the foresight to predict the difficulties that would arise if the principles of federalism were not observed and if the Croatian Diet did not duly and with a qualified majority accept the

unification of the new state. But his warnings were not heeded.’ Although named a member of the delegation, he refused to go.

THE UNIFICATION ACT OF DECEMBER I, 1918, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF JUNE 28, 1921 The delegation of the National Council went to Belgrade to consummate the act of unification with Regent Alexander, who acted for the Serbian government. Because the delegates were not united, however, and above all because they lacked any power base, they were not able to ensure that the letter and spirit of the October 29 declaration from the Croatian Diet and the direc"The Croatian People’s Peasant Party was established in 1905 by the brothers Anton and Stjepan Radié¢, but it never achieved a large vote before 1920 because of the extremely restrictive election laws of the country. In the last prewar Croatian Diet, elected in December 1913, the party had only 3 out of 88 deputies. See Krizman, “Political Parties,” p. 375. '3For the National Council’s decision of November 24 on unification and its directive to

the delegation going to Belgrade, see Sisi¢, Dokumenti, pp. 255-56, 275-78. For Radic’s statements, see Kulundzi¢, Atentat na Stjepana Radiéa, pp. 84-88.

IO YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS tive from the National Council were strictly observed. Moreover, the Serbian army, at the invitation of the National Council in Zagreb and the National Council in Sarajevo, was already in possession of most of the new state’s territory. Pribi¢evi¢ was the person most responsible for the delegates not acting according to their instructions. Thus when Ante Paveli¢, the chairman of the delegation (not to be confused with the man of the same name who later became the leader of the Ustasha movement and the head of the Independent State of Croatia), addressed Regent Alexander, he simply announced that the National Council of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs had decided to unite the state with the Kingdom of Serbia under the Karadjordjevi¢ dynasty. He did not stipulate any conditions, although Point 1 of the National Council’s directive specified that a two-thirds majority in the newly elected Constituent Assembly would have to adopt the new constitution and that the Assembly would also have the right to determine whether the new state would be a monarchy or republic. Regent Alexander simply accepted this declaration as the suf- _ ficient and final act of unification of the two states, and on that day, December I, 1918, the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was established." Just a few days earlier, on November 26, the Montenegrin National Assembly at Podgorica had dethroned King Nikola and proclaimed the unification of Montenegro with Serbia. Unfortunately, neither the Corfu Declaration nor the National Council in Zagreb had postulated that the Serbian National Assembly, the Croatian Diet, and the diets of the other South Slavic provinces formerly under the Habsburg Monarchy all ratify the act of unification. Although the interim government submitted the act of unification of December 1, 1918, to the Serbian National Assembly for confirmation, which it gave on December 29,'° it did not submit it to the Croatian Diet, which would have surely ratified it, though not unanimously. This was undoubtedly by design on the part of

, Pribi¢evic and the Serbian government, because none of the Diet’s power was to be maintained. The new kingdom was clearly a product of the strength of the Serbian dynasty and state on the one hand and the weakness of the short-lived State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs on the other. The Kingdom of Serbia was a state with great prestige in the Allied world because of its victories in the Balkan ‘For Paveli¢’s address and Regent Alexander’s response, see Si8i¢, Dokumenti, pp. 28083. Point 1 of the National Council’s directive read: “The final organization of the new state can be decided only by the General National Constituent Assembly of the entire unified peo-

ple of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes with a two-thirds majority. The Constituent Assembly must meet at the latest six months after the conclusion of peace. Specifically, the Constituent Assembly retains the power to decide on: (a) the constitution, including the form of the state (monarchy or republic), internal state organization, and the basic civil rights of citizens; (b) the state flag; (c) the seat of the government and other supreme state organs.” The directive was prepared by a Committee of Seven and then discussed and on November 24 fully accepted by the Central Committee of the Council. Ibid., pp. 275, 278. 'SCulinovié, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 1: 149.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS II Wars and its valiant stand against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Bulgaria in the First World War. It already possessed recognized territorial boundaries, a functioning government led by experienced and astute politicians, and a victorious army. The territory and peoples of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, by contrast, had been a part of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, an enemy country, until the last few days of the war. Only Serbia had granted recognition to it. It did not have a functioning army and was neither nationally nor confessionally unified. Different provinces had a variety of special interests and tendencies, with some, like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina, ready to join Serbia on their own. The state was beset by danger from without, with Italy claiming choice territory, and Bolshevik danger from within." It had politicians with great differences of opinion, many of them naive and some, like Pribi¢evi¢, acting as tools of the Serbian government. With this discrepancy in power, prestige, and experience, it is not surprising that the Serbian dynasty and the dominant Serbian political parties obtained everything they wanted in the new kingdom from a short-term and narrowly Serbian point of view. But from a long-term, Yugoslav point of view, they saddled the new state with insurmountable weaknesses that kept it in a condition of permanent crisis.

Following the act of unification and protracted negotiations among the political parties and Regent Alexander, an interim government was named and an interim Parliament convened. The government consisted of ministers from Serbia and from the areas earlier in the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. The interim Parliament consisted of representatives elected before the war in all parts of the country, to whom each party added some important figures from public life. Because of the perceived subordinate role of the Croats in the new state, Stjepan Radic and the few delegates of his party refused to sit in the in-

terim Parliament, thereby establishing a pattern of behavior that continued even after the Croatian People’s Peasant Party became the main representative of the Croatian nation in the first postwar election. According to arrangements between the politicians of the National Council and the Serbian government who carried out the unification, the central government assumed responsibility for principal state affairs, while the provincial governments in existence on December 1, 1918, assumed responsibility for those aspects of public administration that had not been transferred to the central government. Here too, Svetozar Pribi¢evi¢, who was considered by most politicians in Serbia to be an expert on the problems of the South Slavic nations formerly under the Habsburg Empire, played a disastrous role in the consolidation of the new state. As minister of interior in the first cabinet of the new kingdom, Pribi¢evi¢ transferred to the central government many functions that the agreements had left to the regional governments. His policies differed so mark'6See Sepi¢, “Croatian Politics,” pp. 401-5.

12 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS | edly from those of Prime Minister Stojan Proti¢ of the National Radical Party | (the Radical Party, for short) that constant difficulties between the two men finally culminated in the resignation of the first cabinet of the new state in August 1919." But this first cabinet change merely established the norm. The new state had eight different cabinets in its first three years. Radi¢ vigorously opposed the new political developments. In February 1919 he convoked a meeting in Zagreb of the delegates of Croatian People’s Peasant Party organizations from Croatia-Slavonia to ascertain the political pulse of the peasantry and demonstrate the new strength that the party had acquired. The delegates decided to work for the creation of a neutral peasant republic in Croatia and to begin collecting signatures for a memorandum to the peace conference at Versailles asking for its support of this cause. According to Vladko Maéek, a party leader, about 260,000 signatures were collected within six weeks, with Radi¢’s on top. Probably because of this action, the Yugoslav

government incarcerated Radié in March 1919. He was not charged witha | specific offense and was not tried, but was simply kept in prison. The Croatian People’s Peasant Party entrusted Macek with sending the memorandum and signatures to Versailles, which he tried to do with the help of the Italian Military Mission in Ljubljana." His use of the Italians as intermediaries was a tactical mistake, however, because it gave them additional proof of the disunity and weakness of the new Yugoslav state and increased their intransigence regarding claims on Slovene and Croatian territory. Had the memorandum arrived at the peace conference, it would have undermined the efforts of the Yugoslav delegation fighting against Italian claims and been counterproductive with President Wilson, who strongly supported the Yugoslav cause.” As it turned out, the signatures never reached the conference, but they did show the immense support for Radié in Croatia, as did the subsequent election for the Constituent Assembly.

Radi¢ was released from jail in February 1920. He resumed political activ-

ity, but was arrested again for another outburst against the government in March, tried, and sentenced in August to two and a half years in prison. The sentence was not immediately confirmed, but he remained incarcerated. When elections for the Constituent Assembly were held on November 28, 1920, however, he was elected, thereby acquiring parliamentary immunity, and released from prison the same day.” The principal tasks of the interim Parliament were to pass the budget and '7Josip Horvat, Politicka povijest Hrvatske, pp. 185-92, 200-202, 214-16. '$Maétek, Struggle for Freedom, pp. 81-82. For this action, Matek and two other important party members were arrested. Ma¢ek was accused of high treason, but the charge could not be sustained, and after several months all three men were released. Smith Paveli¢, Dr. Ante Trumbié, pp. 233-34. Smith Pavelié puts the number of signatures sent to Versailles at 150,000. *Kulundzi¢é, Atentat na Stjepana Radiéa, pp. 133-36, 147-50, 160-61.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 13 enact a law for the election of the Constituent Assembly. It passed the latter on September 3, 1920. The election was held on November 28 with no fewer than 22 different parties participating, many of them of a regional or narrowly special-interest character. The election of the Constituent Assembly was manipulated from the outset in favor of the Serbian political parties. First, according to the law regulating the election, the population census of 1910 was the basis for the number of deputies allotted each province. Because of the great population loss that Serbia subsequently sustained from war casualties and a typhus epidemic, this provision gave it a disproportionate number of deputies. Second, due to the provisions of the peace treaties with Austria (of September 10, 1919) and Hungary (of June 4, 1920), according to which the members of the large German and Hungarian minorities in Yugoslavia could choose the citizenship of these states, these minorities were disenfranchised until 1922, which favored the Serbs in Vojvodina. As a result, in the various historical areas there were great disparities between the number of registered voters and the number of deputies allotted each province, as well as in the number of votes cast per deputy of the various political parties. The political parties whose electorate was chiefly in Serbia emerged with a disproportionate number of deputies. Thus in Vojvodina, an average of 3,301 voters were registered for each representative elected; in Montenegro, 4,337; in Slovenia, 5,382; and in Serbia, 5,642; whereas in Croatia-Slavonia, an average of 6,850 voters were registered for each representative elected; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7,496; and in Dalmatia, 8,092. The total number of votes actually cast for each of the seven leading parties, divided by the number of deputies each party obtained in the Constituent Assembly, showed a similar bias in favor of Serbia. Thus the almost purely Serbian Radical Party obtained on the average 3,127 votes per deputy; the predominantly Serbian Democratic Party, 3,472; the predominantly Serbian Agrarian Party, 3,887; the all-Yugoslav Communist Party, 3,426; the Slovene People’s Party (allied with a small Croatian People’s Party), 4,121; the Croatian People’s Peasant Party, 4,612; and the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, 4,620.” In the election for the Constituent Assembly, the Croatian People’s Peasant Party obtained 52.6 percent of the total vote cast in Croatia-Slavonia, while the other ten competing parties obtained 47.4 percent. Among these ten parties, only three, the Democratic Party, the Radical Party, and the Communist Party, obtained significant blocs of votes.” In fact, in this election the Croatian 1Josip Horvat, Politicka povijest Hrvatske, pp. 190-95, 201-5, 230-45; Culinovié, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 1: 216, 308-15. The electoral disparities were calculated on the basis of a table in Culinovi¢ following p. 312. 22The Democratic Party (formed by the consolidation of two pre-1918 Serbian parties) and the Radical Party were the two Serbian parties that adherents of the older Serbian parties and strongly pro- Yugoslav Croats and Slovenes from areas formerly under Austria-Hungary joined. The Communist Party was a new party created by uniting the left wings of former Social Democratic parties in the various historical provinces of the new state. At its Second Congress at Vukovar in June 1920, it sided with the Communist International.

14 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS People’s Peasant Party, due to its program, its mobilization of the Croatian peasant masses, the persecution of its leader, and newly introduced general male suffrage, practically eliminated all pre-1918 Croatian parties in CroatiaSlavonia.” Beginning with this November 1920 election and in all other elections in the country during the interwar period except the November 1931 election, when only the single government party was able to put up a list of candidates, the Croatian People’s Peasant Party obtained the overwhelming majority of the Croatian vote. As a consequence it was the authoritative representative of the Croatian nation during the interwar period. Despite its name, the Constituent Assembly had only limited powers. The principal issue, the form of the state—a monarchy under the Karadjordjevic dynasty—had already been decided upon by agreement between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee and confirmed by the unification act of December 1, 1918. Although the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was a constitutional monarchy, it remained a monarchy in which the will of the ruler greatly outweighed the power of the parliament. Perceiving this, Radic and the Croatian People’s Peasant Party abstained from participation in parliamentary deliberations. When a new centralist constitution was adopted in June 1921, they continued their determined struggle against the new political system, but without success. This policy earned them the enmity of Regent Alexander (who became king on August 16, 1921) and the dominant Serbian political parties, as well as of Pribi¢evi¢, who was to a large extent responsible for

the nature and policies of the new state.” It was not until 1925 that a basic

change took place in Radi¢’s policy. | |

The diverse historical backgrounds of the different territorial and national units in the new Yugoslav state and its multinational and multireligious character dictated that it be organized as a federal state. Federal organization was clearly intended in the Corfu Declaration, the decision of the Croatian Diet of October 29, 1918, and the directive of the National Council in Zagreb of November 24, 1918, to the delegation going to Belgrade to consummate the act of unification. The aim was to prevent the adoption of a constitution that would allow one of the constituent nations in the new state, without doubt the Serbs, to rule over and against the wishes of the other nations. Thus the Corfu Decla3Qne of the most important consequences for the Croats of the establishment of the new Yugoslav state was the introduction of general male suffrage. This is best seen by considering

the size of the electorate before 1918. According to Croatia-Slavonia’s election law of the early 1890’s, in effect until 1910, only 45,381 people were entitled to vote in the 1906 election. This in a territory whose population was 2,416,304 in the 1900 census. R. Horvat, Najnovije doba hrvatske povjesti, pp. 292-93. The election reform of 1910 expanded the elec-

torate to about 190,000 people. | oe

4Pribicevi¢ joined the Democratic Party in 1919, but left in 1924 because he was much more intransigent on the Croatian question than party leaders from Serbia. He established the Independent Democratic Party, which represented mainly Serbs from South Slavic areas formerly under the Dual Monarchy and strongly pro- Yugoslav Croats and Slovenes.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 15 ration called for a “qualified majority” that the Constituent Assembly itself would define as necessary for adopting the new constitution, and the directive of the National Council specified a two-thirds vote of the Assembly as the “qualified majority” for doing so.” But the two dominant Serbian political parties, the Democratic and Radical Parties, and Regent Alexander disregarded historical logic and the anticentralist wishes of the majority of the South Slavic peoples from the areas formerly under the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Despite the declarations against cen-

tralism, the abstention of the principal Croatian political party from the delib- | erations of the Constituent Assembly, and the abstention or negative vote of several other parties—the Slovene People’s Party (the main Slovene party), the Serbian Agrarian Party, and the Communist Party—the two dominant Serbian political parties, with the help of votes from the Bosnian Muslims, the Macedonian Turks, and a small Slovene peasant party, all secured by specific economic concessions, voted a strictly centralist constitution on June 28, 1921. Of the total membership of 419 deputies in the Assembly, 223 voted in favor of the constitution, 3 5 voted against it, and the others either abstained or did not participate. The representatives who voted for the constitution had received less

than half of the popular vote cast in the election. Thus, even the votes of the small parties obtained by special concessions would not have helped the Serbian-dominated government had it not been for the initial advantage it held from the disproportion in electoral votes.” The Croats, as the second largest nation in the country after the Serbs, with the longest continuous statehood, however formal rather than real for most of the time, and with a strong sense of state right and the principle of self-determination, felt themselves to be the nation most negatively affected by the centralist organization of the government and Serbian domination of political and state life. In their eyes, this robbed them of their national dignity, identity, and tradition. The Macedonians were even more unfavorably affected, because they were denied their nationality and language and simply considered as Serbs from southern Serbia. Those Montenegrins who desired the continuation of their state and dynasty were also dissatisfied. The Albanian minority in the Kosovo area, where in fact it constituted a majority of the population, and in Macedonia was especially harshly treated. The large German, Hungarian, and Turkish minorities were also dissatisfied and fearful about their future. In spite of its many shortcomings, however, the new state, as the culmination of the *SSi8i€, Dokumenti, pp. 99, 275, 309.

6Culinovid, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 1: 348-52. The votes of the Bosnian Muslims and Macedonian Turks were secured by promises that their landlords, who controlled the parties, would receive more considerate treatment in the pending agrarian reform than contemplated earlier. The Slovene votes were obtained by promising one of their deputies (Bogumil Vognjak) a diplomatic appointment and by granting cattle export licenses to Slovene areas.

16 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS movement for liberation and unification of the South Slavic nations reaching back into the nineteenth century, was a decided improvement over the conditions under which these nations had lived until the end of the First World War. The victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia filled the Serbian and later Yugoslav authorities with great apprehension. Prior to 1917, close relations prevailed between Serbia and Imperial Russia, the country that had served as the protector of the small Balkan kingdom. The new Yugoslav state received and treated well thousands of White Russian emigrants. When many former prisoners of war in

Russia from Yugoslav areas of the defunct Dual Monarchy began returning home, potential carriers of new revolutionary ideas—the later Josip Broz Tito

was one—and when the Communists briefly took power in Hungary, apprehension heightened even more. Consequently, the establishment of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its success in the elections for municipal councils held in various provinces between March and August 1920 and in the election for the Constituent Assembly in November 1920 greatly worried the government.”’ In the former, the Communists captured majorities or pluralities in many cities, including Belgrade and Zagreb, while in the latter they obtained the third largest number of deputies and the fourth largest number of votes. After a number of Communist-led strikes, which it interpreted as endangering the country’s security, the government issued the Proclamation (Obznana) on December 30, 1920, outlawing the Communist Party and its organizations. Strict enforcement of the new proclamation followed. A faction of the party reacted by attempting to assassinate Regent Alexander on June 28 and then assassinating Milorad Draskovi¢, the former minister of interior and author of the Proclamation, on July 21, 1921. This led to even stiffer permanent legislation against the party in the Law on the Protection of the Realm issued on August 2, 1921. Two days later, Parliament annulled the credentials of 58 representatives who were members the Communist Party.” Thereafter, many people who had formerly supported the party left it, others became intimidated and inactive, some remained active but went underground, and others went into exile. Police informers infiltrated the party and the police killed some active Communists.

The unfortunate way in which the Karadjordjevi¢ dynasty, the dominant Serbian political parties, and many politicians from areas formerly under the Habsburg Monarchy unified the new State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia; the roughshod manner in which the centralist constitution of June 28, 1921, was adopted; the disregard of Croatian national rights and interests; the lack of recognition of the Macedonian nation; the limited observance of the rights of Albanian, German, and Hungarian minorities; and 27In many areas, the vote for the Communist Party was much more a vote against government policies than a vote for the Communist Party program. *®Culinovic, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 1: 315-21, 359-68.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 17 many other negative developments prevented the interwar Yugoslav state from becoming truly consolidated. These developments were also responsible for political emigration. Several groups of emigrants and those at home closely associated with them played, in turn, an important role in the country during the War of April 1941 and the following years of occupation, war, and revolution. For this reason we will now briefly sketch the history of political emigration from Yugoslavia during the interwar period. We will also examine political developments in the country, especially the relationship between the Croats and the Serbs, which was by far the most important and difficult internal political

problem of the new state and one that evolved into a bloody conflagration during the Second World War.

EARLY POLITICAL EMIGRATION A small number of Croats—former military officers and officials of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and a few politicians—refused to accept the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes at the end of 1918 and moved to Austria or Hungary. The first organization established by these political émigrés was the Croatian Committee, set up in May 1919, with headquarters first in Graz, then Vienna, and later, after the consolidation of Regent Miklos Horthy’s regime in Hungary, in Budapest. For some time it had a small paramilitary wing in Hungary called the Croatian Legion, which planned to enter Croatia in the event of an invasion of Yugoslavia or the outbreak of a revolution.”

Although initially united, the Croatian political émigrés soon disagreed over ideas and objectives. One group, the legitimists, consisting mostly of former Austro-Hungarian officers and government officials, aimed for the restoration of a Danube Basin state centering on Austria and Hungary, if possible under the Habsburg dynasty, to which Croatia would also belong. In Austria, these émigrés were led by former Colonel General Baron Stjepan Sarkoti¢ and former Lieutenant Colonel Stjepan (Stevo) Dui¢. Sarkoti¢ had been the last head of the provincial government of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dual Monarchy and had advocated a solution of the Yugoslav problem within the monarchy that would have satisfied the pro-trialists among the Croats. He felt that the Serbs, because of their strong nationalism and the permeating influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church, endangered the Croats, who were western

oriented and Catholic. Thus a separate state that included all South Slavs threatened Croatian interests.” °For information on the early Croatian political emigration, see the complaint against Hungary that Yugoslavia submitted to the League of Nations in connection with the assassi-

nation of King Alexander, which was received by the League on November 28, 1934, in League of Nations, Request by the Yugoslav Government, “Communication from the Yugoslav Government,” pp. 7-9. See also R. Horvat, Hrvatska na mucéilistu, pp. 124-29, and Banac, The National Question, pp. 264-70. For Sarkoti¢’s ideas, see the minutes of a meeting he held with the Austro-Hungarian

18 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS | Because there was so little pro-Austro-Hungarian feeling in Croatia after 1918, the legitimist émigrés lacked any real support among the Croatian population. Though Duié claimed that he was empowered by Radié to act on his behalf, he also accepted money for his work from former Emperor Karl in Switzerland. Still another legitimist émigré, Emanuel (Manko) Gagliardi, after returning to Yugoslavia in 1922, provided the Yugoslav authorities with information on his former colleagues and wrote a pamphlet on them.” _ The second group of political émigrés was headed by Ivo Frank, the only politician of some standing in the early Croatian emigration. Frank had been a member of the Croatian Diet in 1918 as a representative of the Croatian Party of [State] Right. He was the son of the earlier leader of that party, Josip Frank, © whose strong antagonism toward the Serbs and the Yugoslav idea influenced the son and made him a logical opponent of the new Yugoslav state. Although Frank operated from Hungary during most of his life in exile, he apparently had no hope for the restoration of a Danube Basin state and thought that salvation for Croatia could only come from Italy. He therefore assiduously sought its support. To capitalize on the popularity of Radié and his republican ideas in Croatia, Frank also claimed to be a supporter of a Croatian republic and to represent both the Croatian Party of Right and the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (the renamed Croatian People’s Peasant Party). , The most interesting action that Frank and Gagliardi undertook during this early stage of exile was to sign two agreements in Venice on July 5, 1920, with

- Giovanni Giuriati and Giovanni Host Venturi, representatives of Gabrielle D’Annunzio, at that time usurper of power and self-appointed commander of the city of Rijeka (Fiume).” D’Annunzio concluded the accords, but allegedly made them in the name of Italy. The first was a general agreement between the representatives of the Croatian, Albanian, and Montenegrin anti- Yugoslav political émigrés and D’Annunzio as sponsor and provider of arms, ammunition, and money. The signatories were to undertake concerted political and military military commanders of occupied Serbia and Montenegro in Sarajevo on May 13-14, 1918,

in Stulli, “Contributions to the Source Materials,” pp. 281-304. *'Banac, The National Question, pp. 264-65, 269. According to Banac, Gagliardi was

ers has never been established. | ,

executed by the Ustashas in 1942. Duié was killed in 1934, though the true identity of his kill-

The antiquated and unrealistic views of the Croatian legitimist émigrés are also seen in former Austro-Hungarian Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Peréevié, the third most important figure

in this group. See Fertilio, “Cavalier and Legitimist,” pp. 229-39. . | Gabrielle D’Annunzio, the well-known Italian poet, was also enamored of martial arts and political extravagance. After seeing action as a reserve officer in the Italian army on the Italian-Austrian front during the First World War, he became dissatisfied with what he considered the insufficiently aggressive policies of the Italian government. Following skirmishes between occupying Italian and French forces in Rijeka, he and his adherents entered the city

: on September 12, 1919. He assumed power in the name of Italy and appointed himself head of administration and “comandante” of the city. But the Italian government did not recognize him. See Giuriati, Con D’Annunzio e Millo, and Rhodes, D’Annunzio. -

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 19 operations against the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to free the nations supposedly oppressed by the Serbs and “to occupy militarily the entire Serbian territory.” Military operations against the new kingdom were to start in August 1920, first in Montenegro, then in Albania, and finally in Croatia. The second accord was to become operative after the military breakup of the new kingdom. It regulated frontiers and relations between Italy and the new “Croatian Republic,” whose recognition and neutrality Italy guaranteed. It

also included provisions regarding the frontier between Italy and the new “Slovene Republic” if it should be established. Otherwise, this frontier would be drawn as stipulated in the Treaty of London. According to this accord, Italy was to annex Istria, Rijeka, and a number of smaller islands in the upper and middle Adriatic. The main Dalmatian cities were to form a league, remain autonomous, and serve as free ports. Dalmatia with the islands but without the main cities was to form an independent and neutral “Dalmatian Republic” under Italian guarantee and after the establishment of the “Croatian Republic” was to decide by plebiscite whether to remain autonomous or join the latter. Italy could fortify militarily the islands and territory in Dalmatia that it already occupied according to the Treaty of London and that it deemed necessary for its strategic security, while the “Croatian Republic” could not keep garrisons along the frontier with Italy for a distance of 50 kilometers. The Bay of Kotor, it was agreed, would be included in Montenegro. Finally, there were provisions for the mutual protection of minorities in the affected territories.” These quixotic agreements between D’Annunzio and the émigrés had no

prospect of ever being implemented. But they exemplify typical political exile behavior and were harbingers of the future. Political exiles often put their hopes in foreign sponsors and are willing to pay a high price for outside aid. The actions of Croatian nationalist exiles during the interwar period and, as we shall see, in the Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War amply illustrate this fact. The days of D’Annunzio as commander of Rijeka were limited even before the July 1920 agreements. The government of Francesco Nitti, which D’Annunzio professed not to recognize, was replaced in June 1920 by that of Giovanni Giolitti, with Count Carlo Sforza as minister of foreign affairs. Sforza, who for some time was envoy to the Serbian government, was more conciliatory toward the new Yugoslav state than other Italian politicians. Negotiations between the two countries, which had foundered up to that time, were renewed and on November 12, 1920, the Treaty of Rapallo was signed. Italy kept the Kanal area, the Slovene Littoral, Trieste, and Istria, as well as the islands of Cres, Losinj, and Unije in the upper Adriatic. But it obtained only a symbolic

part of Dalmatia promised by the Treaty of London, that is, only the city of 3For a discussion of how these accords were reached, see Giuriati, Con D’Annunzio e Millo, pp. 137-62, and for their texts, pp. 221-26. See also Rhodes, D’Annunzio, pp. 1902.62.

20 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS Zadar and the islands of Lastovo and Palagruza off central Dalmatia. Rijeka was to become a buffer state between the two countries. D’Annunzio and his cohorts were forced to leave the city at the end of 1920. The Treaty of Rapallo was very unfavorable to Yugoslavia because it left almost half a million Croats and Slovenes in Italy. But France and England pressed Yugoslavia to sign. Peace treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria had already been concluded, and the internal political situation was difficult. Under the circumstances, it was the best that could be achieved. Due to Italian obstruction, Rijeka could not be organized as a separate state and became a part of Italy by the Italian- Yugoslav Treaty of June 27, 1924. Both groups of early émigrés had contacts inside Croatia, but they were, with one exception, of little significance. The exception was the supposed prorepublican group’s Milan Sufflay, a well-known medieval historian, whose Croatian-centered but changing political ideas had earned him a certain domestic notoriety. Sufflay was indicted in 1921 for espionage and connections with Croatian émigrés and sentenced to a three-year prison term. He lost his professorship at the University of Zagreb and was prevented from emigrating to take

, a similar position at the University of Budapest. He then made his living as a newspaperman and dabbled at the fringes of political happenings in Croatia until he was assassinated by police in Zagreb in February 1931.” In addition to the Croatian legitimist and purportedly pro-republican émigrés, several other groups of nationalist émigrés came into existence when the new Yugoslav state was formed. The most important were the Macedonian émigrés active in Bulgaria and to a limited extent in Austria and Italy. There were also a few Hungarian émigrés from Vojvodina, Albanian émigrés from the

Kosovo region and western Macedonia active in Albania, and Montenegrin supporters of the old dynasty active in Italy. All these groups were dissatisfied with some aspect of the political situation in the Yugoslav state and worked against the existing political system. The reasons for this varied political emigration have already been enumerated: the centralist constitution, Serbian hegemony, the brutal persecution of political opponents, and the presence of many national minorities who looked to their respective mother countries. Since Yugoslavia was surrounded for the most part by revisionist states (except for Greece and Romania), which were dissatisfied with the frontiers established by the post-1918 peace treaties and each of which claimed different parts of Yugoslav territory, the émigrés found support in one or more neighboring countries. Finally, a general Yugoslav Communist emigration followed the outlawing of the Communist Party and the application of extremely repressive measures against it. Most Communist émigrés went to the Soviet Union (where scores *Josip Horvat, Hrvatski panoptikum, pp. 22 5-28. For his assassination, see Krizman, Ante Pavelié i ustaSe, p. 78. For more information on Sufflay, see Banac, The National Ques-

tion, pp. 266-69.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 21 later perished in Soviet purges), but some operated from Prague and Vienna and at times from Paris. In the 1920's, political developments in Yugoslavia became less and less encouraging to both the legitimist and pro-republican emigrations. It is interesting to note that Radic himself spent the period between July 1923 and August 1924 abroad seeking support for the Croatian cause, though without success.

A few months after returning home, he was compelled by circumstances to make peace with Belgrade. Except for the submission of memoranda to foreign governments and some propaganda work, the original Croatian political emigration became quite passive. However, in mid-1928 and early 1929, events occurred in Yugoslavia that gave impetus to a new wave of political emigration. The two most important new émigré groups were the Croatian nationalists—the Ustashas (Insurgents), who differed completely in character and size from the earlier Croatian political emigration—and the all-Yugoslav Communists. Because the latter will be dealt with more fully in the third volume of this study, we will concentrate here exclusively on the Ustashas. But to explain the origin and nature of this new emigration, we must first sketch the course of internal political developments during the 1920’s and early 1930’s, particularly the crucial relationship between the Serbian-dominated state and the Croats.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1923 TO 1934 After the government outlawed the Communist Party at the end of 1920 and again in August 1921, the activity of Radi¢é and the Croatian Republican Peasant Party became the most difficult internal political problem for the new state. In the election of March 18, 1923, the party achieved even greater success

than in the election for the Constituent Assembly, obtaining 473,773 votes compared to 250,590 votes in 1920. Emboldened, Radi¢ intensified his attacks against the existing political system. In the early summer of 1923, rumors circulated that he might be arrested again. To avoid this, he fled to Hungary on July 21 and went on to Vienna, Paris, and London to plead the Croatian cause. But he failed to find any understanding or support and returned to Vienna. In early June 1924, following repeated invitations from Soviet Commissar

of Foreign Affairs Georgi V. Chicherin, Radié went to Moscow. He met Chicherin and several other Soviet officials and, most significantly, on July 1, 1924, he enrolled the Croatian Republican Peasant Party in the newly established, Communist-run Peasant International. The Communist International (Comintern), working through the Peasant International, was undoubtedly interested in using Radi¢ and his party to obtain greater influence on the peasant masses in Croatia and other parts of Yugoslavia. Without peasant cooperation, the Communists had no prospect of victory in the Balkans. Possibly they also wanted a tool to break up Yugoslavia into a series of national Bolshevik repub-

22 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS lics, which became the Comintern’s aim in July 1924. Radi¢, on the other hand, apparently thought that his contact with the Soviet Union and the Peasant International would strengthen his position toward Belgrade. On August 3,

1924, the parliamentary deputies of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party confirmed Radi¢’s enrollment of the party in the Peasant International, and

shortly thereafter, Radi¢ returned home.” , Given the negative attitude of the authorities and the general public in Yugoslavia and Western Europe toward Bolshevik Russia, however, Radi¢ and the party soon realized that the trip to Moscow had been a mistake. Thus, although the Croatian Republican Peasant Party had joined the Peasant International, Radic was cautious enough to insist that it retain its own program. The party also never sent representatives to the Peasant International. But the damage was done. Radi¢’s activities in Moscow cost the party sympathies in Western Europe and gave the Yugoslav government the opportunity to invoke the anti-Communist laws of the state against him and the party. As of January 1, 1925, the government officially dissolved the party, supposedly because it had become part of the Communist International, prohibited it from holding meetings and issuing publications, seized its files, and jailed Radi¢ and five other leaders pending prosecution.”

The government, however, did not prohibit all party activity. The party participated in the parliamentary election of February 8, 1925, and was again very successful, obtaining 545,466 votes and 67 out of 315 seats in Parliament.*® The government debated whether to annul the election of party deputies on the basis of the anti-Communist laws, but did not take this step. Meanwhile, having realized that his travels abroad had been completely fruitless and that the Belgrade government had the full support of Western Europe, Radi¢ made a total about-face in policy. With the large new bloc of deputies in Parliament, his party became important as a potential partner of either of the two dominant Serbian political parties, the Radicals or the Democrats. An understanding with Radié would have given the former a majority in Parliament and the latter a strong base for a majority that would also have included the Slovene Clericalists and the Bosnian Muslims. Actually, Radi¢ had already reached a 35See the resolution of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in July 1924 on the national question in Yugoslavia, in Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Istorijski arhiv, 2: 420-21. 6Josip Horvat, Politi¢ka povijest Hrvatske, pp. 343-49. Radi¢é made the trip to Moscow not only to strengthen his position toward Belgrade, but probably also for a number of other reasons: his resentment at not being well received in Paris and London, his penchant for sudden shifts in tactics, and above all his Pan-Slavic feelings and admiration for everything Russian and his belief that the Russian revolution of 1917 meant the liberation of the Russian

peasantry. ; Ibid., pp. 361-66; Culinovi¢, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 1: 441-46; Kulundzié, Atentat na Stjepana Radi¢a, pp. 178-83. ;

*8For detailed results of the 1920, 1923, and 1925 elections, see Culinovi¢, Jugoslavija igmedju dva rata, 1: table following p. 312, and pp. 406 and 455.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 23 tentative understanding with representatives of the Radical Party in April 1923. But he cultivated contacts with other parties as well and was in touch with several Serbian politicians who enjoyed the confidence of the Crown.” Fi-

nally on March 25, 1925, while in prison, Radi¢ made a formal agreement through his representatives to cooperate with the leaders of the parliamentary opposition, Ljubomir Davidovi¢ of the Democratic Party, Anton KoroSsec of the Slovene People’s Party, and Mehmed Spaho of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, in coordinated action against the government, which was controlled by Pasi¢’s Radical Party and Pribicevic’s Independent Democratic Party. Two days later, on March 27, 1925, Radi¢’s nephew Pavle Radié¢, a vice presi-

dent of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, read a declaration in Parliament in which the party recognized the Karadjordjevic dynasty and the constitution of June 1921, discarded its republicanism (including the word “republican” from its name), and asserted its willingness to participate in parliamentary activity, but also declared its intention to work for constitutional reform.” Though Radi¢ had ordered this declaration, he was also exploring the possibility of a coalition government with the Radical Party. As a result, four months later the Radicals unceremoniously dropped Pribicevi¢ and the Independent Democratic Party as coalition partners and on July 18, 1925, entered into a coalition government with the Croatian Peasant Party. Radi¢ and his colleagues were released from prison and on November 17 of the same year Radié¢ entered the cabinet as minister of education. But it was a tenuous coalition. In Radi¢’s own words, his party was not in the government but “attached” to it. Radié was eased out of the cabinet on April 15, 1926, essentially for accusing Radical Party colleagues and their friends of corruption. The coali-

tion finally collapsed on February 1, 1927. The Radical Party remained in power in a new coalition government with the Slovene People’s Party. Thereafter, the parliamentary opposition greatly sharpened its attacks against the government, with corruption as the central charge.” The election of September 11, 1927, failed to change the relationship among the various political parties. However, the Croatian Peasant Party, either because of its unsuccessful collaboration with the Radical Party or because it had These were Radi¢’s contacts with Marko Gjuriti¢é in April 1923 and Mita Dimitrijevi¢, a confidant of the royal court, in March 1925. See ibid., pp. 416-19, 464-70. “For these developments, see Josip Horvat, Politi¢ka povijest Hrvatske, pp. 369-79. For the declaration of March 2.7, see pp. 379-80. ‘Ibid., p. 404; Culinovi¢, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 1: 487-89. In 1925, even while the Radical Party was negotiating a coalition cabinet with the Croatian Peasant Party, it was also exploring the possibility of collaborating with Milan Sufflay and Ante Paveli¢, representatives of what remained of the Croatian Party of Right (Frankists). The Frankists were flattered by these overtures, anticipating that their merger with the Radicals would be a blow to Radi¢ and his party in Croatia and to Yugoslavism in general. But nothing came of these negotiations, which the Radicals only used to put pressure on Radié. Historically, however, this contact is an interesting fact about both Sufflay and Pavelié. See Kulundzi¢, Atentat na Stjepana Radi¢a, pp. 219-28.

24 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS temporarily relinquished opposition to the Belgrade government, or both, obtained one-third fewer votes than in the election of 1925. The most important development among the opposition parties during the ensuing months was the conclusion, on November 10, 1927, of an agreement between Radi¢’s Croatian Peasant Party and Pribi¢evié’s Independent Democratic Party creating the Peasant Democratic Coalition, though both parties continued to exist separately. For Pribiéevi¢, who until 1925 had been one of the most determined promoters and : defenders of crude centralism and strong-arm government policies and thus one of -Radié’s chief enemies, this was both a total about-face and an expression of the needs of Serbs in Croatia. By this time Pribicevi¢ had lost much of his confidence in the organization and administration of the new Yugoslav state and undertook with Radi¢ to seek thorough governmental reorganization. Debates in Parliament and polemics and threats in the press became daily more acrimonious.” The Peasant Democratic Coalition participated in parliamentary work until

June 20, 1928. On that day during a parliamentary session, Punisa Raci¢, a Serbian deputy of the Radical Party, a man of dubious background but reportedly with connections to the royal court, shot and killed two representatives of the Croatian Peasant Party, Pavle Radi¢ and Djuro Basari¢ek, and wounded three others, including Stjepan Radi¢, who died of his wounds six weeks later. - Several individuals in Serbia had made threats against. Radi¢ and threats had even appeared in a newspaper supported by Prime Minister Velja Vukicevic.* And they were not the only ones who wanted to eliminate Radi¢ from public

life. The small but vocal Croatian People’s Party, the party of the Croatian Clericalists, opposed him not only because of his strong anti-Clericalism, but also because of his Pan-Slavic ideas and because he had begun cooperating with Svetozar Pribicevic, the leader of the Croatian Serbs, the previous year.”

“Culinovi¢, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 1: 414-15, 487-98, 502. , **The most complete examination of the assassinations in Parliament is the already cited

work by Kulundzi¢, Atentat na Stjepana Radiéa. See also Josip Horvat, Politicka povijest

| Hrvatske, pp. 423-32, and Culinovi¢, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 1: 524-35. For the threats against Radi¢, see Kulundzi¢, pp. 211-18, 294-305. , , “Kerubin Segvi¢, an adherent of the Croatian People’s Party and a well-known Croatian Catholic priest and writer, wrote in a Croatian newspaper just four days before the tragedy: Radié has stressed several times that somebody wants to take him out of public life. By this he wants to elicit the compassion and sympathy of the public. We want to say only this: if they wanted to remove him, they would have the means and power to do so. .. . If somebody succeeds in removing from public life this leader of the misled, the blind, and the drunk, it would be the greatest event ever remembered in Croatian history. He would

remove a permanent danger to public order and peace in the world. , | Hrvatski list (Osijek), June 16, 1928. Xerox copy in my files. See also Kulundzi¢, Atentat na Stjepana Radiéa, pp. 218-36. This was an extreme view and it is difficult to say how many Croatian Clericalists shared it. For Radi¢’s anticlericalist ideas as well as the Croatian Clericalists’ views about Radic, see V. Novak, Magnum crimen, pp. 209-52. This tendentious book is outspokenly antiCatholic, but it contains valuable documentary material, particularly long quotations from

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 25 After the tragedy, the Peasant Democratic Coalition withdrew from Parliament and demanded the resignation of the government, the dissolution of Parliament, and new elections. The cabinet did resign and a new one was formed, headed by Anton KoroSec, a Catholic priest, the leader of the Slovene People’s Party and the only non-Serb to hold the office of prime minister (for four months) during the interwar period. The one Croat among the ministers in his cabinet was Stjepan Baric, the head of the Croatian People’s Party, which was closely affiliated with KoroSsec’s party. But the government did not dissolve Parliament and new elections were not held.

On August 1, 1928, the representatives of the Peasant Democratic Coalition adopted a resolution in Zagreb that showed the critical impact of the slayings on political opinion in Croatia. The Coalition asserted that the newly convoked rump Parliament in Belgrade could not enact any decisions binding on the whole state, especially those of a financial nature, and that no decisions would be binding outside of Serbia, especially not in Croatia. It further declared that Croatia and Montenegro and all provinces represented in the National Council in 1918 had entered into union with the Kingdom of Serbia without surrendering their historical states or national identities in favor of the new state, but that Serbia had used the unification act of December 1, 1918, and the constitution of June 28, 1921, to establish hegemony over other parts of the country. Finally, since the assassinations in Parliament had destroyed popular support for the existing state, the Coalition vowed to wage a determined fight to achieve a new state organization with full equality for all historical and national entities.** The assassinations in Parliament represented, in fact, the end of parliamentary government in interwar Yugoslavia. Under the royal

dictatorship that followed in the 1930’s, the elections for the two houses of Parliament were a sham. Early in July 1928, just before Radi¢ was taken from his Belgrade hospital

to Zagreb, King Alexander made the rather startling statement to Pribicevic and a Slovene politician that it was impossible to work with the Croats and that if they wanted, the Croats and the Slovenes could immediately have their own separate states. The king was apparently willing to amputate part of the country, which would have created a Greater Serbia and a rump Croatia and Slovenia. But the Peasant Democratic Coalition totally rejected such a measure.” the daily and periodical press otherwise not easily available. Novak, a Croat by birth, was professor of Croatian history at the University of Belgrade. For at least one year, 1936-37, he served as Grand Secretary of the Freemasonic lodge Great Yugoslavia, which heavily influenced his views. The attitude of the Croatian Clericalists toward Radi¢ can also be seen from the proclamation of the Croatian People’s Party before the election of 1927. See Sto je Hrvat-

ska pucka stranka, especially pp. 12-16. ‘SCulinovi¢, Jugoslavija igmedju dva rata, 1: 535. ‘STbid., pp. 544-48; Pribitchevitch [Pribi¢evi¢], La dictature du roi Alexandre, pp. 80-86.

The idea of amputating a rump Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of the state appeared in Belgrade as early as 1923. See Josip Horvat, Politicka povijest Hrvatske, p. 308.

26 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS The tragedy in Parliament and Radié’s death on August 8, 1928, caused sadness and outrage among the Croatian public. Vladko Maéek, who succeeded Radié as leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, wrote later about the threatening situation at the time: The June 20 shooting in the Belgrade Parliament and the ensuing death of Radi¢ _ plunged all of Croatia into indescribable agitation, and an armed revolt was be-

, lieved imminent. . . . I did everything in my power to prevent an open revolt, which was threatened not only in Zagreb but throughout Croatia. I did so not merely because of Radi¢’s wishes and my own pacific tendencies, but because it would have been utter folly to let the political struggle stray onto a field where we

would necessarily prove the weaker.” |

Fortunately, peace was preserved in Croatia. © , During the next few months, with a rump Parliament under the influence of the June tragedy, the cabinet’s prestige and authority greatly impaired, and a critical political situation in Croatia, the governmental crisis deepened. When Prime Minister Korosec submitted his resignation on December 28, 1928, the __ king entered into consultation about forming a new government with the leaders of the different political parties, including the two chairmen of the Peasant Democratic Coalition. The latter informed him that the crisis could not be resolved without a “reorganization of the state system,” a democratic organiza-

tion that would satisfy Croatian demands. But the king had other plans. On January 5, 1929, the Crown issued an ominous statement that.a solution of the crisis was impossible with a parliamentary regime. On the following day the

| king, assured of the support of the armed forces and police, as well as of many important Serbian politicians, abolished the 1921 constitution, prohibited the activity of all political parties, and introduced personal dictatorship. The new cabinet was headed by General Petar Zivkovié, one of the king’s most trusted advisors and up to that time commander of the Royal Guard. It also included several important Serbian and Slovene politicians, several nonpolitical Croatian technicians, a few representatives of small political groups, and later a

number of dissidents from both the Croatian Peasant Party and the Independent Democratic Party. The Croatian Peasant Party initially accepted the © king’s personal rule as the first step in a reorganization of the state following the sense of the August 1, 1928, resolution of the Peasant Democratic Coalition and Macek’s suggestions made to the king in audiences on January 4 and 5, 1929. But this proved to be a mistaken interpretation, the product of wishful thinking. The king showed himself interested in establishing unlimited personal ule and protecting the interests of the Serbian ruling elite, rather than in reor- _ “Matek, Struggle for Freedom, pp. 119-20. Some members of the Croatian Peasant Party, especially former Austro-Hungarian officers in Croatia, thought that such a revolt should have been undertaken and would have been successful, given the internal weakness of the Yugoslav regime and the favorable international situation for the Croats. See Kvaternik, “Trumbi¢’s Attitude,” especially pp. 225-31.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 27 ganizing the state in a manner responsive to Croatian demands. Both parties of the Coalition soon came out in opposition to the new regime.” The political developments of the late 1920’s, culminating in the assassination of Croatian leaders in Parliament and the introduction of King Alexander’s personal dictatorship, were the cause of the post-1928 Croatian political emigration. Had it not been for these developments, the earlier Croatian emigration led by Sarkoti¢c, Dui¢, and Frank would have withered away. But the events of the late 1920’s showed Croatian politicians that normal parliamentary politics could not lead to a satisfactory solution of the Croatian question. The leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party were exasperated by the new situation, but due to the outspokenly pacifist and humanitarian nature of their pro-

gram, did not turn to tactics of force. Hoping to achieve their objectives by peaceful means, they sent two important leaders—Juraj Krnjevic, the secretary general, and August KoSutic, one of the vice presidents—abroad in August 1929 to work for the Croatian cause in Western capitals and to keep the Croatian question before the Western public. But a small number of Croats, especially younger ones exposed to Frankist and Catholic Clericalist ideology, drew different conclusions. They became newly opposed or increased their opposition to the Yugoslav state, which for them meant Serbian domination, and they became dedicated fighters for an independent Croatian state. They were willing to use conspiratorial and terrorist methods and to accept help from any foreign - power, whatever the price. This led to the establishment of the Croatian Liberation Movement (the Ustashas) by Ante Paveli¢ in 1930. Paveli¢ was a 40-yearold lawyer by profession, vice president of the minuscule Croatian Party of Right, a member of the Zagreb city council, and between September 1927 and January 1929 a member of the Yugoslav parliament. After the introduction of royal dictatorship, he left the country and soon became the leader of the new Croatian political émigrés. Before turning to their activities, however, we will describe political developments in the country in the years immediately following the establishment of the new regime.

On October 3, 1929, King Alexander changed the name of the state to Yugoslavia and divided the country into nine regions (banovina) and the district of Belgrade instead of the previous 33 districts. Through gerrymandering, six of these regions and the district of Belgrade had a Serbian majority (counting the Macedonians and Montenegrins as Serbs), two had a Croatian majority, and one had an almost exclusively Slovene population. The king wanted to eliminate or divide the opposition from the old political parties that he could not subvert, particularly the two chairmen of the Peasant Democratic Coalition, Macek and Pribicevic. The government ordered the arrest of Macek in April 1930 and accused him of financing the terrorist activities of a small group of Croatian youths, in this way connecting him with the Croa“Boban, Macek, 1: 41-48.

28 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS tian political émigrés. While in prison, the king’s agents proposed to Macek that he end his opposition, but in vain. Of the large group of people indicted and tried with Macek in June, thirteen were sentenced to long prison terms, while ten, including Macek, were freed for lack of evidence. In October 1930, Macéek was allowed to visit Czechoslovakia for health reasons. While passing through Austria he saw not only the representatives of his own party who were working for the Croatian cause in Western Europe, but also members of the old Croatian emigration, including General Sarkoti¢, as well as the leader of the

new Croatian emigration, Ante Paveli¢.”

The regime also acted against the other chairman of the Peasant Democratic Coalition, Svetozar Pribicevié. In May 1929 he was interned in the village of Brus in the interior of Serbia. Due to illness, he was transferred after six months to a hospital in Belgrade, a section of which served as his prison. He was held

there for more than eighteen months. To keep from being returned to Brus, Pribi¢evié began a hunger strike and requested permission to travel to Czecho-

slovakia for health reasons. Under pressure from authorities in Prague and Paris, the government granted this request and on July 23, 1931, Pribicevic left for Prague. He spent two years there, then three years in Paris, then returned to Prague in the spring of 1936, where he died the following September of lung cancer.” Because of poor health and the difficulty of communicating with Yugoslavia, as well as King Alexander’s success in subverting a considerable number of his former colleagues, Pribi¢evic’s political activity abroad was limited. But he did write and publish La dictature du roi Alexandre in Paris in 1933, a book in which he attacked Yugoslavia’s political system and especially King Alexander,

blaming him personally for all political aberrations and misfortunes in the country since 1918. According to Pribi¢evic, the unification act of December 1,

1918, the adoption of the June 1921 constitution, and the policies based on them were all mistakes. It was necessary to rebuild the country on the basis of the declaration of the Croatian Diet on October 29, 1918. The Croatian question was the key political issue in Yugoslavia for Pribi¢evi¢ and its solution was to be found in the establishment of a federal republic.” But while it is true that King Alexander was largely responsible for political developments during his rule, it is also the case that between 1918 and 1925 Pribi¢evi¢ bore a large share of the responsibility for the aggravation of the Croatian question. In his book he chose not to assume his share of the blame. “Ibid., pp. 50-53. When passing through Austria on his return trip, Matek was joined on the train for some distance by Paveli¢. But the presence of Macek’s companion, Ivan Subagi¢, whom Pavelié considered a confidant of the royal court, prevented them from discussing poli-

tics. See Jareb, Pola stoljeéa hrvatske politike, p. 47. | 0Pribitchevitch [Pribiéevic], La dictature du roi Alexandre, pp. 162-66, 179-82. See also Boban, Svetozar Pribicevic, pp. 62-66, 187. ‘!Pribitchevitch [Pribi¢evic], La dictature du roi Alexandre, pp. 188-90, 269-71.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 29 In September 1931 the king granted a constitution that safeguarded all royal dictatorial prerogatives. With a series of laws and decrees of the same , month, the government prepared for the election, with open balloting, of members of the two houses of Parliament. Limitations on party activity, however, were such that only the government party was able to participate in the election on November 8, 1931. With the new measures, the royal dictatorship obtained

a constitutional and parliamentary veneer. In reality, however, little had changed.” After the constitution was granted, the leaders of the old political parties who had not been subverted by the king tried to reactivate their organizations. An important step in this direction was the secret meeting of the leadership of the Peasant Democratic Coalition on November 5-7, 1932, in Zagreb. The group issued a resolution known as the Zagreb Punctuations, condemning the regime and its policies and spelling out the political demands of the Coalition. The principal demand was to scrap all the fundamental political decisions of the state beginning with the unification act of December 1, 1918, and to rebuild it on the basis of federal and democratic principles so that all component nations and historical entities would have equality with the Serbs and Serbia. At this meeting, the Independent Democratic Party came out in support of a federal organization. Other opposition parties soon issued similar statements. The Zagreb resolution caused a strong negative reaction in the government, but three months passed before it arrested and indicted Macek on the basis of the Law on the Protection of the Realm. The government’s objective was to portray the resolution as an act of Croatian separatism. Macek was tried and on April 29 sentenced to three years in prison.” While Maéek was in prison, the vice president of the party, Josip Predavec, was apparently murdered by the police. Two other leaders, Krnjevi¢ and Kosutic, were in exile, and Ivan Pernar, another leading party member who had been wounded in Parliament in June 1928, was also in prison. Several former deputies of the party, subverted by the king, were serving the new regime. Thus, the Croatian Peasant Party was left without authoritative leadership, precisely the condition that the government desired. Macek gave secret instructions from prison that his followers should consult Ante Trumbi¢, the veteran Croatian politician, for directives when necessary, although he had joined the party only 2Culinovié, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 2: 13-14, 29-45. Tbid., pp. 56-80; Maéek, Struggle for Freedom, pp. 142-48; Boban, Macek, 1: 167-69, 184. In 1937, a leading Zagreb Freemason told me that the royal court had asked him to approach Maéek at the railroad station when the latter was being taken to Belgrade to tell him that if he (Matek) would only say that he recognized the Karadjordjevi¢ dynasty, he would immediately be released and the trial would not be held. Matek, known for his often biting aphorisms, told the intermediary to tell his principal, “Svaka rit dodje na Sekret” (literally “Every arse goes to the toilet”), meaning in this case that King Alexander’s rule would also end some time.

30 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS a few years earlier.” It was Trumbié who had drafted the Zagreb Punctuations. During the later part of Macek’s prison term, King Alexander maintained

contact with him through Ivan Subasi¢, a lawyer and former deputy of the , Croatian Peasant Party who, because he had volunteered on the Salonika front in the First World War, enjoyed the confidence of the Crown. The king was mostly interested in Macek’s views on the Croatian question. It also appears that he promised Maéek to review the whole Croatian problem after his return from a state visit to France in October 1934. But it was at the beginning of that visit that he was assassinated.” The assassination was the most notorious act of the émigré Croatian Ustashas, to whose activities we now turn.

THE EARLY STAGES OF THE USTASHA MOVEMENT The Ustasha movement was founded by Ante Pavelic, a leading Croatian nationalist, in 1930. Paveli¢’s anti- Yugoslav activities, however, had begun well before then. In June 1927, while on his way to Paris to attend an international meeting of municipal government representatives as a member of the Zagreb city council, he first stopped in Vienna, where General Sarkoti¢ and his colleagues arranged for him to meet a representative of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome after the Paris meeting. At about the same time, Ivo Frank in Budapest delivered a memorandum to the Italian envoy similar in content to the accord that he and Gagliardi had signed on July 5, 1920, in Venice with representatives of D’Annunzio. The memorandum outlined the aims of

the Croatian nationalists and asked for Italian assistance in their struggle against Yugoslavia and in the establishment of an independent Croatian state. Italy was known to be assisting other revisionist forces in the Danube Basin and the Balkans, working against Yugoslavia not only on its own borders and in the Adriatic Sea, but also through Albania, which had claims to the Kosovo region and western Macedonia, and Bulgaria, which had claims to most of Yugoslav Macedonia. The Croatian nationalists therefore had every reason to think that

the Italians would consider their memorandum favorably. The meeting between Paveli¢ and the representative of the Italian ministry took place in Rome in mid-July 1927. Paveli¢ submitted a copy of the memorandum that Frank had just delivered to the Italian envoy in Budapest, which in several ways presaged developments in 1941. Though it seemed designed to

enlist Italian aid for Croatian independence, the terms formulated by the Croats made Croatia little more than an Italian protectorate. In exchange for aid from Italy, the Croatian émigrés accepted a number of general principles and a set of specific obligations. They agreed that the Adriatic peoples— Croats, Montenegrins, and Albanians—in accord with the Italians should solve the eastern Adriatic problem. They recognized Italy’s dominance in the Adriatic “Maéek, Struggle for Freedom, pp. 150-51. ‘Tbid., pp. 152-54; Boban, Macéek, 1: 121-31.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 31 and Italy’s right to exercise its cultural influence and use the rich natural resources of the Balkans in exchange for industrial products. Finally, “the Croats were ready to adjust themselves to the Italian sphere of influence both politically and economically, as well as from the military point of view.” They recognized all the provisions of the treaties existing at that time between Italy and Yugoslavia, thus abandoning all claims to Istria, Rijeka, Zadar, and the Adriatic islands that Italy had annexed after the First World War, containing between 300,000 and 400,000 Croats. They also promised that, contingent on their assuming power, Croatia would cede to Italy the Bay of Kotor and any Dalmatian headlands of strategic importance, as well as bases on Dalmatian islands and the mainland, to guarantee Italy effective protection and military control of the Adriatic. Croatia would also renounce having its own navy, as long as Italy would protect the Croatian coast. It would grant Italy all the concessions necessary for utilizing economic resources in Croatia as well as across the Balkans, and it would not build another seaport for a specified time in order not to impede the development of Rijeka (Fiume).”

The Croatian émigrés also renounced their interest in any other part of Yugoslav territory. The memorandum suggested that the Slovene territory of Prekmurje and the Yugoslav areas of Baranja, Backa, and Banat should all belong to their parent country—Hungary—and that the independence of Montenegro should be supported. The Croatian émigrés were also willing to support Italian plans for a common frontier between Italy and Hungary, a plan possible only at the expense of the Slovenes and one that would have meant further encirclement of Croatia by Italy. All these promises were highly treasonable, to Yugoslavia and even more to Croatia. For centuries, a basic component of Croatian national policy had been to maintain a grip on the eastern shores of the Adriatic—Istria, the Croatian Littoral, and Dalmatia—to prevent the Italians from controlling the sea. Not only did the émigrés promise to abandon claims to undeniably Croatian territory already in Italian hands, but they were also prepared to cede additional

Croatian territory and most of Croatia’s sovereign rights to their powerful western neighbor. The émigrés’ schemes with Italy in 1927 might have borne as little fruit as those of Frank and Gagliardi with D’Annunzio in 1920, had the political situation in Yugoslavia not changed. But the assassination of Croatian leaders in Parliament in June 1928 and the death of Radi¢ the following August greatly strengthened the Croatian separatist forces. After the imposition of royal dictatorship in January 1929 and the prohibition on all political parties, Paveli¢ left the country for Vienna, supposedly to seek medical aid. In April he and a colleague, Gustav Peréec, a former Austro-Hungarian lieutenant colonel and later ‘6For this memorandum, see Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I documenti diplomatici italiani, 7th series, 5: 303-5.

32 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS a newspaperman, went to Sofia en route to Italy to make contact with the legal organization of Macedonian political émigrés. The two groups issued_a joint declaration pledging coordination of their activities for achieving full independence for Croatia and Macedonia.” During his brief stay in Sofia, Pavelic also had a clandestine meeting with the leader of the outlawed Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), Ivan Mikhailov, a declared enemy of Yugoslavia, with whom he made an agreement to cooperate against the Yugoslav state. Informers reported this to the Yugoslav authorities and Pavelic was tried in absentia on the basis of the Law on the Protection of the Realm for his association with Macedonian revolutionaries and his declared intention to work against the political and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. He was found

guilty and sentenced to death in July 1929.” , About a year later (the date is uncertain), Paveli¢ established the Ustasha movement, an organization dedicated to using all means, including terror, to achieve an independent Croatian state. This organization, modeled on the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, was the logical culmination of Paveli¢’s nationalist activities and he was the logical person to head it. The sentence of death for his threats and activities against the Yugoslav state enhanced his stature among nationalists both at home and in exile. It also became clear that he had both the financial backing and protection of the Italian government, whose Fascist principles he accepted by the late 1930’s, and the support of Hungary, where his followers, undoubtedly with the acquiescence of the Hungarian authorities, leased an estate called Janka Puszta for training armed units.” ‘7For the October 1928 memorandum, see ibid., 7: 40-42, and for the joint declaration in Sofia, ibid., 7: 392~—93. Paveli¢ was well known in Sofia because in December 1927 he had defended several pro-Bulgarian Macedonian activists in a Yugoslav court. For Pavelié’s brief stay in Vienna, see Krizman, Ante Paveli¢ i ustase, pp. 53-54. Vladeta

Mili¢evié, a Yugoslav police official ostensibly stationed in Vienna as a member of the International Police Organization but there in fact to observe political émigrés working against Yugoslavia, was informed about Paveli¢’s arrival and went to the railroad station to observe. Miliéevi¢, Der Kénigsmord von Marseille, pp. 30-31, gives January 14 as the date of Paveli¢’s arrival in Vienna, which in view of evidence presented by Krizman is erroneous. The Ustashas knew that a few of their colleagues were acting as agents of the Yugoslav police. *°R. Horvat, Hrvatska na muciligstu, pp. 445-47. For a collection of Paveli¢’s political writings, speeches, and statements before he went into exile, see his book Putem hrvatskog drzavnog prava, especially pp. 23, 34-39, 75-86. Discussions of the interwar Croatian political emigration can be found in Hory and Broszat, Der kroatische Ustascha Staat, pp. 19-38; Jeli¢-Buti¢, “Ustasha Activity up to 1941,” pp. 55-92; Coli¢, Takozvana Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska 1941, pp. 9-82; JelicButi¢, Ustage, pp. 13-40; and Krizman, Ante Pavelié i ustaSe, pp. 51-418 and the very

valuable appendixes, pp. 533-79. |

Paveli¢’s Fascist inclinations are best seen in his book Strahote zablude. The first edition was published in Siena, Italy, in 1938 and the second in Zagreb in 1941. Written from the Fascist point of view, this lightweight anti-Communist tract shows Mussolini in a very favorable light and mentions Hitler only in passing.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 33 With the establishment of the Ustasha organization, the new, numerically stronger, partly terrorist, and fanatical Croatian political emigration led by Paveli¢ eclipsed the original and numerically weaker Croatian political emigration led by Sarkoti¢, Dui¢ (until 1934), and Frank. The new emigration was a tool of Italy. Paveli¢ also had the full backing of Croatian émigrés such as Percec and Ivan Percevi¢, another former Austro-Hungarian lieutenant colonel, while the influence of Sarkoti¢ and Frank faded (Sarkoti¢ died in 1939 and Frank in 1940). Percec served for a time as commander of the Ustasha camp at Janka Puszta and became Pavelic’s deputy, but he was executed in February 1935 after the Ustashas learned that his mistress, Jelka Pogorelec, was a Yugoslav government agent.” Paveli¢ deliberately included terrorist features in the Ustasha program. He wanted to cause as much damage to Yugoslavia as possible. He organized training camps in Hungary and Italy, attracting recruits from émigré circles and especially from Croats working in Belgium, France, and other countries. Most of the organization’s funds came from the Italian government, though Croatian workers who belonged to pro-Ustasha organizations that were set up in Western Europe, Argentina, Canada, and the United States also contributed money.” Ustasha operations against the Yugoslav state began shortly after the establishment of the organization. Among other activities, the Ustashas planted time bombs on international trains bound for Yugoslavia. Some caused a few deaths and considerable material damage, while others were discovered in time and dismantled. They also fomented armed rebellion. In September 1932 a small uprising was staged in Lika in northwest Croatia with the help of Ustasha members who had secretly entered the country from Italy. The Yugoslav gendarmerie quickly crushed the uprising with extremely harsh means, which gave the incident a lot of publicity and possibly even some prestige to the Ustashas.® The Ustashas’ most famous terrorist act was the assassination of King Alexander and French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou in Marseilles on October 9, 1934. The gunman, Velicko Georgiev Kerin (also known as Vlada Georgiev Chernozemski), a Macedonian revolutionary, had been an instructor at Janka Puszta. Kerin was immediately killed by the French police, and three Ustashas, Mijo Kralj, Zvonimir Pospisil, and Milan (Ivan) Raji¢, who were waiting for the king at other points, including Paris, were caught and sentenced to life imSee A. Paveli¢, Hrvatsko pitanje, pp. 31-32. This pamphlet, first published in German in 1936, was meant for distribution in German-speaking countries. See also Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I documenti diplomatici italiani, 7th series, 7: 319. ‘IMili¢evicé, Der K6nigsmord von Marseille, pp. 39-43; Krizman, Ante Pavelié i ustase, pp. 128-29, 144, 159. °B, Lorkovi¢, Ustaski pokret, pp. 10-12; Coli¢, Takozvana Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska 1941, pp. 28-29, 68. *For the bombings, see Mili¢evi¢é, Der Kénigsmord von Marseille, pp. 37-39, and Krizman, Ante Pavelié i ustase, pp. 131-32. For the uprising in Lika, see Stojkov, “Lika Uprising,” pp. 167-80. See also Culinovi¢, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 2: 58-59.

34 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS prisonment by a French court. The same court also handed down sentences of death in absentia to Pavelic, Eugen Kvaternik, and Ivan Percevic¢ as the real organizers of the deed. The Ustasha émigrés thought that by killing King Alexander they had broken the back of the Yugoslav state and considered it their most

important achievement.” ,

The assassination brought the political difficulties of Yugoslavia into the international diplomatic arena. Prior to this time, the anti- Yugoslav activities of the émigrés in Italy, Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria had often been an issue in bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and these countries. But with

the assassination of King Alexander and Foreign Minister Barthou on French , soil, these activities became an issue of international diplomacy and a matter of debate before the League of Nations. Since France was trying to reach a political agreement with Italy, neither at the French trial of the Ustashas nor in the statements of the French delegate at the League of Nations did France mention Italy as a culpable party, although it well knew that the Ustashas in Italy had

planned the assassination and that the Italian government had supported them politically and financially for several years. No doubt under French pressure, Yugoslavia also refrained from naming Italy in its request to the League of Nations of November 22, 1934, asking that the matter be put on the agenda of the coming session. But Yugoslavia did accuse Hungary of partial responsibility for the assassination. Czechoslovakia and Romania, as immediate neighbors of

Hungary, supported Yugoslavia in notes to the Secretariat of the League. The Yugoslavs included a detailed account of the anti- Yugoslav activities of Croa-

tian political exiles in Hungary, as well as of alleged Hungarian activities prejudicial to Yugoslav interests and international peace. They charged that the criminals immediately connected with the assassination had been selected and

trained in Hungary and that they had used Hungarian passports. Bogoljub Jevtic, the Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs, implicated the Hungarian authorities again at the meeting of the League on December 7, 1934. _ Hungary, however, rejected Yugoslavia’s accusations. Tibor Eckhardt, the Hungarian delegate, denied that Janka Puszta had been a training camp for terrorists and that Hungary had any responsibility for the assassination. While 30 to 40 Croatian exiles had indeed leased Janka Puszta from a private Hungarian

citizen, the Hungarians pointed out that this was a simple matter of private law. Moreover, by April 1934, in response to Yugoslav government demands, “Mili¢evié, Der Kénigsmord von Marseille, especially pp. 52-85; Culinovi¢, Jugoslavija

izmedju dva rata, 2: 61-70; Krizman, Ante Paveli¢ i ustase, pp. 156-224. ~ , After the Ustasha state was established in 1941, Mladen Lorkovié, minister of foreign affairs, inquired about the three Ustashas imprisoned in France. The French Consulate in Zagreb, in a letter of July 1, 1942, reported that Pospisil had died in prison on August 14, 1940, and Kralj on May 16, 1941. See YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 20/5—3, Box 239. At

the intervention of the German occupation authorities in France, the third member of the group, Raji¢, was freed and, quite ill, returned to Croatia early in 1942, where reportedly he was killed on Pavelié’s orders. Krizman, Pavelié izmedju Hitlera i Mussolinija, pp. 211-12.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 35 the local authorities had started the gradual dissolution of the lease of Janka Puszta and by October 1 a new lessee had taken over the estate. Some Croatian exiles had left the country, some had obtained employment on farms in the area, and others had moved to the city of Nagy Kanisza in search of work. In the discussion at the League of Nations, most countries, with the exception of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, tried to smooth things over. This was clear from the resolution passed on December 10, 1934. It deplored the assassination of King Alexander and called upon all members not to toler-

ate terrorist activities in their territories. It pressed for the punishment of the Croatian émigrés, and it required the Hungarian government to submit a report on the measures it had undertaken against those culpable. Finally, it called for drafting an international convention against terrorism. The Hungarian government submitted its report on January 12, 1935, and the Yugoslav government, often contesting the report’s assertions, added its observations on March 25. Eventually, on May 25, 1935, with the approval of the Yugoslavs, the issue was removed from the League’s agenda.” Whatever the role of the Hungarian authorities in connection with the Us-

tasha terrorist group at Janka Puszta, after October 1, 1934, and the discussions at the League of Nations, only a few Ustashas remained in Hungary. Italy, although not accused of complicity in the assassination at Marseilles, was embarrassed by the matter. Though it refused France’s request for the extradition of Ante Paveli¢ and Eugen Kvaternik, it arrested both in mid-October and kept them in prison for about a year and a half. Subsequently, Paveli¢ was kept in

semidetention and later under surveillance in Siena and then Florence. The Italian government also ordered the disarming of all Ustashas in Italy, between 500 and 600 men. It interned the more important members in various localities in southern and central Italy and sent most of the rank and file to camps on the Lipari Islands. Mile Budak, the second most important Ustasha, was in charge of the camps on the Liparis. Because of the harsh life there, discipline deteriorated and dissension grew. Apprehension about the future greatly increased after Italy and Yugoslavia concluded a treaty of friendship on March 25, 1937, according to which the two countries undertook not to tolerate any groups engaged in activities directed against the other country. Outside Italy, various Ustashas, mostly intellectuals like Andrija Artukovié, Branko Benzon, Branimir Jeli¢, Mladen Lorkovi¢, and Vilko Rieger in GerIn addition to the already cited Yugoslav complaint of November 1934, see also the following League of Nations documents, all published under the general title Request by the Yugoslav Government Under Article 11, Paragraph 2, of the Covenant: “Communication

from the Hungarian Government,” Dec. 10, 1934; “Communication from the Hungarian Government,” Jan. 16, 1935; and “Observations of the Yugoslav Government on the Communication from the Hungarian Government, dated January 12, 1935,” May 20, 1935. Fora review of the debate on the assassination of King Alexander at the League of Nations, which includes long quotations from the above documents and a paraphrase of the resolution of December 10, 1934, see Krizman, Ante Pavelié i ustage, pp. 202-24.

36 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS many and Ivan Peréevi¢ in Austria, continued propaganda work, though without the support of the countries in which they lived.* (Lorkovi¢ returned to Yugoslavia in 1938 and was put in a concentration camp in 1940.) Some Ustashas remained in Hungary, among whom the most important were Marko | Do§Sen and Vjekoslav Luburi¢. A few were also active among Croatian workers in Belgium and France, and some second-echelon leaders traveled to the United States, Canada, and Argentina, engaging in propaganda, publishing, and fund-

raising activities. ,

Propaganda work included the clandestine distribution of pro-Ustasha, © anti- Yugoslav, and toward the end of the 1930’s also anti-Maéek leaflets and pamphlets inside Croatia. Some of this material was written by supporters in the country, well informed about the domestic political situation. Manuscripts were smuggled out for printing and then printed leaflets and pamphlets were smuggled back in for distribution. This activity was on a small scale, however. Its chief effect was to keep the Yugoslav authorities aware of the existence and

, continued activity of the exile Ustasha organization.” _ : | Since both the Ustashas and the Communists were opposed to the Yugoslav state and operated underground in Yugoslavia and in exile, we may ask whether they were in contact and collaborated with each other in any way. To answer this, we must first take a brief look at the Communists’ experience following the introduction of royal dictatorship. A month after King Alexander’s action, in February 1929, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, apparently basing its decision on its interpretation of the resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern and totally misjudging the prospects for revolution, issued a call to the workers and peasants of the country for armed struggle against the government. The regime responded by intensifying its crackdown against the

—56. |

“Undoubtedly they were known to and had some contact with the secret services of these countries. See, for example, the letter of March 20, 1939, from Joachim von Ribbentrop, German minister of foreign affairs, to Count Galeazzo Ciano, his Italian counterpart, in Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, p. 279. See also Biber, “The Ustashas and the Third Reich,” pp.

7 For a review of the Ustasha press in Croatia and abroad, see Coli¢, Takozvana

Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska 1941, pp. 67-70. | . A xerox copy of an anti-Ma¢tek pamphlet, entitled Za sto se bore Hrvatski UstasePavelicevci! (What the Croatian Ustashas-Pavelicites are fighting for!), is in my files. This © 15-page tract, without place or date of issue, was published as a critical answer to the Cvetkovié-Matek Agreement of August 26, 1939, and Maéek’s entry into the cabinet, which

will be discussed later.

See also the article by Lendi¢, “This Is How It All Started... ,” pp. 471-88. Lendi¢, a Croatian poet and journalist, otherwise always identified with Croatian Clericalist groups, admitted (p. 478) that he wrote at least one such propaganda leaflet. He sent the text to Hungary, whence printed leaflets were later smuggled into Yugoslavia and distributed. Lendié¢ did not indicate when he wrote it, but in October 1938 he was chief of the Propaganda Department of the Center of Catholic Action for the archbishopric of Zagreb. See his “Penetration of Marxism,” pp. 269-76, especially p. 269.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 37 party. By the end of April, the secretary general, Djuro Djakovi¢, had been ap-

prehended and killed. During the following three years many other leading Communists, including seven secretaries of the Communist Youth Organization, were killed, while scores of others were sentenced to long prison terms. Party membership fell from about 800 to about 400 by the end of 1929 and to about 200 by 1932.° Thus the Communists suffered even more severe government persecution than the Ustashas. As far as I have been able to ascertain, the only contacts between the Ustashas and the Communists were those among political prisoners, who generally took a united stand against prison authorities in matters of maltreatment, poor food, unsanitary conditions, and the like. Animated political discussions undoubtedly took place among Croatian nationalists, Ustashas, and Communists in prison, because some men who entered as Croatian nationalists, though not as sworn Ustashas, left as Communists. Perhaps the best known was Sime Balen, who entered prison as a Croatian nationalist and strong Roman Catholic, but left as a convinced Communist. Upon his release in 1935, under orders from the Communist Party, Balen became active as a newspaperman with the Croatian Peasant Party. His shift in allegiance became known after he rose to high positions with the Partisans during and after the war.” Italian charges in the spring of 1942 that Mladen Lorkovi¢, for some time foreign minister of the Independent State of Croatia, had been a Communist were undoubtedly circulated to discredit him, since he was at that time in disfavor for his strong pro-German views. Lorkovi¢ was cleared of the charges after a secret investigation by the Croatian police. But the German police attaché in Zagreb was able to establish that Lorkovi¢ was in close contact with several Communists between 1932 and 1934 and that even during 1941 and 1942, he had helped some Croatian Communists.” The Ustashas’ objective of breaking up Yugoslavia and establishing an independent Croatian state was shared by the Communists from 1923 to 1935, when, following the Comintern, they advocated dividing the country into a series of national Bolshevik republics. In this vein, the Communists praised the uprising led by the Ustashas in Lika in 1932. But they criticized the Ustashas for ®Colakovi¢, Jankovi¢, and Moraéa, Pregled istorije Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, pp. 152-60, especially p. 159, for the first drop in membership figures, and Marjanovi¢, Komunisticke partije Jugoslavije, p. 43, for the second.

“Information from a personal conversation with Mr. Balen in the summer of 1979. In 1948, Balen left the Communist Party, for two reasons. First, he disagreed with party authorities about the alleged guilt of Andrija Hebrang, the former secretary general of the Commu-

nist Party of Croatia, who was imprisoned in May 1948 and who subsequently was either murdered or committed suicide. Second, he sided with the Cominform in June 1948, an action, however, that he later recanted. A xerox copy of a Communist pamphlet that was edited and published by a convert from Catholicism, Nikola Rubéi¢, Robija—Zapisci hrvatskih narodnih boraca, is in my files. The main contributors were Sime Balen and Pavle Gregorié. ”Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5786, Frs. H300,766—-69 and H300,773.

38 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS | not appealing to the masses in the antigovernment fight. “The Greater Serbian military-Fascist dictatorship cannot be overthrown only by the actions of small groups without the participation of the broadest masses, not only in Croatian

but also in Serbian areas.””' The Communist Party also came out against acts of individual terror, such as the Ustashas’ assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles, although the party itself had practiced this kind of terror during the early 1920’s. It claimed that the ruling methods of the “Greater Serbian military-Fascist dictatorship were conducive to provoking individual terror,” but it repeatedly rejected such acts as instruments of petty bourgeois political struggle. Its strongest criticism was that Fascist or pro-Fascist groups and their leaders “such as Paveli¢ and Peréec had played and were playing the role of direct agents of foreign Fascism.

... National Fascism, be it Croatian or Macedonian, taken as a whole, was a tool and helper of Hitler’s, Horthy’s, and Mussolini’s Fascism... and an enemy of the proletariat and of the oppressed masses.” In fact, the Communists interpreted the assassination of King Alexander as a deliberate act of the Fascist powers to provoke war and stressed that their own chief objective was to struggle against the Fascists and the new war that they were preparing.” With such views as these, no real cooperation was possible between the Ustashas and the

Communists in exile. Moreover, after the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, following the Comintern, changed its policy in 193 5 and came out in defense of Yugoslavia as a unified state against the looming Fascist danger, the only point on which the Ustashas and the Communists had earlier agreed—the destruction of Yugoslavia—disappeared, and they became bitter enemies.

The Ustashas, however, did maintain limited contact with the Croatian Peasant Party. In Yugoslavia, Mile Budak, the leader of the Ustashas before he went into exile, was on friendly terms with Maéek and was a signatory of the Zagreb Punctuations in November 1932 issued by the Peasant Democratic Coalition. Abroad, the Ustashas had some contact with the two Croatian Peasant Party leaders in exile, Krnjevi¢ and Kosuti¢. Undoubtedly both organizations appreciated each other’s criticism of and activities against the Belgrade government, though the Croatian Peasant Party strongly condemned the Ustashas’ terrorist methods. But during the second half of the 1930’s, increasing differences between the Ustashas and the Croatian Peasant Party developed. Maéek refused to follow Budak’s suggestion (after the latter returned from exile) that the Croatian Peasant Party support the Axis camp. When Macek temporarily sought Italian assistance, he threatened the Ustashas’ monopoly on ”Proleter Reprint, pp. 162-63 (vol. 8, no. 28 [Dec. 1932]). This journal was published in various places, which were never indicated. A complete edition was republished by the Institute for the Study of the Workers’ Movement in Belgrade in 1968, with both original and new

consecutive pagination. _ ,

”Proleter Reprint, p. 319 (vol. 10, no. 8-9 [Sept.-Oct. 1934]), and Proleter Reprint, p.

335 (vol. 11, no. 1 [Jan. 1935]).

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 39 Italian support. Finally, Macek’s negotiations with Prime Minister Dragi8a Cvetkovi¢c, which led to the agreement of August 26, 1939, enraged the Ustashas, in whose eyes Macek had become a traitor to the cause of an independent Croatia.” Because the Croatian Peasant Party had the only effective political party organization among Croats, however, the Ustashas systematically pushed their adherents into it and worked to subvert its members. As we shall see, these tactics paid handsome but not sufficient dividends after the Ustashas were installed in power in April 1941.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LATE 1930’S During the 1930’s, even as Italy continued to plan the dissolution and partition of Yugoslavia and supported enemies of the Yugoslav state, it was pre-

pared to make a formal change of position when it saw the opportunity to achieve influence in Yugoslavia by peaceful means. Both Prince Regent Paul and Milan Stojadinovic, prime minister from 1935 to 1939, were increasingly friendly to the Axis powers, and on March 25, 1937, Italy and Yugoslavia signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression. Article 4 of this treaty, in veiled reference to the Ustashas, specified that the contracting parties would not “tolerate in their respective territories, or aid in any way, activities directed against the territorial integrity or the existing order of the other Contracting Party or activities of a nature that prejudice friendly relations between the two countries.””* The Yugoslavs took the opportunity to insist that the Italians proceed against the Ustashas. As a result, on the occasion of the signing of the treaty, the Italian envoy in Belgrade delivered a verbal note promising action. It declared that Paveli¢ and Kvaternik would be interned, some Ustashas would be sent to Italian colonies, the Italian police would inform the Yugoslav police where the Ustashas were interned and give them the names of the Ustashas who wished to return to Yugoslavia, and “an officer of the Yugoslav police will be

allowed to establish contact with the Italian police in connection with the above matter.”” The man selected for this task was Vladeta Mili¢evi¢, who had followed émigré activities in Austria and Hungary for many years and had assisted French authorities in investigating the assassination of King Alexander.

He had already managed to turn several Ustashas into his agents and had planted some of his own men among the Ustashas.”*

Following the terms of Article 4, the Italian government kept the Ustasha rank and file in detention camps off the Italian mainland. A small group of important Ustashas was transferred from southern Italy to Tuscany in the spring For relations between the Croatian Peasant Party and the Ustashas, see Macek, Struggle for Freedom, pp. 173-75. For Ustasha views about these relations up to 1937, see Kvaternik, “Trumbi¢’s Attitude,” pp. 236—5 5.

For this treaty, see Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, p. 301.

Tbid., pp. 71-74. *’Milicevic, Der Konigsmord von Marseille, pp. 33-46, 94-100.

40 | YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS of 1940. Paveli¢ continued to live under surveillance and enjoy an ample Italian allowance.” Mili¢evi¢, with the help of the Italian police and his own agents,

did his utmost to break up the Ustashas as a potential threat to Yugoslavia, mainly by persuading them to return home. Of about 500 Ustashas in Italy, 220 agreed to go back to their homeland, some with their families. The most distinguished among this group, Mile Budak, arrived in Zagreb in July 1938.” There is some indication that Prime Minister Stojadinovié expected that Budak’s return would not only weaken the Ustasha emigration, but also strengthen his own political standing in Croatia.” However, Prince Regent Paul was beginning to tire of the policies of the prime minister. On December 11, 1938, a new election was held in which the government list received 1,643,783

votes (54.1 percent) and the United Opposition list headed by Macek 1,364,524 votes (44.9 percent). But because of the bias in the electoral law, the

government obtained 306 seats in Parliament and the opposition only 67.” Prince Regent Paul, interpreting the vote as an insufficient mandate for Stojadinovié, dismissed him in February 1939 and appointed Dragisa Cvetkovié as prime minister. Thus, whatever Stojadinovi¢ expected from Budak’s return to Croatia could not be put to the test. However, Budak published a newspaper, Hrvatski narod, in Zagreb with a more or less openly pro-Ustasha orientation from February 1939 until it was prohibited in March 1940. During this time and until the invasion of Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, the activity of the Us-

tashas and of pro-Ustasha elements in Croatia increased. a , As Italian-Yugoslav relations improved and the fortunes of the Ustashas temporarily declined, Ma¢ek and the Croatian Peasant Party continued their search for a solution to Croatia’s problems through legal political means. The participation of the Croatian Peasant Party in the United Opposition in the

, election of 1935 led nowhere. So Macek turned to personal contacts, meeting with Prince Regent Paul in November 1936 and with Prime Minister Stojadinovi¢ in January 1937. His objective was to achieve the consolidation of all 77See two articles by Eugen Kvaternik, “Ustasha Emigration in Italy,” pp. 209-10, and “Words and Deeds,” pp. 57—58. For a list of Ustashas in Italy in the spring of 1937, with names, places of origin, years of birth, and occupations, according to data of the interwar Yugoslav Ministry of Interior, see Krizman, Ante Pavelié i ustage, pp. 564—74. According to data that Mili¢evi¢ collected in Italy, the Ustashas at that time could be classified by social class and profession as follows: 337 peasants, 77 workers, 35 seamen, 17 students, 12 merchants, 10 officers, 2 newspapermen, and 6 other professionals. See Jeli¢-Buti¢, Ustase, p. 35. These figures add up to only 496 men, while at the time there were apparently 510 Ustashas in Italy.

*Mili¢evic, Der Konigsmord von Marseille, pp. 88-100; Kvaternik, “Words and Deeds,” pp. 57-58; Boban, “A Series of Reports,” pp. 507-23, especially pp. 522-23.

”Krizman, Ante Pavelié iustage, pp. 301-9. .

%Culinovic, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 2: table following p. 130. For a detailed analysis of how the Croats voted in the election of December 1938, see Jantikovi¢, Hrvati u izbo-

rima II. prosinca 1938. -

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS AI Croatian territory into one unit and a reasonable degree of internal autonomy for Croatia within Yugoslavia. By November 1938, however, Macek realized that his efforts to reach an agreement with Stojadinovi¢ had failed. He then turned to Count Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, both to ascertain whether the close relations between Stojadinovié and Ciano boded ill for Croatia and to present his own case for Croatia and thereby exert pressure on Belgrade. On three occasions, in November 1938 and March and May 1939, Macek and Ciano, through agents, discussed Croatia’s relations with Belgrade and Italy. There was in principle nothing unusual about this contact with a foreign government; over the years the Croatian Peasant Party, through representatives abroad, had presented its case to several European governments. In a departure from the past, however, the contact with Italy resulted in a draft agreement that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to Macek for his signature (which he never provided). Apparently Amadeo Carnelutti, the Italian intermediary, explained to Ciano Macek’s desire for a federal Croatian state within Yugoslavia, which would include Croatia-Slavonia to a line running from Ilok to Srijemska Mitrovica, Dalmatia (without the Bay of Kotor), and that part of Bosnia and Herzegovina lying west of the Vrbas and Neretva Rivers. Ciano sent back word that he would like further details and suggested that the Croats ask for more territory.” For some time the matter rested. The Italians were well aware that Macécek had the support of a large majority of Croats, whereas Paveli¢ had only a small following. Thus it was in Italy’s interest to keep Macek on its side. In addition, should he become discouraged and turn to the Germans for help, that might lead to the direct or indirect presence of Italy’s powerful northern ally on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, territory that Italy itself coveted.” After Stojadinovi¢é was removed as prime minister, Macek initiated talks with his successor, Dragisa Cvetkovic. In March 1939 he also spoke to the Marquis Josip Bombelles, who like Carnelutti had connections with Ciano. Macek and Cvetkovi¢ soon arrived at a tentative agreement on the Croatian question, but in April Prince Regent Paul vetoed it because he disliked the provision for partitioning Bosnia. Following this disappointment, Macek asked Carnelutti to convey to Ciano the additional information that the latter had asked for in January. He also repeated Croatia’s terms: a federal state within Yugoslavia, with joint ministries of foreign affairs and defense (with the understanding that Croats would serve their military duty only in Croatian territory *‘IMacek, Struggle for Freedom, pp. 186-90; Ciano, Diaries, pp. 39-40, 48-50, 84-88, 91; Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, pp. 136-41; Culinovi¢, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 2: 136-47, especially pp. 143-46, where he reproduces the deposition of Amadeo Carnelutti before the Yugoslav authorities on March 4, 1946; Tasso, Italia e Croazia, 1: 179-82, 210-18; Martinovic¢, “My Recollections from the Great Times, II,” pp. 32-38; Boban, Macek, 1: 43 559 and 2: 79-140. Boban’s is by far the most complete and most objective discussion. Amadeo Carnelutti, an architect by profession, was a naturalized Croat whose father had been a building contractor in Zagreb. *Ciano, Diaries, p. 46.

42 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS under Croatian generals), a joint central bank, joint state monopolies, and joint

customs. The Croatian state would have a democratic form of government with secret balloting and the Croatian parliament would serve as a legislative body. The frontiers would be as previously stipulated, except that the line in Bosnia would be moved east to the Bosna River. After he delivered this information to Ciano, Carnelutti saw Maéek again two days later. He gave Macek the draft of an agreement that supposedly had been concluded between Ciano and Carnelutti himself as Maéek’s special emis-

sary and that the Italians wanted Macek to sign.” The purpose of the agreement, which the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had prepared and Mussolini probably approved, was to push the Croats into action against Yugoslavia. The

agreement stipulated that after the Croatian Peasant Party prepared for a revolution in Croatian areas, it would appeal to Italy for military intervention. Once the Italians occupied the country, Croatia would be established as a free state with fixed borders, federated with Italy. Macek would head the govern- . ment, though there would be an Italian viceroy, Croatia would share certain ministries with Italy, and Italy would initially garrison troops in Croatia. The question of a possible personal union between the two countries would be decided in the future. Finally, Italy would loan Maéek 21 million dinars to finance the revolution.” Maéek quickly informed Carnelutti that this agreement was not what he had in mind and, furthermore, “that this action had become superfluous because meanwhile he had reached agreement with the Cvetkovic government.”” The Italians had clearly misunderstood Maéek’s intentions by imagining that he would undertake a revolution with Italian backing, call in the Italian army to occupy the country, and accept an Italian viceroy—in other words, that he would allow Croatia to become an Italian protectorate. But Macek was not looking for a solution to the Croatian question outside of Yugoslavia. His behavior both before and after this incident proves that he never considered allowing Croatia to become a puppet state. He apparently used the talks with Ciano to apply pressure on the Yugoslav government. His-choice of intermediaries bears out this interpretation, for it seems reasonable to believe that if he had been serious in these negotiations, he would have relied on trusted party officials to represent him rather than men who had no connection with his party. The negotiations between Macek, the head of the Peasant Democratic Coa-

lition, and Prime Minister Cvetkovi¢ culminated in the Cvetkovic-Macek 83 According to Carnelutti, in Culinovi¢, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 2: 145. Carnelutti said that this happened toward the end of March, but other evidence puts it in late May 1939. “For this draft agreement in Italian, as acquired by German authorities (but incorrectly

dated April 26, 1939, instead of May 26, 1939), see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5786, Fr. H300,913. For the Serbo-Croatian translation, see Boban, Maéek, 2: 111. See also the paraphrase of the draft in Ciano, Diaries, pp. 87-88. ®5See Carnelutti’s statement in Culinovié, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 2: 146.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 43 Agreement (Sporazum) of August 26, 1939. This decreed the establishment of Banovina Croatia by consolidating the former banovinas of Sava and Primorje and a number of counties from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The new banovina

was autonomous in internal affairs. Macek became the first vice premier of Yugoslavia and several colleagues from the Peasant Democratic Coalition became members of the cabinet, which was headed by Cvetkovic. Ivan Subaiié, an important member of the Croatian Peasant Party who also enjoyed the confidence of the Crown, became the ban (chief executive) of Banovina Croatia. Undoubtedly the threatening situation in Europe—war broke out just a few days later—facilitated the conclusion of the Cvetkovic-Macek Agree- | ment, which the Yugoslav government thought might help consolidate and strengthen the country should it be drawn into war. While Maéek and his colleagues did not consider the Agreement as the final solution to the Croatian question, it was a great advance over previously existing arrangements and met

with wide approval among the Croatian people.” |

The conclusion of the Cvetkovi¢-Ma¢ek Agreement, as well as leaks about Macek’s earlier contacts with the Italians, infuriated the Ustashas. They felt that Macek’s agreement to participate in the Yugoslav government and accept the formation of an autonomous Banovina Croatia was tantamount to bailing out the Yugoslav state and therefore nothing short of treason. The Ustashas immediately launched a propaganda barrage against Macek and other leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party. One of their most outspoken pamphlets accused them of working against the vital interests of the Croatian people and cooperating with Serbs, Jews, and other enemies of the Croats. “To this Macek, all Serbs, all Slovenes, all Jews, all Communists, all Russians, all Freemasons, and all capitalists are closer than Dr. Paveli¢ and the Croatian nationalists, because since he has been sitting in the Belgrade government, the pressure on the Croatian nationalists—the Ustashas—not only has not stopped but has increased.”* The presence of Macek in the cabinet did not improve the political and economic situation in Croatia, though it was not for his lack of good intentions.

The outbreak of war in Europe only a few days after the signing of the Cvetkovi¢-Macek Agreement posed a grave threat to the country as a whole, as Maéek realized, and international concerns crowded out all other matters. In

the past Macéek had occasionally stated that in case of war with Italy, the Croats in the Yugoslav army would not fight. But after the Agreement, he became a defender of Yugoslav unity.” “For more details on the Agreement, see my book The Chetniks, pp. 22-25. ’7Za sto se bore Hrvatski Ustage-Pavelicevci!, p. 6. In fact, under the Cvetkovié-Macek regime, a sizable number of Ustashas and Communists were put in concentration camps for reasons of national security.

The Italians were always interested in this point. See, for example, Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I documenti diplomatici italiani, 7th series, 7: 127-28, and ibid., 9th series, 3:

141,155.

44 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS Since the Croats had expected an immediate improvement in their fortunes after the signing of the Cvetkovi¢-Macek Agreement, when things seemed to get worse, not better, the Croatian Peasant Party had to bear the brunt of the criticism from both the right—the Ustashas—and the left—the Communists. As part of the government coalition and as the controlling force in Croatia, the party had to deal with higher taxes, increasing inflation, growing government expenditures, a shortage of consumer goods, and the rationing of some commodities, all caused or exacerbated by the war in Europe and the fear that the war might engulf Yugoslavia too.”

The war did, in fact, provide Italy with the opportunity it had been seeking to acquire Yugoslav territory. Part of the grand plan of the Rome-Berlin Axis

for creating a “New Order” in Europe was dividing spheres of influence be- | tween Germany and Italy. Germany was to have a free hand in central and eastern Europe and Italy a free hand in the Mediterranean, particularly in | Yugoslavia and Greece. The Germans pointed this out to the Italians once again after they dismembered Czechoslovakia and took over the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia (March 15, 1939), ina message from the German ambas-

sador in Rome to Ciano on March 20 and a letter from von Ribbentrop to Ciano on the same day. A special point in these communications was that Ger-

many had no political interests in Croatia.” As if to match Hitler’s move against Czechoslovakia, Mussolini took over Albania on April 7-8, 1939, the first step of an expansionist drive in the Balkans. But Italy’s main objective was Yugoslavia. Ever since unification, the Italians had coveted parts of Slovene and Croatian territory and dreamed of reconquering what Venice had held for centuries. They hoped to get much of this with minimal risk and sacrifice, and they thought they had permission from Germany. Hitler explained to Ciano on August 12, 1939, apropos of the impending German attack on Poland, that Poland represented an acute danger for Germany that had to be eliminated. When Ciano suggested that Yugoslavia represented a similar danger to Italy, Hitler answered that “Italy should grasp the first favorable opportunity to dismember Yugoslavia and occupy Croatia and Dalmatia.””' Ciano also wanted to sound out France and England about Italian aspirations in Yugoslavia, possibly hoping to arrange a Yugoslav Munich, but Mussolini opposed this idea.” After the Italians were rebuffed by Maéek, they again turned to Paveli¢ and the Ustashas, whom they had been supporting for a decade as potential tools against Yugoslavia. The 1937 treaty of friendship and nonaggression with Yugoslavia did not hamper them from scheming against their neighbor. On aN good discussion of this period is in Boban, “Political Ferment,” pp. 225-66, especially Pp. 241-43, 250-64. See also Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 24-25. *Ciano, L’Europa verso la catastrofe, 2: 43-45.

"Ibid., 2: 83-84. *Ciano, Diaries, pp. 158-59, 183, 199-200.

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS 45 January 23, 1940, Ciano had a long meeting with Paveli¢ and the Marquis Bombelles, the link to the Ustashas in Croatia. They discussed how Croatia could be detached from Yugoslavia, with Italian armed forces brought in to make the separation effective, and connected by strong political, military, and economic ties to Italy. Ciano proposed a plan similar to the one he had outlined to Macek eight months earlier: the domestic Ustashas would start a revolution

against Yugoslavia in Croatian areas and after they had acquired control of Zagreb and the main cities, they would invite Italian forces in to help maintain the new state. From the Italian point of view, Croatia would be handed to them at virtually no cost.” Paveli¢ apparently accepted the plan in principle, though he was not able to guarantee that the Ustashas could carry out their part. His refusal to accept the plan outright may have been an attempt to reduce Italian demands. But there is

no doubt that he signified the Ustashas’ willingness to participate in Italian plans to usurp a large part of Yugoslav (or better said, Croatian) territory, if that would help him establish what he called an independent Croatian state. After the meeting, Ciano wrote in his diary: “Paveli¢ is an aggressive, calm man, who knows where he wants to go and does not fear responsibility for attaining his ends. We have fixed upon the principal points of preparation and action.” Many issues still remained to be settled, but the meeting marked the beginning of a new phase in relations between the Italians and the Ustashas. The Italians began preparing for military action against Yugoslavia as early as June 1940. On May 10, Ciano had another meeting with Paveli¢.” A month

later, probably at Paveli¢’s request, the Ustashas in Yugoslavia sent Ciano a memorandum appealing for Italian military aid in detaching Croatia from Yugoslavia and proclaiming an independent Croatian state under Italian auspices. According to Ciano, the memorandum (which no longer exists in the original Croatian) was signed by 66 members of the so-called Croatian National Committee for the Liberation and Reestablishment of the Independent State of Croatia, from all parts of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.” For the minutes of the meeting prepared by Filippo Anfuso, Ciano’s chef de cabinet, see Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I documenti diplomatici italiani, 9th series, 3: 162-64. For Bombelles’s understanding of what was discussed in the meeting, see ibid., pp. 164-66. Bombelles’s role has never been satisfactorily and clearly explained. He apparently enjoyed the confidence of Prince Paul and also had contacts with the British services, since according to a reliable source he traveled abroad during the second half of the 1930’s with a British passport (to which he was entitled because of a relative’s marriage to a British woman). Apparently he also felt safe with Paveli¢, because he went to see him after the latter’s return to Zagreb in mid-April 1941. But he was arrested in the anteroom of Paveli¢’s office and later taken to a concentration camp and savagely murdered. “Ciano, Diaries, p. 200. *STbid., pp. 247, 249.

"Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I documenti diplomatici italiani, 9th series, 4: 63132. Unfortunately the memorandum as printed, if genuine at all, does not include the names of the signers.

46 YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN THE WARS | Italy’s entry into the war against France on June 10, 1940, brought the planned Italian invasion of Yugoslavia to a temporary halt. As Ciano commented, if Mussolini did not intervene in the war against France soon enough, he would lose whatever spoils he might get at the expense of that country.” The Italian invasion of Yugoslavia, under code name E, was rescheduled for September. But in the meantime Hitler changed his mind about Italian aspirations in Yugoslavia. As late as July 7, 1940, he had assured Ciano that the question of Yugoslavia would be solved in a manner favorable to Italy. When he heard of Mussolini’s plan to invade the country in September, however, he indicated that Germany wanted peace on its southern border and had no wish to give the British an excuse to bring their air force to Yugoslavia.” Mussolini complied with Hitler’s views and deferred the invasion. In addition, he ordered a partial demobilization of the army, despite the objections of his leading generals, though they were also opposed to the invasion of Yugoslavia.” Then suddenly on Oc-

tober 28, without prior consultation with Hitler, Mussolini ordered Italian troops in Albania to attack Greece, and so the war moved into the Balkans. In November, Hitler, also acting in the name of Mussolini, began pressing Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact. The government of Prince Regent Paul

finally did so on March 25, 1941, a blow to the Ustashas’ plans for an independent Croatia.'” But their disappointment was short-lived, for the Yugoslav officers’ coup two days later precipitated the invasion of the country and insured that the services of the Ustashas would be used by the Axis powers. The

Ustashas’ time was at hand. — ,

*Ciano, Diaries, p. 249. France signed the armistice with Germany on June 22 and with

Italy on June 24, 1940. ,

*®Von Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, p. 105.

*Roatta, Otto milioni di baionette, pp. 118-19. Tt should be mentioned that Vice Premier Maéek strongly supported Yugoslavia’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact, believing that he was thereby helping to preserve peace and the territorial integrity of the country. But his colleagues in the Peasant Democratic Coalition, the leaders of the Independent Democratic Party who were also in the cabinet, strongly opposed it. Because of this difference in views on such a crucial question, the Coalition collapsed.

CHAPTER 2

The Partition of Yugoslavia

ee 9

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA To put the partition and occupation of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia into perspective, it is necessary to go back to Hitler’s reaction to the officers’ coup in Belgrade on March 27, 1941, and the organization of the government of General Dugan Simovié. Originally Germany, unlike Italy, was not interested in invading and breaking up Yugoslavia,

at least not as long as the country served German aims. After the middle of 1935, under Prime Ministers Milan Stojadinovié and Dragisa Cvetkovi¢, Ger-

many and Yugoslavia were on friendly terms. Germany became the chief trading partner of Yugoslavia, which served as an important source of food and nonferrous metals. Moreover, the Germans, and especially Hitler, recalling Serbia’s splendid military record in the Balkan Wars and the First World War, believed that the Yugoslav army was a strong force that would require considerable effort to crush, an effort that until March 1941 they were not willing to expend. A politically “coordinated” Yugoslavia, playing the role assigned to it, suited German interests well. But the revolt of March 27, 1941, changed this view. Carried out at British urging, the coup was a reaction to the decision of Prince Regent Paul and the Cvetkovi¢-Maéek government to join the Tripartite Pact two days earlier. It showed Hitler the necessity of subduing Yugoslavia militarily in order to eliminate any threat of British air force operations from bases in Greece and Yugoslavia against the southern flank of the German armies soon to invade the Soviet Union. At the same time, Hitler decided to destroy Yugoslavia politically by partitioning it.

To subdue and break up Yugoslavia, Hitler decided to use not only the forces of Germany and its allies Italy and Hungary, but also the dissatisfaction of a large number of Croats with their inferior position in the interwar Yugoslav state. Consequently, his directive for the invasion of Yugoslavia—Operation 25—stated: “Internal political tension in Yugoslavia will be increased by political promises to the Croats.” Yet the minutes of the meeting in Hitler’s office on the day the directive was issued indicate that German thinking on how

48 THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA to reward the Croats for their help was not clear. The minutes stated only that the Croats “will be assured of political treatment (autonomy later on).”' The Germans were also planning on the assistance of national minorities in Yugoslavia, especially the half-million strong Volksdeutsche, already fully under Nazi influence. A change. in German thinking about Croatia took place while Operation 25 was being prepared, under the influence of the activity of German agents in Zagreb and of Hitler’s diplomatic play with his allies. Eventually the idea of an independent Croatian state emerged. Initially, in a message to Regent Miklos Horthy of Hungary on March 27, Hitler suggested that Hungary should in some way absorb Croatia. But Horthy wisely declined the offer and so informed Hitler on March 29. In a conference on March 31 in the Abteilung Landesverteidigung, the Germans subsequently decided that Croatia would be given independence.’ That same day, von Ribbentrop ordered the German consul general in Zagreb to “Please inform Croatian leaders confidentially through

suitable intermediaries that we would provide for an independent Croatia within the framework of the new order for Europe, should the Yugoslav state collapse through its own mistakes. They could promote this goal most effectively by completely abstaining from further cooperation with Belgrade.”’ When German planes bombed Belgrade and ground forces invaded Yugoslavia on April 6, German agents continued their subversive work in Zagreb. On April 10, under their guidance, Slavko Kvaternik proclaimed the Independent

State of Croatia. ,

For those Croats who collaborated with German agents in proclaiming the new State, its territory was also to include the province of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But here too, German thinking was not clear. Point 6 of Hitler’s Preliminary Directive of April 12, 1941, on the partition of Yugoslavia declared: “Croatia within its ethnic frontiers will be an independent state. Germany will not interfere in its internal affairs.”* But what Hitler included in Croatia’s “ethnic frontiers” seems to have been only the pre-1918 province of CroatiaSlavonia, since Point 7 of the directive stipulated that the decision about the organization of the “remaining areas including Bosnia and Herzegovina” would be left to Italy. The order of General Franz Halder, chief of General Staff, of April 13, 1941, to the German 2nd and 12th Armies in the field in Yugoslavia

about the “administration of Yugoslavia” confirmed this in Point 5: “The Dalmatian coast including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro should be

1DGFP, 12: 274. .

*The Abteilung Landesverteidigung was the Wehrmacht department that, under the direction of the chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW), formulated Hitler’s war directives for the various departments of the Wehrmacht and other high Reich authorities. See

Kriegstagebuch, 1: 371, 881. . | — *DGFP, 12: 425. *Micr. No. T-77, Roll 1295, Fr. 814.

THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA A9 left to the Italian political decision. Renewal of an independent Montenegro can also be considered.”*

However, even while Hitler’s directive declared that Germany would not interfere in Croatian internal affairs and both it and Halder’s order specified that the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be left to Italy to decide, the Germans again revised their plans. They established a demarcation line separating German and Italian zones of occupation in Croatia that left most of the province of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the German zone (see Map 1 below). With minor changes, Foreign Ministers von Ribbentrop and Ciano accepted it at their conference in Vienna on April 21-22. This line (sometimes called the Vienna Line) was supposed to remain in force for the duration of the war. Just before the invasion, in March and early April 1941, the German consul general, Alfred Freundt, several German intelligence officers, and Walter Malettke, a special agent of Alfred Rosenberg’s Office of Foreign Relations of the National Socialist Labor Party, were active in Zagreb. They were joined on April 3 by SS Colonel Edmund Veesenmayer, representing the Dienststelle Ribbentrop. Veesenmayer was by far the most accomplished and successful expert on installing pro-Nazi governments in central and southeast Europe and was to play a leading role in developments in Zagreb during the following two weeks.’ Although the Ustasha movement was ideologically akin to the Fascist and Nazi movements, the Germans were more interested in having a government in

Croatia with popular support, which would allow them to control their zone with limited forces and exploit it peacefully, than in establishing a regime similar to theirs ideologically, but which had a small following and could not give assurance of governing in the manner the German military authorities desired. With these aims in mind, they tried to enlist Viadko Macek, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, in their cause. Macéek had the support of a majority of the Croatian people, was vice premier in the Cvetkovi¢ cabinet, and was known as a staunch supporter of Yugoslav adherence to the Tripartite Pact. Moreover,

the Croatian Peasant Party and its ally, the Independent Democratic Party (consisting mostly of Serbs from Croatia), controlled the administration of Ba-

novina Croatia and in particular the party’s paramilitary forces, so that the transition to a new regime under German tutelage would have been relatively easy. Finally, unlike Paveli¢, Macek was not an Italian agent. The Germans wanted Macek to proclaim an “independent” Croatian state and call in Ger‘Micr. No. T-77, Roll 1295, Fr. 811. ‘Prior to his assignment in Croatia, Veesenmayer played an important role in the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938 and the proclamation of the “independent” state of Slovakia in March 1939. After managing Croatia’s “independence,” he helped select and install General Milan Nedi¢ as prime minister of the Serbian government in August 1941. His last assignment was as plenipotentiary and envoy to Hungary after it was occupied by the Germans in March 1944.

50 THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA | man troops to effect the separation of Croatia from the rest of Yugoslavia. In this way, they would acquire a large part of Yugoslavia with no military effort and the remainder would probably crumble automatically. Influenced by German agents, the domestic Ustashas under Slavko Kvaternik, a former Austro-Hungarian lieutenant colonel, reportedly would have

accepted Maéek as head of the new Croatian puppet state.’ They were proGerman and there was every reason to think that if the German Wehrmacht was instrumental in creating the new Croatian state either by being invited in or by invasion, it would be better to have as its head a man selected by the Germans instead of Ante Paveli¢. Macek, however, refused German overtures. On April 3, he went to Belgrade to join his party in the putschist cabinet of General Simovi¢ as first vice premier. Since the Germans had admonished him to stay away from Belgrade, they may have interpreted his action as a resolve to preserve the country’s territorial integrity. At this moment, the Ustashas and their sympathizers repeated their charge that Macek was a traitor to his people. But Macek thought that by joining the Simovié government, which had declared its intention to honor the country’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact, he was helping to keep the country out of war and preserve its territorial integrity.’ His refusal to play the role of a German agent in wrecking Yugoslavia, a decision reached and maintained against tremendous pressure, testifies to his unwillingness to serve as a pawn in the Axis attack on Yugoslavia and to his faith in the victory of the Western democracies. It was only after Macek’s refusal that the

“ Germans threw their full support behind the Ustashas. Following the German bombing of Belgrade and the opening of hostilities on April 6, the king and the cabinet left the capital for what they thought was the comparative safety of the mountainous interior, intending to go from there into exile, since no one had any confidence in protracted resistance against the invaders. On the second day out of Belgrade, Macek informed Simovi¢ “that under no circumstances would he consent to go into exile.”’ He thereupon resigned his position, designated the secretary of the Croatian Peasant Party, Juraj Krnjevié,

as first vice premier and his representative in exile, and returned to Zagreb. Macek’s resignation was a severe political blow to the Simovi¢ government, since he had the strongest popular backing of all its members. Two other minis-

ters, also members of the Croatian Peasant Party, Ivan Andres and Barisa Smoljan, as well as the chief of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization and the sole

’Tudjman, Okupacija i revolucija, p. 72. , ’For Ma¢ek’s press statement after he decided to join the Simovié cabinet, see DGFP, 12:

448-49. The report of the German consul in Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry contains this statement, the report of German agent Malettke on his conversations with Maéek, and the latter’s categorical refusal to serve as a German instrument in wrecking Yugoslavia. See also Boban, Macéek, 2: 364-436.

*Maéek, Struggle for Freedom, p. 226. ,

THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA 51 representative of the Bosnian Muslims in the cabinet, Dzafer Kulenovic¢, also chose to remain in the country.

When Macek returned to Zagreb on April 8, the Germans had already decided to use Paveli¢ and the Ustashas as their agents in Croatia and Maéek’s

personal and political authority all but disappeared. On the same day, the Yugoslav military command in Zagreb asked him to send an emissary to the rebelling ro8th Regiment of the Slavonian Division in Bjelovar, not far from Zagreb, urging the soldiers to obey their officers, which he did. But the appeal

was of no use."” Macek also issued a statement addressed to the Croatian people: Croats! I have returned among you and would like to convince you of the following: the greatest possible misfortune that can occur to a nation has struck us— war. This evil can be mitigated only if we remain united and disciplined. You have so far followed me in hard times, and I am sure that you will continue to do so from now on. I shall remain among you and will share with you the good and evil. It goes without saying that I shall give instructions in each particular case as I have done up to now. This will be done either through our organizations or through special envoys who will be people’s deputies or other well-known leading personalities of our party. At this moment, I ask from you order and discipline, regardless of whether you are in the forces or at home."

Some Zagreb newspapers published Macek’s proclamation on April 9, but by then the influence of German agents, the Ustashas, and pro-Ustasha elements in the Croatian Peasant Party was such that those newspapers never reached the masses. But the proclamation provides further evidence that Macek did not support Ustasha efforts to disrupt the activity of the Yugoslav army and open Croatia to German forces.” He naively assumed that he still enjoyed the confidence of most Croats, that he was in a position to make significant political decisions, and that the orders he issued would be followed. Undoubtedly a majority of the people supported him, but a considerable number, especially in Zagreb and other cities, who had anticipated the creation of an independent Croatian state had already switched allegiance to Paveli¢ and the Ustashas. Thus Maéek and several other important leaders were left powerless and isolated. Though the Croatian Peasant Party had representatives in the Yugoslav government-in-exile, this did not help party leaders or members still in Croatia. '"Tbid., p. 228. According to a political portrait of Maéek drawn up in the British Foreign Office using information from Rudolf Biéani¢ and other sources in London during the war, Maéek took the initiative in sending his emissary to the rebelling division. But this assertion was obviously not true. See F.O. 371/44271, R 8642/11/92. 'Tudjman, Okupacija i revolucija, p. 73; Matek, Struggle for Freedom, p. 227. '2General Velimir Terzi¢’s assertion in Jugoslavija u Aprilskom ratu 1941, pp. 524-25, that Maéek left the Simovié government without informing anyone and went to Zagreb to meet the Germans is inaccurate. His attempt to malign Maéek is only part of his thesis that the Croats were responsible for the rapid collapse of Yugoslav forces in April 1941.

52 THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA The Croatian Peasant Party, which throughout the interwar period had been

the authoritative voice of the Croatian people, was crippled, with none of its | parts in a position to exercise any real political influence.

In view of later developments, another event at this time was also important. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the party’s secretary general, Josip Broz Tito, were then in Zagreb. On April 8, 1941, the Central Committees of the Yugoslav and Croatian Communist parties decided to send a delegation to the headquarters of the Yugoslav 4th Army to urge the military authorities to issue arms to workers to help defend Zagreb. Pavle Gregori¢, a member of both committees, went to the army command twice, but though he spoke briefly with the commanding general on the first day and with one of his aides on the second, he failed to convince them to arm

the workers.” |

After Macek rejected their overtures, the Germans threw their support to the Ustashas. Though they knew of Paveli¢’s pro-Italian stand, they relied on the pro-German attitude of many other leading Ustashas, especially the most prominent domestic Ustasha, Slavko Kvaternik. With this support, the Germans set about undermining the Yugoslav state from within and preparing a military attack on Croatia. In Zagreb Veesenmayer worked closely with a group of pro-German Ustashas and third-echelon leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party, who had already been planning the proclamation of a Croatian

state with German assistance. On April 10, learning that German forces were nearing Zagreb, Veesenmayer decided to arrange the proclamation of an independent Croatian state to coincide with the entry of German troops into the city. In the morning he saw Kvaternik and in mid-afternoon he persuaded Macek to give up his leadership and cooperate in the transfer of power. He then saw Kvaternik again to tell him that the time had come to proclaim the new state. Both went to Maéek, who, faced with the inevitable, cooperated in composing and signed a declaration that would be read over Radio Zagreb following the proclamation of independence by Kvaternik.'’ This done, Vee-

62. |

'3Gregori¢, “Entry of German Troops,” pp. 88-89. a

See Veesenmayer’s telegram to his ministry on April 5, which refers to an earlier manifesto by these politicians dated March 31, 1941, on the end of Yugoslavia. DGFP, 12: 461'SMatek only briefly described his encounter with Veesenmayer and Kvaternik on April ro in Struggle for Freedom, pp. 228-29. But he did relate how earlier, after he had decided to join the Simovi¢ cabinet, Walter Malettke, another German emissary, called on him and

told him that the time had come to “sever Croatia from Serbia.” Matek refused to go along, since it would have meant war, and Malettke, in taking leave, handed him a loaded revolver. Ibid., pp. 220-21. Count Paul Teleki, the Hungarian premier who opposed the invasion of Yugoslavia by Hungarian troops because he had concluded a treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia on December 11, 1940, was presented with an identical gift and obliged the Germans by committing suicide on April 4. For Slavko Kvaternik’s version of the events that led to Macek’s declaration on April 10, see his statement as a government witness at the trial of Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac in 1946, in Sudjenje ... Stepincu, pp. 362-63. At

THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA 53 senmayer and Kvaternik went to the Zagreb radio station, over which Kvaternik read the following proclamation at about 5:45 P.M.: Croats!

God’s providence and the will of our ally, as well as the hard centuries-long struggle of the Croatian people and the great efforts of our Poglavnik [Leader] Dr. Ante Paveli¢é and the Ustasha movement both at home and abroad, have determined that today, the day before Easter, our independent Croatian state arise. I call upon all Croats wherever you may be, and especially all officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates of the entire armed forces and public security forces, to maintain perfect order, to report to the commander of the armed forces in Zagreb or the place where you are now stationed, and to take an oath of allegiance to the Independent State of Croatia and its Poglavnik. As plenipotentiary of the Poglavnik I have today taken control of the entire government and command of all armed forces.”®

Soon after, Macek’s statement was read over the station: Colonel Slavko Kvaternik, the leader of Croatian nationalists in the country, has today proclaimed a free and independent state of Croatia in the whole historical and ethnic area of Croatia and has taken over the powers of government. I call upon the entire Croatian nation to obey the new government and I call upon all the followers of the Croatian Peasant Party who are in various positions of administration, all county deputies, all mayors of communes and their council members, etc., to remain at their posts and to cooperate loyally with the new government.’

With this unequivocal declaration, Macek abdicated his role as the political leader of the vast majority of Croats and approved the new puppet state. Clearly, Veesenmayer was the metteur en scéne of the political change in Zagreb and the drama was made possible by the collapse of the Yugoslav army and state under German attack. Without German tanks and bayonets on Croatian territory, no proclamation of a Croatian puppet state could have succeeded. The new state was the offspring of the Wehrmacht and German subversion experts. Veesenmayer’s role is best shown in his own report on April 11 to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs about his activities on April ro: the trial, Jakov Blazevi¢, the public prosecutor, asserted (p. 363) that before the collapse of the old Yugoslavia, Kvaternik and Maéek conspired with German agents against it. With respect to Maéek, all evidence proves that this accusation was false. The same must be said about Blazevi¢’s statement in January 1981 when he was president of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, on the occasion of the publication of the third volume of his memoirs, dealing mostly with the case of Archbishop Stepinac, that Ante Paveli¢ was brought to Zagreb in April 1941 only after the Germans had made the necessary arrangements with Matek and the archbishop “on what to do and how to do it.” See Sedam dana (Zagreb), January 31, 1981, p. 10. ’Coli¢, Takozvana Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska 1941, p. 91. The original text was in Veesenmayer’s possession. The above wording is from Martinovi¢, “My Recollections from the Great Times, II,” p. 48. Other sources corroborate this text.

54 THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA At noon on April 10 the first reliable reports reached me of the advance of German troops, for which reason I decided to act on my own without delay. At 3:00 P.M. there was another meeting with Kvaternik, during which I informed him that now the hour had come and I had resolved to call on Maéek in order to induce him to resign. Kvaternik was very pleased with this because this matter was his greatest worry, which he did not feel entirely able to cope with. From 3:30 to 4:00 P.M. the discussion between me and Maéek took place that, after some struggle, resulted in his stating that he was willing to withdraw and hand over the power of government to Kvaternik personally. Matek gave me his word of honor that he

, would carry out this decision. I went to Kvaternik without delay, informed him of this outcome, which occasioned tremendous rejoicing among the leadership of the nationalists, and took him to Maéek at once. There the statement of resignation and the transmittal of the power of government to Kvaternik was formulated and signed by Maéek. The original text is in my hands. In order not to lose any time, and because I had to reckon with sabotage if this decision should become known too soon, I succeeded with great difficulty in getting Kvaternik to go with me at

once to the radio station, where the solemn announcement of the decision regarding resignation and the assumption of government was made at about 5:45 P.M. Being an officer, Kvaternik wanted to go to meet the German troops in order to be the first to greet them. In the end, however, he did not reject my considerations of practical politics, and it thus came about that shortly before the entry of the first German troops the proclamation of a free, independent Croatia was made; this fact called forth tremendous rejoicing and the immediate decorating of the city with flags. An upshot of this was the subsequent welcome for German troops in a manner that would never have been considered possible, and General Kihn said to me that he had experienced something similar only in Linz [presumably on the occasion of the Anschluss of Austria to Germany in March 1938]. The initiative and execution during the hours described were exclusively in my hands. Thus it was possible to avoid bloodshed entirely and, at the same time, because of Kvaternik’s splendid preparatory work from the military point of view, to spare German troops time and blood. The faith and trust of the entire Croatian people in the Fiihrer and his Wehrmacht from the day of the start of the war against Serbia is moving. Since Kvaternik took over the government I have been at his side constantly and I am assisting him inconspicuously. I intend to continue to do this so that the existing elements of danger can be overcome more easily. However, I have not committed myself in any way as regards the interpretation of the

concept of freedom.” ,

There is no doubt that the Ustashas and many followers of the Croatian Peasant Party wanted an independent Croatian state. But the state they obtained was a puppet state, independent in name only. Two weeks earlier, Hitler had not even considered a separate Croatian state, and even after he had de'SDGFP, 12: 515-17. Veesenmayer may have overstated his role, but there is no doubt that he orchestrated the affair and that the Ustasha regime was indebted to him. A few days after he completed his job, Paveli¢ expressed special thanks to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs for his aid and requested his help “in the work of reconstruction.” Ibid., pp. 58081.In fact, Glaise, plenipotentiary German general in Croatia, in a letter to Colonel von Mellenthin of the Army High Command Attaché Department on November 26, 1941, called Veesenmayer “the leader of the [Croatian] fifth column and the founder of the Croatian state.” See Micr. No. T-501, Roll 268, Frs. 667-68.

THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA 55 cided to destroy Yugoslavia, he did not know exactly what to do with Croatia. Nevertheless, on April 10, 1941, the Croatian state came into existence, a part of Hitler’s “New Order” in Europe. Most revealing for its future was the last sentence of Veesenmayer’s report, in which he refrained from committing himself “in any way as regards the interpretation of the concept of freedom.”

The “splendid preparatory work from the military point of view” that Veesenmayer praised Kvaternik for was largely done by General Staff Colonel Franjo Nikolic, chief of staff of the Yugoslav rst Group of Armies, the 4th and 7th Armies deployed in northern Croatia and Slovenia, respectively. Leaving his post early on April 10, Nikolic laid before Kvaternik a plan for neutralizing the 4th Army command. He carried out this plan by returning to his post and directing 4th Army units in the vicinity of Zagreb to either cease operations or move to innocuous positions and wait, since armistice talks with the Germans were already under way. In this fashion, armed resistance against the Germans moving on Zagreb was reduced or eliminated and, above all, any danger that Yugoslav troops around Zagreb might foil the plans of Kvaternik and Veesenmayer was averted.” Additional preparatory work included the limited fifth-column activities of a few Croatian officers in the Yugoslav army and air force, preparations among the Civic and Peasant Guards, most of whose officers and men transferred allegiance to the Ustashas at this time, and two speeches by Pavelic¢ over the radio from Florence (see below). One 4th Army unit—the ro8th Regiment of the Slavonian Division, stationed at Bjelovar—refused to move toward the front on

April 8. The Ustashas and their sympathizers from the Civic and Peasant Guards succeeded in disarming and capturing the staff of various 4th Army units, including that of 4th Army Headquarters. The Ustashas apparently killed a number of Serbian officers and men of the 4th Army in these actions.” While waiting for Pavelié to arrive, Kvaternik, together with leading domestic Ustashas and dissidents from the Croatian Peasant Party, set up a rudimen-

tary administration for the new state in those areas of the country that were under the security umbrella of German troops. On April 12, he established an interim government—the Croatian State Leadership—under the chairmanship of Mile Budak, consisting of Budak (who was in the hospital), Budak’s deputy, seven other members (one a Bosnian Muslim), and four delegates of his own (for economy and finances, railroads, the army, and Dalmatia).”’ Kvaternik also issued several laws and decrees, the most important being a law on the orFor Nikoli¢’s activities on April 10, see a series of articles that were written or inspired by him but do not mention him by name, entitled “On April 10, 1941, Zagreb was Saved from Bombardment in the Last Moment by the ‘Yugoslav’ Artillery” (in Serbo-Croatian), in Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), October 10-13, 1941. See also an early November 1941 report from General Vilko Begi¢, undersecretary in the Ministry of the Army of the Independent

State of Croatia, to Glaise, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Frs. 782-84. | ~Terzi¢, Jugoslavija u Aprilskom ratu 1941, pp. 498-99. ~ *"TFelié-Buti¢, Ustase, p. 75.

56 THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA

and Italy. ,

ganization of the Croatian army (see Chapter 10). The war on Yugoslav territory continued officially until April 17, when representatives of the Yugoslav army in Belgrade signed the document of unconditional surrender to Germany

On the same day that the Croatian puppet state was proclaimed, Macek tried to withdraw to his farm in Kupinec near Zagreb, but was returned to the city by German soldiers. Subsequently, according to Macek, he was interrogated by a high Gestapo official and again offered the leadership of the new state. He later wrote: “I extricated myself as well as I could from this situation by underlining my reputation as an incorrigible pacifist who had no desire for

: any political activity during the war.”” If these events are true—and there is no reason to doubt that they are—they show with what great reluctance the Germans accepted Pavelié as head of the new state and how much they would have

preferred to have Macek even after the state was proclaimed in Paveli¢’s name. , This was because the Germans knew that Paveli¢ had a small political following and suspected that he was an Italian agent. After this interview, the Germans allowed Maéek to leave for his farm but ordered him not to move or re-

turn to Zagreb. ,

Macek’s statement over the radio undoubtedly gave some of his followers and almost all officials (except Serbs) of the former Banovina Croatia an excuse

to side with the new government. The Ustashas and those former Croatian Peasant Party members who had joined them even before April 10, 1941, already maintained that Macek, by concluding the Cvetkovi¢é-Macek Agreement of August 26, 1939, and participating in the Belgrade government, had saved __

Yugoslavia and in so doing had lost the confidence of Croats who wanted an | independent Croatian state. Ma¢ek’s decision to join the Simovié government had further enraged the nationalist Croats, to whom he became a traitor.” It was especially important to the Ustashas in their seizure of power that the two paramilitary organizations of the Croatian Peasant Party, the Civic Guards (Gradjanska zastita) and the Peasant Guards (Seljacka zastita), especially the former, sided almost completely with them. In the first crucial days and weeks, the guards helped to disarm several units of the Yugoslav army and to establish some degree of control over much of the territory of the new puppet state under the security umbrella of the German and Italian armies.” But the Ustashas did

Matek, Struggle for Freedom, p. 230. , 8See the telegram of the German consul general in Zagreb to the Foreign Ministry on April 4, 1941, in DGFP, 12: 449. On the alienation of some Croats from Maéek during the two years before the invasion of the country, see also Jareb, Pola stoljeca hrvatske politike, pp. 71-81, and Boban, “Political Ferment.” _ *The Croatian Peasant Party established the Civic and Peasant Guards after the 1935 parliamentary election, when the party again showed great electoral strength. Their overt purpose was to guard Mac¢ek, help implement the decisions of the party, and act as a countervailing force to various progovernment organizations in Croatian territory, such as the (pre1941) Chetniks and the National Defense Organization, which sometimes engaged in terror-

THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA 57 not trust the guards. As soon as they organized their own party militia and took

control of the police, they incorporated some guard units into the nascent regular army and disbanded others altogether.

While Hitler was orchestrating the alliance against Yugoslavia and assembling forces for the campaign and German agents in Zagreb were busily preparing to detach Croatia from the Yugoslav state, Italian forces were readying their own operations against the country. Mussolini personally took charge of activating Paveli¢ and the Ustashas, now that the opportunity for which Italy was supporting them had arrived. On March 29, Mussolini received Paveli¢ for

the first time, at his private residence, the Villa Torlonia. Filippo Anfuso, Ciano’s chef de cabinet, who was acting minister of foreign affairs while Ciano was in military service, was the only other person present.” According to Anfuso, Mussolini’s principal concern was with Italian rights in Dalmatia. Paveli¢ acknowledged his earlier obligations and fully reassured him in this respect.” The two men also discussed several other matters of immediate interest to the Ustashas. First, Paveli¢ requested that the Ustashas interned on the Lipari Isist activity against the Croatian population. Their covert aim was to serve as the nucleus of a Croatian army once Croatia had gained enough autonomy within Yugoslavia to have its own separate force. Guard members were men between 25 and 50 years of age who had completed military service. The commanding staff was recruited from former Austro-Hungarian officers who had participated in the First World War and who were later retired by the new Yugoslav state or simply not taken into the Yugoslav military. The exercise manual was written by retired Lieutenant Colonel Slavko Kvaternik, Zvonko Kovaéevi¢, another retired officer, and Major Ivan Babié, at that time on the Yugoslav General Staff. At the end of 1940, the guards had about 142,000 members. These data are from a series of articles by Batusi¢, “The Croatian Peasant and Civic Guards,” in Drina (Madrid), an organ of General Luburi¢’s wing of the Us-

tashas in exile. I had only the installments listed. On the basis of a special decree by the autonomous government of Banovina Croatia, Civic Guard contingents in Zagreb had the status of an auxiliary police force. This undoubtedly increased their standing and made it easier for them to obtain arms, ammunition, and other supplies, as well as important information. ’There are only two important sources on Paveli¢’s activities between the officers’ coup in Belgrade on March 27, when the Ustashas’ main objective, the establishment of a Croatian state, became imminent, and his return to Zagreb on April 15 after twelve years in exile. These are Filippo Anfuso and Eugen Kvaternik. Anfuso wrote from memory, provided no dates, and implied that only one meeting occurred between Mussolini and Paveli¢. Kvaternik wrote that there were two. For Anfuso’s story, see Du Palais de Venise, pp. 142-53, and Roma Berlino Salo, pp. 184-97. The second version is a little different from the first. Eugen Kvaternik, Slavko’s son, also known as Dido, was a member of Paveli¢’s immediate entourage in exile. His main contribution on this period is “Ustasha Emigration in Italy.” Because Paveli¢ unceremoniously removed both Kvaterniks from their posts in October 1942, this article, as well as others cited elsewhere, displays a clear anti-Paveli¢ and anti-Italian bias.

Paveli¢é never wrote about his meetings with Mussolini, nor did he confide in even his closest associates about what was discussed. In fact, if at all possible, Paveli¢ attended all meetings with German and Italian officials as the sole representative of the Croatian side. 6 Anfuso, Du Palais de Venise, pp. 143-44.

58 THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA lands and elsewhere be released to join him, which Mussolini immediately agreed to. Second, an Italian liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel Domenico Sangiorgio, was assigned to maintain contact between Paveli¢ and the Italian military in Rome and in the field. He met with Paveli¢ for the first time on April 6. Finally, Mussolini put at Paveli¢’s disposal a radio station in Florence for late evening broadcasts. This was put to immediate use.

Within a few days of the meeting with Mussolini, Paveli¢ broadcast two speeches and sent two proclamations to the Croatian people over the Florentine station, which operated as the Ustasha station Velebit. These announced that the hour of Croatian liberation was at hand, attacked Serbian domination of the old Yugoslav government and those Croats who had cooperated with the Serbs, praised the friendly and liberating German and Italian forces, and described in glowing terms how wonderful life would be in the new Ustasha state. Paveli¢ appealed to Croatian soldiers in the Yugoslav army to “remove Serbian officers, pledge allegiance to the Ustasha flag, and turn your rifles against those

who had captured the Croatian people, desecrated all things sacred to Croats, | and taken over Croatian homes and Croatian land.”” On April 10, 1941, Supreme Ustasha Headquarters used the station to order the domestic Ustashas to form units in order to take over all government offices and communications, disarm the gendarmerie and any Serbian military deserters, and apprehend all people considered traitors and enemies of Croatia, as well as other unreliable persons. They were also directed to preserve peace and order and prevent plundering.” Meanwhile, the Ustashas detained on Italian soil were released and sent to Pistoia (about 50 kilometers northwest of Florence), where they were issued Italian uniforms and light arms. On April ro, they were visited by Pavelic and learned over the radio of the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia. At this point, events began to move rapidly. On April 11, Mussolini received Paveli¢ a second time, this time at his official residence, the Palazzo Venezia. Anfuso was again the only other person present, although the young Eugen Kvaternik (Slavko’s son) had accompanied Paveli¢é to Rome. Dalmatia was again apparently uppermost in Mussolini’s mind, whereas Paveli¢ had many other problems, chiefly, in Anfuso’s view, that he would return to his country looking like a traitor because of the concessions he was promising Mussolini.” But no written document was composed or signed obligating Paveli¢ to consider Italian rights in Dalmatia once he became head of the Croatian state, though the new state was understood to be in the Italian sphere of influence. The Ustashas assembled at Pistoia traveled by special train to Trieste, where they were temporarily housed in military barracks. Paveli¢ also made his way ”For the texts of these broadcasts, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 2/15, 1-8,

Box 85, especially Reg. No. 2/15, 1. |

8Y A, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 37/1-1, Box 114b. ”Anfuso, Roma Berlino Salo, pp. 186-87, and Du Palais de Venise, pp. 144-45.

THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA 59 to Trieste, stopping briefly at Gorizia to see General Vittorio Ambrosio, the commander of the Italian 2nd Army, which a few days earlier had begun operations against Yugoslav forces. In Trieste, Paveli¢ and the Ustashas were provided with buses and a few automobiles, and on April 13 at 2:10 A.M. they entered Croatian territory at Susak and proceeded toward Zagreb. The column of vehicles stopped for short breaks in several towns along the way, where Paveli¢

made brief speeches. At Karlovac, some 50 kilometers southwest of Zagreb, they were met by a German general, who requested that Paveli¢ come to Zagreb as soon as possible. They were also met by a Croatian delegation led by Slavko Kvaternik and accompanied by Veesenmayer.” And the next day they were sought out by Filippo Anfuso, whom Mussolini had sent in search of Paveli¢.

Although Italian rights in Dalmatia had been Mussolini’s chief concern at both of his meetings with Paveli¢, in response to which Pavelic apparently gave clear oral promises, the lack of a written document confirming these promises disturbed the Italian leader. While he trusted Paveli¢ and thought that he was “our only pawn on the Balkan chessboard and we should not let him escape,” Mussolini was afraid of what the Germans, already in Zagreb, might let Paveli¢ do once he returned. Consequently, he felt that it was essential for Paveli¢ to give a “public and solemn declaration” recognizing Italian rights in Dalmatia

before the Axis powers recognized his government and thus before the Germans might act.*' On April 14 Mussolini sent Anfuso posthaste to obtain sucha declaration from Paveli¢. Anfuso flew to Zagreb and then to Karlovac. Apparently after considerable argument, the two men composed a telegram to Mussolini in which Paveli¢ acknowledged that Italian rights in Dalmatia would be taken into consideration in the establishment of Croatia’s new frontiers. But Paveli¢ insisted that the telegram first be cleared with Berlin. After German approval was obtained, the telegram still could not be sent because telephone and telegraph connections with Rome were interrupted. Anfuso therefore personally took the telegram to Mussolini.” At the same time, Paveli¢ asked Mussolini and Hitler for official recognition of the Independent State of Croatia. *Kvaternik, “Ustasha Emigration in Italy,” pp. 231-37. For the recollections of another Ustasha who was at Pistoia and returned with Paveli¢ to Zagreb on April 15, 1941, confirming in all essentials Kvaternik’s narrative, see the interrogation of Ante Moskov by Yugoslav authorities in May 1947, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 1/4, Box 9 I. O., pp. 2631. Moskov was the commander of Paveli¢’s Personal Guard.

Anfuso, Du Palais de Venise, pp. 147-48; idem, Roma Berlino Salo, p. 191. Anfuso wrote that Paveli¢ had obligated himself more formally on the issue of Dalmatia than he did at the meeting at Villa Torlonia (Du Palais de Venise, p. 147), but it is not clear to what occasion he was referring. He could hardly have meant the memorandum that Paveli¢ delivered to a representative of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1927 (see Chapter 1), because it had not been sufficiently formal to satisfy the Italians. 2Anfuso, Du Palais de Venise, pp. 152-53. According to Kvaternik (“Ustasha Emigra-

tion in Italy,” pp. 241-43), Veesenmayer ordered German soldiers, who at that time controlled the telephone and telegraph lines in Croatia, to disconnect the lines to Rome.

60 THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA Because Paveli¢ and his entourage in Karlovac were concerned about his. safety in Zagreb, they decided to move into the city not during the day, but at night. Thus in the small hours of April 15, without fanfare and through empty streets, Paveli¢, his assistants, and 200 to 300 Ustashas in Italian uniforms with light arms moved into Zagreb in Italian trucks and occupied the former residence of the Croatian bans. I suspect, however, that another consideration also _ favored a nighttime entry. After the German army had broken through Yugoslav defenses in Macedonia in the south, Paveli¢ had announced in a radio © broadcast that German and Italian forces in the northwest had started to move, which would lead to the dispersal of the Serbian army in Croatia, and he had called upon the Croatian people “to meet the brave soldiers of our friends and protectors with joy, jubilation, and respect.” “With them,” he had added, “your sons also, the Croatian Ustasha army, are coming into your midst with rifles in their hands, bravely fighting.” But revealing to the Zagreb public that the Ustasha army consisted of only 200 to 300 men would not have impressed

it at all. ,

Thus on April 15, 1941, Paveli¢ came to power, albeit a very limited power, in the new Ustasha state under the umbrella of German and Italian forces. On

the same day, Hitler and Mussolini granted recognition to the Croatian state and declared that their governments would be glad to participate with the Croatian government in determining its frontiers.’ As we shall see, reality in , the Ustasha state proved quite different from the glowing promises that Paveli¢ made in his broadcasts and from the expectations that many Croats had when they celebrated the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia. The German plenipotentiary general in Croatia, Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, arrived in Zagreb on April 15 and the German envoy, Siegfried Kasche, presented his credentials to Paveli¢ on April 22. The Italians were slower in appointing representatives. The special representative, Raffaele Casertano, arrived in Zagreb around April 20 and presented his credentials as envoy on July 3. Glaise’s counterpart, General Giovanni Battista Oxilia, together with the - Military Mission under his direction, arrived in mid-June. The oral directive

that the state secretary in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ernst Waizsacker, gave to Kasche before the latter left for Zagreb illustrated the offi-

cial German attitude toward both Italy and the Croatian state: © , Subject to such instructions as he [Kasche] would receive from the Foreign Minister or from the Fuhrer himself, I said that I wanted to draw his attention to a sin-

gle though important point. It was in the nature of things that the Croats and Italians would not get along well with each other. It was therefore certain that the Croats would come to Kasche, as he was the German Minister, and attempt to

BY A, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 2/15, 4-5, Box 85. . | “For these telegrams, see Italy, Stato Maggiore del R. Esercito, Ufficio Propaganda, Bollettini della guerra, pp. 500-501.

THE PARTITION OF YUGOSLAVIA 61 make him the arbiter in the disputes between themselves and the Italians. As long as the war continued we would absolutely have to spare Italian sensibilities. If we therefore should become involved in deciding disputes between the Italians and the Croats, we would in each instance have to decide in favor of the Italians. As a result the Croats would be disgruntled, and there was no reason whatever why we should take this burden upon our shoulders. Therefore Kasche should keep his hands off these matters and let Italian hegemony in Croatia prevail to the extent that this was in harmony with our own interests.”

THE PARTITION OF THE COUNTRY Once Hitler had made the decision to destroy and partition Yugoslavia, he was intent on accomplishing five territorial objectives: (1) rounding off the Greater Reich by occupying for later annexation the northern part of Slovenia, an area inhabited by a population that according to Nazi ideology was amenable to speedy Germanization; (2) temporarily occupying part of Yugoslavia, in particular Serbia proper, which was important in the Balkan area because of its communication lines and large supplies of strategic nonferrous metals; (3) satisfying the territorial aspirations of both Italy and the minor partners, Hungary and Bulgaria, and in this way rewarding them for playing the roles assigned to

them; (4) satisfying the Croatian Ustashas’ proclivities for an independent Croatian state as a reward for their role during the invasion of Yugoslavia; and (5) of vital concern, preserving and, in fact, extending “Germany’s special economic interests in territories in the former Yugoslav state.”* Map 1 shows the partition of Yugoslavia. Germany occupied the greater part of Slovenia, excluding the city of Ljubljana but including the northwest area of the province to the Italian border and the area from a line about ten to fifteen kilometers from the right bank of the Sava River to the former Austrian border and east to the new Croatian and Hungarian borders. Germany decided

unilaterally what it wanted of Slovene land, informed the Italians, and expressed the hope that they would be satisfied with the remainder. In fact, during the first few weeks before the new border was fixed, the Germans changed it several times to their own advantage. Italy annexed the remainder of Slovenia and called it the Ljubljana Province (Provincia di Lubiana). Italy also annexed some Croatian territory in the hinterland of Rijeka (Fiume), a large part of Dalmatia including most of the Adriatic islands, and the Bay of Kotor. Further, Italy occupied Montenegro, which was supposed to become a separate kingdom attached to Italy as a vassal state.

Italian-ruled Albania annexed the western part of Macedonia, most of the Kosovo region (or the Kosovo-Metohia region as it was called at the time), a SDGFP, 12: 605-6. Kasche barely escaped liquidation during the purge of Ernst Roehm and his group on June 30, 1934. But he soon rehabilitated himself and ended up as envoy to the wartime Croatian state. See Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, p. 143. *DGFP, 12: 632.

_: ZY ©fy

vt < — Q oc . 3 (// anct. | =)SLA vy .

S 1 LAO/

_— ——— za oO Va Vv ! UA . A

Z . \LAOF Te Sas oc s » ‘S £1] Ik Ly 2 Ba

. 2\\ NOSBIR WS Pere ee ZYlak re QO). \NESTERN| . on MY CEDON,, BWBONS BVN CRG! 8StRL = ws ON ‘NS a 8 | BNR WS8 YN, iF “i5 . SW NASH 'N YS«aN s2 al faye LOO AS oU Ve || — co aa —_—~¢5 mad i fees cam ron ef j

"a> |ij} (——— asLia faa ¢js OCA>|88°28 6% 2292B||| ae ecm \ NS) © ££| te Sa gw mn oO I We Sy Wi Sa | OS ZSaS = | | -—-——_——— => Wis \( oN a us 2 Go #

x—MX, z| oss Or. |Cog a» =& treDO] Bz || | || WS WH qa:»ia8@#ees6ge oO Z SS N’ f x \ 5 1 5 ogo6 & w > || ' ro) OX \ f | ys 8 OV CG 2 Cc

| EWS | Otatyst os || | RS SS SXwr. wk) ¢ i fod | Mura / | QS oftSS aNPSYC N iafoo ean {[{?DO ff wa io |

|| NS ASS Y . oN wer B | ‘ A SS . » A i = : 3 EN | NM ¥e. © ONIN WSWE SS A1¢i & &~*~ GX 22| = . NS = » ) AZ 3\\ Ss =) |i| \NY c : EN WS f. mt | Ra eS OV NY: oF. Ns: SS.-— Sy © 2ULL =) ¥RE :2EN .YY __—C' Vo AN -» N||| fX A\ IAA SS VUVy siioewot SS VAGHAAA | Ya oc * SE \ sig. = ‘€§.s &% ~

|

tWS . : . WS oP ok oc7|gof | | » St . 5, , @ W > .=2=hoS (- SS FE

|| -Ye EX DNS Se ' oo oS a Ee ee c WS iS) S$ Vo be — . 4 oO | < LZ SSN See

i \

rae Oy | ; O08 hare o ’ ro WY | Cy é ; aN fy \ \ — O cond fl fo . | CS ere * — a ||| a__f 7i ( QVe a.ra Lf a a, a ft— /\°“oe ).:ae Ne = e a . Ee j= Se a 4 £7 Fan of LO \ , \— A 68 “, ; rie S \ FO & 3 o/ rnA/i a f ‘4 XS * \ et J ° as A " _ y . 2 ake - 3) a on S \ Y

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 85 The proponents of annexation felt that many Slovenes in the occupied areas were “people very close to the Germans.” Hitler had ordered his officials “to make these lands German again” and they immediately went to work. Already on April 12, 1941, Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Reich Security Police and Security Service (SD) and the official supervising the implementation of German population policies in Lower Styria, established a special Staff for the Re-

settlement of the Population in the office of the commander of the Security Service for Lower Styria. On April 18, Heinrich Himmler, Reichsfiihrer SS and chief of German police, in his capacity as Reich commissar for the strengthen-

ing of Germandom abroad, issued a six-point directive on the removal of “foreign elements” from Lower Styria and a series of orders on specific matters of German policy in this area. On May 3 he issued a separate directive on the expulsion of Slovenes from Upper Carniola and the occupied part of Carinthia, where conditions differed from those in Lower Styria. On May 14 he established a Staff for the Resettlement of the Population from these areas. For the Germans to achieve their demographic aims in occupied Slovene areas, they needed to change both the ethnic composition and the national consciousness of the population. They planned to achieve these goals in three ways: by the large-scale expulsion of undesirable Slovenes, especially the intelligentsia; by the transfer in of Volksdeutsche from the Italian-annexed part of Slovenia, northeast Italy, and east and southeast Europe; and by the Germanization of the remaining Slovene population.’ As they did in other parts of occupied and annexed Yugoslavia, the Germans in occupied Slovenia used the services of the local Volksdeutsche to further their aims. While the Volksdeutsche in the Danube basin were to serve as the nucleus of a future German political unit spearheading German rule in that part of Europe, the Slovene Volksdeutsche were to serve as a bridge to the Adriatic." slawien, p. 122E. For a succinct presentation of Nazi views and German objectives in the Slovene areas occupied in April 1941, see Rich, Hitler’s War Aims, 2: 268-73. ’The best and most complete study of the German expulsion of Slovenes from Lower Styria, Upper Carniola, and parts of Carinthia, and of denationalization policies in these areas, is Ferenc’s Nacisti¢na raznarodovalna politika. Ferenc later edited Quellen zur nationalsozialis-

tischen Entnationalisierungspolitik in Slowenien, 1941-1945 (cited as Quellen), containing 323 documents, including several from the Independent State of Croatia. For special problems on the expulsion of Slovenes from Upper Carniola, see Ferenc, “Expulsion of Slovenes,” pp. 91-103. For the expulsion of Slovenes from Lower Styria and Upper Carniola, see also Milogevi¢, Izbeglice i preseljenici, pp. 19-43. ‘The Volksdeutsche in Slovenia came under Nazi influence earlier and more fully than those in other areas of Yugoslavia. In the mid-1930’s, the Yugoslav government prohibited the activity of their Kulturbund organizations, though the latter continued to operate surreptitiously as sporting, folklore, and similar groups. Late in 1939, the government again allowed the Kulturbund to operate legally. Biber, Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji, pp. 43-58 and 93-127.

86 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA The earliest German document specifying the number of Slovenes to be ex-

pelled from the newly occupied areas was issued by Heydrich on April 21, 1941. Heydrich felt that the essential issue was to evacuate about 260,000 Slovenes—a number arrived at in preliminary discussions among German authorities—to occupied Serbia. He invited officials concerned with this question to a conference in Maribor on May 6 to discuss the implementation of Hitler’s order to change the composition of the population. On the same subject, the German Army High Command sent a message to the military commander in Serbia on April 30, stating that the intended transfer of Slovenes to Serbia would be made only with the latter’s approval.’ At the May 6 conference in Maribor, the

representative of the military commander, while expressing strong reservations, agreed that Serbia would take as many Slovenes as possible in order to comply with the Fihrer’s wishes. However, he also suggested that Bulgaria and Italy be urged to accept some of the expellees, Bulgaria some 40,000 to 50,000 in the Bulgarian-annexed part of Yugoslav Macedonia and Italy some 60,000 to 70,000. This conference also revealed that Hitler opposed settling any Slovene expellees in the new Croatian state. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently asked its envoys in Sofia and Rome about the possibility of resettling Slovenes in the two allied countries. On May 16, the envoy in Sofia advised against approaching the Bulgarian government about the matter because of the difficulties it would cause in the newly acquired areas. A negative response also came from German diplomats in Rome. As a result, the idea of resettling a large number of Slovenes in these countries was dropped.° Meanwhile, Envoy Siegfried Kasche had informed the Croatian government about German plans to expel Slovenes from Lower Styria, Upper Carniola, and parts of Carinthia to occupied Serbia. On May 13, 1941, he reported to Berlin that the Croatian government was considering accepting all Slovene expellees if it were allowed to expel the same number of Serbs from Croatia to Serbia. Realizing that there was no possibility of transferring any Slovenes to

the Bulgarian-annexed part of Yugoslav Macedonia or to Italy and that the military commander in Serbia also had reservations about accepting them, the Germans accepted the offer of the Croatian government. On May 21, German authorities announced that Hitler had withdrawn his opposition to the resettlement of Slovenes in Croatia and had accepted the proposal that in exchange for Slovenes expelled to Croatia, Croatia could expel the same number of Serbs ‘For Heydrich’s invitation, see Quellen, p. 67, and for the message of the German Army High Command to the military commander in occupied Serbia, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Fr. 1096. Just two days earlier, the same commander had opposed the transfer of some 8,000 Serbs from Hungarian-annexed Bacéka into Serbia because of the difficulty of feeding

and housing them. See Fr. 1098. | , ,

Ouellen, pp. ror, 104. , | |

‘See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H297,892-93, H297,897-903, H297,914, and

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 87 to Serbia. On May 28, the Croatian government agreed in principle to accept the Slovene expellees.’ At aconference in Zagreb on June 4, 1941, convoked at Kasche’s initiative,

all interested parties unanimously agreed that about 5,000 intellectuals and politically tainted Slovenes from Lower Styria and about 4,000 from Upper Carniola and the occupied part of Carinthia would be transferred to occupied Serbia, while the 25,000 Slovenes who had settled in the German-occupied parts of Slovenia after 1914 and 145,000 Slovene peasants from border areas would be transferred to the Independent State of Croatia. They were to be expelled in three successive stages: first the intellectuals, then those Slovenes who

had settled in these areas after 1914, and finally people from areas along the new borders. A corresponding number of Serbs from Croatia would be moved to Serbia. It was specifically provided that the Slovene intellectuals to be expelled included Catholic priests and that Croatia was entitled to deport an equivalent number of Orthodox priests and their families to Serbia. The conference also agreed that about 30,000 Serbs living in Croatia who lacked resident rights would be transferred to Serbia.* | The expulsion of Slovenes from Lower Styria to occupied Serbia started on June 7 and to Croatia on July 11, 1941, and was carried out with great brutal-

ity. People were not given time to prepare for departure and were allowed to take along only 30 kilograms of personal belongings and less than ten dollars in — cash.’ The Slovenes reacted very negatively to expulsion and this reaction was intensified by two facts. First, with the exception of the intelligentsia and peo-

ple who had settled in the occupied areas after 1914, the Germans did not clearly identify the groups to be expelled. As a result, all Slovenes in Germanoccupied areas felt threatened and turned against Germany. Second, those expelled were deprived of their possessions without indemnity and were placed at the mercy of the authorities and populations in the areas in which they were resettled. Himmler’s directive of May 3 on the expulsion of Slovenes from Upper Carniola and parts of Carinthia was essentially the same as his April 18 direc-

tive for expulsions from Lower Styria. But already during that month the Carinthian regional government and Nazi Party officials expressed their oppo7See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,639-49, especially Fr. H296,639, and Quellen, pp. 109-10. As German envoy in the Independent State of Croatia, Siegfried Kasche was involved from the beginning in resettling Slovenes in Croatia and expelling a corresponding number of Serbs to Serbia. He provided a chronological account of Nazi denationalization measures and their consequences in German-occupied Slovene areas, as well as much statistical data, in a concluding report of November 20, 1941, in the microcopy cited at the beginning of this

footnote. |

’Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,639-40; OQuellen, pp. 163-69. "Ferenc, Nacisti¢na raznarodovalna politika, pp. 239-63.

88 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA sition to parts of the plan. A principal concern was the damaging effect the expulsion would have on the supply of labor for war industries. Surveys were soon prepared showing that the racial composition of Slovenes in the border belt of Upper Carniola, all of whom were to be expelled, was largely acceptable

from the German point of view, intimating that they should not be expelled. The Germans also realized that Germanizing the Slovene population in occupied areas would require working systematically on Slovene young people over several generations. This led to a new directive on expulsions from Upper Carniola, issued on July 7, 1941, that reduced the number of planned expellees in the first and third stages and halted the expulsion of people in the second stage to Serbia and Croatia. However, it permitted the continued expulsion of Slovenes to Germany. Toward the end of July, proposals were made for the first time to postpone the expulsion of Slovenes until the end of the war and presumed German victory.”° Actually, the Germans soon started to exempt from deportation Slovenes working in industries and services important for the war effort. In addition, many able-bodied Slovenes who were deported to Serbia and Croatia were apprehended by German labor recruiters and sent to

Germany as slave labor. }

The expulsions, in addition to creating unfavorable political and economic consequences in both the areas from which people were expelled and the areas

in which they were resettled or to which they fled, also contributed to the spread of armed resistance. Armed resistance by Serbian nationalists (Chetniks)

and members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Partisans) began in all parts of Yugoslavia except Macedonia in July 1941 and quickly gathered mo-

mentum. The Slovenes resettled in Serbia and Croatia and the Serbs moved , from Croatia to Serbia spread anti-German sentiment in these areas. Displaced individuals joined armed groups. Armed resistance in Yugoslavia endangered vital German communication lines in southeast Europe as well as the supply of food and strategic metals for the German economy from Yugoslav territory. The Germans soon realized the connection between the expulsion of Slovenes from Slovenia and Serbs from Croatia on the one hand and the rise of armed resistance on the other. On August 18, Himmler ordered a temporary halt to the

war." ,

expulsions. On August 25, he limited expulsions from Lower Styria to its southern part and halted them from Upper Carniola altogether until after the _ Aconference in Zagreb on September 22 to examine the new situation was attended by Reich representatives from Berlin, German occupation authorities from the two parts of northern Slovenia, the military commander from occupied Serbia, and Croatian government officials. According to Kasche’s data, up to that date a total of 9,343 Slovenes had been expelled to Croatia in organized Ferenc, “Expulsion of Slovenes,” pp. 94-95. 'Ibid., pp. 96-97; Ferenc, Nacisti¢éna raznarodovalna politika, pp. 279-83; Quellen, pp. 231-33.

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 89 railroad transports and another approximately 17,000 had moved there on their own, for a total of 26,343 persons. In addition, 6,720 Serbs had been sent

by railroad transports to Serbia. At the same time, Croatian authorities had sent 9,900 Serbs in officially organized railroad transports to Serbia and had driven about 90,000 Serbs illegally across the frontier into Serbia.” Both those Serbs who were officially moved to Serbia and those who fled were dispossessed without indemnity. Disorder and armed resistance made it impossible for Croatian and Serbian authorities to handle satisfactorily transferees and refugees. This conference confirmed the order halting the expulsion of Slovenes to Serbia and Croatia and officially stopped the expulsion of Serbs from Croatia to Serbia. The expulsion of Slovenes from Lower Styria to Croatia, which had been temporarily permitted on September 11 and involved 3,730 people, was stopped on September 27. On October 13, Himmler finally decided that no more Slovenes would be expelled to Croatia." However, this did not put a stop to the expulsion of Slovenes to other areas

where they could not assist in armed resistance or otherwise work against Germany. Thus, some 36,000 Slovenes from the two Lower Styrian counties bordering the Italian-annexed Ljubljana Province were expelled to various

parts of the Old Reich between October 22, 1941, and July 30, 1942. For “reasons of state policy,” the Germans wanted a German population along that border. These deportees could take along their cash and valuables and as much movable property as transportation conditions would allow and were reimbursed by German authorities for their real estate. Subsequently, the only kind of deportation from Slovene areas that continued was the deportation of relatives of Partisans and executed hostages to a score of small camps in the Reich. The Germans stopped such deportations from Lower Styria in the spring of 1943 but continued them from Upper Carniola and the occupied part of Carinthia until August 1944. From each of these areas, the Germans deported about 4,000 people under this program." Instead of expelling, in three stages, about one-third of the Slovene population from the areas they occupied, the Germans actually expelled an estimated 80,300 people (including those who left on their own), or about one-third of '2See the data from Kasche’s report of November 20, 1941, in Micr. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,640~41; Ferenc, Nacisti¢na raznarodovalna politika, pp. 284-87. For the life of Slovene expellees in Serbia, see Ferenc, Nacisti¢na raznarodovalna politika, pp. 418-35; Ros, Slovenski izgnanci v Srbiji; and MiloSevi¢, Izbeglice i preseljenici, especially pp. 259-62 and 268-72. For the life of Slovene expellees in the Independent State of Croatia, see Ferenc, Nacistiéna raznarodovalna politika, pp. 436-74, and Milosevi¢, Izbeglice i preseljenici, pp. 325-42. For the especially difficult conditions of Slovene deportees in Bosnia, see Bréié, “Settlement of Slovene Refugees,” pp. 301-15. 'Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Fr. H296,642; OQuellen, pp. 392-93; Ferenc, Nacisticna raznarodovalna politika, pp. 280-89. Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. Hz96,656-57; Ferenc, Nacisti¢na raznarodovalna politika, pp. 290-332; and Professor Ferenc’s letter of June 23, 1982, to the author.

90 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA the number originally planned. This was about ro percent of the Slovene population of these areas. While sources differ somewhat on the numbers in various groups of expellees, the best authority on this problem, Professor Tone Ferenc, estimates that the expelled population consisted of about 7,300 depor-

, tees to Serbia, 10,000 deportees to Croatia, 17,000 people who fled to Croatia on their own, 37,000 deportees to Germany, 8,000 relatives of Partisans and executed hostages deported to Germany, and about 1,000 others deported

across the frontier.’ a | -

Thus, German plans to change the ethnic composition of occupied parts of Slovenia by the rapid mass expulsion of Slovenes and their replacement by Volksdeutsche from other areas met with only limited success. However, the Slovenes deported included those who provided leadership to Slovene society, namely Catholic priests, teachers, other intelligentsia, and business leaders. This left the peasants, workers, and lower middle class leaderless and consequently more amenable to German policies of denationalization and economic subjugation. Nevertheless, some German officials considered the undertaking a political failure. In his report of November 20, 1941, Kasche wrote, “Through the expulsion of Slovenes we wanted to free the southernmost frontier of the Reich from all hostile forces and to destroy the strength [Volkskraft] of the Slovenes as a people. In fact, we have achieved just the opposite.” He estimated

that 70 to 80 percent of the Slovenes in these areas who had earlier been friendly toward Germany had been transformed into bitter enemies and that many of them became new recruits for guerrilla forces." Economically, the principal negative effect of the expulsions was to reduce agricultural and livestock production and industrial and mining output. In general, the new settlers proved less efficient producers than the expelled Slovenes

had been. In Croatia, the brutal expulsion and flight of Serbs from the state, general insecurity and disorder, and armed resistance also greatly reduced agricultural production and general economic output there.” A further consequence of Germany’s anti-Slovene policies in the areas under its occupation was the flight of many Slovenes to the Italian-annexed Ljubljana Province. Some Slovenes who had been expelled to German-occupied

Serbia and many who had been expelled or fled to the Independent State of Croatia later moved to the Ljubljana Province. The Germans estimated that in

, the city of Ljubljana alone there were about 17,000 fugitives and expellees from German-occupied areas. Naturally they spread anti-German feeling in the

, city and many worked against the German occupation regime in northern Slovenia.'* They also supplied manpower to the Partisan forces fighting in the

'SProfessor Ferenc’s letter of June 23, 1982, to the author. , '6See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,642-46, especially Fr. H296,642. '7Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,646—48. See also Kasche’s reports of January 7

and 13, 1942, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,626-3 5. .

"Ferenc, “The German Occupier in Ljubljana,” p. 188. ,

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 91 Ljubljana Province, as well as to the Partisan units sent to the German-occupied parts of Slovenia to spread resistance. Although the Germans stopped the mass expulsion of Slovenes from occupied areas, they were determined to carry through Germanization in these areas as far as possible. They had developed plans for that purpose even before the

occupation and after it they enlarged and adjusted them to fit the new conditions. One of the simplest measures was Germanizing all geographical names and changing the names of streets, offices, businesses, banks, and so on to German form. Slovenes were also ordered to change their names: the Slovene form of first names was prohibited and all family names had to use German spelling. The German form of names was introduced in all public records. To further the process of Germanization, the Germans established two special organizations, the Carinthian Volksbund and the Styrian Heimatbund, and induced or forced most Slovenes to join. Applicants were classified according to political and racial criteria. Politically they were ranked in five different groups from “friendly to the Germans” to “strongly anti-German” and racially in four groups from “very good” to “unsuitable” for inclusion in the German community. The Germans interpreted the large number of applicants for membership in the two organizations as an unofficial plebiscite indicating acceptance of their rule. While a considerable number of Slovenes did succumb to German propaganda and joined in good faith, most joined to avoid expulsion and the expropriation of their possessions without indemnity. But the Germans went even further in exploiting the Volksbund and Heimatbund. In Lower Styria they enrolled 84,700 men between the ages of 18 and 45 from the Heimatbund and in Upper Carniola 28,052 men from the Volksbund into the Wehrmannschaft and in both areas about 33,000 youths of both sexes into the Deutsche Jugend. Although both organizations were primarily intended to serve as instruments of Germanization, the former was also used as an auxiliary military force for guard duty and fighting the Partisans." Employing one of the most common techniques used by states engaged in

denationalization for political purposes, the Germans closed all Slovene schools and reopened them with instruction permitted only in German. The Germans fired almost all Slovene teachers, expelled most to Serbia or the Independent State of Croatia, and replaced them with hundreds of teachers brought from Austria and Germany. The obvious objective was to prevent the development of Slovene national consciousness in Slovene children and young people and to implant German national consciousness instead. The Germans closed all Slovene libraries and after removing copies of Slovene books, journals, and newspapers for a select number of German and Austrian libraries, burned the rest. They also gave special attention to identifying and removing

89. |

Mikuz, Pregled razvoja NOB u Sloveniji, 1: 63-67; Ferenc, “The German ‘Wehrmannschaft,’” pp. 81-156; idem, Nacisti¢éna raznarodovalna politika, pp. 731-34, 745-61, 781—

92 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA Slovene cultural monuments and historical materials from the occupied areas, in order to destroy the evidence proving that these were Slovene lands. They prohibited the activity of various Slovene cultural and social associations and transferred their properties to the Volksbund and Heimatbund.” Aware of the important cultural and political role of the Catholic Church in Slovenia, the Germans expelled 448 Catholic priests—most of the priesthood in the occupied

areas—to the Independent State of Croatia during the summer of 1941. They allowed only sick and elderly priests to remain, leaving the majority of parishes without priests. Few of the new priests whom the Germans brought in from the outside spoke any Slovene. The Germans also closed Catholic schools and divested the church of a large part of its property, transferring it to the Volks-

bund and Heimatbund.”! , | In March (in Lower Styria) and July 1942 (in Upper Carniola and the occupied part of Carinthia), the Germans introduced German military law and began drafting young men into military service. According to the report of the postwar Yugoslav commission that investigated the crimes of the occupying

and collaborating forces in Slovenia, the Germans drafted 28,092 men in Lower Styria and 7,216 in Upper Carniola and the occupied part of Carinthia, figures that do not include those who later deserted to the Partisans. Many of these men lost their lives on the Russian front.” Other young men and women were drafted for German labor service. In addition to supplying soldiers and labor power, these drafts were aimed at facilitating the Germanization of these young people and at preventing them from joining the Slovene Partisans.

, Finally, the Germans systematically acquired ownership of the economic assets of occupied Slovenia. In addition to expropriating without indemnity the land and other possessions of the expelled population and of hostages and executed Partisans, the Germans-expropriated, or German banks, industrial com-

bines, and other business interests took over, mines, industrial enterprises, banks, insurance companies, cooperatives, newspapers, and other businesses that had belonged to the Yugoslav state, local governments, private Slovene citizens, or private interests in other parts of Yugoslavia or in countries at war with Germany. Some of the changes in property rights required settlement with Italian authorities because the domicile of the former owners was in the Italian-

annexed partofSlovenia. — ,

However, the negative effects of the mass expulsion of Slovenes, the failure of measures directed at the Germanization of the remaining Slovene population, and the armed resistance that began in Slovenia in the summer of 1941 Ferenc, Nacisti¢na raznarodovalna politika, PP. 734-44, 789-97. For the number of expelled priests, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 17/51, Box 238; Ferenc, Nacisti¢na raznarodovalna politika, pp. 245-46, 800. In his study Ferenc pays minimal attention to the Nazi persecution of the Catholic Church in occupied Slovene

areas. |

2 As given in Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, p. 419. |

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 93 and more or less steadily gathered momentum forced the Germans to abandon their plans to annex the occupied areas of Slovenia to the Greater Reich. Thus the administrative system they established in April 1941 remained until the end of the war. As in most other parts of Yugoslavia, the Communist-led resistance in Slovenia started in July 1941. The Liberation Front (Osvobodilna fronta), behind which stood the Communist Party of Slovenia, led the fight. The front was initially established in April 1941 as the Anti-Imperialist Front and engaged only in propaganda. But it changed its name and increased its activity after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Throughout the war, the Liberation Front considered Slovenia a political unit, though as long as Italy held the Ljubljana Province and to some extent even after Germany occupied it in September 1943, conditions of resistance there differed markedly from conditions in the originally German-occupied parts. Although armed attacks by the Communist-led resistance first began in the western part of German-occupied Slovenia, the resistance there and especially in Lower Styria developed more slowly and on a much more limited scale than in the Italian-annexed part. This was so for several reasons. The mass expulsion of the intelligentsia and those persons considered politically unreliable from Lower Styria in the first few months of occupation removed the most politically active elements of the population. The mass enrollment of Slovenes in the Hei-

matbund and its suborganizations, the Wehrmannschaft and the Deutsche Jugend, enabled the Germans not only to fully control the movement of their members, but also to use the Wehrmannschaft as auxiliary troops. Above all, the execution of hostages and of Partisans and their sympathizers for even minor offenses eliminated many Slovenes who had chosen active resistance. Mass executions increased as time went on. From July 30 to December 1941, the Germans executed 306 people; from January 3 to May 21, 1942, 391; and from June 3 to November 4, 1942, 976. In addition, they deported the family members of those executed to detention camps in Germany and confiscated their possessions.” The Partisans from the Ljubljana Province, probably encouraged by their success there and wanting to intensify their operations in Lower Styria, attempted to send an expeditionary force of about 500 men to Lower Styria in May 1942. But the plan was betrayed and the Germans repulsed all Partisan efforts to cross the Sava River. In the next effort, made much further to the west

the following July, the Partisans sent the 2nd Group of Detachments with about 500 men to the German-occupied area. The operation proved costly and 3For the names of the Partisans and hostages, including some women, executed by the Germans, based on copies of official German announcements, see Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 1:

291-510; 6, bk. 2: 307-453; and 6, bk. 3: 625-50. I was unable to find any additional systematic data on mass executions in the German-occupied parts of Slovenia for the period after November 4, 1942.

94 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA only a small number of men reached the western part of Lower Styria. The penetration of this group into the German-occupied area was also responsible for a great increase in the execution of Partisan sympathizers and hostages. Nevertheless, the operation was important for maintaining the Partisan struggle in the German-occupied parts of Slovenia. The last Partisan expeditionary force sent from the Ljubljana Province to Lower Styria got under way in January 1944. The 14th Partisan Division with about 1,100 officers and men, after

making a wide detour through Croatia, entered Lower Styria from the east. This division also suffered terrible losses but contributed materially to the growth of Partisan resistance in Lower Styria and succeeded in maintaining itself in the area until the end of the war.”

ITALIAN ANNEXATION OF THE LJUBLJANA PROVINCE

The Establishment of the Province , The Italians received much less Slovene territory than they expected. They

were very dissatisfied with the frontier that Hitler established and that the Germans continued to change at Italian expense for several weeks after the end of the war against Yugoslavia. They were especially disgruntled by the fact that

the German-occupied area included the Ljubljana-Zagreb railroad line, the coal mines of Trbovlje, and the steel mill at Jesenice.”* But the Italians did re-

ceive the city of Ljubljana, although the Germans drew the frontier near its northern suburbs. The Germans feared that if Ljubljana, the political and cultural capital of Slovenia, were included in their own occupation area, it might counteract efforts at Germanizing the Slovene population.” The partition of Slovenia and the location of the border between its German and Italian parts caused many economic and financial problems. Property rights among citizens, banks, insurance companies, mining and industrial enterprises, and cooperatives had to be settled; debts owed by the Yugoslav government, local governments, and the Yugoslav National Bank had to be apportioned; Ljubljana had to be supplied with electricity produced by power plants located in the German-occupied area; and small traffic in goods across the border had to be regulated. A German-Italian commission settled some of the economic and financial problems resulting from the partition of Yugoslavia as a whole and another commission dealt with such problems in partitioned Slovenia.” For the first Partisan effort in May 1942, see Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 3: 147. For the next two attempts, see Narodnoosvobodilna vojna: for the second, in July 1942, pp. 269, 355-77, and for the last, in January 1944, pp. 654-70 and 981-86. *SFavagrossa, Perché perdemmo la guerra, pp. 156-57, and Mikuz, Pregled razvoja NOB

u Sloveniji,1:37-45,52-68. > 6Ferenc, “The German Occupier in Ljubljana,” pp. 187-88. 7See Micr. No. T-586, Roll 424, Frs. 12,146-63 and 12,172~-87.

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 95 In May 1941, the Germans estimated that there were about 18,000 Volksdeutsche in the Ljubljana Province, although according to preliminary data from the Italian census of July 31, 1941, there were only 13,580. After the expulsion of the Slovene population from the counties along the border between the Ljubljana Province and Lower Styria and following a German-Italian agreement of August 14, 1941, the transfer of Volksdeutsche from the Ljubjana Province began. This transfer, carried out between mid-November 1941 and the end of February 1942, involved about 12,000 people from the Kocevje (Gottschee) area (an old German enclave in southern Slovenia) and possibly 1,000 to 2,000 people from other parts of the province, especially the Ljubljana area. Most transferees were settled in the Lower Styrian frontier counties from which the Slovene population was expelled, but some were sent to the Reich and some to new German colonies in Polish territory, depending on their classification by officials carrying out the transfer.” The Italians annexed outright the part of Slovenia allocated to them and organized it as the Ljubljana Province (Provincia di Lubiana). The XIth Army Corps of the Italian 2nd Army under General Mario Robotti occupied the province. When Robotti became commander of the 2nd Army in December 1942, he was succeeded by General Gastone Gambarra, who remained until the Italian surrender. The civilian administration of the province was headed by a high commissioner, first Emilio Grazioli until June 1943 and then retired General Giuseppe Lombrassa, previously the chief of the Italian Administration for Internal Colonization. Lombrassa was soon replaced by another retired general, a Badoglio appointee, whom the Germans drove out when they took over the province in September after the Italian surrender.” In order to make their rule more acceptable to the Slovene public and probably to stress the difference between Italian and German treatment of the Slovene people, the Italians in the beginning behaved relatively decently in the Ljubljana Province.” To give an impression of Slovene participation in the administration of the province, they appointed the Consulta, an advisory body of fourteen Slovene representatives from political, business, and cultural groups, several of them followers of the former Slovene People’s Party (Clericalists), to advise the high commissioner. However, advice was seldom asked for and after

its principal members resigned, the Consulta withered away. In addition, in 8For the estimate of the Volksdeutsche population, see Micr. No. T-586, Roll 424, Frs. 12,143—-45. For their resettlement, see Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, p. 82E; Ferenc, Nacisticna raznarodovalna politika, pp. 616-32; Frensing, Die Umsiedlung der Gott-

scheer Deutschen, pp. 45-47, 87-98, 152-72. Italy, Stato Maggiore del R. Esercito, Ufficio Propaganda, Bollettini della guerra, pp.

513-14; Juvantic¢, “The Italian Occupier in Ljubljana, 1941-1943,” pp. 63-143, especially

138.

° For a critical Italian assessment of German policy toward the Slovenes in the latter’s area of occupation, see a report to Mussolini of July 20, 1941, in Micr. No. T-586, Roll 424, Fr, 12,202.

96 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA June 1942 the Italians appointed a former Yugoslav general, Leo Rupnik, a conservative and a determined enemy of Communism, as mayor of Ljubljana, who held that position as long as Italian rule lasted. But Rupnik’s powers were limited and he operated under close Italian control. In another important de-

parture from practices in the German-occupied area, the Italians took no measures against the Catholic Church in their part of Slovenia. Rather, in time, close cooperation developed between the church and the Italian civilian and

military authorities. |

The Origin of Resistance and Collaboration In addition to describing Slovenia’s partition between Germany and Italy _ and the policies of the Axis states in their respective parts, our main task in this chapter is to analyze the formation and activities of the Slovene forces that subsequently collaborated with the occupying powers. This requires a description and analysis of the Communist-led resistance that arose in Slovenia, because it was the development and policies of the latter that were chiefly responsible for the rise and behavior of the former. Both resistance and collaboration first became established to a significant degree in the Ljubljana Province. Although several potential resistance groups emerged in the province soon after the annexation, only the Communist-led Liberation Front began to organize armed units and engage in sabotage and active resistance. The front consisted of members of the Communist Party of Slovenia, a sizable number of followers of the Christian Socialist Party, the gymnastic organization Sokol, progressive intellectuals from other groups and organizations, some former Yugoslav army officers, and even some members of the Slovene People’s Party. According to Professor Ferenc, there were eighteen distinct groups in the front, differing in origin, ideology, and strength. But all of them supported a policy of

immediate armed resistance against the occupying forces.” } The Communist-led resistance in Slovenia was part of the general Communist-led resistance throughout Yugoslavia, whose objective was to establish a Communist-ruled Yugoslav state. The grand strategy of the Communists was to oppose, with the help of popular front organizations, the armies of the occupying powers and the armed units of the collaborationists unequivocally and at all costs. Through armed struggle, they hoped to become the controlling military force in the country so that political control of the state would be within their grasp at the end of the war. Since Yugoslavia was an agricultural country

whose peasants were strong believers in peasant ownership of the land, the Communists could not hope to attract the peasants—without whom they could not achieve victory—by advocating traditional Communist objectives. Conse*'For the genesis of the Liberation Front in 1941 on the one hand and the growth of its rightist opponents on the other, see Skerl, “Slovene Liberation Front,” pp. 7-86; idem, “Opponents of the Liberation Front,” pp. 69-198; and Professor Ferenc’s letter of June 23,

1982, to the author. |

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 97 quently, their chief appeal was to nationalist, democratic, and federalist sentiments and to reliance on the Soviet Union in foreign policy. In the latter respect, a large dose of Pan-Slavism was present, since the war in Europe appeared to the Yugoslav masses largely as a struggle between Slavs and Teutons. Another Communist plank demanded the inclusion into Yugoslavia of those Slovene ar-

eas that were acquired by Italy or remained in Austria after the First World War. The nationalist factor was perhaps stronger in Slovenia than in any other part of Yugoslavia because the Slovenes’ very existence as a nation was in jeopardy if the Axis triumphed. The Communist Party and the Liberation Front undertook their first armed

attacks against the Italian and German occupation forces and their domestic opponents toward the end of July 1941. The next month, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia established the Security and Intelligence

Service (Varnostno-obvescevalna sluzba—VOS) to coordinate the struggle against the enemy. The VOS was subsequently incorporated into the Liberation Front, but it remained under exclusive party control. Its chief was Zdenka Kidri¢, known in party circles and the Liberation Front as Marjeta. She was the wife of Boris Kidri¢, who with Edvard Kardelj and Franc LeskoSek formed the senior Communist leadership in Slovenia. Boris Kidri¢ was also political commissar for Partisan forces in the province for about twenty months at various times during the war and secretary, that is chief executive officer, of the Libera-

tion Front.” The Communist Party and the Liberation Front also established the People’s Protection (Narodna zascita—NZ). While the VOS was a relatively small but highly select and dedicated group, the NZ was a mass organization, a support and auxiliary group for Partisan armed units. Its members and sympathizers, many of them women, came from all professions—government work, teaching, business, transportation and communication, and so on. The NZ was especially widespread in Ljubljana, but it was also active in the countryside. Its principal tasks were to serve as the recruiting reserve for the armed units of the Liberation Front and the VOS, to engage in sabotage, to work against police raids and the deportation of Slovenes to concentration camps, to organize the production and transportation of supplies to the fighting units, to collect useful information for the Partisans, and to maintain morale.*° On December 4, 1941, the VOS began a campaign of liquidating important collaborationists by executing Fanous Emer, a prominent leader, for recruiting former Yugoslav officers and followers of Catholic Action for groups opposed to the Liberation Front. The next victim was the industrialist Avgust Praprot@Krivic, Ljubljana v ilegali, 2: 276-93 and 3: 286, 368; Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 3: 149. In 1944, the VOS was taken over by the all-Yugoslav police organization, the Department for the Protection of the People (Odjeljenje za za8titu naroda—OZNA). 8BMikuz, “The People’s Protection in Ljubljana,” pp. 204-14. The NZ was established in October 1941 and its multiple tasks were defined in January 1942.

98 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA nik, killed in February 1942 for denouncing some Partisans (who were later , executed) to the Italians. On May 26 came the execution of the Reverend Lambert Ehrlich, for proposing that the Italians allow the Slovenes to form a gendarmerie and security service to fight the Partisans. This was followed by the execution of Fortunat Majdi¢, an alleged police confidant, in August 1942 and of Kazimir Kukovié, a police officer, and Marko Natlaéen, the domestic leader of the Slovene People’s Party and the most prestigious anti-Partisan leader in Slovenia, on October 13, 1942.™ The Italians retaliated by shooting a number of hostages for each person killed, the largest being 24 hostages for Natlaéen. That effectively stopped VOS executions in Ljubljana. In the countryside, however, the VOS continued liquidating people accused of treason, while the collaborationists reciprocated by killing members of the Communist Party and the

Liberation Front or denouncing them to the Italians. } | In response to an Italian decree of April 21, 1942, on the shooting of hostages, the Liberation Front declared on May 1 that for every hostage executed by the Italian police and armed forces, the Partisans would execute the same number of people from among those on whom Italian rule in the Ljubljana Province rested, namely Italian soldiers, gendarmes, policemen, and government officials, as well as Slovenes who collaborated with them. The threat applied equally to German authorities and Slovene collaborators in Slovene areas

under German occupation. And on May 27, 1942, the Liberation Front warned their bourgeois opponents that the Partisans would execute anybody who engaged in organizing Slovene armed units outside the Liberation Front.” These threats were mostly psychological, however, since the Partisans could only carry them out to a small extent. Nor could they stop the Italians and _ Germans from shooting hostages in reprisal. German and Italian operations in the late summer and fall of 1941 destroyed or broke up 15 of the 31 Partisan companies formed in Slovenia up to that time and inflicted losses on the others.” This and the early and very severe winter of 1941-42 greatly reduced Partisan activity in both the Ljubljana Province and the German-occupied areas and prevented the Partisans from securing any liberated territory. Early in 1942, Yugoslav Partisan Supreme Headquarters ordered the Slovene Partisan leadership to strengthen its units and increase armed actions and sabotage. The results were widespread Partisan operations in April, May, and June 1942 in the Ljubljana Province. Since these operations coincided with a planned Italian withdrawal from weak outposts to. 4Saje, Belogardizem, 1st ed., pp. 129-31; Krivic, Ljubljana v ilegali, 3: 295, 314, 322,

, 326-38, 346. In a letter of November 17, 1942, to Marjeta, the chief of the VOS, Kardelj wrote: “At present the main task is to demolish the White Guard, politically as well as physically. You can therefore liquidate all those who you can easily prove to the public were the

originators of civil war in favor of the Italians.” Ljubljana v ilegali, 3: 39. | 5For the May 1 declaration, see Krivic, Ljubljana v ilegali, 3: 179, 189. For the May 27 warning, see Saje, Belogardizem, 1st ed., pp. 296-97.

6K lanjscek, “Slovene Partisan Detachments,” pp. 88-89.

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 99 larger garrisons (Plan Primavera), the Partisans, according to Kardelj, were able to establish control over about half of the province. At about the same time

High Commissioner Grazioli reported that the Partisans controlled about twothirds of the province’s territory and population.” This enabled the Partisans to increase their armed effectives, broaden the groups that supported their armed forces, and strengthen their position against both the Italians and their domestic adversaries. But it also increased the determination of the Italian military authorities to deal resolutely with the Partisans, whose challenge to them had become very frustrating. And it strengthened the determination of the Slovene

bourgeois forces to find an effective mode of armed collaboration with the Italians to fight the Partisans. In the Ljubljana Province, bourgeois political forces were very dispersed.

Only a few followers of the interwar bourgeois parties joined the Liberation Front. The majority concluded that the enemy was so overwhelmingly strong that immediate resistance was pointless, too expensive in lives, property, and suffering to undertake. Instead they planned to establish the framework of an underground military organization that would surface when Allied troops landed on Yugoslav soil, call a general mobilization, and, with arms obtained from the Allies or captured from the enemy, turn against the occupation forces and be on the winning side in the end. In this respect, the strategy for resistance of these Slovene groups was identical to that of General Draza Mihailovic¢, to whom they soon secretly pledged allegiance. The Yugoslav government-inexile also urged these groups not to undertake any premature action, but to wait for the appropriate time. Thus in regard to armed resistance, a fundamental difference of opinion and approach existed between the Liberation Front and the Slovene bourgeois groups. This difference and the political and military

consequences deriving from it determined the nature of Slovene politics throughout the war. The main body of every bourgeois political party and of some non-political organizations initially formed groups that were intended to be the nuclei of resistance to the occupying powers at a later date. The Slovene People’s Party, with strong ties to the Catholic Church, organized the Slovene Legion at the end of May 1941; the Yugoslav National Party and a large segment of the Sokol organization formed the Sokol Legion; and still another intermediate group organized the National Legion. Although in 1941 it was impossible to predict who was going to win the war, most Slovene bourgeois political forces were pro-Western. Some, however, were pro-Axis, as the considerable number of active collaborators, primarily with the Italians, clearly indicated. All of them, however, tried to position themselves favorably for whatever outcome the war might bring. These groups were known in Liberation Front terminolFor Kardelj’s report, see Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 3: 139, and for Grazioli’s views, see Juvanti¢, “The Italian Occupier in Ljubljana, 1941-1943,” p. I19.

100 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA ogy as the White Guards (Bela garda). The Slovene bourgeois political forces that were pro-Western wanted the reestablishment of Yugoslavia and, like the Communists, the inclusion into it of those Slovene areas that had gone to Italy

or remained in Austria after the First World War.

During the second half of 1941, the bourgeois forces in Slovenia remained in a waiting state. The Communist Party and the Liberation Front, on the other

hand, greatly increased their activity after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union. The Liberation Front systematically endeavored to acquire greater political control both in Ljubljana and the countryside through underground or- | ganizations and to obtain more recruits for its fighting and auxiliary units. The _ front’s attacks and acts of sabotage against the enemy and its liquidation of important domestic opponents engendered Italian retaliation against it and the civilian population. All this worked against the bourgeois parties, which tried not to provoke the enemy. They, meanwhile, established contact with Mihailovi¢

and planned to supply manpower for units of the Yugoslav Army in the

Homeland (the Chetniks) in Slovenia. ,

By early 1942, the bourgeois parties came to realize, with good reason, that the ultimate objective of the Communists and the Liberation Front was the introduction of a Communist regime in Slovenia as part of a Communist-ruled Yugoslavia. From their point of view, this made the Partisans a much more dangerous enemy in the long run than the foreign occupation forces. The latter

were expected to rule only a short time, until the anticipated victory of the Allies. Once the bourgeois parties realized this, it was only a small step for them to shift from passive acquiescence to armed collaboration with the enemy, first the

Italians and later the Germans. This enabled their nascent armed units to obtain legal standing and to receive arms, ammunition, and other supplies, as well as pay, from the enemy. Since the Chetniks had legalized most of their units with the Nedi¢ regime in Serbia and with the Italians in Montenegro and the Independent State of Croatia, it was natural for the anti-Partisan forces in the Ljubljana Province to work for a similar arrangement as well. Thus the groups deriving from the bourgeois parties, which in the beginning appeared to be potentially anti-Axis resistance groups, never became such; rather, they became

collaborationists. . , | :

On their side, the Partisans likewise came to consider the bourgeois forces

as their principal opponent. For they also anticipated an Allied victory, in which case only the defeat of both the occupying powers and the domestic bourgeois parties would allow them to reach their goal of political control in | Slovenia. With such diametrically opposed objectives, the two groups became

bitter enemies. oe .

In order to devise an appropriate policy and an effective strategy against the Communist Party and the Liberation Front, representatives of the bourgeois parties—which, though prohibited, continued to operate surreptitiously on a limited scale—met together with several non-political groups in early 1942.

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA IOI Italian officers were reportedly present at some of the meetings. The result was a series of proposals made to the Italians, most directed in one way or another against the Partisans.** The aims of the bourgeois forces are well illustrated in the memorandum that the Reverend Lambert Ehrlich, a Jesuit priest and theology professor at Ljubljana University and the supervisor of the most militant

Catholic student youth group in Slovenia, submitted to the Italian military command in Ljubljana on April 1, 1942. (As we have already mentioned, Ehrlich was subsequently executed by the VOS for this memorandum.) This document reflected the views of the Slovene People’s Party and groups closely allied with it. Ehrlich first reviewed conditions in the Italian- and German-held parts of Slovenia and argued that the foremost need in the Ljubljana Province was to establish order and safety. To this end, he suggested that the Italians give arms to Slovene gendarmes, who would be commanded by former Slovene police officers. To help destroy Communist organizations, which the Clericalist Slovenes considered “their greatest internal national and cultural evil,” the Slovenes should be allowed to establish their own security service, which would

operate under Italian military supervision. They should also be permitted a greater degree of administrative autonomy so that the population would feel closer to the occupying authorities. The Italians should release innocent people from prisons and concentration camps, help rebuild burned-down villages, and allow the Slovene press freedom to engage more fully in anti-Communist propaganda.” Shortly after the submission of the memorandum, in early April 1942, the bourgeois parties established the Slovene Alliance (Slovenska zaveza) to coordinate their anti-Partisan policies. By far the strongest member of the alliance was the Slovene People’s Party (Clericalists), which controlled the Slovene Legion. It also had the best connections with the West. Until June 1944, it had representatives in the Yugoslav government-in-exile and also good channels of communication through the Vatican. Soon after the alliance was established, Miha Krek, head of the party and a vice premier in the government-in-exile, called upon all alliance members over the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) to follow the orders of General Mihailovic, minister of army, navy, and air force in the government-in-exile from January 1942 and chief of staff of the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland from June 1942. In the following months, a series of messages through various channels and over the BBC was exchanged between Krek and the Reverend Alojz Kuhar, another 8Saje, Belogardizem, ist ed., pp. 277-84. One suggestion that was not directed against the Partisans was that the Italians arrest and deport to prisoner-of-war camps the large number of former Yugoslav officers and noncommissioned officers who lived in the Ljubljana Province, since they were considered an unsafe element. In fact, between March 19 and 27, 1942, the Italians did just that, taking 1,103 former officers and noncommissioned officers to prisoner-of-war camps. Ibid., p. 284. See Proces proti Rupniku, pp. 151-54 for the Ehrlich memorandum.

102 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA Slovene People’s Party leader in London, on the one hand, and the Slovene Alli-

ance on the other, concerning policies to be followed at home. Beginning in August 1942, the government-in-exile sent a regular monthly subsidy to the

Slovene Alliance through Switzerland.” , ,

The clandestine recruiting and organizing of the first Slovene anti-Partisan armed units began in May 1942. These units, initially only a few score men, included members of the Slovene, Sokol, and National Legions, as well as some of Major Karlo Novak’s followers of General Mihailovi¢. The new units called themselves the Legion of Death. Already in the first month of operation they had some minor encounters with the Partisans.*' Once these first, though small, armed units were organized and began to fight the newly strengthened Partisans, obtaining legal standing with the Italian occupation forces became ur-

gent. , :

Both the Italian military and civilian authorities in the province at first opposed allowing the Slovenes to organize their own militia and police units. The Italians did not trust the Slovenes with arms, nor were they prepared to grant any authority to militia units. A report of the intelligence unit of the Italian XIth Army Corps of June 1, 1942, however, revealed that the Italians had become aware in the preceding months that Slovene anti-Partisan groups were recruiting men for armed units and that they had already had brief encounters with the Partisans. The report continued, “Although for the time being these are only modest episodes, this development should be carefully watched be-

, cause it shows in these groups intentions that deserve to be helped and that seem capable, if rationally used, of making possible interesting future developments in the anti-Bolshevik struggle. An anti-rebel spirit is rising among the population that is mostly Catholic because the rebels have taken a decisively

Bolshevik orientation.”"” = ,

Italian Operations Against the Partisans , The principal problem facing the Italian civilian and military authorities in the Ljubljana Province from July 1941 on was the Communist-led resistance. In the beginning the police were the prime force used to combat the rebels, with military forces playing a secondary role. However, the civilian authorities, un-

der the leadership of high officials in the Fascist Party, did not always agree with the military authorities on how to proceed and an intense rivalry developed between them. High Commissioner Grazioli was instrumental in temporarily removing General Robotti and his staff from Ljubljana. But Grazioli could not suppress the resistance and after Mussolini declared the Ljubljana

dilna vojna, pp. 321-23. | *'Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, pp. 320-27. Mikud, Pregled zgodovine narodnoosvobodilne borbe, 1: 298-315; Narodnoosvobo“For a Serbo-Croatian translation of the report, see Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 3: 406-7. See

also Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, pp. 322-23. | |

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 103 Province an “operational area” on January 19, 1942, Robotti returned to Ljubljana and the chief burden of fighting the resistance devolved upon the military, with the full participation of the police. Disagreements between Grazioli and Robotti, however, continued.* In dealing with the resistance in the Ljubljana Province, the Italians had two operationally different tasks: to crush it in the city of Ljubljana, the center of both the political and military struggle against the Italians, and to fight it in the countryside, where occupation forces were especially inconvenienced by Partisan attacks on vital communication lines. In Ljubljana, the Italians proceeded in a methodical and costly manner. During the first half of 1942, they built a barbed wire fence and bunker system around the entire city, which at that time had a population of about 80,000 people. Some bunkers, barricades, and machine gun nests were also built inside the city. The objective was to break the links between the Partisans in the city and the countryside and, with the city divided into sectors, to make systematic and sustained searches for members of the resistance. A further objective was to find the able-bodied men of military age whom the Partisans were recruiting and deport them to concentration camps. According to a report of the “Granatieri di Sardegna” Division of July 4, 1942, in the eight-day period from June 24 to July 1, 20,435 people were stopped, and of them, 2,858 were arrested (771 students, 1,899 suspects, and ' 188 jobless and refugees). These systematic raids inflicted great losses on the Partisans in the city and resulted in the deportation of several thousand young men to concentration camps. The leadership of the Communist Party of Slovenia and the Liberation Front had to be moved to the countryside in May 1942. Thereafter, according to Kardelj, women formed the great majority on the 300 to 400 committees in Ljubljana supporting the Partisans. Italian operations greatly increased the difficulty of Partisan communications between the city

and the countryside, which continued to function only ona reduced scale.“ But they failed to crush resistance in the city entirely.

Mass raids and deportations to concentration camps remained a basic component of the Italian struggle against the Partisans and their sympathizers, both in Ljubljana and the countryside. The main Italian concentration camps for the Slovenes were located on the island of Rab in the northern Adriatic and *3An Italian intelligence report of March 1942 noted that the situation in the Ljubljana Province was gradually deteriorating and that relations between the civilian and military authorities were not satisfactory. Micr. No. T-586, Roll 424, Frs. 12,164-69. The squabbles between Grazioli and Robotti can be clearly seen in Juvan¢ié, “Occupier’s Documents,” pp. 102-38. According to a German report of December 1942, Robotti was removed from his post at Grazioli’s request. See Micr. No. T-175, Roll 124, Frs. 2,598,736-43. Since he was then promoted to commander of the 2nd Army, the perennial rivalry between the army and the Fascist Party may have been at play.

“On the barricading of Ljubljana, see Juvanci¢, “The Enclosure of Ljubljana by Wire,” pp. 141-54. On the report of the “Granatieri di Sardegna” Division, see Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 3: 515-16. On Kardelj’s analysis, see Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 3: 149, 276.

104 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA | at Gonars near the town of Udine in Italy. Undesirables were also interned in smaller camps and in small groups or individually in rural areas on the Italian mainland. The chief rationale for deportation was to repress resistance activity, but it was also used secondarily as a precautionary measure. Both types of deportation were directed against the Partisans, though some collaborators were deported to protect them from the Partisans. In addition, the police confined individuals in certain localities for various reasons.” It is estimated that about

, 40,000 Slovenes went through Italian concentration camps in the course of the . war, of whom 7,000 perished from illness, starvation, and maltreatment. Between October 1941 and October 1942, Italian military and civilian — authorities in the Ljubljana Province and the province of Fiume (Rijeka), which included some newly annexed parts of Croatian territory, carried on an ex-

tended correspondence with the 2nd Army command and the Comando Su- | premo about measures contemplated or undertaken against the Partisans and their families. These included interning family members of Partisan leaders and more prominent Partisans, reducing food rations for family members of known

, Partisans, prohibiting family members of Partisans from moving between lo- | calities, penalizing people who had left their regular domicile without permits, and confiscating the movable and immovable property of Partisans and distributing it to families of Italian soldiers wounded or killed in action against the Partisans. Several of these measures were put into effect, but on October 14, 1942, the Comando Supremo countermanded the decreed confiscation of the

regulations.” , oo |

property of known and supposed Partisans as contrary to existing laws and 7 To fight the Partisans in the countryside, the Italians had to use a totally different approach than the one used in the city of Ljubljana. Partisan resistance in

, the countryside frustrated the Italians in the extreme. They had two full divisions and other forces in the province, about 35,000 well-armed and well- supplied men, and still could not eliminate the rebels. But doing so became more urgent when the Partisan leadership from the Ljubljana Province began sending small units and organizers to the Slovene Littoral and the Julian March to foment resistance. This activity threatened peace and communication lines in sSkerl, “Robotti’s Eight Hostages,” pp. 285-92, especially p. 285. , **For Slovene estimates, see VoduSek, “The Meaning of Italian Occupation,” pp. 266-70,

No. T-821, Roll 405, Fr. 819. | oe

| especially p. 268, and Krivic, Ljubljana v ilegali, 3: 156, 173. For Italian statistics, see Micr.

According to data from the Italian 2nd Army, the number of inmates on April 1, 1943, in

the main civilian camps for Slovenes were: 2,628 on the island of Rab; 4,499 at Gonars; 35 at | Monigo; 3,013 at Chiesanuova; 2,390 at Visco; 3,183 at Renicci; and 619 at Camp. No. 83; for a total of 16,367, all for repressive reasons; and 4 at Gonars, 2,465 at Monigo, and 2 at

Catholic. }

Chiesanuova, all for protective reasons, for a total of 18,838 persons all together. Most were

63, and 1195-97. | | ‘7Micr. No. T-821, Roll 498, Frs. 960-1205, especially Frs. 976-1004, 1036-58, I160- ,

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 105 areas that the Italians had held since 1918 but that had large Slovene populations. Consequently, in the spring of 1942 the Italian authorities decided to re-

move the Slovene Partisan menace in the countryside once and for all by mounting a strong offensive over a prolonged period of time. The plan of the offensive and its objectives were described in detail by General Mario Roatta, commander of the Italian 2nd Army, in an order of June 8,

1942, to General Robotti, who was put in charge of the forthcoming operations. The Partisans were to be methodically sought out, pushed together, surrounded, and destroyed. So that they could not maintain themselves in rural areas, Italian troops were to destroy crops, remove all food and livestock, and burn villages supporting Partisans and Partisan bases in forests and mountains. Men found with weapons in their hands were to be shot on the spot and most other men of military age were to be sent to concentration camps. While the Italian military authorities were aware that these operations would cause great hardship to the civilian population, they considered this an unavoidable consequence that the population had brought upon itself by aiding the rebels. To prevent the Partisans in the Ljubljana Province from escaping to neighboring areas, other Italian troops were to seal off the province from the southeast and west. Under a special arrangement with the Germans, the latter were to move against the Partisans along the frontier in their area of occupation.” On July 15, General Robotti and High Commissioner Grazioli together issued a proclamation to the population of the Ljubljana Province explaining the reasons for the coming offensive—Partisan activity and its support by a small part of the Slovene population—and describing the non-military measures that would accompany the military operations. All local rail and bus traffic would be stopped, all city and intercity mail, telegraph, and telephone traffic would be halted, and all travel by any vehicle or on foot between localities was prohibited. All people opposing the Italian forces with arms, all people with arms in the areas of operations, and all people with false identification papers would be shot. All houses and buildings from which shots were fired at the Italians, all buildings in which arms, ammunition, and explosives were found, and all buildings whose owners voluntarily gave hospitality to the Partisans would be destroyed. The proclamation also guaranteed that those rebels who reported to the Italian command and laid down their arms before the start of the offensive would be spared and promised that those who behaved peacefully and properly toward the Italians need not fear for their lives or property. On July 16, Robotti ordered the start of the first phase of operations.” The Italian military authorities assumed that there were between 8,o00 and 10,000 armed Partisans in the Ljubljana Province. Accepting this estimate, Roatta assigned Robotti two more divisions from Montenegro and Herze8For a Serbo-Croatian translation of the respective documents, see Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 3: 429-41, 531-35. *Ibid., pp. 553-59.

106 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA govina, which had had considerable experience in fighting the Partisans there. In addition, several smaller units were also moved into the province. Thus, the Italian forces in the great offensive, which lasted from July 16 to November 4, 1942, numbered between 75,000 and 80,000 men. By contrast, the number of Partisans in fighting units, that is, excluding members of the NZ (People’s Pro-

tection), was only between 2,500 and 3,000 men.” The Italians were well armed and supplied, had various means of transportation and communication

. at their disposal, and also used some artillery and aircraft. The Partisans had only light arms and few supplies. Nevertheless, the Partisans were able to partially offset this tremendous disproportion in manpower and armaments by anticipating both the overall strategy and various tactical moves of the Italians.” To stress the military and political significance of the offensive, Mussolini himself, Marshal Ugo Cavallero, chief of the Comando Supremo, and General Vittorio Ambrosio, chief of General Staff of the army, came to Gorizia (Gorica) on July 31, 1942, for a conference with Roatta, Robotti, and other field generals. In addition to discussing the objectives and progress of the offensive, the Italian leaders were determined to show their strength and dispel any idea that they were weaklings. The conference reaffirmed the policy of mass deportation of Slovenes of fighting age to concentration camps. In fact, the Italians agreed to deport the majority of the Slovene population from the province if necessary, resettling it with Italians. At this meeting the Italian military command in the province obtained Mussolini’s permission to accept the offer of the Slovene People’s Party to help fight the Partisans, though this was to be understood as an Italian concession “without obligations for the future.” In a conference a few days later at Kocevje, Robotti and his officers again discussed the matter of deportations and agreed on the possibility of deporting even the entire Slovene population from the Ljubljana Province and colonizing it with Italians, so that

Italian ethnic and political frontiers would coincide.” , Tbid., pp. 555-56; Mikuz, Pregled zgodovine narodnoosvobodilne borbe, 2: 92-93. For the phases of the offensive from July 16 to November 4, see MikuzZ, pp. 92-141, and Narod-

noosvobodilna vojna, pp. 304-21. , | *'See, for example, Kardelj’s letters to Fischer (Ivo Lola Ribar, a member of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and of Partisan Supreme Headquarters) of

July 14 and early August 1942, in Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 3: 139-50, 264-76. | *2See ibid., pp. 587-93 for a Serbo-Croatian résumé of the minutes of the Gorizia conference, and pp. 596-600 for a similar resume of the Robotti conference. See also Saje, Belogardizem, 1st ed., p. 520. Some Italian politicians, such as Aldo Vidusoni, the secretary general of the Fascist Party,

thought that most Slovenes should be killed outright. See Ciano, Diaries, p. 432. Angelo Scocchi, a professor in Trieste, in a pro memoria entitled “Politica di frontiera: La difesa dell’Italia dallo slavismo,” prepared for the Italian authorities in July 1942, advocated the uprooting of all Slovenes and their resettlement on the Italian mainland and islands, in the colonies, and in Russia, which he assumed would be German after the war. Slovene territory would then be colonized with Italians. See Micr. No. T-5 86, Roll 424, Frs. 12,225-5 5.

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 107 The Rise of Collaborationist Forces Units of the Legion of Death collaborated with Italian forces during the first two weeks of the great offensive against the Partisans in the second half of July

1942. Collaboration apparently occurred on the basis of informal arrangements reached in the field. It showed the Italians that the Slovene armed groups could be very helpful. Consequently, immediately after obtaining Mussolini’s permission at the Gorizia conference to accept the offer of armed collaboration

from the organizations of the Slovene People’s Party, the Italian command formally arranged to employ Slovene units as auxiliaries. On August 6, the Italian command ordered all existing and future Slovene anti-Partisan units to be organized into the Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia (Milizia volontaria anticomunista—MVAC). Toward the end of the same month, armed units in rural areas were also formed for self-defense and to fight the Partisans. These units, called Village Guards (Vaske straZe), in time became the largest component of the MVAC.” In mid-August 1942, while on an inspection trip to Ljubljana, Roatta visited Bishop Gregorij Rozman and urged the Slovene Catholic forces to participate actively in the struggle against the Communists. The reaction of the bishop and his colleagues was very favorable, as his memorandum of September 12, 1942, to General Robotti indicated (see Chapter 12). Thus a combination of factors accounted for the rapid growth of the MVAC units. The Italians needed them in operations against the Partisans. The Catholic Church in Slovenia fully supported them ideologically and politically and in rural areas parish priests were in many cases their chief promoters. The Slovene Legion, by pushing its supporters into the MVAC units, saw a simple and easy way of legalizing a large number of its forces and insuring a steady supply of arms, ammunition, food, and pay from the Italians. For the same reasons, men from the two other legions also joined the MVAC. Finally, after the Partisans lost a large part of their liberated territory in the Italian offensive, many Slovenes thought they had been defeated and turned to collaborationist units. Among the latter were some Partisan deserters and individuals afraid of Italian reprisals. By the end of September 1942, the MVAC units in the Ljubljana Province had 2,823 men, 2,219 of them under arms, and by the end of November 1942, 4,471 men under arms. By the end of February 1943, there were 40 MVAC detachments in the province with 5,145 officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates distributed among Italian divisions and other forces of the XIth Army Corps deployed there. The militia continued to grow and by July 1943 included 6,134 officers and men in its two battalions of the former Legion of Death, 107 detachments, and 171 men detailed to three Italian special battalions. Although the Partisans had expected armed collaboration between the White Guards and ‘3Saje, Belogardizem, ist ed., pp. 393-98; Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, pp. 327-30.

108 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA the Italians to develop, they were surprised at the speed with which this occurred.™ 7 In March 1942 the Slovene People’s Party and its organizations had been primarily responsible for inducing the Italians to apprehend and send over 1,100 former Yugoslav officers and noncommissioned officers living in the Ljubljana Province to prisoner-of-war camps. Subsequently, in the fall of 1942 and early 1943, they were chiefly responsible for convincing the Italians to release those officers who were anti-Partisan, somewhat more than half of the total, to join the rapidly growing MVAC units. The units included both these men and men who, with Italian permission, were drafted. The officers who were pro-Partisan remained in captivity. One released officer, former General Staff Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Peterlin, was appointed by the Italians to command the MVAC unit in Ljubljana. This unit, organized at the end of October 1942, had about 150 men and served as an auxiliary police force in the city. It acted so harshly against actual and suspected followers of the Liberation Front, espe- | cially during raids and searches in December 1942, that considerable public protest arose. As a result, it was disbanded in mid-January 1943. Those it had apprehended were either released, turned over to military courts, or sent to concentration camps. In the spring of 1943, the Slovene Legion named Peterlin the secret commander of all its men in the MVAC in the province.”°

A variety of individuals commanded the MVAC units: men from the Slovene Legion, that is, Catholic activists; men from the Sokol Legion; former Yugoslav officers and noncommissioned officers released from prisoner-of-war , camps; and young peasants recommended by rural parish priests. To each unit the Italians assigned one or more liaison officers, who did not, however, live

with the unit.”

“For the strength of MVAC units in September and November 1942, see Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, pp. 343, 346. See also Saje, Belogardizem, 1st ed., pp. 397-404. For the strength of most detachments, their armament, and the Italian command to which they were attached in February 1943, see Micr. No. T-821, Roll 31, Frs. 218-19. For MVAC strength in July 1943, see Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, p. 520. For Partisan reaction, see Kardelj’s report to Tito of December 7, 1942, in Krivic, Ljubljana v ilegali, 3: 68. ‘5See Kardelj’s report to Tito of December 14, 1942, in Krivic, Ljubljana v ilegali, 3: 82.

“Ferenc, “Police Raids by the Enemy,” pp. 183-228, especially pp. 214-24; Saje, Belogardizem, ist ed., pp. 631-41; Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, p. 520. For the great December — 1942 raids, several hundred Slovene MVAC members were brought to Ljubljana from the

surrounding areas. . ,

‘7In the first volume of this study (The Chetniks, p. 224, footnote 81), I stated that, according to a report by General Robotti, some Village Guard units were commanded by Catholic priests. Janez Grum of Milwaukee, Wis., sent me a memorandum dated April 22, 1976, contesting this point. According to Mr. Grum, a high school teacher in interwar Slovenia and first lieutenant in the reserves of the royal Yugoslav army, who served as an officer in the Village Guards from the time they were formed, no Catholic priest was ever in command of these units. In his opinion, General Robotti’s report rested on an understandable misconception. Some Village Guard units were commanded by young peasants who did not know Italian. In dealing with Italian liaison officers, they were often assisted by Catholic priests,

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA TO9 Although some members of the Sokol Legion and a considerable number of former Yugoslav officers and noncommissioned officers released from prisoner-of-war camps were included in the MVAC units, the controlling force, with Italian acquiescence and within the limits imposed by the Italians, was the Slovene Legion, the fighting arm of the Slovene People’s Party. The Italians, however, never fully trusted the MVAC units and supplied them almost exclusively with light arms. When General Gambarra assumed command of the XIth

Army Corps with the assignment from Rome to “destroy the Partisans and pacify Slovenia,” he also gave detailed instructions on how to manage the MVAC units. He thought that these units could be “precious” if well armed and appropriately used. They should be considered as “voluntary aid,” should always be under Italian command and used with Italian forces, and should not be employed alone for tasks that could be easily abused, such as house searches and arrests. Gambarra reminded his troops that the MVAC, as a party (that is, Slovene People’s Party) militia, might act not only against the Communists, but also in its own interests.” At this point we may logically ask why the bourgeois forces in the Ljubljana Province were so splintered during the Second World War and why each politi-

cal party and group organized its own armed units and tried to maintain, at least to some extent, its own identity within the armed units collaborating with the occupying powers. The explanation lies in the nature of political conditions in Slovenia during the interwar period. At that time, the Slovene People’s Party was the strongest political party in Slovenia, exercising great influence not only on Slovene politics, but also on the educational, cultural, social, and economic affairs of the province. The opposing forces, from the Liberals and the Socialists to groups like the Sokols, had to struggle to assert themselves. It is not sur-

prising that when the war came, the Slovene People’s Party developed the strongest armed group, the Slovene Legion, within the MVAC (and later within the Slovene Home Guards under the Germans). The Catholic Church, with the who used Latin to communicate with the Italians. The Italians apparently assumed that these priests were in command of the units. While this may be true, there is no doubt that in many instances priests were the principal organizers of MVAC units in rural areas and were also an important source of information for the Italians about the Partisans and their sympathizers. See Saje, Belogardizem, 1st ed., pp. 517-74. Mr. Grum noted: “It is true that almost all priests in the Ljubljana Province have publicly shown their sympathies for the Village Guards.” 58In a speech at a confidential gathering, Rudolf Smersu, a principal leader of the Slovene Legion, stated on July 8, 1943: “The Slovene Legion is today the most powerful political and military organization. It is kept secret from the Italians and is illegal. It has 7,000 members in

the countryside, of whom 6,000 are in the Village Guards, and 1,600 sworn members in Ljubljana. The Sokol Legion has 600 members in Ljubljana and 100 outside, and the National Legion has 200 members in Ljubljana and 50 outside.” The speech was apparently reported by a secret Partisan agent who was present. See “The Slovene Legion,” pp. 294-301, especially p. 298.

See the Serbo-Croatian translation of his message to the troops of the XIth Army Corps on January 1, 1943, in Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 5: 349-56, especially pp. 354-55.

IIO GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA exception of a few individual priests, was solidly behind the party, which had

representatives in the Yugoslav government-in-exile until June 1944 and through it contact with the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland (the Chetniks) of General Mihailovic. This meant that in the case of a Chetnik victory and the reestablishment of Yugoslavia under Chetnik control, the Slovene People’s Party, as the Chetniks’ strongest ally in Slovenia, would be assured of even more power than it had had during the interwar period. It was therefore natural for the other collaborating political parties and groups to try and maintain their identity and at least the positions they had had before April 1941. They could achieve this only if they remained separately organized and active. This situation on the political right made the work of the Communist Party of Slovenia and the Liberation Front easier than it would have been had the right been

united. ,

The limited success of Major Karlo Novak, the chief representative of Mihailovié in Slovenia, further reflected this political reality. Novak’s relations with the political parties and groups included in the Slovene Alliance, of which his own group was a part, were never marked by sincere cooperation, partly due to Novak’s exaggerated opinion of his own importance. Since the political parties and their armed groups in the MVAC secretly owed allegiance to Mihailovié and the government-in-exile, separate armed units under Novak’s command apparently seemed redundant to them. Moreover, Novak lacked a political base in Slovenia, while all other armed groups participating in the MVAC had the support of a political party or group. At the suggestion of the Slovene People’s Party, the Italians took Novak’s group, most of which consisted of former Yugoslav officers and noncommissioned officers, to prisonerof-war camps. This still further weakened Novak’s influence. Those officers later released were designated for release by the Slovene People’s Party and, as subsequent developments showed, Novak could not count on their loyalty to him. The political parties, especially the Slovene People’s Party through the Slovene Legion, wanted to maintain control over their men in the MVAC units rather than share it with Novak. Not surprisingly, after months of unsuccessful

cooperation and bickering, Novak began organizing his own armed units, popularly known as the Blue Guards (Plava garda), in February 1943. But neither Novak nor these units—which according to him numbered only 350 to 400 men at the end of August 1943—ever acquired any military or political significance in wartime Slovenia. For some time Novak pressed the Slovene Alliance to detail part of their forces from the MVAC units to him, ostensibly to start actions against the Italians. But to no avail; the Slovene People’s Party and its organizations effectively blocked all Novak’s efforts. According to an Italian report of July 31, 1943, the Slovene People’s Party considered the MVAC units its monopoly and opposed the efforts of all other groups, including Novak’s, to put its men into or withdraw them from the militia. Novak accused many former Yugoslav officers of Slovene nationality and a number of Slovene politi-

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA III cians of following the orders of the Slovene People’s Party rather than cooperating with him as Mihailovi¢’s representative in Slovenia.” After the war Novak claimed that his units had several armed encounters with the Italians and that they were important in gathering intelligence, especially on the movement of Italian troops, that was then sent through Mihailovi¢ to the Western Allies. The first claim is groundless because the Italians assigned a special zone to Novak’s principal unit and there is evidence that they also indirectly supplied Novak’s units.*' As for the second claim, any intelligence gathering could have been of only very limited benefit, due to the small number of Novak’s troops and their inability to observe much Slovene territory. Consequences of the Italian Offensive

The large-scale Italian offensive in the Ljubljana Province from July 16 to November 4, 1942, inflicted considerable damage on the Slovene Partisans. The Italians shot all prisoners found with arms and ammunition (except when Italian commanders failed to enforce this rule), removed several thousand men of military age to concentration camps, wreaked great material destruction in the countryside, and pushed the Partisans out of a large part of their liberated territory. In general, they caused so much demoralization in the population at large and in some Partisan units that between 200 and 300 Partisans deserted. The Italians also succeeded in largely destroying units of the NZ (People’s ProFor Novak’s side, see K. Novak, “The Resistance in Slovenia,” pp. 317-32. For the . Italians’ assessment, see the report of the Italian 2nd Army on political and military developments in its area of command, including the Ljubljana Province, for July 1943, in Micr. No. T-821, Roll 31, Frs. 246-63, especially Fr. 249. For the tenuous relationship between former Yugoslav officers and noncommissioned officers who commanded a large number of MVAC units and representatives of the Slovene Legion who controlled these units, see also Kardelj’s report to Tito of December 14, 1942, in Krivic, Ljubljana v ilegali, 3:79.

The fierce opposition of the Slovene People’s Party to Major Novak’s proposals was probably also influenced by an additional factor. Early in 1943, while vice premier in the government-in-exile in London, Miha Krek had begun to doubt the possibility of reconstituting a unified Yugoslav state after the war because of the deepening antagonism between Croatian and Serbian politicians in the government-in-exile. In conversations with Sir George Rendel,

British envoy to the government-in-exile, he expressed his doubts about the future of the country, although up to that time the Slovenes had been strong supporters of Yugoslavia and of the Karadjordjevi¢é dynasty. Krek tried to gauge British reaction to a non- Yugoslav alternative for Slovenia, because the Slovenes wanted to have British backing for any new arrangement. This would be a state embracing territory from Rijeka and Trieste on the Adriatic to the central Danube in the east, in which Slovenia, united with Slovene areas at that time under Italy and Austria, would be a federal unit. For both Yugoslav and non- Yugoslav alternatives, it was in the interest of the Slovene People’s Party as the main representative of the Slovene antiCommunist forces to keep all its armed forces together, as it did in the MVAC units, rather than relinquish any control to Major Novak. See Rendel’s reports of March 4 and May 28,

1943, to the Foreign Office, in F.O. 371/37630, R 2038/246/92, and F.O. 371/37630, R 4737/246/92.

6! Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, p. 518. |

[12 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA tection) by killing some members, taking many to concentration camps, forcing

others into inactivity, and even inducing some to transfer allegiance to the MVAC units. But the Partisans also made many political and military mistakes before and during the Italian offensive. The policy of “leftist deviation”—the use of terror against alleged and actual collaborators and those who, because of their social class, were considered potential adversaries in the future, as well as against Partisan deserters and their families—was very damaging because it fostered the development and strengthened the determination of the collaborationist forces. In combination with the loss of a great deal of liberated territory, this also led to the loss of Partisan influence with the wealthier peasants and the so-called Middle, that is, with groups that until the late summer of 1942 refused to join either the Liberation Front or its adversaries on the right. Some of the Partisans’

difficulties were due to the mediocre quality and inexperience of their commanders, and Kardelj asked Tito to send some experienced officers from other areas to Slovenia. On occasion, the Partisan leadership misinterpreted certain moves of the Italian troops. At one point Partisan leaders were surrounded and had great difficulty in extricating themselves from encirclement.” However, according to Kardelj’s reports, the Italian offensive was in some ways salutary for the Partisans. The leaders of the Communist Party and the

| Liberation Front were able to identify and demote or replace commanders who were not upholding the party’s directives, who tended to assume the role of small independent chieftains, and who inclined toward “leftist deviation.” The Partisans also came to realize that the MVAC units were an important and disturbing factor, because they controlled an increasing number of villages and had infiltrated other Partisan areas. When the Partisans moved out of the reach of Italian troops and sought safety in the villages, they often found themselves facing the Village Guards. As Kardelj reported, it was impossible for small Partisan units to move about any longer in many rural areas. The Partisans therefore needed to organize larger units to withstand pressure from the MVAC units, to impress the villagers with their strength, and to engage in more ambitious offensive undertakings. In fact, by November 1942 the destruction of the

MVAC units became the first priority of the Partisan forces.© ,

, During the last stage of the Italian offensive and soon after it, the Slovene Partisans undertook a series of measures to strengthen their military forces. They began organizing brigades with complements of usually less than 1,000 men and they reorganized the Partisan Chief Staff for Slovenia. At the beginning of December 1942, they divided Slovenia into four operational zones to “On the “leftist deviation,” see Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 210-11, 231, 257. Of Kardelj’s writings, see his letters of July 14 and early August 1942 to Fischer (Ivo Lola Ribar),

in Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 3: 139-50, 264-76, and his reports to Tito of December 7 and 14, 1942, in Krivic, Ljubljana v ilegali, 3: 65-95, especially pp. 68, 74-79, 82-83. “8Krivic, Ljubljana v ilegali, 3: 78-80; Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 4: 229-31.

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 113 promote an offensive spirit in the troops against the occupying and collaborating forces and to give more independence to the commanding cadres in the zones. In December 1943, the first, second, and third operational zones, with the addition of the Slovene Littoral and Slovene parts of Istria, were divided between the VIIth and [Xth Army Corps, while the fourth operational zone, Styria, remained intact until the end of the war. Having learned valuable lessons during the Italian offensive, the Partisans

quickly recovered, both politically and militarily. Already in late November 1942, they could again mount successful operations, primarily against their domestic adversaries. Above all they were able to maintain themselves in the Ljubljana Province without having to flee to neighboring Croatia, which would have destroyed their remaining prestige and political standing in all parts of Slovenia and correspondingly enhanced that of the White Guards. The Slovene Partisans were also proud that their organization, though much weakened, survived in Ljubljana. Even after the leaders of the Liberation Front were forced to leave in May 1942, the city remained a stronghold of both political and military resistance in Slovenia.“ The most important decision-making entity in the Liberation Front was the Communist Party of Slovenia. The Communists controlled the armed units, the VOS, the technical services, the communication lines between the Executive Committee of the front and the organizations in the field, and the majority of

regional and local committees. This fact, and the “leftist deviation” of some Partisan commanders, often led to disagreements with the non-Communist leaders of the front. Since its breakup would have been politically inopportune for the Communist Party, discussions among the leaders of all participating groups were held in February 1943 to overcome these difficulties. The resulting agreement, later known as the Dolomites Declaration, pointed to the achievements of the front, smoothed over the difficulties between member groups, recorded the promises of the non-Communist groups to not form their own political parties, and reaffirmed the leading role of the Communist Party in the front. In short, the Liberation Front ceased to be a coalition of the Communist Party and dissidents from bourgeois political parties and groups and became a front organization for the Communist Party of Slovenia. It later became part of the all- Yugoslav National Liberation Front.” The Slovene Partisans, like the Partisans in other provinces of Yugoslavia, also established political and administrative organizations. In September 1943 “Mikuz, Pregled zgodovine narodnoosvobodilne borbe, 2: 170-77; Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, pp. 391-413. See also the reports of Kardelj to Ribar and Tito cited in footnote 62.

‘For the controlling role of the Communists, see a report by Boris Kidri¢, secretary gen- , eral of the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front, around December 14, 1942, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, in Kardelj and Kidri¢, Jesen 1942, Pp. 575-89, especially p. 589. For the Dolomites Declaration, see Zbornik DNOR, 6, bk. 5: 185-89, and Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, pp. 442-45.

114 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA. they held public elections in liberated areas. The 572 elected delegates met on October 1-3 in the town of Koéevje and elected a Slovene National Liberation Committee of 120 members, who constituted themselves as the general Slovene legislative body while its Presidium assumed executive powers. Though the Slovene Partisans had been unable to send representatives to the first session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifasisticko

vijece narodnog oslobodjenja Jugoslavije—A VNOJ]) held in Bihac in western , Bosnia on November 26-27, 1942, they did send representatives to its second session, held in Jajce in central Bosnia on November 29, 1943. This session de- , cided, among other things, that AVNOJ would assume the functions of the supreme legislative body of the peoples of Yugoslavia organized in a federal state

and it established the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia (Nacionalni komitet oslobodjenja Jugoslavije—NKOJ) as the interim Partisan

government. On February 19-20, 1944, the Slovene Partisans convened the Slovene National Liberation Council (Slovenski narodnoosvobodilni svet— SNOS), the Slovene counterpart of similar councils established by the Partisans in the other Yugoslav provinces, all subordinate to AVNOJ. SNOS accepted all _ decisions of the second session of AVNOJ and also established an interim Slo-

vene government.” oe

An extremely important development for the Partisans in the Ljubljana

Province, as well as in other parts of Yugoslavia under Italian control, was that from early 1943, the Italians became steadily weaker and therefore unable or unwilling to mount new large-scale operations or maintain sustained pressure against the insurgents. The loss of the 8th Army in Russia, the landing of Anglo-American forces in North Africa, increased Anglo-American air attacks on mainland Italy, worsening relations between the Italian and German military | commands, increasing economic difficulties, and the Allied invasion of Sicily on July 10, 1943, all led to spreading demoralization in the Italian armed forces and among the civilian population and a growing readiness to get out of the war at almost any price. The ouster of Mussolini on July 25, 1943, presaged the © early surrender of Italy. This greatly improved the prospects of victory for the

_ Partisans and increased the number of volunteers joining their units. On the other hand, the Slovene forces that had been collaborating with the Italians, about to lose their protector and supplier, were faced with difficult choices: establishing effective contact with Western Allied troops if they should land in Istria; making some arrangement with the Partisans, which meant surrendering to them; or collaborating with the Germans in order to continue fighting the _ Partisans. Since Allied troops did not land on the eastern shores of the Adriatic and the collaborationist forces were unwilling to surrender to the Partisans, the

only viable alternative was to collaborate with the Germans. . During April and May 1943 Allied military missions arrived at Partisan Mikuz, Pregled zgodovine narodnoosvobodilne borbe, 3: 89-95, 215-19.

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 115 Chief Headquarters in Croatia and Partisan Supreme Headquarters in Montenegro. One Allied mission under the command of British officer Major William

Jones (a Canadian) spent about a month at Partisan Chief Headquarters in Croatia and then moved north, arriving at Partisan Chief Headquarters in Slovenia on June 27. Judging from what Jones later wrote in his book, his reports on the Partisans must have been very favorable.*’ Partisan contacts and cooperation with the Western Allies steadily grew, providing them with a great political and military boost and auguring well for their cause in all parts of the country. Moreover, during the period from mid-March to mid-June 1943, the Partisans, while sustaining great losses, inflicted a series of defeats on the Chetniks in Herzegovina, southeast Bosnia, and Montenegro that ushered in a period of military and political decline from which the latter never recovered. This decline was greatly accelerated by the de facto and then at the Tehran Conference the formal recognition of the Partisans as an Allied force and the withdrawal of Allied military missions and aid from the Chetniks. All of this also had harmful effects on the Slovene forces allied with the Chetniks. One immediate benefit for the Western Allies from their support of the Slovene Partisans was the rescue of Allied personnel. These included American and British fliers who had been shot down in, bailed out over, or crash-landed in Partisan-controlled Slovene territory, as well as Allied prisoners of war and slave laborers who had escaped from the Germans. The Slovene Partisans rescued 303 American airmen, 389 British airmen and prisoners of war, and 120 French and other prisoners of war and slave laborers. Two additional advantages for the Allies from their cooperation with the Slovene Partisans soon became apparent. First, the Partisans significantly disrupted railroad communications through the Ljubljana Province and later to some extent also through the Slovene Littoral, lines over which the Germans moved troops and supplies, especially Romanian oil, to the Italian front. Second, and especially appreciated by Allied intelligence and special operations services, it now became relatively easy for the Allies to infiltrate operatives into northeast Italy and Austria.” As already noted, the principal reason for the development of Slovene collaborationist armed forces in the Ljubljana Province, under first Italian and later German rule, was the rise of the Liberation Front and the fear of the bour‘Jones, Twelve Months With Tito’s Partisans, pp. 1-2, 11, 47-122. “Research Institute, Ljubljana, Allied Airmen and Prisoners of War, pp. 11-88, provides names and dates of all those who reached the Slovene Partisans and were flown out to Allied bases in Italy.

*’This last point was stressed by Lieutenant Colonel P. A. Wilkinson, an SOE officer and British liaison with the Slovene Partisans. He also pointed out that the latter were almost exclusively interested in tactical intelligence. They were not concerned about wider aspects of the war and knew little about broader German intentions, which could be of help to the Allies. See his report of April 27, 1944, in F.O. 371/44255, R 7125/8/92, pp. 15-16, 20-23, 27.

116 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA geois political parties and groups that the Partisans would introduce a Communist dictatorship after the war. This is clearly indicated in many wartime sources, and later historical writings bear it out. Professor Metod Mikuz has said it succinctly: “The counterrevolution in the true sense of the word appeared only as a reaction to the National Liberation War, that is, to the na-

tional revolution.”” , ,

The Slovene bourgeois parties fought the Liberation Front politically and with propaganda both before and after they began collaborating militarily with the Italians against the Partisans in July 1942. The Slovene Alliance coordinated their policies. In their propaganda effort, two books, one published in February 1943 and the other sometime in 1944, were especially important. They alleged that the Liberation Front was a Communist organization that planned to turn Slovenia into a Bolshevik state and that it pressured people to - join its ranks and used terror against them when they refused. They portrayed the Slovenes who were caught between the occupation forces and the Liberation Front as victims caught between two fires and asserted that their only appropriate action was to organize self-defense armed units against the Liberation Front in order to defend the lives, homes, and religious and cultural values of the Slovene people. The most telling aspect of these two publications was the inclusion of hundreds of names and photographs of people, including some Catholic priests, killed by the Partisans, as well as pictures of churches, schools,

and other buildings destroyed by them.” The End of Italian Rule ,

With the Italian surrender approaching, the competing forces—Slovene groups within and behind the MVAC, Major Novak and the Chetniks, and the Liberation Front—jockeyed for position when the crucial moment came. As — Italian 2nd Army reports for July and August 1943 indicate, the Partisans continued their attacks against Italian and MVAC units and communication lines, but on a reduced scale, trying to save their forces for critical developments after See the already quoted Italian intelligence report of June 1, 1942, cited in footnote 42; Kardelj’s report to Tito on December 14, 1942, cited in footnote 62; and the memoranda of the Slovene People’s Party and other Slovene anti-Partisan political parties, received by the British Foreign Office in January 1944, cited in footnote 95. For Professor Mikuz’s statement, see his Pregled razvoja NOB u Sloveniji, 1: 244. See also Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, p. 328. "The first of these books was V znamenju Osvobodilne fronte (Under the Shadow of the Liberation Front) (Ljubljana, February 1943), and the second, a sequel and enlargement of

, the first, was Crne bukve (The Black Book) (Ljubljana, 1944). Both described the terrorist acts of the Communist-led Liberation Front in Slovenia. They were published anonymously, but according to reliable information the first was edited by the Reverend Franc Glavac¢ and

, the second by journalist Mirko Javornik, editor of the strongly anti-Partisan Catholic weekly Slovenski dom (Slovene Home) in Ljubljana. While saying nothing about the collaboration of

their own side with the enemy, the editors accused the Partisans of collaboration with the Italians, especially during the last few months of Italian occupation. =

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 117 the Italians left.” In July 1943, as a preparatory measure, they established two divisions by combining three or four brigades. They also strengthened existing guerrilla units and established new ones in the Slovene Littoral, which, like the Ljubljana Province, had important railroad lines for both the Italians and the Germans. The MVAC units and Novak’s Chetnik units hoped that when the Italians surrendered, Allied troops would land in Istria and accept them as allies. So the Chetniks’ principal detachment, with about half of the Chetnik forces, moved south in the province to meet the reinforcements that the Chetniks hoped would be coming from the Croatian area of Lika and there await further orders. However, the Partisans attacked the detachment and pushed it southwest, where it withdrew to the village of Gréarice about ten kilometers west of Koéevje. In a similar action, after the Italian surrender, the former MVAC units—now renamed the Slovene National Army (and part of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland commanded by Mihailovi¢)—which were in no way connected with the Chetniks at Gréarice, concentrated a sizable part of their forces, together with large amounts of ammunition and food, in the castle of Turjak, some twenty kilometers southeast of Ljubljana. It was a favorable point for an expected move toward the coast. But Partisan brigades were also moving in the same direction and were under orders to disarm Italian troops and capture or destroy any Chetnik and former MVAC units within their reach. The Slovene Partisans wanted to inflict as much damage as possible on the Slovene collaborationists, so that the latter would be of less value to the new German occupation forces. Significantly, these Partisan units had succeeded in inducing some Italian soldiers to join them, including some with tanks and artillery. Italy surrendered on September 8. At the time, it had about 50,000 men in the Ljubljana Province. In the middle of the previous month, the MVAC units included 6,049 men, the Chetnik forces of Major Novak between 300 and 400 men, and the Partisan units 2,958 men.” According to Professor Ferenc, Partisan strength was actually much larger if one included armed men in Liberation Front committees, the Communist Youth Organization, and other Partisan groups.

Great uncertainty reigned among the Chetniks and the former MVAC forces when the Italian army, their erstwhile protector and provider, surrendered. Above all they were deeply disappointed that no Allied troops landed in Istria or along the eastern Adriatic coast. This deprived them, as a part of General Mihailovic’s forces, of any opportunity for political maneuvering with the Allied side. At Gréarice and Turjak a breakdown in the lines of communication with superior commands or the actual disintegration of these commands oc”?Micr. No. T-821, Roll 31, Frs. 249, 260, 322. ?V ojko, Izmedju Triglava i Trsta, p. 52, citing figures published in 1952 by Franéek Saje. ~

118 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA curred. The upshot was that at Gréarice the Chetniks dug in, hoping that rein- , forcements would arrive in time, and at Turjak approximately two-thirds of the troops or close to 750 men stayed at the castle, planning to withstand an attack until help arrived from Ljubljana. The rest of the troops moved to the village of Zapotok, three to four kilometers due west, where they were joined by

the remnants of other former MVAC units and two small Chetnik detachments |

that came to the area. , The Partisans pressed their advantage. On September 9 and 10, after refusing an ultimatum to surrender, the Chetniks at Gréarice were overwhelmed by a Partisan brigade using two Italian howitzers. On September 14, the Partisans completed the encirclement of Turjak and, after the defenders refused to sur-

render, laid it under a siege that lasted until September 19. Essential for its speedy collapse were again the heavy weapons that the Partisans had acquired from the Italians. During this same period the Partisans also captured men from other former MVAC units, including some assembled at Zapotok, which were pushing north toward Ljubljana (where they were disarmed by the Germans). By September 21, Kidri¢ reported that the Partisans had about 1,200 prisoners of war. A small number were tried for war crimes and shot, while most were put into work battalions or in work units as preparation for entering Partisan

ranks.” oe

There is great controversy over the number of men liquidated from among the prisoners taken at Gréarice and Turjak. According to Partisan data, about 115 former MVAC members and Chetniks were sentenced to death, and others

were shot while trying to flee from work battalions. Slovene anti-Partisan - sources, however, put the number of collaborationist prisoners liquidated after the Italian surrender as high as 1,000.” Considering the inherent tendency of

the Yugoslav Communist authorities to minimize or not acknowledge the number of opponents they liquidated and the tendency of former collaboraFerenc, Kapitulacija Italije, pp. 181-99; Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, pp. 518-20, 523-

28; Hronologija 1941-1945, pp. § 59-60. , —

Professor Ferenc’s letter of June 23, 1982, to the author; Grum, Memorandum (cited in footnote 57), p. 10. Janez Grum, who commanded the former MVAC units that moved to Zapotok, claimed that the Partisans liquidated between 500 and 600 officers and men of the former MVAC and Chetnik units during September 1943. In his memorandum, Grum disagreed with parts of my brief presentation of the happenings at Turjak in the first volume of this study. In particular, he disputed the assertion that the troops under his command suffered “huge losses” in extricating themselves from Zapotok and fleeing toward Ljubljana. According to him, of the 650 to 700 men involved, only be~ tween 20 and 30 lost their lives. Grum attributed the Partisans’ speedy victories at Gréarice and Turjak in large part to the Italian heavy arms at their disposal. But he concluded that major blame for both disasters lay with the defenders themselves, who made a basic tactical ‘mistake when they decided to hold fixed positions. See Grum, “On the Twentieth Anniversary of Turjak,” pp. 310-20; idem, “On the History of Turjak,” pp. 260-72. These detailed descriptions of developments at Turjak and Zapotok were partly based on Grum’s own experience and partly pieced together from conversations and correspondence with other surviving participants.

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA L19 tionists to increase their own number of victims, we will probably have to wait several more years before we learn the full truth about this episode in the Partisans’ settling of accounts with their adversaries. After his disappointing experience with the Slovene People’s Party organizations and the destruction of his principal unit at Gréarice, Major Novak, totally disgusted, ordered the disbanding of his remaining Chetnik detachments. However, the Germans had already disarmed them together with the former MVAC troops that had come from Zapotok. Novak withdrew from the Slovene Alliance and left Ljubljana for Italy on September 26, 1943.” The disasters at Turjak and Gréarice were only the worst episodes in the disintegration of the Slovene forces that had collaborated with the Italians. According to Franéek Saje, of about 6,500 men belonging to such forces in the Ljubljana Province at the time of the Italian surrender, about 3,000 were captured by the Partisans, about 500 were killed in fighting against them, about 1,000 volunteered to join Partisan troops, and about 2,000 later joined the Slovene Home Guards, sponsored by the Germans.” Thus the momentous developments that immediately followed upon the end of Italian rule in the Ljubljana Province also brought about the end of the Slovene Chetniks and the almost total disintegration of the Slovene forces that had served as MVAC units. This, and the fact that the Partisans were able to disarm a large part of the Italian forces in the Ljubljana Province at the time of surrender, which gave them sizable amounts of arms and other military supplies, led to a rapid increase in the size of the Partisan forces and greatly strengthened their position and prestige.

West of the Ljubljana Province, in the Slovene Littoral and Istria, the Slovene and Croatian populations welcomed the Partisans as liberators when the Italian army and administration collapsed in September 1943. This was due to their pent-up hostility toward the Italians’ oppressive rule of the previous 24 years and to the successful preparatory political and propaganda work of the Partisans during the preceding year. A considerable number of Italian antiFascists also cooperated with the Partisans, at least in the beginning. On the political side, the Partisans immediately set up their own administration and on

September 16 proclaimed the unification of the Slovene Littoral with free | Slovenia as part of a federal Yugoslavia. On the military side, they tried to at-

tract volunteers to their units and ordered a general mobilization of young people in order to enlarge existing units and establish new ones. They even formed several units from anti-Fascist Italian soldiers and civilians. The Partisans’ chief military aim was to destroy communication lines in order to impede the movement of German troops and military supplies. The fact that the Slovene bourgeois political forces had no military forces in the Slovene Littoral similar to the 7K. Novak, “The Resistance in Slovenia,” pp. 330-31. ”Saje, Belogardizem, enl. ed., p. 608.

120 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA former MVAC units in the Ljubljana Province and that, out of consideration for the Italian authorities, they also had no underground political organization

also helped the Partisans. | The Communists’ administrative, military, and party organizations in the Slovene Littoral and Istria were not as widespread and effective after the Partisans assumed control as Yugoslav Communist sources would have us believe. Sharp differences also developed between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (and its subdivisions in Slovenia and Croatia) and the Communist Party of Italy over Yugoslav procedures and policies in the newly liberated areas, which the Yugoslav Communists annexed to Yugoslavia without discussion with the Italian Communists. Moreover, according to Italian witnesses, Yugoslav Partisan forces engaged in mass terror and killed between 400 and 500 Italians in the Slovene Littoral and Istria before the Germans retook these areas. Without any trial, these people were shot or thrown alive into karstic abysses.” After the Italian surrender, the Germans also moved in to establish control over the Slovene Littoral and Istria, as well as the Ljubljana Province, and organize them militarily and administratively. Because the Partisans threatened important railroad communications and could be of great help to invading forces in case of an Allied landing in Istria, the Germans gave high priority to clearing these areas. Since they did not have sufficient forces there, they first had to bring in additional troops from outside. Army Group B, which was deployed in northern Italy, was in charge of operations. Between September 25 and 30 the Germans undertook sweeping operations against the Partisans in the Slovene Littoral and between October 2 and 10 in Istria. They inflicted great losses and cleared most of the territory that the Partisans had briefly held. A principal reason for their speedy

success was that in these areas, the Partisans deployed mostly new, rapidly formed, or enlarged units without battle experience and with inexperienced commanding cadres. Hitler ordered German forces to proceed with exemplary brutality and immediately shoot all people giving resistance regardless of nationality (that is, whether Slovene, Croat, or Italian), so that they could accomplish their objective as quickly as possible and be available for use elsewhere.”

After clearing out the Partisans from the Slovene Littoral and Istria, the Germans undertook a similar operation in the Ljubljana Province. This offensive, which has been compared with the Italian offensive between July and November 1942, lasted from October 21 to November 12, 1943. Although the Slovene Partisans suffered great losses and were driven from much of their liberated territory, they were not defeated and reappeared again and again in supposedly cleared areas. They continued to grow and expand their operations as

the war progressed.” , , ,

*Terzuolo, Red Adriatic, pp. 25-28. These karstic abysses are called foibe in Italian. , Ferenc, Kapitulacija Italije, pp. 375-413; Kriegstagebuch, 3, pt. 2: 1121-22, 1130-33; Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, pp. §78-93. Ferenc, Kapitulacija Italije, pp. 456-566; Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, pp. 594-604.

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 121 GERMAN OCCUPATION OF THE LJUBLJANA PROVINCE Operation Achse was the Germans’ plan for taking over Italian-held areas after the Italian surrender. But already two weeks before the surrender, and despite Italian protests, the Germans moved two regiments of the 71st Infantry Division from Carinthia and Upper Carniola through the Ljubljana Province to

the Slovene Littoral and the neighborhood of Trieste and stationed a third regiment in the area of Ljubljana and along the Ljubljana-Postojna railroad. Between September 9 and 14, they moved additional forces into the Ljubljana Province, mostly SS, police, and gendarmerie units.”' Their main concern in these areas was to secure the principal communication lines connecting southeast and central Europe with German forces in Italy. Already on September 10, 1943, apparently following an earlier suggestion of Friedrich Rainer, Gauleiter of Carinthia, Hitler ordered the establishment of two operational zones in Italian territory, the Lower Alps Zone and the Adriatic Coastland Zone. The objective was to have special administrations in both zones completely responsive to local military needs. Franz Hofer, Gauleiter of the District of Tyrol, also became the highest commissar of the Lower Alps Zone, while Rainer, Gauleiter of Carinthia, also became the highest commissar of the Adriatic Coastland Zone. Since the Germans had just helped form a new Italian Fascist government in Munich on September 9 and had rescued Mussolini on September 12, the creation of the two zones was a politically ticklish problem and the decree establishing them was not published. Instructions on the organization and administration of the two zones were apparently given only orally to Hofer and Rainer on September 12.” Militarily, the Adriatic Coastland Zone was from September to early November 1943 the responsibility of Army Group B under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and included northern Italy between the French and Croatian borders. At the beginning of November, Army Group B was reorganized as an Army for Special Purposes and sent to Western Europe. The Adriatic Coastland Zone came under the command of General Ludwig Kubler. He was subordinate to Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, who as commander of Army Group C and commander in chief in southwest Europe was put in command of all German troops in the whole of Italy, including the Adriatic Coastland Zone. On September 10, 1944, the forces in the zone were redesignated as the XCVIIth Army Corps and remained part of Kesselring’s forces until early April 1945, when the ‘Ferenc, “The German Occupier in Ljubljana,” pp. 197-207. *2For the establishment of the two new operational zones, see Kriegstagebuch, 3, pt. 2: 1113-14, and Ferenc, Kapitulacija Italije, pp. 352-74. On September 23, 1943, Mussolini reorganized and moved this government to Italian soil. On November 25, he named his puppet state the Italian Social Republic. See Deakin, The Brutal Friendship, pp. 5 54-74.

122 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA approach of the strong and well-equipped Partisan 4th Army toward Istria resulted in a transfer of the corps to the command of Colonel General Alexander Lohr, the new commander in chief in southeast Europe. Police and SS troops in

the Adriatic Coastland Zone, with the exception of those in the Ljubljana Province, were under the command of General of Police Odilo Globocnik, the

higher SS and police leader in Trieste. __ |

Highest Commissar Rainer divided the Adriatic Coastland Zone into six provinces: Gorica, Kvarner, Ljubljana, Pula, Trieste, and Udine. The former Ljubljana Province continued as a separate administrative unit with the same lower administrative organization as in pre-April 1941 Yugoslavia and under Italian occupation. In all the provinces except Ljubljana, Rainer named Italians as prefects. In the Ljubljana Province, he appointed Leo Rupnik as president of the provincial government. A former Yugoslav general and mayor of Ljubljana under the Italians, Rupnik assumed his position on September 22, 1943." He was a logical choice. In addition to his military background and collaboration with the Italians, he was recommended by Bishop Rozman of Ljubljana and thus supported by most Catholic-oriented politicians. Above all, Rupnik acted on the assumption that the Germans would win the war. His powers and prerogatives were narrowly limited and he served only as a tool of the German oc-

cupation authorities.” , ,

To the head of each provincial civilian government, the Germans assigned a

group of advisers, the chief among them bearing the innocuous title of “the German adviser” (der deutsche Berater). In fact, this individual was the princi- , For Field Marshal Keitel’s order of September 9, 1943, on the command organization in Italy, see Kriegstagebuch, 3, pt. 2: 1257-58, 1295, 1460-61, 1465-67. For later organizational changes, see ibid., 4, pt. 1: 563; ibid., 4, pt. 2: 1892, 1902; and the postwar interrogation of General Kiibler, in YA, Mil. Hist., German Docs., Reg. No. 50/7, p. 7, Box 7. See also

Ferenc, “The German Occupier in Ljubljana,” p. 213. |

“Ferenc, Kapitulacija Italije, pp. 357-58. Those parts of Slovenia occupied by the Germans in April 1941 were administered as before. *SFor Bishop Rozman’s recommendation of General Rupnik for the position of president of the provincial government, see Ferenc, “The German Occupier in Ljubljana,” p. 211, and

for General Rupnik’s expectation that the Germans would win the war, see Hren, “Addendum: My Encounters with General Rupnik,” p. 156. Rupnik’s belief in a German victory can also be seen in many of his speeches and appeals. See, for example, his speech of April 17,

1944, in Zeljeznov, Rupnikov proces, pp. 179-93. -

After the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1941, Rupnik had gone to the German-occupied part of Slovenia hoping to obtain employment from an acquaintance, August Westen, a Volksdeutsche and important Slovene industrialist. But as a non-German citizen, he could not get work. He considered obtaining German citizenship, but the procedure was too cumbersome and he did not apply. Hearing favorable reports from his family about the decent behavior of the Italians in the Ljubljana Province and believing that as a former Yugoslav officer he might obtain financial support, he moved to Ljubljana in mid-May 1941. After a brief arranged sojourn in an Italian prisoner-of-war camp, he began his collaborationist career as mayor of Ljubljana in June 1942. See Zeljeznov, Rupnikov proces, pp. 65-72.

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 123 pal occupation executive in the province. The first German adviser in the Ljubljana Province was Hermann Doujak. After only a few days on the job, he was replaced by Lieutenant General of Police Erwin Rosener, the higher SS and police leader of the Alpenland from Salzburg. Rosener was responsible directly to Himmler. In addition to supervising the Ljubljana provincial administration, his main task was to fight the Slovene Partisans in the province as well as in the Slovene areas occupied by the Germans in April 1941. The Security Police and Security Service for Carinthia, with their seat at Bled, were in charge of political and other police work in the Ljubljana Province. These services had a special delegation in Ljubljana whose members worked with and supervised the Slovene political police, headed by Lovro Hacin, a pre-1941 director of the Ljubljana police and now an appointee of General Rupnik.” Since the Slovene anti-Communist forces were more threatened by the Partisans after the Italian surrender than they had been before and since no Allied troops landed in Yugoslav territory, it was natural for these forces to seek an accommodation with the Germans in order to survive and continue their struggle against the Communists. Similarly, it was advantageous for the Germans,

who lacked manpower, to have the help of as many Yugoslav anti-Partisan groups as possible, including those in Slovenia. Both Rainer and R6sener knew that the Slovene anti-Partisan forces in the Ljubljana Province had collaborated with the Italians against the Partisans and they were determined to have similarly organized Slovene forces help them.” Given this resolve, it was not surprising when Rainer suggested that Rupnik start organizing a new anti-Partisan force immediately after the latter took office as provincial president. This must have pleased both Rupnik personally *6General Rosener, as one of Himmler’s commanders, was in charge of antiguerrilla operations in his area of command, which included the German-occupied parts of Lower Styria,

Upper Carniola, and Carinthia. To conduct operations in these areas, he had a command staff at Bled, northwest of Ljubljana. Because of increased Partisan activity in the spring of 1943, Himmler proclaimed them “guerrilla fighting areas” on June 21, 1943. According to Hitler’s dispositions, this gave Himmler and the SS and police organization the exclusive right

to combat the guerrillas. See Micr. No. T-175, Roll 81, Frs. 2,601,636-37; 2,601,64 5-46; 2,601,651; 2,601,659. From later correspondence between Roésener and Himmler and other documents, it is clear that RGsener retained both of his posts, that is, as higher SS and police leader in the Alpenland with the seat at Salzburg and as German adviser in the Ljubljana Province, until the end of the war. See also Ferenc, “The German Occupier in Ljubljana,” pp. 213,216. The Liberation Front had a highly placed pre-1941 police official, Vladimir Kante, working for them in the Ljubljana police. Siding with the Liberation Front from the beginning, Kante served during the entire Italian occupation and was retained after the Germans took over. When the Germans penetrated the Ljubljana Communist Party and Liberation Front in February 1945, he was discovered, arrested, and executed. See Krivic, Ljubljana v ilegali, 4: 253-54, 535-36. ®’For the change in German policy toward the Chetniks and other anti-Partisan forces, see Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 317-21.

124 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA | and the anti-Partisan political and armed groups that earlier had collaborated _ with the Italians. On September 24 Rupnik issued a call for volunteers for a Home Guard Legion, to which about 1,000 former MVAC members and other men responded by October 1. In fact, three former MVAC units survived destruction and dispersal following the Italian surrender by joining the Germans for safety. These were soon organized as the first three battalions of the German-sponsored Slovene Home Guards and together with German forces immediately engaged the Partisans in the Ljubljana Province. This was the beginning of the military collaboration of the Slovene anti-Partisan forces with the Germans, which steadily grew and lasted until the end of the war. Shortly after recruiting for the Home Guards was launched, Résener took over the in-

cipient guard organization and split it into two departments, organizational and propaganda. Former Yugoslav officers of Slovene nationality who had served with the MVAC units and were known for their close relations with Slovene People’s Party organizations (the Committee on Village Guards and the Slovene Legion) were put in charge, though under close German supervision. On September 30, Résener established the Command Staff for the Suppression of Guerrillas (Fuhrungsstab fiir Bandenbekampfung).” In time, with the complete cooperation of Rupnik, collaborating Slovene officers, and anti-Partisan political forces, he developed the Home Guards into the principal instrument for fighting the Partisans in the Ljubljana Province. Although Rupnik had initiated the establishment of the Home Guards, he had no control over them, even after ROsener named him inspector general in September 1944. In this capacity he helped only with recruitment and training. When visiting guard units in the field, Rupnik always called upon them to be good and disciplined soldiers, to work closely with the German forces, and to fight with determination against

the Partisans.”

The Home Guards were at first organized into companies and battalions. Subsequently the Germans reorganized and regrouped them several times. In the last stages of the war, German officers commanded several battalions, some with mixed Slovene-German complements. By September 1944, according to Slovene sources cooperating with the Home Guards, their strength was about 13,000 officers and men. They were fully armed, supplied, and paid by the German occupation authorities. Whenever deployed in operations against the Partisans, guard units were under higher German command. On April 20, 1944, the Home Guards took a solemn oath to fight together with the SS and

*8Professor Ferenc’s letter of June 23, 1982, to the author. - a , ’Proces proti Rupniku, pp. 93-95; Mikuz, Pregled zgodovine narodnoosvobodilne borbe, 3: 44-47; Ferenc, “The German Occupier in Ljubljana,” pp. 213-14; KriZnar, “The

Slovene Home Guards,” pp. 238, 244. ;

154-55, 175-95. | | ,

*°See especially his appeals and speeches, in Zeljeznov, Rupnikov proces, pp. 142-43,

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 125 German police under the leadership of the Fiihrer against the Communist guerrillas and their allies, meaning Soviet and Western Allied troops. Though they probably acted under duress and with reservations, the fact that the Home Guards took this oath made them suspect in the eyes of the Western Allies.” Akin to the Slovene Home Guards in ideology, organization, and purpose were the German-sponsored Home Guards in the Slovene Littoral and the Province of Trieste, which were organized beginning in November 1943 to fight Partisan forces there. The inspector general and later commander of the guards was Colonel Anton Kokalj, a former Yugoslav officer sent by the Slovene People’s Party from Ljubljana, who was appointed by and directly subordinate to General of Police Globocnik, higher SS and police leader in Trieste. By the end of July 1944, these units included 1,815 officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates from volunteers and a partial draft. Most officers came from the Slovene Home Guards in the Ljubljana Province. The Littoral Home Guards were organized in companies and were helped by the Slovene Home Guards to the extent that the Germans allowed.” In mid-1944 Colonel (later General) Ivan Prezelj, General Mihailovic’s representative in Slovenia after Major Novak’s departure, tried to induce a few Home Guard officers and men to reestablish units of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland in Slovenia. The few small detachments that were organized disintegrated almost immediately, partly because they did not have a political base and partly because the Germans intervened. But one Chetnik unit organized in Lower Styria by Joze Melaher, a follower of the Slovene People’s Party, survived until the end of the war.” Slovenes serving in the Home Guards, although ostensibly on the Axis side, occasionally helped the Allies by assisting Allied airmen who had been shot down over Slovene territory. Rudolf Hirschegger, a Slovene Clericalist who served in both the MVAC and the Home Guards, described how he saved an American pilot whose plane was shot down by the Germans near Ljubljana in November 1944. He evacuated the pilot to a supposedly safe place where another fourteen American fliers were hidden by the Home Guards. But they were discovered by the Germans and taken as prisoners of war. In contrast to such actions, Hirschegger asserted, “It is the actual truth that the Partisans shot all "KriZnar, “The Slovene Home Guards,” pp. 267-69, 277; Mikuz, “The Ljubljana Bishop Dr. Gregorij Rozman,” pp. 340-42.

*Narodnoosvobodilna vojna, p. §77; Mlakar, Domobranstvo na Primorskem (19431945), pp. 63-65, 78. Mlakar, p. 96, thinks that these troops might have increased in number to about 2,000. See also B. Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, pp. 86, 105-6.

Kriznar, “The Slovene Home Guards,” p. 274; Mikuz, Pregled zgodovine narodnoosvobodilne borbe, 3: 199-203, 276-77; Melaher, “The Chetniks in Styria,” pp. 245-60. On pp. 247-51, Melaher gives firsthand observations on the extremely harsh German occupation regime in Lower Styria. Professor Ferenc has German documents showing that Melaher collaborated with the Germans.

126 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA | the airmen who tried to save themselves on Slovene soil and fell into their hands (Borovnica, Velike Lasée, and elsewhere). They did not have a single one at the end of the war to turn over to the British or the Americans.”™ As we have seen

above, the facts speak otherwise. | , COLLABORATION LEADS THE ANTI-PARTISAN . FORCES TO DEFEAT The Slovene political parties in the Slovene Alliance and the Slovene National Council, which was established in October 1944 (see below), remained emotionally attached to the Allies and expected them to win the war. Their

- policy was to wait for a favorable opportunity when, after Western Allied forces had landed in Istria, they could transfer allegiance to them and turn their

arms against the Germans. Meanwhile, they considered the Partisans their foremost enemy, to be fought with all possible means. The Catholic political forces in the alliance stressed again and again that their struggle was directed against “godless Communism.” It was this collaboration with the Axis powers to counter the greater threat of a Communist victory that alliance members re- | _ peatedly tried to explain to the Western Allies. In a memorandum to the Yugoslav government-in-exile in Cairo on December 20, 1943, also conveyed tothe _ British Foreign Office by way of the Yugoslav and British Legations at the Vati- _

can, the representatives of the Slovene People’s Party argued: , . The steps that the Slovenes have taken in order to stop the destructive activities of the Communists by means of armed resistance against them were in no way meant to help the invader. Armed resistance to Communism was forced upon the Slo-

venes by Communist terrorism. The Slovenes made up their minds to defend | themselves and the life of the Slovenes as a nation. These measures of self-defense had furthermore the aim of building up an armed force with which to secure an orderly administration and to maintain peace and public order in Slovene territory at the moment of Germany’s collapse. By which [means] the Slovenes meant to facilitate the occupation of the country by the Allies.”

The reports of British liaison officers with the Slovene Partisans told a different story. Their major conclusion about the Slovene Home Guards was that the Germans had developed them into an important force, especially for protecting railroads and fighting the Partisans. As one British officer wrote on July 23, 1944, “Therefore, the White Guards are by their actions declared enemies of the Allies. Their existence deprives the Partisans of much needed manpower

and immeasurably eases the task of the Germans.”” 7 “Hirschegger, “The Truth About Our Struggle,” pp. 109-26, especially p. 126. , **The British envoy to the Vatican sent this memorandum and several from other Slovene

memorandum. 7 ,

anti-Partisan political parties to the Foreign Office with his report of January 28, 1944. See

F.O. 371/44269, R 3490/11/92. The quotation is from p. 4 of the Slovene People’s Party *6See Lieutenant Colonel P. N. M. Moore’s “Report on the Military Situation of the Jugoslav

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 127 German commanders were aware of the pro-Western leanings of the Slovene Home Guards. A report of the XCVIIth Army Corps of December 17, 1944, on the current enemy situation noted that as long as the Home Guards fought against Tito’s Partisans, they could be considered reliable. In case of an Allied landing in Istria, however, they would change sides, as would collaborating Serbian groups, that is, Ljoti¢’s Serbian Volunteer Corps and the Chetniks of Dobrosav Jevdjevicé and Moméilo Djuji¢, all of which had come to the

area on German instigation. Even the Croatian forces, the report warned, would have to be carefully watched in case of an Allied landing.” For this reason, the Germans exercised tight control over the Slovene collaborationists, successfully thwarting every effort of the latter to contact the Allies and gain their support.” In the struggle of the anti-Communist Slovene forces against the Liberation Front, the Slovene political police under Police Chief Hacin played an important part. To fight the Partisans efficiently, he established branches of the police organization in half a dozen larger cities of the Ljubljana Province. Generally speaking, close cooperation existed between the police, the Home Guards, and the Gestapo. To avoid criticism about police brutality toward arrested Partisans and their sympathizers, an unofficial secret organization called the Black Hand was established in the spring of 1944 in several cities, including Ljubljana.

It arrested, tortured, and killed outright Liberation Front members.” One of the foremost tasks of the police on the collaborationist side and of the VOS on the Communist side was to penetrate the organizations of their opponents in order to gather information on their agents and modes of operation. The struggle between the two sides was continuous and very bloody and based exclusively on ideological differences. The observations of Colonel Vladimir Vauhnik, an experienced prewar Yugoslav intelligence officer and anti-Partisan who during the first two years of occupation organized an intelligence network in Croatia and Slovenia for the British, are revealing in this respect. In a letter from Switzerland in June 1944, he wrote that the Slovene police and Home Guards “have mopped up everything that could be suspicioned [sic] of leftist sympathies. They have gone too far in many cases in helping the German cause, so much so that now they really are collaborationists.”'” Army of National Liberation (JANL) in Slovenia,” p. 16, in F.O. 371/44263, R 14117/8/92. Among the duties that the German occupation regime in the Ljubljana Province imposed on the population was labor service to build a rearward system of defenses on Slovene territory. Since the appeal for volunteers, both men and women, did not fill the need, some labor had to be drafted. See Germany, Wehrmacht, Oberkommando, Hitlers Weisungen, pp. 267723 Kriznar, “The Slovene Home Guards,” pp. 274-76. "YA, Mil. Hist., German Docs., Reg. No. 17/7, Box 7. *Kriznar, “The Slovene Home Guards,” pp. 269-70, 274.

*TIbid., pp. 252-63.

'See his letter of November 4, 1944, to an unidentified friend in London, which the

British intercepted, in F.O. 371/44326, R 20050/8 50/92.

128 GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA In an effort to counteract the establishment of SNOS (Slovene National Liberation Council) by the Slovene Partisans on February 19-20, 1944, which

| proclaimed itself the highest organ of Slovene statehood, the anti-Partisan political parties and groups, under the leadership of the Slovene People’s Party, established the Slovene National Council on October 29, 1944. On the same day

the council issued a declaration signed by some 300 participants, including Bishop Rozman (using a pseudonym), stating Slovene national objectives: the formation of a united Slovenia, including the entire territory inhabited by Slovenes (Slovenia proper together with the Slovene Littoral and the southern parts of Carinthia), as a unit in a federally organized Yugoslav state under the Karadjordjevic dynasty, and the assumption by the council of the prerogatives of supreme Slovene national authority. Despite the fundamentally strong pro-Western stance of the Slovene anti-

Communist political parties and groups, their collaboration with the Italian and German occupation forces in this strategically important area worked against both the Slovene Partisans and the Western Allies. It is not surprising that the Allies, assessing the situation from a short-term military point of view, decided to transfer their political and military support to the Slovene Partisans, _who were useful to them, and came to consider the Slovene anti-Partisan forces as the enemy. Once inaugurated during the second half of 1943 by Great Britain, the maker and manager of Allied policy toward the competing domestic groups in Yugoslavia, this policy gathered momentum, and the hopes of the Slovene Home Guards and Mihailovié’s Chetniks in the Western Allies proved

, completely misplaced. Indeed, on September 12, 1944, under British pressure, King Peter II in a speech over the BBC called upon the soldiers in the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, as well as Croats and Slovenes in various collaborationist formations, to join the forces of Marshal Tito. An important leader of the Slovene People’s Party in exile, the Reverend Alojz Kuhar, also urged the Slovene Home Guards over the BBC to transfer to Tito’s command.” In Sep-

tember 1944, Tito announced an amnesty for the members of all Yugoslav collaborationist forces, including the Slovene Home Guards, who did not have criminal records and who were willing to join the Partisans. But the response of the Home Guards was limited. The main reason seems to have been the Guards’ _ counterpropaganda that the Germans would take reprisals on the families of those men who transferred allegiance to the Partisans.'” The strong Catholic and anti-Communist values of the Guards were also a contributing factor. Although the Allies supported the Slovene Partisans, relations between the two groups were not always good. After Major Jones’s mission in June and July 1943, several other British military missions spent extended periods of time

with them. A few American and Soviet military missions also joined them. '0'Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 415-16; Debeljak, “The First Slovene Parliament,” pp. 280-86, especially p. 280. 'Kriznar, “The Slovene Home Guards,” pp. 276-77.

GERMANY AND ITALY DIVIDE SLOVENIA 129 When the Allied missions tried to collect military and political information on the Partisans’ organization and plans for the future, both in Slovenia and other parts of Yugoslavia, Partisan leaders became apprehensive and suspicious. They considered such activity potentially dangerous to their military and political interests. Consequently, Allied missions were restricted in movement and contacts and were given only limited amounts of information, while Soviet missions were treated with full confidence and not subject to any supervision or limitation. According to the Allied missions, the Slovene Partisans did not live up to Allied expectations in helping Allied missions penetrate Austrian territory, establish contacts, and collect desired intelligence.’” In fact, in Trieste, Istria, the Julian March, and Carinthia, relations between the Western Allies and the Yugoslav Partisans became potentially explosive. In the end, peace and coOperation were preserved, but the Yugoslavs were forced to reduce considerably their territorial aspirations toward Italy and give them up completely to-

ward Austria." The collaboration of the Slovene anti-Communist forces—like that of General Mihailovi¢ and the Chetniks—with the Italians and the Germans against the Partisans was fraught with danger. From the time of the Italian surrender, and especially during the last year of the war, the position of the Slovene collaborationists became extremely precarious. As Tine Debeljak, an important postwar Slovene émigré, put it, “The situation filled the politicians of all Slo-

vene democratic groups with fear. They were preoccupied with . . . how to separate the Slovene anti-Communist forces from apparent collaboration and how to regain the original Western European political orientation and alliance.”'” But this they were unable to do. Their subsequent fate at the end of the war will be discussed at the conclusion of this study. '3See Biber, “Allied and Soviet Military Missions.” See also idem, “Failure of a Mission.” '4On the involved problem of Trieste and its satisfactory solution by the agreement of October 5, 1954, see Jeri, TrZasko vprasanje; Duroselle, Le Conflit de Trieste; B. Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954; and Campbell, Successful Negotiation: Trieste 1954. 'Tebeljak, “The First Slovene Parliament,” p. 280.

- CHAPTER 4 , , Foreign Annexation of Yugoslavia _

een 9

ITALIAN RULE IN THE ANNEXED | PART OF DALMATIA In the division of spoils that followed the dismemberment of Yugoslavia in

1941, the Italians acquired Dalmatia, the coastal region of the country extending along the eastern shores of the Adriatic Sea from the island of Rab in

the north to and including the Bay of Kotor in the south. The Italians had claimed most of the area as part of their national territory as far back as Roman times. Only by possessing a large part of Dalmatia could they satisfy their pro-

pensity to call the Adriatic “mare nostro.” |

_ Dalmatia had become a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes : (later renamed Yugoslavia) at the end of the First World War. Prior to that, it had been under Austro-Hungarian rule from 1815 to 1918. The Habsburgs followed a policy of “divide and rule” in the province, favoring the Italian population over the Dalmatian by using the Italian language in administration and employing Italians in government service. In terms of population, however,

_ the Italian claim to Dalmatia was quite unjustified. The Austrian census of 1910 showed that only 18,024 out of 645,604 people in Dalmatia were Italians

and about half of them lived in Zadar (Zara), thecapital.' During the First World War, Great Britain, France, and Russia, ignoring the national interests of the South Slavic nations, promised Italy large sections of territory in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, including more than half of Dalmatia, in the secret Treaty of London of April 1915 as an inducement to enter the war on the Allied side. At the end of the war, Italy and the newly established

Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes could not agree on frontiers at the peace conference, so the two countries had to settle the problem through bilateral negotiations. The result was the Treaty of Rapallo of November 12, 1920. In Dalmatia, Italy obtained the city of Zadar and the island of Lastovo but renounced its claim to other Dalmatian territory. Following the conclusion of the treaty, a considerable number of Dalmatian Italians sold their businesses and 'Digovic, La Dalmatie et les problemes de l’Adriatique, p. 557.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 131 properties and moved to Italy. The Yugoslav census of 1931 recorded only 2,095 Italians in (Yugoslav) Dalmatia’ and the number probably declined during the next decade, leaving the minority with no political or economic power. This figure did not include the Italians in Zadar and on the island of Lastovo, where the Italian population increased.

Many Italians lamented the decline of the Italian presence in Dalmatia, which seemed to spell the end not only of the “Italianity” of Dalmatia but also of Italian influence in adjoining South Slavic areas.’ Though this was self-delusion in the extreme, there having been no real Italian influence in the province since the Croatian national renaissance of the 1860’s, Italy’s determination to acquire Dalmatia continued. During the interwar period, despite the Treaty of Rapallo, a series of economic agreements, and the Italian-Yugoslav treaty of friendship of 1937, Italy worked to subvert the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state. It did this both directly by supporting the Croatian Ustasha and Macedonian political émigrés and indirectly by working with Albania and Bulgaria against Yugoslavia. According to Pero Digovié, at least eight societies in Italy, all supported more or less by the Italian government, had as their main purpose to keep alive Italian interests in Dalmatia and work for its incorporation into Italy. They were very vocal partisans for the cause, leading Ciano to comment in his diaries that “to be pro-Dalmatian is a profession for many.”* In the course of the invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Italian forces occupied about a third of Slovenia, large parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of Dalmatia, all of Montenegro, and through Albania most of the Kosovo region and western Macedonia. Shortly after the entry of their troops into Yugoslav territory, the Italians established a military government admin-

istration for Dalmatia, a regime that lasted only about a month. Athos Bartolucci, chief of the Fascist Party in Zadar, was named civil commissioner, based in Zadar. Prefects were appointed in what were formerly counties and mayors were appointed in communes (the lowest administrative units). A considerable number of appointees to lower administrative positions were people

of Dalmatian birth who had emigrated to Italy during the interwar period. Many of them bore South Slavic names and were of mixed Italian-South Slavic descent.”

According to the treaties of Rome between Italy and the Independent State of Croatia that were concluded on May 18, 1941 (see Chapter 6), Italy obIbid. One pro-Dalmatian Italian fanatic, Luigi Federzoni, called this the period of the quasi agony of Italianity in Dalmatia. L’ora della Dalmazia, p. vii.

See, for example, the February 19, 1929, report of the Italian envoy in Belgrade, Carlo Galli, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I documenti diplomatic italiani, 7th series, 17: 288-90. ‘Digovi¢, La Dalmatie et les problemes de l’Adriatique, pp. 411-15; Ciano, Diaries, p. 432, the entry for April 24, 1941. ‘Kvesi¢, Dalmacija u narodnooslobodilackoj borbi, pp. 70-73; Barbari¢, “Italian Policy in Dalmatia in 1941,” pp. 142-47.

132 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA tained part of the Croatian Littoral and its islands in the upper Adriatic and

roughly half of Dalmatia and most of its islands, with a total population of | about 380,000 (see Map 1). The annexed parts of the Croatian Littoral and the

neighboring islands were incorporated into the Italian province of Fiume (Rijeka). The annexed part of Dalmatia was organized as the Governorship of Dalmatia (Governatorato di Dalmazia) under a governor, based at Zadar, responsible directly to Mussolini. Giuseppe Bastianini, an important Fascist functionary and most recently Italian ambassador to the United Kingdom, was named governor. The Governorship of Dalmatia was divided into the three provinces of Zadar (Zara), Split (Spalato), and Kotor (Cattaro). Venzi Orazi was appointed prefect of Zadar, Paolo Zerbino prefect of Split, and Franco | Scasselatti prefect of Kotor. All were Fascists of high standing.° -

After the establishment of the new governorship, the Italians began a drive | to Italianize the annexed territories, as they had worked to Italianize Istria, the Slovene Littoral, and other South Slavic areas acquired after the First World War. Geographical names were Italianized and Italian was introduced as the official language in schools, churches (next to Latin), government administration, telegraph, and radio. Croatian cultural and national societies were prohibited. Newspapers were published either in Italian or in both Italian and Croatian. Government employees and teachers were required to speak Italian to remain in government service, and few were so qualified. Some students

from Dalmatia were sent to Italian universities for schooling in the hope that they would accept Italianization and help promote it, but the scheme did not prove successful. Still, the Italians believed that schools were the best instruments of Italianization and to that end they brought several hundred teachers from Italy to replace teachers in elementary and secondary schools who had been dismissed. The Croatian population stubbornly resisted all these efforts, prompting Bastianini to declare that the population of Dalmatia would have to

accept Italianization or emigrate.’

The organization of the three provinces paralleled the state government and Fascist Party organizations existing in the rest of Italy. Italian legislation on the ‘mainland was extended to the Dalmatian provinces, formally putting them on an equal footing with provinces in other parts of the kingdom. In the judicial area, the Italians established, in addition to regular courts, a section of the Military Court, in Sibenik. On October 11, 1941, alarmed by spreading resistance, Bastianini also established an Extraordinary Tribunal. But on October 28 both ‘For the decree establishing the Governorship of Dalmatia, see Italy, Stato Maggiore del R. Esercito, Ufficio Propaganda, Bollettini della guerra, pp. 536-37, or Zbornik DNOR, 13, bk. 1: 65-69. Several regulations promulgated by the military occupation administration re-

mained in force for some time. :

_ Fora Yugoslav description and analysis of Italian rule in the annexed part of Dalmatia,

see Sepi¢, “La politique italienne d’occupation,” pp. 377-424. oo Se ’Sepi¢, “La politique italienne d’occupation,” pp. 383-89.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 133 the Military Court and the Extraordinary Tribunal were replaced by a Special Tribunal for Dalmatia “with far-reaching powers,” established by a special order of Mussolini. To maintain peace and enforce the orders of the civilian administration, the governor had at his disposal units of the gendarmerie, the financial police, and the Blackshirts. A large part of the XVI[Ith Army Corps was deployed in the provinces of Zadar and Split.’ All principal mineral and industrial resources and business establishments in the annexed areas—coal and bauxite mines, cement production, electric power, chemical and aluminum factories, shipping, and fish-processing plants— were taken over by Italian interests. So too were banks, insurance companies, and various endowments. Most Italians in the government no doubt realized that there could be no real peace and friendship between Italy and Croatia as long as Italy held any part of Dalmatia and therefore that the whole system of Italian-Croatian relations based on the Rome treaties was unstable. Possession of a large part of Dalmatia may have satisfied Italy’s desire for prestige and contributed to its military security in the Adriatic (serving as a buffer against possible threats from Germany), but from an economic point of view it was a burden. However, the Italians were determined to remain in Dalmatia because they envisioned it as a stepping-stone for further penetration into the Balkans and the Danube Basin. Soon after the annexation, some Italians looked beyond Dalmatia to the large timber, mineral, and water resources of Bosnia and Herzegovina and proposed that Italy occupy these areas as well—which according to their experts had nothing in common with Croatia proper—and establish an Italian “military governorship” there, at least until the end of the war.’ The Dalmatian Croats, an intensely nationalistic people with a centuriesold animosity toward the Italians because of the latter’s traditional aspiration to possess the eastern shores of the Adriatic, met the annexation and attempted Italianization of their homeland with determined resistance. The Dalmatians never accepted the Ustashas’ surrender of Croatian territory to Italy and the Ustashas never succeeded in overcoming the unfavorable political effects of surrendering it. Furthermore, it was apparently well known that Paveli¢ had little trust in and actually disliked Dalmatians. Once, half jokingly and half seriously, he allegedly told his entourage that to him the most satisfactory compromise with the Italians over Dalmatia would be for Croatia to obtain all Dalmatian territory and the Italians all Dalmatians.” ®Micr. No. T-821, Roll 55, Frs. 984-86, and Roll 410, Fr. 330. For Bastianini’s report to Mussolini of November 17, 1941, see Micr. No. T-5 86, Roll 424, Frs. 12,306-7.

"For a candid Italian discussion of Italian-Croatian relations, the problem of Dalmatia, and the desirability of Italy acquiring Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Marcello Zuccolin’s report of December 1941, in Micr. No. T-821, Roll 410, Frs. 898-909. On Italian desires for Bosnia and Herzegovina, see also the report by General Pieche of the Italian 2nd Army of September 9, 1942, in Roll 347, Frs. 774-79. lV A, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 1/3-7, Box 219.

134 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA About 83 percent of the Dalmatian population was Croatian and Roman Catholic. With the exception of a few Ustashas, clerics, and business and professional people, it was solidly against Italian rule. The Italian government hoped that it might strengthen the Italian element in Dalmatia by inducing Dalmatian-born Italians living in Italy to return to Dalmatia. But it soon became evident that there was no suitable employment or housing for them there and that in order to make room for them, it would have been necessary to expel the same number of people to other parts of Croatian territory. Consequently, only a few families were transferred and the scheme was abandoned." As in other parts of Yugoslavia, armed resistance in Dalmatia was a threat to the Axis powers and the quisling regimes from the summer of 1941 on. Beginning with the sabotage of communication lines and of industrial and mining enterprises working for the Axis and with attacks on individuals and small units of Axis and quisling armed forces, the resistance eventually became organized guerrilla warfare, for which the Italian army, gendarmerie, and Blackshirts were not at all suited. Partisan attacks caused heavy losses and great frustration among the Italians. The situation led to three distinct, but interdependent, developments. First, since the Italians could not subdue the Partisans, they resorted to brutal reprisals against the civilian population for Partisan attacks and sabotage. Their fixed policy was to rule with an iron hand in the belief that this would break the will of the South Slavs to resist. They reacted to attacks in the countryside with instantaneous reprisals against neighborhoods and villages where attacks took place or from which suspected attackers came. These reprisals included taking or shooting hostages, withdrawing ration cards and burning houses, confiscating the property of known Partisans and declaring their family members to be Partisans, and taking all males over fifteen years

of age or all inhabitants of villages to concentration camps. The Italians also paid bounties for the capture of more important Partisans. Often the reprisals were indiscriminate and victimized innocent people. Two of the most brutal such operations took place near SuSsak and in the village of Primosten in 1942. On July 12, near Sugak, in reprisal for the killing of 4 Italian citizens by the Partisans, over 100 men from the village of Podhum and the neighboring area were

shot and some 800 people from the same area were taken to concentration camps in Italy.'"" On November 16, in retaliation for a Partisan attack on a "According to data of the Italian Ministry of Interior, at the beginning of January 1942 , there were 6,413 Italians born in Dalmatia who lived in Italy: 573 in Rijeka (Fiume); 1,539 in

Frs, 12,3 51-54. |

Pula (Pola); 3,513 in Trieste; and 788 in other parts of the region. Micr. No. T-5 86, Roll 356, "For the Italian side of the reprisals near Susak, see Micr. No. T-821, Roll 410, Frs. 478523. For the Yugoslav side, see Hronologija 1941-1945, p. 304. Two Italian victims of the Partisans were 63-year-old Giovanni Renzi, a reserve officer and former member of the national militia, who had been brought from Italy to serve as principal of the elementary school in Podhum, and his wife: Renzi showed manly courage before his execution on June 16, 1942, bearing his breast and shouting “Viva l’Italia!” This incident

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 135 truck convoy in which 14 Italian soldiers were killed, 7 wounded, and 6 taken prisoner, the Italians bombarded the village of Primosten and the coast south of Sibenik in a four-hour combined land, air, and naval attack, leaving about 150 dead. They also burned nearby villages and arrested about 200 people.” A second development that occurred as a result of Partisan activity, as well as from the Italians’ desire to profit from a policy of “divide and rule,” was that the latter sought likely collaborators. They found them among those Serbs in the annexed part of Dalmatia and the adjacent areas of Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Lika who opposed both the Partisans and the Ustashas, that is, among the Chetniks. In fact, Serbian politicians in the annexed part of Dal-

matia urged the Italians to broaden their zone of annexation beyond the agreed-upon limits.'* The Italians also found collaborators among Croats in the annexed part of Dalmatia who were likewise opposed to both the Partisans and the Ustashas.

A limited amount of Italian-Chetnik collaboration occurred in the latter part of 1941, but it greatly increased after General Mario Roatta assumed command of the Italian 2nd Army in January 1942. Within a year, by the end of February 1943—shortly after Roatta was replaced by General Mario Robotti as commander of the 2nd Army—20,514 Chetniks were organized as Italian auxiliary forces in the Independent State of Croatia in the Anti-Commu-

nist Volunteer Militia (MVAC). In addition, 882 men were attached to the Italian army in the provinces of Zadar and Split and 1,474 more in the province of Kotor. We do not have Italian data on the confessional and national composition of the MVAC and Yugoslav sources give contradictory information, but

it included both Serbs and Croats and the majority were young men. These Dalmatian units were commanded by Italian officers and they were armed, supplied, and paid by the Italian authorities. Their families were given food and textile ration cards. As auxiliaries they proved eager and harsh helpers of the Italian gendarmerie.’ The recruitment of local men for the auxiliary units may

have helped to polarize the population in these areas into those who supported , was reported in several Italian newspapers, and the army collected eyewitness affidavits of Renzi’s courage while considering giving him a posthumous “medaglia d’oro.” The Italian reprisal was probably partly inspired by public reaction in Italy. '3For the PrimoSten action, see Hronologija 1941-1945, p. 375. Following it, the bishop of Sibenik, Jerolim Mileta, submitted a vigorous protest to Governor Bastianini and wrote to Luigi Cardinal Maglione asking for the Vatican’s help. See YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 1/3, 99-101, Box 281. For a partial record of the brutal Italian rule in Dalmatia, see Yugoslavia, State Commission of Croatia, Dokumenti o zlocinima talianskog okupatora, and Despot, “Reprisals of the Italian Armed Forces,” pp. 91-109. “Zuric, “Serbian Bourgeois Politicians and the Italians,” pp. 195-211. 'STomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 215-18. See also the report of the consulate general of the Independent State of Croatia in Zadar of July 9, 1943, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 1/3, 138-42, Box 281. On the whole issue of “banda anticomunista,” see Branica, “The Formation of the Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia,” pp. 87-105.

136 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA the armies of occupation and their helpers and those who opposed them, but it did little to help the Italians maintain peace and order and indeed it probably made the antagonisms among various segments of the population worse than

ever. |

The failure of the Italian armed forces and domestic auxiliaries to crush the Partisans also led to a third development, namely, changes in the deployment of Italian army units, which in turn caused disagreements between the military

authorities and Governor Bastianini. When General Quirino Armellini, the commander of the XVIIIth Army Corps stationed at Split, withdrew troops from smaller localities and concentrated them in a number of larger military posts in late February 1942, for example, Bastianini thought that this action endangered peace and order in smaller localities. He insisted on participating in decisions on the deployment of army units within the territory for which he was responsible. But Armellini was not willing to allow the civilian authority to interfere in his affairs and the dispute continued between Bastianini and General Roatta, commander of the 2nd Army. The result was Roatta’s order of April 6, 1942, stipulating that he alone would decide all fundamental matters and that army commands must only obey the orders of higher command posts in all basic matters. In minor matters, however, military commanders could take into

account the desires of local administrators, provided they stayed within the framework of military orders. In case of disputes, Roatta and Bastianini would decide. Note that in this case the original dispute was between a leading Fascist

Party member and General Armellini, a well-known Badoglio man. Subse- | quently, Bastianini was able to arrange the removal of Armellini from his post without consultation with Roatta."° Disputes between the military and civilian authorities in the Governorship of Dalmatia over their respective powers continued until the final days of Italian rule in the province. As late as August 4, 1943, Governor Francesco Giunta

asked the commander of the Supersloda (Superior Command for SloveniaDalmatia), General Robotti, for a review of “the attributions and powers of the military and civilian authorities” in the governorship and Robotti reported (the same day) to the General Staff of the army that this problem should be settled.” After changes in the Italian government and higher echelons of the armed forces, as well as among officers and officials in the occupied and annexed areas, were instituted toward the end of January 1943, Bastianini was recalled to Rome, where he assumed the post of undersecretary in the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. He took a number of assistants with him, most of whom had been detailed to him by the ministry when he went to Dalmatia. In February 1943, Francesco Giunta, an old Trieste sqguadrista with extremely anti- Yugoslav '6For correspondence on the disputes between Armellini, Bastianini, and Roatta, see Micr. No. T-821, Roll 55, Frs. 928-94. Roatta’s order of April 6 is found in Frs. 962-63. For Armellini’s removal, see Zanussi, Guérra e catastrofe d’Italia, 1: 246-48. '7Micr. No. T-821, Roll 410, Frs. 63 5-36.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 137 views, became the governor of Dalmatia. Giunta installed a number of former irredentists from Trieste and elsewhere in Italy as assistants and ruled even more brutally than Bastianini had done." Even in the concluding months of their occupation, the Italians continued to

perpetrate acts of terror in Dalmatia and other parts of the Ustasha state. Among these were killing seven civilians in the village of Strozanac near Split on April 21, 1943; plundering villages in the area of Omis during combing opera-

tions against the Partisans between June 29 and July 3, 1943; burning the village of Zrnovnica near Omis on July 8, 1943; and burning villages and shooting civilians on the island of Bra¢ in August 1943. These acts brought protests from the Ustasha government and from the Catholic Church in Croatia to the Vatican, which in turn protested through its nuncio to the Italian government.” The draft of the report of the Supersloda to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of early September 1943, prepared as an answer to the Vatican, maintained that the latter’s protest was based on assertions used in a long-continuing campaign against Italy by the archbishopric of Zagreb and that it disregarded the positive deeds of Italian forces in Croatia. The draft explained that all the measures of the Italian forces had been necessitated by the nature of anti-Partisan warfare and the efforts of Italian forces to maintain peace and order and protect the civilian population.” As their alliance with Nazi Germany drew to a close, the Italians, perhaps realizing how costly and unproductive their policy in Dalmatia had been, abolished the Governorship of Dalmatia in mid-August 1943. Italy’s surrender the following month brought to an end its rule in those parts of Yugoslavia that it had occupied or annexed in 1941.”' On September ro, the Ustashas declared the Rome treaties of May 18, 1941, null and void and incorporated the Dalma'8See the report of the consulate general of the Independent State of Croatia in Zadar of July 9, 1943, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 1/3-138, Box 281. "For these incidents, see Micr. No. T-821, Roll 403, Frs. 194-214, 269-96, and 298— 325. For the nuncio’s note of July 12, 1943, see Roll 410, Frs. 314-15. He particularly re-

ferred to the area between Rijeka (Fiume) and Senj, but also took into account conditions throughout Italian-ruled Dalmatia. He noted, for example, that 9,416 people were in concentration camps out of a total population of about 60,000 in the area. In the parish of Jelenje on July 12, 1942, alone, Italian forces executed 108 males between 18 and 45 without even allowing them to have confession. For Archbishop Stepinac’s letter of protest to Raffaele Casertano, Italian envoy in Zagreb, on the excesses of Italian troops in Croatian villages, see Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 265-66. The date of the letter is not given. For the Supersloda’s draft report, see Micr. No. T-821, Roll 410, Frs. 316-21. *IMicr. No. T-586, Roll 424, Frs. 12,256—59. According to the decree abolishing the governorship, most of the powers earlier vested in the governor were now assumed by the three provincial prefects for their respective territories. However, because these provinces were within military operation zones, the Comando Supremo claimed civilian powers in the provinces for itself and delegated them to the commanders of the two army corps deployed there. Micr. No. T-821, Roll 403, Fr. 1032. Italian rule in Dalmatia was drawing to a close, however, and these formal changes made no practical difference.

138 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA tian and Croatian areas that Italy had annexed two years earlier into the Independent State of Croatia. (The Germans resisted their efforts, however, to incorporate the Croatian areas that Italy had held during the interwar period.) Croatian and German contro! of Dalmatia until the end of the war will be described in Chapter 7.

ITALIAN AND GERMAN OCCUPATION OF MONTENEGRO Among the Yugoslav areas that Hitler assigned to Italy in his preliminary decision of April 12, 1941, on the partition of Yugoslavia was Montenegro. Montenegro was a miniature Balkan kingdom up to the end of the First World War, ruled by King Nikola I of the Petrovic-Njegos dynasty. In early 1916, Austro-Hungarian forces overran the country and King Nikola and his government went into exile in Italy and France. The rule of the Montenegrin king, _ unlike that of King Peter I of Serbia, was personal rather than democratic and many of his subjects opposed him and worked for union with Serbia. By the decision of the Montenegrin National Assembly meeting in Podgorica on November 26, 1918, Montenegro united with Serbia. When the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, proclaimed shortly before that by the representatives of these nations living in the now defunct Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, united with Serbia on December 1, 1918, to form the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes under the Karadjordjevi¢ dynasty, Montenegro became part of a united Yugoslavia. King Nikola died in exile in 1922, but the supporters of Montenegro’s independence continued to oppose the Yugoslav state. They were known as separatists or the Greens (Zelenast), while those who supported the new state were known as the Whites (Bjelasi).” In April 1941, Montenegro was invaded by both Italian forces from Albania and German forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Germans withdrew almost immediately and the military occupation of Montenegro was taken over by the Italian “Messina” Division, part of the XIVth Army Corps deployed in Albania with the 9th Army. Civil affairs were managed by a civil commissioner (later high civil commissioner), Count Serafino Mazzolini, appointed on April 28, who was responsible to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Italy had a dynastic interest in Montenegro—Queen Elena of Italy was the - daughter of the late King Nikola—but its principal interest was strategic: Montenegro, along with Albania and the annexed part of Dalmatia, was a steppingstone into the central Balkans, and the adjacent Bay of Kotor was to serve as a base for the Italian navy guarding the southern Adriatic. From an economic The appellations were derived from the color of the ballot boxes used in the National Assembly during the voting on November 26, 1918. Because some Greens later accepted Yugoslavia but demanded a federal organization of the country in which Montenegro would be a separate unit, they were also called Federalists.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 139 point of view, however, Montenegro was a burden from the start. It was a food-deficit area into which the Italians had to import between 1,200 and I,500 metric tons of food monthly, though they were able to utilize some of the

country’s own production, such as livestock, for the troops deployed there. Thirty-six percent of the total area was forested and deposits of lead, zinc, manganese, bauxite, and lignite had yet to be developed.” When Italian troops arrived at Cetinje, the former capital, they were met by leaders of the local separatists calling themselves the Committee for the Liberation of Montenegro. Italian commanders suggested that they organize a committee to represent the Montenegrin population. Mazzolini launched an Advi-

sory Council of Montenegrins on May 18, which, along with a government administration almost unchanged from the previous one, began to work with mixed Montenegrin and Italian personnel under the supervision of the Italian occupation regime.” In the beginning, the Italian occupation authorities were friendly and lenient. At the same time they systematically fostered the notion that Montenegro would be closely linked to Italy. But the Montenegrins soon found reasons to be dissatisfied. Mazzolini summed up their grievances in a report he submitted at the end of July 1941 after he was recalled to Rome, following a revolt and the introduction of a military government. Most serious was the influx of refugees, estimated at up to 25,000 people, including about 5,000 Montenegrins expelled from the Kosovo region and to some extent from Vojvodina, where they had settled during the interwar period. These refugees, together with other Montenegrins who had fled from other parts of Yugoslavia and refugees fleeing Ustasha terror in the border areas of southeast Bosnia and Herzegovina, constituted a great economic burden, even though the occupation authorities helped to support them. Another grievance was the loss of territory, including land near the coast and Lake Scutari, the area of Plav and Gusinje, and especially the greater part of the Kosovo region, all of which Italy included in the new Greater Albania. In losing its part of the Kosovo region, Montenegro lost its only foodsurplus area, and in losing Ulcinj, in the coastal area, it lost a salt-producing facility. This meant not only a possible salt shortage, but also a loss of revenue. A third major grievance had to do with the stamping of old Yugoslav banknotes, which was carried out in the first week of July. After calling in and marking the old currency, the occupation authorities returned banknotes of small denominations to the populace, but retained on deposit those of 500 and 1,000 dinars, 3For food imports into Montenegro, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 258, Fr. 679. For the use of local products for Italian troops, see Micr. No. T-821, Roll 248, Frs. 6-7. As the latter source indicates, between July 1, 1941, and March 31, 1943, Montenegro’s exports to Italy consisted of only 608.2 metric tons of hides, 117.3 metric tons of wool, and 6.5 metric tons of goat hair. 4See Jaukovié, “The Italian System of Occupation,” pp. 349-75, and Pajovi¢, “The Occupation of Montenegro in 1941,” pp. 272-306.

I40 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA claiming that many of them had been unlawfully put into circulation. Many Montenegrins were economically greatly damaged as a result (though apparently banknotes of all denominations that had been put into circulation legally

were eventually recognized as valid).” — ,

The Italians had good reason to be concerned about dissatisfaction among the people. As a result of the collapse of the Yugoslav army in April 1941, the population in Montenegro had a plentiful supply of arms and ammunition, far more than any other area of Yugoslavia. Montenegro also had many officers from the former Yugoslav army, men of Montenegrin birth who had been released from prisoner-of-war camps and had returned to Montenegro. Most importantly, it had a strong Communist Party organization. In July 1941 in Montenegro, including the areas of Kotor and Sandzak, the Communist Party

, of Yugoslavia (CPY) had 1,800 members and the Communist Youth Organization 3,000 members, many of whom, together with their friends, were , ready to follow the party in armed action after the German attack on the So- |

viet Union.”

Italy was determined to use the Montenegrin-Italian dynastic connection to reconstitute Montenegro as a separate “independent” state. This plan went awry when Prince Mihajlo Petrovic-Njegos, a grandson of the late King Nikola, refused the offer of the throne. The Italians, undaunted, convoked a Montenegrin Assembly at Cetinje with the help of the Montenegrin separatists. On July 12, 1941, the assembly issued a declaration (prepared by the Italian Minis-

try of Foreign Affairs and submitted to the assembly by High Civil Commis- | } sioner Mazzolini) that annulled the decision of the Montenegrin National Assembly of November 26, 1918, unifying Montenegro with Serbia and “proclaimed a sovereign and independent state of Montenegro in the form of a constitutional monarchy.” It also thanked Italy for making possible the reconstitution of the Montenegrin state and announced its decision to link Montenegro with Italy. Since Prince Mihajlo had refused the throne, the assembly asked the

Italian king to name a regent.” |

, The following day, July 13, the Communist Party initiated a general uprising. Many non-Communists and a substantial number of former army officers, some pro-Communist but most strongly nationalistic, joined in. According to Yugoslav sources, some 32,000 people participated in the uprising.” Most of _ For Mazzolini’s report, see the Serbo-Croatian translation in Zbornik DNOR, 13, bk. I: 230-34. See also Pirzio Biroli’s report of August 2, 1941, on pp. 245-53. For the estimate of refugees, see MiloSevic, Izbeglice i preseljenici, pp. 105-6.

Oo. .

_ *Trgo, Cetrdeset prva, p. 261; B. Jovanovic, Crna Gora, 1: 46. , |

~ *?Petrovié-Njegos, “How I Refused to Accept the Throne,” pp. 33-37. Among the leading separatists participating in the assembly was Sekula Drljevic, a former minister under King Nikola. For more about his role in the Second World War, see Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 209, 446-49. For the assembly’s proclamation, see Zbornik DNOR, 3, bk. 4: 389-

° 8B. Jovanovic, Crna Gora, 1: 257. According to Mazzolini’s report at the end of July

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 141 its success came in the early days, when rebel forces seized local administrations in small towns and villages. The Italians quickly dropped their plans for a regent and appointed a military governor, General Alessandro Pirzio Biroli, up to that time commander of military forces in Albania, with full control over both military and civilian affairs in Montenegro and directly responsible to Mussolini. Pirzio Biroli put the commander of the XIVth Army Corps in charge of the

military in Montenegro and the province of Kotor and assigned over 70,000 Italian troops to crush the uprising. He declared martial law, introduced a strict curfew, and on August 5 ordered the civilian population to surrender all firearms. Three days later he ordered the confiscation of the property of the rebels.” Under Pirzio Biroli’s command, the Italians began using their large forces to good advantage. The uprising had been hastily organized. Within six weeks the Italians reestablished control over the towns and all main communication lines in the country. Between the towns, Italian troops moved as a rule in convoys accompanied by light artillery and even airplanes. To handle civilian business, Pirzio Biroli established the Office of Civilian Affairs, which included Montenegrin as well as Italian officials, on July 26. (The post of high civil commis-

sioner being thereby made redundant, Mazzolini was recalled to Rome.) He dismissed the existing Advisory Council and only named a new National Council, composed of both separatists and nationalists, a year later, on August 22,1942.” Some separatists had refused to attend the meeting of the assembly on July 12, 1941, because they disagreed with certain Italian actions. The military government of occupation introduced by Pirzio Biroli dismayed them even more. One of their principal representatives, Novica Radovic, replied to a letter of Pirzio Biroli with a petition on January 11, 1942. It accused the Italians of introducing a regime of military occupation instead of creating a sovereign and independent state as promised and of separating important Montenegrin areas from the state and incorporating them into Albania, thus contributing to the uprising in July r941.”' Toward the end of 1941, the rebels recovered sufficiently from their setback to resume activity. But this only brought sharper repressive measures from the

Italians. An order of the commander of the XIVth Army Corps of December (after he was recalled to Rome), the number of rebels did not exceed 5,000 men with light arms. Zbornik DNOR, 13, bk. 1: 233. For Pirzio Biroli’s order of July 15, 1941, on the suppression of the Montenegrin uprising, see Micr. No. T-821, Roll 356, Frs. 722-25, and for its Serbo-Croatian translation, see Zbornik DNOR, 3, bk. 4: 392-96. For his subsequent orders, see Zbornik DNOR, 3, bk. 4: 416-27. ®Micr. No. T-311, Roll 196, Frs. 99, 101; Micr. No. T-821, Roll 3 56, Frs. 682-87. 'Zbornik DNOR, 3, bk. 4: 464-67. For the views of and divisions among various groups of separatists regarding Italian policy in Montenegro, see also Micr. No. T-821, Roll 3 56, Frs. 689~-91, and Pajovi¢, “The Occupation of Montenegro in 1941,” pp. 291-93.

142 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 21, 1941, declared that people in villages in whose neighborhood attacks on

shot.” So

, Italians occurred would be considered responsible for the attacks. An order of , the military governor of January 12, 1942, specified the reprisals: for every Italian officer killed or wounded, 50 civilians would be shot, and for every noncommissioned officer or private killed or wounded, ro civilians would be

The defeats inflicted by the Italians on the insurgents and the realization by some that the leading elements in the uprising were Communists led to a split in the resistance between the nationalist, Serbian-oriented forces—the Chetniks— and the Communist-led forces—the Partisans. In late October 1941, Colonel

(later General) Draza Mihailovi¢, the Chetnik leader in Serbia, came to the conclusion that his principal enemies were the Partisans, not the Axis forces. From the beginning of 1942, this attitude was also clearly reflected in Montenegro in relations between the Chetnik and separatist forces on the one hand and the Partisans on the other. Instead of concentrating on the Italians, the two sides of the resistance turned their energies against each other, a development that the Italians naturally welcomed. The Chetniks and the separatists in turn sought to use the Italians against the Partisans. In return for aid against the Par-

tisans, they promised to follow a policy incommon withthe Italians. The first collaboration between the Italians and the Chetniks took place on the basis of special agreements concluded between representatives of Colonel Bajo Stanigi¢ (on February 17 and March 6, 1942) and Captain (later Major) Pavle Djurii¢ (in early March 1942) and representatives of Italian division commanders or the military governor of Montenegro and covered territories in which the respective divisions were deployed. Asa result, during the first half of 1942 the great majority of Montenegrin Chetniks were put into Italian service as auxiliary troops against the Partisans. The officially organized and recognized auxiliaries were detachments of about 1,500 men each, led by Stanisi¢ and Djurisi¢ (mostly Montenegrin Chetniks) and the pre-1918 Montenegrin Brigadier General Krsto Popovi¢ (mostly separatists). But collaboration also extended to armed Chetniks who were not part of the auxiliary forces. The special agreements were followed on July 24, 1942, by a general agreement be-

tween General Blazo Djukanovic¢, the senior commander of all Chetnik forces | in Montenegro, and Pirzio Biroli, the military governor. The Italians allowed the Chetniks to establish the Nationalist Committee of Montenegro under the chairmanship of Djukanovic. The committee obligated itself “to use all its power and authority for the maintenance of order and discipline in the country and to prevent any possible action that might be directed against the Italian

authorities.”*

®Z bornik DNOR, 3, bk. 4: 462-63. | oe For more information on these agreements, see Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 210-12.

The Djukanovié-Pirzio Biroli agreement is in Zbornik DNOR, 4, bk. 4: 527-30. | Pirzio Biroli had proposed the formation of a group like the Nationalist Committee as.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 143 The collaboration between the Italians and the Chetniks was very successful, in part because of a series of Partisan military and political blunders. In the course of the second quarter of 1942, Italian-Chetnik operations in Montenegro, which coincided with operations of German and Croatian troops in southeast Bosnia and eastern Herzegovina (the Third Enemy Offensive in Partisan parlance), forced the remaining Partisans out of Montenegro. These forces, estimated at about 3,000 troops, joined other Partisans forced out of southeast Bosnia and eastern Herzegovina and began their “long march” toward western Bosnia. With the exception of some individuals and small groups operating underground, the Partisans did not reenter Montenegro for almost a year.” One of the major blunders of the Partisans was the attempt on December 1, 1941, to take the town of Pljevlja with its strong Italian garrison. This unsuc-

cessful effort resulted in 203 dead and 269 wounded for the Partisans and caused widespread desertions. Partly to stem them and partly anticipating a later stage of Communist revolution, the Partisans pursued the policy of “leftist deviation” in Montenegro, the use of mass terror not only against the deserters

and their families and the Chetniks and their followers, but also against wealthier peasants, merchants, and professionals, who were regarded as a present or potential fifth column. This policy embittered many people and turned them against the Partisans, further weakening their position in Montenegro.” During the first half of 1942, Italian-Chetnik collaboration in Montenegro

took the form of a condominium in which the Italians controlled and main-

tained peace in the towns while the Chetniks operated and tried to maintain | peace in the countryside. Both groups cooperated in securing communication lines.*° The Italians supplied, armed, and paid the Chetnik auxiliaries and brought food into the country; in exchange, the Chetniks and separatists put themselves at the disposal of the Italians in fighting the Partisans and, after the Partisans were ousted, in policing the country. In specific instances, for example during the last stages of Operation Weiss in the winter of 1943, the Chetniks also fought for the Italians against the Partisans in Herzegovina. According to the Comando Supremo, on January 2, 1943, all Montenegrin auxiliary armed forces (Chetniks, separatists, police, gendarmerie, and militia) in Italian service numbered about 17,000 officers and men.” General Mihailovi¢ established his headquarters in Montenegro in June 1942. On June 10, he was named chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army in the early as December 1, 1941, but the Italian government did not accept his proposal at that time. See Micr. No. T-821, Roll 356, Frs. 750-54. “For a brief review of operations by the Axis and collaborationist forces against the Partisans between September 1941 and June 1943, see the last section of Chapter 9.

On the disaster at Pljevlja, see Hronologija 1941-1945, p. 172. There is a great deal of literature on the Partisans’ subsequent “leftist deviation.” See, for example, Vujovi¢, “On the Leftist Mistakes of the Communist Party,” pp. 45-113. 6Z bornik DNOR, 3, bk. 4: 486-87. ”Micr. No. T-821, Roll 248, Fr. 28.

144 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA Homeland by the Yugoslav government-in-exile. Thus Montenegro became the center of the Chetnik organization for the whole of Yugoslavia. Though Mihailovi¢é himself did not maintain direct contact with the Italian commands in Montenegro, his principal commanders did, with his backing and cooperation. In Chetnik strategy Montenegro had another advantage: it was adjacent to the

Adriatic coast and the Chetniks could take advantage of any Allied invasion of Yugoslav territory along that coast. Two of the most ambitious plans formulated by the Chetnik Supreme Command were developed in December 1942 and January 1943 when it was located in Montenegro. The first was for a “march on Bosnia” to destroy Partisan forces there and the second was for Chetnik operations that would begin after the Allies landed on the Adriatic

coast.” ; |

The Germans, less trusting than the Italians, pressed the latter to disarm the Montenegrin Chetniks. They also insisted that the Italians disarm the Chetniks in their service in the Independent State of Croatia. The Italians argued that disarmament would have to be gradual and that the Partisans must be liqui-

dated first. The question of disarming the Chetniks arose at meetings between Mussolini and the new chief of the Comando Supremo, General Ambrosio, in Rome on March 3-4, 1943, during the final days of Operation Weiss. Robotti, the commander of the Supersloda, and Pirzio Biroli, the military governor of Montenegro, who were also present, resolutely opposed the German requests. Robotti declared that disarming the Chetniks would give the Italians another 50,000 enemies: the 25,000 Chetniks that they would lose and the 25,000 new allies that the Partisans would gain. Pirzio Biroli claimed that disarming the _ Montenegrin units commanded by Popovic, Stanisi¢c, and Djurisi¢ was absolutely impossible and that if anything of this sort were attempted, the “whole of Montenegro would burst into flames.” The same would happen, he said, if the

Italians acted against Mihailovi¢.” ,

Events soon resolved the question for the Italians. Instead of marching on Bosnia and annihilating the Partisan forces there, the Chetniks suffered a series of irreversible military defeats, beginning with the battle of the Neretva River in Herzegovina in mid-March 1943, during the last phase of Operation Weiss. The Partisans routed the Chetnik forces defending the left bank of the river and with their main force and sick and wounded crossed into an area considered -Chetnik domain. These reverses were followed by a series of engagements in

eastern Herzegovina and southeast Bosnia that took place between about March 20 and the end of April, in which the Partisans defeated some of the best Chetnik units and forced the remaining Montenegrin Chetniks back into Mon- tenegro. Since Operation Weiss had failed to annihilate the Partisans, the Ger-

mans launched a new attack, Operation Schwarz, to destroy the Partisans in

See Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 233-34, 240. | | *Micr. No. T-821, Roll 252, Fr. 319, and Roll 125, Frs. 817-19.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 145 Montenegro, disarm a large part of the Chetnik forces there, and capture Mihailovic. Italian forces, along with some Croatian regiments and a Bulgarian regiment, joined the Germans in this operation. Disregarding Italian protests, the Germans disarmed the elite Montenegrin Chetnik troops of Major Djurisi¢ and took him and his troops prisoners of war. This left the Italians little choice but to submit to German pressure and follow suit, since in the circumstances the Chetnik units still under their control would be of limited value. They began disarming Chetnik units in Italian areas in Montenegro and Herzegovina. But having no reason to doubt the allegiance of the units composed of Montenegrin separatists, they decided to “clear” and reduce them without disarming them.” Mihailovi¢é had been waiting for the arrival of Chetnik units from Serbia to join

him in Montenegro in order to establish a barrier against further Partisan advances to the southeast, but when he saw how events turned against the Chetniks, he decided to return to Serbia. To stay in Montenegro was to risk capture by the Germans. In the latter part of May, he took over the newly arrived Chetnik contingents and, without engaging them in battle against the Partisans, headed for Serbia.” On the political front, too, the spring of 1943 was unfavorable for the Chetniks. The establishment of direct relations between Partisan Supreme Headquarters and operatives of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) toward the end of May was the first step leading to eventual military and political aid to the Partisans, recognition of them as an Allied force, and later the withdrawal of recognition of and aid to the Chetniks. The Chetniks never recovered from the military setbacks in Herzegovina and Montenegro between mid-March and June 1, 1943, and the resulting political reversal. Beginning in late January 1943, the Italians inaugurated changes in their military and political leadership both at home and in the annexed and occupied areas of the Balkans. In the process, they reassigned the leaders of the occupation regime in Montenegro. Pirzio Biroli was withdrawn and on July 1, 1943, the post of governor of Montenegro was assumed by General Curio Barbasetti di Prun. But the new governor was only in command of the military government, while the XIVth Army Corps was in charge of military affairs. Pirzio Biroli’s report on his stewardship in Montenegro, submitted to Mussolini on June “For the Partisans’ defeat of the Chetniks, see Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 242~43, 247-55. See also the reports of the Information Service of the Italian army’s General Staff on May 13 and 23, 1943, dealing with the crisis of the nationalist forces in Montenegro, in Micr. No. T-821, Roll 248, Frs. 9-12. For the disarming of the Chetniks by the Germans, see Micr. No. T-315, Roll 64, Frs. 630-37, and by the Italians, Micr. No. T-821, Roll 248, Frs. 4-5. ‘IMajor Radulovi¢é, a Chetnik commander, informed Mihailovié from the area of Nik8i¢ on May 20, 1943: “It has to be clearly understood that everything has been destroyed here and that we have no more forces for attack. A terrible spirit of capitulation prevails among the people, even among the best known. We must recuperate and organize anew. The Partisans are in the forests and we have no place to go.” From a German radio intercept turned over to the Italians, in Micr. No. T-821, Roll 356, Fr. 202.

146 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 26, 1943, was optimistic but contained little worthwhile information. He paid

| special tribute to the Montenegrin Chetniks and separatists for collaborating . with the Italian forces and occupation authorities and also noted the Montenegrin politicians whose quarrels he had used to promote Italian interests.”

The last three or four months of Italian rule in Montenegro, although marked by occasional outbursts of brutality against the civilian population, were essentially a time of waiting for the inevitable end. By this time the Italians

had ceased to be either the protectors of or the providers for the Chetniks in Montenegro and parts of Herzegovina and in fact had disarmed or attempted to disarm most of the Chetnik units in these areas. They continued to support the Chetniks only in parts of the Independent State of Croatia almost until their capitulation. According to Italian reports, Chetnik leaders in Herzegovina were unable to hold their followers together and many Chetniks, primarily those forcefully drafted and not compromised by atrocities against the Croatian, Muslim, and Partisan-inclined Serbian populations, joined the Partisans.*

, Even before the Italian surrender, some Chetnik commanders—Dobrosav Jevdjevic from Herzegovina, for example—had developed contacts with the Germans. But most Chetnik commanders had to establish contact for the first time and arrange for collaboration when the Germans arrived in the formerly Italian-controlled areas of Montenegro and the Independent State of Croatia. All this took time and some Chetnik leaders, including Djukanovi¢ and Stanisi¢ in Montenegro, fell victim to the Partisans in the interim.“ Nor did collabora-

° tion with the Germans in the end prove of great value to the Montenegrin and Croatian Chetniks. Not only were the Germans less trusting of the Chetniks than the Italians had been, but also the government of the Independent State of Croatia continued to protest against German-Chetnik collaboration in its territory. Chetnik commanders never achieved the status and importance, nor the “For the changes made by the Italians, see a report by the Abwehrstelle Zagreb of September 7, 1943, in Micr. No. T-311, Roll 196, Frs. 183—84. In the reorganization of the Ital-

. ian armed forces in the spring of 1943, the XIVth Army Corps, as well as the troops of the 9th and r1th Armies (deployed in Albania and Greece), were included in the Group of Armies East. The ViIth Army Corps, deployed in southern Dalmatia and Herzegovina as part of the

Italian 2nd Army, was also attached to it later on. 7 | Pirzio Biroli’s report, “Governatorato del Montenegro—luglio 1941-giugno 1943,” is in

Micr, No. T-821, Roll 347, Frs. 579-602.

8Vrazalic, “The Occupation System in Montenegro,” pp. 169-208 and 457-83. For an interesting report by the Intelligence Section of the Italian VIth Army Corps on July 1, 1943, which also deals with the problem of the Chetniks, see Micr. No. T-821, Roll 3.47, Frs. 83 16.

“General Djukanovi¢, Colonel Stanigi¢, and their retinue were caught by the Partisans in the monastery of Ostrog between October 14 and 18, 1943. They were either killed in the course of the four-day siege or, after surrendering, sentenced to death by an impromptu court martial. In all, 28 men were executed. The Partisans had 5 dead and 20 wounded. See

Zbornik DNOR, 3, bk. 5: 280-83.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 147 same amount of aid and privileges, while collaborating with the Germans that they had enjoyed while collaborating with the Italians in these areas. After the Italian surrender, the Germans took over all of Montenegro except certain Partisan-controlled areas and established an occupation regime under an area command headed by Major General Wilhelm Keiper.** Until the spring of 1944, this area command was subordinated in succession to three different German commands, the German general in Albania, the Vth SS Mountain Corps, and the 2nd Panzer Army. Then it was raised to an independent area command and put directly under the military commander in southeast Europe, who had his headquarters in Belgrade. To facilitate their rule in Montenegro, the Germans followed the Italian practice of securing the cooperation of the separatists, of those Chetniks who were well disposed toward Nedi¢ but not toward Mihailovié in Serbia, and even of representatives of the Sandzak Muslims.** From among representatives of these groups, the Germans formed the National Administrative Council in October 1943 to help them administer the country. Misjudging its standing, the council tried to bargain with Keiper about its prerogatives, but was sharply reprimanded and told that it was only an organ of the occupation regime. A major concern of the council was to insure imports of food into the area with German help. The Nedi¢ government in Serbia was willing to supply about 900 metric tons of food monthly, but the Germans had to furnish transportation. But what they and the civilian population provided was so limited that only 250 to 300 metric tons of grain were imported monthly, or only about 20 percent of what the Italians had imported. Thus in many areas of Montenegro there was near starvation during the German occupation.” The Germans tried to use the local gendarmerie and militia and the remainder of some Chetnik units to help control Montenegro. When these forces proved inadequate, they turned to Chetnik Major (later Lieutenant Colonel)

Pavle Djurisi¢, whom they had captured together with his troops in May 1943."° Djurisi¢ had escaped from a prisoner-of-war camp in Galicia and later

turned up in Belgrade, where he was accepted by Nedi¢ and the Germans. ‘SThis was area command (Feldkommandantur) no. 1040. Like the Italians, the Germans considered Montenegro a state in a nascent stage. See Herzog, Besatzungsverwaltung, pp. §2-53, 77.

‘This was a group of Montenegrin politicians formed during the last month of Italian rule. See Micr, No. T-311, Roll 196, Frs. 183-84. For their meeting on September 14, 1943, see Frs. 194-97. ‘For General Keiper’s reprimand to the council, see his letter of November 3, 1943, to Ljubo Vuksanovié¢, council chairman, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 258, Frs. 7o0o—701. On food imports, see Frs. 679, 690.

*’General Djukanovié and Colonel Stanisi¢ were killed in October 1943, and Major Djordjije Lasi¢é, another leading Chetnik commander, was killed in an Allied air raid on Podgorica (later Titograd). The remaining Chetniks in Montenegro, deprived of leadership, completely lost control of the area.

148 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA Nedi¢ took him into the Serbian State Guard with the rank of lieutenant colonel and asked him to help organize the Montenegrin Volunteer Corps, which was then sent to Montenegro to fight the Partisans. The Germans were not entirely pleased with the arrangement, however, since Djurisi¢, while owing allegiance to the Germans who maintained him, also owed allegiance to Nedi¢ and Mihailovi¢. Djurigi¢ apparently thought that in the end Mihailovi¢é would reestablish good relations with the Western Allies, who would save him from disaster.” German rule in Montenegro lasted until early December 1944, when the last occupation forces departed in the general German withdrawal from the Balkans through Bosnia toward the Austrian border.” Djurisi¢é and his troops withdrew along with the Germans to northeast Bosnia, where they joined Mihailovi¢ and his much depleted forces. But Djurisié soon discovered that Mihailovi¢ had neither a plan for saving what remained of the Chetnik forces nor effective contacts with the Western Allies. They quarreled over whether to return to Serbia, as Mihailovi¢ proposed and later attempted, or to move to the Slovene Littoral, as Djurisi¢ wanted, to join the Ljoti¢ forces and other Chetnik forces and await the arrival of the Western Allies. Djurisi¢ and his troops eventually left on a fateful trek toward the Slovene Littoral. In northwest Bosnia they collided with superior Ustasha forces and he, most of his entourage, and some of his men met their end. Other troops were destroyed by the Partisans. Still others transferred allegiance to the Montenegrin separatist Sekula Drljevi¢é and withdrew to Austria.*' In the second half of May, these troops were delivered by the British to the victorious Communist forces.

ITALIAN-ALBANIAN RULE IN KOSOVO AND WESTERN MACEDONIA The Kosovo region in southern Yugoslavia (or the Kosovo-Metohia region, as it was known until recently) was acquired by Serbia in the First Balkan War of 1912-13. A majority of the population—an estimated 70 percent in 193 8— was Albanian, about 20 percent was Serbian, and the remainder belonged to other national groups. During the interwar period, the Yugoslav government followed a policy of strengthening and favoring the Serbian and Montenegrin elements in the area and discriminating against the Albanian population, which caused much dissatisfaction among the latter.” “Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 348-51. For the Germans’ account of their occupation of Montenegro, see the “Concluding Report on the Military Government in Montenegro,” prepared in April 1945, in Micr. No. Tgor, Roll 258, Frs. 673-702. © *'Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 446-49.

For the 1938 population figures, see Hadri, Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, pp. 16-17. For conditions in this region during the interwar period, see Hadri, “Kosovo and Metohia Under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,” pp. 51-84.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 149 The first Axis unit to enter the Kosovo region in April 1941, the German 60th Motorized Infantry Division, was hailed as a liberating force. On April 21, the commander of the division and a group of local Albanian chieftains, among them Xhafer Deva, a leading chieftain, signed an agreement according to which the latter were to help the Germans maintain peace and order in exchange for a certain degree of autonomy in administering regional affairs.” Undoubtedly most Albanian chieftains in the Kosovo region were pro-Albanian, but since Albania was under full Italian control, they threw in their lot with the Germans. According to German-Italian agreements, most of the Kosovo region, as well as western Macedonia running north from Lake Ohrid to a point east of the town of Prizren, was to be annexed by Italian-occupied Albania. Consequently, the Germans withdrew their forces from these areas. By a special decree of the Italian viceroy in Albania of July 10, 1941, they were annexed to Al-

bania and put under civilian administration. The northern part of the Kosovo region was incorporated into German-occupied Serbia and the eastern part was | annexed by Bulgaria.” Feizi Alizoti, Albanian minister of state, was named high commissioner of the annexed areas. The move was generally applauded by Al-

banians both in Albania proper and in the new regions.” In December 1941, the administration of the annexed areas was put in the hands of the Italian Ministry for Liberated Areas and in February 1943, when the latter was abolished, it was spread among various other ministries. The Italians also annexed to Albania the small Montenegrin area of Plav and Gusinje and some Montenegrin territory in the vicinity of Lake Scutari. Because the areas annexed to Albania contained about 35 to 40 percent of the total Albanian population of the region, the annexation in 1941 fulfilled the Albanian nationalist dream of a so-called Greater Albania, even though control was in Italian hands.” The demarcation line (the Vienna Line) in these areas was provisional, however, drawn so that the two main Axis partners and their lesser satellite Bulgaria could arrive at a quick solution to their conflicting interests. Both the Italians and the Bulgarians were dissatisfied and were determined to rectify the situation. Here as elsewhere, the Germans used their dominant position to in3Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Frs. 1053-56. 4For a review of Italian-Albanian and then German rule in the Kosovo region, see Hadri,

Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, pp. 89-144. For an account of Italian-Albanian and later German rule in Western Macedonia, see Todorovski, “Occupation of Western Macedonia,” pp. 25-39. For a map showing how the Kosovo region was partitioned in 1941, see Hadri, Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, p. 92. ‘SJacomoni di San Savino, La politica dell’Italia in Albania, pp. 279-80. Before the Italian

occupation of Albania on April 7-8, 1939, Jacomoni was Italian envoy in Tirana. From then , until March 20, 1943, he was Italian viceroy in Albania. He was succeeded by General Al-

berto Pariani, a former Italian military attaché and military adviser in Albania.

‘6On the Italian administration, see Hadri, Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, pp. 98-99. On the Albanian population, see Skendi, Albania, pp. 48-51.

150 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA sure that they had control of the main lines of communication and the chief economic resources. In this instance, they were mainly interested in denying the Italians control of the British-owned Trepéa mines in the northeast Kosovo re-

gion, which produced lead, zinc, and silver, and the chrome ore mines in the Ljuboten massif northwest of Skopje.” Accordingly, the Trepca mines were added to German-occupied Serbia and the chrome ore mines in the Ljuboten massif, although actually in territory annexed by Bulgaria, were put under the control of German or joint German-Bulgarian corporations. But the Germans failed to obtain a majority of stock in the Jezerina mine, one of the most important chrome ore mines in the Bulgarian-annexed part of Macedonia. The unequal division of spoils was one reason why the Kosovo region continued to create problems in German-Italian relations. Concerns by both countries about the population’s loyalties were another reason. After the transfer of most of the Kosovo area to Italian-controlled Albania, the April 1941 agreement between local Albanian chiefs and the German 6oth Motorized Infantry Division applied only in that part of the Kosovo region in German-occupied Serbia. It remained in effect until some time in 1942. Several Albanian chieftains from the Albanian- and Bulgarian-annexed areas who had readily cooperated with the Germans, including Xhafer Deva, left those areas and moved to Belgrade and other places. The Germans rebuffed all Italian efforts to have Deva extradited. They worried that the Italians might woo the 100,000 or so Albanians still living in Serbia into Albania, while the Italians worried that among these Albanians an anti-Italian irredentism might develop. Largely to forestall trouble that might arise over these and other matters, including control of the Trepéa mines, which Italy attempted to acquire, Germany consented to certain small adjustments in the demarcation line between German-occupied Serbia and Italian-occupied Albania to the advantage of Albania. These were agreed upon in Rome on November 13, 1942, and became effective the fol-

lowing month.” |

The Italians made no secret of their determination to tie the Albanian peo-

‘’Most characteristic in this respect is a message of the German Army High Command (OKH) to the commanders of the German 2nd and 12th Armies in the field in Yugoslavia on May 20, 1941: “According to a message of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it is especially im-

portant to see to it that Italian troops do not advance into the area of Mitrovica east of the present line of demarcation (because of the lead and zinc mines in that area) and likewise into the area of the Ljuboten massif northwest of Skopje (because of the chrome ore mines in that area).” See Micr. No. T-78, Roll 329, Frs. 6,285,668-747 and 6,285,778-82; the quoted passage is from Fr. 6,285,779. The directive from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was dated May 14,1941. 58See a series of documents from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November 1941 and January 1942, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,757-64, especially a memorandum of November 11, 1941, from Benzler, the Ministry’s representative with the military commander in Serbia, answering point by point various questions and issues raised by the Italians about the Kosovo region. See also Micr. No. T-120, Roll 2415, Frs. E221,621-

23, and Micr. No. T-501, Roll 352, Frs. 542-47, 566, 749. ,

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 151 ple to their cause in the newly annexed areas. First, they used Albanian instead | , of Serbo-Croatian as the official language in administration. They opened many elementary and several secondary schools with Albanian as the language of instruction and with most of the teachers brought in from Albania. The use of the Albanian language in schools was welcomed by the local population, since Yugoslavia had forbidden it during the interwar period. The Italians also established special forces, made up of the local populace, as border guards in the region. To please the landlord class, the Italian-Albanian administration reversed the agrarian reform carried through in parts of the annexed region by

the Yugoslav government after the First World War, which had aimed at strengthening the Serbian and Montenegrin population. The Italians cleared the area of most Serbian and Montenegrin settlers who had moved into the region during the interwar period. They also tried to increase farm and livestock production and mining in the Kosovo region and western Macedonia. As in Albania proper, the Italians promoted their administrative institutions and practices in the annexed areas, as well as the organizations of the Albanian Fascist Party.” In western Macedonia, the Italians resurrected certain pre-1912 Turkish practices for the maintenance of law and order in villages. They hired special village guards from powerful local families and placed a ro percent tax in kind (over and above other taxes) on agricultural products, which had to be paid before sale. The tax was probably intended not only to assure food for the local population, but also to cover the needs of Italian and Albanian forces in the area. The right to collect the tax in kind was given to the highest bidder at public auctions.” As in Yugoslavia, resistance in Albania developed among Communist-led groups and nationalists. With the help of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the small and disparate Communist groups in Albania were consolidated into the Communist Party of Albania in November 1941. Throughout the war its armed units followed a line parallel to that of the Yugoslav Partisans. The Communists were unsuccessful in their attempt to absorb the incipient nationalist resistance, however, and the latter established its own organization, the

National Front (Balli Kombétar), in September 1942.°' The National Front was , supposed to be directed against the Italians, but it soon became anti-Communist and an instrument of the Italians in the struggle of both groups against the Communist-led Albanian forces. Partly because Italy considered Albania its most secure base and a stepping*Hadri, Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, pp. 105-17. See also a report of the British ambassador in Belgrade on April 27, 1945, reviewing developments in the Kosovo region during the entire war, in F.O. 371/48090, R 8181/237/90. T odorovski, “Occupation of Western Macedonia,” pp. 32-34. ‘Skendi, Albania, pp. 19-22; Dedijer, Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi (1939-1948), pp. 7-110; Hadri, Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, pp. 263-72 and 282-84.

152 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA stone into the Balkans and partly because of the Yugoslav and Albanian resistance movements, Italy maintained a large military presence in Albania and the areas annexed to it. According to a report of the Italian Comando Supremo, even as late as August 1, 1943, the Italians had 108,000 troops in Albania. The size of Italian and Albanian collaborationist forces in the annexed areas of Kosovo and western Macedonia is more difficult to determine. Yugoslav sources put the number of Italian troops in the Kosovo region (no exact date indicated) at about 20,000 and the number of Italian police and frontier guards at 5,000, with an additional 5,000 Albanian collaborationist forces. In the latter part of 1941 Italy had 12,000 soldiers and about 3,000 police and border guards in western Macedonia.” As already mentioned, armed groups of volunteers (known as Kosovars or Vulnetars) were also organized locally for the protection of villages in the Kosovo region under Italian and later German rule. Some groups were also used as frontier guards. These forces, by choice, fought only in their own localities, which sometimes meant action against the Partisans or the Chetniks, against

whom they showed themselves skilled and determined fighters.° After the surrender of Italy in September 1943, the Germans took over Alba-

nia and reorganized the administration of the country. An Albanian National Committee under German sponsorship was established on September 15, 1943, and governed until a formal Albanian government under a Regency Council was established on November 3 and immediately recognized by Germany as the official government. The Germans’ old ally from the Kosovo region, Xhafer Deva, became minister of interior and their most effective and reliable helper, though other ministers and members of the council also enjoyed their confidence. For the

| Germans, the Albanian government’s main task was to help maintain peace and

order so that Germany could use manpower elsewhere.” | Bulgaria had hoped that the surrender of Italy might lead to a rectification of the border in western Macedonia to its advantage, but Germany refused to alter the demarcation line that had been established in April 1941 and slightly adjusted in November 1942 (with Serbia) and in December 1942 and March 1943 (with Bulgaria). Germany did make some concessions to Bulgaria, however, in the organization of local government and the establishment of local self-protection

units in western Macedonia.* German policy was dictated by the need to retain , _ For the Comando Supremo’s estimate of Italian troops in Albania, see Micr. No. T-821, Roll 252, Frs. 72-73. For the Yugoslav estimate of Italian troops in the Kosovo region, see Hadri, Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, p. 105. For the Italian presence in western

Macedonia, see Todorovski, “Occupation of Western Macedonia,” p.25. _ ‘’The Kosovars are mentioned in many documents and secondary sources, but I have not — run across a systematic study of them. See, however, Hadri, Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, p. 105, and especially F.O. 371/48090, R 8181/237/90. “Avramovski, “The Third Reich and ‘Greater Albania,’” pp. 130-33. For a brief account by the man who was largely responsible for the formulation of German policy in Albania, see

Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Siidost, 1940-1945, pp. 105-21. | 6SMitrovski, “Some Aspects of German Policy in the Balkans,” pp. 135-41. —

| FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 153 the good will of the Bulgarian and Albanian governments, since the Germans needed both as allies against the Yugoslav and Albanian Partisans.

The main German force in Albania, with the task of keeping the country under control and fighting the Albanian Partisans, as well as resisting any Allied invasion, was the XXIst Mountain Army Corps. It was part of Colonel General Rendulic’s 2nd Panzer Army, deployed in the Balkans in August 1943, shortly before the Italian collapse, to take over the areas held by Italy (except those in Greece) and suppress the Partisans in Yugoslavia and Albania. In Ti-

rana there was also a plenipotentiary German general representing the Wehrmacht and a special representative of the Reichsfiihrer SS. In order to save their own troops for deployment elsewhere, the Germans used all the Albanian forces available that had formerly collaborated with the Italians, including the National Front. They also added to the strength of several units of the regular Albanian army and increased the effectives of the Albanian gendarmerie. But

none of these troops proved reliable, especially as the war turned more and more against the Germans. On May 23, 1944, Himmler’s representative in Albania, General Josef Fitzthum, reported that the Albanian units used in operations against the Albanian Partisans had completely failed and that he had dissolved the four battalions organized by the Wehrmacht. Most Albanian _ army and gendarmerie officers were totally corrupt, he wrote, and unusable, undisciplined, and untrainable.” Since the Germans found the Albanians in the Kosovo region more coop-

erative than those in Albania proper,” they had great expectations for the pro- | jected establishment of SS formations composed of men from there. In this they were influenced to some extent by the leaders of the Second League of Prizren for the Defense of Kosovo, which was established in September 1943 after the Italian surrender to promote the interests of the Kosovo Albanians. In a memo-

randum to Hitler on March 29, 1944, the president of the Central Committee of the league proposed to “militarize” 120,000 to 150,000 Kosovo volunteers to fight the Serbian and Montenegrin Partisans. He asked for arms, ammunition, and other military supplies, German officers and noncommissioned officers as instructors, and personnel for the units. He also asked for the rectification of existing Albanian borders with Serbia and Montenegro. None of these requests was fulfilled, but the league remained the chief anti-Partisan organization among the Kosovo Albanians and the leader in anti-Partisan activity.” 66 A vramovski, “The Third Reich and ‘Greater Albania,’” pp. 13 5-37, 164-65. ‘’Micr. No. T-175, Roll 81, Frs. 2,601,478-79. ’’This situation was clearly recognized by the president of the Regency Council of Albania. See a report by Herman Neubacher, special envoy in southeast Europe, to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop of January 29, 1944, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5783, Frs. H298,807-9.

“The First League of Prizren was established in 1878 following the conclusion of the abortive Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey, for the purpose of protecting Albanian interests against the Slavic peoples of the Balkans. It was abolished by the Turks in 1881. Skendi, Albania, pp. 7-9. The Second League of Prizren was established in September

154. | FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA | After months of preparation and after scaling down their plans, the Germans established the 21st SS Volunteer Mountain Division “Skanderbeg” in April 1944 as part of the XXIst Mountain Army Corps. Included in it was the Albanian contingent from the 13th SS Volunteer Division “Handschar.” All of- , ficers, noncommissioned officers, and specialists in the “Skanderbeg” division were German, under the command of General August Schmidhuber. By September 1944, the total combined manpower of the division was somewhat below 7,000 men, less than one-third of its planned strength.” But the same lack

of discipline, unreliability, and desertions that plagued other Albanian units ! soon appeared in the new division and by the autumn of 1944, drastic changes were ordered. On October 24, the commander of Army Group E instructed the XXIst Mountain Army Corps to disarm (and presumably release) all Albanian manpower of the “Skanderbeg” division and reorganize it. The result was the

_ §S Fighting Group “Skanderbeg,” of regimental strength, consisting of the German manpower of the division along with some German naval personnel withdrawing from Greece. This reorganized unit was pulled out of the Kosovo

, region in mid-November in the course of the general withdrawal of German

| troops from the southern Balkans and for a few weeks was redeployed in the areas of Zvornik and Bréko in northeast Bosnia. In late February 1945 it was disbanded altogether and its remaining manpower reassigned to the German

police regiment in the area of Zagreb.”!

The imminence of the German withdrawal in late 1944 apparently inspired the Albanians to increase their fighting units. In early September 1944, Xhafer Deva and other leaders from the Kosovo region returned to Prizren to take charge of the Second League of Prizren and its operations against the Partisans. According to German reports, Deva had about 20,000 armed men in the region in November.” Although this figure is probably exaggerated,

, large groups of armed Kosovo Albanians were in the area at that time. In fact, at the beginning of October, when the Germans were preparing to leave Albania, General Fitzthum, Himmler’s representative in Albania, and Deva were collecting arms, ammunition, food, and radio equipment for Albanian guerrilla units to use against the Partisans in northern Albania and the Ko1943 after the capitulation of Italy. Hadri, Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, pp. 306-10. See Micr. No. T-175, Roll 81, Frs. 2,601,486—88 for the league’s proposals to Hitler.

In early April 1944, the Germans and some members of the Albanian government thought that they could draft 50,000 troops that year in Albanian territory for the Waffen SS. © See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5783, Fr. H298,869. For the actual strength of the division, see

, Hadri, Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, pp. 294-97, and Avramovski, “The Third

Reich and ‘Greater Albania,’” pp. 156-64. , ,

"For the creation of the SS Fighting Group “Skanderbeg,” see Micr. No. T-311, Roll | 186, Frs. 915-18. The details on its fate are from the postwar interrogation of a German po-

189, Fr. 1201.

lice officer whose unit was detailed to the group immediately after its formation and remained with it until its dissolution. YA, Mil. Hist., German Docs., Reg. No. 55/6, Box 9.

”Hadri, Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, pp. 309-10; Micr. No. T-311, Roll

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 155 sovo region. Deva himself soon left Kosovo, however, and in December 1944 turned up in Vienna.” A few words should also be said about the Partisans and the Chetniks in the Kosovo region. Although elsewhere in Yugoslavia both these resistance groups arose in the first few months of occupation and soon became important political and military forces for the occupying or annexing powers and the Western Allies to deal with, in the Kosovo region, where the population was over two-thirds Al-

banian, neither group developed quickly or became important during the war. , Membership in the prewar Communist Party in the Kosovo region was small and almost exclusively limited to Serbian and Montenegrin settlers, with a handful of Albanian intellectuals who had few contacts and no real influence. After the former left the region, the Albanian people, largely peasants dominated by reactionary chieftains, were readily caught up in the strongly nationalistic regime instituted by the Italians with the cooperation of many chieftains. They were easily persuaded to see the Partisan movement as not only a Serbian and Montenegrin movement—as indeed it was in that area—but also as Christian and Communistcontrolled and thus opposed to the political and social interests of Albanian Muslims. During the early months of Italian-Albanian rule, the Albanians committed many atrocities against the Serbian and Montenegrin population, which intensified old, latent antagonisms. Consequently, only a few small Partisan units were raised in the Kosovo region prior to the Italian surrender. From the point of view of the Yugoslav Partisans, their chief value was to serve as a communication link with the Albanian Partisans in Albania proper. The strength of the Partisans in the Kosovo region increased somewhat af-

ter the Italian surrender, but the newly established Second League of Prizren was an important foe. The Partisans tried to form several new units, mostly of Albanians, but they had trouble recruiting, especially after the Albanian Partisans, in the summer of 1944, had to recognize the Yugoslav Partisans’ claim to the territorial integrity of the old Yugoslav state, including the Kosovo region and western Macedonia annexed to Albania in 1941.” The Chetniks of Draza Mihailovi¢c had even more trouble recruiting in the Kosovo area than the Partisans. Within the region, most Chetnik units were no more than command staffs that were supposed to become active and fill their units as needed when a general uprising was called.” Most Chetnik units carrying the names of the Kosovo region were actually organized in adjacent areas Micr. No. T-120, Roll 1757, Frs. Eo25,389-90; Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Stidost, 1940-1945, p. 119. [next heard about Xhafer Deva from an obituary in my local newspaper, The Palo Alto Times, on May 27, 1978. Deva was a retired assistant supervisor of the mailing service department at Stanford University, where he was employed from 1959 to 1971. The obituary noted that he had been president of the Second League of Prizren and the leader of Albanian political exiles for over thirty years. “FO. 371/48090, R 8181/237/90.

’>Hadri, Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, pp. 310-13; F.O. 371/48090, R 8181/237/90.

156 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA of Serbia, ready to move into the Kosovo region when conditions permitted, and not all of these were in active training. Their personnel consisted mostly of Serbs and Montenegrins formerly resident in the Albanian- and Bulgarian-

, annexed areas—former gendarmes, border guards, government employees, merchants, and a few professional people and peasants—all eager for revenge against the Albanians. All Serbian nationalists looked upon this region, the site of the Battle of Kosovo Field in 1389, when the Serbian medieval state was lost _ to the Turks, as hallowed ground that had to remain forever in Serbian hands. In this situation, no collaboration was possible between the Serbian Chetniks and the Albanian forces in the service of the Axis powers, although they had a

common enemy in the Communist-led Partisans. , |

During October and November 1944, the Kosovo region became an important area militarily for both the Germans and the Yugoslav Partisans. German -Army Group E was withdrawing through it from Greece toward Bosnia, since the escape route over Nis and Belgrade had been closed by Yugoslav Partisan, ‘Bulgarian, and Soviet forces. German forces from Albania and Montenegro were withdrawing through Sandzak toward Bosnia. In fighting the withdrawing Germans, the Yugoslav Partisans were assisted by troops of the new Bulgarian regime and two brigades of Albanian Partisans, as well as by air force

sorties of the Western Allies and Soviets.” | ,

Freeing the Kosovo region from the Germans did not bring immediate peace and order. Some Partisan units of Kosovo Albanians refused to leave the area to fight in other parts of Yugoslavia and fled to the hills. Other armed groups af-

filiated with the earlier pro-German regime and some Chetnik units that had not withdrawn from the area were also active against the Yugoslav Partisans. __ In February 1945, Tito ordered the establishment of a military regime in the area and additional Partisan troops were brought in for intensified mopping-up operations, but it was not until the end of May 1945 that the opposing armed groups were completely eliminated and peace and order established.”

BULGARIAN RULE IN PARTS OF | ,

oe MACEDONIA AND SERBIA , _ Undoubtedly one of the most involved national and territorial problems of modern Europe has been that of Macedonia. The complexity of this issue was __ reflected in developments during the Second World War, which must be put in

I941I-1945,p.101§. , : |

Yugoslavia, Vojnoistorijski institut, Oslobodilacki rat, 2nd ed., 2: 372-77; Hronologija —

“F.O. 371/48090, R 8181/237/90; Hadri, Narodnooslobodilacki pokret na Kosovu, pp. 387~90. According to a telegram from Ambassador Stevenson to the Foreign Office on March 29, 1945, the Germans parachuted Kosovar agents and a group of 60 men into the area in mid-March to make trouble for the Partisans. F.O. 371/48090, R 5950/237/90.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 157 historical perspective to be understood. The territory of Macedonia lacked clearly and unambiguously defined frontiers. It also lacked a unifying language;

until the end of the Second World War, the Macedonians spoke a variety of dialects related to both Serbo-Croatian and Bulgarian. (After the war, the Macedonians living in Yugoslavia accepted the western Macedonian dialect as the literary language of the Macedonians.) In the Middle Ages, the area was at different times a part of the Byzantine Empire, a part of the Bulgarian state, and the center of the Serbian state. Church organization was at times Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian Orthodox. From the late fourteenth century to 1912, as part of the Ottoman Empire, Macedonia acquired a sizable Turkish population, brought in by Turkish rulers for strategic reasons. A considerable number of Albanians also moved in. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, when it became apparent that Ottoman rule in that part of the Balkans was drawing to a close, the area became the object of rival claims by its neighbors. Inevitably, in vying for primacy in the Near East, the Great Powers used the Balkan states as their pawns and also became involved in the fate of Macedonia.

Three neighboring states, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, claimed that the area was inhabited by Bulgarians, Greeks, or Serbs, respectively, but that five centuries of Ottoman rule had kept the Macedonian people at a low level of socioeconomic and educational development and had prevented them from developing their national consciousness. Thus, each claimant state argued that there was no separate South Slavic Macedonian nation, but that Macedonia or very large parts of it belonged rightfully to it. Each tried in various ways to promote its interests. Correspondingly, there were always groups of Macedonians who thought of themselves as Bulgarians or Greeks or Serbs and who wanted the liberation of their homeland from Turkish rule and its unification with their respective mother country. Up to 1870, the Greeks had the upper hand because, through the Patriarchate in Istanbul, they controlled the church and thus also the schools, which were used as instruments of Hellenization. When the Ottoman Empire established the Bulgarian Church Exarchate in 1870 and subjected Macedonia to its jurisdiction, the Bulgarians gained the advantage. It might be added that from the 1870’s until the Balkan Wars, probably due to the new church organization, a large number of people from Vardar Macedonia moved to Bulgaria, where many of them and their descendants prospered in all walks of life. This greatly contributed to the interest and emotional involvement of Bulgaria in the Macedonian question. In the early 1870’s and even more forcefully in the early 1890’s, some Mac-

edonian intellectuals claimed that the Macedonians were a separate South Slavic nation, related to the Bulgarians and the Serbs but clearly distinct from them. They began to work first for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire and ultimately for a separate Macedonian state. But lacking the support of any neighboring state or church organization and the backing of any Great Power,

158 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA theirs was an uphill struggle. Despite temporary setbacks, however, their ideas spread.” In the half century between the 1870’s and 1918, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, supported by different Great Powers, fought among themselves to acquire Macedonia from the Ottoman Empire. It remained under Turkish control until the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, when it was divided among the three countries. Bulgaria acquired Pirin Macedonia and access to the Aegean Sea, Greece obtained Aegean Macedonia, and Serbia acquired Vardar Macedonia.” This division was confirmed at the end of the First World War, though Bulgaria was forced to yield small sections of territory in the west to the new Yugoslav state and to give up some territory in the south that it had gained in 1913 to Greece, thereby losing access to the Aegean.” After the First World War, in the Yugoslav part of Macedonia, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes continued the policies of Serbianization and discrimination against the Macedonian people that the Serbian government had begun after the Balkan Wars. The dissatisfaction of the population with these policies was shown in the first postwar election of November 20, 1920, for delegates to the Constituent Assembly. The Serbian parties failed to win a majority in Macedonia. Out of 109,489 votes cast, the Communist Party obtained 36.7 percent of the total; the Democratic Party, the main party in the cabinet, 28.7 percent; the Turkish National Party, 19.6 percent; the National Radical Party, which from 1912 to 1920 had been primarily responsible for policies of Serbianization, 9.8 percent; and the Republican Party, 5.2 percent.” The heavy Communist vote in Macedonia, compared with only 12.4 percent in the country as a whole, was mainly a vote of protest, since the Communists did not include Macedonians among the three nations—Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—of the Yugoslav state. The vote was directed against the government’s policy of including Macedonia as a part of Serbia, labeling it Southern Serbia and its population Southern Serbs or simply Serbs. The dissatisfaction of the Macedonians expressed in this election did not diminish. Throughout the in-

terwar period, the Macedonian question was an open sore on the Yugoslav

skata nacija.

”*Apostolski, “Historical Development of the Macedonian People,” pp. 26-38; Dellin, Bulgaria, pp. 182-85; Doklesti¢, Kroz historiju Makedonije, pp. 92-204. See also Smilevski,

“Macedonian National Question,” pp. 81-118, and Taskovski, Radjanjeto na makedon-

”Yugoslavia, Vojna enciklopedija, 2nd ed., 1: 449-58. The two Balkan wars were fought with unusual brutality by all participants. The International Commission that investigated their origin and conduct for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace criticized all parties involved, particularly Greece and Serbia. See Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, Report, especially pp. 21-70 and 148-207. , Dellin, Bulgaria, p. 19. For the arguments of Bulgarian and Serbian scholars in support of their respective countries’ claims to Macedonia during and immediately after the First World War, see, for example, Ischirkov, Les confins occidentaux des terres bulgares, and Georgevitch, La Macédoine. *‘!Based ona table in Culinovi¢, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 1, facing p. 312.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 159 body politic, next in seriousness only to the Croatian question. Instead of becoming closer to either the Serbs or the Bulgarians, the Macedonians seemed more and more aware that they were a separate and distinct people.” When the new Yugoslav state continued the policies of Serbianization in Yugoslav Macedonia, a sizable emigration of Macedonians to Bulgaria took place. Many émigrés were militantly anti-Yugoslav or, more precisely, antiSerbian. They worked against Yugoslavia from Bulgaria, mostly through the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), which had been established in 1893. Under Ivan Mikhailov, who became its leader in 1927 after a bloody intraorganizational struggle, the IMRO supported the incorporation of Macedonia into Bulgaria. But a second branch, which soon broke away, supported an independent Macedonian state, and a third branch, which was proCommunist, supported a Balkan federation with Macedonia as one unit. For a time, the Macedonian exiles in Bulgaria had the support—official or unofficial—of the Bulgarian government and military authorities, in part because many Bulgarian politicians and military leaders were of Macedonian origin. To some extent they, and Mikhailov in particular, also had the backing of Italy, which at that time supported all groups working against the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. But when Bulgaria outlawed Macedonian terrorist groups in

1934, Mikhailov fled the country, going first to Turkey and then to Italy (which was also harboring Yugoslavia’s other archenemy, Ante Paveli¢).” Up to 1934, the various groups of Macedonian revolutionaries at home and in exile in Bulgaria engaged in terrorist activity in Yugoslav and Greek Mace-

donia, which Yugoslavia and Greece determinedly tried to suppress. From 1929 on, the IMRO also cooperated with the Croatian Ustashas in terrorist and other anti- Yugoslav activities. I was unable to find a consolidated statistical record of these operations. But in his autobiography Ivan Mikhailov provided detailed information on the starkly suppressive measures undertaken by

the Yugoslav and Greek governments against Macedonian revolutionaries from 1918 to 1934.” It is in the nature of such data to be biased, however, and

they must be read with caution. |

The authoritarian regime of Kimon Georgiev and Colonel Damian Velchev that came to power in Bulgaria in May 1934 was genuinely interested in improving relations with Yugoslavia. King Boris, who replaced this government with more moderate rule in 193 5, continued a policy of reconciliation with his western neighbor. In 1937 Bulgaria concluded a pact of friendship with YugoA postolov, “Manifestations of Macedonian National Individuality,” pp. 71-88. The first collection of poems by a Macedonian poet in the Macedonian language, in the eastern dialect spoken near the Bulgarian border, was published at the end of the interwar period. This was Beli mugri (White Dawns) by Koéo Racin, published in Samobor, near Zagreb, in 1939. After the war, the Macedonians chose as their literary language the dialect of the westernmost areas of Macedonia, that is, of the areas furthest from Bulgarian territory. 8Micr. No. T-311, Roll 196, Fr. 227. Mikhailov, Spomeni, 4: 627,727.

160 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA slavia and in 1938 promised not to use force to change its frontiers.* But though this was official policy, powerful individuals and groups in Bulgaria, even in the government, still hoped to realize the dream of a Greater Bulgaria. One of these was Parvan Draganov, the Bulgarian envoy to Berlin, who told Hitler on December 3, 1940, apparently on his own initiative and not on orders from his government, that one and a half million Bulgarians lived in Macedonia and could not be left there. Bogdan Filov, the Bulgarian prime minister, also brought up the issue with Hitler on January 4, 1941. He raised the Bulgarian claim to Yugoslav Macedonia as one of the matters to be considered in a final territorial settlement after the war.” Hitler was at that time trying to bring Yugoslavia peacefully into the Tripartite Pact and he cautioned the Bulgarians to have patience. But the Belgrade revolt of March 27, 1941, quickly changed his attitude. On the same day that he decided to destroy Yugoslavia, he summoned Draganov and told him that “the Macedonian question was cleared,” in other words, that Bulgaria, which had joined the Tripartite Pact on March 1 and where German forces were already poised for the attack on Greece and Yugoslavia, would be given the Yugoslav part of Macedonia.” The Germans also gave some thought to using Mikhailov and the IMRO to organize an uprising in Yugoslav Macedonia to coincide with the German invasion, but nothing came of it. Following the invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Hitler allowed the Bulgarians to appropriate the bulk of Yugoslav Macedonia, the southeast part of Serbia, and a small eastern part of the Kosovo region (see Map 1). At the same time, through a secret six-point agreement concluded on April 24, 1941, between Ivan Popov, the Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs, and Carl Clodius, the German special representative, the Germans laid a heavy lien on these areas. The agreement provided that in the occupied areas, Germany would continue extracting industrial raw materials, especially minerals, from existing plants without any limitations, and would have a preferred position in obtaining new mining concessions. It would also have full control of the chrome ore mines. The Bulgarian government was to assume responsibility for changing

, German military currency already spent by German forces in these areas, as well as sums that might be spent in the future, into Bulgarian currency. All goods in these areas acquired by German forces through requisitioning were to remain German property. Enemy (Yugoslav) property in Yugoslav territory

occupied by Bulgarian forces would remain under German administration. *SDellin, Bulgaria, p. 21. a *See Hillgruber, Staatsmadnner und Diplomaten bei Hitler, 1: 387-88 for Draganov’s statement, and 1: 424 for Filov’s claims. See also the memorandum by the director of the Political Department of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs about a conversation with Envoy Draganov on December 10, 1940, in which the latter mentioned one million Bulgarians in Macedonia and half a million Macedonian refugees in Bulgaria. DGFP, 11: 833-35. *’Hillgruber, Staatsmanner und Diplomaten bei Hitler, 1: 501-2.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 161 Workers from these areas already in Germany would continue to work there and the Bulgarian authorities would facilitate German recruiting of additional labor from these areas. Bulgaria would pay that portion of the Yugoslav state debt that fell on the Bulgarian-occupied areas to Germany and to German citizens. Furthermore, according to a later agreement, Bulgaria was obliged to put its (leva) currency at the disposal of the Germans for the needs of the Wehrmacht as well as for the wages of workers in enterprises working for Germany in Bulgarian-occupied (later annexed) areas of Yugoslav Macedonia.” The Bulgarian government, which had maintained that Yugoslav Macedonia was rightfully Bulgarian, treated the newly acquired areas as “liberated territory.” Without making any formal proclamation, it simply extended Bulgarian military, administrative, police, and judicial organizations and legislation to these regions, though it did issue a number of specific laws and decrees applicable to them.” Militarily, the Macedonian area was taken over by the Bulgarian 5th Army. In all, including the gendarmerie, various specialized troops, and police, the Bulgarians kept a force of about 40,000 men in the annexed part of

Yugoslav Macedonia until early 1943, when increased Partisan activity re**For the agreement of April 24, 1941, see Valev, Bolgarskii narod v borbe protiv fashizma, pp. 290-92. On April 27, it was extended to cover Bulgarian-occupied Western Thrace. Bulgaria stopped making the required currency payments to the Germans in June or July 1944. Micr. No. T-501, Roll 258, Fr. 736. Bulgarian materials on Bulgarian rule in Yugoslavia during the Second World War are extremely scarce. I learned in Belgrade that repeated Yugoslav efforts to gain access to Bulgarian wartime documents were unsuccessful, the Bulgarians arguing that their publication might put a strain on Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations. My impression is that the Bulgarians have decided to publish as little as possible about the history of their government and armed forces during the period from March 1941 to September 2, 1944, when they were in the Axis camp, and to concentrate their attention almost exclusively on the policies and achievements of the Fatherland Front government and the Communist Party of Bulgaria during the last eight months of the war, when they contributed to the defeat of Hitler. According to one impartial author, “Bulgarian historiography has not been very helpful on the wartime period. Bulgaria having lost to Tito after 1943, Bulgarian sources have since concentrated on polemics. For the wartime years reliance is overwhelmingly on Yugoslav sources.” Oren, Bulgarian Communism, p. 189. Some Yugoslav works dealing more generally with Bulgarian rule in Yugoslav territory during the Second World War are: Mojsov, Bugarska radnicka partija (komunista), pp. 5287; Yugoslavia, Vojnoistorijski institut, Pregled narodnooslobodilackog rata u Makedoniji, 1941-1944, pp. 5-32; Apostolski, Hristov, and Terzioski, “The Position of Occupied Macedonia,” pp. 303-48; Yugoslavia, Institute for National History, Skopje, Istorija makedonskog naroda, 3: 253-733 Kuli¢, Bugarska okupacija, 1941-1944, vol. 1;and Mitrovski, Gli8ié, and Ristovski, Bugarska vojska u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945. For non-Yugoslav works, in addition to Oren, Bulgarian Communism, pp. 166-200, see also Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Politics, pp. 76-101, and Miller, Bulgaria During the Second World War, pp. 122-34. “Culinovic, Okupatorska podjela Jugoslavije, pp. 602-5; Yugoslavia, Institute for National History, Skopje, Istorija makedonskog naroda, 3: 259.

162 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA quired that another division be brought in from Bulgaria.” For administrative purposes, the annexed area was divided into two districts, Skopje and Bitola, each under a district director. The police, too, were territorially organized, though police chiefs were independent of administrative directors. The an- nexed parts of Serbia and the Kosovo region, which the Bulgarians claimed were populated by Morava Valley Bulgarians, were attached to other administrative districts and put under other Bulgarian troops.” In addition, the Bul-

| garians annexed Greek western Thrace and the eastern parts of Aegean Macedonia in 1941, thereby regaining access to the Aegean Sea. The annexations were represented as rectifications of the unjust territorial decisions made at the -

expense of Bulgaria in 1913 and 1919. |

In Yugoslav Macedonia and the Kosovo region, the demarcation line between the German and Italian spheres of influence (the Vienna Line) did not fulfill the goals that the Bulgarians and the Albanians (and the Italians) had, and it failed to satisfy any of these parties. The Bulgarians had hoped to realize their dream of a Greater Bulgaria and the Albanians theirs of a Greater Albania through the partition of Yugoslavia. The Germans, in the role of arbiter, naturally made decisions in their own interest. They divided Macedonia for a number of reasons. First, though Italy was a weak partner, nevertheless it was the other main Axis pillar, anda sensitive one, especially because it was jealous about its areas of interest. Consequently, though Germany was biased in favor of Bulgaria, it could not disregard Italian interests. A second important concern : was communication lines. The main railroad line from Belgrade to Greece ran through Macedonia. Since its operation and security were vital for the Germans as long as their troops were in Greece and North Africa, they found it expedient to put this railroad in Bulgarian-annexed Macedonia, where they could easily keep their troops. About 4,000 men were assigned to protect airfields and supervise Bulgarian services protecting the railroads. For similar reasons, Germany allotted Bulgaria those areas containing large chrome ore mines and

put their management in the hands of German firms or mixed GermanBulgarian corporations or, if sequestered, German commissioners.” Finally, in part by rewarding Bulgaria with territory, Germany was able to induce it in January 1942 to supply troops for occupation service in a large part of Serbia, an arrangement extended on two later occasions to include additional territory, and to police it under German control and for the German account, thereby

_ freeing German forces for use elsewhere. !

PP- 5-7. . , ,

Yugoslavia, Vojnoistorijski institut, Pregled narodnooslobodilackog rata u Makedoniji,

Popovic, “The Bulgarian Army in Occupied Serbia (1941-1944),” 1952, nO. 3: 23-26. On the Germans’ supervision of Bulgarian forces to protect airfields and railroads, see Yugoslavia, Vojnoistorijski institut, Pregled narodnooslobodilackog rata u Makedoniji, p. 7. On the Germans’ control of chrome ore mines in Bulgarian territory, see DGFP, 12: 623-24,

639-40.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 163 The dissatisfaction of both the Bulgarians and the Italians (speaking for the Albanians) with the Vienna Line caused trouble between the two countries almost from the start. Bulgaria asked for practically the entire area of Macedonia that had been allotted to Albania and Albania asked for the city of Skopje and other parts. Border rectification became a matter of discussions between the Bulgarians and the Italians as early as July 1941. In the second half of 1942, an Italian-Bulgarian Border Commission was established, which agreed on small adjustments to the border in early December 1942. On January 2, 1943, an agreement on fishing rights in Lake Ohrid was reached and on March 29 an overall agreement on the demarcation line was signed in Tirana. It was to go into effect the following June 15, though it only became effective on July 15. But despite the agreement, Bulgaria still refused to give up certain villages to Albania. Bulgaria thus obtained actual control of small sections of territory in the area of Lake Ohrid, including several villages and three monasteries that it deemed of national significance. The Bulgarians also succeeded in obtaining

from Germany a border adjustment that slightly extended the Bulgarianannexed area in southeast Serbia.” The Germans, however, did not trust the Bulgarians, fearing that at an opportune moment they might leave the Axis camp. Consequently, they also sup-

ported remnants of the IMRO, now displaying definite pro-Nazi leanings. (Mikhailov spent the entire war in Zagreb as a guest of Paveli¢.) This group now agitated for a unified and independent Macedonia and was on the whole anti-Bulgarian. Reports of the representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Macedonia from 1942 and early 1943 indicate that the IMRO had at that time substantial support among the rank and file of the Macedonian population.”

After the Bulgarian annexation of Macedonia, the pro-Bulgarian Macedonian exiles who returned to their homeland were eager to help in its administration. They organized the Central Action Committee in Skopje and action subcommittees in various other towns, but these were dissolved when the Bulgarians established a firm hold over the area. During the interwar period, the Macedonians had been told that they were Serbs from southern Serbia; now they learned that they were Bulgarians from Macedonia. But even those Macedonians who felt that they were Bulgarians soon discovered that the Bulgarians from Bulgaria were suspicious of them and discriminated against them in em*Todorovski, “Relations Between Italy and Bulgaria,” pp. 77-97, especially pp. 90-91; Klhjakovié¢, “The Italian-Bulgarian Conflict About Macedonia in 1941,” pp. 159-74; Toskowa, “The Foreign Political Position of Bulgaria,” pp. 34-38. The border adjustment was arranged in November 1942 and went into effect in March 1943. Micr. No. T-501, Roll 352, Fr. 749. Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Istorijski arbiv, vol. 7, Makedonija, pp. 173-74, 23236.

164 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA ployment and other ways—in short, considered them second-class Bulgarians. Consequently, many Macedonians cooled toward the new regime.” The Bulgarians, realizing that only part of the Macedonian population felt Bulgarian or was pro-Bulgarian, initiated a program of Bulgarization. This extended to all areas of life and was mainly the work of Bulgarians brought from Bulgaria for specific functions. The Bulgarians had already brought military and police forces into the country and most of the manpower to establish the civil, judicial, and police administrations. The chief thrust of subsequent Bulgarization was in education. Many new schools, from elementary to university level, were established to inculcate into young people the idea that Macedo-

nians were Bulgarians. Bulgarian was the only language of instruction and textbooks and many teachers at all levels were brought in from Bulgaria. In the school year 1941-42, for example, of a total of 2,03 5 teachers in annexed Macedonia, 1,508 came from Bulgaria. Macedonian teachers deemed suitable were sent to Bulgaria for a year of study and indoctrination, while unsuitable teachers were transferred to administrative jobs outside the school system or were dismissed. The government also established and funded branches of Bulgarian patriotic organizations, such as Branik, Father Paisi, the Legionnaires, and the Warriors, in annexed Macedonia. It made every effort to use the mass media for propaganda to promote Bulgarization. Similar policies were followed in the annexed areas of Kosovo and southeast Serbia.”

A special target of Bulgarian anti-Serbian policies in Macedonia was the Serbian Orthodox Church, which the Bulgarians considered the principal vehicle of Serbianization. At the beginning of May 1941, they expelled the metropolitan of Skopje, Josif Cvijovic, two other bishops, and all priests who were considered Serbs to German-occupied Serbia and replaced them with clergy from Bulgaria. The Macedonian bishoprics were also formally included in the organization of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (see Chapter 12). But all these measures in education, church organization, personnel, and propaganda failed to achieve their objective. The only Macedonians to welcome the new policies were those who already considered themselves Bulgarians and had faith in the new rulers. All the rest—those who considered themselves Serbs or Turks or Albanians, and especially the great majority who considered themselves Macedonians—resisted the new policies or remained passive. The latter in particular saw no difference between the wartime Bulgarian regime and the interwar Yugoslav (in fact Serbian) government: both denied **See, for example, the report of the military attaché of the Independent State of Croatia in Sofia on October 21, 1941, relaying information from a German with business interests in Skopje, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 38/5-3, Box 239. Similar views were expressed in the September 28, 1943, report of a former Austro-Hungarian and Yugoslav officer with a good knowledge of Macedonia, who was used as a confidant by the Germans. See

Micr. No. T-311, Roll 196, Frs. 203-7. } **Terzioski, Denacionalizatorskata dejnost, pp. 21-59, 145-228.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 165 them their nationality, their language, political autonomy, and free development as a national unit. In short, the Bulgarians committed all the mistakes in Macedonia that the Serbs had made earlier and thus forfeited the support and allegiance of the majority of the population. If the Bulgarians had developed in the Macedonians a sense of cultural unity with Bulgaria and a feeling that they were part of the Bulgarian nation, then the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, in its Macedonian branch and Partisan formations, which advocated a separate Macedonian republic in a federal Yugoslav state, would not have had the success it did.

The Bulgarian government took over all the property that had formerly belonged to the Yugoslav state, except for the assets retained by the Germans. In banking and industrial and commercial businesses, owners and other personnel of Serbian orientation were replaced by Bulgarians from Bulgaria or Macedonians of Bulgarian orientation. Forests and grazing lands, insofar as they had not been nationalized before, were nationalized. A further measure of both economic and political significance was the expulsion of Serbs and Montenegrins who during the interwar period had settled on land made available by the post-1918 agrarian reform and who were regarded as instruments of Serbianization. In this way, some 26,000 settlers were expelled to Serbia (or left because they expected to be expelled) from Bulgarian-annexed areas.”

An extremely important aspect of the Macedonian problem during the war was the conflict between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) and the Communist Party of Bulgaria (CPB) over the province’s national loyalties. The CPY charged that the CPB tried to appropriate the regional Macedonian party organization of the CPY by subverting its leading officials, including Metodi Satorov-Sarlo, the secretary of the Provincial Committee, and by so doing accepted the partition of Yugoslavia. It further charged that the CPB never protested against the Bulgarian annexation of Yugoslav Macedonia and Greek territories and thus identified itself with the views of the pro-Nazi Bulgarian government. Finally, it accused the CPB of failing to call for the withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from Yugoslav Macedonia, as it did for the withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from German-occupied Serbia. Along with these specific differences, there were also disagreements over tactics in the armed operations undertaken by the two groups during the war.” Tito lodged a strong protest with the Comintern about the subversion of the Macedonian Provincial Committee by the CPB. The Comintern took the Yugo*’Apostolski, Hristov, and Terzioski, “The Position of Occupied Macedonia,” p. 348. The expellees and refugees from the Bulgarian- and Albanian-annexed parts of Macedonia and the Kosovo region were a difficult problem for the German occupation authorities in Serbia, but nothing was done to force them back on the Bulgarians and Albanians. See Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 249, Frs. ro05-7. *®These matters will be discussed in the volume on the Partisans. See, however, Zbornik DNOR, 2, bk. 2: 335.

via. ,

166 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA .

slav side and after reexamining party ranks in Macedonia, named a new Provincial Committee with Lazar Kolisevski as secretary. But all this took time and delayed the start of the Communist-led uprising in Macedonia until October --r1, 1941, that is, almost three months after it began in other parts of YugoslaThe CPY only had a few members in Macedonia at the time of Yugoslavia’s collapse and the differences between the pro- Yugoslav and pro-Bulgarian factions were only one of many hindrances to its growth. The deposed leadership of the Provincial Committee tended to undermine the weak authority of the

new leadership, which was unable to come to a decision about armed struggle and generally seemed inept. The latter also had to contend with the infiltration _of the Bulgarian police into local party organizations. Many leading members, including Kolisevski, were arrested and sent to Bulgaria. Partisan units were organized, only to fall apart or give way under counterattacks in the few areas they managed to liberate in early operations. The Partisans elsewhere in Yugoslavia also suffered reverses, but in Macedonia it took over a year and a half for sizable Partisan operations to get under way. Beginning in the early summer of 1943, however, the Partisan movement and pro- Yugoslav Communist forces in ~Macedonia showed steady growth, even in the face of mounting opposition from the Bulgarian military, while pro-Bulgarian Communist sympathizers, pro-Bulgarian nationalists, and pro-Serbian Chetnik forces, as well as forces

agitating for a unified and independent Macedonia, weakened.” _ , In response, the Bulgarian government used repressive measures on a broad | scale against villages in Macedonia that were known to harbor Partisans. Those suspected of pro-Partisan sympathies were drafted into special labor companies, imprisoned, or deported to Bulgaria. A special type of counterunit for combating the Partisans was also developed, though with little success.

Bulgarian rule in the Yugoslav areas annexed in April 1941 lasted until early September 1944. The three weeks between August 20 and September 9, 1944, were filled with activity of great consequence. As Soviet troops approached the Bulgarian frontier through Romania toward the end of August, the Sofia government declared its neutrality and dispatched its representatives to Cairo to seek contact with the Western Allies. At the same time, however, aside from disarming a few troops, it did nothing to prevent the German forces stationed in Bulgaria and those coming from Romania from withdrawing toFor the difficulties in Partisan ranks and operations in Macedonia, see the letter of Svetozar Vukmanovié Tempo, the delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Macedonia, of February 28, 1943, to all party members and organizations in Macedonia, in Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Istorijski arhiv, vol. 7, Makedonija, pp. 204-

Il.

For the unsuccessful organization and operation of Mihailovi¢’s Chetnik detachments in Macedonia, several of which eventually switched over to the Partisans, see Coli¢, “The Chetnik Armed Formations in Macedonia, 1942-1944,” pp. 145-67, especially pp. 153-65.

, FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 167 ward Yugoslav territory. This brought strong protests from the Soviet Union. On September 2, a new pro-Western government was established in Sofia, which only a week later, following a domestic revolt by the leftist Fatherland Front coalition, was replaced by a pro-Communist government. The new government immediately joined the Soviet side.'” Even as these changes transformed a German ally into a German foe, formerly Bulgarian-annexed Yugoslav Macedonia acquired great military importance as a withdrawal corridor for German forces in Greece numbering over 300,000 men. Ivan Mikhailov then again entered German schemes for Macedonia. After much effort and in the face of Bulgarian opposition, Mikhailov had finally succeeded in January 1944 in persuading the Germans to arm some of his followers and attach them to SS formations in Bulgarian-annexed Greek Macedonia.’ More important, in September 1944 the Germans decided to use Mikhailov personally to help them shore up the situation in Yugoslav Macedonia by proclaiming a separate Macedonian state and organizing an administration and military forces, which would be put in their service. Aleksandar Stanishev, a friend of Mikhailov who had been the Bulgarian minister of interior, also suggested the proclamation of a separate Macedonian state under German protection. So Mikhailov was brought from Zagreb to Skopje by way of Sofia to establish the new state. But after two days in Skopje, September 4 and 5, he realized that the plan was hopeless, since it was impossible to achieve anything with political means alone and no military support was forthcoming. Mikhailov’s only choice was to leave and he was returned to Zagreb.'” The withdrawal of German forces from Greece through Yugoslav Macedonia (and continuing through the Kosovo region and Sandzak toward Bosnia) began in early October and continued for several weeks. A special task force under the command of Luftwaffe Lieutenant General Scheurlen was charged with keeping communications open. Yugoslav Partisan troops, with the limited cooperation of Bulgarian forces, inflicted some losses on the Germans and delayed their passage through Yugoslav Macedonia by ten to twelve days. The last enemy troops that the Partisans had to clear from their soil were Albanian National Front units helping the Germans to protect communication lines. By Dellin, Bulgaria, pp. 114-20; Oren, Bulgarian Communism, pp. 244-58; Miller, Bulgaria During the Second World War, pp. 204-16.

!Micr. No. T-311, Roll 196, Frs. 224 and 227-34. A German intelligence report on Mikhailov dated December 12, 1943 (Fr. 227), noted that “Mikhailov’s importance in Bul-

| garia and Macedonia has much declined. He maintains contact only with former close coworkers, having lost all influence with the Macedonian masses some time ago, mainly to the Communists. His only influence now is over some compact Macedonian localities in northern Greece and on small Macedonian groups in Old Bulgaria.”

'2For the proposed proclamation of a new Macedonian state, see Toskowa, Bulgaria i Tretiat Raih (1941-1944), p. 214. For Mikhailov’s realization of its hopelessness, see Micr.

No. T-120, Roll 1757, Frs. Eo25,194-95.

168 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA mid-November, all German units had withdrawn from Macedonian soil and the Partisans included the whole province in their military and interim governmental organizations.” In Bulgaria, one of the first priorities of the new Fatherland Front government was to reorganize the armed forces. The Russians supplied advisers and instructors and the whole army was put under supreme Soviet command. Some Bulgarian units on Yugoslav soil at the time of the change in government continued to operate, but under new leadership. Other units of the new Bulgarian army entered Yugoslav territory on the basis of a special Yugoslav-Bulgarian agreement of October 5, 1944, between Marshal Tito and Bulgarian representative Dobri Terpeshev, which provided for the participation of Bulgarian troops in the fight against German forces in Yugoslav territory as well as against various Yugoslav collaborationist forces. But cooperation between the Yugoslav Partisans and the new Bulgarian troops did not proceed without difficulties.'** Besides the Yugoslav Communists’ above-mentioned criticism of the pro-Nazi Bulgarian regime and its forces and of the policies and activities of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, differences of opinion and recriminations arose regarding the Bulgarians’ military effort after September 1944 and the extent of their contribution in fighting German forces on Yugoslav soil.

After Bulgaria left the Axis alliance in September 1944, the expansionist dreams of the Greater Bulgaria enthusiasts—both within the army and among politicians and intellectuals—collapsed, like the expansionist dreams of other countries in southeast Europe that rode Hitler’s coattails in 1941. But if Bulgaria was the loser, the Macedonians in Yugoslavia were the winners. They acquired a high degree of autonomy in the postwar Yugoslav state, and independence following the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990’s.

HUNGARIAN RULE IN PARTS OF YUGOSLAV TERRITORY One of the first moves that Hitler made after he decided to destroy Yugoslavia following the Belgrade coup was to summon the Hungarian envoy in _ Berlin, Dome Sztdjay, to deliver a confidential message to Regent Miklés Horthy in Budapest. The message had four main points. Germany would not per-

mit any anti-German base to be established in southeast Europe; in the event of . a conflict with Yugoslavia, Germany would not oppose Hungary’s desire for a revision of frontiers with that country; Germany considered it tactically advantageous to give autonomy to the Croats; and Hungary should undertake pre'Mitrovski, “Operations Against German Army Group E,” pp. 73-86. | '*For the announcement and provisions of the agreement of October 5, 1944, see Yugoslavia, Vojnoistorijski institut, Pregled narodnooslobodilackog rata u Makedoniji, pp. 14142. For the difficulties in Macedonia in November 1944 according to German intelligence sources, see Micr. No. T-311, Roll 189, Frs. 1298 and 1301.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 169 liminary military preparations, which would be discussed and agreed upon between the military authorities of the two countries. The editor of the minutes of Hitler’s meetings with foreign statesmen and diplomats notes that Hitler’s reference to autonomy for the Croats in fact meant “that Hungary should in some fashion absorb Croatia into its own state system.”'* Horthy’s answer confirms this inference. The message to Horthy seemed to suggest that, despite German assurances to Italy that Yugoslavia and, even more, Croatia were within the Italian sphere of influence, Hitler would have preferred for Hungary to have predominance in Croatia. But it is quite possible that Hitler was only making promises to Hun-

gary to induce it to abrogate its pact of friendship and nonaggression with Yugoslavia and bring it to Germany’s side. Although Horthy was agreeable to

most of the propositions, he declined to accept the Croatian bait. Through Sztdjay, who returned to Berlin on March 28, he declared that “Hungary had no interest in including Croatia within its frontiers” and only wanted to be a good neighbor to Croatia. He did hope, however, that some arrangement could be made for a Hungarian outlet on the Adriatic.'* It would appear that Hitler decided to let Italy have formal dominance in Croatia only after receiving this reply from Horthy. Hungarian forces entered Yugoslavia on April 11 in the Backa region be-

tween the Danube and Tisza Rivers. After the war, Horthy told American authorities during his interrogation that he had not wanted to attack Yugoslavia but was forced to do so because of disorders and the massacre of Hungarians in Backa.'” This, however, was not true. All Yugoslav defenses had collapsed by the time Hungarian forces entered the country, and they advanced southward to the Danube between Vukovar and the confluence of the Tisza and the Danube without difficulty. The report of a Volksdeutsche leader, Johann Wuescht, of April 17, 1941, shows that the German minority had already established its own militia and had disarmed about 90,000 Yugoslav soldiers.'” But though the Hungarians encountered no military resistance to speak of, they engaged in the wholesale killing of civilians. Yugoslav sources put the estimate

for Backa and Baranja at about 3,500 people. This is documented by the Volksdeutsche reports from Ba¢ka from this period, which describe how Hungarian troops engaged in wild shooting even in German villages and caused a number of deaths among the German minority.” The Hungarians occupied the Yugoslav areas of Backa, Baranja, MedjiMSHillgruber, Staatsmanner und Diplomaten bei Hitler, 1: 498-501. Undoubtedly Hitler had in mind only the historical province of Croatia-Slavonia.

Ibid., pp. 514-18, especially p. 517, and DGFP, 12: 403-4. '’Micr. No. 679, Roll 2, Fr. 297. '$Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H297,862-64.

See Golubovi¢, “[Hungarian] Raids in January 1942,” p. 165, for the Yugoslav estimate, and Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H297,8 52-89, for the Volksdeutsche reports.

170 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA murje, and Prekmurje (see Map 1). The Germans had also promised them the Yugoslav Banat, but the promise was withdrawn. For the first four months, until August 16, 1941, these areas were under purely military occupation, with all executive powers held by the Hungarian Southern Army. This was followed by another four months of military occupation, but under a civilian administra- _ tion. Then on December 14 the Hungarian parliament voted to annex the areas to the Crown of St. Stephen and give them full representation in the parliament. According to the census of 1931, Ba¢ka and Baranja had a total population of 837,742 people: 305,917 Serbs and Croats, 283,114 Hungarians, and 185,458 _ Germans, with Slovaks, Ukrainians, Russians, and Gypsies making up the remainder.''’ Because Hungary had never accepted the loss of these and certain other areas by the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, 1920, their full reincorporation into the Hungarian body politic was the foremost aim of the Hungarian regime that took them over in April 1941.

In Batka and Baranja, one of the first actions of the Hungarian occupation - , authorities was to classify the population into two groups: those who had been in the territory at the time of the armistice of 1918 and those who had entered during the interwar period. The latter included mainly government officials, teachers, businessmen, workers, and colonists on agricultural land formerly belonging mostly to Hungarian noble families and made available by the post1918 Yugoslav agrarian reform. The influx of these people was considered part of the policy of Yugoslavization (mostly Serbianization) of these areas, which was now to be undone by countervailing measures of Magyarization. During the first two weeks of Hungarian rule, about 10,000 people were expelled to Serbia, the Independent State of Croatia, and Montenegro. A plan to deport about 150,000 Serbs to German-occupied Serbia failed because of the opposition of the German military commander there, but even so, some 35,000 Serbs, according to estimates of German occupation authorities in Belgrade, were secretly shipped to Serbia, and another 12,000 were put in Hungarian concentration camps, from which they were gradually shipped to Serbia.'" By expelling

the Yugoslav colonists, the Hungarian government acquired an estimated 192,000 cadastral yokes of land (1 yoke = 0.58 hectares or 1.07 acres). By dispossessing the Jews, it acquired another 86,000 cadastral yokes, for a total of 278,000 yokes. Of this total, 25,000 yokes were distributed to individuals enti— tled to such land, 35,000 yokes to relocated families, and 11,000 yokes to an"For the Hungarian occupation of Yugoslav areas, particularly of Ba¢ka and Baranja, see Mirni¢, “The Hungarian Occupation Regime in Yugoslavia”; Atanackovié, Vojvodinau — borbi, 1941-1945, pp. 7-22; idem, “The Occupation of Vojvodina”; and a very critical review of Atanackovié’s article by Josip Mirni¢ in the same journal in which it was published, Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 1965, no. 3: 57-70. See also Horthy, Confidential Papers, pp. 18794. For the Hungarian law of December 27, 1941, on the annexation of Batka, Baranja, Medjimurje, and Prekmurje, see Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. 63 1-33. For the 1931 census figures, see Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, p. 11E.

'"' Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, p. 77E. Oo

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 171 other group of transferees, while the remainder was kept by the state or sold to large landowners and other people.'” After this, the Hungarians began a systematic Magyarization of the political, economic, and cultural life of the annexed areas. They reestablished the old 1918 administrative divisions of local government, with the difference that the new officials were appointed rather than elected. They encouraged the activity of Hungarian political parties and patriotic organizations in the drive to Magyarize desirable elements of the population, which conversely meant discrimination against Serbs and Croats. In the economic domain, the Hungarians took over the assets that had formerly belonged to the Yugoslav state. They endeavored to increase the Hungarian share of the stock capital of banks and industrial and trading corporations, hoping to eliminate Yugoslav interests and reduce the share of the German minority. Most industrial enterprises were arbitrarily placed in the category of war industries and put under the management of commissioners named by the military authorities. The same sort of discrimination against Serbs, Croats, and Jews also applied in educational and cultural institutions. With one exception, all secondary schools had to use Hungarian or German as the language of instruction. The publication of books, newspapers, and periodicals in Serbo-Croatian was almost completely prohibited, and Serbs and Croats with higher education were effectively excluded from appropriate employment.'” That Hungary was made to pay for its acquisition of Yugoslav, as well as Czechoslovak and Romanian, territory is evident from a report by the German economic expert Carl Clodius on August 16, 1941: “The Hungarian government has tried as far as possible to take account of German wishes in the economic field. Thus, among other things, it agreed to do away with the undervaluation of the Reichsmark; it provided a credit of 200 million Reichsmarks

for financing German purchases of strategic goods from Hungary; and it greatly improved conditions for the activity of Reich Germans and Reich German capital in Hungary in compliance with our requests.” Sending a Hungarian army of about 205,000 men to the Russian front may also be considered payment for German help in acquiring the annexed areas.'“ Large surpluses of food and such raw materials as hemp from Backa and

Baranja were earmarked for Germany. A memorandum of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared in March 1943 in expectation of forthcoming German-Hungarian negotiations noted that “the harvest of the Backa 2] ebl, “The Agrarian Policy of the Hungarian Occupier,” pp. 198, 205, 209. '3Mirni¢, “The Hungarian Occupation Regime in Yugoslavia,” pp. 436-42, 459-66.

'4For Hungary’s economic concessions, see DGFP, 13: 319-21. For a map showing Hungarian territorial acquisitions between 1938 and 1941, see Helmreich, Hungary, p. 15. For the way in which Hungary was brought into the war against the Soviet Union by an attack of unidentified but probably German planes on the border town of KoSice (Kassa) on June 26, 1941, and the strength and losses of the Hungarian 2nd Army, which was sent to the Russian front, see Gosztony, Hitlers fremde Heere, pp. 120-23, 213, 343-44, 433-34.

172 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA area, which was reincorporated from Yugoslavia, stood and still stands in its entirety at the disposal of the Axis powers.”' In all the annexed areas, as in Hungary proper, the government applied direct controls over wages, prices, rationing, and similar matters.

: The well-organized German minority in Ba¢ka and Baranja, about 22 percent of the total population in 1931 and outnumbered by the Hungarians, who made up about 34 percent of the total population, was economically the most advanced and strongest group. At the time of the invasion of Yugoslavia, the Backa Volksdeutsche were completely under Nazi influence. They were very disappointed to see Hungarian rather than German troops marching in, the

| more so as some of these troops saw no reason to treat them any differently than the rest of the population. Several incidents, resulting in a few Volksdeutsche casualties, for a time caused such difficulties between the Germans and the Hungarians that they came to Hitler’s attention.’ As a result, the Volksdeutsche refused to assume any role in local administration. But they had a certain — amount of power as well as a bargaining chip in their chief political and cultural organization, the Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn, which had been recognized by a German-Hungarian agreement of August 30, 1940, as the only official Volksdeutsche organization in Hungary. The German minority in the annexed areas and in Hungary soon came to enjoy the status of almost a state

within a state. They professed full loyalty to the Hungarian state and had a number of representatives in the Hungarian parliament. But they were allowed |

to appoint their own officials in towns with a predominantly German population and, on the basis of a German-Hungarian agreement of February 12,

forces.'!’ , |

1942, they acquired the power to draft their members into the German armed

When armed resistance broke out in Hungarian-annexed Backa and Baranja in the second half of 1941, though ona much smaller scale than in most parts of Yugoslavia, the Hungarian military authorities, like their counterparts elsewhere, applied heavily repressive measures. Their harshest action against the insurgents and the Serbian and Jewish civilian population occurred in January 1942, when according to Yugoslav sources about 3,500 people were killed and thousands more were robbed, imprisoned, otherwise maltreated, or taken to

concentration camps.'"® The Partisan movement was never as strong in Batka as it was in most other parts of Yugoslavia, however, for two reasons. First, the '’Horthy, Confidential Papers, p. 367. ''6In addition to the already cited reports from the field in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H297,8 5 3-89, see also the notes on the conference between Hitler and Hungarian Envoy , Sztdjay on April 19, 1941, in Hillgruber, Staatsmanner und Diplomaten bei Hitler, 1: 527. '’ Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, pp. 57E, 68E-72E. See also Mirni¢, “The Hungarian Occupation Regime in Yugoslavia,” pp. 468-69. "8Mirni¢é, “The Hungarian Occupation Regime in Yugoslavia,” p. 459; Golubovié, “[Hungarian] Raids in January 1942,” pp. 170-90. See also reports from some Volksdeutsche representatives in Backa, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,61 5-20.

FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 173 flat land was not suitable for the type of guerrilla warfare practiced by the Partisans, and second, the South Slavic population constituted only a little more than one-third of the total population. Some Partisan units from Backa were sent to Srijem and Bosnia to reinforce Partisan forces there. The Chetniks also apparently had an underground organization in Backa, but otherwise they exhibited little activity.

Despite the abusive treatment of the Serbian, Jewish, and to some extent Croatian population by the Hungarian military and civilian authorities, some Serbian and Croatian politicians collaborated with them. A former Serbian senator and a former representative of the Croatian Peasant Party became members of the Hungarian parliament and urged the Yugoslav population to support the new Hungarian regime. Their example was followed by a number of other politicians and by some large landowners and businessmen eager to protect their personal economic interests.'” Beginning in late 1943, the Hungarian government made a number of attempts to reach the Western Allies, with a view to detaching itself from what now looked like the losing side in the war. This became known to the Germans, who responded in March 1944 by taking control of the country in order to keep it from falling into Soviet hands. Operation Margarethe, launched on March 19, brought large additional German forces into Hungary. Regent

Horthy was allowed to remain as head of state, but the government was replaced by a cabinet headed by the former Hungarian envoy in Berlin, General

Dome Sztdjay, whom the Germans trusted. Much of the planning for the political takeover was done by Edmund Veesenmayer of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who became the chief civilian executive in Hungary with the title of German plenipotentiary and envoy in Hungary.” With the assumption of full control over Hungary, the Germans also superimposed their rule over the Hungarian-annexed Yugoslav areas of Backa, Baranja, Medjimurje, and Prekmurje. By August 1944, however, Germany began rapidly losing its hold over southeast Europe. The collapse of Romania and soon after of Bulgaria induced Regent Horthy, despite opposition from a majority of his cabinet, to renew his contact with the Allied command in Caserta in order to negotiate a surrender. The latter advised him to deal with the Soviet forces, which he did, and on October 11 a provisional truce was signed in Moscow between the representatives of Hungary and the Great Allies. This brought swift German reaction. Horthy was removed from his post and replaced by Ferenc Szalasi, the head of the Hungarian Nazi Party, which now assumed power in that part of the country still under German control. In late December in Debrecen, the political forces '? Atanackovié, “The Occupation of Vojvodina,” pp. 3 5-36. 'Kriegstagebuch, 4, pt. 1: 177-249. One result of German rule in Hungary was the deportation of about 300,000 Hungarian Jews from the territory of pre-1940 Hungary to extermination camps. See Braham, The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry, especially p. 971.

174 FOREIGN ANNEXATION OF YUGOSLAVIA that had gone over to the Allied side announced the establishment, with Soviet backing, of a National Front government under the leadership of General Béla Miklés, in which various bourgeois political parties as well as Socialists and Communists were represented. On December 30, this government declared war on Germany and a little later accepted the conditions for a truce imposed

on the Horthy representatives in Moscow.” : |

The Germans perceived in time the danger to the Volksdeutsche in southeast Europe from advancing Soviet forces as well as from vengeful national groups who during the war had been harmed by them. The evacuation of the German minority from Backa and Baranja to Austria and Germany started about October 1, 1944. In the course of that month about half of them were

moved out.'” , ,

By the end of October, Soviet, Bulgarian, and a small contingent of Yugoslav forces had cleared Ba¢ka of German troops. By the end of December, these forces were in control of most of western Hungary, and Soviet forces surrounded Budapest. To counteract these advances, the Germans assembled a huge number of troops in the remainder of western Hungary and on March 6, 1945, launched an offensive against the Soviets. This undertaking had several objectives. One was to defeat the Russians on a subsidiary front, which would necessitate the shift of some Soviet forces away from the eastern front, thus easing pressure on German troops there. Another was to free Budapest and reach the Danube River to block the Russian advance toward Austria, in order to safeguard oil and bauxite supplies in western Hungary—of critical importance for the German war machine—and prevent the bottling up and destruc-

tion of German Army Group E, withdrawing from the Balkans, before it reached Austrian territory. But this last great German offensive of the war, involving about 30 divisions, 11 of them armored, failed to achieve any major results. Ten days after the offensive began, it was met by a Russian counteroffensive. German forces were pushed back until by April 4 the last German troops,

together with Hungarian forces still loyal to the Szalasi government, were forced to withdraw from Hungarian territory."*> The Hungarian-annexed Yugoslav areas of Medjimurje and Prekmurje were liberated during the last

weeks of the war by Bulgarian forces. . oe

As it lost territory during the last few months of 1944, Hungary was , stripped of all the territorial gains it had made between 1938 and 1941. Thus ended, much as in the case of Bulgaria, this short-lived period of Hungarian ex-

pansion at the cost of its neighbors. '1Gosztony, Hitlers fremde Heere, pp. 428-34. '2Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, pp. 87E-88E.

pp. 214-46. |

'3Kriegstagebuch, 4, pt. 2: 1151-1225; Gosztony, Endkampf an der Donau, 1944-45,

ee CHAPTER 5

The Puppet Government of Serbia

The Germans established a military government of occupation in Serbia proper in order to control several critical resources. Besides possessing two strategic transportation routes, the Danube River waterway and the railroad line con-

necting central Europe with Bulgaria and Greece (and thence by sea with North | Africa), Serbia was also a large producer of certain nonferrous metals (lead, antimony, and copper) that Germany needed for war production. The Germans wanted to utilize the country’s resources without, however, tying up a large amount of German manpower. They did so by using Serbian labor to man the factories, the Serbian puppet government and its forces to run the country un-

der their direction, and Bulgarian occupation troops to keep the peace. They , also used several kinds of armed formations as auxiliary military forces. In addition, from November 1943 on, as a result of sometimes formal, sometimes in-

formal, arrangements with the principal Chetnik commanders, they could count on the support of the bulk of General Mihailovi¢é’s Chetniks. Map 3 shows the dimensions of occupied Serbia during the war.

Even before the end of the brief military campaign against Yugoslavia in April 1941, the commander in chief of the German army issued a proclamation defining the conditions of German rule in occupied areas of the country. There was no question but that the Germans intended to enforce a very strict occupation. The death penalty was established for acts of violence and sabotage, especially of communication lines and public utilities. All arms were to be surren- : dered, along with all other implements of war and all radio transmitters and batteries. No assistance was to be given to non-German soldiers or civilians in occupied territory trying to escape to unoccupied territory. Communicating any news outside the occupied area that could be injurious to German forces, or communicating with prisoners of war, was strictly forbidden. So too was insulting the German army and its commanders or demonstrating against German forces. Street meetings were banned, as were demonstrations without previous permission and the distribution of leaflets. All work stoppages, strikes, and lockouts were prohibited. Shops and enterprises were ordered to reopen and begin regular operation. The hoarding of goods was forbidden, as well as

HUNGARY ( ~ yt Ej Annexed to Albania

a -Crvenka : , : aseers x . ae pied by italy .

{D2 ¢ Subotica ' - ~ ASS Annexed to Bulgaria

al , \ | [ILL] Annexed to Hungary ,

ne BARANJA! Independent State by of Croatia mii * f=] Occupied Ital }—

) ; | | | | VOJVODINA Areas of Bulgarian army occupation: -

| inlBeckerek Spry B. From January 1943, | > | | y> anne tary | oe- -*&q|caleo C. Fromof Yugoslavia, July Al NovilSad | |).1943 ;April ree —— Kingdom 6, 1941 eee, rrt—s—C‘CC , 0 60 km.

fe JE le Pancevo a

fo =hChlr] Sabaa Ov ti‘ ee SS Ves gO ™m,cverin ©

ii =,. »-oo ory . >... . oN aa veee. oeeee” Bor - 7.a oe — 4, me be: St | | Se ‘fie Kragujevac }¢ Cuprija OF ¥, a Bo GF __dituievac BULGARIA ee ee ee DB eee’eeSe eee - ae .A ES : |ESFe |gg eee eh CC a :—«v,, | Bo Sea Oe Se Ee eee a Secs ee -_

- rrtr—rt—“i“‘COOOOCOOOCSR . ) _ » |

EO OE Ne ey ee ee eee ee ean ao Ah es Leskovac mg

Mm eS RO ——siC‘“‘ =e, , Kosovska Mitrovica oo —> vxxzzm= I | _— Oo oe __t—SC(' ame, _ ee, PSr QY

a == = RS | eg- =: QRIE a JE S Fe

e.rr—COCOA . Ff} ) KOSOVOPristina QOS ON SS) ALBANIA FE RRANRKR Xs . a \ sf

Map 3. Occupied Serbia, 1941-1944 -

, THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 177 any increase in prices and wages above the level existing on the first day of oc-

cupation.' A special German occupation currency, the Reichskreditkassenscheine, became legal tender for all German armed forces personnel. The Ger-

mans further decreed that the German criminal code and criminal statutes would apply in German-occupied areas of Yugoslavia. Other orders were issued soon after the occupation began. One required the registration of all printing and mimeographing equipment. Another specified

that determining what could be published in newspapers and periodicals in Serbia was a public function that was to be exercised only by editors who had been duly admitted to the profession and registered according to this order. Special orders regulated the opening of theaters and places of entertainment (from which Jews were expressly excluded). To tighten control over vital production, all manufacturing firms with more than twenty employees were required to obtain special permission from the German authorities to continue operating. Inventories of a long list of raw materials had to be reported to the German authorities and their transfer was prohibited.’ By these and a multitude of subsequent rulings and orders, the Germans regulated a wide range of administrative, political, economic, cultural, and social matters during their occupation of Serbia. Since it was impossible for them to take on all aspects of the day-to-day operation of the Serbian administration, however, they had to establish some domestic public body that would carry on administrative chores under their direction and supervision. This they quickly did in the form of a puppet government, which could issue orders that came from them or that they had sanctioned in advance.

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT The first puppet government established in Serbia on May 30, 1941, was the so-called Commissioner Administration. It was headed by Milan Acimovi¢ and had a commissioner in charge of each of the former Yugoslav ministries except the Ministry of Army and Navy, which was abolished. Acimovi¢ was a former Belgrade police chief and had been minister of interior for a short time in the Stojadinovié cabinet. Ardently anti-Communist, he had had contact with the German police even before the war. There were nine other members in the administration: Stevan Ivani¢é, Moméilo Jankovi¢, Risto Jojic, Stanislav Josifovic, Lazo Kosti¢é, Dugan Letica, Dusan Panti¢, Jevrem Proti¢, and Milisav Vasiljevi¢.’ The government was an experienced one. Letica, too, had been in the 'For an English translation of this proclamation, see Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. §91-92. "Tbid., pp. §92—-601.

3Micr. No. T-5or, Roll 264, Frs. 422-23. See also B. Kosti¢, Za istoriju nasib dana, pp. 20-21.

178 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA Stojadinovié cabinet, Pantic had been in the Cvetkovic cabinet, both Ivani¢ and Vasiljevic were closely associated with Dimitrije Ljoti¢’s political party, and the others belonged to various former Serbian political parties or were experts in

, specific fields. All of them were known to be pro-German. A¢imovié maintained the existing administrative apparatus, though personnel changes were required to replace non-Serbian government employees who had left Serbia. Also, in one way or another, most Serbian officials of actual or suspected antiGerman sentiment were removed or resigned from the government. The Acimovi¢ administration was in an extremely difficult position because it lacked any semblance of power. It was nothing more than an instrument of the German occupation regime. It performed administrative chores in Serbia,

now constituted as a separate German-occupied area and still stunned by the quick and complete collapse of the Yugoslav army and state. The king and the previous government had fled in the last days of the war; most of the officer corps of the defeated Yugoslav army, primarily Serbs from Serbia, as well as soldiers from Serbia, had been taken as prisoners of war to Germany and Italy. From the neighboring Independent State of Croatia, where Serbs were being systematically persecuted by the new Ustasha regime, refugees were flooding in, some officially expelled, others escaping. Other Serbian refugees were en- _ tering from Macedonia, the Kosovo region, and Vojvodina, and several thousand Slovene refugees were being transferred from the German-occupied part

of Slovenia. |

To this grave situation was added, beginning in early July—that is, shortly after the German attack on the Soviet Union—the turmoil of armed resistance. Under Communist leadership, it was directed at both the A¢imovi¢ administration and the German occupation regime. After it gathered momentum, some Serbs of nationalist inclination joined, while other nationalist forces under

Draza Mihailovic prepared for action of their own against the occupation forces at an opportune moment. Acts of sabotage against communication facilities and economic enterprises producing for the Germans increased. Be- | tween July 1 and August 15, 1941, according to a report of the A¢imovié¢ administration, the rebels made 246 different attacks and killed 26 government

functionaries, wounded 11, and captured 1o. In the same period, the gendarmerie killed 82 rebels, wounded 14, and captured 47. The German occupation authorities took harsh measures against the rebels, shooting hostages, who were labeled as Communists and Jews, and burning villages where German soldiers and policemen had been attacked.* But the insurgency continued. On August 11, the Appeal to the Serbian People was issued. Sponsored by the Commissioner Administration and signed by 307 prominent intellectuals and other important Serbs, it called upon the rank and file of the population to “For the report of the Acimovi¢ administration, see YA, Mil. Hist., Nedi¢ Govt. Docs., Reg. No. 31/3, 1-11, Box 19. For reports on retaliation by German forces, see Zbornik DNOR, 1, bk. 1: 345-424.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 179 help the authorities in every way in their struggle against the Communist rebels.

This was followed on August 14 by an appeal to all rebels to return home within eight days. The Acimovi¢ administration also announced a bounty of 3,000 dinars to anyone who captured or killed a member of the Communist armed bands and a bounty of 25,000 dinars to anyone who killed the leader of an armed band.’ But the appeals had no effect. Rather than subsiding, the uprising increased in momentum.° The military commander in Serbia, General Heinrich Danckelmann, realizing that the forces at his disposal were insufficient to quell the growing rebellion, asked for additional police and army units. But he was advised that they were needed on the Russian front and that he should use his available forces fully and ruthlessly. It was in this context that the chief of the military administration, Harald Turner, suggested reorganizing and strengthening the Serbian administration so that the Serbs themselves might crush the rebellion. To head such an administration, the Germans had to find a Serb who was well known and highly regarded by a substantial part of the population, who could be entrusted with the task of establishing some sort of Serbian armed force—though of course under full German control—and who, moreover, would be willing to proceed ruthlessly against the insurgents. When the German authorities in Belgrade asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for help, it sent Edmund Veesenmayer to provide assistance. After a series of consultations, General of the Army Milan Nedi¢, former Yugoslav minister of army and navy and chief of General Staff, was selected to head the new government.’ To arrange the transition more smoothly, first two commissioners and then the entire Commissioner Administration resigned. General Nedi¢ was installed as prime minister on August 29. In addition to him, the government had twelve ministers: Milan A¢imovié, Dusan Djordjevi¢é, Djura Doki¢, Panta Draskié, - Momiéilo Jankovic, Josif Kosti¢, Ognjen Krsmanovi¢, Cedomir Marjanovié, Jovan Mijuskovi¢é, Mihailo Olcan, Milos Radosavljevic, and Milos Trivunac (soon replaced by Velibor Joni¢c). There were also three subministers: Tanasije Dini¢ for reorganization of government administration and personnel prob‘For the Appeal to the Serbian People, see Krakov, General Milan Nedié, 1: 105-13. Many of those who signed it were known for their leftist views. Some later turned out to have been Partisan supporters even at that time, and others subsequently joined the Partisans. For the bounties offered, see Zbornik DNOR, 1, bk. 2: 328. °‘DGFP, 13: 308, 400. 7General Nedi¢ had been fired from his ministerial post by Prince Regent Paul in Novem-

ber 1940 for advocating that Yugoslavia join the Tripartite Pact, at a time when the country was still desperately trying to remain neutral. Nedié believed that the Germans would win the war and he wanted Yugoslavia to be on the winning side. After the coup of March 27, 1941, General Simovic, trusting Nedi¢’s seniority and high professional standing, put him in charge of the 3rd Group of Armies, assigned to the defense of Yugoslav Macedonia, the Kosovo region, and Montenegro. That the Germans gave Nedié special treatment is best shown by the

fact that, after the defeat of the Yugoslav forces, he was not taken as a prisoner of war to Germany, as most other generals were, but was left at home in peace.

180 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA lems, Djordje Peri¢ for propaganda, and Darko Petrovié for price control. Only two ministers from the Commissioner Administration, A¢cimovi¢ and Jankovié, were retained. Of the new ministers, several were experts in their fields, and three, Doki¢, Kosti¢, and Draski¢, were former generals. Doki¢ headed the Ministry of Transportation, Kosti¢ the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, and Draski¢ the Ministry of Labor.’ The facilities managed by the first two ministries were prime objects of sabotage by the rebels, and it was intended that the | third ministry would play a key role in mobilizing labor for the economic re-

, construction of the country. _ , - a

The Germans had sound reasons for choosing General Nedi¢ to head the puppet government. He was well known among Serbs as an elite General Staff officer of the pre-1918 Serbian and interwar Yugoslav armies, and he had held the two highest military positions in the country. He was regarded as a man of great personal authority, not simply because of his high professional standing, but also because of his commanding behavior in official positions. The Germans were particularly impressed by his reputation as a man of authority.’ Nedi¢ was also considered fairly reliable, since he was known as a believer in German victory and was strongly anti-Communist. Nonetheless, according to a variety of sources, the Germans had to use strong-arm tactics to persuade Nedi¢ to accept the job. These included threats that they would bring in Bulgarian troops to occupy Serbia and Belgrade and would take him as a prisoner | of war to Germany if he did not accept. I was unable to confirm another threat supposedly used against him, namely, that if he did not assume the leadership of the government, the Germans would split Serbia into four parts to be occupied by Bulgarian, Albanian, Hungarian, and Croatian troops. Additional persuasion also came from several Serbian generals and politicians who apparently

was Communist led." ,

took these threats seriously and who no doubt were worried that the uprising

’Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 424. ’For a favorable appraisal of Nedi¢, see Krakov, General Milan Nedié; Martinovié¢Bajica, Milan Nedi¢; and Karapandzi¢, Gradjanski rat u Srbiji, 1941-1945. These authors ei-

ther supported or collaborated with Nedi¢ during the war and have defended him ever since. All the Chetnik and Communist literature during and after the war is anti-Nedi¢. For a Chetnik appraisal, see, for example, Trisi¢, O Milanu Nedi¢u, which rebuts Martinovi¢-Bajica’s

praise of Nedi¢ and strongly criticizes both the man and his policies. = , ‘©The German threat to use Bulgarian troops as an occupation force in parts of Serbia was employed again later and, as will be shown below, became a reality in January 1942. For the German threat to divide Serbia into four parts, see Krakov, General Milan Nedié, 1: 143-45. It is true, however, that in April 1943 the Hungarian General Staff turned down a German request to supply two or three Hungarian divisions for occupation duty in Serbia beginning in June. The Hungarian government had good reasons to refuse (though these were not necessarily communicated to the Germans). Not only would it have been a moral impossibil-

ity to use Hungarian troops abroad while parts of supposedly Hungarian territory (such as the Banat) were still under foreign occupation, but Hungary wanted to use Hungarian troops only within its historical borders. Furthermore, it needed a relaxation of tensions with its neighbors and, considering the unfriendly attitude of Romania and Slovakia, it could not af-

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 181 Nedi¢ finally yielded to these various pressures. On August 27 he informed Danckelmann by letter that after consulting with the commissioners and leading representatives of the Serbian people, he would be willing to become prime minister if the military commander would agree to specific operating condi-

tions. First, a Serbian government would be formed that would manage the af- | fairs of the Serbian people under the supervision of the military commander, to

conform to German military, political, and economic interests. Second, the Serbian government would be allowed to develop an armed force (without which it could not assure peace and order in the country), consisting of a gendarmerie of up to 10,000 men and auxiliary armed forces according to need, and, with the permission of the military commander, both of them would be equipped with the Yugoslav arms captured by the Germans. Third, Serbian prisoners of war in Germany who were ill, all prisoners over the age of 55, and those prisoners needed for the reconstruction of the country would be released to their homes, and the Serbian government would be allowed to send food supplies to improve the rations of prisoners remaining in Germany. Fourth, the “economic and administrative boundaries” of Serbia would be improved by having German troops occupy certain areas (meaning, apparently, northeast Bosnia). And finally, the impoverishment, persecution, and murder of Serbs in Croatia and in Bulgarian- and Hungarian-occupied areas would cease. In addition to these major conditions, Nedi¢ also wanted a number of other concessions. He asked for a political council to promulgate the new political arrangements. The struggle against Communism was to be considered primarily the concern of the Serbian people and its government, with the German army helping only insofar as the means used by the Serbian government proved insuf-

ficient. In cases of sabotage, reprisals were to be applied only against those who | were guilty and never against the innocent, and they were not to be undertaken until complete information had been obtained from the Serbian government. And the use of Serbian national and state emblems was to be allowed."

There is no written record of Danckelmann specifically accepting these conditions, but in Nedi¢’s speech on the occasion of his installation, he thanked Danckelmann “for the full power of authority [Vollmacht] which it pleased you to give me.” And from Danckelmann’s reply on the same occasion, which also mentioned giving Nedi¢ “full power of authority,” it would seem that a

real understanding existed between the two men, though only in oral form. Other documentary evidence, including a circular sent by Turner to all German

area and district commands in Serbia, dated August 29, 1941, shows that Danckelmann did promise Nedi¢ that the Serbian authorities, under German supervision, would have a large degree of independence. Turner wrote: “A ford to alienate the Serbs. See Horthy, Confidential Papers, pp. 367-68, and Kallay, Hungarian Premier, pp. 149-50. "For this letter, see Krakov, General Milan Nedi¢, 1: 145-46, or Micr. No. T-501, Roll 2.56, Frs. 103 5-36.

182 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA promise was given to the government that, under German supervision, it will be

given the highest possible degree of independence in administration. Please, therefore, limit the activity of the administrative groups to purely supervisory

| functions.” A note from Minister of Interior ACimovi¢ to Turner, dated September 16, 1941, protesting against the interference of German authorities in the operations of the Serbian gendarmerie and other government armed forces,

is further proof that the Nedi¢ administration understood that it would be largely free in using these forces.”

But all these promises were soon forgotten. Almost as soon as the Nedi¢ government had been installed, the intensity of the uprising increased markedly

| when some Chetnik forces joined the Partisans. Nedic, not having had time to organize his own forces, could only stand by helplessly as the Germans began bringing new forces into Serbia and applying reprisals of the utmost brutality against the insurgents and the civilian population. Since the arrangements between Nedi¢é and Danckelmann had not been put in writing, when Danckelmann was removed as military commander for misjudging the seriousness of the uprising and allowing it to get out of hand, his oral agreements with Nedi¢ were forgotten. Danckelmann’s successor, General Franz Bohme, was satisfied with keeping Nedi¢ as head of the puppet government, as was BOhme’s successor, General Paul Bader, who held the command in Belgrade from December 1941 until the end of August 1943. But neither of them was inclined to make Nedi¢’s position any easier. For a time, Nedi¢ stood to gain some increase in executive powers from Turner, chief of military administration and one of the few Germans who had a sense of his nearly impossible position. But Turner, as shown in Chapter 2, was unable to convince his superiors to grant Nedic¢ enough additional power to administer the state efficiently. In November 1942 he was forced out for his efforts. Nedié thus headed a government whose powers were strictly limited, one that had no international standing even with the Axis powers. Like its prede-

cessor, it was no more than a subsidiary organ of the German occupation authorities, doing part of the work of administering the country and helping to keep it pacified so that the Germans could exploit it with a minimum of effort, and bearing some of the blame for the harshness of the rule. As time went on, Nedi¢’s powers, instead of being increased as a reward for his loyal service to the Germans (which was repeatedly noted by most high German commanders and officials in Serbia), were whittled away. His situation was always difficult

and frustrating and the minutes of his conferences with and his letters and memoranda to succeeding military commanders in Serbia amply show that it

became more and more degrading to him personally. , Nedi¢ was undoubtedly sincere in his determination to follow policies that

"For the text of Nedi¢’s and Danckelmann’s speeches, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Frs. 1032-34. For Turner’s circular, see Micr. No. T-5o1, Roll 246, Frs. 190-91, and for Acimovié’s note, Fr. 333.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 183 would minimize the sacrifices of the Serbian people. Order No. 1 of September

5, 1941, to all government employees and all armed formations under his command encouraged government officials, the armed forces, and the public at large to resist the spreading rebellion. It stressed the need for discipline, hard work, honesty, and devotion to the good of the people. Point 6 said: “All national forces, both of the state gendarmerie and police and of loyal Serbian men at large, can have at this time only one objective, that is, to save the Serbian people from new bloodshed and sacrifices, removing without compromise all those elements in their midst that would want to push the nation into total ruin. Under these circumstances, my orders, directed through the appropriate state organs, must be carried out by all people without hesitation.”” Nedi¢ emphasized unity and sacrifice in his first radio address to the nation on September 13. He condemned the Communist-led resistance and those who had brought on the war in April and were now making trouble again. In view of Germany’s tremendous military power, he argued, resistance was senseless. It could only result in undue hardship. He gave an ultimatum to all those in the hills to put down their arms by September 17 and return home to useful work. Those who did not respond to the call would be destroyed." During the second half of August 1941, even before Nedi¢ became prime minister, the Germans had arranged with Kosta Milovanovi¢ Pecanac for the transfer of several thousand of his Chetnik followers to the Serbian gendarmerie as auxiliaries. These were controlled by the Serbian government, though under German supervision. In September these forces were strengthened when the Germans allowed Dimitrije Ljoti¢ and his followers to organize the Serbian Volunteer Detachments. In November, in the course of the successful opera-

tion by German and quisling forces against the insurgents in northwest and southwest Serbia, a group of detachments that had been part of the Chetnik forces of Draza Mihailovié also legalized their status with the Nedi¢ government and became part of its auxiliary forces. In the meantime, Nedi¢ was allowed to proceed with the organization of the Serbian State Guard (Srpska drzavna straza), which absorbed the Serbian gendarmerie within a few months. The Serbian State Guard was organized into three sections: the police in the cities, the forces in rural areas (performing functions earlier assigned to the gendarmerie), and the Serbian Frontier Guard (Srpska pogranicna straza). In

addition, a certain number of peasants who were considered reliable were armed and served as a sort of auxiliary militia in the villages. Although first planned as a moderately sized force of around 17,000 men, by late 1943 the State Guard, counting officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates in all these services and the village militia, numbered 36,716 men.”

But Nedi¢c’s command over these combined forces was short-lived. On | | BYA, Mil. Hist., Nedié Govt. Docs., Reg. No. 1/5-2, Box 19. “Micr. No. T-314, Roll 1457, Frs. 1128-32. 'SMicr. No. T-5o01, Roll 249, Fr. 523; Yugoslavia, Vojna enciklopedija, 1st ed., 9: 185.

184 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA January 22, 1942, General August Meyszner, the newly appointed higher SS and police leader, took over command of the State Guard, and German customs authorities in Serbia took over command of the Frontier Guard. Nedi¢ retained control of the Volunteer Detachments and the Chetniks from Pecanac and Mihailovic, but it was not long before he lost control of even these. Nedié soon lost authority over the government as well. The German military administration, the plenipotentiary for economic affairs, and the higher SS and police leader took over all fundamental decision making and all functions of government and even intervened in small decisions supposedly still left to the Nedi¢ administration. Nedi¢’s only power lay in whatever influence he might have on the Serbian people, to whom he could speak more or less freely over the radio and in the press. He used the media regularly, appealing to the population to keep the peace. He himself gave not the least offense to the Germans, so as not to provoke them into even more severe policies toward Serbia or into reprisals against the civilian population, and he did his best to convince his fellow

Serbs to follow his example. Many Serbs at home and in the government-inexile did not for this reason consider him a true quisling, but looked upon him rather as a man who knowingly sacrificed himself, much as Marshal Pétain did, in order to prevent the loss of Serbian lives and in general to soften as much as possible the severity of the German occupation. To some extent this is a fair judgment. But Nedi¢ was at the same time a resolute foe of the Communists and considered the harshest measures against them justified. For a long time he was also an enemy of Mihailovic, whose actions he thought were inspired from London and contrary to Serbian national interests."° In addition to the troubles that the Nedi¢ regime experienced because of its

limited powers and constant difficulties with the Germans and, after January 1942, with the Bulgarian occupation forces as well, Nedi¢ was also handicapped by the weakness of his following in the country. It was never large,

and as time went on it declined even further, while that of Mihailovi¢’s Chetniks, who infiltrated his regime, rose. Even within the cabinet there were conflicts. An apt appraisal of Nedi¢’s situation in August 1943 came from the chief of staff of the commander in chief in southeast Europe, General Hermann Foertsch: The political situation in Serbia is dominated by the struggle between the legal government of Nedi¢ and the movement of Draza Mihailovi¢. The Nedi¢é government has been unable to acquire an appreciable following among the people. Government employees are dissatisfied and largely unreliable. Their salaries often do not suffice for the barest necessities. The Serbian State Guard becomes more ‘6The best collection of Nedi¢’s radio speeches is in Krakov, General Milan Nedié, 1:

156-57, 164-67, etc., and 2: 12-13, 25-27, etc. :

That Nedi¢ himself considered his role similar to that of Marshal Pétain can also be seen from General Bohme’s letter to Field Marshal List of November 15, 1941, in Micr. No. T-

501, Roll 251, Fr. 365. ,

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 185 and more unreliable. Ljoti¢’s Serbian Volunteer Corps, which was built on national socialist lines and has up to now fought well against the Chetniks, also shows signs of disintegration. The peasants, who are thoroughly nationalistic and devoted to the king, reject the Nedi¢ government. The workers are partly Communist oriented. The largest number of Serbs put their hopes in Draza Mihailovié."’

Nedi¢ had a thankless job. He was not fully trusted by the Germans and he was mistrusted by most of his fellow Serbs, who in their unhappiness under foreign occupation blamed him for many things over which he had no control. In one of his long conferences with Turner, on March 28, 1942, in which he complained that the Germans did not trust him and had curtailed his powers to the point of making his regime totally impotent, he pointed out that he had many enemies: “The amorphous mass of the Serbian Church, Draza Mihailovié, a part of the Chetniks, the professional officers who did not side with me, the Bulgarian occupation [forces] that make enemies against me among the people, certain politicians, Freemasons, and Jews.” Furthermore, “surely unintentional interference and mistakes of the German command posts” created difficulties for him, as did the dropping of leaflets by Croatian planes in western Serbia and the plundering of the peasant population by units of the Russian Protective Corps.” Nedi¢’s difficulties within his cabinet and the upper echelons of his administration were mainly with pro-Ljotic and pro-Stojadinovi¢ individuals and, during the second half of the war, with those who, in one way or another, were working for Mihailovic. Periodically, apparently as a way of trying to force the Germans to grant concessions, Nedi¢ handed in his resignation. Each time it was he, not the Germans, who backed down. Twice he reorganized his cabinet. In October 1942 he dropped several ministers, including Oléan, the chief Ljoti¢ supporter, and Acimovic, the leader of the Stojadinovié faction who was also well disposed toward Mihailovic. He replaced Acimovi¢ with Colonel Tanasije (Tasa) Dini¢c, who was strongly pro-German and equally strongly anti-Mihailovi¢.”” In November 1943, Nedi¢ reorganized the cabinet a second time, apparently after consulting with General Hans Gustav Felber, the newly appointed military commander in southeast Europe. Nedi¢ himself took over the Ministry

of Interior and shifted Dini¢ to the Ministry of Social Welfare. He reduced the , size of the cabinet by eliminating several ministries altogether, and he dropped all the generals. The cabinet kept this composition until the end of the Nedi¢é government in early October 1944.” '7Micr. No. T-311, Roll 196, Frs. 159-60. '§Micr. No. T-501, Roll 257, Frs. 1229-30. "Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 264, Fr. 425. Dini¢’s ideas on close cooperation with the Germans and on various ways of fighting Mihailovi¢’s Chetniks can be seen from his statements to German officials in Belgrade. See Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Frs. 889-90 and 977-79. 0See General Felber’s notes on his meetings with Nedié on September 10 and 24, 1943, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 253, Frs. 283-87 and 366-68. See also Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 426.

186 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA The cabinet reorganizations, however, had no effect on the real problem,

which was lack of power. As time went on and it became clear that Germany | was going to lose the war and that the days of the Nedi¢ regime were numbered, the cabinet became almost meaningless. Not only were Nedi¢’s armed forces and administration officials trying to hedge their bets with the Chetniks, but the Germans themselves, aware of Nedi¢’s dwindling following and lack of prestige, began circumventing him and dealing directly with the commanders

under Mihailovic¢. - , , | GERMAN AUXILIARY FORCES IN SERBIA

Three special, formally organized, and officially recognized armed groups operated as German auxiliaries during the occupation of Serbia. These were the Serbian Volunteer Corps, the Russian Protective Corps, and the small and rather insignificant Auxiliary Police Troop composed of Russian Volksdeutsche. The Germans also used two other armed groups between the fall of 1941 and the end of 1942 as auxiliaries, the Chetnik detachments of Peéanac, which _ began collaborating in August 1941, and later the legalized Chetnik detachments of Mihailovi¢. Though differing greatly in origin and composition, all these groups were utilized as auxiliary troops because of the pressing need of the German occupation forces for immediate aid in combating the expanding Communist insurgency in the late summer and fall of 1941 and in establishing

peace and order. We will describe them in turn. | , ,

The Serbian Volunteer Corps was the party army of the Yugoslav People’s Movement, or Zbor (Assembly) for short, a small political movement that was established at the beginning of 1935 under the leadership of Dimitrije V. Ljoti¢. A deeply religious and staunchly patriotic man, Ljoti¢ propounded a political philosophy of many extreme components. He believed in Serbian peasant paternalism, the religious ethics of Serbian Orthodoxy, monarchism, and total | loyalty to the Karadjordjevié dynasty, as well as authoritarianism, the corporative organization of the state, and integral Yugoslavism. He was also antiliberal and antidemocratic, opposed to the traditional political parties, Freemasons, and Jews, and above all anti-Communist. Because of these latter views and because he collaborated with the Germans throughout the war, many consider him to be a Fascist, which is, however, too one-sided a characterization.” 1For Ljoti¢’s political and philosophical views, see his autobiography, Iz moga Zivota; a collection of his writings, Videlo u tami, published in Munich in 1976 and later translated into English and published as Light of Truth in Birmingham, England in 1984; and a collection of his prewar and wartime work, edited by his followers: [Ljoti¢], Dimitrije Ljotié u

| revolucijiiratu. — |

For the beginning and later development of the Zbor movement and a portrayal of Ljoti¢ by an early coworker and strong supporter, see PareZanin, Drugi svetski rat i Dimitrije V. Ljotié. Other accounts by close associates are Kosti¢, Za istoriju nasih dana, pp. 9-45, 63-64, and Karapandzi¢, Gradjanski rat u Srbiji, 1941-1945, pp. 66-69, 81-91. For a Yugoslav

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 187 Ljoti¢’s followers were mostly conservative, pro-authoritarian intellectuals, militant anti-Communist high school and university students, and, especially outside Serbia, young people of an integral Yugoslavist orientation. But his movement did not achieve any substantial following in Serbia or other parts of Yugoslavia during the second half of the 1930’s.” Because of its conservatism and authoritarianism and especially its anti-democratic and anti-Communist

stance, however, it was followed with interest by the Germans. The Nazis’ strength and strong anti-Communism, in turn, greatly impressed Ljoti¢. After war broke out in Europe, Ljoti¢ supported Yugoslavia’s policy of neutrality, but he also felt that Yugoslav diplomacy should focus on relations with Berlin.

He bitterly opposed the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement in August 1939 and Yugoslavia’s diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union in July 1940, both of which were intended to strengthen Yugoslavia internally in case of war.” As a result, the Yugoslav government became increasingly irritated by the activities of Ljoti¢ and the Zbor. In November 1940, after an incident between Ljoti¢’s supporters and Communist students at the University of Belgrade, the Zbor was abruptly declared illegal and Ljoti¢ went into hiding. After the invasion and partition of the country and the German occupation

of Serbia in April 1941, Ljoti¢’s political fortunes again rose. In July and

August, he was permitted to give three talks over Radio Belgrade, and he was , one of the Serbs whom the Germans consulted before they installed General Nedi¢ as prime minister. Ljoti¢ refused to take an official position in the puppet government, but he apparently had a good deal of influence on Nedi¢ in a private advisory capacity and as a relative. Several important followers served in Communist view of the establishment and development of the Zbor movement until the invasion of Yugoslavia, see Gligorijevi¢, “Political Movements and Groups,” pp. 3 5-82. A good example of Ljoti¢’s rhetoric is this statement from a brochure entitled “Stav ‘“Zbora’” (“The Position of the ‘Zbor’”), written or approved by Ljoti¢ and issued shortly after the

Germans occupied Serbia: “Democracy as a system has dragged politics into the mud and made it a profession for the mob.... In the Karadjordjevi¢ dynasty Zbor sees the natural protector of the Serbian nation from the ruin which Jewry induces through republics and democracies.” YA, Mil. Hist., Nedié Govt. Docs., Reg. No. 1/9, 1-2, Box 27. For the denials of Fas-

cism, see Dimitrije Ljotié u revoluciji i ratu, pp. 18-38, and Parezanin, Drugi svetski rat i Dimitrije V. Ljotic, pp. 128-42. 2In the election of May 1935, the first in which the Ljotié party took part, its national list obtained 23,814 votes out of 2,778,172 cast. Of these, 13,635 were in Banovina Danube, in which Ljoti¢’s home district of Smederevo was located. In the election of December 1938, its national list got 30,734 votes out of 3,039,041 cast. Of these, 17,573 were in Banovina Danube. The Zbor vote also increased in Banovina Primorje, primarily in the northern Dalmatian area, from 974 in 1935 to 2,427 in 1938. For data on the election of 1935, see Yugoslavia, Kingdom of, Slugbene novine, May 30, 1935, and for those on the election of 1938, see idem, Annuaire statistique, 1938-1939, pp. 478-79. 31 joti¢ bitterly criticized the government in three long memoranda to Prince Regent Paul on February 22, August 30, and December 25, 1940. English translations of them, as well as most of the other cited works by Ljotié and his followers, were sent to me by Mr. Svetolik Lazarevi¢, a devoted coworker and follower now living in Wellington, New Zealand. I greatly appreciate his courtesy.

188 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA the Nedié cabinets during the occupation. What Nedié thought about Ljoti¢ is best indicated by his remark to Turner on March 28, 1942, that in the event of his departure, Ljoti¢ was the only man to be considered as his successor. Turner

thought that Nedié “could not be serious about this because Ljoti¢é was a prophet and a visionary, not a leader and statesman.”” The Germans trusted Ljoti¢, however, more than any other Serb. And since they needed dependable domestic forces to help them combat the Communistled uprising, they allowed him to form a party army in September 1941, the

Serbian Volunteer Detachments, with a maximum strength of about 3,500 men. The initial public appeal in October called for volunteers in the struggle against the Communist danger. It did not mention Mihailovi¢ or the Chetniks, but did speak of small army detachments still in the hills whom the Communists had contacted and misled. By November, however, Ljoti¢ was openly denouncing Mihailovi¢ and his forces. In a scathing article, he charged Mihailovi¢ with responsibility for the death of many Serbs and much destruction in the country as a result of his naive cooperation with the Communists, which gave them a standing that they otherwise would not have had.”

In addition to thousands of Serbs, a few Croats and Slovenes joined the Ljoti¢ party before the war and the Volunteer Detachments—later renamed the Volunteer Corps—during it. I believe they did so because of Ljoti¢’s supposed integral Yugoslavism. But there is no reason to believe that if the latter had been put into practice, it would have been any different from the discredited Yugoslavism that served as a cloak for the Greater Serbianism of the Serbian-dominated regime in Yugoslavia in the interwar period. If we judge this question by Ljoti¢’s proposals in memoranda to Prince Regent Paul on February 22 and August 30, 1940, it is clear that his Yugoslavism was a sham. In these memoranda, he advocated, among other things, immediately reorganizing the government according to his political views, abolishing Croatian autonomy, and dividing the Yugoslav army into contingents of Serbs augmented with Croatian

and Slovene volunteers, which would be armed, and contingents of most Croats and Slovenes, which would serve as labor units and would not be armed.” Thus the non-Serbs would be formally second-class citizens. FurtherFor favorable German references to Ljoti¢, see Veesenmayer’s postwar interrogation, in Micr. No. 679, Roll 3, Fr. 641, and Gerhard Feine’s report from Belgrade of December 3, 1941, to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in DGFP, 13: 947. See also Micr. No. T501, Roll 249, Frs. 60-63. For his influence on Nedi¢, see PareZanin, Drugi svetski rat i Dimitrije V. Ljotic, pp. 34243. For Turner’s remark, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 257, Fr. 1227. *5For the public call for volunteers of the Serbian Volunteer Command on October 9, 1941, see YA, Mil. Hist., Nedi¢ Govt. Docs., Reg. No. 5/9, 1-2, Box 27. For Ljotié’s subse-

quent attack on Mihailovié, see “Draza Mihailovié and the Communists,” in [Ljoti¢], Dimitrije Ljotié u revoluciji i ratu, pp. 306-19. 76See Ljoti¢’s memorandum to Prince Regent Paul of August 30, 1940, especially points b,

c, d, i,j, and | (footnote 23).

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 189 more, during the critical years of the war when even the Serbian Chetniks paid lip service to Yugoslavism—the official name of their forces was the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland—Ljoti¢, to my knowledge, never spoke in favor of it.

The Volunteer Detachments and later Volunteer Corps were almost purely Serbian forces. Out of a total of about 12,000 members in their ranks, there were only about 150 Croats’”’ and even fewer Slovenes.

According to an order of the German commanding general on April 10, 1942, the volunteers were organized into nineteen detachments, designated D1, D-2, and so on. Each detachment was assigned an area of operations and was subordinate to the German division located in that area. In areas occupied by Bulgarian army units, the detachments were subordinate to the German area or district command. They could not move out of their assigned area without German permission, and they had a German liaison officer with them in all operations.” In December 1942, after several months of deliberation, the German millitary authorities changed this parallel organization to the traditional army organization of companies, battalions, and regiments. The Serbian Volunteer Detachments were renamed the Serbian Volunteer Corps and placed under the direct command of General Bader, commanding general in Serbia. The corps was in no sense an SS organization or formally part of the German armed forces. It received arms and ammunition from the Germans and the men were fed and

clothed according to German army standards, but for the latter outlay the Germans were reimbursed by the Serbian government. The men were also paid by the Serbian government, at the same rate as the Serbian police.” Point 2 of the service oath of the Serbian Volunteer Corps, as revised in December 1942, stated that members would fight, to the death if necessary, both 27Anti¢, “Croats in the Serbian Volunteers,” pp. 430-48, especially p. 442. Some of these Croats were already in Serbia and others went there after hearing about the establishment of the Volunteer Detachments. *8Micr. No. T-5o1, Roll 247, Frs. 1118-19, and Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Fr. 142. >For the proposal by the commanding general in Serbia to reorganize the Serbian Volun-

teer Detachments and subordinate them to the German army, made to the armed forces commander in southeast Europe on November 7, 1942, see Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 352, Frs. 492-94. For the commanding general’s order on December 23, 1942, on the formation of the Serbian Volunteer Corps, see Fr. 694. According to a report of the Abwehrstelle Belgrade, some young Serbs with Nazi views had expressed a willingness to fight in German forces against Bolshevism on the eastern front. The Wehrmacht Operations Staff (QU 5) answered on December 9, 1942: “The use of Serbs

in the German Wehrmacht is out of the question.” Wehrmacht Operations Staff to Abwehrstelle Belgrade, December 9, 1942, in Heinrich Himmler Collection, Box 8 (File 300), Hoover Institution Archives. Apparently, however, a small Serbian SS unit was later established by former Yugoslav army Lieutenant Strahinja Janji¢, who reportedly was a German

agent. But the unit never operated successfully; it was disbanded and Janjié was taken to Germany. See Kosti¢, Za istoriju nasih dana, pp. 61-62.

For the outfitting and reimbursement of the corps, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Frs. 142 and 285.

I9O THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA the Communists and the Chetniks.* Due to the political indoctrination of the corps with Ljoti¢’s ideas, Chetnik infiltration of their units was rare. And de-

spite Mihailovic’s accusation that the corps included a high percentage of Communists—in February 1943 he reported to the government-in-exile that

tration was even rarer.” |

60 percent of corps members were Communists—I think that Communist infilLjoti¢ himself had no control over the volunteers. General Nedi¢, as head of

the Serbian puppet government, was the official commander in chief (until 1942), but the troops were at the disposal of the German commanding general in Serbia. Direct command was given to Colonel (later General) Kosta Musicki, a former officer in the Yugoslav army and a longtime supporter of the Zbor.”

Most of the officers came from either the old Yugoslav army or the gendar-

- merie. One of Ljoti¢’s most trusted lieutenants, Mihailo Ol¢éan, who was dropped from the Nedi¢ cabinet in October 1942, became, on German insistence, a sort of political commissar of the corps in October 1943, enjoying complete German confidence and working as Ljoti¢’s representative.” Among the volunteers, morale was high. Each company, battalion, and regiment had its own education officer, who taught and indoctrinated the soldiers and generally worked to maintain morale, much as political commissars did for Soviet forces and for Yugoslav Partisan troops. The Education Department, as it was called, was headed by Ratko Parezanin, Ljoti¢’s longtime coworker and one of the founding members of the Zbor. In the ideology of the corps, Ljoti¢ himself, through his philosophical and political pronouncements, was the guiding spirit.” *°For the volunteers’ oath, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Fr. 64. They pledged to stay in

the corps at least six months and to serve the cause of the Serbian people. In a report on September 1, 1943, Colonel MuSicki cited an instance in which a Volunteer Corps officer helped the Chetniks: one of his staff officers, apparently with the assistance

of the Serbian State Guard, transferred a shipment of 50 machine guns to the followers of Chetnik commander Nikola Kalabié. Micr. No. T-501, Roll 253, Fr. 195. For Mihailovi¢’s accusation that many corps members were Communists, see Z. Knezevi¢, Why the Allies

Abandoned the Yugoslav Army, p. 26. , | Both Colonel Mu8icki and his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Radoslav Tatalovié,

were Serbs from outside Serbia and began their careers as officers in the Austro-Hungarian

army. Micr. No. T-501, Roll 260, Fr. 422. | | .

3Micr. No. T-501, Roll 253, Frs. 367 and 379. Ljoti¢ withdrew his two representatives from Nedi¢’s cabinet in October 1942 in order to avoid sharing responsibility for the unpopular and difficult economic measures, especially food policies, that Nedi¢é was forced to take. See the report by Turner, chief of military administration in Serbia, for September and

October 1942, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 3 52, Frs. 513-14. 4Parezanin, Drugi svetski rat i Dimitrije V. Ljotic, p. 458. Parezanin performed other functions for Ljoti¢ as well, most importantly acting as liaison with Lieutenant Colonel Pavle

Djurigi¢, commander of the Montenegrin Volunteer Corps after its establishment in the spring of 1944. Ibid., pp. 494-98. On the role of education officers, see Mitrovié, “The Education Service in the Volunteer Units,” pp. 9-14. _ A politically didactic aspect, or better said, political religious preaching was characteristic of most of Ljoti¢’s writings and pronouncements. For his sermon-like addresses to the volun-

teers during the war, see [Ljoti¢], Dimitrije Ljotic u revolucijiiratu, pp. 347-60.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 191 The Serbian Volunteer Corps was the only group of armed Serbs during the

war that the Germans trusted, and the units were often praised by German commanders for their valor in action. The Germans wanted to develop the corps as a nationalist group around national socialist ideology to serve as a counterweight to Mihailovic’s Chetniks, but the corps was no more successful than the Zbor had been in acquiring a mass following.” The antagonism between Ljoti¢’s forces and Mihailovi¢’s Chetniks that developed in the fall of 1941 lasted until almost the end of the war. Only in the final months, under the pressure of rising military difficulties, were there a few instances of cooperation between the two groups. In mid-September 1944, a corps unit saved Mihailovi¢ and the Chetnik Supreme Command in northwest Serbia from capture by the Partisans, enabling them to withdraw to northeast Bosnia. During March and early April 1945, Mihailovi¢ and Ljotic exchanged messages on the possibility of a last-ditch alliance against the Partisans, though it was too late for this to be of any practical use. However, on March 27, 1945, General Miodrag Damjanovic, chief of the Forward Command of the Supreme Command, following an understanding between Mihailovi¢c and Ljoti¢c, took under his command all Ljoti¢ and Chetnik forces in the Slovene Littoral. On April 23 Ljoti¢ was killed in an automobile accident. Early in May Damjanovic¢ led the troops under his command into northeast Italy, where they were disarmed by the British and put in detention camps. Almost all remained abroad after the war, and the antagonism between them continued in exile. The Russian Protective Corps was established at the same time as the Serbian Volunteer Detachments, in September 1941, and in the same way, that is, by an order of the military commander in Serbia in agreement with the Nedi¢c government. The name—briefly at first the Separate Russian Corps (Das Abgesonderte Russische Korps) and for a year or so the Russian Factory Protective Group (Weissrussischer Werkschutz)—described its function and manpower. Originally it consisted of White Russians who had been living in Yugoslavia, primarily in Serbia, during the interwar period and who, because of their

anti-Communism, volunteered on the German side. In the words of its first For the good opinion of German commanders, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Frs. 6063; Micr. No. T-501, Roll 253, Frs. 936-37; Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Frs. 596 and 757. Only one detachment, D-r1, had to be disbanded in the summer of 1942 because of unreliability.

Critics of the Volunteer Corps were found even among Nedi¢’s ministers. Milorad Nedeljkovié, minister of economic affairs from October 1942 to the end of the Nedi¢ regime, commented in January 1944 that the corps, as Ljoti¢’s party army, was looked upon with suspicion by the population and therefore could never gain significant support among Serbs. But the Germans rejected his suggestion that the corps be reorganized and renamed the Serbian Home Guards or Serbian Militia. Micr. No. T-3 11, Roll 286, Fr. 190. 6For a Chetnik treatment of Ljoti¢é and his movement, mostly on the war period in occpied Serbia, see Ragevic, Ogled o shvatanjima Dimitrija Ljotiéa, and Ivanovi¢, Ko su Ljotiéevci?. For an instance of cooperation between the two groups, see footnote 31 above and the reference cited there.

192 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA commander, General Mikhail Fedorovich Skorodumov, after they had fulfilled

their duty toward Serbia, the land that had welcomed them after the First World War, he was to lead them back to Russia.*” Skorodumov was chosen by the Germans, but he was sick and old and not well known to the rank and file of Russian émigrés. He was replaced within the first month by his chief of staff, General Boris Aleksandrovich Steifon, who held the position until his death shortly before the end of the war. The German officer who was instrumental in organizing the Russian Factory Protective Group was Colonel Erich Kewisch, chief of staff of the military commander in Serbia. Recruitment and screening were carried out by the head of the Russian Intelligence Office (Vertrauensstelle) in Serbia, Major General Kreyter, a White Russian who must have earlier been in German service. The original plans were modest: a force of some 3,000 officers and men, organized in three regiments, to protect industrial enterprises and mines producing for the Germans. The group was under the jurisdiction of the plenipotentiary for economic affairs in Serbia, but the cost of its outfitting and maintenance was borne by the Serbian government. However, within a year the force had grown to more than twice its original size and its responsibilities had been enlarged.* As early as May 1942 Kewisch recommended a reorganization of the Russian Factory Protective Group and its closer affiliation with the Wehrmacht. After much additional consideration, on October 29, 1942, the German Army High Command ordered the reorganization of the group, renaming it the Russian Protective Corps and subordinating it in all respects to the commanding general in Serbia.” By December, the size of the corps was around 7,500 men, all Russians, though some members came from areas of southeast Europe other

than Serbia. The command language was Russian. German liaison officers were assigned to work with the Russian (former tsarist) officers. After the reorganization, a few Germans were added to each unit to ensure full German con37See his order of September 12, 1941, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 246, Frs. 310-11. For a general report on White Russian émigrés in Yugoslavia (estimated at about 10,000 men, the majority in Serbia), prepared by the Abwehrstelle Belgrade on October 27, 1941, see

| Micr. No. T-312, Roll 470, Frs. 8,060,017-25. Of those émigrés who had been officers in the Yugoslav army or were specialists such as engineers and physicians, a small number joined the Mihailovié Chetniks, the Croatian army, or the Yugoslav Partisans. **According to a report of May 9, 1942, Colonel Kewisch thought that if he were permitted to recruit in all areas of Europe under German control, he could create a force of 25,000 men. He also recommended reorganizing the unit and tying it more closely to the Wehrmacht. Micr. No. T-501, Roll 248, Frs. 55-56. For a history of the corps as seen by its veterans, see Vertepov, Russkii Korpus na Balkanah.

For the burden on the Serbs to outfit and maintain the corps, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5786, Fr. H301,083. And for its expansion, see the letter of SS Obergruppenfiihrer Karl Wolff of November 30, 1942, to Martin Luther, undersecretary in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Fr. H301,182.

787-92, and 806-7. |

See Micr. No. T-501, Roll 257, Fr. 1192 and Micr. No. T-501, Roll 352, Frs. 66-68,

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA I93 trol and better training and command, and generally the corps became more closely tied to the German forces than it had been. Like the units of the Serbian Volunteer Corps, the units of the Russian Protective Corps were subordinated to the German division in whose area they were deployed and to the respective German area or district command in Bulgarian-occupied areas. Unlike the Serbian Volunteer Corps, the Russian Protective Corps was a full-fledged part of the German armed forces and its members took the oath of allegiance to the German Fuhrer.” In addition to recruiting Russian émigrés from areas outside of Serbia and Yugoslavia, since the supply there was necessarily limited, the corps also made an attempt to expand its size by taking in Russian prisoners of war. This strategy was decided upon in December 1942 at the time of the reorganization. In March of the following year some 300 Soviet prisoners were transferred to the corps, but apparently with so little success that the program was not repeated. There is no record of how many émigrés were persuaded to volunteer by promises, made after December 1942, that they would receive preferential treatment in obtaining land in Russia after the war, when it was assumed that the Communist regime would collapse.*! The third German auxiliary force in Serbia, launched in late May 1942, was the Auxiliary Police Troop, composed solely of Russian Volksdeutsche and “of Russians who in their sentiments stood near to the German people.” The size of

the unit was to be around 400 men, recruited not only in Serbia but also in Croatia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania. The chief of the Ordnungspolizei in Berlin was kept informed about the troop and put the necessary training personnel at the disposal of General Meyszner, higher SS and police leader in Serbia. Very little was heard about this small force during the remainder of the

war, and I have not been able to determine even its exact size, but probably it was not much larger than originally planned.” In all, by mid-1943 the Germans had under their command in Serbia, other

than their own and Bulgarian army and police forces, between 25,000 and 30,000 officers, noncommissioned officers, and men in the Serbian State Guard, the Frontier Guard, the Serbian Volunteer Corps, the Russian Protec”Micr. No. T-501, Roll 352, Frs. 533 and 754. For an interesting report on the Russian Factory Protective Group just before it was reorganized, see Meyszner’s letter of October 23, 1942, to Himmler, in Heinrich Himmler Collection, Box 4 (File 272), Hoover Institution Archives.

‘IMicr. No. T-501, Roll 352, Frs. 647, 754, 780-81. See another letter from Meyszner to Himmler of March 24, 1943, on the Russian Protective Corps, with his comments on the 300 former Red Army men assigned to it, in Heinrich Himmler Collection, Box 4 (File 272), Hoover Institution Archives. “The establishment of the unit and the international political questions that were raised because of recruitment for it in several countries led to a voluminous correspondence between Meyszner and the SS Chief Office in Berlin and between this office and the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For our purposes it is sufficient to consult Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5786,

Frs. H301,081-82, H301,100-102, and H301,181-84.

194 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA tive Corps, and the Auxiliary Police Troop. After September 1943, the Serbian

Volunteer Corps and the Russian Protective Corps were allowed to enlarge their effectives. But the reversals suffered by the Germans on various fronts and stiffer opposition from the Chetniks hampered recruiting for the Serbian Vol-

unteer Corps. According to a German report on January 7, 1944, the great majority of new recruits for the corps were draftees, not volunteers. Since the Germans relied on highly trained officers to build quality in a corps, and such > officers were not available—professional Serbian officers were considered too

much of a risk—growth and training lagged. The Russian Protective Corps was | allowed to recruit in all southeast European states, at the discretion of those states, but lack of funds and lack of potential recruits hampered the undertaking. Despite these difficulties, however, both corps managed to greatly increase their complements. Data prepared by the staff of Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs, commander in chief in southeast Europe, for his report to Hitler on August 22, 1944, show that the effectives of the Serbian Volunteer Corps amounted at that time to five regiments with 9,886 officers and men and those of the Russian Protective Corps to five regiments with 11,188 officers and men. Of the latter, only the newer regiments, composed of younger men, were usable

for frontline fighting.® , As auxiliaries, the Chetnik detachments of Peéanac and the legalized Chet-

nik units formerly under the command of Mihailovié were in a unique position. They were organized not by the Serbian government or the German occupation forces, but by individuals with no official standing, and were then taken over by the Serbian government. The first volume of this study, The Chetniks, explains the origin of these two kinds of Chetnik units in detail, and I refer the reader to that account. We are concerned here with these Chetniks’ rather brief

participation in the fighting forces of the Serbian puppet government. | . Pecanac’s detachments were taken on as auxiliaries in August 1941, when the Communist-led uprising was growing. The Mihailovié units that legalized themselves became German auxiliaries in November 1941, when the uprising ~ was nearly crushed. By December, the Germans were already having second thoughts about using the Chetniks.*“* They were concerned about the quantity of arms in the hands of Serbs, most of whom, with the exception of Ljoti¢ and his party army, they did not trust. They also saw no need to maintain such siz-

able forces after the uprising had been quelled. Moreover, early in January *Micr. No. T-5or, Roll 352, Frs. 850-51; Micr. No. T-sor, Roll 253, Frs. 29, 582, and

613; Micr. No. T-311, Roll 195, Fr. 974. .

According to Vertepov, Russkii Korpus na Balkanabh, p. 405, Romania was the most im-

portant source of new recruits for the Russian Protective Corps; of its 11,197 officers, non-

commissioned officers, and men on September 12, 1944, no fewer than 5,067 came from , Romania (perhaps including Bessarabia—the source is unclear). There were 3,198 from Serbia. The remainder, including the 314 former Red Army men, were from other areas.

“Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Frs. 1150-53. |

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 195 1942, large Bulgarian forces moved into Serbia for occupation duty. The Germans realized that the manpower of the two Serbian groups would be more useful to them in the labor force, either in Serbia or Germany. For the time being, however, they decided to maintain both groups at full strength. At the peak of their strength in mid-May 1942, the two Chetnik auxiliary forces numbered 13,400 officers, noncommissioned officers, and men.* In the same fashion as the Serbian Volunteer Detachments, the Mihailovi¢ and Peéanac detachments were given unit numbers according to an order of the commanding general in Serbia on April 10, 1942, designations C-20 to C-38 for Mihailovic’s Chetniks and C-39 to C-ro1 for Pe¢anac’s Chetniks. The detachments were put under the command of the German garrisoning divisions in whose areas they operated or under the command of the German area or district commands in Bulgarian-occupied parts of Serbia. No unit could leave its area without prior permission of the division or area command. German liaison officers accompanied the detachments during all operations. Requests for arms and ammunition for these detachments were submitted by the division or area command, with their comments, to the commanding general in Serbia, who made all such decisions. During the summer of 1942, some Chetnik detachments and even one of the Serbian Volunteer Detachments were dissolved, but full-scale disarming did not start until late September 1942, as a result of the combined actions of the Nedi¢é government and the German occupation administration. First most of the legalized Mihailovic detachments were dissolved and then most of the Pe¢a-

nac detachments. By the end of 1942, all but two of these auxiliary detachments with a total of about 12,000 men had been dissolved.* The last two detachments, one from each group, were dissolved in March 1943. The manpower thus freed was used in various ways. Some men were reassigned, either to the Serbian State Guard or the Serbian Volunteer Corps. Others were put at the disposal of the authorities who recruited workers for industrial and mining enterprises producing for the Germans. Still others returned to agricultural work in their villages. A number of officers who were regarded as security risks were sent to prisoner-of-war camps in Germany. But a very large number of both officers and men—perhaps as many as half the total—seeing what was happening to their comrades-in-arms as the process of dissolution advanced, deserted and made their way to the hills to throw in their lot with the

illegal Chetnik detachments of General Mihailovic. | THE BULGARIAN ARMY IN SERBIA In addition to using the auxiliary troops we have just described to help them put down the uprising, the Germans also used the Bulgarian army to help keep ‘SMicr. No. T-5o01, Roll 3 52, Fr. 809.

“6Micr. No. T-501, Roll 3 52, Frs. 572-74; Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Fr. 61.

196 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA the peace. The Germans did not at first envision a major role for the Bulgarians in Serbia. In April 1941, after Yugoslavia had surrendered, Bulgaria, in accordance with Hitler’s grand plan, was allowed to annex a large amount of Yugoslav territory, including the better part of Yugoslav Macedonia, a small section of the Kosovo region, part of southeast Serbia, and a narrow strip of land along Serbia’s eastern frontier (see Map 1). In southeast Serbia, the Bulgarian 29th

Division and the necessary police and administrative cadres took over, and Bulgarization proceeded there along much the same lines as it did in the Bulgarian-annexed part of Macedonia (see Chapter 4). Late in the first year of occupation, after the uprising in Serbia had finally been quelled by troops brought from France and the Russian front, Hitler and his senior command decided that Serbia could be policed mainly by Bulgarian forces, so that frontline German troops could be transferred to places where the need was greater. In early January 1942, following Hitler’s Directive 39a of December 15, 1941, the German 113th Infantry Division returned to the Russian front and the 342nd Infantry Division was sent temporarily to the Inde-

pendent State of Croatia for operations against the Partisans. The German armed forces commander in southeast Europe arranged with the Bulgarian Ministry of War for Bulgarian troops to occupy about 4o percent of Serbia proper (that is, excluding the Banat), under overall German control.” Map 3 shows the Yugoslav areas that were occupied and annexed by Bulgaria in the

course of the war. | | :

The basic terms of the arrangement were contained in two German documents, the Order to the Bulgarian Ist Occupation Corps in Ni8, issued by General Paul Bader, plenipotentiary commanding general in Serbia (and subsequently commanding general and military commander), on January 16, 1942, and the Directive on Relations Between the Bulgarian Occupation Troops in Serbia and the Service Posts of the German Armed Forces in Serbia, issued by the German Armed Forces High Command on January 17, 1942. These orders—the second in essence repeated the provisions of the first—made clear the position of the Bulgarian army doing occupation duty in Serbia and its relationship to the German occupation authorities, the Serbian administrative apparatus, and the Serbian population at large.* The order of January 16 provided for the Bulgarian Ist Occupation Corps, consisting of three divisions that had begun moving into Serbia on December 31, to occupy the roughly circular area from just south of the Bor copper mine on the north to the Bulgarians’ annexed

territory on the south and from the Ibar River on the west to the old and new Bulgarian borders on the east (A on Map 3). The territory remained under German sovereignty, but Bulgarian rather than German troops were responsi*7Germany, Wehrmacht, Oberkommando, Hitlers Weisungen, p. 175; “Wisshaupt Report,” pp. 93-97 (see Chapter 2, footnote 43, about this report). *’For Bader’s order of January 16, 1942, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 247, Frs. 727-29, and for the directive of January 17, 1942, see Micr. No. T-77, Roll 884, Frs. 5,633,891-93.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 197 ble for security. Bulgarian forces were under the command of the German mili-

tary commander in Serbia, a position that had been vacated by General Franz Bohme in December and that was assumed by Bader in February. The principal task of the Bulgarian troops was to safeguard the railroads— especially the Belgrade-Nis-Sofia and Nis-Skopje lines—the main highways, and the main industrial enterprises, mines, and supply centers. The administration of the railroads and the maintenance of peace and order on them were the

duties of the Serbian state authorities, and Bulgarian and German soldiers could not interfere, though if the Serbs’ forces proved insufficient for the task, German area commands were to ask the Bulgarian army for assistance. In this work, the closest cooperation was required among the Serbs, the German area commands, and Bulgarian troops. People arrested and arms captured in such operations were to be turned over to the area commands. When conditions required Bulgarian troops to engage in active operations against the rebels, they were to inform the German authorities of all planned operations involving battalion-size or larger forces. Political control, in areas occupied by Bulgarian troops, remained exclusively in the hands of German area and district commands, which supervised the Serbian civilian administration. The German commands assisted the Bul-

garian troops in all administrative matters, because the latter were not supposed to deal directly with the Serbian authorities. All announcements to the

civilian population were made through the German military commands. Ger- , man military courts were responsible for prosecuting and punishing Serbs who had committed crimes against the Bulgarian forces. All actions by the Bulgarians involving taking or shooting hostages or requesting food from civilians required the prior approval of the German commanding general in Serbia. The Bulgarians were primarily responsible for supplying their own troops, though the German authorities were to give advice. To facilitate cooperation between the Bulgarian and German occupation authorities, special liaison officers were appointed. The Bulgarian Ist Occupation Corps was to submit daily reports on its activities and the enemy situation to the German commanding general in Serbia. Other documents show that German area and district commands, as well as German police and economic officials in areas occupied by Bulgarian forces, remained in full operation and whenever necessary cooperated with Bulgarian command posts.”

The order of January 17 was issued to iron out difficulties between the Germans and the Bulgarians, following a second meeting between them at which the Bulgarian commanders seemed dissatisfied with and professed themselves not able to fully understand the order of January 16. The Bulgarians specifically objected to German military courts having jurisdiction over Serbian citizens committing offenses against Bulgarian soldiers, but the Germans in”Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 210.

198 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA sisted that they had sovereign rights in the occupied areas and therefore also ju-

risdiction in such cases. After the second meeting, however, the German com- } manding general in Serbia issued a number of additional regulations and ex_planations on the maintenance, financing, and prerogatives of the Bulgarian troops, amplifying the basic regulations of the January 16 order. One addi-

tional provision was that German forces were made responsible for protecting ,

, Germans.” oe

a series of industrial enterprises and coal mines in the area producing for the

In so carefully specifying the duties of the Bulgarians in Serbia, the Germans were no doubt primarily interested in avoiding trouble with their ally in the future. But they may also have wanted to allay General Nedi¢’s apprehension about the presence of Bulgarian troops there. Nedi¢ strongly protested Germany’s decision to bring in Bulgarian troops for occupation duty, and he was so fearful about how they might act toward the populace that he threatened to resign and even to kill himself. On December 31, 1941, Bader at-

tempted to placate him by suggesting to the armed forces commander in , southeast Europe that Bulgarian troops be limited to one division, with another to be brought in only in the event of new disorders, and that the towns of Kragujevac and Zajecar not be occupied by them. This would have left the

Kragujevac-Kraljevo railroad line (Kraljevo was the seat of a German divi- , sional command) and the Bor-Zajeéar line (over which Bor copper was transported) in German hands, and would have satisfied one of Nedi¢’s special requests.”’ But Bader’s suggestion was disregarded, and three Bulgarian divisions were brought in as scheduled. Nedi¢ did not resign, but the presence of Bulgarian troops in Serbia was a heavy political burden for him to bear and he

continued to ask for their removal. |

Hitler and senior Wehrmacht officers had no intention of withdrawing Bul- | garian troops to please Nedi¢. Already in January 1942, they were making > plans to enlarge the area of Bulgarian occupation at an early date. Again they brushed aside Bader’s objections.” The area in which the Bulgarians served as occupation troops was expanded on two later occasions. In January 1943, the

Bulgarians occupied the area (B on Map 3) that had been held for some three months by the 7th SS Volunteer Division “Prinz Eugen,” which was transferred _ to Croatia for the impending Operation Weiss against the Partisans.*’ Early in July 1943, the Bulgarian 25th Division took over the area (C on Map 3) previ_ ously held by the German 297th Infantry Division, bringing the total strength

Micr. No. T-501, Roll 247, Frs. 746-48 and 73 3-38. _ , *'In his letter, Bader reported on Nedi¢’s reaction to the introduction of Bulgarian troops in Serbia, discussed the implications of this move, and suggested not proceeding with the ear-

lier plans. Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Frs. 1141-42. .

See Bader’s letter to the armed forces commander in southeast Europe of January 19,

1942, in Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 257, Frs. rr11-13. Kriegstagebuch, 3, pt. 1: 36.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 199 of the Bulgarian Ist Occupation Corps to four divisions. Thereafter, only the agriculturally rich northwest corner of the country, the immediate area around Belgrade, the area around the Bor copper mines in the northeast, and a strip along the Danube River in the Iron Gate area from Ram (west of Veliko Gradiste) to Turnu Severin, about 150 kilometers long, were under exclusive German

control. The rest of Serbia proper (excluding the Banat), about 80 percent of the country, was occupied by Bulgarian forces. From the German point of view, the main task of the Bulgarian occupation troops was to maintain peace and order and to relieve German forces for service in other theaters of war. Maintaining peace and order meant controlling guerrilla activity, which was usually done by the Bulgarian forces acting in cooperation with German army and police units and Serbian quisling forces. Since the Chetniks had an incomparably larger following in Serbia than the Partisans until the concluding weeks of German rule, the Bulgarians considered them to be potentially more dangerous than the Partisans until the middle or even end of 1943. They kept strict watch over them and on several occasions suggested that the Germans arrest various Chetnik leaders. In the fall of 1943, when the Germans began making armistice agreements with Chetnik commanders, the Bulgarians cooperated, but when the “new policy” ran into difficulties-early in February 1944, they came out against the extension of such agreements.”

On several occasions, the Bulgarians supplied troops for German operations against the Partisans. The Bulgarian 61st Regiment participated in Operation Schwarz in May and June 1943. The Bulgarians also contributed a large part of the forces in combined operations against the 2nd and sth Partisan Divisions that penetrated deep into Serbia in April and May 1944 and were successfully turned back into Sandzak (Operation Kammerjager). In these operations, the Bulgarian 24th Division supplied the bulk of the forces, though the Germans were not satisfied with their performance.” Relations between the Bulgarian forces and the Serbian population were strained. The Serbs had not forgotten the draconian rule imposed by the Bulgarians during the First World War in areas under their occupation, and the Bulgarians made no effort to change that impression. Particularly in operations against the Partisans, the Bulgarians burned their share of villages, deported people to Bulgaria or to labor camps, and seized crops and livestock from peasants beyond the scope of their legal obligations.”

For the Bulgarians’ suggestion to arrest Chetniks leaders, see the report by General Asen | Nikolov, commander of the Bulgarian Ist Occupation Corps, to the German commanding general in Serbia in late September 1942, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 257, Frs. 1174-80. For their opposition to the armistice agreements between the Germans and the Chetniks, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Fr. 16. ‘SThere were several reasons for German dissatisfaction: lack of discipline, poor commanding cadres, inadequate preparation for attack operations, and in a few cases, even the disposal of arms and surrender to the Partisans. Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Frs. 663-64. 6See Popovic, “The Bulgarian Army in Occupied Serbia (1941-1944).” This article was

200 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA The attitude of Bulgarian commanders in Serbia toward the Serbian puppet government and population in the early period of Bulgarian occupation can be seen in a speech made by Colonel Ivan Malinov, commander of the Bulgarian 6th Division, in Cuprija on February 25, 1942. Clearly, he had no intention of coddling the Serbs: The population hates the Germans and the Bulgarians equally. People’s behavior depends exclusively on the strength of the occupation forces and the strictness with which they are dealt. All people are our enemies. Nedi¢ is not the right man for the government. The Serbian gendarmerie cannot be trusted. The [Pecanac] Chetniks are completely unsafe. In the beginning there was some friction with German troops because the Germans were taken in by Serbian intrigue. One must not believe anything the Serbs say. The county prefects and [rural] mayors, not we, must name the necessary number of hostages. The mayors should prepare lists of all unreliable men and all men in the hills. All Chetniks are unreliable, and their detachments should be disarmed immediately, because at a later date this will be impossible to do. County prefects . . . and mayors should be made responsible for

everything that goes wrong in their respective areas. , All gun permits are to be withdrawn and new ones issued on the basis of very strict standards. Thereafter, whoever is found to possess arms without a new permit is to be killed. Nedi¢ should be given only until April 1, 1942, to pacify the country. If he fails, then the Bulgarians should take matters into their own hands and proceed ruthlessly against all those who possess arms without new gun permits. One should carry on active propaganda by posters and over the radio, especially pointing to successes against the insurgents. All radio receivers in the hands of the public must be confiscated. The people listen as a rule only to London and Moscow radio and not to what Radio Belgrade says.”

Toward the end of 1942, the Bulgarian intelligence service, through skillful work, succeeded in penetrating the organization of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Nis and in February 1943 arrested several of its leaders. It then proceeded to work against CPY organizations in the remainder of its occupa-

tion area.” On its side, the CPY and the Yugoslav Partisans had a standing policy of directing propaganda at Bulgarian officers and soldiers, urging them to turn against their own government and the senior officers who had put their country and army in the service of Hitler against their neighbors and brother Slavs, the Serbs. But Communist propaganda met with little success, partly because it ran counter to the policy of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, which cautioned its members and sympathizers in the Bulgarian army not to join the Partisans in the hills, but to work within the armed forces to bring them to the Communist side en bloc when the opportunity arose. In the closing days of the pro-Nazi Bulgarian regime, in late August and early September 1944, German written in 1952 at a time of great tension between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and is somewhat polemical as a result. So is the treatment of the same subject in Mitrovski, Glisi¢, and Ristovski, Bugarska vojska u Jugoslaviji, pp. 35-42 and 94-114. See also Kuli¢, Bugarska oku-

pacija, 1941-1944, 1:97-195. *’This is taken from a German report, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 247, Frs. 875-80. 8Popovié, “The Bulgarian Army in Occupied Serbia (1941-1944),” 1952, NO. 4: 44-45.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 201 troops in Serbia disarmed a large part of the Bulgarian occupation forces and apparently took possession of the heavy equipment from all forces. The Chetniks also disarmed some units and the Partisans others, while some units remained intact. The whole former occupation army subsequently returned to Bulgaria.” After the change in the Bulgarian regime on September 9, 1944, and the organization of the new Bulgarian army, part of its forces, as described in Chapter 4, were brought to Yugoslavia and participated with Partisan forces in operations against the Germans. However, most Bulgarian forces operated under Soviet command against the Germans in Hungary.

THE SPECIAL OCCUPATION REGIME IN THE BANAT In the Yugoslav Banat, the Germans established a special occupation regime

administered by the strong local German minority. In so doing they not only solved the troublesome problem of who, the Hungarians or the Romanians, would occupy or annex the Yugoslav portion of the Banat, but also secured for their own use the rich agricultural resources of the area. At the same time they satisfied the demands of the German minority itself. The Yugoslav Volksdeutsche in the Banat, Backa, Baranja, Slavonia, and Srijem, as well as the rather small minority in Slovenia, was well organized in the interwar period. In June 1920, shortly after the formation of the new state, they established a central cultural and social organization, the SchwabischDeutscher Kulturbund, which had as its slogan “True to the State and the People,” that is, true to the Yugoslav state and the Volksdeutsche. In December 1922, some months after they acquired the right to vote, they established their own political party and began to participate as an independent voting bloc in national elections. Usually they were able to send five to eight representatives to °Mitrovski, Gli8i¢, and Ristovski, Bugarska vojska u Jugoslaviji, pp. 159-97. There were of course isolated instances of individual Bulgarian officers and soldiers going over to the Par-

tisans. And in May 1944, two Bulgarian companies deserted to the Partisans in the area of Lebane in southern Serbia. Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Frs. 770 and 863. According to the Yugoslav census of March 31, 1931, there were 489,943 people in Yugoslavia whose mother tongue was German, excluding 10,026 Jews but including 17,614 citizens of other countries. Adjusted by German writers to historical provinces, the German minority, excluding the Jews, was divided as follows: 169,776 in Baéka, 15,682 in Baranja, 118,576 in the Banat, 48,806 in eastern Srijem, 77,731 in Croatia-Slavonia, 28,833 in Slovenia, 9,818 in Belgrade, 14,979 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 5,742 in other areas. Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, p. 11E. Confessionally, 78.3 percent were Roman Catholic, 20.6 percent were Protestant, and 1.1 percent were other religions. Ibid., p. 19E. For detailed information on the German minority in Yugoslavia, see also Biber, Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji; Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich; and Paikert, The Danube Swabians, pp. 263-91.

202 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA the Yugoslav parliament.” At about the same time they also organized a number of agricultural, credit, and health care cooperatives. The political, cultural, and economic center of the Vojvodina (Banat, Ba¢ka, and Baranja) and Srijem Germans was Novi Sad, with a population in 1941 of about 64,000 people, of whom some 10,000 were Germans. The center of the Slavonian Germans was Osijek, with a population in 1941 of about 36,000 people, of whom somewhat

Over 7,000 were Germans. _ OS |

Until the late 1930’s, the leadership of the Volksdeutsche organizations was conservative and hardworking, cooperating with the government in Belgrade and seeking to improve the economic and cultural status of the German minority. But after the rise of Hitler, most younger members of the minority, many of whom attended German universities, became converted to Nazi ideology and fell under the influence of Berlin. These young people, eager to spread their ideas, challenged the leadership of the older conservatives. In the ensuing political struggle, the Nazi-oriented younger group, with a good deal of help from | Himmler’s organization, the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VOMI), swept away the old leadership. Although the militant wing of the younger group favored an outspoken Nazi named Jakob Awender to head the national group, the VOMI prudently decided upon a middle-of-the-road candidate, Sepp Janko, a politi-

cian and lawyer, in order not to antagonize the Yugoslav government and jeopardize Germany’s relations with a friendly state. Janko’s position was further strengthened by his election as the leader of the Kulturbund. Under his direction, a restaffed and revitalized organization, embracing numerous political, cultural, and economic societies of one sort or another, embarked upon a pro-

gram of Nazi-oriented political mobilization. It was not long before it had drawn in almost the entire German minority in Yugoslavia.? _ Janko and his associates made no secret of their hope that after Germany invaded Yugoslavia, the areas with strong Volksdeutsche populations would

‘'Briicker, Deutsche Spuren in Belgrad, pp. 179-86. 7 “For the change in the political leadership of the German minority in 1939, see Biber, _ Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji, pp. 167-210. For the views of Janko’s assistant, Johann Wuescht, on the German minority in Yugoslavia, including its relation to the Reich and its development during and fate after the war, see his Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, pp. 247-85. Wuescht, who apparently left Yugoslavia in 1944, strongly favored the Germans

and German minority against the Yugoslavs. Oe For the political mobilization of the minority under Janko’s leadership, see the report, “Die deutsche Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien,” prepared by the staff of the Reichsbauernfihrer

_ (Reich peasant leader) early in 1941, in Micr. No. T-84, Roll 104, Frs. 1,398,832-41. It also - gives information on the minority’s new political and economic leadership and its various economic organizations throughout Yugoslavia. See also Janko, Reden und Aufsatze, pp. 5051, who asserted that by the summer of 1940, there were 300,000 Kulturbund members and plans existed to bring in another 200,000 by the end of the year. In Belgrade alone, Kulturbund membership (including family members) rose from 280 in 1933, to 1,248 in 1938, to 2,818 in 1940, and to 5,784 shortly before the invasion in April 1941. Briicker, Deutsche Spuren in Belgrad, p. 189.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 2.03 be made a separate political unit and an integral part of (or at least closely linked to) the Reich. They reasoned that since the Danube River was the economic lifeline of the whole area, the Reich must have complete control over its entire course. These grandiose ideas were shared by some important officials in the German government and the Nazi Party. The heart of the scheme was control of Belgrade because of its strategic location and commanding position over the Danube waterway. From Belgrade the Germans could also easily control the rich mining areas (of copper and coal) of northeast Serbia, as well as the approaches to the central Balkans. Consequently, Belgrade was to be developed into a Reich Fortress.” A separate political unit of Yugoslav Germans, however, was not created. Hitler’s decision to dismember Yugoslavia after the conquest effectively di-

vided the Volksdeutsche among four different state jurisdictions: Germanoccupied Serbia (the Yugoslav Banat), Hungarian-annexed areas (Ba¢ka and Baranja), the Independent State of Croatia (Srijem and Slavonia), and the German-occupied part of Slovenia. The Germans living in the Italian-annexed part of Slovenia, mainly in the enclave of Kocevje (Gottschee), 13,000 or 14,000 people, were resettled in the German-occupied part in the homes and on the

farms of those Slovenes who had been resettled in the Reich or expelled to Croatia and Serbia.“ The dismemberment of Yugoslavia and therefore also the division of the German minority was dictated by the temporary political interests of the Third Reich, and the Yugoslav Germans could only acquiesce.® What their future role might be in the overall scheme of the “New Order” in Europe was to be decided after Germany had won the war. 63Janko’s views on the critical position of the Danube and the strategic importance of the Danube Basin for the German Reich were expressed in a speech, “Volkwerdung der Deutschen in Sidslawien,” delivered in Munich in October 1940. See Reden und Aufsdtze, especially pp. 54-60. See also the telegram of the German envoy in Hungary, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 9, 1941, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5783, Frs. H297,774-75. On Nazi plans for the incorporation of Belgrade and northern and eastern Serbia into a German-controlled Danube Basin political unit, see Wehler, “‘Reichsfestung Belgrad,’” pp. 72-84. These plans were inspired by the conquests of Prince Eugene of Savoy, the great Austrian military leader of the early eighteenth century, who wrested much of the Danubian plains, as well as Belgrade and most of northern Serbia, from the Ottoman Empire. Belgrade and much of northern Serbia were subsequently occupied by Austrian troops from 1718 (the Treaty of Pozarevac [Passarowitz]) to 1739 (the Treaty of Belgrade), when they reverted to Ottoman control. Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, pp. 82E-83E. According to the census by the Italian authorities, there were 13,580 Volksdeutsche in the annexed part of Slovenia on July 31, 1941, that is, prior to their resettlement. Micr. No. T-586, Roll 424, Fr. 12,143. ‘The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs order of May 11, 1941, defined the policy precisely: all displaced Volksdeutsche in southeast Europe had to return to their original domiciles, and other Volksdeutsche were prohibited from moving, under any pretext, from areas under non-German rule or occupied by non-German forces to areas under German occupation. Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Fr. 1029.

204 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA Only a small number of Volksdeutsche of military age in Yugoslavia had been called up into Yugoslav military units and a somewhat larger number into military labor battalions before the invasion of the country. The military coup of March 27, 1941, caught the German minority by surprise and uncertain about what course of action to follow. Asa precaution, Janko visited the ban of Banovina Danube to express his congratulations on King Peter II’s assumption of full power and sent a telegram to the king expressing his loyalty. He also ordered the Volksdeutsche organizations to cease their political activity.°° But on March 28 the German envoy in Belgrade was advised by Berlin that the Volks-

: deutsche Mittelstelle had received orders to make it known confidentially to those members of the German minority in Yugoslavia who might be called to the colors that they were to desert at the first opportunity and attempt to reach

, German territory, if necessary by way of Hungary.” On March 29 Janko asked the Abwehr in Graz to inform him about plans for the invasion of Yugoslavia so that the German minority could prepare for action. On April 6 Janko put the . entire German minority at the disposal, for military purposes, of the Abwehr

organization Jupiter.@

The chief task of the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche at the time of the invasion was to act as a fifth column. Under Janko’s direction, German men had been organized into a sports group, the Deutsche Mannschaft. Overnight it was converted into a paramilitary organization that collaborated with German forces entering the Banat from Romania and with those entering Slovenia, Croatia, and Slavonia from Austria and western Hungary.” As noted in Chap- . ter 4, the German minority in Ba¢ka and Baranja was disappointed when the area was invaded by Hungarian rather than German troops, but it eventually

reached an accommodation with the new rulers.” , The breakup of Yugoslavia meant a change in the administrative structure “Biber, Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji, p. 262. See also Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5783, Fr. H297,812.

*’Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5783, Fr. H297,816. |

*8See the references to these prewar days in the Kriegstagebuch der Abwehr (conducted by Erwin von Lahousen, chief of Section II of the Abwehr from 1938 to mid-1943), as given in Jong, The German Fifth Column, p. 233. See also Biber, Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji, pp.

261-64. °On the fifth-column activity of the German minority in Yugoslavia, see Biber, Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji, pp. 211-67, and Vegh, “German Occupation in the Yugoslav Banat,”

PP. 497 547-48. , |

See Johann Wuescht’s report of April 17, 1941, on the entry of Hungarian troops into the area and the reaction of the local Volksdeutsche, apparently submitted to Werner Lorenz, chief of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle then visiting Batka, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H297,862-64. See also Envoy von Erdmannsdorff’s telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of May 9, 1941, in which he reported information from Franz Basch, the leader of the Volksdeutsche in Hungary, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5783, Frs. H297,774-75. Basch sug-

gested that the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle intervene with the Volksdeutsche in Batka and Baranja to emphasize the seriousness of the situation, especially to make clear that nobody should leave his job or land.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 205 of the Volksdeutsche organizations. Because Backa and Baranja were now occupied by Hungary, the Volksdeutsche political, cultural, and economic groups centered in Novi Sad were no longer within Janko’s jurisdiction, though they apparently continued to function on their own. In Berlin, where he went for instructions, Janko was told to move the main offices of the Kulturbund and of various cooperative organizations, together with most of his leading assistants, to the Banat.”!

The Yugoslav Banat, like the rest of Vojvodina, was a preeminently multinational area. According to estimates by German authorities shortly after the

occupation began, the Banat had a total population of 640,000 people, including 280,000 Serbs, 130,000 Germans, 90,000 Hungarians, 65,000 Roma-

nians, 15,000 Slovaks, and 60,000 others.” From the outset, the Banat Volksdeutsche assisted the German occupation authorities in controlling and

exploiting the region. By a decree of the Serbian puppet government, the Volksdeutsche were constituted as a public law body. According to a special agreement with the Acimovi¢ Commissioner Administration, and under the guidance and supervision of the German occupation authorities in Serbia, they took over the entire civilian administration of the region. A Volksdeutsche was made vice ban of Banovina Danube, and he functioned as the head of the civilian authority in the Banat until the abolition of the banovinas by the administrative reform in October 1941. A German area command was established in

Panéevo and a district command in Veliki Beckerek. The latter became an inde- , pendent district command, directly under the control of the military commander in Serbia, when the area command was moved to Kraljevo in Serbia proper following the administrative reform. The district command was in charge of both the German military government and the Volksdeutsche civilian administration.” Janko, as the leader of the Volksdeutsche, thus became the

chief political executive in the area. Two other important minority leaders, Sepp Lapp and Franz Reith, were put in charge, respectively, of the civilian administration and the police. Jakob Awender was given the most important economic position, that of head of the Association of German Cooperatives. A number of minor posts in public service were filled by members of other na-

tionalities—the German minority was after all only one-fifth of the Banat population—but they had no voice in political decisions.” 1'Vegh, “German Occupation in the Yugoslav Banat,” pp. 507-9, 550. 2Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 214. For the national composition of the Banat population according to the census of 1931, see Vegh, “German Occupation in the Yugoslav Banat,” p. 495. By and large, on a percentage basis, the two sets of figures agree. See Micr. No. T-501, Roll 246, Frs. 723-27. Area command no. 610 was first in Pancevo and then in Kraljevo; district command no. 823 remained in Veliki Be¢kerek. “Vegh, “German Occupation in the Yugoslav Banat,” pp. 507-10, 531. In the higher echelons of the Banat administration, which included commune mayors, a small number of Hungarians and even fewer Romanians held positions, but only one Serb did. See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5785, Frs. H299,934-37.

206 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA A special branch of the Serbian State Guard, the Banat State Guard, was established in the Banat, made up of the German minority. In March 1942, this small force had 94 officers and noncommissioned officers and 846 privates, all

of them Volksdeutsche.” , |

The Hungarians had been promised the Yugoslav Banat as well as Backa and Baranja, and they were very displeased when Hitler changed his mind on the eve of the invasion as a result of Romanian threats that the Romanians would challenge the Hungarians if the latter moved into the Banat. The Hungarians smoldered under what they considered an injustice.” On June 7, 1942, at Hitler’s headquarters, Nicholas Kallay, the Hungarian prime minister, handed von Ribbentrop a memorandum in which he called attention to the unfair treatment of the Hungarians in the Banat by the ruling Volksdeutsche. The memorandum complained about the lack of participation of the Banat Hungarians in political decision making, administration, and the police forces, the condition of Hungarian schools in the area, and the lack of freedom of Hungarians to travel, unfavorably contrasting all of this with the lot of the Hungarians under the former Yugoslav regime. But the Germans brushed aside most of these complaints, making at most one or two token concessions.” On January 19, 1943, Dome Sztdjay, the Hungarian envoy in Berlin, made a second attempt to improve the position of the Banat Hungarians. In a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he argued that because of Hitler’s promise, the Hungarians regarded the Banat as belonging de jure to Hungary and the Hungarians in the area as equal in every respect to the Volksdeutsche and due equal treatment. He attached a detailed nine-point memorandum listing the earlier complaints and adding additional ones of an economic nature, such as lowergrade grain rations for the Hungarians than for the Volksdeutsche, lower textile and leather goods rations, and the failure to compensate the Hungarians for damages suffered during the War of April 1941, as the Volksdeutsche had been

compensated. ,

But this protest, too, had little effect. A telegram from the Germans in April

1943 stated that all Hungarian complaints had been investigated and taken into account and that, whenever feasible, the Hungarian minority had been put | on an equal footing with the Volksdeutsche. A change in the existing situation

in the Banat was impossible, however, because it would have resulted in a _ For the composition of the guard, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 247, Fr. 985. Later it increased to about 1,300 men, with only a few from other nationalities. | | ”°See Neubacher’s postwar interrogation for his recollection of Marshal Ion Antonescu’s reaction when he told him about the impending invasion of Yugoslavia, in Micr. No. 679, Roll 2, Fr. 731. For German-Hungarian exchanges on the disposition of the Yugoslav Banat, see also DGFP, 12: 525-26, 548, 551, 562-63, 574-77, 581-86, and especially 909-10, and

13:28 and 65. , :

_ See Benzler’s memorandum of July 20, 1942, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5785, Frs. |

H299,934-37, and a similar memorandum of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Oc-

tober 1, 1942, in Frs. H299,887-90. a

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 207 marked reduction in the economic output of the area, which was extremely important for the German war economy.” The Romanians also presented the Germans with various complaints on behalf of the ro percent Romanian minority in the Banat. As with the Hungarians, the Germans gave them only nominal concessions: some token positions in administration, a few changes in schools, and permission for their cultural organization, Astra, to carry on certain cultural activities. But all activities of a political nature were forbidden, and travel by the Romanian minority, within and especially out of the Banat, was strictly regulated. It should be mentioned in this connection that the Yugoslavs have interpreted some Romanian activities in northeast Serbia during the Second World War as irredentist.” Although the Banat was administered partly by the Serbian puppet government and partly by the German minority as an authority of public law, the directives of both rested on the decrees and ordinances issued by the military commander in Serbia and were applied under the direction and supervision of his administrative organs. All political activity in the Banat except by the German minority was forbidden. Regulations on the maintenance of peace and order were identical with those prevailing in Serbia, and Jewish businesses and properties were taken over by authorities of the German minority. Decrees on crop planning, compulsory deliveries of agricultural and livestock products, compulsory labor service, and price, wage, and rent controls were also identical

with those in Serbia, except that the Volksdeutsche as a rule enjoyed a favored position.” In addition to agricultural products—grains, oilseeds, livestock, and livestock products—the chief contribution of the Banat Volksdeutsche to the German war effort was in manpower. As early as the end of April 1941, the SS began recruiting volunteers for the SS Division “Das Reich.” The following year, in March and April 1942, the Deutsche Mannschaft was disbanded, and from it and other sources a special division, the 7th Volunteer SS Division “Prinz Eugen,” was formed. This was designated as a volunteer division, but in fact its ranks were filled mostly with draftees. The “Prinz Eugen” division was used by the Germans in various parts of Yugoslavia and became notorious for its bru*For the Hungarians’ complaints in January 1943, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Frs. H299,8 58-69, and for the Germans’ response the following April, Frs. H299,839—40.

”For the Germans’ response to Romanian complaints, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,688-89 and H296,752-56. For the Yugoslavs’ view of Romanian activity, see Dragoljub Petrovi¢, “The Irredenta of Fascist Romania,” pp. 31-54. “The 4,000 Jews from the Banat were expelled to Serbia in July and August 1941 and soon liquidated together with most Jews from Serbia proper. See Federation of Jewish Communities, The Crimes of the Fascist Occupants, pp. 1-53. See also Vegh, “German Occupation in the Yugoslav Banat,” pp. 500-501, §12-13, 525-27. For the disposal of Jewish prop-

erty in Serbia and the Banat, see materials in Micr. No. T-75: Records of the Office of the , Plenipotentiary for Economic Affairs in Serbia. For economic regulations in the Banat, see Vegh, “German Occupation in the Yugoslav

Banat,” pp. 510-12.

208 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA tality. After the division was moved from the Banat to Serbia in October 1942,

the Deutsche Mannschaft was again reconstituted in order to help existing forces police the area.*' Members of the minority also worked in various other German services in the Banat and elsewhere in Yugoslavia. According to German sources, as of December 28, 1943, the German minority in the Banat and Serbia, estimated at 150,000, had contributed 21,516 men to the Waffen SS,

auxiliary police, and the Banat police, 602 men to other units of the Wehrmacht, and 1,805 men to labor service, mostly in the Reich.” , The recruitment of Volksdeutsche from the Hungarian-annexed parts of Yugoslavia for SS formations proceeded on the basis of a separate GermanHungarian agreement of 1942. The 18,500 recruits came mostly from Ba¢ka and from the parts of Transylvania that Hungary acquired from Romania. Following a new agreement of April 14, 1944, between Germany and (newly German-occupied) Hungary, Germany acquired the right to recruit for military service all members of the German minority throughout Hungary, by force if necessary. As the war advanced and manpower losses mounted, the Nazi military machine demanded ever more inductees. The Volksdeutsche in various areas were called upon to supply their quota and to make ever greater economic contributions as well. Under this mounting burden, many Volksdeutsche in the Banat began to tire of the sacrifice, with some of them complaining of having to do more than their share for the glory of the Reich.” It did not help that along with this burden they also had to deal with the hatred of the other national groups in the area. Although the latter were not called up for military service, they were in other ways much worse off than the German minority and blamed the latter along with the German occupation authorities

for their ill-treatment.

As will be explained in Chapter 6, the advance of Soviet forces toward the Balkans in August 1944 and the fear of revenge from the Yugoslavs for the brutal behavior of the Volksdeutsche during the war induced the German authorities to organize a mass evacuation of the German minority from southeast Europe to the Reich that fall. Of those Volksdeutsche from the Banat, Backa, and Baranja who were unable or refused to leave, the Russians eventually transported an estimated 27,000 to 30,000, mostly women between the ages of 18 and 40 and men between the ages of 17 and 45, to the Soviet Union as forced labor. They were released in the fall of 1949 and taken to East Germany. Some of the other Volksdeutsche who remained in Yugoslavia at the end of the war were, after screening, expelled by the postwar Yugoslav authorities to Ger-

*'Vegh, “German Occupation in the Yugoslav Banat,” pp. 53 5-36. , “Herzog, Die Volksdeutschen in der Waffen-SS, p. 17. On the enlistment of Volksdeutsche from the Banat and Batka in SS formations, see also Das Schicksal der Deutschen in

Jugoslawien, pp.64E-72E. > | | |

Herzog, Die Volksdeutschen in der Waffen-SS, pp. 9-10; Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, p.265; Vegh, “German Occupation in the Yugoslav Banat,” p. 560.

, THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 209 many. According to the census of March 15, 1948, only 55,337 people of Ger-

man nationality, about ro percent of their pre-1941 number, remained in Yugoslavia.”

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE NEDIC GOVERNMENT As we noted earlier, General Nedi¢’s troubles with the Germans started soon after he became prime minister. Whether or not the Germans had expected him to stop the growing uprising, they regarded his failure to do so as reason enough to reduce his tenuous powers. Danckelmann had promised Nedié¢é certain concessions, but when Danckelmann himself was recalled for failing to stop the rebellion, these promises were simply put aside. The occupation regime became unbelievably brutal, and the economic impositions on the Serbian people greatly increased. One major issue was that of prisoners of war. In his letter of August 27, 1941, to Danckelmann, Nedi¢ had put great stress on the early return of a sizable number of prisoners of war from Germany, especially those who were old or sick or who could be useful in the economic reconstruction of the country. Not only were very few released and sent home, but subsequent attempts to obtain the release of additional prisoners on special terms were overruled. In Oc-

tober 1941, the military commander in Serbia, concerned about the danger from some 1,200 former professional officers in Belgrade who refused to collaborate with the Nedié regime, reached an agreement with Nedi¢ that about 1,000 would be arrested and sent to Germany as prisoners of war in exchange for the release of approximately the same number of Serbian prisoners, primarily those who could help in anti-Communist work and in rebuilding the country. The move was supposed to strengthen the Nedi¢ regime. But the German Armed Forces High Command refused to approve the exchange. The question of prisoners of war remained open. During the second half of 1942, a number of Serbian officers who had commanded the now dissolved Pecanac and Mi-

hailovié Chetnik detachments were taken to prisoner-of-war camps in Germany because their presence in Serbia was considered potentially dangerous. And in January 1943, in agreement with the Germans, Nedi¢ ordered the arrest and deportation to prison camps in Germany of about 600 former officers who supported Mihailovic.” “Tas Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, pp. 93 E-97E. The Germans estimated that after October 1944, about 200,000 Volksdeutsche remained in Yugoslav areas then controlled by Soviet or Yugoslav Partisan forces. See p. 89E. For German views on the treatment of the German minority in Yugoslavia after the war, see pp. 97E-118E. For the Yugoslav census of March 1948, see Yugoslavia, Combined Office for Statistics and Evidence, Statisticki godisnjak, p. 60. ®SMicr. No. T-501, Roll 251, Frs. 372-86; Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Fr. 61; Micr. No. T-120, Roll 402, Fr. 308,416.

210 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA A lack of agreement with the Germans about the return of prisoners of war was only one of the Nedi¢ administration’s troubles. We have already mentioned its loss of tactical command over the Serbian State Guard and Frontier Guard and later also over the Serbian Volunteer Corps. The Pecanac Chetniks, as well as the legalized Chetniks of Mihailovié under the Nedi¢ government’s command, were disbanded. Against Nedi¢’s wishes, Bulgarian troops were

brought into Serbia to do occupation duty for the Germans. Nedi¢ had no power to dispatch troops or police on his own, and he was also forbidden to make any exploratory contacts with any rebel groups. Not only that, occupation costs increased steadily and were never specified in advance for any length of time. The country was systematically looted of food—an ever increasing proportion was earmarked for the Germans, while too little was allowed for Serbia’s own needs—and of raw materials and manufactured goods (see Chapters 14 and 15). Perhaps most vexing of all, the Nedi¢ government had to contend with a highly complicated occupation system lacking a single policy. It received directives from four different authorities in the occupation regime and had no power itself to reorganize its own administrative and political system in order to tighten its rule and increase its efficiency. Even the lowliest German official could interfere in the affairs of local Serbian governmental units. | The difficulties between the Nedi¢ government and the Germans are fully reflected in the letters and memoranda that Nedi¢ sent to officials of the occupation regime and in statements that he made to them in conferences. The first important memorandum, signed by the entire cabinet, was dated March 25, 1942, and described the situation in detail. First, because the government had

been established by the Germans, it appeared to be a German tool. Therefore the accusations of London and Moscow propaganda that it was a puppet government found credence among some Serbs. And in fact the government did have very little authority, although considering the authority it possessed, it had accomplished quite a lot. Second, even though the government had rendered a service not only to the Serbian people but also politically to the Germans—‘“The government is made responsible by the people for all the difficulties of everyday life: food and fuel shortages, requisitioning, the Bulgarian occupation, punitive expeditions, and the like”—at the same time, the populace could see no important benefit coming from it that would justify its existence. Third, considering its limited means, the government, with the help of nationalist forces, had done a great deal toward reestablishing order in the country, but strict limitations on its authority would prevent it from maintaining this

orderinthefuture. = SO ,

The memorandum went on to list a set of specific recommendations. First, the Nedi¢é government should be legalized by the Germans instead of being maintained simply as a tool of the occupation regime. To do this it would be best to appoint a head of state, in fact a royal regent, to be elected by the national assembly. In this way the authority of the government would be greatly

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 211 enhanced. Second, the government should be allowed to establish a national front under the leadership of the head of state, which as the single political party in the country could unite all constructive nationalist forces and express the popular will. Third, the head of state should be the commander of the Serbian State Guard and its strength should be sufficient to maintain peace and order in the country. Fourth, Serbia should be given some autonomy in running its governmental affairs. The German occupation authorities should establish general principles of political and economic administration and limit themselves to controlling the highest levels, leaving the Serbian governmental apparatus to do the work and thus be the intermediary between the occupation regime and the Serbian people. Finally, Bulgarian occupation troops, an intolerable hindrance to the consolidation of and effective administration by the Nedi¢ government, should be withdrawn.” The memorandum was not well received by the Germans. Bader, the commanding general, thought the proposals were premature and ill advised, and he quickly ordered Turner, the chief of administration, to try and induce Nedi¢ to withdraw it. Three days after the memorandum was submitted, Turner and Nedi¢ had a long and acrimonious meeting, during which Nedi¢ brought up many additional complaints about German policies and the position of his government. The next day Nedi¢, backed by his entire cabinet, declared that he would not withdraw the memorandum and requested that it be sent to Berlin

for consideration by the highest authorities. Apparently this request was granted, but Berlin, quite in agreement with the commanding general, took no action.” Six months later, on September 16, 1942, Nedic¢ tried again, this time adding his resignation for greater effect. The letter he submitted to the commanding general was for the most part a repetition of the detailed complaints of the March memorandum. Nedié believed that he and his government had legitimate grounds for complaint: in August 1941 when he became prime minister, General Danckelmann, the military commander in Serbia at the time, made a series of promises, none of which had been kept. Since then, the Germans had brought in Bulgarian forces for occupation duty, had continued to impose large occupation costs on Serbia, and had taken a much larger proportion of current Serbian food production for German use than in the beginning. Under these

conditions, he protested, the Serbian government could not function, and therefore he was submitting his resignation. In reply, the Germans again described the conditions and objectives of the occupation system in Serbia, and Nedi¢ was persuaded to remain in office.” *6Micr. No. T-501, Roll 257, Frs. 123 3-36. *’For Bader’s order of March 27 to Turner, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 257, Fr. 1232. For the record of the Turner-Nedi¢é meeting of March 28, see Frs. 1218-31. For Nedi¢’s request that the memorandum be sent to Berlin, see Frs. 1216-17. *8For Nedi¢’s letter of September 16, 1942, Bader’s comments on Nedi¢’s proposals, and

212 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA Nedi¢’s powers were by this time quite insignificant, but he would not let the Germans alone. On January 1, 1943, he submitted the draft of a fundamental law for Serbia, consisting of fourteen articles that he asked the occupation authorities to enact. This law, amounting to a constitution, would have reor-

ganized Serbia as an authoritarian, corporative state more or less along the © lines long advocated by Dimitrije Ljoti¢. But the fate of the proposed law could have been foreseen. When General Bader solicited the views of various departments in his administration, several specialists thought that it should be enacted. Higher SS and Police Leader Meyszner, however, was squarely opposed to it, seeing it as a threat to German interests. The proposed law then went to the commander in chief in southeast Europe, who passed it on to Hitler. On March 30 the decision came down: Hitler considered it “untimely.” In spite of Nedi¢’s frequent complaints and his proposals for change outlined in memoranda, letters, and the fundamental law for Serbia, the Germans still considered him the best person to head the Serbian government. The military commanders especially trusted him. Numerous officials—General BGhme; Gerhard Feine, counselor to Envoy Benzler; and General Bader—strongly endorsed or praised Nedi¢ as a very dependable man and the best available from the German point of view. Nedi¢ also made a favorable impression on Hitler during his visit to Hitler’s headquarters on September 18, 1943, according to the official report of the interview. Special Envoy Neubacher made several fa-

, vorable comments about him in the period from September 1943 to September 1944, when he tried to strengthen the Nedi¢ regime. General August Winter, chief of staff to the commander in chief in southeast Europe, ina report on July — 5, 1944, noted that Nedi¢ had behaved loyally toward the Germans, although they had strengthened his position far less than he had hoped. Finally, late in August 1944 both von Weichs, the commander in chief in southeast Europe, and Neubacher, the special envoy, advocated substantial aid in arms and am-

munition to the “Serbian nationalist forces,” that is, both Nedi¢’s and Mihailovi¢’s units, to help them in their forthcoming struggle against the Parti-—

sans, who had begun to move into Serbia.” Nedi¢’s letter of September 18 expressing his willingness -to continue in office, see Micr. No.

T-501, Roll 256, Frs. ro18-21, 1024-31. oe

- Nedié’s letter of September 16 as well as some of the proposals in his March 25 memorandum were also partly (and negatively) answered by von Ribbentrop orally through Benzler, who conferred with Nedié on October 19, 1942. Frs. 997-1002. “For Hitler’s verdict, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Fr. 904. For the proposed constitution, the supporting brief for it, exchanges between the commanding general in Serbia and his officials, including Meyszner, and his correspondence with the commander in chief in south-

east Europe, see Frs. 905-76. For Meyszner’s views, see Frs. 924-26. | For Bohme’s evaluation, in a letter of November 15, 1941, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 251, Frs. 364-67; for Feine’s, in a letter of December 3, 1941, see DGFP, 13: 944-48; and for Bader’s, in letters of January 19 and September 19, 1942, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 257, Frs.

1111-13, and Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Fr. 1020. | |

For Nedi¢’s favorable impression on Hitler, see Kriegstagebuch, 3, pt. 2: 1166. Unfortu-

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 213 But both Hitler and Himmler detested all Serbs, and because this attitude at the highest level influenced all official policy, those who dealt with Nedi¢ were bound to narrow limits. As early as October 1941, in connection with proposals for the exchange of former active officers for prisoners of war in Germany, the German Armed Forces High Command declared: “Prime Minister Nedi¢

must be considered unreliable in the German sense and cannot lay claim to | trust.””' Himmler’s letter to Turner, chief of military administration, on August 23, 1942, stated quite clearly the policy he wanted the occupation authorities to follow: In Serbia there should be only the State Guard, which should be supplied with foreign rifles and machine guns that cannot use either German or former Yugoslav ammunition, so that the ammunition can be strictly rationed by us. All other formations, such as the Chetniks and similar ones, should be disarmed, gradually and in a planned fashion. Never forget that the Serbs remain Serbs, and that the Serbian people are a people who have been in armed resistance for centuries and are trained for it, and that we should do nothing except what is necessary at the moment to maintain our own strength. Anything that would in any way contribute to the strengthening of the Serbian government and thus of the Serbian people must be avoided.”

General Meyszner, too, at a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on May 31, 1943, expressed grave doubts about Nedi¢’s loyalty and gave him good marks only in regard to fighting the Communists. He was, he said, “a nationalist Serb, who most probably had connections with both Draza Mihailovi¢ and the Yugoslav government-in-exile.”” Draza Mihailovié and the Chetniks were another frustrating issue that General Nedi¢ had to deal with. When Nedi¢ assumed office in August 1941, he was resolutely opposed to both of the resistance groups that were active in Serbia, but he nonetheless made a sharp distinction between them. He believed that most rank-and-file Chetniks, and Mihailovi¢ himself, had been misled by London propaganda, but otherwise were good Serbs who with the right persuasion—something like that of a stern but just father to rebellious children— could be brought back to proper behavior and productive work. The Commu-

nist-led Partisans, on the other hand, were nothing but agents of Moscow, revolutionaries bent on destroying the traditional political and social order in Serbia and Yugoslavia and replacing it with a Communist dictatorship. Nedi¢ nately the minutes of this meeting were not preserved among German documents. For Neubacher’s comments, see his Sonderauftrag Siidost, 1940-1945, pp. 13-36, 155-57, and for Winter’s report, Micr. No. T-311, Roll 195, Fr. 788. For the additional arms advocated by von Weichs and Neubacher in August 1944, see Micr. No. T-311, Roll 195, Frs. 956-64, and Micr. No. T-77, Roll 883, Frs. 5,631,201-6. *tMicr. No. T-501, Roll 251, Fr. 380. 2Micr. No. T-501, Roll 266, Frs. 1196-97. Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Fr. H299,467.

214 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA hated them for their goals and for instigating an uprising that resulted in much suffering and bloodshed among innocent Serbian victims of German reprisals. His main objective as prime minister was to contribute to the pacification of the country, primarily by suppressing the Partisans, and save his people from more

hardship. — OO

Initially, Nedi¢ was firmly opposed to Mihailovié and the Chetniks. When he first attempted to meet Mihailovi¢, the latter rebuffed him and-sent Major - Aleksandar Mi8sié and Lieutenant Colonel Miodrag Pavlovi¢ instead.” The meeting on September 4, 1941, apparently accomplished nothing. But when

Mihailovié shifted from a policy of lukewarm cooperation with the Partisans to a policy of all-out hostility toward them in late October 1941 and the Chetniks ceased almost all armed attacks and sabotage against the Germans, Nedi¢ relaxed his resolute opposition to them. In October and November 1941, the first signs of the rather involved but flexible system of collaboration between the

Nedié regime and Mihailovié occurred during the large German offensive against the Partisans and the Chetniks in western Serbia. As we described ear, lier, a number of Mihailovi¢’s Chetnik detachments legalized themselves with the Nedi¢ forces to continue their fight against the Partisans. = => The collaboration of sorts between the Nedié administration and the Mihailovi¢ forces that began in the fall of 1941 lasted to the end of the German occupation. It went through phases of varying intensity with first Nedic, then Mihailovié, playing the principal role. It should also be noted that during the , first two years or so of occupation, when Nedi¢ and many people in Serbia thought that Germany would win the war, relations were different from what

, they became during the latter half of the occupation, when Germany’s defeat became more certain. But the main objectives of the two parties never changed. The common goal was to fight the Partisans and keep them from emerging as the dominant armed group at the end of the war. Both also wanted to keep Serbian losses to a minimum, which could only be done by preventing acts of sabo-

tage and armed resistance against the German and Bulgarian occupation forces, since such acts invariably brought bloody reprisals. For the Chetniks, a further motive in collaborating with the Nedi¢ government was to gaina solid — base in the military, administrative, and police apparatus of the regime, so that when the Germans and Bulgarians finally left, the Chetniks could seize the government organization and armed forces before the Partisans did. —_

Certain pro-Mihailovi¢ officers and officials in the Nedi¢ administration, | presumably on their own, also established and kept up contact with Mihailovi¢ In addition to professing different loyalties, Nedié and Mihailovié also felt a certain amount of personal antagonism toward each other. While Nedi¢ was minister of army and navy in the prewar Yugoslav government, Mihailovié was disciplined twice with 30 days’ arrest, in 1939 and 1940. At his trial, he remarked: “Nedi¢ and I were bitter enemies. As a colonel I was twice given 30 days in jail. Personally, I considered him absolutely senile.” The Trial of Dragoljub-Draza Mihailovié, p. 237.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 215 and his forces. The acting commander of the Serbian gendarmerie from June 24 to September 12, 1941, and thereafter its deputy commander, Colonel Jovan P. Trisic, was arrested in November 1941 for having maintained such contact and sent to a prisoner-of-war camp in Germany.” Milan Acimovic, minister of interior, was another Nedi¢ government official in close contact with Mihailovi¢. When the Germans launched Operation Mihailovi¢ on December 6-7, 1941, with the aim of capturing Mihailovi¢ and breaking up his headquarters at Ravna Gora, he managed to escape, probably because he had been warned of the attack by A¢cimovié on December 5. With

Nedié’s help, Acimovié overcame the Germans’ suspicion that he had forewarned Mihailovi¢ and managed to stay on good terms with them during the next year while he was in the cabinet. Later in the war he served as a liaison between the Germans and Mihailovic¢.” Lieutenant Colonel Milan Kalabi¢, a Serbian State Guard officer and at the same time prefect of the county of Pozarevac, was not so lucky. He passed on

both information and military supplies to the Chetniks, with whom his son Nikola served as a commander. On October 3, 1942, after a period of surveillance, the Gestapo arrested him along with a number of Chetnik commanders and men and executed them all.” The relationship between Nedi¢ and Mihailovi¢ changed over time, and so too did the views of German commanders in Serbia on how Nedi¢ should handle Mihailovi¢é. Late in the war, Nedi¢ noted that General Bhme had given him

written orders in 1941 that “the Mihailovi¢ case was a German problem in which he as prime minister was not to get involved.” In February 1942, in a conference with the chief of staff of Paul Bader, the new commanding general, Nedi¢ noted that according to the 1941 orders, the Serbian authorities were simply to discover Mihailovi¢’s whereabouts and report it to the Germans; it

was the task of German troops to capture him. But at the same conference, Nedi¢ learned that Bader thought that rendering Mihailovi¢ harmless should be a high priority for the Serbian authorities. No action against him, however, was

taken. On several occasions, Nedi¢ recommended to the Germans that he should be allowed “to liquidate the Mihailovi¢é movement,” but he was unable to persuade them to accept his plan.” STri8i¢, O Milanu Nedicu, pp. 61-63, 92. See also Krakov, General Milan Nedic, 1: 264-68. **Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 199, 420, 444. See Micr. No. T-501, Roll 352, Frs. 81, 254, and 267, and Krakov, General Milan Nedié, 2: 451-57. Krakov maintains, without proof, that Kalabié acted on Nedi¢’s orders and was betrayed by a woman who posed as a Chetnik but was actually a Communist in the pay of the Gestapo. *’For Nedi¢’s reference to General Bohme’s orders in 1941 ina letter of February 22, 1944, to General Felber, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Fr. 880. For his February 27, 1942, conference with the chief of staff of the new commanding general, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 247, Frs. 89293. For his request to liquidate Mihailovi¢, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 253, Frs. 283-84.

216 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA As a result of the combined actions of German and Serbian quisling forces, with some help from Mihailovié’s Chetniks, the Partisan forces in Serbia were soon routed in the fall of 1941. Tito and other leaders and some Partisan units fled into Sandzak, while the units that remained were crushed or broken up so

that they were capable of only very limited action.” After Bulgarian troops were sent in to occupy Serbia in January 1942, the country was fairly quiet. In June 1942, Mihailovi¢ left Serbia for Montenegro and was out of reach of the Nedié authorities until his return the following June. Subsequently, as we have seen, Mihailovié’s (and Pe¢éanac’s) Chetnik units that had legalized themselves

with the Nedié regime were dissolved in the fall of 1942. Gradually, however, the Partisans and occasionally the illegal Chetniks resumed sabotage activities, sometimes attacking units of the Serbian quisling forces or German and Bulgarian forces, sometimes attacking communication lines or mines and industrial enterprises producing for the Germans. The Partisans also kept up their attacks on government bureaus, as they had done in the uprising, that is, on commune and tax offices and gendarmerie and police stations, where they burned files and generally tried to cause havoc in the government apparatus.’ The huge number of hostages killed by the Germans in the course of 1942 and 1943, taken from among the followers and sympathizers of both the Partisans and the Chetniks as well as from the population at large, is in itself proof of the disordered state of affairs in Serbia at the time.” Although the Nedi¢ government was given only a limited amount of arms ~ and ammunition by the ever suspicious Germans, the pro-Chetnik elements in its armed forces filtered some of them to the Chetniks. Little of this transfer es-

caped the notice of the Germans, no matter how cleverly it was disguised, sometimes under cover of mock battles between the Chetniks and the Serbian State Guard or legalized Chetnik units. It can be assumed that there was also some transfer of intelligence by pro-Mihailovi¢ individuals in the Nedi¢ regime,

and in the later stages of occupation the Nedi¢ government authorized the _ ”For the Partisan rout, see Yugoslavia, Vojnoistorijski institut, Oslobodilacki rat, 2nd ed., I: 219-26, 317-23; Krakov, General Milan Nedié, 2: 396-99. 'For the Partisans’ renewed attacks on enemy forces, see, for example, Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Frs. 128-30. For a German statement on the matter, dated August 20, 1941, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 246, Fr. ro. For German statistics on these attacks, for example, during late October 1941, see Micr. No. T-314, Roll 1457, Fr. 1246, and from March to October 1943, Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Frs. 221-31. See also Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Fr. 535. 'IThe original gruesome formula of executing 100 Serbian hostages for each German soldier killed by resistance forces in Serbia and 50 for each German soldier wounded, following Hitler’s order of September 16, 1941 (see Chapter 2), was reduced by the commanding general in Serbia on February 28, 1943, until further notice, to executing 50 hostages for each German soldier, armed forces employee, or civilian killed, or each Bulgarian soldier killed, and 25 for each German or Bulgarian wounded. For the order, see United States, Trials of War Criminals, 11: 1020-25. In the fall of 1943, the numerical formula was abolished and a decision was made separately for each case in consultation with Special Envoy Neubacher. Generally speaking, the shooting of hostages was greatly reduced.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 217 transfer of money to the Chetniks from the Serbian National Bank.'” Food was not a problem; the Chetniks took what they needed, either in surprise raids on merchants or shipments in transit or by exacting it in semilegal fashion from mostly well-to-do households in areas under their actual if not formal control. The Germans were well aware of this, as they were of the ability of the Chetniks, functioning as a kind of shadow government with many sympathizers in the Nedi¢ regime, to draft manpower and generally to influence the activities of the population. As time went on, the Chetniks’ standing also benefited from people’s growing tendency to scoff at the impotence of the Nedi¢ government by ignoring its orders and regulations.’”

Because the Serbian puppet government was so subservient to the German occupation authorities, it cannot truly be said that it had its own policies in any field of government activity. It was simply an auxiliary organ of the German occupation regime. In one area, however, the Nedi¢ government did show considerable initiative and success: in the acceptance and care of several hundred thousand transferees and refugees who were expelled or came on their own to occupied Serbia from other parts of dismembered Yugoslavia. Some transferees arrived in Serbia in organized transports with the assistance of the German occupation authorities on the basis of special agreements; many more were expelled to Serbia by neighboring states, especially the Independent State of Croatia; and thousands of refugees escaped to Serbia on their own in order to save their lives, again especially from the Croatian state. There were two principal reasons for the large shifts of population among the various parts of divided Yugoslavia, including the large transfers into Serbia. First, the German government wanted to change the national composition of German-occupied Slovenia before formally annexing it to the Greater Reich, which required expelling a large segment of the Slovene population and re-

placing it with Volksdeutsche from various parts of southeast Europe and northeast Italy. Second, the Ustasha government in Croatia expelled Serbs from the country as part of its radical solution of the Serbian problem in Croatia. Additional secondary factors also played a role in forcible population shifts

within and out of Yugoslav areas and in decisions by individuals to move to | other areas on their own. '2For a German report on November 24, 1942, that a unit of the Serbian State Guard consisting of 2 officers and 126 noncommissioned officers and men had been disarmed by Mihailovi¢’s Chetniks and that an investigation was under way, see Kriegstagebuch, 2, pt. 2: 1017. For the transfer of money, see The Trial of Dragoljub-Draza Mihailovié, p. 238. '3For the Chetniks’ influence as perceived by the Germans, see the report of the military commander in southeast Europe of December 23, 1943, to the commander in chief in southeast Europe, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 253, Frs. 1020-21. See also Micr. No. T-501, Roll 260, Fr. 424. For the Chetniks’ influence as perceived by Nedi¢, see especially his letter to Felber of February 22, 1944, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Frs. 881-82.

218 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA As we described in Chapter 3, already in April 1941 the Germans made plans to expel about 260,000 Slovenes from German-occupied northern Slovenia to Serbia. At the behest of the Croats, this plan was altered so that the vast

majority of Slovenes would be transferred to Croatia and a corresponding number of Serbs would be expelled from Croatia to Serbia. Between early June and late September 1941, 6,720 Slovenes were sent to Serbia, 26,343 Slovenes were sent or fled Croatia, and at least 118,110 Serbs were legally and illegally transported from the Croatian state to Serbia, while thousands more fled there on their own. The transfer of peoples, however, engendered ill-will toward the Germans, disrupted local economies, and contributed to the spread of armed resistance. As a result, in September 1941, the Germans ended the two-phase

transfer of people between northern Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia (see also Chapter 9). As soon as the German occupation authorities advised the Serbian puppet government that large numbers of transferees would be coming, the government established the Committee for Refugees in May 1941 to handle them. In November, the committee was superseded by the Commissariat for Refugees, probably with somewhat greater resources and powers. The commissariat was headed by Toma Maksimovic, previously the director general of the formerly Czechoslovak-owned Bata Shoe Factory at Borovo in Slavonia, one of the largest industrial enterprises in interwar Yugoslavia.'™ Once in Serbia, refugees and transferees were supposed to register with the committee (later commissariat). But a considerable number who came to Serbia on their own chose not to do so. Under such conditions, there are understandably no precise data on the total number of transferees and refugees in occupied Serbia during the war. What is available are estimates by the German occupation authorities and the Serbian puppet government on their total number in July and September 1942, and rather precise data on the number of registered transferees and refugees on later dates. In a July 1942 report on economic conditions in Serbia during the previous year and a half, Franz Neuhausen, plenipotentiary for economic affairs, discussing food requirements for the country, estimated that there were about 420,000 transferees and refugees in Serbia, including about 86,000 orphaned children. In a September 16, 1942, memorandum to the military commander in Serbia, Prime Minister Nedi¢ claimed that there were about 400,000 transferees and refugees in Serbia, including, again, about 86,000 destitute, mostly orphaned children.’”

The usual estimates of the number of transferees and refugees in Serbia

| during the war, cited by S. D. Milogevi¢, one of the best Yugoslav authorities on wartime transferees and refugees in Serbia and Yugoslavia as a whole, range between 300,000 and 400,000. However, Milosevi¢ thinks that the higher es'Miulosevit, Izbeglice i preseljenici, pp. 251-5 §. ‘For Neuhausen’s estimate, see “Neuhausen II,” p. 4, and for Nedi¢’s memorandum, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Frs. 1024-34, especially Fr. 1027.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 219 timate is somewhat too high. But both he and several other sources agree that in mid-1942, the number of transferees and refugees in Serbia from the Croatian state alone was about 200,000.'"

Data on the number of transferees and refugees in occupied Serbia who were registered with the Commissariat for Refugees are undoubtedly quite ac-

curate, but much lower than estimates for the total refugee population, since | many refugees chose not to register. According to the commissariat, as of August 16, 1944, there were a total of 241,011 registered transferees and refugees in Serbia: 118,167 from the Independent State of Croatia, 24,931 from Hungarian-annexed Backa and Baranja, 42,065 from the Bulgarian-annexed

part of Macedonia, 48,808 from the Albanian-annexed Kosovo region and parts of Montenegro, 6,175 from Slovenia, and 865 in quarantine not yet classified.'”’

Nearly all transferees and refugees from Backa and Baranja, Macedonia, and the Kosovo region and parts of Montenegro were Serbs who were originally from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia, and Montenegro, or Montenegrins. They had settled in these areas as colonists after the First World War, on land granted to them because they had volunteered for the Serbian army during the war, were retired gendarmes, or were otherwise deserving. The states that annexed these parts of Yugoslavia in 1941, that is, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania (for the Italian account), regarded them as intruders who had been settled there primarily to strengthen the Serbian element. They justified their expulsion as the rectification of a politically motivated colonization.'®

The transferees and refugees, Serbs and Slovenes alike, were well received by the Serbian population. But the Commissariat for Refugees had great difficulty providing food, housing, other supplies, and medical aid for them, as well as schooling for the young and employment for able-bodied adults. The magnitude of the problem can best be judged by the fact that the estimated number of 400,000 transferees and refugees in the summer of 1942 amounted to over I1

percent of the total population of Serbia of 3,810,000, as estimated by the Germans in March 1941. Providing food was especially difficult, since it was in short supply not only because of reduced agricultural production, but also be-

cause of the Germans’ demand for food for their occupation troops in Serbia and for export to German troops in Greece and to the Reich. Housing was provided wherever it could be found—with relatives, in spas, in special refugee camps, and in rural areas—in fact, throughout the whole of occupied Serbia. By August 1944 there were 53,326 registered transferees and refugees from outside Serbia in the city of Belgrade alone. Most able-bodied persons were emMilosevic, Izbeglice i preseljenici, pp. 154, 254, 280; Borkovi¢, Kontrarevolucija u Srbiji, 1: 199.

7Milosevic, Izbeglice i preseljenici, pp. 277-78. '8Tbid., pp. 57-60, 82-94.

220 - THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA ployed. Some young men joined the Serbian Volunteer Corps or the Serbian State Guard, and others found their way into the ranks of Mihailovi¢’s Chet-

niks or the Partisans.'” ,

An especially difficult problem among the transferees and refugees in Serbia was the large number of children. Children could not be usefully employed and

needed not only food and housing, but also family care and education. The Commissariat for Refugees settled children throughout the country, trying to put peasant children in peasant households and children of artisans and merchants in households similar to those from which they came. But this was only partly successful, and many children ended up in children’s homes. The Serbian government also tried to transfer to Serbia the 30,000 Serbian children estimated to be in Ustasha concentration camps in Croatia in mid-1942. On the basis of a special agreement between Serbian and Croatian authorities, these children, according to Milosevic, were transferred to Serbia in February and March 1943, though he does not give the exact number transferred. The Croatian authorities released the children only on the condition that they would not

be returned to Croatia at a later date.'"°

In addition to the transferees and refugees from outside Serbia, there were thousands of displaced persons within Serbia itself, that is, refugees from villages devastated by the Germans and Bulgarians in reprisals for guerrilla attacks and sabotage. Many survivors fled to the towns and cities in hopes of finding greater safety there and this contributed to their overcrowding. Officials of the German occupation regime in Serbia repeatedly pointed out

that transferees and refugees from the Independent State of Croatia, who brought reports of Ustasha atrocities against the Serbian population, contributed greatly to unrest in Serbia, as well as to the instability of the Nedi¢ regime.''' An independent Serbia would surely have intervened to halt the persecution of Serbs in the Croatian state. Nedi¢’s failure to do so is clear proof of

how weak he and his government were. oe

The flood of transferees and refugees into Serbia impelled the German oc-

, cupation authorities to persuade the Bulgarians, with some success, to ease the pressure on Serbs to leave Bulgarian-annexed areas. Turner, chief of administration for the German occupation regime, even wanted some refugees already in Serbia to be returned to their place of origin. But the German military decided that this was not feasible, either for Serbs from the Bulgarian-annexed ar-

'Tbid., pp. 278, 3 56-62. . °Tbid., pp. 293-308, especially pp. 306-7. , 'N'See especially the letter of Harald Turner, chief of military administration in occupied Serbia, of May 3, 1942, to Siegfried Kasche, German envoy in Croatia, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H301,637—-43. See also the note of Envoy Benzler to Paul Bader, commanding general in Serbia, of August 31, 1942, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Fr. 1041. August 1942 was the month when the Germans brought about 9,000 evacuees from the Kozara Mountain area in northwest Bosnia and from Srijem to the Security Service (SD) concentration camp in Zemun across the Sava River from Belgrade.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 221 eas or for those from the Albanian-annexed Kosovo region.'” On at least one occasion, in May 1943, the Serbian government too asked the German occupation authorities to repatriate some of the transferees and refugees to their areas of origin. But the Germans considered the request impracticable. They gave lack of transport as a general reason and, in the case of Serbs from the Independent State of Croatia, an inability to guarantee their security.'” It is interesting to note, however, that several thousand Serbian transferees and refugees from the Independent State of Croatia chose to return home on their own, most during 1943. After the war, the new government helped transferees and refugees in Serbia and other areas of Yugoslavia return to their former homes. The former Serbian colonists from Slavonia, Srijem, Ba¢cka, the Banat, and Baranja were encouraged to return to their former localities. But only some of the former colonists from Macedonia and the Kosovo region were encouraged to return there; others from these areas were encouraged to move to Slavonia, Srijem, Ba¢cka, the Banat, and Baranja and settle on land made available by the agrarian reform.'" In the summer of 1943, the Germans were forced to reassess their military and political policies in southeast Europe. With Italy on the verge of surrender, the German Armed Forces High Command became responsible for policing and safeguarding a much larger area than before, and at the same time faced the increased possibility of an Allied landing in the Balkans. The problem was the growing strength of the Partisans, whose tactics forced the Germans to disperse their forces over wide areas, who made all communication lines unsafe

and prevented the full utilization of important natural resources, and who rep- | resented a grave danger to German forces should the Allies land in the Balkans.

For these reasons the Germans undertook a complete reorganization of the command structure in southeast Europe in the summer and fall of 1943. They inaugurated a policy aimed at mobilizing and uniting by political means all anti-Communist nationalist forces in the Balkans for a struggle against the Communist-led Partisans. On the military side, as described in Chapter 2, Field Marshal von Weichs was made commander in chief in southeast Europe, and a new post, military commander in southeast Europe, was created and filled by General Felber, who at the same time became chief of the occupation regime in Serbia. On the civilian side, the major change was the assignment of one of the most skilled experts on the Balkans, Hermann Neubacher, to the post of special envoy of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, responsible both to the ministry '?Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Frs. 1005-7. "3Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Frs. 525-26, 540. M4 Milosevic, Izbeglice i preseljenici, pp. 362-72. The agrarian reform was carried out in August 1945.

222 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA and directly to Hitler. Neubacher, a former mayor of Vienna, had been a representative for economic affairs in Romania and still retained the post of special representative for economic affairs in Greece. In his new position he became responsible for political affairs in Greece, Albania, Serbia, Sandzak, and Monte-

negro. His task was to inaugurate the Germans’ “new policy” in Serbia: to strengthen the Nedi¢ regime and at the same time to establish some sort of collaboration with Mihailovi¢’s Chetniks so that they might become a more effective force against the Partisans.’ Of the latter I will speak only briefly, having dealt with it in detail in the first volume of this study. Neubacher thought that it would be good to strengthen Nedi¢’s position

, not only domestically, but also territorially. Little came of the latter effort, however. Its basis was to have been a Greater Serbian Federation, headed by Nedi¢ as the first president and consisting of Serbia, Sandzak, and Montenegro (and possibly eastern Bosnia, though this was not openly discussed).’* Each of the areas would have retained its autonomy in administrative and cultural matters, but they would have acted together as an economic and monetary unit. A battalion of the Serbian Volunteer Corps was sent to Sandzak along with for-

, mer minister Oléan, and in Montenegro the Montenegrin Volunteer Corps was established in the spring of 1944 under Lieutenant Colonel Pavle Djurisié, formerly one of Mihailovi¢’s leading Chetnik commanders, who owed some allegiance as well to Nedi¢ and the Germans."” Nedi¢ did acquire some standing in ~ Sandzak and Montenegro, but it had nothing to do with the federation, which was never formed, and it had absolutely no effect on his position in Serbia.

As for strengthening the Nedi¢ government domestically, Neubacher pointed out to von Ribbentrop in a telegram on October 1, 1943, that “if the intent of Reich policy is to make out of a 5 percent prime minister a 30 percent prime minister, there is no other way but to take the missing 25 percent from other authorities who have it and give it to Nedi¢.” According to Neubacher,

the military commander in southeast Europe, who was to have full command, agreed to lend his support to the “new policy” by consulting with him. Neubacher knew that he lacked the power to interfere in economic matters (except in Greece), but he thought that through the military commander in

niks,p.319. — — ,

>On Neubacher’s appointment, see Kriegstagebuch, 3, pt. 2: 1036, 1233. Forexcerpts

of Hitler’s order of October 29, 1943, on Neubacher’s functions, see Tomasevich, The Chet- —

"At a much later date, in November 1944—when the Germans and all Serbian collaborationist groups had withdrawn from Serbia—Neubacher reported on a conference with Paveli¢ in which the latter seemed willing to consider a territorial adjustment in eastern Bosnia in favor of Serbia (Micr. No. T-311, Roll 194, Frs. 1136-37). Neubacher was not the only German who entertained the idea of territorial adjustments between Croatia and Serbia in favor of Serbia. See, for example, the draft of a letter from the Wehrmacht Operations Staff to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of August 21, 1943, in which the transfer of part of eastern Bosnia and Srijem to Serbia was proposed for discussion, in Hass and Schumann, Anatomie

der Aggression, pp. 195-98. , | "'”Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 349-51.

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 2.23 southeast Europe he would be in a position “to influence in a decisive fashion, owing to consideration for the political line, the development of policy in the economic field.” Neubacher’s proposals would have meant a significant restoration of power to the Serbian government. He wanted the authority of German occupation agencies in public administration, police, and economic affairs to be gradually curtailed, primarily at lower levels, and truly limited to directing and control. He also recommended fulfilling the promises that Hitler made when Nedi¢ visited him at his headquarters, including restoring Serbian control over the State Guard and Volunteer Corps, increasing Serbian jurisdiction in administrative affairs, and reopening the University of Belgrade. All these proposals could be justified on the German side by economies in personnel and

troops.'" Neubacher had great hopes for his plan. During his interrogation by American authorities in October 1945, he asserted: “With Nedié strong in such a Serbia [strengthened according to his proposals], it would have been possible to

defeat Tito in Serbia, Sandzak, and Montenegro without the use of a single German soldier; the Serbian nationalists would have done the job for them.” But this statement seems surprisingly naive coming from an acknowledged expert in Balkan affairs. Neubacher apparently underestimated not only Tito’s support within Yugoslavia but also his standing with the Western Allies and the

Soviet Union. Furthermore, he was naive in thinking that with von Ribbentrop’s backing he had any chance of wresting power from Neuhausen and Meyszner and transferring it to Nedi¢. Neuhausen represented Goring and Meyszner represented Himmler, and von Ribbentrop was not a successful rival of those high officials. Neubacher’s appeals to Hitler to support his proposals

fell on deaf ears, and when von Ribbentrop realized the situation, he abandoned his support of them.'” It made no difference that Neubacher later helped to remove both Neuhausen and Meyszner from Belgrade, because none of their power was transferred to Nedic. In any event, by that time the days of the German occupation regime in Serbia were numbered. None of the talk about strengthening the Nedi¢ regime, some of which inevitably filtered down to Serbian government circles, enhanced Nedi¢’s standing as prime minister. Though his situation was hopeless, Nedi¢ renewed his appeals, listing complaint after complaint. In a letter to Neubacher dated November 10, 1943, he called attention to the punitive expeditions of German troops and police units in rural areas, which included illegal arrests and sending people to concentration camps and into forced labor, all of which, he argued, should be reduced if '8Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H298,707-9. ‘For the quote from Neubacher, see his interrogation in Micr. No. 679, Roll 2, Fr. 742. See also Frs. 741-44. It might be added that Neubacher himself, in a meeting on October 12, 1943, with senior officials of the occupation regime in Belgrade, reduced his goal of making Nedi¢ a 30 percent prime minister to making him an “at least 20 percent prime minister.” Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 253, Fr. 512.

224 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA not stopped until the “new policy” was inaugurated and Hitler’s promises fulfilled. Otherwise, the Germans’ actions tended to drive the Chetniks into the arms of the Partisans.’”° But as before, his complaints were ignored. Despite his prom-

, ises, Hitler had not really changed his attitude toward Nedi¢ or the Serbs, and he had no intention of strengthening the Nedi¢ regime. The reasons remained the same: the fear that any increase in Nedi¢’s power would not be in Germany’s interests and that any sizable transfer of arms and ammunition to him might be used not only against the Partisans but also against the Germans. _ Though Nedi¢ came to realize that he could not expect any improvement in his position through Neubacher’s efforts, he continued to look for ways to in-

crease the supply of arms and ammunition to the Serbian State Guard, in preparation for the time when it would fight the Partisans. In January 1944 he proposed that the Germans transfer any arms captured by units fighting in Serbia under German command to the guard. But General Felber denied this request on February 11 “because of the steady high demand for arms and also

| because of matters of principle.”’' In the fall of 1943, the Germans also began making agreements with Mihailovi¢’s Chetniks, with a view to increasing their effectiveness against the Partisans. The Germans had heretofore respected the Nedi¢ government’s position that Mihailovi¢’s army was a rebel force, not to be dealt with directly. In

bypassing Nedi¢ and making so-called armistice—in fact collaboration— agreements with Chetnik commanders, the Germans were making an about-

face that could not but harm Nedi¢ and dismay the Serbian Volunteer Corps, | which had fought relentlessly against the Chetniks. The German army tried to mollify the Nedi¢ regime by explaining that the armistice agreements supported their mutual anti-Communist struggle and therefore benefited both Germans and Serbs.'” But it was plain that Mihailovi¢ was strong and Nedi¢ was weak. 120Micr, No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H298,989—-91. According to a report of the military commander in southeast Europe, Nedi¢’s hopes for positive results from his visit to Hitler had apparently completely faded by the middle of October 1943. Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 253, Fr. 610. See also his criticism of the “new policy” in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Frs. 880-81.

'IMicr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Fr. 36. Ina memorandum dated July 15, 1946, Felber, the former military commander in southeast Europe and the last commander in occupied Serbia,

wrote: “The stability and the clarity of purpose of the Serbian government contributed to _ close relations between the occupation administration and the Serbian ministries. No really serious complaints ever arose on the part of Prime Minister Nedi¢. The occupation costs imposed on the country were heavy, of course, but on the whole, the machinery of the German occupation administration worked smoothly, and as practice showed, to the best interests of Serbia and its population.” See Germany, Federal Republic of, Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, File N 67/20, p. 24. In view of Nedi¢’s repeated and invariably serious complaints, Felber’s

self-serving statement speaks for itself. a | For a description of the Germans’ collaboration with the Chetniks in 1943 and 1944,

see Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 317-49. On the reaction of the Serbian Volunteer Corps,

see the letter that Colonel MuSicki, its commander, wrote to Nedié on December 1,1943,in

Mihailoviéa, 1: 585-86. .

Yugoslavia, State Commission on Ascertainment of Crimes, Dokumenti o izdajstvu Drage

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 225 As a result of the armistice agreements, Chetnik infiltration of the Nedi¢ forces and administration, up to this time fairly subtle, now became almost overt. A whole string of officials and military and police officers in the Nedi¢ government began making private arrangements with the Chetniks—Milan Acimovic, who, though he had been dropped from the cabinet in October 1942, still had influence and many contacts among both the Germans and the Serbs; Dragomir Jovanovic, the mayor and chief of police of Belgrade; and General Miodrag Damjanovi¢, who became Nedi¢’s chef de cabinet in early 1944.'” As 1944 wore on, more and more of the military, police, and administrative apparatus of the Nedi¢ administration secretly put itself in the service of the Chetniks (or, toa small extent, the Partisans). No one was more aware of this erosion of power and influence than Nedi¢ himself. As before, in over two years of frustrated dealings with the Germans, he could only enumerate his grievances and hope that they would be acted on.

On February 22, 1944, he wrote a long letter to the military commander in southeast Europe—nine pages of single-spaced text on legal-sized paper—in which he reiterated the many complaints of his government against the German authorities, who consistently worked against one another at the expense of the Serbian government and people. It is as if Nedi¢ was determined to add up all his complaints against the Germans after years of occupation. He charged them with a lack of trust despite his loyal service to German (and Serbian) interests and complained of unfair accusations against him, broken promises, and ef-

forts to undermine him and his regime. He accused the Germans of having made a hero out of Draza Mihailovi¢, perhaps deliberately, in order to create a rival to him and in that way weaken his government and keep the Serbian peo-

ple divided. He particularly objected to the armistice agreements with Mihailovi¢’s commanders, which the population interpreted as German weakness, so that everyone, including his own officials and armed forces, flocked to the Chetniks. He noted the existence of a Mihailovi¢ headquarters in Belgrade, known to German authorities and to the city’s chief of police, Dragomir Jovanovic, but allowed to function freely. He complained that ever since the beginning of his regime he had tried in vain to get German permission to convene an assembly of representatives of the Serbian people to serve as a link between the The Germans assumed that Nedi¢ had nothing to say about their dealings with the Chetniks. They simply presented him with a fait accompli. The Serbian State Guard gladly accepted the new arrangement, which only showed how thoroughly it had been infiltrated, although technically it was under the command of General Meyszner. To assuage the feelings of the Serbian Volunteer Corps, Felber wrote a conciliatory letter to Colonel MuSicki on November 29, 1943, in which he assured MuSicki that the corps “is and will remain the basic military force of the future free Serbia.” See Micr. No. T-501, Roll 253, Frs. 936-37. 3Micr. No. T-501,.Roll 253, Frs. 366-67. See Mihailovi¢’s statement at his trial that Damjanovi¢ was his contact in the Nedié administration, through whom he kept in touch with and influenced what was going on. The Trial of Dragoljub-Draza Mibailovié, pp. 238, 245.

226 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA government and the populace, whereas only three months after armistice agreements were inaugurated, the Germans had allowed Mihailovi¢ to hold a congress of more than 300 delegates in the village of Ba. At the same time, all

sorts of obstacles were thrown in the way of his government, including at-

tempts to make it ridiculous.

Nedié again criticized the tremendous burden of occupation costs, other monetary contributions, and fines imposed by the Germans that ran into hundreds of millions of dinars, and German actions that made the Serbian National Bank (the central bank) completely independent of the government, so that the latter had no influence over its policies. He also complained about the way in which the Germans controlled the appointment and transfer of even the lowliest government employee and how long delays for security checks impeded the operation of the government. As for his proposals, none of them, from those on eradicating the Communists in southeast and eastern Serbia to those on improving government efficiency, had ever been accepted. The promises that Hitler had made to him in September 1943 had not been kept, and no Serbian prisoners of war, not even the weak and sick, had been released. Most painful and difficult of all to bear was the presence of Bulgarian occupation troops and their policies directed against him, his government, and the Serbian people. At the end, as on several previous occasions, Nedi¢ submitted his resignation.” There the matter ended. The letter caused no more than a ripple. Nedi¢ stayed on, and matters continued as before, though now with an awareness of the approaching end. The sum total of Neubacher’s policy in Serbia was unfavorable for both the Nedi¢ administration and Mihailovi¢’s Chetniks—the two groups that it was supposed to help—and did not further Germany’s interests either. When the Germans began dealing directly with Mihailovic’s Chetniks, the Nedi¢ government lost the last vestige of support that it had among the people. And for Mihailovi¢, the net result was a loss of standing among the Serbian people and the loss of any possibility of rehabilitating himself with the Western Allies. At the bottom of all this, of course, was the growing realization that Germany was losing the war, and no one wanted to be on the side of the losers. —

In April 1944, General Felber and Envoy Neubacher asked Nedi¢ for his opinion about a change in policy toward Mihailovi¢, because their arrangement of armistice agreements had reached an impasse. Even though all but one of these agreements had expired or been canceled, informal collaboration with most of the Chetnik units still continued. Nedi¢ described the recommendations that he had already made directly to Mihailovi¢. Because of the Communist danger, the Chetniks should cease all actions not only against the Germans '4For this letter, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Frs. 878-86. In it (Fr. 882), Nedié also complained about the arrest of Stanislav Krakov, director of the leading Belgrade newspaper Novo vreme and a relative and close coworker. He felt the arrest was directed against him

personally. |

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 227 but also against the Serbian authorities and cease all independent actions toward the civilian population, meaning, apparently, such things as recruiting, taxation, and threats. Mihailovi¢ should go abroad, though Nedi¢ would be willing to let him stay in the forests somewhat longer, with a limited force, and would give him financial support. And the bulk of the Chetniks should be demobilized so that they could return to productive work in the fields. Nedi¢ also promised that he would not conduct any negotiations with Mihailovic without notifying the Germans, and he assured them that he would abide by their right to sanction any agreement that he might make with Mihailovic. But the Germans did no more than duly note these suggestions and subsequently ignore them.'” Neubacher was successful in only one respect, though a very laudable one indeed, in his mission in Serbia. As part of his “new policy,” he helped introduce a considerable relaxation in the taking and shooting of hostages en masse. The shooting of 50 Serbian hostages for each German killed, which was in ef-

fect when he arrived in Serbia, was substantially reduced, and military commanders had to consult with him before undertaking mass reprisals. As the war progressed and it became clear that the Germans would lose, it became a matter of pressing importance for Nedi¢ and Mihailovic to arrive at a modus vivendi, in order to facilitate necessary transfers at the time of the expected Western Allied landings in the Balkans. The Nedi¢ regime was certain to collapse when the Germans left Serbia. But many people in it and the armed forces still believed that the Western Allies would not in the end allow Mihailovi¢ and the Chetniks to collapse as well, though after September 1943 they showed them little favor. On August 20, 1944, Nedié and Mihailovi¢ met face to face to discuss the situation in Serbia, including their own positions and what course of action to follow. But this meeting, which was intended to show the Germans that a Serbian national front against the Communists had at last been forged, had no discernible outcome. The Chetniks’ most urgent need was for arms and ammunition, which, of course, could only come from German sources and with German approval. Even when Nedi¢ and Mihailovi¢ worked closely together and Nedi¢ convinced both von Weichs and Neubacher that arms and ammunition should be provided to the Serbian State Guard and the Chetniks, they were able to

| get only a trickle of additional supplies from the Germans. With the German position deteriorating everywhere, it was impossible to convince Hitler and the German Armed Forces High Command that such aid was in the Germans’ interest.'”°

By the end of August 1944, a resolution of the situation in Serbia was at '5Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Fr. 460. 126On the meeting between Nedié and Mihailovi¢, see Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Siidost,

1940-1945, p. 164, and the testimony of Mihailovi¢ and Dragi Jovanovi¢ in The Trial of

Dragoljub-Draza Mihailovié, pp. 231-44. On their failure to obtain more arms, see Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 342-46.

228 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA hand. The attack on German, Nedi¢, and Mihailovi¢ Chetnik forces was opened by the Partisans from the west and southwest in the last days of August. For a week in early September, Western Allied air forces parachuted supplies into Serbia and pounded the most important communication lines in Yugoslavia, with the aim of making it impossible for the large German army in Greece

to link up with German troops defending Serbia. The Partisans forced Mihailovi¢ and the Chetnik Supreme Command out of Serbia during the second half of September. To the east, Soviet operations against the Germans in Serbia and the Banat began in late September and early October. Under these multiple

attacks, the German defense, aided by weak Serbian quisling and Chetnik troops, collapsed, and German forces began to withdraw, taking along the Serbian Volunteer Corps and the Russian Protective Corps. The Chetnik forces that still remained, together with the Serbian State Guard that was now a part of them, withdrew first to Sandzak and then to northeast Bosnia. Belgrade was liberated by Soviet and Partisan units on October 20. The rout of the Nedi¢ and Chetnik forces that had ruled Serbia under German occupation was complete. During the first week of October, Nedi¢ and his government were evacuated from Belgrade to Austria. On October 6, at Nedi¢’s suggestion, General Felber transferred command of the Serbian State Guard to General Miodrag Damjanovic¢, formerly Nedi¢’s chef de cabinet and Mihailovic’s chief representative in the Nedi¢ government. Damjanovi¢ immediately put the guard under

Mihailovié’s command, though effective cooperation between it and the Chetniks proved impossible, and they separated in January 1945 in Bosnia. On October 7 Felber appointed twelve high government officials (including Damjanovic) from various ministries, proposed by Nedi¢, as commissioners to take charge of the ministries until the Partisan authorities arrived. Such was the end of the tortuous road for the Nedi¢ administration, the much abused tool of the German occupation regime in Serbia.” The later fate of Nedi¢ and the various Serbian collaborationist forces will be related in the concluding chapter of this study.

THE SERBIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

DURING THE WAR }

In Chapter 3, when describing wartime developments in Slovenia, we also reviewed the activities of the prohibited Slovene People’s Party, the main Slovene political party in the interwar period. It is therefore fitting to review here what happened to the pre-1941 Serbian political parties during the war. We

begin with a brief look at their activities up to 1941.’ , 27Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Fr. 871; Solari¢, “How I Became a Member of the Serbian Volunteer Corps,” pp. 32-38; Micr. No. T-311, Roll 194, Fr. 259. '8For a review of the Serbian political parties, see my book, The Chetniks, pp. 8-12, 22-

25, 35-53, and 75-79 for their prewar actions, and pp. 162-65, 262-81, 303-I1, 372, 399-

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 229 The history of political parties in Serbia during the interwar period was extremely involved. The two main parties, the National Radical Party (the Radical Party, for short) and the Democratic Party, usually in coalition with other parties, alternately ran the government of Yugoslavia during the 1920’s, with the king selecting the prime minister. Due to changing conditions and especially to King Alexander’s manipulations, there were often minor splits in these parties.

With the introduction of royal dictatorship in January 1929, all political parties were prohibited. But they continued to operate informally in a very limited fashion. When King Alexander granted a constitution in 1931 that also provided for a parliament, the government allowed the formation of political parties that met certain restrictive conditions. Only the government-sponsored party could meet these conditions, and only this party, whose members were drawn from the two former major Serbian parties, presented a list of candidates in the 1931 elections. Subsequently, in the elections of 1935 and 1938, the informally operating opposition parties were able to unite for the purpose of participating in the voting and presented a single list of opposition candidates. Even under King Alexander’s dictatorship, both before and after the establishment of the government-sponsored party, the former Serbian party politi-

cians managed the government. Parliament had only a decorative function. Under Prince Regent Paul too, from October 1934 to the officers’ coup of March 27, 1941, the former Serbian party politicians, operating through the government-sponsored party, ran the government. Milan Stojadinovi¢, prime minister from mid-1935 to February 1939, was the leading member of the larger faction of the Radical Party and the leader of the Yugoslav Radical Union, the government party, and Dragisa Cvetkovié, who replaced him, came from the same wing of the Radical Party. The Cvetkovi¢ government brought Yugoslavia into the Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941, but this action had only limited support among the Serbian

political parties and senior army officers. The officers’ coup two days later overturned the Cvetkovic¢ government and sent Prince Regent Paul into exile.

The new government was headed by General Dusan Simovié and included leading members of the Radical and Democratic Parties, the Serbian Agrarian Party, and the Yugoslav National Party, as well as representatives of the Croatian and Slovene political parties that had earlier participated in the Cvetkovi¢ cabinet. With the German invasion of the country on April 6, however, the Simovi¢ government too was forced into exile. Several smaller parties also existed in Serbia that were of no real political consequence: the Socialist Party under the leadership of Zivko Topalovié, dubbed a “royal court socialist”; the Republican Party headed by JaSa Prodanovic¢; and the Peasant National Party, established in 1940 from the left wing of the Serbian Agrarian Party and headed by a political maverick, Dragoljub Jovanovic. 407, and 471~73 for their wartime activities. See also Bodrozi¢é, “The Bourgeois Parties in Serbia, 1941-1945.”

230 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA When the Germans occupied Serbia, they prohibited the activity of both formally and informally existing political parties. The only party that was allowed to operate was the Zbor movement of Dimitrije Ljotic, described earlier. Ljoti¢ was one of several Serbian politicians who supported the new collaborationist government. The head of the Commissioner Administration between May and August 1941, Milan A¢cimovic¢, had earlier been a member of the Sto- , jadinovic wing of the Radical Party. Several members of the Nedi¢ cabinets that followed had formerly been members of the Radical or Democratic Parties. The majority of prewar Serbian professional politicians who did not go into exile with the royal government and who, during the first two years of the war, were not sure whether the Axis or the Allies would win, simply ceased political activity. But after the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942 and the German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943, they began to anticipate an Allied victory and a repeat of what had happened at the end of the First World War in 1918. At that time, the Serbian government returned from exile on the heels of the victorious Serbian and Allied armies, resumed its duties in Belgrade, and soon thereafter, somewhat enlarged but fully in control, took over as the , government of the newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. With this precedent in mind, many prewar party politicians in Serbia gradually

became more active beginning in early 1943.

In the government-in-exile in London, meanwhile, General Simovi¢ was eased out as prime minister in January 1942 and succeeded by Slobodan Jovanovi¢, a well-known Serbian professor of constitutional law, prewar president of the strongly nationalistic Serbian Cultural Club, and a frequent adviser to the royal court, but not a party politician. Simovic’s downfall was hastened by the rise of Draza Mihailovic, the new star of the Serbian politicians and young officers in exile. British and Yugoslav government-in-exile propaganda made Mihailovi¢ into the first successful resistance leader against the Axis. To give him more formal prestige, he was rapidly promoted to the highest rank in the Yugoslav army and named minister of army, navy, and air force in the Jovanovic cabinet and chief of Supreme Command of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, as his Chetnik formations were renamed. Mihailovi¢c thus became the domestic arm of the government-in-exile. For several years, he enjoyed the full support of the British and the Americans, so that it was assumed in Serbia that he would have a controlling influence in the postwar government of the country. As a result, many politicians from the traditional political parties in

Serbia threw their support to him and the Chetniks. ; The Communist-led Partisans, however, endangered the position of all political groups in Serbia—collaborationist forces, groups allied or sympathizing with the Western Allies, and those who wanted to remain neutral between the competing camps. For the Communists, the war was an opportunity to press forward with armed resistance, develop commanding military forces, and eventually seize

power and introduce a Communist dictatorship. The Communists broadened

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA 231 | their appeal by reviving the Yugoslav idea, which had been completely discredited | during the interwar period by being used as a cover for Greater Serbianism. Redefined as the ideal of unity among free and equal South Slavic peoples and as the best means of their mutual survival, it attracted many supporters.

This threat to both the Chetniks and the traditional political parties in Serbia from their domestic opponents was matched by an ominous development in

, mid-1943 from their foreign backers. The British began to doubt the value of Mihailovic and the Chetniks as their allies in Yugoslavia. They came to realize that Mihailovi¢ was less a fighter against the Axis powers than a collaborator with them against the Partisans. The Partisans emerged as the group struggling against both the Axis and the domestic collaborationist forces, and the British

threw their support to them. Because of this and the Partisans’ military and domestic political success, the Communists emerged as the presumptive postwar rulers of Yugoslavia. At the second session of AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia) meeting in Jajce in Bosnia at the end of November 1943, they formed an interim government, reorganized Yugoslavia as a federal state, and forbade the king to return to the country before an election decided his future status. Perceiving the danger, Mihailovi¢c and the Chetniks, in cooperation with

representatives of the traditional Serbian political parties, convoked a congress in the village of Ba in western Serbia on January 25-28, 1944. Following the practice in the earlier period of royal dictatorship, the congress established a new superparty, the Yugoslav Democratic Union, under the leadership of a committee that included, among the many Serbs, a few Croats, one Slovene, and one Muslim from Bosnia. The leader of the minuscule Socialist Party, Zivko Topalovi¢, became the chairman of the new party, reportedly because he personally knew several socialist members of the British cabinet. Acting on an earlier hint from the government-in-exile, the congress declared that the future Yugoslavia would be organized as a federal state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the details of which would be worked out after the war. At the congress, the representatives of the traditional Serbian political parties fared poorly, because many Chetnik delegates considered them unreliable and corrupt. Almost all the individuals appointed to conduct the affairs of the new party supported Mihailovi¢. But under prevailing conditions—the situation in Yugoslavia in early 1944 and the deepening split between the Chetniks and the British—nothing that Mihailovi¢ and the traditional Serbian politicians might have done could improve their position. The traditional Serbian political parties were faring no better in the government-in-exile in London. Slobodan Jovanovi¢ had been replaced as prime minister in June 1943 by Milos Trifunovic¢, a leader of the Radical Party and a former minister in several cabinets. But squabbles between the Serbian and

Croatian members of the cabinet led him to resign in August, when he was , replaced by Bozidar Puri¢, a pro-Chetnik professional diplomat. Puric’s cabi-

232 THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA net was composed, not of politicians of stature, but of government officials,

third-rank politicians, and Mihailovi¢ as minister of army, navy, and air force. Under British pressure, King Peter and the government-in-exile moved to Cairo at the end of September, ostensibly to be near Yugoslavia when developments in southeast Europe climaxed, but in fact to be out of the British government’s way. Understandably, the Puri¢ cabinet was incapable of making any decisions of consequence due to its weak political composition, isolation in Cairo, the continuing quarrels between Serbian and Croatian politicians, and an increasingly anti-Chetnik and pro-Partisan British policy. In May 1944, the British withdrew their last mission from Mihailovic’s forces, to whom they had even earlier ceased delivering military supplies. Their aid now went exclusively to the Partisans. For some time, however, they worked toward the merger of the government-in-exile with the interim Partisan government, in hopes that they would retain some influence in Yugoslavia after the war. They also thought that this would be the best way to secure the future of the Karadjordjevi¢ dynasty. But no Serbian politician in exile was willing to preside over this transaction. The British, with American agreement and an understanding from Tito, did manage to induce King Peter to appoint © Ivan Subagi¢, former ban of Banovina Croatia, as prime minister of the government-in-exile on June 1, 1944. At the same time, Mihailovi¢ lost his post as minister of army, navy, and air force in the reorganized cabinet and also, in August, his post as chief of Supreme Command. The next year, after several months of preparation and encouraged by the decisions of the Big Three at Yalta in February 1945, the government-in-exile returned to Yugoslavia and on March 7 merged with the interim Partisan government, with Tito as prime minister and minister of defense, Subasi¢ as foreign minister, Milan Grol, the leader of the prewar Democratic Party, as vice premier, and Juraj Sutej, a party colleague of Suba%i¢, as minister without portfolio. A Regency Council of Three, all acceptable to the Communists, temporarily took over the functions of the Crown. The unified government was soon recognized by the Big

Three and other important governments. ,

In August 1945, however, Grol, and in September SubaSi¢é and Sutej, resigned their cabinet posts because the Communists did not observe the democratic conditions that had been agreed upon when the unified government was established. Despite various cosmetic trimmings, the Communists had actually introduced a one-party dictatorship. On November 11, 1945, an election was held with a single list of government candidates, which obtained about go percent of the vote, and on November 29, the new parliament proclaimed a republic. Politically, the dynasty and the two former leading political parties in Serbia, the Radical Party and the Democratic Party, were the main losers in —

postwar Yugoslavia.

ee ; CHAPTER 6

The Independent State of Croatia: An Italian-German Quasi Protectorate

After Germany crushed Yugoslavia militarily with minimal help from Italy and

Hungary and the Wehrmacht took control of most Yugoslav territory, Germany and Italy had to agree on the partition of the country. Hitler personally made some preliminary but fundamental decisions in this regard on April 12, 1941, while military operations were still in progress. The foreign ministers of the two countries met in Vienna on April 21-22 to give final form to these decisions. The major result of this meeting was the agreement on a demarcation line (the Vienna Line) between German and Italian zones of occupation and influence in Yugoslavia for the duration of the war, with a final adjustment to come after the Axis victory.

For the Germans, the demarcation line had to be drawn so that the main communication line from Austria to Greece (the railroad line from Graz to Athens, along with its branch from Ni to Sofia) was either under their direct control, as in occupied Serbia, or in friendly hands over which they had effective control, as in the Independent State of Croatia and Bulgaria. The Germans were also vitally interested in having control over the Danube River in Yugoslavia and in getting the lion’s share of Yugoslav raw materials for themselves. Thus, the demarcation line dividing the German and Italian zones of occupation and influence ran from the northwest tip of Slovenia through the middle of the Independent State of Croatia and then southeast to the junction of the wartime Serbian, Bulgarian, and Albanian borders (see Map 1). Strategic raw materials and other essential products in areas not under direct German control, such as bauxite in the Italian-controlled areas, nonferrous metals in the Bul-

garian-annexed parts, and food surpluses in the Hungarian-annexed parts, were earmarked for Germany for the duration of the war by special agreements. In the Independent State of Croatia, the demarcation line running down its center gave Germany control over the industrially and agriculturally more pro-

ductive parts of the country, leaving to Italy the economically less valuable parts. Though the Germans continued to assure the Italians that the Croatian state was in the latter’s sphere of influence, German bayonets kept the Ustasha

234 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA regime in power and the Germans gradually expanded their hold over many aspects of Croatian political, military, and economic life. Germany’s increasing control at Italy’s expense was made easier because the Germans did not annex

any Croatian territory and thus did not engender resentment and hostility , among the Croats. Italy, by contrast, forced the new state to give up much of its territory along the Adriatic coast and greatly reduced Croatian sovereign rights through the treaties of Rome of May 18, 1941. As Envoy Casertano was to say later, the Italians considered the new state “dependent on Italy.” This loss of territory and rights was tremendously resented by the entire Croatian population, including the Ustashas and their political allies. The Italian reoccupation of Zones II and III (see below) in September and October 1941 was interpreted by many Croats as Italy’s first step in acquiring these areas too. Italy’s explanation that the reoccupation was a necessary precaution against Allied landings on the Adriatic coast, as well as a way of strengthening the fight against the resistance, was only part of the rationale, for the Italians were also apprehensive — about German encroachment.on the Adriatic. Italian-Croatian relations were further strained because from the outset the Italians favored the Serbian population in areas under their control and later used Chetniks drawn from both the local region and outside the area as auxiliary forces. Although according to the

Rome treaties Italy was supposed to help Croatia organize and develop its armed forces, Croatia did not ask Italy for such aid, but turned instead to Germany. Since Germany was only too eager to assume an active role in Croatia, it welcomed these requests for assistance, though for quite some time it gave aid surreptitiously out of consideration for Italy’s feelings. Italy was powerless in this situation. Being much the weaker of the Axis

partners, it could only lodge protests with the Croatian government against Germany’s growing hold on Croatia. Thus Croatia became one of the most troublesome problems in relations between the two Axis countries. Until September 1943, the new Croatian state existed in reality as a joint Italian-German

quasi protectorate, with Germany’s influence steadily growing and Italy’s steadily declining. Since Croatia owed its existence to the Axis powers and could not continue without their political and military support, especially Germany’s, it had to put up with whatever conditions they imposed.

THE ITALIAN-CROATIAN TREATIES

OF ROME OF MAY 18, 1941 The establishment of frontiers between the new Croatian state and its neighbors occurred in several steps, and in one case remained unresolved. The frontier with Germany presented no difficulties and was fixed by a bilateral agreement of May 13, 1941. The frontier with German-occupied Serbia was set by a unilateral Croatian law decree of June 7, 1941, which, however, had re-

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 235 ceived German approval beforehand.' The really critical problems regarding frontiers arose with Italy. Italian support of the Ustasha exiles during the 1930’s was based on an understanding with Paveli¢, probably in the spirit of the memorandum submitted by him and Ivo Frank in 1927 (discussed in Chapter 1), that specified that after Italy had helped put the Croats in power, it would satisfy its territorial aims on the eastern shores of the Adriatic Sea and Croatia would form part of the Italian sphere of influence. In addition, the Italians had Paveli¢’s telegram to Mussolini of April 14, 1941, which Anfuso had made him send from Karlovac, as well as new clearance from the Germans from the von Ribbentrop-Ciano conference in Vienna on April 21-22, 1941. In regard to the latter, the German memorandum on the conference stated: Italy intends to link Croatia closely to it, possibly through a personal union. The Italians intend to annex Dalmatia; it is to be given the status of an Italian government (governatorato). The same holds for the rest of the littoral between Rijeka and the border of Montenegro. In principle, Germany is politically disinterested in Croatian questions. Hence the Fiihrer has no reason to take any position concerning them. He leaves it to the Duce to settle them with the Croats.”

The first round of negotiations on borders between Italy and Croatia took place between Ciano and Paveli¢ in Ljubljana on April 25. Having obtained a free hand from Germany, Ciano tried to impose a settlement on Paveli¢ that would have given Italy a strip of territory along the entire eastern shore of the Adriatic, thereby connecting Istria with Italian-occupied Montenegro and Albania. When Paveli¢ remarked that “the solution proposed... would have him thrown out of his job,” Ciano had ready a second alternative, annexation of a large part of Dalmatia. “This last-named portion [of territory] should be integrated by a political contract that would practically put the whole of Croatia under our control.” Paveli¢ countered by offering the Italians that portion of Dalmatia promised to Italy by the secret Treaty of London of 1915 (see Chapter 1). He also agreed to a comprehensive treaty with Italy regulating relations between the two countries.’ Because Mussolini and Ciano did not want to let Paveli¢ slip from their grasp, they were prepared to be satisfied with less than their maximum territorial aims. The meeting in Ljubljana identified the problems at issue between the two countries and probably led to a tentative agreement on some of them. Negotiations continued in Zagreb with Raffaele Casertano, the Italian special delegate, 'The border with Hungary remained unresolved because Croatia claimed the area of Medjimurje, which Hungary declared annexed and took possession of. See Jeli¢-Buti¢, UstaSe,

pp. 93-94. For the borders with Germany and Serbia, see Croatia, Independent State of, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Medjunarodni ugovori, 1941, pp. 23-26, 85-86. 2DGFP, 12: 630. Emphasis as in the English translation of the original German document, which is not reproduced here. See also Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, pp. 436-37.

3Ciano, Diaries, pp. 341-43. For the views of a Croatian politician who accompanied Paveli¢ to the Ljubljana conference, see Bulat, “The Negotiations in Ljubljana,” pp. 7-20.

yy AUSTRIA yy Lb wn aribor Natl \ \ | | |Y{or» 2a : ay HUNGARY i , fiUeWY, Varazdin \ 2 TIA TT. RS rc fe |} < Yer khefg ee Uy \ J aerate ‘Subetes 7 |

| ¢ MBHANA SLOVENIA? APH | LLL Cc CC ZAGREB *Borjelovar avaLIVOLVODINAZ Shaeee | : > |

ITALY oe AA BARANJA\ | | BACKA | \ . CoO NULLD ¢ R \Ss}., kupae En e) lL SSiskLozega Osijek aon , | Rijekaiume) 0 a fy Poy Nig UlXI Novi| Sad |Gy :

i . ef Topusko ° ¥ Lt LLL |'NK IMWe \V BAS ‘2: \2 f N_ AKozara ¢j“~2 SX 3; LS \ S: of ed y h UY AN a Bee 8 ° ® f ‘ ¢@2 Se “yy, pha Prijedor RY, / as zemun/ I \W Cres\ | f \. @ Bihac ‘\ fy an: @ fBogatic, BELGRADE” | Ie g BuSak \O® oy, 09 ALLL LISA | | | (K

(A ae:og7Nort Slavonski A NY |ISTRIA PBS. SSM BANUA Bosanska Dubica 4 4 fruska f {) fess " °C\ Ned aon ep _»Micr. No. T-501, Roll 268, Fr. 159. See also Roll 264, Frs. 962-63.

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 279 cies inaugurated in the fall of 1942, as well as subsequent changes leading to ever greater German political and military involvement in the country, failed to pacify it.

Germany’s increased control in Croatia came none too soon. By early November 1942, the Partisan main force, which had been advancing northwestward since June from the borders joining Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro, reached the Una River and established contact between the Bosnian liberated area and the liberated areas of Lika, Kordun, and Banija. This meant that there was now a liberated area about 250 kilometers long and 40 to 70 kilometers wide in the heart of the Independent State of Croatia, essentially within the Italian zone of occupation. The German and Italian commands, with some participation from the Croats, discussed the situation at length and decided to undertake a large-scale combined operation to eliminate the Partisan threat and disarm the Chetniks in the Italian zone. This was Operation Weiss (the Fourth Enemy Offensive in Partisan parlance), in which German, Italian, Croatian, and Chetnik forces from the Italian zone of occupation participated. It required bringing new German forces into Croatia, in particular the 7th SS Volunteer Division “Prinz Eugen” and the 369th Infantry Division, the first Croatian legionnaire division. Operation Weiss, which lasted from mid-January to midMarch 1943, inflicted severe losses on the Partisans and, after several interconnected phases, succeeded in pushing the Partisan main force southward onto the left bank of the Neretva River. But it did not put them out of action. In fact, between mid-March and mid-May 1943, the Partisan main force inflicted irreparable losses on the Chetniks in eastern Herzegovina and southeast Bosnia, which for all practical purposes eliminated the Mihailovi¢ Chetnik threat to the Independent State of Croatia. In the middle of May, the Germans launched another large-scale combined operation, Operation Schwarz (the Fifth Enemy Offensive in Partisan parlance), against the Partisans in Montenegro. This operation, which lasted until mid-June, also inflicted heavy losses on them, but failed to achieve its objective, since the bulk of the Partisan main force managed to escape into northeast Bosnia.” Among the preparations for Operation Weiss was an agreement between the Germans and the Croatian government on January 17, 1943, which gave German commanders executive power in their areas of operation, that is, between the Sava River and the German-Italian demarcation line. To put this agreement into effect, the Croatian government issued the Law Decree on the Introduction of the Emergency Regime on January 18, 1943, which provided for the transfer of executive power to the commanding general or any other **For a brief discussion of Operations Weiss and Schwarz, see Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 231-56.

280 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA designated person in the area in case of a declared emergency.” While the transfer of executive power to German generals in specified areas was important in principle because it meant an infringement on the sovereign rights of the Croatian state, it did not mean much in practice. The Germans were primarily concerned with military operations, and German military commands had only minimal personnel for government administrative affairs, few of whom were fluent in Serbo-Croatian. The civilian administration remained in the hands of Croats, but under German supreme authority and supervision. The Germans also had to approve appointments to higher administrative positions in these areas, and in some cases they vetoed Croatian proposals. Since the Germans officially recognized the Independent State of Croatia as a sovereign state, they could not organize a government of military occupation in the

country or any part of it, so their influence on Croatian civilian administration was limited.” But they felt that it was both necessary and advantageous to hold executive power in those areas of Croatia of great military significance, as is shown by the fact that, after such power was taken away from German generals in September 1943, it was returned to them in May 1944 on the basis of a new agreement and retained until the end of the war (see the following chapter). -Paveli¢ undoubtedly found his position as head of a captive state awkward, but since he relied on the Germans’ presence in Croatia to remain in power, he was careful lest he lose their support. His nervousness can be sensed in Glaise’s memorandum on his conference with Paveli¢ on January 27, 1943, during Op-

eration Weiss: “Beyond the agenda of the conference the Poglavnik asked whether it was not true that the German Wehrmacht intended to remove him from his post. The general [Glaise] thought that present conditions were not

suitable for experiments of this nature.””

- German commanders in Croatia, especially Glaise, worked hard to increase the military power of Croatia for service to the Reich. They accelerated the development of the Croatian legionnaire divisions, which upper-echelon German commanders considered the most efficient way of combining Croatian manpower with German command personnel and specialists. They also gave careful attention to reorganizing, developing, and training purely Croa-

tian army units, primarily four mountain and four light infantry brigades, each with three to four battalions. As instructional personnel, the Germans For the German-Croatian agreement of January 17, 1943, see Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 268, Fr. 37. This followed Hitler’s Directive No. 47 of December 28, 1942, on the reorganization of the command for the defense of southeast Europe (Germany, Wehrmacht, Oberkom-

mando, Hitlers Weisungen, p. 213). For the law decree of January 18, 1943, see Zbornik

zakona i naredaba NDH, 1943, pp. 39-40. ,

*8Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Fr. 321; Micr. No. T-501, Roll 258, Frs. 723-24. *Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Fr. 344.

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 281 detailed about 50 officers and 3 50 noncommissioned officers and men to each brigade. The commanding general of German troops in Croatia also helped reorganize other Croatian forces, primarily the fifteen regiments of reservists from the old Austro-Hungarian and Yugoslav armies.'” Another German military plan at this time was to declare Slavonia, the area between the Sava and Drava Rivers—the breadbasket of Croatia, which was to

some extent under Partisan control—an operational area in which German commanders would exercise supreme executive power with the assistance of Croatian regional authorities. In a report of April 20, 1943, Glaise complained that the influence of Croatian authorities on pacification efforts in the area was “damaging and obstructing.” And in a private service letter to Colonel Schuchardt on May 26, 1943, he remarked, after describing different operations against the Partisans in Slavonia: “In many often very rugged and thickly forested mountain ranges rising from the fertile plains, new fighting detachments are assembled and go through the land and plunder it. In those areas, where there is no stronger German or—but this only conditionally—Croatian military unit holding the terrain, all state power ends and the Partisans rule the land.”'" The primary objective of the plan was to secure the grain harvest of the area for the Croatian government (and no doubt for the German army as well) and keep it out of the hands of the Partisans. The Germans also sought to squeeze as much manpower out of Croatia as possible, especially during 1943. Kasche’s message of June 5, 1943, to his ministry discussing German plans to recruit volunteers in Croatia (as well as Bulgaria and Slovakia) for service in antiaircraft defenses in the Reich described Paveli¢’s willingness to supply men for this purpose to the extent that they were available. But Kasche pointed out that several other recruiting drives for Croa-

tian manpower were also under way—for the development of the Croatian armed forces and the formation of Croatian legionnaire divisions, for the Waffen SS and the German Luftwaffe and navy, for the newly formed GermanCroatian SS police and gendarmerie, for work in German industry and agricul-

ture, and, among the Croatian Volksdeutsche, a special recruitment for the Waffen SS. Kasche reported that some recruiting in Croatia was done on the basis of several German-Croatian agreements, but that some was done without any formal arrangement. Furthermore, Croatian draftees were often called up at the same time as volunteers were recruited, which created many political diflMMicr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 832; Micr. No. T-501, Roll 268, Fr. 78-80. The new chief of the Croatian General Staff, General Ivan Prpi¢, was not pleased that Croatian soldiers were taken to Austria for training, but his displeasure did not deter the Germans from doing

what they wanted. This is clearly seen from Glaise’s December 13, 1942, report, “The Current Status of Croatian-German Military Cooperation,” in the second microfilm cited above. For Glaise’s report of April 20, 1943, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 857, and for his private service letter of May 26, 1943, Frs. 527-28.

282 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA ficulties and caused a lot of resentment. He proposed that discussions be under-

taken with the Croats to clear up the problem.’” |

From the very beginning of the Independent State of Croatia, the Germans had a special source of power in the well-organized, though relatively small, German minority. In 1941, according to their own estimates, the Croatian -Volksdeutsche numbered between 140,000 and 150,000 people and were located mainly in the rich agricultural areas of Slavonia and Srijem, with smaller numbers in Croatia proper and northern Bosnia. Other German and Yugoslav sources put the number of Volksdeutsche in the Independent State of Croatia in April 1941 at about 170,000, which seems more accurate. In Slavonia and Srijem, the Volksdeutsche were descendants both of earlier colonists, who had arrived as far back as the eighteenth century following the liberation of these areas from Turkish rule by the Habsburgs, and of more recent colonists, who had arrived during the second half of the nineteenth century.’ In Bosnia they were descendants of colonists who had settled there after 1878, when AustriaHungary occupied the province. The cultural and political center of the Croa-

tian Volksdeutsche during the war was Osijek. a

In prewar Yugoslavia, as we noted in the previous chapter, the German mi-

| nority had its own cultural organization (the Kulturbund) and press, a separate political party, and various agricultural, credit, and health cooperatives. Close to 80 percent of the Volksdeutsche were Roman Catholic. Living in the richest agricultural areas of Yugoslavia, they were the most advanced farmers in the - country and supplied a large share of marketable agricultural and livestock

products. a 3 | ,

Toward the end of the 1930’s, all German minority organizations in Yugo-

. slavia and almost the entire German population came under the control of younger pro-Nazi elements, who kept in close touch with Reich authorities and followed orders from the Reich. Just prior to and during the short War of April 1941, the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche, under the direction of these pro-Nazi ele-

ments and German agents, acted as a fifth column." oe : As we have already described, after the partition of Yugoslavia in April

, 1941, the German minority was split among four different states. The Yugoslav portion of the Banat became part of occupied Serbia, but it was administered by the local Volksdeutsche under the direct supervision of the German —12Micr. No. T-120, Roll 1757, Fr. Eo2z4,710. I have not seen any evidence that Kasche’s

suggestion was accepted, but after the Italian surrender in September 1943, additional _ changes took place in German-Croatian military relations, which are discussed in the fol-

lowing chapter. — ‘For the smaller estimates, see the note of Martin Luther of the German Ministry of For-

, eign Affairs of June 12, 1942, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5783, Frs. H297,444-46. For the larger estimates and the colonists’ provenance, see Micr. No. T-175, Roll 460, Frs. 2,979,486-

89, and Krni¢, “The Transfer of Volksdeutsche,” pp. 73-74. ,

Biber, Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji, pp. 211-67. _

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 2.83 occupation authorities in Belgrade. Backa, Baranja, Medjimurje, and Prekmurje were annexed by Hungary, and the Germans in these areas were included in the organizations of the German minority in Hungary. The northern part of Slovenia, occupied by Germany, contained most of the Slovene Volksdeutsche except for those in the enclave of Kocevje (Gottschee) in the southern part, annexed by Italy, who were removed in late 1941 and early 1942. Finally, Slavonia and Srijem in the Independent State of Croatia had a sizable German minority. For the organization of all Volksdeutsche in all countries or areas that came under their formal or virtual control, the Germans followed a set of general principles. In all areas the Volksdeutsche were organized as an autonomous body. They obtained full rights in local administration, schools, the economy, political and youth organizations, and language. Those who served in German military units acquired Reich citizenship but also kept the citizenship of their state of origin. Finally, the Volksdeutsche could be resettled in other areas of their state or in other states or occupied areas, or transferred to the Reich, by the German authorities.'” Soon after the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia, the German minority became formally and openly an arm of the Third Reich and undertook to promote its objectives. Its separate status in Croatia, amounting to

that of a state within a state, was established by the law decree of June 21, 1941. A series of other decrees and ordinances regulated German schools, the status of German minority members as officials of the Croatian government, the Volksdeutsche militia as part of the Ustasha militia, and so on. Other German-Croatian arrangements regulated the service of the German minority in the German armed forces. The leader of the Croatian Volksdeutsche, selected by the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, was Branimir Altgayer, who held this position throughout the war. But criticism of his leadership was heard from both official and private sources, and many regional and local leaders seem to have acted more or less on their own.'”° 'SMicr. No. T-120, Roll 2415, Frs. E211,526-27. '6For the law decree of June 21, 1941, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1941, p. 189. On Altgayer, see Biber, Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji, pp. 334-35. On the independence of local Volksdeutsche leaders, see the reports of a private observer knowledgeable about conditions among the German minority in Croatia, which the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to the German Legation in Zagreb on February 11, 1942, in Micr. No. T120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,684-87, and the July 1, 1943, report by Willy Requard, the official in charge of Volksdeutsche affairs at the German Legation in Zagreb, on his visit to various Volksdeutsche organizations in Croatia, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H297,536O.

, Altgayer, who was 44 years old in 1941, had been an officer in the Yugoslav army in the early 1920’s, but had resigned his commission because he found it incompatible with his German national feeling. He was released from SS service by a special order of Himmler on July 16, 1943, so that he could resume leadership of the Volksdeutsche. See Micr. No. T-5or, Roll 267, Fr. 114.

284 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA The Italians were not at all pleased by the special status accorded the Volksdeutsche in Croatia. According to Minister of Foreign Affairs Lorkovié, a high official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luca Pietromarchi, complained to the Croatian envoy in Rome in November 1941 “that in his opinion the Germans are not serious about Croatian sovereignty if they asked for the enactment of such laws [as the law decree of June 21, 1941].” He was especially perturbed that the Volksdeutsche took the oath of allegiance to Hitler. Similar sentiments were expressed by Militia General Eugenio Coselschi, the representative of the Italian Fascist Party with the Ustasha movement in Zagreb, and by Envoy Casertano. The latter remarked that if Italy had known-that Croatia was

to be a German protectorate, it would have insisted on different frontiers in April and May 1941.’” But these remarks had no effect.

The first Volksdeutsche military formation in the new Croatian state was the Einsatzstaffel der Deutschen Mannschaft (although some Yugoslav Volks-

deutsche had enlisted on their own in German SS formations before April 1941). The unit was established by a law decree of July 31, 1941, in “appreciation for services rendered by the German national group in the maintenance of order, the establishment of the New Order, and the disarming of the former Yugoslav army during the founding of the Independent State of Croatia.” Although it was deployed as part of the Ustasha militia, its chief task became the protection of Volksdeutsche communities in the state. Its commander until June 1942 was Willibald Keller, who had been a captain in the Yugoslav army up to April 1941. According to the July 31 decree, the strength of the Einsatzstaffel was limited to one battalion. But because Volksdeutsche communities needed more protection from guerrilla forces in the Croatian countryside, the Einsatzstaffel was gradually expanded and by June 1, 1942, had reached the strength of 1,500 officers and men. By additional arrangements with the Croatian government, two reserve battalions were created that, by the same

date, had a combined complement of 1,200 men." , According to an agreement between the German and Croatian governments of September 16, 1941, Volksdeutsche men of military age were to serve in separate units of the Croatian army. Ten percent of the recruits each year were to serve in German formations, which came to mean SS formations. Germany was always pressed for manpower and for its SS troops especially wanted as many men as possible from German minorities (and later other groups) in allied _ and occupied countries, including Croatia. Thus at the beginning of June 1942, Reichsfiihrer SS Himmler proposed to enlist all German minority members between the ages of 17 and 30 in the 7th SS Division “Prinz Eugen.” On July 14,

H296,720-21. |

'’Micr. No. T-120, Roll 2415, Frs. Ex21,615-17, and Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs.

‘For the law decree of July 31, 1941, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1941, pp.

326-27. For a detailed report by Kasche on the development and activities of the Einsatzstaf-

fel up to June 1, 1942, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,583-90. |

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 285 1942, von Ribbentrop asked Kasche to arrange with the Croatian government for all Croatian Volksdeutsche males in this category to be put at the disposal of SS formations. This was agreed upon in an exchange of notes between the

two governments on September 21 and October 10, 1942, after which all Volksdeutsche men between the ages of 17 and 35 were permitted to volunteer

for SS units. Far more men were pressured into joining SS units by Volksdeutsche organizations than volunteered on their own. By April 1, 1943, two recruiting drives had resulted in 10,270 Volksdeutsche enlisting in German military units and 5,000.in Volksdeutsche units in the Croatian army, with an additional 2,900 applications on hand. A special protocol of April 24, 1943, es-

tablished a mixed German-Croatian police and gendarmerie open to older Volksdeutsche (see below). The chief of the police force, SS Brigade Leader and

Major General of Police Konstantin Kammerhofer (incorrectly identified as Viktor Kammerhofer in the first volume of this study), as the representative of the Reichsfiihrer SS in Croatia, was later also named his representative for the affairs of the Croatian Volksdeutsche." By July 1943 over 15 percent of the total estimated Volksdeutsche population in Croatia was serving the Reich in one way or another. According to a memorandum from a conference on the position of the Croatian Volksdeutsche and their contribution to the German war effort, held at the German Legation in Zagreb on July 1, 1943, minority members at that time were serving as follows: 13,500 with police and SS forces in the Reich; 2,500 with German police forces in Croatia; 3 50 in the Wehrmacht; 700 as interpreters in the Wehrmacht; 1,600 in Croatian army and railroad protection battalions; 450 as specialists in the Croatian army; 2,200 in Organization Todt (apparently outside the Reich);

and 4,500 as workers in the Reich—a total of 25,800 men. During the next twenty months, even more manpower was drawn from the minority. The Volksdeutsche in Croatia felt this drain acutely, since the largely agricultural group could ill afford to lose nearly all its able-bodied males. A report by Willy Requard of the German Legation in Zagreb on July 1, 1943, noted that in some villages in Slavonia, 65 to 70 percent of the men between 17 and 60 years of age were in military service or war-related work away from home. Thus the heavy farm work was being done mostly by women and children.'" For the stipulation that ro percent of Volksdeutsche recruits for the Croatian army serve in German formations, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H297,484—-86. For the volunteer and recruiting drives, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Frs. H299,396-97, and for the pressure on young men to join SS units, and Kammerhofer’s role, Fr. H299,771. An excellent article on the involvement of the SS in the Independent State of Croatia is Sundhaussen, “Zur Geschichte der Waffen-SS in Kroatien,” pp. 176-96. See especially pp. 188-89 for the pressure put on members of the minority. Sundhaussen also elaborates on the conflict between Kasche and the SS, both in the field and in Berlin. "For the memorandum on the contribution of the Croatian Volksdeutsche, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Frs. 383-85, and for Requard’s report, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H297,53 6-40.

286 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA _ In addition to arranging the enlistment of Croatian Volksdeutsche in SS formations, Himmler also proposed that those Croatian Volksdeutsche. who were exposed to great danger from Yugoslav resistance forces, specifically those in Bosnia, be resettled in the Reich. There was some opposition to this in Berlin, but Himmler prevailed, and on July 14, 1942, von Ribbentrop asked Kasche to arrange with the Croatian government for the resettlement of the

Bosnian Volksdeutsche in the Reich.”

Himmler correctly feared for the safety of the German minority in Bosnia. Not only there but all over the Croatian countryside, the main problem for the German minority was protecting itself from hostile Partisans. For a number of reasons, the Volksdeutsche in Croatia were a favorite target of the Partisans: they lived mostly in villages and were identified as instruments of the German invader; they participated in large numbers in German units that fought the Partisans; they often took possession of the property of Serbian families expelled from these areas or whose members were Partisans; and in towns they often took possession of Serbian and Jewish businesses and properties. There was also a great deal of friction between the German minority and the Croatian population, because the former, as a privileged group, behaved arrogantly and

took the best of the available spoils. ,

The Volksdeutsche in Croatia were exposed to different degrees of danger depending on the location of their village, the intensity of guerrilla activity, and. their behavior. Initially the most endangered were the Germans in northern Bosnia, most of whom lived dispersed among the South Slavic population

rather than in separate villages. Most of them, about 18,300 people, were evacuated in October and November 1942 and resettled in the Polish General

' Government (the part of Poland under German control but not annexed by Germany). Toward the end of the war, most of them moved to the territory of the Old Reich. After November 1942, only a few compact German villages re-

mained in Bosnia.'” _

Himmler had in fact planned to evacuate the entire German minority from

Croatia by September 1942 to remove them from Partisan danger, and in postwar depositions Altgayer acknowledged that he also favored evacuation.

But the plan was not carried out because of the opposition, on political grounds, of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Kasche.'” Thenceforth the resettlement of the Croatian Volksdeutsche to safer areas within Croatia or

to Germany was left in abeyance. |

"For the opposition in Berlin, see a report by Martin Luther on June 17, 1942, to von Ribbentrop, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H2z97,441-46. For the latter’s request to

Kasche, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5788, Frs. H302,671-73. "Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, pp. 83E-84E. :

'"3Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Fr. H299,773, and Krni¢, “The Transfer of Volksdeutsche,” pp. 80-81.

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 287 During most of 1943, there was no organized transfer of Volksdeutsche within or outside of Croatia. But as pressure from the Partisans mounted, increasing numbers of Volksdeutsche were forced to flee their villages. Late in 1943 Kammerhofer and Altgayer organized the evacuation of Volksdeutsche from dangerous areas in western Slavonian counties. According to Andreas Rihrig, Kammerhofer’s chief of staff, up to December 18, 1943, 3,593 Volksdeutsche were expelled or were refugees from these areas, and from that date to

April 14, 1944, 3,643 families with 16,613 members were systematically evacuated by the Waffen SS and minority organizations dealing with resettlement. Some evacuees were distributed among Volksdeutsche families in the area of Osijek, while others were sent to eastern Srijem to farms left vacant by Serbs who had been killed by the Ustashas, fled to Serbia, or joined the guerrillas, leaving their properties to be confiscated by the Croatian government.'” Kammerhofer’s action caused a great deal of friction among the Volksdeutsche themselves, among German representatives in Croatia, primarily Kasche and Kammerhofer and his staff, and between the German Ministry of Foreign

Affairs on the one hand and the Office of the Reichsfiihrer SS and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle in Berlin on the other. Kammerhofer and Altgayer were criticized for having acted without prior consultation with either Kasche or the Croatian government. Some evacuees complained that the action was unnecessary, ill prepared, and badly handled; others criticized the resettlement of evacuees on property that had been confiscated by the Croatian government

from Serbs. In April 1944 the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Himmler to halt the resettlement until its political aspects could be studied.'” For the next four or five months there were apparently no evacuations from Croatia or internal resettlement of Volksdeutsche. As the war began drawing to a close, the German minority had more and more reason to fear for its safety. According to a German intelligence report on the situation in Croatia in September 1944, after Bulgaria went over to the Soviet side, the hard core of the minority was convinced that they would be removed to safety. Others who had lived as Croats but had reverted to German nationality in 1941 began to find their way back into the Croatian community. Some who had been resettled in eastern Srijem returned to their villages in Slavonia and established contact with the Serbian population and the Partisans. Many young people called up for labor service refused to go, and some even be-

gan working with the Partisans. Throughout the war, the Partisans had encouraged the Volksdeutsche to join their ranks. In August 1943, they organized 'M4Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Frs. H299,741-42. See also Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, pp. 85E-86E. For the rationale of resettling Germans from western Slavonia in eastern Srijem, see Micr. No. T-175, Roll 480, Frs. 2,974,480-84.

"SMicr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Frs. H299,731-49. For the memorandum of April 1, 1944, see Fr. H299,768.

288 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA a company of mostly Volksdeutsche in western Slavonia, the “Ernst Thalman” Company, and a year later they established a second company of the same sort,

the “Freies Deutschland” Company." , , | The Germans did not fail the Volksdeutsche who counted on being rescued. In the last three months of 1944 they carried out a mass evacuation of Volks~ deutsche from all of southeast Europe, particularly the Yugoslav Banat, Backa, and the Independent State of Croatia. By agreement between Kammerhofer and Altgayer, the evacuation of the Volksdeutsche from Croatia to the Reich

was done in three stages from three designated zones. The first evacuation started on October 1, the second followed on October 20, and the third concluded in the last days of October. Plans called for the evacuation of 150,000 people, but because a large number of men were in various German services _ and because some people refused to leave, the actual number, according to the

VOMI report on the evacuation, was somewhere between 90,000 and 100,000. People were helped to take along (by train and cart) as much movable

, property as possible. No decision was made about what to do with their immovable property, but new Home Guard units were formed and left behind for guard duty. According to the VOMI report for November 1944, as of November 7, a total of 90,000 Volksdeutsche had been evacuated from Croatia. Since 18,300 Volksdeutsche from Bosnia had been evacuated in 1942 and 28,000

Croatian Germans were in the Waffen SS and about 15,000 worked in the Reich (and some in Home Guards still in Croatia), the German authorities con-

sidered the evacuation very successful.” |

~The German minority, which had lived and worked peacefully in various

parts of Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary for centuries and contributed greatly to the economies of these countries, was converted by the Nazis into an

important agent for subjugating and exploiting these areas during the war. Some leaders in the Reich and among the Danubian Volksdeutsche themselves even dreamed of using the Volksdeutsche as the foundation of a German Danubian state, the bastion for further domination of southeast Europe. Instead of fulfilling this dream, the Volksdeutsche had to be evacuated wholesale to the Reich in the fall of 1944 in order to be saved from large-scale retributions.

Thousands of Volksdeutsche from the Banat and Batka who could not be

over to Germany. . | ,

evacuated were taken to the Soviet Union after October 1944 and later turned At the end of the war, an estimated 30,000 Volksdeutsche were left in the territory of the former Independent State of Croatia. Since many had helped Nazi Germany, the new Yugoslav government assembled them in camps and. ~ expelled most to Germany. The property of expelled and evacuated Volksdeutsche was nationalized and later distributed to local families whose homes and

"6K rnié, “The Transfer of Volksdeutsche,” pp. 86-87. | , '7Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Frs. H299,305 and H299,347. See also Das Schicksal der

Deutschen in Jugoslawien, pp. 86E-87E.

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 289 property had been destroyed and to colonists. In the Yugoslav census of March 15, 1948, there were only 55,337 people of German nationality in Yugosla-

via.

Both as Reichsfihrer SS and chief of German police and as Reich commissar

for the strengthening of Germandom abroad through the Volksdeutsche Mit- , telstelle (VOMI), Heinrich Himmler was involved in the affairs of the Croatian Volksdeutsche from the beginning. He was instrumental in arranging the exceptionally favorable status of the German minority in Croatia, and the VOMI selected Altgayer as their leader. Himmler’s role in Croatia was enlarged even further as a result of the continuing guerrilla resistance and the reputed inability of the Croatian police and government—the Ustashas—to pacify and properly administer the areas that had been cleared of insurgents by German and Croatian forces. From the spring

of 1943, as chief for the suppression of guerrillas (Bandenbekampfung), Himmler greatly expanded the SS and police organization in Croatia by establishing a special SS division for Bosnian Muslims and a special German-Croatian police and gendarmerie.” The Germans had high expectations of Operation Weiss, the large-scale offensive against the Partisans launched on January 20, 1943. Using German, Italian, Croatian, and Chetnik forces, Operation Weiss was supposed to eliminate Partisan sabotage of communication lines through Croatia and the Partisan threat to bauxite-producing areas. The destruction of the Partisans would also put an end to the need for large numbers of German troops in Croatia. The Italians somewhat reluctantly agreed to disarm the Chetniks in their area once the Partisans had been liquidated. However, the Germans were skeptical of the ability of the Ustasha administration and police forces to keep the peace and govern competently in the areas cleared of Partisans. Without this, Operation Weiss would be fought to little purpose. The Germans therefore decided that it was necessary to organize a special German-Croatian police force in Croatia to secure cleared areas. The initiative for this came from Alexander Lohr, commander in chief in southeast Europe, who was responsible for the pacification of Croatia. However, since the maintenance of peace and order was a police matter and since Himmler was in charge of all operations against guerrillas in German theaters of war, it became his task to establish and supervise the police

and gendarmerie organization and its operation in Croatia.” , "'8For the Yugoslav census of March 1948, see Yugoslavia, Combined Office for Statistics and Evidence, Statisticki godisnjak, p. 60. The organization of the 7th SS Volunteer Division “Prinz Eugen,” which was occasionally deployed in the Independent State of Croatia beginning in January 1943, was discussed in Chapter 5 because its manpower consisted essentially of Volksdeutsche from the Banat.

'0For Lohr’s role, see Micr. No. T-77, Roll 788, Frs. 5,517,500-501. Himmler at first organized the plenipotentiary for the suppression of guerrillas (Bevollmdchtigte fiir die Bandenbekampfung). On June 21, 1943, it was reorganized and renamed the chief of troops

290 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA | After a series of high-level discussions among the German armed forces and | ~ §S and police authorities, Hitler issued an order on March 10, 1943, for the use of a mixed German-Croatian SS police and gendarmerie to bring about the “final pacification of Croatian areas freed from the Communists.” He ordered Croatian domestic manpower to be used for this task. Himmler delegated authority to organize and command this force to his special representative, SS Brigade Leader and Major General of Police Konstantin Kammerhofer. Except for his title, which differed because Croatia was nominally independent, Kammerhofer’s position was essentially the same as that of Higher SS and Police Leader General August Meyszner in German-occupied Serbia. It was to be ex-

pected that Himmler would try to make the organization in Croatia an autonomous body, independent not only from Croatian authorities but also from other German authorities in Croatia. The nature of the command could

| also be expected to reflect Himmler’s loathing for the Ustashas, whom he

looked upon as a “band of robbers.” _ a oe

_ According to a memorandum from the Croatian Legation in Berlin on April 12, 1943, the Croatian government first learned of the proposed plan from Kasche in early March 1943. Although it immediately protested, Kammerhofer soon arrived in Croatia with about 1,000 German police and on April 7 informed the government of his plan to send three-man units to take command of the 540-odd gendarmerie stations in Croatia. He also intended to enlarge his force with manpower from the Volksdeutsche and from Croatian forces and to : put all of them in German uniforms. Paveli¢ and Lorkovi¢ again protested, citing numerous objections: the establishment of this police would infringe on

: Croatian sovereignty; it would be a boon to enemy propaganda as a surrender of Croatian independence; it would have unpleasant repercussions on Croatia’s relations with Italy, which, under the Treaty of Guarantee and Collaboration, had advisers with the Croatian gendarmerie; and it would increase friction be-

tween the Croatian population and the Volksdeutsche.'” | Far from withdrawing the plan, the Germans expanded it. Originally they _ thought of establishing the mixed police and gendarmerie apparatus only in areas in which German commanders exercised executive power, that is, between the Sava River and the German-Italian demarcation line. When this proved too | restrictive, the Armed Forces High Command and Himmler agreed to establish the same organization in areas north of the Sava River, which were technically

the responsibility of the German plenipotentiary general in Croatia, Glaise, for the suppression of guerrillas (der Chef der Bandenkampfverbande). The chief of staff of , this command was Higher SS Leader and General of Police Erich von dem Bach. Micr. No. T-

| 120, Roll 1757, Frs. Eo24,696-701. See also Himmler’s report on his conference with Hitler on June 19, 1943, in which the latter confirmed Himmler’s jurisdiction over the struggle against the guerrillas, in Micr. No. T-175, Roll 81, Frs. 2,601,626-27.

'*IMicr. No. T-77, Roll 788, Frs. §,517,499-501I. ,

'2Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H297,553-56.

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 291 though he had no executive power there. When Kammerhofer told Glaise of this new extension of power, he fully supported it, seeing the Kammerhofer police as “an extended arm of German occupation troops.” By Himmler’s decision of June 21, 1943, the whole of Croatia was declared a guerrilla-infested area. Thus the jurisdiction of his representative in antiguerrilla police operations was extended to the entire Croatian state.'* It should be emphasized, however, that Glaise had made it clear that he considered the pacification of Croatia primarily a political problem, which could only be solved by political changes. He regarded a clarification of the German-

Italian condominium in Croatia as the first essential step. He also thought it should be made clear to Paveli¢ that, considering “the troublesome errors of his regime in the past and the approach of the military front [to Croatia], Croatian sovereignty is much more a rain check on the future than a fact of the present.” In addition, because of the past mistakes, criminal acts, and corruption of Ustasha Party members, the Ustasha movement had to be separated from the Croatian army and police. Finally, the Serbian population in Croatia had to be treated more decently—given equality before the law, security of life and property, and a moderate share in government employment. If nothing positive came from these changes, Glaise proposed to establish some sort of German military administration in Croatia.’ On April 20, 1943, shortly after arriving in Croatia, Kammerhofer issued a detailed preliminary order on the organization of the mixed German-Croatian police force. The country was divided into five areas, including Italian-occupied as well as German-occupied territory, though Kammerhofer did not propose to organize the police force in Italian territory. The police forces were uniformed (Ordnungspolizei) and headed by a police commander. Below him in authority were area police commanders and then region and district police commanders. A certain number of Security Police (Sicherbeitspolizei) were assigned to all police areas, depending on need.'” The lowest-level police and gendarmerie units, consisting of five to eight men, were eventually established in hundreds of localities. They were ordered to cooperate closely not only with the local Croatian police and gendarmerie, but also with Croatian administrative personnel such as mayors, and to engage local people when necessary. In the event of new military operations, the mixed SS police and gendarmerie units were immediately to come under the command of the German military commander in the area.

An agreement of April 21, 1943, between Paveli¢ and Glaise and the re'3For the extension of the police and gendarmerie apparatus north of the Sava River, see Micr. No. T-77, Roll 788, Frs. 5,517,485—-86 and 5,517,492-95. See also Sundhaussen, “Zur Geschichte der Waffen-SS in Kroatien,” and idem, “The Intelligence Service and Police Apparatus,” pp. 89-133. For Glaise’s support, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 523-24, and for Kammerhofer’s expanded jurisdiction, see Micr. No. T-175, Roll 81, Fr. 2,601,650. '4See Glaise’s report of April 20, 1943, in Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 268, Frs. 3 5-38. 'SMicr. No. T-77, Roll 788, Frs. 5,517,478-80.

292 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA. sulting protocol of April 24 gave Himmler’s representative in Croatia farreaching control over the entire Croatian police and gendarmerie. In principle _ the German-Croatian SS police and gendarmerie were separate from the Croatian administrative and criminal police, but Kammerhofer was to have the closest possible collaboration from the Croatian police and gendarmerie. Whenever they were engaged in combined operations, the Croatian units were under

his command. Furthermore, all other organs of the Croatian administration were obliged, when requested, to assist him by supplying the information he required. It was also agreed that the necessary Croatian contingents would be obtained by both open recruiting and transfers from existing Croatian police and Ustasha militia units. The mixed police and gendarmerie were to wear German SS uniforms, with the Croatian members distinguished by appropriate armbands, and all were to take an oath of loyalty to both Hitler and Pavelié. As the chief Croatian liaison officer with these forces and to supervise the execution of this agreement by Croatian authorities, Paveli¢é named Mladen Lorkovié,

minister of interior. The planned strength of the mixed German-Croatian SS police and gendarmerie was about 20,000 men, including 2,000 Reich Germans, 4,000 to 5,000 Croatian Volksdeutsche, and 14,000 to 15,000 Croats. Kammerhofer’s seat of command was in Osijek.’ Having opposed the establishment of the German-Croatian SS police and gendarmerie, the Croatian government could hardly have been expected to co-

operate enthusiastically in the implementation of the protocol. It went about . recruiting for Kammerhofer’s police at a pace so leisurely that Glaise described

it The aSdecision passive resistance.” , to establish the SS police and gendarmerie in Croatia and

Kammerhofer’s scheme of organization were made without consultation with the Croatian government. The Croats could protest as much as they liked, but the Germans chose to interpret broadly the understanding of January 17, 1943, between Croatian and German authorities and the ensuing Croatian law decree of January 18, 1943, on the introduction of emergency regimes in areas where German troops were fighting. According to them, in case of state necessity or in areas where military operations were under way, emergency rule could be established under which executive powers would be transferred to German mili-

tary commanders.” , |

Since the Italians had been helping Croatian authorities organize and to |

some extent train police and gendarmerie forces, the new German venture was of great interest to them. Glaise explained to Italian representatives that the

new mixed police organization had nothing to do with the regular Croatian

523-24. ,

'°Micr. No. T-77, Roll 788, Frs. §,517,475-77 and 5,517,481-82. 7Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Frs. 395-98, and Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 499 and

"®Micr. No. T-501, Roll 268, Fr. 37; Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1943, pp. 39-40.

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 293 police and that it would be engaged exclusively in policing and pacifying areas that army operations had cleared of the Partisans.” The German SS and police organization always sought to enlarge its powers wherever it operated. In Croatia it did this by using the German minority, the Kammerhofer organization, and the 13th SS Division “Handschar” in Bosnia, as well as other German police and intelligence organizations. Its old adversary Kasche complained in a report on February 29, 1944, that the SS and police organization in eastern Croatia was following its own political ways and that this

would damage German interests in Croatia. Again on March 29, 1944, in a longer report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kasche complained about the confusion in moving about 25,000 Volksdeutsche in Slavonia and asked for the dismissal of Kammerhofer’s chief of staff Rtihrig, who was largely responsible for it. He also requested assurances that he would participate in matters be-

tween the German minority and the Croatian government, as he had before Kammerhofer became Himmler’s representative.’ A few months later, in a note dated July 28, 1944, but apparently not sent to von Ribbentrop until September 29, Kasche criticized in detail the operation of the Kammerhofer organization. Among his many points were that the organization did not live up to the Fihrer’s order to pacify areas cleared of Communists, did not cooperate with the Croatian authorities or with the German envoy, and spread itself over the entire state instead of selecting areas in which it could help significantly in pacification efforts. Furthermore, it did not honor

promises to protect the German minority, did not cooperate properly with Wehrmacht forces, but engaged in independent military operations, did not contribute to training Croatian gendarmerie and Ustasha units, and competed with the Croatian gendarmerie instead of cooperating with it. Kasche concluded by making a series of suggestions on reorganizing the SS police and gen-

darmerie forces that would have so modified their powers as to make them mere shadows of what they were.” In September and October 1944, Kammerhofer devoted considerable time to planning and carrying out the evacuation of the bulk of the German minority

from Croatia to the Reich. In November, Kasche took issue with Kammerhofer’s apparent tendency to disregard established policies and procedures and again sought a thorough change in his organization. He wanted to phase out the Kammerhofer forces in their existing form, return Croatian manpower to the Croatian gendarmerie, and combine Kammerhofer’s post with that of the police attaché in the German Legation. The reduced units, with German man'®Micr. No. T-77, Roll 788, Fr. 5,517,482. 130Sazi¢, “The Intelligence Services of the Third Reich,” pp. 133-63. For Kasche’s report of February 29, 1944, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Fr. H306,087, and for his report of March 29, 1944, Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Frs. H299,768-71. '31Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,687—-90.

294 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA power, would mainly be engaged in training and advising the Croatian police __ and gendarmerie, in addition to participating in the pacification of the country. By then, however, Kammerhofer’s forces had been put under the command of the 2nd Panzer Army and were being used in military operations together with other German and Croatian forces,'’” The standing of Himmler’s SS and police organization in Croatia rose with the appointment of SS Obergruppenfiihrer and General of the Waffen SS HansAdolf Priitzmann to replace Glaise as plenipotentiary German general in Croatia on November 29, 1944. Priitzmann’s task was to represent the interests of both the Wehrmacht and the SS and police before the Croatian government, but he remained in Croatia only a few weeks.

THE ITALIAN SURRENDER , After Anglo-American forces landed in Morocco and Algiers in November 1942 and began operations against German and Italian forces in North Africa, Italy seemed likely to become the first area of invasion on the European continent. In fact, at the conference in Casablanca in the second half of January 1943, the Allies made the decision to attack Sicily and Sardinia in due course. Sicily was geographically closest to the large Allied forces in North Africa, Italy’s government and military forces were known to be shaky, and eliminating one of the Axis partners from the war was a very attractive goal. Furthermore, the United States favored such an operation and opposed an Allied landing in the Balkans. On May 12, 1943, the last German and Italian troops in North Africa surrendered to Anglo-American forces. Earlier, on the Russian front, the main body of the Italian 8th Army had been destroyed at the Don River in December 1942,'° and the German debacle at Stalingrad had concluded on Feb-

ruary 2, 1943. ,

In Yugoslavia, Italian troops participated in Operations Weiss and

Schwarz against the Partisans in the first half of 1943 together with German, Croatian, and Chetnik forces, but without distinction. At the same time, in

March, the Germans arranged with the Italians to occupy, ostensibly only temporarily, the bauxite-producing area west of Mostar in Herzegovina. In early May, without previous agreement with the Italians, the Germans moved an entire division and parts of three others into Italian-occupied areas for over

a month to mount Operation Schwarz against the Partisans and disarm as many Chetniks as possible. In mid-June, after concluding Operation Schwarz, they occupied certain parts of Sandzak by agreement with the Italians and '32See Kasche’s reports of November 8 and 20, 1944, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Frs.

H299,032-33 andH299,045. '°Gosztony, Hitlers fremde Heere, pp. 315-24, 458-59. According to Italian sources that he quotes, in addition to those killed and wounded, 74,830 men of the Italian 8th Army were taken prisoner by the Russians. In the first postwar years, only 10,030 returned.

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 295 moved other forces into Herzegovina without an agreement." In effect, in addition to losing territory to the Partisans, the Italians also lost some Yugoslav areas obtained in April 1941 to the Germans well before their surrender in September 1943. Owing to Italy’s weakening position, its troop losses in Russia, and its troop and territorial losses in North Africa, relations between Mussolini and Hitler and especially between the Italian Comando Supremo and the German Armed Forces High Command became more and more strained. Already in late 1942 Mussolini, convinced that the Axis could no longer win in Russia,

advised Hitler “to conclude, in one way or another, the chapter of the war against Russia, which no longer has any reason.”'* Mussolini hoped that Hitler would then concentrate on fighting the Western Allies in the Mediterranean, but this did not happen. The Italian economy was an especially weak link in the country’s capacity to wage war. When Italy entered the war, it was not economically prepared for even a short struggle, and as the war advanced, it became more and more economically dependent on Germany. The Germans squeezed out of the Italians as much as they could, making them finance German troops in Italy and taking large quantities of certain commodities to Germany without customs inspection. For its part, Italy was dependent on Germany not only for arms, ammunition, and aircraft, but also for a long list of essential materials and semifinished products such as coal, steel, chrome, rubber, wool, and oil. As long as Italy was a worthwhile ally, Germany supplied much of what it asked for, but when it became weak, Germany lagged more and more behind in delivering orders, making it economically impossible for Italy to continue to fight.'”° As Italy’s position worsened, both on the battlefront and at home, Mussolini began to differ sharply on the conduct of military affairs, not only with Hitler and other German leaders but also with his own chief military and political advisors. As a result, a series of changes were instituted in the upper echelons of the Italian government and military beginning in late January 1943. First came the dismissal of the pro-German chief of the Comando Supremo, Marshal Ugo Cavallero, on January 31, both because he could serve as a scapegoat for the disasters in North Africa and Russia and because of his misleading '4Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 255-56. On June 1, 1943, the commander of the Italian VIth Army Corps, General Sandro Piazzoni, ordered all Chetnik units in Herzegovina to be disarmed. This could only be carried out to a small extent. For an Italian analysis of the German advance into Herzegovina and developments among the Chetniks, see a report of General E. Quarra Sito of the VIth Army Corps of July 1, 1943, in Micr. No. T-821, Roll 3.47, Frs. 831-36.

'35See Kriegstagebuch, 2, pt. 2: 1440. See also Smyth, “The Command of the Italian Armed Forces,” p. 47. Mussolini’s clearest statements are in letters to Hitler of March 8 and 25,1943. See Hitler, Hitler e Mussolini, lettere e documenti, pp. 144-45, 151-54. '56For economic difficulties in wartime Italy, see especially Favagrossa, Perché perdemmo la guérra, pp. 133-241, 289-307. See also Gallo, Mussolini’s Italy, pp. 304-5, 314.

296 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA statements to and disagreements with Mussolini. General Vittorio Ambrosio, his replacement, began bringing as many Italian troops home from abroad as possible, simplified the organization of the Comando Supremo, and showed greater independence toward the Germans.’ Then on February 5, Mussolini reorganized his cabinet. The chief casualty was his son-in-law, Count Ciano, minister of foreign affairs, who apparently had been working against Mussolini’s policies for several months. Mussolini himself took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although it was run in fact by the new undersecretary, Giu-

seppe Bastianini, up to that time governor of Dalmatia. Many personnel changes in senior positions, both in Rome and among Italian commanders, civil commissioners, and diplomats abroad, followed, none of which improved the now hopeless Italian situation.'” On July 10, 1943, Allied forces invaded Sicily and began advancing toward the mainland. Allied air attacks on Milan, Turin, and Genoa greatly hampered Italian industrial production and further sapped morale. The Italian people at large were totally demoralized and ready for peace at almost any price. Both King Victor Emmanuel III and his entourage, as well as a number of senior military leaders, had decided even earlier that Mussolini had to go. The question was only when and how to remove him. On the morning of July 25, after an all-night meeting, the Fascist Grand Council passed a vote of no confidence in Mussolini, which the king took as formal cause to remove him. At an audi-

ence with the king that same afternoon, Mussolini was dismissed, arrested, and incarcerated.'” The leaders of the rebellion in the Grand Council expected to assume the leadership of both the Fascist Party and the government. But supreme command over the Italian armed forces, which Mussolini had arrogated to himself on May 29, 1941, reverted instead to the king, who with the armed

forces now assumed the leadership of the country, with Marshal Pietro Badoglio as prime minister. Though Badoglio announced that Italy would continue to fight on Germany’s side, most people assumed that he simply needed time to arrange a surrender and transfer Italy to the Allied side. The immediate problem for the Badoglio government was “to neutralize the Fascist forces,” and General Roatta ordered military units to proceed with the utmost strict'37Smyth, “The Command of the Italian Armed Forces,” p. 47. '38Pero Digovic, chief of the Consular Section in the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

returned from a visit to Rome in mid-April 1943 to report that high officials in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had told him that Italy would soon get out of the war. Micr. No.

T-501, Roll 265, Fr. 97. ,

'The overthrow of Mussolini took the Germans by surprise, and Hitler was especially

angry. See Kesselring, Memoirs, pp. 167-74. For the reaction in Zagreb to the fall of Mussolini—perplexity among government and Ustasha Party officials, hope that the Italians would quickly leave Dalmatia, assurances from Pavelié that Croatia would continue its alliance with Italy, and improved prospects for negotiations between the Ustashas and the Croatian Peasant Party—see General Re’s report of July 27, 1943, in Micr. No. T-821, Roll 403, Fr. rogz2. On the joyful reaction in Croatian areas under Italian control, see an Italian report in Micr. No. T-821, Roll 406, Frs. 16-19.

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 297 ness against disorders. Nonetheless, there were a small number of casualties. That Fascism, after over twenty years of absolute control in Italy, died peacefully shows clearly that the misfortunes of the war had sapped its strength to

live," The transition to the new regime was marked by considerable bungling. Many Italian officials in high positions, in particular Marshal Badoglio and Generals Ambrosio and Roatta, did not want to take responsibility for key decisions that had to be made, especially in the critical days before and after the surrender." The Germans, meanwhile, anticipating that Italy would change sides, made all the necessary preparations in a timely fashion both in Italy and the Balkans, drawing up Operation Achse to go into effect when Italy surrendered.

In preparation for changing sides, the Italians transferred a few troops from Albania and Montenegro to the mainland, but the bulk of their forces in Yugoslav territory remained deployed in their original areas.’ The Italians feared that any wholesale withdrawal of forces from the Balkans might show their intentions and that the Germans might intervene before arrangements with the Allies were complete. After relatively brief negotiations beginning in early August between Italy and the Allies, agreement was reached on September 3. Five days later, on September 8, Italy surrendered and joined the Allied camp. A day later, Marshal Badoglio (continuing as prime minister), the royal court, the government, and the armed forces chiefs traveled by car to Pescara

on the Adriatic coast and from there by warship to Brindisi behind Allied On the new Italian leadership, see Deakin, The Brutal Friendship, pp. 457-85, and Gallo, Mussolini’s Italy, pp. 346-62. On local disorders, see Pieri and Rochat, Pietro Badoglio, pp. 784-86. According to incomplete data, 83 people were killed, 308 wounded, and 1,554 arrested between July 28 and July 30. Of the main Fascist actors, Marshal Cavallero committed suicide on September 13, 1943;

Count Ciano and five other leaders were tried in Verona in January 1944 for their antiMussolini vote in the Grand Council preceding Mussolini’s downfall, sentenced to death, and

executed; and Mussolini was caught by the Italian Partisans at the end of April 1945 in the | village of Dongo in northern Italy and executed. Among the dozen and a half other people executed in northern Italy at that time was Paolo Zerbino, minister of interior in the Social Republic of Salé and formerly prefect of the province of Split in Dalmatia. But the most important casualty of the Second World War in Italy was the royal House of Savoy, which was voted out by a national referendum on June 2-3, 1946. '41Smyth, Secrets of the Fascist Era, pp. 103-9.

'2On August 16, 1943, the Italian VIth Army Corps deployed in southern Dalmatia and Herzegovina was transferred from the 2nd Army to the Group of Armies East. Micr. No. T821, Roll 403, Fr. 145. Curiously, during the last few months of the war, command over Italian army forces was divided among the Comando Supremo (Ambrosio), the General Staff of the army (Roatta), and the War Ministry (Sorice). See Smyth, “The Command of the Italian Armed Forces,” p. 51. For an appraisal of the political and military situation in the area under the control of the Italian 2nd Army and adjacent territories on August 31, 1943, and for what the 2nd Army’s Intelligence Department anticipated for the future, see Micr. No. T-821, Roll 31, Frs. 291302.

many. ,

298 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA lines.’*? On October 13, 1943, the Italian government declared war on Ger-

As in the surrender of all armies, so also following the surrender of the Italian forces, a unified Italian command that decided what course of action all Italian troops would follow ceased to exist. The conditions in which various Italian army units found themselves differed, as did the allegiance of unit commanders. Badoglio wrote later in his memoirs that he instructed Italian forces through Allied intelligence to join the Partisans in the Balkans and form guerrilla units in Italy. General Henry Maitland Wilson, Allied commander in the

Mediterranean, broadcast a message to Yugoslavia that Italian forces were now under his command and the Yugoslavs should not prevent them from leaving for Italy. He warned the Yugoslavs not to be provoked by the Germans

into new battles with the Italians and urged them to try and obtain, without fighting, as large a quantity of arms, military equipment, and supplies from the Italians as possible. Though Wilson did not specify whom he meant by “Yugo- | slavs”—the Partisans or the Chetniks—certain formulations in the text indicated that he meant only the Partisans. On the Axis side, the Germans also issued directives to their forces on how to handle Italian troops that came under their control. For the Italians who refused to continue fighting on the German side, to work for the Germans, or to go to prisoner-of-war camps, the terms

were extremely harsh.'* -

The totality of the Italian collapse and the complete disintegration of Italian forces in Yugoslavia is best illustrated by the way in which different Italian

army units behaved after the sudden announcement of surrender. A small number of troops made their way to Italy by boat, to the extent that local shipping facilities allowed. Others were persuaded by the Germans to continue fighting on their side, a choice the more easily made because the Germans rescued Mussolini from detention at Gran Sasso on September 12, 1943, and took him to Germany. The Germans used these troops in northern Italy, Slovenia,

and Croatia. Other Italian troops were disarmed by the Germans, taken as prisoners of war, and later used as labor. Still others were disarmed by Croatian quisling forces and later, at German intervention, released. A few troops, such as those in the area of Dubrovnik, fought briefly against the Germans. Many others were disarmed by the Yugoslav Partisans, and still others fought together with the Partisans. '3Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War, pp. 65-86; Pieri and Rochat, Pietro Badoglio, pp. 794-824. '*For Badoglio’s instructions, see Italy in the Second World War, p. tor. For German measures instituted after the Italian surrender, see Kesselring, Memoirs, pp. 175-78. For General Wilson’s order, printed in a leaflet dropped by Allied aircraft over Yugoslavia, see Micr. No. T-313, Roll 151, Fr. 7,404,932. For Field Marshal Keitel’s order of September 15, 1943, regarding the treatment of the ‘Ttalian armed forces, see United States, Trials of War Criminals, 11: 1081-83 (The Hostage case, Military Tribunal V, Case 7).

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 299 Those who fared the worst were Italian officers caught by the Germans after allowing their forces to be disarmed by the Partisans or negotiating to cooperate with them. Most dramatic was the fate of the acting commander and officers of the “Bergamo” Division, stationed in Split, who negotiated a surrender and the transfer of arms and supplies to a group of two Partisan representatives, two British officers stationed with the Partisans, and an American officer detailed to the British. The conclusion of the surrender was delayed and in the meantime, German forces entered Split, seized the acting commander and officers, and disarmed most of the troops. The acting commander and officers were court-martialed on Field Marshal Keitel’s order by the 7th SS Division “Prinz Eugen” and sentenced to death. Officers who had left for Italy in mid-August— General Emilio Becuzzi, commander of the division, Admiral Antonio Bobbiese, and a colonel—were court-martialed in absentia and sentenced to death. On this occasion, 3 generals and 47 officers were executed, and soon thereafter, 2 more Italian generals and 29 officers were sentenced to death and shot.” The Partisans disarmed four complete Italian divisions and parts of nine others. The “Venezia” Division and parts of the “Taurinense” Division, both deployed in Montenegro, transferred to their side. The Partisans also captured

a huge quantity of Italian arms and military supplies, which significantly helped them through the following winter. The Italian surrender also led to a general uprising in most of the formerly Italian-controlled areas and enabled the Partisans to increase their forces by several divisions. In Slovenia, as we described in Chapter 3, Italian heavy arms were instrumental in the Partisans’ defeat of the main Chetnik unit at Gréarice between September 8 and 10 and of a large group of former Slovene MVAC troops at Turjak between September 13 and 19."*°

The Italian collapse was welcomed in Croatia by all levels of the population. The Ustasha regime was pleased because the heavy Italian mortgage on its shoulders was removed. But it was also aware that for most people, the Italian surrender was only the first step in the collapse of the Rome-Berlin Axis and that anything that contributed to the defeat of the Axis contributed to the Us'4SFor the Italian text (and a German translation) of the document of surrender of the “Bergamo” Division, see Micr. No. T-314, Roll 566, Frs. 332-35. For the story of two British participants in concluding the surrender, see Captain Burke’s report, in W.O. 202, 617, XM 04188, and Deakin, The Embattled Mountain, pp. 331-37. For the court-martial, see Micr. No. T-314, Roll 566, Fr. 331, and United States, Trials of War Criminals, 11: 1292-93. In Greece, the Germans were even more brutal. While crushing the resistance of an Italian division on the island of Cephalonia, they killed 4 50 Italian officers and men. Gallo, Mussolini’s Italy, p. 376. '6For events in Montenegro, see Yugoslavia, Vojnoistorijski institut, Oslobodilacki rat, 2nd ed., 1: 540-67, especially pp. 566-67. The “Venezia” Division first arranged to surrender to the Chetniks. But when Partisan officers accompanied by British liaison officers appeared on the scene, they persuaded the division to shift to the Partisans. For a thorough discussion of the effects of the Italian surrender on the competing armed groups in Slovenia in the fall of 1943, see Ferenc, Kapitulacija Italije, especially pp. 126-201.

300 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA tashas’ defeat. With a proclamation of September 10, 1943, Paveli¢ declared the treaties of Rome of May 18, 1941, null and void and incorporated the areas that Italy had annexed in 1941 into the Independent State of Croatia. On Sep-

tember 14, he withdrew the offer of the Croatian crown to the duke of Spoleto.'*’ Paveli¢ also wanted to incorporate Zadar, Rijeka, most of Istria, and the upper Adriatic islands, that is, the Croatian areas that Italy held during the interwar period, into Croatia, but here he met with German evasion and opposition. The German view was that all such territories would be occupied by German forces, that Hitler was preoccupied with securing them against a possible Anglo-American invasion and with defeating the Partisans, and that the Croats should be satisfied with the large territorial gains the Germans allowed. It was obvious that the Germans did not want to create embarrassing problems with Mussolini, whom they had just rescued, or to prejudice their own territo-

rial plans in the upper Adriatic. ;

Croatia’s abrogation of the Rome treaties also torpedoed efforts to estab- _ lish diplomatic relations between the Ustasha state and Mussolini’s Italian Social Republic of Salo. The Italians had already designated Antonio Tamburini as envoy to Zagreb, but diplomatic relations between the two states were never

established.” _ |

Since the Ustasha regime had no troops in the Italian-controlled areas and was totally unprepared for the Italian collapse, its immediate military benefit from Italy’s surrender was slight. In Zagreb, the German gendarmerie disarmed |

about 500 Italian soldiers and interned Italian officials. Croatian forces dis- . armed part of the “Lombardia” Division deployed in the area of Karlovac. Croatian authorities sequestered various Italian assets in Croatian territory, but the Germans also claimed them and appropriated a part.’” At this time, the '“7The official Croatian reaction to the surrender of Italy was reached after Croatian officials consulted with German diplomatic and military representatives in Zagreb. See Kasche’s reports of September 9 and 10, 1943, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H302,108—13. For -Croatia’s abrogation of the Rome treaties, see Croatia, Independent State of, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Medjunarodni ugovori, 1943, p. 317, and for the withdrawal of the offer of the Croatian crown, Micr. No. T-311, Roll 196, Fr. 500.

‘German views on this matter were most clearly stated in a memorandum from von _ Ribbentrop to Hitler on October 26, 1943, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H302,114- |

82. . | |

881-82. : | -

19. For the confused conditions in Rijeka and the Croatian Littoral during the first two weeks after the Italian surrender from the Ustashas’ point of view, see a report by David Sin¢ié¢, the

last Croatian administrative delegate to the Supersloda, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Frs.

Blazekovi¢, “El status internacional del Estado Independiente de Croacia,” pp. 281-

'S°How completely unprepared Croatian authorities were for the Italian collapse, for example in the Croatian Littoral, is best seen in a report by Stanko Drnas, a representative of the Propaganda Office in Zagreb, on August 28, 1943. According to Drnas, Croatian officials in the area had no troops or other enforcement organs at their disposal and no effective commu-

nication with Zagreb. In addition, the hinterland was held by the Partisans. See YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 6/27-2-3, Box 87.

AN ITALIAN-GERMAN QUASI PROTECTORATE 301 Croatian government also suffered some bitter disappointments. Following the

Italian surrender, the Germans did not use Croatian troops to take over any part of the formerly Italian-held areas, probably because they did not trust them. On the other hand, they did employ some Italian troops, for example for guard duty in Zadar. And they used Chetnik units for guard duty and similar operations and as combat troops against the Partisans in the areas of Dubrovnik, Metkovié, Split, and Sibenik. On balance, among Italians both during and after the war, the Italian occupation of Yugoslav territory is presented as having been a favor to the domestic population. In a report of January 30, 1942, Brigadier General C. Carrana Mayneri waxed almost poetic: “Croats, Muslims, and Serbs, distrustful at the beginning, in time changed their minds and came to appreciate the courage, discipline, kindness, bearing, and generosity of the Italian soldier.” Many Italian soldiers may have been all of this. And as we shall see in Chapter 13, the Italians also helped Yugoslav Jews who fled from the Germans and the Ustashas to Italianheld Dalmatian cities, as well as many Serbs and anti-Ustasha Croats who fled from the Ustashas. But the policy of the Italian army as a whole was to use terror and force and to arm and support one South Slavic group, the Chetniks, against the others, so that, in General Roatta’s words, they could “slaughter each other.” For the Italians, this was the way to save Italian blood, maintain Italian conquests, and improve the Italian position in the future in these areas. And we must not forget that the Italians supported the Ustashas for the better part of the 1930’s and helped them to come to power in April 1941."*!

After Italy surrendered, the Yugoslav government-in-exile was faced with the problem of collecting information about Yugoslav citizens held in Italy or living there as a consequence of the war. There were an estimated 10,000 prisoners of war from the War of April 1941 and thousands of deportees held in concentration camps, prisons, and in small groups in isolated rural areas. There were also thousands of Yugoslav Jewish and other refugees. From August 1944, the government-in-exile’s delegation to the Allied Advisory Council in Italy had a special officer collecting information on these groups. It was estimated that between 70,000 and 90,000 people were involved and that between 8,000 and 10,000 had perished in captivity.’* Most prisoners of war and poFor the disarming of the “Lombardia” Division, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Fr. H302,108-9. The interned Italian officials were later released. For the sequestration of Italian assets, see Budak’s postwar interrogation, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 4/3, Box

I.O.9, p. 12. 'S'For Mayneri’s assertion, see Micr. No. T-821, Roll 60, Fr. 824. For the Italian assessment of their occupation, see, for example, Zanussi, Guérra e catastrofe d’Italia, 1: 218-24, and Faldella, L’Italia e la seconda guerra mondiale, p. 5 48. 'S2See the report of the Allied Force Headquarters (Italy) of October 19, 1944, to the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, dealing with the problem of Yugoslav and Greek prisoners of war and internees, in F.O. 371/39008, C 16101/14/62. See also Tomasevich, The Chetniks, p. 74.

302 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA , litical deportees undoubtedly returned to Yugoslavia after the war, but I was

unable to find any numerical estimates. 7 |

Another wave of Yugoslav nationals—former Chetniks, Ljoti¢é’s Serbian Volunteer Corps, Slovene Home Guards who had been deployed in the Slovene Littoral, some Croats who had served in the 392nd Infantry Division (the Croa-

tian legionnaires), other Chetniks, and some members of the Serbian State Guard—entered Italy at the end of the war and were interned there by the British. More will be said about these groups in the conclusion. The collapse of Italy had a profound effect on Croatia. Henceforth, the Ustasha state had one master, not two, to contend with. If Germany won the war, Croatia could consolidate its power and hope to acquire some of the Croatian

areas that Italy had held during the interwar period. But such good fortune seemed increasingly unlikely, since Germany was itself in crisis and betraying

signs of certain defeat. | _

CHAPTER 7

The Independent State of Croatia: Under German Dominance

eee

THE GERMAN ROLE IN MILITARY AFFAIRS Anticipating Italy’s surrender, the Germans reorganized their military command in southeast Europe in the early summer of 1943 so that it would be

ready to take over the Italian-held areas and defend them in the event of a Western Allied invasion. Insofar as this reorganization applied to Croatia, they took three essential steps. First, they brought to Yugoslavia the staff (but not the armored troops) of the 2nd Panzer Army under Colonel General Lothar Rendulic, who was put in charge of all military operations in the western Balkans, including the Independent State of Croatia, under the overall command of the commander in chief in southeast Europe. Hitler cautioned Rendulic that “the defense and holding of the Balkans was of vital importance because its possession by the enemy would represent a deadly threat to the armies of the Reich and a danger to the southern flank of the front in Russia.” He outlined his task as follows: “Utilize the military power of Croatia, destroy Tito’s forces, remove the danger from the Italians on the Adriatic coast if the need should arise, possibly by capturing them, then occupy Dalmatia, Montenegro, and Albania and defend the coast.”'

Second, the Germans incorporated the post of commanding general of German troops in Croatia into the XVth Army Corps and made it a part of the 2nd Panzer Army. And third, on September 7, 1943, Hitler issued Order No. 26, Improvement in the Defensive Power of Croatia. Its main objective was to bring about closer collaboration between the German and Croatian armed forces by encouraging a positive attitude in the German military toward the Croatian state and armed forces, by raising the self-confidence and morale of Croatian troops, and by speeding up the development of the Croatian armed forces through increased German influence on their organization, training, and supply.” The steps taken to implement this order constituted the second basic reorganization of military relations between Germany and the Independent 'Rendulic, Gekdmpft, Gesiegt, Geschlagen, p. 154. *For this order, see Kriegstagebuch, 3, pt. 2: 1455-59. See also p. 1071.

304 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA State of Croatia—after that of September and October 1942—and resulted in a

great increase in German influence.

An important component of Order No. 26 was the appointment, as of October 1, 1943, of General Hans Juppe as Wehrmacht inspector of the Croatian army, charged with training, supplying, and generally improving Croatian - troops as fighting units. Another important provision decreed that the Croatian legionnaire divisions would be used exclusively in Croatia, not on the Russian or western fronts, though Glaise only communicated this to the Croatian government on October 20, 1943.’ The growing strength and activity of the Partisans in Croatian territory made this change necessary. In fact, the Germans were later obliged to commit several more divisions to the Yugoslav theater of war, particularly in the Independent State of Croatia. Hitler also tried to show his confidence in the Croatian government and administration by issuing special instructions that German generals in Croatia would henceforth not hold executive power. This meant that a new arrangement between German commanders and the Croatian civilian authorities in all areas south of the Sava River had to be worked out to replace the earlier one. An agreement between Paveli¢ and the German envoy divided the area into four regions. In each region the Croatian government appointed a delegate (Beauftragte) for civil administration with executive powers, who was responsible for civil affairs and closely cooperated with the German commanders. In

addition, each German corps and divisional command was assigned a special , Croatian delegate for civil affairs, whose activities were centrally coordinated by Mladen Lorkovi¢, Croatian minister of interior. Lorkovi¢ also became the chief Croatian liaison officer-with Glaise, German plenipotentiary general in Zagreb, with whom he adjusted any differences that arose. Glaise commented in a report on September 11, 1943, that “the close cooperation of the delegates with German commanders in the field and of Minister Lorkovi¢ with the Ger-

| man plenipotentiary general will ensure the necessary influence in the field of | civilian administration required for the protection of our military interests.”* _ Thus the new arrangements, although not explicitly infringing upon Croatian sovereignty in the way that the granting of executive power obviously did, still | enabled German commanders in the field to influence the Croatian civilian administration if military exigencies demanded it. Hitler’s order of September 7 did specify, however, that the Croatian government was to be kept informed of all plans and activities of German troops and of Croatian troops under German - command, insofar as this was compatible with military security. It was Glaise’s task to obtain current information from all German commands in Croatia and convey it to the Croatian authorities.’ As will be shown below, however, Ger-

3Micr. No. T-501, Roll 268, Fr. 559. ,

808-10. . a

‘For a list of these delegates on September 11, 1943, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. ‘Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 811.

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 305 man generals again acquired executive power in specified areas of the Independent State of Croatia in the spring of 1944.

At the same time that the Germans reorganized their military command in Croatia and increased their control over the Croatian armed forces, they also expanded their use of auxiliary troops to maintain security and fight the Partisans. They brought in a Russian Cossack cavalry division and they began utilizing the local Chetniks. When the Croats objected, the Germans overrode their complaints, yet further evidence of the latter’s increased influence in the military affairs of the Croatian state.

As Hitler and his senior commanders repeatedly stated, the most critical task in Croatia was to safeguard the railroad line from the Austrian border through Zagreb to Belgrade. The changes in German-Croatian military collaboration instituted in September and October 1942 were principally motivated by the need to improve protection of this line. But despite these measures, the Partisans continued to make it their prime target of sabotage. In an effort to stop their activity, the Germans brought in the rst Cossack Division in October 1943. This was a cavalry unit of Russian Cossacks—some captured from the

Red Army, others recruited by the Germans in occupied Russian areas, plus some deserters—known for its strong anti-Bolshevik attitude and resilient fighting. The division consisted of four regiments, the Don, Kuban, Siberian, and Terek Cossacks, commanded by both German and Cossack officers, with General Helmuth von Pannwitz in command. Many members of the division were accompanied by their families.° The Germans had organized, equipped, and trained the Cossack division in

southern Russia to fight the Red Army, but when this proved inadvisable in mid-1943, they looked for another place to deploy it as a cavalry division. The

relatively flat area between the Sava River in the south and the Danube and | Drava Rivers in the north (the areas of Srijem and Slavonia) in the Independent

State of Croatia seemed eminently suitable. The Germans also used some units , of the division in operations against the Partisans in central northern and northwest Bosnia, in areas southeast and southwest of Zagreb, and in southeast parts of Slovenia around Metlika.’ But from the beginning, its foremost task remained the protection of the railroad line from Zagreb to Belgrade. In Croatia, the division was put under the command of the 2nd Panzer Army, which had assumed command of all military operations in Croatia following the Italian collapse. In August 1944, Himmler suggested transferring it to his SS forces, and though General Pannwitz opposed the move, this was done in November. At the same time, work began on the development of a Cossack cavalry corps. ‘For a very favorable portrayal of the development and deployment of the Cossack division, see Kern, General von Pannwitz und seine Kosaken.

Ibid., pp. 66-67, 71-72, 94-95, and 115-17.

306 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA | The Cossack division quickly established a reputation for undisciplined and ruthless behavior, not only toward the Partisans attacking the railroad line but also toward the civilian population. The Croatian authorities complained to the Germans and finally even to Hitler personally, and Glaise soon asked that the division be removed from Croatia.’ Besides raping women, killing people, and plundering and burning towns and villages suspected of harboring Partisans or Partisan supporters, the division used telegraph poles along the railroad tracks in Slavonia for mass hangings as a warning to the Partisans and others.’ A letter from Vladimir Kréeli¢, Croatian liaison officer with the division, to

| Minister of State Vjekoslav Vran¢i¢ on December 14, 1943, also revealed that _ though the division’s discipline had improved and the Cossacks were not as brutal as portrayed by Partisan propaganda, nevertheless during its first two months of deployment in Croatia, special divisional courts-martial had imposed at least twenty death sentences in each of the four regiments. But despite

| such barbarities, Hitler ignored the complaints, the Cossacks were not withdrawn, and the Partisans were not frightened off."° The railroad line remained a

prime target, and constant sabotage heavily damaged equipment and caused | delays in transport.

-On February 25, 1945, the rst Cossack Division was split into two divisions. Combined, they formed the XVth Cossack Cavalry Corps, which according to Erich Kern had a force of about 25,000 officers and men by May 1945. The Cossacks remained in Croatia until the end of the war, fighting with

. German and occasionally Croatian troops. In the last few days of the war, they *For the protest of the Croatian Ministry of Interior to Glaise on October 29, 1943, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 492-95. See also a list of atrocities perpetrated by Cossack , troops that Croatian Foreign Minister Stijepo Peri¢é delivered to von Ribbentrop on March 1, 1944, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,106-7. For protests made directly to Hitler by the Croatian prime minister on March 1, 1944, and by Paveli¢ on September 18, 1944, see Hillgruber, Staatsmanner und Diplomaten bei

Hitler, 2: 365-67, §17. -

For Glaise’s request, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 487-89. *For the Cossacks’ brutality, see Glaise’s report of October 28, 1943, to the commander

in chief in southeast Europe, in Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 264, Frs. 772-73. For their mass

264, Fr. 481.

hangings, see Glaise’s letter to Rendulic of November 15, 1943, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll One of the most distressing reports on Cossack rampaging that I came across was by the Reverend J. Novosel, the parish priest of Djurdjevac in the Drava Valley, to the archbishop of Zagreb. According to Novosel, on and following December 13, 1944, the Cossacks killed 26

innocent people, raped many girls and women, and plundered everything in the town that they could put their hands on, including hay and livestock. The report was later sent to the Croatian Ministries of Armed Forces and Foreign Affairs to support complaints made to

| German commands. YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 24/2-2-4, Box 269. ‘For the special courts-martial, see Micr. No. T-313, Roll 488, Frs. 686-87. In addition to arguing that there was a shortage of German troops for keeping peace in the area, Hitler also maintained that the Cossacks would be effective against the British if they landed on the Adriatic coast, because they hated the latter for cooperating with the Soviet Union.

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 307 withdrew to Austria. Along with other Soviet renegade troops, they were forcibly repatriated by the Western Allies to the Soviet Union after the war." In addition to bringing in the Russian Cossacks, the Germans also turned to the Chetniks for help in policing the country and fighting the Partisans. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, already in the spring of 1942, the Germans

had favored the live-and-let-live agreements that Croatian authorities concluded with several Chetnik detachments in Bosnia because they were directed

against the Partisans, contributed to the pacification of areas in which Germany had important interests in industry, mining, and communications, and reduced the number of German troops needed in Bosnia. They represented what one might call indirect collaboration between the Germans and the Chetniks. Italian documents, undoubtedly prepared to defend the Italians’ use of the Chetniks in areas under their control against the Germans’ repeated criticism, show as well that on various occasions before September 1943, the Germans also collaborated directly with some Chetnik detachments in areas northeast of the German-Italian demarcation line. Documents issued by German commands in Bosnia also prove this.'’* Without such direct German-Chetnik collaboration in Croatia while Italy was still engaged, it would have been impossible for the German 114th Light Infantry Division (formerly the 714th Infantry Division) to use a Chetnik detachment while advancing toward the Adriatic coast after the Italian surrender. In fact, the report on German-Chetnik collaboration of the XVth Army Corps on November 19, 1943, to the 2nd Panzer Army, which contains this information, noted that the collaborating Chetnik detachments had proven themselves “both in attack and defense” against the Partisans while “leaning” on the German forces for close to a year." "On Kern’s estimate of the size of the corps in May 1945, see his General von Pannwitz und seine Kosaken, p. 72. According to him, the Cossacks were continuously exposed to Partisan propaganda, but only about 250 deserted to the Partisans during their stay in Croatia. Naturally, a few Soviet spies were also found among them. On the repatriation of renegade Soviet troops in German service to the Soviet Union, see Bethell, The Last Secret, and Tolstoy, The Secret Betrayal. Most of these troops were subsequently liquidated. Neither Bethell nor Tolstoy mentioned the barbarities committed by Cossack troops in Croatia, although many German and Croatian documents dealt with this matter. Tn a series of dispatches to the Comando Supremo between January 17 and March Io, 1943—that is, during Operation Weiss—Major General Gian Carlo Re, chief of the Italian Military Mission in Croatia, reported when and where Croatian and German troops collaborated with Chetnik detachments against the Partisans. He used Croatian, German, and Partisan data, as well as Italian intelligence information. See Micr. No. T-821, Roll 247, Frs. 75065. See also the letter of the German town command in Banja Luka of February 26, 1943, to five Chetnik commanders in northwest Bosnia, in YA, Mil. Hist., German Docs., Reg. No. 71/4, Box 27B.

'S3Micr. No. T-314, Roll 566, Fr. 342. For a detailed report by the 114th Light Infantry Division of November 5, 1943, on its use of some Rokvié and Djuji¢ Chetnik detachments, see Frs. 337-41.

308 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA German-Chetnik collaboration in the Independent State of Croatia entered a new phase after the Italian surrender, when the Germans faced the task of policing a much greater area than before and fighting the Partisans in the whole of Yugoslavia. Because they were short of troops and needed new allies, they significantly liberalized their policy toward the Chetniks in order to mobilize all Serbian nationalist forces for the struggle against the insurgents. The 2nd Panzer Army managed the new policy. According to the army’s order on September 29, 1943, tothe XVth Army Corps deployed in Croatia, the commanders of the

corps’s divisions and fighting groups were allowed to conclude temporary

niks. , , agreements with Chetnik detachments for fighting the Partisans. The first such

formal agreement seems to have been concluded in early October 1943 between the 373rd Infantry Division (the Croatian legionnaires) and a group of 260 Chetniks under Mane Rokvi¢ operating in western Bosnia and Lika.” From this simple beginning, a practice developed involving thousands of Chet-

Just as the Italians’ use of Chetnik formations as auxiliary troops in the Independent State of Croatia produced resentment among Croatian authorities, so also did the Germans’ use of the same troops. In fact, German-Chetnik collaboration became the biggest problem in German-Croatian relations almost from the moment of Italy’s surrender. The Germans not only used Chetnik detachments to advance to the coast and both Chetnik troops and those Italian troops that opted for collaboration for guard duty in Sibenik, Split, Metkovic, and Dubrovnik, but also—a bitter pill for the Croatian government to swallow—they chose not to use Croatian troops in this process of taking over and securing formerly Italian-held areas. The Germans also used Chetnik and Italian, but not Croatian, troops for guard duty on railroads and for fighting the Partisans. This was too much for the Croatian government. First, in early October, it presented a list of requests and complaints to Glaise, focusing on the Germans’ use of Italian troops. The Croats requested that Croatian troops be used in Sibenik, Split, SuSak, and around Zadar and that only German troops and possibly the Italian-Croatian Legion be used in eastern Istria, because using Italian Fascist troops there would drive the Croatian population into the arms of the Partisans. They also asked for the establishment of a Croatian civilian administration in the area of Kotor. They objected to the use of Italian troops outside the cities of Rijeka and Zadar and expressed concern for the security of the area between Ogulin in Lika and Rijeka. Then, on October 18, 1943, at a meeting with Kasche, a delegation of Croatian ministers took up the question of the Germans’ use of Chetnik detachments, specifically around Sibenik, Split, “For the inauguration and development of the Germans’ liberalized policy toward the Chetniks, see Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 317-58. On the first agreement, see the October 4, 1943, report of the 373rd Division to the XVth Army Corps, in Micr. No. T-314, Roll 566, Fr. 678. Rokvi¢’s Chetnik group had previously collaborated with the 114th Light Infantry Division in its advance toward the Adriatic coast after the Italian collapse.

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 309 Metkovic, and Dubrovnik. They complained that this would induce the Croatian population to think that the Germans’ promise of eventually granting the coastal area to Croatia could not be taken seriously." In response, however, the Germans allowed only a few Croatian troops on the Adriatic coast later and continued to use both Chetniks and pro-German Italians as auxiliaries. The Germans did not use Croatian troops in coastal areas after the Italian surrender and used them to only a limited degree later because they were unreliable. This fact was best exemplified by the continuing mass desertion of Croatian soldiers to the Partisans. Needless to say, in all protests to the Germans regarding their use of Chetnik detachments, Croatian authorities never raised the issue of desertions from their own units, though they must have known that it

was a critical matter for the Germans. But some Ustasha officials in Dalmatia | had a more realistic view of German-Chetnik collaboration in the province. When Bruno Nardelli, chief of civil administration in Dalmatia, complained to Edo Bulat, minister for liberated areas, on January 18, 1944, that “one of our cancerous wounds is still the Chetnik question. The collaboration of the Chetniks with the Germans is such that the latter openly favor Chetnik elements,” he also added, “in our military sector, unfortunately, great disorder reigns.” Ustasha Major Mirko Blaz, deputy commander of the 7th Brigade of the Poglavnik’s Personal Guard, reporting from the Drnis area east of Sibenik on March 5, 1944, complained about the lack of discipline among Ustasha units and their refusal to fight except in their native areas. With regard to the Germans’ use of Chetnik troops, he observed: “The Germans are not interested in politics, they look at everything from a military point of view. They need troops that can hold certain positions and clear certain areas of the Partisans. If they ask us to do this, we cannot do it. The Chetniks can.””®

In a pro memoria, Some Military Questions of the Independent State of Croatia, delivered to von Ribbentrop on March 1, 1944, the Croatian government protested that the German armed forces, which in April 1941 had destroyed the anti-German Yugoslav army, were now using the most fanatic remnants of that army in the friendly and allied Croatian state, even entrusting them with the defense of sections of the Adriatic coast, while the Croatian flotilla was fighting in the Black Sea. In an accompanying pro memoria, the Activity of Chetnik Detachments in the Independent State of Croatia, the Croats argued that they could not allow armed groups that were enemy forces to exist on their territory. They proposed that all Chetnik officers and men who were not citizens of the Independent State of Croatia leave its territory; that no new Chetnik units be formed and supplied with arms; that other Chetnik groups be used as local guards in villages with an Orthodox majority; and that the latter 'SSee Glaise’s report of October 5, 1943, in Micr. No. T-s5o1, Roll 264, Frs. 793-95, and Kasche’s report of October 19, 1943, in Micr. No. T-77, Roll 883, Frs. 5,631,875-77. '6For Nardelli’s report, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 57/2-2-6, Box 67, and for Blaz’s report, see Reg. No. 5 1/2-3-5.

310 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA groups be required to recognize the Croatian state, drop all non-Croatian insignia and flags, and be subject to Croatian authorities and rules. But the Ger-

mans paid little attention to these protests.'” , , During the winter of 1943 and the spring of 1944, German-Chetnik collaboration intensified. According to a German report, at the time the Croatian pro memorias were submitted, there were about 23,300 Chetniks in 35 different detachments in the Ustasha state. Nineteen, with 17,500 men, were collaborating closely with German forces and to a much lesser extent with Croatian forces, while sixteen, with about 5,800 men, were not collaborating. According to a Croatian report translated by the Germans and dated April 14, 1944, there were about 3 5,000 armed Chetniks in the state. Whether they were collaborating with German or Croatian troops was generally not specified.” To assuage Croatian sensitivities, the 2nd Panzer Army issued a directive, the Employment and Subordination of Croatian Combat Groups, on May 11,

1944. It stipulated that Chetnik detachments would operate as Croatian “combat groups” under Chetnik leaders. The directive was based on a decision by Hitler and reflected the Germans’ realization that they could not dispense with the Chetnik detachments that were fighting the Partisans. But while a considerable number of Chetnik detachments took on the new designation and operated under the supervision of various German divisions, the new policy was not really acceptable to either them or the Croatian authorities, who sabotaged

the German effort.” | ,

From the German point of view, the issue was simple. Germany was pressed for troops on all fronts, and in Yugoslavia it used not only the armed forces of

the collaborating regimes, but also all other armed groups that were fighting the Partisans. In Croatia, this meant the Chetniks. And here the need was heightened by the fact that Croatian army troops were quite unreliable and therefore of limited use. The issue was put in a nutshell by Phleps, commander of the Vth SS Mountain Corps, to a visiting German officer on May 25, 1944, when he explained that he could not disarm the Chetniks until the Croatian

army supplied him with the same number of dependable troops.” i Two German documents clearly illustrate this troublesome triangle. The first is a report by Captain Merrem, an intelligence officer with the commander in chief in southeast Europe, on his inspection visits with the intelligence offiFor the first pro memoria, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,091—-108 (with enclosures). See also footnote 61. For the second pro memoria, see Frs. H306,116—25, espe-

cially Fr. H306,125. |

'8See Micr. No. T-311, Roll 286, Frs. 224-28 for Glaise’s report of February 26, 1944, which gives the smaller figure, and Frs. 337-43 for the translated, unsigned report of April

14, 1944, which gives the larger figure. | "’Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 355-57. ,

*Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,506-7. Even though Phleps used the Chetnik units, he felt that they would turn against the Germans if the Allies landed on the Adriatic coast.

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 311 cers of various German units in the Croatian state between June 20 and July 4, 1944. Merrem traveled from Belgrade through western Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Lika to Zagreb. He was full of praise for Chetnik units collaborating with the Germans, for the smooth relations between German and Chetnik units, and for the Chetniks’ good record in fighting the Partisans. On the other hand, he reported that relations between German and Croatian units were very unsatisfactory. Croatian units were not reliable, they were not supplying needed information, some of their men seemed to be in contact with the enemy, and Croatian counterintelligence apprehended German agents among the population. The chief reason for the Croats’ behavior seemed to lie in the friendly relations the Germans maintained with the Chetniks. The second document is a letter from the chief of staff of the German 2nd Panzer Army to the army’s Croatian liaison officer on August 9, 1944, regarding German-Chetnik relations in eastern Bosnia. The chief of staff observed

that the Chetniks fighting the Partisans in eastern Bosnia were making a worthwhile contribution to the Croatian state and that the 2nd Army refused in

principle to accept Croatian complaints against these units “as long as the Communist bands are not liquidated.” He directly accused the Croatian authorities of overstating or inventing Chetnik attacks on Muslims and of not taking advantage of German offers to investigate such happenings. The 2nd Army also refused to let Croatian Lieutenant Colonel Franjo Sudar engage in “pacification” in eastern Bosnia, because that in fact would have meant indiscriminate action against the Serbian population.” Official Croatian reports dealt repeatedly with the Chetnik question. In the top secret “Intelligence Report No. 3” of August 12, 1944, the section on the “Chetnik question” began: “One of the most painful questions of our state and national policy is the question of the Chetniks. It is not only the matter of Chetnik misdeeds, but primarily the fact that our people cannot understand why the allied German army collaborates with our deadly enemies.”” After the Italian surrender, there was hardly a German-Croatian political or military conference at which the Croats did not raise the Chetnik issue. The Croatian government wanted all Chetniks who were not natives of Croatian territory to be repatriated, it wanted the Germans to stop arming and using Chetnik units, and it wanted German soldiers to stop fraternizing with them. The Chetnik issue was an important topic of discussion even at the last meeting between Paveli¢c and Hitler on September 18, 1944. Both Hitler and Field Marshal Keitel defended German-Chetnik collaboration on practical military grounds, and Hitler argued that it was better to have the Chetniks fight with German and Croatian troops against the Partisans than to have them go over to the Partisan side. As 1For Merrem’s report, dated July 5, 1944, see Micr. No. T-311, Roll 195, Frs. 770-86, and for the letter of the 2nd Panzer Army, see YA, Mil. Hist., German Docs., Reg. No. 15/2, 4-5, Box 265. 2See Viesti, no. 3,in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 20/23—5, Box 86.

312 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA for German field commanders, their standard reasons for using Chetnik units were that their own troops were insufficient for the tactical tasks assigned to them and that it was better to have the Chetniks as allies than as adversaries, so that German blood was saved. Only Kasche, as was so often the case, supported the Ustasha government and pressed for a solution of the Chetnik issue along the lines that it proposed.” But in this case, as in so many others, when German interests, military or otherwise, were involved, they took precedence over the desires of the Croatian government and Croatian military authorities. As German involvement in the military affairs of Croatia increased, so too did the number of German military personnel in Zagreb. According to information that Glaise supplied to the military commander in southeast Europe, in October 1943 there were 126 separate German military posts (Dienststellen) in Zagreb representing the German army, the Luftwaffe, and the Waffen SS and police. By early March 1944, this number had risen to 151, an increase of 20 percent, with 897 officers and military officials, 11,5 51 noncommissioned officers and privates, and their families.” Six months later, when the German position in southeast Europe began to crumble in the fall of 1944, Zagreb also became the seat of the command of Army Group F and thus of the commander in

chief in southeast Europe, and in February 1945 the seat of the command of Army Group E as well. The placement of these senior commands in Zagreb, however, probably did not significantly raise the number of German military personnel there because by this time the Germans were already withdrawing from Yugoslav territory. German military involvement further increased when executive power was transferred back to German generals in Croatia in the spring of 1944. As shown earlier, this power was withdrawn from them on the basis of Hitler’s Order No. 26 of September 7, 1943. For some time, German generals influenced Croatian civilian authorities through the special delegates that the Croatian government detailed to German divisional and higher commands and through the liaison between the German plenipotentiary general and the Croatian minister of interior in Zagreb. But this was not satisfactory for the Germans, particularly in areas that at times acquired special strategic importance. Consequently, on April 12, 1944, the commander in chief in southeast Europe ordered Glaise to arrange with the Croatian government for the proclamation of a “fighting zone” along the entire Adriatic coast and the introduction of an emergency regime in which German generals would exercise supreme executive For Hitler’s view, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,697—98. For the field commanders’ reasoning, see the protocol of a meeting with the intelligence officer of the 2nd Panzer Army on July 29, 1944, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 257, Fr. 1042. For Kasche’s arguments, see his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of August 23, 1944, following his discussions with Lorkovié and Paveli¢ on the Chetnik question, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,576—78, and his report of November 8, 1944, to von Ribbentrop, in Micr. No. T120, Roll 5784, Fr. H299,045. 4See Micr. No. T-501, Roll 253, Fr. 647, and Micr. No. T-501, Roll 256, Fr. 253.

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 313 power according to the directives of the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army. Glaise approached Paveli¢ and on May 17 the two men signed a memorandum of understanding with just such stipulations. By an order of May 20, 1944, Paveli¢ introduced an emergency regime in the area based on the Law Decree on the Introduction of the Emergency Regime of January 18, 1943 (see Chapter 6). The coastal region was divided into two military government areas, with a Croatian general with executive power in charge of each. According to the May 17 memorandum of understanding, however, the Croatian generals were subordinate to the German generals, who held executive power. In later months, the same formula was used to give executive power to German generals in Srijem, Slavonia, northeast Bosnia, and western Bosnia.” Several months later, on July 26, 1944, von Weichs, commander in chief in southeast Europe, proposed what became known as the “von Weichs plan,” a series of steps that would have further expanded the Germans’ control over the Croatian armed forces. Von Weichs was concerned about the continuing disintegration of these forces and the increased risk that, with the advance of Soviet forces toward southeast Europe and the possibility of Allied landings on the Adriatic coast, the bulk of the army would go over to the Western side. He recommended that no more purely Croatian military units be formed, that existing Croatian units be strengthened by substantial contingents of German personnel, that existing mountain and light infantry brigades be reformed along the lines of the Croatian legionnaire divisions, and that in every respect Croatian units be subject to and used exclusively as a part of German forces.” On August 14, Hitler and the Wehrmacht Operations Staff consulted von Ribbentrop and Kasche on von Weichs’s proposal and found them, as usual, on the side of the Croatian government. Kasche’s note on the meeting pointed out that Hitler was somewhat less skeptical toward Croatia than earlier, and in the end the proposal, after some discussion, was abandoned. In these critical days, an important consideration was to not exacerbate relations between the two countries.”’ As before, in reaching decisions about Croatia, the desirable had to give way to the practical: the von Weichs plan called for many more German troops beyond those already in Croatia, and these the Germans simply did not have. It may be added that in August 1944, the Germans transferred some ’5For the order of the commander in chief in southeast Europe to Glaise, see Micr. No. T-

120, Roll 5793, Fr. H306,571. For the memorandum of understanding, see Fr. H306,556. See also Frs. H306,563-67. The memorandum was not made public. For Pavelié’s order of May 20, 1944, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1944, p. 377, and for his orders of October 14 and December 13, 1944, pp. 749 and 829. *For von Weichs’s report of July 26, 1944, on conditions in the Croatian army and his proposal for its reorganization, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,267-74. *’For Kasche’s note on the meeting, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H301,996-99.

For the position of the German Foreign Ministry and Kasche toward von Weichs’s plan, see , also Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,256—-67. For the German effort to avoid exacerbating relations with Croatia, see Micr. No. T-77, Roll 781, Frs. 5,507,643—-46.

314 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA Croatian mountain brigade units into their own forces and replaced them with German units, which some Croats considered the beginning of the liquidation

of the Croatian army. But this practice soon ceased.” | As part of the Germans’ stepped-up effort to destroy the Partisans after the Italian surrender, Colonel General Lothar Rendulic, the new commander of the

2nd Panzer Army in the western Balkans, mounted a series of operations against them beginning in early December, with the aim of exhausting them and destroying their fighting power.” In Croatian territory, these maneuvers were part of Operation Kugelblitz, which was carried out partly with the aid of

Croatian troops. It was followed by Operations Schneesturm, Ziethen, Herbstgewitter, Panther, Delphin, Merkur, Waldrausch, and Weihnachtsmann. Though the Germans inflicted many losses on the Partisans and forced them to yield territory, the tide was turning in their favor. Manpower losses

were offset by the influx of new volunteers and territorial losses by the recap- | ture of old or the acquisition of new territory elsewhere. The Italian surrender not only greatly increased the number of new Partisan recruits and vastly improved their supply lines, but also greatly strengthened them psychologically. At the Tehran Conference in late 1943, they were recognized as an Allied military force, which increased their political standing at home and at the same time diminished still further that of the Chetniks. Moreover, Allied aid to the Chetniks was gradually phased out and aid to the Partisans steadily grew. The continued advance of Soviet troops on the eastern front and after June 1944 of the Western Allies on the western fronts and the general feeling that the Germans would lose the war benefited them and hurt all their enemies in Yugoslavia.

Rendulic soon realized the futility of conventional operations against the Partisans and decided to try an airborne attack on Tito’s headquarters at Drvar in western Bosnia. He reasoned that if Tito were captured or killed, the Partisan movement would disintegrate. The attack occurred on May 25, 1944 (Tito’s birthday), and inflicted heavy losses, but Tito escaped.” He was flown to Allied-held Bari, Italy, then moved to the central Dalmatian island of Vis, safely held by the Partisans and the British, where he maintained his headquarters for the next several months. For the Drvar failure, among other reasons, Rendulic was removed as commander of the 2nd Panzer Army around June 20, 1944, and replaced by General Maximilian de Angelis.

*®Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Fr. H301,540. 7 **Kljakovi¢, “Reflections on Tito’s Conduct,” pp. 5-11.

The airborne attack on Drvar will be discussed fully in the third volume of this study. According to a German report, the Germans used the following forces: one regiment of the Brandenburg Division, Motorized Grenadier Unit No. 92, parts of the Reserve Light Regiment No. 1, parts of the 7th SS Division “Prinz Eugen,” and roo German aircraft of different types, including Stukas. See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,442-43.

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 315 THE GERMAN ROLE IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS The Italian surrender prompted the Germans to reassess not only their mili-

tary arrangements, but also their political relations, with the Croatian state. Glaise, as we have already noted, had begun to work against Paveli¢ and the Ustashas from the fall of 1941. His aim was to remove them from power or at least broaden the base of government with elements more conciliatory toward the Serbian population and more widely supported by the people. As an alternative to the Ustashas, Glaise had in mind specifically the Croatian Peasant Party and after that “groups broadly representative” of Croatian political life. After the Italian surrender, Glaise apparently thought that the Ustasha regime might collapse because of the great increase in strength of the Partisans. Although events proved him wrong, the change did provoke a reconsideration of the Croatian problem in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. In the first half of October 1943, the Germans thought “that the disintegration in Croatia had progressed so far that it finally had to be faced.”*! On October 24 von Weichs, commander in chief in southeast Europe, sub-

mitted a proposal to the Wehrmacht Operations Staff advocating radical changes in the Independent State of Croatia.” Two days later, Glaise also sub-

mitted a detailed plan on the need for introducing an emergency regime (Ausnabmezustand) that would usher in drastic political and military changes and included not only ousting Paveli¢ but also reorganizing the governmental structure. On the political side, Glaise proposed that Croatia remain an independent state, but be put under German trusteeship, with Paveli¢ either a figurehead or else removed. A German general should be appointed as Reich plenipotentiary in Croatia, with command over military forces and other German agencies and with full control over the Croatian government. The existing Ustasha government should resign and the chief of state (or a regency council, if he resigned) should name a new government proposed by the Reich plenipoten-

tiary but broadly representative of Croatian political forces. All executive power should be in the hands of the Reich plenipotentiary, but legislative power should remain in Croatian hands, with all laws being countersigned by the Reich plenipotentiary. Similarly, the judiciary and police should be left in Croatian hands, but under German supervision. The Ustasha Party should be separated from the state and left to wither away; acceptable Ustasha officials

could be retained, but others should be gradually removed. On the military side, Glaise proposed sending three additional all-German, first-class divisions

to Croatia, which would undertake a systematic and orderly pacification of 'Kriegstagebuch, 3, pt. 2: 1234. Ibid. It might be added that two days earlier, Kasche had written a long letter to von Weichs, praising the Ustasha militia and pleading for German understanding of their contri- , bution to the war effort, as well as for aid for future training and closer cooperation with German troops.

316 | THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA various areas, eschewing the use of terror, after which the maintenance of peace and order would be entrusted to the Croatian gendarmerie and garrison troops.

The local German military government would be strengthened in order to

| tighten its control over local Croatian authorities. And the Ustasha militiaand Pavelié’s Personal Guard would be merged with the Croatian army and thus

brought under the latter’s control.” , , ~The Wehrmacht Operations Staff presented the plan to von Ribbentrop and

Kasche, the German envoy in Zagreb, and also passed it on to Hitler. A conference took place at Hitler’s headquarters on October 29, 1943. In his notes on the conference, Kasche remarked on the “strong reserve, in fact skepticism, of the Fiihrer toward Croatia. This view was obviously formulated on the basis of reports from the military and the Reich SS leadership.” He also noted that “the _ Fiihrer denied the capacity of the Croats to rule; without German support the Croats would never be able to establish order. In this respect he thought that one day Croatia would come to lean more heavily on the Reich. Then within six months the Germans would have to establish order by any means necessary if a reasonable and peaceful development was to be expected.” To a large extent, Hitler’s judgment reflected the views of Generals Rendulic and Phleps, who had

command posts in the Croatian military theater. On the other side were von Ribbentrop, the foremost defender of the Croatian government and the Us-

tashas on that and several other occasions, and Kasche.* _ , As a consequence of this exchange between Hitler and the Wehrmacht Op- _ erations Staff on the one hand and German military and diplomatic authorities in the field and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on the other, the Wehrmacht

Operations Staff decided not to implement the recommendations of von

Weichs and Glaise. It so informed them on October 30, 1943: , Any attempt to improve the unsatisfactory conditions in Croatia in a political _ manner by a more or less radical removal of the Croatian government leadership

would be an experiment whose consequences for the population and Wehrmacht , _ troops in Croatia could not be foreseen with certainty. The tasks that would then

, devolve upon the German Wehrmacht could not be handled with the available forces; [and] reinforcements cannot be provided. Therefore the hitherto existing political line toward Croatia has to be continued, at least for the time being.”

As Hitler had expressed to Kasche on August 30, 1943, “the government of the Poglavnik is the only possible one in Croatia and therefore it has to be strengthened. The danger from outside requires that the chaos be removed as fast as possible. The Croatian state as such lacks the necessary backbone for this; consequently, German leadership, especially in the military field, is indispensable.

- 83Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 774-76. , See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H301,990~91 for Kasche’s note of November 11,

1943, on the conference of October 29, 1943. , /

*Kriegstagebuch, 3, pt. 2: 1234. | |

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 317 It, however, must act tactfully. . .. The Ustashas, as the only state-building movement, must be maintained.””*

Hitler and the Wehrmacht Operations Staff went along with the policy of von Ribbentrop and Kasche not so much because they agreed with it, but because they could ill afford to commit more manpower in Croatia. If the Germans had jettisoned Paveli¢ and the Ustasha regime, it would have proved to the Partisans that German policy in Croatia had broken down and would have encouraged them to intensify their activities and gained them more support. Hitler and the Wehrmacht wanted to avoid renewed unrest in Croatia. As long as Paveli¢ and the Ustashas were in power, the Wehrmacht could assume that they would remain true to the Germans and would act to the limits of their capacity against the Partisans or anyone else who tried to make arrangements with the Western Allies. As the months passed, Glaise became resigned to the fact that the Germans would have to muddle through with the existing policy. The victory for von Ribbentrop and Kasche was somewhat lessened, however, at a conference on March 9, 1944, among Hitler, von Ribbentrop, Kasche, Glaise, and Warlimont, when a strong pro-Ustasha line was set aside in favor of strengthening simultaneously both Croatian army and Ustasha militia units.” But even though the Ustasha regime survived both the collapse of Italy and the efforts of von Weichs and Glaise to do away with it, it could not prevent an increase of German influence in Croatia. With more territory to control, a stronger enemy in the Partisans, and the ever present danger of Allied landings, the Germans convincingly argued for stronger powers in the Independent State of Croatia.

, Personnel changes in the Croatian administration reflected the increase in German control. First came the easing out of Mile Budak, minister of foreign affairs, who was considered pro-Italian. Budak had assumed his post on May 1, 1943, after spending a year and a half as envoy in Berlin. On July 9, 1943, he wrote an internal memorandum critical of German policy in Bosnia, which, like most official documents, eventually passed into German hands. After the Italian collapse, Budak insisted that the Italian government, in the form of Mussolini’s Social Republic of Salo, acknowledge Croatia’s abrogation of the Rome *Tbid., p. 1035.

*’For Glaise’s reluctant acceptance of the pro-Ustasha policy, see his letter to Warlimont of February 29, 1944, in Micr. No. T-77, Roll 781, Frs. 5,507,634 and 5,507,647. For the softening of the pro-Ustasha policy, see Frs. 5,507,63 5-36. Glaise did not exclude the possibility of removing Paveli¢ and the Ustasha regime if the opportunity arose, by, for example, the repulsion of an Allied attempt to land in Dalmatia or the successful stabilization of the Russian front. For Kasche’s report on the conference on March 9, 1944, see his memorandum of March 30, 1944, in which the negative attitude of both Hitler and the Wehrmacht Operations Staff toward the Croatian government and army is clear, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H301,992-95.

318 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA treaties of May 1941, and when it refused, he ordered Croatian authorities to sequester all Italian assets in the country. But the Germans claimed these assets as well. Differences also arose between Budak and Kasche and led to a break between them. When Pavelié reorganized his cabinet in early October 1943,

Budak was dropped.” a | | |

Another personnel change, in this case in the armed forces, was the appointment, at Glaise’s urging, of Air Force Colonel (later General) Fridrih Navratil as minister of armed forces and commander in chief. Navratil, until then Croatian military attaché in Bucharest, took the position on the condition that he would have ultimate authority in military matters insofar as that authority was still held by the Croatian government, that he would have a free hand in personnel matters, and that he would be allowed to merge Ustasha militia units into Croatian army units. He was on friendly terms with the Germans and made a good impression on Hitler when he visited him on November 22,

1943. On that occasion, he made several requests on behalf of the Croatian armed forces, almost all of which were turned down.” An important change that he instituted was the replacement of former Austro-Hungarian officers with younger officers who had been in the Yugoslav army. But this policy, though it may have been motivated by purely professional considerations, and Navratil’s extensive authority were too much for Paveli¢. He ousted Navratil on January 23, 1944, ostensibly for being too friendly toward the Serbs and in-

sufficiently attentive to the Ustashas. Glaise and Kasche intervened on Navratil’s behalf, but to no avail, and Hitler finally decided that this was an internal Croatian matter for Paveli¢ to resolve.” Navratil was replaced by Us**For Budak’s memorandum dealing with German policy in Bosnia, see Micr. T-501, Roll

265, Frs. 463-70. For Budak’s dismissal, see his postwar interrogation, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 4/3, Box I. O. 9, p. 12. Thereafter, Pavelié pushed Budak completely into the background. He continued to be a deputy leader (doglavnik), but exercised no power. 9Kriegstagebuch, 3, pt. 2: 1035, 1299-301. Navratil began his career in the AustroHungarian armed forces as a successful fighter pilot in the First World War. He then served in the Yugoslav air force, but was retired shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, reportedly because he was pro-German and advocated the purchase of German planes by the

air force. See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5788, Frs. H302,457-58. Glaise thought that Navratil _ was one of the best officers in the Croatian army and that Marshal Kvaternik sent him to

serve abroad purely out of jealousy. | ,

“Both Glaise and Kasche argued that because Navratil had recently been so well received by the Fiihrer, he should not be so easily dismissed. Kriegstagebuch, 4, pt. 1: 737-38. Perhaps in an effort to mollify Glaise and Kasche, Pavelié named Navratil to the newly created post of

inspector general of national defense, a figurehead position. Shortly before Soviet forces pushed the Germans out of Romania, Navratil was named Croatian envoy in Bucharest, but he apparently did not have a chance to present his credentials before he was forced to leave

the country. a a

. Paveli¢é had an ideal opportunity to oust Navratil in January 1944, when Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Babic¢, a former Yugoslav General Staff officer and friend of the Croatian Peasant Party, escaped to the Allies in Italy in the plane that both Navratil and Paveli¢ used for long trips, with Navratil’s pilot at the controls. See Micr. No. T-77, Roll 883, Fr. 5,601,844.

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 319 tasha Colonel Ante Voki¢, the 36-year-old minister of transportation (who continued in that position), who had no professional military training and could not speak German, but who belonged, in Glaise’s words, “to the better Ustasha elements.” By making such a man the minister of armed forces, Paveli¢ not only increased the Ustashas’ influence over the army and his own influence over the armed forces, but also probably deliberately affronted Glaise.“ During both Navratil’s and Vokic’s tenure of office, the Croatian government sought to wring military concessions from the Germans. It tried to trans-

fer some areas of Croatian territory under German command to Croatian command; it asked that some frontline troops be restored to its command, among other reasons to protect the 1944 harvest in Slavonia and Srijem; it sought additional arms; it requested permission to organize special village militia units and obtain arms for them; it asked the Germans to supply additional Croatian units; and it also asked them to reduce the monthly bill for German forces stationed in Croatia. The Germans refused outright almost all these requests. However, Hitler did allow the gradual establishment of village militias, with arms supplied by the Germans and under their strict control. Otherwise these militias would be, as Hitler and many German generals feared, the surest way of helping to arm the Partisans.” Another aspect of increasing German involvement was the evacuation of thousands of civilians from the Dalmatian coast. General Artur Phleps, commander of the Vth SS Mountain Corps, feared that if the Western Allies landed on the Adriatic coast, they would be helped by the local population. Because the Germans lacked sufficient troops or trusted Croatian units to deploy in the area, they decided toward the end of January 1944 to evacuate the male popu-

lation between the ages of 17 and 50 from the Dalmatian islands and the coastal areas to inland localities, which were also considered secure from the Partisans. In addition, they wanted to stop traffic between the Partisan-held islands of Lastovo and Vis and other Dalmatian islands.” Initially the plan called for the evacuation of an estimated 20,000 men from the Adriatic islands and along the coast from Split to Kotor. The Croatian gov-

ernment feared that such an undertaking, especially if left to the Germans alone, would induce men to flee to the mountains and turn public opinion 41Ror Glaise’s assessment of Voki¢, see Micr. No. T-77, Roll 781, Frs. 5,507,629-30. By March, Supreme Ustasha Headquarters itself was urging a thorough “cleansing” of the army

officer corps. It proposed that Pavelié dismiss not less than 129 officers, mostly of higher rank. Glaise prevented this from being implemented. For further details, see Chapter ro. “Micr. No. T-77, Roll 781, Fr. 5,507,635. 43Ror an account of the evacuation from its inception in January to the middle of June 1944, see Kasche’s report to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs of June 26, 1944, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H301,377—85. For the effort to stop traffic to the Partisanheld islands, see the report by Ernest Bauer, the Croatian delegate with the 181st German Division, of March 20, 1944, to the minister for liberated areas and the undersecretary in the Ministry of Interior, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 49/6—-1, Box 218.

320 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA against it. Instead, it proposed drafting the intended evacuees for military or labor duty. But this carried no weight with the Germans, because to be effective, the evacuation could not be publicly announced or prepared for in advance. So it went ahead as originally planned, and those to be evacuated were given only short notice. Not only males between 17 and 50 years of age, but also those down to the age of 12 or 15 and up to the age of 60 or 70 were included. A great deal of brutality accompanied the evacuation, and no advance arrangements were made in the interior of the country for feeding, housing, and medically caring for the evacuees. This provoked the local authorities to protest to the

Croatian government in Zagreb. In reports on March 22~23, 1944, to the Croatian Ministry of Interior, Antun Bué, the head of the district of Dubrava,

complained that the evacuees were “handled like convicts” and that the evacuation of men “from Peljesac and the area of Ston looked very much like herding livestock.” This led to new protests by the Croatian government. In a report to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 25, Kasche sided completely with the Pavelié regime and severely criticized German military

, commands, especially the Vth SS Mountain Corps, for their handling of the evacuation.“ Nevertheless, the Croats had to go along with it, though they con-. tinued to protest about the way it was carried out. The Germans evacuated the whole population of some villages, as well as of the two small islands, Solta and Drvenik, off of Split. The Croatian government especially complained that the Germans often evacuated local officials and Ustasha Party representatives along with the other males, leaving the remaining populace without leaders and normal channels of communication. But despite all Croatian protests, the evacuation continued until the end of August 1944 and was extended as far north as Zadar.* After August 1944, the Germans apparently evacuated men only from the immediate area of German military in-

stallations and fortifications. _ I was unable to ascertain the exact number of people evacuated, but it probably greatly exceeded the original estimate of 20,000, because it included a much larger area and many more people than originally planned. This was yet another mass evacuation that the people of the Dalmatian islands and coastal areas had to endure. The Italians had already evacuated people from these areas who were considered sympathetic to the Partisans to concentration camps either on Dalmatian islands or in Italy. The total number of people evacuated “Kasche fully supported the Croatian government’s proposal to draft, not evacuate, the male population. See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,434-35. He also supported the Croats’ complaints about the evacuation; see Frs. H306,425-26. His report of March 25 was of such a nature that on May 18, Colonel General Jodl, chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, complained to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Kasche should have ascertained the facts from German military commands in Croatia before making his reproach and that in the future he should support any necessary military measures undertaken by the 2nd

Panzer Army. See Frs. H306,406-—7. For the quotes from Bué, see Frs. H306,429-30. .

*Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Fr. H302,148. |

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 321 by the Italians, including those from the Croatian Littoral, was several tens of thousands. The mass evacuations were only a further example of how harshly the Germans treated the local population when pursuing their military objectives. Earlier, in occupying formerly Italian-annexed and -occupied areas in the fall of 1943, they often behaved ruthlessly when they were opposed by the Partisans and where they suspected Partisan sympathizers were harbored. They engaged in mass shootings of civilians, including women, burned houses, and appropriated livestock and personal valuables.** When news of such actions spread, a mass exodus of people occurred from the inland areas toward the Adriatic coast and from there and the Dalmatian islands via the Partisan-held island of Vis to Italy. An estimated 45,000 people took part. Of these, about 27,000 were later transferred to refugee camps on the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt (El Shatt, El Khatadba, and Tolumbat), where the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) cared for them until they were later repatriated.” A typical example of the action of German troops, in this case the dreaded 7th SS Division “Prinz Eugen” composed of Volksdeutsche from the Banat, and of the mass exodus of people to avoid disaster occurred in my native commune of Kuna on the Peljesac peninsula during late October and early November 1943. According to a report on December 17, 1943, by the Croatian gendarmerie station in the nearby town of Trpanj, of the total population of the commune, 69 were killed by German forces, 1,712 fled, partly under Partisan

prodding, to the neighboring island of Korcula, and 207 (58 men and 149 women) remained. The Germans burned 82 houses and plundered many others. Much of the grape harvest could not be collected and much of the wine already made was spilled out or taken away. Since most of the refugees on Kor‘See, for example, the report of the local Croatian authority in Vrgorac on German operations in that area on February 19-20, 1944, in which 1 child was killed, 27 boys and old men were taken away, 61 houses with all contents were burned down, leaving 203 people homeless, and all livestock was confiscated, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 33/61, Box 218. See also the protest note of Bruno Nardelli, chief of the Croatian administration in Dalmatia, to the German area command (Feldkommandantur) in Split, of March 31, 1944, about punitive German operations on the island of Braé. In reprisal for 10 German soldiers killed and 3 wounded, the Germans killed 56 people, burned down several score of houses, raped women whose husbands were with the Partisans, and arrested or evacuated a large number of other people. Ibid., Reg. No. 48/2-2-7, Box 87. *"Kvesi¢, Dalmacija u narodnooslobodilacékoj borbi, pp. 683-84. According to a 71-page report on January 1, 1945, of the Central Committee of Yugoslav refugee camps in Egypt, which administered the camps for the Yugoslav side, at the end of December 1944 there were

24,689 people in the main camp at El Shatt, including those previously housed at El Khatadba, and 2,183 people at Tolumbat, for a total of 26,872 people. There were 1,250 children up to two years old; 2,036 preschool children; 7,020 school children and youngsters; 6,665 men; and 9,901 women. The report also listed the refugees’ area of origin and religion (pp. 2-3). I obtained a copy by courtesy of Petar Anti¢evié, an elementary school friend and secretary of one of the five administrative sections in the camps.

322 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA , cula could not be transferred to Vis because of the shortage of boats, they were later caught by the Germans and returned to their homes.” The Germans’ mass evacuations in Dalmatia and their punitive actions toward the local populace resulted in a head-on confrontation between them and several Ustasha ministers in April 1944. This led the Germans to demand further personnel changes in the government. The immediate cause was the mass killing of civilians by units of the 7th SS Division “Prinz Eugen” in operations around Poljica on the coast and Sinj in the interior at the end of March. In early April, Edo Bulat, Croatian minister for liberated areas (areas officially incorpo-

rated into the Independent State of Croatia after the Italian surrender), com- |

| plained not only to the German commanders in charge of the operations, but . also to Stijepo Peri¢, minister of foreign affairs, in Zagreb, that German forces, assisted by Chetniks, had killed about 400 men, women, and children in the ~ two areas. Both Bulat and Peri¢ were Croats from Dalmatia. When Croatian authorities arrested 70 Chetniks, the Gestapo tried to free them and gave the Croats a ten-minute ultimatum. Not until the latter threatened to use machine guns did the Gestapo back down and accept the release of three Chetnik offi-

cers, who were to be expelled from Croatia.”

Following Bulat’s complaint, Peri¢ ordered Tomislav Sambugnach, chargé d’affaires in Berlin, to submit a protest note to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking that “criminal procedures be immediately ordered against the German commander and members of the Wehrmacht who ordered this deed and who witnessed and participated in it, and that the Chetniks present in these

German units be delivered to Croatian authorities.” Sambugnach did so on April 11, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to accept his protest, calling it an expression of “shameless arrogance” on the part of the Croatian for-

eign minister and one that required immediate correction. Von Ribbentrop then ordered Kasche to read a note of protest to the Croatian prime minister. The key clause in the oral démarche was “that the Reich government must decline to acknowledge such a written message and that the Reich government forbids, once and for all, the Croatian government to use a similar tone in its communications with the Reich, but rather to use a form that corresponds to the position of Croatia relative to the Greater German Reich.” The note went on to say that the Reich government could not in the future cooperate with “*For the report of December 17, 1943, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 1/6-1, Box 218. See also Pleho, Peljesac u narodnooslobodilackoj borbi, pp. 193-95, 207. According to a list in my possession, 397 refugees from the commune of Kuna were housed in the El

Shatt camp. They returned home at the beginning of May 1945.

*° Although Croatian authorities arrested this group of Chetniks, and the Ustasha press in

Split vociferously blamed them for the massacres, they were almost certainly not responsible. , See the protest note of the Chetniks to the German liaison officer in Drnis of May 2, 1944, in

Micr. No. T-311, Roll 189, Frs. 288-91. The Ustasha authorities probably knew this, but since they could not publicly attack the Germans, they attacked the Chetniks instead, who generally collaborated with the Germans.

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 323 Peri¢ as foreign minister. The inevitable outcome was his forced resignation on April 28, 1944.°° Significantly, not only von Ribbentrop but also Hitler disliked Peri¢é, who had had the temerity to disagree with the latter when he and Prime Minister Mandi¢ were received in a formal audience on March 1, 1944, at Klessheim

Castle. The minutes of meetings between Hitler and foreign statesmen and diplomats show that visitors were usually subjected to long monologues and had to limit themselves to brief expressions of assent, short reports, and pious demands. Peri¢’s delivery of critical pro memorias to von Ribbentrop and his disagreement with Hitler were not only unusual but unacceptable, though en~ tirely in character for him.’ According to one of his former secretaries, Peri¢ lost his post as Croatian envoy in Rome because he talked back to Mussolini. Perhaps encouraged by the ouster of Peri¢, Rendulic, commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, who had already written several letters to Paveli¢ asking for Bulat’s dismissal, ordered Glaise to see Paveli¢ and insist that Bulat “be removed from Croatian public life.” Consequently on May 20, 1944, Bulat was relieved of his post as minister for liberated areas and the ministry was abolished. Bulat

was named a minister without portfolio, but he had no official functions and no contact with German military authorities. Bulat’s dismissal had not first been cleared with von Ribbentrop, although it was an eminently political matter and thus within his jurisdiction, and he objected vigorously to the action of the two generals and insisted that in the future matters of a political nature be handled exclusively by the German envoy or legation.”

GERMAN INCONSISTENCIES, CROATIAN GRIEVANCES As the war continued, the German organization in Croatia grew complex and multipronged. Because Germany’s agenda toward Croatia was never fixed, different agencies followed different and often conflicting policies. Nowhere was this so noticeable as in the policies of the two chief German representatives in Zagreb, Glaise, representing the Wehrmacht, and Kasche, representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” Glaise, as we have seen, realized the fundamental For both notes, see von Ribbentrop’s instructions to Kasche of April 20, 1944, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5788, Frs. H302,511-15. Von Ribbentrop noted that he had not liked Perié’s

conduct since the latter’s earlier visit to Berlin. For Peri¢’s forced resignation, see Frs. H302,508-10. ‘'Hillgruber, Staatsmdadnner und Diplomaten bei Hitler, 2: 364-70. For Hitler’s dislike of Peri¢, as expressed to Kasche, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Fr. H301,994.

For additional information on the Bulat case, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,22 5-34. For an example of the different views of Glaise and Kasche on military matters alone, see Glaise’s report (as military attaché) of October 2, 1943, on the Croatian military situation, and Kasche’s point-by-point criticism of October 12, 1943, of this report, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,81 4-20 and H306,822-23.

324 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA shortcomings of the Ustasha regime in the first year of its existence and tried to convince his superiors of the need for it to broaden its base and reign in its lawlessness or, later, to come under the control of a Reich plenipotentiary. He was not the only German official with a low opinion of Paveli¢ and the Ustashas. Ernst Fick, SS brigade leader and major general of the Waffen SS, commented

in a report to Himmler on March 16, 1944, that “considering the existing situation, our troops here are engaged in a hopeless fight. In the entire political apparatus there is no recognizable political line. ... In terms of power, Dr. Ante Paveli¢ is only the mayor of the city of Zagreb, excluding the suburbs.”™ If Glaise was Paveli¢’s most determined opponent, Kasche was his greatest ally. Kasche was undeviating in his support of the Ustasha regime and the head of state. In part, his position was determined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which exerted influence in all occupied or virtually occupied countries, though its policies often clashed with those of the Wehrmacht and of Himmler’s SS and

police organization. In part, it was the result of his own judgment, which throughout the war amounted to a strong pro-Ustasha stand.” Kasche was so well inclined toward Paveli¢ and the Ustasha regime that in April 1944 von Ribbentrop, after receiving one of his telegrams from Zagreb, felt obliged to take issue with his reporting. Von Ribbentrop broached the matter with Hitler and in a personal telegram to Kasche on April 13 declared: “Your reports show throughout that you see conditions and events in Croatia

too much through the eyes of the Croats, that you are obviously inclined to consider as true and right what you are told by the Croats.” After giving a series of examples that Hitler had indicated were faulty reporting by Kasche, he went on: “I must again strongly urge you to not let yourself be influenced in your reports by views that are so lacking in factual basis. Doing so accomplishes little, and in the end it is your own interests that suffer when your reports convey to me and other officials the impression that you are not free from prejudices of

the above mentioned sort.”

Kasche stood his ground and the crisis with his ministry passed. But the following August, he was again in trouble over relations with Glaise. More trouble arose in December. On December 16 von Ribbentrop advised him to lodge a vigorous protest with Pavelié over recent incidents in Croatia, when Us-

tasha units had mishandled German military personnel, had forcibly seized Croatian soldiers from legionnaire divisions being transported by the German “Fick to Himmler, March 16, 1944, in Heinrich Himmler Collection, Box 5 (File 281),

Hoover Institution Archives. **See, for example, Kasche’s notes on his visits and reports to Hitler, on October 29, 1943, March 8, 1944, and August 14, 1944, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H301,990-99. **Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H302,049—-51. Kasche’s views were criticized by other

people as well. See, for example, the report of Minister Otto von Henting of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs of September 30, 1943, following his visit to Croatia, in Frs. H301,394-98. For Kasche’s reply to this criticism, see Frs. H301,388-91. At times, Hitler was highly critical of Kasche. See Kriegstagebuch, 4, pt. 2: 1637-38.

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 325 military to the Reich to serve prison terms, and had massacred Chetniks and a group of Serbian Volunteer Corps officers and soldiers traveling through Croatia under German escort. In von Ribbentrop’s opinion, “the Reich government must expect that in a country whose existence as a state must be ascribed exclusively to the spilling of blood by German soldiers,” measures would be taken to put a stop to all such activities in the future. The implication was that Kasche, who represented Germany, shared responsibility for the Ustasha excesses, which indicated disrespect for the German armed forces and Germany. Kasche was summoned to Berlin and barely succeeded in retaining his position.”

Kasche’s disputes were not limited to those with von Ribbentrop and Glaise. He also quarreled with Colonel General Rendulic, commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, accusing him of disregarding the Fihrer’s order of September 7, 1943, to treat Croatia as a sovereign state. Rendulic denied the charge and accused Kasche in turn of being more concerned with the interests of the Ustasha clique than with those of Germany. Rendulic finally broke off relations with Kasche and forbade his officers to have any contact with him.” After March 1943, Kasche also came into conflict with Himmler’s representative in: Croatia, General Konstantin Kammerhofer, commander of the mixed German-Croatian SS police and gendarmerie organization. Kasche and Himmler had a long-standing feud dating from 1934, when Himmler virtually liquidated Roehm’s SA forces, to which Kasche belonged. Their policies in Croatia also clashed. Their animosity toward each other helps explain the intensity with which Himmler opposed Kasche at the time of the LorkovicVokié crisis in August 1944 (see below). But Kasche survived Himmler’s attack because his policies were vindicated by developments in Zagreb. ‘’For Kasche’s difficulties in August, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Fr. H302,142, and

for those in December, Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Frs. H299,039-41. After the war, Kasche told British interrogators in Austria that he persuaded his superiors of the expediency of his policy and returned to Zagreb in January 1945, where he remained until he fled to Aus-

tria at the end of the war. For Kasche’s interrogation, see the “Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 6” for the week ending August ro, 1945, in F. O. 371/46611, C §138/141/3. *Rendulic, Gekampft, Gesiegt, Geschlagen, p. 222. At the time of the Lorkovié-Vokié crisis, Paveli¢ apparently took the precaution of informing Gottlob Berger, chief of the SS main office, during his visit to Zagreb on August 1113, 1944, about the action he planned to take against the plotters. Himmler then apparently took Kasche’s trip to Berlin at Paveli¢’s behest as an effort to save the would-be rebels. This explains the comment made by Himmler’s representative, Obergruppenfiihrer Hermann Fegelein, in the daily briefing at Hitler’s headquarters on August 31, 1944, that Himmler had ordered him to report as follows: “The Poglavnik has removed all the anti-Ustasha elements; Envoy Kasche has tried to prevent him from doing so. Envoy Kasche was the worst criminal and blockhead that there is. The Reichsfiihrer SS begs that Kasche be recalled for health reasons.” See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Fr. H299,133. For the feud between Kasche and Himmler, see also Sundhaussen, “Zur Geschichte der Waffen-SS in Kroatien,” p. 186. Berger got a lavish reception in Zagreb. Although he did confer with Lorkovié and Vokié, his principal talks were with Paveli¢ alone. For reports of the German posts in Zagreb on his visit, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,488-96.

326 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA Among his many activities in Croatia, Kasche sought to promote the pacification of the country by arriving at a modus vivendi with Tito. He was convinced that he would have succeeded had he been allowed to proceed. In the pe-

riod from March to May 1943, he supported an armistice between the Germans and the Partisans, but was overruled by von Ribbentrop and Hitler. Even so, he continued to try and win support for this policy, in conversations with Hitler on August 14, 1944, when Hitler told him that any arrangement with Tito would mean letting down Paveli¢, and with von Weichs on October 13,

1944.” Kasche felt certain that he could have reached an arrangement with Tito that was satisfactory to the Germans and not a betrayal of Paveli¢. He thought German interests in Croatia were best served by supporting Paveli¢ and helping him pacify the country and thereby consolidate his power.

Even with Kasche’s unremitting support, the Croats, as we have seen, had much to complain about to the Germans. In no place were their grievances spelled out more fully than in a series of nine pro memorias that Foreign Minister Stijepo Peri¢ delivered to von Ribbentrop on March 1, 1944, when he and Prime Minister Nikola Mandié¢ visited Hitler and von Ribbentrop.” In the pro memoria Some Military Questions of the Independent State of Croatia, dated February 10, the Croats listed six complaints in detail. First, the seat of the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, in charge of all German troops in Croatia and all Croatian troops under German command, was located in Serbia. The Croats found this tactically and operationally damaging and psychologically offensive; they wanted a separate German command on their own soil. Second, of the total number of about 330,000 Croats under arms, except for Paveli¢’s Personal Guard, “the Croatian government had no possibility of having independently at its disposal even a single company.” This situation was unacceptable for reasons of both state sovereignty and, especially, internal security.

Most Croatian forces were used by the Germans to protect transportation lines. Much of Croatian territory was, however, in Partisan hands, and Croatian forces were thus not available to protect the population in endangered areas. A large part of Croatian industry had already been destroyed or badly damaged and barely one-third of the 1943 crop had thus far been collected and secured. The Croatian government wanted the necessary number of Croatian troops to be put at its exclusive disposal. Third, German forces and Cossacks under German command repeatedly engaged in reprisals against the civilian population in areas of Partisan operations and took away livestock, food sup-

plies, and other possessions as booty, although they were operating in a 6°See Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 243-46. For the conversation with Hitler, see Micr.

No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H301,998 and H302,001, and for the conversation with von Weichs, Micr. No. T-311, Roll 194, Frs. 439-40. ®'See Kasche’s office note of March 2, 1944, on the meeting the previous day, listing all these pro memorias, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Frs. 1087-89.

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 327 friendly and allied country. The Croats wanted German forces to be forbidden from taking booty. Fourth, German troops evacuated positions, villages, and small towns without informing Croatian military and civilian authorities, exposing the Croatian population and authorities to many dangers. The Croatian government wanted its authorities to be given advance notice about withdrawals so that the necessary measures could be undertaken with the least risk. Fifth, the Croats protested against the way in which some lower-echelon German commanders developed special Croatian armed units and prohibited recruitment by Croatian authorities in their areas and they wanted these activities stopped. And finally, the Croatian government opposed the formation of new, and the employment of existing, Chetnik formations by the Germans, particularly in Dalmatia, eastern and northwest Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Srijem. This policy was not only extremely offensive, but in many ways incomprehensible because of the great risk to the Germans from the anti-German Serbs, and the Croats urged its immediate cessation. The pro memoria also included two lists of German and Cossack reprisals against the Croatian population and a schedule of promised but as yet undelivered supplies for Croatian forces.” I was unable to find any written German reaction to this pro memoria, but judging by German activities during the remaining fifteen months of war, we may conclude that no change occurred in German policies, except possibly in regard to the fifth complaint. We have already seen that Stijepo Peric, who submitted it, was soon forced out as minister of foreign affairs. Faced with the denial of most of their requests and a steady increase in German demands, many Croats in the government, the Ustasha organization, and the army began to develop a subtle opposition to the Germans. This took the form of passive resistance and bureaucratic sabotage, with officials delaying their response or only partly responding to German demands. Glaise noted in a letter to Colonel Schuchardt on August 13, 1943, even before the Italian collapse, that in his dealings with Croatian officers and officials, “engaging oneself for Germany was downright dangerous for one’s career.” The Croats had no other means of expressing their dissatisfaction, however; the experience of Budak, Peri¢, and others showed that when they openly engaged in activities injurious to German interests or prestige, they paid for it by losing position and power. As most people in Croatia came to realize that Germany would ultimately be defeated, the small amount of popular support that the Ustashas and the Germans still had slipped away. According to a report of the Croatian staff of For this pro memoria, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,091—-108 (with enclosures). A copy, dated February 5, is found in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 20/1— 17, Box 233a, but with one important difference. Instead of putting the number of Croatian men under arms at 330,000, it put it at 280,000. The latter figure probably did not include the estimated number of Croatian men in units that were formally part of the German armed forces, such as the legionnaire divisions and the 13th SS Division “Handschar.” Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 499.

328 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA the German Security Police and Security Service (SD) on November 27, 1943, the attitude of the broad masses of the population in Croatia was influenced, as far as domestic factors were concerned, by the activity of the insurgents, advancing inflation, lack of food, and opposition to the Ustasha regime. The re-

port observed that “even the Catholic Church was outwardly striving to renounce the Ustasha regime.”“ The utter impotence of the Ustasha state was noted in the monthly “Situation Report” of the commander in chief in southeast Europe on November 1, 1943: In Croatia there are four areas of power: (a) the area occupied by German troops, (b) the area controlled by the Croatian authorities, essentially only the city of Zagreb, (c) the autonomous Serbian areas (areas that have made themselves independent), which have “hedgehogged” [eingeigelt] their position and, depending on conditions, do or do not cooperate with the Germans, and (d) the Tito area, a Soviet state with good civilian administration and orderly military organization

(about 100,000 men). , APPROACHING THE END

A new chapter in German-Croatian relations opened with the Red Army’s

breakthrough into southeast Europe in the late summer of 1944. Romania collapsed on August 23, Bulgaria on September 8, and both declared war on Germany. Paveli¢, however, held firm to the German side. On the evening of August 30, immediately after a cabinet meeting, he issued orders for the arrest of Minister of Interior Lorkovi¢ and Minister of Armed Forces and of Trans-

, portation Voki¢. Also arrested were Milutin Jurcic, chief of state police, a score of army officers, and several leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party, including Ljudevit Tomaégi¢ and Ivanko Farolfi. All were charged with plotting to take Croatia over to the Western side. Paveli¢ also implicated Glaise, the German plenipotentiary general, which soon led to his departure. By arresting the would-be plotters and their allies and by strongly reasserting his loyalty to the Germans, Paveli¢ considerably enhanced his own and the Ustashas’ standing with them. The Ustasha state was now the only remaining German satellite on the escape route through the Balkans for the large German army in Greece and other forces in southeast Europe. Paveli¢’s firm stand fully vindicated the policy of von Ribbentrop and Kasche. In reality, in order to save his position—always his primary consideration—Paveli¢ had no other choice. But even at this late date, he seems to have believed that in the end Germany would win the war. In a conversation on August 3, 1944, with papal Legate Marcone, he remarked that “Germany would never lose the war because it was

preparing some ‘horrible weapon.’” Furthermore, “the war will be finished in two years with a German victory, and there will not remain a stone upon a

“Micr. No. T-313, Roll 488, Fr. 429. : ‘SKriegstagebuch, 3, pt. 2: 1253. ,

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 329 stone in any way in England.”® Like Hitler, Paveli¢ also envisaged a falling-out between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, after which Germany would join the Allies in a crusade against the advancing Communist forces of Russia, Yugoslavia, and other eastern and southeast European countries. The Croatian army would also join the Allies and develop into a force capable of preventing the collapse of the Independent State of Croatia and the conquest of Yugoslavia by the Communists. As a true servant of Nazi interests, Paveli¢ was handsomely rewarded for his loyalty. First came the resignation of Glaise. Lorkovi¢, who led the dissident Ustasha plotters, had become a confidant and friend of Glaise during his time as liaison officer. Paveli¢ did not suggest that Glaise had anything to do with the plot, but in a letter on August 22, he told Kasche that Glaise had made vari-

ous defeatist statements to Lorkovi¢ about the probable outcome of the war. Kasche used this information to persuade von Ribbentrop and Hitler that Glaise should be removed, and after a visit to Berlin,” he presented Glaise with sufficient reasons for him to resign. On September 1 Glaise declared in a letter to the commander in chief in southeast Europe that because of an unbridgeable rift with both Paveli¢ and Kasche, he was no longer able to defend the interests of the Wehrmacht in Zagreb. The following day, he wrote a frank letter to Kasche in which he commented on the changes in Zagreb and accused Paveli¢ of contravening existing German-Croatian arrangements, particularly regarding changes of senior military personnel. He asked Kasche to protest these moves, which ran counter to German military interests. Four days later, on September 6, Glaise left Zagreb and asked to be relieved of duty.” But he made one

last attempt to further his policy. On the same day, he wrote to Kasche, imploring him not to emphasize to Paveli¢ Hitler’s decision to continue with the German pro-Ustasha policy, but to let Paveli¢ get out of his difficulties without German intervention. But given previous relations between the two men and *6See Masucci, Misija u Hrvatskoj, 1941-1946, p. 127. *’For Paveli¢’s letter to Kasche, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H302,13 4-36. For Kasche’s activities in Berlin in connection with Paveli¢’s removal of Lorkovié and Vokié and his request that Glaise be relieved of his post, see his detailed report covering the period between August 22 and September 1, 1944, in Frs. H302,138—50. For changes undertaken by

Paveli¢ as reported by the German deputy military attaché in Zagreb, see Micr. No. T-77,

: Roll 883, Frs. 5,631,316-19 and 5,631,326-29. “’For Glaise’s letter to the commander in chief, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 755. For his letter to Kasche, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H302,153—54. For his request to be relieved of duty, see Micr. No. T-77, Roll 781, Fr. 5,507,647. It might be added that on

September 29, 1944, Kasche was instructed by von Ribbentrop to inform Pavelié that the German Armed Forces High Command could not accept his assumption that Glaise had unfavorably influenced Lorkovié and Vokié. Instead, Kasche told Pavelié that Glaise had resigned his post for health reasons. Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Fr. H306,467. Apparently the German Armed Forces High Command could not accept the idea that Paveli¢ had succeeded in having Glaise removed from Zagreb and for the record changed the reason for his resignation.

330 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA | Kasche’s fixed ideas about the Ustashas’ value for the Croatian state and as

German allies, Glaise’s last suggestion carried no weight.” On September 18, Paveli¢ paid what was to be his final visit to Hitler’s , headquarters. The two leaders discussed the new situation and plans for

, strengthening the Croatian armed forces. Paveli¢ also made a number of requests, including one to establish a separate Croatian Supreme Command. The Germans did not fulfill this request, but others were granted, and on September 20, Hitler informed the commander in chief in southeast Europe and the acting German plenipotentiary general in Croatia that the following guidelines would prevail in all future relations with the Croatian armed forces and state authorities: The Ustashas form the political foundation of the Croatian state and therefore also of the Croatian armed forces. All German Wehrmacht staffs in Croatia must clearly and without compromise adopt a pro-Ustasha course and support it. Col~ laboration with the Chetniks, in which the Croatian government sees a danger for the existence of its state, must be gradually and systematically reduced. The devel- | , opment of Ustasha formations must be supported by supplying arms and ammunition, and by further training. . . . The Germans would support the development of two new Ustasha divisions from the eventual dissolution of army units. Withdrawal from presently. occupied, but strategically unimportant, positions must be undertaken in consultation with the Croatian government. For political reasons Banja Luka must be secured by sufficient Croatian troops.”

In the Croatian government, Vice Admiral (later Admiral) Nikola Steinfl_ became the new minister of armed forces. There were also several important changes in the cabinet, as well as at Supreme Ustasha Headquarters, Ustasha militia headquarters, and in the police.” Steinfl was also at first the titular commander in chief of the Croatian armed forces, but in early December 1944

Paveli¢ assumed this empty title. ,

With permission from Hitler, Paveli¢ and the Ustashas began preparations for a thorough reorganization of the Croatian armed forces. On December 1, 1944, the Croatian army and Ustasha militia were merged and organized into divisions and corps. Soon thereafter, leading Ustashas who had military or police experience, as well as some professional officers considered to be devoted to Paveli¢ and the Ustashas, were assigned to all important command posts (see Chapter ro). “For Glaise’s subsequent letter to Kasche, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Fr.

264, Frs. 468-69 and 5 52-53. , ,

H302,160. For his earlier efforts to bring about Kasche’s downfall, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll Glaise was not purged or punished, but he was also not reassigned to a new position. He survived the war and committed suicide in an American prisoner-of-war camp in Germany in 1946. Before his death he had to endure the humiliation of having not only Yugoslavia but —

also his own country, Austria, request his return to be tried as a war criminal. , ”Micr. No. T-77, Roll 781, Frs. 5,507,646—49. Some of these policies were put into op-

eration even before Paveli¢’s visit to Hitler on September 18, 1944. |

“Micr. No. T-77, Roll 883, Fr. 5,631,316. ) :

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 331 Pavelic’s removal of the pro-Western plotters among the Ustashas, his outflanking of Glaise, the unification of the Croatian army and the Ustasha militia,

and the appointment of his devoted lieutenants to the chief command posts were not, after all, victories of much consequence. After September 1944, whatever the Germans did in Croatia, or allowed the Ustasha regime to do, was merely an expression of their weakness and need to hold on to this last satellite in order to obtain some assistance during the withdrawal of their forces from southeast Europe. The Germans found it difficult to choose a successor to Glaise who would satisfy all interested parties—Hitler, the Wehrmacht, the SS and police, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. General Juppe, Wehrmacht inspector in Croatia,

was given the job temporarily and was also considered as a permanent replacement. In September, Paveli¢ and Kasche strongly favored the appointment of General Julius Ringel, who had been in command of the LXIXth Reserve Army Corps in Croatia between April 1 and June 26.” But in late November, the final choice fell on SS Obergruppenfiihrer and General of the Waffen SS Hans-Adolf Priitzmann, the highest SS and police leader in the Ukraine. Priitzmann had no experience in Croatia and apparently knew as little about it as did

Kasche when he was appointed envoy in April 1941. The delay in filling Glaise’s post was caused by interservice rivalries at the highest levels in Berlin, at Hitler’s headquarters, and in the field, where Kasche had running feuds with both the Wehrmacht and SS and police representatives. To simplify the often criticized double-track German military representation in the Croatian capital, Priitzmann, by a special order of December 4, 1944, was put in command of all

liaison and other Wehrmacht and SS services in the country, including the forces commanded by Kammerhofer.”

Priitzmann arrived in Zagreb around December 20, 1944. By that time German authorities had already issued orders to destroy all compromising documents, so very few of them dated later than January 1, 1945, have been preserved. In all my searches among German wartime documents, I did not find a single one signed by Priitzmann, nor any addressed to him, while he was the German plenipotentiary general in Croatia. Nevertheless, it is possible to piece together basic information about him. In a letter of March 23, 1945, addressed 72Q©n the case for Ringel, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Fr. H306,681. In fact, Kasche had urged his appointment as early as August 23 in talks with von Ribbentrop on the Lorkovi¢-Glaise crisis. Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Fr. H302,140. By mid-November, Kasche favored Juppe, who was still filling the post on an interim basis. Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Fr. H299,032.

On the feuds that delayed the appointment of Glaise’s replacement, see Micr. No. T120, Roll 753, Frs. 365, 576, and 586-88. On the scope of Priitzmann’s command, see Micr.

No. T-77, Roll 781, Fr. 5,507,653. As of January 30, 1944, General Priitzmann was the twenty-third highest ranking SS officer. See National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei, Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP, alphabetically arranged and not paginated.

332 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA to Himmler, Kammerhofer wrote: “May I beg you, Reichsfihrer, for information whether General Pritzmann will again return to Croatia. He is already absent ten weeks and neither I nor the Wehrmacht services here have heard from

him during the last six weeks, a fact which is abused a great deal by the Wehrmacht.” Kammerhofer also asked Himmler to withdraw his police forces in Croatia from the Wehrmacht’s command and to request the Wehrmacht to return some Croatian members of those forces fighting outside the country to Croatia, because this was contrary to German-Croatian agreements.”

We do not have Himmler’s answer to Kammerhofer, but the absence of Priitzmann from Zagreb and his lack of contact is easily explained. Priitzmann had also been appointed commander of the German Werewolves organization, which, after the end of the conventional war, was to go underground and continue the struggle using guerrilla tactics. He was preparing himself for his new

job and could not inform Zagreb about it. However, plans to activate the Werewolves were not put into effect. A few weeks after the end of the war, on — May 21, 1945, Priitzmann committed suicide in Liineburg near Hamburg.”

After Priitzmann’s departure from Zagreb, Juppe again became acting German plenipotentiary general in Croatia. He apparently remained in Zagreb until the end of the war because he was seen in the company of Croatian government ministers withdrawing to Austria during the second week of May

1945.” | |

After Italy’s surrender in September 1943, Croatia’s situation worsened day , by day. The already low morale of the army continued to decline, and greatly increased difficulties in obtaining arms and ammunition from the Germans, de-

teriorating economic conditions, as well as steady Partisan advances on the military, political, and diplomatic fronts, further eroded the Croatian forces. After September 1944, when it became evident that the Germans were using Croatian troops only to help them hold on to territory necessary for a safe withdrawal of their forces from southeast Europe, few Croatian soldiers could have any illusions about whom they were fighting for or about the eventual outcome of the war. They showed their lack of faith by deserting, often en | masse, from frontline positions and garrisons to the Partisans. These displays “Xerox copies of Kammerhofer’s letters to Himmler of March 23 and 26, 1945, were made available to me by courtesy of Tone Ferenc, professor of history at the University of Ljubljana, and come from the Archives of the Institute for the History of the Labor Move-

ment in Slovenia. |

’*Werewolves operations against Anglo-American forces were forbidden by an order of Field Marshal Keitel on May 5, 1945. Kriegstagebuch, 4, pt. 2: 1673. This prohibition was

soon also applied to operations against Soviet forces. ;

On Priitzmann’s fate, see Stockhorst, Fiinftausend Kopfe, p.331.’Stockhorst, Fiinftausend Kopfe, pp. 222-23. See Erih Lisak’s postwar interrogation, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 2/6, p. 18, Box 9 I. O.

UNDER GERMAN DOMINANCE 333 of unreliability were one of the important topics that Paveli¢ and Hitler discussed at their last meeting on September 18, 1944.” At the root of the problem were, first, the Germans’ desire to get as much as possible from the Croatian forces while investing as little as possible in them and leaving them practically no freedom of action, and second, the realization by many Croatian troops at all levels that they were merely pawns in a war being fought for the Germans and a handful of Ustashas. Apart from the purely Ustasha units and the steadily declining number of officers and soldiers in the army who believed in the Ustasha cause, it seemed that the majority of troops of the Independent State of Croatia had never believed in the fight against the Partisans. Paveli¢, too, was beginning to lose confidence. In August and September 1944, he still gave the impression that he believed Germany would win the war and he forestalled the attempt by fellow Ustashas to shift Croatia to the West. But by November, he realized that the days of Germany’s power to wage war and thus also of the Independent State of Croatia were numbered. By the end of October, Serbia had been freed from the Germans (except for German troops

withdrawing from Greece) and all Serbian quisling and Chetnik forces had been expelled (except for Montenegrin Chetniks withdrawing through southwest Serbia). In Bosnia, German and Croatian troops held only the main cities and communication lines and were under increasing pressure from the Partisans and Allied air attacks, so that this province was also as good as lost. By this

time Paveli¢, perhaps with a view to facilitating a last-minute collaboration with the Chetniks against the Partisans, was willing to acknowledge that a set-

tlement with the Serbs was necessary. He was also willing to grant Serbia terri- | torial concessions in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina. He said as much to Hermann Neubacher, Hitler’s special envoy in southeast Europe, in early November 1944. Paveli¢ knew that Neubacher, who had consistently opposed him, was still in contact with Serbian quisling and Chetnik forces as the chief political liaison official between them and the German authorities and that he remained in good standing with Hitler and von Ribbentrop. Kasche also reported this new flexibility to von Ribbentrop.” At this late date, however, Paveli¢’s willingness to arrive at a settlement with the Serbs had no practical significance whatsoever, either politically or militarily. But it is of interest ideologically, because it represented a departure from a fundamental plank of the Ustasha program, indeed from the program of all Croatian ultranationalists. In 1941, Paveli¢ and the Ustashas had acted treasonably by giving up a large part of Dalma”For a report and minutes of this meeting, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,69 5-701. On the problem of the unreliability of the Croatian army, see especially Frs. H306,699-700. See also Hillgruber, Staatsmanner und Diplomaten bei Hitler, 2: 506-19. *®On Paveli¢’s new flexibility as reported by Neubacher, see Micr. No. T-311, Roll 194, Fr. 113.6; as reported by Kasche, Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Fr. H299,045.

334 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA tia to Italy; now Paveli¢ was prepared to renounce the claim that the eastern

frontier of Croatia lay on the Drina River. Another interesting document from November 1944 was the Croatian government’s memorandum to the German authorities on evacuation. Presented on November 15, it outlined plans for evacuating the Croatian government and Croatian forces to Germany, there to continue, together with the German government and German forces, the struggle against the enemy for the “creation of conditions for a renewed liberation of their homeland.” In a point-by-point re-

: ply on January 25, 1945, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs granted most requests that were put forth and provided details about taking Paveli¢, the Ustasha government, and Croatian forces to Austria. The evacuation was also discussed by the Ustasha Council of Deputy Leaders, whose members wanted to be sure that they and their families were included.” But as we shall see in the concluding chapter, the final phase of German-Croatian military collaboration, including the evacuation of the Croatian government and the withdrawal of Croatian forces to Austria in May 1945, did not turn out as planned. ”For the Croatian government’s memorandum on evacuation, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 43/1, Box 233a. For the German reply, see Reg. No. 1/2, Box 233a. The Council of Deputy Leaders (Doglavnicko vijeée) discussed evacuation at its meeting on December 14, 1944. Jareb, “Meetings of the Ustasha Council of Deputy Leaders,” p. 192. Actually, Paveli¢’s wife Marija was evacuated to Austria as early as December 1944 and lived with

her retinue at Semmering. Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Fr. H299,343. -

CHAPTER 8

ee

_ The Independent State of Croatia: Internal Problems and Policies

In addition to the problems besetting the new Croatian state with its foreign sponsors, Germany and Italy, it also faced a series of intractable domestic problems. Three were primarily political in nature: deciding what political system the state would have and which group would form the government; defining Croatian “ethnic and historical territory” and whether to draw the eastern frontier at the Drina River or elsewhere; and formulating a policy toward the non-Croatian part of the population. The latter was made up of Serbian Orthodox Serbs (about 30 percent), Volksdeutsche (2.5 percent), Jews and Gypsies (less than 1 percent), and a few other minorities. The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina (about 15 percent) were in a special category, since their na- . tional affiliation had not yet been established. In fact, Paveli¢ had already made decisions on all these issues. After the

Germans failed in their attempt to entrust the government to Macek, he received the backing of both Axis partners and the opportunity to implement his plans. Paveli¢ and a small group of Ustashas established the government of the new state and assumed all the powers that the Axis states were willing to leave to them. They installed a regime in the image of Nazism and Fascism, though

under German pressure, they gave the Volksdeutsche the status of a state within a state. They included Bosnia and Herzegovina within Croatian national territory and, with German approval, drew the eastern frontier of the state at the Drina River. They regarded the Bosnian Muslims as an integral part of the Croatian nation and went so far as to call them, in Starcevi¢’s fashion, the purest part or “flower” of the Croatian nation. Finally, they put Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies outside the law and tried to eliminate them from the Croatian body politic. Each of these “solutions,” however, was pregnant with unending problems.

To these political problems was added the extremely difficult economic | situation of the country. The new state had a low level of economic development: it was unable to produce, except in times of peace and during the best harvests, a sufficient amount of food for its needs, and it suffered from pronounced regional differences in food production. Because of the war, agricul-

336 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA tural and industrial production were greatly reduced. The ownership and management of many commercial and industrial enterprises had been dislocated due to anti-Jewish and anti-Serbian measures, further lowering production. There were difficulties in foreign trade, rising expenditures for war, huge payments for the upkeep of German and Italian forces in Croatian territory, and rampant inflation (see Chapters 14, 15, and 16). In addition, armed resistance against the Ustasha regime and foreign armies of occupation began less than three months after the establishment of the new state, led partly by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and partly by Serbian

nationalists, the Partisans and the Chetniks, respectively. The problem of armed resistance in Croatian territory and the measures of the Axis powers and the Ustasha regime against it are the subject of a separate volume. They will be. discussed briefly here only to show how they affected the Ustasha state’s rela-

tions with its foreign sponsors and influenced its domestic policies.

THE USTASHA PROGRAM AND PARTY Oo As we have seen, German agents staged the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia on April 10, 1941, to coincide with the entry of German troops into Zagreb. Paveli¢ and other Ustasha émigrés from Italy entered the capital city on April 15. According to Ustasha sources, the number of Ustashas in Italian camps who returned to Croatia in uniforms and on military trucks supplied by Italy was about 200, while according to German sources, it was

about 300.' , |

Another group of Croats, between 500 and 600 men, returned home toward the end of May 1941. With German permission and under German supervision, they had organized the Croatian Legion in Vienna just before and during the German campaign against Yugoslavia in April 1941. The legion gathered together Croats from various parts of Europe under German control, but once it returned to Croatia, all further recruiting stopped. Some legion members were taken into the gendarmerie and the Croatian army, but others returned to their homes, apparently because the core group of Ustashas that re-

| turned with Paveli¢ did not trust them.’ | | , |

Finally, a number of important Ustasha émigrés who were in the Greater - Reich and Hungary when Axis forces invaded Yugoslavia—Andrija Artukovic, Branko Benzon, Marko DoSen, Vjekoslav Luburi¢, Ivan Peréevi¢, and Vilko Rieger—returned to Croatia on their own. Paveli¢ trusted them and they participated in the Ustasha regime as members of his inner circle. 'See Kvaternik, “Ustasha Emigration in Italy,” p. 211, and DGFP, 12: 513. For the legion’s activities in Europe, see the report of the Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherbeitshauptamt—RSHA) of April 29, 1941, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5785, Frs..H300,661—62. For the fate of its members in Croatia, see Kasche’s report of June 27, 1941, to the same ministry, in Fr. H300,660. -

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 337 Under the growing influence of Nazism and Fascism in Europe, the Ustasha movement in Croatia had experienced moderate growth during the late 1930’s. The vast majority of Croats, however, continued to give steady, though after

August 1939 slightly reduced, support to Mac¢ek and the Croatian Peasant Party. There is no adequate information on the number of sworn Ustashas within Yugoslavia prior to April 10, 1941. Publication of such data could hardly have been expected from the Ustasha Party or, after April 10, from the Ustasha government, because it would have shown how small the group was and how hollow its claim to represent the Croatian nation. According to Arthur Haeffner, who had excellent contacts within political circles in Zagreb, the number of domestic sworn Ustasha Party members at the time of the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia was about 900. The Ustashas themselves estimated that they had about 40,000 sympathizers.’ Paveli¢ published a program for the Ustasha organization as early as 1933.’ Ideologically, it lacked originality, containing components from a variety of sources: extreme Frankist Croatian nationalism, Nazism and Fascism, Catholic Clericalist authoritarianism, and ideas from the Croatian Peasant Party. The program consisted of Seventeen Principles, some of which were amended after the Independent State of Croatia was established. The first seven described the Croatian nation, its name and homeland, and the unity of the Croatian lands. Paveli¢ asserted that the Croats had always been free, that the Croatian nation had always had lofty political capabilities and an organizational tradition, and that Croatian statehood had existed uninterruptedly almost from the moment the Croats arrived in their present homeland. He strongly emphasized these last claims, as did many other Croatian politicians and historians, although in reality, since its union with Hungary in r1o2 and its election of the Habsburgs as

kings in 1527, Croatia had had only limited, formal statehood, not true national sovereignty. The notion of uninterrupted statehood was thus more myth than reality, embodied primarily in the concept of Croatian state right. Nevertheless, it played an important political and psychological role in Croatian history and gave the Croats an important instrument of political defense. The eighth principle, modified after April 1941, declared that the Croatian 3See Haeffner’s report of June 14, 1941, to Glaise, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Fr. 335. In their literature, the Ustashas referred to their group as the Ustasha movement ( Ustaski pokret), probably to give it greater significance than if they called it the Ustasha Party. Even at

the zenith of their power and prestige, however, they did not have a large following among the Croatian population. We will call them interchangeably the Ustasha group, movement, or party. *The Ustasha program, under the combined dates of June 1, 1933, and April 16, 1941,

was published in Zagreb by Supreme Ustasha Headquarters, Propaganda Department (Glavni ustaski stan, Ured za promicbu), in Ustaga (The Ustasha). The Seventeen Principles of the Ustasha movement are given on pp. 7-11. The rest of the publication contains the party constitution, rules on Ustasha discipline, Paveli¢’s orders on coordinating the work of the party with the operations of state authorities, the functioning of Supreme Ustasha Headquarters, the Ustasha militia, and so on.

338 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA nation had through revolution reestablished the sovereign Independent State of Croatia. It asserted Croatian sovereignty over and rights to “uninterrupted national and historical territory” and declared that the Croatian nation was not

, bound by any past international or constitutional obligations not in agreement

with the Seventeen Principles. | The ninth principle postulated the happiness and welfare of the Croatian people and each individual Croat and proclaimed that this could only be achieved in an independent Croatian state that “should not and cannot be a ,

part in any form of any other state or state formation.” | According to the tenth principle, “The Croatian people have their own sovereign rights according to which they alone have the right to rule in their state

and conduct all their national affairs.” The eleventh principle elaborated on this idea: “In state and national affairs in the Independent State of Croatia nobody can participate in political decision making who is not by origin and blood a member of the Croatian nation. Furthermore, no foreign nation or state should determine the fate of the Croatian nation.” Through these two principles, Paveli¢ excluded the Serbian population as well as most national minorities from political life. However, as shown earlier, the German minority in Croatia enjoyed the position of a state within a state, and the Slovak minor-

_ ity also had a privileged position. Oo |

_ The main point of the twelfth principle was that “the peasantry is the foun-

| dation and source of all life, and as such it is the first carrier of all political power in the Croatian state.” This principle was taken from the Croatian Peasant Party, but whereas the latter adhered to the Western democratic belief that representatives of the peasantry were to be freely elected, the Ustashas ridiculed popular elections as a political sham. Instead, they argued that a political leader

| who acted in the interests of the people, as they claimed Pavelié did, could be~ come the nation’s ruler without being elected. The principle of a charismatic

leader was part of Ustasha ideology and practice. , The thirteenth principle asserted that all material and spiritual goods in the Croatian state were the property of the people, who alone were entitled to use

_ and dispose of them. Private trade in forest and mineral resources was forbid- | den. With regard to the means of production, the Ustasha program followed Fascist and Nazi ideology. With regard to the ownership of agricultural land, however, the Ustashas took over ideas from the general, but somewhat more radical, Croatian and South Slavic tradition, which had developed under the influence of acute agricultural overpopulation in the country. Ownership of agricultural land was to be limited to peasant households that worked the land

themselves. | , } ,

The fourteenth principle postulated the “nobility of work and duty.” At the

same time, a section denied all those rights that in the Western world were con- , sidered the inalienable rights of the individual: “Nobody can have any particular rights, but the duties toward the nation and state give the individual

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 339 [who lives up to them] the right to a protected life.” The fifteenth principle dealt with responsibility in public life.

The first sentence of the sixteenth principle on the “sources of Croatian power and progress” asserted that the “center of the moral power of the Croatian people is found in the orderly and religious life of the family.” This created

an opening for an alignment of the Ustasha movement with the Catholic Church and its political and social organizations. Another point of alignment with church political and socioeconomic ideology, as well as with Fascist and Nazi ideology, not found in the Seventeen Principles but later included in the Ustasha program, was the idea of the corporative state, in which legislative bodies represented various occupational groups. On May 1, 1942, Pavelié issued an order establishing eighteen different occupational federations within the Ustasha movement, ranging from the Federation of Peasants to the Federation of Firemen.’ But wartime difficulties and civil war prevented them from developing to any great extent. Finally, the seventeenth principle called for the promotion of all Croatian national virtues and national objectives and the continuity and security of the

Independent State of Croatia. ,

An expanded version of the Seventeen Principles was prepared by Danijel Crljen in 1942 to popularize the Ustasha program. A high school teacher in Dalmatia before the war, Crljen became one of the Ustasha movement’s princi, pal ideologists during the war. A further and somewhat different elaboration of some of these principles was presented to the newly convoked Croatian Diet by Paveli¢ and Ustasha ministers Mladen Lorkovié, Andrija Artukovi¢, and Mirko Puk during the last week of February 1942.°

Some writers of Clericalist orientation and some Catholic priests maintained that the Ustasha program represented the quintessence of the Croatian national spirit and that under the Ustashas the Croatian nation had again assumed its traditional role as a rampart of Western civilization against Byzantinism and Eastern Orthodoxy, as well as against the new threat of Communism. For these people, the extreme anti-Serbian and anti-Orthodox posture of the Ustasha regime was probably its most attractive feature.’ Some elements of Ustasha ideology had their roots in pre-1918 Croatian political ideas and movements, especially Frankism and Clericalism. But the

157-65. |

Ustasha movement itself was engendered by the discontent of the Croatian people with the Yugoslav state during the interwar period. It was also fostered SZbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1942, p. 489. ‘For the expanded version by Crljen, see his Nacela Hrvatskog Ustaskog Pokreta, pp. 9-

117. For the version presented to the Diet, see Brzopisni zapisnici, pp. 5-7, 17-34, 36-41, |

Lendié, “The Meaning of the Croatian Spiritual Revolution”; Guberina, “Ustashism and Catholicism”; idem, “Ustashism and Croatism.” Lendié was a poet and journalist. Guberina, a Franciscan friar, spent some time with the Ustashas in exile in Italy and was the director of the Ustasha movement’s archives.

340 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA by the political climate in Europe in the 1930’s, characterized by the growth of

Nazism and Fascism, the economic and political encroachment of the Axis powers on Yugoslavia, and the increasing threat of Communism. Nevertheless, had it not been for the conquest of Yugoslavia by the Axis powers and the ensuing dismemberment and occupation of the country, the Ustashas would have remained only a small group on the outer fringe of the Croatian body politic. Our principal interest in the Ustasha movement is not in its roots or in what the Ustashas and their supporters claimed it was, but in its character and activity as —acollaborationist regime, that is, a special form of foreign occupation of part of Yugoslavia. Following the example of Nazism and Fascism, the Ustasha movement developed an elaborate party organization. According to Article 3 of the Consti-

tution of the Ustasha Movement, the central organ was “Supreme Ustasha Headquarters, which directed all activity of the entire movement and liberation work” (wording of 1932). Supreme Ustasha Headquarters consisted of the Poglavnik (Leader), the Council of Deputy Leaders, with a maximum of twelve members, and the Chief Adjutants, with a maximum of seven members. The Poglavnik appointed and dismissed the members of the two groups. Below Su-

preme Headquarters were the headquarters of each district (stozer), county (logor), commune (tabor), and individual village (zbir). A separate headquarters for university students was directly subordinate to Supreme Headquarters. Ustasha officials themselves maintained discipline among members, as required by the Constitution and the Rules of Discipline. But there was also a party court

appointed by Supreme Headquarters and the Poglavnik for more serious breaches of discipline. This court had in fact the power of life and death over members brought before it.’ On the basis of Article 13 of the Constitution, “in order to safeguard the achievements of the Ustasha struggle and of the Croatian national uprising, and in order to defend the Independent State of Croatia,” on May 10, 1941, Paveli¢ issued orders on “the organization within the Ustasha movement of special Ustasha military units under the name of the Ustasha militia [Ustaska vojnica].”’ Armed units of the Ustasha movement had already been organized

in the course of the collapse of the Yugoslav army and state, and Slavko Kvaternik gave them official status by creating a special staff for them on April

I1, 1941. Ustasha returnees then took over command, and these units later *Croatia, Independent State of, Glavni ustaski stan, Ured za promitbu, Ustasa, pp. 1324. For an apparently complete list of Ustasha Party personnel who served during the war, from the minister administrator, to the Council of Deputy Leaders and various officials of Supreme Ustasha Headquarters (administrator, adjutants, chiefs of sections, members, and employees), to the people in charge of district, county, and commune party headquarters, see YA, Mil. Hist., Enemy Units, Reg. No. 1/1-78-83, Box 13 4a. *Croatia, Independent State of, Glavni ustaSki stan, Ured za promitbu, Ustaga, pp. 17, 31.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 341 served as the basis for the more formal organization of the militia.’” A certain number of irregular or “wild” Ustasha armed units also came into existence in various localities. Both kinds of units soon acquired an exceedingly bad reputation because of terrorist acts against Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, and all open and many alleged Croatian opponents of the Ustasha regime. On August 16, 1941, the Ustashas established the Ustasha Surveillance Service (Ustaska nadzorna sluzba) as a special party organ for the suppression of activities directed against the Ustasha movement, the Independent State of Croatia, and the Croatian people. The service consisted of four departments: the Ustasha Police, the Ustasha Intelligence Service, Ustasha Defense, and Personnel. The head of the Ustasha Surveillance Service was named by the Poglavnik and was responsible directly to him. This service as a separate agency was eliminated in January 1943 and its functions transferred to the Directorate of Public Order and Security in the Ministry of Interior."

Following the examples of Germany and Italy and of the youth group Catholic Action at home, the Ustashas established the Ustasha Youth Organization (Ustaska mladez) and the Ustasha Women’s Organization (Ustaska zenska loza). While Ustasha youth groups existed almost from the beginning of the Ustasha regime, a fully structured organization was first established by a decree of November 4, 1941. The Ustasha Youth Organization included all Croatian youths from 7 to 21 years of age, in four sections, ages 7 to I1, II to

I5, 15 to 21, and university students. At its head was an administrative commander operating from Supreme Ustasha Headquarters and responsible directly to Pavelic¢.

The Ustasha Women’s Organization consisted of female members of the Ustasha movement, under a special women’s leader. Its task was to strengthen the contribution of Croatian women to the Ustasha movement by encouraging their full participation in charitable and social work and by educating them to be good mothers and housewives. In the Ustasha movement, women had a definitely inferior social and political status, both theoretically and practically. After the Ustashas had been in power for a little over a year, the organizational director of the party, on Paveli¢’s orders, issued a Regulation (Propisnik) on August 11, 1942, defining the objectives of the Ustasha movement and the membership, tasks, and activities of all party organizations. The Regulation spelled out every aspect of the movement’s character, organization, and objectives based on the Seventeen Principles and the Constitution, generally in quite

idealized form.” )

Coli¢, Takozvana Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska 1941, p. 269. "See Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1941, pp. 483, 918, 994-96, and ibid., 1943, pp.

" Er the decree establishing the Ustasha Youth Organization, see ibid., 1941, p. 857. For the Regulation of August 11, 1942, see ibid., 1942, pp. 1028-50. The regulations of the Us-

342 | THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA Like all totalitarian states, the Ustasha state prohibited the existence of other political parties, though they continued to operate illegally. The Croatian Peasant Party, the main political party in Croatia during the interwar period, despite being weakened by a faction that joined the Ustashas and another that collaborated closely with the Partisans, continued to function, though in a very limited fashion. The Independent Democratic Party, the former main political

| party of the Serbs in Croatia, likewise continued to operate on a very limited scale, though many of its members joined the Partisans. The Communist Party of Croatia, however, a branch of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which was already illegal, seized the opportunity that the war provided and steadily

expanded as the Communist-led resistance and revolution grew.

THE USTASHAS AS A POLITICAL GROUP The Ustashas were an extremely small political group. During the 1930's, when some members were in exile and some at home, they constituted no more than a minuscule body on the outer fringes of the Croatian political spectrum. Because of their small numbers, they could not have dreamed of destroying Yugoslavia or coming to power in an independent Croatia through normal po-

litical channels. Since they were too weak to achieve their objectives alone, from the outset they sought help from those foreign powers interested. in wrecking Yugoslavia, primarily Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Because Italy and Hungary traditionally had claims on Croatian territory, however, many people in Yugoslavia suspected that the Ustashas were prepared to trade territorial, political, and economic concessions for political, financial, and military

: aid. Consequently, many Croats were fearful and apprehensive about them,

though the majority ignored or discounted them. , |

It is essential to keep in mind that the Ustashas did not come to power by the , free choice of the Croatian people, nor were they ever accepted as a government in their own right by most Croats. Therefore, their actions cannot properly be blamed on the Croatian people as a whole. The Ustashas were installed by Germany and Italy and maintained first by them and then, after Italy’s sur_ render in September 1943, by Germany alone, as well as by their own terrorism. In exchange for Axis support, the Ustashas served as tools of these foreign

powers. ,

Although the Ustashas’ use of terror as an instrument of political control did have some Croatian adherents, most Croats condemned its use. Terrorism was not part of the Croatian political tradition and was at odds with the pacifist ideology of the Croatian Peasant Party, the leading political force in Croatia

during the interwar period. | , ,

tasha Youth Organization are on pp. 1031 and 1045-46, and those of the Ustasha Women’s

Organization on pp. 1031, 1045, and 1048. Be

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 343 Despite these facts, membership in the Ustasha Party rose markedly after the Ustashas came to power. Most Croats did want to have their own state af-

ter more than eight centuries of subordination to other powers, first in the Hungarian-Croatian state up to 1526 and then in the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918. Croatia had also fared badly in royal Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1941. In addition, most Croats did not know the full extent of the political, economic, and military obligations that Germany and Italy imposed on the new state. Finally, neither the Ustasha government nor most Croats realized that the Independent State of Croatia, created in the early stages of the Second World War, was in an inherently no-win situation. If the Allies, with Yugoslavia on their side, won the war, Croatia would again be included in the Yugoslav nation. If the Axis powers won, Croatia would lose additional territory and components of sovereignty, especially to Italy, beyond what it had already lost in

I94I. Immediately after its establishment, the Ustasha regime obtained the support of two established Croatian political forces, the right wing of the Croatian Peasant Party, consisting mostly of urban elements, and the Croatian Catholic movement, an amorphous political and ideological grouping with many subgroups, whose adherents were generally known as Clericalists and were supported by the Catholic Church. The Ustashas had already heavily infiltrated both groups, and some of their members became Ustasha supporters even before the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia. The support of these two groups was crucial for the Ustashas, as will be shown more fully later. In

addition, many nationalistically inclined young people, believing Ustasha propaganda, joined the organizations sponsored by the Ustasha movement for

totally unselfish reasons. Because the Ustashas were very few in number, they , welcomed the newcomers. But there were also other, not so respectable, kinds of newcomers to the movement. Certain unsavory social elements were attracted to Ustasha ranks by the lawless behavior of the Ustasha militia, of “wild” Ustasha units, and of many Ustasha administrators and party officials. In a speech before the Diet on February 28, 1942, even Paveli¢ recognized that a number of “the worst criminals” had put on “honorable (Ustasha] uniforms and in them and in the name of the Ustasha movement had committed the greatest illegalities and bad deeds.”’’ He could not deny the misdeeds in the name of the Ustashas, but he attributed them to such elements rather than laying chief responsibility on the core of the Ustasha movement, where it belonged. Vilko Rieger, Ustasha chief of propaganda from the fall of 1941 to October 1943, writing to all party members and state authorities in late September 1942, stressed the need for party members to live up to Ustasha principles and to consider as Ustashas only those people who lived according to these principles. Then he added: SBrzopisni Zapisnici, p. 164.

344 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA It is true that various latecomers [Nastashas] have cast a shadow over Ustashism with their immoral excesses, but it must be clear to every state employee, every peasant, and every worker—as Ustasha officials will explain to them—that Ustashism, its essence and its foundation, is not what occurred in the days of revolution and chaos, but what is prescribed in the Seventeen Principles of the Ustasha Liberation Movement, behind which stands the greatest moral and ethical figure and the ideally formed personality of our Poglavnik.”*

While some reprehensible acts could be blamed on unsavory elements within the movement, however, the principal culprits were Paveli¢ and other leading Ustashas. These activities took place under their direction or with their knowledge. The Croatian public came to form its utterly negative assessment of the Ustashas and Ustashism from such acts and the general behavior of the move-

ment’s leaders. , ,

With Pavelié at their head, the main group of Ustasha returnees, complemented by a few leading domestic Ustashas, became the ruling elite in the new state. The Ustasha state apparatus was used as an instrument of coercion and terror to achieve Ustasha goals. Following the principle that state policy is based on the will of a charismatic leader, Paveli¢ himself made all basic deci-

sions. They were implemented by him personally or in his name by Supreme Ustasha Headquarters and its subsidiary organs, as well as by the cabinet, the police, the army, and the courts. Ustasha Party members and the organs of the party and state generally agreed with Paveli¢’s decisions and were by and large ~ eager executors of his policies until the end of the war. The principle of a charismatic leader naturally led to the development of a cult of personality around Pavelié. Vilko Rieger, chief of propaganda, was a mid-level Ustasha politician of Clericalist political background who worked with great diligence on elaborating this cult. In a circular of August 10, 1942, he wrote: “The State and the Poglavnik are two sacred things around which it is

necessary to weave myths. They are above everything else and are everything.”’’ But Rieger was never more idolatrous of Paveli¢ than in Circular No. “YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., General Circular No. 7, under top secret No. 1499/42, with the reg. no. and date unreadable on the xerox copy, Box 155. A copy is in my files. The

term Nastashas apparently denoted unsavory elements who joined the Ustashas after they

were installed in power. | SYA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 28/3-2, Box 87. :

Vilko Rieger (William G. Rieger in the United States), born in Zagreb in 1911, was active in organizing Ustasha student groups while still a student at the School of Economics and Commerce in Zagreb. He also worked as a journalist and magazine editor. Toward the end of the 1930’s, he obtained his doctorate in Berlin, where he kept a low profile as an Ustasha émigré activist. His first position in Ustasha state service was as counselor in the Croatian Legation in Slovakia. In the fall of 1941, Pavelié appointed him chief of propaganda in the Ustasha government, a post he held until October 1943, when he became professor of economics and commerce. In April 1944, he became chief of the Political Department in the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a position he held until the end of the war. Throughout the war, he wrote for the Ustasha ideological weekly Spremnost, published in Zagreb. After the war Rieger, like several other Ustasha functionaries, came to the United States. He subsequently

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 345 4 of August 29, 1942. After praising National Socialism and Fascism as new and healthy philosophical views of life and stressing that only the Poglavnik and those he designated had the right to interpret Croatia’s sovereign political orientation, he went on: Therefore we call the attention of all responsible state and Ustasha Party officials to the fact that they should always and in all places point out to their subordinates that today in the Independent State of Croatia only the Poglavnik conducts political affairs, that today in the Independent State of Croatia the most sacred authority is the authority of the Poglavnik, that today in the Independent State of Croatia social, economic, political, religious, educational, and legal views are identical to those of the Poglavnik, the carrier of the New Order. ... On one occasion the Poglavnik said: “Consider as friends those whom I consider friends, and as enemies those whom I consider enemies.” Therefore, since the Poglavnik is our sovereign, since the Poglavnik is the most ideal Ustasha and the most ideal man of contemporary Croatia, since in the eyes of his people He is their Savior and their Redeemer, since in His political and national work until now He was always right, and since He was appointed by the people as the sovereign into whose hands they had delivered their fate, then He is also the best qualified to give directions for the entire [state] activity. '°

Even after leaving his position as chief of propaganda, Rieger often engaged in propaganda work. An interesting example is his article “National Socialism and Ustashism,” written on the eleventh anniversary of Hitler’s assumption of power. Comparing National Socialism and Hitler in Germany with Ustashism and Paveli¢ in Croatia, Rieger argued that the future of the two nations would be determined by the two movements for a long time. “The Ustasha movement,” he asserted, “is the only movement in this part of Europe that according to its program and its activities is so close to German National Socialism, and it is therefore completely understandable that it has the greatest support of the friendly National Socialist movement.” The Ustashas as a political group consisted of many subgroups. The chief division was between the returnees—the émigrés who had returned in April 1941 and during the previous three years—and the “domestic” Ustashas, those who had not been in exile. The first group, with Paveli¢ at its head, was the decision-making political elite, while the second group had much less power and, as one of them stated after the war, was only attached to the government.” In addition, the returnees were divided among themselves. Some had been in exile became professor of economics at Marywood College, a Catholic women’s college in Scranton, Pennsylvania. When he writes in this country, he either uses his own name or the pseudonym Dr. George W. Cesarich, or he does not sign his articles.

SYA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 51/6-2, Box 155. This circular had top secret No. 1340/42. Capitals as in the original. This was written in 1942, the year the Croatian Diet Was In Session.

Rieger, “National Socialism and Ustashism.” '’The words of Mate Frkovié¢, the last minister of interior in the Ustasha government, to Vinko Nikolié, in the latter’s Pred vratima domovine, 2: 170.

346 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA in Italy, some in Germany, and some in Hungary, and through this experience they had become oriented toward one or another of these states. The different - foreign political orientation of the returnees contributed to the lack of unity

among them. | |

Another division was between those Ustashas who took the Ustasha oath before April 10, 1941, who joined presumably because they were motivated by idealistic reasons and a readiness for sacrifice, and those who took the oath after April 10, who were often self-seeking. The Ustashas who joined before April

to discriminated in many ways against those who joined later and coined the

derogatory term “latecomers” (Nastashas) for them. _ There were also other easily observable divisions among the Ustashas. In a

report to the commander in chief in southeast Europe on April 21, 1943, Glaise identified, besides Paveli¢, three main groups in the upper echelons of the Ustasha regime: (1) the group of returnee Ustasha colonels, the most important being Rafael Boban, Erih Lisak, Vjekoslav Luburi¢, Ante MoSkov, and Viktor Tomié, who operated partly from their positions in the police, the Ustasha militia, and other posts, and partly behind the scenes through Ustasha Party channels; (2) the old politicians who had not gone into exile, such as the ministers

Milovan Zani¢ and Mirko Puk, both small-town lawyers; and (3) the three younger Ustasha intellectual politicians, Mladen Lorkovié, minister of foreign affairs, Viadimir Kogak, minister of finance, and Vjekoslav Vran¢ci¢, a general

troubleshooter for Paveli¢ who held several important positions, all three reportedly highly intelligent, capable administrators and ambitious politicians. The first two groups, according to Glaise, were pro-Italian and determined _

promoters of a radical anti-Serbian policy, whereas the last group was proGerman, with Lorkovi¢ serving as the chief contact between the Paveli¢ cabinet

and Glaise. Franjo Tudjman has given an even more complicated division of the , high and middle Ustasha leadership. In addition to dividing the leading Us- tashas into those who had been in exile and those who had not, he further distinguished them by their pro-Italian, pro-German, and toward the end of the war pro-Western stand, by their regional origin—Herzegovina, Lika, Dalmatia, or Bosnian Muslim—and by their political background—those of Clericalist persuasion and those from the Croatian Peasant Party.” Because of these divisions within the upper echelons of the Ustasha movement, the leadership was plagued by suspicions and jealousies. The best-known ‘For Glaise’s report, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 852-53. In addition to the colonels already mentioned, several other Ustasha colonels held leading positions in the police, _Ustasha militia, and propaganda apparatus, and toward the end of the war, in the army: Mijo Bzik, Danijel Crljen, Jure Francetié (killed by the Partisans in late 1942), Ivan Herenti¢, Vilko

Petnikar, and Vjekoslav Servatzy. Until October 1942, when they were removed from their posts, Marshal Slavko Kvaternik, minister of the army and commander in chief of the Croatian armed forces, and his son Eugen, state secretary and chief of state police, held positions of

power just below Pavelié. so . a For Tudjman’s analysis, see his Okupacija i revolucija, pp. 95-96.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 347 personal antagonisms were between Paveli¢ and the two Kvaterniks, Slavko and Eugen, and between Paveli¢ and Mile Budak. Paveli¢ aggravated the situation by only surrounding himself with men who were blindly devoted and obedient to him. He was known to pit one individual or group against another in order to strengthen his own position. Since conspiratorial and terrorist policies and the principle of a charismatic leader were new phenomena in Croatian political life, the Ustasha movement was at odds with both the pre-1918 and the interwar political experience of the country. It purported to be the heir to the ideology of Starcevic’s Croatian Party of [State] Right, especially with respect to the ideas of Croatian independence and enmity toward Serbs. But while Starcéevi¢ had advocated sovereign independence, the Ustashas planned from the beginning to make Croatia dependent on Italy. And Staréevic’s anti-Slavoserbianism did not refer to the Serbs as a nation (whom he actually considered as Croats), but to politically servile groups

and individuals. The perversion of Staréevi¢’s ideas in this way first by the Frankists and then by their ideological heirs, the Ustashas, made Star¢éevi¢ incorrectly appear anti-Serbian in a national sense. Consequently, with respect to both independence and anti-Serbianism, the Ustashas cannot be taken as the heirs to Staréevic’s ideology.” Since almost all Ustasha émigrés were trained and indoctrinated in armed struggle, they developed the cult of the knife, the revolver, and the bomb. An Ustasha propaganda circular, “The Life and Work of the Ustasha Poglavnik— The Briefest Outline,” asserted: “In the struggle the Poglavnik selects the most suitable and most effective means: arms. His activity is permeated with revolutionary spirit. In his publications he writes and says ‘Knife, revolver, bomb, and

the infernal machine, these are the means that are going to return to the peasant | the fruits of his land, give to the worker his bread, and to Croatia its freedom.’”?! The party emblem was a capital “U” with a bursting bomb in the middle, and the “U” became part of the national coat of arms, the flag, and military and state insignia. The members of the Ustasha movement also took their oath in front of a crucifix, a knife, and a revolver. How incongruous was this behavior in the land of Staréevié, whose chief instrument of political struggle was the idea of state right, and of the pacifist Radic! Because the knife, the revolver, and the bomb were used as symbols of their struggle, Ustasha ideologists were keenly interested in discovering revolutionary antecedents in Croatian history. They appropriated as historical precedents the Uskoks (Raiders), who first operated from Croatian lands under Austria

and Venice against the Ottoman Turks and later from Croatian lands under 0See Chapter 1, pp. 3-4. For a defense of the use of foreign aid in obtaining national independence, see the pamphlet Ustaski pokret u borbi za oslobodjenje Hrvatske, issued by Supreme Ustasha Headquarters (Croatia, Independent State of, Glavni ustaSki stan), pp. 8-9,

Il.

41V A, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 29/1 5-3, Box 85.

@

348 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA Austria against Venice; the peasant rebellion led by Matija Gubec against feudal lords in areas north of Zagreb in 1573, for which he was tortured and executed; the plot against the Austrian Empire by Croatian nobles Petar Zrinski and Krsto Frankopan in 1671, for which they paid with their lives; and the war led by General Josip Jelaci¢ against the Hungarians in 1848, after which Jelaci¢ was appointed ban of Croatia until 1859. Finally, the Ustashas read more into the Rebellion of Rakovica (the village in Lika where the rebellion started) than it deserved. This quixotic undertaking against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1871, led by Eugen Kvaternik, a nationalist politician and colleague of Starcevic, collapsed within three days, cost the lives of its leader and a few oth-

ers, and had no prospect of succeeding. It also had several negative consequences for Croatia, disorienting the Party of Right for a decade and making the revision of the Hungarian-Croatian Accord of 1868 more difficult.” Many Ustashas, including Pavelic, believed that the Croatian people were not of Slavic, but of Gothic, origin. Their aim was probably to show that there was no kinship between the Croats and Serbs, although the two nations spoke

practically the same language, lived intermixed or in contiguous areas, and came to the Balkans at about the same time. The original proponent of this thesis seems to have been the Austrian sociologist and jurist Ludwig Gumplowicz, who argued in an article in 1903 that the Croatian people had arrived in their present homeland from an ancestral home in eastern Europe, where a group of already Slavicized Goths ruled over them. The Croatian case was only an illustration of Gumplowicz’s general theory that most modern European nations

had been formed from a land-tilling and peaceful substratum and a warlike ruling group that had sought land and people for conquest. But if the Croatian supporters of this thesis had read Gumplowicz carefully, they would have seen that he also postulated a similar origin for the Serbs.” The Ustashas, like the Nazis, were anti-Semitic. However, since several Ustasha leaders, including Pavelic¢, were married to Jewish or half-Jewish women, since some Jews had been strong supporters of Croatian nationalist forces, and since the regime needed certain groups of Jews, such as physicians, for their ”Bzik, Ustaska borba, pp. 31-33. The Ustashas tried to create what could be called a Rakovica cult. See Polonijo, “Ustashism: An Apotheosis to Rakovica.” On the Rakovica re-

bellion, see also Jareb, Pola stoljeca hrvatske politike, pp. 15-16. Toward the end of the 1930’s, the Croatian Communists began to challenge the claim of the Croatian nationalists, especially the Frankists and Ustashas, that the latter were the heirs of Staréevié and Kvaternik. Under fire by rightists for being anational and antinational, the Communists launched their attack through the well-known writer August Cesarec and at the same time tried to link themselves with the Croatian nationalist tradition. See Stipeti¢, “The Communists and National

History,” pp. 1743-57.

*>Gumplowicz, “Die politische Geschichte der Serben und Kroaten,” pp. 779-89. Probably with the political disputes between Croats and Serbs in Croatia-Slavonia during the last quarter of the nineteenth century in mind, Gumplowicz interpreted the struggle between them as largely a consequence of their religious differences.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 349 technical skills, the Ustasha regime exempted selected Jews from anti-Jewish measures and declared them to be “honorary Aryans.” The Ustashas were also outspokenly anti-intellectual, although there were some intellectuals among Ustasha leaders, such as Mladen Lorkovi¢, Vladimir KoSak, and the lawyer and novelist Mile Budak. Paveli¢ had no interest in intellectual pursuits, and the government introduced a strict and pervasive censorship. Most intellectuals in the Ustasha camp during the war came from

among the Clericalists, and their intellectual intolerance and _ closedmindedness were well known. Some leading Croatian artists who tolerated the Ustashas in the beginning, such as the poets Vladimir Nazor and Ivan Goran Kovaci¢ and the sculptor Antun Augustin¢i¢, transferred their allegiance to the Partisans in 1943. The world-renowned sculptor Ivan MeStrovié and the painter Jozo Kljakovi¢ were imprisoned for their anti-Ustasha views for several months and only freed and allowed to go into exile because of the intervention of the Vatican. The Ustashas executed as hostages a number of important Croatian Communist intellectuals, among them Bozidar Adzija, August Cesarec, and Otokar

Kersovani. They also killed the primitive painter Mirko Virius and the most important Croatian peasant writer and a deputy of the Croatian Peasant Party, Mihovil Pavlek-Miskina, in concentration camps. The bulk of the Croatian intelligentsia was hostile to the Ustasha regime and its policies from the beginning. Paveli¢ often took note of this. In a speech on December 28, 1942, to the Diet, he lashed out at people who congregated in coffee houses, at the remaining Freemasons and Jews, and at those who by their actions “had excluded themselves from the Croatian nation.” In his last meeting with Hitler on September 18, 1944, Paveli¢ was quoted as saying that “in

Croatia, the Zagreb intelligentsia above all was against the government, but this did not bother him too much.” The Propaganda Office in Split declared in March 1944 that “although the Croatian intelligentsia, generally speaking, has

, failed [zatajila], it is impossible to say that all Croatian intellectuals have lost the most fundamental sense of life and reality in which their nation lives.” Postwar Ustasha exiles and their supporters often point with pride to the large amount of writing published in the Independent State of Croatia during the war. But while the quantity was large, there was no outstanding quality in 4See Article 6 of the Law Decree on Racial Belonging of April 30, 1941, in Zbornik zako-

nainaredaba NDH, 1941, p. 43. *For Paveli¢’s speech to the Diet, see Brzopisni zapisnici, pp. 165, 185-86. For his remarks at his last meeting with Hitler, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Fr. H306,698. For the report from the Propaganda Office, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 42/2, 3-7, Box 87, “Povjerljiva obavjestajna sluzba” (Confidential Intelligence Service) (Split), March 30, 1944, no. 23, p. I.

350 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA | the literary and artistic output of the period.” The great majority of Croatian intellectuals and the common people felt deeply hurt and strongly resented the damage that the Ustashas inflicted on the historical image and reputation of the | Croatian people. While times of repression and crisis often serve as a stimulus to literary and artistic creativity in the life of a nation, such was not the case in

Croatia under the Ustasha regime. _ |

The Ustashas as a political group practiced corruption on a large scale. Toa certain extent this was to be expected, because taking the spoils was part of what many people were fighting for and because in the Balkans, as in many other parts of the world, corruption was characteristic of most new regimes.

Moreover, in interwar Yugoslavia, the Croats had been largely excluded from _ the fruits of power because the government was centered in Belgrade and mostly benefited the Serbs. With the Ustasha state largely under Croatian control in many internal matters, opportunities for corruption in the takeover of Jewish and Serbian properties and businesses were ample, and if one was well connected, no unfavorable consequences were to be feared. Other important opportunities for corruption came from the allocation of imports, from secur-

ing purchasing contracts for livestock and other supplies for the state, from smuggling on a large scale, and from helping people without proper qualifications to obtain jobs, avoid the draft, and so on. Because the state collapsed at the end of the war, however, the beneficiaries of wartime corruption were gen-

ment. | | . erally not able to retain their spoils. As for the principal victims of corruption,

only a few survived the war and even fewer repossessed any of the property they had lost. The bulk of it was nationalized by the new Communist govern-

Because of the arbitrary nature of justice in the Independent State of Croa-

tia—many people were unjustly arrested, jailed, put in concentration camps,

killed, or simply disappeared—people in authority (such as Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac of Zagreb) and others with good contacts developed the practice of intervening with powerful individuals and state authorities on behalf of those vic- timized by circumstances. In regimes like this, such intervention becomes part of the system, because effective legal channels for lodging complaints and ob-

taining information and rectification do not exist.”’ , Finally, a basic characteristic of the Ustasha regime was that it had very *For an official Croatian report on publishing and cultural activities in 1943, probably prepared for propaganda use, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 12/27, 1-4, Box 87. For the Ustashas’ “cultural policy,” see also Jeli¢-Buti¢, Ustase, pp. 203-14. Extensive publishing activity was greatly helped by ample government subsidies to both publishers and

authors. See Barac, Bijeg od knjige, pp. 13-26. , | *7The amount of intervention apparently got out of hand. On October 17, 1944, Paveli¢ issued-an order calling intervention a sabotage of government activity and prescribing various

disciplinary measures to stop it, including sending transgressors to labor and concentration camps. He urged citizens to use official channels for oral or written complaints. Zbornik za-

kona inaredaba NDH, 1944, pp. 799-800. |

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 351 limited popular support among the Croatian people. This condition had many causes and was of profound political significance for the fate of the country.

THE NARROW POPULAR BASE OF THE USTASHA REGIME The fundamental weakness of the Ustasha regime from the first day of its existence was its narrow popular base in the Croatian body politic. The Ustashas were a small political group who were installed and maintained in power by the traditional enemies of the Croatian nation and who accepted international treaties injurious and degrading to the Croatian people. They inaugurated genocidal policies against the Serbian and Jewish populations and also introduced drastic measures against the remaining Croatian population. Nevertheless, as explained earlier, the establishment of the new state, despite the adverse circumstances out of which it came and the inauspicious prospects for its future, resulted in a considerable enlargement of the popular base of the Ustasha regime during its first few months. Soon, however, the high price that the Croatian nation had to pay for foreign support became clear. Croatian territory was split by a demarcation line

into Italian and German zones of occupation; the Italians annexed about half of , Dalmatia together with other Croatian territory in the Croatian Littoral and its hinterland; and Croatia agreed to not arm the Croatian part of the Adriatic coast and surrendered most of its sovereign rights to Italy. Although the Italians and Germans left considerable latitude in internal affairs to the Ustasha government, both powers behaved as if they were occupying an enemy country. Indeed, Croatia was occupied, the Italians maintaining a formal, and the Germans a virtual, occupation in their respective zones. After the Italian surrender, the Germans’ virtual occupation was extended to all territory not included in the Partisan-liberated areas. The occupations not only proved to the popula-

tion that the Ustashas were simply tools of the occupying powers, but also eliminated or greatly reduced the power of Ustasha authorities in much of the country. The self-rule of the German minority in Croatia also limited their authority. It was obvious that Croatian independence was a sham. Thus within a very short time, a sober reassessment of the Ustasha regime set in among the Croatian people. As a consequence, the popular base of the regime, temporarily enlarged during its first months of rule, started to shrink. This process, to which many other factors also contributed, could not be arrested, let alone reversed, and continued until the very end of the Ustasha state.

One of the most fundamental reasons for the Ustashas’ meager popular support was their genocidal policy against the Serbs. The Orthodox Serbs con-

stituted close to one-third of the population of the country and were spread over 60 to 70 percent of its territory. Before the war, both the Ustashas in exile and those at home were proponents of an extremely radical policy against the

352 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA Serbs. As Professor Jareb put it: “The policy of the annihilation [unistenja] of the Serbs was not only Pavelic’s policy, but also that of the Ustasha movement at home. This policy began to be applied even in those first few days [of the new state] before Paveli¢’s return. Not only was such a policy incomprehensible froma moral point of view, but it was also unreasonable from the point of view of any real and possible policy.” The multifaceted Ustasha policy against the Serbs will be discussed in the following chapter. Suffice it to say that it contributed greatly to the spread of armed resistance in the country. Moreover, the genocidal treatment of the Serbs helped many Croats, who for a brief time had supported the new regime or were indifferent toward it, recognize its true na-

ture. |

The first reference to the narrow popular base of the Ustasha regime in General Glaise’s reports is dated June 28, 1941. According to identical ac-

counts from innumerable German military and civilian observers, wrote Glaise, the Ustasha militia’s “senseless outrages in the cities and the countryside” had caused a considerable decrease in the already limited popular support for the government. These outrages were so extreme, in fact, that on June 26, August 9, and September 27 Paveli¢ issued special orders dealing with them. Glaise returned repeatedly to the problem of limited public support for the Ustasha regime. With the broad popular base of the Fascists and Nazis in their respective countries in mind, Glaise wrote on September 13, 1941: “The attempt to master the difficulties in the Croatian state with dictatorial means must end in fail-

ure, because even a dictatorship cannot act out of thin air, that is, without ground under its feet.” He went on to note that the Ustasha dictatorship had been sullied from the beginning by atrocities, especially against the Serbs, that

most Croats decidedly repudiated. Glaise also mentioned that the Croatian population was beginning to doubt whether the Ustasha state had the capacity to survive. In addition, by comparing the present with the “relatively calm times under old Yugoslavia, some slight pro- Yugoslav feeling had reappeared.” Soon after submitting this report, Glaise tried to persuade Macek to take over

as head of the Croatian government, but without success. In another report that soon followed, Glaise also blamed the Germans themselves for the Ustashas’ lack of popular support: “The narrow base that we gave the Paveli¢ government at the time when the state was established undoubtedly proved more and more a mistake.”” Another important factor contributing to the lack of public support was Ustasha policy toward the Croatian army. A basic antagonism existed between

the Ustashas and the army, most of whose officers were former AustroHungarian or Yugoslav officers whom the Ustashas did not trust. Furthermore, *8Jareb, Pola stoljeéa brvatske politike, p. 89.

**For Glaise’s report of June 28, 1941, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 1208, and for his report of September 13, 1941, Frs. 1368-69. For his last report, of November 4, 1941, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Fr. 664.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 353 the Ustashas established a party army, the Ustasha militia, which came to rival the regular army. The militia was totally devoted to Pavelié and the Ustasha regime and was favored politically and materially in many ways. The professional officers resented this and often criticized the militia’s policies and methods. The dissatisfaction of many army officers with the Ustasha regime was well known to the general public. It was confirmed by the mass refusal to follow army induction orders, by a steadily growing desertion rate, with many deserters joining the Partisans, and by other aspects of disintegration in the army (see Chapter 10).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Ustashas tried to use the Muslims to broaden their support. But their policy soon backfired. While some Muslim groups stayed with the Ustasha regime to the end, already by late 1941 other groups were sending memoranda of protest against Ustasha policies to the Muslim members of the cabinet. They were apprehensive about Ustasha efforts to use the Muslims against the Serbs and about the considerable number of Muslims recruited from the “scum of society” for Ustasha military units. The Muslims feared Serbian retaliation, the more so as the Ustasha authorities were unable to fully protect the Muslim population. And at least some Muslims were also worried about the implications of the Ustasha policy of forced conversion of the Serbian Orthodox population to Catholicism. They reasoned that if forced conversion succeeded with the Serbian Orthodox, the Ustashas might use it later on the Muslims as well.*° As a consequence, many Muslims who were initially neutral or favored the Ustashas eventually turned against them and tried to protect their interests by making arrangements with other groups. In short, Ustasha policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina also led to a steady lessening of the regime’s support among the Muslims. A further reason for the narrowing of both the territorial and popular base

of the Ustasha regime was the growth of Partisan strength and Partisanliberated territory within the area claimed by the Croatian state. Partisan influence, in fact, was felt far beyond the liberated areas because of underground National Liberation Committees in Croatian government-controlled territory. These committees greatly impeded Ustasha recruiting efforts and contributed to the increasing desertion rate of Croatian army soldiers. In addition, much of the food produced in government-controlled areas, especially north of the Sava River, found its way through these committees to Partisan-liberated areas. The territorial base of the Ustasha regime was also limited by enclaves controlled by See Haeffner’s report to Glaise of April 26, 1942, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Fr. 263. Their apprehension was understandable, because some units of Luburi¢’s Ustasha Defense sang a ditty which went: “Gone is the faith that washes the arse, Gone is the crossing with three fingers” (“Nesta vijere Sto guzicu pere, Nesta krsta sa tri prsta”). This referred to the daily ablutions practiced by the Muslims and the Orthodox way of making the sign of the cross with three fingers rather than with the whole hand. See Salihbegovi¢, “Pleasant Discourse of the Bosnian Muslims.” This was published in Slobodna rijeé, a Croatian antiCommunist émigré newspaper.

354 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA armed Chetnik units. On the basis of special agreements with Croatian government authorities or with the Italians before and the Germans after September 1943, these units more or less fully controlled certain areas where Croatian

state authority was formally recognized but actually not in effect. , Two insoluble economic problems also contributed to the steady decline of the popular base of the regime: a deteriorating food supply and galloping inflation. Both were caused by a combination of factors brought on by war and internal revolution, over which the Ustasha government had no control. Soon af-

ter being installed in power, the government adopted and later steadily expanded measures to increase crop production and to acquire a large part of the harvest through compulsory deliveries; it established ceiling prices, instituted a rationing system, and so on. But disruptions in agriculture resulted not only in _ reduced food production, but also in the government’s inability to collect the compulsory deliveries for distribution to consumers and the armed forces. Despite the relatively good harvest in 1943, for example, by early February 1944 the government had not collected even 30 percent of the planned quantities. Consumers in Croatia at that time had the lowest daily bread ration in Europe, 150 grams, and it was distributed irregularly.” The failing rationing system was replaced or supplemented in many cities by a free market, where prices soared, smuggling and corruption reigned, and goods were available primarily to the well-to-do. Imports of small quantities of food—bread grains, sugar, po-

tatoes—from Germany and Romania relieved shortages for brief periods of time in most critical areas, but were of no help to most consumers. The food supply was worst in the otherwise food-deficit areas south of the Sava River, which were most affected by guerrilla operations. Starvation and near starva-

tion prevailed in many areas. ,

Inflation became an equally critical problem. The Ustasha government was able to meet only a small part of its expenditures by taxes, even after taxes were increased considerably. Since government borrowing from public and commercial banks produced only meager results, the government’s major source of funds came to be credits in banknotes from the central bank. From roughly 6 billion kunas at the time of the establishment of the Croatian state, banknote circulation rose to 149.5 billion kunas at the end of 1944 and to 241.0 billion kunas by May 1945. Banknote circulation rose so rapidly primarily because the

- government bore most of the cost of maintaining Italian and German troops stationed in Croatian territory. Comparing price increases, we see a similarly dramatic rise. The best available indexes of price increases are those for controlled retail and free-market prices of food in Zagreb. Controlled prices rose from a base of 100 in August 1939 to 473 in December 1942 and to 8,350 in December 1944 (the last available date), while free-market prices rose in com*'See Cabas, “Economic Problems of the Independent State of Croatia,” p. 13. This was a report of February 4, 1944, that Josip Cabas, minister of industry and trade, submitted to

Prime Minister Nikola Mandi¢. , ,

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 355 parison to the same base to 2,310 in December 1942 and to 21,857 in December 1944.” Periodic increases in wages and salaries, rents, and various fixed incomes lagged far behind price increases in goods and services, and low-income and fixed-income groups were extremely hard hit. The suffering caused by food scarcities, skyrocketing prices, and lagging incomes was blamed on the government, and its standing in the eyes of the public steadily fell. (See Chapter 16 for a more detailed discussion of these economic problems.) A further reason for the steadily declining support for the Ustasha regime as the war progressed was general war weariness. While many Croats felt even at the time of the invasion and dismemberment of Yugoslavia that the Axis powers would lose the war, this feeling became widespread after the landing of Anglo-American troops in North Africa and the German debacle at Stalingrad. With it came the sure realization that the new state would disappear at the end of the war and thus that all the fighting and suffering were for a lost cause. In countries that anticipate victory, even the last reserves of physical and psychological strength can be mobilized up to the end, but in countries where defeat is certain, it is impossible to keep up morale. Disorganization and despair take over, and more and more people try either to ally with the winning side or at least separate themselves from the losing one. The desire of Croats to distance themselves from the Ustasha regime was especially strong because the latter had committed many crimes against hundreds of thousands of the country’s citizens and the public anticipated postwar retributions on a large scale. The Ustasha government and its propaganda machine were able to make a certain, though decreasing, proportion of the Croatian people take seriously their claims that the Croats had their own independent and sovereign state, their own armed forces, their own diplomacy, and so on. But these claims were true only on the surface; hard reality proved that they were a sham. This reality prevented the Ustashas from ever achieving even a minimal consolidation and stabilization of their rule and led to a steady weakening of the popular base of the regime. Even the last minister of interior of the government, Mate Frkovi¢, acknowledged after the war that “our regime did not have a broad enough base for a successful conduct of national and state policy.”” 32 All data on prices and on banknote circulation at the end of 1944 are from Croatia, Independent State of, “The Croatian State Bank in 1944,” pp. 12, 14-15, 32. Data on kuna circulation in early May 1945 are from Yugoslavia, Ministry of Information, The Debate on the Budget for 1946, p. 59. 33See V. Nikolié, Pred vratima domovine, 2: 170.

Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Babi¢, who fled from Croatia to Italy in January 1944, said at his interrogation by British intelligence officers: “At the present time the Ustashi regime has

no more than one percent of the Croats behind it.” F.O. 371/44249, R 3364/8/92. It was natural for Babié to underestimate the Ustashas’ strength, but their popular following by that time was indeed extremely low. In his article, “My Mission to the Allies in 1944,” p. 269, Babié translated this sentence as: “At the present time the Ustasha regime has only a small percentage of people behind it.”

356 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA Considering the developments that contributed to the ever narrowing popular base of the Ustasha regime, it is difficult to understand why Paveli¢ did not try to enlarge its support by concessions to the Maéek center of the Croatian Peasant Party. After all, the Ustashas themselves admitted that their regime and the Croatian nation were at stake. The fact that Paveli¢ made no serious offer to the party—not that one, if made, would have succeeded—reflects a complete absence of political acumen and responsibility and bears out the supposition that the uppermost consideration in his mind was to hold on to as much personal power as possible.

THE CROATIAN PEASANT PARTY DURING THE WAR While the Ustashas did not have a broad enough base of popular support to rule effectively, the Croatian Peasant Party—the undisputed representative of most Croats during the interwar period and an important participant in the Yugoslav government during the twenty months preceding the invasion, partition, and occupation of the country—did. But under Ustasha rule in Croatia, the party’s leaders were isolated and the party split into factions. It was outmaneuvered by the Communists, and an Allied landing on the Adriatic coast that might have solidified support from the West never materialized. In fact, the

Second World War sounded the death knell for the Croatian Peasant Party. , In the War of April 1941, as we saw in Chapter 2, the party’s leader, Viadko Maéek, refused to go into exile with the Yugoslav government, delegating Juraj Krnjevi¢, the party’s secretary general, in his place. Ma¢ek also resisted strong German pressure to head the government of the new Croatian state. But in his statement on Radio Zagreb after its proclamation on April ro, he did call upon the party’s elected deputies and members, as well as its followers in the government and among the general public, to support and cooperate loyally with

the new rulers. This statement was very beneficial to the Ustashas because it allowed many party members to opt for the new regime and delivered into Ustasha hands almost the entire administration, police, and judiciary of Banovina | Croatia. Subsequently, most government officials belonging to the party, as well as lower-echelon leaders at the county and communal levels, sided with the , Ustashas. Especially important was the allegiance of most of the two paramilitary organizations, the Civic Guards and Peasant Guards, which helped the Ustashas disarm part of the Yugoslav armed forces and seize power in the country, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the safety umbrella of German and Italian forces. Not all Croatian Peasant Party members, however, went along with the Ustashas. A split soon developed in party ranks between those who remained true to Maéek and those who were eager or at least willing to collaborate with them.

Among those not collaborating were the party’s other main leaders and the

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 357 majority of its members, especially among the peasantry where its main strength lay. Among those collaborating, the most important deputies were Josip Berkovié, Stjepan Hefer, Zivan Kuvezdi¢, Lovro Susi¢, and Janko Tortié, and the most important high banovinal officials were Ivica Frkovi¢, Vladimir

Kosak, and Dragutin Toth. Even before April 1941, these men had become strong supporters, and some even sworn members, of the Ustasha Party. Several subsequently became ministers or high officials in the new administration, envoys in foreign countries, or district heads. When Macek heard of these appointments, he remarked pithily, “When the flood is high, even turds float.” Representative Tomo Jancikovic, one of Macek’s staunchest supporters,

sharply criticized party members who joined the Ustashas. In Jancikovic’s opinion, The Croatian Peasant Party, according to its program, has to fight against foreign forces and domestic injustice. At the time of Yugoslavia’s collapse, there were in Croatia, in addition to the elements who were treasonable both to the nation and to the party, also such naive followers of the party and a considerable proportion

of the general population who thought, well, we have freed ourselves from Greater Serbian militarism and the hated Belgrade ruling clique. They did not see that at this very moment a far greater foreign force entered the country and with it also foreign, namely schooled, hirelings and scoundrels, terrorist Ustashas, and that only now was there to fall upon us both a foreign force and domestic injustice.”

Jancikovi¢ was especially bitter toward those former members of the party who had supported it only because of its struggle against Serbian hegemony and the Belgrade ruling clique, but who had nothing in common with the social ideology of the Radic brothers. It was from this group that many Frankists and Ustashas were recruited. These people, according to Jan¢ikovi¢, had aggressively pushed their way into many important positions in the party organization and, after the Cvetkovi¢-Macéek Agreement of August 1939, into the government of Banovina Croatia. He called them the party’s “fifth column.” In April 1941

and the following months, they joined the Ustashas en masse. As a consequence, Jancikovi¢ felt that the party had lost almost all of its urban middleclass following and even some peasants; what remained was essentially the peasant element.” The Ustashas were well aware of their small numbers and of the potential opposition of the Croatian peasantry. Thus they started almost at once to woo the peasants, for which they had a ready-made opening in the twelfth principle of the Seventeen Principles. Paveli¢ initiated a campaign to attract more follow-

ers of the Croatian Peasant Party to the Ustasha movement with a speech on 4See the report that Jancikovi¢ prepared in January or February 1943, which circulated in Croatia clandestinely as a document of the Croatian Peasant Party, in YA, Wkrs. Mvmt., Com. Party, 42-2896 (“Jan¢ikovic Report”), pp. 7-9. The report was made available to me by courtesy of Fikreta Jeli¢-Buti¢. ‘STbid.

358 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA | May 21, 1941. The Independent State of Croatia, he indicated, would be “a Croatian, peasant, and Ustasha state.”** Thereafter, the Ustashas held a series

of “assemblies” with former Croatian Peasant Party organizations 1n various

allegiance. _ |

parts of the country. In some, all the members transferred wholesale to the Ustasha side, while in others, only some members, or only some leaders, switched

The next major step occurred when the leading “dissidents,” former Croatian Peasant Party members sympathizing with the Ustashas, declared their support for the new state and the Ustasha government at a meeting in the hall of the Croatian Diet on August 10, 1941. They officially enrolled in the Us-

tasha Party and took the Ustasha oath, after which Paveli¢ made appropriate | remarks.” This was the apogee of Ustasha efforts to attract members of the Croatian Peasant Party to their side. Without explanation, the assemblies = ceased being held in September and the campaign to attract party members _ came toa halt. Since the leadership of the party stood apart from and in oppo-

number. | | oe ,

| sition to the Ustashas, the latter probably did not trust many of the new converts who had joined their ranks and decided not to continue to increase their

_ Assoonas they felt secure in power, the Ustashas also disbanded the Civic and , Peasant Guards, probably because they did not trust them either. They trans-

ferred some members into the army and demobilized others. They also issued decrees that put all personnel in government service and in government-owned enterprises (railroads; postal, telegraph, and telephone services; public utilities; and many other enterprises) at the disposal of the respective state ministries. This al- lowed these employees to be examined for their national affiliation and past con-

duct. Only those who passed Ustasha standards were retained. Although the Croatian Peasant Party was formally prohibited by the Us-

tasha government and greatly weakened by defections to the Ustashas, as well as by the isolation of Maéek and the periodic incarceration of most other leaders, it continued to act, though in a very limited fashion. It even continued to

function while leftist and action-oriented members joined the Partisans in growing numbers, especially after the middle of 1943. What remained was the party center, which held true to Macek. In the discussion that follows, the term _ “Croatian Peasant Party” will denote either the pre-April 1941 party as a

whole or this reduced center. 3

See the front-page article, “The Independent State of Croatia will only be a Vehicle to Serve the Croatian Peasant and Working People,” in Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), May 22, 1941, pp. 1-2, which also quotes Paveli¢’s speech. See also Konjevi¢, “Ustasha Policy Toward

the Croatian Peasant Party,” pp. 173-90; Jeli¢-Buti¢, Ustage, pp. 190-93. , *’Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), August 11, 1941. The declaration was read by Janko Torti¢, a representative of the Croatian Peasant Party, and was signed by about 120 dissidents. It did

not mention Matek by name, but lashed out against those party members who were ministers in the Yugoslav government-in-exile. Many of the signatories were of low rank within party organizations. ~

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 359 Under the Ustashas, the party was deprived of full-fledged leadership. Ma¢ek was held in the Jasenovac concentration camp between October 1941 and March 1942 and thereafter under strict house arrest, so that he was only rarely and furtively in contact with other party leaders. These were August Kosutic¢, the vice president, and Ivan Andres, Ivanko Farolfi, Ivan Pernar, Barisa Smoljan, Ljudevit Tomasgi¢, and Josip Torbar, all of whom lived in Zagreb. The first five were outspoken conservatives. The most important leader outside of Zagreb was Tomo Jancikovi¢, a known liberal, who lived in the Italian-occupied Croatian Littoral. Since Macek had exercised a tight hold over party leaders before the war, the wartime leadership of KoSuti¢ and associates could not but have a substitute character. Outside the country, a group of party members— Rudolf Biéanié, Ilija Jukié, Juraj Krnjevi¢, Ivan Subasi¢, Juraj Sutej, and a few lesser men—also served with the Yugoslav government-in-exile. In spite of the truncated form of the Croatian Peasant Party during the war, the Ustashas clearly recognized its potential power. Pavelic had several meetings with Koguti¢é before Italy’s surrender, and after it, when the political, military, and economic liens imposed by the Italians on Croatia were lifted, Prime Minister Nikola Mandié opened official negotiations with him to discuss the inclusion of the Croatian Peasant Party in a coalition government. But Pavelic

was not willing to relinquish any dictatorial powers, let alone accept farreaching changes in government policies, and the representatives of the Croatian Peasant Party were only interested in a fundamental overhaul of the regime, with the aim of making it democratic. In a letter of September 30, 1943,

responding to Mandi¢’s invitation for further talks, Kosuti¢ and Torbar pointed out that the party had been proscribed by the Ustasha government and that nobody could negotiate in the name of a political party that did not legally exist. As for the entry of individuals connected with such a party into the government, they thought that this would be “impossible in principle and useless

under present-day conditions.” They reaffirmed their earlier proposal to Mandi¢ for the formation of a government standing above all parties, a government that would return confidence and the eternal ideals of humaneness, legality, honesty, freedom, and justice to the people, and in this fashion create the preconditions for a spiritual calming and rehabilitation of our public life. This view has also been accepted by others of our colleagues whom we have consulted. . . . You have declined this stand of ours... . It is to be regretted that in this very difficult situation you prefer apparent rather than real solutions that, according to our deepest conviction, would attack the problem at its core.”

After this, Paveli¢ made no further overtures to the Croatian Peasant Party. The German military quickly perceived that it had been a mistake to entrust

the government to Paveli¢ and the Ustashas. They were a very small group 3%YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 20/1, F 14, Box 86.

360 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA whose policies kept Croatia in constant turmoil and whose regime was opposed by the vast majority of Croats. But Glaise was unsuccessful in his efforts either to induce Maéek to take over the leadership of the government or, until late 1943, to bring the party into it. The Ustashas were probably aware of his attempts and, afraid that Macek might succumb to German pressure in the fu-

ture, kept the latter in a concentration camp from October 1941 to March 1942. This in turn helped to stem the influx of Croatian Peasant Party members into the Ustasha Party. Macek and other party leaders confidently expected the Western Allies to win the war and the Axis powers, and the Ustashas along with them, to be defeated. Because of this conviction, and because the Ustashas quickly compromised themselves politically, it would have been folly for them to join the government or make any agreement with the new rulers. Instead, party leaders anticipated that the time for action would come near or at the end of the war. Because they believed that the outcome in Yugoslavia depended on the strength of the contending Great Powers, they considered a wait-and-see policy the best one to follow. As a result, during the second half of 1941 and throughout 1942 and part of 1943, the party leadership remained passive.

During the war, the Croatian Peasant Party had to contend not only with the Ustashas, but also with the Communists. The party had been a target of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia since 1924, when Stjepan Radi¢ renounced its entry into the Peasant International, because it was the chief political obstacle to the Communists’ advance in Croatia. The establishment of the Communist Party of Croatia in 1937 as a branch of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was calculated to touch the Croatian nationalist nerve and help advance the Communist cause. In the late 1930’s, because of the looming danger from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, as well as the disappointment of some segments of the population with Maéek’s entry into the Yugoslav government in August 1939 and with worsening economic conditions, the Communists, under Tito’s leadership and with the help of Popular Front ideology, made some advances in Croatia, just as the Ustashas did. But the Croatian Peasant Party kept its domi-

nant position among the Croatian population, especially the peasantry. The invasion, dismemberment, and occupation of Yugoslavia in Aprilr941 drastically changed the political scene. All political parties except the Ljoti¢ party in Serbia, the Ustasha Party in Croatia, and Volksdeutsche groups in various parts of the country were prohibited. In the old parties, splits developed, with some factions collaborating with the occupying or quisling regimes, other factions lying low in order to get through the war with the least sacrifice, and yet others joining the resistance movements when these began operations. The Communist Party of Croatia was fully aware of the strong position that - the Croatian Peasant Party had among the peasantry and a large part of the ur-

ban population and intelligentsia. It also knew that Macek was held in high

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 361 personal regard by the population at large and especially the peasantry, a regard that was probably enhanced by his time in a concentration camp and under house arrest. The years-long conditioning of the Croatian peasantry in the democratic, pacifist, relatively leftist, and anti-Communist ideology of the Radi¢ brothers and the nationalistic character that the party acquired during the interwar period fighting Serbian hegemony and royal dictatorship were great barriers to Communist advances. Enticing a large number of peasants to join and fight on the Partisan side became by far the most difficult political problem in Croatia for the Communists.” Since the Macek center of the party adopted a wait-and-see approach and opposed the Partisans’ policies and armed operations, it refused to urge its members to join them and fight. In response, the Communists developed two strategies. First, in both oral and written propaganda, they strongly attacked Maéek and the “clique around him” as helpers of the Ustashas, the Chetniks, and the government-in-exile. These bitter attacks were partly fueled by the policy of the party’s leaders of advising young men to “keep away from the Reds” and join the Croatian army instead. As will be explained in Chapter ro, the Croatian Peasant Party hoped to eventually obtain control over the army and, with the help of the Western Allies, use it as an instrument to gain political power at the end of the war. But by urging young men to join the Croatian

army, the party opened itself to the Communist charge of collaborating with . the occupying powers.”” By September 1943, however, the Partisans realized that propaganda attacks

on Macek were counterproductive. Instead of drawing supporters away from him, they increased peasant support for him. As a result, attacks on Macek personally were stopped, though not attacks on members of his entourage. But this was only a temporary respite. According to a directive from the Propaganda Section of the Regional Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia (Zemaljsko antifasisticko vijece narodnog oslobodjenja Hrvatske—ZAVNOH) of February 15, 1944, “Acertain reserve which to some extent characterized our struggle against these [political] speculators [Macek and his clique], of not directly mentioning Maéek himself as the carrier of this policy, is rescinded. Our attack now is directed ... against Macek himself and his clique in order to isolate them from the peasant and nationally suppressed masses.”*’ See Bakari¢, “Political Report of the Central Committee,” pp. 3 5-89, especially pp. 6872. See also Bodrozi¢, “Policy of the Croatian Peasant Party,” pp. 33-63.

“For the Communists’ barrage of attacks on Maéek and other leaders around him, see the official organ of the Communist Party of Croatia, Naprijed, from April 1943, when it started to appear as a weekly, until September 1943, when the attacks on Matek temporarily ceased. Naprijed 1943, pp. 97, 109, 165, 181-84. ‘For the Partisans’ awareness that their attacks on Maéek were backfiring, see the directive of the presidency of ZAVNOH of August 19, 1943, to the National Liberation Committee of the Area of Zagreb, in ZA VNOH dokumenti 1943, pp. 353-56. For the directive of the Propaganda Section in 1944, see ZAVNOH dokumenti 1944, pp. 145-46. Partisan propa-

362 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA The Communists also wanted to draw as many Croatian Peasant Party members as possible into liberated areas, to include them in the National Lib_ eration Front and Partisan fighting units. They pursued this second strategy of attracting party members by organizing a dissident Croatian Peasant Party, es-

sentially under Communist control, in free territory. Bozidar Magovac, a newspaperman by profession and close friend and coworker of Ma¢ek who

enjoyed a high standing in party ranks, was a promising arrival in Partisanliberated territory in early June 1943. The Partisans hoped that he would attract additional party members and serve as a counterweight to the leadership

~around Macek. On June 19 Magovac sent a statement to ZAVNOH explaining | the conditions and principles of cooperation between the Croatian Peasant Party and the National Liberation Front in Croatia. He accepted the principles and objectives of the national liberation struggle announced on May 26, 1943, by the Chief Headquarters of the National Liberation Army for Croatiaandthe

preparatory committee for the organization of ZAVNOH. He also ridiculed the charge of anti-Partisan forces that the Partisans intended to introduce a Communist regime after their victory. In July, he issued an appeal to the members of the Croatian Peasant Party, asserting that the place of all honest Croats

was in the ranks of the National Liberation Army.” | | Probably taking his cue from Jancikovi¢’s report (see below), Magovac an-

nounced that an Executive Committee of the Croatian Peasant Party would be established as soon as a sufficient number of party leaders came to free territory. While some formulations in his June and July statements did not please the Communists and the Partisans, they supported his activities as a means of attracting more party members to Partisan ranks. Magovac was therefore allowed to establish a weekly party newspaper, Slobodni dom, in July 1943. He

soon came to be recognized as the leader of those Croatian Peasant Party mem- , bers who were cooperating with and supporting the Partisans. Due partly to his ganda often made unfounded charges against Maéek and the Croatian Peasant Party. One Partisan leaflet in February 1944 accused Macéek of concluding an agreement with Mihailovi¢’s Chetniks in order to destroy the Partisans. ZA VNOH dokumenti 1944, pp. 233-35. No

such agreement ever existed. __ | | | , ZAVNOH was a combined interim parliament and interim government established by |

the Partisans in Croatia on June 13-14, 1943. It carried out its governmental functions both in liberated and still occupied parts of Croatia through area, county, and communal National Liberation Committees. Similar bodies were established by the Partisans in other Yugoslav provinces and functioned as provincial organs of the two central Partisan political organizations—the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifasisticko vijece narodnog oslobodjenja Jugoslavijfe—AVNOJ), the supreme legislative body, and the Na-

tional Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia (Nacionalni komitet oslobodjenja Jugo- , slavije—NKOJ), the interim government. Although all these organizations included a variety

of prewar political parties and individuals, as well as members of the Partisan armed forces, ,

- they were under the complete control of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, directly or

through national or regional Communist parties. oo

“For Magovac’s statements, see ZAVNOH dokumenti 1943, pp. 235-36, 265—66. For

the Partisan declaration of May 26, 1943, see pp. 132-33. , |

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 363 efforts and partly to other developments, particularly the surrender of Italy, the number of Croatian Peasant Party members in Partisan ranks steadily grew. While in 1941 and 1942 the majority of Partisans in Croatia were Serbs, by early October 1943 the majority had become Croats. Through Magovac’s initiative and under prodding from the Communist Party of Croatia, the Executive Committee of the Croatian Peasant Party was established in liberated terri-

tory at Plaski in Lika on October 12, 1943. Magovac was elected its first chairman.” We should point out here that deep differences of opinion existed among higher- and lower-echelon leaders of the Communist Party of Croatia and in Partisan ranks about the policy to be followed toward Maéek, the Croatian Peasant Party, and party members who joined the Partisans. Some Partisans resented accepting party members into their ranks, accusing them of being latecomers or of joining only when it became clear that the Partisans would win. Others not only favored accepting them, but were generous in this respect, arguing that they did not need to change their political views and beliefs, but only had to be willing to fight with the National Liberation Front. This latter policy was the official line of the Communist Party of Croatia, which knew that unless it drew many members of the Croatian Peasant Party into its ranks, it could not achieve victory in Croatia.“ In fact, the activities of those Croatian Peasant Party leaders who joined the Partisans before and after the establishment of the Executive Committee contributed greatly to the mass mobilization of the Croatian people on the side of the Partisans. The response of Croatian Peasant Party members differed markedly from area to area, however, depending on military conditions and the actions of local party leaders. The number of party members in Partisan ranks was relatively much greater in Dalmatia, the Croatian Littoral, Lika, and Slavonia, for example, than in the area north of Zagreb. That part of the lower-level Croatian Peasant Party leadership that considered Macek’s policy of waiting injurious to party interests and thus decided to cooperate with the Partisans was itself not united. Two different groups were willing to fight with the Partisans, but differed on the nature of their relationship with the Communist Party of Croatia and the Partisan leadership. On the one hand, Magovac saw cooperation between the Croatian Peasant Party and

the Communist Party of Croatia as a political coalition between relative equals.” On the other hand, some party leaders joined the Partisans without asking for equality for their party with the Communist Party. Although this difFor Magovac’s activities, the establishment of the Executive Committee of the Croatian Peasant Party, and the growing preponderance of Croats in Partisan ranks in Croatia, see Rubéié, “The Second Session of ZAVNOH,” pp. 127—46, especially pp. 13 5-40. “This is attested to by a series of articles and directives in the official organ of the party. See, for example, Naprijed for August 18 and 25 and September 8, 1943. Naprijed 1943, pp.

235-375 248-50, 275-77. *SSee especially Rubéi¢, “The Second Session of ZAVNOH,” pp. 136-37; BodroZié, “Policy of the Croatian Peasant Party,” pp. 44-46, 58-59.

364 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA ferent view on such a fundamental issue persisted, it was tolerated for some time and Croatian Peasant Party cooperation with Communist-led political forces continued. Thus, by agreement with the Communist Party of Croatia, Magovac and several other party leaders became members of ZAVNOH. Later Magovac also became vice president of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, the interim revolutionary government of the Partisans established by the second session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation

of Yugoslavia (Antifasisticko vijece narodnog oslobodjenja Jugoslavije— , AVNO)J) at Jajce on November 29, 1943, which was under the full control of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. While he cooperated with the Communists in various political bodies and continued to urge Croatian Peasant Party members to mobilize on the Partisan side, Magovac was unwilling to brand Maéek a traitor or criticize the party leaders and members who supported him. In keeping with his view of a coalition between his party and the Communists, Magovac also wanted to renew | Croatian Peasant Party organizations on a local level in liberated areas. But his efforts ran headlong into the policy of the Communist Party, which denied effective political organization to every group but itself. For some time, representatives of Magovac’s weekly newspaper served as agents of the party. But the Communists soon made this impossible.“* After being accused of working against the National Liberation Front with pro-Maéek leaders of his own party instead of cooperating with it, Magovac fell into disfavor with the Communists and some of his own party colleagues. Finally, at the second meeting of the Executive Committee of the Croatian Peasant Party on April 29, 1944, he was forced to resign as chairman, and in August 1944 he also resigned as vice president of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia. He retained only a pro forma connection with these bodies, his power and influence effectively

eliminated. oe | ,

In both positions Magovac was succeeded by Franjo Gazi, who was willing to cooperate completely with the Communists.” Thereafter, relations between the Executive Committee and the Communists proceeded smoothly. Gazi and

, his colleagues on and around the committee continued to operate as a group, but they became submerged within the Communist-dominated National Liberation Front. With the removal of Magovac from the leadership of the Executive Committee and the steadily improving military and political situation of the Partisans in Croatia, Croatian Peasant Party members joined the Partisans ““Rubéi¢é, “The Second Session of ZAVNOH,” p. 137. See also Suljak, “Bozidar Ma-

govac,” pp. 416-30, especially pp. 422-25. , “’Rubéi¢, “The Second Session of ZAVNOH,” pp. 138-39. Gazi, a peasant, was an alternate for Croatian Peasant Party representative Mihovil Pavlek-Miskina, who was killed by the Ustashas in Jasenovac in 1942. For a series of GaZi’s articles in the party’s weekly paper, Slobodni dom, which had been taken out of Magovac’s hands, written during the war and republished in 1945, see Gazi, Na$ put u borbi za slobodu, especially pp. 15-19, 36-43.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 365 in large numbers and contributed greatly to the eventual Partisan victory. Some authors stress the fact that the Communists in Croatia and the Executive Committee of the Croatian Peasant Party put the problem of the national

liberation of Croatia in the foreground and deemphasized issues of social change, undoubtedly to strengthen the position of the Executive Committee and make it more acceptable and effective.” This, however, was a mark of Communist policy throughout Yugoslavia during the entire war. Because of this policy, when the third session of ZAVNOH meeting at Topusko on May 8-9, 1944, proclaimed the formation of a Croatian federal republic as one of the sovereign states of a reorganized federal Yugoslavia, it was very favorably received by the general public in Croatia. By early 1943, the center of the Croatian Peasant Party began to realize that it could not continue its policy of total passivity indefinitely. However, Jancikovi¢ had quite different views on what should be done than the group around Koégutié in Zagreb. In a report that he prepared in early 1943 and that circulated clandestinely as a party document, Jancikovi¢ argued that inactivity was killing the party and urged an immediate and thorough reorganization of party structure. He proposed that the existing leadership sponsor an election by loyal members as soon as possible, to choose both a wider and a narrower Executive Committee to conduct the party’s affairs in the absence of the president, Maéek. He also proposed that the Executive Committee conduct a survey of the remaining members and issue a declaration of the party’s objectives and its views on all outstanding political problems.” But the party leadership in Zagreb ignored these proposals. It may have thought that they would be difficult or impossible to carry out under wartime conditions, or it may have disagreed with them in principle. Both the leaders in Zagreb and Jancikovic had a few contacts with Chetnik and Partisan representatives, but because of fundamentally different views on wartime and postwar policies, these had no positive results. The leadership in Zagreb continued to intensively cultivate contacts with friendly officers in the Croatian army. And as will be shown in Chapter ro, from the middle of 1943 on, the party made a concerted effort to establish direct contact with Western Allied forces in Italy, in order to insure that there would be close cooperation between the party, friendly officers in the Croatian army, and the Allies when the latter made their expected landing on the eastern Adriatic. With the certainty increasing that the Partisans would be on the winning side at the end of the war, it began to appear absolutely necessary that the party have effective cooperation with the Allies, which together with control of the Croatian army would give it a strong position from which to bargain with the Partisans. “*For the policies and activities of the Executive Committee of the Croatian Peasant Party under Magovac’s chairmanship until the end of April 1944 and then under GaZi’s chairman-

ship until its third meeting in Zagreb on June 29-30, 1945, see Konjevi¢, “The Executive Committee of the Croatian (Republican) Peasant Party,” pp. 207-20. “YA, Wkrs. Mvmt., Com. Party, 42-2896 (“Jancikovi¢é Report”), pp. 2-3, 4-7, 9-10.

366 , THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA Party leaders were further persuaded that the Western Allies would help them because the Partisans were Communist-led, while they were a democratic anti~ Communist force through which the Allies could then exercise influence in the

country after the war. ,

Until well into 1944, the center of the party was opposed to collaboration with either the Chetniks or the Partisans. But after realizing that the Partisans would be on the winning side and after failing to arrange any kind of coopera- tion with the Western Allied command in Italy, it changed its mind. Through agents in Switzerland, the party sounded out the British government on the desirability of cooperation with the Partisans. The British favored such a course of action, which, however, they felt should be worked out between the two groups. As a result, Kosuti¢, who earlier had bitterly opposed any overture toward the Partisans, approached them in April 1944. This involved story, which coincided with critical new developments in the party and its leadership, will be

dealt with in Chapter ro. | ,

Croatian Peasant Party representatives in the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London also worked to protect the interests of the Croatian people as they saw them. To counter the exponents of a Greater Serbia, who controlled the government-in-exile and supported General Mihailovi¢, party representatives — struggled to secure the support of the British.” Then in June 1944, Ivan Subaaic, an important party member, was appointed prime minister. Suba8i¢ was forced — on King Peter II by the British with the mandate to reach an accord with Tito on the formation of a unified Yugoslav government. While the first steps toward such an accord were made that June, it was only on March 7, 1945, after the

Yalta Conference the month before issued directives on Yugoslav affairs, thata unified government was formed combining the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav government-in-exile. In fact, this meant _ the absorption of the latter by the Partisans, who speedily acquired full diplomatic recognition for the new government by the Big Three and subsequently other countries. The unified government constituted a crowning success for

Tito and the Partisans and a total defeat for the forces that stood behind the government-in-exile, including King Peter and Suba8i¢ personally. — |

, In sum, developments during the Second World War proved to be catastrophic for the Croatian Peasant Party. As we have seen, it split into three groups—those who remained true to Matéek, those who collaborated with the _ _Ustashas, and those who supported and cooperated with the Partisans. This was because it was not a homogeneous political body, but a national movement See Martinovi¢, “The Painstaking Labors of Dr. Krnjevi¢,” pp. 66-79. For examples of Krnjevi¢’s pro memorias to the British defending Croatian interests, and British reaction to those submitted in January, February, and June 1943, see F.O. 371/37630, R 562/246/92; F.O. 371/37630, R 1945/246/92; F.O. 371/37630, R 5235/246/92; and F.O. 371/37630, R 523 5/246/92 (two different documents under the last two identical numbers). See also Klja-

! kovi¢, “The Yugoslav Government-in-Exile and the Allies,” pp. 5-31. . |

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 367. that during the interwar period had drawn in all shades of political thinking and a great variety of interest groups. Macek, its leader, while capable and steadfast in times of peace, failed to become the forceful and decisive leader that the difficult conditions of wartime required. Moreover, the Ustashas effec- : tively isolated him from other party leaders throughout the war. His policy of passive waiting proved unsatisfactory to most party members, who kept aloof from the Ustasha regime and ended up cooperating with the Partisans. It is difficult to estimate how many members fell into each group. Major Randolph S. Churchill, British liaison officer with Partisan Chief Headquarters in Croatia, reported on April 20, 1944, that each group was of approximately the same numerical strength.*' This seems improbable to me. Rather, it is more likely that the segment of the party that joined the Ustashas began to decline toward the end of 1941 because the Ustashas became compromised in so many ways. The center group that remained true to Macek also gradually lost much of its strength because more and more of its members went over to the Partisans as the war advanced. Thus, toward the end of the war the pro-Partisan wing of the Croatian Peasant Party became the largest of the three. Some writers claim that party leaders purposely delegated members to each of the competing forces in Croatia, as well as representatives to the Western Allies through the govern-

ment-in-exile, in order to protect the party’s position under all circumstances. However, except for the party’s participation in the Yugoslav government-in-

exile and Magovac’s unsuccessful attempt to arrange a coalition with the Parti- ; sans, nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the party simply disintegrated during the war and the three groups struggled against each other. Not one of the three factions was able to exercise any independent or effective influence on Croatian affairs during these fateful years. It should also be noted that

representatives of the party in exile split after the formation of the Subaéi¢ , cabinet. Only about half of the leaders in exile sided with Subagié and returned with him to Yugoslavia, while the highest ranking member in exile, Krnjevic, opposed cooperation with Tito and remained abroad.

Our discussion of the Croatian Peasant Party during the Second World War , would not be complete without a comment on the fate of its major ally from 1927 to 1941, the Independent Democratic Party. This was the main political party of Serbs in Croatian territory and of Croats and Slovenes who considered themselves Yugoslavs. The Peasant Democratic Coalition, which the two parSIW7.O. 202/306, X/L 03669. Churchill also noted that the group around Maéek “has disintegrated or like Ma¢ek himself has lain as low as possible.” For the British report, “The Croat Peasant Party and the Partisan Movement,” which was “intended merely to summarize

those facts and impressions which are available at Partisan Headquarters,” see W.O. 202/306, XL 03669. For a Serbo-Croatian translation of another British report on the Croatian Peasant Party of January 28, 1944, prepared by Stephen Clissold, see Boban, “British Policy Toward the Croatian Peasant Party,” pp. 99-107.

368 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA , ties formed in 1927, split apart in March 1941 over the question of whether Yugoslavia should join the Tripartite Pact, with the Croatian Peasant Party favoring adherence and the Independent Democratic Party opposing it. Once the Yugoslav government-in-exile was established, the latter also had representa-

tives in it. , , |

During the war, members of the Independent Democratic Party were

among the main targets of Ustasha anti-Serbian policies. Many were killed or died in concentration camps; others were expelled to German-occupied Serbia or fled there on their own. Still others fled into the forests and mountains and

joined the Chetniks or the Partisans, mostly the latter because of their proYugoslav stance. Together with the pre-1941 Communist Party members, they

probably formed the most important element of Partisan forces in Croatia during the first two years of resistance and revolution, and they remained an essential part of these forces until the end of the war. The Serbs made important contributions to the work of ZAVNOH and its National Liberation Commit-

tees at the lower levels of the interim wartime government. On January 12, 1944, the Serbian members of ZAVNOH met at Otoéac in Lika and established the Serbian Club of the Members of ZAVNOH, under the chairmanship of Rade Pribicevi¢, scion of a famous Serbian political family from Croatia and

a member of the prewar Main Committee of the Independent Democratic Party. The club issued a proclamation to the Serbs of Croatia, spelling out its principles and objectives and calling on the populace to increase its struggle

against occupation and collaborationist forces.” | ,

Since participation in the Partisan fighting forces was the foremost route to membership in the Communist Party of Croatia, many Serbs found their way into the party. This, and the fact that many Serbs became high-ranking military commanders during the war, had important long-term political consequences for Croatia. Ustasha policies, which aimed at eliminating the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a viable national group, inflicted such great loss

of life and sacrifices on the Serbian people that they joined the Communist revolution in large numbers and contributed materially to its success. The victory of the Communists in Yugoslavia led to a great increase in the relative political power of the Serbs in Croatia.

THE USTASHA REGIME AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH While the role of the Roman Catholic Church in the Independent State of Croatia will be treated in detail in Chapter 12, it is appropriate here to briefly describe relations between the church and the Ustasha regime. Because of their *ZAVNOH dokumenti 1944, pp. 79-82. For a speech by Rade Pribi¢evié at the Third Session of ZAVNOH at Topusko on May 8-9, 1944, see pp. 609-10. See also his article, “The Serbian People in Croatia and the National Liberation Movement.”

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 369 small numbers, the Ustashas were forced to look to other political and social groups for allies and educated workers to staff their administration, though many employees from the earlier regime were retained, provided they could pass Ustasha scrutiny. Abhorring most of the ideas of the Croatian Peasant Party, they found their natural allies among those who expounded nationalist and authoritarian political views, such as many Catholic clergymen and Clericalist-oriented intellectuals. Significantly, a large number of Ustasha leaders were products of Catholic high schools and came from areas in which the Roman Catholic and Serbian Orthodox Churches had coexisted for centuries.” They were well aware of the Catholic Church’s grievances over political and religious conditions in interwar Yugoslavia and its opposition to the Serbiandominated Yugoslav state and the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Ustashas also attracted the leading personalities of the former Croatian People’s Party, the Catholic political party in Croatia during the 1920’s, who were originally pro-Yugoslav but who by the late 1920’s had become outspokenly separatist and anti- Yugoslav.

Both before and after April 1941, many Croatian Catholic priests, especially younger ones, saw in the ultranationalist program of the Ustashas the solution to the Croatian national question and a means of improving the position of the Catholic Church in Croatia. In fact, quite a number of Catholic priests, particularly Franciscan friars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and southern Dalmatia, were sworn members of the movement before April 1941. Close collaboration between the Ustashas and part of the Catholic clergy followed naturally from the fact that both were authoritarian, anti- Yugoslav, antidemocratic, anti-Freemason, and above all anti-Serbian, anti-Orthodox, and antiCommunist. Three important Ustashas, two of them Catholic priests, attest to the congeniality between certain Ustasha and Catholic attitudes. The Reverend Dragutin Kamber, parish priest in Doboj, Bosnia, who in April 1941 became the prefect of the county, wrote in an article celebrating the first anniversary of the Independent State of Croatia: “It is far from us to compete with anybody. But without drawing any comparison, I will point out that we, Croatian Catholic ‘’The two churches coexisted for centuries in Bosnia and Herzegovina, parts of CroatiaSlavonia and Dalmatia, and present-day Yugoslav Macedonia without becoming involved in religious wars comparable to those between Catholics and Protestants in Western Europe.

Such conflict first appeared during the First World War, primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the defender of Catholicism, went to war with Serbia, the home of Serbian Orthodoxy. Both the Austro-Hungarian authorities and many Catholics and Muslims engaged in activities against priests and members of the Orthodox Church that could be labeled religious warfare. Ekmeti¢, Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914, pp.

112-51. During the Second World War, the Independent State of Croatia waged a fullfledged religious war against its Serbian Orthodox population. The armed conflicts between Serbian Orthodox and Muslim populations in areas where they lived intermixed were of a similar nature.

370 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA , priests, have in the overwhelming majority belonged to that group of people _ who have been preparing the coming of an independent Croatia.” In a similar vein, the Reverend Vilim Cecelja, a parish priest in a Zagreb suburb, who took the Ustasha oath before April 10, 1941, and who administered the oath of office to Pavelié and the ministers of the new state, asserted to a journalist that the | clergy had always been patriotically disposed and had welcomed the moment of freedom with enthusiasm. He especially mentioned Franciscan friars from Dalmatia and Herzegovina, but also stressed that there were many sworn Ustashas among diocesan priests. And Vjekoslav Luburi¢, an important Ustasha and practicing Catholic, wrote in exile in June 1955 that he could not under- stand how a person could “faithfully serve Paveli¢ while raising monstrous accusations against Ustashism and against the clergy, the two pillars of our revo-

lution, our war, and our resistance.”™ OO ,

Just as the statement that Maéek read over Radio Zagreb on April 10, | 1941, helped the new regime consolidate its power (see Chapter 2), so also did several of Archbishop Stepinac’s actions and statements, especially his immediate visits to Slavko Kvaternik and Paveli¢ and his circular letter of April 28 calling on the priests of his archdiocese to do their duty toward the new state. It should also be noted that, from the beginning to the end of the Ustasha state, the entire Catholic press in the Independent State of Croatia supported Paveli¢

and the Ustasha regime. , ,

Since the Ustashas lacked intellectuals and writers, most official propagandists for both the state and the party (Ivo Bogdan, Matija Kovaci¢, Ivan OrSanic, Vilko Rieger) and many other leading figures in journalism, radio, and film (Petar Bareza, Ivo Guberina, Ivo Lendi¢, Milivoj Magdic¢, Tias Mortigjija, Fran-

jo Nevistic), that is, in the mass media, came from Catholic Clericalist or Frankist backgrounds or were connected with such forces. Beginning with a speech by Minister of Interior Andrija Artukovi¢ in the Croatian Diet on February 24, 1942, but actually continuing a long line of Croatian nationalist and Clericalist thought, the Ustashas and their Clericalist allies directed their chief attack against the four groups considered to be the chief enemies of the Croatian

people and state: Serbs, Jews, Freemasons, and Communists. Once the Jews *“Kamber’s statement was from a publication of the archbishopric of Sarajevo, and Cecelja’s remarks were reported on the basis of the official organ of the Ustasha movement, Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), of April 20, 1941. See Dokumenti o protunarodnom radu, pp. 10-

379-80. | , II.

For Luburi¢’s assertion, see his editorial note in Drina (Madrid), June 1955, no. 4-7, pp.

- See the testimony of former state minister Vladimir KoSak at the trial of Archbishop

Stepinac and others, in Sudjenje... Stepincu, pp. 363-66. For Stepinac’s circular to the clergy of his archdiocese, see Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 258-60. For the background of those in the mass media, see Jeli¢-Buti¢, Ustase, pp. 204-6. For Artukovié’s speech in the Diet, see Brzopisni zapisnici, p. 30. Until the spread of Nazi influence in the late 1930’s, there was very little anti-Semitism in Croatia.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES : 371 were removed from Croatian life and the influence of the Freemasons, who had ceased activity on their own in 1940, was eliminated, the propagandists united the Serbs and the Communists to form their most cherished pejorative term,

“Serbocommunists,” to identify the archenemy of the Croatian nation and state.

In addition to managing most of the propaganda and mass media for the Ustashas, the Clericalists were especially influential in education. The first minister of religion and education, Mile Budak, reportedly had excellent connections with the Catholic Church, and two Clericalists, Ivan OrSani¢ and Feliks Niedzielsky, were successively leaders of the Ustasha Youth Organization. Marian Mikac, a Clericalist, was in charge of Croatian Film Central, and Radovan Latkovié, a Frankist, headed Croatian Radio. The three main sources of talent that the Ustashas used to staff propaganda and mass media organizations and the educational administration were Clericalist journalists, the faculty of the archbishopric’s high school in Zagreb, and the Clericalist intellectuals who published the journal Hrvatska smotra. Some of these individuals were reportedly sworn Ustashas before April 10, 1941.” The Vatican, in accordance with its usual practice, did not officially recognize the Croatian state because it was established during wartime. But it had a legate, Abbot Giuseppe Ramiro Marcone, with the Croatian episcopate, and the Croatian state had an unofficial representative at the Vatican.

, Archbishop Stepinac sent Luigi Cardinal Maglione, papal secretary of state, a revealing report on May 24, 1943, about the attitude of the Croatian Catholic Church toward the Ustasha regime. Somewhat earlier the Yugoslav government-in-exile had remonstrated with the Holy See that Orthodox Serbs in the “so-called Independent State of Croatia” were being maltreated and that

the Catholic Church in Croatia “did not do its duty toward the persecuted schismatics and that it . . . even had approved and arranged the measures against the schismatics.” The archbishop’s report supplied background information for the Holy See about these charges. According to Stepinac, such accusations by Serbian propaganda “had no other purpose but to make the prestige of the present regime in Croatia fall in the eyes of the Holy See.” Further, “despite all enemy propaganda against the Catholic Church in Croatia, it had always made its voice heard before the highest organs of the state. . . and all this is recognized by not a few Serbs, who are guided not by hatred, but by truth

and gratitude.” The archbishop admitted that some atrocities that the Serbs complained about “had been committed at the time of national revolution, which had brought forward some irresponsible people. They had committed these delicts in the name of the government, but the government did not know about them, and often delicts were committed against [existing] government decrees. This is visible from the fact that many of those irresponsible people ‘’Sudjenje... Stepincu, pp. 363-64.

372 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA have been executed by government order.” He deplored and condemned such delicts, but noted that these acts were a reaction to what the Serbs had done during the interwar period, when they had violated all the rights of the Croa-

tian people. He also reminded his readers of the assassination of Croatian

deputies in the Parliament in Belgrade in June 1928. , Stepinac went on to note that the Croatian government had done much good of immediate interest to the Catholic Church in Croatia. It had fought the widespread practice of abortion, practiced largely by Jewish and Serbian Orthodox physicians, which the former government had done almost nothing to

stop; prohibited pornographic publications, earlier promoted primarily by Jews and Serbs; abolished Freemasonry; energetically fought the Communists, who had started to flourish under the old Belgrade government; and issued decrees against cursing. The Ustasha government had further provided for the education of army soldiers in a Christian spirit; insisted on religious education in schools and was not opposed to confessional schools; increased financial aid

to seminaries and other religious institutions; increased the salaries of the clergy; supported the charitable activities of the church; and helped financially in the construction of new and the repair of existing churches. All of which, ac-

cording to the archbishop, showed that the Ustasha government possessed good will toward the Catholic Church. And as the archbishop’s report makes

clear, the church reciprocated in kind.*

| However, as the war progressed, the terrorist policies of the Ustasha government against the Jewish and Serbian populations, as well as against antiUstasha Croats, its totalitarian character, and its subservience to the Italians and the Germans threatened to inflict great damage on both the Croatian people and the Croatian Catholic Church. As a result, the Catholic hierarchy began to criticize certain actions of the Ustashas and later endeavored to distance itself from the regime. Given the alternatives facing it, however—a Yugoslav state controlled by the Chetniks or the Communists—it ultimately maintained its support of the Ustashas and the Independent State of Croatia to the end of the war. The last formal expression of that support was the Pastoral Letter issued after the Episcopal Conference on March 24, 1945, which will be more

fully discussed in Chapter 12. | ,

THE USTASHAS CONVOKE THE CROATIAN DIET | Some Ustashas credit their movement with the reestablishment of the Croatian Diet—the Sabor—which met for the first time on February 23, 1942. But the Diet had no political or constitutional significance and was convoked at the whim of the Ustashas, who were not willing to give the populace real political ‘Holy See, Actes et documents du Saint Siege, 9: 222-24. For comments on Archbishop Stepinac’s view of widespread abortions in Croatia in the interwar period, see Chapter 12, footnote 24.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 373 rights and so tried to bluff them with form and ceremony. Pavelié also wanted

to have an official forum that he could periodically address. The Diet had twelve meetings during 1942, the last one on December 28, and did not meet again for the remainder of the war. It was not elected. Its members included surviving representatives of the Croatian Diet of 1918, some deputies of the Croatian Peasant Party and the Yugoslav Muslim Organization elected in December 1938, several members of the governing board of the old Croatian Party of Right, various functionaries of the Ustasha movement, a few personal friends of Paveli¢ from among the Bosnian Muslims, and two Serbs, Savo Besarovic, a personal friend of Pavelic from Sarajevo, and Svetislav Sumanovié, vice ban of Croatia-Slavonia from 1903 to 1906.” Paveli¢c and the Ustashas would have liked the Diet they convoked to have had the historical significance of former Diets. But without an election to select the members, with a one-party system and Pavelic’s personal dictatorship in effect, with the Ustasha Party exercising total control over the mass media, and with all political meetings prohibited except those sponsored by the authorities, this was excluded by definition. There is some disagreement about the exact number of deputies in the Diet. According to official membership rolls, the Credentials Committee confirmed the credentials of 147 members. Some individuals who had been invited to participate could not be reached and others declined. The most interesting question is the number of Croatian Peasant Party deputies elected in December 1938 who consented to serve. According to the official listing of the Diet and confirmed by August KoSsutic, the party’s vice president, 18 deputies of the 46 elected in 1938 participated in the Ustasha Diet.” For an official record of the Diet’s constitution, leadership, and members, and the reports and speeches of Paveli¢ and Ustasha ministers in its twelve plenary meetings, see Brzopisni zapisnici. Of the Yugoslav writings on the Ustasha Diet, see Buti¢ and Jeli¢, “History of the Independent State of Croatia,” pp. 339-56, especially pp. 341-43, and Konjevié, “The Place and Role of the ‘Croatian State Diet,’” pp. 115-3 5. “For the official membership, see Brzopisni zapisnici, pp. 10-12, 34, 36. See also Konjevic, “The Place and Role of the ‘Croatian State Diet,’” pp. 121-24. For the number of Croatian Peasant Party deputies participating, see Kosuti¢é’s pro memoria of September 22, 1944, to Major Randolph S. Churchill, the British liaison officer with Partisan Chief Headquarters in Croatia, in W.O. 202/222, X/I 8972, Appendix B. For the number of Croatian Peasant Party deputies elected in December 1938, see Jantikovi¢, Hrvati u izborima 11. prosinca 1938, p. 27. Some Croatian Peasant Party deputies who took part in the Ustasha Diet did not join the Ustasha Party or take the Ustasha oath. Some apparently participated in the hope that they could help Maéek, who was kept at the Jasenovac concentration camp and then under strict house arrest during the war. A report by the Maéek core of the Croatian Peasant Party, circulated clandestinely in early 1943, characterized the Diet as “illegal and falsified.” It claimed that the deputies who had joined the Ustasha movement and taken the Ustasha oath had nothing in common either with Maéek or the Croatian people, and that by their behavior they had excluded themselves from the Croatian Peasant Party. Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Fr. 769.

374 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA In his opening speech, Paveli¢ addressed its members as “honorable, esteemed, exalted, powerful, respectable and noble, wise and considerate, loved and faithful.” Already on January 25, he had informed Envoy Kasche that the Diet would temporarily represent the whole nation, but only in an advisory capacity. Later he planned to have it represent various occupations, as in a corpo-

rative state. The Diet was formally dissolved on December 28, 1942, as planned, but at the express wish of Pavelic, its leadership remained in readiness. However, it was never again called upon to act. If one compares how the Diet acted during the ten months of its existence with a parliament in a democratic state, or even with what Minister of Interior Andrija Artukovié described as its functions and meaning when addressing it on February 24, 1942, the inescap-

able conclusion is that it was a mockery.°! Oo A further indication of the Diet’s illusory power was the fact that Marko Doéen, its president, an old Ustasha returnee, and nine other colleagues who were critical of policies pursued by the Ustasha regime apparently did not dare to air their criticisms publicly in it, but rather presented them in a pro memoria to Paveli¢ on November 30, 1942.” The pro memoria deserves further attention because of the light it sheds on the political situation in the Ustasha state and the degree of dissatisfaction among even strong supporters of the regime. Several developments contributed to the timing of its presentation. Marshal Kvaternik was “on leave” in Slovakia and most officials as well as the general public believed that he would not return to his posts. His son Eugen, formerly the powerful state secretary and chief of police, had been relieved of his post. An increase in the bloody excesses of the Chetniks in the Italian-controlled areas of the state during the preceding two or three months had stimulated a great deal of resentment in Croatia against Italy. At the same time, the Germans had acquired the upper hand over the Italians in Croatian affairs. Finally, AngloAmerican forces had landed in North Africa in November, changing the strategic situation in the Mediterranean at the expense of the Germans and the Ital-

lans. |

In the pro memoria, the Dosen group, after complimenting Paveli¢ personally on his historic role in reestablishing the Croatian state and acknowledging that the Ustasha movement was the foundation of the state and political life in

Croatia, leveled its criticism against existing conditions. After finding fault ‘See Brzopisni zapisnici, p. 5 for Paveli¢’s opening speech; p. 188 for his wish that the leadership remain ready; and pp. 28-34 for Artukovi¢’s description of its functions. For Paveli¢’s internal political plans, see Glaise’s report of January 26, 1942, in Micr. No. T-5o1,

Roll 264, Fr. 1128. , , | -

*Among them were some of the Diet’s leading members: Ferdinand Gasteiger, one of the Diet’s four secretaries; Mirko Koguti¢, chairman of the Education Committee; Ademaga Me&Sié, chairman of the Legal Committee; Fran Milobar, chairman of the Finance Committee; Vinko Krigkovi¢é; Krunoslav Lokmer; Stjepan Uroi¢é; Marko Vergi¢; and Tomo Vojkovic. Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Frs. 855-59. Vojkovié later joined the Partisans. The Germans soon obtained a copy of the pro memoria, but it was never published in the Ustasha state.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 375 with the Rome treaties and the ensuing loss of more than half of Dalmatia, it reproved the Italians for allowing Chetnik anti-Croatian activities in the Italian-controlled parts of Croatian territory and demanded that such activity be stopped and that the problem of Dalmatia be definitively solved. The group hoped that Hitler would help Croatia in this respect. The pro memoria went on to assert that unsavory elements had found their way into the Ustasha movement and engaged in corruption on a large scale. It then took under critical examination almost every aspect of Ustasha policy: the duplication of administration in the government and the party, resulting in constant squabbles between the two, which prevented the proper functioning of the state apparatus; the existence of a regular and a party army, both with many incompetent officers, and the constant disagreements between the two, making it impossible for the army to properly fulfill its duty; and the existence of several kinds of special courts, many of whose judges were legally untrained and yet possessed the power of life and death over defendants, which greatly impaired the standing of the judiciary in the country. The group noted that reports circulated among the population about the maltreatment and slaughter of inmates in concentration camps and prisons, pointed out that the public thought that many individuals and groups who had been sent to the camps did not present any danger to public order or the security of the country, and urged that all inmates be given the opportunity to defend themselves in regular courts. It also reported that a general feeling of insecurity concerning person and property prevailed. Finally, it requested that all these negative conditions be eliminated because they endangered the safety and life of the state and nation and it asked that the Diet be reorganized as a truly representative body and be convoked again. As far as I am aware, Paveli¢ never answered this pro memoria. But in his speech before the Diet on December 28, 1942, he undoubtedly had its signatories in mind when he said: I alone take responsibility for everything. I do not require even the ministers to be responsible to the people. The minister is there as long as he serves the given objective and thereafter nobody asks him to be responsible. I gladly take responsibility upon myself. I assume full responsibility for the army, I take responsibility for the food supply, as well as for politics and for lives. [Whereupon all members of the Diet stood up and applauded.] For this reason I do not ask and I do not de-

| sire to share this responsibility, but I desire to share with you the work, the job, and the successes.”

However, none of the specific recommendations of the pro memoria were taken into consideration, nor was the Diet reorganized and reconvened after its final meeting. In fact, the content and tone of this pro memoria might have contributed to Pavelic’s decision not to convoke it again. The Ustasha Diet never passed, nor did Paveli¢, the head of state, ever grant, SBrzopisni zapisnici, p. 187.

376 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA | a constitution. On May 15, 1941, however, Paveli¢ issued a decree stating that the Croatian royal crown (no longer in existence) of medieval King Zvonimir

was the embodiment of Croatian sovereignty. In this he imitated Hungary, where the Crown (still in existence) of St. Stephen is ascribed specific constitutional properties. There was a great deal of talk about the resurrection of traditional Croatian state and constitutional rights, but no positive action resulted from it. Some Croatian authors maintained, however, that the Seventeen Principles of the Ustasha movement, which up to April 10, 1941, were binding on members of the movement alone, became binding thereafter on all citizens of the state and thus constituted the de facto constitution of the land. This was analogous to the situation in Germany, where the program of the National So-

, _cialist Labor Party was the de facto constitution of the Third Reich.” In Croatia this proposition was actually confirmed by administrative practice. For gov: ernment officials to advance in their positions, examinations had to be taken in the three fields of constitutional organization, administrative organization, and legislation in the specific field of the candidate’s competency. The material on constitutional organization consisted of the Ustasha program and various Us-

, tasha regulations and laws pertaining to the movement and the state. After disregarding the existence of even such an inconsequential Diet for over two years and ignoring the proposal for its reorganization and reconvocation put forth by the Dosen group, the Ustasha government issued an order on April 5, 1945, for a new future Diet. The new Diet was to include, in addition to the members of the 1942 Diet, representatives of various occupations, scientific institutions, and the like. But with the Ustasha state in its final days, the plan for reorganizing the Diet was a bizarre exercise in futility. _

, CROATIAN “ETHNIC AND | a HISTORICAL TERRITORY” | Defining the “ethnic and historical territory” of the Croatian nation is a complex and emotion-laden problem that has frustrated politicians and histo- rians since the 1 840’s and confounded the Ustashas during the Second World War as well. The central issue has been whether the province of Bosnia and “For the decree of May 15, 1941, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1941, pp. 8788. For the argument that the Seventeen Principles were a de facto constitution, see Sladovié,

“Der Unabhangige Staat Kroatien,” pp. 1-41, especially p. 15; idem, “Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrecht des Unabhangigen Staates Kroatien,” pp. 222-82. In the same vein is his

article, “The Constitutional Foundation of the Croatian State.” 6See, for example, the regulations on examinations in the Ministry of Public Health and So-

cial Welfare of November 23, 1943, in Zbornik zakona inaredaba NDH, 1944, pp.90-92. -Among German wartime documents, I found German translations of a draft constitution for the Independent State of Croatia with 127 articles and a draft interim constitution with 11 articles. There was no indication of when they were prepared or by whom or whose order.

*6Jareb, “Meetings of the Ustasha Council of Deputy Leaders,” p. 196.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 377 Herzegovina is Croatian or Serbian and thus whether it should be included in Croatia’s or Serbia’s national territorial patrimony. A key element in resolving this issue, as we shall see, has been the Muslim population, which during the interwar period represented about one-third of the province’s population. By being claimed, or claiming themselves, as Croats or Serbs, the Muslims could create a Croatian or Serbian majority in the province. The involved history of the Bosnian Muslims, which goes back to medieval times, will be touched upon in Chapter 11. It is sufficient here to discuss briefly the nature of the Croatian claim to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beginning with Staréevi¢ in the 1850's, Croatian nationalists claimed that Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged wholly to Croatia, and they put the eastern frontier of the Croatian nation at the Drina River. The first argument to support this claim was geopolitical: the province was bordered on three sides by the Croatian provinces of Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia and only on one side—the eastern—by non-Croatian territory, Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, geopolitically Bosnia and Herzegovina looked like a central part of Croatian national territory. Conversely, possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serbia would mean the expansion of Serbian sovereignty into the northwest part of the Balkan peninsula, from which it could exercise a strong influence on Croa- | tia-Slavonia and Dalmatia and thus on most of the Adriatic coastal area. The Croats who claimed Bosnia and Herzegovina for Croatia also asserted that all Muslims in the area were Croatian by nationality. If the Muslims were counted as Croats, a majority of the population was then Croatian, and the historical claim went back to the Middle Ages. According to this theory, the medieval Bosnian state, which religiously was part Roman Catholic and part Bogumil, was Croatian because the Bogumil faction, prior to becoming Bogumil, was Catholic and Croatian. Therefore the present-day Muslims, who were to a large extent descendants of the Bosnian Bogumils, were Croats. Mladen Lorkovic, an Ustasha minister, in a book published shortly before the outbreak of the war, took for granted that all Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina were Croatian by nationality, and Paveli¢ did the same in his lead article in the first issue of the Ustasha ideological weekly newspaper Spremnost.” The Croatian nationalists claiming the Muslims as Croats also maintained (in fact, historically accurately) that the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, were mostly descendants of settlers who gradually came there from Serbian and Montenegrin areas. These Serbs were either forcibly settled there by the Turks, or responded to the call of Austria to move out of Ottoman-controlled areas and settle as peasant soldiery in the Austrian-controlled Military Frontier along the Ottoman border, or came on their own initiative. But as settlers or squatters, so the Croatian nationalists 67M. Lorkovi¢, Narod i zemlja Hrvata, pp. 147-57; A. Paveli¢, “The Concept of Bosnia Through the Centuries.”

378 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA argued, these Serbs had no right to remain. In addition, in certain areas, espe-

cially southern Herzegovina, some present-day Serbs could be claimed as Croats after they converted to Catholicism because they were the descendants of former Catholic Croats who turned Orthodox under conditions prevailing

in the Ottoman Empire (see Chapter 9). } A special reason why Croatian nationalists made a strong claim to Bosnia and Herzegovina was that during the interwar period the Croatian Catholic population in the province grew much faster than in Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, thus helping to replenish the Croatian population as a whole. The claims of Greater Serbian enthusiasts that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a

Serbian province were based on the plurality of the Orthodox, that is Serbian, , population in the province from the middle of the nineteenth century on, on the claim that the Bosnian Muslims were simply “Islamized Serbs,” and on the asser-

tion that the medieval Bosnian state was Serbian and the medieval Bosnian Church (the Bogumils) a Serbian Orthodox Church with some minor differences.

What allegiance did the Bosnian Muslims show? In the interwar Yugoslav

state, just as during the preceding centuries under Ottoman and AustroHungarian rule, the leaders of the Bosnian Muslims gave primary attention to their own interests. After the establishment of the Yugoslav state in 1918, for example, the Bosnian Muslim deputies in the Constituent Assembly, in exchange for promises of favorable consideration in the post-1918 agrarian reform and despite the fact that most of them had declared themselves to be of Croatian nationality,

helped to pass the centralist, pro-Serbian constitution of 1921. They pursued similarly self-interested policies in the wartime Independent State of Croatia, though they were much less united then than during the interwar period. The Ustashas, in order to secure the cooperation and allegiance of the Bosnian Muslims and thereby to claim the province as Croatian on the basis of a majority of the population, granted them numerous favors. The Ustasha government gave them an ostentatious building in Zagreb for a mosque. Pavelié named eleven Muslims to the Croatian Diet convoked in February 1942, out of a total membership of 147.” Muslims continuously held the offices of vice premier and one other ministry in the Ustasha regime, as well as a second ministry during the last few months of the Ustasha state. Such concessions were easily arranged, partly because Paveli¢ himself (whose parents were from Lika in Croatia), as well as a number of his most devoted ministers (Andrija Artukovi¢, Jozo Dumandzié¢, Julije Makanec, Nikola Mandi¢, Ante Voki¢, and Vjekoslav Vranci¢) and several senior of8M. Lorkovic¢, Narod i zemlja Hrvata, pp. 157-58. Between 1921 and 1931, the Catholic population in Bosnia and Herzegovina grew by 25.5 percent, while in Croatia-Slavonia it

grew by only 11.2 percent and in Dalmatia by only 10.0 percent. , ,

® As noted in the previous section, the exact number of members of the Ustasha Diet is not known, but according to Brzopisni zapisnici, there were 147 members whose credentials were accepted. I cannot explain the figure of 193 members given in the Muslim memorandum discussed in Chapter 12.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 379 ficers in the Ustasha militia and police (Rafael Boban and Vjekoslav Luburic), were Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even if all Bosnian Muslims had declared themselves to be Croats and supported the Ustasha regime, the small majority that would have resulted in the early 1940’s—about 55 percent combined Muslims and Catholic Croats out of the total population of Bosnia and Herzegovina—would still have made a policy of cooperation with the Serbs imperative. To the Ustashas, however, this was unacceptable. Their objective in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to expel or exterminate a large number of Serbs and convert the remainder to Roman Catholicism and thus to undo in a few years the national and confessional population mix that powerful and diverse historical forces had produced over five or six centuries. In this policy they faced an immediate challenge from both the Chetniks and the Partisans and eventually opposition from a great majority of Muslims as well. The Ustashas’ policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina of expelling, exterminating, or converting the Serbs and the Chetniks’ corresponding policy of expelling or exterminating the Croats and the Muslims did not advance the interests of the nationalist factions among either the Croats or the Serbs, much less the interests of the Bosnian Muslims. There is no doubt, as will be shown more fully in Chapter 1, that the Ustashas’ policy of wooing the Bosnian Muslims did not succeed. It is equally true that the Chetniks’ goal of including Bosnia and Herzegovina in a Greater Serbia and the concomitant policy of “clearing” the Croats and the Muslims out of the province or exterminating them also failed. This happened because a steadily growing number of all three national groups turned against the Ustashas and the Chetniks as they came to realize that the policies of both would lead to the destruction of all and that the road to survival was cooperation within a Yugoslav federal framework. It was the Partisans who promoted this solution. If the policies of the Ustashas, the Chetniks, the Muslims, and the Partisans during the Second World War proved anything conclusively, it was that there existed neither a Croatian, nor a Serbian, nor a Muslim, but only a multiethnic solution to the problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The disintegration of the province in

the 1990’s has confirmed this truth yet again. , “Even though wartime events completely discredited Ustasha policy toward the Bosnian Muslims, some former Ustasha functionaries from Bosnia have insisted that the majority of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina “either already feel Croatian or are on the way to being fully Croatized.” The Reverend Kamber has argued: “If we do not want to lose or partition Bosnia, we have to preserve in it a compact and overall Croatian majority. We can only have this majority when all Muslims become consciously Croats, and not only with a Muslim majority, even if that majority were very large. Only when all Catholics and all Muslims become united can we Croats obtain a majority of about 55 percent” [Kamber’s emphasis]. Kamber, “Relations between Croats of Catholic and Muslim Faiths,” pp. 103-20, especially pp. 11314. This first chapter of a planned book was published in Osoba i duh, a periodical of Croatian Dominican priests in exile. As far as I know, the book was never completed. Kamber died in Toronto on June 30, 1969.

CHAPTER 9 | The Independent State of Croatia: | The Rule of Lawlessness and Terror |

, ne ee

THE POLITICAL AND “LEGAL” FOUNDATIONS

OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR , A fundamental principle underlying Ustasha thought and action was that the Independent State of Croatia would be a state of one nationality (Croatian) and two religions (Roman Catholicism and Islam). The major obstacle to realizing this objective was a Serbian population of Serbian Orthodox faith that numbered some 1,820,000 in April 1941, about 30 percent of the total population. The Serbs were not concentrated in any one area of the new state in a compact manner, but were spread over 60 to 70 percent of its territory. In what became the Socialist Republic of Croatia after the war, but excluding Istria and other Croatian territory that was under Italy in the interwar period, the Serbian

Orthodox population was 17.5 percent of the total population in the 1931 census. In what became the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was ~ 43.6 percent of the total population.’ Similarly widely varying ratios of Serbs to

other nationalities prevailed in those parts of Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia included in the Independent State of Croatia in 1941 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of which was included in the state.

In the Ustashas’ one-nation state, Serbs, together with Jews and Gypsies, were put outside the law. The exclusion began on the very first day of the new state’s existence, when Slavko Kvaternik excluded Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies

from service in the Croatian armed forces. The only exceptions were some Serbs who had been Austro-Hungarian officers, who were taken into the Croatian army. Two other Serbs, Savo Besarovi¢, a lawyer from Sarajevo and a per'Bicani¢, “The Population of the Federated Peoples’ Republic of Yugoslavia,” pp. 74-84,

especially pp. 80-81. }

Since the Second World War, the Socialist Republic of Croatia has been made up of the former province of Croatia-Slavonia minus Srijem, Dalmatia minus the area of Kotor, Istria, and Baranja. The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been made up of the former provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For census data from 1948 to 1981 showing the - composition of their populations, as well as of the populations of the other socialist republics in Yugoslavia, by nationality, see Yugoslavia, Federal Statistical Office, Statisticki bilten, No. 1295, pp. 8-19, especially pp. 9 and 11.

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 381 sonal friend of Paveli¢, and Svetislav Sumanovié, vice ban of Croatia-Slavonia from 1903 to 1906, both politically innocuous, were later given seats in the Croatian Diet. Still later, Besarovic was named a minister without portfolio. Ustasha policy toward the Serbs thus postulated that almost one-third of the state’s population of military age (the same proportion of Serbs as found in

the general population) was politically unfit to serve in the Croatian armed forces. Paveli¢ was not willing to alter this policy even when a serious shortage of manpower developed after mid-1943, though Glaise, German plenipotentiary general in Croatia, and Liters, commanding general of German troops in Croatia, urged him to do so. A change was only made a week before the war ended, too late to have any practical effect. Paveli¢ did agree to allow the Germans to draft some Serbs, but only for use on the eastern front or as laborers in

Germany and only when they were designated as Orthodox.’ Probably less than a thousand Serbs from Croatia saw service on the Russian front, but a sizable number of Serbs born in Croatia in 1923 and 1924 were drafted to work in Germany. Some able-bodied Serbian inmates of Croatian concentration camps, who were always listed as Orthodox, were also recruited for that purpose.’ In order to proceed against Serbs and Jews with genocidal measures, the Us-

tashas introduced draconian measures of such widespread application that Croats themselves were also victims. In fact, never before in their history had Croats been exposed to such legalized administrative, police, and judicial brutality and abuse as during the Ustasha regime. In addition, all general laws retained from the old Yugoslav state were made immeasurably stricter than they had been.’ By a special decree of April 13, 1941, Kvaternik established a new gendarmerie for the maintenance of peace and order consisting solely of Croats ?For the change in policy in May 1945, see Chapter ro, footnote 6. For German suggestions that Paveli¢ include Croatian Serbs in the Croatian armed forces and his refusal, and for the use of Croatian Serbs as laborers in Germany, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Frs. 307,

311,343,424. A historical irony in this connection should be noted. Most Serbs living in Croatia and Slavonia in 1941 were descendants of military peasant soldiers who were settled in the Croatian-Slavonian Military Frontier—established by the Habsburgs as a defense against the Ottoman Empire—after about 1530. Both Croats and Serbs from the Frontier were known as excellent soldiers, and many had distinguished careers in the Habsburg Empire until its disintegration in 1918. *Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5797, Frs. H309,981-87; Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 265, Fr. 31; and Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Fr. 3.43. On April 16, 1944, the Yugoslav Legion, which the Soviets were in the process of organizing and which they brought to Yugoslavia in the late stages of the war, included 1,543 officers and men, 293 of them Serbs. See Tomasevich, The Chetniks, p. 395. *On the apparatus and methods of terror used by the Ustashas and the occupying powers

in the Independent State of Croatia, see Haramina, “The System of Ustasha and Occupying | Powers’ Terror in Croatia,” pp. 1-16; idem, “Crimes Against Jews,” pp. 89-96; Scukanec, “Terror by the Occupying Powers and Quislings,” pp. 419-25; Kobsa, “Ustasha Apparatus for Terrorist Activity,” pp. 223-51.

382 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA and Muslims. On the same day an order was also issued for the collection of arms, ammunition, and other supplies from the collapsing Yugoslav army.” By a decree of April 19, all judges, state attorneys, and other employees of the judicial system were suspended for a period of three months, during which time the Ministry of Justice would decide whether they would be retained, retired, or fired from government service. No appeal of the decision was possible. By a decree of April 22, all remaining employees of the state, of local governments, and of government-owned economic enterprises, including the postal,

telegraph, and telephone services and the railroad, were put on temporary status in the respective state ministries. Regardless of their position or acquired rights, these employees could be retained, retired, or fired by the respective ministry without the possibility of appeal. These two decrees provided the formal basis that allowed the new regime to rid itself of all unwanted employees in state and local government and in state

enterprises. In principle this meant all Jews, Serbs, and Yugoslav-oriented Croats, and all of these, except for some specialists urgently needed by the government, were thrown out. This left a multitude of jobs to be filled by Ustashas, pro-Ustasha adherents and friends, and careerist followers, thereby fully tying the administrative apparatus of the state to the Ustasha Party. In this fashion many government jobs were filled by people who had no professional qualifications, but were part of the Ustasha movement or were eager to please the new regime and were eligible by virtue of their national affiliation. Another decree of April 19 authorized the Ustasha government to cancel the

pensions that the former Yugoslav government had granted to politicians, diplomats, and other high government officials and to people who had made notable contributions to the former state. The same decree restored rights to people who had lost government jobs or pensions because of opposition to the former Yugoslav state and who had a positive attitude toward an independent Croatia.® According to a decree of April 29, all former Austro-Hungarian officers and state officials of Croatian nationality who had earned the right to retirement pay prior to December 1, 1918, and whose rights had been denied in the interwar Yugoslav state had these rights restored and became entitled to regular retirement pay from May 1, 1941. For the retirement pay due to them but not paid, they received a lump sum corresponding to three years of retirement pay. A decree of April 24 prohibited the wearing of all medals and decorations granted by the short-lived State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs in 1918

and by the interwar Yugoslav state, canceled all privileges connected with

to state authorities.’

them, and ordered the delivery of these decorations and supporting documents

*For these decrees, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1941, p. 7. ‘See ibid., pp. 15 and 18-19 for the decrees of April 19, and pp. 19-20 for the decree of

April 22. |

’See ibid., p. 32 for the decree of April 29, and pp. 20-21 and 26-27 for that of April 24.

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 383 By a decree of April 18, the Ustasha government abolished the institution of the notary public, that is, the privilege of some private lawyers to perform certain public services for a fee. A decree of April 21 put all physicians who were in government service except those working for the Ministry of Education and all physicians who were in private practice at the disposal of the Ministry of Public Health, which was to assign them “to jobs according to the needs and interests of national health.”* On April 29, Paveli¢ issued a decree coordinating the activities of Ustasha Party organizations with those of Croatian state authorities at the central, district, and local levels. In effect, this put the newly proclaimed Independent State of Croatia under the tutelage of the Ustasha Party. The Ustasha Party was to ensure that “only Croats rule always and everywhere” in the Croatian state. In areas in which governmental authority was already established, party organizations were to exercise supervisory (and obviously controlling) power over state authority. In areas in which such authority was not yet established, they were to organize the new state authority. Where conditions warranted—when, for example, in their view state or Croatian national interest was endangered— Ustasha district or local organizations were empowered to act on their own according to Ustasha principles, without first informing the central authorities. In addition to placing the Ustasha movement above the state, this decree formally allowed district and local Ustasha organizations to meddle in governmental matters, which frequently created confusion and disorder and was often illegal.’ The pro memoria that Marko Dosen and his colleagues submitted to Paveli¢é on November 30, 1942, criticized this practice. Six months later, Bozidar

Kavran, administrative commander of Supreme Ustasha Headquarters, in a circular to district party chiefs on April 12, 1943, pointed out that despite Paveli¢’s orders to the contrary, Ustasha Party officials continued to interfere in state administration, and he requested most strongly that this practice be stopped. Ustasha Party officials, in his words, “were to give all assistance to administrative organs and to supervise their work, but not usurp their duties.”'°

In order to have a “legal” basis for policies directed against Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, and anti-Ustasha Croats, the Ustasha government issued several loosely worded laws and law decrees that could be broadly and variously interpreted. The first of these, on April 17, was the Law Decree on the Defense of the People and the State. Its two chief provisions were: “(1) Whoever in whatever way acts or has acted against the honor and vital interests of the Croatian people or in any way endangers the existence of the Independent State of Croatia or state authority, even if the act is only attempted, commits an act of high treason. (2) The penalty for crimes mentioned in Article 1 is death.” This decree ®’For these two decrees, see ibid., pp. 11, 14. "Ibid., p. 41.

YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., xerox copy in my files, call number unreadable.

384 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA | also provided for the formation of “extraordinary peoples’ courts of three persons” to adjudicate cases covered by it in a speedy process according to the provisions of a former Croatian law on courts-martial. A second Law Decree on Citizenship followed on April 30. According to Article 2, “A citizen is a resident of the state of Aryan origin, who by his actions has shown that he has not

worked against the liberating tendencies of the Croatian people and who is prepared to serve readily and faithfully the Croatian people and the Independent State of Croatia.” With this formulation not only Jews, Serbs, and Gypsies, but also Croats who did not agree with the Ustashas could, by administrative fiat, be denied Croatian citizenship. On the same day the government also issued the Law Decree on Racial Belonging, largely modeled on Nazi laws, which furnished the formal basis for outlawing Jews and Gypsies." It became the foundation for all legislation and administrative regulations leading to the

far-reaching destruction of these ethnic groups. oe

On May 4, the government issued a decree establishing the Directorate of Public Order and Security and on May 13, a decree on its organization and operation.’”* The directorate was a department of the Ministry of Interior and for

the first eighteen months was headed by Eugen Kvaternik, one of the leading and most ruthless Ustashas. | On May 17, the Ustasha government issued the Law Decree on CourtsMartial especially intended to deal with people unlawfully possessing arms, people harboring others suspected of acts against the state, and people suspected of intending to commit such acts. For these acts only the death penalty was prescribed, and the execution of offenders had to take place within three

hours of the pronouncement of the sentence.” . By a special decree of June 4, the government barred Jews from participating in the activities of any Croatian social, sporting, or cultural organization, “particularly those in literature, journalism, graphic and musical arts, theater, and film.”"* Although no formal counterpart of this decree existed applying to Serbs, evidence shows that similar restrictions were also in force against them. With these measures the Ustasha regime deprived Jews and Serbs active in these varied fields of their means of livelihood and effectively brought about their economic ruin. At the same time, although not in all cases with such speed, the government proceeded against Serbs and Jews active in business and finance. One of the first measures was the appointment of “state supervisors” in their firms. Since "For the decree of April 17, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1941, p. 8. For the decrees of April 30, see pp. 42-43. A month later, on June 4, the government established the Directorate for Racial Policy, which was charged with implementing the Law Decree on Racial Belonging. See pp. 138-39.

Tbid., pp. 61,104-5. 107-8., STbid., pp. “Tbid., p. 134.

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 385 the government subsequently had to issue a special decree stating that only supervisors appointed by the Ministry of National Economy were legal, one can

infer that some supervisors had been illegally appointed by Ustasha Party headquarters or other party organizations.” Strict rules were imposed on the management of these firms. Any infraction of the rules, which were often so formulated that they could not easily be observed, was regarded as sabotage. This, as well as the absence of the owners of the businesses—most of whom had been driven from their homes or taken to concentration camps by Ustasha authorities—was used as a pretext for placing the businesses under state management or confiscating them. At first the registration, management, and disposition of formerly Jewish businesses was handled by the Office for the Reconstruction of the Economy, established on May 3 in the Ministry of National Economy.* To manage the properties and businesses of people who had been

expelled and to oversee the disposition of property to people brought into Croatia, the State Directorate for Renewal was established on June 24. The enforcement powers of the directorate were spelled out in a special directive issued on June 26. On July 1, the State Directorate for Economic Renewal was established. This body took over the functions of the Office for the Reconstruction of the Economy and acquired many other duties in the economic field. Both of these agencies were under the direct control of the president, Paveli¢ himself. By a special decree of September 15, the State Directorate for Renewal and the State Directorate for Economic Renewal were consolidated into one agency and under the former name continued to operate under the jurisdiction of the prime minister.’” In addition to the temporary management and disposal of properties and businesses formerly owned by Jews, these agencies also handled the management and disposal of properties and businesses confiscated from Serbs. By a decree of July 8, the Ustasha government empowered the

Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry and Trade to nationalize various private banks when this was “in the state and national interest” and to decide which state banking institutions and in exceptional circumstances which private banks would carry on the business of the nationalized banks. This measure was directed against banks owned by Jewish and Serbian interests. No indemnity was provided to the owners of the nationalized banks, and there was no possibility of appealing the government decision.”® Several additional decrees and regulations were issued in connection with the requisition, 'STbid., p. 13.

\6Ibid., pp. 50-51. For various implementing orders and regulations concerning the application of this decree, see pp. 139-5 5.

'7For the decrees of June 24, July 1, and September 15, see ibid., pp. 195-96, 215-16, 252-53, 598-99. The State Directorate for Renewal was abolished on December 30, 1941, and its functions were taken over by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. See pp. 1096-97. '’Ibid., pp. 253-54.

386 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA temporary management, sale, or final nationalization of properties and businesses owned by Jews and Serbs, but further details are not necessary here.

| What should be emphasized is the fact that the owners obtained no indemnity for their lost property and had no possibility of appealing the decisions de-

priving them of their possessions. , |

By a decree of April 18, agricultural land in Slavonia and Srijem that the Yugoslav government had allotted to volunteers in the First World War, mostly of Serbian nationality, during the post-1918 agrarian reform was proclaimed “national property” and confiscated without indemnity from its owners, who were expelled to German-occupied Serbia. On the basis of decrees of August 6 and 7, the Ustasha government nationalized the real estate and movable property of tens of thousands of other Serbs expelled from Croatia to Serbia, also

| without indemnity. Agricultural land so acquired was set aside for colonization by Croatian and Volksdeutsche peasants. The property of people who had fled the Independent State of Croatia was taken under government administration, and their owners were invited, by announcements in the office of the State Directorate for Renewal and in the offices of their respective communes, to appear in person in the directorate within fifteen days to claim their property, which would otherwise be nationalized without indemnity. If suitable for agricultural colonization, property acquired in this way was transferred to the Office for Colonization; otherwise it became the property of the State Directorate

for Renewal.” Thus, the expulsion or flight of persons from the Independent : State of Croatia meant at the same time the expropriation of their possessions

without indemnity. So OO

Among similar measures was the decree of October 20 empowering the

state to separate from the collective property of extended families (zadruga) the __ aliquot part or parts of any members who had fled from the Independent State —

of Croatia and to nationalize it without indemnity. These individuals were also given a grace period of fifteen days to claim their property in person. Finally, by

a decree of December 27, the government ordered the nationalization without indemnity of the property of all persons accused of “disturbing public peace

and order,” which meant members of resistance organizations, whether they | | had been caught, tried, and sentenced or were still at large.” All these measures

- tashas. _ Oo - .

were directed primarily against Jews and Serbs, but it is clear that they also served generally to dispossess and punish anyone who actively resisted the Us-

There is no doubt that the Ustasha regime was bent on systematically and thoroughly destroying the economic foundation of the Jewish and Serbian | populations. In the urban sector it fully succeeded. Ironically, while the Ustasha regime during the war stressed, and its exiled survivors in the West since 1945

and 7. , |

See ibid., p. ro for the decree of April 18, and pp. 360-63 for the decrees of August 6

°For these decrees, see ibid., pp. 766, 1080-81. | |

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 387 have continued to stress, that the Independent State of Croatia was a bulwark against Communism, the economic and other discriminatory measures taken against Serbs and Jews were no less drastic than those that any Communist regime has ever taken against any social, ethnic, religious, or political group. Needless to say, the process of dispossessing Serbs and Jews was characterized by large-scale corruption on the part of many Ustasha officials and people in the regime overseeing it.”!

THE USTASHAS’ CASE AGAINST THE SERBS WEST OF THE DRINA RIVER The large Serbian population residing in the historical provinces of CroatiaSlavonia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was a thorn in the side of the Ustashas. Many Croatian nationalists, both lay and those connected with the Catholic Church, had long resented the presence of the Serbs and the Orthodox Church in these areas. They also felt aggrieved at the way in which AustriaHungary and Serbia before 1918 and then the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav state during the interwar period had used these Serbs to promote their political interests at the expense of the Croats. As already noted, about 30 percent of the total population of the Independent State of Croatia was Serbian. After the establishment of the new state, the Ustashas considered conditions propitious for solving this problem in a radical fashion. Moreover, since Serbia was under strict German occupation, it could not come to the aid of Serbs in the Ustasha state. The Ustashas’ anti-Serbian policy was aimed at completely ridding the state of Serbs so that none would remain west of the line that had divided Serbs and Croats before the Turkish conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slavonia in

the fifteenth century, that is, west of the Drina River and north of the Sava River. Before we discuss the means the Ustashas used to achieve this objective, let us first briefly explain how such a large number of Serbs came to be in these areas. Maps that show the location of the religious houses of the different religions in previous centuries are a good guide to the distribution of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims at any given time. A map of most of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina based on Turkish tax rolls and other pertinent sources, showing the religious houses of the area’s main religion, the Bosnian Church (Bogumils), as 21 Among the domestic reports citing widespread corruption among the Ustashas and their friends, see those of Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Babié and Colonel Ladislav Medved of August 7, 1941, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Fr. 1192; the “Jureti¢ Report” of June 10, 1942, p. 9, in RG 226, OSS-File No. 21782; and the pro memoria of Dosen and his colleagues to Paveli¢ of November 30, 1942, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Fr. 857. Among reports by Axis representatives in Croatia noting corruption among Ustasha and Croatian government officials, the most critical was by General Giuseppe Pieche, the representative of the Italian Carabinieri in Croatia, on August 5, 1942, in Micr. No. T-821, Roll 3.47, Frs. 730-31.

388 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA well as of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, in the mid-fifteenth century, reveals that there were no Orthodox bishoprics, monasteries, or churches, and therefore no Serbs in large numbers, west and north of the line connecting the estuary of the Neretva River, the town of Konjic on the upper reaches of that river, the town of Visegrad on the Drina River, the confluence of the Drina and Sava Rivers, and the confluence of the Sava and Danube Rivers. On the other hand, a map of the Serbian Patriarchate of Pe¢ shows that by the time of its renewal in 1557, a century later, several Orthodox bishoprics existed in the newly conquered parts of the Ottoman Empire, that is, in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, northern Dalmatia, Srijem, and parts of Croatia-Slavonia, as well as in much of Hungary. During the next 150 years, several additional Orthodox bishoprics and monasteries were established in these areas.” Thus by the end of the seventeenth century, there was a large Orthodox population in these Ottoman-controlled South Slavic areas. Most Orthodox were Serbs and Slavicized Vlachs from central Balkan areas, with some converts from local

Roman Catholics and Bosnian Bogumils and their descendants.” In areas where they intended to advance, such as northwest into the Balkans, the Turks usually pursued a policy of softening local defenses and breaking down the population’s morale for a lengthy period of time. Campaigns of plunder and conquest were accompanied by enserfing large numbers of Christians. In response, the inhabitants of the area, in this case Catholic Croats and |

Catholic Croatian Vlachs (Bunjevci) from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later also from the adjacent areas of Srijem, Slavonia, Lika, and northern Dalmatia, fled north to Austria and western Hungary, west to the Dalmatian coast under the control of Venice and Dubrovnik, and farther west in small numbers to It-

aly. The number of Croats who were enserfed by the Turks, or fled, or settled in Austrian and Hungarian territory is not known. But on the basis of Croatian historical writings and Venetian sources, Mladen Lorkovié estimated in 1939 that by 1533 the Turks had taken into slavery about 600,000 Catholic Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina and adjacent Croatian lands and that another 200,000 later fled north and west to non-Croatian territory, especially during _ “For the extent of the three churches’ religious houses in the mid-fifteenth century, see Cirkovi¢, Istorija srednjovekovne bosanske drzave, p. 284. For the extent of the Orthodox bishoprics by 1557, see S. Stanojevi¢, Istorija srpskoga naroda, map following p. 208. *The Vlachs are the remnants of the pre-Roman inhabitants of the Balkans, who were first Romanized and then adjusted to other dominant nations in the area. Thus in the South Slavic areas, they became Slavicized. Until well into modern times, they lived in mountainous areas and engaged in animal husbandry. Later they also settled in the plains and urban areas. Depending on where they live, they are Orthodox, Roman Catholic, or Muslim. They go under a variety of names, in addition to Vlach. In Serbia and Bulgaria, they are also known as Cincari and Aromuni; in Croatia, Vojvodina, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Bunjevci and Morovlachi; and in Istria, as Citi. The development and role of this small, but-wide-ranging, very gifted, and adaptable minority is by far the most complex, controversial, and still only partially explored historical and anthropological phenomenon in the Balkans. See, for example, R. Paveli¢, Bunjeuci.

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 389 the last two decades of the seventeenth century.“ While Lorkovié is hardly an unbiased source, his figures give some idea of the magnitude of the population shift. This “dispersal of the Croats,” as Lorkovié aptly called it, greatly reduced the number of Catholic Croats in areas conquered by the Ottoman Empire. It also made it necessary for the Turks to bring in settlers from the central Balkans, since land without population was of no use to them. In this way, over several centuries, the Croatian population not only suffered great losses in wars with the Turks, but was also subjected to widespread forced movements toward the southeast, where it was lost in the vastness of the Ottoman Empire, and toward the west and north. At the same time, Serbs and Vlachs moved into the areas emptied by the Croats and Croatian Vlachs. After the Bosnian kingdom was defeated in 1463, the Turks advanced into western Bosnia and then beyond the Sava and Una Rivers over the next 150 years. Two dates of great significance in this process were the destruction of Croatian forces at Krbava Field in 1493 by a large Turkish force returning from a plundering raid, when most of the Croatian nobility perished, and the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, when the Turks defeated the Hungarian kingdom, leading to additional losses of Croatian territory. The Hungarian-Croatian king lost his life in this battle and since the order of succession was not fixed, the Croats elected the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand Habsburg as their king in 1527. The Hungarians, who were outside the Turkish grip, soon followed suit. After the Battle of Mohacs, the remaining Croatian lands and Austrian territory lay directly in the path of the Turks and the responsibility for repelling the latter fell upon the shoulders of the Austrian Habsburgs. This was a burden they carried for over 250 years and one which steadily drained the Croatian nation. One of the first measures the Austrians took after acquiring the Croatian lands was to organize a cordon sanitaire, or Military Frontier, along the border with the Ottoman Empire. Since many former inhabitants of these areas, often serfs on feudal estates, had either been captured by the Turks or emigrated northward, much of the land was vacant. The Austrians introduced a policy of enticing people, mostly Serbs and Vlachs, from the Ottoman Empire to settle as free peasant soldiers in the Military Frontier, by guaranteeing among other things religious freedom. Together with the Croatian inhabitants of the frontier, who had also been transformed into a peasant soldiery, they were used as troops against the Ottoman Empire, as well as in many other parts of Europe. Thus both the Austrians and the Turks, each for their own side, used the same groups—Serbs, Vlachs, and Croats—to defend the border area between the two empires. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, large sections of Croatian and Hungarian territory were freed from Turkish control, and the Military Frontier 4M. Lorkovi¢, Narod i zemlja Hrvata, pp. 47-67. The migration of the Croats during the Turkish period and its consequences for the national and confessional composition of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are currently popular themes among Croatian historians.

390 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA was extended to the Carpathian Mountains. Most of the Serbian population that had settled on the territory remained, as did the bishoprics and monasteries of the Orthodox Church. This population, in fact, especially after the great Serbian emigration (some 30,000 families) from the Kosovo area into Austriancontrolled territory north of the Danube and Sava Rivers in the last decade of

the seventeenth century, was treated with considerable benevolence by the Habsburg Monarchy. The Austrians used the Serbs in the Military Frontier to fight against the Turks (and others) and used those still within the Ottoman

Empire whenever possible as internal pawns against it.” , The Orthodox population west of the Drina River grew significantly for yet another reason. In a dissertation at the Pontifical Institute in Rome in 1937, the Reverend Krunoslav St. Draganovié established that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a considerable number of Roman Catholic Croats, especially in southern Herzegovina, converted to Orthodoxy. Draganovi¢ adduced a number of reasons for this. The Orthodox Church enjoyed a more favorable

status within the Ottoman Empire than the Catholic Church. The head (or heads) of the Orthodox Church lived within the empire and thus could be influenced by the Porte, whereas the pope lived outside the empire and could not be intimidated. The pope was in fact “the strongest and most dangerous enemy

of the Crescent on the Bosporus.” In addition, the Orthodox Church mistreated the Catholics: it collected the tithe not only from the Orthodox but from the Catholic population as well, it drove Catholics under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox hierarchy, and it forced the Eastern rite on Catholics of the Latin rite. There was also a shortage of Catholic priests in the area to-tend to the needs of the Catholic population. Catholic bishops did not reside in these areas and relations between the distant diocesan clergy and the local Franciscan

order were characterized by quarrels and disputes. The introduction of the Gregorian calendar served to mark Catholics as outsiders. Finally, many Catholics emigrated from Bosnia and Herzegovina and adjacent areas to Austrian, Hungarian, and Italian territory. In Draganovie’s opinion, the two most important reasons for the shift from Catholicism to Orthodoxy were the stronger juridical position of the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire and the difficulties within the Catholic Church itself, primarily the lack of priests and the non-residence of bishops in their dioceses. Although the population in these areas had earlier been Catholic, “on the other hand, people were ignorant __ in religious matters. Slowly their connection with the Catholic Church loosened and, almost without any fault of their own, they became schismatic.” The **For a brief review of the history of the Serbs in the Habsburg Empire, see Vucinich, “The Serbs in Austria-Hungary,” pp. 3-47, especially pp. 34-42. For the general development of the Serbian Orthodox Church, see Slijeptevi¢, Istorija Srpske pravoslavne crkve, 2: ,

20-244, 538-615, and Plochl, “Die Orthodoxe Kirche,” pp. 17-30. oe For a brief history of the Military Frontier, see my book, Peasants, Politics, and Eco-

| nomic Change in Yugoslavia, pp. 74-81. _ |

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 391 leading Serbian historian, Stanoje Stanojevic, largely agreed with Draganovic’s conclusions.” Clearly, the national and confessional composition of the population in the Independent State of Croatia in 1941 was the product of powerful political, military, and religious forces acting over a period of five or six centuries. In addition, the rise of nationalism in the early part of the nineteenth century and the Austro-Hungarian policy of “divide and rule” toward the Serbs and Croats in the Habsburg Monarchy created much ill will between these two peoples. Finally, the Croats had a frustrating experience in royal Yugoslavia during the interwar period. All this led to a great deal of pent-up hostility in the Yugoslav state. In these conditions, the events of the Second World War—the War of April 1941, the partition of the country, foreign occupation and annexation of territory, the appearance of collaborationist regimes and groups, and the rise of resistance and revolutionary movements—served as a catalyst, igniting a multifaceted bloody conflagration embracing nations, religions, cultures, and ide-

ologies. ,

In the new circumstances that the war brought, the Ustashas developed an anti-Serbian policy that included expelling some Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia behind the line existing between Serbs and Croats at the beginning

of the fifteenth century, converting some to Roman Catholicism, and ultimately destroying the rest. Such a policy could not even have been contemplated if the Croats had had to rely on themselves alone, even if most Croats had supported the Ustashas, which they definitely did not. Nor could it have been attempted at a time when the Serbian nation was able to defend itself. Only the full support of the Germans throughout the war, while at the same time Serbia proper was under strict German occupation, allowed the Ustashas to pursue their radical anti-Serbian policy. While not succeeding fully in any part, the Ustasha regime did accomplish some of what it set out to do. In this it was assisted by some Catholic clergy and was not publicly opposed by the Catholic hierarchy. The Ustashas’ anti-Serbian policy was based on the tenth and eleventh principles of the Ustashas’ Seventeen Principles, which stated that only Croats could rule in Croatia, from which followed the aim of making the Independent State of Croatia into a one-nation state. The Ustashas defended the policy with several arguments. First, the Serbs had no true right to live in Croatian territory because they were merely squatters, having been brought in or come on their own during Ottoman or Habsburg rule. Second, in the final decades of AustroHungarian rule, the Serbs who lived intermixed with Croats, especially in Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, had been willing tools of Austria and Hungary against the Croats. Third, in royal Yugoslavia the Serbs of Croatia had been **(Draganovic¢, “Masseniibertritte von Katholiken zur ‘Orthodoxie,’” pp. 24-36, 5 5-104.

The quote is from p. 36. S. Stanojevié, review of “Masseniibertritt von Katholiken zur ‘Orthodoxie.’”

392 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA tools of Belgrade’s anti-Croatian policy. Milovan Zanié, chairman of the Legislative Council in the first Paveli¢ cabinet, clearly expressed this reasoning in a

speech on May 2, 1941:

Ustashas, hear this. I am speaking openly. This state, this homeland of ours, must , be Croatian and no one else’s. Therefore, those who have come here must also leave. Developments over the centuries and especially during the last twenty years have shown that no compromise is possible in this respect. This must be the land of the Croats and no one else’s. There is no method that we, as Ustashas, will not use to make this land truly Croatian and to cleanse it of Serbs who have endangered us through the centuries and would endanger us again at the first opportunity. This is not a secret, this is the policy of our state, and when we accomplish this, we will have accomplished only what is written in the Ustasha Principles.”’

Finally, the Ustashas argued that the Croats, as Roman Catholics and because of their history, formed the frontier of the European West and Western civilization toward Eastern Orthodoxy and Eastern or Byzantine civilization. The Serbs, as Orthodox, were an incongruent part in the Croatian state and therefore had to be removed. The Ustashas, as we have already noted, adopted a three-pronged antiSerbian policy that went beyond their initial measures of putting the Serbs outside the law, destroying their economic foundations, and enacting many antiSerbian regulations. First, they expelled over a hundred thousand Serbs to German-occupied Serbia, a number that was greatly increased by the many thousands of Serbs who fled to Serbia on their own. Second, they killed Serbs in reckless rampages in the countryside and small towns or herded them into concentration camps, where thousands were killed or died from disease, hunger, cold, and maltreatment. Third, they forcibly converted some Serbs to Roman Catholicism and induced others to convert voluntarily in hopes of saving their lives, and when mass conversions failed to produce the desired results, they established a separate Croatian Orthodox Church. We will deal with the first two aspects of this policy below and with the third in Chapter 12.

THE MASS EXPULSION OF SERBS The mass expulsion of Serbs began soon after the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia and proceeded in several stages. The first stage consisted both of official propaganda to induce Serbs to move to German-occupied

Serbia and of preparatory measures to expel a special group of Serbs. The propaganda had no effect, but the preparatory measures did. On April 18, 1941, the government issued a law decree depriving the so-called volunteers of their farms, without compensation. The volunteers were mostly Serbs who, as Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia during the First World War, had volunteered to serve in a newly formed Yugoslav division that was sent to the ?7As quoted in Jeli¢-Buti¢, Ustase, p. 164.

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 393 Salonika front and included in the Serbian army. For their service, they received

farms from parts of large estates that the government expropriated in the course of the post-1918 agrarian reform.” Croatian nationalists claimed that this colonization was one means by which the Serbian-dominated interwar Yugoslav government strengthened the Serbian element in Slavonia and Srijem, where Serbs already formed a good part of the population. In its essence, this allegation was true. According to data from the State Directorate for Renewal, 5,370 people from volunteer colonist families were removed from their farms and expelled to Serbia, apparently in May and June 1941. Subsequently, with a law decree of May 4, 1941, the Ustasha government established the Office for

Colonization to deal with the problems resulting from this expulsion and to help Croats from overpopulated areas and outside the Croatian state settle on

the newly vacated holdings.” |

In mid-May 1941, a new stage of population transfers began. As explained in Chapter 3, German authorities originally intended to move from 220,000 to 260,000 Slovenes from German-occupied northern Slovenia to Germanoccupied Serbia and to settle Volksdeutsche from various areas on the newly vacated Slovene land. But when the German military commander in Serbia protested that he could not accept that number of Slovenes because of the difficulty of feeding and housing them, the Croatian government expressed its willingness to accept them if the same number of Serbs could be moved from Croatia

to Serbia. Thus a two-phase program of orderly population transfers was decided upon. According to an agreement of June 4, 1941, between German representatives from Berlin and occupied parts of Slovenia, German diplomatic representatives in Zagreb, and the German military commander in Serbia on the one side, and Croatian authorities on the other, the bulk of 170,000 Slovenes were to go to Croatia, “while a corresponding number of Serbs were to be transferred from Croatia to Serbia.” About 9,000 “politically tainted persons and intellectuals” from German-occupied parts of Slovenia were to go directly to Serbia. To administer this new program, the Ustasha government, as already noted, established the State Directorate for Renewal on June 24. The transfer of Slovenes to Croatia began as early as July 10, but the orderly transfer of Serbs from Croatia to Serbia did not start until August 1. The State Directorate for Renewal oversaw the resettlement of Slovenes in Croatia and the transfer of Serbs to Serbia. The expulsion of Serbs was done at night, with individuals given no more than 30 minutes to get ready. They could take only 50 kilos of personal property and whatever money, jewelry, and fi8For this law decree, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1941, p. 10. The few volunteer colonists of other nationalities—Croats, Montenegrins, and others—were as a rule exempt from dispossession. See Milosevi¢, Izbeglice i preseljenici, pp. 173-74. For the report of the Directorate of September 20, 1941, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 17/5, 1-3, Box 238. For the decree establishing the Office for Colonization, see Zbornik zakona inaredaba NDH, 1941, p. 56.

394 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA _ nancial assets they possessed. They had to lock their homes and give the keys to the police. They could not sell their property and possessions or leave them with neighbors or friends for safekeeping. Non-Serbs could not buy or take into safekeeping such property. All such property and possessions were nationalized

without indemnity.” so Oo : The expulsion of Serbs was administered very differently from area to area

and even from county to county. The selection of Serbs to be expelled, how-

ever, followed a general plan. Prominent people—those with substantial , amounts of property and actual or potential leaders—were deported first. It | was economically more advantageous to deport such people, since more property could be nationalized and the remaining Serbian population, deprived of leaders, could be more easily manipulated. A telling fact in this respect was the expulsion of 335 priests, or about half of the Serbian Orthodox clergy, by the

end of September 1941. 7 i ,

Ustasha authorities first moved the Serbs selected for deportation to special _

assembly camps at Bjelovar, Sisak, and Slavonska Pozega, from where they . were taken by train to occupied Serbia. While being assembled for expulsion, _ Serbs were occasionally deprived of their personal possessions and money,

physically maltreated, and sometimes even killed by escorting Ustashas.” In some places, for example in Mostar on August 14, 1 941, the Ustashas ordered Serbian families to report to the railroad station at fixed times in alphabetical _ order to be entrained for Serbia. In other cases, especially in northwest Bosnia, the Serbian population from various towns was relocated to the interior of the

country, prior to being expelled to Serbia.” a

Most Serbs deported to Serbia had residence rights in the Croatian state. At | the request of the Croatian authorities, the military commander in Serbia was also willing to accept about 30,000 Serbs from Croatia who did not have resi-

dence rights, many of whom were in fact from Serbia.” , | ~ From the available documentary evidence, it is clear that Ustasha authorities began the mass transfer of Serbs to Serbia considerably before the orderly transfers specified in the June 4 agreement got under way. A report of the Ger-

man area command in Uzice on July 10, 1941, for example, noted that about ~ | - 6,000 Serbs from Bosnia crossed the Drina River to Serbia at Bogati¢. Since — they were empty-handed and thus likely to cause trouble by stealing and disorderly conduct, the German occupation authorities protested to Ustasha offi- _ cials. But apparently to no avail, because such occurrences continued. A few Lisac, “The Deportation of Serbs,” pp. 125-45. The liberal provisions of the original directive of the State Directorate for Renewal, allowing transferees to take along as much money, jewelry, and financial assets as they had, was almost immediately abolished in prac- oO tice. Transferees were allowed to take along only 500 kunas (less than $10) per person.

*"bid., pp. 135-39; DGFP, 13: 113-15. |

*’For conditions in Mostar, see MiloSevi¢, Izbeglice i preseljenici, pp. 119-20; for those in northwest Bosnia, see Lisac, “The Deportation of Serbs,” pp. 131-32.

— 8Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Fr. H296,640. | |

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 395 weeks later Sturmbannfihrer Beisner in Zagreb was informed by the military commander in Serbia that the Ustashas had expelled about 10,500 Serbs from Bosnia with almost no food, money, or clothing across the Drina River to western Serbia near Uzice on July 17 or 18.*

Clearly, Ustasha authorities wanted to transfer the 170,000 Serbs stipulated in the agreement as quickly as possible. But unauthorized transfers continued even while orderly transfers were being made in August and, according

to estimates of the military commander in Serbia, amounted to about 8,000 people. The unauthorized transfers, however, aroused German opposition. First, the brutal roundup and transfer of thousands of Serbs, added to other Ustasha terrorist practices, increased both resistance among Serbs in Croatia and criticism on the part of many Croats, all of which German authorities feared might be blamed on the Germans, Second, because the number of Slovenes transferred or fleeing to Croatia was relatively small, the Ustasha practice contradicted what might be called the provision of parity in the June 4 agreement.

Third, the rapid transfer of so many thousands of people created food and housing problems in Serbia. Finally, some Serbs transferred in orderly fashion during August were physically mistreated and had many fewer possessions than allowed, causing additional problems for German and Serbian authori-

ties. German authorities therefore temporarily halted the orderly transfer of Serbs on August 22, 1941.” Croatian authorities had sent 27 official transports of Serbs to Serbia during August, and on the basis of special arrangements with the German military commander in Serbia, they sent another five in September. At this point, the orderly transfer of Serbs stopped. Estimates of the total number of people involved range up to 17,706. Compared to this number of official transferees, the military commander in Serbia estimated that as of August 20, 1941, Croa-

tian authorities had also illegally expelled about 90,000 people to Serbia. Kasche, who helped negotiate the June 4 agreement and observed its application in Croatia, claimed that up to September 20, 1941, the Croatian government had deported “a total of 118,110 people in legal and illegal transports” to

| Serbia.*” By comparison, official documentation showed that 9,343 Slovenes “For the report of the German area command on July 10, 1941, see Micr. No. T-5o0r, Roll 249, Fr. root. For the military commander’s report to Beisner, see Lisac, “The Deportation of Serbs,” pp. 136-37. SS Sturmbannfiihrer Beisner was the liaison officer for the military commander in Serbia. He was temporarily attached to the German Legation in Zagreb, where he dealt chiefly with the transfer of Serbs from Croatia to Serbia according to the June 4, 1941, agreement. See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Fr. H296,650. *“Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,650 and H296,653; Lisac, “The Deportation of Serbs,” pp. 137-38. “Milosevic, Izbeglice i preseljenici, p. 158. Lisac, “The Deportation of Serbs,” p. 145, es-

timated that 15,256 people were so transferred, and Beisner, Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Frs. H296,554~-55, put the number at 14,557. *’For the military commander’s estimate of expellees, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Fr. H296,650. For Kasche’s estimate, see DGFP, 13: 570.

396 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA were transferred in an orderly manner to Croatia. In addition, an estimated 17,000 fled from northern Slovenia to Croatia, bringing the total number of Slovenes entering Croatia to 26,343 people. Finally, in early October 1941, Himmler ordered a stop to the deportation of Slovenes to Croatia and Serbia (see Chapter 3). With this, the program of two-stage transfers of population between northern Slovenia, Croatia, and occupied Serbia came to a formal end.* Even after the prohibition of the orderly transfer of Serbs from the Croatian state to occupied Serbia, however, thousands of Serbs moved to Serbia. Many were forced to go by the Ustashas, while others fled on their own. Serbs from Srijem crossed the Sava River to northwest Serbia, while those from Bosnia fled across the Drina River to northwest and western Serbia. In a letter to Kasche on January 21, 1942, Harald Turner, chief of administration of the German occupation in Serbia, estimated that about 8,000 Serbs and Muslims fled from Bosnia to Serbia between December 23, 1941, and January 21, 1942. In the same letter, Turner asked Kasche to intervene with the Croatian government to ob- | tain the release of women and children from concentration camps.” For a time during German military operations against the Partisans in eastern Bosnia in late January and early February 1942, German occupation authorities in Serbia tried to prevent Serbs in eastern Bosnia from fleeing to Serbia, but later this restriction was lifted. Some German soldiers in western Serbia helped refugees, for an appropriate fee, cross the Drina River to Serbia, but this was prohibited

by German commands at the end of April 1942.° , Serbian authorities paid special attention to helping the great number of children among the refugees. Since many Serbian children were in concentration camps in Croatia, the director of the Commissariat for Refugees in Serbia arranged with Ustasha authorities to transfer about 30,000 to Serbia, with the understanding that they would not be returned to Croatia. This operation was carried out in February and March 1943, but the exact number of children in-

volved was not reported.” ,

After some time in Serbia, some Serbian refugees decided to return to their homes in Croatia. According to S. D. Milosevic, one of the leading Yugoslav experts on wartime population shifts in Yugoslavia, about 3,500 people returned through the Bosanska Dubica area alone. In addition, several thousand more returned, though he did not venture to give an overall estimate. Ustasha authorities put most of them in concentration camps, but at the insistence of German authorities in Croatia, subsequently released them and even returned homes and farms to some of them.” As shown in Chapter 5, in the summer of 1942 German occupation and “DGEP, 13: §53; Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Fr. H296,642.

*’Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H301,644-47. |

‘Ibid., pp.308-11. 306-7. ,| “Ibid., pp. “Milosevic, Izbeglice i preseljenici, p. 163.

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 397 Serbian government authorities estimated the number of transferees and refugees in Serbia at about 400,000 people. Milosevié thinks that this figure may be exaggerated. It is generally agreed, however, that close to 200,000 of these transferees and refugees came from the Independent State of Croatia. There are also official figures from two years later on the number of transferees and refu-

gees in Serbia registered with the Commissariat for Refugees, giving the total | number and the number from the Independent State of Croatia. According to this source, there were 241,011 transferees and refugees in Serbia on August

16, 1944, of whom 118,167 were from the Croatian state. By January 18, 1945, there were 121,033 from Croatia.” The increased number was probably caused by the increased registration of refugees already in Serbia. As far as I know, there is no systematic study of the return of Serbian transferees and refugees from the Independent State of Croatia to their homes after

the war. Some of those who had relatives in Partisan ranks or had had very , small farms or homes that were completely destroyed probably colonized land in Slavonia and Vojvodina that was made available through the 1945 agrarian reform. Croats who had been given the farms of expelled and escaped Serbs during the war also probably returned to their former homes. Almost all Slovenes who were transferred to Croatia, as well as those who fled there on their

own, returned to Slovenia. , THE MASS KILLING OF SERBS

The most reprehensible aspect of Ustasha policy toward the Serbs was the program of physical annihilation. Despite the understandable absence of official orders spelling out this policy in writing, five different kinds of evidence attest to its existence. There were numerous implied or open threats against the Serbs in speeches and statements of high Ustasha government and party officials. There were loosely worded laws on the protection of the Croatian state and the honor of the Croatian people, applicable retroactively, under which almost anybody could be indicted, as well as the series of laws and decrees noted earlier, which virtually outlawed the entire Serbian population. There were German and Italian reports from wartime Croatia describing the practices of Ustasha Party agencies, the state police, and the armed forces. There were wartime letters or excerpts from letters of Croatian clergymen published after the war. Finally there was the testimony from survivors of Ustasha concentration camps and other atrocious practices in postwar trials and reports and the testimony of Ustasha officials before the Yugoslav commissions investigating the crimes of the armies of occupation and their domestic helpers. The mass killing of Serbs began toward the end of April 1941, that is, less than three weeks after the proclamation of the new state. According to an office “3See ibid., pp. 154, 254, and 280 for the estimate of transferees and refugees from Croatia who were in Serbia in 1942. See pp. 278 and 280 for the estimates in 1944 and 1945.

398 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA memorandum by Kasche on April 30, he was informed on the previous day by

Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lorkovi¢ that 11 Croats had been killed by Serbs near the town of Bjelovar and that in retaliation the Ustashas had exe- _ cuted 192 Serbs in the neighboring village of Gudovec. Following the massacre, , the German post commander nearby ordered the arrest of some 40 people. But Croatian authorities protested that the matter was an internal political affair under their jurisdiction, and those arrested were released. A second outrage occurred on May 12 in the small town of Glina, about 55 kilometers south of Za- _ greb, where the Ustashas corralled about 260 people in an Orthodox church, killed them, and then set the church on fire. A third massacre took place on

133 Serbs.” oo oe

| June 3 in the village of Korita in eastern Herzegovina, where the Ustashas shot Ustasha measures against the Serbs took a sharp turn for the worse following Pavelié’s visit to Hitler in Berlin on June 6, when the two leaders discussed | the ethnic composition of the new Croatian state, the problem of the Muslims and the Serbs, and the resettlement of Serbs and Slovenes. Hitler advised Pave-

—‘ié that “if the Croatian state was to be really stable, a nationally intolerant policy had to be pursued for 50 years, because only damage resulted from too

‘much tolerance in these matters.” After this conference, Ustasha authorities , lifted all restrictions on the persecution of the Serbs and large numbers of them were killed in punitive and rampaging expeditions by Ustasha armed units or were herded into concentration camps where they were mistreated, starved,

and killed.®” | ,

As will be shown in detail in Chapter 12, an especially grave aspect of this anti-Serbian policy was the killing of Serbian Orthodox clergymen. Already on | May 5, 1941, the Ustashas arrested and immediately killed Platon Jovanovi¢, bishop of Banja Luka. His body was thrown into a river and later recovered and buried by Serbs. On May 12, the Ustashas arrested Petar Zimonji¢, metropolitan of Sarajevo, and soon killed him, and in mid-August, they arrested and killed Sava Trlaji¢, bishop of Plaski-Karlovac. Neither the site of the killing nor the final resting place of the latter two is known, but it appears that both were | killed at the Jadovno camp near Gospi¢. From May to December 1941, the Us— tashas also killed over 150 Serbian Orthodox priests (see Table 2 in Chapter

12). OB | oS

_A key component of the Ustasha regime’s terrorist system was the concen-

tration camp. Although the Law Decree on the Deportation of Undesirable and “On the killings near Bjelovar, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Fr. E301,722. On those in Glina, Archbishop Stepinac sent a letter of protest to Paveli¢ on May 14, 1941 (mentioned in Holy See, Actes et documents du Saint Siége, 9: 224), but made no public protest. On those in Korita, see Kovacéevi¢ and Skoko, “The June 1941 Uprising in Herzegovina,” pp. 104-7. , *SFor Hitler’s advice to Paveli¢, see DGFP, 12: 979, and also Hillgruber, Staatsmdnner und Diplomaten bei Hitler, 1: 575-80. On the early rampages, see YA, Mil. Hist., Nat’l. Lib. War, Reg. No. 15/2-8-12, Box 233; Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5797, Frs. H309,998-H3 10,026;

and Jeli¢-Buti¢, Ustase, pp. 162-78. _ |

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 399 Dangerous Persons to Detention and Labor Camps was only issued on November 25, 1941, most concentration camps had been established the previous summer. On July 10, 1942, the Law Decree on the Suppression of Punishable

Acts Against the State, Individuals, or Property was issued, stipulating that people accused of such acts or, if they were outside the grasp of the law, their family members would be sent to assembly camps for a minimum of six months to a maximum of three years. All the property of such people could be (and undoubtedly was) nationalized. Only two weeks later, all concentration camps were officially transferred from the jurisdiction of the Directorate of Public Order and Security in the Ministry of Interior to the Ustasha Surveillance Service.“ In fact, the service ran the camps from the time of its establishment in August 1941 until its liquidation in January 1943. Throughout most of the war the camps were under the direction of Vjekoslav Luburic. There were about twenty large and midsize concentration camps. The largest was at Jasenovac, a cluster of camps in the marshlands at the confluence of the Sava and Una Rivers, notorious for its barbaric practices and the large

number of victims. Other camps were located at Danica near Koprivnica, Djakovo, Fericanci in central Slavonia, Jadovno near Gospic¢ in Lika, Jastrebarsko southwest of Zagreb, Kerestinec, Krus¢ica near Travnik in Bosnia, Lepoglava, Loborgrad, Sisak, Slano on the island of Pag, Stara Gradigka, and Tenje near Osijek, among other places. In addition, there were several so-called assembly camps, which housed Slovene transferees before they were assigned to definite localities, Serbs before they were deported to Serbia, and others des-

tined for concentration camps. The two camps at Jadovno and Slano, where many Jews and Serbs from what became Italian Zones II and III were killed, were closed in late August 1941, with the remaining inmates transferred to camps in the interior. In addition, the Germans, at least during the second half of the war, maintained detention camps for people apprehended by their security forces, at Bjelovar in Slavonia, Doboj in Bosnia, Jankomir near Zagreb, and Zemun in Srijem, among other places.” For the location of the concentra-

tion camps that took Jews as well as Serbs—Danica, Djakovo, Jadovno, Jasenovac, Kerestinec, Kruscica, Lepoglava, Loborgrad, Stara Gradiska, Tenje, “*For the decree of November 25, 1941, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1941, pp. 968-69. An order from Pavelié of June 26, 1941, claimed that Jews spread false rumors, which disturbed the public, and engaged in speculation, which made supplying the population with food more difficult. For this they were held collectively responsible and in addition to being criminally liable, they could be sent to assembly camps “under the open sky.” See pp.

212-13. For the decree of July 10, 1942, and the transfer of jurisdiction over the concentration camps, see ibid., 1942, pp. 924-25, 987. *’For the Croatian concentration and assembly camps, see PerSen, Ustaski logori, pp. 37, 160-62. See also Jeli¢-Buti¢c, Ustase, pp. 185-87, and Micr. No. T-821, Roll 405, Fr. 763. PerSen, a Croat and journalist, survived the Stara Gradiska camp. For the German detention camps, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5797, Frs. H310,028-38 and H3 10,072.

400 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA and the island of Pag—see Map 6, Concentration Camps for Jews in Yugosla-

via, 1941-1945, in Chapter 13.

One of the most incriminating Ustasha documents relating to Jasenovac is the circular in which General Ivan Prpi¢, following the orders of Marshal Kvaternik, commander in chief of the Croatian armed forces, informed the General Staff of the army, Ustasha militia headquarters, the Ministry of Interior, and the chief command of the gendarmerie on April 27, 1942, as follows: “The command of the Ustasha Surveillance Service—the chief adjutant, with top secret No. 139/42, has informed us that the assembly and labor camp in Jasenovac can accept an unlimited number of inmates. Therefore, please issue orders to all your subordinate command posts to send to Jasenovac all Communists who are caught during the clearing of areas in which military operations are conducted.”* The clear implication was that room for new inmates was ob-

tained by killing old ones and expanding camp capacity. , The existence of Jasenovac remains a dark blot on the conscience of many Croats. It is difficult to reconcile a thousand-year-old Croatian culture that Croatian nationalists boast about with the barbarities perpetrated at Jasenovac

by the Ustashas. In a report of June 10, 1942, Monsignor Augustin Jureti¢ _ wrote: “The concentration camp at Jasenovac is a real slaughterhouse. You have never read anywhere—not even under the GPU or Gestapo—of such hor-

rible things as the ‘Ustashi’ commit there. . . . the story of Jasenovac is the blackest page of the ‘Ustashi’ regime, because thousands of men have been

killed there.””

Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac also severely criticized activities at Jasenovac | when the Ustashas killed seven refugee Slovene priests there who were accused of working against the Croatian state. After they were arrested, the archbishop established through his own investigation that they were innocent and tried to save them, but in vain. After their killing, he wrote to Paveli¢ on February 24, 1943: “This is a shameful blot and crime which cries to heaven for revenge, as

the whole Jasenovac camp is a shameful fault for the Independent State of Croatia. ... the entire public, and especially the relatives of the killed priests, ask for compensation and satisfaction and ask that the killers, who are the greatest misfortune for Croatia, be brought before a court of justice.” Even a generation after the war, Vinko Nikoli¢, editor of Hrvatska revija, the leading Croatian émigré journal, commenting on the assassination of Vjekoslav Luburi¢ in Spain on August 30, 1969, wrote: “Jasenovac is a great Croatian wound, and an even greater shame, for which even today our souls ache and our faces burn for shame.” Nikoli¢ was a high school teacher and poet who spent much of the war as an adjutant (poboénik) at Supreme Ustasha Head, *YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 52/1-1, Box 73. See also Pergen, Ustaski logori, PP. 99-100.

#“Jureti¢ Report” (RG 226, OSS-File No. 21782), pp. 3, 8.

Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 418. |

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR AOI quarters. He knew not only a great deal about what happened at Jasenovac, but also that Luburi¢’s name was synonymous with the worst of Ustasha terror.’ Without a doubt, the most controversial issue in the entire history of the Second World War in Yugoslavia remains the number of victims who lost their lives in the concentration camps of the Ustasha state. This topic will be examined in detail in Chapter 17. Glaise and Kasche protested against the Ustashas’ terrorist treatment of the Serbs on several occasions. The Germans wanted to keep Croatia at peace in order to obtain as many men as possible to fight on the eastern front or work in Germany, as well as to extract the maximum amount of food and strategic raw materials from the country. The Ustashas’ policy adversely affected German objectives by keeping Croatia in turmoil and strengthening the resistance. According to the diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff for 1942, Hitler “gave a free hand to the Ustashas of the Poglavnik to continue a war of extermination against the Orthodox in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”” This policy was also followed against Serbs in all other parts of the Ustasha state. Horrified public reaction to the Ustasha outrages, as well as Glaise’s and Kasche’s protests to Paveli¢ and the elder Kvaternik and Archbishop Stepinac’s protest to Paveli¢ on the massacre in Glina—none of which were made public— induced Paveli¢ to issue the Extraordinary Law Decree and Command for the maintenance of peace and order on June 26, 1941. The decree warned of harsh punishment both for those who broke the law and for those who enforced it in an illegal fashion. Some offending Ustashas were arrested by Ustasha authorities and a few were even executed. But the persecution of Serbs continued. On August 9, Paveli¢ issued an order prohibiting the activity of “wild” Ustasha units, but it did not help. Finally, on September 27, he issued a new order calling on all officials to maintain peace and order and reiterating the prohibition ! Hrvatska revija (Munich), September 1969, p. 314. It is generally assumed that Luburi¢ was killed by an agent of the Yugoslav secret police.

For the horrors of life in Jasenovac, see especially N. Nikoli¢, Jasenovacki logor smrti, and Kolar-Dimitrijevi¢, “Recollections of the Veterinarian Zorko Golub,” pp. 155-76. Both Nikoli¢ and Golub were sent to the camp because they were Communists. After thirteen days, Golub was sent to another camp with a large livestock farm, and after about six months, Nikoli¢ was exchanged for a German officer held by the Partisans. Both survived the war. See also A. Mileti¢, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac, 1941-1945, discussed in Chapter 17. I might add that Tomislav Filipovi¢, a former Franciscan friar, under the name of Miroslav Majstorovi¢c, was commander of the Jasenovac camp as an Ustasha militia captain for about a year. As a member of the Bosnian Province of the Franciscan Order, he had accompanied the Ustashas in rampages against Serbs around Banja Luka. When his superiors heard of this, he was expelled from the order on April 28, 1942. See the statement by the head of the Bosnian Province of the Franciscan Order on May 2, 1945, in Petesi¢, Katolicko sveéenstvo u NOB-u, 1941-1945, pp. 264-67. After the war, Filipovi¢ was sentenced to death by hanging. Politika (Belgrade), July 2, 1945. See especially Glaise’s report of July 10, 1941, in Micr. No. T-5o1, Roll 264, Fr. 1193, and Kasche’s report of the same date, in DGFP, 13: 113-15. The quote from the Wehrmacht Operations Staff diary is from Kriegstagebuch, 2, pt. 1: 137.

402 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA on “wild” Ustasha units. This was especially addressed to Ustasha authorities in western Bosnia. It also tried to induce the Serbian population hiding in the mountains to return to their homes and promised to guarantee their safety.” But even this order from Paveli¢ did not stop Ustasha terror. In many cases, when Serbs came out of hiding and returned to their homes and even when they

had converted to Catholicism, they were killed.” , , The Croatian public’s strong disapproval of the Ustasha regime, the new state’s subservience to the Germans and Italians, and the Ustashas’ brutal treatment of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, and anti-Ustasha Croats were also described by Herbert C. Pell, United States envoy to Hungary. His report came in the wake of a three-week trip he made through the Independent State of Croatia, from Zagreb through Lika to the Dalmatian coast and Dubrovnik, in Novem-

, ber 1941.° | a

In the face of the Ustasha terror machine, behind which stood the overwhelming might of the Axis powers, the great majority of people in the new state recoiled in horror. As massacres against the Serbs spread, Serbs fled for their lives to the mountains and some started to fight. Toward the end of July 1941, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, heeding the call of the Comintern after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, ordered its members and sympathizers in Croatia to form fighting detachments and start operations against Axis and Ustasha forces, as they had earlier successfully done in Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, just three and a half months after the proclamation of the new state and the inauguration of its terrorist policies, the Ustasha regime had

the beginnings of a full-fledged armed resistance on its hands.

In order to explain and justify what they regularly referred to as “some ex-

cesses” by certain Ustasha individuals and groups of “wild” Ustashas against | Serbs in the Croatian state, the Ustashas during the war (as well as almost all Ustasha writers and sympathizers in exile since 1945) cited three factors. First, _ they claimed that the interwar Yugoslav government, characterized by Serbian hegemony, was a bloody regime that cost the lives of thousands of Croats. SecFor the law decree of June 26, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1941, pp. 212-13. For the arrest and execution of several Ustashas, see DGFP, 13: 301-2. For the order of August 9, see Coli¢, Takozvana Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska 1941, p. 281, and for the order of September 27, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 4/3-1-2, Box 174. “See German reports on the Ustasha killing of Serbs who had put down their arms in the small town of Bosanska Krupa on August 20, 1941, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Frs. 28687, and in the villages of Drakuli¢ and Sargovac near Banja Luka in February 1942, in Frs.

274-75. oe

703. .

*The report, dated December 1, 1941, indicates that Pell not only talked to American consular officials, but also spoke to many Croats, observed their daily life, and heard their complaints. The report was obtained by a German agent from the envoy’s residence, translated into German, and sent by the Security Service (SD) to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But it was not considered important enough to be presented to von Ribbentrop personally. See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5785, Frs. H300,686—89, and Roll 5786, Frs. H300,690-

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 403 ond, they argued that in mid-April 1941, guerrilla or Chetnik detachments of the royal Yugoslav army, that is Serbs, massacred Croats in western Herzegovina, so that the Serbs themselves were to blame for what later happened to them in the Ustasha state.*° Third, they claimed that when the Partisans and the Chetniks invaded the Ustasha state from Serbia in late 1941 and early 1942 and from Montenegro in the spring of 1942—having been pushed out of the two provinces by either German or Italian and Chetnik forces, respectively—Croats had the right to defend their state. This latter argument applied only to those Serbs who came to eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina as Partisans and Chetniks from Serbia and Montenegro and not to Partisan and Chetnik fighters who came from within the Ustasha state itself.

The first argument, that thousands of Croats died for political reasons | during the interwar period, is simply not true. Rudolf Horvat did not identify even several hundred political victims, let alone thousands, who died by force, in his 1942 book describing the measures taken by the interwar Yugoslav regime against the Croats. Monsignor Jureti¢c, a well-informed source on interwar Croatian and Roman Catholic complaints against the Serbian-dominated

Yugoslav state, claimed that between December 1918 and April 10, 1941, abut 230 Croats were killed or executed and several thousand incarcerated for political reasons. But neither Horvat nor Jureti¢ provided details.’ Thus, we do not know whether their figures included the small number of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina killed in connection with the agrarian reform or for

personal revenge imniediately after the First World War or people killed in connection with the registration of draft animals by military authorities in September 1920 in parts of Croatia-Slavonia.” By far the most absurd figures on the number of Croats supposedly killed by the Serbs in interwar Yugoslavia were given by the Reverend Dragutin Kamber, a Catholic parish priest and Ustasha county head in Doboj, Bosnia, and toward the end of the war deputy military vicar of the Croatian armed forces, in a letter

to Eugéne Cardinal Tisserant in late 1945. As a political exile from Croatia temporarily in Rome, Kamber was taken to an audience with the cardinal by a friend. When Tisserant asked him how the Croats could have killed 300,000 Serbs during the war, Kamber was taken aback at the directness of the question and could not immediately answer. But toward the end of 1945, he wrote the *Omréanin, Istina o Drazi Mibailovicu, pp. 106-7; Varo’, “The Chetniks in the Struggle Against the Croatian State,” pp. 4-7. ‘For Horvat’s claims, see his Hrvatska na muéiligtu. Whenever he could, he adduced the figures, but more often he used the phrase “there were many victims.” For Jureti¢’s claims, see

Mlinari¢, Tito: der rote Rebell, pp. 10-11. For some comments on this latter author, see Chapter 12, footnote 27. *’According to Professor Ivo Banac of Yale University, official statistics show that be-

tween September 4 and 24, 1920, fifteen peasants and ten soldiers, gendarmes, and other government personnel died. Banac thinks that the number of peasants killed may have been

higher. See The National Question, pp. 248-60, especially p. 254. :

404 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA cardinal a long letter giving his version of the relationship between Croats and Serbs and labeling the latter the worst enemy of the Croats. Kamber claimed

that the Serbs killed between 50,000 and 60,000 Croats during the interwar period. Publication of this letter was delayed, but it finally appeared in the weekly newspaper of the Herzegovinian Franciscan friars in Chicago in 1967 and was reprinted in an Ustasha journal in Buenos Aires in 1969.” It is true that during the interwar period in Yugoslavia, thousands of Croats were mistreated in different ways and denied their political and civil rights. There was pervasive discrimination against Croats and other non-Serbs at all levels of military and government service, especially the higher echelons. But these injustices, however offensive in principle and however injurious to Croatian national interests in practice, did not constitute political or cultural genocide. Moreover, under royal dictatorship, Serbs too were denied civil and political rights because all power was concentrated in the hands of the Crown, the

military, and the Belgrade ruling cliques. , 7 |

As we have tried to show, the anti-Croatian policies of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav government in the 1920’s and 1930’s, especially the assassination of Croatian Peasant Party leaders in Parliament in June 1928 by a deputy of the main Serbian political party, were largely responsible for the creation,

growth, and nature of Croatian nationalist forces. These culminated in the Us- | | tasha movement and ultimately its anti-Serbian policies in the Second World War. From the beginning, an essential ingredient of the Ustasha program was

the use of terror as a political instrument, best exemplified by the assassination , of King Alexander in Marseilles in October 1934. However, wartime Ustasha policies against the Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia were of a genocidal nature and totally out of proportion to earlier anti-Croatian measures, both in nature and extent. In addition, the Ustashas’ genocidal policies were also directed against Jews and Gypsies, and Ustasha authorities applied draconian measures against anti-Ustasha Croats and all Communists as well. Let us quote from Glaise’s report of December 11, 1941, on conditions in Croatia: “The sacrifice in blood of its own citizens, which the Croatian state has caused in the short time of its existence, surpasses by many times [um ein Vielfaches] that of

Yugoslavia during its entire existence.” | ae

The second argument of many Ustashas and Ustasha sympathizers, that ~ Chetnik (guerrilla) units of the Yugoslav army initiated the bloody wartime carnage between Serbs and Croats by massacring Croatian civilians in Capljina

in western Herzegovina during the War of April 1941, is also not true. According to an article published in Hrvatski narod, the official organ of the Ustasha movement, on October 8, 1941, the facts of the matter were as follows. When Lieutenant Colonel Dragutin Ivanigevi¢é, commander of the 85th Regi| Danica (Chicago), August 23, 1967; Hrvatska misao (Buenos Aires), 1969, no. 43: 56— 61.

Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Frs. 608-23, especially Fr. 610.

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 405 ment of the Yugoslav army deployed in Capljina and in Ustasha words “a Catholic and a good Croat,” heard of the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia, he ordered the disbanding of the regiment on April 11 under the influence of an Ustasha delegate from Mostar. But some officers and men, undoubtedly most or all of them Serbs, refused to disband. Some regrouped at Stolac, about 22 kilometers southeast, while others moved toward Ljubuski,

about 15 kilometers west. Meanwhile, the Croats in the regiment, together with some Ustashas who had joined them or were brought in as reinforcements, organized to defend Capljina. In the next several days, the group at Stolac, reinforced by newcomers, approached Capljina. In the fighting that ensued from April 14-17, 22 people on the Ustasha side and among the civilians were killed. Six other civilians were killed in neighboring areas by strafing from a Yugoslav military plane flown by a local pilot. But by April 17, Capljina was securely in Ustasha hands.°! Had any wanton mass killing of Croatian and Muslim civilians by Serbian Chetnik or Yugoslav soldiers taken place, it would have been prominently used by Ustasha propaganda at the time. But the article in Hrvatski narod showed that most, if not all, deaths at Capljina were the result of fighting between the defenders of the town and the attackers. There was no massacre. By June 1942, however, an elaborate Ustasha propaganda publication claimed in outrage that _ 25 named victims at Capljina were killed in an indiscriminate three-day massacre by Chetnik units of the Yugoslav army.” Neither Vjekoslav Vranci¢, an important Ustasha functionary from Herzegovina who went into exile after the war, nor Professor Jere Jareb, an American historian of Croatian birth, mention any massacre at Capljina in their writings. Vran¢i¢ puts the first insurrection of the Serbs in eastern Herzegovina on June 25,1941. Jareb sidesteps the problem, admitting that there is no evidence of an _ indiscriminate massacre of Croats by Chetnik units of the Yugoslav army. Further study of these special Chetnik formations and their activities at the time of the army’s collapse would be necessary, he writes, to ascertain whether there had been any atrocities and “any plans for killing all the more important anti-

Serbian personalities in case of war.”” | Another confrontation between the Ustashas and Yugoslav army units in Herzegovina occurred during the collapse of the country in the village of Ilici, near Mostar. Initially, Ili¢i was captured by rebelling soldiers of the Mostar garrison and Ustasha sympathizers. According to a Yugoslav army participant, the rebels were subsequently subdued not by Chetnik army units, as is usually ‘The Course of Fighting by the Ustashas in the Area of Capljina-Ljubuski,” Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), October 8, 1941. This is one of a series of articles reviewing the achievements of the Ustasha government during its first six months in power. °°Greueltaten, p. 39, where the names of the 25 people killed are given.

SVrancic, “Italian and German Policy,” 1961, no. 27-28: 24; Jareb, Pola stoljeéa hrvatske politike, p. 89.

406 | THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA | alleged, but by cadets from the School for Reserve Officers in Sarajevo, brought to Mostar on April 13 to establish order. Ili¢i was recaptured from the rebels on _ April 15 and a number of prisoners were brought to Mostar, then released the following day. Two cadets and an accompanying civilian were killed in the op-

~ eration, but the Yugoslav army participant gave no information on the number | of other civilian casualties. The official Ustasha government publication Greueltaten (in German) listed by name only one woman killed in Ilici and five people killed in the neighboring village of Cim. It also gave the names of the owners of the 85 houses in the two villages that were burned down. Had there

been a massacre in Ili¢i, this publication would have announced it. Consequently, Juretié’s statement that over 30 civilians were killed in Ilici in mid-

April 1941 seems based on dubious sources.” , _ There were individual cases of Serbs plundering and killing Croats, and vice versa, in areas with mixed populations during the ten days of the War of April 1941. But even after the Serbs started fighting back in eastern Herzegovina at the end of June 1941, their objective was self-defense and they initially acted as haphazardly assembled groups. Most of the terrorist acts of the Ustashas, on the other hand, were part of a broadly designed anti-Serbian state policy. The brutality of Ustasha policy against the Serbs in Herzegovina is also indicated by an Ustasha police report showing that by the end of August 1941, the total Or-

thodox population of about 5,000 in Mostar (a city with 20,295 inhabitants in | the 1931 census) had been reduced to only 852. The majority of Serbs had fled -

or been expelled, arrested, taken to concentration camps, or killed. Several

almost unbelievable cases of the mass murder of Serbs by the Ustashas in Herzegovina were also reported by Monsignor Alojzije Misi¢, Catholic bishop of Mostar, to Archbishop Stepinac in letters in August and November 1941

(see Chapter 12). oo

To explain and defend their repression of the Serbs, the Ustashas also cited a long list of specific reasons: the assassination of Croatian Peasant Party leaders in Parliament by a Serbian deputy on June 20, 1928; the killing of the Croatian nationalist anthropologist and historian Milan Sufflay in 1931; the brutal

suppression of a small Ustasha uprising in Lika in September 1932 (when, however, only one gendarme was killed); the killing of Josip Predavec, a vice president of the Croatian Peasant Party, in 1933; and the political killing or

: sentencing to death of certain other Croats. These specific charges were true. But the charges made by Mladen Lorkovi¢, Ustasha minister of foreign affairs,

‘in a speech on July 27, 1941, were not and were undoubtedly calculated to arouse passion, hate, and brutal action against the Serbs. He claimed: “For the report of the Yugoslav army participant, see Trifkovié, “Village Ili¢i,” pp. 1, 57, which appeared in Vidovdan, a bimonthly issued by exiled Chetniks. For the Ustasha government’s version, see Greueltaten, pp. 41-44. For Jureti¢’s statement, see Mlinari¢, Tito: der

rote Rebell, p. 24. , .

Cited in Kovacéevié and Skoko, “The June 1941 Uprising in Herzegovina,” p. 102.

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 407 You know furthermore that the Ustasha movement is using a strong arm to solve the Serbian question in Croatia. Those who during the past 22 years used fire and sword here, those to whom no cruelty was too small, those who have beaten, mutilated, and massacred tens of thousands of Croatian peasants, those who put tens of thousands of Croats into jail, those who shot thousands of Croats and annihi-

lated numberless Croatian families . . . those across the Sava and Drina now shout.”

In addition to directly reducing the number of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia, the Ustashas’ mass killing was apparently also intended to scare Serbs into fleeing to Serbia and induce others to convert to Catholicism. But the anti-Serbian policies of the Ustasha regime produced to a very large extent the opposite of what was intended. This was clearly seen by Glaise as early as September 13, 1941, when he reported that the Ustashas had helped produce the Chetniks. He reiterated this many times, soon adding the Partisans and later usually substituting them for the Chetniks. Archbishop Stepinac also realized that the wanton behavior of the occupying armies (he did not mention the Ustasha armed forces) and the mass shooting of hostages caused people to flee to the forests and join the Partisan ranks.*’ After the war, several Croatian writers in exile confirmed these views. Ante Ciliga, a former Communist who spent part of the war in Croatia, including several months in the Jasenovac concentration camp, and then worked for Ustasha newspapers, put it this way: “With

one word, Pavelié [by his policies] disunited the Croats, united the Serbs, strengthened the Communist Partisans, and blindly tied the Croatian cause to those who were bound to lose the war. It is difficult to imagine a more suicidal

policy.” Eugen Kvaternik himself wrote after the war that in order to combat Communism, the Ustashas should have followed a policy of accommodation with 6As quoted by Persen, Ustaski logori, p. 11.

’’For Glaise’s views, see, for example, Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 1368. For Stepinac’s conclusions, see his letter to Paveli¢ on March 6, 1943, and his sermon on October 31, 1943, in Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 210-12, 265-86.

*Ciliga, Dokle ce hrvatski narod stenjati pod srpskim jarmom?, p. 30. Ante Ciliga was the secretary of the Regional Committee for Croatia of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. He went to the Soviet Union in 1926, was later accused of Trotskyite leanings, and spent several years in a Siberian camp. He returned to Europe in 1936 and settled in Paris, where he

published a noted book, Au pays du mensonge déconcertant, in 1938. In December 1941, he , entered the Independent State of Croatia with an Italian passport, which he was able to get

| because he had been born in Istria. The new state, as he said, awaited him with open prison doors, and he spent several months in the Jasenovac concentration camp. According to him, he was released because the international military situation had changed and the Ustasha regime thought his contacts in the West might make him useful. See his book Sam kroz Evropu

u ratu, pp. 11, 181-346, 353-63. Ciliga became a contributor to the Ustasha ideological weekly newspaper Spremnost and as such went on a “study trip” to Berlin in August 1944. Because the Clericalist intellectuals editing Spremnost had moved from a pro-Ustasha to a pro-Western stance, the editorial board was disbanded. In Bavaria at the end of the war, Ciliga later went to Rome, where he continued his activity as a writer and publisher.

408 | THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA _ the Serbs. He claimed that he had actually worked toward such a policy at the

, beginning of 1942 and had obtained assurances of cooperation from both Nedié’s and Mihailovi¢’s forces in Serbia, on the condition that the mutual | killing of Serbs and Croats cease. But he concluded: “The victory was carried by anti-Serbianism a tout prix, which finally resulted in Serbo-Communism.” For this, he blamed Pavelié and the Italians, ignoring both his own activities as one of the most ruthless persecutors of the Serbs and the Germans’ support of

the Ustasha regime throughout the war.” ; oe | The Ustashas’ mass killing of Serbs, either outright or after they were

herded into concentration camps, went on in the whole territory of the Ustasha state during the entire war. It decreased markedly, however, beginning in 1943. This was due in part to the growth of the Partisan resistance movement and in

part to the moderating influence of the Germans, who for military and economic reasons wanted a pacified Croatia and pressured the Ustashas to follow policies that would lead to this end. It was also fostered by the collaboration of the Italians and the Chetniks in Italian-controlled areas, which led to better protection for the Orthodox population; by the live-and-let-live agreements concluded after May 1942 between Croatian authorities and several important Chetnik detachments in Bosnia; and by the agreements concluded after Sep-

tember 1943 between the Germans andthe Chetniks. = The Ustasha leadership apparently thought that the majority of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia would passively accept their fate. Indeed, thousands of Serbs did not flee because they believed that the state would not harm obedient citizens, or they returned to their homes following assurances that nothing untoward would happen to them. Many paid for this misplaced trust with their lives. Over a quarter of a million Serbs accepted conversion to Catholicism, hoping that this would save them, but for many again, in vain. However, many other Serbs, especially young people, fled into the mountains and joined the Chetniks or, in much larger numbers, the Partisans. _ The Ustashas hoped to prevent the reconstitution of a common state of Serbs and Croats and indeed any future cooperation between them. But the mutual hatred and proclivity for revenge that they created were temporarily neu“Kvaternik, “Words and Deeds,” p. 71. Ina meeting between Branko Peelj, a Croatian Peasant Party member and Matek’s personal secretary, and Kvaternik on July 21, 1941, which according to PeSelj took place at Kvaternik’s request, PeSelj told the latter that the policy of “cleansing Croatia of Serbs” was not wise. Indeed, it might return to haunt the Croats because the war was not yet over and England would probably win. Kvaternik answered that he also believed that the British would eventually win, but by then there would be no more Serbs in Croatia and everybody would have to accept the fait accompli. PeSelj, “Some Re-marks on the Writings of Eugen Kvaternik,” pp. 276-79. In the same issue of Hrvatska revija, _ _ Sept. 1962, pp. 280-82, Kvaternik denied that he had invited Pegelj to his office. He claimed that during the war, he met PeSelj only once briefly on the street and never discussed the Serbian problem with him. Given Kvaternik’s record and the self-serving nature of his writings, I

am inclined to accept PeSelj’s version of the episode. _ -

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 409 tralized by the Partisan movement and Marshal Tito, himself a Croat. Instead of joining the Ustashas because of their fear of Serbs, more and more Croats

joined the Partisans. A similar effect was produced by Chetnik atrocities against Muslims and Croats, as well as against pro-Partisan Serbs, in areas where the Chetniks temporarily had the upper hand. Consequently, opponents of the postwar Communist regime in Yugoslavia often say, only partly face-

tiously, that the Communists, who built thousands of monuments to commemorate the victims of Fascism and to extol their military exploits, should also erect monuments to both Paveli¢ and Mihailovic. Yet, while not diminishing the responsibility that the Ustashas bear for their crimes, one should not forget that they could never have come to or remained in power had it not been for the presence of the Germans in Croatia. Similarly, the

Italians bear a large share of the responsibility for Chetnik atrocities against Croats and Muslims in areas under Italian control.

OTHER POPULATION SHIFTS In addition to the transfer of Slovenes into and the expulsion of Serbs out of

the Independent State of Croatia and the extermination of Serbs in it, other groups of people moved or were moved into or out of Croatia, and thousands more were internal refugees within it. After the establishment of the new state, the

Ustashas wanted Croats living outside of Croatia to return to the homeland. These included a considerable number of Croats living in occupied Serbia, especially Belgrade, who were former government employees or employees in banking and other branches of the economy, and a smaller number of Croats living in the Bulgarian- and Albanian-annexed parts of Macedonia, who were former government employees or colonists on land obtained in the post-1918 agrarian reform. These Croats were pressed to leave, and most did move to the new state.”” Among the refugees within the state were Croats expelled from Ba¢ka and

Baranja, which the Hungarians occupied in April 1941 and annexed soon thereafter. The Hungarians expelled colonists on land obtained in the post1918 agrarian reform, as well as settlers from the interwar period, usually to areas from which they had come. At the same time, some Hungarians living in Croatia moved to the new or pre-1941 Hungarian areas.”! The only other refugees who came into the new Croatian state during 1941, 1942, and especially early 1943 were Muslims fleeing to Bosnia and Herze-

govina to avoid Chetnik terror in Sandzak and eastern Bosnia. In the latter area, the Partisans also engaged in anti-Muslim terror while they were still cooperating with the Chetniks up to the middle of 1942. The Merhamet, a Muslim welfare organization, helped refugees from both areas. I have not been able ”Milosevié, Izbeglice i preseljenici, pp. 319-24. “For the number of people moved from Ba¢ka and Baranja and a discussion of the special conditions in Medjimurje and Prekmurje, which Hungary also annexed, see ibid., pp. 57-82.

410 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA to find any data on the number of refugees from Sandzak, but they probably to-

, taled several thousand.” , a |

Many population shifts also took place in those parts of Croatia that Italy annexed (Zone I) or occupied, withdrew from, and again occupied in 1941 (Zones II and III) (see Map 4). Ustasha terror against Serbs and Jews drove

many of them to the Italian-annexed zone, while Italian policies against Croats | in the latter drove many of them to the German-controlled part of Croatia, especially Zagreb. The Italians also herded many Croats into concentration camps in the annexed zone and transferred some to camps in Italy. After the _ Italian surrender, the Germans gradually occupied the whole Dalmatian coast and all the islands except Vis, and to escape their rule and terror, perhaps as many as 45,000 people, mostly Croats, were evacuated by the Partisans and the British to Italy in the fall of 1943. About 27,000 were then taken to refugee camps in Egypt. Finally, because the Germans feared that Allied forces might land on the Adriatic coast and be helped by the local population, they evacuated thousands of people from the coast and islands to the interior between - March and August 1944. (For more details, see Chapters 4, 6, and 7.) Most people displaced to Italy or Egypt returned to Yugoslavia after the war, though

a small percentage remained abroad.

~ Next to the Serbs who were transferred or fled from Croatia to Serbia, the

largest group of people moved out of the state during the war were the Volksdeutsche. Of a total of about 170,000, some 18,300 from Bosnia were evacuated in late 1942 and about 90,000 from Croatia, Slavonia, and Srijem were evacuated in late 1944, in both cases to the Reich. The main reason was the danger from the Partisans. In addition, German sources estimated that about 28,000 Croatian Volksdeutsche served in the Waffen SS and other branches of the German armed forces and that about 15,000 worked in Germany. After the war, additional Yugoslav Volksdeutsche were expelled from Yugoslavia, so that only a little over 10 percent of their prewar number re-

mained in the country in 1948.” , | — In addition to those who were expelled from Croatia or brought into it,

| there was the very difficult problem of people displaced within the country. Ustasha rampages—and to a much smaller extent, later Muslim rampages— against Serbs, as well as Chetnik rampages against Muslims and Croats in eastern Bosnia and eastern Herzegovina, created these internal refugees. In addition, Partisan guerrilla operations in most of the country, Chetnik guerrilla operations at certain times and in certain areas against Axis and Croatian forces,

and Axis and Croatian operations against the guerrillas, contributed to the

growth of internal refugees. ,

As soon as Ustasha or Chetnik rampages began, the targeted group fled to © | , “According to the 1931 census, there were 100,253 Muslims, 134,783 Serbian Ortho-

See Chapter 6, pp.286-89. =>

dox, and only 1,049 people of other faiths in Sandzak.

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR AII the forests or to larger localities: Similarly, when guerrilla operations were under way or when large-scale Axis operations against the guerrillas were undertaken, people fled from contested areas to the forests and towns beyond and generally to areas where they expected to find safety. Since both rampages and guerrilla and antiguerrilla operations usually resulted in burned villages and plundered food and livestock, most of those who fled did not return home as long as the war lasted. They were forced to look elsewhere for food, housing, and safety. Consequently, there were many internal refugees both in areas under Ustasha and Axis control and in areas under Partisan and Chetnik control. To alleviate the plight of internal refugees in areas under Ustasha and Axis control, Pavelic issued an order on September 16, 1942, directing the Ministry of Social Policy, and in cases of special need army and Ustasha militia commands as well, to provide food, shelter, and other necessities for the refugees and if possible work. Because guerrilla, and thus also antiguerrilla, operations were most intensive in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Lika, where most members of the Ustasha Party and militia came from, Pavelié was especially interested in providing aid for Catholic and Muslim refugees from these areas.” The timing of this order coincided with the push of the Partisan main force out of southeast Bosnia and eastern Herzegovina into the center of the Independent State of Croatia, which caused a great increase in the number of internal refugees in Ustasha-controlled areas. I have seen no estimates, official or otherwise, of the number of internal refugees in the Croatian state, but they probably totaled several hundred thousand people. The estimate of Muhamed PandzZa, director of the Merhamet, that there were about 250,000 homeless Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone toward the end of 1943 seems exaggerated.” It is reasonable to assume that the number of internal refugees in areas under Ustasha control grew as the war advanced and as territory under Partisan control expanded. Finally, many internal refugees who were already in or on their way toward Zagreb in the concluding weeks of the war accompanied Croatian forces with-

drawing toward Austria in the second week of May 1945.” These forces wanted to surrender to the Western Allies instead of the Partisans, an effort that failed. The fate of both the troops and the attending refugees will be discussed in Chapter 18. For Paveli¢’s order and the implementing order of the Ministry of Social Policy to all district and county offices, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 1/18, 1a—2, Box 87. *SMicr. No. T-311, Roll 189, Frs. 264-65. ’”’The population of Zagreb, which was about 250,000 in April 1941, increased to almost

500,000 by May 1944, according to official Croatian sources. See the report of Dragutin Toth, Croatian minister of finance, of May 22, 1944, to Prime Minister Nikola Mandié, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5796, Fr. H308,571. While the greater part of this increase occurred because the city became the capital of the new state, part of it was due to the influx of the families of Ustasha officials from other parts of the country and of refugees in search of safety and sustenance.

412 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA USTASHA TERROR ENGENDERS

ARMED RESISTANCE The Ustasha campaign of terror resulted in the flight of many young Serbs into the forests and the beginning of their fight against the Ustasha regime. They joined either the Serbian nationalist Chetniks or the Communist-led Partisans. The Chetniks consisted exclusively of Serbs, except for a few Croats who joined in some areas of Dalmatia. The Partisans consisted of both Serbs

, and Croats, though Serbs were in the majority until the second half of 1943, when Croats became the majority in Croatian Partisan ranks. As the war progressed, many Chetnik units came to collaborate with the occupying powers and to some extent even with the Croatian army and thus gradually lost their military and political importance. The Partisans, by contrast, became steadily stronger and, as the main Yugoslav force on the side of the Allies, emerged as the only group around which Serbs and Croats rebelling against Axis and Ustasha forces in the Independent State of Croatia could rally. The Ustashas, by driving the most active opponents of the regime into the ranks of the Partisans,

| contributed greatly to the defeat of their own policies and to their own destruc-

tionattheendofthewar. _ -

Ustasha anti-Serbian terror not only directly fostered armed resistance in the Independent State of Croatia, but also negatively impacted the German occupation regime in Serbia. The Ustashas, by expelling a much larger number of transferees than agreed upon to Serbia and causing tens of thousands of Serbs to flee there, created difficult problems for the Serbian puppet government and the German occupation regime (see Chapter 5). Ustasha terror, by engendering anger and revulsion in the Serbian government and population at large, undermined peace and order in occupied Serbia and thus militated against German interests. The Germans wanted to keep Serbia at peace for strategic and economic reasons, especially the unobstructed railroad connection with German forces in Greece and the regular supply of essential nonferrous metals from the country. This was clearly indicated in a series of letters that Harald Turner, chief of administration of the German occupation regime in Serbia, wrote to Kasche between June 1941 and May 1942. Turner asked Kasche to protest against the persecution of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia to the Croatian government and to request that it be stopped and peace and order reestablished, as otherwise great damage to German interests in Serbia would result.” German officials in Zagreb were well informed about Ustasha outrages because they had close contacts with most Croatian military, police, and civilian agencies, and Croats in different services volunteered information. There were ”For the June 25, 1941, letter, in which Turner listed nineteen cases of Serbs killed individually and in groups in the Ustasha state, see YA, Mil. Hist., Nat’l. Lib. War, Reg. No. 5/2-

, 8-12, Box 233. For Turner’s letters of January 21 and May 3, 1942, and Kasche’s letter of February 12, 1942, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H301,63 1-47.

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 413 frequent German reports on these outrages, as well as a list of not less than 87 cases of the Ustashas’ murder of Serbs between May 1, 1941, and May 4, 1942, some with up to hundreds of victims. This, as well as additional information on Ustasha atrocities and letters from Turner in Serbia, led to new protests and suggestions by Kasche and Glaise. On July 15, 1942, Kasche proposed to Foreign Minister Lorkovi¢c that Croatia improve the propaganda directed at the Serbs and adopt a more conciliatory policy toward the Chetniks, and in a later memorandum to Paveli¢, he criticized various Ustasha activities. At a special meeting of the two men on November 14, 1942, Paveli¢ promised to make some of the changes that Kasche desired.”

In Serbia, the Communist-led uprising against the German occupation forces and the puppet government, which started in early July 1941, soon gathered considerable momentum. As noted above, the Germans could not afford to lose control of Serbia for strategic and economic reasons, nor could they allow a successful revolt there (or anywhere else in Yugoslavia) to serve as an example to other occupied European countries. Consequently, in response, they completely overhauled their military arrangements in Serbia, adding a field operations command and greatly increasing their occupation forces in the fall of 1941. Not surprisingly, the well-prepared German operation against the Partisans in northwest and western Serbia (the First Enemy Offensive in Partisan parlance) from mid-September to early December 1941 crushed the rebels. German forces were aided by troops from the Serbian puppet government and by their auxiliaries, including some detachments of Mihailovi¢’s legalized Chetniks. After crushing the Partisan forces in western Serbia and eliminating their liberated area, the Germans turned to the pacification of that part of Croatia north of the German-Italian demarcation line, for which the German military commander in Serbia was also militarily responsible. This task became the

more urgent because Partisan leaders and troops from Serbia, after being ousted from the Uzice area, moved by way of Sandzak to eastern Bosnia, joined the local Partisan forces there, and established their command center at Foéa on

the Drina River. The first German operation supported by Croatian forces against the Partisans in the Independent State of Croatia was carried out in eastern Bosnia in late January and early February 1942 (the Second Enemy Offensive). While the Germans inflicted considerable losses on the Partisans and reduced their liberated area, they failed to eliminate them as a military factor, and as a result, had to undertake new operations. Since Croatia was a German-Italian condominium and nominally an inde-

pendent state, military operations against the Partisans, who were active in both the German and Italian zones, necessitated Italian as well as German parFor the Germans’ list, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5797, Frs. H309,998—H3 10,026. Possibly not all of the information they collected was verified, but I believe that most of it was true. For Paveli¢’s promises to make changes, see Frs. H309,992-97.

AI4 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA ticipation. At a German-Italian-Croatian conference in Opatija (Abbazia) on the Istrian peninsula on March 2-3, 1942, a series of anti-Partisan operations was planned in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandzak, Montenegro, western Bosnia, and Lika. However, only operations in eastern Bosnia by German and Croatian troops and in Montenegro and eastern Herzegovina by Italian and Montenegrin Chetnik forces were undertaken from March to June 1942 (the Third Enemy Offensive). The Partisans again suffered heavy losses in manpower and territory, and many Partisans units suffered from Chetnik subversion and troop demoralization. The situation was greatly aggravated by the Partisans’ use of mass terror against deserters, their families, and those considered politically dangerous, all of whom were accused of collaborating with the enemy. In fact, the Partisans experienced one of their greatest crises of the entire war at this time. It became clear to their leaders that the remaining dependable

Partisan units could not maintain themselves in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as a result, the center of Partisan activities was gradually shifted to western Bosnia in the course of the Partisans’ “long march” there from June to

November 1942.” ,

In June and July 1942, German and Croatian forces undertook a successful major offensive against the Partisans in the Kozara Mountain region in northwest Bosnia, a Partisan stronghold with potentially dangerous military implications for the Zagreb-Belgrade railroad line. Then in August, German forces

from that operation, together with Croatian army and Ustasha militia units, launched a major operation in Srijem, where Partisan forces endangered the grain crop. This operation was marked by large-scale Ustasha militia atrocities against the Serbian civilian population in the area.” In all these operations, the Partisans suffered grievous manpower losses and surrendered much liberated territory. Moreover, following operations against them in the Kozara Mountain area and Srijem, German and Ustasha troops thoroughly combed the area and rounded up thousands of civilians, including women and children, and some Partisans, who were taken to concentration camps at Jasenovac, Sisak, Stara Gradiska, and Zemun.” All these major mili”For an analysis of Axis and collaborationist operations against the Partisans in western Serbia, eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, and the Partisans’ “long march” to western Bosnia between September 1941 and November 1942, in official Yugoslav historiography, see Yugoslavia, Vojnoistorijski institut, Oslobodilacki rat, 2nd rev. ed., 1: 116-

28, 175-86, 191-218, 269-92. . .

“For the Kozara Mountain operation, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 249, Frs. 1139-58, and Micr. No. T-501, Roll 250, Frs. 52~55, 86-98. For operations against the Partisans in Srijem, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5788, Frs. H302,61 4-26. See also Yugoslavia, Vojnoistorijski institut, Oslobodilacki rat, 2nd rev. ed., 1: 238-42 for the former operation and 1: 323-26 for

the latter. , |

*'Because of a great increase in the number of inmates in Ustasha concentration camps after the Kozara Mountain operation against the Partisans, the German representative for labor

recruiting in Croatia recruited 7,190 Orthodox people (including 409 children) from the camps at Stara Gradiska and Sisak, and anticipated another 1,000 to 3,000 recruits in the

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS AND TERROR 415 tary undertakings, however, failed to crush the Partisans. They regrouped and reorganized and appeared in other parts of the country. A major reason why Axis and Croatian forces failed to subdue the Partisans in the Independent State of Croatia in the course of 1941 and 1942 was the Ustashas’ policy of terror against the Serbs, which continued to drive young Serbs into Partisan ranks. Glaise clearly perceived the connection between Ustasha terror and success-

ful Partisan resistance. Reasoning that the Ustashas would probably not change their policy, and following a meeting in Sofia with Colonel General Alexander Lohr, armed forces commander in southeast Europe, who gave his full

; support, he wrote a memorandum to the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on September 18, 1942. He argued that for military operations in Croatia to succeed, they must be accompanied by political preparations. Germany should press the Ustasha government to stop the senseless Ustasha terror against the Serbs, which fed the resistance; to stop other equally senseless Ustasha outrages and tame the Ustasha party and militia; and to cleanse the Ustasha state administration and party apparatus of individuals who had compromised themselves by terrorist activities and corruption. Glaise noted that his opinion was based on a thorough knowledge of the country and was shared by the mass of the Croatian people and some important Ustashas.” No such political changes took place, but a thorough overhaul of German military forces in Croatia was carried out in October 1942. The Germans established the post of commanding general of German troops in Croatia on November 1, 1942. Lieutenant General Rudolf Liters was put in charge of pacifying the area between the Sava River and the German-Italian demarcation line, and Glaise was made responsible for pacifying the area between the Drava and Sava Rivers. Between January and June 1943, the Germans brought additional forces into Croatia, which together with Italian forces (assisted by Chetnik units) and Croatian forces undertook two cycles of operations against the Partisans, Operations Weiss and Schwarz (the Fourth and Fifth Enemy Offensives). The Partisans suffered heavy losses and lost much of their liberated territory, but were not brought to their knees. By April 1943 the first Allied military missions reached the Partisans, and a few months later Allied military aid began arriving. The Ustashas, by their inability to realize and act upon the connection between their terrorist anti-Serbian policies and armed resistance in the Croatian state, insured their failure at state building and sealed their fate. near future. See his report of July 20, 1942, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5797, Frs. H309,98184. Some Serbs from the Kozara Mountain area and Srijem were taken to the concentration camp at Zemun, and some of them were also recruited for work in Germany. Many Serbs from the Kozara Mountain area were taken to the Jasenovac concentration camp, where most were later liquidated. *Micr. No. T-501, Roll 268, Fr. 159.

CHAPTER IO

The Armed Forces of the

eee

Independent State of Croatia |

FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION A major issue between the Germans and the Italians in the Croatian puppet state up to September 1943 and between the Germans and the Croats during the entire war was the role of the Croatian armed forces—how they would be organized and developed, who would arm and command them, and how they would be used. In this chapter, I will discuss the organization of these forces in the context of the domestic political situation, their weaknesses, and the influences to which they were exposed. I will not review, except occasionally and briefly, the operations in which they were engaged, which is reserved for the planned third volume of this study. It should always be kept in mind that the Croatian armed forces were part of the German and Italian occupation systems and were usually under German or Italian command. The information available on the armed forces of the Independent State of Croatia is ample but by no means complete, especially regarding the Ustasha militia. Because these forces were under German or Italian operational command during most of the war; because many accusations of terrorist and unlawful actions were leveled against them, especially the militia, both during and

after the war; because they belonged to a defeated puppet state that disappeared at the end of the war; and finally, because after their defeat and surrender they were to a large extent destroyed by the victorious Partisans, very few studies have been written about them. Although over a score of high ranking Croatian army officers escaped to the West, none has written a history of the Croatian armed forces. A former Ustasha civilian minister and three former officers have written articles, but these lack proper documentation and abound with unrealistic claims and false statements.’ Several works by Croatian civilian

émigrés deal with the destruction of these forces by Yugoslav Communist forces at the end of the war, but they leave much to be desired. 'Vrancic, “Croatian Armed Forces,” pp. 141-69; I. Babi¢, “Military History,” pp. 13166, especially pp. 151-66; Dragojlov, “Der Krieg 1941-1945,” pp. 345-64, 425-49, 50923; and Luburi¢, “Ustashism,” Pp. 3-27. See also the newspaper article by a Croatian, nonUstasha political émigré, Dragutin Sporer, “The Creation and Downfall of the Army.”

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 417 Similarly, in Yugoslavia itself since the war, little systematic work has been published on the Croatian armed forces, although, as part of the German and Italian forces of occupation, they were militarily the strongest domestic opponents of the Partisans. And little systematic and objective work has been published on the fate of these forces after their surrender.’

The Croatian armed forces were established on April 10, 1941, the same day that the Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed, by the Law on the Establishment of the Army and Navy. This was issued by retired former Austro-Hungarian Lieutenant Colonel Slavko Kvaternik, a leading domestic Ustasha, whom Pavelié immediately promoted to marshal.’ According to this law, all officers, noncommissioned officers, and men on active duty or in the reserves of the former Yugoslav army who (or whose fathers) were domiciled in any commune (the lowest administrative unit) of the new Croatian state on November 1, 1918, comprised the army and navy of Croatia. All such military personnel ceased to be members of the army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and, freed from the oath to that army, were forbidden to act as its members under penalty of death for treason. All members of the former Yugoslav army in the new Croatian state on active duty or in the reserves who (or whose fathers) were not domiciled in it on November 1, 1918, ceased to be military personnel and could be punished for any military activity. The state planned to remove such personnel from its territory. The task of the new Croatian armed forces was to defend the new state against both foreign and domestic enemies. All members of the army had to take the oath of allegiance to the state of Croatia and its head. All laws and regulations of the old Yugoslav army, if not contrary to the law establishing the new army, remained in existence. The new armed forces were under the commander of all forces, Slavko Kvaternik, who could release or retire members from service without regard to acquired rights and who could appoint or advance them without regard to provisions of the old laws. He could also accept qualified personnel into the army and navy who had not been members of the former Yugoslav forces and appoint or advance them. This provision made ?A systematically arranged, unpublished source on the organization, changes, and overall strength of the armed forces of the Independent State of Croatia, by year, is a series of reports based on official Croatian military publications and documents, written by Yugoslav military historians after the war. See YA, Mil. Hist., Enemy Units, Reg. Nos. 2/1-27, 2/1-34, 2/1-38, 2/1-22-48, and 2/1-53-64, Box 134a, xerox copies of which I have in my files. Of the literature published in Yugoslavia, see especially Coli¢, Takozvana Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska 1941, pp. 193-328; idem, “The Land Army of the Independent State of Croatia,” pp. 169-230; idem, “The Armed Formations of the Independent State of Croatia,” pp. 151-84; Culinovi¢é, “Government and Armed Forces of the ‘Independent State of Croatia,” pp. 131-99; and Jeli¢-Buti¢, Ustase, pp. 114-23. For this law, which was published and became effective on April 11, 1941, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1941, pp. 1-2. On his arrival in the new Croatian state on April 14, | Pavelié named Kvaternik first marshal and then on April 16 also minister of the army and

commander in chief of the Croatian armed forces. ,

418 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA possible the mass reactivation of Croats who had served as officers or noncommissioned officers in the former Austro-Hungarian armed forces, but who had not been members of the former Yugoslav forces. Finally, Article 9 of the

new law stated: | ,

The commander in chief of the armed forces can, by general decree, make certain groups of men subject to military service, that is, as officers, military officials, noncommissioned officers, and privates in the army and navy, whether on active duty or in the reserves, or [he can], by special order, put individuals “outside the army and navy” permanently or for only a limited time. With this they cease to be

military personnel. But all of these people can be put into labor service.

Although no specific group was singled out to be put “outside the army and navy,” it became evident from the overall policy of the Ustasha state that this article was directed against Serbs and Jews. The Croatian Ministry of the Army confirmed this on May 7, 1941, with a statement explaining that “according to Ustasha principles, service in the armed forces represents an honor for every racially pure Croat” and that only those former officers of the Austro-Hungarian

and Yugoslav armies who had always been devoted to the Croatian nation would be accepted in the Croatian army.’ Nevertheless, the new army accepted a certain number of Serbs who had been former Austro-Hungarian and Yugoslav army officers, as well as some Slovenes and men of other nationalities. Furthermore, several dozen Jewish physicians served in the Army Medical Corps

or on other assignments. ; |

Officers of both the former Austro-Hungarian and Yugoslav armies had to apply for admission into the new army. According to lists published in the armed forces gazette and the daily press between May 8 and December 31, 1941, a total of 31 generals and 2,662 officers of various ranks applied. A special army commission processed these applications and invited the public at large to submit information on the applicants that might be of interest. Another commission followed the same procedure for noncommissioned officers. In addition, some officers who had not applied for service with the new armed forces were drafted when the need arose.’ The Ustasha regime held fast to excluding Serbs from military service until a week before the end of the war.’ But it drafted some young Serbs for military labor service (from which Jews were excluded), and the Germans recruited a

‘Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), May 8, 1941. — | , , *See Coli¢, “The Land Army of the Independent State of Croatia,” especially p. 190. 6On April 30, 1945, the Ministry of Armed Forces issued an order for all male citizens in

Zagreb, “without regard to religion,” born between 1912 and 1928 and liable for military service, to report for the draft. No orders to individuals were sent out. Reporting was scheduled by years from May 2 to May 7. See “A Call to All Those Eligible to be Drafted,” in the last issue of Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), May 6, 1945, p. 2. On May 3, Paveli¢ signed a decree stipulating that all inhabitants of the Independent State of Croatia were equal with respect to racial belonging and declaring all laws and regulations on racial belonging null and void. This

was published in Hrvatski narod (Zagreb) on May 5, 1945. _

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 419 few Serbs from Croatia for service on the Russian front and several thousand for work in Germany. In both cases, they were designated not as Serbs but as Orthodox. Issuing the law establishing the army and navy was one thing. Organizing the armed forces with an officer corps, arms, ammunition, military equipment, housing, food, and medical facilities and ensuring a steady flow of supplies was another. In addition, all matters regarding the armed forces were subject to decisions by Italy and Germany, especially the latter. Initially, the first armed forces, augmented by between 200 and 300 armed Ustashas who had returned with Paveli¢ from exile in Italy, were the former paramilitary formations of the Croatian Peasant Party, the Civic and Peasant Guards, most of whom transferred their allegiance to the Ustashas after the proclamation of the new state. The two guards helped the Ustashas, under German and Italian tutelage, assume power in the second half of April 1941. But only a small number were later incorporated into the Croatian army. Most were demobilized, undoubtedly because the Ustashas did not trust them. The Croatian armed forces took over all the facilities and most of the records of the collapsed Yugoslav army in the new state, but not its arms, ammuni-

tion, and other supplies, which the German and Italian forces took as war booty. Croatia was also deprived of its only two plants for manufacturing arms. One factory producing light arms and another producing ammunition, both located near Sarajevo and both near completion in April 1941, were dismantled (one by removing only key machinery) and carted off by the Germans. Indeed, in the early months of the new state, both the Germans and the Italians were unwilling to supply arms for Croatia’s planned forces. Had it not been for the uprising that broke out in July 1941 throughout Yugoslavia, including the Croatian state, which endangered many German and Italian military and economic interests, equipping the Croatian armed forces would probably have been delayed even longer.’

According to the Italian-Croatian treaties of May 18, 1941, Italy was supposed to help Croatia develop its armed forces. But the Croats, resenting these treaties and afraid of further Italian encroachment, did not want to depend on Italy in this respect. They therefore turned surreptitiously to the Germans for assistance, and the latter, who had intended to use Croatian manpower for policing operations in Croatia and also for fighting outside it, gladly obliged. The first tangible result of this military cooperation was the establishment, training, and outfitting of the 369th Reinforced Infantry Regiment, which was used by the Germans on the Russian front (see Chapter 6). Glaise’s report of October 10, 1941, reveals that by then, the Germans had supplied arms for all five divi7On the dismantling of the arms factories, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5796, Frs. H309,062, H309,128, and H309,218-19; Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5797, Frs. H309,528 and H309,628. On the Axis powers’ unwillingness to supply arms, see Glaise’s report of June 12, 1941, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 1213.

420 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA sions of the Croatian army in the process of formation, mostly captured Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, Polish, and French arms.® Because Croatia’s treaties with Italy were an impediment to this cooperation, German military assistance in the first year and a half or so was, except for arms and ammunition that Croatia

paid for, more or less covert. a ,

_ The Italians, however, did supply some arms to Croatia. In September

| 1941, they turned over 35 small former Yugoslav tanks, and on April 3, 1943, General Gian Carlo Re, chief of the Italian Military Mission in Croatia, told Glaise that the Italians had delivered 48,000 rifles as well as some supplementary arms. But Glaise thought that Re’s figure was too high. It is also not clear whether these rifles were part of a contingent of 100,000 rifles that the Italians had promised to deliver, but did not, by September 1942.’ Excluding the relatively small amount of arms from Italy and some small quantities of Yugoslav arms that the Civic and Peasant Guards and the newly formed Ustasha units had probably hidden away rather than delivered to the Germans and Italians in April 1941, from the late summer of 1941 Germany was the foremost supplier of arms and ammunition to the Croatian armed forces for the duration of the

war. =

The Law Decree on the Armed Forces of March 18, 1942, organized these forces into several sections: the army (Domobrani), divided into the land army, the navy, and the air force; the gendarmerie; and the Ustasha militia (Ustaska

vojnica). The land army was divided into six divisional areas, organized into three army corps areas with two divisions each. Outside the army corps areas, a

Military Frontier Force with a strength of six battalions was initially located in , eastern Bosnia, but was abolished in late 1942. The gendarmerie was at first part of the land army with a special status, but a law decree of June 26, 1942, transferred it to the Ustasha militia, undoubtedly to bring it more fully under the control of the Ustasha Party." This transfer, which put the gendarmerie under the command of a young Ustasha colonel, Vilko Pecnikar, was greatly re-

sented by the professional gendarmerie officers." Oo

During the second half of 1943, the Croats, with German assistance, completely reorganized the land forces, eliminating the divisions (except for the 6th ’Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 1311-12. Already in April 1941, Marshal Kvaternik had asked the Germans to allow the new Croatian army to have uniforms that resembled those of the German army. Out of consideration for the Italians, who were supposed to have

primacy in Croatia, Hitler refused. See Fr. 1157. ,

*For Glaise’s opinion of Re’s figure, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 859-60. For the

: Italians’ promise of arms, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Fr. H299,635. For the law decree establishing the armed forces, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH,

, 1942, pp. 326-31. Two decrees of August 21, 1941, described the original organization of the gendarmerie. See ibid., 1941, pp. 467-73. For the decree transferring the gendarmerie to the militia, see ibid., 1942, p. 804, and for the law decree of November 26, 1942, stipulating

its new organization, see ibid., 1942, pp. 1493-1502. |

"Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Fr. 148. | |

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA A421 Division deployed in the Italian-occupied areas) and establishing instead four mountain and four light infantry brigades, as well as a number of specialized units for railroad protection, garrison duty, labor, replacements, and special volunteers. The aim of this reorganization was to produce smaller, more mobile operational units better suited to antiguerrilla operations. With minor changes, this organization continued until December 1944, when the army was consolidated with the Ustasha militia into the new armed forces, of which more will be said below. The Ustasha militia came into existence on April 11, 1941, when Kvaternik appointed a separate staff for the new volunteer armed groups of Ustashas that sprang up spontaneously in many parts of the country during the collapse of the Yugoslav army. Its formal organization was spelled out in a special order issued by Paveli¢é on May 10, 1941.” The militia was a party army similar to the

SS formations in the Third Reich and the Blackshirts in Italy. In July and August 1942, new regulations were issued covering its organization and recruitment. Thereafter, all Croatian armed forces outside the army, navy, and air force became part of the Ustasha militia. The militia consisted of the regular militia, Paveli¢’s Personal Guard, the railroad security troops, the gendarmerie, the regular police, the Ustasha Surveillance Service, the Ustasha educational establishment, the Ustasha preparatory service, and the disciplinary court.’ Most officers of the regular militia were not professionally trained, and most of its soldiers during the war were volunteers." Ideologically, a wide gulf existed be-

tween the militia and the army. The army was not politically indoctrinated, while the militia was indoctrinated in Ustasha ideology and was dedicated to the defense of the Ustasha regime and its leader. Paveli¢ was the commander in chief of the militia, but when its units were engaged in military operations with the Croatian army or with German or Italian forces, they were under the com-

mand of the respective army commanders. ,

According to a report by Glaise on May 26, 1943, about 30 regular militia battalions of varying strength existed at that time. Twelve were in the Italian areas of occupation (primarily Zone III), while the remainder were detailed to the Croatian light infantry and mountain brigades and to the German-Croatian SS police. Such a deployment of militia units, with none being used in the formerly Italian-annexed areas after the Italian surrender in September 1943, conFor Kvaternik’s order establishing the separate staff, see Coli¢, Takozvana Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska 1941, p. 269, and for Paveli¢’s order of May 10, 1941, see Croatia, Independent State of, Glavni ustaSki stan, Ured za promitbu, UstaSa, pp. 3 1-32. '3See the law decrees of July 17 and August 3, 1942, in Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH,

1942, pp. 927-28 and 1153-62. ) '4As late as May 1943, Colonel Oton Cu8, a former Austro-Hungarian and then Yugoslav officer, who served as chief of staff of the Ustasha militia until mid-1944, reported that only 25 percent of militia officers could be considered professionally trained. See Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Fr. 310. 'SMicr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 524.

422 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA tinued until December 1944, when the Croatian army and the militia were con-

solidated into one force. | . |

Some militia units were established for special purposes. The Black Legion,

for example, was organized in Bosnia toward the end of 1941 mostly from Muslim and Croatian refugees from villages in eastern Bosnia, where the Chetniks and to a much smaller extent the Partisans had committed large-scale massacres. Not surprisingly, the legion became known for its fierce fighting against the Chetniks and the Partisans and for the widespread massacre of Serbian civilians. The legion was commanded by Ustasha Lieutenant Colonel Jure Franceti¢ and Major Rafael Boban and had between 1,000 and 1,500 men.” Franceti¢ was captured and killed by the Partisans after his airplane crashed in Lika in late December 1942. Under Boban’s command, the legion was used in vari-

ous parts of the country and was included in the armed forces’ 5th Division in December 1944, with Boban, promoted to general, as commander. The other special force was the Ustasha Defense Brigades, established in late 1941 and headed by Vjekoslav Luburi¢, a young man of 28, who in time acquired a reputation for being the most brutal and bloodthirsty of all Ustasha commanders. The brigades, part of the Ustasha Surveillance Service, participated in operations against the Chetniks and the Partisans and also administered the concentration camps and engaged in mass terror. The government abolished the Surveillance Service in January 1943 and transferred its functions to the Ministry

of Interior, but the Defense Brigades under Luburi¢ survived. _ Because the militia lacked discipline and repeatedly behaved unlawfully, because of its preferred status and its negative effect on the cohesion and morale of the army, and because it was outside the army’s influence, the army would have liked to put the militia under its authority by unifying the two under its command. In effect, army leaders wanted the army to absorb the militia. Glaise and other German officers also favored this course of action because the militia’s activities harmed German military and economic interests in Croatia. But as the war progressed, the army became more and more unreliable as the number and frequency-of desertions rose. After the military situation in southeast Europe deteriorated with the breakthrough of Soviet forces into the region — in the late summer of 1944, opposition to continuing to fight on the German side even reached the top echelons of the Ustasha Party and government. At this point, Paveli¢ proposed unifying the militia and the army in a manner opposite to the earlier plans of the military, by having the militia absorb the army. The issue came to a head over the plans of Ministers Mladen Lorkovié and '’Kvaternik, “Italian Policy,” especially pp. 178-86. This largely self-serving article in Hrvatska revija, which includes a discussion of the formation of the Black Legion and its use in eastern Bosnia, produced a strong, self-serving rebuttal by Vjekoslav Vran¢ié, “Italian and German Policy,” in Hrvatska misao. For the Partisan view of the massacres on both sides in eastern Bosnia in late 1941 and early 1942, see Vukmanovié Tempo, Revolucija koja teée, 1:

241-67. .

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 423 Ante Voki¢, together with Croatian Peasant Party leaders and friendly Croatian army officers, to shift Croatia to the Western side. But their plan would have meant the end of the Ustasha regime and of Pavelic’s personal rule. Consequently, at the end of August 1944 Paveli¢ moved to liquidate the Lorkovic¢Vokié plot and to remove a number of army officers with known sympathies for the Croatian Peasant Party, as well as the most active leaders of the Maéek core of the party. At the same time he also decided to subordinate the army to the militia. The army was officially merged into the militia on December 1, 1944, though the process continued over several months. The unification of the Croatian armed forces will be discussed more fully later in this chapter. Croats served not only in the Croatian armed forces, but also, on the basis

of various agreements, in purely German units, in mixed German-Croatian units, and even in an Italian-Croatian legion (see Chapter 6). Information on the strength of the Croatian armed forces at various times is far from satisfactory. On several occasions, Glaise complained about not being

able to secure reliable statistics on them. On April 20, 1943, for example, he reported that the Croatian forces were requisitioning 300,000 food rations daily, not counting the legionnaire divisions, although in his opinion they needed at most about 160,000 rations.’” The most detailed and authoritative wartime information on the strength and composition of the Croatian forces is found in a report that Paveli¢ submitted to Kasche on October 4, 1943, on their condition as of September 23, 1943, shortly after the Italian surrender. Significantly, Paveli¢ did not submit the report to Glaise, the Wehrmacht’s representative, whom he thoroughly disliked and feared. He divided all Croatian forces— 262,326 men strong—into two categories, those under German command and those under Croatian command. The forces under German command consisted of 62,020 Croatian troops within the German armed forces, 9,000 new recruits

for these troops, 36,300 Croatian troops supplied by the Germans and under German command, and 62,760 Croatian troops supplied by the Croats but under German command, for a total of 170,080 men. More specifically, the first group included the legionnaire divisions, the SS formations of men from Croatia, and Croats in the German Luftwaffe, antiaircraft forces, and navy. The second included the new recruits for the legionnaire divisions already in training at Stockerau, Austria, and the third consisted mostly of the light infantry brigades and railroad security troops. The fourth group included the 18,200 men of the mountain brigades—the elite troops of the Croatian army—some other army troops, and 25 battalions (22,500 men) of Ustasha militia troops. The forces under Croatian command, totaling 92,246 officers, noncommissioned officers, and men, included all other Croatian armed forces in 30 different groups, including the gendarmerie with about 18,000 men, Paveli¢’s Personal Guard of 6,000 men, air force and antiaircraft troops with 9,775 men, '7Micr. No. T-501, Roll 268, Fr. 38.

424 , THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA —_| three labor regiments with 5,996 men, garrisoning troops with 7,133 men, the Zagreb garrison with 3,935 men, the medical corps with 2,680 people, the

navy with 1,262 men, and so on.” _ ,

, THE WEAKNESSES OF THE ARMY , | Despite its large size, the Croatian army was never a well-functioning, de_ pendable, and efficient fighting force. The reasons for this are clear. First, few Croats owed complete and undivided allegiance to the Ustasha regime and its institutions, including the army. As early as September 13, 1941, Glaise reported to his superiors that the “rank and file [of the Croatian army] often feel that the civil war is a war between brothers,” and he noted that he heard daily from Croatian officers, his former comrades in the Austro-Hungarian army, that they “have doubts about the sense and success of their task and the propri-

ety of the ways of their superiors.”” CS

| Second, the army was discriminated against in favor of the Ustasha militia,

| which undermined its cohesion and morale. Because the Ustasha regime distrusted the army, it purposely kept it in a subordinate position and sought to build up the militia instead. Discrimination went so far that militiamen received preferential treatment in food and care even when wounded army soldiers and militiamen had beds in the same ward of a military hospital.” There was also a _ differentiation in functions, the easier or more unsavory tasks, such as mopping-up operations, assignments in Zagreb, guard duty in concentration camps,

and punitive operations, mostly going to the militia. ae Third, there was mass disregard of calls for induction and widespread evasion of the draft, a clear expression of the public’s lack of confidence in and opposition to the Ustasha regime and the army. According to a report by Glaise on May 19, 1942, of 20,000 men called up over a given period of time, barely more than half showed up. Most men exempted from service by draft commis- sions were from well-to-do families able to bribe commission members, which caused great dissatisfaction among those who had no such resources and thus

had to serve. Reserve officers similarly disregarded calls for service on a mass , basis. In the spring of 1943, for example, when the Croatian Ministry of Armed Forces called up 149 reserve officers for induction and further training at the Central Military School in Varazdin, only 65 responded, while 84 failed to ap-

pear. Of the latter, only 22 had valid excuses.”' | oo "*Micr. No. T-77, Roll 883, Frs. 5,6 3 1,890-92. According to Kasche, ina letter to the Foreign , _ Ministry of October 8, 1943, accompanying Paveli¢’s statistics, the number of Croatian servicemen in the German forces in the first group, after the unification of SS troops and the German

navy, was 70,000 to 80,000 rather than the 62,020 indicated by Paveli¢. See Fr. 5,63 1,890.: | , "Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 1369. _

The “Jureti¢ Report” of June 10, 1942, p. 4, in RG 226, OSS-File No. 21782.

”!For Glaise’s report, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 1048. See Micr. No. T-501, Roll 2.67, Frs..329-30 for the letter that a group of reservists in service wrote to Glaise on February

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 425 Jakob Elicker, a Volksdeutsche and chief of the district of Vuka, sent a revealing report on the draft (among other matters) in parts of Slavonia to Glaise on August 24, 1943. According to Elicker, in the general mobilization of Croats up

to age 35, most simply did not respond and many non-respondents joined the Partisans instead. Croats no longer believed in a German (and thus Ustasha) victory and consequently did not want to fight. Elicker further reported that Croatian peasants considered the Germans their worst enemy and that no Ustasha supporters could be found in the countryside of his district. Even some Volksdeutsche, he wrote, when returning home with arms on furlough, did not want to return to their units if their families were left unprotected.”

Undoubtedly, the two principal reasons for the public’s mass refusal to follow induction orders from mid-1942 on were the growth of the Partisan resistance movement and growing dissatisfaction with and opposition to the Ustashas and the Germans. The Partisans offered an alternative that appeared

more in Croatia’s national interest than that offered by the Ustashas, who were seen as tools of the Axis powers. As the war advanced and it became clear

that after Italy, Germany also, and with it the Independent State of Croatia, would be defeated, the willingness of Croats to serve became less and less and the attraction of the Partisans greater and greater. Fourth, the army did not have a well-trained and dependable officer corps. The officer corps consisted of four different groups. Initially, Croatian officers who had earlier served in the Austro-Hungarian armed forces, such as Vilko Begi¢, Fedor Dragojlov, Slavko Kvaternik, Vladimir Laxa, and Slavko Stancer, held the highest posts. Almost all in their late fifties and sixties, some even in their seventies, they had ended the First World War as majors, lieutenant colonels, or colonels and had spent the interwar period in retirement or in private employment. They had little notion of a modern army. In a special category was a former Austro-Hungarian and later Yugoslav officer, Lieutenant General August Mari¢, who was on active duty until the collapse of the Yugoslav

army in April 1941 and who became the first chief of the Croatian General Staff. But he was removed from his post and retired already in September 1941, probably because, as a former high Yugoslav army officer, he was not trusted. As the war progressed, most of these former Austro-Hungarian officers, due to old age, professional incapacity, or political incompatibility with the Ustashas, were retired at their own request or on the basis of a special order from Pavelic of July 27, 1942, according to which all state employees in both the civil and military services who reached 60 years of age had to submit applications within three days requesting retirement.” 4, 1943, strongly protesting against draft evasion and corruption in the draft commissions, and Frs. 28 5-87 for the failure of reserve officers to report for training in Varazdin.

*~Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Frs. 642-43. |

For Mari¢’s retirement, see Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 266, Frs. 365-66. For the special order of July 27, 1942, see Zbornik zakona inaredaba NDH, 1942, p.944.

426 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA | The second group of officers consisted of Ustasha returnees of several different backgrounds. Some were former Austro-Hungarian officers who spent the 1920’s abroad as active anti- Yugoslav political émigrés and joined the Ustashas in the 1930’s (Josip Metzger, Ivan Per¢cevic). Some were former AustroHungarian noncommissioned officers (Vjekoslav Servatzy). Some were former Yugoslav officers who fled from Yugoslavia and joined the Ustashas abroad (Tomislav Serti¢). Some were Yugoslav officers who deserted during the War of April 1941 either to the Germans or the Ustashas (Vladimir Kren, Franjo Nikoli¢). Finally, some belonged to a select set of Ustasha returnees, in their late twenties or early thirties, who had no professional military training but enjoyed Paveli¢’s confidence. After serving as officers in the militia, gendarmerie, or special units, they were promoted to generals following the unification of the army and militia in December 1944 and were put in charge of most Croatian military forces (Rafael Boban, Ivan Heren¢i¢, Vjekoslav Luburié, Ante Moskov,

Vilko Peénikar). ! a , The third and largest group of officers were Croats, plus a few men of other nationalities, who were officers in the Yugoslav army at the time of the collapse of Yugoslavia in April 1941 and who applied to join the new armed forces. Al-

though several had formerly been Austro-Hungarian officers of low rank, Glaise considered them all poorly trained. As former Yugoslav officers, they were not trusted by the Ustashas and former Austro-Hungarian officers. Indeed, a sizable number of them became secret Partisan sympathizers while remaining in the Croatian forces or gradually went over to the Partisans. There are indications, which I was unable to confirm, that among the former were General Ivan Prpi¢, chief of General Staff during most of the war, and General Viktor Prebeg, for some time chief of Paveli¢’s Military Office. However, some officers who had earlier served in the Yugoslav army did rise to high rank in the Croatian army and proved to be good commanders. Three Serbs from Croatia who had been Austro-Hungarian officers, Fedor Dragojlov, Djuro Grui¢, and Lavoslav Milic, the latter two also former Yugoslav officers, became generals in the Croatian army. Gruié was the last chief of Paveli¢’s Military Office. A fourth group of officers consisted of reservists, who during the interwar period received training for reserve officers in Yugoslav schools, and of rapidly

aly. , ,

trained draftees, who graduated from high schools and universities in the course of the war. Some of the latter were trained in Germany and a few in It-

One of the major complaints of Croatian army commands was that they lacked younger General Staff officers. The army was top-heavy with generals and colonels, many of them of an advanced age. From various sources, I have prepared a list of the generals and admirals in the Croatian armed forces that totals about roo, though the actual number was probably higher, around 130. The large number of high ranking officers contributed little to the strength of

the armed forces.

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 427 Considering its varied background and training and its different views toward the Axis and Allied powers as well as toward the Ustasha regime and other political and fighting forces in Croatia, the Croatian officer corps could hardly be expected to provide efficient, dedicated, and dependable leadership to the Croatian armed forces. As will be shown later, both the Ustashas and the Germans blamed it as the principal cause for the unsatisfactory performance of the Croatian army and for the process of disintegration that began in the Croatian armed forces as early as the summer of 1941. There were several other reasons for the weakness of the Croatian army, in addition to those we have already enumerated—the public’s lack of allegiance to the Ustasha state and its institutions, discrimination against the army in favor of the Ustasha militia, widespread evasion of the draft, and the lack of a well-trained and cohesive officer corps. The pay, for both officers and the rank and file, was low, much less than that for German officers and soldiers serving in Croatia. There was a lack of proper clothing and footwear and often a poor and irregular food supply. Furthermore, many units were kept at the front lines

too long without relief, which led to exhaustion and increased rates of sickness." Arms and ammunition were inadequate and unsatisfactory. A few months after the establishment of the new state, the Germans sold captured Yugoslav army arms and ammunition to the Croatian forces, but subsequently they sold them captured Czechoslovak, Polish, or French arms, which were of lower quality than German arms and not familiar to Croatian soldiers. Glaise reported to Colonel Schuchardt in the Attaché Department of the German General Staff on August 13, 1943, that neither he nor Lieutenant General Liiters, commanding general of German troops in Croatia, could bring themselves to deliver German arms coming into Croatia to Croatian light infantry brigades “because we feared to create new arms suppliers for the Partisans.”” After the Italian surrender in September 1943, Croatian requests for arms from the Germans were mostly met by turning Italian arms over to them, sometimes without essential parts. Finally, after Bulgaria defected from the Axis camp in September 1944, some of the arms captured from its forces in Serbia and Yugoslav Macedonia were turned over to the Croatian forces.”* Additional problems arose from the arrogant and abusive behavior of Ger-

man officers and noncommissioned officers toward the Croatian troops they fought with. Conflicts sometimes reached such a pitch that the Croatian General Staff asked the German plenipotentiary general in Zagreb to remove cer4For the poor pay in the army, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Frs. 338-39. For the poor supplies and extended service periods, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 1284; Micr. No. T501, Roll 265, Frs. 748-51; and Zbornik DNOR, 5, bk. 10: 444.

*SFor the army’s poor armament, see Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 267, Frs. 676-77. For Glaise’s report of August 13, 1943, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 498. 6Micr. No. T-77, Roll 781, Frs. 5,507,636 and 5,507,649.

428 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA | tain individuals and groups. And finally, the pacifist-oriented Croatian Peasant

Party continued to exercise a strong influence on Croatian politics and the Croatian population.”” While this factor is difficult to assess, it probably contributed to the increased unwillingness of the Croatian army to fight, the more so as the Macek core of the party opposed the Ustasha regime. It is clear that many factors combined to keep the Croatian army from be-

coming a capable and reliable fighting force. Cumulatively, they created the feeling in most officers and men that they were being used by the occupying powers, especially Germany, for the latter’s own aims. The result was that the Croatian army ceased to have a sense that what it was fighting for was worth-

while. |

In time all these factors engendered a process of progressive disintegration in the Croatian army. In late 1942 and early 1943, under the impact of the Allied landings in North Africa and the German debacle at Stalingrad, together |

with constant Partisan propaganda and the work of Partisan sympathizers within army units, as well as the appeals of Croatian Peasant Party politicians cooperating with the Partisans, large-scale desertions from the army began, with many deserters joining the Partisans. As the war advanced, desertions spread to the legionnaire divisions and reached mass proportions. A highly confidential report by Glaise to Lohr, commander in chief in southeast Europe,

on January 4, 1943, pointed out that an average of 25 men per company were |

absent without leave in some battalions of the 369th Infantry Division | (legionnaires) on the very day that they arrived in Croatian territory from Austria. In the “Situation Report” for June 1943, Lohr, who was responsible for

Operations Weiss and Schwarz against the Partisans, noted that 2,000 men from the Croatian forces had deserted to or were captured by the Partisans and that the latter had captured “15 artillery pieces, 2 antitank guns, 14 mortars, 39 heavy machine guns, 79 light machine guns, 3,000 rifles, and a great quantity of ammunition. The booty taken by the Partisans almost corresponds to the

total booty taken by us in Operation Schwarz.”” In the following months, especially after the Italian surrender in September 1943, a new wave of mass desertions occurred. According to a German report

of November 30, 1943, between June and October 1943, 786 men deserted from the 2nd Light Infantry Brigade, 1,097 men from the 4th, and 2,217 men from the 3rd. During October 1943 alone, 334 men deserted from the 373rd Infantry Division and 489 men from the 369th.” In innumerable cases, Croa?”For an example of a Croatian General Staff request, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Frs. 747-51. For the influence of the Croatian Peasant Party, see Nazor, S Partizanima, p. 28. *For Glaise’s report to Lohr, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 572-76, and for Lohr’s “Situation Report,” see Micr. No. T-78, Roll 332, Fr. 6,290,262. © *Micr. No. T-313, Roll 488, Frs. 212-14. In a report of October 1, 1943, to the 2nd Panzer Army, Lieutenant General Liiters stated that the best soldiers (veterans from the Russian

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 429 tian army troops simply surrendered their positions to the Partisans without a fight or went over to them with their arms, as they did on September 30, 1943, near Tuzla and Stojdraga, on October 6 near Kupres, on October 8 near Marija Bistrica, on October 21 near Preko and Sanski Most, on November 4 near Kotor Varos, on November 7 near Virovitica, on November 11 near Bjelovar, and on November 14 near Cazin. Desertions occurred throughout the country and in all units. According to “Report No. 6” of the Military Intelligence Department of the Croatian Ministry of Armed Forces on April 15, 1944, during February and March 1944 there were 2,63 1 desertions from the Croatian forces.” Desertions from the Croatian army to the Partisans were not limited to the ground forces. On May 23, 1943, two Croatian fighter pilots, Rudi Cajavec and Franjo Kluz, deserted with their planes to the Partisans and were soon in action against their former comrades, both pilots subsequently losing their lives | in battle. In the fall of 1943 a pilot with his training plane and a pilot and navigator with their bomber deserted to the Partisans. As the war advanced and the realization spread that Germany and thus Croatia too would be defeated, the Croatian army lost even more will to fight and the rate of desertions increased. This was especially true after Ivan Subasié, a prominent member of the Croatian Peasant Party who had become prime minister of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, concluded an agreement with Marshal Tito on June 16, 1944. Tito subsequently issued a new proclamation calling on all Yugoslavs fighting on the German side to join the Partisans. Further demoralization followed the liquidation of the Lorkovié-Vokié plot and the arrest of collaborating politicians and army officers at the end of August 1944 and the surrender of Romania and Bulgaria and the Red Army’s appearance on the Yugoslav frontier in Vojvodina and Serbia in September 1944. A report by the German military attaché in Zagreb on September 12, 1944, noted that between August 29 and September ro—that is, in less than two weeks— there were 3,500 desertions from army forces and 2,500 soldiers missing after the fall of the towns of Derventa and Prijedor in Bosnia; in both cases most of the deserters apparently went over to the Partisans. The same report listed Croatian units according to their degree of disintegration, from most to least, in the following order: light infantry brigades, other army units, railroad protecfront and specialists) mostly deserted from the legionnaire divisions to the Partisans. Micr. No. T-314, Roll 554, Fr. 1403. For the surrenders of the Croatian army, see Micr. No. T-313, Roll 488, Frs. 209, 212~ 14. The deserters at Tuzla included Colonel Sulejman Filipovi¢ and 74 other army officers (see Chapter 11 for more about Filipovic), According to a British liaison officer with the Parti-

sans, of the Croatian forces involved in fighting near Sanski Most, 70 were killed and wounded, while 865 officers and men with their arms surrendered to the Partisans. United Kingdom, PREM [records of the Prime Minister] 3/613/13, p. 94. See also Micr. No. T-501, Roll 253, Fr. 650. For “Report No. 6” on April 15, 1944, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 11/17, Box 87.

430 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA tion troops, police, air force, the 13th SS Division “Handschar,” mountain bri-

gades, and legionnaire divisions.” , |

In September 1944, an entire antiaircraft company from the air defenses of Zagreb, consisting of two officers and about 100 men, with all light arms and equipment, and an entire Air Force School regiment from Petrovaradin (across the river from Novi Sad), with over 400 officers, noncommissioned officers, and men, deserted to the Partisans. On the night of September 20-21, 1944, when the Partisans took the Zaluzani airfield near Banja Luka, they captured eleven aircraft and about 200 men of the Croatian air force, apparently without any opposition, and used them almost immediately in operations against German and Croatian Ustasha forces.”

Especially heavy desertions took place from the 13th SS Division “Handschar” in September 1944. This was the chief reason for relocating the division from northeast Bosnia to northern Croatia. A December 11, 1944, report from the intelligence unit Leitstelle I Siidost to Reichsfithrer SS Himmler

and others on political conditions in Croatia noted that during September 1944, 247 officers and 6,156 noncommissioned officers and privates had deserted from the Croatian army, navy, and air force.” _ Of course, by late 1944 desertions were also common in other forces under German command deployed in southeast Europe. According to reports of the commander in chief in southeast Europe for September, October, and November 1944, desertions were numerous not only from auxiliary units consisting of non-Germans, but also from regular army units from the Greater Reich.* _

As already noted, most German documents from the last six to eight months of the war were ordered destroyed. However, a surviving last volume of the diary of the Operations Staff of the German Armed Forces High Command, chronicling operations from January 1, 1945, to the end of the war on the basis of “Situation Reports” (Lagebiicher), shows that desertions from the Croatian armed forces continued. Following a December 12, 1944, report from the intelligence officer of Army Group F that a large number of Croats from the 3731d Infantry Division (legionnaires) went over to the Partisans during the attack of the 3 5th Partisan Division in Lika, a January 2, 1945, report stated that 'Micr. No. T-77, Roll 883, Fr. 5,631,298. *Micr. No. T-77, Roll 883, Fr. 5,631,301; Dumitrov, “Air Force in the Yugoslav Na-

tional Liberation War,” pp. 60, 87-88. _ 8Micr. No. T-311, Roll 196, Frs. 499-504, especially Fr. 502. This report also gave the |

reasons for the disintegration of the Croatian armed forces. |

“For the number of search warrants issued and the number withdrawn for AWOL soldiers in twelve different groups of regular and auxiliary units under the commander in chief in southeast Europe for September, October, and November 1944, see Germany, Federal Republic of, Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg i. Br., Document Group RH 149 IX, File 40. For the order of the commander in chief in southeast Europe of November 29, 1944, to the 2nd Panzer Army to put a halt to the disintegration of the LXVIIIth Army Corps, see Micr. No. T-311, Roll 194, Frs. 1189-90. |

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA A31 two more companies of Croatian soldiers from that division had deserted. The “Situation Report” for March 18, 1945, noted that 120 men had deserted from the Croatian 9th Division near Sarajevo and that the authorities had ordered the division to be disarmed, though later reports indicate that the order had been rescinded. The Croatian navy, consisting of a flotilla of small craft stationed at Rijeka, also tried to desert to the Partisans at the end of December 1944, but was

prevented by timely German intervention, except for one craft with the com- | mander of the flotilla. The Germans disarmed the other vessels and sent the crews to Zagreb, where they formed a special unit for service on land.”

In view of the many desertions to the Partisans from all of the Croatian armed forces except the Ustasha militia, we can say that the Croatian army, like the Chetnik formations, in time became an important recruiting pool for the Partisans. This was so obvious that a maverick pro-German Croatian nationalist politician, Stjepan Buc, in a memorandum to Prime Minister Mandi¢ on

October 22, 1943, criticizing the policies of the Ustasha government, wrote, “Without any sentimentality our army should be disbanded immediately. Today it is a center for the dissemination of troop demoralization, which arms the ‘Partisans’ and kills the confidence of the people in its defensive activity.”*° The Ustasha militia was totally different in nature and esprit de corps from the army. Militia units were composed mostly of young volunteers, indoctrinated in ultranationalistic Ustasha ideology, proud of belonging to the party’s

armed elite, and, like their commanders (with very rare exceptions), completely : loyal to Paveli¢ and the Ustasha Party. They were unruly and undisciplined but liked fighting and according to general opinion were tough combat soldiers. So it is especially significant that by April 1944 the abandonment of frontline posi-

tions and desertions began even in Ustasha militia units, though very infrequently. For example, on April 11, 1944, a group of 150 Ustasha militiamen left their bunkers in a sawmill at Djurdjenovac near NaSice in Slavonia without a fight, whereupon about 150 Partisans took the sawmill and set it on fire. According to a message from the German Vth SS Mountain Corps, a bridge guard detail from an Ustasha transportation brigade near Metkovi¢ in Dalmatia deserted to the Partisans in early May 1944, whereupon the bridge was demolished; some other Ustasha units maintained secret contacts with the Partisans; and on May 17 and 22, 1944, 52 Ustasha militiamen from the transportation brigade in the same area deserted to the Partisans.” 5For reports on the 373rd Infantry Division, see Germany, Federal Republic of, Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg i. Br., Document Group RH 19 IX, File 26. For reports on that division, on the gth Division, and on the navy, see Kriegstagebuch, 4, pt. 2: 978, 1181, and 1424. For the navy, see also Micr. No. T-311, Roll 196, Fr. 490. *Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 265, Frs. 646-52, especially Fr. 649. See also the report of the German XVth Army Corps of August 27, 1943, in Micr. No. T-314, Roll 554, Fr. 1393. *’Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5788, Frs. H302,601 and H302,607—-10. According to Partisan sources, 42 Ustasha militiamen who were surrounded near Bugojno in Bosnia surrendered to the Partisans on August 25, 1943. See Zori¢, “Attack on Bugojno,” p. 23.

432 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA _ While Croatian army desertions were of tremendous military, political, and psychological significance to the Partisans, Croatian army officers and men

also helped the Partisans in other ways. They surreptitiously supplied them with military matériel, especially light arms, ammunition, and explosives, and medical supplies. According to German sources, Partisan sympathizers in the

, ‘Croatian air force supplied the Partisans with explosives by bombarding vil-

lages with bombs without fuses.” an ,

Croatian military officers also made a significant contribution to the Partisans in intelligence. The center of this activity was Zagreb. On the Partisan side, it was the work of a trio of operators, Ivan-Stevo Krajaci¢, Ivo Lola Ribar, and

Dragutin Saili, and on the Croatian side, of a group of officers, most of whom | had been in the Yugoslav army. Kraja¢i¢ named not less than nineteen officers in the Croatian forces who collaborated closely with the Partisans in intelli_ gence work. Four, including Colonel Vladimir Gali¢, commander of a brigade of Paveli¢’s Personal Guard, were caught and executed by the Ustashas, while the others survived and joined the postwar Yugoslav army. In one of the final

exploits of this group, one of the officers arranged for the remainder of the Croatian air force assembled on an airfield near Zagreb to move to Partisan territory just before the liberation of Zagreb.” Intelligence supplied by Croatian army sympathizers was used by the Parti-

sans in military maneuvers. In Croatia, where the Partisans usually fought against a combination of German, Italian, Croatian, and Chetnik troops, those sections of the front held by units of the Croatian army or legionnaire divisions were invariably its weakest points, since these forces were increasingly demoralized and influenced by pro-Partisan committees. When informed of their lo~ cation by Croatian army intelligence, the Partisans could choose the best loca-

tions for breakthroughs and other maneuvers.” |

In order to counteract repeated Partisan amnesties that encouraged desertions from the Croatian armed forces, the Ustasha government instituted amnesties of its own on January 26, 1944, for deserters from Partisan formations

38Micr. No. T-313, Roll 488, Fr. 214. oo See Ivan-Stevo Krajati¢’s contribution, “Illegal Work in Zagreb,” in Dedijer, Novi priloziza biografiju Josipa Broza Tita, 2: 496-505. On January 16, 1944, Archbishop Stepinac’s secretary noted in the archbishop’s diary that the archbishop had sent a letter to Paveli¢é that _ day, asking the latter to commute the death sentence for Colonel Gali¢é and Lieutenant Colo- —

nel Bakota. Stepinac, “Diary” (unpublished), vol. 5 (1942-1944), p. 167 (excerpts). The archbishop’s diaries are still held by the police, but have been made available to a few selected scholars. I have consulted excerpts made by a reputable scholar. It may be mentioned that not

tia). : , |

one of these Croatian officers, including those who lost their lives, has been honored with a few lines in the official postwar Yugoslav Vojna enciklopedija. 1 do not know whether the lat-

ter received any other posthumous recognition.

“Information received from a former Partisan intelligence officer (a Croat) and confirmed by a former political commissar of a Croatian Partisan brigade (a Serb from Croa-

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA | 433 and deserters from its own forces who returned to their units.*' Some men who had simply gone AWOL and some who had deserted to the Partisans but became disappointed did return. “Report No. 6” of the Military Intelligence Department of the Croatian Ministry of Armed Forces noted that during February and March 1944, 40 officers returned from being held prisoner (23 fled, 8 were exchanged, and 9 were released) and 2 noncommissioned officers and 205 privates returned, mostly by fleeing. An additional 13 noncommissioned officers and 908 privates returned to their units by fleeing from the Partisans or by re-

turning from AWOL. For propaganda purposes and when reporting to the Germans, the Croatian authorities always claimed a much larger number of deserters from the Partisans than there really were. Paveli¢ made some typically egregious claims in this regard when he met with Hitler on September 18, 1944, and asserted that “in all only 2,500 Croatian army men had deserted, but only 500 have gone over to the enemy.... Thanks to the amnesty that had already expired, 30,000 Partisans had returned from the forests to their villages and the

Partisans had become much weaker than they had been before.” For their part, the Partisans often released some deserters or Croatian soldiers taken prisoner for propaganda purposes. But this also redounded to their benefit in other ways; it was reported, for example, that some Croatian army soldiers took as many as five rifles to the Partisans by repeated desertions.*

For the Germans, just as for the Ustashas, the Croatian army’s lack of fighting zeal, demoralization, and gradual internal disintegration caused no end of problems. But they were unwilling to acknowledge the basic cause of the trouble, namely that a large number of officers and rank and file did not want

to fight for them against their own people. The Germans and the Ustashas blamed the officer corps for the demoralization and desertions, although the frequent abandonment of positions without a fight and mass desertions could hardly have taken place without cooperation between dissatisfied officers and men. German commands frequently accused Croatian army officers of being the chief cause of demoralization and disintegration. The report of the German XVth Army Corps of August 27, 1943, for example, stated that “with some exceptions the fighting value of Croatian troops is always low. The officer corps has only partial confidence in German leadership and the mass is anti-German 'Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1944, pp. 80-81, 383. The amnesty apparently ran until July 1, 1944.

“For “Report No. 6,” see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 11/17, Box 87. For Paveli¢’s claims at his meeting with Hitler, see Hillgruber, Staatsmadnner und Diplomaten bei Hitler, p. 508. Kasche generally supported Croatian claims, for which he was heavily criticized by von Ribbentrop and Hitler. See von Ribbentrop’s message to Kasche of April 13, 1944, in Micr.

No. T-120, Roll 5787, Fr. H302,050, and Hitler’s statements on September 17, 1944, ina meeting at his headquarters, in Kriegstagebuch, 4, pt. 2: 1637-38. **General Luburi¢ acknowledged this in his article “Ustashism,” pp. 15-16.

434 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA and [pro-] Yugoslav.” In the same vein, Paveli¢ remarked in a conference with

Glaise and Kasche on November 18, 1943, that army troops, especially the light infantry brigades, were not reliable and that the responsibility for this lay with the officers. Many officers, he added, lacked “a feeling for the fatherland and a faithfulness to duty.” On the other hand, he thought that many other officers, especially those in the mountain brigades, were good, and he stressed the complete dependability of the Ustasha militia, which he wanted to increase in

size tO 50,000 men.” | | CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ARMY

AND THE USTASHAS | , From July 1941 on, Glaise began to refer repeatedly in his reports to conflicts between Croatian army officers and the Ustasha authorities.** Many army officers came into conflict with the Ustashas because they were distrusted by the latter or disagreed with or opposed their policies. Since most officers in the Croatian armed forces were former Yugoslav officers, they were suspected of

not being fully devoted to the new state and the Ustasha regime. Also under suspicion were former Yugoslav officers with known or suspected sympathies for Maéek and the Croatian Peasant Party. Many former Austro-Hungarian officers of Croatian (and some of Serbian) nationality who joined the new Croatian army and in the beginning held most of the leading positions were not fully trusted by the Ustashas either. This lack of trust in the officers of the new army on the one side reinforced or produced mistrust on the other. Many army officers also did not like the methods of the Ustasha regime, and they especially objected to the persecution of Serbs. When Colonel Petar Blaskovi¢, a former

Austro-Hungarian army officer and a divisional commander in Sarajevo in August 1941, protested against the mistreatment of Serbs to Pavelic, he was immediately retired. General Ivan Prpi¢ was removed from his post in Mostar and General Vladimir Laxa from his post in Sarajevo for similar reasons, although both later held the position of chief of General Staff in Zagreb. While Laxa was still in Sarajevo, the Ustashas massacred between 50 and 60 Serbian men, women, and children in a nearby village. To prevent the recurrence of such events, Laxa had posters put up announcing that he would proceed vigorously against such acts, but he was immediately removed from his post and the ~ “Micr. No. T-314, Roll 554, Fr. 1395. See also the report of the 369th Legionnaire Division of October ro, 1943, on the defection of Croatian officers at Tuzla in early October, in

Fr. 1361.Seealsofootnote30. | : *Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5788, Frs. H302,461-62.

**For conflicts from July to September 1941, see Glaise’s reports in Micr. No. T- sor, Roll

264, Frs. 1133-34, 1192-94, and 1361-62. See also a report by General Slavko Stancer, commander of the Croatian land army, of July 21, 1941, in which he also dealt with this

problem, in Zbornik DNOR, 5, bk. 1:277-78. ,

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 435 announcements were taken down.” This undoubtedly served as an encouragement to Ustasha groups bent on disorderly conduct and terror. Marshal Slavko Kvaternik, though himself a prominent Ustasha, was also among the officers of the Croatian army removed from their posts. General Mihajlo Lukié, commander of the Croatian IIIrd Army Corps, who was not well inclined toward the Germans, was also forced to retire in October 1943 because he was suspected of being in contact with the Chetniks.” The lack of trust that the Ustashas had in the army officer corps was well indicated by a statement attributed to an Ustasha militia captain, a returnee in charge of the army officers’ prison on Sava Road in Zagreb. He told his charges in March 1943 “that the Croatian army would not become useful to the Ustashas until at least 80 percent of the present officers are shot.” Even if this threat became exaggerated in the retelling, it indicates how strained relations were between the Ustashas and a large number of army officers. In fact, on August 23, 1943, the Ustashas unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate General Prpic, then chief of General Staff.” Perhaps the most critical assessment of early Ustasha activity that I found was a memorandum of August 7, 1941, by two Croatian officers, gendarmerie Colonel Ladislav Medved and General Staff Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Babié,

apparently written for their own and the Germans’ use. According to the memorandum, the Ustasha Party had attracted many unsavory individuals, who had obtained positions allowing them to engage in numerous unlawful acts, mass corruption, and the like. The two officers drew the following seven

general conclusions: ,

1. Conditions in Croatia are untenable. 2. Yugoslavia perished because it was a lawless state and the center of all disorder

| and unrest in this part of Europe. Croatia has become even worse than Yugoslavia was.

3. The Orthodox population in Croatia is being murdered on a large scale— without sense, reason, order, legal motive, or a feeling of responsibility. It is not the Chetniks or the Partisans who are being killed, but the peaceful population, women and children in villages. 4. The Partisans are really not Communists, but pauperized men, who have been forced to flee into the forests and fight to save their bare lives. 5. The carriers of this system are the Ustashas. 6. Now is the time to undertake decisive measures against the Ustashas, because [continuation] of the present situation may mean the end of the Croatian state. 47Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 1133 and 1362; Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 266, Frs. 365-66. “8Micr. No. T-313, Roll 488, Frs. 212 and 215. Luki¢’s chief of staff was also forced to re-

tire.

“For the militia captain’s remark, see Haeffner’s report to Glaise of April 2, 1943, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Fr. 103. For the attempted assassination of General Prpi¢, see Micr. No. T-5or, Roll 264, Frs. 818 and 826. It was later reported that the attack was ordered by Ustasha Colonel (and later army General) Ivan Herenéi¢é. Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,196-97.

436 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 7. The liquidation of the Ustashas cannot be undertaken with half measures, but as was said, word for word, by the principal German speaker, by “disarming

and shooting.” | ,

They concluded that only the head of state and the army, relying on the broad masses of the Croatian people, could and should solve the pressing difficulties of the state, since all other authorities had been compromised.” This memorandum undoubtedly remained secret because both officers continued in service. Babi¢ fled to the Allies in Italy in January 1944 and Medved was put in prison after the liquidation of the Lorkovi¢-Vokié plot at the end of August 1944, where he remained until he was murdered at the end of the war. Another indication of the difficult relations between the Ustashas and army officers is the list of officers that Supreme Ustasha Headquarters sent to Paveli¢ at the end of March 1944, that is, soon after Ustasha Colonel Ante Vokié became minister of armed forces, with the recommendation that they be removed from active service. The reasons given were many and varied. The most frequent was that the officer had a Serbian or Jewish wife. Some were considered

pro-Yugoslav, some pro-Partisan, a few pro-Chetnik, and still others proBritish. A few were Serbs from Croatia, Slovenes, or Russian by birth; some were accused of being drunkards or corrupt, others of being simply antiUstasha. The list included 6 generals, among them Ivan Prpi¢, chief of General Staff, and Fedor Dragojlov, chief of the Operations Division of the General Staff; 20 General Staff officers; 31 infantry colonels; 32 lieutenant colonels; 10 majors; 15 captains; 4 air force officers; and 11 naval officers—129 in all. In fact, some of these officers were already fighting with the Partisans and others were under arrest. Supreme Ustasha Headquarters suggested that henceforth only Croats and Germans serve as officers in the Croatian armed forces and

that the number of officers assigned to desk duty in the Ministry of Armed Forces in Zagreb be drastically cut.*' Had it not been for the determined intervention of Glaise, who argued that if the listed officers were removed, the Croatian armed forces “would remain without any professionally usable officers,” most of these officers would probably have been dismissed. _

In addition to threats, arrests, retirement, and other mistreatment, the Ustasha regime vigorously prosecuted army officers who secretly worked for the Partisans. The first case was that of Lieutenant Colonel Stjepan Neuberger, a former Yugoslav officer and commander of a transportation unit, which was later sent with the Italians to the Russian front. He was accused of possessing Soviet literature and held responsible when his unit shot at a Croatian military train carrying high dignitaries. He reportedly had contacts with the Chetniks and also, according to German documents, with the Partisans. He was discovered, court-martialed, sentenced to death, and executed on December 23,

~*Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Frs. 1192-94. a *!Micr. No. T-77, Roll 883, Frs. 5,631,770-93.

U

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 437

other officers.” |

1941. His execution was announced on billboards with the aim of frightening

When the Ustasha police arrested about 40 army officers (or according to other reports, 68) in December 1942, one lieutenant colonel who resisted was shot and killed in his home.” In the course of 1943 and 1944, many officers in the army and even some in the Ustasha militia were discovered to be working

for the Partisans in intelligence or otherwise. All were arrested and courtmartialed, with most sentenced to death or long prison terms. In addition to the trial against Ustasha Colonel Gali¢ and Lieutenant Colonel Bakota, there were

at least six other courts-martial in which officers working for the Partisans were sentenced to death. Some pro-Partisan officers who were caught were liquidated without any formalities at all.” As far as am aware, no drastic measures were taken against any army officers whom the Ustashas suspected of sympathizing with the Croatian Peasant Party, probably because the Ustashas believed that they might be used as insurance in the event of an Allied victory. The only exceptions were the officers involved in the Lorkovi¢-Vokié plot. The conflicts between Croatian army officers and the Ustasha authorities and the demoralization and disintegration in the army were well known to both Croatian and German authorities. These conditions had an unfavorable impact on the performance of the Croatian armed forces, and the government went to great lengths to improve the situation. Several services worked against the internal enemy in the armed forces: military counterintelligence, the military police, the Ustasha Surveillance Service, and the military courts. German and Italian intelligence services assisted the Croatian services in this work.** Many

measures were undertaken to remove the malaise in the Croatian army, the mildest being the preparation of lists of suspected men, especially those suspected of Communist leanings, who were then kept under surveillance. Closely related were efforts to discover actively pro-Partisan officers and committees in various military units and commands. Despite these unceasing efforts, however, many pro-Partisan officers remained undetected and rendered invaluable service to the Partisans. *Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Fr. 276; Coli¢, Takozvana Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska 1941, p. 308. 3Micr. No. T-5o01, Roll 265, Frs. roo-104, 164-65, and 181-82, and Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Frs. 3 50-51.

“Coli¢, “The Sympathizers of the National Liberation Movement,” pp. 269-84, especially pp. 279-84; Krajaci¢, “Illegal Work in Zagreb,” especially pp. 498—-sor. *SColi¢, “The Sympathizers of the National Liberation Movement,” pp. 279~80. On some occasions, the Ustasha and German military authorities used bizarre methods to counteract the disintegrating tendencies in the Croatian armed forces. In September 1944, for example, they transferred seven Croatian army generals and senior Ustasha quartermaster of-

ficers from desk assignments in Zagreb to temporary frontline duty, where several were assigned to scouting and others to combating dangerous rumors. Micr. No. T-77, Roll 883, Fr.

§,631,298. :

438 _ THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA Another measure was to flank suspected army units in action with Ustasha

militia and German units, so that the former could not leave their positions , without a fight or make other moves favorable to the opposing Partisan units. Yet another measure, introduced in September 1944, was to detail especially reliable officers and noncommissioned officers to many army units as “political specialists” to counteract disintegrating and demoralizing tendencies. And in | the summer of 1944, the government began systematically reducing the total manpower of army units while at the same time increasing Ustasha militia and |

- legionnaire divisions by directing new recruits to the latter. In addition, German intelligence and police services in Croatia often initiated or supported the investigation and removal from the service or other punishment of Croatian of-

ficers who attracted their suspicion. , ee | Another way in which the Ustasha government tried to improve the armed

forces was by removing undesirable elements from them. On the basis of a law a _ decree of April 4, 1944, the head of state, on the recommendation of the minis, ter of armed forces, could order the separation of officers, and the minister of —__ armed forces the separation of other personnel, from the armed forces if their |

, presence was judged prejudicial to the forces or to the interests of the state. |

be appealed.” OO an

~ Such persons lost their rank and all acquired rights and the decision could not

For the Germans, the dependability of the Croatian army became increas-

ingly important as the Croatian theater of war acquired greater strategic sig- __ nificance. From mid-1943 to the autumn of 1944, the Germans, fearing an Al- | | ) lied landing on the eastern shores of the Adriatic or elsewhere in the Balkans, ©

faced the nagging question of whether the Croatian army would stand by them | or join the Allies and turn against them. The breakthrough of Soviet forces into southeast Europe in the late summer of 1944 and the surrender of Romania _and Bulgaria and their immediate defection from the Axis again raised the same —

concern. In the summer of 1944 the Germans were aware of the possibility that _ the Croatian army might switch to the Western Allies, as several of their intelli-

| gence reports indicated. By September 1944, the permanent “problem state” among German satellites acquired additional importance as the corridor through which the large German forces in the Balkans, particularly the more

than 300,000 men in Greece, had to withdraw to return to the Fatherland. © _ Inthe long run, all the measures undertaken by the Croatian authorities and the Germans to arrest the malaise in the Croatian army failed. The roots of de, -moralization and disintegration were deep, widespread, and continuing. Even- __ ‘For these law decrees, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1942, pp. 326-31 and 1293, and ibid., 1944, p. 285. For several lists of such personnel, see, for example, Croatia, _ Independent State of, Ministry of Armed Forces, Vjestnik Ministarstva Oruzanih Snaga, 5 (1945): 107-10, 118, 157-60, 232-35, 318-20. (See footnote 103 for more information on __ this publication.) Some 134 officers and several noncommissioned officers were “separated”

a from the armed forces only from December 20, 1944, to January 24,1945. ,

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 439 tually Paveli¢, with German blessing, unified the army and the Ustasha militia in December 1944 in order to put the Ustashas in complete control of the army and increase its discipline and fighting quality. The Ustasha state and armed forces remained loyal to the Axis and Croatian territory remained an active theater of operations for German troops until the last days of the war.

THE REMOVAL OF THE KVATERNIKS On two occasions during its existence, the Ustasha regime faced fundamental crises within its leadership, both related to the army. The first was the removal of the Kvaterniks from the Ustasha government in October 1942, and the second, the liquidation of the Lorkovié-Vokié plot at the end of August 1944. The plot was the last phase of the Croatian Peasant Party’s effort to secure control of the Croatian army and from this power base play a decisive role after anticipated Allied landings on the Adriatic and the shift of the army to the Allies. Thus it will be discussed in the following section on the party’s plans for the army. In early October 1942, Marshal Slavko Kvaternik, who had proclaimed the “independence” of Croatia and was Paveli¢’s first deputy, minister of the army, and commander in chief of armed forces, and his son Eugen, a leading Ustasha

returnee, state secretary in the Ministry of Interior, and chief of state police, were removed from their posts and soon thereafter sent into exile in Slovakia. This was not only an indication of serious trouble in the Ustasha leadership, but also a sign of basic problems between Croatia and Germany over military matters. Precisely what caused the downfall of the Kvaterniks was never officially disclosed.’ There is no doubt, however, that both father and son were removed at the insistence of the Germans, especially Glaise. Several weeks earlier, at a meeting in Sofia on September 17, 1942, Glaise and Lohr, armed forces commander in southeast Europe, agreed that the Kvaterniks had to go. They prepared a plan and waited for a favorable moment to put it into effect. This decision was then reflected in a sort of agenda, dated September 22, that Glaise prepared for his forthcoming visit with Paveli¢. Under the heading “The Three Basic Requests,” he wrote: a. The marshal must go. We must participate in naming his successor... . b. Reorganization of the Ministry of the Army. Removal of present clique. Appointment of suitable tougher officers, possibly without a chief of staff of their *’The Kvaterniks were members of an important family. One of the marshal’s brothers, Ljubomir, head of the district (velika Zupa) of Krbava-Psat, with its seat at Bihaé in 1941 and part of 1942, was well known for his ruthlessness against the Serbs. Another brother, Petar Milutin, a former Austro-Hungarian officer like the marshal, was killed by a Yugoslav naval officer early in the Ustasha regime when he tried to take over the county office in Crikvenica, a small town in the Croatian Littoral. On the very strong anti-Serbian stance of the marshal and his brother Ljubomir, see especially Glaise’s report of September 23, 1941, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 266, Frs. 308—11.

440 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA own. Appropriate discussion of personal qualifications of officers. Decisive German influence in the whole reorganization. c. Removal of Eugen Kvaternik; reorganization and disciplining of the Ustasha militia, in connection with which German participation in decision making ab-

, solutely necessary.” |

: There were several reasons for the Germans’ determination to get rid of the older Kvaternik. At the beginning of the Ustasha regime, the marshal had been

so markedly pro-German that he had incurred the wrath of the Italians. But subsequently, he did not perform to the Germans’ satisfaction. In their opinion, he was guilty of mismanaging the Croatian army by filling important military positions with old and inefficient former Austro-Hungarian officers, whose chief qualification was their devotion to him. These officers were unable to instill order and confidence in the army and improve its fighting will. Quite simply, the marshal’s removal was necessary if the quality of the army was to be improved, under German guidance and for principally German objectives. The Germans also wanted to remove the younger Kvaternik, though for quite different reasons. Eugen Kvaternik bore a large share of the responsibility for the persecution of the Serbs in Croatia, which unfavorably affected German mili-

| tary and economic interests in Croatia as well as in occupied Serbia, where reports of the Ustashas’ activities and the large number of Serbian expellees and refugees from the Croatian state destabilized the Nedié regime. In a report of August 9, 1941, Glaise wrote that Eugen Kvaternik was “the most hated man in the country by all groups without distinction as to social standing or national affiliation. The Serbs or Orthodox, essentially, were put outside the law, but the Croats also experience the greatest legal insecurity and in all social strata are exposed to personal indignities.”” Paveli¢ also wanted to remove the Kvaterniks. The removal of the marshal would eliminate a rival, smooth the way for closer military cooperation with the Germans, and increase his personal influence over military matters, since he planned to assume the posts of minister of the army and commander in chief himself. The removal of the police chief would eliminate an individual whom he apparently feared. Furthermore, it appears that Paveli¢ wanted the marshal to take the blame for the failures of the army and the younger Kvaternik the blame for the terror in Croatia, even though all their decisions had been made

with his knowledge.” | *’Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 618-21.

*’Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 1134. . “According to General MoSkov, in his interrogation by postwar Yugoslav authorities, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 1/4, Box 9 I. O., p. 69. According to Glaise’s agent Haeffner, Eugen Kvaternik was secretly inspecting Paveli¢’s personal mail. See Micr. No. T501, Roll 265, Fr. rrr. For his part, in a postwar article the younger Kvaternik accused Paveli¢ of planning to kill him at the beginning of 1942. See his “Italian Policy,” p. 186. The Germans reported that already in February 1942 they had heard that Paveli¢ was contemplating relieving Marshal Kvaternik of his post as minister of the army, in part because

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 441 The opportunity to remove the Kvaterniks came after Paveli¢ visited Hitler’s headquarters on September 23, 1942. Their removal was presented as a routine reorganization of the cabinet. The immediate reasons for sending the marshal first on a sick leave to Slovakia in October 1942 and soon thereafter for dismissing and exiling him were two speeches he gave on October 2, 1942.

Speaking to the graduating class of reserve officer cadets at Varazdin, Kvaternik declared that claims by enemy propaganda that they would be sent to the Russian front were false. The real question is why Marshal Kvaternik took this stand so early in the war, since it implied strong doubts about Germany’s ability to conquer Russia and contrasted sharply with his initial eagerness in sending a regiment of Croatian troops to the Russian front. The answer lies in a very pessimistic report on

Germany’s position in Russia that he received in May 1942 from Lieutenant Colonel Anton Svajger. A Slovene and former Yugoslav General Staff officer who joined the Croatian General Staff after April 1941, Svajger visited the Russian front in the spring of 1942 and subsequently gave Kvaternik a detailed analysis of why he thought Germany could not expect to win the war against Russia. The marshal used it to argue that “we will not senselessly squander our capital [young reserve officers] on the eastern front.”*' But this flew in the face of the plans that the Germans still had at that time to obtain more Croatian the Italians accused him of sabotaging Italian-Croatian agreements on military cooperation. See Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5785, Frs. H300,676-77. In his report of June 10, 1942, Jureti¢ wrote that Marshal Kvaternik was on his way out. See RG 226, OSS-File No. 21782, p. 6. 6IGlaise obtained the verbatim texts of Kvaternik’s speeches in a letter from Haeffner dated October 3, 1942. See Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Frs. 216-21, especially Fr. 219. I did not find the text of Svajger’s report to Kvaternik, which may have been oral. But Svajger talked extensively about his visit to Captain Arthur Haeffner, a retired former AustroHungarian officer whom he apparently took to be a Croat, but who was actually an Austrian who had long lived in Croatia, as well as a friend and confidential agent of Glaise. According to Haeffner, Svajger told him that he had made the following observations about the Russian front in a report to Marshal Kvaternik in May 1942: the overextension of communication lines was endangering German military operations; German brutality against political commissars, soldiers, and the civilian population had solidified Russian opposition; the Russians’ scorched-earth policy was so thorough that the Germans found nothing usable in the conquered areas, which greatly increased their supply and billeting problems; and Russian reserves in manpower represented an insurmountable difficulty for the Germans, which in the end would be decisive. In a word, Germany could not expect to win the war against Russia. See Frs. 236-38. See also Glaise’s reports of December 12, 1942, and January 2, 1943, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 268, Frs. 66-67 and 78-79. In a similar vein, when Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Babié returned from service on the Russian front in the summer of 1942 and informed a high Ustasha official “that the Germans cannot win the war in Russia and that it would be necessary to adjust Croatian policy according to this,” the Ustasha official replied that Babi¢ “was a crintinal and that he should be turned over to the Ustasha police.” Babi¢ prepared a written report in much milder terms and avoided incurring the wrath of the authorities. See Babi¢’s reply to a three-part interview of

him in Nova Hrvatska (London), 1976, nos. 2, 3, and 4, in the same journal, no. 7, p. 7. |

442 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA | troops to fight in Russia.” It was only in September 1943, after the Italian surrender and a great increase in the strength of the Yugoslav Partisans, that they

decided that the Croatian legionnaire divisions and other mixed German-

Croatian units would be used exclusively in Croatia. | After Marshal Kvaternik’s speeches in Varazdin on October 2 provided an immediate excuse for his ouster, a reorganization of the cabinet was undertaken on October ro. The number of ministries was reduced from twelve to eight. The marshal was removed as minister of the army and commander in chief, positions that Paveli¢ himself took over for the time being. At the same

time, the younger Kvaternik was removed as chief of state police.® a But the problems in the armed forces and with the Ustashas’ anti-Serbian policies were too deep to be solved by reshuffling the cabinet, and the removal of the Kvaterniks had only a limited effect. The mismanagement and poor fighting quality of the Croatian army continued, though no additional troops were sent to the Russian front. The. persecution of the Serbs also continued, though on a somewhat reduced scale. However, after the ouster of Marshal Kvaternik, “the Ministry of Armed Forces and Supreme Headquarters became only the conveyors of German orders for the Croatian forces and this remained

| the case more or less until the end of the war.” ae ,

The removal of the Kvaterniks was an important event in the history of the Ustasha regime. It led to an increase in German influence, enabled Paveli¢ to increasingly intervene in military affairs, and contributed to the worsening of relations between the army and the Ustasha militia, at the expense of the former.

CROATIAN PEASANT PARTY PLANS

FOR THE ARMY | Se ,

_ The second crisis over the army that the Ustasha regime faced was the plan of Ministers Lorkovié and Vokié to shift the Croatian state and armed forced to. the Allied side in the fall of 1944. This plan originated with the Croatian Peasant Party and is most easily understood as part of the party’s sustained effort,

supported by friendly army officers, to obtain control of the Croatian army and , secure the backing of the Western Allies, especially Great Britain. The party’s objective -was to create a position of strength from which to bargain with other

domestic forces at the end of the war. - ns

In the previous chapter, we described the three-way split that occurred in

the party during the war and noted that from April 1941 to the second half of |

, 1942, the center of the party remained inactive. But toward the end of 1942 and in early 1943, it became active again, for a number of reasons. The war had

— ?Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Fr. 706. ] , | Micr. No. T-501, Roll 268, Frs. 130-31. , OS

“The words of General Mogkov in his postwar interrogation, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia

-Docs., Reg. No. 1/4, Box 9 I. O., pp. 68-69. | -

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 443 definitely turned against the Axis. The Partisans had become a serious competitor for power by significantly increasing their strength, as shown by the creation of a large liberated area in the middle of the Independent State of Croatia and the establishment of AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia) in November 1942 and of ZAVNOH (Regional Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia) in June 1943. An increasing number of Croatian Peasant Party members, especially in Dalmatia, the Croatian Littoral, Lika, and Slavonia, were growing impatient with Macéek’s wait-andsee policy and deserting to the Partisans. The party was acutely conscious of the need to avoid a repetition of 1918, when the lack of an adequate army unfavorably affected Croatian national interests after the proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. The Croatian Peasant Party was fully aware that, whatever the political situation internationally and within Yugoslavia, its bargaining position at the end of the war would be much stronger if it had the solid support of the Western Allies, as well as an adequate military force of its own. The party had lost its two paramilitary guards to the Ustashas in April 1941 and had not planned or organized any armed units of its own. Thus, the only armed force that was a potential ally was the Croatian army. The party knew that many former Yugoslav officers in the army opposed the Ustashas and the occupation powers and were ready to support Croatian Peasant Party policies and cooperate with the Western Allies. Consequently, from mid-1942, most political statements from the party circulating clandestinely in Croatia praised the army as a national force separate from and opposed to the Ustashas and as an important factor in Croatian politics after the end of the Ustasha regime.” Both the party and the army officers who sympathized with it became preoccupied with the need for Croatia to shift to the Allied camp to avoid being on the losing side at the end of the war. These ideas were probably soon communicated to party representatives in the Yugoslav government-in-exile. The already mentioned Jureti¢ report of June ro, 1942, harshly criticized the Ustashas, but then went on in somewhat defective English: “The behavior of the great number of ex-Yugoslav officers at present in the Croatian Army, is very good. The people put their hopes in them for the day of overthrow of the ‘Ustashi’ regime. It is advisable not to

degrade [criticize] from amongst them [any] other than those who were ‘SSee, for example, a long memorandum reportedly of Macéek’s views that the party circulated clandestinely in February 1943, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Frs. 763-70, and a memorandum from the same source in early 1943, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Frs. 117285, especially Frs. 1184-85. It is interesting, however, that Jancikovié, in his report of January 1943 (p. 13), asserted that the Croatian Peasant Party should take over nothing of the Ustasha administration in “the organization of a new administration. Likewise nothing can be taken over from the army and gendarmerie, which anyway carry in themselves the seeds of disintegration. These forces were organized by fifth column officers and traitors to the people.”

444 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA marked by their zeal to please the regime. Most of these officers are ready to act when the moment comes.”® In a memorandum of September 22, 1942,

Glaise noted that according to one of Maéek’s confidants, Macek thought that when the Ustasha regime collapsed, any political reorganization in Yugo-

slavia would have to take into account an independent Croatian state and army. This army would seal off the frontiers and Croatia would then negotiate with Serbia about creating a common state based on conditions existing in the fall of 1918. With regard to Serbian demands for new territory (presumably in eastern Bosnia), the ceding of only a few counties could be considered.” It is quite clear that in Maéek’s reported thinking, the Croatian army played a key role. It is also clear that Macek did not yet take the Partisans seriously. Maéek and other party leaders not only believed in an Allied victory, but also assumed that the Western Allies were against any postwar settlement in Yugoslavia in which the Communists and thus the Soviet Union would play a dominant role. To prevent this scenario, they thought that the Allies would eventually land on the Dalmatian coast and that the British would support the party asa democratic and anti-Communist force. These two assumptions— that the Allies would land on the Adriatic coast and that they would support the Croatian Peasant Party, backed by the Croatian army, which would switch

| to the Allied side—furnished the basis for the new policy that the party developed in early 1943. It should be kept in mind that Mihailovi¢ and the Chetniks

| also had a detailed plan of action in case the Allies landed, a plan directed

against both German and Croatian forces.” ,

The three members of the party leadership most closely involved in developing and implementing the new policy were August KoSutic, the vice pres-

_ ident; Ljudevit Tomasi¢, a representative who had had contacts with British officials in Yugoslavia before the war; and Ivanko Farolfi, an alternate to Tomasi¢, who in the absence of Krnjevic was the acting party secretary. Farolfi was the most active and was in charge of maintaining contact with army officers, party leaders, and foreign intelligence services abroad. He was in touch with several army officers, none of whom had a leading role, though Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Babi¢ was often involved. But to be successful, the alliance of the party with friendly army officers had to have Allied support. It was, therefore,

tention.

toward this objective that the party and its officer friends directed their at-

While it was not difficult for party leaders to establish contact with the Allied command in Italy, their discussions with the Allies proved very frustrating. From the Allied point of view, the party had both minuses and pluses on its record. Among the minuses was the fact that the party had been strongly in favor of Yugoslavia joining the Tripartite Pact, although this stance was partly recti*°“Jureti¢ Report,” p. 4, in RG 226, OSS-File No. 21782. *’Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 618-19. *Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 233-34.

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA A45 fied when Maéek subsequently joined the Simovi¢ government and the party participated in the government-in-exile. Another minus was Macek’s statement over Radio Zagreb urging Croats to support the Ustashas after the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia, which the Allies did not realize had been made under duress. Important elements of the party had switched to the Ustasha side, including the two paramilitary guards, several deputies elected in December 1938 together with a considerable number of lower-echelon leaders, and almost the entire administrative, police, and judicial apparatus of Banovina Croatia, which was under the party’s control. Finally, and this especially must be stressed, the party had not opposed the Axis powers and the Ustashas with arms, but had pursued a wait-and-see policy. On the other hand, the party had several pluses on its ledger: its claim to legitimacy based on repeated victories in elections during the interwar period in Yugoslavia, its democratic character, and its refusal to collaborate with the occupation powers or the Ustashas, other than to urge Croats to join the Croatian army instead of the Partisans. In many rural areas, the party and Ma¢cek personally still enjoyed broad support. Finally, except for the Communist-led Partisans under Tito, Macek and the Croatian Peasant Party were the logical and only possible political force that could assume power in Croatia after the fall of the Ustashas. At the same time that the Croatian Peasant Party approached the Western Allies, General Mihailovi¢ became interested in coming to an understanding with Maécek to strengthen the Chetniks’ position against the Partisans in Yugo-

slavia, especially in Croatia. But no agreement between the two men was reached because of the fundamental differences between them on most wartime and anticipated postwar problems. However, Krnjevi¢, the party’s chief representative in the government-in-exile, did make some incongruous overtures to the Chetniks. In January 1943, over the BBC in London, he urged young men from the party to join Chetnik detachments, obviously to strengthen the antiPartisan forces in Croatia. But this call had no effect, because rank-and-file Croats feared and detested the Chetniks, while they were relatively well disposed to the Partisans. On July 22, 1943, Krnjevi¢ appealed to party members to take up arms, but he did not mention that they should ally with the Partisans. Nevertheless, this call considerably increased the number of party members who joined the Partisans.” In a similar vein, toward the end of 1943 the British Foreign Office became interested in using Macek to strengthen the weak position of King Peter II and the government-in-exile toward the Partisans, despite the considerable support that British military and intelligence services were giving the Partisans by this time. The Foreign Office sounded out British services in the field about rescuing Macek, bringing him to Egypt, and allying him with the king. But after investi“Boban, “British Policy Toward the Croatian Peasant Party,” pp. 1-109, especially pp. 23, 26, and 33.

446 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA , gating the feasibility of this plan and ascertaining the Partisans’ reaction, Ralph _

S. Stevenson, British ambassador to the Yugoslav government-in-exile, wrote 7 _ to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden on January 12, 1944, that the Parti- . sans would not be willing to help, which effectively doomed it. The British also , figured in the curious invitation that Mihailovié sent to Krnjevi¢ on March 16, 1944, inviting him to his headquarters in Yugoslavia, undoubtedly to discuss cooperation between the party and the Chetniks against the Partisans. The British, who carried the message, did not take it seriously, so that Krnjevi¢ was

apparently not informed of itandnothingcameofit.? = 7 Meanwhile, the main preoccupation of Croatian Peasant Party leaders from early 1943 on was to establish direct contact with Western Allied commands. They first tried to send Tomo Jan¢ikovi¢, who lived in Crikvenica in the Italianoccupied Croatian Littoral, to Switzerland. Jancikovi¢ was probably selected because he was a leading party deputy and a trusted friend of Macek. Also, his ©

January 1943 report had recommended that the party send representatives to all centers abroad where decisions-on the future of Croatia would be made. At

about the same time, in February 1943, another party report entitled “Croatia. and the Croats” circulated clandestinely, claiming that Macek was “the great-

est moral and political asset of Croatia” and alone was entitled to speak for ,

dence.”” a |

Croatia at the end of the war. Whereas Jancikovié had a negative opinion about Croatian army officers, this report argued that it was “of invaluable significance that the entire Croatian army looked to Dr. Maéek with undivided confi-

| Jancikovi¢’s passage to Switzerland could not be arranged, so in June 1943 he moved near Dubrovnik in southern Dalmatia with the intention of escaping to Italy. On his trip south, he organized secret committees to help Allied troops when they landed on the Dalmatian coast and to claim a leading political role

_ for the party. Just shortly before this, however—in April and May 1943—the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) had established contact with the

Yugoslav Partisans by parachuting exploratory missions into their liberated territory. This initiated a complete about-face in British policy toward the competing forces in Yugoslavia, which eventually had dire consequences for _ the Croatian Peasant Party, the Chetniks, and the anti-Partisan forces in Slovenia. The British were able to confirm that the Croatian Peasant Party was not engaged in armed resistance in Croatia, but was following a policy of passively

, Partisans. | a see F.O. 371/44270,R 6324/11/92. . , . | Fr. 768. | | waiting, and that the Chetniks and the Slovene anti-Partisan forces were not ,

, fighting the occupation forces, but were collaborating with them against the

_ For Stevenson’s letter, see F.O. 371/44245, R 1044/8/92. For Mihailovié’s invitation, ,

“See the “Jancikovié Report,” pp. 3-4, in YA, Wkrs. Mvmt., Com. Party, 42-2896. For the report “Croatia and the Croats,” see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Frs. 763-70, especially —

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 447 In mid-October 1943, Jancikovié escaped across the Adriatic to Bari, Italy. Thus began a long, involved, and ultimately fruitless effort by the party and friendly army officers to switch Croatia to the Allied side upon the expected Allied landings on the Dalmatian coast. The British closely interrogated Jancikovi¢, but he had neither a message from Macek nor any specific proposals about how the Croatian Peasant Party could assist the Allies in Croatia or how the Allies could help the party. Jancikovi¢’s main goal was to explain the situation in the Ustasha state to Krnjevi¢ and other party representatives in exile and consult on the most suitable policies for the party. The British, however, did not allow him to go to London to see other party politicians or to correspond with them. Nor was he able to get in touch with friends in Zagreb through prearranged coded messages. The British did not know what to do with Jancikovi¢ and almost completely ignored him. Jancikovic’s presence in Bari also disturbed the Partisans, because they feared that he would act against their interests. To discredit him, they accused him of having collaborated with the Italians and Chetniks and possibly even with the Germans, all of which was false, for he strongly opposed both the Axis powers and the Chetniks.” All these factors taken together, however, conspired to make Jancikovi¢’s mission a total fail-

ure. |

The Croatian Peasant Party’s next step was to send a message to the West-

ern Allies through Zenon Adami¢, a former lieutenant commander in the Yugoslav navy. A Slovene with a Croatian wife, Adami¢ badly wanted to leave Croatia to avoid having to serve in the Croatian or German navy. He was the vice president of the minuscule Slovene Peasant-Workers Party, whose president, Paul Horvat, was cooperating closely with the Croatian Peasant Party. Adami¢ obtained a position with an Austrian firm in Istanbul, where he arrived on November 23, 1943, carrying a message from the Croatian Peasant Party to Allied forces. Through the Yugoslav Consulate, he got in touch with Allied intelligence services, which interrogated him and soon transferred him to Egypt, where he remained until the end of the war. According to Adami¢’s recollections, the message he conveyed to the Allies

(in a letter that he destroyed during the trip) was that the Croatian Peasant Party opposed the Ustasha regime, the Partisans, the Chetniks, King Peter II, and the civil war. The party wanted the Allies to occupy Croatia and remain until free elections were held and all basic problems of the new Yugoslav state were resolved, possibly as long as ten years. But because the British thought that Adami¢ had left Croatia with “the knowledge and connivance of the Germans,” he was unable to gain their full confidence. He also had difficulties with Yugoslav officers in exile in Egypt, who supported the king and accused him of ”The most complete and useful study in Serbo-Croatian on Jan¢ikovié and the Croatian Peasant Party’s other two emissaries to the Allies, as well as on the pro-Maéek Croatian army officers, is that by Boban, “British Policy Toward the Croatian Peasant Party.” For a discussion of Jancikovic’s political activities in the country before his escape to Italy, see pp. 15-57.

448 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA _ being an Ustasha. In spite of this, however, he later become the commanding officer of the Yugoslav naval base in Alexandria. But the message he brought from Zagreb had no effect.” The next and even more ambitious effort of the Croatian Peasant Party and its army officer friends was to send Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Babic¢ to the Allies in Italy in January 1944. Babi¢ had been on friendly terms with the party even while on active duty in the Yugoslav army prior to April 1941. He had joined the new Croatian army as a major and was promoted to lieutenant colonel in

June 1941. He had several important assignments, but the fact that he remained at the rank of lieutenant colonel showed that the Ustasha regime had little confidence in him. It is clear from the memorandum that he and Colonel Medved prepared in August 1941 that he strongly opposed the Ustashas. In January 1944, he and his wife escaped to Bari, Italy, in the personal plane of Fridrih Navratil, Croatian minister of armed forces. In Bari, the British allowed him to see Jancikovi¢, but refused to let him go to London or to correspond with Croatian politicians abroad. They interrogated him repeatedly, but he was not completely obliging, and a relationship of trust and cooperation did not develop. The British were requested by the Partisans to deliver him as a war criminal, but instead they interned him in an Italian camp for Axis prisoners until September 1946. Like Jancikovié, Babi¢ was effectively kept isolated from

, any Croatian politicians. He did, however, meet Ivan Subaéic, the governmentin-exile’s new prime minister, after Subasi¢ concluded an agreement on coop-

eration with Tito on the island of Vis in Dalmatia in mid-June 1944. Babi¢ thought that both Churchill and Subasié had been deceived by Tito and the Communists, who had developed good relations with the Allies by “playing the card of self-determination and democracy,” but who were aiming for a “complete takeover of power.”” In the end, Babi¢’s mission, like that of Jancikovi¢

and Adamic¢, had no positive results. |

In his testimony to the British, Babi¢ overstated the strength of the Croatian Peasant Party and the number of army officers supporting it at the end of 1943. While he recognized that the Partisans had a strong political organization and

_ significant armed forces in Croatia, he failed to mention that they also had a solid footing in the Croatian army through pro-Partisan officers and committees. Nor did he mention that the Partisans had established ZAVNOH in Croatia in June 1943, in which several deputies and lower-echelon leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party participated. He did make the important, though negaIbid., pp. 58-70. I received additional information from Lieutenant Commander Ada-

mi¢ in a personal conversation and a letter of July 19, 1983. , “Boban, “British Policy Toward the Croatian Peasant Party,” pp. 70-87. For a four-page summary of Babi¢’s statements to the British, see F.O. 371/44249, R 3364/8/92. For Babic’s own story about his mission to the Allies and their treatment of him, see his “My Mission to the Allies in 1944,” pp. 240-79, and a long interview in Nova Hrvatska (London), 1976, nos.

2, 3, and 4. For the quotes from Babié, see no. 3, p. 12. |

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA AAO tive, point that pro-Maéek officers in the Croatian army lacked a conspiratorial organization and only operated in a loose and informal fashion. This would have proved a great impediment to action if Allied troops had landed on the Dalmatian coast and the Croatian army had tried to transfer to their side. A final gesture by the Croatian Peasant Party to align itself with the Western Allies was the message that it sent to Ivan SubaSi¢ after he became prime minister of the Yugoslav government-in-exile on June 1, 1944, with the mandate to reach an agreement with the Partisans. Party leaders in Zagreb informed him

that General Ivan TomaSevié, commander of Croatian forces in northwest Croatia (under overall German command), would be amenable to striking at the Nazis at an appropriate time, and suggested that Subaéi¢ contact the general. But British officials in Bari interpreted this as a new move, similar to that of Babié the previous January, to “insure the Croatian army in the eyes of the Allies.” They felt that “it would not be desirable to play with senior Croatian army officers at this stage. Croatian army and Ustashi units are now integrated formations within the Wehrmacht.” Subasi¢é was given both the message and the British warning. He apparently attached no importance to it and planned to handle it after consulting with Tito.” Since I did not find any mention of the matter in later documents, I assume that Tito vetoed any further contacts with General Tomasevic, as he earlier had vetoed dealings with Jancikovi¢ and Babic. The principal reason for the cold reception of the three Croatian Peasant

Party emissaries was that the British were interested in helping only those groups in Yugoslavia that actually fought the Axis and collaborationist forces. This meant, in effect, only the Partisans. The passive policy of the Croatian Peasant Party did not rate their attention, and postwar political considerations had a very low priority.

: When party leaders in Zagreb did not hear from Babic, except that he had arrived safely, Tomasi¢ and Farolfi got in touch with British military intelligence in Switzerland. They were told that the British favored collaboration be-

tween the party and Tito, but would leave it to the two parties to arrange, a stand that was reiterated by Foreign Secretary Eden in Parliament on April 6, 1944. Subsequently, Kosuti¢ sent the Communist Party of Croatia and the Partisans a memorandum expressing the willingness of the party to cooperate with The Croatian Peasant Party message to Subasié was delivered by a party agent in Switzerland to the American OSS, which passed it through the British services to Subasi¢. Dated June 27, 1944, it is found in F.O. 371/44273, R 1021 2/11/92. This also contains Ambassador Stevenson’s note of July 1, 1944, describing Subaéi¢’s reaction.

The leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party apparently made a serious miscalculation in evaluating Subagi¢’s policy. Although he was an important member of their party, he was primarily devoted to Yugoslavia and the Karadjordjevi¢ dynasty. As prime minister of the government-in-exile, his mandate, as formulated by the British, was to save Yugoslavia and the dynasty and to serve as a counterweight to the Partisans. SubaSi¢ neither offered nor rendered any help to the party during or after the war.

450 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA . them and spelling out its objectives and conditions.” The Communist Party re-

plied in July. Understandably, neither side considered it advisable to publish the , contents of this exchange, which led to direct negotiations only the following

September (see below). © oS , a So oe

- About this time, in the spring of 1944, a critical change took place in the | composition of the group that wanted to ally the Croatian state with the Western Allies. Croatian Peasant Party leaders Tomasi¢ and Farolfi and friendly 7 army officers were joined by two leading ministers of the Ustasha government,

Mladen Lorkovi¢, minister of interior, and Ante Voki¢, minister of armed forces and of transportation, and by Milutin Jurci¢, chief of state police. There-

after, the initiative in this planning apparently shifted into the hands of the two ministers. Trusting in Paveli¢’s patriotism, they confided in him and received

the impression that he favored the switch. , By the summer of 1944, the Germans had also become aware that Croatia might shift to the Western Allies. The Luftwaffe attaché in Zagreb reportedon == _ August rz on the increasingly uncooperative behavior of the Croatian military authorities toward the Germans, as well as their efforts to obtain as large a quantity of new arms and ammunition from the Germans as possible. He also - mentioned a highly secret conference presided over by Vokié in Sarajevo in ~ July—obviously attended by a German spy—where the Croatian minister, showing unusual independence, asserted that nobody could dictate terms to

Croatia, which would find its proper place at the proper time, and that in case 7 of an Allied invasion of the Balkans, German troops in Croatia must be disarmed and their arms and ammunition depots well secured.” -

None of the efforts of the Croatian Peasant Party to join the Western Allies,

| predicated as they were on the assumption that Allied forces would land onthe , _ Adriatic coast and that the Croatian army would then join them, had any positive

| results. Negotiations with the Allies remained fruitless because the latter had no plans to invade the Balkans, although the idea was close to Prime Minister Churchill’s heart and he did discuss the possibility of Allied landings on the Istrian

peninsula with Tito in August 1944.” Moreover, while the emissaries of the , *F.O. 371/44270, R 6000/11/92; United Kingdom, Parliament, 398 H.C. Deb. 5 S.5 Pp. 2196; Martinovic¢, “The Life and Work of August KoSuti¢,” pp. 3 5-59, especially pp. 46-50. Ko’uti¢, who was related by marriage to the Radi¢ family, spent eight years in exile during the 1930’s, was arrested several times, and spent two years in Ustasha prisons during the

, war. Though he negotiated with Paveli¢ and Prime Minister Nikola Mandi¢ about the possible entry of the Croatian Peasant Party into the Ustasha government, he always declined their | invitations. On occasion, he also saw Kasche and Glaise. All these contacts were at the request

of Ustasha and German officials and bore no fruit. a _ 77Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,479-83, especially Fr. H306,480; Micr. No. T311, Roll 195, Fr. 673. Voki¢’s statement clearly indicated that Paveli¢ had been told about

the plan and had given his support. — - | |

62, and 375. , oe — oe

| “For the pertinent documents, see Biber, Tito-Churchill, strogo tajno, pp. 275, 309, 361-

There is a substantial literature on possible Allied invasions at various points in southeast

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA A5I Croatian Peasant Party and friendly Croatian army officers offered the Allies only promises, the Partisans provided tangible help. They tied up a considerable number of Italian, German, and Axis satellite forces in Yugoslavia, which was especially important after the Allies landed on Sicily and the Italian mainland. At the Tehran Conference in late 1943, the Partisans acquired the status of an Allied military force. Hugh Seton- Watson, a British wartime intelligence officer dealing with Yugoslavia, commenting on the interrogation of Babi¢ in a 1976 letter, asserted: It is true also that nobody in a place of responsibility in these organizations [British wartime organizations dealing with Balkan affairs] would have dared to [put at] risk the cooperation with the Partisans because of a foggy, even if very well intentioned, offer of a group of Croatian army officers, This does not refer only to my conviction, but also reflects the conviction of my superior officers and of all men who at that time were preoccupied on the British side with Yugoslav problems.”

It should also be kept in mind that the Allies were already dealing with several competing groups in Yugoslavia—the government-in-exile, the Chetniks, and after April 1943, the Partisans. Entering into separate arrangements with the Croatian Peasant Party and its Croatian army friends would have complicated their involvement in Yugoslav affairs even more, without any identifiable ad- vantages. But the acting leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party and their allies in Zagreb could not know this, since Jancikovic, Adami¢, and Babi¢ received no

information on Allied plans and could not communicate with them. | Nevertheless, the proponents of the Croatian Peasant Party plan apparently thought that the three emissaries sent to the Allies and party representatives abroad had been at least partly successful in arranging a cooperative plan of action with the Allies. SubaSi¢’s appointment as prime minister of the Yugoslav government-in-exile in June 1944 and General TomaSevic’s offer to switch his troops to the Allied side at the proper time also encouraged the plotters. Finally,

Romania’s surrender and the approach of Soviet troops, together with the other developments, might have induced them to think that the Allies would soon land on the Dalmatian coast. The two Ustasha ministers who became involved with this plan, however, were not cautious enough when they assumed that Paveli¢ approved of it. It was not in Paveli¢’s nature to remain passive in a major undertaking, especially one in which he would be the principal victim. At

this time, he still thought that the Germans were perfecting the “horrible weapon” that would enable them to win the war. When Paveli¢ decided that the plotters had gone far enough, he turned against them. On August 30, 1944, after a cabinet meeting at his villa, all the important plotters and some others

were arrested, perhaps as many as 60 people. According to Edo Bulat, a cabinet , Europe—Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia—but for a brief and solid picture, it is sufficient to consult Deakin, “The Myth of an Allied Landing in the Balkans,” pp. 93-116, and Kljakovié, “The Question of Allied Landings in the Balkans,” pp. 7-25.

”Nova Hrvatska (London), 1976, no. 7, p. 6, where the editor comments on the interview with Lieutenant Colonel Babi¢ in nos. 2, 3, and 4.

452 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA member and eyewitness, the meeting was well staged. The villa was surrounded by armed men and Paveli¢ accused Lorkovié and Voki¢ of treason. Vice Premier Kulenovi¢ and several others defended them, but to no avail. Lorkovi¢c asked Pavelié that “as promised,” nothing would be done against the members

of the Croatian Peasant Party. Vokic, on the other hand, stated bluntly: “Poglavnik, everything that we did, we did according to your orders and with your approval, and therefore I do not know why I should be made responsible.”*° A few of those arrested were soon released, but Jurci¢ was assassinated within a few days, while Lorkovi¢ and Voki¢ were tried before the Ustasha

Party court and imprisoned. ,

This turn of events led to a second and final attempt by Croatian Peasant Party leaders to reach an agreement on cooperation with the Partisans. Kosutic was sent to Partisan free territory on September 5, 1944, with this goal, as well as two others: avoiding a second arrest by the Ustasha police and contacting the British liaison officer at Partisan Chief Headquarters for Croatia at Topusko (about 60 kilometers south of Zagreb) to report on these negotiations. Kosuti¢ first met with Andrija Hebrang, secretary general of the Communist Party of Croatia, and then with Major Randolph S. Churchill, British liaison officer

with the Partisans and son of the prime minister. oo The basis for KoSutié’s discussions with Hebrang was his April 1944 memo-

randum to the Communists, consisting of two prefatory assertions and eight points. In essence, the memorandum declared that while the war lasted, the role . of the Croatian Peasant Party was first to “give active support to the Partisan movement, and second to offer resistance against tyranny [Paveli¢] on the ‘internal front.’” In discussions between the two groups, the following points

were to be kept in mind:

a. The Croats are predominantly a peasant people who have a right to national

_ self-determination. ,

b. The government of Croatia must be based on free democratic elections. c. The Peasant Party is opposed to all forms of dictatorship. It favors the princi-

teed. | a ples of “Slavonic solidarity” and social justice. ,

d. Social justice means that the needs of the peasantry be taken into consideration first: the main allies of the peasantry are the workers. e. Personal liberty, equality before the law, and private property must be guaranf. Croatia must have its own army within the Yugoslav federal forces.

g. Croatia should have its own diplomatic representatives. . ,

groups. a . ,

h. When once they have their own national, economic, and cultural unit, the Croats will be prepared to collaborate with all other reasonable parties and political

Recollections of Edo Bulat as reported by Kazimir Lelas, in “Testimony [of Dr. Edo Bulat] about a Dramatic Meeting,” pp. 616-18. In a postwar article, Luburié openly asserted

that he and General Mo’kov carried out the liquidation of the plot. See his “General Ante

Knight Moskov,” pp. 132-66, especially p. 153. ,

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 453 When the Communist Party of Croatia had answered KoSuti¢’s memorandum in July 1944, it had demanded from the Croatian Peasant Party “(1) recognition of the aims and all the achievements reached by the war for liberty, and (2) a call to all Croats to join the National Liberation Army.”*' By September 1944, there was no need for the Communists to alter this stance. They were negotiating from a position of strength, gained through armed struggle and backed by armed forces, with a provisional parliament and government. They were strong everywhere in Yugoslavia except Serbia, which their formidable forces were now entering from the west to join with Soviet forces coming from Bulgaria and Romania. Three additional factors must also be kept in mind in evaluating their attitude. First, the Partisans had the full backing of the Big Three, while the Croatian Peasant Party had been unsuccessful in gaining even modest support from them. Second, the position of the Partisans in Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia grew stronger day by day, while the position of the Croatian Peasant Party and its allies in the Croatian army grew increasingly precarious and suffered an irreparable setback when the Lorkovié-Voki¢ plot was exposed and its important leaders were arrested. Third, the Communists already had many Croatian Peasant Party members on their side, led by the dissidents on the Executive Committee, which, once Magovac was removed as leader in April 1944, was almost as critical of Mac¢ek and the party center as the Communists themselves.” Despite all this, when KoSuti¢ arrived in Partisan free territory to negotiate with the Communists, he increased his demands beyond those in the April memorandum. In particular, he proposed that a supreme council of the republic of Croatia be established to function as a constituent assembly, which would consist of 72 members of ZAVNOH and 79 members selected from the deputies and county chairmen of the Croatian Peasant Party elected in December 1938. In addition, the units of the National Liberation Army and the Partisan detachments of Yugoslavia in Croatia were to be united with the Croatian army, which the Croatian Peasant Party hoped to have under its control. Finally, the Communists had to accept the principles of peasant democracy propounded by the party. To the Communists, these demands negated the decisions of AVNOJ’s second session and ZAVNOH’s third session. They rejected all KoSutic’s proposals and broke off negotiations.” *'Kogutic’s points in abbreviated form are found in a summary of his memorandum of September 22, 1944, to Major Churchill, in F.O. 371/44282, R 20604/11/92. For Koguti¢’s original memorandum in somewhat defective English, see W.O. 202/222, X/I 8972. The eight points in original form and the Communist demands are on pp. 4-5. See the resolution adopted at the meeting of the Executive Committee on April 29, 1944, in ZAVNOH dokumenti 1944, pp. 545-47, and Gazi, Nas put u borbi za slobodu, especially pp. 9-19 and 36-38. Edvard Kardelj, next in importance to Tito in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, wrote to Andrija Hebrang, secretary general of the Communist Party of Croatia, on August 8, 1944, instructing him on how to handle those Croatian Peasant Party members who had

454. THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA i In a memorandum to Major Churchill, Koguti¢ claimed that his move to — liberated territory was a signal of what all Croats should do, which had already | had significant results. The Tito-Subasi¢ agreement, he argued, had been fa_vorably received in Croatia and could serve as the basis for an agreement between the Croatian Peasant Party and the Communist Party of Croatia. It was _ necessary to announce immediately that the existing Partisan government was

only temporary, to last only until a free general election was held in which the | | people could express their will. Kosuti¢ also insisted that the Communists stop attacking Macek and the party. Only under such conditions could cooperation _ between the Croatian Peasant Party and other “progressive and democratic” forces in the country be possible. Only then did Kogutié think that it would be | possible to cooperate with the political parties in Serbia. All these measures, he

argued further, were necessary and in the common interest, and he asked the Western Allies to support them through the press and diplomatic action.” Unlike their opponents—the Chetniks, whose aim was a Greater Serbia within a Serbian-dominated Greater Yugoslavia under the Karadjordjevic¢ dy-_ , nasty, closely allied with the West, and the Communist-led Partisans, who _ wanted a federal Yugoslavia under their exclusive control and leaning on the — Soviet Union—the Croatian Peasant Party did not have a precisely defined po-

litical objective for a postwar state. The party repeatedly stated that the Croats , as a nation had a right to their own separate national state. But it was also _ willing to accept any one of several other alternatives—a federal republican Yugoslavia, a federal monarchical Yugoslavia, or a federation of Danubian na- | . tions—provided that each was the result of free agreements among the con-

cerned nations after free democratic elections. The party stressed free democratic elections because it believed that it would obtain a secure majority in them. If the Western Allies would guarantee such elections, the party was ap-

parently willing to cooperate temporarily and share power with the Commu- , nists until the elections were held. In the final analysis, the party, by insisting on

truly free democratic elections, aimed to prevent, with Allied help, the intro-

duction of a Communist dictatorship in Croatia and Yugoslavia. | , The Communists knew that the Croatian Peasant Party, if it survived the war as a viable political force, would be their principal antagonist in Croatia. In a letter of August 8, 1944, to Hebrang, Kardelj, after strongly urging him to en-

tice Ko$uti¢ into free territory, also advised: “In my opinion the main thing that , you should achieve in the present phase of struggle is to split the Maéek clique ,

2, bk. 13: 656-57. , , Oe

sided with the Partisans and the leaders who had remained with Maéek. See ZbornikDNOR, “W.O. 202/222, X/I 8972, p. 5. For the Croatian Peasant Party’s version of these developments, see Martinovic, “The Life and Work of August Koguti¢,” especially pp. 51-56. For the Communist interpretation of Ko8uti¢’s efforts in negotiations with the Communist Party of Croatia, see an article by Vladimir Bakari¢ that first appeared in the party’s official news_ paper, Naprijed, on October 31, 1944, reprinted in Bakari¢, Drugtvene klase, nacija i socijali-

_ Zam, pp. 101-3. ce | | ,

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 455 into several groups and thereby prevent it from becoming a center of attraction for other reactionary forces in Croatia and Yugoslavia. At the same time this would definitely destroy the many illusions that still exist among the Croatian peasant masses about Macek.” In fact, the Communists had already tried to weaken the Croatian Peasant Party during the war as much as possible.* By this late date, there was no point in negotiating any agreement that would be to the latter’s advantage. As we have seen, the Communists also helped frustrate the efforts of the emissaries sent by the Croatian Peasant Party and Croatian army officers to the Allies. Finally, an important point in their propaganda was that Kosuti¢ made no proposals to increase the efforts of the Croatian Peasant Party to win the war, but simply tried to secure a share of power for the party without contributing to the fight against foreign and domestic enemies.

In view of the Communists’ overall strategy of discrediting Ma¢ek and weakening the Croatian Peasant Party leadership and rank and file that remained true to him on the one hand and strengthening the party’s Executive Committee and increasing its following on the other, the presence of a man of Kosutic’s standing in liberated territory and his contacts with British liaison officers was not in their interest. Consequently, on October 1, 1944, they arrested Kosutic, cutting short any further political activity or contact with the British. He was kept under arrest until September 6, 1946, without ever being indicted. His political career was finished.” With the arrest of the leaders of the Lorkovic-Vokié plot, any possibility of cooperation between the Croatian Peasant Party and pro-Macek army officers was destroyed and with it any influence that the party might have had on the army. The arrest of Tomasi¢ and Farolfi by the Ustashas and the departure of Koésuti¢ for Partisan-liberated territory and his subsequent arrest eliminated the activists in the party leadership and greatly weakened its position. With this

turn of events, the party also lost contact with its agents in Switzerland and thus with its representatives abroad, as well as with the Western Allies.*” The *“SFor Kardelj’s letter, see footnote 83 above; the quote is from p. 657. For the Communists’ efforts to weaken the Croatian Peasant Party, see Boban, “British Policy Toward the Croatian Peasant Party,” p. 96. “For the British reaction, see Major Churchill’s two telegrams of October 1, 1944, in W.O. 202/306, X/L 03669. See also Martinovié, “The Life and Work of August Koéguti¢,” p. 40. Koguti¢ later worked as an engineer in a large electrical products enterprise in Zagreb. He was allowed to go abroad twice for medical treatment. *’’ According to excerpts from two intercepted letters, written on February 23 and March 23, 1945, by a Croatian Peasant Party representative (presumably Monsignor Jureti¢c) in Switzerland to party members in Belgrade, which were sent by the American Military Mission at Tito’s headquarters to the American office in Caserta on May 2, 1945, there was apparently no contact between the party leadership in Zagreb and its agents in Switzerland from October 1944 to sometime in February 1945. The leaders in Zagreb complained in February 1945 that they were not receiving any directives from the leaders abroad. They also claimed that though Lorkovi¢é and Vokié had tried to gain control over the Croatian army, the Croa-

456 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA remaining party leaders—Ivan Andres, Ivan Pernar, Bariga Smoljan, and Josip Torbar—became even more passive than before. With these developments, the

desire of party leaders, of many officers in the Croatian army, and of the dissi- | dent Ustasha ministers to secure a place for themselves on the side of the victorious powers at the end of the war proved beyond reach.

After Paveli¢’s last visit to Hitler on September 18, 1944, the Germans adopted a wholeheartedly pro-Ustasha course, and the Independent State of Croatia with all its forces headed toward an ignominious end at Germany’s side.

, , THE UNIFICATION OF THE ARMY AND THE USTASHA MILITIA | The unification of the Croatian army and the Ustasha militia under the effective formal control of the Ustashas—that is, the “Ustashizing” of the Croatian armed forces—occurred in the late fall of 1944. Pavelié had been aware of the critical attitude of many army officers toward the Ustasha regime and such Ustasha organizations as the militia and police for a long time. He knew of earlier efforts by the army to absorb the militia and extend army discipline and order to it. He also realized, and the Lorkovi¢-Vokié plot confirmed, that many army officers were eager to help the Croatian Peasant Party move Croatia to the Allied side, which would have meant his removal as head of state. Finally,

from the half-dozen courts-martial of Croatian army officers and Ustasha commanders, he knew that a good number of officers were cooperating with the Partisans. In these circumstances, Paveli¢ sought and received permission from Hitler to fulfill his long-standing goal of having the militia absorb the army and putting the combined forces under the command of zealous and dependable Ustashas or pro-Ustasha army officers. With this reform, he hoped to remove any danger that army officers and soldiers would cooperate with the Croatian Peasant Party or the Partisans. He probably also hoped to improve the discipline and fighting quality of the armed forces. Furthermore, he appar-

ently thought that if Croatia lost the war, a unified force would entitle the members of the former militia, now part of the regular army, to the rights guar-

anteed to prisoners of war under international conventions. = , Because of conditions in the fall of 1944, the “Ustashizing” of the Croatian armed forces was difficult to accomplish. The pool of men available to the mili-

tary was decreasing, and the knowledge among Croatian soldiers that they were fighting for a lost cause undermined morale and fighting spirit. The narrowing territorial base under German and Croatian control in the area claimed by the Independent State of Croatia and the certainty that the Partisans would eventually win the war led more and more men to join the latter, not only civilians, but also officers and men deserting from Croatian army units and from tian Peasant Party still held that control, a claim that seems wishful thinking. See RG 226, OSS-File No. XL 8354.

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 457 German units with Croatian manpower. The liquidation of the Lorkovi¢é-Vokié

plot, which eliminated once and for all the possibility that Croatia would switch to the Western Allies, exacerbated still further relations between the army and the Ustasha militia.

For their part, the Germans were well aware of the unreliability and poor fighting quality of many army units. With the departure of Glaise from Zagreb after the liquidation of the Lorkovi¢-Vokié plot, the Croatian army lost its chief advocate with the Wehrmacht. Thus both Hitler and the German Armed Forces High Command were willing to allow the army to be consolidated with the Ustasha militia under the predominant influence of the latter. But given the steadily deteriorating conditions of both German and Croatian forces, the unification could not proceed rapidly, nor could any real improvement of the armed forces follow. In addition to obtaining permission to unify the army and militia, Pavelic’s chief objective at the meeting with Hitler on September 18 was to secure additional German arms and ammunition. The Germans, however, knowing full

well the unreliability of many army units, suggested that some be disarmed and their arms given to militia units. Paveli¢ declined this as politically unworkable.

He proposed that new arms be sent to him personally and assured Hitler that “new arms would be allocated only to entirely dependable units.” But the Germans themselves badly needed new arms. According to Hitler, Germany had experienced three military crises thus far in 1944, requiring the formation and arming of more than 70 new divisions: 45 to replace losses in operations against Soviet forces on the middle front, 25 to replace losses in operations against Allied forces in France, and additional divisions to replace losses from the defection of Romania to the Soviets. In addition, a whole series of armored

brigades and about 200 fortress battalions had to be newly formed and armed.” The Germans undoubtedly allocated additional arms and ammunition to the Croatian armed forces during the following months, since otherwise the latter would have been useless to them, but the lack of arms remained a constant complaint among the Croats. On December 4, 1944, Paveli¢ took over the title of commander in chief of

the Croatian armed forces from the minister of armed forces, Admiral Nikola , Steinfl, and established the armed forces’ Supreme Headquarters. In Supreme Headquarters Order No. 1121 of the same day, he announced: “As supreme commander I have personally taken into my hands command over the armed forces, as well as over other armed formations of the Independent State of Croatia.” This formal change had little or no operational significance, since most Croatian forces were under German operational command. But it apparently influenced some of Paveli¢’s later decisions regarding military organization. General Djuro Grui¢, an Eastern Orthodox Croat and former Yugoslav *“Hillgruber, Staatsmdnner und Diplomaten bei Hitler, 2: 515-16.

458 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA |

Military Office.” , 7 | army officer in whom the Germans had full confidence, became chief of Paveli¢’s

_ An important next step in “Ustashizing” the Croatian armed forces was the

promotion of a group of leading Ustashas from colonels to generals in the armed forces in mid-December. All of them—Rafael Boban, Ivan Heren¢ic, Vjekoslav Luburié, Ante Moskov, Vilko Peénikar, Tomislav Rolf, and Tomislav Sertic—were Ustasha returnees. The promotion suggested that additional changes at the highest levels of military organization and command were soon to follow. In fact, because of Paveli¢’s desire to fill high posts with officers he fully trusted, the Croatian armed forces, as we shall see, continued to undergo

further changes until the end of the war. _ oe

On December 22, 1944, the Ministry of Armed Forces was reorganized into two departments, the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Administrative Staff of the Armed Forces. Tomislav Serti¢, one of the newly promoted generals and a former deserter from the Yugoslav army, became chief of the General | Staff and Vilko Petnikar, another newly promoted general, became chief of the

Administrative Staff, while continuing as commander of the Croatian gendarmerie. On the same day, Paveli¢ abolished the Military Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Armed Forces as of December 31, retired its head, _ General Rudolf Wanner, and transferred military intelligence matters to the © new chief of the General Staff.” Whereas Wanner’s intelligence reports had been detailed and realistic analyses of military and other developments, Serti¢’s

reports were to a large extent propaganda statements. It is quite possible that the nature of Wanner’s reports led to his replacement, since they may have con-

tributed to the demoralization of the armed forces. a _ | The unification of the Croatian army and the Ustasha militia was supposed

to be completed by January 1, 1945, but it actually required several more , weeks to accomplish. Sixteen divisions were organized, divided among three

army corps. Data on the unified armed forces are not fully satisfactory, due to , the extremely complex and rapidly deteriorating military situation at the time.

Nevertheless, on the basis of Croatian, German, and Partisan documents and , , “For Order No. 1121, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 56/5, 1-3, Box 83a. For the Germans’ opinion of Gruié, see the report of the German Luftwaffe attaché in Zagreb

of August 11, 1944, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Fr. H306,482. | oe , In December 1944, the Croatian 8th, roth, and 11th Divisions were under the German XVth Army Corps; the 9th and 15th Divisions under the XXIst Army Corps; the 12th Division under the LX VIIIth Army Corps; the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 13th Divisions under the LXIXth Army Corps; and the 14th Division under the German Railroad Security _ Staff in Croatia. The 16th Division was a replacement and not an operational division. See

YA, Mil. Hist., Enemy Units, Reg. Nos. 3/1-40 to 3/1-48, Box 34a. .

For the reorganization of the Ministry of Armed Forces, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 56/5, 1-3, Box 83a, and Reg. No. 2/1-49-52, Box 134a. For the change in the Military Intelligence Department, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 42/8-1,

Box 95, and Reg. No. 3 5/4-1, Box 95. , . ,

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 459 TABLE I

Army Corps and Divisions of the Croatian Armed Forces Late December 1944/Early January 1945

Army Corps/ AreaCommander of Approximate Division deployment strength Army Corps

Ist Army Corps Zagreb Gen. Ivan Brozovi¢ IInd Army Corps Slavonski Brod Gen. Franjo Pacak

IlIrd Army Corps Sarajevo Gen. Ivan Markulj

Divisions

rst Assault Pitomacéa on Drava Gen. Ante Moskov 6,000 2nd Assault Forming in Zagreb Gen. Mirko Gregurié 5,000 3rd Assault Vinkovci-Vrpolje (Slavonia) Gen. Stjepan Mifek 7,500

4th Assault Dvor (Lika) Gen. Anton Nardelli 7,000

5th Infantry Bjelovar Gen. Rafael Boban 6,000

6th Infantry Banja Luka Gen. Vladimir Metikos 4,000

7th Mountain Nova Gradiska (Slavonia) Gen. Stjepan Perici¢ 4,000

8th Infantry Sarajevo Gen. Roman Domanig 7,000

gth Infantry Mostar Gen. Bozidar Zorn 6,000

roth Infantry Bihaé Gen. Ivan Tomasevi¢ 3,500

11th Infantry Ototac (Lika) Col. Josip Aleksié 7,0004 12th Infantry Bréko (northeast Bosnia) Col. Slavia Cesarié 6,000

13th Infantry Karlovac Col. Tomislav Rolf 6,500

14th Infantry Zagreb-Slav. Brod Railroad Col. Jaroslav Sotola b

15th Infantry Doboj Gen. Milan Cudina 3,000 16th Replacement Zagreb Col. Milivoj Durbesi¢é 9,000 SOURCE: Yugoslavia, Archives of the Institute of Military History, Belgrade, Documents of Enemy Units, Reg. Nos. 3/1-41 to 3/1-48, Box 1342. 7 As stated in the text, the 11th Infantry Division was established on February 27, 1945. ’ I was unable to find any data on the manpower of the 14th Infantry Division.

writings, we can reconstruct fairly well the organization of the army corps and divisions, with their commanders, and the areas of deployment and manpower of the divisions as of late December 1944 or early January 1945. This information is given in Table 1. At the time of unification, the Croatian army had

about 70,000 officers, noncommissioned officers, and men and the various armed groups under the Ustasha militia had about 76,000 officers, noncommissioned officers, and men, for a total of 146,000 men. But as shown in the table, the unified armed forces included only around 90,000 men. Most of the rest were later included in divisions that were reorganized or newly formed, a process that lasted until the end of the war. The 11th Division, for example, — which included troops mostly deployed in Lika, was organized as late as February 27, 1945, and put under the acting command of Colonel Josip Aleksic. The 5th Division under General Rafael Boban was reorganized on April 12, 1945, and the 9th Division under General Bozidar Zorn was reorganized as late as

April 30, 1945. The orders for the organization of the 11th Division and the reorganization of the 9th Division gave only the names of the units to be included and no information on their manpower, but the order on the reorganization of

460 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA the 5th Division also gave data on the strength of the units to be included, and its new complement was just short of 5,700 officers, noncommissioned offi-

cers, and men.” _ ,

The unification of the armed forces did not mean that the troops of the two former services were mixed together in new units. Rather, whole units from each service, as a rule of brigade or regiment size (usually two to four depending on their strength), but also smaller units, were combined into new divisions. The uniforms and insignia of each service remained as before; eyewitness accounts of the

withdrawal of Croatian forces toward Austria at the end of the war speak of troops in a variety of earlier uniforms. Armaments were also probably distributed as they had been prior to the unification, but new deliveries of German arms were

probably given primarily to former militia units. It is likely that preferential treatment of the militia units in food and other supplies also continued. —

Following the unification, several factors prevented the Ustashas from increasing the complements of the newly created divisions. The territory under ef- | fective German and Croatian control was steadily shrinking, especially after the Partisans opened their general spring offensive in areas south of the Sava River on March 20 and broke through the German-Croatian front line at Srijem on April 12-13. Thus the population from which draftees could be-drawn was reduced. When Croatian troops did succeed in recapturing territory from the Partisans, as for example in the Drina River valley, there was no administrative apparatus to draft additional manpower, since Ustasha Party and state authorities had withdrawn when the Partisans first took the area and did not return when it was recaptured. Since the population had known for a long time that Germany would lose the war and that this would also mean the end of the Independent State of Croatia, many officers and soldiers refused to heed calls to serve, instead fleeing into the forests or joining the Partisans. Thus the only possibility of increasing the size of military units was by transferring to them existing armed or unarmed formations that up to that time had not been considered part of the armed forces. The main such formation was the Ustasha Defense Brigades, about 10,000 men strong at the end of 1944, which had the tasks of defending the Ustasha Party and serving as guards in concentration camps.” In March 1945, the Defense Brigades were included in the armed forces, as was the State Labor Service, though I was unable to find the number

of men involved in the latter. |

1On the reorganization of the 11th Division, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 6/11, 1-3, Box 101; of the 5th Division, Reg. No. 22/13—-1, Box 85; and of the 9th Division, Reg. No. 53/6, 1-2, Box 98c. Xerox copies of detailed orders on the reorganization of these

three divisions are in my files. _ , , ,

See YA, Mil. Hist., Enemy Units, Reg. No. 2/1~50, Box 134a for estimates of army manpower, and Reg. No. 3/1-29, Box 13 4a for estimates of militia manpower.

_ »YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. could not be found among author’s papers. |

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 461 Even after these changes, the Croatian armed forces remained under German operational command and the Ministry of Armed Forces and Supreme Headquarters continued to serve as conduits for German orders.” Altogether, the unification apparently had two principal results. First, the manpower of former army units was systematically reduced, while that of former militia units was increased. Second, beginning in December 1944, Ustasha officers and dependable army officers who were given high command posts were able to exercise—within the limits imposed by German operational command over them—some control over units from both former services. In addition to unifying the Croatian army and Ustasha militia and making many changes in the armed forces’ organization and high command, Croatian authorities enacted a series of measures dealing with the armed forces and national defense in the second half of 1944 and the first four months of 1945. A decree of August 21, 1944, reduced the draft age of young men from 18 to 17 years. On September 26, general labor service was introduced, under which the State Labor Service was empowered to send any citizen to any specified work place “without regard to his or her profession or work, when this was required by important state interests.”” Already on January 18, 1943, the government had issued a decree allowing the introduction of a state of emergency whenever military conditions required, which permitted military authorities to take over the civil administration of the affected region. On October 14, 1944, the government declared such a state of emergency for much of the eastern part of the country. As the military front moved west, the state of emergency was introduced in areas newly affected by military operations.” With a decree of November 14, 1944, the government established the legal basis for a general citizens’ mobilization, to become effective on the order of the prime minister. The obligation to serve was independent of the obligation to

render military service. It affected men between 16 and 65 and women between | 17 and 55 years of age. The decree also allowed the government to take control of all state, local governmental, and private property when this was required for the defense of the state. To put this mobilization into effect, each city, town-

ship, and commune had to establish a special defense committee to cooperate , with the Ustasha government. This decree went into effect on December 11, when detailed rules on the formation and operation of general mobilization *3See General Moskov’s interrogation after the war, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 1/4, Box 9 I. O., p. 68. See footnote 89 above for the distribution of Croatian divisions among Germany army corps. For a German review of the changes in the Croatian armed forces, see Kriegstagebuch, 4, pt. 1: 753-56. *4See Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1944, p. 602 for the August 21 decree, and pp. 715~-16 for the introduction of general labor service. *Tbid., pp. 749 and 829.

462 THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA committees and on exemptions from this service were also issued. Service was

performed only in one’s own locality.” ,

Before the decree on the general citizens’ mobilization had been issued, and even after it, several units of the “people’s Ustashas” were formed, especially in the eastern part of the state. But according to an order of March 10, 1945, these formations were to be liquidated. Men of military age were to join regular mili-

tary units, while others were to report to the general citizens’ mobilization

committees in their respective communes.” . a

A sign of the continuing disintegration in the Croatian armed forces was the

unauthorized movement of soldiers between military units. In effect, commanders of some units raided soldiers from other units. This apparently caused considerable disciplinary problems, because on December 13, 1944, Paveli¢ issued an order intended to stop it. Soldiers who transferred to other units without official orders were to be considered deserters, and commanders who encouraged soldiers to transfer were to be immediately removed from their posts and shot. I never encountered a case of punishment for this infraction, and the whole attempt to prevent such shifting was soon given up.” With a special order issued by Paveli¢ on December 15, 1944, all Croatian soldiers who had shown special valor, fidelity, and conscientiousness in the performance of their duties were guaranteed farm land, support for the schooling of their children, and preference in government and other employment after the war. If the soldier was killed, these privileges were to accrue to his family.”

The last major change in the organization and command personnel of the Croatian armed forces occurred in mid-March 1945, when Pavelié raised the number of army corps from three to five and the number of divisions from sixteen

to eighteen. According to compilations by Yugoslav scholars after the war, the five army corps (which were officially called Ustasha Corps, though for simplicity’s sake we will continue to call them army corps) were commanded as follows: the first by Ante Moskov, the second by Vjekoslav Luburi¢, the third by Artur Gustovi¢, the fourth by Josip Metzger, and the fifth by Ivan Herenéi¢.'® Three

of the five new commanders, Generals Herenci¢é, Luburi¢, and MoSskov, as noted earlier, had had no formal military training before the war but had held important posts in the Ustasha militia and Paveli¢’s Personal Guard prior to **Ibid., pp. 794-95 and 823-25.

"YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., xerox copy in my files, call number illegible. YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 32/4-2, Box 95. General Luburi¢ proudly referred to the transfer of soldiers from one Croatian unit to another as acts of opposition by the Ustashas and a challenge to German commanders. See his article “Ustashism,” p. 23. Thus Paveli¢’s order of December 13 might have been intended simply as a sop to the Germans. Moreover, by a special order of December 28, 1944, those accused of such transgressions of discipline were given amnesty. Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1944, p. 849.

*Zbornik zakona inaredaba NDH, 1944, p. 831. | a |

, MYA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 2/1-49-52, Box 13,44.

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 463 December 1944.'"' Only Generals Gustovi¢ and Metzger were professional officers, though because Metzger had been a political exile in Austria during the interwar period, he too could be considered nonprofessional. In ten divisions, older professional army generals and colonels were replaced as commanders by younger colonels or lieutenant colonels from the Ustasha militia or the army who were known for their strong support of Paveli¢ and the Ustasha regime. These new commanders were Colonels Josip Aleksi¢, Zdenko Begi¢, Slavisa Cesari¢, Alarih Deskovi¢, Milivoj Durbesi¢é, Andro Grum, Branko Rukavina, Franjo Sudar, and Jaroslav Sotola, and Lieutenant Colonel Dugan Rajkovié.'” In April, Paveli¢ made several additional personnel changes. On April 20 he named General Adolf Sabljak as commander of the Zagreb city garrison and General Tomislav Rolf, recently promoted from colonel, as commander of the 13th Division. And on April 25, Colonel Josip Aleksié, up to that time acting commander of the 11th Division, was appointed chief of military intelligence, a function taken over from Serti¢, chief of General Staff." However, Aleksi¢ did not have time to take over his new functions, nor Sabljak either time or means to strengthen the garrison. As of April 5, 1945, the Croatian armed forces had only ten frontline divi-

sions: Paveli¢’s Personal Guard, and the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, r1th, rath, 14th, 15th, and 16th Divisions.” Most of the other divisions continued to exist, but were not capable of frontline duty, for if they had been, the Germans would certainly have used them while they and most Croatian troops, under steady attack by the Partisans, withdrew toward Austria. There were also the three legionnaire divisions, but by that time a large part of their Croatian manpower had either been lost or released, and thus their value as fighting units had been

greatly reduced.’ We do not know whether Paveli¢ had to have advance clearance from the Germans to make these last-minute changes, though probably he did. But they took place so near to the expected total collapse of German military operations that the Germans probably paid scant attention to his formal actions. Indeed,

they may have welcomed the replacement of older former Croatian army offi- | cers by younger former Ustasha militia officers. The changes that Paveli¢ made in the Croatian armed forces in the last six '"! Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), December 31, 1944. YA, Mil. Hist., Natl. Lib. War, Reg. No, 1-15/4, Box 119, and YA, Mil. Hist., Enemy Units, Reg. Nos. 3-1-5 4 to 3-1-64, Box 13 4a. 'The appointments of April 20 are in Croatia, Independent State of, Ministry of Armed Forces, Vjestnik Ministarstva Oruzanih Snaga, 1945. (The page numbers were not specified by the author—Ed.) The last issue of this publication was no. 18, April 26, 1945, when it had reached 1,108 consecutive pages for the year. It began in 1941 as Vjestnik vojnih naredaba i zapovijedi, and sometime between 1941 and 1945 its name was changed. Aleksi¢’s appointment is in his article, “It is Necessary to Reexamine History,” p. 440. '4Kriegstagebuch, 4, pt. 2: 1224-38. 'Micr. No. T-501, Roll 267, Frs. 306, 479-83.

464 , THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA weeks of the war completed the total “Ustashizing” of the military that began in December 1944. There were several reasons for these changes. First, al-

| though Paveli¢é assumed the title of commander in chief of the Croatian armed forces in December 1944, he actually had no power over them. The Germans held the real power, since they had operational command over all troops and supplied them with arms and ammunition. By establishing new units and naming their commanding officers, Paveli¢ apparently wanted to create the impression that he had power and that the armed forces were strong and capable, which would impress and give a psychological boost to those authorities and the general public who did not know the real state of affairs. Second, Pavelic | wanted to reward young Ustasha militia officers and pro-Ustasha army officers for their faithful service and, even more, to secure their loyalty and cooperation in the critical closing weeks of the war, when Croatian forces planned to with-

| draw to Austria and surrender to the Western Allies. Third, Paveli¢ may have been afraid that some high-ranking professional officers who had served in the

Yugoslav army prior to April 1941 might try to change sides in the closing

son. , - |

stages of the war, just as those officers involved in the Lorkovi¢-Voki¢ plot had

, wanted to do. Thus, taken together, the concluding changes in the organization

3 and command of the armed forces represented Paveli¢’s final effort to maintain his authority to the very end of the war and improve security for his own per-

From a military point of view, however, it is difficult to explain or defend these changes. Neither the unification of the Croatian army and Ustasha militia in December 1944 nor further changes in command personnel in March and

April 1945 could improve the condition of the Croatian armed forces in terms of increasing their discipline or fighting quality. The only result was to make

the military more ready to follow Paveli¢’s orders. But since the Croatian , armed forces were under German operational command until May 8, 1945, the

, changes could not lead to any new defense approaches or policies by the new Croatian commanders. In fact, there was.no time to do anything, there were no

| arms to fight with, and there was no suitable area in which to organize new operations. We may realistically ask whether the new commanders even had time

to establish their command staffs. oo , | In addition, German forces were in the process of collapsing on both the western and eastern fronts. But even as the end approached, they retained an

7 | important stake in the Ustasha state and the help that Croatian troops could give them. This was because German forces in Greece, over 300,000 men | strong, as well as those in Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro, had to withdraw through Croatian territory on their way home. There was considerable discussion about building a defense line—the Zvonimir Line—between the

, Drava and Sava Rivers east of Zagreb, where a strong stand against the Parti| sans could be organized, but only minor preliminary work was undertaken. The withdrawal of German forces from the Balkans began in October 1944

THE ARMED FORCES OF CROATIA 465 and lasted until the very end of the war. During the entire withdrawal, which was carried out under steady attack from the Partisans, aided by Allied air power from Italian bases, the Germans generally used Croatian forces as their

rear guard. After prolonged consideration, at the beginning of May 1945 the | Ustasha leadership also began to withdraw its forces to Austria in order to surrender to the Western Allies. These developments in the last stages of the war will be described in Chapter 18.

CHAPTER II |

ee

| The Independent State of Croatia: —

| The Bosnian Muslims _

For a number of reasons, the Bosnian Muslims living in the Independent State of Croatia require a chapter of their own. Because Bosnia and Herzegovina had a predominantly Serbian and Muslim population, it was the weakest part of an extremely weak Ustasha state, even though Paveli¢ and many other Ustasha leaders were Croats from the province. Since the 1840’s, Bosnia and Herzegovina had been a political prize sought by both the Serbs and the Croats. After the First World War, the Muslims intensely resented the Serbs for the agrarian reform the latter pushed through, but during the Second World War, they also” resented being used by the Ustashas. In fact, some Muslims tried for almost the entire war to obtain political autonomy by making separate arrangements with the Germans. The Communists had promised autonomy since the 1930’s, but the Partisans too had an uphill struggle in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the initial stages of the war. Peace, however, brought statehood for the province within the new Yugoslav federation and recognition of the Muslims as a separate national unit, of equal standing with Serbs and Croats. As a result, the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced a political and cultural renaissance, until renewed ethnic struggles brought about the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the

1990'S. , , |

We have seen that the Ustashas followed Croatian nationalist tradition in claiming Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of Croatian “ethnic and historical territory.” Until the first appearance of the Bogumil heresy in the last quarter of the twelfth century, the population of the Bosnian region was for the most part Croatian and Roman Catholic. For the next 300 years, until the Turkish conquest in 1463, the Bosnian region and later the Bosnian state was claimed as part of the Croatian or Hungarian-Croatian state. The Bosnian bans (rulers) and kings, especially during times of weakness, recognized the overlordship of the Hungarian-Croatian kings. The Ustashas pointed out that the forefathers of most Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been Croatian and Catholic or Bogumil before they became Muslim and that they were therefore, as some Croats said, the “flower,” or the purest, of all Croats. Together, Croatian Catholics with 24 percent and Muslims with 31 percent comprised a majority

THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS 467 of 55 percent of the total population of the province in 1931, which provided the basis for the Croatian nationalist claim. ' But the Croats’ claim was disputed not only by most Muslims, but also by the Serbs. The Serbs claimed the Muslims as “blood brothers” and as a component part of the Serbian nation.” From the late nineteenth century up to the Second World War, the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina had a plurality of 43 to 44 percent of the total population, in part because a small percent of Muslims

declared themselves as Serbs from the beginning of this century. The Serbs needed the Muslims, though not as much as the Croats did, to reinforce their historical claim to the province, but they were less justified than the latter in

: making it. It is true that parts of Bosnia together with the territory of Herzegovina to the Neretva River and part of southern Dalmatia were under the Serbian kingdom during some of the medieval period. But by the twentieth century most Serbs in the province were descended from people who immigrated from the Serbian and Montenegrin areas of the central Balkans during Ottoman rule, particularly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus, there have been two mutually exclusive claims on Bosnia and Herze-

govina, which since about 1840 have aroused more passion than any other theme in Croatian and Serbian nationalist history and politics.’ For the vast majority of Muslims, the rival claims of Croats and Serbs were more irritating than meaningful: although the Muslims were overwhelmingly of South Slavic blood and spoke the same language as the Serbs and Croats, they considered themselves separate because of their Islamic religion. Their national affiliation was an issue forced on them by Serbs and Croats for selfish political reasons. Although a few Muslim intellectuals, under the influence of modern nationalist movements, chose to consider themselves as either Croats or Serbs, most intellectuals and almost the whole Muslim population, urban as well as rural, thought of themselves as Muslims (and earlier even as Turks).* ‘See, for example, M. Lorkovi¢, Narod i zemlja Hrvata, pp. 41~67, 145-58, 229-32. Lorkovic¢, together with many other Croatian nationalists, extended the Croatian nationalist claim to the Muslims of the Sandzak because of their affinity with the Muslims of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. See pp. 206-7. .

The great Serbian geographer Jovan Cviji¢ called the Bosnian Muslims simply “Serbes islamisés.” See his La Péninsule balkanique: Géographie humaine, pp. 343-55. For the views of the most nationalistic political party in Croatia, the Croatian Party of Right, on Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Gross, Povijest pravaske ideologije, pp. 103-8, 164-

66, 322-25, 356-64, 381-84. See also her article, “Croatian Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” pp. 9-68. An interesting collection of excerpts is L. Kosti¢, Sta su Srbi mislili o Bosni.

‘The complications were occasionally rather ridiculous. In the Spaho family, a leading Muslim family in Bosnia in the interwar period, Mehmed Spaho, head of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, which during this period represented over 90 percent of all Bosnian Muslims, refused to declare himself either Serb or Croat. His brother, Fehim, who was the Reis-ulUlema—the religious head of the Bosnian Muslims—between 1938 and 1942, declared himself a Croat, and his brother Mustafa, a civil engineer, declared himself a Serb. HadzZijahié, Od tradicije do identiteta, p. 227.

468 , THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA This way of thinking had a long history, whose roots go back to the Bosnian state and church during the Middle Ages and to the more than 400 years of

Turkish rule in the province. We are chiefly interested here in two aspects of this history: first, how developments during these earlier periods contributed to the Bosnian Muslims’ sense of being separate and different from the Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats, and, second, what forces brought about the

great confessional and national mixture of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both these elements contributed significantly to the bloody de-

| velopments in the province during the Second World War. .

| HISTORICAL BACKGROUND | ee | The Medieval Bosnian State and Church , , Up to the middle of the twelfth century, the name Bosnia was applied to only a small region lying on the upper reaches of the Bosna River, variously belonging, at different times, to the Byzantine, Croatian, and Serbian states. From about 1200, Bosnia developed its own political individuality, which it

managed to maintain for two and a half centuries, even though it formally ree mained under the suzerainty of the Hungarian-Croatian kings. At times during

this period it was completely independent, and it expanded its territory inalldirections at the expense of its neighbors. In 1377, the Bosnian ban (ruler) had ~ himself crowned king of the neighboring Serbian lands on the basis of his kinship with the Nemanji¢é dynasty, and this title was also later recognized for

_ Bosnia proper.° a | Oo

, The royal crown of Bosnia and the council of Bosnian nobles served as the ~ two constitutional pillars of the state.° Territory belonged either to the ruler or to various powerful feudatories, of which there were six or seven by the early | fifteenth century. Large and small feudatories were often at war among themselves over territory and rights, and the larger feudatories also occasionally fought the king. In 1448, the ruler of the Hum—the southeast part of the king-

dom—appropriated the special new title of herceg (duke) of St. Sava to stress ' his independence from the king and his possession of a standing higher than SSome recent histories of medieval Bosnia are: Corovié, Historija Bosne; Draganovi¢, Povijest hrvatskih zemalja Bosne i Hercegovine, vol. 1; Mandi¢, Bosna i Hercegovina; and Cirkovi¢, Istorija srednjovekovne bosanske drzave. On the formation of the Bosnian state,

see A. Babic, “Medieval Bosnian State,” pp. 57-79. |

_ “In imputing a fundamental constitutional property to the crown, the Bosnians followed a the precedent set in Hungary, where the Crown of St. Stephen symbolized the Hungarian state. The council of Bosnian nobles was called the “rusag,” for “state council,” a corruption

pp. 29-48. ,

_ of the Hungarian word orszag, meaning “country.” See Cirkovi¢, “The Nobles of the Rusag,” pp. 5-17, and Andjeli¢, “Barones Regni and the State Council of Medieval Bosnia,”

THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS 469 that of other regional feudatories.’ It is from this title that the present name of the region, Herzegovina, derives. Toward the end of the twelfth century, a separate church, whose adherents were called Bogumils (or Bogomils), developed among the clergy of the Catholic bishopric in Bosnia. It used the national language and apparently the Eastern rite and was headed by a native bishop. Within the country, a large part of the clergy, the feudal lords, and the population, as well as perhaps half of the country’s rulers during the ensuing two and a half centuries, were followers of or tolerated the local church, thus splitting the Bosnian body politic over religion. As a result of this division, as well as of rivalries among and centrifugal tendencies within the big feudatories and the wretched condition of the serfs, the medieval Bosnian state was always weak and unstable.’ Externally, the Bosnian Church was a source of unending trouble for the country. Both the papacy and the Hungarian-Croatian kings, as well as the Serbian state and the Orthodox Church, considered it heretical. The kings, in concert with the papacy, undertook several crusades to extirpate the heresy and bring the country under their rule. In 1233, the pope installed two foreign bishops in succession to work against the heretics, but they only served to alienate the population.’ Around 1250, the pope transferred the seat of the Bosnian bishopric outside of Bosnia, but this only caused the Catholic Church there, now without a bishop on the scene, to grow weaker, while the Bosnian Church expanded. During the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the papacy also sent in the Dominicans and later the Franciscans as missionaries and inquisitors, though squabbling between the two orders eventually forced the pope to choose one order—the Franciscans—for a monopoly of inquisitorial work in Bosnia.” At times, the efforts of the Catholic orders bore fruit, leading several Bosnian rulers and feudal lords to abjure Bogumilism, but the successes were only temporary and the antagonism toward Rome, the Catholic religious or-

ders and functionaries, and the Hungarian-Croatian kings continued. The Catholics’ efforts tended to draw together the various elements in Bosnia—the ruler, most of the feudatories and the clergy, and the Bogumil population—in defense of their several interests, and the Bosnian Church assumed the role of a national church defending itself and the state against foreign powers. While the medieval Bosnian state has received little attention from historians, the Bosnian Church has been intensively studied for 150 years. In 1849, the French historian Charles G. A. Schmidt, in the first modern study, labeled ’Cirkovié, Istorija srednjovekoune bosanske drzave, pp. 289-90. *Relatively little is known about the obligations of Bosnian medieval serfs toward their landlords and the conditions of their lives. See, however, Jokanovi¢, “Bosnian Feudalism,” pp. 220-67, and Cirkovic, Istorija srednjovekoune bosanske drzave, pp. 186-92. *Cirkovi¢, Istorija srednjovekoune bosanske drzave, pp. 60-68. 'Sanjek, Bosansko-humski krstjani i katarsko-dualisticki pokret, pp. 76-78, 81.

| 470 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA the Bosnian Church a dualistic church of moderate orientation, closely related to the Cathar sect, which spread from Constantinople to Dalmatia and thence to Bosnia, northern Italy, and southern France. Almost two decades later, in

, 1867, Bozidar Petranovi¢, in the first South Slavic study, claimed that the Bosnian Church was in-essence an Orthodox church, with some slight modifications. In 1869 and 1870, after long years of research and partly in response to Petranovic¢, the Catholic priest and eminent Croatian historian Franjo Racki, using both Catholic and domestic Bogumil sources, proved that the Bosnian Church belonged to the neo-Manichaean dualistic heresy. But in 1924, Vaso Glugac, on the basis of domestic sources, elaborated on and strengthened Pe-

tranovic’s claim that the Bosnian Church was Orthodox." , Inevitably, Croatian historians felt that it was their patriotic duty to enter the controversy, since Petranovic’s and later GluSac’s views that the Bosnian Bogumils were in essence Orthodox meant that they must also be Serbs and that consequently, from a historical point of view, Bosnia and Herzegovina in modern times belonged to the patrimony of the Serbian nation. Starting at the turn of the century, a series of Croatian writers took up the challenge. All of them affirmed that the Bosnian Church, contrary to the findings of the papacy and the Catholic inquisitors, was in fact a Catholic church with slight deviations." The political implications of this view were obvious. Since the Bosnian Church was Catholic, so the reasoning went, and Bosnia in medieval times had been formally and occasionally also materially a vassal of the HungarianCroatian kings, medieval Bosnia and Herzegovina was therefore Croatian and its population, including the Muslims, who were descended mainly from Islamized Bogumils, remained a part of the Croatian national patrimony. According to prevailing views, based primarily on the work of Professor _ Jaroslav Sidak of Zagreb University, a leading Yugoslav expert on the church, the Bosnian Bogumil Church was moderately dualistic.” Its teachings were "Schmidt, Cathares ou Albigeois, 1: 15-16, 50-59, 104-42; Petranovi¢, Bogomili, crkva bosanska i krstjani; Ratki, Bogomili i Patareni; Glusac, “The Medieval ‘Bosnian Church,’” pp. I-55, especially his emphatic conclusion on p. 55. Schmidt was professor at the Faculty of Theology and the Protestant seminary in Strasbourg. Ratki’s work was first issued in installments in 1869 and 1870 by the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb in its Rad series, and republished in one volume by the Serbian Academy of Sciences in Belgrade in

I I.

able. | , ,

»° Among this group of authors are, for example, Hoffer, Dua odlomka iz poveceg rada o krséanskoj crkvi u Bosni; Truhelka, “The Testament of Gost Radin,” pp. 355-75; idem, “The Bosnian National (Patarin) Church,” pp. 767-93; L. P[etrovi¢], Krgéani bosanske crkve. The most recent support for the thesis that the Bosnian Church, though schismatic, was nevertheless Catholic, has come from the leading French Slavicist, André Vaillant. See his | article, “Les ‘chrétiens’ bosniaques,” pp. 525-30. But his argument is superficial and unten13Sidak, Studije o “Crkvi bosanskoj ” i bogumilstvu. This collection of Sidak’s articles and

reviews is by far the most complete source of information on the course of studies of the Bosnian Church. Three other works maintaining the dualistic character of the Bosnian Church should be mentioned: Kniewald, “Bosnian Christians,” pp. 115-276; Mandi¢, Bo-

THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS A7I brought to Dalmatia by Dalmatian merchants from Byzantium and other parts of the Middle East in the last quarter of the twelfth century. When the members of the sect were expelled from Dalmatian towns as heretics, they found refuge and acceptance in neighboring Bosnia. This is largely the view that the French historian Schmidt took in 1849. Also, as he suggested, the Bogumils were similar in their teaching and organization to the Cathars in northern Italy and the Albigenses in southern France, though they reached their zenith some 150 years after the latter were subdued by the papacy and its political allies. The Bosnian Church had its most fervent adherents among the clergy and

the nobility, who had personal reasons for choosing to oppose the Catholic Church and the Hungarian-Croatian kings. It was easy, therefore, for it to become “an expressly state church” around 1330. Subsequently, for more than two centuries, the church “was the protector and ideological representative of the political independence of the land in the struggle against the expansionist tendencies of the Hungarian crown.” Therefore, the Bosnian Church, “which was anyway close to the people through its ceremonial language and script, had in fact the characteristics of a true national church.” The existence of the Bosnian Church profoundly affected not only the religious but also the political and cultural life of the land. Although it developed into a national state church and was the main supporting pillar of the Bosnian state until its last two decades, the consequences of this success were not necessarily beneficial. According to Solovjev, despite its original revolutionary character, the Bosnian Church in time became the servant of the feudal class be-

cause, lacking large estates and economic power, it was unable to furnish a counterweight to the nobility. By favoring the national language in religious services and government administration, the church helped isolate Bosnia culturally from both Rome and Byzantium. Thus “although situated at the door of the Adriatic, Bosnia remained uncultured, without knowing a foreign culture and unable to create one of its own.” Alone among the South Slavic lands, Bosnia has no medieval heritage in the form of cathedrals and monasteries, paintings, literature, or codices. Finally, as Solovjev pointed out, many Bogumils later embraced Islam and thus contributed to the presence of three religions in Bosnia and Herzegovina." gomilska crkva bosanskih krstjana; and Loos, Dualist Heresy in the Middle Ages, pp. 162~ 66, 292-328. The authors of two of the most recent studies on the Bosnian Church (both doctoral dissertations) are more guarded in their interpretation. Both Fine, The Bosnian Church, pp. 194, 295-96, 361, and Sanjek, Bosansko-humski krstjani i katarsko-dualisticki pokret, pp. 157, I9I, seem to suggest that the Bosnian Church was not dualistic, although Sanjek at one point (p. 93) says clearly that the Bosnian Bogumils preserved a dualistic character throughout their existence.

'4Sidak, “Heretical Movements,” pp. 7-8. 'SSolovjev, “Bogomilentum und Bogomilengraber,” pp. 180-82. All that remains of the church are thousands of funerary monuments, or steéci (which some authors, however, do

472 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA , During the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the principal enemy of

| the Bosnian state and church was the Hungarian-Croatian kingdom. But the _ situation changed drastically in the second half of the fourteenth century, when

the Ottoman Turks began expanding into southeast Europe. The Turks first , came to the Balkan peninsula in large numbers in 1342 as mercenaries. In 13 54, having determined to conquer the area, they seized Gallipoli and from this fortress began two centuries of conquest that carried them to the shores of the upper Adriatic and the gates of Vienna. In 1371 and 1389, they crushed the Serbian medieval state, leaving only the satellite despotate of Smederevo in the north, which they overpowered in 1459. In 1393, they subdued the second Bulgarian kingdom and took its capital, Trnovo. Finally, in 1453 they took Constantinople, thus eliminating the Byzantine Empire, once the most powerful _ tate in medieval Europe and Asia Minor, from the historical scene.”

: It was only a matter of time before Bosnia, lying directly in the Turks’ | | northwesterly drive toward the Hungarian-Croatian kingdom and the republic of Venice, fell to the invader. It was an easy prey, economically exhausted after

, repeated wars with Hungary, disunited from frequent struggles among the king and the regional feudatories, and divided by religious differences. The serfs

of frequent wars. - a

were discontented, overburdened by the exactions of the nobility and the costs

The first Turkish raids into Bosnian territory occurred in 1386 and 1388. After 1415, Turkish influence steadily increased, until by the middle of the fifteenth century the Turks were able to impose the payment of an annual tribute , to the sultan on the king and a number of feudatories. By 1451, without having engaged in out-and-out warfare, they had absorbed parts of Bosnian territory

nia.” | | | )IIIf. 1327. a,.

as far west as the Bosna River and the town of Vrhbosna, where, nearby, they :

established their own town of Sarajevo. In 1463 a large Turkish army arrived to crush the remainder of the kingdom. Though Hungarian-Croatian forces re-

| took some territory, by 1528 the Turks had completed their conquest of BosSoon after subduing the Bosnian kingdom, the Turks again began expand-

not associate with the Bogumils). Two recent studies on them are Wenzel, Ukrasni motivi na _ steccima, and Kutzli, Die Bogumilen: Geschichte, Kunst, Kultur. Wenzel found over 50,000 undecorated and over 3,000 decorated tombstones in the area she covered. Kutzli puts the _ teachings of the Bosnian Bogumils in the context of Middle Eastern and Western European

- theological and social thought. The Bogumils did not build churches, but according to Hadzi_ Jahié, they did build chapels over some graves, and a number of such chapels have been found in recent years in Bosnia. Hadzijahi¢, “About the Disappearance of the Bosnian Church,” p.

” "eVeyonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism, pp. 69-287, 351-443; Ostrogorski, Istorija Vizantije, pp. 324-26, 457-59, 492-5303 Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, pp. 33-

'Cirkovié, Istorija srednjovekoune bosanske drzave, pp. 157-60, 323-41; Draganovic, _ Povijest hrvatskih zemalja Bosne i Hercegovine, pp. 574-84; Cirkovi¢, “Nobility and Kings

| in Bosnia After 1463,” pp. 123-31. .

THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS 473 ing to the west and north. In 1493, they inflicted a crippling defeat on Croatian forces at the Battle of Krbava Field in Lika, in which most of the Croatian nobility perished, never to recover, and in 1526, they crushed Hungarian forces at Mohacs on the Danube, killed the Hungarian-Croatian king, and took Budapest, which they held for the next century and a half. When the Croats and the Hungarians elected the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand Habsburg as their king the next year, the Austrian Habsburgs became the principal defender of the Catholic world in central Europe against the Turks. The Venetian republic performed the same role in areas bordering on the Adriatic and Ionian Seas and in the eastern Mediterranean.” The Turks reached the farthest extent of their conquest in southeast Europe

in the first part of the seventeenth century, when they controlled much of Croa- | tian territory—almost all of Dalmatia, large parts of Lika, Kordun, and Banija,

and all of Srijem and Slavonia—and came almost to the gates of Zagreb. For a | period of over 200 years, from the late fifteenth to the early eighteenth century, these Croatian areas as well as adjacent territories were a main battleground between the cross and the crescent. Croatian lands served as a military frontier for Catholic Christendom against the Ottoman Empire, a fact which cost the Croatian nation untold sacrifices in blood and treasure. While the Bosnian state and church did not have behind them the international power of the pope and the Catholic Church, nor the drive of the Serbian medieval state and the organization and spirit of the Serbian national church, they did possess the tradition of a separate political and religious entity and

over 200 years of struggle against both the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches and the expansionism of the Hungarian-Croatian kings. That they resisted such powerful pressures for so long is proof of their vitality. They thus created in the minds of much of the Bosnian population a sense of being distinct from other Slavic peoples in the area. This was a contributing factor to the mass Islamization of Bosnia and Herzegovina that subsequently occurred under the Turks, and it became intensified in the privileged Bosnian Muslim population during Turkish rule.

Bosnia and Herzegovina Under Turkish Rule | As the Turks advanced into Bosnian territory, two processes occurred: Bosnia (and after its conquest in 1482, Herzegovina) was organized as a military frontier province (and later as a pashalik), and much of the population was Islamized.” ; ''Yugoslavia, Vojna enciklopedija, 2nd ed., 1: 329-333 3: 509-143 4: 699-700; §: 5§3944, 557. For a detailed analysis of the role of Venice, see G. Stanojevi¢, Jugoslovenske zemlje u Mletacko-Turskim ratovima.

For the early political and administrative organization of Bosnia under the Turks and its evolution to the end of Turkish rule in 1878, see Sabanovi¢, Bosanski pasaluk: Postanak i upravna podjela. For the mass Islamization of the population, see Solovjev, “The Disappear-

474 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA With the Turkish conquest, land in Bosnia and Herzegovina became part of the sultan’s domain, and most of it was distributed as military fiefs to individuals who had given notable service to the empire, usually for valor in battle. The fief holders became members of the feudal cavalry, who were obliged to go to war when called, along with a number of men commensurate with the income from the fief.2° During their first two and a half centuries of rule, the Turks also judiciously distributed a certain number of fiefs to Christians, mostly former lower nobility, as well as to the chiefs of the nomadic Vlach groups, to tie these people to the state. The diffuseness of the feudal cavalry had distinct economic advantages for the central government, which was freed from the burden of supporting large garrisons in all parts of the empire. As long as the Ottoman political and military system retained its vigor, the fief holder who refused to respond to mobilization or became undisciplined could easily be punished by

the recall of the fief. : ,

The Turks also took over the Christian military and semi-military auxiliaries already existing in Byzantium and the Balkan states and used them for a great variety of tasks. Such groups were the Akindzis, the DerbendZzis (troops for securing and maintaining roads), the Martolos (light cavalry), the Vlachs, the Voynuks, and many others.”' In the South Slavic lands, these groups consisted mostly of Orthodox Serbs and Vlachs and only small numbers of Catholic Croats. They rendered service to the Ottoman Empire in military operations against the Christian world and helped keep the domestic serfs under control. While the Ottoman Empire expanded, Bosnia served as an offensive military base for the Turks. After Turkish military fortunes began to decline, Bosnia became the defensive bastion of the empire in Europe. Because of its large Muslim population and its strategic importance as a frontier province, several unique changes were instituted in the land-holding system and the defensive organization of the province. From some time early in the seventeenth century, military fiefs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were made hereditary. In addition, seeing the effectiveness of the Military Frontier on the Austrian side of the border, the Turks established a special military institution, the captaincy, for the protection of frontiers and to ensure peace and communications in the interior. In time, both the captaincies and service in the troops at their disposal also became hereditary, and the captains eventually developed into the wealthiest and most powerful men in the pashalik.” ance of Bogumilism,” pp. 42-79; Handzié, “Islamization in Northeast Bosnia,” pp. 5-48; Filipovi¢, “Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” pp. 141-67; Hadzijahi¢, “About the Disappearance of the Bosnian Church,” pp. 1309-28. The smaller military fief, or timar, was the central unit in the whole land system. See Deny, “Timar,” pp. 767-76; Cubrilovi¢, “The Origin of the Muslim Nobility,” pp. 383-84;

Filipovic, “A View of Ottoman Feudalism,” pp. 67-68. 21See, for example, Vasi¢é, Martolosi, pp. 39-200; also Zirojevi¢, Tursko vojno uredjenje u Srbiji, pp. 101-250. oe On the hereditary military fief, or odzaklik timar, see Filipovi¢é, “The Odzaklik Ti-

THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS 475 As early as the last quarter of the sixteenth century, there were signs of internal decay in the Ottoman Empire. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, geographically remote but strongly Muslim, decay set in more slowly and was never as acute as in other provinces of the empire, but it was nonetheless evident.” The old and once stable systems of military fiefs and elite military troops as agencies of the central government particularly declined. They became more and more instruments for the promotion and defense of their own interests, ignored their responsibilities, and intimidated the Christian and Muslim peasants in what amounted to a state of feudal anarchy.” This continued as long as the central government was unwilling or unable to assert its authority. In the 1790's some initial attempts were made to modernize the Ottoman state, but they were unsuccessful. In the 1820’s, a new program of reforms was inaugurated,” and in 1839 further reforms abolished all military formations of feudal origin and replaced them with general military service, introduced new and uniform taxation, and ended the legal discrimination against non-Muslims. This was too much for the Bosnian nobles, many of whom were in open rebellion against the Porte throughout the 1840’s. It was not until the early 1850’s that the political and military power of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian nobles was crushed and the 1839 reforms were at last carried through. Within a generation, however, peasant uprisings against the Porte and war with Russia changed the map of the Balkans. Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania were recognized as independent states, Bulgaria was divided and kept under Ottoman suzerainty, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was assigned to Austria-Hungary as an occupying power. Turkish rule brought to Bosnia and Herzegovina not only its organization as a military frontier province, but also the conversion of much of the population to Islam. Some Bosnians accepted Islam as early as the first half of the fifteenth century when the Turks gradually penetrated the eastern part of the

country, subduing feudatories and promising freedom to the serfs. Most authorities agree that during the second half of the fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth, it was essentially the Bogumils and former Bogumils (Cryptobogumils, who had been forced to convert to Catholicism under the mars,” pp. 255-57, 265-73. On the captaincy, or kapudanlik, see KreSevijakovi¢, Kapetanije u Bosni i Hercegovini, pp. 9-71, and Cubrilovi¢, “The Origin of the Muslim Nobility,” pp.

395-401. 3For the decline of the Ottoman Empire, see especially Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 21-39. For the effects of the decline on the serfs, see Inalcik, “The Ottoman Decline,” pp. 338-54.

*4Rycaut, The Present State of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 169-72, 180-82, 190-99; Filipovic, “The Odzaklik Timars,” pp. 260-64; Cubrilovic, “The Origin of the Muslim Nobility,” pp. 395-401; Suceska, “The Formation of Ciftliks,” pp. 37-57, especially pp. 46-51; idem, Ajani, pp. 79-161. 5Kregevljakovi¢, Kapetanije u Bosni i Hercegovini, pp. 64-71, 203-5; Suceska, Ajant, pp. 210-22.

476 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA last two Bosnian kings) who embraced Islam. Some Catholics and Orthodox converted as well, but they were the exception. The process of Islamization was at its strongest up to the middle of the sixteenth century, though it continued for some time thereafter and only weakened at the end of the seventeenth cen-

tury, reflecting a general decline of the empire in Europe. In all southeast European countries that came under Ottoman rule, there were individuals and small groups of people who accepted Islam. But aside from Albania and some sections of Bulgaria inhabited by the Pomaks, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only area where mass Islamization occurred. A principal reason for this lies in the preceding two and a half centuries of religious strife between the Roman Catholic and Bosnian Churches, which occurred simultaneously with repeated political and military offensives by the HungarianCroatian state against Bosnia. This situation made the advance of Islam easier. The Bosnian serfs, moreover, who had to carry the economic burden of both the perennial struggles among the domestic feudatories and wars against the Hungarian-Croatian kings, were completely dissatisfied with their position and open to skillful Turkish propaganda promising the abolition of serfdom and better living conditions.” Certain similarities in doctrine and practice between Islam and the Bosnian Church also made conversion to Islam easier for Bogumils and former Bogumils than for Catholics and Orthodox. In addition, some scholars have pointed out that the spread of Islam in the Balkans was greatly helped by Muslim ascetic orders like the Dervishes, which attracted numerous

convertsand proselytes.”” 7 oe

Among those Bosnian young men who converted to Islam of their own free will, the most important reason was opportunism. In becoming a Muslim, one became a first-class citizen of a great empire, because religion determined the political standing and also largely the socioeconomic well-being of individuals

and groups. As so often happens, converts were recruited primarily from among young people, because they adjusted easily.”* Since there were plenty of Opportunities to distinguish oneself in the expanding Ottoman Empire, many of these converts achieved high government and military positions, which also *6Filipovié, “Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” pp. 141-67. In Albanian territory, the centuries-long struggle between the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches undoubtedly weakened the hold of the Christian churches over the population and probably contributed to the mass Islamization of the Albanians. For this conflict, see Sufflay, Srbi i Ar-

banasi, Pp. 62-66, 79-105, 133-35. , |

Both Cubrilovi¢, “The Origin of the Muslim Nobility,” pp. 376-77, and Draganovic,

Povijest brvatskih zemalja Bosne i Hercegovine, p. 584, who also quotes other experts, think that the precarious position of the Bosnian serfs was an important reason for the speedy col-

lapse of the medieval Bosnian state. __ | *“Solovjev, “The Disappearance of Bogumilism,” pp. 66-70; Babinger, “Der Islam in

Siidosteuropa,” p. 211. | ,

8Many tax rolls listed Muslim Bosnians with their fathers’ Christian or Slavic names or gave their fathers’ name as “Abdulah,” which served as a cover for a Christian or Slavic name. See, for example, HandZi¢, “Islamization in Northeast Bosnia,” pp. 38-41.

THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS 477 attracted their relatives and acquaintances to Islam. For the lower nobility, conversion might mean obtaining land in exchange for military service, and for the peasants, a lessening of the taxes owed to their landlords and the state. For the seminomadic Vlachs, it meant a decrease or cancellation of taxes on their leaders in exchange for certain types of military service. And for the relatively few merchants and artisans in the towns, the advantages of conversion were obvious, since the official Turkish presence—military, administrative, and religious—was concentrated in the towns. The Islamizing of Bosnia and Herzegovina was apparently largely completed by the second half of the sixteenth century. The Turkish defeat of the Hungarian state at the Battle of Mohacs in 1526 probably hastened the process because it proved the superiority of the Turkish empire and demoralized the Christians in Bosnia. Early in the seventeenth century, after the large-scale emi-

gration or transfer of Catholics out of Bosnia but before the immigration of large numbers of Orthodox into the province, the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed an estimated two-thirds of the total population.” During the next century a certain number of conversions occurred, but after the Ottoman Empire began a rapid decline toward the end of the seventeenth century, conversion was only sporadic. An individual might convert to marry, or some members of a large family might convert to protect family interests, or men might convert for reasons of professional advancement.” The Turks almost never used force to promote conversion to Islam. They provided substantial political and economic incentives, but at the same time they generally behaved tolerantly toward other religions. This was especially For the effects of the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, see Handzi¢, “Islamization in Northeast Bosnia,” pp. 12-13. For the estimates of the population of the province, see Pejanovié, Stanovnistvo Bosne i Hercegovine, pp. 24-28, and Solovjev, “The Disappearance of Bogumilism,” pp. 60-66. “Conversion to marry occurred in the family of Muhamed Hadzi¢, former Yugoslav minister of foreign trade, who was from Gacko, in Herzegovina. His paternal grandfather, born and reared as a Serbian Orthodox, wanted to marry a Roman Catholic woman. His parents objected, so both he and the woman converted to Islam to marry. Conversion to protect family interests is described in the autobiography of the famous Bosnian Muslim author MeSa Selimovié (1910-1982), whose family was descended from the Vujovic clan on the border between Herzegovina and Montenegro. Early in the eighteenth century, when there were nine brothers, they decided that two would convert to Islam in order to assure better protection for the remainder of the family. From these two came the Muslim families of Selimovi¢é and Ovéina. Selimovié, Sjeéanja, pp. 20-26. Selimovié declared himself a Serb.

Conversion for professional advancement is well illustrated by the case of Omer Pasha Latas in the early nineteenth century. Born Mihailo Latas, he was an Orthodox Serb from Lika, the son of a noncommissioned officer in the Croatian-Slavonian Military Frontier, which was commanded by Austrians. He graduated with honors from a military academy but apparently gave up hope of a career in the Austrian army after his father was tried for misappropriating state property. He fled to Bosnia, converted to Islam, and moved to Istanbul, where he became a teacher. One of his pupils was the heir to the throne. He soon entered the military and in time made a great name for himself.

478 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA true when the head of a religious community resided within the empire. “With the extinction of the Byzantine Empire and the reestablishment of the [Greek]

Orthodox patriarchate under Ottoman suzerainty in 1454, the Orthodox Church became a bureau of the new Muslim state. The patriarchate was no longer looked upon as the instrument of a hostile power and its relations with provincial metropolitanates and bishoprics were secured, as were its remaining lands and revenues.”*’ Much the same thing seems to have occurred after the reestablishment of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate of Pe¢ in 15 57. Relations between it and the Porte remained amicable until the early 1680’s, when the church lost the Porte’s confidence because it sided with the Austrians in wars against the Turks between 1683 and 1717. For several decades before it was abolished in 1766, the Patriarchate was headed by patriarchs of Greek nation-

ality.” :

In a theocratic state like the Ottoman Empire, based on Islamic law, no other religion could be recognized as equal to Islam. But Orthodox churches were tolerated and enjoyed rights and privileges stipulated in the decrees appointing the higher clergy. They were subject to taxation, and they were obliged to see that their members paid the taxes imposed on them as nonMuslims and to guarantee their good behavior. In return, they were free to conduct services, carry on educational and cultural affairs, tithe church mem- | bers, and set rules of marriage for their flocks. Thus, by cooperating with the Turkish state, the Greek and Serbian Orthodox Churches were able to preserve many religious, political, and cultural practices for their people that would otherwise have been lost. In so doing, the churches to some extent replaced the earlier political states and served as national authorities under conditions of

Captivity. oe

No such privileges were allowed the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, since its head, the pope, was beyond the reach of Ottoman power and the instigator of repeated Christian drives against the Turks. But the Turks did allow the activities of Franciscan monks, who, like Orthodox priests, developed close ties with their flocks and were their spiritual leaders. The Franciscans and the Catholic population were rarely persecuted. It should also be

mentioned that some crossing of confessional lines within the Christian churches in the South Slavic areas, especially in southern Herzegovina, occurred during Turkish rule, primarily from the Roman Catholic to the Serbian

Orthodox Church (see Chapter 12). | ,

In the Balkans, one of the most important long-term consequences of Ottoman rule was the shift of population in the area, generally speaking from the southeast to the north and northwest. In the early period of Turkish rule, these — 3!Vryonis, “Religious Change and Continuity in the Balkans,” pp. 137-38.

“Hadrovics, Le peuple serbe et son église sous la domination turque, pp. 44-108, 13 557; Cubrilovié, “The Serbian Orthodox Church Under the Turks,” pp. 163-88.

THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS 479 shifts were caused primarily by wars and political factors, but from the early eighteenth century on, they were largely due to demographic and economic fac-

tors.” While the Turks were expanding their domain into Croatian and Hungarian lands, the Christian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina emigrated or fled toward the Adriatic coast and islands held by the Venetian or Dubrovnik republics and in particular toward Croatian areas adjacent to Bosnia’s western and northern frontiers and beyond toward Austria and Hungary. At the same time, part of the Muslim and Christian populations from Bosnia and Herzegovina and other Balkan Slavic areas moved in or were induced to move in to settle the newly conquered areas. This movement lasted until the long war of 1683-99. At its conclusion, the Ottoman Empire lost a great deal of territory in Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavonia, Hungary, Poland, and southern Russia. The Muslims who had settled in central and northern Dalmatia and in the Lika, Kordun, and Banija areas of Croatia, Slavonia, and Srijem after their conquest by the Turks withdrew from these areas before or when Turkish forces withdrew. A century later, following the First and Second Uprisings of 1804 and 1815 in Serbia, the Muslims there also withdrew, some, though not all, to Bosnia. On the other hand, most of the Serbs in these areas, who were settled there by the Turks, remained and increased in numbers during the eighteenth and even the nineteenth century, when new settlers from Ottoman territory were attracted by Austria. Thus, in all Croatian areas adjacent to the Bosnian border, the Orthodox population represented a sizable segment of the total population. The establishment of the Military Frontier by Austria along the border with the Ottoman Empire and the formation of captaincies along the borders and in the interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Turks also stimulated population movements. In addition, some Bosnian areas, particularly eastern Bosnia, lost much of its population due to frequent plagues in the course of the eighteenth and first two decades of the nineteenth century, and Serbs from eastern Herzegovina and Montenegro were attracted as colonists, since without sufficient labor, the land was of no use to the Muslim landlords.” Centuries of population

shifts, along with the Islamization of much of the population of Bosnia and According to Pejanovié, the following factors affected the size and composition of the Bosnian population during Ottoman rule: immigration and emigration, frequent epidemics, the enslavement of the population, the tax in blood, pogroms and violence, the forced transfer and dispersion of people, continuous military campaigns and the constant transit of armies, the participation of Bosnian forces in Ottoman wars on other frontiers of the empire, uprisings and disorders and their suppression, poor harvests and famines, and generally difficult social and economic conditions. See Stanovnistvo Bosne i Hercegovine, p. 13. For the influence of continuous migrations on the origin and composition of the population in various areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Petri¢, “The Migrations of Population in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” pp. 5-16. To a very large extent, these movements were from the relatively overpopulated mountainous areas that depended primarily on animal husbandry to the relatively less populated flat lands with large reserves of agricultural land. 4Suceska, “The Formation of Ciftliks,” pp. 43-45, 52.

a ror . : - a‘"0 0 Zs 33:ure Se -7@ = @ eo. fe e eg0° 800feee@ LeeeSe “3 aie - -S. } | @.21.'@s SCOCe@e°

.=- 2 ss : .aae‘oe r oe St oy oO . @. ‘@ ‘ nd ae8ak, -‘e (3 A By SSe:@ @bed & By- ae sam e o Oo ' @ . sh Ze) . : . :

oE, ~. eae : ‘ eo € e 7aao: ES;Qo ‘S e@ ee : ee" . ee sf @e eten _/ oNe°.a oe No ‘@ @ @:* A ye) 1.0.’ -@ | @e Aut Soea0O@ bSe 7Bih ac ea @ eet 2@ ‘. Oat e@ , °@ ee : “8 ~ py&s' 2 oe - hg ry@ e*e" @ ae O- -ee*‘' .) && “ee ’ é 7e@ mm “e “e) e. * &. O8 ;@ e 8 et ®2s HES a — ee oo. . .: . . A . \ e Se a * ’ 7 Se @ e ‘ e oe os ed . 00 ®:t\,, 9@08 eae ‘4 e,@ @#~@ Banj . es Pe@e Ov3e 6’ Hee a < .ee . : . .fe at 7°77 @ Be ee Cea s , * co ye ° “ee 9* e_‘ 2? oeee .*° (7e,°(° es >& &- act - ‘s “s _ Be aa of “s & heet » 'g O38 Lo e . ;

es:aae-tee x"e® :oS sserEE SS . . ° a * s en SOS 35 0~C«E a ' : ||_oe & & © & @ _ > -« : rae: 8!cen? eaaa ee -@ x®@ ‘ 6e» —&S"ee & ao ee area wos ,8e *: .,*e ® .!2oo Ge re~ee@®

ee _a=»* gPs& . = °8&@ rr) «aear a . a8 ==, e & 20'% --.°@@-« e 0.” ~ @®.* ~%se«or 0 eee ; «...,ha(e%e AN _™” g @ ®.|Bh oR €® 2 e* ee ap*ae % e.@ @ eS 2 @& ‘. e° e *. t gee . ~ sibenik « « ens Bg, @ '. SS = « @ ei? ee eo” a) 6 foe @ - S@ee’ ‘oe°”.

||2 : ja® .& @*/ @2?. ae 8pe «ao5@ @ oe lene — a. @ hs. td] .@1“&Se@ _8Ad oe Pa @ @ oo e ian e &® 8e& =ee ah e 2% as .@@ ow? ee EJe-ox" oor:. a.& xao? \ \& 8oR :@° ®2 an& ae'2@* Sarai *6Oe* F) 3 2@ e @eS ely

, «)e «@ vl ® » eo eo.oO. _—Se_@ ..@xCe oe 2 8 og mw vee.) Fa @% ad@&oC" &a€rajevo ve®7avis Ge ee eee ae a a “ °@ @° @ eee Ofte eee “e — — oF: * peg ote * . & See L ee a” * ‘oe 8 e : ee, rae ~ ee ° ° ine .: d aaeee See a SEE &aa!ee ‘\Sees e ®ee eEeSale e@@ ®e.@e® e s@ ~. #@ eg @ wet, agme : .Se&& Se ., ss ry ee &°® @*p : &/isegra .e” ’ 1 aN -eee (&@. ®att@* 7 ¢-* oO ee . ee aeeca al@ > @@ ® ne @e é":iocr — = ee ’ oe ee e _ e @¢ @: © @e.0e|.a. 2 ee Ps ¢ ge eee a as . " e ee tee! ce : es cd ° e @ — =F a “hs ostar o ae e “ % . € oca OH. » e YY .“ee @@ oF — a 8 & « Re F wt ; fe: a . ase a & eee e we -& e @

7. _— . eee .— SEetsiaii:; _oe Ss a ~ -i So ee . 7 eee « oeSo 3 . s_ -& _-

OO _ oe awet a& een ol@° er.’ ' : oe 7” 2 oe oe . es * te “yy —etoer ar "te\ 8 ®@ ®@ e: ws ee ® ® ft: * e*%.) _ ee — e 4 ra ° : : : .- 7 eres & *s ‘@ e .-

% .oe O ; oli ae Ca . — a — O \ti ee K @a @ O° cS = \ eRe a — ee . ° a , . . co =i « ree.«ae —=< ee For arrangements on July r1 and 23, 1943, between Germany and Croatia on the allocation of new Croatian recruits, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5782, Frs. H297,582-86. For about six months the division also had about a thousand Muslim Albanians from the Kosovo region. They were removed in February or March 1944 and used as the nucleus for the new 21st SS Volunteer Division “Skanderbeg” in April 1944.

*For the mutiny, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5787, Frs. H301,454-58, and Labovi¢, Refleksi revolucije, pp. 127-41. See Berger’s report of September 25, 1943, in Heinrich Himmler Collection, Box 5 (File 281), Hoover Institution Archives. ”For long excerpts from this directive, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,23 5—

49, and for its withdrawal, see Fr. H306,503. A September 6, 1944, circular letter from the imam of the [Xth Waffen SS Mountain Army Corps to the imams of the “Handschar” and projected “Kama” divisions comprising it encouraged faith in the corps, which could serve as a political nucleus for the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina to fill the vacuum created by the absence of older leaders. The imam advocated cooperation with the Chetniks in the struggle against the Partisans and did not even mention the Ustashas. YA, Mil. Hist., German Docs., Reg. No. 14/4, Box 9. After the war, Yugoslav teams searching in German and Austrian camps turned up a number of former officers and noncommissioned officers of the “Handschar” division. They were subsequently taken to Yugoslavia, tried in military courts, and sentenced to prison or death. For samples of statements made by these men, see YA, Mil. Hist., German Docs., Reg.

Nos. 17/5 and 52/4, Box 9. ,

500 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA flict was rapidly turning against the Germans. The Partisans were expanding and consolidating their military and political control and, with the support of both the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, were on their way to becoming the future rulers of Yugoslavia. Even though the Third Reich still stood, along with the Croatian government, its days were numbered. All this directly affected the attitude and behavior of the Muslim population and Muslim political forces in Bosnia. A German “Situation Report” on Croatia for September 1944 described the situation in this way: “The break in diplomatic relations between the Reich and Turkey [on August 2] had a very unfavorable effect on the Bosnian Muslims. They were disappointed that the Muslim Division did not immediately bring about Bosnian autonomy and reestablish the agrarian order existing before 1918. The heretofore friendly attitude toward the Germans now barely exists. Their intelligentsia is at present without orientation and tries hard to find its way in a new Yugoslavia.”” The fundamentally changed situation for Germany was inevitably reflected in the Muslim fighting units. In June 1944, the Muslim 13th SS Division “Handschar,” which was showing signs of dissatisfaction, was given a new commander, General Desiderius Hempel.” The Germans planned to establish a second Muslim SS division, the 23rd SS Division “Kama,” but during Pavelic’s visit to Hitler’s headquarters in September, General Djuro Grui¢, chief of Paveli¢’s Military Office, contended that it would be very difficult for Croatia to supply another 5,000 men requested by the Germans to complete it, in addition to the 5,000 men already assigned.” In fact, plans for the second Muslim SS di-

vision had to be scrapped. Soon there was further bad news about the “Handschar” division. A German memorandum on October 5, 1944, noted that about 2,000 members of the division had already deserted to the Partisans. For the next month, reports were quite inconsistent. On October 28, 1944, ina telegram to von Ribbentrop, Kasche reported that on October 17, 140 members of the “Handschar” division refused to fight against the Russians and that on October 21, more than 600 members in northern Croatia deserted, some to the Ustashas and some to the Partisans. He suggested that both the division and the SS Replacement Command in Croatia be dissolved. On November 7, 1944, the commander in chief in southeast Europe reported that the division was still

*Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Fr. H299,234. . See YA, Mil. Hist., German Docs., Reg. No. 25/4, Box 9, p. 3 of “Izvjestaj o zlocinima 13. SS bosansko-hercegovatke Handzar divizije” (Report on the Crimes. of the 13th SS Bosnian-Herzegovinian Handschar Division) by the Provincial Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Ascertainment of Crimes Committed by Occupying Powers and Their

Helpers, prepared in Sarajevo in March 1947. |

*Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,700-701. Somewhat later, the staff of the

| “Kama” division was withdrawn from Croatia and used to organize the 23rd Volunteer Panzer Grenadier Division “Nederland.” Stein, The Waffen SS, p. 185; Keilig, Das deutsche Heer, 1939-1945, 2, section 141, “Kommandobehorden der Waffen-SS,” p. 20.

THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS 501 deployed in Bosnia. He flatly warned that even if some 70 percent of the Muslims in the division were removed, it would still be too unreliable to use in Bos-

nia. If the Reichsfiihrer SS approved, he proposed relocating the division to | northern Croatia to guard the Celje-Zagreb railroad.” Parts of the division may have already been relocated to northern Croatia in October and it may have been their desertions that Kasche referred to. What is definite, however, is that in December 1944, Himmler ordered all Croatian SS units brought to the Celje-Maribor area in northern Slovenia to be sorted out. Soldiers were given the choice of staying with SS troops fighting outside Croatian territory, joining the German-Croatian gendarmerie and police forces, joining Ustasha units, or going to the Reich as laborers. This was the end of the “Handschar” division. Its name was retained, however, and applied first to the reinforced regiment consisting of the German personnel of the former division and later as camouflage to the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division “Reichsfithrer SS,” which traveled from Italy to Hungary in early March 1945 and fought against the Russians there and in Austria in the final weeks of the war.”

Independent Arrangements A number of Bosnian Muslims had their own ideas about how to deal with wartime conditions. Mustafa Mulali¢, a politician and former member of the Yugoslav parliament representing the Yugoslav National Party before the war, became the chief spokesman for those Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandzak who sided with General Mihailovi¢é. In January 1944 at the Chetnik congress in Ba, he was appointed vice chairman of the Chetnik Central National Committee, a position he retained until the closing weeks of the war, when he surrendered to the Partisans. In a circular letter to some leading Muslims, he came out against both the Ustashas and the Partisans and explained why the Muslims’ place was with Mihailovi¢. The Chetniks, it should be noted, had in the meantime found it politically expedient to moderate their policy toward the Muslims and indeed, in late 1944, had organized a Muslim Chetnik corps in northeast Bosnia.” ‘For the October 5, 1944, memorandum, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Fr. H299,217. For Kasche’s telegram, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Fr. H297,378. For the November 7, 1944, report, see Micr. No. T-311, Roll 194, Fr. 863. The Germans tried to use the division imams to halt the disintegration, but without success.

For the dissolution of the Croatian SS units, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5784, Frs. H299,415~-17. I was unable to ascertain what choices the troops made. For the subsequent use of the name “Handschar,” see Kriegstagebuch, 4, pt. 2: 1151, and Stein, The Waffen SS,

184. ° “For a German translation of Mulali¢’s letter of December 1943, see Micr. No. T-311, Roll 196, Frs. 244-49. Mulali¢ subsequently wrote other letters to important Bosnian Muslims, promoting Mihailovi¢é’s cause among them. See Hurem, “Conceptions of Some Muslim Bourgeois Politicians,” pp. 533-48.

502 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA In the area of Cazin, north of Bihaé in Bosnia, a different situation prevailed. This area, with a population about 60 percent Muslim, 38 percent Orthodox, and 2 percent Catholic, was economically and culturally one of the most backward of the province. In the first summer of the war, the Ustashas established a Muslim militia there. Partly on the urging of the Ustashas and partly

on their own, the militia terrorized the Serbian population, plundering livestock, burning villages, and abducting or killing people. In self-defense, the Serbs fled into the hills, organized their own armed groups, and retaliated. The Communist Party was very weak in the area and during the first several years of Partisan resistance was powerless to stop the fighting between the two groups. Furthermore, Partisan ranks in this area consisted almost exclusively of Serbs. Since the Muslims constituted a majority of the population, the Partisans had to gain their confidence if they wanted to induce them to join Partisan ranks

and support their goals. OS -

The leading Muslim in the Cazin area to emerge during the war was Husnija (Huska) Milkovié, who became a regional warlord with a force of about 3,000 men at the height of his power in the winter of 1943-44. Before the war, Milkovi¢ had been a peasant and trader in agricultural products ona small scale. Through association with liberals and Communists, he became a party member in 1939. When the uprising began in Bosnia in the summer of 1941, he first joined the Partisans, but then by September went over to the Croatian army. Thus began a vacillation that continued throughout the war. He left the Croatian army to rejoin the Partisans and stayed with them until early 1943, becoming a member of the regional committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Karlovac and later post commander in a small town in the Cazin area and the secretary of the local party committee. The Partisans used him to attract Muslim support in the area. But Milkovic¢ left them during the bitter fighting of Operation Weiss in the winter of 1943 and went back to the Croats. The Ustashas and the Germans found him useful as a Muslim, as the Partisans had, and with their encouragement he formed a Muslim militia with the slogan “for faith” (za din) in the Cazin area in November 1943. However, he could not stay put, and by the end of January 1944 had taken his eleven battalions over to the Partisans again. They renamed his forces the Una Operative Group and kept him in command, though they suspected that he still had contacts with Croatian and German forces and could hardly be called reliable. Milkovi¢ was killed by a former Ustasha on April 27, 1944, still in good standing with the Partisans.** Many of his troops then returned to the Croatian For the Muslim Chetnik corps, see Micr. No. T-501, Roll 266, Frs. 554-5 5. Little is known about it. For the extremely involved developments in northeast Bosnia during the last eight months of the war, with a description of relations among the Partisans, Chetniks, Ustashas, and various groups of Muslims, see Lazarevi¢, “Northeast Bosnia,” pp.

T§7-213. | |

For detailed information on Huska Milkovié and his forces, as seen by the Croats and the Germans, including German reports on SS attempts to liquidate him, see Micr. No. T120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,53 5-37, and Micr. No. T-314, Roll 566, Frs. 314, 450-53, 511-

THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS 503 army, but enough remained to form the nucleus of new Muslim units that the Partisans established in the Cazin area. Colonel Sulejman Filipovi¢ was another Muslim from the Croatian army whom the Partisans had the good fortune to attract, along with a large number of his officers and men. Filipovié had been an officer in the interwar Yugoslav army and was one of the few high ranking Muslim officers in the new Croatian army. He and his men deserted to the Partisans from the garrison at Tuzla in northeast Bosnia after the first liberation of the town by the Partisans in early October 1943. The Partisans quickly made Filipovi¢ a delegate to the second session of AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia), which met in Jajce at the end of November, and then put him in charge of the Department of Forests and Mines in the new interim Partisan government.” Toward the end of 1943, Muhamed Pandza, a Muslim religious leader who had been openly and consistently pro-German, adopted an all-Muslim stance. He proclaimed what he called the Muslim Liberation Movement, which was opposed to both the Chetniks and the Ustashas and was primarily interested in arming Muslim units for the defense of Muslim villages and families. He urged tolerance and peaceful cooperation with both the Orthodox and the Catholics of the province. Pandza disappeared into the hills for a time and was accused by some Croats and Germans of having gone over to the Partisans. He was with the Partisans for a while, in fact, and even gave several speeches supporting them.” He escaped a German attack on the Partisan unit that he was with, but soon thereafter was arrested by Croatian authorities. In his deposition to the Ustasha police in Zagreb on January 21, 1944, he gave detailed information on Chetnik terror against Muslims; on his collaboration with the Germans, including helping them establish the 13th SS Division “Handschar,” which he claimed was cleared with Paveli¢c; on Partisan policies toward the Muslims; and on Partisan terror. In conclusion, he expressed his devotion to the Independent State of Croatia, Croatian nationalism, and harmony between Muslims and Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but insisted that Croatian nationalism must be pure and free from any religious and clerical admixtures. While Pandza did not mention several German massacres of Muslims, including women and children, he must have been particularly horrified by them, and they probably 14, 551-77, 602-7, 646-47, and 651-68. For the report of his death, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Fr. H306,387. For the Partisans’ view, see Bijedi¢, Ratne slike iz Cazinske krajine, pp. 9-98. Bijedi¢, a Muslim from the Bihaé¢ area in northwest Bosnia, was appointed political

the second time in late January 1944. commissar to Huska’s units by the Partisans after Huska transferred allegiance to them for

“Yugoslavia, Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, 3: 322; NeSovi¢, Prvo i drugo zasjedanje AVNOJ-a, pp. 168, 188-90, 223. ‘*For a German translation of Pandza’s proclamation, see Micr. No. T-311, Roll 189, Frs. 264-65. For Pandza’s speeches supporting the Partisans, see Selimovic¢, Sjecanja, pp. 148-51. Selimovi¢ referred to Pandza as the Reis-ul-Ulema, obviously a mistake. Pandza was a member of the Ulema Medizlis. See footnote 69 above.

504 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA contributed to his proclamation of the Muslim Liberation Movement and his

, short-lived excursion to the Partisans.°” , | The so-called Green Cadres were privately organized Muslim armed

groups that began appearing in the fall of 1943, in response to threats from the

Chetniks and the Partisans. They not only protected villages against attack, _ but also carried out occasional sorties of their own against the rebels. Among the most important such units were those organized in September and October 1943 in the area between Tuzla and Zvornik in eastern Bosnia by Neget Top¢ié,

a high school teacher. TopZié was strongly against the Communists and equal- , ly strongly for the Germans, under whom he envisioned an autonomous Bos-

| nia and Herzegovina similar to the one advocated by the Muslim People’s Committee in its memorandum of November 1, 1942. He cooperated with both Croatian and Chetnik forces against the Partisans. After a time his units were taken into the Croatian armed forces, where they were given the status of a volunteer Bosnian mountain regiment.” In May 1944, at the invitation of the SS, he traveled to Berlin to meet with Gottlob Berger, the head of the SS Chief Office, and the grand mufti of Jerusalem. But these were little more than courtesy visits, since it was too late for the SS or the grand mufti to provide any substantial help to the Bosnian Muslims or obtain any new fighting effort from

them. — oe a 7

As the war advanced and it became evident that Germany would lose and that the Independent State of Croatia would disappear, more and more Muslims gave their support to the Partisans. The Ustasha authorities reacted brutally against such moves, which led in turn to determined protests by Muslim leaders to the Croatian authorities. One such protest was submitted by a group of fifteen leading Muslims from Sarajevo, following meetings on April 28-29, 1944, between them and Nikola Mandi¢, Croatian prime minister, Ivica Frkovié, chief of the Sarajevo city government, and Muhamed Kulenovié, head of the Vrhbosna district. In their own words, the group included representatives of all Muslim political groups from the preceding two decades. Their memorandum, dated April 30, stated their shared grievances in blunt terms—against “For a German translation of his deposition before the Zagreb police, see Micr. No. T120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,129-46. For reports on the investigation of the shooting of 69 Muslims for supposed pro-Partisan activities by units of the 7th SS Division “Prinz Eugen” in

, the village of KoSutica in eastern Bosnia in July 1943, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5788, Frs. H1302,257-75. On this, as well as on incidents in September 1943 resulting in more deaths of Muslims, see also the report of General Phleps, commander of the Vth SS Mountain Corps, to

: Himmler on September 7, 1943, in Micr. No. T-175, Roll 81, Frs. 2,601,899-901. According to Phleps, “about 50 percent of the Muslims in the city of Mostar have to be considered

friendly to the Communists.” | |

"For Green Cadres in northeast Bosnia during the last phase of the war, see Lazarevié, | “Northeast Bosnia,” pp. 157-61, 168, 175. For Topti¢’s ideas, see Hurem, “Conceptions of Some Muslim Bourgeois Politicians,” pp. 546-47. See also the message of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Kasche of March 23, 1944, providing him with special information

on conditions in Bosnia, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. H306,161—64. , ,

THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS 505 the administration, the military, the secret police, and all Ustasha policies toward the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” They felt that they were discriminated against because of their religion, and they deplored the use of religious intolerance as a weapon in a country that had such a long history of religious toleration. Instead of law and order, many injustices had occurred at the expense of the Muslims, and these injustices increased from day to day. As a re-

sult, the Muslim population felt that “a system is being created and imple- | mented in certain circles that is leading toward the extermination of Muslims.” The memorandum listed specific accusations against the Ustasha and Croatian authorities, with names, dates, and places. Citing some of the numerous killings of Muslims, committed as a rule because of their alleged pro-Partisan activities, the Muslim leaders were especially angered by the fact that the Ustasha officers who had perpetrated these acts, against whom open accusations had been lodged with the Croatian authorities and in some cases with the prime minister himself, had not been called to account and continued to hold their positions, some even being promoted. A second complaint was that thousands of Muslims, especially from Sarajevo but also from other areas, had been taken

to concentration camps, again for alleged pro-Partisan activity, and never heard from again. The Ustashas, police, and Croatian army units were accused

of unauthorized entry and robbing Muslim families, and both Ustasha and army authorities, almost the only ones who had direct access to German troop commanders on Bosnian soil, were charged with making false accusations to them about alleged pro-Partisan activities by the Muslims, which led to bloody reprisals by the Germans against the Muslims. Lastly, the Muslim leaders complained of discrimination against Muslims in the government. To prove their point, they presented statistics on the number of Muslims at the higher levels of state administration, in 31 different fields (excluding the army and Ustasha militia), presumably from late 1943 or early 1944, that showed the government’s

lack of confidence in Muslims. A partial list is sufficient to show the inequality: ,

State Ministers 186 20 State Undersecretaries Members of the Diet (1942) 193 13 Higher Officials in the Foreign Ministry 49 2 Envoys Abroad 7 10 Consuls Abroad 6 Higher Officials in Legations & Consulates 33 0 District Heads112 1913 3 County Prefects

Catholics Muslims

Higher Officials in the Ministry of Finance 159 2 Higher Officials in the Croatian State Bank 32 1

Directors of Radio Stations 7 0 For this memorandum, see YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 1/23, Box 86, or Micr. No. T-175, Roll 460, Frs. 2,979,461-70.

506 ‘THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA _ | The memorandum did not make threats, advocate autonomy for the province, or suggest any shift to the Partisans. But it is hardly possible to imagine a stronger condemnation of the Ustasha regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Muslim point of view. In the words of the memorandum, assertions that the _ Muslims were the “flower” of the Croatian nation were only “empty phrases.” _

, As another memorandum, probably prepared by the same group, made clear, the Muslims expected their share of power and government employment to be

23 percent in the entire state.” . oe OO Growing Support for the Partisans | | In addition to the Bosnian Muslims who supported the Ustashas, the Axis

powers, or Mihailovic, or took an independent stand, there were also those | who supported the revolt against the Ustasha regime. Their position among the — rebels was initially precarious, however, when national animosities prevailed

over the struggle against a common enemy. 7 | The immediate cause of the uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the Ustasha government’s policy against the Serbs, characterized by plunder, arrests,

: deportations, forced conversions, and mass killings. Throughout the province, Serbs fled to the hills. This happened even before Communist-led units began an uprising in the area of Drvar and Bosansko Grahovo on July 27, 1941, in response to the Comintern’s call to put pressure on the rear of German forces to

help the hard-pressed Russians. Subsequently, the Serbian nationalists—the Chetniks—and the Communists—the Partisans—struggled for leadership of

the aroused people. a . | oe } At the outset, both groups were composed almost exclusively of Serbs. But whereas the Partisans from the beginning proclaimed a policy of cooperation

and unity among the three population groups of the province, the Chetniks were militantly anti-Muslim and anti-Croatian. Partisan leaders made a special effort to recruit members of all three groups, as well as to blunt the efforts of

Ustasha and Chetnik extremists and develop as strong a front as possible against foreign enemies and domestic collaborators. But they had set themselves a formidable challenge that was initially too difficult to meet. The mostly Serbian Partisans in Bosnia and Herzegovina cooperated closely with the Chetniks until early 1942, and some Partisans—around Drvar in western Bosnia and in eastern Herzegovina—refused to accept Muslims into their ranks, occasionally behaving just like the Chetniks toward the Muslim population. Small

wonder, then, that for many months the Muslim rank and file saw no differ- _

ence between the Partisans and the Chetniks.” , a

*Micr. No. T-175, Roll 460, Frs. 2,979,477-79. / , a _ *!For conditions in eastern Herzegovina in September 1941, see the report of Avdo Humo, a Muslim, to his Partisan command, in Zbornik DNOR, 4, bk. 1: 158-60. For conditions in the Bosnian krajina, see Lukat, Ustanak u Bosanskoj krajini, pp. 189-94, 268-69,

THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS 507 , The exceptions were those Muslim intellectuals and industrial workers who, as members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, participated in the uprising from the beginning and held several leading positions. Also, in a number of areas the Partisans were successful from the outset in mobilizing large numbers of Muslims and Croats. In the Kozara Mountain area in northwest Bosnia, for example, Muslims and Croats made up about ro percent of the Partisan units as early as the end of August 1941,-.and their participation rose to about 25 percent by the end of the year. A similar situation seems to have prevailed in Partisan units in the Romanija Mountain area near Sarajevo.” At least one Partisan leader, Svetozar Vukmanovi¢ Tempo, the delegate of the Central Committee of the CPY and Partisan Supreme Headquarters to the

Bosnian Partisans from July 1941 to the late fall of 1942, put much of the blame for the Muslims’ mistrust of the Partisans on the Chetniks. According to Vukmanovi¢ Tempo, relations between the Partisans and the Muslims in eastern Bosnia were good enough during the early stages of the uprising for the Partisans to organize a Muslim battalion. Their subsequent efforts to attract more Muslims, however, were successfully thwarted by the Chetniks. Reports of Partisan defeats in Serbia, along with many shortcomings in Partisan commanding cadres, boosted the number of Serbs who joined the Chetniks, some of whom

had apparently first joined the Partisans. The increase in Chetnik numbers, along with the arrival of two strong Chetnik detachments from Serbia, was followed by an intensification of Chetnik atrocities against the Muslims in eastern Bosnia. There is evidence that some Partisans joined the Chetniks in carrying out these atrocities. When the Partisan command showed itself incapable of either keeping many of its own units under control or protecting the Muslim population, so many Muslims left the Partisans that their battalion had to be dissolved. The Muslim population fled for safety to Ustasha-controlled areas adjacent to eastern Bosnia. According to Vukmanovic Tempo, some refugees later took revenge as members of the Ustasha Black Legion, which became notorious for its atrocities against Serbs in eastern Bosnia.” In two areas of Bosnia—east-northeast and northwest—the conflict between the Muslim population and the Chetniks was particularly brutal. In both areas, as well as elsewhere in the province, the Ustashas organized, in cooperation with part of the Muslim population, special Muslim militia units to carry out their anti-Serbian policy or to defend the Muslim population once this policy produced an anti-Muslim backlash by the Serbs. 297, 329. For conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina generally, see Purivatra, “The Attitude of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,” especially pp. 509-22. 2S ojic, “Uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” pp. 11-12, 22-23.

Vukmanovié Tempo, “National Liberation Struggle in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” pp. 126—-53. For an appraisal of the Black Legion by a leading Ustasha who was instrumental in establishing and outfitting it, see Kvaternik, “Italian Policy,” pp. 178-86.

508 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA When the Ustashas realized that they could not carry through their radical anti-Serbian policies and came to see that the Partisans posed a greater threat than the Chetniks, they inaugurated a new policy toward the latter. Towardthe _ end of May 1942, they began concluding agreements with various Chetnik de- . tachments, granting concessions to them in exchange for their collaboration

against the Partisans. This put Ustasha-Muslim-Chetnik relations in a new light. Some obviously anti-Muslim requests by the Chetniks were not granted by the Ustashas, but the conclusion of several agreements was sufficient proof to the Muslims not only of the weakness of the Ustasha regime, but also of its

inability to completely protect the Muslim population.” | Autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina within its traditional frontiers in a Yugoslav federal republic became part of the CPY program some time before the war. There were few Muslim Communists then, and, as we have seen, few Bosnian Muslims joined the Partisans in the first two years of the war, despite the efforts of Partisan propagandists to attract them. But toward the end of 1943, as more and more Muslims became dissatisfied with the Ustashas and lost hope in a German victory, larger numbers began joining various Communist Party organizations and the Partisans. Since the party could not appeal to the Muslims on religious grounds, as had the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, _ the main interwar political party of the Bosnian Muslims, it appealed to them as victims of the competing claims of Serbian and Croatian nationalists. But the

task of winning over a sizable number of Muslims was formidable. Not only did the Partisans cooperate with the Chetniks in Bosnia until January 1942, but also the low educational level and strong religious conservatism of the Muslims

made them suspicious of Communist overtures. Without the trauma of war and revolution between 1941 and 1945, the CPY could not have attracted any of the Muslim rank and file. Even with the war, it took a great amount of patience and perseverance by the CPY and the Partisans to dispel the Muslims’

mistrust. From the outset, Partisan propaganda and practical policy was to inculcate unity among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims and to castigate the killing of Serbs by Croatian and Muslim Ustashas and of Muslims and Croats by Serbian Chetniks as the work of foreign enemies and their domestic collaborators, not of those national groups. Little more could be added to this basic appeal, and the struggle simply had to be continued slowly and steadily.% That the struggle “On these agreements, see Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 226-31. For Muslim doubts about the security of Croatian rule in eastern Herzegovina as early as November 1941, see a

report by the Croatian military command in Sarajevo on November 4, 1941, in YA, Mil. ,

Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 41/2-12, Box 233. a | |

| *The resolution of the Fifth Conference of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Zagreb in October 1940 declared that the CPY would carry on a “struggle against the efforts of the Serbian and Croatian bourgeoisie to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina between themselves without asking the peoples of the province. We Communists consider that the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina ought to decide by themselves and to find a solution in the

_ province by way of autonomy or something similar.” Komunist (Belgrade), 1946, No. 1,

THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS 509 was successful proved the power of the Muslims’ desire to survive, first of all, and from some time in the early fall of 1943, of their desire to survive on the

winning, Partisan, side. |

At the first session of AVNOJ at Bihac in western Bosnia on November 2627, 1942, there were 4 Bosnian Muslims among the 54 members who assem-

bled (without those from Slovenia and Macedonia, who were unable to attend). A year later, on November 25-26, 1943, Bosnian Partisan leaders held the first session of the Regional Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Zemaljsko antifasisticko vijece narodnog oslobodjenja Bosne i Hercegovine—ZAVNOBIH) at Mrkonji¢ Grad northwest of Jajce. They constituted themselves as the regional people’s assembly of the province and elected delegates for the second session of AVNOJ, which met a few days later on November 29 at Jajce and proclaimed Yugoslavia a federal state. Only Ao of the 172 members of ZAVNOBIH were Muslims, something less than a truly representative number for Muslims in the province, but reasonable considering the fact that they had only lately begun to join the Partisans in large numbers.” Autonomy, or in fact federal statehood, whose formal beginnings were laid at the second session of AVNOJ in November 1943, came to Bosnia and Herzegovina through the victory of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the war and revolution between 1941 and 1945. It was also during these years that the Bosnian Muslims, by participating in Partisan ranks, acquired in principle their political equality. However, this equality was repeatedly tested during the period from 1945 to the early 1960’s, when Communist, state, and individual forces pressured them to declare themselves nationally. The constitution of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted on April 10, 1963, however, guaranteed Muslims equality with Serbs and Croats. By the census of 1971, they could and did declare themselves as simply “Muslims.”” But even pp. 117-18. For the gradual evolution of the CPY’s views on autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in November 1943 resulted in the party granting the province the status of the sixth federal unit in the state of Yugoslavia, see, for example, N. Babié, “Position of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” pp. 219-40. For the wartime statements of the CPY and its various forums and of different Partisan military commands on the problem of the Bosnian Muslims during and after the war, see Purivatra, “The Attitude of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,” pp. 491-531. There were four Partisan brigades made up of Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first was established on September 21, 1943. Yugoslavia, Vojna enciklopedija, 2nd ed., 5: 661-62. Of course, there were also Muslims in other Partisan units in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A. Babi¢, “The Place and Role of ZAVNOBIH,” pp. 320-21; Purivatra, “The Attitude of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,” pp. 514-16. Of the wartime material, see especially the speeches of Rodoljub Colakovié, the leading Bosnian Communist at the time, to the first and third sessions of ZAVNOBIH, in his Izabrani govori i élanci, 1: 47-61, 65-78.

7In the 1948 census, out of a total of 885,689 Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 71,991 declared themselves as Serb Muslims, 25,295 as Croat Muslims, and 788,403 as “Muslims, undecided.” In the 1953 census, the overwhelming majority declared themselves

510 THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA with this newfound identity, the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were ne1ther numerically large enough nor politically and militarily strong enough to maintain the integrity of the province and survive the renewed ethnic struggles

of the 1990's. | oo

1974. , 36 5-67. } ,

as “Yugoslavs, undecided.” In the 1961 census, they declared themselves as “Muslims in the ethnic sense.” See Yugoslavia, Federal Statistical Office, Statisticki bilten, No. 727, pp. 4-6, and Yugoslavia, Combined Office for Statistics and Evidence, Statisti¢ki godisnjak, pp. 60, 76. For the constitution of 1963, see Yugoslavia, Ustav Socijalistictke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, p. 95 . Similar provisions were found in the constitution adopted on February 25,

For the Bosnian Muslims’ predicament over identity, see Selimovi¢, Dervis i smrt, pp.

CHAPTER 12

ee

The Churches During the Occupation and Revolution

The partition and occupation of Yugoslavia in April 1941 affected all of the country’s social institutions, including its churches and religious communities. Because the churches in the Balkans were traditionally involved in state and political affairs, they became inescapably embroiled in the ensuing political developments and civil war. The religious situation was the more complex and calamitous because for close to 900 years, the area had been an arena of competition between Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, and for about 500 years a battleground between the two Christian churches and Islam. Religious differences had become closely interwoven with national differences in the pre-

ceding century and a half, making the struggle between the nations and churches even more confused. Thus the role of the churches in Yugoslavia during the Second World War was exceedingly involved and emotion-laden and further complicated the already difficult conditions under occupation and revolution. During the war, the situation and behavior of the churches and religious

communities and the policies of different wartime authorities toward them varied greatly from area to area, nation to nation, national minority to national minority, and one period to the next. The position of the Jewish religious community was the worst in all areas. The position of the Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches in the Independent State of Croatia was the most complicated, and so most of this chapter is devoted to it. The losses of the Muslim population and Muslim clergymen in Bosnia and Herzegovina will also be noted, while those of the Jewish religious community will be discussed in the next chapter.

THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH In occupied Serbia, excluding the Banat, the Serbian Orthodox Church was the only important religious organization. Here the population was both nationally and denominationally homogeneous. Most Roman Catholics, that is, Croats and Slovenes, who had settled in Serbia during the interwar period, pri-

512 THE CHURCHES

of the country. ,

marily as government employees, left for their area of origin after the partition

From its inception in 1219, the Serbian Orthodox Church was a national church, and few national churches have been so closely identified with their nation and state as it. The Serbian Orthodox Church traditionally protected its nation and moved abreast, and in some periods even ahead, of Serbian national endeavors.' During the interwar period, it fostered the expansionist tendencies of the Greater Serbian forces in the religious, cultural, and to some extent political fields. In conjunction with Serbian political groups, the Serbian Orthodox Church was at times able to exert great political influence. The best example of this was its success, in alliance with Serbian political forces opposed to the Stojadinovié government, in preventing the ratification of a concordat between Yugoslavia and the Vatican in 1937. Negotiations for such a concordat had been conducted on several occasions from 1924 on, and it was finally concluded and signed in 193 5. But when its provisions became unofficially known, it aroused bitter opposition from the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Yugoslav Freemasons. Without first preparing public opinion, the Stojadinovic government submitted the concordat to the National Assembly for ratification in July 1937. After the addition of several amendments and under great pressure from the government, the Assembly ratified it on July 23, 166 to 129. The Serbian Orthodox Church then excommunicated those Orthodox members of the

cabinet and the Assembly who had voted for passage and helped organize a massive campaign, which included street processions and demonstrations, to arouse public opinion against ratification by the Senate. With this reaction from the church and much of the Serbian public, the government abandoned efforts to have it ratified. Peace between the government and the church was only

gradually reestablished.’ , , On the whole, the problems facing the Serbian Orthodox Church and

clergy in Serbia proper during the Second World War were relatively simple. Differences of opinion among priests and the population did surface, dividing those who supported Mihailovi¢, Nedi¢, Ljoti¢, or the Partisans, and bloody struggles did ensue, but these were the result of political and ideological differences, without the admixture of any religious or national factors. The church was deprived of its formal head for the duration of the war. The 'For a recent history of the Serbian Orthodox Church, see Slijepéevic, Istorija Srpske pravoslaune crkve. For the history of the church since 1920, see Srpska pravoslavna crkva, Sveti

sinod, Srpska pravoslavna crkva, 1920-1970. |

For the government’s failed effort to have the concordat ratified, see V. Novak, Magnum crimen, pp. 411-68. For Prime Minister Stojadinovi¢’s views on the concordat, see his book,

Ni rat ni pakt: Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, pp. 519-43. See also a collection of speeches made in Parliament in favor of the concordat, in which the objections of its opponents were discussed, entitled Konkordat pred Narodnom skupSstinom; Slijeptevic, Istorija Srpske pravoslavne crkve, 2: 634-58; S. Simi¢, Vatikan protiv Jugoslavije, pp. 15-23; Muzi¢, Katolicka crkva u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji. |

THE CHURCHES 513 patriarch, Gavrilo Dozi¢, had staunchly opposed Yugoslavia’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941, and strongly favored the officers’ coup on March 27. Not surprisingly, he was a man the Germans wanted. Two days after the invasion of April 6, he left Belgrade, going first to the Zi¢a Monastery in southwest Serbia and then to the Ostrog Monastery in Montenegro, where the Germans caught him. He was returned to Belgrade and, following a thorough investigation, interned, first in the Rakovica Monastery and then in the Voj-

lovica Monastery near Panéevo in the Banat.’ With the approach of Soviet forces in the summer of 1944, he was taken to the Dachau concentration camp. Shortly before the end of the war, he was released and allowed to go to Italy. After some time in France and England, he returned to Yugoslavia on November 14, 1946, and resumed office. Nikolaj Velimirovié, bishop of Ziéa, was another Serbian church dignitary interned by the Germans. Although known for his anti-Hitler and anti-Nazi views, the bishop was well inclined toward the Ljoti¢ movement, undoubtedly because of its strong religious attitudes and conservative ideas rather than its pro-Fascist tenets. After being apprehended, he was kept in various monasteries in the Banat until the summer of 1944, when he too was transferred to the

Dachau concentration camp.’ He was released with Patriarch Gavrilo and made his way to the Slovene Littoral to join the Ljoti¢ and Chetnik forces assembled there. After the war, he emigrated to the United States, where he died in I956. In the absence of Patriarch Gavrilo, the Serbian Church was led by Metropolitan Josif, himself an expellee from the see at Skopje in Bulgarian-annexed

, Macedonia. Metropolitan Josif and the church’s Holy Synod collaborated both with the Nedié quisling regime and to some extent with the German army of occupation, in part to ingratiate themselves with the Germans so that the latter might use their influence in the Independent State of Croatia on behalf of the persecuted Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian population. Some of the lower clergy collaborated with the Ljoti¢ movement, the group the Germans trusted most in occupied Serbia. Undoubtedly, however, most Serbian Orthodox clergymen from both Ser>For the patriarch’s attitude to the Tripartite Pact and the officers’ coup, see Poruka (London), no. 19, March 16, 1954, p. 7. For a report on the interrogation of Patriarch Gavrilo that Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Security Police and Security Service, sent to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on June 16, 1941, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5783, Frs. H298,512-18. The Germans were especially interested in the patriarch’s activities in connection with the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact, the officers’ revolt, and discussions between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Church of England on possible fusion, which they thought would have meant the transformation of the former into an instrument of British imperialism. ‘On Bishop Nikolaj’s thoughts about Ljoti¢, see especially his eulogy at the latter’s fu-

neral, in B. Kosti¢, Za istoriju nasih dana, pp. 250-56. For Heydrich’s report of July 17, 1941, to von Ribbentrop on the interrogation of Bishop Nikolaj and the Germans’ interpretation of the bishop’s political views and activities, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5783, Frs. H298,518-24.

514 | THE CHURCHES bia proper and other areas of Yugoslavia sympathized and cooperated with the

Chetniks of General Mihailovi¢, and for good reason. Mihailovié built the Chetnik movement on traditional Serbian nationalist forces. He strongly supported the Karadjordjevié dynasty and worked to establish a Greater Serbia within a Greater Yugoslavia and thus to preserve the dominant position of the Serbs in a reorganized Yugoslav state. As a traditional Serbian nationalist, he thought of the Macedonians as southern Serbs, who should continue to be politically and ecclesiastically controlled by Serbia. Given the background of the Serbian Orthodox Church, it is clear that it could hardly follow any policy but a pro-Chetnik one. Some Serbian Orthodox priests even held command positions with the Chetniks. The Reverend Moméilo Djuji¢ became the most important Chetnik chief (vojvoda) in northern Dalmatia and western Bosnia, and the Reverend Savo Bozic was the commander of an important Chetnik group in

northeast Bosnia.° 7

Some Orthodox priests in all parts of the country, however, sided with the _ Partisans as soon as Mihailovi¢ began collaborating with the occupying powers

- to fight the Partisans. The best known among these was the Reverend Vlada Zecevic, who first commanded Chetnik forces in western Serbia in the summer of » 1941, then cooperated with the Partisans in fighting the Germans and the quisling Serbian forces, and finally shifted to the Partisans after hostilities broke out between the Chetniks and the Partisans that fall. He became a Partisan com-

mander and a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (though during the war he always claimed to be a representative of the Democratic Party) and during and after the war held high positions in the Communist regime, both on

the federal and Serbian republican level. a | Further support for the Partisans came from a small group of Orthodox priests from Montenegro, who gathered at Tjentiste on June 16, 1942, and issued a declaration calling for the liquidation of all collaborators and for support of the National Liberation Movement in its struggle for the freedom of Montenegro. A similar declaration was issued by a group of Serbian Orthodox clergymen meeting in the village of Srpska Jasenica in western Bosnia on November 15, 1942. The conference was attended by twelve Orthodox priests and | twelve theology and seminary students who served as chaplains or fighters in

Partisan units.° - oe

In contrast to the situation in Serbia proper, the Serbian Orthodox Church faced particularly difficult problems outside of Serbia, that is, in Yugoslav _ Macedonia, the Kosovo region, Vojvodina, to some extent in Montenegro, and

158,177. |

‘For more information on these two Chetnik leaders, see Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp.

_ ‘For the declaration at Tjentiste, see Zbornik DNOR, 3, bk. 4: 368-80. It carried only four signatures, but additional priests supported this group. For the declaration at Srpska Jasenica, see Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Istorijski arbiv, 1, bk. 2: 240-42. This volume contains the reprints of Borba, the official organ of the CPY, issued from 1941 to 1943. |

THE CHURCHES 515 above all in the Independent State of Croatia. The difficulties in the former areas will be dealt with below, while those in the latter state will be described when we discuss the wartime development of the churches in the Croatian

puppet state later in this chapter. .

After the partition of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria’s annexation of most of Yugoslav Macedonia, part of southeast Serbia, and a part of the Kosovo region, Josif Cvijovic, metropolitan of Skopje, together with all other bishops and Orthodox priests considered to be Serbs, were expelled from these areas to German-occupied Serbia. Their places were taken by clergymen from Bulgaria, and the church in the annexed regions was incorporated into the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. In the Albanian-annexed parts of Macedonia and the Kosovo region, most priests were left in their positions, but the church was incorporated into the Albanian Orthodox Church. The Serbian Orthodox Church vigorously protested these changes, but to no avail. As it turned out, however, all of them were only temporary. But another development took place in Yugoslav Macedonia that had significant consequences after the war. In the multifaceted struggles in Yugoslav Macedonia during the war, the anti-Bulgarian and anti-Serbian but pro-Macedonian and pro-Communist forces were part of the Communist-led Partisans. Knowing full well that the Serbian Orthodox Church was a power of the first order in Macedonia and with a number of Orthodox priests in their ranks, the Macedonian Partisans created a Bureau of Religious Affairs within the Partisan Chief Staff for Macedonia on October 11, 1943. The order appointing its first head declared that “his commands and recommendations are obligatory for all

priests and parishes in free territory.” Toward the end of the same month, a meeting of Orthodox priests from Macedonian free territory was held in the village of Izdeglavje, near Ohrid. Several decisions were made there that constituted the beginning of the independence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church

from the Serbian Orthodox Church. A Guiding Committee for the organization of church affairs in Macedonia was established, which called together the First National Church Assembly at Skopje on March 4, 1945. The assembly demanded the reestablishment of the archbishopric of Ohrid as “an autocephalous Macedonian Church that would be subject to no other local church whatsoever,” decided that only Macedonian nationals could be bishops and clergy in Macedonia, and elected a new Guiding Committee.’ - After the war, protracted negotiations between the Guiding Committee and

the Serbian Orthodox Church led to a modus vivendi in 1957, according to which the Macedonian Orthodox Church was canonically united with the Serbian Orthodox Church and recognized the Serbian patriarch as its head. But Tlievski, The Macedonian Orthodox Church, pp. 69-76. This work presents the Macedonian view of the Orthodox Church in Macedonia. Slijeptevi¢, Makedonsko crkveno pitanje, presents the Serbian view. Slijepéevié is a well-known historian of the Serbian Orthodox Church. A follower of Dimitrije Ljoti¢, he has lived in exile since late 1944.

516 THE CHURCHES when this arrangement proved unworkable, the Third National Church Assembly of Macedonia proclaimed the Macedonian Orthodox Church an autocephalous church on July 18, 1967, with the archbishop of Ohrid and metro-

politan of Macedonia as its head.° | a | The wartime experience of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Hungarianannexed Batka and Baranja was heavily influenced by the anti-Serbian policies , of the Hungarian government. The Hungarians expelled tens of thousands of

, Orthodox Serbs who had settled there after the First World War, mostly on land obtained by the post-1918 agrarian reform, and would have expelled many more thousands if German occupation authorities in Serbia had not refused to accept them. The Serbian Orthodox bishop from Novi Sad was not allowed to participate in the activities of the church’s Holy Synod. The Hun-

garians killed a number of Serbian Orthodox priests (see Table 2 below), mostly during raids against the Partisans in January 1942, when they also killed several thousand civilian Serbs and Jews in Novi Sad and elsewhere in Backa.’?__ In Montenegro, a relatively larger proportion of Orthodox priests cooper-

ated with the Partisans than in any other Yugoslav area. Two factors were probably responsible for this. First, the Partisans were on the side of Russia, a country to which many Montenegrins were traditionally emotionally attached, and second, there were relatively more followers of the Communist Party in

Montenegro, especially among young people, than in any other part of the country. Thus, of the 188 Orthodox priests and 33 monks in Montenegro in 1941, about 60 sided with the Partisans. A majority of the remainder collaborated with the Chetniks or the separatists and thus indirectly with the occupying powers. A few collaborated directly with the occupying powers, and some did not take sides. When Lieutenant Colonel Pavle Djurisi¢ and the Montenegrin Volunteer Corps withdrew along with the Germans in December 1944

toward northeast Bosnia, about 60 Montenegrin priests led by Metropolitan

Joanikije Lipovac went with them.” | a |

_ After the war, the Serbian Orthodox Church was reestablished along its pre-1941 lines in all parts of the new Yugoslavia except Macedonia. But the ideologically conditioned antiecclesiastical and antireligious policies of the Communist regime worked against its interests, as well as against the interests of the other religious communities. Consequently, the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church was much weaker from the end of the war to the mid-1980’s ‘Those interested in developments after 1945 that led to the full independence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church should consult Ilievski, The Macedonian Orthodox Church, pp. 98-128, and Slijeptevic, Makedonsko crkveno pitanje, pp. 58-88. Up to the mid-1980’s, the Serbian Orthodox Church had refused to recognize the independence of the Macedonian

— Orthodox Church. . : |

Chapter 4. . ee , cially p. 621. oe , , . | *DuSan N. Petrovi¢é, “The Serbian Church in Batka and Baranja,” pp. 205-9. See also

-'Bojovi¢, “Orthodox Clergy in the National Liberation Movement,” pp. 603-22, espe-

THE CHURCHES 517 than it was during the interwar period, though the increase in Serbian nationalism since the mid-1980’s portends a possible increase in the power of the church.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN SLOVENIA The role of the Roman Catholic Church in Slovenia during the war, like the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Serbia proper, was relatively simple, although in Slovenia the church was deeply involved with the occupying powers

and also, through groups under its spiritual control, in the civil war. Since Slovenia was almost completely Roman Catholic, none of the problems that arose in multiconfessional areas of Yugoslavia appeared. It was natural that the already existing strong connection between the Catholic Church and the Slovene People’s Party, the strongest and most influential interwar political party, continued during the war. When these conservative and democratic religious and political forces were confronted by the Communist-led resistance and revolutionary political forces, they turned to collaboration with the Italian and then the German occupation authorities. They considered Communism a much greater danger, both present and future, to the Slovene people than the Italian and German occupations. At the same time, these pro-Western forces awaited the opportunity to join the Allies, turn against the Axis, and continue the struggle against their domestic enemies. The position of the Catholic Church in the Italian-annexed part of Slovenia was relatively favorable, but in the German-occupied part it was extremely grave. As explained earlier, the Germans planned to annex their area, and to forestall any resistance to this, they drastically reduced the leadership role of the church. Thus, among the expellees to the Independent State of Croatia were not less than 448 Catholic priests. Altogether, up to April 1, 1942, the Germans expelled about 70 percent of all Catholic priests from the occupied areas. In addition, some priests moved to the Italian-annexed part of Slovenia on their own. The Germans closed Catholic schools, took over most church property, and prohibited the use of the Slovene language in schools.'' They also held Monsignor Ivan Tomazi¢, bishop of Maribor, under house arrest most of the time.

Both in the church and informally in politics, the most important representative of the Slovene Catholic Church and of Slovene Catholic political forces during the war was Monsignor Gregorij Rozman, bishop of Ljubljana. This was especially true after the assassination of Marko Natlacen, the ranking leader of the Slovene People’s Party at home, by the Partisan VOS (Security and ''For the Germans’ expulsion of Catholic priests, see Proces proti Rupniku, p. 152. For their actions against the church, see Bishop Rozman’s rebuttal of the public prosecutor’s charges at his trial, which he wrote in Klagenfurt, Austria, and which was first published in Jagodic, “The Trial Against Bishop Dr. Gregorij Rozman,” p. 66.

518 , THE CHURCHES | Intelligence Service) on October 13, 1942. Rozman’s preeminence may have partly resulted from the fact that the leaders of the Slovene People’s Party © pushed him forward to utilize the prestige and influence of his office. In addition, he was the titular head of all Catholic Action organizations in Slovenia,

which supplied the core of the armed forces under the influence of the party. , Rozman undoubtedly knew of the memorandum submitted by the Reverend Lambert Ehrlich to the Italian command in Ljubljana on April 1, 1942,

which was discussed in Chapter 3, and he may even have participated in its , formulation. The bishop himself submitted a memorandum to General Mario Robotti, Italian commanding general in the Ljubljana Province, on September 12, 1942, with suggestions on how best to fight the Partisans. After the Italian surrender in September 1943, the Germans consulted him on who should fill the post of quisling administrator of the Ljubljana Province and followed his advice by appointing Leo Rupnik, the former Yugoslav general and mayor of Ljubljana under Italian rule. During the remainder of the war, with the Ljub-

ljana Province under German occupation, Rozman collaborated fully with the Germans and with the Slovene anti-Partisan forces. Because of these activities, | he, along with 162 priests and 48 seminarians, left for Austria during the closing days of the war so that they would not have to face a Yugoslav Communist court. But because Rozman left without the pope’s permission, he was never assigned another formal position in the church and was denied ad limina access to the pope. He was not deprived of his title, however, nor was his see filled until after his death.” After the war, he lived as a guest in various Slovene Catholic

parishes abroad, mostly in Cleveland, and died in 1959. me | After the Communist takeover, RoZman was indicted in absentia under — thirteen different points for collaborating first with the Italians and later with the Germans, making speeches and working politically against the Slovene Liberation Front, giving assistance to conservative military and political forces against the Partisans, and finally, asking the Western Allied command in Italy

through the Vatican to occupy Slovenia and prevent the establishment of a Communist regime. A military court found him guilty on all counts and on August 30, 1946, sentenced him to eighteen years in prison, loss of civil rights for another ten years, and loss of all property. RoZman wrote a point-by-point rebuttal of the charges, dated September 30, 1946, from Klagenfurt, Austria, _

, where he lived at the time, denying them or asserting that the court had not established some beyond a reasonable doubt. Naturally, he did not mention ac"For the number of priests and seminarians who left with the bishop, see O’Brien of _ Thomond, Archbishop Stepinac, p. 27. According to his biographer, Bishop Rozman realized as soon as he arrived in Austria that he had made a mistake in leaving his see. On August 1, 1945, he submitted a detailed report to the pope explaining his actions, the events in his diocese, the activities of the Partisans, and the needs of the refugees and put his see at the disposal _

of the pope. Kolarit, Skof Rozman, 3: 424-27, 439-48. , a |

THE CHURCHES 519 tivities that the court had not mentioned. He concluded: “Conscious of my responsibility before the all-knowing God, all my statements, so far as I remember, are fully true.”” What Rozman did not remember, or chose not to remember, however, was very incriminating. Thus Point VII, 1 of his rebuttal explicitly stated that he had nothing to do with the establishment of the Village Guards and the Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia (MVAC) units and that he never had contacts with Italian commanders regarding them. But in mid-August 1942, General Roatta, commander of the Supersloda, aware of Rozman’s influence in the Italianannexed part of Slovenia, paid a visit to the bishop during his inspection trip to Ljubljana and told him that Catholic forces in the Ljubljana Province should abandon their relatively neutral position and in the struggle between the forces — of “civilization and religion on the one hand and Bolshevism on the other,” should be on the side of the former.'* Soon after this conference, on September 12, 1942, Rozman submitted a memorandum to General Robotti, commander of the XIth Army Corps deployed in the Ljubljana Province. To set the record straight, we quote the main parts of this memorandum: From the sound part of the Slovene people, who have declared themselves ready to seriously work together with the Italian authorities for the purpose of reestablishing order and destroying subversive and rebellious elements, the following is proposed to the military authorities:

1. We should be allowed to establish protective armed units under Slovene command in all rural areas. The names of the members and commanders of these units will be supplied to the military authorities. The command will be responsible for the members of the protective units and their behavior. The commanders of these units will be selected from men worthy of trust, to fully guarantee that the arms will be used exclusively against rebellious elements that endanger the land either with

arms or revolutionary propaganda.... ,

3. We are convinced that without the establishment of the proposed system of protective units, no self-supporting and lasting order can be maintained. The soldiers have already dispersed the camps and groups of the rebels, but many of them are still in the woods and in villages, where they are camouflaged as peace-loving citizens. Such persons are not known to the Italian armed forces. Because of their unfamiliarity with the language and the difficulty of finding those who help those who hide in the woods, it will be very difficult to find the culprits. But for the local young men such difficulties are nonexistent or can easily be overcome.... 5. In addition to the protective units stationed in rural areas, it would be necessary to establish a few central units under the command of former Yugoslav officers. The task of these units would be to keep wooded areas under surveillance and prevent the formation of armed Partisan groups.

6. To achieve the given objective, it would be necessary to bring back some '3See Bishop RozZman’s rebuttal, in Jagodic, “The Trial Against Bishop Dr. Gregorij Rozman,” pp. 64-72, especially pp. 69, 72. '4See Roatta’s report of September 12, 1942, to the Comando Supremo, in Micr. No. T821, Roll 252, Frs. 306-7.

520 - THE CHURCHES Be

be proposed by us. , ,

young, dependable former Yugoslav officers from prisoner-of-war camps, but in an unobtrusive fashion, as if letting the officers home on furlough. Their names would

7, In regard to Ljubljana, the following is proposed as urgent: . .. We should be

allowed, so to speak, to establish a Corps of Secret Police of 500 men, to be armed

with revolvers. We can give assurances that within six weeks, dangerous elements , would be found, arrested, and turned over to the authorities. Those persons who have false identification cards and who freely circulate in the streets would be identified and arrested with the help of the citizens. In this way Ljubljana would become a peaceful and orderly city in which there would be no more Communists. At the same time everything would be done to remold public opinion with the help of strong and

continuing anti-Communist propaganda. , OS

These sincere proposals show the good will of the majority of the population and create the possibility of achieving the given objective in a manner that must also please the authorities. His Excellence, General Roatta, has said that the people must - now choose between order and Bolshevism. We have chosen order, and propose the only way that in our humble opinion will be effective and certain to achieve com-

plete order in active collaboration with the authorities.”* Oo | In 1946 Rozman denied almost every point of the indictment against him, — but this memorandum shows that he collaborated with the Italians, acting either for himself or as a spokesman for a group of politicians and officers, to the point of giving detailed advice to the Italians on how to fight the Partisans. The defense lawyer agreed with the public prosecutor on almost all points of the bishop’s indictment, but he maintained that the bishop did not know of all the

actions taken by those on his side and that he often intervened on behalf of people in prisons and concentration camps. The defense lawyer’s most important point, however, was that the bishop did not have a strong will and was toa | great extent and very unfavorably influenced by his entourage.’* But for men like Monsignor Jagodic, as well as for active Catholics and anti-Communist political forces in Slovenia during the war and since, Rozman was perceived as

a devoted and courageous prelate andanationalhero. _ : , | A detailed analysis of Rozman’s behavior during the occupation and civil war, including a reply to the bishop’s rebuttal of the indictment and a review of much additional pertinent literature, has been made by the Reverend Metod Mikuz, the most important Catholic priest in Slovenia to side with the Partisans during the war.” Mikuz also thought that the bishop was very unfavorably in-

fluenced by his entourage, but that this did not excuse his actions. According to | 'SMicr. No. T-821, Roll 252, Frs. 313-15. For Robotti’s comments on the memorandum,

gestions to the general. , _ :

see Frs. 315-17. From them it is clear that Bishop Rozman and a friend made additional sug-

'6Jagodic, “The Trial Against Bishop Dr. Gregorij Rozman,” pp. 61-63. "Mikuz, “The Ljubljana Bishop Dr. Gregorij RoZman,” pp. 320-60. Reverend Mikuz 7 was the archivist for Bishop Rozman until he was suspended from his clerical duties in June - 1943. Later, he openly joined the Partisans and served as chaplain at Partisan Chief Head-

quarters for Slovenia. F.O. 371/48931, R 9553/5007/92. } 7 ,

THE CHURCHES 521 Mikuz, Rozman considered the Italian and German occupation forces as Godgiven authorities who had to be obeyed and the Communist-led Partisans as the much greater danger and enemy of the Slovene people. Mikuz claimed that Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidri¢, the two main leaders of the Slovene Partisans and the Communist Party of Slovenia, tried to meet with the bishop in order to bring him over to the Partisan side or at least induce him to take a neutral posi-

tion, but that the latter refused any meeting. But in a letter addressed to Slovene , Catholic priests in the United States in November 1945, Rozman asserted that the Communists were “unapproachable for any sort of discussion.” Mikuz’s final judgment was that Rozman was a collaborationist, an active opponent of the national liberation struggle, and a traitor to the Slovene people." Only a small number of Roman Catholic priests in Slovenia supported or joined the Partisans. According to a document from the leaders of the antiPartisan forces, in addition to the Reverend Mikuz, two other Catholic priests were members of the Plenum of the Liberation Front.’? More Catholic priests in the Ljubljana Province than in the German-occupied area and reportedly a majority of priests in the Slovene Littoral supported the Partisans. From the names supplied by Ciril Petesi¢, it would appear that possibly as many as 40 Slovene Catholic priests in the Ljubljana Province, including some who had come from German-occupied northern Slovenia, cooperated with the Partisans. Among these were the prior and monks of the famous Carthusian monastery at Pleterje near Kostanjevica, who supplied the Partisans with food and medicine and cared for the wounded.” Some Catholic priests from northern Slovenia expelled to Croatia lost their lives at the hands of the Ustashas for alleged pro-Partisan activities. Some Catholic priests in Slovenia were killed by the Partisans, and some by other forces in Slovenia (see Table 2). A number of Catholic churches were damaged or destroyed by the Partisans during the civil war in Slovenia, though according to two leading experts on Slovene wartime history, Dusan Biber and Professor Tone Ferenc, this occurred only when the anti-Partisan forces used churches as military strongholds. After the war, relations between the Catholic Church and the new Communist government in Slovenia began to normalize almost immediately. This was in marked contrast to the situation in Croatia, where the church and the new government immediately came into conflict. Even Rozman’s trial in absentia and sentence did not adversely affect matters. There were two basic reasons for this difference. First, in Slovenia there was no wartime persecution of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian people as there was in Croatia, with its ''For Rozman’s assertion, see O’Brien of Thomond, Archbishop Stepinac, p. 28. For Miku2’s judgment, see “The Ljubljana Bishop Dr. Gregorij Rozman,” pp. 320, 347-59.

{Javornik], Crne bukve, pp. 245-47. Javornik was the editor of the virulently antiPartisan Catholic weekly Slovenski dom.

Petesic, Katolicko svecenstvo u NOB-u, 1941-1945, pp. § 5-83, 274-76.

522 THE CHURCHES legacy of resentment and hatred. Second, a large majority of Slovenes and Slovene priests supported the Yugoslav federal state, considering it the best solution from the point of view of Slovene national interests, whereas in Croatia much of the population and many Catholic priests favored an independent Croatian state or some kind of Catholic Danubian federation. —

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE INDEPENDENT

STATE OF CROATIA |

The Croatian nation has been closely linked with the Catholic Church and the popes ever since the Croats accepted Christianity in the seventh and eighth centuries, though initially the Dalmatian dioceses belonged to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The relationship with the popes endured both when the Croats had their own state under national dynasties and when they were under foreign rule.”’ From 1102 to 1918, the Croats were politically federated with — the Hungarians, and from 1527 to 1918 the Croats and the Hungarians were ruled by the Habsburgs, the most important proponents of Catholicism in cen-

tral and southeast Europe.

As a part of the Hungarian and Austro-Hungarian states, Croatia lay directly in the path of the Ottomans’ northwest thrust through the Balkans into central Europe. In their struggle against the Turks on their own soil, the Croats made tremendous human and material sacrifices defending themselves and the Catholic West. In this role, they came to be called the “ramparts of Christianity” (antemurale christianitatis) after the Battle of Krbava Field in 1493.” This defensive posture declined after about 1700, when the Turkish danger diminished, But two important legacies of Ottoman rule in the Balkans remained: a large Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a still larger Serbian Orthodox population there and in parts of Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia. Both groups have complicated and still complicate the religious and political

situation of the Croatian nation. . ,

!There is no satisfactory general history of the Catholic Church in Croatia. A recent effort to fill this gap, Povijest Katoli¢ke Crkve medju Hrvatima, by two Catholic priests, Josip Buturac and Antun Ivandija, is mostly a chronicle of developments to 1971. The book, which carries the imprimatur of the Zagreb archdiocese, has only a few lines on the Second World

War. There is not a word on Ante Paveli¢, the Independent State of Croatia, the killing of Catholic priests, the flight of bishops and priests into exile, or the trial of Archbishop Stepinac. There is also no mention of the fate that befell the Serbian Orthodox Church in the

Independent State of Croatia during the war.

“The Croatian humanists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who witnessed the Turks ravage their homeland, were an important source of information on the Turkish peril for the rest of Europe. They often appealed to the papacy and to Western European countries for help. But some of them praised certain aspects of the Turkish state. See Petrovich, “The

Croatian Humanists and the Ottoman Peril,” pp. 257-73. ;

THE CHURCHES 523 The Church Between the Wars In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Roman Catholic Church was the state church. It enjoyed all the prerogatives of that position in those South Slavic areas that were part of the Dual Monarchy until the end of the First World War and that were then included in the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia) in 1918. In pre-1918 Serbia, the Serbian Orthodox Church held a comparable position. Both the Habsburg monarchy and Serbia had concordats with the Holy See, regulating the position of the Catholic Church in the two states. After the First World War, because of the multiconfessional character of the new Yugoslav state, a single state church could not exist, but due to the dominant role of the Serbs in the state, the Serbian Orthodox Church had a

much stronger political position than the Catholic Church. As a result, the Catholic Church in Croatia, although not in Slovenia, felt disadvantaged in comparison with the Serbian Orthodox Church and had a series of grievances against it and the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav government.

First, the Catholic Church in Croatia charged the Serbian Orthodox Church with expansionist tendencies. These could be seen in the establishment of Orthodox parishes and the building of Orthodox churches in areas that had formerly been purely Catholic, but that had acquired some Orthodox population after 1918 because of the influx of Orthodox Serbs in government service and the armed forces. While such activities would hardly have been noticed ina country where religious tolerance prevailed and religious differences played little or no role politically, in interwar Yugoslavia the Catholic Church in Croatia and some Croats resented them for both religious and political reasons.

Second, the Catholic Church complained that the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav government took almost no steps against abortion. Abortion had been practiced among Croats and Slovenes since the 1890’s in urban as well as rural areas, and church authorities referred to it as the “white plague.” Wide-

spread abortion, together with larger emigration from Croatian lands than from Serbia (which had experienced significant immigration throughout the nineteenth century) and a higher level of economic and educational development and urbanization in Croatia than in Serbia, led to a much lower rate of population growth in Croatia and Slovenia than in Serbia. According to recent calculations, the population in the postwar Socialist Republic of Croatia rose on the average by 7.42 per thousand annually between 1800 and 1910, in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia by 3.84 per thousand, and in Serbia proper by

14.68 per thousand.” Of course, Croats and Slovenes could not rightfully blame the Serbian Orthodox Church or the Serbian-dominated regime in in?5See Professor Vladimir Stipeti¢’s introduction to Korenti¢, Naselja i stanovnistvo S.R. Hrvatske, p. xxi. Between 1880 and 1957, the population in the postwar Yugoslav socialist republics increased as follows: 1.4 times in Slovenia, 1.6 times in Croatia, 2.2 times in Serbia proper, 2.3 times in Macedonia and Montenegro, and 2.5 times in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Macura, Stanovnistvo i radna snaga, pp. 7-8.

524 THE CHURCHES terwar Yugoslavia for this development, for it was of much longer standing. But with this background, there is no doubt that during the interwar period, abortion and its effect on the relative rate of population growth in Croatia were of grave concern to the Catholic Church. Among Croatian nationalists, the saying arose that “the Serbs will swallow us” (“nas ée Srbi progutati”).”* | Third, during the interwar period the Catholic Church was disturbed by the fact that it was politically advantageous to belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church and to be counted as a Serb. Catholics and members of other denominations, as non-Serbs, endured a certain amount of discrimination by a Serbian-dominated public policy. This was especially true for employment in the government, the largest employer in the economy outside agriculture, particularly in such sensitive fields as diplomacy and the armed forces. To get around this, some Catholics married Serbian Orthodox spouses or converted to Orthodoxy, or both. Conversion primarily to the Serbian Orthodox Church and to a small degree to the Croatian Old-Catholic Church, which did not recog- — nize the pope, was also used by some Catholics who wanted to divorce and remarry.” Occasionally, differences arose between Catholic parish priests and their flocks, which in two cases resulted in the conversion of the whole parish to Orthodoxy. A certain number of Catholics of the Eastern rite also converted to Orthodoxy. Altogether, an estimated 200,000 Roman Catholics in Yugoslavia, primarily Croats, converted to Serbian Orthodoxy during the interwar period.

, This further increased the relatively faster growth of the Serbian Orthodox , population.” Occurring in a zone of centuries-long coexistence and confrontation between the two churches, these conversions revealed a weakness in the religious armor of thousands of Croats and were emotionally disturbing to the Catholic hierarchy and nationalist Croats. - In his report to the Vatican of May 24, 1943, in which he mentioned the salutary actions that the Paveli¢ regime had taken for the Catholic Church in Croatia, Stepinac also noted that Jewish and Serbian Orthodox physicians were the principal practitioners of abortion in Croatia. He implied that they were engaged in a kind of conspiracy against the Croatian people. But the case of Slovenia easily disproves this charge. That almost entirely Roman Catholic region had few Jews and Serbs, but birth control and abortion were practiced on such a large scale that the rate of live births was lower than in Croatia. A still lower rate of live births was found among the half-million-strong German minority in Yugoslavia, which according to the census of March 1931 was 78.3 percent Roman Catholic. *The Croatian Old-Catholic Church was a tiny denomination with only 5,231 members in Yugoslavia in 1931, 4,153 of them in the archdiocese of Zagreb. See Draganovi¢, Opéi Sematizam, pp. 20, 80. It had formally existed since 1923 and was associated with the Utrecht Union. The Croatian Roman Catholic hierarchy considered it to be a tool of Serbs and Free-

masons intended to divide Croatian Catholics. oo

6Guberina, “La formazione cattolica della Croazia,” p. 27. The same figure is given by Archbishop Stepinac in his report to the pope of May 1943. For excerpts from it, see Sudjenje ... Stepincu, p. 305. Long excerpts are also found in F.O. 371/44325, R 5331/850/92. At his trial (Sudjenje .. . Stepincu, p. 242), the archbishop asserted that during the interwar period, Catholics were forced to convert to Orthodoxy. It would be more accurate to say that their

| principal inducement for doing so was to advance their careers. _

THE CHURCHES 525 Croats and Croatian Catholics also complained that the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav state generally discriminated against Croats and other non-Serbs in taxation, in the distribution of government contracts, and the like. They resented the fact that the Serbian Orthodox Church had helped prevent the ratification of the concordat between the Holy See and the Yugoslav government, which they interpreted as an effort to deny the Catholic Church a position of equality with the Orthodox Church. And they complained about a whole series of minor issues. These included the required observance of certain Orthodox religious holidays and customs in all schools, such as the celebration of St. Sava, the founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church, although he was an exclusively Serbian Orthodox saint and Serbian national patron; the official toleration of disturbances of Catholic public observances, such as processions; the prohibition on Catholic students becoming members of the Marian Congregation; the reported inequitable distribution of state subsidies to various churches; and the alleged state support of the Croatian Old-Catholic Church.”’ Croatian Catholic Church functionaries articulated these grievances soon after the abortive attempt to ratify the concordat in 1937, as well as during the war, when the Croatian state severely persecuted Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church. A certain degree of bias in these accusations was unavoidable. But it is interesting to note that when the Reverend Dragutin Kamber, a Catholic priest and for some time Ustasha prefect in the county of Doboj in Bosnia during the war, took Vladko Maéek to task after the war for failing to say in his autobiography that the Catholic Church in interwar Yugoslavia was perse7Rogosi¢, Stanje katolicke crkve, pp. 8-41; Guberina, “La formazione cattodlica della Croazia,” pp. 24-30; Archbishop Stepinac’s report to the Vatican of May 24, 1943, cited in the previous footnote; Mlinari¢, Tito: der rote Rebell, p. 11. For a rebuttal of the charge that the Yugoslav government favored the Serbian Orthodox Church in the allocation of subsidies—in the budget for 1931-32, for example—see Glasnik Srpske pravoslaune patrijarsije (Srijemski Karlovci) 13, no. 10 (May 15, 1932): 1§ 5-57. Mlinari¢’s book gives the impression that its author was a member of the Communist Party of Croatia who became disillusioned and left. However, according to reliable information, Bruno Mlinari¢ was a pseudonym of Monsignor Augustin Jureti¢. Before the war, _ Jureti¢ was a consultant to the archbishop of Belgrade, and during part of 1941 and 1942, a consultant to the Catholic Episcopal Conference in the Independent State of Croatia. Politically, he was a strong supporter of the Croatian Peasant Party and an adversary of the Ustashas. His aim was to go abroad and engage in intelligence work for the church and the Croatian people. He visited the Vatican first in June and again in September 1942. Before leaving Zagreb for the second visit, he saw Matek, who was under house arrest, and also Archbishop Stepinac, who told him: “Do not return. Go to Switzerland and remain there and if you should go further, work and defend the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Croatian people.” After visiting the Vatican, Jureti¢ reached Switzerland on October 31, 1942, where he remained until his death on August 6, 1954. He passed intelligence that he received from Croatia to Croatian Peasant Party representatives in the Yugoslav government-in-exile through a Czechoslovak diplomat. These representatives then made the reports available to the Western Allies. See Martinovi¢, “The Painstaking Labors of Dr. Krnjevi¢,” pp. 67—69, 76. On his first visit to Rome, Juretié sent to friends in London what we have called the “Jureti¢ Report” of June 10, 1942.

526 THE CHURCHES cuted, Macek replied: “I could not write about the persecution of the Catholic Church because to the best of my knowledge, such persecution did not exist.” While there was discrimination against the Catholic Church, we agree com-

pletely that there was no persecution of it. a

In response to this discrimination, the Catholic Church took measures to defend and promote its interests. Politically, it tried to further the development of a Catholic political party among Croats, though the Croatian People’s Party, which existed until 1929, never achieved political significance. The church also promoted its views through Catholic Action, whose most militant segment was an organization of Catholic youths, the Croatian Eagles (Hrvatski orlovi). Founded in 1920, the government prohibited it in the late 1920’s, but it soon reappeared as the Crusaders (KriZari). The largest organization of the latter was in the Zagreb archdiocese, where there were 16,350 young men in 241 brotherhoods and 7,872 young women in 225 sisterhoods in 1937. In addition, there were about a dozen other special groups within Catholic Action for adults and young people.” The church also had a powerful press. Through activists in various organizations, it promoted its spiritual and secular objectives in institutions of higher learning, the arts, and the professions. Ideologically, its most important struggle during the interwar period was against Freemasonry and Communism. Fascism, by contrast, was treated with tolerance or even benevolence. A bitter battle was also waged against Stjepan Radi¢, the founder and leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, because of his anticlericalism. Radié¢, however, was well known for a folksy kind of piety—epitomized by the greeting with which he often opened meetings in rural areas, “Praise be to Jesus and Mary, down with the priests”—and a considerable number of rural Catholic priests supported him.” Since religious instruction was part of the curriculum in elementary and general secondary schools, the church also had some influence in education. Moreover, in those parts of Yugoslavia where Catholics made up a large segment of the population, the Catholic Church and its various orders maintained high schools in which church influence on the curriculum and students was decisive. Except in Vojvodina, the law required church marriages in all parts of the country, and church courts handled the problem of divorce. In its function as record keeper of births, marriages, and deaths, as well as through its educational activities, the church performed certain activities of public administration, for which it received state subsidies. It also supported a wide variety of 8Matek, “Dr. Ma¢ek’s Comments,” p. 186. *Draganovic, “Le didcesi-croate,” p. 186; idem, Opéi Sematizam, pp. 76-77, 101. The

Crusader units. | :

Djakovo diocese had the next largest number of Crusaders: 49 brotherhoods with 3,822 members and 42 sisterhoods with 4,129 members. In other dioceses, there were few or no

*°V. Novak, Magnum crimen, pp. 203-52. For the intensity with which some Catholic

priests hated Radi¢, see Chapter 1, p. 24.

THE CHURCHES 527 charitable organizations and owned agricultural and urban real estate, from which it derived a limited income.

The Catholic Church was not the only religious body that feared for its standing and rights in Yugoslavia during the interwar period. The Serbian Orthodox Church, despite the fact that it was the national church of the dominant nation in the country, felt threatened by Rome, not only in Bosnia and Herze-

govina, where the Catholic Church was extremely dynamic, but also in other | parts of Yugoslavia. At no time did this fear reveal itself more strongly than | during the debate over ratifying the concordat. But in Serbia proper, Macedonia, and Montenegro, there were no realistic grounds for this feeling. The Or-

thodox numbered 4,364,412 in those areas combined in March 1931; the Catholics numbered only 116,636 there in July 1937.” In Bosnia and Herzegovina, during Austro-Hungarian rule from 1878 to 1918, the Roman Catholic population increased considerably faster than the

Orthodox population, partly through immigration. During the interwar period, it continued to increase faster than the Catholic population in other areas of Yugoslavia. Simultaneously, church organization expanded rapidly. Under Habsburg rule, favoritism toward the Catholic Church had the political objective of curbing the power of the Serbian Orthodox Church and population and countering their leaning toward Serbia.” During the interwar period, church expansion was largely due to the energetic drive of Monsignor Ivan E. Sarié, archbishop of Sarajevo and a Croatian ultranationalist. According to his former secretary, in the archdiocese of Vrhbosna (Sarajevo), which included about half of all Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1937, seventeen new parishes were established during the interwar period, and in two-thirds of the parishes, new parish churches, parish houses, or Catholic centers were built. But

according to the same man, Archbishop Sari¢é operated in “volcanic territory”—“volcanic” undoubtedly in a political sense—since the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina were as assertive about the Serbian character of the province as the Croats (who also spoke for the supposedly Muslim Croats) and the Catholic Church were about its Croatian character.” In the context of our study, the discrimination against the Croatian CathoRogodi¢, Stanje katolicke crkve, p. 37; Draganovit, Opdi Sematizam, p. 357. Many devoutly Orthodox Serbs, who valued the social and spiritual values of Serbian patriarchal society and Orthodoxy, were apprehensive about the influence of Western values, ideas, and institutions, including Catholicism, on Serbian society. See, for example, Josi¢, “For Orthodoxy,” pp. 199-206. 2Up to 1881, the province of Bosnia and Herzegovina was classified as a “mission land,” for which the Franciscan Order supplied both bishops and parish priests. The introduction of diocesan church organization in that year and the order’s gradual loss of its controlling position led to many disputes between the order on the one hand and the church in the province

and the Vatican on the other. ; 3Draganovic, “Archbishop Dr. Ivan Sari¢,” pp. 321-34.

528 - THE CHURCHES | lic population and the Catholic Church during the interwar period, the comparatively slow growth of the Croatian population, the alleged expansionism of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the numerous conversions to Orthodoxy are of basic importance. They led to an increasing intolerance by Croatian nationalist politicians and their followers and by many Catholic priests, especially younger ones, of everything Serbian and Orthodox. Religious antagonism thus became an important part of Ustasha antagonism toward the Serbs, with fate-

ful consequences during the war. ; | The Ustashas’ Massive Attack on the Serbian Orthodox Church |

After the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia, the Ustashas

| turned to a radical solution of the Serbian problem in religion, as in other areas of society. To the Ustashas, the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia were the most dangerous and implacable enemies of the Croats and the Croatian state, and no compromise with them was possible. The Ustashas’ official rationale for its policy against the Serbian Orthodox Church was stated by Mirko Puk, minister of justice and religion, in a speech to the Diet on February 25,1942, and reiterated by Paveli¢ in a speech three days later. Puk argued that the Ustasha state recognized only three religions: Roman Catholicism, Islam, and Protestantism. As for the “so-called Serbian Orthodox Church or Greek Orthodox Church,” he said, “the Independent State of Croatia does not perse-

| cute the Greek Orthodox religion, but on the other hand it cannot recognize the Serbian Orthodox Church.” The reason was the “Caesaristic character” of the church, due to the great influence that the Serbian government had on it by having a hand in selecting its head. “[Thus] the government of Serbia would also exercise some of its powers through the Serbian Orthodox Church in the territory of the Independent State of Croatia—an interference that no state in the world would allow, and one that would not be allowed by the Independent

State of Croatia either.”** Paveli¢ elaborated further onthis point: = Gentlemen! Nobody is bothering Orthodoxy, but in the Croatian state there can be no Serbian Orthodox Church. I repeat, there can be no Serbian and no Greek Orthodox Church. Why? Because all over the world the Orthodox churches are national churches. The Serbian Orthodox Church is a part of the Serbian state. In the hierarchical sense the Serbian Orthodox Church is directed by the government of Serbia. The Serbian government or its representatives appoint the patriarch, or at least have a preponderant say in his appointment, and on him depends the whole hierarchy from the bishops to the deacons. All of this depends on Serbian. state authority. ... In the Croatian state, international church organizations can exist that do not depend on any state power, and such organizations do exist. However, if the church organization is not international, but national, then there can only be a na- : tional Croatian organization. . . . In no case will we allow any church to become a

4 Brzopisni zapisnici, p. 41. Be

THE CHURCHES 529 political instrument, especially not an instrument directed again the existence of the Croatian nation and the Croatian state.”

These statements had been preceded by a series of measures that had effec-

tively shut down the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Independent State of Croatia by the end of 1941. As shown in Chapter 9, the Ustasha government pursued a policy of pushing back the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church to the frontiers that had existed between Serbs and Croats and the Orthodox and Catholic Churches in the mid-fifteenth century by expelling or extermi-

nating the Serbs or forcing them to convert to Catholicism. These policies , grievously affected the Serbian Orthodox Church. Among the Serbs expelled from the Independent State of Croatia to German-occupied Serbia in August and September 1941 were 327 Orthodox priests. One bishop was deported and 2 bishops and 12 priests left for Serbia on their own. By this measure alone, the Serbian Orthodox Church, which had had 8 bishops and 577 priests in the Independent State of Croatia in April 1941, was deprived of more than half of its clergy.” The mass killing of Serbs by the Ustashas during 1941 took the lives of an additional 3 Serbian Orthodox bishops and 154 priests (see Table 2). If we combine the clergymen killed with those expelled, we find that by the end of 1941, the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Independent State of Croatia was left with only about 85 priests. Some of these were not Serbs by nationality, and it is reasonable to assume that at least some were not allowed to minister to their flocks. Undoubtedly, the removal of the bulk of the church’s priesthood was intended to leave the Orthodox population without spiritual leadership so that the Ustashas’ policy of forced or fear-induced conversions to Catholicism would be easier to carry out. It should be pointed out, however, that priests were killed not only by the Ustashas, who apparently started the practice, but also by all contending armed groups and all occupying powers in Yugoslavia. A special aspect of the attack on the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Independent State of Croatia was the desecration or destruction of many Orthodox churches. The worst situation in this respect was in the Orthodox bishopric of Plaski-Karlovac, which included Banija, Kordun, Lika, the Croatian Littoral, Istria, and one parish in Slovenia. Of the 189 Orthodox churches in this bishopric, 67 were badly damaged and 88 completely demolished. The Ustashas did not even shrink from demolishing Orthodox cathedrals, like the one in Banja Luka completed just before the war. The Chetniks and the Partisans also desecrated or destroyed Roman Catholic churches, but their number was insignificant in comparison with the number of Orthodox churches desecrated, burned, ‘STbid., pp. 161-62.

6See the report of the Croatian State Directorate for Renewal of September 20, 1941, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 17/5-1-3, Box 239, and Kasgi¢, “The Serbian Orthodox Church,” p. 196.

530 THE CHURCHES or demolished by the Ustashas.”’ Furthermore, many artistic and sacred items were removed from Orthodox churches and monasteries and taken to Zagreb, where they were later housed in the Historical Museum of Croatia and other

depositories. These articles were only returned to the Serbian Orthodox

Church in 1980, 35 years after the war.” | ,

In some places, for example in Slavonski Brod, eager Ustasha officials not only demolished Orthodox churches, but also ordered the destruction of the Serbian Orthodox cemetery, possibly in reaction to a widespread Serbian saying that all lands where there were Serbian graves were Serbian.” __ 7 Another important means of reducing the Serbian Orthodox population in the Ustasha state was through forced and fear-induced conversions to Roman Catholicism. This approach had two advantages over expulsion. First, it could be represented as bringing back into the fold of the Croatian nation the progeny of former Croatian Catholics who by force of historical circumstances, or in Draganovi¢’s words, “almost without fault of their own,” had become schismatic. Second, it increased the number of Croats and Catholics, while at

the same time reducing the number of Serbs and Orthodox. , , The Ustasha government pursued all three ways—expulsion, extermination, and forced conversion—in trying to extirpate the Serbs and the Orthodox Church from its territory. Due to the enormity of the undertaking, as well as

, growing armed resistance, the Ustashas succeeded in carrying out only part of what they desired. When they realized that their plan could not be completed and that the majority of Serbs would remain in their territory, they established a separate national Croatian Orthodox Church in April 1942, endeavoring in _ Srpska pravoslavna crkva, Sveti sinod, Srpska pravoslavna crkva, 1920-1970, p. 5073 Slijepéevié, Istorija Srpske pravoslavne crkve, 2: 687; excerpts from Archbishop Stepinac’s

report in May 1943 to the pope, in Sudjenje... Stepincu, p. 303. |

At the dedication of the cornerstone of the new Croatian Center in Banja Luka in July 1941, the Reverend BoZidar Bralo, parish priest from Sarajevo and a leading Ustasha delegate

in Bosnia and Herzegovina, congratulated Viktor Guti¢, the ruthless Ustasha party chief in Banja Luka, on his courage in razing to the ground “that house of defiance,” the new Ortho-

dox cathedral. Quoted from a contemporary Ustasha newspaper clipping in Dokumenti o | protunarodnom radu, p. 343. Bralo’s remark implied that Banja Luka was not a proper place

for an Orthodox cathedral. But in July 1937, there were 129,132 Roman Catholics in the Catholic diocese of Banja Luka, while according to the census of March 31, 1931, there were 472,866 Serbian Orthodox in the same area. Draganovi¢, Opéi Sematizam, p. 156. For the fate of Platon Jovanovié, Orthodox bishop of Banja Luka, see Chapter 9. 8Pravoslavlje (Belgrade), February 15 and March 15, 1980. But see the protest of Miroslav Vlasi¢, an Ustasha official in the town of Bosanska Gradigka, to the State Propaganda Office, which was forwarded to the Ministry of Interior as top secret document No. 1760/42. Vlasié advocated decent treatment of the Serbs and called the destruction of the cemetery at Slavonski Brod, ordered by Vladimir Saboli¢, chief of the _ Posavije district, a “barbaric” action. YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 24/11-4, Box 175. Internal evidence shows that Vlasi¢’s memorandum was written in the second half of

1942. : a

THE CHURCHES 531 this way to destroy the religious, national, and cultural unity of the Serbs in the Ustasha state with the Serbs in Serbia proper. In addition to these crippling measures, the Ustasha government undertook a series of administrative and economic actions against the Serbian Orthodox Church. Among the earliest, on April 25, 1941, was the prohibition on using, officially as well as privately, the Cyrillic script. Neither the decree nor the regulations for its application gave any reason for the prohibition. In Croatia, the Cyrillic alphabet was deemed to be closely associated with the Serbian Orthodox Church and with Serbian expansionism in education, literature, and the public media and was thus obnoxious to many Croats. On June 14, the Croatian state prohibited the operation of confessional Serbian Orthodox (as well as Czech) elementary schools. On July 18, the Croatian minister of justice and religion prohibited the use of the term “Serbian Orthodox religion” and ordered the substitution of the term “Greek Eastern religion.” On December 4, the state prohibited the use of the Julian calendar, which had been used by the Orthodox Church up to that time, and ordered the introduction of the Gregorian calendar.” Other measures against the Serbian Orthodox Church were of a financial and economic nature. A law decree of April 25, 1941, annulled the assessment

and collection of the “Patriarchate tithe,” a ro percent surtax on the income tax of the Orthodox population, which had been collected by the Yugoslav state and turned over to the church since 1936. This annulment largely robbed the church of its financial wherewithal. Although a decree of December 27, 1941, empowered the minister of justice and religion to authorize the payment of subsidies to religious organizations and priests, these subsidies were completely at the minister’s discretion and the Serbian Orthodox Church was not included.*!

By special decrees, certain properties of Serbian Orthodox churches, monasteries, and educational endowments were taken over by the state. This happened to the Serbian Orthodox Church school properties in Srijemski Karlovci, the center of the educational facilities of the church in the Croatian state, which were confiscated by a law decree of September 19, 1941. Other endowment properties were affected by the general law on endowments of February 17, 1942, in which only the endowments of the Roman Catholic and Evangelical churches and of the Muslim religious community were noted to be in operation.” The Ustasha regime’s massive attack against the Serbian Orthodox Church was approved and supported by many Croatian Catholic priests. At this point, we may ask what the attitude of the Vatican was toward such Ustasha policies

and about the leadership it provided to the Croatian Catholic Church at this time of political and religious upheaval. “Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1941, pp. 26, 191, 293, IOI2-13. ‘Tbid., pp. 211, 1081. “Ibid., pp. 629, 721; ibid., 1942, pp. 198-204.

532 THE CHURCHES The Independent State of Croatia was located in an area of vital concern to the Vatican, where Roman Catholicism had coexisted or collided with both

, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam for centuries. During the Second World War, a new enemy, international Communism, threatened the position of all churches

and traditional ruling groups in eastern and southeast Europe, and Croatian territory was a central battleground in this struggle. In the newly established Croatian state, Catholics wielded all the political power that the forces of occupation allowed. Croatia had also become a formal quasi protectorate of Italy, the home of the Catholic Church. For all these reasons, the Vatican’s inter-

est in the political and religious developments in the area was intense. oo During the war, neither the Vatican nor the Independent State of Croatia, each for its own reasons, gave out information about the precise nature of their relationship. In documents published after the war, Vatican authorities constantly stressed that the Vatican could not and did not recognize the Croatian state de jure because, according to established custom, it did not so recognize states created during war until peace treaties were concluded and the new states were accepted into the community of nations. But while formal appearances were preserved, Vatican diplomatic practice was flexible enough to allow representation of a special nature in states created during war but not yet recognized. So in August 1941, the Vatican accredited Giuseppe Ramiro Marcone, abbot of the Benedictine monastery of Montevergine, as apostolic legate to the. Croatian episcopate. In the message of July 25, 1941, that Luigi Cardinal Maglione, papal secretary of state, sent to Archbishop Stepinac announcing the arrival of Abbot Marcone, he observed that “surely the abbot will have opportunities to make contact with Croatian government authorities and to listen to their requests.” That Abbot Marcone took advantage of this possibility is seen. from the diary of his secretary, the Reverend Giuseppe Masucci, which tells of the abbot’s visits to Paveli¢, the head of state, and to various Croatian ministries—Army, Education and Religion, and Interior—with the exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he scrupulously avoided visiting. After February 1942, Abbot Marcone was present at practically all official functions of the Croatian government. At the same time, however, it should be noted that the Vatican maintained diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav government-inexile throughout the war and recognized the unified Yugoslav government formed on March 7, 1945.“ The Independent State of Croatia, for its part, had ‘*3For Cardinal Maglione’s message to Stepinac, see Holy See, Actes et documents du Saint

Siége, 5: 106. For Abbot Marcone’s presence at Croatian government functions, see Masucci,

Misija u Hrvatskoj, 1941-1946, pp. 325 39-435 77: | |

“Diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the Yugoslav government-in-exile during the war became a test case for the interpretation of Article 12, Paragraph 2 of the Lateran Treaty of 1929 between the Vatican and Italy. According to the Vatican, diplomats accredited to the Holy See could maintain their residence in Rome proper, that is, outside the Vatican. According to the Italians, once the war began, they could not. In fact, most diplomats accredited to the Vatican from countries at war with Italy moved into the Vatican. The Yugo-

THE CHURCHES 533 an unofficial representative at the Vatican, stationed at the Croatian Legation in Rome, first Nikola Rusinovic* and later Count Erwein Lobkowicz. The best description of the true nature of the relationship between the Vatican and the Independent State of Croatia is found in a dispatch of the German News Agency DNB from Rome on March 14, 1942: “According to well-informed Vatican sources, there are no diplomatic relations between Croatia and the Vatican, but there exist confidential relations recognized and authorized by both parties.” This dispatch was preceded by one day by a report to the same effect from the German ambassador to the Vatican, Diego von Bergen, to his ministry. According to von Bergen, the main reason for the establishment of these confidential relations was the existence “of a series of questions which urgently required mutual discussion and regulation. The most difficult problem

was that of the Orthodox.” It is obvious from these sources that the Vatican recognized de facto the Independent State of Croatia. This was also the opinion that Archbishop Stepinac gave at his trial.“”7 From the contacts that Abbot Marcone maintained with

Croatian authorities and the reports that he received directly from Croatian bishops and clergymen, as well as from the information that the Vatican received from the Yugoslav government-in-exile, the Vatican was undoubtedly well informed about both ecclesiastical and political events in the Independent State of Croatia during the war. At the same time, reports from the unofficial Croatian representatives at the Vatican, Rusinovic and Lobkowicz, show that some officials in that body had grave misgivings about the Ustasha state and severely criticized it.** Yet according to the available documents, the Vatican slav minister to the Vatican, Niko Mirogevié-Sorgo, was initially permitted to live in Rome, but when the Italian government accused him of espionage, he was forced to leave the country. He did so at the end of July 1941, but remained accredited to the Vatican, performing his duties from Lisbon. A Yugoslav diplomatic chancery operated in the Vatican with a diplo-

matic official who lived in the Vatican and a consultant for religious affairs who lived in Rome. See Pavlowitch, “‘Il caso Mirogevié,’” pp. 105-37. See also the memorandum of the papal Secretariat of State of February 12, 1942, to the diplomatic missions to the Holy See on the issues raised by the Mirogevi¢-Sorgo case, in Holy See, Actes et documents du Saint Siége, 5: 417-27.

‘SRuginovié was born in the United States, but was taken by his mother to her native Dalmatia while still a child. His two most important posts during the war were as the unofficial representative of the Croatian government to the Vatican and as the Croatian delegate to the Italian 2nd Army, the army of occupation in about half of Croatian territory. After the

war, he eventually returned to the United States and became a professor at a university in Kentucky. *6Germany, Federal Republic of, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, “Nachlass Kasche.” Both quotations are from this collection of Envoy Siegfried Kasche’s files, made available to me on microfilm by courtesy of the ministry. ‘"Sudjenje .. . Stepincu, p. 266. Blazekovi¢, “El status internacional del Estado Independiente de Croacia,” p. 270, also says that the Vatican had recognized de facto the Independent State of Croatia. 8Tajni dokumenti, passim; see also Falconi, I/ silenzio di Pio XII, pp. 453-504.

534 THE CHURCHES | never protested publicly to Croatian authorities against Ustasha persecution of the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church. As will be seen below, the Vatican may also have been partly responsible for the fact that the Catholic Church hi-

erarchy in Croatia itself never protested publicly against this persecution, which many Catholic priests abetted. The absence of an official Vatican representative with the Croatian government might be a formal excuse for this lack _of protest, but it cannot serve as a moral-excuse, and in fact indirectly implicates the Vatican in the persecution. The rationale for silence apparently lay in the fact that the Croatian government was engaged in a struggle against both the traditional and new enemies of the Catholic Church—Eastern Orthodoxy

condemn. Oo /

and Communism—which the Vatican felt it was politically inopportune to

| Forced and Fear-Induced Conversions |

The process of the mass conversion of the Serbian Orthodox population to

Roman Catholicism started almost immediately after the establishment of the , Independent State of Croatia as part of the Ustasha program of making it a one-nation, two-religion state. To encourage and facilitate conversions, the Ustasha government issued a law decree on conversion from one religion to.another as early as May 3, 1941. The single article of the decree stated: Until the enactment of a law on interdenominational relations, all presently valid legal regulations on the manner of conversion from one religion to another are hereby | - abrogated. For a conversion to be valid, it is necessary that the person who changes _ religion submit a written application to the county or municipal authority about his decision and receive a confirmation of his application and that the religious regulations of the recognized religion to which the person is converting be fulfilled.”

Although this decree appears to regulate conversions from any one religion to any other, the intent was solely to promote conversions to Catholicism, as we

shall see below. 7 a a

How directly the government intervened in conversions is best shown by the July 14, 1941, circular from the Department of Religion, which was headed by Radoslav Glavaé, a young Franciscan monk, in the Ministry of Justice and Re-

ligion, to all Roman Catholic ordinaries (bishops) in the state. The circular stated: “The intention of the Croatian government is to not accept into the Catholic Church Orthodox priests, teachers, the intelligentsia, and the layer of | - rich merchants, artisans, and peasants, because of eventual later decisions about them, so that religion and Catholicism may not be exposed to any unpleasantness.” Such persons could be accepted into the Catholic Church only if they were married to Catholics in a Catholic church and if their children were

raised as Catholics, but even in such cases only with the permission of the Min- | istry of Justice and Religion. According to the same circular, no Orthodox per-

“Z bornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1941, pp. 56, 122.

THE CHURCHES 535 son could join the Catholic Church of the Eastern rite, a position that went counter to the historical practice of the Vatican.” It is obvious from this circular that the Ustasha regime wanted to leave the mass of the Orthodox peasantry and lower-class Orthodox adherents without any of their former leaders after conversion, in order to incorporate them more easily into the Catholic Church and the Croatian nation. Because the promotion of conversions by the government and the Ustasha Party represented an intrusion of the secular authorities into ecclesiastical affairs, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Croatia became involved almost immediately. The hierarchy moved to insure the proper observance of existing dogmatic and canonical regulations and procedures in conversions by issuing a series of circulars specifying the steps to be taken. Potential converts were to be instructed in church teachings only by priests who had been properly designated and empowered as missionaries by the ordinary of the diocese in which they were active.’ Once the massacre of Serbs started in late April 1941, Catholic laymen and priests promoting conversion often stated that it was the only way in which the Orthodox population could avoid persecution. Facing such alternatives, many individuals and occasionally entire communities of Orthodox Serbs asked to be converted to save their lives. The Vatican also became directly involved in conversions. According to the instructions that Eugéne Cardinal Tisserant, secretary of the Vatican Congregation for the Eastern Churches, sent with his July 17, 1941, letter to Archbishop Stepinac, people who had earlier been Catholics of the Eastern rite before recently converting to Orthodoxy were to be given the opportunity to join parishes, already existing or soon to be formed, of the Catholic Church of the Eastern rite. The cardinal’s message concluded: “If Your Excellency will present this necessary rule to his venerable brothers, the bishops of Croatia, they will merit recognition through this valuable contribution to a progressive extension of Catholicism in a region where so many hopes are nourished for the conversion of non-Catholics.” And in a regulation of October 18, 1941, the

Vatican stated: “In all places where there are already parishes of the Greek Catholic rite, let the non-Catholics who wish to be converted be directed to those parishes. It is recognized that if the non-Catholics do not wish or are not YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 6/3 7-1, Box 87. ‘'Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 370-84. The Croatian Catholic hierarchy issued its first statement on conversions on May 15, 1941. This was followed by several others that stressed the general conditions for conversion to the Catholic faith: for converts, sincerity of desire, proper preparation, and determination to live according to Catholic principles, and for priests, strict observance of the rules governing conversions and great understanding for those who had earlier converted from Catholicism to Orthodoxy and were now returning to their former church. On Pattee’s book, see a review by Tomas, “Stepinac’s Portrait,” pp. 129-60, especially p. 131. Among the source materials in the book are the indictment against Stepinac, his main statement in court, and the statements of his two defense counsels.

(536 THE CHURCHES able to keep their Oriental rite, they may choose the Latin rite.” [Pattee’s emphasis] Following these instructions, the Croatian Catholic hierarchy insisted, despite the order from the Ustasha government, that converts could freely

choose between the Eastern and Latin rites. , a | a oe Although the Vatican knew that conversions were occurring primarily for

| political reasons and often under extreme duress, Abbot Marcone, its legate in Zagreb, only “tried to make clear to Paveli¢ the need to proceed slowly and cautiously in the conversion of dissidents and to hold him back from totally destroying their churches.”® This indicates that the Vatican did not look with dis-

favor on conversions from Orthodoxy, but that it would have preferred a slower and more cautious and therefore safer approach. Nevertheless, it might

be argued that it also bears a degree of responsibility for them, because it did not protest against them. Since, according to German documents, Archbishop | Stepinac also favored a slower and more cautious approach, it seems obvious that he fully accepted and reflected Abbot Marcone’s, that: is the Vatican’s,

views on the issue.” Oo

Because Ustasha government authorities arrogated to themselves considerable power about the way the Catholic Church should handle conversions, and because many unauthorized state and party officials and some Catholic priests pushed conversions, several basic prerogatives of the Catholic Church were infringed upon. Moreover, there were many abuses and atrocities committed by

government authorities and the Ustasha militia against the Orthodox popula- | tion, even those who had already converted to Catholicism. On May 12, 1941, in the town of Glina, 50 kilometers from Zagreb, for example, the Ustashas from surrounding localities drove about 260 people, some of them reportedly

new converts, into a church, slaughtered them, and set the church on fire. Archbishop Stepinac wrote a letter of protest to Paveli¢é on May 14, but said nothing publicly. And the complaints that Monsignor Alojzije Misi¢, bishop of Mostar, communicated to Archbishop Stepinac were truly agonizing. In a letter of August 18, 1941, Misi¢ explained that initially a good beginning had been made in converting the Orthodox to Catholicism, because people of the

two religions knew each other. But then, he said, irresponsible elements “For the first quote, see Tajni dokumenti, p. 94, and Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, p. 386, and for the second quote, the same page in Pattee. On the issue of

_ the conversion of the Orthodox to Catholicism, see also S. Simi¢, Prekr3tavanje Srba, espe- | cially pp. 59-64. The Catholic Church of the Eastern rite in Yugoslavia had only one diocese,

which was based in Krizevci near Zagreb and covered the whole country. As of July 1937, there were only 49,638 Eastern rite Catholics in Yugoslavia, of whom not more than about a

third were Croats; the others were Ukrainian or Romanian minorities or Macedonians. See :

Draganovit, Opéi Sematizam, pp. 103-13. oe ‘See his report to Cardinal Maglione of May 8, 1943, in Holy See, Acts et documents du

Saint Siége,9:220. | oe | So

_ “Germany, Federal Republic of, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, “Nachlass Kasche,”

Kasche’s report to his ministry of November 19, 1942. a | | *SHoly See, Actes et documents du Saint Siége, 9: 224. a .

THE CHURCHES 537 (obviously the Ustashas) started to intervene: Unhappily the authorities by their extreme views are, without perhaps intending to, placing obstacles in the way of the Croatian and Catholic cause. The leaders are not guilty. But all kinds of people are interfering in this matter, youths without learning or experience; in place of intelligence and reason, there is force and violence. It is not surprising that evil consequences for the Croatian and Catholic causes have resulted.

... [The Orthodox] went to holy Mass, they learned the Catholic catechism, had their children baptized, but then the intruders gave their order. While the neoconverts were at Church attending holy Mass, they seized them, the young and the old, men and women, and drove them before them like cattle... and soon sent them to eternity, en masse.” [Pattee’s emphasis]

Even more horrifying was his account in a letter of November 7, 1941: At one time it seemed that a large number of schismatics would be converted to the Catholic Church. However, those who have been stozernik, designated logornik [Ustasha officials], have abused their positions, exploited the worst instincts of the

: masses and the weakest side of human nature, with the result that a reign of terror has come to pass. And there is nowhere a remedy for it. Men are captured like animals. They are slaughtered, murdered; living men are thrown off cliffs. The underprefect in Mostar, Mr. Baji¢, a Mohammedan, has stated with the authoritative voice of his position—he should keep silent and not utter such statements—that at Ljubinje, in a single day, 700 schismatics were thrown into their graves. From Mostar and from Capljina a train took six carloads of mothers, young girls, and children ten years of age to the station at Surmanci. There they were made to get off the train, were led up to the mountains, and the mothers together with their children were thrown alive off steep precipices. In the parish of Klepci 700 schismatics from the surrounding villages were murdered. Must I continue this enumeration? In the town of Mostar itself, they have been bound by the hundreds, taken in wagons outside the town, and there shot down like animals.”

Despite such occurrences; despite the fact that by September 24, 1941, the Croatian government had expelled to Serbia, along with at least 118,000 Serbs, about half of the Orthodox priests in the Independent State of Croatia; despite the fact that by that time three Orthodox bishops and several score of Orthodox priests had been killed by the Ustashas, and that many Orthodox churches had been desecrated or destroyed; despite all this, neither Archbishop Stepinac personally, nor any other Catholic bishop in the state, nor the Episcopal Conference, the highest Catholic body in Croatia, uttered one word of public pro-

test against them. This was not a mere oversight. It was a deliberate policy clearly stated by Abbot Marcone in his report of May 8, 1943, to Cardinal Ma**Quoted by Archbishop Stepinac in his letter to Paveli¢ of November 20, 1941, in which he informed him about the conclusions of the Episcopal Conference in Zagreb on November 17-18, 1941. It is reproduced in Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, p. 389. ‘Ibid., pp. 389-90. It is interesting that in his letter to the Vatican of December 3, 1941,

about the Episcopal Conference, Archbishop Stepinac did not include any passages from Bishop Misi¢’s letters, as he did in his letter to Paveli¢. Possibly Abbot Marcone told the Vatican about them.

538 THE CHURCHES glione. After a series of points about the church and political affairs in Croatia, including the fact that most of the guerrillas were schismatics, the abbot went on: “Under these conditions, our Croatian episcopate did not have and does not have any special motive to protest publicly against the government in favor of the schismatics.”** Archbishop Stepinac protested quite often to Pavelié¢ directly, but the effect of these protests was in most cases nil, because Paveli¢ treated the archbishop in a degrading manner—referring to him in his entou-

rage as “that ass”—and paid little attention to his letters.” - a The position of the Catholic Church hierarchy in Croatia toward conversions from Orthodoxy to Catholicism was enunciated in the “Resolution on Conversions” issued by the Episcopal Conference, chaired by Archbishop Stepinac, after its meeting in Zagreb on November 17-18, 1941. The key sections

of the resolution read as follows:

1. The Conference considers it a dogmatic principle that the solution of all ques-

tions pertaining to the conversion of Orthodox persons to the Catholic religion is | exclusively within the province of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, which alone, according to Divine Law and canonical regulations, has the right to lay down rules and regulations; and, as a result, all outside action on this matter is excluded. - 2, For this reason no one, with the exception of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, has the right to appoint “missionaries” to take charge of the conversion of Orthodox persons to the Catholic Church. Any missionary of this kind must receive his mission and the jurisdiction for his spiritual work from the Ordinary of the place

where he is active. It is, consequently, contrary to dogma and to canonical regulations that “missionaries” receive their mission, unknown to the Ordinary of the , place where they work, from the commissioners of communes, representatives of the civil authority, Ustasha officials of the Religious Section of the Department of Re-

construction, or from any civil authority whatsoever... . ,

4. The Catholic Church can recognize as valid only those conversions that have been or will be carried out according to these dogmatic principles.....

8. Only those may be received into the Catholic Church who are converted without any constraint, completely free, led by an interior conviction of the truth of the Catholic faith, and who have entirely fulfilled ecclesiastical regulations. ... 1. It is necessary to create among the Orthodox inhabitants a psychological basis for conversion. Toward this end they shall not only be promised but actually be guaranteed all civil rights, especially personal freedom and the right to hold property. All proceedings contrary to law in regard to Orthodox persons shall be strictly forbidden and they shall be penalized as other citizens through due process of law. And, most important, all private actions in destroying the churches and chapels of the Orthodox or stealing of their property should be severely punished. [Pattee’s emphasis]

Holy See, Actes et documents du Saint Siége, 9: 221. , °“Juretié Report,” p. 12, in RG 226, OSS-File No. 21782. I was told by several people in Zagreb, and a high church dignitary confirmed in 1967, that whenever the archbishop visited Paveli¢ in his office, he was searched “down to his fountain pen.” It was also generally known that Ustasha zealots loudly expressed their disapproval of the archbishop and even threatened

his life. No harm came to him from the Ustashas, however, only humiliation. | Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 384-87. Numbering, quotes, and

emphasis as in Pattee. | ,

THE CHURCHES 539 In order to regulate the process of conversion, the Catholic hierarchy established, in Sections 6 and 7 of the same resolution, a special Committee of Three Bishops, under the chairmanship of Archbishop Stepinac, with an attached five-member Executive Working Committee of Experts (all Catholic priests), to attend to problems connected with conversions in the spirit of the resolution. These regulations were quite different from what the Ustasha re-

gime would have liked and fully protected the church hierarchy against charges of promoting forced conversions. But they indicated that the church was willing to cooperate with the regime’s policy of conversions, provided that canonical rules were safeguarded. Indeed, in a report on the Episcopal Conference that the archbishop sent to the pope on December 3, 1941, he noted that “the best prospects appear to exist” for conversions.” But it is also true that the rules on conversions that were stipulated by the church were not always observed in practice. The political and religious rationale for mass conversions in the Independent State of Croatia derived from the thesis of Reverend Draganovi¢ that there was a widespread shift from Roman Catholicism to Orthodoxy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, primarily in southern Herzegovina (see Chapter 9). Thus it could be argued that when the Orthodox converted to Catholicism, they were merely returning to the church of their forefathers. But the Ustashas applied this thesis to most of the Serbian Orthodox population living in all other areas of the Independent State of Croatia as well, which was not supported by historical fact. By altering Draganovic’s thesis in this way, the promoters of mass conversions could assert that the process was natural and legitimate. Alluding to reports of a Franciscan friar from the seventeenth century that Orthodox priests were doing everything possible to make Catholics accept Orthodoxy and that they were greater enemies of the Catholics than the Turks, Puk, in the speech cited above, remarked: What was happening in eastern Herzegovina was also happening in other areas of Bosnia, Srijem, and Slavonia. Consequently, the Independent State of Croatia supports the action of conversion of the Greek Orthodox to the Roman Catholic religion, because this conversion is only a return to the former religion of their forefathers and because it is known to the state that from this Croatian element, later, ‘'For the composition of the two committees, see Dokumenti o protunarodnom radu, p. 379. In Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, p. 385, data are not complete. For the archbishop’s letter to the pope, see Holy See, Actes et documents du Saint Siége, 8: 369. In discussions of the Catholic hierarchy’s activity in conversions, it is often claimed that the Committee of Three Bishops never met. But this did not mean that the machinery set up to supervise conversions did not function. It is true, however, that two members of the Commit-

tee of Experts left Croatia and thus could not participate in its work. Monsignor Augustin Juretié left Croatia permanently in September 1942 and Reverend Draganovi¢ left for Rome in August 1943. But already by September 1942, the authorities had ceased to force conversions by brutal pressure. It is interesting that in his otherwise candid report of June 10, 1942, Monsignor Jureti¢ did not mention mass conversions or any other measures against the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Independent State of Croatia.

540 THE CHURCHES Serbs were created through propaganda. With this conversion to the religion of their forefathers, the unity of the Croatian people is reestablished in all those areas where,

by force of conditions, this unity was weakened. 7 |

Whoever for any reason does not want to recognize this historical situation is

free to leave the territory of this state.” ,

In speaking so plainly about church problems and the Ustashas’ policy on conversions, Puk apparently went too far, for a few days later Paveli¢ sought to moderate the impression given by his minister: “It is not true that the Croatian state endeavors to convert the Orthodox to Roman Catholicism. This is not the policy. Everybody is free to decide in this respect.” But his assertion is contradicted by none other that Abbot Marcone, who in his May 8, 1943, report to” Cardinal Maglione on “the attitude of the Croatian clergy toward the Serbian Orthodox,” remarked: “It should also be acknowledged that the head of the Croatian government, Ante Pavelic, during the whole year of 1941, nourished the idea of a rapid conversion to the Catholic faith of all schismatics living

within Croatian frontiers.”™ ) | } , The Ustasha regime was not alone in altering Draganovi¢’s thesis to support

the policy of conversions. Some Catholic clergymen, and to some extent the Catholic Church itself in Croatia, did too. This is implied in the archbishop’s letter to Paveli¢ on November 20, 1941, which included a copy of the “Resolution on Conversions” from the Episcopal Conference. As far as I could ascertain, this letter, which also contained excerpts of letters from several bishops to the archbishop that were extremely critical of the Ustashas’ behavior toward

the Orthodox population and new converts, was never published in Croatia | during the war.® Had it been, in the form of a pastoral letter, the cautious position of the Catholic hierarchy in Croatia on conversions might have served to _ enlighten the public as well as the Ustashas and might have had some salutary

effect. HC oo

By applying a distorted version of Draganovi¢’s thesis to the entire Serbian Orthodox population in the Independent State of Croatia, mass conversions occurring under tremendous political and psychological pressure could conveniently be represented as a natural tendency of the Croatian nation and the Catholic Church to recoup ground lost in earlier centuries, rather than as a hos-

tile action against the Serbian Orthodox Church. The fact that about 200,000 Roman Catholics, mostly Croats, had converted to Orthodoxy during the interwar period helped to justify this policy politically and emotionally. — In the view of some Catholic bishops, for example Bishop Mi8i¢ of Mostar,

“Brzopisni zapisnici, p. 41. | - a

positions. , , cially p. 393. | Oo “Ibid., p. 161. In his brochure “Istina o toboZnjem prekrstavanju Pravoslavnih,” published in Buenos Aires by Hrvatska misao in 1953, Pavelié only restated some of his wartime.

“Holy See, Actes et documents du Saint Siége, 9: 219-20. oe ,

“For this letter, see Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 384-95, espe-

THE CHURCHES 541 the greatest impediment to orderly and more numerous conversions apparently came from the terrorist acts of overzealous Ustasha officials against the Orthodox. These acts also belied the promises of some Catholic clergy to the Orthodox that they would be spared pogroms if they converted. In his November 7, 1941, letter, Misi¢ asserted that had it not been for the terrorist actions of the Ustashas against the Orthodox, there would have been as many as 500,000 to 600,000 converts by that time, which seems to me to be an excessively high estimate.” From the available information, it is possible to establish only the approxi-

mate number of Orthodox Serbs who converted to Catholicism in the Independent State of Croatia during the war. Precise records were not always kept, most of the records were eventually destroyed in order to prevent the Yugoslav Communists from using them as incriminating material, and many of those who converted later perished. The number of converts, however, was certainly much lower than Pavelié and many other promoters of conversion hoped. The most authoritative statement on the number of conversions was attributed to Archbishop Stepinac at his trial in October 1946. The public prosecutor quoted extensively from a purported report of the archbishop to the pope on May 18, 1943, in which he stated that the number of converts up to that time

was about 240,000. There are two versions about the archbishop’s reaction when he was shown a copy of the report. According to the semiofficial report of the trial proceedings, the archbishop only looked at it without saying anything.

According to Richard Pattee, who also quotes Ivo Politeo, the archbishop’s senior counsel, the archbishop denied having authored it. Because of this reported denial and certain formal characteristics of the report, Politeo believed the archbishop’s claim and tried to prove that it was an Ustasha forgery.°’ The archbishop’s reported denial and Politeo’s doubts also raised doubts in my mind. While all my efforts to obtain more precise information from Roman Catholic authorities over several years failed, I eventually found conclusive proof in British diplomatic papers that the report was genuine (see Appendix). Thus we can say that according to Archbishop Stepinac, up to May 1943 the “Tbid., pp. 388-90. In addition to Bishop Mi8i¢’s letter to Archbishop Stepinac on August 18, 1941 (ibid., p. 389), in which he asserted that some converts had been killed by the Ustashas, see also the letter of Augustin Kralj, parish priest of Crkveni Bok, to Paveli¢ on October 16, 1942, in which he described the murder and removal to concentration camps of recent converts in his parish (ibid., pp. 400-404). *’Sudenje ... Stepincu, p. 298; Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 21112. Politeo considered this report to be an Ustasha forgery, or at best an Ustasha composition that the archbishop never used. It ended with the words: “Holy Father . . . I recommend to Your Fatherly care and Your prayers our Independent State of Croatia, considering that in this way I recommend our Sacred Faith in my fatherland and in the Balkans.” Politeo asserted: “It is incredible—and it would have been ridiculous and naive on the part of the Archbishop—to count on, and still less desire, that the Holy See do anything on behalf of the Independent State of Croatia.” Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, p. 213. For further details about this controversial report, see the Appendix to this chapter.

542 THE CHURCHES number of converts from Orthodoxy to Catholicism was about 240,000. Since probably more conversions subsequently took place, the total number might

have been about 250,000. -

In 1966, I asked Vladimir Bakari¢, who was prime minister of the Socialist Republic of Croatia at the time of the trial, for his estimate of the number of Orthodox who had converted to Catholicism in the Independent State of Croatia during the war. He replied: “It is very difficult to give even an approximately precise answer on the number of forced converts to Roman Catholicism in the

300,000 people.” - ,

Independent State of Croatia. Guarded estimates indicate a figure of about An additional piece of information on conversions is an undated note on a scrap of paper, supposedly from the archives of the archbishopric of Zagreb. According to the author who published it in 1974, it was a confidential directive from Stepinac to subordinates in his archdiocese, advising them to consider

the ongoing conversions as temporary. It reads: Se

When you are visited by people of the Jewish or Eastern Orthodox faith, whose lives are in danger and who express the wish to convert to Catholicism, accept them in order to save human lives. Do not require any special religious knowledge from them, because the Eastern Orthodox are Christians like ourselves, and the Jewish faith is the faith from which Christianity draws its roots. The role and duty of Christians is in the first place to save people. When this time of madness and savagery passes, those who would convert out of conviction will remain in our church, while the others, after the danger passes, will return to their church.® ©

The fact that this very important note was written on a scrap of paper, that it did not carry either a date or the archbishop’s signature, and that it implied that most conversions were temporary, throws doubts on its authenticity. If it was genuine, why was it not produced at the archbishop’s trial or included in Pat-

tee’s book? But as indicated in the Appendix, it appears to be authentic. There is no formal evidence that conversions were considered only temporary in any diocese or archdiocese of the Independent State of Croatia. This is quite understandable, because it would have brought the church into collision with the Ustasha government and opened it to charges of hypocrisy in a matter of utmost dogmatic sensitivity. Moreover, in his May 1943 report to the pope, Stepinac expressed the fear that in the case of the establishment of a Greater Serbia, which would leave only a rump Croatia, not only would the 240,000 Two slightly different versions of this directive, supposedly Stepinac’s, have. appeared. The one quoted is from the most authoritative biography of Cardinal Stepinac, by Aleksa Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 428, published in 1974. The second is from an article by Ivan MeStrovi¢, “Stepinac, the Spiritual Hero,” p. 204, published in 1956. MeStrovi¢ claimed that the note was shown to him by the parish priest of the largest parish in Zagreb. It contains a regional Bosnian form for the word “savagery,” divljaluk, however, instead of the literary Croatian form divljastvo, which throws doubt on its authorship. These sources give no indication of whether the note was in the archbishop’s handwriting,

handwritten by somebody else, or typed. ;

THE CHURCHES 543 new converts be lost, but also the remaining Catholic population would be converted to Orthodoxy. This would indicate that he considered the new converts a permanent acquisition for the Catholic Church, provided, of course, that the Independent State of Croatia survived.” In addition to issues of principle and policy in connection with mass conversions, both the Catholic Church and the Ustasha government faced other difficulties. One was the problem of providing sufficient clergy for the new parishes of converts, since even before the war there was a shortage of Catholic priests in Croatia. The chief of the Religious Section of the State Directorate for Renewal, Franciscan brother Dionizije Juriéev, in a letter to the Office of the Head of State on October 25, 1941, expressed the hope that Franciscan friars would take over some of the parishes. But since he thought that “there would be almost a million converts if the situation should continue to develop as it was up to now,” the problem of the availability of priests was a vexing one. Despite this, he wrote, “We are far from the thought that foreign priests, especially Slovenes, could under any circumstances be allowed to administer such parishes, because in our opinion that would be a heavy blow to Croatian national interests in such parishes.”” Another problem arose in connection with some Orthodox Serbs and Jews who converted to Islam in hopes of saving their lives. This was apparently pos-

sible only in Bosnia and Herzegovina and not in the territory of the former Croatia-Slavonia. But the Ustasha authorities discriminated against these converts to Islam. One of the first formal complaints lodged by the Reis-ul-Ulema in early September 1941 with Osman Kulenovic¢, the vice premier, who was then based in Banja Luka, dealt with discrimination against converts to Islam compared to converts to Catholicism. Following this protest, the vice premier’s office informed the head of the Sana and Luka district on September 30 that the

Muslim and Catholic religions had equal standing and that all discrimination , against converts to Islam was contrary to established policy.”!

Somewhat later, however, problems arose for Orthodox Serbs and Jews who tried to convert to Islam in the territory of the former Croatia-Slavonia. The Ustasha government insisted that according to a law of January 17, 1906, which to them, but not to Muslim religious authorities, was still valid, conversion in that area was allowed from one religion only to a legally recognized Christian religion and not to a non-Christian religion such as Islam. A representative of the Reis-ul-Ulema strongly protested this in a letter to Vice PreIn regard to temporary conversions, see also Stepinac’s statement in the spring of 1942 to Stanislav Rapotec, an agent acting for the Yugoslav government-in-exile and the British, noted in the Appendix. Dokumenti o protunarodnom radu, pp. 117-18. The reference here is to 448 Slovene Roman Catholic priests who were among the expellees from German-occupied areas of Slovenia to the Independent State of Croatia (see Chapter 3). 7'Y A, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 30/2-1, Box 169.

544 | - - THE CHURCHES , mier Dzafer Kulenovi¢ on August 25, 1943, arguing that it degraded Islam in comparison to other religions, was contrary to the law decree of May 3, 1941, and “was offensive to all Muslims.” The Muslim representative noted that one of the arguments of the Croatian authorities in support of the validity of the 1906 law was that “the Holy See would sharply protest a change in the legislation [of 1906] and that it would not be desirable that relations with the _ Holy See deteriorate.” He also pointed out that difficulties existed with regard to the religion of children from mixed Christian-Muslim marriages. He re-

quested that all these inequities be removed.” 7 ae , The government’s answer to the Reis-ul-Ulema, a top secret document, upheld the validity of the provisions of the 1906 law restricting conversion to Is-

lam and pointed out that the issues raised by the Reis-ul-Ulema could be | changed in agreement with his wishes only by issuing a new law decree. In the | meantime, the provisions of the 1906 law would continue in force.” As far as I am aware, no decree was ever issued removing the limitations of the 1906 law. This was just another example of how Muslims in the Independent State of _ Croatia were treated as second-class citizens. Even worse for their cause was

that as early as April 1942, many Muslims were aware of threats from the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Franciscan friars and their Ustasha allies that the time was not far off when the Muslims would be treated in the same way as the Serbian Orthodox if they did not return to the religion of their forefathers.47 A certain number of Orthodox Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia, especially in areas where they lived intermixed with Volksdeutsche, converted or tried to convert to the Evangelical religion.” Croatian authorities impeded _ these conversions as well. The Ustasha government’s policy toward conversions shows clearly that it was only in favor of conversions to Roman Catholi-

cism. We may be sure that in this respect the Ustasha authorities had the full

support of the Catholic Church in Croatia. oe _

The Establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church a When the German representatives in Croatia, Glaise and Kasche, saw the nature of Ustasha policies toward the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church _and realized the negative effects that they would have on both the Croatian state and German interests in Croatia, they spoke up for the Serbs, but to no’

avail. Kasche met with Marshal Kvaternik and Foreign Secretary Lorkovié on a August 28 and with Paveli¢ on September 1, 1941, and suggested measures that

might contribute to the pacification of the country. Among them was a pro- -

“Ibid., Reg. No. 2/39-1, Box 87. | | ,

— *Ibid., Reg. No. 2/39-2, Box 87, Top Secret No. 3 38/1943. , See Haeffner’s report to Glaise of April 26, 1942, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 265, Fr. 263,

and Salihbegovic¢, “Pleasant Discourse of the Bosnian Muslims.” rs “See a general intelligence report of the Croatian Ministry of the Army of December |

1941,in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 25/13-5, Box 85. a ]

THE CHURCHES 545 posal that the Croatian government establish a separate Croatian Orthodox Church, completely independent from the Serbian Orthodox Church.” Since at this time the Ustashas were pushing the mass conversion of the Orthodox to Roman Catholicism, for which they had high hopes, and expelling Serbs from Croatia to Serbia, Kasche’s proposal did not strike a responsive chord. But some months later conditions changed. When the Ustasha government realized that mass conversions could not succeed, the idea of a national Croatian Orthodox Church became attractive. At the end of February 1942, Paveli¢ intimated the establishment of such a church in a speech to the Croatian

Diet, and a law decree of April 3, 1942, created the Croatian Orthodox Church. The constitution of the new church, published two months later, provided that it would be headed by a patriarch, who together with the bishops would be named by the head of the Croatian state.” The new church would be organized over a period of three years, and pending full organization and the naming of a patriarch, would be headed by the metropolitan of Zagreb. To this position Paveli¢ named, not a Serbian Orthodox archbishop or priest, but an octogenarian Russian refugee and member of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, Germogen, former archbishop of Ekaterinoslav, who was installed on June 8, 1942. From the time he had arrived in Yugoslavia in 1922, Germogen had lived at various Serbian Orthodox monasteries, for the most part at the Hopovo Monastery in Srijem, which the Serbian Orthodox Church had put at his disposal. During the entire existence of the Croatian Orthodox Church, only one additional prelate, Spiridon Mifka, a bishop for the diocese of Sarajevo, was consecrated (in August 1944). At a meeting of the Holy Synod on April 17, 1942, the Serbian Orthodox Church condemned the establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church as canonically undogmatic and against the law. But as revealed in an August 4, 1942, report from the commander of the German Security Police and Security Service in Belgrade, which also included a translation of the decisions of the Holy Synod on July 7, the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy could not make this judgment public nor communicate it to its churches abroad due to the opposition of the German occupation authorities. From the minutes of the July 7 meeting, it is clear that during the previous May, several clerical and lay members of the newly forming Croatian Orthodox Church had been in touch with the Serbian Orthodox Church hierarchy in Belgrade. One was Milos ObrkneZe“For Kasche’s internal memorandum, which gives a synopsis of his talks with Croatian

leaders and his suggestions for the new church, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5797, Frs. H309,939-44. Ina July 20, 1942, dispatch to his ministry, Kasche opposed the appointment of a special Security Service (SD) representative in the legation to follow religious developments in Croatia. He argued that the legation already had good contacts with church authorities in Zagreb and that its suggestions about the Croatian Orthodox Church had already been carried out by the Croatian government. Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5785, Frs. H300,390-92. ™See Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1942, p. 390 for the law decree establishing this church, and pp. 689-97 for its constitution. _

546 THE CHURCHES vic, a lawyer and former consistorial employee of the church from Srijemski Karlovci and later secretary to Metropolitan Germogen, who was received in Belgrade only by Alagi¢, the secretary of the Holy Synod. ObrkneZevié expressed the desire of the Croatian government that some Orthodox bishops and priests who had earlier been expelled return to the Independent State of Croatia to help organize the new church. They would receive Paveli¢’s personal

guarantee of their personal safety and the return of any private property that had been confiscated. ObrkneZevié gave Alagi¢ a list of 20 Russian and 42 Serbian Orthodox clergymen who had freely chosen to cooperate with the Croatian authorities in organizing and serving the new church. Additional pressure

on the Serbian Orthodox Church came from Gestapo representatives in Belgrade, who also suggested that they help organize the new church in Croatia. But the appeals fell on deaf ears. Both Obrknezevi¢ and the Belgrade Gestapo were rebuffed. Furthermore, the metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad called Metropolitan Germogen before the church court and prohibited

him from conducting services.” © |

The Ustasha government also felt that the establishment of the new church

would contribute to the pacification of the country. A meeting of all Croatian ministers, undersecretaries of state, district chiefs, and regional Ustasha Party officials in Zagreb on July 2, 1942, on matters of pacification concluded that the Croatian Orthodox Church was a new autocephalous church, in no way a successor to the former Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia. Only people who : voluntarily and formally joined the new church were considered members. Only those Orthodox churches operated by the new church were recognized by the Croatian government and no other religious groups could maintain Orthodox churches in the Croatian state.” Had the Ustasha state treated the Serbian Orthodox population within its borders as equal to other citizens, had it not expelled over half of the Orthodox priests and allowed the killing of three bishops and over a quarter of all priests during 1941, and had it, with or without an agreement with the Serbian Or*Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5785, Frs. H300,214-20. For ObrkneZevi¢’s activities in May 1941, see especially Frs. H300,217-18. For his views on the Croatian Orthodox Church, see his article, “The Development of Orthodoxy in Croatia,” pp. 229-67, written in 1979. This self-serving piece praised the behavior of Croatian authorities toward the new church and was acclaimed by many Croatian political exiles. Its basic shortcoming was ObrkneZevi¢’s failure to state that in the first six months of the Ustasha regime, well before the establishment of the new church, the Croatian government had completely destroyed the Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia. ObrkneZevic also states (p. 253) that Patriarch Gavrilo, who was interned, and Metropolitan Josif, who was acting for him, were unofficially informed about what was happening in Croatia and that the patriarch agreed with the selection of Metropolitan Ger-

mogen as the head of the new church. But how could the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church have agreed to the selection of the head of a church whose establishment the Orthodox Holy Synod had officially condemned as canonically undogmatic and contrary to law? See the circular letter of Minister of Interior Andrija Artukovié of July 20, 1942, in YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 19/7—50, Box 213.

THE CHURCHES 547 thodox Church, established an autocephalous Croatian Orthodox Church in good faith, one would have to view the new church in a more positive light. But it is clear that its establishment, although intended to contribute to the pacification of the country, was principally a measure of religious and political warfare

aimed at destroying the feeling of religious, cultural, and national unity between Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia and those in Serbia. The creation of the church also amounted to an acknowledgment by the Ustashas that they could not achieve their aim of eliminating the Serbian Orthodox population in Croatia. The establishment of the new church was undoubtedly a concession to the remaining Orthodox Serbs, although none of the latter could put much trust in Pavelic’s promises. Discrimination against and persecution of the Serbian Orthodox population continued, though in less intensive forms, even after the establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church, just as it continued against many former Orthodox Serbs who embraced Catholicism. According to a May 1942 report by Nikola RuSinovic, the unofficial Croatian representative at the Vatican, the latter was pleased with the establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church and considered it “a way to the union between the churches and the disappearance of the schism in Croatia.” In this critical frontier area between Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, it would be: much easier to deal with a national Croatian Orthodox Church, which had no

outside state support and no tradition, than with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which was supported by the Yugoslav state and heir to a great tradition. One important Vatican dignitary, however, Eugéne Cardinal Tisserant, a determined opponent of the Axis powers and all their political creations, including the Ustasha state, was clearly not impressed. In December 1942 he told Erwein Lobkowicz, RuSinovic¢’s successor, that the Croatian Orthodox Church meant nothing; it had been established by Paveli¢ and could be abolished by him.” The weak foundations of the new church were revealed not only by the selection of a refugee Russian archbishop as its head, who was subsequently excluded from the synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, prohibited from celebrating services, and called before the court of his former church, but also by its lack of bishops, the dearth of any provisions for schooling new priests, and an insufficient number of clergymen to perform priestly duties. This last condition was clearly shown at a conference of Italian and German diplomatic and military representatives in Zagreb with Andrija Artukovic¢, Croatian minister of justice and religion, on April 9, 1943."' The Axis represen8See Tajni dokumenti (documents section) for Rusinovi¢’s report to Foreign Minister Lorkovié of May 9, 1942, on the Vatican’s reaction, and Lobkowicz’s report to Lorkovié of December 20, 1942, on Tisserant’s reaction. *'For a negative appraisal of Metropolitan Germogen by an Italian Carabinieri general, see Micr. No. T-821, Roll 347, Fr. 732. For a series of critical articles on the Croatian Orthodox Church, see Lozo and Doder, “The Croatian Orthodox Church.” For the text of a proto-

548 THE CHURCHES Oo tatives were interested in improving the condition of the Orthodox population

in Croatia in order to further the pacification of the country. They recommended freedom of religious observance for the Orthodox, the rebuilding of Orthodox churches, financial aid to the Orthodox clergy, and an equitable dis-

tribution of available priests, as well as the enactment of legislation that would bring about some active participation of the Orthodox population in public , life. Artukovi¢ promised financial aid to rebuild churches and maintain the clergy, but noted that at that time, one year after the establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church, there were only 80 Orthodox priests in the whole state,

who would be assigned to localities with large Orthodox populations. The small number of priests—less than one-seventh of the number active before the war—is the best evidence of the shattering effect that Ustasha policies had had — ~ onthe Serbian Orthodox Church in the Independent State of Croatia and of the insurmountable obstacles that the Croatian Orthodox Church faced in fulfill-

ing its functions.” Oo oo | -

Artukovi¢ also revealed that the Croatian government was thinking of inviting Bulgarian Orthodox priests to establish seminaries for Orthodox youths

and of naming Bulgarians as bishops to the vacant Orthodox bishoprics. This would have been an open insult to the Orthodox population in both the Us_ tasha state and Serbia proper. These proposals, however, as well as most promises of support for the Croatian Orthodox Church, with the exception of

_ continued financial support for the clergy of the new church as one of the offi- ,

cially recognized churches, were never implemented.” a When we consider the way in which the Croatian Orthodox Church was established and its record during the three years of its existence, we can truly call it a stillbirth. With the disappearance of the Independent State of Croatia at the end of the war, it too disappeared. The entire prewar organization of the Ser~ bian Orthodox Church was reestablished in all areas that had been included in — the Croatian state, and almost all converts returned to their former church. The only legacy remaining was a bitter remembrance in the hearts of those who had been so senselessly subjected to persecution, conversion, and other indignities, __

and an additional blemish on the record of extreme Croatian nationalist ,

groups, lay andclericalalike. | _ 7

col resulting from the April 9 meeting that was sent by the German Legation in Zagreb to the

H306,871-73. . oe oe | oo German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 2, 1943, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5793, Frs. —

2K asi¢, “The Serbian Orthodox Church,” p. 196. KaSi¢é’s calculations—3 priests taken as _ prisoners of war, 5 dying of natural causes, 217 killed by the Ustashas, 334 deported to Serbia, and 18 fleeing to Serbia on their own—do not leave any Orthodox priests remaining in

Croatia, which certainly was not the case. © Oe , , _ For the order of the minister of justice and religion of July 20, 1942, authorizing the ©

payment of a subsistence allowance to the priests of the Croatian Orthodox Church and their

widows and orphans, see Zbornik zakona i naredaba NDH, 1942, pp. 966-67. 7 ,

THE CHURCHES 549 The Church’s Antagonism Toward the Communists

The Catholic Church in Croatia opposed not only Orthodoxy, but also Communism. The meager support that Croatian Catholic priests gave to the Partisans during the war, as well as several events at the end of the war, illustrate the fundamental antagonism between the Croatian Catholic Church and the Yugoslav Communists. The wartime record of support was very modest indeed. According to Petesic, about 70 Catholic priests in the Ustasha state supported the Partisans. Those who did had neither the church organization nor the Catholic press behind them; they acted as individuals and mostly in secret, but occasionally had the tacit approval of their superiors.” In some dioceses, Catholic priests who were sympathetic to or cooperated with the Partisans were threatened with a suspension of sacerdotal activities. Only a few priests actually joined the Partisans, some reportedly with the permission of Archbishop Stepinac, but others without it.** Among the most important was Monsignor Svetozar Ritig, the parish priest of St. Mark’s parish, the most prestigious in Zagreb. Because of his pro- Yugoslav views, he feared for his life and in the early days of the Ustasha state moved to the Italian zone of occupation in the Croatian Littoral. He joined the Partisans after the Italian surrender and participated as a Croatian delegate in several Partisan political

assemblies. The only case known to me of Croatian Catholic priests as a group coming out openly in support of the Partisans were the twelve priests in northern Dalmatia who issued a resolution on December 29, 1943, condemning the armies of occupation, the Ustashas, the Chetniks, and the Yugoslav government-in-exile and declaring their support for the Partisans and for the inclusion of Croatia in a federal Yugoslav state.” A certain number of Croatian Catholic priests, especially older ones, tried to remain completely neutral and attend to their sacerdotal duties as best they

could. In general, however, the great majority supported the Ustasha regime | and opposed both the Partisans and the Chetniks. As its last important act in support of the Independent State of Croatia, the Croatian Catholic hierarchy issued a pastoral letter at the conclusion of its Episcopal Conference on March | “Petesi¢, Katoli¢ko svecenstvo u NOB-u, 1941-1945, Pp. 55-57, 274-76; V. Novak, Magnum crimen, especially pp. 1093-1100. In contrast, Novak lists hundreds of Catholic priests who supported and worked with the Ustashas. According to Draganovié, there were about 2,500 Catholic priests in the three historical provinces—Croatia-Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Dalmatia—in 1937. See Opéi Sematizam, pp. 556-57. We assume that there were about the same number when the Independent State of Croatia was established. Several hundred resided in areas annexed by Italy and Hungary, but some of them moved to the Croatian state. ‘Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, p. 353. “See Ritig’s two speeches in 1944 supporting the National Liberation Struggle and castigating Catholic priests who supported the Ustashas, in Svecenstvo u narodnooslobodilackoj borbi. YA, Mil. Hist., Croatia Docs., Reg. No. 33/1, Box 12.

550 THE CHURCHES 24, 1945, not only urging continued allegiance to the state, but also strongly condemning Communism and the Yugoslav Partisans. This was actually a rump conference, because only five of twelve archbishops and bishops entitled , to attend did, while seven either could not (some were in Partisan-held territory) or chose not to. Since it was convened at the urging and with the help of the Ustasha government, which also had a hand in drafting the pastoral letter, the latter was as much a political as an ecclesiastical document. Abbot Marcone, the papal legate, was not consulted. According to a British representative in Zagreb, the abbot later said that “had he had any idea of what was impending, he would have used all his influence to prevent its publication.”® To a large extent, this pastoral letter presaged the future behavior of the Croatian Catholic hierarchy, especially Archbishop Stepinac, toward the new Yugoslav regime.

It should also be noted that it was issued after the formation of the unified , Yugoslav government in Belgrade on March 7, 1945, which was almost imme-

diately granted diplomatic recognition by the Allies. oo | When reports of the Partisans’ persecution of the Catholic Church began to come out of Yugoslavia in the concluding months of the war, the church appealed to Western governments to protect Yugoslav Catholics. Among the church dignitaries appealing for protection was the archbishop of Belgrade, Monsignor Josip Ujécié. In an interview with a representative of the British Embassy in Belgrade in mid-April 1945, Ujci¢ complained about the measures that the new Yugoslav government was taking against the Catholic Church. But he spoke essentially about conditions in Serbia, where most Catholics at that time

_were Slovene refugees. Subsequently, however, the pope delivered a long memorandum about the anti-Catholic measures of the new government to Richard C. Patterson, Jr., the new American ambassador to Yugoslavia, when he called at the Vatican on his way to Belgrade.” And Bishop William Godfrey, apostolic delegate to the United Kingdom, on orders from the Holy See, reported about the difficulties of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia to the British Foreign Office on March 14, 1945—such things as the killing of priests and laity, the reduction of religious instruction in elementary schools and its abolition in secondary schools, the confiscation of church property, and the like—and

asked for British intervention on behalf ofthe Catholicsthere.* Most widely known in this regard was a report highly critical of the Partisans’ treatment of the Catholic Church, “Church and State in Liberated Croatia,” by Captain Evelyn Waugh, which he submitted to British authorities in **For the pastoral letter, see Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 415-19. - For the role of the Ustasha government in drafting it, see Sudjenje... Stepincu, pp. 348-55. 8°See Ambassador Stevenson’s report from Belgrade to the Foreign Office of June 7, 1945,

in F.O. 371/48911, R 10313/1059/92. Oo Oo

For both the statement of Archbishop Ujéié and excerpts from the pope’s memorandum , to Patterson, see Ambassador Stevenson’s message to the Foreign Office of April 20, 1945, in

F.O. 371/48910, R 7721/1059/92. - a ne | *1See F.O. 371/48910, R §366/1059/92, and F.O. 371/48910, R §388/1059/92.

THE CHURCHES 551 March 1945 after completing a tour of duty as a liaison officer with the Yugoslav Partisans. The report, which took on added importance because of the literary standing of the author, described the current condition of the church in Croatia proper, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Dalmatia. It caused considerable discussion in official British circles because Waugh asked to show it to various Roman Catholic members of the British Parliament and to other friends, which he was allowed to do, and also to publish it, which he was not allowed to do.

Waugh charged that the Partisans were persecuting the Catholic Church in Croatia, killing Catholic priests, and introducing measures against the wishes of Croatian Catholics. His views were decidedly one-sided and his interpretation quite biased. In addition, he only briefly referred to wartime Ustasha activities against the Serbian Orthodox population and did not mention the killing of Serbian Orthodox bishops and priests, the desecration and demolition of

Orthodox churches, the expulsion of Orthodox clergymen to Serbia, and forced conversions to Roman Catholicism. A convert to Catholicism himself,

Waugh also made snide remarks about other religions. Christianity was equated with the Roman Catholic Church, while Eastern Orthodoxy, because of its “long tradition of subservience to temporal rulers,” was denigrated as “oriental mysticism remote from human obligations” at best and as “the mere observance of a rite unconnected with moral and social duty” at worst. And

while Catholic Croats, whom the Partisans blamed for Ustasha atrocities against Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, “were not guiltless .. . there is good reason to believe that Mahometans from Montenegro and Bosnia were principally re-

sponsible”—an assertion that was patently false. Waugh’s report recommended that the British government, as a supporter of the Partisans, take Croatian Catholics under its protection. But this was declined by responsible British authorities as constituting interference in the internal affairs of an allied nation.” The Case of Archbishop Stepinac Any appraisal of the role of the Catholic Church in Croatia and Yugoslavia during the Second World War must consider the person and activities of Archbishop (later Cardinal) Alojzije Stepinac of Zagreb.” Stepinac first came into prominence when he was nominated as archbishop coadjutor to Archbishop For Waugh’s report, see F.O. 371/48910, R 5927/1059/92. Among the comments by British officials on it, the most important are those of Ambassador Stevenson from Belgrade, in F.O. 371/48910, R 855 5/1059/92. *’The chief primary source materials on Archbishop Stepinac are his sermons, his published circulars to the clergy of his archdiocese, a few pastoral letters issued by the Bishops’ Conference over which he presided, his letters to government officials, excerpts from some of his reports to the Vatican, a few speeches he made before April 1941, his statements before the court during his trial in the fall of 1946, and his diaries, which are still held by the police but have been made available to a few selected scholars. There is also a voluminous secondary literature about Stepinac.

552 THE CHURCHES , Antun Bauer of Zagreb in 1934, with the right to succeed him. He was 36 years old and had been ordained a priest barely three and a half years earlier. According to some accounts, Stepinac was the fifth and possibly even the eighth

candidate for the position. All other candidates were turned down by one or | another authority that had a say in the selection, which shows how important and politically sensitive the post was.” It is generally agreed that Stepinac was the more acceptable to King Alexander because, while an Austro-Hungarian prisoner of war in Italy in 1918, he had joined a Yugoslav volunteer division in

the Serbian army on the Salonika front, arriving there after hostilities had ceased. But whatever his Yugoslav inclinations at the time, he later became a

strong Croatian nationalist. He was not active as a writer or organizer of Catholic Action groups or in the Croatian Catholic movement, as were many other clergymen. As a young priest attached to the archbishopric in the minor post of ceremonialist to the archbishop, he apparently had no special friends or enemies. But he was conscientious and devoted to his work. When all other |

candidates proved wanting, he was proposed and found to be acceptable to both the Vatican and King Alexander. After receiving additional information, the king reportedly wanted to withdraw his approval, but Archbishop Bauer

countered: “The royal word is irrevocable.” _ ,

The Vatican’s approval of Stepinac was apparently due in part to his total devotion to the church and to his ascetic life during his years of study in Rome. The Vatican may also have felt that a young prelate without any special ties to local clerical or political groups could be more easily directed than a man with strong local or political allegiances. But Stepinac’s prosperous fellow clergymen in Zagreb were reportedly less approving of his ascetic life and his efforts to reduce the revenues of the higher clergy so that more financial means could be directed to charity and the construction of small churches on the outskirts of the city. Even at the seat of the archbishopric, they whisperingly called him “the

Bolshevik.””° oe

As archbishop coadjutor from 1934 to 1937 and then as archbishop until the partition and occupation of the country in April 1941, Stepinac expresseda . number of revealing opinions about fundamental religious and political matters in his speeches, sermons, and diary (seized by the police after his arrest). Of special interest are his views on Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Commu-

nism, and Freemasonry. , BC Stepinac criticized Protestantism in an opening allocution to the third ses-

sion of Croatian Social Week in October 1938. The Catholic Church, according to the archbishop, was the greatest civilizing force in human history and the leader in developing a superb civilization worthy of praise by all

those who loved truth. But, he continued, - _

*V. Novak, Magnum crimen, pp. 413-16. , ,

**MeStrovi¢, “Stepinac, the Spiritual Hero,” p. 203. ,

THE CHURCHES 553 while the Church was engaged in its beneficial work, the “gates of hell” of which Jesus spoke did not stay closed. Already during the fourteenth century prophets began to appear, whom we also do not lack today, saying that humanity would be better off if the Church limited itself to work within the four walls and if it were

deprived of any influence on public life. When later the Reformation (or better | Deformation) under the leadership of Luther came and demolished the principles of legal authority given by the Lord, the road was wide open to anarchy in all areas of human life. Humanity, which had believed in these false prophets, can truly sigh today with the Jews of old: “We had expected light and we got darkness.” In-

stead of blessing we have damnation, instead of paradise we have the hell in which human society suffers today.”

The archbishop was also extremely critical of Eastern Orthodoxy. To him, as to many other Croats, Orthodoxy and the Serbian nation represented a great danger to the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Croatian nation. A day after the officers’ coup in Belgrade on March 27, 1941, he wrote in his diary: “All in all, Croats and Serbs are two worlds, the north and south poles, which will never become close except by a miracle of God. The schism is the greatest curse of Europe, almost greater than Protestantism. In it there is no morality, no principle, no truth, no justice, no honesty.”” Stepinac saw Communism as the greatest modern enemy of the Croatian nation, the Catholic Church in Croatia, and Catholic civilization. In a sermon on August 15, 1940, shortly after the Yugoslav government established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, anticipating that this might be advantageous in the approaching war, he exhorted: The truth is that there can be no cooperation with the Communists until they give up their teaching and their crimes and thus cease to be what they are. .. . The Lord will never forget his Church, especially after some of its representatives become victims in the defense of justice and truth against the Communist criminals. And therefore we are not afraid of them at all. And therefore we will not cease to work or cease to tell our people the truth, because we do not want them to spit on their honorable, heroic, Christian, and Catholic past of 1300 years and become a nation of killers and robbers, debauchees, and thieves.”

Finally, the archbishop was bitterly opposed to Freemasonry. In his diary entry for May 30, 1934, shortly after his appointment as archbishop coadjutor, he wrote: In Yugoslavia today, Freemasonry rules. Unfortunately, in the heart of the Croatian nation also, in Zagreb, this hellish society has entrenched itself, a lair of immorality, corruption, and all kinds of dishonesty, the sworn enemy of the Catholic Church and therefore also of the Croatian nation. Without the knowledge and **Stepinac, “The Church and the Social Order,” pp. 29-34, especially p. 30. Quoted by Jakov Blazevi¢, his prosecutor in 1946 and the president of the Presidium of the Socialist Republic of Croatia in 1980, in his book, Maé, ane mir, p. 161. 1 was able to confirm this quote, as well as the one on Freemasonry cited in footnote 99, by consulting long excerpts from the archbishop’s diaries made by a reputable scholar. **Stepinac, “By Their Fruits Ye Shall Know Them.”

554 THE CHURCHES approval of the Freemasons, nobody can be appointed to any influential position.

It is no joke to join battle with it, but it must be done in the interests of the church, the Croatian people, and even the state of Yugoslavia if it wants to continue to exist, because the violence that rules today is supported by Freemasonry.”

The struggle between the Catholic Church and Freemasonry went back for centuries. In Croatia, as in Yugoslavia in general during the interwar period, most Freemasons supported the unity of the Yugoslav state. They opposed both the authoritarianism and antiliberal ideology of the Catholic Church and

the totalitarianism of the Communists."” | OO Stepinac’s language may be particularly strong, but his deprecating views

about the traditional enemies of the Catholic Church were commonly shared by conservative Catholic Church prelates before the Second Vatican Council. In the allocution in October 1938, Stepinac also reviewed liberal capitalism and Marxist Communism and found them both materialistically oriented and totally wanting in terms of the human spirit. He then pleaded for a socioeco- — nomic organization of society according to principles laid out in papal encyclicals.’” At that conference, organized by Catholic Action and dealing with social

order and social movements, he never mentioned, let alone criticized or condemned, either Fascism or Nazism, although Pope Pius XI had issued special encyclicals condemning both (Fascism in 1931 and Nazism in 1937). As a devoted representative of the Vatican, the archbishop supported its policies, but in 1938, the Catholic Church supported the same side as the Italian Fascists and the German Nazis in the civil war in Spain, and it was not opportune to criticize them publicly. Moreover, with the Communist menace in the background, the Vatican was counting on Nazi Germany to be the foremost de-

fender against Communism. | a , _ When the Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed and the Ustasha regime installed by the Axis powers, Stepinac became a determined supporter of

As quoted by Blazevi¢, Ma¢, ane mir, p. 158. , According to documents of Yugoslav provenance that I found in German archives, most Masonic lodges in interwar Yugoslavia belonged to the Grand Lodge Yugoslavia, which had 25 sister lodges throughout the country and about 850 members. There were also several other groups of Masonic lodges in the country, but of much less importance. In Zagreb, four-

lodges, with about 200 members in the mid-1930’s, belonged to the Grand Lodge Yugoslavia—Maksimilijan Vrhovac, Count Ivan Draskovic, Pravednost (Justice), and Perun (a Slavic pagan god). The Grand Lodge Yugoslavia included a sizable proportion of the intellectual elite of Croatia and Serbia—leading artists, university professors, high government officials, politicians, lawyers, physicians, bankers, and businessmen. Three good friends of the archbishop were Freemasons—the famous Croatian and Yugoslav sculptor Ivan MeStrovi¢, the painter Jozo Kljakovi¢, and the chief organist of the Zagreb cathedral and professor at the

Academy of Music, Franjo Dugan. —

Freemasonry in Yugoslavia during the interwar period has been a popular research topic in Yugoslavia in recent years, but it is sufficient to consult Muzi¢, Masonstvo u Hrvata, espe-

cially pp. 267-91, 315-39, 343-47. : oo | ‘'Stepinac, “The Church and the Social Order,” pp. 32-33.

THE CHURCHES 555 the new state. He immediately paid courtesy visits to Kvaternik and Pavelic¢. His circular letter of April 28, 1941, urged the clergy of his archdiocese to fulfill their duty toward the Croatian state and to pray that the head of state “may have the spirit of wisdom in order to fulfill this noble and responsible office for the glory of God and for the salvation of the people in justice and truth.”'” Soon after the Ustashas had been installed in power, however, they opened an all-out campaign against Serbs, the Serbian Orthodox Church, Jews, Gypsies, and anti-Ustasha Croats. Stepinac received letters from prominent clergymen, some opposition politicians, and ordinary people who were shocked at the Ustasha persecution of Serbs and Jews and implored him to intervene with the authorities. Especially important was a letter of July 19, 1941, from Dominik Mandié, a prominent Croatian Franciscan friar and well-known historian, then stationed at the Vatican. Mandi¢ recalled the basic Biblical Golden Rule and pointed out that the Ustashas’ policies blackened the fair name of Croatia and could lead to revenge: “This might exact a terrible vengeance on the Croatian people and the Catholic Church in our lands, if the war does not end in the way the Croatian Ustasha movement wishes and expects.”'”° In terms of the number of people involved, the variety of measures taken, and the political and military consequences that resulted, the Ustashas’ most far-reaching and deplorable persecution was of the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church. In the face of such persecution, neither Stepinac nor any other member of the Croatian Catholic hierarchy, as far as I have been able to ascertain from documentary evidence, made a single public protest. Nor was there any protest or condemnation by the Vatican. In fact, it seems that the Catholic Church fully supported the Ustasha regime and its policies. A considerable number of Catholic priests and a large number of well-known Catholic intellectuals openly sided with the regime and assumed responsible positions in it. The Catholic press was also full of praise for Paveli¢ and the Ustashas. After the war, the church’s position was confirmed by no less an authority than Abbot Marcone, papal legate in Zagreb. He was interviewed in Zagreb on June 2, 1945, by Major Owen Reed, a British officer, who reported: Dr. Marconi [sic] considers that the Catholic Church in Croatia tended to identify itself too closely with the Ustase movement during the war because: a. Many Croat priests were genuine and impassioned believers in Croat claims to independence. With the retirement of Dr. Macek from the political scene and the insistence of the Partisans on federation and nationalisation on Communist lines, '2The quotation is my translation from the Serbo-Croatian original published in the Catholic weekly Nedjelja (Zagreb), May 4, 1941, as reproduced in Dokumenti o protunarodnom radu, p. 296. See also Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 25860.

‘037 have in my files copies of ten of these letters written between June 1 and August 19, 1941, which I obtained from the archbishop’s files through a Yugoslav scholar. Mandi¢’s letter also showed that the Vatican was well informed about what was happening in the Independent State of Croatia.

556 THE CHURCHES the Ustase movement became more and more the only resort of those who believed in true independence for the Croat State. In pursuit of this ideal the clergy

were often tempted to turn a blind eye on atrocities. So b. Many priests were drawn into association with leading Ustase personalities by their fervent zeal as Catholics. For example, the three worst criminals of the entire

regime, Pavelic himself, Rukavina and Luburic, were devout and practising Catholics. (Incidentally the French vice-consul in Zagreb considers that both the Archbishop and Dr. Marconi belonged to this category of priests.)'"

As we shall see, a complex set of reasons explained the Catholic hierarchy’s

lack of protest and public condemnation of the genocidal policies of the Ustasha regime toward the Serbs. The chief representative of the Croatian Peasant Party in the Yugoslav government-in-exile, Juraj Krnjevic, first vice premier, took the Croatian Catholic hierarchy to task over this issue. In a broadcast over London radio on November 16, 1942, he appealed to it to publicly raise its

voice against Ustasha policies toward the Serbs: BS I am not appealing to Dr. Sari¢é [archbishop of Sarajevo], who is behaving like — those who have lost their souls and conscience, but to you other heads of the Catholic Church in Croatia to search your conscience to see whether you have fulfilled your duty one hundred percent. It is not sufficient to establish some complex commissions and to distance oneself discreetly from Ustasha crimes, particularly conversions to Catholicism. What is necessary is your manly word of condemnation in agreement with the feelings of the Croatian people and the teachings of the Catholic Church. And such words, unfortunately, we did not yet hear from our

religious leaders.'”° oe oe a

Similar appeals had apparently been made earlier by representatives of the

Croatian Peasant Party abroad through secret channels. According to Ilija Jukié, an important party member and assistant minister of foreign affairs in the Yugoslav government-in-exile, Stepinac had answered in mid-summer 1942 that if he were to publicly condemn the transgressions of the Ustasha government against the Orthodox, the Vatican would immediately order him into a monastery. In that case, he would not be able to continue supporting and protecting about 7,000 orphaned, mostly Orthodox children. In this dilemma, the

archbishop chose to save the lives of the latter.'*° , | As the war progressed, however, the archbishop became more and more critical of Nazi and Fascist, and thus by implication also of Ustasha, views and _ policies, especially after the landing of Anglo-American troops in North Africa and the German debacle at Stalingrad, when it became clear that the Axis powers and the Croatian state would lose the war. He began by attacking the Nazis in his sermons and letters to Paveli¢, at first rather cautiously. In the course of October 1943, German actions affected his family directly. His brother Miko, See the report of the British ambassador in Belgrade, R. C. S. Stevenson, of June 7,

1945, to Foreign Secretary Eden, in F.O. 371/48911, R 10313/1059/92. ‘Yugoslavia, Kingdom of, Slugbene novine (London), no. 10, November 24, 1942.

See Juki¢, “In Memoriam: Cardinal Stepinac,” pp. 311-14. 7

THE CHURCHES 557 a member of the Partisan Liberation Committee in his native village of Krasic¢, was caught by the Germans and executed without a trial. Shortly thereafter, on

October 31, in a sermon in front of the cathedral concluding a procession of penance, the archbishop made his most direct and strongest attack on the Nazis and by implication also on the Ustashas: The Catholic Church cannot admit that one race or one nation, because it is more numerous or better armed, may do violence to a smaller nation with fewer people. We cannot admit that innocent people may be killed... . The system of shooting hundreds of hostages for a crime, when the person guilty of the crime cannot be found, is a pagan system which only results in evil. It is absolutely certain that if order is sought with such measures, many people who up to now have obeyed the voice of the Church, although exposed to the terror, will, finally, attempt to seek safety in the forests. ... We condemn all injustice; all murder of innocent people; all burning of peaceful villages; all killings; all exploitation of the poor. We sorrow for the miseries and the sadness of all who today suffer unjustly, and reply: the Catholic Church upholds that order which is as old as the Ten Commandments of God.'°’ [Pattee’s emphasis]

The archbishop was immediately reproached by Julije Makanec, Ustasha minister of education, who criticized him as “the high ecclesiastical dignitary who has recently, in his sermons, passed beyond the limits of his vocation and begun to meddle in affairs in which he is not competent.”'* On the other hand, Allied propaganda immediately picked up the sermon and broadcast parts of it to German-controlled Europe. This further aggravated the archbishop’s relations with the Ustashas and the Germans. Already by the middle of August 1943, shortly before Italy surrendered, Stepinac seems to have become convinced that Germany and the Independent State of Croatia would lose the war and that the Yugoslav state would be reconstituted. In this connection, he was worried that if the Serbian Chetniks were victorious, they would undertake mass revenge against the Croatian people. This fear was apparently so great that he was willing to temporarily accept, despite his total opposition to Communism, a Communist regime in Croatia rather than a Chetnik one. His new attitude was conveyed to Reverend Draganovic in August 1943 before the latter left for Rome to join the unofficial Croatian representative at the Vatican and apparently also to serve as the archbishop’s point man there. Stepinac told Draganovi¢, “If people ask you what the archbishop of Zagreb thinks about conditions in the country, tell them that '"’Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 285-86. The information that PeteSi¢, Katolicko svecenstvo u NOB-u, 1941-1945, p. 194, gives, that Misko had been caught and executed by the Ustashas in January 1943, does not correspond to fact, though it is based on the writings of an important Croatian Partisan, Marko Belini¢é. Mi8ko’s wife, Mica, was chairperson of the local committee of the Anti-Fascist Council of Women of Yugoslavia, the main Partisan organization for women.

'8Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, p. 291, quoting from an article by Makanec in Nova Hrvatska (Zagreb), November 7, 1943.

558 THE CHURCHES | , if faced with the choice of a temporary Communist government in Croatian lands and a Chetnik government, he would choose the Communist one. The Communists would kill the clergy and the intelligentsia, while the Chetniks in

, some regions would not leave even a Croatian child in his crib.” . Despite the archbishop’s growing misgivings about the Ustasha regime, the Croatian Catholic hierarchy gave the Independent State of Croatia and the Us- _ tashas a last formal expression of support in a pastoral letter issued by the Episcopal Conference on March 25, 1945. But the Croatian state was nearing its end, and the leaders of the Ustasha regime, the armed forces, and many others,

including clergymen, who had collaborated with the Ustashas were preparing | to leave the country. The same thing was happening among collaborationist forces in German-occupied Slovenia. In the course of the withdrawal of Croa- ,

tian forces and the Slovene Home Guards toward Austria, one Catholic arch- , bishop, Ivan E. Sari¢ of Sarajevo, and two bishops, Jozo Gari¢ of Banja Luka and Gregorij Rozman of Ljubljana, left their posts without Vatican permission and went into exile. Many Catholic priests and seminarians from Croatia and © Slovenia also joined the withdrawing government officials and armed forces. But Archbishop Stepinac stayed at his post and refused to assume the position of head of a transitional government in Zagreb that was offered to him, appar-

ently by Paveli¢.'” | .

After the collapse of the Ustasha state in May 1945 and the flight of Ustasha officials and many Croatian Peasant Party leaders abroad, Stepinac became the chief voice of Croatian nationalist forces, religious and to a certain extent also -

political. This happened by virtue of his position and regardless of his wishes. _ ‘The archbishop behaved quite differently toward the new government than he had toward the Ustashas. The new regime was Yugoslav and Communist and pursued policies opposed to religion in general and to the earlier prerogatives of

all churches. The Communists, aware of the archbishop’s anti-Communism, watched his statements and activities carefully and made it clear that they - would use harsh measures against him if need be. He was arrested on May 17, _ 1945, but released on June 3. The next day he met with Marshal Tito, the vir- _

tual head of state, and Vladimir Bakari¢, prime minister of the Socialist Republic of Croatia." Despite this meeting, however, relations between the arch-

bishop and the government did not improve. — OO . ,

The new Communist regime introduced a series of important changes in _ church-state relations that marked a significant departure from conditions be- — ‘See Draganovic¢’s statement to Vinko Nikoli¢ in the latter’s Pred vratima domovine, 2: 322. The archbishop expressed the same view to the Reverend Ivo Vukina, a parish priest, be-

_ fore the latter went into exile in 1945. Tomasevich, The Chetniks, p. 468. oe ’Sudjenje .. . Stepincu, p. 285. The offer to Stepinac followed an old Croatian tradition

| that the archbishop of Zagreb temporarily assumed the functions of the ban—the head of

government—when the latter leftthe country. . a —

| 'Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, pp. 499-507. - -

THE CHURCHES 559 fore 1941. First and foremost was the separation of church and state, which deprived the church of a variety of religious and educational functions, such as the recording of births and deaths, obligatory baptism, obligatory church marriage in most of the country, and religious instruction in elementary and general secondary schools. State subsidies to the churches were eliminated at the same time. The churches were only permitted to have schools for educating religious personnel, and at their own expense. They were prohibited from engaging in any political and nonreligious activity except charity, and the religious press was greatly curtailed. The state also introduced obligatory civil marriage, with an optional church marriage following, though the political environment was against it. The radical agrarian reform enacted on August 23, 1945, took away agricultural land in excess of 10 hectares from churches and monasteries in general, as well as any surplus beyond 30 hectares of cultivated land and 30 hectares of forest land from churches and monasteries of great historical significance.’ All these measures were introduced while a pronounced antichurch atmosphere was being created by the new government. Many clergymen, especially Catholics, were accused of having collaborated with the foreign occupying forces and domestic collaborationist regimes, and a number of them were sentenced to death. For a devoted son of the Catholic Church like Stepinac, the policies of the new Yugoslav regime were totally unacceptable. From the beginning, he was

on a collision course with the Communist Party and the government. His criti- , cism and defiance of the new regime became direct, explicit, and public. The position that the Catholic Church claimed to have toward the state and the privileges it demanded were spelled out in detail in a series of letters that he wrote to Tito and Bakari¢ between July 21 and September 22, 1945. This position was succinctly summarized in the penultimate passage of the pastoral letter that was issued at the end of the first Episcopal Conference held after the introduction of the Communist regime on September 20, 1945: Therefore, we seek—and under no circumstances shall we desist [from seeking]— full and complete freedom for the Catholic press; full and complete freedom for Catholic schools; full and complete freedom for religious instruction in all grades of elementary and secondary schools; full and complete freedom for Catholic so-

cieties and organizations; full and complete freedom for Catholic charitable works; full and complete freedom for man’s dignity and personality and inalienable rights; full and complete respect for Christian marriage; [and] the return of all confiscated properties and institutions. Only under these conditions can the situation in our country be solved and lasting internal peace be realized.''” '2The total amount of land in the whole country taken from churches, monasteries, religious endowments, and similar institutions of all denominations was 173,367 hectares, out of a total of 1,611,867 hectares expropriated as part of the reform. '13See Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 426-69 for these letters and memoranda, and pp. 470-80 for the pastoral letter. The quote is from p. 480.

560 THE CHURCHES As the rallying point not only for militant Catholic circles but also for all na-

tionalist forces in Croatia, Stepinac became a powerful adversary of the new Yugoslav state. In response, the government first suggested that he and other Catholic bishops separate the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia from the Holy See. But this was an unimaginable course of action for Stepinac.'* Then it was suggested that he move to Rome. But this was opposed by both the archbishop and the Vatican. With other archbishops and bishops having left their posts and gone into exile without Vatican permission, and with so many Catholic priests having fled from Croatia and Slovenia, the Vatican needed prelates ready to stand up to Communist regimes and even become martyrs if necessary.’ Together with Cardinal Midszenty in Poland, Stepinac was among the most determined and outspoken Catholic dignitaries in eastern Europe to

strongly oppose the newly installed Communist regimes. a , The new regime closely monitored the archbishop’s activities and contacts. Among the latter, and ultimately quite damaging to him, was Erih Lisak, the , last chief of police in the Ustasha state. After fleeing the country with Paveli¢ in May 1945, Lisak secretly returned to Croatia on September 15, 1945, under an assumed name. His purpose was to organize the remnants of Ustasha forces hiding in the forests, known popularly as the Crusaders (Krizari), against the Communist regime. On September 19, he established contact with the archbishop’s office and the archbishop himself, thinking that they could provide information about conditions in the country. However, he was soon arrested. Ante Moskov, a former Ustasha general who had secretly returned with the same aim as Lisak, also contacted the archbishop, sending him two notes that he apparently never read. Earlier, the police had discovered the files of the Ustasha Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a set of records of Paveli¢’s speeches, and

some gold in the cellars of the archbishopric.

In addition to Lisak, the Reverend Ivan Salié, the archbishop’s secretary, was arrested, as was Pavao Gulin, a Slovene, who through his relatives in Croa-

tia had helped Moskov establish contact with the archbishopric, and several others, mostly priests. After a long investigation, the matter culminated in a trial, which began on September 9, 1946. Within a few days, Jakov Blazevi¢, the public prosecutor, announced that interrogation of the defendants had shown that Stepinac was “the immediate participant, instigator, and helper of the Crusader actions.” The archbishop was arrested on September 18, and his

trial was combined with that of Lisak and the others. -

The public prosecutor charged Archbishop Stepinac with the following "Tito was not the first politician in recent Croatian history to suggest that the Catholic Church in Croatia distance itself from Rome and become a de facto national church. Stjepan Radi¢ made the same suggestion several times in the 1920’s. See V. Novak, Magnum crimen,

Pp. 232-33, where he quotes from Radi¢’s speeches. | ''’Archbishop Sari¢ and the two bishops were penalized by the Vatican by being denied the privilege of periodic personal ad limina visits with the pope.

THE CHURCHES 561 crimes: collaborating with the occupying powers and their agents in Croatia, | the Ustashas; helping the Ustasha regime carry out the policy of trying to con-

vert Orthodox Serbs to Roman Catholicism; allowing the Catholic press to support Paveli¢ and his policies; serving as military vicar of the Croatian armed forces; collaborating during 1944 and the first part of 1945 with Macek, Generals Mihailovic and Rupnik, and Bishop Rozman against National Liberation forces; talking about the early return of the old regime after the end of the war;

protesting against the just sentences meted out to Catholic priests who had collaborated with the enemy; collecting information about conditions in the country and sending it abroad; and keeping the archives of the Ustasha Ministry of Foreign Affairs and recordings of Paveli¢’s speeches in the archbishopric, thus helping to conceal Ustasha crimes. All these acts were punishable on the basis of the Law on Criminal Acts Against the People and State.'® Stepinac declared at the outset that he was not going to defend himself, but in fact he did. He denied the charges in general and claimed that during the war he could not have been responsible to the Partisans, who were fighting in the

mountains. In answering some of the questions from the prosecutor and the judge—many others he refused to answer—he often criticized the antichurch policies of the new regime. His two counsels, Ivo Politeo, easily the most outstanding trial lawyer in Zagreb, and Natko Katici¢, denied point by point most of the charges against him and argued that the other activities imputed to him did not constitute criminal acts. In his concluding statement, the archbishop asserted, “I say before God, the people, the diplomatic corps so far as they are present here, the representatives of the foreign press, and the public, that I am completely innocent, and history will fairly judge my whole work.” But he was found guilty and sentenced on October 11, 1946, to sixteen years in prison at hard labor and an additional five years of loss of civil rights. Lisak and Gulin were sentenced to death, ten codefendants were sentenced to prison terms of varying lengths, and five codefendants were freed.'”’

The Yugoslav government apparently hoped to fulfill three objectives by ''6The charges against the archbishop were complicated and not clearly laid out. For the indictment and its explanation in Serbo-Croatian, see Sudjenje ... Stepincu, pp. 190-218. For an English translation, see Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 157-92. Sudjenje... Stepincu, which is a semiofficial publication, does not include the defense statements

either of the archbishop himself or of his two defense counsels. A Serbo-Croatian text of Stepinac’s defense statements can be found in Hrvatska revija (Buenos Aires) 6, no. 3 (1956):

207-12. An English translation of his first statement, as well as of the statements of his two counsels, can be found in Pattee, pp. 238~44 and 192-238. These texts were brought out of the country by friends of the archbishop. Among them was Joseph P. Hurley, at that time bishop of St. Augustine, Florida, and regent of the papal nunciature in Belgrade, who, according to a high church dignitary in Zagreb, served as chief of staff of the personnel assisting Archbishop Stepinac during his trial. '!7For the archbishop’s concluding statement, see Hrvatska revija (Buenos Aires) 6, no. 3 (1956): 212. See Sudjenje ... Stepincu, pp. 468-70 for the sentence, and pp. 471-94 for the court’s explanation of it.

562 , - THE CHURCHES. | oO putting Archbishop Stepinac on trial. First, it wanted to show clerical and nationalist forces in Croatia that the government would not allow the Catholic Church to serve as a base or shield for political activity against the new regime.

| Second, it wanted to show that the government would not allow the Catholic ~ Church, and the churches in general, to play the same public role that they had played historically. And third, it wanted to give some satisfaction to the Serbian population and the Serbian Orthodox Church for their losses and suffering during the war. The importance of the last motive is underscored by a statement made by Metropolitan Josif to a United States Office of Strategic Services _ operative in Belgrade on April 11, 1945, “that he could not cooperate with the

Roman Catholic Church in any way since the Serbian Church regards the Catholic Church as directly responsible for the massacre of Serbs in regions

outside Serbia.”"* Be oo

Political trials in Yugoslavia were held throughout the country and affected _ politicians of all nationalities who were at home or (by a kind of proxy) in exile and people, including clergymen, classified as “war criminals,” “enemies of the people,” “friends of foreign reaction,” and “spies for foreign powers.” Draza Mihailovié, the leader of the Chetniks and a hero to many Serbs, had been captured on March 12, 1946, and then tried, sentenced to death, and executed on July 17. If Ante Paveli¢, the head of the Ustasha state, had been captured instead of successfully escaping to Argentina, he would surely have suffered the same fate.'? Among other things, this would have given some satisfaction to the

Serbian population and the Serbian Orthodox Church and would have pro- _ | vided a balance to the trial and execution of Mihailovic. In that case, Stepinac might not have been tried at all, or might have been tried on lesser charges and given a much lighter sentence. But lacking Paveli¢, the regime had to find a

leading Croat to try and punish, and Stepinac was the logical choice. = After his trial, Stepinac was imprisoned in the Lepoglava penitentiary. On December 5, 1951, he was conditionally released due to poor health and returned to his native village of Krasi¢, where he was held under house arrest. In - appreciation of his stand, Pope Pius XII named him a cardinal in 1952, whereupon the Yugoslav government broke off diplomatic relations with the Vatican. Stepinac died at Krasi¢ on February 10, 1960, about three years before the

end of his sentence, and was buried inthe Zagrebcathedral.” 2s

ERG 266, OSS-File No. XL 9761,p.9. | On | ‘Stepinac’s own contact at the Vatican, Reverend Draganovi¢, helped smuggle Pavelié from Austria to Italy, secured secret living quarters for him apart from his family in Rome, | and prepared his escape to Argentina. According to well-informed sources, Paveli¢ did not _ trust even Draganovi¢ completely. While Draganovié waited in Genoa to put Paveli¢ on a ship , _ for Buenos Aires, the latter used an alternate route through Spain to escape to Argentina.

Draganovic reportedly never forgave Pavelié for this insult. } 7

'°As long as Stepinac was alive and serving his sentence, talks between Yugoslavia and

the Vatican on resuming diplomatic relations were not possible. But in 1964, formal discussions between the two parties were opened, and on June 25, 1966, a protocol was signed in

THE CHURCHES 563 The Stepinac trial and sentence, however useful it may have been for the Communist regime, mobilized the Catholic, as well as most of the secular, world press against the Yugoslav regime. Moreover, the timing of the trial was very inopportune. It followed shortly upon the Yugoslavs’ forcing down one,

and shooting down another, American military transport plane that had strayed over Yugoslav territory when flying from Austria to Italy. The second incident caused several casualties and produced a great deal of anti- Yugoslav feeling in the West. Because the cold war was already in full swing and Yugoslavia was considered the most devoted follower of the Soviet Union in southeast Europe, its standing in the West fell to a postwar low. Undoubtedly, the weakest aspect of the Yugoslav government’s trial of Stepinac and its later justification of it was denying the media and responsible historians free and full access to the archbishop’s pretrial interrogation and to his main statements and the statements of his two defense counsels in court. The authorities did not want the Yugoslav public to hear Stepinac explain and defend his views and actions. This automatically put the archbishop’s guilt in

question.’ The archbishop’s statements and activities during the war can be divided into three categories: those relating to individuals and groups appealing for his help, those referring to principles of religion and human rights, and those dealing with Catholic Church policies toward the historical adversaries of the church and the wartime Croatian state. With respect to the first category, Pattee has published a long list of the archbishop’s interventions with the Ustasha, German, and Italian authorities in Zagreb in favor of individuals and groups sentenced to prison or death or sent to concentration camps; of Jews scheduled to be deported by the Germans to extermination camps in eastern Europe; and of homeless or orphaned Serbian Orthodox children.'” His record deserves the highest praise, although his interventions were not always successful. With respect to the second category, the archbishop’s views on fundamental human rights and the dignity of man without regard to race or religion, which ran counter to Nazi racist ideology and were expressed in his sermons occasionally and mildly before 1943 but frequently and strongly thereafter, equally deserve the highest praise. In expressing such views under the conditions existing in the Belgrade establishing quasi-normal relations. Full diplomatic relations were reestablished in 1970 and envoys were exchanged. During his visit to Italy in March 1971, Tito also paid an official visit to Pope Paul VI on March 29. '21In order to confirm certain expressions in Stepinac’s defense statements at his trial, in 1979 I asked Vladimir Bakari¢ for permission to see the original trial documents. He agreed. I then approached Jakov BlazZevié, president of the Presidium of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and the archbishop’s prosecutor at the time of the trial, who had control over the documents. He told me that a stenographic record of the archbishop’s defense statements did not exist, but only minutes that he had to sign, and that there would be no point in my looking through the trial documents. '2Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 104-7, 319-39.

564 THE CHURCHES Ustasha state, Stepinac showed great courage. This earned him, on the one hand, the admiration of anti-Ustasha Croats among his flock and of many other people and, on the other, the enmity of the Ustashas and of Paveli¢ personally, as well as the hostility of the Italian and German occupation forces. The Germans considered him pro-Western and a friend of Jews.

But with respect to the third category, there are serious shortcomings in | Stepinac’s statements and actions toward the Ustasha regime and its genocidal measures against the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church. A number of reasons help to explain the archbishop’s lack of public condemnation and protest. The Catholic Church in Croatia was favorably disposed toward the new state, and many Catholic clergymen and leading Catholic intellectuals, as well as the Catholic press, cooperated closely with the Ustasha regime. The Croatian Catholic hierarchy and the Vatican also regarded Ustasha policies against the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church as advantageous to Roman Ca-

tholicism in the Balkans. | , Stepinac, in particular, took a dim view of Orthodoxy and thought that an unbridgeable gulf existed between Croats and Serbs. He resented the interwar conversion of some 200,000 mostly Croatian Catholics to Orthodoxy, which he felt had been forced on them by prevailing political conditions. He also resented the efforts of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Freemasons to prevent the ratification of the concordat between Yugoslavia and the Vatican in 1937. Furthermore, during the first year and a half of the existence of the new Croatian state, the Croatian Catholic hierarchy apparently expected that the Axis would win the war and that the Croatian state would continue to exist after the war, so that there was no need to fear reprisals from the Serbs.’” The Croatian hierarchy also had to take into consideration the Vatican’s desire to have a legate in Croatia in order to be fully informed about events in this crucial area. To make possible the legate’s presence and activity, the Croatian hierarchy had to refrain from publicly criticizing the Ustasha government’s policies, particularly such sensitive matters as the handling of the Serbs ‘and the Serbian Orthodox Church. As we noted earlier, Legate Marcone wrote in April 1943 that since the majority of guerrillas in Croatia were schismatics, the Croatian

Catholic Church had no particular reason to protest about how they were

treated by the government. | ,

: The policy of the Croatian Catholic hierarchy and the Vatican of not publicly condemning the Ustasha regime’s actions during the war will probably remain controversial. From the standpoint of humanity, justice, and common decency, it cannot be defended. But Stepinac was not the only one responsible for it; the Vatican was too. And the Croatian Catholic hierarchy was convinced '*°See Glaise’s report of April 26, 1942, to his superiors on the visit of senior Italian mili-

| tary leaders to Zagreb, in Micr. No. T-501, Roll 264, Frs. 1062-63. At that time Marcone and the Vatican reflected the views of the Italian military leadership on the progress of the war.

THE CHURCHES 565 that it was following the proper course of action. Archbishop Franjo Seper of Zagreb told me in an interview in 1967: “If the Catholic Church in Croatia were again faced with the same problems as during the Second World War, it would again act in the same way.” The trial of Archbishop Stepinac has also remained an issue, between the Communist regime and the Serbs on the one hand and the Vatican, the Croatian Catholic hierarchy, and Croatian nationalists on the other. The Commu-

nist regime, mindful of Serbian sensitivities and its historical image as Stepinac’s judge, has continued to insist on the archbishop’s guilt and has opposed his rehabilitation and the reappearance of what it sometimes refers to as “the Stepinac church.” The latter is not defined in any concrete way, but can be summed up as the church that denies the Communist government the right to impose limitations on its traditional activities or to take away any of its properties. The Croatian Catholic hierarchy, Croatian nationalists at home and in exile, and many other Croats, by contrast, consider Stepinac to be the defender of the Catholic Church and the Croatian national cause. They deny his guilt and consider him to be almost a saint, the greatest Croatian national, moral, and spiritual personality of recent times, and one with an international reputation. They want the stigma of “war criminal” removed from his name and his memory honored in Croatian lands. His rehabilitation would reflect favorably on the Catholic Church and its role as a defender of Croatian spiritual and national interests. It is easy to understand why Stepinac is extolled as a hero and frequently cited by many Croatian political émigrés. Unlike Paveli¢ and the Ustasha regime of the defunct Independent State of Croatia, which present a dismal political and moral record, Stepinac can be portrayed in a very positive light in the West, particularly because of his strong anti-Nazi and anti-Communist stands. As Vinko Nikoli¢, the editor of the leading Croatian émigré periodical Hrvat-

ska revija and the principal writer using the Stepinac theme, has put it, “Affirmation of Stepinac means affirmation of Croatia.” The portrait of Archbishop Stepinac presented here is based on his sermons, public statements, and diary entries; the scanty material about him available from the Vatican; the Yugoslav demographic material brought out at his trial; statements and sermons about him by various Croatian bishops and clergymen; and many hagiographic works in this and other countries. It seems to me, however, that a definitive portrait of him, especially concerning his activities and thinking during the war and until his death, cannot yet be drawn. This is so for a number of reasons. To complete the archbishop’s portrait, we would first need the correspondence between him and the Vatican. The Catholic Church was the authority to which Stepinac gave his foremost loyalty and devotion. '4In an interview in Nova Hrvatska (London), 1979, No. 7, pp. 13-14, in connection with the publication of Stepinac mu je ime, a two-volume symposium that he edited.

566 - THE CHURCHES a Therefore it is almost certain that he expressed his innermost thoughts about the major political and ecclesiastical problems facing him and the church in Croatia in his reports to the Vatican. Most of these did not fall into the hands of the Yugoslav police; if they had, many more would have been used at his trial.

foreseeable future. _ | oe | But it is unlikely that the Vatican will make this correspondence available in the

_ Second, we do not yet have a clear picture of the archbishop’s true attitude |

, toward the Independent State of Croatia and Yugoslavia. While his Croatian _ admirers assume that he was an ardent supporter of an independent Croatian state, in August 1985 I learned that during the early part of the war, he strongly

favored a Yugoslav state organized on federal lines. This information came , from Stanislav Rapotec, partly from a report he wrote in early August 1942to his superiors in Cairo and partly from a personal interview I had with him in August 1985.'” While Rapotec’s report was bitterly critical of the behavior of "5A copy of Rapotec’s report is in my files. Our interview was held on August 75 I 985. Stanislav Rapotec, a Slovene, studied in Zagreb in the 1930’s and was active in politics. At the end of the decade, he took a job with a state bank in Split, Dalmatia. He was mobilized before the invasion of the country on April 6, 1941, and served as a reserve lieutenant in the Yugoslav army. Captured by the Germans, he soon escaped and returned to Split, which had been annexed by the Italians. He became involved with supporters of the Yugoslav government abroad, who persuaded him to go to the Middle East to establish contact with the government-in-exile and the British. He left Split in June and reached Cairo in July 1941, having passed through the Inde-

pendent State of Croatia, German-occupied Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. After establishing contact with Yugoslav authorities and the British in Cairo, Rapotec was returned to Dalmatia. The first try to land him in November 1941 failed, but the second try to land him on the island of Mljet using a British submarine on January 27, 1942, succeeded, and he reached Split by way of Kortula. His task was to reestablish contact with supporters of the government-in-exile and to gather intelligence on developments in the Inde-

, pendent State of Croatia and occupied Slovenia and Serbia. He assumed the alias of Dr. Dejan Konstantinovic. Both he and his couriers were provided with necessary papers by pro-_

Yugoslav officers in the Croatian army. ee ee

Rapotec set out for Zagreb in early April 1942. Friends in Split, including representatives of General Mihailovi¢, suggested that he visit Archbishop Stepinac to ask him to intervene with Pavelié on behalf of the Serbs in the Ustasha state. Contact with Stepinac was facilitated by a well-known formerly Jewish family in Zagreb, new converts to Catholicism, who were friends of the archbishop and some of whom lived in Split. Rapotec stayed with that family ,

while in Zagreb. . , | . a _

During his stay in the capital from early April to mid-June 1942, Rapotec was received by Stepinac five times. The two men talked freely, and according to Rapotec, the archbishop was very pleased with the visits. Some of the attitudes and observations that he expressed to Rapo-

tec are given in the text and the Appendix. At Rapotec’s suggestion that he should be more - critical of the policies of the Ustasha government, Stepinac replied that he had to observe church rules in this regard and that the use of a more critical tone would benefit nobody, but might prevent him from helping those in need. Rapotec found that both Croats and Serbs in Zagreb were against the government-in-exile’s attacks on Stepinac. For additional information on Rapotec’s mission, see Pavlowitch, Unconventional Perceptions of Yugoslavia, 1940-

1945,PPp.67-105,145-50. , | , |

leading painters. |

After the war, Rapotec settled in Australia, where he has become one of the country’s

THE CHURCHES 567 the Catholic Church in much of the Independent State of Croatia, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Lika, he praised the behavior of, among others, Archbishop Stepinac. Since the Vatican gave diplomatic recognition to the Yugoslav government-in-exile and the unified government organized in March 1945, it would be enlightening to know what opinions on this topic passed between Stepinac and papal Legate Marcone and between Stepinac and the Vatican. Third, more information would be needed on the relationship between Archbishop Stepinac and Pavelic. It is generally agreed that they thoroughly hated each other. We have already noted the disparaging way that Paveli¢ treated the archbishop. It was also public knowledge that when, according to tradition, the members of the newly appointed Croatian Diet, accompanied by Paveli¢ and members of the cabinet, attended church before their first meeting and the archbishop, meeting them at the door, told them that the laws they enacted had to be in agreement with God’s laws of love and equality among men, Paveli¢ turned to his ministers and loudly retorted, “Is this brat [balavac] going to teach me politics!”'’* For his part, during the five meetings that the archbishop had with Rapotec in April and May 1942, he never referred to Paveli¢ as Poglavnik (Leader) or prime minister, but always as “he” or “that man” (“on” or “onaj tamo”). I think that Paveli¢ suspected Stepinac of pro- Yugoslav incli-

nations, an unpardonable sin from his point of view. As we have noted, the archbishop also opposed Fascist and Nazi ideologies, especially Nazi racist ideology, and many Ustasha policies. Indeed, Stepinac told Rapotec that Monsignor Jozo Garic, bishop of Banja Luka, “protested against his treasonable and antistate tone” in one of his sermons. Fourth, it would be instructive to know whether the archbishop knew that his brother Misko and sister-in-law Mica were active supporters of the Partisans and how he felt about it. Archbishop Seper told me that Mica was a strong leftist and that Misko acted under her influence. Misko’s death undoubtedly greatly affected Stepinac, for soon thereafter he made his most determined attack on Nazi ideology and German policies.

Finally, it would be necessary to ascertain whether Stepinac wrote any reminiscences during his five years in prison and eight years under house arrest.

It is hard to believe that a man who had gone through what he did would not reflect in writing on his experiences and their significance for the Catholic Church. It is possible that he did write something, but that its content and tone were such that church authorities did not want it made public. Even if we had all these sources of information at our disposal, some inconsistencies would probably appear, because conditions changed during the war and surely also the thinking of the archbishop. Moreover, under these changing conditions it would be natural for him to write or say different things to differ26Ciliga, Sam kroz Europu u ratu, p. 372.

568 THE CHURCHES ent people representing different institutions and powers, depending on what appeared opportune at any particular time. Nevertheless, additional information would enable us to draw the cardinal’s portrait with greater fidelity to the truth and assign him his true and proper place in history with greater justice.

THE KILLING OF PRIESTS

THROUGHOUT YUGOSLAVIA — | Many priests from both the Serbian Orthodox and Catholic Churches were deeply engaged in the political, ideological, and military struggles in Yugoslavia during the Second World War. The killing of priests of the two denominations was thus only part of the general collision of competing religions, nationalities, and political ideologies that exploded into a great bloodletting during the war between 1941 and 1945. The killing of priests was worst in areas where

the population was nationally and denominationally mixed, that is, where latent or actual religious intolerance was aggravated by national animosities. But strong ideological antagonisms were superimposed, so to speak, on old religious and national antagonisms, and these were so powerful as to cause the killing of priests even in otherwise nationally and denominationally homoge-

neous areas, such as Serbia and Slovenia. , Feelings about the killing of priests have continued to run high ever since

the war. It is therefore not surprising that works by Serbian Orthodox or Catholic writers on the war and revolution, the role of the clergy, and the fate of the churches at the time are often acrimonious and completely one-sided. Statistics on the number of priests killed, the incarceration and maltreatment of bishops and priests in concentration camps, the destruction of churches, and other atrocities against one church or another are cited by each side only for its own denomination, while nothing is said about similar or identical happenings to the priests, functionaries, churches, and temples of other faiths. Many priests of both Christian churches who lost their lives were undoubtedly innocent victims, suffering death as martyrs simply because they were doing their sacerdotal duty. But many others were engaged in political, adminis-

trative, military, and sometimes also espionage activities incompatible with their calling. In the Independent State of Croatia, according to documentary evidence, some Catholic priests became members of the secret Ustasha organization even before April 1941, while others became heads of local Ustasha units after the proclamation of the new state. Some were county prefects; some, delegates responsible for the organization of the Ustasha Party and government apparatus in various areas; some denounced Partisans and Chetniks and their friends to police or military organs, causing their death or deportation to concentration camps where they died. Some openly collaborated with the Italians and the Germans against their own nationals. A few were defrocked for their

THE CHURCHES 569 unpriestly activities and then became Ustasha officers, serving in concentration camps. Above all, many Catholic priests engaged in propaganda work for the

Ustasha state. In occupied Serbia, several Serbian Orthodox priests commanded Chetnik units, one commanded first a Chetnik and then a Partisan unit, and some fought in Chetnik or Partisan ranks. Some Orthodox priests, followers of Dimitrije Ljoti¢c, collaborated openly with the German forces. In

the Italian- and later German-occupied Ljubljana Province, most Catholic priests, with Bishop Rozman of Ljubljana at their head, collaborated with the Italians and the Germans against the Partisans. Throughout Yugoslavia, a small number of Roman Catholic and a larger number of Serbian Orthodox priests worked closely with the Partisans. Consequently, some priests lost their lives in military action, and some of those on the anti-Partisan side in the civil war were later tried and sentenced to death by military or people’s courts for what the victors referred to as “war crimes.” Most of the latter did not die because they were priests or because they belonged to a specific religion or nationality, but because, as participants in a civil war, they had committed acts which were declared punishable and they were on the losing side. The killing of priests occurred in three phases. In the first wave, Serbian Orthodox bishops and priests in the Independent State of Croatia were killed by Ustasha militia and “wild” or irregular Ustasha units in the early months after the establishment of the new state in April 1941. In the second phase, both Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic priests, as well as Jewish and Muslim religious functionaries, were killed throughout Yugoslavia by all contending par-

ties. In the final wave, both Roman Catholic and Serbian Orthodox priests | were killed during the concluding stages of the war and in retributions immediately after the war, almost exclusively by the Partisans. When the first wave of the killing of priests began in the Independent State of Croatia, Serbian Orthodox Church leaders in Belgrade submitted a memorandum to General Ludwig von Schréder, military commander in Serbia, in July 1941, appealing to him to ask German authorities in Berlin to intervene with the Ustasha government in Zagreb on behalf of Serbs living in the Ustasha state. The church submitted a similar memorandum to Schréder’s successor, General Heinrich Danckelmann, the following month. This second memorandum was accompanied by lists of clergymen and of thousands of people (based on reports by transferees and refugees) who reportedly had been killed in the first four months of Ustasha rule. I have never seen any evidence in German documents that these appeals led the German authorities to take any specific steps toward the Croatian government. However, both the German envoy and

the German plenipotentiary general in Zagreb had earlier intervened on several , occasions with the Ustasha government on behalf of the Serbs. Copies of the memoranda and the lists of victims were smuggled out of Serbia, brought to London, turned over to the British government and the Church of England, and

570 THE CHURCHES _ later published in Serbian immigrant newspapers in the United States. The Serbian members of the government-in-exile used them as propaganda against the Croatian members, which exacerbated relations between the Serbs and the Croats in the government and led to the preparation of a Croatian commentary

on them.” | -

Official and semiofficial Yugoslav sources put the number of Serbian Orthodox bishops and priests who lost their lives in massacres, concentration camps, prisons, and as members of Partisan political and armed forces at about

| 370. But this figure does not include Orthodox priests who died fighting against the Partisans or from Partisan retributions at the end of the war. According to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the total number of Orthodox cler-

, gymen killed during the war was 515, though there is no indication of when and by whom they were killed. The most complete list of Serbian Orthodox

clergymen killed during and immediately after the war, with the time and , source of death provided for most, was published by the Reverend Uros Zonjic,

a Serbian Orthodox priest, in the United States in 1974. According to him, 8 Orthodox bishops and 490 priests were killed or died due to maltreatment

during the war. These figures were used in Table 2 below.’ — | , The first list of Croatian Catholic priests who lost their lives during the Second World War was published, as far as I am aware, in March 1945, and included 149 names. The first formal Catholic statement on the number of Catholic priests killed “not only because of the war, but also because of the present

civil and military rule,” was contained in the “Pastoral Letter” of Yugoslav Catholic bishops of September 21, 1945, which reported that 243 priests had been killed, 89 were missing, and 169 were in prisons and concentration camps. According to later Croatian exile sources, 2 Croatian Catholic bishops and 383 priests lost their lives due to war, retribution, and illness and maltreatment during and immediately after the war. This list gave the names of the clergymen, the bishoprics or religious orders to which they belonged, the posi- __ tions they occupied, and in most cases the circumstances of their death. These

figures were used in Table 2. The Catholic priests who collaborated most closely with the Ustasha regime were the Franciscan friars from several Bosnian

and Herzegovinian Franciscan provinces, and they were also the most deter, mined adversaries of both the Chetniks and the Partisans. Consequently, since

'2”7Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp. 265-67. OO '8For the figure of 370 Orthodox clergymen killed, see Vidi¢, The Position of the Church in Yugoslavia, p. 32, and Smiljani¢, Spomenica pravoslavnib svestenika, p. 13. The latter is a publication of the government-sponsored Association of Orthodox Priests. For the figure of 515, see Srpska pravoslavna crkva, Sveti-sinod, Srpska pravoslavna crkva, 1920-1970, Pp. 231. For the figure of 498, see Zonji¢, “The Killing of Serbian Clergy,” pp. 56-79. The first list of Serbian Orthodox clergymen who lost their lives in the whole of Yugoslavia during the __ war was published in the United States in 1958. See “The Ustashas’ Bloody Harvest,” pp. 77—

82. See also Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia, pp. 285-89. oe

THE CHURCHES 571 events in Yugoslavia turned against the Ustashas, they were also the most severely punished.'” The authors of this list gave the name of only one Catholic priest killed by the Ustashas. On the other hand, Petesi¢ (pp. 275-76) gave the names of seven Croatian Catholic priests killed by the Ustashas for cooperating with the Partisans. But two of these, according to the authors of the above list, were killed by the Partisans. Another Croatian Catholic priest, Monsignor Pavao Lonéar, was sentenced to death for opposing Pavelic’s policies, but at Archbishop Stepinac’s intercession his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and he was freed after the war. Between April 1942 and February 1943, seven Slovene Catholic refugee priests serving in the archdiocese of Zagreb were taken to the Jasenovac concentration camp by the Ustashas, apparently for sympathizing or cooperating with the Partisans. All efforts of Archbishop Stepinac to learn their fate were in

vain. In a letter to Paveli¢, he assumed that they had been executed, which turned out to be true. Although other sources cite five, six, or even nine Slovene priests murdered at Jasenovac, the number of seven has been confirmed by two other good sources.'”°

It has been the practice of Serbian (Orthodox) and Croatian (Catholic) priests in exile never to give any data on the priests of the other denomination killed during the war. By using their own data, we have combined these sorry statistics in Table 2 for comparison. The first part gives the number of Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Roman Catholic bishops and priests killed by year '°For the figure of 149 Croatian Catholic clergymen killed, see Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), March 17, 1945. For the figures in the “Pastoral Letter” of September 21, 1945, see Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, p. 472. For the figures from Croatian exile sources, see “The List of Croatian Catholic Priests Killed,” pp. 36-52. The list was prepared from data collected by the Reverend Draganovié, the Reverend Bazilije Pandzi¢, and others. Both the Reverend Zonji¢ and the Croatian Catholic priests noted that their lists might not be complete, but the margin of error in both is probably similar. The list of Catholic priests killed during and immediately after the war, which we use in Table 2, includes the names of 66 Franciscan friars of the Herzegovinian province and 47 friars of the Bosnian province. '°For Stepinac’s letter, see Pattee, The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, pp. 319-22. Svetozar Ritig, the most important Croatian Roman Catholic priest to side with the Partisans, mentioned that five Catholic priests were killed in the Jasenovac concentration camp in early October 1942. See Sveéenstvo u narodnooslobodilaékoj borbi, p. 9. According to a former inmate of Jasenovac, nine Slovene Catholic priests were brought to the camp in the summer of 1943 and shot by order of Vjekoslav Luburi¢, chief of concentration camps. Dokumenti o protunarodnom radu, pp. 169-70. Undoubtedly the most authoritative source in this regard is the Reverend Vilim Cecelja, who was deputy military vicar of the Croatian armed forces and an Ustasha who maintained close contact with Archbishop Stepinac. In an interview ina Croatian exile magazine, he stated that, as far as he remembered, seven Slovene priests were taken to the Jasenovac camp and all were executed. He also said that Archbishop Stepinac intervened on their behalf but without success. Cecelja, “Stepinac—Patriot and Saint.” Petesié, Katolicéko svecenstvo u NOB-u, 1941-1945, pp. 275-76, confirmed that number and gave the names of the priests.

572 - THE CHURCHES TABLE 2 .

Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Roman Catholic ,

Bishops and Priests Killed, 1941-1945 | I. Bishops and Priests Killed, by Year

, Serbian Orthodox | Roman Catholic

1941 3 206 0 6 1942 | 1 64 0 22 | 1944 1943 1 49 0 41 0 36 0 60 1945 3 83 1 204 Date unknown | 0— 47 353 0 20 Total 8 485 1 After the war 025383 1 30 | TOTAL 8 490

Year Bishops Priests Bishops Priests

II. Bishops and Priests Killed, by Force , | 7 Serbian Orthodox Roman Catholic Force Bishops Priests Bishops Priests

Albanians , 1 21 Allied bombing | 0 6: 00 0 0

Bulgarians 0 7 0 0 Chetniks , 0 14 0 24 Germans 1 70 0 3 Hungarians 0 16 0 Italians 0 12 0 ")0

Ljotic forces 0 22 353 00 Partisans 1 152 Ustashas 5 183 0. 1 Explosion in Smederevo 0 3 0 0

Others 420383 2 TOTAL 8 0 490

SOURCES: For Serbian Orthodox clergymen, Uros Zonji¢, “The Killing of Serbian Clergy During the Second World War” (in Serbo-Croatian), Glasnik SIKD ‘Njegos’, December 1974, pp. 56-79; for Croatian Roman Catholic clergymen, “The List of Croatian Catholic Priests Killed During the Period 1941-1954” (in Serbo-

Croatian), in Dominik Mandi¢, ed., Hrvatski kalendar za 1955 (Chicago, 1954), pp. 36-52. “For several bishops who died in 1945 and one who died in 1946, as well as for some priests who died after the war (for Croatian priests, until 1951), death was a consequence of maltreatment during the war or of

maltreatment in concentration camps and prisons after the war. .

between 1941 and 1945, while the second part lists the forces at whose hands they perished. Two things are especially noteworthy in this table. First, a very large number of the Serbian Orthodox priests perished in 1941; that is, most were early victims of the Ustashas in the Independent State of Croatia. Second, the largest number of Roman Catholic priests perished at the end of the war or shortly thereafter at the hands of the Partisans. Whereas Ustasha actions in 1941 were directed against Serbian priests as exponents of Orthodoxy and Ser- © bian nationalism, the Partisans paid little attention to national and religious affiliation, but looked primarily to ideological, political, and military loyalties.

THE CHURCHES 573 Immediately after the war, for example, they killed 61 Montenegrin Orthodox priests in Slovenia, as well as 27 Roman Catholic priests, primarily Franciscan friars from Bosnia and Herzegovina, captured when the Croatian armed forces surrendered.” A sizable number of Slovene Catholic priests also lost their lives during and immediately after the war. According to information supplied by Bishop Rozman to Slovene priests in the United States in November 1945, 34 Slovene Catholic priests and 6 seminarians were killed by the “liberators,” namely the Partisans. While not mentioning the priests killed by the Partisans, Petesi¢é named 8 Slovene Catholic priests killed by the Germans or who died in German concentration camps, 8 killed by the Ustashas (7 of them at Jasenovac), 1 killed by the Chetniks, and 1 by the Hungarians. Finally, according to Monsignor Josip Ujci¢, archbishop of Belgrade, Soviet or Yugoslav troops killed 5 Volksdeutsche Catholic priests in the Banat in late 1944.'” Some bishops and priests of other Christian denominations were also killed

in Yugoslavia. The head of the Croatian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Germogen, was sentenced to death and executed immediately after the war, as was Bishop Spiridon Mifka and a good number of priests of that church. Dr.

Philip Popp, Evangelical bishop of Zagreb, was also tried and sentenced to death by the Yugoslav authorities after the war. And many functionaries of other religious communities in Yugoslavia also lost their lives during the war. Most rabbis and cantors of the Jewish religious community were killed. Edmond Paris gives the names and places of service of 47 rabbis and cantors killed in the Independent State of Croatia.’” '31Zonji¢, “The Killing of Serbian Clergy,” pp. 65-71; “The List of Croatian Catholic Priests Killed,” pp. 47-51. Montenegrin Metropolitan Joanikije Lipovac, who led the Montenegrin priests out of Montenegro, reportedly died somewhere in Serbia, but the exact date and place of his death are not known. Srpska pravoslavna crkva, Sveti sinod, Srpska pravoslavna crkva, 1920-1970, p. 534. Among the Montenegrin priests liquidated in Slovenia was the Reverend Luka Vukmanovié, brother of the political commissar of the rew Yugoslav army, who did nothing to save his brother. Vukmanovi¢é Tempo, Revolucija koja teée, 1: 1114.

'32CEn the Slovene clergymen killed, see O’Brien of Thomond, Archbishop Stepinac, p. 27,

and Petesi¢, Katolic¢ko svecenstvo u NOB-u, 1941-1945, pp. 275-76. On the Volksdeutsche Catholic priests killed, see F.O. 371/48910, R 7721/1059/92. '33For the sentence of death meted out to Metropolitan Germogen, Bishop Mifka, and several priests of the Croatian Orthodox Church, as well as to Evangelical Bishop Popp, see Politika (Belgrade), July 2, 1945. See also Kasche’s report of September 12, 1942, in which he stated that Bishop Popp fully shared the ideology of National Socialism, in Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5781, Fr. H296,768. For Paris’s figures, see his Genocide in Satellite Croatia, pp. 289-

90. I wanted to obtain more information on this issue and turned first to the Federation of Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia in Belgrade and then to the Yad Vashem Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority in Jerusalem. But in letters of July 10, 1979, and January 29, 1980, respectively, they informed me that they had no information on the number of Jewish religious functionaries from Yugoslavia who lost their lives during the Second World War.

574 THE CHURCHES . Studies in Yugoslavia give no information on the number of Muslim religious functionaries who lost their lives during the war. However, according to a pamphlet published in 1978 in Canada by Muslim émigrés from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandzak of Croatian orientation, the Partisans and the Chetniks killed 67 imams and hafizes. Another work by Croatian émigrés in Canada published in 1981 gives the names of both Catholic priests and Muslim imams and hafizes killed during the war. It gives the same total of Muslims, 67, and the same names, and charges the Chetniks with killing 3 5 and the Communists 32, including the Zagreb mufti, Ismet Mufti¢, a close collaborator of the Us-

tashas, who was sentenced to death after the war.’ a

I asked officials at the Supreme Authority of Islamic Faith in Sarajevo for their estimate of the total number of Muslims and Muslim religious functionaries who lost their lives during the war. According to their letter of February 3, 1983, they did not specifically investigate the number of religious functionaries

killed, but estimated that about 50 out of a total of 1,762 in 1939-40 were killed by the Chetniks, the Ustashas, the Fascists, and the Nazis, and none by the Partisans. They noted that their religious personnel did not particularly stand out during the war and that proportionately fewer of them were killed than the estimated 13 percent of the Muslim population as a whole that perished. They also gave the names of about 30 Muslim religious functionaries who were killed, 23 of them by the Chetniks. With one exception, none of them coincided with those listed by the émigrés in Canada.'* Considering the differences in the two sets of sources, the number of functionaries of the Islamic religious community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandzak killed during the

war remains open. | Oo

In this discussion we have identified the Partisans, the Ustashas, and the Chetniks, the three chief domestic contending forces in wartime Yugoslavia, as the main perpetrators—in that order—in the killing of clergymen, which was begun by the Ustashas. We may also ask what the religious affiliation was of the members of these three groups. The Ustashas were overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, with a large number of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the early stages of the Ustasha regime. The Chetniks were. almost ex_clusively Serbian Orthodox, with a small number of Catholics in Dalmatia and Slovenia. And the Partisans were overwhelmingly Serbian Orthodox in the beginning, and from early 1943, included large numbers of Roman Catholics and

Clergy, pp. 15-16, 23-24. | ,

'4Croatian Islamic Centre, Massacre of Croatians, pp. 39-41; Massacre of Croatian

‘5 do not know whether all hafizes—Muslims who know the Koran by heart and pre-

serve it in memory—are considered religious functionaries if they do not have another position in the Islamic religious community. The letter from the Supreme Authority of the Islamic Faith in Sarajevo of February 3, 1983, listed some people who had been in purely administra-

tive and judicial positions among those killed during the Second World War.

THE CHURCHES 575 , Muslims. Thus it is clear that all denominations and all South Slavic nationalities and minorities were represented among both the victims and the perpetrators in the killing of priests.

CONCLUSION The two principal Christian churches in Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church, went through a great crisis during the Second World War. Clergymen of both churches were killed in large numbers.

About half of the Serbian Orthodox clergyman in the Independent State of Croatia were expelled to Serbia, and most Catholic clergymen from the German-occupied part of Slovenia were expelled to Croatia. The schooling of religious personnel in both churches was drastically reduced. In the Independent State of Croatia, the Serbian Orthodox Church suffered especially severely.

Many Orthodox churches were desecrated or destroyed; monasteries were plundered; and about a quarter of a million Serbs, or roughly 14 percent of their total number in the state, were forced or induced by fear to convert from Orthodoxy to Catholicism. The Croatian government established a new national Croatian Orthodox Church. The latent antagonisms between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches and between ultranationalist Serbs and Croats were greatly intensified by wartime developments. In the Croatian state, opposition to Serbianism and Communism fused into opposition to “Serbocommunism.” Among Serbs, the Croatian Ustashas and Communists were seen as one enemy of the Serbs and Orthodoxy. Thus, not even the danger of Communism could push the enmity between the two churches into the background and bring about collaboration between them. Other old religious antagonisms, such as those between the Serbs and the Muslims, also exploded anew during the war years, with genocidal measures practiced on both sides. The Communist-led Partisans were committed to reestablishing a Yugoslav state in which all constituent nations and national minorities would enjoy full freedom. They preached and to a large extent practiced a policy of brotherhood among the South Slavic nations and tolerance for all religious denominations as the only way of successfully resisting the armies of occupation and their domestic allies. This policy was a principal reason for their ultimate victory. At the end of the war, three Catholic bishops and several hundred Catholic clergymen from the defunct Ustasha state and Slovenia, and several Orthodox

bishops and a considerable number of Orthodox priests, went into exile. But Archbishop Stepinac remained in Zagreb, and the Serbian Orthodox patriarch, who had been taken to Dachau and released shortly before the end of the war, returned home in November 1946. After the Communists took power, the churches and religious communities in Yugoslavia were confronted with government policies that were strongly

576 THE CHURCHES inimical to religion and the church establishments. The government’s objective was to force the churches and religious communities into a narrow sphere of strictly religious activity, thereby limiting their influence and impact. Antichurch

policies resulted in a numerically reduced clergy, hampering the churches’ ability to minister to their flocks. The government deprived the churches of all educational functions except the training of their own professional staffs, prohibited political activity, allowed church marriage only after civil marriage,

drastically muzzled the church-controlled press, and greatly reduced the churches’ access to the mass media. In an effort to weaken the church hierarchies, it sponsored priests’ associations that granted members social security and pension privileges, a development that was strongly resisted, especially by the Catholic Church. The government also essentially eliminated subsidies to _

the churches and reduced their income by taking over their landed estates above a limited maximum and their urban rental housing. Because the churches had collaborated with the occupying powers and collaborationist regimes during the war, the policies of the new regime were easier to implement than they otherwise might have been. This antichurch environment did not bring the Roman Catholic and Serbian Orthodox Churches closer together. While they observed common civilities and spoke about forgiving and forgetting, it seemed that little was forgiven and nothing forgotten. The collisions among the various nationalities and con-

, fessions during the war greatly aggravated existing differences. The Communist victory and the reorganization of the country on a federal basis temporarily

, mitigated these differences, but in certain respects also increased centrifugal forces. Just as during the interwar period, the multinational and multiconfessional nature of the Yugoslav state remained the fundamental weakness of the country and became the cause of its disintegration in the 1990’s.

APPENDIX: WAS THE ARCHBISHOP’S MAY 1943

REPORT TO THE POPE GENUINE? | In 1967, I began my effort to verify the authenticity of Archbishop Stepinac’s report to the pope of May 18, 1943, which the public prosecutor introduced at his trial, and to obtain more information on relations between the

Croatian Catholic episcopate and the Independent State of Croatia and the Vatican. In a letter of April 17 to papal Secretary of State Amleto Cardinal Cicognani, I asked for permission to see the correspondence in the Vatican archives between the Vatican and Abbot Marcone, papal legate in Zagreb, and Archbishop Stepinac. On June 5, 1967, the Apostolic Delegation in Washing~ ton, DC, replied. Without responding directly to my request, it called my attention to the series of documents on relations between the Vatican-and various countries during the Second World War, and added, “It is suggested, therefore, that you may wish to consult a forthcoming volume in that series which will

THE CHURCHES 577 contain a number of documents which may be of help to you in your research.” My perusal of the ten volumes of the series thus far issued failed to provide the information I requested, and I continued my search. In July 1967, in the course of an interview with Archbishop Franjo Seper in Zagreb, I also raised the question of the approximate number of wartime converts from Orthodoxy to Catholicism in the Independent State of Croatia. He answered: “I do not recall the number any more.” On September 27, 1974, I visited the Secretariat of State of His Holiness in Rome in search of information on the same issues, but in vain.'** Somewhat later, in letters dated August 31, 1975, I asked His Holiness German, patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Monsignor Franjo Kuharic, archbishop of Zagreb, and Monsignor Ciril Kos, bishop of Djakovo, for their estimate of the number of converts from Orthodoxy to Catholicism in the wartime Croatian state. Ina letter of October 25, 1975, the Reverend Dusan Kasi, director of the St. Sava Seminary in Belgrade, answering on behalf of the patriarch, wrote: It is difficult to establish how many Orthodox Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia were converted to Roman Catholicism. This was done under coercion, often carried out on a mass basis, in a time of general fear for one’s very life and in a time when both religion and God were exposed to ridicule. Since all forced con-

, versions were annulled by the [postwar] civilian authorities as acts of political violence, of the converts from that time, only a few married partners, who until the conversion were members of the Orthodox religion, have remained in the Catholic religion. The other “converts,” if they survived the war, continued afterwards as Orthodox Serbs, feeling that what had happened to them was an act of humiliation and offense. Any counting of the “converts” would not only be useless and unsuccessful, because the registers were kept by Roman Catholic parish offices and Ustasha authorities and have been by now as a rule destroyed, but it would also aggravate the old wounds.

From the Reverend Nikola Soldo, secretary of the Episcopal Conference in Zagreb, I received the following letter of November 8, 1975: In response to your letter of August 31, 1975, after consulting our bishops in this regard, I am, at the instruction of Archbishop Kuhari¢, replying as follows: In regard to the “conversion of Orthodox to Catholicism” in our country in the course of the Second World War, we have no documented data which could serve for your scientific study, nor did we try after the war to put in order these statistical data due to the conditions in which we found ourselves.

These letters, unfortunately, did not answer my question. About a year later, however, I found British documents relating to wartime Yugoslavia in the

Public Record Office in London that showed conclusively that Archbishop Stepinac’s report to the Vatican in May 1943, which he reportedly disavowed '36W/7hen I explained to the monsignor who received me what I had requested from the pa-

pal secretary of state in 1967 but had not obtained, he told me to submit another application. When I asked him to tell me frankly what the chances were of it being granted, he candidly answered that they were nil. So I did not do so.

578 THE CHURCHES at his trial and which his counsel characterized as a forgery, was in fact genuine. What I found was a February 17, 1944, report by Sir Godolphin Francis d’Arcy , Osborne, British envoy at the Vatican, that included a special appendix by Mr. Montgomery of the British Legation. Osborne reported on the visit of the Reverend Krunoslav St. Draganovi¢, special attaché at the office of the unofficial representative of the Independent State of Croatia at the Vatican, to him and Montgomery in the second half of 1943 or early 1944. To both, Draganovi¢ presented his own fifteen-point memorandum, the full text of which Osborne

reproduced. In it, Draganovié-claimed that most Croats supported an independent Croatian state, that “several hundred thousand graves that lie between the Croats and the Serbs would be an eternal ground for a lasting vendetta,” and that “if Croatia cannot continue to be entirely independent, then it should certainly not form part of a Balkan union, whether on a Communist or a nationalist basis, but [should form part] of a western, central European Danube federation.” He asserted that all the points in the memorandum were “the true expression of the firm conviction of all positive elements in present-day Croatia and quite particularly of ecclesiastical circles, with the archbishop of Zagreb at

their head.” | - ee

In addition, Draganovi¢é showed Montgomery a copy of a report from Archbishop Stepinac to the pope. In the appendix to Osborne’s report, Montgomery provided almost two single-spaced pages of quotations and -paraphrases from it, which coincide precisely with the text of the report presented at the archbishop’s trial. Consequently, we can affirm that the latter document was authentic and that the archbishop did give the estimate of 240,000 converts from Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism in the Independent State of Croa-

tia up to May 1943." ; oo

In his second and concluding statement at his trial, Archbishop Stepinac criticized wartime conversions. He said that he could not be held responsible for what had happened in other dioceses because, according to church canons, every bishop was responsible for conversions in his own diocese. He continued,

, ‘Also in my archdiocese, because of extraordinary conditions, irregularities occurred against my wishes. In fact, these were not conversions, but comedies for which the Church cannot bear responsibility. I repeat: the Church has never used

_ force to carry out conversions. Be _

I know very well that had I not approved and made possible conversions on the repeated insistence of the converts themselves, I would be accused today of not _ having had the heart and not wanting to save the Serbs from being massacred.'™

Rapotec’s report on his meetings with Archbishop Stepinac also mentioned conversions as well as Draganovic’s claim that the archbishop strongly favored a Danubian federation if Croatia could not continue as an independent state. In

FLO, 371/44325, R 5331/850/92. | a } '8 Hrvatska revija (Buenos Aires) 6, no. 3 (1956): 212.

THE CHURCHES 579 regard to conversions, Stepinac told Rapotec that after the war and accompanying dangers had passed, converts should be free to return to their former churches or religious communities. This confirms the authenticity of the archbishop’s directive, unsigned and undated, proposing the same idea, which I initially considered with suspicion because of its form. In regard to Draganovi¢’s claim, Stepinac told Rapotec that a Danubian federation was not acceptable to Croats and Slovenes and asked him to convey this view to the government-inexile.

CHAPTER 13 ,

ee

The Destruction of the Jewish -

Community in Yugoslavia

INTRODUCTION | In the opening section on Yugoslavia in The Final Solution, Gerald Reitlinger wrote: “In no country of Axis-occupied Europe is the fate of Jewry more difficult to trace than in Jugoslavia. In no country are the final figures of losses and survivals more difficult to assess.”' The following pages amply illustrate this point. The lack of precise data on the number of Jews in Yugoslavia goes back to 1918, and even less reliable data exist on the number of Jews who lost their lives in or survived the Second World War. David Levi Dale estimated that there were about 75,000 Jews in the new state of Yugoslavia in 1918 (20,000 in

Serbia and Macedonia, 24,000 in Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, 11,000 in , Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 20,000 in Vojvodina), while Albert Vajs estimated that there were only about 71,000 in the country in 1941, two decades later.’ But estimates of the Jewish population in 1941 have been increased twice by Jasa Romano. Consequently the Levi Dale estimate for 1918 might be quite

correct. ,

One of the most detailed and reliable statistical surveys of the Jewish population in prewar Yugoslavia, especially its regional distribution, put the membership of Jewish religious communities in 1939-40 at 69,984.’ But this survey was neither complete nor precise. In many cities, including Belgrade and Zagreb, the authorities had only round numbers; in some instances where religious communities were in the process of formation, as in Ljubljana, no figures were available; Jews in small localities were probably not able to form religious communities; and at least in some larger localities they may not have chosen to

belong to such communities. , |

Given these considerations, Professor Vajs, a leader of the Yugoslav Jewish 'Reitlinger, The Final Solution, p. 358. ’For Levi Dale’s estimate, see Savez Jevrejskih opStina Jugoslavije, Spomenica, 19191969, pp. 7-21, For Vajs’s estimate, see his article, “The Jews in New Yugoslavia,” pp. 125-36.

Jevrejski narodni kalendar za godinu 1939-40, pp. 154-57. A table giving the membership of Jewish religious communities in Yugoslavia, their lay heads, and the highest ranking religious functionaries was kindly sent to me by the Jewish Historical Museum in Belgrade in June 1981. These data, rearranged to serve our specific needs, are presented in Table 3.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY 581 community, estimated in 1954 that there were about 71,000 Yugoslav Jews and between 3,000 and 5,000 Jewish refugees from Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in Yugoslavia in 1941. Jasa Romano, an active researcher on the recent history of Jews in Yugoslavia, estimated in 1973 that there were 78,500 Jews in the country in 1941. However, in 1980 he increased his estimate to 82,242, though he warned that this figure was only an approximation.’ He also did not explain the earlier underestimate. But it is not difficult to identify the causes that led to low estimates of the number of Jews. Some Jews felt that nationally they were Serbs or Croats or Yugoslavs rather than Jews. There was little incentive to belong to a Jewish religious community in a country in which a large majority of Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholics were also not regular churchgoers. Many intermarriages with Christians reduced the incentive of the Jewish partners to declare their Jewishness. Before Hitler came to power, some Jews identified with the German or Hungarian minority rather than with other Jews. And finally, although there was little anti-Semitism, some Jews feared discrimination and tried to identify with a South Slavic nationality

by converting to one of the Christian religions and changing their family names.

During the interwar period, Yugoslav Jews were found throughout the country except in Slovenia, where there were very few except in Prekmurje. Se-

phardic Jews, a little over one-third of the total, lived mostly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Belgrade, where their forefathers from Spain had settled while these areas were under Ottoman rule. Ashkenazic Jews and a small number of Orthodox Jews lived mostly in Croatia-Slavonia and Vojvo-

dina. Most Jews were urban dwellers and worked in commerce, crafts, and the liberal professions. They were organized in 115 religious communities. In all areas, particularly in Serbia and Croatia, Jews were fully integrated into national life. There was also considerable intermarriage between Jews and Christians. It was estimated that at the beginning of 1941 there were over 800 mixed Jewish-Christian marriages in Zagreb alone, which in 1939-40 had 11,255 Jews in three religious communities, and between 2,500 and 3,000 mixed marriages in other areas of what became the Independent State of Croatia.° With the exception of a few brief anti-Semitic measures instituted after the establishment of Yugoslavia at the end of the First World War, when some people thought of Jews as enemy aliens because they were from former enemy countries ‘For Vajs’s 1954 estimate, see his article, “The Jews in New Yugoslavia,” pp. 125-36, especially p. 126. For Romano’s 1973 estimate, see his article, “Jews in the Medical Services,” p. 92, and for his 1980 estimate, see his book, Jevreji Jugoslavije, 1941-1945, p. 201. ‘Peri¢, “Demographic Study of the Jewish Community,” pp. 267-87, especially p. 268.

‘For the number of religious communities, see Jevrejski narodni kalendar za godinu 1939-40, pp. 154-57. For the figures on intermarriage, see Micr. No. T-120, Roll 5797, Frs.

H309,830-32.

582 THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY (Austria, Hungary, and Germany), there was no anti-Semitism in Yugoslavia un-

til the 1930’s. Then, with the growth of Nazi Germany and Nazi ideology after - 1933 and the increasing economic and political influence of Germany on Yugo-. slavia after 193 5, some anti-Semitism crept into the Yugoslav scene. The first legislation against Jews was enacted in 1940, a quota system for Jewish youths in —

| high schools and at institutions of higher learning. Next, Jews were prohibited from engaging in the food trade. Finally, through confidential orders, Jews were

_prohibited from serving in the air force, and taking exams to advance in rank in | other branches of the armed forces was made more difficult for Jewish officers.’ | In the 1930’s Yugoslavia became a transit area through which Jews from Germany, Austria, and central eastern Europe fled from actual or anticipated _ Nazi terror on their way to Palestine or another foreign country. Several thousand such Jews in Yugoslavia lived freely in hotels and private houses, while others were confined by the Yugoslav authorities to specified localities. Some of these _ _ refugees had no means of subsistence, and the Federation of Jewish Religious Communities of Yugoslavia became the principal source of financial assistanceto

them. Christian churches and various charitable organizations also gave some | help. In Zagreb a committee was established, apparently as early as 1936, with Archbishop Coadjutor Stepinac as patron, to support fleeing Jewish refugees. a

| The fate of Yugoslav Jews during the Second World War, while disastrous and tragic everywhere, differed markedly according to where they lived and _

what occupation system or collaborationist regime was in power. In the final analysis, however, one force, Nazi Germany, was responsible for the destruction of most of Yugoslav Jewry. Generally speaking, the more complete Germany’s hold was over an area through direct or virtual occupation or through

its power to impose anti-Jewish measures on the basis of special agreements, | _ the earlier and more complete was the destruction of the Jews there. Bytheend __ of the war, all Yugoslav areas under direct or indirect German control except the city of Zagreb were left without Jews. Of the 115 Jewish religious commu- } | nities in Yugoslavia in 1939-40, only the one in Zagreb survived the war. As a statistical basis for our discussion of the fate of Yugoslav Jewry during

the Second World War, we present two sets of figures in Table 3. The first gives - | the population of Jewish religious communities in-193 9-40, consolidated and re- _ arranged to correspond as closely as possible to the jurisdictions established after __ | the partition and occupation of the country in April 1941. The second is the newest estimate of the number of Jews in 1941 by historical province, prepared by Romano. In addition, Map 6 shows the location of concentration camps for Jews in Yugoslavia during the war. We must keep in mind that most of the figures

given in the table and text are only the best approximations and that not all the |

camps where Jews were held or exterminated are indicated on the map.

7Vajs, “The Jews in New Yugoslavia,” pp. 28-29. a oe

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY 583 TABLE 3

Jews in Yugoslavia: Membership in Religious Communities, 1939-1940, by Political Units Established in April 1941, and Distribution by Historical Province, 1941

Membership in religious communities Distribution by historical province

Area Number ___ Province Number German-occupied Banat 3,044 Banat 4,200 German-occupied Serbia 12,820 Serbia 12,500

Bulgarian-annexed Macedonia 6,173 Macedonia 7,762 Bulgarian-annexed southeast Serbia 100 Albanian-annexed Kosovo 373 Kosovo & Metohia 550

Hungarian-annexed Batka & 15,405 Batka & Baranja 16,000 Baranja

Hungarian-annexed Medjimurje 425 Slovenia, Medjimurje, &

Hungarian-annexed Prekmurje 850 Prekmurje 1,500 Independent State of Croatia

Bosnia & Herzegovina 10,270 Bosnia & Herzegovina 14,000

Croatia-Slavonia 19,953 Croatia-Slavonia 25,000

Dubrovnik parts 87 484 Dalmatia 400 Italian-annexed Montenegro 30 Sandzak 300 TOTAL 69,984 TOTAL 82,242

SOURCES: For membership in Jewish religious communities, Jevrejski narodni kalendar za godinu 1939-40 (Belgrade, 1940), pp. 154-573 for distribution of Jews by province, Jasa Romano, Jevreji Jugoslavije, 19411945: Zrtve genocida i ucesnici Narodnooslobodilackog rata (Belgrade, 1980), p. 201. NOTE: Data are arranged in order of the discussion in the text.

After the partition and occupation of the country in April 1941, Jews were put outside the law. They had to register with special government authorities, report regularly, and wear signs identifying themselves as Jews. Those who had changed their family names had to resume the names they had at the end of the First World War. They were limited to living in specific ghettos in various cities. They were prohibited from working in the liberal professions, performing arts, and mass media. They were not allowed to frequent restaurants, hotels, and places of entertainment. Jewish religious and cultural institutions were plundered, and most synagogues were destroyed outright. Jewish real estate and valuable personal property were also plundered. Jewish businesses were subjected to a variety of controls and ultimately taken over by the Germans, the domestic Volksdeutsche, or domestic state authorities. Sometimes, however, they were taken over by other businesses or individuals closely related to the authorities. A great deal of corruption pervaded this whole process. Finally, with the exception of special groups of Jews in certain areas, Jews were killed outright in police raids, armed reprisals, and mass executions. Or they perished

in concentration camps in Yugoslavia or in Germany, Austria, and Poland. . Though Italy also passed anti-Jewish legislation, neither in Italy nor in the Yugoslav areas annexed or occupied by Italy did such legislation take on a genocidal character. In fact, the Italians protected the Jews from the Germans in parts of Yugoslavia, especially the Independent State of Croatia. The only

, -| SN, of ro f | ° ~‘é 7~s . Ne? . al. jen wn ~aQa. : Oo : vy? 4 f wy‘ o. wieaeo, : -O6oO. wT ‘“C -, — : raOOG— -“_ Oo. ae S“ O. oe \:~: a, ral a ‘\ 0 ee re “) Qo. ae a ra S \ a. \ a : . j ; 2 :acetal i) an i \— ---s-e ‘. AS pw < i. > Oo 4 ‘\ poe ly x. _ 9 \ye at (ama iv) Mo ‘- -_ON TL o Os } 4! . ee.

©3ci)S§Q 0Y > Y fos ~ Penne renee f, VW < . : ; oe ae ot re] ) mn ‘ : r “y . a = n@ = ¢ - t Co eererr yn

™ as fo FFE < ‘ f _ |. 2 (|nor. Der ra4fi.~y -ae ee = LEER

we /»~Rlo2a oy SNR. A oNee asf .~—— | os Ne \ees hie fo “=e. |

é foi:4gy ‘£3 ~~ (L4Do} Z,Eé 4) K ®& a“7 * 7;‘”a° ‘\psra. = a .: :

- yf\ ‘., ,J. .fe. -_4 .Vv f ‘\ 4 “’ If, 1 oth

a; aset Q . —r——._CUCi >F, °™ -- y- LL rr—O_ Cr Ss oeAe SL \ C/ \ aoh j—_ “=> a, igo .&4£4afreYZ -aar be ~--/ 8 rrr c -. . \ ©3=CUGgh 3s VW8n ge i) p Sra 7\) ON B ‘c.—rt~—C«i-4 ee

In this index an “f” after a number indicates a separate reference on the next page, and an “ff” indicates separate references on the next two pages. A continuous discussion over two or more pages is indicated by a span of page numbers, e.g., “57-59.” Passim is used for a cluster of references in close but not consecutive sequence. Names beginning with C, $, and Z are listed following the entries for C, S, and Z respectively.

Abromeit, Franz, 595 nexes Yugoslav territory, 61, 149f, 162f,

690, 696 705, 708

Account of Workers’ Savings No. 40651, 219, 515, 609, 637, 639, 665, 671, 684, Acimovic, Milan (also his administration), Albanian Orthodox Church, 515

177-85 passim, 205, 215, 225, 230, Aleksi¢, Josip, 459, 463 709. See also Commissioner Administra- Alexander (regent and king of Yugoslavia),

tion 10-17 passim, 25-30, 33-39 passim, 229,

Adamié, Zenon, 447f, 451 404, §§2

Adriatic (coast, region, sea), 19, 63, 103, Alizoti, Feizi, 149 297, 351,377,447, 471ff, 479, 641f, 661, Allied Advisory Council, 301, 663 72.7, 732, 749; rival claims to, 30f, 41,85, Allies, Western, 73, 100, 111, 125, 166, 173,

130, 169, 235, 243-48 passim, 253, 300; 228, 230, 232, 268, 295ff, 329, 343,457; under Italy, 61, 132f, 138, 234, 237, 246, 500, 5575 598, 604, 635, 637, 717; 731, 249, 303, 60off; under Germany, 121f, 741, 743; landing in Balkans, 7of, 114-27 307, 309, 312, 319, 321. See also Allies, passim, 144, 221, 227, 234, 244f, 262, Western, landing in Balkans; Dalmatia 294, 303, 313, 317, 319, 356, 365, 410,

(coast, region) 43 8f, 444-51 passim, 630, 674, 776; and

Adriatic Coastland Zone, 121f, 680 Tito and Partisans, 82, 115, 128-29,

Advisory Council (Montenegro), 139, 141 15 5f, 223, 314, 412, 415, 500, 632, 698,

AdzZija, Bozidar, 3.49 743, 759; and Slovene collaborationists, Africa, North, 162, 175, 243, 276, 627, 99f, 125-28 passim, 517f, 772f; and Al629f, 715; Anglo-American landings in, lied prisoners of war, 115, 125-26, 272— 114, 230, 259, 294f, 355, 374, 428, 556, 74; and Mihailovic and Chetniks, 115,

590 128, 148, 155, 226f, 314; enemy surren-

Aganovic, Mehmed, 491 der at war’s end, 117, 307, 411, 464, 752Agreement on Maintaining German Troops 62 passim, 766, 777; air attacks on Yugoin the Independent State of Croatia Who slavia, 228, 333, 465, 630, 632f, 642,

Are Not in Transit, 242, 672 652, 657, 680, 716f, 733, 742, 748-49;

Ajanovic, Junus, 490 and Croatian Peasant Party, 3 6of, 365ff,

Alagic, Secretary, 546 423, 442-56 passim

Alajbegovic, Mehmed, 489 Altgayer, Branimir, 283, 286ff, 289 Albania, 19f, 30, 131, 141, 147, 156, 222, Ambrosio, Vittorio, 59, 63f, 106, 144, 246-

235,476, 589, 597, 629, 632, 663, 682, 55 passim, 29 6f 752; under Axis powers, 44, 46, 72,138f, | Andres, Ivan, 50, 359, 456 I 51-56 passim, 249, 297, 303, 464; an- Anfuso, Filippo, 57ff, 235

822 INDEX Anglo-American forces, 114, 300, 556,772. Bakaric, Vladimir, 542, 558f, 724

See also Africa, North, landings in Bakic, Mitar, 723

Anschluss, 54, 239, 611 Bakota, Lieutenant Colonel, 43 2n, 437 Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia, see Balen, Sime, 37

MVAC Balestra di Mottola, Carlo, 240

Antimon A. G., 637 Balkan Wars, 4, 8, rof, 47, 148, 157f, 484, Armed Forces High Command (OKW), 67, 739 69f, 72, 81, 196, 209, 213, 221,227,290, Banat, the, 31, 63, 73, 170, 196-204 passim, 295, 329N, 430, 457, 586, 626, 640, 675 221, 228, 288, 513, 622, 629, 706;

Armellini, Quirino, 136 Volksdeutsche in, 75, 78, 205-8, 282,

Army High Command (OKH), 65, 69, 86, 288, 573, 620, 646-49; destruction, of

192,754 Jews in, 585, 587f, 591, 606, of Gypsies

Artukovic, Andrija, 35, 251, 336, 3395 370, in, 608f; Germans exploit resources, 613,

374, 378, 547-48, 595 617, 646-53 passim, 708f

Association of German Cooperatives, 205 Banat State Guard, 206

Augustinéic, Antun, 349 Bankverein fiir Kroatien, 621 Austria: before 1918, 1-8 passim, 388ff, Bankverein fiir Serbien, 619 391, 479; interwar, 13, 17, 20, 28, 34,36, Banovina, 27, 43, 205; Banovina Croatia, 39,239, 581f, 6rrf, 615; wartime, 54, 91, 43,49, 56f, 232, 356f, 445, 487f, 608; 97, 100, I1§, 129, 174, 204, 233, 266f, Banovina Danube, 204f 501, 583, 627-32 passim, 681, 687, 731; Banque Mirabaud et Compagnie, 616 goal of escaping forces, 148, 228, 307, Baranja, 31, 63, 201f, 208, 221, 653; an3325 334, 411, 460, 463 ff, 518, 558, 682, nexed by Hungary, 169-174, 203 ff, 206, 716, 718, 729, 739, 75 1-64 passim, 769- 219, 283, 409, 516, 591f, 606, 608, 708

77 passim Barbasetti di Prun, Curio, 145

Austria-Hungary (also Austro-Hungarian Bareza,Petar,370 Monarchy), 5-7, 11, 15, 17f, 130, 138, Baric, Stjepan, 25 282, 343, 347f, 369n, 377f, 387, 391, Barthou, Louis, 33f

475, 481, 482-85, 522f, 527 Bartolucci, Athos, 131

Auxiliary Police Troop, 186, 193f Basaricéek, Djuro, 24

AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of National Basta, Milan, 757f, 760 Liberation of Yugoslavia), 114, 231, Bastianini, Giuseppe, 132, 13 6f, 241, 265n,

362N, 364, 443, 453, 503, 509 2.96, 597, 603 Awender, Jakob, 202, 205 Bauer, Archbishop Antun, 5 52 Axis (forces, powers, side): in 1930’s: 3 8f, Bauxite Lines, 632

340, 611; and Independent State of Croa- _— Bay of Kotor, 19, 31, 41, 61, 130, 138, 597

tia, 78, 268, 272, 299, 335, 402, 425;con- _ Begic, Vilko, 425 , flicts among, 149, 162f, 234, 245; and Begic, Zdenko, 463 Yugoslav economy, 617, 696ff, 699,704, | Behrends, Hermann, 78 708, 714; other, 126, 182, 231,445,451, Belgium, 33, 36, 75,271, 612 494, 517, 556, 564, 632, 663, 745, 754; Belgrade (city): prewar, 5, 16, 25, 27f, 39,

766, 778f, 784 372, 489, 580f; wartime, 47, 50, 64, 82,

Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (A.G.I.P.), 150, 1§6, 177, 180, 199, 203f, 209, 219,

662 : 225,228, 311, 409, 545f, 550, 585ff, 589,

Azienda Minerali Metallici Italiani 625, 647f, 657, 667, 709, 712-13, 7523

(A.M.M.I.), 662 bombing of, 48, 50, 740, 74.4; transporta-

tion hub, 65, 162, 197, 274, 276, 305, Babic, Ivan, 57n, 318n, 35 5n, 387nN, 43 5-36, 414, 630f, 642, 746, 749; administrative

441n, 444, 448f, 451, 759f, 782 center, 67n, 68-79 passim, 147, 170, 179, Batka, 31, 63, 201f, 221, 288, 613, 653; an- 182,221, 223, 283, 619, 629 nexed by Hungary, 169-174, 203-8 pas- Belgrade (prewar government of Serbia or sim, 219, 283, 409, 516, 590f, 606, 608, Yugoslavia), 9, 14, 21f, 24, 26, 38, 41, 43,

708 48, 56, 160, 168, 202, 230, 350, 357, 392,

Bader, Paul, 66-73 passim, 79-80, 182, 189, 484

196ff, 211f, 215, 274-75, 277 Benzler, Felix, 68, 78-79, 82, 212, 585-86,

Badoglio, Pietro, 29 6ff 648, 649-50

INDEX 823 Benzon, Branko, 35, 336, 658 Bosnian Church, 469-71, 472, 476

Berger, Egon, 727 Bozic, Rev. Savo, 514

Berger, Gottlob, 325n, 499, 504 Brajovic, Petar, 724

Berkovic, Josip, 357 Bralo, Bozidar, 490, 496, 530n

Berlin, Congress of, 482 Braumiiller, Erwin, 77, 620

Besarovic, Savo, 373, 380f, 489n Britain, British, see Great Britain

Bethell, Nicholas, 758 Buc, Anton, 320

Bicanic, Rudolf (also his memorandum), Buc, Stjepan, 431

359, 721N, 732n Budak, Mile, 35, 38, 40, 55, 317-18, 327,

Big Three, 232, 366, 453, 748, 752; 7545773 3475 3495 371, 498, 780, 783

Black Hand, 127 Bulat, Edo, 257, 309, 322f, 451

Black Legion, 422, 494, 507 Bulgaria: before 1941, 11, 20, 30, 34, 157ff,

Blaskovic, Petar, 434 342, 475f; wartime: 61, 67, 77, 86, 131,

Blaz, Mirko, 309 173 ff, 193, 233, 266f, 269n, 281, 453, Blazekovic, Milan, 269-70 5 8off, 685f, 715; annexes Yugoslav terriBlazevic, Jakov, 560 tory, 63, 149f, 160-68, 196, 219, 271, Bleiburg, 757, 760, 763-64, 765, 767 684, 705, 708, 745; its troops in Serbia, Blue Guards, 110 63f, 73, 195-201, 211, 216, 226, 668; Boban, Rafael, 346, 379, 422, 426, 458f joins Allies, 73, 156, 166ff, 201, 287, 328,

Boehnke, Colonel, 721 427, 429, 438; border conflicts, 149f, Bogdan, Ivo, 370, 760n 152, 162-63; Bulgarizing efforts, 164-65, Bogumils, 377f , 387f, 466, 469-71, 475f 196, §15; annexed territory exploited by Bohemia-Moravia, Protectorate of, 44, Germany, 622, 629ff, 633, 637ff, 645f,

611f, 687 657, 660, 665, 697

Bohme, Franz, 69-70, 182, 197, 212, 215 Bulgarian Church Exarchate, 157 Bolshevik(s) (also Bolshevism), 16, 102,116, Bulgarian Ist Occupation Corps, 73, 196-

266, 519f, 604 200

Bombelles, Josip, 41, 45 Bulgarian Orthodox Church, 164, 515,

Bonner, Egon, 76 590

Bor, 75, 196, 198f, 591, 606, 616, 623,627, Bulgarization: of Macedonians, 164-65,

633-40 passim, 657, 717 515; of Serbs, 196

Boris (king of Bulgaria), 159, 590 Busic, Bruno, 727f, 73 5n, 736 Bor Kupferbergwerke und Hiitten A.G., Byzantine Empire (also Byzantium, Byzan-

617, 619 tinism), 157, 339, 392, 468, 471f, 474,

Bosnia and Herzegovina (also Bosnia; 478 Herzegovina): before 1918, 1, 4, 11, 17,

377, 387ff, 390, 466-85 passim, 539; Cabas, Josip, 35 4n, 678-84 passim, 694, interwar, 13, 43, 403, 486-88, 58of, 608; 710 rival claims to, 41f, 45, 48f, 133, 181, Canki, Josip, 498 376-79, 444, 527;in Independent Stateof Carinthia, 1, 83-92 passim, 121, 123, 128f,

Croatia, 63, 139, 333,335,356, 368f, 7595773 380, 387, 394-403 passim, 412,551,567, Carnelutti, Amadeo, 41-42 592, 605f, 747, 749, 765, 780; Muslims Carniola, Upper, 83-92 passim, 121 iN, 353, 422, 430, 488-94, 522, 543f, Casertano, Raffaele, 60, 23.4f, 240f, 248, 727f, 747; Chetniks in, 115, 135, 144ff, 264f, 267, 284 148, 191, 228, 244, 255-63 passim, 307f, | Catholic Action: Slovene, 97, 518; Croatian, 311, 327, 403, 408ff, 414, 422, 514, 746f, 341, $26, 552,554 776; Partisans in, 143, 173, 252, 274, Cavallero, Ugo, 106, 250, 261, 295, 297n 279, 314, 403, 409-14 passim, 422, 429f, | Cecelja, Rev. Vilim, 370, 571n 442, 460, 514, 630, 642, 746; and Italy, Census: 1910, 13, 130, 482n, 483; 1921, 249, 253, 745; Volksdeutsche in, 282, 608; 1931, 83, 131, 170, 380, 406, 48of, 286, 288, 410; and Germany, 293ff, 305, 524n, 608, 730f; 1948, 209, 289, 509n, 313, 619, 621, 626f, 630, 641-44, 660, 609f, 714, 719, 729-39 passim; other

752,769 postwar, 509, 607, 750

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Socialist Republic Central Clearing Account (German-

of, 380, 509, 610, 727f, 735 Serbian), 686f

824 - INDEX Central National Committee (Chetnik), 501 © Commissioner Administration, 63f, 68,

Central Powers, 5f, 485 177ff, 180, 205, 230, 709, 720

Cesarec, August, 348n,349 Committee for Ores and Metals, 615 -

Cesaric¢, Slaviga, 463 Committee for Refugees, 218

Chetniks, 88, 110, 128f, 436, 445ff, 45.4, Committee of Three Bishops, 539 |

741,745 - , Communism (also anti-Communism), 96,

— in Serbia, 64, 69, 175, 182-95 passim, 126, 181, 187, 191, 339f, 387, 407, 517, 199, 216-17, 224-25, 228, 413, 655, 526, 532, 534, 549-58 passim, 565,575,

657,714, 746 a 7435762

—in Slovenia, 100, 115, 116-19, 125, 127, Communist International (Comintern), 13n,

299 | 21-22, 36ff, 165, 402, 506, 721 _

—and Western Allies, 115, 128, 148, 226f, Communist Party of Albania, 151 .

314,444, 446, 451 . Communist Party of Bulgaria, 165, 168,200 |

— in other areas, 142-48, 152, 155f, 173 Communist Party of Croatia, 52, 342, 360, — in Independent State of Croatia: 144-45, 363f, 368, 449-54 passim © 245, 262, 279, 298, 301, 407-13 passim, Communist Party of Italy, 120 , 445, 719; used by Axis powers in, 135, Communist Party of Slovenia, 93-103 pas-

234, 240f, 244, 250-63 passim, 289, 294, sim, 110, 112f, 521, 775 . a

301, 307-12 passim, 322, 327, 408, 412f, | Communist Party of Yugoslavia: interwar:

415, 599, 746f; and Bosnian Muslims, 13, 15f, 20f, 36-38, 44, 158, 360, 605;

493f, 498-508 passim wartime, 52, 88, 96-97, 120, 140, I§1, | — in religious struggle, 514, 516, §29, 569, 155, 163, 165-66, 200, 336, 342, 364,

573f 402, 493, 502, 507ff, 514, 516; postwar, 728f, 739-49 passim, 783 Josip Broz _

— and population losses, 718, 721, 726, 559, 723f, 735. See also Partisans; Tito, — final days, 752, 760-67 passim, 773n, Communists, League of, 72.4, 727 ,

775£. See also Mihailovic, Draza; MVAC Communists (military insurgents), see Parti-

(Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia) sans a |

Chicherin, Georgi, 21 , Communists (postwar), see Yugoslavia after

Churchill, Randolph S., 452, 454 1945 oe

Churchill, Winston, 448, 450, 742,754 Communist Youth Organization, 37, 605 |

Church of England, 569,720 _ Compagnie frangaise des mines de Bor, 614, Ciano, Galeazzo, 36n, 41-49 passim, 57, 615-16. SeealsoBor 131, 235-42 passim, 248, 296, 297N, Concentration camps: German (outside

660f Yugoslavia), 93, 258, 513,573, 5835 589-

Cicognani, Amleto Cardinal, 576 95 passim, 602, 606, 745, 748, 775; Ital-

Ciliga, Ante, 407, 781n ian, 97, lOI—-12 passim, 134, 1370, 301, Civic Guards, 55, 56-57, 356, 358, 419f, 32.0, 410, 597, 6ooff, 663, 732; Hungar-

443,445,740 , , ian, 170, 172; Ustasha, 220, 3 49f, 3 5off,

Clearing Accounts (various), 670, 679f, 682, 368, 375, 385, 392-401 passim, 406ff,

686-91 passim, 695£ i 414, 422, 424, 460, 569, 571, 593ff, 596, |

Clericalists: Slovene, 22, 95, IOI, 125, see 603-10 passim, 659, 721-28 passim, 736, also Slovene People’s Party; Croatian, 24, 739f, 747; German (in Yugoslavia), 223, 27, 337> 339s 343f, 346, 349, 3 69ff 399, 585-91 passim, 606, 609, 655, 657,

Clodius, Carl, 160,171,621In | 748; general, 568, 570, 582f, 718f, 733; in Clodius Agreement, 242, 620f, 672f Norway, 659, 719, 745, 748. See also

Clodius-Popov agreement, 160-61, 622 Jasenovac - |

Comando Supremo, 104, 106, 143f, 152, Concordat, 512, §23 §25, 527; 564 250,255, 260f, 263, 295f, 599f, 602 Confidential Protocol: of May 16, 1941, see Combined Clearing Account No. 4065 Clodius Agreement; of January 19, 1943,

(German-Croatian), 679f, 682, 689ff, 674,676f,679,690 —

695f oO Constituent Assembly, 8-16 passim, 21,

Comintern, see Communist International 158, 378 ee

Commissariat for Prices and Wages, 700 Constitution of June 28, 1921, 10, 14ff, 20-

Commissariat for Refugees, 218ff, 396f 28 passim, 378, 486£ - ,

Commissariato civile, 671 Consulta (Slovenia), 95 _ |

INDEX 825 Corfu Declaration, 6, 10, 14-15 Croatian State Bank, 505, 672-83 passim,

Coselschi, Eugenio, 240, 284 693, 696, 701, 703, 707

Cossacks, Russian (Ist Cossack Division, Croatian State Emigration Service, 657f XVth Cossack Cavalry Corps), 305-7, Croatian State Leadership, 55, 488

326f, 681, 746, 751, 762 Croatia-Slavonia, 1, 7, 12ff, 41, 48, 63,

Council of Deputy Leaders, 334, 340 219, 253, 373, 3771, 380f, 387f, 391, Coup of March 27, 1941, 46f, 160, 168, 403, 479, 483f, 522, 543, 580f, 592,

764 560

204, 229, 489, 513, 553, 623,741 605, 725

Crljen, Danijel, 339, 346n, 757ff, 760, Crusaders: Catholic, 526; postwar rebels, Croatia, interwar: before 1918, 2-4, 337, Cvetkovic, Dragiga (also his government), 3395 343, 347!, 3778, 3 871f, 390, 466-73 39-43, 47,49, 178, 229, 488, 740 passim, 479, 481, 483f, 522; unification Cvetkovic-Macéek Agreement, 3 6n, 39, 42of Yugoslavia, 6-11 passim, 443; dissi- 44, 56, 187, 357, 487 dent Croats in, 9-15 passim, 20-30 pas- Cvijovic, Metropolitan Josif, 164, 513, 515,

sim, 38, 40-44; political émigrés from, 562 17-19, 27, 30-39, 45-46, 339, 342; inter- | Czechoslovakia, 28, 34f, 44, 239, 581, 611f,

war, 343, 378, 391, 402-4, 487-88, 615, 717 523ff, 581, 592. See also Croatian Peas-

ant Party; Maéek, Vladko; Pavelic, Ante; Cati¢, Mihailo, 655 Radié, Stjepan; Roman Catholic Church, Cajavec, Rudi, 429 before 1941

Croatia, Kingdom of, 237f D’ Ajeta, Marquis, 599 Croatia, Socialist Republic of, 380, 523, Dalmatia (coast, region): before 1941, 1, 7,

$42, 558, 610, 725ff, 73 5f 13, 20, 391, 467, 470f, 473, 479, 483,

Croatia, wartime, see Independent State of 522; rival claims to, 19, 31, 41, 44f, 48,

Croatia 57£ff, 130f; and Ustashas, 55, 63, 257,

Croatian Bank, 662 261, 333, 346, 369f, 377£, 380, 387f, 402,

Croatian Committee, 17 567, 725, 749; annexed by Italy, 61, 130-

Croatian Eagles, 526 38, 235, 237, 239, 248f, 253, 258, 260,

Croatian Legion: in 1920’s, 17; 1N 1941, 336 351,375) 592, 597-606 passim, 613, 661, Croatian Littoral, 31, 132, 235, 321, 351, 663, 669, 741, 745f, 748; and Germans,

359,363, 443,446, 529, 549, 597, 600 303, 309, 311, 319-22, 327, 410, 619, Croatian Old-Catholic Church, 524f 641, 654, 660, 717, 746, 769; other, 363, Croatian Orthodox Church, 392, 530, 544- 412, 443, 446, §14, 551, 580, 705, 746f.

48, 573,575 See also Adriatic (coast, region, sea); Al-

Croatian Party of [State] Right, 3-4, 18, lies, Western, landing in Balkans

23n, 27, 3476, 373 Damjanovic, Miodrag, 191, 225, 228, 770,

Croatian Peasant Party: before 1941, 23-30 772, 776f passim, 37-44 passim, 49-§6 passim, Danckelmann, Heinrich, 66ff, 69, 179, 181f, 337, 404, 406, 488, 526; wartime: 173, 209, 211, 569 315, 342, 366, 368, 419, 429, 445ff, 556, | Danckelmann Memorandun, 569, 720 5 58; and Ustashas, 328, 338, 343, 346, D’Annunzio, Gabrielle, 18-20, 30f 349, 356-60, 369, 3735 4375 740, 7825 Danon, Jakob, 610 and Partisans, 360-65, 367, 428, 443, Danube Basin, 17f, 30, 85, 133, 239, 245,

445, 449-55 passim; and Western Allies, 264 365ff, 442-$1 passim, 456, 7793 and Danube River, 73755 169, 174, 199, 305, Croatian army, 423, 428, 434, 439, 442- 388, 390, 473, 586, 588, 708, 711; trans44, 456. See also Maéek, Vladko; Radic, portation artery, 64f, 175, 203, 233, 618,

Stjepan 627, 629-30, 636

Croatian People’s Party, 13, 24-25, 369, Davidovic, Ljubomir, 23

526 De Angelis, Maximilian, 314

Croatian People’s Peasant Party, 9, 11-14, Debellatio, 270-71

18 Dedijer, Vladimir, 726

Croatian Republican Peasant Party, 18,21- | Demarcation line (Vienna Line), 49, 63,

23 149f, 152, 162-63, 233, 240, 242, 246f,

826 INDEX 259, 2575 263, 2755 2774f, 290, 397, 351; Duic, Stjepan, 17-18, 27533 ) 413, 415, 495, 618, 660, 663, 669 DumandzZi¢, Jozo, 378 Democratic Party, 13ff, 22f, 158, 229f, 232, | Durbegic, Milivoj, 463

514 Dynamit Nobel A. G., 625

Denationalization, see Bulgarization, Ger-

manization, Hellenization, Italianization, | Eastern Orthodoxy (also Eastern Ortho- |

Magyarization, Serbianization, Yugo-. dox), 1, 339, 392, 4735 SII, 532, 534;

slavization 542, 547, 551ff

Deskovic, Alarih, 463 Eckhardt, Tibor,34

Deutsche Bank, 619, 63 5n Eden, Anthony, 446, 449, 720

Deutsche Jugend, 91, 93 Efenko, Ivan Kovatic, 758

Deutsche Mannschaft, 204, 207f _ Ehrlich, Rev. Lambert, 98, 101, 518 Deutsche Verrechnungskasse, 675f, 686, Eichmann, Adolf, 586,596

693, 696 Einsatzstaffel der Deutschen Mannschaft,. Deutsche Wehrmacht Zentralkasse fiir 284 | |

Kroatien, 672, 675 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 777

Deva, Xhafer, 149-5 § passim Elena (queen of Italy), 138

Diet, Croatian State: before 1918, 6-10,14, — Elicker, Jakob, 425 18, 28; wartime, 339, 343, 349,358,370, England, 6, 20, 44, 329, 513, 612 372-76, 378, 381, 505, §28, 545, 567, Episcopal Conference, 372, 537ff, 540, 549,

595,782 558f, 577

Dinic, Tanasije, 179, 185 | Evangelical religion, 531, 544, §73 Directorate of Public Order and Security, Excesses, see Terror

341, 384, 399 Executions (mass) (also killings, massacres, Djakovic, Djuro, 37 , murders, shootings): of Serbs, 69, 178, Djordjevic, Dugan, 179 197, 216, 227, 397-402, 406-9, 413, Djujic, Moméilo, 127, 262, 514, 772, 776 422, 43.4f, 492f, 502, 506, 508, 535, 585,

Djukanovic, Blazo, 142, 146, 147n 590, 745 ff, 765; of Partisans, 93f, 98,

Djukic, Svetomir, 772 , , III, 321, 655, 744, 746; of others, 97-98, Djurisic, Pavle (also his Chetniks), 142, 120, 134, 142, 169, 172, 325, 608ff, 746, 144f, 147-48, I9on, 222, 262, 516, 772, 765,774; of Croats, 259, 306, 322, 407,

77 6f 422, 508, 745f, 761f, 765f; of Muslims,

Dokic, Djura, 179f 259, 422, 493f, 503, 505, 508, 574, 726,

Dolomites Declaration, 113 746; of clergy, 529, 546, 569, 571ff; of Dominican (friars, order), 469 Jews, 573, 583-94 passim, 605f, 745;

Dogen, Marko, 36, 336, 374ff, 383, 387n, general, 719, 732-33, 744-49 passim. See

782 | also Genocide; Terror

Doujak, Hermann, 123 Executive Committee (Croatian Peasant | Dozic, Patriarch Gavrilo, 513, 546 Party), 362-65

Draganov, Parvan, 160 .

Draganovic, Rev. Krunoslav, 390f, 530, Farolfi, Ivan, 328, 359, 444, 449f, 455, 768n 539-40, §49N, 557, §62n, 571n, 578f, 729 Fascism, Fascist (ideology, movement,

Dragojlov, Fedor, 425f, 436 party), 32, 38, 49, 102, 121, 131f, 136,

Dra&skié, Panta, 179f : 151, 186, 240, 270, 284, 296-97, 335-40 Dragkovi¢, Milorad, 16 a passim, 345, 352, 360, 409, §26, 554,

Draskovic, Vuk, 725-26 556, 567, 5745 7355 743

Dresdner Bank, 619, 63 5n | Favagrossa, Carlo, 663

407, 413, 460, 752 35 , ,

| Drina River, 334f, 377, 387f, 390, 394ff, Federal Office of Statistics, 723n, 733, 734Drljevic, Sekula, r40n, 148, 776 Federation of Jewish Religious Communities

Drobnjakovic, Borivoje, 608 _ in Yugoslavia, 582, 607

Dual Monarchy, 4-8, 14n, 16f, 253, 483f, Feine, Gerhard,212 |

523 | Felber, Hans Gustav, 72-73, 81n, 185, 221,

Dubaj, Vitomir, 752, 753n 224, 226, 228 |

Dubrovnik, 298, 301, 308f, 388, 402, 446, Ferenc, Tone, 90, 96, 117, §21

479, 600, 602, 632, 641 Fiat Corporation, 661

INDEX 82.7 Fick, Ernst, 324, 722 Germany (Third Reich): Filipovic, Suleyman, 429n, 503 —and Yugoslavia, 34f, 44, 46, 611-17; Filov, Bogdan, 160 breaks up, 47-56, 60-61, 63, 168-69, Finland, 69, 269n, 687 203, 708, 739; exploits wartime econ-

First World War, 5-9, 11, 31, 47, 97, 100, omy, 61, 233, 617-19, 622f, 627, 629130, 138, 151, 158, 199, 219, 230, 239, 33,644, 653, 656, 659f, 696-97, 715f5 271, 386, 392, 403, 485, 487, 516, 523, withdrawal from, 751-57 passim, 761-

581, 583, 590, 737,739 62, 763f, 768, 770, 775 Fiume, see Rijeka 47ff, 61, 63, 83, 130, 239, 351, 660, 708;

Fitzthum, Josef, 153f —and Italy: divides Yugoslavia with, 44, 46, Fiume, province of, 104, 132, 669f takes over after surrender of, 72, 77, 120-

Foertsch, Hermann, 184 24, 146-48, 152-53, 221, 294-301 pas-

Forster, Helmuth, 66 sim, 303, 308, 314f, 637, 674; rivalry

France, 6, 9 20, 30-36 passim, 44> 46, 130, with, 94, 149-50, 162-63, 233-34) 240138, 457, 470f, 499, 513, 612, 614ff 45, 263-68, 278, 284, 374, 416, 419-20,

Francetic, Jure, 346n, 422, 490, 494 495, 652, 662f

Franciscan (friars, order), 369f, 390, 401n, | —and Independent State of Croatia: estab-

404, 469, 478, 481, 539, 543f, 570f, lishes, 47-56, 60-61, 63, 169, 336, 342f,

573 351f, 360, 740f; military operations in,

Frank, Ivo, 18-19, 27, 30-31, 33, 235 262,274, 279, 294, 314, 413-15; devel-

Frank, Josip, 4, 18 ops and controls armed forces of, 265-68, Frankists (also Frankism), 4, 23n, 337, 339, 275-81, 289-94, 303-4, 312-14, 330-34

347, 35753708 passim, 419-20, 423, 427-42 passim,

Franz Ferdinand (archduke), 5, 485 450, 456-57, 461, 463ff, 779; recognizes Freemasons (also Freemasonry), 25n, 43, legality of, 268-72; officials critique Us185f, 349, 369, 370ff, 497, 512, 526, tasha regime, 278, 291, 315-17, 323-24,

553-54, 564, 586 352, 360, 381, 394ff, 401, 412-15 pasFreundt, Alfred, 49 of, 281, 620-22, 626-33 passim, 641-46 Freiberger, Miroslav, 596, 603 sim, 422, 544-45, 548; exploits economy Friedrich Krupp A.G., 619, 622, 626, 637f passim, 653-59 passim, 671-96 passim,

Frkovic, Ivica, 357, 504 713f; uses auxiliary forces in, 305-12,

Frkovic, Mate, 355 327, 681; other, 315-31 passim, 354f, Fuchs, Wilhelm, 77, 586 442; and Bosnian Muslims, 493, 495-

Fund for Economic Reconstruction, 705 501, 502ff; and Roman Catholics, 5 56-

Funk, Walther, 613 57, 563-64, 567ff

— and Hungary, 47f, 61, 63, 83, 168-74

Gagliardi, Emanuel, 18-19, 30f passim, 203-8 passim, 233, 266f, 271,

Gaj, Ljudavit, 2n, 4 283, 622, 627, 629, 643; exploits its an-

Gali¢, Vladimir, 432, 437 nexed areas, 171-72, 208, 665, 697, 708 Gambarra, Gastone, 95, 109 —and Volksdeutsche, 48, 63, 75, 77f, 83,

GaraSanin, Ilija, 2 85, 90, 95, 169, 172, 174, 201-9, 281-93 Garic, Bishop Jozo, 558, 567 passim, 393, 410, 613, 620, 622, 646-49, Gavrilo, see Dozic, Gavrilo 653, 659, 708, 731 GazZi, Franjo, 364 — and Bulgaria, 61, 63, 67, 77, 86, 149-50, Geneva Convention, 272f 152-53, 160-63, 167, 195-201, 219f,

Genocide, 719, 747; against Serbs, 3 51f, 233, 266f, 271, 328, 629ff, 653, 668; uses 381, 404, 556, 564, 575, 725, 741f, 7475 its troops in Serbia, 63f, 73, 195-201, against Jews, 351, 381, 404, 607, 741; 211, 216, 226, 668; exploits its annexed against others, 404, §75, 726, 742, 747: areas, 622, 633, 637ff, 645f, 657, 660 See also Executions (mass); Terror — and Serbia: military occupation regime in,

Georgiev, Kimon, 159 61, 63, 64-82, 175, 177-79, 221-23, 230, German, Patriarch, 577 233,276, 744ff; uses auxiliary troops in, Germanization, of Slovenes, 85, 88, 91-92, 63f, 73, 186-201, 211, 216, 226, 668; and

94 Nedi¢ regime, 68, 78ff, 81, 179-86, 198,

German Railroad Security Staff in Croatia, 209-28 passim, 648f, 656, 666, 720ff;

278, 631 other, 413, §13, 722; exploits economy

828 INDEX , of, 619-40 passim, 644-57 passim, 665- | Grdjic, Radmilo, 257 i 68, 684, 685-87, 701, 708-14 passim Great Allies, see Allies, Western , — and Slovenia: occupies, 61, 83-85, 93-94, Great Britain (also Britain, British), 9, 46f, 120-27, 271, §517f, 665, 705, 771; Ger- 68, 126f, 130, 148, 191, 299, 302,314, manizing efforts, 91-92; exploits econ- | 410, 442-51 passim, 455, 550f, 569, 578,

omy of, 617, 633, 644, 653, 659f. 588, 603, 614, 637f, 716, 720, 732, 742, — and other areas, 61, 63, 72f, 77, 83, 86, 773; formulates Allied policy toward 138, 144-56 passim, 160-63, 167-74 Yugoslavia, 128, 145, 230ff, 366, 446, — population transfers, 85-92, 95, 203, 449, 451, 741; enemy surrender at war’s

(719 OO 777

217-18, 243, 319-22, 393-96, 410, 517, end, 752-59 passim, 763, 767, 769, 774; .

—and Partisans, 71, 120, 127,144-45,167, Greater Serbia, 3, 5, 25, 38, 188, 231, 247,

221, 697-98, 711, 713,717,745, 7524, 3575 366, 378f, 454, 512, $14, $42,742, 756, 761, 763f, 769-71; in Serbia, 69, 73, 768 82, 178, 182, 199, 216, 223, 228; 636, Greater Serbian Federation, 222 640, 655, 657; in Independent State of Great Powers, 157f, 360, 778, 780 Croatia, 244f, 262, 274, 279, 281, 286ff, Greece, 20, 44, 46f, 157ff, 623; under Axis. 289, 294, 306, 314, 321, 326, 413 ff, 425, powers, 67-72 passim, 77, 153, 160, 193, 428, 506, 624, 630ff, 641f, 643-44, 658f, 219, 222, 625, 637, 652, 685, 709, 715;

681 ; 748; German withdrawal from, 73,154,

— and Chetniks, 144-45, 147-48, 194-95, 156, 167, 228, 328, 333, 438, 464, 632, 199, 216-17, 224-25, 228, 244, 262, 643, 682, 716, 752; transportation artery,

307-12, 322, 327, 408, 412f, 415, 506, 162, 175, 233,276, 412, 627, 629ff ,

655,748 , Greek Orthodox Church, 157, 478, 528, — and Romania, 201, 206f, 266f, 328, 612, 539 oe

618, 629, 645£ oo Green Cadres, 504 7 | — destroys Jews, 582-607 passim. See also Greens, 138-47 passim. Hitler, Adolf / : Gregori¢, Dragutin, 494 ,

Germogen, Metropolitan, 545f, 573 __ Grol, Milan, 232 - : |

587,775 Grum, Andro, 463 an ,

Gestapo, 56, 77, 127, 215, 322, 400, 546, Gruic, Djuro, 426,457,500

Giolitti, Giovanni, 19 Guarantee and Collaboration, Treaty of,

Giunta, Francesco, 136 , 237-38,265,290 Giuriati, Giovanni, 18 , Gubec, Matija, 348 a :

_Glaise von Horstenau, Edmund, 54n, 241, Guberina, Ivo, 370 a — 245,250, 268, 281, 327, 346, 401, 404, Gulin, Pavao, 56o0f 7 , 407, 444, 492f, 600, 630, 671n, 710, Gumplowicz, Ludwig, 348

721-22; and German-Croatian military Gusinje, 63,139,149 . arrangements, 252, 265, 275-78, 280, Gustovic, Artur, 462f oe 290ff, 304, 306, 308, 312-13, 419-28 © Gypsies, I, 170, 335, 341, 380, 383f, 402, passim, 434-40 passim, 779; reform pro- 404, $55, 592, 608-10, 727, 739, 748,

posals, 278, 291, 315-17, 323-24, 352, 763 a ,

360, 381, 413, 415, 544; replaced, 294, _ re -

328ff, 331,457 , Habsburg, Ferdinand (archduke), 389, 473

Glavas, Radoslav, 534 Habsburg Monarchy (also Habsburgs), 2— Globocnik, Odilo, 122,125,776 18 passim, 130, 282, 337, 381n, 389ff,

~ GluSac, Vaso, 470 | a «4735, 483, 522f, 527 7 Godfrey, Bishop William, 550 7 Hacin, Lovro,123,127

Goring, Hermann, 65, 76, 82, 223,615,653 Hadzic, Hakija, 490f, 495 —

Government Committee: Croatian, 675ff, HadzZiefendic, Muhamed, 496 | | -- 68of,", 691ff; German, 675ff, 678, 680, » Haeffner, Arthur, 337, 440n, 441n, 712n

691ff | Halder, Franz, 48-49 © / 7

Government-in-exile, see Yugoslavia, gov- Hansa Leichtmetalle, 618, 662

ernment-in-exile - 7 Hebrang, Andrija, 37n, 452, 454 |

Governorship of Dalmatia, 132, 13 6f, 603 Hefer, Stjepan, 357, 681 7

Grazioli, Emilio, 95, 99, 102-3, 105 Heimatbund, 9r1ff a |

INDEX 829 Hellenbach, Zdenko, 274 Husic, Sulejman, 725-26 Hellenization, of Macedonians, 157 Husseini, Haj Amin el, 493, 497, 604 Helm, Hans, 596f

Hempel, Desiderius, 500 I.G, Farbenindustrie, 613, 619, 625 Herenti¢, Ivan, 346n, 426, 458, 462, 758f, Illyrianism, 2-3

764n Independent Democratic Party, 14n, 23-29

Hermann Goring Werke, 618f, 624f, 638 passim, 46Nn, 49, 342, 367-68 Herzegovina, see Bosnia and Herzegovina Independent State of Croatia:

Heydrich, Reinhard, 8 5f —and Germany: established by, 47-56, 60Himmler, Heinrich, 78-89 passim, 123, 61, 63, 169, 336, 740; growing depend213, 223, 284-94 passim, 305, 324f, 332, ence on, 240-45, 304, 315-30; Ustasha

396, 496f, 501, 722, 771 policies protested by, 278, 291, 381, Hirschegger, Rudolf, 125 394ff, 401, 412f, 544-45, 548; economy Hitler, Adolf (also Fiihrer): and Mussolini exploited by, 281, 620-22, 626-33 pasand Italy, 44-49 passim, 61, 63f, 169, Sim, 641-46 passim, 653-59 passim, 665, 233, 239, 295; partitions Yugoslavia, 47, 671-96 passim, 713f; auxiliary troops 61, 63, 138, 153, 206, 233; and Hungary, used by, 301, 305-12, 322, 408; Jews de47f, 61, 168-69, 172, 206; and Pavelic stroyed by, 594-602 passim, 606 and Independent State of Croatia, 47-49, | —and Dalmatia, 55, 63, 257, 333, 380, 387,

54-61 passim, 168-69, 239, 245, 266f, 402, 567, 725, 749 2.70, 2745 300, 305, 317f, 323-31 passim, —and Italy, 57-60, 246-53, 299-302, 7453 3455 3495 375, 398, 401, 600, 643, 778£f, Rome treaties with, 13 1ff, 137-38, 23 4and Croatian military matters, 262, 276f, 47 passim, 2.65, 290, 300, 317-18, 419, 2.90, 292, 303f, 306, 310-19 passim, 333, 661f; Chetniks used by, 244, 251-63 pas-

433,441, 456f, 631; and Bulgaria, 61, sim, 747; economy exploited by, 660-65 160, 168, 196, 198; and Serbia, 61, 68f, passim, 669-71, 684, 689 77, 79f, 82, 196, 198, 212f, 222-27 pas- — population movements, to and from, 86sim, 586, 744; and Slovenia, 61, 85f, 94, 92 passim, 170, 178, 217-21 passim, 120f; other, 67-73 passim, 202f, 284, 286-88, 319-22, 392-97, 409-10, 517, 495ff, 499, 604, 745, 762, 778. See also 5295 537s 590, 5955 5975 749

Germany (Third Reich) — Serbian population in: expulsion of, 86-

Hofer, Franz, 121 90 passim, 178, 217-21 passim, 392-97, Holy See, see Vatican 711,741, 749; mass killing of, 3 51-52,

Holy Synod, 513, 516, 545f 397-402, 406-8, 741, 746f; legal measHome Guards, Slovene, 109, 119, 124-28 ures against, 3 80-387 passim, 399, 418; passim, 302, 558, 719, 739, 744, 7525 Serbian Orthodox Church attacked, 528-

761f, 771-77 passim 31, 534-48 passim, 555, 564, 568-75

Hondl, Aleksandar, 670f, 681, 683f passim, 741; other, 253, 338, 348, 371, Horthy, Miklos, 17, 38, 48, 168f, 173f 387-91

Horvat, Paul, 447 — and Chetniks: used by Italians, 135, 144, Hostage case, 271-72 146, 244, 251-63 passim, 301, 747; used , House of Savoy, 237f, 297n by Germans, 146, 244, 263, 301, 307-12, Hromi¢, Muhamed, 490 322; other, 257, 408ff, 422, 719, 746f Hungarian-Croatian Accord, 2, 6, 348 —and Volksdeutsche, 203, 281-93 passim, Hungarian-Croatian kingdom (also king, 335,410, 425, 690 ruler, state), 343, 389, 466-76 passim — Italian-German rivalry in, 233-34, 240Hungary: before 1918, 2-8 passim, 13, 337, 45, 263-68, 278, 284, 294-95, 416, 419, 388ff, 391, 479, 481, 522; interwar, 16ff, 495, 662f 2of, 31-39 passim, 336, 342, 346, 582, — and Serbia, 234, 276, 326, 333, 377-78, 614; wartime, 47f, 61, 173-74, 180n, 391, 408, 467, 527, 673, 685ff; negative 204, 208, 233, 266f, 269n, 288, 376, sor, impact of its policies on, 218, 220, 395f, 590-91, 597, 603f, 606, 622, 627, 629f, 412f, 440 643f, 682, 685, 687, 715, 752; annexes —and Partisans, 250, 252, 255, 262, 267, Yugoslav territory, 63, 83, 168-74, 2o05f, 274,279, 281, 286ff, 289, 298f, 306, 314, 219, 271, 283, 409, 516, 665, 684, 697f, 353, 407-15 passim, 425, 428-33, 43 6f,

705, 708, 717, 745£ 460, 630ff, 641, 643f, 719, 746f

830 INDEX — armed forces of: Ustasha militia, 253-54, Italian-Croatian Legion, 268, 308, 423

330, 340f, 353, 421-22, 431, 456-64; Italianization, of Dalmatians, 132-33 Germany develops and controls, 265-68, —_ Italy, interwar: and Yugoslavia, 1, 9, r1f,

275-81, 303-4, 312-13, 419, 423, 439, 34-35, 39-40, 44, 46, 47ff, 56, 159, 611442, 457, 461, 779; legionnaire divisions, 13, 614; and dissident Croats, 18ff, 41—

267-68, 304, 428, 430, 463, 761, 763, 42; and Ustashas, 30-35, 39-40, 44-45, 769-71; army, 328, 332f, 352f, 424-52 46, 57-60, 301, 336, 342f, 346f; and passim, 456, 462; establishment and or- Germany 44, 46, 47ff

ganization of, 380-81, 417-21, 423; at Italy, wartime: ,

war’s end, 751-68 passim; other, 265f, — and Germany: divides Yugoslavia with,

268, 289-94, 380-82, 420, $02, 504 6of, 63, 83, 233f, 2395351; 660, 708; ri— political organization, behavior, and valry with, 94, 150, 162-63, 233-34, Status, 268-74, 335-49 passim, 351-56, 240-45, 263-68, 278, 284, 374, 416,

372-78, 380-87, 391f, 745 419-20, 495,652, 662f —

— and Bosnian Muslims, 268, 335, 353, — and Independent State of Croatia, 6of, 63,

376-79, 466f, 470, 488-90, 489-508 169, 246-53, 268-72 passim, 284, 320— economic dislocations: labor, 281, 654, 21, 342, 351, 410, 493, 494-95; Rome 657-59, 663, 731; payments for Axis treaties with, 13 1ff, 137-38, 234-47 pastroops, 354, 665, 669-84; inflation, 3 54- Sim, 265, 290, 300, 317-18, 419, 66rf; 55, 699-705 passim; food production, uses Chetniks in, 135, 144ff, 244, 250-63 354, 708, 710-14; industrial capacity, passim, 301, 408f, 722, 747; and armed 626-27, 640-44, 661ff; communication forces of, 244, 265-68, 292f, 419f, 426; lines, 629-33 passim, 661, 694-95; for- and Partisans, 250, 252, 299; military | eign trade, 661, 684, 687-96; taxation, operations in, 262, 279, 289, 294, 413ff;

706-7 protects Jews in, 583, 592; 597-606 pas-

— and Jews: protected by Italians, 301, 583, sim, 748; exploits economy of, 660-64

592, 597-603 passim; legal measures passim, 669-71, 684, 689. against, 380-87 passim, 418, 592-93; — and Slovenia, 61, 83-93 passim, 122, 705; killed, 399, 573, 594-96, 606, 741, 747; annexes Ljubljana Province, 83, 94-96; other, 348-49, 410, 418, 497, 543, 593- Volksdeutsche in, 83, 95, 203, 217, 283;

94, 603-4 , and Partisans, 96—99, 111-20; and col-

— and Roman Catholic Church, 339, 343, laborationists, 99-102, 107-22 passim, 368-72, 391, 530-44, 549f, 568-75 pas- 128f, 517-21, 568f, 775; military operasim, 741; role of Archbishop Stepinac, tions in, 102-7, 109, II I-12

554-58, 563-68, 577ff —and Dalmatia, 61, 130-37 passim, 235,

— and Croatian Peasant Party, 342f, 356- 237, 239, 248, 253, 258, 260, 351, 375,

60, 366f, 373, 443 592, 597-606 passim, 661, 663, 669, 741,

— legacy: accusations against, 718-28 pas- 745£,748 | sim, 739-40, 741f; assessment of, 379, —and other areas, 61, 63, 138-47, 149-52 548, 607, 610, 767-68, 778-84. See also passim, 1§§, 162f, 585, 589

Pavelic, Ante; Ustashas (group, move- — surrender, 117, 121, 137, 146f, 152, 294-

ment, party) an 302; impact of, 71f, 77, 114-24 passim,

Inter-Allied Reparations Agency, 723, 737 155,221, 263, 303, 308-9, 314, 315-17, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Orga- 3325 359, 363, 4271, 442, 605, 674; Serves

nization (IMRO), 32, 159f, 163 as Allied base after, 191, 301-2, 314, 410,

Iron Gate, 75, 199 , 436, 444, 446ff, 752f, 772, 776f. See also Islam (also Islamic faith), 380, 467, 471, Germany (Third Reich); Independent

475ff, 478, 482, 494, 497, 511, 528, 532, State of Croatia

543f Ivanic, Stevan, 177f

Islamization, of Bosnians, 473, 475-77,.479, IvaniSevic, Dragutin, 404 482

Israel, 607, 732 , Jagodic, Monsignor, 520 |

Istria, 19, 31, 71, 113-122 passim, 126f, Jancéikovic, Tomo (also his report), 3 57, 129, 132, 235, 300, 308, 380, 529, 602, 359, 362, 365, 443N, 446-51 passim, 782

642, 663,727, 745, 752, 766, 773 Janko, Sepp, 202, 204f Italian-Croatian Clearing Account, 670,689 Jankovic, Momitilo, 177, 179f

INDEX 831 Japan, 269n, 272,754 | 412, 497, 4998f, 544f, 596, 600f, 632, Jasenovac, 359, 399ff, 407, 414, 571, 573; 660, 673, 690, 746, 783; and German606, 609f, 718-28 passim, 736, 739f, 747 Croatian military affairs, 242, 252, 276,

Jelic, Branimir, 3 5 281, 285, 290, 293, 308, 423, 434 Jevdjevic, Dobrosav (also his Chetniks), Katicic, Natko, 561 127, 146, 255,257) 7725 7753777 Kavran, BoZzidar, 383, 766n

Jevtic, Bogoljub, 34 Keiper, Wilhelm, 147

Jews, 170ff, 207, 511, 516, 569, 580-91 Keitel, Field Marshal, 299, 311, 617, 643 passim, 605-6, 723, 732, 739, 7493 in Keller, Willibald, 284 Serbia, 177f, 185f, 585-89, 606, 657, Kerin, Velicko Georgiev, 3 3 745, 748; in Independent State of Croatia: KergSovani, Otokar, 3.49 protected by Italians, 258, 301, 583,592, | Kesselring, Albert, 74, r21

597-606 passim, 748; legal measures Kewisch, Erich, 192 against, 335, 380-87 passim, 418, 592- Keyser, Theo, 640 93; terror against, 341, 351, 381, 399- Kidrié, Boris, 97, 521 404 passim, 410, 543, 555; killed, 573, Kiessel, Georg, 76 594-96, 606, 727, 741, 747, 763; other, Killings (mass), see Executions (mass) 348-49, 370, 372, 497, 563-94, 603-4, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, see

644. See also Concentration camps Yugoslavia, interwar Jezerina mine, 150, 622 638, 640 Kiszling, Rudolf, 729, 759f, 763f

Jodl, Alfred, 320n, 630 Klauzer, Ivan, 728, 730, 73 6f

Jojic, Risto, 177 Kljakovic, Jozo, 349 Jonic, Velibor, 179 Kluz, Franjo, 429 Josif, Metropolitan, 513, 546n, 562 Koéevic, Bogoljub, 723n, 730ff, 736-38, Josifovic, Stanislav, 177 739 Jovanovic, Dragoljub, 229 Koéevje, 83, 95, 203, 283

Jovanovic, Dragomir, 225 Koéevski Rog, 774

Jovanovic, Bishop Platon, 398 Kokalj, Anton, 125

Jovanovic, Slobodan, 230f Koligevski, Lazar, 166 Jovanovic-Patak, Ljuba, 655 Kon, Hugo, 596 _ Jugomontan A. G., 63 8f Kontinentale Oel, 618

Jukic, Ilija, 359, 556 Korogec, Anton, 23, 25-26

Julian March, 104, 129, 759 Kosovo, I, 15, 20, 30, 72, 148, 167, 178,

Juppe, Hans, 304, 331f 219, 221, 252, 390, 742, 752; under Axis Juréic, Milutin, 328, 450, 452 powers, 61, 63, 131, 139, 149-56, 160, Juretic, Msgr. Augustin (also his report), 162, 164, 196, 249, 515, 585, 588-89, 265n, 387N, 400, 403, 406, 441N, 443, 601, 606, 609, 637, 660, 745, 749

455n, §25n, 539n, 782 Kosovo Field, Battle of, 156

Juri¢ev, Dionizije, 543 Kostic, Josif, 179f

Juttner, Hans, 498 Kosti¢c, Lazo, 177 Kogak, Vladimir, 248, 257, 346, 349, 357;

Kalabic, Milan, 215 621n, 674, 684

Kallay, Nicholas, 206 Koégutic, August, 27, 29, 38, 359, 365f, 373,

Kamber, Rev. Dragutin, 369-70, 379n, 444, 449-55 passim

403-4, 490, 525, 782 Kovaéevic, Zvonko, 57

Kammerhofer, Konstantin, 268, 285-94 Kovaéic, Ivan Goran, 349

passim, 325, 331f Kovacic, Matija, 370

Karadjordjevic dynasty, 6, 10-11, 14, 16, Kozara Mountain, 220n, 274, 414, 507,

23, 29n, 128, 138, 186, 232, 454, 514, 659n

742 Kragujevac, 69, 71, 198, 587, 624, 626, 745

Karadzic, Vuk Stefanovic, 3 Krajacic, Ivan-Stevo, 432 Kardelj, Edvard, 97, ro6n, 112, 454, §21, Kralj, Mio, 33f

7230 Kraljevo, 69, 198, 205, 587, 625, 642, 745

Karl (emperor of Austria-Hungary), 7, 18 Krbava Field, Battle of, 389, 473, 522 Kasche, Siegfried, 60-61, 86ff, 90, 286f, Kréelic, Vladimir, 306 312-33 passim, 374, 395f, 398, 401, Krek, Miha, 1o1, 111n, 772

832 _ INDEX . Kren, Vladimir, 426 212, 230, 512f, 569, 739, 746, 752, 775ff. Krener, Franc, 773, 775 See also Serbian Volunteer Corps

Kreyter, Major General, 192 a Ljubljana, 12, 61, 90, 94-108 passim, 113, Krnjevié, Juraj, 27, 29, 38, 50, 356, 3595 117-27 passim, 235, 248, 518ff, 580,

367, 444ff, 447, 556, 740, 764 , 752, 7724; transportation hub, 94, 121, Krsmanovic, Ognjen, 179 629,632 | ,

Kubler, Ludwig, 121 - Ljubljana Province: under Axis powers, 61,

Kuhar, Alojz, ro1, 128 oe 83, 89ff, 94-114, 120-25, 518f, 521;

Kuharic, Msgr. Franjo, 577 | collaborationists in, 107-29 passim, 569, Kulenovic, Dzafer, 51, 452, 488ff, 491, 544 771-75; resistance in, 96-102, II I-20,

_ Kulenovi¢é, Muhamed, 504 , 128-29. See.also Slovenia, wartime

Kulenovic, Osman, 488f, 5.43 Ljuboten (mines, Massif), 150, 622, 660 Kulturbund, 83, 85n, 202, 205, 282 Lobkowicz, Erwein 533, 547

Kuna Account, 691,696 | Lohr, Alexander, 7of, 73, 80, 122, 241, 252, Kuntze, Walter, 70, 76 | } 275f, 289, 415, 428, 439, 600, 682n, 716,

Kutschera, Franz, 83 , 751n, 752, 755f, 762n, 768ff , Kvaternik, Eugen, 3 4-35, 39, 57ff, 270, Lombrassa, Giuseppe, 95 | 346, 347, 384, 407-8, 493, 781, 783; London, Treaty of, 9, 19, 130, 235

removal of, 374, 439-42 Lorkovic, Mladen, 34n, 35-37, 339,346, Kvaternik, Slavko (marshal), 48-59 passim, 349, 377, 388-89, 398, 406, 413, 544, 256, 265, 267,275, 340, 346N, 347, 370, 608, 768, 783; and Italians, 248, 251f, 380f, 400f, 417, 421, 425, 488, 544, 555, 257ff, 264, 267, 284; and Germans, 290, 5935 740, 781, 783; removal of, 277, 374, 292, 304, 660. See also Lorkovié-Vokié

439-42 | plot !

Kuvezdic, Zivan, 357 Lorkovic-Voki¢ plot, 325, 328f, 422-23, 429, 436-42 passim, 450-57 passim, 464,

Labor, forced and slave, 88, 115, 208, 223, 779 | - } 586, 590f, 606, 649n, 65 8f, 663, 719 Lower Alps Zone, 121

Lah, Ivo, 730-37 passim Luburic, Vjekoslav, 36, 336, 346, 370, 379,

Landfried, Friedrich Walter, 688 399ff, 422, 426, 458, 462, 556, §71N, Lapp, Sepp, 205 722, 752, 760n Latkovic, Radovan, 371 oO Lueti¢, Ante, 252

Laxa, Vladimir, 277, 425, 434 Lukic, Mihajlo, 43 5

League of Nations, 17n, 3 4~35, 611f Liiters, Rudolf, 277, 381, 415, 427 , “Leftist deviation,” r12f, 143, 414, 746 Luther, Martin, 586,598

Legionnaire divisions, 267-68, 279ff, 302, | :

304, 308, 313, 324, 423, 428, 430, 432, Macedonia, 1, 1§f, 20, 30, 32, 72, 156-60, 438, 442, 463, 495, 755, 761, 763, 769- 464, 527, 580f, 608, 629, 654, 660, 716;

71 annexed by Bulgaria, 63, 86, 150, 160-

Legion of Death, 102, 107 68, 196, 409, 515, 585, §89, 591, 606, Lendic¢, Ivo 36n, 370 , , 609, 622, 638, 657, 7053 Serbian refugees

Leskoéek, Franc, 97 from, 178, 219, 221, 749; exploited by Letica, Dugan, 177 , Germany, 622, 629, 638, 654,660 ~

Liberation Front (Slovenia), 93, 96-103 pas- | Macedonia, Socialist Republic of, 610 | a sim, 108-17 passim, 123n, 127,518,521 | Macedonia, Western, 20, 30, 249; annexed Lika, 33, 37, 348, 388, 399, 406, 459, 473, by Albania, 61, 72, 131, 149, 15 1f, 155,

479, 529, 567; 724, 747f, 752; Chetniks 409, 609, 745 |

In, I17, 135, 255-63 passim, 308, 311; Macedonian Orthodox Church, 515-16 Partisans in, 279, 363, 368, 430, 443, Maéek, Vladko, 12, 26-30 passim, 36-56 746; provenance of important Ustashas, passim, 270N, 335, 3375 352) 35 6-70 pas-

346, 378, 411, 780-81 SiM, 43.4, 443-47 passim, 453ff, 488,

Lipovac, Metropolitan Joanikije, 516, 573n 525-26, 555, 740, 780. See also Croatian

Lisak, Erih, 346 560f Peasant Party , List, Wilhelm, 67, 68-69, 70 Magdic, Milivoj,370 =

Ljoti¢, Dimitrije V. (also his forces and Maglione, Luigi Cardinal, 371,532,537

movement), 127, 178, 183-94 passim, 540 ee

INDEX 833 Magovac, Bozidar, 362-64, 453 Military Economic Staff for Serbia (also for

Magyarization, 170f Southeast Europe), 77, 619-20, 625, 627,

Makanec, Julije, 378, 557 63 5£, 640, 645

Maksimovic, Toma, 218 Military Frontier, 377, 381n, 389f, 474, 479 Malettke, Walter, 49, son, 52n Milkovic, Husnija, 502

Malinov, Ivan, 200 Mines de Bor, see Compagnie frangaise des

Mandi¢, Dominik, 555, 783 mines de Bor Mandié¢, Nikola, 323, 326, 359, 378, 431, Minucci, Enzo, 662 504, 678, 710, 712 Misic, Aleksandar, 214

Mannesmanngesellschaft, 619 Misic, Msgr. Alojzije, 406, 536-37, 540-41

Mansfeld A. G. fiir Bergbau und Hittten- Mitteleuropdischer Wirtschaftstag, 613

betrieb, 636 Mohacs, Battle of, 389, 473, 477

Mansfeld Kupfer A. G., 619 Montenegrin Volunteer Corps, 148, 190n, Marcone, Abbot Giuseppe Ramiro, 328, 222, 516 371, §32-40 passim, §50, §55§f, 564,567, | Montenegro, rf, 8-15 passim, 19, 25, 31,

576, 603 138, 377; 464, 467, 475,479, 481, 483,

Maric, August, 425 496, 527, 682, 748f; under Axis powers, Marjanovié, Cedomir, 179 48f, 61, 63, 72f, 77, 131, 138-48, 149,

Massacres (mass), see Executions (mass) 170, 219, 222f, 235, 237, 249, 260, 297,

Mayneri, C. Carrana, 301 299, 303,414, 514, 516, 606, 641, 705, Mazzolini, Serafino, 138, 139, 140, 141 745; Chetniks in, 100, 142-48 passim,

MazZuranic, Ivan, 4 216, 262f, 403; Partisans in, 115, 140-48

Medjimurje, 63, 169, 173f, 23 5n, 283, 585, passim, 252, 262,279, 402f, 630, 746 |

590f, 606, 622, 708 Montgomery, Mr., 578 Mehitic, Mehmed, 489 Mortigjija, Tias, 370 Medved, Ladislav, 387n, 43 5f, 448, 782 Moraéa, Pero, 72.4

Melaher, Joze, 125 Moskov, Ante, 59n, 346, 426, 458, 462, 560 Merhamet, 409, 411, 495n Muftic, Ismet, 488, 574 Merrem, Captain, 3 10-11 Mulalic, Mustafa, sor MeSi¢c, Ademaga, 490f, 495 Muslim Legion, 496 MeStrovic, Ivan 349, 780 Muslim Liberation Movement, 503 Metzger, Josip, 426, 462f Muslim People’s Committee, 495, 504

Meyszner, August, 76-82 passim, 184,193, | Muslims, Bosnian: before 1941, 1, 15, 22,

212f, 223, 290 3771, 387, 403, 475-77, 479, 481-88,

Midszenty, Cardinal, 560 522; terror against, 311, 396, 405, 409f,

Mifka, Bishop Spiridon, 545, 573 569, §74, 726ff, 742, 746f; definitions of, Mihailovic, Draza, 143-48 passim, 230ff, 335, 3771, 466-73 passim, 481-82, 489; 255,261, 366, 408f, 444ff, 501, 506, 514, SS division of, 268, 289, 496-501; and 562, 762, 768, 776; and Slovenes, 99, Independent State of Croatia, 335, 346, roof, 110f, 117, 129, 772f; and govern- 378f, 382, 410f, 422, 543-44, 765; dement-in-exile, ror, 230, 232, 741; in Ser- clining support for Ustashas, 3 53, 491bia, 142, 178, 184ff, 188, r90f, 213-16, 96, 502-7 passim; token power in Croa224-28 passim. See also Chetniks; Yugo- tian state, 373, 488-90, 505

slav Army in the Homeland Mussolini, Benito, 102, 106f, 132f, 141,

Mihaljevic, Marko, 494 144f, 497n, 597, 603; and Ustashas and Mijuskovic, Jovan, 179 Independent State of Croatia, 32n, 57-64

Mikac, Marijan, 371, 760n passim, 235, 237, 323; designs on YugoMikhailov, Ivan, 32, r59f, 163, 167 slav territory, 42, 44, 46, 239, 245; and

Miklos, Béla, 174 Hitler and Germans, 44, 46, 63f, 295,

Mikuz, Rev. Metod, 116, 520-21 599f, 661-62; ouster and rescue, 114,

Miletic, Antun, 726 121, 296-300 passim

Mileti¢, Milan, 725 Mu&sicki, Kosta, 190, 777

Mili¢c, Lavoslav, 426 MVAC (Anti-Communist Volunteer Mili-

Milicevic, Vladeta, 32n, 39-40 tia), 135, 251-63 passim, 599; in SloveMilitary Economic and Armaments Office, nia, 107-12 passim, 116-20 passim, 124f,

619, 620n, 623, 626, 645; 665-66 299, 519,771,775

834 , INDEX , Nacertanije, 2 6 17, 6r9f, 633, 6356, 647-54 passim, Nadj, Kosta, 758, 761 , 668, 685, 700, 709, 714

Nardelli, Bruno, 309 Nevistic, Franjo, 370

| Nastashas, 344, 346 , “New Order,” 44, 55, 203, 284 |

(Montenegro), 147 310 : .

National Administrative Council — “New policy,” 81, 199, 222-24, 227, 308, National Assembly (Montenegro), 10, 138, Niedzielsky, Feliks, 371

140 Nikola I (king of Montenegro), 138,140 __

National Assembly (Serbia), 5, 10 Nikolic, Franjo, 55, 426 National Assembly (Yugoslavia), 512 Nikoli¢, Vinko, 400-401, 760n

National Committee (Albania), 152 Ni Declaration, 5-6 — BC National Committee of Liberation of Yugo- _— Nitti, Francesco, 19

slavia (NKOJ), 114, 362n, 364, 366 Norway, 659, 719,745,-748.

National Council (Montenegro), 141 Novak, Karlo, 102, 110-11, 116-17, 119,

National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and 125 Se , Serbs, 7-10, 11,14-15,25 ‘Nuremberg Military Tribunal,27r So

National Front (Albania), 151, 153, 167 NZ (People’s Protection), 97, 106, 111-12

Nationalist Committee of Montenegro, 142

National Legion (Slovenia), 99, 102, Logn_ ObrkneZevic, Milos, 545-46 | National Liberation Army (Yugoslavia), Office for Colonization, 386, 393 |

362, 453,765 Office for the Reconstruction of the Econ- _

National Liberation Committee © omy, 385 , , (Yugoslavia), 353, 368 Oléan, Mihailo, 179, 185, 190, 222

National Liberation Front (Yugoslavia), Omréanin, Ivo, 729 |

113, 362ff , Operation Achse, 72, 121, 297

National Liberation War (Yugoslavia), 116, Operation Kammerjager,199 _

760 Oe Operation Ratweek, 632 -

229ff, 232 294, 415,428,630 |

National Radical Party, 12f, 15, 22-24,158, | Operation Schwarz, 144, 199, 262, 279,

National Socialism, 185, 191, 345, 497 Operation Weiss, 143, 144, 198, 244, 262f, | National Socialist Labor Party, 49, 82, 376, 279f, 289, 294, 415, 428, 502 ,

496 a Orazi, Venzi, 132 ,

Naval, Pierre, 616 , 685 oo. , Navratil, Fridrih, 3 18f, 448 OrSanic¢, Ivan, 370f, 594, 760n |

Natlat¢en, Marko, 98, 517 — Organization Todt, 79, 285, 636, 654f, 674,

Nazi, Nazism (ideology, movement, party), | Osborne, Godolphin Francis d’Arcy, 578 49, 61, 87, 163, 165, 168, 173, 187, 200, Ottoman Empire (also Ottoman Turks), 2,

384, 592 7 340, 352, 360, 554, 556f, 563, 565, 567, 157-58, 347,377, 388ff, 391, 466ff,

574, 582, 588f, 604-10 passim; and 472-83 passim, 487, 522, 539, 581 |

Volksdeutsche, 48, 172, 202f, 282, 288; Oxilia, Giovanni Battista, 60, 240f, 248,

_ and Ustashas, 329, 335-40 passim, 348, 264-65, 267 | Nazor, Vladimir, 349 Palestine, 582, 588, 603f,607 Nedic¢, Milan (also his government), 147- Pandza, Muhamed, 411, 495n, 503 ,

, 48, 187-88, 190f, 195, 408, 440, 513, _Pannwitz, Helmuth von, 305, 762 587, 657, 721, 741, 745, 777-78; head of Panti¢, DuSan, 177f , re government, 63, 68, 74, 179-86,217-21; Pap,Pavle,605 SO difficulties with Germans, 78ff, 81, 182, Parac, Matija,770_ —-

184-85, 198, 209-13, 222-27, 648f, PareZanin, Ratko, 190 | .

652n, 656, 666; and Mihailovi¢ and Chet- Parliament (of interwar Yugoslavia), 11-14,

Nemanjié dynasty, 468 406 . a ,

niks, 184ff, 213-17, 224-28 passim, 714 16, 22-27, 29, 31, 40, 202, 229, 372, 404,

Neubacher, Hermann, 69, 76n, 78f, 81,212, Partisan Chief Headquarters, 115, 367, 452

221-24, 226f, 333,653, , Partisans (Albanian), 153, 15 5£ Oe a

Neuberger, Stjepan, 436 a Partisans (armed force of the Communist , Neuhausen, Franz, 76-77, 79, 81, 218, 223, Party of Yugoslavia): .

INDEX 835 — in Serbia, 69, 71, 73, 78, 82, 178-201 sim; and Archbishop Stepinac, 5 5 5-67 passim, 212ff, 216, 220-31 passim, 254, passim, §71, 782; at war’s end, 753, 755-

413, $85, 636, 640, 655, 657 56, 762, 7678; after May 1945, 560, 562, — in Yugoslavia, 71, 88, 231-32, 241, 500, 565. See also Independent State of Croa674, 680, 697f, 703f, 713f, 743, 745f tia; Ustashas (group, movement, party) — in Slovenia, 89-116 passim, 122-29 pas- Pavlek-Miskina, Mihovil, 349, 364n

sim, 254, 704, 719 Pavlovic, Miodrag, 214

—and Allies, Western, 114-15, 128-29, Peasant Democratic Coalition, 24-29, 38, 145, 231f, 298, 314, 333,412, 415, 446- 42f, 46n, 367-68

51 passim, 500, 748 Peasant Guards, 55, 56-57, 356, 358, 419f,

— and Italian surrender, 116-120, 298f, 314 443,445,740 — in other areas, 13 4ff, 137, 142-48 passim, Peasant International, 21-22, 360

I 51-56 passim, 161, 165-68 passim, Peasant National Party, 229

172-73, 252,254, 681 Petnikar, Vilko, 346n, 420, 426, 458 — inthe Independent State of Croatia, 144- | Pecanac, Kosta Milovanovic (also his Chet-

45, 244f, 250, 252, 254-55, 274, 279, niks), 183f, 186, 194f, 200, 209f, 216 281, 286ff, 299, 306, 314, 321, 326,353, Pell, Herbert C., 402 368, 402f, 407, 411-15 passim, 425, 428- Percec, Gustav, 31, 33, 38 32 passim, 460, 624, 630ff, 641f, 643-44, Peréevic, Ivan, 18n, 33f, 36, 336, 426, 594

658f, 681, 703, 710f, 721 Peric, Djordje, 180

— and Croatian Peasant Party, 3 58-67 pas- Peric, Stijepo, 261, 322f, 326f

sim, 428, 443, 445, 449-50, 452-55 Pernar, Ivan, 29, 359, 456 — and Croatian army, 416f, 425-37 passim Personal Guard, 309, 316, 326, 421, 423,

—and Bosnian Muslims, 493, 502ff, 506-9 432, 462f, 783

passim Pétain, Marshal, 184

— and churches, 514ff, 520f, 529, 549ff, Peter I (king of Serbia), 138

569-75 passim Peter II (king of Yugoslavia), 50, 128, 178,

— and Jews, 588, 590f, 602f, 605f 185, 204, 231f, 366, 445, 447, 740 — and population losses, 718, 721, 729, Peterlin, Ernest, 108

731, 739, 7426 Petesic, Ciril, 521, 549, 571, $73

—at war’send, 729, 751-77 passim. Seealso _ Petranovic, BoZidar, 470 Communist Party of Croatia;Communist _ Petric, Jak$a, 726

Party of Yugoslavia; Tito, Josip Broz Petroleum Lines, 629 Partisan Supreme Headquarters, 98, 115, Petrovic, Darko, 180

145, 507 Petrovic-Njegos, Mihajlo (prince and dy-

Patriarchate of Pec, 388, 478 nasty), 138, 140

Patterson, Richard C., 550 Petrucci, Luigi, 247, 265 Paul (prince regent), 39-41, 45n, 46f, 179n, Phleps, Artur, 310, 316, 319, 496, 498

188, 229, 741 Pieche, Giuseppe, 13 3n, 264, 387n, 599

Pavelic, Ante: Pietromarchi, Luca, 284

— in 1930’S, 23N, 27-45 passim, 159, 235 Pijade, MoSa, 605 — and Hitler and Germans, 49-56 passim, Pirzio Biroli, Alessandro, 141, 142, 144, 145 239, 241, 264, 266, 268, 280f, 300, 311, Pius XI, Pope, 554 413, 441, 456f, 741; concerning military Pius XII, Pope, 562, 604 matters, 275-78, 290-92, 302, 313;inin- Plav, 63,139,149

ternal politics, 315-34 passim Plote, 496, 642n, 674

—and Mussolini and Italians, 57-60, 23 5- Poland, 44, 286, 479, 488, 581, 583, 586,

58 passim, 264, 268, 276, 300, 661 611, 625,744 — head of Ustasha state: and armed forces, Polish General Government, 286, 685, 687

330, 421-26 passim, 433-42 passim, Politeo, Ivo, 270n, 541, 561 450-52, 456-58, 462-64; in internal poli- Popov, Ivan, 160 tics, 335-53 passim, 356-59 passim, 373— Popovac, Ismet, 494 75,376, 381, 383, 385, 400ff, 407, 411, Popovic, Krsto, 142, 144 417, §93f, 715; and Bosnian Muslims, Popp, Bishop Philip, 573 377, 466, 489, 497; attack on Serbs, 351- Population: 52, 381, 398, 408f, 528-29, 536-47 pas- — movements (expulsions, fleeing, trans-

836 , INDEX fers): of Slovenes, 85-91, 178, 217-19, Rainer, Friedrich, 83, 121ff 243, 393-99 passim, 409; of Serbs, 86- Rajic, Milan (Ivan), 33f © 89, 90, 170, 178, 217-21, 243, 386,392- Rajkovic, Dusan, 463 99 passim, 409f, 412, 440, 516, 537; of Rapallo, Treaty of, 19-20, 130f clergy, 87, 90, 92, 394, 515, 517f, 521, Rapotec, Stanislav, 566-67, 578-79 529, 537; of Volksdeutsche, 95,208,217, Ratkovic, Stjepan, 270 286-88, 410, 731; of Montenegrins, 139, Re, Gian Carlo, 265, 420 170; of Croats and Dalmatians, 170,319- Red Army, 305, 328, 429, 731 22, 409f, 511, 662; of Muslims, 396, Red Cross, International, 272, 592, 603 409ff, 507; in earlier centuries, 388-89, Refugees: in Serbia, 89, 178, 217, 218-21,

478-79, 481; of Jews, 590, 597 396-97, 440, 550, 647, 708, 712; in Mon— migration in and out, and growth: in tenegro, 139; in Independent State of earlier centuries, 3 89f, 467, 477ff, 481, Croatia, 287, 400, 409-11, 422, 571, 483, 523; in twentieth century, 527, 607, 712; in Italy, 301, 731f; in Egypt, 321,

731-32, 749; growth, 378, 523-24 603, 732; Jewish, 581f, 588, 592, 597f, — losses: exaggerated claims, 718, 720-29, 600, 602, 606, 732; general, 719, 729, 735-44 passim; scholarly estimates, 729- 732. See also Population

39, 764-65. See also Refugees. Regency Council (Albania), 152, 153n

Pospisil, Zvonimir, 3 3f Regency Council of Three (Yugoslavia), 232

Prcela, John, 729 Reichsinstitut fiir Auslandische und Prebeg, Viktor, 426 Koloniale Forstwirtschaft, 613 Predavec, Josip, 29, 406 Reichskreditkasse, 671, 679

Prekmurje, 31, 63, 83, 170, 173f, 283, 581, Reichskreditkassenscheine, 177, 671, 701

585, 590f, 606, 622, 708 Reis-ul-Ulema, 490, 495n, 543-44

Preussische Bergwerke und Hiitten A.G. Reith, Franz, 205

(also Preussag), 619, 636f Rendulic, Lothar, 71, 153, 303, 314, 316,

Prezelj, Ivan, 125 323,325,722

Pribicevic, Rade, 368 Reparations Commission, 715, 737

Pribicevic, Svetozar, 9-12, 14, 23-25, 27-28 _Reprisals, see Terror Prisoners of war: Serbian, 65,178, 181,209, Republican Party (Serbia), 158, 229

213,226, 392, 654, 656, 731; Russian, Requard, Willy, 285 80, 193; Yugoslav, rorn, 108ff, 301,656, Ribar, Ivo Lola, 106n, 432

663, 731; Allied, 115, 125, 272-74, 753; Rieger, Vilko, 35, 336, 343-45, 370, 760n : Slovene, 118, 656; Chetnik, 145, 195; Rijeka (Fiume), 7, 18ff, 31, 61, 63, 104, 132, Italian, 298, 655, 657; other, 456, 588, 235,248, 260, 300, 308, 600, 629, 632,

719. See also Labor, forced and slave 727,746,770

Proclamation (Obznana), 16 Ringel, Julius, 331 Prodanovic, JaSa, 229 Ritig, Msgr. Svetozar, 549, 571n

Protestantism, 528, 552-53 Roatta, Mario, 63-64, 105-6, 107, 13 5f,

Proti¢c, Jevrem, 177 241, 246-63 passim, 296f, 301, 519f, 599

Protic, Stojan Robotti, Mario, 95, 102-8 passim, 13 5f, Prpic, Ivan, 277, 400, 426, 43 4ff 144,247, 249, 263, 518f —

Priitzmann, Hans-Adolf, 294, 331-32 Rohrbach, Colonel, 246 Puk, Mirko, 339, 346, 528, 539-40 Rohstoffhandelsgesellschaft A. G. (Roges),

Puric, Bozidar, 23 1f 626 Rokvic, Mane, 308

Radic, Puniga, 24 Rolf, Tomislav, 458, 463

Ratki, Franjo, 470 Roman Catholic Church: before 1941, 377f,

Rademacher, Franz, 586 , 387f, 390, 403, 469-81 passim, 522-28,

Radic, Pavle, 23f 5398; in Slovenia, 87-101 passim, 107f,

Radic, Stjepan, 9-14 passim, 18, 21-26, 31, 109-10, I16, 126, 128, 517-22, 558, 347,357, 360f, 526, 560n. See also Croa- 575; after May 1945, 518, 520ff, 5 58-63,

tian Peasant Party | 565, 5758; priests killed, 568-75 passim; Radjenovic, Stevo, 255 and Jews, 581, 592, 594, 604 Radosavljevic, Milos, 179 — in the Independent State of Croatia, 137, Radovic, Novica, 141 282, 328, 339, 411, $31, §32-34, 7263

INDEX 837 compatibility with Ustashas, 339, 343, Schmidt, Charles G. A., 469-70, 471 368-72, 391, §49f; forced conversionsto, Schmidt-Logan, Wolfgang, 65 353,379, 391, 408, 530, 534-44, 545; Schuchardt, Colonel, 245n, 281, 327, 427,

741; role of Archbishop Stepinac, 5 5 1- 671n, 710

58, 562-64, 565-68, 577f Schwabisch-Deutscher Kulturbund, 2orf,

Romania, 20, 34f, 77, 166, 193, 204, 208, 205 222, 266f, 269n, 288, 453,475, §85f, Scott, Brigadier, 758-59 603f, 612, 614, 618, 629, 644ff, 685, Scutari, Lake, 63, 139, 149 687f, 710; collapse of, 173, 328, 429, Second League of Prizren, 153 ff

438,451, 457 Second World War, 4, 356, 391, 565, 570, Rome, treaties of, 13 1ff, 13.7f, 234-47 pas- 5755 580, §92, 606, 737 Sim, 265, 269N, 270, 290, 300, 317f,375, Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst—SD), 67,

419-20, 661f, 778 775 85, 123, 328, 596, 722

Rome-Berlin Axis, 44, 299 Senate (Yugoslavia), 512 ,

Rommel, Erwin, 121 Serbia, Greater, 2n, 3, 5, 25, 38, 188, 231,

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 754 2475 357, 366, 378f, 454, §12, 514, §42

Rosener, Erwin, 123f Serbia, interwar: before 1918, 2-6, 148,

Rozman, Bishop Gregorij, 107, 122, 128, 157f, 387, 468f, 475, 479-84 passim,

517-21, §§8, §69, §73, 772 523, 527, 737; and unification of Yugo-

Rudnik Corporation, 662 slavia, 9-11, 13-15, 138, 15 8f; control of

Rihrig, Andreas, 287 state, IO-15, 22-29 passim, 229f, 486,

Rukavina, Branko, 463, 556 524f; other, 512, 523, 580f. See also AlRupnik, Leo, 96, 122, 123-24, 518, 771, exander (regent and king of Yugoslavia);

775 Karadjordjevic dynasty

Russia (Imperial), 5f, 9, 16, 130, 392, 475, Serbia, Kingdom of, 1, 8ff, 16, 25

479 Serbia, Socialist Republic of, 610

Russia (Soviet), 16, 22, 69ff, 92, 114, 171, Serbia, wartime: and Nedi¢ regime, 63, 68, 179, 192f, 196, 243, 265ff, 294f, 303 ff, 74, 78ff, 81, 179-86, 198, 209-28 pas329, 381, 419, 436, 441f, 495, 516, 586, sim, 587, 648f, 656, 666, 714, 721, 741,

629. See also Soviet Union 745; Volksdeutsche in, 63, 75, 77f, 203, Russian Army of Liberation, 762 205-8, 282, 648f; Partisans in, 69, 73,78, Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, 5 45ff 82, 182, 191, 199ff, 212ff, 216, 220-32 Russian Protective Corps, 80, 185f, 191-93, passim, 254, 413; Chetniks in, 69, 100,

194, 228, 654n, 666, 776 145,156, 175, 182-95 passim, 1994f,

RuSinovic, Nikola, 240n, 533, 547 209-31 passim, 714, 741, 746; population transferees and refugees, 86-91 pas-

S. A. Mineraria Siderurgica “Ferromin,” sim, 164f, 170, 178, 217-21, 386, 392—

662 97; and Serbian Orthodox Church, 5 11—

Sabljak, Adolf, 463 16 passim, 529, 537, 568-74 passim; and Saili, Dragutin, 432 Jews, 585-89, 591, 601, 605f; other,

Salo, Social Republic of, 300, 317 , 152f, 160, 162ff, 333, 608ff, 749, 779 Sambugnach, Tomislav, 322 — and Germany: occupied by, 61, 63, 64—

Sandzak, 72f, 77, 140, 199, 216, 222f, 228, 82, 149f, 175-86, 197, 222-24, 276, 391, 294, 409f, 413, 494f, 501, 574, 588, 630, 722f, 740, 745, 748; Bulgarian troops 746f; corridor for German withdrawal, used by, 63f, 175, 195-201, 210f, 214,

156, 167, 716, 752 216, 226, 668; auxiliary forces used by,

Sangiorgio, Domenico, 58 175, 183, 186, 188-95; withdrawal of,

Santovito, Ugo, 494 228, 752, 775; economy exploited by,

Sarajevo, 5, 10, 242, 264, 419, 434, 472, 619-40 passim, 644-57 passim, 665-68, 485, 490, 494ff, 5o4f, 527, 619, 621, 626, 684, 685-87, 701, 708-14 passim

632, 644, 646, 712, 748 — and Independent State of Croatia, 23 4, Sarkoti¢, Stjepan, 17, 27f, 30, 33 276, 326, 333, 391, 408f, 673, 685ff; Sauberzweig, Karl-Gustav, 499 negative impact of its policies, 218, 220,

Scasselatti, Franco, 132 395f, 412f, 440; dispute with over Bosnia

Scheurlen, Lieutenant General, 167 and Herzegovina, 377-78, 467, 527; Ser-

Schmidhuber, August, 154 bian Orthodox Church persecuted by,

838 INDEX 528-29, 537, §47f; claims of Serbian “Slavoserb” (also Slavoserbianism), 3-4, ]

population losses in, 720ff, 740ff 347 oe oe

—economic dislocations: industrial __ Slovakia, 266f, 269n, 281, 374,439, 441,

Capacity, 623, 624-26, 63 3-40 passim, 604, 629 ee

644-46; communication lines, 629-33 Slovene Alliance, 101-2, 110, 116, 119, 126 passim; food production, 646-53, 701, Slovene Legion, 99, rorf, 107ff, 110, 124.

} 708f, 712-13; labor, 654-57; occupation Slovene Littoral, 19, 104, 113-21 passim, costs, 665-68; foreign trade, 684, 685—_ 125, 128, 132, 148, 191, 302, 513, §21, 87; inflation, 699-705 passim; taxation, 663,745, 752, 770-77 passim

706 Slovene National Army, 117, 773, 775

Serbia after May 1945, 742 Slovene National Council, 126, 128, 773, |

Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 735, 775 , | 737 | | Slovene National Liberation Committee,

Serbian Agrarian Party, 13, 15,229. II4 , ,

Serbian Frontier Guard, 183f, 193,210,776 Slovene National Liberation Council — Serbianization: of Macedonians, 15 8f, 164f; (SNOS), 114, 128

inBatkaandBaranja,170 Slovene Peasant-Workers Party, 447 ©

Serbian National Bank, 217, 226, 619, 666, Slovene People’s Party, 13, 15, 23, 25, 95—

668, 686, 706 | oo 102 passim, 106-11 passim, 119, 124ff,

Serbian Orthodox Church: before 1941, 17, 128, 228, 517f, 771f OB

369, 388, 390, 392, 469-81 passim, 512, Slovenes (also Slovenia), interwar, 1-9 pas522-28 passim, 539; in other locations, sim, 12f, 20, 25ff, 31, 43f, 83, 581, 613

157, 164, 514-16, 521; in Serbia, 185, Slovenia, Socialist Republic of, 523 , 512-14, 720f; in Independent State of Slovenia, wartime: occupied by Germany, Croatia, forced conversions to Catholi- 61, 65, 71, 83-94 passim, 120-25, 127, cism, 378, 530, 534-44, 545, 5771, attack 271, 283, 517f, 665, 705, 745; annexed on, 394, 398, 513, 528-31, 534, 544-48, _— bby Italy, 61, 83, 94-114 passim, 237,249, _ 5555 564, 741; after May 1945, 562, 575f; 745; annexed by Hungary, 63; population

priests killed, 568-75 passim transfers to and from, 85-91, 95, 178,

Serbian State Guard, 77, 148, 183f, 193, 203, 217£f, 243, 283, 393, 396f, 749; and . 195, 206, 210-16 passim, 220-28 passim, Partisans, 93-94, 96-99, III-20, 128—

302, 650, 776 a 29,254, 299, 704f, 719, 746; Axis mili-

Serbian Volunteer Corps, 80, 127, 185-95 tary operations in, 98, 102-12 passim, passim, 210, 220, 222ff, 228, 302, 325, 120-22; collaborationists in, 99-102,

772-77 passim 107-29 passim, 446, 771-75; Volks-

Serbian Volunteer Detachments, 183f, 188f, deutsche in, 201, 203f, 283, 393; Catholic

191,195 Church in, 92, 107-10 passim, 122, 126,

“Serbocommunism,” 371, 408, §75,757N 517-22, 523, 558, 568-75 passim; econSerbo-Croatian language, 3n, 75, 151, 157, omy exploited by Axis, 617,633, 644,

171, 280 | 653, 659f, 731; escape route at war’s end,

Serti¢, Tomislav, 426,458,463 751,753,760, 769f

Servatzy, Vjekoslav, 346n, 426, 758 Smoljan, Bariga, 50, 359, 456 Oo

Seventeen Principles, 337-39, 341, 344, Socialist Party (Serbia), 229,231 _ .

357,376, 391f Sokol (also Sokol Legion), 96, 99, 102, 108f

Sforza, Carlo, 19 - Solovjev, Aleksandar, 471 , _ , Shootings (mass), see Executions (mass) Soviet Union, 20, 22, 47, 93, 975 100, 140,

Simovic, Dugan (also his government), 47, 167, 178, 187, 208, 223, 266, 288, 307, 50, 52n, 56, 179n, 229f, 445, 488,720, 329, 402, 444, 454, 500, 553, 563, 604,

740 | 698, 731, 742, 744, 773. See also Russia Sinéic, David, 240n, 260f (Soviet) | Skorodumov, Mikhail Fedorovich, 192 | Spaho, Fehim, 490 |

Slavonia, 218, 221, 281, 305f, 313, 319, Spaho, Mehmed, 23 | 363, 386ff, 393, 397, 399, 425,431,443, Spain (also Spanish), 269n, 400, 554, 768 4735479, 539, 629f, 663, 681,708,749; Special Account A No. 40655, 691, 696 Volksdeutsche in, 201, 203f, 282-88 pas- | Special Account M No. 40653, 675-83 pas-

Sim, 293, 410,613,622 | sim, 690,693,695

INDEX 839 Special Operations Executive (SOE), 145, Sudost Montan, 616n, 618, 622

446 Supersloda (Superior Command for Slove-

Speer, Albert, 620n, 642, 654n nia-Dalmatia), 136f, 144, 249-57 passim,

Spoleto, Duke of, 238, 300, 662 519, 670

Srijem, 13, 221, 274, 276, 305, 313, 3275 Supreme Command (Chetnik), ror, 144, 388, 393, 396, 399, 414, 460, 473, 479, I9I, 228, 230, 232, 772, 776 5395 5455 587; 630, 673, 685, 690, 705, Supreme (Ustasha Armed Forces’) Head725, 727f, 752; Volksdeutsche in, 2orff, quarters, 442, 457, 461 282f, 287, 410, 622; food-producing Supreme Ustasha Headquarters, 58, 3 19n,

region, 319, 386, 613, 647, 681, 708 330, 340f, 344, 383, 400, 436, 490 SS Divisions (selected): 7th Volunteer “Prinz — Susic, Lovro, 357, 621n

Eugen,” 77, 82, 198, 207, 279, 284, 299, Switzerland, 18, 102, 127, 269n, 366, 446, 321f, 496, 666, 746, 761; 21st Volunteer 449,455, 604, 681, 687

Mountain “Skanderbeg,” 154, 499n; Szalasi, Ferenc, 173f 13th Volunteer Mountain “Handschar,” Sztdjay, Dome, 168f, 173, 206 154, 268, 293, 430, 496-501, 503, 7713 ;

“Das Reich,” 207; 23rd Volunteer Salic, Ivan, 560

“Kama,” 268, 500, 771 Santi¢, Milan, 261 Staff for the Resettlement of the Population, — Sari¢, Msgr. Ivan, 490, 527, 556, 558

85 Satorov-Sarlo, Metodi, 165

Stahl, Friedrich, 275 Segvic, Kerubin, 24n Stalin, 742,759 Seper, Archbishop Franjo, 565, 567, 577 Stalingrad, 70, 230, 266, 294, 355, 428, Sidak, Jaroslav, 470-71

556, 590 Skoda Works, 612

Standing Economic Commission, Italian- Sotola, Jaroslav, 463

Croatian, 240, 689 Stancer, Slavko, 425, 758

Stanishev, Aleksandar, 167 Subagié, Ivan, 28n, 30, 43, 232, 359, 366f, Stanisic, Bajo, 142, 144, 146, 147N 429, 448f, 451, 454,773 Stara Gradiska, 399, 414, 722, 724, 747 Sufflay, Milan, 20, 23n, 406 Starcevic, Ante, 3-4, 335, 347f, 377, 489 Suljak, Alija, 490f, 498 State Commission on (Ascertaining) Crimes, Sumanovié, Svetislav, 373, 381

724f Sutej, Juraj, 232, 359

State Directorate for Economic Renewal, Svajger, Anton, 441 385

State Directorate for Renewal, 385f, 393 Tasic, Dragoljub, 73 3f State Food Administration, 669, 672, 678, Tatalovic, Radoslav, 773

7i1f Tehran Conference, 115, 314

State Labor Service, 460f, 729 Teleki, Paul, 52n

State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, 1, 8-11, | Terpeshev, Dobri, 168

16, 138, 382, 443 Terror (also atrocities, excesses, outrages, Stefan, Exarch, 590 reprisals, transgressions): against interSteifon, Boris Aleksandrovich, 192 war Yugoslavia, 27, 32ff, 35, 38, 159;

Steinfl, Nikola, 330, 457 against Croats, 137, 254, 256ff, 262, 301, Stepinac, Archbishop Alojzije, 3 50, 370, 326f, 341, 372, 374, 409, 410, 491, 747; 371-72, 400f, 406f, 532-42 passim, 549- against Serbs (Orthodox), 139, 182, 214, 71 passim, 575-82 passim, 594, 603, 768, 220, 253f, 278, 341, 371f, 398-406 pas-

782 sim, 410-15 passim, 4g91ff, 502, 506, 507,

Stevenson, Ralph S., 446 536f, 541, §56, 711, 720, 723, 7273 Stickstoff-Syndikat, 613 against Jews, 341, 372, 410, 582-88 pasStojadinovic, Milan (also his government), sim, §90, 593, 605; against Muslims, 409,

39-41, 47, 1776, 185, 229f, 512 491, 502, §03, 505, $07, 728, 7473 Strossmayer, Bishop Josip, 2n, 4 against others, 98, 112, 120, 13 4f, 142f,

Stuckart, State Secretary, 75 341, 372, 414, 630; target not specified, Styria, Lower, 83-95 passim, 125 3425 344, 347, 352,395, 422, 503, 728,

Sudar, Franjo, 311, 463,758 739,746; general, 719, 728, 733, 7395 Siidosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 613 744-47. See also Executions (mass)

840 INDEX Terzic, Velimir, 725 Ustasha government, see Independent State

Thomas, Georg, 623f of Croatia

Tinti, Aleksandar, 684 Ustasha militia, 253-54, 275, 283f, 3 16ff, Tisserant, Eugéne Cardinal, 403-4, 535, 343,346, 400, 411, 414f, 431, 437f, 490f,

547 536, 569; and Croatian army, 330f, 353,

Tito, Josip Broz, 16, 52, 112, 156, 165, 168, 423f, 438f, 442, 456-64 passim; organi216, 303, 314, 326, 328, 360, 367, 409, zation of, 340-41, 420, 421-22; “wild,”

5 58f, 605, 721, 723, 742; and govern- 341, 343, 401-2, 569 ment-in-exile, 128, 232, 366, 429, 448, Ustashas (group, movement, party): in 454, 773; and Western Allies, 223, 232, 1930'S, 4, 18n, 21, 27-46 passim, 131, 449f, 759. See also Communist Party of 159, 342, 404; use of terror, 27, 33f, 342,

Yugoslavia; Partisans 347f, 391-92, 412; anti-Semitism, 43,

Tomagevic, Ivan, 449, 451 348-49, 370, 593; anti-Serbianism, 43, Tomasic, Ljudevit, 328, 359, 444, 449f, 455; 351-52, 380, 391-92, 398, 402-4, 406f,

768n | 528, 539-40; other ideological tenets, 56,

Tomazic, Msgr. Ivan, 517 335-52 passim, 356, 376-79, 402, 466,

Tomic, Viktor, 346 5 68ff, 608f; other aspects, 49-61, 382f, Topalovié, Zivko, 229, 231 422, 489f, 505f, 543-44, 780-81. See also Toptic, NeSet, 504 Independent State of Croatia; Pavelic, Torbar, Josip 359, 456 Ante; and individual Ustashas by name Torti¢, Janko, 357 Ustasha Surveillance Service, 3 41, 399f,

Toth, Dragutin 3 57, 712 421f, 437 i Trepca mines (also Mines Limited), 150, | Ustasha Women’s Organization, 341

614, 636f Ustasha Youth Organization, 341, 371, 594 Trianon, Treaty of, 170 , Trieste, 19, 58f, r21f, 125, 129, 137, 629, Vasic, Dragisa,776

632, 641f, 759, 766, 773 Vasiljevic, Milisav, 177f Trifunovic, Milos, 231 Vatican, 101, 126, 137, 238n, 349, 371,

Trifunovic-Biréanin, Ilija,255 512, §18, §23, §25, 531-36 passim, 544Tripartite Pact, 46f, 49f, 160, 229, 272, 368, 67 passim, 576ff, 603f, 721, 726, 772

444, 513, 612, 623, 741 Vauhnik, Vladimir, 127 Trigic, Jovan, 215 Veesenmayer, Edmund, 49, 52-55, 59, 68,

Trivunac, Milo’, 179 173, 179, 497N, 740 Trlajic, Bishop Sava, 398 Velchev, Damian, 159.

Trumbic, Ante, 6, 29-30 Velimirovic, Bishop Nikolaj, 513 Tudjman, Franjo, 346, 728, 735-36 Venice (also Venetian Republic), 18, 30, 44,

Turkey, 159, 493, 500, 603f, 637 248, 347f, 388, 472f, 479

Turkish National Party, 158 Venturi, Giovanni Host, 18

Turks, see Ottoman Empire Vereinigte Aluminium Werke A. G., 619 Turner, Harald, 75-82 passim, 179-88 pas- —_ Versailles Peace Conference, 12

SiM, ZII, 213, 220, 396, 412f, 586 Veterans Association, 727, 734-35, 761 Victor Emmanuel III (king of Italy), 23 8f, Uiberreither, Sigfried, 83 296 a Ujcic, Msgr. Josip, 550, 573, 783 Vienna Line, see Demarcation line

Ulema MediZlis, 491, 495n, 503n Viktring (Vetrinje), 765, 774

762 Virius, Mirko, 349

Unconditional surrender, 754-55, 756,758, Village Guards, 107f, 112, 12.4, 519

United Kingdom, 272, 550 Vlachs, 388f, 474, 477 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Vogelnik, Dolfe, 730, 733f Administration (UNRRA), 321, 717 Vojvodina, I, II, 13, 20, 139, 178, 202, United States, 6, 33, 36, 272, 294, 570, 607, 205, 397; 429, 514, §26, 580f, 705, 742,

720, 731f, 742, 773 749

Uppenkamp, Walter, 76 Vokic¢, Ante, 319, 325, 328, 378, 423, 436,

. Uskoks, 347 442, 450, 452, 768, 783. See also Lorko- ,

729 Volksbund, 91f

Ustasha Defense Brigades, 3 53n, 422, 460, vic-Vokic plot |

INDEX 841 Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn, 172 Wisshaupt, Ernst, 66n

Volksdeutsche (Russian), 186, 193 World Jewish Congress, 603 Volksdeutsche (Yugoslav): interwar, 48, Wuescht, Johann, 169 201-4, 282, 585, 587, 613; in the Banat,

63,75, 78, 205-8, 282, 288, 573, 620, Young Bosnia, 4-5, 485n 646-49, 653, 668, 708; in 7th SS Volun- Yugoslav army (interwar), 47, 188, 190,

teer Division “Prinz Eugen,” 77, 207, 309, 318, 417, 432, 464, 503; during 284, 321, 666; in other German military invasion and collapse, 51-58 passim, 140, formations, 78, 206ff, 284-85, 290, 292, 178, 284, 340, 382, 4o4ff, 421, 426, 739; 410; in Slovenia, 83, 85, 90, 95, 203, 217, booty from, 65, 244, 265, 419, 427, 617, 283, 393;1n Hungarian-annexed areas, 660, 672 169, 171f, 174, 205, 208, 283, 288, 708; Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, roof, 110, in the Independent State of Croatia, 203, 117, 125, 128, 143, 189, 230, 261, 770f, 281-89 passim, 335, 386, 425, §44, 622, 773. See also Chetniks 653; evacuation to Reich, 208, 286-88, Yugoslav Committee, 5-6, 14 410, 681, 690, 731; inall areas, 283,360, | Yugoslav Democratic Union, 231

583, 659, 731 Yugoslavia, government-in-exile, 99, 126,

Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VOMI), 78, 184, 190, 213, 268, 272, 301, 361, 371,

202, 204, 283, 287ff 443-51 passim, 532f, 556, 567, 570, 579, von Bergen, Diego, 533 720-21, 739ff, 773; composition of, 51, von Brauchitsch, Walther, 65 IOI-2, 110, 144, 230ff, 359, 366ff, 429 von Ribbentrop, Joachim: and Italians, 36n, | Yugoslavia, interwar: establishment, 1, 7—

44, 235, 242, 660; and Independent State 12, 130, 138; competing political visions of Croatia, 48f, 63, 285f, 293, 309, 313, for South Slavic areas, 2-6, 377-78, 466— 316f, 322-29 passim, 333; and Serbia, 67,470, 481-85 passim; dissident Croats

77, 78n, 222f, 586; other, 206 IN, 9-15 Passim, 20-30 passim, 38, 40von Schroder, Ludwig, 66, 569 44, 50-52, 53, 56; government, 13-17, von Weichs, Maximilian, 71, 73n, 194, 212, 21-30 passim, 36-37, 43-44, 148, 158—

221, 227, 313, 315ff, 326 59, 229, 350, 378, 386, 393, 404, 486-88,

VOS (Security and Intelligence Service), 97- 523-28; political émigrés from, 16-21,

98, IOI, 113, 127, 517, 746 27, 30-40, 43-46, 51-60 passim, 159, Vrantic, Vjekoslav, 240n, 251, 256-57, 426; foreign affairs, 19-20, 34-35, 39260Nn, 306, 346, 378, 405, 498, 753 40, 46f, 159-60, 444, 512; coup of March

Vrkljan, Andrija, 753 27,1941, 47, 160, 168, 204, 229, 489, Vukiéevic, Velja, 24 lapse, 50-51, 5 5f, 131, 138, 149, 169,

Vutkovic, Vladeta, 723n 513, 553, 623, 740f; invasion and col-

Vukmanovic Tempo, Svetozar, 166n, 507 175, 204, 271, 282, 356, 391, 404-6, 611,

Vulnetars, 152 623, 739f; economy, 486-87, 611-17,

627, 707-8; other, 13-20 passim, 201-3,

Waffen Union $koda-Briinn G.m.b.H., 625 282, 580-83, 588, 592, 608

Waizsacker, Ernst, 60 Yugoslavia, Kingdom of, 417, 773 Wanner, Rudolf, 458 Yugoslavia, wartime: partition, 61-64, 83,

Warlimont, Walter, 81-82, 317 94, 130, 138, 149, 160, 162, 168—70, 196, War of April 1941, 47-61 passim, 206, 271, 203f, 233-34, 271, 282-83, 351; uprising 282, 301, 356, 391, 404, 406, 426, 633, in, 67-70, 88, 93-100 passim, 134, 140-

700, 723, 731 42,151,155, 166, 172-73, 178, 182, 216,

Waugh, Evelyn, 550-51 2.525 254,279, 314, 402, 412-15, 419, Wehrmannschaft, 91, 93 506-7, 585f, 605, 624, 697f; liberation of

Weltwirtschaftliches Institut, 613 areas, 73, 82, 128, 148, 156, 166-68,

Werewolves, 332 173-74, 228 752, 761f, 764f, 770-77

Western Macedonia, see Macedonia, West- passim; struggle among competing

em groups, 96-100, 126, 128, 142, 144, 199,

White Guards, 100, 107, 113, 126 230-32, 254-55, 424f, 433,447, 454,

Whites, 138 508; end-of-war reconstitution of state,

Wilson, Henry Maitland, 298 128, 232, 343, 366, 429, 500, 509, 550,

Winter, August, 212 773; legal status of, 268, 272; religion in

842 INDEX , under attack, 568-75, 583, 585, 591, 395,412, 434, 436, 450, 457, 489, 598, 606; economic exploitation of, 233, 617- 620, 675, 679, 713; inflation in, 354-55, 19, 622f, 627, 629-33, 644, 653, 659f, 703-4, 712; other, 87f, 235, 311, 349, 696-97; material and human losses, 714- 359, 365, 378, 402, 410f, 424, 430ff, 447, 19 passim, 729-39, 744-50. See also Al- 449, 451, 463f, 549, 582, 594, 596, 603, lies, Western; Yugoslavia, government-in- 627, 658, 681, 711, 748, 753,772

exile; and individual areas by name Zagreb Punctuations, 29f, 38 Yugoslavia after May 1945, 232, 509-10, ZAVNOBIH (Regional Anti-Fascist Council 516-22 passim, 5 58-63, 565, §76, 607, of National Liberation of Bosnia and

610, 696, 715-28 passim, 731, 735, 739- Herzegovina), 509 ,

«44 passim, 749-50, 767, 775 ZAVNOH (Regional Anti-Fascist Council Yugoslav idea (also Yugoslavism), 2f, 18, of National Liberation of Croatia), 3 6r1f,

186, 188f, 231 364f, 368, 443, 448, 453 !

Yugoslavization, 170 Zbor, 186-87, 190f, 230, 360 Yugoslav Muslim Organization, 13,23, 50, | Zetevic, Rev. Vlada, 514 373, 486ff, 491,508 =. Zerbino, Paolo, 132,297n

Yugoslav National Bank, 94, 621-22, 701 Zimonjic, Metropolitan Petar, 398 : , Yugoslav National Party, 99, 229, 501 Zones of occupation, Italian (I, II, and II), Yugoslav People’s Movement, see Zbor 234, 2375 244-62 passim, 269f, 399, 410,

Yugoslav Radical Union, 229 . 421, 494, 597-603 passim, 669f, 674 ,

Yugoslav Steel Corporation, 626 Zorn, Bozidar, 459 |

| | . Zuccolin, Marcello, 133n, 240n, 241

Zagreb: prewar, 7-16 passim, 20, 25ff, 29f, Zvonimir Line, 464, 752 -

37> 40, 45, 348, 473, 481, 484, 580ff; ; | | |

wartime: invasion, 48-63 passim, 336f, Zanic, Milovan, 346, 392,594

| 740; transportation hub, 94, 274, 276, Zerjavic, Vladimir, 730ff, 737, 764-65, 774

305, 414, 501, 629ff, 641, 746; adminis- Zivkovié, Petar, 26 , trative center, 240ff, 246-66 passim, 275, Zivojinovic, Dragoljub, 725 284f, 300, 304, 312, 320-32 passim, 393, Zujovic, Sretan, 705