War and Religion: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict [3 volumes] [Illustrated] 161069516X, 9781610695169

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WAR AND RELIGION

WAR AND RELIGION An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict VOLUME 1: A–G

Jeffrey M. Shaw and Timothy J. Demy Editors

Copyright © 2017 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Shaw, Jeffrey M., editor of compilation. | Demy, Timothy J., editor of compilation. Title: War and religion : an encyclopedia of faith and conflict / Jeffrey M. Shaw and Timothy J. Demy, editors. Description: Santa Barbara, California : ABC-CLIO, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and indexes. Identifiers: LCCN 2016038200 (print) | LCCN 2017005624 (ebook) | ISBN 9781610695169 (set : acid-free paper) |  ISBN 9781440847615 (volume 1 : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9781440847622 (volume 2 : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9781440847639 (volume 3 : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9781610695176 (ebook) | Subjects: LCSH: War—Religious aspects—History—Encyclopedias. | Religions—History—Encyclopedias. | Social conflict—   History—Encyclopedias. | Military history—Encyclopedias. Classification: LCC BL85 .W37 2017 (print) | LCC BL85 (ebook) | DDC 261.8/73—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016038200 ISBN: 978-1-61069-516-9 (Set) ISBN: 978-1-4408-4761-5 (Volume 1) ISBN: 978-1-4408-4762-2 (Volume 2) ISBN: 978-1-4408-4763-9 (Volume 3) EISBN: 978-1-61069-517-6 (Set) 21 20 19 18 17  1 2 3 4 5 This book is also available as an eBook. ABC-CLIO An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 www.abc-clio.com This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Volume 1: A–G

Volume 3: S–Z

Alphabetical List of Entries—vii List of Primary Documents—xv Preface—xvii Acknowledgments—xix Introduction—xxi Chronology—xxiii Guide to Related Topics—xxxix Entries: —1

Alphabetical List of Entries—vii List of Primary Documents—xv Guide to Related Topics—xvii Entries: S–Z—693 Primary Documents—887 Bibliography—1009 Editors and Contributors—1017 Index—1021

Volume 2: H–R Alphabetical List of Entries—vii List of Primary Documents—xv Guide to Related Topics—xvii Entries: H–R—323

v

Alphabetical List of Entries

Volume 1: A–G

Anabaptist Pacifism Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842) Anglo-Sikh Wars (1845–1846, 1848–1849) Antioch, Siege of (1097–1098) Anti-Semitism Apocalyptic Literature Apocalypticism and War, Christian Apocalypticism and War, Jewish Apocalypticism and War, Muslim Aquinas, Thomas (1225–1274) Arab-Israeli War of 1948 Arianism and War Armenian Massacres Arnaud Amaury (Arnaud Amalric) (d. 1225) Art and the Crusades Ascalon, Battle of (1099) Ashoka (304–232 BCE) Ashur Ashurbanipal (ca. 685–ca. 627 BCE) Assassins Assyrian Warfare Audita Tremendi (1187) Augustine (354–430 CE) Aum Shinrikyo

Abbasid Revolution (747–750 CE) Acre, Sieges of (1189–1191, 1291) Adī Granth Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1979–1989) Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–) Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (Martin Luther, 1525) Ahimsa Ahura Mazda Ai, Battle of (ca. 1400 BCE or 1200 BCE) Alarcos, Battle of (1195) Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229) Alcántara, Order of Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857) All India Muslim League Almohad Revolution (12th Century CE) Al Qaeda Al Shabaab Alsted, Johann Heinrich (1588–1638) Ambrose, Bishop of Milan (ca. 339–397 CE) American Civil War, Religious Dimensions of American Revolution, Religious Dimensions of Ames, William (1576–1633) Amun vii

viii  Alphabetical List of Entries

Austro-Ottoman Wars Ayodhya Conflict (1992) Ayyubids Baal Babylonian Conquest of Israel (597–586 BCE) Bacon, Roger (ca. 1214–1294) Badr, Battle of (624 CE) Bahādur, Bandā Singh (1670–1716) Baha’i Faith and War Balfour Declaration (1917) Balkan Wars (1912–1913) Bar Kochba Revolt (132–136 CE) Bar Kochba, Simon (d. 135 CE) Barons’ Crusade (1239–1241) Bartholomew, Peter (d. 1099) Basmachi Rebellion (1918–1933) Belatucadros, Celtic God of War Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) Beth Zechariah, Battle of (162 BCE) Beth Zur, Battle of (164 BCE) Beza, Theodore (1519–1605) Béziers, Massacre at (1209) Bhagavad Gita and War Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh (1947–1984) Bible and War Bin Laden, Osama (1957–2011) Bishops’ Wars (1639–1640) Boko Haram Bonhoeffer, Dietrich (1906–1945) Bouillon, Godfrey de (1060–1100) Brown, John (1800–1859) Buddhism and War Bullinger, Heinrich (1504–1575) Bushido Buyids Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035) Byzantine-Seljuk Wars Calatrava, Order of Caliphate Calvin, John (1509–1564) Camel, Battle of the (656 CE) Camisards, Revolt of (1702–1704) Camp David Accords (1978) Canon Law on War

Carlist Wars (1833–1840, 1846–1849, 1872–1876) Cathars Catholic (Holy) League Central Asia, Russian Conquest of Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response (1983) Chamkaur, Battle of (1705) Charlemagne’s Conquests (ca. 747–814 CE) Chemosh Christian Daimyo Christianity and War Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Christian-Muslim Wars in Spain Cistercian Order Clement V, Pope (ca. 1260–1314) Clermont, Council of (1095) Cold War, Religious Dimensions of Cologne War (1583–1588) Confucianism and War Constantine (272–337 CE) Constantinople, Arab Sieges of (674–678, 717–718) Covadonga, Battle of (ca. May 28, 722 CE) Cresson, Battle of (1187) Crimean War, Religious Dimensions of Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658) Crusade (as term) Crusade of 1101 Crusade of Henry VI (1197–1198) Crusade of the Poor (1309) Crusades (Overview) Crusades and Religious Relics Crusades, Naval History of Crusades, Women in the Cyprus, Kingdom of Cyrus Cylinder Cyrus II, King of Persia (ca. 600 or 576–530 BCE) Dalai Lama XIV (1935–) Damascus, Arab Conquest of (634 CE) Damietta, Siege of (1218–1219) Daoism and War Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb Dasam Granth Deborah Deborah, Defeat of Sisera

Alphabetical List of Entries  ix

Decades (Bullinger, 1552) Decretum (Decretum Gratiani) (Gratian, 12th Century CE) Deeds of the Franks (Gesta Francorum) (ca. 1100) Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East Delaware River Valley, Toleration and Conflict (1609–1681) Despenser’s Crusade (1383) Dev, Guru Arjan (1563–1606) Dharam Yudh Dhimma Divine Kingship and War Druze and War Druze-Maronite Conflict (1840–1860) Duc, Thich Quong (1897–1963) Easter Rising (1916) Edessa, County of Edict of Fontainebleau (1685) Egyptian Warfare Eighth Crusade (1270) Eighty Years’ War, or Dutch War of Independence (1568–1648) El Cid (Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar) (ca. 1043–1099) Emicho, Count of Leiningen (Late 11th Century) English Civil Wars (1642–1651) Erasmus, Desiderius (1466–1536) Ethiopian-Adal War (1529–1543) Fatimid Conquest of Baghdad (1058) Fatimid Conquest of Egypt Fatimid Conquest of North Africa Fatimids Fifth Crusade (1217–1221) Fifth Monarchists First Crusade (1096–1099) First World War and Religious Art First World War, Religious Dimensions of Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) Frederick II and the Papacy, Conflict of French and Indian War, Religious Dimensions of French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900) French Wars of Religion (1562–1598) Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948) Gaza War (2006) German Peasants’ War (1524–1525) Ghost Dance Movement

Gideon Golden Temple, Battle of (1984) Goodman, Christopher (1520–1603) “Gott mit uns” Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922) Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645)

Volume 2: H–R

Hachiman, Japanese God of War Hadith and War Haganah Hamas Hanh, Thich Nhat (1926–) Harbiyah, Battle of (1244) Harran, Battle of (1104) Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) Hattin, Battle of (1187) Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831) Henry VIII, King of England (1491–1547) Herem Hezbollah Hindu Mythological Wars Hinduism and War Hittite Warfare Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679) Holocaust Holy Roman Empire Holy Sepulchre, Church of the Holy War (Bellum Sacrum) Holy War, Medieval Roman Catholic Conceptions of Huguenots Hus, Jan (ca. 1370–1415) Hybrid War of the 21st Century, Religious Dimensions of Ibn Khaldun (1332–1402) Ibn Taymiyah (1263–1328) Ikko-ikki Illinois Mormon War (1844–1846) In Praise of the New Knighthood (Bernard of Clairvaux, 1128–1136) India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in India, Muslim Conquest of Northern India, Religious Conflict in Indian Mutiny (1857)

x  Alphabetical List of Entries

Indo-Pakistani Wars Indra, Hindu God of War Innocent III, Pope (1160–1216) International Religious Freedom and Human Rights Intifada Investiture Controversy Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938) Iranian Revolution (1979) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Ishtar Islam and War (Jihad) Islamic State Israelite Conquest of Canaan Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy Israelite Wars of the Judges Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy Jaffa, Treaty of (1192) Jahiliyya and Asabiyyah Jainism and War Jericho, Battle of (ca. 1400 BCE or 1200 BCE) Jerusalem as Holy City Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, Sieges of Jesuits Jesus as Warrior Jewish Revolt (66–70 CE) Jews and the Crusades Joan of Arc (1412–1431) Jos Riots (2010) Josephus (37–ca. 100 CE) Joshua Judaism and War Just War Tradition Kamikaze Kappel, Wars of (1529–1531) Karbala, Battle of (680 CE) Kashmir Conflict Khalid ibn al Walid (d. 642 CE) Khālsā Khandaq, Battle of (627 CE) Khartoum, Siege of (1884–1885) Khaybar, Battle of (629 CE) Khilafat Movement (1918–1924)

Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi (1902–1989) King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) King David as Warrior King Philip’s War (1675–1676) Knighthood, Christian Ideal of Knights Templar Knox, John (1514–1572) Konishi Yukinaga (1558–1600) Kosovo, Battle of (1389) Kosovo War (1999) Kurds Kurukshetra War Lachish, Battle of (701 BCE) Lactantius (240–320 CE) Languedoc Revolts (1215–1229) Las Casas, Bartolomé de (1484–1566) Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of (1212) Lateran Church Councils Lawrence of Arabia (1888–1935) Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982) Lebanon, Israeli Operations against (2006) Lepanto, Battle of (1571) Lex Rex Liberation Theology Liberian Civil Wars Libraries and Religious Texts, Destruction of Liturgy of the Crusades Locke, John (1632–1704) Luther, Martin (1483–1546) Maasai Warriors Maccabean Revolt (167–160 BCE) Maccabeus, Judas (d. 160 BCE) Mad Mullah, Wars of the (1892–1920) Mahdi Mahdia Crusade (1390) Mahdist Revolution in Sudan Maimonides (1138–1204) Malta, Siege of (1565) Manichaeism and War Manifest Destiny Mansurah, Battles of (1221 and 1250) Manzikert, Battle of (1071) Maronites and War

Alphabetical List of Entries  xi

Mars, Roman God of War Martin of Tours (d. 397 CE) Martyrs, Jesuit Martyrs’ Mirror (1660) Marx, Karl (1818–1883) Masada, Siege of (73–74 CE) Masts, Battle of the (655 CE) Mau Mau Rebellion (1948) Mazu-Tianfei Megiddo, Battle of (15th Century BCE) Melanchthon, Philip (1497–1560) Melito of Sardis (d. ca. 180 CE) Merton, Thomas (1915–1968) Meskhetian Turks Mexican-American War, Religious Dimensions of Milhemet Misvah Milhemet Reshut Militarism, Religious Military Chaplains Military Chaplains, African American Military Raid in Islam Milvian Bridge, Battle of (312 CE) Missouri Mormon War (1838) Mohammed Omar, Mullah (d. 2013) Mongols Monophysitism Montesa, Order of More, Thomas (1478–1535) Mormon Rebellion (1857–1858) Mu’awiya (602–680 CE) Mughal-Maratha Wars (1659–1707) Mughal-Sikh Wars (1628–1715) Muhammad as Warrior Mujahideen Münster Rebellion (1534–1535) Muslim Armies of the Crusades Muslim Brotherhood Muslim Civil War, First (656–661 CE) Muslim Civil War, Second (680–692 CE) Muslim Conquest of Egypt Muslim Conquest of Iraq Muslim Conquest of Persia Muslim Conquest of Sindh Nachmanides (1194–1270)

Nahawand, Battle of (642 CE) Nānak, Guru (1469–1539) Native American Warfare Nazism, Religious Aspects of Neo-Assyrian Warfare Nicopolis, Crusade of (1396) Ninth Crusade (1271–1272) Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict Nostra Aetate (Paul VI, 1965) Nur Al-Din (1118–1174) Odin, Teutonic God of War On War against the Turk (Luther, 1529) Origen and War (ca. 185–ca. 254 CE) Oslo Accords (1993) Otranto, Battle of (1480–1481) Ottoman Empire Ottoman-Persian Wars Pacem in Terris (John XXIII, 1963) Pacifism, Religious Pakistan, Religious Violence in Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Papal-Imperial Conflict Peace in the Hebrew Scriptures Peace in the New Testament Peace in the Qur’an Peace of God Penance (Christian) and War Penn, William (1644–1718) Philistines Pius XII, Pope (1876–1958) Political Theology and War Ponet, John (ca. 1514–1556) Popular Crusades Prayer Book Rebellion (1549) Protestant Reformers and War Pueblo Revolt (1680) Puritans and War Qadesh, Battle of (1274 BCE) Qadisiyya, Battle of (636 CE) Qarmati Uprising (923–951 CE) Qur’an and War Radical Islam in the 20th Century Reconquista Religious Military Orders

xii  Alphabetical List of Entries

Religious Propaganda and War Religious Wars and Mortality Rates Rhodes, Siege of (1522–1523) Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) (632–633 CE) Ritual and War Roland, Song of (La Chanson de Roland) Roman Army and Religion Roman Emperor Worship Roman Religion, Mythology, and War

Volume 3: S–Z

Sacred Space and Conflict Sacred Swords Saffron Revolution (2007) Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (1572) Saint George Saint Ursula (d. 383 CE) Saladin (1138–1193) Salafism Sant Sipāhī Santiago, Order of Saracens Saudi-Hashemite Wars (1917–1925) Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar (1883–1966) Saxon Wars Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) Schmalkaldic War (1546–1547) Second Crusade (1147–1149) Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) Second World War, Japanese Empire, and Islam Second World War, Religious Dimensions of Seljuks Sennacherib’s Attack on Judah (ca. 701 BCE) Seventh Crusade (1248–1254) Sharia and War Shimabara Rebellion (1637–1638) Shinto and War Shoko Asahara (1955–) Shouren, Wang (1472–1529) Shrine Cults, East Indies Siffin, Battle of (657 CE) Sikhism and War Simons, Menno (1496–1561) Singh, Bābā Dīp (1682–1757)

Singh, Guru Gobind (1666–1708) Sinn Féin Sirhind, Battle of (1710) Six-Day War (1967) Sixth Crusade (1227–1229) Sōen Shaku (1860–1919) Sōhei South Vietnamese Buddhist Uprising (1966) Southeast Asia, Religious Conflict Spanish-American War, Religious Dimensions of Spanish Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Suarez, Francisco (1548–1617) Sufism and War Süleyman the Magnificent (1494–1566) Sunni-Shi’a Conflict Syrian Orthodox Church Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) Tajikistan Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Talas, Battle of (751 CE) Taliban Talmud and War Tamil Tigers Tannenburg, Battle of (1410) Taraori (Tarain), Battles of (1191–1192) Tarsusi, Ali ibn Mardi al (12th Century CE) Ten Kings, Battle of (2900 BCE) Terrorism and Religion Third Crusade (1189–1192) Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) Three Kingdoms, War of the (1638–1660) Tibetan Rebellion (1959) Tours, Battle of (732 CE) Transcendentalism and War Tripoli, County of Tripolitan War Truce of God True Cross Twelve Articles (1525) Tyr, Norse God of War Tyrannicide Uhud, Battle of (625 CE) Uighur Unrest in Xinjiang Urban II, Pope (ca. 1035–1099) Vattel, Emmerich de (1714–1767)

Alphabetical List of Entries  xiii

Venetian Crusade (1122–1124) Verden, Massacre of (782 CE) Vermigli, Peter Martyr (1499–1562) Vienna, Siege of (1529) Vienna, Siege of (1683) Viret, Pierre (1511–1571) Vitoria, Francisco de (1483–1546) Voetius, Gisbertus (1589–1676) Vow (Crusade) Wahhabism Walter the Penniless (d. 1096) Warrior Saints Wars of the Reformation Weapons in the New Testament Wendish Crusade (1147) West Africa, French Wars of Conquest in West Semitic Warfare Westphalia, Peace of (1648)

Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved (Luther, 1526) William of Adam (ca. 1275–1338/39) Wingate, Orde (1903–1944) Wollebius, Johannes (1586–1629) Wounded Knee, Massacre of (1890) Wyatt’s Rebellion (1554) Yahweh as Divine Warrior Yarmouk, Battle of (636 CE) Yasukuni Shrine Yom Kippur War (1973) Young Turks Zab, Battle of (750 CE) Zanj Rebellion (869–893 CE) Zealots Zen and War Zionism and War Zoroastrianism and War Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531)

List of Primary Documents

An Account of the First Crusade: Anselme of Ribemont’s Letter to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims (1098) An Account of the First Crusade: Letter of Daimbert, Archbishop of Pisa; Godfrey of Bouillon; and Raymond, Count of St. Gilles to Pope Paschal II (1099) Crusading in the Thirteenth Century: A Letter to All the Faithfull by the Patriarch of Jerusalem (1229) Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation (1520) Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (May 1525) Excerpts from the Peace of Augsburg (1555) Excerpt from Jacques-Auguste de Thou’s Account of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day in Paris (1572) Granting Religious Toleration to Huguenots: Henri IV’s Edict of Nantes (1598) The Dutie of a King in His Royal Office by Sir Walter Raleigh (1599) Edicts Issued by the Japanese Shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa: “Closed Country Edict” (1635) and “Exclusion of the Portuguese Edict” (1639) Excerpt from Samuel Rutherford’s Lex, Rex (1644) Declaration of Breda (April 4, 1660)

Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (July 8, 1663) Withdrawing Religious Toleration for Huguenots: Louis XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) Government and Religion in British Canada: The Quebec Act (October 7, 1774) Treaty of Tripoli (January 3, 1797) President Abraham Lincoln’s Proclamation Declaring a National Fast Day (March 30, 1863) Max Nordau’s Address to the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland (August 29, 1897) “At the Battle of Nan Shan Hill” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk Sōen Shaku (December 1904) “Buddhist View of War” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk Sōen Shaku (1904) Issuance of Ottoman Fetva by Essad Effendi, Sheik-UlIslam in the Name of Sultan Mehmed V (November 1914) Balfour Declaration (1917) Pacem, Dei Munus Pulcherrimum, a Papal Encyclical Issued by Pope Benedict XV (May 23, 1920) The Palestine Mandate (July 24, 1922) U.S. Congress Endorsement of the Balfour Declaration (September 21, 1922)

xv

xvi  List of Primary Documents

Christianity in Nazi Germany: Karl Barth’s Theological Declaration of Barmen (1934) British House of Commons Discussion Expressing Outrage Following the Zionist Terrorist Attack on the King David Hotel in Jerusalem (1946) UN Partition Plan for Palestine: UN Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine (November 29, 1947) Statement by the Arab League upon the Declaration of the State of Israel (May 15, 1948) President Dwight Eisenhower’s Message to Congress Setting Forth the “Eisenhower Doctrine” (January 5, 1957) Pacem in Terris, a Papal Encyclical Issued by Pope John XXIII (April 11, 1963) UN Resolution Declaring Zionism to Be Racism (1975) Camp David Accords: A Framework for Peace Between Israel and Egypt and a Framework for Negotiations (September 17, 1978) Article 27 of the Hamas Charter (August 18, 1988) Speech by Nelson Mandela at the Zionist Christian Church Easter Conference (April 20, 1992) Parliament of the World’s Religions: Hans Kung’s Declaration Toward a Global Ethic (September 4, 1993) Last Speech of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (November 4, 1995) Wye River Memorandum (1998) United Nations Secretary-General’s Statement Calling for Support of All Religions (September 10, 2001)

Defining Terrorism: UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (October 8, 2004) Declaration of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation from the First Jewish-Hindu Leadership Summit (February 5–6, 2007) Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France, in Commemoration of the Mumbai Terrorist Attacks (December 7, 2010) UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Message to the International Conference on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (April 15, 2013) UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Message to the Religions for Peace Assembly: People of Faith Can Pave Way for Tolerance, Solidarity among All Groups (November 20, 2013) Excerpt from the Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan (2015) UN Resolution 2199: The UN Security Council Condemns Trade with Al-Qaida-Associated Groups (2015) UN Security Council Statement on Boko Haram (January 19, 2015) Guidelines Proposed at the UN General Assembly Meeting on the Syrian Refugee Crisis (November 20, 2015) Remarks at the International Conference on the Question of Jerusalem (December 15, 2015)

Preface

The aim of this encyclopedia is to present not only the great religious traditions themselves and examine what influence they have had over warfare throughout the ages, but also to present some of the major personalities who have been involved with these conflicts, as well as some of the battles and weapons involved in these wars. How has religious belief influenced conflict and warfare through the ages, and what is the relationship between war and religion? What do the major religious traditions have to say about the use of armed force, and how can people today learn from the past in hopes of minimizing the potential for future conflict emanating from religious ideas and practices? War and Religion is written with these questions in mind. War and Religion: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict comprises three alphabetically organized volumes and is geared toward a high school and undergraduate student audience, as well as proving useful for nonspecialist library patrons. Featured within are more than 500 individual entries that are related in some way to the major faith traditions that have been part of human societies throughout history. Some of the earliest traditions include Zoroastrianism as well as the panoply of Greek and Roman gods, and Celtic and Norse gods. Major religious traditions, as well as those

with fewer adherents, that are also covered include Baha’i, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, and Sikhism. Not only are the major faith traditions themselves presented, but entries also explore the religious dimensions of major wars and conflicts, such as the American Revolution, the American Civil War, the Cold War, the First World War, the Second World War, and the various medieval European crusades against Middle Eastern Islam. The entries also cover the religious aspects of many smaller wars and conflicts, such as the Anglo-Sikh Wars, the Balkan Wars, the Bishops’ Wars, and the German Peasants’ War. Many prominent battles, leaders, philosophers, and theologians, and even some weapons employed throughout the numerous conflicts are also included. A timeline puts the chronological sweep of the entries into visual perspective. Each entry also offers a “See also” list of cross-references to related entries that can be consulted for further clarification. In addition, each entry concludes with a “Further Reading” list of print and electronic resources that can be consulted to provide greater insight into any of the topics for further research. Nearly 50 primary document excerpts relating to war and religion are provided in Volume 3. Each document excerpt begins with an explanatory paragraph describing what the docuxvii

xviii Preface

ment is and how it relates to the overall theme of religion and war. Also included is a general bibliography of important works on the topic of war and religion, as well as a Guide to Related Topics that breaks the entries down into broad topical categories that allow users to easily

and quickly trace important ideas, themes, and concepts across the entries. It is the editors’ hope that students will find this encyclopedia to be informative, enjoyable to read, and a useful addition to the literature on this important topic.

Acknowledgments

Many individuals helped bring this encyclopedia to print. First and foremost, the editors thank ABC-CLIO’s John Wagner for oversight and guidance with this project. Thanks also to George Butler of ABC-CLIO for allowing us to serve as editors for this important book. Barbara Patterson provided needed technical assistance throughout the three-year production process—thank you, Barbara, for your great work! Our many contributors took the time to share their scholarship with us in their various fields of expertise. Nearly 200 professors, authors, scholars, and military and

government practitioners from more than 20 different nations provide a diverse array of perspectives on the interplay between religion and war. Helping us find these contributors, we thank Dr. Michael Jerryson of Youngstown State University; Dr. Mark Juergensmeyer of the University of California, Santa Barbara; and Dr. Brian Sandberg of Northern Illinois University. These three scholars identified many of our contributors, many of whom are leading experts in their field. A final thanks to all of our contributors for their work.

xix

Introduction

Religion has been a central facet of human society since the dawn of history. From earliest times, human civilization has been centered on belief in a greater power, one that created the world and provided meaning to human affairs. As civilizations grew and interacted with one another, conflicting patterns of belief often fueled conflict as kings and emperors sought justification for expanding their borders and for dealing with inhabitants of foreign lands. While religion has rarely served as the cause for warfare, religious ideas, systems of belief, and ethical patterns based on established religious traditions have influenced warfare and conflict from antiquity to the present day. In its three volumes, War and Religion: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict examines the interaction between war and religion, offering students and interested nonspecialist readers an opportunity to investigate the complex interaction between these two central elements of human history. War and religion have been driving forces behind the rise and fall of the great civilizations, but there are certain historical episodes that come to mind as particular examples of the interplay between war and religion. While the crusades, the wars of the Protestant Reformation, and the conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Middle East are some of the more obvious examples of the influence of religious

belief on war and conflict, many of the major wars and some of the smaller peripheral conflicts that have occurred throughout history have had a religious component of some kind or another. This encyclopedia traces the relationship between war and religion from ancient times until the present day. In ancient times, gods and deities were considered crucial components of warfare. Entries covering this era are plentiful, including a look at the gods and deities themselves, some of the great empires of antiquity, and a number of ancient battles. Many of the world’s major faith traditions were founded during this age, and synopses of the relationship between the great faiths and warfare are included as entries. Not only the religious traditions but the accompanying sacred texts are covered, as well as, in many cases, the founders of the great faiths and their thoughts on warfare and conflict. A number of eras and epochs stand out as being prone to religious violence. Readers will find concentrations of entries dealing with a number of these eras. First and foremost, the rise of Islam is one such epoch about which readers will find a variety of entries on the personalities, theorists, battles, and outcomes of the rapid spread of the Islamic faith over much of the Mediterranean world and into Asia and Africa. xxi

xxii Introduction

The consequent crusade era, launched to liberate the Holy Land from Muslim rule, is another such era, and thus is rich in entries and primary source documents. The individual crusades themselves, whether against the forces of Islam or against other Christians, are covered extensively, as are a number of battles, leaders, and ideas that emerged in this historical era. The Protestant Reformation is another era in which religious fervor led to large-scale violence in Europe. The individual reformers themselves are covered in a variety of entries, as are many of their doctrines and theories. Battles and conflicts of this age are many—from the French Wars of Religion to the Thirty Years’ War, this era of savagery is well documented in the following pages. Entries covering a number of rather unknown individuals and events are also to be found throughout the encyclopedia. A detailed subject index guides readers to where they want to go, and researchers will have little trouble identifying what we believe to be some of the most salient issues, people, ideas, battles, and wars that compose the fascinating panoply of war and religion. Continuing with the historical eras, the modern Middle East is the concern of numerous entries. The Arab-Israeli wars and the various actors in this perpetual struggle receive a great deal of attention, especially in the primary source documents section. Speeches, UN declarations, and other primary documents relating to this part of the world are plentiful in the document section at the end of the third volume.

Religious conflict has been a central phenomenon of the 21st century. Whether renewed violence in the Holy Land or the rise of various political groups claiming to spring from an interpretation of Islam, the violence in Kashmir along the Indo-Pakistani border, continued unrest in Tibet, questions concerning the continued relevance of the just war tradition, or some of the lower intensity conflicts taking place in Africa between armed groups and established governments, today’s headlines document a resurgence in religiously motivated violence and war. Few of the conflicts today in which religion is a factor are new—the roots of these conflicts extend back for centuries, or, in some cases, thousands of years. However, like all conflicts throughout history that have had a religious component, few if any of today’s wars can be described as purely religious wars. Various other factors, such as economic growth, control of resources, or the drawing and/or redrawing of political borders, color the conflicts within which religion is also a factor. The entries in this encyclopedia provide both a historical overview of the ways in which the great religious traditions have viewed war and violence over time, and also the individuals within those traditions who have added to the dialogue and the debate about how a religious faith ostensibly based on peace and goodwill can be used as a means to justify armed conflict against neighbors, whether of the same or of an opposing faith.

Chronology

ca. 1482/1479 /1457 BCE:

Egyptian forces under Pharaoh Thutmose III defeat a CanaaniteMitanni coalition in Canaan at the Battle of Megiddo.

1400 BCE/ 1200 BCE:

The Israelites capture Jericho and Ai, two important Canaanite cities.

1274 BCE:

Fighting for dominance in Canaan, an Egyptian army commanded by Pharaoh Ramses II clashes with a Hittite army at the Battle of Qadesh; although Ramses claims victory, the battle may have been a draw.

ca. 1000 BCE:

King David besieges and captures the Jebusite city of Jerusalem, making it thereafter the political and religious capital of the Israelite people.

701 BCE:

The Assyrian king Sennacherib besieges and conquers Lachish, the second-largest city in the Hebrew kingdom of Judah.

597–586 BCE:

The Babylonians conquer the southern Israelite kingdom of Judea;

many Israelites are taken to Babylon as captives.

xxiii

539 BCE:

Cyrus of Persia, upon defeating Babylon, decrees that all peoples previously exiled by the Babylonians could return to their homelands and resume the worship of their own gods; among the returning exiles were many Jews.

304 BCE:

Birth of Ashoka, first ruler of the Mauryan dynasty, who controlled much of what is present-day India and who was a prominent convert to Buddhism.

167–160 BCE:

Led by the priest Mattathias and his sons, who eventually took the name Maccabee, the Maccabean Revolt, a Jewish uprising sparked by the Hellenization policy of the Greek Seleucid Empire, results in the restoration of Jewish religious freedom.

164 BCE:

Judas Maccabeus, leader of the Jewish Maccabean Revolt, wins a major

xxiv Chronology

victory over the forces of the Seleucid Empire at the Battle of Beth Zur. 162 BCE:

381:

The Council of Constantinople produces the NicenoConstantinopolitan Creed, thereby rejecting the set of Christological beliefs comprising Arianism.

570:

Muhammad, the founder of Islam, is born in the Arabian city of Mecca.

624:

The Battle of Badr is a victory of the forces of Islam, led by the Prophet Muhammad, over the Quraysh, the tribe that then dominated Mecca.

625:

The small Muslim community led by Mohammad is defeated by the Meccans at the Battle of Uhud; the defeat, which for the Muslims seems to indicate divine disfavor, leads to great soul-searching within the community.

627:

Led by Muhammad, the Muslims win a major victory at the Battle of Khandaq, defeating a coalition of polytheist and Jewish tribes led by the Quraysh, the dominant tribe of Mecca.

ca. 628:

Khalid ibn al-Walid, a prominent military leader of the Quraysh tribe of Mecca and an opponent of Muhammad, converts to Islam.

629:

Emperor Constantine’s Edict of Milan grants toleration to Christianity within the Roman Empire.

Led by the Prophet Muhammad, Muslim forces defeat the Jews of Medina at the Battle of Khaybar; the victory stimulates further conversions to Islam among the Arab tribes.

632:

Birth of Saint Ambrose, bishop of Milan, one of the first early church fathers to construct a theology of just war.

The Prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam, dies in the Arabian city of Medina.

632–633:

Following the death of Muhammad, Muslims launch a series of campaigns, known as the Ridda Wars, against non-Muslim tribes of Arabia.

634–639:

Arabic Muslim armies conquer much of the Sassanid Persian Empire, seizing

The forces of the Greek Seleucid Empire defeat the Jewish rebels under Judas Maccabeus at the Battle of Beth Zechariah during the ultimately successful Jewish Maccabean Revolt.

ca. 30 CE:

Crucifixion, in Roman-controlled Jerusalem, of Jesus of Nazareth, founder of Christianity.

66–70:

Jewish Revolt against Roman rule leads to the destruction of Jerusalem and the Jewish temple.

73–74:

132–136:

312:

313:

ca. 339:

354:

After a long siege, Roman troops capture the fortress of Masada from a band of Jewish rebels who had fled to the desert stronghold after the fall of Jerusalem in 70 CE; Masada’s defenders choose suicide over capture. The Bar Kochba Revolt, a Jewish uprising against Roman rule led by Simon Bar Kochba, erupts in the Roman province of Judea. Constantine defeats his rival Maxentius at the Battle of Milvian Bridge, thus becoming emperor of Rome; Constantine is said to have had a vision before the battle telling him to fight under the emblem of Christ.

Birth of Augustine, bishop of Hippo and an influential Christian philosopher and theologian, who was instrumental in the development of Christian just war theory.

Chronology xxv

Iraq, and portions of the Byzantine Empire, seizing Syria and Palestine. 634:

Muslim Arabs capture the Syrian city of Damascus from Byzantine defenders.

636:

Arab Muslim forces defeat a Byzantine army at the Battle of Yarmouk in Syria.

636:

Arab Muslim forces win a major victory over the Sassanid Persian army at the Battle of Qadisiyya, thereby extending Muslim control throughout much of modern-day Iraq.

639–642:

Arabic Muslim armies conquer Egypt, a province of the Byzantine Empire.

642:

Arabic Muslim armies overthrow the Sassanid Persian Empire with a major victory at the Battle of Nahawand.

655:

The Battle of the Masts (655 CE), the first major naval encounter between the forces of Islam and the Byzantine Empire, is a Muslim victory opening the Mediterranean to further Muslim expansion.

656–661:

656:

657:

The First Muslim Civil War results from conflict over succession to the spiritual and political leadership of Islam following the murder of Caliph Uthman ibn Affan. The Battle of the Camel, the first conflict between two Muslim forces, is fought in Iraq; the forces of Caliph Ali ibn abi-Talib defeat the armies of A’isha bint Abu Bakr, widow of Muhammad; the conflict between these two for control of the Muslim empire is at the root of later differences between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. The Battle of Siffin, an encounter between two Muslim armies

supporting different candidates for the caliphate, weakens the position of Caliph Ali and opens the door to his murder in 661. 674–678:

The first Arab siege of Constantinople ends in failure when the Byzantine use of Greek fire destroys the Arab fleet.

680–692:

The Second Muslim Civil War, a new conflict over succession to the political and military leadership of Islam, follows the death of the Umayyad caliph Mu’awiya in 680.

680:

Fought between two Muslim factions, the Battle of Karbala (October 10) results in the death of Husayn-ibnAli, grandson of Muhammad, whose death becomes the root of the permanent split in the Islamic umma (body of believers) between Sunni and Shi’a branches.

717–718:

The second Arab siege of Constantinople is defeated by the Byzantine use of Greek fire and by the death of the caliph.

722:

Spanish Christians win an overwhelming victory over Muslim forces in Spain at the Battle of Covadonga.

732:

Frankish Christian forces led by Charles Martel defeat a Muslim army from Spain at the Battle of Tours in southern France; the victory checks Muslim expansion into Western Europe.

747–750:

The Abbasid Revolution leads to a change of dynasty in the Muslim empire, with the overthrow of the Umayyad caliphate and the installation of Abu’l Abbas As-Saffah as the first Abbasid caliph.

xxvi Chronology

751:

An Arab-Tibetan army defeats a Chinese army at the Battle of Talas; the battle is part of a struggle for cultural dominance between Islam and Tang China in Central Asia.

782:

At Verden in modern-day Germany, Frankish Christian forces under Charlemagne massacre about 4,500 captive pagan Saxons.

923–951:

The Qarmati Shi’a Muslim uprising erupts in Arabia and southern Iraq.

969:

Fatimid Shi’a Muslims seize control of Egypt from the Sunni Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad; in 973, the Fatimids move their capital in Egypt to the new city of Cairo.

1058:

Baghdad falls to the Fatimid Ismaili Shi’a Muslim Empire, which holds the city for 13 months until it returns to the control of the Abbasid caliphate.

1071:

The Battle of Manzikert, a Byzantine defeat by Muslim Turkish forces that results in the capture of the Byzantine emperor, opens central Anatolia to Muslim conquest.

1090:

Birth of Bernard, abbot of the French Cistercian abbey of Clairvaux, whose preaching helped inspire the launching of the Second Crusade (1147–1149).

1094–1260:

The Assassins, a branch of Shi’a Muslims that used assassination as a political weapon, operated out of strongholds in the mountains of northern Syria and Persia.

1094:

El Cid (Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar), a legendary Spanish Christian warrior who fought both Muslims and Christians, captures the city of Valencia (June 10).

1095:

At a meeting of the Council of Clermont in France (November), Pope Urban II delivers a speech that helps initiate the First Crusade (1096–1099) and the whole European crusading movement by propagating an ideology that declares freeing the Holy Land from Muslim control to be God’s will.

1096–1099:

The First Crusade captures Antioch, Edessa, and Jerusalem, thereby establishing a series of Christian citystates in the Middle East.

1097–1098:

The armies of the First Crusade besiege Antioch, which falls through treachery; the crusaders are then themselves besieged within the city by Syrian Muslim forces, which are ultimately defeated, leaving the city in crusader hands.

1099:

Jerusalem falls to the armies of the First Crusade (July 15); the crusaders slaughter many of the city’s inhabitants.

1099:

Crusader victory over Fatimid Muslim forces at the Battle of Ascalon (August 12) ends the First Crusade and ensures crusader control of Jerusalem.

ca. 1100: The Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum ("The Deeds of the Franks and the Other Pilgrims to Jerusalem"), or simply Gesta Francorum, a chronicle of the First Crusade, is written. 1101:

The crusade of 1101 comprises four separate expeditions to the Holy Land launched in this year in response to Pope Urban II’s call to arms at the Council of Clermont (1095); the expeditions are often regarded as a second wave of armies following the First Crusade (1096–1099) rather than as a separate crusade.

Chronology xxvii

1104:

1128–1136:

A serious crusader defeat, the Battle of Harran allows the Muslim Seljuk Turks to recapture territory in Syria and weakens the crusader states of Antioch and Edessa. Bernard of Clairvaux writes In Praise of the New Knighthood, a treatise defending the Knights Templar, a military order, from their critics.

1190:

The Teutonic Knights, a religious crusading order, is founded to protect Christian pilgrims in the Holy Land.

1147–1149:

Led by King Louis VII of France and Conrad III of Germany, the Second Crusade is riven by internal dissention and thus fails to materially assist the crusader states in the Holy Land.

of Christians; the bull inspires the launching of the Third Crusade. 1189–1191:

The first siege of Acre concludes with the recapture of the port city of Acre by the armies of the Third Crusade, led by Richard I of England and Philip II Augustus of France, from the Muslim forces of Saladin.

1189–1192:

Led by King Philip II Augustus of France and King Richard I of England, the Third Crusade captures Acre and other Holy Land ports, but fails to retake Jerusalem from the Muslim sultan Saladin.

1191–1192:

Muslim Turks, led by Muhammad of Ghur, win two battles at Taraori (Tarain), thereby destroying the Hindu states of north India and establishing Muslim rule in the region; the Muslim conquest also begins the virtual eradication of Buddhism in the region.

1164:

The Order of Calatrava, the first indigenous Spanish religious military order, is formally recognized by a papal bull (September 26).

1170:

The Order of Santiago, the most powerful Christian military and religious order in the Iberian Peninsula, is established.

1192:

The Treaty of Jaffa, an agreement between Saladin, Sultan of Egypt, and King Richard I of England, ends the Third Crusade (1189–1192).

1187:

The Muslim forces of Saladin defeat crusader forces at the Battle of Cresson near Nazareth in the Holy Land (May 1).

1195:

1187:

The Muslim forces of Saladin destroy a Christian army at the Battle of Hattin (July 4); the victory allows Saladin to retake Jerusalem after a siege lasting from September 20 to October 2.

Berber Muslim forces defeat the army of the Christian king of Castile at the Battle of Alarcos, thereby temporarily checking the advance of the Christian Reconquista on the Iberian Peninsula.

1197–1198:

The crusade of German Emperor Henry VI, also known as the German Crusade, reaches the Holy Land and captures several towns, but dissolves after the death of the emperor in 1197.

1198–1216:

The papacy of Innocent III marks the high point of crusading activity in medieval Europe, with the pope using the loss of Jerusalem in 1187 to initiate the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221)

1187:

In response to the Muslim capture of Jerusalem, Pope Gregory VIII issues the papal bull Audita Tremendi (October 29) in which he portrays the Muslims as bloodthirsty savages and ascribes the fall of the city to the sins

xxviii Chronology

and inspire a movement that leads to the Children’s Crusade (1212). 1202–1204:

Although called to reclaim Jerusalem from the Muslims, the Fourth Crusade instead captures Christian Constantinople, replacing the Greek Byzantine emperor with a Latin noble.

1218–1219:

After a long siege, the armies of the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221) capture the Egyptian city of Damietta.

1221:

Egyptian Muslim forces defeat the crusaders at the First Battle of Mansurah, thereby ending the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221).

1206:

At a tribal assembly, the Mongol leader Temüjin, who has subdued the neighboring tribes of the eastern Asian steppe, is proclaimed ruler of all the tent-dwelling peoples under the title of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan.

1225:

Birth of the Italian Dominican friar Thomas Aquinas, a theologian and philosopher who synthesized Catholicism with Aristotelian thought and systematized Christian thinking on just war theory.

1209–1229:

Sanctioned by the pope, orthodox French knights launch the Albigensian Crusade against upholders of the Waldensian and Cathar heresies in southern France.

1227–1228:

Led by Frederick II, King of Sicily, the Sixth Crusade results in a truce that returns Jerusalem to Christian control for a decade; the city reverts to Muslim rule after the expiration of the truce.

1209:

The massacre by orthodox Christian knights of Cathar heretics at Béziers, a major military operation of the Albigensian Crusade in southern France, is one of the most infamous atrocities of the Middle Ages.

1239–1241:

1212:

The Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, a major Christian victory, becomes a decisive turning point in the Christian-Muslim struggle for control of the Iberian Peninsula; the battle confirms Castile as the leading Christian kingdom in the peninsula.

The Baron’s Crusade, a series of expeditions occurring between the Sixth (1228–1229) and Seventh (1248–1254) Crusades, was named for the great number of European Christian nobles who participated in it; the crusade regained considerable territory in the Holy Land, primarily through forceful diplomacy.

1244:

Birth of Roger Bacon, an English philosopher, theologian, and Franciscan friar; he advocated experimental science and mathematics as a means of better understanding the natural world.

Fought only months after the fall of Jerusalem to the Islamic Mamluks of Egypt, the Battle of Harbiyah (October 17–18), a crushing Mamluk victory, destroys the military power of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.

1248–1254:

Led by King Louis IX of France, the Seventh Crusade fails to conquer Egypt and results in Louis’s capture and ransom; after being freed, the king spends four years ruling the Holy Land, where he negotiates treaties with the Egyptian sultan that allow him to fortify Acre and other crusader ports.

ca. 1214:

1217–1221:

Launched by Pope Innocent III, the Fifth Crusade attacks Egypt, where the crusaders capture Damietta but fail to take Cairo.

Chronology xxix

1250:

1263:

Egyptian Muslim forces defeat a Christian army commanded by Louis IX of France at the Second Battle of Mansurah, thereby effectively ending the Egyptian phase of the Seventh Crusade (1248–1254). Birth of Ibn Taymiyah, an Islamic legal scholar whose definition of jihad and reflections on the concept heavily influence Islamic theories on war.

1270:

Louis IX of France (St. Louis) launches the Eighth Crusade (1270) by attacking Tunis; the crusade collapses upon Louis’s death (August 25).

1271–1272:

The Ninth Crusade, led by Prince Edward (later Edward I) of England, breaks the Muslim siege of Acre but is unable to make any further conquests in the Holy Land.

1291:

The second siege of Acre by the Muslim forces of the Mamluk Sultan al-Ashraf Khalil is the last major siege of a crusader stronghold in the Holy Land; the fall of the city ends any significant crusader presence in the Holy Land.

1307:

1309:

1309:

Seeking to confiscate to himself the order’s wealth, King Philip IV of France orders the arrest of all Knights Templars in France; accused of blasphemy and sexual misconduct, many Templars are tortured until they confess. Pope Clement V establishes the papacy in Avignon under the protection of the French monarchy. The Crusade of the Poor, a popular movement of European peasants initiated by Pope Clement V’s call for a crusade to retake the Holy Land after the fall of Acre in 1291, sends large bodies of peasants to Avignon where they are granted a papal

indulgence; unable to obtain transport to the Holy Land, most of the would-be crusaders return home. 1332:

Birth of Ibn Khaldun, an Arab philosopher and historian whose work contributed to the Islamic theory of just war.

1383:

Despenser’s Crusade, a brief English military incursion into the principality of Flanders conducted as a show of support for the anti-French pope Urban VI, is essentially another phase of the Anglo-French Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453).

1389:

The Muslim Ottoman Turks defeat an army led by Christian nobles of various Balkan states at the Battle of Kosovo (June 28); the battle opens the door for the eventual Muslim conquest of most of the Balkans.

1390:

The Mahdia Crusade, a FrancoGenoese campaign sometimes known as the “Barbary Crusade,” attacks the Muslim port of Mahdia in North Africa, but fails to take the city after a nine-week siege.

1396:

Fought in modern-day Bulgaria, the Battle of Nicopolis (September 25), a crushing Ottoman victory over a crusader force from Hungary and Western Europe, ends the Crusade of Nicopolis.

1410:

The Battle of Tannenburg, a decisive engagement fought by the Teutonic Knights against a Polish-Lithuanian alliance, ends with the defeat of the Knights, whose power in northeastern Europe thereafter gradually declines.

1415:

Czech reformer Jan Hus is condemned as a heretic and burned by order of the Council of Constance.

xxx Chronology

1431:

Joan of Arc, a French peasant girl who claimed to hear the voices of saints and angels directing her to help the French Dauphin be crowned and drive the English from France, is burned to death as a heretic by her English captors.

1466:

Birth of the Dutch humanist reformer Desiderius Erasmus.

1469:

Birth of Guru Nānak, founder of the Sikh religion.

1480–1481:

Spanish and Italian forces retake the Italian city of Otranto from a Turkish Muslim army sent to conquer Italy.

1492:

Granada, the last Muslim state in Spain, is conquered by the Spanish monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella, thus ending the Christian Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula, which had begun following the Muslim invasions of the early eighth century.

1504:

Birth of Heinrich Bullinger, a German Protestant reformer who taught on the duties of civil magistrates and the doctrine of war.

1509:

Birth of John Calvin, a French Protestant reformer and leader of the Reformed Church in Geneva, whose teachings and doctrines became the basis of the Reformed Churches in France, Germany, England, Scotland, the Netherlands, and elsewhere throughout Europe.

1514:

Birth of John Knox, leader of the Scottish Reformation.

1517:

Seeking to begin discussion of what he sees as various abuses in the church, German theologian Martin Luther sends his 95 Theses to his bishop, thereby unintentionally initiating the Protestant Reformation.

1519:

Birth of Theodore Beza, a French Protestant reformer and pastor of the Geneva church, who later writes Concerning the Rights of Rulers over Their Subjects and the Duty of Subjects towards Their Rulers, in which he presents his resistance theory and his justice of war doctrine.

1522–1523:

Ottoman Muslim armies besiege and capture the island of Rhodes, which is defended by the Knights Hospitaller and the Republic of Venice, thus largely clearing the eastern Mediterranean of Christian outposts.

1524–1525:

The German Peasants’ War erupts in southwestern Germany, where peasants, influenced by the writings of the Protestant reformer Martin Luther, seek greater political and religious rights; due to the extreme violence of some rebels, Luther denounces the movement, which is crushed by the German nobility.

1525:

Protestant reformer Martin Luther publishes Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants in response to the violence of the German Peasants’ Rebellion.

1526:

Protestant reformer Martin Luther publishes his treatise Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved in response to the spiritual concerns of a soldier who was troubled about whether or not he could be a Christian and a soldier.

1529–1531:

Two Kappel Wars are fought between alliances of Catholic and Protestant cantons in Switzerland; the second ends with the death in battle of Zurich reformer Huldrych Zwingli and the victory of the Catholic cantons.

Chronology xxxi

1529–1543:

A Muslim-Christian conflict in the Horn of Africa, the Ethiopian-Adal War nearly results in the destruction of the Christian Ethiopian Empire at the hands of the Muslim Adal sultanate.

1549:

Jesuit missionary Francis Xavier brings Christianity to Japan.

1546–1547:

The Schmalkaldic War, a conflict between Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, a Catholic, and the Protestant Schmalkaldic League, ends in victory for the emperor, who then tries and fails to impose a religious settlement on the league.

1554:

Wyatt’s Rebellion erupts in England when Protestant gentry oppose the plans of Queen Mary I, a Catholic, to marry the Catholic prince of Spain; the rebellion is crushed and the marriage takes place.

1529:

In October, the Muslim Ottoman Turks unsuccessfully besiege Catholic Vienna in modern-day Austria.

1533:

The English Parliament passes the Act in Restraint of Appeals, which ends papal authority in England, thus initiating the English Reformation and allowing King Henry VIII to annul his marriage and contract a new marriage with Anne Boleyn.

1534–1535:

Radical Anabaptists, who are viewed as seditious and perverse by both Catholic and Protestant rulers, seize control of the German city of Münster, declaring it a “New Jerusalem”; the Münster rebellion is crushed and many of the rebel leaders are tortured to death.

1562–1598:

A series of wars of religion disrupt France as Protestants (Huguenots) seek to win civil rights and freedom of worship from the Catholic monarchy; King Henry IV, a former Protestant, ends the wars by issuing the Edict of Nantes, which grants religious and political rights to the Huguenots.

1535:

Execution (July 6) of the English politician and humanist scholar Sir Thomas More for his opposition to Henry VIII’s assumption of sole authority over the English church.

1565:

The Ottoman Siege of Malta is defeated by various Christian maritime powers; the Christian success at Malta checks Muslim naval expansion in the Mediterranean.

1540:

Ignatius of Loyola founds and becomes first superior general of the Society of Jesus, known as the Jesuits, a Roman Catholic religious order that combats Protestantism in Europe and brings Catholic Christianity to India, Japan, and other parts of Asia.

1568–1648:

The Eighty Years’ War (or Dutch War for Independence) ends with the Protestant Dutch achieving full independence from Catholic Spain.

1571:

A Christian naval force comprising vessels from Genoa, Spain, Venice, and the Papal States defeats an Ottoman Turkish fleet at the Battle of Lepanto (October 7), thereby checking Muslim naval expansion in the Mediterranean.

1572:

Initiated by the Catholic monarchy, the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre

1549:

In the Prayer Book Rebellion, West Country English peasants unsuccessfully rebel against the imposition by Parliament of an English Protestant worship service.

xxxii Chronology

1576:

(August 24) leads to the deaths of thousands of French Protestants (Huguenots) in Paris and throughout France.

1637:

Led in part by Catholic peasants, the Shimabara Rebellion in Japan is crushed and Japanese Catholics are forced underground.

The first kingdom-wide Catholic League appears in France, where it becomes a mainstay of Catholic resistance to the spread of Protestantism and a leading force in the opposition to Henri IV, a Huguenot who becomes king of France in 1589; this resistance was instrumental in Henri’s conversion to Catholicism in 1593.

1639–1640:

The Bishops’ War erupts between England and Scotland over the attempt by King Charles I to force the Scottish church to accept episcopacy; the war becomes an initiating event of the English Revolution.

1642–1651:

A series of three English Civil Wars leads to the deposition and execution of King Charles I and the institution of a republic governed by Parliament and by Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector; the wars had a religious dimension, with Puritans generally supporting Parliament.

1660:

Publication of Martyrs’ Mirror of the Defenseless Christians . . ., a compendium of graphic testimonies of the persecution of Christians, particularly Anabaptists.

1670:

Birth of Bandā Singh Bahādur, the military commander of the Sikh community and the founder of the first Sikh state in the Punjab in northern India.

1675–1676:

King Philip, chief sachem of the Wampanoag, leads his people and other New England Indians in a war against the English colonists; the conflict results in the defeat of the Indians and the ending of most colonial efforts to Christianize the local tribes.

1680:

The Pueblo Indians of the American Southwest rebel against Spanish attempts to impose Christianity upon them; the Pueblo Revolt results in the temporary Spanish withdrawal from New Mexico.

1576:

Birth of William Ames, an English Puritan writer on issues of conscience.

1583–1588:

The Cologne War in erupts in Germany, when the ecclesiastical ruler of Cologne converts to Protestantism and refuses to resign as called for by the Peace of Augsburg (1555); the Catholic forces eventually win the war.

1593:

Henri IV, the Protestant king of France, converts to Catholicism (July 25), thereby effectively ending the French wars of religion.

1598:

Henri IV, king of France, issues the Edict of Nantes granting freedom of worship to French Protestants (Huguenots).

1599:

Birth of Oliver Cromwell, leader of the parliamentary forces during the English Civil War; Cromwell, a Puritan, favors a church organization of independent congregations.

1618–1648:

The Thirty Years’ War, one of the most destructive conflicts in European history prior to the 20th century, is fought to establish the political and religious order within the Holy Roman Empire; the war is finally ended by the Peace of Westphalia (1648).

Chronology xxxiii

1683:

1685:

1690:

The Muslim Ottoman Turks launch a second siege of Vienna in Catholic Austria; like the 1529 siege, this one is unsuccessful. Louis XIV, king of France, issues the Edict of Fontainebleau (October 22) and thereby revokes the Edict of Nantes, which had granted freedom of worship to French Protestants (Huguenots) in 1598. The English philosopher John Locke publishes his Two Treatises of Government (1690), wherein he refutes the notion of government by divine right, arguing instead that the legitimacy of any government originates only from the consent of the governed.

1699:

Guru Gobind Singh is said to found the Khālsā, a revolutionary organization meant to bring Sikhs more fully under the teachings of the Sikh gurus.

1702–1704:

The Camisards, Huguenots (French Protestants) who live in south-central France, unsuccessfully rebel against Louis XIV following his 1685 revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which had granted the Huguenots freedom of worship in Catholic France.

1705:

1710:

The Battle of Chamkaur is fought in Punjab, India (December 7–8) between the forces of the Mughal Empire and the Sikhs, who seek autonomy and freedom of worship; although the Sikhs are defeated by a greatly superior force, their stand becomes a pivotal event in Sikh history. The Battle of Sirhind, a victory of Sikh forces led by Bandā Singh Bahādur over the local Mughal governor,

results in the founding of the first Sikh state 1754–1763:

The French and Indian War is fought in North America; the war results in the expulsion of France from Canada by the British, who were aided by the American colonists.

1775–1783:

The American Revolution, which leads to the establishment of the British colonies of North America as the independent United States, is fought.

1800:

Birth of John Brown, a white American abolitionist who advocated the use of violence to overthrow slavery; his raid on the federal arsenal in Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, in 1859 helped spark the American Civil War.

1830–1857:

In an effort to win support for his unpopular regime, Charles X of France invades Muslim Algeria, which is brought under French control only after a long and bloody struggle against Muslim Berber resistance forces.

1833–1876:

Three Carlist Wars (1833–1840, 1846– 1849, 1872–1876) occur in Spain as part of a succession dispute between Queen Isabel II and her uncle Carlos, who claims the crown for himself; the Carlists draw much support from Spanish peasants who object to the increasing secularization of Spanish society.

1838:

The Missouri Mormon War, a conflict between Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) and nonMormon settlers in Missouri, results in the expulsion of Mormons from the state.

1839–1842:

The Anglo-Afghan War sees the British occupation of Qandahar and

xxxiv Chronology

Kabul, though an uprising led by deposed Kabul ruler Dost Mohammad Khan forces the British to evacuate the city and undertake a harrowing retreat; the British retake Kabul in 1842 but again evacuate the city and agree to the restoration of Dost Mohammad Khan. 1840–1860:

Conflict erupts in what is today Lebanon between the Druze, a cloistered, nonpreaching religious sect deriving from the Shi’a Ismaili faith, and the Maronite Christians for political dominance in the region, which is part of the Muslim Ottoman Empire.

1844–1846:

The Illinois Mormon War, an armed conflict between Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) and non-Mormon residents of western Illinois, results in the forcible expulsion of Mormons from the state and the beginning of the Mormon trek to Utah.

1845–1849:

Two Anglo-Sikh Wars (1845–1846 and 1848–1849) lead to the establishment of British colonial rule in northwestern India and the absorption of the Sikh empire into British India.

1845:

An anonymous article supporting the U.S. annexation of Texas in John L. O’Sullivan’s United States Magazine and Democratic Review coins the term “Manifest Destiny” to describe belief in the inevitability of U.S. expansion to the Pacific Ocean and American dominance of the continent.

1846–1848:

The Mexican-American War is fought, resulting in the cession by predominantly Catholic Mexico to the predominantly Protestant United States of a large part of what is today the American Southwest.

1848:

Publication of Karl Marx’s The Communist Manifesto.

1851–1864:

The Taiping Rebellion, one of the largest rebellions in Chinese history, grows out of a religious movement based on a blending of Christian, Confucian, and Buddhist ideas.

1853–1856:

The Crimean War is fought between an Anglo-French force and Russia; the war arises from Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox disputes over control of Christian sites in Muslim-held Jerusalem.

1857–1858:

In May, elements of the Bengal Army rebel against their British officers; the Indian Mutiny triggers armed insurrection in the countryside and overthrows the rule of the British East India Company over much of north India; British control is reasserted by the end of 1858 and India is placed under the administration of the British government.

1857–1858:

The Mormon Rebellion, a state of armed hostility between the U.S. Army and the Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) inhabitants of Utah Territory, is ended by Mormon acceptance of terms offered by President James Buchanan.

1861–1865:

The American Civil War is fought.

1869:

Birth of Mahatma Gandhi (born Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi), an influential advocate of nonviolence who was instrumental in the establishment of the Republic of India in 1947.

1870s–1880s:

The Ghost Dance movement spreads among Native American tribes of the western United States; founded by a Piute medicine man, the movement

Chronology xxxv

promises the restoration of the traditional Native American way of life if the Ghost Dance is properly performed. 1877:

Birth of Muhammad Iqbal, an Islamic philosopher, politician, and poet, who became the first Muslim to call for a division of India into separate Muslim and Hindu states.

1884–1885:

Besieged in Khartoum by the jihadist forces of Muhammed Ahmed ibnAbdullah, a Sudanese imam proclaiming himself the Mahdi, an Islamic prophet of God, British general Charles Gordon, commanding a body of Egyptian troops, is killed when the city falls.

1890:

In what becomes known as the Wounded Knee Massacre, U.S. troops kill many members of a band of Sioux Ghost Dancers in South Dakota; firing begins when some of the Indians refuse to be searched for weapons.

1892–1920:

Known as the “Mad Mullah,” Muhammad ‘Abd Allah al-Hasan, a Somali religious and political leader, wages a long guerrilla war against British, Italian, and Ethiopian forces, eventually establishing an Islamic Dervish state in central Somalia.

1898:

The Spanish-American War results in the transfer of Cuba and the Philippines from Spain to the United States.

1906:

1906:

Birth of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a pastor, theologian, and member of the antiNazi resistance in Germany during World War II; the Nazis execute him as a traitor in 1945. The All India Muslim League is organized to represent the civil rights

of Indian Muslims, the largest religious minority in British India. 1912–1913:

In two Balkan Wars, alliances of Christian states in the Balkans, including Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, first drive back the Muslim Ottoman Turks and then fight among themselves for control of territory; the Balkan Wars pave the way for World War I, presaging the style of warfare that occurred during the First World War.

1914–1918:

World War I is fought.

1916:

Seeking an end to British rule, members of the Irish volunteers launch the Easter Rising in Dublin, standing siege for some days in the General Post Office; the rebellion is crushed, but the Irish Republic is established in 1922.

1917:

T. E. Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”) leads the successful Arab attack on the Turkish-held port of Aqaba (July).

1917:

On November 2, Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign secretary, makes public a letter to Baron Walter Rothschild, subsequently known as the Balfour Declaration, which declares the support of the British government for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.

1918–1933:

The Basmachi Rebllion, an Islamic insurgency against Soviet occupation of Central Asia, occurs in what is today Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

1918:

Lawrence of Arabia and his Arab allies capture Damascus in Syria from the Turks (October).

xxxvi Chronology

1919–1922:

1926:

Arising from the collapse of the Muslim Ottoman Empire at the end of World War II, the Greco-Turkish War is an attempt by Greece to seize territory in Anatolia with Greek Christian populations; the war ends with the withdrawal of Greek troops from Anatolia and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Birth of Thich Nhat Hanh, a Vietnamese Buddhist monk who advocates nonviolent conflict resolution and the cessation of international military action.

1928:

Hassan al-Banna founds the Muslim Brotherhood in Ismailia, Egypt.

1933–1945:

In what is known as the Holocaust, the Nazi regime of Germany systematically exterminates nearly 6 million European Jews, who are imprisoned and killed in various concentration camps in Germany and Eastern Europe.

1935:

Birth of Tenzin Gyatso, who is recognized as the 14th Dalai Lama, the leader of Tibetan Buddhism, in 1939.

1936–1939:

The Spanish Civil War, a conflict between the Nationalists, who supported a Catholic monarchy, and the Republicans, who supported a secular state, ends in victory for the Nationalists.

1939–1945:

World War II is fought.

1947:

The first war between Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan begins with Pakistani forces entering Kashmir and Jammu, two north Indian states of mixed religion that had opted for independence; with British assistance, India drives back the Pakistanis, though a portion of Kashmir remains

under Pakistani control, while the rest and Jammu fall to India. 1948:

Mahatma Gandhi is assassinated (January 30) by a Hindu communalist who believes Gandhi is too friendly toward Muslims.

1948:

The Arab-Israeli War of this year leads to the successful foundation of the Jewish state of Israel in the face of Muslim Arab opposition.

1948:

In the Mau Mau Rebellion, members of the Kikuyu people of Kenya rise against British colonial rule and British attempts to Westernize Kenyan society.

1959:

The Tibetan Rebellion, an uprising of Buddhist Tibetans against the Communist Chinese invasion of Tibet, ends with the flight of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan political and spiritual leader, to India.

1963:

Pope John XXIII issues the papal encyclical Pacem in Terris (“Peace on earth”).

1963:

On June 11, Thich Quong Duc, a Buddhist monk, commits an act of selfimmolation in Saigon to bring attention to the persecution of Buddhist monks in South Vietnam by the largely Catholic regime of Ngo Diem.

1964:

Founding of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

1965:

Pope Paul VI issues Nostra Aetate (In Our Time) (October 28), a papal declaration that expresses sincere reverence for the truth and goodness found in other religions, especially Judaism, and names points of similarity the Christian faith shares with them.

1965:

Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India fight a second war over Kashmir;

Chronology xxxvii

begun by a Pakistani invasion of Indian Kashmir, the war ends in stalemate and a reversion to the status quo ante bellum. 1967:

1968:

1971:

1973:

Israel defeats Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six-Day War; the war results in the Israeli capture of the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, the Old City of Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, and the West Bank. Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (April 4), an American civil rights leader who espoused the Gandhian principle of social change through nonviolent means. A third war between Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India erupts when a revolt in East Pakistan leads to a Pakistani civil war; Indian intervention results in Muslim East Pakistan achieving independence as the new state of Bangladesh. Egypt and Syria initiate the Yom Kippur War by launching surprise attacks (October 6) on Israel on one of the holiest days in the Jewish calendar.

1975–1990:

Civil war rages in Lebanon between various Christian and Muslim factions.

1978:

U.S. president Jimmy Carter brokers a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel at a meeting of Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat held at the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland.

1979–1989:

The decade-long Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ends U.S.-Soviet détente, weakens the Soviet military and economic establishments, and precipitates an increasingly successful

guerrilla warfare that later becomes one of the foundations of 21stcentury jihadist extremism. 1979:

The Iranian Revolution overthrows the pro-Western, secularist monarchy and replaces it with an Islamic republic led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

1980–1988:

The Iran-Iraq War is fought between Sunni Iraq and Shi’a Iran; a stalemate, the war ends with a U.N-brokered cease-fire.

1982:

Israeli forces invade Lebanon (June 6) to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) units conducting raids and rocket attacks on northern Israel from Lebanese bases.

1983–2005:

The second Sudanese civil war, a struggle between the Muslim government in Khartoum and rebel groups in the largely Christian South, results in the independence of South Sudan, which is formally recognized in 2011.

1983:

The National Conference of Catholic Bishops in the United States issues The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, a pastoral letter on war and peace (May 3).

1984:

Assassination of Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi (October 31) by members of her Sikh bodyguard, who act in retaliation for her government’s raid (known as Operation Blue Star) on the Sikh Golden Temple in the previous June; the raid led to the death of Sikh teacher Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, and the assassination led to Hinduled pogroms against the Sikhs.

1987–1993:

Muslim Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip conduct the First

xxxviii Chronology

Intifada, a series of peaceful protests, riots, and acts of terrorism directed against the civil and military authorities of Jewish Israel.

Western influence and establish a government based on sharia law. 2004–present:

Al Shabaab, a militarist Islamist organization affiliated with Al Qaeda, wages jihad against the Somali government and conducts acts of terror in eastern Africa.

1988:

Osama bin Laden and Abdullah al-Azzam, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, found Al Qaeda.

1992:

Hindu-Muslim violence erupts in the Indian city of Ayodhya and its surrounding environs over the Hindu destruction (December 6) of a Muslim mosque that is said to stand on a site sacred to Hindus.

2006:

Israeli forces invade the Gaza Strip ostensibly to free captured Israeli soldiers and to end rocket attacks into Israel, although Palestinians denounce the Gaza War as an attempt to overthrow Gaza’s Hamas government.

1993:

Signed by Israel, the PLO, and the United States, the Oslo Accords (September 13) create a framework for an autonomous Palestinian state.

2007:

1994:

Mullah Mohammed Omar founds the Taliban, a political and religious movement in Afghanistan that follows strict Islamic principles.

Buddhist monks lead the Saffron Revolution, a series of economic and political protests against the militarycontrolled government of Burma (also known as Myanmar).

2010:

1999:

To prevent the violent mass expulsion of mostly Muslim ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, a province of Christian Serbia, NATO intervenes in the Kosovo War.

The Jos Riots, a series of clashes between the Muslim Hausa-Fulani people and the Christian Berom people of Nigeria, result in the deaths of more than 1,000 individuals.

2011:

In May, U.S. Special Forces kill Osama bin Laden, the cofounder of Al Qaeda and mastermind of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in Pakistan.

2014:

The Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham [ISIS]), a Salafist jihadist movement of Sunni Muslims that seeks to reestablish the medieval caliphate, seizes control of substantial parts of Syria and Iraq.

2015:

Pope Francis issues the encyclical Laudato Si, which addresses threats to the environment stemming from globalization and endemic warfare.

2016:

Islamic State’s self-proclaimed caliphate launches terrorist attacks in France, Germany, and the United States.

2000–2005:

Muslim Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip conduct the Second Intifada against Jewish Israeli authorities.

2001–present:

The U.S. war in Afghanistan topples the Taliban government, which shelters and supports Al Qaeda terrorist groups, but also leads to a continuing Taliban insurgency requiring the retention of U.S. troops within the country.

2002:

Mohammed Yusuf founds Boko Haram, an Islamic jihadist organization in Nigeria that seeks to rid Nigeria of

Guide to Related Topics

Battles and Sieges

Kosovo, Battle of Lachish, Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of Lepanto, Battle of Malta, Siege of Mansurah, Battles of Manzikert, Battle of Masada, Siege of Masts, Battle of the Megiddo, Battle of Milvian Bridge, Battle of Nahawand, Battle of Otranto, Battle of Qadesh, Battle of Qadisiyya, Battle of Rhodes, Siege of Siffin, Battle of Sirhind, Battle of Talas, Battle of Tannenberg, Battle of Taraori (Tarain), Battles of Ten Kings, Battle of Tours, Battle of Uhud, Battle of Vienna, Siege of (1529)

Acre, Sieges of Ai, Battle of Alarcos, Battle of Antioch, Siege of Ascalon, Battle of Badr, Battle of Beth Zechariah, Battle of Beth Zur, Battle of Camel, Battle of the Chamkaur, Battle of Constantinople, Arab Sieges of Covadonga, Battle of Cresson, Battle of Damietta, Siege of Golden Temple, Battle of Harbiyah, Battle of Harran, Battle of Hattin, Battle of Jericho, Battle of Jerusalem, Sieges of Karbala, Battle of Khandaq, Battle of Khartoun, Siege of Khaybar, Battle of xxxix

xl  Guide to Related Topics

Vienna, Siege of (1683) Yarmouk, Battle of Zab, Battle of

Crusades

Acre, Sieges of Alarcos, Battle of (1195) Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229) Alcantara, Order of Antioch, Sieges of (1097–1098) Art and the Crusades Ascalon, Battle of (1099) Audita Tremendi (1187) Barons’ Crusade (1239–1241) Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) Bouillon, Godfrey de (1060–1100) Calatrava, Order of Clement V, Pope (ca. 1260–1314) Clermont, Council of (1095) Cresson, Battle of (1187) Crusade (as term) Crusade of 1101 Crusade of Henry VI (1197–1198) Crusade of the Poor (1309) Crusades (Overview) Crusades and Religious Relics Crusades, Naval History Crusades, Women in the Cyprus, Kingdom of Damietta, Siege of (1218–1219) Despenser’s Crusade (1383) Edessa, County of Eighth Crusade (1270) Fifth Crusade First Crusade (1096–1099) Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) Harbiyah, Battle of (1244) Harran, Battle of (1104) Hattin, Battle of (1187) Holy Sepulchre, Church of the Holy War (Bellum Sacrum) Holy War, Medieval Roman Catholic Conceptions of Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of

Jews and the Crusades Knighthood, Christian Ideal of Knights Templar Liturgy of the Crusades Mansurah, Battles of (1221 and 1250) Montesa, Order of Muslim Armies of the Crusades Nicopolis, Crusade of (1396) Ninth Crusade (1271–1272) Popular Crusades Religious Military Orders Saladin (1138–1193) Santiago, Order of Saracens Second Crusade (1147–1149) Seventh Crusade (1248–1254) Sixth Crusade (1227–1229) Tannenburg, Battle of (1410) Third Crusade (1189–1192) Tripoli, County of True Cross Urban II, Pope (d. 1099) Venetian Crusade (1122–1124) Vow (Crusade) Walter the Penniless (d. 1096) Wendish Crusade (1147)

Deities

Ahura Mazda Amun Ashur Baal Belatucadros, Celtic God of War Chemosh Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East Hachiman, Japanese God of War Indra, Hindu God of War Ishtar Mars, Roman God of War Odin, Teutonic God of War Roman Emperor Worship Tyr, Norse God of War Yahweh as Divine Warrior

Guide to Related Topics  xli

Individuals

Alsted, Johann Heinrich Ambrose, Bishop of Milan Ames, William Aquinas, Thomas Arnaud Amaury (Arnaud Amalric) Ashoka Ashurbanipal Augustine Bacon, Roger Bahādur, Bandā Singh Bar Kochba, Simon Bartholomew, Peter Bernard of Clairvaux Beza, Theodore Bhindranale, Jarnail Singh Bin Laden, Osama Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bouillon, Godfrey de Bullinger, Heinrich Calvin, John Clement V, Pope Constantine Cromwell, Oliver Cyrus II, King of Persia Dalai Lama XIV Deborah Dev, Guru Arjan Duc, Thich Quong El Cid Emicho Erasmus, Desiderius Frederick II and the Papacy, Conflict of Gandhi, Mahatma Gideon Goodman, Christopher Grotius, Hugo Hanh, Thich Nhat Hassan al-Banna Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Henry VIII Hobbes, Thomas Hus, Jan

Ibn Khaldun Ibn Taymiyah Innocent III Iqbal, Muhammad Jesus as Warrior Joan of Arc Josephus Joshua Khalid ibn al-Walid Khomeni, Ruhollah al-Musavi King, Martin Luther, Jr. King David as Warrior Knox, John Konishi Yukinaga Lactantius Las Casas, Bartolomé de Lawrence of Arabia Locke, John Luther, Martin Maccabeus, Judas Mahdi Maimonides Martin of Tours Martyrs, Jesuit Marx, Karl Melanchthon, Philip Melito of Sardis Merton, Thomas Mohammed Omar, Mullah More, Thomas Mu’awiya Muhammad as Warrior Nachmanides Nānak, Guru Nur Al-Din Origen and War Penn, William Pius XII, Pope Ponet, John Saint George Saint Ursula Saladin Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar

xlii  Guide to Related Topics

Sayyid Qutb Shoko Asahara Shouren, Wang Simons, Menno Singh, Bābā Dīp Singh, Guru Gobind Sōen Shaku Suarez, Francisco Süleyman the Magnificent Tarsusi, Ali ibn Mardi al Vattel, Emmerich de Vermigli, Peter Martyr Viret, Pierre Vitoria, Francisco de Voetius, Gisbertus Walter the Penniless Warrior Saints William of Adam Wingate, Orde Wollebius, Johannes Zwingli, Huldrych

Rise of Islam

Abbasid Revolution (747–750) Almohad Revolution Assassins Ayyubids Badr, Battle of (624) Buyids Caliphate Camel, Battle of the (656) Covadonga, Battle of (ca. May 28, 722) Cresson, Battle of (1187) Damascus, Arab Conquest of (634 CE) Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb Egypt, Fatimid Conquest of Fatimid Conquest of Baghdad Fatimid Conquest of North Africa Hadith and War Ibn Khaldun Ibn Taymiyah India, Muslim Conquest of Northern Islam and War (Jihad) Jerusalem, Sieges of

Karbala, Battle of (680 CE) Khalid ibn al Walid (d. 642 CE) Khandaq, Battle of (627 CE) Khaybar, Battle of (629 CE) Mahdi Masts, Battle of the (655) Military Raid in Islam Mu’awiya Muhammad as Warrior Muslim Armies of the Crusades Muslim Civil War, First (656–661) Muslim Civil War, Second (680–692) Muslim Conquest of Egypt Muslim Conquest of Iraq Muslim Conquest of Persia Muslim Conquest of Sindh Nahawand, Battle of (641) Nur Al-Din (1118–1174) Peace in the Qur’an Qadisiyya, Battle of (636 CE) Qarmati Uprising (923–951 CE) Qur’an and War Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) (632–633CE) Saladin (1138–1193) Salafism Saracens Sharia and War Siffin, Battle of (657 CE) Sufism and War Süleyman the Magnificent and War Sunni-Shi’a Conflict Talas, Battle of (751) Tarsusi, Ali ibn Mardi al Uhud, Battle of (625) Yarmouk, Battle of (636) Zab, Battle of (750) Zanj Rebellion (869–893)

Sacred Texts and Traditions

Ahimsa Apocalyptic Literature Apocalypticism and War, Christian Apocalypticism and War, Jewish Apocalypticism and War, Muslim

Guide to Related Topics  xliii

Arianism and War Baha’i Faith and War Bhagavad Gita and War Bhindranale, Jarnail Singh Bible and War Buddhism and War Bushido Canon Law on War Christianity and War Confucianism and War Daoism and War Dasam Granth Hadith and War Hinduism and War Islam and War (Jihad) Jahiliyya and Asabiyyah Jainism and War Jerusalem as Holy City Judaism and War Just War Tradition Milhemet Misvah Milhemet Reshut Pacifism, Religious Peace in the Qur’an Qur’an and War Sharia and War Shinto and War Shrine Cults: East Indies Sufism and War Syrian Orthodox Church is Christian Talmud and War Transcendentalism and War Zen and War Zionism and War Zoroastrianism and War

20th and 21st Centuries

Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1979–1989) Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–) Al Qaeda Al Shabaab Antisemitism Arab-Israeli War of 1948 Armenian Massacres

Aum Shinrikyo Ayodhya Conflict (1992) Balfour Declaration (1917) Balkan Wars (1912–1913) Bin Laden, Osama Boko Haram Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Camp David Accords (1978) Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Cold War, Religious Dimensions of Druze and War Duc, Thich Quong (1897–1963) Easter Rising (1916) First World War and Religious Art First World War, Religious Dimensions of Gandhi, Mahatma Gaza War (2006) Gott mit uns Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922) Haganah Hamas Hanh, Thich Nhat Hassan al-Banna Hezbollah Holocaust Hybrid War of the 21st Century, Religious Dimensions of India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in India, Religious Conflict in Indo-Pakistani Wars International Religious Freedom and Human Rights Intifada Iqbal, Muhammad Iranian Revolution (1979) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Islam and War (Jihad) Islamic State Jos Riots (2010) Kamikaze Kashmir Conflict Khilafat Movement Khomeni, Ruhollah al-Musavi King, Martin Luther, Jr. Kosovo War (1999)

xliv  Guide to Related Topics

Kurds Lawrence of Arabia Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982) Lebanon, Israeli Operations against (2006) Liberation Theology Liberian Civil Wars Mau Mau Rebellion Merton, Thomas Meskhetian Turks Militarism, Religious Military Chaplains Military Chaplains, African American Mohammed Omar, Mullah Mujahideen Muslim Brotherhood Nazism, Religious Aspects of Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict Nostra Aetate Oslo Accords (1993) Pacem in Terris Pakistan, Religious Violence in Palestine Liberation Organization Pius XII Radical Islam in the 20th Century Religious Propaganda and War Religious Wars and Mortality Rates Saffron Revolution (2007) Saudi-Hashemite Wars Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar Sayyid Qutb Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) Second World War, Japanese Empire, and Islam Second World War, Religious Dimensions of Shoko Asahara Sinn Fein Six-Day War (1967) Sōen Shaku South Vietnamese Buddhist Uprising (1966) Southeast Asia, Religious Conflict Spanish-American War, Religious Dimensions of Spanish Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Sufism and War Sunni-Shi’a Conflict

Taiping Rebellion Tajikistan Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Taliban Tamil Tigers Terrorism and Religion Tibetan Rebellion (1959) Uighur Unrest in Xinjiang Wahhabism Wingate, Orde Yasukuni Shrine Yom Kippur War (1973) Young Turks Zionism and War

Wars, Conflicts, and Rebellions

Afghanistan, Soviet War in Afghanistan, U.S. War in American Civil War, Religious Dimensions of American Revolution, Religious Dimensions of Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of Anglo-Afghan War Anglo-Sikh Wars Arab-Israeli War of 1948 Austro-Ottoman Wars Ayodhya Conflict Balkan Wars Bar Kochba Revolt Basmachi Rebellion Bishops’ Wars Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035) Byzantine-Seljuk Wars Camisards, Revolt of Carlist Wars Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Christian-Muslim Wars in Spain Cold War, Religious Dimensions of Cologne War Crimean War, Religious Dimensions of Druze-Maronite Conflict Easter Rising Eighty Years’ War, or Dutch War of Independence English Civil Wars Ethiopian-Adal War First World War, Religious Dimensions of

Guide to Related Topics  xlv

Frederick II and the Papacy, Conflict of French and Indian War, Religious Dimensions of French Wars of Religion Gaza War German Peasants’ War Greco-Turkish War Hindu Mythological Wars Hybrid War of the 21st Century, Religious Dimensions of Illinois Mormon War India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in India, Religious Conflict in Indian Mutiny Indo-Pakistani Wars Intifada Iran-Iraq War Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy Israelite Wars of the Judges Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy Jewish Revolt Kappel, Wars of Kashmir Conflict King Philip’s War Kosovo War Languedoc Revolts Lebanese Civil War Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of Liberian Civil Wars Maccabean Revolt Mad Mullah, Wars of the Mahdist Revolution in Sudan Mau Mau Rebellion Mexican-American War, Religious Dimensions of Missouri Mormon War Mormon Rebellion Mughal-Maratha Wars Mughal-Sikh Wars Münster Rebellion Muslim Civil War, First Muslin Civil War, Second Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict Ottoman-Persian Wars Pakistan, Religious Violence in Papal-Imperial Conflict

Prayer Book Rebellion Pueblo Revolt Qarmati Uprising Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) Saudi-Hashemite Wars Saxon Wars Schmalkaldic War Second Sudanese Civil War Second World War, Religious Dimensions of Shimabara Rebellion Six-Day War South Vietnamese Buddhist Uprising Spanish-American War, Religious Dimensions of Spanish Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Sunni-Shi’a Conflict Taiping Rebellion Tajikistan Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Thirty Years’ War Three Kingdoms, War of the Tibetan Rebellion Tripolitan War Wars of the Reformation Wyatt’s Rebellion Yom Kippur War Zanj Rebellion

Wars of the Protestant Reformation

Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants Alsted, Johann Heinrich Ames, William Anabaptist Pacifism Beza, Theodore Bullinger, Heinrich Calvin, John Camisards, Revolt of (1702–1704) Catholic (Holy) League Cologne War (1583–1588) Edict of Fontainebleau Eighty Years’ War or Dutch War of Independence (1568–1648) English Civil War Erasmus, Desiderius French Wars of Religion German Peasants’ War (1524–1525)

xlvi  Guide to Related Topics

Goodman, Christopher Kappel, Wars of (1529–1531) Knox, John Locke, John Luther, Martin Melanchthon, Philip More, Thomas Münster Rebellion (1534–1535) On War Against the Turk Ponet, John Prayer Book Rebellion (1549) Protestant Reformers and War Puritans and War Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (1572)

Simons, Menno Suarez, Francisco Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) Three Kingdoms, War of the (1638–1660) Viret, Pierre Vitoria, Francisco de Voetius, Gisbertus Wars of the Reformation Westphalia, Peace of (1648) Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved Wollebius, Johannes Wyatt’s Rebellion (1554) Zwingli, Huldrych

A Abbasid Revolution (747–750 CE)

Early support came from the Shi’a, who appointed ibn Ali imam in exchange for his vague promises of a return to orthodox Islam. Muhammad ibn Ali established his base at al-Kufa in Iraq, where he sent out secret agents to build a network of support among disaffected tribes in the empire. After ibn Ali died in 743, his plans for revolution were continued by his son Ibrahim, who was named imam. In 747, Ibrahim openly rebelled and formed an army in the Khorasan region, which was commanded by the Persianborn Abu Muslim. By 749, Abu Muslim had led the rebels to several important victories and had taken control of the important Khorasan region. In response, Marwan II had Ibrahim assassinated, after which Abu’l Abbas As-Saffah was named imam. As-Saffah continued the revolution, which ended with the destruction of the Umayyad army at the Battle of Zab in January 750. The victorious As-Saffah named himself caliph and consolidated his power by moving the center of power from Syria to a new capital in Baghdad, Iraq. Minorities and most tribes received better treatment than before, and Persians were particularly well represented within the caliphate bureaucracy. The one exception was the Shi’a, who as a group were bitterly disappointed with As-Saffah’s decision to name himself caliph instead of appointing a descendant of Ali. Toward his enemies As-Saffah was less

The Abbasid Revolution began in 747 CE when Ibrahim ibn-Ali led a coalition of disaffected Arabs and non-Arab converts to Islam in revolt against the Umayyad caliphate. The revolution ended in 750 with the destruction of the Umayyad army at the Battle of Zab, and the installation of Abu’l Abbas As-Saffah as the first Abbasid caliph. The second Muslim civil war ended in 691 with the Umayyad caliphate ruling over a vast empire that encompassed many non-Arab tribes and nations. From the start, the Umayyads faced much opposition from within and outside the regime. First, the Syrian Arabs who controlled the caliphate bureaucracy marginalized the southern Arabs, and treated all non-Arabs (whether converted to Islam or not) as second-class citizens. Most importantly, the legitimacy of the Umayyad caliphate was not accepted by Shi’a Muslims, who believed a caliph could only come from Muhammad’s blood line. Over time, the Umayyads were increasingly isolated and reliant on support primarily from the strongest northern Arab tribe, the Quays. Eventually, Quay influence became so strong that Marwan II, the last of the Umayyad caliphs, transferred his capital to northern Mesopotamia, a move that further isolated the Umayyad rulers from their subjects. In 718, Muhammad ibn Ali, a great-grandson of al-Abbas, uncle of the Prophet, began to quietly plan a revolt. 1

2  Acre, Sieges of (1189–1191, 1291)

charitable, and he had most of the surviving Umayyads hunted down and killed. As-Saffah’s benevolent and inclusive policies marked the beginning of the Islamic Golden Age, which lasted from 750 to the destruction of Baghdad by a Mongol army in 1258. H. Allen Skinner See also Caliphate; Zab, Battle of Further Reading Shabhan, M. A. The Abassid Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Sharon, Moshe. Black Banners from the East: The Establishment of the Abbasid State. Leiden: Brill, 1983.

Acre, Sieges of (1189–1191, 1291) Siege of 1189–1191

The siege of Acre in 1189–1191 was a critical event in the aftermath of Saladin’s conquest of most of the crusader lands in Syria and Palestine. Following the battle of Hattin on July 4, 1187, at which Saladin decisively defeated the Christian army of Jerusalem, Acre was among the first crusader cities occupied by the Muslims. Two years later, Guy of Lusignan, titular king of Jerusalem and only recently released from captivity, attempted to retake the city. Accompanied by a small group of followers, Guy attacked Acre in August 1189. This attack began a two-year siege that would ultimately be brought to an end by Richard I (the Lionheart) of England, Philip II (Augustus) of France, and the other participants of the Third Crusade. Acre was an important urban center on the Palestinian coast. The city is situated on a peninsula that extends into the Mediterranean Sea, providing it with strong natural defenses and a very good harbor. Acre was first taken by the crusaders in 1104 and became the second most important city in the Kingdom of Jerusalem during the 12th century. The city had surrendered to Saladin without a fight on July 9, 1187, and certain repairs were carried out to the city’s fortifications over the following two years.

Guy’s force arrived at Acre in late August 1189 and attacked the city three days later. Saladin, informed of Guy’s movements, arrived shortly after Guy and deployed his army around the Christians on August 29, using it to trap them against the walls of Acre. Although crusader reinforcements arrived by sea and additional Muslim forces joined Saladin’s army, neither side was strong enough to gain a decisive advantage in the remaining months of 1189. The crusaders began to fortify their position in September and developed two lines of defenses through October and November, one to contain and repulse the attacks made by the besieged garrison and the other to resist Saladin’s army on the other side. On October 4, the crusaders went on the offensive and attacked Saladin’s army. Although the attack failed, the pressure was sufficient to persuade Saladin to pull back his army in the days that followed and establish a more passive blockade of the Christian besiegers over the winter. Cut off from Saladin’s army, the garrison was resupplied ahead of winter when an Egyptian fleet sailed into the harbor near the end of November. Components of Saladin’s army that had been sent home for the winter began to return in the spring of 1190, and the sultan advanced his forces toward the crusaders on April 25. The move was made in response to a new threat: over the winter, the crusaders had constructed three siege towers. The towers were advanced as part of an attack on May 5. The defenders successfully held off the attack and burned the siege towers by throwing pots of Greek fire at them with their trebuchets. Changing tactics, the crusaders attacked Saladin’s army on July 25. Although they were able to pillage the camp of Saladin’s brother, al-Adil, who commanded the Muslims’ right flank, they gained little advantage. Only days later, Henry of Champaign and a sizable group of fellow crusaders arrived to join the siege, compelling Saladin to pull back his army once more. Under Henry, the crusaders advanced their trebuchets and proceeded to bombard the city. By all accounts, the garrison successfully destroyed these engines around the start of September. On September 24, the crusaders made a failed attack against the Tower of the Flies, which secured the entrance to the harbor. Another attack using a ram, or possibly two, failed not long after on October 14. In November 1190, famine spread through the Christian army, made worse when the remaining elements of Frederick

Acre, Sieges of (1189–1191, 1291)  3

This miniature from an illustrated manuscript depicts the capture of the city of Acre from Muslim sultan Saladin by Richard I (the Lionheart) of England and Philip II (Augustus) of France during the Third Crusade. (Library of Congress)

Barbarossa’s force arrived. While the siege had thus far proven costly and claimed many lives, progress was becoming visible as it entered its second winter. During a winter storm in January 1191, a section of the town wall collapsed. Although the damage was repaired before the crusaders could exploit the gap, weaknesses in the defenses were beginning to appear. While Muslim forces again returned to Saladin’s army in the spring of 1191, the siege entered a new phase with the arrival of Philip II of France and Richard I of England. Philip arrived in April and began to attack Acre on May 30, a week ahead of Richard’s arrival on June 8. Although both kings battled personal illness through the month of June, the pressure placed on Acre mounted as the city was bom-

barded by at least nine significant trebuchets and sappers steadily undermined sections of its fortifications. A series of concerted attacks began on July 1 and a day or two later, Aubrey Clément, marshal of France, was able to climb a ladder up to the besieged parapet after a mine weakened but did not bring down a section of the town wall. On July 5, Richard’s sappers brought down a tower. Despite their weakened defenses and dwindling numbers, the garrison was able to resist the crusaders’ attacks until July 12, when finally their representatives, who had been negotiating the terms of a surrender for more than a week, received Saladin’s permission to surrender the city. In exchange for the lives of the Muslims inside Acre, it was agreed that Christian prisoners and the True Cross,

4  Adı¯ Granth

which the army of Jerusalem had lost at the Battle of Hattin, would be returned to the crusaders. Additionally, a fee of 200,000 bezants would be paid and hostages would be retained to ensure the terms were met. As time passed, Richard came to believe that Saladin was intentionally delaying upholding his end of the agreement, and on either August 17 or August 20, Richard ordered the execution of all but a few of the most prestigious hostages. As many as 2,700 may have been executed. Whatever his motives, this controversial move freed the crusader army to travel south and begin reconquering the Palestinian coast south of Acre.

Siege of 1291

The Mamluk siege of Acre in 1291 was the last major siege of a crusader stronghold in the Holy Land. Shortly after its capture, the few remaining towns and castles occupied by Latin Christians in Syria and Palestine were abandoned, bringing to an end two centuries of Latin occupation in the Holy Land. In 1290, a treaty between Mamluk sultan Qalawun and Henry II of Cyprus and Jerusalem was violated when a group of Christians killed a number of Muslim merchants who were conducting business in Acre. Qalawun died in November 1290 while making preparations to attack Acre, but his son, al-Ashraf Khalil, lost little time completing the preparations that his father had initiated. While Syrian forces gathered around Damascus, al-Ashraf led the Egyptian army north out of Egypt and the combined armies met at Acre in early April 1291. Fighting took place outside the city walls while large trebuchets, which had been brought from certain Syrian towns and castles, began to bombard Acre’s landward walls. The Mamluks were quickly able to advance their sappers to certain sections of the town ditch and, under the cover of wooden shelters and protected by light trebuchets, they began to undermine the city’s fortifications. Henry II arrived from Cyprus around May 4, 1291, but by this point the Mamluk miners had compromised the King’s Tower at the northeast corner of the city’s outer wall. The defenders were forced to withdraw from the outer wall in this area by May 8, and a week later the King’s Tower was completely abandoned to the besiegers. Three days later, on May 18, 1291, al-Ashraf ordered a general assault. As Mamluk troops passed through the King’s Tower and the breaches in the adjoining wall, the first panicked defenders began to

flee toward the harbor, hoping to escape the city by boat. Attacking forces began to enter the city through a door in the Accursed Tower, which anchored the northeast corner of the inner wall behind the King’s Tower, while others forced their way in at the St. Anthony Gate, overcoming a last effort by members of the military orders to defend Acre’s inner line of defenses. As the Mamluks poured into the city, the Templars made a last stand in their fortified headquarters. On about May 28, this last bastion of resistance literally collapsed: as Mamluk troops entered the fortress, their added weight was enough to cause the undermined structure to fall, killing all of those within. Following the siege, al-Ashraf ordered that Acre be destroyed. The city remained in a relative state of ruin until the late 18th century, when it was refortified under the Ottomans. The sieges of Acre in 1189–1191 and 1291 bookend what is sometimes referred to as the second Kingdom of Jerusalem. Despite the crusaders’ acquisition of Jerusalem once more from 1229 to 1244, Acre remained the administrative capital of the kingdom throughout the century between its recapture and its final loss to the Mamluks. So central was its place that Steven Runciman referred to the 13th-century Kingdom of Jerusalem as the “Kingdom of Acre.” Michael S. Fulton See also Hattin, Battle of; Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of; Saladin; Third Crusade Further Reading Lyons, M. C., and Jackson, D. E. P. Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Nicolle, David. Acre 1291: Bloody Sunset of the Crusader States. Oxford: Osprey, 2005. Rogers, Randal. Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Runciman, Steven. A History of the Crusades. Vol. III: The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954.

Ad ı¯ Granth The Adī Granth is an early version of Sikhism’s revered scripture, the Guru Granth Sāhib, which is considered by

Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1979–1989)  5

believers to have been completed by the religion’s 11th living guru. In popular usage, the Adī Granth, or “first book,” refers to the first draft compiled by the fifth Sikh guru, Guru Arjan Dev, while the Guru Granth Sāhib refers to the final draft of Guru Gobind Singh, who was elevated as the community’s guru upon his death in 1708. The Guru Granth Sāhib contains the writings of the first five gurus and the ninth guru, the latter having been added by Guru Gobind Singh. Guru Arjan Dev and Guru Nānak are its most prolific authors. Also included are the writings of the Bhagats, or devotional preachers; the Bhat.t.s, or bards; and several Muslims. Sikhs point to this interfaith quality of their scripture as illustrating their belief in religious pluralism. The essential teachings of the Guru Granth Sāhib are referred to as gurmat and revolve primarily around the devotee’s relationship with God, which is developed through the chanting of his name, nām simran, and the performance of good works. The scripture’s hymns were composed in a variety of North Indian vernacular and literary languages, as well as both Sanskrit and Persian. The Gurmukhī script is used for each, which is also the contemporary script of modern Punjabi. The status of the Guru Granth Sāhib affords it great respect among believers. It is said not to have pages, but angs, or limbs. It is covered in fine cloth and stored in a small chamber overnight. When a copy is damaged, it is destroyed in a cremation ceremony similar to those conducted for dead human beings. This anthropomorphization of the text delayed the application of printing technology due to the perceived violence of the process. Printing is still tightly controlled by officials in Amritsar, India. As the center of Sikh religious life, the Guru Granth Sāhib is the source of the majority of the Sikhs’ daily prayers and is installed in the center of prayer halls in Sikh gurdwārās, or houses of worship. Devotees cover their head when in the text’s presence and prostrate themselves before it as a sign of respect. Public readings of the text are often performed in remembrance of the dead or in celebration of life’s milestones. Often these are unbroken readings, with a full reading requiring roughly two full days. Though the supreme status of the Guru Granth Sāhib is virtually unchallenged, a second text, the Dasam Granth, which is said to contain the writings of the 10th guru, Guru Gobind Singh, is a subject of serious debate among 21st-

century Sikhs. Detractors object to the text’s retelling of popular Hindu texts and to its other “non-Sikh” passages. Unlike the Guru Granth Sāhib, the Dasam Granth is replete with martial imagery, though this is not in and of itself a point of objection. Complicating the debate is the presence of passages from the Dasam Granth in Sikh daily prayers and elsewhere in routine religious practice. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn See also Dasam Granth; Dev, Guru Arjan; Nānak, Guru Further Reading Mann, Gurinder Singh. The Making of Sikh Scripture. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Singh, Pashaura. Guru Granth Sahib: Canon, Meaning and Authority. London: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1979–1989) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan destroyed the U.S.-Soviet détente of the 1970s; inaugurated a new, dangerous stage in the Cold War; and badly weakened the Soviet military and economic establishments. The Soviet-Afghan War represented the culmination of events dating to April 1978, when Afghan communists, supported by left-wing army leaders, overthrew the unpopular, authoritarian government of Mohammed Daoud and proclaimed the People’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Although the extent of Soviet involvement in the coup remains unclear, Moscow certainly welcomed it and quickly established close relations with the new regime headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki, who was committed to bringing socialism to Afghanistan. With the ambitious, extremely militant foreign minister Hafizullah Amin as its driving force, the Taraki regime quickly alienated much of Afghanistan’s population by conducting a terror campaign against its opponents and introducing a series of social and economic reforms at odds with the religious and cultural norms of the country’s highly conservative, Muslim, tribal society. Afghanistan’s Muslim leaders soon declared a jihad against “godless communism,” and by August 1978 the Taraki regime faced an open revolt, a situation made especially dangerous by the defection of a portion of the army to the rebel cause.

6  Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1979–1989)

As Afghanistan descended into civil war, Moscow grew increasingly concerned. Committed to preventing the overthrow of a friendly, neighboring communist government and fearful of the effects that a potential Islamic fundamentalist regime might have on the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia, specifically those in the republics bordering Afghanistan, the Soviets moved toward military intervention. During the last months of 1979, the Leonid Brezhnev government dispatched approximately 4,500 combat advisers to assist the Afghan communist regime while simultaneously allowing Soviet aircraft to conduct bombing raids against rebel positions. Although Soviet deputy defense minister Ivan G. Pavlovskii, who had played an important role in the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, counseled against full-scale intervention in Afghanistan, his superior, Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, convinced Brezhnev to undertake an invasion, arguing that only such action could preserve the Afghan communist regime. He also promised that the Soviet presence there would be short. Brezhnev ultimately decided in favor of war, the pivotal factor arguably being the September 1979 seizure of power by Hafizullah Amin, who had ordered Taraki arrested and murdered. Apparently shocked by Amin’s act of supreme betrayal and inclined to believe that only a massive intervention could save the situation, Brezhnev gave approval for the invasion. Beginning in late November 1979 and continuing during the first weeks of December, the Soviet military concentrated the Fortieth Army, composed primarily of Central Asian troops, along the Afghan border. On December 24, Soviet forces crossed the frontier, while Moscow claimed that the Afghan government had requested help against an unnamed outside threat. Relying on mechanized tactics and close air support, Soviet units quickly seized the Afghan capital of Kabul. In the process, a special assault force stormed the presidential palace and killed Amin, replacing him with the more moderate Babrak Karmal, who attempted, unsuccessfully, to win popular support by portraying himself as a devoted Muslim and Afghan nationalist. Soviet forces, numbering at least 50,000 by the end of January 1980, went on to occupy the other major Afghan cities and secured major highways. In response, rebel mujahideen forces resorted to guerrilla warfare, their primary goal being to avoid defeat in the hopes of outlasting Soviet intervention.

Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan had immediate and adverse international consequences, effectively wrecking the détente that was already in dire straits by December 1979, thanks to recent increases in missile deployments in Europe. Having devoted much effort to improving relations with Moscow, U.S. president Jimmy Carter believed that he had been betrayed. He reacted swiftly and strongly to the Afghan invasion. On December 28, 1979, Carter publicly denounced the Soviet action as a “blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior.” Three days later, he accused Moscow of lying about its motives for intervening and declared that the invasion had dramatically altered his view of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy goals. On January 3, 1980, the president asked the U.S. Senate to delay consideration of SALT II. Finally, on January 23, in his State of the Union address, Carter warned that the Soviet action in Afghanistan posed a potentially serious threat to world peace because control of Afghanistan would put Moscow in a position to dominate the strategic Persian Gulf and thus interdict at will the flow of Middle East oil. The president followed these pronouncements by enunciating what soon became known as the Carter Doctrine, declaring that any effort to dominate the Persian Gulf would be interpreted as an attack on American interests that would be rebuffed by force if necessary. Carter also announced his intention to limit the sale of technology and agricultural products to the USSR, and he imposed restrictions on Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters. In addition, he notified the International Olympic Committee that in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, neither he nor the American public would support sending a U.S. team to the 1980 Moscow Summer Games. The president called upon America’s allies to follow suit. Carter also asked Congress to support increased defense spending and registration for the draft, pushed for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force that could intervene in the Persian Gulf or other areas threatened by Soviet expansionism, offered increased military aid to Pakistan, moved to enhance ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), approved covert CIA assistance to the mujahideen, and signed a presidential directive on July 1980 providing for increased targeting of Soviet nuclear forces.

Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1979–1989)  7

Carter’s sharp response was undercut to a certain extent by several developments. First, key U.S. allies rejected both economic sanctions and an Olympic boycott. Second, Argentina and several other states actually increased their grain sales to Moscow. Third, a somewhat jaded American public tended to doubt the president’s assertions about Soviet motives and believed that he had needlessly reenergized the Cold War. Ronald Reagan, who defeated Carter in the November 1980 presidential election, took an even harder stand with the Soviets. Describing the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” that had used détente for its own nefarious purposes, the Reagan administration poured vast sums of money into a massive military buildup that even saw the president push the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)— labeled “Star Wars” by its critics—a missile defense system

dependent on satellites to destroy enemy missiles with lasers or particle beams before armed warheads separated and headed for their targets. The Soviet response was to build additional missiles and warheads. Meanwhile, confronted with guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan, the USSR remained committed to waging a limited war and found itself drawn, inexorably, into an ever-deeper bloody quagmire against a determined opponent whose confidence and morale grew with each passing month. To make matters worse for Moscow, domestic criticism of the war by prominent dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov appeared early on, while foreign assistance in the form of food, transport vehicles, and weaponry (especially the Stinger antiaircraft missile launchers) from the United States began reaching the mujahideen as the fighting dragged on.

8  Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–)

Neither the commitment of more troops, the use of chemical weapons, nor the replacement of the unpopular Karmal could bring Moscow any closer to victory. Accordingly, by 1986 the Soviet leadership, now headed by the reformist general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, began contemplating ways of extricating itself from what many observers characterized as the “Soviet Union’s Vietnam.” In April 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a United Nations mediation proposal providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops over a 10-month period. One month later the departure of Soviet military forces, which had grown to an estimated 115,000 troops, commenced—a process that was finally completed in February 1989. Although the Soviets left Afghanistan with a procommunist regime, a team of military advisers, and substantial quantities of equipment, the nine years’ war had exacted a high toll, costing the Soviets an estimated 50,000 casualties. It seriously damaged the Red Army’s military reputation, further undermining the legitimacy of the Soviet system, and nearly bankrupted the Kremlin. For the Afghans, the war proved equally costly. An estimated 1 million civilians were dead, and another 5 million were refugees. Much of the country was devastated. Bruce J. DeHart See also Bin Laden, Osama; Mujahideen; Taliban Further Reading Hauner, Milan. The Soviet War in Afghanistan: Patterns of Russian Imperialism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991. Judge, Edward, and John W. Langdon, eds. The Cold War: A History through Documents. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999. MacKenzie, David. From Messianism to Collapse: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1991. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace, 1994. Russian General Staff. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002.

Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–) The American-led invasion of Afghanistan that began on October 7, 2001, sought to topple the Taliban government

and kill or capture members of the Al Qaeda terrorist group, which had just carried out the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States. The Taliban had sheltered Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, on Afghan territory and provided the terrorists with bases, training facilities, and quite possibly financial support. The war is also known under its code name, Operation Enduring Freedom. The United States faced major problems in planning a war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Prime among these were logistical concerns, for Afghanistan is a landlocked country quite distant from U.S. basing facilities. American planners decided that an alliance would have to be forged with the Afghan United Front (also known as the Northern Alliance), an anti-Taliban opposition force within Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance would do the bulk of the fighting but would receive U.S. air support, along with assistance, advice, and cash from U.S. special operations forces. The war began on October 7, 2001, with American air strikes intended to knock out the Taliban’s antiaircraft defenses and communications infrastructure. However, desperately poor Afghanistan had a very limited infrastructure to bomb and the initial air attacks had only minimal impact. Al Qaeda training camps were also targeted, although they were quickly abandoned once the bombing campaign began. U.S. special operations forces arrived in Afghanistan on October 15, at which time they made contact with the leaders of the Northern Alliance. The first phase of the ground campaign was focused on the struggle for the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif, which fell to the Northern Alliance forces led by Generals Abdul Dostum and Muhammed Atta on November 10, 2001. The fighting around Mazar-e-Sharif was intense, but U.S. air strikes, directed by special operations forces on the ground, did much to break Taliban and Al Qaeda resistance. As the fighting progressed, the Taliban and Al Qaeda improved both their tactics and combat effectiveness. Camouflage and concealment techniques were also enhanced, helping to counter American air power. However, the Taliban’s limited appeal to the population meant that the regime could not withstand the impact of a sustained assault. The repressive rule of the Taliban ensured that the Taliban never widened its base of support beyond the Pashtun ethnic group from which they originated.

Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–)  9

Northern Alliance forces captured the Afghan capital of Kabul without a fight on November 13. On November 26, a besieged garrison of 5,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda soldiers surrendered at Kunduz after heavy bombardment by American B-52s. Meanwhile, an uprising by captured Taliban fighters held in the Qala-e-Gangi fortress near Mazari-Sharif prison was suppressed with great brutality in late November. The scene of the fighting then shifted to the city of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Because the Taliban had originated in Kandahar in the early 1990s, they were expected to put up a stiff fight for the city. Kandahar was attacked by Northern Alliance forces led by Generals Hamid Karzai and Guyl Agha Shirzai, with U.S. special operations forces coordinating the offensive. The Taliban deserted Kandahar on December 6, and Taliban leader Mohammed Omar and the surviving Taliban elements went into hiding in the remote mountain regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The fall of Kandahar marked the end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, only nine weeks after the beginning of the bombing campaign. On December 22, 2001, an interim administration, chaired by Hamid Karzai, took office. Despite the rapid and efficient progress of Operation Enduring Freedom, Taliban and Al Qaeda elements remained at large in Afghanistan, and the operation had failed to capture or kill either Osama bin Laden or Mohammed Omar. Bin Laden was believed to be hiding in mountain dugouts and bunkers located in the White Mountains near Tora Bora. A 16-day offensive in early December 2001 failed to find bin Laden. For this offensive, the United States once again relied on Northern Alliance ground troops supported by U.S. special operations forces and American air power. Later there would be charges that this offensive had been mishandled, and an opportunity to take bin Laden was lost. Bin Laden escaped, probably into Pakistan through the foreboding but porous border that separates Afghanistan from Pakistan. Despite the failure to capture or kill bin Laden, the United States could point to notable success in the so-called War on Terror by the end of 2001. The Taliban had been deposed and Al Qaeda was on the run, with many of its members and leaders having been killed or captured. This occurred despite the fact that the United States had

only deployed about 3,000 service personnel to Afghanistan by the end of the year, most of them special operations forces. The U.S. death toll had been remarkably light, with only two deaths attributed to enemy action. Estimates of Afghan fatalities are approximate, at best. Possibly as many as 4,000 Taliban soldiers may have been killed during the campaign. Afghan civilian deaths have been estimated at between 1,000 and 1,300, with several thousand refugees dying from disease and/or exposure. Another 500,000 Afghans were made refugees or displaced persons during the fighting. The United States attempted a different approach in March 2002 when Al Qaeda positions were located in the Shah-i-Khot valley near Gardez. On this occasion, U.S. ground troops from the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division led the way, along with special operations forces from Australia, Canada, Germany, and Afghan government troops in an offensive code-named Operation Anaconda. Taliban reinforcements rushed to join the Al Qaeda fighters, but both were routed from the valley with heavy losses. Since 2002, the Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants have maintained a low-level insurgency in Afghanistan. Troops from the United States and allied countries, mainly from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, remain in Afghanistan operating ostensibly under the banner of Operation Enduring Freedom. An upsurge of Taliban insurgent activity beginning in 2006, however, has necessitated a series of coalition offensives that inflicted heavy casualties on the Taliban but failed to defeat it. In early 2009, the U.S. government announced plans to dispatch up to 30,000 additional troops. With the arrival of new troops, the coalition forces launched new offensives in southern Afghanistan but struggled to end the insurgency. Paul W. D oerr See also Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Taliban Further Reading Biddle, Stephen. Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. Biddle, Stephen. “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare.” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (March–April 2003): 31–46.

10  Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (Martin Luther, 1525) Kagan, Frederick. Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy. New York: Encounter, 2006. Maley, William. The Afghanistan Wars. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (Martin Luther, 1525) Martin Luther (1483–1546) penned his little treatise Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants in 1525 in response to the Peasants’ Rebellion that began among the German peasants in 1524. The peasants’ grievances erupted in attacks upon their lords and rulers, resulting in the plundering and destruction of churches, monasteries, and castles. Cities such as Erfurt surrendered to them. Luther expressed his belief that the devil was behind the uprising: “See what a mighty prince the devil is, how he has the world in his hands and can throw everything into confusion, when he can so quickly catch so many thousands of peasants, deceive them, blind them, harden them, and throw them into revolt, and do with them whatever his raging fury undertakes” (51). He conjectured,“I think there is not a devil in hell; they have all gone into the peasants. Their raving has gone beyond all measure” (51–52). He then added, “God may, perhaps, have thus aroused the devil as a punishment upon all Germany” (52). Although he contended that the devil was behind what was happening, Luther asserted that the peasants were responsible for their actions. He thus began by indicting them for their sins (49). He called attention to their insubordination, rebellion, murder, and robbery. He emphasized the biblical duty of submission, quoting from Romans 13:1: “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities” (50). He drew attention to 1 Peter 2:13: “Be subject to every ordinance of man” (51). In his emphasis upon the duty of submission, Luther stood in continuity with the Christian moral tradition that had developed over the preceding centuries. John of Salisbury in the 12th century, for example, had declared that “loyal shoulders should uphold the power of the ruler.” Furthermore, “inferiors should cleave and cohere to their

superiors, and all limbs should be in subjection to the head” (Policraticus, VI.25). Luther’s contemporaries took the same view. The Geneva reformer John Calvin (1509– 1564) asserted that the people should be submissive: “It is our duty to show ourselves compliant and obedient to whomever he sets over the places where we live” (Institutes of the Christian Religion IV.20.8). Heinrich Bullinger (1504–1575), in Zurich, similarly described the duty of the people toward their magistrates, “Let them love him, favor him, and pray for him as their father, and let them obey all his just and fair commands.” Far from attacking their rulers, the people must even be willing to lay down their lives on behalf of the magistrates. In the Second Helvetic Confession, Bullinger wrote, “If the public safety of the country and justice require it, and the magistrate of necessity wages war, let them even lay down their life and pour out their blood for the public safety and that of the magistrate.” In a certain sense, Luther’s piece against the peasants amounts to a treatise against the evil of sedition. His deep conviction regarding the heinous sin of sedition finds roots in medieval teaching. Thomas Aquinas had regarded it as a “special sin,” and he defined it in these terms: “Sedition . . . is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part” (Summa Theologica 2a2ae, q. 42, art.1). Calvin’s idea that “the magistrate cannot be resisted without God being resisted at the same time” (Institutes of the Christian Religion IV.20.27) finds a similar conception in the statement made by Salisbury that “the crime of lése majesté [from the Latin meaning “injured majesty,” the crime of violating the majesty or dignity of a sovereign or a state] is “aimed against the likeness of Him who alone wears the truth of true and native majesty.” This was a crime that was committed by the person who “has incited or solicited the people to rebel against the commonwealth” (Policraticus VI.28). Luther’s treatise was also addressed to the governing authorities. He exhorted them to seek a peaceful resolution of the dispute, if possible.“We must go beyond our duty,” he asserted, “and offer the mad peasants an opportunity to come to terms, even though they are not worthy of it” (52). If that did not work, the rebellion was to be put down by force. “Let everyone who can,” he exhorted, “smite, slay, and stab, secretly or openly, remembering that nothing can be more poisonous, hurtful, or devilish than a rebel” (50).

Ahimsa 11

Some think that Luther was urging an indiscriminate slaughter at this point. This was not the case. This was simply Luther—colorful and dramatic, captivating and emphatic. Luther did in fact assert that just war restraints should be kept in place. He distinguished between the peasants who instigated and initiated the rebellion and the people who were coerced by those peasants to join the rebellion. With regard to the participants who had been forced to join the rebellion, Luther admonished, “The rulers ought to have mercy on these prisoners of the peasants” (54). Luther was urging discrimination in the putting down of the rebellion, rather than an indiscriminate slaughter of everyone connected with it. Luther reminds us in his treatise against the peasants that he was a public theologian. He frequently addressed contemporary social and political developments with biblical teaching and counsel. Mark J. Larson See also Aquinas, Thomas; Bullinger, Heinrich; Calvin, John; German Peasants’ War; Luther, Martin; Protestant Reformers and War; Primary Documents: Excerpt from Martin Luther Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation (1520); Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (May 1525) Further Reading Luther, Martin. “Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants.” In Robert C. Schultz, ed. Luther’s Works. Vol. 46: The Christian in Society III. Philadelphia: Concordia Publishing House, 1967.

Ahimsa Ahimsa is an ethical concept related to nonviolence in the South Asian religious tradition. The word ahimsa is derived from the Sanskrit root him . s, which literally means “to strike,” but in its nominal form can express the concept of violence, killing, harm, or envy. Ahimsa is the negation of this term and therefore expresses nonviolence and refraining from doing harm and taking life, as well as refraining from envy. The origin of the concept, and especially the question of whether or not it has a Vedic origin, that is,

appears in the Vedas, the oldest Hindu scriptures, has been debated by scholars. Ahimsa appears as an ethical idea in the Manusmr.ti, one of the earliest legal texts in the South Asian tradition, in which people are encouraged not to cause harm to animals outside of ritual needs. The idea also appears in the Upanis.adic and epic literature of Hinduism as a moral ideal. In the Upanis.adic literature, a philosophical consideration of the meaning of the Vedic sacrifices emerges and such meaning is often given in terms of an internalization in the form of moral virtues. In the Chāndogyopanis.ad, one of the early Upanis.adic texts, humanity is equated with the Vedic rites. The text refers to ahimsa as one of the daks.in.a or fees received by Vedic priests for religious services. This suggests that by the time the Upanis.ads emerged, ahimsa was also gaining currency as an ethical ideal. The concept is perhaps most conspicuous in Buddhism and Jainism, two religious traditions arising from Hinduism, as well as in the much later Gandhian notion of satyagraha, or nonviolent civil disobedience. Both Buddhism and Jain philosophical traditions inherited the notion of an ethicized universe in which the moral forces of karma were causally efficacious. Acts generate positive, neutral, or negative effects which in turn are related to the quest for liberation from a world of suffering, sam . sāra. In the Tipit.aka, the collection of the Buddhist Pāl. i canon, the Pāl. i version of the term ahimsa, avihim . sā, appears 32 times in the Suttapit.aka; three times in the Abhidhammapit.ake, the collection of philosophical texts; and once in the Vinayapit.ake or texts on monastic conduct. Overwhelmingly these mentions extol the virtues of both nonviolence in conduct as well as nonviolence in intention (cetanā) and deplore the karmic effects of harming others. While using an alternative word, refraining from killing is one of the five fundamental vows (pañca sīla) of Buddhist practitioners. Ahimsa is also one of the five lay vows (anuvrata) of Jain practitioners. Perhaps in no other tradition has ahimsa played such an important role as within the Jain tradition. The two fundamental ontological categories of the Jains are those things with souls (jīva) and those things without souls (ajīva). Any harm inflicted on entities possessing souls results in deleterious karmic effects. In the practices of laypeople, this means avoidance of vocations, such as farming, that could result in harming living beings, and for monastics it entails practice meant to

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prevent even accidental harm to insects or other microscopic creatures. In the 20th century, Mohandas Gandhi made ahimsa the key concept in his philosophy of political change, satyagraha, which he developed in South Africa and in the Indian independence movement and which later had a profound impact on the civil rights movement in the United States. Jarrod W. B rown See also Buddhism and War; Jainism and War Further Reading Bhattacharyya, Narendra Nath. Jain Philosophy: Historical Outline. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1999. Gandhi, Mohandas K. “Ahimsa, or the Way of Nonviolence.” All Men Are Brothers (1931): 85–107. Gier, Nicholas F. The Virtue of Nonviolence: From Gautama to Gandhi. Albany: SUNY Press, 2004. Kotturan, George. Ahimsa: Gautama to Gandhi. New Delhi: Sterling, 1973. Richards, Glyn. The Philosophy of Gandhi: A Study of His Basic Ideas. Surrey, UK: Curzon, 2005. Sangave, Vilas Adinath, et al. The Jaina Path of Ahimsa. Solapur: Bhagawan Mahavir Research Centre, 1991.

that afflict corporeal creations. By medieval times, Ohrmazd had come to be regarded by the magi or Zoroastrian priests as the sole source of all that is good and pure, a deity incapable of any ill will, harm, or malice. Angra Mainyu, known by then as Ahreman, was despised as the singular cause of all that harmed the cosmos. In the universal battle between Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu, Zoroastrians are supposed to support their deity by keeping evil away from their thoughts, words, and deeds and by doing good at all times. Zoroastrian eschatological accounts narrate that at the end of time, during a final apocalypse, Ahura Mazda will emerge victorious, Angra Mainyu will become powerless and will be cast back into hell forever, humans will be resurrected, and the physical world will be refurbished perfectly. Narges Nematollahi and Jamsheed K. Choksy See also Zoroastrianism and War Further Reading Dhalla, Maneckji Nusservanji. History of Zoroastrianism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938. Kuiper, Bernardus, and Franciscus Jacobus. “Ahura.” In Encyclopaedia Iranica. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983.

Ahura Mazda The Avestan word Ahura is the name of the highest deity in Zoroastrianism, which is the ancient religion of Iran. From a philological perspective, the phrase Ahura Mazda consists of ahura “lord,” which corresponds to Sanskrit asura and represents a group of Indo-Iranian deities, and mazda, which is interpreted either as the substantive “wisdom” or the adjective “wise”—hence the meanings “Lord Wisdom” or “Wise Lord.” The oldest scriptures of Zoroastrianism, called the Gathas “(Devotional) Songs,” are attributed to the prophet Zarathustra and possibly date from the second millennium BCE. From the theological perspective, the Gathas present Ahura Mazda as the ultimate creator of the spiritual and physical worlds in their perfect ideal states. The creative force of Ahura Mazda, presented as Spenta Mainyu, “Holy Spirit” in the Gathas, is opposed to Angra Mainyu, “Angry (or Evil) Spirit,” who is held responsible for introducing all the evil, pollution, pain, illness, and death

Ai, Battle of (ca. 1400 BCE or 1200 BCE) According to the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament), after the Israelite exodus from captivity in Egypt, the city of Ai was the second city conquered by the Israelites upon their entry into the land of Canaan because it was on one of the major roads leading into the highlands (Joshua 7–8). The Israelite scouts sent to investigate Ai recommended sending only 3,000 men to attack the town due to its small size, but the army at Ai routed the Israelite force. When Joshua asked God why this had happened, Yahweh told him that the loss was due to the seizure of plunder from Jericho by the Israelite soldier Achan, which had been expressly prohibited by the herem laws. Even though only one soldier had done this, the anger of Yahweh came upon all the people of Israel (Josh. 7:1). Killing Achan restored the people’s

Alarcos, Battle of (1195)  13

relationship with God, who then instructed them how to conquer Ai by employing an ambush. When the Israelites attacked with a larger force, they pretended to run away again from the people of Ai. However, Joshua stretched out a javelin at God’s command, instructing the ambush troops to come out of hiding and attack the town. The javelin was not simply a military symbol, but also a religious symbol to show the people that Yahweh had given the people into their hands (Josh. 8:18). Unlike at Jericho, the people were allowed to take livestock and items from Ai. The site usually associated with the town (et-Tell) was devoid of any inhabitants at the time of Joshua, though it is possible that Ai was only a military encampment or that the location has been attributed to the wrong place. According to the biblical chronology, the conquest of Ai happened about 1400 BCE or 1200 BCE, depending on whether one holds to an early or late date for the Hebrew Exodus from Egypt. Charlie Trimm See also Herem; Israelite Conquest of Canaan; Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare; Jericho, Battle of; Yahweh as Divine Warrior Further Reading Kaminsky, Joel S. Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible. JSOTSup 196. Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2013.

Alarcos, Battle of (1195) Fought between Christians and Berber Muslims in 1195, the Battle of Alarcos must be seen in the context of the Reconquista by which the Christian natives of the Iberian Peninsula retook it from the Muslim Moorish conquerors of 711 CE and following. Although a decisive victory for Abu Yusuf Ya’qub al-Mansur of the Almohad Moors, who defeated Alfonso VIII of Castile, the battle had little longterm strategic impact on the course of the Reconquista. For Iberian Muslims, the Battle of Alarcos became instead a high point prior to decline and loss.

The centuries-long Iberian conflict between Christians and Moors proceeded deliberately and with many anomalies. It was not uncommon for Christians to fight Christians and Moors to fight Moors in internecine struggles. It was also not uncommon for particular groupings of Christians and Moors to ally with each other on a local and temporary basis. Gradually, however, the idea of Reconquista took root and flourished—along with many military actions that, in the aggregate over time, saw success. The Christian kingdoms relentlessly moved south from their beginning point clinging to the edge of the Pyrenees at the Frankish border. Al-Mansur, king of an empire from northern Africa through southern Iberia, had fought both illness and a usurping brother in his capital of Marrakesh (in modern Morocco). Alfonso VIII took the opportunity of Al-Mansur’s absence to attack his province of Seville in 1194. AlMansur, having secured Marrakesh, crossed back to Iberia in 1195 to meet Alfonso VIII’s threat. The two large armies met at the southern boundary of Alfonso VIII’s realm, near Alarcos, an unfinished outpost castle. Al-Mansur declined battle for two days, resting his forces. Alfonso VIII was eager to fight, declining to wait for the imminent arrival of the allied forces of Kings Alfonso IX of León and Sancho of Navarra in spite of the Moors’ great advantage in numbers. The morning charge of 8,000 Castilian heavy cavalry caused heavy Moorish casualties and made much progress through the day, but was steadily diminished by missile weapons, then enveloped by Moorish reserve forces. Foot forces accompanied by Alfonso VIII himself joined the fray only to be overcome, with the Castilian king barely escaping. A remnant escaped to the Alarcos fortress, where they and many women and children were allowed surrender and safe passage upon payment of ransom and hostages. This epic battle claimed tens of thousands of lives, far more on the Christian side than the Moorish. The destruction of the Castilian army was complete. Moorish forces next raided and captured numerous nearby cities, securing Al-Mansur’s sovereignty. The raids expanded to regional forays reaching even the region of Toledo, the Castilian capital, but without territorial gain. Castile, greatly weakened and threatened, was even attacked in 1196 by a Christian coalition—allied with

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Al-Mansur’s Almohads!—led by Alfonso IX of León, who bitterly recalled Alfonso VIII’s slight of not waiting for his help at Alarcos. This Christian quarrel was only stopped by the intervention of Pope Celestine III. An antebellum status quo gradually returned. Al-Mansur, having achieved his goal of stopping the Christian incursions, returned to Marrakesh in poor health, dying in 1199. But the inexorable progress of Reconquista continued, even if incrementally and gradually, with Christian positions constantly improving. Alfonso VIII lived to lead a coalition army that decisively defeated the Moors in 1212 at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. That battle broke the strength of the Almohad reign in Spain. Alarcos proved to be a pause in the Reconquista, a dramatic tactical defeat that delayed but did not deter ultimate strategic Christian victory. Mark A. Jumper See also Christian-Muslim Wars in Spain; Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of; Reconquista Further Reading El Hareir, Idris, and Ravane M’Baye, eds. Different Aspects of Islamic Culture: Volume Three, The Spread of Islam throughout the World. New York: UNESCO, 2011. Gerli, E. Michael, et al., eds. Medieval Iberia: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229) The Albigensian Crusade was fought against Christian heretics over a wide area of southern France, stretching from the delta of the Rhône in the east as far as Agen in the west and from the Pyrenees north as far as Cahors. The origins of the crusade lay in two differing but related areas: the political and social history of Languedoc in the 12th century, and the growth of the Waldensian and Cathar heresies.

Political Background

Based in Paris in the north, the kings of France had little influence in the region, which was divided between two great families that struggled for hegemony. The counts of Toulouse held territory that covered the whole diocese of Toulouse, Quercy, the Rouergue, the Agenais, and the mar-

quisate of Provence. They also exercised overlordship in the Rhône delta and valley, in parts of the Auvergne, and in part of the county of Foix. The other important family, the counts of Barcelona, were from 1137 also kings of Aragon. They had very little territory in the region, apart from the county of Provence on the eastern side of the Rhône, which they had gained through marriage in 1112. However, they often opposed the counts of Toulouse through the Trencavels, viscounts of Béziers and Carcassonne, who dominated the Béziers-Carcassonne-Albi region and were frequently clients, and from 1179, vassals of the king of Aragon. Along the coastal strip were the small principalities of Montpellier and Narbonne, which maneuvered to maintain their independence during the 12th century. A series of wars forced them into alliance with Aragon, and in 1198 Count Raymond VI of Toulouse acknowledged his failure to control the coastal strip when he signed the Treaty of Perpignan with the king of Aragon. This left him with his lands divided between the Rhône delta and the Toulousain to the west. During the 12th century Toulouse was an object of interest to the dukes of Aquitaine, who claimed the county through Philippa, daughter of William IV of Toulouse, who had married William IX, duke of Aquitaine. That claim was eventually transmitted to King Henry II of England by his marriage to Eleanor of Aqui­ taine and used as a pretext for interference. Continual warfare and probably a lack of real resources meant that the counts of Toulouse were relatively weak rulers. Like other parts of western Europe, Languedoc experienced a wave of castle building, which began in the later 10th century and continued unabated until the 13th. Most of these castles were in the hands of minor members of the aristocracy, and during the 12th century many of these men were able to behave like petty sovereigns. Such men ruled their territories from castles and lived surrounded by a court. Raymond of Termes, for example, “an avowed heretic .  .  . feared neither God nor man. He had such confidence in his fortress that he fought both the count of Toulouse, and his own suzerain, the viscount of Béziers” (Histoire Albigeoise de Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay, pp. 71–72).

Origins of the Crusade

It was in these circumstances that both the Waldensian and Cathar heresies appeared and flourished. The Waldensians,

Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229)  15

named after their founder, Peter Valdes, a merchant of Lyons, were expelled from Lyons in 1182 for persistently preaching the gospel to laypeople without either formal education, holy orders, or authority. In addition they provided the Gospels in the vernacular. Catharism seems to have been established in the Toulousain by about 1165 and between 1174 and 1177 was organized into a structure of dioceses with local bishops, as well as traveling perfecti (perfect ones) who preached and administered the consolamentum (the only sacrament among the Cathars, consisting of a transmission of the Holy Spirit by the laying on of hands) and deacons who acted somewhat like parish priests. In 1177 Count Raymond V of Toulouse made a dramatic appeal to the chapter-general of the Cistercian order describing the spread of the heresy as like a disease. By the time of the crusade, Catharism was widespread across Languedoc, but the greatest concentration was in the Toulousain, in Foix, and in the Carcassonnais. Strong in the many small towns, as well as in large centers such as Toulouse, it appealed to merchants and craftsmen in a society that was becoming industrialized in the towns, where the manufacture of cloth had become widespread and important. In the countryside it found sympathizers in a world where town merchants and bankers were involved in sheep-raising and from which the growing town populations were drawn. Among the nobility at all levels, both in towns and the castles of the countryside, Catharism was strong. It was an expression of independence as well as a sign of the problems many had in their relationships with local religious communities. Esclarmonde, sister of the count of Foix, was a perfecta and was consoled at Fanjeaux in the presence of a large gathering of nobility around 1204. The count appointed her head of a convent of Cathar perfectae at Pamiers and was certainly a sympathizer himself. Raymond VI, count of Toulouse, while perhaps not a believer in Catharism, was certainly tolerant of it and was not a fervent Catholic, living excommunicated for long periods. Thus the most senior prince in Languedoc was a lukewarm supporter of the church hierarchy, and more importantly, was unable to contemplate military action against so many of his own people. The church in Languedoc found itself without the natural support it expected from secular authority in its attempts to suppress heresy. It was also hampered by uneven

quality within its own ranks. The archbishop of Narbonne, Berenger (1191–1212), was a pluralist noted for his scandalous conduct, who retained his see for several years despite vigorous efforts to remove him. The bishop of Toulouse, Raymond of Rabastens, ruined the finances of his diocese by fighting a war against his vassals. Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) was anxious to see the heresy crushed and appointed a series of legates to carry out his policies in Languedoc. Although they were able to carry through some reforms, they were not able to influence the conduct and policies of Raymond VI of Toulouse. The legates blamed him for the deterioration of relations between the church and secular authorities. They became increasingly angry and intransigent as direct attempts to convert the heretics by preaching failed, and Raymond refused to implement the canons of the church that called for action against heretics and their supporters. The defining moment came with the murder of the pope’s legate, Peter of Castelnau, by a follower of Raymond VI near Saint-Gilles on January 14, 1208. For the pope, besides the natural anger at the insult to his authority of the murder of his own legate, there was an increasing concern about the challenge to the authority of the church from a well-organized group of heretics and equally the refusal of the local nobility to heed the calls to action.

The Course of the Crusade

The pope called a crusade, which was preached in northern France and surrounding areas by the Cistercians, led by Arnold Amalric, abbot of Cîteaux and head of the order. He received an enthusiastic response. Partly this was the result of a desire for loot, but there was also a fervent hatred of the unorthodox, the result of increasing definition of Catholic doctrines, which thereby also marked those who were outsiders. One consequence had already manifested itself in attacks made upon the Jews of northern France and England, and in the heretics of Languedoc the northerners perceived a contagion that they were anxious to eliminate. The crusade attracted a large number of men of good family and prestigious connections. Among them were Odo, duke of Burgundy; Hervé, count of Nevers; Peter of Courtenay, count of Auxerre; and William of Roches, seneschal of Anjou; as well as many of slightly lesser rank such as Guy of Lévis; Gaucher of Joigny, lord of Beaujeu; and of

16  Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229)

course Simon of Montfort. Many senior churchmen, especially from Burgundy, also took part, among them the archbishop of Sens and the bishops of Autun, Nevers, and Clermont as well as members of monastic orders. The bulk of the army seems to have been recruited from Burgundy and other eastern parts of France, but there were contingents from the Saintonge, Poitou, and Gascony as well as Germany. Partly this can be explained as a result of the bias toward the East among the aristocratic recruits, who brought many followers with them; but the high density of

Cistercian houses in that region had also resulted in more intensive preaching of the crusade. The crusaders assembled at Lyons in June 1209 under the leadership of Arnold Amalric, and the very large force moved down the Rhône Valley and into the lands of Raymond VI. He offered himself to the church as a penitent and on June 18, 1209, was reconciled in a humiliating ceremony at SaintGilles. His lands were thus made safe from attack, and the crusaders turned their attentions to the lands of RaymondRoger Trencavel, viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne. The

Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229)  17

first town to be assaulted was Béziers, which was sacked and the population massacred. This was the occasion on which a crusader, having asked Arnold Amalric how they should tell the Catholics from the heretics, was told, “Kill them all, God will know his own” (Caesarius Heiserbacensis monachi ordinis Cisterciensis, Dialogus miraculorum, 2:296–298). The story is probably apocryphal. Nevertheless, the crusaders reported that they had slaughtered 20,000 people, and although this, too, is almost certainly a gross exaggeration, it is a sign of their intentions. The army moved on to Carcassonne, to which the viscount and his court had fled and which was in a state of defense. The crusaders began their attack on August 1, and on August 15 the town surrendered after the viscount had been seized while discussing terms under a safe conduct. He later died in prison. The townspeople were turned out, and the place became the headquarters of the crusaders, who elected Simon of Montfort as their leader and as viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne. Simon of Montfort immediately received the surrender of other towns in the lands of the viscount and began to burn heretics where he could find them. During the winter of 1209–1210 he saw his position weaken as his crusaders returned home, but the following spring he regained lost ground as fresh crusaders arrived. He set out to reduce the great fortresses of Minèrve, Termes, and Cabaret, which controlled the surrounding countryside. The fall of Minèrve was followed by the burning alive of about 140 Cathar perfecti, both men and women, a pattern that was to be followed as other towns fell. Lavaur, a town quite close to Toulouse and part of the possessions of the viscount of Carcassonne, was stormed. The lord and his knights who had defended the town were hanged, and the lady Geralda, his sister, was thrown down a well and killed when stones were hurled down on top of her. Their deaths were followed by the burning of 400 heretics. The next phase of the crusade extended the attack to the lands of Raymond VI of Toulouse, who was pressed to meet humiliating conditions and excommunicated when he refused. During the summers of 1211 and 1212 Simon of Montfort’s forces campaigned across the whole of Languedoc. By the end of the 1212 season much of the countryside, as far to the west as the Agenais and south as far as Foix, was in his hands, although the major towns,

Toulouse included, held out against him. At first Simon accepted the submission of southern noblemen and regranted towns and castles to them. When it became apparent that these men would throw off their allegiance as soon as they could, he began to grant lands to his followers. A parliament at Pamiers held on December 1, 1212, tried to introduce northern legal practices, such as inheritance rules, and to bar southerners from control of castles. It was a sign that the crusade had entered a new phase in which the northern soldiers would begin to make permanent settlements in the south. The battle of Muret (September 12, 1213) marked a turning point in the campaigning. Simon of Montfort’s small force defeated a much larger army led by Raymond VI of Toulouse and King Peter II of Aragon. The king was killed and the southerners routed. Although Toulouse itself did not fall, Raymond VI was now a fugitive and all of the rest of the south was under Simon’s control. He assumed the title of count of Toulouse and with the enthusiastic support of the local church hierarchy so reduced the area that only Toulouse itself was outside his control. The pope now intervened, protecting Toulouse from further attack and calling the Fourth Lateran Council. The council (November 1215) was primarily concerned with settling affairs inside Christendom in such a way that a new crusade to the Holy Land would be possible. A settlement for Languedoc, which the pope now ordered, was ancillary to the ecclesiastical work. The pope proposed to carry through his claim to be able to depose secular rulers by taking the county of Toulouse from Raymond VI, as punishment for his support of the heretics, and recognizing Simon of Montfort as count in his place. The new settlement was not accepted by the majority of southerners, and Raymond VI and his son, “the Young Raymond (VII),” returned to Languedoc from Rome determined to continue the war with new support. Both men were now active. The ensuing campaign continued to be a disaster for the south as Simon of Montfort took control of Toulouse for a while and destroyed its walls. In the autumn of 1217 Raymond VI was invited back to the city, which defied Simon. A long siege followed. Simon of Montfort was killed on June 25, 1218, when he was struck on the head by a stone fired from an engine, supposedly worked by women: according to a contemporary chronicler, “the stone arrived just where needed”

18  Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229)

[La Chanson de la Croisade Albigeoise, ed. and trans. E. Martin Chabot, 3rd ed. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1976), 3:207]. His son Amalric was unable to continue the siege. Over the next few years he lost ground to the southerners, now led increasingly by Raymond VII, who succeeded to his father’s claims when Raymond VI died in 1222. On January 25, 1224, the bankrupt Amalric of Montfort retired to the family lands near Paris, taking his father’s body with him. Raymond Trencavel, the son of Raymond-Roger Trencavel, reentered Carcassonne as viscount. This was the sign for a determined intervention by the French king. During his father’s lifetime, Prince Louis (VIII) had already made a formal entry to the crusade in 1219, when he had briefly campaigned as a crusader in the Toulousain. In January 1226 the legate Cardinal Romain excommunicated Raymond VII, and King Louis VIII immediately began a crusade in the Languedoc. He made progress through the region during the summer of 1226, and the exhausted towns and villages submitted: only Toulouse stood out against him. Carcassonne surrendered, and a seneschal was installed as the king’s military governor in the area. Although Louis died unexpectedly in Languedoc in November 1226, the regency government of Louis IX, led by his mother, Blanche of Castile, continued the policy of conquest. In April 1229 Raymond VII signed the Treaty of Meaux, by which he acknowledged the authority of the king of France. He also had to allow the church to pursue the heretics and had to agree that his heir, his only legitimate child, Jeanne, would marry the king’s younger brother, Alphonse of Poitiers. Thereafter, until his death in 1249, Raymond VII of Toulouse remained reluctant to cooperate with the church and used much energy seeking a new wife and a possible male heir. His one attempt at a rebellion, in 1242, collapsed when Henry III of England was defeated at the battle of Taillebourg (July) and failed to come to his aid.

The Inquisition

A consequence of the revolt was a determination by the French government to destroy the last major group of perfecti and their sympathizers, ensconced in the castle of Montségur, which had been refortified in 1204 by Raymond of Péreille, a member of a Cathar family. The hilltop, with its castle and village, had been a refuge for heretics for

many years, and from 1232 the Cathar bishop of Carcassonne had lived there. It was besieged in the spring of 1243 by an army led by the seneschal of Carcassonne, and it finally surrendered in March 1244. The inhabitants and the professional garrison were allowed to leave, but the Cathar perfecti, including the bishop Bertrand Marty, remained behind. On March 16, 1244, they came quietly down the hill and allowed themselves to be consigned to the flames of a great fire built within a palisaded enclosure. About 200 people died. The dramatic destruction of so many perfecti was the result of a coordinated campaign of persecution that had begun after the Treaty of Meaux. When it became apparent that local bishops could not deal adequately with the situation, Pope Gregory IX set up an Inquisition. It covered the whole of the Languedoc and was staffed by Dominican friars (April 1233). For the first time there was a permanent body in existence dedicated to the destruction of heresy and run by a body of well-trained men. Although they exercised a judicial function, they acted by questioning their suspects and all witnesses, on oath and in secret. There was no formal trial, and since no charges were brought against suspects, the suspects had no right to know the evidence alleged against them, no right to examine witnesses or to call witnesses in their defense, and no right to legal representation. There was no limit of time on their detention. Over the years the Inquisition developed a body of expertise that was passed on in written manuals. With the backing of the secular authorities, enormous numbers of people were questioned. Starting in the larger towns, the inquisitors were aided by perfecti who converted to Catholicism. Gradually the net was widened to take in smaller towns and rural areas. It is likely that during 1245–1246 about 10,000 people were questioned in Toulouse, and a minimum of 203 condemnations were recorded. Similar activity occurred throughout the Languedoc. After the bull Ad Extirpandum of 1252, the inquisitors were authorized to use torture in their work. The Inquisition was active in the region until the end of the century. The effect on the Cathars was immense. The system used by the Inquisition disrupted the functioning of groups of believers by introducing suspicion of those who had been questioned and then released. Those who were condemned faced a variety of punishments and disabilities.

Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229)  19

Perfecti were normally condemned to death if they refused to recant. Most refused and were burned. The vast majority of Cathars were believers rather than perfecti, and most of them recanted when faced with death. Others were sympathizers or merely associated with Cathars, and they too faced punishment. Those who only recanted at the last moment and were adjudged reluctant converts were imprisoned for life and lost their property. Others suffered a variety of penances. Some were sent on pilgrimages; many others were condemned to wear yellow crosses prominently displayed on their garments. Many Cathars were condemned after their deaths and their remains dug up and burned. Their descendants were usually excluded from public office for two generations. Other Cathars fled, either to Aragon, which soon ceased to be a refuge, or to Italy, where Catharism continued to flourish for many years. Although Catharism continued to exist as a belief throughout the 13th century and into the early years of the 14th, the unrelenting pressure of the Inquisition stopped the spread of the heresy and cut off its connections with the great nobility and the rural aristocracy. The heretics who were condemned in the village of Montaillou in the early 14th century were mostly peasants who had only a debased understanding of the tenets of their faith. Between 1308 and 1321, 25 believers were burned to death, mostly in Toulouse. The last perfectus to be executed was Guilhem Belibaste, burned to death at Villerouge-Termenès in 1321. Although the fighting of the crusade was long over, the work of the Inquisition was its logical extension. It was only once the secular authorities of the Languedoc were willing to aid the church, or at least not actively hinder it, that the work of extirpating the heresy could begin. The terrible deaths of the Cathars of Minèrve, Lavaur, and Montségur were spectacular demonstrations of the fear and hatred that the heretics incited in the orthodox northerners, but they had little impact on the organization or the strength of the Cathars, who were initially fortified by persecution. It was the steady work of the Inquisition, rounding up and questioning thousands of men and women, that broke the organization. In the towns and to a lesser extent the countryside, the church gained a grip over the lives of the laity that it had never had in the 12th century. What drove it to this gigantic task was a deep-rooted fear of the consequences for the church as an institution if it lost its

monopoly of control over religious belief and activity. For many laypeople there was probably a similar, though hardly articulated, feeling that the roots of society were in danger if unorthodox opinions were unchecked. The consequences of the crusade and Inquisition for the church were considerable. As one of the measures taken against the heretics, possession of the Bible (even in Latin) was forbidden to the laity, as were all translations into Occitan. Only a breviary, a psalter, and a book of hours were allowed. Thus the church placed a real barrier between itself and the laity just as increasing wealth and literacy among the laity made it possible for more people to take an intelligent interest in the faith. Doctrinal and theological debate became something restricted only to the most trusted scholars. The church learned slowly that its relationship with the secular powers had changed. It had proved itself unable to defeat the heretics without the support of the kings of France and the power they wielded. From now on the king would be the leading partner in their relationship. Michael D. Costen See also Arnaud Amaury (Arnaud Amalric); Béziers, Massacre at; Cathars; Innocent III, Pope; Languedoc Revolts Further Reading Alvira Cabrer, Martín. “La Cruzada albigense y la intervención de la corona de Aragón.” Hispania 60 (2000): 947–975. Barber, Malcolm. “Catharism and the Occitan Nobility: The Lordships of Cabaret, Minerve and Termes.” In Christopher Harper-Bill and Ruth Harvey, eds. The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood, III. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell, 1988, pp. 1–9. Barber, Malcolm. The Cathars: Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in the High Middle Ages. London: Longman, 2000. Caesarius Heiserbacensis monachi ordinis Cisterciensis. Dialogus miraculorum. Edited by J. Strange. 2 vols. Köln: Heberle, 1851. Costen, Michael D. The Cathars and the Albigensian Crusade. Manchester: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997. La Croisade Albigeoise: Actes du Colloque du Centre d’Etudes Cathares, Carcassonne, 4, 5 et 6 Octobre 2002. Edited by Marie-Paul Gimenez. Balma: Centre d’Etudes Cathares, 2004. Evans, Austin P. “The Albigensian Crusade.” In Kenneth M. Setton et al., eds. A History of the Crusades. 2nd ed. 6 vols. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–1989, pp. 277–324.

20  Alcántara, Order of Histoire Albigeoise de Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay. Edited by Pascal Guébin and Henri Maisonneuve. Paris: Vrin, 1951. Kienzle, Beverley Mayne. Cistercians, Heresy and Crusade in Occitania, 1145–1229. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell, 2001. Le Roy Ladurie, Emanuel. Montaillou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village, 1294–1324. London: Penguin, 1980. Marvin, Laurence W. “War in the South: A First Look at Siege Warfare in the Albigensian Crusade, 1209–1218.” War in History 8 (2001): 373–395. Oberste, Jörg. Der “Kreuzzug” gegen die Albigenser: Ketzerei und Machtpolitik im Mittelalter. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003. Paix de Dieu et guerre sainte en Languedoc en XIIIe siècle. Edited by Marie-Humbert Vicaire. Toulouse: Privat, 1969. Paterson, Linda M. The World of the Troubadours: Medieval Occitan Society, c. 1100–c. 1300. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Roquebert, Michel. Epopée Cathare. 5 vols. Toulouse: Privat, 1970–1991. Strayer, Joseph R. The Albigensian Crusades. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992. Vincent, Nicholas. “England and the Albigensian Crusade.” In Björn Weiler and I. W. Rowlands, eds. England and Europe in the Reign of Henry III (1216–1272). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002, pp. 67–97. Wagner, Kay. Debellare Albigenses: Darstellung und Deutung des Albigenserkreuzzuges in der europäischen Geschichts­ schreibung von 1209 bis 1328. Neuried: Ars Una, 2000. Zerner-Chardavoine, Monique. La Croisade albigeoise. Paris: Gallimard, 1979.

Alcántara, Order of The Order of Alcántara was a Spanish military order founded in the 12th century for the purpose of defending Christian frontier positions from Muslim advance and for taking the Reconquista (Reconquest) of the Iberian Peninsula to the infidels. The word Alcántara comes from the Arabic al-cantara meaning “the bridge.” The origins of the Order of Alcántara are obscure, given subsequent damage suffered by its archive repository in San Benito de Alcántara. Some evidence points to a possible foundation in 1156, but the first official record dates to 1177 when Pope

Alexander III issued a bull confirming papal recognition on the order. The members of the order followed the strict and austere Cistercian observances and took monastic vows. They wore the Cistercian white mantle into battle emblazoned with the symbol of the order—a green cross in gules with fleur-de-lis. During the reign of Almohad caliph Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf I (1163–1184), the Muslim forces in Iberia began an aggressive expansionist drive to push the Christians into the northern regions of the peninsula and beyond the Tagus River under the guise of fundamentalist Islamic principles. In response to this, the Christian kings set up military orders comprised of monks and knights to defend frontier positions against further Almohad advances. Several military orders were established from brotherhoods including one named the Order of San Julián del Pereiro. San Julián was strategically located on the banks of the Tagus River, which bordered the Kingdom of Portugal to the west, Castile to the east, and León to the north. The order imitated the larger Order of Calatrava and allowed that order to inspect its frontier positions. Despite this coordination, the Muslim forces overran the order’s frontier positions and crossed the Tagus. In 1212, a decisive Christian victory at Las Navas de Tolosa turned the war definitively against the Almohads. In 1218, San Julián renamed its recovered headquarters Alcántara after the bridge crossing the Tagus. The order suffered from repeated internecine political conflict common between the kings of Castile and León, who vied for control of its revenues or to place it under their control through a more amenable and experienced order, the Order of Calatrava. The duties of Alcántara were recorded by Alfonso IX of León as both a military order to wage war against the Muslims but also as the king’s peace envoys to ensure that truces between Christian and Muslim communities were upheld: “you are always to make war from there [Alcántara] and also peace whenever and with whomsoever I command.” The Spanish kings were encouraged after Las Navas de Tolosa to keep up the offensive against the Muslims by Pope Innocent III and his successor Honorius III. These campaigns proved costly with Alcántara drawing on its surrounding domains and revenue streams (in particular sheep herding) to contribute to the cost. In September

Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857)  21

1236 Gregory IX instructed prelates to provide 20,000 gold pieces annually for three years to subsidize the cost of campaigns Alcántara was engaged in. New members were encouraged to join the order to fight in the cause of Christ and become martyrs for the faith. On April 12, 1238 the papacy issued a crusading indulgence to anyone who volunteered to fight for Alcántara. In 1494, Alcántara was placed under royal control by the Catholic Monarchs and annexed to the crown. The order was abolished in 1874 by the First Spanish Republic but was later revived as a noble organization with a purely honorific character. Barry N. Whelan See also Christian-Muslim Wars in Spain; Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of; Reconquista Further Reading Cabrer, Martín Alvira. Las Navas de Tolosa 1212: Idea, Liturgia y Memoria de la Batalla. Madrid: Sílex, 2012. Forey, Alan. The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries. New York: Macmillan, 1992. Lomax, Derek W. The Reconquest of Spain. London: Longman, 1978. Madden, Thomas F. The New Concise History of the Crusades. Oxford: Rowman, 2005. O’Callaghan, Joseph F. Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857) The conquest of Algeria was initiated in the last days of the Bourbon Restoration to the throne of France by Charles X as an attempt to increase his popularity among the French people, bolster patriotic sentiment, and expand French influence in North Africa. In 1827, a diplomatic incident led to Algiers being blockaded by the French Navy for three years. On April 28, 1827, Hussein Dey of Algiers, while demanding an explanation from Pierre Deval, the French consul, for France’s failure to pay a 30-year-old debt, struck the consul with a fly whisk and called him a wicked rascal. King Charles X of France used this slight against his diplomatic representa-

tive to first demand an apology from the dey, and then to initiate a blockade against the port of Algiers. The blockade lasted for three years until Charles X ordered an invasion. The French army of 38,000 men, led by General Louis Auguste Victor de Ghaisne, comte de Bourmont, landed near Algiers on June 14, 1830, and during a three-week campaign, it inflicted a series of defeats on Algerian forces, capturing Algiers on July 5 and ending more than 300 years of Ottoman presence in the region. However, this was not the end of local resistance to the French. Ahmad Bey ben Mohamed Chérif, the bey of Constantine, led the local Berber population in a fierce resistance to the French occupation forces, as did Abd al-Qadir, emir of Mascara, who established his base in western Algeria and staged a large number of raids against the French. In 1834, France formally annexed the occupied areas of Algeria and created a colonial administration that was led by a governor-general responsible to the minister of war. The French then directed their attention to defeating the continued Algerian resistance. Despite their attempts to crush Abd al-Qadir’s insurgency, it endured, compelling the French to accept the Treaty of Tafna in May 1837, which recognized French conquests in Algeria but also surrendered much of Algeria to al-Qadir’s sovereignty. But the French effectively broke the terms of the agreement when they stormed Constantine in October 1837. This led to Abd al-Qadir’s launching fresh attacks, and by 1839, he effectively controlled two-thirds of the country. To put an end to this, in 1840, King Louis Philippe appointed a new commander in chief, Thomas Robert Bugeaud, who pursued a vigorous campaign using mobile columns that struck at the supply centers of Abd al-Qadir. In May 1843, the French army inflicted a heavy defeat on Algerians at Smala, forcing Abd al-Qadir to withdraw into Morocco and continue his campaign from there. However, Bugeaud again defeated Abd al-Qadir and his Moroccan allies at Isly (1844) and then at Sidi-Brahim (1845), effectively ending al-Qadir’s resistance. While al-Qadir’s forces were being subdued, the French also led a series of expeditions into the Aurès Mountains, where Berber resistance remained strong until late 1849. By then nearly all of northern Algeria was under French control, and the government of the Second Republic declared the occupied lands an integral part of France, creating three départements (local administrative units) under

22  All India Muslim League Laurie, G. B. French Conquest of Algeria. Uckfield, UK: Military and Naval Press, 2004.

All India Muslim League

Abd al-Qadir was a Sufi scholar and military leader who founded an independent Islamic state in western Algeria during the 1830s. After a long struggle against the French Army he was defeated, captured, and exiled in 1847. (Library of Congress)

a civilian government. The last stronghold of Algerian resistance was the mountainous area of Kabylia, which the French gradually conquered in 1856–1857. This victory effectively ended the conquest of Algeria, although isolated resistance continued for many years. Ralph M. Baker See also French Colonial Policy in Africa Further Reading Bennison, A. Jihad and Its Interpretation in Pre-Colonial Morocco: State-Society Relations during the French Conquest of Algeria. New York: Routledge, 2002. Blunt, W. Desert Hawk: Abd el Kader and the French Conquest of Algeria. London: Methuen, 1947. Kiser, J. Commander of the Faithful, the Life and Times of Emir Abd El-Kader: A Story of True Jihad. London: Archetype, 2008.

The All India Muslim League was organized in 1906 to represent the civil rights of Indian Muslims, the largest minority religious group of British India. The organization was formed in the midst of anti-British agitation by opponents of the 1905 partition of Bengal. Throughout its history, the league participated in the political process in support of those rights either in conflict or cooperation with the larger Hindu Congress Party, which had been established in 1895. The All India Muslim League eventually grew in influence to compete directly with the Congress Party and became the proponent for a separate Muslim homeland that would be created out of four of India’s North-Western provinces, and would become the state of Pakistan. The origins of the league arose out of widespread Hindu agitation over creation of a majority Muslim province folowing the 1905 British partition of Bengal. Government negotiations with the Hindu Congress Party raised Muslim concerns that their interests would be ignored. Muslim discussions with the viceroy resulted in political assurances that won the support of the Muslim minority against a Hindu boycott, fueling future Hindu-Muslim antipathy and conflict. This led to the formation of the All India Muslim League, which met for the first time on December 30, 1906 in Dacca, led by Mohsin-ul-Mulk (1837–1907) and Mushtaq Hussain (1841–1917). The early Muslim League did not reflect the larger Muslim population, but was a “political club” composed of and representing only the Muslim elite. The Congress Party was similar, but was radically changed in 1915 as the party was transformed into a grassroots organization representing all Indians. After this, the Muslim League had to compete with the Congress Party for Muslim support. Sectarian strife was widespread in India and set the political agenda throughout the 1920s and 1930s, defying all efforts to find a solution. Riots, abuse of women, and murder were common, perpetrated over religious slights, real or imagined. At the provincial level, arguments over the provision

Almohad Revolution (12th Century CE)  23

of government services based on sectarian considerations were common. In the midst of this tension, the Muslim League wavered between support for the government or alliance with the Congress Party. This resulted in a 1927 split of the league into two factions, the Punjabi faction under the leadership of Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) and an All India League under Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948). Jinnah supported the nationalist efforts against the British government and attempted to forge a Hindu-Muslim alliance with the Congress Party. The Iqbal league opposed his efforts, deeply distrustful of Hindu motivations. Frustrated with sectarian intransigence, Jinnah washed his hands of Indian politics and moved to England in 1930. Muhammad Iqbal, a poet and intellectual, became president of the Muslim League with Jinnah’s departure. In his presidential address at the league’s December 1930 meetings, he called for a separate Muslim homeland. There is disagreement about Iqbal’s intentions, but his speech is heralded today as the birth of the idea of Pakistan. With Iqbal’s illness and death in 1938, Jinnah assumed leadership of the league and transformed it into a powerful party enjoying widespread Muslim support. By 1939, Jinnah was recognized as a political power of equal stature with Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948). After the Second World War, Great Britain sought to divest itself of India, which had become a tinderbox of sectarian conflict. The Muslim League, led by Jinnah, insisted on the creation of Pakistan, a separate Muslim state. The Congress Party defiantly rejected all Britain’s efforts to establish a united India. Britain announced the partition of India and creation of Pakistan on July 15, 1947. The All India Muslim League ceased to exist after partition, having accomplished its mission. It was succeeded by the Pakistan Muslim League, which played a major role in early Pakistan’s formation. Dayne E. Nix See also Bhagavad Gita and War; Gandhi, Mahatma; Hinduism and War; India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in; Indo-Pakistani Wars; Iqbal, Muhammad Further Reading James, Lawrence. Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997.

Nix, Dayne. The Integration of Philosophy, Politics and Conservative Islam in the Thought of Muhammad Iqbal: The Restoration of Muslim Dignity Against the Tide of Westernization. New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011. Wolpert, Stanley. A New History of India. 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Almohad Revolution (12th Century CE) The Almohad Revolution was the outcome of a revivalist Islamic movement led by Muhammad Ibn Tumart (ca. 1078/1081–1128/1130). The Almohads/al-Muwah.h.idun (Unifiers) (1121–1269) originally comprised clans from the Masmuda Berbers. They began their activities in the early 1120s. The movement challenged the supposed mystical tendencies of their predecessors, the Almoravids/alMurabitun (1040–1147) and the rising power of the Christian states of Iberia during the Reconquista. The Almohads established a state that stretched from Morocco to Tunisia and extended into Iberia. Muhammad Ibn Tumart, the founder of the movement, was from Tinmel in the Atlas Mountains in south Morocco. He was the chief architect of this revolutionary movement, but the exact nature of Ibn Tumart’s revolution and many of the details of his life are contradictory or nonexistent in many of the contemporary sources. Additionally, it is more than likely that contemporary chroniclers and historians of the Almohads consciously shaped the nature of the revolution to fit the needs of the movement rather than painting an exact picture of Ibn Tumart. Even the exact date of his death is difficult to pinpoint, due to the fact that his followers kept his death a secret for quite some time. With this in mind, some things are more definite. Ibn Tumart was born in the Atlas Mountains in the Sus Valley. He traveled to Arabia, Syria, and Egypt around 1106, returning to Morocco around 1119. His journey shaped his outlook on the world and Islam. Many of his ideas for the reformation of Islam were written into the Kitab A’azz ma Yutlab, published in French as Le livre d’Ibn Toumert. This work called for a reformation of Islam, and Ibn Tumart was proclaimed Mahdi (the Renewer/Guided One). While calling for a new political and religious order, the Almohads leaned very heavily on Berber tribal structure.

24  Al Qaeda

This structure not only functioned as a basis for the Almohad military, but was also an administrative structure. Rather than destroying Berber tribal structure, Ibn Tumart and the early Almohads used it to suit their own purposes. The Almohad version of Islam often defied traditional definitions of Islam. One controversial concept was that of Ibn Tumart as Mahdi. The new message of Ibn Tumart was to bring Muslims to the original intent of Muhammad. Additionally, the context of Ibn Tumart’s proclamation of being the Mahdi and the new theology of the Almohads was most likely inspired by the declining authority of the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, the crusades in greater Syria, rising Norman power in Sicily, and the Reconquista. The Almohads gave no loyalty to the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, but instead claimed authority through the Mahdi, Ibn Tumart. The religious dogma of the Almohads emphasized tawhid (unity), specifically the unity of the nature of God, and it deemphasized tribal loyalty and heredity. Ibn Tumart’s theology also emphasized the role of rationality in understanding God. At the same time, the new government established by Ibn Tumart utilized the tribal structure of the Atlas Berbers to rule the growing Almohad Empire. Ibn Tumart’s successor/Khalifa, al Mu’min, reinvented this structure. This reform changed the nature of the Almohad Revolution, although aspects of it continued on after Ibn Tumart’s death. James N. Tallon See also Caliphate; Reconquista Further Reading Baadj, Amar Salem. Saladin, the Almohads and the Banū Ghāniya: The Contest for North Africa (12th and 13th centuries). Leiden: Brill, 2015. Buresi, Pascal, and Hicham El Aallaoui. Governing the Empire: Provincial Administration in the Almohad Caliphate (1224– 1269). Leiden: Brill, 2013. Fierro, Ma. Isabel. The Almohad Revolution: Politics and Religion in the Islamic West during the Twelfth-Thirteenth Centuries. Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012. Fromherz, Allen James. The Almohads: The Rise of an Islamic Empire. London: I. B. Tauris, 2010. García-Arenal, Mercedes. Messianism and Puritanical Reform: Mahdīs of the Muslim West. Leiden: Brill, 2006.

Al Qaeda Al Qaeda is a violent Sunni Islamist terrorist group. The group’s Arabic name translates as “the base.” Al Qaeda promotes religious faith as a justification for conflict. While the term jihad means “to struggle, strive, or exert oneself,” Al Qaeda advocates external jihad, especially involving violence. The group interprets the Qur’an and other Islamic religious texts as providing sanction and legitimacy for violence against Christians, Jews, and any Muslims whom the group deems to be apostates. The organization claims that such conflict is intended to cleanse the Muslim community, known collectively as the umma. Al Qaeda also focuses heavily on the concept of tawhid, a doctrine that blends Islamic religion, politics, and society. Al Qaeda has three professed goals. The first is to eliminate Western influence from Muslim countries. The second is to remove from power governments in the Middle East that the faction judges secular. The third is to establish in the region an Islamic caliphate governed by sharia law. The group is international in scope and anti-Western in ideology and action. Al Qaeda has identified the United States as the most powerful symbol of Western influence and therefore seeks to attack the United States and its allies. Al Qaeda also espouses anti-Israel rhetoric, including support for the Palestinian cause. In addition, the movement decries U.S. support of local governments in the Middle East that Al Qaeda claims are either secular or pro-Western. The group characterizes these Muslim leaders as illegitimate. Examples include the Al Saud royal family in Saudi Arabia and Hosni Mubarak’s former regime in Egypt. Al Qaeda perpetrates violence against members of these governments, their supporters, and Westerners worldwide, with no distinction between military and civilian targets. A pivotal moment in the formation of Al Qaeda occurred in Afghanistan during the 1980s. In December 1979, Soviet Union forces invaded Afghanistan. From 1979 to 1989, mujahideen fighters waged a vicious insurgency against the Soviet Union. Osama bin Laden recruited and trained fighters, funded their operations, and personally participated in the insurgency. In 1984, Osama bin Laden and Abdullah al-Azzam, an influential leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, founded the Maktab al-Khidamat (Services Office) to organize the insurgency. Maktab

Al Qaeda  25

was the nascent seed that eventually became Al Qaeda four years later. In February 1989, the costly insurgency convinced Soviet Union leaders to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden and many Al Qaeda leaders promoted the Soviet Union’s withdrawal as a vindication of violent jihad against foreign influence and a model for future al Qaeda operations. In 1988, Osama bin Laden and Abdullah al-Azzam formally founded Al Qaeda. Azzam was widely credited as the founder of the mujahideen insurgency, and the two had previously worked together to form Maktab. Osama bin Laden was one of 20 sons born to a wealthy Saudi family. He was highly educated, having studied at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden revered the teachings of Muhammad Qutb, whose brother Sayyid Qutb founded the Muslim Brotherhood. During the first two years of Al Qaeda’s existence, Osama bin Laden and Azzam struggled to control the ideology, leadership, and direction of the movement. In 1989, Azzam died and Osama bin Laden emerged as the undisputed leader of the group. Some observers estimate that Al Qaeda members numbered as many as 10,000 at the time of the organization’s founding. Early in its history, Al Qaeda shifted its primary target from the Soviet Union to the United States. The U.S.-led war against Iraq in 1990–1991, known in the United States as Operation Desert Shield/Storm or simply the Gulf War, brought approximately 500,000 coalition troops to the region, many of them deployed to Saudi Arabia. More than 5,000 American military personnel remained in Saudi Arabia after the conflict ended. Al Qaeda railed against this foreign presence, labeling it at best interference in Saudi Arabian affairs and at worst foreign occupation of religiously revered territory. The Saudi royal family disagreed with Osama bin Laden on the necessity of coalition troops to counterbalance the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, creating an open schism between the leadership of Saudi Arabia and Al Qaeda. In 1991, Al Qaeda shifted its base of operations to Sudan and further emphasized its target of choice as the United States and its citizens. During the 1990s, Al Qaeda consolidated its organization and launched increasingly deadly attacks against foreign targets. In 1996, the government of Sudan expelled Osama bin Laden under heavy diplomatic pressure from the United States. As a result, Al Qaeda relocated its base of

operations back to Afghanistan. There the group worked closely with the Afghanistan Taliban. In the fall of 1996, the Taliban captured the capital, Kabul, and asserted their control over much of the country. Afghanistan remained the primary Al Qaeda base of operations until 2001. In 1996, Al Qaeda openly declared jihad against the United States. The group claimed that the regimes they sought to remove from power in Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, only remained in power due to U.S. backing, funding, and support. Al Qaeda sermonized that by removing U.S. influence from the region, they could achieve victory over these apostate regimes and ultimately establish an Islamic caliphate. In 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa (religious edict) labeled “The World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders.” In it, Al Qaeda called for the indiscriminate killing of U.S. citizens worldwide with no distinction made between military personnel and civilians. By the late 1990s, Al Qaeda converted its religious ideology into increasingly deadly terrorist attacks. In 1998, Al Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The brutal attacks killed more than 225 people and wounded more than 5,000 others. On October 8, 1999, the U.S. State Department designated Al Qaeda a Foreign Terrorist Organization. On October 12, 2000, Al Qaeda bombed the USS Cole (DDG-67), a U.S. Navy warship. The ship was in port in Aden, Yemen, on a routine refueling stop. Al Qaeda operatives came alongside the Cole in a small vessel laden with explosives. The resulting blast ripped a 40 x 60 foot hole in the hull of the warship, killed 17 American sailors, and wounded 39 more. On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda conducted its most notorious and horrific terrorist attack on the United States. On that tragic day, 19 members of Al Qaeda hijacked four commercial airliners and crashed two into the World Trade Center in New York City and another one into the Pentagon building in Washington, DC. Due to the heroic efforts of its passengers and crew to retake control of the fourth airliner, that plane crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania instead of reaching its likely intended target of the U.S. Capitol or the White House. Al Qaeda chose these targets for their perceived symbolic value, representing in turn U.S. economic, military, and political power. The horrendous attacks claimed the lives of almost 3,000 innocents, including citizens of more than 75 countries. On October 7, 2001, the

26  Al Qaeda

This photo shows a port-side view of the damage sustained in Al Qaeda’s attack on the USS Cole in Yemen on October 12, 2000. A violent Islamist terrrorist group with roots in the Mujahideen insurgency in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda was responsible for a number of successful terrorist attacks throughout the 1990s, culminating in the events of September 11, 2001. (Department of Defense)

United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The U.S.-led coalition military operation sought to drive Al Qaeda from Afghanistan and to critically weaken Taliban control of the country. The contemporary structure of Al Qaeda includes a core group of operatives from the original organization. International counterterrorism efforts have significantly degraded the centralized leadership of Al Qaeda. In December 2001, U.S. forces and their Afghan allies tracked Osama bin Laden to the Tora Bora Mountains near the Khyber Pass but were unable to capture or kill the Al Qaeda leader at that time. Nearly a decade later, U.S. special operations forces killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Shortly thereafter, a Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) drone killed Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, another top Al Qaeda leader. The CIA drone program has killed more than 60 senior Al Qaeda leaders during its existence. Osama bin Laden’s location at the time of his death less than a mile from the Pakistani military academy reinforced the belief that Al Qaeda had transferred its base of operations once again, this time to Pakistan. Al Qaeda also has increased its cooperation with the Pakistani Taliban. The group has increased its presence in Pakistani cities such as Karachi and Lahore. The expansion of Al Qaeda into Pakistan has spurred attacks by Pakistani Al Qaeda affiliates on the Hindu population of India. In November 2008, Al Qaeda affiliates launched a horrific terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, that killed more than

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170 people. After Osama bin Laden’s death, Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri assumed the mantle of leadership for Al Qaeda, presumably directing the organization from the desolate tribal region on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. It is useful to distinguish between the core group of Al Qaeda operatives located in Pakistan and the organization’s many affiliates worldwide. The core Al Qaeda group located primarily in Pakistan has a membership numbered only in the hundreds. More significantly, Al Qaeda has diffused its ideology to many affiliates worldwide, including both individuals and groups. Al Qaeda has increasingly preached its violent ideology combining faith and conflict globally. Similar groups have emerged in places as diverse as Yemen, Algeria, the West African Sahel, Nigeria, Somalia, and Indonesia. Al Qaeda has also perpetrated terrorist attacks globally; for example, in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan. Since 9/11, Al Qaeda has planned and attempted multiple unsuccessful terrorist attacks on the United States. Al Qaeda affiliates exist in as many as 75 countries. Affiliated groups include Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and Al Shabaab, among others. Affiliates also include notorious individuals such as American-born Anwar al-Awlaki and groups that have openly split from Al Qaeda such as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), referred to after its 2013 reorganization alternatively as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or simply the Islamic State (IS). Al Qaeda is the largest, most notorious, and most dangerous violent Islamist terrorist organization in the world. Due to internal fissures and external pressure, the group evidences a splintered ideology, with many affiliated individuals and groups pursuing their own interests and interpretations of the original Al Qaeda tenets. Most importantly, Al Qaeda has increasingly engaged in sectarian conflict, much of it highly controversial even among Islamist extremists. Examples include the killing of local civilian Muslims whom Al Qaeda or its affiliates label as heretics. The willingness to engage in sectarian conflict has eroded Al Qaeda’s legitimacy among some former supporters. The open split between Al Qaeda and Islamic State exemplifies this schism, with Islamic State employing increasingly brutal methods against more and more Muslims in addition to

its atrocious attacks on members of other religious groups. In the end, Al Qaeda epitomizes the highly volatile and extremely dangerous combination of faith and conflict. Originally envisioned as “the base” for Muslim purification of foreign influence, Al Qaeda has gradually spurred conflict between Muslims. In this vein, Al Qaeda represents the deadly ways in which extremists can exploit religious faith to spark violent conflict. William A. Taylor See also Bin Laden, Osama; Islam and War (Jihad); Islamic State; Mohammed Omar, Mullah; Mujahideen; Muslim Brotherhood; Taliban; Primary Document: UN Resolution 2199: The UN Security Council Condemns Trade with Al-Qaida-Associated Groups (2015) Further Reading Atwan, Abdel Bari. After Bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the Next Generation. New York: New Press, 2012. Gerges, Fawaz A. The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. Riedel, Bruce. The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008. Soufan, Ali H. The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda. New York: W. W. Norton, 2011. Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab is a militarist insurgent organization fighting against the government in Somalia in the early 21st century. Al Shabaab is affiliated with Al Qaeda. The group’s name in Arabic is Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, which translates roughly into “Youth Movement.” At its height in 2014, Al Shabaab had approximately 7,500 fighters, but as of 2016 it has mostly been dispersed to rural areas in Somalia and is not as much of a threat to the government forces in the Somali capital of Mogadishu as it once was. Al Shabaab has declared a jihad against the Somali government, and has been waging this campaign since 2004.

28  Alsted, Johann Heinrich (1588–1638)

There are numerous foreign fighters within Al Shabaab’s ranks. Ethiopian military forces have assisted the Somali government in its fight against Al Shabaab, and Kenyan military forces entered Somali in October 2011 to try to defeat Al Shabaab and bring a modicum of peace and stability to their neighbor, Somalia. This operation was ostensibly launched in response to Al Shabaab’s capture of two Spanish nurses working for Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders). Kenyan and Somali military forces acted in concert during Operation Linda Nchi to drive Al Shabaab into retreat into the Somali countryside. However, it was the U.S.-assisted Operation Indian Ocean, launched in August 2014, that has had the most impact in degrading Al Shabaab’s threat to the stability of the Horn of Africa region, and to Somalia itself. Internal rifts within Al Shabaab leadership and defections and killings of some of its senior members have degraded Al Shabaab’s ability to wage jihad against the Somali government. The organization has still managed to strike, and, in September 2013, claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack against the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya. Al Shabaab, like many terrorist organizations that claim to be aligned with Al Qaeda, continues to pose regional threats, as it does in East Africa. Jeffrey M. Shaw See also Al Qaeda; Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa; Islam and War (Jihad) Further Reading Fergusson, James. The World’s Most Dangerous Place: Inside the Outlaw State of Somalia. Boston: Da Capo Press, 2013. Hansen, Stig Jarle. Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group 2005–2012. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Solomon, Hussein. Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Alsted, Johann Heinrich (1588–1638) Born in 1588, Johann Heinrich Alsted was a leading Protestant thinker and writer during the Reformation and the Thirty Years’ War. He was a seminary professor in early

17th-century Germany who attended the Synod of Dort, at which Calvinism was codified, and compiled the first German-language encyclopedia. His experience at the hands of Roman Catholic armies in the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) influenced his speculations on how the world would come to an end. His Diatribe mille annis apocalypticis (1627) was translated into English as The Beloved City or, the Saints Reign on Earth a Thousand Years (1643) and became one of the most cited apocalyptic works in the 17th century. Alsted believed he was in the Great Tribulation of the biblical end times, which would precede the return of the Jews to Israel, the coming of the Messiah, and a thousand years of peace. Alstead figured that the 1,260 days of Revelation 11 were actually 1,260 years of Roman dominance, ending in 1622. However, that year Heidelberg and Mann­ heim, along with the rest of Calvinist Rhineland, were destroyed by the Catholic League, primarily by Spanish infantry. In Revelation, the forces of the Antichrist would celebrate the death of the two witnesses for three and a half days (years, according to Alsted), then the witnesses would be resurrected (a revival of the Protestant cause, according to Alsted, when Jews and Protestants would make common cause against the pope, whom Protestants considered to be the Roman Antichrist). Unfortunately, three and a half years later in 1626 two decisive battles took place (Dessau Bridge and Lutter); in both, Roman Catholic forces smashed the Protestant armies. Alstead’s hometown of Herborn, near one of those battles, was occupied by Roman Catholic armies, who burned it to the ground and replaced Alstead’s Reformed university with a Jesuit college. In the midst of the Protestant defeats at the hands of the victorious Roman Catholic troops, Alsted wrote Diatribe mille annis apocalypticis. Although he expected Jews and Protestants to eventually triumph over the Roman Catholic forces, instead Roman Catholicism returned to his native Rhineland. Alstead then accepted a position in Transylvania, published his renowned Encyclopedia (1630), and died several years later. William C. Watson See also Apocalypticism and War, Christian; Calvin, John; Catholic (Holy) League; Thirty Years’ War

Ambrose, Bishop of Milan (ca. 339–397 CE)   29 Further Reading Alsted, Johann. The Beloved City or, The Saints Reign on Earth a Thousand Years. London, 1643. Alsted, Johann. Encyclopedia (1630). Reprint ed. W. SchmidtBiggemann. Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzboog Press, 1990. Hotson, Howard. Johann Heinrich Alsted, 1588–1638: Between Renaissance, Reformation, and Universal Reform. Oxford: Clarendon, 2000.

Ambrose, Bishop of Milan (ca. 339–397 CE) Saint Ambrose, bishop of the Christian church in Milan during the late fourth century, was one of the first of the early church fathers to construct a theology of just war. His ideas regarding war greatly influenced Augustine’s later development of a systematic just war theory. Ambrose was born into a middle-class, Roman Christian family. He followed his father into the civil service. While serving as governor of Northern Italy, at the insistence of a large assembly of the populace, Ambrose accepted the office of bishop of Milan. The changed relationship between church and state following Emperor Constantine’s adoption and patronage of Christianity necessitated a transformed understanding of the Christian’s role in the affairs of state, including involvement in war. Church teachings prior to Constantine generally condemned Christian participation in warfare (though not necessarily military service). Because the Roman Empire was newly faced with invading barbarian armies that adhered to a heretical Arian Christianity, the church of the fourth century required teachings on war that were suited to the defense and preservation of Rome and of the Roman Church’s orthodoxy. Ambrose developed the official church position that, within certain constraints, war was justified and could be justly waged by the Christian empire of Rome. Ambrose derived his ideas about just warfare from two sources. First, he adapted ideas related to just warfare from thinkers of classical antiquity. Ambrose embraced the platonic idea of a natural law that was superior to the laws of any particular state. Stoicism provided Ambrose with the idea of the brotherhood of all humanity. Ambrose’s com-

Saint Ambrose was one of the most influential leaders of the Catholic Church in late antiquity and developed the official Church position that, within certain constraints, war was justified and could be justly waged by the Roman Empire. (Sergio Anelli/Electa/Mondadori Portfolio via Getty Images)

position On the Duties of the Clergy, which contains much of his thought related to war, relied heavily upon Cicero’s De Officiis (On Duties) and Cicero’s outline of a just war theory. Following classical philosophers, Ambrose wrote of the virtue of war for Christians. Courage or fortitude in war was noble “because it prefers death to slavery and disgrace” (Duties 1.41.211). Courage in war is better than seeking a peaceful life for oneself, in that “it is a far more noble thing to exert oneself for our country than to pass a quiet life at ease in the full enjoyment of leisure” (Duties 3.3.23). In addition to being influenced by thinkers of classical antiquity, Ambrose also relied upon military examples from the Hebrew Bible adopted by Christians to support his position on just war. Joshua’s bravery in felling five kings is lauded by Ambrose, and the Maccabees are commended for their determination in fighting on the Sabbath to

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defend the temple and their rights (Duties 1.40.205–206). David’s prudence and fortitude as a warrior, particularly against Goliath, are extolled (Duties 1.35.177). Ambrose even cites Moses as showing valor in fighting wars: “Thus holy Moses feared not to undertake terrible wars for his people’s sake, nor was he afraid of the arms of the mightiest kings, nor yet was he frightened at the savagery of barbarian nations. He put on one side the thought of his own safety so as to give freedom to the people” (Duties 1.28.135). Relying upon classical philosophy and the Hebrew Bible as touchstones, Ambrose formulated key principles governing the requirements of Christian warfare: 1.  War must be entered for just reasons. Armed combat is generally permissible only as a means of defense. Such warfare includes preserving one’s country from barbarian attack, defending the weak at home, or defending friends from robbers (Duties 1.27.129). 2. War must be conducted via just means. Wars must be conducted with honesty and integrity. Agreements with the enemy should be kept (Duties 2.7.33), no unfair advantage should be taken of the enemy (Duties 1.29.139), victory may not be obtained by treachery or deceit (Duties 3.14.87, 3.15.91), and mercy should be afforded an enemy in defeat (Duties 3.15.91–93). 3. Christians must engage in violent combat to defend one another against aggression. Not only could Christians be justified in engaging in armed violence, but they could be morally culpable for failing to do so. “He who does not keep harm off a friend, if he can, is as much in fault as he who causes it. . . . For when [Moses] saw a Hebrew receiving hard treatment at the hands of an Egyptian, he defended him, and laid low the Egyptian and hid him in the sand” (Duties 1.36.179). Ambrose did make exceptions to these rights and duties, however. He did not find it fitting for clergy to participate in war: “The thought of warlike matters seems to be foreign to the duty of our office, for we have our thoughts fixed more on the duty of the soul than on that of the body, nor is our business to look to arms but rather to the forces of

peace” (Duties 1.35.175). Nor did Ambrose sanction violence in self-defense. While the Christian had a duty to use violent means to defend another who was imperiled, Christians were forbidden from engaging in violence in defense of self: “I do not think a Christian, a just and wise man, ought to save his own life by the death of another; just as when he meets with an armed robber he cannot return blows lest in defending his life he should stain his love toward his neighbor” (Duties 3.4.27). Christ’s own example of refraining from self-defense established that Christians should not value self above another. There are two particular incidents that are instructive of Ambrose’s nuanced position on violence undertaken by Christians. The first example occurred in 388 CE when the bishop of Callcinium instigated the burning of a local synagogue, ostensibly in retaliation for an offense committed by Jews against Christians in that town. Emperor Theodosius, an orthodox Christian, determined that the bishop involved in the burning of the synagogue should be punished, and that the bishop should finance the synagogue’s rebuilding. Upon learning of the emperor’s judgments, Ambrose wrote a letter to Theodosius strenuously arguing against penalizing the bishop of Callcinium. Ambrose advised the emperor that, ultimately, because the Jews deny Jesus, they forfeit the blessing of God, and advocacy on behalf of those who deny Jesus constituted apostasy. Such apostasy would forfeit God’s covering of the army and would surely result in the army’s defeat. The emperor complied with Ambrose’s request and did not penalize the bishop. The next example of Ambrose’s treatment of Christians and violence involved a massacre at Thessalonica. In 390 CE a riot occurred after a charioteer who was a favorite of the people was arrested on charges of immorality. During the riot the commander of the garrison at Thessalonica and other officials were killed. At Emperor Theodosius’s furious behest, soldiers lured the citizens of Thessalonica into a public theater and proceeded to massacre some 7,000 people. Following the emperor’s action, Ambrose refused the Christian emperor entry to the church, refused him the Eucharist, and demanded that the emperor do public penance. Ambrose explained that if the murder of one person precluded participation in the sacrament, then the murder

American Civil  War,  Religious  Dimensions of  31

of many must also preclude participation. Ambrose adjured the emperor to repent as did David and Job when they understood their sin. The emperor acceded to the bishop’s ecclesiastic discipline and, after some months, was restored to fellowship in the church. Ambrose’s response to these two incidents of violence by Christians is revealing. First, he regarded his sentiments relating to war and violence to be instructive for the head of state, as much or more than he intended it for local parishioners. The emperor was to follow the bishop’s direction. Further, though Ambrose acknowledged the concepts of a common humanity of all people and of the natural law of justice, he preferred and practiced the principle that enemies of orthodox Christianity constituted enemies of the state, to whom differing standards of justice may be applied. Ambrose’s opposition to improper worship was meant to secure the blessing of God upon the empire. Ambrose effectively adapted Roman culture’s concern for pietas, which compelled proper worship as a means of appeasing Roman pagan deities, into the Roman church’s policy of war, which required appeasing the Trinitarian Christian God. Finally, any violence used by the Christian emperor must adhere to just standards if the Roman populace, and not an enemy, was involved in a public controversy. Ambrose, thus, imputed Christianity, and privileged legal protections, to all Roman citizens who were not Arians, pagans, or Jews. War and violence was not to be undertaken against Roman citizen Christians. Ambrose’s views significantly influenced fourth-century politics, set an enduring standard for church-state relations, instituted the concept that the tool of war is primarily for use against specifically non-Christian “others,” and laid the foundation for the construction of a systematic just war theory by St. Augustine and future generations of Christian theologians. Alease Brown See also Arianism and War; Augustine; Christianity and War; Just War Tradition; Milvian Bridge, Battle of Further Reading Bainton, Roland H. Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Strock, 1999.

Massaro, Thomas J., and Thomas A. Shannon. Catholic Perspectives on Peace and War. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. McLynn, Neil B. Ambrose of Milan: Church and Court in a Christian Capital. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. Ramsey, Boniface. Ambrose. London: Routledge, 1997. Swift, Louis J. The Early Fathers on War and Military Service. Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1983. Yoder, John H., and Roland H. Bainton. Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution: A Companion to Bainton. Elkhart, IN: Distributed by Peace Resource Center, 1983.

American Civil  War,  Religious  Dimensions of As a pervasive part of American society during the mid19th century, religion functioned in significant ways before, during, and after the American Civil War (1861–1865). Both North and South viewed the war, its causes, and its events through religious lenses. Religion, specifically Protestant evangelicalism, provided civilian and military participants the framework and language for understanding the events of the war in a theological sense. Additionally, religion also served to motivate, inspire, and comfort many in the face of complex and terrible realities. In mid-19th-century America, Protestantism was the dominant form of religious belief and expression. Due to the influence and extent of the First and Second Great Awakenings, that Protestantism was most often of the evangelical variety. Nevertheless, the overall religious unity in the country was lessened by the various denominational divisions of which Baptists and Methodists were largest. Religious unity was further compromised by the divisive effect slavery had upon the largest denominations, splitting them into northern and southern halves and diminishing the trans-sectional solidarity that such denominations provided while reinforcing sectional loyalties. For example, state Southern Baptist conventions in several states declared themselves in favor of secession in December 1860 before their respective states had left the Union. Protestants on either side of the slavery question often looked to the Bible to find support for their position on slavery. For Southern defenders of slavery, this meant reading

32  American Civil  War,  Religious  Dimensions of

the Bible in a more literal fashion—appealing to the examples of slave ownership in the Old Testament as well as citing the New Testament’s failure to condemn slavery. Antislavery Protestants, in contrast, often argued for the spirit of the Bible’s message, emphasizing the freedom and equality that the gospel brought. This difference in interpreting the Bible’s message also reflected geographical differences as less literal methods of reading the Bible were developed in Germany and entered American theological circles through seminaries and churches in the North. However, abolitionism was clearly not the dominant view in the North and many Northern Protestants would not have viewed the Bible as opposing slavery. But for most Southern Protestants and for Northern abolitionist Protestants, this meant that the contest over slavery was a religious and theological contest as well, hardening beliefs on both sides. Once the war began, partisans both North and South sought to portray the struggle in theological terms. The revivalism of the 19th century had brought about greater attention among evangelicals to social problems like slavery and led to greater support for abolitionism in the North. The Second Great Awakening, which began around 1790, also had promoted millennial expectations and language among Protestants. Anticipating the imminent establishment of God’s kingdom and rule and seeking to implement Christian ideals in social contexts, many Northern Protestants expected slavery’s demise and saw the war’s outbreak as the occasion for implementing this reality and preparing the nation to fulfill God’s purposes for it. For Southern Protestants, defeating the North meant defeating a liberalizing Christianity that diminished the authority of the Bible and sought to reorder society in man’s image. Christians both North and South saw their nation as uniquely chosen by God to fulfill his purposes and consciously adopted language linking their national identity with the Israel of the Old Testament, God’s chosen people of that time. For many clergy on both sides, then, a religious commitment necessitated a political and military commitment as well. For soldiers, the experiences of war and military service in general provided challenges to religious beliefs as well as opportunities for strengthening belief. Certainly, the massive casualties of Civil War battles turned the thoughts of many to mortality and increased the interest of soldiers in religion. Faced with the prospect of death or being wounded,

religion could provide comfort and assurance. The widespread presence of chaplains and the occurrence of revivals in both Union and Confederate armies indicate that encouragements to religious belief were never far away. While chaplains served in both Northern and Southern armies, unlike the South, the Union established military regulations for chaplains at the start of the war. Nearly 2,400 chaplains served in Union armies, the vast majority serving as regimental chaplains. With about half of this total serving a year or less, only a quarter or so of the 2,400 were active at any one time. The Confederacy initially expected churches to send and support chaplains to the army, but when this proved insufficient, the Confederate government authorized field commanders to assign chaplains. Perhaps due to this initial confusion or less centralization overall, chaplains were slower to serve the Confederate forces with around 1,000 men serving during the course of the war. Methodists, Presbyterians, and Baptists, in that order, had the largest denominational representation in both armies. These three denominations accounted for 67 percent of Union chaplains and just over 80 percent of Southern chaplains. Both North and South, Catholic chaplains accounted for 3 percent of the total. The remainder were composed of smaller Protestant denominations, though at least one Jewish chaplain was appointed in the North. After the Emancipation Proclamation, a small number of African Americans served as chaplains in United States Colored Troop (USCT) regiments. Chaplains provided comfort on the battlefield and even medical assistance at times. They also ministered to wounded soldiers in hospitals, provided semiregular preaching and religious instruction in camp, and advocated on behalf of soldiers. Chaplains and even clergymen serving in the ranks or as officers conducted religious services as they could during campaigns. Such semiregular services were often conducted in open-air settings. During longer breaks from campaigning, during late fall and winter, semipermanent structures were erected and regular services were conducted, allowing for baptism and communion. It was in these times that the most notable revivals occurred. During the fall and winter of 1863–1864 in the “Great Revival,” revivals swept each of the main Union and Confederate armies both east and west, but other

American Civil  War,  Religious  Dimensions of  33

A group of chaplains from the Union Army’s 9th Corps poses for a group photo at the Siege of Petersburg, October, 1864. Nearly 2,400 chaplains served in Union armies during the American Civil War, while approximately 1,000 served in Confederate forces. (Library of Congress)

periods of the war saw revivals as well. In all, it is estimated that about 10 percent of the total number of soldiers— around 100,000 Confederate and from 100,000 to 200,000 Union troops—were converted during the war. Evangelicalism’s certainty of heaven and hell, the imminence of death in the soldier’s occupation, and the camp meeting traditions of the Second Great Awakening combined to promote religious appeals. The revivalism in the armies may also be an instance of religion helping to prolong rather than shorten the war in that it bolstered the morale and will to continue to fight.

Evangelicalism placed emphasis, not just on a salvific conversion, but also on living in a manner that demonstrated the surety of one’s eternal destiny. In the eyes of the religiously inclined, camp life, with vices like gambling, drinking, profanity, and prostitution, constituted a dangerous spiritual threat to young men away from home for the first time and who were without the traditional moral safeguards of family, church, and community. And indeed, camp life could provide a license to engage in behaviors that contradicted religious mores. To combat such temptations, tract societies, relief societies, and denominational

34  American Civil  War,  Religious  Dimensions of

groups, as well as chaplains, were very active in distributing religious literature to troops. Both armies included officers well known for their religious belief or character. In the Union army, General Oliver Howard (1830–1909) was known as the “Christian general” because of the openness of his Christian beliefs and practices. Generals Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson (1824– 1863) and Robert E. Lee (1807–1870) were widely regarded as exemplars of Christian probity in the South. Jackson in particular was known for the fervor of his religious convictions, which featured a supreme confidence in an all-wise God who superintended human affairs. Every outcome on the battlefield, then, to Jackson’s mind, was attributable directly to God, whose wise purposes could be beyond human understanding. This conception of God’s authority and activity as “Providence” was not uncommon in both the North and the South due to the relative uniformity of Protestant Evangelicalism. Combined with the moral absoluteness with which many participants, civilian and military, on both sides viewed the rightness of their cause, this meant that events of the war could be read as divine communication since God surely would not let his favored side lose. In this framework, military success was understood to be a clear sign of divine favor and approval. Conversely, battlefield defeats were viewed, not as indicative of a failing cause, but as divine testing or, more commonly, divine judgment for the moral shortcomings of the nation such as immorality, pride, materialism, and irreligion. This attitude was expressed and widely propagated through a particular form of religious address known as the jeremiad. Modeled on Jeremiah and Lamentations in the Bible, a jeremiad was a sermon that bitterly lamented the disasters befalling a society, or sometimes prophesied disaster because of the wickedness or the failures of that society. While the Puritans had used them occasionally, jeremiads proliferated during the Civil War in both the Union and the Confederacy. Preachers decried immoral behaviors like profanity, drunkenness, Sabbath-breaking, and, in the South especially, war-profiteering. Trusting in military might rather than God was also condemned, along with failure to adopt more religious language in the Constitution. Abolitionist preachers in the North identified the North’s failure to fight for abolition as a cause for mili-

tary defeats, at least until the Emancipation Proclamation was issued. Civil leaders too invoked the rhetoric of the jeremiad in public addresses, and both governments issued periodic calls to thanksgiving to acknowledge God’s role in aiding them during the conflict. Having been used to sanctify the war’s causes and explain its events, it was natural for religious language to be used to help comprehend the terrible consequences of the fighting, and thus the nature and character of the war. Evangelicalism’s certainty of heaven provided comfort to those suffering loss, as well as stimulating family members to be concerned about the spiritual state of their soldiers. The massive number of battlefield casualties, beginning particularly with the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862, deeply affected the Northern and Southern home fronts. Referring to those who had died as “martyrs” became a way of reinforcing the holiness of the cause and identifying soldiers who died as certainly deserving of God’s favor. Religious convictions played a role in motivating aid groups both North and South, with some organized specifically for religious reasons. The largest of these religious aid groups was the United States Christian Commission. Initiated by the New York Young Men’s Christian Association, it was a cross-denominational association organized to provide care to soldiers and assist chaplains. It raised money to send delegates to distribute religious literature and material goods such as medical supplies and food. Aid groups in the Confederacy were much smaller and local in character. While evangelical Protestantism was the dominant religious category, other categories existed. Catholics were the most sizable non-Protestant group in the United States. Since anti-Catholicism attitudes and propaganda had reached a high point in the 1850s, many Catholics were averse to speaking out strongly on the war. Some identified Protestantism as naturally conducive to rebellion; others noted that the liberal attitudes associated with abolitionism were among those most hostile to the political conservatism of Rome. Many were influenced by sectional attitudes and adopted proslavery or antislavery views accordingly. Catholics served both North and South in significant numbers, and a handful of notable generals on each side were Catholic, including William Rosecrans (1819–1898) and Pierre G. T. Beauregard (1818–1893). Likewise, Jews served on both sides during the war, though they were only a tiny

American Revolution, Religious Dimensions of  35

fraction of the population. While several Jews reached prominent military or civilian rank, anti-Semitism was not unknown, with periodic complaints about Jews and at least one military order, later withdrawn, expelling them from a Union military district in Tennessee. Nonevangelical Protestants such as Quakers, Mennonites, and Congregationalists were particularly active in abolitionism due to their socially progressive views and location primarily in the North, although the pacifism of Quakers and Mennonites inhibited their participation in the war itself. Likewise, the most liberal Christian denominations, Unitarians and Universalists, were socially progressive, Northern, and generally abolitionist. As for the irreligious, overt atheism was not common during this era and the progressive attitudes of agnostics and atheists aligned more closely with abolitionist thinking than otherwise. Joshua Michael See also Manifest Destiny; Primary Document: President Abraham Lincoln’s Proclamation Declaring a National Fast Day (March 30, 1863) Further Reading Brinsfield, John W., et al., eds. Faith in the Fight: Civil War Chaplains. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003. Miller, Randall M., Harry S. Stout, and Charles Reagan Wilson, eds. Religion and the American Civil War. New York: Oxford University, 1998. Noll, Mark. The Civil War as Theological Crisis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2006. Rable, George C. God’s Almost Chosen People: A Religious History of the American Civil War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2010. Stout, Harry S. Upon the Altar of the Nation: A Moral History of the American Civil War. New York: Viking, 2006. Woodworth, Steven E. While God Is Marching On: The Religious World of Civil War Soldiers. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001.

American Revolution, Religious Dimensions of The American Revolution refers primarily to a political and social repudiation of British monarchical and parlia-

mentary authority over 13 North American colonies by representatives of the governed of those colonies beginning as early as 1764 and continuing until 1783. This disavowal led to a violent event referred to variously as the Revolutionary War, or the American War of Independence (1775–1783). The war pitted the citizen armies of the colonies, which in 1776 declared themselves the newly independent United States of America, against the professional soldiers, mercenaries, and a minority of subjects loyal to the crown (called Loyalists) that served Great Britain. Colonists who embraced republican ideas are referred to as Patriots after 1773. Eventually, traditional British enemies Spain, the Netherlands, but especially France entered the conflict on the side of the United States, and the British were ultimately defeated, forced to acknowledge the independence of the United States in 1783. While the Revolutionary War was not a religious war, many religious leaders played an indispensable part by seeking to preserve liberties through influencing public opinion for the revolution and mobilizing congregants on behalf of the war. This activism on the part of Protestant ministers, particularly New Light evangelicals, was unprecedented in that it came about from the collaboration between those holding the disparate ideological threads of Reformed theology and Real Whig republicanism.

Causes of the War

To understand the unlikely alliance of Christian ministers and Whigs that showcases religious aspects of the American Revolution, one needs to grasp the evolution of British and colonial attitudes over more than a decade leading up to the war. Historians have commonly connected the aftermath of the British victory in the French and Indian War (1754–1763) to the incipient stirrings of the revolution more than a decade later. This war, fought along the frontier between New France and the British colonies, resulted in Great Britain’s assimilation of all French claims in North America, including Canada and all lands east of the Mississippi River. Native Americans populated these territories and increased contact with colonists intending to hunt or settle the newly acquired lands represented a threat to the tribal way of life. No doubt many colonists looked longingly upon these lands because of their abundant natural resources and potential for supporting expanded trade and

36  American Revolution, Religious Dimensions of

agriculture. At the same time, the war undoubtedly created fear among English American Protestant Christians of the near threat of French Catholicism with its perceived unwavering allegiance to the pope, considered to be the enemy of their religious freedoms. Costs of keeping the peace, defending the settlers, and to some extent managing war debt led British authorities to impose taxation schemes upon the various colonies. These measures proved to be highly unpopular with a population that was unaccustomed to taxation by remote authorities. The British rationale was that the colonists should shoulder some of the burdens of their own defense, but many, if not the majority, of colonists strongly opposed levies. The latter objected that the British imposed these taxes without the colonists’ consent, which was beyond the grasp of the Americans when they were without representation in Parliament. Objections to taxation took many British authorities by surprise since ideas of consent and representation were republican ideas held by only a minority in Britain, though arguably a majority of colonists subscribed to these Real Whig views. At least four successive acts between 1764 and 1767 served to increase tensions between the colonies and the British: The Sugar Act of 1764 and Stamp Tax of 1765 attempted to raise money for frontier defenses while guaranteeing compliance through the courts. Parliament repealed these initial acts in the face of colonial protests and civil disobedience, but the parliamentary majority asserted the legislative body’s right to control the colonies by passing the Declaratory Act. In 1767, the Townshend Acts attempted to raise revenue by taxing tea and other items regularly imported into the colonies. When opposition to the acts crystallized, the British colonial secretary instructed governors to dissolve any legislative assemblies that did not conform. Determined to resist what they now saw as arbitrary power, many colonists organized boycotts and resisted the law. With tensions high, British troops arrived in Boston to restore order in October 1768. For more than a year both sides were able to avoid major violence, but on March 5, 1770, rioters attacked the main British barracks at Boston and baited soldiers into firing into a crowd of protesters during a street fight, killing five civilians. This was called the Boston Massacre, but even a scrupulously fair trial resulting in the exoneration of the British soldiers who stood accused of

murder did little to reduce the rising tensions. Colonists increasingly resisted what they viewed as unjust and illegal efforts to control the colonies and abridge liberties of movement, trade, and self-government that they had enjoyed before the war with the French. What may have seemed to be a mostly internecine dispute was pushed into warfare by the Tea Act. The 1773 act was designed to help the financially troubled British East India Company (BEIC) as well as bring the colonies into line. Without having to pay the usual duties, the company was given the opportunity to sell tea to the colonists at a price that was lower than they would pay for smuggled tea. Besides reducing the company’s inventory, colonists would be forced to pay taxes as specified by the earlier Townshend Acts. At the port of Boston, the Sons of Liberty sniffed out the intent of the British government and determined that no tea would be unloaded. This led to what was later called the “Boston Tea Party,” in which more than 46 tons of tea were disposed of in the harbor. This creative disobedience inspired Patriots in other ports to prevent the landing of BEIC tea. In response, Parliament determined to punish Massachusetts by suspending some traditional liberties and giving the new governor, General Thomas Gage (1718–1787) arbitrary executive power. Gage closed Boston harbor. The colonies fought back by calling for a Continental Congress that met in Philadelphia. Congress petitioned the king to relieve Boston, but in February 1775, Parliament declared Massachusetts to be in a state of rebellion and issued instructions that Gage received on April 14. Within a few days, British troops and Massachusetts militia opened hostilities at Lexington and Concord. Congress appointed George Washington (1732– 1799) to take charge of militia units that surrounded the British at Boston. The Revolutionary War had begun.

Religious Aspects

Because the American Revolution under the leadership of the American founders has loomed large in American civil religion since just before the end of the 18th century, historians have sought to gain clarity in understanding the war as a religious event. While the founders represented an elite group of individuals with power and influence who acted mainly from political and self-interested convictions, their plans for independence could not come to fruition without

American Revolution, Religious Dimensions of  37

the support of thousands of colonists who made up for what they lacked in political acumen by a seriousness toward religion that included biblical literacy. In a letter written in his early eighties, John Adams (1735–1826) reflected on the revolution by asserting that the real American Revolution was less an armed conflict than an affective change in the American people themselves. He maintained that between the earliest political clashes and the time the war broke out, attitudes of Americans toward the British rulers had completely changed. It is significant to note that Adams identified two major groups with altered opinions. One was those who had no particular religious commitment but had grown up with a humane education that taught them loyalty and patience. Members of this group held to the notion that loyalty and protection were reciprocal, and when the British withdrew protection, “allegiance was dissolved.” Speaking of the second group, Adams alluded to Americans’ respect for biblical authority, such as that contained in St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans Chapter 13, when he said that these individuals sincerely believed that God gave the magistrate for the good of the people. Adams said the latter began to see that the king and his servants had abdicated their moral right to political authority. To Adams the real American Revolution was the change in the “principles, opinions, sentiments and affections of the American people.” The largest and most influential group of colonists were undoubtedly Protestant Christians, and among these New England’s predominantly Reformed clergy were most outspoken in their support of the Revolution. Reformed ministers, infamously referred to as the “Black Regiment” because of the color of their robe “uniforms” and because they were just as vital as armed men were to the realization of the Patriot cause, cultivated and sustained the mentality of revolution through pulpit and publication. Their influence extended beyond their own congregations and region to encourage American autonomy throughout the colonies, particularly among the numerous New Light evangelicals who had emphasized the importance of religious liberty and Christian conscience. After John Witherspoon (1723–1794), Reformed minister and president of Princeton University, signed the Declaration of Independence, British Whig Horace Walpole (1717–1797) quipped, “There is no use crying about it. Cousin America has run off with a Presbyterian parson, and that is the end of it.”

The Reverend John Witherspoon was the only clergyman to sign the Declaration of Independence and served during the revolutionary era as president of the College of New Jersey and as a delegate to the Continental Congress. (Library of Congress)

While the Black Regiment exercised outsized influence on behalf of the American Revolution, historians have struggled to pin down what evangelical Protestants conceived the fight for independence to be. Did these Protestants consider it to be a holy war with eschatological implications such as ushering in the Millennium, or was it a just war reluctantly waged to defend religious freedom and other natural and political rights? While there were unquestionably themes associated with a holy war mentality in some sermons and religious publications, most evangelical rhetoric both before and during the revolution was more characteristic of a just war approach to the conflict. The advocate of autonomy must be able to prove biblical authority for Christian participation in revolution, especially when the prima facie reading of passages such as Romans 13 seemed to urge obedience to de facto rulers such as King George III. Even so notorious an unbeliever as Thomas Paine (1737–1809), influential author of Common Sense, found it necessary to disguise his skepticism and

38  Ames, William (1576–1633)

cite Old Testament passages in support of his revolutionary ideas. Adams thought Paine’s attempts at exegesis were ridiculous at best. However, Paine’s attempt at cultural synthesis is suggestive of a remarkable alliance of evangelical Protestants with republican elitists and others who did not share their view of biblical authority. This remarkable accord brought about a successful dissolution of the colonists’ political ties to Britain. Evangelicals began to embrace ideas that were not necessarily new but which they were largely indifferent to previously, such as rule by consent of the governed, no taxation without representation, and the importance of citizen armies. There existed a minority of religious colonists who could not justify rebellion. While not a colonist, the English Methodist leader John Wesley (1703–1791) was a person of considerable influence, who exhorted American Christians to oppose rebellion against British authority. The Georgian Presbyterian, Swiss-born John Zubly (1724–1781) was also outspoken in his opposition to the revolution. In the end most evangelicals followed a theological understanding of the conflict set forth by those such as Boston pastor Jonathan Mayhew (1720–1766), who preached a 1750 sermon on Romans 13:1–8, “A Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission and Non-Resistance to the Higher Powers.” The homily was delivered more than two decades before the revolution but its influence endured. Among other influential evangelical leaders who urged American autonomy were David Jones (1736–1820), a Baptist from Chester County, Pennsylvania, who served as a chaplain in the Continental Army under General Anthony Wayne, and Virginia Anglican David Griffith (1742–1789). Stephen Case (1746–1794), a soldier in the New York militia, wrote “Defensive Arms Vindicated” and dedicated this work to George Washington. Liam J. Atchison See also French and Indian War, Religious Dimensions of; Primary Documents: Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (July 8, 1663); Government and Religion in British Canada: The Quebec Act (October 7, 1774) Further Reading Atchison, Liam J. “The Biblical Text That Primed the Revolutionary Canon.” In Liam J. Atchison, Keith Bates, and Darin D. Lenz, eds. Civil Religion and American Christianity. Mountain Home, AR: BorderStone Press, 2016, pp. 239–74.

Byrd, James P. Sacred Scripture, Sacred War: The Bible and the American Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Endy, Melvin B. “Just War, Holy War, and Millennialism in Revolutionary America.” William and Mary Quarterly: A Magazine of Early American History and Culture (1985): 4–25. Kidd, Thomas S. God of Liberty: A Religious History of the American Revolution. New York: Basic Books, 2010. Noll, Mark A. “The American Revolution and Protestant Evangelicalism.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History (1993): 615–38.

Ames, William (1576–1633) William Ames was a 17th-century Puritan writer on issues of conscience. He was heavily influenced by the thought of his tutor William Perkins (1558–1602), “the Father of Puritanism.” Ames fled England due to his radical Puritan ideals, settling in the Netherlands and serving as military chaplain to the states-general and to the English troops in service there. He has been recognized as one of the most important theological thinkers of the Puritans, and he was especially influential in the American colonies. In Book Five of Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof (London, 1639) there is a chapter (XXXIII) on the morality of war in which Ames asks questions and then answers them for the reader. This chapter builds on the previous one in which he addressed the issue of dueling and then expands it to conflict beyond that of two people fighting. The first question (pp. 184–85) asks, “Whether or no Warre bee lawful for Christians.” To Ames war “is a kind of evill,” which brings “the heaviest of Gods judgements” and is “a signe of a barbarous and cruell man, if any one bee given to Warre simply desiring it.” However, “it is not alwayes unlawfull, but it may bee warranted upon some conditions.” He cites John the Baptist telling soldiers “not to cast away their armes, but use them rightly,” cites centurions and soldiers who were converted to Christianity as recorded in the New Testament, and that Christ “teaches us to give the things that are Caesars, among which were payments for souldiers wages and costs of Warre.” Ames points out that St. Paul in his letter to the Romans taught “that a supereminent power doth beare the sword, as the Minister

Amun 39

of God” and in the Apocalypse there are future “Warres which the Children of God would wage.” Ames then dealt with the passages in which Jesus seemed to promote passivism, but noted that they “doe not shew that all Warre is simply unlawful.” Instead “those things are there said . . . to private men . . . not to Publicke authority, which by God is constituted.” Ames’s second question (pp. 185–87) was “What conditions are requisite to make a War lawfull?” He presented the just war tradition answer first presented by St. Augustine (354–430). There must be a “just cause . . . after the trial of all means of peace . . . just authority . . . right intention . . . a just manner of waging . . . doing nothing contrary to the Law of God.” However, both sides cannot have a just cause. The third question (pp. 187–88) was “how farre those that wage Warre are to bee acquainted with the Iustice of their cause.” He concludes that “The Prince” and “Souldiers of the Highest Rank” should consult their consciences and “other prudent and religious men” to determine if there is a just cause. Ames even allows “Souldiers of the lower rank, which are subjects to the Prince,” if they consider the war unjust, they “ought not to assist him,” for otherwise “they offer violence to their owne consciences.” Question four (pp. 188– 89) asked, “whether it bee lawful for a Christian Prince in a just Warre to accept the aid of Infidels, or to give them aid.” He does not oppose such an alliance or coalition and argues that Abraham “joined his forces with the forces of the King of Sodome,” but then warned that infidels cannot be trusted and cited biblical injunctions not to place one’s trust in ungodly foreign powers. Ames then warned in question 5 (pp. 189–90) that those fighting in a war must have only the best intentions, not allowing “the helpe of those who fight out of a bad intention, either out of hatred, violence, or ambition, or desire of prey.” Ames adds in question 6 (pp. 189–90) that war should only be waged “against the Offendours and those . . . whose cause and fault it is that the Warre was begunne . . . neither Children nor ordinary Women, nor indeed any other quiet men.” This upholds the just war tradition principle of not attacking noncombatants. Even those guilty “are not to bee hurt further then the compassing the just end of the Warre doth require.” He mentioned the atrocities committed by Roman Catholic armies in the Thirty Years’ War as examples of how wars are waged wrongly. His

writing provides a good example of the extensive writings on political theory by the Puritans as a result of the political turmoil in England and Europe during the 1500s and 1600s, much of which was grounded in religion. William C. Watson See also Augustine; Puritans and War; Thirty Years’ War Further Reading Ames, William. Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof. 1693. https://archive.org/details/conscp00/ames. Accessed April 5, 2016. Sprunger, Keith. The Learned Doctor William Ames. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1972.

Amun One of the principal deities of ancient Egyptian pantheons, Amun (or Amon) was the creator, the sun god along with Ra (or Re), the god of wind and breath, and the warrior. He was unknown in the very earliest times but by the Middle Kingdom period (2000–1700 BCE) he became celebrated as the victor over Mont, the god of war in the northern city of Thebes. Evidence of this is the theophoric name Amenhotep, the founding pharaoh of Dynasty XII. In time Amon overcame and absorbed Ra, the sun deity of South Egypt, taking on the combined name Amon-Ra. He then divested himself of connection with Ra, but Ra revived and became chief deity at Amarna under the kingship of Ikhnaton in the New Kingdom era (1570–1200 BCE). There he was known as the disk of the sun (Aten) and by the name RaHarakhte. Amun then turned the tables on Ra at Amarna through the aegis of Pharaoh Tut-ankh-Aten (King “Tut”) who underwent a religious conversion and renamed himself Tut-ankh-Amon. Amun took on various representations, including a man with a ram’s head and a phallus. He was considered at Thebes to be father of the kings and king of the gods. By Dynasty XIX (1320–1220 BCE) he reabsorbed Ra and was called Amon-Ra, a name reflected in the many kings of the dynasty named Rameses. Thenceforth he was hailed as the god of all Egypt though his principal worship center was at Luxor and Karnak in the south. Eugene H. Merrill

40  Anabaptist Pacifism See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of; Egyptian Warfare Further Reading Frankfort, Henri. Ancient Egyptian Religion. New York: Harper & Row, 1961. Graves, Robert, ed. New Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology. London: Prometheus Press, 1968. Kemp, Barry J. Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization. London: Routledge, 1991. Shafer, Byron E. Religion in Ancient Egypt. London: Routledge, 1991. Silverman, David P. “Divinities and Deities in Ancient Egypt.” In Byron E. Shafer, ed. Religion in Ancient Egypt. London: Routledge, 1991.

Anabaptist Pacifism Anabaptism is a Christian movement that originated in the Radical Reformation and Protestant movements of the 16th century and whose direct descendants include the Amish, Hutterites, and Mennonites. The name “Anabaptist,” which means “one who baptizes again,” was originally a term of abuse given to the movement by its detractors, who rejected the Anabaptist practice of rebaptizing believers following a baptismal candidate’s confession of faith. This contrasted starkly with the prevailing practice of infant baptism, which Anabaptists rejected as having no basis in scripture. Another theological characteristic distinguishing the Anabaptist movement is their commitment to pacifism and adherence to a strict separation between civil and divine law. Anabaptists hold to a literal interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, where, it is asserted, Jesus condemned the use of force against wrongdoers and (in Matthew 22:15–22) distinguished sharply between God’s kingdom and Caesar’s. In the sermon, Jesus states: “But I say to you, do not resist the one who is evil. But if anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also” (Matthew 5:39). Elsewhere, Jesus, in an answer to Pontius Pilate, asserts: “My kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of this world, my servants would have been fighting, that I might not be delivered over to the

Jews. But my kingdom is not from the world” (John 18:36). These scriptures, among others, are used by Anabaptists to justify a strict pacifism that rejects any Christian right to jus gladii, or high justice by the sword, including capital punishment and military coercion—even in cases of self-defense. The founder of Swiss Anabaptism, Conrad Grebel, for example, in a 1524 letter to Thomas Müntzer, wrote: “True, believing Christians are as sheep in the midst of wolves. . . . They . . . must reach the fatherland of eternal rest, not by overcoming bodily enemies with the sword, but by overcoming spiritual foes. They use neither the worldly sword nor engage in war, since among them killing has ceased entirely, for we are no longer under the old covenant.” Outside Anabaptism, modern pacifism—at least since the First World War—designates a broadly antimilitarist position that seeks to eliminate war as an international institution, while sometimes allowing for it in extreme cases, and then only as a last resort. As such, the doctrine can be political or nonpolitical, Christian or non-Christian, but ultimately is rooted in the transformation of global society by rational means. By contrast, Anabaptist pacifism was and continues to be strictly biblical in its foundation and orientation, with adherents arguing that the new covenant of Jesus, as articulated in the Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere (Romans 12, 1 Peter 2, and so on), superseded the Old Testament’s apparent acceptance of retributive killing. This strict adherence to an uncompromised pacifism has led to famous cases of pacifistic martyrdom in the Anabaptist tradition, most notably that of Dirk Willems. Willems, a 16th-century Dutchman, was caught, tried, and convicted of Anabaptism—a heresy—under the Duke of Alva in the Netherlands. He escaped from prison through a window that overlooked a moat that had frozen over during the harsh winter. Willems had lowered himself onto the ice using a rope made of knotted rags, and was immediately pursued by a prison guard. The guard, whose weight broke through the ice causing him to fall into the moat, cried out to Willems for help and mercy. True to his pacifistic theology, Willems rescued the guard, who, in return, seized him and brought him back to the prison. Willems was burned at the stake on May 16, 1569, and has subsequently been revered as an Anabaptist martyr.

Anabaptist Pacifism  41

Anabaptist views about man’s place within his political community were deeply affected by this radical pacifism. Adherents rejected the notion that any compatibility exists between the Christian life and military or governmental service. However, they also rejected anarchy. Anabaptists believed that human governments had both the right and duty to kill, in certain circumstances, and that this right extended to a duty to conduct warfare. Yet since in their view Christians could not use the sword, then they also could not take part in government. Felix Manz, who along with Grebel was a co-founder of Swiss Anabaptism, for example, defended himself against charges of promoting resistance to infant baptism before a Zurich court by asserting the strict separation between God’s kingdom and human civil law, and by emphasizing the role of scripture in these matters. He pointed to biblical verses to bolster his commitment to this demarcation, noting that Paul, in 1 Corinthians 5:12–13, had written: “What business is it of mine to judge those outside the church? Are you not to judge those inside? God will judge those outside. Expel the wicked person from among you.” Similarly, on trial, Manz argued: “No Christian could be a government officer, nor could he use the sword nor kill anyone nor punish, because he had no Scripture for it.” This Anabaptist view has, of course, strong affinities with Augustine’s distinction between the City of God, the heavenly city whose love is oriented toward God, and the City of Man, the earthly city whose orientation is rooted in sin. For the Anabaptists, as for Augustine, earth is a mixture of these two, and the just Christian must remain oriented toward God—allowing that which is Caesar’s to remain with Caesar (Matthew 22:15–22). Thus, Anabaptist pacifism leads directly to what scholars have called a “separatist nonresistance” to the authority of the state. Here, once again, the Sermon on the Mount is paramount. Anabaptists point to Jesus’s teachings about the need for Christians to refrain from judging each other (Matthew 7:1–6) as entailing that no Christian can justly exercise authority over any other. When Jesus commands his followers, “Judge not,” he enjoins them to mutual respect and love as a community of believers. Politically, this places the spiritual community of love and charity at the center of social life rather than the authority of the state. More generally, argue Anabaptists, separatist nonresis-

tance follows from the replacement of the Old Testament’s law of retributive justice with the New Testament’s radical law of love. Inherent within this radicalism, Anabaptists say, is a doctrine of pacifism and a commandment to abstain from participating in the coercive force embodied in state institutions. The 16th century witnessed destructive warfare on a scale not seen before, whether between individual states, coalitions of states, civil wars, wars of intervention and aggression, or wars against unbelievers. Within this violent context, the scientific study of war began—where previously it had been a phenomenon to glorify, justify, deplore, or merely chronicle. Anabaptist pacifism is best understood as an important contribution to the moral side of this systematic inquiry. Its profundity rests in its ability to connect a strict form of pacifism, epistemically grounded in scripture, to a bifurcated conception of the relationship between civil and divine law. Joseph M. Hatfield See also Pacifism, Religious Further Reading Bender, Harold S. “The Anabaptist Vision.” Church History 13, no. 1 (1944): 3–24. Bender, Harold S. “The Pacifism of the Sixteenth Century Anabaptists.” Church History 24, no. 2 (1955): 119–131. Friedmann, Robert. “Conception of the Anabaptists.” Church History 9, no. 4 (1940): 341–365. Friesen, Abraham. “The Marxist Interpretation of Anabaptism.” Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies 1 (January 1970): 17–34. Friesen, Abraham. “Toward an Anabaptist Political Philosophy.” Transformation 14, no. 4 (1997): 1–6. Hale, J. R. “Sixteenth-Century Explanations of War and Violence.” Past & Present Society no. 51 (May 1971): 3–26. Heilke, Thomas. “Locating a Moral/Political Economy: Lessons from Sixteenth-Century Anabaptism.” Polity 30, no. 2 (Winter, 1997): 199–229. Magedanz, Stacy. “Public Justice and Private Mercy in ‘Measure for Measure’.” Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900, 44, no. 2 (Spring, 2004): 317–332. Oyer, John S., and Robert Kreider. Mirror of the Martyrs. Purcellville, VA: Good Books, 1990. Smolin, David M. “A House Divided? Anabaptist and Lutheran Perspectives on the Sword.” Journal of Legal Education 47, no. 1 (March 1997): 28–38.

42  Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of

Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of The ancient Near East refers to the area of Mesopotamia that is roughly equivalent to the modern Middle East, in the time period from about the year 3000 BCE until the conquests of Alexander the Great in the fourth century BCE. The Sumerians, the Babylonians, the Akkadians, and the Assyrians are some of the more prominent civilizations of this era. For these civilizations, religion was often considered inseparable from other aspects of life. Warfare was often spoken of in religious terms, and religious motives were often cited for warfare and conquest. To explore the connection between the two can thus provide modern readers with a better understanding of both in the ancient Near East. When discussing the relationship between religion and warfare in the ancient Near East, it is apropos to discuss first the general concept of religion. While religion in the ancient Near East cannot be given a monolithic definition, any more than religion in the 21st century, it was nevertheless a fundamental aspect of ancient Near Eastern culture generally. Most ancient Near Eastern societies were polytheistic and believed in a higher power(s) to which they looked for protection and sustenance. Thus their livelihood, successes, failures, and other aspects of life on earth were believed to be a reflection of their relationship with deity and of events in the spiritual realm. In connection with this concept, people in the ancient Near East believed that occurrences on earth (such as signs and portents) were an indicator of spiritual things. With regard to the divine will, it was believed that humans both felt the effects of, and to some extent assisted in carrying out, the divine will. A nation, therefore, could have served either as a military aggressor or defender, as an expression of divine will. As pertinent to a discussion on warfare, one aspect of religion that was seemingly shared by all ancient Near Eastern cultures was the concept of justice or righteousness. It was considered a standard that was believed to be equally applicable to all humans, and was therefore necessary to enforce. Warfare was the method used to enforce it, and the king was the divine representative whose responsibility this was. The justification for warfare ultimately derived from a divine prerogative.

While the reasons for engaging in warfare again may not always be discernible to us today, nevertheless a religious connection can be seen, or this was at least a reason given. Some possibilities for which a nation might go to war of course included defending itself against attack. Further, the king, who was responsible for providing for his subjects, might go to war to conquer other lands to increase food production, or to secure tribute from foreign kings. As the representative of deity, the king often spoke of his bellicose actions in religious terms. Ancient Near Eastern texts show that the king and his war machine were considered a manifestation of the deity’s power. In Akkadian, we read of such divine metaphors for the king as the “might,” the “weapon,” and the “standard” of the deity in military contexts. Other texts speak of the deity’s “splendor” overwhelming enemies. Sargon II (721–705 BCE) and Sennacherib (704–681 BCE) speak of this “splendor” as coming from both the deity Ashur and, in the same text, from their own domination. In the Bible, victory in war is spoken of in terms of foreign nations recognizing the God of Israel. Likewise, in both Akkadian texts and in the Bible, defeat is understood as the result of national sin or hubris of the king before the deity. In both the Bible and Akkadian texts, the king is occasionally pictured as seeking or receiving approval from deity by prayer or prophets before going to war. In Akkadian a deity is sometimes said to accompany the king in battle, and Israelite kings took the Ark of the Covenant with them into battle to ensure victory (1 Samuel 4, 11). Such a purpose for warfare as justice or righteousness then causes war to be defined as a “holy war,” being thus justified on the basis of righteousness or sin. This can be illustrated by the fact that the command not to “kill” in the biblical Ten Commandments means not to take life unlawfully, whereas the word used of the Israelites’ military actions in invading Palestine simply means to kill. The results of warfare engaged in on behalf of a deity are therefore seen to have spiritual ramifications. Victory in warfare was used to show that the king had spread the influence of the deity to foreigners who did not believe in him or her. This perception is seemingly illustrated by the fact that the Assyrian accounts of war concentrate not on the details of battle, but rather on the effect of a campaign, especially in terms of the king’s divine duty.

Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842)  43

Some ways in which a Mesopotamian king spoke of his victories in religious terms included such things as the viewing and capture of sacred articles from the temple of the conquered land, and the king’s performing his own sacred festival in the conquered town as well. As a representative of deity, a king’s rule was evidently strengthened by removing the image of the conquered king and replacing it with an image of himself and his gods. Sennacherib spoke of deporting the family gods of the king of Ashkelon in the same context as deporting the king and his family. From this study can be seen, among other things, the importance of the ancient Near Eastern king with regard to both war and, therefore, national concerns in general. Warfare was a means for the deity to punish the nation, and it was the king who was held responsible accordingly. The religious component contained therein included the idea that such an attack often would have been interpreted as an expression of divine displeasure. In Israel’s case, a seeming irony is that the desire to have a king like the other nations led to bellicose troubles by aggressor nations. In the ancient Near East, war was an extreme physical means of carrying out the will of the deities people served. War, like many other things, was evidently looked upon differently in the ancient Near East than it would be today. The religious dimension was a key factor in the attitude toward warfare and, therefore, toward shaping the destiny of nations and of the ancient Near Eastern world. David Musgrave See also Assyrian Warfare; Babylonian Conquest of Israel; Divine Kingship and War; Israelite Conquest of Canaan; Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare Further Reading Anati, Emmanuel. Palestine Before the Hebrews. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. Bahrani, Zainab. Rituals of War: The Body and Violence in Mesopotamia. New York: Zone Books, 2008. Gordon, Cyrus H. The Ancient Near East. New York: W. W. Norton, 1953. Jacobsen, Thorkild. The Treasures of Darkness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976. Læssøe, Jørgen. People of Ancient Assyria. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963. Oppenheim, A. Leo. Ancient Mesopotamia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Roux, Georges. Ancient Iraq. 2nd ed. Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1964. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2013.

Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842) Competition between Britain and Russia for territory and influence in the region of Afghanistan and India during the middle of the 19th century was known as the “Great Game.” British foreign policy at this time was definitely anti-Russian, and Britain remained very apprehensive of Russia’s expansionist designs. In 1838, Persia (Iran) attacked the city of Herat with Russian encouragement, thus putting the northwestern frontier of the British Empire in India at risk of falling under Russian control. But the British colonial government in India wanted to follow a proactive policy in Afghanistan. The Pashtuns constituted one of the largest ethnic groups in Afghanistan, where a bitter power struggle had erupted between two Pashtun tribal groups, the Durranis and the Barakzais. The city of Kabul was under the effective control of Dost Mohammad Khan (1792–1863), who had established the new dynasty of Barakzai. In 1838, the British committed the blunder of trying to replace Dost Mohammad with the former Durrani ruler, Shuja Shah Durrani (1785–1842), with whom they had signed a friendship treaty in June 1809. Since 1813, Shuja had been an exile in India, where he was the virtual prisoner of the pro-British Indian Punjab ruler Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780–1839) until about 1833. When the British backed Shuja’s claim to power in Afghanistan, Dost Mohammad, who bore the title of Amir-al-momenin (commander of the faithful), launched a jihad (holy war) against Ranjit Singh. The Anglo-Afghan War began in 1839 when British army marched into Afghanistan through the Bolan and Khojak passes. The British occupied Qandahar and Kabul, overthrowing and imprisoning Dost Mohammad and installing Shuja as a puppet ruler in August 1839. The Afghans fiercely resisted this foreign imposition of a ruler over them. The ousted Dost Mohammad escaped from a British prison in Bukhara and led a new offensive, but, after

44  Anglo-Sikh Wars (1845–1846, 1848–1849)

his recapture at the Battle of Parwan in November 1841, Dost Mohammad was succeeded as leader of the Afghan resistance by his son Akbar Khan. The misconduct of the British army of occupation further angered the Afghans, and in November 1841 a serious uprising occurred in Kabul. British officials were murdered and Kabul was evacuated in January 1842. The British retreat from Kabul was harrowing, with casualties resulting not only from Afghan bullets but also from freezing weather. One of the survivors of the retreat, Dr. William Brydon, reached Jalalabad to report the disaster to the British authorities. The Afghan rebels murdered the puppet Shuja in April 1842. Although the British retook Kabul and blew up its great bazaar in September 1842, they evacuated the city a month later. Dost Mohammad was released and restored to the throne in December 1842. During his second rule, he brought all of Afghanistan under his control. His military prowess, his matrimonial alliances (16 marriages), his ability to play one tribe against another, and his later friendship treaties with Britain (1855 and 1857), secured his position until his death in 1863. Proclaimed a serious blunder by both contemporaries and later historians, the Anglo-Afghan War of 1839–1842 initiated an ongoing jihad in Afghanistan against both the British and the Russians that lasted for three more decades. Patit Paban Mishra See also Islam and War (Jihad) Further Reading Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839–1919. Oxford: Osprey, 2009. Munshi, Mohana L. Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan of Kabul. New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 2004. Noelle, Christine. State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826– 1863). Richmond, VA: Curzon, 1997. O’Ballance, Edgar. Afghan Wars. Herndon, VA: Book International, 2002. Stewart, Jules. On Afghanistan’s Plains: The Story of Britain’s Afghan Wars. London: I. B. Tauris, 2011. Waller, John H. Beyond the Khyber Pass: The Road to British Disaster in the First Afghan War. New York: Random House, 1990.

Anglo-Sikh Wars (1845–1846, 1848–1849) Between 1845 and 1849, two Anglo-Sikh Wars led to the establishment of British colonial rule in northwest India and the absorption of the Sikh Empire in the Punjab into the possession of the East India Company. The empire had been founded at the end of the 18th century by Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780–1839) by absorbing the different sovereign states that had emerged in the previous century. Its two main unifying elements were religion and a powerful army, forged along Western lines with the support of foreign mercenaries, such as Alexander Gardner (1785–1877) and Josiah Harlan (1799–1871) and veterans of the European wars such as the Frenchmen Jean-François Allard (1785–1839), Claude Auguste Court (1793–1880), and the Italians Paolo Avitabile (1791–1850) and Giovanni Battista (Reuben) Ventura (1794–1858). At its peak, the Sikh Empire extended from the Khyber Pass to western Tibet and from Mithankot to Kashmir, and was divided into four provinces (Lahore, Multan, Peshawar, and Kashmir). Its success had fueled resentment in both the Mughal Empire and among the Afghan rulers, to whom large tracts of the Sikh Empire’s possessions belonged at the time of Ahmad Shah Durrani (r. 1747–1772). The Sikh Empire’s relations with British authorities were cordial. They cooperated in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), although Sikh assistance in the invasion of the Kingdom of Kabul failed to materialize. In the same way, until 1846 the British recognized a special status for the areas of Kaithal, Patiala, Jind, Thanesar, Maler Kotla, and Faridkot, all of which were former Sikh territories added to the possessions of the British-owned East India Company after the end of the second Anglo-Maratha War (1803–1805). After the death of Ranjit Singh the Sikh Empire started to decline. While central power weakened under the maharaja’s heirs, local authorities gained increasing strength. In 1841, after the death of Maharaja Nau Nihal Singh and a bloody siege of the Lahore fort, Ranjit’s illegitimate son, Sher Singh (1807–1843), ascended to the throne with the support of the Dogras, who were one of the main ethnic components of the empire. Sindhanwalias, the other main

Anglo-Sikh Wars (1845–1846, 1848–1849)  45

ethnic component of the empire, remained nonetheless one of the key elements of the army, whose political role gradually increased. Reviving Guru Gobind Singh’s teaching, the army proclaimed itself the embodiment of the Sikh nation and its panchayats (committees) emerged as an alternate power source, starting what some British observers labeled “a dangerous military democracy.” The drift between the army and the court culminated in the assassination of Sher Singh and Wazir Dhian Singh Dogra at the hand of an army officer, Ajit Singh Sindhanwalia. Rivalry also existed between Dogras and Sindhanwalias, among the different parts of the empire, and among the multiple branches of Ranjit Singh’s extended family. In the meantime, British control had gradually extended. In 1839, the East India Company (EIC) established a cantonment in Ferozepur near the Sultej River, while in 1843 it occupied Sindh, south of the Punjab, fueling Sikh fears of new hostile moves. After Sher Shah’s killing, Jind Kaur, Ranjit Singh’s youngest widow, became regent for her infant son, Duleep Singh (1838–1893). Power remained, nonetheless, in Dogra’s hands, with Wazir Lal Singh and the commander of the army Tej Singh. Different factors led to the outbreak of the hostilities. In 1845, on the eve of the war, the Sikh army had grown to about 80,000 men and was perceived by the British authorities as largely out of control. Mistrust between Sikh and British authorities had grown to a dangerous level. The Sikh Empire was the only great power in northern India outside of British influence, while its strategic position and considerable wealth made it a coveted prize. The Sikh army crossed the Sutlej on December 11, 1845, clashing with British troops converging on Ferozepur in Mudki on December 18. On December 21–22 in Ferozeshah, a second encounter ended in a stalemate. Sikh efforts to establish a bridgehead near Aliwal to threaten British supply lines were repulsed by General Sir Harry Smith (Battle of Aliwal, January 28, 1846), who later joined his forces with those led by General Sir Hugh Gough in the decisive Battle of Sobraon (February 10). In Ferozeshah and Sobraon the attitude of Lal and Tej Singh fueled widespread rumors about their loyalty. In the Treaty of Lahore (March 9), the Sikhs surrendered to the EIC the region between the Beas and the Sutlej (Jullundur Doab), Kashmir, Hazarah, and the forts, territo-

ries, rights, and interests in the country between the Beas and the Indus. Maharaja Duleep Singh remained ruler of the Punjab; however, the Lahore Durbar later requested that a British presence remain until the maharaja attained the age of 16. On December 16, 1846, the Treaty of Bhyroval installed a British resident (Henry Lawrence) in Lahore, supported by a Council of Regency with agents in other cities and regions. The British grip tightened when Jind Kaur was imprisoned on Lawrence’s advice. Then, in 1848, the maharani was exiled upon request of the new resident, Frederick Currie, a move that fueled resentment against the pro-British Lahore Durbar. In April 1848, a rebellion in Multan supported by Governor Diwan Mulraj ended with the killing of the two British officers in charge of retaking control of the town. Against the cautious attitude of the governor-general, Lord Dalhousie (in charge 1848–1856), and the commander in chief of the Bengal Army, Sir Hugh Gough, British officers in the Punjab began recruiting units to cope with Sikh hostility. Among them Herbert Edwardes, political agent in Bannu, raised a force of Pathans in the very early stages of the rebellion; John Nicholson led an irregular cavalry troop based at Peshawar; and James Abbott, commissioner of Hazarah, raised Hazara and Muslim levies in the region under his authority. In August, Chattar Singh Attariwalla, governor of Hazarah, rebelled in his turn, followed, on September 14, by the Sikh troops in Multan led by his son Sher Singh, who nonetheless refused to join hands with Diwan Mulraj. In November, at the beginning of the cold weather season, fresh British troops started moving toward the Punjab, but Sikh resistance halted them on the Chenab River, which was crossed only in December. In early 1849, Afghan emir Dost Mohammad entered the conflict on the Sikh side to retake the Peshawar Valley, which was conquered by Ranjit Singh in 1823. On January 13, Sher Singh and Gough clashed in Chillianwala and on February 21 in the decisive Battle of Gujrat, where Sher Singh’s troops were routed and pursued behind the Jhelum until—on March 12—Chattar and Sher Singh surrendered near Rawalpindi, together with some 20,000 men. Dost Mohammad Khan later signed a treaty acknowledging British possession of Attock and Peshawar. On March 30, Duleep Singh held his last court in Lahore when he signed away all

46  Antioch, Siege of (1097–1098)

claims to the rule of the Punjab, which was officially annexed to the EIC’s possessions. Gianluca Pastori See also Sikhism and War; Singh, Guru Gobind Further Reading Cook, Hugh C. B. The Sikh Wars. The British Army in the Punjab, 1845–1849. London: Leo Cooper, 1975. Farwell, Byron. Queen Victoria’s Little Wars. London: Allen Lane, 1973. Gott, Richard. Britain’s Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt. London: Verso, 2012. Singh, Fauja. Military System of the Sikhs during the Period 1799–1849. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1964. Singh, Khushwant. A History of the Sikhs. 2nd ed., 2 vols. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004. Singh, Patwant, and Jyoti M. Rai. Empire of the Sikhs: The Life and Times of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. New Delhi: Hay House, 2008.

Antioch, Siege of (1097–1098) Antioch was the first Syrian city encountered by the main army of the First Crusade, after the crusaders had marched across Europe and Anatolia. The siege that followed was the longest and most difficult of the crusade and was perhaps the closest the crusade came to defeat. After enduring famine and cold through the winter, repeated sallies by the garrison, and attempts by three different relieving armies to break the siege, many of the crusade’s participants (and their Latin Christian contemporaries back in Europe) believed the ultimate success of the siege was clear evidence of the crusade’s divine favor. Antioch was a large and important city on the east bank of the Orontes River that dated to the third century BCE. Its position between Anatolia and Syria and the trade routes of Asia and Europe made it an important administrative and commercial center. It was also the site of St. Peter’s first church and was one of the five patriarchies—the preeminent bishoprics of the Christian world at the time. Although the city had been strongly fortified by the Byzantines, notably under Justinian in the sixth century, it had

been traded back and forth between the Muslims and Byzantines from 637 and, since 1085, had been under the control of the Seljuk Turks. When the crusaders arrived in the autumn of 1097, they were awestruck by the city’s size and strength. The city’s double walls reportedly displayed 400 towers and enclosed three and a half square miles. Unlike at Nicaea, which the crusaders had besieged earlier the same year, they did not pursue an aggressive siege strategy but decided instead to blockade Antioch. On October 21, the crusaders arranged themselves to the north and west of the city. Bohemond of Taranto opposed the St. Paul Gate on the crusaders’ extreme left while Raymond of St. Gilles initially positioned himself opposite the Dog Gate near the north end of the town’s western wall, and Godfrey of Bouillon, on the crusaders’ extreme right, faced the Gate of the Duke midway along the western wall. This left three of the city’s six gates unopposed, exposing the crusaders to sudden attacks by the garrison and jeopardizing their supply links with the coast to the west. This was highlighted in early March 1098 when a convoy of much needed supplies was ambushed while traveling to the crusaders’ camp from the coast. Although escorted by Bohemond and Raymond, the convoy was overcome and forced to flee toward the crusaders’ camp. The timely arrival of Godfrey with reinforcements allowed the crusaders to turn the rout into a small victory. The retreating Muslims ran into a bottleneck as they tried to pass back through the Bridge Gate at the southwest corner of the city and many were killed. To strengthen their position and to cut off the garrison, the crusaders built siege forts outside some of the city’s gates. The first was built on a hill overlooking Bohemond’s position to the north of the city in November 1097. The second was built in March 1098 after the ambush of the convoy. It was constructed opposite the Bridge Gate and was defended by Raymond of St. Gilles. The third was created when Tancred fortified a monastery outside of the Gate of St. George to the south of the city in April. Treachery rather than hunger led to the city’s fall. Bohemond had opened negotiations with a man named Firuz who guarded one of the towers. On the night of June 2, 1098, a party of men under Bohemond climbed a ladder up to the tower. They took possession of this section of wall

Antioch, Siege of (1097–1098)  47

and managed to open a small gate, allowing the crusader army to begin to pour into the city. By the end of June 3, the crusaders controlled the entire city with the exception of the citadel. Divisions among the regional Muslim powers were partly responsible for the crusaders’ success. The ruler of Antioch, Yaghisiyan, had been an ally of Ridwan of Aleppo, but rather than appeal to him when the crusaders arrived, he turned to Ridwan’s enemies, Kerbogha of Mosul and Ridwan’s brother, Duqaq of Damascus. While leading a foraging party along the upper Orontes in December 1097, Bohemond and Robert of Flanders defeated Duqaq and his army near Albara. Although the victory allowed the crusaders to continue the siege, the raiding party was forced to abandon what it had plundered, adding to the famine that was spreading through the besiegers’ camp. After his gamble to gain greater autonomy from Aleppo had failed, Yaghisiyan called upon Ridwan. In another decisive upset, Bohemond successfully intercepted and turned back Ridwan’s force near the Lake of Antioch in February 1098. Although Yaghisiyan had appealed to Kerbogha in the autumn of 1097, the ruler of distant Mosul had paused on his way to relieve Antioch to attack Edessa, which had recently come under the control of the crusader Baldwin of Boulogne. Kerbogha spent three months unsuccessfully besieging Edessa before continuing his march to Antioch. Kerbogha’s eventual arrival on June 5, only days after the crusaders had broken into Antioch, brought about a second siege as the crusaders found themselves pinned down in the city that they had just spent seven and a half months besieging. Facing the largest of the three Muslim armies and with few provisions left in the city, desertions, which had surged over the winter, again became rampant. In desperation the crusade leaders locked the city gates to keep their men from fleeing. Kerbogha quickly overcame the crusaders’ siege forts but was stopped short when he attempted to break into the city. Although the citadel remained in Muslim hands, the crusaders blocked the single path that connected it with the town below. From about June 14th, Kerbogha organised his army to the north of the city and appears to have intended to blockade the city much as the crusaders had done.

Inside Antioch, famine once more spread through the crusader army and morale plummeted. Hope came on June 15 when what was believed by many to be the Holy Lance, the spear that had pierced the side of Christ while on the cross, was discovered buried in the Cathedral of St. Peter. The discovery was made following a vision by a priest named Peter Bartholomew who claimed the location was revealed to him by St. Andrew. Riding a wave of renewed enthusiasm and morale, the crusade leaders decided to seek battle rather than starve inside Antioch. With Raymond of St. Gilles carrying the Holy Lance, the crusaders marched out of Antioch on June 28. Kerbogha held back his forces until the entire crusader army had entered the field. Kerbogha’s force, although superior in number, was divided internally and was ultimately defeated by the crusaders. Following the battle, the citadel quickly surrendered to Bohemond, who, in opposition to Raymond of St. Gilles, claimed the city for himself. The crusaders’ success at Antioch brought renewed faith in the divine provenance of their undertaking. In the months after this victory, however, the Christian leaders paused to carve out territory in Syria for themselves. It was not until the rank and file of the army began to tear down the walls of the recently captured town of Marrat al-Numen that the leaders were compelled to press on to Jerusalem. While the others went south, Bohemond remained at Antioch, building around it the Latin Principality of Antioch, the second of the four crusader states. Antioch retained its regional importance under the crusaders and remained under the control of Latin Christians until it was taken by the Mamluks in 1268. Michael S. Fulton See also Bouillon, Godfrey de; First Crusade; Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of Further Reading Asbridge, Thomas. The First Crusade. London: Free Press, 2004. France. John. Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Runciman, Steven. A History of the Crusades. Volume I: The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951.

48 Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism Anti-Semitism is hatred, opposition, and persecution of Jews as a group. It is not hatred of persons apart from the fact that they are Jews, but hatred of them because they are Jews. The term Judenhass (“Jew hatred”) was first used in 1879 by a German journalist and agitator named Wilhelm Marr (1819–1904), but the idea is centuries old. Anti-Semitism is manifested in many ways, ranging from expressions of hatred of or discrimination against individual Jews to attacks on individual Jews or groups instigated by individuals, groups, mobs, or the state. It can also entail military attacks on Jewish communities. Anti-Semitism has had political and religious forms that have been historically expressed in propaganda demonizing the Jews and in pogroms and “ethnic cleansing” (genocide), as was done in the Holocaust during the Second World War. Among the most common manifestations of anti-Semitism historically are pogroms—violent riots directed at Jewish communities and often initiated and supported by government authorities. Notable pogroms among the hundreds that have occurred include ones before the First Crusade in 1096, ones associated with the expulsion of Jews from England in 1290, massacres of Spanish Jews in 1391, persecutions associated with the Spanish Inquisition and expulsion of Jews from Spain in 1492, Cossack massacres in Ukraine from 1648 to 1657, and pogroms that were perpetrated in Imperial Russia from 1821 to 1906. The latter pogroms occurred mostly within the Pale Settlement, an area that would become Belarus and Ukraine. Although the word “pogrom” is normally associated with violent acts against Jews, it has also been used for violent acts against other nonethnic Jews and religious groups. Pogroms often had religious overtones of blood libel in which instigators spread rumors of the ritual killing of Christian children in order to use their blood as part of Jewish holy day rituals such as Passover. Such accusations date to the Middle Ages but continued through the centuries and were a part of anti-Jewish Nazi propaganda. Notable during the Nazi era was the organized destruction of synagogues and Jewish shops on the night of November 9–10, 1938, throughout Germany and Austria known as Kristallnacht or “Night of Broken Glass.” This event marked an increase in anti-Semitism by the Nazis in which geno-

Prayerbooks and rubble scattered on the floor of the choir loft in the Zerrenerstrasse synagogue in Pforzheim, Germany, which the Nazis destroyed during Kristallnacht on November 9, 1938. Kristallnacht, also known as the “Night of Broken Glass,” was one night of organized and concentrated German Nazi terrorism of Jews and Jewish establishments. (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum)

cide of Jews would become the focus of Nazi anti-Semitism. Additionally, the Nazi introduction of the Nuremburg Laws of 1935 that defined people by race and segregated “Aryan” and “non-Aryan” people furthered governmental and legal institutionalization of Nazi anti-Semitism. In the 19th and 20th centuries to the present there has frequently been a political dimension added to anti-Semitism, often fueled by nationalism and conspiracy theories, in which Jews are accused of being part of an international conspiracy of political influence and financial domination. In the present era anti-Semitism is found in many nations around the globe and is at a level in Europe not seen since the rise of the Nazi Third Reich. Some political parties in European countries have anti-Semitic values as part of their platforms. Anti-Semitism is seen in the Middle East where the existence of Israel as a nation since 1948 has

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produced belligerence among the Arab states in the region and compounded the problem of achieving lasting peace there. The explanations for the cause or causes of anti-Semitism are varied and sometimes grouped by categories. Racial theory states that the Jews are hated because they are an inferior race. The outsiders theory argues that Jews are hated because they are different from everyone else. The economic theory holds that the Jews are hated because they possess too much wealth and power. The deicide theory contends that Jews are hated because they killed Jesus of Nazareth. The scapegoat theory claims that the Jews were a convenient people to blame for societal troubles (e.g., the Black Plague). The chosen people theory contends that the Jews are hated because they arrogantly declare they are the “chosen ones of God.” However, xenophobia and conflicting religious ideologies exist in all societies, and it is clear from history that non-Jews with the same traits were not treated in the same manner. Therefore, these theories alone cannot explain the long and irrational reactions from diverse peoples ancient and modern that appear in the history of anti-Semitism. More recent Christian interpretations regarding the origins of anti-Semitism believe that the origins have a textual and theological foundation and argue that the Bible offers insight into the origin and cause of anti-Semitism. In Genesis 3:15 it is described that the “seed (offspring) of the serpent” (who most commentators ancient and modern identify as Satan who instigated the fall of mankind) will continue to attack the “seed” of the woman down through time. Tracing this concept of the “seed” in the Old Testament (Hebrew scriptures) narrows it to a particular “seed,” the Jewish people and from them the Messiah. Thus, the Genesis passage has in view the conflict between Christ (Messiah) and Satan. The New Testament seems to follow this interpretation in Romans 16:20 where it declares that “Christ will soon crush Satan” and in Revelation 12:1–13 where Israel (symbolized as the woman who gave birth to the male child who is destined to rule the nations, i.e., Christ) is persecuted by Satan, apparently with a genocidal purpose. Therefore, the cause for anti-Semitism is the agesold conflict between Satan’s seed and the chosen seed (Israel and the Messiah). Satan’s intent to thwart the plan of God can only be accomplished by the destruction of Israel,

and so the persecution of the Jewish people goes on from age to age. The history of anti-Semitism has pagan roots, with the Egyptian priest Manetho issuing propaganda in his time (3rd century BCE) that the Hebrews were a race of lepers who had been cast out of Egypt in the days of Moses. There also were similar accusations and significant persecutions under the Greeks and Romans, in part because the Jews opposed Hellenization or would not worship their gods and insisted on observing their own laws (the injunctions of the Torah). Emperor Claudius called them a people who spread “a general plague throughout the world,” an expression that echoed the feeling that the Jews were a danger to the Gentile world. It is often claimed that the New Testament is anti-Semitic, a claim that is debated pro and con by Christian and non-Christians scholars with many contemporary Christian scholars contending that the charge does hold up under scrutiny. The most prominent texts viewed as anti-Semitic are Matthew 27:24 and 1 Thessalonians 2:15–16. The first text presents those Jews in the crowd at the time of Jesus’s trial as saying “His blood be on our heads and our children’s heads,” thereby interpreted by some through the centuries as incurring an enduring curse for their part in the crucifixion of Jesus. This has come down in history as part of the previously discussed “blood libel.” The second text speaks of God’s wrath coming upon “the Jews” as those who do not please God and are hostile to all people. From this came the label on the Jewish people of “Christ killer” (the unpardonable crime of deicide). Counterarguments contend that in the first instance (Matthew 27:24), only Matthew views those Jews who were at the Jerusalem trial and who rejected Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah as culpable and the extension to their “children” cannot go beyond the first century. Therefore, it is unwarranted to extend the curse to all Jews of all time. In the second instance (1 Thessalonians 2:15–16), although Paul is clearly condemning Jews, it must be remembered that he himself was a Jew and his comments are not directed to all Jews but to those particular Jews (“Judaizers”) who were upsetting the community of the believers in Jesus of Nazareth at Thessalonica (both Jewish and Gentile). In other words, this is an in-house controversy and not a branding of the Jewish people as condemned by God.

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Having said this, the history of the Christian Church from the fourth century was largely anti-Semitic in character. This began, as some scholars believe, when the Pax Romana (“peace of Rome”), a legal protection offered by the empire to “old religions” existing in the lands they conquered (27 BCE–193 CE), was lifted with respect to the early Christian community (which was predominately Jewish). The Jewish community had apparently told the Roman authorities that Christianity was not a sect of Judaism as had been supposed, but a “new religion,” and therefore it did not deserve Roman protection from persecution. In response, the Christian community claimed that they were the “true Israel,” because the scriptures had viewed Jews who were believers as “the Remnant” of Israel that would be saved (Romans 9:27). They understood Jews who did not believe in Jesus as the Messiah as being ethnically Jewish, but not true believers (Romans 2:17–29) and themselves as a legitimate part of the Chosen Nation from the earliest time (Acts 24:14). It is thought that advancing this claim, as well as suffering Roman persecution as a result of the Jewish claim that they were not part of biblical Judaism, began a polarization that included apologetic disputations between Christians and Jews and eventually to what is known as “the parting of the way.” An early wedge driven between Jews and Jewish-Christians was the flight to Pella before the Roman invasion of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Second Temple (66–70 CE). Jewish-Christians had understood the words of Jesus in Luke 21:20–23 as a warning to flee the city; however, this act was interpreted by the Jews of Jerusalem as abandoning their people in a time of national crisis. Nevertheless, this was part of a gradual decline in relations, as Talmudic scholar Rabbi Daniel Boyarin notes: “for at least the first three centuries of their common lives, Judaism in all of its forms and Christianity in all of its forms were part of one complex religious family, twins in a womb, contending with each other for identity and precedence, but sharing with each other the same spiritual food” (1999, p. 6). Rabbinic Judaism with its beginning at the council of Yavne (ca. 90 CE) shared a common origin with Christianity, but from the second to fifth centuries several things happened to divide Christianity from its Jewish roots. First, the church became majority Gentile and was centered outside Jerusalem. Second, Jews were replaced by non-Jews as the majority in the

Roman Empire. Third, the Roman Empire under Emperor Constantine adopted Christianity as the religion of the state. Thereafter, the apologetic disputes of the previous centuries were canonized as official dogma and the Jews were regarded as God’s enemies in opposition to Jesus Christ and the Church. Theologically, supercessionism redefined the biblical understanding of God’s chosen as Christians, not Jews. Politically, this teaching of contempt resulted in a body of anti-Jewish laws. Church councils (341–626 CE) prohibited Christians from observing the Shabbat, Jewish holidays, or eating with Jews, and separated the celebration of Easter from the Jewish Passover. Converting to Judaism became a crime and the marriage of a Jew to a Christian was a capital offense. In the middle of the sixth century, a group of scholars working for the Roman emperor Justinian issued the Justinian Code, a series of anti-Jewish laws excluding Jews from all public places, prohibiting them from giving evidence in lawsuits in which Christians took part, and reading from the Bible in Hebrew. In 1095 Pope Urban II ordered the first of what would be five crusades to take back the Holy City of Jerusalem from the Muslims who had prevented Christian pilgrims from gaining access to holy places. However, the knights and mercenaries hired to wage the crusades made no distinction between Muslims and Jews, and the first victims of these crusades were often Jews living alongside their Christian neighbors. After the First Crusade, images began to appear visually aligning the Jews with the devil. In 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council forced Jews to wear yellow badges, because that was the color assigned to prostitutes. One of the most notorious symbols of anit-Semitism was the images of “Ecclesia” and “Synagoga” (Church/Christianity and the Synagogue/Jews). In the statuary of these figures adorning cathedrals (such as Strasbourg Cathedral in 1230) the Church is portrayed as a king riding a lion while the Synagogue is a blindfolded woman, her staff broken and the crown sliding off her head, and holding the tablets of the Law in an upside-down position. When the Black Death spread through Europe from 1347 to 1352, Jews were accused of starting the plague by poisoning the Christian water supply with a potion. Consequently, more than 200 Jewish communities were annihilated (usually by burning), even though Pope Clement VI issued a bull declaring Jews not responsible for the plague.

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As a result of general anti-Semitic feeling, Christian art of the Middle Ages depicted Jews in place of Judas betraying Jesus of Nazareth and in place of the Romans crucifying him. In keeping with the belief that the Jews were the enemies of God and Christendom, over time old conspiracy theories reemerged, such as the 12th-century “blood libel” in which Jews ritually use the blood of Christian children to make their Passover matzos, and new conspiracies appeared such as the 20th century’s Protocols of the Elders of Zion (1903), a fiction of the Russian and later Soviet secret police that told of a secret plot by Jewish leaders to take over the world. Unfortunately, these unfounded and disproven theories, the latter used as part of the Nazi propaganda machine against the Jews in Eastern Europe and once promoted by American industrialist Henry Ford and also enthusiastically supported by Adolf Hitler, continue today throughout the Middle East and Asia as well as other parts of the world. Following the Black Death came the Spanish Inquisition, which led to the expulsion of all Jews from Spain in 1492. This event forms a backdrop for the voyage to the New World of Christopher Columbus, who in many scholars’ opinion was a Marrano Jewish-Christian. The anti-Semitic attitude embedded in European Christianity revealed itself in the period of the Reformation in the hostile rhetoric of Martin Luther (1483–1546) in his treatise “On the Jews and Their Lies” (1543), in which he advocated burning their synagogues, confiscating their prayer books, forbidding rabbis to teach “their filth” upon pain of death, and expelling them from all Christian lands. This rhetoric, as well as the name of Luther, was repeated by Adolf Hitler in his diatribes against inferior races and formed the background for his “Final Solution” against the Jews in Europe (a cause shared by the Muslim Mufti Haj Amin al-Hussein for the Jews of the Middle East). In modern history there is no greater example of anti-Semitism than the atrocities committed against the Jews in the Holocaust. Fortunately, following the Holocaust many Christian denominations (such as the Lutheran church) sought to apologize for acts committed against Jews and many, such as the Roman Catholic Church, reversed language in their official documents that was considered anti-Semitic. The evangelical church, though divided in their expression of support for the state of Israel, has largely distanced itself from the anti-Semitic heritage of the Reformation.

Today, sects of Islam have branded Jews as inhuman (“the sons of apes and pigs”) and called the state of Israel the “Little Satan.” Especially since the Jewish return to Palestine and the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, many quarters of the Islamic world have called for the destruction of Israel. The modern opposition to Zionism, the right of Jews to have their own homeland in the historic land of Israel, is deemed by most Jews as anti-Semitic. Many evangelical Christians identify themselves as “Christian Zionist” and attempt to challenge anti-Semitic tendencies within their churches. However, the disturbing trend in the 21st century is toward a resurgence in anti-Semitism throughout the world. A form of anti-Semitism emerged at the end of the 20th century known as “the New Anti-Semitism.” It is rooted in past anti-Semitism, but it targets not just Jews as a group, but Israel as a nation. It is therefore both anti-Semitic and anti-Israel. This New Anti-Semitism is seen in Islamic entities and anti-Zionist organizations that have used public measures to penalize the state of Israel. Christian denominations have joined in these efforts, which find expression in churches and on college and university campuses, such as the Boycott, Divest, and Sanction (BDS) movement. The history of anti-Semitism is one of centuries of violence, tragedy, and genocide. It has been part of war and conflict such as during the crusades, the Second World War, and some of the conflict in the Middle East in the last hundred years. Although it is not the central factor in the outbreak of war, it has been a component of it, and when war erupts, dormant and active attitudes and beliefs, antiSemitism among them, can be ignited and reignited, fueling the flames of war and religion. Randall Price See also Constantine; First Crusade; Holocaust; Luther, Martin Further Reading Ben-Itto, Hadassa. The Lie That Wouldn’t Die: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. London: Valentine Mitchell, 2005. Bergen, Doris. War & Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Boyarin, Daniel. Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. Browning, Christopher. The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004.

52  Apocalyptic Literature Burleigh, Michael. The Racial State: Germany 1933–1945. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Delin, Grant. Lebensraum: Extermination Camps of the Third Reich. London: Westzone, 2001. Goldstein, Phyllis, and Harold Evans. A Convenient Hatred: The History of Antisemitism. Facing History and Ourselves National Foundation, 2012. Hilberg, Raul. The Destruction of the European Jews. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003. Landes, Richard, and Steven A. Katz. The Paranoid Apocalypse: A Hundred-Year Perspective on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. New York: NYU Press, 2011. Lazare, Bernnard. Antisemitism: Its History and Causes. New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005. Levy, Richard S., ed. Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005. Lewis, Bernard. “The New Anti-Semitism.” American Scholar 75, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 25–36. Marcus, Kenneth L. The Definition of Anti-Semitism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Merback, Mitchell. Beyond the Yellow Badge: Anti-Judaism and Antisemitism in Medieval and Early Modern Visual Culture. Leiden: Brill, 2007. Motadel, David. Islam and Nazi Germany’s War. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2014. Parkes, James W. Antisemitism. London: Valentine Mitchell, 1963. Perry, Marvin, and Frederick M. Schweitzer. Anti-Semitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to the Present. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Poliakov, Leon. The History of Anti-Semitism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003. Steinweis, Alan E. Kristallnacht 1938. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009. Wistrich, Robert S. Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred. New York: Pantheon Books, 1991.

Apocalyptic Literature Religious literature from many traditions speaks of warfare at the end of time. “Apocalyptic” is the adjectival form of the noun “apocalypse,” from the Greek apokalupsis, which conveys the idea of “disclosure, revelation,” especially of end times. Apocalyptic messages invariably proceed from God, since only God (or the gods) can take away the shrouds that obscure future times and events. Although

most commonly associated with the Bible, apocalyptic literature and concepts abounded in the ancient Near East as well. Among its more common (but not invariable) features are the following: • It is in narrative form, telling stories about what will occur, usually in highly hyperbolic, even grotesque imagery. • It is mediated through visions using symbolic language and featuring superhuman mediators. • It makes connections from the known and the familiar of history to the unknown and the unfamiliar of the future. • It despairs of human solutions to problems and invokes God/the gods to interfere, usually drastically and destructively. • It pits the righteous against the wicked and anticipates the conquest of good over evil. • It describes a re-creation that will supplant the corruption of earthly affairs and usher in a paradise or utopia. • It is militaristic, viewing final conflict as the only means of bringing about a just and orderly society. The element of war is central to apocalyptic literature, since only war, successfully waged, can undo the human plight by the destruction of the present order and the recreation of a better one. This becomes clear in the following examination of a wide range of apocalyptic texts from the ancient world.

Mesopotamia

An interesting (though fragmentary) example of an apocalyptic genre is “A Vision of the Nether World,” an Assyrian text of the seventh century BCE, in which a certain Prince Kumma expresses a desire to see the nether world, an appeal granted to him by means of a dream. The brokenness of the inscription limits the discussion to only a few phrases characteristic of apocalyptic literature, but enough to show its existence in ancient Assyrian literature. [Kum]ma lay down and beheld a night vision in his dream. . . . The evil [. . .] (had) the head (and) hands

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(of) men; his headgear was a crown; his feet were (those of) a . . . bird. [. . .] they were cast down; from [. . .] of his arms lightning was flashing; . . . When [I] saw him, my legs trembled as his wrathful brilliance overwhelmed me; I kissed the feet of his [great] godhead as I bowed down; when I stood up, he looked at me, shaking his [head]. . . . He drew [tow]ards me in order to kill [me]; Ishum, his counselor, the intercessor who spares life, who loves truth, and so forth, spoke up: “Put not the fellow to death.” (Pritchard, 2nd ed., 109–110)

Then I [Atum] shall destroy all that I have made. This land [Egypt] shall return into the Abyss, into the flood as into its former state. It is I who shall remain together with Osiris, having made my transformations into other snakes which mankind will not know, nor gods see. How beautiful is that which I have done for Osiris, exalted more than all the gods. I have given to him rulership. . . . Then Re [= Atum] said to Osiris: “Behold, goodness has come to you from my mouth. By means of it your primal state has come into being.” (Hallo and Younger, 1:28)

Though the narrative is disjointed, the elements of an apocalypse are obvious: dreams, wondrous evanescence, brilliance, conflict, deliverance, resolution, and restoration. Particularly informing is a Neo-Assyrian prophetic text:

This brief excerpt tells of a struggle among the gods for domination and the plan of the creator god Atum to reinstate Osiris to his former position of kingship. This can be accomplished only by the violent overthrow of the existing order and its replacement by another in which Osiris will prevail over his erstwhile foe and brother Set. “The Prophecies of Neferti,” an example from the Middle Kingdom (ca. 2000–1700 BCE), though perhaps not formally apocalyptic, is sprinkled with apocalyptic motifs, especially warfare. The relevant lines are as follows:

[A prince will come] and reign eighteen years. The land will live in safety and flourish and the people [will have] abundance. The gods will make favourable decisions for the land, good winds will come. . . . (But) this ruler will be killed violently during a rebellion. A ruler will come and reign for thirteen years. There will be an attack of the Elamites on Akkad and the booty(?) will be taken away from Akkad. The temples of the great gods will be destroyed, and Akkad will suffer defeat. (Pritchard, 3rd ed., 606–607) Though this is certainly an ex eventu prediction, one given following its alleged fulfillment, the catastrophic scene presented contains at least the militaristic tone of apocalyptic language.

Egypt

A selection from the Book of the Dead (ca. 2000 BCE) describes the god Atum’s pledge to Osiris, god of the dead, who was slain by his own brother, Set, that he will reign again:

Then a king will come from the South, Ameny, the justified, by name, Son of a woman of Ta-Seti, child of Upper Egypt, He will take the white crown, He will wear the red crown; He will join the Two Mighty Ones, He will please the Two Lords with what they wish, With field-circler in his fist, oar in his grasp, Rejoice, O people of his time, The son of man will make his name for all eternity! . . . Asiatics will fall to his sword, Libyans will fall to his flame, Rebels to his wrath, traitors to his might. (Hallo and Younger, 1:28) Particularly redolent of apocalypse are (1) the coming of a redemptive ruling figure, (2) his stance as a warrior, (3) his titulary “son of man,” and (4) his unending reputation and praise.

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Greece

Apocalyptic imagery, in a somewhat altered form from that of the Semitic and Egyptian milieus, was at home in the Greek and Aegean world as early as the seventh century BCE. Hesiod is often cited as a clear example of its use, particularly in his Works and Days. Most striking is his categorizing of humankind in its origination as being made of gold, silver, bronze, and iron, precisely the order of minerals describing the kingdoms of the world in the biblical book of Daniel, which lists them according to their power, wealth, and influence (Daniel 2:31–32). Hesiod’s description of the fate of the wicked also resonates with apocalyptic tones and topics, as in the following selection: “But for those who occupy themselves with violence and wickedness and brutal deeds, Kronos’ son, wideseeing Zeus, marks out retribution.  .  .  . From heaven Kronos’ son brings disaster upon them, famine and with it plague, and the people waste away. The womenfolk do not give birth, and households decline, by Olympian Zeus’ design” (Works and Days, 44).

The Bible

Two books of the Bible—Daniel in the Old Testament and the Apocalypse (or Revelation) in the New—are largely apocalyptic in their form and substance and are the most familiar to students of the genre. Daniel’s internal evidence dates the book to the late sixth century BCE, and Revelation is clearly to be assigned to the end of the first Christian century (ca. CE 90). The similarity of their outlooks attests to an unbroken apocalyptic tradition for 600 years of Jewish and Christian history. It also underscores the dependency of John, the author of Revelation, on the earlier Old Testament work. Perhaps the most central and important theme common to the two writings is the sovereignty of God who, at the end of time, will rain down judgment on unrepentant sinners, redeem his own chosen ones, destroy the old order of corruption and decay, and create a new heaven and a new earth. However, until that final day kingdoms and nations will rise and fall successively as symbols of human power and inventiveness. By a series of military conquests they will advance, growing ever stronger than those that preceded them until they encounter the Kingdom of God,

before which they will fall in ignominious defeat and everlasting ruin. War thus occupies center stage in biblical apocalyptic works and for that reason will be the focus of the following discussion, beginning with Daniel and then ending with the Apocalypse. The prophet who composed the work—likely Daniel himself—served the court of King Nebuchadnezzar II (605–562 BCE), but all the time gave exclusive allegiance to his God, the God of his fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. By a series of dreams and visions he revealed not only to Nebuchadnezzar but to the king’s Babylonian and Persian successors what the end of history would be like and how they and the potentates that followed them would collapse beneath the hammer blows of the God of the universe. First in the order of the oracles was a dream by Nebuchadnezzar, which he could not fathom but which had brought him great consternation (Daniel 2:1). However, he could not recall what he had dreamed, so he presented to his sages an impossible demand: They must relate the content of the dream and offer an interpretation. This unreasonable assignment could not be fulfilled, so Daniel, the young Hebrew captive, was summoned and proceeded to relate the dream and to declare its meaning. The king had seen a great statue whose head was fashioned of gold, the breast and arms of silver, the belly and thighs of bronze, the legs of iron, and the feet of a mixture of iron and clay (Daniel 2:31–33). Next appeared a great stone that was dashed against the image, shattering it to pieces (vv. 34– 35). The image, said Daniel, represented four world powers that would at the end fall beneath the judgment and destruction of the Kingdom of God. The second dream was by Daniel himself. It featured four animals also in succession—a lion, a bear, a leopard, and one unlike any other ever seen for its appearance and ferocity (Daniel 7:1–8). They too represented nations that would be crushed by the Ancient of Days and the faithful remnant that followed him (vv. 22–27). Belshazzar, who succeeded Nebuchadnezzar, then had a vision in which the kingdoms of men were represented by only two animals, a ram and a goat (Daniel 8:3–5). The goat defeated the ram but was himself defeated and broken into four divisions.

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This time the prophet was privy to the identification of the protagonists. The ram was Persia, the goat Greece, and the four divisions the four entities that would result from the death of the goat. These in turn would come to a violent end at the hands of an unnamed dictator who at last would be overcome by the “prince of princes” (Daniel 8:23–25). Common to all these revelations is the futility of human government and the wars that mark human history. Yet, and ironically, God will himself wage war and as the warrior from heaven will judge the nations and assume his role as King of kings and Lord of lords. The apocalyptic imagery of human futility in the face of divine sovereignty moves forward from Daniel to the Apocalypse, the last book of the Christian canon—the Book of Revelation. The violence of the scenes of war and destruction is striking, especially given the contrast of the peaceful Jesus of the Gospels and the warlike Jesus of Revelation. The difference, of course, lies in the teaching of the New Testament about Jesus’s twofold mission: (1) his first advent as the savior of the world; and (2) his second advent as the sovereign of the world. Humanity’s rejection of salvation in the first instance invites God’s terrible judgment as a necessary precondition to the ultimate establishment of the everlasting kingdom in which there will be peace and felicity. The principal texts by which this bifurcation is presented and resolved in the book are: 1. Revelation 6: This section describes four horses that are dispatched throughout the world to judge it with conquest, civil war, famine, and death. The whole is described as “the great day of [God’s] wrath” (v. 17). 2. Revelation 8–11: This more lengthy account records seven battle trumpets that announce hail and fire, volcanic eruption, the falling of poisonous comets, universal darkness, setting loose of demonic spirits from within the earth, the death of one-third of earth’s population, and the appropriation of the kingdoms of the world by God himself (11:15). 3. Revelation 12–14: War in heaven and on earth between the hosts of evil and those of the Lord God is the subject of this narrative.

4. Revelation 16: This passage details the results of the previous conflict including disease, water turning to blood, unbearable heat from the sun, demonic armies crossing into the land over the dry riverbed of the Euphrates, and great earthquakes and storms unlike any ever seen in the past. 5. Revelation 17–22: This extended portion of the book climactically reveals scenes of divine judgment of human institutions and their satanic architects and proponents, all epitomized in Babylon, the great prostitute (Revelation 17:5, 15, 16; 19:2). Babylon has become a cipher for the kingdoms of mankind, hopeless rebels who must be finally defeated and destroyed by the kingdom of heaven. Jesus is seen coming from heaven as a warrior waging holy war against his foes (Revelation 19:11–21). All demonic and human forces arrayed against him are put to death, including at last Satan, the archenemy of God from the beginning (Revelation 20:1–3). All hostility against him now put down, God establishes his own righteous kingdom made up of all the saints of all the ages and situated in a renovated earth. The king will be God himself, no longer remote but dwelling among his people (Revelation 22:3, 5).

Second Temple Jewish Apocalyptic Literature

Following the return of the Jews from Babylonia beginning in 538 BCE, two moods began to emerge in the thinking of the newly reconstituted community. First, they faced the daunting task of rebuilding the temple and reorganizing the political, social, and religious life of what was now called Yehud by the larger world. Second, any hope of a revived Davidic dynasty seemed to have been dashed forever, first in light of the imperialism of Persia and then the rise of the succeeding Hellenistic and Roman empires. All that was left was to dream of a day when the Lord would intervene, throw off the oppressive great powers of the world, restore the house of David, and make of Israel once more the navel of the earth, the center of God’s affection, and the vehicle of his redemptive purposes. All these aspirations were grounded in a mighty restorative act of God that

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found expression in a rich apocalyptic body of visions penned and disseminated in a corpus of texts articulated in the apocalyptic literary genre that had buoyed the preexilic nation. The Jewish Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphical Writings are defined respectively as (1) works with hidden meaning whose authorship is unknown but that enjoy canonical status, at least in some Christian communities, and (2) those of false authorial attribution and for the most part considered by all traditions to be noncanonical. The apocalyptic documents of these extracanonical works are best represented by 1 and 2 Esdras (Apocrypha), and 1 and II Enoch, the Book of Jubilees, the Sibylline Oracles, the Testaments of the XII Patriarchs, the Assumption of Moses, the Apocalypse of Abraham, and the Apocalypse of Baruch (all Pseudepigrapha). They share in common the idea that though the present age is rife with persecution and foreign domination, the chosen people of God will at last be redeemed and reconstituted by God the Warrior in a final holy war led (in some case) by a messianic deliverer or by God’s personal intervention. One example from 2 Esdras 7:31–34 will suffice to capture the apocalyptic mood of the time: Then after the seven days [of primordial silence], the world that is not yet awake will be aroused and what is corruptible will pass away. The earth will give up those asleep in it, the dust will [let go] those who repose in it, and the storehouses will give up the souls entrusted to them. The Most High will appear on the judgment seat; then the end will come, and compassion will vanish; pity will cease, and forbearance will be withdrawn. Only judgment will remain; truth will stand and faith regain strength.

The Qumran (Dead Sea) Texts

The most important of these for the apocalyptic viewpoint and teaching are the Damascus (or Zadokite) Document, the Manual of Discipline, the Thanksgiving Hymns, the War of the Sons of Light against the Sons of Darkness, and the Pseudo-Daniel Apocalypse. They convey the same message of despair followed by a glorious hope of a utopian

kingdom to come as do the Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphical texts.

Early Christian Apocalyptic Literature

In addition to the Book of Revelation mentioned already, a number of Jewish works, including the Sibylline Oracles, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, and 2 Esdras, were influential in early Christian thought. In addition, a few indigenously Christian writings of an apocalyptic nature were created, notably the Apocalypse of Peter, the Shepherd of Hermes, and the Epistle of the Apostles. None of these was given any canonical status, but they do reflect the same aspirations as those of the Jewish traditions. Eugene H. Merrill See also Apocalypticism and War, Christian; Apocalypticism and War, Jewish; Apocalypticism and War, Muslim; Bible and War; Talmud and War Further Reading Charles, R. H. Eschatology: The Doctrine of a Future Life in Israel, Judaism, and Christianity. New York: Schocken Books, 1963. Collins, John J. A Commentary on the Book of Daniel. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1993. Collins, John J. Daniel: With an Introduction to Apocalyptic Literature. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1984. Collins, John J. The Oxford Handbook of Apocalyptic Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Hallo, William W., and K. Lawson Younger Jr. The Context of Scripture. 3 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1997. Hanson, Paul D. “Apocalyptic Literature.” In Douglas A. Knight and Gene M. Tucker, eds. The Hebrew Bible and Its Modern Interpreters. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985. Hesiod. Works and Days. Translated by M. L. West. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Lichtheim, Miriam. Ancient Egyptian Literature. 3 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975–1980. Pritchard, James B., ed. Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969. Russell, D. J. The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964. Sandy, D. Brent, and Martin G. Abegg Jr. “Apocalyptic.” In Cracking Old Testament Codes. Nashville: B&H, 1995.

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Apocalypticism and War, Christian Apocalpyticism is religious belief in the cataclysmic and catastrophic end of the world and human history on earth through human and divine means in accordance with divine revelation and the will of God. It has often been assumed to be part of warfare and frequently is portrayed in literature and art in conjunction with it. In Christian theology it is also associated with the belief in the return of Jesus Christ to the earth at the end of time, known as the “Second Coming.” The return was often understood to be to the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem, and therefore the city and site of Jerusalem held specific appeal and significance, something especially true during the era of the crusades. The term “apocalypse” is the English transliteration of the Greek word apokalupsis, which is the ancient title for the last book of the New Testament, the Apocalypse (Revelation) of St. John, written at the end of the first century of the Common Era. “He will come again to judge the living and the dead.” Throughout the centuries faithful Christians have pronounced these words and proclaimed this belief as found in the Apostles’ Creed and a score of other creeds of Christianity. Belief in the physical return of Jesus Christ to the earth is the historic and biblical position of Christianity throughout the ages. The belief is grounded in interpretation of various passages of the Bible, such as Acts 1:6–11. For many Christians and biblical interpreters throughout the history of Christianity, the return of Jesus has been understood to be a physical bodily return. War is also understood to be part of the scenario surrounding the return of Jesus. In Christian theology, from passages such as Matthew 24:6 and Mark 13:7, war is understood as being something that occurs for long periods of time before the return of Jesus. In these verses are the words: “You will hear of wars and rumors of wars, but see to it that you are not alarmed. Such things must happen, but the end is still to come” (Matthew 24:6, New International Version) and “When you hear of wars and rumors of wars, do not be alarmed. Such things must happen, but the end is still to come” (Mark 13:7, New International Version). However, there is also understood to be a specific war, known as the battle of Armageddon, that occurs just prior

to and immediately after the return of Jesus. According to Revelation 16:16, Armageddon is the site where the armies of the final war will gather. The actual fighting of the prophetic battle is then understood to be in and around Jerusalem. It will be on the plain of Esdraelon, around the hill of Megiddo. John writes in Revelation 16:16,“Then they gathered the kings together to the place that in Hebrew is called Armageddon” (New International Version). This area is located in northern Israel about 20 miles south-southeast of Haifa and 50 miles north of Jerusalem. The area was the scene of many battles in Israelite history during the era of the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament). Judges 4 records it as the area of Barak’s conflict with the Canaanites, and it was the area of Gideon’s battle with the Midianites recorded in Judges 7. According to this view, biblical passages supporting such a war include Daniel 11:40–45; Joel 3:9–17; Zechariah 14:1–3; and Revelation 16:14–16. In this ultimate battle between forces of good and evil, Jesus is understood as being victorious and after his victory, inaugurating a 1,000year kingdom on earth known as the millennial kingdom. The imagery of the great battle of Armageddon and the belief in such an actual battle has been depicted in Christian art and literature throughout the centuries and has often been used either as symbolic descriptions of wars or as the actual fulfillment of the prophetic passages such that the conflict itself is believed to be either the prophetic precursor or the prophetic fulfillment of the battle of Armageddon. For some Christians at the time, the First Crusade (1096–1099) was thought to be Armageddon. While proponents find biblical passages supporting this concept throughout the Bible, the Book of Revelation is a major text that is interpreted as prophesying war with respect to this event. Also part of the apocalyptic belief for many Christians has been belief in a prophetic figure called the Antichrist depicted in biblical passages such as Daniel chapters 7–9 (especially 7:8, 24–27 and 9:26–27) and Revelation chapters 10–13, (especially 13:1–10). He is also mentioned in 2 Thessalonians 2:3–4, 8 and 1 John 2:18. The history of Christianity has brought forth many attempts to identify, label, and describe the Antichrist. Much of this, though finding its source in the biblical text, has diverged significantly from

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the Bible in attempts to identify this prophetic figure with current events surrounding the interpreters of the prophecies. The zeal and discussions about the Antichrist in history (e.g., Nero, the pope, Roman Catholicism, Hitler) has been erroneous but has fueled religious passions that tied apocalypticism to war. Throughout history many leaders, both secular and ecclesiastical, have been called the Antichrist. No single group, faction, denomination, or individual has had the monopoly on rhetoric regarding the Antichrist. Teachings regarding his true and false existence have cut across all of Christendom’s boundaries. Anxious to apply prophecy to their own age or to stress their own trials and persecutions, false and often fantastic identifications of the Antichrist have been made by students of prophecy. Every century since Christ has witnessed Christians expressing misplaced but fervent identifications of and speculations about this figure. The Book of Revelation is filled with the language and imagery of the genre of apocalypticism. It is not the only book of the Bible to contain prophecy, but it is the one that has received the most attention (along with Daniel, Isaiah, and Ezekiel) throughout history. Prophetic interpretation in Christian writing and theology differs from earlier Jewish and later Islamic methods of interpretation, although it shares some of the same themes. Different schools of thought and frameworks with regard to how to best interpret prophecy arose within Christianity throughout the centuries. Various interpretive systems of biblical prophecy and its relationship to human events and history were applied to biblical passages and current events in efforts to understand the present and future and to give religious significance to momentous happenings such as natural disasters, plagues, tumultuous political events, and wars. Some interpreters used current events as theological signposts pointing to what they believed would be milestones on the way to the return of Jesus, and other interpreters used specific dates as either markers or deadlines for which they tried to pinpoint the exact time of the return of Jesus. One of the most popular passages from Revelation that is used with respect to war is Revelation 6:3–4: “When the Lamb opened the second seal, I heard the second living creature say, ‘Come and see!’ Then another horse came out, a fiery red one. Its rider was given power to take peace from the earth and to make men slay each other. To him

was given a large sword” (New International Version). These verses speak of one of four divine judgments of Revelation 6:1–8. Each judgment is depicted as a rider on various colored horses (sometimes called Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse). With respect to the judgment of war, the rider is on a red horse and many interpreters understand the passage to be a parallel of Matthew 24:6–7. Noted earlier, the First Crusade was one of several events in Western history that generated speculation about and anticipation of an apocalyptic ending of human history. Apocalyptic language permeates the French and German chronicles of the crusade, and many participants reported accompanying visions, dreams, and miracles, further heightening the spiritual expectations of the crusaders. One example of a person preaching apocalypticism and the crusade was Peter the Hermit (ca. 1050–1115). During the crusades, often coupled with Christian apocalyptic fervor was anti-Semitism and pogroms fueled by rumors of Jewish and Islamic collusion against Christians. One example of this was the sacking of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in 1009, 90 years before the First Crusade, by followers of al-Hakim bi Amr Allah, the caliph of Egypt who controlled Jerusalem at the time. When news of the desecration of the church reached France, Christians there rose up in anger against the French Jewish population, slaughtering many. A second era of apocalyptic speculation with respect to war was during the 16th century and Protestant Reformation. One very popular image from about 1497 or 1498 (20 years before the beginning of the Reformation in 1517) was the woodcut by Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528) titled Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. In this image of the apocalyptic harbinger of war, the warrior horseman representing the “Red Horse” from Revelation 6:3–4 is wearing Turkish-inspired headgear representing the threat of the Ottoman Empire but wielding a European-style sword as if a precursor of coming European conflict during the 16th and 17th centuries. For many Protestants the apocalyptic threat fluctuated between the Islamic Ottoman Turks and the Roman Catholic Church and papacy wherein the pope was portrayed as the Antichrist. At various times, the victories of Ottoman armies and potential victories such as the 1527 siege of Vienna generated prophetic speculation by European Christians that the end of the age might be near.

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The coupling of war and Islam in apocalypticism is a theme that recurred in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In addition to Christians seeing the fulfillment of prophecy in conflicts with Islam, some Christians also saw their own persecution by other Christians as apocalyptic. Such was the case of early Anabaptist leader Thomas Müntzer (ca. 1489–1525) and the Münster Rebellion (1534–1535). Wherever and whenever there was persecution, there was a tendency to use apocalyptic rhetoric or believe in the actual fulfillment of Bible prophecies. Apocalyptic speculation was not limited to the European continent. During the period of the Interregnum (1649–1660) in England there was considerable prophetic speculation, as there had been earlier during the English Civil Wars (1642–1651). Much of this centered on the Fifth Monarchists, Christians who believed on the basis of their interpretation of Daniel 2 that four great empires had come and gone in world history and that a final fifth empire or monarchy led by Jesus Christ was imminent. Their ideas spread as far as the colonies of New England. The turmoil of the secular French Revolution (1789– 1799) caused some English interpreters of prophecy to see in it and the rise of Napoleon and subsequent Napoleonic wars images and possibilities of the end of the world. One such example was the best-selling book by Thomas Bicheno, The Signs of the Times (1792–1794). In the 20th century, especially in the aftermath of the advent of nuclear weapons and during the Cold War, images of fears of apocalypticism were prominent in religious and secular segments of the American population. Coupled with conflict in the Middle East, especially after the Six-Day War (1967), there was renewed speculation within elements of conservative American Christianity of events in the Middle East inaugurating the end times. Apocalypticism and war has been a recurring theme in Western history. Its rhetoric, art, symbolism, and imagery have influenced numerous individuals and generations of Christians, providing a unique interpretation of current events and the tragedy and trauma of war. Timothy J. Demy See also Anti-Semitism; Apocalypticism and War, Jewish; Apocalypticism and War, Muslim; Fifth Monarchists; Münster Rebellion

Further Reading Cunningham, Andrew, and Ole Peter Grell. The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and Death in Reformation Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Ice, Thomas, and Timothy J. Demy. Fast Facts on Bible Prophecy: From A to Z. Eugene, OR: Harvest House, 1997. Maclear, J. F. “New England and the Fifth Monarchy: The Quest for the Millennium in Early American Puritanism.” William and Mary Quarterly 32, no. 2 (1975): 223–60. McGinn, Bernard. Antichrist: Two Thousand Years of the Human Fascination with Evil. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1994. McGinn, Bernard. Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. Rubenstein, Jay. Armies of Heaven: The First Crusade and the Quest for Apocalypse. New York: Basic Books, 2011. Whalen, Brett Edward. Dominion of God: Christendom and Apocalypse in the Middle Ages. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Apocalypticism and War, Jewish Apocalypticism is commonly defined as an eschatological religious ideology. Within Jewish thought, apocalypticism envisions human history culminating in the cataclysmic divinely initiated change from the chaos and suffering of the present age to the divinely ordered age to come. This changing of the ages is marked by a cosmic divine judgment and the overturning of the present order of civilization. The term “apocalypticism” derives from the Greek word apokalupsis meaning “revelation.” The inconsistent use of the term “apocalyptic,” however, has complicated the scholarly conversation on the subject. Generally, the term “apocalypticism” signifies the ideological movement, with “apocalypse” designating the literature of this movement and “apocalyptic” adjectively associating traits, characteristics, and other subjects with such literature and movements. Although many scholars avoid associating apocalypticism with inherently violent/revolutionary ideology, early Jewish apocalypticism developed in correspondence with two formative periods of Jewish military conflict, and further grew to envision a final cosmic battle through which God would defeat the enemies of the Jewish people and establish his eternal kingdom.

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Jewish apocalypticism and the early apocalyptic literature through which it is studied originated in late Second Temple Judaism during the third and second centuries BCE. Earlier Hebrew prophetic and wisdom traditions as well as the broader ancient Near Eastern mythological depiction of a battle between chaos and divine order provide ideological and literary precursors to Jewish apocalypticism. Apocalypticism shares several characteristics with earlier Hebrew prophetic traditions, such as the use of symbolism, visions, cosmic judgment, and in the case of Zechariah, even the presence of an angelic companion. Jewish apocalypticism, however, is distinguishable from earlier Hebrew prophetic traditions by its division of history into epochs, heightened expectation of the cosmic upheaval and divine judgment, as well as the use of resurrection from the dead for postmortem rewards and punishments. Second Temple–era (503 BCE to 70 CE) Jewish apocalypses are commonly divided into two categories. The “historical” apocalypse offers an overview of the course of human history unveiling the divine plan to inaugurate the Kingdom of God. The “otherworldly journey” apocalypse depicts a tour of the spiritual or heavenly realm, often with the accompaniment of an angelic guide. The biblical book of Daniel is the only apocalypse of the canonical Hebrew scriptures (although some scholars argue texts such as Isaiah 24–27 and parts of Zechariah are early apocalyptic, or proto-apocalyptic), and a prime example of the “historical” apocalypse category. Daniel 7–12 recounts a series of visions and interpretive reflections concerning the course of human history. Daniel 7–8, for example, presents two visions representing the rise and fall of human empires throughout history. Each vision culminates with a foreign ruler blaspheming God and persecuting the Jewish people, prompting divine intervention and cosmic judgment through which foreigners are stripped of their power and the eternal kingdom of God is established. The various articulations of this historical paradigm reveal an awareness of the struggle between the Seleucid and the Ptolemaic kingdoms during the third and second centuries BCE. Scholars commonly identify the climactic act of blasphemy and persecution with Antiochus Epiphanes’s desecration of the Jewish temple and abolition of Jewish cultic

practices (168–164 BCE). For this reason, the book of Daniel is considered by many to be pseudonymously credited to Daniel, as a hero of the faith, who “predicted” the coming periods of suffering to impart assurance of an imminent divine deliverance for the Jewish people. Scholarship, therefore, commonly reads the book of Daniel against the backdrop of the Maccabean revolt (167–160 BCE). The Jewish priest Mattathias and later his son Judas Maccabeus led the Maccabean revolt to overthrow their Seleucid oppressors and purify the desecrated Jerusalem temple, an act that is remembered today in the Jewish celebration of Hanukkah (see 1 and 2 Maccabees). These victories led to the establishment of Jewish rule of Jerusalem and the surrounding Jewish territory under the Hasmonean dynasty. Both the Maccabean revolt and Jewish apocalypticism emerged in response to the same period of intense foreign oppression, providing hope for an immanent divine deliverance and establishment of a Jewish kingdom. Although both movements provided a common message of hope to the same historical situation, the presence of some ideological differences complicate identifying the nature of a historical relationship between Jewish apocalypticism and the Maccabean revolt. Early Jewish apocalypticism, for example, relied upon divine agency for deliverance and the establishment of the kingdom, whereas texts pertaining to the Maccabean revolt place greater emphasis on human agency. The book of 1 Enoch contains an additional series of Second Temple Jewish apocalypses. 1 Enoch is pseudonymously credited to the antediluvian character Enoch (Genesis 5:21–24) who “predicts” the course of human history with special attention to the Hellenistic era. Dated to the second century BCE, the “Animal Apocalypse” of 1 Enoch 83–90 portrays a similar historical paradigm as the book of Daniel. The “Apocalypse of Weeks” in 1 Enoch 93:1–10; 91:11–17 divides history into temporal periods of “weeks” (cf. Daniel 9), which culminate in cosmic judgment and the establishment of the new heavens. The third-century BCE “Book of Watchers” in 1 Enoch 1–36 represents an “otherworldly journey” apocalypse in which Enoch tours the heavenly and earthly realms. Unlike the “historical” apocalypses, the “Book of Watchers” does not presuppose a historical setting of persecution, but

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rather explores the origins of sin and evil by presenting the Watchers as fallen angels associated with the antediluvian “sons of God” from Genesis 6:1–4 who spread various forms of evil across the earth. Although the collection of Second Temple Jewish apocalyptic literature is small (see also the Sibylline Oracles and the Christian edited Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs), the Dead Sea Scrolls provide significant evidence of the spread of prerabbinic apocalypticism. The Dead Sea Scrolls were composed in the late Second Temple period and collected at Qumran by a sectarian Jewish community prior to the Roman destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE. The discovery of the scrolls revealed multiple copies of apocalypses such as the books of Daniel and 1 Enoch, along with additional texts reflecting apocalyptic themes in the form of hymns, community rules, and commentary on biblical texts. The Dead Sea Scrolls reveal that the Qumran community divided history into distinct epochs, which would culminate in an immanent final judgment leading to postmortem punishment and rewards. The War Scroll especially reveals the relationship between apocalyptic ideology and warfare at Qumran. The scroll depicts a final battle between the “Children of Light” led by the angel Michael and the “Children of Darkness” led by Belial. The scroll expands the apocalyptic emphasis on divine action in the final battle to allow for human participation in the final victory. The scroll, therefore, depicts divinely commanded military maneuvers, cultic and purity instructions, along with liturgical recitations for the human agents participating in the war. Some scholars propose that this apocalyptic anticipation of a final war may have influenced the Qumran sect’s participation in the Jewish revolt against Rome that led to the 70 CE destructions of Jerusalem and the Qumran community. A small series of apocalyptic writings emerged in the wake of the Roman destruction of Jerusalem, such as 3 Baruch in which Baruch is encouraged through an otherworldly journey not to worry about the fate of Jerusalem but rather to consider the mysteries of God. The apocalyptic fervor of texts such as the War Scroll, however, is noticeably absent from later postdestruction rabbinic traditions. The Mishnah and Talmud make use of select themes from earlier apocalyptic texts, and the “otherworldly journey” theme was largely reappropriated for Jewish mystical writ-

ings (e.g., Sefer Heikhalot), but the apocalyptic genre largely fell dormant. The 7th through 10th centuries CE witnessed a revival of Hebrew apocalyptic literature reflecting messianic themes. In the seventh-century CE Book of Zerubbabel, for example, the Persian-appointed governor over postexilic Judea known from the canonical Hebrew scriptures is taken by the angel Michael to Rome where he meets the coming Messiah. Zerubbabel observes the events leading to the “End of Days,” the revelation of the Messiah, and his defeat of the Roman ruler and persecutor of the Jewish people. The Book of Zerubbabel inspired subsequent medieval Jewish apocalypses concerned with the messianic kingdom and the requisite precursory military conflicts. The rise of medieval Jewish apocalyptic thinking, however, was not universally accepted. Moses Maimonides (ca. 1135–1204 CE), for example, opposed the belief in a cosmic upheaval producing a messianic age significantly different from the present natural order. The rise of medieval Jewish apocalyptic imagination was occasionally accompanied by isolated messianic movements. Shabbatean apocalypses, for example, were written during the 17th century identifying Shabbetai Z.evi (1626–1676 CE) as the messiah. Such movements often responded to renewed periods of social upheaval and Jewish persecution (e.g., the Arab expansion and the crusades) with apocalyptic warfare rhetoric, which occasionally led to armed conflict. Nicholas R. Werse See also Apocalypticism and War, Christian; Apocalypticism and War, Muslim; Maccabean Revolt Further Reading Collins, John J. Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls. London: Routledge, 1997. Collins, John J. The Apocalyptic Imagination. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998. Davies, Philip R. “The Biblical and Qumranic Concept of War.” In James H. Charlesworth, ed. The Bible and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Volume One, Scripture and the Scrolls. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006, pp. 209–32. Gruenwald, Ithamar. Apocalyptic and Merkavah Mysticism. Leiden: Brill, 1980. Sacchi, Paolo. Jewish Apocalyptic and Its History. London: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996.

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Apocalypticism and War, Muslim In Islamic writings the term apocalypse most commonly refers to a scenario for the tumultuous time leading up to the Day of Judgment. Islamic conceptions of apocalypse share many symbols and concepts with Judaism and Christianity, such as an Antichrist (al Dajjal), massive destructive battles, and a God-chosen leader to right wrongs before the end. In this respect, Islamic apocalyptic material builds on, expands, and converts the corpus of prophetic material. For Muslims, the most authoritative source for a study of the end of the world is the Qur’an, the holy book of Islam, followed closely by the Sunna, the example of the life of Muhammad as compiled through hadith collections, and the Sirah, biographies. The Book of Dissensions and Portents of the Hour in Abu Muslim’s hadith collection devotes 143 hadith to the last days of the world. Though the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, it is important to differentiate the eschatological from the apocalyptic in Islamic writings; the eschatological is mainly the domain of the Qur’an itself, in passages that deal with humanity’s fate at the Day of Judgment (Surahs 5 and 17), and the apocalyptic arises from the hadith that are concerned with events leading up to, though not including, the end. Many scholars see Islam as being an apocalyptic movement from its establishment, as evidenced by references to Muhammad as a “warner” (Surah 7:188, 11:12, 22:49, etc.) before the impending Day of Judgment. The Qur’an and the hadith warn that the world’s end is imminent, and with the sense of foreboding that that engenders, many Muslims have been moved to action, sometimes militarily, throughout Islamic history. Apocalyptic movements have historically emerged under charismatic leaders, as stimulated by their particular circumstances, primarily into one of two forms: a separatist, quietist form, or a militant activism bent on restructuring society to hasten the final event. It must be emphasized that most of these militant groups were more concerned with the reformation of the Islamic community (umma) than in revolution; a move back to a more authentic religion, instead of a change of direction into new ways of thinking and acting. Apocalyptic movements are typi-

cally a move to replicate the perceived ideal period at the origin of the religion.

Important Characters in Muslim Apocalyptic Thought

There are six primary actors are on the Muslim apocalyptic stage: 1. The Mahdi: The ultimate messianic figure in Islam is the Mahdi (Divinely Guided One). In Islamic eschatology the Mahdi is a political/religious/military leader, the deliverer who will establish justice and righteousness throughout the world through the agency of a restored caliphate, restore the true religion (Islam), and usher in a golden age before the end of the world. The Mahdi is not directly mentioned in the Qur’an, but he is mentioned in a number of hadith. 2. Isa, the Islamic Jesus: In the Qur’an he is referred to as the “Word of Allah.” He was born of a virgin and performed miracles (with Allah’s permission, not of his own power). According to Muslim understanding of the Qur’an, Isa was not crucified, but was taken directly up to paradise, where he waits to be called back to Jerusalem to kill the Dajjal, and to assist the Mahdi at the end of the age. 3. Al-Dajjal: “The Deceiver” is the closest Islamic parallel to the Christian Antichrist. The Dajjal is a leader who performs false miracles to mislead people into following him. He will be recognizable to true Muslims by his blind right eye, and he has Kafir (Unbeliever) written between his eyes. 4. The Beast of the Earth (al Dabbah): The Beast appears in the Qur’an (27:82) and in the hadith that develops and expands upon the verse. The Qur’an mentions that the Beast will address the unbelievers and admonish them for their lack of devotion to Allah. The Beast is revealed to have the staff of Moses with which he will mark unbelievers with the saying “He is destined for hell,” and he will carry the seal of Solomon with which he will mark upon the face of the believer “He is destined for paradise.”

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5. The people group known as in the Bible as Gog and Magog (Yajuj wa-Majuj): They are mentioned in the Qur’an in two places (18:94 and 21:96) and in several hadith. They are groups descended from Japheth (Surah 18:94, 21:96) that act as an unconstrained killing force, attempting to destroy all of humanity. 6. The Sufyani: An evil leader based in Damascus, he will lead his army to battle the Mahdi. According to the hadith, the Sufyani descends from Abu Sufyan, an early opponent of Muhammad. The Mahdi’s army will defeat the Sufyani and his followers. Fewer commentators mention the Sufyani.

Portents of the End Times

Generally, the portents that augur the end of the world are divided into the minor and major signs. The minor signs will predominantly appear before the greater signs, though there is some intermingling of events. The minor signs include a decline of (Islamic) knowledge, an increase in drinking alcohol, and a number of massive earthquakes. The scholars have listed almost 60 signs, some of which will coincide with the major signs. According to most contemporary authors, the minor signs have been fulfilled. The second group is the “Greater Signs of the Hour,” which are events that must occur before the end of the world. The primary events in this sequence are the appearances of the Mahdi and the Dajjal. Other major signs are the arrival of the Beast, the rising of the sun in the west, the descent of Jesus, the terror of Gog and Magog, and three landslides: one in the east, one in the west, and one in the Arabian Peninsula. Finally, a fire will emerge from Yemen. Some Islamic commentators consider the Mahdi, Jesus, and the Dajjal the major signs, and all the others lumped together the minor signs.

The Islamic End Time Narrative

The major signs of the Day of Judgment provide the sequence of events for Islamic awareness of the times of the apocalypse. First, the Sufyani will arise in Damascus and build a powerful army that brutally puts down any resistance. As the Sufyani grows in power and his kingdom begins to expand eastward, an army will arise in Khorasan, in the eastern part of modern Iran. The army from Khorasan

will carry black flags, signifying a devotion to jihad in the path of Allah, and engage in a terrible battle with the army of the Sufyani. Next there will be rumors of the arrival of the Mahdi in Mecca. While traveling to Mecca to kill the Mahdi, the Sufyani’s army will be swallowed up in the desert. The Mahdi will be given perfect Islamic knowledge in a single day, and Muslims from around the world, including the Army of the Black Flags, will rush to swear allegiance to him at the Kaaba. The deceived Muslims under the leadership of Sufyani will enter Jerusalem and kill half of the Jews in Israel, fulfilling the prophecy in the Qur’an (17:4–8). After the Mahdi defeats and kills the Sufyani, he and his army will enter Palestine and kill the rest of the Jews, fulfilling the hadith recorded by al-Bukhari which reads: “The stones and the trees will speak, and everything behind which a Jew is hiding will speak, and say, ‘O ‘Abdallah [Servant of God], there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.’” The Dajjal will join together with the Byzantines (usually seen as a type of western Christianity) to fight the Mahdi. Then the Beast will crawl out of the earth, followed by Gog and Magog, who will break through the wall that protects the world from them, running amok in the world. Allah will enable the Mahdi to defeat the Byzantine army and conquer all of Europe. The Dajjal, enraged at this turn of events, will call together his vassals and counterfeit Muslims, and attack the true Muslims in Jerusalem. Jesus will descend from Paradise and lead the true Muslims, and in Jerusalem Jesus will kill the Dajjal. After fervent prayer from the Mahdi and Jesus, Allah will destroy the forces of Gog and Magog. Finally, the Mahdi will reestablish the caliphate with its capital in Jerusalem, ushering in a short golden age before the Day of Judgment. R. Don Deal See also Apocalypticism and War, Christian; Apocalypticism and War, Jewish; Islam and War (Jihad); Mahdi; Qur’an and War Further Reading Cook, David. Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature (Religion and Politics). New York: Syracuse University Press, 2008. Cook, David. “Muslim Apocalyptic and Jihad.” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 20 (1996): 66–104.

64  Aquinas, Thomas (1225–1274) Cook, David. Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 2002. Filiu, Jean-Pierre, and M. B. DeBevoise. Apocalypse in Islam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.

Aquinas, Thomas (1225–1274) Thomas Aquinas (Tommaso d’Aquino), Italian-born theologian, philosopher, and Dominican friar, was an influential figurehead of medieval scholasticism in the High Middle Ages. Having studied under Albertus Magnus (1193–1280) and taught in the University of Paris, Aquinas became a doctor of the Roman Catholic Church. Known for his comprehensive summas, such as the Summa Theologica and the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas synthesized Catholicism with systematic Aristotelian thought. During Aquinas’s time, just war theory reached a point of major synthesis within Catholic theology. Aquinas contributed to just war theory by arranging the insights from Ambrose of Milan (337–397) and Augustine of Hippo (354–430) into a systematic format using scholastic disputatio. However, Aquinas did not offer many concrete laws about the specifics of just war. This came later with late medieval theologians Francisco Di Vitoria (1486–1546) and Francisco Suarez (1548–1617), who developed Aquinas’s theories of just war. Aquinas primarily addresses war within the articles of Book II–II, Question 40, in the Summa Theologica. In Article One of Question 40, the most important article regarding this subject, Aquinas asks, “Whether it is always sinful to wage war?” According to Aquinas, just war depends on three conditions. First, “natural order” demands authority “to declare and counsel war”; therefore, only sovereign authority may wage war. Natural order can be defined as a participation in the “share of providence,” that is, the “mind of God,” which leads to a “natural inclination to its proper act and end” (I–II.91.2). In contrast, a private dissenter should not declare war nor rally soldiers. In a later article (II–II.41.1), Aquinas explains that private war between private persons is labeled “strife,” not “war”—and strife is always sinful because a public authority does not declare it. Thus, a just war lies outside of the private domain; it is the

Among the most important Italian theologians and scholasticist philosophers, Saint Thomas Aquinas has been credited with using philosophical teachings to explain Catholic theology. His seminal work, Summa Theologica, is one of the most influential works in medieval theology. (The J. Paul Getty Trust)

public duty of the sovereign power to protect the people since it is the authority’s natural providential order. Aquinas’s second condition of just war requires a just cause. The opponents should be attacked on account of some fault of their own. Aquinas’s third condition for a just war necessitates that the combatants should have a “rightful intention”—intending the advancement of good or avoidance of evil. Aquinas quotes Augustine, who posits that the motives of war should be “with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil doers, and of uplifting the good.” This is later substantiated in the Summa Theologica when Aquinas discusses fortitude (Book II–II, Question 123, Article 5); he asserts that just war is fought to ensure a country’s temporal peace.

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After establishing the conditions for a just war, Aquinas, in Question 40, Article 2, discusses the lawfulness of clerics and bishops fighting in war. Aquinas argues that people, even those without sin, who shed the blood of others, become irregular. Therefore, it is unlawful for clerics and bishops to engage in battle because they would shed the blood of others. He continues to clarify that clerics and bishops can participate in war, however, only to provide spiritual help to those who fight. Aquinas’s third and fourth articles within Question 40 address more specific dimensions. In his third article he examines the lawfulness “to lay ambushes in war.” Quoting Augustine, Aquinas echoes that it does not matter if ambushes or open battle tactics are used in a just war. Aquinas clarifies that ambushes cannot properly be called “deceptions” because ambushes in a just war are associated with “a well-ordered will.” The fourth article discusses the lawfulness of fighting on holy days. Aquinas simply writes that just as a physician can attend to his patients on holy days to ensure their safety and health, a just war can also be fought on holy days because it ensures the well-being of faithful human beings. In an additional article, Aquinas also briefly discusses the virtue of prudence in respect to war. In Book II–II, Question 50, Article 4, Aquinas examines the nature of military prudence. He explains that military prudence should be acted upon in war. Military actions should be enacted in accordance with “the art of reason,” “nature,” and ultimately “Divine Reason.” The virtue of fortitude subsumes the execution of military service; the virtue of prudence subsumes the direction of the war, especially in relation to the commander in chief. Ultimately, in the Summa Theologica, war is often not discussed outside of Question 40 (“On War”) and Question 41 (“On Strife”). For example, when punishment is later discussed in Aquinas’s treatise on justice (Book II–II, Questions 57–122), just war receives little attention. Moreover, Aquinas never specifically claims that just war is an act of charity. Instead, Aquinas’s just war is indirectly charitable, preserving the notion of concord—implying a reactive use of force to overthrow the opposite of concord, to depose the “sins against peace.” In other words, Aquinas’s just war is both a protective and restorative measure, exercised against serious violations of the peace. Additionally,

in Summa Contra Gentiles (Book III–II, Question 128), Aquinas states that peace is caused by charity and the role of justice is to “remove the obstacles to peace.” He further explains that justice can “come from within” by love or “from without” by force. Therefore, just war utilizes the interrelationship between charity, peace, and justice. Aquinas does not directly explore the pacifist outlook on war within the Summa Theologica. While he cites the scriptural passages that were often used by pacifists of the time, Aquinas does not quote Tertullian, Lactantius, or the other early Christian authors who had objected to war. Aquinas’s neglect of pacifism may relate to the numerous Catholic-endorsed crusades—specifically, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Crusades—that continued throughout his life. Gavin F. Hurley See also Augustine; Christianity and War; Just War Tradition Further Reading Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles: Book Three: Providence: Part I + II. Translated by Vernon J. Bourke. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991. Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica: Complete English Edition in Five Volumes. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1948. Cahill, Lisa S. Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism, and Just War Theory. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1994. Cole, Darrell. “Thomas Aquinas on Virtuous Warfare.” Journal of Religious Ethics 27, no. 1 (1999): 57–80. Massaro, Thomas, and Thomas A. Shannon. Catholic Perspectives on Peace and War. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Reichberg, Gregory M. “Thomas Aquinas Between Just War and Pacifism.” Journal of Religious Ethics 38, no. 2 (2010): 219–41.

Arab-Israeli War of 1948 The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 marked the end of two millennia of Jewish statelessness following the destruction of the Second Jewish Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE by the Romans and the onset of the Diaspora. The simmering Arab-Jewish conflict since the early 20th century, especially

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in the wake of the Balfour Declaration and the support of Great Britain for a Jewish national home in Palestine, transformed into a full-fledged war in May 1948. The immediate cause was the partition plan for Palestine adopted by the United Nations on November 29, 1947. Great Britain, which was given the Mandate over Palestine on July 24, 1922, by the League of Nations, was unable to reconcile its contradictory promises to the Arabs and Jews; while it offered the former support for an independent Arab kingdom, it pledged a homeland to the Jews. Unable to satisfy either of the parties and in the wake of the Second World War, which forced it to abandon overseas possessions and colonies, in April 1947 Britain handed over the Palestinian question to the UN. Upon the recommendations of the majority members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, the UN General Assembly voted to partition Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish states. Under the plan the city of Jerusalem, which has sites holy to the three monotheistic religions, namely, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and its environs including Bethlehem would be an international city. The Zionist leaders viewed the partition plan as an answer to centuries of Jewish suffering and accepted it, but Palestinians and neighboring Arab states viewed Palestine as an Islamic waqf land that cannot be shared or given away to non-Muslim control or sovereignty. Since November there had been large-scale violence in Palestine between Arab and Jewish forces. On the Sabbath eve of May 14, 1948, hours before the departure of the last British soldier, Zionist leaders met in the coastal town of Tel Aviv and declared the formation of the state of Israel, which was immediately recognized by President Harry S. Truman. On May 15, regular armies of Arab states neighboring Palestine—Egypt, the then Transjordan, Lebanon, and Syria—as well as troops from Iraq and volunteers from Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen, launched an invasion into the erstwhile Mandate territory. The first phase of the conflict, which lasted until June 11, the nascent state of Israel managed to survive, but it suffered numerous casualties and could not hold most of the areas allotted to it under the partition plan. The UN-sponsored truce came into force on June 11 and lasted until July 8, which enabled Israel to reorganize and reequip its forces and plan its military strategy. During this period, internal political divisions

and lack of military preparations on the Arab side became apparent. While others were opposed to the emergence of Israel, Emir Abdullah of Transjordan was not averse to coexistence with the Jewish state if that entailed certain territorial gains for the Hashemites. The political differences prevented any coordinated Arab politico-military strategy against Israel. Fighting resumed on July 8 and lasted for 10 days, during which Israel consolidated its territorial gains, repulsed Arab armies on all fronts, and vastly expanded areas under its control. The second UN-enforced trace came into force on July 18 and lasted until October 15, when Israel broke the truce. During this phase, the Israel Defense Force (which was formed on May 26, 1948) captured Negev, which was allotted to the Jewish state under a partition plan from Egypt, and established a foothold on the Gulf of Aqaba. On January 12, 1949, delegates from Israel and Egypt began armistice negotiations on the Greek island of Rhodes under UN auspices, and they were soon joined by other Arab countries. On February 24, Egypt became the first Arab country to sign an armistice agreement with Israel, and this was followed by Lebanon (March 23), Jordan (April 3), and Syria (July 20). In early February, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, whose troops took part in the 1948 war, informed the UN that armistice terms agreed upon by Arab neighbors of Palestine would be acceptable to them. The armistice agreement, which was supposed to be a first temporary step toward the resumption and conclusion of a peace agreement between Israel and its neighbors, did not happen. The armistice lines, later known as the Green Line, constituted Israel’s de facto borders with its neighbors. The city of Jerusalem, known as al-Quds in Arab and Islamic history, was different. The Hashemites, who lost control over Mecca and Medina to al-Saud in 1924–1925, sought the third holiest site in Islam, al-Aqsa mosque in the Harem al-Sharief/Temple Mount area of old Jerusalem. Its Arab Legion fought with Jewish forces for control over the old city and laid a siege that lasted until July 18, 1948, when the UN-mediated second ceasefire came into force. All the residents of the Jewish quarters were given a safe passage, and the old city came under Jordanian control while western parts of the city came under the control of the Jewish forces. This de facto division was formalized in the armistice agreement signed between Israel and Jordan

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on April 3, 1949. The old city, including the Western Wall, remained under Jordanian control until its capture by Israel on June 7 in the June War of 1967. During this period a number of historic synagogues located in the old city were destroyed and Jews, including non-Israeli citizens, were denied access to and prohibited from praying near the Western Wall. During the war, Israel suffered substantial casualties. More than 6,000 persons, including 1,500 civilians, were killed and another 3,000 were wounded. About 2,000 Arab soldiers were killed along with an unknown number of irregular forces and civilians. By the time the armistice agreement came into force in 1949, Israel controlled about 20,770 square kilometers (12,905 miles) of Mandate Palestine, and this was about 5,000 square kilometers more than the territory allotted to it by the UN partition plan. About 5,700 square kilometers of the eastern part of Palestine, or the West Bank, came under the control of and later annexation by Jordan, while the 360 square kilometer Gaza Strip came under Egyptian control. The war ended Jewish statelessness, but lack of foresight and Arab infighting prevented the formation of an independent Arab Palestinian state as visualized by the UN partition plan. The war also resulted in the mass exodus of Arab populations from erstwhile Mandate Palestine and witnessed the birth of the refugee problem. Both the Palestinian stateless and the refugee problem subsequently became core issues of the Arab-Jewish, Arab-Israeli, and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. P. R. Kumaraswamy See also Balfour Declaration; Islam and War (Jihad); Judaism and War; Primary Documents: UN Partition Plan for Palestine: UN Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine (November 29, 1947); Statement by the Arab League upon the Declaration of the State of Israel (May 15, 1948) Further Reading Karsh, Efraim. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The 1948 War. New York: Rosen Publishing Group, 2009. Morris, Benny. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009. Pappe, Illan. The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947–1951. London: I. B. Tauris, 1994. Shlaim, Avi, and Eugene L. Rogan. The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Arianism and War Arianism is the collective name for a range of Christological beliefs that were debated over the course of the fourth century, beginning with the Council of Nicaea (325 CE), and eventually decisively rejected by the mainstream Christian church in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed produced at the Council of Constantinople (381). The term “Catholic” is used in reference to the theology of the 381 creed, which became the official Christian theology of the church in the Roman Empire. The central theological issue in the Arian conflict was the status of Jesus Christ, the Son/Logos, in relation to God the Father, a longstanding question that took on new significance after the legalization of Christianity (313) transformed theological problems into matters of governmental concern, since the church was expected to play a vital role in public unity. Over the course of the dispute emperors took a range of positions; dissenting bishops were usually exiled; popular processions chanting opposing theological slogans sometimes came to blows. Scripture was cited by all parties. The term “Arianism” is taken from Arius, an Alexandrian presbyter, who objected to his bishop, Alexander’s, support for the divine unity and co-eternity of the Father and Son. Arius’s position, which had deep roots in earlier Christian theology, was that the Son was created by the Father first of all created things and was the instrument through whom the Father created all other things; the Son was not, however, of the same divine substance as the Father, lacked perfect knowledge of the Father, and was, at least in theory, susceptible to change. Crucial questions of monotheism, the distinction of persons, and salvation were at stake. Over decades of theological conflict, key terms debated for the Father-Son relationship ranged from homoousios (same substance—the term introduced at Nicaea and victoriously reaffirmed at Constantinople) to homoiousios (similar substance) to homoios (similar, but without reference to substance) to anomoios (unlike, meaning that the Father and Son, although united in will, were utterly unlike in substance). Although Arian theology was rejected at Constantinople in 381, the homoian (similar) form of Arianism remained for several centuries the official Christianity of a

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multitude of barbarian Germanic peoples (the so-called “ethnic Arians”) who had first encountered Christianity in this theological form through the ministry of Ulfilas (ca. 311–383). Ulfilas was a Cappadocian Greek who spent all or most of his life among the Goths (his parents were part of a large group of Greeks captured in a raid by Goths). Ulfilas was converted to Arian Christianity and began converting others, was made bishop of the Goths by Eusebius of Nicomedia (341) while Emperor Constantius supported Arianism, created the Gothic alphabet, and translated almost the entire Bible into the Gothic language. According to Philostorgius, the fifth-century Arian historian, Ulfilas decided to exclude the Old Testament books of Kings on the grounds that the warrior Goths should be taught more peaceful attitudes rather than be given biblical books that glorify warfare. Of course, it was precisely because of the military prowess of the Germanic peoples (Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Lombards, Vandals, and Burgundians), first as settlers and mercenaries of the Roman Empire in the East and West and later as rulers of Barbarian kingdoms in the former Western Empire, that Arian Christianity continued to play a major role in military and political history of the period. These Germanic peoples had begun to press on the northeastern borders of the Roman Empire as a result of the territorial expansion of the Huns further to the east. Some were converted to Arian Christianity while outside the empire, others after entering the empire as settlers, mercenaries, or invaders and conquerors. They considered their form of Christianity to be the true Christian faith and a key part of their identity as a people, often referring to Catholic Christianity as the “Roman church.” Relations between Catholic Christians and Arian Christians where both were present ranged from mutual toleration to hostility. The famous basilica confrontation between Catholic bishop Ambrose of Milan and Arian empress Justina (385 or 386) was caused by the empress’s demand that one of Milan’s basilicas be made available as a place of worship for Arian Christians, especially Arian troops. In this case, the Arian faction finally had to back down. Usually, however, the need to provide for the religious life of Arian troops, often through a church outside the walls of a city, continued to be recognized, however reluctantly by the more theologically zealous, as a necessity in a period in

which an emperor’s tenure on the throne depended on continued military support from mercenaries. The reality of shared Christianity, even of opposing types, could also sometimes moderate violence. The sack of Rome in 410 (the catalyst for Augustine’s monumental City of God) was carried out by an aggrieved Visigothic mercenary army led by Alaric. The Arian Christian Visi­ goths spared Catholic churches and the Roman civilians who took sanctuary in the churches. The role of Christianity in saving lives during the sack was recognized at the time. As the Western Roman Empire disintegrated in the fifth century, Arian rulers established Barbarian kingdoms in Gaul, Italy, Spain, and North Africa. As a pragmatic measure (the invaders were numerically in the minority), the Catholic Christian segment of the existing population was allowed to continue to practice its form of Christianity, while the Arian invaders practiced theirs. Sometimes, however, persecutions broke out. Gregory of Tours describes sporadic persecution by the Vandals in fifth-century Spain, including executions and forced rebaptisms. The most extreme example (tortures described in lurid detail in Victor of Vita’s history) was probably the Vandal persecution of Catholic Christians in North Africa under Huneric (r. 477–484). The persecution was apparently triggered by Huneric’s anger at the new Catholic bishop of Carthage’s allowing persons in Vandal ethnic dress to attend Catholic worship; the Vandal king probably interpreted this as the first step in a program of Catholic conversion of the Vandals. The conversion of Clovis, king of the Franks (one of the most important barbarian kingdoms), from Germanic paganism to Catholic Christianity in 496 marked the beginning of the turn toward the decline of Arian Christianity. For various political and military reasons including the temporary but crucial Byzantine reconquest of North Africa and Italy in the sixth century under anti-Arian emperor Justinian, the increasing need of Arian kings for the support of their Catholic subjects (especially the bishops), the increasing adoption of Roman culture by the Germanic ruling class, the conversion of pagan Germanic peoples such as the Anglo-Saxons to Catholic Christianity (pioneered by Pope Gregory, who held office from 590 to 604), and dynastic marriages with Catholic princesses, the Arian

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Germanic leaders gradually accepted Catholic Christianity for themselves and their people. At the Third Council of Toledo (589), Reccared, the Visigothic king of Spain, announced his conversion. The Lombards abandoned Arian Christianity in 671. By the early 700s, there were no more Arian kings. Unity in a single Catholic Church was now a major component of the emerging early medieval European identity and order, dramatically manifested in the Christmas Day coronation by Pope Leo III of Charlemagne, king of the Franks, as the first Holy Roman Emperor. The early medieval emphasis on Christ as a divine warrior-king may be related to the Catholic theological need to stress the full divinity of the Son in a way that would appeal to a warrior culture. During the campaign against Arianism in the West, the filioque (“and from the Son”) clause, stating that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son, was created and inserted into the Western version of the NicenoConstantinopolitan Creed, probably first in sixth-century Spain with the intention of further emphasizing the equality in divinity of Father and Son. This change to the creed, however, was rejected by Eastern Christians on theological and jurisdictional grounds and contributed to the still-unhealed break between Western and Eastern Christianity. Nancy Weatherwax See also Augustine; Charlemagne’s Conquests Further Reading Ayres, Lewis. Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to FourthCentury Trinitarian Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Gregg, Robert C., and Dennis E. Groh. Early Arianism: A View of Salvation. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981. Gregory of Tours. The History of the Franks. Translated by Lewis Thorpe. New York: Penguin Books, 1974. Hilgarth, J. N. Christianity and Paganism, 350–750: The Conversion of Western Europe. Rev. ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985. (Contains many primary sources on “ethnic Arianism.”) Philostorgius. Church History. Translated by Philip R. Amidon. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007. Victor of Vita. History of the Vandal Persecution. Translated by John Moorhead. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1992.

Armenian Massacres Armenians claim that they are descended from Hyak, a grandson of the biblical Noah. For more than 3,000 years their homeland has been the region around Lake Van and Mount Ararat. Their greatest political empire was under Tigranes the Great in the first century BCE. His empire stretched from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean. In the fourth century CE, Armenia became the first nation to convert to Christianity. The Armenian Orthodox Church was instrumental in helping Armenians survive centuries of Turkish rule. In the 1870s, nationalistic movements in the Ottoman Empire stirred Armenians to press for greater rights. In response, the Turks repressed them in various ways, including using the Kurds as surrogates to harass the Armenians through violent means. Prior to the First World War, territorial advancement of the Russian Empire had led to the creation of a Russian Armenia. During the war, the Russian government recruited thousands of Armenians to join the army and fight against the Ottoman Empire. In 1914, there were perhaps 2 million Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. In 1915, leaders in Constantinople, notably Interior Minister Mehmet Tâlat Pasha, Minister of War Enver Pasha, and Minister of the Navy Djemal Pasha, decided that the Armenians were a threat to Turkey and needed to be eliminated. The Turkish ruling triumvirate found a pretext for the massacre in the claim that the Armenians were openly supporting the Russians. The Turkish government planned to proceed in stages. First, they would kill the chief Armenian leaders. The Turks would then disarm Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman army and place them in labor battalions on the railroads, where they might be killed off in small groups. The Turks would then move against outlying Armenian villages, endeavoring to kill all their inhabitants. Finally, the cities would be emptied of their Armenian populations. The Turks planned to kill many of the men and teenaged boys. Those who remained, chiefly women and children, would be sent on forced marches to the eastern desert areas. Worn down by exhaustion and starvation, only a minority were expected to survive. On the night of April 23, 1915, a coordinated Turkish government operation led to the arrest of hundreds of Armenian leaders. Many were executed or soon died in

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confinement. A few were saved by the intervention of U.S. ambassador Henry Morgenthau and others. As further punishment for “supporting the Russians,” the triumvirate ordered local authorities forcibly to relocate Armenians in Anatolia to Aleppo and then to remote mountainous or desert locations in the Mesopotamian desert such as Deir es Zôr on the Euphrates River. These “relocations” were actually extermination marches during which most of the Armenians were murdered, beaten, and raped by Kurds or vengeful Turks. Estimates of the number of Armenians who died from violence, starvation, or disease as a result of this policy range from between 600,000 and 1.5 million people. In some locations, Armenians resisted the removals. At Musa Dagh (Mount Moses) on the Mediterranean Sea near Antioch and the Orontes River in the late summer of 1915, Armenians held out against the Ottoman army for 50 days. More than 3,000 Armenians in this location were eventually rescued by the French navy. With evidence of the massacre widespread, the German and Austrian embassies warned Turkish authorities that this policy would provide the Allied Powers with strong propaganda material. When the Turks rejected the appeals, however, Berlin and Vienna took no further action for fear of alienating their ally. Indeed, the plight of the Armenian people became a powerful propaganda tool for the Allied side. Secret negotiations between Djemal Pasha and the Allies from December 1915 until March 1916 that might have ended the massacre came to naught, largely because of French and British desire to secure territory in the Middle East at Turkish expense. The March 3, 1918, Treaty of Brest Litovsk ended fighting between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, but the region remained in flux. A Transcaucasian Federative Republic of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia soon collapsed. The Turks recovered Erzincan, Erzurum, Kars, and Alexandropol to reach their 1914 border in the spring of 1918 and then attempted to drive eastward to establish a link with historic Turkistan and the Turkic peoples beyond the Caspian Sea. They were halted on May 23, 1918, in the Battle of Sardarapat, and on May 28, 1918, an Armenian Republic was declared in Tiflis by the Armenian National Council. The Treaty of Batum of June 4, 1918, ended hostilities between Armenia and Turkey.

Following the Paris Peace Conference, on August 10, 1920, the Allied Powers signed the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey. It recognized an independent Armenia with boundaries to be submitted to the U.S. president for arbitration. On November 22, 1920, the Wilson administration drew the border between Turkey and Armenia from the Black Sea to include the areas of Trebizond, Erzincan, Bitlis, Van, and all of Lake Van including the land to the south for about 25 miles, and then eastward to the Persian border. Turkish leader Kemal Atatürk rejected this provision of the treaty and mounted an operation that drove the Armenians eastward. On December 2, 1920, following the Turkish military victory, the Armenians were forced to accept the terms of the Treaty of Alexandropol, which effectively placed the border at approximately the present border. Shortly afterward, Armenia became a republic in the Soviet Union. To this day the Turkish government denies that any wartime massacre of Armenians ever occurred. Andrew J. Waskey See also First World War, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Akçam, Taner. From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide. New York: Zed, 2004. Balakian, Peter. The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response. New York: HarperCollins, 2003. Graber, G. S. Caravans to Oblivion: The Armenian Genocide, 1915. New York: Wiley, 1996.

Arnaud Amaury (Arnaud Amalric) (d. 1225) Arnaud Amaury (also known as Arnaud Amalric) is probably best known for what many consider to be the apocryphal statement directed at soldiers worried about killing Christians during the siege of Béziers during the Albigensian Crusade: “Kill them all, for the Lord knows who are his.” Not much is known about Arnaud Amaury’s early life, though it is clear he rose quickly through ecclesial ranks. He was probably from Catalan minor nobility, and a younger son at that. Arnaud first enters the records as the

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abbot of Poblet from 1196, located in the diocese of Tarragone. Two years later, he was chosen as abbot of Grandselve, located in the diocese of Toulouse. By 1202, Arnaud attained one of the most important ecclesiastical positions of the day as abbot of Cîteaux. Pope Innocent III chose him to serve as legate to southern France in 1204, and by 1212 the pope appointed Arnaud archbishop of Narbonne where he served until he died at Fontfroide in September 1225, after which his body was moved to Cîteaux. Arnaud was an advocate for church reform early in his ecclesial career, and he expressed this through two means, the preaching of reform and crusade. Regarding the former, there are examples in the sources of his struggling against heresy as abbot of Grandselve, as well as encouraging the placement of reform-minded clerics to fill vacancies in southern France. Arnaud was close with Innocent III, and, when the former was elected as abbot of Cîteaux, the pope sent him a collection of sermons regarding the role of the pastor in preaching reform, and the pope prefaced the collection with a letter to the newly elected abbot. Innocent III was particularly preoccupied with the problem of heresy and lack of reform within the church in southern France, and thus Arnaud was one of the pope’s early choices for a legate in the region in 1204. As legate the abbot of Cîteaux was known for his steadfastness in preaching in the region, even when others lost hope. He also held conferences, assemblies, and councils in an attempt to reform the church in the region. His opponents would no doubt claim Arnaud was overzealous for reform, as he often proved inflexible and hard to work with. Arnaud was also known for his support and participation in crusade. In 1209, at the start of the Albigensian Crusade against the Cathar heretics, Innocent III chose him to serve as the leader of the crusaders gathered at Lyon, and Philip Augustus recognized him as such. After the first major crusader victories in the fall of Béziers and Carcassonne, Arnaud assembled the main leaders of the crusade, who ultimately appointed Simon de Montfort as the military leader. At various points during the crusade he was even consulted on military strategy and affairs. For the most part, Arnaud remained dedicated to the crusade until his death. Arnaud also supported crusade in Iberia, and in 1212 led troops against Muslims at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa.

After his ascension to the position of archbishop of Narbonne, Arnaud seemed to forsake his duties as preacher of the crusade and reform, and instead became embroiled in the various power struggles of the region. While this appears inconsistent with the earlier Arnaud to scholars, it could be that he saw this as part of his reforming duties in the region. The most important right he attempted to claim as archbishop was that of the duchy of Narbonne. These struggles found him in contest mostly against the preeminent secular authority in the region, which at this point was Simon de Montfort, his one-time ally. This led the archbishop to join forces with his former enemy, Raimon VI, the count of Toulouse. Ultimately Arnaud lost this struggle as Innocent III named Simon de Montfort duke of Narbonne at the Fourth Lateran Council in November 1215, a title he held until his death in 1218, which reverted to his son until 1224, when it passed to the king of France. Despite struggling for what he perceived was his right as archbishop of Narbonne, Arnaud returned to supporting reform and crusade in the region, as he continued to preach, assist in military strategy, and even wrong the king of France on behalf of Amaury de Montfort, seeking help on crusade until he died in 1225. Walker Reid Cosgrove See also Albigensian Crusade; Cathars; Innocent III, Pope; Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of Further Reading Alvira Cabrer, Martín. “Le ‘vénérable’ Arnaud Amaury: Image et réalité d’un Cistercien entre deux croisades.” In Heresis 32. Carcassonne: Centre d’Ètudes Cathares, 2000. Costen, M. D. The Cathars and the Albigensian Crusade. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997. Kienzle, Beverly Mayne. Cistercians, Heresy and Crusade in Occitania, 1145–1229: Preaching in the Lord’s Vineyard. Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2001.

Art and the Crusades The crusade era generated significant art and helped shape future art in Europe. Crusader artists expressed religious and political affiliations in several forms: architecture,

Art and the Crusades  73

sculpture, painting as demonstrated in icons and painted panels, frescos, mosaics, illuminated manuscripts, metalwork and numismatics, and auxiliary arts like glass, pottery, and textiles. The crusades were military campaigns primarily between 1099 and 1291, joined by religious leaders and pilgrims, whose objective was to retake Jerusalem and the Holy Land from Muslim control and return them to Christendom. It was an ongoing period of conflict involving Western Christendom, the eastern Byzantine Empire, and the Muslim world. Pope Urban II’s call to arms in 1095 was powerful, combining military power with religious and political powers. Crusader art was a unique collection produced in the Holy Land and Middle Eastern areas under crusader control considered by many to be the heart of Christendom, and the art became important to the crusader cause. Art, architecture, and church furnishings, from the end of the Romanesque style to the introduction of Gothic style in Europe, reflected the crusader viewpoint that Jerusalem was Christianity’s Holy City. The art was intended to honor God and demonstrate and inspire faith, educating and delighting patrons who included kings and queens, nobles, knights, priests, bishops, monks and nuns, the bourgeoisie and merchant classes, soldiers, and pilgrims. Themes represented included religious pilgrimages, piety, sacrifice, martyrdom, salvation, celebration, military triumph, and commemoration. Royalty, religious military orders, and nonreligious subjects were incorporated into various art forms. Artistic expressions were found in practical forms, such as coins, seals, and domestic objects; in works for ecclesiastical ceremony, such as templons, liturgical vessels, and service books; and in works for private devotion such as prayer books and personal icons. Crusader artists traveled in crusader expeditions from Western Europe, arrived in the Holy Land on their own pilgrimage, or were resident artists who were commissioned by Byzantine and Latin Christian churches in the Holy Land. Local artists relied on inspiration from the West while incorporating strong ties to Eastern Christian artistic surroundings for their commissions. Many artists considered it a form of prayer and worship to work on crusader art. The new art, geographically located where three monotheistic religions of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity coex-

isted, combined the strong preexisting Byzantine and Islamic artistic presence in the Holy Land, Constantinople, and Cyprus, with the Western European Christian art introduced by the crusaders who drew inspiration from France, Italy, Germany, England, and smaller principalities. Western Europeans favored their own artistic styles but, enjoying the art of the Near East, eagerly employed local artists and craftsmen from Byzantine, Armenian, and Syrian Christian backgrounds for their artistic projects. Eventually the transfer of Muslim and even Mongol traditions and motifs occurred. Drawing from Christian traditions from the Greek East and the Latin West, crusader art developed into multicultural artistic expressions combined with an overt political agenda to unite Christians against an Islamic threat. Extant crusader art should not be confused with later artistic depictions of the crusades. For example, 19thcentury artistic presentations, poetry and literature, and contemporary films, television, and theater productions designed for entertainment often romanticize the crusaders and their loves and expeditions. The functions and styles of crusader art changed throughout the era and are categorized into three general time periods. The first phase, 1099–1187, includes the First and Second Crusades and ends with the Battle of Hattin (1187) and Jerusalem’s fall to Saladin (1187). Although it was a turbulent and bloody time period, artistic endeavors were very productive. The primary focus was on Christian holy sites such as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, the Church of the Annunciation in Nazareth, the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, and sacred locations in the crusader states throughout Syria-Palestine. Primarily religious, the art was intended for church interiors and private devotion. Sculpture, frescos, liturgical vessels, templons, and gold and silver reliquaries were products of the resident artisan community. Illuminated manuscripts and psalters in Latin were produced in Jerusalem. The audience for this art was comprised of pilgrims, religious leaders, royalty, religious military orders of the Hospitallers, the Templars, and the Teutonic Knights, merchants, and members of the aristocracy. Common secular themes were castles, royal tombs, and city fortifications. The second phase, 1187–1250, includes the collapse of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Third, Fourth, Children’s,

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Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Crusades, and concludes with the Mamluk conquest of Egypt (1250). Changes in political, military, religious, and economic circumstances changed the focus and locations of crusader art. Because the Kingdom of Jerusalem was reduced to only a few coastal towns, the artistic output did not cease but focused predominately on architecture. For instance, numerous crusader castles, built for fortification and protection, were constructed for the religious military orders. Hospitaller castles include the heavily fortified Margat, north of Tortosa, and the Krak des Chevaliers. Surviving frescos indicate that the Hospitallers procured artists for extensive interior decorations. Castle interiors were also decorated with statuary and mosaics. Churches and chapels were constructed and decorated throughout the reestablished crusader states. Examples include the Church of St. Sophia in Nicosia, Cyprus (1200–1228) and the Cathedral of Our Lady at Tortosa (ca. 1265). Artists and craftsmen relocated from Jerusalem to Acre, the new crusader headquarters. The main Jerusalem scriptorium was reestablished at the Church of the Holy Cross, Acre, where the production of illuminated manuscripts, icons, gospel books, and psalters continued. The final phase, 1250–1291, exhibits the mature development of crusader painting. This period encompasses the arrival of King Louis IX of France in Acre, Lord Edward’s Crusades, and finally, the 1291 fall of Acre to al-Ashraf Khalil of Egypt. Religious art and architecture continued, but with important shifts in style and content. Styles, formats, and color schemes for icons, psalters, and Bibles reflect the greater acceptance of preexisting Byzantine symbols and ornamentation, and the introduction of French Gothic art. As an example, the illustrations in the Arsenal Old Testament Bible, associated with King Louis IX during his residency in Acre, 1250 to 1254, contains color combinations, linear designs, draperies, and ornamentation of French Gothic ideas. Architecture also adopted some of the new French Gothic motifs. In Cyprus, the Gothic cathedrals in Famagusta and Nicosia were constructed by the Lusignan kingdom. Also important is the crusader art adoption of political motifs and messages rather than religious persons and symbols. The new Franco-Byzantine crusader style emphasized secular images of heraldry, crowned rulers, rulership symbols, and

soldier saints. A manuscript written and drawn at Acre, ca. 1280, depicts Louis IX’s attack on Damietta in Egypt (1249). Instead of a cross, the crusaders are shown bearing the royal emblem of France, the fleur-de-lis. Byzantine symbols such as the cintamani textile design and chrysography became common additions in iconography. Western imagery also incorporated crusader symbols that are identified as visual messages. The diagonal placement of the Virgin at Jesus’s feet, the “v”-fold formula of drapery under the left leg of Christ, the Western versus the Eastern blessing gesture of Christ, the red cross banner, the diadems, and the pearl dot haloes all add meaning to the content of the art. The figural sculptures, stained glass, and iconic paintings shift from the earlier depictions of an austere God of the Old Testament to the human images of the Virgin Mary and the Crucifixion. Secular architecture continues as well as castle fortifications. The crusader art of this time period serves a broader cross-section of crusader society, emphasizing art for pilgrims choosing to settle in the crusader East. In architecture, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre best exemplifies the different developments and changes throughout the era of the crusader states. Essentially a Byzantine complex when the crusaders arrived in June 1099, it was transformed into a flexible plan of a Romanesque church and eventually changed into a cathedral with a Gothic double dome and rib vaulting. The other predominant type of Crusader architecture were the castles and fortifications that the military orders constructed throughout the Holy Land such as the Hospitallers’ castles, the Krak des Chevaliers (ca. 1187), and the Margat (ca. 1186). Local sculptors using traditional Byzantine artistic foundations were joined by pilgrim artists from the West. Settled descendants from France and Italy also joined the artistic pool in the Holy Land, and together they produced Romanesque Levantine–style sculpting in the 12th century and Gothic style in the 13th century. The predominant influence for sculpture during the 12th century was inspired by the French Romanesque style. Artistic expressions became a communication device for the crusade objectives of conquering, sacrifice, and piety. Every interior surface of churches, chapels, tombs, and shrines became an instrument to spread the message. Paintings consisted of icons, panel paintings, frescos, mo-

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saics, and illuminated manuscripts. The formal portrait and celebrated artists were almost nonexistent. Crusader artists worked from a conventional figure and then added traditional sacred symbols or insignias of an office that in turn translated into stories and communicated stories to viewers. The earliest example of crusader paintings is the enthroned Madonna and Child Glykophilousa (ca. 1130) in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, commissioned by a pilgrim and his family. Icons became a significant sacred artistic expression during the crusades. They were religious works of art that incorporated an image, symbol, or representation, allowing believers direct communication with the saint or holy figure. In Eastern Christian theology, an individual could petition the iconic saint through prayers, requesting miracles, good fortune, and forgiveness. The images represented saints, biblical narratives, angels, and the cross; but the most popular were of Christ and the Virgin. Byzantine media ranged from marble and ivory, to gemstones, ceramics, precious metals, enamel, embroidery, frescos, and mosaics. Icons served several purposes and were made in several sizes. Religious and laypersons wanted small icons for personal use. Monumental icons were mounted on poles for processionals in churches and on battlefields. Icons, initially associated with Byzantine and Eastern Christian religious ceremonies, were adopted by the crusaders into their religious practices. Western artistic characteristics were added to the Byzantine iconographic elements such as beaded halos, decorated borders, raised gesso plasterwork, and chrysography. Eventually soldier/ warrior saints with gold and jeweled diadems, spears with red cross standards, and pearl dot–outlined haloes were added as iconic images. The icon of Sts. George and Theodore depicts them as mounted warrior saints displaying flame-like draperies with crusader banners. The high point for most pilgrims was a visit to the Holy Sepulchre. One of the objectives of the crusaders and political leaders was to beautify churches and to instruct the illiterate, through artistic display, in the Gospel story and the celebrations of the church. Decorative mosaics were used in an extensive crusader program to communicate the story. During the rebuilding of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in the 1140s, the interior also underwent a considerable renovation.

European traditions of painting, mosaics, and decorative arts introduced by the crusaders to the Levant are best illustrated in the illuminated manuscripts surviving from the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Sources for manuscript illustrations have been traced to English, French, and Italian books that were brought to Jerusalem. These were combined with Byzantine sources in the Greek Orthodox community. Prior to the 12th century, most manuscripts were produced in monasteries. Larger monasteries contained a specialized room for manuscript production called the scriptorium. During the crusades, the scriptorium of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem was the center of manuscript production. After the fall of Jerusalem in 1187 it was moved to Acre, and a dramatic shift occurred in art that moved from depicting primarily religious scenes to include military objectives. A manuscript produced in Acre (ca. 1280) refers to the religion of the monarchy and their crusade quests. Its importance is that it shows the union of religion and politics in a war effort. An illustration from a mid-13th century English psalter portrays the ideal crusader knight demonstrating piety and power in a bowed posture with uplifted hands. Examples of combined military and religious arts include manuscript illuminations. Some, left unfinished at the fall of Acre in 1291, portray battling knights in the capture of Antioch, the Siege of Shayzar with crusaders refusing to fight or playing chess in camp, crowned King Richard I and crusaders attacking Acre in 1191, a crusader warship, and Louis IX on horseback adorned in fleur-de-lis regalia headed to the Holy Lands. Each of these emphasizes the importance of political gain through a religious agenda. In another, a map of Jerusalem (ca. 1170) combines the efforts of the church and the crusaders. The circular design of the Holy City symbolizes Jerusalem as the center of the world. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre is in the bottom left quarter, with the Temple Mount occupying the top half. Of note is the depiction of crusaders fighting the Muslims in the bottom margin. Coins were issued for the Kingdom of Jerusalem as well as other provinces throughout the history of the crusader states. The oldest extant crusader coin dates from 1109 to 1112. Various kings of France, crusader kings, and barons of the crusader states minted coinage that was circulated,

76  Ascalon, Battle of (1099)

banked, and used by the Templars. Most coins had the Cross of Jerusalem embossed on the surface. It became the unifying image on crusade coins and symbolized their cause. Privileged individuals commissioned artists to create reliquaries to carry the remains of saints. Soldiers and crusader kings carried reliquaries with them on crusade and into battle as a statement of faith and interceding protection. By the conclusion of the crusades, churches, cathedrals, and private homes were filled with reliquaries. Periods of religious and political strife throughout the crusader states, however, created widespread destruction of religious objects and art. Often taken for granted by historians and in accounts of the crusades, textiles, like other common daily objects, were an important component of the trades and revenueproducing industries that financially supported the crusades. Caravans supplied goods between trading centers, and Persia and Constantinople became important markets. Spain was also important in textile production and was frequented by crusader ships. Appreciation of Islamic woven textiles grew throughout Europe. Syrian designs used fantasy animals, flora, birds, and jungle animals framed in circular bands or woven into geometric compartments. An example of cultural exchange is evident in the adoption of the Byzantine cintamani motif, originally an Ottoman decorative motif inspired by Buddhist beliefs. The crusaders eventually adopted the motif in their textile designs. Throughout the crusading era, artists produced artwork for various patrons that represented ecclesiastical, military, political, and merchant ideals and goals. As crusader kingdoms fell, much of the artwork was systematically destroyed by conquering armies. Some works of art were rescued from destruction, like pilgrimage art work, and came to the West as either personal property or souvenirs. Crusader art was viewed as privileged and had great influence on European styles and tastes. M. Lynn Barnes See also Crusades and Religious Relics; Religious Military Orders; True Cross Further Reading Folda, Jaroslav. Crusader Art: The Art of the Crusades in the Holy Land, 1099–1291. Burlington, VT: Lund Humphries, 2008.

Hazard, Harry W., ed. A History of the Crusade. Vol. 4: The Art and Architecture of the Crusade States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977. Hunt, Lucy-Anne. Byzantium, Eastern Christendom and Islam: Art at the Crossroads of the Medieval Mediterranean. 2 vols. London: Pindar, 1998–2000.

Ascalon, Battle of (1099) The Battle of Ascalon (August 12, 1099) is generally considered to be the final battle of the First Crusade. The crusaders, under the leadership of Godfrey of Bouillon, had defeated the Fatimid forces of Jerusalem, under the leadership of the Fatimid governor Iftikhar ad-Daulah, on July 15, 1099. AdDaulah then fled to the port city of Ascalon to seek shelter. Upon hearing of the fall of the Holy City, the Fatimid vizier in Egypt, al-Afdal Shahanshah, raised an army estimated at 50,000 Seljuk Turks, Persians, Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, and Ethiopians (probably Sudanese), and by early August the army had set up camp just north of Ascalon. Upon learning that the Fatimid army was planning an attack, on August 10 Godfrey led the crusader army (numbering about 10,000) to Ascalon, about one day’s march away from Jerusalem. Along the way, the crusader forces gathered a large number of livestock, variously said to be either a ploy to distract the crusaders by encouraging pillaging, or alternately, said to be for the purpose of feeding the larger Muslim army. The Fatimid army was caught completely unawares when on August 12, 1099, the sight of a large dust cloud of the approaching army, supplemented by the livestock, caused the Fatimid army to believe that the crusaders had been supplemented by another force. This unnerved and discouraged the largely untrained Fatimid army. The crusaders’ army was better trained, and through years of battle more prepared. After an exchange of arrows from their archers, the crusader cavalry charged the middle and soon routed the Fatimid forces. The losses on the Fatimid side were estimated at 10,000 to 12,000. This final victory ensured the security of the crusader forces in Jerusalem and effectively ended the First Crusade. R. Don Deal

Ashur 77 See also Bouillon, Godfrey de; Fatimids; First Crusade Further Reading Asbridge, Thomas. The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land. New York: HarperCollins, 2010. Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War: A New History of the Crusades. New York: Penguin Books, 2007.

Ashoka (304–232 BCE) Ashoka was the first monarch to rule over a united India. He is considered to be one of the most important political and religious figures in the early history of Buddhism. He was the grandson of Chandragupta (340–298 BCE), the first monarch of the powerful Mauryan dynasty. By the latter half of the third century BCE, Ashoka presided over most of India, establishing a peaceful rule within the borders of a unified country. King Ashoka’s reign began in a period of conflict. However, the character of his kingdom would slowly transform into one of benevolence and nonviolence. After a particularly violent but successful campaign subduing the province of Kalinga (Orissa), Ashoka is believed to have had a change of heart. He considered his actions to be responsible for the suffering of the people of Kalinga, as well as of the other provinces that his forces had subdued, and as such he swore an oath that in the future he would only solidify his rule by employing the practice of righteousness (dhamma). This decision, which is the earliest of his known edicts, coincided with the king’s conversion to Buddhism. A meeting with a Buddhist novice would likely have been responsible for Ashoka’s spiritual awakening. Ashoka, the once violent ruler, who is alleged to have killed more than 90 of his own half-brothers before his conversion, was the patron who sponsored the construction of more than 80,000 monasteries. He was willing to spread Buddhist religious teachings not only throughout his own country, but into surrounding states as well. Due to this royal patronage within and beyond the borders of his own kingdom, Ashoka was responsible for the transformation of Buddhism from a religion primarily located solely in the northern half of modern-day India into what would eventually become a world religion.

It is difficult to separate legends form the true facts of history, but it is generally held that Ashoka abolished the death penalty in his kingdom, many animal species became protected, and the royal kitchen was not allowed to kill an animal for meals, except for peacocks or deer. Ashoka’s victories following his conversion were no longer victories in battle, but dhamma victories. Ashoka embarked on numerous dhamma expeditions, in which Buddhist teachings were spread to surrounding kingdoms. He was driven by his goal to promote the new religious beliefs of a nonviolent, peaceful world. Shortly after Ashoka’s death, Buddhism began spreading throughout the Asian continent. Frank Jacob See also Buddhism and War Further Reading Nikam, Narayanrao Appurao, and Richard McKeon, eds. and trans. The Edicts of Ashoka. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. Seneviratna, Anuradha, ed. King Ashoka and Buddhism: Historical and Literary Studies. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 1994.

Ashur Ashur was the East Semitic patron deity for the city of Assyria. Earliest evidence of Ashur from about 2000 BCE indicates that he was initially a deified representation of the city and thus lacked familial relationships with other deities and had no specific power over forces of nature. Ashur operated as the true ruler of Assyria with the human king functioning as a chief priest and ruling viceroy. Ashur’s theocratic command of Assyria developed during the reign of Adadnirari (ca. 1305–1275 BCE), when military conquests were credited to the command of Ashur. The divinely directed military exploits grew into divine commissioning for Assyria to conquer and rule the known world. Assyrian ideology cast conquered peoples as abandoned and punished by their own gods. Ashur gradually adopted southern Mesopotamian characteristics between the 13th and 7th centuries BCE when Assyria encountered greater political and military conflict with Babylon. Ashur

78  Ashurbanipal (ca. 685–ca. 627 BCE)

adopted qualities of the Sumerian-Babylonian chief deity Enlil, including his wife Ninlil, who became the Assyrian Mullissu. Under the reign of Sargon II (721–705 BCE) and his son Sennacherib (704–681 BCE), Ashur replaced the Babylonian deity Marduk as the victor over Tiamat in the Enuma Elish creation myth that initially elevated Marduk over the pantheon in Babylonian mythology. Ashur was further cast as An-shar, the grandfather of Marduk, and became the omnipotent creator god, who determined the destinies of the other deities. Ashur continued to be worshipped to some degree until replaced by Syrian Christianity in the fourth century CE. Nicholas R. Werse See also Assyrian Warfare; Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East Further Reading Bienkowski, Piotr, and Alan Millard, eds. Dictionary of the Ancient Near East. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. Healy, Mark, and Angus McBride. The Ancient Assyrians. Oxford: Osprey, 1991.

Ashurbanipal (ca. 685–ca. 627 BCE) Ashurbanipal was the Great King of Assyria during the pinnacle of Assyrian military, political, and cultural power. Inheriting the throne from his father, Esarhaddon, Ashurbanipal expanded the borders of Assyria through conquests that solidified his fearsome reputation with the early Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans, but also laid the foundation for the downfall of a vastly overextended Assyrian empire. His conquests, though not religious wars, often invoked Assyrian deities. Ashurbanipal himself, according to the governing customs of ancient Mesopotamia, was less a political king than a divinely appointed high priest representing and glorifying Ashur, who was the highest god in the Assyrian pantheon, the ruler of all heaven, creator of humankind, and slayer of Tiamat, the chaotic god of the ocean. Ashurbanipal was uniquely prepared for his military and religious reign. As the second son of King Esarhaddon,

he was not expected to inherit the throne, and consequently, he received a better education, including reading and writing, than his brothers. This education placed Ashurbanipal even more firmly within the Assyrian religious culture and his writings, preserved in the Library of Ashurbanipal in Nineveh, are suffused with references to Assyrian deities. Additionally, the library also housed other works that preserved Assyrian culture and interpretations like the Epic of Gilgamesh that further strengthened Ashurbanipal’s religious beliefs. In 668 BCE, Ashurbanipal inherited both the Assyrian throne and its long-simmering war with Egypt. Ashurbanipal sought both to crush Egyptian resistance and also to hold the territory by undermining its culture and religious forms. To do that, he marched his army into Egypt, destroyed every outpost and city in rebellion, and killed every Egyptian ruler except for Necho, the only king that remained loyal. Ashurbanipal took Necho’s son hostage and moved him to Nineveh to learn Assyrian ways and religion. One year later, the Egyptians again rebelled and killed Necho. Ashurbanipal once again conquered the rebels and made Necho’s son, Psammetichus, pharaoh. The Egyptian wars provided the template for Ashurbanipal’s conquests in that he both destroyed military and political resistance while elevating the divinity of Assyrian gods over the power of native gods by appointing Assyrian educated rulers to vacant thrones. As both military and religious strategy, it did not work. Egypt’s Assyrian-trained ruler soon rebelled as did Ashurbanipal’s proxies in Elam, a much more dangerous enemy. In 653 BCE, Ashurbanipal defeated Elam and personally killed their leader and his heir at the inspired insistence of the god Ashur. When Ashurbanipal took the Elamite city of Susa in 647 BCE, he made it a point to proclaim that Elamite gods were no match for the power of Ashur wielded through Ashurbanipal. Though Ashurbanipal’s campaigns spread Assyrian religion throughout Mesopotamia and beyond, it was not enough to hold the empire together when civil war and unrest in conquered territories broke out. The fall of the Assyrian Empire came only a decade after Ashurbanipal’s death in 627 BCE when its enemies finally broke from the political, military, and cultural control of Assyria and its gods. Russell S. Perkins

Assassins 79 See also Assyrian Warfare Further Reading Bryce, Trevor. The World of the Neo-Hittite Kingdoms: A Political and Military History. New York: Oxford, 2012. Hays, Christopher B. Hidden Riches: A Sourcebook for the Comparative Study of the Hebrew Bible and Ancient Near East. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2014. Van de Mieroop, Marc. A History of the Ancient Near East, ca. 3000–323 BC. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.

Assassins The Assassins were a branch of Shi’a Muslims that used assassination as a political weapon against their enemies. They operated out of strongholds spread across the mountains of northern Syria and Persia from 1094 until 1260. They led a reign of terror in which they allegedly partook of hashish to put themselves into a state of ecstatic intoxication before venturing out to kill their enemies, usually at night with daggers. They were motivated by religious belief, yet they were often employed to settle political matters. The term assassin is thought to have been coined by the crusaders, possibly having been derived from the Arabic word for “hashish.” The Assassins were founded by Hasan-i-Sabbah (d. 1124), the son of a Twelver Shi’a with a Yemeni lineage who converted to Ismailism and became a government official of the Seljuk Empire in 1071. In 1090 he took possession of the Alamut fortress, an “eagle’s nest” perched atop a 10,200-foot-high mountain in Daylam in northern Persia just south of the Caspian Sea. From this location, Hasan-i-Sabbah’s followers unleashed a campaign against the enemies of the Ismaili sect. These enemies were primarily Sunni Muslims, but other Shi’as were targeted as well. Hasan-i-Sabbah led an ascetic and puritanical life and through his claim of absolute religious authority, he imposed the same life upon his followers. He killed both of his sons, one for drunkenness. Both Sunnis and the Twelver Shi’a considered the Nizaris, another Shi’a sect, to be extremists, especially after their “Resurrection” of 1164 freed

them from the requirement of prayer, fasting, and halal food. Hasan-i-Sabbah was so revered that his tomb became a shrine during the reign of the next seven grand-masters of Alamut. Assassination among Muslims did not originate with the Nizaris; the third and fourth caliphs, Uthman (d. 656) and Ali (d. 661), had been assassinated. Like the Khawarij who had assassinated Ali, the Nizaris believed that everybody else was an unbeliever. Nizari propagandists tried to convert these unbelievers, but genuine enemies were subject to assassination. They are known to have assassinated the famous Seljuk vizier Nizam al-Mulk in 1092, the Fatimid caliph al-Amir in 1130, the Abbasid caliph alMustarshid in 1135, the crusader Raymond II of Tripoli in 1152, and the crusader king of Jerusalem Marquis Conrad of Montferrat in 1192. They also attempted to take the lives of Nur al-Din (d. 1174) and Saladin, the latter of whom, in 1176, laid siege to the Syrian castle in Masyad of Rashid al-Din Sinan (d. 1192), who was known to the crusaders as the “Old Man of the Mountain.” The Assassins’ threat was neutralized by the Buddhist monarch Hulugu (d. 1265) from faraway Mongolia. Hulugu dispensed with the Persian Nizaris at Alamut in 1256 and then the Mamluk sultan Baybars (d. 1277), who conquered the remaining Syrian Nizaris at Masyad in 1273. In 1271, Marco Polo (d. 1324) wrote a glowing report of the Alamut fortress, comparing it to paradise. These conquests, however, did not bring an end to the Nizaris, because their missionary work had established a successful community in the subcontinent (particularly in the Punjab, Sind, and Gujarat regions) that became known as the Khojas. W. Richard Oakes Jr. See also Fatimid Conquest of Egypt; Qarmati Uprising Further Reading Daftary, Farhad. The Ismāʿīlīs: Their History and Doctrines. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Encyclopaedia of Islam. 2nd ed. Edited by P. Bearman, et al. Brill Online. Gibb, H. A. R., and J. H. Kramers. The Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leiden: Brill, 1953. Hitti, Philip K. History of the Arabs. London: Macmillan, 1937. Lewis, Bernard. The Arabs in History. London: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1950.

80  Assyrian Warfare Lewis, Bernard. The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Netton, Ian Richard, ed. Encyclopedia of Islamic Civilization and Religion. London: Routledge, 2008.

Assyrian Warfare The great Assyrian empire in northern Mesopotamia was led by kings who were seen primarily as warriors. Even the Akkadian word for king (sarrum) was derived from the Sumerian logogram LU.GAL, literally translated “big man,” insinuating physical prominence as key to the king’s military roots. The king was the earthly representative of the gods and saw his duty as shepherding his people, caring for them, bestowing justice upon them, and protecting them. This mindset creates the backdrop for warfare in Assyria. Whether securing their borders or more often expanding their territories through military campaigns, the kings saw themselves as acting on behalf of the deities for the benefit of the people. When kings went into battle, Assyrian belief was that kings fought only from the direct orders of the gods. Oracles would speak to the king, revealing the will of Ashur and the gods who commanded them to “expand their boundaries.” So the king’s victories were ultimately seen as the victories of the gods, fighting on their behalf. As many kings asserted, their victory was due to “trust in the god Ashur, my Lord” while their enemies trusted in their own strength. The kings also boast about their gods’ melammu, which was an overwhelming splendor and awe that paralyzed and terrorized their enemies. Sometimes the gods even enacted a psychological warfare of sorts on the enemy before the battle, preparing them for defeat. Ultimate victory was in the hands of the deities. Because of this heavily theologized rationale and outlook on warfare, the kings were typically brutal and thorough in the treatment of the conquered and their territories. They terrorized the vanquished as a means of squelching potential rebellion and intimidating future foes. Flaying their captives alive, boiling them in oil, placing heads on stakes, piling heads and hands outside of vanquished cities and hanging decapitated bodies on the city walls were all

part of what ancient Near Eastern historian T. Olmstead termed “the calculated frightfulness of the Assyrian kings.” This approach of ultimate intimidation and brutality becomes standard with Tukulti-Ninurta I (1244–1208 BCE). While the rhetoric of warfare in Assyria was theological, the benefits were clearly economic. Mesopotamia (until the later discovery of oil) has always been poor in natural resources, so the Northern and Western campaigns produced great wealth in precious metals, timber, livestock, and human resources, whether as part of looting and taking of spoils or through formal tribute paid as part of the suzerain-vassal relationships established with the conquered territories. After vanquishing a territory, the Assyrians would establish a puppet ruler who would maintain order in a pro-Assyrian manner and ensure the regular tributary tax. Another method by which the Assyrians maintained their order over vassals was to exile royal figures and leading citizens to Assyria proper while sending their own marginalized peoples to live in the conquered territory. As the kings enriched their lands, capitals, and palaces via warfare, they were also sure to dedicate their booty to the gods. They would officially consecrate a portion of the spoils to the deities for the victory. Regularly the kings would use the plunder to either build or rebuild temples to the gods. In the mud brick buildings of Mesopotamia, reworking and rebuilding was a continual occurrence. The religious work of “rededicating” temples from the plunder of war was something kings recorded in annals and building inscriptions to commemorate their work and allegiance to the deities that led them to victory. Another way they honored their gods from war was to cart away the deities of their conquered foes. In the same way that Assyrian kings would exile defeated rulers who would serve them in the palace, the physical representations would be brought back and placed before the Assyrian gods, as if their captured subjects would serve them too. If the Assyrian gods had defeated the foreign gods, it would be logical that the Assyrian gods should rule over them. In the Hebrew Bible, the Philistines carry out a similar tactic with Yahweh but with an ironic twist. The ancient Near Eastern practice may likely lie behind the Israelite prohibition by Yahweh that “you shall have no other gods before me” (Exodus 20L3; Deuteronomy 5:7).

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The Assyrians were a dominating force militarily throughout the Fertile Crescent for much of the second and first millennia BCE but especially during the Sargonid dynasty. A significant factor in Assyrian dominance from the early second millennium was because of the use of chariots. Typically the chariots would transport a driver, an archer, and a shield bearer. This superior weapon of war gave the Assyrians a vast advantage, so much so that the 16th–9th centuries BCE are referred to as the age of chariotry throughout Mesopotamia. They would attack in the dry, hot summer months when muddy terrain was not a neutralizing factor. The Assyrian military would chase its enemy into submission. Tactics began to shift in the 10th–9th centuries BCE as the army became larger (Shalmaneser raised a force of 120,000 men), which would shift battles from an extended chase to prolonged sieges of cities and territories. Particularly as the Sargonid dynasty used its forces for imperialistic goals, they used foreign fighters for their expertise and specializations. Whether Urartian cavalry, Syrian chariotry, Sidonian naval construction, Elamite archers, or Arabs on camels, the Assyrians expanded and controlled their empire with the aid of mercenaries throughout their conquered territories. The Assyrians established a reputation and military power that was feared by the entire ancient Near Eastern world and caused dread throughout the Fertile Crescent, from southern Mesopotamia to Egypt. While Assyrian warfare was understood and spoken of theologically, its outcome had great economic benefit to the kingdom. And the brutality of the Assyrians tactics kept vassal states subservient and in fear. Dean Andrew Nicholas See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of; Yahweh as Divine Warrior Further Reading Niehaus, Jeffrey. “The Warrior and His God: The Covenant Foundation of History and Historiography.” In Alan Millard, James Hoffmeier, and David Baker, eds. Faith, Tradition, and History: Old Testament Historiography in Its Near Eastern Context. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, pp. 299–312. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2013.

von Soden, Wolfram. The Ancient Orient: An Introduction to the Study of the Ancient Near East. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994 Yigal, Yadin. The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.

Audita Tremendi (1187) On July 4, 1187, Saladin proved victorious at the Battle of Hattin and news of his recapture of Jerusalem spread across Europe. The shock of the slaughter reportedly induced the death of Pope Urban III, followed by the election of his successor Albert of Morra as Pope Gregory VIII. In horrified retaliation against the “infidels,” Pope Gregory VIII issued the papal bull Audita Tremendi on October 29, 1187, which was read aloud at the papal court in Ferrara. In it he recounted the horrific battle and the atrocities committed by the Muslims as punishment for the sins committed by European Christians and the Franks of the Crusader States. The Muslims were portrayed as “savage barbarians thirsting after Christian blood”—pagans who did not share the same God as the Jews or Christians (Bird, Peters, and Powell 2013, p. 4). Evil was personified in Saladin, who was likened to the devil. Jerusalem fell to him as the Latins were “smitten by the divine hand” for their sins. Subsequently, the powerful call for mandatory repentance in Audita Tremendi inspired the military expeditions known as the Third Crusade. Islamic defeat of the Cross being attributed to Christian sin was an approach known as peccatis exigentibus, which had been prevalent since the failure of the Second Crusade in 1147. It explained military failures and embedded the need for moral reform within the crusade movement. Crusaders were called to enlist not “for money [or] worldly glory, but according to the will of God” (Asbridge 2012, p. 1162). The bull closed by detailing the spiritual and temporal rewards for crusaders, including immunity from legal prosecution, relief from interest on debts while on the expeditions themselves, and full remission of all confessed sins. Audita’s impact outlasted the Third Crusade as it inspired moral theologians to factor in the needs of the

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Holy Land and the nexus of Christian European moral regeneration. Hillary Briffa See also Hattin, Battle of; Saladin; Third Crusade Further Reading Asbridge, Thomas. The Crusades: The War for the Holy Land. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012. Bird, Jessalynn, Edward Peters, and James M. Powell, eds. Crusade and Christendom Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall of Acre, 1187–1291. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.

Augustine (354–430 CE) Aurelius Augustinus was born on November 13, 354 CE, in North Africa in the town of Tagaste, near the ancient city of Carthage. His mother tried to raise him as a Christian (his father was a pagan who converted to Christianity), and while he was interested in aspects of Christ, he was initially drawn to the typical adolescent preoccupations of women, fame, and a belief in his own superiority. When he was 18, he had a child with a woman with whom he had a faithful relationship, but never married. At 19, while a student in Carthage, he found his love of philosophy after reading a treatise by Cicero. He taught rhetoric in Carthage until his late twenties, when he decided to seek greater fortune in Rome. He was highly successful in Rome and was eventually appointed to the position of chief professor of rhetoric in Milan. It was there that Augustine met a bishop named Ambrose, a man who had a profound influence on him. Augustine became infatuated with the works of Plato, who taught that only God was fully real, and other things were of lesser importance in varying degrees. Although Augustine notes being touched by God, that and the fact that Bishop Ambrose was always able to answer his questions on spirituality and philosophy led him to conversion. On Easter Sunday in 387, Ambrose baptized Augustine. By 391 Augustine had returned to Africa and had been ordained a priest. By 396, he was consecrated bishop of Hippo, which is the reason he is known as Augustine of Hippo.

Saint Augustine of Hippo is considered one of the most important Church Fathers in Christianity, and a significant figure in the development of the Just War theory prior to the 16th century. (Library of Congress)

Augustine is a significant figure in the development of the just war theory in canonical and theological writings predating the 16th century. Prior to the works of the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546), just war theory was predominantly attributed to Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), a 13th-century Italian Dominican priest, theologian, philosopher, and later saint. This was more than likely due to the fact that Augustine never published one text that synthesized all of his thoughts similar to Aquinas’s Summa Theologica. Instead, Augustine’s theories are scattered among his books, letters, and sermons. As the history of just war theory in the Western tradition evolved, historians have traced many of the foundational principles of what constitutes a just war to the writings of Augustine through the frequent citations made to him by philosophers and theologians that followed. Augustine identified two areas related to war that needed clarification with respect to morality and specific guidelines:

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jus ad bellum (the right to go to war) and jus in bello (the proper conduct in war). In relation to the right to go to war, Augustine identified four prerequisites: just authority, just cause, right intention, and last resort. In relation to the proper conduct of war, he outlined three limitations: proportionality, discrimination, and responsibility. Before any attempt to further discuss Augustine’s principles on war can be made, it is important to understand that he abhorred war. Although never a military man, Augustine witnessed the suffering caused by the sack of Rome in 410 by the Visigoths, the barbarians advancing across North Africa, and the Vandal siege of his hometown of Hippo in 430 in the last years of his life. As a result of his earlier exposure to war, Augustine regarded war as a tragedy, even if a war was declared just or necessary, and held strong contempt for anyone who believed conquest and military prowess were glorious and praiseworthy accomplishments. He devoted a great deal of thought to the idea of glory, and differentiated between the Roman pursuits to quell civil wars (because Rome and its conquered people enjoyed the advantages of common laws) and barbarian invasions. One of his more illuminating pieces on the notion of glory, however, was revealed in a letter to General Boniface in 428 after he fell out of favor with the imperial court in Italy. When Rome sent the military after him, he prosecuted a civil war. Boniface had claimed that his actions were just because he had no other choice than to fight the army sent out against him. Augustine refuted his claim, stating that he would not be in the situation if he had not been pursuing his own personal glory and interested in defending any attempt to call into question the honor that accompanied his power. Even though Augustine professed a great deal of contempt for the idea of glory and war, he understood that war was inevitable given the sinful nature of man, and recognized that some wars were just wars, and therefore defensible. From that realization, Augustine composed his thoughts on the rules of war, or what became known as early just war theory. The majority of Augustine’s views on war can be found in his attack on Manichaeism in Contra Faustum. In it, Augustine tackles the issue of divine providence in war by refuting Faustus’s claims that Moses had not only ordered, but participated in actions that included murder and the

waging of wars that claimed the lives of thousands of human beings; acts that clearly violated Christ’s commandment that “thou shall not kill.” He would discuss similar questions from Antonious Agrypnius Volunsianus—a pagan Roman from a powerful family—and other pagans in his later work, The City of God. His response in both cases was that when God directed Moses to prosecute wars, the decision was not based on cruelty, but on righteous retribution for a previous injustice that was done. Moreover, Augustine was clear on the point that circumstances in the Old Testament were not relevant to the New Testament. Such beliefs were rooted in the idea that the patriarchs and prophets in the Old Testament taught that God was capable of granting military victories to his people, whereas the martyrs in the times of the New Testament were slain without offering any resistance, and that it was a preferable victory to die for the true faith. While Augustine’s intentions regarding divine providence are clear, his words are heavily derived from the works of Plato and Cicero, whose philosophies had the most influence on his attitude toward war. When the often difficult and seemingly contradictory language of his time is simplified, Augustine informs us that war is not God’s doing, but the fault of man. As such, God cannot be held responsible for the wars waged among men. That did not mean, however, that war and the inevitable consequences of war—poverty, slavery, violence, devastation, death—escaped God’s providence. From this belief, Augustine drew the foundational principle of just war theory that God permits states to wage war only insofar as their battles and campaigns contribute to his ends, which is the punishment of the wicked and the testing and training of the good. In taking this position, Augustine clearly highlights that victory and conquest are granted by God to both the good and the evil, so long as the outcome is ultimately just, and contributes to his righteous plans for the world. What, then, constitutes a just motive to prosecute war? Wars, according to Augustine, fell into two categories: defensive and offensive. A war fought on the defensive was just, because it was fought solely to prevent or to punish the unjust actions of the aggressor. Such reasoning is straightforward. Offensive wars, however, are not as transparent, and therefore have certain provisions to meet in

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order to be deemed just. Before professing said provisions, Augustine reminds us that war is evil, but professes that it is sometimes necessary if wrongdoing and injustice are not to be permitted to flourish. If some country has committed aggression or some clear injustice, the wrong must be corrected by peaceful means if possible, or failing that, by war. Also important is that the perception of a wrong being committed is highly subjective. There are many reasons why one party might feel wronged by the other. Augustine recognizes this, and as a result, he does not discuss the semantics associated with it. He does make explicitly clear, however, who has the right to declare a war just. Only the monarch, or chief of state, has both the right and duty to decide that a just war is to be undertaken. There are inherent difficulties with the duality of the ruler’s position. On one hand, the ruler is one of the parties to the dispute, while on the other he must decide if the other state is guilty of injustice, and if said injustice warrants the infliction of justice. This is obviously a flawed position and could easily be corrupted by personal or national interest, but Augustine cannot find any better solution. Just as Augustine outlined the position of the ruler, so too did he write about the position of the soldiers that fight the war. Augustine states emphatically that disobedience on the part of the soldier is forbidden. Just as ordinary citizens are not permitted to disobey the laws of the ruler, it is not within the soldier’s purview to decide whether an order or a war is just. Given that soldiers must obey the commands of their rulers, they are not held accountable for any acts of wrongdoing. Even if the justice of the war being waged is questionable, or it is clear that the ruler has acted unjustly in undertaking a “just war,” the soldier is not at fault. Accountability is an important feature of Augustine’s theories on war because the idea behind right intention requires that the response to injustice (war) be proportional to the cause, and not go beyond righting the wrong. If the ruler’s actions go beyond righting the wrong, his actions are not just, but the soldier still does not have the option to disobey the orders to prosecute the war. The idea of proportionality constitutes one of the three limitations Augustine places on what a nation can do in prosecuting a war. Proportionality, along with discrimination and responsibility, form the basis for Augustine’s definition of morality in conducting war. Just war, according to

Augustine, was not merely related to providence and the right to go to war. Equally important was defining the right sort of conduct allowed in prosecuting a war. Discrimination related to the viable targets in war. Augustine noted the importance of combatants distinguishing between other combatants and noncombatants. Innocent civilians should never be the target of attacks. Responsibility, as the word implies, referred to the unexpected side effects of war. Augustine stated that a country is not responsible for the unexpected side effects of its military actions as long as three conditions are met. The first condition is that the action must be intended to produce good consequences. This is, of course, related to the idea that the war is deemed just in the first place. The second condition is that negative effects were not intended. The final condition is that the good of the war must outweigh the damage done by it. While all three of these conditions seem repetitive and common sense, they all revert back to the original concept that rulers should only conduct a war to right a wrong, and not as a means of satisfying their own hopes of glory. All of Augustine’s provisions on what constitutes a just war were formed based on his own experiences and relationships in the fourth and early fifth centuries. Although all of his writings must be synthesized to form a coherent theory about the morality of war, his thoughts form the basis of just war theory, which has been built upon by subsequent philosophers and theologians to form the modern conception of just war in Western thought. Jeremy Maxwell See also Aquinas, Thomas; Christianity and War; Just War Tradition; Manicheaism and War; Vitoria, Francisco de Further Reading Augustine. Confessions. 2nd ed. Translated by F. J. Sheed. Edited by Michael P. Foley. Cambridge: Hackett, 2006. Brown, Peter Robert Lamont. Augustine of Hippo: A Biography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Charles, J. Daryl, and Timothy J. Demy. War, Peace, and Christianity: Questions and Answers from a Just-War Perspective. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2010. Hollingworth, Miles. Saint Augustine of Hippo: An Intellectual Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Matthews, Garrett B. The Augustinian Tradition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

Aum Shinrikyo  85 Mattox, John Mark. St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War. London: Continuum, 2006. Reichberg, Gregory, Henrik Syse, and Nicole Hartwell. Religion, War, and Ethics: A Sourcebook of Textual Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Robert, Peter, and Lamont Brown. Augustine of Hippo: A Biography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Stevenson, William R. Christian Love and Just War: Moral Paradox and Political Life in St. Augustine and His Modern Interpreters. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987. Vessey, Mark, ed. A Companion to Augustine. Oxford: Blackwell, 2015. Wills, Gary. Saint Augustine: A Life. New York: Penguin, 2001. Wynn, Phillip. Augustine on War and Military Service. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013.

Aum Shinrikyo A syncretic religious movement combining yogic Hinduism, Buddhism, apocalyptic Christian philosophy, and esoteric traditions from the East and West, including the works of 16th-century French astronomer and seer Nostradamus, Aum Shinrikyo emerged from the teachings of “the Spirit of Truth, His Holiness the Master Shoko Asahara.” Founded initially as the “Aum Hermit’s Society” (Aum Shinsen no Kai) by Asahara (birth name, Chizuo Matsumoto) in 1984 to study yoga and meditation, the movement attracted a small yet passionate group of young and often well-educated followers. Enticed initially by the promise of attaining individual enlightenment, within a couple of years the group began to shift from projects of personal salvation to establishing a transformative movement seeking world redemption. Aum revolved around Asahara’s charismatic leadership, asserting him and his apocalyptic vision as the epitome of divine truth and the only means to restore the world to “original Buddhism” (Shoho), Asahara’s stated desire. Asahara officially changed the name to Aum Shinrikyo (roughly, “supreme truth”) in 1987, a movement that highlights the millennial shift and darkening tone in Asahara’s divine teachings regarding world transformation. In 1989, Aum was recognized as a religious corporation in Japan under the Religious Corporations Law (shukyo hojin ho), and by 1995 it held assets in

excess of $1 billion, mostly by operating electronic businesses and restaurants, in addition to requiring members, often from wealthy and elite families, to sign their estates over to the group. Punctuated by Asahara’s evolution from a sensei (teacher) to the guru (spiritual master) owed total obedience by disciples, Aum’s teachings emerged directly out of Asahara’s messianic positioning and doomsday prophesies. Thus at the center of the group’s belief is reverence for Asahara, who, in addition to proclaiming himself the first “enlightened one” since Buddha, also declared himself “Christ,” identifying his work with the “Lamb of God” in order to position his sacred mission as that of taking upon himself the sins of the world. Like many other Japanese new religions at the time, Aum considered the world as blanketed in a crisis—due to global war, environmental destruction, and natural disasters—that would inevitably lead to cataclysm and apocalypse by the end of the 20th century. In rejecting materialism and accepting the austere asceticism expected by Asahara’s growing influence, Aum members could not only find a path to personal enlightenment, but could also spiritually liberate all of global culture, a special mission Aum members protected at all costs, including the legitimate (meaning karmic) killing of others. Millennial in nature, Aum operated through a polarized view of the world, a binary understanding that divided worldly (and spiritual) forces into categories of good and evil. Believing the world to be mired in materialism, violence, and asymmetrical domination by national forces (for Aum, this included primarily the corrupt governments of the United States and Japan, but also traditional conspiracy-based groups such as the Freemasons and the Illuminati), Aum saw itself as fighting a sacred war against evil. Borrowing heavily from the Book of Revelation 16:16, Asahara described a final conflict—a World War III between the United States and Japan—culminating in nuclear Armageddon. Except for the elite few who joined Aum, the rest of humanity would not survive the apocalypse, which Asahara predicted would occur in 1997, or between 1999 and 2003 (and at some points, 1995). In other words, Asahara taught that the path to salvation could be achieved only by accepting his teachings, which offered a pluralist and syncretic solution to the spiritual malaise of a globalized, neoliberal world.

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Never a mass movement, at its peak Aum registered 10,000 members in Japan and 40,000 worldwide, primarily in Russia. Its core, however, centered on a small number of people (approximately 1,100 by 1995) who renounced the world to live as monastics in Aum’s rural communes (shukkesha), where harsh ascetic practices and physical discipline, including the beating of members to make them engage in more ascetic practices, cultivated a culture of violence within the group. The first overt expression of this violent orientation actually occurred earlier in 1988 when Aum leaders acted to cover up the death of devotee Majima Terayuki, who had died during ascetic training. As a direct consequence of Terayuki’s death and its cover-up, another disciple, Taguchi Shuji, lost faith in Asahara and Aum, leading to his decision to go public with the internal workings and failings of Aum. To prevent Shuji from bringing disrepute to the movement, and to protect the divine truth presented by Asahara and his spiritual methods, a group of devotees murdered Shuji in February 1989. During this same period, Aum found itself embroiled in a series of disputes with neighbors of their communes and with families of devotees who had joined Aum only to sever all familial ties. This culture of violence and conflict culminated in the murder by devotees of an anticult lawyer, Sakamoto Tsutsumi, and his family in November 1989. While these murders and events would not come to light until years later, Asahara justified such actions vis-àvis his having attained divine status, arguing that by going beyond the world of normative morality, he had acquired a spiritual station that entitled him and other Aum devotees to kill in the service of their guru’s vision. To ground this reasoning within spiritual principles, Asahara reformulated the Tibetan doctrine of poa, which (as originally conceived) refers to the belief that spirits of the deceased can advance toward salvation with the guidance of spiritual practitioners who perform rituals in their honor. In moving from ascetic rituals to acts of murder, however, Asahara modified poa from being a sacramental performance aimed at improving the karmic merit of someone who had died to a process of “saving” an individual by intervening in their lives (i.e., killing them) in order to stop them from committing grave karmic sins. Problematically, because Aum regarded anyone who rejected their message as shinri no teki (“enemies of the truth”), this interpretation gave

Aum members the alleged sacred right to kill in order to (1) prevent individual persons not belonging to Aum from accruing negative karma as a result of living in the material world, and (2) produce a beneficial act that would bring merit in this world and the next. Such a doctrine proved foundational as Aum moved from individual acts of violence to a millennial vision that sanctified its dedication to actively engage in a perceived war between good and evil in order to secure Asahara’s divine mission. In an effort to gain positive exposure in public life, Asahara declared the necessity of political involvement, establishing the Shinrito (“Supreme Truth Party” or “Party of Truth”) political party in July 1989 to participate in the February 1990 elections. Shinrito, whose proclaimed purpose was to publicize Aum’s teachings, offer salvation to a wider audience, and provide Aum with access to “positive” publicity, experienced total failure and overwhelming defeat as all 25 candidates from the party, including Asahara, lost, leading to what Richard Young labeled “Aum-Bashing,” or public ridicule in the media (during and after the election) that served to further estrange Aum from Japanese society. Such conflicts and embarrassments (in politics, vis-à-vis the media, and with neighbors of their communes) intensified feelings within Aum that the movement was being threatened by hostile forces out to stop it from bringing about world transformation. Following its electoral humiliation, Aum held a seminar on the island of Ishigaki in March 1990, a moment that produced and cemented a marked shift in Aum’s ideological countenance. Positioning itself as being the only remaining force of good in a corrupt and evil world, the seminar culminated with Asahara’s announcement that a global apocalypse was inevitably close and only a select few (those who followed his teachings) would survive—the rest of humanity, as a result of turning its back on Aum, had lost any chance for universal salvation. In rejecting the world and denying the early optimism that positioned Aum as saving all humanity, Asahara and Aum began final preparation for Armageddon in which the force of good (Aum) would confront the forces of evil, whose sole purpose was to destroy Aum and subjugate the world. From the spring of 1990 onward, Aum devoted its energies to “self-protection” by constructing nuclear shelters on its communes and by acquiring the means to fight.

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In essence, Aum militarized itself, stockpiling weapons and recruiting trained scientists to help construct an arsenal of biochemical weapons. These weapons, Asahara promised, would lead Aum to victory against the forces out to destroy his movement. Believing that those who opposed Aum or who refused to acknowledge Asahara’s divine nature deserved physical punishment and direct retribution, Aum placed itself on a war footing, seeking through terrorist actions the apocalyptic justification necessary to secure its rightful place following the end of times. In the years leading up to March 1995, dissidents within the movement and opponents outside it (including the Society of Aum Victims, or Aum Higaisha no Kai, which consists of ex-members and the families of devotees) were attacked, leading to a complete disconnect between the aims of Aum and the realities of modern Japan. In an effort to legitimate this divide, Aum declared its secession from Japan in June 1994 by announcing the formation of a “sacred government” headed by Asahara as its holy leader. At the same time, Aum initiated a reign of terror. In addition to murdering more than a dozen political opponents whose bodies were incinerated in specially built microwave ovens, Aum staged its first sarin gas attack in Matsumoto (west of Tokyo) to strike at a group of judges administering a court case involving fraud charges leveled against Aum by Matsumoto landowners. Using a car to release the lethal gas, this act of domestic terrorism killed eight people (one victim died after 14 years of living in a coma) and injured more than 150. However, although mounting evidence, which included increasingly paranoid public declarations by Asahara, pointed to Aum as the prime suspect, Japanese authorities failed to arrest Asahara or suppress his movement following the Matsumoto attack. Ultimately, several Aum members were found guilty of masterminding the murders and attack. In early 1995, Asahara informed his followers that World War III had begun, a moment requiring a preemptive act of cosmic war to fully position Aum’s divine ascendance. On March 20, 1995, Aum members launched five coordinated attacks during rush hour, simultaneously releasing the chemical nerve agent sarin on several lines of the Tokyo subway system passing through Kasumigaseki and Nagatacho, home to the Japanese government. Labeled the “Subway Sarin Incident” by Japanese media, the attack

killed 12 people, severely injured more than 50, and impacted thousands of people’s vision. Beginning March 22, 1995, police mounted raids on Aum centers throughout Japan, including Aum’s primary commune at Kamikuishiki, arresting hundreds of members. Over the following months, Aum’s entire hierarchy was deconstructed as the Japanese government arrested and convicted all but one of the 189 Aum members brought to trial. Asahara, along with 12 other Aum members, was sentenced to hang for his crimes, which included seven counts of murder; however, although his avenues for appeal were exhausted in 2006, Asahara remains on death row following the June 2012 arrest of additional Aum members, which resulted in a postponement of death penalties. Following the 1995 attacks and subsequent arrests, the majority of Aum members left the movement, which was later stripped of its legal status and tax privileges as a religious organization—the Japanese government refused, however, to use an antisubversion law to ban the group entirely. In July 2001, Russian authorities arrested a group of Aum followers who sought to set off bombs near the Imperial Palace in Tokyo in an effort to free Asahara from jail. Such an event, however, has proved to be an outlier as, for the most part, only a small group of Aum devotees continue to exist, including members of Asahara’s family and others released from prison after serving their sentences. For these remaining members, maintaining their faith required both spiritual change in the form of renouncing Asahara and any teaching that legitimated violence, as well as material sacrifice by liquidating all of Aum’s remaining assets to provide compensation for its victims. To reflect and protect this distancing from Asahara, the movement officially changed its name to Aleph in 2000—“Aleph,” being the first letter of the Hebrew alphabet, signifies renewal. Aleph itself has undergone further transformations, including secessions and formations of new groups, such as the Hikari no Wa in 2007 by Joyu Fumihiro, a senior figure not directly involved in Aum’s violence. Today, Aum holds a formal designation as a terrorist organization in several countries, including Canada and the United States. In Japan, former members of Aum continue to be subject to arrest, and the Japanese Public Security Examination Commission considers both Aleph and Hikari no Wa to be branches of a “dangerous religion,” announcing as recently

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as January 2015 that both would remain under surveillance for three more years. Morgan Shipley See also Shoko Asahara Further Reading Baffelli, Erica. “Hikari no Wa: A New Religion Recovering from Disaster.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 39 (2012): 29–50. Baffelli, Erica, and Ian Reader. “Impact and Ramifications: The Aftermath of the Aum Affair in the Japanese Religious Context.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 39 (2012): 1–28. Beckford, James A. “A Poisonous Cocktail? Aum Shinrikyo’s Path to Violence.” Nova Religio 1, no. 2 (1998): 305–6. Brackett, D. W. Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo. New York: Weatherhill, 1996. Clarke, Peter B., ed. Japanese New Religions: In Global Perspective. London: Curzon Press, 2000. Head, Anthony. “Aum’s Incredible Journey Towards Armageddon.” Japan Quarterly (Oct.–Nov. 1996): 92–95. Kaplan, David E., and Andrew Marshall. The Cult at the End of the World: The Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear Arsenals of Russia. New York: Crown, 1996. Kaplan, Jeffrey. Millennial Violence: Past, Present and Future. London: Frank Cass, 2002. Kiyoyasu, Kitabatake. “Aum Shinrikyo: Society Begets an Aberration.” Japan Quarterly (Oct. 1995): 376–83. Lifton, Robert J. Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence and the New Global Terrorism. New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999. Metraux, Daniel Alfred. Aum Shinrikyo and Japanese Youth. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999. Mullins, Mark R. “Aum Shinrikyo as an Apocalyptic Movement.” In Thomas Robbins and Susan J. Palmer, eds. Millennium, Messiahs, and Mayhem: Contemporary Apocalyptic Movements. New York: Routledge, 1997. Murakami, Haruki. Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese Psyche. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. Pye, Michael. “Aum Shinrikyo: Can Religious Studies Cope?” Religion 26 (1996): 261–70. Reader, Ian. “Consensus Shattered: Japanese Paradigm Shifts and Moral Panic in the Post-Aum Era.” In Philip Charles Lucas and Thomas Robbins, eds. New Religious Movements in the 21st Century: Legal, Political and Social Challenges in Global Perspective. New York: Routledge, 2004. Reader, Ian. “Globally Aum: The Aum Affair, Counterterrorism and Religion.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 39 (2012): 177–96.

Reader, Ian. “Manufacturing the Means of Apocalypse: Aum Shinrikyo and the Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” In Ian Bellany, ed. Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Responding to the Challenge. New York: Routledge, 2007. Reader, Ian. Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000. Sims, Calvin. “Under Fire, Japan Sect Starts Over.” New York Times (Feb. 28, 2008): A7. Young, Richard Fox. “Lethal Achievement: Fragments of a Response to the Aum Shinrikyo Affair.” Japanese Religions 20, no. 2 (1995): 230–45.

Austro-Ottoman Wars The Austrian and Ottoman empires had a long history of rivalry and conflict. The Ottoman expansion into Serbia and Hungary in the 15th century led to Ottoman raids on Austrian territory and prolonged the Austro-Ottoman Wars, which shaped the history of both empires.

Early Conflicts

Ottomans initially raided the southern regions of Austria between 1408 and 1426, but subsequent decades saw more serious attacks. Sultan Süleyman’s successful invasion of Hungary, which resulted in the destruction of the Hungarian army at Mohacs in 1526, opened the way for systematic Ottoman attacks on Austrian territory. Furthermore, the Ottoman threat allowed the Habsburgs, the ruling dynasty of Austria, to unite the crowns of Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia. In 1515, the treaty of alliance concluded between Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I and King Uladislaus II Jagiello of Hungary and Bohemia specified that if one dynasty died out, the other would continue to resist the Ottomans. The death of King Louis II Jagiello at the battle of Mohacs allowed Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, Maximilian’s grandson, to become king of Hungary and Bohemia, eventually inheriting the Austrian crown as well.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1529–1533

Ferdinand’s succession, however, faced local resistance, notably from János Szapolyai (John Zápolya), who claimed

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the crown of Hungary. Ferdinand successfully campaigned in Hungary, capturing several major fortresses, including Buda, and occupying Győr, Komárom, Esztergom, Buda, and Székesfehérvár, and defeating Szapolyai in a few engagements. However, Ferdinand was unable to unseat his rival, who sought Ottoman help and recognized Sultan Süleyman’s suzerainty. In 1529, the Ottoman forces under Petry Rareş, voivod of Moldavia and Süleyman’s vassal, defeated Ferdinand at Feldioara (southern Transylvania). Furthermore, to protect his vassal, Sultan Süleyman launched a major invasion of Austria proper in 1529. The Ottoman siege of Vienna (September 27–October 14, 1529) ended after the Ottoman forces compelled Süleyman to withdraw, but it had a profound effect on the Austrians, who offered to give up the whole of Hungary to Szapolyai on the condition that at his death it should revert to Ferdinand. After peace negotiations failed, hostilities resumed in 1530. In the absence of the Ottoman army, the Austrians captured several cities in Hungary. But Süleyman returned in 1532 when he led some 200,000 men from Constantinople at the end of April. Holy Roman Emperor Charles mobilized his army and sought support from other European states. Fortunately for the Austrians, the Ottoman army did not reach Vienna as it became bogged down at Güns (Koszeg) where the Austrian garrison heroically defended the fortress for three weeks in August. Sultan Süleyman showed his great admiration for the enemy’s gallantry, inviting the Austrian commandant to his camp where he was cordially received and awarded a robe of honor, as well as posting guards in the breach in the wall to prevent his troops from entering during the respite. The dogged defense of Güns convinced Süleyman to give up besieging Vienna, which was much more fortified. After campaigning in Styria and parts of Lower Austria, he returned to Istanbul in early November. Austrians were more successful on the seas, where Andrea Doria, Emperor Charles’s admiral, had successfully operated against the Ottoman fleet and captured Coron, one of the strongest Ottoman coast fortresses in the Morea, Patras, and a few others forts. Fearing another Ottoman invasion, the Habsburgs sought to compromise while Süleyman, concerned about the rising Iranian power in the east, was quite willing to negotiate. In early 1533, a truce was concluded, with Süleyman demanding the keys of Gran in token of Austrian sub-

mission and homage; he later generously returned them without insisting on the surrender of the fortress. The formal Treaty of Constantinople was negotiated in June 1533. Ferdinand gave up his claims on Hungary, which meant Szapolyai retained his crown under Ottoman suzerainty. Austria agreed to pay annual tributes of 30,000 guldens. The treaty survived for seven years, although it was violated on several occasions since neither Szapolyai nor Ferdinand were fully satisfied with it. In 1537, the Austrian attempt to capture the Ottoman fortress at Essek (Osijek) resulted in a disastrous defeat at Đakovo. The new Treaty of Nagyvárad (February 1538) confirmed Szapolyai while Ferdinand was recognized as heir to the Hungarian throne if Szapolyai died childless.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1540–1547

In 1540, Szapolyai died, but a short while before his death, his wife bore him a son, John II Sigismund Szapolyai. Ferdinand refused to recognize his succession (Süleyman did) and besieged the Hungarian capital city of Buda. Yet he soon faced an Ottoman invasion as Sultan Süleyman sought to strengthen his authority in Hungary. The Ottomans defeated the Austrians at Buda and occupied central Hungary. In the Treaty of Gyula (December 29, 1541), Austria and the Ottoman Empire agreed to partition Hungary: Habsburgs received the western and northern regions, the Ottomans received central Hungary, while the eastern regions became the Ottoman client principality of Transylvania ruled by John Sigismund. However, hostilities soon resumed. Austrian attempts to avenge their defeat by seizing Algiers and Tunis led to another disastrous failure. In 1543, Süleyman captured all the fortresses leading to Buda, including Grau and Stuhlweissenberg, the largest in the area. Distracted by a new war against the Safavid Iranians in the east, the sultan entrusted the Hungarian theater to his lieutenants, who successfully campaigned in Styria, Carinthia, and Croatia in 1544. Hard pressed, Austrians sued for a truce in 1545, but hostilities continued until 1547 when the Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople) was signed, confirming the provisions of the Treaty of Gyula.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1551–1553

The Peace of Edirne was signed for a period of five years but lasted only three. By 1550, George Martinuzzi, who

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acted as a regent to John Sigismund, concluded an alliance with the Austrians to drive the Ottomans from Hungary. Although the allies gained some success and defeated the Turks at Deva, their relations soon soured and Ferdinand had Martinuzzi assassinated in 1551. The Ottoman counterattack soon reclaimed lost ground as the Turks captured major fortresses, including Temesvar and Szolnok, but failed to overcome determined Austrian resistance at Erlau (Eger) in 1552. An armistice ended hostilities in 1553, but a formal peace treaty came only 10 years later, and it confirmed the terms of the 1547 accord, keeping Hungary divided into Austrian (Royal) Hungary, Ottoman-held Central Hungary, and Transylvania.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1566

After the failed Ottoman siege of Malta (1565), the 72-yearold Sultan Süleyman turned to Hungary where he wanted to offset his failure at Malta as well as punish Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I who refused to pay the tribute. In 1566, the sultan’s army invaded southwestern Hungary and besieged Szigetvár, whose Croatian commander, Miklos Zrinyi, led a valiant defense that destroyed most of the fortress and its garrison but inflicted heavy losses on the Turks. Süleymen died during the siege on September 6 but his death was concealed from the army until the fortress was stormed on September 8. Informed of the sultan’s death, the Ottoman army returned to Constantinople (Istanbul) carrying Süleyman’s embalmed body for burial.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1591–1606

The so called “Long War” was caused by intermittent border strife between Austrian and Ottoman Hungary that intensified in 1591. Two years later, Croatian forces inflicted a heavy defeat on the Bosnian Ottoman army at Sissek (Sisak), which provoked a war. In 1594–1595, with Pope Clement VIII’s help, Austria established an alliance with Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia. In 1595, Austrians reclaimed Győr, Esztergom, and Visegrád, while Michael the Brave of Wallachia successfully campaigned on the Lower Danube, seizing Giurgiu, Silistra, Nicopolis, and Chilia. In late August 1595, Michael celebrated one of the most important Romanian victories over the Ottomans at Călugăreni, but could not exploit it due to lack of support from his allies. The Ottomans still managed to occupy Bu-

charest and Târgovişte, but they suffered a series of defeats at the hands of Transylvanian-Wallachian forces at Târgovişte, Bucharest, and Giurgiu. Alarmed by these setbacks, Ottoman sultan Mehmet III came to Hungary to lead his troops personally. In 1596, he captured Erlau (Eger) while in October, he snatched victory from the jaws of defeat at Mezokeresztes; with his troops fleeing en masse, Mehmet III personally led a desperate charge with the remaining troops and turned the tide of battle. For the next five years the war became a battle of fortresses, in which Austria gradually gained key fortresses in central Austria, although its attack on Buda failed in 1598. In 1599, the Austrian peace overtures were rebuffed by the sultan, whose new offensive led to the capture of Kanizsa (1600), but also to a defeat at Stuhlweissenberg (1601). In Transylvania, the situation improved in the Ottomans’ favor after tensions among the allies led to splitting of the coalition. In 1599, Michael the Brave invaded Transylvania and scored a victory at Şelimbăr, causing the defection of Sigismund Báthory of Transylvania to the Ottoman side. Threatened by Wallachian success, the Austrian army under Giorgio Basta invaded Transylvania and defeated the Wallachian army at Mirăslău (September 1600), with Michael later assassinated on Basta’s orders. In August 1601, the Austrian army defeated Sigismund Báthory at Guruslău, and later scored another victory over Transylvanians at Braşov (1603). After the Austrian defeat at Buda, in 1605, Ottomans seized Esztergom, Visigrad, Veszperm, and Palota, thus regaining much of the land lost since 1595. In Transylvania, István Bocskay launched an anti-Austrian uprising (1604), recognizing Ottoman sovereignty in exchange for military aid. The Long War ended with the Treaty of Zsitva-Torok (1606), which marked the first major check of the Ottoman expansion and stabilized the Habsburg-Ottoman frontier for half a century.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1663–1664

The new conflict between Austria and the Ottomans broke out following the invasion of Poland (1658) by Prince György Rákóczi II of Transylvania, an Ottoman vassal who, however, acted without the sultan’s permission. To rein in the unruly vassal, Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmet Pasha conducted a successful campaign (1660) in Transylvania that claimed Rákóczi’s life and annexed the region to the

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Porte. Rákóczi’s successor, Transylvanian prince János Kemény, fled to Vienna seeking Habsburg support against the Turks. Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I, desiring to bring Transylvania under his influence and prevent the spread of Ottoman authority, pledged support to Kemény. In 1663, following the Habsburg rejection of the Ottoman demands to evacuate Transylvania, Fazil Ahmad led some 100,000 Ottoman troops into Hungary and besieged the strategically important fortress of Nové Zámky (Neuhäusel, in Slovakia). The small Austrian army under Count Raimondo Montecúccoli was too weak to attack the Turks and sought protection on the fortified island of Schutt that protected the eastern frontier of Austria. The Nové Zámky fortress offered a determined resistance to the Turks, who captured it only at the end of Sepetmber. With the winter fast approaching, Köprülü Fazil Ahmad decided to winter in Serbia and resume the offensive in the spring. The threat of a major Ottoman invasion of Austria—the first since the time of Süleyman the Magnificent— prompted Leopold I to seek a wider alliance with European states. The Imperial Diet voted a levy of money and troops from the Holy Roman Empire while King Louis XIV of France, traditional enemy of the Habsburgs, chose to set aside his grievances and dispatched some 4,000 men under Jean de Coligny to assist the Imperial army under Montecúccoli. Köprülü Fazil Ahmad resumed the offensive in the spring of 1664 but conducted it very slowly. To avoid devastation of the Habsburg land, the Austrians chose to reach a peaceful settlement with the Porte, and negotiations began at Vasvar (Eisenburg) in late July. However, while they were underway, the Imperial and Ottoman armies continued to fight. As the Turks advanced, Montecúccoli chose to wait for the Turks behind the Raab River (in western Hungary) and shadowed their march along the right bank of the river. On August 1, Köprülü Fazil Ahmad found a convenient place near Szentgotthárd (St. Gotthard) Abbey to cross the Raab. But while his army was in the midst of the crossing, it was surprised by Montecúccoli, who exploited the fact that the Turks could only move across the river in small detachments that could be defeated piecemeal. Nevertheless, the Turks fought fiercely and broke the Austrian center, which was formed by the troops dispatched by the Imperial Diet. The Austrian right wing, however, held its

ground while the impetuous attack of the French on the left wing proved to be decisive. The Turks were driven across the river, abandoning most of their artillery and suffering heavy losses. Simultaneously another Habsburg army, operating in north Hungary, won a series of smaller victories against Kutschuk Mehmet Pascha, most notably at Levice. Despite these victories, Emperor Leopold chose to accept the Treaty of Vasvar with the Turks.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1683–1699

The Treaty of Vasvar held for 20 years before it was broken by another war. The so-called Great Turkish War, however, was not limited to Austrian-Ottoman conflict but rather involved other European states that united into an antiOttoman coalition. Relations between Austria and the Ottoman Empire remained tense. Austrian positions in Royal Hungary remained tenuous and faced resistance from the Kuruc movement led by Imre Thököly. In 1682, Thököly recognized Ottoman sovereignty, and Austrian attempts to subdue him prompted an Ottoman response. The Ottoman invasion of Austria in 1683 almost succeeded in capturing Vienna before the Austrian-Polish forces under King John III Sobieski of Poland scored a major victory at Vienna (September 1683) and drove them out of northwestern Hungary. Pope Innocent XI helped create the Holy League, consisting of the Holy Roman Empire, Venice, and Poland (Russia joined in 1686). The Poles conducted campaigns in Moldavia in 1686 and 1691 while Venetians attacked Ottoman interests in Dalmatia, Morea (southern Greece), and the eastern Mediterranean. The Ottomans repelled Russian invasions of Crimea (an Ottoman vassal) in 1687 and 1689 as well as attacks on the Ottoman fort of Azov in 1695– 1696. Yet the fate of the war was decided on the field of Hungary, where the Ottomans suffered defeats at Gran (Esztergom) and Neuhäusel (1685), Buda (1686), and Mount Harsan (near Mohacs, 1687). By the end of 1687, southern Hungary and much of Transylvania came under Habsburg (Austrian) control and Austrian operations extended into Serbia, where Habsburg forces celebrated victories at Belgrade (1688) and Nis (1689). Sultan Süleyman II’s counterattack into Transylvania and Serbia was at first successful and led to the conquest of Belgrade in 1690. Yet the Ottomans then suffered defeats at Slankamen (1691)

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and Grosswardein (Oradea, 1692). Austria then became distracted by the War of the Grand Alliance against France and turned away from the Ottoman front for almost five years. In 1697, as an Ottoman army marched from Belgrade toward Hungary, an Austrian army under Prince Eugene of Savoy routed it at the battle of Zenta on September 11. This crushing defeat compelled the sultan to accept peace negotiations, which resulted in the Treaty of Karlo­ witz on January 26, 1699. The Ottoman Empire, although retaining Serbia, accepted Austria’s control of all of Hungary (except the Banat of Temesvar), Transylvania, Croatia, and Slavonia, and recognized Venice’s influence in Morea and Dalmatia, and Poland’s presence in Podolia.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1716–1718

The Treaty of Karlowitz maintained peace between Austria and the Ottoman Empire for 15 years. Both empires waged wars on other fronts, however, and Sultan Ahmad III concentrated his efforts on reclaiming lands in Greece, which resulted in the start of the Venetian-Ottoman War in 1714. Austria accused the Turks of breaking the treaty by endangering Venetian interests and made a defensive alliance with Venice in 1716. The Austrian army, led by the brilliant commander Prince Eugene of Savoy, routed the Turks at Peterwardein on the Danube River on August 5, 1716, and captured the Banat of Temesvar, the only remaining Ottoman region in Hungary. The following year, Austrians invaded Serbia, defeating the Ottoman army and capturing Belgrade in August 1717. With the Austrians controlling much of Serbia and western Wallachia, the Ottomans sued for peace. In 1718, the Treaty of Passarowitz confirmed Austrian gains in Hungary, Serbia, and Wallachia.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1737–1739

In 1735, Russia and the Ottoman Empire became embroiled in a war that, two years later, involved Austria as well. A Russian ally since the late 1720s, Austria closely watched the Russian campaigns in Crimea in 1736–1737 and, following a series of Russian victories and alarmed by Russia’s ambitions, it joined the war in July 1737. The Ottoman army, however, proved to be much better prepared than its Crimean ally. The Turks inflicted several major defeats upon the Austrians, most notably at Banja Luka

(1737) and Grocka (1739), and forced them to sue for peace. The treaty of Belgrade, signed in 1739, proved to be a sweet retribution for the Ottomans, who compelled Austria to surrender Belgrade and parts of Wallachia.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1787–1791

Until the end of the 18th century, Austro-Ottoman relations remained relatively peaceful and focused on commercial and diplomatic contacts. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1787–1792 changed that. Empress Catherine II of Russia shared her “Greek Project”—partitioning of the Ottoman Empire—with Emperor Joseph and convinced him to take part in Russia’s war against the Porte. In 1783, Austria supported Russian annexation of Crimea, an Ottoman vassal state, which strained Austro-Ottoman relations. When the Porte declared war on Russia in August 1787, Austria joined as Russia’s ally, hoping to reverse territorial losses suffered in 1739. Yet, early on Austrians suffered a major defeat at Karánsebes (September 1788), allowing the Turks to launch devastating raids deep into the Banat of Temesvar. Although Austrians later recovered positions and even captured Belgrade, unrest in the Netherlands and Hungary, compounded by Prussian hostility, compelled Vienna to end the war at all costs. The Treaty of Svishtov (Sistova) reestablished the prewar situation, with only minor Austrian territorial gains in Croatia.

Later Relations

The Austro-Ottoman War of 1787–1791 was the last major conflict between these two states. Occupied with events in Europe, Austria abandoned its expansionist policy in the Balkans for decades to come while the Ottoman Empire became embroiled in a prolonged conflict with Russia. Austria remained neutral during the Crimean War (1853– 1856), which proved to be beneficial for the Ottoman Empire. Russian expansionism in the Balkans and the spread of Pan-Slavism as well as nationalism among the Slav peoples brought the Ottoman Empire and Austria closer as Vienna sought to restrain Russia’s influence in the region. Austria, while interested in the partition of the Ottoman Empire, perceived it as undesirable since it would have strengthened Russian positions and created difficulties with Slav peoples in the Balkans. In 1878, following Russia’s

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triumph over the Ottomans, Austria succeeded in containing Russian gains in the region and even secured permission to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, which remained under nominal Ottoman rule. The Bosnian issue proved to be fateful for both empires. In 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia, provoking a confrontation with Serbia that eventually contributed to the start of the First World War. Austria and the Ottoman Empire fought as allies in that war and both empires disintegrated as a result of it. Alexander Mikaberidze See also Crimean War, Religious Dimensions of; Ottoman Empire; Vienna, Siege of (1529); Vienna, Siege of (1683) Further Reading Aksan, Virginia. Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged. Harlow, UK: Longman, 2007. Fleet, Kate, Suraiya Faroqhi, and Reşat Kasaba, eds. The Cambridge History of Turkey. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006–2008. Hochendlinger, Michael. Austria’s Wars of Emergence: War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683–1797. London: Longman, 2003. Inalchik, Halil, and Cemal Kafadar, eds. Suleyman the Second and His Time. Istanbul: Isis, 1993. Murphey, Rhoads. Ottoman Warfare. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999. Parvev, Ivan. Habsburgs and Ottomans between Vienna and Belgrade, 1683–1739. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1995.

Ayodhya Conflict (1992) The Ayodhya conflict was a burst of intercommunal violence that erupted in 1992, with its epicenter in the city of Ayodhya (Faizabad district, Uttar Pradesh, India). The origins of the incident lay in the demolition of the Babri Masjid mosque by hardline Hindu extremists during a political rally that turned into a riot on December 6, 1992. According to the Hindus, the mosque, which was built in 1529, was built on a site regarded as the birthplace of Vishnu’s seventh avatar, Rama (“Ramkot,” or Rama’s fort), and on the remains of a previous Hindu temple (“Ram Janmabhoomi,” or Rama’s birthplace) that was demolished or

modified to allow the presence of the mosque. After the destruction of Babri Masjid, violence spread all over India, lasting for some months. It affected Mumbai, Surat, Ahmedabad, Kanpur, Delhi, Bhopal, and several other cities, eventually resulting in more than 2,000 deaths, mainly Muslim. In the Mumbai riots alone (December 1992–January 1993), some 900 people were killed with property damage amounting to nearly 3.6 billion dollars. Quarrels around the Babri Masjid date back to the mid19th century, when Hindu-Muslim incidents were recorded for the first time. Until then, the site was said to be used for religious purposes by both communities. In 1859, to avoid further incidents, British authorities set up a railing to separate the outer courtyard of the mosque and to avoid disputes. The demands presented by local Hindu groups claiming possession of the site and the right to establish a new temple were regularly denied by the colonial government. In 1946, in the overheated climate surrounding the British decision to leave India, the Akhil Bharatiya Ramayana Mahasabha (ABRM), an offshoot of the Hindu nationalist party Hindu Mahasabha, started agitating for the possession of the site, culminating in the installment of idols of Rama in the mosque. Despite the opposition of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (in office 1947–1964), the idols remained in place. A compromise was found, closing the mosque to the public and allowing priests to enter to perform daily worship, while both the Muslim authorities and the ABRM filed civil suits staking claims to the site. The social and political turbulence of late-1940s India largely accounted for these tensions. The end of British domination on August 15, 1947, had led to widespread violence and massive population movements between newly established India and Pakistan. In the process, some 14.5 million people had crossed the borders in the two directions, while deaths had ranged—according to the different estimates—between 200,000 and 1,000,000 people in a population of 390 million. Resettlement was another source of resentment and frustration, later taking a political form, for example, in the case of the Pakistani Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM). Although in Uttar Pradesh (at that time still part of the United Provinces together with present-day Uttarakhand) the impact of Partition was limited, the fact that the province had been one hotbed of the

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Indian national movement, coupled with the presence of a large and important Muslim minority (more than eight million people according to the Census of India 1941, accounting for 14.5 percent of the total population), contributed to making the crisis deeply felt. The compromise of 1949 somehow held until the early 1980s. In 1984, a committee was formed under the aegis of the right-wing Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) movement to “liberate” the Ramkot and build a new temple in lieu of the Babri Masjid. The project was supported by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), at that time assuming increasingly radical positions. The BJP also included the Babri Masjid issue in its nationwide electoral platform. The situation deteriorated when, in 1986, a district judge ordered the opening of the gates of the mosque to allow Hindus to worship there; the decision provided a boost to Hindu ambitions, while the Muslims, in protest, set up a Babri Masjid Movement Coordination Committee, which, three years later, splintered the (more radical) All-India Babri Masjid Action Committee (AIBMAC). In November 1989, the VHP convened a symbolic temple foundation– laying ceremony on a plot near the Babri Masjid, attended also by the Minister of Home Buta Singh. Muslim opposition heavily contested both the ceremony and the presence of the minister, claiming rights to the area where the foundations of the new temple had been laid. The poor management of the Ayodhya issue was one of the factors behind the results that Rajiv Gandhi’s Indian National Congress (INC) scored in the elections of November 22–26, 1989. The elections returned a very fragmented House of the People (Lok Sabha), with INC losing 207 seats and—while retaining the relative majority—forced to agree on a minority government led by the former minister of defense, Vishwanath Pratap Singh (in office 1989– 1990), and the National Front. The elections also witnessed the meteoric rise of the BJP, whose seats increased from 2 to 85 (11.63 percent of the votes) and whose support became crucial to the National Front government. In 1990, the situation further eroded. Between September and October, a pilgrimage between Somnath (Gujarat) and Ayodhya promoted by BJP senior leader Lal Krishna Advani triggered violent communal riots, culminating in the killing of 19 people in Ayodhya when the local police opened fire on BJP activists in late October. Governmental

uncertainty made things worse, and in an effort to reduce tension, the government proposed to acquire the land around the Babri Masjid and hand it over to a trust run by the VHP, while the status of the mosque would be referred to the Supreme Court for deliberation; the Court would be asked to decide whether there had previously been a Ram temple on that site, and if so, the site would be given to Hindu control. On October 19, an ordinance was issued to this effect, but Muslim opposition forced the government to withdraw it, leaving the issue unresolved. Soon after, Lal Krishna Advani was apprehended in the state of Bihar and prevented from reaching Ayodhya. The BJP withdrew its support from the government, leaving it short of a majority in Parliament and paving the way to new elections. In the new electoral round (May–June 1991), heavily influenced by the Ayodhya issue, the BJP further increased its representation, gaining 120 seats (20.04 percent of votes) in the Lok Sabha and the majority of the seats in the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh. Rajiv Gandhi’s killing (May 21, 1991) by a suicide bomber contributed to giving the elections a dramatic relevance and accounted—to a certain extent—for the good performance of the INC, which won 244 seats in the Lok Sabha and retook the premiership with Pamulaparti Venkata “P.V.” Narasimha Rao (in office 1991–1996) at the head of a new minority government. However, the political landscape grew increasingly polarized, with BJP’s success being at the same time the product of and the reason for a greater radicalization. In Uttar Pradesh, the incidents of October 1990 were pivotal in boosting BJP’s consensus and forcing the Babri Masjid crisis towards a showdown. It was to increase pressure on the central government that—under the auspices of the right-wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)— the VHP and the BJP rallied some 150,000 constituents in the meeting culminating in the riot and in the demolition of the mosque, which was protected by the local police. The demolition of the Babri Masjid triggered immediate and widespread violence both in India and outside. In Bangladesh and Pakistan the riots were especially violent and ended in the looting and damaging of Indian properties and in the retaliatory demolition of Hindu temples. Many Muslim countries formally complained to the Indian government (among them Iran and the Gulf monarchies, as well as Pakistan and Bangladesh), calling upon New

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Delhi to do more to protect its Muslim citizens. On December 16, the minister of home affairs, Shankarrao Chavan (in office 1991–1996), established the Liberhan Commission, a one-man panel formed by former High Court judge Manmohan Singh Liberhan, to investigate the events leading to the destruction of the mosque and their causes. However, since the very beginning, the work of the commission (whose report was due within three months) were extremely slow; the report was submitted to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (in office 2004–2014) on June 30, 2009, and tabled in Parliament in November after its conclusions—highly critical of the attitude of the promoter of the rally and of the leadership of the BJP, the VHP, and the RSS—had leaked to the press, fueling a very heated debate in the Lok Sabha. The debate on the report and on the accompanying Action Taken Report (ATR) that took place in December in the Lok Sabha and then in the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) did not placate the atmosphere; rather, the report’s harsh criticism of all the major right-wing mass Hindu organizations, as well as the fact that it contained no remark on the role of both the 1992 Indian government and then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, provided wide room for attacking it as politically biased. The debate also provided the VHP and the RSS with the occasion to reassert their commitment to building a Rama temple on the site of the Babri Masjid, “interpreting the will of millions of Hindus in the country.” The final document blamed 68 people, including senior BJP, RSS, and VHP leaders, for the demolition of the Babri Masjid. Among those criticized were BJP leaders such as Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Murli Manohar Joshi, and Lal Krishna Advani, and the BJP’s chief minister of Uttar Pradesh at the time of the crisis, Kalyan Singh (in office June 24, 1991–December 6, 1992), whose government was regarded as “the essential component” of a strategy (sometimes labeled a “conspiracy”) deliberately aimed at the demolition of the mosque. In the meantime, the results of the excavations that the Archaeological Survey of India had carried out on the Babri Masjid site in 2003 and submitted to the Allahabad High Court had added new reasons for complaint. Muslim activists vigorously contested the hypothesis of the presence of an original temple, restructured and expanded multiple times until the beginning of the 16th century,

when the final mosque was built; on the other hand, on the basis of this hypothesis, on September 30, 2010, the Allahabad High Court had decided that the 2.77 acres of the Ayodhya site had to be divided among the “Rama Lalla” (“Infant Lord Rama”), represented by the Hindu nationalist party Hindu Mahasabha (Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha) for the building of the Rama temple; the Sunni Waqf Board; and the Nirmohi Akhara, a Hindu religious denomination that in 1885 had filed a suit seeking consent to build a temple to Rama in an area adjoining the Babri Masjid. While they were not unanimous in their decision that the Babri Masjid was constructed after the demolition of a temple, the judges agreed that a temple or a temple structure predated the mosque at the same site. Both the judicial and the political solution of the conflict proved, thus, unsatisfactory. The building of the Lalla Rama temple in place of the Babri Masjid remains a key rallying point for Hindu nationalist forces, which periodically reaffirm their right thorough different symbolic acts, such as the launching of nationwide subscriptions to collect building materials. Large-scale political meetings continue to take place in Ayodhya on the anniversary of the Babri Masjid’s demolition, attended by thousands of supporters, and in 2009, the BJP released its election manifesto repeating its promise to construct a temple to Rama at the site. Tensions still lingering around the issue remain a reason of concern for local and central authorities. In February 2012, a train carrying Hindu activists to Gujarat from Ayodhya was set alight—allegedly by a Muslim mob—and 50 people died, while at least 1,000 people— mainly Muslims—died in the riots that erupted afterward. In 2015, the arrival of two stone-laden trucks in Ayodhya led to a new outburst of polemics, following the declaration of Nritya Gopal Das, head of the Ram Janmabhoomi Nyas (the trust in charge of the promotion and the supervision of the construction of the Lalla Rama temple), and other VHP leaders, complaining that the government led by Narendra Modi had done nothing to initiate the construction of the temple. The Ayodhya dispute is still pending in the Supreme Court, which has ruled that, until its final decision, no initiative has to be taken affecting the status quo. In the last few years, the issue has lost part of its emotional appeal. However, the Babri Masjid controversy dominated Indian

96 Ayyubids

politics for about two decades and was so controversial and rooted in communal politics that it polarized Indian people along religious lines for the first time since independence in 1947. Still more important, the uncertain government attitude has fueled a deep mistrust within both the Hindu and Muslim communities, with the latter deeply convinced that, at the root of the crisis, lies the will of the INC to appease the most radical fringes of the Hindu nationalism groups to sap the emergence of its right-wing competitors, such as the BJP. The rise of the BJP and the other forces of Hindu nationalism at the same time promoted and benefited from the Ayodhya conflict. However, the same force seems also to have pushed the conflict into a deadlock. Not surprisingly, the same Supreme Court affirmed, in August 2015, that it could take 10 years for the Babri Masjid case records to be streamlined. Gianluca Pastori See also India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in; India, Religious Conflict in Further Reading Ahmed, Hilal. Muslim Political Discourse in Postcolonial India: Monuments, Memory, Contestation. New York: Routledge, 2014. Gopal, Sarvepalli, ed. Anatomy of a Confrontation: Ayodhya and the Rise of Communal Politics in India. London: Zed Books, 1993. Hartung, Jan-Peter, Gillian Hawkes, and Anuradha Bhattacharjee. Ayodhya 1992–2003: The Assertion of Cultural and Religious Hegemony. Delhi: Media House, 2004. Hassner, Ron E. War on Sacred Grounds. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009. Hibbard, Scott W. Religious Politics and Secular States: Egypt, India, and the United States. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. Report of the Liberhan Ayodhya Commission of Inquiry. New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2009.

Ayyubids The Ayyubids were a family of Kurds who established an empire in the late 12th century. They ruled over Egypt, North Africa as far east as Tunisia, Syria, the upper portion of Mesopotamia (al-Jazira), the western regions of Arabia

(al-Hijaz), and Yemen until the mid-13th century. Their rule represented a time of prosperity both economically and culturally. Origins of the family line are traced back to the Armenian vicinity of Dvin. Ayyub ibn Shadhi ibn Marwan was a member of a powerful Kurdish tribe, the Rawadi, who in turn were part of the dominant Hadhbani clan. Displaced as Turkish power grew in the region, Shadhi became governor of Takrit in Iraq. Dying shortly after his appointment, Shadhi was succeeded by one of his sons, Ayyub. Ayyub and his brother, Shirkuh, would then enter the service of the lord of Mosul, Imad al-Din Zanki (Emad al-Din Zangi), in 1138 CE. Both would endear themselves to the lord and become prominent members of his establishment. When Zanki was succeeded by his son, Nur al-Din, the brothers continued to serve their new master. Shirkuh was dispatched to Egypt with Ayyub’s son, Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub (Saladin). Shirkuh became the vizier of the Fatamid caliph of Egypt and was succeeded by his nephew, Salah al-Din, the true founder of the Ayyubid dynasty, in 1169. Though still operating as liege to Nur al-Din, Salah al-Din began exerting his own control over Egypt and reestablished Egypt’s fidelity to the Abbasid Caliphate in 1171. Scholars mark Salah al-Din’s career as one of the major periods of the Ayyubid Empire. Saladin’s career was extensive and what follows is a summary of his military exploits. He and his commanders spent the early part of the 1170s continuing the subjugation of Egypt and began capturing territory through the Hijaz and Yemen with Sana’a being taken in 1175. With the death of Nur al-Din in 1174, Saladin turned his attention to Syria and the Jazira. He took control of Damascus in that same year and challenged the descendants of his former Zenki lord for the remainder of the territory. Aleppo and Mosul were subdued and made clients to the Ayyubids. As Saladin expanded his control over Islamic territories, he began vying for territory under Christian crusaders’ (often referred to as Frankish or Latin) control. Defeating the crusader armies at Hattin in 1187, Saladin took possession of the lands in the Levant, expelling the crusaders’ armies from Jerusalem, which had been conquered by the crusaders 80 years earlier. The recapturing of Jerusalem sparked a series of wars between Saladin and the Europeans, the Third Crusade, from 1189 to 1192. Saladin’s successors

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would face continuous encroachment from crusader armies in the mid-13th century. Saladin’s territorial expansion brought with it the establishment of a political system characterized as a confederation consisting of familial relations. Family members, including Saladin’s brother, sons, and nephew, were given governorship over principalities throughout the realm. These lords owed allegiance to the sultan but operated with autonomy over their respective fiefdoms. As a result, the Ayyubids were not entirely unified. Furthermore, this system would lead to internal conflicts among the various principalities, which began following the death of Saladin in 1193. The history of the Ayyubids following the death of Saladin is complex, but the emergence of his brother, alMalik al-Adil Sayf al-Din, and his son, al-Kamil, mark the second major period of the Ayyubid empire. After years of internal wrangling, Saladin’s brother, alAdil, emerged as the dominant prince and was proclaimed sultan in 1200. He further solidified his position with the capitulation of Damascus and northern territories in 1201. Though he consolidated his power over the fiefdoms, Egypt would be the primary seat of power for al-Adil and his son, al-Kamil. Al-Adil, as well as his son, emulated the political system instituted by Salah al-Din, granting his own descendants control of fiefdoms throughout the territory under Ayyubid control. His rule was largely peaceful both internally as well as with the crusader states still present on the coast of the Levant. However, in 1218, another invasion was undertaken by the crusaders in Egypt, the Fifth Crusade. Al-Adil died that same year, and al-Kamil succeeded his father. The crusader armies occupied the Egyptian city of Damietta until 1221 when they were expelled by al-Kamil. While al-Kamil’s period of rule is marked as one of excellent diplomacy with his enemies, Ayyubid territory in Yemen, the Hijaz, and the Jazira came under pressure from external rivals, such as the Seljuqs (Seljuks) in the north and the Khwarazmians in the east. A new crusade was initiated in 1227, the Sixth Crusade, while alKamil was competing with his brother, al-Mu’azzam, for the lands in Syria. By the time the crusader army arrived in 1228 at Acre, al-Kamil’s brother had died, and al-Kamil’s position was strengthened. He negotiated a peace with the crusaders in 1229 giving the crusaders control of Jerusalem.

Although the Ayyubid sultans from Salah al-Din to alKamil were frequently engaged in war with internal rivals and the external crusader threat, these years represent the apex of the Ayyubid dynasty. Despite the constant tension with the crusaders, the Ayyubids were able to establish commerce with European nations, including many Italian states, first under Salah al-Din. Al-Adil and al-Kamil instituted strict economic policies, which were of great benefit for the dynasty. A number of schools (madrasas) were constructed across the territories, and a number of great Andalusian scholars settled in Ayyubid lands, including the botanist Ibn Baytar, during the reign of the Ayyubids. With the death of al-Kamil in 1238, the Ayyubid dynasty entered its final period, which represents the decline and dissolution of the empire. Civil war erupted with the death of al-Kamil. As was common, various princes began vying for control, but scholars have pointed to a departure in how rivals viewed each other. Relations between descendants were far more acrimonious. Though al-Kamil’s youngest son, al-Adil II, was proclaimed sultan in Cairo, his brother, al-Salih Ayyub, would overthrow him and take the sultanate in 1240. Al-Salih Ayyub battled his cousin, al-Nasir Dawud, and uncle, al-Salih Isma’il, for Syria and the Levant. The latter two would align themselves with the crusaders in an attempt to fend off al-Salih Ayyub. Their strategy failed, and al-Salih Ayyub secured Syria and retook Jerusalem from the crusaders. He would be the final Ayyubid to control the many principalities of the empire, except for Aleppo, which was under the command of a direct descendant of Salah al-Din, al-Nasir Yusuf. However, the retaking of Jerusalem was the impetus for yet another invasion by crusader armies in 1248, the Seventh Crusade, landing again in the Egyptian city of Damietta in 1249. Al-Salih Ayyub died that same year and was succeeded by his son, but the Mamluk soldiers, who had become the backbone of al-Salih Ayyub’s army, took control in 1250, effectively ending the Ayyubid line of rulers in Egypt. Syria, including Aleppo and Damascus, remained under Ayyubid authority with al-Nasir Yusuf at its head, but lands under his dominion were whittled away by the Mamluks and the Mongols who swept in from the east. Following the sack of Baghdad in 1258 by the Mongols, al-Nasir Yusuf was captured and the former lands of the Ayyubids were eventually overrun by the Egyptian Mamluk army in 1260. Remnants of this empire lasted in a

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few vicinities including the region of Hama in Syria until 1341 and Hisn Kayfa (Hasankeyf) in Turkey. Matthew Long See also Caliphate; Islam and War (Jihad); Saladin Further Reading Gibb, H. A. R. “Ayyubids.” In Kenneth Sutton et al., eds. A History of the Crusades, Vol. 2: The Later Crusades, 1189–1311. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.

Humphreys, R. S. From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193–1260. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. Ibn al-Furat, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahim. Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders. 2 vols. Translated by U. Lyons and M. C. Lyons. Introduction and notes by J. S. C. Riley-Smith. Cambridge, MA: Heffer, 1971. Maqrizi, Ahmad Ali. A History of the Ayyuubid Sultans of Egypt. Translated by R. J. C. Broadhurst. Boston: Twayne, 1980.

B Baal

See also West Semitic Warfare; Yahweh as Divine Warrior

The storm god and divine warrior Baal was the son of El in the literature of Ugarit, the closest extant witness to Canaanite mythology (Ugarit was destroyed about 1200 BCE). He was often portrayed in iconography holding thunderbolts as a weapon. The most well-known account of Baal’s battles is found in the Baal Cycle. First, Baal fought and defeated Yam (sea) after he had demanded that El give Baal to him. When he defeated Yam, Baal built a house to proclaim his victory and provoked Mot (death) to battle, at which point Mot threatened Baal. Baal was fearful and surrendered to Mot (he died). However, when the rains stopped due to Baal’s absence, Anat defeated Mot and rescued Baal to restore him to his throne and restore creation to its proper order. This mythological victory provided the basis for his actions on behalf of humans: if Baal could defeat Yam and Mot, then he was strong enough to defeat anyone who would threaten the king of Ugarit or other followers of Baal. For example, a prayer from Ugarit calls on Baal to drive the enemy from their city in return for a series of offerings to the divine warrior. Although the end of the inscription is broken, the Aramean king Zakkur (about 800 BCE) prayed to Baal-Shamayn during a siege and Baal answered him through a prophet, assuring Zakkur that he would rescue him. Charlie Trimm

Further Reading Hallo, William W., and K. Lawson Younger Jr., eds. Context of Scripture. 3 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1997. Miller, Patrick D., Jr. The Divine Warrior in Early Israel. HSM 5. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973.

Babylonian Conquest of Israel (597–586 BCE) Following the death of Solomon in 931 BCE, the Kingdom of Israel divided into two separate entities, Israel proper in the north and Judah and Benjamin (added later) in the south. Israel became apostate first, having not even one righteous ruler, so its capital, Samaria, was therefore destroyed by the Assyrians in 722 as an act of divine judgment. In addition, the great bulk of the nation’s population was taken captive and scattered throughout the Assyrian Empire. Following Assyrian policy in such circumstances, foreigners were imported into Israel, resulting eventually in a mixed ethnicity called Samaritans. All this, says the historian, was God’s punishment for Israel’s infidelity (2 Kings 17:7–13). 101

102  Babylonian Conquest of Israel (597–586 BCE)

According to the biblical tradition, the southern kingdom, under the more godly kings of the Davidic dynasty, held on for 136 more years but at last met a fate similar to that of its sister nation, Israel. This time the instrument of Yahweh’s wrath was the Babylonians who had overcome and replaced Assyria on the world stage by 626. The following account will trace the course of these events and their aftermath. The first campaign was led by Nebuchadnezzar II in 605. He had overwhelmed the last remnants of the Assyrian hegemony at Haran in 609, then at Carchemish in 605, and then swept into Judah to take a number of choice Jewish captives to Babylon. Judah at the time was ruled in rapid succession by three sons and one brother of the godly king Josiah: Jehoahaz (609), Jehoiakim (608–598), Jehoiachin (598–597), and Zedekiah (597–586). Jehoahaz ended up in Egypt because of his rebellion against Pharaoh Necho, the temporary lord of the Levant. Jehoiakim, an appointee of Necho, occupied Judah’s throne in the last years of Egyptian suzerainty into that of Babylonia. Nebuchad­ nezzar subjected him to vassalage in 605, a state of affairs that continued under Jehoiachin. By 597, the Babylonian king ran out of patience with the incessant attempts at rebellion by the Jewish rulers. He therefore besieged Jerusalem, plundered the royal palace and temple, and took thousands of captives, including Jehoiachin. Nebuchadnezzar permitted Zedekiah, the uncle of the three previous three kings, to occupy Judah’s throne until he too rebelled. After a two-year siege (588–586), Nebuchadnezzar came once more, this time leveling the holy city to the ground and burning down its magnificent Solomonic temple. Zedekiah was captured, blinded, and taken to Babylon along with thousands of other prisoners of war. Meanwhile, Jehoiachin, the last surviving heir to the Davidic crown, was languishing under house arrest in Babylonia until the death of Nebuchadnezzar, whose successor, Merodach-Baladan, released him and granted him a pension on which he lived for the rest of his days. One of the most remarkable archaeological finds of the late 19th entury was a collection of cuneiform tablets consisting of records of the Neo-Babylonian (or Chaldaean) kings from the first year of the first ruler of the regime, Nabo-polassar (626–623), to its overthrow by Cyrus and the Persians in 539, the last year of Nabonidus (555–539). The relevance to the biblical account of events leading to

Judah’s demise is immediately apparent. According to the Babylonian rendition, Nebuchadnezzar II, crown prince of Babylon and successor to Nabo-polassar, enjoyed a lengthy reign of 43 years (605–562) that paralleled the major events of Judah’s last two decades (609–586) in its own land and nearly the entirety of exile in Babylonia (605– 539). Thus, the historical events of this important era are documented by the respective historical memories of the major protagonists involved. The historian is able then to assess the objectivity of the data and draw conclusions about the Tendenz that is unavoidable in historiographical reportage. The first significant point of comparison pertains to Nabo-polassar’s conquest of the Assyrian city Haran in 609 despite the attempted interdiction of the Egyptian army that had come north to aid Assyria. The Bible relates that King Josiah, loyal to Babylonia, had encountered the Egyptians at Megiddo in the fruitless objective of buying time for his Babylonian allies (2 Kings 23:28–30). The Babylonian Chronicle text in the British Museum says not a word about Josiah and Judah, no doubt because his relatively limited and ineffective efforts seemed of no consequence to the Babylonian historian. Other documents in the British Museum describe the Babylonian army, under the command of Nebuchadnezzar II, having taken the important Assyrian post of Carchemish on the Euphrates in 605. Again, nothing is said directly of Judah, but the region that included Judah, then known to the Babylonians as Hatti, became the arena for predation by Nebuchadnezzar. Line 8 of the inscription reads, “At that time, Nebuchadnezzar conquered the whole area of the Hatti-country,” which is another term for the whole area of the Levant from Egypt to what is now Turkey. In that lies Judah and Jerusalem. The Bible states that during that campaign Nebuchadnezzar laid Jerusalem under threat and, in fact, captured the city and deported a number of promising young men including Daniel (Daniel 1:1–7; cf. 2 Kings 24:1–7). Nebuchadnezzar established Judah as a client state in 605 and retained Jehoiakim as king. The rebellion of Jehoiakim, noted above, was countered by Nebuchadnezzar, who removed Jehoiakim and set the latter’s son Jehoiachin in his place in 597. According to British Museum documents, Nebuchadnezzar encamped against the city of Judah and seized the city, capturing the king. He appointed in

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After conquering the Hebrew city of Jerusalem in 586 BCE, Nebuchadnezzar II made prisoners of much of the population and moved them to Babylon. It was not until after Nebuchadnezzar’s death in 562 BCE that the Hebrews began returning to their homeland. (Ridpath, John Clark. Ridpath’s History of the World, 1901)

Judah a king of his own choice, received tribute, and sent the captives to Babylon. According to 2 Kings 24:9–17, this strategy failed, resulting in a massive devastation of Jerusalem, the looting of its temple, and the deportation of Jehoiachin to Babylon where he remained until at least 562, the year of King Nebuchadnezzar’s death. Unfortunately, the Chronicles attest to nothing beyond Nebuchadnezzar’s 10th year (595), and thus the account of the total destruction of Jerusalem and the temple is limited to the Bible alone (2 Kings 24:18–25:17; cf. 2 Chronicles 37:17–21). The Bible provides only a few glimpses into the affairs of the Jewish Diaspora during the 70 years of the Babylonian

exile (2 Kings 24:27–30; 2 Chronicles 36:17–21; Nehemiah 1:1–2:8; 13:6; Daniel; Psalm 137). As for the postexilic era, though biblical texts ignore him, secular inscriptions begin to yield important information from the reign of Nabonidus (556–539), the ruler of Babylonia who succeeded Nebuchadnezzar after six years of turmoil. His son Belshazzar, however, finds a place in the Bible (Daniel 5:1–31; 7:1; 8:1). With the death of Belshazzar the Babylonian Empire collapsed and the Medo-Persian Empire took its place. After Cyrus the Great (550–530) penetrated and destroyed the city of Babylon in 539, he issued a decree in 538 in which he gave permission for captives

104  Bacon, Roger (ca. 1214–1294)

in the hitherto Babylonian Empire to return to their homelands. The text of Cyrus’s decree has been preserved in the socalled Cylinder of Cyrus (see elsewhere in this volume) and in an edited form in both 2 Chronicles 36:22–23 and Ezra 1:1–4. In the biblical passages, it is Yahweh of Israel and not Marduk of Babylonia who commissioned Cyrus to issue his decree, and specifically it is the Jews who not only may return home but who will be provided workers and material to rebuild the house of the Lord. Eugene H. Merrill See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Merrill, Eugene H. Kingdom of Priests: A History of Old Testament Israel. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2008. Moore, Megan Bishop, and Brad E. Kelle. Biblical History and Israel’s Past. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011. Wiseman, D. J. Chronicles of Chaldaean Kings (626–556 B.C.). London: Trustees of the British Museum, 1961.

Bacon, Roger (ca. 1214–1294) Roger Bacon was born in approximately 1214 at Ilchester (near Somerset, England) and died June 11, 1294, in Oxford. He was a philosopher, theologian, and naturalist, as well as a Franciscan friar. He was educated at Oxford University where he was taught and influenced by scholastic philosopher and theologian Robert Grosseteste. He finished his studies in Paris where he followed the lectures of Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great. He was awarded the title of master of arts in Paris in 1241 and was proposed to occupy the position of professor in the Paris University, where he taught philosophy and logic of Aristotle, the Latin language, and other disciplines until 1247. Some researchers believe that Bacon had obtained the title of philosophy doctor there, while others suggest that there is no direct evidence of his doctoral dissertation, and the highest title he was awarded in Paris—miracle doctor (doctor mirabilis in Latin, which means astounding teacher)—is posthumous and figurative.

In 1250, Bacon returned to England where he started his teaching at Oxford University and in 1256 joined the Franciscan order. In 1257 he was accused of alchemy and of dabbling in black magic and was dismissed from teaching. He also was eventually forced to leave England and was placed under close supervision in a Franciscan convent in Paris. Between 1265 and 1267, due to the personal protection of Pope Clement IV, Bacon was allowed to disregard the general rule of the Franciscans not to publish any pamphlets and other works, and in a very short period he wrote three key treatises: Opus Majus, in which he explained how Aristotle’s science can be incorporated into theology; Opus Minus (preserved only in fragmentary form); and Opus Tertium, an introduction to the Opus Majus, which contains some biographic details about Bacon. Most likely, Bacon also wrote works in natural history, optics, physics, mechanics, and alchemy, gaining quite a bit of fame at this time as a writer. In 1268 he returned to Oxford and continued his studies; most likely Communia mathematica, Communia naturalium, and Compendium studii philosophie were written at that time. Based on the Condemnations of 1277, which prohibited the teaching of certain disciplines, General of the Franciscan Order Bonaventura severely condemned Bacon because of his adherence to and promulgation of astrology, and in 1278 Bacon was placed under house arrest for an extended period, at least a year, after which he returned to the Franciscan House at Oxford and continued his studies. In 1292 before his death, he was free to work on the Compendium studii theologie which probably was never finished. Bacon is famous due to his critique of authority and his distrust of abstract truths that could not be verified and/or proven. He maintained confidence in expert knowledge rather than in the field of faith and held to empiricism in respect to the natural world. That was why he appealed for the study of optics, physics, and mechanics, which he considered to be “practical geometry.” He was also especially interested in the development of the methodology of scientific cognition, the basics of which he envisaged in grammar. Bacon proposed a new vision of grammar as the foundation of any theory, anticipating in such a way the theory of “universal grammar.” Bacon was among the first who appealed for reading the works of Aristotle and Avicenna in their original language

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because he believed that their later translations contained many mistakes. He suggested that Greek, Arabian, and classical Hebrew were as necessary for the pursuit of scientific research as Latin. He believed that mathematics was “the door and the key” for all other sciences. He suggested that mathematical axioms were innately known by every human being. Bacon also believed that human knowledge is managed by experimental science (scientia experimentalis), which he understood as a means of acquisition of the knowledge of nature. This science is in opposition to superstition and magic. Experimental science is the highest and the only one true moral philosophy. One of its most important missions is the streamlining of the state, which Bacon perceived as a giant machine; the state should manage the selection of talented youth and their education. Bacon believed that morality is very important for the young because knowledge could penetrate only to a pure soul, which is able to perceive intellectual energy (intellectus agens), understood as divine wisdom. Only true Christian theists are able to reach depths of this type of knowledge, and Bacon envisaged broad dissemination of Christianity all over the world, by conquest if necessary, or by conversion of adherents of all different faiths to Christianity. Bacon expressed many bold hypotheses about future inventions, most remarkable of which were the telescope and aircraft; he also mentioned submarines, artificial minerals and precious stones, remedies for life extension, astrological maps, and other useful inventions that have parallels in the works of Leonardo da Vinci and later were put into practice. Some researchers also suggested Bacon to be the first European who described gunpowder (he had a chance to observe its action during a demonstration by Chinese artists) and suggested the list of ingredients necessary for its composition. Based on his astronomic and astrological observations, Bacon severely criticized the Julian calendar and proposed to revise it. Bacon was not sufficiently esteemed by his contemporaries; nevertheless, some of his works were published during the Enlightenment in 18th-century Europe. His critique of scholastic deduction was later adopted by other philosophers, including Francis Bacon, Giordano Bruno, and others. Rene Descartes highly appreciated his estimation of mathematics. Bacon’s legacy was revised again at the beginning of

Roger Bacon, a 13th-century English Franciscan friar and forwardthinking scientist, is remembered for his emphasis on observation and experimentation in science. Although gunpowder was invented in China, it is widely believed that Bacon was the first in Europe to document its formula and ingredients. (Library of Congress)

the 20th century by Martin Heidegger and Alistair Crombie. In 1935, a crater on the Moon was named in his honor. Olena Smyntyna Further Reading Clegg, Brian. Roger Bacon: The First Scientist. London: Constable & Robbins, 2003. Lindberg, David. Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. Roger Bacon and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters. No. 57. Leiden: Brill, 1997.

Badr, Battle of (624 CE) The grand ghazwa (incursion) of Badr, as the incident is known, took place in March 624 CE. Badr is a watering

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place about 100 miles south of Medina along the route to Mecca, where Muhammad achieved a landmark victory for Islam for the first time over his native people of Quraysh. During the battle, Muhammad himself was calling God loudly as reported by Ibn Hisham, his biographer (d. 833). This victory for Muhammad’s forces inflicted a psychological defeat on the Quraysh of Mecca and inspired the new believers of Islam to continue to spread the prophet’s message. Without the victory at Badr, the message of Islam would have perished. From the year 610 CE, when Muhammad started to receive the message of Islam from God, he was ill-treated by the Quraysh, the tribe that dominated Mecca. After nearly 12 years of their persecuting Muhammad and his few followers, Muhammad decided to emigrate to Yathrib (later Medina), which is north of Mecca and where he was promised a safe haven by its tribes. This took place in 622. The prophet started an economic war of attrition, attacking the vital Meccan trade routes to finance his activities and to punish the Quraysh. In January 624, Muhammad dispatched a force to spot the commercial movement between Mecca and al-Taif in Hijaaz, which resulted in a confrontation between the Muslims and a Meccan caravan led by Amr b. al-Hadrami, who was killed. The Muslim force confiscated the caravan, taking two prisoners back to Muhammad in Medina. The Quraysh were forced to negotiate with Muhammad to free the two men; one was converted to Islam and stayed in Medina. The attack was without Muhammad’s permission, the Qur’an stating that Muslims should fight only those who initiate aggression against them. The Quraysh realized the rising danger that Muhammad posed, and in late February–early March 624, Muhammad marched out to intercept the grand annual caravan of Quraysh returning from Syria to Mecca. It was led by Abu Sufyan, chief of the prestigious clan of Umayya. Since Badr is a place of several rich water wells, it was a place most caravans used for rest. Probably through merchants or agents, Abu Sufyan knew of the trap and managed to divert the caravan closer to the coast, thus bypassing Badr. At the same time, he sent word to Mecca asking for reinforcements. Although Abu Sufyan made it safely to Mecca, an army of about 1,000 warriors went out to attack Muhammad’s force. Abu Jahl commanded

the army, which included Muhammad’s uncle, al-Abbas b. Abd al-Muttalib. Muhammad’s army consisted of only about 310 men. The night before the battle, Muhammad filled all the wells with sand, except the one near his enemy, hoping to deprive the Quraysh of water once they reached Badr. On Friday, March 14, 624, the two sides clashed. The Muslim side included Abu Bakr, Umar, and Ali, who all became the rightly guided caliphs after Muhammad’s death. Only Uthman stayed behind in Medina tending to his wife and to the daughter of the prophet, Ruqayya. The outcome of the Battle of Badr was disastrous for Quraysh. Abu Jahl was killed with 70 other Qurayshi leaders, while the Muslims under Muhammad lost only 14 men. Many Meccans were taken prisoner, but were freed after Mecca paid Muhammad a large ransom, according to Ibn Hisham, al-Tabari. The repercussions of the Battle of Badr were overwhelming: the new Muslim army gained great confidence in Muhammad, and they considered the victory a sign from God who sent his angels to fight with the believers. It was a long-awaited punishment to their enemies, and they named it al-Furqan, or salvation, which was mentioned in the Qur’an, 3.124. The Muslims have ever since glorified the names of every person who took part in Badr and called them alBadriyyun. As for Muhammad, he took this opportunity of victory to besiege the Jewish tribe of Banu Qainuqa in Medina, forcing them to evacuate. As for the Quraysh, the shock of defeat was overcome quickly and calls for revenge were loud. They mobilized a large army to punish the Muslims, led by Abu Sufyan, who managed to defeat Muhammad in battle in March 625 at Uhud, outside Medina. Because Badr took place during the holy month of Ramadan between the minority believers and their superior enemy, Muslims in modern times try to use the name “Badr” as inspiration for the operations of militant groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other places in which insurgencies are being fought. The Egyptian army named its attack on Israel (Yom Kippur) in 1973 “Operation Badr,” which took place also during Ramadan. Taef Kamal El-Azhari See also Muhammad as Warrior; Uhud, Battle of; Yom Kippur War

Baha’i Faith and War  107 Further Reading Guillaume, Alfred. The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ish.āq’s Sīrat Rasūl Allāh. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 1955. Hamidullah, Muhammad. The Battlefields of the Prophet Muhammad. 4th ed. New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1992. Watt, W. Montgomery. Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Baha¯dur, Banda¯ Singh (1670–1716) Bandā Singh Bahādur was the military commander of the Sikh community immediately following the death of the 10th and final human guru, Guru Gobind Singh. Though originally a Hindu ascetic, he adopted Sikhism after a meeting with the guru in 1708. He is remembered for avenging the killing of Guru Gobind Singh’s sons and mother in Sirhind by defeating the forces of Wazīr Khān and having him executed, as well as for his establishment of the first Sikh state in Punjab. Though Bandā Singh Bahādur’s conquests of 1709– 1710 were rapidly reversed by the Mughal Imperial Army, he continued maneuvers against the Sikhs’ enemies, including the hill chiefs to Punjab’s northeast, who had earlier allied with the Mughals against Guru Gobind Singh. It was during this period that, some traditional sources argue, he founded his own loyal group of followers, styling himself the spiritual successor of the 10th guru. Bandā Singh Bahādur was ultimately captured after a successful Mughal siege of Gurdās Nangal in 1715. Popular tradition recounts the public torture and execution of him and his companions in the imperial capital of Delhi, prefacing the atrocities that Sikhs would continue to face throughout the 18th century. Armed members of the khālsā were forced to retire into the jungles and foothills of Punjab in the years immediately following Bandā Singh Bahādur’s defeat. Those who styled him the 11th human guru were quickly marginalised within the Sikh community, enjoying no political success and remaining confined to very small numbers. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn See also Mughal-Sikh Wars; Singh, Guru Gobind; Sirhind, Battle of

Further Reading Dhavan, Purnima. “Sikhism in the Eighteenth Century.” In Pashaura Singh and Louis E. Fenech, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Sikh Studies (pp. 49–58). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Mandair, Arvind-Pal Singh. Sikhism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.

Baha’i Faith and War The Baha’i faith is a monotheistic religion founded in Iran in the 19th century. Baha’is have been persecuted in the Middle East throughout the history of the faith because Islamic leaders have frequently viewed it as Islamic apostasy rather than an independent monotheistic religion. Whereas adherents of many major faith traditions have at times claimed scriptural sanction for warfare, the prophetfounder of the Baha’i faith, Bahá’u’lláh (Mírza Husayn ‘Alí, 1817–1892), explicitly and unambiguously exhorted his followers never to engage in violence on religious grounds. The Summons of the Lord of Hosts (SLH), a collection of tablets containing Bahá’u’lláh’s sayings, states: “Beware lest ye shed the blood of anyone. Unsheathe the sword of your tongue from the scabbard of utterance, for therewith ye can conquer the citadels of men’s hearts. We have abolished the law to wage holy war against each other” (p. 23). His son and appointed successor ‘Abdu’l-Bahá (1844–1921) insisted that the purpose of religion is to promote love, peace, and harmony, and that the absence of religion is preferable to the presence of religion in the world if that religion is a source of warfare, enmity, and strife. Suffering violent persecution by the Persian government and Islamic clerical establishment, two youth members of the Bábí movement, which was a precursor to Baha’i, concocted a feeble plan to assassinate the Persian monarch, Násiri’d-Dín Shah, in 1852. However, Baha’i founder Bahá’u’lláh forcefully denounced such actions, declaring that it was better to be slain than to slay another. The Baha’i commitment to accept martyrdom, rather than to resist persecution with violence, enhanced their reputation at home and abroad, facilitating the rapid expansion of the movement in the Middle East and South Asia in the late 19th and

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early 20th centuries. The lesson that Baha’is have taken from this is that violence is ultimately counterproductive: the harsher the persecution directed at them, the greater their fame and the more widely their message spreads. In an article for the Bombay Chronicle on May 24, 1944, the champion of nonviolence, Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), described the Baha’i faith as “a solace to mankind.” However, Baha’is cannot be described as absolute pacifists, because they acknowledge that force may be necessary to protect the defenseless or to resist aggression. Nor are they forbidden from serving as noncombatants (whenever possible) in the military or in times of war. ‘Abdu’lBahá was knighted by the British government for his humanitarian service in Palestine during the First World War. Baha’is’ vision of a future world order concedes the need for coordinated military action to keep the peace. States would require only the armaments needed to defend their borders, maintain internal order, and contribute to collective security, should a rogue state become belligerent. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá stated that while it is commendable for an individual to forgive a personal injury, it is “injustice” to allow an assailant to harm someone else; defense of self or others must, however, stop short of retaliatory vengeance. Because Baha’is regard prejudice, war, and exploitation as the expression of immature stages of a vast historical process of human development, they envision a future world in which war is neither glamorized nor necessary, and structures that promote enduring peace prevail. Baha’is believe in the unity of humanity and a future single global government. To that end, they have been very active in promoting international programs through organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. E. Taylor Atkins See also Pacifism, Religious Further Reading ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. The Promulgation of Universal Peace: Talks Delivered by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá During His Visit to the United States and Canada in 1912. Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1982. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Some Answered Questions. Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1990. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Tablets of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá Abbas. Chicago: Bahá’í Publishing Society, 1909.

Bahá’u’lláh. Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh. Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1982. Bahá’u’lláh. The Summons of the Lord of Hosts: Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh. Bundoora, Victoria: Bahá’í Publications Australia, 2002. Esslemont, John E. Bahá’u’lláh and the New Era: An Introduction to the Bahá’í Faith. London: Allen & Unwin, 1923. Nabíl-i A’zam. The Dawn-Breakers: Nabíl’s Narrative of the Early Days of the Baháí Revelation. Translated by Shoghi Effendi. Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1932. Smith, Peter. A Concise Encyclopedia of the Bahá’í Faith. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2000. Universal House of Justice. The Promise of World Peace. Haifa, Israel: Bahá’í World Center, 1985. Walbridge, John. “The Bábí Uprising in Zanján.” Iranian Studies 29, nos. 3–4 (1996): 339–62.

Balfour Declaration (1917) The Balfour Declaration derives its name from a letter sent by Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign secretary, to Baron Walter Rothschild, a prominent Jewish leader in the United Kingdom. Dated November 2, 1917, the letter publicly declared that the British government supported the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. It further avowed to actively assist in this endeavor. One week later, on November 9, 1917, the Balfour Declaration was published in the press. Modern political Zionism was formally established in 1897 by Austro-Hungarian journalist Theodor Herzl following the publication of his pamphlet Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State). Herzl argued that the Jewish people should be granted a national state. Initially, a portion of British East Africa was offered to the Jewish people, a plan that Herzl supported. Known as the “Uganda Scheme,” it was formally presented at the 1905 World Zionist Congress. Membership resolutely declined the proposal. Most Zionists were adamant that any future state be established in the “promised land” of Palestine, which, according to the Hebrew Bible, God promised to the descendants of Abraham. Meanwhile, a wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine occurred between 1904 and 1914, largely from the Russian Empire. Rising anti-Semitism, pogroms, and economic hardship were primary reasons for immigration. During

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this 10-year period, nearly 20,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine. On the eve of the First World War, approximately 85,000 Jews lived in Palestine, which comprised about oneninth of the overall population. Nearly half of all Jews in Palestine lived in Jerusalem. Tensions increased between some of these recent immigrants and the rest of the population, frequently over land and agriculture. The First World War began in 1914 between the Triple Entente, comprised of Britain, France, and Russia, and the Central Powers, which consisted of Germany, AustriaHungary, and later the Ottoman Empire. For centuries Palestine had been under Ottoman rule. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the war as an ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary would become one of the many catalysts for the Balfour Declaration. After the Ottoman Empire entered the war, Britain began to consider both invading and occupying Palestine. Chaim Weizmann, biochemist and prominent Zionist leader, sensed an opportunity. Born in Belarus, in 1910 Weizmann became a British citizen. During the First World War, Weizmann was the director of the British admiralty laboratories. He helped develop industrial fermentation, a propellant explosive required to fire ammunition. This discovery aided the British war effort. The minister for munitions at the time, and later prime minister of the United Kingdom, David Lloyd George, recognized Weizmann’s timely contribution and supported his Zionist objectives. Likewise, Weizmann also had the support of Arthur James Balfour. Indeed, Weizmann is often credited with convincing Balfour of the importance and legitimacy of the Zionist cause. As the First World War continued, the fall of the Ottoman Empire became a distinct possibility. The Triple Entente began to discuss prospective spheres of future influence in the Middle East. Accordingly, and with the assent of Russia, a secret treaty was signed between the United Kingdom and France. Officially known as the Asia Minor Agreement, but more commonly known as SykesPicot, the treaty divided a number of Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, specifically Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. These Ottoman provinces were to fall under the control or influence of either Britain or France. In regard to Palestine, it was agreed that it would be placed under the control of an international administration.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement was criticized in both France and Britain. Many argued it made conflicting promises. For example, in an exchange of letters between the sharif of Mecca, Hussein bin Ali, and Sir Henry McMahon, British high commissioner in Egypt, it was agreed that Britain, in acknowledgment of its support against the Ottoman Empire, would recognize Arab independence after the war. However, the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and later the Balfour Declaration, contradicted promises made in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. British motives for supporting Zionism were closely linked to the First World War. Indeed, a number of issues came together that cleared a path for Britain to publicly declare its support for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. A primary factor was the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war in November 1914 as an ally of the Central Powers. The Triple Entente’s declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire presented the option of a British assault on Palestine. Furthermore, during the first two years of the war, Herbert Asquith was the prime minister of the United Kingdom. Asquith did not support a Jewish homeland in Palestine and was generally hostile to Zionism. In December 1916, Asquith was replaced as prime minister by David Lloyd George, a Zionist sympathizer who supported the idea of a Jewish Palestine. There are a number of reasons why Britain ultimately issued a declaration backing a Jewish homeland. A major factor was the harnessing of Jewish support both at home and abroad. As the war continued, British officials hoped to ensure the continued cooperation and assistance of both Russia and the United States, two countries with large Jewish populations. In addition, as a buffer to Egypt and the Suez Canal, Palestine was of strategic importance to the British. Consequently, officials felt supporting a Jewish homeland would secure British control of Palestine in the immediate postwar period. The Balfour Declaration went through several drafts and revisions. It also received the input of several key British officials. On November 2, 1917, the Balfour Declaration was authorized. The letter, signed by Arthur Balfour and addressed to Lord Rothschild, stated the following: His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the

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Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. The letter stopped short of calling for a national “state” for the Jewish people. Opponents of Zionism in the British cabinet demanded that the word “home” be used instead of “state.” Reaction to the Balfour Declaration, which was published in the press a week later, was swift. Zionist leaders, while pleased with an endorsement for a Jewish homeland, felt the declaration fell short of their objectives of obtaining a national state. As they felt with the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Arab leaders argued that the declaration was both contradictory and a betrayal. Nevertheless, the Balfour Declaration was supported by the principal Allied powers. On December 9, 1917, under the leadership of General Edmund Allenby, British forces formally occupied Jerusalem upon the retreat of Ottoman Army units. Thus, after more than 400 years, Ottoman rule ended. The Balfour Declaration was later included in the British Mandate over Palestine. On July 24, 1922, the newly formed League of Nations formally confirmed the British Mandate for Palestine. British rule would last nearly 30 years, forever altering the landscape of Palestine. By 1948, when the British Mandate for Palestine came to an end, the foundations for a Jewish state were in place and tensions between Zionists and Palestinians were deeprooted. Following the termination of the British Mandate, on May 14, 1948, the executive head of the World Zionist Organization and the chair of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, David Ben-Gurion, declared the establishment of the State of Israel. The following day, May 15, 1948, the armies of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, and Iraq entered the former British Mandatory Palestine and thus launched the ArabIsraeli War. After nearly 10 months of fighting, a truce agreement was signed. At war’s end, the State of Israel would occupy a territory greater than was allocated under a United Nations partition proposal.

The Balfour Declaration was influenced by and authorized during the First World War. It was issued primarily to further British interests in the war and, to a lesser extent, in the Middle East. The Balfour Declaration was a landmark document that ignited a series of events with which the world still contends. Mark Celinscak See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; First World War, Religious Dimensions of; Haganah; Judaism and War; Ottoman Empire; Primary Documents: Balfour Declaration (1917); The Palestine Mandate (July 24, 1922); U.S. Congress Endorsement of the Balfour Declaration (September 21, 1922) Further Reading Barr, James. A Line in the Sand: The Anglo-French Struggle for the Middle East, 1914–1948. New York: W. W. Norton, 2012. Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. New York: Henry Holt, 2001. Renton, James. The Zionist Masquerade: The Birth of the AngloZionist Alliance, 1914–1918. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Schneer, Jonathan. The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. New York: Random House, 2010.

Balkan Wars (1912–1913) The Balkan Wars were a series of sharp and bloody conflicts in southeastern Europe that led to the First World War. Most of southeastern Europe had come under Ottoman domination by the end of the 14th century. During the 19th century, nation-states emerged from the weakened structure of the Ottoman Empire. These states, including Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia, all harbored irredentist aspirations against the Ottomans, and many of these aspirations overlapped, especially in Macedonia. For some time these rivalries precluded the formation of a Balkan alliance directed against the Ottomans. The Young Turk revolution in 1908 and its objective of an Ottoman revival, however, engendered closer cooperation among these Balkan states. An opportunity for the realization of their nationalist objectives arose when the weakness of the

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Ottomans became apparent during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–1912. With the support of Russia, which sought to regain the position lost in southeastern Europe during the Bosnian Crisis of 1908–1909, Bulgaria and Serbia signed an alliance in March 1912. This alliance contained provisions for the rough division of Ottoman territories, including a partition of Macedonia into a Bulgarian zone and a contested zone to be arbitrated by the Russian czar. Bulgaria and Serbia then signed bilateral agreements with Greece and Montenegro during the spring and summer of 1912. Other than the Bulgarian-Serbian agreement, the Balkan allies made little effort to arrange the division of any territories conquered from the Ottomans. The fighting between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire began on October 8, 1912. Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia entered the war on October 18. Each of the Balkan allies separately confronted their common enemy. The most important theater was in Thrace, where a strong Bulgarian offensive overcame Ottoman resistance at Kirk Killase (Lozengrad), and at the massive battle raging from Buni Hisar to Lyule Burgas. At the same time, the Bulgarians surrounded and besieged the Ottomans at Adrianople (Edirne). The Bulgarian offensive thrust the Ottomans to the final defensive positions at Chataldzha (Çatalca), about 20 miles outside of Constantinople. Only on November 16–17 did Ottoman forces rally to defeat a Bulgarian attempt to cross the Chataldzha lines and seize their capital. Smaller Bulgarian units, meanwhile, proceeded against little opposition into western Thrace and toward Salonika. Elsewhere, the Greek army advanced in two directions against slight opposition. The northwesterly thrust moved into Epirus and besieged Janina (Ioannina). The northeasterly push overran Thessaly and entered Salonika only a day ahead of the Bulgarian unit moving south from Bulgaria with the same objective. An uneasy condominium ensued in that city. The Greek navy held the Ottoman fleet at bay and seized the Aegean Islands. One section of the Montenegrin army advanced into the Sandjak of Novibazar while most of the rest of the Montenegrin force besieged the northern Albanian town of Scutari (Shkodër). The main part of the Serbian army easily defeated the Ottomans at Kumanovo in northern Macedonia and then proceeded to take most of the rest of Macedonia. Meanwhile, other

Serbian units occupied Kosovo. By the time the warring parties agreed to an armistice on December 3, the only territories in Europe remaining to the Ottomans were the besieged cities of Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari; the Gallipoli Peninsula; and that part of eastern Thrace behind the Chataldzha lines. While the Balkan allies and the Ottomans assembled in London on December 16 to negotiate a peace settlement, the ambassadors of the Great Powers convened nearby to direct the course of the peace settlement and to protect their own interests. This ambassadors’ conference, on the insistence of Austria-Hungary and Italy, recognized the independence of an Albanian state that some Albanian notables had proclaimed in Vlorë on November 28. This state blocked Serbian and Montenegrin claims to territories on the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea. These claims had the strong support of Russia. At the same time, the Austrians demanded that Serbian troops evacuate those portions of northern Albania occupied that autumn. Talks between the Balkan allies and the Ottomans soon stalled, mainly over the issue of Adrianople, and hostilities resumed on February 3, 1913. On March 6, Janina fell to the Greeks. On the 26th, the Bulgarians, with Serbian help, took Adrianople. The Montenegrins and assisting Serbian units bogged down around Scutari. Only on April 23, after the departure of the Serbs under pressure from the Great Powers, did the Montenegrins succeed in entering the city. Nevertheless, the major powers, especially Austria-Hungary, refused to sanction a Montenegrin occupation of Scutari because the London ambassadors’ conference had assigned it to the new Albanian state. After threats and a show of force, together with the promise of generous subsidies, the Montenegrins evacuated Scutari. On May 30, 1913, the Balkan allies and the Ottomans signed a peace treaty in London. With the Treaty of London, the Ottoman Empire ceded its European territories west of a straight line drawn between Enos and Media (Enez-Midye). By then, however, the loose Balkan alliance was disintegrating. The Serbs sought compensation for Albania in Macedonian areas assigned to Bulgaria by the alliance treaty but occupied by Serbia during the previous autumn fighting. At the same time, the Bulgarians and Greeks were

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skirmishing over Macedonia. On May 5, 1913, the Greeks and Serbs signed an agreement directed against the Bulgarians. A feeble Russian attempt at arbitration in June failed. On the night of June 29–30, the Bulgarians launched probing attacks against Serbian positions in Macedonia. The Greeks and Serbs utilized these attacks to implement their alliance, and the Second Balkan War resulted. Greek and Serbian counterattacks thrust the Bulgarian forces back. Taking advantage of the situation, Romanian and Ottoman troops joined in the attack on Bulgaria. The Romanians objected to the establishment of a strong Bulgaria on their southern frontier and sought compensation in the town of Silistra and in southern Dobrudzha. The Ottomans sought to recover Adrianople. The Bulgarians found themselves attacked on all sides. The result was a Bulgarian catastrophe. With no aid forthcoming from any Great Power, the Bulgarians had to seek terms. In the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) with Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia and the Treaty of Constantinople (September 30, 1913) with the Ottoman Empire, the Bulgarians acknowledged complete defeat and the loss of much of the gains from the First Balkan War. The two Balkan Wars changed the map of southeastern Europe. A fragile Albanian state emerged, largely dependent on the Great Powers. Serbia acquired Kosovo and much of Macedonia, almost doubling its territory. Serbia and Montenegro divided the Sandjak of Novibazar between them. Montenegro also gained small areas on its southern border with the new Albanian state. Greece obtained clear title to Crete and also obtained Epirus, including the city of Janina; a large portion of southern and western Macedonia, including Salonika; and the Aegean Islands. Bulgaria, even after defeat in the Second Balkan War, gained central Thrace, including the insignificant Aegean port of Dedeagach, and a piece of Macedonia around Petrich. Romania obtained southern (Bulgarian) Dobrudzha. The Ottomans managed to regain eastern Thrace, which remained its only European possession. The Balkan Wars were the first armed conflicts on European soil in the 20th century and presaged the First World War. Mass attacks against entrenched positions, concentrated artillery barrages, and military use of airplanes made their first appearances in European warfare. The two

wars resulted in at least 150,000 military dead, with the Bulgarians and Ottomans suffering the heaviest losses. Many more soldiers were wounded and missing. These wars also brought about the deaths from disease of tens of thousands of civilians, and many more were displaced. The Balkan Wars left a legacy of frustration for the Bulgarians and Ottomans, providing a basis for continued conflict in the First World War. They also imparted a sense of inflated success among the Greeks, Romanians, and Serbs. On two occasions during the Balkan Wars, Austria-Hungary had resorted to threats of force against Serbia to protect Albania. The Austrians would make one more such threat in October 1913 before finally resorting to force. Less than a year after the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, war again erupted in southeastern Europe, but this time the Third Balkan War metamorphosed into the First World War. Within the next five years, all of the participants in the Balkan Wars would become involved in further disastrous and costly conflicts. Many of the same battlefields of the Balkan Wars, such as Salonika, Gallipoli, and Dorian, again saw fighting. During the First World War, the populations of southeastern Europe again made great sacrifices for nationalist aims. Richard C. Hall See also First World War, Religious Dimensions of; Ottoman Empire Further Reading Hall, Richard C. The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War. London and New York: Routledge, 2000. Helmreich, E. C. The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938. International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. The Other Balkan Wars. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1993. Király, Béla K., and Dimitrije Djordevic, eds. East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars. Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1987.

Bar Kochba Revolt (132–136 CE) The Bar Kochba Revolt was a conflict between Rome and Jews in the Roman province of Judea in 132–136 CE.

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Precursors to the Bar Kochba Revolt

The first Jewish revolt against Rome occurred in 66 CE and lasted until Jerusalem was conquered by Titus, son of Emperor Vespasian, in 70 CE. The devastation of the Jewish people was severe, with hundreds of thousands of Jews dying during the war, hundreds of thousands more suffering under Roman enslavement, and thousands dying in gladiatorial games throughout the empire, especially in the Colosseum in Rome. The second revolt was limited in scope, being an insurrection in Cyrene, Cyprus, and Egypt in 118 CE, the year of Hadrian’s ascension, and quickly put down by the military general Lucius Quietus. The city of Lydda was put under siege by Quietus, and after the conquest of the city large numbers of Jews were put to death. As devastating as the first Jewish war was, the second major war—that of Simon Bar Kochba—valiant as it may have been, became the undoing of Jewish hopes for an independent nation free of Roman dominance.

Possible Reasons for the Bar Kochba Revolt

The Bar Kochba Revolt was the third rebellion by the Jews against the Roman Empire and was the most significant, since after the Roman destruction in 135 CE by Hadrian, the Jewish people never recovered until the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. This revolt bears the name of the primary instigator and leader of the rebellion, Simon Bar Kochba. What later became one of the most embarrassing conflicts for Rome, and the most devastating defeat for the Jewish people with lasting consequences, began with far better prospects, at least from the Roman view. In 130 CE Hadrian journeyed to Egypt through Judaea, and the province of Judea appeared to be politically calm. Imperial coinage of the reign for the area pronounced the adventus of the emperor positive and few of the emperor’s entourage would have guessed that a few years later a revolt would break out and cast a shadow over the emperor’s reign. The turn of events that brought about the war between the Jews and the Roman Empire in the years 132 through 135 CE is a matter of dispute. Some have argued that Hadrian desired to have peace throughout the Roman Empire and thus made several concessions to the Jewish people in

the area of Libya and Israel. Apparently he had given permission for the rebuilding of the Temple, and in view of that many Jews from the Diaspora began to return to Jerusalem. It may be that agitation by Samaritans caused Hadrian to order the cessation of the work on the Temple, which had been destroyed in the first war against the Jews that was prosecuted by Titus. This is attested by the Christian writer Chrysostom (Oration against the Jews, Homily 5, XI, 1, 2, 4; 6, II, 3) and by Nicephorus (Ecclesiastical History, iii.24). Hadrian, it is said, did not directly forbid the building of the Temple but asked the work to stop and for the Temple to be built in another location. The Jews were unwilling to accept this stipulation. In view of this effort by Hadrian, many Jews began to gather to revolt, but were dissuaded by Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah. This was temporary, however, and weapons that were constructed by the Jewish artisans for the Romans were poorly made, and consequently rejected, but these were available, then, for Jews to use in the war against the Romans. Additionally, Jews began to prepare for their struggle against Rome by converting caves into fortifications, many connected by tunnels, according to Lucius Cassius Dio, the only Roman historian to write about the Bar Kochba revolt. As long as Hadrian was in the vicinity of Israel the Jews kept peace. When he visited Jerusalem, it is said that he desired to build a Roman colony, named Aelia Capitolina, upon the ruins of Jerusalem, and to erect a temple to the god Jupiter on the ruins of the Temple destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE. The Roman writer Cassius Dio gives this as one cause of the war, but Eusebius and other church historians mention this as a result, not a cause. If this is so, it means that the construction had begun before the war and was interrupted by it. Additionally, apparently various essential Jewish practices such as circumcision and other Jewish practices were forbidden, but then again, this may have been a result rather than a cause. In addition to the immediately stated possible causes for the Jewish revolt, it has been suggested also that leftover psychological damages to the Jewish people may have erupted apart from the other factors given here (Isaac and Oppenheimer 1985), and also possibly the difficult economic situation in Judea.

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The Rise of Simon Bar Kochba and the Revolt against Rome

The intention of Hadrian to make Jerusalem a Gentile city, as seen above, did not bring an immediate response from the Jews, but seeds of rebellion were sown throughout Judea. Unlike the first Jewish war, in which there was considerable rivalry and confusion in the ranks, this revolt against Rome had the earmarks of organization, and there may have been a communications network between Jewish teachers and sympathy for the revolt within the rabbinic movement. This becomes most evident with the famed Rabbi Akiva, known as the major supporter of Simon and a rabbi who had students in Alexandria and did much travel. We know that the Jewish rebels had made preparations through caves and tunnels for clandestine acts against the Roman army, and this may have been underway for some time before the actual revolt began. They dared not face the Roman army straight on, but used skirmishes and guerrilla activity to wear the Romans down. Little is known about Simon Bar Kochba other than brief references in Dio, Talmudic material, and negative comments by some of the church fathers, but recent discovery of letters in the caves of Judea where Simon and his warriors hid provide for us a little larger glimpse of his character and administrative skill. Called the Bar Kochba Letters, these letters were discovered in caves west of the Dead Sea between 1950 and 1965, written in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek. Until this discovery, little was known outside rabbinic sources of the person and the war he led, and even then, there was little to do with historical facts and more with creating a legendary figure. Many of the letters, 15 in total, were from Bar Kochba and others were from his subordinates. They touch on aspects of the revolt but do not provide adequate information to construct much helpful information on its beginning, strategies of the rebels, dating of events, and the like. The letters reveal that he maintained close ties with his solders and became involved in various mundane details such as food and property concerns, and give evidence of his being a pious Jew. The extent of Simon Bar Kochba’s control of Israel appears to be limited to Judea, and though some Talmudic materials indicate inroads into Galilee, there is not sufficient evidence for this.

Simon, upon his defeat by Rome, dashed the hopes of the Jews for a deliverer, and his name goes down into ignominy in the rabbinic writings. His star, however, has risen in some recent Jewish estimations. He has been portrayed as a person who resided over a sovereign Jewish state against massive odds, and he serves as an inspiration in contemporary nationalism in the modern state of Israel. Various Christian writers in the centuries subsequent to the Bar Kochba revolt assert, or at least insinuate, that because Christians in Israel would not participate in the revolt against Rome, they were subjected to persecution by Simon Bar Kochba. Evidence in the Bar Kochba Letters does not support this perspective; however, the evidence is scant. Though Simon was viewed as the Messiah prophesied in Hebrew scripture by Rabbi Akiva and by many other followers in the revolt, this is explicitly stated only in rabbinic literature. When the revolt began, the governor of Judea was not able to adequately resist the Jewish onslaught, and so began to surrender various cities in the southern part of the country to the Jewish warriors. In view of this the Romans sent Publius Marcellus, who was the legate of Syria, to assist Rufus, but Marcellus was defeated. The havoc by the Jewish insurgents was so great that it is likely they conquered Jerusalem and held this site for approximately two years. The evidence for this may be found partially through the depictions that one observes in coins that have been dated to the first year of the revolt. For example, one coin gives the wording “year one of the redemption of Israel,” and another rare coin even has a depiction of the Temple on the back. One coin has the words Shim’on and Jerusalem, or Shim’on, prince of Israel. Although most of the coins were minted in Jerusalem, some coins may have been struck elsewhere late in the war. Some historians, such as Benjamin Isaac and Aharon Oppenheimer, consider this unlikely, so one cannot be certain of Simon’s conquering of Jerusalem, or at the least keeping it for a prolonged period of time, but it is certain that he did, however, at a minimum control Bethar in close proximity to Jerusalem.

The Roman Response

With the defeat of their legate Marcellus, it became necessary for the Romans to advance against the Jews with overwhelming force. One can understand the humiliation that

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could result from a small nation rebelling, now, for a third time against the mighty Roman Empire. Not only would this be an embarrassment to Rome, but it might cause other subjects of Rome to be unrestful or also revolt, if the Jewish nation were allowed to resist the subjugation of the Roman Empire. The urgency of the Roman response is seen through several unusual actions by Emperor Hadrian. First, the choice of Julius Severus to lead the Roman force is unusual, since Severus served at one of the major posts in the empire, over the British command. Now he was being asked to take a minor post and overcome a revolt in a small province. Second, it became necessary for the empire to send a number of soldiers from the Roman fleet to the 10th Legion in Judea, such action investing them with Roman citizenship. Eck (1999) provides additional support in the fact that some epigraphic sources of the time indicate that there was conscription of soldiers in places like Central Italy, which was unusual, indicating serious losses in the army in Judea and the need to strengthen their forces. Consequently, Hadrian may have sent six Italian legions and six auxiliary legions to Judea, and even those who doubt this number concede that as many as eight legions were involved in the war. At the head of this force was a general, Julius Severus, whom Hadrian summoned from his tasks in writing to head the campaign. Rather than directly attacking the insurgents, Severus attacked various stronghold cities, certain writings indicating that approximately 52 to 54 battles were fought, with Bethar being the last city attacked. It is at this battle that Bar Kochba met his fate. The fate that awaited the land of Judea became far greater; Cassius Dio recorded that nearly 600,000 Jews fell in battle, and many thousands of others died through hunger and pestilence; those left went into slavery. Israel became a wasteland and the Jewish nation had come to an end, something that Chrysostom and other later fathers of the church in their writings used as a basis to demonstrate God’s ultimate and final judgment against the Jewish people for their killing of the Messiah, Jesus. An exception to this is the early fifth-century historian Orosius, who though agreeing with many church fathers such as Eusebius that the Jews received much persecution because of their acts against Jesus, did not interpret the Roman war against the Jewish revolt in 132 CE in the same light, but rather as a

divine retribution against the Romans because of Trajan’s persecution of Christians. He did, however, believe that the slaughter by Hadrian of Jews in the Bar Kochba Revolt avenged Christians that were killed by Bar Kochba. As damaging as the revolt was to the Jewish people, the toll on the prestige of Rome and the loss of life had a lasting impact on Hadrian himself. When he gave his report to the Roman Senate after he returned from the war, he omitted the customary salutation “I and the Army are well,” and unlike the triumphant entry into Rome, depicted in the arch of Titus in Rome today, Hadrian did not have a triumphal entry. H. Wayne House See also Bar Kochba, Simon Further Reading Betlyon, John W. “Coinage.” In David Noel Freedman, ed. The Anchor Yale Bible Dictionary. New York: Doubleday, 1992, pp. 1088–1089. Eck, Werner. “The Bar Kochba Revolt: The Roman Point of View.” Journal of Roman Studies 89 (1999): 76–89. http:// www.jstor.org/stable/300735. Freedman, David Noel, ed. “Bar Kokhba.” The Anchor Yale Bible Dictionary. New York: Doubleday, 1992, p. 598. Goodblatt, David. “Varieties of Identity in Late Second Temple Judah (200 B.C.E.–135 C.E.).” In Benedikt Eckhardt, ed. Jewish Identity and Politics between the Maccabees and Bar Kochba. Leiden: Brill, 2012, pp. 11–27. Gottheil, Richard, and Samuel Krauss. “Bar Kokba and Bar Kokba War.” JewishEncyclopedia.com (1906 Jewish Encyclopedia). http://jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/2471-bar -kokba-and-bar-kokba-war. Horbury, William. Jewish War under Trajan and Hadrian. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Isaac, Benjamin, and Aharon Oppenheimer. “Bar Kokhba: Bar Kokhba Revolt.” In David Noel Freedman, ed. The Anchor Yale Bible Dictionary. New York: Doubleday, 1992, pp. 598–601. Isaac, Benjamin, and Aharon Oppenheimer. “The Revolt of Bar Kokhba: Ideology and Modern Scholarship.” Journal of Jewish Studies 36 (1985): 33–60. Klauck, Hans-Josef. Ancient Letters and the New Testament: A Guide to Context and Exegesis. Edited by Daniel P. Bailey. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006, pp. 289–297. Kloner, Amos. “Underground Hiding Complexes from the Bar Kokhba War in the Judean Shephelah.” Biblical Archaeologist (American Schools of Oriental Research, 1983).

116  Bar Kochba, Simon (d. 135 CE) Mor, Menahem. “Are There Any New Factors Concerning the Bar-Kokhba Revolt?” Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica XVII (2012): 161–93. Porat, Roi, Hanan Eshel, and Amos Frumkin. “Finds from the Bar Kokhba Revolt from Two Caves at En Gedi.” Palestine Exploration Quarterly 139, no. 1 (2007): 35–53. Wilson, Stephen G. “Jewish-Christian Relations 70–170 C.E.” In David Noel Freedman, ed. The Anchor Yale Bible Dictionary. New York: Doubleday, 1992, pp. 838–39. Wise, Michael O. “Bar Kokhba: Bar Kokhba Letters.” In David Noel Freedman, ed. The Anchor Yale Bible Dictionary. New York: Doubleday, 1992, pp. 601–06. Yadin, Yigael. Bar-Kokhba: The Rediscovery of the Legendary Hero of the Last Jewish Revolt against Imperial Rome. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971.

Bar Kochba, Simon (d. 135 CE) The name Bar Kochba (also Bar Kokhba or Bar Kokhva) is the Aramaic name given to the Jewish Zealot leader Simon bar Kosiba, who led a revolt against the Roman Empire between 132 and 135 CE. This unsuccessful revolt, under the reign of Emperor Hadrian, has come to be used as an alternative designation for the Second Jewish Revolt, to distinguish it from the Jewish war against Rome in 66–70 CE and the Jewish insurrection that occurred in Cyrene, Cyprus, and Egypt during the last portion of the reign of Trajan (ca. 117 CE). Bar Kochba also is connected to a number of letters that were found in the Judean desert, some signed by Simon Bar Kochba himself, called the Bar Kochba Letters.

The Rise of Simon Bar Kochba

Unlike the Jewish war of 66–70 CE (aftermath 71–73, ending in the siege of Masada), which had no single leader and had warring groups within the Jewish community, leading to its ineffectiveness in war, Simon united the Jewish people behind him. He was assisted by the proclamation of the noted Rabbi Akiva that Simon was the Messiah, who named him Bar-Kochba (“son of the star”), possibly relating to an interpretation of Numbers 24:17, speaking of the Messiah, “I shall see him, but not now: I shall behold him, but not nigh: there shall come a Star out of Jacob, and a Sceptre shall rise out of Israel, and shall smite the corners

of Moab, and destroy all the children of Sheth” (Num 24:17 KJV). Coins minted by the rebels during the war with Rome speak of Simon as the prince of Israel. There were many Messiahs before and after Simon Bar Kochba, but other than Yeshua’ ben Yosef (popularly known as Jesus Christ), Simon was probably the most successful. This is especially so since he achieved the goal of establishing a Jewish state once again, even if only for a short time, before this dream was crushed by the Romans three years after the revolt.

Character and Leadership of Simon Bar Kochba—Early Christian Sources

Little is known about Bar Kochba, but some early Christian writers do mention his name, recalling his messianic aspirations. Probably these accounts must be taken with care and may not reflect the historical reality. According to the Christian historian Eusebius of Caesarea Maritima (ca. 260–340 CE), Bar Kochba claimed to have been sent from heaven to the Jewish people: The Jews were at that time led by a certain Bar Chochebas, which means “star,” a man who was murderous and a bandit, but relied on his name, as if dealing with slaves, and claimed to be a luminary who had come down to them from heaven and was magically enlightening those who were in misery. (Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History IV.6.1–2 [Loeb Series], pp. 311, 313) The Greek philosopher turned Christian, Justin Martyr, also speaks of Simon Bar Kochba regarding his disdain for and unfair treatment of Jewish Christians. However, what is known of Bar Kochba, other than Justin’s statement, does not indicate a persecution of Jewish believers in Yeshua: The same writer [Justin Martyr] mentions the war of that time against the Jews and makes this observation, “For in the present Jewish war it was only Christians whom bar Chocheba, the leader of the rebellion of the Jews, commended to be punished severely, if they did not deny Jesus as the Messiah and blaspheme him.” (Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History IV. 8.4)

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Character and Leadership of Simon Bar Kochba—Rabbinic Sources

Simon Bar Kochba was hailed by many as a messiah until his ignoble death. After he was unable to perform miracles requested by the people, and Rome gained the upper hand over the Jews in the war, Simon was renamed by many within the Jewish community as Simon Bar-Koziba, meaning “the son of a lie” (the s changed to a z). This is found also in later rabbinic writing. This term is a mocking pun on his given name, Bar Kosiba (whose forename Bar Kosiba is of unknown meaning), and Bar Kochba. His reputation has been redeemed somewhat in some recent Jewish circles as a Jewish hero who fought against overwhelming odds. We find in Simon Bar Kochba the union of commitment to the Jewish religion and the zealousness of a Zionist who was concerned with nationalism. Within the Bar Kochba Letters, we discover that he was a pious Jew, his letters revealing his attention to detail in preparation for the Succot. He also, apparently, was an able leader, who often used threats against his fellow countrymen to achieve the victory against Rome, but he failed to gain credibility in the eyes of most of his peers, particularly as the war against Rome began to take a bad turn. What is unexpectedly revealed in the Bar Kochba Letters is the amount of small details of the various camps he was involved in. This legendary leader was far less a military genius than one would expect in his successes against the might of the Roman Empire. Rome brought 12 legions against the revolutionaries and had thousands of casualties. Rather than face the Jews in open battles, they laid waste to smaller communities, gradually decimating the population. Much of the interest in Bar Kochba today seems not to relate to his uniqueness as a man or military general, but to the fact that he was the last leader of a sovereign Jewish state.

The Bar Kochba Letters

What are commonly called the Bar Kochba Letters were discovered in caves west of the Dead Sea between 1950 and 1965. The letters are written in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek. Until this discovery little was known outside rabbinic sources of the person and the war he led, and then

little to do with historical facts, and more with creating a legendary figure. Many of the letters, 15 in total, were from Bar Kochba, and others from his subordinates. They touch on aspects of the revolt but do not provide adequate information to add much to our knowledge of the beginning of the revolt, the strategies of the rebels, the dating of events, and the like. H. Wayne House See also Bar Kochba Revolt Further Reading Avon, Eli. “Rediscovering the Real Bar Kokhba.” Jerusalem Post. http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors /Rediscovering-the-real-Bar-Kokhba-324220. Cary, Earnest, ed. Dio Cassius Roman History, Vol. VIII: Books 69.11.1–15.1. Loeb Classical Library no. 176. Freedman, David Noel, ed. “Bar Kokhba.” The Anchor Yale Bible Dictionary. New York: Doubleday, 1992, p. 598. Gottheil, Richard, and Samuel Krauss. “Bar Kokba and Bar Kokba War.” JewishEncyclopedia.com (1906 Jewish Encyclopedia). http://jewishencyclopedia.com/ articles/2471-bar-kokba-and-bar-kokba-war. Horbury, William. Jewish War under Trajan and Hadrian. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Isaac, Benjamin, and Aharon Oppenheimer, “Bar Kokhba: Bar Kokhba Revolt.” In David Noel Freedman, ed. The Anchor Yale Bible Dictionary. New York: Doubleday, 1992, pp. 598–601. Kavon, Eli. “Rediscovering the Real Bar Kochba—Opinion.” Jerusalem Post, jpost.com. http://www.jpost.com/Opinion /Op-Ed-Contributors/Rediscovering-the-real-Bar-Kokhba -324220. Klauck, Hans-Josef. Ancient Letters and the New Testament: A Guide to Context and Exegesis. Edited by Daniel P. Bailey. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006, pp. 289–97. Mayhew, Eugene J. Encyclopedia of Messianic Candidates & Movements in Judaism, Samaritanism and Islam. Clinton Township, MI: Cadieux & Maheux Press, 2009. Porat, Roi, Hanan Eshel, and Amos Frumkin. “Finds from the Bar Kokhba Revolt from Two Caves at En Gedi.” Palestine Exploration Quarterly 139, no. 1 (2007): 35–53. Wise, Michael O. “Bar Kokhba: Bar Kokhba Letters.” Edited by David Noel Freedman. The Anchor Yale Bible Dictionary. New York: Doubleday, 1992, pp. 601–06. Yadin, Yigael. Bar-Kokhba: The Rediscovery of the Legendary Hero of the Last Jewish Revolt against Imperial Rome. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971.

118  Barons’ Crusade (1239–1241)

Barons’ Crusade (1239–1241) The Baron’s Crusade of 1239–1241 was a series of expeditions that occurred in the interval between the Sixth (1227– 1229) and Seventh (1248–1254) Crusades, so named because of the large number of European Christian nobility who participated. The first expedition, led by Theobald IV, count of Champagne and King of Navarre, and the second by Richard, Earl of Cornwall, regained considerable territory in the Holy Land, primarily by means of forceful diplomacy. The immediate motivation for the crusade was the imminent end of a 10-year truce for the Kingdom of Jerusalem, signed in 1229 by Frederick II of the crusaders and the Ayyubid sultan of Egypt, al-Kamil. In 1234 Pope Gregory IX called for a new crusade to protect the Christian lands and people of Jerusalem. Frederick II, as the nominal ruler of Jerusalem, desired that his son Conrad IV succeed him on the throne, against local Frankish claimants. The excommunication of Frederick II in 1239, combined with Frederick’s belief that the crusading French nobles would oppose the succession of Conrad, led to delays in launching the crusade. The death of the Ayyubid caliph al-Kamil in 1238 led to wars of succession, with the result that al-Kamil’s son alAdil became sultan in Egypt, controlling the southern lands of the dynasty, while al-Kamil’s cousin, al-Nasir Dawud, imprisoned al-Kamil’s other son, Ayyub, and ruled the northern part of the kingdom from Damascus. The first expedition of the Barons’ Crusade, led by Theobald IV of Champagne and Hugh IV, duke of Burgundy, reached Acre on September 1, 1239. The Ayyubid succession wars had subsided, and a possible alliance between the now separate Islamic kingdoms created a new threat. The crusaders’ strategy was first to fortify the city of Ascalon, protecting their southern flank, then assault Damascus. After the crusaders marched toward Jaffa, Egyptian troops deployed to Gaza. Working against Theobald’s instructions, a group of 400–600 knights, led by Henry of Bar, Amalric of Montfort, Hugh of Burgundy, and Walter of Jaffa, decided to act. However, after being overwhelmed by superior Muslim forces, Hugh and Walter escaped to Ascalon, Henry was killed, and Amalric and around 500 other knights were captured.

In the spring of 1240, al-Nasir of Damascus released Ayyub and helped him seize control of Egypt. Concerned with the threat of a stronger Egypt to his own domain, Isma’il, who had allied with al-Nasir, approached the crusaders,with a deal to restore Galilee, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and considerable coastal areas (areas belonging to alNasir) to the Franks in exchange for crusader support against Egypt. The crusaders, hoping to obtain the freedom of the Frankish prisoners held in Egypt, opposed the truce. AlNasir’s hopes that his previous support for Ayyub would gain his assistance to win back Damascus from Isma’il did not come to fruition, so both al-Nasir and al-Mansur Ibrahim (ruler of Homs) entered a Frankish-Damascene alliance. By mid-September 1240 Theobald departed for Europe, while Hugh remained to fortify Ascalon. In October 1240, the crusaders of the second (English) expedition arrived at Jaffa, greeted by an Egyptian envoy who suggested that Ayyub would honor Isma’il’s territorial promises (Ayyub actually controlled none of those territories), with the exception of Gaza, Hebron, and Nablus, and that he would release the Frankish knights if the crusaders would abandon their alliance with Damascus for a position of “benevolent neutrality.” On February 8, 1241 the two sides agreed to the terms, thus ending the Barons’ Crusade. R. Don Deal See also Frederick II and the Papacy, Conflict of; Seventh Crusade; Sixth Crusade Further Reading Armstrong, Karen. A History of Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths. New York: HarperPerennial 2005. Asbridge, Thomas. The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land. New York: HarperCollins, 2011. Boas, Adrian J. Jerusalem in the Time of the Crusades: Society, Landscape and Art in the Holy City under Frankish Rule. London: Routledge, 2001. Humphreys, R. Stephen. From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus 1193–1260. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. Lower, Michael. The Barons’ Crusade: A Call to Arms and Its Consequences. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

Basmachi Rebellion (1918–1933)  119 Masson, Georgia. Frederick of Hohenstaufen: A Life. London: Secker and Warburg, 1957. Mundy, John H. Europe in the High Middle Ages, 1150–1309. New York: Basic Books, 1973. Tierney, Brian. The Crisis of Church and State 1050–1300. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988. Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War: A New History of the Crusades. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2006. van Cleve, Thomas Curtis. Immutator Mundi: The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Bartholomew, Peter (d. 1099) Peter Bartholomew was a French monk, mystic, and soldier of the First Crusade (1096–1099). In December 1097 during the siege of Antioch by crusaders, he began to have religious visions of Saint Andrew, one of the 12 disciples of Jesus of Nazareth. In these visions Peter claimed that Saint Andrew took him inside the Church of St. Peter that was inside the walls of Antioch and showed him where the sacred relic of the Holy Lance was buried. The lance was believed to be the weapon used by a Roman soldier to pierce the side of Jesus during his crucifixion in the first century CE. The piercing is recorded in the Gospel of John 19:34. Peter stated that Saint Andrew told him to tell the crusaders about the lance, recover it, and give it to Raymond of St. Gilles, one of the crusade leaders. When the city was captured by crusaders, Peter and Raymond began excavating the church floor and, on June 14, 1098, claimed they had discovered the lance, though many people believed Peter to be a charlatan who had brought the piece of iron with him. Crusaders at first took the alleged finding of the lance to be a sign of divine favor and morale was boosted, but Peter’s reputation was tarnished because many of the leaders did not believe him. In an attempt to secure his reputation, on April 8, 1099, Peter underwent the medieval practice of ordeal by fire, during which an accused individual would either walk on fire or hold a piece of red-hot metal for a few seconds. In several days, if the wounds were healed, the individual was deemed to be innocent or have divine favor,

and, if not, to be guilty or lack divine favor. Peter claimed that Jesus Christ had appeared to him in the fire and that there was no injury at the time, but he was injured after the ordeal when he was rushed by a crowd. He died on April 20, 1099. His unusual story is an example of the power of religious persuasion and religious personalities during times of conflict. Timothy J. Demy See also Antioch, Siege of; First Crusade Further Reading Asbridge, Thomas S. “The Holy Lance of Antioch: Power, Devotion and Memory on the First Crusade.” Reading Medieval Studies 33 (2007): 3–36. Housley, Norman. Fighting for the Cross: Crusading to the Holy Land. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.

Basmachi Rebellion (1918–1933) The Basmachi Rebellion was an Islamic insurgency that fought against the Red Army’s occupation of Central Asia from 1918 to 1933 in what is today Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The term basmachi was a derogatory Turkish term that meant bandit, but the name became synonymous with the Islamic resistance to Soviet rule in Central Asia. The Basmachi movement tapped into anti-Russian sentiments among local Muslims and occupied large parts of Central Asia during the turbulent decade following the 1917 Revolution in Russia. In 1917, while the revolution was unfolding in Russia, Central Asian Muslims founded a government in Kokand in the Fergana valley in modern-day Uzbekistan. The Kokand government adopted sharia law and respected traditional Islamic institutions, but in 1918 the Red Army sacked the city and desecrated mosques and Islamic shrines. This act ignited an anti-Soviet rebellion across Central Asia, and mullahs in villages across Central Asia rallied support in the name of Islam for the Basmachi, although elements of the Basmachi leadership made common cause with the Jadids, reformists who espoused

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secular reforms and the Pan-Turkic goal of uniting the Turkic people of Central Asia. The Basmachi initially overwhelmed the Bolsheviks, but the movement was plagued by lack of a central command and infighting among commanders. In 1920 the Basmachi suffered setbacks after Soviet commander Mikhail Frunze elicited mass defections from the Basmachi through a general amnesty. That same year the Soviets invaded Khiva and Bukhara, nominally independent states that had been protectorates of the now defunct Russian Empire. The Soviets deposed the rulers of Khiva and Bukhara and their countries were reconstituted as people’s republics, but the local population took up arms with the Basmachi. The emir of Bukhara invoked Islam in defense of his homeland and fled to Afghanistan, which served as a sanctuary for the Basmachi over the next decade. The Basmachi garnered international attention when Turkish revolutionary and former Ottoman minister of war Enver Pasha joined the rebellion. Enver Pasha had originally been recruited by the Soviets to win over Muslim holdouts in Turkestan, but in 1921 he defected to the Basmachi and temporarily unified the disjointed movement. Enver Pasha called for jihad, or holy war, against the Soviets and his followers chased the Red Army out of much of eastern Bukhara. In 1922 Enver Pasha was killed in battle, leaving the Basmachi relegated to making cross-border raids from their bases in Afghanistan and Iran. The Basmachi again rose up in Khiva in 1924 when Soviet authorities closed traditional Islamic schools, but this rebellion was swiftly crushed. The last Basmachi uprising occurred under Ibrahim Bek, a loyal follower of the emir of Bukhara, who crossed from Afghanistan into Tajikistan and briefly held eastern districts of the republic before he was captured and executed in 1931. By 1933 the Basmachi resistance in Central Asia had been extinguished. David P. Straub See also Ottoman Empire Further Reading Marwat, Fazal-Ur-Rahim Khan. The Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia: A Study in Political Development. Peshawar: Emjay Books International, 1985.

Ritter, William S. “The Final Phase in the Liquidation of AntiSoviet Resistance in Tadzhikistan: Ibrahim Bek and the Basmachi, 1924–31.” Soviet Studies 37, no. 4 (October 1985): 484–93.

Bassorah, Battle of See Camel, Battle of the

Belatucadros, Celtic God of War More than 20 altars dedicated to the Celtic deity Belatucadros are known to us from northern England near Hadrian’s Wall in Cumberland. Variations of his name include Balatocadrus, Balatucadrus, Balaticaurus, Balatucairus, Baliticaurus, Belatucairus, Belatugagus, Belleticaurus, Blatucadrus, and Blatucairus. Most modern sources agree that Belatucadros was a god of war and that his name translates as “fair shining one,” “fair slayer,” or “comely in slaughter.” However, some older sources speculate that the name meant “invincible or omnipotent Ba’al,” thereby equating him to one of the best-known and most powerful gods of the ancient Semitic peoples. Nearly all altars inscribed to Belatucadros are small and simple, and some are crudely carved, suggesting that his worshippers were from the lower social ranks. Five altars from the Roman period refer to him as Mars Belatucadros, evidence that the Romans identified him with Mars, the god of war. The absorption of the gods and religious rituals of conquered peoples was not an uncommon Roman practice, however. The concentration of inscriptions near Hadrian’s Wall implies that Belatucadros might have been a local deity, his worship perhaps even confined to one tribe. Although Belatucadros is probably the best-known Celtic war god, the Romans perceived warlike qualities in dozens of other Celtic gods and associated them with Mars as well. The plethora of Celtic gods with martial

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Morrigan, the Celtic Goddess of War, at the Battle of Moyrath

The female Celtic goddess of war, Morrigan, appeared at the Battle of Moyrath in 637 CE. The battle, also known as Magh Rath, was one of the most important recorded in the Irish Annals. Legend holds that Morrigan was present during the battle, appearing over the Druid forces, encouraging them to fight for victory. Morrigan has been described as a fury, flying over the spears of Druid soldiers. Morrigan was hailed as a goddess of war, but also of birth and death. She is one of the more important goddesses in the Celtic/Druid pantheon. However, the Battle of Moyrath led to the defeat of the Druids by the Christian forces led by Donal, the Irish high king. Despite the outcome of the battle, Druid practices and traditions were not entirely eradicated and are still practiced today. Thomas E. Creely characteristics may point to the Celts’ penchant for war and the hostilities that were common between the tribes. John Paul Hill See also Mars, Roman God of War; Roman Religion, Mythology, and War Further Reading Bruce, John Collingwood. The Roman Wall: A Historical, Topographical, and Descriptive Account of the Barrier of the Lower Isthmus, Extending from the Tyne to Solway, Deduced from Numerous Personal Surveys. London: John Russell Smith, 1851. Chadwick, Nora. The Celts. London: The Folio Society, 2001. McCulloch, J. A. The Celtic and Scandinavian Religions. New York: Cosmo Classics, 2005. Ross, Anne. Pagan Celtic Britain: Studies in Iconography and Tradition. Chicago: Academy Chicago Publishers, 1996.

Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) Bernard of Clairvaux was a medieval French abbot, reformist of the Cistercian order, Catholic theologian,

One of the most acclaimed clerics of 12th-century Europe, Bernard of Clairvaux was a French abbot and reformist of the Cistercian order who combined a deep mystical tradition of asceticism with worldly activism and struggle. (Library of Congress)

Christian Neo-Platonist, and a mystic and philosopher. He was born in 1090 in Fontaine-les-Dijon, Burgundy, France, into a noble family. At the age of 12 he became a member of the Cistercian order and soon demonstrated himself to be one of its most devoted activists and promoters. He encouraged the crusades early in his monastic career, but in later life regretted the harm and suffering that the crusades had caused. After the death of his mother, Aleth, in 1107 he decided to spend his life involved only in religious activity. In 1115, Bernard founded an abbey and convent in Clair Vallee (later transformed into Clairvaux) where he remained the abbot until the end of his life in 1153 and where he was buried. He promoted the development of the Cistercian order by establishing new convents, a total of 63

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having been established by 1153. In spite of his official position of modesty and humility, Bernard of Clairvaux was actively engaged in clerical activity, being invited as mediator and adviser in many difficult and challenging cases that came before the church authorities. His authority among the highest clergy of the Catholic Church allowed him to have a significant influence over the election of the popes—the bishop of Rome. When the papal schism broke out after the death of Pope Honorius II on February, 13, 1130, Bernard of Clairvaux was selected by French king Louis VI as an independent judge between two rivals and later acted as the key figure in negotiations over the recognition of Pope Innocent II, personally discussing this issue with the king of England, Henry I; King Lothair III of Germany; and rulers of Portugal, Castile, Aragon, Aquitaine, and Sicily. Bernardo Paganelli, who was elected Pope Eugene III on February 15, 1145, was a Cistercian and a close disciple of Bernard of Clairvaux. This election increased Bernard’s influence and power in the church. Being an energetic proponent of the ideals of virtue, chastity, and poverty, Bernard of Clairvaux appealed for the strict regulation of the everyday life of the clergy, struggling against its embellishment and relaxed discipline. He insisted that the holy tradition was inviolable, and that any scholastic innovations should be severely criticized. He was in opposition to the theological rationalism of Peter Abelard and participated in his conviction at the Second Lateran Council in 1139 and at the Council at Sens in 1141. In addition, he contributed to the church’s conviction of Arnold of Brescia and Gilbert of Poitiers. He participated in the prosecution of the heresy of the Cathars and others. His preaching helped end the dissemination of many heretical ideas in France. Being a proponent of the “militant church,” Bernard of Clairvaux was among the leading inspirers of the Second Crusade (1147–1149). In particular, in 1146 on behalf of Pope Eugene III, he preached the Second Crusade in front of French king Louis VII at the State Senate in Vezelay (Burgundy). He sat near Louis, placed the cross on him, and delivered an emotional speech in which he invited the faithful to join the struggle against Muslims. Later on, following the invitation of German emperor Conrad III, Bernard of Clairvaux participated in the New Year’s celebration of 1147, and his emotional speech after the ceremonies

convinced many German Christians to participate in the Second Crusade. In the spring of 1147, when Pope Eugene III was Bernard’s guest in Clairvaux, Bernard managed to persuade him to shift the focus of the crusades from liberating the Holy Land from Muslim control toward punishing the European pagans. It was reflected in the papal bull Divini dispensatione signed April 11, 1147, in Trois, the essence of which is often expressed as “death or conversion.” It was the beginning of the Wendish, or Northern, Crusade undertaken in the summer and autumn of 1147 by the German kingdoms against Polabian Slavs (Wends). Bernard’s selfless devotion and penance were highly appreciated not only by the Cistercians order’s authorities but also by the broader Catholic Church community. He became the first Cistercian canonized by the Catholic Church (in 1174 by Pope Alexander III), and in 1830 he was exalted as a doctor of the church (doctor ecclesiae). His ideas influenced Bonaventura and many other scholastic theologians—followers of St. Augustine. Sometimes members of the Cistercian order call themselves Bernardinians in his honor. Olena Smyntyna See also Cathars; Cistercian Order; Second Crusade Further Reading Evans, Gillian R. Bernard of Clairvaux (Great Medieval Thinkers). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Gilson, Etienne. The Mystical Theology of St Bernard. London: Sheed and Ward, 1940.

Beth Zechariah, Battle of (162 BCE) Beth Zechariah was a battle that was part of the Jewish Maccabean Revolt (167–160 BCE) against the Seleucid Empire. After their victory at Beth Zur near Jerusalem in 164 BCE, the Jewish rebels under Judas Maccabeus (d. 160 BCE) consolidated more territory. They laid siege to the Seleucid forces at the Acra, a fort in Jerusalem that faced the Temple Mount and stood as a blatant reminder of the Seleucid occupation of the Jewish holy city of Jerusalem.

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Because of political instability in what is today Syria, Judas calculated that the Seleucid (Syrian) army would not make another expedition to Jerusalem. However, this was a miscalculation. Philip, the chief rival to the Seleucid general Lysias, was engaged in military operations in the east, and Lysias believed he was free to come to Judea to overpower the Jewish revolt. Lysias approached Judea from the south and west with light infantry, cavalry, and war elephants to avoid the rebel strongholds and rough terrain of the hill country in the north. Lysias destroyed Beth Zur. Judas moved south to meet the Syrians and encamped approximately six miles from Beth Zur at Beth Zechariah. The Syrians, moving north, met the Jews there. Judas and his Jewish rebels met a much larger Syrian force. Judas calculated that the guerrilla tactics used against the Syrians two years earlier would not be effective. This was the first battle in which the Maccabeans fought from defensive positions. They changed to more conventional military tactics. The Syrians also learned from the loss at Beth Zur two years earlier. They changed their tactics as well. Josephus describes these new tactics. This was also the first battle in which the Jews encountered elephants. Lysias used the animals, no doubt, in part to instill fear in the rebels. The elephants had armor of gold and bronze shields, which reflected the rays of the sun. During the battle, Eleazar, the youngest of the Maccabean brothers, attempted to encourage the Jewish rebels by slaying one of the elephants. He mistakenly thought the Syrian king was on the beast. He thrust his spear and killed the animal, but he was crushed and killed by the weight of the dead elephant. This demoralized the Jewish defenders even further. The battle at Beth Zechariah was a complete defeat for the Jews. It was the first defeat of the Jews at the hands of the Syrians. Judas and his men fled to the Hills of Gopha, north of Jerusalem. Lysias and his forces moved north to retake the capital and the Temple Mount. At Jerusalem, Lysias laid siege to the city. The Jewish defenders were few. There was a food shortage. After Beth Zechariah, the cause of the Maccabeans looked lost. However, the food shortage made it difficult for the Syrians as well. More importantly, political considerations came into play. Philip had returned to Syria and this meant a threat to Lysias’s power. He was forced to return to his home country.

The Syrian general sued for peace with the Jews. The Jews surrendered the fortified area of the Temple, and the Acra remained in Syrian hands. The Jews could continue to worship according to their traditions. In addition, the Jews were able to place a high priest in the office who met their religious beliefs and sensitivities. The campaign around Beth Zechariah is a study in how military forces change tactics based upon lessons learned and new situations. It also demonstrates how political considerations can change the course of a military campaign. Kenneth Wayne Yates See also Beth Zur, Battle of; Jerusalem, Sieges of; Maccabean Revolt; Maccabeus, Judas Further Reading Allegro, John M. The Chosen People: A Study of Jewish History from the Time of the Exile until the Revolt of Bar Kocheba. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1971. Bruce, F. F. Israel and the Nations: From the Exodus to the Fall of the Second Temple. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1963. Josephus. Antiquities 12.362–81. Josephus. Jewish Wars 1.41–46. Noth, Martin. The History of Israel. New York: Harper & Row, 1958. 1 Maccabees 6.28–54. Sievers, Joseph. The Hasmoneans and Their Supporters: From Mattathias to the Death of John Hyrcannus I. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990.

Beth Zur, Battle of (164 BCE) Beth Zur was a village approximately five miles north of Hebron on the road that came from the south from Hebron to Jerusalem. It was on the southern border of Judea. During the Maccabean revolt for independence from Syria, Judas assumed the role of leader after the death of his father Mattathias. In 164 BCE, the Syrian general Lysias marched against Jerusalem with an army much larger than that of the Jewish rebels. Lysias approached from the west and south to avoid the more difficult hilly terrain of the north. The area to the north of Jerusalem was also a stronghold of the rebels. Judas and his forces met Lysias at Beth Zur as Lysias approached from the south. Judas used guerrilla tactics,

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including splitting his forces into smaller groups. Judas also took advantage of a narrow passage near Beth Zur to minimize the Syrian advantage of superior forces. The Jewish rebels recorded a decisive victory. The Syrians sued for peace and allowed the Jews to worship as they saw fit. This led to the Jews occupying the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, with the Syrians controlling only the Acra fortress. The Temple was rededicated to the worship of Yahweh, which led to the institution of the Jewish Feast of Dedication (Hanukkah). The battle at Beth Zur was Lysias’s first expedition into Judea. At that time, it also marked the most humiliating defeat of the Syrians at the hands of the rebels. After the victory and reclaiming the Temple Mount, the rebels desired political autonomy as well. Kenneth Wayne Yates See also Maccabean Revolt Further Reading Bar-Kochva, Bezalel. The Jewish Struggle against the Seleucids. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 1 Maccabees 4.26–35. Sandgren, Leo D. Vines Intertwined: A History of Jews and Christians from the Babylonian Exile to the Advent of Islam. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2000. Sievers, Joseph. The Hasmoneans and Their Supporters: From Mattathias to the Death of John Hyrcannus I. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990.

Beza, Theodore (1519–1605) Theodore Beza is chiefly remembered as the Reformed theologian during the Protestant Reformation who served as one of the pastors of the church in Geneva, who became the moderator of the Company of Pastors following the death of John Calvin (1509–1564), and who first took the position of rector in the Geneva Academy. Although Beza gave his life to serving the Geneva Church, his thoughts were ever directed toward the spiritual and political wellbeing of France, the country of his childhood and youth. It was his concern for France and the French Reformed Church that impelled him to write Concerning the Rights of

Rulers over Their Subjects and the Duty of Subjects towards Their Rulers—his great political work that presents his resistance theory and his justice of war doctrine. Beza was a Frenchman, born in Vézeley, Burgundy, on June 25, 1519. His family background and education contributed toward the development of a political interest. Beza was from a Burgundian noble family. His father was the king’s bailiff, while his uncle had been a member of the Parlement of Paris. Beza studied at Orléans, Bourges, and Paris, receiving most of his legal training at the University of Orléans. Beza’s lifelong political focus is reflected not only in his writings on political theory and war, but also in practical ways. He corresponded with political leaders throughout Europe, and he engaged in political intrigue. He knew, on a personal level, the major political figures in France— including King Charles IX, Catherine de Medici (the Queen Mother), Antoine de Bourbon (King of Navarre), and Jeanne d’Albret (Queen of Navarre). His relationship with Louis of Bourbon, prince of Condé, was particularly close. Following the massacre in March 1562 of unarmed Protestants in Vassy by Francis of Lorraine, duke of Guise, the French Reformed Church held a national synod at which it requested the prince of Condé to raise an army for their protection. As Louis of Bourbon led the Protestant forces in the first war of religion, Beza served alongside him in a number of capacities, but mainly as his chaplain. At times, such as at the Battle of Dreux in December 1562, Beza could, as it were, “smell the smoke of battle.” Beza’s political fascination came to its intellectual fruition in Concerning the Rights of Rulers over Their Subjects and the Duty of Subjects towards Their Rulers. It is one of the most significant Protestant works on political theory in the 16th century. It was Beza’s response to the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacres of 1572, the wholesale slaughter of Huguenots in Paris and throughout France—ultimately traced to King Charles IX who determined to murder the admiral of France, Gaspard de Coligny, and some two or three dozen members of the Huguenot nobility who were still in Paris following the wedding of Henry of Navarre and Marguerite of Valois. With a tyrant upon the royal throne of France, Beza completed a draft of his treatise by July 1573. Beza wrote the original text in Latin, but his treatise was first published in French in the city of Lyon in 1574. Beza’s

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treatise was marked by restraint and scholastic form— unlike many Huguenot pamphlets that were characterized by their passionate oratory. It is divided into 10 sections, each section focusing upon a particular issue and developing the argument further. This entry will examine Beza’s teaching on war as it is presented in the context of a discussion on the nature of political authority in a constitutional monarchy. Beza gave considerable attention to fact that the power of the prince has limitations. The authority of all magistrates, he contended, is hedged in by two limits set by God himself, piety and charity. Beza argued that the commands of the magistrates must fall within the boundaries of the First Table of the Law (piety) and the Second Table of the Law (charity). The obedience of subjects is conditioned upon whether or not the magistrate’s commands fall within the limitations of the divine will. It was the law of God that provided boundaries for the commands of the prince, but the prince himself was likewise under human law. Beza appeals to both historical example and natural law in support of his position. Beza recognized that there had to be boundaries to kingly authority. This necessity was due to the perennial problem of the abuse of monarchical power. He maintained that there never was a king who did not in some measure abuse his authority. He repeatedly refers to sinful and unjust commands of rulers and the folly of magistrates. Along these lines, it should be remembered that Beza, as one of the “monarchomachs” (king eaters), was not opposed to monarchy, but rather to an absolute monarchy. He desired a moderation of royal power, regarding it as a beneficial and blessed thing. In his treatise on rulers and their subjects, Beza set forth the two major institutional ways in which the authority of the prince ought to be limited. He maintained that the monarch’s power is limited by the existence of the inferior magistrates and by the Estates-General. The inferior magistrates provided for a vertical distribution of power. There were two kinds of inferior magistrates. The first type consisted of dukes, marquises, counts, viscounts, barons, and squires. This group would be the aristocrats. The second kind would be mayors, vicars, consuls, municipal judges, syndics, and aldermen. This group would be the elected rulers of cities.

The existence of the inferior magistrates in France limited the power of the French king in two ways. It provided, first, for a limitation upon his administrative power. Second, it made provision for resistance against a possible abuse of the monarch’s military power. Such a defense would necessarily entail the taking up of arms by the inferior magistrates, and Beza maintained that this was their duty. This moral obligation to take up arms rested upon the oath that the inferior magistrates had taken to defend the kingdom. Beza’s argument that the inferior magistrates may limit the tyrannical authority of the king by armed resistance did not merely rest on the implication of an oath. Beza also appealed to the sacred history as recorded in the Bible in support of his position. He cited the example of David during the monarchy of the tyrant Saul. David, Beza argued, took up arms to defend himself: “He had taken the resolve to defend himself by means of arms. . . . For what else was the purpose of those military forces by which he had attended?” (43). Furthermore, David did not do this as a private individual, but as one of the inferior magistrates of the kingdom. A superficial reading of his discussion on warring by the inferior magistrates leads some to think that Beza was a radical in his position. This is far from the case. Fundamentally, he was a conservative political theorist who sought to root his positions in biblical doctrine, natural law, and historical precedent. Furthermore, he qualified his call to armed resistance with three axioms in Question VII (73–74). He insisted that the tyranny must be “undisguised and notorious.” He maintained, second, that “recourse should not be had to arms before all other remedies have been tried.” Finally, he counseled that this recourse to arms should not be had “before the question has been thoroughly examined, not only as to what is permissible, but also as to what is expedient, lest the remedy prove more hazardous than the very disease.” Later, in Question VIII, he provided this maxim: “It befits a wise man to make trial of all things by deliberation before armed force” (80). The second institution that provided for a limitation upon the authority of the prince was the Estates-General in France, consisting of representatives of the nobility, the clergy, and the burghers. Beza located the antecedents of this institution within the Old Testament history of Israel.

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He referred to the Estates in Israel as the Estates of the People. The Estates of ancient Israel had a threefold authority. They had the right to choose a king, but they could also depose him, and even punish him. The Estates could choose a man from the family of David if they wished, and they could also depose him and even execute him. As an example of a biblical deposition and execution, Beza cited the uprising of the people of Judah against King Amaziah resulting in his execution and the installation of Amaziah’s son Azariah in his place. The proper functioning of the Estates-General in France in Beza’s political thought would provide for a horizontal distribution of power between the prince and the Estates. He believed that the Estates-General ought to have a significant role in government—a role similar to that of the Parliament in England. The Estates-General should have an important advisory role, but also the significant power of deposing and even punishing a king. Beza argued the right of deposition both logically and historically. His fundamental premise, repeatedly asserted, is that those who have the authority to elect a king also have the right to remove him from office. In addition, he supported his case by appealing to French history, maintaining that there are countless examples of kings who were deposed. Finally, Beza maintained that the deposition of a king might well, at certain times, go one step further. The EstatesGeneral also had the power of punishment: “The Estates . . . can and must . . . oppose the tyrant and even, if need be, inflict just and deserved punishment upon him” (63). Numerous political treatises were produced in the 16th century. French Protestants, in particular, produced a number of important works. One of the most influential among them was Beza’s treatise on rulers and their subjects. Beza’s resistance theory and justice of war doctrine helped to provide a theoretical justification for subsequent Calvinist revolutions—the English Civil Wars in the 17th century and the American Revolution in the 18th century. Mark J. Larson See also French Wars of Religion; Huguenots; Protestant Reformers and War; Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre Further Reading Baumgartner, Frederic. France in the Sixteenth Century. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.

Beza, Theodore. Concerning the Rights of Rulers over Their Subjects and the Duty of Subjects towards Their Rulers, Capetown and Pretoria, South Africa: H.A.U.M., 1956. Holt, Mack P. The French Wars of Religion: 1562–1629. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Raitt, Jill. “Bèze, Théodore de.” In The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation. Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 149–151.

Béziers, Massacre at (1209) The siege and sack of Béziers, marking the beginning of major military operations of the Albigensian Crusade, ranks as one of the most infamous atrocities of the Middle Ages. A number of reasons account for this. First, the entire crusade is notorious as the quintessence of the crusade ideal gone awry. Second, some consider it at best an unnecessary travesty against Christians, and at worst as outright genocide toward practitioners of an alternative religion. Third, it happened uncommonly quickly, in a single day, and was overwhelmingly successful, whereas medieval sieges typically took weeks or months. Fourth, at the height of the sack the senior papal representative of the crusade army, Arnaud Amaury, supposedly uttered an apocryphal line often rendered as “Kill them all, God will know his own.” The army recruited for the Albigensian Crusade, most of whose members came from northern France, was extremely large by 13th-century standards. Its composition consisted of many social elements, but it clearly contained a large segment of the untrained and disorderly. The Albigensian Crusade had in fact been preached against Raymond VI, Count of Toulouse, but by the time the army arrived in the region, the count had already been reconciled to the church and had become a crusader himself. Despite no longer having a papal-directed target, the leadership, partially encouraged by Raymond, decided on an alternative: his nephew, Raymond-Roger, Viscount of Béziers, Carcassonne, and Albi. Thus Béziers was the first sizable city attacked by the crusaders. Other than the crusade army’s sheer numbers, however, the advantage lay with Béziers. The city had adequate walls and a solid topographical position atop a large hill east

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of the Orb River. Static, stone fortification always lent the defense in medieval sieges great military and logistical advantages. Besieging armies quickly ran out of food and stripped the local countryside, but usually all available supplies had already been taken into the city. Cities like Béziers also had organized citizen militias capable of aggressive defense of their town walls and occasionally even offensive warfare outside of them. The army encamped west of the river paused to decide on a course of action, but things moved far more quickly than anyone reckoned. People in Béziers, overly confident of their inherent advantages, taunted and fired arrows at the crusaders across the river. There was a scuffle between crusaders and townspeople over one of the few bridges leading to the eastern side of the river, and a crusader was killed as a result. This goaded many of the rank-and-file crusaders into action without orders from their leaders or the papal representative, still in council discussing various issues preparatory to a siege. Grabbing whatever weapons they had to hand, hundreds, perhaps thousands swarmed the bridge, climbed the hill leading into Béziers, and attacked the gates, all before the militia of Béziers could mobilize to stop them. The crusaders quickly poured into the city, and organized resistance collapsed as the militia abandoned their positions to save themselves and protect their families. Many gathered in the city’s churches. The crusade leadership, once they realized what had happened, moved quickly into the city to control a chaotic situation, but in fact may have caused things to escalate. Those common crusaders who had already started plundering were forced by the crusade leaders to pool their spoils. In their anger at being deprived of what they thought was theirs, some of the common crusaders set parts of the city on fire. Though we cannot be sure, the fires spread or were set to large parts of the town, including the city’s churches where hundreds of people had packed in. Although the crusaders undoubtedly killed untold dozens of men, women, and children outright, it is likely that fire, especially in crowded buildings like the churches, accounted for most of the deaths. All of this took place in a single afternoon. In the immediate aftermath the crusader army returned to its camp across the river rather than occupying the houses of Béziers. This has led some historians to maintain that the

city was completely destroyed. Within weeks, however, the newly selected chief of the crusade, Simon of Montfort, awarded houses within the city to a monastic order, indicating that not all of Béziers was devastated. Many problematic details about the siege remain, ranging from those who wrote about it, what they said about numbers killed, and the implications of such a quick victory. This was undoubtedly an example of the “winners” writing the main primary sources, but the destruction was such that it was hard to accurately estimate the lives lost during the sack. The papal representatives offered an impossibly high number of 20,000, since that was more people than actually lived in the city at the time. The apocryphal saying “Kill them all” by the senior papal representative was reported by a monk who was not present and who wrote decades after the event. Modern scholars emphasize the brutality of the sack, even though it was standard practice, as indeed it had been for the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans, for the inhabitants of a city that failed to come to terms or surrender to forfeit their lives and property. In that sense Béziers was treated no differently than other places had been in recent memory, including Constantinople five years before, which fell to members of the Fourth Crusade, also amidst large fires. The effects of the sack were, however, dire for what became a decades-long conflict in the south of France. The swift victory spurred the army gathered that summer to besiege other cities belonging to Viscount Raymond-Roger, including Carcassonne, which fell after a lengthy siege but only after the city negotiated its surrender. The success at Béziers was never replicated in the Albigensian Crusade, but it served as a startling beginning to a religious and political war that still epitomizes callousness and brutality and continues to polarize scholars today. Laurence W. M arvin See also Albigensian Crusade; Arnaud Amaury (Arnaud Amalric); Cathars; Innocent III, Pope; Languedoc Revolts Further Reading Graham-Leigh, Elaine. The Southern French Nobility and the Albigensian Crusade. London: Boydell Press, 2005. Marvin, Laurence W. “The Massacre at Béziers, July 22, 1209: A Revisionist Look.” In Michael Frassetto, ed. Heresy and the Persecuting Society in the Middle Ages. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006, pp. 195–225.

128  Bhagavad Gita and War Marvin, Laurence W. The Occitan War. A Military and Political History of the Albigensian Crusade, 1209–1218. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pegg, Mark Gregory. A Most Holy War. The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Bhagavad Gita and War The Indian classic, the Bhagavad Gita, is a 700-verse portion of the enormous Indian epic the Mahabharata. It is generally believed that the Bhagavad Gita was composed between the fourth and the second century BCE. The epic is set on the battlefield of a civil war as Prince Arjuna is prepared to begin a battle to recover his usurped kingdom from another branch of his family that has wrongly taken it. As Prince Arjuna looks across at his adversaries, he is struck with the realization that he will be fighting and killing relatives, friends, and revered teachers. The weight of that recognition causes him to lose heart and will to fight, and he collapses in his chariot, unwilling to commence the battle. Unbeknownst to him, his chariot driver is the god Krishna. What ensues is a philosophical dialogue in which Krishna marshals a series of arguments, all intended to persuade Arjuna that he must fight the battle that lies before him. It is an unusual work of religious literature in that the god doesn’t command Arjuna or dazzle him with revelation until quite late in the book. In tone, much of the work is more reminiscent of a Platonic dialogue than typical Western religious texts. Krishna’s first argument is to suggest that Arjuna’s metaphysical understanding is mistaken. He is focused on the killing he will do. But in fact, Krishna argues, the essential self, the atman, is immaterial and eternal, so Arjuna is incapable of killing anyone. Yes, it is true, the person’s current body may be destroyed, but that is not the essential self, and the laws of karma will dictate a future incarnation into other physical forms. Arjuna is not entirely convinced by this first metaphysical argument. Therefore, Krishna offers another. Every individual is placed by the karma of their previous lives into

a specific caste. Arjuna is a member of the kshatriya caste: the caste of warriors and political rulers. Each caste has its own specific set of duties, its varna-dharma. It is vital to the generation of good karma that members of castes fulfill their specific duties. Since this war is, at least for Arjuna’s side, a justified and legitimate war, his varna-dharma requires him to fight it, and failure to do so would result in bad karma for him. Again, Arjuna is not fully convinced. Krishna proceeds to argue that it is possible to act well and properly in the world if one focuses only on the actions required, but without being “attached to the fruits of action.” For example, the god Shiva himself is portrayed in the famous image of Shiva-Nataraj (Shiva the Lord of the Dance), dancing wildly and powering the wheel of rebirth (samsara), while maintaining a completely composed face. In the same way, one must act but remain detached from the fruits and consequences of one’s action. Krishna moves on to discussion of the various paths (yogas) that lead to release (moksha) from the wheel of rebirth (samsara). Each of the paths, properly pursued, will successfully lead to release. They are the path of intellectual insight (jnana yoga), the path of asceticism and meditation (raja yoga), the path of action in accordance with caste duty (karma yoga), and the path of devotion and worship of a god (bhakti yoga). Krishna strongly argues for bhaki yoga on the grounds that it is easier and reliable. Indeed, Krishna says that devotion to any god is effective because in the end, all worship and devotion comes to Krishna himself, and he himself will free all devotees of any god from the wheel of rebirth. At this point in the dialogue, Arjuna realizes the true divine nature of his chariot driver. He implores Krishna to reveal his true cosmic form. Krishna grants this request, and a breathtaking theophany occurs in which Arjuna has direct unmediated vision to see that Krishna does indeed contain and encompass the entire universe. Lastly, Krishna argues that individuals and actions are only apparent and ultimately illusory. In the end, the universe is a vast unitary system in which the constituent elements of matter are acting on one another in a pre­­de­­ter­­ mined way. The person of penetrating insight sees through this illusion, which is really just the play (maya) of Krishna

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himself. From this perspective—what Spinoza would call sub specie aeternitatis (under the aspect of eternity)—none of this is ultimately real, and one can therefore act without worrying about the outcome. It is an open question whether the Bhagavad Gita is actually about war at all. Obviously, the literal setting of the narrative is on a field of battle. But one reasonable reading of the text is that it is in that setting because it is embedded in a larger narrative of the epic, which is filled with the action and drama of war. But clearly the themes explored in the Gita are more general and universal than the particulars of that setting. It deals with timeless themes of the nature of the universe itself, personal identity, the meaningfulness of human action, and the means of achieving “salvation,” that is, release from the endless cycle of the wheel of rebirth. The date of composition of the Gita is also uncertain. But some scholars believe it was written after the rise of Buddhism and Jainism—both of which counsel radical withdrawal from engagement in the world in the individual quest for release from rebirth. For early Buddhism, this meant following the Buddha’s own example and leaving the life of family and the practical life for life as a monk or nun. For Jains, the withdrawal is even more radical. The exemplars of Jain spirituality are the Tirthankaras, the conquerors, shown in Jain iconography with vines growing up their legs and arms, symbolizing their utter lack of movement and culminating in death by starvation. If the Gita is indeed in some sense a response to those movements, all of its arguments point in the same direction: the validity and indeed importance of remaining in the world of practical affairs, doing one’s caste duty. Whether one focuses on the caste duty argument, the bhakti yoga of casting the fruits of one’s actions on Krishna, or the cosmic illusion that one is acting at all when in reality the world is just the strands of matter interacting, all counsel Arjuna—and therefore, everyone—to remain engaged in the world of practical action. Martin L. Cook See also Hinduism and War; India, Religious Conflict in; Kurukshetra War; Ten Kings, Battle of

Further Reading Davis, Richard H. The “Bhagavad Gita”: A Biography. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. Malinar, Angelika. The Bhagavadgita. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh (1947–1984) Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale built a significant following among rural Sikhs throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, preaching against popular deviation from Sikh teachings and the perceived mistreatment of the Sikh community by the Indian government. Bhindranwale spoke often of Sikh sovereignty without explicitly endorsing separatism. The Indian National Congress first supported Bhindranwale so as to discredit the moderate Sikh party, the Shiroman.ī Akālī Dal (SAD), but his increasing popularity, collaboration with the SAD, rumored involvement in political killings, and amassing of weapons in Amritsar’s Golden Temple complex drew fears of a significant threat to central authority. Bhindranwale was ultimately killed during Operation Blue Star, a raid ordered by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on the Golden Temple complex in the first 10 days of June 1984. Sikhs around the world were outraged by the attack on their holiest place of worship. Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two Sikh bodyguards on October 31, 1984, which was followed by pogroms against Sikhs organized by elements within the Congress Party. These events saw immediate growth in the demand for a separate Sikh country, Khālistān. Militant activity was repressed by heavy police action for roughly 10 years until the movement was defeated. Many Sikhs remember Bhindranwale as a moral and political authority, believing that the Indian government’s actions surrounding and following his death further legitimize his teachings on Sikh sovereignty. This perspective is not universal, however, and Bhindranwale is labeled a “terrorist” by many Sikhs and non-Sikhs alike. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn See also Golden Temple, Battle of

130  Bible and War Further Reading Chima, Jugdep S. The Sikh Separatist Insurgency in India: Political Leadership and Ethnonationalist Movements. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2010. Tatla, Darshan Singh. The Sikh Diaspora: The Search for Statehood. London: UCL Press, 1999.

Bible and War The Bible, the central religious text of Christianity, contains accounts of warfare in the Old Testament (Hebrew scriptures) and in the New Testament. In the Old Testament there are also guidelines in the book of Deuteronomy that the Hebrews were to use when engaging in conflict. As Christians through the centuries thought about and participated in warfare, most notably the crusades, they often looked to the Bible for direct and indirect guidance and a theological framework for understanding the theological reason that war exists as part of the human experience.

The Christian and War: Theological Perspective

One of the ironic tragedies of history is that its eras are as likely as not to be marked by wars rather than by advances in science and the arts or by important moments of philosophical and religious thought that have made the world a better place to live. In fact, more wars have been fought over religion than perhaps any other single cause. The reason is almost self-evident: Religion is a phenomenon that grips the very soul and caters to the best or basest human instincts. Nations will live and die more readily for religion than for patriotism, material acquisition, or imperialistic ambition. The modern Middle East is a case in point as were the Muslim conquests, the Christian crusades, and the Catholic-Protestant conflicts in post-Reformation Europe and in Ireland and Ulster in modern times. The Hebrew Bible and the apocalyptic texts of the New Testament are rife with scenes of war and bloodshed in the names of Yahweh and of Jesus Christ. (For the latter, see “Apocalyptic Literature”). However, before any kind of judgmental conclusions can be drawn from this stark reality, it is essential that the impetus behind these wars and their causes and conditions be carefully studied. Behind both

cases and the Bible as a whole lies a strong theological grounding, a rationale that can be explained only in theological terms. It is this observation that requires an examination of the connection between the seemingly incompatible terms “Christian,” “War,” and “Theological” in the title of this section of this entry. In the first place, the Hebrew Bible has surprisingly little to say about warfare in general in either historical or theological terms. It does address the theology of eschatological war, more fully addressed below. In historical contexts it is concerned almost exclusively with Israel and its intertribal battles and interaction with the nations in its geopolitical environment. Only ancillary to its preoccupation with Israel does the Bible address war among the major world powers of the time or even more regional conflicts among smaller nations. As is usually the case, war entails offensive or aggressive action on the one hand, and defensive or reciprocal response on the other. The Hebrew scriptures make this distinction and portray Israel as both aggressor and defender. In the former instance, Israel was not only permitted to engage in conflict, but in fact was instructed to do so, but only in specific circumstances and for divinely ordained reasons. The theological difficulty lies in the very fact that Yahweh commanded war and the kind of war that mandated the slaughter not only of soldiers but of entire populations—men, women, and children. The issue thus becomes one of attempting to reconcile God-ordained slaughter of the “innocents” with the ethic of love, mercy, and grace one would expect of the God of the Bible. The biblical and theological underpinnings of this apparent moral dilemma are the following: • As created beings who have rebelled against the Creator, the nations have become enemies of God, alienated from him apart from his gracious forgiveness and restoration to fellowship. • This restoration was to be mediated through God’s chosen vessel, Abraham, and his descendants. • These descendants of Old Testament times would become solidified and democratized as a nation (Israel) with a law (Torah) and a land (Canaan). Christian theology goes beyond this to assert that the Abrahamic line would culminate in a solitary

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individual, the Messiah Jesus of Nazareth, who, by his atonement, would effect redemption and reconciliation for all nations and peoples who would believe. The promise of the land long antedated the time of its occupancy by the peoples whom Israel encountered in the conquest under Joshua. Therefore, Israel had divine sanction not only to expel the “squatters” who lived there, but to annihilate them lest they continue to be an ongoing threat to the nation’s fidelity to Yahweh. They were fundamentally not the enemies of Israel but of Israel’s God, so the wars of destruction and expulsion they undertook were “Yahweh War” or, as most scholars suggest, “Holy War.” The answer to the moral question as to why noncombatants—even infants—must be slaughtered is that God, knowing their incurable disposition to sin and to be in rebellion, removed them as a measure whereby his chosen nation could be less vulnerable to pagan beliefs and practices that would render them unacceptable as a covenant-bearing people. Central to the theological issue is the Torah instruction commonly called “The Manual of War,” the purpose of which is to regulate Yahweh War as well as the kind typically carried out by all Middle East nations in the Late Bronze Age. The biblical text is Deuteronomy 20:1–20. The first part (vv. 1–15) has to do with war against peoples that are “very far off ”; that is, outside of Canaan, the land promised to Israel. The second part (vv. 16–20) concerns the conduct of Yahweh War, that is, war against the several small kingdoms of the lower Mediterranean coast. However, fundamentally the two kinds share much in common because Israel, as the chosen nation, can always be assured of the presence and power of God when undertaking just and justifiable war. When authorized by God, this will nearly always be defensive but, obviously, with offensive strategies as needed. The principles of the two codes are described in the following paragraphs.

Secular War (Deuteronomy 20:1–16)

1. The command to “fear not” (vv. 1–4). This injunction rests on the promise that Yahweh is with them: “Yahweh your God is the one who goes with you to fight for you against your enemies and to save you” (v. 4).

2. Four reasons for disqualification for military service (vv. 5–9): (1) the building and securing of a new house; (2) the harvesting of crops when ripe; (3) an engagement to be married; and (4) inordinate fear of battle. 3. Extension of offers of peace (vv. 10–15). If the terms of surrender are accepted, the people shall become tributary to Israel and shall serve it. If the terms are refused, all the conquered men shall be slain; the women, children, and livestock shall become captives; and foodstuffs and other spoils of war shall be consumed.

Yahweh War (Deuteronomy 20:16–20)

The procedures and outcomes are quite different here: no offers of peace are extended and all living things are slain except for fruit-bearing trees (vv. 19–20). The rationale for such harsh treatment is “so they [the Canaanites and other pagan nations in the land] will not teach you according to all their abominations which they have done to their gods and thus sin against Yahweh your God” (v. 18). Clearly the intent is to eradicate anyone or anything that can dissuade God’s people from worshiping and serving him alone. In military circles much is made of the “just war tradition.” The Hebrew Bible’s approach to this issue is clear and straightforward: Any war done in the name of Yahweh and for his glory is just. The New Testament ethic is entirely different, for (1) the kingdoms of this world are not yet under the sovereignty of God; (2) the church is not Israel; and (3) God has never promised to be the warrior on behalf of any individual, people, or nation in this present stage of history. That is reserved for the eschatological age when all kingdoms, tribes, and nations will be subject to God’s dominion. Eugene H. Merrill See also Apocalyptic Literature; Apocalypticism and War, Christian; Assyrian Warfare; Christianity and War; Egyptian Warfare; Holy War (Bellum Sacrum); Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy; Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy; Judaism and War; Just War Tradition Further Reading Craigie, Peter C. The Problem of War in the Old Testament. Grand Rapids. MI: Eerdmans, 1978.

132  Bin Laden, Osama (1957–2011) Gundry, Stanley N., ed. Show Them No Mercy: 4 Views on God and Canaanite Genocide. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003. Miller, P. D., Jr. The Divine Warrior in Early Israel. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973. Rad, Gerhard von. Holy War in Ancient Israel. Edited and translated by Marva J. Dawn. Grand Rapids, MI: Eeerdmans, 1991. Reid, Daniel G., and Tremper Longman III. God Is a Warrior. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1995. Smend, Rudolf. Yahweh War and Tribal Confederation. Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1970.

Bin Laden, Osama (1957–2011) Osama bin Laden was the founder and leader of the violent Sunni Islamist terrorist organization Al Qaeda. He leveraged Islamic concepts of umma (community) and jihad (struggle) to inspire terrorist attacks worldwide, which he often purported to be defensive. Bin Laden advocated the expulsion of non-Muslim influence from the greater Middle East. He also promoted the establishment of Islamic states dominated by sharia law and resistance to governments in the region that he deemed secular, such as the Saudi royal family. Bin Laden based much of his religious narrative of faith and conflict on the concept of tawhid (absolute unity of God). He argued for using violence to merge religion, politics, and society under Islam. Specifically, he criticized U.S. support of Israel, railed against the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia due to the location of the Muslim holy sites Mecca and Medina in that country, and advocated war between Muslims and the West, especially the United States. Born in 1957 in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden was the son of Mohammed bin Laden, a Yemeni businessman who accrued vast wealth constructing many of the Saudi royal family’s palaces. One of 20 sons, bin Laden studied at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia during the late 1970s, earning degrees in public administration and civil engineering. He drew inspiration from the religious teachings of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Abdullah al-Azzam (1941– 1989), leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Bin Laden joined Azzam and Umar Abd al-Rahman to support

the mujahideen (holy warriors), an insurgency movement against communist rule in Afghanistan. Bin Laden eventually became a key financier for that foray. He also played a significant role in logistics, organization, and recruiting and fought alongside the mujahideen. As a result of his role in the struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden became influential as an Islamist leader. In 1988, he founded Al Qaeda with Abdullah al-Azzam. When Azzam died the following year, Osama bin Laden became the undisputed leader of Al Qaeda. After the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Osama bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United States and an international coalition liberated Kuwait and deployed approximately 500,000 troops to Saudi Arabia to prevent further Iraqi incursions. This development incensed bin Laden. He characterized it as occupation of Muslim holy land, argued that it demonstrated the corruption of allegedly secular regimes in the region, and concluded that U.S. support allowed those governments to remain in power. Thereafter, Osama bin Laden directed his ire toward the United States. During the 1990s, Osama bin Laden expanded Al Qaeda in size, reach, and potency. In 1991, he left Saudi Arabia under pressure from the government there and settled in Sudan, where he established multiple training bases for Al Qaeda recruits. During the 1990s, Al Qaeda commenced a series of deadly terrorist attacks worldwide. In February 1993, Al Qaeda associates bombed the World Trade Center, killing six people and wounding more than 1,000 others. In June 1996, Al Qaeda operatives destroyed the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 people and wounding several hundred others. Bin Laden lived in Sudan for five years before the Sudanese government expelled him under increasing pressure from both the U.S. and Saudi governments, at which time he left Sudan for Afghanistan. In August 1998, Al Qaeda devotees assaulted U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These massive attacks caused more than 200 fatalities and injured approximately 5,000 others. In October 2000, Al Qaeda associates bombed the USS Cole, which was in port in Aden, Yemen. The blast killed 17 American sailors and wounded 39 others. Osama bin Laden’s most infamous strikes were the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Nineteen Al Qaeda

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terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners and crashed them into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. The fourth airliner crashed near Shanksville, PA, prior to reaching its probable target of either the U.S. Capitol building or the White House. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 claimed the lives of approximately 3,000 victims from more than 75 countries. The United States and its coalition allies responded by launching Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and later Operation Iraqi Freedom, which bin Laden characterized as crusades against Islam. Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda continued to inspire, plan, and execute terrorist attacks during the 2000s, including bombings in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. U.S. intelligence and military leaders labeled bin Laden High Value Target One (HVT-1) and relentlessly pursued him after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The United States offered a reward for information leading to his capture, which eventually reached $25 million. In December 2001, intelligence operatives tracked him to the Tora Bora mountain region in southeastern Afghanistan, but he escaped, utilizing the extensive network of caves located there. After nearly a decade-long international manhunt, intelligence assets located him in a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. In May 2011, U.S. Special Forces and CIA operatives conducted a raid on the compound and killed Osama bin Laden, after which U.S. naval forces buried his body at sea. Several Al Qaeda leaders succeeded Osama bin Laden, most recently Ayman al-Zawahiri. William A. Taylor See also Al Qaeda; Islam and War (Jihad); Mohammed Omar, Mullah; Mujahideen; Muslim Brotherhood; Taliban Further Reading Bergen, Peter L. Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. New York: Touchstone, 2001. Bergen, Peter L. Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad. New York: Crown, 2012. Coll, Steve. The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century. New York: Penguin Press, 2008. Owen, Mark, and Kevin Maurer. No Easy Day: The Firsthand Account of the Mission That Killed Osama Bin Laden. New York: Penguin Press, 2012. Scheuer, Michael. Osama Bin Laden. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Bishops’ Wars (1639–1640) The Bishops’ Wars, which were in fact only one war with a brief interlude, took place in 1639–1640 between England and Scotland. The war was caused by the attempt of the Stuart king Charles I and the archbishop of Canterbury William Laud to force episcopacy (bishops) on Presbyterian Scotland. Over the previous century, Scots had agreed to a series of covenants and a Confession of Faith in 1581 denouncing “popish” practices in the Church of Scotland. King James I, who was king of Scotland before becoming king of England, introduced bishops back into Scotland in 1584, even though they were seen by Scottish Covenanters as popish. Later James’s son, King Charles I, tried to impose a new liturgy (the English Book of Common Prayer) on the Scots, who saw it as another violation of their covenants and confession. Riots broke out when a bishop tried to read from the Prayer Book in St. Giles Cathedral, Edinburgh, in July 1637. Throughout Scotland, except for the far northern highlands, Scots recommitted themselves to their Calvinist Confession of Faith. King Charles and the Privy Council in London decided to use force to suppress the Scots and impose Anglican worship upon them, but before English troops could arrive, the Assembly of the Church of Scotland met and called for an end of both Prayer Book and bishops. The Scottish National Covenant was adopted by the Scottish Parliament, and the Covenanters raised a Scottish army to resist the English invasion. In June 1639 the two armies met on their mutual border but refrained from conflict, except for a few outlying skirmishes. To avoid bloodshed, King Charles agreed to cease hostilities until the Scottish Parliament could meet and accept his plan. Instead they abolished the bishops and called for an end to royal control over the Church of Scotland. This caused the king to prepare for war and call on the English Parliament to provide funds needed for the war. However, the English Parliament, before voting to provide those funds, made their own demands upon the king, causing him to declare their session cancelled. Parliament refused to cease deliberations, which resulted in the English Civil Wars between the king and Parliament. In the meantime the Scots marched south, occupying northern England, while the royal army continued their retreat south while attempting to sue for peace.

134  Boko Haram

There were hardly any casualties in the Bishops’ Wars, just a few bruises in the riots and a single soldier shot in one of the skirmishes on the border. Both sides avoided open battle, as the royal army retreated rather than engage the angry Scottish Covenanters. King Charles I of Scotland and England was unable to force his hierarchical religion on the Calvinist Scots, and in attempting to do so lost not only Scotland but also England, and eventually even his own life. William C. Watson See also English Civil Wars Further Reading MacInnes, A. I. Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement. Edinburgh: John Donald, 1991. Paterson, R. C. A Land Afflicted, Scotland and the Covenanter Wars, 1638–1690. Edinburgh: John Donald, 1998. Royle, Trevor. Civil War: The War of the Three Kingdoms. London: Abacus, 2005. Stevenson, David. The Scottish Revolution 1637–44. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973.

Boko Haram Boko Haram is an Islamic jihadist and takfiri political organization in Nigeria that seeks to rid the country of Western influence and establish a government based on sharia law. Targets of Boko Haram have been Nigerian Christians, churches, and government sites. The name allegedly derives from the Arabic terms for Western-style learning (boko) and sin, or a forbidden practice (haram). The term Boko Haram translates loosely into what advocates understand to be “forbidding the sin of Western-style learning and practice.” The official English name of the organization, founded in 2002 by Nigerian Mohammed Yusuf (1970–2009), is the Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad (Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad). Yusuf remained Boko Haram’s leader until his death in 2009 at the hands of Nigerian soldiers. The organization represents a fusion of militant religious belief and political ambition, and it has placed a strict interpretation of Islam at the center of its ideology.

Boko Haram seeks to leverage religious fervor in pursuit of specific political objectives. It operates in an area where militant Islamism has been present for decades. Boko Haram has been said to be a partner with Al Qaeda in the Maghreb and Al Shabaab in Somalia, although these links have not been conclusively demonstrated. The organization has restricted its attacks to within Nigeria’s borders, targeting Christian churches and schools, as well as police stations, military barracks, and other government buildings. However, Muslims have been targeted as well, as have some mosques. It is even alleged that some non-Muslims are members of the group. Civilians have borne the brunt of the casualties of Boko Haram attacks. Between the time of the organization’s founding in 2001 and 2013, more than 10,000 people were killed in attacks attributed to Boko Haram. In May 2013, Nigerian president Jonathan Goodluck ordered a major military offensive against Boko Haram, employing conventional forces with little regard for civilians caught in the crossfire. Reports stated that as many as 200 civilians may have been killed in the 2013 offensive against Boko Haram in the town of Baga. Although the Nigerian army claims to have made significant progress against Boko Haram, these claims have not yet been independently verified. Boko Haram is one of a number of organizations that has employed religious fervor and religiously motivated objectives at the forefront of a political agenda. Seeking to replace the Western-oriented Nigerian government with a government that respects and adheres to sharia law, Boko Haram has conducted a campaign of terror in Nigeria for more than a decade, and the ongoing activities of the group demonstrate the persuasion and vitality of religiously motivated terrorism. Jeffrey M. Shaw See also Al Qaeda; Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa; Islam and War (Jihad); Sharia and War; Terrorism and Religion; Primary Document: UN Security Council Statement on Boko Haram (January 19, 2015) Further Reading Johnson, Toni. “Boko Haram.” Backgrounder. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013. Pham, J. Peter. “Boko Haram’s Evolving Threat.” Africa Security Brief No. 20 (April 2012). Washington, DC: Africa Center for

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich (1906–1945)  135 Strategic Studies and National Defense University Press, 2012. Walker, Andrew. “What Is Boko Haram?” United States Institute of Peace Special Report. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012.

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich (1906–1945) Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a pastor, theologian, and member of the anti-Nazi resistance in Germany during the Second World War. Born in Breslau, Silesia (now Wroclaw, Poland) on February 4, 1906, Dietrich Bonhoeffer was the sixth child and youngest boy among eight children. Young Die­ trich and his siblings benefited from all the material comforts of a German upper-middle-class home during their formative years, spent first in Breslau and later in Berlin. The Bonhoeffer family was proud of its academic distinction, its connection to the aristocracy, and its conventional morality as taught by the state-sponsored Lutheran church. This nominally Christian family of physicians, scientists, and thinkers produced a young man who, to the surprise of many of his contemporaries, chose to pursue theological studies at the University of Tübingen in 1923. Dietrich Bonhoeffer was licensed as a Lutheran minister in the German state church in 1928. In the five years following he served in various pastoral positions while continuing his studies to qualify as a university lecturer in theology. Travels, including a visit to a seminary in New York City, drew Bonhoeffer into association with a group of church leaders from several nations hoping to create a “World Council” of Christian churches to meet the varied spiritual challenges of modern life. The links Bonhoeffer forged in the early 1930s with these fellow believers from other lands proved particularly significant after the Nazi rise to power in his homeland. National Socialist ideology was not only nationalist, racist, and antidemocratic, it was also fundamentally antiChristian. When the Nazi government began to replace the administrators of the state church with officials chosen for their adherence to party doctrine, Bonhoeffer was among the first to object. Between 1933 and 1939 he worked with like-minded pastors to establish an illegal network of

independent Protestant churches, opened a covert seminary to train new preachers, maintained his overseas ecumenical contacts, and published a treatise on Christ’s “Sermon on the Mount.” Resistance to the official, Nazified church was, for Bonhoeffer, a necessary part of following the teachings of Jesus. Bonhoeffer’s understanding of his faith also made him an early exponent of peacemaking, which he conceived as an active process rather than simple pacifism. He argued in his 1937 book, The Cost of Discipleship, that Christians must renounce “all violence and tumult,” “patiently suffer in the face of hatred and wrong,” and “maintain fellowship where others would break it off.” He insisted that there should be no repetition of the fratricidal struggle among the Christian states of Europe that began the century. For Bonhoeffer the concept of war and its consequences was not merely an academic or theological one. His boyhood was marked by the First World War’s impact on the German home front, and his own home was scarred by the death of an elder brother from wounds received in 1918. But this alone did not shape his theological opposition to war. Instead, he took a far broader perspective. Bonhoeffer argued that Christ’s sacrifice on the cross was meant to restore a broken union between the Creator and his creatures, between God and man. Unity was thus a vital component of Christianity. Consequently, he saw the Christian church as critical in shaping the cultural institutions that united Western civilization from the late Roman Empire to the growth of the modern nation-state. Precisely because of this connection with the faith, one must actively work against war between Christian nation-states: such a conflict was a sinful rejection of the unity they enjoyed in Christ. Nationalism was thus a false religion and total war an indication of profound moral failure. “It is only when Christian faith is lost,” Bonhoeffer observed in an unfinished study entitled Ethics, “that man must himself make use of all means—even criminal ones—to secure by force the victory of his cause. . . . Only with the advent of total war is there a threat to the unity of the West.” The coming of the Second World War in 1939 changed the nature of Bonhoeffer’s resistance to Nazism but not his conviction that his Christian duty was to seek the peace of Europe. If called upon to serve in Hitler’s army, he intended to accept the punishment allotted to a conscientious

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objector. Instead, friends and family members worked to have the theologian enrolled as a civilian agent of the army’s Abwehr, the one intelligence organization in the Third Reich not under Nazi control. This appointment not only protected him from wartime military service, it also brought him into contact with a group of men who opposed a regime they found to be criminal. In the Abwehr Bonhoeffer was, on the one hand, a moral counselor for his colleagues and, on the other, a voice for “good Germans” in the wider world. Between October 1940 until April 1943, Bonhoeffer made six trips to neutral states for “information gathering” for the Military Intelligence service. In each case, he renewed his contact with friends on the World Council of Churches, assuring them that there were Germans working against Hitler and planning for a postwar Germany. While the foreign clergymen welcomed the news, their influence on Allied governments was negligible and the early peace efforts by the World Council came to nothing. Various Abwehr-related plots against Hitler enjoyed no greater success. Bonhoeffer and his fellow conspirators were discovered by the Gestapo in the spring of 1943, arrested, imprisoned, arraigned as traitors, and ultimately executed in April 1945. If only for resisting the evils of Nazi tyranny at the cost of his own life, this Christian thinker is justly remembered among the modern martyrs of the church. Dietrich Bonhoeffer offers us no easily accessible modern Christian theology for wartime; instead, he exemplifies the complexities of Christian action and thought in an age of ideological war. As equally committed to peace as he was to the purity of the church, Bonhoeffer opposed Hitler’s regime from its inception and Hitler’s war from its first day. As evidence of Nazi atrocities mounted, he perceived that the war had become a total war, one that would result in the total annihilation of one side or the other. In this context, the Christian thinker accepted that a moral evil, the murder of Hitler, was a necessity if there was to be any hope of an end to the fighting. By September 1941, Bon­ hoeffer confessed to a contact in Zurich, “I pray for the defeat of my country, for I believe that this is the only way in which it can pay for the suffering which it has caused the world.” John E. Kuykendall

See also Christianity and War; Nazism, Religious Aspects of; Second World War, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Bethge, Eberhard. Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Man of Vision, Man of Courage. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. The Cost of Discipleship. New York: Touchstone, 1995. Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Ethics. New York: Macmillan, 1955. Dramm, Sabine. Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Resistance. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009. Kelley, Geffrey B. Reading Bonhoeffer. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009. Klemperer, Klemens von. German Resistance against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad, 1938–1945. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Schlingensiepen, Ferdinand. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 1906–1945: Martyr, Thinker, Man of Resistance. London: T and T Clark, 2010.

Bouillon, Godfrey de (1060–1100) Godfrey de Bouillon, long portrayed in both history and medieval romances as the model Christian knight of the crusades, was in reality a much more complex figure. One of the leaders of the First Crusade, who also ruled Jerusalem during the brief period of Christian control, Godfrey would also achieve renown as a poet of the crusades and as the founder of the Knights Templar order. Of Frankish origin, Godfrey lived from approximately 1060 to 1100, and for much of his life he was a fairly minor nobleman, whose early life has been greatly distorted by subsequent legend. Believed to have been born in Boulogne-sur-Mer, the son of Eustace III, the Count of Boulogne, and Ida, the daughter of the Duke of Lower Lorraine, Godfrey was also a descendant of Charlemagne. According to some sources, the region of Godfrey’s ancestry was home to a sizable Jewish community, and one of Godfrey’s ancestors was Guillem de Gellone, a close associate of Charlemagne, who according to some historical accounts was “a Jew of royal blood.” This somewhat distant, but identifiable Jewish ancestry was ironic in light of Godfrey’s image as the ideal Christian knight, but appeared to have a limited effect on his role in the anti-Jewish violence that characterized the crusades.

Bouillon, Godfrey de (1060–1100)  137

But in his early adult life, Godfrey’s background was characterized mainly by the disadvantages of being the second (and hence noninheriting) son of a count, resulting in a necessary struggle to acquire the duchy of Bouillon, which he eventually achieved, along with the duchy of Lorraine. As duke of Bouillon and Lorraine, he initially lived, and could have continued to live a comparative comfortable life on his fiefs. But like so many Frankish noblemen of this period, Godfrey was swept up in the religious fervor of the crusades. In fact, Godfrey was one of the first to respond to the call of Pope Urban II, even selling his hardfought-for estates in order to finance and equip his army, and additionally giving away properties to the bishop of Liège and even to the pope. Godfrey and his forces then

saw combat even before reaching the Holy Land, fighting in the early battles in Constantinople, as the result of a dispute with Alexius Comnenius over who would have ownership of the retaken Holy Land. Godfrey’s forces would then play an important role in the 1098 capture of Antioch, the first major crusader victory that occurred even before the crusader arrival in the Holy Land. Godfrey, in the company of his brothers Baldwin and Eustace, reached Jerusalem in 1099, and they and their forces would play key roles in the First (and most successful) Crusade that included the taking of the city. In the battle for Jerusalem, Godfrey and his troops also took part in the slaughter of thousands of Jews who lived in the city. But Godfrey’s primary motive was the retaking of the

This miniature from a 12th-century manuscript based on the Chanson d’Antioche depicts two images of Godfrey de Bouillon: one on horseback with the river Jordan below, and the other of Godfrey decapitating a camel with his sword. Godfrey was one of the leaders of the First Crusade, and founder of the Knights Templar Order. (Library of Congress)

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Christian holy places, most notably the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, from Muslim control. Interestingly enough, Godfrey accomplished this by diplomatic as well as military means, making truces along the way with Muslim coastal cities such as Acre and Caesarea. When the crusader forces emerged victorious, Godfrey was offered the kingship of Jerusalem. The pious Godfrey, out of deference to Jesus Christ’s crown of thorns, refused to accept “a crown of gold,” but merely the title of defender or advocate of the Holy Sepulchre. Regardless of title, however, Godfrey was the de facto king of Jerusalem, but ended up ruling for only one year before an untimely death whose cause has been a subject of historical controversy. Some of the more popular stories recount a death in battle in order to emphasize Godfrey’s heroism, but the historical evidence shows that it is more likely that he simply died of illness in Jerusalem. He was buried in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, but his tomb would largely be destroyed in 1808. Following his death, his brother Baldwin, who had far less compunction about crowning himself king, and who did not follow Godfrey’s simple and unpretentious mode of living, took over as ruler of Jerusalem and the crusader states. Godfrey’s rule of Jerusalem ended up being not only brief, but full of struggle. The Kingdom of Jerusalem’s troubles began when most of Godfrey’s troops, following the victory and success in a subsequent battle against Egyptian forces, saw their mission of securing Jerusalem as accomplished. Hence, most returned home shortly after the capture of Jerusalem, leaving Godfrey with very little military or political support. For this and other reasons, Godfrey accepted the demand of Daimbert, the papal legate and patriarch of Jerusalem, that the Holy City (and the entire Holy Land) be placed under church control. This decision to accept vassal status to the papacy was the beginning of a struggle for control of Jerusalem that lasted well beyond Godfrey’s death. In any case, the death of Godfrey, who had been very much a unifying figure, led to increased divisions among the crusaders, contributing to the eventual loss of Jerusalem. But if Godfrey ultimately failed to establish a stable crusader kingdom, he did contribute to the formation of military-religious orders whose purpose was to defend the Christian presence in Jerusalem. Even then, his role in the founding of the most famous of these orders, the Knights

Templar, whose original purpose was to ensure the safety of Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land, is also controversial. There is, by contrast, much more evidence for Godfrey’s founding of the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulcher, a military unit whose purpose was to protect the Canons of the Holy Sepulchre by providing the military support that freed the religious brothers in the order from the necessity of taking up arms. And like the Knights Templar, the Order of the Holy Sepulchre was also dedicated to the protection of Christian holy places and Christian access to them. The earliest accounts of the life and crusader career of Godfrey of Bouillon, as well as the embellishment of both are found in the Cycle de la Croisade, a series of French poetic chronicles composed in the wake of the success of the First Crusade, and inspiring similar crusader literature that created the idealized representation of Godfrey that tended to embellish his ancestry to include descent from the mythical “King of the Swan” and distort his pre-crusades adulthood. The mythologized history of Godfrey de Bouillon was further developed in the literary-historical account of William of Tyre in his history of the crusader kingdom and continued in other historical, visual artistic, and theatrical representations throughout the Middle Ages. Godfrey was also named one of “The Nine Worthies” who modeled the ideal of chivalry, ironically as one of the few Christians to make the list, which also included Judas Maccabeus. These religious, literary, and artistic accounts have in turn made it challenging to understand the actual historical figure, whose reputation for piety was largely created after the fact, and whose actual motives for choosing to go on the crusade remain unclear. Godfrey’s significance to the history of war and religion, therefore, is in the creation of the idealized image of the crusader king who founded a holy order of warriors and demonstrated why the Christian holy places were worth fighting for and guarding. This in turn has contributed to the traditionally airbrushed image of the crusades and the crusaders, and if anything, obscures the more complex, but no less significant leadership role Godfrey played in the success of the First Crusade. Susan Roth Breitzer See also Clermont, Council of; Crusades (Overview); First Crusade; Holy Sepulchre, Church of the; Jerusalem as Holy City; Knights

Brown, John (1800–1859)  139 Templar; Primary Document: An Account of the First Crusade: Letter of Daimbert, Archbishop of Pisa; Godfrey of Bouillon; and Raymond, Count of St. Gilles to Pope Paschal II (1099) Further Reading Olsen, Oddvar. The Templar Papers: Ancient Mysteries, Secret Societies, and the Holy Grail. Franklin Lakes, NJ: New Page Books, 2006. Tozer, Tom. Godfrey de Bouillon: Defender of the Holy Sepulchre. New York: Publish America, 2004.

Brown, John (1800–1859) John Brown was a white American abolitionist who advocated the use of violence to overthrow slavery and helped spark the American Civil War. A descendant of 17thcentury Puritans, he befriended prominent abolitionists such as Frederick Douglass and William Lloyd Garrison. Following the passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, he founded the League of Gileadites to protect slaves by preventing their recapture. When the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act made the status of slavery in Kansas dependent on popular sovereignty, proslavery and abolitionist groups moved into the state. Brown moved to the region to help his sons living there as well as to oppose slavery. In May 1856 a proslavery group destroyed a newspaper office and hotel in Lawrence, Kansas, killing one person. After learning of threats made against his family, Brown and his sons killed five proslavery individuals, hacking their bodies with broadswords, in retaliation. Prior to this event, known as the Pottawatomie Massacre, eight individuals had been killed in two years of fighting between proslavery and abolitionist forces in Kansas. After this event, 29 people died in a three-month period of retaliatory attacks during the bloodiest period of what was known as “Bleeding Kansas.” Brown returned to the northeast in November 1856. For the next two years he raised funds for his idea of creating a new state for freed slaves. He was heavily influenced by the successful slave revolt in Haiti for which a key element was the establishment of maroon (free slave) colonies. He planned to begin the fight but anticipated that freed slaves

would ultimately take over the battle themselves. Fighting was to be done only in self-defense. Harriet Tubman helped Brown in his efforts to recruit former slaves. Frederick Douglass disapproved of Brown’s approach. On July 3, 1859, Brown went to Harper’s Ferry, Virginia where he rented a nearby farmhouse under an assumed name. Unlike the brigade of 4,500 supporters he anticipated, only 21 men showed up—16 white and 5 black. Northern abolitionists sent him 950 pikes and 200 rifles. On October 16 he raided the armory and seized more weapons. Brown was captured two days later by U.S. Marines led by Robert E. Lee and ultimately hanged for treason. Fearful that Brown’s raid was part of a much larger plot on the part of northern abolitionists, Southerners strengthened their local militias. In December 1859 a Senate investigation looked into whether Brown’s raid was indeed part of a larger conspiracy. The results, released in June 1860, found no evidence of a larger conspiracy but blamed the Republican Party and its doctrines. Republicans adamantly denied those claims. A few months later, in November 1860, in the context of the hysteria generated by Brown’s raid, Lincoln was elected president. In December, South Carolina seceded. Historians today argue over whether Brown deserves to be called a terrorist, but agree that the actions John Brown took escalated tensions in the United States and helped pave the way for the Civil War. Melissa Fulgham See also American Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading DeCaro, William A. John Brown: The Cost of Freedom. New York: International, 2007. Horwitz, Tony. Midnight Rising: John Brown and the Raid That Sparked the Civil War. New York: Henry Holt, 2011. Miller, Randall M., Harry S. Stout, and Charles Reagan Wilson, eds. Religion and the American Civil War. New York: Oxford University, 1998. Noll, Mark. The Civil War as Theological Crisis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2006. Reynolds, David S. John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked the Civil War, and Seeded Civil Rights. New York: Random House, 2005. Stout, Harry S. Upon the Altar of the Nation: A Moral History of the American Civil War. New York: Viking, 2006.

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Buddhism and War Buddhism is the dharma or the teachings of the Lord Buddha. The exact dates of his birth and death are not known. Known as Prince Siddhartha, he was born in Lumbini, which belonged to what is today Nepal, during the fifth or sixth century BCE. He was the son of King Suddhodana, who was the leader of the Shakya clan in India. His mother, Queen Mahamaya (or Maya), passed away after his birth. Subsequently, he was raised by Queen Prajapathi Gothami. According to chronicles, a few days after Prince Siddhartha’s birth, astrologers had told King Suddhodana that the prince would be either a great military conqueror if he were to continue his lay life (a Sakvithi Raju in Sinhala) or a great spiritual leader if he left the lay life. The father, who wished his son to be a great king, made every effort to ensure that his son would not experience human suffering and frustrations during his lay life and to this effect, he built for him four houses for the four seasons and employed dancers and singers to ensure that he would always remain happy. The prince was taught all the required knowledge in the art and science of that period, in the art of war, and in all other skills that would be needed for a ruler, and he demonstrated a sharp brain and a great physique. However, when he reached the age of 29, he was convinced of the futility of lay life when he saw a man with disease, an old man, a dead body, and a priest. After thinking deeply about the realities of the life that was beyond the mechanical luxurious life that he enjoyed, he became much attracted to the life of a priest. The day his son, Prince Rahula, was born to his wife, Princess Yashodara, Prince Siddhartha left the palace in search of a permanent end for the suffering of samsara, which was understood to be the limitless number of rebirths and the suffering life entailed, following the great tradition of the prevalent religions of the time. After following two extremist traditions—giving great comfort to the body (Kame Sukallikānu Yogaya) and experiencing great suffering (Attakilamathānu Yōgaya)— Prince Siddhartha realized the importance of the middle path, which was not to enjoy extreme luxury or extreme suffering, and he was able to understand the reasons behind the continuation of samsara. He ceased his rebirth by attaining nirvana.

Buddhist Traditions

Buddhist practices today are mainly divided into two schools of thought, namely the Mahayana and Theravada traditions. The everyday practices of Buddhism around the world suggest that the original teachings of the Lord Buddha are mixed with local traditions. The Theravada tradition has been practiced in countries such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos. A majority of the Chinese population practices the Theravada tradition in China, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Nepal, and Vietnam. The Mahayana tradition has been practiced mainly in Japan, Korea, and Mongolia, while the minority follows the Theravada tradition. Today, the Mahayana tradition is a mixture of the Chinese Chan, Tiantai, Zen, Nichiren, and Pure Land traditions. A significant factor is that there are Mahayana traditions and other different traditions that are mixed in countries that practice Theravada Buddhism. In addition, Buddhism was remarkably influenced by colonial interventions in South Asian countries, such as Sri Lanka, India, and Bangladesh. The colonists brought different Christian and Catholic traditions, which influenced, modified, and modernized Buddhism during colonial invasions and against threats posed by different religions, such as Christianity and Islam. Today’s Sri Lankan form of Buddhism is identified as Protestant Buddhism and as Sinhala Buddhism by some scholars, under which the religion could be used to justify wars and to fight to safeguard the sovereignty of a country.

Is War Good or Bad in Buddhism?

There have never been reported cases of Buddhists waging wars in the name of religion anywhere in the world. However, there have been wars in Buddhist societies based on economic and political issues. In Buddhist history, there are reports of the great king Ashoka (304–232 BCE) waging wars against regional kingdoms in India. He saw the great number of soldiers and civilians killed, the damage caused to property, and the suffering of the people during a war. This situation led him to work to establish peace and reconciliation in India, as well as to send the message of Buddhism to Sri Lanka. King Ashoka honestly accepted the violations of human rights and the destruction of humanity caused by war, and it eventually led him to give up

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territorial conquest (digvijaya) policies and to follow the law of virtue as expounded in Buddhism. Buddhist teachings take us beyond the right/wrong dichotomy. According to the Buddha’s teachings, not only acts, but also the thoughts that lead to the acts cause harm and lead to akusal (sin). This is connected to Buddhist morality, which is not based on a policy or law, but rather on a principle. Buddhists can fight to protect their nation, motherland, or themselves. However, harboring hate, and even regarding another as one’s enemy, is still a way of acquiring akusal. Sowing seeds of war is considered to be a way of collecting akusal. Buddhists consider war and fighting as an akusala or as being sinful. This is connected to their thinking of rebirth or the liberation from samsara, and from being released from suffering and achieving nirvana, which ceases rebirth. Buddhists observe the five precepts and the avoidance of killing any breathing being. The Lord Buddha himself has intervened on many occasions to resolve wars and to highlight the value of humanity and the need to resort to nonviolent means. A Buddhist scripture narrates a situation in which the Lord Buddha arrived to settle a war between the Sakyans and Kolyans to sort out an issue connected to sharing the water of the Rohini River. The Dhammapada verses 197, 198, and 199 explain the Buddha’s position on war. Sri Lankan folklore reveals how the Lord Buddha arrived to resolve a battle between Chulodara and Mahodara, two brothers who were involved in a dispute over a precious chair that was made using gems.

Buddhist Involvement in Wars

Ground-level realities have meant that Buddhism has not been completely uninvolved in war. The monks of the Shaolin temple engaged in a war in 621 CE that established the Tang Dynasty. Tibetan monks aligned with Mongol generals to benefit from the war. During the 14th century, Buddhist combatants supported the expelling of Mongols from China. There are reports about the link between samurai warriors and Zen Buddhism in the period 1930–1940 during the Second World War. During this period, Japanese Zen Buddhist teachings were exploited to justify assassinations. A critical analysis of the involvement of Buddhism in wars reveals that it is an outcome of abusing or misusing

the Dharma (Buddha’s teachings) to justify killings. This has happened when Buddhism has been linked with party politics and nationalism in Buddhist countries. The social, cultural, and economic aspects of society, including the local religions, suffered heavily during colonial rule in most Asian countries. Citizens of these countries have fought against those of different religions, such as Islam, and against Christians who were favored by the colonial powers. With these efforts, the revival of religious movements was linked with the independence movements in these countries. These movements were linked to the determination of the political shapes of these countries after independence. Buddhist monks, too, continuously involved themselves in attempting to secure a better share for their own religious groups in these states and to ensure their continuation, as well as to act against foreign and local threats to state affairs. Within this context, we can understand monks’ involvements in political activities in countries such as Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Monks played a leading role in sociopolitical activities in these societies. The Saffron Revolution in Myanmar and the March 2008 demonstration by Tibetan monks are such examples.

Buddhist Monks’ Involvement in Wars via Ethno-National Politics

The violent forms of Buddhism or Buddhist monks’ aggressive behavior mostly appear with their political involvement and social activism mainly in the South Asian regions. It is primarily an outcome of securing countries from foreign invasions and of protecting one’s own religious groups from other ethno-religious groups that were introduced by colonial powers. The radicalization of monks is also an outcome of their involvement in electoral politics. Mostly in Asian countries, Buddhism and monks play a vital role in the shaping of public opinion. Therefore, almost all political parties compete against each other to attract monks for their political campaigns. Among popular examples, the Saffron Revolution in Myanmar is very significant. Monks there took to the streets to revolt against the existing military governments. Monks mostly engaged in demonstrations in Tibet in 2008. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist monks engage in party politics through parties such as the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU, National

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Heritage Party). The JHU was formed following the ethnopolitical or Buddhist chauvinist revival against Muslims in Sri Lanka and was aggravated by Gangodawila Soma Thera’s death in Russia, which convinced local Buddhists of an apparent/alleged Christian fundamentalists’ conspiracy that gave rise to Sinhala Buddhist chauvinist thinking. By the time of his demise, Soma Thera was campaigning against the expansionism of Islam and various Hindu places of worship, and the spread of Christianity in Sri Lanka. Exploiting these emotions, a few Buddhist monks contested in the General Election and were able to obtain seats in Parliament. They became advisers, as well as ideological supporters and opinion-creators of the government’s military action against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or Tamil Tigers, in 2009. The postwar “victorious” situation gave rise to a few other rebellious monk groups, such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS, Buddhist Power Force) and the Rawana Balaya. The BBS contested in the 2015 general election under the newly formed political party called the Bodu Jana Peramuna (BJP), but could not secure the necessary percentage of votes to enter Parliament. Buddhist monks were considered to be enemies by the Tamil Tigers and the latter deployed a few infamous attacks against Buddhist monks, such as the killing of 33 novice Buddhist monks, which was commonly known as the Aranthalawa Massacre, on June 2, 1987. The Tamil Tigers deployed attacks not only against Buddhists monks and followers, but also at religious places. The Tamil Tigers attacked the Jaya Sri Maha Bodhiya, which is a sapling of the original Bodhi Tree under which the Lord Buddha attained enlightenment, and perpetrated a suicide bomb attack in the premises of the Dalada Maligawa (the Temple of Tooth Relic) in Kandy.

Buddhist Identification of the “Enemy”

Buddhist teachings reveal that greed (lobha), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha) are the three main causes of violence. The Lord Buddha’s teachings suggest the need for loving one’s enemy. According to Buddhist literature, the Lord Buddha very kindly tolerated the demon Ālawaka to correct his misbehavior that had damaged that society. The Lord Buddha also went to see Angulimala, who was collecting the fingers of the people he murdered to make a garland to offer his teacher. These stories suggest that the Lord Buddha highlighted the need for searching for the

reasons/backgrounds that led an “enemy” to engage in antisocial activities. The Lord Buddha was able to correct Angulimala and to teach him the correct path. The Lord Buddha preached to him and this preaching, known as the Angulimala piritha, is chanted nowadays for pregnant females in the last few days of their pregnancy as a means of healing pain and invoking blessings for a comfortable delivery, as well as for the good health of both the mother and child. Anton Piyarathne See also Ashoka; Bushido; Kamikaze; Saffron Revolution; Tamil Tigers; Zen and War Further Reading Gombrich, Richard, and Gananath Obeyesekere. Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka. Delhi: Motilala Banarsidass, 1988. Jerryson, Michael, and Mark Juergensmeyer. Buddhist Warfare. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Kulshrestha, Mahendra. Culture India. New Delhi: Lotus Press, 2006. Maguire, Jack. Dhammapada. Mumbai: Jaico, 2007. Narada Thera. The Dhammapada. Kuala Lumpur: Buddhist Missionary Society, 1978. Oldenberg, Hermann. Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order. Delhi: Motilala Banarsidass, 1997. Perez, Louis G. Japan at War: An Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2013. Shahar, Meir. The Shaolin Monastery: History, Religion, and the Chinese Martial Arts. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008. Subramanian, Samanth. This Divided Island: Stories from the Sri Lankan War. London: Atlantic Books, 2014. Swearer, Donald K. Becoming the Buddha: The Ritual of Image Consecration in Thailand. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Tambiah, S. J. Buddhism Betrayed?: Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Zaun, Kathy. Inside Buddhism. Dayton, OH: Milliken, 2003.

Bullinger, Heinrich (1504–1575) Heinrich Bullinger, a major leader of the Protestant Reformation, was trained in scholastic theology in general and in

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Thomist theology in particular. Bullinger, who was something of a prodigy, received both a bachelor of arts and a master of arts at the University of Cologne by the time he was 18 years old. While still a university student, he attended lectures on Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica. His education in scholastic methodology is reflected in Sermons VI–IX of the Second Decade, where Bullinger presented his teaching on the civil magistrate and the doctrine of war. Is there evidence, however, that he studied and embraced Aquinas’s teaching pertaining to the matter of the justice of war (jus ad bellum)? With respect to the category of justice in war (jus in bello), Bullinger indeed opened the door to the holy war practice of fighting without restraint as seen below. Interestingly enough, though, when it came to his discussion of the justice of war, he turned away from the holy war idea of fighting that is authorized by the church, embracing a classical just war perspective and thus reflecting the impact of Aquinas. Even before Bullinger treated the doctrine of war at length in Sermon IX of the Second Decade, he briefly presented his understanding of what constitutes the just war in Sermon VI. In one paragraph, he presented the three Thomist elements of the just war. Bullinger insisted first upon the proper authority, the civil magistrate. He affirmed, second, that there had to be a just cause. He maintained, third, that there had to be a right intention, the confirmation of peace. We must focus at this point upon the first constituent of the just war, the public authority. Holy war advocates within the Christian political tradition had long believed that the church had the authority to declare war. The First Crusade had been proclaimed by Urban II in 1095 to liberate Jerusalem from Muslim control and oppression. Bullinger rejected the crusade mentality at this point. Civil government alone has the authority to initiate war. He stated that “the magistrate kills at God’s commandment . . . when in defense of his people he does justly and necessarily arm himself to the battle” (Decades, 307). Later, in Sermon IX of the Second Decade, Bullinger distinguished between the use of the sword in punishment and its use in war. Like Aquinas, Bullinger reasoned from the lesser issue (defending the commonwealth against internal disturbances) to the greater (defending it against an even more serious threat, a large host of external enemies):

“The use of the sword in the magistrate’s hand is twofold. . . . For either he punishes offenders therewith; or else he repels the enemy that . . . would spoil his people” (Decades, 370). Shifting attention to the category of justice in war, we note that Bullinger envisioned circumstances in which noncombatants (as well as armed soldiers) would be put to death in a time of war. This is the necessary implication from his statement that the laws of war in Deuteronomy 20 are still to be kept. The climactic statement of this biblical passage is the divine mandate of holy war, the complete extermination of the pagan inhabitants of the Promised Land (Deuteronomy 20:6–18). In addition, there is his statement regarding the civil magistrate that he has the duty to make war upon men who are incurable. Bullinger was here speaking about the prosecution of war without humanitarian restraint, that the Lord bids the civil magistrate at times “to kill without pity or mercy.” Such unrestrained war must be waged against the “incurable” (Decades, 376). One historical example of such warfare is to be found in the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament) in Numbers 31, the wars of Moses against the Midianites. As Bullinger knew, the Numbers passage supplies the account of noncombatants, captive Midianite women and male infants, being put to death. Killing without pity or mercy meant violating the limits of war traditionally developed in the doctrine of justice in war. In these statements, Bullinger was drawing away from the medieval Peace of God trajectory, which culminated in the doctrine of noncombatant immunity in later just war teaching. In addition, by moving toward the possibility of holy war, Bullinger provided a foundation within the Reformed tradition for later holy war advocates among the English Reformed tradition for such a theologian as William Gouge (1575–1653). In a real sense, his teaching at this point would have provided a justification for what happened at Drogheda under Cromwell’s Puritan army in the massacre of Irish combatants and noncombatants alike. In the ancient biblical world, killing without pity or mercy is seen in the wars of Moses against the Midianites. The same thing, Bullinger affirmed, applies to the present time: “Such are at this time those arrogant and seditious rebels as trouble commonwealths and kingdoms” (Decades, 376). In this statement, Bullinger affirmed that with

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respect to rebels, the people responsible for sedition, there must be no pity. The absence of all mercy would mean that the casting away of arms by a rebel and an appeal for mercy would be a useless endeavor. One can only wonder if Bullinger approved or disapproved of the response of German authorities to the Peasants’ Rebellion of 1524–1525 in which the restraints of the classical justice in war doctrine were not observed. The rebellion was put down with indiscriminate bloodshed, entailing the death of more than 100,000 people. Mark J. Larson See also Aquinas, Thomas; Christianity and War; Decades (Bullinger) Further Reading Baker, J. Wayne. “Bullinger, Heinrich.” In The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Bullinger, Henry. The Decades of Henry Bullinger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1849. Johnson, James Turner. Just War Tradition and the Restraints of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975. Keen, M. H. The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.

Bushido Bushido, or the “way of the warrior-gentleman,” is a set of claims about the proper etiquette and ethic—the Way (dō) of acting—of a bushi, a term virtually synonymous with samurai. Discourse about warriors’ behavior emerged in premodern Japan, but it was not until the Meiji period (1868–1912) that bushido gained the prominence that many people currently ascribe to it. In 1900, Nitobe Inazō published Bushido: The Soul of Japan. He portrays bushido as consisting of seven main virtues: rectitude, courage, benevolence, politeness, veracity, honor, and loyalty. He construes rectitude as the performance of one’s duty as informed by reason. He sees courage primarily as the courage to do what is right, and benevolence as affection and sympathy for others. Politeness consists of proper manners and recognition of people’s positions in the social hierarchy. Veracity pertains to honesty and

sincerity, and honor implies recognition of the dignity and worth of oneself and others. The most prominent virtue in Nitobe’s discourse about bushido is loyalty, whether to one’s feudal lord or the modern emperor, even at the cost of one’s life. Around the time Nitobe published his book on bushido, a newly industrialized and militarized Japan was beginning to assert itself as an imperial power, and other writers joined Nitobe in celebrating the supposed traditional ethos of the samurai. For example, in Religion of the Samurai: A Study of Zen Philosophy and Discipline in China and Japan (1913), Zen priest Nukariya Kaiten argued that even ordinary citizens must be like a samurai, demonstrating bravery, faithfulness, self-sacrifice, and other martial values. Statements about bushido also appear in nationalist documents leading up to and during Japanese warfare in the 1930s and early 1940s. For example, one section of the main statement of the official wartime ideology, Fundamentals of Our National Polity (Kokutai no hongi, 1937), is replete with references to bushido. This textbook claims that bushido, as the “sacred martial spirit” of Japan, centers on self-effacement and calmness in the face of death and exists for the sake of harmony and peace. Although bushido is primarily a modern construction that gained prominence at a time of Japanese militarism, writings about how a samurai should act did appear earlier in Japanese history. Starting around the 13th century, feudal lords promulgated “house codes” (kakun) that laid out norms of behavior for the military retainers under their employ. More developed formulations of warrior ethics appeared in the 1600s, right after a century of civil war. Prominent in this regard are the writings of two individuals at that time: Yamaga Sokō (1622–1685) and Yamamoto Tsunetomo (1659–1719). They set forth their ideas about the proper behavior of samurai not because they thought that war was imminent, but because they perceived the need, for the sake of public order, to articulate ideal norms of behavior as exemplified by samurai and to ensure that samurai, now playing administrative roles in the Tokugawa system of government (1603–1867), would not become lazy or corrupt. In his writings Yamaga delineated a “teaching for warriors” (bukyō) and the “Way of [martial-] gentlemen” (shidō). Concerned about how samurai would adapt to

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their new role as bureaucrats in a time of relative peace, Yamaga stressed such virtues as duty, loyalty, filial piety, service, self-discipline, willpower, courage, honesty, fortitude, circumspection, proper speech, social etiquette, and correct understanding of one’s place in society—all key components of what later came to be formulated as bushido. In Yamaga’s eyes, the Way of the warrior-gentleman also included accomplishment in literary study and other artistic pursuits. By cultivating these virtues and attributes, the samurai bureaucrat could serve as a role model for commoners. Yamamoto Tsunetomo strikes a more martial note in Hagakure (ca. 1716), even though he was writing in a time of peace more than a hundred years after the battles of the 16th century. In particular, he sets a high value on being willing to sacrifice oneself for one’s lord. Early in the text he argues that the ethos of a samurai centers on not fearing death. He calls on samurai to give up calculation and hesitation, and to “dash headlong” into things, whether battle or other calls of duty. He celebrates such virtues as loyalty, filial piety, determination, single-mindedness, courage, wisdom, compassion, and restraining one’s speech. These virtues appeared in an array of other writings on samurai behavior but, contrary to what Nitobe later claimed, they never coalesced into a set “code” that was studied by samurai and hence never uniformly shaped the character and actions of samurai down through the centuries or, more broadly, constituted the “soul of Japan.” Also, these representations of ideal patterns of behavior need to be distinguished from what was actually the case. That is to say, one should not confuse prescriptions with descriptions. As historian Cameron Hurst has pointed out, writers like Yamaga and Yamamoto may have emphasized loyalty precisely because many warriors in the 1500s had not been enduringly loyal, especially as generals purchased their services—and their loyalty—in attempts to organize the best forces possible. As is the case with all ideologies that are disseminated largely from above, the advocacy of certain ideas and actions often increases in direct correlation with elites’ perception if not recognition that popular acceptance of them is thin. In this regard, given the degree to which government officials in the 1930s and 1940s felt the need to relentlessly promulgate the official ideology, inclusive of the components concerning bushido, one should be

careful not to view all Japanese soldiers in World War Two as fanatical warriors who fully believed that ideology, exemplified bushido, and hence relished offering up their lives to the emperor out of loyalty and with fearlessness toward death. Discourse about bushido has thrived in the postwar period, as evidenced by the number of books about bushido in Japanese bookstores and the frequency with which conservative public figures celebrate this Way. It is a characteristic of Japanese culture that can be seen in many facets of society. Christopher Ives See also Buddhism and War; Zen and War Further Reading Benesch, Oleg. Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushido in Modern Japan. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Hurst, G. Cameron III. “Death, Honor, and Loyalty: The Bushido Ideal.” Philosophy East & West 40, no. 4 (October 1990): 511–27. Nitobe Inazō. Bushido: The Soul of Japan: A Classic Essay on Samurai Ethics. New York: Kodansha USA, 2012. Nukariya Kaiten. Religion of the Samurai: A Study of Zen Philosophy and Discipline in China and Japan. London: Luzac, 1913. Yamaga Sokō. “The Way of the Knight.” In Thomas Cleary, ed. and trans. Samurai Wisdom: Lessons from Japan’s Warrior Culture. Rutland VT: Tuttle, 2009. Yamamoto Tsunetomo. Hagakure: The Book of the Samurai. Translated by William Scott Wilson. New York: Kodansha International, 1983.

Buyids The Islamic Buyid dynasty ruled over an empire located in Persia, the country that is now known as Iran, during the 10th and 11th centuries. The three sons of Buya, a fisherman, were among the earliest converts to Shi’a Islam from the tribes of Daylam, just south of the Caspian Sea in northern Persia. One son, Ali, obtained the patronage of a wealthy landowner to found a state in Shiraz in 934. Another son, Ahmad, took control of Baghdad in 945, and then the third son, al-Hasan, established his throne in Rayy

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in 947. Unlike hereditary dynasties, the Buya family confederation chose its most able men to rule its three contiguous emirates that encompassed greater Persia from 934 until 1062. During this period, most of the non-Arab peoples living in lands controlled by the Muslims were converting to Islam and were becoming unified by religion; however, great divisions between and among the Shi’as and the Sunnis remained to be resolved. Fourteen different claims concerning the successor of the Twelfth Imam competed for the loyalty of the Shi’as—known as Twelvers due to their faith in the eventual return of the Twelfth Imam to earth. Through the patronage of several members of the Buyid court during the 960s, these factions came to agree upon the doctrines and practices that would unite them. These included the public denigration of the first two caliphs (successors of Muhammad), the Ashura festival that mourns the martyrdom of al-Husayn (d. 680), the Ghadir Khumm festival that commemorates Muhammad’s (d. 632) appointment of Ali (d. 661) as his successor, and pilgrimages to Alid tombs. To quell some of the tensions that would occasionally arise due to the Shi’a-Sunni split within Islam, the Buyids appointed Christians to some positions of power within the empire. During the following two decades, Sunnis responded by burning down the Shi’a portion of Baghdad and by instituting a festival commemorating Muhammad’s closeness with Abu Bakr (d. 634). Then in both 1018 and 1029, the Muslim caliph al-Qadir (d. 1031) proclaimed that the first four caliphs should be venerated while Shi’ism should be condemned. These polarizing divisions caused Baghdad to degenerate from an exemplary multicultural melting pot into a city divided into armed sectarian ghettoes along Sunni and Shi’a lines. In 1029, Mahmud (d. 1031), a Sunni leader of the Ghaznawids, another province in Persia, sent his son, Prince Mas’ud (d. 1041), to liberate Rayy from the Shi’as by massacring them, burning their libraries, and toppling the Buyids. Baghdad had long required a large army to maintain its ongoing skirmish with the Shi’as. Division among the ranks in the Buyid military resulted from paying the infantry, largely recruited from the province of Daylami, poorly while granting tax farms to the standing professional non-Muslim Turkish mercenary cavalry. High taxes

so devastated trade that civil servants became the wealthiest people, while farmers abandoned their farms to return to Bedouin life. Baghdad fell in 1055 to the Seljuk Turk Tughril Beg. Shiraz was the last Buyid emirate to fall; in 1062, it fell to the Kurdish tribal federation and then to the Seljuk Turks. W. Richard Oakes Jr. See also Fatimid Conquest of Baghdad Further Reading Encyclopaedia of Islam. 2nd ed. Edited by P. Bearman, et al. Brill Online. Kennedy, Hugh. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphate: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century. London: Longman, 1986. Morgan, David. Medieval Persia: 1040–1797. London: Longman, 1988.

Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035) In 629, the Byzantine Empire successfully concluded a long series of wars with Sassanian Iran. As a result, the Byzantines recovered territory in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria but had little time to organize administration or defense there before the Muslim incursions. An initial Muslim Arab invasion in 629 was defeated by Byzantine forces at Mutah, but in 630, a Muslim expedition forced the submission of the town of Aqaba. A more earnest Arab effort at conquest began in 633 and 634, when Caliph Abu Bakr sent four armies, perhaps totaling 20,000 men, into Syria. By the end of 634, the Arabs had won a series of victories, most notably at Bosra, Ajnadayn, Marj-al-Rahit, and Fahl. In 635, the Muslim armies occupied Damascus and Homs for the first time, but they were forced to abandon the cities in the face of a Byzantine counteroffensive led by Emperor Heraclius (r. 610–641). This counteroffensive ended on August 20, 636, when the Byzantine forces suffered a catastrophic defeat in the Battle of the Yarmouk. As a result of this victory, Muslim armies overran most of Palestine and Syria, save only for a portion of Syria granted a one-year truce. This allowed Christian Arabs to flee into Byzantine territory before hostilities resumed. After the truce expired, Muslim forces

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resumed the offensive, taking over the remainder of Syria and Palestine. In December 639, Arab forces invaded Egypt and Mesopotamia and raided Cilicia and Anatolia. The deaths in 641 of the Byzantine emperors Heraclius and Constantine III (r. 641), and then the removal, through a coup, of the emperor Heraclonas (r. 641), created political instability in Constantinople. As a result, no effective aid was given to the isolated Byzantine forces in Egypt. Arab armies were able to complete their invasion of Egypt, and moved on Cyrenaica in 642. After these initial disasters, the Byzantines turned to positional warfare, attempting to hold the major cities while letting interior areas go. Although this policy slowed the Muslim advance by forcing Arab armies to take the time to seize fortified points, in the long term the strategy was doomed to failure. The cities could not be held without also securing the agricultural hinterland that supplied them. In 642, the Arab invasion of Armenia began. Within 20 years, despite constant Byzantine efforts to control Armenia, the Muslims had successfully converted the region into a client state. In 650, the Arabs invaded Cyprus, which later became a Byzantine/Arab co-dominion by treaty. In the 650s, the Arabs turned their attention to the Persian Empire and to further conquests in North Africa. Although raids remained frequent, the Byzantine Empire was able to gain control of the Taurus mountain passes leading into Anatolia, thereby blocking further Arab conquests. In 648, an initial Arab invasion of the Byzantine province of Africa was bought off by local officials. The years 653–654 saw further Arab assaults on Cyprus, Crete, and Rhodes. At the same time Mu’awiya, the governor of Syria, developed the first Muslim naval fleet, and in 655, the Muslim navy led by Abdullah bin Sa’ad bin Abi’l Sarh defeated a Byzantine fleet commanded by Emperor Constans II (r. 641–668) in a naval battle known as the Battle of Masts or Battle of Phoenix, off the coast of Lycia. The Byzantine defeat opened the eastern Mediterranean to further Muslim expansion. However, by 656, the Muslim offensive stalled as the ascension of Ali ibn Abi Talib to the caliphate split the Muslim community and led to a Muslim civil war that lasted until 661. After the assassination of Caliph Ali in 661, Caliph Mu’awiya launched a new offensive against the Byzantine Empire, seizing the city of Calcedon on the Bosporus in 668. The following year, the Muslims crossed the Bosporus to

attack the Byzantine capital, Constantinople, but were repelled by the Byzantines at Amorium. In 670, the Muslim invasion of Africa began in earnest but was met with firm resistance. In 674, the Muslims attempted to seize Constantinople by a siege but failed after four years; in 677, the Byzantine navy decisively defeated the Muslim navy at Syllaeum in the Sea of Marmara, which greatly contributed to the lifting of the siege the following year. As a result, the Muslim advance in Asia Minor and the Aegean was halted, and an agreement to a 30-year truce was concluded soon after. Over the next two decades both the caliphate and the Byzantine Empire were occupied securing their domains and waging minor skirmishes against each other. Fullscale war began in 696–699, when a second Arab expedition to Africa led to the seizure of Carthage and Utica, ending the Byzantine presence in North Africa. Byzantine efforts to recover their possessions proved unsuccessful, and this led to further political instability in Constantinople, where three emperors were overthrown between 711 and 717. At the same time, in 711, the Muslims breached the Taurus barrier and advanced into Anatolia. Unable to stop the Arab advance, Emperor Anastasius II (r. 713–715) began preparing the defenses of the capital. In 716, another Muslim assault on Constantinople failed, but in 717, an Arab force of 120,000 men and 1,800 ships besieged the capital. The Bulgarians, hoping to take the city for themselves, attacked the Arabs, who were forced to build two sets of siege works to contain the Byzantines on one side and to keep out the Bulgarians on the other. In September, the Muslim fleet appeared but was driven off by the Byzantines using Greek fire. The Muslim army thus remained trapped in its siege works during an unusually harsh winter. A fleet of 600 ships was sent to replenish the Muslim forces. The ships landed near Chalcedon to avoid the Byzantine fleet. The crews of the Muslim fleet, mostly Egyptian Christians, defected en masse to the Byzantines. After a Muslim reinforcing column was destroyed near Nicaea and an epidemic had broken out among the Muslim forces near Constantinople, Caliph Umar finally ordered a retreat in August 718. The Muslim retreat was not opposed, but surviving Muslim ships were attacked, and their fleet was further damaged by storms. Between 718 and 741, a series of raids and counterraids ravaged Anatolia. In this period, Byzantine strategy embraced

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not only positional defense but also a policy of intercepting Muslim raids returning from plundering expeditions. These tactics proved moderately successful and gave rise to a series of Byzantine epic poems and legends about border raiders and defenders, most notably the epic poem Digenes Akrites. In 739, Emperor Leo III gained a major victory over the Muslim forced led by Sulayman, the brother of Umayyad caliph Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik (723–743) at Akroinon. In 741, Emperor Constantine V (r. 741–775) took advantage of the political instability in the Umayyad caliphate to begin a campaign to regain lands lost to Muslims. In the mid-740s, he gradually pushed the Byzantine frontier forward, recapturing parts of Syria, and, in 746, his fleet defeated a Muslim navy near Cyprus and took control of the island. As the Ummayad dynasty fell to the Abbasid attacks, Constantine campaigned in southern Caucasia, reclaiming parts of Armenia in 751–752. The Byzantine expansion continued under Constantine’s successor, Leo IV (r. 775–780), who defeated the Muslims at Germanicopolis in 778 and reclaimed most of Anatolia. Nevertheless, Muslim attacks and raids on the Byzantine territories continued. The death of Leo IV in 780 left the Byzantine crown to his young son, Constantine VI, who was only nine years old. Constantine’s mother, Irene, served as a regent, facing a renewed Muslim offensive initiated by Caliph al-Mahdi (r. 775–785). In 783, the Abbasid army reached the Bosporus, near which they defeated the Byzantines at Nicomedia ( Izmit or Kocaeli), forcing Irene to sue for peace, accept a three-year truce, and pay tribute. In 786, the new caliph, Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809), began fortifying his borderland territories in preparation for an invasion of the Byzantine Empire. In 797, Abbasid forces advanced to the Byzantine cities of Ephesus and Ancyra (Ankara), forcing Empress Irene to reinstate the payment of previously agreed tributes. In 802, Nicephorus I (r. 802–811) seized the Byzantine throne and broke the truce with the Abbasids agreed upon by Empress Irene. In response, Harun al-Rashid led an army across the Taurus Mountains of Anatolia in 803 and seized the Byzantine city of Heraclea Cybistra (Eregli). Although Nicephorus sued for peace, he soon broke the truce once again, provoking another Abbasid retribution. Harun al-Rashid’s armies won victories on land and at sea,

defeating the Byzantines at Krasos in 805, capturing Tyana and Ancyra (Ankara) in 806, and ravaging Rhodes and Cyprus between 805 and 807. The Byzantine emperor was compelled to sue for peace once more. The subsequent death of Harun al-Rashid in 809 and the succession struggle enveloping the caliphate allowed Nicephorus to concentrate on other threats to his power before being killed in a battle against the Bulgars in 811. Over the next two decades, both sides were occupied with internal turmoil. Besides the threat from the Abbasids, the Byzantine Empire came under attack from other Muslim states. Thus, in 824, Crete fell to Abo Hafs Omer al-Baloty’s Iberian Muslims who were exiled from Spain by the Umayyad emir Abd-ar-Rahman I (r. 796–822). Three years later, Ziyadat Allah, the Aghlabid emir of Tunisia, attacked Sicily. Meantime, Abbasid caliph al-Mamun (r. 813–833), having secured his authority, resumed attacks against the Byzantine territories in 830–832— Palermo fell in 831— and forced Emperor Theophilus (r. 829–842) to accept heavy tribute in 833. After al-Mamun’s death, Theophilus sought to recover lost ground and led a Byzantine army into northern Iraq in 837, capturing several Abbasid fortresses. Caliph al-Mutasim (r. 833–842) retaliated in 838, and his army, led by Khaydar ibn Kavus-Afshin, defeated Theophilus in the Battle of Dazimon on the Halys River in July 838 and sacked the Byzantine stronghold of Amorium. However, al-Mutasim’s plan to besiege Constantinople failed when the Abbasid fleet was destroyed in a storm. In 841, the Byzantine emperor and caliph agreed to a truce, but sporadic attacks continued: Muslims sacked Messina in 842 and Enna in 859, and the Byzantines, led by Petronas, uncle of Emperor Michael III (836–867), attacked Damietta in 853 and defeated Muslims near Amida (Diyarbakir) in 856. However, four years later Emperor Michael III suffered a defeat on the Euphrates River in northern Syria and the two sides soon concluded a truce. The armistice lasted only three years, and in 863, Omar, emir of Melitene, invaded Anatolia, sacked Samsun, and campaigned in Paphlagonia and Galatia. But the Byzantines intercepted him on return, and in the decisive battle of Poson, the Muslim army was almost entirely destroyed and Omar was slain. This victory was celebrated with great pomp at the Hippodrome in Constantinople.

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The victory at Poson produced a seven-year lull in the Byzantine-Muslim hostilities. The Abbasid caliphate, meanwhile, suffered major domestic turmoil, which the Byzantines immediately exploited. Emperor Basil (813– 886) launched a major campaign into Syria and Iraq, defeating the Abbasid forces on the upper Euphrates River at Samosata (Samsat) in 873 and capturing Zapetra. Although he later suffered defeat at Melitene, he launched an expedition to drive Muslims from Sicily and southern Italy, where Bari was besieged and captured in 875. Basil failed to drive the Muslims out of Sicily, where Syracuse was in the Muslim hands, but he secured Tarentum (Taranto) in 880 and Calabria in 885. In the 10th century, Byzantine defense efforts began to show real results. In 900, Leo VI (r. 886–912) invaded the emirate of Tarsus and campaigned in Armenia. In 926, Romanus Lecapenus (r. 920–944) renewed the attack upon the Arabs and sacked Melitene. In 927, the emir of Melitene submitted to the empire, and in 928 the city received a Byzantine garrison. The Abbasid initially expelled it, but in 933 and 934 the Byzantines systematically occupied the fortresses around Melitene and around the city of Samosata. Melitene was eventually taken and all non-Christians were forced to leave. Samosata was taken and razed in 936. In 940, Saif al-Dawla, the gifted Hamdanid general, successfully campaigned in Armenia and raided Byzantine territory up to Colonia before John Curcuas, grand domestic, drove him back. In 941–943, John Curcuas launched a counteroffensive, sacking a number of cities in Armenia and Mesopotamia and besieging the city of Edessa; he withdrew only after the governor of the city agreed to surrender the Mandylion, a cloth said to bear the imprint of the face of Christ. The relic and Curcuas were accorded a triumphal entry into Constantinople. However, in late 944, the Byzantines were soundly beaten by Saif al-Dawla near Antioch. Constantine VII (r. 913–959) assumed full power in 944 and, with his generals, Nicephorus Phocas, John Tzimisces, and Basil the Grand Chamberlain, conducted a successful raiding war against Saif al-Dawla, who repelled the first invasion in 948 but was forced to give ground in subsequent attacks. Byzantine efforts to recapture Crete, Sicily, and Italy were less successful, and Muslim forces repeatedly defeated forces sent to those places. Encouraged

by Byzantine losses, Saif al-Dawla organized an ambitious raid from Tarsus to the Theme of Charsianum, where he defeated the Byzantines in the valley of the Lycus. But on the return trip, Saif al-Dawla was ambushed and defeated by Leo Phocas in a mountain pass between Lycandus and Germanicea. Rejecting the Byzantine offer of truce, Saif raided Melitene and Lycandus in 951, successfully campaigned in the border regions in 953–954, and rebuilt the strategic fortresses of Adata and Samosata. In the spring of 956, Saif defeated the rising Byzantine general John Tzimisces but suffered a naval defeat at the hands of Cibyrrhaeots. Three years later John Tzimisces raided southern Armenia and northern Mesopotamia, sacking Dara and Samosata and decisively defeating Saif ’s main army. The Byzantines fared worse in Italy, where their attacks failed in Calabria and Sicily in 958–959. Constantine’s successor, Romanus II (r. 959–963), reorganized Byzantine forces in an effort to intensify the war against the Arabs. In 960, a massive expedition under Nicephorus Phocas landed on Crete. Phocas’s army killed thousands of Muslims and besieged the principal city of Chandax from 960 until the spring of 962, when it finally fell. A raid into Syria by Saif in that year was defeated by Byzantine forces in a pass through the Taurus. After capturing Chandax, Nicephorus Phocas attacked and defeated the emir of Tarsus and took several towns in Anatolia and Syria. Phocas then marched against Saif al-Dawla in Aleppo, and evading Saif’s main force, he fell upon the poorly prepared defenses of Aleppo, which he overcame. Upon his return to Constantinople, Phocas found that Romanus II had died in a hunting accident, and he assumed imperial power. Nicephorus Phocas (r. 963–969) continued the war against Saif, taking the town of Mopsuestia, as well as Tarsus in 965. The following year, Saif al-Dawla asked for a truce and exchange of prisoners, which the Byzantines accepted. In 967, Saif al-Dawla, the dauntless Muslim commander who had fought the Byzantines for decades, died. Nicephorus exploited this opportunity to expand Byzantine control of Armenia and Syria, clearing Cyprus of its Arab garrison. Yet the Byzantine emperor was murdered in 969 and John Tzimisces (r. 969–976) seized power in a coup. During his reign, Aleppo ceded control of its coastal territory to Byzantium, which now bordered the Fatimid

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caliphate of Egypt and the Hamdanid emirate of Mosul, both of which were willing to expand at the expense of Byzantine or Arab neighbors. Tzimisces thus found himself fighting against the Fatimids in 971 and 975 and against the Hamdanids from 972 to 974. Tzimisces was able, in the end, to subject most of Syria and Lebanon to direct Byzantine government or tributary status. He died before these conquests could be followed up and was succeeded by Basil II (r. 976–1025), the greatest ruler of medieval Byzantium. Basil II faced civil disorder in the early part of his reign, but his Arab neighbors were too weak to take advantage of the situation. Basil was strong enough in the 990s to drive off Fatimid attacks upon the emirate of Aleppo, now a Byzantine client state. Fatimid attempts at naval warfare were equally unavailing. An Egyptian fleet burned in 996 in a mysterious fire. A second fleet was defeated off Syria by the Byzantines. The Fatimid caliph, al-Aziz, then died, and rebellions broke out over the succession. Basil II turned his attention to Byzantine territories in Europe. He signed a 10-year truce with the Fatimids in 1001, which he renewed periodically for the rest of his reign. Basil refused to respond to Fatimid and Hamdanid attacks on Aleppo; the city fell to the Fatimids in 1015, only to be lost to them in a revolt in 1025. At this point, Byzantine attentions became fixed elsewhere, with few exceptions. Romanus III (r. 1028–1034) forced the surrender of Edessa in 1031 and attempted to purchase the city of Aleppo. The offer was refused. The Fatimids renewed the 10-year truce in 1036, and the Byzantine frontier was secured by the presence of a client state, the Mirdanid emirate, in what is now modern Syria and Iraq. Though raids would occasionally continue, the initiative in Muslim expansion had passed from the Arabs to a group of Islamic mercenaries brought in by the Arabs, the Turks. Alexander Mikaberidze See also Constantinople, Arab Sieges of; Mu’awiya Further Reading Kaegi, Walter. Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Treadgold, Warren. A History of the Byzantine State and Society. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997. Whittrow, Mark. The Making of Byzantium, 600–1025. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Byzantine-Seljuk Wars The wars between the Byzantines and Seljuks took place during the 11th and 12th centuries CE, between the Christian Orthodox Byzantine Empire and the Sunni Muslim Great Seljuk dynasty. This conflict between these two empires concluded largely with the victory of the Seljuks, to whom the Byzantine Empire lost the control over territories in Asia Minor, mostly the region of Anatolia, in modern-day Turkey. A lesser Seljuk dynasty, the Seljuks of Rum, was established in Anatolia and continued to clash with the Byzantine Empire. With the expansion of the Islam in the seventh century CE, the Byzantine Empire had already lost much of its hold of the eastern Mediterranean region to the Rashidun Caliphate and to later Muslim dynasties. By the late 10th century, the Seljuk dynasty had accepted the religion of Islam in Central Asia, on the outskirts of the Islamic world, and continued its migration to the west. Leading a coalition of Oghuz Turkish nomadic tribes, the Seljuks settled in the province of Khorasan during the first half of the 11th century. After initially receiving recognition from the Ghaznavid sultan Mas’ud, the Seljuks initiated a military campaign in the first half of the 11th century, during which they were able to defeat the Ghaznvids and then continued to conquer Persia and Mesopotamia. Under the leadership of the Seljuk ruler Thugril, the Seljuks defeated the Shi’a Buyid dynasty and conquered the Abbasid capital city of Baghdad in 1055 CE. Thugril received the title of sultan and was recognized as a legitimate Muslim leader by the Abbasid caliph. The Seljuks’ territories in the west, mainly Syria, bordered the Byzantine-controlled territories of Asia Minor. The Seljuks did not initiate a military campaign against the Byzantine Empire, and the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan did not intend to conquer the region. Rather, the Seljuks’ supporters, the Oghuz tribesmen, penetrated into Byzantine territory in Asia Minor in a series of sporadic raids in search of plunder. These raids led to a collision between the Seljuks and the Byzantines in 1071 CE. In order to deal with the Oghuz raiders, the Byzantine emperor Romanus Diogenes gathered an army and moved toward Syria. The Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan used Romanus’s advancement to Syria as an

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opportunity to advance into the Byzantine territories. The two armies met at the Battle of Manzikert, which in turn became one of the important battles in the history of the Middle East and the world. The Seljuk army was able to defeat the Byzantine forces and capture Emperor Romanus, releasing him afterward. As the result of the Seljuk victory, eastern Anatolia was conquered; the Byzantine Empire entered into a period of civil war, while the Oghuz tribes continued to advance into Asia Minor and settled there. Following the battle, the Oghuz Turks continued to raid Byzantine territories, establishing in the process several Turkish principalities, beyliks, in Asia Minor. Members of the extended Seljuk family also participated in the raids and established a principality of their own, known as the Seljuks of Rum (1081–1307), with their capital in Konya, established by Sulayman b. Kutalmish. The Byzantine Empire regained some of its control in western Anatolia during the reign of the Comneni family, with the assistance of the crusaders who passed through Asia Minor on their way to the Holy Land. The Byzantine emperor, Manuel I Comnenus, even led an assault on Konya in 1147 CE. However, the Byzantines once again suffered a major defeat by the Seljuks at the Battle of Myriokephalon in 1176 CE. In this battle, the Seljuks of Rum, led by Izz alDin Kilij Arslan II, were able to defeat the Byzantines, preventing them from assaulting Konya again. The victory at Myriokephalon ended the Byzantine attempt to reconquer Anatolia from the Seljuks and ensured the permanence of the Turkish presence in Asia Minor. To conclude, from the establishment of the Seljuk Empire in the 11th century, the Seljuks’ and the Oghuz tribes’ advancement into Byzantine lands led to a gradual conquest of

Anatolia and Asia Minor from the Christians. The Seljuk victories led to the advancement and settlement of Oghuz Turks in former Christian Byzantine regions, leading to the Islamization of Asia Minor. With the settlement of the Oghuz in Asia Minor, several principalities were established. The Oghuz Turks, and specifically the Seljuks of Rum, continued to clash with the Byzantine Empire, leading to the permanent loss of the majority of Anatolia to Muslim rule. The effect of the Seljuk expansion into Asia Minor reshaped the region, with a Muslim-Turkish population present in this part of the world to this day. Leon Volfovsky See also Manzikert, Battle of Further Reading Bryer, Anthony. Manzikert to Lepanto: The Byzantine World and the Turks, 1071–1571, Papers Given at the Nineteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, March 1985. New York: ACLS History E-Book Project, 2008. Carey, Brian Todd, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Road to Manzikert: Byzantine and Islamic Warfare, 527–1071. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Press, 2012. Catherwood, Christopher. A Brief History of the Middle East. London: Constable & Robinson,, 2011. Donner, F. Early Islamic Conquests. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1981. Hillenbrand, Carole. Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. Nicolle, David. Manzikert 1071: The Breaking of Byzantium. Oxford: Osprey, 2013. O’Shea, Stephen. Sea of Faith: Islam and Christianity in the Medieval Mediterranean World. New York: Walker, 2006. Peacock, A. C. S. The Great Seljuk Empire. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015.

C Calatrava, Order of

dominance in the peninsula. The order recaptured their headquarters and acquired more castles for their loyal service to Alfonso VIII. From this time onward the Kingdom of Castile played the leading role in the expansion of Christian territory south toward Andalusia. The next few decades of rapid military conquest swelled the number of recruits and the finances of Calatrava. Calatrava was repeatedly praised by the papacy for its stoic fight for Christendom. In 1220 Honorius III promised indulgences to anyone who joined the order to fight in Castile against the Moors. In 1221 the order agreed with Santiago to fight together and share booty. Success on the battlefield brought amalgamations as smaller orders needed Calatrava’s direction. In that same year the Order of Monfragüe merged with Calatrava, which facilitated major offenses such as the capture of Cáceres in 1227. At its height Calatrava controlled six major castles on the peninsula (Alcañiz, Monroyo, Monfragüe, Calatrava, Salvatierra, and Martos) and derived annual income from their estates. The order also had an international dimension with a possession in central Europe at Thymau. Calatrava’s attachment to Castile attracted mainly indigenous recruits, and the records of the order reflect the very Spanish nature of the organization. So long as Castile expanded, so did Calatrava’s influence and power, which made it an elite, noble, and independent authority.

The Order of Calatrava was the first indigenous Spanish religious military order, formally recognized on September 26, 1164, by a papal bull. Calatrava was modeled on the austere Cistercian monastic order and set up its headquarters in Calatrava la Vieja, Spain. The primary role of Calatrava was to train monks into knights so they could mobilize quickly, defend frontier positions and take the Reconquest to the Moors. All members of Calatrava took monastic vows and wore the Cistercian white mantle into battle emblazoned with the symbol of the order—a red cross in gules with fleur-de-lis. The struggle between the Moors and Christians for control of the Iberian Peninsula gave rise to the foundation and growth of military orders in Spain, imitating the Temple and Hospital orders in the Holy Land. As kings were in charge of the Reconquest, they dispensed patronage. In 1174 Alfonso VIII of Castile granted Calatrava one-fifth of conquest spoils. Calatrava, unlike Santiago, confined its operations to one region—Castile. In 1195 Alfonso suffered the worst Christian defeat in a century against the Almohads at Alarcos, which occasioned the loss of Calatrava’s headquarters, despite a stubborn 51-day defense by some knights. In 1212 Calatrava fought in the center of the Christian lines at Las Navas de Tolosa, a battle that ended Muslim 153

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By 1476 most of the Reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula had been accomplished with the exception of Granada. The decline in military conquest turned Calatrava increasingly toward involvement in domestic Castilian affairs. The Catholic Monarchs saw this as a threat. They disliked the independence of the organization, its large size, and its rich revenue stream. In 1487, they placed the title of Grand Master under King Ferdinand, and in 1523 a papal bull definitively incorporated Calatrava under royal authority and jurisdiction. The order became an honorary organization of nobles until its dissolution in the 19th century. Barry N. Whelan See also Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of; Reconquista; Religious Military Orders; Santiago, Order of Further Reading Cabrer, Martín Alvira. Las Navas de Tolosa 1212: Idea, Liturgia y Memoria de la Batalla. Madrid: Sílex, 2012. Forey, Alan. The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries. New York: Macmillan, 1992. Lomax, Derek W. The Reconquest of Spain. London: Longman, 1978. Madden, Thomas F. The New Concise History of the Crusades. Oxford: Rowman, 2005. O’Callaghan, Joseph F. Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Caliphate The caliph (Arabic for successor) was a post created the same day that the Prophet Muhammad died in 632 CE. The role of the caliph was to lead the Muslim umma, or community, in Medina on the Arabian Peninsula. The caliphate was the institution that had both a religious and a secular authority over all Muslims. The authorities inherent in the caliph developed over time to conform to the different geographical areas as Islam expanded over the centuries until the caliphate was abolished with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. The Prophet did not provide details on how Muslims should be ruled after him.

Rashidun Caliphate, 632–661

The four caliphs who followed in the wake of Muhammad were close companions of the Prophet and were connected to him by marriage. He married one daughter of the first two, and the last two caliphs were his son-in-laws. They were Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali. They were called the rightly guided caliphs. Each one of them came to the caliphate through different means, and the last three were killed for political reasons. Under Umar and Uthman, Muslim conquests began, and the Islamic Empire spread into contemporary Iraq, Persia, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, coming up to the borders of the Sassanian and Byzantine empires.

Umayyad Caliphate, 661–750

The Umayyad caliphate was founded by Mu’awiya I from the Umayya clan in Mecca, who challenged the authority of the last rightly guided caliph, Ali. Mu’awiya was the one who introduced the hereditary system into the caliphate, which contributed to weak candidates rising to power and created the appearance of the Shi’a (Arabic for supporters or party), who objected to this policy and believed that Ali, the cousin of Muhammad, was the guided imam (religious-secular leader), and only his line of descendants could reign as caliph. Under the Umayyads, the Islamic conquest reached its pinnacle when in 711, their armies invaded the Indus valley in India, and also advanced on Toledo in Spain. Consequently, the Umayyads started to create their administration modeled on the Persian and Byzantine style, and had their capital moved to Damascus.

Abbasid Caliphate in Iraq, 750–1258

The Abbasids came from the family of Muhammad’s uncle, al-Abbas, from the Hashim branch. They depended on their distinguished descent and the non-Arab elements in the empire, which were racially discriminated against by the Umayyads. The Talib branch of the same family rejected this caliphate, and the Shi’a revolutions continued, especially in remote areas of the empire, against the Abbasids. The Abbasid caliphate, like the Umayyads, were Sunni (followers of the prophet’s tradition), while the Shi’a supporters believed that they should follow the

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interpretations of Ali and his descendants, who were the only capable ones to govern, also following the tradition of the Prophet. The first century of the five-century-long rule of the Abbasid caliphate is known as “the Golden Age.” This is due to the foundation of the capital in Baghdad and the start of a vast movement of translation of Indian, Greek, Persian, Syriac, and Egyptian heritage into Arabic, which boosted the development of the Islamic state and society. The second Abbasid caliph, al-Mansur, declared that he was the shadow of God on earth, which made him similar to most Persian monarchs before Islam. All caliphs who came after him enjoyed the same right to divine will and power. After the Golden Age ended in 847, the caliphs became more of a religious symbol rather than political leaders. The caliphate witnessed the arrival of different Turkish and Persian elements that dominated and even installed the caliph, who had to come from the Prophet’s family, while the political affairs were left to these elements. The Muslim caliphate started to lose territories to other rival Muslim dynasties, which claimed their own caliphates, like the Umayyads in Spain (929–1031) and Almowahidun in North Africa and Spain (1147–1269), among others. When the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258 and killed the last caliph, the Mamluk sultan of Egypt and the Levant revived the Abbasid caliphate in Cairo in 1261, with no political power until the Ottomans invaded Egypt in 1517 and took the caliphate to Istanbul, where it remained until 1924. After Ataturk abolished the caliphate in 1924, there were several attempts by diverse Muslim groups to revive the institution, which is regarded as the symbol of Muslim unity, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, which today has branches in more than 60 countries. Also, the recent Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, or ISIL) declared al-Baghdadi as the new caliph in 2013 and invited other Sunni Muslims around the world to join him, although he did not have a clear method of election to the post. Taef Kamal El-Azhari See also Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035); Islamic State; Muslim Brotherhood; Muslim Conquest of Egypt; Muslim Conquest of Persia; Ottoman Empire; Reconquista

Further Reading Bennison, Amira K. The Great Caliphs: The Golden Age of the Abbasid Empire. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009. Bobrick, Benson. The Caliph’s Splendor: Islam and the West in the Golden Age of Baghdad. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012. Crone, Patricia, and Martin Hinds. God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Sayyid, Salman. Recalling the Caliphate: Decolonisation and World Order. New York: Hurst, 2014.

Calvin, John (1509–1564) French theologian and pastor John Calvin (1509–1564) is the most influential of the Protestant Reformed theologians of the 16th century. He was born in Noyon, Picardy, France and trained first as a humanist lawyer before turning to theology. He was educated primarily at the University of Orléans and the University of Bourges and spent the majority of his life in Geneva. While he was and is extremely influential, at the same time he is the most distorted in terms of contemporary caricatures of his political teaching. He is frequently presented as a theocratic tyrant ruling Geneva with an iron fist and believing in holy war against godless foes. The stereotypical portrait is that Calvin implemented a theocratic structure in which he ruled the republic of Geneva, even while he approved of prosecuting war without humanitarian restraints. The reality is that Calvin rejected theocracy, granting the Genevan Consistory (the council of the Protestant Church of Geneva) a limited spiritual jurisdiction. In addition, he firmly positioned himself within the medieval just war tradition as it had been articulated by Augustine of Hippo (354–430) and as it was later reaffirmed by Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). Calvin repudiated a theocratic arrangement in which the ministers would have civil authority. He taught a doctrine of two spheres, separating church and state with respect to their distinct jurisdictions and giving different roles to ministers and magistrates. Pastors were called to wield the sword of the Holy Spirit in the preaching of the Word of God. Princes were appointed to unleash the sword

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John Calvin, a French theologian and pastor, was one of the most prominent leaders of the Protestant Reformation during the 16th century. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

of justice in the punishment of domestic evil and in battle against hostile foreign powers. “Ministers,” Calvin wrote, “have no civil jurisdiction.” Furthermore, he added, “The authority” of “the magistracy” shall “continue in its entirety” (Ecclesiastical Ordinances, 49). Calvin insisted that the best condition for citizens was to live in a republic; to be under the civil authority of the very leaders the people themselves had chosen to hold political office. It is true that some of the Reformed Protestants moved in the direction of holy war. The Puritan armies in the English Civil Wars, for example, put holy war doctrine into practice. The Roundheads prosecuted the war effort against the Cavaliers and their supporters with ruthless abandon, eliminating not only men, but also women and children in their engagements. The Ottoman Turks acted similarly in the time of Calvin. Ottoman disdain for the justice in war practice of restraint in battle was reflected at the battle of Mohacs in 1526. Suleyman’s policy of taking no prisoners resulted in the annihilation of some 30,000

soldiers. The captives that he temporarily held were put to death. Calvin understood that holy war deviated from the restraints advocated by the proponents of the just war tradition. Holy war entailed, he wrote, “the indiscriminate and promiscuous slaughter, making no distinction of age or sex, but including alike women and children, the aged and the decrepit” (Commentaries on the Book of Joshua, 97). As to “how far this doctrine is applicable to us,” he declared in no uncertain terms, “To us, in the present day, no certain region marks out our precise boundaries; nor are we armed with the sword to slay all the ungodly” (Commentaries on the Book of Joshua, 268). Calvin also spoke against the slaughter of captives by asking what it is for all the men to be put to the sword without sparing any. He answered his own question by asking, “Is it not as good as defying God?” (Sermon 119, Sermons on Deuteronomy, 734). He probably was opposing at this point the widespread practice in the Middle Ages of defeated infantry being massacred by victorious knights. Calvin explicitly repudiated holy war doctrine. More than that, he deliberately positioned himself in the mainstream of the just war tradition of Christianity. In his discussion of just war doctrine in Institutes of the Christian Religion, he connected his teaching with Augustine by referring to him two times by name (Institutes, IV.20.12). He also included the same three just war components that Augustine had articulated—proper authority, just cause, and right intention. Calvin in the Augustinian tradition asserted that the civil magistrate alone is authorized to declare and prosecute war when there is a just cause. “Both natural equity and the nature of the office dictate that princes must be armed,” he said, “to defend by war the dominions entrusted to their safekeeping” (Institutes, IV.20.11). The private individual does not have such authority. “It is not for everyone to take the sword in hand,” he declared. “The authority of our princes must guide us.” The war had to be “undertaken by a just authority.” If that were the case, we may conclude that “it is good and legitimate” (Sermons on 2 Samuel, 459). This perspective reflects the statement of Augustine that “the natural order which seeks the peace of mankind, ordains that the monarch should have the power of

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undertaking war if he thinks it advisable” (Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, XXII.75). The prince may initiate war, but it must be on the basis of a just cause. The just cause looks to the past. Something must have already happened that justifies going to war. Calvin affirmed that there is a standard by which we may judge whether or not a war is lawful. The criterion relates to whether the cause of the war is “to execute public vengeance.” The need for public vengeance assumes that a fault exists, that wrongdoing has been committed. Some evils that Calvin mentioned include disturbing “the common tranquility of all” and raising “seditious tumults” and “vile misdeeds” (Institutes, IV.20.11). Calvin here stands in continuity with Augustine who asserted that “good men undertake wars”“to punish” various kinds of evil such as “love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power” (Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, XXII.74). A just cause might well lead a prince to make war, but he had to do so with a right intention in view. This third component of the just war tradition looks to the future. It focuses attention upon what the government intends to achieve by going to war. Classical just war teaching asserted that a just war must have the proper intention of advancing the good, correcting an injustice, and maintaining or securing the peace. Augustine had affirmed that “the soldiers should perform their military duties in behalf of the peace and safety of the community” (Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, XXII.74). In his biblical commentary on Deuteronomy 20:10, Calvin reflects continuity with Augustine when Calvin expressed his agreement with the position of Cicero, who maintained “that wars must not be undertaken except that we may live in unmolested peace” (Commentaries on the Last Four Books of Moses, 52). Calvin went beyond Augustine and Aquinas in his justice of war discussion—adding a fourth component, stressing that war must be an option of last resort. The idea of last resort has become firmly grounded in the just war tradition and is a central idea in it to the present. Governments, Calvin argued, ought not to go to war “unless they are driven to it by extreme necessity.” He stated: “Everything else ought to be tried before recourse is had to arms” (Institutes, IV.20.12). Calvin was probably referring here to a diplomatic solution to problems. That is what he pre-

ferred. “An ambassador,” he said, “ought to be favored because he tends to maintain peace among men, or to remove troubles which have already started” (Sermon 30, Sermons on 2 Samuel, 451). Calvin believed that a given war had to be just— necessitating a proper authority, a just cause, and a right intention. He also insisted that a just war had to be fought justly. When a state determined that a war was morally justified, it also had to be concerned about godly warfare, the moral obligation of justice in war. Calvin therefore wrote not only about justice on the way to war (jus ad bellum), but also about justice in war (jus in bello). In this connection, he affirmed that the waging of war must be done with humanity and restraint. The traditional military restraints espoused by the medieval church had to do with the weapons of war that were allowable and with differentiating between combatants and noncombatants. The Second Lateran Council (1139) forbade the use of crossbows and siege machines in battles among Christians. The Peace of God movement insisted upon the protection of noncombatants in times of war. Calvin manifested continuity with the Peace of God movement, teaching the necessity of humanity and restraint in battle. He differed, however, with the approach propagated by the Second Lateran Council. Calvin recognized the legitimacy of all the available weapons of his time, not adopting the medieval limits upon the crossbow or the siege machine. He reasoned that because war is lawful, all the constituent elements of war, including the most advanced weapons of the time, must be legitimate. Speaking about the rulers of his time, Calvin declared that they utilize infantry, cavalry, artillery, intelligence, and alliances. Calvin here mentioned the weapon of choice for maximum firepower in the 16th century—artillery pieces, cannons. He did not suggest that such an overwhelming instrument of violence be banned from the field of battle. He rather affirmed that “all these things are necessary” for warfare (Sermon 117, Sermons on Deuteronomy, 721). Perhaps the most influential aspect of Calvin’s doctrine of war relates to his teaching on parliamentary resistance, warring by the popular magistrates as a response to a tyrannical monarch. Calvin’s discussion at this point occurs in the context of his reflections on the tyrant, the “savage prince” (Institutes, IV.20.29). The despot sees to it that “no freedom of speech” is “allowed” (Commentaries on the

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Prophet Amos, 269–70). Tyrants were known for “plundering houses, raping virgins and matrons, and slaughtering the innocent” (Institutes, IV.20.24). There were remedies in Calvin’s thought for despotic governments. In the first place, the private individual was to pray. Such prayer might well lead to the second remedy of a divine intervention by way of a servant avenger, a brave person who brings deliverance to the distressed, a person like the judges of Israel in the Old Testament. The third remedy for tyranny was an institutional one. Calvin appealed here to the existence of the populares magistratus, calling them “magistrates of the people, appointed to restrain the willfulness of kings” (Institutes, IV.20.31). The idea in the expression populares magistratus was that these individuals constituted a representative body that was appointed in an elective manner. Calvin left his readers with no ambiguity as to the kind of representative assembly that he had in mind. He alluded to the various European parliamentary bodies, referring to the “three estates,” which no doubt included the French Estates-General. Parliamentary bodies had the duty to “withstand . . . the fierce licentiousness of kings . . . who violently fall upon and assault the lowly common people.” They had the responsibility to take up arms, if necessary, on behalf of the people for whom they had been “appointed protectors by God’s ordinance” (Institutes, IV.20.31). Calvin’s position regarding armed parliamentary resistance to tyranny was nothing new. It was an old medieval idea that was implemented, for example, in the uprising led by Simon de Montfort in 1258 when he led the barons to victory over a royal army. Calvin’s teaching also anticipated the future, having a bearing on the American Revolution. The magistrates of the people who had been sent to Philadelphia by the 13 colonial governments formed a representative body in the Second Continental Congress. The point at issue that resulted in the armed conflict was tyranny, the trampling down of legal rights, either by King George III, Prime Minister Lord North, or the British Parliament as a whole. It was Calvin and his doctrine of armed resistance by a parliamentary body that provided theological and moral legitimacy among Reformed and Presbyterian Christians for the suppression of tyranny in the American Revolution. Mark J. Larson

See also Aquinas, Thomas; Augustine; Holy War (Bellum Sacrum); Just War Tradition; Peace of God; Protestant Reformers and War Further Reading Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion (1559). 2 vols. Translated by Ford Lewis Battles. Library of Christian Classics. Vols. XX and XXI. Edited by John T. McNeill. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. Gatis, G. Joseph. “The Political Theory of John Calvin.” Bibliotheca Sacra 153 (1996): 449–67. George, Timothy. Theology of the Reformers. Revised edition. Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2013. Larson, Mark J. Calvin’s Doctrine of the State: A Reformed Doctrine and Its American Trajectory, the Revolutionary War, and the Founding of the Republic. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009. Parker, T. H. L. John Calvin: A Biography. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007. Stevenson, William R. “Calvin and Political Issues.” In The Cambridge Companion to Political Issues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Witte, John, Jr. The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Camel, Battle of the (656 CE) The Battle of the Camel, also known as the Battle of Jamal or the Battle of Bassorah, occurred near the modern site of Basra, Iraq in late 656 CE. The encounter resulted from a conflict between the new caliph, Ali ibn abi-Talib (600– 661), and the supporters of A’isha bint Abu Bakr (613–678), the favorite wife of Muhammad (570–632). The battle itself was named after the fact that A’isha directed her forces from a litter that was mounted on a camel. This conflict is significant since it marks the first time Muslims fought one another, and it is therefore known as the First Fitna, the Civil War of the Early Caliphates, or Muslim Civil War. The outcome of the Battle of the Camel also shaped the early Iraqi nation and its historical relationship with Syria. In addition, A’isha, as both Muhammad’s favorite wife and a political leader, has since become a role model for women in the Muslim world, and owing to varying interpretations

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of her actions, is the source of differences between the Sunni and Shi’a Muslim communities. When on pilgrimage to Mecca, A’isha, also known as the “Mother of Believers,” was informed of the killing of Uthman ibn Affan (576–656), the third caliph (644–656), and learned that Ali ibn abi-Talib had been appointed the fourth caliph, while allowing his predecessor’s death to go unpunished. In response, A’isha assembled forces, supported by large segments of the settlement of Basra, and took up arms against supporters of Ali. Once in Basra, A’isha’s forces drove out the regional governor, a supporter of Ali, and put Uthman’s murderers to death. Upon discovering A’isha’s actions, Ali marched his army from Medina to Kufu and eventually to Basra with a force of many thousands of troops. While an agreement between the two groups was reached in Basra, some, fearing for their own safety, launched an early morning attack on A’isha’s forces. As a result, both sides were soon convinced that the other had betrayed the settlement, and the battle commenced. The results of the battle were decisive as it led to the almost complete destruction of A’isha’s forces, her capture, and the deaths of Talhah ign Ubayd-Allah and az-Zubayr ibn al-Awam. In addition, A’isha’s loss meant the collapse of her political goals and her desire to challenge the authority of Ali. Afterward, Caliph Ali forgave his opponents and sought to reconcile and to quell instability in the region, as well as reach a lasting arrangement with A’isha. Eventually Ali agreed to allow A’isha to retire to Medina in exchange for her not interfering in political matters again. In the succeeding years Ali’s political and military authority in Iraq increased, and Kufu became the capital of the region. Subsequently, A’isha became a figure of note within the Muslim community and an established role model for women in the Middle East. Sean Morton See also Caliphate Further Reading Glubb, J. The Great Arab Conquests. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1963. Madelung, W. The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Camisards, Revolt of (1702–1704) The Camisards were Huguenots (French Protestants) who lived in the isolated and mountainous Cévennes region of south-central France. They revolted against the French monarchy and against the persecutions that came in the aftermath of the 1685 Edict of Fontainebleau. This civil rebellion in France represented, after decades of conflict, the last gasp of the (Protestant) Huguenots’ organized corporate and military expression in that nation. Before the Camisard Revolt, Huguenots still held a base of friendly territory—the Cévennes—from which to operate and in which to take refuge. Following the revolt, they held no such sanctuary. Their identity as a societal group was thus permanently broken as survivors emigrated, publicly converted to Roman Catholicism, or went underground. France endured severe religious conflict and wars for decades in its encounter with the Protestant Reformation from the early 1500s. Huguenots were alternately persecuted, tolerated, fought, and at times were even allowed some forms of autonomy. The Edict of Nantes (1598) had afforded them toleration and limited autonomy. However, King Louis XIV (ruled 1643–1715) set out to unify France and to do so, he sought to subdue all opposition to the crown, whether from feudal lords, the Vatican, or from the Protestant Huguenots. His revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 resumed formal persecution of Huguenots, who were forced to convert or to illegally emigrate from France. The state ultimately sent soldiers (dragoons) to the Cévennes to enforce Huguenot conversions to Catholicism (dragonnades) and prevent emigration. These operations became so egregious that a spontaneous revolt erupted on June 24, 1702 with the assassination of François Langlade, Abbé of Chaila (1647–1702), who had embodied the state’s cruelty and oppression with his tortures and executions of attempted émigrés. The rebels soon became known as Camisards due to the white shirts that they wore for identification in night fighting. There were few Huguenots left of significant social rank, professional position, or clerical and academic training. The Camisards were swept by religious enthusiasm, complete with prophets urging them to action. Their

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religious and military leadership fell to untrained and inexperienced persons, several of whom yet proved to be remarkably effective. The 21-year-old Jean Cavalier (1681–1740), a shepherd’s son and an apprentice baker, became the Camisards’ charismatic military leader. He led a classic insurgency/ guerrilla campaign that sometimes accepted formal engagements with regular troops and achieved several notable victories. In the Battle of Vagnas, February 10, 1703, 600 French troops engaged the Camisards, who were overtaken and surprised with an initial but poorly aimed musket volley. The Camisards responded with a bayonet charge that swept the field and killed the French captain, Baron de la Gorce, whose retreating force was reduced to 60 men taking refuge in a castle. However, the Camisards also experienced a number of defeats as superior forces supported by Louis XIVs modern nation-state inexorably closed in. Even so, the Camisards maintained a force in the field that received constant shelter and replenishment from a friendly populace and many willing recruits. They were masters of the mountainous terrain, and being on home ground they presented many challenges for standard military operations. The French forces numbered at least 20,000 regulars plus militia. They executed a classic counterinsurgency campaign, which involved destroying enemy home bases including societal support structures, capturing supply caches and eliminating leaders, and relentlessly hunting insurgent forces to reduce them through attrition and battle. The French methods may be described as brutal and vicious, characterized by executions, massacres, and mass destruction of 466 villages and hamlets in “the Burning of the Cévennes” in the autumn of 1703. The Camisards in turn committed their own atrocities and massacres. After two years of attrition, Jean Cavalier’s force of 1,000 Camisards was brought to pitched battle against 5,000 soldiers at Nages, on April 16, 1704. They fought well but were pushed from the field and retreated in good fighting order. French marshal Villars (1653–1734) then met with Cavalier to end the revolt on terms of respect, amnesty, and vague religious toleration (found to be meaningless to Camisards without freedom of conscience). Cavalier, sensing the futility of resistance and generosity of terms, accepted and departed with his loyalists for service elsewhere,

first briefly with the French, then with foreign powers friendly to the Huguenot cause (closing his distinguished career as a British major general), but the bulk of his troops would not accept the terms. Without their leader and under constant pressure from the French monarchy, they had little cohesion or strategy and dissipated as an effective fighting force. The revolt, following a few more desultory actions, subsided by 1710. King Louis XIV had finally the suppressed the Huguenots after almost two centuries of conflict. France’s “brain drain” of talented Huguenots to other lands was considered an acceptable price for unity of the modern nationstate under centralized political and religious rule. French Protestants were not allowed citizenship until the French Revolution in 1789. The French state apologized to Huguenot descendants in 1985. Mark A. Jumper See also Edict of Fontainbleau; French Wars of Religion; Huguenots Further Reading Ladurie, Emmanuel LeRoy, and John Day. The Peasants of Languedoc. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1977. Lynn, John A. The Wars of Louis XIV 1667–1714. New York: Taylor & Francis, 1999. Monahan, W. Gregory. Let God Arise: The War and Rebellion of the Camisards. London: Oxford University Press, 2014. Smiles, Samuel. The Huguenots in France after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes: With a Visit to the Country of the Vaudois. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1874. Treasure, Geoffrey. The Huguenots. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013.

Camp David Accords (1978) The Camp David Accords were a peace agreement reached between Egypt and Israel in September 1978 at Camp David, the U.S. presidential retreat in rural Maryland. During 1977 and 1978, several remarkable events took place that set the stage for the Camp David negotiations. In autumn 1977, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat indicated his willingness to go to Israel for the cause of peace, something that no Arab leader had done since the creation of the Jewish state in 1947. On November 19, 1977, Sadat followed through on his

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promise, addressing the Israeli Knesset (parliament) and calling for peace between the two nations. The Israelis welcomed Sadat’s bold initiative but took no immediate steps to end the state of belligerency, instead agreeing to ministeriallevel meetings in preparation for final negotiations. In February 1978, the United States entered into the equation by hosting Sadat in Washington, with both President Jimmy Carter and Congress hailing the Egyptian leader as a statesman and courageous leader. American adulation for Sadat led to greater cooperation by the Israelis, and they thus agreed to a summit meeting in September at Camp David. For two weeks in September 1978, Sadat, Carter, and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin hammered out a framework for an agreement, but not before both sides were forced to make serious concessions. Begin insisted that Sadat separate the Palestinian issue from the peace talks, something that no Arab leader had been willing to do before. Israel also demanded that Egypt negate any former agreements with other Arab nations that called for war against Israel. Sadat bristled at Begin’s demands, which led to such acrimony between the two men that they met in person only once during the entire negotiation process. Instead, Carter shuttled between the two leaders in an effort to moderate their positions. After several days of little movement and accusations of bad faith directed mostly at Begin, however, Carter threatened to break off the talks. Faced with the possibility of being blamed for a failed peace plan, Begin finally came to the table ready to deal. He agreed to dismantle all Jewish settlements in the Sinai Peninsula and return it in its entirety to Egypt. For his part, Sadat agreed to put the Palestinian issue aside and sign an agreement separate from the other Arab nations. On September 15, 1978, Carter, Sadat, and Begin announced that an agreement had been reached. In reality, there were still many details to work out, and Carter and his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, made numerous trips to the Middle East during the next several months to finalize the agreement. One guarantee that the United States made was to help organize an international peacekeeping force to occupy the Sinai following the Israeli withdrawal. The United States also promised $2 billion to pay for the relocation of an airfield from the Sinai to Israel and made guarantees of economic assistance to Egypt in exchange for Sadat’s signature on a peace treaty.

Finally, on March 26, 1979, in a White House ceremony, Sadat and Begin shook hands again and signed a permanent peace treaty, normalizing relations between their two nations. When the accord was reached, all sides believed that other Arab nations, particularly the pro-Western regimes in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, would soon follow Egypt’s lead and sign similar agreements. They were mistaken. Other Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) denounced the Camp David Accords and Sadat for having sold out the Arab cause. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League, and several Middle Eastern nations broke off diplomatic relations with Cairo. Not until the mid-1990s would another Arab nation, Jordan, join Egypt in normalizing relations with Israel. The Camp David Accords were, without doubt, Carter’s greatest foreign policy success. Brent Geary See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Primary Document: Camp David Accords: A Framework for Peace Between Israel and Egypt and a Framework for Negotiations (September 17, 1978) Further Reading Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983. Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1995. Quandt, William B. Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1986.

Canon Law on War The term “canon law” refers to the rules and regulations promulgated by or adopted by church authority for its members. The word “canon” derives from the Greek kanon, used to denote specific rulings of the earliest ecumenical councils, though the term kanon also came to be applied to rules and regulations issued by bishops for their own sees and to early works attributed pseudoepigraphically to the apostles. These early texts defined specific beliefs and behavior for Christians, aiming to distinguish them from the remainder of Roman society at the time.

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In the early fifth century the first Western canonical collections appeared, based on the early ecumenical councils. The Greek councils were known in two Latin versions, one from the Spanish church attributed to Isidore of Seville (ca. 560–636) and one from Rome. In the sixth century collections of canons began to appear that added specifically Western elements: papal letters or decretals and canons from Western councils of bishops. The canon law of the Western or Catholic Church, considered separately, effectively begins with these collections. During this period, as well as before and after, individual bishops were responsible for the canonical life of the faithful in their respective sees. While the writings of most of these have been lost—including most of the writings of bishops of major sees—those of one bishop of a relatively minor see, Augustine of Hippo, were both voluminous and widely known. Augustine died a quarter of the way into the sixth century, and by the end of that century collections of excerpts from his writings began to appear and be transmitted from generation to generation. Why not whole books? This was because of the enormous price of books at the time. Each copy had to be individually transcribed, and though the materials were relatively costly and long-lived, over time they would deteriorate and new copies had to be made. Only the very wealthy had libraries of books; and even if all of Augustine’s works could have been assembled in one place, they would have been available to read by only a comparative few. This is why collections of excerpts from the works of major figures like Augustine developed, and it was through these collections of excerpts that his thought was promulgated to later generations. For the story of canon law, including that relating to war, it is the collected excerpts from Augustine’s works that matter, because in the 12th century they became central in the section of Gratian’s Decretum devoted to war (Reichberg, Syse, and Begby 2006, 104–24). But the production of canons by councils of bishops continued between the time of Isidore and that of Gratian, and three provisions from this period dealt directly with war (see Johnson 1981, 124–31; 1987, 79–91). The most important of these was the canonical Peace of God, a form of which was first promulgated by the Council of Le Puy, in France, in 975. This council imposed an oath on all soldiers that they respect the possessions and personnel of the

church as well as peasants and their possessions: this was the first appearance in the West of an idea of noncombatant immunity. Subsequent regional councils of bishops extended this requirement, and a much expanded list of noncombatants appeared in the 13th-century De Treuga et Pace, which formed part of the Corpus Juris Canonici compiled by Raymond of Pennafort at the direction of Pope Gregory IX. Another element in the Peace of God movement was to attempt to canonically delegitimize anyone taking arms who was not under the authority of a prince: this subjected bandits and individual knights acting without superior authority to the punishment of excommunication. The canonical Peace of God turned out to be extremely successful: besides establishing precedents that have continued to the present day both in Christian teaching and in public and international law, in the 10th and 11th centuries it was seconded by the forces of regional counts, acting under the authority of the French king, who by enforcing the church’s canons also extended royal authority. The second canonical attempt to limit the practice of war was the Truce of God, first promulgated at the Council of Narbonne, also in France, in 1054 and reaffirmed and extended by several subsequent councils later in the 11th century. The Truce of God began by prohibiting private warfare on Sundays, and by the end of the century the truce included the days of all the great Christian festivals as well as the period each week from Wednesday sunset to Monday dawn (the Sunday vigil). But this effort, by attempting too much, gained little, and though it remained in the canonical collections, it was generally ignored by the 12th century. The third canonical effort to affect war came from the Second Lateran Council in 1139. This was a canonical ban on the use of certain weapons in warfare among Christians—the crossbow, bows and arrows generally, and siege machines. Not only were these especially deadly—a crossbow bolt or an arrow caused a penetrating wound that very often became infected and led to death, while siege weapons were inherently indiscriminate in the harm they caused—but they were all weapons usually used not by knights but by commoners serving as mercenaries. So this was an attack on mercenaries as well as an effort to limit especially deadly weapons. The knightly class applauded

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the former aim, but only so far as it applied to mercenary bands operating on their own authority. Major armies continued to employ groups of mercenaries specializing in the use of these weapons, but operating under princely authority. Also, the ban expressly did not apply to the crusades, where the enemies were not other Christians. All in all, the results of the Lateran council weapons ban anticipated the results of subsequent efforts at weapons bans: it worked only so far but no farther. A major climax in the treatment of war by canon law was reached in the completion around 1148 of the Concordia discordantia canonum (Concordance of Discordant Canons), subsequently generally referred to as the Decretum, authored by a Camaldolese monk named Gratian, a member of the faculty of laws at the University of Bologna, the premier such faculty at the time. Canon lawyers regard the publication of this work as marking the beginning of a new period in canon law. The legal faculty at Bologna were principals in the recovery of Roman law, and Gratian sought to describe canon law in a comparable way. In his treatment of war a sea change is evident. The second of the three parts of the Decretum consists of a discussion of 36 practical topics or cases (causae), with Causa 23 devoted specifically to war. It proceeds through treatment of several questions (questiones) on different topics, and in his answers to each of these questions Gratian drew not only on existing canons but, much more heavily, on the collected excerpts of passages from major church authorities. Most of his citations in this causa are from Augustine; he also cites Isidore and Ambrose. He also provided his own interpretation and judgment on each question, thus effectively establishing the canon law on each point. While present-day authors referring to Augustine tend to cite City of God Book XIX, the passages in the Decretum are from various other works, and only Book I of City of God is cited. This follows from the purpose of the passages from Augustine preserved in the medieval collections: they connected to the practical aim of guiding Christian behavior so as to avoid sin, an aim that fit well with the development of the sacrament of penance and the canon law. The Decretum was quickly adopted as a textbook for canon law at Bologna and in other universities. Gratian’s contemporaries and immediate successors (known collectively as the Decretists) added their own comments and

glosses to the text of the Decretum as it was used in teaching. They were followed by another generation known as the Decretalists, including some popes who issued decretals or decrees on particular points, as well as others who commented on these. The most important Decretalists included Gregory IX, his secretary Raymond of Pennafort, Hostiensis, and Innocent IV. As noted earlier, Raymond prepared the Corpus juris canonici (literally, The Body of Canon Law), which was promulgated under the authority of Gregory: this added to the Decretum a new volume utilizing a different method. It also included a section on war, in which an important element was a much expanded list of noncombatants built on the Peace of God canons. Pope Innocent IV was the last Decretalist to make a major contribution to canon law on war, distingishing between defense (defensio) and war (bellum), stipulating that anyone has a right to the former while an attack is going on (incontinenti), but that just war (bellum iustum) has to do with the use of force after the fact to punish a wrongful attack and seek restitution (see Reichberg, Syse, and Begby 2006, 150–51). Collectively the work of Gratian, the Decretists, and the Decretalists established a comprehensive and systematic conception of just war for the first time. It required the authority of a sovereign temporal ruler, one with no temporal superior; it required a just cause, defined following Augustine so as to punish evildoing and restore anything unjustly taken but not, following Innocent IV, including immediate self-defense; and it required a right intention, defined in two ways following Augustine: negatively in the list of wrong intentions given in Contra Faustum xxii.74, and positively as the end of peace, as in Letter 189 To Boniface. These were the three conditions stated by Aquinas in his question “On War” in Summa theologiae II/II, q.40, A.1, and they remained unchanged afterward through the Middle Ages and into the modern period. In the 17th century this came to be known as the jus ad bellum, a term not used by medieval and early modern thinkers. The canon law did not return to the matter of war after the Decretalists, but the scholastic and neo-scholastic theologians took it up and developed it further within the context of theology, and in the era of the Hundred Years’ War the canonical provisions on noncombatancy and weapons limits were reinforced by the chivalric code in the

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work of Honoré Bonet (or Bovet) and Christine de Pisan. Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis repositioned the just war idea at the core of the idea of the law of nations, and it continues to provide the historical basis for international law on war. The present-day recovery of just war in the frames of theology and philosophy effectively reinvents the meaning of just war, and this recovery has paid no attention to the canonists who first defined a systematic conception of just war. The medieval canonical contribution to moral thinking on war remains normative, because by its structure canon law is cumulative, with later elements building on what had been set in place earlier. Thus the definitive contribution of Gratian, the Decretists, and the Decretalists continues to provide the substantive anchor of canon law on war and the classic statement of the requirements for just war. James Turner Johnson See also Augustine; Christianity and War, Just War Tradition Further Reading Johnson, James Turner. Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975. Johnson, James Turner. Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Johnson, James Turner. The Quest for Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. Reichberg, Gregory, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby. The Ethics of War. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.

Carlist Wars (1833–1840, 1846–1849, 1872–1876) The Carlist Wars were a succession of civil wars that affected Spain during the 19th century. The intensity of the fighting varied from international involvement to isolated regional rebellions against central authority. The conflicts cast a long shadow over Spanish history into the 20th century with supporters of the Carlist royal line fighting for the Nationalist forces during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Much of the fighting centered on maintaining central authority as a bulwark against liberal secularism, and the subsequent threat to Spain’s conservative religious traditions.

In 1833, the last absolutist king of Spain, Fernando VII, died without a legitimate male heir. His daughter Isabel was the closest successor, but this was challenged by the late king’s brother Carlos. The political instability caused by the succession came at a time of major change in Spanish politics as the loss of most of Spain’s overseas possessions in Latin America led to a gradual shift in the nature of the state from an authoritarian to a liberal one. The Carlist Wars were as much a struggle about royal succession as a reaction against liberalism. The First Carlist War lasted from 1833 to 1840 with Carlos objecting to his niece Isabel II succeeding her father to the throne. Isabel’s mother María Cristina acted as queen regent for the young heiress. Liberals looked to Isabel to introduce political and constitutional change that would separate authority between the government and the crown. They also hoped for major bureaucratic and administrative reforms. Carlos’s supporters, known as Carlists, stood for tradition, conservatism, absolute monarchy, and ultramontanism. Although the Carlists enjoyed success under the military command of Tomás de Zumalacárregui and briefly threatened to march on Madrid, their forces were heavily outnumbered by the liberals who commanded central authority and who received financial and military support from Britain, France, and Portugal. The Carlists were defeated but their “cause” remained strong in Navarre and along the Pyrenean region. The Second Carlist War, also known as La Guerra dels Matiners, was a second revolt by Carlist supporters against Isabel II. This struggle was largely a guerrilla campaign fought in the highlands of Catalonia from 1846 to 1849. The war was confined to this region and unlike the first conflict, the Second Carlist War never threatened central authority. The revolt was a reaction to the liberal reforms initiated in the 1837 and 1845 constitutions that authorized a bicameral parliament and popular elected municipal governments, and transformed the crown into a constitutional monarchy. The Third Carlist War was fought between 1872 and 1876. The Carlists established their own state in the north with their own government offices and post and press services. As with the other wars, the conflict rallied peasant support for the Carlist cause largely as a reaction to the liberalization and secularization of Spanish society that

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was gradually emerging. The Third Carlist War was firmly centered on the Navarrese heartlands. The tenaciousness of Carlism centered on the loyalty of succeeding generations to the “cause,” which was nurtured within families and local communities. It was this regionalism and parochialism that also, however, made Carlism incapable of projecting its movement nationally. The last generation of Carlists to bear arms for the struggle wore the traditional symbol of Carlism—the red beret—as one contingent of the Nationalist forces in the Spanish Civil War. Barry N. Whelan See also Spanish Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Blinkhorn, Martin. Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931–1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Brett, Edward M. The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War in Spain, 1835–1838: A Forgotten Army. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2005. Clemente, Josep C. Breve Historia de las Guerras Carlistas. Madrid: Ediciones Nowtilus, 2011. Edgar, Holt. The Carlist Wars in Spain. London: Putnam, 1967. Vincent, Mary. Spain 1833–2002: People and State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Cathars The Cathars were a heretical Christian movement in parts of southern France and northern Italy during the 12th to 14th centuries that was persecuted during the era of the crusades. As far as doctrine and practices, the Cathars are considered dualists who rejected the Old Testament, had severe dietary restrictions, avoided sex, and attempted to live simple lives. Cathars had two major ecclesial rites. The first was the consolamentum, which had two functions; one was a sort of ordination of the bishop class of Cathars, while the second function was a type of last rites for the dying believers, which guaranteed salvation. A second practice was the blessing of ordinary credentes by the perfecti after the preaching of sermons and other sorts of services. There is much debate among scholars as to the nature of the Cathars, and two interpretive schools will be explored

in this entry. The first school, and really the standard interpretation, is that the Cathars created a counterchurch that existed throughout medieval Christendom from the mid12th through the early 14th centuries. Scholars imagine this Cathar Church as mimicking much of the Catholic Church at the time. This is seen specifically in terms of a high degree of ecclesial organization including their own version of bishops and priests, a divide between the laity and the priesthood, and a somewhat international system throughout southern France, Italy, northern Europe, and even the lands of Byzantium. In terms of doctrine, this Cathar Church preached dualism, and depending on the interpretation ranging from absolute to a more moderate form. This school tends to (overly?) focus on the intellectual world of heresy. A more recent interpretive school, which at this writing remains very much the minority interpretation, instead attempts to understand the lived religion of the various peoples seen as Cathars, particularly in southern France. The main thrust is that no real Cathar Church existed vis-à-vis the Roman Catholic Church and that, while there were no doubt dualists wandering around medieval Europe preaching dualist doctrines, most people in medieval Europe focused instead on orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy and were more caught up in the preaching of various practices as well as how these preachers lived rather than the doctrine they preached. And thus people merged many practices from the orthodox and heterodox worlds, with seemingly no understanding of the contradictions between them. Most of the wandering preachers during this era of reform (mid-12th through the mid-13th centuries) did not fit into a nice dichotomy of orthodox/heterodox, but rather somewhere on a very long spectrum between the two, and differences were not always clear-cut, especially to those untrained in the finer points of theology. The traditional narrative of the Cathars finds them first in Western sources in a letter from Eberwin, provost of the Premonstratensians at Steinfeld, written to Bernard of Clairvaux around 1143 regarding a trial of heretics before the archbishop of Cologne, which is supported by a contemporary chronicle that describes a similar, if not the same, trial. A decade or so later Eckbert of Schonau, a monk, encountered the Cathars for the first time in the 1150s, and, in 1163, preached against them with his

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Sermones contra Catharos, in which he described a Cathar Church that had spread throughout Germany, France, and Flanders. In this sermon, he describes the Cathars as dualists, claiming they received their beliefs in an earlier era from Mani, the originator of Manichaeism. Hildegard of Bingen documented her visions about the Cathars in the same year Eckbert preached his sermon, and she dated their appearance in the Rhineland around 1140, which suggests that the heretics Eberwin struggled against were actually Cathars. From this point forward, everywhere heresy appears in the next two decades it is somehow connected with the Cathars, either by the contemporaries themselves or modern scholars of heresy, from Liège in 1145, Reims in 1157, Tours in 1163, Lombers in 1166, Oxford in the mid1160s, and finally Vezelay in Burgundy in 1167. Those who see high ecclesial organization at an early date point to a Cathar Council of St. Felix, which is dated between 1167 and the mid-1170s. Those who accept this council as authentic are quick to accept a large Cathar Church that spread rapidly throughout Europe. That said, not all scholars agree that the council signifies a high degree of organization, and there are some who reject the documents as later forgeries, suggesting no council took place. It does seem to be the case that at the very least from the mid-13th century on there is some sort of Cathar church that exists throughout Europe, with around 16 bishoprics, that stretched from Toulouse in the west to Constantinople in the east. The records mention two offices, bishop and deacon, though other offices are occasionally mentioned as well. Those considered part of the hierarchy were called perfecti, while the rest were called credentes. Perhaps the reason the Cathars are so remembered to the present day, other than strange connections to a variety of conspiracy theories, is that they received the brunt of Roman Catholic aggression in the Albigensian Crusade, a 20-year war waged by the church against the lords of southern France who were deemed supporters of Cathars (1209– 1229). The success of this crusade, which was put in place by Pope Innocent III, as well as its aims, is often debated. What is clear, however, is that it disrupted the entire region, allowed this region to be brought more closely under the sway of the French crown, was followed by the birth of the inquisition aimed at the Cathars in the region (1234), and

ultimately clarified religious identity for the peoples of the region as to whether they were Catholic or Cathar. Walker Reid Cosgrove See also Albigensian Crusade; Innocent III, Pope Further Reading Arnold, John H. Inquisition and Power: Catharism and the Confessing Subject in Medieval Languedoc. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. Barber, Malcolm. The Cathars. Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in the High Middle Ages. London: Longman, 2000. Bruschi, Caterina. The Wandering Heretics of Languedoc. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Costen, Michael. The Cathars and the Albigensian Crusade. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997. Frassetto, Michael, ed. Heresy and the Persecuting Society in the Middle Ages: Essays on the Work of R. I. Moore. Brill: Leiden, 2006. Hamilton, Bernard. Monastic Reform, Catharism, and the Crusades (900–1300). London: Variorum Reprints, 1979. Lambert, Malcolm. The Cathars. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998. Lansing, Carol. Power & Purity: Cathar Heresy in Medieval Italy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Mundy, John Hines. The Repression of Catharism in Toulouse: The Royal Diploma of 1279. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1985. Pegg, Mark Gregory. Corruption of Angels: The Great Inquisition of 1245–46. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. Pegg, Mark Gregory. A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Sparks, Chris. Heresy, Inquisition and Life Cycle in Medieval Languedoc. Woodbridge, UK: York Medieval Press, 2014. Taylor, Claire. Heresy in Medieval France: Dualism in Aquitaine and the Agenais, 1000–1249. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell, 2005. Wakefield, Walter. Heresy, Crusade, and Inquisition in Southern France 1100–1250. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

Catholic (Holy) League The Catholic League (also known in some circles as the Holy League) was probably the most important of a number of leagues and confraternities established by 16thcentury French Catholics concerned about the growth of religious heresy within their realm. Its membership

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consisted of French nobles determined to eradicate the Huguenots, who were adherents of a branch of Protestantism known as Calvinism (named after John Calvin). The Catholic League played an extremely important role in the French Wars of Religion, being vigorous defenders of the Roman Catholic faith. Their Catholicism meant that they were supporters of the French crown (though critical of it) during the first three of the civil wars prior to the beginning of the reigns of King Henry III in 1574 and King Henry IV (who was a Protestant Huguenot) in 1589, after which they found themselves as rivals to the crown. The origins of the Catholic League are complex, but one element can be found in the character of religious belief in the 16th century. During this time, French Catholics believed that the presence of “heretics” within France

threatened the country with God’s wrath. Natural disasters, disease, and conflicts were blamed on heretics and understood as warning signs of God’s displeasure. Accordingly the French Calvinists, also known as “Lutherans” (Luther’s name had become a commonplace for all European heresies at this time), represented an extremely serious danger to the realm. It was, therefore, a matter of both political and religious importance that the Huguenots be removed from within their borders. Laxity on such an issue as this was conceived of as disobedience to God. Meanwhile the French Calvinist churches had been growing for several decades, ballooning in size during the 1530s, 1540s, and 1550s. By the mid-1550s, tensions between the Calvinists and Catholics were escalating, with various skirmishes occurring, particularly as the Huguenots grew bolder and

This woodcut depicts a procession of penitents in Paris, one of many instituted during the time of the Catholic (Holy) League in France. The Catholic League of France was formed in 1576 by Henry I, Duke of Guise, to protect Catholicism from heresy in the form of Protestantism. The League played an important role in the French Wars of Religion. (British Library)

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attempted to take over churches, engage in iconoclastic activities, mock the procession of the Eucharist by Catholics, and the like. French Catholics were laboring to resist these Huguenot encroachments. Yet more and more nobles during this time were either adopting the Calvinist faith or assuming sympathetic attitudes toward it. This meant that by the early 1560s a third of the parliament was well disposed toward the Huguenots. French Catholic nobles were enormously frustrated with the perceived carelessness of the monarch toward this grave threat. These nobles collected themselves into loosely organized alliances of a politicoreligious nature that began appearing around 1561 and represented a kind of grassroots movement to combat Huguenots at the local level. The first kingdom-wide league appeared in 1576. This was prompted in part as a response to the Peace of Monsieur, which many perceived as being too conciliatory toward the Calvinists. Among those involved in this coming together were members of the House of Guise, an influential Catholic family, and in particular Henry, the duke of Guise, who is regarded as the head of the Catholic League. Given its initial frustration with the king, one might assume the monarch would want nothing to do with the Catholic League and its members. But to the contrary, once King Henry III came to the throne, he appointed himself head of the Catholic League (in fact, not long after its formation), due to his perception of it as a threat to his own authority. While this initiated a period during which nobles lost interest in joining the league, this changed in the summer of 1584 when the Catholic League experienced a reorganization. This was the result of political maneuvering following the death of King Henry III’s younger brother. His death meant that Henry of Bourbon, the king of Navarre, was now next in line for the throne. As king of Navarre, he was strongly associated with the Huguenot cause. His relatives, such as Antoine of Navarre, were Huguenots and in fact Henry himself had held the position of commander of the Huguenot army during an earlier series of wars. With this reorganization, then, the Catholic League survived a takeover by the French monarch and went on to appeal to a wider range of French Catholics during its second manifestation. The Catholic League’s efforts after 1584 were considerable and included exerting pressure on King Henry III, which led to him opting to recriminalize adher-

ence to the Protestant religion. This helped bring about an increase in tensions and further escalated into wars. While political wrangling, class, and social tensions were of real significance to the formation of this league, there is an indisputably religious issue that also governed its formation and activities. Behind its formation was a fundamentally religious question: what is the proper disposition one should have toward God? Is concession or compromise with respect to the worship of God permissible? This question was alive at this time within France and was answered differently by different groups. On the Calvinist side, there were those identified as Nicodemites (named after Nicodemus, mentioned in John 3) who claimed to believe Calvinist doctrine but wanted, for various reasons, to continue to worship in Roman Catholic churches. Fanatically opposing the Nicodemites were those French Calvinists devoted to the teachings of John Calvin. The Catholic League, one might say, represented the fanatical side of Catholicism. Their fanaticism or intensity is not difficult to point out. The league made a secret treaty, called the Treaty of Joinville, with the Guises and Philip II of Spain in December 1584. The Catholic League also had the support of the Jesuits. Additionally, the manifestation of the Catholic League in the city of Paris became known by the name “Sixteen” due to the fact that it was organized according to the 16 wards of the city; it was an element known for its radical character. Yet pointing to their fanaticism and to the political and social aspects associated with the movement must not cause us to overlook or give short shrift to the spirituality of the Catholic League. With the new spiritual landscape introduced through the Council of Trent and its pronouncements, the Catholic League sought to deal. This was a kind of new era for Catholicism. And, in many ways, the Catholic League became one of the more impressive representations of the new era of Tridentine spirituality. Jon Balserak See also Calvin, John; French Wars of Religion; Huguenots Further Reading Ascoli, Peter, ed. Dialogue d’entre le maheustre et le manant. Geneva: Droz, 1977. Baumgartner, Frederic J. Radical Reactionaries: The Political Thought of the French Catholic League. Geneva: Droz, 1976.

Central Asia, Russian Conquest of  169 Buisseret, David. Henry IV. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984. Crouzet, Denis. Les guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion. 2 vols. Paris: Seyssel, 1990. Holt, Mack P. The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Salmon, J. H. M. Society in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth Century. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975.

Central Asia, Russian Conquest of A decade-long process of gradual Russian expansion into and conquest of Central Asian states, Russia’s conquest of Central Asia was similar in many ways to the colonial expansion of other Western powers at the same time. As in Britain or France, the Russian elites cherished the belief that Russia had a “civilizing mission” to be accomplished by way of geographical expansion into Asia. This belief was particularly strengthened in the wake of Russia’s humiliation in the Crimean War (1853–1856) when Russia was eager to restore its military prestige and position among the European powers. The Central Asian khanates had limited means to resist the Russian expansion. Divided and feuding, the local khans and emirs had little, if any, understanding of the outside world and made no serious attempts to unite against Russia, often exploiting Russian pressure on a neighboring state to enrich themselves. Russia’s initial expansion into Central Asian states can be traced to the 16th century but it was of limited nature. In the early 18th century, Russian rulers began a more systematic expansion into the Kazakh steppes. In 1715 Peter the Great, exploiting internal feuds in the Kazakh khanates, dispatched two military expeditions (one from Astrakhan to Khiva under the command of Prince Bekovich-Cherkasskii; another from Tobolsk up the Irtysh river led by Lieutenant Colonel Buchholtz) to conquer the steppes but both ended in military disasters. Nevertheless, the Russian government continued to interfere in the steppes, and a number of Kazakh khans and tribal leader acknowledged Russian authority between 1731 and 1740. The Russian drive southward soon clashed with the northward expansion of the khanates of Kokand and Khiva. At the same time, domestic challenges, military involvement

in Europe, and conquests in the Balkans and the Caucasus delayed Russian expansion into Central Asia for a century and Russian interference, for the most part, was minimal. In 1839–1840, a Russian military expedition was organized against Khiva but suffered greatly from poor weather and enemy attacks. The failure of this expedition forced Russia to temporarily give up the idea of conquering Khiva and instead strengthen its authority in the Kazakh steppes first. In the 1840s, Russia built a series of fortresses to project Russian military power into the southern regions of the Kazakh steppes. This alarmed the khanate of Kokand, and the Russian gradual advance to the Syr Darya River caused a conflict between Russia and Kokand in 1852. The following year, General Petrovskii, governorgeneral of Orenburg, successfully campaigned on the Lower Syr Darya, capturing the Kokandian stronghold of Aq Masjed. Starting in the mid-19th century, Russian authorities gradually devoted more attention to this region. Planned in 1854, the expansion into the Central Asian regions south of the Syr Darya had been delayed by the Crimean War and was not undertaken until 1863. Between 1858 and 1863, Russian authorities conducted numerous reconnaissance missions that made them familiar with the region and facilitated the conquest. In 1863, the Kirghiz mountaneous regions south of Lake Issyk-Kul were annexed to Russia and, in December 1863, Emperor Alexander II demarcated a new imperial border that ran through Suzak (east of the Syr Darya) and Awlia-Ata (Jambul in Kazakhstan), annexing Chimkent (in southern Kazakhstan) and Turkestan to his realm. In 1864, Russian foreign minister Alexander Gorchakov wrote the famous memorandum “A Justification for Russian Advance in Central Asia” that highlighted Russia’s mission to civilize the “half-savage nomad populations” of Central Asia. The same year, the Russian troops under Major General Mikhail Chernyaev marched into Turkestan. Although his first attack on Chimkent was repelled by Molla Alemqul of Kokand in July 1864, the Russians returned later the same year, expelling the Kokandians and capturing the city in September. In the fall, Chernyaev marched to Tashkent where he was initially repelled by the local garrison. Yet the Russians occupied vast territories between the Aral Sea and Lake Issyk-Kul, which were now united into the Turkestan region with Chernyaev as its first

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military governor. In 1865, taking advantage of Bukhara’s attack on Kokand, Chernyaev invaded the latter, routed the Kokandians in a battle near Tashkent in May, and stormed the city on June 29. The khanate of Kokand retained nominal independence until 1876 when, following a series of local revolts, it was annexed as the Fergana region to the governorate-general of Turkestan. The Russian authorities then turned their attention to Bukhara’s khan, Emir Mozaffar al-Din, who demanded the Russians withdraw from Kokand. In late 1865, Russian and Bukharan troops clashed south of Tashkent while, in January 1866, Chernyaev crossed the Syr Darya River and invaded the Bukharan territory, although he was soon repelled at Jizak. He was replaced by General D. Romanov­ skii, who routed the Bukharan army, led by Emir Mozaffar al-Din himself, near Irjar in May 1866 and captured Kojand, Ura-Tube, Jizak, and Yani-Qyurghan by the spring of 1867. In July 1867 the newly conquered territories were united into the governorate-general of Russian Turkestan (the first governor-general was General Konstantin Petrovich Von Kaufman, who was given almost unlimited authority, including the right to wage wars, conduct diplomatic negotiations, and conclude treaties) with its headquarters at Tashkent. In April 1868, Emir Mozaffar al-Din proclaimed a holy war on Russia but was routed by Von Kaufman on the Chopan-Ata heights near Samarkand on May 1, 1868. The following day, the Russian army occupied Samarkand, once the capital of Timur’s empire. On June 2, the Bukharans suffered another devastating defeat on the Zirabulaq heights, which forced Emir Mozaffar al-Din to sue for peace by the end of the month. He ceded all territories conquered by the Russians until then and agreed to pay a war indemnity. Following the conquest of Bukhara, the Russian authorities turned to Khiva. In late 1869, the Russians established Krasnovodsk on the eastern coastline of the Caspian Sea, which served as their base of operations in the region. Over the next three years several Russian expeditions reconnoitered the desert, despite the protests from Khan Muhammad Rahim II of Khiva. In 1873, Von Kaufman led a major invasion of Khiva, which overwhelmed the Khivan resistance, and captured Khiva on June10. Throughout the summer of 1873, Von Kaufman conducted punitive expeditions against local Turkmen tribesmen before forcing

Khan Muhammad Rahim II (on August 24) to cede his territory to Russia and pay a war indemnity. With Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva conquered, Russia turned to the Turkmen but faced an uphill struggle against the local tribesmen. In 1879, the Russian expedition under General A. Lomakin was defeated by the Teke Turkmen at their famous Geok-Tepe fortress. The defeat at Geok-Tepe was one of the most humiliating defeats for the contemporary Russian army and caused a great outcry in Russia. To avenge the defeat, General Mikhail Skobelev, with some 13,000 men and more than 100 cannons, returned to the fortress in late 1880 and had it completed destroyed after a month-long siege in January 1881. In 1881–1885, as a result of the campaigns of Generals Mikhail Annenkov and Mikhail Skobelev, Russia annexed the Transcaspian region and extended its authority to Ashkhabad, Merv, and Pendjeh. The Russian expansion in Central Asia formally ended with the signing of agreements with China in 1894 and Britain in 1895, which demarcated Russia’s boundaries in the Pamirs and recognized its conquests in Central Asia. Alexander Mikaberidze See also Crimean War, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Becker, S. Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968. Little, Bruce. Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860–1914. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987. Pierce, R. Russian Central Asia. A Study in Colonial Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960. Soucek, Svat. A History of Inner Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response (1983) The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response (TCOP) is a Pastoral Letter on War and Peace issued by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops on May 3, 1983. This highly public and controversial advisory work burst

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on the world scene with a flash of assertive Christian involvement in questions of nuclear weapons, entering fields of national policy and military strategy that tended to resist such input—even though the topic of nuclear war encompasses every human. It created intense discussion at the height of Cold War tensions between the West (primarily the United States and other NATO nations) and the Soviet Union. The scope of societal response encompassed representatives of religion, philosophy, ethics, politics, international relations, economics, and the military. The letter was both widely hailed and reviled, advocated and opposed. These discussions took additional impetus from the almost-concurrent address of President Ronald Reagan on March 8, 1983, to the National Association of Evangelicals, known as “the Evil Empire speech,” which had brought both widespread praise and opprobrium that mirrored the reaction to TCOP. TCOP examined questions regarding nuclear weapons from a comprehensive ethos of Catholic Christian tradition, study, and application. Its stated foundations included the just war tradition (JWT); however, the work was slanted toward rejection of applying that tradition to nuclear weapons, due to their perceived qualitative differences from all other weapons: that they inherently exceed traditional tenets of discrimination, proportionality, and probability of success (due to escalation into mutual assured destruction), among others. The work also favored a pacifist-oriented interpretation of the JWT that focused more on goals and states of peace than decisions and actions toward war. Indeed, it declared a “presumption against war” (II.C.2). Its primary concern was stopping war, rather than stopping evil and injustice. It tended to equate pacifism with peace, rather than seeing pacifism as one methodological choice for achieving peace. (The idea that pacifism might endanger peace or lose the peace was alien to the work [¶ 224].) TCOP was advisory in nature, specifically sourced in and aimed toward the U.S. church that its authors pastored. It thus did not carry magisterial authority or precedent within the Catholic Church as a whole; only the Catholic Catechism, far more amenable to the JWT, holds that place. However the subject matter itself, and the work’s point of view that was severely critical of many U.S. policies and practices, guaranteed a worldwide hearing, discussion, and

impact. The authors avowed their status as moral thinkers and advisors, not technicians; yet then proposed a technical policy “to halt the testing, production and deployment of new nuclear weapons systems” (¶s 191, 204). Such a policy could result in greater instability and risk as existing weapons age, become less reliable, and fail to receive improvements in accuracy and yield that could move closer to the moral goals of discrimination and proportionality. Developing events—combined with TCOP’s limited grounding and outlook—combined to eclipse TCOP over time. In fulfillment of TCOP’s hopes (¶ 191), the West and the Soviets achieved the total elimination of an entire class of destabilizing intermediate missiles through the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles (INF Treaty) of December 8, 1987—but only after, following President Reagan’s “Zero Option,” NATO deployed such missiles in quantity. The Nuclear Freeze movement, implicitly advocated by TCOP, not only failed to achieve policy status, but also was completely surpassed by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of July 31, 1991. President Reagan had offered the substance of both treaties even in his “Evil Empire” speech, then pursued them to success. A further major development was President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech of March 23, 1983, followed by a massive program that sought technical means to achieve the moral purpose of “making nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.” He thereby almost singlehandedly completely altered the moral calculus of nuclear orthodoxy as he energetically rejected the immorality of mass incineration of undefended populations—a point not considered by TCOP, which only addressed civil defense measures (¶ 220). Events have thus shown that moves reducing tensions and armaments, but also increasing security, can be sourced as much in policies of “peace through strength” as of pacifism. However, it cannot be necessarily gainsaid that TCOP contributed to these successful developments. Notwithstanding the flaws and critiques of TCOP, the work achieved the major purpose of boldly inserting Christian moral theology and ethics into critical discussions of humanity’s survival. It must be said that in Christendom, the Catholic project of moral theology and ethics leads the way in depth, breadth, and cohesive unified

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thought. Building on that lineage, TCOP has become a watershed modern reference text in discussions of nuclear weapons, and war in general. Regardless of one’s views on these topics, any discussion of them must deal with TCOP. It is this status that attests to TCOP’s place in history and its enduring value. Mark A. Jumper See also Cold War, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response. http://www.usccb.org/upload/challenge-peace-gods-promise -our-response-1983.pdf Hollenbach, David. “War and Peace in American Catholic Thought: A Heritage Abandoned?” Theological Studies 48 (1987). Weigel, George. “The Next Line of Hills: The Challenge of Peace Revisited.” First Things (April 1990). Weigel, George. Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Chamkaur, Battle of (1705) The Battle of Chamkaur was fought in Punjab, India, on December 7–8, 1705, between the forces of the Mughal Empire and the Sikhs, who sought to maintain their autonomy and the right to practice their religion without interference within the Mughal Empire. The Mughals had ruled northern India since 1526. However, by 1700 the empire was weak and decaying as it faced vigorous new groups within—such as Sikhs, led by Guru Gobind Singh (1666–1708). Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (ruled 1658–1707), breaking from his predecessors’ practice of religious tolerance and syncretism, was committed to orthodox Islam. His strict advocacy provoked much protest from several of the empire’s areas and groups. Guru Singh meanwhile dynamically defined Sikhism’s practice, such as introducing the teaching of kahlsa (1699), which refers both to the body of Sikhs as a whole— endued with military spirit—and to the basic governing unit of five Sikhs. (The number five is especially significant

to Sikhs, representing their five primary tenets.) Guru Singh’s leadership brought many converts and had much influence, to the point of attracting the opposition of tribal hill chiefs, then the emperor. The emperor assisted the chiefs besieging Anandpur, the guru’s key citadel. Guru Singh and his people were eventually promised safe passage from Anandpur, but were attacked once they were in the open. Singh’s charismatic leadership made him, personally, the primary military objective for capture or killing. A Mughal force of thousands pursued Guru Singh and his guard force of 40, finally besieging the small body in an enclosure near the town of Chamkaur. Several Sikh kahlsas of five warriors at a time— including two of the guru’s sons—courageously sallied out to glorious annihilation, holding back the besiegers for a full day. Guru Singh proposed to follow their example. However, a formal kahlsa meeting ordered Singh to escape to lead the Sikh nation. He submitted to the system he had enacted. A ruse followed in which a Sikh wearing Guru Singh’s raiment displayed himself to the besiegers, while the guru and a company of three warriors escaped in the night. The emperor’s forces overcame the garrison the next morning. Thinking that they had killed Guru Singh, they displayed the body and clothes as proof and spread the word. Guru Singh made good his escape and proceeded to evade capture, initiating an epic odyssey across four years and almost 600 kilometers (372 miles), galvanizing his people. The emperor was eventually forced to recognize the guru’s significance and called him to an audience in 1707. As Guru Singh made his way to the audience, the emperor died and his empire began disintegrating because of his sons’ internal conflicts, eventually to be succeeded by the Marathas, prior to the preeminence of the British Raj. The Battle of Chamkaur is a significant event in Sikh history. It preserved Guru Singh’s life and leadership by means of a dramatic stand by a small force that refused to give way against overwhelming odds—as with Thermopylae and the Alamo. In each case, the doomed defenders bought time for leaders to organize and obtain eventual victory. Mark A. Jumper See also Sikhism and War

Charlemagne’s Conquests (ca. 747–814 CE)   173 Further Reading Richard, John F. The Mughal Empire (The New Cambridge History of India) Vol. 1, Part 5. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Singh, Patwat. The Sikhs. New York: Doubleday, 1999.

Charlemagne’s Conquests (ca. 747–814 CE) Charlemagne, also known as Charles the Great (ca. 747– 814 CE), was the second king of the Franks of the Carolingian dynasty. His reign lasted from 768 to 814 and was marked by a dramatic increase in Frankish influence in the unification of most of Western Europe through a series of campaigns of conquest. This series of wars would bring most of modern Germany and France as well as the northern sections of modern Italy under his dominion. In the year 800, he would be crowned Holy Roman Emperor. His campaigns can generally be categorized as serving one or more of three basic purposes: fulfillment of obligations to the papacy, protection or expansion of Christendom as a whole, or the protection and expansion of the Frankish kingdom. Until the time of Pepin the Short (714–768), the father of Charlemagne, Francia was ruled by the Merovingian dynasty. In the declining years of that rule, the real power in the kingdom was held by the mayor of the palace. Charles Martel (ca. 680–741) served in that capacity without aspiring to the royal title. At the time, the papacy had been held by ethnically Greek prelates. Pope Stephen II sought the assistance of the Franks against the Lombards, who had conquered Ravenna and were attempting to take the former Byzantine duchy of Rome. Pepin led two military campaigns against the Lombards, expelling them from Ravenna and Rome. These conquered territories, the socalled “Donation of Pepin,” were granted to the papacy in part to fulfill obligations made in exchange for the consecration of Pepin as king of the Franks. Charlemagne would redeem these promises made by his father in one of his first major campaigns of conquest. Charlemagne initially ascended the throne as king of half the Frankish Empire, sharing authority with his

brother Carloman. The brothers were not on amicable terms. The death of Pepin had led to a revolt in Aquitaine, only recently conquered. Charlemagne’s first campaign of conquest, or more appropriately reconquest, was undertaken without the aid of his co-king. The success of this undertaking was due in part to the decision after the victory to replace rebellious nobles in this province with trusted retainers from north of the Loire River. The campaign had been waged primarily for the security of the Frankish kingdom. When Carloman died in 771, Charlemagne became sole king of the Franks. At the time he rose to this position, the Franks were involved in an intermittent war of conquest and proselytization against the neighboring Saxons dating to the reign of his father. The series of campaigns was interrupted by a campaign of conquest in Italy conducted by the new king. When the Lombard king Desiderius refused to honor the agreements made with Pepin, the papacy sought aid from Charlemagne to enforce compliance. The situation was complicated by the fact that his brother’s widow had fled to the Lombard court with her infant son when Frankish nobles repudiated the child’s claim to a part of the throne in favor of Charlemagne. The Lombard court was also embittered by the repudiation of the king’s daughter by Charlemagne, who had divorced her. The conquest was achieved by late summer in 774 and was undertaken in compliance with obligations made by the previous king. Unlike Pepin, Charlemagne had himself crowned king of the Lombards. While a garrison was left in Pavia and native governors were replaced in a few cities by Frankish counts, the decision to leave the manner in which local governance was conducted unchanged meant that northern Italy would remain secure for the balance of Charlemagne’s reign. Frankish intervention in Italy, however, would have a long-standing impact. By ceding all the territories between Ravenna and Rome to the papacy, the Papal States were effectively established, making the pope a temporal power in addition to a moral authority based on spiritual leadership. This mixing of religious and political power would endure into the 19th century with often catastrophic effects. In addition to the conquest of Aquitaine, Charlemagne would conduct further campaigns of conquest in south-

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In this 14th-century illuminated manuscript, Pope Leo III is shown crowning Charlemagne as emperor at St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome in 800 CE, instituting the Holy Roman Empire. (The British Library)

western Europe. Muslim Spain began to fracture with rebellions against the central government, the leaders of which appealed to the Franks for assistance. The first expedition revealed that neither the Muslims nor the Spanish Basques could be trusted as the latter fell on the rear guard of the retreating Franks at Roncesvalles (778). This battle was immortalized in the Song of Roland, an epic poem that celebrated the fall of the most celebrated of Charlemagne’s subordinates at the battle. The initial invasion was driven by an apparent opportunity to extend and protect Christendom. The pagan Basques and Muslims proved impervious to proselytization. Subsequent campaigns across the Pyre-

nees were driven by the assessment based on this campaign that the Muslims would need to be driven from the territories. This would be the only avenue for success as they would not convert to Christianity. These later campaigns, undertaken by the king’s son Louis, established a buffer south of the Pyrenees, expelling the Muslim population and replacing them with Christianized Goths from Septimania. The Saxon Wars occupied more than 20 years of Charlemagne’s reign. Interrupted by emergencies in other areas of the realm, the Saxons were gradually conquered and converted over time. The motive for the subjugation of Saxony may originally have been undertaken for reasons of security,

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as evidenced by the willingness of the Franks to ally with pagan tribes against rebellious Christians. In the latter stages of Charlemagne’s rule, the motivation shifted to Christianizing the population, by force if necessary. Many of the conversions accomplished at sword point proved less than authentic, leading to a series of rebellions that continued even after Charlemagne’s death. While sporadic revolt still plagued the region, the elevation of Charlemagne to the title of Roman emperor appears to have made assimilation under his rule more palatable to the majority of the Saxons. The pacification of the greater portion of the Saxon lands freed the Frankish forces for campaigns against the Slavs, Avars, and in the provinces of the eastern Roman Empire bordering the Adriatic Sea. Conducted primarily to secure the southeastern flank of Christendom and the Saxon regions of the Frankish kingdom, these campaigns also transformed, in some areas, into campaigns of conversion as well. This pattern accelerated once Charlemagne assumed the title of emperor and assumed the responsibility of protecting the religious authority of the papacy in addition to the military boundaries of Christendom. In the latter stages of his reign, the campaigns were often undertaken by Bavarian and Lombard troops rather than Franks. Additionally, Charlemagne developed a system wherein his sons conducted the campaigns. Each had been given a subordinate kingdom in which armies were raised. While these armies were often employed in adjacent areas, larger campaigns were often assigned to forces that had to cross into different sections of the empire. This prevented any potential for an accumulation of military power in one area. The transformation of the rationale from basic security to religious conversion may have been, in part, an effort to inspire and motivate the levies assigned to duty far from the native territories. The campaigns of conquest came full circle from fulfillment of a religious obligation incurred by Pepin the Short and inherited by Charlemagne to a charge to protect and expand the reach of Christianity. K. J. Delamer See also Holy Roman Empire; Saxon Wars Further Reading Barbero, Alessandro. Charlemagne: Father of a Continent. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Becher, Matthias. Charlemagne. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003. Bohte, Tehmina. Charlemagne: The Life and Times of an Early Medieval Emperor. New York: Rosen Publishing Group, 2005. Collins, Roger. 1998. Charlemagne. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Einhard. The Life of Charlemagne. Translated by Samuel Epes Turner. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1880. Oman, Charles. The Dark Ages, 476–918. London: Rivingtons, 1908. Story, Joanna, ed. Charlemagne: Empire and Society. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005.

Chemosh Chemosh is a deity associated primarily with the Moabites of the Bible and other early writings. Like other principal deities, Chemosh is characterized as being responsible for the well-being of his followers, especially in times of distress such as famine, disease, and military threat from enemies. It is in the latter role that he is prominent in both the biblical narratives and in the one inscription of any length in the Moabite language, a stela of Mesha, king of Moab, from the mid-ninth century BCE. According to the Bible, the land of Moab—just east of the Dead Sea—had become tributary to Israel, probably under King Ahab of Israel (2 Kings 1:1), and then achieved independence during the reign of Ahab’s successor, King Joram (852–841), assisted by King Jehoshaphat of Judah and the unnamed king of Edom (2 Kings 3:4–12). According to the Moabite version, Mesha attributes to Chemosh success in battle. The stela opens with Mesha’s declaration of his fealty to Chemosh. Speaking of a worship center he states, “I built this high place for Chemosh in Qarhoh, a high place of salvation, because he delivered me from all assaults, and because he let me see my desire upon all my adversaries.” Of special interest to the Old Testament, he boasts that Chemosh had spoken to him: “Go take Nebo from Israel. So I went by night, and fought against it from break of dawn till noon; and I took it and slew all in it, seven thousand men and women, both natives and aliens, and female slaves; for I had devoted it to Ashtar-Chemosh.” The importance of Chemosh

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as a warrior god is evident from the fact that the text of only some 34 lines refers to him at least 12 times. Chemosh was also well known in the Hebrew literature as the national god of Moab. His name occurs eight times in the Old Testament, three times in Kings and Jeremiah each, and once in Numbers and in Judges. Though the biblical spokesmen knew that such a deity did not exist in reality, Jephthah the judge sarcastically conceded that just as Yahweh had given Canaan to Israel, so Chemosh had given the Moabites their territory (Judges 11:24). Nevertheless, Israel had settled in Moab, thus showing Yahweh’s power and his disdain for the Moabite god. Shamefully, Solomon, hundreds of years later, erected a shrine to Chemosh to pacify one of his pagan wives. The historian describes this imaginary deity as a “detestable idol” (1 Kings 11:7; cf. 2 Kings 23:13). The adjective used to describe this particular image presents Chemosh as something abhorrent or even monstrous, a polemic clearly designed to dismiss such a so-called god as too ugly to be taken seriously. The biblical account presents Israel’s god Yahweh as incomparable, well able to overcome Moab’s so-called god and Mesha’s armies. The prophet Elisha pronounced to King Joram that Yahweh would produce a miraculous supply of water without rain, enough to sustain the Israelite troops and their animals. Then he said, “This is but an easy thing in the sight of Yahweh; [as a mighty Warrior] he will also deliver the Moabites into your hand” (2 Kings 3:18). The great victory that ensued certified this claim (vv. 24–27). Eugene H. Merrill See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of; Yahweh as Divine Warrior Further Reading Albright, W. F. “The Moabite Stone.” In James B. Pritchard, ed. Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955. Arnold, Bill T., and Bryan E. Beyer, eds. Readings from the Ancient Near East. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2002. Smelik, K. A. D. “The Inscription of King Mesha.” In William Hallo and K. Lawson Young, Jr., eds. The Context of Scripture. Vol. 2. Leiden: Brill, 2000. Smelik, Klaas A. D. “Kemosh Was Angry with His Land.” In Writings from Ancient Israel. Louisville: Westminster, 1991.

Ullendorff, E. “The Moabite Stone.” In Documents from Old Testament Times. London: Thomas Nelson, 1958.

Christian Daimyo Christianity arrived in Japan in 1549 in the person of the Jesuit missionary Francis Xavier. Encouraged by initial success on Japan’s southernmost island of Kyushu, he decided to make his way to Japan’s capital, Kyoto, only to discover that an audience with either the emperor of Japan or the shogun, who supposedly ruled Japan on the emperor’s behalf, was out of the question. Xavier reluctantly returned to Kyushu, where he was forced to rethink his plan of action and soon realized that the key to successful mission work in Japan was to make converts of the daimyo (feudal lords), as they were then in a position to order all in their fiefs to follow suit and convert to the new faith. Civil war was rife and many of the daimyo ruled their territories as petty princes whose power allowed them to ignore the existence of the shogun and the emperor. Local daimyo were free to determine local policy, and the lure of trade with these foreigners was a great incentive. In 1551 Xavier made his second visit to Ouchi Yoshitaka, a daimyo whom he had already identified as a key figure. His first visit to Ouchi’s capital of Yamaguchi, when Xavier had behaved almost as a supplicant, had been a failure. The second attempt, when he turned up dressed as an ambassador and bearing gifts and credentials, had a very positive effect. The Jesuits were allotted a vacant Buddhist monastery and allowed both to preach and to convert. Unfortunately for the mission, Yoshitaka was overthrown in a coup, and the Jesuit church in Yamaguchi became a Buddhist temple once again. The mission fared better with Otomo Sorin in Bungo Province. In 1578, in return for a little help with his marital problems, Sorin accepted baptism and became one of the most prominent of Japan’s Christian daimyo. He proclaimed that his subjects “would all have to become Christians and live with each other in brotherly love and concord.” To help the brotherly love on its way, Sorin instituted a policy of persecution of Buddhist and Shinto priests and the destruction of their property. He was

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currently expanding his territories into Hyuga Province, where such havoc was pursued even more intensely than in his home province. We do not have an eyewitness account of these activities, but they probably differed little from the actions of his fellow Christian daimyo Antonio Koteda, who “had no greater pleasure in the world than to see them pull down idols out of the temples and houses, and burn them and throw them into the sea.” When Otomo Sorin died, the Christian influence in Bungo started to fade, and the focus of activity with the daimyo shifted to Hizen Province and the city and harbor of Nagasaki. It was ruled by Omura Sumitada, whose family was faced with almost certain extinction at the hands of his rival Ryuzoji Takanobu. Both Sumitada and his Jesuit friends who used the harbor realised that if the Omura domain succumbed to the pagan Ryuzoji, then precious Nagasaki would be lost with him. In 1574 four Portuguese ships had come to the rescue of Omura Sumitada in one of these actions, and the grateful Sumitada undertook the conversion to Christianity of his entire domain, which was to remain the heartland of the Jesuits’ mission until 1606. Unfortunately, this did not immediately guarantee Sumitada’s security because Takanobu invaded Sumitada’s lands in 1577 and 1578. Faced with losing their great ally to vassalage under a pagan lord, the Jesuits made an extraordinary deal and Sumitada ceded to them the port of Nagasaki. Nagasaki therefore became something unique on Japanese soil: a European colony in all but name. The terms of the gift specified that the Jesuits had full jurisdiction over it, and by the end of 1581 Nagasaki had been surrounded by a rammed earth wall and wooden palisades and armed with a few small cannons formerly sent as presents to Omura Sumitada. Portuguese families were encouraged to settle in Nagasaki and were told that in times of attack they would be invited into the shelter of the fortifications. Nagasaki was to remain a center of European influence on Japan long after the Christian missionaries had gone, because the sole Dutch trading post after the expulsion was to be set up on Dejima, an island in Nagasaki harbor. Arima Harunobu, a contemporary and near neighbor of the Omura, is also popularly celebrated as one of the great Christian daimyo, although Harunobu’s conversion had been somewhat opportunistic. Upon inheriting the territory from his father Yoshisada in 1576, Harunobu had

embarked upon a persecution of the numerous Christians who had followed Yoshisada’s example of baptism. It was only when Harunobu found himself in desperate straits as a result of aggression by Ryuzoji Takanobu that Harunobu accepted baptism in return for generous military support from the Jesuits. Receiving the Christian name of Protasio, Harunobu applied himself with equal zeal to the persecution of any remaining pagans in his territory. His positive contribution was the founding of the Arima seminary, the Jesuits’ first formal educational institution in Japan. One of the most prominent Christian daimyo of all was Konishi Yukinaga. Born probably in 1558 in Kyoto, he was the son of an influential merchant who specialized in goods such as medicinal herbs and saltpetre. Harunobu and Yukinaga were also renowned as two of the most important Christian leaders in Japan, although if the Jesuit records are to be believed, neither accepted personal baptism until 1584. Such a delay was not unusual, and both may be regarded as having already been Christian believers through their actions and support for their fellow Christians prior to their full acceptance into the church. Konishi Yukinaga prospered as a merchant, a negotiator, and a general, placing each role at the disposal in turn of the unifier of Japan, Oda Nobunaga, and his successor Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Yukinaga’s military skills included those of naval warfare, and he eventually acquired the fief of Shodojima, a large island in the Inland Sea from where he could combine his naval expertise and business acumen in a way that greatly benefited Hideyoshi’s expansionist plans. Yukinaga’s naval expertise was put to further good use during the conquest of Kyushu in 1587. This was when Christian persecution began, but Yukinaga ensured his survival as a Christian leader because as a general, an administrator, and a master of commerce to Hideyoshi, he had placed himself in a position where he was indispensable. His faith was put to the test during the siege of Hondo Castle in 1590, where he was allied with the anti-Christian daimyo Kato Kiyomasa. The garrison was full of Christian rebels, and the desperate nature of the defense allowed Kiyomasa to make little immediate impression on the castle, so Konishi Yukinaga had to bring reinforcements. While he waited in the siege lines for an order to follow into the attack, Kiyomasa and the other commanders began a major assault. The defenders made their confessions to the

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priests before going into battle as stray bullets whizzed past their heads. Konishi Yukinaga appears to have taken no part in the fighting until he was requested to attack the back gate. He then delayed his assault so as to give the defenders time to escape or may even have arranged an evacuation. Even though 1,300 of the defenders of Hondo were killed in the battle, Yukinaga had allowed the gates on his side of the castle to be opened for safe conduct, thus saving the lives of a further 1,000 Christians who would otherwise have been slaughtered by Kato Kiyomasa’s troops. Konishi Yukinaga eventually perished after the battle of Sekigahara in 1600 where he had chosen to oppose the eventual victor, Tokugawa Ieyasu. Under Ieyasu’s new regime, the persecution of Christians began again. The authorities sought always to make their victims apostatise so as to discredit the faith, and one by one the former Christian daimyo succumbed. Many abandoned their faith; others were forced into exile, among whom was the prominent Christian leader Takayama Ukon, who sought refuge in Manila. When European priests were expelled from Japan and banned from reentering, the role of defending and continuing the Christian faith fell to lower class farmers and merchants, who would heroically keep Christianity going as an underground church, abandoned by the shortlived support of Japan’s Christian daimyo. Stephen Turnbull See also Jesuits; Konishi Yukinaga; Martyrs, Jesuit Further Reading Boxer, Charles Ralph. The Christian Century in Japan: 1549– 1650. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. Moran, J. F. The Japanese and the Jesuits: Alessandro Valignano in Sixteenth Century Japan. New York: Routledge, 1993. Petrucci, Maria Grazia. “In the Name of the Father, the Son and the Islands of the Gods: A Reappraisal of Konishi Ryusa, a Merchant, and of Konishi Yukinaga, a Christian Samurai, in Sixteenth-Century Japan.” MA thesis, The Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of British Columbia, 2002. Samuel, Lee. Understanding Japan through the Eyes of Christian Faith. Diemen, Netherlands: Foundation University Press, 2009. Turnbull, Stephen. Japan’s Hidden Christians. Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 2000. Turnbull, Stephen. Samurai Invasion. Japan’s Korean War 1592– 1598. London: Cassell, 2002.

Christianity and War Christian responses to war are on a spectrum ranging from absolute rejection to full participation in war with proclamations of divine authority and blessing. Throughout its 2,000-year history, Christians have justified, rationalized, restrained, and informed the act of war and the conduct of warfare. They have, in various times and by various means, upheld and departed from consensual standards as well as debating and denying the existence of such standards. Both ecclesiastical and secular leaders have appealed to biblical teachings for personal and national guidance and support with respect to war. Central to the Christian understanding of war is a belief in the broken nature of humanity that is rooted conceptually in the biblical story of the fall from grace of Adam and Eve as recorded in the creation narrative of Genesis chapters 1 to 3—all of humanity and every aspect of personal and corporate life are marred by original sin and sin. The sinful nature corrupts international relations as well as interpersonal relations. For Christians, war is ultimately a reflection of the consequences of sin. Wars are fought on battlefields, but are waged first in human hearts. The question for Christians regarding participation in war is whether war in all cases is avoidable. For the Christian pacifist, the answer to the question is yes, while for just war proponents, the answer is no. The death, destruction, horrors, personal and property losses of war are real. For Christians to think about issues of war is to struggle with the problem of evil. While there has not been unanimity of thought regarding the participation of Christians in war, recognition of the tragedy of war has been normative in Christian thinking. There is disagreement among historians of Christianity regarding the position of the early church toward war and military service. In the first century there was a general avoidance of military service by Christians. However, the reason for this was not necessarily pacifism and an abhorrence of war. Rather, there was an abstaining from many social, commercial, and political activities in the expectation of belief by Christians in the imminent Second Coming of Christ in an apocalyptic event. It was not so much pacifism as it was an otherworldly expectation—the expectation of the coming of Christ’s kingdom rather than acceptance of Caesar’s already present earthly kingdom. It was not necessarily

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explicitly violence and war as it was the affairs of the world that were to be shunned by Christians due to eschatological expectations. During the second and third centuries there was a mixture of participation and pacifism. There was a plurality of views. There were also other social and religious reasons for not participating in the military. Persecution of Christians because of their faith and because they were seen as unsupportive of the Roman state was frequent. For many Christians, service would have been difficult. Some of the rejection of military service in the early church was not an embrace of pacifism, but a rejection of what Christians believed to be idolatrous practices within the Roman army. Yet, in spite of pagan religious practices in the Roman army, it contained some Christians and in at least one legion, the Legio Fulminata (“Thundering Legion”), Christians may have been a majority. There is evidence that from 173 CE onward there were significant numbers of Christians in the military despite occasional attempts to purge them. There are clear statements by early Christian theologians against military service. Both Tertullian (ca. 160–225 CE), arguing against military service on the grounds of idolatry, and Origen (185–254 CE), arguing against it because killing is not the way of Christ, reject Christian participation in the military. Other voices include Cyprian, Clement of Alexandria, and Hippolytus. There are also records of Christians in military service who became martyrs because of their Christianity. The early Christians—bishops and laypeople, monks and magistrates—agonized over war and if and when it is right to participate or not participate, just as Christians have continued to do ever since. Because of this, a consensual Christian understanding of the ethics of war and peace through the ages can be seen to emerge. This wider consensus is located in the just war perspective—a perspective that unites thinkers in the Christian moral tradition from Ambrose and Augustine (fourth and early fifth centuries), medieval thinkers such as Gratian, Alexander of Hales, and Thomas Aquinas, 16th-century Protestant reformers such as Martin Luther and John Calvin, early modern theorists such as Francisco Vitoria, Francisco Suárez, Hugo Grotius, and John Locke, to modern theorists such as John Courtney Murray, Paul Ramsey, William V. O’Brien, James Turner Johnson, and Jean Bethke Elshtain.

Properly understood, the just war tradition—and it is precisely this, namely, a moral tradition—understands itself as a mediating or moderating position between two ideological poles that are absolutist in their attitude toward coercive force. Although not all just war proponents argue from a position of Christianity, the just war tradition is rooted historically in Christian thought even though there are nonreligious representations of it today. On the one hand, the militarist—whether secular (sometimes called the “political realist”) or religious (the crusader or jihadist)—views war and coercive force as justifiable under any circumstance. No moral restraints beyond political expediency or the “command of God” need be applied. On the other hand stands the pacifist. Given the untold suffering and bloodshed caused by violence and war, the pure or principled pacifist believes that war and coercive force can never serve just purposes; they are to be rejected under any and all circumstances. The just war position, an expression of consensual Christian thinking about war and peace through the ages, seeks to mediate this tension. As a form of “Christian realism,” it rejects the line of reasoning either that nothing in the way of coercive force is ever permissible or that everything is. War is both permissible and limitable and thus must be subject to severe qualification. At its base, just war thinking proceeds with a presumption not against war or coercive force per se but against injustice. It expresses itself in an ethics of protection that is undergirded by the wedding of charity and justice, both of which virtues are universal in their prescription and rooted in the conviction of human dignity. Thomas Aquinas, in his famous treatment of the subject in Question 40 of II–II of his Summa Theologica, frames the question by asking: “Is it always sinful to wage war?” The framing of the question in this manner suggests that Thomas is responding to standard religious objections of his own day. His response is that three things are required for a war to be “just”: just cause, legitimate authority, and right intention. These three elements are the primary criteria from which traditional discourse on the justice of going to war (Latin: jus ad bellum) proceeds. The second broader category of just war doctrine, justice in prosecuting war (Latin: jus in bello), entails two chief criteria: discrimination (= noncombatant immunity) and proportionality. Yet

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a third category, justice in the aftermath of conflict (jus post bellum), has received considerable attention in the last decade. In the 1500s, Martin Luther found it necessary during the era of the Reformation to address this very question in his important tract “Whether Soldiers, Too Can Be Saved.” His response was that Christians may engage in public service such as military service, since without such vocations the world would descend into utter chaos. To ask if Christians are permitted to fight in a war is to ask whether Christians are permitted to use coercive force in any context. This, of course, is to ask whether Christians are permitted to enter vocations that contribute to the common good or maintain justice. This includes not only military service but a broad array of civil and public service positions. There are no biblical injunctions prohibiting any particular vocations per se. The Christian scriptures do, however, counsel with regard to motives and intentions, condemning that which is selfish, unjust, or malevolent. Thus, for example, Christ’s teaching found in the so-called “Sermon on the Mount” and St. Paul’s teaching in the New Testament in Romans 12, both of which address the matter of retaliation, speak to matters of the heart and not statecraft. Specifically, Jesus’s teaching in the New Testament in Matthew 5 regarding the slap of the cheek—a text frequently used to justify ideological pacifist nonresistance and the rejection of coercive force—is addressing insult, not assault; it speaks to matters of private conscience, not matters of public policy. Evidence of this is found in the text itself. While the Christian pacifist is not required to use force in self-defense, the Christian is obligated to defend an innocent third party by appropriate and just means. This, after all, is a duty of charity and has become part of the ethics of protection and idea of the responsibility to protect, known in the contemporary international arena as “R2P.” Notwithstanding the idealistic appeal of religious pacifism, coercive force can be used for just and moral purposes, as not only just war theorists but also law enforcement officers and agencies well know and experience on a daily basis. One particular part of Christendom that remains pacifistic is the Anabaptist tradition. Part of the wider Protestant Reformation of the 16th century, Anabaptists confessed from the beginning that the sword was not to be

Basics of Christianity

Christianity is the world’s largest religion with more than 2.4 billion adherents or about one-third of the world’s population of 7 billion. Like Judaism and Islam, it is a monotheistic religion. Its practitioners are called Christians and its central tenet is that Jesus of Nazareth, known to Christians as Jesus Christ, is the eternal Son of God and the promised and prophesied Messiah of the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament). Jesus’s birth, life, ministry, death, and resurrection are recounted in the 27 writings that comprise the New Testament. Christians believe that Jesus came to earth to bring salvation and eternal life to all who affirm his teachings. Christianity was founded in the first century CE. The three largest groups of Christians are divided into the Roman Catholic Church, the Eastern Orthodox Church, and various groups within Protestantism. Christianity is a global religion that affirms the existence of three distinct and eternally coexisting and equal persons who comprise the Trinity—God the Father, God the Son (Jesus Christ), and God the Holy Spirit. Throughout the centuries, the teachings of Christianity have been articulated and affirmed in numerous ecumenical councils and creeds. The most well known of the creeds are the Apostles’ Creed and the Nicene Creed.

wielded by believers. In large part this theological stance was the result of the tragic fact that both Roman Catholics and fellow Protestant reformers used the sword against them; hence, the language of the “ban” in Article 6 of the early 16th-century Schleitheim Confession. Consequently, the standard Anabaptist account of the early church’s attitude toward military service and war—an account that religious pacifists in general share together—is grounded in certain baseline assumptions: • That a “faithful” reading of the Sermon on the Mount prohibits Christians from serving in the military • That military service and warfare were condemned from the beginning because of bloodshed • That the silence of early patristic voices is evidence that Christians were not participating

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• That the ante-Nicene church fathers—and the two principal pacifist fathers, Tertullian and Origen, in particular—offer us a uniformly negative testimony of Christian participation • That by the late fourth century, the church’s progressive decline in moral purity was advanced to the point that we may speak of its “fall,” its being “coopted,” its being the unwitting handmaiden of the state This sketch, it should be emphasized, is simplistic and ignores countervailing patristic evidence during the early Christian centuries. Recent ongoing historical scholarship has adjusted this painting of early Christian attitudes (and of Constantine, for that matter), yielding a more nuanced and accurate portrait, indicating greater diversity than many thought, and confirming the presence of Christians in the Roman legions by the mid- to late second century— a fact of which the two main pacifist church fathers, Tertullian and Origen, seem to be aware. We may conclude that any reservations about military service, thus, are at most prudential and not absolute moral proscriptions, which is why soldiers qua soldiers are never excommunicated from the church or refused the sacraments. While the just war position shares pacifism’s commitment to peace, it acknowledges the potential for the existence of an unjust peace, as exists, say, within the Mafia or among terrorists or tyrants in order to plunder others; therefore, peace must be justly ordered. The reason for the just war tradition’s nuanced and qualified view of force lies in its underlying philosophical foundation, namely, its wedding of justice and charity (or neighbor-love), which gives it its unique ethical character. Christians believe that charity must motivate all that is done, including the application of coercive force, as the tradition maintains. This commitment to right intention, requiring the confluence of justice and charity, bestows on it a distinctly Christian imprimatur, which comports with the Christian church’s mainstream teaching. Throughout the history of Christianity, thinking about war from a perspective of Christian ethics and Christian theology has meant that individual Christians, groups, and denominations have wrestled with ideas and values that are upheld because they were believed to be greater than any individual, nation, or era. In the early modern era, the contributions of Christian thinkers on war such as Francisco

de Vitoria (ca. 1483–1546), Suarez (1548–1617), or Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) was enormous in the development of law and international relations. Currently, contributions of Christian ethics with regard to war include, at the most basic level, an approach to international law grounded in universal “laws of humanity” (originally rooted in natural law theory), by which international relations might be governed, and concomitantly, clearly defined rules of international law for the conduct of war. Christian voices across the political spectrum have been central to the development of Western ideas about ethics and war. Christianity proceeds on the assumption that war and coercive force are ultimately a matter of policy, and policy is ultimately determined not by the church but by representative government. Herein Christianity distinguishes itself, for example, from Islam, whose theocratic foundations fail to acknowledge the distinction between “Caesar” and “God” in the way that Jesus himself taught as recorded in the New Testament books of Matthew 22:21 and Mark 12:17. While on the one hand Jesus desacralizes political power by relativizing its claims over him (John 18:28–42 and 19:11), he does not deny its place. Nor does he fuse religion and political power. Both realms, the spiritual and the political, coexist and are distinct realms. The teaching of the New Testament is that the sword must justify itself. Caesar and God are not the same. J. Daryl Charles and Timothy J. Demy See also Aquinas, Thomas; Augustine; Calvin, John; Charlemagne’s Conquests; Crusades (Overview); Just War Tradition; Luther, Martin; Militarism, Religious; Saxon Wars; Wars of the Reformation Further Reading Charles, J. Daryl, and Timothy J. Demy. War, Peace, and Christianity: Questions and Answers from a Just-War Perspective. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Publications, 2010. Demy, Timothy J. “War.” In Robert L. Brawley, ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Bible and Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Hashimi, Sohail. Just Wars, Holy Wars, and Jihads: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Encounters and Exchanges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Helgeland, John, Robert J. Daly, and J. Patout Burns. Christians and the Military: The Early Experience. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985.

182  Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Holmes, Arthur F., ed. War and Christian Ethics: Classic and Contemporary Readings on the Morality of War. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2005. Johnson, James Turner. Morality and Contemporary Warfare. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999. O’Donovan, Oliver. The Just War Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Partner, Peter. God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997. Thomas, Heath A, Jeremy Evans, and Paul Copain, eds. Holy War in the Bible: Christian Morality and an Old Testament Problem. Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press Academic, 2013.

Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Christians in sub-Saharan Africa constitute about 65 percent of the population. Although Muslims are estimated to be 30 percent of the population in the same region, when you add the dominant Muslim population in North Africa, there is no doubt that both Islam and Christianity have commanding population dominance on the continent of Africa. The history of the relationship of Christians and Muslims in Africa is complex and varied, as evidenced in the continent’s different geopolitical, cultural, historical, and colonial experiences. Therefore, to justifiably broach this topic, it is imperative to acknowledge these differences and experiences. The geopolitical divisions of Africa are as follows: North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and Southern Africa. Except for countries in North Africa, Ethiopia, and parts of Eritrea, all of sub-Saharan Africa received Christianity through missionary activities that were largely funded and supported by European colonial authorities. Conversely, Christian missionaries were substantially effective instruments of the colonial governments toward securing the submission and loyalty of native Africans to the foreign dominance of European colonizers. These facts significantly underscore the defining moments of Christian-Muslim relationships and eventual conflicts. Many Muslims in different parts of postcolonial Africa continue to see Christianity as an extension of colonial or Western

governments. This also explains some of the hostilities that prevail in Christian-Muslim relationships in different parts of Africa, especially in Northern Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, and Sudan.

North Africa

The first Christian-Muslim conflict in this region began in the seventh century when Muslims invaded Egypt and subsequently other North African countries. For the most part, Muslims had very little resistance from Christians in most parts of North Africa. One of the reasons is that although Christianity was the official religion in these parts of Africa, a significant number of the indigenous people of these countries were considered by either the Roman or the Byzantine empires as uncivilized people, who fit into the broad category of pagans or barbarians. In addition, when Islam took over different parts of North Africa, many of the local Christians welcomed their presence, because it relieved the pressure of conformity required of them by the Byzantine Church. In particular, Coptic Christians in Egypt facilitated and appreciated the overthrow of the Byzantine authorities in Egypt by the Islamic invaders. Muslim leadership did not pay attention to the differences of faith between the Copts and the mainline Christianity of either the Roman or Byzantine churches. Moreover, Muslims for their part were unequivocal about not demanding the conversion to Islam of the Copts. But the latter were required to pay the dhimmi tax and other additional property taxes to keep their religion. The Copts preferred paying the taxes to the persecution and rejection they experienced from the Byzantine and Roman churches. The tension and negativity Coptic Christians of Egypt later experienced from their largely Muslim neighbors gradually transpired into violent attacks. Such attacks became more rampant and vicious as Egypt experienced control and colonization by European powers beginning in the 19th century. However, the nationalist movement in Egypt that was initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s attracted many Coptic Christians, who like their Muslim neighbors were opposed to political control by the European colonial authorities. There have been ongoing attacks against Coptic Christians and their churches in different parts of Egypt with the growing political influence

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Coptic Christianity

Coptic Christians, known as Copts, are a religious group found primarily in North Africa and parts of the Middle East. In total, Copts at the start of the 21st century number approximately 15 million people. Most Copts live in Egypt, but Coptic Christian churches can also be found in the United States. Copts are also the largest Christian denomination in Libya and Sudan. Christianity was the religion of the vast majority of people living in North Africa prior to the spread of Islam across the area, known as the Maghreb, in the 8th through the 10th centuries CE. Coptic Christians were the first to establish monasteries, and the entire monastic tradition within Christianity can be traced to Egyptian roots. Historically, Copts spoke a unique Coptic language, but this language is rarely used today, and Copts in Egypt and the Middle East speak Arabic. Copts in Egypt and Sudan constitute the largest Christian communities in those nations; in fact, Coptic Christians in Egypt account for about 10 percent of the country’s population. Percentages of the population in Libya and Sudan are less than 3 percent, with Islam making up the largest share of religious affiliation in those countries. Copts have faced discrimination in Egypt in modern times; discrimination and persecution intensified following the Arab Spring of 2011 and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood represented by the ascension of Mohammed Morsi to power. Copts and other Christians in Africa and the Middle East will face growing challenges as Christianity and Islam compete for adherents in times of increasing economic and political uncertainty. of the Salafi Islamic ideology and the Muslim Brotherhood. Currently, Coptic Christians make up only about 10 percent of the Egyptian population, which is a huge drop from their pre-Islamic population in Egypt. Sudan is one country in North Africa that has experienced continued tension and conflict in Christian-Muslim relationships. The Sudanese demography consists of people of Arab ancestry, most of whom are Muslims, and people of African descent who are mostly African Traditionalists or

Christians. The old country of Sudan is now split into the Republic of the Sudan and South Sudan. Prior to the split in 2011 the former country experienced two different civil wars (1956–1972 and 1983–2005), each of which was precipitated by the introduction of the sharia legal system in the country’s constitution. The Christian minority, who largely come from the south, felt alienated by the preponderance of state law in the Islamic legal system. Even with the split of the former Sudan into two countries, MuslimChristian tension exists actively in the Republic of the Sudan. The population of Christians in North Africa has gone through steady decline due to the Islamic sharia policies regarding conversion, inheritance, and taxation, which put pressure on Christians to convert to Islam. The situation has been further worsened with the growing effect of militant Islamic threats and attacks on Christian communities. While Coptic Christians in Egypt continue to draw strength from the growing call for religious freedom in Egypt and the support of the international community, the presence of Christians in other parts of North Africa is often merely symbolic, reflected in the marginal numbers of Christian immigrants from Europe, Asia, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

West Africa

All of West Africa was colonized in the 19th century by, especially, France and Great Britain. However, the Portuguese colonized Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, while the Germans colonized parts of modern-day Cameroon and Chad (the Germans lost their African colonies following Germany’s defeat in the First World War). The different colonial authorities in some of these countries of West Africa, as in other parts of Africa, significantly impacted or defined ChristianMuslim relations. For instance, in the early years of French colonization of Senegal, the Christian missionaries had more appreciation for the local animists than the Muslims, as the former provided a more successful response to the quest for proselytes by Christian missionaries. It is pertinent to recall that after the French Revolution, religion (especially Christianity) lost its absolute control over the French social and political structure. As a result, Christian missionaries in many French colonial territories had to contend more with the French colonial officials’ restrictions on their missionary

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goals than the resistance they faced from local Muslims. In both French and British territories, the norm was to discourage Christian evangelization of Muslims. Except for Northern Nigeria and currently in some parts of the Niger Republic and Mali, most Christians and Muslims in West Africa have cordial relationships. The case of Northern Nigeria is further complicated by economic, social, cultural, and political factors. With the jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio, which created the Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th century, Islam in Northern Nigeria took on a puritanical approach, similar to Wahhabism and Salafism. Such puritanism would thrive in what became Northern Nigeria and eventually metamorphosed into the present-day radical fundamentalist Islam that perceives Christianity and its growth in Northern Nigeria as inimical to Islam. This mindset crystallized into random violent attacks targeting churches, Christian businesses, and Christian residences in different parts of Northern Nigeria beginning in the late 1970s to the 21st century. As the violent attacks on Christians became more incessant, there were also ongoing tensions and even counterviolence among Muslims of different tariqa or brotherhoods (especially between Tijjaniya and Qadariya), as well as between other Islamic sects. However, the violence against Christians attracts more national and global interest. Due to the political and cultural factors affecting the Muslim-Christian relationship in Northern Nigeria, among residents of Northern Nigeria who identify as Christians (most of whom belong to different ethnic groups than the Muslims, who are predominantly of Hausa-Fulani ethnicity) there arose a surge of ethnic political development operating under the guise of Christian social political activism, which waged ethnically motivated conflicts against the Hausa-Fulani ethnicity. Some of these conflicts resulted in the Kafanchan crisis of 1987, Zango-Kataf riots of 1992, Bauchi riots of 1991, Yelwa riots of 2002–2004, and the Jos crisis of 2001–2013. Twelve northern states in Nigeria since 1999 have adopted the sharia legal system in addition to the federal constitution. Although the application of sharia jurisprudence varies from one state to another, its strict application is also varied. However, the existence of such jurisprudence has been at the center of different conflicts between Christians (who are

generally opposed to it) and Muslims in different parts of Northern Nigeria. There have been different violent riots between Muslims and Christians resulting from the sharia legislation in different Northern Nigerian cities. The rise of Boko Haram from the eastern part of Northern Nigeria has put a different spin on existing MuslimChristian conflicts and the general atmosphere surrounding militant Islamic extremism. Boko Haram has brutally attacked Christians and Muslims alike, as well as public places and government establishments. Therefore, while Boko Haram is not exclusively against Christianity, it is the latest phenomenon arising from the incessant MuslimChristian conflicts as well as Muslim-Muslim conflicts in Northern Nigeria. At the national level, there have been attacks against Muslims or Northern Nigerian interests, especially in parts of Southeastern Nigeria. These attacks are often described as revenge attacks for the casualties suffered by Igbos from Southeastern Nigeria who live in Northern Nigerian cities, following attacks by Muslim extremists. Southeastern Nigeria is dominantly Christian. It should, however, be noted that the Western Nigerian region has significant Muslim and Christian populations who generally have coexisted peacefully and collaboratively. It is necessary to reiterate that most Muslims and Christians of West Africa live peacefully together. It is also important to highlight that Christian-Muslim relations in places like Senegal, Gambia, and Sierra Leone with large or dominant Muslim populations generally live peacefully. The same is true in Northern Ghana, Burkina Faso, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Benin Republic where Muslims and Christians live side by side with each other.

Central Africa

One of the flashpoints of Christian-Muslim conflicts today in Africa is the Central African Republic (CAR). The political developments based on ethnic differences in that country have eventually appropriated the weak link of religion to generate some of the most vicious and inhumane attacks between Muslims and Christians in that country. The current violent conflict started after a group of Muslim soldiers took power through a coup d’état in 2013, overthrowing the civilian government led by a Christian, and

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then attacked some non-Muslim villages. The violent attacks of the Saleka against non-Muslims set in motion what became a major sectarian crisis. Given the Christian majority of the country, Muslims have been hugely outnumbered and viciously attacked by both Christians and African Traditionalists. This development has led to a mass wave of refugees, some of whom are fleeing to Chad, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Republic of Congo for safety. However, in most other Central African countries, Christian-Muslim conflict is minimal or nonexistent due to the small minority populations of Muslims in those countries. Therefore, the Christian-Muslim adversarial polemic, which is often fanned into violent conflicts between people of the two religions, has not successfully crystalized in most Central African countries, except in the CAR.

East Africa

In countries of East Africa, Muslim-Christian relationships can be said to be generally peaceful except in Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Northern Uganda. Al Shabaab, a terrorist organization that originated in Somalia, has raised the tension level between Christians and Muslims in different parts of East Africa in the last several years through their attacks. However, it is important to underscore that Muslims in Kenya, given their minority status in a country whose population is about 80 percent Christian, consider themselves oppressed and have expressed that experience publicly. The attacks of Al Shabaab in Kenya exploit existing tension between Christians and Muslims, hence further straining their relationship. The frosty relationship between Muslims and Christians in Kenya is not only because of Islamic radicalization of the youth in Kenya but also because of the growth of Christian fundamentalism, which intensifies religious intolerance in the country. East Africa has large Muslim populations in Tanzania (especially in Zanzibar), Djibouti, Comoros, Malawi, Mozambique, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. The relationship between Christians and Muslims is quite cordial in most parts of these countries and the other parts of the region. However, recent violent activities by Islamic militants often threaten the peaceful relationship between Muslims and Christians in the region.

Southern Africa

In Southern Africa, due to the low demographics of Muslims and the history of apartheid, Christian-Muslim conflict in the region is quite minimal and is not as much of an issue as it is in other parts of Africa. Indeed, the Christian-Muslim relationship has a unique dynamic. While there have been more instances of conflict among Christians in Southern Africa on the basis of racial differences, interestingly there has been more collaboration between black African Christians and Muslims against apartheid and racial discrimination. Most Muslims in South Africa emigrated from Asia. In conclusion, while Christians and Muslims in Africa, for the most part, live peacefully, there are areas of Africa that have become hot spots of conflict and violence. These include Northern Nigeria, Republic of Sudan, Central African Republic, and Kenya. The conflicts in these parts of Africa continue to make headline news across the world. The escalation of conflict and its frequency between Christians and Muslims in Africa has been boosted by the growing impact of extremist Islam and its financial support from many Middle Eastern countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as militant Muslim support from Muslimmajority countries like Pakistan, Egypt, and Libya. The most widespread and toxic of these foreign supports and influences is Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia. This brand of Islam is puritanical, militant, and extremist. It is exponentially earning global outreach largely contingent on its huge reserves of financial resources and ideologues. This brand of Islam continues to exploit emotionally vulnerable, gullible, economically challenged, and criminally inclined Muslims in different parts of Africa, conscripting them into the new phenomenon of Islamic extremism. These recruits, who often describe themselves as mujahideen, form the nucleus, tributaries, and infantry of growing terrorist and militant Islamic organizations across Africa. It is imperative at this juncture to acknowledge that the relationship between Muslims and Christians in Africa is both complex and fluid. This is because in many cases they live as family members, friends, and neighbors as well as business partners and political associates. Yet, in some cases and while in the same spatial context, they live as vicious opponents, biased against each other, and consider each other as foes. But because they have to coexist due to

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habitat and cultural proximity, and the need to guarantee political and economic security in their common geopolitical contexts, they invariably have to evolve the best ways to peacefully coexist. It is necessary that African Muslims and Christians understand and appreciate that being neighbors, they owe it to each other, to themselves, and to posterity to promote and support peaceful coexistence. Conflicts persist when people focus on the things that tear them apart and narrowly identify the causes of conflicts exclusively in the other. Marinus Iwuchukwu See also Al Shabaab; Boko Haram; Jos Riots; Liberian Civil Wars; Muslim Brotherhood; Second Sudanese Civil War Further Reading Falola, Toyin, and Adebayo O. Oyebade. Hot Spot: Sub-Saharan Africa. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2010. Foster, Elisabeth A. Faith in Empire: Religion, Politics, and Colonial Rule in French Senegal, 1880–1940. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013. Haron, Muhammed. The Dynamics of Christian-Muslim Relations in South Africa (ca. 1960–2000)—From Exclusivism to Pluralism. Sweden: Uppsala Universitetstryckeriet, 2006. Iwuchukwu, Marinus. Muslim-Christian Dialogue in Postcolonial Northern Nigeria: The Challenges of Inclusive Cultural and Religious Pluralism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Levtzion, Nehemia, and Randall L. Pouwels. The History of Islam in Africa. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000. Sanneh, Lamin. Piety & Power: Muslims and Christians in West Africa. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996. Sharkey, Heather J. “Middle Eastern and North African Christianity: Persisting in the Lands of Islam.” In Charles E. Farhadian, ed. Introducing World Christianity. Oxford: Blackwell, 2012. Soares, Benjamin F. Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa. Leiden: Brill Academic, 2006.

Christian-Muslim Wars in Spain Muslims and Christians fought over control of the Iberian Penninsula for almost 800 years. These wars were defined

by constantly shifting allegiances and competing interests. The first Muslim armies, representing the Umayyad caliphate (661–750), arrived in Spain in the seventh century CE. General Tarik ibn Ziyad, a freed slave from the Arab governor Musa ibn Nusayr of North Africa, assembled an army of Berbers and Arab mercenaries from throughout the Muslim world. On April 30, 711, General Tarik landed 7,000 troops near Gibraltar and killed the Visigoth king Roderick at the Battle of Guadelete. Tarik was supported in his campaign by a rebel Visigoth chief named Julian. Tarik was recalled to Syria while Governor Musa transferred 10,000 additional troops from North Africa to seize Seville and surrounding regions at the Battle of Septimania (719). Muslims then attacked northern Christian strongholds defended by Pelagius of Asturias. In 722, Pelagius’s troops fled into the mountains as the Muslims advanced. Pelagius reconcentrated his forces in the narrow Covadonga Valley and won a victory against a smaller Muslim army. This battle, said to be the first of the Reconquista (reconquest), won independence for the Kingdom of Asturias. This kingdom came to include all of northwest Iberia under the rule of Alfonso II (791–842). Muslim forces then turned their attention northward where they were defeated at Toulouse (721) before their ultimate defeat by Charles Martel at the Battle of Tours, France (732). After retreating from the Frankish Empire, Muslim forces (about 60,000 strong) sought to consolidate their control throughout al-Andalus (Andalusia). This effort was relatively easy because the Visigoths had left behind a population vanquished by years of subjugation. Victimized Jewish communities, oppressed serfs, and others who had suffered under Visigothic plunder, rape, and pillage welcomed the Muslims as liberators. Muslim soldiers frequently intermarried into local communities and many villagers converted to Islam. Many North Africans, following in the wake of these Muslim victories, relocated to Spain. Their numbers grew so large that the Berbers of Spain felt empowered enough to revolt against their Arab rulers after harsh taxes were imposed by Emir Abasa Ibn Suhaym al-Kalbi. This uprising was quelled in 742 by an army from Syria led by General Balj ibn Bishr. Balj established Córdoba as the capital of Arab Spain. Colonists from Syria were then relocated to Spain to further tighten Arab control.

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In 756, shortly before the rise of the Abbasid caliphate, an Umayyad prince, Abd al-Rahman fled to Spain and became the emir of Cordoba (756–788) after overthrowing the local Arab governor. Almost immediately, al-Rahman was forced to defend this claim. He successfully defeated an army sent from Damascus by the Abbasid caliph Abu Jaffar al-Mansur. The next major threat to Muslim rule came when Charlemagne attempted, but failed to conquer Zaragoza in 778. Emir Hisham I then counterattacked, but could not conquer the Kingdom of Asturias in 793. Hisham I did have success, however, in recapturing Barcelona in 799 before it was returned to Christian rule by an army led by King Louis of Aquitaine in 801. Under the reign of Emir Abd al-Rahman II (822–852), Muslim rule extended along the Ebro River and from Coimbra and through Saragossa. These boundaries with the neighboring Christian kingdoms of Asturias, Leon, Castile, Aragon (and Navarre) did not significantly change until the 11th century. Much has been written about positive MuslimChristian relations during this 250-year period. Certainly, Muslim rule over Spain was led by able administrators who were largely sensitive to cultural differences. Sciences and the arts flourished under the stable rule of Caliph Abd al-Rahman III (912–961) and his successors AlHakam (961–976) and Hisham (976–1008). The reign of Abd al-Rahman III is considered the Golden Age of Umayyad Spain. While Muslim policies toward nonMuslims were generally tolerant, Christians who resisted felt the invaders’ full fury. Churches and monasteries were looted while some were even demolished. Some Christians resented being assigned a second-class social status as dhimmi (“protected one”), obligating them to pay a submission tax (jizya), even though this tax was less onerous than those levied by the Visigoths. From 850 to 859, 48 Christians in Cordoba chose beheading instead of submission to Muslim rule. On the positive side, Arab rule introduced irrigation, citrus fruits, rice, sugarcane, and cotton to Spanish agriculture. Textile mills, sugar refineries, paper and silk production, leatherworks, carpet weaving, and new mining techniques all strengthened Spain’s economy. The Muslim presence in Spain also enriched the literary, musical, scientific, medical, architectural, and

philosophical richness of Spain, and from Spain, to all of Europe. With Hisham’s death (1008), regional rivalries resurfaced and soon civil war ensued. Politically fragmented regions led by “partisan kings” allied with both invaders and defenders to advance competing agendas, often regardless of religious backgrounds. Some Muslims fought with Christians against other Muslims (and vice versa). Christian-majority regions in northern Spain, with the aid of Frankish kings, saw an opportunity and recruited Christian slaves (from Italy and other parts of Europe) to revolt against Arab Spain. Their first major triumph was the recapture of Toledo in 1085. This tumult led, in 1086, to an invasion of Spain by North African Berber troops under the command of Yusuf ibn Tashfin, the first Almoravid monarch. Yusuf annexed much of Arab Spain. The Almoravid Empire was then replaced by an extremist Berber dynasty known as the Almohades. The last Muslim victory against northern Christian forces came at the Battle of Alarcos in 1195. The Muslim defeat at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 paved the way for the recapture of Cordoba in 1236 and Seville in 1248. All that remained of Muslim rule was the province of Granada, which held out for another two centuries. Finally, on January 2, 1492, Emir Muhammad XII surrendered Granada to the combined forces of Castile and Aragon. Almost 800 years of Muslim presence in Spain drew to a close and all non-Christians were expelled from Spain. Even after 1492, however, Mozarabs (or Moriscos)— Arabized Christians—continued practicing many Muslim traditions. In 1567, Philip II made speaking Arabic illegal and forbade all Muslim customs and clothing. This led to a Mozarab rebellion, finally quelled when the last Mozarab was expelled by an edict of Philip III (1609). Chris Van Gorder See also Caliphate; Reconquista; Tours, Battle of Further Reading Jamieson, Alan G. Faith and Sword: A Short History of ChristianMuslim Conflict. London: Reaktion Books, 2006. Prescott, William Hickling. The Art of War in Spain: The Conquest of Granada, 1481–1492. London: Greenhill, 1995.

188  Cistercian Order

Christian Samurai See Christian Daimyo

Cistercian Order The Cistercian order is named after its first monastery, Citeaux (Cistercium), south of Dijon, Burgundy. It was founded in 1098 as a reform monastery, seeking to revive the ideals and Rule of St. Benedict, the founder of Western monasticism, and restore the daily balance between prayer, work, and (spiritual) reading. It stressed the importance of seclusion, poverty, and economic self-sufficiency (through manual labor, etc.), and introduced lay brothers to assist the monks in their duties. This demanding ideal gained them numerous followers. In 1113, Bernard (1090–1153), the famous future abbot of Clairvaux, entered with 30 companions. Foundations followed in practically all of Western Europe, which led to the creation of a new order (with eventually 700 monasteries of men). The latter was guided by a number of original innovations: the Charter of Charity, which introduced annual general chapters of their abbots meeting at Citeaux, and yearly visitations of all (independent) monasteries by their founding abbots. The general chapters exercised governing, legislative, and executive functions and also evaluated and corrected the conduct of abbots. Their rapid growth was also due to their authentic and genuine reform, which fully answered the great needs of the time (apostolic life, freedom of the church, flight from the world, etc.). It was additionally aided by their spirituality, which stressed the importance of “humanity,” selfknowledge, simplicity, friendship, and love. (In 1120 Tart, the first Cistercian convent, followed by some 900 others, was founded.) They also had other great achievements. Their daily reading inspired numerous spiritual authors, among them the immortal Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153). It also promoted the love of history—of the order and individual monasteries. Their daily manual labor helped them become innovative agricultural pioneers, highly successful

gardeners, fruit growers, vine growers, horse and cattle breeders, fishermen, colonizers, wool traders (in England), and even bankers and miners. Thus the order flourished in the 12th century. Then new religious needs emerged, answered by the friars, and later on the modern religious orders, and the influence of Citeaux began to recede. The subsequent fortunes of individual monasteries were greatly affected by the destructive Mongol invasion of Eastern Europe (1241), the Hundred Years’ War (1336–1456), the Hussite rebellions (1419–1436), and the Turkish advances on the Balkans after 1526. Additional difficulties arrived in the ecclesiastical sphere under the “Babylonian Captivity” of the church (1378–1416), the (triple) papal schism (1378–1415), the appointment of lay (“commendatory”) abbots, and the rise of “reform” congregations in the late medieval period (which considerably weakened the central authority). The Reformation era brought the suppression of numerous monasteries by the states (while some freely joined the reformers). The 17th century witnessed reform movements and the rise of the Strict Observance in France (stressing penitential standards) and of the unedifying literary “war of observances” between the two camps. In the Age of Enlightenment traditional monastic practices (miracles, legends, etc.) were seriously questioned on a “rational” basis, and “nonactive” monasteries were suppressed by Joseph II of Austria. The French Revolution abolished all French monasteries (and the general chapters) in 1791, while the following “secularization” led to the suppression of all monasteries in many other countries. In 1892 the Strict Observance was separated by papal decree from the Cistercian order and made into a separate order often called “Trappists.” The 20th century with its dictatorships and world wars also immensely damaged the Cistercians; but then followed a considerable revival on all continents and the amazing growth of the order in Vietnam. In its long history the order had a long list of heroes, saints, and martyrs, but also numerous human failings. These included autocracy, power struggles, rivalries, ritual differences, profiteering, financial excesses, riots (of the lay brothers), and considerable national differences. The order today, with more than 2,570 members living in

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159 monasteries, offers a rich diversity of divergent liturgical, pastoral, and educational involvements. Monasteries, among them Cistercian monasteries, are rightly considered to be islands of peace or earthly paradises, far removed from all the troubles of the world. Yet they are also engaged in warfare: the spiritual combats against the devil, worldly allurements, vices, temptations, and personal struggles. This is why the Benedictine Rule has called for a “strong” type of monk given to a “military” service (i.e., combat), fought with the armor (weapon) of obedience. The Cistercian monks have built their life on this rule. From the daily spiritual reading they could learn what the Bible and early Christian tradition said about holy wars and spiritual battles. A great many of them were experienced former knights. They considered themselves to be spiritual warriors and soldiers of Christ by following a strict discipline and even accepting whipping (for failures). Although they had left the world, they still knew about external religious needs (like pilgrimages). And to them the crusades were knightly efforts to free the land where Jesus had lived and taught. (“God wills it” had been echoing all over.) The Cistercians enthusiastically and consistently supported the crusading movement and the Christian knights moving to the Near East. Already after the First Crusade, Abbot Arnold of Morimond planned to make a foundation in it with some of his able-bodied monks. But the order and Bernard of Clairvaux felt that devoted monks should seek the heavenly Jerusalem in a life of prayer and let the secular knights go and fight in the Holy Land. (Arnold actually died before his departure.) But they did support all subsequent crusades in their own ways. Thus Bernard of Clairvux, by now of immense moral power, preached the Second Crusade (1147–1149) on the orders of the pope, his former monk, in France and Germany, enlisting even the reluctant emperor. His argument was: Do not forsake the king of heaven himself. Ward off the enemy attack with vigor. Defend the places where the Savior has saved you. Hence he reminded the rulers of the coming Day of Judgment when the question will be: What could you have done and did not do? He assured all that God was well pleased with the crusaders and their undertaking and even performed astonishing miracles in support of his claims. He won many for the overseas crusade,

but believed they must be good warriors and experienced fighters (not monks). The expedition itself ended with a crushing defeat of the crusaders. To Bernard this was due to “our sins,” which provoked God’s justice instead of his mercy. He attributed the military loss to the ungodly behavior that sought the well-being of the body rather than the salvation of the soul. He believed an army’s victory rested on its soul. The Third Crusade (1189–1192) was to a large extent organized by Cistercian abbots with the support of the order. For the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) the Cistercian General Chapter appointed several abbots to be field chaplains and imposed a war tax on the wealthier abbeys; thus several abbots and monks joined the crusading army to the East. The order obviously endorsed the crusades of Louis IX of France in 1250 and 1270. In addition, the Cistercians also took part in crusading actions in Europe itself. Thus Bernard of Clairvaux encouraged (Letter 457) an expedition against the pagan Slavic tribes of eastern Germany to bring about their conversion. But its leaders, while speaking about God, pursued their selfish political advantages. The so-called “Albigensian Crusade” (1209–1229) had been proclaimed by Pope Innocent III after the assassination of the papal legate, the Cistercian Peter of Castelnau (a former monk of Fontfroid), to proceed against the Cathar heretics in southern France. (This was the first and only time when Christians in a Christian country took up arms against heretics.) The organizer of the expedition was the abbot of Citeaux, Arnaud Amaury, who ennvisioned the conversion or defeat of the Albigensian heretics. He was joined by Abbot Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay and his nephew, the monk Peter. During the siege of Béziers, Abbot Arnaud reportedly exclaimed: “Kill them all, God will recognize his own,” in a clear allusion to the scriptural passages of Numbers 16:5 and 2 Timothy 2:19 (“The Lord knows who are his”). The crusade ended with the (political) victory of the French king. (Abbot Arnaud also took part in the battle of Las Navas [1212], which stopped the Muslim advances in Iberia.) The Cistercian influence also extended to the military orders of knights. Bernard of Clairvaux had been instrumental

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in the foundation of the Knights Templar and drafted their early rule (1128). They were ideal soldiers, taking and observing the monastic vows. Abbot Raymond of Fitero founded an order of knights in the war against the Moors from which the Order of Calatrava, approved by the General Chapter in 1164, developed. Several other knightly orders also attached themselves to the Cistercians, like the Portuguese Knights of Avis (founded in 1169), or were under Cistercian guidance. Secluded Cistercian monks have also written about the crusades. Otto of Freising recorded his personal experiences in the Second Crusade. Gunther of Pairis recorded the Hystoria Constantinopolitana about the Fourth Crusade from the reports of his abbot, Martin, a participant. Pierre de Vaux-de-Cernay, a member of the 1212–1218 expedition in the company of his abbot and uncle, is well known for his Historia Albigensis. Cistercians have also been active peacemakers between popes and rulers as well as rulers and local churches. And popes also asked Cistercian abbots to settle local (disciplinary, territorial, or legal) conflicts in many countries. All this is part of a rich Cistercian legacy. Bede K. Lackner See also Albigensian Crusade; Arnaud Amaury (Arnaud Amalric); Bernard of Clairvaux; Béziers, Massacre at; Calatrava, Order of; Cathars; Fourth Crusade; In Praise of the New Knighthood (Bernard of Clairvaux); Knights Templar; Second Crusade; Third Crusade Further Reading Andrea, Alfred J. The Capture of Constantinople: The “Hystoria Constantinopolitana” of Gunther of Pairis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997. Bouyer, Louis. The Cistercian Heritage. Translated by Elizabeth Livingstone. London: A. R. Mowbry, 1958. Bruun, Mette Birkedal. The Cambridge Companion to the Cistercian Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. King, Archdale. Citeaux and Her Elder Daughters. London: Burns & Oates, 1953. Lekai, Louis J. The Cistercians. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989. Luddy, Ailbe. The Order of Citeaux. Dublin: M. H. Hill, 1952. O’Callaghan, Joseph. The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and Its Affiliates. London: Ashgate Press, 1975.

Smith, Katherine Allen. War and the Making of the Medieval Monastic Culture. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2011. Wakefield, Walter L. Heresy, Crusade and Inquisition in Southern France. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

Clement V, Pope (ca. 1260–1314) Clement V, pope from 1305 to 1314, was the first to reign in the Avignon papacy, ruling from France between 1309 and 1314. His highly centralized papacy oversaw the trials, dissolution, and death of the Knights Templars and three of the crusades of 1309–1310. His circle of cardinals was largely French, with many being related to him. Clement V formed alliances with Philip IV (1285–1314) of France (Philip the Fair) and the Hospitallers, one of the groups in the crusade. Though quite intelligent, Clement’s characteristics were indecisiveness and weakness, exacerbated by cancer. Bertrand de Got was born in Villandraut, Gironde, in the Bordelais in approximately 1260, into the politically influential Gascon family. Got studied law, both canon and civil, at Orléans and Bologna. He served English king Edward I during the 1280s in Paris, and in 1294 became a diplomat in England, being appointed bishop of Comminges the following year (1295). In 1299 he was selected as archbishop of Bordeaux. Got was crowned as Pope Clement V in June 1305, succeeding the scandalous papacy of Boniface VIII. To placate Philip IV, Clement selected Lyons as the location for this coronation. Six months later he formed a group of 10 cardinals, 9 of whom were French, including 4 nephews. In March 1309, he further appeased Philip IV by moving to Avignon, France, and beginning what many called a 70year Babylonian captivity. Of the 24 cardinals appointed by Clement V, 23 were French. Clement V cooperated with Philip IV to suppress the Knights Templar, arrested them in October 1307, and ordered their executions between 1310 and 1314. He ruled that their property be transferred to the Hospitallers (Knights of St. John of Jerusalem). But he resisted Philip’s pressure to conduct a posthumous trial of Boniface VIII.

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Clement oversaw three specific crusades of 1309: the Aragonese and Castilians pressed against the Moors in Granada on the Iberian Peninsula; his efforts against Venetians who had occupied Ferrara helped the Vatican regain that territory. The Hospitallers, led by Fulk of Villaret (d. 1327), battled against Muslims in the eastern Mediterranean. Defeated by the Saracens, the Hospitallers located themselves on the island of Cyprus and later Rhodes. But in 1310, the Hospitallers conquered the Saracens and freed Henry II of Jerusalem (1270–1324) from his captivity in Armenia. In their quests, the Hospitallers requested funding, much of which was squandered by papal authorities. While James II of Aragon viewed the Hospitaller crusade as an impediment to his conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, Clement saw the Granada campaign as a threat to his Hospitaller strategy. The movement for a large-scale crusade was becoming uncontrolled, as large numbers of peasants from England and the continent signed themselves with a cross, indicating their willingness to serve. As a result, several Jewish communities were destroyed, and money unlawfully taken from Jews filled the coffers of the Hospitallers. By 1309, more than 30,000 people had arrived at Avignon, prepared to receive a passagium generale. Part of the eastern crusade was precluded by the death of Azzo VIII of Este (1263– 1308), resulting in a battle of succession between his brothers, Aldevrandino and Francesco, and Azzo’s son, Fresco. The results of crusades during Clement’s reign were rather insignificant: Hospitallers amalgamated power in Rhodes, Castilians temporarily ruled Gibraltar, and there was very brief papal governance of Ferrara. Corruption filled the reign of Clement V as pope, with bribery, nepotism, threats of excommunication, and greed running rampant. Clement V died at Roquemaure (Gard) on April 20, 1314. Ralph Hartsock See also Knights Templar Further Reading Housley, Norman. “Pope Clement V and the Crusades of 1309– 10.” Journal of Medieval History 8, no. 1 (1982): 29–43. Menache, Sophia. Clement V. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Mollat, G. The Popes of Avignon, 1305–1378. London: Thomas Nelson, 1963.

Clermont, Council of (1095) The Council of Clermont marks the beginning of the crusades and the crusaders’ ideology started and supported by the pope. The idea of Deus lo vult! (“God wills it!” or “This is the will of God!”) expressed by Pope Urban II as the motto for the crusades is attributed to this meeting of clerics and laymen. The beginning of the crusade era is of course the most important outcome of this council (or synod), but at the time it was only a by-product. In fact, the Council of Clermont in November 1095 and the preceding Council of Piacenza in March 1095 were convened to address internal problems between church leaders and the temporal leaders of states, kingdoms, and principalities. It is not clear to contemporary scholars if the liberation of the city of Jerusalem was identified as the ultimate goal for the crusades, or if it was even mentioned during the Council of Clermont. The crusading question entered the council almost as a sideshow, as the Byzantine emperor had sent a letter to ask for assistance in his fight against advancing Seljuk Turks, who were Muslims. The pope’s speech probably used this unifying aspect of the fight against the “infidels” (i.e., Muslims) to appease the internal conflicts affecting the church in Western Europe. The main sources that we have today on the Council of Clermont come from one or more participants as well as from people with hearsay knowledge of the event. But these sources were composed in certain literary styles that do not always lend themselves to effective historical analysis of actual events. The role of Pope Urban II at the council was contested by Clement III, a pope considered to be an illegitimate antipope by the Catholic Church during the time of the investiture controversy between the papacy and the emperor. Since the emperor at the time supported the antipope, the Council of Clermont lacked Germanic participants and was largely composed of clerics and nobility from the Francophone kingdoms. In this difficult internal situation came the letter from Byzantium, which drew attention to the military successes of Muslim invaders. Even so, the relations between the (Western) Catholic Church of Rome and the (Eastern) Orthodox Church of Byzantium were as strained as the relations within Western Christendom during the time of the investiture controversy, Pope Urban II

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used the letter from the Byzantine emperor to try to smooth over the internal disputes within Christendom, providing an excuse to unite as one and defend Christian lands against the infidel Muslims. Pope Urban II won the day, and the idea of a crusade to both assist the Byzantines and liberate Jerusalem gained momentum. A crusade offered many advantages to the participants as well as to those staying home, most important of which was an absolution of sins for either participating in or supporting the crusade. In practical terms the first result of the Council of Clermont was not a crusade to attack Jerusalem directly, not even a rescue mission to the beleaguered and retreating Byzantine troops. The First Crusade initiated at Clermont materialized first in late 1095 and early 1096 in a so-called “People’s Crusade” or “Popular Crusade,” which was a series of pogroms against the Jewish population of the Rhineland. Regional church leaders (as the bishops of the important dioceses in this region) sometimes spoke against this form of crusade, but the result was nevertheless a nearly total destruction of Jewish life in the Rhine Valley, which had begun there centuries earlier during the Roman period. The crusade against the Muslims did not start before August 1096. Led by high-ranking noblemen (hence sometimes referred to as the “Princes’ Crusade”), it went via Constantinople, Nicaea, Dorylaeum, and Antioch to reach Jerusalem in 1099. After a monthly siege of Jerusalem in June/July of that year, the city was conquered. The establishment of the (Christian) Kingdom of Jerusalem under Godfrey of Bouillon was preceded by a massacre against the Muslim and Jewish population of Jerusalem. Most of the Kingdom of Jerusalem was destroyed by Saladin in 1187; it (i.e., the following Christian territories) finally collapsed in 1291. This ideology shaped the confrontation between the Christian West and the Muslim East. The concept of “jihad” in the Islamic tradition is often compared to the crusaders’ ideology. Although theologically there are important differences between the Christian crusades and the Muslim jihad, the comparison seems legitimate as the practical outcome (i.e., application of the religious concept into worldly expansion and power struggle) was in fact very similar. It has to be said that the concept of crusades is not easily reconciled with the ideas of the New Testament.

Nevertheless, this crusade idea lived well beyond the actual 250 years of conflict concerning the domination of the “Holy Land” between the 11th century and the 13th century. It even survived in a more or less secularized form. For example, General Dwight D. Eisenhower named his war memories about his fight against Nazi Germany a “Crusade in Europe,” and President George W. Bush used the term after 9/11. Islamic fundamentalist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIL/ISIS regularly use the word “crusader” as a synonym for Christians and Westerners. Oliver Benjamin Hemmerle See also Bouillon, Godfrey de; First Crusade; Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of; Popular Crusades; Saladin; Urban II, Pope Further Reading Balard, Michel, ed. Autour de la Première Croisade. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1996. Boas, Adrian J., ed. The Crusader World. New York: Routledge, 2016. Bull, Marcus. Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade: The Limousin and Gascony, c. 970–c. 1130. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Cowdrey, H. E. John. “Pope Urban II’s Preaching of the First Crusade.” History 55 (1970): 177–188. Runciman, Steven. The First Crusade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Somerville, Robert. Pope Urban II’s Council of Piacenza. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Vauchez, André, ed. Le Concile de Clermont de 1095 et l’appel à la croisade. Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1997.

Cold War, Religious Dimensions of The term “Cold War” describes the state of military and political tension that existed primarily between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from immediately after World War II (1939– 1945) until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. There is no unanimous agreement on the exact dates of the Cold War; however, many recognize the initial intensification of hostilities as occurring in 1947 with the issuing of the Truman Doctrine and the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. While many identify the collapse of the Berlin

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Wall in 1989 as the end of the Cold War, hostilities completely halted with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. No direct fighting took place between the Soviet Union and the United States as the contest was largely waged by proxy in places such as Korea, Africa, Vietnam, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. The Cold War dominated the foreign relations of many nations across the globe, yet the main struggle was between the United States and the U.S.S.R. This contest between the world’s most powerful states featured a major religious component. In the United States, the Cold War rallied the nation against a common, clearly defined enemy. National leaders frequently described the differences between America and the Soviet Union in religious, moralistic tones. The early Cold War years contained the most blatant and extreme use of religious imagery, language, and even policy, yet the religious dimensions of the Cold War span its entirety. Moreover, scholars have examined the struggle between democracy and communism through a religious lens more frequently in recent years. The greatest religious component of the Cold War was America’s foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. American diplomat George F. Kennan (1904–2005) is credited with the conception of this policy, which was formally spelled out in National Security Council document number 68 (NSC-68) in 1950. Serving as an American diplomat in Moscow, Kennan cabled his assessment of Soviet strength and intentions in a report now commonly referred to as the “Long Telegram,” in February 1946. Kennan called for a national policy that aggressively limited Soviet expansion and influence. This policy, later referred to as “containment,” guided U.S. foreign policy over the course of the next 40 years. Government policy was aided by America’s social and religious culture. Domestically, the United States underwent an evangelical Christian resurgence following Billy Graham’s (1918–) successful 1949 Los Angeles revival. Graham often utilized the context of the times in assessments of the nuclear stalemate and used images of good versus evil in his sermons. Indeed, America’s religious life flourished, as many Protestant denominations’ membership rolls revealed, and most Christians in the United States were anticommunist for political as well as religious reasons. The Cold War served as a rallying point in the

1950s as “In God We Trust” was added to the national currency and “Under God” was inserted into the Pledge of Allegiance. The 1950s also witnessed a sharp increase in civil religious behavior. Churches across the nation demonstrated a rise in patriotism, offering prayers for America’s leadership and military, displaying the American flag inside churches, and denouncing the atheistic, materialist worldview of communists. Civil religion in the United States expressed itself in a number of ways, yet three major elements comprised the bulk of civil religious activity. The first was a strong emphasis on the individual, spiritual being. The second element rested on the assumption that America— specifically its system of democracy—was established upon a spiritual foundation. The last attribute of civil religion was its crusading character. Many of America’s political leaders framed the contest with the Soviet Union as a crusade against evil. In all of these forms, Americans maintained a deeply spiritual understanding of their place in the Cold War. In the main, U.S. churches and religious leaders marched in step with American foreign policy, save for a minority of historic peace churches. Neo-Orthodox professor and pastor Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971), evangelical preacher Billy Graham, and many theologically liberal church leaders supported many of America’s foreign policies while simultaneously offering encouragement and support to successive administrations of presidents, secretaries of state, and congressional leaders. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Cold War was waged in different forms. The United States attempted to confine the spread of communism in Korea (1950–1953) and Vietnam (1961–1973). It also competed with the Soviet Union for supremacy in space flight capability during the space race that took place between 1955 and 1972. In a variety of ways, the Cold War was waged on different fronts. In each of these arenas, Americans viewed the struggle with the Soviet Union as one that permeated political and diplomatic boundaries. In each of these examples, Americans perceived of themselves as having God’s divine sanction in their battle with a foe that many compared to the Antichrist. In the late 1960s and 1970s, Richard Nixon (1913–1994) oversaw a cooling of Cold War tensions with his policy of détente. Nixon became the first U.S. president to visit China and negotiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

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Agreement (SALT I) with then Communist Party general secretary Leonid Brezhnev. This improvement in relations between the United States and communist states did not dampen the American religious perspective of foreign relations. The 1967 Six-Day War and subsequent 1973 Yom Kippur War bolstered American support for the state of Israel. Not only did Israel represent a democratic ally in the Middle East, but the state of Israel also maintained a prominent place in Protestant Christian eschatology. As the 1970s ended and the 1980s began, America’s religious makeup underwent further changes. A strong, politically and theologically conservative movement identified itself more and more with social and political domestic issues. This grassroots, conservative Christian segment became increasingly outspoken on issues such as abortion, education, and homosexuality. This same coalition fully supported the U.S. government’s approach toward the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. The moralistic characterization of the Cold War was renewed again in the 1980s. This religious component that was as entrenched as the policy of containment itself was bolstered in the hawkish pronouncements of the Ronald Reagan administration (1981–1989). In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) labeled the Soviet Union an “Evil Empire.” His hardline stance against the Soviet Union generated further support for American anticommunist policy from the politically conservative, grassroots New Christian Right segment that helped elect him. Eventually, Reagan contributed to the ultimate demise of Cold War hostilities by working with Soviet leadership in easing tensions and reaching an agreement on nuclear disarmament. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev (1931–) sought to revitalize the Soviet economy by introducing elements of free enterprise and reducing an immense defense budget. Both Reagan and Gorbachev worked together, meeting four times between 1985 and 1988, to hasten the end of the Cold War. By 1991, the Cold War had ceased. The Soviet Union had completely dissolved and the Russian-American diplomatic relationship began a new path centered upon similar interests in the Middle East, Cuba, and Angola. The guiding light of American foreign policy—containment—ended with the close of the Cold War. Since the early 1990s, U.S. foreign policy has retained elements of promoting democracy and liberty abroad. It has also ensured the continua-

tion of American interests overseas. Yet, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy has lacked an easily recognizable central feature. Without an easily defined enemy, the policy of containment and the larger Cold War rivalry faded from the epicenter of America’s foreign relations. Aaron K. Davis Further Reading Finstuen, Andrew. Original Sin and Everyday Protestants: The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, Billy Graham, and Paul Tillich in an Age of Anxiety. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009. Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Inboden, William. Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945– 1960: The Soul of Containment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Preston, Andrew. Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012. Stevens, Jason. God-Fearing and Free: A Spiritual History of America’s Cold War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Cologne War (1583–1588) The Cologne War in Germany was the first significant disturbance in the Holy Roman Empire since the Peace of Augsburg (1555) drew a line under earlier conflicts associated with the Protestant Reformation and Roman Catholic Counter-Reformation. The war also occurred concurrently with the Dutch Revolt (1566–1648) and the French Wars of Religion (1562–1598). The Peace of Augsburg had stipulated the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (“whose rule, his religion”), meaning that the religion of the ruler dictated the religion of those ruled. However, the Peace of Augsburg had excluded ecclesiastical territories of the Holy Roman Empire from application of the principle, stipulating instead that if the ecclesiastical prince of such a territory converted to Protestantism, he would resign rather than force the conversion of the subjects of that territory to Protestantism.

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Like the (largely bloodless) Strasbourg “Bishops’ War” (1592–1604) and the more serious Jülich-Cleves succession dispute (1609–1610, 1614), the Cologne War exposed the potentially dangerous intersection of international tensions with constitutional disputes within the empire. This has led some to see it as evidence for the supposedly inevitable outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War in 1618, while others argue that it shows contemporaries’ desire to minimize conflict. The war originated in disagreements over how to choose the rulers of the empire’s ecclesiastical principalities, which had long been regarded as preserves of princely and aristocratic families who used their influence in cathedral chapters (a college or council of clerics used to advise a bishop or govern a diocese in his stead) to place their younger sons as imperial prince-bishops. Roman Catholic families argued that the Augsburg Peace reserved the remaining church principalities exclusively for them. The Bavarian Wittelsbachs were the most important Roman Catholic dynasty after the Austrian Habsburgs who held the imperial title. Spain and the papacy regarded Bavaria as politically more reliable at this point and promoted the career of Ernst, seventh son of Duke Albrecht V, helping him to secure three bishoprics by 1581. Ernst failed in Cologne where the cathedral canons chose Gebhard Truchsess von Waldburg, a minor aristocrat who appeared more amenable to local interests. Spain and the papacy accepted this, because Truchsess was viewed as a good Roman Catholic with close ties to the Jesuits, while Ernst had not even been ordained. Truchsess fell in love and married a nun in February 1582. More seriously, he announced his December 1582 conversion to Calvinism and refused to accept the Roman Catholic interpretation of the Augsburg rules that his conversion rendered him ineligible to continue as archbishopelector in Cologne. He signaled his defiance by ousting local opponents and occupying his capital, Bonn, with troops. His choice of Calvinism alienated German Lutherans, who largely backed the emperor’s feeble efforts to mediate a peaceful solution. Only the Calvinist elector palatine sent 1,000 troops to help, but most of these refused to enter Cologne territory once they received an imperial summons to desist. Ernst seized his chance to add Cologne to his growing list of bishoprics. Cologne’s location in the Lower Rhine

made Spain concerned to prevent Dutch influence, which might disrupt the flow of reinforcements northward in the ongoing Eighty Years’ War. Bavaria paid for 6,000 Walloon and German mercenaries, while Spain sent 3,000 infantry. Together, these took Bonn on January 28, 1584, after a sixweek siege. Truchsess fled to Holland. Ernst received general recognition as the new archbishop and went on to secure Münster as well in 1585, heightening his strategic significance to Spain, which felt obliged to protect him against Dutch raiding parties. One of these retook Bonn in December 1587, which had to be recovered through another six-month siege. Spanish and Dutch influence shifted in the region over the coming decades, but the Cologne dispute was settled and the Bavarian Wittelsbachs secured continual reelection there until 1761. The success of the Roman Catholic faction in the conflict consolidated and strengthened the territorial holdings of Roman Catholics in the northwest territories of the Holy Roman Empire and buttressed the efforts of the Roman Catholic CounterReformation. The war also demonstrated the complexities of international affairs and the use of mercenaries in that Dutch, English, French, Italian, and Scots forces were involved as well as the influence and finances of the papacy, all of which changed the dynamics and course of already complex German religious and dynastic disputes. Peter H. Wilson See also Holy Roman Empire; Thirty Years’ War; Wars of the Reformation Further Reading Holborn, Hajo. A History of Modern Germany: The Reformation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959. Petri, Franz. “Im Zeitalter der Glaubenskämpfe (1500–1648).” In F. Petri, ed. Rheinische Geschichte. Vol. 2. Düsseldorf, 1976, pp. 1–218. Ziegler, Walter. “Die Hochstifte des Reiches im konfessionellen Zeitalter 1520–1618.” Römische Quartalsschrift 87 (1992): 252–81.

Confucianism and War In the Confucian tradition there are Thirteen Classics and countless commentaries. However, many Confucian

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scholars agree that the Book of Mengzi is perhaps the best text to use when discussing the subject of war in Confucianism because Mengzi deliberately specifies when and how to wage a war. Mengzi is one of the Four Books, the significance of which is unquestionable in the Confucian tradition. It was Zhu Xi (1130–1200 CE) who collected them and presented them as essential texts of Confucianism. The Four Books and Zhu’s commentaries formed the basic texts for civil service examinations in the Chinese empire from the early 14th century until the civil service exam’s abolition in the 20th century (1313–1905 CE). It should be noted that what is known as “Confucianism” in the West is a living religious, philosophical, and ethical tradition that emerged around the sixth century BCE and is still influencing not just East Asians but also Western adherents of Confucianism. The ideas have been developed by a vast range of diverse scholars with different interpretations of the understanding of war. Mengzi was born and raised in the fourth century BCE just before the beginning of the Warring States period in China (403–221 BCE). It was a time of turmoil, famine, and frequent large-scale military conflagrations. An interesting change in this period of Chinese history is that the emergence of a specialized, intellectual discipline devoted to the conduct and principles of combat was developed. The infamous Sun Tzu’s Art of War, which is known to be the oldest military treatise in the world, was written in this era. With the rise of mass infantry armies, the rulers searched for a specialized officer corps with expertise to provide not only detailed accounts of technology, placement of troops, and strategies to win the war, but also elaborate accounts of the principles of waging war. Many scholars and schools competed to win the patronage of one or more of the many Warring States. Mengzi, like Confucius and Sun Tzu, was one of the many philosophers who traveled around the states hoping that his advice would be heard, accepted, and put into action. From Mengzi, at least four intriguing features of the Confucian understanding of war can be identified. First, in principle, war is a crime and there is no “just war.” Mengzi argues that to boast about being specialized in war is great crime (7B. 4.1–2). Considering that there were many specialists in warfare in the Warring States period, this statement was to condemn those who were profiting by their

specialty in the theory and practice of warfare. Mengzi even insists that to wage a war for the profit of the ruler is a crime even death cannot atone for (4A. 14.1–3). Therefore, there is no such thing as a “just war” if “just” means “righteous.” There are only “permissible” or “acceptable” wars. As Mengzi said, “There is not righteous wars in the Spring and Autumn Annals. There are only cases of those that are better than others. A punitive war is when a superior attacks a subordinate. When hostile states attack one another, it is not a punitive war” (Mengzi and Van Norden 2008, 7b 2.1) Christian “just war theory” seeks to clarify what kind of war can be considered “right.” To examine which war is right, according to Aquinas (ca. 1270), one should inquire about three preconditions: authority, just cause, and right intention. In principle, just wars are wars for righting wrongs. In contrasting, for Mengzi to determine the “permissibility” of war, what matters most is not so much the rightness of motive or intention, but the “ritual propriety.” Even the punitive war, which can be fairly translated as “righting wrongs by punishment,” is permissible only when it is done by a superior, that is, when it is attuned with the Way, and not when the cause and effect of it is “right.” However, Mengzi thought even punitive war is neither right nor useful in building up the peace of the world: If the ruler of a state is fond of benevolence, he will have no enemies in the world. When King Tang attacked in the east, the tribes of the west were bitter. When he attacked in the south, the tribes of the north were bitter. They said, Why does he make us last? And when King Wu attacked the Shang, he had three hundred war chariots and three thousand infantry. But the King said,“Fear not! I bring you peace! I am no enemy of the people.” Then the people bowed their heads, like animals shedding their horns. To launch a “punitive attack” means to correct. If each wishes to correct itself, of what use is war? (Mengzi and Van Norden 2008, 7B 4.2–6) What Mengzi argues is that even when the punitive attack is permissible, it is useless because what is ideal is extending the benevolent governance of the ruler to others. There is a tremendous difference between the idea that the

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right can punish the wrong (Aquinas) by waging a war and the idea that the benevolent should extend their virtue to many (Mengzi). Second, for Mengzi the question “who is qualified to wage a war?” is more important than the question “what kind of war is justifiable?” In other words, the qualification of the moral agent matters more than justifiability of the act of war. War is “permissible” only for those who are morally qualified, the ancient sages being the standard for the qualification: The Qi people invaded Yan. Someone asked, “Is it the case that you encouraged Qi to invade Yan?” Mengzi replied, “I never did. Shen Tong asked whether it was permissible to invade Yan. I answered, ‘It is.’ They then invaded it. If they had asked me, ‘Who may invade it?’ then I would have answered, ‘One who is the agent of Heaven may invade it.’ Suppose there is someone who murders another. Someone asks, ‘May this person be executed?’ then I would answer, ‘He may.’ If they asked, ‘Who may execute him?’ then I would answer, ‘The Chief Warden may execute him.’ In the current case, why would I encourage a Yan to invade a Yan?” (Mengzi and Van Norden 2008, 2B 8.2) It may appear that in Western terms, Mengzi’s position is an extreme form of virtue ethics in the sense that he seems to argue that when the agent is virtuous enough, whatever he or she does, even waging a war, is virtuous. However, Mengzi’s point is not that a virtuous person can do whatever he or she wishes to do, but that those who are not morally qualified to the level of the sages should not dare to wage a war. Mengzi concretely discusses when and how war is permissible. Confucian scholar Daniel Bell calls these “conditions” for just war. According to Bell, there are four “conditions” that must be in place in order for a state to legitimately invade other states: (1) the “conquerors” must try to liberate people who are being oppressed by tyrants (1B.11, 1B.8); (2) the people must demonstrate, in concrete ways, the fact that they welcome their conquerors (7B.4, 1B.10, 1B.11, 3B.5); (3) punitive expeditions must be launched by rulers who are at least potentially virtuous (1B.11); and (4) the leader of justified punitive expeditions

must have some moral claim to the world’s support, that is, the ruler must have the trust of the world (1B.11) (Bell 2007, p. 234). Third, Mengzi argues that using the means of brute force to pacify the world is like “climbing a tree in search of a fish” (1A7.16). In his conversation with King Xuan of the state of Qi, he says: You desire to open up new lands for cultivation, bring to Your court the states of Qin and Chu, oversee the Central States, and dominate the border tribes. But to seek what You desire by the means that You employ is like climbing a tree in search of a fish. (Mengzi and Van Norden 2008, 1A7.16) His advice to the ruler is that he should “simply return to the root” (1A7.18). It should be noted that the Mengzian theory of war and peace is grounded on a strong belief in the goodness of human nature. Mengzi heard that King Xuan saved an ox because he simply could not bear to witness the suffering of the ox. Therefore Mengzi insists that the king just has to “extend” that virtuous “root” of mind in his governance. The fundamental philosophical perspective of Mengzi is that heaven endowed the “four sprouts” in all human beings. According to this philosophical framework, to have a healthy, beautiful, and harmonious society, what the ruler should do is to reinforce and strengthen the good sprouts through “benevolent governance” so that they might naturally grow and bear fruit, rather than make them fear and tremble using violent means, which will only disrupt or disturb the sprouts and prevent their blooming. Therefore, it is “laughable” to attempt to bring about the peace of the world, which is the goal of humanity, by using war and violence, which only prevents human flourishing that naturally grows out of the goodness of human nature when people are governed and educated properly. Finally, while Mengzi opposed those who wanted to use war to make peace in the world, he also opposed those who attempted to stop the wars, if that was not based on ren (benevolence or love) and yi (righteousness or justice). The dialogue between Mengzi and the diplomat Song Keng is important in understanding Mengzi’s position. Song Keng, when he heard that Qin and Chu were at war, planned to

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persuade them to stop the war, just as many diplomats did in his time. So Mengzi asked him to explain his grounds for his persuasion. Song Keng replied, “I shall explain the unprofitability of what they plan” (6B.4.4). Mengzi replied: Your intention, venerable sir, is indeed great. But your slogan is unacceptable. If you persuade the kings of Qin and Chu by means of profit, the kings of Qin and Chu will set aside the commanders of their armies because they delight in profit. This is for their armies to delight in being set aside because they delight in profit. Those who are ministers will embrace profit in serving their rulers. Those who are children will embrace profit in serving their fathers. Those who are younger brothers will embrace profit in serving their elder brothers. This is for rulers and ministers, fathers and children, elder and younger bothers to end up abandoning benevolence and righteousness. It has never happened that people embrace profit in their contact with one another yet fail to be destroyed. (Mengzi and Van Norden 2008, 6B.4.5) While Mengzi admits the noble intention of Song Keng, he argues that “benevolence and righteousness” rather than “profit” should be the means of persuasion. While Song Keng and others think of peace in terms of “the cessation of wars” as the ultimate goal, Mengzi pays more attention to the question of “how to get rid of war from the earth.” He recognizes that to cease the war immediately through whatever means available is the wrong approach, because it will not solve the fundamental problems that will eventually cause another war. Further, using the rhetoric of “material benefit” to stop the war will only make the situation worse, because having delight in profit, rather than benevolence and righteousness, will be contagious and eventually corrupt and hence destroy the whole society. Nonviolence is not enough: genuine peace and harmony among all human relations through benevolence and righteousness should be the goal. In summary, there are at least four intriguing aspects to the Confucian understanding of war and peace: (1) in principle war is a crime and there are no “righteous” wars;

war is neither justifiable nor useful for the peace and harmony of the world; (2) the question of moral qualification of the agent is more important than the question of justifiability of the act of war; (3) the fundamental ground for Confucian understanding of war is the strong belief in the goodness of human nature; (4) just stopping the war should not be the goal; the genuine harmony of all under heaven should be the goal. Sungrae Kim See also Aquinas, Thomas; Christianity and War; Just War Tradition Further Reading Angle, C. Stephen. Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Bell, Daniel A. Confucian Political Ethics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. Confucius. Confucius Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries. Translated by Edward Slingerland. Hackett Classics Series Edition. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003. DeBary, William Theodore, Irene Bloom, and Joseph Adler. Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. 1. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Hagen, Kurtis. The Philosophy of Xunzi: A Reconstruction. Chicago: Open Court, 2007. Juergensmeyer, Mark, and Margo Kitts, eds. Princeton Readings in Religion and Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. Lau, Te-Li. The Politics of Peace. Leiden: Brill, 2009. Lee, Janghee. Xunzi and Early Chinese Naturalism. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. Li, Chenyang. The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony. London and New York: Routledge, 2013. Loewe, Michael, and Edward L. Shaughnessy. The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 BC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Mair, Victor H., ed. The Columbia Anthology of Traditional Chinese Literature. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Mengzi, and Bryan W. Van Norden. Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2008. Stevenson, Leslie Forster, and David L. Haberman. Ten Theories of Human Nature. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Tzu, Mo. Mo Tzu: Basic Writings. Translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Xunzi. Xunzi: Basic Writings. Translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.

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Constantine (272–337 CE) Constantine was emperor of Rome from 306 to 337 CE. He is known as Constantine the Great, and also as Saint Constantine. As emperor, Constantine decreed that Christianity would be the official religion of the Roman Empire, one of the most important and significant acts in the 2,000year history of Christianity. Constantine also moved the capital of the Roman Empire from Rome to Constantinople, laying the groundwork for the future Byzantine Empire, which would have Constantinople as its capital. While Constantine decreed that Christianity would be the official religion of the Roman Empire, it is difficult to determine to what degree he was actually a devout Christian. Constantine adopted the Christian faith himself in the year 312, after having seen a vision in the sky just prior to engaging in the Battle of Milvian Bridge against Maxentius. His Edict of Milan granted toleration to Christianity in 313. Biographers such as Eusebius and other Christian writers have elaborated upon his faith, but he remained a determined political figure and did not forbid worship of the old Roman gods. However, pagan sacrifices were forbidden, and pagan temples throughout the empire were ransacked for their treasures, the profits from which were used to build new Christian churches in the Holy Land at both Jerusalem (the Church of the Holy Sepulchre) and Bethlehem. While persecutions against Christians largely ceased during this time, pagans were persecuted instead, transferring the state’s wrath from one group of religious adherents to another. Constantine took an active part in Christian affairs. In 321, he proclaimed that Sunday would be an official day of rest. He also attended the Council of Nicaea in 325 at which the heresy known as Arianism was confronted. According to Eusebius, Constantine delivered an oration entitled “Assembly of the Saints,” although the length of this work comes to 26 books in Eusebius’s estimation. Scholars have debated the content of the work, and even if it was ever actually written and delivered, but evidence suggests that in fact Constantine did compose the work. Building the new city of Constantinople on the site of the old Greek city of Byzantium indicated that the future of the Roman Empire lay in the east. Although enormous resources were spent to build the new city, Constantine did

In hoc signo vinces

In hoc signo vinces is Latin for “In this sign, you will conquer.” The phrase is attributed to Constantine’s vision of the cross hovering above the sun just prior to his victory at the Battle of Milvian Bridge on October 28, 312 CE. While the vision has been described as the Chi Rho symbol, which comes from the Greek word ΧΡΙΣΤOΣ, which spells KRistos, or Christ, the phrase In hoc signo vinces is the Latin translation of Eusebius’s wording describing Constantine’s Chi Rho vision. In hoc signo vinces has been used by military units over time, and even today by various sports teams as a motivating “battle cry.” For example, British grenadiers placed the phrase on their miter caps in the 18th century. It was also used by the Masons in the United States in the 20th century.

not completely abandon the Western Roman Empire. While Christianity had become the official religion of the Roman Empire by Constantine’s conversion, laying the groundwork for Christianity’s spread in future centuries, the decision to move the capital of the empire to the new city of Constantinople ensured that the future Byzantine Empire would be in place as a bulwark against both the Persian Empire and later the Islamic Empire, which took advantage of the weakened state of both the Byzantines and Persians to spread rapidly throughout North Africa and the modern Middle East. However, the Byzantines would remain as a check on Islamic advance into Europe from the southeast for more than 1,000 years as Constantinople withstood enemies of Christendom from its founding in the fourth century until its collapse in 1453. Constantine not only established Christianity as the official religion of Rome, but enhanced the conditions within which it was able to promulgate through Europe (and eventually beyond) as well as the defensive barriers against competing faiths. Jeffrey M. Shaw See also Arianism and War; Christianity and War; Constantinople, Arab Sieges of; Holy Sepulchre, Church of the; Milvian Bridge, Battle of

200  Constantinople, Arab Sieges of (674–678, 717–718) Further Reading Barnes, Timothy. Blackwell Ancient Lives: Constantine Dynasty: Religion and Power in the Later Roman Empire. Somerset, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2013. Brent, Allen. Political History of Early Christianity. London: T & T Clark International, 2009. Holloway, R. Ross. Constantine and Rome. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004. Leithart, Peter J. Defending Constantine: The Twilight of an Empire and the Dawn of Christendom. Westmont, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2010. Lenski, Noel. The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Constantine. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Litfin, Bryan M. “Eusebius on Constantine: Truth and Hagiography at the Milvian Bridge.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 55, no. 4 (2012): 773–92. Pohlsander, Hans A. The Emperor Constantine. London: Routledge, 1996. Van Dam, Raymond. Remembering Constantine at the Milvian Bridge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Constantinople, Arab Sieges of (674–678, 717–718) The early Muslim Arabs, under the rule of the Umayyad dynasty from 661 to 750 CE, managed to besiege the Byzantine capital of Constantinople twice. The first siege began in 674 under the caliph Mu’awiya I (d. 680), and the second began in 717 under the caliph Suleyman (d. 717). These sieges posed a significant military and economic threat to the mighty Byzantine Empire. The Muslims failed in their two attempts but gained much better control of their coastal cities and towns in Syria, Egypt, and North Africa against the Byzantine navy as a result of lessons learned during the sieges.

Arab Navy before the Siege

The Arabs primarily maintained a land-based military, and they had little experience with maritime warfare until the end of the rule of the second caliph, Umar, who ruled from 634 to 644 CE. Umar initiated the expansion of the Muslim caliphate outside of Arabia and into the territory of modern-day Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. He strictly avoided the

coastal areas as much as he could, as he was unable to protect these regions from hostile powers, mainly the Byzantines. He gave strict orders to his deputies in the new Arab provinces to follow the same policy. For example, a grand metropolis like Alexandria in Egypt, capital for a millennium, was deserted administratively for the newly built but much smaller capital, Fustat, which is part of Cairo today. This policy of avoiding coastal regions changed under the third caliph, Uthman (d. 656), a wealthy merchant, who commissioned his relative, Mu’awiya, to begin building an Arab navy to confront and challenge the Byzantine fleet, which was threatening coastal Muslim cities in the eastern Mediterranean. Muslim historian al-Tabari (d. 923) recorded that most shipbuilders and sailors in the early Muslim navy were Syrian Christian natives and Copts from Egypt, and most of the timber came from Syrian-Lebanese provinces. The Arab navy under Mu’awiya achieved surprising and remarkable victories soon after it was first put to sea. In 649, Cyprus was attacked and seized from the Byzantines. In 654, the island of Rhodes was attacked and finally subdued in 672. The pinnacle of Arab maritime victories came in 655 when the Arab fleet of 200 ships commanded by Mu’awiya defeated the Byzantine fleet led by Emperor Constans II (d. 668) commanding 550 ships at the Battle of the Masts off the southwestern coast of Anatolia. Muslim sources recorded the legendary victory, while the Byzantines wrote that the result of the battle was due to divine punishment. In addition to the fact that the emperor was nearly captured by the Muslims, the outcome was disastrous for the Byzantines as their navy was annihilated and the southwestern Anatolian coast and the Aegean Sea were now defenseless against Muslim raids. The Muslim victory in the Battle of the Masts was a double blow to the Byzantines as they now also had to contend with Arab raids across the Taurus Mountains into Armenia, Cilicia, and Cappadocia in central Anatolia, leading to the establishment of some Arab strongholds in the area.

First Arab Siege of Constantinople

Mu’awiya was pragmatic enough to conclude a truce with Constans II in 657 to secure Syria, while at the same time disputing the caliphate with Ali in a civil war. In 668,

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Constans II was killed in Sicily, which was his headquarters, while the Arabs were expanding to the west of Egypt into North Africa in the 660s under the new caliph, Mu’awiya. The Arabs had managed to commission a series of coastal forts to protect their coastline from the Byzantine navy. In 670, the Arabs built the second capital in Africa, al-Qairawan, in modern-day Tunisia. This city greatly enhanced their maritime capabilities. In 672–673, the Arab naval commander, Junada b. Abi Umayya, was directed by Mu’awiya to raid other islands in the Mediterranean. He managed to capture Rhodes, Crete, and an unnamed island in the Marmara Sea. Al-Tabari and other historians failed to give details, but it seems that Arab forces did settle in key positions on the western coast of Anatolia around Marmara. As a result, the Arabs were able to threaten Byzantine interests in the Aegean Sea. Sicily itself was raided but was not captured. Muslim historians, including al-Tabari, describe Arab attacks on Constantinople between 674 and 679 as primarily occurring in the spring and summer months. The Greek historian Theophanis (d. 817) concurs with these dates. Sources also mention that Mu’awiya’s son, Yazid (d. 683), was leading some of these attacks in person, elevating him to the status of a mujahid, or holy warrior. Most of the naval operations were launched from Crete, Rhodes, and Alexandria. Arab chroniclers have given unrealistic numbers for many of these raids; for example, historian al-Tabari stated that the Arab fleet consisted of 300 ships, each carrying 1,000 sailors and troops. That would total 300,000 men, which is clearly beyond either the Byzantine or Muslim capacity of the time. In addition, the largest ship at the time could only carry a crew of approximately 150 men. Influenced by religious ideology, Arab chroniclers of the time described continuous Arab raids and sieges of Constantinople, but in reality it was raids threatening the trade routes to Constantinople that caused the most harm to the Byzantine economy. The Arab presence at the city walls required far more equipment and technical competence than the Arabs were able to muster, even though they had made enormous advances in maritime warfare. Employing exactly the type of technical advances that the Muslim forces would have required to capture Constantinople, in 678, a Greek inventor named Kallinikos came up with the

idea of “Greek fire,” a liquid fire that remained on the surface of the water. This fire severely crippled the Arab fleet, and Mu’awiya and his successor, Yazid, were forced to end the siege and withdraw to Cyprus. In the Arab chronicles of the siege, the Arab fleet was destroyed by a severe storm, causing Mu’awiya to call off the campaign.

Second Arab Siege of Constantinople

The short-reigned caliph Sulayman ibn Abd al-Malik (r. 715–717), hoping to appear statesman-like and posing as a mujahid (holy warrior) after the rivalry with his brothers over becoming caliph, commissioned his brother Maslama to march into Anatolia, while appointing Umar ibn Hubaira to attack Constantinople with the fleet in 716. The Arabs formed a pact with the Byzantine governor of Anatolia, Leo the Isaurian, who had revolted against Byzantine emperor Theodosius III. Arab and Greek sources note that Leo had agreed to surrender Constantinople to the Arab forces in return for their aid during his rebellion. The total numbers of troops available in the Arab armies is disputed to have been between 50,000 and 120,000 soldiers, a number that is far from likely, keeping in mind that in 711, the Arabs had reached the height of their expansion by capturing most of Spain and the Sindh valley in northwest India in the same year, resulting in their military capacity being distributed across a large geographic area. In the spring of 717, the rebellious Leo captured Constantinople and toppled Theodosius, becoming the new Byzantine emperor. Soon after, he went back on his word and turned against the Arabs, strengthening Constantinople’s walls. The 12th-century historian Michael the Syrian added that the caliph Sulayman came in person to lead and boost the spirits of his forces who were beginning the siege of Constantinople for the second time. Maslama, the Arab commander, withdrew to Nicaea and Nikomedia to reorganize his troops, while Leo made extensive use of the successful “Greek fire,” compelling many Egyptian sailors, who formed a major part of the Arab navy, to desert and join the Byzantine side. Leo had military help from his Bulgarian and Romanian allies, while the Muslim army was suffering from severe shortages of supplies with winter coming. The Arabs may even have had to resort to cannibalism while in their siege positions outside

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of the formidable Byzantine walls. This coincided with the death of the caliph Sulayman in Damascus. The new caliph, Umar (d. 720), ordered the end of the campaign in early 718, after realizing the catastrophic situation of his military forces that were besieging Constantinople. The first and second Arab sieges of Constantinople had failed, but the lasting impact of these sieges was very important. The Byzantine Empire had survived and defended Anatolia against Muslim conquest, compelling Arab forces to change the direction of their advance to the east towards Asia. The Arabs had gained tremendous maritime expertise and had proven themselves the equal of their sophisticated Byzantine foe both at sea and at the walls of their capital, which would withstand capture by any power until the mighty Venetian fleet was finally able to subdue Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade in 1204 after a full year of siege. As a result, Arab historians exaggerated for centuries afterward the might of Muslims and the power of jihad without examining the logistics of their armies. The Arabian Nights also mentions the heroic performance of the Arabs in their attempts to capture Constantinople. The failure of the siege made the Taurus Mountains the de facto boundary between the two sides for centuries to come, until the Muslim Turks with their overwhelming defeat of the Byzantines in 1071 at Manzikert began the Islamization of the Anatolian Peninsula, paving the way for their descendants, the Ottomans, to capture the city in 1453. Taef Kamal El-Azhari See also Byzantine-Muslim Wars; Caliphate; Manzikert, Battle of; Masts, Battle of the; Mu’awiya Further Reading Feldman, Ruth Tenzer. The Fall of Constantinople. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century Books, 2013. Frassetto, Michael. The Early Medieval World: From the Fall of Rome to the Time of Charlemagne. Santa Barbara, CA: ABCCLIO, 2013. Humphreys, R. Stephen. Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan: From Arabia to Empire. Oxford: Oneworld, 2006. Jamieson, Alan G. Faith and Sword: A Short History of ChristianMuslim Conflict. London: Reaktion Books, 2006. Mayor, Adrienne. Greek Fire, Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs: Biological & Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World. London: Overlook, 2003.

Nossov, Konstantin. Ancient and Medieval Siege Weapons: A Fully Illustrated Guide to Siege Weapons and Tactics. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2005. Turnbull, Stephen. The Walls of Constantinople AD 324–1453. Oxford: Osprey, 2004.

Covadonga, Battle of (ca. May 28, 722 CE) The battle of Covadonga was fought between Christians and Muslims in Asturias, Spain. The battle came to symbolize Christian resistance to Islam for the reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the “infidel.” In 711, the first wave of invasions by Arabs and Berbers from North Africa landed on the Iberian Peninsula from across the Straits of Gibraltar. On July 19, 711, the invasion force was confronted by a Christian Visigothic army under the leadership of King Rodrigo at the Guadalete River. The Muslim rout of the Christian forces and the death of the king were blamed on divine retribution for Christian sin. The collapse of the Visigothic kingdom left the entire peninsula open to Muslim conquest. Over the next few years, invading Muslim forces expanded their territory and went north into Cantabria and southern France. The inclement weather, mountainous terrain, and dense woodland that they encountered were markedly different from the warmer climate and flatter pastures that they had easily traversed until then. These difficulties made effective control of northwestern Spain very difficult. The invaders fell back south to León from where raids could be launched into Galicia, Asturias, and Cantabria every summer. Many Christians from southern Spain fled Muslim rule and sought refuge in these remote areas to practice their faith. As more Christians moved north to escape Muslim rule, a growing but geographically isolated Christian community emerged in northwestern Spain and organized itself into a resistance force. They consolidated themselves politically by electing a king named Pelayo. Pelayo was reportedly of royal Visigothic blood, which secured his legitimacy as heir to the Christian Visigothic line.

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Pelayo ordered the Christians not to pay the jizya (a tax levied on non-Muslims) and then led several raids against Muslim frontier posts. In response, a Muslim army was sent into Asturias to defeat the rebels. Around May 28, 722, both forces met at Covadonga. The ensuing battle and overwhelming Christian victory was attributed to Divine Providence and the salvation of Spain from the infidel. Although the battle was in truth only a small skirmish, it had several long-term effects that proved critical in the struggle for control of the Iberian Peninsula. The victory of the Christian forces solidified their ranks against any further Muslim encroachment and gave Christians who had previously lived under Muslim rule a sanctuary to escape from Muslim authority. The battle secured the independence of the kingdom of Asturias, which allowed the Christians time and space to build up their forces and to enlarge their territory, particularly during periods of internal Muslim disunity and internecine conflict. To later Christian generations, Covadonga was viewed as a religious battle for liberation from the Moors who had desecrated Christian soil. The greatest outcome of the battle was the notion, gradually formed and evolved over centuries, that Covadonga was the first reverse inflicted on the Muslims and the first step in the Reconquista or Reconquest of Spain. The idea of reconquest was used politically to justify later Christian territorial aggrandizement and provided the justification for papal bulls calling for crusades in Spain to defend Christendom. Barry N. Whelan See also El Cid (Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar); Reconquista Further Reading Collins, Roger. The Arab Conquest of Spain, 710–797. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. Fletcher, Richard. Moorish Spain. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. Kennedy, Hugh. Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History. London: Longman, 1996. Lomax, Derek W. The Reconquest of Spain. London: Longman, 1978. O’Callaghan, Joseph F. Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Cresson, Battle of (1187) The battle of Cresson took place at the Springs of Cresson near Nazareth, in the Holy Land, on May 1, 1187. A relatively small and short but massively one-sided battle, it foreshadowed the Christian loss of Jerusalem. This Christian defeat resulted primarily from disunity among the crusaders, who ignored important intelligence about the enemy forces prior to the battle. The battle imparted a long-lasting mythological status upon the ill-fated crusader knights for their inspirational courage throughout the engagement. Bickering among competing Christian factions at Jerusalem set the scene. The Templars and the Hospitallers supported opposing claimants to the throne. The Templars supported Sibylla (1160–1190). The Hospitallers advocated Raymond III of Tripoli (1140–1187), who had been regent for King Baldwin V (1187–1186). The Templars barred Raymond from Jerusalem and named Sibylla as queen. She duly named Guy, her new husband, as king. Templar grand master Gerard de Ridefort urged King Guy to bring Raymond into line by attacking and confiscating some of his lands. Cooler heads prevailed and instead an embassy was sent northward to urge Raymond’s return to comity with the Christian camp. The embassy included de Ridefort and Roger de Moulins, Grand Master of the Hospitallers, along with religious and political leaders. In the meantime, Raymond had allied with Saladin, their putative common enemy, in preemptive defense. Details of the battle are much obscured. However, certain facts can be pieced together to form a likely narrative. Two simultaneous movements of forces resulted in collision and battle. Raymond had given Saladin permission to cross his lands southward in safety with a scouting/raiding party numbering at least 700 (some accounts claim 7,000). Raymond knew of the Christian embassy group’s path north from Jerusalem and warned them for their safety of the Muslims’ presence. Learning of Muslims on Christian land, Templar grand master de Ridefort immediately gathered an army of 430 (130 knights and 300 foot soldiers). The Muslims were present at Raymond’s permission and offered no challenge upon de Ridefort’s arrival. The crusaders looked down into the valley of the springs of Cresson to see an overwhelmingly superior force. Vastly

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outnumbered, the Templars attacked, losing all but four of their number out of the 430—with a wounded de Ridefort among the survivors. The defeat was a dramatic blow to Christian strength and morale. It foreshadowed further and final defeat. At first there were signs of hope for the Christians as the quarreling Templars and Hospitallers, having shared such sacrifice together in the field, finally found common ground. Raymond and King Guy were sufficiently shaken to reconcile, as Raymond revoked his alliance with Saladin and met Guy in Jerusalem. It was too little, too late. Together they fielded their largest army in years—20,000—only to be decisively defeated by Saladin’s force of 30,000 at the battle of Hattin in July 1187. In October, Muslim troops recaptured Jerusalem. For the Muslims, Cresson was a skirmish in which they reluctantly took part and decisively defeated their foe. For the Christians, only the legendary courage of the knights of Cresson remained to embellish a sad tale. Mark A. Jumper See also Jersusalem, Latin Kingdom of; Religious Military Orders; Saladin Further Reading Housely, Norman. Fighting for the Cross: Crusading to the Holy Land. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008. Marshall, Christopher. Warfare in the Latin East 1197–1291. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Smail, R. C. Crusading Warfare, 1097–1193. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Crimean War, Religious Dimensions of The Crimean War, which began in 1853, was a conflict that pitted the Russian Empire against the Ottoman, British, and French empires, along with the Kingdom of Sardinia. The power of the Ottoman Empire had been in decline throughout the 19th century, yet the empire was still a participant against Russia. This conflict, known in the general historiographical tradition as the Crimean War, in Russia as the Eastern War, and for a long time in Britain as the Russian War, must be seen not only as a conflict between

empires, but also as a conflict in which the religious dimension played a significant role. While the Ottoman decline and what is known as the Eastern Question were a part of the long-term causes of the war, this conflict can be seen primarily as an imperial war between Russia, Britain, and France. The “Eastern Question” refers to the problems posed in the Balkans as Ottoman power began to erode and national aspirations began to rise to the surface, potentially causing instability in southeastern Europe. Russia had proven to be a useful policeman for Europe against the Ottomans, and at the time enjoyed an alleged continental military superiority. Britain, on the other hand, was not interested in engaging in any military conflicts that might interfere with their overseas trade, but they did promise the Ottoman sultan that they would support him should any conflict break out between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. The French sought to regain their prominence on the European scene after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 and their subsequent domestic instability. However, the immediate causes of the Crimean War have a significant religious dimension. The Ottomans were the rulers of what is now Israel and Palestine, home to the most sacred sites of Judaism, Christianity, and to a lesser degree, Islam. The Russian Orthodox Church had taken a leading role in providing oversight over the Christian sites of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Church of the Nativity. The French claimed that the Roman Catholic nuns and priests were suffering under Russian Orthodox control, and sent warships to the Dardanelles. This act compelled the Ottoman sultan to transfer control of these particular sites to the French, violating an agreement signed with the Russians that gave them protectorate responsibility for the sites. The ability of the Russian Orthodox Church to claim to be the protector of these sites in the Holy Land gave Russia enormous influence in geopolitical affairs. In 19th-century Europe, international prestige was acquired as a result of providing protection to religious groups outside of one’s own borders, such as the Russians had traditionally done for the Eastern Orthodox Slavic peoples in the Balkans. Russia, through its ability to provide protection for these sacred sites, sought to retain its status as the protector of the Christians in Muslim lands. Although intercessions took place in Istanbul between Ottoman and Russian emissaries, the talks failed to restore

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Florence Nightingale and Religious Tolerance

While serving as a nurse in the Crimean War, Florence Nightingale demonstrated an intense personal devotion to Jesus Christ. Her service during this war provided a boost to the professional practice of nursing. She believed that hospitals should be free from the lordship of organized religion, although her faith played an important role in her decision to minister to the sick and wounded. She remained a strong opponent of religious intolerance throughout her life, and she firmly believed that Eastern religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, contained genuine revelation. Even pagans could find grace and were deserving of the fullest care that could be provided to them when sick. Florence Nightingale ensured that her nurses practiced religion to remain connected to a good greater than themselves. She provided a pledge for her nurses to take that has been modified somewhat, but is still in use today in most nursing schools. Florence Nightingale’s combination of religious belief and wartime experience led to the professionalization of nurse training throughout the world. The original Nightingale Pledge was as follows: I solemnly pledge myself before God and in the presence of this assembly to pass my life in purity and to practice my profession faithfully. I shall abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous, and shall not take or knowingly administer any harmful drug. I shall do all in my power to maintain and elevate the standard of my profession and will hold in confidence all personal matters committed to my keeping and all family affairs coming to my knowledge in the practice of my calling. I shall be loyal to my work and devoted towards the welfare of those committed to my care.

the protectorship to the Russian Orthodox Church, and war broke out as a result in 1853. In conclusion, the Crimean War was primarily a result of power struggles between competing empires, namely,

the Russian, Ottoman, French, and British. However, religious elements provided a catalyst for the outbreak of hostilities, demonstrating that although religious ideas are not necessarily the direct cause of conflict, in many cases, religion can complicate matters between nations and empires, leading to war. Orel Beilinson See also Holy Sepulchre, Church of the; Ottoman Empire Further Reading Figes, Orlando. The Crimean War: A History. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010. Sweetman, John. The Crimean War. Oxford: Osprey, 2001. Goldfrank, David M. The Origins of the Crimean War. London: Longman, 1994.

Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658) Born April 25, 1599, Oliver Cromwell was the second, but eldest surviving son of the knight Robert Cromwell. His mother, Elizabeth, was a member of the landholding Steward family. Cromwell’s early years were spent in the rural towns of Huntingdon in East Anglia until 1631 and St. Ives until 1636. In 1636, an inheritance from his uncle improved his status and he moved to Ely to administer the properties he was bequeathed. Cromwell’s situation was ambiguous. He describes himself in humble terms, yet his family connections place his social position in the governing elite, although upon the lowest rungs. In the 1610s, Cromwell went to London where he may have studied law as he was administering properties. However, he does not appear to have ever practiced. Cromwell’s actions are believed to have been religiously driven. His spiritual conversion to Calvinism is generally thought to have occurred between 1626 and 1636 but it may have been as late as 1638. Unfortunately, Cromwell did not leave a diary or journal. There are no discussions recorded by him on his religion other than a letter in which he seems to describe having had a fundamental change in belief. There are arguments that he believed in providentialism, which could have stemmed from his early education under Thomas Beard; otherwise he is not identified

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Oliver Cromwell was an English military and political leader who created the New Model Army and helped lead it to victory over the royalist forces of King Charles I in the English Civil War. Following the king’s execution in 1649, Cromwell effectively ruled England as an uncrowned monarch until his death in 1658. (Library of Congress)

with any sect. Cromwell’s providentialism can be seen when he attributes his victories not to his generals or himself but to God’s will and grace. Additionally, his writings have an edge of despair when things are not going well. Cromwell’s piety borders on fanaticism as he believed he was in a struggle against ungodliness. Some have linked his religious conversion to an illness he suffered in 1628 that has been thought to have been a severe depressive episode. Cromwell’s health has been an issue for much discussion, and there are suggestions that he may have suffered from a type of bipolar disorder. Cromwell was on the fringe of parliamentary circles in the 1630s and a justice of the peace briefly for Huntingdon in 1628–1629. This brief session ended in a political defeat for Cromwell and is thought to have caused his move to St. Ives. Cromwell was not active again in Parliament until

1640. Cromwell is described as naive and tactless, a man of action rather than thought. Some of his contemporaries noted Cromwell’s impulsiveness, citing his rants, anger, and oddly timed mirth. An example of the latter in demonstrated by his uncontrolled laughter after the victory at Dunbar, and the tossing of a cushion at a fellow MP before fleeing the room after a debate. When Cromwell returned to Parliament, he had little support or power; however, his views gained more recognition, especially when he voiced concerns regarding military issues in 1641. Despite having no previous military experience, Cromwell was commissioned a captain in 1642 and led troops in the field in support of Parliament during the English Civil Wars. In 1643 he was promoted to colonel and given leave to raise more troops. Rather than choose men based on social status, Cromwell selected “godly honest” men who then would recruit like-minded fellows from their hometowns. Cromwell felt that these men were supporters of the cause and would follow their commanders because of their hometown connections. Cromwell’s own experience of the war vacillated from fighting in the army to legislating in Parliament from 1642 until 1651, although more of his time was spent with the army. Cromwell’s battlefield and political exploits during the English Civil Wars were numerous and noteworthy. Remarkably, Cromwell achieved what others had not, the military conquest of both Ireland and Scotland. In 1648 Cromwell invaded and occupied Edinburgh, Scotland, which foreshadowed his ultimate victories at Dunbar (1650) and Worcester (1651), leading to his conquest of Scotland in 1651. Between campaigning in Scotland, in August 1649 Cromwell embarked upon the conquest of Ireland where he earned infamy that lasts to today in Ireland for the atrocities at Drogheda and Wexford. It is estimated that more than 3,500 individuals, including 700–800 civilians, were killed at Drogheda and more than 2,000 soldiers and civilians were killed in Wexford by the New Model Army. Much has been discussed as to the reasons for the atrocities. Cromwell himself claimed Drogheda as a deliberate example of his ruthlessness concerning the Irish. The events at Wexford appear to be unplanned as Cromwell lost control of his men when an unexpected breach in the walls occurred. Regardless, in 10 months

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Cromwell broke the Irish resistance, returned to England, and conquered Scotland. September 12, 1651, saw Lord General Cromwell return to London. There he tried to work within the Rump Parliament to make good on what the military had won. From the military’s view, Parliament failed to enact any reform, which placed Cromwell and Parliament at odds. Ultimately, this stalemate caused Cromwell, acting with others, to dissolve the Rump Parliament on April 20, 1653, and then later call the Little or Barebones Parliament (because of its small membership) on July 4 of the same year. The Little Parliament voted to disband itself and cede its powers to Cromwell on December 12, 1653. On December 16 Cromwell became the Lord Protector of England, Scotland, and Ireland and would remain in power until his death in 1658. As Lord Protector Cromwell was monarch in all but title, although he did not regard himself as such. As Lord Protector he twice called for and dissolved Parliament. When Parliament was not in session, Cromwell held absolute power over the governing of the Commonwealth. In 1657 Cromwell refused a proposal from Parliament to make him the king. Cromwell died on September 3, 1658, while still in office. Tracy M. Westcott See also English Civil Wars Further Reading Bennett, Martyn. Oliver Cromwell. London: Routledge, 2006. Coward, Barry. Cromwell. London: Longman Group UK, 1991. Cunningham, John. “Oliver Cromwell and the ‘Cromwellian’ Settlement of Ireland.” Historical Journal 53, no. 4 (December 2010): 919–37. Davis, J. C. “Cromwell’s Religion.” In John Morrill, ed. Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution. London: Longman Group UK, 1990, pp. 181–208. Hill, Christopher. God’s Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Morrill, John. Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution. London: Longman Group UK, 1990. Morrill, John. “Textualizing and Contextualizing Cromwell.” Historical Journal 33 (Sept. 1990): 629–39. Ó Siochú, Micheál. “The Curse of Cromwell?” History Ireland 16 (Sept.–Oct. 2008): 14–17. Ó Siochrú, Micheál. God’s Executioner: Oliver Cromwell and the Conquest of Ireland. London: Faber and Faber, 2008.

Crusade (as term) There were various attempts to investigate the phenomenon of crusading. The key interpretations, however, are provided by traditionalists, pluralists, popularists, and generalists. Thus, traditionalists construe “crusade” as a certain military activity conducted by a large group of people whose main purpose was to protect Jerusalem. Pluralists, in turn, understand crusading as a holy war carried out by Christian believers. Popularists underline a tight connection between a military campaign and a religious thrill that accompanied crusaders and contend that these are two major constituent parts of a crusade. Finally, generalists suggest thinking of any medieval war that was supported by or approved of by the church as a crusade. Therefore, it is obvious that scholars also variously interpret the starting point of crusading. For some, the First Crusade of 1095 was the beginning of such military and religious campaigns; for others, crusades did not start earlier than the 12th century. Apparently, over time, crusading was influenced by significant social, political, economic, and military changes, which made every crusade unique. An integral symbol of a crusade was the Christian cross. The cross patently symbolized the religious nature of this type of warfare, the devotion of the participants to God, and the righteousness of their aims. However, some scholars argue that crusaders did not take the cross of their own will but frequently were forced to do so. Nonetheless, thinking that there were crusades when the cross was taken as a purely “decorative” object would be incorrect as the religious grounds of crusading should not be doubted. Such facts as, for example, the absence of the cross during some crusades should only be considered the absence of a visible religious sign; their inner faith never left the participants. The role of the church in crusading was substantial. Crusading was not only approved but was often proclaimed and advocated by the pope. Along with various material benefits, crusaders were also promised God’s grace and atonement for sins. Crusades, hence, can be considered acts of redemption; such an understanding of a crusade, of course, only promoted further campaigns that promised

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forgiveness and grace to those who undertook the crusade. Crusades are often similar to pilgrimages in their reliance upon religious imagery and meaning. Everybody willing to do so could have taken part in a crusade, regardless of sex, age, or social status. Yet some sources indicate that crusading was an activity of and for nobles. The poor, indeed, were partaking but their duty was to follow the knights. Notably, military leaders and the pope often tried to prevent the participation of the poor in a crusade. Fighting was an inevitable part of every crusade and everybody was supposed to be ready for military action, unless they were physically unable to do so. A crusade was built upon the twin ideologies of religious faith and warfare. The motivation to participate in crusades was, therefore, to deserve God’s forgiveness and/or to demonstrate impeccable military skills. Tatiana Prorokova See also Crusades (Overview) Further Reading Housley, Norman. Contesting the Crusades. Malden: Blackwell, 2006. Prawer, Joshua. Crusader Institutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Richard, Jean. “The Adventure of John Gale, Knight of Tyre.” In Peter Edbury and Jonathan Phillips, eds. The Experience of Crusading. Vol. 2. Defining the Crusader Kingdom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 189–95.

Crusade of 1101 The Crusade of 1101 consisted of four separate expeditions to the Holy Land launched in 1101 in response to Pope Urban II’s call to arms at the Council of Clermont (1095); it may be regarded as a second wave of armies following the First Crusade (1096–1099) rather than as a separate crusade. The capture of Jerusalem in July 1099 combined with efforts by Pope Paschal II to encourage further calls to crusade at the synod of Anse in December 1099 and the Council of Poitiers in November 1100; these efforts, together

with a vigorous letter-writing campaign, led to a number of new armies departing for Jerusalem in 1101. The motives of the crusaders varied considerably. Some, like Albert, count of Biandrate, desired to emulate the success of the First Crusade, while others such as Welf IV, duke of Bavaria, evidently felt a need to go on pilgrimage after a long and eventful life. Stephen, count of Blois, had been one of the leaders of the First Crusade, but had not fulfilled his vows, having deserted at Antioch; he was pressured into traveling back to Jerusalem by Adela, his wife. William IX, duke of Aquitaine, seems to have gone on crusade for the adventure. The crusading armies were powerful but uncoordinated military enterprises, and included a large number of pilgrims and other noncombatants. Hugh, archbishop of Die, had been appointed as papal legate, but seems to have traveled independently to Jerusalem and took little part in the enterprise. This lack of coordination had important consequences, as a small but mobile Turkish army was able to defeat each crusading army in turn as it attempted to travel across Asia Minor. The first army to depart for the East left Milan on September 13, 1100. It was composed primarily of northern Italians from Lombardy and was led by Anselm, archbishop of Milan; Albert of Biandrate with his brother Guy and nephew Otto Altaspata; William, bishop of Parma; Guy, bishop of Tortona; Albert, count of Parma; and Albert, bishop of Piacenza. Anselm of Milan had been pressured into taking the cross by Urban II and Paschal II, both of whom had written many letters to him. He had then enthusiastically preached the cross in 1100, leading to the formation of the Lombard army. It comprised 8,000 soldiers (including many pilgrims), most of whom appear to have been interested in emulating the success of the First Crusade. The Lombard army marched swiftly through Hungary, passing the Bulgarian border at Semlin. The Byzantine emperor Alexios I Komnenos made market privileges available to the crusaders at various towns between the Bulgarian frontier and Thrace, but when the crusaders wintered outside Adrianople (modern Edirne, Turkey), they began to commit numerous atrocities, pillaging, raping, and desecrating Greek shrines. Alexios ordered them to proceed directly to Constantinople (modern Istanbul, Turkey), which they reached between March 15 and March 20, 1101. At the Byzantine capital the Lombard army was

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joined by a compact force of 2,000 soldiers led by Conrad, constable to the German emperor, Henry IV, which arrived in the second half of April. A second crusader army of around 3,000 people, commanded by William II, count of Nevers, left for the East at the beginning of February 1101. It went south through Italy to Brindisi, sailed to Avlona (modern Vlorë, Albania), and then traveled across Macedonia via Thessalonica (modern Thessaloniki, Greece) to Constantinople, where it arrived around June 14. Like the other armies, this contingent also contained a large number of noncombatants, including women. The third group of crusaders to leave was a large combined army from northern France, Flanders, and Burgundy, which departed for Constantinople at the beginning of March 1101. Its leaders were Stephen of Blois; Stephen, count of Burgundy, with his brothers Reginald and Hugh; the archbishop of Besançon; Miles, viscount of Troyes; Guy, count of Rochefort; Baldwin of Grandpré; and Ingilrand, bishop of Laon. They traveled south through Italy and across the Adriatic, arriving in Constantinople at the beginning of May 1101. At the start of the crusade this army was composed of approximately 8,000 soldiers. The fourth and final army to depart was made up of two originally separate contingents. One was led by William IX of Aquitaine and included Geoffrey of Vendôme; Herbert, viscount of Thouars; and Hugh of Lusignan. This Aquitanian expedition departed around March 20, 1101 and joined up with a large army of German crusaders in southern Bavaria that was commanded by Welf IV of Bavaria and included Thiemo, archbishop of Salzburg; Ulrich, bishop of Passau; and many of the anti-imperial Bavarian nobility. Welf ’s decision to journey to the East was a personal one based on the need to expiate his sins. It was far more in the nature of a pilgrimage than a conscious desire to embark on a crusading venture. The joint AquitanianBavarian army passed through Hungary and after much fighting with Byzantine forces, including a pitched battle outside Adrianople, eventually arrived in Constantinople at the beginning of June 1101. The joint army equaled about 16,000 people. The crusaders’ opponents in Asia Minor consisted of a compact but powerful Muslim alliance. Their principal enemy was Qilij Arslān I, Seljuk sultan of Rūm. Although he

had lost his capital of Nicaea (modern İznik, Turkey) to the army of the First Crusade in 1097, his largely nomadic Turks were still a formidable force. He had already proven a dangerous enemy to the crusading movement through his destruction of the People’s Crusade in 1097 and his bitter clashes with the army of the First Crusade at Nicaea and Dorylaion. Having learned to avoid the crusader army in open battle and not to rely solely upon his own resources, Qilij Arslān now gathered a number of allies. The main one was Malik-Ghāzī, the Dānishmendid emir of Sebastea, who governed northeast Asia Minor from the cities of Sebastea (modern Sivas, Turkey), Amaseia (modern Amasya, Turkey), and Ankara, and since he was holding captive Bohemund I, prince of Antioch, he had as much incentive to defeat this fresh expedition as did Qilij Arslān. The two other allies were Riwān of Aleppo and Karaja of Harran, both of whom had fought against the crusader army outside Antioch in 1098. The Muslim armies consisted of approximately 4,000–6,000 cavalry. Following a disturbance in Constantinople, the Lombard army moved to Nikomedia (modern İzmit, Turkey), where it was joined by Conrad and his German force and the larger northern French army of Stephen of Blois and Stephen of Burgundy. The Franco-Lombard army was also joined at Nikomedia by Raymond of Saint-Gilles, acting on the orders of Emperor Alexios I Komnenos. About this time a dispute broke out over the direction of the army across Asia Minor. Alexios advised following the route of the First Crusade, but news had broken of the capture of Bohemund, one of the heroes of that expedition, and the leaders of the Franco-Lombard army instead determined to rescue him from captivity in Paphlagonia. They left Nikomedia around June 9, 1101, traveling along the Pilgrim’s Road, and on June 24 reached Ankara, then held by forces of Qilij Arslān I. The Turkish garrison fled during the night, and the town was handed back to Alexios. From Ankara the crusaders struck northward, arriving at Gangra (modern Çankιrι, Turkey) around July 2, which they attacked but were unable to capture. The Franco-Lombard army was then forced northward by Seljuk forces, arriving at Kastamoni on July 30, where a foraging expedition suffered a particularly heavy defeat. Despite intense enemy pressure, the crusaders pushed eastward, hoping to reach Amaseia. However, they were intercepted by the main

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Turkish army and at Mersivan on August 16 were forced into a protracted engagement lasting more than five days. On the first day the Turkish army attacked the crusader encampment but was driven off with heavy losses. On the second day the Turks successfully ambushed a crusader foraging expedition, capturing all their plunder. The main battle occurred on the fourth day. The crusader army attacked the Turks in five separate divisions, but each was defeated in turn and the crusader encampment was besieged. During the night the crusader army fled toward Bafra on the Black Sea coast, but the Turks were able to overtake and massacre the infantry and enslave large numbers of women. Stephen of Blois and Stephen of Burgundy traveled overland back to Constantinople with as many survivors as they could find. Raymond of SaintGilles traveled back to Constantinople by ship. Anselm of Milan died at Constantinople on September 30, 1101. The army of William of Nevers left Constantinople on July 1, 1101 and arrived at Ankara on July 25, hoping to catch up with the Franco-Lombard army. Failing to find it, the crusaders traveled south to Ikonion (modern Konya, Turkey), which they found heavily defended by Seljuk troops and were unable to capture. On leaving Ankara the crusaders were constantly harassed by local Turkish forces until the main Seljuk army was able to catch up with them at Herakleia (modern Eregli, Turkey) around August 25– 26. By this stage the crusader army was suffering terribly, having been unable to find water for three days. Abandoning their usual hit-and-run tactics, the Turks engaged in close combat, and after a fierce engagement the crusader cavalry was forced to flee, leaving the infantry to be massacred. About 1,000 women were taken prisoner. William of Nevers escaped by fleeing to Antioch via Ermanek. The last army to leave Constantinople was the Aquitanian-Bavarian expedition, but before its departure rumors had begun to spread that Alexios was in league with the Turks. Fearing treachery, many German crusaders, including the chronicler Ekkehard of Aura, sailed directly from Constantinople in July 1101, reaching the port of Jaffa (modern Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel) in late August. After fulfilling their vows, many departed for home, Ekkehard leaving Palestine in September 1101. The rest of the crusaders traveled to Nikomedia and from there to Philomelion, which they destroyed, before arriving at Ikonion around

August 20. After leaving Ikonion, the crusader army suffered greatly from Turkish attacks and lack of provisions and water, and after leaving Herakleia the crusader army was attacked by the main Muslim army commanded by Qilij Arslān. Following a long and bitter contest the crusader army fled; William IX of Aquitaine and Welf IV of Bavaria escaped, but Thiemo of Salzburg was captured and executed. All of the crusading armies had been defeated piecemeal by a mobile and powerful Muslim alliance, whose forces had all fought against the army of the First Crusade and were well versed in crusader military tactics. Later crusader allegations of Greek treachery and collusion with the Turks are unfounded. After the heavy defeats suffered by all the crusader armies in Asia Minor, the survivors regrouped, using Antioch as a base. The crusading leaders still commanded a powerful army. Raymond of Saint-Gilles had been arrested by Tancred, regent of Antioch, but was allowed to rejoin the army at the request of the crusader leaders. The crusaders left Antioch in mid-February 1102 and besieged Tortosa (modern Tartūs, Syria). However, Welf IV of Bavaria and Reginald of Burgundy continued on to Jerusalem. Reginald died en route, but Welf fulfilled his vows, only to die in Cyprus on his way home. The main crusader army stormed Tortosa with the help of a Genoese fleet and then massacred the population. Raymond of Saint-Gilles remained in command of Tortosa, taking no further part in the crusade. The crusaders then traveled south, meeting King Baldwin I of Jerusalem at Beirut around March 8. They arrived in Jaffa on March 23, 1102, and finally fulfilled their vows in Jerusalem in time for Easter. William of Aquitaine was able to leave by ship, arriving back in Poitiers by October 29, 1102, but all the other crusader leaders were delayed at Jaffa by contrary winds and so were caught up in an Egyptian invasion of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The leaders and their knights fought in the disastrous second battle of Ramla on May 17, 1102, where they formed the majority of Baldwin’s army. Stephen of Blois, Stephen of Burgundy, and Hugh of Lusignan were killed in the fighting. The constable Conrad was captured and held prisoner for three years. Albert of Biandrate survived and was still with Baldwin in 1103. William of Nevers also survived and later refused to join the Second Crusade. Although the crusader knights’ contribution to

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the defense of Jerusalem had ended in failure, the crusader infantry formed the bulk of Baldwin’s army that decisively defeated the Egyptian army at the battle of Jaffa on July 4, 1110, and thus helped save the kingdom from collapse. Alec Mulinder See also First Crusade; Popular Crusades; Urban II, Pope Further Reading Beech, George T. “Contemporary Views of William the Troubadour, IXth Duke of Aquitaine.” In Neithart Bulst and JeanPhilippe Genet, eds. Medieval Lives and the Historian: Studies in Medieval Prosopography. Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1986, pp. 73–89. Cate, James Lea. “The Crusade of 1101.” In Kenneth M. Setton et al., eds. A History of the Crusades. 2nd ed. 6 vols. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–1989, 1: 343–367. Cate, James Lea. “A Gay Crusader.” Byzantion 16 for 1942–1943 (1944): 503–526. Mulinder, Alec. “Albert of Aachen and the Crusade of 1101.” In Alan V. Murray, ed. From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies, 1095–1500. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1998, pp. 69–77. Mulinder, Alec. “The Crusading Expeditions of 1101–2.” PhD diss., University of Wales, Swansea, 1996. Runciman, Steven. “The Crusades of 1101.” Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinischen Gesellschaft 1 (1951): 3–12. Runciman, Steven. A History of the Crusades. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951–1954.

crusade, Henry VI was able to raise an army of 60,000 soldiers and several nobles. However, due to unrest in the Kingdom of Sicily and his poor health, Henry VI would not lead the forces. Instead, Conrad of Wittelsbach, the archbishop of Mainz, was put in charge. The crusaders traveled by sea, leaving from ports in southern Italy on September 22, 1197, and then landing in Acre in what is today northern Israel. While the crusade of 1197 did not succeed in capturing Jerusalem, Henry VI’s forces were successful in capturing the coastal towns of Sidon, Botron, Jubail, and Beirut, thus linking the Levant coast from Tyre to Tripoli. The crusade faltered, however, when Henry VI died from a fever on Sicily on September 28, 1197. Upon hearing of Henry’s death, imperial leaders would return to their homes by the summer of 1198. Christopher D. Nelson See also Crusades (Overview); Saladin Further Reading Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The Crusades: A History. 3rd ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014. Setton, Kenneth M., Robert Lee Wolff, and Harry W. Hazard. A History of the Crusades. Vol. 2. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962.

Crusade of the Poor (1309) Crusade of Henry VI (1197–1198) The Crusade of Henry VI, also known as the Crusade of 1197, or as the German Crusade (Deutscher Kreuzzug), was launched after the failed crusade attempt of his father, Fredrick I (Fredrick Barbossa), in 1189–1190. Following Fredrick’s crusade, in which he died before he reached the Holy Land, Pope Celestine III, in 1195, called for a renewed attempt to seize Jerusalem. Seeing an opportunity to expand German influence, secure the Kingdom of Sicily (which he gained by marrying Constance, the queen of Sicily, in 1185), and capitalize on Muslim disunion following the death of Saladin in 1193, Henry VI initially paid for a force of 3,000 mercenaries to capture the Holy Land. By late 1195, after campaigning in Germany for the future

The Crusade of 1309 was a popular movement that took place after the fall of the city of Acre (present-day ‘Akko, Israel) to the Mamluks in 1291, inspired by the ideals and aims of the crusades. In the Low Countries, northern France, and the Rhine valley of Germany, a popular enthusiasm was aroused by the possibility of a new crusade and the desire to participate in it. Clearly, this demonstrates that more than a decade after the loss of the Holy Land, the zeal for a large-scale crusade to the Holy Land was still powerful. The event known as the “Crusade of the Poor” began as a direct popular answer to official crusade preaching, intended by Pope Clement V to be a first-stage, limited crusade to the East, which was to be conducted by the Knights Hospitallers. The first instructions were issued in August

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1308 for a crusade that was originally intended to depart in the spring of 1309, but which was then postponed until the autumn of that year. In June and July of 1309, the pope urged his bishops who were preaching the crusade north of the Alps to encourage the faithful to contribute with funds and prayers for the success of the forthcoming expedition; however, the laity were not supposed to take the cross or participate overseas in military actions. Their role in the crusade was to support the campaign with funds and prayer. From the spring of 1309, hordes of people (tens of thousands of them in some perhaps inflated estimates) headed for the papal court at Avignon, hoping to combine their forces with the army of Hospitallers. The majority of these crusaders came from England, Picardy, Flanders, Brabant, and Germany, taking the cross, but not welcomed by the bishops. This is important, for it indicates that they perceived themselves as authentic crusaders. The chroniclers (the anonymous author of the Annales Gandenses in particular) agree that nearly all these “Brothers of the Cross” came from the lower ranks of society, the landless peasants, rural laborers, and poverty-stricken urban artisans, but some were wealthy burgesses from northwestern German towns, even some knights—therefore this massive gathering possibly represented the upright structure of the distressed society of late medieval northwestern Europe. Lacking effective leadership and proper provisions, the poor of 1309 were forced to provide for themselves through robbery, violence, and plunder. Soon the Jews became a special target for the desperate crusaders. At the castle of Born, north of Maastricht, Netherlands, they attacked and reportedly killed more than 100 Jews from the surrounding region who had taken refuge there. As the crusaders besieged the castle of Genappe, Belgium, which gave shelter for the Jews threatened by the army of the poor, the protector of the Jews, Duke John II of Brabant, who had an economic interest in their well-being, sent his ducal army to their rescue, and the marauders fled with heavy losses. The climax of the entire crusade occurred in July 1309, as the great multitude of unsummoned crusaders arrived at the papal residence in Avignon. It is said that they asked the pope to declare a full-scale crusade, which would have had the effect of licensing their efforts. Clement V never condemned the movement; instead, on July 25, he granted

an indulgence of 100 years to all the German faithful who had assumed the cross, together with those who financed them, and who vowed to assist the Holy Land but were unable to carry out their pilgrimage due to their lack of ships. Nevertheless, due to this pontifical grant, the entire campaign remained unrecognized. That is why the Knights Hospitallers rejected their advances and refused to transport them. Since the crusaders were unable to manage their own military operations without the logistic support of the Hospitallers, they returned home without any achievement. Finally, in early 1310, the Hospitaller fleet sailed out of Brindisi in southeastern Italy, after consolidating their power in Rhodes, Greece; the Hospitallers had begun the conquest of the island in 1306, securing it by 1311. In all respects, the popular crusade and the crusade of the Hospitallers of 1309, two diverse undertakings originating from the same papal summons, display striking similarities, almost as if they mirrored each other. A papal crusade intended for specially selected, professional warrior-monks had been preached to the lay faithful, who then responded with their own unauthorized crusade of selfselected peasants and other nonwarrior members of society. The failure of the Crusade of the Poor clearly indicates that the ideal of the crusades had a solid ideological background and moral underpinning among the population even in the early 14th century. Gábor Bradács See also Crusades (Overview); Jews and the Crusades; Knights Templar Further Reading Carr, Mike. Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean, 1291–1352. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2015. Housley, Norman. The Later Crusades, 1274–1580. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Manion, Lee. Narrating the Crusades. Loss and Recovery in Medieval and Early Modern English Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. “The State of Mind of Crusaders to the East, 1095–1300.” In Jonathan Riley-Smith, ed. The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 66–90. Setton, Kenneth M., Robert Lee Wolff, and Harry W. Hazard, eds. The Later Crusades, 1189–1311. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.

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Crusades (Overview) The crusades were a series of intermittent military campaigns taking place between 1096 (First Crusade, 1096– 1099) and 1487 (the so-called “Waldensians Crusade” in Savoy, Piedmont, and Dauphiné), promoted by the papacy with the aim of extending and/or defending the Christian faith. In a wider perspective, the word encompasses all papal-sanctioned military campaigns in Southwestern Asia or in Europe, including a wide spectrum of conflicts, such as the persecution of heretics in southern France, the political conflict between Christians in Sicily, the Christian reconquest of Iberia, the Hussite Wars and the conquest of pagans in the Baltic, as well as the war in the Levant against Muslims to free the Holy Land from Muslim rule. A key distinction between the crusades and other holy wars is the legitimization of the crusades by the Pope, a legitimization based on the authority of contemporary thinkers such as Saint Bernard of Clairvaux (Bernardus Claraevallensis, 1090–1153). Crusades were also often declared as a means of conflict resolution among Roman Catholics; for example, a number of popes declared crusades against Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen (r. 1220–1250) and his sons and two crusades against the opponents of King Henry III of England (Henry III Plantagenet, r. 1216–1275), whose participants were granted the same privileges as the participants in the Fifth Crusade. The idea of crusade as “armed pilgrimage” to free the Holy Land emerged at the end of the 11th century in a context in which the gradual decay of the Byzantine Empire and the emergence of the Seljuk Turks were drastically changing the traditional balance of power of the Levant. In the same period, the Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula was facing a critical moment, with the emergence of the Almoravid Muslims temporarily checking the southward push of Castile, León, and the other Christian kingdoms of the North. In Eastern Europe, the Germans were expanding at the expense of the Slavs, while in the Mediterranean Sicily was conquered by Norman adventurer Robert Guiscard in 1072. The East-West Schism (1054) and the papalimperial conflict (investiture controversy) were opening large cleavages in the Christian world, paving the way to the crisis of the traditional concept of worldwide Christian community (Res publica christiana). In the effort to affirm

its superiority over secular powers (an effort that largely rested on the spirit of the Gregorian reformation), the church increasingly intervened in regulating the proper use of violence by Catholics. All of this occurred in the framework of an intense piety, a widespread interest in religious affairs, and an exacerbated perception of the role of sin and penance in everyday life. In March 1095, the Byzantine emperor Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081–1118) requested the pope’s assistance in facing the Seljuk threat pending on his territories. A few months later, during the Council of Clermont, Pope Urban II raised the issue of the struggle of the Eastern Roman Empire against the Muslims (November 27, 1095). However, in his preaching, the reconquest of the Holy Land was given far more emphasis than the aid to the Byzantine emperor. Although the pope did not explicitly call for the reconquest of Jerusalem, he called for military “liberation” of the Eastern churches and appointed Adhemar de Monteil (Adhemar de Le Puy, d. 1098) to lead the crusade, due to begin on the following August 15. The crusade was widely preached, especially in France. Shortly after Easter 1096, some 20,000 people (mostly peasants) followed Peter the Hermit (Peter of Amiens, ca. 1050–1115) toward the Holy Land, sacking far and wide along their route and indulging in large-scale anti-Jewish pogroms such as in Speyer, Worms, Mainz, and Cologne. This so-called “People’s Crusade” (“Peasants’ Crusade,” “Paupers’ Crusade.” or “Popular Crusade”), sapped by internal dissents between French and Germans, ended after clashing with the Seljuk forces of Kilij Arslan at Civetot in northwest Anatolia (October 21, 1096). In the meantime, the bulk of the First Crusade had left Italy and France, divided into four parts up to Constantinople. Its leaders (Godfrey and Baldwin of Bouillon, Robert Curthose, Hugh of Vermandois, Tancred de Hauteville, Bohemond of Taranto, Robert II, Count of Flanders, Raymond of Toulouse, Stephen of Blois) mostly belonged to the lower or the middle aristocracy, while neither the emperor Henry V nor Philip I, King of France, at odds with the papacy, joined the crusade. After the successful battle of Dorylaeum (July 1, 1097), the siege and the conquest of Antioch (June 1098) made evident the divergences existing between Alexios and the crusaders. While Bohemond and his troops occupied Antioch, the rest of the

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crusades reached Jerusalem on June 7, 1099, and on July 15 entered the city, which was heavily sacked. Four crusader states were established: the Kingdom of Jerusalem under Baldwin I (Baldwin of Boulogne, r. 1100–1118); the County of Edessa, originally under Baldwin I, then under Baldwin de Bourg (r. 1100–1118), who succeeded Baldwin I as king of Jerusalem after his death; the Principality of Antioch under Bohemond (r. 1098–1111) and his heirs; and the County of Tripoli under Raymond of Saint-Gilles (r. 1102– 1105). Since the very beginning, the fragmentation of power coupled with the hostile environment made the life of these states difficult and goes a long way in explaining the reason for their fall between 1149 (County of Edessa) and 1291 (Kingdom of Jerusalem). However, in the early 12th century, the Christian pressure continued. In 1101, three hastily organized expeditions in support of the newly established Christian states in the Holy Land were defeated in the battle of Mersivan and in the two battles of Heraclea, their only success being the conquest of Tortosa (Tartous). With the successes of Mersivan and Heraclea, the Seljuks led by Kilij Arslan were firmly established in the area of Konya, definitively cutting the land route between Constantinople and the Holy Land. The only open route remained the sea route, mostly to the benefit of the Italian maritime republics. The lack of a land route from Constantinople also benefited the Principality of Antioch, where Tancred (Tancred of Galilee, 1075–1112), now ruling for his uncle Bohemond, was able to strengthen his power without Byzantine interference. In 1122–1124, the “Venetian Crusade” promoted by Pope Callixtus II led to the conquest of Tyre. In these years, the needs of the conquest, the control of the territory and the protection and assistance of the pilgrims led to the birth of a series of military orders; among them, the Knight Hospitallers, more completely Knights of Saint John of Jerusalem (Ordo Fratrum Hospitalis Sancti Ioannis Hierosolymitan, est. 1099, rec. 1113); the Order of the Holy Sepulcher (Ordo Equestris Sancti Sepulcri Hierosolymitani, est. 1099, rec. 1113); the Knights Templar, or Poor Fellow-Soldiers of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon (Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Salomonici, est. 1118, rec. 1129); and the Order of Saint Lazarus of Jerusalem (est. 1119, rec. 1255). After the fall of Aleppo (1128) and Edessa (1144) to the Muslims, Pope Eugene III (r. 1145–1153) tried to revive the

crusader spirit by launching a second crusade on March 1, 1145. The crusade was preached also by Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, and both Louis VII, King of France (r. 1131– 1180) and Conrad III, Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1138– 1152) joined the effort (1147). However, results were poor. The crusaders was unable to both capture Damascus and relieve the Muslim pressure on the Christian states in the Levant. Amid widespread mistrust, Louis and Conrad returned to their possessions by 1150, while in the Levant Christian states grew increasingly divided. On the Muslim side, the rise of the Ayyubid dynasty under Saladin (AnNasir Salah ad-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, 1137–1193) was a major threat. On July 4, 1187, the Ayyubid army under Saladin defeated the crusaders at the battle of Hattin and reoccupied Jerusalem on September 29 of the same year. On October 29, Pope Gregory VIII (r. October 21–December 17, 1187), with the bull Audita Tremendi, called for a Third Crusade to retake the city. Frederick I, Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1155–1190), Philip II of France (r. 1179–1223), and Richard I of England (r. 1189–1199) all engaged in the operations but, again, their results were limited. While Frederick I drowned in the Saleph River and his army plunged into chaos (June 10, 1190), Philip and Richard occupied Acre (July 12, 1191) and Jaffa, routing the Muslim forces in the battle of Asruf (September 7, 1191). However, political dissent and logistic difficulties made the final conquest of Jerusalem impossible. Facing the risk of a stalemate, on September 2, 1192, Richard and Saladin negotiated an agreement by which Jerusalem remained in Muslim control but unarmed Christian pilgrims and traders were allowed to enter the city. The disappointing end of the Third Crusade paved the way to the call for a fourth one in 1198. This was anticipated by a personal initiative of Emperor Henry VI (r. 1191–1197), who was able to restore a land link between Acre and the territories of the County of Tripoli. In 1202, upon the initiative of Pope Innocent III (r. 1198–1216), a new effort to retake Jerusalem was undertaken. While en route to the Holy Land after the aborted effort to invade Egypt, the Christian forces were involved in the struggle for power engulfing the Byzantine Empire and entered into an agreement with Prince Alexios Angelos (Emperor Alexios IV, r. 1203–1204) to restore his deposed father, Isaac II, against his uncle, Emperor Alexios III (r. 1095–1203). The

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conflict that ensued ended with the brutal sack of Constantinople, which the Christian army conquered on April 12–13, 1204. With the treaty Partitio terrarum imperii Romaniae, the Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261) was established under the rule of Baldwin I (Baldwin IX, Count of Flanders, 1172–1205) and the partition of the Byzantine territories among the participants of the crusade was arranged. However, since they did not control most of the empire, Byzantine nobles could establish their local potentates, such as the Empire of Nicaea (1204–1261) under Theodore I Laskaris; the Empire of Trebizond (1204–1461) under Alexios I Megas Komnenos; and the Despotate of the Epirus (1205–1479) under Michael I Komnenos Doukas. The conquest of Constantinople, a traditional Christian bastion against Islam, by the Franks gravely discredited the idea of crusade. The pope himself openly (although not unambiguously) spoke against the event. The fact that only a very small part of the original force finally reached the Holy Land made an even worse impression. The Fifth Crusade (1213–1221) and the Sixth Crusade (1228–1229) had little military impact, with the brief capture of Damietta in Egypt (1219) as the only noteworthy result. It was only through the emperor’s diplomatic efforts, which led to an agreement with the Ayyubid sultan of Egypt, al-Kamil (alMalik al-Kamil Naser ad-Din Abu al-Ma’ali Muhammad, r. 1218–1238), that Jerusalem returned to Christian hands from 1229 to 1244. European rulers were far more interested in expanding and consolidating their possessions on the Continent through a series of local “crusades” such as the ones against the Wends, the Livonians, and the other “pagan” populations of northern and northeastern Europe (1147–1290), the Cathars in southern France (Albigensian Crusade, 1209–1229), and the “heretics” of Bosnia (1235– 1241). Even the alleged “return to the crusades’ original spirit” that marked the Seventh Crusade (“Crusade of Saint Louis,” 1248–1254) was short lived. With Pope Innocent IV (r. 1243–1254) and Emperor Frederick II (r. 1220–1250) now engaged in a new round of the long-lasting papalimperial struggle, the crusade itself was largely a brainchild of the king of France, Louis IX (Saint Louis, r. 1226–1270). In this case too, the final result was rather disappointing, with the king taken prisoner in the crushing defeat of al-Mansurah (February 8–11, 1250), together

with his brothers Charles d’Anjou (later Charles I of Naples, 1227–1285) and Alphonse de Poitiers (1220–1271) and some 12,000 men. Also from a symbolic point of view, the capture of Saint Louis marked the end of the “Age of the Crusades.” To be released, the king had to pay a ransom of 400,000 dinars and pledge no more return to Egypt. In 1256 the Venetians were evicted from Tyre, an event that triggered the socalled “War of Saint Sabas” (1256–1270) and the open clash of two Christian coalitions (respectively led by Venice and Genoa) employing Muslim mercenaries in their military operations and widely engaging the local Muslim powers in their diplomatic strategies. In this new context, there was little or no room for either the idea of crusade or the feeling of religious tension that originally supported it. In 1270, the Eighth Crusade, launched by Saint Louis against Tunis, was little more than an effort to gain the initiative in North Africa, while in the Levant the Mamluk sultan Baibars (alMalik al-Z.āhir Rukn al-Din Baibars al-Bunduqdari, r. 1260–1277) had made decisive inroads by defeating the Mongols in the battle of Ain Jalut (September 3, 1260), capturing Nazareth, Haifa, Toron, and Arsuf in 1265 and conquering Antioch in 1268. The Ninth Crusade (1271–1272), promoted by Prince Edward (later King Edward I) of England, while directly aimed at the Holy Land, suffered from the same limitations: the forces were too small, its duration too short, and the interests of the parties too diverse to allow any sound accomplishment. The last crusaders’ stronghold in the Levant, Acre, fell to Sultan Al-Ashraf Khalil (Al-Ashraf Salāh ad-Dīn Khalil ibn Qalawūn, r. 1290–1293) on May 18, 1291. Although the Christians maintained control of the tiny island of Ruad (Arwad) until 1302–1303, the age of the Latin kingdoms in the Holy Land had come to an end. Worth noting, a call for a Tenth Crusade preached by Pope Gregory X (r. 1271– 1276) during the Council of Lyon (1272–1274) had fallen on deaf ears. While the main front of the Christian-Muslim confrontation moved toward Anatolia and the Mediterranean Sea, the concept of crusade gradually evolved into a rhetorical stereotype. It maintained a strong emotional power until at least the 15th century, when it can be traced to the struggle against the Ottoman Turks (Crusade of Nicopolis, 1394–1396; Crusade of Varna, 1443–1444; Siege of Belgrade, 1456) and the menace of the heresy (Hussite

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Wars, 1419–1434; Waldensians Crusade, 1487). However, behind the rhetorical artifacts, new realities were emerging, in which conflict and cooperation coexisted in the same way as they did in the period of the Latin kingdoms, when Christian and Muslim powers entered into agreements to promote their interests and guarantee their security. Gianluca Pastori See also Albigensian Crusade; Antioch, Siege of; Audita Tremendi; Bouillon, Godfrey de; Constantinople, Arab Sieges of; Crusade (as term); Crusade of 1101; Crusade of Henry VI; Crusade of the Poor; Crusades and Religious Relics; Crusades, Naval History of; Crusades, Women in the; Edessa, County of; Eighth Crusade; Emicho, Count of Leiningen; Fifth Crusade; First Crusade; Fourth Crusade; Innocent III, Pope; Investiture Controversy; Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of; Jews and the Crusades; Knights Templar; Muslim Armies of the Crusades; Ninth Crusade; Popular Crusades; Reconquista; Religious Military Orders; Second Crusade; Seventh Crusade; Sixth Crusade; Urban II, Pope; Primary Documents: An Account of the First Crusade: Anselme of Ribemont’s Letter to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims (1098); An Account of the First Crusade: Letter of Daimbert, Archbishop of Pisa; Godfrey of Bouillon; and Raymond, Count of St. Gilles to Pope Paschal II (1099); Crusading in the Thirteenth Century: A Letter to All the Faithfull by the Patriarch of Jerusalem (1229) Further Reading Gaposchkin, M. Cecilia. The Making of Saint Louis: Kingship, Sanctity, and Crusade in the Later Middle Ages. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008. Harris, Jonathan. Byzantium and the Crusades. London: Bloomsbury, 2014. Hillenbrand, Carole. The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 2000. Malegam, Jehangir Yezdi. The Sleep of Behemoth. Disputing Peace and Violence in Medieval Europe, 1000–1200. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013. Murray, Alan V. “Bibliography of the First Crusade,” in From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies, 1095–1500. Edited by Alan V. Murray. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1998, pp. 267–310. Poumarèd, Géraud. Pour en finir avec la croisade. Mythes et réalités de la lutte contre les Turcs aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading. London: Athlone, 1986. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The First Crusaders, 1095–1131. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Riley-Smith, Jonathan, and Louise Riley-Smith, The Crusades: Idea and Reality, 1095–1274. London: Arnold, 1981. Runciman, Steven. History of the Crusades. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951–1954. Tellenbach, Gerd. The Western Church from the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War. A New History of the Crusades. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006. Tyerman, Christopher. The Invention of the Crusades. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998.

Crusades and Religious Relics Christian relics and places sanctified by the physical presence of a prominent saint, Mary, or Christ became holy pilgrimage destinations prior to the crusades, but even more so during them. As such, when used in the warfare of the crusades, they are illustrative of the historical practice of many religions of desiring talismans, omens, and answered prayers for divine assistance in combat. Relics are the physical remains of a holy person, their personal effects and objects, or a holy site and are a tangible memorial to the saint or site. They were more than mementos and were believed to possess healing powers and protection. The body of the deceased saint became a spiritual link between life and death and between individuals and God by providing intercession for the benefit of those on earth, specifically relief from famine, drought, or plagues. Relic collection and shrines predate the crusades and are witnessed in several religious practices and locations throughout Western and Eastern Europe. By 1100, the devout Christian associated a holy pilgrimage to the Holy Land and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, which was a place sanctified by the physical presence of Christ, Mary, or prominent saints, as a true sign of spirituality and veneration. Soldiers and crusaders made solemn oaths and offered gifts and their services in return for protection during battle and peace between warring factions. Miracle tales associated with relics attracted pilgrims. Acquisition of an important holy relic by abbeys, churches, and towns en route to the Holy Land made a distinction

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between holy sites that then became centers of pilgrimage and also offered the opportunity to make a pilgrimage to a holy site that was not in an area of war. A guaranteed revenue from housing, food, and portable souvenirs made relics much sought after during the crusade campaigns. Souvenir badges purchased at the shrines of saints were common keepsakes of humble pilgrims. Construction of churches and reliquaries along the pilgrim route into Jerusalem accompanied the collection of and the dealing in relics. An active market followed and relic trade entered the marketplace along the same trade routes as other portable commodities, ensuring the transmission of other arts to Western Europe. Relics became objects of devotion so powerful that pilgrims walked hundreds of miles to venerate them. Eventually, possession of relics extended from churches to royalty, nobility, and the merchant classes. The protection of precious relics initiated a major form of artistic expression and production across Europe and Byzantium. Reliquaries, produced in the Holy Land between ca. 1125 and 1187, are the containers or shrines that store and display the very valuable religious relics. Gold, silver, ivory, gems, and enamel were therefore deemed appropriate mediums with which to decorate a relic container. Reliquaries were usually created in the form of a casket; however, they frequently took the form of a double-armed cross of wood, encased in silver gilt and jeweled. The actual relic is viewed through openings made in the container. Reliquaries were often covered with narrative scenes from the life of the saint and common Christian themes. These were artistically carved, painted, or embellished with mosaic and embedded gem decorations. Often placed on an altar and carried in processions, these highly decorated works of art came to mirror the crusader ideas of beauty and made a permanent impression on the faithful. Privileged individuals commissioned reliquaries, and they were also available for purchase. Soldier saints and crusader kings carried reliquaries with them on crusade and into battle as a statement of faith and interceding protection. By the conclusion of the crusade campaigns, churches, cathedrals, and private homes were filled with treasuries of precious reliquaries. Periods of religious and political strife throughout the crusader states, however, created widespread destruction of religious objects and art. The reliquaries that survive display exceptional artistic

creativity and expertise. One such reliquary is the True Cross. The True Cross reliquary, which purportedly contains pieces of the cross of Christ, is associated with the crusades for several reasons. It was carried by crusader kings, as a symbol of their vow, on military campaigns during the 1120s and gained importance as the royal military ensign. When it was in Jerusalem it stayed in its chapel in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The True Cross relics became extremely valuable and highly desired as gifts and souvenirs among pilgrims and esteemed visitors to Jerusalem. Therefore, several reliquaries were cast as bequests. One, a golden reliquary of the True Cross, was made in Jerusalem about 1130. This reliquary has the distinctive crusader double-armed cross shape, inspired by Byzantine connections and found on crusader seals and coins. The golden reliquary of the True Cross was preserved for centuries in the Monastery of the Holy Cross in Denkendorf and is now located in the Württembergisches Landesmuseum near Stuttgart, Germany. M. Lynn Barnes See also True Cross Further Reading Folda, Jaroslav. Crusader Art: The Art of the Crusades in the Holy Land, 1099–1291. Burlington, VT: Lund Humphries, 2008. Freeman, Charles. Holy Bones, Holy Dust: How Relics Shaped the Medieval History of Europe. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011. Sumption, Jonathan. The Age of Pilgrimage: The Medieval Journey to God. London: Faber & Faber, 1975. Ure, John. Pilgrimages: The Great Adventure of the Middle Ages. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2006. Webb, Diana. Medieval European Pilgrimage, c. 700–c. 1500. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Crusades, Naval History of The crusades spanned two centuries beginning with the 1095 CE call by Pope Urban II to come to the aid of the Christian Byzantine Empire, then under pressure from the Muslims led by the Seljuk Turks. The ultimate goal of this effort may have been to reunify the Christian churches

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under the pope in Rome. During the course of the campaigns to regain control of significant religious sites in the Levant, maritime affairs played a significant role. One of the distinctive features of this period was the absence of religious factors directly affecting the war at sea. Economic factors and political alignments played a dominant role. Ironically, it was the economic aspects of Islam that provided a second-order effect on the naval conflict. Three periods characterized the naval history of the crusades. The first segment, dominated by the First Crusade, saw little naval activity. The middle period, consisting of the Second and Third Crusades, saw relatively few naval battles, and the maritime activity was dominated by amphibious operations. This combination of factors led to the destruction of Muslim naval power. The concluding phase featured an increase in the number of battles at sea, but these activities consisted primarily of intramural conflicts among the Latin powers. The First Crusade was composed of the disastrous People’s Crusade followed by the militarily professional Princes’ Crusade, during which the European armies traveled overland. Naval operations followed in the wake of the armies in order to establish logistic support and centers for reestablishing trade. The most significant role played by maritime forces was the resupply fleet that allowed the crusader army besieging Antioch to regenerate its combat power in time to defeat the Muslim army marching to relieve the city. While contemporary sources attribute the revitalization of the Christian army to the discovery of the “Holy Lance” within the city, the principal factor was likely the arrival by sea of food and of the materials necessary for building the siege engines that were instrumental in taking most of the city before the arrival of the relieving Muslim army under Kerbogha, Atabeg of Mosul. The most significant battle at sea during this period occurred between the fleets of Venice and Pisa, effectively expelling the Pisans from the eastern Mediterranean. A Venetian fleet was also reported to have defeated a Fatimid fleet sent to relieve Muslim forces under siege at Tyre. During the Second and Third Crusades, the armies ashore enjoyed limited success. At sea, amphibious operations against islands held by Seljuk and Fatimid forces were generally successful. Resupply from the sea was also

critical in preserving the first Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem until its fall to Salah al-Din in 1187, which precipitated the Third Crusade. Fatimid naval forces were again defeated off the Levant coast at Ascalon in 1153. Muslim naval power continued to wane until a brief renaissance under Salah al-Din during the 1180s. While the Third Crusade failed to retake Jerusalem, the combined Christian naval forces under the leadership of Richard I of England eliminated the threat of Muslim maritime forces, ushering in the final phase of the naval and maritime history of the crusades. The Ayyubid dynasty founded by Salah al-Din and its Mamluk successors in Egypt were never able to rebuild their fleets. The absence of an Ayyubid or Mamluk maritime threat produced an increase in competition and conflict among the various Christian maritime powers. The 14th century saw a rise in the number of fleet battles fought in the Mediterranean, almost entirely between Latin navies. Venice emerged as the main protagonist, providing transport to the various crusader armies while attempting to bend the objectives of the campaign to suit its own political, religious, and economic objectives. The Fourth Crusade was emblematic of this new dynamic. The Venetians simultaneously negotiated the fare to carry Western European soldiers on crusade while also guaranteeing the Ayyubids that Egypt would not be invaded. The end result was the redirection of the Fourth Crusade against Constantinople. The Western church, having failed to reunite Christendom under the papal banner by influence, resorted instead to a military assault. Venice eliminated one commercial rival by conquest while simultaneously defeating Genoa and Pisa in traditional naval battles. While the Venetian goal was primarily economic, the offer by the son of the deposed Byzantine emperor Isaac II to agree to the reunification of the Byzantine church with that of Rome also played a role. The landing of the invading army by the Venetian fleet ultimately led to further embitterment of relations between the Orthodox and Latin churches. The principal naval battles of the era took place among the fleets of Genoa, Norman Sicily, Pisa, and Venice rather than against Muslim antagonists. Even after the rise of the Mamluk sultans in Egypt, Latin sea power continued to dominate the Mediterranean. This situation ensured that

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amphibious landings on the coast of Egypt during the Fifth and Six Crusades were virtually unopposed. Continued logistic support provided by sea was also critical in the continued existence of the reestablished Kingdom of Jerusalem (Acre). While the crusades were an inherently religious undertaking, the naval history of the era was influenced far more by political and economic factors. The principles of Islam regarding economic activity were, in the end, much more influential in shaping the maritime environment. The principle of riba, or usury, which was interpreted as the paying or accepting of interest and was prohibited in some interpretations of the Qur’an, affected the ability of Muslim forces to generate naval power. Religious fervor was sufficient to mobilize large, victorious armies on land. At sea, the expense and complexity of warships required a much greater economic investment. Limitations on raising capital impacted Muslim naval power. The principal Latin maritime states were more likely to war among themselves and trade with Muslim adversaries than to adhere strictly to religious alignments. To the degree that religion played a major, direct role, the rivalry between the Byzantine church and the papacy was far more significant. K. J. Delamer See also Constantinople, Arab Sieges of; Crusades (Overview); First Crusade; Fourth Crusade, Saladin; Second Crusade; Third Crusade Further Reading Dotson, John. “Venice and Genoa in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries.” In John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds. War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. New York: Boydell Press, 2003. Lewis, Archibald R., and Timothy J. Runyan. European Naval and Maritime History, 300–1500. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990. Rodgers, William Ledyard. 1940. Naval Warfare under Oars: 4th to 16th Centuries. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1940. Rose, Susan. Medieval Naval Warfare, 1000–1500. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. Runciman, Steven. The History of the Crusades. Volume I: The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1951.

Crusades, Women in the The crusades were a series of military campaigns sanctioned by the Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages, stretching from 1096 into the 15th century. The majority of crusaders were Roman Catholics from Western Europe. The explicit goal of the first and largest crusades was to restore access for Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land, which was at the time under Muslim control. However, individual crusades and crusaders each had their own motivations, and the outcomes of the crusades were numerous and varied. As the crusades were primarily militaristic in nature, it is commonly assumed that women played little to no part in the events that defined the period. However, in reality women played varied and important roles in military events, as patrons and commanders of crusader groups, and of course on the home front, where the mass departure  of crusaders led to a variety of significant social changes. The women who physically accompanied men on the Crusades represented all walks of life and took part in the crusades for a variety of reasons. Some were relatives of crusading men—wives, daughters, sisters, and even mothers—while some chose to join the crusades independently. These women provided physical and moral support for crusading men, and in some cases even joined in the fighting themselves. Women played a number of key support roles during the crusades that proved vital to the male-dominated effort of combat. Firsthand accounts of the First Crusade document how women were largely in charge of finding and providing drinking water for their male counterparts as they moved through and fought in the Middle East—no unimportant task in such a climate. These women did not only provide water while on the move or at camp; documents also show women entering the battlefield to bring water and projectiles such as stones to their male fighting counterparts. Behind the front lines, one of the most prominent female roles was that of the washerwoman. These women, the only ones officially authorized to join the crusades by the Catholic Church, provided basic sanitary services such

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as washing clothes when possible and removing lice from men’s hair. These women could not be “a burden on the army nor a cause of sin,” meaning that they were required to be physically unattractive so as not to arouse the men. Of course, all of the regulations in the world could not stop prostitutes from accompanying crusading armies, a fact mentioned in both Christian and Muslim firsthand accounts of the crusades. Women engaging in direct physical combat during the crusades were a comparatively rarer phenomenon, but it certainly did take place. A crusader account mentions women among the ranks of Christian soldiers taking Jerusalem in 1099, and a Muslim account of the Third Crusade recalls Frankish prisoners who were only recognized as women once their armor was removed. Overall, accounts of crusader women engaging in physical combat are primarily confined to Muslim sources, and many scholars argue that these authors had incentive to lie. However, even the most skeptical scholars tend to agree that women engaged in battle at least in emergency situations. During the crusades, a number of noblewomen accompanied men and even organized and commanded their own fighting forces in the Holy Land, though often under unanticipated circumstances. The most famous story regarding a woman crusader—that of Eleanor of Aquitaine dressed as an Amazon warrior—is almost certainly a myth, but she did play an important role in encouraging support among her vassals and attracting additional soldiers to the Second Crusade. Certain women leaders, including Queens Sybilla and Isabella I of Jerusalem, played active roles in commanding defenses of the “crusader kingdoms” established in the Holy Land during the late 12th and early 13th centuries. And Margaret of Provence, Queen of France during much of the 13th century, was for a brief time the only woman to lead a crusade after the capture of her husband, King Louis IX, in 1250. Wafa Hozien See also Crusades (Overview) Further Reading Edgington, S., and S. Lambert, eds. Gendering the Crusades. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

Hodgson, N. Women, Crusading and the Holy Land in Historical Narrative. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2007. Kelly, A. Eleanor of Aquitaine and the Four Kings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950. Maier, C. “The Roles of Women in the Crusade Movement: A Survey.” Journal of Medieval History 30, no. 1 (2004): 61–82. Nicholson, H. “Women on the Third Crusade.” Journal of Medieval History 23, no. 4 (1997): 335–49.

Cyprus, Kingdom of The Kingdom of Cyprus was established during the era of the crusades after the capture of the island by Richard I of England (“Richard the Lionheart”) in 1191 and survived until the Turkish conquest of 1571. Due to its geographic location between the eastern Byzantine Empire and the Levant, Cyprus would remain an integral region for military campaigns for both Christian and Muslim forces. At the time of Islam, Cyprus (Arab. Khubrus) was a province of Byzantium. In the mid-seventh century, following the reign of Heraclius (r. 610–641), expeditions against the island commenced under Islamic rule; the governor of Syria and founder of the Umayyad dynasty, Mu’awiya (r. 661– 680), is credited for this early campaign, the first extensive maritime tour of the Arabs on the Mediterranean found in the annals of history. During Muslim occupation, the inhabitants of Cyprus were required to pay a yearly tax to the caliph equal to that which the Byzantine treasury received. This indicates that both the Islamicate and Byzantium had joint control over the island. The relationship between the two empires that ensued under various peace treaties would continue for nearly 250 years. The presence of the original Cypriots, however, and the vying for power among the three parties (Cypriots, Byzantines, and Muslims) caused internal conflict that only intensified with crusader interests in the island. Byzantine forces led by John Comnenus were put out of commission in 1156 by the crusader Reynald de Châtillon, who was aided by Thoros II (r. 1145–1168) of Armenia; a Byzantine presence on the island would continue, however, until the invasion of 1191.

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A fleet of crusader ships leaving Sicily were blown ashore on the island in April 1191 due to a storm, and the occupants were captured by Isaac Ducas Comnenus, a former member of the Byzantine ruling party turned dissenter and ally of S.alāh. al-Dīn (Saladin). Word of their maltreatment reached Richard the Lionheart, who swore revenge on Isaac for his actions. After first capturing Limassol, Richard took the entire island. The surrender of Comnenus ended Cyprus’s heterogeneous rule on May 6, 1191. Richard sold the island to the Knights Templars in July 1191, though a rebellion quickly arose, leaving Cyprus in financial ruin. Guy de Lusignan repurchased the island in May 1192, thereby inaugurating the Kingdom of Cyprus (“Kingdom of Lusignan”), which included the kings of Cyprus and Jerusalem. This became a period of Frankish rule lasting nearly four centuries (1192–1571). During this time, two periods can be delineated: the rule of the House of Lusignan (1192–1474) and the Venetian rule (1474–1571). The Ottomans took possession of Cyprus formally on March 7, 1573, under a treaty with Venice, though their occupation went unchallenged. One of the major changes that occurred on Cyprus during the Ottoman period was the abolition of the feudal system that freed native farmers from serfdom. Lands were granted to them in exchange for paying a “non-Muslim” tax of one gold piece per head of family. The Ottoman administration lasted until the sultan ceded the island to the British in July 1878. Roy Michael McCoy III See also Mu’awiya Further Reading Haag, Michael. The Tragedy of the Templars: The Rise and Fall of the Crusader States. London: Harper, 2013. Herrin, Judith, and Guillaume Saint-Guillain. Identities and Allegiances in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204. Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011. Kostick, Conor, ed. The Crusades and the Near East. London: Routledge, 2010. Nader, Marwan. Burgesses and Burgess Law in the Latin Kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus (1099–1325). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006. Phillips, Jonathan. The Crusades, 1095–1204. London: Routledge, 2014.

Cyrus Cylinder This barrel-shaped stone inscription was composed in the mid–first millennium BCE under the aegis of the great Medo-Persian founder of the Persian Empire, Cyrus II. It is written in the cuneiform syllabic dialect of Neo-Babylonian Akkadian rather than the expected Persian since Akkadian was then the lingua franca of the Middle Eastern world. Cyrus conquered the city of Babylon in 539, a historical turning point recorded in the Old Testament as well as in secular texts (Daniel 5:30–31; 2 Chronicles 36:22–23; Ezra 1:1–4; 5:13–17; 6:3–5). One of the first official acts of his administration was the disposition of the problem of the thousands of refugees, including Jews, who had been brought to Babylonia as early as 605 BCE under Nebuchadnezzar. Noted as one of the most benevolent rulers of the time, Cyrus decided to allow these captives to return to their homelands, all the time, of course, as citizens of vassal states beholden to the Persian king. According to the inscription, the impetus behind this apparently benign policy was Cyrus’s desire to placate Marduk, the Babylonian god, because of the failure of the Babylonian kings to maintain the sacred trust given them by their god in matters both religious and political. He declared that Marduk had, in fact, called him to restore Babylonia to its once vaunted glory (Cylinder, lines 9–19; cf. Isaiah 44:28–45:4). The section of the stele that is of particular relevance to the Hebrew Bible reads as follows: the holy cities beyond the Tigris whose sanctuaries had been in ruins over a long period, the gods whose abode is in the midst of them, I returned to their places and housed them in lasting abodes. I gathered together all their inhabitants and restored (to them) their dwellings. . . . I at the bidding of Marduk, the great lord, made to dwell in peace in their habitations, delightful abodes. The Old Testament historians of the period learned of the inscription and, indeed, were likely beneficiaries of its provisions. The book of Ezra (written approximately 430 BCE) commences with a Hebrew interpretation and/or application of the cylinder appropriate to the situation of the

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Jews who had been returned to Yehud, the Persian way of speaking of Judah. A later biblical text in 2 Chronicles (ca. 400 BCE) reads virtually the same as the Ezra rendition. The highlights of the latter passage (2 Chronicles 36:22– 23) are as follows: Now in the first year of Cyrus king of Persia . . . the Lord stirred up the spirit of Cyrus king of Persia, so that he made a proclamation throughout all his kingdom and also put it in writing: “Thus says Cyrus king of Persia: ‘The Lord, the God of heaven, has given me all the kingdoms of the earth, and he has charged me to build him a house at Jerusalem, which is in Judah. Whoever among you of all his people, may the Lord his God be with him. Let him go up.’” It is clear that the fundamental thrust of the two versions of the decree is the same in both; however, it is equally clear that the biblical historians felt free to reword the original Akkadian text so as to fit the situation of the Jewish refugees who had by then returned and built what is now called the “Second Temple.” Eugene H. Merrill See also Cyrus II, King of Persia Further Reading Arnold, Bill T., and Bryan E. Beyer, eds. Readings from the Ancient Near East. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2002. Cogan, Mordechai. “Cyrus Cylinder.” In William W. Hallo and K. Lawson Younger Jr., eds. The Context of Scripture. Vol. 2. Leiden: Brill, 2000. Fish, T. “The Cyrus Cylinder.” In Winton Thomas, ed. Documents from Old Testament Times. London: Thomas Nelson, 1958.

Cyrus II, King of Persia (ca. 600 or 576–530 BCE) One of the greatest monarchs of the ancient Near Eastern world, Cyrus, also known as “Cyrus the Great,” sprang from two royal lines, that of the kingdom of Media (his maternal ancestry) and of the kingdom of Persia (paternal roots).

The royalty of the latter kingdom derived from Achaemenes (ca. 700–675 BCE) whose name is reflected in the name Achaemenid dynasty. His successor Teispes (675– 640 BCE) divided the kingdom into two parts ruled respectively by two sons, Ariaramnes (640–615 BCE) over the southern part of what is now western Iran, and Cyrus I (640–600), grandfather of Cyrus II, over the northern areas. The Median side of the family originated north of the Caucasus Mountains and migrated south into the Iranian plateau. The first datable king was Phraortes (675–653 BCE), the conqueror of Parsa (Persia), then ruled by Teispes. The Median control of the region was lost to the Scythians for a number of years and then recovered by Cyaxares (625–585), whose son was Astyages (585–550 BCE). The daughter of Astyages married Cambyses I of Parsa, thus uniting the Median and Persian royal houses. A son of this union was Cyrus II (550–530 BCE). A result of this intermarriage is that Cyrus of Persia became the grandson of Astyages of Media. Cyrus determined to unite Media and Persia, but to accomplish this he had to overthrow his own grandfather, which he did by attacking the Median capital, Ecbatana, taking Astyages prisoner. By 550 BCE Cyrus had become king of both Media and Persia and shortly thereafter the emperor of a vast domain stretching from Upper Egypt and North Africa to the southwest, Greece to the west, the Black and Caspian Seas to the north, and (modern) Pakistan to the east. His armies were large, well trained, and superbly equipped to wage war against enemies near and far and both the weak and the powerful. Cyrus, upon defeating Babylon in 539 BCE, decreed that all peoples previously under Babylonian retention could return to their homelands, rebuild their infrastructures, and resume the worship of their own gods, rather than Marduk, head of the Babylonian pantheon. This included the Jews, who had been deported from Judah nearly 65 years earlier in some cases (605 BCE). Cyrus in the strictest sense was an ecumenist or syncretist, religiously speaking. Though possibly a Zoroastrian by birth and practice, he was wise enough to see that the best policy in creating and maintaining an empire was to allow the various satrapies (or provinces) a certain amount of autonomy, especially in the realm of religion. Thus, in Judah’s case he not only

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allowed the Jews to return to their homeland, but he guaranteed their security and provided for them the assets wherewith to reestablish themselves there and, in particular, to rebuild their temple (2 Chronicles 36:22–23; Ezra 1:1). This same generous attitude toward Judah and the Jews was carried out by his royal successors Cambyses II (530–522), Darius Hystaspes (522– 486; Ezra 4:5, 24; 5:6– 17; Haggai 1:1; Zechariah 1:1); Xerxes (486–465; biblical Ahasuerus; Ezra 4:6; Esther passim); and Artaxerxes I (464–424; Ezra 4:7–24; 8:1; Nehemiah 2:1–8; 5:14; 13:6). Eugene H. Merrill

See also Cyrus Cylinder Further Reading de Gobineau, J. A. The World of the Persians. Geneva: Minerva, 1971. Ghirshman, R. Iran. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1954. Olmstead, A. T. History of the Persian Empire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Widengren, Geo. “The Persians.” In D. J. Wiseman, ed. Peoples of Old Testament Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973. Yamauchi, Edwin M. Persia and the Bible. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1990.

D Dalai Lama XIV (1935–)

make our world a truly global village, I believe there will be a time when war and armed conflict will be considered an outdated and obsolete method of settling differences among nations and communities. (Gyatso, Message, 1)

Tenzin Gyatso was only a child when he was recognized as the 14th Dalai Lama in 1939. He is the religious leader of Tibetan Buddhism and the founder of the Tibetan government in exile in Dharamsala, India, to which he fled in 1959 following the 1950 Chinese invasion of Tibet. Born on July 6, 1935, he is the 14th incarnation of the Dalai Lama, the Bodhisattva or “embodiment of compassion.” Tibetan Buddhists revere him as a living prophet—similarly to how Christians would relate to Christ if he were alive today—and commonly refer to him as “His Holiness the Dalai Lama” (HHDL). Given the dualistic concepts of diplomacy and defense that dominate international relations, how might one’s thinking and actions change if, as Tibetan Buddhists advocate, compassion rather than aggression were the primary objective of international relations? Widely respected as a world leader and nonviolence advocate, the Dalai Lama is uniquely qualified to address this challenge of embracing and promoting a “peace first” approach to human conflict:

Tibet and Conflict

Located at an elevation exceeding 13,000 feet, the Tibetan Plateau borders numerous countries, including China and Nepal. Tibet’s strategically advantageous position at the “rooftop of the world” has seen it fought over for centuries. For instance, in the 19th century, Russia and Britain (then in control of India) contended for control of the region. In the 20th century, China and India were rivals for dominance in Tibet. Tibet’s spiritual and political leader since the age of 15, the 14th Dalai Lama adhered to a strict policy and philosophy of nonviolence. From a position of peace through negotiation, he fought to preserve Tibet’s independence from growing Chinese interference in the Tibetan government. During the 1950 Chinese invasion of Tibet and subsequent Tibetan resistance, monks and nuns took up arms, torn between a commitment to nonviolence and the realistic need to protect the life of the Dalai Lama and fight for Tibetan independence. The Dalai Lama’s people feared for his life, and he was forced to escape to India in 1959. Despite his

It is . . . my belief that whereas the 20th century has been a century of war and untold suffering, the 21st century should be one of peace and dialogue. As the continued advances in information technology 225

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Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, is greeted by President Barack Obama during his visit to the White House on June 15, 2016. As a result of his adherence to compassion and nonviolence in the midst of the Tibetan struggle for independence, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

refugee status, he continued to urge his people to exercise nonviolent resistance and believed that if Tibetan independence could not be attained, then autonomy in government could be negotiated with world support. The CIA assisted his escape into India and initially provided the Tibetan freedom fighters with support and training. After the Dalai Lama established a Tibetan government in exile in India, China, despite international pressure and the ongoing Tibetan rebellion, did not restore Tibetan independence, but instead exercised a policy of strict control, suppression of dissent, and assimilation. Chinese government plans that risk marginalizing ethnic Tibetans include mass resettlement campaigns that aim to increase the ur-

ban population of Tibet by as much as 30 percent by the year 2020. Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama remains in exile with little hope of return. As a result of his adherence to compassion and nonviolence in the midst of the Tibetan struggle for independence, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989.

War: An Outdated Response to Conflict

The 14th Dalai Lama continues to promote Tibetan Buddhist ideals based on compassion through teachings, book authorship, and advocacy. His political experience leading Tibet provided an ideal crucible for coalescing realist needs for defense with nonviolent diplomatic policy: conflict

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where the tenets of just warfare must be debated will always occur. He has in the past, for example, cited the Second World War case of the Allies stopping Hitler’s aggression as regrettable, but necessary. However, despite realist application in the case of the Tibet/China conflict, the Dalai Lama has forged the conviction that debate must focus beyond just war considerations. He advocates the idea that all individuals and communities must value peace, nonviolence, and compassion above all else and consider the needs and interests of each person and family and every individual’s right to happiness and well-being. His works pertinent to war and religion include the following: The Wisdom of Compassion (2015), Beyond Religion: Ethics for a Whole World (2012), Toward a True Kinship of Faiths (2010), Path of Wisdom, Path of Peace (2005), and The Political Philosophy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama—Selected Speeches and Writings (1998). If one accepts the premise that globalization has made it impossible to ignore the needs of others, the default question of importance when considering differences should not ask, “When is war just?” Instead, one should ask, “What is the source of conflict?” and “How can conflict be settled by nonviolent means?” In the Dalai Lama’s view, there is always a way to find and choose a nonviolent solution. Gina Granados Palmer See also Buddhism and War, Just War Tradition Further Reading Bsod-nams-dban.-’dus, Khe-smad, Basil John Gould, and Hugh Edward Richardson. Discovery, Recognition, and Enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama: A Collection of Accounts. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, 2000. Dunham, Mikel. Buddha’s Warriors: The Story of the CIA-backed Tibetan Freedom Fighters, the Chinese Invasion, and the Ultimate Fall of Tibet. New York: J. P. Tarcher, 2004. Gyatso, Tenzin. “The Message of the Dalai Lama Sent to the Millennium World Peace Summit.” Gyatso, Tenzin. Letter to Delegates. August 23, 2000. MS. United Nations Headquarters, New York. Kanwal, Gurmeet. “China’s Long March to World Power Status: Strategic Challenge for India.” Strategic Analysis 22, no. 11 (1999): 1713–28. Norbu, Dawa. “Chinese Strategic Thinking on Tibet and the Himalayan Region.” Strategic Analysis 32, no. 4 (2008): 685–702.

Damascus, Arab Conquest of (634 CE) The siege and conquest of the city of Damascus, in modern-day Syria, occurred between August 21 and September 19, 634, when Arab forces under Khalid ibn al-Walid defeated Byzantine defenders under Thomas of Damascus after attempts to rush reinforcements to the area and to break the siege from within failed. While it was not the first defeat of the Byzantines by invading Arab armies, it was the first major city to fall in the few years since the Christian-ruled Byzantine Empire reclaimed the area from the Persian Empire. The conquest of Damascus demonstrated Arab ideas of military victory, political peace, and the demands of honor inside their new Islamic religion. With the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, his successor Abu Bakr began the expansion of Islam to areas beyond Arabia. Abu Bakr decided to fight both the Persians and Byzantines simultaneously. The first area that fell, in 633, was Mesopotamia in a lightning campaign that crushed the already weakened Persians. These Arab forces, led by Khalid, turned in 634 to the conquest of Syria. This turn from total victory in Persia was necessary due to Byzantine reinforcements that poured into the Middle East to deter the invading Arabs. When Khalid arrived and linked up with these smaller Arab armies, he crushed the Byzantines at the Battle of Ajnadayn, in modern-day Israel, in the summer of 634. Following this victory, Khalid arrived in front of the powerful fortifications protecting Damascus and its 15,000 defenders under the capable command of Thomas of Damascus. More than 20,000 Arabs surrounded the city, avoiding attacks against its thick walls, opting instead to starve the city into submission. In support of these tactics, Khalid detached a small force to ensure Byzantine reinforcements would never arrive. The failure of the Byzantines to get reinforcements through, at the Battle of Uqab, ensured the fall of Damascus. With no reinforcements coming, Thomas attacked from one of the city gates but failed to break the Arab line. Attacking again, the Byzantines were again defeated with heavy losses. The siege of Damascus ended with political and religious maneuvering rather than military might. Christian rule was unpopular in Damascus, and it was a Christian

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priest that gave Khalid information exposing weaknesses in the Byzantine defense on September 18, 634. Khalid attacked and quickly went over the wall, but Thomas, well aware of the Islamic practice of sparing unresisting populations, negotiated his surrender with one of Khalid’s subordinates who was unaware that an attack was already underway. Frustrated, Khalid stopped fighting, promised to preserve the city and its people, and allowed a three-day truce for Thomas and his survivors to evacuate. The truce was honored. Damascus thrived and eventually became an Islamic capital. Thomas and most of his soldiers that actually did resist Arab conquest were killed three days later at the Battle of Maraj-al-Debaj. With that final victory, Arab Islamic customs of death to those who resist, mercy for those who do not, and respect for promises made were all fulfilled. Russell S. Perkins See also Islam and War (Jihad) Further Reading Hoyland, Robert G. In God’s Path: The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire. New York: Oxford, 2015. Khalek, Nancy. Damascus after the Muslim Conquest: Text and Image in Early Islam. New York: Oxford, 2011. Purton, Peter. A History of the Early Medieval Siege, c. 450–1200. New York: Boydel & Brewer, 2009.

tack by the crusaders’ ally, Kay Kaus I, the Muslim sultan of Anatolia. With their northern flank occupied, the crusaders, under the leadership of the titular king of Jerusalem, John Brienne, were free to attack the heart of the Ayyubid kingdom. The clearest route to Cairo lay through the town in the Nile delta that guarded the main route upriver to Cairo, Damietta. The crusaders laid siege to Damietta with the aid of Genoan and Frisian fleets. After Sultan Al-Adil died, the defensive tower outside of Damietta fell on August 25, 1218, but with a heavy cost in casualties. A force led by Cardinal Pelagius of Albano arrived to augment the crusader army to 35,000 against the nearly 70,000 Muslim troops. The city fell in November 1219, resulting in the new sultan Al-Kamil’s offer to trade Jerusalem for Damietta. The crusaders, persuaded by pontifical representative Cardinal Pelagius, declined the offer and marched on Cairo. They never reached it, succumbing to natural disasters and the Muslim army, losing Damietta and any chance to retake Jerusalem. R. Don Deal See also Ayyubids; Fifth Crusade Further Reading Asbridge, Thomas S. The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land. New York: Ecco Press, 2010. Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War: A New History of the Crusades. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006.

Damietta, Siege of (1218–1219) The Siege of Damietta occurred during the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221) and resulted in the crusader capture of a key entry route to the Ayyubid capital of Cairo. In 1218 Oliver of Cologne from Germany and William I, Count of Holland arrived with a contingent of German, Dutch, Flemish, and Frisian soldiers, with the goal of recapturing Jerusalem, then under the control of the Ayyubid dynasty ruled by Sultan Al-Adil, based in Cairo, Egypt. Due to the difficulty of directly taking Jerusalem, the crusaders decided that breaking the stronghold of the Ayyubid government would facilitate the capture of Jerusalem. The strategy involved a two-pronged attack; the northern regions of the caliphate, Syria, would come under at-

Daoism and War “Daoism” in English is quite a loose term that has been linked with what is called “philosophical Daoism” represented by Laozi (sixth century BCE) and Zhuangzi (369– 298 BCE) and what is called“religious Daoism”characterized by a variety of practices such as divinatory rituals, inner alchemical experiments, martial arts, and medicine. These two forms of Daoism have been interrelated but also separated in many ways over the past 2,000 years in China. The Daodejing (hereafter DDJ, commonly translated as the Classic of the Way and Virtue, and sometimes written

Daoism and War  229

as Tao Te Ching) by Laozi is an ancient text traditionally taken as a representative Daoist classic expressing a distinctive view on war from the Warring States period (475–221 BCE). As a matter of fact, one of the crucial interpretative traditions seen throughout the history of China views the DDJ as a military text. Nevertheless, what makes the DDJ distinctive from other well-known texts on warfare or what is called the “art of war corpus” in China is that the discourse on war in the DDJ is presented via its unique understanding of peace and peacemaking at the personal, social, and political levels. Although the DDJ does contains chapters that discuss how to be engaged in war including various tactics and strategies, it actually uses warfare to express a philosophy of peace and harmony. Laozi’s critique of war is focused on the Daoist method of preventing war from happening amid a world full of selfish interests and excessive desires. The Zhuangzi (commonly translated as the Book of Zhuangzi), another important Daoist text, also demonstrates the author’s explicit skeptical position on war, including the notion of “just war” argued by other philosophical schools at the time. For both Laozi and Zhuangzi, moral claims on war, if used inappropriately, can be dangerous. The Daoist views on war and peace are based on an ontocosmological argument concerning the Dao expressed through two key concepts in Daoism, that is, naturalness (ziran) and nonaction (wuwei). Naturalness (also meaning self-so-ness and spontaneity) is taken as a critical Daoist concept for it speaks to both the primordial origin of the Dao and sociopolitical aspects of human life envisioned by the Daoists. For Daoists, the primordial Dao of the universe is natural and self-soing, upon which human society actualizes its primordial nature (i.e., self-ordering) in perfection. That is to say, the way for humanity to flourish is to follow the principle of naturalness and self-so-ness. Nonaction, on the other hand, refers to a specific method to achieve the idea of naturalness, particularly at the political level. According to the notion of nonaction, the best sageruler is one who “reigns without ruling.” Questioning the “paternalistic model” of Confucian governance, the Daoist advocates the idea of following a “spontaneous order” by avoiding all coercive and excessive actions. Thus nonaction does not mean that there is no action per se, but there is no coercive action. As such, the Daoist ideal of a sage-ruler is

more centripetal, allowing more freedom for people to find the Dao and transform themselves in their own ways. The political leader à la Confucianism is one who draws people upward through the excellence of his moral charisma like a polar star, whereas the political leader à la Daoism is one who puts himself in a low and humble position like a valley that is more nourishing and accommodating, thus allowing people to focus on their own spontaneous tendencies, which, in turn, lead them to live in greater harmony and peace. In fact, the DDJ suggests a correlation between ontocosmological self-ordering and self-ordering in human society. It follows that war-waging is a sign of the disruption of cosmic naturalness. In the DDJ, there is a wellknown statement that cautions against war: “Weapons are nothing but ominous instruments / Not the instruments of the cultured and refined / They are used only when there is no other alternative.” For both Laozi and Zhuangzi, great peace in the world starts with the inner peace of an individual person that then extends to the world as a whole. Peace, according to Daoism, refers primarily to an inner peace that comes from personal cultivation. And this personal peace (pinghe) can be expanded to society at large (heping). In modern Chinese, when this phase “peace” (heping) is reversed as pinghe, it references one’s personal character and disposition. This progressive structure from the personal to the social is translated into a statement in the DDJ: “Thus you use your person to survey other persons, your family to survey other families, your village to survey other villages, your state to survey other states, and your world to survey worlds past and yet to come” (DDJ, Ch. 54). Although Daoism represented by Laozi and Zhuangzi condemns weapons and warfare, tempting many contemporary scholars to identify the Daoist thought with pacifism, such an interpretation does not completely square with the complicated dimensions of the Daoist tradition, especially if one takes into consideration religious Daoism, which was highly influenced by the Daoist thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi but at the same time has developed its own unique belief systems and practices. The religious views on war articulated by religious Daoism can be seen as a combination of early Daoist philosophy (such as the DDJ, the Zhuangzi, and other Daoist-oriented texts as well as their commentary tradition) and various

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ideas that can be traced back to the early Military School (bingjia), especially the one that is called “the military yinyang school” (bing yinyang), an esoteric tradition derived from the military school in the Warring States period. One of the characteristics of religious Daoism with regard to its view on war and peace is to identify statecraft and warfare with the practice of alchemical experiments and cultivation of qi-energy. For instance, the Huangdi Yinfujing, known as the Yinfujing (the Yellow Emperor’s Hidden Talisman Classic, hereafter YFJ), is an anonymous and esoteric Daoist text that became popular during the Tang period (618–907). The title of the text implies the notion of “hidden” or “secret,” and the word fu means correspondence and unification; suggesting its connection to the genre of talisman (fulu) in the religious tradition. The esoteric sign used in the text, according to Daoism, refers to the tallies of various specified lengths employed between the emperor and his generals for confidential communication in war. The YFJ has been conceived as one of the important classics of religious Daoism, second only in significance to the DDJ. The religious canon of Daoism (daozang) contains more than 30 commentaries on the YFJ. Another text that follows the basic format of the YFJ is The Classic of Dark Yin (Taibai yinjing), written by Li Quan (ca. 712–763), a famous Daoist and military theorist in the Tang Dynasty who also wrote a commentary on the YFL. Li claimed that his book was meant to be “miraculous strategies” on military affairs. Like the YFL, Li’s book also combines Daoist ontocosmology and the technique of the internal alchemy of meditation with the art of military strategies. During the Song Dynasty (960–1279), both Chuxuan (1147–1203), the founder of the Mount Sui (Suishan) lineage, and Qiu Chuji (1148–1227), the founder of the Dragon Gate (Longmen) lineage, wrote their own textual exegeses on the YFJ to explicate the importance of warfare to punish social evil and establish social order. Religious Daoism did not hesitate to use war as way of achieving what they called “great peace” (taiping). Therefore, one of the biggest differences in terms of views on war that marks the departure of religious Daoism from early philosophical Daoism represented by Laozi and Zhuangzi is that religious Daoism is more militaristic in that it even takes war as a necessary means to stop evil (i.e., social injustice) and restore social order, holding that great harmony can only be achieved through phases of chaos

and disorder. This shift from peace to war in religious Daoism would not be surprising given that religious Daoism, over the past 2,000 years in Chinese history, had often been connected to peasant upheavals and sanctioned violence. In sum, defining Daoism as a form of pacifism is reductionistic if not totally wrong. Despite its pacifistic sentiment, the DDJ not only talks about war as the last resort, but also suggests proper conduct in war and after war. For Daoists, a pacifist gesture is a guiding idea rather than a fixed principle. As suggested by traditional Chinese medicine, the upper medicine is meant to be preventive before any disease can set in, while the lower medicine is meant to be remedial in treating specific diseases. Thus war, even if it can be justified, is like a remedial drug that can be poisonous and generate side effects. As such, preventing war from happening in the first place is more critical and effective. This is why Daoism, especially the Daoism advocated by Laozi and Zhuangzi, was more concerned with peacemaking than warmaking. Ellen Y. Z hang See also Confucianism and War Further Reading Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. Daodejing: Making This Life Significant. New York: Ballantine Publishing Group, 2003. Legge, James. “Yin Fû King, or Classic of the Harmony of the Seen and the Unseen.” In The Texts of Taoism. New York: Dover Publications, 1962. Lewis, Mark E. Sanctioned Violence in Early China. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. Zhang, Ellen Y. “‘Weapons Are Nothing but Ominous Instruments’: The Daodejing’s View on War and Peace.” Journal of Religious Ethics 3 (2012): 473–502.

Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb denote the two basic categories—the Abode of Islam and the Abode of War—of political space in Islamic law. Dar al-Islam designates the area under Muslim rule in which Islamic law operates and war is neither necessary nor permissible; Dar al-Harb is terri-

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tory not under Muslim control. The inhabitants of the Dar al-Harb, the harbis, are non-Muslims who have received a call to convert to Islam. This concept of political space reflects the political unity of the Muslim community (the umma) under Muhammad and the early caliphs. Muhammad and his successors offered their non-Muslim neighbors the choice of conversion or warfare. Because the most fundamental roots of sharia are the Qur’an and the hadith, the findings of the jurists inevitably reflected the early decades of Islam rather than the eighth and ninth centuries when Islamic jurisprudence developed. The jurists clearly regarded the expansion of the Dar alIslam to absorb the entire Dar al-Harb as a fundamental duty of Muslim rulers, but they did not envision continuous warfare, given the severe restrictions on the waging of offensive jihad. Two of the four major schools of Sunni law, the Hanafis and the Shafi’is, both envision intermediate territories, Abodes of Truce (Dar al-Muwada’ah or Dar alSulh), where the rulers have reached a truce with the Muslims, generally in return for the payment of tribute. Although the concepts of Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam form the basis of political space in Islamic law, they have had little impact on actual statecraft. While Muslim rulers have occasionally referred to or made use of these concepts, they have not and do not make them the basis of their external policies. Even the contemporary states that claim to govern in accord with the sharia—the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran—have routine diplomatic relations with non-Muslim states. Doug Streusand See also Qur’an and War; Sharia and War Further Reading Bonner, Michael. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practices. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. Cook, David. Understanding Jihad. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. Khadduri, Majid. War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955. Kohlberg, Etan. “The Development of the Imami Shi`i Doctrine of jihad,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 126 (1976), pp. 64–86. Kulini, Muhammad b. Ya`qub. Furu `al-Kafi. Edited by `Ali Akbar al-Ghifari. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyya, 1375/1996.

McCants, William, ISIS: The Apocalypse. The History, Strategy and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Renard, John. “al-Jihad al-akbar: Notes on a Theme in Islamic Spirituality.” Muslim World 78 (1988): 225–42. Sarakhsi, Muhammad. Kitab al-mabsut. 15 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 2000. Tusi, Muhammad b. al-Hasan. Tadhhib al-ahkam. 11 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Adwa’, 1992.

Dasam Granth The Dasam Granth has traditionally been ascribed to the 10th guru, Guru Gobind Singh. Though it does not enjoy the same status as the Guru Granth Sāhib, which is considered the 11th living Sikh guru, its passages are recited in daily prayer and its hymns frequently sung in Sikh houses of worship. Controversy around both its content and its questionable authorship have led some critics to reject the text to varying degrees. The majority of what is included in the Dasam Granth is sourced from the Hindu puranas, focusing particularly on major mythological episodes and the military accomplishments of the Hindu gods. Also included are retellings of the two great Hindu epics, the Ramayana and the Maha­ bharata. Most of this material is written in Braj, which was the contemporary literary language of devotional poetry written about Krishna. Other sections include the retelling of famous Persian moral tales, the Hikāyats, and warnings against the danger of scheming women; it is a particularly controversial text with few, if any, defenders. Not all of this material is explicitly marked as the work of Guru Gobind Singh, and of the parts that are, critics continue to maintain skepticism as to their true authorship. Commentators traditionally attributed the use of this “Hindu” material to Guru Gobind Singh’s martial pursuits and study of Hindu poetry, viewing it as an allegory of the Sikh response to their struggles of the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Critics instead argue that it was mistakenly accepted by Sikhs during the chaos of the 18th century, when khālsā Sikhs were forced into hiding and the stewardship of houses of worship passed into questionable hands. The Singh Sabha, a Sikh reform group of the late

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19th and early 20th centuries, was particularly critical of “Hindu” influences on the Sikh faith, beginning some of the first questioning of the Dasam Granth’s authenticity. Controversy aside, one of the most popular texts within the Dasam Granth is the Zafarnāmā, a letter said to be written by Guru Gobind Singh for the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb in response to being betrayed after the negotiation of a truce; an episode resulting in crushing military defeat and the capture of the guru’s mother and two youngest sons. Included is Sikh scripture’s articulated qualification of when it is appropriate to take up arms: “When all else fails, it is righteous to draw the sword.” The Dasam Granth is perhaps most important in its thematic reflection of developments within the Sikh community following the martyrdom of Guru Arjan Dev at the hands of Mughal authorities. Guru Gobind Singh completed Guru Hargobind’s arming of the community through his formation of the khālsā, a group of devoted sant sipāhīs (saint soldiers) prepared to defend Sikh sovereignty and combat tyranny. Though Sikhs seldom turn to the text to justify their use of armed force, the quote from the Zafarnāmā accurately sums up Sikh attitudes and their understanding of the political role they have played in the history of Punjab. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn See also Adī Granth; Hindu Mythological Wars; Singh, Guru Gobind Further Reading Fenech, Louis E. The Sikh Zafar-namah of Guru Gobind Singh. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Rinehart, Robin. Debating the Dasam Granth. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

David, King of Israel

a warrior, and general. She concurrently holds three roles as military leader, statesman, and prophet of Israel. Her contribution to Israel is found in Judges Chapter 4 in prose summary and in Chapter 5 as a song. During the period of Israel’s judges, the typical cycle of national distress commenced with apostasy followed by corporate repentance and then deliverance by God. God’s method of relief throughout this period was initiated by the appointment of judges. During the time of Deborah, Israel was oppressed by Jabin of Canaan and his commander, Sisera, who empowered the Canaanite ruler with 900 iron chariots. Chariots were prized as the indomitable height of military technology at the time. Terror stricken, the people of Israel came to Deborah seeking help. She called for Barak, along with the northern tribes, to lead Israel into combat against Sisera. However, Barak’s unwillingness to engage in battle unaccompanied by Deborah resulted in her prophecy that he would not receive glory as a warrior. Instead, Deborah said that “the Lord will sell Sisera into the hand of a woman.” This woman was Jael, whom Sisera met following his narrow escape from a losing battle against 10,000 Israelites. Defeated and dejected, Sisera died while sleeping when Jael silently approached him and hammered a tent peg into his temple. The military battle was a total victory for Israel. Due to Deborah’s leadership, Israel found rest for 40 years. Alan T. Baker See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2013. Zucker, David J. The Bible’s Prophets: An Introduction for Christians and Jews. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2013.

See King David as Warrior

Deborah, Defeat of Sisera Deborah Deborah’s story is unique in the Bible. No other account in scripture has a woman portrayed as a military commander,

The defeat of Sisera by Deborah is a Hebrew judge (hero) tradition recorded in two stories in the biblical book of Judges. The tradition recounts a period of Israelite history in which the Israelite tribes were governed by tribal leaders

Decades (Bullinger, 1552)  233

and divinely commissioned “judges,” who often provided military leadership to overthrow neighboring oppressors (ca. 12th–11th centuries BCE). The narrative of Judges 4:1–24 recounts how Sisera, commander of the army of Jabin, king of Hazor, oppressed the early Israelite tribes through the use of iron chariots. The Israelite prophet Deborah summoned Barak to lead an Israelite force against Sisera, promising divine assurance of victory. Barak, however, was afraid to go into battle without Deborah, and thus Deborah accompanied him into battle, but prophesied that God would deliver Sisera into the hands of a woman and not into the hands of Barak. Barak defeated the army of Sisera with divine assistance, but Sisera fled to the tent of Jael, the wife of Heber, who was an ally of King Jabin. Sisera sought refuge from the Israelite army, but Jael killed him by driving a tent peg through his head while he slept. The victory is recounted again in Deborah’s victory song of Judges 5:1–31, which is commonly considered an older composition than the narrative. The song proclaims God’s victory over Sisera, which recounts his death at the hands of Jael (vv. 24–27) and reflects upon the lamenting of Sisera’s mother, who waited in vain for Sisera’s return from battle (vv. 28–30). Nicholas R. Werse See also Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy; Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy Further Reading Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2013. Zucker, David J. The Bible’s Prophets: An Introduction for Christians and Jews. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2013.

Decades (Bullinger, 1552) Heinrich Bullinger (1504–1575) presented his teaching on war in the context of a lengthy discussion on the civil magistrate in Sermons VI–IX of the Second Decade. The collected edition of the Decades was first published in 1552. The 1587 English translation published in London by Ralph Newberie was entitled Fifty Godlie and Learned

Sermons, Divided into Five Decades Containing the Chiefe and Principall Points of Christian Religion. It covers the full spectrum of Christian theology. The sermons were delivered in Latin, rather than in the German vernacular. They were possibly preached to the pastors and teachers of the city at the Zurich Prohezei, or they may have been given as lectures at the Zurich academy. Bullinger was not only the leading pastor in the city, but also after 1537 he became a professor of theology in the academy. The impress of Bullinger’s education in scholastic methodology is evident in Sermon VI of the Second Decade. From his consideration of the sixth commandment and its prohibition against murder, Bullinger transitioned to the doctrine of the civil magistrate—cautioning his audience that the magistrates’ activity of judicial punishment and the waging of war is exempt from the commandment against murder. The first topic that Bullinger considered in a fairly extensive treatment of the magistrate are the answers to the questions traditionally raised in a scholastic order of teaching: Does it exist (An sit?) What is it? (Quid sit?) Of what sort is it? (Quia sit?) The first three issues that Bullinger addressed were the answers that would be given to such questions, if they had been explicitly raised. First, magistrates do exist, and they are described by various terms: power, authority, domination, princes, consuls, and kings. Second, Bullinger affirmed that the magistracy is an office that should be biblically defined. His definition takes in the origin of the office, the end in view, and the way in which the end is to be achieved. He referred in the third place to the three different sorts of magistracies— monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The Decades also reflect the disputation form that had been used in formal academic theology in the medieval period. To cite one example of this style, we may look at Sermon VIII of the Second Decade in which he affirmed his thesis that the magistrate bears the sword and is commanded by God to punish evil—both in the domestic realm against criminals, and in terms of warring against foreign enemies and seditious citizens. Having presented his thesis, there is a movement to the disputatio. Bullinger here introduced two specific objections typically raised by the Anabaptists of his day. The first objection was based upon Matthew 5:39 and the statement of Jesus that his

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disciples were not to resist evil. The second objection came from the force of Matthew 26:52 and the command of Jesus given to Peter to put his sword back into its sheath, accompanied by the warning that the one who takes up the sword will perish by it. Bullinger then offered his direct reply to objection one and objection two, stressing the need to distinguish between private vengeance and public, magisterial vengeance. He argued that while Romans 12 forbids private vengeance, public vengeance by the civil magistrate is commanded in Romans 13. His ensuing discussion on the subject of war deals with the two classical categories of the justice of war (jus ad bellum) and justice in war (jus in bello). Mark J. Larson See also Anabaptist Pacifism; Bullinger, Heinrich; Just War Tradition; Protestant Reformers and War Further Reading Bullinger, Henry. The Decades of Henry Bullinger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1849. Opitz, Peter. “Bullinger’s Decades: Instruction in Faith and Conduct.” In Bruce Gordon and Emidio Campi, eds. Architect of Reformation: An Introduction to Heinrich Bullinger, 1504– 1575. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004, pp. 101–16.

Decretum (Decretum Gratiani) (Gratian, 12th Century CE) In the 12th century, Gratian (d. ca. 1159), an Italian monk, produced a compilation and harmonization of laws drawn from various Roman and Christian sources; this compilation came eventually to serve as part of the basis of canon law, the law of the Roman Catholic Church. Gratian named his work the Concordia Discordantium Canonum (Concord of Discordant Canons), but it also became known as the Decretum Gratiani (Decrees of Gratian) or, simply, the Decretum. Gratian’s work filled a widely felt need for law and order. A company of “Decretists,” those who specialized in the study and application of the Decretum, soon spread across Europe. The Decretum thus became for centuries the standard textbook of canon law and was a widely

used norm of reference. It is a major waypoint in the development of Western law, including the law of war. The fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century CE was followed by a general collapse of political and social order that stifled trade and thus also brought about economic collapse. Knowledge and education regressed or were lost. The lack of effective governments made chaos and local warlords the norm. These negative effects held sway for centuries. The gradual rise of feudalism in the early Middle Ages imposed some degree of local order, but the many small feudal entities were often in conflict with one another. Little law was promulgated or enforced within or among feudal jurisdictions, and there was no accepted body of law by which the operations or interrelations of feudal entities could be regularized. Gratian sought to recover, gather, and record as much legal material as possible from Roman law, the church fathers, church councils, and existing canon law. However, his work went beyond compilation to harmonization, regularization, and application. Because he tracked down a wide variety of sources, Gratian’s work was the most complete compilation among various efforts undertaken in the medieval period. He sought in his comments, or glosses, to find concord among the varied laws that differed in their sources, premises, and outcomes. This harmonization led to regularization by which a common standard could be generally recognized and agreed upon across an increasing number of ecclesiastical and political jurisdictions. Gratian addressed the topic of war both directly and in dealing with other topics through which war was considered. James Turner Johnson (2008) judges that Gratian was the first to set down a systematized statement of just war, in which he drew from the writings of Augustine and Isidore of Seville to state the following: “That war is just which is waged by an edict to regain what has been stolen or to repel the attack of enemies” (see “On War,” Decretum Volume II, Causa 23, Question 2, Canons 1 and 2). This concept also included defense of property and punishment for wrongdoing. These thoughts, amplified and expanded by Pope Innocent IV (r. 1243–1254), were further developed in due course by Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). This line of intellectual development became the taproot of the just war tradition that has become so prominent and influential.

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The Decretum also influenced a key development in Western political evolution: the emergence of the sovereign prince. The “edict” mentioned above needed to be issued by someone of appropriate standing and authority who had no superior. Any person who owed allegiance to a feudal superior therefore did not qualify to pronounce war. This emerging understanding of the need for proper authority to declare war thus reinforced the gradual transition from feudalism to sovereign princes, who represented and exercised centralized authority of first regional and then national entities. It may therefore be said that the development of the just war tradition, and that of the centralized nation-state, were synergistic and mutually supportive. Mark A. Jumper See also Aquinas, Thomas; Augustine; Just War Tradition Further Reading Johnson, James Turner. “The Idea of Defense in Historical and Contemporary Thinking About Just War.” Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 4 (December 2008): 543–56. Reichberg, Gregory M., Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, eds. The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. Winroth, Anders. The Making of Gratian’s Decretum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Deeds of the Franks (Gesta Francorum) (ca. 1100) The Deeds of the Franks, also known by its Latin name Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum ("The Deeds of the Franks and the Other Pilgrims to Jerusalem"), or simply Gesta Francorum, is ostensibly a chronicle of the First Crusade. It reports the actions of the crusaders, covering the period from the inception of the crusade in November 1095 to the Battle of Ascalon in August 1099. The Deeds of the Franks served as a source and template for all other extant chronicles of the First Crusade. Though the author and exact date of the writing is uncertain, it is thought to have been originally written around 1100 by an Italian (or perhaps a southern Italian noble-

man, and hence Norman) crusader from the duchy of Apulia, who accompanied Bohemond of Taranto. He wrote his narrative of the journey to, and capture of Jerusalem during the crusade, initially under the leadership of Bohemond, then Raymond of Toulouse. The chronicle, written with the help of a scribe who made edits of his own, provides the unique viewpoint of a knight who was not at the highest levels of leadership, nor a cleric. The author of the Gesta produced an original approach to the recording of history by culling the experiences of thousands of participants into a single, overarching narrative. From the Gesta came the first and sometimes best reports of the day-to-day progress, the provisioning for troops, the tactics employed, and the moods, beliefs, and prejudices of average crusaders. It remained influential in informing and motivating European crusader action for centuries, and the chroniclers who reported on the subsequent crusades emulated the style. R. Don Deal See also Ascalon, Battle of; First Crusade Further Reading Asbridge, Thomas S. The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land. New York: Ecco Press, 2010. Dass, Niral, trans. The Deeds of the Franks and Other JerusalemBound Pilgrims: The Earliest Chronicle of the First Crusades. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011.

Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East The literature, iconography, and art of the ancient Near East often depict deities as warriors. The type of war and how the deity participates in warfare varies. Some battles reflect cosmic concerns such as the battle of chaos in creation accounts or the battles over divine kingship that include cosmic elements of chaos and fertility as in the Baal Cycle. Other battles portrayed in art or literature relate to national warfare where a person or object mediates or represents the deity’s presence and involvement in the battle, such as in the battle for Jericho when the Israelites marched around the city with the Ark of the Covenant to bring

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down the city walls so that they could take possession of the city (Joshua 6). Deities in the literature of the ancient Near East include both males and females. The divine warrior motif in creation or other narratives appears in Canaanite, Hebrew, and Babylonian literature. Through the creation or recreation battles the deity declares and achieves his kingship over chaos, which scholars describe as Chaoskampf or “chaos battle.” In the Baal Cycle, a Canaanite story about divine kingship found on cuneiform tablets in Ugarit located in modern-day Ras Shamra in northern Syria, Baal, the storm god, battles Yamm, the sea. As the sea, Yamm represents the primeval chaos waters, reflecting early ideas that the world consisted of water that posed a threat to creation. The storm god, Baal, on the other hand, represents the life-giving fertile rains. Baal defeats Yamm, making the floodwaters recede to their natural boundaries, and Baal sends his rain on the earth, demonstrating his victory and divine kingship over the land. Similarly, in the Babylonian creation epic, Enuma Elish, Marduk, the storm god, defeats Tiamat, the primordial ocean. Then Marduk creates the universe out of Tiamat’s carcass and celebrates his kingship. Both the Baal Cycle and the Enuma Elish portray the gods as warriors attempting to establish their kingship and dominion as they defeat a form of chaos. In the Hebrew Bible, the God of Israel too battles different forms of chaos and displays his divine kingship by defeating the chaos and bringing harmony to the world and judgment on his enemies. Some psalms, such as Psalm 74, praise the God of the Hebrews as creator and highlight his battle and defeat over the sea and creatures associated with the sea such as the Leviathan sea monster. Like the Enuma Elish and the Baal Cycle, Psalm 74 links the concepts of divine kingship and divine warrior together. Similar themes also appear in Job and Isaiah (see Job 26 and Isaiah 24–27). In the ancient Near East, an earthly king often mediated the presence of the deity in battle by serving as the deity’s human representative. A Mesopotamian commemorative stela (ca. 2500 BCE) called the “Stela of the Vultures” details this concept. The stela commemorates the victory of the city-state of Lagash over the city-state of Umma. The front of the stela shows the god Ningirsu, the main deity of Lagash, present on the battlefield, indicating that the Meso-

potamian city of Lagash viewed the god Ningirsu as responsible for the victory. Similar to Ningirsu, Yahweh features in the Hebrew Bible as a warrior deity who affects victory for his people as they battle the Egyptians (Exod. 14–15), the Canaanites (Josh. 6), and the Philistines (1 Sam. 5–6), among others. In each of these battles another figure or object mediates Yahweh’s presence, but the people of Israel consider Yahweh the primary victor, not the human or inanimate object present at the battle. In the Exodus narrative, Moses mediates the victory by obeying Yahweh’s instructions, which causes the sea to part so that the Israelites can escape but also causes the sea to collapse and drown the Egyptian army (Exodus 14). In addition to Moses, the angel of God and the cloud represent the presence of Yahweh with the Israelites. The angel passes before the Israelites and the cloud follows them, indicating that Yahweh encompasses his people (Exodus 14). Although the people know Yahweh’s presence through Moses, the angel of God, and the cloud, none actually are Yahweh. Despite this, the Israelites praise Yahweh for the victory over the Egyptians (Exodus 15). In addition to male warrior deities, the literature of the ancient Near East includes narratives concerning warrior goddesses. Some goddesses embody elements of war and eroticism, such as the Mesopotamian goddess Inanna/ Ishtar, a coalescence of the Sumerian Inanna and Semitic Ishtar. Others, such as the Egyptian goddess HathorSekhmet, represent warrior mother goddesses. The Greek tradition, unlike that of the ancient Near East, does not include a goddess who encompasses erotic passions and a warrior spirit. Instead, the Greek tradition depicts virgin warriors, such as Athena. In the Baal Cycle, Anat is Baal’s sister, and she wages war on his behalf. Some scholars have labeled Anat a goddess of love and war while others consider her a virgin warrior. While the nature of Anat’s sexuality remains debatable, her prowess as a warrior does not. Anat’s most infamous battle in the Baal Cycle, commonly called Anat’s bloodbath, depicts the goddess as fierce and ruthless. In this story Anat adorns herself with the severed heads and hands of the slain, tying the heads to her back and the hands around her waist. Then the goddess wades in the pooled blood of those she slaughtered, with the blood rising to her thighs.

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Anat’s bloodbath has parallels with the goddess HathorSekhmet in the Egyptian story Deliverance of Mankind from Destruction, which dates as least as far back as the 14th century BCE. Both Anat and the Egyptian goddess wade in the blood of the slain. In the Egyptian myth, humanity revolts against the sun god Re, and the goddess Hathor-Sekhmet slaughters humanity. Sekhmet, the manifestation of Hathor, wades in the bloodbath, and the goddess plans to slaughter more of humanity the following day. Re quenches the goddess’s bloodlust by deceiving her by flooding the battlefield with red-colored beer, which the goddess drinks until she becomes too drunk to remember her plan to annihilate humanity. The ancient Near Eastern warrior deities engage in cosmic battles to bring about creation and to convey their kingship over creation. Additionally, warrior deities fight on behalf of the people they represent. The warrior goddesses often fight to avenge a god as seen in the example of Anat. The concept of warrior deities also occurs in the Greek and Roman pantheons, including the following gods and goddesses: Ares, Athena, Heracles, Nike, Polemos, Perses, Mars, Minerva, and Victoria. Lacy K. Crocker See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of; Baal; Chemosh; Mars, Roman God of War; West Semitic Warfare Further Reading Cross, Frank Moore. Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic; Essays in the History of the Religion of Israel. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973. Day, John. God’s Conflict with the Dragon and the Sea: Echoes of a Canaanite Myth in the Old Testament. University of Cambridge Oriental Publications 35. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Gunkel, Hermann. Creation and Chaos in the Primeval Era and the Eschaton: A Religio-Historical Study of Genesis 1 and Revelation 12. Translated by K. William Whitney Jr. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006. Keel, Othmar. Gods, Goddesses, and Images of God in Ancient Israel. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998. Lang, Bernhard. The Hebrew God: Portrait of an Ancient Deity. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. Pritchard, James B., ed. The Ancient Near East: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.

Smith, Mark S. The Early History of God: Yahweh and the Other Deities in Ancient Israel. 2nd ed. The Biblical Resource Series. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002.

Delaware River Valley, Toleration and Conflict (1609–1681) Prior to the establishment of the British colony of Pennsylvania, the Native American tribe of the Lenni Lenape (also known as the Delaware Indians) lived alongside sparsely populated European settlers in the Delaware River Valley. They shared a cultural understanding that stressed restraint and commitments to toleration, trade, and diplomatic resolutions to conflict. The Lenape tolerated small numbers of Dutch, Swedish, Finnish, and English settlers to gain access to European trade goods and acquire allies. European presence along the Delaware River relied upon the goodwill of the Lenape. While having to act subservient to the surrounding natives who continually demonstrated their authority, Europeans cooperated and competed against one another to have a favorable stance in the fur trade. Despite their infighting and different religious faiths, Europeans offered toleration and local autonomy to one another because they fundamentally had to rely on those who made inroads with the more powerful Lenape. Early European settlement attempts in the Delaware River Valley saw the establishment of a power hierarchy and both the Dutch and the Swedes jockeying for the best position in the fur trade with surrounding indigenous peoples. Henry Hudson first explored Delaware Bay in 1609. After a group of Walloons abandoned their short-lived colony on Burlington Island in 1626, Gillis Hossit purchased land from a Lenape group along the southeast bank of Delaware Bay in 1629. He returned two years later with settlers and established a whaling colony called Swanendael. The Lenape expected the Dutch to only trade, but soon feared Dutch agricultural pursuits might impact their harvests. This fear of Dutch expansion, coupled with cultural differences over honor, diplomacy, and reciprocity, moved them to kill all the settlers. With Lenape power and authority on display, future Dutch activity remained

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limited to keeping peace and trading at a seasonal outpost at Fort Nassau further up the Delaware River. Competition soon arose when Peter Minuit, a former director of the colony of New Netherland, led Swedish and Finnish settlers in the establishment of New Sweden in 1638. The construction of Fort Christina competed with Fort Nassau as a terminus point for the fur trade as the Swedes jockeyed with the Dutch for primacy among native traders. As a small settlement never growing beyond several hundred persons, New Sweden found itself the junior ally to the Lenape. In 1643 Governor Johan Printz expressed the difficulty in converting the Lenape from their animism beliefs to Christianity. Occasional Lenape outbursts of violence demonstrated the power dynamic and forced the Swedes to purchase Dutch goods so as to secure the Lenape alliance when supply ships became infrequent. This cooperation between the Protestant Swedes and Dutch grew to keep other European players out of the area. When Printz arrested two Englishmen and put them on trial in 1643, his counterpart at Fort Nassau, Jan Jansen, served on the jury and collaborated with Printz to keep the English out to assure Swedish and Dutch viability. Changes in Dutch and Swedish leadership soon ended peaceful cooperation but also ushered in toleration among former enemies. In 1647 Peter Stuyvesant took over as director of New Netherland and several years later had Fort Casimir built south of Fort Christina. The new round of fur trade jockeying escalated when the new Swedish governor, Johan Rising, captured Fort Casimir upon his arrival in 1654. Stuyvesant responded with a large military expedition in September 1655 and forced the surrender and removal of Swedish governance. Faced with threats against New Amsterdam, including Lenape reprisals for the Dutch attack on their Swedish allies, Stuyvesant granted the Swedes autonomy and offered them the opportunity to practice their Lutheran faith if they took a loyalty oath. Stuyvesant could not afford to aggravate the Swedish community because of their ties to the powerful Lenape. When the English captured New Netherland in 1664, they too tolerated and relied upon the Europeans already present in the Delaware River Valley to keep the peace. Swedish and Dutch magistrates retained their positions because of their language skills and ties with the Lenape. When the Lenape murdered several servants in 1668 and

1671 to symbolically resist any English encroachment upon their lands or power, New York governor Francis Lovelace called for war. However, Swedish and Dutch officials deliberately delayed any pursuit of hostilities. They understood that their security rested in dialogue with Lenape sachems and offering gifts to bond their alliance, practices that had kept the peace over several decades. When William Penn received his charter for Pennsylvania in 1681, he understood the cultural practices of religious and cultural toleration, autonomy, and emphasis on diplomacy already present in the Delaware River Valley. In addition to his friendly and just approach with the Lenape, he approached the European settlers with religious toleration and respect, offering an introductory letter penned in Swedish to be read by the Swedish clergy to the community. Following the violence at Swanendael, Europeans and natives used trade as a common bond and developed a cultural understanding centered on diplomacy and restraint. Toleration grew among former enemies so that they could live in peace. Patrick Cecil See also Penn, William; Puritans and War Further Reading Dorwart, Jeffery M. Invasion and Insurrection: Security, Defense, and War in the Delaware Valley, 1621–1815. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2008. Hoffecker, Carol E., Richard Waldron, Lorraine E. Williams, and Barbara E. Benson, eds. New Sweden in America. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1995. Richter, Daniel K. Trade, Land, Power: The Struggle for Eastern North America. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. Schutt, Amy C. Peoples of the River Valley: The Odyssey of the Delaware Indians. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. Soderlund, Jean R. Lenape Country: Delaware Valley Society Before William Penn. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015. Thompson, Mark L. The Contest for the Delaware Valley: Allegiance, Identity, and Empire in the Seventeenth Century. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013. Ward, Christopher. The Dutch and Swedes on the Delaware, 1609–64. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1930.

Despenser’s Crusade (1383)  239 Weslager, C. A. The Delaware Indians: A History. New Bruns­ wick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1972. Weslager, C. A. Dutch Explorers, Traders and Settlers in the Delaware Valley, 1609–1664. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961. Weslager, C. A. The English on the Delaware: 1610–1682. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967.

Despenser’s Crusade (1383) Despenser’s Crusade was a brief English military incursion into the principality of Flanders conducted as a show of support for the anti-French pope Urban VI in 1383. The crusade was launched during the time of the papal schism, which divided Western Christians between 1378 and 1417. Despite its overtly religious rationale, it should be considered part of the multiphasic Hundred Years’ War (1337– 1453). The larger war was waged to determine questions of royal succession and the disposition of dependent principalities. In England, advocates of the Flemish campaign presented it as an opportunity to strike against the schismatic followers of the antipope Clement VII. These enemies included the French and their ally, the count of Flanders, Louis II (1330–1384). Flemish cities, particularly Ghent, were also dependent on the wool trade with England, so the crusade presented an opportunity to rescue traditional economic partners from the French sphere. The organizer and leader of the campaign was a cleric. Henry Despenser (1341–1406), Bishop of Norwich, fought in Italy in the late 1360s and gained prominence through his part in suppressing the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 in East Anglia. As the 14th century progressed, English and French kings increasingly employed clergy as apologists for the justification and aims of warfare. Not the first to ignore canon law prohibitions against clerics joining armies, English kings eventually mobilized members of the clergy for “defensive” purposes beginning about 1369. In 1382, the French invaded Flanders and compelled conquered cities to recognize Clement VII as the true pope. In response, Pope Urban VI announced a crusade against schismatics, granting a plenary indulgence for participants. Urban selected Despenser to lead, and 15-year-old King Richard II ordered promulgation on December 6. Some

members of Parliament hesitated to support the selection of Despenser, perhaps because of the brutality he demonstrated in mopping up the East Anglian revolt. Because private contributions financed much of the enterprise, the risk must have seemed small, and Despenser remained in charge. On May 17, 1383, Despenser crossed the Channel with 8,000 men and attacked French-held Gravelines. On May 25 the English defeated a Franco-Flemish army at Dunkirk. After the victory, neighboring towns fell and as many as 30,000 men of Ghent united with the English army. However, the crusade bogged down quickly. On June 9, Despenser accepted the advice of his Gentenaar allies to besiege Ypres, about 50 km (30 miles) southeast of Dunkirk. The siege exposed the attackers’ deficiencies as the town held out against repeated attacks. On August 8 in the midst of dissension among his commanders and spreading disease among the army, Despenser decided to give up the siege and march south into Picardy. Some subordinate commanders refused to follow and returned to the coastal towns of Bourbourg and Bergues. Meanwhile, a French army was on its way, and Despenser fell back to Gravelines. Combining force and bribery, the French drove the English from town after town until the Duke of Brittany intervened, negotiating safe conduct home for the crusaders. One of the last acts of the withdrawing army was to burn Gravelines to the ground, and hostilities ended by mid-September. In England, Despenser’s administration of the crusade made him enemies who roundly condemned him for his apparent ineptitude. On October 26, 1383, Chancellor Michael de la Pole summoned the bishop, who stood accused of incompetence and deception. Despenser presented a persistent but unsuccessful defense. The king stripped him of his temporalities and required him to repay the public cost of the crusade. The sting of this humiliation may have been lessened when Richard II restored Despenser in time to accompany Richard and the king’s armies in repelling the Franco-Scottish invasion of 1385. Liam J. Atchison See also Crusades (Overview) Further Reading Allington-Smith, Richard. Henry Despenser: The Fighting Bishop. Dereham, UK: Larks Press, 2003.

240  Dev, Guru Arjan (1563–1606) Guard, Timothy. Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade: The English Experience in the Fourteenth Century. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2013.

Dev, Guru Arjan (1563–1606) Born in 1563, Guru Arjan Dev became the Sikh community’s fifth guru in 1581. He is remembered for the completion of Sikhism’s famous Golden Temple, harmandir sāhib; the compilation of the Adī Granth, a major early form of Sikhism’s holy scripture, and authorship of more than onethird of its hymns; and his execution by the Mughals, making him the religion’s first martyr. Guru Arjan was the first direct relative of a previous guru, a pattern that continued with the five human gurus that followed. For Sikhs, Guru Arjan’s work on scripture is his most important legacy. For the first time, a standardized scriptural work was invested with direct spiritual authority, a response to challenges from the guru’s brother, who himself desired the guruship and authored his own book of hymns. The Adī Granth contained the work of Guru Arjan and the four previous gurus, as well as the writings of bards and other spiritual figures of importance to the early Sikh community. The final version of the text, the Guru Granth Sāhib, also contains the hymns of Guru Tegh Bahādur, the ninth guru, as added by his son and tenth guru, Guru Go­ bind Singh. This scripture was invested with complete spiritual authority and the guruship itself with the death of Guru Gobind Singh, completing the process initiated by Guru Arjan. Guru Arjan’s martyrdom has left a lasting mark on the Sikh tradition and the Sikh view of their own history. As the future Mughal emperor Jahāngīr launched a campaign to challenge his brother Khusrau’s accession to the throne, Guru Arjan hosted the latter’s army as it crossed Punjab. Brought before the courts of the successful Jahāngīr under a charge of treason, the guru refused to acknowledge guilt or convert to Islam. He was executed in 1606 in a particularly brutal fashion as per received tradition: after being made to sit on a burning hot plate, hot sand and water were poured over his body. He died after entering water to soothe his burns. This early account prefaces what would

become a long tradition of recounting in gruesome detail the persecution faced by Sikhs throughout their history; a narrative that finds contemporary expression in the community’s reflection on conflict with the Indian government in the 1980s and 1990s. Guru Arjan’s death at the hands of the Mughals would spur his son and successor, Guru Hargobind, to articulate the concept of mīrī-pīrī, referring to both the spiritual and temporal dimension of Sikh teachings. Guru Hargobind was the first guru to articulate an explicit temporal sovereignty of the community by asking them to take up arms in defense against abuses by other temporal authorities. This would find its culmination later in Guru Gobind Singh’s founding of the khālsā, an armed community into which he exalted his followers to become initiated. Guru Arjan’s martyrdom is therefore viewed as the event that forced Sikhs to respond to political pressures and reinvent themselves. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn See also Adī Granth; Nānak, Guru; Singh, Guru Gobind Further Reading Fenech, Louis. Martyrdom in the Sikh Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Singh, Pashaura. Life and Work of Guru Arjan. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Dharam Yudh The concept of dharam yudh in Sikhism refers to armed struggle that is an ethically justified response against external oppressors. This struggle can be undertaken either in defense of fellow Sikhs or on behalf of other oppressed communities. Sikh self-understanding relies heavily on a reading of history that sees Sikhs as responding militarily against despotic Mughals, invading Afghans, and for some, the Indian government, in a way that is justified as dharam yudh. It is authorized by the gurus’ investment of sovereignty in the Sikh community, or panth, as an organic decision-making body. Scripturally, one of the few articulations of anything resembling Western just war theory is a quote in the

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Dasam Granth from the Zafarnāmā, a letter written by Guru Gobind Singh to the Mughal emperor: “When all else fails, it is righteous to raise the sword.” Quotes from elsewhere in the Dasam Granth emphasize how God aided the Sikhs during war, but there is no delineation of further conditions for the moral use of force. It is worth noting that those who embark on the dharam yudh are to be sant sipāhīs, or saint soldiers, individuals of both military prowess and well-developed moral character rooted in the teachings of the gurus. This concept has its root in Guru Hargobind’s articulation of mīrī-pīrī, or both the spiritual and temporal authority of the Sikh community. Further reinforcing this engagement with the world is the mainstream Sikh rejection of monasticism and asceticism; the Sikh is to live a wholly moral existence within the world. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn See also Sant Sipāhī; Sikhism and War; Singh, Guru Gobind Further Reading Dorn, A. Walter, and Stephen Gucciardi. “The Sword and the Turban: Armed Force in Sikh Thought.” Journal of Military Ethics 10, no. 1 (2011): 52–70.

Dhimma Throughout history, Islam has taken many forms in practice, and the expression of Islamic faith in human lives includes numerous aspects of a personal devotional nature. However, unique to classical Islam among the major religions of the world is the requirement that believers strive toward political implementation of God’s laws as revealed through Muhammad, as well as the proposition that these laws rightfully govern everyone, Muslims and all others, and rightfully supplant human laws with which they come into conflict. Among the laws governing societal order established in Muhammad’s name is the dhimma, a covenant operative in both Sunni and Shiʾa Islam that governs the place in the world of all non-Muslims who are neither pagan nor atheist. Included among the dhimmis are all the world’s Christians, all Jews, all Zoroastrians, and, according to some

legal opinions, Hindus and Buddhists. Under the dhimma, anyone belonging to one of these religions must be constricted from full and equal participation in society, must follow Islamic rules of conduct for non-Muslims, and will enjoy certain protections from the hands of Muslims if the dhimmis fully comply with the rules governing their lives. Under conquest or colonization by Muslims, dhimmis have an advantage over pagans or atheists in that they are permitted the choice of keeping their faith even if they cannot manifest it publicly through such activities as proselytization, polemics, or singing loudly. Under Islam’s system, adult dhimmi men are required to pay an annual poll tax (jizya) for the privilege of keeping their heads for one more year, and for the protection of their household from enslavement and looting. In essence, the dhimma represents the second tier of Islam’s three-tiered caste system. Unlike Hinduism’s caste system, Islam’s is not immutable; a person may always move “up” in caste. However, a pagan or atheist under Islamic rule may only convert to Islam and technically does not have the option of choosing any other faith but Islam. Likewise, a Christian or Jew may convert to Islam, but not, on penalty of death, atheism or paganism. Muslims may not move “down” to embrace another faith, again on penalty of death. That the death penalty is sometimes not applied little diminishes the fact that it is called for and solidly justified by classical jurisprudence when used in such circumstances: the threat stands as warning. Dhimmi peoples in Muslim societies, even into modern times, have often been required to wear distinctive dress as a marker. Other rules have included the prohibition of riding a horse, a privilege reserved to the Muslims. The testimony of dhimmis in an Islamic court is invalid against that of Muslims. Understanding the dhimma is crucial to recognizing the purpose of Muslim calls for laws concerning “incitement to religious hatred” or other restrictions on nonMuslims’ speech about Islam in Western societies. Such calls represent attempts to impose the rules of the dhimma upon non-Muslims even before the Muslims have gained full political control of the society in question. Self-censoring of speech by non-Muslims and other forms of voluntary compliance with sharia requirements is sometimes seen as common courtesy, but in fact it advances sharia

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and an unwitting acceptance of Islamic rule, including the inferior status imposed upon non-Muslims by the dhimma. Not all aspects of the dhimma are enforced everywhere and at all times, nor are all Muslims of equal opinion about the dhimma covenant or how it ought to be implemented. Even so, the dhimma serves as a subtext to most relationships between Muslims and others. Daniel A. Brubaker See also Islam and War (Jihad) Further Reading Cook, Michael. Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Friedmann, Yohanan. Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Hallaq, Wael B. Sharia: Theory, Practice, Transformations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Yeʿor, Bat. The Dhimmi. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1985. Yeʿor, Bat. Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2002.

Divine Kingship and War There is a direct correlation between divine kingship and war in the ancient Near East. The ancient Near East refers to the area of Mesopotamia that is roughly equivalent to the modern Middle East, in the time period from about the year 3000 BCE until the conquests of Alexander the Great in the fourth century BCE. The Sumerians, the Babylonians, the Akkadians, and the Assyrians are some of the more prominent civilizations of this era. The perception of the king’s military role in the ancient Near East was framed by the idea that kingship equated with divinity. One reason for this was due to the general belief that actions and events occurring in the physical world were a reflection of events in the spiritual world. The king was the representative of a deity, and as such he carried out the wishes of the deity. In the ancient Near East generally, the king was the leader of his people, whose responsibility it was to provide

for their well-being. Kingship was historically borne of crises, as a king was needed to solve a major problem on behalf of the people. Kingship naturally changed throughout the course of history and assumed different aspects, depending on the period and people with whom the king was connected. Kingship was considered to be a divine office. As kingship became an institution, the king was looked upon as the representative of the god he served, and eventually was basically considered by some kings to be the deity himself. The aspect of divinity can be seen in several ways, including the epithets that were used to refer to the king. He was often referred to as the god’s “son,” a “god among kings” or, in the Bible, God’s “anointed one.” Also, in Mesopotamia, the name of the king was sometimes written with the tag that designated divinity. The city wherein the king ruled and represented the deity was considered the deity’s own particular city, and some kings, namely Hammurabi, describe themselves as like the sun god rising over the entire land. Further, some ways in which the king was treated show him to have been considered divine. In Mesopotamia, the statue of the king was sometimes worshipped in the temple as one would worship a god. Oaths and curses were often taken in the name of the king as well as the god. That the militaristic role of the king included his role as a representative of deity can be seen in Mesopotamian art; that is, some kings are pictured wearing a helmet that reflects their divinity. All of these things show that, with regard to warfare, the king was more than just a high military official. For the purposes of this entry, the most pertinent aspect of the king as a divine representative is his role as military leader. This can be seen in several ways. The king’s role as a representative of deity included the oversight of his kingdom, and therefore his providing for his subjects. While this included several things, his role as a divine servant in administering the realm occasionally took expression in warfare. That the king engaged in warfare as a representative of deity can be seen in several ways. Biblical texts such as 2 Kings 3:10 show that some kings consulted prophets before going to war, and some Akkadian texts show that prophets gave kings a message from the deity regarding their upcoming battles as well. Also, some Akkadian texts

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speak of the deity as being present with the king in battle, and the Israelites carried the Ark of the Covenant with them into battle to ensure victory. There could have been several reasons for a king to engage in warfare. Of course, a king would do so to defend his people. He might also have gone to war to conquer another nation for several reasons. There might have been an interest in gaining territory for the purpose of providing sustenance for the king’s subjects. The king might also have wanted to conquer other people for the glorification of the deity. The king also went to war for the administration (or imposition) of justice or righteousness. According to both Akkadian and biblical texts, the king speaks of his role as warrior in terms of the administration of justice or righteousness. For example, kings in Mesopotamia placed a great value on their role in unifying the north and south, calling themselves by such titles as “king of Sumer-Akkad,” “king of the four quarters,” and so on. To conquer other peoples was therefore done partly in an effort to impose a unified legal standard upon them. The two concepts of the king as a representative of deity and of warfare thus coalesced in the concept of the holy war. The concept of justice or righteousness was considered to be binding over all people. It was the king, as the representative of deity, who was the instrument to carry out the administration of justice. The means by which this was effected was the “holy war.” The king thereby saw to the unification of the land, justice, and the subjugation of enemies. As the representative of the deity, the king’s decision to engage in warfare meant several things. For the king, it meant the fulfillment of his divine role. For his subjects, it surely meant protection and providing, as the king saw to their needs by conquering lands whereupon produce could be gained. This in turn would mean that the king had fulfilled his divinely appointed role. With regard to the deity, victory or defeat meant several things. A certain outcome would mean that the deity was either pleased or displeased with the king either due to his attitude, or lack of faithfulness. It further illustrated that the king was responsible for whatever befell the nation over which he served. In both Akkadian and biblical texts, the outcome of warfare would also mean either the glorification or humiliation of the god, and therefore of his people.

Not every ruler in the ancient Near East was a warrior. War in general might be said to be an extreme measure or last resort. To conquer other peoples also suggests an animosity between nations or rulers. Warfare therefore seems to be an extreme expression by the one upon whom all responsibility fell, and the only one who could so fulfill the corresponding desires of the ones he served. For a king to so fulfill his duties was, therefore, a reflection of the deity’s relationship with his subjects. David Musgrave See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare: Religious Dimensions of; Assyrian Warfare; Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East; King David as Warrior; Primary Document: The Dutie of a King in His Royal Office by Sir Walter Raleigh (1599) Further Reading Anati, Emmanuel. Palestine Before the Hebrews. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. Frankfort, Henri. Kingship and the Gods. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Gordon, Cyrus H. The Ancient Near East. New York: W. W. Norton, 1953. Jacobsen, Thorkild. The Treasures of Darkness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976. Longmann, Tremper, III, and Daniel G. Reid. God Is a Warrior. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1995. Oppenheim, A. Leo. Ancient Mesopotamia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Roux, Georges. Ancient Iraq. 2nd ed. Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1964. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2013. von Soden, Wolfram. The Ancient Orient. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1985.

Druze and War The Druze are a cloistered, nonpreaching religious sect derived from the Shi’a Ismaili faith in the early 11th century. They call themselves Muwahhidun, which is Arabic for Unitarians. Their population is about two million, living mainly in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. Their language is Arabic, and they have no unified religious leader,

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The Druze are an Arabic-speaking ethnoreligious group with origins in 11th-century western Asia who have frequently endured persecution throughout their history. The Druze faith incorporates elements of numerous religions and philosophies, including reincarnation and transmigration, and prohibits proselytization. In this photo, a young Druze man from Mont Liban, Lebanon, is pictured with pistol and sheathed sword, ca. 1889. (Library of Congress)

but each country has its own religious authority known as the Aqqal, or “knowledgeable one.” Druze beliefs developed during the rule of the Fatimid Ismaili Shi’a caliph al-Hakim in Cairo (r. 996–1021). Muhammad Ismail Anushtakin appeared in Cairo in 1017, claimed that Caliph al-Hakim was God, and wrote a book similar to the Qur’an called, al-Dustur (Persian for “constitution”). Al-Darzi was the third preacher during al-Hakim’s rule to proclaim his divinity. Al-Darzi had thousands of followers in Egypt, and he became a close confidante of Caliph al-Hakim, who encouraged al-Darzi to move to Syria to spread this message. Caliph al-Hakim was murdered in 1021 in a cave in the Muqattam Mountain in Cairo, but his body was never found. The Druze believe that he is alive and will return. This belief resembles that of many other

Shi’a sects, including the Twelvers in Iran and Iraq, or the Buhara in India, all of whom maintain the faith that a divine individual will return to earth. The Druze ethnicity is a mixture of Arab and Syriac, but their language is only Arabic. Due to their secret faith and closed communities, their faith has always been shrouded in mystery, and there is little if any proselytizing ever done by the Druze. The Druze are found primarily in mountainous and semi-isolated areas in the Levant, such as the alSummaq Mountains west of Aleppo, in the Wadi al-Taym in southern Lebanon, in the Golan Heights in Syria, and in the Suwayda Mountain in southern Syria. The Druze saw the rise of some powerful families, such as the Arslan who still lead more than half of the Druze community in Lebanon. Through family bonds, tribal pacts, and followers of their doctrine, they maintained a semi-independent society with a distinct culture, forbidding marriage outside of the community of believers. Muslim forces carrying the banner of jihad against the crusaders and the Mongols also led military campaigns against the Druze, the primary campaigns taking place from 1260 to 1277, and another under the leadership of al-Nasir ibn Qalawun. The Druze were considered heretics, along with other Shi’a-originated sects like the Nusairis, now known as Alawites. When the Ottoman Empire dominated Syria and the Levant in 1516, they continued to prosecute the Druze until the Ottomans finally recognized the authority of some Druze families, like the Maan and the Shihab in Lebanon and parts of Syria, who eventually paid fealty to the empire. Between 1840 and 1860, the Druze and the Christian Maronites fought a series of bitter civil wars in Lebanon and Syria, areas in which the Christian population was widely oppressed under the Ottomans. In the early years of the 20th century, the al-Atrash family led a rebellion against the Ottomans, and after the First World War fought for autonomous status within the French Mandate under a distinct Druze flag. In Lebanon, the long-surviving Druze family of Arslan (Turkish for lion) competed with a rival, the Janbolat family of Syria, each family today claiming authority over the Druze in Lebanon. The basic doctrine of the Druze is contained in the “book of wisdom” written by Hamza ibn Ali, a follower of Caliph al-Hakim. They do not recognize or follow many of

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the basic Islamic rules, like requiring the hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca. They also do not build mosques. They have their own religious building, called the khilwa, which is the same term used to describe the building in which Caliph al-Hakim worshipped in Cairo before his death. The Druze in Israel have been one of the most integrated ethnic groups in the state, and they are trusted, unlike Muslims or Christians, to serve in the Israeli armed forces on an equal footing with Jewish citizens. The Druze in Israel were rewarded for their extreme loyalty to the state during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. Taef Kamal El-Azhari See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Druze-Maronite Conflict; Ottoman Empire Further Reading Abraham, Antoine J. Lebanon at Mid-century: Maronite-Druze Relations in Lebanon, 1840–1860: A Prelude to Arab Nationalism. Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981. Abu Izzedin, Nejla M. The Druzes: A New Study of Their History, Faith, and Society. Leiden: Brill, 1993. Atashe, Zeidan. Druze and Jews in Israel: A Shared Destiny? Sussex, UK: Sussex University Press, 1997. Betts, Robert Brenton. The Druze. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988. Churchill, Charles Henry. The Druzes and Maronites under the Turkish Rule, 1840–1860. London: Bernard Quaritch, 1862. Farah, Caesar E. The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830–1861. Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000. Firro, Kais M. History of the Druzes. Leiden: Brill, 1992. Treston, Mark. Galilee: The Christian, the Druze, the Jew and the Muslim. New York: iUniverse, 2006.

Druze-Maronite Conflict (1840–1860) The Druze-Maronite conflict was in fact a series of armed conflicts between Maronite and Druze religious communities on the territory of present-day Lebanon that took place between 1840 and 1860. The conflict broke out after an escalation of rivalry between the regional ruling elites representing two religious groups. It resulted in the decline of Druze influence in Lebanon, which during that period was a part of the Ottoman Empire.

Contradictions between the two main ethno-religious groups of Mount Lebanon started to accumulate in the beginning of the 18th century with the increasing migration of Maronite Christians from northern Lebanon to central and southern areas controlled by the Druze, a religious community with a distinct doctrine and rituals, which at the time was officially considered a branch of Islam. In the beginning Druze feudal lords even encouraged the migration of Maronite peasants, who brought new agricultural methods and technologies. In spite of this migration the Druze, who made up the majority of regional elites, remained the most influential political force. The situation changed in the first half of the 19th century due to the internal split of the Druze community, and after the occupation of Lebanon by Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad Ali, a self-declared ruler of Egypt and Sudan. Ibrahim Pasha exiled a large number of Druze elites, and their lands were distributed to Maronite leaders who supported the new authorities. A number of reforms and transformations carried out by the Egyptians, as well as the use of armed Maronite squads for suppression of antiEgyptian Druze revolts, led to the emergence of a new and predominantly Christian elite and strengthened the political position of the Maronite Church. Bashir Shihab II, the emir of Lebanon, who secretly converted to Christianity, began publicly taking part in Maronite religious ceremonies. Soon Maronite Christians made up the majority of the staff in his administration and armed forces. After Ibrahim Pasha was defeated by Ottoman and British troops and the territories occupied by him returned to Ottoman rule in 1841, the exiled Druze elites came back to Lebanon intending to regain their lost political and social influence. A sectarian conflict was inevitable. The DruzeMaronite rivalry was also intensified by the politics of European powers, and first of all Great Britain and France, looking to strengthen their positions in the Middle East. In Lebanon Great Britain supported the Druze community, while the Maronites were backed by the French. The first stage of the Druze-Maronite conflict began on April 4, 1841, when a simple incident between two hunters—a Druze from the village of B’alqin and a Maronite from Dayar al-Qamar—resulted in an armed battle. In October 1841 Druze feudal lords, supported and armed by the British, organized a revolt against local Lebanese

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authorities with the involvement of Druze peasants who depended upon them. They laid siege to the emir’s palace and attacked Maronite villages, slaughtering the population, burning homes, and seizing lands. After the Maronite patriarch called for a holy war, Maronites organized selfdefense troops. However, Druze militias showed better fighting skills. Among approximately 1,500 killed during this mutual extermination, which lasted for six weeks, the majority were Maronite Christians. Ottoman authorities, who were interested in weakening the two most influential Lebanese communities, did not intervene in the conflict. It was not until November 1841, when the military advantage of the Druze became obvious and the conflict spread to districts beyond Mount Lebanon, that the Ottomans were forced by the Europeans to send their military troops to the region. In 1842 Lebanon was divided into a Druze and a Maronite district (qaimaqamiyya). This was the first time in the Middle East when a territory was divided between ethno-religious communities. Nevertheless, this new system was based on a wrong understanding of the Lebanese demographics. Over time it caused a number of legal and administrative problems for the two districts and predetermined further sectarian collisions. The winter of 1845 saw the beginning of the second stage of the Druze-Maronite conflict. After a general meeting of Druze chiefs in Mukhtara on February 2, 1845, Maronite Christians, who perceived it as a new challenge, took precautions, and in a few weeks growing sectarian antagonism resulted in a new series of armed clashes in various districts. As before, Druze militias were better organized and equipped. Pressured by the Europeans, the Ottoman authorities intervened again, implementing wide administrative reforms aimed at reducing sectarian tensions. The intervention and reforms had some success, and following that the two rival communities coexisted relatively peacefully for 15 years. Nevertheless, the new administrative system was just a temporary solution and could not prevent increasing antagonisms, sometimes even within each of the ethno-religious groups. Moreover, the Ottomans, the British, and the French continued to use different Druze and Maronite clans in their own political interests. The growing confrontation between the two communities eventually led to an

incident in Bayt Miri in mid-August 1859, which escalated into serious fighting between the Maronites and the Druze in Beqaa Valley. The incident was followed by numerous confrontations in different villages and resulted in a real civil war, which broke out on May 28, 1860. During May and June 1860 Druze forces gained a number of victories. They seized the main Christian town of Dayar al-Qamar, captured and burned major Christian villages in Beqaa Valley and Wady Taym, and on June 20 took over the city of Zahla. The Druze considered their military victories a basic prerequisite for returning to their former influence. On July 5 Ottoman authorities proposed a peace agreement based on the demands of the Druze chiefs. After Maronite Christians rejected this proposal and the Ottoman foreign minister Fuad Pasha, who arrived in Beirut, did not manage to resolve the crisis, French troops landed on the Lebanese coast on Augus16. The military presence of the French, who were known for their support of the Maronites, caused panic among the Druze and led to their mass migration to the region of Hawran in present-day Syria. Maronite Christian refugees returned to their villages, which had been seized by Druze militias. Pressured by the French, the Ottomans agreed on military collaboration in Mount Lebanon. After negotiations on the Lebanese crisis held in Beirut between representatives of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, a new administrative reform was carried out and Mount Lebanon became a political entity ruled by a Maronite Christian governor and an administrative council made up of four Maronites, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Sunni, and one Shi’a Muslim. It established the end of the former Druze influence in Lebanon; their role was reduced to that of other communities, which have never been of similar significance in this region. Maronite Christians became the new Lebanese political elite. Dmitry E. Sevruk See also Druze and War; Maronites and War Further Reading Abraham, Antoine J. Lebanon at Mid-Century: Maronite-Druze Relations in Lebanon, 1840–1860: A Prelude to Arab Nationalism. Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981. Churchill, Charles Henry. The Druzes and Maronites under the Turkish Rule, 1840–1860. London: Bernard Quaritch, 1862.

Duc, Thich Quong (1897–1963)  247 Farah, Caesar E. The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830–1861. Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000. Firro, Kais M. History of the Druzes. Leiden: Brill, 1992.

Duc, Thich Quong (1897–1963) Thich Quong Duc was a Buddhist monk who committed an act of self-immolation in Saigon on June 11, 1963, during the Vietnam War. This radical act was designed to bring attention to the persecution of Buddhist monks in South Vietnam at the hands of the largely Catholic government of Ngo Diem. Duc’s death resulted in the U.S. government increasing pressure on the Diem administration to implement some measure of religious toleration to prevent further internal discord in South Vietnam. This act of self-

immolation is largely considered to have been a catalyst in the Diem regime’s collapse in the fall of 1963. It was captured in a Pulitzer Prize–winning photograph by American journalist and photographer Malcolm Browne, who was informed by one of Duc’s fellow monks on the day of the act that something dramatic and important would occur that would be worthy of a photograph, but that was all the information that was provided. Thich Nhat Hanh, a fellow Vietnamese Buddhist monk who was also suffering persecution under the Diem administration, praised Duc for internalizing the suffering of all Buddhists and proclaimed that the act of self-immolation was not the result of cowardice or a death wish, but of a desire to liberate others and to pave the way for change in Vietnam. Duc’s act of protest against the South Vietnamese government is an example of religious fervor employed with the objective of illustrating the plight of a persecuted religious

The Reverend Thich Quang Duc, a 73-year-old Vietnamese Buddhist monk, is soaked in petrol and burned to death in front of thousands of onlookers at a main highway intersection in Saigon, Vietnam, on June 11, 1963. He had previously announced that he would commit suicide in protest against persecution of Buddhists by the South Vietnamese government. (AP Photo/Malcolm Browne)

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group, ultimately aiming for political change and for liberation. However, in this particular case, political change would not occur for more than a decade, and the Diem regime’s weakness and corruption would be one of the primary catalysts for America’s decade-long conflict in Vietnam. Jeffrey M. Shaw See also Buddhism and War; Hanh, Thich Nhat; South Vietnamese Buddhist Uprising Further Reading Fall, Bernard. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985.

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Penguin, 1997. Schecter, Jerrod L. The New Face of Buddha: Buddhism and Political Power in Southeast Asia. New York: Coward-McCann, 1967.

Dutch War of Independence See Eighty Years’ War

E Easter Rising (1916)

and from 1914 onward wanted to seize the opportunity given to them by the First World War, an event that they termed “England’s difficulty” and “Ireland’s opportunity.” The IRB was too small to organise an insurrection by itself and therefore enlisted the help of the more moderate Irish Volunteers. However, from 1915 onward, a power struggle began within the movement between those such as Bulmer Hobson, who believed that people’s lives should not be risked unnecessarily, and those such as Sean MacDermott, who wanted to seize the opportunity presented by the war and organize a campaign of mass resistance. In the end, those advocating an armed insurrection won. In January 1916, the Supreme Military Council of the IRB decided to launch a rebellion as soon as possible and began, under the leadership of Joseph Plunkett, to draw up plans that focused the resources available entirely upon Dublin. It was hoped that such a plan would inspire rebellions in other parts of the country. The leaders of the rebellion, with the support of Sir Roger Casement, a British diplomat and radical nationalist, had negotiated with the Germans, who agreed to provide assistance in the form of an arms shipment. However, this consignment of 20,000 Russian rifles on board a ship named the Aud was intercepted by the British and Casement, who was traveling with the arms, was arrested and later executed for his part in the rebellion. Casement managed to get word to the IRB

The Easter Rising began on Easter Monday, April 24, 1916. It marked a turning point in the history of Irish nationalism, which always has had strong religious overtones. It was the first success for those arguing for the use of physical force in pursuit of Republicanism and a complete break with Britain, and it marked the end of the more moderate home rule movement, which wished to work within existing political structures. The Easter Rising was led by the Irish Volunteers, who wished to see British rule in Ireland replaced by an Irish republic. Originally meant to be a county-by-county rebellion against British rule, backed by a German invasion, it centered on the capital, Dublin, with the rebels occupying strategic city-center buildings such as the General Post Office and the Four Courts. During the Rising itself, the rebels issued a proclamation declaring an Irish republic, and it was this act that was to lead to their almost immediate executions by the British government. The roots for such a revolution can be found in the 1890s when nationalism in Ireland began to change, with some moving toward an acceptance of physical force as a means of achieving their aims. It is during this period that the roots of the Rising can be found with the reestablishment of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). This radical organization believed in the creation of an Irish republic 249

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British soldiers fire upon Irish rebels from behind a barricade of empty beer casks near the quays in Dublin during the 1916 Easter Rising. Also known as the Easter Rebellion, the armed insurrection was instigated by Irish Republicans in an effort to end British rule and establish an independent Irish republic. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

leaders that the German support would not be forthcoming, and despite the objections of Eoin MacNeill, the Rising went ahead. The Easter Rising was a brief affair, undertaken by around 1,400 volunteers and resulting in the deaths of approximately 450 people: 116 from the British military, 16 policemen, and 318 others. The rebels found little support among the ordinary people of Dublin, who were angered by the action. However, it was the draconian response of the British authorities that turned public opinion toward the leaders. In an overreaction to events, 15 men were shot by firing squad, including James Connolly, who was so badly injured that he had to be tied to a chair to face his executioners. Additionally, 400 men were sent to internment camps in Britain, only to be released a few months later, providing the Republicans with a new leadership and a focus for their resistance to British rule. In the aftermath of the rebellion, Fr. John Flanagan, the unofficial chaplain to the Rising, stressed the pious nature

of the atmosphere in the General Post Office (the headquarters of the rebellion). In making such claims, Flanagan was emphasising a relationship between Catholicism and the national cause that had been in existence in Ireland since the early 19th century. The seeds of this relationship had been sown during Daniel O’Connell’s Catholic emancipation campaign, which had harnessed the organizing power of the Catholic Church in Ireland for political ends. In the years after Catholic emancipation was achieved, a battle for power ensued between those who put the nation first and those who believed that the nation should be at the service of the Catholic faith. This dispute was brought into sharp relief by the events of Easter 1916, which was presented as a sacrifice for the nation on a par with Christ’s sacrifice for humanity. The Rising was a significant turning point in the history of Irish nationalism: the preceding century had given Catholics in Ireland the confidence needed to provide their own leadership rather than relying upon Protestants. They had found an identity for themselves and this identity was a Catholic one. The Rising therefore represented the zenith of the relationship between Catholicism and nationalism in Ireland. Although all the leaders of the Rising were nominally Catholics and died Catholic deaths, it was IRB member Patrick Pearse—a product of the Christian Brothers—with his own unique brand of mystical nationalism who defined the Catholic nature of the Rising. From 1913 onward, Pearse launched a campaign to raise nationalism both in himself and in others to a far higher emotional plane by sacralising it and fusing it with the religious faith of the people. He drew inspiration from the sacrifices made by soldiers at the front during the First World War, and at his trial he frequently mentioned the sacrificial nature of his engagement in the rebellion. In this, he was joined by others such as Michael McDonagh who wrote prior to Easter 1916 that the rebels “would offer themselves up as a holocaust for their country.” The intent of the Rising was to create an Irish republic. Protestants were to be included in the new Irish nation but in Pearse’s words, “Protestant and Dissenter must be brought into amity with Catholics.” There is no suggestion of it being the other way around. According to Pearse and his form of Catholic nationalism, Ireland was a Catholic nation and Protestants were to be there under sufferance as their religion prevented them

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from becoming truly Irish. Additionally, unlike the Catholic nationalism espoused by the church, which placed Catholicism before nationalism, Pearse’s brand put the nation before the church: devotion to the nation was to be on a par with devotion to the church. Pearse’s ideology and work were peppered with religious feeling and motivation, and the Easter Rising in 1916 was the culmination of this development with Pearse’s sacrifice at Easter doing for the Irish nation what Christ’s death had done for the world some 1,900 years previously. However, the Rising caused problems for the Catholic hierarchy because as it was doomed to failure, it was suicidal and therefore went against Catholic teaching. Furthermore, it had been led and organised by members of an oath-bound and secret society, and again membership in such societies was prohibited by the church’s doctrine. However, in rallying against the British, the participants were creating exactly the kind of anti-British, Anglophobic form of nationalism that the church had encouraged through its education system, albeit through violent means. What the church now had to do was ensure that if there was going to be a revolution, which after the executions seemed likely, it would be a Catholic revolution. The Catholic hierarchy therefore decided not to denounce the cult of 1916 and by saying nothing effectively left the constitutional, nonviolent nationalism that it had previously been so supportive of to its own fate while tacitly condoning the new physical-force nationalism that was emerging in its stead. During the Anglo-Irish War or Irish Revolution of 1919–1921, the church effectively stood back and waited for a victorious side to emerge, condemning the violence on both sides but with more of an emphasis on British acts of repression than on Irish acts of rebellion. Once the treaty creating the Irish Free State was signed in 1921, the church threw its full weight behind the pro-treaty party, excommunicating the anti-treaty leaders. In the three decades after 1921, the Catholic Church exerted control over the government of the south of the country, which led to what many have argued was the creation of a theocratic state. Catholicism was a key motif in the Easter Rising of 1916, but it was not a Catholicism born of religious belief; rather it was the use of religious symbolism that provided the religious focus for this uprising. In placing such an emphasis on Catholic imagery, the rebels ensured that Cathol-

icism and nationalism would be inextricably linked no matter what geographical form the new Irish republic would take. Maria Power See also First World War, Religious Dimensions of; Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict Further Reading Augusteijn, Joost. Patrick Pearse: The Making of a Revolutionary. London: Faber and Faber, 2010. Bew, Paul. Ireland: The Politics of Enmity, 1789–2006. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. English, Richard. Irish Freedom: The History of Irish Nationalism. London: Pan, 2007. Fanning, Ronan. The Fatal Path: British Government and Irish Revolution, 1910–1922. London: Faber and Faber, 2013. Townshend, Charles. Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion. London: Penguin, 2006.

Edessa, County of The County of Edessa was the first crusader state established in the East. It remained a Latin province from 491 to 539/1098 to 1144 CE, at which time it fell into the hands of Imad al-Din Zangi and reverted back to Muslim control. The territory included the cities of Edessa, Samosata, and Sarudj. The city of Edessa, however, was the jewel of the “blessed state,” which is a reference to the crusader state. Edessa (Arab. al-Ruhā) is located in the south of present-day Turkey and is known as Urfa. Its location in the ancient world was at the junction of a central passage from Armenia southward and east to west across the Euphrates to Mesopotamia and Persia. The Seleucid kingdom (323– 364 BCE) exploited the strategic value of this route, and the new polis received the name “Edessa” to pay tribute to the capital city of the Macedonian homeland. From the first to second century CE, local rulers were vassals of the Parthians, but during the latter period, the Romans laid claim to the city. Under Roman control, Edessa became renowned for its adoption of Christianity as the state religion (fourth century CE), the first kingdom to do so officially. Although the city was threatened by the expansion of the Sassanid

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Persian Empire, it remained under Roman and Byzantine dominion until the Arab invasions of the seventh century. From the 7th until the beginning of the 11th century, Edessa continued under Muslim occupation, though it was sacked and burned by Byzantine forces on more than one occasion. In 422/1031, the Byzantines under Georgias Maniakes gained control of the town and citadel. However, in 478–479/1086–1087 it once again became a Muslim municipality, this time with the victory of the Seljuk sultan Malikshāh. It remained as such until the inception of the

crusader state (491/1098) under Baldwin of Bouillon (Baldwin I, 1058–1118). The circumstances surrounding Baldwin’s control of Edessa, which secured his rule over the county (1100 Baldwin II; 1119 Joscelin I; 1131 Joscelin II), are quite egregious. After Baldwin captured the neighboring city of Tell Bāshir, the Armenian leader Toros (Theodorus), who at that time occupied the city of Edessa, invited him over as reinforcement against their mutual enemies. Baldwin obliged Toros, but shortly after had the Armenian ruler murdered, thereby usurping his power

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over the city. Baldwin’s allegiance to Pope Urban II and the cause of the First Crusade was thus severed as he established independence from the other crusader states. Once the Franks gained control of the Latin East, a degree of religious tolerance developed toward eastern Christians, Jews, and Muslims alike, more so in the County of Edessa than in other crusader states. Here intermarriage occurred between the Franks and the native, “heretical” Christian groups (monophysite Jacobites, Armenians, and Maronites). The Westerners accepted the local nobility as worthy marriage partners who could strengthen social and political ties with the region. This level of integration, however, was unique to the County of Edessa. After the initial conquest, moreover, the relationship between the native peasantry and the Franks was amicable relative to that in the West. The villein had to pay a tax to the Franks, the traditional Islamic kharaj (land tax). However, this tradeoff worked well for both parties and contributed to a flourishing agricultural life in the Latin East, developing trade routes between Asia and other Frankish settlements like the County of Edessa. Roy Michael McCoy III See also Crusades (Overview); First Crusade Further Reading Dostourian, Ara Edmond, trans. Armenia and the Crusades, Tenth to Twelfth Centuries: The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa. New York: University Press of America, 1993. Edgington, Susan B. Albert of Aachen: Historia Ierosolimitana, History of the Journey to Jerusalem. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Phillips, Jonathan. The Crusades 1095–1197. London: Routledge, 2002. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. Oxford History of the Crusades. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Ross, Steven K. Roman Edessa: Politics and Culture on the Eastern Fringes of the Roman Empire, 114–242 CE. London: Routledge, 2001.

Edict of Fontainebleau (1685) Louis XIV signed the Edict of Fontainebleau on October 22, 1685, at the royal chateau of Fontainebleau to fully revoke

the Edict of Nantes. While the Edict of Nantes granted limited religious privileges to Protestants, the new Edict of Fontainebleau made it illegal to practice Protestantism in France and officially permitted the king to inflict forced conversions and intimidation on the one million French Calvinists (called “Huguenots”) who resided in the country, a process known as the dragonnades that had been implemented several years before. The new edict illustrated both the need for the French crown to reclaim its legitimacy through “une fois, une loi, un roi” (one faith, one law, one king) but also demonstrated the power of Louis XIV’s central government in demanding and maintaining internal order. The Edict of Nantes was signed by Louis’s grandfather Henri IV in April 1598 and was designed to create a socially based status quo between the Roman Catholic majority and French Calvinist Protestants (called “Huguenots”), until such time as religious divisions could be healed. The French Wars of Religion in the 16th century had torn the country apart. Prior French kings had attempted similar negotiated solutions, thus the Edict of Nantes was the last of a series of attempts to impose limited religious coexistence while longer-term solutions were sought. Unlike previous agreements, all of which had failed to stem the violence, the initiative came at a propitious time and the Edict of Nantes was implemented with only minor disruptions. In hindsight, contemporaries and historians hailed the accord as genuine evidence of the rise of toleration and the end of the Wars of Religion. Yet the Edict of Nantes was never intended to be a permanent solution. The articles and provisions contained therein represented a very limited type of coexistence, within very defined boundaries, and which afforded few rights to French Huguenots. Henri made it clear that he firmly believed the edict would someday be unnecessary, as France would return to a society unified in Roman Catholic faith and tradition. This objective was sought by Henri’s son Louis XIII and then by his grandson. By 1685, Louis XIV’s mistress Madame de Maintenon and his powerful minister of war, François Michel Le Tellier, the marquis de Louvois, were able to convince the king that few if any Huguenots remained in France and that it was now time to return to the legitimacy of rule through one faith, one law, one king. In reality, more than one million Huguenots were actively exercising their faith in 1685 throughout France.

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The resulting Edict of Fontainebleau was stark and demanding, as its provisions made it illegal for Huguenots to worship, either in public or private, to run religious schools, to engage in proselytism, and, except for Huguenot pastors, even to emigrate. Huguenot parents were forced to baptize their children in the Roman Catholic Church, and ministers were required to convert or leave the country. To create the appearance of “mass conversions” to the Catholic faith, and later to enforce the new law, from 1681 Louvois billeted several regiments of the army in certain provinces in a reign of terror known as the dragonnades. By billeting the soldiers with Huguenot families, this system of logement brought a direct threat of violence, where soldiers were encouraged to take aggressive liberties with everything from food to material goods to female household members. The dragonnades compelled a number of Huguenots to renounce Protestantism, although few actually converted to Catholicism. Indeed by 1685, from all appearances, Louvois could report to the king that the numbers of Huguenots were substantially reduced. Yet a determined and hardy minority remained in France and continued to secretly practice their faith. One result of this was the revolt of the Camisards in southwestern France in 1702. In addition and despite the prohibition against emigration, by most historians’ estimates slightly more than 20 percent of French Huguenots left the country, becoming one of the largest diaspora groups in early modern times. These émigrés tended to be wealthy merchants, craftspeople, and those with family already residing in other European kingdoms or in colonial venues. Many monarchs, including Frederick Wilhelm of Brandenburg-Prussia, welcomed the refugees with enthusiasm. France thus lost a substantial portion of its intellectual capital, and the country suffered economically, socially, and culturally while other countries benefited. Louis XIV’s diplomacy suffered as well, as all of Europe continued to align against what was seen as unrestrained French aggression. Huguenots added their voices to those of rulers such as William of Orange, Stadtholder of the United Provinces (Holland), who after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 became king of England. The agitation against Louis culminated in the War of the League of Augsburg (the Nine Years’ War), which saw much of Europe arrayed against his armies. Eventually, however, it took a revolution in 1789 to

establish a more solid right to freedom of religion in France. Robert Jay Fulton See also Calvin, John; Camisards, Revolt of; French Wars of Religion; Huguenots; Primary Document: Withdrawing Religious Toleration for Huguenots: Louis XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) Further Reading Benedict, Philip. The Faith and Fortunes of France’s Huguenots, 1600–85. St. Andrews Studies in Reformation History. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001. Garrison, Janine. L’Edit de Nantes et sa Révocation: Histoire d’une Intolerance. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985. Holt, Mack P. The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629. New Approaches to European History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. McCullough, Roy L. Coercion, Conversion and Counterinsurgency in Louis XIV’s France. History of Warfare 42. Edited by Kelly DeVries. Leiden: Brill, 2007. McKee, Jane, and Randolph Vigne. The Huguenots: France, Exile and Diaspora. London: Sussex Academic Press, 2012. Mentzer, Raymond A., and Andrew Spicer. Society and Culture in the Huguenot World, 1559–1685. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Sandberg, Brian. “‘To Deliver a Greatly Persecuted Church’: Resituating the Edict of Nantes within the History of Laïcité.” Storica 38 (2007): 33–64.

Egyptian Warfare Although Egypt was relatively isolated in ancient times, warfare played an important role in its history. The key figure in Egyptian warfare was always the pharaoh, as the occupant of the office of pharaoh was reckoned as a divine being (though he was commonly recognized as being human and the Egyptians were not afraid to make fun of him for his human faults). For example, the character Sinuhe in the ancient Egyptian narrative “The Story of Sinuhe” (ca. 2000 BCE), describes the pharaoh as a god without peer. It was the pharaoh’s responsibility to preserve order in Egypt and to suppress chaos in the world, which included leading the army to defeat any nation that was in rebellion against Egypt.

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The Egyptian myths also featured combat, though it did not involve the pharaoh and was portrayed somewhat differently than in other ancient Near Eastern cultures. Hymns to the gods portray them as divine warriors. Each night during the sun’s (Re) journey, it was attacked by the serpent Apophis and rescued by Seth. In another myth, Re prevented the destruction of humans by a group of gods. The portrayal of chaos as connected with water was not as common in Egypt as it was elsewhere in the ancient Near East, though the “Instructions of Merikare” (ca. 2025–1700 BCE) refer briefly to the destruction of the sea monster. Various rituals involved the gods in warfare; execration texts called down curses on the enemies of the Egyptians throughout Egyptian history. In the battle descriptions by the pharaohs, the gods are often called upon to defeat the enemy and to empower the pharaoh. However, nonroyal texts rarely refer to divine warriors besides the pharaoh. According to Egyptian records the formation of the Egyptian state began with Narmer’s (also known as Menes) unification of his own Upper Egypt (southern Egypt) with Lower Egypt (northern Egypt) in 3100 BCE. The image of the pharaoh holding his enemies by the hair and smiting them was already present during the early dynasties and became ubiquitous in later Egyptian culture. For example, Snefru (about 2600 BCE) portrays himself this way, labeling one such picture of himself with the caption “the Smiter of Barbarians.” The Old Kingdom of Egypt was a powerful empire (the time of the Giza pyramids), but historical information is scarce about specifics of Egyptian warfare. It appears that the Egyptians routinely went on campaigns in several directions to gain plunder, including south to Nubia and northeast to Canaan. Weni served as a general and campaigned many times in the northeast to defeat the Asiatics. However, he does not thank any divine warrior for his victory (besides the pharaoh) or record other religious activities connected to warfare. The good times were not to last, however, as the First Intermediate Period disrupted Egypt (2125–1975 BCE). The central power of Egypt declined during this period, leading to civil war between Herakleopolis and Thebes. The lack of central power enabled local leaders to become more powerful and act as rulers of their areas, taking on tasks traditionally done by the pharaoh.

However, by the end of the Eleventh Dynasty central power had been restored in Egypt and the Middle Kingdom had begun (1975–1640 BCE). Perhaps as a reaction against the chaos of the First Intermediate Period, the pharaohs of the Middle Kingdom portrayed themselves in their iconography as larger-than-life and as great warriors. They spread Egypt’s control south into Nubia, a source of workers and wealth for Egypt. Egypt also extended its influence into Canaan, but this seems to be more conciliatory than martial, as illustrated by the fictional story of Sinuhe. Sinuhe was a court official who fled Egypt when Amenemhat I died and lived among the Canaanites until he was brought back to Egypt shortly before his death. As in other nonroyal accounts of warfare, Sinuhe did not refer to divine work in his defeat of his enemies in Syria (including a duel with a local fighter that provides one of the few parallels to the David and Goliath story in the ancient Near East). The Middle Kingdom reached its end when the foreign Hyksos (they seem to be Canaanites) ruled Egypt during the Second Intermediate Period (1630–1520 BCE). Although the Hyksos most likely rose to power with the cooperation of the Egyptians, they came to be hated and were replaced by the New Kingdom pharaohs (the New Kingdom was from 1539 to 1075 BCE). Ahmose, an Egyptian general, fought the Hyksos and left a tomb biography; like other warriors he praised the pharaoh (who rewarded him for each hand of a defeated enemy he brings back) but did not refer to divine warriors or other religious activities in battle. During the New Kingdom the pharaohs became more personally involved in warfare. Thutmose III (1479–1425 BCE) was one of the most prominent early pharaohs of the New Kingdom. Since the Nubian (south) and Libyan (west) frontiers were stabilized, he focused on Canaan (northeast), launching a campaign his first year as king and going on a total of 17 campaigns over the course of his reign, reaching as far as the Euphrates River. His most famous battle was against the Canaanites in Megiddo during his first campaign. He records that he went to war to defend Egypt against invaders and to reduce the anarchy and chaos in foreign lands. Since a land was viewed as being in anarchy if it was not submitting to Egypt, this allowed great freedom in religious justification for attacks. The

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gods also ordered him to expand the borders of Egypt. When his armies reached the pass entering the Jezreel Valley, he held a council with his generals before the battle, but he rejected their advice and followed his own idea: taking the more direct but also more difficult pass through the hills to directly assault the Canaanites in the plain near the powerful city of Megiddo. However, his army spent too much time plundering and allowed the Canaanites to escape into the fortified city of Megiddo, leading to the pharaoh’s rebuke of his troops. Thutmose III portrayed himself fighting at the head of his troops and thanking Amun for strengthening his arms and Seth for protecting him in battle. A report of the battle (written by army scribes who went on campaign with the pharaoh) was deposited in the temple of Amun upon his return to Egypt. Other inscriptions from Thutmose III emphasize his personal martial ability (even fighting alone in battle) and his ability to defeat the strongest of enemies with the fire from the cobra that often appeared on the pharaoh’s crowns, known as the uraeus. Amun gave the enemy into his hands, and on one occasion he sent a star against the enemy, causing them to flee. Amun was the most powerful divine warrior and was active throughout Egyptian history in empowering pharaohs in battle. Even though Seth was portrayed as helping the sun every night against Apophis and was attributed with protecting pharaohs in battle, he was recognized only during the New Kingdom and fell out of favor after that time period, since he was connected with Asia and was also known as a god of trickery. The pharaohs after Thutmose III continued the stabilization of Canaan under Egyptian control and fought many battles there with divine help. Amenhotep II, the son of Thutmose III, told how Amun-Re appeared to him in a dream to encourage him, promising that he would protect the pharaoh’s body in battle. The Amarna period (1353– 1332 BCE) is a famous time in Egyptian history during which Amenhotep IV changed his name to Akhenaten and moved his capital to Amarna, focusing on the sole worship of Aten, the sun-disk. While some have argued that Akhenaten disregarded his Canaanite land, based on the Amarna Letters (in which many local Canaanite minor kings repeatedly begged the pharaoh for help and fought each other), and perhaps even was religiously opposed to warfare, this does not appear to be the case. No land was lost

under his reign; major expeditions were not needed, most likely because Egyptian control was so strong in the region; and images of the king in the traditional smiting pose show that whatever changes he brought to Egyptian culture, it did not appear to affect the way he waged war. The warrior pharaohs after the Amarna period, including Seti I, Ramses II, Merneptah, and Ramses III, continued to seek to expand Egypt’s empire beyond its borders with the Libyans to the west and the Hittites to the north. Seti I (1294–1279 BCE) fought the Hittites in Amurru (modern-day Syria), a region that the Egyptians attempted to control but which consistently reverted to Hittite influence due to the close proximity to Hittite cities (such as Carchemish). His son Ramses II campaigned against the Hittites in his fifth year (1274 BCE) to secure control of the area for Egypt. According to the Egyptian account, Ramses II charged into the Hittite troops by himself when his army was fleeing. He called on Amun to help him, since Ramses II was following the plan of Amun, and the divine warrior spoke an encouraging word to him. Although Ramses II portrayed the battle as a great Egyptian victory, the lack of plunder taken and the immediate return to Egypt indicate that it was at least a draw, if not an Egyptian defeat. The city of Qadesh remained under Hittite control, and the two empires later signed a peace treaty in 1269 BCE, one of the first times that Egypt had officially recognized the existence of another major empire as an equal. The arrival of the Sea People from Greece heralded the downfall of the New Kingdom. While Ramses III defeated them at the Delta region, the Philistines’ settlement in the coastal plain (astride the valuable international highway) in Canaan demonstrates the weakening of the Egyptians. While they might have been given the land peacefully by the Egyptians as a buffer against the Hittites, the Philistines quickly become independent of Egyptian control. The Third Intermediate Period (1075–715 BCE) followed, when Nubia and Assyria conquered Egypt. The most wellknown pharaoh of this time was the Nubian king Piye, who conquered large parts of Egypt from the south in about 750 BCE. Even though he was Nubian, he portrayed himself in his victory stela as following many of the Egyptian ritual practices. Unlike the New Kingdom pharaohs, he made no claim about fighting on the front lines. He commanded his troops to purify themselves before battle and

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exhorted them to trust in Amun to give them victory. Like Thutmose III, he berated his troops publicly when they did not perform according to his expectations. Piye often offered sacrifices (including to the gods of the cities he captured), and he viewed his enemy as those who were blaspheming the gods. When he conquered Memphis, he intentionally protected the temples of the city and performed various rituals in them. Throughout Egyptian history warfare was always viewed as a religious activity, focused either on the divine warrior(s) from the pharaoh’s perspective or on the pharaoh in the nonroyal texts. In Egyptian thought, no pharaoh would engage an enemy without divine command and could not win a battle without having divine empowerment. Charlie Trimm

not to be the case. Instead, Abu Abdallah Muhammed recruited Moroccan forces to aid the defense of Tunis. On July 18, 1270, the crusader forces landed and won a series of small engagements against Muslim forces, taking the city of Carthage. Because of a lack of fresh water, Louis’s army was soon beset by disease. On August 25, Louis himself succumbed, probably to dysentery, and Charles of Anjou took over direction of the crusade. He made little progress on the defenses of Tunis and abandoned the siege on October 30, after signing an agreement with the bey that granted trade concessions to Christian merchants and allowed clergy to reside within the city. Because of these treaty clauses, the crusade was deemed to be a partial success. Ralph M. Baker

See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of; Hittite Warfare; Qadesh, Battle of

See also Ninth Crusade; Seventh Crusade

Further Reading Breasted, James Henry. Ancient Records of Egypt: Historical Documents. 5 vols. New York: Russell & Russell, 1906. García, Juan Carlos Moreno. “War in Old Kingdom Egypt (2686–2125 BCE).” In Jordi Vidal, ed. Studies on War in the Ancient Near East: Collected Essays on Military History. AOAT 372. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2010, pp. 5–42. Hallo, William W., and K. Lawson Younger Jr., eds. Context of Scripture. Leiden: Brill, 1997. Kang, Sa-Moon. Divine War in the Old Testament and in the Ancient Near East. BZAW 177. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1989. Spalinger, Anthony J. War in Ancient Egypt: The New Kingdom. Ancient World at War. Malden, UK: Blackwell, 2005.

Eighth Crusade (1270) This crusade was launched by King Louis IX of France in 1270 against Muslim territories in Tunisia. It failed mainly because of the onset of disease. In 1267, about 18 years after his failed crusade in Egypt, Louis IX decided to launch a crusade to aid the embattled crusader states under attack from the Mamluk forces. The king was advised by his brother, Charles of Anjou, to begin his campaign with an attack on Tunis. Louis believed the bey of Tunis, Abu Abdallah Muhammed, might convert to Christianity. This was

Further Reading Falk, Avner. Franks and Saracens: Reality and Fantasy in the Crusades. London: Karnac, 2010. Jotischky, Andrew. Crusading and the Crusader States. New York: Routledge, 2013. Kedar, Benjamin Z. Société pour l’étude des croisades et de l’Orient latin. Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1992, pp. 294–301. Powell, James M. Anatomy of a Crusade. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986. Richard, J. The Crusades c. 1071–c. 1291. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War: A New History of the Crusades. London: Penguin Books, 2007.

Eighty  Years’  War, or Dutch  War of   Independence (1568–1648) At the conclusion of the Eighty Years’ War, the Dutch Republic (also known as the Low Countries, or the Netherlands) emerged as an independent political entity in Europe. By 1568, tensions between the 7 increasingly Protestant provinces in the northern part of the Low Countries and the 10 predominantly Roman Catholic southern provinces—part of the old Duchy of Burgundy—were at the breaking point. Prior to the end of the Eighty Years’ War

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in 1648, all 17 of these provinces were under the rule of the Spanish Habsburg crown, which was a Roman Catholic monarchy. During the rule of the Habsburg monarch Charles V (1500–1558), the Low Countries were heavily taxed and local governments, which were increasingly run by Protestants, were replaced by Catholic governing bodies in an attempt to reestablish Catholic dominance. During the Protestant Reformation in the early 16th century, the Low Countries had become a hotbed of Reformist scholarship and publication, with émigrés from many nations taking shelter in the cities. Influenced by humanists such as Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536), critics of the Roman Catholic Church were seen by the Habsburgs as a threat to the religious and political order. The Habsburgs declared the independent cities in the Low Countries to be in revolt, and their leaders to be both heretics and rebels. Convinced that their authority in the Low Countries was at risk, the Habsburgs sent the uncompromising Duke of Alba and the 10,000-man Army of Flanders to Brussels, rekindling the Inquisition. Leading Catholics who protested the Inquisition’s reappearance in the Low Countries were arrested, tortured, and executed, along with more than 1,000 others, while those who were able fled. The Spanish advance into the predominantly Protestant Low Countries was met with resistance from Dutch Catholics, who had largely adopted a position of tolerance for their Protestant neighbors. From exile in Saxony, the Catholic William of Orange, also known as William the Silent, directed the Protestant resistance, hiring mercenary troops to bolster their forces. William’s motives for resisting Spanish power centered on his dissatisfaction with Habsburg heavy-handed rule in the Low Countries and their persecution of Dutch Protestants. William supported religious freedom, and as such he led the rebellion against the Spanish invasion. Having had some military success against the Habs­ burgs, William returned to the Low Countries to lead the insurrection from there. During this period, however, internal divisions over religion almost undid Protestant rebel unity, as radical Calvinists insisted on conversion of captured Catholics to the Reformed faith. To maintain his leadership, William converted to Calvinism in 1573, angering Catholic fanatics. By 1581 the seven Northern Provinces had declared independence, becoming known as the United Provinces, or the Dutch Republic. As the Southern

Netherlands remained under Spanish rule, the increasingly pluralistic United Provinces attracted financial, intellectual, and cultural elites from the South when the Spanish Army, often unpaid, mutinied and pillaged their hosts. Nevertheless, several Southern provinces (Artois, Hainaut, and Walloon Flanders) signed the Union of Artois in 1578, sponsored by the new Spanish governor and military commander, Alexander Farnese (later Duke of Parma), ending hopes of a reunion based on the 1576 Pacification of Ghent. William and the Protestants responded to the Union of Artois with their own Union of Utrecht, bringing together Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Guelders, and Groningen in January 1579; Brabant and Flanders joined a month later. Calvin’s authorization of lesser Protestant magistrates to rebel against monarchs to check tyrannies imposing false religion, a doctrine especially attractive to both Dutch and Huguenots, led to a political revolution in Europe. In 1581, through the Act of Abjuration, the Dutch repudiated Philip as the legitimate King of Netherlands. After a fruitless search for other Protestant European princes (including Elizabeth I of England), they would proclaim themselves a republic. The Spanish resumed their offensive, recapturing many rebel strongpoints, including Antwerp, though Philip diverted the Army of Flanders to the fruitless armada enterprise against England in 1588, and then further weakened his forces in the Low Countries by assisting the Catholic League against the Huguenot claimant to the French throne, Henri of Bourbon. During this interlude the House of Nassau, led by the brilliant and well-organized Maurice of Nassau (1567– 1625) and his kin, created one of the most effective armies in early modern Europe, providing vital military experience to a generation of anti-Habsburg leaders from across Europe, especially Sweden, England, and France. It was his successes against Parma that eventually established the boundaries between North and South. Though vicious fighting continued, especially the Siege of Ostend, the Dutch republic effectively was independent after 1585, and in 1609 Spain agreed to a truce of exhaustion. The great dispute between Protestants and Catholics in the Netherlands remained unresolved, as the Dutch vainly called for public tolerance of Protestants in the Spanish South, and Catholics insisted on the same for Dutch Catholics in the North, who were only able to worship in secret.

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Until complete independence was recognized by the Spanish as part of the general peace of 1648–1649, the republic continued to fight for its life. Though the border zones remained devastated by constant fighting, the central northern provinces of Holland and Zeeland remained at peace, while the Dutch emerged as masters of the sea and a flourishing cultural, scientific, and economic power. Similarly, hardening political divisions were matched by the conversions of most Catholics in the North to Calvinism, and in the South from Calvinism to Catholicism. Amsterdam flourished, while Antwerp, often cut off from the sea by the Dutch in Zeeland, lost its former dominance. The formation of the Dutch East India Company in 1602 heralded the republic’s ambitions to challenge Spain for its world empire. It was during the truce that religious divisions within the republic established one of the most enduring debates in Protestantism. Reformed worship had been made the only legal form since 1572, but the long-brewing debate between two Leiden theological professors, Jacob Arminius and Franciscus Gomarius, eventually led to factional clashes. In their Five Articles of Remonstrance, followers of Arminius repudiated the Belgic Confession, the teaching of John Calvin, Theodore Beza, and their followers, insisting on God’s election of men on the basis of foreseen faith, a universal atonement, resistible grace, and the possibility of lapse from grace. The Arminians, led by Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and Jacob Oldenbarnevelt (1547–1619), forwarded the Remonstrance to the States assembly. Oldenbarnevelt’s moderate policy with Spain, however, opened the Arminians to the charge of treason. In 1610 a disputation in the States assembly allowed the Gomarists to challenge the Arminians, though they advised the States to leave the doctrinal dispute to a National Synod. The elites, however, fearing Calvinist mobs, attempted to have Grotius’s liberal Calvinism made law, proclaiming freedom of conscience in the spirit of the Union of Utrecht. Pastors who attacked the Arminians would then be liable to dismissal. The protests of outraged pastors and schoolteachers (and many of the common people) led to riots in 1617–1618. Maurice and others joined the protests when local authorities were encouraged by Oldenbarnevelt to raise mercenary troops to keep public order, threatening the sovereignty of the States-General and the Union itself.

Maurice had Oldenbarnevelt arrested for treason and executed in 1619, linking the House of Orange with Calvinism. In the same year the long-delayed synod at Dordrecht, with theologians and observers from England, Scotland, and Switzerland in attendance, after discouraging Arminian participation in the debate, established strict Calvinism as the official doctrine of the Reformed Church. The synod commissioned a new and complete translation of the Bible in Dutch, unifying both doctrine and the national language. The final decision, known as the Canons of Dort, set forth Reformed doctrine on five points: total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement (intended only for the elect), irresistible grace, and perseverance of the saints—defining classical Calvinism in Europe for the next century. When leading Arminians refused to endorse the Canons, they were required to leave the country. With the Arminians in retreat (though never absent), and their policy of peaceful coexistence with Spanish Flanders in disarray, the militant Calvinists supported Denmark’s Frederick in the Bohemian civil war (Frederick was also nephew of Maurice), brought English troops into the first engagements, and sheltered the exiled Frederick at The Hague. Holland officially rejected attempts to extend the Spanish truce in 1621. While the siege of Breda led to a humiliating defeat in 1625 at the hands of Spanish general Ambrosio Spinola, made worse for the Dutch by the death of Maurice, his brother Frederick Henry took the strategic city of ‘s-Hertogenbosch in 1629. In 1632, Frederick Henry captured Venlo, Roermond, and Maastricht during his famous “March along the Meuse,” though attempts to take Antwerp and Brussels failed. The Dutch learned that the new Catholic generation raised in Flanders and Brabant distrusted them even more than it loathed the Spanish. At sea, on the other hand, Spanish attempts to bring troops by sea met disaster at the hands of the Dutch navy at the Battle of the Downs in 1639. Overseas, the naval wars for colonial supremacy and wealth went mostly to the Dutch, either through privateering or seizure of trading posts in Asia, financing the triumphs on land that culminated in the siege of Hulst in 1645. The resurgence of Spanish military strength after the battle of Nordlingen prompted Holland in 1635 to ally with France under Louis XIII and his first minister, Richelieu,

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bringing panicky ultra-Calvinist pressure on Frederick Henry, as he had earlier relaxed persecution of Arminians. Thereafter, though Arminianism remained a subject of heated debates in Scotland and other bastions of Reformed theology, an uneasy domestic peace ensued. Though the French alliance raised Dutch hopes of taking back the South, captured territories eventually were added to victorious (and Catholic) France. Opposition to the war increased, and peace feelers went out from the moment talk began of a general end to the European war. On January 30, 1648, the Treaty of Münster between Spain and the Netherlands brought the 80 years’ struggle to its end. The Dutch Republic was recognized de jure as an independent state. Understanding the role of religion in the Dutch struggle must be based on the complex but deep intermingling of the theological cross-currents of Lutheranism, Anabaptism, Calvinism, and Catholic Reformation with the dynastic interests and secular concerns triggered by the rise of absolute monarchy. Old feudal privileges and immunities were the basis of the early resistance, though by then the Dutch had played host to two generations of church reformers exiled from Germany, France, England, and Scotland. Scholars see mixed motives in many of the apparently religiously inspired insurrections of the mid-1500s, such as the iconoclasm, which also expressed resentment of Habsburg tyranny. The eventual co-location of the House of Orange with Calvinism and the condemnation of Arminianism ironically led to a republican rebellion presided over by an emerging monarchy. The waves of war with Holland bankrupted the Spanish Empire and left the Catholic Reformation largely in the hands of clergy, the Vatican, and the new orders, supported by devout and privileged laity. At the same time, the doctrine of the divine right of kings had been subverted by the Calvinist idea of legitimate resistance against a defaulting sovereign and the rule of scripture, a key Calvinist contribution forged from the Reformation Wars of France, Holland, and the Scottish Reformation, culminating in the English Civil Wars and execution of Charles I. Duff Crerar See also Beza, Theodore; Calvin, John; Grotius, Hugo; Luther, Martin; Wars of the Reformation

Further Reading Israel, Jonathan I. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Koenigsberger, H. G. Monarchies, States Generals and Parliaments: The Netherlands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Parker, Geoffrey. The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1659. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Parker, Geoffrey. The Dutch Revolt. London: Allen Lane, 1977. Spaans, J. “Catholicism and Resistance to the Reformation in the Northern Netherlands.” In Philip Benedict et al., eds. Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands, 1555–1585. Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1999. Tracy, J. D. The Founding of the Dutch Republic: War, Finance, and Politics in Holland 1572–1588. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

El Cid (Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar) (ca. 1043–1099) The term “El Cid” derives from the Arabic sayyid meaning “lord” or “master.” El Cid was a legendary Christian warrior-knight from Castile who became widely known in Spain for liberating Valencia from the Moors in the 11th century CE. This achievement earned the Cid a special place in the annals of Spanish history as he became the symbol of a crusading ideal, a justification for armed conflict in the cause of religion, and an important icon to be manipulated for political purposes. The story of the Cid has been told in history, poetry, and on the big screen in a Hollywood film staring Charlton Heston in 1961. The Cid was a real-life warrior named Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar (born ca. 1043 CE), an aristocrat and adventurer from Castile who was a lieutenant in the royal court. At the age of 14 he entered the court of Fernando I of Castile to be trained as a warrior-knight. He fought in battles between Christian kings, such as the battle of Graus in 1063, and rapidly rose through the ranks. His supporters called him El Campeador (from the Spanish meaning the “Battler” or “Campaigner”) in recognition of his valor and bravery in combat. On the death of Fernando I in 1065, his son and successor Sancho II promoted Rodrigo to constable. He

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now carried the king’s sword, lance, and shield into battle and was in charge of the royal escort. When King Sancho died on October 7, 1072, his brother Alfonso VI—King of León—took Castile and exiled Rodrigo in 1081 to please his own retinue of royal followers. The loss of social status meant the loss of many of the benefits a king could accord a nobleman such as promotion, power, land, plunder, opportunity, title, and tribute. Exile from court forced Rodrigo to turn himself into a mercenary soldier fighting for whoever could pay him and his men the most money. The Moorish kingdoms, enriched by gold from Africa, could pay warriors like Rodrigo handsomely. He joined the emir (ruler) al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza and helped him in his wars against the emir of Lérida. Rodrigo’s success as a military commander also earned him respect among the Moors, who called him the Cid. While the Cid was fighting for the Moors, Alfonso VI, Emperor of León-Castile, was engaged in a militant and expansionist policy to increase his royal dominions under the guise of a holy war against the Moors to claw back lands formerly held by Christians. On May 25, 1085, he took Toledo, the seat of Catholicism in Spain and the ancient capital of the Visigothic kingdom, which had been lost since 711 CE. He forced tribute from neighboring Muslim emirs, but his authority was quickly challenged by the arrival of a new Islamic fundamentalist sect from Africa, known as the Almoravids, who soon reversed these Christian gains. On October 23, 1086, Alfonso was beaten at the Battle of Sagrajas. The loss of many experienced military commanders in the battle forced Alfonso to quickly reconcile with the Cid, who returned to the Christian court to prepare a defense against further Almoravid incursions. The loss of so many Christian nobles at Sagrajas also meant that the Cid could charge Alfonso more money for his services than previously. He was given extensive territory and frontier castles to command, which would have been unpopular with other aristocrats at court. One notable opponent was Count García Ordóñez, who rallied other noblemen around him to conspire against the Cid. In 1089 he was accused of treachery for failing to come to the relief of the royal army at Aledo where the Christians suffered a significant defeat. The Cid was exiled for a second time. His family was briefly imprisoned and all his property expropriated.

The Cid and his followers decided not to join any Muslim court but rather exacted their own tribute from the Moors by laying siege to towns and cities. They marched to the Levant coast and forced tributes from the towns of Polop and Ondara. These towns were already paying tribute to the Christian ruler, Count Berenguer of Barcelona, who attacked the Cid for supplanting his tribute. The Cid defeated him at Tévar. In 1092 the Cid turned on Alfonso’s kingdom and laid waste to it. Some of the land he destroyed belonged to court noblemen who had conspired against the Cid, especially Count García Ordóñez. After exacting tribute and ransom from his fellow Christians, the Cid then turned to the city of Valencia in 1093 and laid siege to it. On June 10, 1094, he became master of Valencia when its inhabitants and defenders surrendered unconditionally. An Almoravid army came to Valencia to retake the city but was defeated by the Cid at Cuarte and at Bairén. He ruled the city harshly, demanding excessive tribute, and turned the main mosque into a cathedral dedicated to Saint Mary. He died in 1099 without a male heir, and the city was recaptured by the Almoravids in 1102. His body was taken to the Cardeña monastery in Burgos. In his lifetime the Cid was an excellent military commander whose talents and expertise were sought by both Christian and Muslim rulers. He was a mercenary soldier whose loyalty was not bound by ties of friendship or religion but by the pursuit of money. In the centuries since his death many myths and legends were compiled around the Cid that portrayed him as an embodiment of the warriorcrusader taking up the sword in the name of Christianity. Poets recited tales of the Cid, extolling every military victory to God, and made him into a hyper-Christian. His conquest of Valencia was linked to the Reconquest, despite the evidence that he always acted not out of religious devotion but rather for personal gain. In the 20th century the Cid’s fame reached its height. A major Hollywood film from 1961 brought the tales of the Cid to an international audience, while in Spain the man had become a national hero. General Francisco Franco saw in the Cid the ideal Castilian. Statues were built to commemorate the warrior, songs were written comparing him and the dictator favorably together, the Cid’s campaigns were taught in military academies, and his birthplace was renamed Vivar del Cid. Barry N. Whelan

262  Emicho, Count of Leiningen (Late 11th Century) See also Reconquista Further Reading Barton, Simon, and Richard Fletcher. The World of El Cid: Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. Fletcher, Richard. The Quest for El Cid. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Lowney, Chris. A Vanished World: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Medieval Spain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Nicolle, David. El Cid and the Reconquista, 1050–1492. Oxford: Osprey, 1988. Simpson, Lesley B. The Poem of the Cid. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.

Emicho, Count of Leiningen (Late 11th Century) In November 1095, Pope Urban II called for noble Christian warriors to free Jerusalem from Muslim rule. The charismatic monk Peter the Hermit extended the call to crusade to all Christians, and his zealous sermons inspired Count Emicho of Leiningen (or Flonheim). (Count Emicho should not be confused with Bishop Emicho of Leiningen.) Jewish chronicler Solomon bar Simson claims Count Emicho envisioned an apostle branding him, choosing him to be the “Last Emperor” who would fulfil the “end of times” prophecy (Gabriele 2005, 65). He would march on Constantinople, all Christian armies would unite to seize Jerusalem from the Saracens, and this would prompt the Second Coming of Christ. Inspired by these apocalyptic promises and the zero-sum battle between good and evil, and fueled by vengeance against the supposed killers of Christ, 12,000 Franks and Germans rallied behind Count Emicho to march east in 1096. This crusade, known variably as the “Peasants’ Crusade,” “People’s Crusade,” or “Popular Crusade,” began with the killing of Jews in Metz and Speyer, and then in Worms. Here the bishop sought to shelter Jews and negotiate on their behalf, yet their refusal of Catholic baptism led to the ransacking of his episcopal palace and the slaughter of 800 Jews. Emicho is renowned thereafter for his assault on

Mainz, where Jews were sequestered in the bishop’s fortified palace. Despite accepting a gold offering in exchange for their safety, Emicho allowed the massacre to go ahead. Although the burghers fought the first wave, ordinary citizens joined the frenzy and the death toll climbed to 1,100 Jews, including ritual suicides. The destruction of Cologne Jewry is similarly attributed to Emicho’s troops. Since the Carolingian age, victory in battle had demonstrated the righteousness of one’s cause and may have substantiated Emicho’s messianic apocalypticism (Gabriele 2005, 81). Emicho’s army met its downfall against the Christian militia in Hungary owing, according to Albert of Aix, to excessive fornication and avarice. By this time, Emicho was infamous. In the words of Jewish sources, he “was our chief prosecutor. He had no mercy on the elderly, on young men and young women, on infants, or on the ill. He made the people of the Lord like dust to be trampled underfoot” (Roth 2003, 241). Hillary Briffa See also Crusades (Overview); Jews and the Crusades; Popular Crusades; Urban II, Pope Further Reading Gabriele, Matthew. “Against the Enemies of Christ: The Role of Count Emicho in the Anti-Jewish Violence of the First Crusade.” In Christian Attitudes towards Jews in the Middle Ages: A Casebook. New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 61–82. Roth, Norman. Medieval Jewish Civilization: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge, 2003.

English Civil Wars (1642–1651) Introduction and Historiography

The English Civil Wars were largely the result of religious conflict between Calvinist Puritans supporting parliamentary rule and Arminian Anglicans supporting the monarchy and advocating a more Catholic, hierarchical religious structure overseen by bishops and enforcing a formal liturgy (S. R. Gardiner, Hugh Trevor-Roper, and Nicholas Tyacke). It was the English version of the Thirty Years’ War, a religious war on the continent between Catholics and

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Protestants, which was still going on when the English conflict broke out. Although most historians agree that the surface causes of the conflict were religious, they often seek deeper forces at work beneath the surface. Those underlying causes are usually in line with their own particular worldviews or political and economic agendas. Tory historians see it as another popular uprising in the manner of earlier medieval-style riots like the Fronde in France against unpopular monarchs (C. V. Wedgwood); Whig historians, whose interpretation held sway in the 19th and early 20th centuries, considered it as another step in the progress of liberty against oppressive monarchy in the development of parliamentary democracy in modern Western civilization (T. B. Macaulay); Marxist historians, whose views dominated much of the mid to late 20th century, insisted that it was the result of class struggle, most notably the rise of the middle class (Friedrich Engels, R. H. Tawney, and Christopher Hill), or a crisis of an English aristocracy threatened by the growth of monarchical power in the Tudor and Stuart periods (Lawrence Stone). In recent years revisionist historians have brought both the Whig and Marxist views under close scrutiny, discovering that the historical record is too complicated to fit either model. Parliament was not as democratic as the Whigs supposed, many of the middle class supported the monarchy, and many of the aristocrats supported Parliament, thereby undermining the Marxist class-struggle interpretation.

Origins of Religious Tension

All three archbishops in the reign of Elizabeth—Parker, Grindal, and Whitgift—encouraged an educated, preaching clergy and a diminished liturgy. According to Professor Kenyon, “the theological standpoint of the Church of England was rigidly Calvinistic” (Kenyon 1978, 24). Archbishop Grindal (1576–1583) was a strong Calvinist, as was the next archbishop, Whitgift (1583–1604), who approved the Calvinistic Lambeth Articles of 1595, the first official denunciation of Arminian theology in England, to the displeasure of the queen. One cannot underestimate the degree to which Calvinism became popular in the reign of Elizabeth, for “by the end of the sixteenth century the Church of England was largely Calvinist in doctrine” (Tyacke 1990, 3). Both Archbishops Whitgift and Bancroft, who were archbishops of Canterbury from 1583 to 1604,

had endorsed the Calvinist doctrine of absolute predestination. It would be careless, however, to equate Calvinism with Puritanism in the reigns of Elizabeth and James, as Puritanism was limited to issues of liturgy and church governance, which Puritans considered holdovers from popery. Many clergy, especially the bishops, were theologically Calvinists but favored a formal liturgy, the prayer book, and episcopal authority. It wasn’t until the reign of Charles I that Calvinism became conflated with Puritanism, and that the monarchical Arminian clergy heaped the scorn they already had for Puritans upon even the moderate Calvinists. In 1630 the master of Trinity College, Cambridge claimed that “Praedestination is the roote of Puritanisme [and] Puritanisme the roote of all rebellions and disobedient intractableness in parliaments and all schism and sauciness in the country, nay in the Church itself ” (British Library, Harleian MS 7019:89, in Tyacke 1990, 57).

The Moderate Calvinism of King James I

When James I (1603–1625) came to the throne, a number of Puritan clergy presented the Millenary Petition to him, signed by a thousand clergymen. It asked that the church be further reformed in liturgy and practice. The king, fearing they would also push for an end to the bishops, which would weaken royal authority over the church, responded by calling the Hampton Court Conference, a summit of bishops and leading Puritans. James was convinced that the oversight of bishops was essential to support royal authority, so episcopacy was reaffirmed. The Puritans also got little in the way of reforming the church, but the king did approve a new translation of the Bible, later known as the Authorized or King James Version. Hampton Court resulted in a reaffirmation of episcopacy, support for moderate Calvinist liturgy and theology, and the majority of clergy becoming “much more conformist” (Kenyon 1978, 27). The first archbishop of Canterbury appointed by King James was Richard Bancroft (1604–1610), a Calvinist and major figure in translating the King James Bible (Tyacke 1990, 3). However, due to attacks on the authority of the episcopacy, Bancroft began attacking those who denied the authority of bishops in fiery sermons, which came to the attention of King James, who appointed him archbishop. Although Calvinism was continuing to grow in influence, especially after the Gunpowder Plot, Archbishop Bancroft

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began a campaign to limit criticisms of episcopacy, but he died after only six years as archbishop, prompting Clarendon to claim, “if he had lived, he would quickly have extinguished all that fire in England which had been kindled at Geneva” (Clarendon’s History of the Rebellion, I, 156). In 1611 King James did two things that pleased the Calvinists: he authorized the King James Bible and elevated another of its chief translators, George Abbot, another staunch Calvinist, to archbishop of Canterbury. There is a lot of evidence that in the last few years of James’s reign he began to move away from Calvinism. The crown began to show signs that it wanted to return to a via media, fearing Calvinists could use their theology to challenge royal authority. First came “Directions to Preachers” (1622), designed to return to an emphasis on liturgy over preaching. In 1624 the author of an Arminian publication, A New Gagg for the Old Goose, claimed to have the support of the king in its publication (Tyacke 1990, 103), and Calvinist efforts to get the Canons of the Synod of Dort adopted by the Church of England became increasingly remote as James continued to move away from Calvinism in his last year.

The Growth of Anti-Calvinism in the 1620s and 1630s

“Calvinism remained dominant in England throughout the first two decades of the seventeenth century,” but near the end of James’s reign opposition began to build. The pressure on Calvinism grew exponentially when Charles I came to the throne in 1625. The change was so drastic that it has been called an “overthrow of Calvinism” in an “Arminian revolution” (Tyacke 1990, 8). A year into his reign Charles pushed to reform both Cambridge and Oxford. Part of this reform was to replace Calvinists with those more conformable to the wishes of the king. Cambridge was the first to come under close royal control, and a few years later Oxford was as well. By 1629 Parliament openly accused King Charles of purposely opposing those of a Calvinist persuasion (Commons Debates 1627, 100 in Tyacke 1990, 106). Charles considered Calvinist theology as supporting an opposition to his monarchical rule, for it “erected a second, independent, hierarchy of spiritual grace alongside that of a temporal authority and dignity.  .  .  . Divine law and the will of God transcended the normal

respect due to a titular superior” (Stone, 1967, 346–47). Soon even prelates were in trouble for holding Calvinist views: Bishop Davenant for preaching a sermon to the king on predestination (Bodleian, Tanner MS 290, 86–87 in Tyacke 1990, 106) and Archbishop Abbot for refusing to license a sermon emphasizing absolute obedience to the will of the monarch. This incurred the anger of the king, and the archbishop was no longer welcome at court. The Arminian anti-Puritan faction of churchmen marginalized their own archbishop. This was led by Bishop of London William Laud, who now assumed many of the duties of the archbishop, virtually exiling Abbot to his estate in Kent and finally replacing him at his death in 1633.

The Parliamentary Crisis and Personal Rule of Charles I

Conflict between King Charles and Parliament reached a crisis point early in his reign. In 1627 Parliament, called to raise a tax, instead impeached one of Charles’s officials. Charles then dissolved Parliament and attempted to rule alone. The following year Charles again called Parliament to raise a tax, but instead Parliament drew up the Petition of Right, appealing to the Magna Carta as their authority. Once again Charles dissolved Parliament without raising a tax and saw it necessary to rule for the next decade without calling them again. Since only Parliament could raise a tax, Charles had to find other means to finance his rule. He did this through selling titles of nobility, going into debt, increasing fines for offenses, and raising a “ship money tax to support the navy”; however, all of these efforts made the king less popular.

Archbishop William Laud and the War on Puritanism

The new archbishop was not only Arminian and anti-Puritan, he also promoted High Church liturgy and absolute monarchy, both abhorrent to the Puritans. Archbishop Laud insisted that wooden communion tables in the middle of the church be replaced by a stone altar at the front, and that clergy wear vestments reminiscent of Roman Catholicism. Those who objected were subject to arrest, and several were flogged and had their ears cut off for publishing pamphlets opposing the changes made by Archbishop

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Laud. Puritans were subject to fines for not attending the new liturgical High Church form of worship. The divide between the crown and Parliament was mirrored in the church, where Puritans would appeal to Parliament for redress of grievances, whereas the anti-Calvinists would appeal to the crown.

Scottish Rebellion or Bishop’s War and Scottish Invasion

Due to the attempt by Charles I and Archbishop Laud to force High Church Anglicanism on Calvinist Presbyterian Scotland, the Scots rebelled. Resisting the imposition of hierarchical bishops and use of the English Book of Common Prayer, riots broke out and the Scots drew up a covenant opposing these innovations. In 1639 the English king led his army to the border of Scotland, but war was avoided by the signing of a truce. The following year Charles once again marched on Scotland, but was defeated and the Scots marched south, taking most of northern England. Charles was forced to accept the demand of the Scots to leave the church in Scotland alone and pay for all expenses of the war. Upon returning to London he called Parliament after an 11-year hiatus and asked for taxes to be raised to form a larger army to march again to Scotland. The Puritan majority in Commons told the king that before any tax was approved, their grievances should be considered. The reply of King Charles was to dissolve Parliament, which is why it was called the Short Parliament. Charles then once again marched his army on Scotland, and again broke the truce. This resulted in another loss to the Scots, who now occupied all of northern England and demanded tribute of £850/day, pillaging the civilian population if the money was not provided. Now King Charles was desperate. He once again called Parliament to raise a tax to provide money for his war effort.

The Long Parliament

Each parliament called by Charles I was more extreme than the last. This one in 1640 again drew up a list of demands to make upon the king. Before any talk of a tax was considered, they insisted that the church should be reformed, Parliament should meet regularly, all forms of tax should be approved by Parliament, and Parliament should

have a say in the selection of royal ministers. When a plot was discovered to have the Irish invade England, Parliament led by John Pym accused the plotters of high treason. Charles, fearful that he would be implicated in the Irish plot, accused parliamentary leaders of treason for opposing him. He brought troops into Parliament to arrest them, but was rebuffed by Parliament. The breach between king and Parliament was now critical. Parliament used this opportunity to arrest several key supporters of King Charles. Among them was Thomas Wentworth, who was organizing an Irish invasion of England in support of the king, and Laud, who was using his ecclesiastical courts to persecute Puritans. Both were imprisoned in the Tower. Wentworth was executed that year, while Laud was imprisoned in the Tower of London for four years until his execution.

No Bishop, No King

Both early Stuart kings, James I and Charles I, believed strongly in the doctrine “No Bishop, No King.” An ecclesiastical hierarchy whereby the king selected bishops who tightly controlled the clergy of their diocese was considered essential to royal control. Calvinists saw episcopacy as a holdover from Roman Catholicism and sought to abolish it. A large crowd of Londoners presented a petition to the Long Parliament in 1640 to abolish episcopacy “root and branch,” but the bill was defeated and not passed until 1646, in the midst of the Civil War and in the wake of the execution of Archbishop Laud. Episcopacy was abolished in England for the next 14 years and not reestablished until the Stuart Restoration of 1660. During this hiatus those who had been Anglican bishops lived quietly on their estates. Instead the Calvinist church polity of a rule by local elders who met in synods ruled the Church of England. The claim of “No Bishop, No King” turned out to be reality, for when there were no bishops, there was also no king in England.

The First English Civil War (1642–1646)

Fearing for his safety, King Charles fled London. Attempting to gather munitions, he discovered that the armories were refusing him access. The cities tended to favor Parliament, while the countryside favored the king. Charles gathered his forces in Nottingham and began to march

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west across central England, attempting to raise more troops. Gathering his army at Shrewsbury, he told them that the rival army was nothing but “Brownists, Anabaptists, and atheists” (Russell 1971, 353). At the same time Parliament raised an army in London led by Thomas Fairfax, which marched northwest to meet the king’s army. There were several minor battles between the two armies, mostly in the midlands in 1642 and 1643, with the Royalists controlling the north and west of England and Parliamentarians holding the south and east. Royalists were supported by the Irish, while Parliamentarians were assisted by the Scots. In July 1644 the most significant battle of the first war was at Marston Moor where Parliament won a decisive victory, due to help from Scottish troops and Cromwell’s cavalry. All of northern England was lost to the king. The following year saw even more significant victories by Parliament’s “New Model Army” under the command of Sir Thomas Fairfax and his master of the cavalry Oliver Cromwell. This resulted in the destruction of most of the royalist armies and the capture of the king by the Scots, who turned him over to Parliament and kept him under house arrest from the summer of 1646 until his trial and execution in 1649.

Radical Movements within the English Civil War

With the monarchy replaced by a parliament and the traditional religious hierarchy in disarray, more room was allowed for freedom of thought. Press censorship was ended in 1641, allowing many publications to emerge that never would have made it past the censors during the Stuart monarchy. Radical groups like the Quakers, Baptists, Levelers, Diggers, and Muggletonians emerged (Hill 1975). There was also a rebirth of millenarianism, whereby some saw the Stuart monarchy as the Antichrist and expected the return of Christ at any time (Watson 2015). One of these groups was the Fifth Monarchists (see the entry Fifth Monarchists), who believed it was their duty to establish Christ’s kingdom on earth through the rule of the saints. Although moderate Presbyterians usually had the upper hand in Parliament, the radical sects had great influence within the ranks of the New Model Army. Cromwell needed a dedicated fighting force and found it in a new army. Knowing that a royalist victory would mean the end of their religious zealotry, and even the loss of their heads,

they fought ferociously. When criticized for promoting a Baptist to captain, Cromwell replied, “The State in choosing men to serve it takes no notice of their opinions. If they be willing faithfully to serve it” (Cromwell, before the battle of Marston Moor, July 2, 1644). Although the New Model Army was filled with religious radicals of various stripes, Cromwell was able to knit them together into a powerful fighting force by convincing them that they were God’s instrument in destroying the power of the Antichrist, whom he equated with the Stuart monarchy. Parliament was dominated by the more moderate Presbyterians, who began to fear the army’s power and radicalization. In 1647 they withheld their pay and benefits, and voted to disband them. The New Model Army’s response was to occupy London, causing many Presbyterian members of Parliament to flee. The army in cooperation with the Levelers (a group dedicated to complete egalitarianism) drew up “The Agreement of the People” calling for full democracy. The result was the Putney debates between army radicals and Parliamentary moderates, led by Cromwell. Cromwell was walking a tightrope. He needed the radical enthusiasm of his army in the field, but not threatening the government in London. No army was as effective in battle, and he wanted to use them as a pawn in English power politics, yet not allow them to dictate the agenda. The solution was to put them back into the field, so the king was allowed to escape and the army had to pursue him, which began the Second Civil War.

The Second English Civil War (1648–1649)

While in captivity King Charles negotiated with the Scots, promising that Presbyterianism in Scotland would be unhindered if they invaded England to support his rule. This took place in conjunction with royalist rebellions around England that winter of 1647–1648. Parliamentary forces spent most of 1648 putting down the rebellions, Fairfax pacifying southeast England, while Cromwell did the same in Wales. A Welsh preacher, William Erbury, believing that “God dwelling in the flesh of the Saints . . . hath chosen a company of men . . . to destroy the powers of the world opposing God,” called on Cromwell’s army to end “all oppressions in Government” by “the appearance of God in the Army with the Saints” (Erbery, The Armies Defence, or God guarding the Camp of the Saints). Cromwell then defeated

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both the royalists in the north of England and the Scots. By spring of 1649 Parliament was again in control, sentencing to death royalist officers who had violated their oath of peace at the end of the First Civil War.

The Trial of King Charles I (1649)

The army became angry at continued negotiations with Charles I and in December 1648 marched on Parliament, arresting many of its members and allowing only the most antimonarchical 75 to continue in their positions. This group became known as the Rump Parliament, and their first order of business was to put the king on trial. The next month Charles was found guilty of treason and of being a “tyrant, traitor, murderer and public enemy” (Death Warrant of King Charles, House of Lords Record Office). Thomas Goodwin, chaplain to Oliver Cromwell and coauthor of the Westminster Confession, believed with the death of the king that “the Fourth Monarchy is destroyed by the Sword of the Saints, the followers of the Lamb” (Goodwin, Sermon of the Fifth Monarchy, proving . . . the Saints shall have a Kingdom here on Earth).

The Third English Civil War (1649–1651)

Ireland was in constant rebellion throughout the 1640s. Being Roman Catholic and anti-Puritan, the Irish made common cause with Anglo-Catholic anti-Puritan King Charles. Under the Duke of Ormonde, now commander of the royalist forces in Ireland, they attacked the Parliamentarian army in Dublin in the summer of 1649. After a siege of several months, Cromwell and his New Model Army arrived in Dublin to lift the siege and conquer Ireland. Cromwell was merciless in his destruction of Royalist forces, most memorable being the Drogheda “massacre,” annihilating not only the Royalist army but many Irish civilians and priests. All land owned by Catholics in Ireland was distributed to his soldiers and to Protestant settlers. In the summer of 1650 Charles II, who had fled to exile in France years earlier, landed in Scotland. He expected the Scottish Highlanders to support him, but was pleasantly surprised to discover that the Covenanters would join them as well, if Charles would sign their covenant guaranteeing Presbyterianism and protecting them from English domination. Able to unite both Royalists and Scots under his leadership, Charles thought a restoration of the monarchy to be possible.

Cromwell was now forced to leave part of his army behind in Ireland and march on Scotland. By spring of 1651 Cromwell had taken all of Scotland but the Highlands, so he left another part of his army behind and marched south, as Charles II and his Royalist army had outflanked him and marched down the west of England, hoping to pick up support for his royalist cause. Cromwell’s army pursued, finally defeating them at Worchester in the fall of 1651. Charles II once again fled to France, putting an end to the long civil war period. By the summer of 1652 both Ireland and Scotland were pacified and the English Civil Wars ended.

Conclusion

Although the Civil Wars ended, the problems within English society were not solved. Ideological differences remained, as did religious and social turmoil. The Rump Parliament ruled England as a republic known as the Commonwealth (1649–1653), then Cromwell ruled alone in the Protectorate (1653–1658) until his death. Things then began to unravel, until a more moderate Parliament invited Charles II to return as king in 1660. The English Civil Wars were the first modern revolution, whereby a monarch was replaced by parliamentary rule, a hierarchical religion was replaced with religious diversity, and civil freedoms (like an end to press censorship) were realized. The “rule of the saints” established by the English Civil Wars only endured a couple of decades. The Stuart monarchy along with the hierarchical, liturgical Church of England were reestablished. Their restoration made it seem as if the English Civil Wars were irrelevant, as all seemed to return to what it was before. However, new ideas emerged during this conflict that would ultimately succeed not only in England but also in America. Limited government, parliamentary sovereignty, broad religious toleration, a free press and free speech, as well as other individual liberties became the norm in the English-speaking world. William C. Watson See also Anabaptist Pacifism; Calvin, John; Cromwell, Oliver; Puritans and War; Thirty Years’ War; Three Kingdoms, War of the; Primary Document: Declaration of Breda (April 4, 1660) Further Reading Hill, Christopher. Century of Revolution 1603–1714. New York: Norton, 1961.

268  Erasmus, Desiderius (1466–1536) Hill, Christopher. God’s Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution. New York: Harper, 1972. Hill, Christopher. World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution. New York: Penguin, 1975. Kenyon, J. P. Stuart England. New York: Pelican, 1978. Kishlansky, Mark. A Monarchy Transformed: Britain 1603–1714. New York: Penguin, 1996. Russell, Conrad. Crisis of Parliaments: English History 1509– 1660. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. Stone, Lawrence. Causes of the English Revolution 1529–1642. New York: Harper, 1972. Stone, Lawrence. Crisis of the Aristocracy 1558–1641. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967. Tyacke, Nicholas. Anti-Calvinists: Rise of English Arminianism c. 1590–1640. Oxford: Oxford Historical, 1990. Walzer, Michael. Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965. Watson, William C. Dispensationalism Before Darby. Silverton, OR: Lampion Press, 2015. Wheeler, James Scott. Cromwell in Ireland. London: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.

Erasmus, Desiderius (1466–1536) Noted humanist, reformer, translator, and satirical author, Desiderius Erasmus was born in Rotterdam, Holland, the illegitimate son of a physician’s daughter and a priest. Erasmus was initially educated to the priesthood by the Brethren of the Common Life and ordained in 1492. He was subsequently educated in the College de Montaigu in Paris, Oxford in London, in Italy, and in Basel, eventually deciding to dedicate his life to education and learning, through which he believed both individuals and the world could be improved. In particular, Erasmus immersed himself in Greek and Roman classical research, including Aristotle and Augustine, prior to turning to biblical scholarship. As a humanist he sought to mend the divide between the church and classical scholarship through rationality and logic. He was considered an expert translator of classical Latin and Biblical texts, including the works of Aristotle, Seneca, Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome. He was also known for publishing In Praise of Folly (1511), in which he satirized the institution, doctrines, and actions of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as for publishing a Greek-

Latin editon of the New Testament (1516), which influenced subsequent biblical scholarship, Bible translation, and the later King James Bible (1611) and shaped subsequent theological scholarship. Erasmus was also a respected advocate of tolerance, patience, and rationality who abhorred violence and promoted understanding the essence of theological ideas as being more important than the contentious and elusive minor points of dispute frequently focused on. His writings highlighted the differences between Jesus’s teachings on peace and Christian and institutional arguments supporting warfare, often developing humanist critiques against conflict and war. In 1516 Erasmus was made counselor to Charles V in Brussels, as well as being offered similar positions in Vienna, France, and England. Throughout the last decades of his life he remained immersed in the theological debates of Martin Luther (1483–1546) and the Protestant Reformation. Erasmus was a contemporary of Aldus Manutius (1449–1515), Johann Froben (1460– 1527), Giovanni de Medici (1475–1521), later Pope Leo X (1513–1521), Sir Thomas More of England (1478–1535), John Colet (1467–1519), and Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (1500–1558). Throughout Erasmus’s life, Europe was caught up in the Protestant Reformation, during which Christians and Christian nations frequently fought one another. Erasmus disagreed with the Roman Catholic Church, which encouraged conflicts and “just wars,” suggesting that they were part of the divine order, that faith would aid in their victory and absolve the immorality of their actions. Erasmus was also frustrated by European monarchs and nations that utilized Christian positions as excuses, or that acted with the church’s support to justify engaging in conflicts. Erasmus suggested instead that the gospel, the writings of the apostles, and Christ’s teachings each clearly argue against engaging in war. While Erasmus did acknowledge many of the institutional pressures that prompt leaders to go to war, he affirmed that given the consequences of these conflicts, it is never proportionally beneficial. Erasmus’s works that discuss war and peace, published between 1500 and 1518, include The Handbook of the Christian Soldier (1501), The Education of a Christian Prince (1516), In Praise of Folly (1511), A Complaint of Peace (1517), and The Colloquia (1518). There is also a fragment of a writing, “Antipolemus, or, the Plea of Reason,

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Religion, and Humanity against War.” Throughout his writings Erasmus argued that the source of war was irrationality, immorality, ignorance, inexperience, and poor leadership, which overestimated the justified benefits of conflicts while underestimating the resulting injustice. As such, he sought to appeal to humanist reason, experience, and foresight to eliminate war, which he argued was often used as the excuse to undermine the basis of Christian society including faith, laws, justice, and civility. Erasmus’s writings on war and peace established the humanist position on the subject and set out a number of key arguments. Throughout his publications, Erasmus asserts that human reason is based in free will and rationality, which naturally seeks peace, which means that war contradicts the natural state. Furthermore, he emphasizes that there is a difference between Christ’s teachings, which advocate peace, and the church’s support for conflict, which is immoral and leads to spiritual struggle. Therefore, war does not reflect either the teachings of Christ or rationality and should be avoided. Erasmus also argues that humanity is by nature hedged in social interaction, which war undermines by destroying community trust and our understanding of one another. In this manner, war does not contribute to individuals or their community, but instead promotes the worst aspects of society and should be avoided. By following the teachings of Christ and rationality, alternatives to conflict, such as arbitration, should be found, allowing both people and communities to develop. As such, leaders need to utilize rationality and compassion rather than relying on their own passions to identify and achieve the needs of society and nations. Given the importance of the church and national leaders in society, both need to be moral, teach toleration and peace, and promote the use of restraint, virtuousness, justice, and social well-being. For Erasmus, citizens have the right to oppose and reject clergy and kings who advocate conflict and warfare, or who fail to promote peace. Finally, he emphasizes that the greatest means to convert foreign nations and peoples, such as the Turks, would be to demonstrate that Christianity is a peaceful and civilized religion rather than one that advocates warmongering and immorality. Erasmus’s arguments and position against warfare, his advice to monarchs, critiques of the

church, and reliance upon rational consideration have left an enduring legacy, fostering the basis for modern ethical philosophers, social justice advocates, pacifists, and subsequent peace efforts. Sean Morton See also Wars of the Reformation Further Reading Adams, Robert, ed. The Praise of Folly and Other Writings, A Norton Critical Edition. New York: W. W. Norton, 1989. Fernández, José. “Erasmus and the Just War.” Journal of the History of Ideas 34, no. 2 (April–June 1973): 202–26. Huizinga, Johan. Erasmus and the Age of Reformation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. Phillips, Margaret. Erasmus and the Northern Renaissance. London: English Universities Press, 1950. Schoeck, Richard. Erasmus of Europe. The Making of a Humanist, 1467–1500. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991.

Ethiopian-Adal War (1529–1543) The Ethiopian-Adal War was fought between the Ethiopian Empire (also called the Abyssinian Empire) and the Adal sultanate from 1529 to 1543. This war nearly resulted in the destruction of the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia at the hands of the Muslim armies from Somalia. The war was an early example of Christian-Muslim conflict in the Horn of Africa. It also was one of the first conflicts in Africa to feature gunpowder weapons, as both sides employed the harquebus—an early form of musket—and the Muslims also employed cannons later in the war. The Adal sultanate occupied what is today the country of Somalia. Islam had spread into this region as a result of migration from the Arabian peninsula across the Red Sea into the Horn of Africa, as well as through commerce. The Red Sea was a major trade route and the Muslim caliphs began to hold sway over some of the major ports along this route as Islam spread across portions of the east coast of Africa and into Egypt throughout the centuries prior to the outbreak of the Ethiopian-Adal War. The Christian kingdom of Ethiopia suffered economic decline as Muslim control over the Red Sea prevented Ethiopian shipping from

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maintaining the crucial cultural and economic ties with the Mediterranean Sea that had allowed the Ethiopian state to flourish. Following centuries of intermittent conflict between the Adal sultanate and Ethiopia, European states began to take an interest in what they believed was the territory ruled by the legendary figure Prester John, whose Christian kingdom might act as a bulwark against Muslim expansion in the crucial areas through which much valuable trade transited. As such, when an emissary from Ethiopia reached the Portuguese at Macao and requested assistance against the Somali military leader Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi (ca. 1507–1543), the Portuguese responded favorably. Al-Ghazi had defeated several Ethiopian emperors and embarked on a conquest of Christian Ethiopia, placing well over half of the Christian kingdom under the power of the Muslim sultanate of Adal. The war between Ethiopia and the Adal sultanate can be divided into two phases. The first phase lasted from 1529 to 1541. During this time, the Adal forces, composed mostly of Muslims from Somalia, nearly defeated the Christian Ethiopians, potentially extinguishing one of the oldest Christian kingdoms, as Christianity in Ethiopa dated to the first century CE. The Somali forces maintained the upper hand throughout these 12 years of fighting, winning battles at Shimbra Kure against a more numerous Ethiopian army. The victory solidified the Somali forces’ morale, demonstrating to the Ethiopians that the Muslim troops could withstand superior numbers. In 1531 at the Battle of Antukyah, Somali cannon fire at the start of the battle panicked the Ethiopians, leading to another major Somali victory. At the Battle of Amba Sel, Somali troops defeated and dispersed another Ethiopian army. Following these victories, the Somalis entered the Ethiopian highlands unimpeded, at which time the Ethiopians reached out to the Portuguese for assistance against the Muslim threat. The religious element of this conflict and the opportunity for the Portuguese, a Roman Catholic nation, to tie their assistance to Ethiopia with their struggle to control the Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade routes was enough to convince the Portuguese to intervene on Ethiopia’s behalf. The second phase of the conflict, from 1541 to 1543, involved outside forces that were drawn into the conflict primarily for economic reasons, but religious overtones are

also apparent. The Ethiopians managed to secure the assistance of Christóvão (Christopher) da Gama’s 400 Portuguese troops. The Adal sultanate secured assistance from the Ottoman Empire, which had been vying with the Portuguese for control of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade routes. While the conflict appeared to be a religious war between Christians and Muslims, the religious element was secondary to the struggle for control of the trade routes, which were crucial to both the Muslim Ottomans’ continued growth and prestige, and the Christian Portuguese as they competed for power against their European rivals. Throughout 1541, the Ethiopian army, reinforced by the Portuguese contingent, liberated most of Ethiopia. The Portuguese also waged a naval war against the Ottoman Empire in the Red Sea at the same time that da Gama’s 400 soldiers fought in Ethiopia against the Somali force led by Ibrihim al-Ghazi. Da Gama helped the Ethiopians to turn the tables on their Somali foe, as victories were secured against Muslim armies much larger than the Christian forces. However, da Gama was captured and executed after the Battle of Wayna Daga, but by this time both the Christian and Muslim armies had nearly exhausted themselves in constant fighting. With the remainder of his Christian troops, and with what few Portuguese soldiers remained alive, the Ethiopian emperor Galawedos conducted a successful hit-and-run campaign against the remaining Muslim forces in Ethiopia, and on February 25, 1543, his troops caught and killed Ibrihim al-Ghazi, dispersing the Muslim armies still in Ethiopian territory. The war was over and Ethiopian territory had been liberated. Portugal and the Ottoman Empire suffered little in this war, but both the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia and the Muslim sultanate of Adal were severely weakened. While Ethiopian territory had been restored, trade routes into the Mediterranean had not been reopened. The origins of hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia, which would flare up in the 20th century, are often traced to this war. The Ethiopian-Adal War was an example of conflict that was influenced by religion, but was not fought primarily for religious objectives. The two sides were drawn along religious lines, and religious passions helped both prolong the war and perhaps added to the morale of both sides, but economic factors and geopolitical considerations were the primary

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motives for the war’s expansion from a localized conflict between Ethiopia and the Adal sultanate to a more widespread conflict involving the Portuguese and Ottoman empires. Jeffrey M. Shaw See also Assassins; Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa

Further Reading Henze, Paul B. Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia. New York: Hurst, 2000. Marcus, Harold G. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. Paez, Pedro. History of Ethiopia, 1622. Volume I. Edited by Isabel Boavida, Herve Pennec, and Manuel João Ramos. Translated by Christopher J. Tribe. London: The Hakluyt Society, 2011.

F Fatimid Conquest of Baghdad (1058)

General al-Basasiri (d. 1059) led the Buyid army from Baghdad, forcing Abu Kalijar to return to the Buyid Sunni fold and causing al-Shirazi to again flee for his life in 1045, this time to Cairo. After taking the pilgrimage and serving in the Chancery, al-Shirazi forged an alliance among Syrians and Kurdish tribes. He then commissioned his former adversary, al-Basasiri, to lead these forces by providing him with a bountiful supply of the Fatimid caliph’s horses and swords to fight against their mutual enemy, the Seljuk Turk Tughril Beg (d. 1063), who had just taken Baghdad in 1055. His timing could not have been better, for Tughril Beg had just left Baghdad unprotected to settle a feud with his brother. It was really quite remarkable to have captured the world’s largest city of more than a million people with only a few hundred troops. While the Fatimid imam’s right to brag about his sovereignty over Baghdad lasted only 13 months, al-Shirazi lived out his last 23 years in glory. The caliph al-Mustansir lavished several titles upon him including the Fatimids’ preeminent religious title of da‘i al-du‘at (chief propagandist). The caliph also gave him the unparalleled gift of his own personal robes and saddle mount. Increasing religious tensions in Baghdad both prompted and resulted from the conquest. In the decades before the conquest, the Abbasid caliph al-Qadir (d. 1031) brought an

The Fatimid Ismaili Shi’a Muslim Empire conquered the world’s preeminent Sunni Muslim city, Baghdad, in 1058. Baghdad served as the commercial, cultural, intellectual, political, and religious capital of the rival Abbasid caliphate (750–1258) from the time that the round city had been founded on the banks of the Tigris River in 762 and, after this brief interlude, would continue to do so until the Mongols destroyed it in 1258. Although Fatimid rule only lasted for 13 months, it provided great religious symbolism for them, while antagonizing the city’s Sunnis by proclaiming Friday’s sermon in the name of the Fatimid caliph alMustansir (d. 1094). The Ismailis fled from Salmiyyah (in modern-day Syria) in 893 to Ifriqiyya (modern-day Tunisia), where they established a beachhead for their kingdom in 910, and then, at a most propitious moment, they captured Egypt in 969. From the beginning, the Ismailis had harbored imperial ambitions, so Baghdad always remained in their sights. Al-Mu’ayyad fi’l-Dīn al-Shirazi (d. 1077) orchestrated the military campaign against Baghdad. He succeeded his father as da’i (Ismaili politico-religious propagandists) in Fars, and then he gained so much influence over Prince Abu Kalijar (d. 1048), the Buyid ruler of Shiraz, that his Sunni opponents forced him to flee in 1038 and again in 1041. When Abu Kalijar defected to the Ismaili cause, 273

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end to multiculturalism in Baghdad by issuing his Qadari Creed that prohibited Ismailis and other non-Sunnis from holding public office. Bagdad degenerated into armed sectarian ghettoes with gang warfare, sectarian violence, and general anarchy. In the year that al-Shirazi fled to Egypt, Sunnis massacred Ismailis in Transoxania. After Tughril Beg recaptured Baghdad, a staunchly Hanbali Seljuk form of Sunni Islam emerged while the caliph’s minister, Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092), promoted Shafi‘i jurisprudence, causing further polarization among and between religious communities. The Fatimids were unable to retain control of their vast empire, so they hired the Armenian Badr al-Jamili (d. 1094) and his Turkish mercenaries to restore order in Cairo in 1074. After Caliph al-Mustansir died, his two sons split the empire. The weaker Musta‘lis feebly held onto power in Egypt until Saladin (d. 1193) took control in 1171. Hasan-iSabah (d. 1124) started leading the Nizari (sometimes referred to as “Assassins”) in Alamut and the surrounding mountains of northern Syria and Iran until the Mongol Hulegu conquered the Persian Nizaris in 1256 and the Mamluk sultan Baybars conquered the Syrian Nizaris in 1273. W. Richard Oakes Jr. See also Assassins; Buyids; Fatimid Conquest of Egypt; Fatimid Conquest of North Africa Further Reading Daftary, Farhad. Ismailis in Medieval Muslim Society. London: I. B. Tauris, 2005. Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. Edited by P. Bearman et al. Brill Online. Kennedy, Hugh. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century. A History of the Near East. London: Longman, 1986. Klemm, Verena. Memoirs of a Mission: The Ismaili Scholar, Statesman and Poet al-Mu’ayyad fi’l-Din al-Shirazi. London: I. B. Tauris, 2003. Walker, Paul E. Exploring an Islamic Empire: Fatimid History and Its Sources. London: I. B. Tauris, 2002.

Fatimid Conquest of Egypt The Fatimid Shi’a Muslims had always sought legitimacy in the Muslim heartland from whence they came, so their

capitals in Ifriqiyya (modern-day Tunisia) were viewed as temporary. Efforts to gain control of Egypt were started even before they began building their new capital. During the reign of the fourth Fatimid caliph, al-Mu‘izz (d. 975), the Fatimids took Fustat from the Ikhshidid governors who ruled Egypt on behalf of the Sunni Muslim Abbasid caliphate in 969 and then built their new capital city of Cairo. In contradistinction to the long-held Ismaili doctrine that proclaimed the return of Imam Muhammad b. Isma‘il from occultation, Ubayd Allah (d. 934) declared himself and his heirs to be living imams with authority over all Ismailis. Unable to attract a sufficient following in the Islamic heartlands, he traveled through Egypt to establish himself in Raqqada in Ifriqiyya in 910. In 920, he established a new capital, al-Mahdiyya, on a shore facing eastward toward the Islamic heartland. But even before that, he twice sent his son al-Qa’im (d. 946) to attack Egypt, once in 913–915 and again in 919–921; his third attack was in 925, after he had ascended to the throne. The third Fatimid caliph, al-Mansur (d. 953), started construction on their new inland capital at al-Mansuriya in 946 and his son, Caliph al-Mu‘izz, completed construction in 972. A terrible 969 famine destabilized the new government of Egypt and provided the long-awaited opportunity for alMu‘izz to conquer Egypt. The Fatimids immediately started construction on their new capital city of Cairo to replace the city of Fustat, which had been built by the Sunni Muslim conquerors in 641. Among the first structures that the Fatimid Shi’as started was the famous al-Azhar mosque and university that became the bastion of Sunni Muslim scholarship. The Fatimid throne was moved to Cairo in 973, the year after al-Mansuriya was completed. But Egypt was not their ultimate goal. In the next year, they successfully took control from their Qaramita Ismaili rivals of Islam’s three holiest cities, Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. Cairo quickly rose to prominence during the 11th century when it rivaled Baghdad’s political and cultural influence. In 1004, the sixth Fatimid caliph, al-Hakim (d. 1021), commenced a campaign against the Eastern Orthodox Christians, and then five years later, he destroyed Jerusalem’s Church of the Holy Sepulchre. In 325, Constantine (d. 337) built this most important pilgrimage site where Jesus is thought to have been buried. Al-Hakim then

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The Al-Azhar mosque and university in Cairo, Egypt, founded by the Fatimids in 972 CE, is now the second oldest continuously run university in the world and is considered the foremost institution for the study of Sunni theology and Islamic law. (Paulos/Dreamstime.com)

founded the Dar al-Hikma to train propagandists to promote the Ismaili cause among the Sunni majority. The eighth Fatimid caliph, al-Mustansir (d. 1094), funded an army that temporarily gained control of Sunni Abbasid Baghdad in 1058. Upon his death, a split occurred among the Fatimids wherein those who recognized his son Nizar (d. 1095) came to be known as the Assassins. W. Richard Oakes Jr. See also Assassins; Caliphate; Fatimid Conquest of Baghdad; Fatimid Conquest of North Africa Further Reading Daftary, Farhad. Ismailis in Medieval Muslim Society, Ismaili Heritage Series 12. London: I. B. Tauris, 2005. Yaacov, Lev. State and Society in Fatimid Egypt. Leiden: Brill, 1991.

Fatimid Conquest of North Africa From his headquarters in Salmiyyah in western Syria, Ubayd Allah (d. 934), founder of the Fatimid dynasty, announced a change to the central doctrine of Ismailism, but he was unable to build sufficient support in Syria to establish a state, so he fled 2,500 miles west from the center of the Islamic world to Raqqada in Ifriqiyya (modern-day Tunisia) to establish his Fatimid Empire in 910. By proclaiming that Ali (d. 661) was a prophet, the Ismailis had always directly opposed one of Sunnism’s central doctrines, that Muhammad (d. 632) had been the last prophet. Therefore, mainstream Islam has always had concerns about Ismailis. Following the deaths of Isma‘il b. Ja‘far and Ja‘far b. Sadiq in 765, most Ismailis believed that Muhammad b. Isma‘il had gone into occultation. It was expected that he

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would return as the Qa‘im, Mahdi, infallible imam and the seventh and last Speaking Prophet who would bring justice to replace the injustice of the Abbasid regime, abrogate the sharia ‘a of Muhammad with a just law, and reveal the truths that were hidden in the scriptures. These politico-religious ideas so challenged Abbasid legitimacy that the successors of Muhammad b. Isma‘il were forced into hiding. Variant beliefs multiplied because propagandists (da‘is) so confusingly referred to the imams by nicknames that Ismailis could not even agree about their genealogy. From Basra in 874, during the times of the Zanj revolts, Hamdan Qarmat (d. 999) and his brother-in-law Abdan (d. 999) unified the Ismailis by proclaiming the imminent return of Muhammad b. Isma‘il. They also started sending da‘is (propagandists) throughout the Muslim world, and one of them, al-Jannabi, founded a Qarmati Ismaili state in Bahrayn in 893. When Ubayd Allah ascended to leadership in Salamiyya in 899, he claimed to be in the genealogical line of the infallible living caliph-imams. This genealogical claim was not based upon direct descent from Muhammad, but rather upon lineage through his uncle’s line, a claim that his direct descendants later changed. Rather than waiting for the return of Imam Muhammad b. Isma‘il, who was in occultation, followers were told to acknowledge the authority of the line of living imams. Since Ismailis had always been waiting for the return of Imam Muhammad b. Isma‘il from his occultation, most of them rejected the claims of a living imam with a questionable genealogy and continued to follow their traditional doctrine. Rather than acknowledging the seven traditional Ismaili imams, today’s Ismailis revere their 49th imam and some believe in the divinity of their imams. Ubayd Allah responded by having one of his da‘is, Zikrawayh, murder Abdan while Hamdan disappeared. In 902, Zikrawayh’s son, al-Husayn, converted two Syrian clans, who then adopted the distinguishing name al-Fatimiyyun. After unsuccessfully trying murder, revenge, slaughter, and direct military action to obtain more conversions, Ubayd Allah secretly fled circuitously to Raqqada to establish the Fatimid state in 910. In 891, Hamdan Qarmat recruited Abu Abdallah al-Shiʿi (d. 911) and his brother, Abu l-Abbas Muhammad (d. 911) and then sent them to Egypt. Abu Abdallah joined a pilgrimage caravan and then accompanied some Yemenis

home where he joined one of the few supporters of Ubayd Allah, the daʿi Mansur al-Yaman (d. 914), also known as Ibn Hawshab, the next year. Abu Abdallah stopped proclaiming the return of Muhammad b. Isma‘il and started advancing the cause of the living imam. Following the next pilgrimage, he accompanied some Kutama Berbers back to Algeria where he recruited Abu Zaki and Abu Musa to form a 1,000man cavalry force to fight the Sunni Aghlabid rulers. After 18 years in the field, Abu Abdallah gained control of Raqqada for the imam. In the meantime, Ubayd Allah had been traveling a circuitous route through Egypt (where Abu l-Abbas joined them), Sijilmasa (in modern-day Morocco), and then back through Algeria to assume power in Raqqada. Early the next year, Ubayd Allah executed these four men for treason. Conflict within religious traditions has as long a history as conflict between different religions. W. Richard Oakes Jr. See also Fatimid Conquest of Baghdad; Fatimid Conquest of Egypt; Zanj Rebellion Further Reading Daftary, Farhad. Ismailis in Medieval Muslim Society. London: I. B. Tauris, 2005. Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. Edited by P. Bearman et al. Brill Online. Stern, Samuel M. Studies in Early Isma‘ilism. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983.

Fatimids An Arab dynasty that ruled Egypt from 969 to 1171, the Fatimids belonged to the Ismaili branch of Shi’a Islam, which recognized the descendants of Asan and Usayn, the two sons of Prophet Muhammad’s daughter Fāţima and ‘Alī, the fourth caliph, as the legitimate rulers of the Muslim community. By the mid-ninth century, the Ismailis were engaged in subversive and revolutionary activities against the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad. In 909, the establishment of a Fatimid state in Tunisia caused a rupture in the Ismaili movement, when the Carmathians of Bahrayn opposed the Fatimid claim to be the imams, that is, divinely chosen and rightly guided rulers of Islam.

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The Fatimids ruled Tunisia and Sicily until 973, when they transferred their state to Egypt, following the conquest of that country by their General Jawhar in 969. The North African phase of the Fatimid state was marked by the establishment of two new capital cities: Mahdia (mod. al-Mahdiyya, Tunisia), built in 916–921, and al-Abra or alManūriyya (near mod. Kairouan, Tunisia), begun in 946 and occupied until 1053. Mahdia was erected on a peninsula on the coast of Tunisia and marked the Fatimid state’s Mediterranean orientation, both with its deep involvement in trade with Muslim Spain, Italy (especially Amalfi), and Byzantium, and with its naval activities against them. The Fatimids also maintained a network of commercial relations with sub-Saharan Africa, where they procured gold and black slaves. The Fatimid efforts to conquer Egypt were inspired not only by their difficulties in ruling North Africa (exemplified by the rebellion of Abū Yazīd in 944–947, which posed a serious challenge to the Fatimid rule), but mainly by their desire to reach Baghdad and supplant the Abbasid caliphs. The conquest of Egypt in 969 was achieved after some initial failures, and the Near Eastern phase in the history of the Fatimid state began. Immediately after the conquest of Egypt, the Fatimids invaded Palestine and Syria, but their dream of reaching Baghdad never materialized, and their always precarious hold over Damascus and Palestine collapsed in the second half of the 11th century with the arrival of the Turkish Seljuks. The impact of Fatimid rule on Egypt was manifold and outlived the Fatimids in two areas. The establishment of Cairo proved to be a great success. The town became the seat of the Fatimid rulers, a religious and cultural center, and a magnet for local and foreign merchants. During Fatimid rule in Egypt, a commercial network that connected India and the Mediterranean emerged, and it lasted well into the late Middle Ages, declining only during the Ottoman period. The trade of Egypt flourished, with merchants from the Muslim areas of the Mediterranean (Spain, North Africa, and Sicily), Italy, and Byzantium visiting Alexandria and Cairo in pursuit of spices and goods from India and the East Indies. The majority of the Egyptian population were Sunni Muslims, with minorities of Christians and Jews. The number of Shi’as was small. The Fatimid regime depended

largely on its control of the army, which was mostly made up of non-Egyptian elements. Although the Fatimid caliph was nominally the head of state, from the second half of the 11th century the actual control of government was usually in the hands of a vizier. The Fatimids used missionaries outside the empire to spread Shi’a doctrines, especially among the urban populations of Seljuk-controlled Syria, but there was no attempt to spread Shi’ism within Egypt, as this would have aroused antagonism within the majority Sunni population. The Fatimids misunderstood the intentions of the First Crusade (1096–1099) and initially tried to form an alliance with the crusaders for cooperation against the Seljuks, who supported the rival Abbasid caliphate. As it was the Seljuk territories that came under attack first, the Fatimids were able to take the opportunity to seize the city of Jerusalem from Seljuk control (June 1099). However, they were slow to recognize that Jerusalem itself was the main goal of the crusade, and their relieving army arrived too late to prevent the fall of the city to the crusaders (July 15, 1099). The Fatimid army that camped around Ascalon (modernday Tel Ashqelon, Israel) suffered a humiliating defeat by the crusaders at the Battle of Ascalon (August 12, 1099), allowing the crusaders to consolidate their territorial achievements to that point. During the first decade of the 12th century, the Fatimids lost the towns of Arsuf, Haifa, Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli to the Franks of Jerusalem and Tripoli. The Fatimid land and naval efforts were uncoordinated and their armies hesitant and unable to mount a serious military challenge to the Franks. The fall of Tyre (modern-day Soûr, Lebanon) in 1124 came about as the result of lack of cooperation between the Fatimids and the rulers of Damascus, while a contributory factor to the fall of Ascalon in 1153 was a coup that took place in Cairo while the Franks were besieging the town. An examination of the battles that took place between the Fatimids and the Franks shows that the Fatimids failed militarily because their army collapsed in crucial battles fought in Palestine (1099, 1105, and 1123), due to a lack of cooperation between the cavalry and the infantry. This reflected a sociomilitary problem deriving from the inherent weakness of Muslim multiethnic armies. Traditionally, the Fatimid army was a multiethnic force dominated by a very large component of black slave infantry with a much

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smaller, but ethnically diverse, cavalry element. In the mid11th century, the strength of the Fatimid army was probably over 100,000 soldiers, but the numbers dwindled from that point, and during the 1060s, the army consisted of only 40,000 African infantry and more than 10,000 cavalry. The Fatimid multiethnic army was very difficult to handle on the battlefield, since such a heterogeneous force was ridden with ethnic animosities, exacerbated by the different status of freeborn troops and military slaves (Arab. mamluks). On three occasions (at Ramla in 1105, Ibelin in 1123, and Ascalon in 1153), the navy performed better than the army, but the navy on its own, without the support of the army, achieved nothing. The small Fatimid navy was vastly outnumbered by the European fleets that operated in the eastern Mediterranean in support of the crusades, and its ability to ship supplies and reinforcements was limited. For this reason the Fatimids were very hesitant about committing their navy to the support of coastal towns that were besieged by the Franks and large European naval forces, as happened at Acre in 1104, Tripoli in 1109, and Tyre in 1124. In any case, naval battles were quite rare events, and only in the summer of 1123, off the south Palestinian coast, was the Fatimid navy involved in a disastrous naval battle with a Venetian fleet. Naval raids were more common, but the shipping lanes used by the European fleets on their way to the Levant were beyond the range of Fatimid warships operating from the Egyptian ports of Alexandria and Damietta. The Fatimid naval failure was a result of European naval superiority combined with geographical and naval factors characteristic of the eastern Mediterranean. During the 1160s, the Fatimids became entangled in the conflict between Nūr al-Dīn, the ruler of Muslim Syria, and the Franks. Shāwar, an ousted Fatimid vizier, managed to involve both Nūr al-Dīn and the king of Jerusalem in the internal affairs of the Fatimid state. Each power coveted Egypt and was ready to do anything to prevent its rival from gaining control of Egypt. Politically the Fatimid state was weak and divided, and the Fatimid army was not a match either for the Franks or the forces of Nūr al-Dīn. In economic terms, Egypt was a valuable prize with its rich agricultural output and flourishing long-distance international trade. The Franks were well informed about Egypt’s agricultural potential, and they are known to have possessed a list of Egyptian villages and the incomes derived

Fatimid Caliphs in the Period of the Crusades al-Musta‘li

1094–1101

al-Āmir

1101–1130

Interregnum

1130–1131

al-Āfi

1131–1149

al-Afir

1149–1154

al-Fā‘iz

1154–1160

al-‘Āid

1160–1171

from them. The participation of Italian maritime republics in the crusades also posed a serious dilemma for the Fatimids, since the Italians stimulated trade with India because of their demand for spices, and their presence in Egypt was crucial to maintain the momentum of this trade. Egypt was also dependent on its Mediterranean partners for supplies of timber, iron, and pitch. The Fatimids, like Saladin later on, continued to maintain commercial relations with the Europeans and allowed the presence of Italian and Byzantine merchants in their ports in spite of the wars of the crusades. Between 1164 and 1171, the armies of Nūr al-Dīn and the Kingdom of Jerusalem fought their wars on Egyptian soil with the Fatimids being unable to influence the course of events. Eventually, the Franks withdrew from Egypt, and Egypt came under the control of Nūr al-Dīn’s General Shirkuh. On Shirkuh’s death his nephew Saladin succeded him as vizier. The Fatimid regime had failed to strike deep roots among the Muslim population of the country during the two centuries of its rule in Egypt, and it was overthrown by Saladin with ease. He broke up the Fatimid army and on the death of the caliph al-‘Āid (1171) recognized the religious authority of the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, which effectively ended Fatimid rule. From the Franks’ point of view, the rise of Saladin meant a change for the worse and, under Saladin’s rule, Egypt became fully integrated in the Muslim wars against the Franks. The Fatimids had lacked any real zeal or motivation in their military efforts against the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Yaacov Lev See also Ascalon, Battle of; Assassins; Buyids; Caliphate; Fatimid Conquest of Baghdad; Fatimid Conquest of Egypt; Fatimid Conquest of North Africa

Fifth Crusade (1217–1221)  279 Further Reading Bachrach, Bernard S. “Some Observations on the Role of the Byzantine Navy in the Success of the First Crusade.” Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002): 83–101. Brett, Michael. “The Battles of Ramla (1099–1105).” In Urbain Vermeulen and Daniel De Smet, eds. Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras. Leuven: Peeters, 1995, pp. 17–39. Brett, Michael. The Rise of the Fatimids: The World of the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the Tenth Century CE. Leiden: Brill, 2001. Ehrenkreutz, Andrew S. “The Fatimids in Palestine—The Unwitting Promoters of the Crusade.” In A. Cohen and G. Baer, eds. Egypt and Palestine. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984, pp. 66–77. France, John, Victory in the East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Goitein, Shlomo D. “Contemporary Letters on the Capture of Jerusalem by the Crusaders.” Journal of Jewish Studies 3 (1952): 162–77. Halm, Heinz. The Empire of the Mahdi: The Rise of the Fatimids. Leiden: Brill, 1996. Halm, Heinz. Die Kalifen von Cairo: Die Fatimiden in Ägypten, 973–1074. München: Beck, 2003. Hamblin, William J. “The Fatimid Navy during the Early Crusades: 1099–1124.” American Neptune 46 (1986): 77–83. Jacoby, David. “The Supply of War Materials to Egypt in the Crusader Period.” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 25 (2001): 102–33. Lev, Yaacov. Saladin in Egypt. Leiden: Brill, 1999. Lev, Yaacov. State and Society in Fatimid Egypt. Leiden: Brill, 1991. Pryor, John H. Geography, Technology and War. Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649–1571. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Walker, Paul E. Exploring an Islamic Empire: Fatimid History and Its Sources. London: Tauris, 2002.

Fifth Crusade (1217–1221) The Fifth Crusade was a crusade originally launched by Pope Innocent III (1198–1216), but actually implemented by his successor, Honorius III (1216–1227). Its objective was to reestablish Christian possession of Jerusalem and the interior of the Holy Land by means of an attack on Ayyubid Egypt, and thus to make good the failings of the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204), which had started with

similar aims but had been diverted to Constantinople (mod. Istanbul, Turkey). Despite the capture and temporary occupation of the port of Damietta in 1219, the crusade was obliged to withdraw from Egypt, having achieved almost nothing.

Origins

In a series of letters in April 1213, Innocent III announced his intention to summon a general council for the reform of the church and to launch a crusade. In the letter Vineam Domini, addressed to the hierarchy of the church and secular princes, he asked them for reports on the state of the church. In Quia maior he explained his plan for the crusade to all the faithful. Finally, Pium et sanctum was sent to those charged to preach the crusade. Clearly, Innocent wanted to allow time for recruitment and careful preparation. These steps were taken by a man who had already occupied the papal throne for 15 years and who combined his commitment to the crusade with a strong desire to restore the unity of the various Eastern churches with Rome. He also recognized that there were serious obstacles to the achievement of that goal. His hopes for the Fourth Crusade had been frustrated by its diversion and conquest of Constantinople, which left bitterness among the Greeks and a sense of failure in the West. In all probability, the so-called Children’s Crusade of 1212 was related to a continuing feeling that the leaders of society, especially in northern France and the Rhineland, had deserted their obligations in order to conquer the Byzantine Empire. Against this background of failure and frustration, Innocent launched his plan for the council and the crusade, linking the reform of the church to the crusade and thereby responding to a longtime concern that the failure of previous crusades stemmed from the corruption of Christian society.

Recruitment, Finance, and Organization

This linkage was made very clear both by the reformminded individuals Innocent appointed to preach the crusade and the sermons that they preached. Crusade sermons were summons to the “vocation of the cross” as a pathway of salvation for the laity; they had little emphasis on the military aspect of the crusade, which was depicted often as an imitation of Christ’s suffering and death, culminating in his resurrection. Those sermons that survive from the

280  Fifth Crusade (1217–1221)

period of the Fifth Crusade are chiefly those of James of Vitry, which reflect his personal experience in the Holy Land but also emphasize the power of the cross. The connection between this emphasis on personal salvation and the instructions of Innocent III is confirmed by the inclusion of the pope’s letters in the Rommerdorf Letterbook, compiled for use by the abbot of that monastery in his preaching of the crusade. The pope’s preachers were often bishops and abbots, most of whom would later participate in the Fourth Lateran Council. Some of those appointed (for example, Cardinal Robert of Courson) enjoyed the status of legate and were also charged with a mission to reform the church. The funding of the crusade was especially important, since the lack of adequate financial support had been largely responsible for the diversion of the Fourth Crusade, but this was a delicate issue, since some of the clergy had resisted a previous effort. What is evident is that Quia maior was not so much a crusade plan as a working paper laying out the tasks to be completed at the council in 1215. But that road itself faced various obstacles. Crusades were already under way in Livonia. The Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229), directed against Cathar heretics, was rapidly becoming a political conflict for control of southern France. The imperial title remained in dispute even after the victory of Philip II of France over Emperor Otto IV at Bouvines (1214), which benefited Otto’s rival, Frederick (II) of Sicily. The bishops in France were increasingly unhappy with Robert of Courson’s efforts to reform the church. These major issues would have to be dealt with at the council. Although issues concerning the reform of the church dominated the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), the crusade occupied as much or more time. It was clear that Innocent was determined to resolve the causes of conflict in the West in order to advance his crusade agenda, but he was only partially successful. Otto IV’s representatives got short shrift, as did the English barons’ protest against King John, but Innocent had little success in securing agreement over southern France. His major achievements, however, were to be found in the crusade bull Ad liberandam, which was the most sweeping effort to date to provide focus for the crusade program. It set the date of departure for June 1217 and provided for spiritual guidance for the crusaders. It levied a new tax of 5 percent on all clerical incomes; the

pope and cardinals would pay 10 percent. Members of the laity who could not afford to go on crusade could band together to support one or more crusaders. The church would take the crusaders and their properties under its protection and would exempt them from payment of interest on loans, as well as suspending collection of principal during their absence on crusade. This applied also to Jewish lenders, but there enforcement was put in secular hands, since Jews were not subject to ecclesiastical penalties. Ad liberandam also prohibited trade and other relations with the Muslims in the eastern Mediterranean and granted pardon for all sins that crusaders had repented of and confessed. But it dealt only with the crusade to the Holy Land. The wars against Muslims in Spain and North Africa, the crusades against heretics and pagans, and the continuing military adventures in the Byzantine East had also to be dealt with if the crusade was to stand any chance of success. Shortly after the council, the pope set out to reconcile conflicts among the Italian communes, but he died in March 1216. His successor, Honorius III, an experienced cardinal who shared his commitment to the crusade, took up the task. King John of England had taken the cross, but he died in October 1216. King Andrew II of Hungary had been pressured to fulfill the crusade vow taken by his late father, but his commitment was in doubt. Honorius turned to the youthful German king, Frederick II, who had taken the crusade vow in 1215 but still faced opposition from supporters of the deposed Otto IV. This necessitated some interim arrangement for leadership if the crusade were to stay on schedule. Such an arrangement, however, was to be left to the crusaders themselves. The German crusaders expected Frederick to join them shortly, but their expectations ran into the realities of prolonged negotiations with the papacy over terms for Frederick’s imperial coronation, which lasted until 1220. Only then did Frederick return to his kingdom of Sicily, for the first time in eight years, where he faced rebellion. Despite papal pressure, he delayed his departure.

The Course of the Crusade

Contingents from the Rhineland and Frisia left Vlaardingen in 300 ships on May 29, 1217, crossing to England where they enacted laws for the crusaders and took part in

Fifth Crusade (1217–1221)  281

what may have been a ceremony of reconciliation, since many among them had previously been enemies. Aware that they were in advance of Frederick and other crusaders, they were in no great hurry to reach the Holy Land. When they arrived in Lisbon in Portugal, the local bishops sought their aid to lay siege to Alcácer do Sol, whose Muslim garrison menaced Lisbon. The Frisians preferred to continue their journey, taking 80 ships to Italy, where they wintered, leaving the Rhinelanders with the rest of the fleet. After a protracted and costly siege, Alcácer do Sol fell on October 21. The first crusaders to arrive in the East were Andrew II of Hungary and Leopold VI, duke of Austria, who landed at Acre (mod. ‘Akko, Israel) in September 1217. The situation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem was tenuous, and the arrival of a large contingent from the West was welcome, since defenses needed to be bolstered and the territory under Latin control expanded. Although no significant gains were made by Andrew’s forces in the short time he remained, their presence, together with that of Leopold, was helpful. Before the arrival of the Rhenish and Frisian contingents (April 1218), further operations were carried out in northern Palestine, including a rather halfhearted effort to capture Mount Tabor, which had been fortified by the Muslims. This activity seems to have enhanced the short-term security of the kingdom; especially valuable were the efforts to strengthen Château Pèlerin (mod. ‘Atlit, Israel) and Caesarea (mod. Har Qesari, Israel). As more crusaders arrived and it became clear that Frederick was not yet prepared to come to the East, they turned their attention to organization and planning. The choice of leader in the person of John of Brienne, regent of Jerusalem for his daughter Isabella II, was based not merely on his status but also on his reputation as a soldier. The decision to attack Egypt had already been taken, but now the crusaders decided to focus their main attack on the port of Damietta rather than Alexandria. As well as crusaders from the West, the army comprised troops from the kingdom of Jerusalem and the military orders. Late in May 1218 the crusaders landed in Egypt near the Damietta mouth of the Nile. They met little resistance. In June, the cardinal legate, Pelagius of Albano, arrived, bringing some of the money raised by the tax on the clergy. With the arrival of John of Brienne, the crusaders began

their attack on a tower near the west bank of the river. A stout chain stretched across the river to the wall of the city to prevent ships from moving further south. The siege was extremely difficult and dragged on through the heat of summer, and it was not until late August that the tower was taken. The victory had been costly. Only the arrival of large numbers of French and English crusaders in September restored the crusaders’ strength, but they were further delayed by disease, which carried off many, including Cardinal Robert of Courson. Throughout the winter, the crusaders were harassed by Ayyubid forces under the command of al-Kāmil, the son of the sultan al-‘Ādil I, who had died. Only a conspiracy against al-Kāmil that forced his withdrawal enabled the crusaders to cross the river and lay siege to the city. But the return of the sultan meant that they were virtually surrounded, with the river at their backs. Throughout the summer of 1219 there was a stalemate. Leopold of Austria departed with a large number of crusaders, and few reinforcements had arrived during the spring of 1219. Frederick II had postponed his planned arrival until spring 1220. In the fall, Francis of Assisi, whose fame as a holy man was already widespread, arrived in the camp. While there, he preached to both the crusaders and the sultan. Although the details of his sermons are unknown, it seems that he advocated peace and conversion instead of military action. His arrival seems to have coincided with a period of truce. The sultan offered to surrender Jerusalem and other sites in the Holy Land in exchange for withdrawal. This was debated, but the crusaders rejected the proposal and additional concessions on the grounds that without the fortresses of Kerak and Montréal in Transjordan (which were excluded from the terms), the holy places could not be defended adequately. The resumption of military operations in November 1219 resulted in the capture of Damietta, which forced alKāmil to move his forces further south. This victory had been accomplished at a horrendous cost after several costly battles, and the crusaders were in no condition to follow it up. The sultan still had hopes of a negotiated settlement, since his first priority was to consolidate his position as the heir to his father. Although the crusaders had rejected his previous offer, they were still open to further negotiations. But, at the same time, al-Kāmil was awaiting additional

282  Fifth Crusade (1217–1221)

military support from his brothers, al-Mu’aam, sultan of Damascus, and al-Ashraf of Iraq. During the winter of 1220–1221 the crusaders worked to consolidate their position. Men and money were running low. Evidence based on deaths among the aristocracy suggests that the casualty rate was well over a quarter of the entire force. There were also disputes as to the ownership of Damietta between Pelagius, as leader of the crusade, and John of Brienne, who claimed it for the kingdom of Jerusalem. Eventually, fear of an attack on Acre and other sites in the Holy Land led John to take a significant contingent back to shore up defenses. The arrival of Frederick had become a necessity for any future action beyond defense. Ludwig I, duke of Bavaria, who arrived in spring 1221, was viewed as the harbinger of Frederick’s arrival, and pressure to move against the enemy now increased. Pelagius, who was well aware of the shortage of men and money, supported those who wished to act immediately. Acting on instructions from the emperor and the pope, Ludwig was only willing to attack the camp of the sultan, but his caution was unpopular. The time of the Nile flood was approaching, and delay might make an advance up the Nile impossible. Pelagius recalled John of Brienne and circulated prophetical writings that seemed to promise success to the crusaders. On July 7, 1221, John rejoined the army at the head of a large force; this was slightly more than a month before the Nile would flood. On July 17 part of the army advanced while the remainder stayed behind to garrison Damietta. Were some of these reluctant to join a risky venture? We only know that there was opposition. On July 18 the army reached Sharamsah. The Ayyubids put up almost no resistance, and by July 24 the army was advancing into a triangle formed by the Nile and the canal from Mansurah (mod. El-Mansûra, Egypt) to Lake Manzala (Bahra el-Manzala). John’s counsel to retreat, based though it was on information about reinforcements for al-Kāmil and the unusually high water of the Nile, was ignored by Pelagius, who was caught up in the euphoric spirits engendered by the ease of the victorious advance. Yet al-Kāmil had moved ships through a canal that entered the Nile at El Baramûn, just north of the crusader fleet. On August 26 the army

decided to retreat, but it was already too late. The fields were flooded, and the crusader fleet was impeded by four ships that al-Kāmil had ordered sunk in the Nile for just that purpose. With a danger of panic, the crusaders decided to negotiate, and on August 29 they agreed to surrender Damietta in return for being allowed to withdraw in safety. This decision was not popular with all, especially those who had remained behind in the city. The leaders tried, however, to save face by arranging that the eight-year truce would not be binding on Emperor Frederick II.

Conclusions

The Fifth Crusade failed largely for lack of resources. This lesson was not lost on others at the time. When Frederick II finally began to plan his own crusade, he put major emphasis on negotiations. This course was unpopular, but it was realistic in terms of his own resources and his understanding of the desires of al-Kāmil. Of course, there were bad decisions during the Fifth Crusade, but there was no consistency in the assignment of blame. Decision making was a collective process, and leaders were seldom able to make decisions without pressures from various parties in the army. Nor were these differences ideological; rather, they pitted those who supported one course of action against those who supported another. In the last months, some opposed action because they wanted to go home. There is, however, no question that the final move involved a feeling that this was probably a last chance. For Pelagius and those who supported him, the decision to advance was based more on hope than reality. James M. Powell See also Albigensian Crusade; Crusades (Overview); Primary Document: Crusading in the Thirteenth Century: A Letter to All the Faithfull by the Patriarch of Jerusalem (1229) Further Reading Abulafia, David. Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor. London: Allen Lane, 1988. Donovan, Joseph. Pelagius and the Fifth Crusade. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950. Powell, James M. Anatomy of a Crusade. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986. Powell, James M. “The Role of Women in the Fifth Crusade.” In Benjamin Z. Kedar, ed. The Horns of Hattin. Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1992, pp. 294–301.

Fifth Monarchists  283 Powell, James M. “San Francesco d’Assisi e la Quinta Crociata: Una Missione di Pace.” Schede Medievali 4 (1983): 69–77. Quinti Belli Sacri scriptores minors. Edited by Reinhold Röhricht. Geneva: Fick, 1879. Röhricht, Reinhold. Studien zur Geschichte des fünften Kreuzzuges. Innsbruck: Wagner, 1891. Roscher, Helmut. Innocenz III und die Kreuzzüge. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969. Testimonia minora de quinto bello sacro. Edited by Reinhold Röhricht. Geneva: Fick, 1882. Van Cleve, Thomas C. “The Fifth Crusade.” In Kenneth Setton, ed. A History of the Crusades. 6 vols. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–1989, 2: 377–428.

Fifth Monarchists Fifth monarchism refers to a militant Puritan movement that flourished during the English Civil Wars of the 1640s and the Commonwealth period of the 1650s, but was later discredited at the Stuart Restoration of the 1660s. Arguably the most violent Christian theological justification for war, it was based on the biblical dream of Nebuchadnezzar in the book of Daniel chapter two and in Daniel’s own vision in chapter seven. Each outlined four subsequent kingdoms, most often understood as Nebuchadnezzar’s Babylonian, Cyrus’s Persian, Alexander’s Greek, and then the Roman Empire. According to Fifth Monarchists the fourth monarchy, Rome, including both pagan and papal periods, would be destroyed by a fifth Messianic kingdom. Fifth Monarchists believed it was their duty to bring in this fifth kingdom by the force of arms, and they considered the Stuart monarchy an extension of papal Rome, which they considered to be the Antichrist. Fifth Monarchist ideology is rooted in the Puritan eschatology of Joseph Mede, who in the 1530s popularized the concept of a coming Fifth Monarchy. Shortly after the end of press censorship in 1642, John Archer published The Personal Reign of Christ upon Earth, followed by Robert Maton who published Gog and Magog, or the Battle of the Great Day of God Almighty. Both expected that the saints would one day reign with Jesus Christ in a Fifth Monarchy. Neither Mede, Archer, nor Maton advocated violence, but they did expect the imminent coming of Christ as Messiah.

The first to claim that the saints themselves would bring in the Fifth Monarchy without waiting for the Messiah was William Erbery, chaplain in Oliver Cromwell’s New Model Army. He told the troops in 1648 that “God dwelling in the flesh of the Saints . . . has chosen a company of men . . . called the Holy, the Elect, and the House of God . . . saints in these last times, they shall attain the glorious liberty of the sons of God [and will] destroy the powers of the world opposing God . . . be the saviours of men . . . have a command and call from God to go forth . . . against King, Lords, Nobles, and the whole world . . . confusion and darkness must be destroyed before order be set up and established . . . God in the saints shall judge the Nations with righteousness, and govern the people with his truth” (The Armies Defense . . . Governments shall cease by the Appearance of God in the Saints, London 1648). This expectation was picked up by Ezekiel Grebner in The Future History of Europe (1650) in which he foresaw “the ruine of the Popish Heirarchy, the final annihilation of the Turkish Empire, the Conversion of the . . . Jews, and their Restauration to their ancient Inheritances in the holy Land, and the Fifth Monarchie and universal reign of the Gospel of Christ upon Earth.” William Aspinwall, in A Brief Description of the Fifth Monarchy (1653), declared that the “karkasses of royalty, all of them first or last must be destroyed [and] kingdom and dominion .  .  . given to the people, the Saints of the most high.” With the execution of King Charles, Cromwell’s chaplain and Westminster divine Thomas Goodwyn declared that “the fourth monarchy is destroyed by the Sword of the Saints, the followers of the Lamb.” Instead of the Stuart monarchy there would be a reign of the saints: “Thou hast redeemed us with thy blood, and hast made us kings, and we shall reign of earth . . . you enemies of the Lord in England .  .  . God is pouring contempt on Princes, on the great ones of the Earth” (A Sermon of the Fifth Monarchy, London, 1654). John Tillinghast concurred, “this kingdom of Christ . . . cannot be a meer Spiritual Kingdom (as many would have it) but must be an outward and visible Kingdom . . . judgment is given to the Saints, casting down the Thrones of the Fourth Beast . . . it is a kingdom the Saints are said to possess . . . they take away his dominion” (Knowledge of the Times, London 1654). As the Commonwealth began to unravel and it appeared the Stuart monarchy would be restored, the tide

284  First Crusade (1096–1099)

turned against any hope of a Fifth Monarchy. Stuart pamphleteers were calling for a return of divine right monarchy, and in 1660 Parliament invited the Stuarts to return to England. Fifth Monarchists were rounded up, put on trial, and executed. In response one last group of 50 Fifth Monarchists, made up mostly of veterans of Cromwell’s New Model Army and led by a wine-cooper turned preacher, assembled in East London in January 1661. They claimed to march under “the standard of our Lord, King Jesus” and “become souldiers in the Lambs army” (cited in Burrage 1919, 740). They marched to St. Paul’s Cathedral and held the neighborhood for several days until finally defeated. The survivors were all executed several days later. Fifth Monarchists were now seen as treasonous fanatics. Fifth Monarchist pamphlets continued to be published, but now anonymously. Some continued hoping for a Fifth Monarchy, but concluded that it must be another time in the distant future. William Hickes concluded that “mystical Babylon and the Whore [are now] in greater pomp.  .  .  . Therefore I conclude now is not the time.” Instead it was “the time of being in the wilderness, witnessing in sackcloth, a time of taking up the cross, a time of tribulation” (Revelation Revealed, London 1661). In response, many emigrated to New England, which they understood as “fleeing to the wildness” to escape the Antichrist. William C. Watson See also Cromwell, Oliver; English Civil Wars Further Reading Burrage, Champin. “The Fifth Monarchy Insurrections.” English Historical Review 25, no. 100 (October 1919): 722–47. Hill, Christopher. God’s Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1970. Hill, Christopher. The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1972. Maclear, J. F. ”New England and the Fifth Monarchy: The Quest for the Millennium in Early American Puritanism.” William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series 32, no. 2 (April, 1975): 223–60. Silver, Abba Hillel. The History of Messianic Speculation in Israel. New York: Macmillan, 1927. Solt, Leo F. “The Fifth Monarchy Men: Politics and the Millennium.” Church History 30, no. 3 (1961): 314–24. Walzer, Michael. The Revolution of the Saints. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966.

First Crusade (1096–1099) On November 27, 1095, toward the conclusion of a major ecclesiastical council at Clermont in Auvergne, Pope Urban II (1088–1099) launched an appeal for a military expedition to liberate the Christians of the Near East and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem from Islamic domination. His appeal was successful, and this expedition established in the Near East a Frankish kingdom of Jerusalem, together with the County of Edessa, the Principality of Antioch, and (later) the County of Tripoli. Because these states were greatly resented by Islam and needed Western support, out of the success of 1099 arose the crusading movement, which powerfully influenced the history of Europe and the Islamic world right down to the 17th century.

Origins

The trigger for the appeal of 1095 was a Byzantine imperial delegation that met with Urban II during the Council of Piacenza (March 1–7, 1095). The Byzantine emperor, Alexios I Komnenos, had seen that the outbreak of a bitter and complex succession struggle in the ruling family of the Great Seljuk Empire offered a golden opportunity for him to recover Asia Minor, which the Seljuks and other Turks had captured in the 1070s. Alexios hoped to enlist Western mercenaries, and this was the nature of the appeal made at Piacenza. Earlier, in 1074, when the Turkish conquest was underway in the aftermath of the disastrous battle of Manzikert in 1071, Pope Gregory VII (1073–1085) had tried to persuade the peoples of the West to rally to the cause of the embattled Eastern Christians, and even to capture Jerusalem. His hope, undoubtedly a factor that also influenced Urban, had been that in return the Byzantines would accept the authority of the Holy See. But Urban was moved by other factors. He had cultivated Alexios lest he ally with Henry IV of Germany (1056–1106) in the struggle between empire and papacy known as the Investiture Contest. Undoubtedly Urban saw in this appeal an opportunity to assert papal leadership in the war against the infidel, traditionally the task of the Holy Roman (German) emperor. However, there was more than self-interest at work, for Urban had supported the Christian reconquest of Spain and seems to have been anxious to roll back the tide of

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Islam, which had conquered much of the old Roman world since the seventh century. Yet he must have known that Gregory’s appeal had failed, and so Urban’s problem was to attract support for his project. First and foremost he was anxious for the support of the arms bearers, the aristocracy and knights, because they dominated society and their support would draw in others. He could certainly count on a mood of confidence in an expanding Europe, but most of Europe’s growth had hitherto been at a local level, with frontier lords annexing adjacent territory. The Norman conquest of southern Italy appears different, but was actually a slow process built on gradual implantation and alliance with native elites. What Urban proposed was on a scale and at a distance without precedent. Nor, outside the Reconquista (the reconquest of Muslim Iberia by the Christian kingdoms of the peninsula), was there any real tradition of such expansion having an ideological dimension, and even in the Iberian Peninsula, Gregory VII’s attempt to interfere in local affairs had been resented. However, the later 1080s had seen more lords from northern Europe participating in the Spanish wars; the Investiture Contest had accustomed some to serving the papacy in an ideological conflict; and naval raids by Italian cities on Muslim lands had taken on a sacred character. Moreover, the papacy had developed a new awareness of the value of holy war. Urban was a skillful diplomat. He eschewed the selfrighteous extremism of Gregory VII, and his journey to France was intended to win more friends for his cause. He prepared carefully for his appeal at Clermont. After sending out the summons for the council from Le Puy around August 15, 1095, he turned south into the lands of Raymond of Saint-Gilles, count of Toulouse. It can be no accident that Adhemar, bishop of Le Puy (later the pope’s legate on the crusade), was the first person, and Raymond of Saint-Gilles the first major magnate, to take the cross. Born as Odo of Lagery into a French noble family from Châtillon-sur-Marne around the year 1042, Urban knew the kind of people he needed to attract. This European elite was deeply Catholic and profoundly hostile to any kind of outsider. Islam was no threat to them, and the Christians of the East were of little interest. At the same time, however, French lords were increasingly taking an interest in the wars in Spain. They were very aware that their military style of life, greed, and acquisitiveness were deeply at odds

with the spirit of monasticism that was reckoned to be the most perfect form of the Christian life, whose exponents, especially the Cluniac order, often had great influence with the more pious among them. At the Council of Clermont Urban appealed to Frankish pride of race. He urged the restoration of God’s land, the Holy Land, and especially the Holy Sepulchre, a notion that resonated with an elite deeply concerned with landed property. They saw pilgrimage, above all to Jerusalem, as a vital way of expiating their sins, and Urban cast his expedition in the form of a pilgrimage. Above all he offered them an indulgence, forgiveness of all their sins, if they undertook this fighting pilgrimage to the most sacred of shrines. They were to be God’s pilgrims, the chosen of the Lord for the Lord’s sacred task. In token of their status they would wear crosses and enjoy the protection of their lands by the church during their absence. Forgiveness of sins was confined to the statement that “whoever, for devotion alone, and not to gain honour or money, goes to Jerusalem to liberate the Church of God, can substitute the journey for all penance” (Canon 2 of the Council of Clermont, in RileySmith and Riley-Smith 1981, 37). However, Urban’s project by its nature involved conquest in a land proverbially flowing “with milk and honey” (Josh. 5:6 and Deut. 31:20) and therefore also embodied powerful material incentives.

Aims and Recruitment

Urban II’s appeal was transmitted to a wider world by the bishops present at Clermont, by the monks, who were strongly propapal, and by preachers. Urban wrote letters, such as those to Flanders, to Bologna, and to Genoa, soliciting support. No pope had ventured north of the Alps since Leo IX (1048–1054), so Urban’s long journey through France excited enormous interest. Still, all this only partly explains the enthusiasm generated across Europe. The success of the appeal was that it came from a man and an institution (the papacy) that increasingly commanded respect and that it came at a time when the notion of fighting for God was becoming more widespread, and when instability in the East was making itself felt in difficulties in reaching Jerusalem. At the same time, expansionism had engendered a sense of confidence and opportunity. Urban seemed to have suddenly opened a gateway to salvation, and many were ready to enter therein. We may surmise

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that the most pious of the aristocrats and knights were the first to join. Urban’s appeal to the elite drew in their wake their followers—knights, and even humble men, servants, and peasants: the crusade was an embodiment of Western society with its hierarchies and patronage groups. However, his message also appealed to large numbers of unattached noncombatants, and we can only suppose that they were taking the opportunity to make a pilgrimage. We are very badly informed about what Urban II intended his expedition to do. It is possible that Jerusalem was not mentioned at Clermont, or mentioned only in a minor key, and that the pope’s real intention was simply to express the Byzantine request for mercenaries made at Piacenza, but that public opinion focused on the liberation of Jerusalem and the project took on a life of its own. Since the work of H. E. J. Cowdrey, however, such ideas have had little currency among scholars in the field, and it is now generally thought that Jerusalem was always central to Urban’s message. For long it was considered that the lure of riches was the fundamental reason why people took up the cross, but Jonathan Riley-Smith (1986, 31–57) has convincingly made the case that the movement was fundamentally a religious one, although John France (1994, 11–16) has more recently stressed that gain was a factor. Among the leaders, very great men like Raymond of SaintGilles and Robert II of Flanders seem unlikely to have been moved by hopes of profit. By contrast, for Robert of Normandy and Godfrey of Bouillon the expedition offered an escape from acute political difficulties, while Bohemund of Taranto seems to have been simply out for gain, and younger men like Tancred and Baldwin of Boulogne probably wanted to make their fortunes.

From the West to Constantinople (1096–1097)

The first expeditions to reach Constantinople (mod. Istanbul, Turkey), the appointed concentration point, were those of the so-called People’s Crusades: they were different from the later armies in that none of them were led by a great prince, and they probably contained a smaller proportion of arms bearers. In northern France an army gathered around a charismatic preacher, Peter the Hermit; in the Rhineland he attracted more followers, and the mood of religious excitement triggered a persecution of the Jews. Although Peter’s force marched peacefully down the

Danube, some of the later bands were poorly disciplined and clashed with local forces in Hungary. Peter’s men had their troubles over food supply in the Byzantine Empire, but they were well received by Alexios Komnenos at Constantinople. Once in Asia Minor they joined Germans and Lombard groups and ravaged the countryside. Without strong military leadership these forces, though substantial, were easily defeated in late October 1096 near Nicaea by Qilij Arslān I, the Seljuk sultan of Rūm. The princely armies took various routes to Constantinople and departed at times of their own choosing. Hugh, count of Vermandois, the brother of King Philip I of France, was the first major leader to leave, taking a traditional pilgrim route to Italy. He crossed from Bari to Dyrrachion (mod. Durrës, Albania) in October 1096 with the intention of taking the old Roman road, the Via Egnatia, to Constantinople, but he was shipwrecked and his army scattered. Bohemund of Taranto, the leader of the Normans of south Italy, crossed on November 1, 1096. He had participated in the attempt of his father, Robert Guiscard, to conquer the Byzantine Empire in 1081–1085, and he was anxious to avoid friction with Byzantine forces concentrated at Dyrrachion, so he landed to the south and cautiously marched to Constantinople, not arriving until April 1, 1097. Contingents from northern France, Normandy, and Flanders were led by Robert Curthose, duke of Normandy; Robert II, count of Flanders; and Stephen, count of Blois and Chartres. These only arrived in southern Italy in late November 1097; Robert of Flanders risked an immediate passage, but the others wintered in Italy, crossing in the spring and arriving at Dyrrachion only on May 14, 1097. Godfrey of Bouillon, duke of Lower Lotharingia, departed in August 1096 with troops from his own duchy and northeastern France, marched down the Danube Valley, and arrived at Constantinople before Christmas. Raymond of Saint-Gilles and Adhemar of Le Puy, the papal legate, led a huge army drawn from southern France and Provence, which seems to have marched across Lombardy and down the Dalmatian coast, arriving at Dyrrachion in early February 1097. These were the main armies, but we hear of other smaller forces of whose journeys we know nothing. What arrived in the East in the spring of 1097 was not a single army, but a loose aggregation of armies. There was no

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overall commander, though the papal legate, Adhemar, seems to have enjoyed a preeminence. The various contingents evidently accepted the command of the major leaders, but they retained considerable freedom: Gaston of Béarn, originally attached to the forces of Toulouse, later changed his allegiance and helped the northern French with their siege equipment at Jerusalem. The lack of any structure of command first became an obvious problem when the princely armies approached Constantinople in the spring of 1097. They needed to establish a relationship with Alexios Komnenos, but because

they arrived separately, the emperor was able to deal with them as individuals. Adhemar fell ill and did not arrive at Constantinople until long after the others. Urban II wanted to aid Alexios, but it is unlikely that the emperor ever promised to lead the crusaders to their goal. Most of the princes, accustomed to wide freedom of action in the West, were wary of relations with the Greeks and unwilling to accept any subordination. Raymond of Saint-Gilles had actually conferred with Urban, but even he did not seriously suppose that Alexios would become their commander. Despite some incidental skirmishes, inevitable when large

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armies were passing through Byzantine territory, all the leaders ultimately took oaths to Alexios to be his men and to return to him any former Byzantine lands, though the extent of these was never defined.

From Constantinople to Antioch (1097–1098)

The working relationship with Byzantium was quickly put to the test at the siege of Nicaea (mod. İznik, Turkey), lasting from May 14 to June 19, 1097, which saw the individual contingents gathered as one army for the first time. The size of that army is a matter of dispute. France (1994, 122– 142) has argued for 60,000 participants, including 6,000– 7,000 knights, but this has been contested by Bernard

Bachrach (1999, 127–146), who argues for 100,000. The sultan Qilij Arslān I was away from the city when the siege began, and his attempt to relieve it on May 16 was driven off. The siege was energetically pressed, and casualties were heavy. Because there was no single leader, a committee of the most important princes controlled the army, and as a consequence their assaults were poorly coordinated. Alexios supplied the crusaders with food and equipment, and sent boats to close the Ascanian Lake, on which Nicaea stood, a decisive move, which meant that the Turkish garrison was now isolated and had to face attacks on all sides. Alexios’s generals negotiated the surrender of the city to Byzantine forces, but he seems to have been generous to

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the crusaders. The capture of the city was a triumph for the alliance, and in its wake Alexios attached Byzantine troops to the army and advised them to open negotiations with the Fatimids of Egypt. By the spring of 1098 crusaders and Egyptians had reached some kind of modus vivendi, presumably on the basis of mutual hatred of the Seljuk Turks of Syria; this understanding was important because Egypt was a strong military power and controlled the only Muslim fleet in the Mediterranean. The crusader army set off across Asia Minor on June 26, 1097, but divided command led to its separation into two groups, which gave Qilij Arslān the opportunity to attack its vanguard, led by Bohemund, at Dorylaion (mod. Eskiflehir, Turkey) on July 1, 1097. The Turkish mounted archers outnumbered the Frankish knights, and they drove them back and besieged them in their camp. The Turks were then drawn into a fight at close quarters, which gave the main crusader force time to arrive and attack them in the rear. The Turkish tactics of enveloping their enemies, showering them with arrows, then exploiting gaps and weaknesses in their line, were an unpleasant shock to the divided and uncoordinated crusader army. But the battle of Dorylaion broke Turkish resistance in Asia Minor, even though the crusader army was sapped by climate and disease, and had lost the bulk of its horses. Guided by Byzantine troops, the crusaders marched via Caesarea in Cappadocia (mod. Kayseri, Turkey) in order to free Armenian centers in the mountains and thus secure a friendly base for the attack they now intended upon the city of Antioch on the Orontes (mod. Antakya, Turkey), where they arrived on October 20, 1097. This policy of friendship toward the Christian Armenians culminated in an invitation to Baldwin of Boulogne, brother of Godfrey of Bouillon, to take over the city of Edessa (mod. Şanliurfa, Turkey), which in March 1098 became the center of the first Frankish principality in the East. Turkish-controlled Syria was divided between the Seljuk princes Riwān of Aleppo and Duqāq of Damascus, and the rivalry between them had enabled cities like Antioch to establish a fair degree of independence. Alexios Komnenos had judged his moment for an assault well, and so the crusaders faced no coordinated Islamic counterattack. Even so, Aleppo and Damascus could raise strong military forces and posed a severe threat to the depleted crusader army. Antioch had strong walls, and it was too big

for the army to surround or storm. The crusaders established a close blockade, but this exposed them to harassment from enemy outposts nearby and to the threat of a relief force. Their major problem was food supply. They could draw on the Armenian lands to the north, and Raymond of Saint-Gilles had established an outpost at Rugia in the Syrian plain before the siege began. Most importantly, an English fleet, probably with Byzantine support, had captured St. Symeon (the port for Antioch) and nearby Laodikeia (mod. Al-Lādhiqīyah, Syria) even before the crusaders arrived, which opened up communications with Byzantine Cyprus. In November 1097 a Genoese fleet arrived with timber and skilled labor, enabling the crusaders to fortify their camp. The Byzantine alliance was working well, and it was reinforced by the good ecclesiastical relations that Adhemar had established with the Greeks. Even so, by Christmas the army was starving, and a large force, commanded by Bohemund and Robert of Flanders, was sent to forage in Syria. Near Albara, on December 31, they defeated a relief force sent by Duqāq of Damascus. Although the Damascenes retreated, the crusaders were unable to forage, and the crisis in the army deepened when it became known that a Turkish relief force from Aleppo was approaching. In this emergency the leaders finally agreed to appoint a single commander, choosing Bohemund, whose military reputation stood high after his victory over the Damascenes. Although they could raise only 700 cavalry, the crusaders ambushed and crushed the army of Aleppo on February 9, 1098, a victory that impressed the Egyptian envoys who were then in Antioch. Shortly afterward a second English fleet arrived, enabling the crusaders to tighten the siege with new fortifications, and the coming of spring eased supply problems. Antioch was betrayed to Bohemund, who was by now the most famous of their leaders, by a tower commander on the night of June 2/3, though the crusaders were unable to seize the citadel. On June 4 a huge Turkish relief army arrived under the command of Karbughā, lord of Mosul, trapping the crusaders in Antioch. Despite terrible hardships the crusaders fought off enemy attacks. Morale was revived by a series of visions and the finding of a relic that was identified as the Holy Lance (the spear with which Christ’s side was pierced during the Crucifixion), and on June 28, 1098, the crusaders sallied out and defeated Karbughā at the Great Battle of Antioch.

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From Antioch to Jerusalem (1098–1099)

After the victory against Karbughā, the crusade leaders sent envoys to ask Alexios Komnenos to take possession of Antioch, in fulfilment of the oaths they had taken at Constantinople. This action is indicative of their adherence to the oath and of the value they attached to Byzantine help, which had been so important during the siege. However, by autumn they had learned that during Karbughā’s siege, Alexios had been told about the army’s plight by Stephen of Blois, who had deserted from Antioch, and had then turned back from coming to its aid, in the belief that all was lost. In a letter of September 11, 1098, to Urban II, the leaders expressed their anger at this turn of events. When they gathered at Antioch on November 1 to resume the march, Bohemund claimed the city. Raymond of Saint-Gilles stood by the Byzantine alliance, but the other leaders were inclined to favor Bohemund. In the subsequent quarrels, personal feelings and old scores came to the fore; Adhemar, who might have been a moderating force, had died of plague (August 1, 1098). As a result of this dispute, the army stalled in north Syria after capturing Ma’arrat al-Numan in December. Bohemund demanded that Raymond should abandon his strong points within Antioch and sought recognition of his control of the city. Not until January 13, 1099, did Raymond march south, but as only Tancred and Robert of Normandy would accompany him, it seems unlikely that he intended an immediate attack on Jerusalem. His army settled down to besiege Arqah on February 14, while Bohemund remained at Antioch, from which he evicted the garrison left by Raymond. Many knights, despairing of the delay, preferred to stay with Bohemund or joined Baldwin at Edessa. However, popular pressure from within their contingents forced Godfrey of Bouillon and Robert of Flanders south; when they joined the siege of Arqah, they were sullen and resentful. Divisions opened further when an imperial embassy asked the crusaders to delay their march so that Alexios could come to their aid, a development welcomed by Raymond but opposed by the other leaders. In early May a Fatimid embassy arrived from Egypt. The Fatimids had seized Jerusalem from Seljuk control in July 1098 and had no intention of conceding it to the

crusaders, who rejected anything less than full possession of the city. The leaders, divided as they were and deeply concerned by the limited manpower available resulting from casualties and the partial breakup of the crusade at Antioch, now rallied the army and marched into Fatimid territory in a determined thrust to Jerusalem, which they invested on June 7. The siege was a race against time, because the crusaders knew that a Fatimid relief expedition was in preparation. On June 13 they launched an initial assault, despite having only a single siege ladder. This assault failed, but the arrival of a Genoese fleet on June 13 brought timber, which enabled the construction of siege engines. Forces led by Godfrey of Bouillon began construction work at the northwestern corner of the city. They had to build a ram that would clear a way through the outer wall along the north perimeter of the city, while a tower was intended to dominate the strong inner wall and so to make possible assaults by siege ladders. The defenders observed this activity and strengthened the threatened part of the city’s defenses, but on the night of July 9/10 the northern French transported their equipment to a weak spot on the northeastern section of the north wall, which critically undermined the preparations of the defenders. Raymond of Saint-Gilles prepared another tower to attack near the Zion Gate on the southwestern section of the wall, and on July 13 a systematic attack from north and south began. On July 15, 1099, the crusaders broke in across the northern wall and massacred many of the Muslim and Jewish inhabitants (the Christians having previously been expelled by the garrison): this was the normal fate of any city that fell by storm. Not without much dispute, Godfrey of Bouillon was elected to rule the city, and on August 12 he led the crusaders to victory over the Fatimids at the Battle of Ascalon (mod. Tel Ashqelon, Israel).

Conclusions

The First Crusade was an astonishing success. As Alexios Komnenos had intended, the crusaders had taken advantage of the divisions of their Islamic enemies and exploited them skillfully. Their own army partially disintegrated because of serious disagreements, but the Muslim powers were never able to exploit them. The crusaders faced formidable military powers, but they triumphed because the

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longer they survived, the more coherent and effective they became as an army and the better they adapted to the tactics of their enemies. They enjoyed the support of Byzantine and Armenian allies, while Western fleets, in alliance with the Byzantines, commanded the sea and helped to supply them. Islamic and Western armies were on a par technically. Although Western horses were bigger than Eastern ones, they died very quickly and were replaced by local stock, and the victory over Karbughā was largely the victory of an infantry army. Other crucial factors in achieving victory were good military leadership, especially by Bohemund, and the profound religious conviction of the crusaders, who saw themselves as a pilgrim army, the chosen of God. Yet crusader success was limited: they had established only the nuclei of viable states at Antioch, Edessa, and Jerusalem, which would need further support. More­ over, the breach with Byzantium meant that there was no land bridge from the West to the Holy Land, so that the future of the new settlements in the East would depend very heavily upon sea power. John France See also Antioch, Siege of; Bouillon, Godfrey de; Crusade of 1101; Crusades (Overview); Edessa, County of; Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of; Primary Documents: An Account of the First Crusade: Anselme of Ribemont’s Letter to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims (1098); An Account of the First Crusade: Letter of Daimbert, Archbishop of Pisa; Godfrey of Bouillon; and Raymond, Count of St. Gilles to Pope Paschal II (1099) Further Reading Autour de la Première Croisade. Edited by Michel Balard. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1996. Bachrach, Bernard. “The Siege of Antioch: A Study in Military Demography.” War in History 6 (1999), 127–146. Bull, Marcus. Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade: The Limousin and Gascony, c. 970–c. 1130. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Le Concile de Clermont de 1095 et l’appel à la croisade. Edited by André Vauchez. Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1997. Cowdrey, H. E. John. “The Mahdia Campaign of 1087.” English Historical Review 92 (1977): 1–29. Cowdrey, H. E. John. “Pope Gregory VII’s ‘Crusading’ Plan of 1074.” In Benjamin Z. Kedar, Hans Eberhard Mayer, and R. C. Smail, eds. Outremer: Studies in the History of the Crusading

Kingdom of Jerusalem. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1982, pp. 27–40. Cowdrey, H. E. John. “Pope Urban II’s Preaching of the First Crusade.” History 55 (1970): 177–88. The First Crusade: Origins and Impact. Edited by Jonathan P. Phillips. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997. Flori, Jean. Pierre l’Ermite et la Première Croisade. Paris: Fayard, 1999. France, John. “The Crisis of the First Crusade: From the Defeat of Kerbogha to the Departure from Arqah.” Byzantion 40 (1970): 276–308. France, John. “The First Crusade as a Naval Enterprise.” Mariner’s Mirror 83 (1997): 389–97. France, John. Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Goetz, Hans-Werner. “Der erste Kreuzzug im Spiegel der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung.” In Franz Staab, ed. Auslandsbeziehungen unter den salischen Kaisern. Speyer: Verlag der Pfälzischen Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften, 1994, pp. 139–66. Murray, Alan V. “Bibliography of the First Crusade.” In Alan V. Murray, ed. From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies, 1095–1500. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1998, pp. 267–310. Nesbitt, J. W. “Rate of March of Crusading Armies in Europe: A Study in Computation.” Traditio 19 (1963): 167–82. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. “Casualties and the Number of Knights on the First Crusade.” Crusades 1 (2002): 13–18. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading. London: Athlone, 1986. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The First Crusaders, 1095–1131. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Riley-Smith, Jonathan, and Louise Riley-Smith. The Crusades: Idea and Reality, 1095–1274. London: Arnold, 1981.

First World War and Religious Art Most of the First World War’s belligerents considered themselves to be Christian nations and consequently, much of the war art produced by their artists centered upon the Judeo-Christian biblical narrative. The terrible nature of war, when man killed fellow man, was emphasised by German artist Lovis Corinth (1858–1925) in his painting Cain (1917, Kunstmuseum, Düsseldorf). Depicting the murder of Abel by his brother Cain, as described in the biblical book of Genesis, the artist implied that as God

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punished Cain for the murder of his brother, so would he also punish mankind for sinfully waging the fratricidal First World War. The biblical David was seemingly deemed a propaganda asset by both sides of the conflict, as the youthful shepherd who overcame the Philistine Goliath and in his later incarnation as the successful warlord, king, and agent of God. German artist Albert Weisgerber’s (1878–1915) most prominent painting, as well as his last, took the youthful David’s triumph as its subject. David and Goliath (1914, Saarland Museum) has David standing over the body of the defeated Goliath, while he holds the dead giant’s sword in his right hand, about to decapitate him. The youth has battled against adversity and defeated his powerful enemy, in an analogous reference to the youthful German Empire’s resolve to overcome the powerful enemies it perceived to be surrounding it. The story of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis 22 tells how Abraham prepared to sacrifice his son Isaac in obedience to God’s command, but was stopped by an angel indicating a ram as a substitute sacrifice. The story was adopted as a war memorial stained glass window design by, among others, Scottish artist Douglas Strachan, as an analogy of wartime willingness for obedient self-sacrifice, reflecting the Christian doctrine of God’s son’s willing sacrifice on the cross. The life, ministry, and death of Christ, as recorded in the New Testament Gospels, was a significant source of First World War religious art. Dutch artist and cartoonist Louis Raemaekers (1869–1956) deplored what he saw as German aggression and expressed his anger through cartoons, published both in Britain and the United States. In The Adoration of the Magi, he satirised the rulers of the three Central Powers, depicting them as the three Magi presenting their gifts to the infant Jesus in the manger. Here the three kings in full royal regalia offer their gifts: the German kaiser, an artillery shell; Austria-Hungary’s Emperor Franz-Josef, a howitzer; and the Ottoman ruler Mehmed V, a blood-stained scimitar. The Christian Holy Week and the events leading up to Christ’s crucifixion provided subjects for First World War artists. Both Raemaekers and British artist Sir William Orpen (1878–1931) utilized Christ’s triumphant entry into Jerusalem in satirical anti-German paintings, and

Raemaekers produced his own version of Christ Cleansing the Temple, in which Jesus drives out from “Humanity” the rulers of the Central Powers. Controversial British artist Eric Gill adapted the story in 1923 when creating a stone war memorial frieze for Leeds University. In his Expulsion of the Money Changers, Gill portrayed Christ whipping out the dealers, who are all in modern clothing, representing those who profited from war and the death of others. In Christ Before Pilate (1922, National Museum of Wales, Cardiff), Welshman David Jones (1895–1974) portrayed the trial and torture of Christ before his execution. In his painting, the soldiers wear the steel helmets of British or American troops, whereas in Louis Raemaekers’s depiction of Christ’s trial, the soldiers are German and Pontius Pilate is the kaiser, washing his bloodstained hands. Artists of both sides in the war chose the Christian belief in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ as a metaphor for wartime sacrificial death and reward. Christ carrying his cross toward Golgotha fills the top half of French artist Lucien Simon’s Le Sacrifice (1920, Notre Dame du Travail, Paris), drawing comparison with the sacrificial death of the French soldiers in the trench fighting in the bottom half of the painting. In the same church, the artist’s companion piece painting La Messe du Soldat Mort portrays a soldier’s grieving family at Mass, above which the dead soldier is presented to Christ in heaven, where he receives his martyr’s crown. Perhaps the most widely disseminated wartime crucifixion depiction was that of British artist James Clark (1858–1943). His painting The Great Sacrifice (1914, St. Mildred’s Church, Medina, Isle of Wight) was purchased to become a war memorial to Queen Victoria’s grandson, Prince Maurice, but not before being reproduced in a popular British magazine. The image is of a dead British soldier complete with small bullet wound in his forehead; he is shown on the battlefield, lying on his back with his right hand stretched out as if placing it upon the feet of an ethereal Christ crucified, indicating the shared sacrifice suggested by the title. So popular was the subject that it survives today in numerous war memorial designs as far apart as Canada and New Zealand, while in the United States it was adapted to advertise a Polish American war charity, with the dead warrior in the uniform of a Polish soldier.

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With limited communication options, postcards were very popular and many wartime examples survive featuring religious images, with soldiers associated with Christ upon the cross commonplace. An Austrian example portrays four soldiers, one of whom is wounded, standing before a vision of Christ crucified, whose cross bears the legend Durch Leid zum Sieg! (By Suffering to Victory!). A British example depicts Christ upon his cross on the battlefield, guarded by an armor-clad St. Michael, before whom stands a British soldier and sailor armed with rifles and bayonets. At the foot of the card, prominently displayed, are the words “Enlisted Under the Cross! Am I?” Christ’s death on the cross was the major artistic wartime inspiration, especially for those with an antiwar agenda. German American George Grosz (1893–1959), in his lithograph of 1923, Eco Homo (the words of Pontius Pilate presenting Jesus to the people), portrayed a crucified Christ dressed in military boots and a gas mask. German Max Beckmann suffered a nervous breakdown in 1915, the result of his wartime service as a medical orderly. One of his paintings, Descent from the Cross (1917, Museum of Modern Art, New York), portrays the gaunt, bloody body of Christ, frozen in rigor mortis, being taken from the cross. The artist suggests a double analogy in his creation, not only of the sacrificial death of Christ and that of the wartime troops, but also of the removal and disposal of the war dead and the need to never forget those who made their sacrifice. The pieta, or artistic portrayal of Mary cradling her crucified son’s body, was taken by American artist Alonzo Foringer (1878–1948) as the basis of his American Red Cross poster The Greatest Mother in the World. In the poster, however, the “Mary” figure is that of a Red Cross nurse and the “body” that of a miniature soldier upon a stretcher. By the use of a simple visual metaphor, Foringer transferred the attributes of the Virgin Mary onto the Red Cross nurse and Christ’s sacrificial suffering onto the wounded soldier, thereby creating one of America’s foremost wartime images. The Gospel narrative of Christ’s resurrection and its concomitant message of spiritual renewal after death provided a convenient subject for First World War memorial artists. Similarly, with the growth of interest in spiritualism, artists were able to incorporate paranormal elements into their art. In the same way as the Christian New Testament describes Jesus appearing to his disciples after his death, Australian

artist William Longstaff (1879–1953) in Apparition of Christ to the Belligerents (ca. 1930, Historial de la Grande Guerre, Peronne) portrayed an ethereal Christ standing at the foot of his cross, preaching peace to a group of soldiers of the warring nations. Longstaff went on to produce a series of paintings incorporating war-related spiritualistic scenes, most famously in his Menin Gate at Midnight (1927, Australian War Memorial, Canberra), where waves of ghostly British and Australian troops advance into battle past the memorial erected afterward in their honor. The trauma suffered by Otto Dix (1891–1969) during his wartime service in the German army was expressed in his huge painting Der King (The War) (1929–1932, Staatlichen Kunstsammlungen, Dresden). Painting it in the early Christian form of a triptych, a three-panel altar piece, Dix thereby invested it with an element of Christian symbolism. At its base, the artist included a predella piece, a panel depicting dead soldiers resting in a shallow grave. The biblical assurances of the resurrection of the dead was taken as the subject of the English artist Stanley Spencer (1891– 1959) in his The Resurrection of the Soldiers (1927–1932, Sandham Memorial Chapel, Burghclere). A deeply religious man, Spencer, who like Max Beckmann (1884–1950) had served as a wartime army medical orderly, chose the subject for the east wall of the chapel, above the altar. Resurrected soldiers leave their graves and stack together their now redundant grave crosses, while in the background, the figure of Christ looks on. If only one painting were to represent the religious art of the First World War, it might be The Unending Cult of Human Sacrifice (1934, Imperial War Museum, London) by British official war artist C. R. W. Nevinson (1889–1946). All the warfare of the ages, presented in a tableau, is surveyed by Christ upon his cross, his saints, his mother, and a group of churchmen. In a juxtaposition of war and religion, Nevinson offers little hope, in a painting executed a mere five years before a new world war was to begin. John A. Hammond See also First World War, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Cork, Richard. A Bitter Truth: Avant-Garde Art and the Great War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.

First World War, Religious Dimensions of   295 Frantzen, Allen J. Bloody Good: Chivalry, Sacrifice, and the Great War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. Jenkins, Philip, The Great and Holy War: How World War 1 Changed Religion for Ever. Oxford: Lion, 2014. Silver, Kenneth E. Espirit de Corps: The Art of the Parisian Avant-Garde and the First World War, 1914–1925. London: Thames and Hudson, 1989. Winter, Jay. Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

First World War, Religious Dimensions of After decades of scholarly neglect, a full appreciation of the profound religious dimensions and significance of the First World War is only now emerging. Stimulated by the rise of militant Islamism toward the end of the 20th century, and by the shaking of naïve assumptions in the secular West as to the declining significance of religion as a global force, historians of religion have recently come to appreciate the significance of the First World War as a religious event. Not only was the conflict fought between and among societies in which religious belief was normative, but the First World War led to the genocide of Armenian Christians in the Ottoman Empire, lent a powerful boost to the Zionist project of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, saw an atheist regime seize power in the former Russian Empire and, in the end of czarist Russia and of the Ottoman sultanate and caliphate, spelled the demise of critical sources of religious authority in the greater parts of the Orthodox and Muslim worlds. In most if not all of the belligerent states, religion played a critical role in legitimizing the national (or imperial) war effort, in uniting and mobilizing wartime societies, and in defining the nature of the enemy. For example, for patriotic Germans the secular Third Republic was emblematic of France’s spiritual and moral bankruptcy, while in the eyes of many Britons (and, later, Americans) the conduct of imperial Germany evinced all the hallmarks of state and societal apostasy—presaged, according to some commentators, by pernicious intellectual and cultural currents that had

first thrown into question the literal truth of the Bible. Even in France’s Third Republic, hitherto in thrall to the dictates of laïcité, the imperative of wartime unity was presented in terms invested with religious meaning, as Catholic and secular patriots came together in the vaunted Union Sacrée. In a similar manner, the Young Turks, often at odds with conservative religious opinion in the Ottoman Empire before the war, exploited jihadist energies—unleashed by the sultan’s proclamation of jihad against the British, French, and Russians in November 1914—as far afield as Libya and the Caucasus. But religion also played a very material role in resourcing the war effort. Despite the secular or anticlerical traditions of several European countries (notably France, Italy, and Portugal), a functioning system of chaplaincy (or its non-Christian equivalent) was the norm in the belligerent armies. The Austro-Hungarian army fielded Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim chaplains, but the British army probably took pride of place in the lavishness of its chaplaincy provision, commissioning more than 5,000 Christian and Jewish clergy over the course of the war. In Britain and the British Empire’s white Dominions, whose armed forces were initially reliant on voluntary enlistment, the churches also had a key role to play in assisting recruitment, and entire battalions were raised from religious organizations such as the (Anglican) Church Lads Brigade. Religious organizations also played an enormous role in ensuring the spiritual, educational, and material welfare of their armed forces. The American YMCA, for example, put 26,000 paid workers into the field and raised $170 million to fund its wartime work. In the Russian Empire, Orthodox monasteries and convents gave vast sums of money to support the war effort, provided huge quantities of clothing and devotional materials, and hosted dozens of military hospitals in their precincts. Although churches played a key role in sanctioning and supporting conflicting war efforts, they could also serve as major sources of resistance to war. The most prominent and consistent promoter of a negotiated peace settlement was Pope Benedict XV, elected soon after war broke out, whose efforts foundered on his signal failure to rally a deeply divided church to his undoubtedly humane but invidious cause. In Anglophone countries that saw the introduction of conscription in the latter half of the war (namely

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Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States), war resistance came most conspicuously from the opposite end of the ecclesiastical spectrum, with Quakers, Mennonites, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other sectarian groups providing a small but conspicuous element of conscientious objectors, whose refusal to participate in the war was in many cases absolute. Among more liberal Protestants, the cataclysmic aberration of a global war served in the long run to promote internationalism and to reenergize the prewar peace movement, with Anglophone Protestants in particular placing huge faith in the nascent League of Nations and in the embryonic World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. Whether the First World War undermined the global influence and significance of religion or not is a contested point. Cherished in the Anglophone world as part of a master narrative of disillusionment with old beliefs and values, the war and its consequences certainly had negative repercussions for Sunni Islam, Russian Orthodoxy, and mainstream German Protestantism, with their close and historic ties to vanquished and fallen political orders. However, Catholicism emerged quite well from the war, enabled to take a more assertive stand in France, Italy, and Germany, and benefiting from the creation of some new and largely Catholic states in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the disruption of missionary work in sub-Saharan Africa did much to foster the autonomy of African Christians and the expansion of African-initiated churches—both of which were major features of the growth of global Christianity in the 20th century. Even in the Christian portions of the British Empire, the confidence of liberal churchmen may have been dented, but the power of Christianity to comfort and console was apparent in the impressive rituals and architecture of remembrance. Furthermore, the abiding capacity of Christianity to mobilize national energies in pursuit of more sanguinary goals was to be underlined a generation later in the even greater human catastrophe that was the Second World War. Michael Snape See also Balfour Declaration; First World War and Religious Art; Lawrence of Arabia; Zionism and War; Primary Documents: Issuance of Ottoman Fetva by Essad Effendi, Sheik-Ul-Islam in the Name of Sultan Mehmed V (November 1914); Balfour

Declaration (1917); Pacem, Dei Munus Pulcherrimum, a Papal Encyclical Issued by Pope Benedict XV (May 23, 1920) Further Reading Ebel, Jonathan H. Faith in the Fight: Religion and the American Soldier in the Great War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Houlihan, Patrick J. Catholicism and the Great War: Religion and Everyday Life in Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914–1922. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Jenkins, Philip. The Great and Holy War: How World War I Became a Religious Crusade. New York: HarperCollins, 2015. McMillan, M. E. From the First World War to the Arab Spring: What’s Really Going On in the Middle East? New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Petrone, Karen. The Great War in Russian Memory. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011. Snape, Michael. God and the British Solider: Religion and the British Army in the Era of the Two World Wars. London: Routledge, 2005.

Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) Pope Innocent III, pope from 1198 through 1216, believed firmly that he had a divine vocation to retake the Holy Land and especially Jerusalem from the “enemies of Christ.” Crusades were pilgrimages that entailed sacramentalized violence attached to a plenary indulgence that theologically and historically differentiate a crusade from the much more common wars between Catholics and nonCatholics. During the pontificate of Innocent III this energy was released in new directions, such as against Albigensian heretics in southern France, reminding us that the crusades were far from confined to confrontations with Muslims. In this and other ventures, the scope of a crusade expanded to encompass any enemy of the Roman church. Less than a year after ascending to the throne of St. Peter, Innocent III called for a new crusade to recapture Jerusalem. Dispatching preachers throughout Europe, noblemen from northern France were the first to respond favorably and were to form the core of this crusade’s leadership. Gathered in Soissons in 1200, these leaders made the decision to travel by sea to the Levant. They approached the preeminent maritime power of the day, Venice, with

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their proposal. The leader, or doge, of Venice, Enrico Dandolo, already past 90 years of age and blind, accepted their offer. The entire industrial infrastructure of Venice was redirected toward producing the large number of ships required for this expedition, which included nearly 30,000 troops and almost 5,000 horses. In addition to all of this, provisions would need to be supplied, and also 50 armed galleys would accompany the expedition. Presumably the Venetians would also receive favored status in governing the commerce of any territory that was captured, and they were especially desirous of achieving this position in Alexandria. The Venetians agreed to this contract, which was valued at 85,000 marks, or about twice the annual income of the English or French crown. Technical advances were achieved. For instance, ships were designed with low doors that could open, allowing mounted knights to ride onto the beach, which is to say they were a predecessor to our landing crafts today. Crusaders started to arrive in Venice in the spring of 1202, but the promised numbers failed to materialize, and the disproportionately enormous scope of the building project became clear. All the finances available still fell short of the promised sum by some 34,000 marks. The entire economy of Venice had focused on this endeavor for a full year, and the crusaders had taken a solemn oath to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem—an oath that could not be broken. The doge proposed that the crusaders make up some of their debt to Venice by helping them to reestablish their rule over the Croatian city of Zara, which had recently thrown off Venetian rule—this even though Zara was under the king of Hungary—himself one of the crusaders. Nevertheless, the fleet departed. The pope threatened excommunication, but his legate, Peter of Capuano, did not prevent the crusaders’ departure from Venice. This unseemly business led to a split among the crusaders, but in spite of this the assault was successful and Zara surrendered in late 1202. Innocent III wrote them a harsh letter and a group of them left for Rome to beg absolution. All in all, though, pragmatism had proved to be more powerful than the pope’s spiritual influence. During the winter of 1202 after the surrender of Zara, envoys from Prince Alexius, claimant to the throne of the Byzantine Empire, arrived. The promises made by the envoys were fantastic: if the crusaders helped reestablish

Alexius on the throne, from which he had been unjustly removed, he would give them 200,000 marks of silver, provisions for the army, and personally accompany them with 10,000 of his own men to take Alexandria—which was the next target of the crusade, prior to Jerusalem. Finally, he would have the Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople acknowledge papal supremacy—one of the key bones of contention between the Orthodox East and the Catholic West. The only drawback was the prospect of fighting their way into Constantinople to enthrone Alexius by force, but the great rewards promised outweighed this minor problem. With the exception of Simon de Montfort, who decided to take his knights directly to the Holy Land, all agreed to the plan. On May 24, 1203, the crusaders set sail for Constantinople, a city far more populous than any place in Europe. But the people of Constantinople did not rise up to welcome Alexius as their ruler. Alexius III, the ruler of Byzantium, proved to be an incompetent leader and in spite of far superior numbers and a superbly fortified city, and in the face of a much smaller but disciplined force of crusaders, withdrew his men behind the city walls. The people were demoralized and on July 17 he fled the city with as much money as he could. The leaders of Constantinople appealed to their sightless former emperor, Isaac Angelos, who was enthroned again, and Alexius, his son, was named coemperor. With relatively little violence the crusaders had succeeded in their mission. The emperor agreed to the terms, though he was aghast at his son’s pledge, and the crusaders were given provisions. The authority of Alexius IV, as he was now known, had been overestimated. His attempt to pay his debt was met with hostility, nor was it clear that he could order the Orthodox clergy to acknowledge Roman supremacy, or that if he did they would obey. Alexius IV and some of the crusade’s leaders set out on a tour to consolidate his authority and raise money, but relations between the crusaders and the locals soured. Alexius stopped paying the crusaders, nor could they depart for Alexandria at that time of the year. Dandolo made one last personal appeal to Alexius IV but was rebuffed. And so, on the first day of 1204 the Byzantines launched a naval offensive on the crusader fleet, sending burning ships with the wind behind them toward the crusader fleet, but the crusaders were quick to respond

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and sent out boats with grappling hooks to redirect the 17 burning ships away from their fleet and succeeded. Byzantine anger at Alexius’s feeble position resulted in a coup. He was imprisoned and the leader of the coup was crowned emperor, taking the name Alexius V. He withdrew provisions from the crusaders, and war was inevitable. On April 8, 1204, the crusaders boarded their ships and set out across the Bosporus to the Golden Horn, but hindered by a contrary wind, they were not able to engage the enemy closely and withdrew. Four days later they had better fortune and were able to breach and scale the city walls. Within the day parts of Golden Horn were in crusader control and Alexius IV, like his predecessor, fled the city. The palaces were secured by the crusader noblemen in a relatively orderly manner, but outside the sack of the city, the rapes, the looting, and the desecration of holy places, which have become so well known, took place. The Venetians were finally paid off for their immense industrial mobilization; Count Baldwin of Flanders was named emperor of the Latin Empire of Constantinople; Dandolo requested that the pope lift his vow to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, which Innocent III did not do, and Dandolo died in 1205. Urban III regarded the conquest as a miracle, but when his legate released the crusaders from their vow to reach Jerusalem—very reasonable given the fragility of the new Latin Empire—and when he learned of the sordid details of how the conquest was carried out, his happiness at the conquest vanished. Duane Alexander Miller See also Constantinople, Arab Sieges of; Crusades (Overview); Innocent III, Pope Further Reading Madden, Thomas. The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1997. Philips, Jonathan. The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople. New York: Viking, 2004.

Frederick II and the Papacy, Conflict of The life of Frederick II (1194–1250) illustrates the close, but also contentious relationship between political power

in the Latin West and a powerful medieval papacy that both legitimated and challenged that power. While the Roman Empire had at times persecuted the early Christians, its fourth-century adoption of Christianity as the official religion forced Christians to reevaluate their relationship with the empire. Particularly in the East, the emperor was viewed as the primary leader and defender of the Christian community; this “caesaropapism” placed Ceasar’s political power—the imperium—above the spiritual authority of the clergy—the sacerdotium (Eusebius of Caesarea). In the Western empire, others promoted a hierocratic vision of society, which might be termed “papocaesarism”; the bishops, rather than the emperor, remain the ultimate leaders of the Christian community on earth, even of the emperor himself (Ambrose). The Roman Empire loomed large in the imagination of Western Europe long after its 476 collapse. The desire to restore the imperium took root when the pope crowned Charlemagne in 800, ultimately resulting in the formation of the Holy Roman Empire, a collection of territories spanning Northern Italy and Germany bound together by the vassals’ personal pledge of loyalty (fealty) to their ruler. Frequently, bishops were invested with their office by political rulers in a manner that recalled the fealty oath. Zealous reformers in the reign of Pope Gregory VII (reigned 1073–1085) objected to the caesaropapist implications of this practice; instead, Gregory VII claimed full jurisdiction over Christendom, including the power to depose not only any bishop, but any secular ruler whatsoever. This papocaesarist claim that sacerdotium generally, and the papacy in particular, was (in the words of Bernard of Clairvaux) the ultimate “fountainhead of justice” led to a serious controversy with Emperor Henry IV. Henry, who had denied the pope’s right to judge prince and emperor alike, was forced to dramatic repentance, famously kneeling in the snow at Canossa. The king was now—at least in canon law—vassal of the pope. Frederick II was made king of Sicily at the age of two and orphaned at the age of four. At the encouragement of Pope Innocent III (ca. 1160–1216; reigned from 1198), his legal guardian, Frederick was crowned king of the Germans while only 17. Innocent, who had quarreled seriously with Emperor Otto IV, believed Frederick would respect the papacy’s territorial rule of central Italy, deemed

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essential to protect its independence from imperial power. Promising to lead a crusade for the Holy Land, Frederick acceded to the imperial throne at the age of 25. Faced with the continuing challenge of reasserting imperial power over the rebellious, independently minded communes of northern Italy, Frederick delayed his crusading commitment to the point that he was excommunicated by Gregory IX (ca. 1145–1241; reigned from 1227). On Palm Sunday, 1239, Gregory IX excommunicated Frederick a second time, apparently for abusive treatment of the church in Sicily; perhaps the true motive was Frederick’s intention to unite Sicily to the empire, effectively surrounding the Papal States with imperial forces (van Cleve 1972). As popes would do throughout their disputes with Frederick, Gregory commanded the popular Franciscan friars to preach disobedience toward the emperor, among other measures. The dispute escalated when Frederick sought the support of Europe’s kings by warning that a pope who could unseat an emperor could all the more easily destroy kings; this warning proved effective, but it also undermined the papal claim of a right to unseat civil authority and so demanded a strong response from Gregory. Papal legates were sent to raise money for armies to fight the emperor and to dissolve the oaths of fealty that held the empire together, resulting in social upheaval throughout Germany. When Gregory called an ecumenical council to depose the emperor, Frederick apprehended more than 100 prelates en route, subjecting them to a brutal and in some cases fatal captivity. Frederick advanced on Rome; a beleaguered Gregory died in the siege. The remaining cardinals first chose as successor Celestine IV, a moderate who reigned 18 days, and then, a year and a half later, in 1243, Innocent IV (ca. 1195–1254), whose election elated the emperor but whose background in canon law ought to have caused imperial concern. The papacy’s continued support for the rebellious cities of northern Italy as a means of ensuring the security of the Papal States and asserting papal supremacy strained relations between pope and emperor, however, and the involvement of Cardinal Rainer in Viterbo’s rebellion brought a return of open hostility. While Frederick’s desire to secure the succession of his son to the imperial throne, as well as the collapse of the Latin kingdoms in the Holy Land, compelled the emperor to seek peace,

Innocent would accept nothing short of Frederick’s total surrender. Instead, Innocent called the First Council of Lyons and deposed Frederick in 1245, again encouraging the nobility to break their fealty to Frederick and sponsoring a rival king over Germany. A failed attempt on Frederick’s life was followed by the actual death of this rival claimant. Long careful to insist on his frustration not with the church or even the papacy but rather with particular popes, Frederick, in the wake of this damaging deposition, denounced the sacerdotium as corrupt, confiscated church wealth, and allied with men like Ezzelino of Romano, who coupled ambition with such ruthlessness and moral unscrupulousness that he has been called “the scourge of God.” The resulting campaign to reassert power through brutality was derailed by the papally backed revolt of Parma. The pope interdicted the entire imperial Kingdom of Sicily, authorizing a crusade against it. The papal moment was lost, however, when the failure of French king Louis IX’s crusade in the Holy Land was popularly blamed on the papacy’s heavy investment in its continuing war on the emperor. Just as the struggle with the papacy was leaning perhaps most decisively in Frederick’s favor, he died of dysentery in December 1250, effectively marking the end of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. Those who had most enthusiastically embraced papal denunciations of Frederick as the Antichrist, however, were slow to accept that he had truly died. The bloody and costly struggle between Frederick II and the popes over the relative power of imperium or sacerdotium, marked by truly vitriolic propaganda denouncing emperor and papacy, discredited both and accelerated the divorce of the two. The dream of pan-European imperium suffered a fatal blow, and, while the popes saw the conflict as a struggle to preserve papal independence and supremacy, many saw it as an unjustified use of the papacy’s rights to tax and call crusades to settle simple territorial disputes. Andrew Benjamin Salzmann See also Holy Roman Empire; Innocent III, Pope; Papal-Imperial Conflict Further Reading Masson, Georgia. Frederick of Hohenstaufen: A Life. London: Secker and Warburg, 1957.

300  French and Indian War, Religious Dimensions of Mundy, John H. Europe in the High Middle Ages, 1150–1309. New York: Basic Books, 1973. Tierney, Brian. The Crisis of Church and State 1050–1300. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988. van Cleve, Thomas Curtis. Immutator Mundi: The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.

French and Indian War, Religious Dimensions of The French and Indian War took place between the years 1754 and 1763; it was an offshoot of the European-based Seven Years’ War. While the North American conflict was not entirely religious in nature, it was certainly a continuance of the century’s long conflicts on European geography. French settlements in the New World were Roman Catholic in belief, and for the most part British settlers were Protestants. British law at that time openly discriminated against Roman Catholics, so religious differences in the North American conflict can easily be considered a continuation of a long-standing religious conflict. French exploration of the New World dates back to 1524 when the king sent the Italian explorer Giovanni Verrazano to examine the east coast of North America. He explored from Newfoundland to the Carolinas. In 1533 Jacques Cartier explored the St. Lawrence River. In 1562, the French Huguenots established a trading post at present-day Parris Island, South Carolina, and named it Charlesfort. In 1603, Samuel de Champlain explored the Great Lakes regions, and a year later the first French fur traders arrived in Nova Scotia. The year 1617 marked the settling of Quebec and Montreal was settled in 1643. New Orleans was founded in 1718. French colonization consisted of soldiers, clergy, and traders. They did not focus on bringing families, instead opting for intermarriage with Native Americans. The French had three goals: business, finding a route to China (the much sought Northwest Passage), and conversion of the native inhabitants to Christianity, primarily Roman Catholicism. The French perspective was one of cross-country movement and good relations with the Indians. When they held

the map they looked southwest from the St. Lawrence all the way to New Orleans. They wanted to connect their holdings in the New World, and the Ohio Valley was essential to this aim. Movement in the Ohio Valley and control of the rivers there would strengthen their claim on holding all lands west of the Allegheny Mountains and essentially shut off westward expansion of the English colonies. English explorers made their first real New World landfall in Newfoundland in 1497. Henry VII sent John Cabot (Anglicized from the Italian Giovanni Cabato) to the west. Drake went to the west coast of the continent in 1572. The English made two attempts to establish holdings on Roanoke Island (off the coast of present-day North Carolina) and claimed all of North America by 1587. In 1607, Jamestown was established by Sir Walter Raleigh in Virginia. In 1620, the Pilgrims landed in Massachusetts. These settlement attempts were distinctively different. Settlements in Virginia and later Maryland and Delaware were purely economic ventures initially funded by large commercial concerns chartered by the British crown. Settlements in present-day Massachusetts were populated by Protestant settlers who left Britain seeking freedom of religion. Rhode Island grew from the Puritan-run Massachusetts when Roger Williams was banished from that colony. Connecticut was later founded to provide a buffer of sorts from Dutch encroachment in New Amsterdam (present-day New York). For the English colonists, inhabiting a thin strip of land between the Atlantic and the Blue Ridge Mountains, the Ohio Valley offered tremendous potential for growth and western expansion as their population was steadily growing. A third “nation” harbored a genuine claim to North America. Native Americans had been steadily pushed westward by the British for the previous 150 years and they felt they had legitimate claims to these lands. They lived there; raised their crops and their children there; and they saw the Ohio Valley as the last place, to stop the westward expansion of Europeans. They were willing to play the French and English off each other to protect their lands. They needed the trade in finished goods Europeans were providing, as the goods had become essential to them. But they were very concerned with the large settlements the British wanted to put down, and while they might like to trade with the French and tolerate their smaller

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developments, the French were attracting a lot of British attention the Native Americans could do without. When lieutenant governor Robert Dinwiddie (the senior crown representative) of the Royal Colony of Virginia sought to conduct a reconnaissance of the west and to ward off any French elements that might be encountered, he knew he would have to do it with local forces. Any emissary he sent would act for the English crown. A young Virginian, an adjutant in the Virginia Militia, Major George Washington, volunteered to serve. Dinwiddie dispatched Washington with a letter from his sovereign, George II, to the French “Christian King.” In November 1753, Washington was dispatched to notify the French. Washington and fellow Ohio Company surveyor Christopher Gist, a few men, and local Native Americans set out on a trip of approximately 500 miles. In the dead of winter, after seven weeks they arrived at Fort Lebouf, a French outpost just south of Lake Erie, where Washington was received as a diplomat, not as an enemy. A few days later the French give him a polite letter of response for Dinwiddie, saying basically that the Ohio country belonged to the French. Washington and Gist set off alone for the month-long trek back to Williamsburg, arriving in January 1754. They completed the epic journey of approximately 900 miles in 77 days on horseback and afoot. Two months later Washington was sent on another mission. He was dispatched to the forks of the Ohio (Allegheny, Ohio, and Monongahela Rivers) to take possession of the area. He led two companies of militia west as the advance element of a Virginia regiment. While on the way his mission changed as the Virginians had learned the French had already begun construction of forts in the Ohio River Valley. Washington advanced to Great Meadows (about 50 miles south of the French outpost, Fort Duquesne—present-day Pittsburg, Pennsylvania) and set up camp to await the arrival of the main body. On May 27, 1754, a native runner arrived with a note from the Half King of the Iroquois informing Washington that there were French forces nearby. Washington moved his force on a night march and at dawn linked up with the Half King’s tribesmen and encircled the French party, led by Ensign Joseph Coulon de Jumonville. In the attack Jumonville was wounded. The wounded French leader claimed to be on a diplomatic mission with a dispatch for any British force they

met (similar to the mission Washington had embarked on five months previously). In a sudden assault the Half King struck a fatal blow to the head of Jumonville. The Half King then dipped his hands in the exposed brains of his victim. This action and the French retaliation at Great Meadows (Fort Necessity) are considered by many historians as the opening shots of the French and Indian War. The war continued on the North American continent as a series of ground campaigns, primarily in the frontier areas between New France and the British colonies. For the most part, ground combat involved regular army forces of the French and British empires and their Native American allies in the Ohio Valley and the Ohio’s tributaries, the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers. During the entire war the British commanders disdained use of the colonial militias. Combat in North America ended in 1760 with the British victories in Quebec and Fort Niagara. The North American aspect of the French and Indian War was ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1763. As a consequence of the war, the political and social relations between the two European powers and their colonies were altered. Britain suffered tremendous financial losses because of the war, and a significant long-term outcome would arise as Britain later sought to extract financial compensation from its colonial holdings. American colonists objected to taxation ordered by an external political body. They saw themselves as Englishmen experienced in governing themselves. Resistance to these taxes forced the British Parliament to impose other sanctions on its colonies, one of which was the Quebec Act that threatened the American colonies with an influx of Catholic settlers from conquered areas of New France. The military defeat of France, the loss of the economic value of a French colony in the New World, and the weight of the war fought in North America and Europe created a devastating financial burden. The French monarchy was significantly weakened and the approaching French Revolution in 1789 ousted the “Christian King.” When Britain gained control of French Canada, more than 80,000 French-speaking Catholics fell under their control. A vast majority of them were displaced to France, New Orleans, and French colonial holdings in South America. The Native American population that fought on both sides of the conflict found no peace after the war. British colonists continued to press

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them west toward the Mississippi Valley and nearer to annihilation on the Great Plains in a hundred years’ time. Norman Hitchcock See also American Revolution, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766. New York: Knopf, 2000. Cave, Alfred A. The French and Indian War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004. Jennings, Francis. Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America. New York: Norton, 1988. Nester, William R. The First Global War: Britain, France, and the Fate of North America, 1756–1775. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000.

French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900) Initially limited to trading posts in Senegal, the French colonial presence grew in the 19th century to include Algeria and then much of northern, western, and central Africa. France first obtained trading posts on the Senegal River (1638) and in St. Louis (1659) and Gorée (1679). These were captured by Great Britain during the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793–1815), and then were restored to France under the 1815 Treaty of Paris. The French had little presence in the interior and limited themselves to exports of gum, ivory, and slaves. The latter item grew in importance with the development of France’s Caribbean colonies in the 18th century. Colonial rule changed dramatically with the advent of the Second Republic (1848). Slavery was abolished permanently, and inhabitants of Gorée and St. Louis (and later Rufisque and Dakar) were allowed to vote in French parliamentary elections. Louis Faidherbe (governor 1854–1861, 1863–1865) fought Arab warlords and expanded the French presence into the interior. In northern Africa in 1798, French forces landed in Egypt to block off British access to India. Despite initial

successes, the expedition was hampered by epidemics, military setbacks in the Levant, and Britain’s naval victory at the Battle of the Nile (1798). The French left in 1801, and Egypt later became a British protectorate (1882). France’s main remaining asset was the Suez Canal, built by Ferdinand de Lesseps during 1859–1869 and owned by a majority-French company until 1956. Algeria (nominally a province of the Ottoman Empire) was one of the infamous Barbary States that preyed on Mediterranean shipping, but the French invasion of Algeria was initially motivated by more prosaic events. A financial dispute led to a diplomatic incident with the dey (governor) of Algiers, leading to a French blockade of the city (1827). French king Charles X, afraid of the political repercussions of the ineffective standoff, sent French troops to occupy Algiers in 1830. His successor Louis-Philippe fought the Abd ElKader Rebellion and occupied all of Algeria (1830–1847). Settlers (the pieds noirs) came from France, Italy, Malta, and Spain and acquired vast estates where they produced tobacco, wine, and grain. Military rule was phased out as the European population increased, and three départements (administrative units under civilian rule) were created in 1848. Jews, along with a few Muslims who had forsaken some tenets of Islam (the évolués), were granted full French citizenship, but most Muslims complained of losing their lands and of being denied equal rights. France battled rival Italian, Spanish, and German ambitions to establish a protectorate over Tunisia (1881) and most of Morocco (1911). Morocco was pacified under the governorship of Louis Lyautey (1912–1916, 1917–1925). In sub-Saharan Africa, French colonies were long limited to the coast and the Indian Ocean islands of Réunion (1664), Mauritius (1718), and Comoro (1841). The French presence grew considerably, however, when the Berlin Conference (1884–1885) granted France vast tracts of Africa. The Afrique Occidentale Française (French West Africa, AOF) was created in 1895 and headquartered in St. Louis and then Dakar. The federation included Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Dahomey (Benin), Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) in addition to Senegal. In central Africa, Savorgnan de Brazza (1852– 1905) explored Gabon and the Congo (1874–1875) and founded Brazzaville (1880). Thanks to his efforts, the

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Afrique Equatoriale Française (French Equatorial Africa, AEF) was created in 1910 and headquartered in Brazzaville. It included Chad, the French Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Gabon, and Ubangi-Shari (Central African Republic). France established a protectorate in Djibouti (1885), conquered Madagascar (1895–1896), and gave up its ambitions in Sudan after the Fashoda Crisis (1898). France ceded part of Cameroon to Germany in 1911 in exchange for Morocco, then regained the entire colony at the Treaty of Versailles (1919), along with Togo. Appraisals of the French presence in Africa vary considerably. Critics view French colonial rule as an example of naked greed, marked by land appropriations, racial discrimination, theft of local resources, forced labor, and disregard for local customs. Others point to France’s civilizing mission (mission civilisatrice), the creation of infrastructures, the eradication of slavery, health and education projects, and the work of philanthropists such as Albert Schweitzer in Gabon (1875–1965). Philippe R. Girard See also Algeria, French Conquest of; Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Further Reading Conklin, Alice. Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000. Demy, Timothy J., and Jeffrey M. Shaw, eds. “Bound to the Coast of Africa”—The 1817 Cruise of the Brig Hiram from the Journal of Edward Watson. Silverton, OR: Stone Tower Books, 2016. Klein, Martin, ed. Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Manning, Patrick. Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 1880–1995. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pyenson, Lewis. Civilizing Mission: Exact Sciences and French Overseas Expansion, 1830–1940. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993.

French Wars of Religion (1562–1598) The French religious wars occurred during the second half of the 16th century and had a profound effect on

subsequent French, and European, history. The wars that were formally declared took place between 1562 and 1563 (settled by the Peace of Amboise), 1567–1568 (Longjumeau), 1568–1570 (Saint-Germain), 1572–1573 (La Rochelle), 1574–1576 (Monsieur), 1577 (Bergerac), 1580 (Fleix), and 1586–1598 (Nantes).

Background

Though often referred to as the French “Wars of Religion,” the causes of this series of military conflicts is a topic of serious scholarly discussion, debate, and disagreement, with some scholars highlighting the significance of secular matters, such as class, social tensions, and economic factors. That being said, to speak to the issues ordinarily pointed to as religiously associated causes is, without any dispute, to speak to the rise of the French Reformed church within the country. The growth of the Églises Réformées de France began in the early 1500s and gained momentum in the 1530s and 1540s with assistance from a range of various cities, including Strasbourg and Geneva. After 1555, its expansion was significantly helped by Geneva. In 1556, John Calvin (1509–1564) and the Venerable Company of Pastors began training and sending ministers into France to serve Huguenot congregations. These ministers, the vast majority of whom were French refugees who had been persuaded to return to France, were trained by Calvin and adopted his uncompromising position regarding the unrivaled wickedness of the Roman Catholic mass, which was “idolatry.” Tensions between these Calvinist churches and the Catholic population of France increased in line with the growth of the former. Heresy within a country’s borders was, during this time, believed to be so serious as to threaten that country with divine wrath, if the heretics were not eradicated. This belief meant that Catholics of all social classes reviled the “Lutherans” (as they were often called), viewing them as a grave menace to the populace. Not surprisingly, this led to skirmishes, riots, iconoclastic acts, and revolts throughout the country, wherever the two groups were in contact with each other. These conflicts increased during the 1550s and continued to occur between the officially declared wars. Nor was this conflict of significance only to the French people. In many ways, in fact, France became a kind of flashpoint for the pan-European

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battle between Catholics and Protestants, drawing in fighters from England, Scotland, Spain, Germany, the Swiss territories, and other areas. A myriad of events helped push France further toward war during the 1540s, 1550s, and 1560s, but one of the more significance was the death of King Henry II in 1559, which was the result of a freak jousting accident. He was succeeded by Francis II, whose reign was short (1559– 1560). Francis II passed away a little more than a year after Henry II and was followed by the even younger Charles IX (whose reign lasted longer, 1560–1574). Henry II’s bereaved wife, Catherine de Medici, became regent for her sons, but her husband’s death in 1559 also opened the door for the house of Guise, since Francis II would marry Mary Stuart (Mary, Queen of Scots). Accordingly, the Guises were able to wield greater influence over the young king Francis II’s decisions. Being staunch supporters of Catholicism, this led to a hardening of attitudes toward the Huguenots in the royal decisions that were issued and, to some extent, among the population more generally. Indeed, the Catholic League—a group of Catholic noblemen belligerent in their defense of Catholicism within France and vigorous opponents of the Huguenots—would be formed beginning around this time and was headed by one of the Guises. It was also around the late 1550s that Protestants were beginning to devise plots to deal with a situation which, in the eyes of many of these evangelicals, was only getting worse. The French Catholic kings had traditionally seen themselves as especially blessed by God and in fact claimed for themselves the title of “Most Christian King.” France, furthermore, was conceived of as possessing special grace from God and being the most Christian nation. While these beliefs were held and acted upon differently by different monarchs and indeed by the same monarch at different periods in his reign, this collection of facts tended to mean that the Huguenots were rarely given rights related to freedom of worship, as this would amount to (or at least be perceived as) a derogation of the king’s duty. This changed somewhat as more and more of the French nobility converted to Calvinism or became increasingly sympathetic toward it (a huge number of the nobility, approximately one-third, fell into this category by the early 1560s). It also changed because Catherine de Medici, along

with individuals such as her chancellor, Michel de l’Hôpital, began for a variety of reasons to assume a more compromising attitude toward the Calvinist churches. Nonetheless, by the late 1550s, many Protestant-minded preachers and polemicists were openly calling for French evangelicals to rise up and attempt to topple the Catholic monarch by force. Accordingly, when Francis II took the throne in late 1559 and the Guises began to wield greater influence with him, even more moderate Huguenots began to feel that radical measures would be necessary if France were ever to escape from the grip of idolatrous tyrants. Among those included in this number, one finds Gaspard de Coligny, admiral of France, and members of the house of Bourbon, in particular Antoine, the king of Navarre, and his brother Louis of Condé. Antoine proved unreliable in terms of taking any leading role to push forward the Huguenot resistance. His brother was a different prospect. Louis of Condé was a devoted adherent of Calvinism and eventually would be profoundly influential in the first of the wars, beginning in 1562. Yet Antoine and Louis were both involved in various plots at this time. The best known of these was the so-called Conspiracy of Amboise of March 15, 1560, which was poorly conceived, ultimately a disaster, and led to the imprisonment of Louis of Condé and to considerable bloodshed.

Early Wars, 1560s

The death of Francis II in the winter of 1560, though curbing some of the authority wielded by the Guises, did little to quell tensions between Catholics and Protestants. Catherine (who was now regent for her son Charles IX) called the ill-fated Colloquy of Poissy, which met in September and into October of 1561. The resulting edict of toleration that was issued in January 1562 was not well received by the French population and seems to have done almost nothing to slow France’s descent into war. The Huguenots had maintained standing militias in various parts of the country since 1558, and these were increased and made more sophisticated as war became increasingly likely. In fact, as they entered the 1560s, Calvinists were becoming more aggressive in proclaiming their faith and more militant in their attempts to spread it—though the iconoclasm and rioting that many of the Huguenots seemed intent upon employing was criticized by the likes of John Calvin.

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Entering 1562, tensions continued high and were raised to a boiling point with the massacre, by members of the Catholic League, of Huguenot worshipers whom they found meeting for a church service. The massacre occurred in the town of Vassy and prompted a spirited response by the Huguenots when Louis of Condé marshaled troops in Orléans. During the military conflict, the Huguenots established an alliance with the English. They also received aid from a variety of other quarters, with John Calvin laboring vigorously to secure funds for the Huguenots. Mercenaries were also sought. During this war Condé was captured and Antoine of Navarre was killed, as was Francis of Guise. The Peace of Amboise, which was signed on March 19, 1563, by Catherine, acting as regent for her son, Charles IX, ended the first war. It granted concessions in the form of degrees of freedom of worship to the Reformed churches, but was harshly criticized by influential members of their community. In fact, the concessions were arguably less generous than those offered after the Colloquy of Poissy. The dissatisfaction with these reforms and the continued hostility between Catholics and Calvinists, again fueled, of course, by a host of issues related to social standing and the like, boiled over into a second war that commenced in 1567. It was prompted by a failed attempt by the Huguenots to take control of the court at Meaux. This attempt was initiated as a result of the perceived danger of the Spanish and French monarchs striving to do away with heresy residing in their countries. Major conflicts in this second war include the battle of Saint-Denis. As was becoming typical of these decades in France, a half-year of peace punctuated another outbreak of armed conflict in 1568, this time associated with an attempt by Catholics to arrest the leaders of the Huguenot party. The following engagement witnessed the death of Louis of Condé, who was killed during the battle of Jarnac. As one examines this initial trio of contests, one sees that the early frontmen—Antoine of Navarre and Louis I of Condé, for the Huguenots, and Francis of Guise on the Catholic side—had all perished. Some of those intimately involved with the Huguenots were also dead. John Calvin passed away in 1564. Guillaume Farel was dead a year later. Pierre Viret would die soon (in 1571). Charles IX was still king of France, but much had changed. Yet perhaps more momentous was the change that had been witnessed intellectually and spiritually.

Later Wars, 1570s–1590s

To try to put an end to the ongoing Wars of Religion, the French king and his government had invited leaders of Catholic and Huguenot factions to Paris with the aim of working toward a truce to these wars that would bring lasting peace. The immediate circumstance calling them to Paris was the celebration of a royal wedding between Protestant and Catholic. Henry, King of Navarre, was to marry Marguerite of Valois, who was Charles IX’s sister. Although peace was ostensibly being pursued by both sides during this time, it would be impossible to say that this was the ardent desire of the populace as a whole. By and large the French population, both Catholic and evangelical, believed that the presence of “heretics” within the country threatened it with divine wrath and had already caused natural disasters, disease, and other portends of God’s displeasure. It was this belief, as scholars like Denis Crouzet have demonstrated, that fueled a near-apocalyptic sense of expectation and urgency with respect to the need to eradicate heresy. It was, thus, a matter of not only religious but also political importance that the apostate be removed from French lands and the land be purified. It was this belief that, by the 1550s, led to tensions between the Calvinists and Catholics, which escalated into skirmishes, iconoclastic acts, and eventually the three wars that were punctuated with only brief periods of peace. Accordingly, though a royal wedding between Catholic and Protestant may appear to those of us living in the 21st century to have been ideal, for many at that time, it was perceived to be the worst thing that could possibly happen to France. Analysis of public opinion at this time shows that the royal aspirations of Catherine and Charles IX to seek to compromise and labor for a truce with the Huguenots was quite unpopular, and not only among those aligned with more radical groups like the Catholic League but with the population more broadly. Similarly, on the Huguenot side, those aligned with the teachings of John Calvin were wholly opposed to any concessionary tactics with respect to the Catholics, such as those propounded by the so-called Nicodemites (whom Calvin plainly abhorred and lumped together as enemies of God’s truth). During the wedding festivities celebrating the uniting of the Bourbon and Valois houses, on August 24, the

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massacre began, commencing with the killing of Admiral Gaspard de Coligny and other Huguenot leaders. There is uncertainty about the precise details but it appears that these killings were ordered in Charles IX’s name due to a variety of concerns and aspirations, some of which related to the possibility of war with Spain and others concerning domestic affairs and issues related to the desire to please ardent Catholics. The aforementioned Duke of Guise was intimately involved in these initial actions, but perhaps could not have foreseen the widespread bloodshed that would be unleashed by them, as a general massacre by Catholics of thousands of Protestants followed the killings of the Huguenot leaders. While in some ways this fit into the same kinds of skirmishes that had been occurring throughout France since the late 1550s, in other ways it far eclipsed them. Large groups of Catholics went on killing sprees, which spread to many other French provincial cities, often the result of groups being organized and directed by civic authorities. Evangelicals were killed in their thousands during the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, which went on for several weeks. Though this cannot help but shock the modern reader and was a shock to some in this period, it came as little surprise to others. John Calvin, one of the most influential theologians and supporter of the Huguenot cause, had written as early as 1559 in a letter to Heinrich Bullinger that the bloodshed would be great if, and when, France descended into war. Many of those Protestants who were not killed in the massacre either fled to other parts of Europe (Switzerland, England, etc.) or converted instantly to Catholicism. This massacre did not end the wars, however. Some of the older leaders had survived and new leaders arose among the French Protestants. Accordingly, the Huguenots labored to fight against the king’s armies in a number of different cities. Receiving financial and military assistance from various sources, most notably England and Germany, they were strengthened and fought vigorously against the Catholic forces. They also sought to justify their efforts theologically and legally by reference to the notion of the popular (or inferior or lesser) magistrates, who, the Huguenots argued, possessed the legitimate right, even duty, before God to rise up against a tyrant to save the people from him. While some of the more influential works setting out such thinking were written at this time—

including François Hotman’s Francogallia, Theodore Beza’s Du droit des magistrats, and the anonymous Vindiciae contra tyrannos—the idea had a discernible history. One can find discussions of the notion of the popular magistrate in the writings of Lutheran theologians, as well as Reformed thinkers like John Calvin and Peter Martyr Vermigli. Indeed, Calvin argues in his Institutio Christianae Religionis that the idea of a popular magistrate existed in ancient governments and seems, as well, to be represented in the estates and parliaments existing in European countries in his own day. Accordingly, he seems to align the notion with the French “princes of the blood royal.” A peace for the war was negotiated near La Rochelle in 1573. Yet, once again, this did not signal a lasting settlement to hostilities. The intense concern over heresy in the country continued with people of all classes, among both Protestants and Catholics. Additionally, now there were individuals who had converted back to Catholicism as a way to avoid death during the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre who, in later years, became disaffected with the faith to which they had returned. These malcontents, as they were called, included important nobles like the young Bourbon princes, Henry of Navarre and Henry I of Condé. Individuals like these, with their power and connections to the throne, began plotting against it. This led, invariably, to leaks, arrests, more plots, and eventually again to war. A number of momentous events accompanied the declaring of a new war. King Charles IX died in May 1574 and was succeeded by King Henry III, who was less interested in advancing Catholic or Protestant interests and more interested in advancing the political power of France. Also the first national Catholic (or Holy) League was formed. Though there had been regional confraternities that had existed for more than a decade, the national league was formed through the efforts and support of Henry, the Duke of Guise. The origins of the movement can be traced to the profound frustration felt by Catholic noblemen over the crown’s unwillingness to combat heresy within the country with sufficient vigor and commitment. The Peace of Monsieur was promulgated on May 6, 1576, by King Henry III, due in part to the besieging of Paris by Protestant armies, in response to which the Catholic League claimed that Henry III’s trusted advisers and friends had perverted his authority and, in so doing, been

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disloyal to the Catholic Church in the country. They in turn pressured Henry III to commence another war against the Huguenots, which was started and settled in 1577. There would not be another declared war until 1577. Following this, there would be a series of wars between 1586 and 1598 prior to the Edict of Nantes. During this period fascinating and momentous events would occur in France, affecting not only the various war efforts but also the broader history (political, intellectual, religious, and cultural) of France. The long series of brutal and exhausting wars would leave an enormous scar in the French consciousness. One can see this, for instance, in the Essais of Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), who adopted Pyrrhonean scepticism in part, it would seem, due to his frustration over the vehemence with which religious claims to truth were asserted and adhered to by both sides in the conflict. Montaigne’s impact would be felt throughout France, Europe, and the New World. Another impact of these conflicts appears in the shifting of intellectual allegiances with the shifting fortunes of the monarchy. So, whereas they were in the position of opposing the throne, French Huguenots wrote strongly against the notion of the king’s absolute power, asserting the divine appointment of popular magistrates whose duty was to protect the people from a tyrannical king. But, once France entered the 1580s, the Huguenots found their fortunes had changed. Through a variety of circumstances, including the death, in 1584, of the Duke of Anjou, who was at that time the presumptive heir to the French throne, the Calvinist prince Henry of Navarre became the heir apparent, since King Henry III had no son. With this change in fortunes, the Huguenots began to write in strong support of dynastic monarchy and essentially abandon or at least markedly downplay any justification for the notion of resistance to God-appointed kingly authority. Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, for example, wrote works on the divine right of kings, while François Hotman would rework his important Francogallia, initially written in the wake of the massacre of Protestants by the French king. Likewise, Catholic authors would begin to adopt the very arguments for resistance that previously had been asserted and defended by their Protestant opponents. Through the Edict of Nantes, which had been pushed for and set into law by Henry IV in 1598, a weak truce was

Edict of Nantes (1598)

Issued by Henry IV of France in 1598, the Edict of Nantes granted the Huguenots rights and promoted civil unity. Huguenots, French Calvinist Protestants, were seen as divisive heretics in this Roman Catholic country. For the Huguenots, Henry IV thought it advantageous to end French religious wars and open the opportunity for tolerance and secularism by expanding freedom of conscience in France. Having espoused Protestantism prior to 1593, Henry IV converted to Catholicism as a political move to rule France. The Edict of Nantes consisted of four basic texts with 92 articles and 56 “particular” articles granting Protestants rights, privileges, and safe havens rights and obligations. The final two parts were “brevets” pertaining to pastoral and military clauses. Where the religion of the ruler had been the religion of the people and state (cuius regio, eius religio), the Edict of Nantes set a precedent for people to choose their faith of practice. Even though the edict reaffirmed Roman Catholicism as the official religion of France, Pope Clement VIII was outraged. Protestants still had to pay the required tithe, abide by Catholic marriage restrictions, and respect religious holidays. After the assassination of Henry IV in 1610, the edict began to weaken along with Protestant uprisings. In 1629, King Louis XIII entirely withdrew the “brevets” following the Siege of La Rochelle. The remainder of the edict was unaltered until King Louis XIV rescinded it in 1685 and made Protestantism illegal with the Edict of Fontainebleau or “the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.” The revocation sent more than 400,000 French citizens to other regions, depleting the country of its most skilled and industrious workers. Religious freedom and civil rights were not restored to Protestants until the issuance of Louis XVI’s Edict of Versailles in 1787. Thomas E. Creely called between Catholics and Protestants. The Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre had left French Protestantism profoundly weakened, and yet here in 1598 they might have acquired something that they never imagined possible, namely, a kind of toleration for their movement. There

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was, at the time, no guarantee that this edict would stop the bloodshed for any longer than any of the other peace treatises had. It brought the so-called Wars of Religion to a close, but Henry had to pressure the French Parliament to pass it. Tensions continued between the two groups. King Henry IV was assassinated by a Catholic who believed that the king’s support of the edict marked a betrayal of the Catholic faith of France. One way that the French Wars of Religion can be interpreted is by considering the handling of major theological, political and social issues and questions. Much thought was given, for instance, to political theory, specifically the question of popular resistance against a civil magistrate. Common in the early part of the 16th century was the claim that a group who rose up against the king of a realm was not opposing the king per se but rather evil counselors who had appropriated the authority of the king. Thus they sought to rescue the king from these counselors. This line of thinking was challenged by thinking that claimed that the king functioned according to the terms of a covenant or contract, the stipulations of which he could violate, abrogating his authority. Interestingly, one can find the same positions set out by both Catholic and Huguenot authors. This is due, in large part, to the fact that as these wars progressed, opposition to the crown shifted from the Huguenots (who opposed French Catholic kings) to the Catholics, who took on the role of opposition once Henry III began his reign in May 1573. Writings that advanced such ideas arose with particular frequency after the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of August 24, 1572, when a number of major tomes were produced, such as François Hotman’s Francogallia (1573), Theodore Beza’s De Jure Magistratum (1574), and the pseudonymous Vindiciae contra tyrannos (1579)—men whose names are associated with the group were sometimes called Monarchomachs. Many of these works were focused on the specific issue of the massacre and claimed that it was premeditated. But whether they did or not, a number of these authors benefited from earlier thinking on the topic by those supportive of the Huguenot cause. John Calvin, in particular, wrote not only in his Institutio Christianae Religionis but also in commentaries, sermons, and lectures on the duties of government, its

rights and responsibilities, and on the citizens’ relationship with the civil magistrate. The Scot John Knox also wrote on the topic. Of import, as well, were Lutherans defending the town of Magdeburg and their refusal to allow the emperor, Charles V, to impose the Augsburg Interim upon the town. Thus, the impact of these wars on French, European, and, indeed, Western thought is apparent. Jon Balserak See also Beza, Theodore; Calvin, John; Huguenots; Knox, John; Wars of the Reformation; Primary Documents: Excerpt from Jacques-Auguste de Thou’s Account of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day in Paris (1572); Granting Religious Toleration to Huguenots: Henri IV’s Edict of Nantes (1598); Withdrawing Religious Toleration for Huguenots: Louis XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) Further Reading Balserak, Jon. John Calvin as Sixteenth-Century Prophet. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Baumgartner, Frederic J. Change and Continuity in the French Episcopate: The Bishops and the Wars of Religion, 1547–1610. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986. Benedict, Philip. Rouen during the Wars of Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Crouzet, Denis. Les Guerriers de Dieu. 2 vols. Paris: Seyssel, 1990. Diefendorf, Barbara B. Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Greengrass, Mark. France in the Age of Henry IV. London: Longman, 1986. Holt, Mack P. The Duke of Anjou and the Politique Struggle during the Wars of Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Holt, Mack P. The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Kingdon, Robert. Geneva and the Coming Wars of Religion in France, 1555–1563. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1956. Knecht, Robert. The French Wars of Religion 1559–1598, New York: Longman, 1996. Wood, James. The King’s Army: Warfare, Soldiers and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1562–76, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Yardeni, Myriam. La conscience nationale en France pendant les guerres de religion. Paris and Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1971.

G Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948)

individual to endure suffering for what he knew to be morally right” (James 1997, 468). His approach, often termed “passive resistance,” was not passive, but emphasized the superiority of moral force in opposing overwhelming governmental power. Returning to India in 1914, he adapted satyagraha to India’s situation where, after many years of nonviolent conflict with British authorities, his efforts resulted in the establishment of an independent Indian state in 1947. Due to his commitment to the Hindu principle of ahimsa (do no harm or injury to any living thing), Gandhi believed that war and participation in war is immoral. Yet he also believed that the citizens of a nation or, in his case, of the British Empire, must support their government in times of war as a duty of citizenship. These conflicting responsibilities resulted in his creation and leadership of an all-Indian volunteer ambulance corps to support British efforts in South Africa during the Boer War (1899–1902) and the Zulu Uprising (1906), to provide medical support to the fallen and wounded. Further complicating the picture is the fact that Gandhi assisted the British Raj of India in its efforts to recruit Indians to fight in the trenches of Europe during the First World War. Later, during the Second World War, he advised the British to practice nonviolence and to surrender to the Fascists of Germany and Italy. He did not support the Allied war effort, in part

Mahatma Gandhi (born Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi) is known as one of the most influential figures and advocates of nonviolence of the 20th century. His main political accomplishment was swarag, the effort to win Indian independence from Great Britain. He did so through satyagraha (truth and firmness), a nonviolent approach that emphasized the moral superiority of truth in confronting the might of the British Empire. However, he did not completely eschew violence and stated: “I do believe that when there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence. . . . But I believe that non-violence is infinitely superior to violence. . . . Let me not be misunderstood. Strength does not come from physical capacity. It comes from an indomitable will” (Nehru 1941, 81). Born in British India in 1869, Gandhi was educated in both India and England, obtaining his education as a lawyer at University College, London from 1888 to 1891. After graduation, he returned to India where he practiced law, with mixed results. Later, Gandhi was hired to practice law in South Africa where he resided from 1893 to 1914. In South Africa, he experienced the racial discrimination that was common in the British Empire and established a nonviolent resistance movement that mobilized Indians residing there to fight for their civil rights. He called this movement satyagraha, “a quality of soul which enabled an 309

310  Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948)

In this 1931 photo, Mahatma Gandhi is seen sitting at his spinning wheel aboard the S.S. Rajputna, enroute to London, England. Gandhi was the leader of the independence movement in India during the era of British rule and inspired similar civil rights movements throughout the world, primarily through his dedication to nonviolent resistance. (Library of Congress)

because of his desire for Indian independence from the British. Gandhi’s commitment to ahimsa is often questioned as a result of these seemingly conflicting actions. Gandhi recognized the difficulty of his position. He believed that war is never consistent with ahimsa, is immoral, and that all participants in war are “guilty of war.” Yet he also held a high view of a citizen’s obligations to his or her government. He came to understand that commitment to truth does not always provide a clear path, but that the “votary of truth is obliged to grope in the dark” (Gandhi 1993, 185). His conscience was troubled by his participation in war, but he found that it was eased by his ministry to the wounded and dead and by the fact that, during the Zulu

Uprising, he and his ambulance corps cared for both Zulu and British combatants. Gandhi was assassinated January 30, 1948, at New Delhi by a Hindu nationalist who opposed Gandhi’s support for both Muslim and Hindu political interests in the fledgling Indian state. Today, he is regarded as one of the founding fathers of democratic India. He was considered multiple times for the Nobel Peace Prize. He also served as an inspiration to such notable figures as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (1929–1968) and Nelson Mandela (1918–2013) in their civil rights efforts in the United States and South Africa, respectively. Dayne E. Nix

Gaza War (2006)  311 See also Ahimsa; Hinduism and War Further Reading Gandhi, Mahatma. The Story of My Experiments with Truth. Translated by Mahadev Desai. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993. James, Lawrence. Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997. Nehru, Jawaharlal. Toward Freedom: The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru. New York: John Day, 1941. Nussbaum, Martha C. The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence, and India’s Future. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007.

Gaza War (2006) The Gaza War was a large-scale, Israeli-launched invasion of the Gaza Strip that began on June 27, 2006, in response to attacks allegedly by Hamas that killed two Israeli soldiers and captured Israel Defense Forces (IDF) corporal Gilad Shalit. This conflict is also known under the Israeli military designation “Operation Summer Rains.” The stated Israeli intention was to secure the release of the captive soldier and to stop the firing of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory. Many Palestinians, however, believe that the Israeli operation was launched in an attempt to topple the Hamas-led government of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Israel carried out strikes against militant Palestinian groups, destroyed infrastructure that the groups used to support their actions, and applied political pressure on the Hamas-led government. Operation Summer Rains began on June 27 with the Israeli bombing of three bridges and a power plant as Israeli ground troops moved into the Gaza Strip. Also, Israeli fighter jets flew over the summer residence of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad as a warning against his continued support of Hamas and Hezbollah. The following day, Israeli troops entered the Gaza Strip with the aim of securing and destroying Qassam rocket sites. Israeli warships also shelled suspected rocket sites from offshore. Israeli air strikes mainly targeted Hamas training camps and arms caches. Israeli aircraft also dropped thousands of leaflets warning Palestinian civilians to leave their homes in areas

of northern Gaza from which it claimed Qassam rockets were being fired. During the operation, Israeli forces arrested a number of members of the Hamas leadership as well as members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. Unsurprisingly, this led to charges by many Palestinians, and especially those in Hamas, that Israel was trying to oust the Hamas government that had been democratically elected in January 2006. The operation also destroyed the only power plant in the Gaza Strip, leaving most of the territory without electricity during the brutally hot days of summer. Most Palestinians were also left with no running potable water and no facilities for sanitation and waste processing. This made it difficult for businesses, hospitals, and basic services to function. In addition to the economic consequences of the operation, a building humanitarian crisis in Gaza caught the attention of various international organizations, including the United Nations (UN). Indeed, UN officials decried the toll that the conflict was taking on civilians and urged both sides to resolve their differences peacefully. By most counts, the majority of Palestinians killed in the Israeli operations in Gaza were militants. However, many civilians also died in the attacks. There was never any conclusive settlement to the crisis, and Gilad Shalit was not returned to Israel. Operation Summer Rains was slowed through a truce agreement between Israel and militant Palestinian organizations on November 26, 2006, although rockets continued to fly from Gaza to Israel through December. Precise casualty figures are difficult to determine, but it is safe to conclude that the majority of casualties occurred among Palestinians. Daniel Kuthy See also Hamas; Hybrid War of the Twenty-First Century, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Efrat, Elisha. The West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Geography of Occupation and Disengagement. New York: Routledge, 2006. Gelvin, James L. The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Hroub, Khaled. Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2006.

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German Peasants’  War (1524–1525) The German Peasants’ War was the largest popular insurrection in European history prior to the French Revolution of 1789. About 300,000 peasants and other commoners were enlisted at the height of the rebellion in April, May, and June 1525. The rebellion arose after the onset of the Protestant Reformation in the politically fragmented German-speaking areas of central Europe, including Upper Swabia, Thuringia, and Franconia (the southwestern part of what is now Germany). It then spread quickly to neighboring regions. The war consisted of a series of revolts inspired by both religious and economic motivations. While some Protestant leaders supported the cause of the peasants, the entire uprising was generally sharply anticlerical. For a time it looked as though the Holy Roman Empire as well as its traditional ecclesiastical Roman Catholic traditions might be destroyed, but the rebellion ultimately failed to bring about the change the peasantry had hoped, as what they had in numbers they lacked in military experience. The aristocracy, which made use of their wealth and well-equipped armies, violently opposed the uprising, slaughtering about one-third of the armed peasants and farmers and fining the survivors. There is much debate as to what degree the Protestant Reformation, a Christian evangelical reform movement sparked in 1517 by Martin Luther, served as a catalyst for the German Peasants’ War. Old sociopolitical tensions were a major driver behind the rebellion, but the revolt certainly incorporated ideals and rhetoric from the Reformation as well. Luther rejected the spiritual and temporal authority of the Roman Church, which he referred to as the “whore of Babylon.” Rather than accepting the traditional Roman Catholic teaching that one was saved by a combination of faith and meritorious works, Luther taught that an individual was redeemed sola fide (“by faith alone”), meaning that for salvation one must rely solely on faith in the redemptive power of Christ. In addition to sola fide, Luther developed a form of Christian egalitarianism, commonly referred to as the priesthood of all believers. He maintained that all Christians were spiritually equal, and he therefore rejected the clergy’s exaltation of themselves over the laity, their immunity from secular laws, and their claim to have special spiritual capabilities. Luther

articulated his doctrine of the priesthood of all believers in three popular tracts of 1520: “To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation,” “The Freedom of a Christian,” and “On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church,” all three of which called for spiritual liberty. The doctrine of the priesthood of all believers crumbled the theological basis by which European society functioned. In place of human authority, Luther taught that the sole authority in matters of faith was the Bible, and sola scriptura, meaning “by scripture alone,” became another strong principle of the Protestant Reformation. As a result the laity or the “common man” became exalted. Although not intended as such, the liberty that Luther advocated could easily be interpreted in a radicalizing social sense. Although Luther sharply contested this view, the Roman Catholic Church argued that Luther’s new theological teachings and his rejection of the spiritual authority of the church brought on the Peasants’ War. In their view, because many church leaders were simultaneously secular leaders, his heretical theological teaching against church leaders inspired the peasants to reject their secular leadership as well, leading to widespread insurrection and chaos. The peasants, constituting the vast majority of the population, received the Reformation message mostly through oral means and visual propaganda. They rejoiced in the personal application of sola fide, the priesthood of all believers, and sola scriptura, which they interpreted according to their own needs. The impact of the Reformation principles heightened the peasants’ desire for social and political reforms and led them to believe that their cause had divine support. As the ideals of the Reformation were fused with existing economic and political grievances, the peasantry in both the countryside and the cities began to engage in a number of rebellious acts in the spring of 1524, with the revolt receiving the most support in areas where hostility to merchant-capitalists was high. Some of the insurgents were moderate with their actions, participating in large peasant rallies and marching around the territories to demand rectification of the grievances they put forward in the form of a number of manifestos. These manifestos expressed their wish for access to land, their hope for stronger territorial government, and their desire that their relationship with the lords not be based on monetary interests but on Christian principles. One of the most influ-

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ential and best known manifestos, the Twelve Articles of the Upper Swabian Peasants, expressed the peasants’ desire to choose their own pastors (who should preach “the holy gospel to us purely and clearly”), to determine where their tithe would be distributed (“it should be given to God and distributed to his people”), to be released from serfdom (which was “deplorable since Christ redeemed us all with the shedding of his precious blood”), and to have the right to fish and hunt (for “when the Lord God created man, he gave him dominion over all animals, birds in the air, and fish in the water”), among other requests. Each article provided biblical citations to prove that the Word of God supported the peasants’ articles. These Twelve Articles were modified variously to suit local conditions. But sometimes violence ensued. With their imposing numbers and strong anticlericalism and iconoclasm, some peasants attacked castles, monasteries, churches, and wine cellars. Icons, written records of obligations and dues, and relics were also targets of destruction. Nonreforming clergy were hit with stones and mud. Some bands of peasants, such as the “Bright Band” (in German, Heller Haufen), went even further. The Bright Band of Peasants captured the castle of Weinsberg, took the Count of Hefenstein and about 70 other nobles, and made them run the gantlet of pikes, where they died horribly violent deaths. The Weinsberg Masssacre, as it became known, was too much for many peasant leaders of other bands and especially for Martin Luther. Just weeks before the massacre, Luther had taken an evenhanded view of the rebellion in his Admonition to Peace: A Reply to the Twelve Articles (April 1525), where he urged the landlords to treat their peasants more humanely. In response to the massacre, however, Luther penned the passionate Against the Murderous and Thieving Hordes of Peasants (May 1525). Appalled by the excesses of peasant violence, Luther called on the princes to “use the sword with a good conscience against the peasants” and articulated his hope that the rebellious peasants would have “neither fortune nor success.” Luther argued that violent uprisings against divinely ordained authorities are never justified, and he urged the people to submit to temporal leadership. The revolt received the blessing of popular Reformation leaders such as the Swiss reformer Huldrych Zwingli and in Thuringia, the radical Anabaptist leader Thomas Münster. Zwingli developed a social reform program in the

Swiss city of Zurich articulated in his Sixty-Seven Articles (1523) where he called for secular authority to authorize religious changes but also to be subject to the community. If the community felt their leadership was not providing proper Christian leadership, Zwingli held that the leadership should be removed. But Münster went further. Inspired by urgent eschatological expectations, he led the radical wing of the peasant revolt, denouncing the veneration of all images and social injustices and demanding a complete transformation of society, which he said should happen by “the sword” if necessary. Münster’s goals found an organizational framework in his “Christian League,” which had its strongest presence in Muhlhausen in 1525. The league embodied his ideals that faithful Christians should destroy tyranny. Münster challenged the lords to either join the commoners’ cause, which he fully believed was God’s cause, or be banished. In addition to Protestant theologians, a few unhappy nobles sympathetic to the Reformation, such as Florian Geyer and Götz von Berlichingen, gave aid. However, Luther’s condemnation of the rebellious peasants contributed to their eventual defeat. The rebel armies occasionally were victorious in battle—for example, at Herrenberg in Württemberg and at Schladming in Styria—but winning was rare. It is estimated that 3,000 peasants lost their lives at the famous battle of Frankenhausen (May 15, 1525) alone, where the peasants eventually panicked and fled for the city and where Münster was arrested and eventually executed. The rulers, who were much more skilled in war, brutally suppressed the rebellion, making the violence of the peasants look pale in comparison. Lacking unity and strong leadership, the peasant forces were crushed in 1525 largely by the formidable army of the Swabian League, which had been released from serving in Italy after Charles V won a major victory against the French at the Battle of Pavia. In the end, the peasants won few concessions, and those surviving the war often lived with increased restrictions and higher taxes. However, the peasant rebels were able to arouse fear in secular leaders and in the Roman Catholic Church, and inside the minority communities of Anabaptist dissenters, the German commoners’ effort to influence public life with their understanding of the communal principles of the Reformation survived. Ashlee R. Quosigk

314  Ghost Dance Movement See also Holy Roman Empire; Luther, Martin; Twelve Articles; Wars of the Reformation; Zwingli, Huldrych; Primary Document: Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (May 1525) Further Reading Bainton, Roland. Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther. Peabody, MA. Hendrickson, 1977. Bak, Janos, ed. The German Peasant War of 1525. New York: Routledge, 2013. Baylor, Michael. The German Reformation and the Peasants’ War: A Brief History with Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2012. Blickle, Peter. The Revolution of 1525: The German Peasants’ War from a New Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

Ghost Dance Movement The Ghost Dance movement was a religious movement among some western Native American tribes that began in the 1870s, matured in the 1880s, and culminated in 1889 in the defeat of the Lakota warriors at Wounded Knee Creek on the Lakota Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota. The event came to be known as the Wounded Knee Massacre or Battle of Wounded Knee fought on December 29, 1890, between Lakota warriors and members of the U.S. 7th Cavalry regiment. The movement (or religion) was understood by adherents to be a peaceful religious response to subjugation of Native Americans by the U.S. government and a means of enduring increasing hunger, poverty, disease, and reservation life in the aftermath of the Indian Wars of the 1860s and 1870s. At its height the Ghost Dance movement found acceptance by tribes as far to the east and south as Colorado, the Dakotas, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. The movement originated among the Paiutes in 1869 or 1870, when a Native American shaman (medicine man) in Nevada named Wodziwob (d. ca. 1872), who claimed the ability to communicate with the dead, began to prophesy. Wodziwob prophesied the cataclysmic destruction of the White Man, the returning to life of dead Native Americans, and the restoration and replenishment with buffalo and

Wovoka, a Paiute mystic and medicine man, sparked the second Ghost Dance movement, which was embraced and celebrated by Native Americans across the western United States during the late 19th century. The Ghost Dance movement was believed to have contributed to Lakota resistance to assimilation and the Wounded Knee Massacre in 1890. (National Archives)

other creatures of Native American land. To hasten and secure the fulfillment of these prophecies and a utopian life, Wodziwob encouraged rites and rituals that included a ceremonial circular dance that became known as the Ghost Dance. The movement initially spread throughout Nevada and to parts of California and Oregon, but subsided when the prophecies failed to be realized. The movement resurfaced and gained visibility and stature when Wovoka (ca. 1856–1932), also known as Jack Wilson, had a vision during a solar eclipse on January 1, 1889. Wovoka was the son of Numu-tibo’o (also known as Tavibo), who was a follower of a Paiute spiritual leader (and is often misidentified as the founder of the movement). Wovoka’s vision and spirituality blended ideas and beliefs of Native American spirituality and Christianity. Similar to the vision and beliefs of Wodziwob, Wovoka’s vision

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also foresaw a time of the resurrection of Paiute dead, the removal of Whites from North America, and a return to a paradise-like state of nature. He called for a peaceful coexistence with the Whites until the beliefs of the Ghost Dance movement came to fruition. Wovoka was a pacifist in his beliefs, but others who adopted the movement’s beliefs were not and saw in the movement a means of using it in conjunction with war. Two prominent leaders of the war faction were Lakota leaders Kicking Bear (1846–1904) and Arnold Short Bull (ca. 1845–1923). Part of their beliefs was that the spirits of dead warriors would return and would join the spirits of living warriors in the fight against the Whites. When properly practiced, the dance was understood to be one of the means of the reunification. One aspect of the dance and rituals was the wearing of shirts or other clothing items believed to be imbued with special religious powers, among them the ability to stop bullets so that the one wearing the item would not be wounded or killed by rifles and pistols in battle. White settlers and the U.S. government had varied reactions to the movement; most opposed it and saw it as a threat. Believing that the movement would reignite militancy and rebellion, the Bureau of Indian Affairs banned the Ghost Dance. After rumors of uprising began to spread and newspaper articles about the Ghost Dance were published in newspapers such as the New York Times, in November 1890, President Benjamin Harrison ordered the U.S. Army to take control of the Lakota Sioux reservation in South Dakota. On December 29, 1890, troops from the 7th Cavalry entered a Miniconjou Lakota camp to disarm Lakota warriors. Fighting ensued, resulting in the death of more than 150 men, women, and children of the Lakota (some estimates are around 300). The event came to be known as the Massacre of Wounded Knee. After Wounded Knee the movement dissipated with some adherents going underground. Elements of it continued and resurfaced in the 1960s and 1970s with rise of the Red Power movement among Native Americans. The Ghost Dance movement provides an excellent case study of the power of religion to influence attitudes toward war and to show how religion and ritual can affect varying factions in a conflict. Timothy J. Demy

See also Native American Warfare; Wounded Knee, Massacre of Further Reading Andersson, Rani-Henrik. The Lakota Ghost Dance of 1890. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009. Brown, Dee. Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West. New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2001. Du Bois, Cora. The 1870 Ghost Dance. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. Hittman, Michael. Wovoka and the Ghost Dance. Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1998. Kehoe, Alice Beck.The Ghost Dance: Ethnohistory and Revitalization. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2006. Mails, Thomas E. The Mystic Warriors of the Plains. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972. Osterreich, Shelley Anne. The American Indian Ghost Dance, 1870 and 1890. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.

Gideon Gideon was one of ancient Israel’s judges—the military deliverers recounted in the biblical book of Judges who led Israel after the conquest of Canaan and before the Israelite monarchy. During this period, the largely independent Israelite tribes were settled in Canaan, but their repeated apostasy and lack of central organization left them vulnerable to more powerful neighbors. God used such enemies to punish Israel by plundering their crops and goods. Then when Israel repented and asked for help, God would raise up judges to deliver them. One of the most significant of these was Gideon, who led a vastly outnumbered force to victory over a large coalition of marauding nomads from the Arabian desert. Gideon performed his exploits in northern Israel, perhaps during the 12th century BCE. By Gideon’s time, invaders from the desert to the east had plundered Israel for seven years. A large coalition of nomads would come each year on their camels to the large, fertile Jezreel Valley in north-central Israel. Such desert dwellers needed grain from farmers, and when strong enough, they would take by force what they wished. After seven years of such oppression, Israel prayed to God for help and God called Gideon to lead the deliverance.

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The biblical account (Judges 6–8) describes the success of Gideon and Israel despite their uneven obedience. When an angel called Gideon to lead, Gideon needed three different signs of God’s presence and aid. Most Israelites at the time were idolatrous, including Gideon’s father and fellow townspeople. When Gideon obeyed God’s command to destroy his father’s pagan religious shrine, the irate townspeople gave Gideon the name “Jerubbaal” (“May Baal contend with him”). Nevertheless, Israel was victorious, largely because of Gideon’s effective leadership. He called for militia troops from four tribes in the region, and 32,000 assembled (the term “thousand” could alternately mean “clan”—troops from a part of a tribe). Gideon dismissed those who were fearful, and only 10,000 remained. God then reduced the number to 300 by having Gideon keep only those who drank from a spring in a certain fashion. With this small number God promised victory. Gideon was further encouraged when he overheard a report of an enemy’s dream predicting Gideon’s victory, and he launched his attack. He divided his troops into three companies and gave each man a trumpet and a torch hidden under a pot. The troops took up positions at night around the enemy camp. On Gideon’s signal, all blew their trumpets and exposed their torches as though signaling to more troops—suggesting a huge attacking force. The enemy fled in confusion and raced back east, first crossing the Jordan River and ascending the Transjordanian plateau toward the desert where Gideon’s force caught up and dealt them a final blow. Gideon and his troops won an overwhelming victory, but the story is tainted by subsequent internal fighting and idolatry. Israelite towns along the path of the escape refused to help Gideon during the chase, so he punished their inhabitants upon his return. After the victory over the invaders, Gideon made a golden ephod (vestment) from his share of the spoils, which eventually became an object of idolatry for the nation. And years later, one of Gideon’s sons killed most of his brothers and ruled a major city as king (Judges 9), but his reign and life ended in shameful bloodshed, sadly characteristic even of Israel’s leaders during this dark time. Boyd Seevers

See also Baal; Israelite Wars of the Judges Further Reading Herzog, Chaim, and Mordechai Gichon. Battles of the Bible: A Military History of Ancient Israel. New York: Fall River, 2006. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2013.

Golden Temple, Battle of (1984) During what is known as the Indian Emergency (1975– 1977), thousands of Sikhs campaigning for an autonomous state were imprisoned. In June 1984, Operation Blue Star began and Indira Gandhi, the prime minister of India, ordered the Indian Army to attack the Golden Temple and kill Sikh separatists and insurgents hiding in the building. This military operation occurred from June 3 to 8, 1984, with the objective of gaining control over the religious complex of the Harmandir Sahib, known as the “Golden Temple,” in Amritsar, Punjab. Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the Sikh separatist leader, had taken up a position in the Harmandir Sahib along with his armed followers and was forcibly removed from the religious complex by the Indian Army. Casualty figures during the operation reported by the Indian government were around 500 civilians, whereas the number of deaths among the Indian Army is recorded as 83 killed and 220 wounded. Operation Blue Star had two parts: Operation Woodrose, which targeted Sikhs carrying a weapon and protesting in the Punjab countryside, and Operation Metal, which was limited to the Golden Temple complex. Following the Battle of the Golden Temple, many Sikhs who had previously served in the Indian Army returned their honors and awards, and many resigned from their civil, administrative, and armed services. The military action increased tension and suspicion among the Sikh community in the country. After Operation Blue Star there were many assaults on Sikhs throughout India. In October 1984, Indira Gandhi was killed by two of her Sikh bodyguards, and violence broke out, resulting in thousands of

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Sikh caualties throughout India. Presently, 20 percent of the Indian military consists of Sikh soldiers. They have been fighting bravely against Muslim terrorism on the border of Pakistan. Amitabh Vikram Dwivedi See also Hinduism and War; India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in; India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in; India, Religious Conflict in; Kashmir Conflict; Sikhism and War Further Reading Brar, K. S. Operation Blue Star: The True Story. Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1993. Nayar, Kuldip, and Kushwant Singh. Tragedy of Punjab: Operation Bluestar & After. Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1984. Tully, M., and S. Jacob. Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle. London: J. Cape, 1985.

Goodman, Christopher (1520–1603) Goodman was born in Chester, England, and educated at Brasnose College, Oxford and Christ Church College, Oxford. He was in exile, one of the “Marian Exiles,” from 1554 to 1565, spending time primarily in Geneva, Switzerland and Scotland. A leading member of John Knox’s (1514– 1572) Geneva congregation and a contributor to the Geneva Bible while exiled during the reign of England’s Queen Mary I, English Puritan and Oxford professor Christopher Goodman was one of the most important proponents of the idea that if rulers were oppressive, then they were no longer legitimate rulers. In January 1558, Goodman published How Superior Powers Ought to Be Obeyed of Their Subjects, and Wherein They May Lawfully Be by God’s Word Disobeyed and Resisted, a work stemming from a sermon he preached on the New Testament passage of Acts 5:29 that reads “Peter and the other apostles replied: ‘We must obey God rather than men!’” (New International Version). In this work he praised the efforts of Sir Thomas Wyatt (1521–1554), who had led “Wyatt’s Rebellion” (1554) in England and argued that if effective resistance cannot be mustered against a tyrant, then exile is the only option for the Christian. Goodman’s

work was published in the same year as John Knox’s The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstruous Regiment of Women, a widely read and anonymously published treatise that argued against the female sovereigns of Knox’s day, particularly Mary of Guise, Dowager Queen of Scotland and regent to her daughter Mary, Queen of Scots, and Queen Mary I of England, known to Protestants as “Bloody Mary.” Both publications advocated resistance to monarchs and magistrates who were deemed to be ungodly. This was a theological and religious position that ran contrary to absolute subject obedience and the theory of the divine right of monarchs. Goodman believed that when tyrants oppressed their subjects, they forfeited their right to rule and submission by those ruled was no longer required. Further, he argued that submission under such circumstances was sinful and the same as rebelling against God. Like John Knox (1514– 1572) and others, Goodman appealed to Old Testament scripture and history to advocate rebellion against, resistance to, or exile from ungodly or idolatrous monarchs. He also found grounds for revolution in the concept of natural law. While in exile, Goodman first went to Basel and then Strasbourg, where he became friends with Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562), an Italian theologian and reformer who had fled Italy because of his preaching and views. Shortly thereafter, Goodman went to Geneva, where his ideas on civil disobedience matured as he ministered alongside John Knox. Much of Goodman’s thought on disobedience and resistance was tied to his understanding of the Ten Commandments and its ongoing applicability. He believed that if a monarch or magistrate required some action that was forbidden in the Ten Commandments such as idolatry, then it was the right and responsibility of the subject to resist. Goodman’s influential thought shows that Reformers were considering many aspects of law and politics, including rights and responsibilities of both those who govern and those who are governed. In the thought of these men and throughout the Reformation we can see the development of the idea of resistance from an abnormal to a normal circumstance. The idea shifts from an action that, in

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the midst of tyranny, is permitted for a few (nobility) to an action that is required of any Christian. It moves from that which is optional to that which is mandatory. Both Goodman and Knox appealed to natural law, the Old Testament, and the New Testament, but Goodman’s ideas and publications predated those of Knox. Although the men knew and consulted with each other, Goodman’s ideas were earlier and showed more independence from other reformers such as John Calvin and Heinrich Bullinger. Throughout the mid-16th century religious and political dissent in Scotland, England, and Europe was fueled by the writings and sermons of leaders such as Knox, John Ponet (1515–1556), and Goodman. They drew from each other as well as earlier Christian writers and other contemporaries like the Swiss-born theologian Pierre Viret (1511– 1571), whose influence among Protestants in France was enormous. Moving beyond the political theory and theology of Protestant reformer John Calvin, Scottish and English Protestant leaders such as John Knox, John Ponet, and Christopher Goodman made an ideological shift from concepts that Calvin only briefly touched upon or that he refused to grant as valid, such as revolt against a monarch, and in so doing, made ideas of the possibility or necessity of disobedience and resistance commonplace in religious and nonreligious circles of thought, especially in England and later in the American colonies. Goodman and others show the importance of ideas and their long life, especially with respect to religion, political theory, and war. Timothy J. Demy See also Calvin, John; Knox, John; Ponet, John; Vermigli, Peter Martyr; Wyatt’s Rebellion Further Reading Craig, Hardin Jr. “The Geneva Bible as a Political Document.” Pacific Historical Review 7, no. 1 (March 1938): 40–49. Danner, Dan G. “Christopher Goodman and the English Protestant Tradition of Civil Disobedience.” Sixteenth Century Journal 8, no. 3 (October 1977): 61–73. Greaves, Richard L. “Traditionalism and the Seeds of Revolution in the Social Principles of the Geneva Bible.” Sixteenth Century Journal 7, no. 2 (October 1976): 94–109. O’Donovan, Joan Lockwood. Theology of Law and Authority in the English Reformation. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1991.

Witte, John, Jr. The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion, and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Wollman, David H. “The Biblical Justification for Resistance to Authority in Ponet’s and Goodman’s Polemics.” Sixteenth Century Journal 13, no. 4 (Winter 1982): 29–41.

“Gott mit uns” Found in 1701 on the coat of arms of Frederick I (1657– 1713), King of Prussia, the phrase meaning “God with us” was used as a watchword of the Prussian Army. The elector-king employed Protestant Pietist chaplains from Halle to instill a blend of piety and loyalty that was manifested occasionally in demonstrations such as the Prussian Army singing the popular Christian hymn written in 1636, “Now Thank We All Our God” (“Nun danket alle Gott”) as they drove the French Army from the field of Waterloo (1815). The Prussian Order of the Crown (established in 1861) placed the phrase on the oblique side of the decoration, and it appeared on the Imperial Standard in 1871. During the First World War, German soldiers wore the “Gott Mit Uns” motto on their belts, a symbol of ethnic, religious, and political unity. This led to constant Allied propagandists and preachers denouncing German soldiers’ brutality while wearing the phrase on their uniform. Conservative Germans vigorously defended the motto from satirists and left-wing critics, and in 1920 German artist George Grosz (1893–1959) was charged with insulting the army, fined, and his lithographs destroyed. In the Second World War the same belt buckle was worn by Wehrmacht, though not by Waffen SS forces. The German Bundeswehr perpetuated this usage until the 1960s, and later the German police dropped the expression from their insignia in the 1970s. Usage of the phrase demonstrates the strong linkage between religion and war throughout the centuries and is similar to earlier phrases such as Nobiscum deus (“God with us”), a battle cry of the late Roman Empire, and Deus vult (“God wills it”), a battle cry of the First Crusade. Duff Crerar See also First World War, Religious Dimensions of

Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922)  319 Further Reading Bergen, Doris. “German Military Chaplains in the Second World War and the Dilemmas of Legitimacy.” In Doris L. Bergen, ed. The Sword of the Lord: Military Chaplains from the First to the Twenty-First Century. South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2004, pp. 165–86. Crockett, Dennis. German Post-Expressionism: The Art of the Great Disorder, 1918–1924. State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. Davies, Alan T. Infected Christianity: A Study of Modern Racism. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1988. Lehman, Hartmut. “In the Service of Two Kings: Protestant Prussian Military Chaplains, 1713–1918.” In Doris L. Bergen, ed. The Sword of the Lord: Military Chaplains from the First to the Twenty-First Century. South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2004, pp. 125–40. Williamson, George S. “A Religious Sonderweg? Reflections on the Sacred and Secular in the Historiography of Modern Germany.” Church History 75, no. 1 (March 2006): 139–56.

Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922) This war between Greece and Turkish nationalists occurred as a result of the partition of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and produced continuing animosity between Greeks and Turks. When the First World War broke out in 1914, the Ottoman Empire had about 2.5 million Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians in Anatolia. King Constantine of Greece declared neutrality, but Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos hoped to obtain Greek-inhabited eastern Thrace, the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, and parts of western Anatolia around Smyrna (present-day Izmir). When he began negotiations with the Allies, the king dismissed him. Venizelos eventually forced Constantine to abdicate in May 1917, and Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres, concluded on August 10, 1920, between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire, among other provisions, allocated these territories to Greece. Meanwhile, after the Armistice of Moudros, signed in May 1919, 20,000 Greek troops occupied Smyrna. The Greeks of Smyrna greeted the Greek troops as liberators, and the Turkish Army put up little opposition to the Greek landings. However, a Turkish nationalist killed the Greek

flag-bearer, resulting in shooting that killed between 300 to 400 Turks and 100 Greeks. During the summer of 1920, the Greek army launched several offensives that extended Greek control over much of western Anatolia. In October 1920, the Greek army renewed its advance into Anatolia to pressure Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish nationalists, to sign the Treaty of Sèvres. The advancing Greeks could not decisively defeat the Turks, who retreated in an orderly fashion. In early 1921, the Greek army resumed its advance but met stiff resistance from the entrenched Turks. On January 11, 1921, the Turkish forces halted the Greek advance at the first battle of Inonu and defeated the Greeks at the second battle of Inonu on March 30. These Turkish military successes caused the Allies to meet in London to consider amending the Treaty of Sevres. In early July 1921, a reinforced Greek army launched another major offensive against Turkish troops along the Afyonkarahisar-Kutahya-Eskisehir line. The Greeks broke through the Turkish defenses and occupied these strategically important cities but halted for a month. Kemal used this delay to retreat to the east of the Sakarya River and organize defensive lines about 62 miles from Ankara. In early August 1921, the Greek Army advanced on the Turkish defenses. From August 23 to September 13, the fighting seesawed across the Turkish defenses. Then the Greek army tried to capture Haymana, 25 miles south of Ankara, but the Turks held out. Exhausted by the ferocity of the battle, the Greeks decided to withdraw to their lines of June. The Greeks then retreated to Smyrna. In March 1922, the Allies tried to negotiate a ceasefire between the Greeks and Turks, but Kemal insisted that the Greeks withdraw from Anatolia. The Turks then defeated the Greeks at the Battle of Dumlupinar near Afyon on August 30, 1922. On September 9, Turkish troops occupied Smyrna, and the remaining Greek forces evacuated Anatolia. The Turks destroyed the city and killed most of the Greeks left. News of the massacre at Smyrna caused more than a million Greeks to leave Anatolia for Greece. In retaliation, Greece forced about 500,000 Turks living in Greece to immigrate to Turkey. As Kemal’s forces advanced toward the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, Italian and French forces abandoned their positions at the straits, leaving the British alone. On October 15, 1922, Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and Kemal signed the Armistice of Mudanya

320  Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645)

by which the Western allies retained control of eastern Thrace and the Bosporus and the Greeks evacuated these areas. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923, recognized the independence of the Turkish Republic, the end of Greek territorial claims in Anatolia, and Greece’s acceptance of its prewar borders. Robert B. Kane See also Ottoman Empire Further Reading Clogg, Richard. A Short History of Modern Greece. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Howard, Douglas A. The History of Turkey. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezul Kural Shaw. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II: Reform, Reaction and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645) Hugo Grotius, also known as Huig de Groot, was a Dutch humanist, jurist, and historian known for his contribution to the development of international law. Grotius’s contribution to political philosophy arose from his contention that human beings employ reason to discern morality rather than receive it by divine revelation. Grotius came to prominence during a critical time of nation building and religious conflict. He was a first-generation Dutch Arminian and public servant who eventually found himself estranged from the Dutch Republic for political associations related to his views on religious tolerance. Grotius’s mature views of war are presented in his magnum opus entitled De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Rights of War and Peace), published in exile in 1625. He took up the pen because of what he viewed as a pervasive lawlessness in the way war was waged among Christian nations. The title of the work suggests its central assertion that states should only enter wars to defend rights and carry out those wars within the limits of rights. While the chaos

of war is disruptive to the conduct of conventional law, natural law still governs war. By nature, individuals and— by extension—nations have the right to inflict punishment for wrongs suffered at the hands of another. In nature, selfpreservation is a right that may be expressed not only by a positive preservation of good, but by the chastisement of evil, often understood as an injury another inflicts. Wars may only be waged for moral reasons, those based on truth and justice. Grotius thus offers three just grounds for war: selfdefense, recovering of one’s lawful possession, and punishment. These reasons apply only to international wars because revolutions and civil wars are impermissible. Individuals who were sovereign in a primitive natural state ceded their right to war when they joined the state. There may be cases in which rulers violate natural law by establishing unnatural customs, but even then rebellion is not normally permitted. Preemptive war is impermissible because it arises from cunning to accomplish an advantageous end rather than real reasons that emerge from natural law. In general, a war for humanitarian intervention is also impermissible because governments have the right to rule their subjects unless they abuse their authority in a universally condemned manner. Thus, while subjects may not revolt, foreigners may intervene on their behalf in extremis. Grotius maintained that it was possible to wage war morally despite the familiar adage that “in times of war the law falls mute.” It is permissible to kill the enemy and seize his property. On the other hand, it is impermissible to inflict harm in a manner that is disproportionate to the original injury or to take more than in necessary for one’s security. However, Grotius’s understanding of the law of nations also permits killing of noncombatants and those who surrender in war zones, enslavement of prisoners of war, and plunder. These rights of nations seem inhumane to moderns, and Grotius anticipates this in Book III of De Jure by urging rulers to employ conscience to establish merciful customs. Grotius considered religious wars impermissible and unjust despite the potential claim that they assert the rights of the church. By biblical principle, Christians are not to judge those outside their community though even in exceptional cases the judgment is not worldly but spiritual.

Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645)  321

The execution of judgment relies upon God’s direct intervention rather than the force of human arms because God’s kingdom is not of this world. Wars cannot use temporal violence to advance the church’s sphere or ever claim divine sanction. Liam J. Atchison See also Christianity and War; Just War Tradition

Further Reading Grotius, Hugo, and Stephen C. Neff. Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Stumpf, Christoph A. The Grotian Theology of International Law: Hugo Grotius and the Moral Foundations of International Relations. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006. Tuck, Richard. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

WAR AND RELIGION

WAR AND RELIGION An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict VOLUME 2: H–R

Jeffrey M. Shaw and Timothy J. Demy Editors

Copyright © 2017 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Shaw, Jeffrey M., editor of compilation. | Demy, Timothy J., editor of compilation. Title: War and religion : an encyclopedia of faith and conflict / Jeffrey M. Shaw and Timothy J. Demy, editors. Description: Santa Barbara, California : ABC-CLIO, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and indexes. Identifiers: LCCN 2016038200 (print) | LCCN 2017005624 (ebook) | ISBN 9781610695169 (set : acid-free paper) |  ISBN 9781440847615 (volume 1 : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9781440847622 (volume 2 : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9781440847639 (volume 3 : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9781610695176 (ebook) | Subjects: LCSH: War—Religious aspects—History—Encyclopedias. | Religions—History—Encyclopedias. | Social conflict—   History—Encyclopedias. | Military history—Encyclopedias. Classification: LCC BL85 .W37 2017 (print) | LCC BL85 (ebook) | DDC 261.8/73—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016038200 ISBN: 978-1-61069-516-9 (Set) ISBN: 978-1-4408-4761-5 (Volume 1) ISBN: 978-1-4408-4762-2 (Volume 2) ISBN: 978-1-4408-4763-9 (Volume 3) EISBN: 978-1-61069-517-6 (Set) 21 20 19 18 17  1 2 3 4 5 This book is also available as an eBook. ABC-CLIO An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 www.abc-clio.com This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Volume 1: A–G

Volume 3: S–Z

Alphabetical List of Entries—vii List of Primary Documents—xv Preface—xvii Acknowledgments—xix Introduction—xxi Chronology—xxiii Guide to Related Topics—xxxix Entries: —1

Alphabetical List of Entries—vii List of Primary Documents—xv Guide to Related Topics—xvii Entries: S–Z—693 Primary Documents—887 Bibliography—1009 Editors and Contributors—1017 Index—1021

Volume 2: H–R Alphabetical List of Entries—vii List of Primary Documents—xv Guide to Related Topics—xvii Entries: H–R—323

v

Alphabetical List of Entries

Volume 1: A–G

Anabaptist Pacifism Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842) Anglo-Sikh Wars (1845–1846, 1848–1849) Antioch, Siege of (1097–1098) Anti-Semitism Apocalyptic Literature Apocalypticism and War, Christian Apocalypticism and War, Jewish Apocalypticism and War, Muslim Aquinas, Thomas (1225–1274) Arab-Israeli War of 1948 Arianism and War Armenian Massacres Arnaud Amaury (Arnaud Amalric) (d. 1225) Art and the Crusades Ascalon, Battle of (1099) Ashoka (304–232 BCE) Ashur Ashurbanipal (ca. 685–ca. 627 BCE) Assassins Assyrian Warfare Audita Tremendi (1187) Augustine (354–430 CE) Aum Shinrikyo

Abbasid Revolution (747–750 CE) Acre, Sieges of (1189–1191, 1291) Adī Granth Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1979–1989) Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–) Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (Martin Luther, 1525) Ahimsa Ahura Mazda Ai, Battle of (ca. 1400 BCE or 1200 BCE) Alarcos, Battle of (1195) Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229) Alcántara, Order of Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857) All India Muslim League Almohad Revolution (12th Century CE) Al Qaeda Al Shabaab Alsted, Johann Heinrich (1588–1638) Ambrose, Bishop of Milan (ca. 339–397 CE) American Civil War, Religious Dimensions of American Revolution, Religious Dimensions of Ames, William (1576–1633) Amun vii

viii  Alphabetical List of Entries

Austro-Ottoman Wars Ayodhya Conflict (1992) Ayyubids Baal Babylonian Conquest of Israel (597–586 BCE) Bacon, Roger (ca. 1214–1294) Badr, Battle of (624 CE) Bahādur, Bandā Singh (1670–1716) Baha’i Faith and War Balfour Declaration (1917) Balkan Wars (1912–1913) Bar Kochba Revolt (132–136 CE) Bar Kochba, Simon (d. 135 CE) Barons’ Crusade (1239–1241) Bartholomew, Peter (d. 1099) Basmachi Rebellion (1918–1933) Belatucadros, Celtic God of War Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) Beth Zechariah, Battle of (162 BCE) Beth Zur, Battle of (164 BCE) Beza, Theodore (1519–1605) Béziers, Massacre at (1209) Bhagavad Gita and War Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh (1947–1984) Bible and War Bin Laden, Osama (1957–2011) Bishops’ Wars (1639–1640) Boko Haram Bonhoeffer, Dietrich (1906–1945) Bouillon, Godfrey de (1060–1100) Brown, John (1800–1859) Buddhism and War Bullinger, Heinrich (1504–1575) Bushido Buyids Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035) Byzantine-Seljuk Wars Calatrava, Order of Caliphate Calvin, John (1509–1564) Camel, Battle of the (656 CE) Camisards, Revolt of (1702–1704) Camp David Accords (1978) Canon Law on War

Carlist Wars (1833–1840, 1846–1849, 1872–1876) Cathars Catholic (Holy) League Central Asia, Russian Conquest of Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response (1983) Chamkaur, Battle of (1705) Charlemagne’s Conquests (ca. 747–814 CE) Chemosh Christian Daimyo Christianity and War Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Christian-Muslim Wars in Spain Cistercian Order Clement V, Pope (ca. 1260–1314) Clermont, Council of (1095) Cold War, Religious Dimensions of Cologne War (1583–1588) Confucianism and War Constantine (272–337 CE) Constantinople, Arab Sieges of (674–678, 717–718) Covadonga, Battle of (ca. May 28, 722 CE) Cresson, Battle of (1187) Crimean War, Religious Dimensions of Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658) Crusade (as term) Crusade of 1101 Crusade of Henry VI (1197–1198) Crusade of the Poor (1309) Crusades (Overview) Crusades and Religious Relics Crusades, Naval History of Crusades, Women in the Cyprus, Kingdom of Cyrus Cylinder Cyrus II, King of Persia (ca. 600 or 576–530 BCE) Dalai Lama XIV (1935–) Damascus, Arab Conquest of (634 CE) Damietta, Siege of (1218–1219) Daoism and War Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb Dasam Granth Deborah Deborah, Defeat of Sisera

Alphabetical List of Entries  ix

Decades (Bullinger, 1552) Decretum (Decretum Gratiani) (Gratian, 12th Century CE) Deeds of the Franks (Gesta Francorum) (ca. 1100) Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East Delaware River Valley, Toleration and Conflict (1609–1681) Despenser’s Crusade (1383) Dev, Guru Arjan (1563–1606) Dharam Yudh Dhimma Divine Kingship and War Druze and War Druze-Maronite Conflict (1840–1860) Duc, Thich Quong (1897–1963) Easter Rising (1916) Edessa, County of Edict of Fontainebleau (1685) Egyptian Warfare Eighth Crusade (1270) Eighty Years’ War, or Dutch War of Independence (1568–1648) El Cid (Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar) (ca. 1043–1099) Emicho, Count of Leiningen (Late 11th Century) English Civil Wars (1642–1651) Erasmus, Desiderius (1466–1536) Ethiopian-Adal War (1529–1543) Fatimid Conquest of Baghdad (1058) Fatimid Conquest of Egypt Fatimid Conquest of North Africa Fatimids Fifth Crusade (1217–1221) Fifth Monarchists First Crusade (1096–1099) First World War and Religious Art First World War, Religious Dimensions of Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) Frederick II and the Papacy, Conflict of French and Indian War, Religious Dimensions of French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900) French Wars of Religion (1562–1598) Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948) Gaza War (2006) German Peasants’ War (1524–1525) Ghost Dance Movement

Gideon Golden Temple, Battle of (1984) Goodman, Christopher (1520–1603) “Gott mit uns” Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922) Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645)

Volume 2: H–R

Hachiman, Japanese God of War Hadith and War Haganah Hamas Hanh, Thich Nhat (1926–) Harbiyah, Battle of (1244) Harran, Battle of (1104) Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) Hattin, Battle of (1187) Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831) Henry VIII, King of England (1491–1547) Herem Hezbollah Hindu Mythological Wars Hinduism and War Hittite Warfare Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679) Holocaust Holy Roman Empire Holy Sepulchre, Church of the Holy War (Bellum Sacrum) Holy War, Medieval Roman Catholic Conceptions of Huguenots Hus, Jan (ca. 1370–1415) Hybrid War of the 21st Century, Religious Dimensions of Ibn Khaldun (1332–1402) Ibn Taymiyah (1263–1328) Ikko-ikki Illinois Mormon War (1844–1846) In Praise of the New Knighthood (Bernard of Clairvaux, 1128–1136) India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in India, Muslim Conquest of Northern India, Religious Conflict in Indian Mutiny (1857)

x  Alphabetical List of Entries

Indo-Pakistani Wars Indra, Hindu God of War Innocent III, Pope (1160–1216) International Religious Freedom and Human Rights Intifada Investiture Controversy Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938) Iranian Revolution (1979) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Ishtar Islam and War (Jihad) Islamic State Israelite Conquest of Canaan Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy Israelite Wars of the Judges Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy Jaffa, Treaty of (1192) Jahiliyya and Asabiyyah Jainism and War Jericho, Battle of (ca. 1400 BCE or 1200 BCE) Jerusalem as Holy City Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, Sieges of Jesuits Jesus as Warrior Jewish Revolt (66–70 CE) Jews and the Crusades Joan of Arc (1412–1431) Jos Riots (2010) Josephus (37–ca. 100 CE) Joshua Judaism and War Just War Tradition Kamikaze Kappel, Wars of (1529–1531) Karbala, Battle of (680 CE) Kashmir Conflict Khalid ibn al Walid (d. 642 CE) Khālsā Khandaq, Battle of (627 CE) Khartoum, Siege of (1884–1885) Khaybar, Battle of (629 CE) Khilafat Movement (1918–1924)

Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi (1902–1989) King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) King David as Warrior King Philip’s War (1675–1676) Knighthood, Christian Ideal of Knights Templar Knox, John (1514–1572) Konishi Yukinaga (1558–1600) Kosovo, Battle of (1389) Kosovo War (1999) Kurds Kurukshetra War Lachish, Battle of (701 BCE) Lactantius (240–320 CE) Languedoc Revolts (1215–1229) Las Casas, Bartolomé de (1484–1566) Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of (1212) Lateran Church Councils Lawrence of Arabia (1888–1935) Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982) Lebanon, Israeli Operations against (2006) Lepanto, Battle of (1571) Lex Rex Liberation Theology Liberian Civil Wars Libraries and Religious Texts, Destruction of Liturgy of the Crusades Locke, John (1632–1704) Luther, Martin (1483–1546) Maasai Warriors Maccabean Revolt (167–160 BCE) Maccabeus, Judas (d. 160 BCE) Mad Mullah, Wars of the (1892–1920) Mahdi Mahdia Crusade (1390) Mahdist Revolution in Sudan Maimonides (1138–1204) Malta, Siege of (1565) Manichaeism and War Manifest Destiny Mansurah, Battles of (1221 and 1250) Manzikert, Battle of (1071) Maronites and War

Alphabetical List of Entries  xi

Mars, Roman God of War Martin of Tours (d. 397 CE) Martyrs, Jesuit Martyrs’ Mirror (1660) Marx, Karl (1818–1883) Masada, Siege of (73–74 CE) Masts, Battle of the (655 CE) Mau Mau Rebellion (1948) Mazu-Tianfei Megiddo, Battle of (15th Century BCE) Melanchthon, Philip (1497–1560) Melito of Sardis (d. ca. 180 CE) Merton, Thomas (1915–1968) Meskhetian Turks Mexican-American War, Religious Dimensions of Milhemet Misvah Milhemet Reshut Militarism, Religious Military Chaplains Military Chaplains, African American Military Raid in Islam Milvian Bridge, Battle of (312 CE) Missouri Mormon War (1838) Mohammed Omar, Mullah (d. 2013) Mongols Monophysitism Montesa, Order of More, Thomas (1478–1535) Mormon Rebellion (1857–1858) Mu’awiya (602–680 CE) Mughal-Maratha Wars (1659–1707) Mughal-Sikh Wars (1628–1715) Muhammad as Warrior Mujahideen Münster Rebellion (1534–1535) Muslim Armies of the Crusades Muslim Brotherhood Muslim Civil War, First (656–661 CE) Muslim Civil War, Second (680–692 CE) Muslim Conquest of Egypt Muslim Conquest of Iraq Muslim Conquest of Persia Muslim Conquest of Sindh Nachmanides (1194–1270)

Nahawand, Battle of (642 CE) Nānak, Guru (1469–1539) Native American Warfare Nazism, Religious Aspects of Neo-Assyrian Warfare Nicopolis, Crusade of (1396) Ninth Crusade (1271–1272) Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict Nostra Aetate (Paul VI, 1965) Nur Al-Din (1118–1174) Odin, Teutonic God of War On War against the Turk (Luther, 1529) Origen and War (ca. 185–ca. 254 CE) Oslo Accords (1993) Otranto, Battle of (1480–1481) Ottoman Empire Ottoman-Persian Wars Pacem in Terris (John XXIII, 1963) Pacifism, Religious Pakistan, Religious Violence in Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Papal-Imperial Conflict Peace in the Hebrew Scriptures Peace in the New Testament Peace in the Qur’an Peace of God Penance (Christian) and War Penn, William (1644–1718) Philistines Pius XII, Pope (1876–1958) Political Theology and War Ponet, John (ca. 1514–1556) Popular Crusades Prayer Book Rebellion (1549) Protestant Reformers and War Pueblo Revolt (1680) Puritans and War Qadesh, Battle of (1274 BCE) Qadisiyya, Battle of (636 CE) Qarmati Uprising (923–951 CE) Qur’an and War Radical Islam in the 20th Century Reconquista Religious Military Orders

xii  Alphabetical List of Entries

Religious Propaganda and War Religious Wars and Mortality Rates Rhodes, Siege of (1522–1523) Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) (632–633 CE) Ritual and War Roland, Song of (La Chanson de Roland) Roman Army and Religion Roman Emperor Worship Roman Religion, Mythology, and War

Volume 3: S–Z

Sacred Space and Conflict Sacred Swords Saffron Revolution (2007) Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (1572) Saint George Saint Ursula (d. 383 CE) Saladin (1138–1193) Salafism Sant Sipāhī Santiago, Order of Saracens Saudi-Hashemite Wars (1917–1925) Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar (1883–1966) Saxon Wars Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) Schmalkaldic War (1546–1547) Second Crusade (1147–1149) Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) Second World War, Japanese Empire, and Islam Second World War, Religious Dimensions of Seljuks Sennacherib’s Attack on Judah (ca. 701 BCE) Seventh Crusade (1248–1254) Sharia and War Shimabara Rebellion (1637–1638) Shinto and War Shoko Asahara (1955–) Shouren, Wang (1472–1529) Shrine Cults, East Indies Siffin, Battle of (657 CE) Sikhism and War Simons, Menno (1496–1561) Singh, Bābā Dīp (1682–1757)

Singh, Guru Gobind (1666–1708) Sinn Féin Sirhind, Battle of (1710) Six-Day War (1967) Sixth Crusade (1227–1229) Sōen Shaku (1860–1919) Sōhei South Vietnamese Buddhist Uprising (1966) Southeast Asia, Religious Conflict Spanish-American War, Religious Dimensions of Spanish Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Suarez, Francisco (1548–1617) Sufism and War Süleyman the Magnificent (1494–1566) Sunni-Shi’a Conflict Syrian Orthodox Church Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) Tajikistan Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Talas, Battle of (751 CE) Taliban Talmud and War Tamil Tigers Tannenburg, Battle of (1410) Taraori (Tarain), Battles of (1191–1192) Tarsusi, Ali ibn Mardi al (12th Century CE) Ten Kings, Battle of (2900 BCE) Terrorism and Religion Third Crusade (1189–1192) Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) Three Kingdoms, War of the (1638–1660) Tibetan Rebellion (1959) Tours, Battle of (732 CE) Transcendentalism and War Tripoli, County of Tripolitan War Truce of God True Cross Twelve Articles (1525) Tyr, Norse God of War Tyrannicide Uhud, Battle of (625 CE) Uighur Unrest in Xinjiang Urban II, Pope (ca. 1035–1099) Vattel, Emmerich de (1714–1767)

Alphabetical List of Entries  xiii

Venetian Crusade (1122–1124) Verden, Massacre of (782 CE) Vermigli, Peter Martyr (1499–1562) Vienna, Siege of (1529) Vienna, Siege of (1683) Viret, Pierre (1511–1571) Vitoria, Francisco de (1483–1546) Voetius, Gisbertus (1589–1676) Vow (Crusade) Wahhabism Walter the Penniless (d. 1096) Warrior Saints Wars of the Reformation Weapons in the New Testament Wendish Crusade (1147) West Africa, French Wars of Conquest in West Semitic Warfare Westphalia, Peace of (1648)

Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved (Luther, 1526) William of Adam (ca. 1275–1338/39) Wingate, Orde (1903–1944) Wollebius, Johannes (1586–1629) Wounded Knee, Massacre of (1890) Wyatt’s Rebellion (1554) Yahweh as Divine Warrior Yarmouk, Battle of (636 CE) Yasukuni Shrine Yom Kippur War (1973) Young Turks Zab, Battle of (750 CE) Zanj Rebellion (869–893 CE) Zealots Zen and War Zionism and War Zoroastrianism and War Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531)

List of Primary Documents

An Account of the First Crusade: Anselme of Ribemont’s Letter to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims (1098) An Account of the First Crusade: Letter of Daimbert, Archbishop of Pisa; Godfrey of Bouillon; and Raymond, Count of St. Gilles to Pope Paschal II (1099) Crusading in the Thirteenth Century: A Letter to All the Faithfull by the Patriarch of Jerusalem (1229) Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation (1520) Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (May 1525) Excerpts from the Peace of Augsburg (1555) Excerpt from Jacques-Auguste de Thou’s Account of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day in Paris (1572) Granting Religious Toleration to Huguenots: Henri IV’s Edict of Nantes (1598) The Dutie of a King in His Royal Office by Sir Walter Raleigh (1599) Edicts Issued by the Japanese Shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa: “Closed Country Edict” (1635) and “Exclusion of the Portuguese Edict” (1639) Excerpt from Samuel Rutherford’s Lex, Rex (1644) Declaration of Breda (April 4, 1660)

Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (July 8, 1663) Withdrawing Religious Toleration for Huguenots: Louis XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) Government and Religion in British Canada: The Quebec Act (October 7, 1774) Treaty of Tripoli (January 3, 1797) President Abraham Lincoln’s Proclamation Declaring a National Fast Day (March 30, 1863) Max Nordau’s Address to the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland (August 29, 1897) “At the Battle of Nan Shan Hill” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk Sōen Shaku (December 1904) “Buddhist View of War” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk Sōen Shaku (1904) Issuance of Ottoman Fetva by Essad Effendi, Sheik-UlIslam in the Name of Sultan Mehmed V (November 1914) Balfour Declaration (1917) Pacem, Dei Munus Pulcherrimum, a Papal Encyclical Issued by Pope Benedict XV (May 23, 1920) The Palestine Mandate (July 24, 1922) U.S. Congress Endorsement of the Balfour Declaration (September 21, 1922)

xv

xvi  List of Primary Documents

Christianity in Nazi Germany: Karl Barth’s Theological Declaration of Barmen (1934) British House of Commons Discussion Expressing Outrage Following the Zionist Terrorist Attack on the King David Hotel in Jerusalem (1946) UN Partition Plan for Palestine: UN Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine (November 29, 1947) Statement by the Arab League upon the Declaration of the State of Israel (May 15, 1948) President Dwight Eisenhower’s Message to Congress Setting Forth the “Eisenhower Doctrine” (January 5, 1957) Pacem in Terris, a Papal Encyclical Issued by Pope John XXIII (April 11, 1963) UN Resolution Declaring Zionism to Be Racism (1975) Camp David Accords: A Framework for Peace Between Israel and Egypt and a Framework for Negotiations (September 17, 1978) Article 27 of the Hamas Charter (August 18, 1988) Speech by Nelson Mandela at the Zionist Christian Church Easter Conference (April 20, 1992) Parliament of the World’s Religions: Hans Kung’s Declaration Toward a Global Ethic (September 4, 1993) Last Speech of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (November 4, 1995) Wye River Memorandum (1998) United Nations Secretary-General’s Statement Calling for Support of All Religions (September 10, 2001)

Defining Terrorism: UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (October 8, 2004) Declaration of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation from the First Jewish-Hindu Leadership Summit (February 5–6, 2007) Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France, in Commemoration of the Mumbai Terrorist Attacks (December 7, 2010) UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Message to the International Conference on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (April 15, 2013) UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Message to the Religions for Peace Assembly: People of Faith Can Pave Way for Tolerance, Solidarity among All Groups (November 20, 2013) Excerpt from the Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan (2015) UN Resolution 2199: The UN Security Council Condemns Trade with Al-Qaida-Associated Groups (2015) UN Security Council Statement on Boko Haram (January 19, 2015) Guidelines Proposed at the UN General Assembly Meeting on the Syrian Refugee Crisis (November 20, 2015) Remarks at the International Conference on the Question of Jerusalem (December 15, 2015)

Guide to Related Topics

Battles and Sieges

Kosovo, Battle of Lachish, Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of Lepanto, Battle of Malta, Siege of Mansurah, Battles of Manzikert, Battle of Masada, Siege of Masts, Battle of the Megiddo, Battle of Milvian Bridge, Battle of Nahawand, Battle of Otranto, Battle of Qadesh, Battle of Qadisiyya, Battle of Rhodes, Siege of Siffin, Battle of Sirhind, Battle of Talas, Battle of Tannenberg, Battle of Taraori (Tarain), Battles of Ten Kings, Battle of Tours, Battle of Uhud, Battle of Vienna, Siege of (1529)

Acre, Sieges of Ai, Battle of Alarcos, Battle of Antioch, Siege of Ascalon, Battle of Badr, Battle of Beth Zechariah, Battle of Beth Zur, Battle of Camel, Battle of the Chamkaur, Battle of Constantinople, Arab Sieges of Covadonga, Battle of Cresson, Battle of Damietta, Siege of Golden Temple, Battle of Harbiyah, Battle of Harran, Battle of Hattin, Battle of Jericho, Battle of Jerusalem, Sieges of Karbala, Battle of Khandaq, Battle of Khartoun, Siege of Khaybar, Battle of xvii

xviii  Guide to Related Topics

Vienna, Siege of (1683) Yarmouk, Battle of Zab, Battle of

Crusades

Acre, Sieges of Alarcos, Battle of (1195) Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229) Alcantara, Order of Antioch, Sieges of (1097–1098) Art and the Crusades Ascalon, Battle of (1099) Audita Tremendi (1187) Barons’ Crusade (1239–1241) Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) Bouillon, Godfrey de (1060–1100) Calatrava, Order of Clement V, Pope (ca. 1260–1314) Clermont, Council of (1095) Cresson, Battle of (1187) Crusade (as term) Crusade of 1101 Crusade of Henry VI (1197–1198) Crusade of the Poor (1309) Crusades (Overview) Crusades and Religious Relics Crusades, Naval History Crusades, Women in the Cyprus, Kingdom of Damietta, Siege of (1218–1219) Despenser’s Crusade (1383) Edessa, County of Eighth Crusade (1270) Fifth Crusade First Crusade (1096–1099) Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) Harbiyah, Battle of (1244) Harran, Battle of (1104) Hattin, Battle of (1187) Holy Sepulchre, Church of the Holy War (Bellum Sacrum) Holy War, Medieval Roman Catholic Conceptions of Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of

Jews and the Crusades Knighthood, Christian Ideal of Knights Templar Liturgy of the Crusades Mansurah, Battles of (1221 and 1250) Montesa, Order of Muslim Armies of the Crusades Nicopolis, Crusade of (1396) Ninth Crusade (1271–1272) Popular Crusades Religious Military Orders Saladin (1138–1193) Santiago, Order of Saracens Second Crusade (1147–1149) Seventh Crusade (1248–1254) Sixth Crusade (1227–1229) Tannenburg, Battle of (1410) Third Crusade (1189–1192) Tripoli, County of True Cross Urban II, Pope (d. 1099) Venetian Crusade (1122–1124) Vow (Crusade) Walter the Penniless (d. 1096) Wendish Crusade (1147)

Deities

Ahura Mazda Amun Ashur Baal Belatucadros, Celtic God of War Chemosh Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East Hachiman, Japanese God of War Indra, Hindu God of War Ishtar Mars, Roman God of War Odin, Teutonic God of War Roman Emperor Worship Tyr, Norse God of War Yahweh as Divine Warrior

Guide to Related Topics  xix

Individuals

Alsted, Johann Heinrich Ambrose, Bishop of Milan Ames, William Aquinas, Thomas Arnaud Amaury (Arnaud Amalric) Ashoka Ashurbanipal Augustine Bacon, Roger Bahādur, Bandā Singh Bar Kochba, Simon Bartholomew, Peter Bernard of Clairvaux Beza, Theodore Bhindranale, Jarnail Singh Bin Laden, Osama Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bouillon, Godfrey de Bullinger, Heinrich Calvin, John Clement V, Pope Constantine Cromwell, Oliver Cyrus II, King of Persia Dalai Lama XIV Deborah Dev, Guru Arjan Duc, Thich Quong El Cid Emicho Erasmus, Desiderius Frederick II and the Papacy, Conflict of Gandhi, Mahatma Gideon Goodman, Christopher Grotius, Hugo Hanh, Thich Nhat Hassan al-Banna Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Henry VIII Hobbes, Thomas Hus, Jan

Ibn Khaldun Ibn Taymiyah Innocent III Iqbal, Muhammad Jesus as Warrior Joan of Arc Josephus Joshua Khalid ibn al-Walid Khomeni, Ruhollah al-Musavi King, Martin Luther, Jr. King David as Warrior Knox, John Konishi Yukinaga Lactantius Las Casas, Bartolomé de Lawrence of Arabia Locke, John Luther, Martin Maccabeus, Judas Mahdi Maimonides Martin of Tours Martyrs, Jesuit Marx, Karl Melanchthon, Philip Melito of Sardis Merton, Thomas Mohammed Omar, Mullah More, Thomas Mu’awiya Muhammad as Warrior Nachmanides Nānak, Guru Nur Al-Din Origen and War Penn, William Pius XII, Pope Ponet, John Saint George Saint Ursula Saladin Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar

xx  Guide to Related Topics

Sayyid Qutb Shoko Asahara Shouren, Wang Simons, Menno Singh, Bābā Dīp Singh, Guru Gobind Sōen Shaku Suarez, Francisco Süleyman the Magnificent Tarsusi, Ali ibn Mardi al Vattel, Emmerich de Vermigli, Peter Martyr Viret, Pierre Vitoria, Francisco de Voetius, Gisbertus Walter the Penniless Warrior Saints William of Adam Wingate, Orde Wollebius, Johannes Zwingli, Huldrych

Rise of Islam

Abbasid Revolution (747–750) Almohad Revolution Assassins Ayyubids Badr, Battle of (624) Buyids Caliphate Camel, Battle of the (656) Covadonga, Battle of (ca. May 28, 722) Cresson, Battle of (1187) Damascus, Arab Conquest of (634 CE) Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb Egypt, Fatimid Conquest of Fatimid Conquest of Baghdad Fatimid Conquest of North Africa Hadith and War Ibn Khaldun Ibn Taymiyah India, Muslim Conquest of Northern Islam and War (Jihad) Jerusalem, Sieges of

Karbala, Battle of (680 CE) Khalid ibn al Walid (d. 642 CE) Khandaq, Battle of (627 CE) Khaybar, Battle of (629 CE) Mahdi Masts, Battle of the (655) Military Raid in Islam Mu’awiya Muhammad as Warrior Muslim Armies of the Crusades Muslim Civil War, First (656–661) Muslim Civil War, Second (680–692) Muslim Conquest of Egypt Muslim Conquest of Iraq Muslim Conquest of Persia Muslim Conquest of Sindh Nahawand, Battle of (641) Nur Al-Din (1118–1174) Peace in the Qur’an Qadisiyya, Battle of (636 CE) Qarmati Uprising (923–951 CE) Qur’an and War Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) (632–633CE) Saladin (1138–1193) Salafism Saracens Sharia and War Siffin, Battle of (657 CE) Sufism and War Süleyman the Magnificent and War Sunni-Shi’a Conflict Talas, Battle of (751) Tarsusi, Ali ibn Mardi al Uhud, Battle of (625) Yarmouk, Battle of (636) Zab, Battle of (750) Zanj Rebellion (869–893)

Sacred Texts and Traditions

Ahimsa Apocalyptic Literature Apocalypticism and War, Christian Apocalypticism and War, Jewish Apocalypticism and War, Muslim

Guide to Related Topics  xxi

Arianism and War Baha’i Faith and War Bhagavad Gita and War Bhindranale, Jarnail Singh Bible and War Buddhism and War Bushido Canon Law on War Christianity and War Confucianism and War Daoism and War Dasam Granth Hadith and War Hinduism and War Islam and War (Jihad) Jahiliyya and Asabiyyah Jainism and War Jerusalem as Holy City Judaism and War Just War Tradition Milhemet Misvah Milhemet Reshut Pacifism, Religious Peace in the Qur’an Qur’an and War Sharia and War Shinto and War Shrine Cults: East Indies Sufism and War Syrian Orthodox Church is Christian Talmud and War Transcendentalism and War Zen and War Zionism and War Zoroastrianism and War

20th and 21st Centuries

Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1979–1989) Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–) Al Qaeda Al Shabaab Antisemitism Arab-Israeli War of 1948 Armenian Massacres

Aum Shinrikyo Ayodhya Conflict (1992) Balfour Declaration (1917) Balkan Wars (1912–1913) Bin Laden, Osama Boko Haram Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Camp David Accords (1978) Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Cold War, Religious Dimensions of Druze and War Duc, Thich Quong (1897–1963) Easter Rising (1916) First World War and Religious Art First World War, Religious Dimensions of Gandhi, Mahatma Gaza War (2006) Gott mit uns Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922) Haganah Hamas Hanh, Thich Nhat Hassan al-Banna Hezbollah Holocaust Hybrid War of the 21st Century, Religious Dimensions of India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in India, Religious Conflict in Indo-Pakistani Wars International Religious Freedom and Human Rights Intifada Iqbal, Muhammad Iranian Revolution (1979) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Islam and War (Jihad) Islamic State Jos Riots (2010) Kamikaze Kashmir Conflict Khilafat Movement Khomeni, Ruhollah al-Musavi King, Martin Luther, Jr. Kosovo War (1999)

xxii  Guide to Related Topics

Kurds Lawrence of Arabia Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982) Lebanon, Israeli Operations against (2006) Liberation Theology Liberian Civil Wars Mau Mau Rebellion Merton, Thomas Meskhetian Turks Militarism, Religious Military Chaplains Military Chaplains, African American Mohammed Omar, Mullah Mujahideen Muslim Brotherhood Nazism, Religious Aspects of Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict Nostra Aetate Oslo Accords (1993) Pacem in Terris Pakistan, Religious Violence in Palestine Liberation Organization Pius XII Radical Islam in the 20th Century Religious Propaganda and War Religious Wars and Mortality Rates Saffron Revolution (2007) Saudi-Hashemite Wars Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar Sayyid Qutb Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) Second World War, Japanese Empire, and Islam Second World War, Religious Dimensions of Shoko Asahara Sinn Fein Six-Day War (1967) Sōen Shaku South Vietnamese Buddhist Uprising (1966) Southeast Asia, Religious Conflict Spanish-American War, Religious Dimensions of Spanish Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Sufism and War Sunni-Shi’a Conflict

Taiping Rebellion Tajikistan Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Taliban Tamil Tigers Terrorism and Religion Tibetan Rebellion (1959) Uighur Unrest in Xinjiang Wahhabism Wingate, Orde Yasukuni Shrine Yom Kippur War (1973) Young Turks Zionism and War

Wars, Conflicts, and Rebellions

Afghanistan, Soviet War in Afghanistan, U.S. War in American Civil War, Religious Dimensions of American Revolution, Religious Dimensions of Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of Anglo-Afghan War Anglo-Sikh Wars Arab-Israeli War of 1948 Austro-Ottoman Wars Ayodhya Conflict Balkan Wars Bar Kochba Revolt Basmachi Rebellion Bishops’ Wars Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035) Byzantine-Seljuk Wars Camisards, Revolt of Carlist Wars Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Christian-Muslim Wars in Spain Cold War, Religious Dimensions of Cologne War Crimean War, Religious Dimensions of Druze-Maronite Conflict Easter Rising Eighty Years’ War, or Dutch War of Independence English Civil Wars Ethiopian-Adal War First World War, Religious Dimensions of

Guide to Related Topics  xxiii

Frederick II and the Papacy, Conflict of French and Indian War, Religious Dimensions of French Wars of Religion Gaza War German Peasants’ War Greco-Turkish War Hindu Mythological Wars Hybrid War of the 21st Century, Religious Dimensions of Illinois Mormon War India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in India, Religious Conflict in Indian Mutiny Indo-Pakistani Wars Intifada Iran-Iraq War Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy Israelite Wars of the Judges Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy Jewish Revolt Kappel, Wars of Kashmir Conflict King Philip’s War Kosovo War Languedoc Revolts Lebanese Civil War Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of Liberian Civil Wars Maccabean Revolt Mad Mullah, Wars of the Mahdist Revolution in Sudan Mau Mau Rebellion Mexican-American War, Religious Dimensions of Missouri Mormon War Mormon Rebellion Mughal-Maratha Wars Mughal-Sikh Wars Münster Rebellion Muslim Civil War, First Muslin Civil War, Second Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict Ottoman-Persian Wars Pakistan, Religious Violence in Papal-Imperial Conflict

Prayer Book Rebellion Pueblo Revolt Qarmati Uprising Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) Saudi-Hashemite Wars Saxon Wars Schmalkaldic War Second Sudanese Civil War Second World War, Religious Dimensions of Shimabara Rebellion Six-Day War South Vietnamese Buddhist Uprising Spanish-American War, Religious Dimensions of Spanish Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Sunni-Shi’a Conflict Taiping Rebellion Tajikistan Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Thirty Years’ War Three Kingdoms, War of the Tibetan Rebellion Tripolitan War Wars of the Reformation Wyatt’s Rebellion Yom Kippur War Zanj Rebellion

Wars of the Protestant Reformation

Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants Alsted, Johann Heinrich Ames, William Anabaptist Pacifism Beza, Theodore Bullinger, Heinrich Calvin, John Camisards, Revolt of (1702–1704) Catholic (Holy) League Cologne War (1583–1588) Edict of Fontainebleau Eighty Years’ War or Dutch War of Independence (1568–1648) English Civil War Erasmus, Desiderius French Wars of Religion German Peasants’ War (1524–1525)

xxiv  Guide to Related Topics

Goodman, Christopher Kappel, Wars of (1529–1531) Knox, John Locke, John Luther, Martin Melanchthon, Philip More, Thomas Münster Rebellion (1534–1535) On War Against the Turk Ponet, John Prayer Book Rebellion (1549) Protestant Reformers and War Puritans and War Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (1572)

Simons, Menno Suarez, Francisco Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) Three Kingdoms, War of the (1638–1660) Viret, Pierre Vitoria, Francisco de Voetius, Gisbertus Wars of the Reformation Westphalia, Peace of (1648) Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved Wollebius, Johannes Wyatt’s Rebellion (1554) Zwingli, Huldrych

H Hachiman, Japanese God of War Hachiman is the Japanese deity of war and archery. His name translates literally to “eight banners,” signifying the banners that were signals of the birth of the Emperor Ojin in the year 270 CE. This is Hachiman’s Shinto manifestation, and he would later be merged into the panoply of Buddhist gods as well. Hachiman is an important deity in Japanese mythology as he emerges from both the Shinto and Buddhist traditions in Japan. Although not actually a “god of war” in the image of Mars or other such gods in various cultural traditions, Hachiman was worshipped by many samurai and warriors in Japan’s history as a protector of warriors. He is also recognized as the protector of the nation of Japan and of the Japanese people. Hachiman was also worshipped by farmers and fishermen in Shinto times prior to Buddhism’s arrival in Japan in approximately the sixth century CE. Hachiman is usually worshipped alongside two other significant deities— Jingo, the mother of Emperor Ojin, and the deity known as Himegami, a Shinto goddess. While Hachiman is often worshipped together with these other deities, there are extant shrines dedicated solely to Hachiman in Japan today. Hachiman provides an example of the convergence of Shinto and Buddhism in Japan. While he emerged in ancient Japan during the time of Shinto, prior to Buddhism’s

This statue from the Kamakura period (12th–14th century) in Japan portrays Hachiman, the god of war, dressed as a Buddhist monk. (DeAgostini/Getty Images)

323

324  Hadith and War

arrival, he became a Buddhist deity and was given the name Hachiman Daibosatsu in the eighth century CE. In modern-day Kamakura, the Hachimangu shrine still stands and is often used for archery demonstrations and samurai reenactments. Jeffrey M. Shaw See also Buddhism and War; Bushido; Ikko-ikki; Shinto and War; Zen and War Further Reading Aston, W. G. Nihongi: Volume 1. Chronicle of Japan from Earliest Times to A.D. 697. New York: Cosimo, 2008. Kanda, Christine Guth. Shinzō: Hachiman Imagery and Its Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1985. Sansom, George. A History of Japan to 1315. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958.

Hadith and War War is one of the subjects addressed in the hadith, which is a collection of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. Entire chapters of both Sunni hadith collections such as the Sahih of al-Bukhari and Shi’a hadith collections such as the al-Kafi by al-Kulayni preserve the actual sayings of the Prophet. Hadith related to the subject of war range in categories; some provide a record of previous battles, others discuss the importance of fighting for the cause of Islam, and many address the appropriate division of war spoils. There even exist hadith that provide for stratagems in war, such as the statement that “War is deception” (al-harbu khad’atun). Perhaps most important, Muslim jurisprudence has been significantly influenced by the hadith that focus on the rules and laws of war. The sanctioning of war was first revealed in the Qur’an. Multiple verses indicate that war was authorized, such as, “Permission [to fight] is given to those upon whom war is made because they are oppressed,” which appears in verse 22:39. Permission to engage in combat was further iterated in the hadith traditions. Multiple hadith collections report the following, “Fight in the name of Allah and in the way of Allah. Fight against those who disbelieve in Allah. Make a

holy war, do not embezzle the spoils; do not break your pledge; and do not mutilate (the dead) bodies; do not kill the children. When you meet your enemies who are polytheists, invite them to three courses of action. If they respond to any one of these, you also accept it and withhold yourself from doing them any harm” (Sahih Muslim). According to this hadith, hostilities could be initiated only after providing opponents with the options of converting to Islam, migrating to Muslim territories, or paying a tax. What remains unclear is whether this authorization of force was restricted to a defensive struggle or could be applied to offensive initiatives. Hadith provide no explicit directives on the issue; some hadith praise those participating in battle and dying in the cause of Islam, but other traditions report that battle should be avoided and those who had not adopted Islam should not be antagonized. It would be later Muslim legal experts and scholars who defined the valid justifications of war, jus ad bellum. Hadith do, however, offer greater clarity regarding jus in bellum, or the limits and rules regarding actual conduct in war. The above cited hadith does much to explain verses in the Qur’an concerning the limitations of war. The Qur’an states, “And fight in the way of Allah with those who fight with you, and do not exceed the limits” (2:190). Approval to wage war is given but fighting is not to be without limits. Hadith specify rules of conduct, for example, refraining from killing children, mutilating bodies, and so on. Additional hadith expressly repeat the prohibition on intentionally killing women, children, the elderly, and the infirmed but do not find fault if women and children are inadvertently killed under certain circumstances, for example, if a town/city is raided at night. Overall, there exists a large body of hadith addressing issues of war. Both existing precedent and contemporary interpretations of hadith define existing Muslim laws of war. Matthew Long See also Islam and War (Jihad); Muhammad as Warrior Further Reading Al-Dawoody, Ahmed. The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. al-Shaybani, Muhammad ibn Hasan. The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar. Translated by Majid Khadduri. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.

Haganah 325 Kelsay, John. Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics. Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1993.

Haganah The Haganah was a Jewish underground paramilitary organization initially formed to protect the Jewish community (Yishuv) in Palestine from armed attacks by Palestinian Arabs. The word “Haganah” comes from the Hebrew word for defense. Following the end of the British Mandate over Palestine in 1948, the Haganah remodeled itself from a milita-based organization to one that resembled a regular army. This transformation enabled the Yishuv to successfully defend itself against five invading Arab armies and armed Palestinian units during the War of Independence. The Haganah formed the core element of the new state’s army—the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Prominent members who fought in the Haganah included the future chief of staff of the IDF and minister of defense Moshe Dayan as well as two future prime ministers,Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon. The origins of Haganah lay in the latter half of the 19th century with the Zionist movement and its cause—the desire of a homeland for Jews in Palestine. In the 1880s only 25,000 Jewish settlers lived there, but by 1914 the number of immigrants travelling to the Holy Land rose to 85,000 and by the end of World War I it reached 160,000. In 1917 the British government published the Balfour Declaration: “His Majesty’s Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” Immigration numbers continued to rise. By 1939 more than 400,000 Jewish settlers were resident in Palestine, eking out a living mainly on collective farms (kibbutzim). The arrival of thousands of the Jewish Diaspora was not welcomed by the native Arabs, who expressed their resentment through sporadic riots and attacks against Jews, their property and settlements. The League of Nations intervened to grant Britain a Mandate over Palestine to keep the peace between both communities and to act as the governing authority in the area. This intervention failed to appease Arab anger, which expressed itself most sharply during the Arab Revolt from 1936 to 1939. In response to

growing Arab violence and rising nationalism, the British government published a white paper in 1939 (drawn up by the colonial secretary, Malcolm MacDonald) that reneged on commitments made previously: “His Majesty’s Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State.” Jewish immigration was capped at 12,000 per year for five years, after which approval would be needed by the Arab majority. Believing that they were under threat from both the Palestinian Arabs as well as the British Mandate administration, the Yishuv decided to form an armed milita force to protect themselves and their property. This organization was named Haganah. Under the leadership of Eliyahu Golomb, Haganah was structured into various units: field units (Plugoth Sadeh), night units, strike units (P’ulot Meyuhadoth), an intelligence unit (Shai), an elite commando unit (Palmach), a secret arms industry (Ta’as), an arms acquisition unit (Rekhesh), and an immigration unit for guiding Jewish refugees to Palestine (Bri’ha). All units were answerable to a chief command (Itzhak Sadeh). The British naval and land blockade made weapons smuggling and Jewish immigration difficult, but the arrival of war in 1939 and the desert campaign in North Africa provided Haganah with opportunities. Haganah operatives liaised with Jewish officers serving in the British Army in Egypt to acquire weaponry to protect Jewish settlements in Palestine. Haganah units also raided British depots. This was controversial because Britain was fighting against Nazi Germany. When a clearer picture emerged of German mass slaughter of European Jewry, Haganah adopted a more pro-British position and acquired weapons through international arms dealers instead. This was in marked contrast to two other underground Jewish milita forces—Irgun Zvai Leumi (Irgun/ IZL) and Lohamei Herut Israel (Lehi)—that carried out violent terrorist attacks against British targets both military and civilian. David Ben-Gurion—chairman of the Jewish Agency and future prime minister—ordered Haganah to collaborate with the British and round up and arrest Irgun and Lehi fighters. Haganah’s pro-British stance changed again in October 1945 when the postwar Labour government refused thousands of Holocaust survivors trapped on ships and in

326 Hamas

refugee camps entrance into Palestine. Haganah cooperated with Irgun and Lehi to form a united resistance movement to frustrate British governance over the Mandate. Infrastructure targets were given priority. In one instance, on June 16–17, 1946, Haganah units attacked 11 bridges, destroying 10. The success of this coordinated movement ended, however, after the bombing of the King David Hotel that killed 92 people, including 17 Jews. The hotel was the center of the Mandate’s military and administration but was also a civilian location. After initially approving the plan, Haganah then vetoed it but Irgun—under the command of future prime minister Menachem Begin—continued with the mission. After this act of terror, the British soon announced their intention to depart Palestine and on April 2, 1947, the United Nations (UN) discussed its future. A special UN committee recommended a two-state solution, which was rejected by the Arabs but accepted by BenGurion. A vote was approved on November 29, 1947, authorizing the partition of Palestine. Haganah prepared for war with the Arab states. Ben-Gurion placed Haganah under greater civilian oversight and instigated a major transformation in the organization. Brigades replaced platoons and a modern mass-industrialized army was formed augmented by immigrants from Europe and abroad as well as by arms acquisitions in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the United States. When the state of Israel was formed on May 14, 1948, it was attacked within hours by five Arab forces (Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt). More than 16,000 volunteers formed Haganah’s ranks. Necessity required an amalgamation of Haganah with all Jewish resistance organizations, and on May 26 the Israeli Defense Forces was created. The IDF numbers stood by December at 92,000 armed with 59,389 rifles, 21,343 submachine guns, 6,436 machine guns, and 253 artillery pieces. Armed with Messerschmitt fighters and B-17s procured by Haganah operatives, Israel bombed Arab cities and troop convoys. The War of Independence added more than 21 percent more land to Israel’s borders and secured Galilee and the Negev as well as the western sector of Jerusalem. It left the state in control of the coastal plain at a cost of 6,000 dead, approximately 1 percent of the total civilian population. While considered a terrorist organization by some, the Haganah played an important role in achieving victory

thanks to its experienced personnel and the ability of its units to adapt to new warfare—total war. Barry N. Whelan See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Balfour Declaration; Zionism and War Further Reading Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime. London: Simon & Schuster, 2003. Gordis, Daniel. Menachem Begin: The Battle for Israel’s Soul. New York: Schocken Books, 2014. Mardor, Munya M. Haganah. New York: New American Library, 1964. Morris, Benny. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008. Rogan, Eugene L., and Avi Shlaim. The War for Palestine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Hamas Hamas, also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement, is an anti-Israeli organization that exhibits both Islamic fundamentalism and Palestinian nationalism. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi co-founded Hamas at the beginning of the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987. The group had previously been the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas’s leadership includes a political bureau led by Khaled Meshaal and a shura council located in Damascus, Syria. Regional shura councils coordinate local affairs, especially in the Gaza Strip. Both Syria and Iran provide varying levels of support for Hamas. The leadership of Hamas outlined the group’s goals with a charter on August 18, 1988. The anti-Israeli document calls for the destruction of Israel through violent jihad and the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state. The main objective of Hamas is the formation of an Islamic Palestinian state encompassing the territory of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the land of Israel. The group’s charter directly links this objective to religion, characterizing the territory as a waqf (religious endowment). The issue of Palestine is central to Hamas. Palestinians are predominately Arab and Sunni Muslim. Israel occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights as a result of the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War

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in 1967. There are approximately four million Palestinians in these occupied territories, with the vast majority being Sunni Muslims. Hamas’s aspiration to create an Islamic Palestinian state includes the explicit aim of implementing sharia law through courts that would apply Islamic legal principles. Hamas encourages violence to achieve its goals, including internally to consolidate its own control over the West Bank (less successful) and the Gaza Strip (more successful) and externally to attack Israel. Hamas has employed suicide bombings and especially rocket and mortar attacks against Israel originating primarily from the Gaza Strip. Hamas launched more than 2,300 rockets and more than 200 mortar shells during 2012 alone. Hamas’s goals and methods as well as the proximity of Israel and Hamas present significant religious issues and the potential for conflict. Both Islam and Judaism consider Haram al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary)/Temple Mount located in Jerusalem a holy site. It includes the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque. Israel gained control of Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in 1967 when it captured East Jerusalem. The Jerusalem Islamic Waqf, a Jordanian organization, administers the holy site, while Israeli police control admission to the area. Some Muslims, especially those from the Gaza Strip, have limited access to the holy site, while Jews pray at the Western Wall because they lack full admittance to the Temple Mount. Hamas carries out wide-ranging military, community, and media operations. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, numbering approximately 2,500 personnel, execute Hamas’s military operations. Hamas also created a police organization known as Executive Force after its electoral victory in 2006. Executive Force is situated within the Ministry of Interior, and some estimates number its size at close to 10,000 members. Hamas performs community operations through an extensive social welfare network known as dawa. Hamas’s community operations are significant and include many schools and charities. The group also conducts far-reaching media operations promulgated through the Internet and Hamas’s own Al Aqsa Television. Hamas uses these efforts to garner supporters, which some estimates number in the tens of thousands. Even though the U.S. government officially designated Hamas a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, Hamas has increasingly moved into the political

arena. Palestinian Authority president Yasser Arafat died in November 2004. Mahmoud Abbas succeeded Arafat in that role in January 2005. Hamas exploited the change in leadership to challenge the Palestinian Authority openly in politics. The Palestinian Legislative Council held elections in January 2006. Hamas candidates won 74 of the 132 seats, approximately 56 percent of the total. Hamas also secured significant Palestinian Authority cabinet positions, such as the Ministry of Interior. Hamas followed its electoral victory by winning effective control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 in an internal Palestinian Authority coup and subsequent military clash with Fatah. The move mirrored the Palestinian Authority’s and Fatah’s consolidation of control in the West Bank at approximately the same time. Since the June 2007 coup, Hamas increasingly has limited religious freedom in the Gaza Strip. Anti-Israeli sermons still routinely occur there, whereas the Palestinian Authority has made some strides to limit their incidence in the West Bank. Israel has responded to frequent Hamas attacks through a series of military operations. Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield in March 2002 in reaction to a lethal Hamas suicide bombing. Israel initiated Operation Cast Lead in December 2008 in retaliation for repeated rocket attacks by Hamas operatives. Israel commenced Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012. Israel Defense Forces decimated Hamas throughout the Gaza Strip. Operation Pillar of Defense resulted in a cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas. The cease-fire ended in December 2013 when Israel conducted air strikes against a Hamas base in the Gaza Strip in reprisal for the killing of an Israeli civilian by a sniper. Both religious faith and nationalistic fervor fuel the recurring conflict between Hamas and Israel. As such, it epitomizes a complex war of religion. It also remains one of the more insoluble problems in the Middle East. Hamas and Israeli leaders have found little room for accommodation in a conflict that has raged for nearly 30 years. William A. Taylor See also Anti-Semitism; Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Balfour Declaration; Hezbollah; Intifada; Islam and War (Jihad); Muslim Brotherhood; Six-Day War; Yom Kippur War; Primary Documents: Article 27 of the Hamas Charter (August 18, 1988)

328  Hanh, Thich Nhat (1926–) Further Reading Gleis, Joshua L., and Benedetta Berti. Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. Gunning, Jeroen. Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. Levitt, Matthew. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007. Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Schanzer, Jonathan. Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Hanh, Thich Nhat (1926–) Thich Nhat Hanh is a Vietnamese Buddhist monk known for his political and social activism. An advocate of nonviolent conflict resolution and the cessation of international military action, Hanh has published more than 100 books on a range of topics, from explications of Buddhist concepts aimed at existing practitioners to more general works designed to introduce lay readers to basic forms of Buddhist practice. Hanh also regularly engages in public speaking, promoting Buddhism across the West, and supporting the propagation of peace. Thich Nhat Hanh was born in Hue, Vietnam, in 1926 as Nguyê˜n Xuân Ba�o, and he began studying Buddhist practice under Thanh Quý Chân Thâ.t at the Từ Hiê´u Temple in 1942. There he assumed the name Thich Nhat Hanh, a title he has been credited with translating into English as “One Action.” In 1966, Hanh was recognized as a dharmacharya, a member of the spiritual lineage of the Buddha and a leader in the Buddhist monastic system. Addressing the escalating conflict in Vietnam in the 1960s, Hanh, in his book Vietnam: Lotus in a Sea of Fire, developed a concept he termed Engaged Buddhism. According to Hanh, Buddhists needed to apply the principles they gleaned from their practice to the social and political conflicts they might find themselves involved in. Practically, this meant that Hanh and other Vietnamese Buddhists, and also Vietnamese Catholics, needed to work

together, in his view, to promote the end of suffering from the actions of both the North and South Vietnamese factions. This stance led to Hanh’s exile from Vietnam, though he was welcomed in the United States by American civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King Jr., who credited Hanh with changing his mind on American involvement in Vietnam. In 1967, King nominated Hanh for a Nobel Prize for his work advocating for peace. Thich Nhat Hanh draws on primarily Zen and Mahayana Buddhist concepts in his work, though he has publicly acknowledged the influence of contemporary psychology as well. The core of Hanh’s peace advocacy is promoting the practice of mindfulness, which he argues encourages greater understanding of others, increased compassion, and a reduction of suffering. Hanh has held teaching appointments at Princeton University and Columbia University, and he is credited with founding both the School of Youth and Social Service and Van Hanh Buddhist University. In 1969, Hanh represented the Buddhist delegation at the Paris Peace Talks, and in 1982 he established Plum Village, a meditation center in the Dordogne region of France where he continues to teach, write, translate Buddhist texts, and create calligraphic art. In 2014, Hanh suffered a stroke that greatly reduced his ability to speak, write, and travel. Hanh still occasionally communicates publicly, however. In late 2014, a letter written by Hanh on the subject of human trafficking was delivered to a papal delegation at the Vatican, and in June 2015, Hanh released a statement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in which he argued for an ecumenical approach to the issue of global warming. Adam K. Sweatman See also Buddhism and War; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Zen and War Further Reading King, Sallie B. Socially Engaged Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009. Moon, Susan, ed. Not Turning Away: The Practice of Engaged Buddhism. Boston: ShambhalaPublications, 2004. Queen, Christopher S. Engaged Buddhism in the West. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2000. Valea, Ernest M. Buddhist-Christian Dialogue as Theological Exchange: An Orthodox Contribution to Comparative Theology. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2015.

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Harbiyah, Battle of (1244) The Battle of Harbiyah (also known as the Battle of La Forbie) took place October 17–18, 1244, between the forces of the Ayyubid Egyptian sultanate, led by the Mamluk Baibars, and the allied troops of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the military orders, and the insurgent Ayyubid provinces in Syria, under the overall command of Walter IV of Brienne, Count of Jaffa and Ascalon. The two-day battle, between about 11,000 troops per side, was an overwhelming Egyptian victory, with more than 5,000 crusaders dead and about 800 taken prisoner. The Battle of Harbiyah is usually seen as the end of the Kingdom of Jerusalem as a military power in the Levant. In 1241 Ayyub, the sultan of Egypt, had signed a peace treaty with the crusader leader Richard, Earl of Cornwall, guaranteeing the security of much of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and ending the Barons’ Crusade. Afterward, the military orders of the Templars and the Hospitallers, backing differing claimants to the throne in Jerusalem, had come to conflict, and even to battle at Acre. In Egypt, after the death of the Ayyubid caliph al-Kāmil in 1238, and fearing that the crusaders would ally with the breakaway lands of Damascus and Homs, the new Ayyubid sultan al-Salih called upon the fierce Turkish nomads the Khwarazmians, under the leadership of Berke Khan, to supplement his forces as mercenaries. The Khwarazmians, now based in Mesopotamia and Syria, who were promised land and money, agreed, and about 10,000 set out to join as-Salih and his army, which was moving northward from Egypt to Gaza in southern Palestine. While en route to Egypt, and under the directions of as-Salih, the Khwarazmians pillaged several cities in the Levant, including Tiberius and Nablus, and captured Jerusalem on July 15, 1244. In Jerusalem they looted the holy places, even killing the priests and worshippers at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, slaughtered thousands of people, and left the city in ruins. The surviving Jerusalemites negotiated safe passage to the coast, but of the 6,000 who left the city, only about 300 survived Khwarazmian ambushes to make it to Jaffa. In response, the Franks called upon Ismail (as-Salih’s uncle) and their Ayyubid allies in Homs and Damascus to join them in battle to regain Jerusalem and avenge the loss of life. The Ayyubids agreed, with the hope of defeating

as-Salih and perhaps taking Egypt as well. The emir of Homs, al-Mansur, suggested following a well-tested strategy of a building a strong defensive position and then waiting for the Khwarazmians to disperse due to their reputed impatience. However, Walter could not let the slaughter at Jerusalem go unchallenged, and on the morning of October 17, 1244, the Christians and their allies attacked the Egyptian Ayyubid alliance near the village of La Forbie. The Egyptian/Khwarazmian lines held, and then on the 18th, Baibars ordered the Khwarazmians to attack the center of the crusader alliance at the point where the Damascene soldiers were stationed. The center gave way under vicious attack and the Damascenes retreated. Though they fought fiercely for several hours, the Syrio-Frankish alliance fell and a great slaughter took place. The Battle of Harbiyah marked the end of the military strength of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and motivated Pope Innocent IV to call for the Seventh Crusade. R. Don Deal See also Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of; Seventh Crusade Further Reading Asbridge, Thomas. The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land. New York: HarperCollins, 2011. Lotan, Shlomo. “The Battle of La Forbie (1244) and Its Aftermath—Re-examination of the Military Orders’ Involvement in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem in the midThirteenth Century.” Ordines Militares: Yearbook for the Study of the Military Orders XVII (2012): 53–67. Lower, Michael. The Barons’ Crusade: A Call to Arms and Its Consequences. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2005.

Harran, Battle of (1104) The Battle of Harran was fought over the course of several days from May 4 to 7, 1104, in the Balikh River Valley near the location of the present-day city of Harran. The contemporary incarnation of Harran rests near the border between Turkey and Syria, only a short distance from the historical settlement, which was originally located in Upper Mesopotamia. In 1104, the Seljuk Turks attacked the County of Edessa, seeking to regain control of this

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settlement from Frankish occupation following the First Crusade (1096–1099). The resulting Battle of Harran was a disastrous engagement for Frankish forces, resulting in a substantive defeat for the Europeans of the First Crusade. The Seljuk Turks recaptured territory they had lost during the First Crusade, a victory that marked the beginning of a resurgence of Muslim strength and ultimately led to increasing regional instability. The Battle of Harran, the first assault against the newly established Frankish territories, was fought by the Seljuk Turks of Mosul and Mardin against the crusader states of the Principality of Antioch and Edessa. The Seljuk Turks sought to conquer the settlement, which had continued to present a threat to Muslim interests in the region. In early 1104, the Seljuk Turks attacked the County of Edessa, leading its ruler, Baldwin II or Baldwin of Bourcq, the Count of Edessa (1060–1131), to request assistance from nearby Christian holdings, including the Principality of Antioch. In response, in May 1104, Baldwin besieged the city of Harran along with Bohemond I of Antioch (1058–1111) and Joscelin of Courtenay (d. 1131). However, the Turkish Seljuks, aware of the Christian alliance and invasion of their territory, met the Frankish army with several thousand Muslims, including troops from Mosul and Mardin. Following two days of combat near Harran, the Muslim forces feigned a retreat, leading the crusader forces into the Balikh River Valley, a tactic that resulted in the entrapment and nearly complete destruction of the pursuing Frankish and Edessan troops, as well as the capture of both Joscelin of Courtenay and Baldwin II. Sensing that the situation was lost, Bohemond I (1058–1111), the ruler of the Principality of Antioch, fled to Edessa, which was also soon besieged by Turkish Muslims. The Battle of Harran resulted in a substantive defeat for the crusader and Edessan forces. As a result, the Frankish control of the region, in existence since the First Crusade, began to collapse, leading to a Muslim resurgence. Following the Battle of Harran, Edessan influence dwindled and the Principality of Antioch increasingly came to rely upon Byzantine assistance. Baldwin would win his release in 1108 and would be named the king of Jerusalem (1118– 1131). Subsequently, around 1260, following the Mongolian invasion of Syria, the settlement of Harran was destroyed. Sean Morton

See also Antioch, Siege of; Edessa, County of; First Crusade Further Reading Runciman, S. A History of the Crusades. Vol. II: The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish East, 1100–1187. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Tyre, W. A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea. Translated by E. Babcock and A. Krey. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943.

Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) An important Islamic thinker, reformist, and founder of the Society of Muslim Brothers, better known as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna promoted the notion of resisting Westernization and reforming Islam by returning to true Islam, thus forming a society based on the Qur’an and Islamic tradition (Sunna). He succeeded in spreading his ideology not only in his native country of Egypt, but also throughout the Muslim world, especially succeeding in conveying his message to the mass population and not only to the elites. Hassan al-Banna was born in 1906 in the rural town of al-Mahmudiyya in Egypt. His father, Sheikh Ahmad alRahman al-Banna al-Sa’ati, served as the imam and teacher of the local mosque, while also working as a watch repairer. Growing up in al-Mahmudiyya, al-Banna was educated in a local mosque and at the age of 12, he enrolled in a primary school. Since the age of 13, he also participated in the activities of the local branch of the al-Hassafiyya Sufi order. In addition, al-Banna learned his father’s trade of watch repairer. In 1923, al-Banna moved to Egypt’s capital, Cairo, where he enrolled in the Dar al-’Ulum teacher training college. While attending Dar al-’Ulum, al-Banna witnessed the Westernization of Egyptian society for the first time. He also made important connections within the Islamic circles of the city, participating in the activities of organizations such as the Islamic Society for Nobility of Islamic Morals and the Young Men’s Muslim Association. In 1927, al-Banna graduated from Dar al-’Ulum, and upon graduation received an appointment as a teacher in a primary

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school in the city of Ismailiya, located near the Suez Canal, then dominated by European foreigners, as well as being the headquarters of the British and French Suez Canal companies. After his arrival in Ismailiya, al-Banna began preaching in coffee shops and mosques. It was in Ismailiya that al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, serving as its General Guide for life. From Ismailiya, the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood spread into additional villages and cities, and al-Banna traveled throughout the country, recruiting new activists. By 1946, a hierarchical system already was in use. Al-Banna oversaw all of the existing branches, with the Brotherhood’s headquarters in Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood’s main purpose was to encourage people to practice what al-Banna considered to be true Islam. Inspired by previous Islamic reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, al-Banna believed that the cause of European political and economic superiority over the Muslims was the fact that the Muslims strayed from true Islam. The solution for Egypt’s political, social, and economic problems was the embrace of a true Islamic way of life, based on the Qur’an and the Sunna. However, al-Banna accepted several Western concepts, such as the constitutional monarchy, which was in use in Egypt, and believed that with modifications and reforms it would be appropriate for a true Islamic state. In 1949, after members of the Muslim Brotherhood assassinated the Egyptian prime minister, members of the Egyptian secret police assassinated Hassan al-Banna. Leon Volfovsky See also Muslim Brotherhood; Qur’an and War; Sayyid Qutb Further Reading Euben, Roxanne Leslie, and Muhammad Qasim. Princeton Readings in Islamic Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Bamma to Bin Laden. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. Kandil, Hazem. Inside the Brotherhood. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015. Kraemer, Gudrun. Hassan al Banna. London: One World Publications, 2010. Lia, Brynjar. The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928–1942. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1997.

Mitchell, Richard. The Society of the Muslim Brothers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969. Qaradawi, Yusuf. Islamic Education and Hassan al Banna. Aachen, Germany: International Federation of Islamic Student Organizations, 1984. Rahnema, Ali, ed. Pioneers of Islamic Revival. London: Zed Books, 1994. Ziad, Abu-Amr. Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

Hattin, Battle of (1187) At the end of the 11th century, the First Crusade had won for European Christians the strip of coast along the eastern Mediterranean Sea. From Antioch in the north to Gaza in the south, for the time being, the Holy Land was under Christian command, if not control. The imposition of feudalism in the region had alienated even the Christian inhabitants, while persecution of Islam and Judaism had angered the remainder of the populace. Further, the rivalries that had existed in Europe were transplanted to the Middle East, and fighting among the Europeans was as common as that between Christians and Muslims. Muslim fortunes began to recover under the leadership of Imad ad-Din Zangi of Mosul, then of his son Nur ad-Din. A Second Crusade proved to be a major failure and Nur adDin became more aggressive in the mid-12th century. His death in 1174 opened the door for a rising general from Egypt, Salah-al-din Yusuf ibn-Ayyub, better known in the West as Saladin. Upon the deaths of Nur-ad-Din and King Almaric of Jerusalem (both leaving 11-year-old heirs), Saladin made his move by marching out of Egypt for Damascus, which he occupied in November 1174. His next target was Aleppo, which would give him control over all of Syria. Political issues delayed that advance; meanwhile disaster struck for the crusaders. The Byzantine emperor Manuel was defeated by Seljuk Turks, and this cut the overland supply line from Europe to the Middle East. With both Christians and Muslims worried about administrative problems, the crusaders and Saladin signed a truce in 1180. Through the 1170s and 1180s, a succession struggle for the throne in Jerusalem dominated the interests of the

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crusaders. By 1187, two major factions emerged. Guy de Lusignan became king of Jerusalem and received the support of most of the knights, but Reynald of Chatillon, at the castle of Kerak on the Mecca-Damascus highway, was a rival. By attacking Muslim caravans and raiding Muslim towns, he provoked Saladin. When Guy would not punish Reynald for violating the 1180 truce, Saladin declared holy war and invaded. Although Guy de Lusignan was king of Jerusalem, his vassals exercised a lot of independence. Rather than support Reynald’s attacks, Bohemond of Antioch and Raymond of Tripoli renewed the truce with Saladin. Raymond then conspired with Saladin to overthrow Guy. When he learned of this, Guy’s advisers urged him to attack Raymond, then at his wife’s castle at Tiberius on the west shore of the Sea of Galilee. After a skirmish between some of Saladin’s troops and a deputation from Guy, Raymond decided he could not fight alongside Muslims against fellow Christians. In May 1187 he left his wife’s castle to make his peace with Guy. During that meeting, word came that Saladin had attacked Tiberius with 20,000 men, capturing the city and besieging Raymond’s wife in the citadel. Raymond argued to Guy that they should not react too hastily, as the supply situation around Tiberius would certainly force Saladin’s withdrawal. Further, the summer’s heat was fast coming on. Guy’s counselors, however, argued for the sake of honor that they move immediately. In late June 1,200 knights and 18,000 infantry marched toward Tiberius. On the morning of July 3, the army was marching eastward, but more in search of water than the enemy army. When Saladin heard of this advance, he exulted, for he knew his heavily armed and armored enemy would become parched along the way. He sent his light cavalry to harass the crusaders. Their attack on the rear guard of Knights Hospitallers and Knights Templars brought the column’s march to a halt in the middle of a very dry emptiness. The crusaders camped near the town of Hattin under two high mounds, called the Horns. Sunset brought little relief, for what water the troops had brought was long since consumed and the Muslims kept up a constant barrage of arrows into the camp. Further, Saladin had his men set fire to the scrub brush upwind from the camp, forcing the

soldiers and horses to breathe smoke all night. The next morning, the Muslim troops would not close with the crusader force but kept up their constant barrage of arrows. The crusader heavy cavalry charged in an attempt to break up the harassing fire, but in doing so separated themselves from the support of the infantry, which retreated in panic up the slopes of the Horns. Raising the True Cross, which they had brought on the campaign, the inspired infantry attacked downhill repeatedly but could not break through. Raymond led a final charge as the Muslims began to close in on the camp, but the Muslim forces merely opened up and let him ride through, isolating him from the remainder of the army. They proved to be the only crusaders to escape. Although the crusaders certainly inflicted serious casualties on Saladin’s forces, it was insufficient and the Christian army was annihilated. Although Saladin treated Guy as a guest, Reynald and the Knights Templars and Hospitallers were all executed. The True Cross fell into Muslim hands, symbolically marking the end of Christian power in the region. Jerusalem fell three months later, and Christian dominance in the Middle East would never be reestablished. Paul K. Davis See also First Crusade; Knights Templar; Saladin; Second Crusade; Third Crusade Further Reading France, John. Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000– 1300. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. Fuller, J. F. C. A Military History of the Western World, Vol. 1. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1954. Payne, Robert. The Dream and the Tomb. New York: Stein & Day, 1984.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831) G. W. F. Hegel is one of the most influential and systematic of the philosophers identified with German idealism. Writing in the aftermath of both Immanuel Kant and the French Revolution, Hegel grappled with (among other issues) how and whether human freedom manifested, became known,

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and ultimately was expressed both individually and collectively. He is perhaps best known for his philosophy of history, in which Hegel claimed that dialectical forces that seemingly act to negate one another are, in fact, mutually participatory in the progression (or, at least, potential progression) of human understanding. Throughout his works, Hegel maintains that it is only through the conflict of such forces that an ever greater, more comprehensive synthesis emerges to be discovered. As noted in Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1837, published posthumously), this emergence of knowledge has, in itself, significance: history itself is the means by which existence becomes more fully known. Rather than a mere record of events, history therefore becomes “real,” a “spirit” (“Geist”) to be known, with human life being both vessel and vehicle for a greater realization of the fullness of reality.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who is considered to be one of the greatest German philosophers, had a significant influence on the study and influence of Protestant Christianity, as well as the development of modern political systems. (Library of Congress)

Hegel’s work can serve to demarcate the end of Enlightenment thinking, as well as the beginning of modernity within philosophy and political thought. He is very much writing against the legalism of preceding Enlightenment thought, which Hegel and his fellow idealists interpreted, in the wake of Napoleon’s wars, as intrinsically tied to French revolutionary expansionism. Napoleon himself had a profound impact on Hegel, who claimed to see the French general during the wars at Jena. In Napoleon, Hegel saw a “world-soul” whose actions would manifest, in human history, a greater understanding of both reality and human freedom within it. Hegel would afterward consistently struggle to reconcile the constructive and destructive dynamics of war throughout his metaphysics, philosophy of history, and political philosophy. Hegel’s idealist approach, similar to that of his contemporaries Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, moved beyond (or outright dismissed) the social contract theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as well as the materialism of Thomas Hobbes and the empiricism of John Locke. It is also possible to consider Hegel in relation to the Romantics of the first German Romantic movement, though identifying him explicitly as such remains debatable. Still, Hegel’s philosophy can be read in light of early German Romanticism in ways similar to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s poetry or Friedrich Schleiermacher’s theology, wherein materialist thinking was understood to not be an exhaustive means of communicating truth. For both groups (and their antecedents in figures such as Friedrich Schiller and Johann Gottfried Herder), previous attempts to ground freedom in a discourse on material rights missed an essential question: for what purpose, and toward what end, were human beings free at all? In works such as Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Hegel explores human freedom as both the process and outcome of an absolute spirit (“Geist”) moving in and through human history. A note on translation is needed here. “Geist” is usually translated as “spirit” or “mind” in English, but it should not be understood as merely either a creature (like a ghost) or a psychological state. Rather, “Geist” intends something more resonate with “reality,” but with the sense that reality itself has intention (if not awareness as humanly understood) and, most importantly, motive force. Existence “wants” to be known, in the sense that

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it literally “is” to be known. Further, the realization of this knowledge of existence is, itself, what freedom essentially is. To be free is to exist in the fullest, most substantively possible way. Yet, human beings can be more or less free. Hegel observes this point not only in terms of concrete bondage (in ways later echoed by Friedrich Nietzsche), but also in terms of free thinking: freedom is to think of oneself as oneself, with reference to one’s own referents and not those of some other party. “Oneself ” here is not merely the individuated self, however. For Hegel, the individual rises to self-consciousness only after and through the mediation of those preceding forces that, in turn, make any individuated perspective comprehensible. Society therefore always precedes itself, even as it pursues a more expansive freedom. Freedom remains the goal of existence, a transcendent truth nonetheless immanent throughout history, in a way that causes human activity to take on extraordinary significance. The movement of peoples (rather than just disparate consensuses of individuals) toward a more thorough expression of freedom suggests that, at various times, nations might institutionally manifest in ways that provide greater opportunities for human life to know itself and its existence in the world. States are thus more than mere engines of commerce or shields against invasions. States are necessary forces in the ongoing revelation of absolute spirit within human history. Hegel’s concept of the state is therefore substantively different from other, earlier theories of government popularized during the Enlightenment, which conceive of the state in more bureaucratic, legalistic, and mechanistic terms. In Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820), Hegel claims, “The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea.” The state is not merely a community of consensus, but an expression of the very resources from which agreement among a people can ever be reached. Hegel finds that Rousseau, Kant, and others had the (admittedly interdependent) causal relationship between individual and community backward: to claim that individuals make the state, for Hegel (and his fellow idealists), begs the question as to how and why any particular group might come together in the first place. Even necessity itself (given, for instance, Hobbes’s war) is not necessarily sufficient, in Hegel’s estimation, to cause

such a group to become a “people.” Rather, “peoplehood” is discovered within oneself and one’s neighbor. From this peoplehood arises the foundation sufficient for the naming of a nation and the emergence of its state. In such a state, then, are found the resources to participate in something truly “world-historic” against other such forces, and thereby more thoroughly realize human freedom. Hegel’s concept of the state as being more than the sum of its constituent parts, his notion of the state as having metaphysical significance, seemed to identify dynamics of human experience that had not been explicitly considered by Western figures since antiquity. There is some criticism, both historic and contemporary, that Hegel functionally deifies the state, turning history into a god and the state into its prophet. If the state is itself an ethical reality, it becomes difficult to articulate against what other ethical parameters the state might be judged. While this Hegelian understanding of the state has enriched liberation movements, including struggles against European imperial colonialization both before and after the World Wars, Hegel’s concept of the state has also been used to justify totalitarianism. Hegel’s philosophy was a significant influence on figures as diverse as W. E. B. DuBois and Karl Marx. Within the field of religion and theology, Hegel greatly impacted the study and interpretation of Christianity, Protestantism in particular. The Western concept of progress, already pervasive due to writers such as Rousseau, also gained new and quasi-religious significance through Hegel’s work. Karl Barth critically engaged Hegel’s positions, as did Ludwig Feuerbach. In some ways, Barth in the 20th century was responding to the ramifications of Hegel’s magnitude in the preceding one. From Feuerbach’s reading of Hegel, especially with regard to the nature and role of religion in history, arose both Marx’s historical materialism and Richard Wagner’s prototypical political romanticism. Both communism and fascism, as experienced in Europe in the 20th century, therefore have conceptual roots in Hegel’s philosophy of history and right. This observation certainly does not disqualify Hegel from further consideration, despite what some partisans might claim. Rather, it more clearly implicates how important the study of Hegel remains in better understanding human structures of history, knowledge, and power.

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In terms of the study of human conflict and its origins, Hegel’s question of whether the state has significance beyond its managerial, technocratic function continues to compel attention. The issue of what renders a particular population a “people” challenges both political theory and the praxis of international order. Such concerns remain relevant in contemporary discourse, especially into the early 21st century in light of the interplay of democratic and nationalist movements throughout both the developing and industrialized world. Troy Mack See also Marx, Karl Further Reading Beiser, Frederick C., ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth Century Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Dorrien, Gary. Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. Safranski, Rüediger. Romanticism: A German Affair. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2014. Solomon, Robert C. In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Henry VIII, King of England (1491–1547) Henry VIII reigned as king of England from 1509 to 1547. He battled against several other nations, hoping to reclaim France, and longed for the days of the Hundred Years’ War. He attempted to reform the church in England, yet remained Catholic in his theology; when the pope refused to annul a previous marriage, King Henry declared himself supreme head of the church. He did leave a successor, Edward VI, but Edward was only a child. Henry VIII could read and speak several languages, including Latin. He was musical as a singer and artistic as a dancer. Henry VIII, second son of Henry VII (1457–1509) and Elizabeth of York, was born on June 28, 1491, at Greenwich Palace. Arthur, an elder brother, died in 1502, so Henry became king of England in 1509. Soon after this he married Catherine of Aragon (1485–1536). He also created a group of combatants known as the “King’s Spears.” Religion

played such a large role in the king’s life that he named his newly manufactured cannons “The Twelve Apostles.” Henry attempted two wars with France, in 1511–1514 and 1522–1525, and claimed the lands of Normandy and Aquitaine for the British. In 1511 he formed alliances with Catherine’s father, Ferdinand II (1452–1516) of Aragon, Pope Julius II, the “Warrior Pope” (1443–1513), and Maximilian I (1459–1519), emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. In April 1512 Henry declared war, but since Ferdinand’s goals differed from his, the latter failed to provide equipment that Henry had expected. A grandiose king, Henry was accompanied by a large entourage administered by Thomas Wolsey, retaining royal ceremonial pomp. Henry briefly held victory in northern France following the pathetic “Battle of the Spurs” (1513); in Thérouanne, the French cavalry retreated. Meanwhile, Catherine’s army defeated that Scots at Flodden in northern England, and left James IV of Scotland dead. In late 1513, Pope Julius was succeeded by Leo X, who pursued peace with France. In August 1514, Henry reached peace with France as well. Henry VIII disputed Martin Luther’s (1483–1546) “Babylonian Captivity of the Church” and responded with “Assertion of the Sacraments” (1521). For this Pope Leo X called Henry “Defender of the Faith.” Luther then made a “vitriolic” reply. Very pious, Henry attended multiple masses on some days. He took a keen interest in theology and invited leading scholars to his court, including John Colet (1466–1519), Thomas More (1478–1535), and Hugh Latimer (1485–1555). William Tyndale (1495–1536), a Lutheran, had published a New Testament in English in 1525, and his marginal notes were considered to be anti-Catholic. Thomas More accused Tyndale of translating outside the Catholic view. Henry squelched this publication by burning the first editions, so only two copies remain. Henry desired that a Bible be translated into English, but retain Catholic theology. Even Mary, Queen of Scots agreed to have an English Bible, but during her coronation, the procession included a picture of Henry VIII holding the “Verbum Dei,” a Latin phrase for the Word of God. Although Miles Coverdale based much of his translation (1535) on the work of Tyndale, Coverdale’s later edition of the Great Bible (1539) utilized the theology of Sebastian Munster and Erasmus.

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Unable to receive an annulment of his marriage to Catherine from Pope Clement VII (1478–1534), Henry separated from the Catholic Church. By 1534, he enacted laws such as the Act of Supremacy (1534), which declared Henry to be the “Supreme Head on Earth under Christ of the Church of England.” During the 1540s, Henry desired a unified British kingdom with Scotland. To this end he envisioned a marriage between Mary and Edward. The Scots remained loyal to the papacy, partially due to Henry’s plundering of towns. Ralph Hartsock See also Luther, Martin; Protestant Reformers and War; Wars of the Reformation Further Reading Bernard, G. W. The King’s Reformation: Henry VIII and the Remaking of the English Church. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005. Gerard, W. B., and Eric Sterling. “Sir Thomas More’s Utopia and the Transformation of England from Absolute Monarchy to Egalitarian Society.” Contemporary Justice Review 8, no. 1 (March 2005): 75–89. Murphy, Neil. “Henry VIII’s French Crown: His Royal Entry into Tournai Revisited.” Historical Research 85, no. 230 (Nov. 2012): 617–31. Popper, Nicholas. “From Abbey to Archive: Managing Texts and Records in Early Modern England.” Archival Science 10, no. 3 (Sept. 2010): 249–66. Rex, Richard. “The Religion of Henry VIII.” Historical Journal 57, no. 1 (March 2014): 1–32. Ryrie, Alec. The Gospel and Henry VIII : Evangelicals in the Early English Reformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Shagan, Ethan H. Popular Politics and the English Reformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Wooding, Lucy E. C. Henry VIII. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2015.

Herem Herem is a Hebrew noun that refers in the Hebrew scriptures (Christian Old Testament) to a devoted thing or to the devotion or ban itself in the absolute sense. There is also a verbal usage of the term that means to ban, devote, or exterminate.

The first consideration is the meaning and use of the noun herem. If a thing was harshly opposed to God’s rule in the world or in Israel, it was, in the strictest sense, to be devoted to destruction (like the city of Jericho and all of its inhabitants—Joshua 6:17), or, ironically, to be devoted to sacred use—brought “into the treasury of (the house of) the Lord” (especially objects of silver, gold, bronze, or iron—Joshua 6:19, 24). Thus, in the biblical text, a Canaanite city, such as Jericho, was to be completely destroyed by being put under the herem (Joshua 6:17), including all inhabitants (Rahab the prostitute and those with her excepted, because she had hidden the spies whom Israel had sent) and all the spoils of war (Joshua 6:17, 18; 7:1, 11, 15). Achan, whose Jewish genealogy is stated in Joshua 7:1, took some of the things (herem) that were to be destroyed. As a result, God’s anger burned against Achan for his covetousness and disobedience, and he brought Israel much trouble and put Israel under the curse (Joshua 6:18; 7:21). Note the solidarity between Achan and Israel as a whole. As a result of Achan’s sin, Israel was defeated at Ai. God was no longer with Israel in its battles (Joshua 7). Joshua, as the leader of the Israelites, interpreted the defeat at Ai as an expression of divine abandonment. Subsequently, Achan and his family were stoned, and they themselves and all their possessions, including the banned things (herem), were burned (Joshua 7:24, 25) in the Valley of Achor (Achor = trouble; Achan had troubled Israel; now God would trouble Achan). A great heap of stones was placed over Achan and, presumably, his family and possessions, and thus God’s anger was turned away (Joshua 7:26). The entire episode was considered an act of unfaithfulness (Joshua 7:1), a covenant breach (Joshua 7:15), and, in general, a disgraceful thing in Israel (Joshua 7:15). Similarly, Saul spared Agag, the king of Amalek, and the people of Israel took what was to be devoted to destruction (herem), presumably with which to sacrifice to God (1 Samuel 15:21). As a result of Saul’s act of covetousness and disobedience, motivated by peer pressure (1 Samuel 15:45), God rejected Saul’s kingship over Israel (1 Samuel 15:26), and eventually Samuel hacked Agag to pieces before the Lord at Gilgal (1 Samuel 15:33). It is also interesting that idolatrous cities in Israel should be considered to be put under the ban (herem) and be totally destroyed (Deuteronomy 13:12–17). An Israelite

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should not bring an artifact of a Canaanite god into his home to become a devoted thing (herem) like it; rather, that thing is to be detested and abhored (Deuteronomy 7:26) since it is an abomination to the Lord (Deuteronomy 7:25). Indeed, any so devoted or proscribed person is never to be redeemed, but instead should be put to death (Leviticus 27:29). The word herem can also be used in a positive sense in reference to something or someone devoted to God and not to destruction: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:28), whether a human, animal, or field of his own property. These things are not to be bought back or redeemed or sold (Leviticus 27:28). Devoted things, whether offerings (grain, sin, guilt, wave), holy gifts, fresh oil, wine, grain, ripe fruits, firstborn, and so on, were to be given to Aaron and his sons (Numbers 18:14). The Zadokite priests were to receive their share of devoted things as well (Ezekiel 44:29). Yet the term herem for the most part entails destruction, a devotion or ban upon a man (1 Kings 20:42) or a country (Isaiah 34:5), even Judah to the Babylonians (Isaiah 43:28). Interestingly, the herem is to be removed from Israel in days ahead and Jerusalem will dwell in security (Zechariah 14:11). The substantive and verbal meanings and uses of herem essentially overlap. Their uses give Old Testament warfare its characteristically severe nature. Theologically from the ancient Israelite perspective, the salvation of the world was to come out of Israel; no measure was too much to preserve the purity of God’s people, the herem included. The cancerous threat must be eradicated since much was at stake. It was holy war for this reason. The verbal use of herem means to ban, devote, exterminate—especially the cities of the Canaanites and their inhabitants, either destroying or appropriating their possessions (Numbers 21:21ff; Joshua 6:21, 8:26). The verb may be used, in a secondary sense, to mean that nations other than Israel were to destroy other nations (2 Kings 9:21 = Isaiah 37:11 = 2 Chronicles 32:11) at the Lord’s command (Jeremiah 50:21, 26). Indeed, God will eventually destroy all nations and their armies (Isaiah 34:2). Israelite cities were to be utterly destroyed if guilty of idolatry (Deuteronomy 13:15,16), including the residents of Jabesh-gilead for not joining the war in judgment against

Benjaminite immorality (Judges 21:11). Also, the unjust spoils of the nations may be devoted to God for sacred use (Micah 4:13). The verb in its passive sense means to be put under the ban or be devoted to death for idolatry (Exodus 22:20) and other anti-God offenses (Leviticus 27:29). In the Christian era, the herem became the basis for excommunication from the church (based upon Ezra 10:8). The apostle Paul put himself under the herem (in Greek, the anathema, as in the Greek version of the Old Testament known as the Septuagint) should he, or anyone, or an angel, preach a gospel of a different content other than the one he preached to the Galatians (Galatians 1:8). With respect to war, the concept of herem significantly affected the ancient Israelite understanding and manner of war. It gave warfare a distinct religious connotation and tied warfare to obedience to God. David K. Naugle See also Ai, Battle of; Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of; Israelite Conquest of Canaan; Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare Further Reading Craigie, Peter C. The Problem of War in the Old Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1978. Firestone, Reuven. Holy War in Judaism: The Fall and Rise of a Controversial Idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Jenkins, Philip. Laying Down the Sword. New York: HarperOne, 2011. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2013. Thomas, Heath A., Jeremy Evans, and Paul Copan, eds. Holy War in the Bible: Christian Morality and an Old Testament Problem. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2013. Von Rad, Gerhard. Holy War in Ancient Israel. Translated and edited by Marva Dawn and John Yoder. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991.

Hezbollah Hezbollah is a Shiite Islamist extremist group based in Lebanon that engages in terrorism, politics, and social services. The group melds violence in the name of religion with anti-imperialism under the banner of nationalism. Hezbollah translates as “party of God” from Arabic, symbolizing

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the group’s religious ideology. Hezbollah is also known as “the resistance,” denoting its Lebanese nationalist agenda. Diverse religious communities such as Sunni and Shiite Muslim, Christian, and Druze, among others, comprise Lebanese society. Lebanon has a population of approximately six million people, with nearly one-third of the total population living in the capital, Beirut. Muslims, fairly evenly divided between Sunni and Shi’a, and Christians, predominately Maronite Catholics, compose the two largest religious communities in Lebanon. Sectarian tensions in the country have always been significant and Hezbollah has often exacerbated them. Hezbollah has traditionally maintained substantial popular support within Lebanon due to its deadly military capabilities, expanding role in Lebanese politics, and vast social services network. Escalating sectarian violence within both Syria and Lebanon has eroded

some of Hezbollah’s reputation regionally, especially among Sunnis. Hezbollah claims to be the defender of the Shiite Islamist goals espoused by Iranian revolution leader Ayatollah Khomeini and carried on by Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Hezbollah merges religious faith with a zealous dedication to the defense of Lebanon. Ultimately, Hezbollah envisions an assertion of Shiite power, both within Lebanon and throughout the region. Hezbollah vows to resist foreign occupation, especially incursions by Israel. Hezbollah steadfastly refuses to recognize Israel’s right to exist and rejects any settlement with Israel on the Palestinian issue. There is a significant Palestinian population in Lebanon, demonstrated by the many large Palestinian refugee camps located across the country. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) increased its influence

Hezbollah supporters wearing headbands that read “at your service oh prophet of God,” chant slogans during a protest about a film ridiculing Islam’s Prophet Muhammad in Lebanon’s eastern city of Baalbek on September 21, 2012. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)

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significantly in Lebanon after its expulsion from Jordan in September 1970. Hezbollah justifies its military existence as offsetting the relative weakness of the Lebanese government, especially perceived shortcomings in the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF). Hezbollah contends that the inadequacy of these military forces results in the government’s inability to defend Lebanon from Israel. Both the religion of Islam and Arab nationalism resonate widely in Lebanon, particularly with Shiites in the country who have traditionally been marginalized there. As a result, Hezbollah blends religion, politics, and culture and uses that volatile mixture to spark conflict with Israel, the United States, and more recently, Sunni Muslims in both Lebanon and Syria. Hezbollah makes little distinction between military and civilian targets in pursuing conflict rationalized by both faith and nationalism. In the 1970s, Lebanon experienced an infusion of assertive Shiite leaders from Iraq. Shiite extremist groups such as Al Dawa al Islamiya (Islamic Call) and Al Amal al Islamiya (Islamic Amal) emerged, later seen as forerunners of Hezbollah. These organizations received support from Iran from their inception, especially training and logistical assistance from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. In 1975, Lebanon erupted into a brutal civil war, which created severe tensions in the country between Muslims and Christians. The ensuing violence eventually claimed the lives of more than 100,000 people. Purportedly to stabilize the situation, Syrian forces entered Lebanon in 1976. In March 1978, Israel responded to repeated PLO attacks by launching a major military operation into Lebanon. The Israeli invasion prompted protestations at the United Nations, formal calls for Israel’s withdrawal embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolution 425, and the establishment of the peacekeeping United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Israel quickly withdrew its forces from Lebanon, but the violence between the PLO and Israel continued unabated. The first Israeli invasion specifically aimed at eliminating PLO influence in Lebanon and degrading the PLO’s ability to launch attacks against Israel from Lebanon. In June 1982, Israel occupied Lebanon and eventually withdrew to southern Lebanon in 1985. Subhi al-Tufayli and Abbas al-Musawi co-founded Hezbollah as a loosely organized movement in 1982. In 1985,

the group publicly announced its goals in a detailed manifesto. These goals included the elimination of Israel and anti-imperialist rhetoric aimed at both the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1989, the Taif Accord ended the Lebanese civil war. As a result, Hezbollah’s goal shifted to resistance against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah engaged in repeated terrorist attacks, including kidnappings, assassinations, and suicide bombings of both military and civilian personnel. Israel eventually withdrew from Lebanon in June 2000. Hezbollah claimed that its resistance campaign expelled the foreign influence, thereby garnering popular support in Lebanon. The Israeli withdrawal resulted in a United Nations demarcation between Lebanon and Israel referred to as the Blue Line. There still exist territories disputed by Israel and Lebanon, especially the Shib’a Farms, the Kfar Shouba Hills, and northern Al Ghajar located near the convergence of the borders of Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. The group’s current leader is Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah claims supporters numbering in the tens of thousands. The group engages in terrorist attacks, political campaigns, and social functions. Within the region, both Iran and Syria support the organization. This is especially true of Iran, which utilizes Hezbollah as a proxy military force that it can wield regionally with some degree of plausible deniability. As a result, Iran provides funding, weapons, and training to the group. Hezbollah is led by a Majlis al Shura (Consultative Council). This seven-member body chooses Hezbollah’s secretary general and oversees the group’s various subcouncils such as the Political, Jihad, Parliamentary, Executive, and Judicial Assemblies. Hezbollah’s military actions are directly antiforeign, especially anti-Israel and anti–United States. In 1982, U.S. President Ronald Reagan deployed U.S. Marines to Lebanon as part of the Multi-National Force (MNF) peacekeeping mission. Early Hezbollah terrorist attacks targeted U.S. and Western personnel, the most infamous attack being the bombing on October 23, 1983, of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 Americans. A practically simultaneous bombing of the nearby French forces barracks killed 58 French paratroopers. President Reagan withdrew U.S. troops from Lebanon the following February. Hezbollah ardently refuses to recognize Israel’s

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right to exist, and the U.S. State Department designated Hezbollah a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. The Lebanese political system is a confessional democracy that aims to share power among various religious sects to mitigate sectarian conflict. In 1992, Hezbollah entered politics during national elections with some success, securing eight seats in the Lebanese parliament. The February 14, 2005, assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri further polarized Lebanese politics. It resulted in splitting Lebanese politics into two main associations. The first is the March 8 Coalition that is predominately Shiite, includes Hezbollah, and strongly supports the regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. Hezbollah played an important role in forming the March 8 Coalition in 2005. The alliance’s name refers to public protests on March 8, 2005, that included Hezbollah as well as other political parties such as Amal, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Progressive Socialist Party and signified the participants’ steadfast support of Syria. The second is the March 14 Coalition that is composed predominately of Sunni Muslim and Christian groups and opposes the Assad regime, ostensibly due to its alleged involvement in the Hariri assassination. In April 2005, allegations of Syrian involvement in the assassination led to mounting Lebanese criticism of Syria and ultimately pressured the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. As a result of the assassination, the United Nations established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon located in The Hague, Netherlands. The tribunal focused on the role of Hezbollah in the assassination. Since Hezbollah refused to surrender any suspects, the tribunal tried them in absentia. In June 2011, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon indicted four members of Hezbollah in the assassination and indicted another Hezbollah member for complicity in October 2013. In 2006, Hezbollah engaged in a war against Israel that lasted from July until August. Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and assaulted Israel with several thousand rockets. Israel responded with potent air strikes and an intensive ground invasion of Lebanon. Throughout the brief war, Hezbollah military forces displayed increasingly lethal capabilities. In August 2006, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 established a cease-fire, which

the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) enforced. However, Hezbollah’s forceful display of power during the war demonstrated the organization’s deadly military capabilities, which have been further honed since then. The confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel continued after the cease-fire of 2006. In 2008 Israel declared that it would hold the Lebanese government responsible for Hezbollah attacks. Later, Hezbollah secretary general Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah threatened Israel’s military and civilian populations by claiming that the group possessed sophisticated long-range weapons and the willingness to utilize them against targets inside Israel. In May 2008, Hezbollah and other Lebanese factions waged a bitter internecine conflict, largely along sectarian lines. The violence followed almost a year and a half of political gridlock during which Hezbollah demanded an enlarged role in Lebanese politics. When the Lebanese government attempted to weaken Hezbollah, violence erupted. The ensuing fighting lasted nearly one month. Hezbollah demonstrated dangerous military capabilities by seizing West Beirut, but also lost credibility among some previous supporters for fostering violence among the Lebanese population. Hezbollah is a complex organization that has historically garnered broad popularity among Shiites within Lebanon. However, the group has recently encountered decreasing legitimacy among Sunnis, especially due to Hezbollah’s controversial defiance of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and its unflinching support for the brutal regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. Hezbollah also claimed some success in the 2009 national elections by winning 10 seats in the Lebanese Parliament (out of 128) and two cabinet positions (Administrative Reform and Agriculture). On November 30, 2009, Hezbollah secretary general Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah attempted to modernize the group’s goals, but notably maintained firm opposition to Israel’s right to exist. In 2013, the group garnered 12 seats in the Lebanese Parliament (out of 128) and two seats in the Council of Ministers. Hezbollah also provides an extensive array of social programs throughout Lebanon, including health clinics, schools, businesses, and charities. Hezbollah’s social services are especially prominent in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah’s social programs have undergirded the organization’s legitimacy within Lebanon, especially among Shiites in the country. Hezbollah

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also maintains a robust communications infrastructure, including Al-Mannar Television, Al-Nur Radio, and extensive use of the Internet to conduct public relations, recruiting, and fundraising campaigns. In 2013, Hezbollah forays into Syria resulted in reprisals from Sunni extremists in both Syria and Lebanon. Approximately one million refugees fled the violence in Syria to Lebanon. This migration of mostly Sunni Muslims further destabilized Lebanon and heightened sectarian tensions in the country. Recently, Hezbollah has shifted its resistance from Israel to extremist Sunni Muslim groups within or near Lebanon such as Jabhat al-Nusra, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or simply the Islamic State (IS). Compounding the problem of counterbalancing Hezbollah is the political stalemate that has prevented a fully functioning government from emerging in Lebanon. Hezbollah remains a significant force militarily, culturally, and politically within Lebanon and one that combines faith and conflict, albeit in unique ways that are often as much about augmenting Hezbollah’s own power as they are about religion. William A. Taylor See also Anti-Semitism; Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Balfour Declaration; Hamas; Intifada; Iranian Revolution; Islam and War (Jihad); Six-Day War; Yom Kippur War Further Reading Azani, Eitan. Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Blanford, Nicholas. Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel. New York: Random House, 2011. Byman, Daniel. A High Price: The Triumphs & Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Gleis, Joshua L., and Benedetta Berti. Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. Levitt, Matthew. Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013. Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Hindu Mythological Wars Both Sanskrit and vernacular texts describe hundreds if not thousands of conflicts involving Hindu deities, mythological figures, celestial weapons, or supernatural elements. Conflicts described in the earliest Vedic Sanskrit literature, those in Indian vernacular languages, including Dravidian languages such as Tamil, and literature from outside of India, such as Javanese, Thai, and Khmer, all fall under the heading of Hindu mythological wars. These mythological conflicts can be broadly divided into those concerning conflicts among the gods, the dēvas, and their primary antagonists, the “demons” or asuras, and those that take place in the realm of humans and concern battles between the forces of righteousness, dharma, and unrighteousness, adharma. The former conflicts are the result of struggles between the gods and demons for supernatural supremacy over the three realms of existence, the trailokya. The latter concern the struggles of humanity to overcome forces of unrighteousness. Of the first form of conflict, the story of the “Churning of the Ocean of Milk” is one example among many. Of the latter form, the principle conflicts of the epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, are examples. All three stories appear across vernacular literature and have even been incorporated into Buddhist mythologies. The supernatural universe of Hinduism is made up of a large number of different supernatural beings. Often beings other than the asuras are antagonists, such as the foul rakshasas and yakshas. The asuras are particularly important because they are the counterpart of the gods, also known as suras. While there are many different creation stories, the fifth chapter of the Siva Purana relates the creation of the asuras from Brahma’s thigh, and composed from the rudiments of darkness, they became the night. The dēvas proceeded from his mouth, were composed from the rudiments of light, and became the day. The fact that the dēvas were not superior over the asuras meant their conflicts were struggles between equals. A Vedic example is the conflict between Indra, king of the dēvas and personification of rain, and the great asura Vr.tra, the personification of drought, in the Rig Veda (1.33). The story of the “Churning of the Ocean of Milk” (the ks.īroda) appears in many of the Puranas as well as in the Mahabharata of Vyasa and the Ramayana of Valmiki. In

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the ninth chapter of the Siva Purana, it is related that Indra, king of the dēvas, is cursed for disrespecting the sage Durvasas, an incarnation of Siva; Durvasas is not mentioned in the two epics’ versions of this story. As a result, the dēvas lose dominion over the universe. The dēvas lose their vigor and their enemies are emboldened, eventually forcing the gods to flee. Famine and immorality plague the earth. The dēvas beseech Vishnu for advice, who instructs them to churn the Ocean of Milk to obtain the elixir of immortality (amr̥ ta). Cooperating with the asuras, the gods churn the ocean using the naga king as a rope, a mountain as the churn, and the world turtle (Kūrma) as a pivot. The ocean yields many miraculous objects, and finally the amr̥ ta. However, the asuras then seize the elixir for themselves, but before they can drink it they are tricked by Vishnu in the form of a woman, who then delivers it to the gods. The gods consume it, and their vitality is restored. They are attacked by the asuras, but with their newly acquired immortality the dēvas are able to defeat their rivals who in turn take refuge. The dēvas are restored to their positions of power over the universe with great benefits to humanity. The story reiterates a common theme that only when the dēvas occupy a proper position of power does humanity benefit. Both the Ramayana and the Mahabharata are essentially stories about the terrible results of usurping the righteous political order. In the Ramayana, Rama (an avatar of Vishnu) is cheated out of his kingdom by the machinations of his stepmother and exiled into the forest with his brother and his wife, Sita. Sita is subsequently kidnapped by the rakshasa king of Lanka, Ravana. With the help of an army of monkeys and his loyal servant, the monkey king Hanuman, he eventually overcomes Ravana and balance is restored to the earth. In the Mahabharata the sons of Pandu, the Pandavas, are cheated out of their kingdom by their 100 cousins, the Kauravas. With their adviser Krishna, an incarnation of Vishnu, they wage war against their cousins (known as the Kurukshetra War), emerging victorious and regaining their proper place as the rulers of the Kingdom of Hastinapura. Hence, a similar theme can be seen in those conflicts set in the human realm. As with the gods, it is only with the proper rulers in place that dharma can be restored to earth. Such disruptions of the proper power relations generate conflict, but, in part due to

the benevolence of the deities Vishnu and Siva, proper relations are finally restored for the benefit of humanity. Jarrod W. B rown See also Hinduism and War; Indra, Hindu God of War; Kurukshetra War Further Reading Ganguli, Kisari Mohan. The Mahabharata of KrishnaDwaipayana Vyasa Translated into English Prose. Vol. 1–4. New Delhi: Munshiram Manorharlal, republished 2002. Haksrea, Kuoch, and Jeanne Jacob. Reamker (Rāmakerti): The Cambodian Version of the Rāmāyan. a. London: Routledge, 2013. Phalgunadi, I. Gusti Putu. The Indonesian Mahābhārata. International Academy of Indian Culture and Lahore: Aditya Prakashan, 1990. Shastri, Jagdish Lal, et al. Siva Purana. Vols. 1–4. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, republished 1999. Sen, Makhan Lal. The Ramayana of Valmiki: Translated from the Original Sanskrit. New Delhi: Munshiram Manorharlal, 1994. Van Buitenen, J. A. B., and Cornelia Dimmitt. Classical Hindu Mythology: A Reader in the Sanskrit Puranas. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2012.

Hinduism and War Scholars have long questioned whether the concept of religion has any meaningful application to Hinduism. For some, the term Hinduism is an artificial construct that emerged under the combined influence of British colonial Orientalism, Western education, and indigenous reform movements within India. There is much truth in this assertion. The term Hinduism first came into existence in the 19th century. An amalgam of philosophy and religious practice, from about 1500 BCE what is now known as Hinduism progressively became the dominant dharma, or system of beliefs, for the people living between the Indus River and the Arakan Yomas mountains. Numerous gods and goddesses are recognized within this tradition. Thus, it is by no means a monotheistic religion. Nor is Hinduism bound up with a single authoritative text, heroic figure, or hierarchical structure. Likewise, it is nearly impossible to identify a single coherent body of beliefs within Hinduism.

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Under this name there coexist a multitude of different orientations such as Brahmanism, Vedantism, Vaishnavism, Shakti, Tantra, and the like. Thus, Hinduism is more a dharma than a religion. However, it cannot be denied that Brahmanism as it emerged at the dawn of Aryan civilization in South Asia constitutes the core of Hinduism even today. Hinduism is closely linked with the caste system, which still operates in the subcontinent even after two millennia. And throughout its different historical periods Hinduism has been identified with certain key texts: the Vedas (Rig, Yajur, Atharva, and Sama) and the Bhagavad Gita, and then the dharmasastra literature (i.e., Manavadharmasastra), which took root during the Common Era. After 900 CE, the growth of Hinduism was shaped by different commentaries on the above-mentioned sources. Finally, from the 15th century onward, two epics in particular, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, came to acquire special significance. The prevalent assumption of Western political scientists and historians is that India lacks the concept of power politics and strategic theory due to the overwhelming influence of Hindu fatalism, which did not encourage long-term planning. Due to the influence of the caste system, it is argued, a strong state failed to emerge, and in the absence of a state, one did not need a standing army. Consequently, without a standing army, there could be no decisive battles. At best, the ancient Indian segmented polities engaged in ritualized battles known as “flower wars,” which according to Western scholars were accompanied by intrigues and treacheries. And even today Hindu metaphysics, runs the argument, prevent the managerial elite of India from pursuing any meaningful strategy. The reality is actually more complex. The philosophical strands in Hinduism could be divided into two schools: world renouncer/spiritual and Lokayata/ Carvakas. The classical Hindu texts following the second philosophical strand make no watertight division between the two concepts of shanti and yuddha/vigraha. War and peace constituted an indivisible entity for the acharyas. From their perspective, routine administrative activities involved waging war and making peace; hence these two activities are inextricably mixed together. In this sense war and peace are not separable either conceptually or in

practice. Yuddha is subdivided into dharmayuddha and kutayuddha. In the Vedas, self-aggrandizement and dominance are unabashedly embraced and unashamedly displayed both in ritual and secular domains. Violence and power are represented as part and parcel of the natural order. They accept that Vedic ideology is brutal and materialistic. The Bhagavad Gita shows the duties of a warrior during dharmayuddha in the context of an intra-Aryan struggle around 1200 BCE, and the issue of civil supremacy over the military. In recent times, some authors have tried to find elements of just war theory in classical Hinduism. The twin Hindu concepts of dharmayuddha and kutayuddha are somewhat equivalent to the Christian concepts of just and unjust war. University of Oslo professor of religious studies Torkel Brekke asserts that unlike the Western theoreticians, the Hindu writers took very little interest in the moral conditions underlying the inception of war (what the Western literature terms jus ad bellum), particularly the issue of right authority. He continues that this was because the Hindu theoreticians made no distinction between private duels and public violence, nor between internal and external enemies. Harvard Divinity School professor Francis X. Clooney asserts that Hindu philosophy somewhat addresses the issue of jus ad bellum through its underlying supposition that righteous activities are context specific. Thus, the king’s duty was to rule the realm; and in pursuit of this task only the king had the legal authority of the scriptures to inflict pain by using force during situations of emergency. In so doing, the ruler must be conscious of using force proportionately and only as a last resort. Certain Hindu texts of ancient India discuss the issue of just use of force by the ruler in pursuit of rajadharma. One component of the rajadharma is waging yuddha against external and internal enemies. The division between external warfare (interstate war) and internal war (intrastate or civil war, now in many cases referred to as counterinsurgency) is a Clausewitzian one. Conceptualizing warfare into these two watertight compartments is also due to the peculiar Eurocentric development where small nation states, each with a homogeneous ethnic populace, emerged after the Thirty Years’ War. However, in Indian history large agrarian bureaucratic empires were

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the norm. These huge Indian political entities were comprised of diverse religious and linguistic groups. Further, differing physical environments in various regions of the subcontinent accelerated the genesis of subnationalities. As a result, throughout history the central Indian governments had been engaged primarily in internal security campaigns. The rulers of the subcontinent realized that if internal rebellion broke out during an external invasion, the regime would be doomed. In addition, foreign support for internal rebels could also subvert the indigenous regime. Thus, Indian political theorists like Kautilya and Kamandaka emphasize the interconnections between interstate war and internal rebellions and the possibility that support for the internal rebels by an external enemy might result in escalation to war with the hostile foreign power. It is to be noted that only in the post–Cold War era have Western political and military theorists begun to realize the complex interconnections between conventional warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns. After 9/11, a number of Western military theoreticians began advocating that armed stateless marginal groups constitute the principal threat to the state. Proponents of what is often called Fourth-Generation Warfare not only speak of insurgency as the main threat to existing societies, but also hint at an evolving Fifth-Generation Warfare. This warfare visualizes a small group of individuals or even a single individual conducting large-scale devastating terrorist-like strikes. Interestingly, Kautilya’s Arthasastra elaborates on how trained individual secret agents could raise a commotion in the enemy kingdom and highlights the linkages between internal warfare and external war and the primacy of the former type of warfare. Kautilya’s Arthasastra emphasizes kutayuddha in the context of an evolving large empire (ca. 300 BCE). The Manava Dharmasastra reflects the swing of the pendulum back to dharmayuddha during the beginning of the Common Era. Manu’s work is on the one hand a Brahmanical reaction against the rise of new religions (Buddhism and Jainism) and on the other hand a critique of Kautilya’s amoral approach to statecraft. During the fifth century CE, Kamandaka’s Nitisara realized that Manu’s idealistic norms of warfare were inoperable, especially as nomadic tribes from the northwest frontier threatened the

subcontinent. Thus, Kamandaka’s Nitisara reverts back to Kautilya’s kutayuddha, yet without totally neglecting the influence of the Brahmanical reaction. Hence, Kamandaka offers an attenuated version of Kautilya’s kutayuddha. Kautilya and Kamandaka refer to the existence of predatory forest chieftains who might foment kopa. Kamandaka, like Kautilya, points out the linkages between kopa and its foreign sponsors. For maintaining the internal order, Kamandaka urges the king if necessary to act like Yama, the god of death. However, coercion is not the only option. Kamandaka, following Kautilya, elaborates the concept of paternal despotism. Both these authors refer to the existence of nonstate actors like trading and craft guilds with their private soldiery who were hired by the rulers during emergencies to meet both internal as well as external threats. In the medieval era, under Muslim rule, the acharyas did not generate any political-strategic treatises. In the early 20th century, a radical intervention came with Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi in relation to the broader Hindu tradition on violence and warfare. Western theoreticians equate Gandhi’s philosophy with nonviolent resistance. They argue that Gandhi showed the world a new way by discovering the quintessential principle inherent in Hinduism: nonviolence. Several Western commentators regard nonviolence as the salvation for the future. Due to Gandhi, Hinduism is considered a religion of peace in contrast to Islam with its baggage of jihad and Christianity with its adage of crusades. Gandhi, while leading the Indian National Congress against the Raj, propounded his philosophy of ahimsa. Gandhi claimed that his satyagraha, which is based on ahimsa, is derived from the Bhagavad Gita. In his framework, ahimsa derived from Hinduism could provide a way out of the present violence-ridden world. In reality, Hinduism is anything but a nonviolent religion. We have seen in the above paragraphs that violence is often endorsed in classical Hindu texts. Viewed in light of this lineage, it must be acknowledged that Gandhian philosophy was the product of a particular historical context. The world renouncer/spiritual school (not to be confused with pacifism) asserts that through penance and sacrifice, satya can be established. This strand of thought influenced fasting by Gandhi, voluntary imprisonment by

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the satyagrahis, and so on. Overall, Gandhi is an idealist and a moralist rather than a realist. Gandhi challenges the Darwinian principle of survival of the fittest and opposes Western materialism with Indian spiritualism. Gandhi in his writings emphasizes general disarmament and vehemently opposes the possession of nuclear weapons. Even today, the antinuclear lobby in India derives moral support from Gandhi’s views. The realist school within Hinduism claims that enforcing bala through danda is necessary for enforcing peace. Enforcement of peace might lead to warfare. And longterm shanti could only be established after waging a successful dharmayuddha. As long as ashanti remains, it is justified to wage kutayuddha against the internal enemies of the social order. The radical proponent of kutayuddha (i.e., Kautilya) influences the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (a right-wing Hindu party) advocacy of a “Hindu” nuclear program. Further, use of brahmastra is described in the Mahabharata for establishing a “just” Hindu order in the subcontinent. This provides further legitimacy to the nuclear lobby. Kaushik Roy See also Bhagavad Gita and War; Gandhi, Mahatma; Hindu Mythological Wars; India, Religious Conflict in; Islam and War (Jihad); Primary Document: Declaration of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation from the First Jewish-Hindu Leadership Summit (February 5–6, 2007) Further Reading Brekke, Torkel. Makers of Modern Indian Religions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Clooney, Francis X., S.J. “Pain but Not Harm: Some Classical Resources toward a Hindu Just War Theory.” In Paul Robinson, ed. Just War in Comparative Perspective. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003. Rowell, James L. “Gandhi and bin Laden: Religious Conflict at the Polar Extremes.” Journal of Conflict Studies 26, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 35–54. Roy, Kaushik. “Hinduism.” In Gregory Reichberg and Henirk Syse, with Nicolle M. Hartwell, eds. Religion, War, and Ethics: A Sourcebook of Textual Traditions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Roy, Kaushik, Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South Asia: From Antiquity to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Roy, Kaushik. “Just and Unjust War in Hindu Philosophy.” Journal of Military Ethics 6, no. 3 (2007): 232–45.

Hittite Warfare As it was elsewhere in the ancient Near East, warfare among the Hittites was closely connected to religion. The Hittites lived in Anatolia (the central part of modern-day Turkey) from about 1650 to 1200 BCE, when their civilization largely disappeared (perhaps due to the Sea People moving east from Greece). The Hittites were famous for having thousands of gods, many of whom acted as divine warriors. The Hittite myths are full of stories of the gods fighting, such as the Illuyanka myth in which the storm god defeats the serpent, representing chaos. Perhaps even more than other empires, the Hittites were continually fighting their enemies on several fronts. The most well-known Hittite enemies were those to the east, such as the Babylonians and Egyptians. An early Hittite king, Muršili I, even conquered Babylon itself in 1595 BCE. Later Hittite kings ruled over much of Syria and fought with Egypt over control of the area, culminating in Muwatalli’s defeat of Ramses II at Qadesh in 1274 BCE. When the Hittite empire was destroyed, a remnant of neoHittites survived in Syria. The Hittites also faced less wellknown enemies to the west (such as Arzawa) and the north (the Kasku). Arzawa was frequently in conflict with the Hittites, and their success fluctuated with their relative military strength. The Kasku were a tribal people who continually attacked the northern border of the Hittites; their decentralized structure made it very difficult for the Hittites to permanently control them. As described in the royal inscription, the Hittites believed the gods were active in their many wars. Hittite soldiers performed rituals upon joining the army, in which they proclaimed their loyalty to the king of Hatti and called down curses on themselves if they broke their oath. Before battle, the Hittite kings often sought oracles to determine if battle was advisable at that time. In battle, the Hittite kings frequently spoke of the gods “going before” or “running before” them (for examples, see the Deeds of Šuppiluliuma and the Apology of Hattušili III). The Hittite kings also claimed that gods ran ahead of the kings’ generals when the king did not accompany the troops on campaign. Other idioms for divine involvement in warfare were that the gods “gave the enemy into the hands” of the Hittite kings or that war was a lawsuit in which the storm god was called on to adjudicate.

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The Hittites respected the gods of their enemies; when Šuppiluliuma conquered Carchemish, he protected the gods of the city from defilement. On very rare occasions the gods directly intervened in battles through nature. Following a call from Muršili II to decide the lawsuit between Hatti and Arzawa, the storm god sent a lightning bolt from the heavens that frightened the enemy. On another occasion, Muršili II attributed some favorable weather (clouds to hide their movement) to the action of the storm god. After battles, the Hittites thanked their gods in a variety of ways. Hittite texts contain a few references to devoting conquered cities to the gods. A king in central Anatolia just before the Hittites, Anitta, devoted several cities (ironically, including the future Hittite capital, Hattusa) to the storm god, declaring that no one would ever live there. Plunder was often given to the temples of the gods as ways of offering thanksgiving to the gods. Hattušili III deposited the weapon he had used in a successful battle in a temple of Ištar, who had helped him in battle. Rituals were also done after battle. After a defeat, a ritual was to be performed that involved walking the troops between the pieces of four sacrifices (of a human, a billy-goat, a puppy, and a piglet), presumably to avoid further defeat. Other genres besides the royal inscriptions show how the Hittites thought the gods were involved in battle. In a prayer to the gods Muršili II confessed his wrongdoing and called on the gods to remove a plague that had been devastating the Hittites, which was originally brought to Hatti by Egyptian prisoners of war. Rituals were also available to be performed if the plague was brought to the Hittites by the god of a defeated enemy, showing again their respect for the gods of the defeated enemy. The Hittites made many treaties, in which the Hittite suzerain made a treaty with a vassal listing the various obligations on both sides. The treaties usually ended with a curse on the one who broke the treaty. On one occasion, Muršili II claimed that the oath gods had turned a rebellious nation to his side by forcing a son to kill his rebellious father and lead the nation back into Hittite control. The Hittites even apparently practiced ritual combat, as demonstrated by a ritual text that describes the Hittites acting out a battle against their enemy; not surprisingly, the Hittites were to win the contest.

While the impression from these texts is of a highly religious type of warfare, other sources reflect a more secularized approach. The historical background section of the treaties, in which the Hittite king detailed how he had acted beneficially for the vassal in the past, focuses on the role of the Hittite king in battle and does not mention the Hittite gods helping the king, because the glory in that context was to be directed at the Hittite king. However, there was a clear religious dimension to warfare during the time of the Hittites. Charlie Trimm See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of; Egyptian Warfare; Qadesh, Battle of Further Reading Beal, Richard H. “Hittite Military Organization.” In J. M. Sasson, ed. Civilizations of the Ancient Near East. Vol. 1. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1995, pp. 545–54. Bryce, Trevor. The Kingdom of the Hittites. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 2005. Hallo, William W., and K. Lawson Younger Jr., eds. Context of Scripture. 3 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1997. Hoffner, Harry A. Hittite Myths. Writings from the Ancient World 2. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990. Kang, Sa-Moon. Divine War in the Old Testament and in the Ancient Near East. BZAW 177. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1989.

Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679) Thomas Hobbes was one of the originators of what has become known as Western social contract theory. His theory that government arises first from the formative consent of its host population remains a crucial contribution to Western political thought. Yet, equally important are Hobbes’s contributions to what has become known as political realism: an approach toward explaining human life and systems commencing with a study of concrete human behavior, rather than starting with a series of preceding aesthetic or ethical assertions. With Hobbes, as with Niccolo Machiavelli, there is thus a break with earlier Western traditions that grounded theories of government in moral philosophy.

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For Hobbes, it is the very possibility of government via the state (his titular “Leviathan”) that guarantees the security necessary to explore and understand “Justice” and “Injustice,” let alone to then pursue art, commerce, philosophy, science, and so on. As such, by differentiating between ethics and politics, Hobbes’s work serves as an early point of departure for what would become, centuries later, political science. More broadly, Hobbes’s arguments substantively impacted philosophers ranging from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to Martin Heidegger and continue to inform contemporary discourse. Hobbes’s writings include an early English translation of Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War (1629), as well as (among others) Hobbes’s own works, Elements of Law (1640) and De Cive (1642). In the latter two works, Hobbes’s explorations of these topics, respectively, necessarily incorporate an examination of how metaphysics, epistemology, and logic are all interrelated. Like his

Seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes believed that a strong state was necessary to guarantee a safe society where individual freedoms could flourish, and that only an absolute monarchy could control the unruly masses of society. (Library of Congress)

contemporary René Descartes, Hobbes is therefore a systematic thinker, one whose investigations span philosophical categories. The breadth and depth of Hobbes’s work makes categorizing him within philosophy and political thought, beyond what has become known as political realism, rather difficult. Hobbes was a nominalist, though a strong materialist current is also present in his works. While not as routinely identified within the early modern school of empiricism, Hobbes’s writings also demonstrate some resonance in that regard with John Locke and David Hume. Yet, it is Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) that continues to largely define him. An expansive piece, Leviathan addresses a host of issues, from philosophical anthropology to the epistemological foundations of both science and theology. Its treatment of the state, however, is central to its ongoing relevance. Hobbes finds that, paradoxically, it is only through the establishment of a strong state that individual human freedom can be actualized, as human life must remain secure from threat before it can prosper. Hobbes begins this argument by accepting the presumption that all human beings both are free creatures and have the right to live. Human beings also have the capacity to reason, but this capacity is not always operative due to the natural influence of humanity’s passions. These observations ensure that there exists the possibility within which one can imagine another human being’s actions putting at risk one’s own life and freedom, regardless of any hostility or malicious intent. Awareness of this risk reasonably encourages action be taken to mitigate against the threat. Such actions include increasing one’s strength, which in turn encourages others to escalate in the same fashion. Such escalation continues until the inevitable crisis, in which all are put in harm’s way because of what Hobbes finds to be the equalizer of all human life: death. All human beings can be killed, so pursuit of such becomes the only common answer available to all caught up in the (again, for Hobbes, reasonable) escalation of force. This “warre of every man against every man” is Hobbes’s often cited state of nature, in which human life is characterized as “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” Locke and Rousseau define their own theories of the state of nature in arguably less savage terms than Hobbes,

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for whom the extralegal landscape is nothing if not violent. It is just this violence that, Hobbes claims, will cause some individuals and families to foresee such a world as untenable. Coming together with other like-minded parties, all at mutual risk, these people will negotiate the surrender of certain aspects of their claim to freedom, to jointly gain for themselves greater security of life. This negotiation (at once both legalistic and somewhat admittedly mystic) takes the form of the social contract, from and through which a commonwealth is established. However, Hobbes notes that contracts alone are mere “words,” “too weak to hold men” to their promises. Contracts must be guaranteed by force against both intentional malevolence and the flaming of human passions. As such, a sovereign is required to safeguard the commonwealth’s agreed terms, hold all parties accountable, and ultimately become the recipient of those rights that have been individually surrendered to the newly formed entity via the social contract. The sovereign, being itself the facilitator for its community’s birth and future, precedes anything within the community: the sovereign is definitively absolute, thus beyond individual judgment. The sovereign either “is” sovereign, or it (and, thus, the commonwealth arising from the social contract guaranteed by the sovereign) ceases to be. Hobbes claims, “This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN,” in, with, and through which exists the only possibility human life has for any sustainable peace. Troy Mack See also Locke, John Further Reading Berns, Laurence. “Thomas Hobbes.” In Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds. History of Political Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 396–420. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Joas, Hans, and Wolfgang Knobl. War in Social Thought: Hobbes to the Present. Translated by Alex Skinner. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. MacPherson, C. B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Schmitt, Carl. The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Holocaust The Holocaust was the state-sponsored persecution and ultimately murder of close to six million Jews by the National Socialist (Nazi) regime of Germany’s Adolf Hitler during the Second World War. It was systematic and carried out by the massive bureaucracy put in place by the Nazi Party. It permeated all levels of society, though a debate remains as to the level of blame that should be placed on lower level officials, many of whom claimed they were merely following orders, and on the ordinary citizenry in Germany, some of whom continued to claim ignorance long after the war ended in 1945. The Nazi regime also targeted, imprisoned, persecuted, and killed other peoples whom they deemed to be “inferior” and who did not fit into their ideal society. These included, but were not limited to, Soviet prisoners of war (2,000,000–3,000,000); ethnic Poles (1.8 million); Serbs (300,000–500,000); disabled, both mentally and physically (270,000); Gypsy or Romany (90,000–220,000); Freemasons (80,000–200,000); Slovenes (20,000–25,000); homosexuals (5,000–15,000); and Jehovah’s Witnesses (2,500–5,000). When added to the 5.93 million Jews, it brings the number close to 12 million. Many of these ethnic people were referred to as Untermenschen or subhuman by the Nazis, in stark contrast to the Herrenvolk or the Aryan master race of the German people. When Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, there were more than 9.5 million Jews in Europe. While they constituted less than 2 percent of Europe’s population, they accounted for more than 60 percent of the world’s 15 million Jews (Jewish population reached a peak of 17 million in 1939). Most of the Jewish population was concentrated in Poland and the Soviet Union, though Germany had a sizeable Jewish population. Poland was home to more than 3 million Jews, while the Soviet Union had 2.5 million and Romania 750,000. Germany was home to 525,000 Jews, followed by its neighbors Czechoslovakia with more than 350,000 and Hitler’s homeland of Austria with close to 200,000. By contrast, today there are only 14.2 million Jews in the world. The majority of Jews today live in Israel and the United States, and only 1.5 million live in Europe, the majority of those in Western Europe as opposed to Eastern Europe, where the majority resided before the Holocaust.

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Years before the outset of the war, the Nazi regime used slave labor to help build their infrastructure. Jews and nonJews were subjected to this forced labor both inside and outside of concentration camps. The first concentration camps were opened in 1933, the year Adolf Hitler came to power. Hitler’s henchmen, the SA (Storm Troopers), the SS (Protection Squadrons), the police, secret police, and even civilian authorities organized various detention camps to house actual and perceived political opponents of Nazism, as well as those who posed a threat to Aryan supremacy, such as Jews. The first concentration camp was Dachau, established in March 1933 outside of Munich, Hitler’s original base of power in southern Germany. In 1933 Dachau was home to approximately 4,800 prisoners. Initially these internees were mostly German communists, other liberals, and

The U.S. Third Army Signal Corps liberated these inmates of the Ampfing concentration camp in Germany near the end of World War II. Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany and its collaborators killed approximately six million Jews during the Holocaust, along with approximately five million non-Jews. (Library of Congress)

leftists or socialists, as well as anyone who politically opposed the Nazi Party. Eventually, others were imprisoned at Dachau, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals, and Gypsies. During the first years few Jews were interned in Dachau. By the end of 1933, 27,000 prisoners were interned in concentration camps across the Third Reich. By the late 1930s the Nazis began to increase their exploitation of slave labor, enslaving peoples that they deemed to be enemies of the Reich. By the end of 1937, most Jewish men in Germany were required under law to perform forced labor for different government agencies. Leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the Nazis undertook a process to “Aryanize” Germany. By doing this, they fired Jews and other non-Aryans from jobs. They seized Jewish-owned businesses, while also stripping Jewish doctors and lawyers of their patients and clients. In 1935 Hitler’s government passed the Nuremberg Laws. Under these decrees, anyone with three or four Jewish grandparents was considered a Jew and subject to harsh restrictions. Those Germans with two Jewish grandparents were designated as Mischlinge, which translates to half-breeds. Under the Nuremberg Laws, Jews became regular targets of verbal and physical abuse, and were routinely persecuted in every way imaginable. This escalated to an event known as Kristallnacht or the “night of broken glass” in late 1938. All across Germany synagogues were set on fire, while windows in Jewish homes and shops were smashed. More than 100 Jews were killed and thousands were arrested. On September 1, 1939, the German army invaded Poland, and by the end of the month, they occupied the western portion of Poland, with the Soviet Red Army occupying the eastern half. Accompanying the German Army into Poland was the secret police, the Gestapo. They, along with the SS, forced hundreds of thousands of Polish Jews from their homes and into ghettos in the larger cities such as Warsaw. They confiscated Jewish property and gave it to Germans who had moved into Poland, or even Polish Christians who collaborated with the Nazis. The ghettos were completely isolated from the outside world and surrounded by high walls and barbed wire. At the same time within Germany, the Nazi government identified more than 70,000 Germans who had been institutionalized for mental illness or physical disabilities to

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be killed in a euthanasia program. After numerous German religious leaders, including Catholic clergy, protested, Hitler ended the program in 1941, though close to 300,000 were murdered during the war across Europe. As German armies conquered Western Europe in 1940, tens of thousands of Jews fell under German control. Starting in 1941, these Jews were transported east to ghettos in Poland. On June 22, 1941, more than 3 million German soldiers invaded the Soviet Union, bringing more than a million Jews under German control. Following the Germany army were mobile killing units or Einsatzgruppen in German. These units would ultimately murder more than 500,000 Soviet Jews and others over the next two to three years. Also commencing in 1941, the Nazis began to transport large numbers of Jews from the ghettos to concentration camps. At first they sent those who were viewed as the least useful; the infirm, old, weak, and the extremely young. To many high-ranking Nazis, this was not enough, and there was still a “Jewish Problem.” On January 20, 1942, highranking Nazis, along with government officials, met outside of Berlin in Wannsee to discuss and ultimately lay out plans for the “Final Solution to the Jewish Question.” This “Final Solution” was merely a code name for the systematic and deliberate mass genocide aimed to wipe out Europe’s Jews. Director of the Reich Main Security Office Reinhard Heydrich called the Wannsee Conference to gain support from government officials relevant to the “Final Solution,” while also revealing to those present that Hitler had personally asked him to coordinate the action. At the conference, most present were already aware that the Nazis had already been involved in the mass murder of Jews and other civilians in German-occupied areas of Europe. They were aware of the Einsatzgruppen, which were slaughtering thousands of Jews in the Soviet Union, while also being privy to the fact there were units in the German Army and the SS that were killing Jews. It was decided that the easiest method of extermination would be gassing, as it was informal and easier on the guards, while it would also allow the Nazis to kill hundreds at a time without wasting valuable ammunition. Gas chambers were created at special extermination camps, which differed from the earlier concentration camps and whose

purpose was solely to annihilate the inhabitants. The chambers were modeled after large shower rooms, and the prisoners were told they were to be cleaned before entering the camp as a means of not causing mass panic. Prisoners were brought into an antechamber where they were told to strip off their clothing and leave all their valuables for redemption at a later time. All of their belongings were subsequently taken by the Nazis. It is not certain whether or not the Nazis meant to display them at a proposed “Museum of an Extinct Race,” which was to be built in Prague. Other items were merely appropriated for use by German citizens. The first mass gassings began at Belzec in Poland in March 1942. Five more extermination camps were constructed in Poland: Sobibor, Treblinka, Chelmno, Majdanek, and the largest and most notorious, Auschwitz-Birkenau. From 1942 to 1945, Jews were deported to the camps from German-occupied territory as well as countries allied with Germany. The summer and fall of 1942 saw the heaviest transportations, as more than 300,000 were deported from the Warsaw ghetto alone. As the war continued, it became clear that the Allied Powers were going to defeat Nazi Germany, and as the Allies stormed across Europe in 1944 and 1945, they began to encounter concentration camps, tens of thousands of dead, as well as survivors. Many of the surviving prisoners were suffering from disease and starvation, and were near death themselves. Many would die soon after liberation by the Soviet, American, and British forces. The Red Army was the first to find a major camp, reaching Majdanek in Poland in July 1944. The Germans had not expected the Soviets to reach Poland that quickly and hastily tried to cover up their crimes by destroying the camp. They demolished the crematorium used to burn the bodies, but left the gas chambers standing. Other camps such as Sobibor, which had been out of commission since 1943, were discovered later in the summer. The Red Army liberated Auschwitz in January 1945, but by this time, the Nazis had already forced many of the prisoners west on one of their notorious death marches to camps within Germany. The Soviets therefore found very few survivors, but what they found shocked and horrified them. The prisoners were emaciated and barely resembled human beings.

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American forces liberated the Buchenwald concentration camp outside of Weimar in central Germany in April 1945, weeks before the war came to an end and a few days after the Nazis evacuated the camp. They found more than 20,000 prisoners at the camp, prisoners who had just seized control of the camp from the retreating guards. The U.S. Army also liberated Dachau in southern Germany, Mauthausen in Austria, and two other camps. British forces liberated Neuengamme and Bergen-Belsen in northern Germany, freeing close to 60,000 at Bergen-Belsen in April 1945. Of that number, close to 20 percent died of disease and malnutrition within days or weeks of the liberation. After the war, the Allies brought some 22 Nazi leaders to trial for their crimes in Nuremberg, Germany. Of those, 12 were sentenced to death. Almost all of the defendants admitted their crimes, but claimed they were merely following orders from someone higher up the chain of command. Adolf Hitler had committed suicide before the war ended, and Adolf Eichmann, one of the main architects of the Holocaust, escaped, as many Nazis did, to South America, living in Argentina until his capture by Israeli commandos in 1962. Healing the wounds of the Holocaust was a slow process. Many survivors refused to return to their prewar homes, while many could not return, creating a refugee problem that pressured the Allies to create a Jewish homeland, Israel, which came into existence in 1948. Germans struggled with the legacy of the Holocaust, and beginning in 1953, West Germany started paying reparations to individuals and to the state of Israel. Presently several nations including Germany have laws that ban Holocaust denial. There has also been a movement around the world, including in Germany, over the past 20 years to create more Holocaust museums in an effort to memorialize, but also ensure that the catastrophe is not repeated. Seth A. Weitz See also Nazism, Religious Aspects of; Second World War, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Bergen, Doris. War & Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Browning, Christopher. The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004.

Burleigh, Michael. The Third Reich: A New History. New York: Hill and Wang, 2000. Delin, Grant. Lebensraum: Extermination Camps of the Third Reich. London: Westzone, 2001. Hilberg, Raul. The Destruction of the European Jews. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003.

Holy League See Catholic (Holy) League

Holy Roman Empire The Holy Roman Empire was a political entity that existed in central Europe from the early Middle Ages up to the year 1806, at which time it was dissolved. The empire covered the territory of modern Germany, parts of eastern France, northern Italy, and western Austria. The themes of war and religion in the Holy Roman Empire (HRE) fall into two general categories: the conflicts between Catholics and Protestants within the empire, for example, inter-Christian conflicts, and religious wars between Christians and nonChristians, in this context mainly the wars between the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Empire. Regarding the name of the HRE, the term “Holy” goes back to the 12th century; the prefix “Roman,” albeit a younger addition, emphasized the continuity to the Roman Empire. One of the most important aspects was the introduction of the Everlasting Public Peace (Ewiger Landfriede) in 1495 at the Diet of Worms that restructured the relationship between the emperor and the imperial princes of the many German-speaking states in what is now the modern nation of Germany. Nonetheless, the HRE remained a complex political entity that is insufficiently described by the term “state.” In contrast to other early modern Western European states, the location of sovereignty was unclear, be it with the emperor alone, as it was the case in France or Spain, with the Imperial Estates (and thus the Imperial Diet), or with both. This carried important practical implications, as it determined how autonomous the imperial princes appeared. Some did indeed act quite independently

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with regard to religious matters and foreign policy, thus enhancing the potential for conflict that originated from the Reformation and that ended religious universalism in early modern Europe. In light of this complex constitutional background, the conflicts within the empire resembled both civil wars as well as wars between states. This creates problems in defining them as religious or confessional wars in comparison with, for example, the French religious wars. In general, the Knights’ War (1522), the Peasants’ War (1524–1525), and the Schmalkaldic Wars (1546, 1552– 1555) have been classified as religious wars. With regard to the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) the matter becomes more difficult. Historians are divided over its nature and the importance of religion within it. The alliance between Catholic France and the Protestant Estates, Sweden, and the Netherlands against the Catholic Habsburgs make it problematic to categorize it as a religious war. On the other hand, the relevance of the denominational differences cannot be denied and were clarified in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. What is clear—and it is valid not only for the Thirty Years’ War—is that all these conflicts have to be considered from a number of perspectives. It is important to specify the perspective under which the phenomenon of religion and war is considered; that is, the experiences and perceptions of the contemporaries, propaganda, or the “official” view. The historians Franz Brendle and Anton Schindling have argued convincingly that no conflict within the HRE in the early modern period was recognized as being a religious (confessional) war by the emperor. Rather, conflicts were presented as protecting the public peace. This so-called tactic of dissimulation was first used by Charles V who insisted that the Schmalkaldic War against the elector of Saxony and the landgrave of Hessen was instigated by their breaking of the imperial peace, and not due to their Protestantism. It is significant that he never declared this war to be against heretics, although the question of religious division certainly incited him. Nonetheless, the fact that the religious motivation was omitted from official proclamations paved the way for the Peace of Augsburg (1555) as well as for the Peace of Westphalia (1648). By defining these religious conflicts in solely political and juridical terms, the volatile question of religious truth was ignored, thus allowing compromises that allowed the two denominations to coexist without

officially accepting each other. Even the Protestant princes were cautious in proclaiming their conflict with Charles V as religious, at least in official statements. Instead, they legitimized their actions in terms of princely liberty and the notion that the reputation of the Imperial Estates had to be defended. Although the Peace of Augsburg could not settle the denominational problems within the HRE, it allowed peaceful coexistence for more than half a century and furthermore created an example of dealing with the issue without coming to a theological agreement. When the conflict reignited in 1618, the interpretation of this peace lay at the core of the escalating constitutional crisis. The crisis in Bohemia was the starting point for a much wider struggle over the issue of imperial authority and over the German bishoprics. In other words, in the early modern HRE the explosive relationship of war and religion was further aggravated by constitutional problems. In the end, the Peace of Westphalia—rooted in the tradition of the Peace of Augsburg—was able to pacify the conflict by once more treating the denominational differences on a political and legal level. This desacralization of imperial politics made the prefix “Holy” a mere ornament in terms of the imperial constitution. However, the denominational differences were not dissolved, indeed they were in a way solidified, but the potential for war was defused. Subsequent conflicts that arose between the different denominations on all levels of society were brought before the imperial institutions, such as the Imperial Diet, the regional Kreis assemblies, the Imperial Aulic Council, the Imperial Chamber Court, or the Imperial courts, where they were either solved or adjourned until they ceased to be relevant. The desire to maintain and participate in a common polity prevented further escalation. However, the matter of religion and war goes far beyond the official perspective and diffusing the potential for a confessional war. While dissimulation was a recurring tactic, denominational arguments nevertheless played an important role in the context of propaganda. While the Protestant princes during the Schmalkaldic Wars publicly presented their action as a defense of their princely liberties, the inner Protestant discourse cast these conflicts as “Wars of Reformation,” protecting the cause of the Reformation and the true religion. During the Thirty Years’ War pamphlets and broadsheets in particular played a central

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role that further emotionalized and thus intensified the conflict. On the Protestant side Frederick V, Elector Palatine, was portrayed as a biblical figure sent by God to further the cause of Protestantism. Later the king of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, was cast in the role of savior, and the sack of Magdeburg by the armies of the Catholic League was described in apocalyptic terms. In contrast, Catholic pamphlets mocked Frederick, the so-called “Winterking,” Luther, and Calvin, who were expelled and forced to flee. Furthermore, the analysis of internal Catholic communication has shown that they did indeed consider it a matter of protecting Catholic vested rights, and not merely of fighting Bohemian rebels. In general, arguments relating to the salvation of souls occurred frequently in pamphlets and broadsheets. This is one reason why the Thirty Years’ War in particular was perceived by contemporaries as a religious war, even after the entry of France had rendered the conflict an international power struggle. After the Peace of Westphalia religion became less of a pretext for war, although it occasionally reappeared in propaganda. During the Great Northern War, Charles XII of Sweden legitimized his intervention on behalf of the Protestants in Silesia with references to Gustavus Adolphus. Similarly, Frederick the Great styled himself as the second Gustavus Adolphus in the Seven Years’ War. Generally seen as a secular power struggle, the war was represented in Prussian propaganda as a religious conflict in which the Protestants had to defend themselves against a growing Catholic coalition. Yet this is quite different from starting a war for religious reasons. Religion did, however, allow a convenient way to categorize allies and adversaries—although the reality was never so clear-cut. Moreover, it also provided an essential means of understanding and coping with the experiences of war, which date to the Old Testament. Across the denominational divisions war was interpreted as God’s punishment for the sins of men, thus prompting acts of repentance, such as making a pilgrimage or observing days of prayer and repentance. Thus, religion also had a consoling function. These aspects are reflected in sermons, church songs, sacred art, poetry, and other literary texts by authors such as Andreas Gryphius. Beyond the confessional wars and the inter-Christian state conflicts lay the wars between Christians and non-

Christians, meaning, in this context, Muslims. During the early modern period the confrontation between the Habs­ burgs and the Ottoman Empire played a significant role, affecting not only the border areas between the Habsburg lands and the Ottoman Empire—such as Styria, Upper Austria, Hungary, and Moravia—but the entire empire. Despite several peace treaties, truces, and diplomatic contacts, warfare was more or less continuous. These conflicts were generally interpreted as holy wars against the hereditary enemy of Christianity. Some sermons even placed them in the tradition of the medieval crusades. Fear of the Turks was widespread and not limited to the affected areas. Stereotypes of Muslims led to the perception that these conflicts were more violent than wars among Christians, regardless of the reality, leading to a general fear of massacre, looting, and forced Islamization. These conflicts were interpreted and explained in religious terms, being regarded as divine retribution and prefiguring the end of the world. Victories against the Muslims, such as the victory of the allied Christian armies at the second siege of Vienna in 1683, were credited to the intervention of the Holy Mary. Catholics and Protestants accused one another of being responsible for God’s anger, as they had deserted the true faith. However, during the 16th century the conflict with the Ottomans helped establish the Protestant faith on a legal level, as the Protestant Estates used the Imperial need for a Turkish tax to gain concessions regarding denominational matters. As a matter of course, they supported the war against the archenemy of Christendom, but for them it was more of a national than a religious question. Altogether, it became clear that religion and war were essential categories that shaped politics, culture, and everyday life in the HRE. Religion could be a reason for war and it could be used to legitimize wars fought for very different reasons. Furthermore, religion provided a framework for explaining and understanding conflict, and thus coping with the experiences of war. This means that religion could intensify a conflict as well as call for peace. It is essential to consider from which perspective this topic is viewed: from that of official or internal politics, in terms of propaganda, or the perception and experiences of the people. The example of the HRE reveals a particular entanglement of religious questions with constitutional issues,

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and of the defense against the hereditary enemy of Christendom with the advance of Protestantism. Lena Oetzel See also Calvin, John; German Peasants’ War; Luther, Martin; Schmalkaldic War; Thirty Years’ War; Westphalia, Peace of Further Reading Buck, J. D. The Holy Roman Empire. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 1992. Coy, Jason Philip, et al., eds. The Holy Roman Empire, Reconsidered. New York: Bergahn Books, 2010. Wilson, Peter H. The Holy Roman Empire: 1495–1806. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999.

Holy Sepulchre, Church of the The Church of the Holy Sepulchre is also known as the Basilica of the Holy Sepulchre and the Church of the Resurrection (Orthodox Christians). Originally identified as being outside the settlement of Calvary, it is located in the Old City of Jerusalem, Israel, and is considered one of the holiest sites in the world, as well as being a central destination for Christian pilgrims. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre was originally built by the Roman emperor Constantine (272–337) in 330 CE upon the site of a Roman temple. It has since been controlled by Arab rulers, reclaimed by Christian crusaders, repeatedly ruined by fires and conquests, and long been subject to regional religious and political tensions. The Holy Sepulchre is a central church in the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic faiths in Jerusalem and is open to other denominations including Coptic Orthodox, Ethiopian Orthodox, and Armenian Apostolic. The holy site of the church includes the Golgotha, or location of Jesus of Nazareth’s crucifixion, the tomb in which he was buried, and the site of his Anastasis, or resurrection. The responsibilities and care for the site are shared between the Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, Coptic Orthodox, Ethiopian Orthodox, and Syrian Orthodox orders. Conflicts between these denominations have damaged, destroyed, rebuilt, desecrated, and neglected the church for centuries. In addition, given the different periods of construction, varying influences

including the Roman, Jewish, Christian, Byzantine, medieval, crusader, romantic, and modern styles can be identified in the structure. Liberation of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was a central motivation of the First Crusade (1096–1099). Presently the Church of the Holy Sepulchre is part of the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Old Jerusalem and consists of dedicated chapels as well as holy relics, including the Stone of Anointing, Rock of Calvary, Angel’s Stone, Stone of Unction, and the Immovable Ladder. Prior to Constantine’s conversion to Christianity and his construction of the Holy Sepulchre, the location of the church was the site of a Roman temple dedicated to Venus by Emperor Hadrian (76–138) in 135 and active until 335. During conversion of the Roman temple, a tomb claimed to be the site of Jesus’s burial, known as the Rock of Golgotha, was discovered. In addition, Helena, Constantine’s mother, is purported to have found the True Cross upon which Jesus was crucified. In response to these discoveries the original Roman church incorporated the locations of Jesus’s crucifixion, his tomb, and the site of his resurrection. The church was severely damaged in 614 when the Persian emperor Chosroes II (550–628) conquered Jerusalem and captured holy relics, including the True Cross. In 630 Emperor Heraclius (575–641) reclaimed the region, recaptured the True Cross, and began rebuilding the church. However, the site was again conquered by Arabs in 638, though notably the Church of the Holy Sepulchre remained a Christian site of worship that was not destroyed or converted to a Muslim mosque. In 746 and again in the early ninth century, the church was damaged by earthquakes, leading to the need for repairs in 810. In 841, 938, and 966, the church was repeatedly damaged by a fire. In addition, in 1009, in an effort to destroy Christian sites of worship in Jerusalem, Palestine, and Egypt, Caliph al-Hakim (985–1021) ordered the church destroyed with the result that little of the original Byzantine structure survived. Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos (1042–1055) later financed reconstruction of the church in 1048. It was rebuilt as a series of smaller chapels commemorating the Stations of the Cross. In the 11th century, Pope Urban II (1042–1099), at the behest of Byzantine emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1048– 1118), in an effort to reclaim Muslim-controlled holy sites and the holy lands, began the First Crusade (1096–1099).

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The Church of the Holy Sepulchre was reclaimed by Christian crusaders on July 15, 1099, along with the liberation of Jerusalem. At this time, Godfrey of Bouillon (1060– 1100), now ruler of Jerusalem, was named the advocate, protector, or defender of the Holy Sepulchre. Throughout the 12th and 13th centuries, repairs and renovations were undertaken on the church during which the remains of the original Roman temple were located and became known as the Chapel of Saint Helena. In 1187, despite having been reconquered by Sultan Saladin (1137–1193), the church remained open to Christian pilgrims. In 1333, the right for a permanent Latin European residence at the site of the Holy Sepulchre was agreed upon; in 1342 Pope Clement VI (1291–1352) named the Franciscan friars the guardians of the church, and they renovated the structure extensively in 1555. In the following centuries control and care of the holy site became the focus of both religious and political struggles. As a result, the Holy Sepulchre suffered from neglect, which was exacerbated by a fire in 1808 and earthquake in 1927. While renovations had been conducted (1808–1810), by the mid-19th century increasing disagreements between religious orders had halted most required care. The contemporary site since 1959 has been jointly cared for by Franciscan friars, Greek Orthodox, and Armenian orders while undergoing minor restoration. While the structure and style of the Holy Sepulchre has changed throughout the centuries, reflecting its Constantine origins, Persian occupation, crusader conquest, and subsequent regional turmoil, the symbolic significance of the site has grown from the fourth century until the present. Sean Morton See also Bouillon, Godfrey de; Constantine; Crusades (Overview); First Crusade Further Reading Biddle, Martin. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Tel Aviv: Israel Antiquities Authority, 2000. Gibson, S., and J. Taylor. Beneath the Church of the Holy Sepulchre Jerusalem: The Archaeology and Early History of Traditional Golgotha. London: Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund, 1994. Murphy-O’Connor, J. Oxford Archaeological Guide to the Holy Land. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Holy War (Bellum Sacrum) Bellum sacrum is the Latin phrase meaning “holy war” or “religious war,” referring to violent conflict that arises with religion as a dominant factor; it represents both an ancient and contemporary example of clashes between cultures, traditions, and ideologies. Holy war is often regarded as a recent category to make sense of millennia of warfare. In the West, it is most generally associated with the crusades of the Middle Ages; however, the concept of religion as the catalyst of war is known to societies worldwide. Holy war differs from just war tradition in the centrality of religious motivations in the former. One of the difficult distinguishing factors of holy war is determining the primary cause of armed conflict because political, economic, and ethnic disagreements can be contributing reasons. The motivations of holy war can include conversion through force, defense of religious beliefs, following what adherents believe to be a divine command, or reparation for perceived blasphemy. The rise of modern states participating in organizations such as the United Nations often means that a religious tradition’s declaration of war does not result in widespread conflict. In modern parlance, holy war is often affiliated with the logic or beliefs of fundamentalism or extremism. Notable historical examples of holy war, though debated by historians and religious scholars, include the crusades, the Thirty Years’ War of 1618–1648, the various conquests of the ancient Jewish people, and the conquests of early Islam. In modern times, it is more challenging to ascribe what constitutes a holy war; questions of religious authority, state sponsorship, diplomatic efforts to avoid war, and widespread media communication complicate categorization. Perhaps examples include the armed conflicts between Israel and Palestine, Protestant and Catholic violence in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and movements associated with jihad in Islam. What connects modern and historical examples of holy war is the difficulty of untangling the various nonreligious motives leading to conflict. In many cases, it is nearly impossible to separate the religious from the secular ideological motivations. In studying holy war, scholars are limited by perspective because not only is the definition of holy war dependent upon society, culture, and religion, but the views of those

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contributing to and victims of violence vary widely. In religious war, often God (or the respective deity/deities) is cited as the authority for conflict. Additionally, wide dis­ agreement about the number of holy wars in human history, the criteria for defining holy war between different religions, and the authority of sanctioning war contribute to the fact that understanding the perspectives of the involved groups is critical. James E. Willis III See also Apocalypticism and War, Christian; Apocalypticism and War, Jewish; Apocalypticism and War, Muslim; Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa; Islam and War (Jihad); Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict; Thirty Years’ War Further Reading Armstrong, Karen. Holy War: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today’s World. New York: Anchor, 2001. Cavanaugh, William T. The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Fox, Jonathan. Religion, Civilization, and Civil War: 1945 through the New Millennium. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2004. Ginther, James R. The Westminster Handbook to Medieval Theology. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2009. Johnson, James Turner. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.

Holy War, Medieval Roman Catholic Conceptions of Medieval conceptions of the iustum bellum (just war) begin with Augustine of Hippo (354–430) in Contra Faustum and City of God and end with a systematic, theological theory of just war in the Summa Theologica by Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). Essential to the concept of the just war was who had the authority to resort to armed force, whether or not Christians could serve in the military, how such wars should be carried out, and the underlying philosophy of its justice. The need to define these elements— and the just war in general—was largely driven by a tension between biblical calls to peace and nonviolence

(e.g., Luke 6:29 and Mark 12:31) and biblical calls to justice (e.g., Romans 13:4). Central to Augustine’s conception of the just war is his definition: “Just wars avenge injuries.” According to this definition, a war is just when a rightful authority either redresses a wrong originally committed by an offending group or reclaims something that the offending group had unlawfully claimed. While this can be likened to Marcus Tullius Cicero’s (106 BCE–43 BCE) earlier claim that a just war was fought to recover tangible property or intangible rights, Augustine’s definition distinguishes itself in that Augustine saw “justice” not as reflecting a body of law but rather as righteousness. This opened the possibility not only to recover property or rights through warfare but also to avenge sins committed against the grieved party or even against God’s “law” (i.e., Christian doctrine) itself. Underlying this conception of righteousness was a philosophy of justice that relied upon God to determine the victor (and thus, the just party) in a war. While this definition opens the possibility for all manner of wars, Augustine theoretically limited these possibilities through several provisions. First, a war could not be waged justly unless it was declared by a legitimate authority (e.g., a political ruler). Second, the war must be considered a necessity to redress a wrong by the legitimate authority rather than the most expedient or beneficial means of redress. Third, warfare should not be carried out with malice, hatred, or a desire for domination, but rather with a sense of charity that would prevent one’s opponent from sinning further. Finally, clerics and others engaged in religious vocations could not participate in warfare, while the soldier was obligated to do so even if he did not consider the war just. The next major development in the medieval theological conception of the just war came with Gratian (12th century). In his Decretum, Gratian conflates judicial process and just war, such that a just war becomes a war that “is waged by an authoritative edict to avenge injuries.” While this definition seems similar to Augustine, Gratian’s execution differs in several ways. First, Augustine insisted upon the need for soldiers to obey their commanders, but Gratian opens a space for soldiers to reject their orders if the orders are contrary to Christian precepts. Moreover, Gratian sought to restrain the potential violence

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of Augustine’s definition by insisting that war should be carried out because of a love for justice rather than a lust for retributive punishment. Interestingly enough, Gratian also makes allowances for bishops with temporal authority to go to war with their lords, but limits their function to praying for the army (i.e., they may not participate in actual combat). Later commentators on the Decretum would modify this allowance for ecclesiastical participation in just war to validate the crusading practices of the 11th to 15th centuries. According to these commentators, the church possessed the necessary temporal authority to call for a just war on its own behalf, and Christian princes were required to answer this summons to war (this call could also be issued to laymen but they were not required to answer). The pope gradually became the temporal authority most acceptable to initiate such wars. It was not until the early 13th century (as commentators’ attention moved from the Decretum to papal legislation) that the theory of the just war began to gain practical elaboration. For example, it is at this time that commentators distinguished between two kinds of princes: those with a superior and those with no superior. The wars of the first kind of prince were only just when they were undertaken in defense or to punish rebellious elements of the prince’s polity. On the other hand, princes with no superiors were limited in their capacity to call for war only by the doctrines of the Christian faith. This elaboration not only clarifies previous uncertainty regarding who holds the authority to call a just war, but also brings concepts of the just war in line with the feudal system. The concept of the crusade also received a similar treatment in which the crusader’s vow became a kind of feudal bond that offered special privileges (e.g., exemption from taxes) and the obligation to serve the prince (i.e., the pope) in his fight against heresy. This also served to move the locus of justice from the divine to an extension of the legal process. However, it is not until Aquinas and the Scholastics that theory of the just war moves away from church canon and begins to engage philosophy. While Aquinas by no means rejected Augustine’s notions of just war upon which the majority of the medieval formulation was built, he integrated Aristotelian conceptions of the common good into his notion of the need for war. This notion of a common

good—driven by the supposition that humans were social and political animals that were meant to live in virtuous communities that promoted communal over private good—was arguably more intimately tied with the welfare of country and people than other previous definitions had been, shifting the focus of just war away from divine or legal retribution and more toward peace as a state of equilibrium in which humans were at their best. Michael E. Heyes See also Aquinas, Thomas; Augustine; Christianity and War; Decretum (Decretum Gratiani); Just War Tradition Further Reading Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. New York: Christian Classics, 1981. Augustine. City of God. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2009. Charles, J. Daryl, and Timothy J. Demy. War, Peace, and Christianity. Wheaton, IL: Crossways, 2010. Johnson, James Turner. The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Reichberg, Gregory M., and Henrik Syse, eds. Ethics, Nationalism, and Just War: Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives. Baltimore: Catholic University of America Press, 2007. Russell, Frederick H. The Just War in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Huguenots The Huguenots were French Calvinist Christians who originated during the Reformation era. The word Huguenot was first used as a pejorative term in 1560 referring to “those of the so-called Reformed tradition.” In the 1540s and 1550s persecution against many followers of emerging Protestant groups caused some to seek refuge in Switzerland, specifically in Geneva, where the influence of reformer John Calvin (1509–1564) was enormous. From Geneva, Calvinist pastors were secretly sent back into Roman Catholic France. The first Calvinist church in Paris was established in 1555, although it functioned in secret. The first synod of Calvinist or Reformed churches was held in secret in 1559 in Paris, drew up a confession of faith for the churches, and followed the institutional model of the

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Calvinist church order in Geneva. French Calvinists comprised about 10 percent of the French population in the early 1560s with a strong presence in Normandy and the south of France. Calvinism was found at every level of society and some have estimated that one-third of the nobility were Calvinists on the eve of the French Wars of Religion, providing political, financial, and military leadership to the movement. On March 1, 1562, Huguenots worshiping in a barn were killed on the order of Francis (François), the second Duke of Guise, after an altercation with the duke and his traveling party. Sixty-eight people were killed and more than 100 were wounded. Reports of the “massacre at Vassy” spread widely, and as a result conflict erupted between Protestant and Roman Catholic groups, igniting the French Wars of Religion. The multiyear conflict waned briefly but flared up once again in 1572 when most of the Huguenot leaders in Paris were killed on August 24, 1572, in targeted assassinations in what came to be termed the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. The Huguenots fought for religious freedom, toleration, and recognition of their beliefs with varying degrees of success during the wars. The violence in France caused many of the Huguenots to flee conflict and persecution and settle in other parts of Europe or England. For those who remained in France, the persecution strengthened their belief that there would come eventual triumph and peace. In 1598, Henry IV, who had become king and converted from Protestantism to Roman Catholicism, granted religious freedom and privileges to the Huguenots in the Edict of Nantes. The edict would remain in place for almost 100 years until it was revoked by Louis XIV. From the perspective of religion and war, the Huguenots are an illustration of how persecution, martyrdom, and conflict can strengthen a religious group. Their presence as combatants in the French Wars of Religion also demonstrates how religion can be a major factor and motivator in war, but not the only one. Timothy J. Demy See also Calvin, John; French Wars of Religion; Protestant Reformers and War; Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre; Primary Documents: Excerpt from Jacques-Auguste de Thou’s Account of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day in Paris (1572);

Granting Religious Toleration to Huguenots: Henri IV’s Edict of Nantes (1598); Withdrawing Religious Toleration for Huguenots: Louis XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) Further Reading Gray, Janet Glenn. The French Huguenots: Anatomy of Courage. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1981. Knecht, Robert Jean. The French Wars of Religion (1562–1598). Oxford: Osprey Publications, 2002. Treasure, Geoffrey. The Huguenots. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013.

Hus, Jan (ca. 1370–1415) Jan Hus (also known in English as John Hus and John Huss) was a Czech religious reformer and central figure in the Bohemian or Czech Reformation who was martyred because of his beliefs and whose death fueled the latter Hussite Wars of 1419–1436. Born in Husinec in southern Bohemia, at an early age he traveled to Prague where he supported himself by singing in churches. In 1393, he earned the bachelor of arts degree and in 1396, the master of arts degree from Charles University (University of Prague). Hus was ordained in 1400 and was a popular preacher at Bethlehem Chapel in Prague. He soon came under the influence of the English heretic John Wycliffe (also Wyclif, 1320–1384) and translated one of his works into Czech. Hus also was influenced by native Czech reformers Jan Milič (d. 1374) and Matěj of Janov (d. 1394). As a result of the Council of Pisa (1409) that elected Alexander V (1339–1410) as the third pontiff competing for legitimacy as pope in what is known as the Great Schism or the Western Schism, Hus became embroiled in the fallout of papal politics and divisions regarding it within Bohemia. Dissent was also fueled by rising Czech nationalism, and Hus had a large popular following. In 1410 Alexander V died and was succeeded by antipope John XXIII (ca. 1370–1419). John XXIII proclaimed a crusade against King Ladislaus of Naples in 1411 and authorized the sale of indulgences to fund the war. Hus opposed the sale of indulgences and was especially vocal against them being sold for purposes of war. Hus believed that no bishop or pope had the right to make war. In 1412, Prague was placed under papal interdict and Hus, by then a very

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popular figure, went into voluntary exile for two years during which he wrote 15 treatises on ecclesiastical reform and church practices and tied all of them to social concerns as well. In the fall of 1414, Hus was invited to appear at the Council of Constance and did so. Once there he was arrested, imprisoned, and, in June 1415, tried for heresy. Found guilty and refusing to recant, Hus was executed by burning at the stake. The death of Hus fueled the already growing Czech nationalism and dissent from papal authority, creating what many understand to be the forerunner of the 16th-century Protestant Reformation (although there are distinct theological differences between the two movements). The martyrdom of Hus became a rallying symbol for many Bohemians who had theological, political, and social complaints against religious and political authorities. Fighting eventually erupted in 1419, and during the course of the next 17 years five crusades were called against the Hussites and factions within them. The wars finally came to an end in 1439 when royal Polish troops defeated Hussites at the Battle of Lipany. Throughout the era, the memory and martyrdom of Jan Hus provided a motivation for fighting and also created a legacy that other reformers would look back to in the 16th century. Timothy J. Demy See also Wars of the Reformation Further Reading Fudge, Thomas A. The Memory and Morivation of Jan Hus, Medieval Priest and Martyr. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2013. Haberkern, Phillip N. Patron Saint and Prophet: Jan Hus in the Bohemian and German Reformations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Turnbull, Stephen. The Hussite Wars 1419–36. Oxford: Osprey, 2006.

Hybrid War of the 21st Century, Religious Dimensions of Hybrid warfare is widely accepted as a subset of irregular warfare that has gained currency in the early 21st century.

Recent conflicts in Lebanon, Georgia, and Ukraine are often cited as examples of this type of warfare. It is defined as warfare that simultaneously and adaptively incorporates elements of conventional and irregular forms of war coupled with information and cyber operations designed to destabilize an opponent, often perpetrated by proxy nonstate actors supported by unidentified state actors. Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic State (IS), all nonstate entities, have utilized this type of warfare in the pursuit of their aims, incorporating religious elements as necessary to mobilize support for their cause. Military theorists correctly state that hybrid warfare is not a new concept historically, but has been effectively utilized against Napoleon in Spain, by the British during World War I, and against the United States in Vietnam. However, rapidly evolving 21st-century technology makes this type of warfare much more dangerous and likely, especially considering the conventional dominance of U.S. and Western military forces. Russia’s attacks on Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2013 to the present) serve as contemporary examples of hybrid warfare. In Georgia, Russia invaded the country only after conducting intensive cyber operations designed to cripple the electronic infrastructure, especially command and control facilities. They also conducted intensive information operations to confuse enemy populations and to convince them that it was futile to oppose Russian military intervention. In Ukraine, Russia recently admitted providing extensive military assistance to proxy irregular rebel forces, often accompanied by Russian military “volunteers” dressed in uniforms without identifying insignia. Russian media also conducted an extensive media campaign identifying Ukrainian leaders as Nazis and their ethnic Russian opponents (strongly supported by the Russian Orthodox Church) as freedom fighters while denying any Russian involvement in the conflict. These operations have been so effective that many security professionals suggest that future warfare will be characterized by hybrid threats. The 2006 Lebanon conflict between Israel and Hezbollah illustrates the strong religious dimension of Hybrid warfare. Hezbollah is an armed group that emerged out of Lebanon’s Shi’a population between 1982 and 1984 with the aid of Iran to oppose Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon. During its history, it has engaged in guerrilla

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warfare against Israel, including suicide bombings and the launching of missiles against Israeli cities. Hezbollah has also achieved political legitimacy within Lebanon, electing its members to the Lebanese parliament representing the Shi’a minority. Its military arm is widely viewed within Lebanon as a second Lebanese Army, protecting southern Lebanon from Israel. As a Shi’a sect of Islam, it follows the teachings of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and is supported by and a proxy of both Syria and Iran. Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 was widely viewed as a victory for Hezbollah. Hezbollah immediately began preparation for what it viewed as an inevitable future conflict with Israel in southern Lebanon. It acquired as many as 13,000 missiles from Syria and Iran with which to attack Israeli cities and defeat Israel’s vaunted Merkava tank. It also began the construction of an extensive fortified tunnel system throughout southern Lebanon, reportedly with the aid of North Korea. The tunnel system was outfitted with a command and control system that was designed to withstand Israeli air attacks. Improvised explosive devices and mines were strategically placed throughout the defensive area, and Hezbollah fighters were extensively trained in the use of antitank rockets and presighted their weapons throughout the area’s well-known approaches. This tactical preparation was organized through a strategic planning process that assumed that Israel would attack primarily via air and would avoid personnel casualties whenever possible. Hezbollah precipitated the 2006 Lebanon war when its fighters attacked an Israeli patrol on July 12, 2006, killing three members of the seven-man team and abducting two wounded survivors. Israel responded with an armed ground force, but ran into Hezbollah’s heavily fortified positions, suffering the loss of additional soldiers and the destruction of a Merkava tank and its crew. This opening salvo by Hezbollah guaranteed an Israeli response. Over the following days, Israel responded with extensive air attacks against Hezbollah positions, often within urban areas, resulting in civilian deaths. Hezbollah responded with missile attacks against Israeli cities, also resulting in civilian deaths. On July 17, Israel sent its ground forces into southern Lebanon. Hezbollah training and preparations proved extremely effective, with Hezbollah’s Shi’a fighters inflicting heavy losses on Israeli forces. Of note is the use of

swarming missile attacks against Israeli tanks, with multiple antitank rockets being employed against each target. Hezbollah also employed an effective information campaign to capture public opinion. Initially positive toward Israel due to Hezbollah’s initiation of the conflict and attacks against Israeli cities, international opinion gradually shifted to view Hezbollah as the victim due to the ferocity of Israeli attacks against Lebanon’s urban areas. The sophistication of its media campaign is evidenced in one event. On July 14, the leader of Hezbollah, Nasrallah, delivered a taped message to the press. During the broadcast, he advised the correspondents to direct their gaze toward the ocean. At that moment, his forces launched an antiship missile that struck an Israeli ship just off the coast, exploding inside the ship and killing four sailors. The Israelis had no idea that Hezbollah possessed this capability. On August 14, a UN cease-fire ended the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. During the month-long war, Hezbollah demonstrated that it could stand up to the Israeli military using sophisticated state-provided weaponry, a well-trained irregular military force, and a well-orchestrated media campaign. None of this would have been possible without the aid of Iran and Syria, as well as other outside state powers. Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal included Iranian, Chinese, Russian, and even U.S.–produced weapons. Its defensive tunnel system reflected North Korea’s extensive experience on the DMZ with South Korea. Its fighters had been trained in small unit tactics by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Hezbollah and its leadership provided the inspiration and courage to confront the Israelis, but the support of outside state actors provided the expertise, money, and logistics to facilitate their victory. The 2006 Lebanon war is regarded by many military theorists as a primary case study on hybrid warfare. It has been the subject of many papers and is included in the curriculum of the Naval War College. The conflict certainly displays geopolitical elements, in that Iran and Syria supported Hezbollah to further their own national interests against Israel. It is also clear that Shi’a Hezbollah served as a proxy for their co-religionists in Iran and Syria, enhancing their corporate religious standing and influence within the Muslim world: for this was a Shi’a effort that had defeated Israel, not a Sunni effort.

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As conflict in the 21st-century world becomes more complex and the overlap between religion and nationalism becomes more difficult to discern, hybrid-type warfare will become more prominent. Nonstate actors and state actors employing proxy groups to accomplish security objectives abroad will choose hybrid warfare, often leveraging religious practice and sentiment in the process, as a means to achieve victory against their opponents. Dayne E. Nix See also Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Hamas; Hezbollah; Islamic State Further Reading Harell, Amos, and Avi Issacharoff. 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon. Translated by Ora Cummings

and Mosha Tlamim. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Hoffman, Frank. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War. Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007. Murray, Williamson, and Peter R. Mansoor. Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Simpson, Emile. War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics (Crises in World Politics). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Sultan, Cathy. Tragedy in South Lebanon: The IsraeliHezbollah War of 2006. Minneapolis, MN: Mighty Media Press, 2008. Thompson, Peter G. Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014.

I Ibn Khaldun (1332–1402)

their own sustenance. There is no desire to expand political borders or conquer territory; simply meeting basic societal needs motivates this type of warfare. The third type of war is holy war, or jihad. Finally, the fourth type is dynastic wars between rulers, kingdoms, and empires. In this way, he analyses the modalities of commerce and the development of manufacturing activities and their indissoluble contribution to a thriving society where philosophy, culture, and art bloom freely and without impediment. This complex methodology displays a concrete study on the historical dynamics wherein societal and paradigmatic ideal types clearly appear. Their structural dichotomies are then thoroughly analyzed such as town/countryside, nomad/ sedentary society, and tribal solidarity/individual egoism. His empirical method goes beyond the cold transcription of the events to be correctly defined as “historical science.” His thought is the fruit of a perfect synthesis in which all the social features appear as auxiliary sciences to history in a complex unity. Ibn Khaldun admonishes that “it is necessary that the historian knows the fundamental principles of the art of government, the true character of events, the difference between the nations, the countries and the times in which to observe the customs, the uses, the behaviors, the opinions and religious sentiments and all the circumstances that influence the society” (Ibn Khaldun 1993, 2:235).

Ibn Khaldun was an Arab philosopher and historian and a key contributor to Islamic just war thinking. In his Muqaddima (Prolegomena to Universal History), Ibn Khaldun presents one of the first attempts at a universal history of the world. From this perspective, he depicts possible reasons for social evolution and regression. He also explains in the Muqaddima that there are four different kinds of war. At the beginning, there is a socioanthropological study on the extent of environmental influences on human nature, describing the first nomad civilizations (’umran badawi). The concept of ’umran contains in itself a plurality of meanings: from a loosely organized yet inhabited geographical place on the one hand to a structured, organized society on the other.. From here, the focus then shifts to the first institutional forms and their evolutionary characteristics, later leading to more developed and sophisticated forms of social aggregation in an urban and sedentary context (’umran hadari). The first type of war is that which takes place between competing tribes, families, or clans. This would equate to small, irregular types of warfare in which raids and skirmishes predominate. The second type of war that Ibn Khaldun describes involves nomadic peoples such as the Arab Bedouins seizing lands from others to provide for 363

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This global vision of history permits Ibn Khaldun to formulate a socioeconomic theory characterized by the cyclicity in which the state, originally, has limited power and taxation is at a relatively low level so that it allows constant growth of production and consumption. After this phase (first and second generation), the state primarily concentrates on accumulating greater economic power, followed by an evident diminution of consumption and production (third generation). The final phase (fourth generation) is a strong economic stagnation ultimately causing the state’s paralysis. In this theory of evolution and decline, a reciprocal solidarity plays a fundamental role because it binds each member of the community in a widespread effort toward the common good, and it is a natural barrier to social degeneration (widely expressed by the concept of fitna). Western lectors have mistakenly portrayed Ibn Khaldun’s method, which is deeply analytical and rigorous, as a forerunner of the positivist theories of history and an idol ante litteram of historical materialism. Recent research, however, has revealed the contrary, claiming that criticism of the state’s omnipotence, his denunciation of the centralization of production within the state, and his exaltation of freedom show him to be a precursor of modern political science and classical liberalism. Giovanni Patriarca See also Islam and War (Jihad) Further Reading Al-Azmeh, A. Ibn Khaldun. An Essay in Reinterpretation. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003. Alvi, S., and A. Al-Roubaie, eds. Islamic Economics: Critical Concepts in Economics. Vol. I. New York: Routledge, 2013. Bakircioglu, O. Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International Law. New York: Routledge, 2014. Bonner, M. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2008. Campanini, M., ed. Studies on Ibn Khaldun. Monza, Italy: Polimetrica, 2005. Ibn Khaldun. The Muquaddima: An Introduction to History. Translated by F. Rosenthal. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Mahdi, M. Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy of History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Ibn Taymiyah (1263–1328) Ibn Taymiyah was born in 1263 in Harran, in modern-day Turkey, into a family of prominent Islamic scholars. As a result of the Mongol invasions, he and his family sought refuge in Damascus in 1289, which was under the control of the Mamluks. In Damascus Ibn Taymiyah studied law and theology and proved to be a brilliant student. At this time he followed the teachings of the Hanbali legal school of thought as this was a school of law that followed a literalist interpretation of the foundational Islamic texts. Ibn Taymiyah succeeded his father as a professor, and by the age of 20 he was eligible to provide judgments in Islamic law. Ibn Taymiyah, based upon his study of the Qu’ran and Sunna, called for a return to Islamic purity. He was a literalist and he pronounced that only that which was recorded in the early works of Islam was legitimate. Anything that was not based upon the statements of the earliest Muslims was un-Islamic and a departure from the Prophet’s teachings and should be condemned. This has led some to see Ibn Taymiyah as the founder of the modern Salafist movement. Ibn Taymiyah’s strict literal interpretation of Islam was very controversial at the time and since. He denounced as insincere the Mongols’ adoption of Islam, as they still practiced their old tribal laws. Ibn Taymiyah denounced the Sufi order, the veneration of saints, and Shi’a practices and opinions as contrary to Islam. Ibn Taymiyah asserted that contemporary Christians were not entitled to toleration as they had corrupted the teachings of Jesus. Ibn Taymiyah’s teachings were very controversial, and he was imprisoned twice by the Mamluks for his views. He also accompanied armies campaigning against the Mongols. Ibn Taymiyah, despite suffering persecution, had many followers and when he died in Damascus, thousands attended his funeral. The concept of jihad is extremely important in Islam. Traditionally it has often been used to sanction or instigate a military struggle, especially against non-Muslims. The exact definition of jihad is still controversial. Many see it as a physical struggle in the name of God. There are scholars who hold that jihad is merely a struggle to attain purity of mind. Prior to Ibn Taymiyah, the prevailing view was that jihad was only about a spiritual struggle. Ibn Taymiyah argued forcefully that jihad was a lawful struggle to defend

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and advance Islam by military means if necessary. He described it as a religious duty and the greatest happiness for Muslims. Ibn Taymiyah not only revived the concept of jihad, he also expanded the purpose of jihad, stating it was a struggle against all those who did not adopt a literalist approach to the Qur’an and Sunna writings, and not just nonbelievers. Muslims who failed to observe the laws were not just acting contrary to Islam, they were undermining the teachings of the Prophet, and therefore it was lawful to wage a jihad against Muslim groups such as the Shi’a or Sufi orders. Ibn Taymiyah was not a military thinker, but his definition of jihad and his reflections on the concept have been very influential on Islamic theories of war. He ensured that the concept of jihad continued to be influential throughout Muslim history. An important aspect concerning Ibn Taymiyah is that he physically participated in jihad in battle, and that is why other scholars appreciated his exegesis. Ibn Taymiyah is given more respect to this day, because he was one of the few scholars who fought against the Mongols. Unlike many scholars, he participated in war and issued fatwas or legal rulings. Ibn Taymiyah’s teachings on jihad has influenced the nature of many military conflicts, involving Muslims from the Middle Ages, through the colonial era, to the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Ibn Taymiyah’s belief that Muslims who did not conform to a literal reading of the Qur’an were enemies of Islam influenced Abdal-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, a religious reform movement. In the mid-eighteenth century the Wahhabis launched jihads against those who were not practicing Islam in a literal manner, including Sufis and the Ottoman Turks. Wahhabism is almost unthinkable without the writings of Ibn Taymiyah. The teachings of Ibn Taymiyah, especially his thoughts on jihad, have greatly influenced Salafism and in turn the subsequent development of violent Salafist movements in the Muslim world, including Hamas and Al Qaeda. Wafa Hozien See also Al Qaeda; Hamas; Islam and War (Jihad); Wahhabism Further Reading al-Jamil, Tariq. “Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli: Shi`a Polemics and the Struggle for Religious Authority

in Medieval Islam.” In Ibn Taymiyyah and His Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Hakim, Abdul I. Al-Matrudi. The Hanbali School of Law and Ibn Taymiyyah: Conflict or Conciliation? London: Routledge, 2006. Rapoport, Yossef, and Shahab Ahmed. Ibn Taymiyya and His Times. Studies in Islamic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Sivan, Emmanuel. Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.

Ikko-ikki The Ikko-ikki were religiously motivated uprisings in the Hokuriku, Kinki, and Tokai regions of Honshu Island of Japan in the 15th and 16th centuries. These uprisings were the first time in Japanese medieval history that commoners were taking power, led and unified by religious beliefs. The Ikko rebels believed in the teachings of the Ikko-shu, a militant offshoot of the Jodo Shinshu (True Pure Land) teachings by one of the numerous religious sects in Japan. Led by Buddhist monks, nobles, and Shinto priests, the Ikko rebels were able to take over the control of some areas in Japan and built a third column during the Sengoku period, the era of the Warring States. They combined religious beliefs with military potential, even threatening other warlords, who finally encountered the mighty position of the Ikko-ikki in the wealthy regions of Japan. To protect their own economic power, they needed the unification of Japan under their own banner. The leading figure for the establishment of the Ikko movement was Rennyo (1415–1499), who was the head priest of the well-known Hongan-ji (Temple of the Primal Vow), which was used as the collective name for the largest branch of Jodo Shinshu (True Pure Land) Buddhism and the sects following these teachings. Jodo Shinshu, commonly known as Shin Buddhism, was founded by the monk Shinran (1173–1263), who formulated a kind of “easy path” to Buddhism where the human being is released by the goddess, and not by performing ceremonial religious practices. As a consequence of this rather simple doctrine, the sect was successful in recruiting followers.

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Amidha Buddha’s Primal Vow, which was able to release the individual, attracted many Japanese in the following centuries. Next to the religious roots of the Ikko-ikki, the political situation of Japan was responsible for the development of the uprising against the existing order. The relative weakness of the Ashikaga shogun led to the era of the Warring States, during which several warlords banded together to overthrow the Ashikaga. Lacking firm political order, the warlords could act as they wished, as far as they were militarily powerful enough. Rennyo had fled Kyoto as a result of a conflict between the new religious movement he had led and the monks of Enryaku-ji on Mt. Hiei, who were following the teachings of the Tendai school. The conflict escalated and the first Hongan-ji was destroyed, while Rennyo fled and established a new branch in Yoshizaki (Echizen Province). Peasants and farmers became especially attracted by the religious teachings of Rennyo, because they estimated that the simple way to enlightenment was a very suitable one. The doctrine was easy to understand and the religious community grew. Some years later, in 1488, the first violent uprising of the Ikko-shu, an offshoot from Jodo Shinshu Buddhism, broke out and the rebels demanded the control of Kaga Province (present-day Ishikawa Prefecture). The existing feudal system should have been overcome by the revolt, meaning that it was not only religious teachings that created the upheaval, but also social and political reasons that led the followers of the Ikko-shu to revolt against the samurai rulers in the province. For the first time it was not the samurai, but simple commoners that ruled a province. Consequently, their strength, especially at economically important points of Japan, made them a geo-strategic threat for the ambitions of the later unifiers of Japan, Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598), and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616), who were eager to destroy the economic and military might of this Buddhist sect. The warrior monks were able to remain in power for years as a consequence of their military training and the fact that the temples of the sect became religious fortresses. The Hongan-ji temples mainly controlled the important trade routes, which needed to be secured if Nobunaga wanted to unify Japan. Consequently, he opened the fight against the powerful temples of the Ikko-shu and ended their strong influence.

The Ikko-shu, as a consequence of the successful Ikko rebellion, was able to establish a presence in several regions of Japan. Hence the Ikko monks were especially known for their harsh fighting, because they did not fear being killed and would even call out to Amidha Buddha for deliverance in the moment of death. The Ikko-ikki were a visible expression of several facets of Japanese history. First, the revolts highlighted the harsh living situation during the era of the Warring States, which led commoners to seek their salvation in religion. Second, it demonstrated that religious teachings were able to attract and assemble sufficient followers to wage a rebellion against the Japanese warrior class, at least in some provinces. And third, it shows that even religious movements are able to hold political power for several decades, ruling by the force of religious strongholds and the use of an elite troop of warrior monks. Frank Jacob See also Buddhism and War; Bushido; Christian Daimyo; Sōhei Further Reading Dobbins, James C. Jodo Shinshu: Shin Buddhism in Medieval Japan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. McMullin, Neil. Buddhism and the State in SixteenthCentury Japan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. Richmond Tsang, Carol. War and Faith: Ikkô Ikki in Late Muromachi Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Illinois Mormon War (1844–1846) The Illinois Mormon War was armed conflict between Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) and non-Mormon residents that resulted in the forcible expulsion of Mormons from Illinois. After being driven out of Missouri in the 1838 Missouri Mormon War, many Mormons began settling in western Illinois. Mormon leaders purchased the town of Commerce in Hancock County in 1839, which was renamed Nauvoo by Joseph Smith, the founder of the Mormon religion, in 1840. Smith secured a charter for Nauvoo, which granted the town its own

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municipal court and militia—the Nauvoo Legion. Smith and other Mormon leaders began establishing Nauvoo as the central Mormon city for the movement and began building a temple to serve as the center of Mormon worship. Initially sympathetic to the Mormons because of their mistreatment in Missouri, sentiment in Illinois changed as increasing numbers of Mormons began settling in Hancock County. The population of Nauvoo grew from 100 in 1839 to around 12,000 by 1844—nearly as large as Chicago. The increasing electoral influence of the Mormons, the judicial protection offered to Smith by the Nauvoo municipal court, rumors about Mormon doctrines including plural marriage, apprehensions about the purpose of the Nauvoo Legion, and fears that Smith wanted to establish a theocracy led to increasing agitation against the Mormons. In June 1844, Smith ordered the Nauvoo Legion to destroy a Nauvoo newspaper published by an excommunicated Mormon leader. This act galvanized local opponents of the Mormons who called for the arrest of Smith. The Nauvoo courts dismissed the warrants, and Smith declared martial law and assembled the Nauvoo Legion to protect the Mormons. Governor Thomas Ford assembled state militia and attempted to defuse the situation by guaranteeing Smith’s safety if he would submit to a trial in the nearby non-Mormon town of Carthage. Persuaded by other Mormons to surrender on June 25, 1844, Smith and other Mormon leaders were imprisoned on treason charges. On June 27, Smith and his brother Hyrum were killed by an armed mob. With the death of their leader, the Mormon community endured a succession crisis that eventually resulted in Brigham Young assuming leadership by October 1844. Meanwhile, non-Mormon opposition to the Mormons continued to grow, and many outlying Mormon settlers fled their homes from armed groups of non-Mormons and sought the safety of Nauvoo. In January 1845, the Nauvoo Charter was repealed, ending its civil government and militia protection. This led to a rise of vigilante action against Mormons, leading to several deaths on each side. During 1845 Young and other leaders recognized that the Mormons would need to leave Illinois to survive. They arranged a truce with Governor Ford to finish the temple and prepare to leave Illinois. The first groups left in

February 1846 and the exodus continued throughout the year. The most vocal opponents of the Mormons—the “Regulators”—were dissatisfied at the pace of the departure and assembled an armed force of more than 500 men, which attacked the Mormons remaining in Nauvoo on September 10, 1846. Skirmishing and cannonading left several men on each side dead at the Battle of Nauvoo, and a week later the Mormons surrendered. The Regulators occupied the city and forcibly evicted all but a handful of Mormons. The refugees joined the remainder of the Mormons in exodus to the West. Joshua Michael See also Missouri Mormon War; Mormon Rebellion Further Reading Bushman, Claudia Lauper, and Richard Lyman Bushman. Building the Kingdom: A History of Mormons in America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Hallwas, John E., and Roger D. Launius. Cultures in Conflict: A Documentary History of the Mormon War in Illinois. Logan: Utah State University Press, 1995.

In Praise of the New Knighthood (Bernard of Clairvaux, 1128–1136) In Praise of the New Knighthood (Latin: De laude novae militiae; more completely, De laude novae militiae ad Milites Templi) is a treatise composed by the abbot Bernard of Clairvaux (Bernardus Claraevallensis, 1090–1153) between 1128 and 1136, with the aim of defending the Order of the Knights Templar (Poor Fellow-Soldiers of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon—Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Salomonici) against its critics, and of supporting the commitment of its members in the face of the first doubts emerging among them. The treatise outlined the virtues that should shape the vocation of a truly Christian knight, such as humility, austerity, justice, obedience, unselfishness, and a single-minded zeal in defending the poor, the weak, the church, and the persecuted Christians. The defense of the Holy Land and war against the infidel were both a real expression of chivalric ideals and an achievement of the ideal of the “soldier of Christ”

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(milites Christi) as expressed, for example, by Pope Gregory VII (Hildebrand of Sovana, ca. 1015–1085). According to the treatise, the Knights Templar was the only order to deserve the title of milites; by refusing mundane values, social mores, and behaviors, they escaped the sin of malice. At the same time, while fighting and dying for Christ, they were safe from the risk of damnation that was always threatening those who fought for secular causes. In this perspective, although Bernard was not the first author to distinguish between chivalry and malice, the Praise marks a turning point in the development of the concept of Christian knighthood and in the adaptation of Christian values to the war ethos. Gianluca Pastori See also Bernard of Clairvaux; Knights Templar Further Reading Barber, Malcolm. The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Evans, Gillian R. The Mind of St Bernard of Clairvaux. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. Kaeuper, Richard. Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War: A New History of the Crusades. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.

India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in Conflict between Muslim and Hindu communities in India has been a common occurrence for hundreds of years. This conflict is endemic in the history of India and continues as a defining element of its contemporary history. It reflects an intense rivalry between the two religious groups and has resulted in the death of more than a million victims of religious and communal violence. While rooted in religious differences, the conflict has expanded over the years to include political competition, terrorism, geopolitics, nuclear confrontation, and genocide. The origins of the contemporary Hindu-Muslim conflict have deep historical roots, originating with the sixthcentury expansion of Islam out of the Arabian Peninsula. Within a hundred years of the Prophet Muhammad’s

establishment of Islam, it had expanded to encompass most of the known world, including much of contemporary India. The history of Islam in India includes gradual expansion during its early years, culminating in the domination of the entire region by the Mughal Empire during the 16th century. Mughal Muslim rule over the Hindu majority alternated between remarkable religious toleration and suppression of Hindu beliefs and practices, including the destruction of Hindu temples and the reported construction of mosques on those sites, a source of religious conflict today. The British came to India in the 17th century, first as the British East India Company and then as the British government beginning in 1857. British rule heralded the end of the Mughals and a new relationship between Hindus and Muslims, with some efforts aimed at reconciliation, but most often characterized by conflict. Hindu-Muslim conflict was a common occurrence within British colonial India. This conflict arose out of the two large religious groups living in close proximity and having very different practices and values. Political competition between Hindus and Muslims began in the early 20th century and first became evident with the 1905 British partition of Bengal, creating a majority Muslim province and a majority Bengali province where there had previously existed a Hindu-ruled entity. Hindu leaders implemented a boycott of all British goods, called Swadeshi. The boycott was very effective, driving the government to negotiations with the Congress Party, which claimed to be a secular organization representing all Indians, but which largely reflected Hindu interests. Muslim leaders, fearful their interests would be eclipsed by the majority Hindus, entered negotiations with the British government and guaranteed their support against the Hindu boycott, lending credence to charges that the British were following a “divide and conquer” approach to guarantee British rule. This event caused widespread Hindu-Muslim conflict as Hindus attacked Muslim merchants who continued to sell British goods. The All India Muslim League was formed in 1906, largely as a result of this conflict and a desire to ensure the representation of Muslim political interests before the government. It also set the stage for continuing political friction between the two religious communities throughout the 20th century, the communal problem.

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The communal problem frustrated Great Britain’s efforts to placate increasingly strident Indian demands for political participation, representation, and eventually for independence from Britain in the early 20th century. The All India Congress Party, led by Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) and the political dynasty of Jawaharal Nehru (1888–1964), initially attempted to forge a Hindu-Muslim coalition to present a united front to the British. By 1922 those efforts had failed, with Hindu-Muslim relations divided by arguments over equal representation, “weightage” of electorates, and the allocation of seats in various political assemblies. Throughout these political discussions, the British government sought to guarantee minority rights while the Congress Party insisted that it alone spoke for all of India. Minority parties, including the Muslim League, were distrustful of Congress Party intentions and motivations. They feared that the Congress Party’s inclusionary public pronouncements hid privately held sectarian commitments. Politics at the local level involved arguments over resources allocated along sectarian lines, including funding for education, rural sanitation, and women’s health services. The practical result resembled civil war as sectarian strife raged throughout the country. Riots, abuse of women, and murder were common, perpetrated over Hindu insults to the Prophet, Muslim cow slaughter, Hindu parades and music that interfered with Muslim prayer times, and a myriad of other religious slights. Between 1900 and 1947, many thousands died in riots between the two groups. The intensity of this violence, however, paled in comparison to the conflagration that engulfed the country with the 1947 Partition of India. After the Second World War, governance of India became a burden for war-weary and cash-strapped Great Britain. Indian independence was inevitable, as was the intensified political competition between the Muslim League and the Congress Party. The Congress Party, led by Nehru, insisted that it alone represented India. The Muslim League, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, insisted on a separate Muslim homeland. As the league became frustrated by Congress Party intransigence, Jinnah called for a “Direct Action Day,” which resulted in an explosion of violence that lasted from August to October 1946. In Muslim areas, the mounds of dead were primarily Hindu. In Hindu areas, the opposite was true. In the midst of continuing violence,

the British government announced the Partition of India on July 15, 1947, scheduled to take place one month later. The dividing lines between a Hindu-dominated India and a Muslim-dominated Pakistan did not accurately represent Hindu or Muslim regions. As Partition approached, masses of Muslims and Hindus took to the roads, traveling to the areas in which their religion would dominate. These unfortunate religious refugees experienced intense sectarian savagery, with as many as a million deaths attributed to the violence. Mahatma Gandhi was a victim of these times as well, assassinated on January 30, 1948, by a Hindu communalist who believed Gandhi had been too friendly toward Muslims. Modern India is a secular state with a large Hindu majority, a significant Muslim minority, and many other religious minorities, including Sikhs, Christians, and Buddhists. Hindu political elements have often sought to make Hinduism the official state religion. These elements were largely discredited by the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948. But Hindu sectarian sentiments have continued to foment at the local level. They exploded in violence in the Indian state of Gujarat between February and March 2002. The violence was sparked by a fire at a railway station in Godhra in which 58 people died, mostly Hindus. The fire was blamed on Muslim vendors in the station. Hindu religious extremists began a two-week rampage in which 2,000 Muslims were killed. The dead included men, women, and children, many of them horribly mutilated, raped, and tortured. The local and state governments are reported to have colluded with the attackers, with the police ignoring the violence and the state’s chief minister, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) Narendra Modi, terming the violence “understandable.” Subsequent investigations at the state level were stonewalled by local officials, and the investigation was eventually taken over by the national government. The BJP, implicated in the Gujarat violence, is a Hindu religious right party that pursues a platform of “one nation, one people, one culture.” It seeks to return India to its historic roots, with the abolition of cow butchering, the restoration of historic Hindu temples (often on Muslim sites), and the recognition of India as a Hindu country. It has been blamed for numerous instances of religious violence against Muslims, as well as Christians. In the wake of the 2002 Gujarat killings, the BJP ran an electoral campaign

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A Hindu activist armed with an iron bar shouts anti-Muslim slogans during mob violence in the Sahapur District of Ahmedabad, India, in January 2002. Conflicts between Hindu and Muslim communities have been a common occurence for centuries, as the two religious groups often live in close proximity but have very different beliefs and practices. (Sebastian D’Souza/AFP/Getty Images)

that was openly anti-Muslim and Hindu-first, and it won in a landslide. The party has gained nationwide recognition and recently won a national election, installing its first prime minister in the government. These electoral results seem to herald a rise of sectarian politics against secular ones represented by the Congress Party. Muslims have also perpetrated significant violence in modern India, but primarily from outside the country. The 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai is representative of this violence, probably designed to increase international tension between India and Pakistan. The 2008 attack was perpetrated by the radical Muslim Islamayyit-i-Tayyiba, a Pakistani terrorist group. Launched by boat in Pakistan, the attack was conducted by 10 Muslim terrorists who focused their weapons on Mumbai’s tourist attractions, including hotels, restaurants, religious institutions, and popular sites. The attack raged for more than 48 hours, left

163 dead, and saw the military of both countries moving to the border between the nations. India continues to be a country divided between democratic secularism and religious communalism. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) classifies India as a second-tier country, that is, a country in which religious freedom is seriously challenged. The commission highlights religious violence against Muslims and Christians and a culture of impunity for perpetrators of that violence. It is also concerned that five states have adopted laws against forced religious conversion. These laws, focused primarily on Hindu religious conversion, require those who convert to register within 30 days with government officials, who “assess the sincerity” of the conversion and levy fines on those individuals and groups who encourage religious conversion. The USCIRF indicates that these laws are used to intimidate non-Hindu religious groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The 2013 report also highlights an increased use of rape to intimidate religious minorities, particularly of Muslim and Christian women. The report anticipates an increase in communal violence as national elections take place, encouraged by political leaders who use communal issues to increase electoral support. Discussion of the violence between India’s Hindus and Muslims must also include India’s relations with Pakistan, its Muslim neighbor. The relationship can only be described as tense, with the two countries waging three wars since the 1947 Partition, largely over Kashmir. These tensions have included numerous border clashes, an insurgency in Kashmir, and the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1974 (India) and 1998 (Pakistan). Unfortunately, religious violence between Muslims and Hindus and other religious groups seems to be a part of the cultural fabric of modern India. Rooted in ancient history, it led to the division of the country in 1947 and has resulted in more than a million deaths over the last 100 years. The communal and sectarian nature of modern Indian politics and international relations is a significant concern for the global community, as it also involves a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. It would be unfortunate indeed if India’s religious problems were allowed to unleash the forces of Shiva, Hinduism’s god of destruction, upon the world. Dayne E. Nix

India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in  371 See also Gandhi, Mahatma; Hinduism and War; Indo-Pakistani Wars Further Reading Cohen, Stephen Philip. India: Emerging Power. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. Hardy, P. The Muslims of British India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. James, Lawrence. Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997. Nussbaum, Martha C. The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence and India’s Future. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007. Wolpert, Stanley. A New History of India. 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in India is a majority Hindu state with large religious minorities, including the Sikhs, who comprise roughly 2 percent of India’s total population but make up nearly 60 percent of the State of Punjab. A monotheistic religion born in the 15th century within Mughal-ruled Hindu territories, Sikhism taught universal brotherhood and encouraged worship of one universal all-powerful God, self-discipline, family life, veneration of its gurus, individual service, as well as relative equality between its adherents, including men and women. As a result of persecution by Mughal rulers over Sikh resistance to forced conversion to Islam, Sikhs developed the concept of the sant sipāhī or the saintsoldier and organized their communities along military lines for defense. Sikh opposition to the Mughals resulted in the establishment of a Sikh Empire in present-day Punjab, Pakistan, and Afghanistan that survived from about 1799 until the British annexation of the region in 1849. During the British rule of India, Sikhs were known for their military prowess and comprised a large percentage of the British military in India. Hindu-Sikh animosity and violence dates to the British colonial period and is reflected in British efforts to resolve communal differences in India during the early 20th century. The communal problem reflected religious sectarian and political differences along primarily Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh lines. Numerous attempts were made to resolve

these communal differences, including the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, and the Government of India Act of 1935 (among others). All eventually failed as a result of sectarian intransigence, resulting in the demand for a separate Muslim state by the All-India Muslim League in 1940 and its rejection by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. At the same time, the Sikh leader Dr. Vir Singh Bhatti suggested the creation of a separate Sikh nation, Khalistan. Upon the assurances of the Congress Party that Sikh interests would be respected in an independent India, Sikh leadership agreed to support the Congress Party and its vision of a united India rather than seeking a separate state. When Partition was announced by the British in 1946, Sikhs were considered a Hindu sect for Partition purposes. They violently opposed the creation of Pakistan since historically Sikh territories and cities were included in the new Muslim homeland. During the migration that followed Partition, Sikhs left their homes in Pakistan and moved to India, primarily the Punjab. They also participated in sectarian violence that resulted in nearly a million deaths. The source of Hindu-Sikh violence in India after Partition can be attributed to a number of universally held perceptions on the part of Sikhs. Complaints include the Congress Party’s repudiation of promises made to Sikhs concerning their status in an independent India and the failure to provide a Punjabi linguistic enclave when India was reorganized along linguistic lines in the 1950s, in spite of Sikh requests and political agitation. They also perceive that there is widespread discrimination against Sikhs in favor of Hindu majority interests. During the 1950s to 1990s, these issues resulted in a sense of alienation among the Sikh population, opposition to the national government, and violence perpetrated by Sikh activists. Even though the Province of Punjab was established as a Sikh majority linguistic entity in 1965 after a prolonged satyagraha (peaceful protest) campaign, Sikhs continued to feel alienated from the national government. While some leaders sought increased autonomy within a federated India, others sought to establish an independent state, Khalistan. Matters came to a head in the 1980s with violence perpetrated by Sikh radicals. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi initiated Operation Blue Star to capture Sikh militants who were barricaded in the Darbar Sahib (Golden

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Temple) in Amritsar on June 5, 1985. This was an important holy day for Sikhs and the temple was filled with worshippers as well as militants. In the fighting that ensued, more than 650 worshippers, militants, and soldiers were killed (unofficial estimates are much higher). The Golden Temple, along with its priceless library of Sikh holy books, was mostly destroyed. There are reports that numerous additional Sikh temples were targeted by the Indian military in parallel operations. These attacks were accompanied by widespread reports of human rights violations. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards on October 31, 1984, only five months after the Operation Blue Star attacks. There followed an orgy of violence perpetrated by Hindu mobs on Sikh businesses, homes, and individuals. Congress Party political operatives used party voter lists to identify Sikh homes to identify victims. As many as 8,000 Sikhs were killed while police stood by. Rajiv Gandhi, the son of the assassinated prime minister, is reported to have rationalized the riots with the words, “When a giant tree falls, the earth below shakes.” Although more than 400 individuals were charged and convicted for the attacks, very few received harsh punishments and none of the political leaders who fueled the attacks were charged. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom reports that the perceived lack of justice for the victims of these killings continues as a source of friction between Sikhs and the Indian government. In the aftermath of these events, an insurgency was waged by Sikh militants in the Punjab and northern India throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. Terrorist attacks on Hindu and moderate Sikh police, their families, and innocent bystanders were common. The state responded with increasingly effective counterinsurgency tactics, many that violated individual human rights. Today, the situation in the Punjab remains essentially calm, although a recent newspaper article reports that peaceful demonstrations to commemorate those killed in the 1984 anti-Sikh riots were blocked by local officials and police. There are also continuing peaceful efforts by minor political parties for an independent Khalistan, supported by the large Sikh expatriate community, mostly in the United States and United Kingdom. Dayne E. Nix

See also Golden Temple, Battle of; Hinduism and War; India, Religious Conflict in; Sikhism and War Further Reading Cohen, Stephen Philip. India: Emerging Power. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. James, Lawrence. Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997. Hardy, P. The Muslims of British India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Nussbaum, Martha C. The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence and India’s Future. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007. Wolpert, Stanley. A New History of India, Seventh Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

India, Muslim Conquest of Northern The Muslim conquest of northern India occurred gradually between the first decades of the 8th century CE and the 18th century. Conquest proceeded piecemeal, and during the medieval period neither Muslim sultans nor the Mughals ever ruled the entirety of northern India at any given time. Hindus fought in the armies of Muslim rulers, and alliances were forged between Hindu rulers and Muslim rajas. Infighting among the Muslim kings of northern India was also common. Indian culture, which was pluralistic in nature, was enriched by the gradual assimilation of Muslims into Indian society and culture, which began in earnest in the first decades of the 13th century. The advent of Islam began in the eighth century and the faith spread through the movement of merchants into vast expanses of Africa and Asia. Yearning for territorial expansion, the lure of wealth, and religious zeal were factors behind the Muslim conquest. The Muslim commander Muhammad bin Qasim (591–716) undertook a military expedition in 711 CE against the province of Sindh in present-day Pakistan; he conquered the province in 712. From Sindh, the Muslims attacked north India 17 times between 997 and 1027. The invaders sought to pillage India’s wealth, particularly from its opulent temples. The division of northern India into warring regional kingdoms that were

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unable to unify against a common enemy facilitated the Muslim conquest. After subjugating the provinces of Multan, Peshawar, Lahore, Sialkot, and the Punjab, the Muslim armies turned their attention toward the powerful Rajput kingdom of Prithvi Raj III (r. 1178–1192), who was overthrown by Muslim forces at the second battle of Train in 1192. Rajput dominance of northern India was replaced by the establishment of the Islamic Delhi sultanate. The sultan of Delhi soon added the provinces of Ranthambhor, Bulandshahr, Aligarh, Meerut, Kannauj, Gwalior, Bayana, Varanasi, and parts of Gujarat to his territory. During the 14th century, East and South Bengal were incorporated into the sultanate and North Bengal remained as a vassal state. Muhammad Tughluq (r. 1325–1351) sent expeditionary forces to Khurasan, Nagarkot, Qarajal, and Mewar. Firuz Shah Tughluq (r. 1351–1388) invaded Jajnagar (Odisha) in 1361 and destroyed the famous Puri Jagannatha temple. Shamsuddin Ilyas Shah (r. 1342–1358) established an independent Sultanate of Bengal. By the 15th century, under the rule of Sayyids (1414–1451) and Lodis (1451–1526), the sultanate encompassed only Delhi and its surrounding areas. Most of the provincial kingdoms, which were ruled by both Hindu and Muslim kings, had become independent. In 1526, the Sultanate of Delhi gave way to the Islamic Mughal dynasty when Zahiruddin Mohammad Babur (r. 1526–1530) defeated Ibrahim Lodi (r. 1517–1526), the last ruler of the tottering Lodi dynasty, at the first battle of Panipat. In 1527, Babur defeated the Hindu Rajput confederacy at the battle of Khanwa. This Mughal expansion brought the Muslim provinces in India into contact with the Afghan tribes, whom Babur defeated at the battle of Ghagra in 1529. At his death in 1530, Babur’s empire extended from Kabul in modern Afghanistan to Bihar in northern India. The reign of Babur’s descendent Aurangzeb (r. 1658– 1707) saw the beginning of Mughal decline. Wars against Rajputs, Sikhs, Marathas, and Jats drained the royal treasury. The Sikhs rose up against Aurangzeb, and he also faced a rebellion of the Jat peasants of Mathura in 1669, 1681, and 1685. A army of 10,000 suppressed the revolt of Satnami peasants and the artisans of Narnaul in 1672. The Mughal state apparatus began to fall apart after Aurangzeb’s death in 1707. The provincial governors asserted their independence and throughout the Indian subcontinent new power

centers emerged. The absence of a strong central authority resulted in the rise of provincial kingdoms, in whose political affairs European traders began to take an active interest. The British East India Company began to strengthen its military position in the 18th century and ultimately the whole of India came under British rule, thus ending effective Muslim rule in north India. But the rule of the Delhi sultans and the great Mughals had initiated a new era in the cultural, social, and economic history of the Indian subcontinent. India acquired a composite culture based on the amalgamation of different faiths and cultural traditions, although it also inherited a history of violence between Hindus and Muslims that continues today. Patit Paban Mishra See also India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in; India, Religious Conflict in; Mughal-Maratha Wars; Mughal-Sikh Wars; Muslim Conquest of Sindh; Sikkhism and War Further Reading Alam, Muzaffar, and S. Subrahmanyam, eds. The Mughal State: 1526–1750. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000. Chandra, Satish. Medieval India: From Sultanat to the Mughals. Delhi: Har Anand, 1998. Cheema, G. S. The Forgotten Mughals—A History of the Later Emperors of the House of Babar. New Delhi: Manohar, 2002. Hasan, Mohibbul. Babur, Founder of the Mughal Empire in India. New Delhi: Manohar, 1985. Jackson, Peter. The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Kulke, Hermann, and Dietmar Rothermund. History of India. Calcutta: Rupa, 1994. Mishra, Patit Paban. “Akbar (1556–1605).” In Mark Juergensmeyer and Wade C. Roof, eds. Encyclopedia of Global Religion. Vol. 1. Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2012, p. 22. Mukhia, Harbans. The Mughals of India. New Delhi: Blackwell, 2004. Schimmel, Annemarie. The Empire of the Great Mughals: History, Art and Culture. London: Reaktion Books, 2004.

India, Religious Conflict in India is one of the most religiously diverse countries in the world with a long history of conflict. Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, Baha’i, Jain, Jewish, and Christian religious

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groups as well as others make up its rich cultural fabric. Unfortunately, sectarian conflict between these religious communities has been a common occurrence and continues as a defining element of its contemporary culture. It reflects an often intense rivalry between the many religious groups and has resulted in the death of more than a million victims. While rooted in religious differences, the conflict has expanded over the years to include political competition, terrorism, geopolitics, nuclear confrontation, and genocide. Hinduism is India’s historic polytheistic religion, dating to around 2000 BCE. It incorporates many philosophical and religious traditions and claims Sanskrit as its historic language. India has also been the birthplace of many religions, with Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs calling it home. Christianity came to India in the early years after Christ and traces its roots to the apostle Thomas. Muslims came to India with the 6th-century expansion of Islam out of the Arabian Peninsula and culminated its expansion with the establishment of the Mughal Empire during the 16th century. Mughal Muslim rule alternated between remarkable religious toleration and suppression of opposing religious beliefs and practices, including forced conversions to Islam and the destruction of Hindu temples. The British came to India in the 17th century and ended Mughal rule, first as the British East India Company and then, in 1857, as the British government. With the British came Christian missionaries and their “civilizing” mission, with indigenous religions considered uncivilized and heathen. Communal conflict was a common occurrence within British colonial India. This conflict arose out of many religious groups living in close proximity and having very different practices and values. Political competition between Hindus and Muslims began in the early 20th century with the 1905 British partition of Hindu-ruled Bengal, creating two provinces, one Muslim and one Bengali. Hindu leaders implemented a boycott of all British goods, the Swadeshi. The boycott was effective, driving the government to negotiations with the Congress Party, a secular political organization that claimed to represent all Indians, but which largely reflected Hindu interests. Muslim leaders, fearful that their interests would be eclipsed by the majority Hindus, negotiated with the British and opposed the Hindu boycott, lending credence to charges that the British were

following a “divide and conquer” approach to consolidate their rule. This event caused widespread Hindu-Muslim conflict as Hindus attacked Muslim merchants who continued to sell British goods. The All India Muslim League was formed in 1906, largely as a result of this conflict and a desire to ensure the representation of Muslim political interests. It also set the stage for the communal problem, continuing political friction within India’s diverse religious community. The communal problem frustrated Great Britain’s efforts to placate increasingly strident Indian political demands. The All India Congress Party, led by Gandhi and Nehru, initially attempted to forge a Hindu-Muslim coalition to present a united front to the British. By 1922 those efforts had failed, with Hindu-Muslim relations divided by arguments over equal representation, “weightage” of electorates, and the allocation of seats in various political assemblies. Politics at the local level involved arguments over resources allocated along sectarian lines, including funding for education, rural sanitation, and women’s health services. The British government pursued numerous efforts to resolve Indian complaints, including the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, and the Government of India Act of 1935. The London Round-Table Conferences of 1930, 1931, and 1932 brought together representatives of India’s diverse religious groups to forge a new Indian constitution. The effort failed as a result of sectarian intransigence and Gandhi’s insistence that the Congress Party alone spoke for all of India. However, minority groups, especially the Sikhs and Muslims, distrusted Congress Party intentions, fearing that the Congress Party’s inclusionary public pronouncements hid privately held sectarian motives. The practical result resembled civil war as sectarian strife raged throughout India. Riots, abuse of women, and murder were common, perpetrated over insults to the Prophet, cow slaughter, religious parades and music that interfered with prayer times, and a myriad of other religious slights. Between 1900 and 1947, many thousands died in sectarian riots. The intensity of this violence, however, paled in comparison to the conflagration that engulfed the country with the 1947 Partition of India. After World War II, governance of India became a burden for war-weary and cash-strapped Great Britain. Indian

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independence was inevitable, as was the intensified political competition between the Muslim League and the Congress Party. The Congress Party, led by Nehru, insisted on a united India. The Muslim League, led by Jinnah, promoted the idea of a separate Muslim homeland. The Sikh leader Dr. Vir Singh Bhatti proposed the creation of a separate Sikh nation, Khalistan. Upon the assurances of the Congress Party, Sikh leadership agreed to support the Congress Party and its vision of a united India rather than seeking a separate state. Frustrated by Congress Party intransigence, Jinnah called for a “Direct Action Day,” an explosion of violence that lasted from August to October 1946. In Muslim areas, the mounds of dead were primarily Hindu. In Hindu areas, the opposite was true. In the midst of continuing violence, the British government announced the Partition of India on July 15, 1947, scheduled to take place one month later. The dividing lines between a Hindu-dominated India and a Muslim-dominated Pakistan did not accurately represent Hindu or Muslim regions. As Partition approached, masses of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs took to the roads, traveling to areas in which their religion would

dominate. These unfortunate refugees experienced sectarian savagery, with as many as a million deaths attributed to the violence. Sikhs, who were dispossessed of historic Sikh lands and cities to create Muslim Pakistan, were heavily implicated in anti-Muslim violence. Mahatma Gandhi was a victim of these times as well, assassinated on January 30, 1948, by a Hindu who believed Gandhi had been too friendly toward Muslims. Modern India is a secular state with a large Hindu majority, a significant Muslim minority, and many other religious minorities, including Sikh, Christian, Buddhist, Baha’i, and Jain. Unfortunately, sectarian violence has continued as a common element of India’s cultural life. Two series of events are representative of the most unfortunate instances of sectarian violence: the 1984 destruction of the Sikh Golden Temple and the 2002 Gujarat anti-Muslim riots. The 1984 Hindu-Sikh violence resulted from complaints of India’s failure to keep promises made to Sikhs prior to Partition, widespread discrimination against Sikhs, as well as a desire for an independent or semiautonomous Sikh political entity, Khalistan. Beginning in the 1950s, these

Hindutva

Hindutva is a Hindu nationalist movement that roughly translates to “Hinduness.” The movement was founded by Vinayak Savarkar (1883–1966) (see the entry Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar) and is today part of the official platform of one of India’s largest political parties, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Hindutva seeks to instill the belief that the Indian subcontinent, which is composed of all land south of the Himalaya Mountains, is home to the Hindu peoples. The Hindu nationalist volunteer organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) has recently been accused in the Indian press of requiring Indian citizens of all religious faiths to chant the motto “Bharat Mata ki Jai” (Victory for Mother India). The RSS has also promulgated the following prayer: Affectionate Motherland, I eternally bow to you / O Land of Hindus, you have reared me in comfort / O Sacred Land, the Great Creator of Good, may this body of mine be dedicated to you / I again and again bow before You / O God Almighty, we the integral part of the Hindu Rashtra salute you in reverence / For Your cause have we girded up our loins / Give us Your Blessings for its accomplishment Hindutva has ignited debate among academics, politicians, and citizens within India. Is this a fascist movement designed to ensure that Hindus maintain political and cultural power in India, or is it an attempt to provide a common cultural framework within which India can begin to take its place among the great powers? This is the question that confronts those who engage with Hindutva.

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complaints resulted in a sense of alienation among the Sikh population, opposition to the national government, and violence perpetrated by Sikh activists. On June 5, 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi initiated Operation Blue Star to capture Sikh militants who were barricaded in the Darbar Sahib (Golden Temple) in Amritsar. The temple was filled with worshippers as well as militants. In the fighting that ensued, more than 650 worshippers, militants, and soldiers were killed (unofficial estimates are much higher). The Golden Temple, along with its priceless library of Sikh holy books, was mostly destroyed. Five months later, on October 31, the prime minister was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards in retaliation for Operation Blue Star. There followed an orgy of violence perpetrated by Hindu mobs on Sikh businesses, homes, and individuals. As many as 8,000 Sikhs were killed. Rajiv Gandhi, the son of the assassinated prime minister, is reported to have rationalized the riots with the words, “When a giant tree falls, the earth below shakes.” An unfortunate example of Hindu-Muslim violence occurred in the Indian state of Gujarat between February and March 2002. The violence was sparked by a fire at a railway station in Godhra in which 58 people died, mostly Hindus. The fire was blamed on Muslim vendors in the station. Hindu religious extremists began a two-week rampage in which 2,000 Muslims were killed. The dead included men, women, and children, many of them horribly mutilated, raped and tortured. The local and state governments are reported to have colluded with the attackers. The state’s chief minister, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) Narendra Modi, called the violence “understandable.” Subsequent investigations at the state level were stonewalled by local officials, and the investigation was eventually taken over by the national government. The rise of the Hindu Right has further complicated India’s religious environment. Hindu political elements have often sought to make Hinduism the official state religion. These elements were largely discredited by the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, but Hindu sectarian political sentiments have continued to foment at the local level. The BJP, implicated in the Gujarat violence, is a Hindu religious right party that pursues a platform of “one nation, one people, one culture.” It seeks to return India to its Hindu roots, with the abolition of cow butchering, the

restoration of historic Hindu temples (often on Muslim sites), the teaching of Sanskrit in public schools, and recognition of India as a Hindu country. It has been blamed for numerous instances of religious violence against religious minorities, especially Muslims and Christians. In the wake of the 2002 Gujarat killings, the BJP ran an electoral campaign that was openly anti-Muslim and Hindu-first, and won in a landslide. The party has gained nationwide recognition and recently won a national election, installing its first prime minister in the government. These electoral results seem to herald a rise of sectarian politics against secular ones, represented by the Congress Party. Muslims have also perpetrated significant violence in modern India, but primarily from outside the country. The 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, perpetrated by the radical Pakistani Muslim Islamayyit-i-Tayyiba, is an example of this violence. Launched by boat from Pakistan, the attack was conducted by 10 Muslim militants who focused their weapons on Mumbai’s tourist attractions, including hotels, restaurants, religious institutions, and popular sites. The attack raged for more than 48 hours, left 163 dead, and resulted in increased border tensions between the two countries. India continues to be a country divided between democratic secularism and religious sectarianism. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) classifies India as a second-tier country, that is, a country in which religious freedom is seriously challenged. The commission highlights religious violence against Muslims and Christians and a culture of impunity for perpetrators of that violence. It is also concerned that five states have adopted laws against forced religious conversion, which are used to intimidate non-Hindu religious groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The 2013 report also highlights an increased use of rape to intimidate religious minorities, particularly of Muslim and Christian women. The report anticipates an increase in communal violence as national elections take place, encouraged by political leaders who use sectarian issues to increase electoral support. Unfortunately, sectarian violence within India’s diverse religious community continues to characterize India’s modern cultural fabric. Rooted in ancient history, it led to the division of the country in 1947 and has resulted in

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more than a million deaths over the last 100 years. The communal and sectarian nature of modern Indian politics and international relations is a significant concern for the global community, representing the very worst example of religious tolerance and cooperation. Dayne E. Nix See also Baha’i Faith and War; Bhagavad Gita and War; Hinduism and War; India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in; India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in; Indo-Pakistani Wars; Islam and War (Jihad); Kashmir Conflict; Mughal-Maratha Wars; Pakistan, Religious Violence in; Sikhism and War Further Reading Cohen, Stephen Philip. The Idea of Pakistan. Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004. Cohen, Stephen Philip. India: Emerging Power. Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001. Hardy, P. The Muslims of British India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. James, Lawrence. Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997. Nussbaum, Martha C. The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence and India’s Future. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007. Wolpert, Stanley. A New History of India. 7th ed.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Indian Mutiny (1857) In May 1857, the British-officered Bengal Army (120,000 strong) rebelled in several cantonments scattered in north India. Soon the military mutiny was followed by armed insurrection in the countryside. For two years, British rule vanished from a large swathe of north India. A series of mini uprisings also occurred in parts of central and west India. The principal centers of rebel resistance were Luck­ now, Agra, Kanpur, and Delhi. At the latter place, Bahadur Shah, the Mughal emperor who was a pensioner of the East India Company (EIC), was declared Badshah (king) by the rebel soldiers. By late 1859, the EIC was able to reestablish control. Though the armed rebellion was suppressed, the nature of British rule changed in the subcontinent. The Bengal Army was reorganized and the EIC was replaced by direct British rule (Raj).

Even now, historians continue to debate about the origins and nature of the 1857 Mutiny. The soldier-scholars of the Raj like John Kaye, G. B. Malleson, Lieutenant General George MacMunn, and others categorize the 1857 uprising as a military mutiny. They focus on the mutiny of the 100,000 sepoys and sowars. The Bengal sepoys (also known as Purbiyas) mutinied, argued the Raj’s scholars, due to their religious fanaticism. A modern British historian, Saul David, also accepts this line of argument. In 1856, the smooth-bore Brown Bess muskets were replaced by Enfield rifles. A rumor spread among the highcaste Purbiyas (Brahmins and Rajputs) and the sowars (recruited from Rohilkhand) that the cartridges of the Enfield rifles were greased with the fat of cow and pigs. While the flesh of cow was considered offensive to the Hindus, pigs were abhorred by the Muslims. Both the Hindu sepoys and the Muslim sowars assumed that the British were conspiring to destroy the religions of the Indians. The Bengal soldiery was also angry with the EIC due to its penny-pinching policy, which was initiated by Governor-General Bentinck. Reduction of batta (pay to servicemen in British India) and overseas service were two factors that also angered the sepoys and the sowars. Overseas service meant crossing the kalapani (black water, or ocean), which resulted in loss of ritual status for the high-caste sepoys. In retaliation, the EIC passed the General Service Act in 1856, which made overseas service obligatory for all Indian military personnel. Technically, batta was given for service beyond the EIC’s territories. Withdrawal of batta for service in the peripheries of the subcontinent caused financial hardship for the Indian soldiers since they themselves were responsible for buying provisions. However, after the annexation of Punjab and Sind, batta for service in these regions was abolished. George Anson’s (the commander in chief of India) handling of the crisis, which first started in Barrackpur Cantonment and then spread to Meerut, was inept. The net result was a military mutiny. The historiographical school discussed above completely neglects the large-scale armed uprising among the civilians. In the 1950s, nationalist historiography (one of its pioneers is S. N. Sen) asserted that 1857 was the First War of Indian Independence when the Hindus and the Muslims united to throw off the yoke of alien British rule. The zamindars, taluqdars (Indian landholder), princes, and peasants all participated in the anticolonial armed resistance. From the

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1980s, a group of historians following the history from the subaltern approach have argued that in Awadh and in central India, it was the peasantry who rose up spontaneously against the EIC and forced the indigenous elites to provide symbolic leadership. While the nationalist historiography focuses on Indian leadership at the top, the subaltern approach focuses on the nameless and faceless common men. Nationalist historiography fails to explain why large chunks of Madras and Bombay Presidency along with Punjab remained loyal to the EIC. Moreover, the 40,000strong Madras Army (comprised of Tamils, Telegus, and Muslims from Hyderabad) and the 30,000-strong Bombay Army (Marathas and Muslims of West India) fought against the rebels. In addition, the Punjab Irregular Force with its 45,000 personnel (Sikhs and Pathans from the North-West Frontier) reconquered Delhi from the rebels in late 1857. Though the EIC poured in reinforcements from Britain and diverted British troops that were going to China, the rebels were crushed only with the aid of loyal and gallant Indian troops. Again, many Indian princes who were dispossessed like Nana Sahib of Bithur (successor of the Peshwa) and Kunwar Singh of Arrah (in Bihar) fought actively against the EIC. But several Indian princes like Maharaja Sindia of Gwalior remained loyal to the British cause. Further, many princes like Bahadur Shah and the Rani of Jhansi were forced to join the rebellion by the rebel soldiers who wanted them as symbolic leaders to legitimize their mutiny in the eye of the Indians. In fact, it could be questioned whether there was any sense of nationalism in India at that time. To conclude, we can say that besides the Bengal soldiery, civilians in a large region of the subcontinent rebeled against the EIC during 1857. But, at the same time, several communities of the subcontinent joined hands with the British. The events of 1857 represented both an amalgamation of anti-imperialist rebellion as well as a civil war among Indians. So, we could term the 1857 mutiny an armed uprising. The civil rebellion occurred only when the EIC’s coercive apparatus disintegrated due to the military mutiny. Due to the paucity of sources, we cannot examine the mentality of the common men. In the end, the rebel soldiery was defeated due to the superior technology and command apparatus of the British. Kaushik Roy

See also Hinduism and War Further Reading Bates, Crispin, ed. Mutiny at the Margins: New Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857. Vol. 1: Anticipations and Experiences in the Locality. New Delhi: Sage, 2013. David, Saul. The Bengal Army and the Outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. New Delhi: Manohar, 2009. Rand, Gavin, and Crispin Bates, eds. Mutiny at the Margins: New Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857. Vol. 4: Military Aspects of the Indian Uprising. New Delhi: Sage, 2013.

Indo-Pakistani Wars With the independence of Pakistan and India from the British on August 15, 1947, the struggle for control of the kingdoms of Kashmir and Jammu led to war between Pakistan and India. Major wars were fought between these two nations in 1947, 1965, and 1971.

India-Pakistan War (1947)

The British gave Kashmir and Jammu the choice of joining either Pakistan or India, but both kingdoms opted instead for independence. On October 22, 1947, Pakistani forces entered Kashmir under the guise of quelling tribal rebellion in the southwest region of the kingdom; within a week, Pakistani and local tribal forces moved to take the Kashmir capital, Srinagar. When Pakistani and tribal forces reached Uri, resistance was encountered and the advance was slowed. On October 26 the maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, requested Indian assistance. An Instrument of Accession was signed between Kashmir and India providing the requested assistance. The British government, while still involved in Indian and Pakistani affairs, stepped in to assist the Indian forces in halting the Pakistani advance. Governor-General Lord Mountbatten agreed to provide transport aircraft for Indian forces into Kashmir. At the same time, the acting commander in charge of Pakistani forces, General Douglas Gracy, refused to move to deploy Pakistani forces to counter the impending deployment of Indian troops into the area by aircraft. Because Indian forces found adjusting to

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high-altitude combat difficult and there were delays in the delivery of supplies, Pakistani forces retook some territory from the Indians. With the end of winter, Indian forces conducted a spring offensive and Pakistan moved more forces into Kashmir to counter the Indian advance. By June 1948, the Indian government turned to the United Nations to help settle the conflict. A negotiated cease-fire went into effect on January 5, 1949. The agreement left two-fifths of Kashmir territory under Pakistani control, with the rest held by India; Jammu was absorbed by India. Three thousand soldiers on both sides were killed in the fighting. The tension over control of Kashmir has lasted to the present day.

India-Pakistan War (1965)

The second Indo-Pakistani War fought between August 5 and September 23, 1965, was not only the bloodiest and most intense between the two, it also had big ramifications for the conflicts to come for the two neighbors and indeed for their status in the world. The Pakistani attack, codenamed “Gibraltar,” started with roughly 30,000 troops, dressed as locals, crossing the line of control in Kashmir. The first engagements of consequence happened on August 14 when Indian troops in the northern sector advanced deep into the Kashmir region and captured strategic points within Pakistan. Pakistan, in an attempt to cut off Indian troops in Kashmir, launched a counteroffensive (“Operation Grandslam”) on September 1, inflicting heavy losses in the Punjab area. Indian air support was countered by the Pakistani air force on the next day. The ensuing tank battles were the biggest and heaviest since World War II; altogether 1,000 tanks went into combat. During the largest tank engagement in the Sialkot region more than 500 tanks are believed to have been used. At the battle of Assal Uttar on September 10, three Indian armored regiments faced six Pakistani armored regiments, with almost 100 tanks being captured by the Indian side. With both sides gaining ground, but neither able to achieve a decisive victory, the conflict came to a stalemate. The UN Security Council called for a cease-fire on September 23 and three days later the fighting ended. Still, in the night of September 22 near the village of Dograi, another engagement was fought. Altogether, India suffered about 3,000 troops killed and lost 128 tanks; Pakistan had about 3,800 casualties and 200–300 tanks and 20 aircraft lost.

While the war as such proved inconclusive (both sides had taken prisoners of war and occupied enemy territory), the United States blamed Pakistan fully for the outbreak and withdrew its support, a gap that was filled mostly by China.

India-Pakistan War (1971)

Unlike the other conflicts with close connections to the Kashmir issue, the third India-Pakistan War had its origin not in this conflict between the two rival powers on the peninsula, but more within Pakistan. Feeling oppressed by the ruling elite in the western part of Pakistan, people in eastern Pakistan (now Bangladesh) began to revolt. After winning the 1970 general election the leader of the Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, was imprisoned on March 25, 1971, and civil war broke out. When the regular army started their crackdown in the eastern part of Pakistan—the Bengali side claims that up to 300,000 people were killed in the fighting—and up to 10 million refugees began entering India, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to enter the conflict on the side of the Bengalis in East Pakistan, which is enclosed by India on three sides, and help establish an independent nation. She expressed her full support on March 27, and a massive military buildup was completed by November. On November 23, a state of emergency was declared for all of Pakistan. The Pakistani air force struck the first blows in an attempt to recreate the Israeli preemptive strike of 1967, beginning with strikes on suspected guerrilla camps within India and, on December 3, Indian airfields. Midnight marks the official beginning of the war. On the next day, the Indian army struck with a three-pronged attack launched from West Bengal, Assam, and Tipura states, aiming at Dhaka. Air superiority in the eastern theater existed from the very beginning and an effective naval blockade had been established. Far inferior both in quantity and quality of equipment, and also facing East Pakistan’s Liberation Force (“Mukti Bahini”), the 93,000 Pakistani defenders were quickly and totally overwhelmed, most of them being taken prisoners of war. On the western front, the Indian forces managed to keep the Pakistani army out of India and even gained ground; most of this territory was later returned to Pakistan. Air and naval engagements played a bigger role here,

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but the Pakistani air force was overwhelmed by the sheer mass of Indian attacks and several Pakistani ships were sunk during two naval operations. East Pakistan declared independence on December 6 as Bangladesh; on December 16 Pakistani forces in the east surrendered, and a UN cease-fire was agreed upon. Steve Marin and Thomas J. Weiler See also Gandhi, Mahatma; India, Religious Conflict in; Kashmir Conflict; Pakistan, Religious Violence in Further Reading Cloughley, Brian. A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Dixit, J. N. India and Pakistan in War and Peace. New York: Routledge, 2002. Mohan, Jagan P. V. S., and Samir Chopra. The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965. New Delhi: Manohar, 2005. Palit, D. K. The Lightning Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War 1971. Godstone, UK: Spantech & Lancer, 1997. Pradhan R., ed. 1965 War—the Inside Story: Defence Minister’s Diary of the India-Pakistan War. Ocala, FL: Atlantic, 2007. Schofield, Victoria. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. London: IB Tarus, 2003. Sisson, Richard, and Leo E. Rose. War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Indra, Hindu God of War Indra is a grand mythical figure in Hinduism, the god of gods and ruler of heaven, as well as the lord of war and rain. The oldest reference to Indra is in the approximately 3,000-year-old Indian text known as the Rig Veda, in which nearly 250 hymns are devoted to him. His parents are the sky god Dyaus Pita and the earth goddess Prithvi. However, there is speculation surrounding the manner of his birth in the Rig Veda, in which it is explained that he was born along with his twin Agni (the god of fire) from the mouth of primeval Purusha, a cosmic man or universal principle. According to legend, Indra’s valor and inclination toward war was evident from the time of his birth. Indra drank soma rasa (the alcoholic elixir of life) and seized an arrow as soon as he was born. The epithets given to him also

corroborate his status as a war god, such titles as Sakra (Powerful), Vajri (the Thunderer), and Purandara (Destroyer of Cities). The vajra (lightning bolt) is his primary weapon. Indra also carried a hook, a sword, an axe, a conch, and a noose as backup weapons. Having a powerful physique, he traveled on the divine and mighty elephant Airavat, which had four tusks, and on a magnificent golden chariot driven by 10,000 horses. Indra’s most important achievement was the slaying of the dragon-demon Vritra. The demon’s name means “enclosure” or “obstructer.” The demon had taken the form of a large snake with 99 coils and had seized the most important elements of the universe, such as water, light, and cows. The demon was residing in the mountains when Indra attacked him. Tvashtar, the ironsmith of the gods, manufactured for Indra the powerful weapon vajra. In the process of attacking Vritra, Indra ended up destroying 99 fortresses, a testament to his great strength. The battle between Indra and Vritra was a fight between virtue and evil, at the end of which virtue was triumphant. Indra was subsequently given the name Vrtrahan, or slayer of Vritra. The universe recovered its life-sustaining elements after the battle. The gods and humankind could survive after recovering the vital element of water. The hymns of the Rig Veda praise Indra’s valor in glowing terms. He was also helped by Lord Vishnu in the battles against demons, but the gods elected Indra as their king as a sign of their deep gratitude. The consort of Indra is Indrani, and they live in Swarga, or paradise, a place bereft of sorrow or suffering. Slain warriors go there after their death and, in some cases, they are returned to life. Indra’s much-celebrated son is Prince Arjuna, the valiant fighter and hero in the Sanskrit epic, the Mahabharata. Arjuna is invincible because of the magic armor that Indra gave him. Indra also had many dark sides to his character. Apart from his drinking habits, Indra was also very amorous and extremely jealous of anybody else becoming too powerful. Apprehensive about keeping his throne in paradise, he did not hesitate to destroy anyone who threatened his rule. In latter-day translations of the Rig Veda, Indra lost his paramount position among the pantheon of the gods. He was replaced by Vishnu and Siva. He becomes simply a god of weather and a provider of rain. Indra has survived in myths, legends, and images not

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The thunderbolt scepter, or vajra, of the Vedic god Indra, symbolizes cosmic power and is usually depicted as an hourglass-shaped wand that Vajrayana practitioners use in rituals. (Stephen Ching/iStockphoto.com)

only in India. He was also recognized in many of the kingdoms of Southeast Asia, such as Cham (South Vietnam), the island of Bali, and Cambodia. Patit Paban Mishra See also Bhagavad Gita and War; Hinduism and War Further Reading Beswick, Ethel. The Hindu Gods. New Delhi: Crest, 1993. Chakraborty, Uma. Indra and Other Vedic Deities: A Euhemeristic Study. New Delhi: DK Printworld, 2006. Choudhuri, Usha. Indra and Varuna in Indian Mythology. Delhi: Nag, 1981. Gupta, Shanti S. A Study of God Indra: Rig-Veda, Valmiki Ramayana, and Sri Ramacharitamanasa. New Delhi: Krishna, 2001.

Hemenway, Priya. Hindu Gods: The Spirit of the Divine. San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2003. Kingsley, Rebecca. Indian Gods and Myths. New York: Chartwell Books, 1999. Mitchell, A. G. Hindu Gods and Goddesses. London: H.M.S.O., 1982.

Innocent III, Pope (1160–1216) Innocent III ranks as one of the most influential popes in the almost 2,000-year history of the papacy. He was pope from 1198 to 1216 at the height of the Western High Middle Ages, and he presided over the Fourth Lateran Council

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in 1215. As a political figure, Innocent came closest to what some call the “papal monarchy,” which, while overstating his actual impact, indicates his importance to the age. Innocent III’s pontificate marked the high point of crusade activity in medieval Europe. Innocent ordered the Fourth Crusade and was the first to call for crusades within Western Europe, including the Albigensian Crusade. The so-called “Children’s Crusade” took place in 1212 though the pope never sanctioned this as a crusade. Innocent also orchestrated the extensive preparations for the Fifth Crusade, although he did not live to see it launched. Born around 1160 of a noble family in northern Italy, Lothar dei Conti of Segni was, according to his early 13th-century anonymous biographer, of nondescript appearance but by temperament quick to anger yet quick to forgive. Lothar began his education at Rome, though he moved to the Paris schools, the first future pope to have studied there. He rounded out his education by studying canon law for two years at the schools of Bologna. Lothar rose quickly through the ecclesiastical ranks, thanks to his uncle Pope Clement III (r. 1187–1191). Clement made Lothar a cardinal deacon in 1189 at age 29. At Innocent’s election as pope in 1198, he was one of the youngest men ever to have been chosen, only 37 years old. Innocent III wielded political clout in ways that few popes ever could, and even if his wishes were often thwarted, it is still extraordinary how influential he was. His willingness to excommunicate rulers gave the pope occasional moral leverage over Western monarchs. During his pontificate, John of England, Otto IV of Germany, and Philip II of France were excommunicated, albeit for very different reasons. Two Western European monarchs, Peter II of Aragon and John of England, offered their kingdoms to Innocent as papal fiefs, technically making the pope their political overlord and giving him an excuse to meddle in their affairs. Undoubtedly Innocent presided over the most active crusade period in all of the crusade era (1095–1291). Beyond conception and planning, however, Innocent had little control over how crusades were carried out. Innocent launched the infamous Fourth Crusade, which went horribly awry when fewer crusaders showed up than planned, and when they could not pay the difference between their numbers and the number of ships constructed by

the Venetians. The Venetians postponed the debt in exchange for the crusaders taking the city of Zara on the Adriatic coast for them. Furious at the hijacking of the enterprise against a Christian city, Innocent excommunicated the crusaders. The eventual siege and sack of Constantinople also went completely against his desires, though in the end he conceded that this might finally heal the growing religious differences between Latin and Greek rite Christianity. Innocent was the first pope to extend crusade-like principles to Christian Europe itself. In 1199 he offered an indulgence (remission of sin) for fighting against Markward of Anweiler. Heresy in southern France had brewed for more than 50 years, but after the assassination of a papal official Innocent preached a crusade against the leading noble of the south, Raymond of Toulouse, for failing to root out heresy in his lands. Yet here too he also had little power over operations once the crusade began. During the course of the Albigensian Crusade Innocent was hostage to conflicting reports from those who supported the crusade to those who opposed it, and he tended to be convinced by the last person he met. In that sense he helped sustain the conflict by offering hope to both positions. By 1213 Innocent began planning another crusade to the Middle East, which became known as the Fifth Crusade. Innocent stimulated Christian ideas about holy war, partially through the encyclical Quia maior in 1213 and the papal bull Ab liberandum, promulgated at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. The first called for a new crusade, the details of which would be worked out at an ecumenical council. Quia maior reflected the pope’s attempts to lay out explicitly who should participate in his proposed crusade, how it should be financed, and the rewards available for those who did one or the other. Innocent ended the indulgence for outsiders participating in crusade activity in Spain and the Albigensian Crusade to pool resources for his projected crusade. Ad liberandum further refined what the pope said in Quia maior, including specific details of financing, as well as an exact date for departure, June 1, 1217. As part of his ongoing plans for another crusade to the Middle East as outlined in Quia maior, resolution of the Albigensian Crusade, and general church reform, Innocent called and presided over the Fourth Lateran Council in

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Rome in 1215. It was extremely well attended by hundreds of bishops, abbots, other church luminaries, and representatives of Western governments. It is generally viewed as the most influential, comprehensive ecumenical council between the early Middle Ages and the Council of Trent in the 16th century. Innocent III did not live to see the fruits of his final labors, dying in July 1216 in Perugia. The bishop of Acre, James of Vitry, on his way to the Holy Land to participate in what became the Fifth Crusade, saw Innocent’s body lying in church before burial. The previous night robbers had stripped the pope’s corpse of its vestments and his nude body was already stinking in the heat of an Italian summer. James remarked how “vain and short was the glory of this world.” This is an ambiguous epitaph for a pope who attempted to guide and stimulate holy war like no other before, yet whose reach exceeded his grasp. The Fourth Crusade, Albigensian Crusade, and Fifth Crusade all ended with far different outcomes than anyone, including Innocent, could have imagined. Laurence W. M arvin See also Albigensian Crusade; Languedoc Revolts; Lateran Church Councils Further Reading Cole, Penny J. The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095–1270. Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1991. Moore, John C., ed. Pope Innocent III and His World. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999. Moore, John C. Pope Innocent III (1160–1216): To Root Up and to Plant. Leiden: Brill, 2003. Rist, Rebecca. The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198–1245. London: Continuum, 2009. Sayers, Jane. Innocent III: Leader of Europe 1198–1216. Harlow, UK: Longman, 1994.

International Religious Freedom and Human Rights Religious freedom has been recognized by the United Nations as a fundamental human right; however, it has also been a right that is often abused in the midst of conflict

and war. International legal jurist and scholar Robert George, vice-chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious, defines religious freedom as “the right to ponder life’s origins, meaning and purpose; to explore the deepest questions about human nature, dignity, and destiny; to decide what is to be believed and not to be believed; and, within the limits of justice for all, to comply with what one conscientiously judges to be one’s religious obligation— openly, peacefully, and without fear” (George 2014, 2). Despite the importance of the right to religious freedom, there are increasing and widespread violations of this fundamental human right. Around 5.5 billion people (77 percent of the population of the world) live in places where there are severe restrictions on the implementation of the right to religious freedom (Pew Research Center 2015). One of the most dramatic contemporary examples of violations of religious freedom and conflict is the case of the territories occupied by ISIS. That terrorist-insurgent movement has summarily executed, raped, and abducted people in Syria and Iraq who do not agree with their religious and political beliefs. The main victims are Christians, Yazidis, and Shi’a and Sunni Muslims who oppose the ISIS interpretation of Islam. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 put an end to 30 years of war between diverse Christian denominations in Europe. This was the beginning of a meaningful application of the right to religious freedom as a fundamental human right. The Peace of Westphalia, which was expressed in the treaties of Osnabruck and Munster, acknowledged the equal rights of the Reformed Calvinist denomination and the Lutheran and Roman Catholic religions. After the First World War, the protection of international religious freedom was based on a system of protection for minority rights. Therefore the right to religious freedom was based on a paradigm that focused on the protection for group rights. This was the case in Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece, and Czechoslovakia. After the Second World War, as a reaction to the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime, the international community recognized the paramount importance of protecting fundamental human rights. This recognition was expressed in international legal instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the

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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The foundation for the protection of religious freedom in the post–Second World War era was based on the concept of individual rights and not on the group rights paradigm that was prevalent after the First World War. The United Nations Charter, signed in 1945, indicates that the promotion of “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” is one of the main objectives of the UN. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights acknowledges that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” (Article 18). That normative instrument recognizes the right of individuals to change their religion and to freely express their religious beliefs in private and public settings (Article 18). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), one of the most important international treaties in the field of human rights law, recognizes that every human being has the right to religious freedom. The ICCPR recognizes that religious freedom can be limited to protect public order and moral values (Article 18). The ICCPR acknowledges the right of parents to ensure the religious education of their children consistent with their religious beliefs. Another important international instrument is the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief, which was adopted in 1981. The declaration recognizes, among others, the right to religious freedom, which comprises, among others, the freedom to worship, the right to write and publish religious literature, to teach from a religious perspective, and to receive financial contributions for religious activities. Article 12 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the most important human rights treaty in the Inter-American system of human rights, recognizes that every person has the right to freedom of religion, which includes the right to change religious beliefs and freely express religious ideas. Like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention also recognizes the rights of parents to choose the religious education of their children and the possibility of limiting religious freedom to protect the public order. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights recognizes the right to freedom of conscience and the

freedom to practice religious beliefs. According to the charter: “No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms” (Article 8). The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) grants to every person the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. In that normative system the right to religious freedom includes the freedom to change religions and to express religious views in private and public. Article 9 of the ECHR recognizes limitations to the right to religious freedom “in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” There are diverse levels of interaction and interrelation between state and religion in nations around the world. In some countries, the state systematically undermines the exercise of the right to religious freedom. In other countries, constitutional principles guarantee the implementation of religious freedom norms. Also, there are different levels of association between the state and a religion within a state. Some European countries, such as the United Kingdom and Norway, have officially instituted churches and have established guarantees for the exercise of religious freedom for everybody. Others, such as France, have recognized secularism as a constitutional principle (Article 1, French Constitution of 1958). In communist regimes, such as North Korea, there is a complete separation between state and religion, and the right to religious freedom is not followed. Some countries where there are officially established religions, such as Saudi Arabia, are characterized by systematic violations of the right to religious freedom of minority religious groups. In the United States, the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998 is one of the main legal instruments to ensure compliance with the right to religious freedom. To implement its objectives, there is an ambassador for International Religious Freedom who heads the Office of International Religious Freedom at the U.S. State Department. IRFA requires the publication of a comprehensive annual report on international religious freedom. The report describes violations of the right to religious freedom around the world. The act also requires the publication of a report about the worst violators of religious freedom. IRFA compels the U.S. government to encourage

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respect for the right to religious freedom, by diplomacy, and if necessary to sanction the violators of this fundamental human right. In the United Sates, the most important norm for the protection of religious freedom is the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which says: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” In some Latin American countries, the Roman Catholic Church is recognized as the official religion of the state. For example, Article 75 of the constitution of Costa Rica says: “The Roman Catholic and Apostolic Religion is the religion of the State.” Peru recognizes the supremacy of the Catholic Church and religious freedom for all other religions. Countries such as Argentina, Paraguay, Guatemala, and Panama are nondenominational. The constitutions of Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela recognize a clear separation of church and state. For example, Article 4 of the Bolivian constitution acknowledges the separation of church and state. The constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador recognize the key place of indigenous religions. The constitutional law of Mexico recognizes a strict separation between church and state. Article 24 of the Mexican constitution protects freedom of religions. It says that every person can “practice all ceremonies, devotions, or the acts of respective cults, only if they do not constitute an infraction or crime punishable by law.” In African countries, there is a great diversity of perspectives regarding the right to religious freedom and the relation between church and state. For example, the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania recognizes Islam as the state religion and does not recognize the right to religious freedom. The constitution of Zambia identifies the country as a Christian nation and recognizes the right to religious freedom for all persons. The constitution of Gambia identifies the country as a secular state that recognizes religious freedom as a fundamental human right. Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Ghana also recognize the right to religious freedom. According to Article 10 of the Nigerian constitution: “The Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion.” Section 38(1) of the Nigerian constitution recognizes the right to religious freedom including the possibility of changing a religious faith and the right to express religious

beliefs. The constitution of the Republic of South Africa has a comprehensive description of the right to religious freedom that recognizes that every person has the “right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion” (Article 15). As of 2015, from the 46 Muslim countries in the world, 23 acknowledge Islam as the state religion. Those countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, http://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/spotlight /did-you-knowmuslim-constitutions). In Comoros, Mauritania, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Maldives, Islam is the official religion and there is no recognition of the right to religious freedom. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in Article 1, states: “The government of Iran is an Islamic Republic.” The constitution of Kuwait, in Article 2, states: “The religion of the State is Islam, and the Islamic Shari’a shall be a main source of legislation.” According to Article 1 of the constitution of Saudi Arabia: “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion shall be Islam and its constitution shall be the Book of God and the Sunnah (Traditions) of His Messenger.” According to Article 2 of the constitution of Pakistan: “Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan.” According to the preamble to the constitution of India, secularism is the foundation of India’s legal system. Article 25 of the constitution of India recognizes religious freedom if it does not disrupt public order, morality, or health. Finally, Article 36 of the constitution of the People’s Republic of China states that the “citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.” It emphasizes the function of the state to protect “normal religious activities” and the duty of not engaging in religious expressions that “disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state.” From a perspective of war and conflict, religious freedom is important because if a nation oppresses the religious traditions of its citizens, there is the potential for those who are persecuted to go underground, fight back, create martyrs, and align themselves across borders or

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with other national and global fighters of like values and religion. Yuri Mantilla See also Holocaust; Political Theology and War; Primary Documents: United Nations Secretary General’s Statement Calling for Support of All Religions (September 10, 2001); Defining Terrorism: UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (October 8, 2004); UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Message to the International Conference on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (April 15, 2013); UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon’s Message to the Religions for Peace Assembly: People of Faith Can Pave Way for Tolerance, Solidarity among All Groups (November 20, 2013); UN Resolution 2199: The UN Security Council Condemns Trade with Al-Qaida-Associated Groups (2015); UN Security Council Statement on Boko Haram (January 19, 2015); Guidelines Proposed at the UN General Assembly Meeting on the Syrian Refugee Crisis (November 20, 2015) Further Reading Cianitto, Cristiana, W. Cole Durham, Silvio Ferrari, and Donlu Thayer, eds. Law, Religion, Constitution, Freedom of Religion, Equal Treatment, and the Law. Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2013. Dingemans, Sir James, Can Yeginsu, Tom Cross, and Hafsah Masood. The Protections for Religious Rights: Law and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Durham, W. Cole, and Brett G. Scharffs. Law and Religion: National, International, and Comparative Perspectives. New York: Wolters Kluwer, Aspen, 2010. George, Robert P. The State of International Religious Freedom and Why It Matters, the 18th Annual Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs. Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes, November 2014. Hill, Mark, ed. Religious Liberty and Human Rights. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2002. Pew Research Center, Feb. 26, 2015. “Latest Trends in Religious Restrictions and Hostilities.” Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 2015. Rehman, Javaid, and Susan C. Breau, eds. Religion, Human Rights and International Law, a Critical Examination of Islamic State Practices. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007. Scolnicov, Anat. The Right to Religious Freedom in International Law. New York: Routledge, 2011. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Majority Muslim Countries and Other OIC Members, 2012.

Witte, John, Jr., and Johan D. van der Vyver, eds. Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996.

Intifada The word intifada is an Arabic word for uprising, which was and is used by the Arab/Palestinian population in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. It comprises all sorts of protests from peaceful civil rights movement–type actions to acts of terrorism designed to achieve political objectives. The First Intifada took place between 1987 and 1993; the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005. There is speculation that a Third Intifada will take place. Intifada has to be seen in the context of Israeli-Arabic relations since the mid-1930s. The United Nations’ division of British-controlled Palestine between Arabs and Jews in 1947 was not accepted by the neighboring Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, etc.). The new Israeli state emerged in 1948; the Arabic sections of Palestine did not evolve into a separate state, but were controlled by Egypt and Jordan. After the overwhelming Israeli victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, these territories came under Israeli control. In the meantime several Palestinian nationalist groups emerged (most importantly the PLO). The Palestinians employed terrorist tactics to accomplish their political objectives after Arab armies failed to recover Palestinian territory for the Palestinians. These tactics included airplane hijackings, bomb attacks, and the Munich Olympic massacre against Israeli athletes. This did not change the status of the territories under Israeli control. So the First Intifada was a Palestinian attempt to gain statehood by a broader resistance against Israel. It consisted of actions of civil disobedience and of stone and Molotov cocktail attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians. The First Intifada faded away in the early 1990s. After the U.S.-led Gulf War in 1991 for the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, a peace process started between Israel and the PLO, which led to the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995. After some reconciliation, this process failed, and in 2000 the Second Intifada began. This time Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians characterized the intifada. Israel responded with military

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attacks against terrorist strongholds within the occupied territories. Without any decisive gains for either side, a tenuous truce ended the Second Intifada in February 2005. The following analysis will focus on the religious aspects of the intifada. It should be noted, however, that the intifada uprisings were fueled by a mixture of nationalistic and religious motivations. In general, one could say that the religious aspects grew over time, that is, the Second Intifada was much more influenced by religious motivations than the more nationalistic-secular First Intifada. The Second Intifada was even called the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which refers to the mosque on the Temple Mount, which is at the same time the most sacred ground for Jews. The widespread use of this name by Palestinian terrorists reflects this more religious aspect of the Second Intifada as well, as

the religious promise of a reward for this “sacrifice” in the afterlife ("martyrdom") became an important driving force within the confrontation. Hamas, as an Islamist terror organization, supplemented the more secular Fatah within the Palestinian ranks. The suicide terror actions usually had a religious rationale mixed with the general argument concerning the fight for Palestinian statehood with or without the destruction of Israel. To highlight the religious connotations of the intifada, one has to analyze the importance of holy places in the region to several religions (Jews, Christians, and Muslims). Jerusalem as a city is of course the most important site in Judaism, former place of the Jewish temple last destroyed by the Romans. The Wailing or Western Wall on the Temple Mount remains from the ancient temple structure and is

The Al-­Aqsa Mosque is a complex of religious edifices in Jerusalem that are sacred to Muslims, Jews (as the Temple Mount), and Christians. In response to Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000, the Palestinians launched the Second Intifada. (Library of Congress)

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the holiest place in Judaism. When the State of Israel was established and East Jerusalem came under Jordanian control in 1948, this wall was not accessible to Jews. After the Israeli Army conquered East Jerusalem in 1967, it was opened again for Jews. The Al-Aqsa mosque was built on the ancient structures of the Jewish temple in the early eighth century. When the Israelis took control of the Temple Mount in 1967, Jews guaranteed access for Muslims to this mosque and the status quo on the Temple Mount, which meant no structural changes to the holy sites of the different religions. Jerusalem has of course a strong religious importance for Christians as well, as the last days and the crucifixion of Jesus are linked to the city. For Islam, Jerusalem also is the city that Muhammad passed through on his nightly journey from Mecca to heaven. These claims of three different world religions to Jerusalem are accompanied by claims of different denominations within these three religions. This led to a permanent struggle for the city. Whereas the Roman and later on the Islamic occupation of Jerusalem can be interpreted as a secular territorial conquest, the religious battles for the city started with the crusades. In fact, the Christian justification for the crusades was the conquest by “infidels” (i.e., Muslims) of Jerusalem. The crusade period was characterized by several religiously motivated or justified massacres by Christians and Muslims. For a time the Al-Aqsa mosque was transformed into the headquarters of the Knights Templar, but in the end the Christians lost to the Muslims and Jerusalem remained under Muslim control until the First World War. According to the United Nations partition plan of 1947, Jerusalem and Bethlehem were to be under international control, but in the end East Jerusalem (i.e., the Old City plus other parts) came under Jordanian control, whereas the rest went to the Israelis. From 1948 to 1967 the holy places were not open to the Jews. In 1967 after the Six-Day War, the whole of Jerusalem was reunited under Israeli control. The religious claims for the city nowadays mix with nationalistic aspirations, as both Israelis and Palestinians claim the whole of Jerusalem as their nation’s capital. Internationally, neither of the two claims is accepted. In a peace settlement a new division is the most likely outcome. During the two intifadas the Old City was a regular place for confrontation between Palestinians and Israelis. As the

Muslim site of the Al-Aqsa mosque is located very near and above the Jewish site of the Western Wall, stones were regularly thrown on Jewish worshipers by intifada activists. Israeli security forces responded and tried to limit such events by channeling the access to the Muslim site (banning young males, etc.). This led to new tensions. The Second Intifada is known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada after the Israeli leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount. He wanted to demonstrate Israeli claims to the whole of Jerusalem. Even though he did not enter the Al-Aqsa mosque, this walkabout was regarded as a nationalistic and religious provocation by many Palestinians. The peace process had collapsed some months earlier, when Palestinian president Yasser Arafat refused a compromise proposed by U.S. president Bill Clinton. One of the main obstacles for a durable peace was in fact the future of Jerusalem as a city and of the Temple Mount. Palestinian and other Arabic and Iranian propagandists then labeled the Second Intifada with the name of the mosque, to supplement the Israeli-Palestinian territorial clash with a religious aspect. This was somehow necessary, as the wave of Palestinian suicide attacks needed a religious justification, as a suicide as such is not easily justified by traditional Islamic theology. In 2015–2016 the Palestinian mass knife attacks on Israelis and tourists were fomented by unsubstantiated rumors that the Israelis wanted to alter the status quo of the Temple Mount. Even archaeological surveys of the Temple Mount have sparked violent protests in the past. These conflicting territorial claims for religious sites are not only limited to Jerusalem. Bethlehem and Hebron are two other prominent examples. Bethlehem is regarded as the birthplace of David and Jesus. Therefore it is a highly important place for Christians. For Jews it is a holy site via the David connection and the tomb of Rachel, mother of Joseph. After the Oslo accords Rachel’s Tomb remained under Israeli control, whereas Bethlehem as such was handed over to the Palestinians. During the two intifadas Bethlehem was one of the hot spots of confrontations. During the First Intifada Palestinians and Israeli security forces regularly clashed in the city. During the Second Intifada some Palestinian suicide bombers emerged from Bethlehem and crossed into nearby Israel for their attacks. Traditional Christmas celebrations in Bethlehem were often

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overshadowed by such events. The majority of the Arabic/ Palestinian population in Bethlehem was once Christian. Christian and Muslim Palestinians both participated in the First Intifada. Especially since the Second Intifada, when Islamic justifications became more important for the struggle against Israel, the sectarian divide within the Palestinian community gained in importance. Christian Palestinians were and are often subjected to attacks from militant Islamists within the Palestinian population. Since the Second Intifada quite a number of Christian (Palestinian) churches have been burned by Palestinians. Hebron is another example of the conflicting territorial and religious claims in the region. A Jewish minority lived in Hebron even after the Roman conquest and survived under Islamic rule. But in 1929 the Jewish community in Hebron was driven out during and following a genocidal pogrom. After 1967, Jewish settlers reclaimed parts of the by then all-Arab city. Both Jews and Muslims regard the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron as a holy site. Israeli authorities divided the cave to give access to both religions. Hebron was another hot spot during the First Intifada, but gained notoriety due to a massacre by a Jewish extremist of Muslim worshipers in the cave in 1993. The city was divided between Israelis and Palestinians according to the Oslo Accord in 1995. During the Second Intifada Hebron was again a place of confrontation. The events of 1929 and 1993 gave religious extremists on both sides justifications to see Hebron as a prime target in the dispute. To distinguish between the nationalistic-secular and the religious motivations for the intifadas is difficult, as they go hand-in-hand. To understand the religious aspects of the intifada, one has to take into account actors outside Israel and the Palestinian territories as well. Even so, the Palestinians claim sovereignty for Jerusalem as their capital city; the Jordanian king sees himself in a family line with the Prophet Muhammed and still holds the guardianship over the holy sites in Jerusalem, although this place has been under Israeli control since 1967. Jordan, with its large Palestinian population, was always involved in the intifada uprisings. The Jordanian royal family always tried to calm down tensions and had their own military confrontations with the Palestinians (“Black September”) in 1970–1971. Although the Palestinians have not yet gained a final peace settlement with the Israelis, the Jordanians

concluded a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. But Jordan and other Sunnite Arab states lost importance especially during the Second Intifada, as the extremist Shi’a regime in Iran gained more and more influence. Although the Palestinian groups (both political and terrorist) were always divided in several factions, the confrontation between the traditional (and mostly secular) Fatah/PLO and the Islamist (Sunni) Hamas from the late 1980s shaped the escalation of the conflict both with Israel and within the Palestinian movement. The political-religious inspiration of Hamas was the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The spiritual leader was the cleric Ahmed Yassin, who was killed by the Israelis in 2004. Hamas, albeit a Sunni group, was sponsored financially by the Shi’a regime in Iran, even though Sunni and Shi’a groups usually have problems with each other. The rise of Hamas, which appealed to Palestinians with their more radical approach to pursuing their objectives, led to a decline of the secular approach preached by Fatah. Again the Palestine suicide wave during the Second Intifada somehow needed a religious rationale, because Palestinian terrorist actions previously often had the aspect of suicide missions, but suicide and religious redemption was not the aim of such missions, only a secondary effect. Proper suicide missions mainly derived from Iranian Shi’a practices during the war against Iraq in the 1980s and some experiences of Shi’a groups in Lebanon. So there can be seen some Shi’a influence in the actual running of the Second Intifada by the Sunni Hamas and the secular Fatah. Oliver Benjamin Hemmerle See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Balfour Declaration; First World War, Religious Dimensions of; Hamas; Hezbollah; Six-Day War; Yom Kippur War Further Reading Caplan, Neil. The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Contested Histories. New York: John Wiley, 2011. Freedman, Robert Owen. The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World, and the Superpowers. Miami: Florida University International Press, 1991. Lockman, Zachary, and Joel Beinin, eds. Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation. Washington, DC: Middle East Research and Information Project, 1989.

390  Investiture Controversy Nassar, Jamal Raji, and Roger Heacock. Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads. New York: Praeger, 1990. Schulze, Kirsten E. The Arab-Israeli Conflict. London: Routledge, 2014.

Investiture Controversy The Investiture Controversy was a religious and political dispute beginning in the late 11th century that resulted in half a century of revolt and conflict blending politics, power, and piety in a high-stakes struggle. In what was to become known by the 13th century as the Holy Roman Empire, emperors Henry IV (1084–1105) and Henry V (1111–1125) clashed with popes over who had the right to invest bishops with their ring and crozier. The crozier was a staff that signified the bishop’s authority and the ring was a symbol of pontifical dignity. The emperors understood investiture as a conferral of authority over landed estates and rich endowments. The papacy instead insisted that it established a man in holy office. The conflict stretched over 45 years, culminating in 1122 when Henry V renounced investiture rights and agreed to free election and consecration of bishops as set forth in the Concordat of Worms (1122). He retained only the right to receive feudal homage from bishops as new landholders. The concordat had within in it the beginning of the idea of nation-state political sovereignty that would be more fully expressed in the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The Investiture Controversy originated in the ecclesiastical reform movement centered at the French Benedictine monastery known as Cluny Abbey in the 10th and 11th centuries that condemned three evils: nicolaitism, simony, and lay investiture. Nicolaitism is the practice of priests taking concubines, and simony is the purchase of holy offices. Reformers believed these were sins that were enabled by entrusting investiture to lay rulers, such as kings and princes, who ensnared bishops in worldly allegiances. The reform movement waxed after Pope Nicholas II’s 1059 decree that papal elections would be conducted exclusively by cardinal-bishops, without imperially nominated candidates. In 1073, the reformist Hildebrand of Sovana

was elected Pope Gregory VII. He soon issued Dictatus Papae, asserting that only the pope could appoint, reinstate, or depose bishops. Henry IV responded the next year in 1076, asserting that Pope Gregory VII was nothing but a false monk, devoid of papal authority. Henry IV also asserted that his own imperial privileges were granted by divine right, and subsequently, the pope excommunicated him. For the next 45 years, Henry and his son grappled with popes over investiture. Imperial armies marched on Rome in 1081, sending Gregory VII into exile. Henry V invaded again in 1110–1111, taking Pope Paschal II prisoner for two years after he condemned lay investiture anew. Over the course of the controversy, Henry IV backed three antipopes and Henry V two more. With oft-victorious armies and sympathetic antipopes, why did Henry IV ultimately concede investiture? The reason was due to effective papal diplomacy. Gregory VII allied with ambitious imperial nobles to force Henry IV to perform penance for his disobedience in 1077 in what became known as the “Walk to Canossa.” Seven years later, Gregory VII recruited Lombards to drive imperial troops from Rome (he remained in exile where he died in 1085, though, after the victors set the city ablaze to its residents’ dismay). Pope Urban II (reigned 1088–1099) forged a close relationship with Conrad (1074–1101)—Henry IV’s eldest son—and Tuscany’s powerful Countess Matilda (1046– 1115) when they revolted in the 1090s against Henry IV. Paschal II (d. 1118), too, exploited divisions within the imperial family in 1104–1105, supporting Henry V and lesser nobles as they forced Henry IV—who had recently lost several important commanders in the First Crusade— to abdicate. Finally, from 1115 to 1118, Paschal supported yet another uprising, this time by imperial nobles and Normans. Henry V could not safely reign without papal consent. Popes and their allies proved a threat until he relinquished power over the bishops. At Worms, Henry yielded to reform and surrendered the dispute over lay investiture, maintaining only a right to feudal homage. A stronger papacy, sharper distinctions between religious and civil (lay) authority, and a new level of ecclesiastical independence came into being. Matthew P. Cavedon

Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938)  391 See also Holy Roman Empire; Papal-Imperial Conflict Further Reading Berman, Harold. Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985. Blumenthal, Uta-Renate. The Investiture Controversy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988. Robinson, I. S. Henry IV of Germany, 1056–1106. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Tierney, Brian. The Crisis of Church & State 1050–1300. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964.

Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938) Celebrated as the “Spiritual Father of Pakistan,” Muhammad Iqbal was a philosopher, politician, and poet of Muslim resurgence. He published numerous books of poetry with the intent of awakening Indian Muslims to their impoverishment at the hands of British imperialism. He was the first to call for a division of India into separate Muslim and Hindu states. He is considered to be a founder of the Pakistan movement, which led to the separation of Pakistan from India in 1956. Born of Muslim parents in British India, Iqbal was educated at the Scotch Mission College in Sialkot and Government College in Lahore where he earned an MA in philosophy. His mentor, Sir Thomas Arnold, encouraged him to continue his education in Great Britain, which he did, attending Cambridge University from 1905 to 1908 where he obtained an advanced degree in philosophy. Concurrently, he attended the University of Heidelberg from which he obtained a PhD and also studied for and passed the bar at Lincoln’s Inn. From an early age, Iqbal was recognized as an accomplished poet in the Eastern tradition and published poetry in both Urdu and Persian. In his poetry, he communicated the philosophy of khudi, a call for Muslims to develop a strong will to resist the encroachment of Western culture and to reclaim Islam’s collective dignity. His poetry gave him a wide audience, earning him popular acclaim and a British knighthood. It also established him, with Gandhi, Nehru, and Jinnah, as a leading politi-

cal voice in India. Elected to the leadership of the All India Muslim League in 1930, he called for the establishment of a separate Muslim homeland in his presidential address at Allahabad. Later, in 1931, he attended the Round Table Conference in England, representing the Muslim viewpoint in efforts to resolve the communal problem and determine the future of India. Iqbal was also a proponent of Pan-Islam. Iqbal rejected Western culture, its technology, and nationalism, to which he ascribed many evils, especially the extensive human suffering and destruction experienced in World War I. India sent nearly a million men to support the British war effort (500,000 enlisted, 400,000 to serve as laborers), many seeing action in some of the worst trench warfare. Iqbal attributed the evils of that war to Western thought and technology. In his poem “The Wisdom of the West,” Iqbal complains to God that the West’s war-making acumen is more dangerous than death itself. Iqbal died in 1938, eight years before the state of Pakistan became a reality. Little did he realize that the achievement of his dream would result in what has been estimated as nearly a million deaths and ongoing enmity between India and Pakistan. Today, Iqbal is recognized as one of the leading voices of Islamic resurgence, and Iqbal Day is celebrated each year in Pakistan. His poetry is still sung and revered in both India and Pakistan. The Iqbal Academy in Lahore, Pakistan, continues to champion his life and work. Dayne E. Nix See also India, Religious Conflict in; Pakistan, Religious Violence in Further Reading Iqbal, Muhammad. A Message from the East: A Selective Verse Rendering of Iqbal’s Payam-I-Mashriq. Edited by M. Hadi Hussain. Karachi, Pakistan: Iqbal Academy, 1971. James, Lawrence. Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997. Schimmel, Annemarie. Gabriel’s Wing: A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muhammad Iqbal. Karachi, Pakistan: Iqbal Academy, 1963. The Secrets of the Self: A Philosophical Poem. Translated by Renold A. Nicholson. Lahore, Pakistan: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 2001.

392  Iranian Revolution (1979)

Iranian Revolution (1979) On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Tehran from exile in Paris as leader of the Iranian Revolution, establishing the first modern Islamic republic in the world. The revolution enjoyed widespread popular support in Iran. It succeeded in toppling a monarchy, overthrowing secularism, and ushering in a new era of strict adherence to Islamic law, culture, and practice that set Iran on a course of conflict with the West. The origins of the Iranian Revolution are deeply embedded in both the religious history of the country and the Pahlavi dynasty. In the 16th century, Persia (the historic name for Iran until 1935) rejected Sunni Islam and adopted Shi’a Islam, which followed the lineage of the Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law Ali ibn Abi Talib. Religion therefore became a cornerstone of difference between Iran and its neighbors and helped shape a unique national identity. Persia also rejected Arabism, its language and customs. The country also remained detached from the political rule of the Ottoman Empire, which was viewed as decadent and a corrupting influence on Islam. Shi’a Islam in time was woven into the fabric of daily life as a purer sect of Islam with holy cities like Mashhad and Qom becoming centers of Shi’a pilgrimage and learning. In the 20th century, Iran was ruled by the Pahlavi dynasty. A despotic ruler styling himself king—Reza Shah Pahlavi—took power on December 15, 1925. His vision for Iran was a different one from its historic identity. He wanted to modernize the country, confine religion to the private sphere, secularize society, and rule without any opposition. This vision was bitterly opposed by Islamic imams and mullahs who saw it as a transgression away from pure Islam. The shah remained in power until September 16, 1941, when he was ousted because of his pro-Axis sympathies by Britain and the Soviet Union. He was succeeded by his son, who also took the title of shah, continued the Pahlavi dynasty and promoted foreign involvement in Iranian affairs. In the postwar period British and U.S. interests in Iran accelerated due to the demands of their respective oil corporations. In return for Western technology and advice, the shah granted major oil concessions to Western companies. This relationship was viewed negatively by the powerful

imams, opposition figures, and the population in general. Under the reforming leadership of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, the National Front and various religious leaders succeeded in weaning power back from the shah. They used this limited liberalism to nationalize Iran’s oil and pass social legislation. These policies severely undermined Iran’s economy, but they were popular with the public. In London and Washington agreement was reached to initiate Operation Ajax. Mosaddegh was ousted from power by the CIA in 1953 and the shah was reinstated with full authority. He granted 40 percent oil concessions to the United States. The shah clamped down on any opposition using his secret service, the Savak. He increased spending on the military and began working closely with Israel’s intelligence service, Mossad. The shah tried to appease popular discontent with his rule by launching a “White Revolution” aimed at modernizing and liberalizing Iran by, among other measures, giving women a greater role in society. This, like all his policies, was severely criticized by the clerics. Ayatollah al-uzma (“Great Sign of God”) Ruhollah Khomeini was a leading cleric in the holy city of Qom. An expert in Islamic law (sharia) and jurisprudence (fiqh), he publicly spoke out against the shah, declaring him to be a puppet of the West and a degenerate leader who had moved away from pure Islam. Khomeini could not be arrested given his rank as grand ayatollah and was exiled instead, settling in the holy city of Najaf, Iraq. Throughout the 1970s Iran’s oil output increased due to increased oil prices. This was meant to help the shah’s reforming agenda to modernize and move away from backwardness. From 1973 to 1978 expenditures doubled from $36.84 billion to $69.59 billion. However, this had little impact on most people’s lives with high inflation making basic commodities difficult to buy while the shah and his family enjoyed an ostentatious lifestyle. The Savak (50,000 strong) and the military (700,000 strong, which received $4 billion per year to buy new arms) kept public disquiet in check. Thousands of opponents were arrested. Khomeini’s son Mustafa was killed by Savak. Forced to move to Paris on October 6, 1977, Khomeini attracted the world’s attention as an outspoken critic of the shah. He delivered speeches every day and these cassettes

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were smuggled back to Iran for people to listen to. He denounced the shah as Satan defiling Islam, and he ordered his followers to boycott state institutions and set up Islamic ones. He encouraged nonviolent resistance to the regime through street demonstrations and strikes. He became the voice of resistance: “i’ilamiyahs—I am informing you.” Encouraged by Khomeini’s message, people took to the streets in the thousands to express their support for their real spiritual leader. These demonstrations forced the shah into exile. The second phase of the Iranian Revolution began on February 1, 1979, when Khomeini returned as de facto leader to consolidate Iran as an Islamic state. He destroyed anything connected with the shah including Reza Shah’s mausoleum. A Revolutionary Council imposed Islamic law, principles, punishments, justice, customs, and clothing through decrees (fatwas) as the country became transformed into a fundamentalist state. In November Islamic students seized control of the U.S. embassy in Iran, kidnapping hostages. This act and its endorsement by Khomeini ruptured relations between the two countries for decades. Fearing the internationalization of the revolution, the CIA encouraged Saddam Hussein of Iraq to attack Iran. The subsequent war lasted for eight years. This war and the death of the supreme leader in 1989 took much of the dynamic energy out of the revolution. Since then Iran has been on the periphery of affairs in the Gulf region, sponsoring terrorist groups (Hezbollah— “party of God”) and clashing with Israel over its nuclear development program. Barry N. Whelan See also Khomeni, Ruhollah al-Musavi; Sharia and War Further Reading Axworthy, Michael. Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. London: Penguin, 2013. Esposito, John L. The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990. Heikal, Mohamed. The Return of the Ayatollah. London: André Deutsch, 1991. Kapuscinski, Ryszard. Shah of Shahs. London: Penguin, 2006. Moin, Baqer. Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah. New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999.

Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) The Iran-Iraq war began on September 22, 1980, when Iraq launched a surprise military attack against Iran, and ended eight years later on July 18, 1988, when both countries accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 598. Deeming it as yet another Arab invasion of Iranian territory and one more attempt by Islamic Sunnis to suppress Islamic Shi’a, and so couching the entire conflict in interMuslim sectarian terms, the Islamic Republic of Iran still officially terms the conflict Jang-e Tahmili (“The Imposed War”) and Defa’-ye Moqaddas (“The Holy Defense”). The 1975 Algiers Treaty had settled most of the boundary and political issues between Iraq and Iran, but certain major political changes, most notably the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was overtly inciting rebellion among Iraq’s Shi’a majority, and Iran’s isolation after the hostage crisis with the United States, contributed to Iraq president Saddam Hussein’s decision to abrogate the Algiers Treaty and invade Iran in 1980. Iraqi troops managed to capture Iranian border towns in all four provinces adjacent to Iraq plus Iran’s major Persian Gulf port at Khorramshahr. They also besieged Abadan, the site of Iran’s largest oil refinery. The Iranian side, however, recovered from the shock and with a large volunteer army stopped the Iraqi advance. Then, in November 1981 and March 1982, Iran launched the Tariq al-Qods (“Way to al-Qods [Jerusalem]”) and Fath al-Mobin (“Manifest Victory”) offensives, respectively, to recover much of its territory. Iraq consequently called for a cease-fire, which was rejected by Iran since part of its territory was still under enemy occupation. In May 1982 Iranian forces recaptured Khorramshahr through the Bayt al-Moqaddas (“Sanctified House [referring to Jerusalem]”), after which Iraq announced that it would withdraw all its forces from Iran. Khomeini, however, stated in a speech that his goal for Iranians was “ridding Iraq of its tyrannical rulers and moving on to liberate Jerusalem.” So again Iran’s supreme leader couched the counterattack in confessional terms that depicted Iraq as working in alliance with Israel and the United States against the followers of the 12 imams or spiritual guides from the family of the Prophet Muhammad. Consequently, during July 1982, in the Ramadan Operation, Iranian forces made an effort to take Basra, and in

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response Iraqi fighters struck heavily at Kharg Island, one of Iran’s seaports for the export of oil. During 1983 Iran launched four offensives called Valfajr after a Qur’anic verse (1:89) (“By the Dawn”) to repel Sunni Iraqi forces from Iran’s western provinces of Khuzestan, Ilam, and West Azerbaijan. The offensives achieved only limited gains and resulted in high casualties. In February 1984, Iraq launched Scud missile attacks against the city of Dezful in southwestern Iran. Iran responded with human wave attacks in an operation called Kheybar, symbolically named after one of the wars of the time of the Prophet Muhammad, to capture the Majnoon Island oil field near Basra in southern Iraq during the casualty-ridden Battle of the Marshes. Continuing the religious theme of Iran’s own offensives into Iraqi territory, Ayatollah Khomeini launched the Fatima Zahra battle in late February 1984. It was named for the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter whose sons and later descendants comprised the line of Shi’a imams. Aimed at taking over Basra, it failed after both sides suffered massive losses. Eventually more than 40,000 soldiers from both sides would die fighting for control of the marshlands along the southernmost part of the Iraq-Iran border. During the war, Iraq regularly resorted to the deployment of internationally prohibited chemical weapons. The targets were Iranian soldiers and civilians and Iraqi Shi’as and Kurds suspected of sympathizing with Iran or using the war’s chaos to attempt independence. A postwar 1991 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report estimated that more than 50,000 deaths and 100,000 long-term injuries resulted from exposure to mustard and nerve gas—some manufactured in Iraq, some procured from Western nations. Both countries engaged in destroying infrastructure and exports—most notably in the Tanker War, a subset of battles from 1984 through 1988 that peaked during 1987. Tankers at sea from other nations suspected of transporting crude oil on behalf of the two warring neighbors were destroyed by Iraqi and Iranian fighter jets as well. Eventually, the United States and USSR had to deploy their navies to escort neutral vessels through the Persian Gulf waters. In response to international insecurity caused by the acceleration of the Tanker War, the UN Security Council passed a cease-fire resolution in 1987. Iran was initially

unwilling to accept the resolution, whereas Iraq needed to end the conflict that had become a stalemate with massive losses both in people and infrastructure. So during early 1988, Saddam Hussein warned he would authorize Iraqi forces to relaunch a full-scale invasion of Iran plus attack the most heavily populated Iranian cities with weapons of mass destruction unless Iran came to the negotiating table. Following up on his threat, Iraqi aircraft bombed the Iranian city of Oshnavieh in West Azerbaijan Province with poison gas—resulting in approximately 2,000 casualties. People began pouring out of Iranian cities, fleeing to the countryside to escape impending chemical weapons attacks. Iraqi missiles with conventional payloads pounded Iranian cities including the capital city of Tehran. Iranian clerics and politicians including then Parliament chair Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani—many of whom had supported the eight-year war as a holy Shi’a endeavor—convinced Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini to accept the UN-brokered cease-fire as the best alternate to a conflict that was unlikely to end in victory for either side soon, would continue draining Iran’s meager resources, and would keep terrifying the people. Iran accepted UN Resolution 598 in July 1988, and attacks ended in August, with Khomeini stating publicly that he agreed to the truce in the interests of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic system but that it was akin to drinking from a “poisoned chalice.” By that time, Iran had lost approximately 200,000 citizens and Iraq at least 150,000. Economic costs for each side exceeded $500 billion. Jamsheed K. Choksy and Narges Nematollahi See also Cold War, Religious Dimensions of; Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi Further Reading Bulloch, John, and Harvey Morris. The Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Consequences. London: Methuen, 1987. Cordesman, Anthony. The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security. London: Jane’s, 1987. Farrokh, Kaveh. Iran at War: 1500–1988. Oxford: Osprey, 2011. Murray, Williamson, and Kevin Woods. The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

396 Ishtar

Ishtar Ishtar is a prominent ancient Mesopotamian goddess. Originally appearing as Inanna in the Sumerian pantheon, the goddess was called Ishtar among the Babylonians and Assyrians in the Akkadian language. Ishtar is the daughter of Ninurta, the Sumerian god of war, and she was understood as the goddess of sex and war. There is much more scholarship pertaining to her association with sexuality than her link to warfare. In the realm of war, Ishtar’s link to battle is found in iconography, poetry, and royal curse formulas. In artistic representations, Ishtar is often portrayed holding a weapon such as an axe, mace, or curved sickle-axe. In the Akkadian Agushaya poem, when her battle prowess is being extolled, warfare is described as part of her religious celebration, as it states that “her festival is battle” (ishinsha tamharu). Another poem describes her relationship to battle: With joyous heart she brings a song of death to the field, And while her heart performs the song, She soaks their weapons in blood and gore. The other place we see Ishtar associated with battle and warfare is in royal curse formulas. When Middle Assyrian kings wrote inscriptions, they would include curses for those future rulers who either did things that were proscribed by the gods, or acted in a forbidden manner. The curses appealed to Ishtar to cause the transgressing king’s defeat in in battle, to place him in his enemy’s hand, and to break the weapon that he had chosen to wield. It was also Ishtar who had the power to make a king virile, strong, and victorious. Dean Andrew Nicholas See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of; Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East Further Reading George, A. R. “The Poem of Erra and Ishum: A Babylonian Poet’s View of War.” In Hugh Kennedy, ed. Warfare and Poetry in the Middle East. London: I. B. Tauris, 2013. van der Toorn, Karel, Bob Becking, and Pieter W. van den Horst, eds. The Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999.

Zsolnay, Ilona. The Function of Istar in the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions. New York: Brandeis University, 2009.

ISIS See Islamic State

Islam and War (Jihad) Jihad literally means “struggle, striving” and appears either in its root or derivatives about 40 times in the Qur’an. The word has a secondary but dominant meaning of “regulated warfare with divine sanction.” Doctrine concerning jihad in the Qur’an does not use this word but instead favors the alternate word qital (“fighting”). Traditional Islamic exegesis of the Qur’an divides the doctrine of jihad into four distinct phases—all except the first one dating from the Medinan period of the Prophet Muhammad’s ministry (ca. 622–632 CE). These phases are: 1. Nonconfrontation (Qur’an 15:94–5) 2. Defensive fighting (Qur’an 22:39–40) 3. Initiating attack allowed but within strictures (Qur’an 2:217) 4. Unrestricted warfare against all pagans (and perhaps against all unbelievers) at all times (Qur’an 9:5) (schema according to Firestone 1999, chapter 3) In general, the final phase of the Qur’anic doctrine of jihad was held to be 9:29: “Fight those among the People of the Book [Jews and Christians] who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day, do not forbid what Allah and His Apostle have forbidden and do not profess the true religion, till they pay the poll-tax [jizya] out of hand and submissively.” This limitation of jihad to the period prior to accepting the protection (dhimma) of the Muslims is good for ahl al-kitab, the People of the Book (Jews, Christians, Sabeans, later Zoroastrians, and finally Hindus). However, protection is not accorded to pagans, who only have the choice between conversion to Islam and fighting.

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For jihad to be legitimate, it has to be sanctioned by an authoritative personality (in Sunni Islam, either the caliph or an imam; in Shi’a Islam, the imam or one of his representatives and later the `ulama’), directed against a legitimate target, fought according to the rules laid down by the Qur’an and tradition, and concluded in a manner according to verse 9:29 cited above. These facts mean that, although there are a great many wars associated with Muslims throughout their history, only a limited number of them constitute jihad. However, because of the spiritual prestige of jihad, it is not unusual for there to be disputes concerning the question of whether a given battle or conflict constitutes a legitimate jihad or whether it does not. There exists a general consensus among Muslims that the Prophet Muhammad’s jihad against the polytheists of Mecca and other Arab polytheists during his lifetime was legitimate. Questions began to arise once the prophetic authority was removed. In the immediate wake of his death, most of the Arab tribes revolted against the authority of Abu Bakr (632–634 CE), and some refused to pay their zakat tax. Abu Bakr’s uncompromising attitude towards those who refused this Islamic obligation has made it normative to see the Ridda (apostasy) Wars (632–633 CE) as a legitimate jihad as well. Shortly after the Ridda Wars, the Arabs began to attack and conquer most of the regions bordering on Arabia (Iraq, Syria, Egypt, etc.). These conquests (ca. 634–740 CE) transformed the Middle East; caused a linguistic shift from Aramaic and Greek to Arabic; a religious transformation from Christianity, Zoroastrianism, and Judaism to Islam (over a period of centuries); and formed the territorial basis for the region bound together by the high Islamic culture. Presumably these conquests were jihad; if so, then they would be the best available example of offensive jihad (other prominent Muslim military advances such as the Ottoman conquests are sometimes portrayed in the contemporary sources as jihad). Since the boundaries reached by the early Muslim conquerors were in many cases natural ones (mountain ranges, oceans, or deserts), with few exceptions there was no pressing need for offensive jihad during the period in which Muslim law was codified, which took place between the 8th and 11th centuries. In general, beyond this initial period jihad was declared to repel an invader, to preempt an invasion, or to

conquer an area that had been missed by the first Muslim conquerors. As the doctrine of jihad coalesced in the middle Islamic period, jurists usually divided the world into either two or three sections: Dar al-Islam, the area in which Islam was predominant, and Dar al-Harb, the area where war (jihad) was permitted. Sometimes a third area, the Dar al-Sulh, the area with which there is a peace agreement or truce, is included in this list. The laws of jihad make elaborate provisions for those non-Muslims from the Dar al-Harb or the Dar al-Sulh to travel in Muslim lands with an aman (a safe-conduct), usually for the purposes of commerce or pilgrimage. In essence laws concerning jihad govern all aspects of the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims whether there is hostility or peace between the two groups. Jihad is portrayed in both the Sunni and the Shi’a sources as a spiritual exercise leading to redemption. The Sunni authority al-Bukhari (d. 870) in his Kitab al-sahih (iv, 263, no. 2782) gives jihad a rank immediately after prayer and filial piety (birr al-walidayn). The spiritual value of jihad is legitimate only when one fights for raising the word of Allah to the highest (iv, 272, no. 2810). Likewise, the Shi’a al-Kulini (d. ca. 941) states: “Jihad is the most meritorious [action] after the [sacred religious] obligations” (v, p. 4, no. 5; Tusi 1992, vi, 105). Jihad is usually said to be incumbent upon those who fulfill six criteria: Muslim, male, adult, sane, free, and able-bodied. Although it is imperative that the community as a whole conduct jihad to enjoy these spiritual blessings (fard kifaya, a communal obligation) at all times, during an invasion this obligation becomes incumbent upon each and every Muslim (fard `ayn, an individual obligation). Whether this includes women is debatable; most classical scholars follow Bukhari, who cites a tradition that states a woman’s jihad is a righteous performance of the hajj pilgrimage (Bukhari 1991, iv, 264, no. 2784). Beyond these spiritual aspects, jihad as warfare is governed by a number of regulations in both Sunni and Shi’a law. Declaration of war must be accompanied by a call to convert to Islam, with the other two options being to surrender and pay the jizya tax or to fight. Killing of civilians, including women and children, elderly noncombatants and monks, is strictly prohibited. Excessive forms of warfare such as indiscriminant killing, desecration of bodies,

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or wanton destruction are also forbidden. Spoils taken in warfare are divided in accordance with Qur’an 8:41: “And know that whatever booty you take, the fifth thereof is for Allah, the Apostle, the near of kin, the orphan, and the wayfarer.” The religious authorities are responsible for distributing this fifth to others in need. Other laws concerning jihad involve the question of captives. Sunni law affirmed that it was the responsibility of the caliph or the commander in the field to decide what to do with them: they could be held for ransom, sold as slaves, killed, or set free according to his discretion. Laws concerning the ending of

jihad are less clear; it seems that this was also up to the discretion of the commander or was decided upon the basis of the benefit for the Muslim community. The most tangled questions concerning jihad focus upon the locus of authority to declare a jihad and the issue of fighting other Muslims. In general, Sunnis held that the caliph or rightful Imam had the right to declare jihad, but that when an invader invades Muslim lands there is no need for a formal proclamation of jihad as it is fard `ayn. Since the destruction of the Sunni caliphate by the Mongols in 1258, the caliph has had little role in the declaration

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of jihad (despite occasional attempts by the Ottomans to prove otherwise), and effectively the right to declare jihad has fallen to the `ulama’. The question of which Muslims can be subject to jihad is problematic. In a widely cited (both Sunni and Shi’a) tradition, `Ali b. Abi Talib said: “I was ordered to fight those who leave [Islam] [al-mariqin], those who broke their oaths [al-nakithin] and the unjust ones [al-qasitin]” (alSarakhsi 2000, v, 4). The first group is usually said to be the Kharijites (exemplified by the Battle of Nahrwand, 658), the second those such as al-Zubayr, Talha, and `A’isha whom `Ali fought in the Battle of the Camel (656), and the final group was the Umayyads (the Battle of Siffin, 657). When the implications of this tradition are considered, there are a wide range of possibilities of waging jihad against heretical Muslims or against corrupt and unjust Muslim rulers. Jihad is also foundational within Muslim society because of the confrontation against evil that is implicit in it. One widely cited tradition that indicates this type of confrontation is: “The best type of jihad is a word of truth [or justice] in the presence of the sultan” (Abu Da’ud 1988, iv, 122, no. 4344). The great Sufi synthesizer al-Ghazali (d. 1111) also wrote on jihad. According to his analysis jihad was part of the process of creating a just and ethical society. Without this positive, militant action the believer would be unable to enforce Muslim norms. Thus, by the end of the classical period jihad was divided into several categories: jihad of the hand or of the sword (militant jihad), jihad of the tongue (speaking truth to power), which sometimes includes the jihad of wealth, or jihad of the heart, the Sufi “greater jihad.” Modern interpretations of jihad have usually been either apologetic or radical and aggressive. The apologetic trend began in India during the 19th century when Muslims were first exposed to the polemics of Christian missionaries under the protection of the British raj. A number of the missionaries polemicizing against Islam characterized the entire religion as violent and aggressive. To counteract this polemic, Muslim apologists sought to highlight the defensive nature of jihad and its spiritual aspects (the “greater jihad”). The more radical and aggressive interpretations of jihad have been common among radical Muslims, especially since the 1960s. Most of these interpretations have

centered around the idea that because of the unwillingness of Muslim governments to impose sharia, they are apostate and jihad against them is necessary. Radical Sunni interpretations of this type usually do not emphasize the role of spiritual jihad. Contemporary radicals such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State divide the targets of jihad into “the near enemy” (Muslim governments and societies that refuse to fully implement sharia) versus “the far enemy” (nonMuslim governments and societies that either occupy Muslim territory or prop up “the near enemy”). The goal in both cases is the ultimate unification of world Muslims into a sharia Islamic state, but there is significant disagreement about how to accomplish this task. The primary methodology utilized by contemporary radical Islamic groups is the suicide attack (which is often called the martyrdom operation), and the primary means by which these groups communicate their message is through social media. Facebook, Twitter, and other media are the vehicles for conveying Islamic State videos, which recruit Muslims worldwide to the cause. The Islamic State has been particularly successful in this regard because it is headed by a caliph, who is viewed by a segment of world Muslims as legitimate, and because it has actually founded a state straddling Iraq and Syria. David Cook See also Al Qaeda; Buddhism and War; Camel, Battle of the; Christianity and War; Hinduism and War; Judaism and War; Nahawand, Battle of; Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) Further Reading Abu Da’ud al-Sijistani. Sunan. 4 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Jil, 1988. Al-Sarakhsi, Muhammad. Kitab al-mabsut. 15 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 2000. Bayhaqi, Ahmad b. al-Husayn. Kitab al-zuhd al-kabir. Beirut: Dar al-Jinan, 1987. Bonner, Michael. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. Bonney, Richard. Jihad from Qur’an to bin Laden. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Bukhari, Isma`il b. Muhammad. Sahih al-Bukhari. Edited by Abdallah b. Baz. 5 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1991. Cook, David. Understanding Jihad. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. Firestone, Reuven. Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

400  Islamic State Ghazali, Abu Hamid. Ihya `ulum al-din. 5 vols. Beirut: Dar alQalam, n.d. Khadduri, Majid. War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955. Kohlberg, Etan. “The Development of the Imami Shi`i Doctrine of jihad.” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 126 (1976): 64–86. Kulini, Muhammad b. Ya`qub. Furu `al-Kafi. Edited by `Ali Akbar al-Ghifari. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyya, 1375/1996. McCants, William. ISIS: The Apocalypse. The History, Strategy and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State. New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2015. Renard, John. “al-Jihad al-akbar: Notes on a Theme in Islamic Spirituality.” Muslim World 78 (1988): 225–42. Tusi, Muhammad b. al-Hasan. Tadhhib al-ahkam. 11 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Adwa’, 1992.

Islamic State The entity that calls itself the Islamic State is a Salafist jihadist movement that has controlled and governed substantial parts of Syria and Iraq since the summer of 2014. Also known by its former name, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), this Sunni group has the vision of establishing an Islamic caliphate in the vast regions that were under Islamic control during the historical Rashidun and Umayyad caliphates of the seventh century. Due to its impressive media establishment, the Islamic State is the beneficiary of hundreds of Salafist sympathizing migrants from the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and Asia who have traveled to fight on behalf of the Sunni resistance in Syria. Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, an influential Salafist ideologue of Palestinian descent, and a former Jordanian criminal named Abu Musab al Zarqawi formed the original group in the 1990s as a resistance movement fighting the Jordanian government for their allegedly secular views and un-Islamic practices. Zarqawi took control of the group and moved with the original members to Afghanistan in 1999 to enact their vision of the Salafist lifestyle in a remote location. During this time, Zarqawi spurned recruitment from Al Qaeda leaders due to ideological differences. Zarqawi escaped to northern Iraq, where he worked

with local Salafists to establish a safe base of operations to plot against the Jordanian government. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 changed the focus of the group to capitalize on the same chaotic conditions Zarqawi predicted based on his experience in Afghanistan. Demonstrating a flexibility and capability to adapt to changing situations, the group gained fame for spectacular suicide attacks against Iraqi civilians, Shi’a religious figures, the United Nations, and the American-led coalition. Now known as Tawhid wal Jihad (monotheism and struggle), their pronounced expertise in bomb making (particularly in car bombs) and in running a secretive underground network made them the most visible and productive resistance group in Iraq from the beginning, but this fact alone failed to secure them leadership of the jihad—a major goal. To spur greater acceptance of the group, Zarqawi began negotiations in early 2004 to join Al Qaeda. The two sides overcame significant differences in policy, strategy, and tactics when Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in October of that year. Reflecting this new loyalty, Tanzim Qaidat al Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn, also known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), continued its attacks against the Iraqi government and the coalition. In early 2006, their infamous bombing of the Shi’a holy shrine in Samarra triggered widespread sectarian violence all over the country. The continual targeting of Shi’a civilians in large-scale bombings formed the first rift between Al Qaeda and their Iraq affiliate, due to the unpopularity of AQI’s attacks on other Muslims. AQI’s ruthless reputation was also affecting recruitment of other insurgent groups to fight under their banner. The focus on Shi’a over American targets also fostered some local resentment of the foreign fighter domination of AQI, leading AQI to transition to a front organization with more Iraqis involved. The death of Zarqawi in June 2006 facilitated a leadership transition to Abu Omar al Baghdadi, an Iraqi, and Abu Hamza al Muhajir, an Egyptian, with the two serving roles as political and military leader, respectively. In October 2006, the two heralded the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), effectively transforming the insurgent group into a shadow government in the Sunni areas of Iraq that it controlled. The effort to consolidate control of Sunni areas failed when the Sunni Sahwa (Awakening), a grassroots

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movement of dozens of influential Sunni tribes, moved in 2006 to regain control of tribal areas in Anbar Province from Islamic State control. This movement, which spread to other Sunni areas of Iraq, was the catalyst for a wideranging military, political, economic, and psychological defeat for the Islamic State in 2007. The defection of crucial Sunni tribes, which formed their recruiting base, resulted in large numbers of desertions and forced them to retire to remote areas. After a brief interlude, the group began to plot the return of “the state” by executing a successful assassination program of Iraqi military, police, and Sahwa figures in key Sunni areas; continuing their long-range car bombing campaign in Shi’a urban areas; conducting prison breaks to refill the ranks with experienced jihadists; and pressuring Sunni tribes to repent and join the Islamic State. A major setback during this return to relevance was the death of Abu Omar and Abu Hamza in a 2010 air raid, leading the Shura to select Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, a sharia expert and AQI veteran who joined in 2005, as the new emir. By this period, the Islamic State of Iraq was almost completely populated and led by Iraqis. Meanwhile, the lack of progress in serious reconciliation measures by the Maliki government, especially after a disastrous 2010 election stalemate, assisted the ISI by fueling Sunni discontent and putting intense pressure on the dwindling number of Sunni government supporters. Ever flexible and adaptive, the group looked to exploit additional sectarian divisions in the largely Sunni uprising against the nominally Shi’a Assad regime in next-door Syria. Abu Bakr sent Syrian jihadists home to gain sway over the resistance movement writ large, in much the same manner that Tawhid wal Jihad attempted to dominate Iraq’s early groups. By 2013, the al Nusra front was a dominant force in the Syrian resistance, and Abu Bakr attempted to reassert control of his former subordinates. Al Qaeda, wary of the growing power of the ISI and reflecting on the toxic relationship between AQI’s foreign fighters and locals in Iraq, rejected ISI’s bid for control of the al Nusra front. This disagreement caused ISI to break away from Al Qaeda and form the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), effectively challenging the al Nusra front for the leadership of jihadist forces in Syria. Abu Bakr was relatively successful in this endeavor, and the Islamic State

dominates their Nusra rivals (and all other groups) in the fight against Assad. By late 2013, after Sunni political protests were forcibly dispersed by the Iraqi government, the Islamic State gained control of several Anbari cities, including Fallujah. By the summer of 2014, an ISIS raid into Mosul to free more prisoners became an extended occupation as a demoralized (and overly politicized) Iraqi Army, far from bases of supply and harassed by daily guerrilla attacks for years, collapsed and melted away. The resultant vacuum was adeptly and quickly filled by small bands of ISIS fighters and some battle-hardened reinforcements from Syria. Capitalizing on their rapid conquests, the group changed its name once again to the Islamic State (Dawlah Islamiyah) and declared a caliphate in June 2014—an attempt to claim the allegiance of all observant Muslims worldwide and an acknowledgment that the group’s vision reaches beyond Syria and Iraq. This move brought little recognition from other Islamic groups, states, leaders, or individuals— although their influence is spreading into areas of North Africa, the Levant, and Southwest Asia as of early 2015. The fighting between the Kurds, the Iraqi government, and the Islamic State has settled into a de facto stalemate as each entity controls areas that mostly reflect their individual ethnic and sectarian makeup. The Islamic State has used the levers of power as a governing force in the Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria to enforce their Salafist ideology in every aspect of their citizens’ lives. This practice includes the exploitation of non-Muslims— including the enforcement of the jizya, or tax—and the forced conversions of nonbelievers. The group has a strong belief in the instrumental use of violence to achieve political objectives and instill fear in the population. The group’s unique interpretation of ancient fatwas by clerics like Ibn Taymiyah has long been used to justify the practice of takfir, or the excommunication of insufficiently observant Muslims—followed by a punishment of death when sanctioned by Islamic State authorities. The Islamic State’s interpretation of sharia includes the practices of owning female slaves, stoning adulterers, crucifying criminals, and beheading apostates. Since the summer of 2014, the Islamic State added to a long history of attacks on Shi’a civilians with a genocidal campaign against Yazidis (considered to be devil worshippers) and the massacres of

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hundreds of Iraqi Shi’as that were captured during the rapid expansion of the Islamic State. Craig A. Whiteside See also Al Qaeda; Al Shabaab; Boko Haram; Islam and War (Jihad) Further Reading Haddad, Fanar. Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. Hafez, Mohammed. Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007. Lewis, Jessica. Al Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, Part II: Middle East Security Report 15. Washington, DC: Institute of the Study of War, 2013. Ollivant, Douglas. “Countering the New Orthodoxy: Reinterpreting the Counterinsurgency in Iraq.” National Security Studies Program Policy Paper. Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 2011. Rayburn, Joel. Iraq after America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2014.

Israelite Conquest of Canaan According to the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament), the Hebrew god, Yahweh, promised Abraham the land of Canaan (Genesis 12:7), but he and his descendants only occupied a token portion of it before they moved to Egypt. After they became enslaved there, Yahweh rescued them from Egypt in the Exodus to bring them to the land he had promised the patriarchs (Exodus 3:8). However, the first attempt to conquer the land of Canaan ended badly when the people listened to the opinion of the scouts and refused to enter the land, at which point Yahweh sent a plague against the nation and condemned them to wander in the wilderness for 40 years. When the people heard this, they had a change of heart and attempted to enter the land, but the significant absence of Moses and the Ark of the Covenant led to defeat (Numbers 13–14). After 40 years in the desert and the death of that generation, Yahweh instructed the Israelites to resume the conquest (ca. 1400 or 1200 BCE, depending upon the date of the Exodus). Instead of attacking from the south as they had done before, Yahweh led them around the land of

Canaan to the east, marching past the lands of the Edomites, Moabites, and Ammonites. The Old Testament never states the reason for this change of direction, but it might have been to distance themselves from the previous failed attempt and to align themselves with the frequent entrance of the land by the patriarchs from the east (Genesis 12:4–9; 32:1–33:20). Although the land east of the Jordan was not part of the land initially promised to Israel, when they defeated Sihon and Og in Transjordan (modern-day Jordan and the Golan Heights), they allocated their land to two and a half tribes. After Moses’s speeches to the people in Deuteronomy and his death on Mount Nebo, Joshua assumed control of the people and the conquest of Canaan formally began. Yahweh did not give any military commands to Joshua upon his assumption of control, but emphasized the fundamental religious nature of the conquest by basing Joshua’s success upon his meditation on the Book of the Law and his obedience to it (Joshua 1:6–10). The religious aspect was further emphasized by the trust exhibited by the Transjordanian tribes, who left their new homes unguarded while their troops traveled to help their fellow tribes (Joshua 1:12–15). The conquest began with powerful signs of the power of Yahweh that paralleled what had happened earlier to emphasize that Yahweh was with them once again. The Jordan River parted for them miraculously as the Red Sea had done for the previous generation, while the manna, the food for the wilderness generation, stopped after they crossed the river and the people celebrated the first Pass­ over recorded since Egypt (Joshua 3–5). All of these marks reminded the Israelites that the conquest depended not upon their military strength, but their trust in Yahweh. The people explicitly put their trust in Yahweh when they circumcised all the males at God’s command after they had crossed the river, leaving them vulnerable to attack from the Canaanites when the warriors were recovering from this painful procedure (see the story in Genesis 38 for the danger of circumcising warriors). The first battle of the conquest was the well-known defeat of Jericho (Joshua 6:1–27). Like the defeat of the powerful Egyptian army at the Red Sea by the power of Yahweh, Yahweh reaffirmed his promises of the land of Canaan by unilaterally defeating the first major city the Israelites

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encountered. The Israelites marched around the city once a day for six days and seven times on the seventh day, at which point the walls of Jericho fell down when the trumpet blew. As a symbol of recognition of Yahweh’s role in giving them victory, all of the plunder went to Yahweh rather than enriching the Israelites. However, the events at Jericho were to lead to problems with the next battle. After conquering Jericho, they needed to control the roads leading up from Jericho in the Dead Sea region to the highlands, the next part of the conquest of Canaan. They chose to attack the city of Ai, which sat astride one of those major roads. Not only would controlling Ai allow them access to the highlands, but it would also begin to drive a wedge between the local inhabitants, separating the Canaanites in the southern highlands from those in the north. Joshua again sent scouts to investigate the city, who suggested the Israelites would not need many troops to defeat Ai. Joshua followed their advice, but the people of Ai soundly defeated the Israelites. The narrator seeks to show how the Israelites had not learned the lesson of their need to trust in Yahweh by telling the story without any reference to Yahweh in the buildup to the battle of Ai, a remarkable omission in light of Yahweh’s recent victory at Jericho. After the defeat, the people sought Yahweh and begged for mercy, appealing to Yahweh’s reputation. Yahweh revealed to them that one of them had stolen from him by taking plunder from Jericho; casting lots led to the discovery of Achan as the perpetrator. Having learned to trust in Yahweh (for the present), the Israelites sought guidance on their battle plan, and they defeated Ai with an ambush that deceived the people of Ai into thinking that the Israelites were fleeing when in reality a major Israelite force was waiting in ambush for them. The ambush worked perfectly and the Israelites took the city of Ai, their first city in the highlands. Although the city was put under herem, the people were able to take plunder from the city. The Canaanites were very disturbed by these Israelite successes and began to work against the invaders. The conquest of Ai gave the Israelites access to the central Benjamin Plateau, a key area in the center of the highlands. The city of Gibeon, a powerful Canaanite city near Ai, seeing that they would be one of the next cities attacked by the invaders, decided to take matters into their own hands by

attempting to deceive the Israelites into making a treaty with them (Joshua 9). Apparently aware of the herem laws that exempted nations outside of the land of Canaan from destruction, they successfully convinced the Israelites that they were from a city far away from Canaan (rather than just a few miles away) and signed a peace treaty guaranteeing their survival. The narrator emphasizes that the Israelites still had much to learn about trust in Yahweh with the inclusion of the comment that “they did not ask of the mouth of Yahweh” (Joshua 9:14) before making the treaty. The Israelites soon learned about their error and forced the Gibeonites to become slaves in the tabernacle. The other Canaanite cities also decided to act at this point, but they chose to attack the Israelites rather than submit to them (the similar statements in Joshua 9:1 and 5:1 suggest that they were more willing to fight after observing the Israelite defeat at Ai). The king of Jerusalem (just south of Gibeon) gathered several other Canaanite kings from the southern highlands to join the fight. However, his initial goal was not to repel the invaders, but to attack Gibeon to force them to fight Israel (Joshua 10). When Gibeon called on Israel for help, they responded positively and the first geographically large-scale battle of the conquest ensued. The Israelites defeated the Canaanites and chased them out of the highlands to the west, south among the foothills, and finally back into the highlands further south to Makkedah. Yahweh assured Israel that he would give them the victory and fought alongside them during the battle by sending hail that killed many Canaanites. Yahweh also answered Joshua’s prayer that the sun would stand still, though it is unclear what Yahweh did (possibilities include providing extra daylight or negative astronomical omens to terrify the Canaanites). Interestingly, the narrator does not emphasize the miracle itself, but rather that Yahweh listened to the prayer of Joshua, highlighting the special role that Joshua played in the story. After Joshua defeated the southern coalition, he systematically defeated the rest of the Canaanite nations in the southern highlands (Joshua 10:29–43). The Canaanite kings in the northern highlands, hearing of the defeat of the southern coalition, gathered themselves for battle in Merom (location uncertain, but most likely somewhere in Galilee) to protect their land (Joshua 11). Yahweh exhorted Joshua not to be afraid and promised to

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give the enemy into their hands. After a surprise attack, Joshua defeated the Canaanite kings and conquered many of their cities. Instead of incorporating the captured horses and chariots into the Israelite army, Joshua followed Yahweh’s command to hamstring the horses to prevent them from running (thus ruining their effectiveness in combat) to remind the Israelites that they were victorious only because of Yahweh’s power, not the strength of their army. The account of the conquest ends on a very positive note, with the narrator describing the full extent of Joshua’s conquest and summarizing with the statement that “Joshua took all the land” (Joshua 11:23). Later in the book, the narrator again emphasizes the completeness of the conquest by stating that Yahweh had given them rest from their enemies and had fulfilled all his promises to them (Joshua 21:43–45). However, the narrator tempers this rosy idealism with several comments about land that still had to be taken, a theme that comes to the fore in the book of Judges but is already present in Joshua. More specifically, most of the land of Canaan outside of the highlands and Galilee was still possessed by Canaanites (such as the Coastal Plain, the Jezreel Valley, and Phoenicia), especially the areas that sat on the international highway (Joshua 13:1–7). The narrator of Judges shows how these Canaanites who remained in the land influenced the Israelites to worship other gods besides Yahweh and act in “Canaanite” ways, leading to the “Canaanization” of Israel. The historicity of the conquest of Canaan has been rejected by many scholars in recent years, largely because of the lack of archaeological evidence. The burning of cities leaves a clearly evident destruction level, and the vast majority of Canaanite cities do not have such a level in the appropriate time period. Other theories of Israel’s emergence in Canaan include a peaceful infiltration model in which nomads gradually infiltrated Canaanite land and became the Israelite nation over time, or a rebellion model in which the Israelites were actually Canaanite peasants who revolted against their masters to form a new community. Although the archaeological record does not reveal widespread destruction of Canaanite cities, a close reading of the biblical text reveals that the only cities burned were Jericho, Ai, and Hazor. In the other cities, the Israelites were to kill the inhabitants, but take the city intact as part of their new homeland. If this is the case, then the Israelite

entrance into Canaan would only be visible in those three cities. For those scholars who accept the Exodus as a historical event, the date of the event is unclear. Certain biblical texts provide dates that place the Exodus in approximately 1450 BCE (1 Kings 6:1; Judges 11:26), placing the conquest at about 1400 BCE. However, certain references in the biblical narrative (such as the reference to Ramses in Exodus 1:11), the extensive destruction layers in Canaan, and the general historical context (including the weakening of the Egyptians and the arrival of the Sea People) cause other scholars to believe that the Exodus happened in approximately 1250 BCE, putting the conquest at about 1200 BCE. Charlie Trimm See also Ai, Battle of; Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare; Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy; Israelite Wars of the Judges; Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy; Jericho, Battle of; Yahweh as Divine Warrior Further Reading Hoffmeier, J. K. “The Structure of Joshua 1–11 and the Annals of Thutmose III.” In A. R. Millard, James K. Hoffmeier, and David W. Baker, eds. Faith, Tradition, and History: Old Testament Historiography in Its Near Eastern Context. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1994, pp. 165–80. Merrill, Eugene H. Kingdom of Priests: A History of Old Testament Israel. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2008. Moore, Megan Bishop, and Brad E. Kelle. Biblical History and Israel’s Past: The Changing Study of the Bible and History. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2013. Younger, K. Lawson, Jr. Ancient Conquest Accounts: A Study in Ancient Near Eastern and Biblical History Writing. JSOTSup 98. Sheffield, UK: JSOT Press, 1990.

Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare In the biblical era, the Hebrew god, Yahweh, provided Israel with a variety of religious guidelines for their conduct of

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warfare. In ancient Israel, as elsewhere in the ancient Near East, nothing in life was “secular” as contemporary Westerners view the world. Instead, everything, including warfare, was viewed as a religious activity, leading them to expect their God to guide and help them in warfare. These religious guidelines are a mixture of general commands that were to be applicable for all battles and specific commands that were restricted to a specific occasion. While other nations in the ancient Near East had law codes, Israel was the only nation to include warfare regulations in their law code. The connection between the regulations and the enactment of the regulations in Israelite history is often obscure, but it appears that the primary point of these regulations was not to instruct Israel on exactly what to do (as indicated by the variety of ways Israel put these regulations into practice). Instead, these regulations were designed to show the Israelites that they needed to trust Yahweh rather than their military strength. These regulations were not systematized laws, but snapshots of various aspects of warfare that reminded the Israelites of their need to trust their God.

Before Battle

Most of the regulations concerning Israelite preparation for combat emphasized trust in Yahweh. The priests were to speak to the people beforehand to remind them that Yahweh fought for them and to blow a trumpet before battle to call on God’s help (Numbers 10:9; Deuteronomy 20:1–4). The people who had recently built a house, entered a marriage, or who were scared of battle were allowed to return home to emphasize that victory would not come about through greater numbers (Deuteronomy 20:5–9; see the story of Gideon’s army of 300 men in Judges 7). Sacrifices were sometimes offered before battle (1 Samuel 7:9), and Yahweh often spoke encouraging words to the leaders before battle, ensuring them of his presence and of victory (Numbers 21:34). Yahweh desired that the leaders consult him before going out to battle through the priesthood (Numbers 27:21; for an example see Judges 1:1–2). Surprisingly, much of the material given to Joshua before crossing the Jordan River was nonmartial, reminding Joshua that obedience to the Torah was more important than receiving tactical instruction from Yahweh (Joshua

1:1–10). On some occasions, Yahweh initiated warfare (Numbers 31:2; 1 Samuel 15:2–3), while on other occasions Yahweh prohibited the Israelites from going to war (Deuteronomy 2; 1 Kings 12:22–24). Summing up many of these regulations, the general of the army of Yahweh reminded Joshua that he was the ultimate commander of the army, not Joshua (Joshua 5:13–15). Fewer regulations relate to the practical military side of preparing for battle. The Israelites were to offer peace to cities before attacking them (Deuteronomy 20:10–11; Numbers 21:21–22). No regulations exist about scouts and reconnaissance, but scouts were often sent out before combat to investigate the strength of the enemy. However, in a world where trust in Yahweh rather than military strength was stressed, scouts were almost more of a liability than an asset. In accounts in the biblical text these scouts often focused on the impossibility of victory, causing the people to be disheartened (Numbers 13–14), or assumed they would be able to win easily without help from Yahweh (Joshua 7).

During Battle

Once again, most of the regulations concerning the battle itself were intended to emphasize trust in Yahweh. The battle camp was to be a holy place because of the presence of Yahweh in the camp (Deuteronomy 23:9–14). Yahweh’s presence was symbolized by the Ark of the Covenant on the field of battle; when it was absent, defeat was sure to follow (Numbers 14:39–45; see also Joshua 7:1–5). However, the presence of the Ark did not guarantee victory, as Yahweh could choose to discipline his people for their sin even if they tried to bring him into the battle (1 Samuel 4–6). Throughout the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament), Yahweh gave a variety of specific military commands. In a few cases, the Israelites were to do nothing but stand by and watch Yahweh defeat the enemy. At the Red Sea, Yahweh commanded them to “stand and see” how Yahweh would rescue them from the Egyptians through the Red Sea itself (Exodus 14:13–14). Similar examples of Israelite inaction can be seen at Jericho (Joshua 6) and later at the destruction of the Assyrian army (2 Kings 19:35). In several cases Yahweh fought the enemy alongside the Israelites, as illustrated by battlefield rituals. Examples

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include Moses’s staff held up in the air in the battle against the Amalekites (Exodus 17:8–16) and Joshua’s outstretched javelin in the battle against Ai (Joshua 8). More directly, in the battle against the southern coalition Yahweh sent hailstones from heaven against the Canaanites while the Israelites fought them (Joshua 10). A somewhat unexpected command was that the Israelites were not to cut down fruit trees in a siege (Deuteronomy 20:19–20), perhaps because of environmental concerns. No regulations are given about guerrilla tactics, but the Israelites employed them on many occasions (Joshua 8; Judges 1:25).

After Battle

Most of the regulations concerning events after the battle dealt with plunder and the treatment of prisoners. The best-known example is the herem laws, in which all the people were to be killed and the plunder destroyed. These laws were based on the Canaanite rejection of Yahweh and the Abrahamic covenant that promised the land to Israel (Deuteronomy 7:1–2; 20:16–18). Herem was a religious matter (how one related to Yahweh) rather than an ethnic concern, as it could also be applied against Israel when they sinned against Yahweh (Deuteronomy 13; Judges 20). The actual practice of taking plunder varied, as seen in the differences between the battles of Jericho (Joshua 6), Ai (Joshua 8), and Midian (Numbers 31). More broadly, plunder of military items was often prohibited to the Israelites (such as capturing horses and chariots to outfit the Israelite army), as Yahweh desired them to trust him rather than their powerful army (Joshua 11:6; 2 Samuel 8:4). However, religious paraphernalia was always to be destroyed (Numbers 31:50–56). In cases where prisoners of war were taken, battlefield rape was prohibited, as a soldier had to go through certain rituals and an extended period of time before he could marry a captive (Deuteronomy 21:10–14). Sometimes part of the plunder was given to the priesthood (Numbers 31). Based on an event from the life of David, those who stayed behind to guard the baggage were to be given a share of the plunder (1 Samuel 30:21–25). In sum, the Israelite religious guidelines for warfare called Israel to trust in their sovereign God. Yahweh did not desire Israel to be a militarily powerful nation that would

conquer the world, but one that would trust him in both the good and bad times. Charlie Trimm See also Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East; Israelite Conquest of Canaan; Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy; Israelite Wars of the Judges; Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy; Jericho, Battle of Further Reading Cowles, C. W., et al. Show Them No Mercy: 4 Views on God and Canaanite Genocide. Grand Rapids, RI: Zondervan, 2003. Creach, Jerome F. D. Violence in Scripture: Interpretation. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2013. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2013. Thomas, Heath A., Jeremy Evans, and Paul Copan, eds. Holy War in the Old Testament: Christian Morality and an Old Testament Problem. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2013.

Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy The Hebrew scriptures (Christian Old Testament) record many conflicts of the Hebrew people. The powerful empire in Canaan built by kings David and Solomon of the United Monarchy was not to last more than a few years. The divide between the north (Israel) and the south (Judah) had been evident for many years, but when Solomon died in 931 BCE, the split broke open catastrophically under the rule of Solomon’s son Rehoboam (1 Kings 12). Rehoboam mustered troops to quell the northern rebellion, but Yahweh commanded him to permit them to leave. The biblical account condemns the northern kingdom for never following Yahweh at any point in their history, as exemplified by Jeroboam’s golden calves that he constructed at Bethel and Dan (the southern and northern boundary of his kingdom) to prevent his people from going to Jerusalem to worship Yahweh, but Yahweh never seems to have given up on the northern kingdom until their destruction by Assyria in 722 BCE. Both the north and the south remain his people, and he did not often favor one side in battles against the other.

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The wealth remaining from Solomon’s reign disappeared when Shishak, Pharaoh of Egypt (Shoshenq I), attacked in 926 BCE and plundered many cities (1 Kings 14:25–28; 2 Chr 12:1–12). Judah and Israel frequently warred in the years after Rehoboam’s death, leading to a confrontation between the Judean Abijah, the son of Rehoboam, and the Israelite king Jeroboam in 913 BCE. The Israelites ambushed the smaller Judean force, but according to the chronicler the Judeans called on Yahweh and trusted him, who gave them victory (2 Chronicles 13). Judean trust in Yahweh is also recorded by the chronicler in the account of an attack on Asa (son of Abijah) in about 900 BCE by a very large Ethiopian army (2 Chr 14:9–15). Asa and the Israelite king Baasha fought over the city of Ramah in 896 BCE, which Baasha conquered and fortified to prevent access to Judah. However, Asa bribed the Aramean king Ben-Hadad to attack Baasha and take some of the region of Galilee, which allowed Judah to reconquer Ramah and use the stones to fortify towns further north as a shield against Israel. This type of trust in a foreign king rather than Yahweh led to prophetic condemnation (1 Kings 15; 2 Chronicles 16). While the Davidic dynasty continued in Judah until the exile in 586 BCE, Israel had multiple dynasties, all of which the biblical narrator condemns as evil and portrays their successive downfalls as retribution for their rejection of Yahweh. Though Assyrian records portray Omri (who founded his dynasty in 885 BCE) as a powerful king, the Bible condemns him for his evil acts and records nothing of his martial activities to highlight that the most important aspect of each king’s reign in the narrator’s eyes was his relationship to Yahweh (1 Kings 16:21–28). Omri’s son Ahab receives more attention in the biblical account due to his conflict with the prophets Elijah and Elisha. Ahab married Jezebel, a princess from the Phoenician city of Sidon, who brought renewed worship of Baal and Asherah to Israel. Yahweh declared war on Baal through Elijah by withholding rain from the land of Israel, as Baal was a storm god who was supposed to provide rain for his worshippers. The contest reached its high point at Mount Carmel, where the sacrifice to Baal remained unconsumed but the thoroughly wet sacrifice to Yahweh was burnt up by fire from heaven (1 Kings 17–18). While Ahab allied himself to the Phoenician cities, he frequently fought

with the Aramean king Ben-Hadad. In one attack, BenHadad was so successful that he was able to put Ahab’s capital city Samaria under siege, until a prophet of Yahweh instructed Ahab how to attack in an unexpected manner that resulted in the flight of the Arameans. Convinced that they had lost because Yahweh was a god of the mountains, the Arameans attacked again in the plains near the Sea of Galilee. Once again, a prophet of Yahweh informed Ahab that he would win, to demonstrate to the king that “I am Yahweh,” and the Arameans were defeated a second time. However, Ahab continued to refuse to follow Yahweh, as demonstrated by his release of Ben-Hadad to return home and his seizure of Naboth’s vineyard (1 Kings 20–21). Part of the reason for Ahab’s release of Ben-Hadad is the rise of Assyria. In 853 BCE, Ahab joined many other western kings (including Ben-Hadad) to fight Shalmaneser III at Qarqar; though the Assyrian king claimed victory, his lack of progress further west indicates that it was effectively an Assyrian defeat (COS 2.113A). Shortly after the battle at Qarqar, Ahab renewed his conflict with Aram by attempting to seize Ramoth-Gilead and its rich trade revenues east of the Jordan with the help of the Judean king Jehoshaphat. However, a prophet of Yahweh prophesied before the battle that he would lose, and Ahab was killed in the battle (1 Kings 22; 2 Chr 18). Ahab’s son Joram continued the martial tradition of his father, but he also fought the Moabites, who rebelled in 852 BCE. Like his father, Joram enlisted the Judean king Jehoshaphat to fight with him, and Yahweh saved them by supernaturally providing them with water in the desert as they journeyed to Moab. Further, the water appeared to be red to Moab, and they assumed that the enemy armies were fighting against each other. But when they approached, the Israelite army surprised them and defeated their army. However, Mesha successfully defended his city, Kir-hareseth, when he sacrificed his oldest son to Chemosh, the Moabite god, and the Israelites fled (2 Kings 3). An inscription found in Moab written by Mesha records his perspective on Moabite-Israelite relations, including his claim that Moab was subject to Israel because Chemosh (the national Moabite god) was angry with them, but now under Mesha Chemosh had restored their independence (COS 2.23).

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Jehoshaphat faced the Moabites in another encounter told only by the chronicler. When he was attacked by a group of Moabites and Ammonites, he called on Yahweh to help him, and Yahweh responded in a way that recalled the Red Sea defeat of the Egyptians. Their role was just to stand and watch Yahweh defeat their enemy for them. In this case, the Transjordanians fought and killed each other, leaving the Judeans to plunder what was left (2 Chr 20). The wars with the Arameans also continued during this time of Joram’s rule (852–841 BCE). The story of Naaman concerns a commander in the Aramean army who was healed from his leprosy by Yahweh, ironically because he was informed of the potential for healing in Israel by an Israelite slave girl that he had captured in a previous battle (2 Kings 5). Elisha frustrated the Arameans when he accurately informed Joram (the Israelite king) about the location of each Aramean attack. Ben-Hadad attacked Dothan (just south of the Jezreel Valley) to capture Elisha, but a heavenly army struck the Aramean army with blindness and Elisha led them to Samaria, where Joram captured them and sent them back to Aram. Not one to give up easily, Ben-Hadad again besieged Samaria for a long time, driving the price of food very high. But Yahweh caused them to hear the sound of a (nonexistent) approaching army, which prompted them to leave abruptly, leaving everything behind (2 Kings 6–7). Yahweh’s influence (through Elisha) even reached directly to the Aramean leadership, as Hazael, an Aramean general, murdered Ben-Hadad in 843 BCE when Elisha prophesied that he would be king of Aram (2 Kings 8:1–15). Meanwhile, in Judah the Edomites rebelled against the Judeans, who were now ruled by Jehoram (848–841 BCE), the son of Jehoshaphat. Jehoram (who had married one of Ahab’s daughters) attempted to suppress the Edomite revolt, but his army deserted him and he was forced to flee. The narrative has no reference to any involvement of Yahweh, though the chronicler attributes the rebellion of Libnah at the same time to the Judean’s forsaking of Yahweh (2 Kings 8:20–23; 2 Chr 21:8–10). In 841 BCE Jehu killed all of Omri’s line (after Elisha told him that he would be king), as well as the Judean king Ahaziah (son of Jehoram) since he was also present at Jezreel (2 Kings 9–10; 2 Chronicles 22). This upheaval weakened Israel and Jehu was forced to offer tribute to the

Assyrian king Shalmaneser III (COS 2.113F). The north­ern kingdom (under Jehoahaz, the son of Jehu) was also frequently under the control of Aram during this time. When the Israelite king called on Yahweh for help, he sent a “savior” to deliver Israel, most likely referring to one of the campaigns of the Assyrian king Adad-Nirari III (2 Kings 13:3–5; COS 2.114). War with the Arameans continued under the reign of the Judean Jehoash (also called Joash), the son of Ahaziah, when Hazael the Aramean king took Gath (to the west of Judah and far from the Aramean homeland), leading to Jehoash giving tribute to Hazael (2 Kings 12:17–18). However, Elisha instructed Joash to strike the ground with some arrows. After the king had done so three times, Elisha chided him for not doing it enough times, for now Judah would only strike Aram three times, which he did after Hazael had died in 801 BCE and his son Ben-Hadad became king in his place (2 Kings 13:14–19, 22–25). Amaziah, the son of Joash and the Judean king, conquered Edom, leading him to challenge the northern king Jehoash to battle (perhaps in 783 BCE). Unfortunately for him, Jehoash conquered and pillaged Jerusalem (2 Kings 14:7–14; 2 Chr 25:11–12, 17–24). Jeroboam II, the son of Jehoash (793–753 BCE), continued this expansion north and extended Israelite territory to the Euphrates River (2 Kings 14:23–27). Meanwhile, the Judean Uzziah (792– 740), called Azariah in Kings (son of Amaziah), expanded Judah in the south (2 Chr 26:1–15). His son Jotham continued that expansion with control of the Ammonites (2 Kings 27:5). After this time of renewed glory for both Judah and Israel, Assyria became the dominant force in the land. The first direct reference to Assyria in the book of Kings comes in the reign of Menahem of Israel, when he gave tribute to Tiglath-pileser III (2 Kings 15:17–22; COS 2.117A). A few years later (under Pekah), Tiglath-pileser III took part of northern Israel (2 Kings 15:29). In 734 BCE Aram and Israel attacked Judah to force them to oppose Assyria, but Judah called on the Assyrian emperor for help, who defeated Damascus (2 Kings 16; 2 Chr 28). Israel’s time was limited, and Shalmaneser V conquered Israel in 722 BCE, a defeat that the author of Kings attributes to their idolatry and disobedience of the Mosaic Torah (2 Kings 17). Upon Hezekiah’s revolt against Assyria in 705 BCE, Sennacherib

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attacked them as well in 701 BCE. However, when Hezekiah called on Yahweh for help, the angel of Yahweh unilaterally defeated the Assyrian army (2 Kings 18–19; 2 Chr 32). In his inscriptions Sennacherib boasts about imprisoning Hezekiah in Jerusalem like a bird in a cage, but says nothing about capturing him (COS 2.119B). The chronicler recounts that the Assyrians (most likely Asshurbanipal) later captured Manasseh (Hezekiah’s son) and brought him into exile in Babylon (perhaps near 648 BCE), where he repented and Yahweh restored him to his throne (2 Chr 33:10–13). The last Judean offensive came in the time of the greatgrandson of Hezekiah, Josiah. Assyria had been weakened by this point, and they were fighting a desperate battle against the Babylonians. The Egyptians, worried about the Babylonians, decided to send troops to help the Assyrians. However, Josiah attempted to stop the Egyptian troops, apparently to curry favor with the Babylonians. The battle in 610 BCE did not go well, and the Judean king was killed in the battle, cutting short his reform of Judah (2 Kings 23; 2 Chr 35:20–27). After several rebellions by Judean kings, Nebuchadnezzar, the Babylonian king, conquered Jerusalem at least twice and brought the people of Judah into exile in 586 BCE (2 Kings 24–25; 2 Chr 36). The books of Kings and Chronicles feature several themes concerning religion in the wars of the Divided Monarchy. The overarching theme of the book of Kings is that the people of Judah and Israel went into exile because they had not been faithful to Yahweh. Their warfare broadly reflected this theme: the kings who followed Yahweh tended to see greater success in battle (though not necessarily greater wealth and power), while those who did not follow Yahweh faced more failure. But this is only a general tendency and the book contains many exceptions. At a few points the book of Kings focuses on the role of Yahweh in specific battles, especially during the time of Elijah and Elisha and other prophets. These roles included generic statements of giving the enemy into the hands of the Judeans and Israelites, providing orders before battle, and intervening directly in battles through supernatural means. However, this work of the divine warrior was not jingoistic, as Yahweh also fought against Israel throughout the time of the Divided Monarchy. The book of Chronicles

contains greater emphasis on Yahweh’s divine intervention in battle. Charlie Trimm See also Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare; Israelite Wars of the Judges; Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy; Lachish, Battle of; Yahweh as Divine Warrior Further Reading Grabbe, Lester L., ed. Ahab Agonistes: The Rise and Fall of the Omri Dynasty. Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 421. London: T&T Clark, 2007. Grabbe, Lester L., ed. “Like a Bird in a Cage”: The Invasion of Sennacherib in 701 BCE. JSOTSup 363. London: Sheffield, 2003. Hallo, William W., and K. Lawson Younger Jr., eds. Context of Scripture. 3 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1997. Kelle, Brad E. Ancient Israel at War 853–586 BC. Essential Histories, 67. Oxford: Osprey, 2007. Niditch, Susan. War in the Hebrew Bible: A Study in the Ethics of Violence. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2013.

Israelite Wars of the Judges The book of Judges in the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament) portrays a dark period in Israelite history (according to the biblical chronology, the time of the judges appears to begin in approximately 1350 or 1200 BCE and ends around 1050 BCE). The optimistic book of Joshua records how the Israelites consistently obeyed Yahweh and repented quickly when they transgressed the covenant they had made with their god. In military matters, they had trusted Yahweh in the midst of great difficulty and recognized that he had granted them victory over the Canaanites. The future looked bright as they pledged to continue to serve Yahweh in their new home (Joshua 24:16–18). However, the continuation of the story in the book of Judges portrays a decidedly more pessimistic tone. Instead of following Yahweh and rejecting Canaanite religion, they gradually became Canaanite over the course of the book, a process that has been described as the “Canaanization” of Israel. The Israelites and their judges spiraled progressively

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downward away from Yahweh over the course of the book; by the end of the book, the Israelites have become worse than Sodom and Gomorrah, the byword for evil in ancient Israel (Judges 19–21; see Genesis 19). This Canaanization is reflected in the martial activities of the judges. A judge in ancient Israel was one who led the people in both internal affairs (judicial) and external affairs (warfare), though only the latter receives any attention in the book of Judges. The basic structure of the book involves the repeated pattern of Israelite sin, punishment by the hand of a foreign nation, the Israelite call for help to Yahweh, and Yahweh’s appointment of a judge to rescue them. The book begins well as the Israelites request direction from Yahweh about who would fight for them against the Canaanites (Judges 1:1–2), but the narrator’s note that they could not defeat some of the enemy because they had iron chariots (Judges 1:19, 21, 27–36) reflects their lack of trust in Yahweh. A messenger of Yahweh reminded the Israelites that Yahweh would defeat their enemies if they would obey him (Judges 2:1–5), but the remainder of the book illustrates that they do not learn this lesson. The first judge, Othniel, provides the model for how a judge should fight: the Spirit of Yahweh came upon him, and Yahweh gave the oppressor into his hand so he could rescue Israel and bring rest to the land (Judges 3:7–11). The next judge illustrates the problems that would become more common in the book. When the Moabites enslaved Israel, Yahweh raised up Ehud to save them by defeating the Moabites through deceitful means in the story of the very large and gullible Moabite king Eglon, who stood to receive the word of God from Ehud and instead received a dagger buried in his stomach. The first reference to Yahweh comes at the end of the story when Ehud informed his kinsmen that Yahweh had given the Moabites into his hands (Judges 3:15–30). While the narrator may not condemn Ehud for his guile, the lack of involvement from Yahweh foreshadows later stories in Judges. The next major story returns Yahweh to center stage (Judges 4–5). Through the prophet Deborah, Yahweh instructed the Israelite general Barak to go to Mount Tabor (just north of the Jezreel Valley) to fight the Canaanites oppressing Israel. Since chariots were the center of the Canaanite army and they were unwilling to advance up the

steep hill to attack them, Yahweh commanded the Israelites to descend to the plain, where Yahweh “threw them into a panic” and defeated them. Though Sisera, the Cananite general, escaped, he was killed by Jael, a Kenite friendly to Israel, through a deceitful ploy. The victory song in Judges 5 implies that Yahweh had fought directly against Canaan by means of natural forces (perhaps causing the Kishon to overflow its banks and make the Canaanite chariots useless). The conflicted Gideon is the picture of a warrior who both trusts Yahweh and who seeks his own glory (Judges 6–8). The most well-known battle of Gideon is his attack on the Midianites camped in the Jezreel Valley. Yahweh commanded him to reduce his troops to 300 men and then surround the enemy at night carrying only trumpets and torches covered with jars; when they broke the jars to reveal the lights and shouted “A sword for Yahweh and Gideon” (even though they apparently did not have any swords), the Midianites panicked and began to fight each other. However, this great expression of trust on the part of Gideon contrasts with his earlier refusals to trust Yahweh and his demands for excessive proof. It also contrasts with his battles following his great victory, in which Yahweh disappears from the story and Gideon becomes more concerned with his own glory as he chases down the enemy, eventually leading him to fight his own people. Gideon refused the people’s call to be their king, but made an ephod (a garment that became an idol) that led the people away from Yahweh and named his son Abimelech (“my father is king”). Abimelech went on in his father’s footsteps and became a king himself, but was eventually brought down by his allies, as recounted in a story utterly devoid of any involvement of Yahweh (Judges 9). The judgeship of Jephthah continues the trend away from God as he manipulates everyone around him to advance his own cause, even attempting to manipulate Yahweh to give him victory by promising to give to him whatever walked out of his house when he returned, even though the Spirit of Yahweh was already resting upon him (Judges 10–12). When Jephthah returned from defeating the Ammonites, tragically the first thing out of his house was his daughter. The final judge, Samson, took antagonism against God to the extreme (Judges 13–16). Although Yahweh had

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granted him his strength, Samson continually made decisions based on what he saw and desired, disregarding any plan Yahweh had for him. Samson’s plan for friendship with the Philistines did not succeed and led to several battles with the Philistines. Even at the very end of his life, Samson only turned to Yahweh for revenge for his two eyes. The ending of the book of Judges includes several more stories relating to warfare. The Danite tribes were not able to take the land allotted to them, so they captured the remote city of Laish, north of Galilee (Judges 17–18). The mistreatment of a concubine in Gibeah, a city of Benjamin, led to a civil war between the other tribes and Benjamin, almost culminating in the destruction of the entire tribe of Benjamin. When it was over, the other tribes refused to break their own vow and instead kidnapped women from Jabesh-Gilead and Shiloh to supply wives for Benjamin (Judges 19–21). These horrific stories at the end of Judges were included to show the depth of depravity that the Israelites had reached as they had become Canaanite. Charlie Trimm See also Deborah; Gideon; Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare; Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy; Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy; Philistines; Yahweh as Divine Warrior Further Reading Block, Daniel I. Judges, Ruth. NAC 6. Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 1999. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2013. Wright, Jacob L. “Military Valor and Kingship: A Book-Oriented Approach to the Study of a Major War Theme.” In Brad E. Kelle and Frank Ritchel Ames, eds. Writing and Reading War: Rhetoric, Gender, and Ethics in Biblical and Modern Contexts. Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series 42. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008, pp. 33–56.

Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy The Hebrew scriptures (Christian Old Testament) records many conflicts of the Hebrew people as both a unified

nation and later as a divided nation. The United Monarchy of Israel consisted of three kings, Saul, David, and Solomon, who reigned from approximately 1050 to 930 BCE. Saul, from the tribe of Benjamin, was appointed king by the prophet Samuel (1 Samuel 10), and one of the new king’s first actions was to rescue the people of JabeshGilead (on the east side of the Jordan) from an Ammonite attack. When Saul heard of the attack, the spirit of Yahweh came upon him (confirming him as king); he gathered an Israelite army, and he defeated the Ammonites. At least temporarily, all those who had earlier expressed skepticism about his appointment as king were proven to be wrong (1 Samuel 11). Saul’s main opponent during his reign as king was the Philistines, living on the coastal plain to the west of Israel. It appears that the Philistines largely oppressed the Israelites, as evidenced by their outposts deep in Israelite territory, the fear they caused among the Israelites, and their monopoly on iron weapons. In the midst of a dangerous encounter with the Philistines, Saul disobeyed Samuel’s instructions and offered a sacrifice himself. When Samuel appeared moments later, he rebuked Saul and informed him that his dynasty would end and someone else would be appointed king (1 Samuel 13). However, Saul was temporarily saved by the bold plan of his son Jonathan, who climbed a steep cliff with his armor-bearer and routed a Philistine outpost, leading to a mass flight of the Philistines. Saul continued his ineptitude in religious areas by prohibiting his troops from eating while they chased the fleeing Philistines, leading not only to a curtailed chase but also a condemnation of death for Jonathan, who had not heard the instruction and had eaten. However, the troops rescued Jonathan from his father and preserved his life (1 Samuel 14). The fate of Saul’s kingship was definitively decided in his battle against the Amalekites. Yahweh ordered Saul (through Samuel) to attack the Amalekites because of their treatment of Israel during the exodus. Saul defeated them, but kept the best of the plunder for himself and preserved the life of their king against Yahweh’s commands. Samuel rebuked him once again and declared that Yahweh had rejected him as king (1 Samuel 15). The most famous battle Saul participated in was the duel between David and Goliath. Instead of David, Saul should have been the one to

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fight Goliath: he was the Israelite king, he was the tallest Israelite, and he had iron weapons (unlike the rest of the army). But David began to prove himself through his trust in Yahweh, in contrast to Saul’s persistent lack of trust (1 Samuel 16). The rest of Saul’s reign is taken up with incessant battles with the Philistines, and either promoting David or trying to kill him. The Philistine war did not go well for him, and he met his end at a battle against the Philistines on Mount Gilboa in the eastern edge of the Jezreel Valley, far from the Philistine homeland (1 Samuel 31). Upon Saul’s death, David assumed the kingship of Judah and defeated the remnant of Saul’s house in a series of battles (2 Samuel 2–4). David defeated the Jebusites in Jerusalem and established his capital there (2 Samuel 5:6–10). When the Philistines heard that he had become king over united Israel, they attacked their former friend. However, David displayed his devotion to Yahweh by inquiring of Yahweh concerning what he should do, and David defeated the Philistines several times (2 Samuel 5:17–25). After consolidating his kingship and receiving the Davidic covenant from Yahweh promising him an eternal throne if he and his descendants obeyed Yahweh (2 Samuel 7), David set about expanding his kingdom. The precise order and strategy is unclear, as the battles are only summarized (2 Samuel 8), but we know that David conquered the Philistines to the west, the Moabites, Ammonites, and Edomites to the east (across the Dead Sea), the Arameans to the north, and the nomadic Amalekites. The narrator records that Yahweh gave David victory every place he went. However, not all went well for him. The battle against the Ammonites foreshadows the decline of David and the Davidic monarchy, as it includes the story of Uriah and Bathsheba (2 Samuel 10–12). The narrator presents David as fighting mainly rebellions after the Bathsheba affair. But in spite of these setbacks, the United Monarchy continued for another generation with his son Solomon.

The transition of power was not smooth and Solomon acted violently against several powerful men who might have caused him trouble, but full civil war did not break out as it had when David became king (1 Kings 1–2). According to the biblical narrative, Solomon’s reign was peaceful and he did not fight any wars (though he is recorded as controlling land near the Euphrates that David had not, so perhaps he fought there [1 Kings 4:21]). Since we do not have records of Solomon from other sources, we are left in ignorance about any martial activity on his part. Solomon had a large and powerful army, so it is possible that everyone submitted to him peacefully. The narrator of 1 Chronicles records that David was not to build the temple because he was a man of war, but his son Solomon would not be (1 Chronicles 28:4). Solomon’s large army was not necessarily approved by Yahweh, as the narrator of Kings draws on the Deuteronomic Law for kingship (Deuteronomy 17:14–20) to show that Yahweh did not desire the kings of Israel to be known for their army, but to trust him. While Yahweh did not judge Solomon directly for his lack of trust (and other breaches of the law), the kingdom was split into two after Solomon died: the southern kingdom (Judah) and the northern kingdom (Israel). Charlie Trimm See also Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare; Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy; Israelite Wars of the Judges; King David as Warrior; Philistines; Yahweh as Divine Warrior Further Reading Hays, J. Daniel. “Has the Narrator Come to Praise Solomon or to Bury Him? Narrative Subtlety in 1 Kings 1–11.” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 28 (2003): 149–74. Meier, Sam. “The King as Warrior in Samuel-Kings.” Hebrew Annual Review 13 (1991): 63–76. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2013.

J Jaffa, Treaty of (1192)

protecting Christian prisoners, Saladin gained a reputation as a worthy adversary. Richard’s reputation as a military leader was enhanced. Ultimately, the treaty demonstrated that religious differences were not insurmountable. Unfortunately, the failure of Christian forces to retake Jerusalem led to the Fourth Crusade, which itself would be transformed into an attack on Constantinople due to commercial rivalry and confessional differences. K. J. Delamer

The Treaty of Jaffa (1192) was an agreement reached between Saladin, Sultan of Egypt, and King Richard I of England, ending the Third Crusade. Also known as the Kings’ Crusade, it was a reaction to the capture of Jerusalem by Saladin in 1187. Philip II of France and Richard I of England set aside their ongoing conflict to mount the crusade. Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa also led an expedition overland through Anatolia. The death of Frederick during the march led to the effective disintegration of the German contingent. The departure of Philip and Leopold V, Frederick’s successor, from the Levant in August 1191 left Richard as the commander of Christian forces. The city of Jaffa changed hands several times. Originally captured by the crusader army in September 1191, it was recaptured by Saladin following the retreat of the Christian forces after a failed attempt to take Jerusalem, and finally retaken by Richard in a surprise amphibious operation. Following a failed attempt to recapture the city yet again, Saladin agreed to a negotiated settlement. The treaty was a landmark agreement. It secured a threeyear truce that effectively ended the crusade and preserved the crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, albeit relocated to Acre. Unarmed pilgrims and merchants, both Muslim and Christian, were accorded the right to travel through the Levant unmolested. As a result of the treaty and several acts

See also Fourth Crusade; Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of; Saladin; Third Crusade Further Reading Asbridge, Thomas. The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land. New York: HarperCollins, 2010. Hindley, Geoffrey. Saladin: Hero of Islam. London: Constable, 1976.

Jahiliyya and Asabiyyah The concept of jahiliyya refers to the “state of ignorance and barbarism” that preceded the Qur’an’s revelation to the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century CE. The end of 413

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jahiliyya had a strong messianic value, which was considered to be an axial moment in the history of the world. The revelation finally liberated the umma from polytheism. The concept of asabiyyah can be defined as public spirit, social solidarity, group cohesion, and/or common will. After the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar world order, political and philosophical debate within the Islamic world has presented an alternative to contemporary thinking in the field of sociology. Contemporary exegesis— especially that of the philosophers Qutb, Al-Albani, and their followers—gives jahiliyya multiple meanings. On the one hand, there is a linguistic and literary approach according to which the quality of the Arab language was extremely inferior in the pre-Qur’an era, which in turn justified a “new beginning.” On the other hand, we have another level of meaning, applying jahiliyya to all those people that do not know or accept—consciously or unconsciously—the message of Islam. In this perspective, the jahili (ignorant/ pagan/atheist) are those contemporary people lost in their mediocre and individualistic horizons and condemned to waste their lives without any salvation, obstructing the realization of a pious and just society. Strictly connected to this aspect, there is a “radical contrast” to all those social degenerations, which cause revolution, subversion, sedition, civil war, and divisions (fitna) within the community. After the collapse of Soviet Union and Arab nationalism, the materialistic interpretation of history no longer sufficed to analyze social progress and development. The concept of asabiyyah—public spirit, social solidarity, group cohesion, common will—was rediscovered politically. The philosopher Ibn Khaldun (Tunis 1332–Cairo 1402) has admirably described this concept in his Muqaddima (Prolegomena to Universal History). In his theory of social evolution and decline, the asabiyyah plays a fundamental role. The sense of common belonging and “reciprocal solidarity” binds each member of the community in a widespread effort toward a common aim. Mutual agreements (asaba) connect the individuals to a shared code of values in order to ensure their survival. It is possible to read about the development, the acmes, and the deterioration of each civilization’s historical parabola. The capacity to rid oneself of any form of egotism and to contribute personally in the interest of the entire society appears to be the sole and necessary condition for cooperation

and public action, forming these solidarity bonds and strengthening their intrinsic forces. A common conviction is necessary to fortify spirits and political power. It is considered a spiritually bonding agent. “A dynasty,” Ibn Khaldun affirms, “that begins its history supported by the religion doubles the force of asabiyyah that helps it in its formation” (Muqaddima 2:325). In its cyclical paths, a civilization is in the beginning characterized by a strong spiritual and ascetic union among the members. After many years, the state or the political authority becomes the unique administrator of the religious sphere, which assumes a merely social value. Society begins to lose that centripetal force of defense and the enjoyment of riches substitutes for the spirit of sacrifice and austere practices. This generational path marks the end of social solidarity. The asabiyyah of the origins loses its strong spiritual characterization until being completely substituted by new emerging ideals and different social behaviors. Giovanni Patriarca See also Ibn Khaldun Further Reading Alatas, S. F. “A Khaldunian Exemplar for Historical Sociology for the South.” Current Sociology 54, no. 3 (May 2006). Browers, M. Democracy and Civil Society in Arab Political Thought: Transcultural Possibilities. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006. Esposito, J. L. The Islamic Threat. Myth or Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Euben, R. L., and M. Q. Zaman. Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Text and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. Gabrieli, F. “Il concetto della ‘asabiyyah nel pensiero storico di Ibn Haldûn.” Atti della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino. Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche LXV (1929–1930): 473–512. Ibn Khaldun. The Muqaddima: An Introduction to History. Translated by F. Rosenthal. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Kassir, S. Considérations sur le malheur arabe. Arles: SindbadActes Sud, 2004. Patriarca, G. “Il caleidoscopio dell´assabiyya: analisi, rischi e prospettive. L´attualità di Ibn Khaldun in un contesto di crisi.” Studia Politica—Romanian Political Science Review XIII, no. 3 (2013): 541–48.

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Jainism and War Adherents of Jainism believe in a succession of eternal world cycles of generation and degeneration. Twenty-four Jinas (“conquerors”) or Tirthankaras (“ford builders”)— those who have successively crossed the river from this world to the realm of spiritual liberation or release from samsara (the cycle of birth and rebirth)—appeared during the present world cycle. Mahavira is the last of these Tirthankaras, promulgating Jainism during the sixth century BCE alongside Hinduism and Buddhism in India. The two main Jain sects are Digambara and Svetambara. The foundational ethical principle of Jainism is ahimsa (“noninjury to life” or “nonviolence”), and mendicants as well as laypeople (to varying degrees because an avoidance of all violence is impossible) are subject to this precept of not intentionally inflicting harm, lest one accumulate binding karma or the residual consequences of negative actions that will lead to an unfavorable rebirth. Ostensibly, then, the precept of ahimsa absolutely prohibits Jain engagement in warfare—yet Jainism’s relationship to war, in both practice and literature, is not so straightforward. Jain mendicants did not condemn militarism, consistent with Jaina literature that indicates that the dharma (or duty) of Kyshatrias (the caste of warriors and kings) is to fight and rule. Nonetheless, Jainism prohibits aggressive warfare (but recognizes the necessity of defensive wars for the purpose of preserving Jainism and protecting innocents), strictly circumscribes violence, and opposes the glorification of battle. Like Hinduism and Buddhism, Jainism developed in an Indian culture that included a warrior class, was threatened by Muslim persecution, and enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship with courts in the form of royal patronage that promoted their survival during the Middle Ages. From the 4th to the 10th century CE, Jainism had to cope with acts of aggression and aggressors, and Jain mendicants advised and cultivated some of India’s greatest kings, emperors, and generals. Although these mendicants did not denounce the aggressive wars of the court, Jain monks and philosophers—among them, Somadeva Suri, a Digambara Jain monk of the 10th century—were invested in constraining violence and cultivating virtuous rulers. Somadeva is the author of several works that expressly address warfare, such as Yasastilakacampu and his treatise

Nitivakyamrita on politics and statecraft that affirms the right of Jain kings to defend their kingdom and describes the ideal king as “righteous” and “self-controlled.” For example, Kumarapala, a ruler of the Solanki dynasty in the 12th century, is touted as such an ideal king who enforced practices based on ahimsa in his realm. Chavundraya was a 10th-century Jain general who served under the Gangas and Rashtrakutas and was renowned for his kills. Jain noninterference in the violent affairs of kings and warriors is consistent with Jaina literature that acknowledges the dharma of Kyshatrias. However, this same literature is replete with condemnations of violence and attempts to limit carnage as well as the personal, negative karmic consequences of warfare. Two paradigmatic Jaina stories, in particular, exemplify these sentiments. Jinasena’s ninth-century CE poem, Adi purana, recounts the story of Bharata and Bahubali—the two oldest sons of King Rushabhdev and the first of the 24 Tirthankaras of the current cycle. Rushabhdev renounced his throne to become a mendicant, making his eldest son, Bharata, his successor and bestowing on Bahubali a portion of the kingdom. Due to competing rights, Bahubali challenged Bharat. Heeding the counsel of their advisers, the brothers agreed to limit the loss of life by wrestling each other as opposed to dispatching their armies. Poised to strike Bharata with a fatal blow and claim victory, Bahubali realized his error in coveting his brother’s position and possessions, and in the manner of their father, Bahubali also became a renunciant—the only status that affords one the opportunity of release from samsara. In the canonical Bhagavati Sutra, a record of the teachings of Mahavira, his followers ask if the warriors who have died in combat fighting for or against the nonfictional king of Maghadah will be reborn in heaven—per the belief in Hinduism. Mahavira responds that only two men were reborn in heaven: Varuna, a Jain who vowed only to strike if struck first, who died disavowing all violence and without harboring animosity toward his adversary, and the Jain’s friend who emulated the circumstances of Varuna’s death. Both Adi purana and Bhagavati Sutra affirm the aspirant commitment to ahimsa, which can only be practiced strictly by renunciants, while acknowledging the violent realities of living in the world and the duty of warriors. Therefore, cowardice is unacceptable but

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warfare should always be a last resort and never extolled. Furthermore, every effort should be made to limit destruction and acknowledge the dignity of one’s opponent— unless one die an unwholesome death filled with animus and thoughts of violence and be reborn in the hell or animal realm. Jaina mythology unequivocally conveys that all Tirthankaras were Kyshatrias, and the very name, “Jainism,” stems from Jina or “conqueror.” Ultimately, neither Jain monks nor Jaina literature endorse pacifism, and Jaina texts are replete with martial symbolism. For example, the Adi purana characterizes Jainism as a weapon of war and instructs monks to abandon their bodies like that of an enemy on the battlefield. This metaphorical language exemplifies a trend in Jaina thought: the eclipsing of the battle warrior by the ascetic warrior whose object of conquest is no longer territories and soldiers but his own passions and attachments. It appears that the avenue for reconciling Jainism’s ultimate valuation of ahimsa with Jainism’s historical stance on warfare lies in understanding that the ideal observance of ahimsa governs personal intentions and interactions within particular religious circumstances by mendicants. However, Jains also recognize that not all violence is avoidable and that ahimsa cannot pragmatically extend to the wider contexts of the polity, which must be defended, but every effort should be made to contain violence in warfare and counteract the accumulation of binding karma. Kate E. Temoney See also Ahimsa; Buddhism and War; Hinduism and War Further Reading Carrithers, Michael, and Caroline Humphrey, eds. The Assembly of Listeners: Jains in Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Dundas, Paul. The Jains, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2002. Jaini, Padmanabh S. The Jaina Path of Purification. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979. Murthy, M. Chidanand. “The Concept of War and Ahimsa in Jainism in Karnataka.” Indian Philosophical Quarterly 3:1 (1975): 19–28. Pruthi, Raj. Jainism and Indian Civilization. New Delhi: Discovery, 2004. Sethia, Tara, ed. Ahimsa, Anekanta, and Jaininsm. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004.

Jericho, Battle of (ca. 1400 BCE or 1200 BCE) The battle of Jericho (Joshua 6) is one of the most wellknown battles of the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament), occurring at a pivotal point in Israelite history. Interpretation of the meaning of archaeological evidence has been disputed for several decades. According to the biblical text, the Hebrew god Yahweh had rescued the Israelites from Egypt and displayed his power over the strongest empire of the time when he destroyed the Egyptian army at the Red Sea, without any action on the part of the Israelites. However, after this climatic event the Israelites repeatedly rejected Yahweh through their grumbling and idolatry, culminating in their refusal to enter the land of Canaan that had been promised to them in the Abrahamic covenant (Genesis 12, 13, 15, 17, 22). After this final display of disbelief, Yahweh condemned them to wander in the wilderness for 40 years (Numbers 13–14). At the death of that generation, Yahweh brought them to the brink of the land of Canaan once again. According to the biblical chronology, the date of the conquest of Jericho is either about 1400 BCE or 1200 BCE, depending on whether one holds to an early or late date of the Hebrew Exodus from Egypt. The battle against Jericho, just on the western side of the Jordan River, began on an ominous note when Joshua sent scouts to investigate the city, reminding the reader of the events of the previous generation when the report of the scouts had led to the people’s rejection of Yahweh. However, these scouts received encouragement about Yahweh’s strength from an unlikely source: Rahab, a Canaanite prostitute in Jericho who preached to them about the power of their God and the fear of Canaanites. Promising her that the Israelites would preserve her and her family, the scouts returned home to report to Joshua what they had learned. Joshua led the people across the Jordan River in a miraculous fashion, reminiscent of the crossing of the Red Sea 40 years before. Yahweh communicated his military commands for the battle to Joshua through an apparently angelic figure (the commander of the armies of Yahweh): the Israelites (with the Ark of the Covenant to symbolize the presence of Yahweh) were to walk around the city once a day for six days and then seven times on the seventh day. The reason for these seemingly peculiar instructions is not

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given, but it might be to illustrate to the Canaanites that the ensuing victory came from Yahweh or to give the Canaanites time to surrender and turn to follow the Israelite god (as Rahab had done). On the seventh day, the walls fell down when the trumpet was blown and the Canaanites were defeated. The herem laws dictated that everything was to be given to Yahweh by being destroyed; Achan’s breach of these rules when he took several items of plunder led to the upcoming defeat at Ai. The prohibition of taking plunder reminded the Israelites that this was not their victory, but one given to them by Yahweh. The herem laws were not absolute, however, as illustrated by the case of Rahab. The laws were about rejection of Yahweh, not ethnicity: any Canaanite who chose to follow Yahweh was exempt from the regulations. The biblical account of the miraculous nature of the battle of Jericho (parallel to the miraculous defeat of the Egyptian army) emphasized to Israel that Yahweh would continue to fight for them, even after the disastrous events of the previous generation. The account demonstrates the importance and integral nature of religion in the ancient Near East and biblical world, especially with respect to warfare. Charlie Trimm See also Ai, Battle of; Israelite Conquest of Canaan; Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare; Yahweh as Divine Warrior Further Reading Creach, Jerome F. D. Violence in Scripture. Interpretation. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2013. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2013. Thomas, Heath A., Jeremy Evans, and Paul Copan, eds. Holy War in the Old Testament: Christian Morality and an Old Testament Problem. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2013. Wood, B. G. “Did the Israelites Conquer Jericho? A New Look at the Archaeological Evidence.” Biblical Archaeology Review 16, no. 2 (1990): 44–58.

Jerusalem as Holy City The significance of Jerusalem to war and religion has been continuous throughout the history of Western religion.

Founded as a capital as the result of a religious war, this ancient city has been the focus of religious struggles up to the present. Much of this has to do with Jerusalem being not merely a near-continuous ancient city, but because of its pivotal role in the creation of (and hence sacredness to) the three major Western faiths. As a result, Jerusalem, whose Hebrew name, Yerushalayim, means “foundation of peace,” has always been venerated as the sacred city worth fighting and dying for. Although Jerusalem’s history predates the Davidic dynasty, it was first established as the capital of ancient Israel by King David in 1000 BCE. What made Jerusalem more than a seat of government was the building of the first Temple by King Solomon, after his father, King David, was forbidden to do so, according to the Bible, because he was “a man of battles who has shed blood” (I Chronicles 28:3). The Temple, furthermore, was not to be built with iron tools, on account of their association with war, and according to the legend, the stones were cut by a stone-eating worm called the shamir. The Temple facilitated the centralization and regulation of the Jewish sacrificial cult, which in turn increased Jerusalem’s centrality and importance to the ancient Israelite religion as practiced during this period. The end of Jerusalem as the central location of worship and ultimately as the capital of the independent kingdom of Israel began with political division and war. Following the death of King Solomon and a revolt of the northern tribes against his son and successor, Rehoboam, ancient Israel split into the northern kingdom of Israel and the southern kingdom of Judah. The division and resulting rivalries weakened the Israelite kingdoms and made them vulnerable to outside invading powers. The beginning of the end came with the conquest of the northern kingdom by Assyria in 722 BCE. The Southern kingdom, where Jerusalem was located, maintained independence until 586 BCE, when the Babylonians, led by King Nebuchadnezzar, invaded and destroyed the first Temple. When King Cyrus of Persia defeated the Babylonians in 539 BCE, he encouraged Jewish exiles to return and rebuild the Temple. Though this did not mean political independence, the Temple stood through the duration of the Persian Empire, and then Alexander’s empire and its successor states. During the late Seleucid period, the semi-independent Hasmonean dynasty first accommodated, then revolted

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against forced Hellenization, leading to the famous Mac­ cabean revolt that became the basis of the Hanukkah story. But the victory proved brief, as subsequent Hasmonean rulers succumbed to corruption and Hellenization. These developments weakened the Hasmonean kingdom and led to its takeover and incorporation into the Roman Empire and the installation of Herod as its royal governor. Herod as monarch engaged in massive public works, but failed to control the increasing restiveness within Judea. The many religiously based rebel movements included one led by Jesus of Nazareth, whose crucifixion, part of a larger Roman crackdown on revolutionary activity, became the starting point for the new religion of Christianity that be­ gan as merely another sect of Judaism. But Jesus’s follow­­ ers, who eventually included a non-Jewish majority, would interpret the Crucifixion and rejection of Jesus’s message as a portent of the coming destruction of the Temple and dispersion of the Jewish people. Subsequent historical events appeared to confirm the Christian view of the Jewish loss of Jerusalem, only for the 638 Muslim conquest of the city to inspire a Christian longing for Jerusalem that in 1095 morphed into a call by Pope Urban II to retake the Holy City from the Muslim “infidels,” launching the crusades. This new holy war for Jerusalem, which lasted from 1096 until 1291, resulted in initial Christian victories and unprecedented Christian control of Jerusalem. But the crusader takeover of the Middle East would be short-lived, with increased Muslim pushback. The crusades would end with the Ottoman Turkish takeover and increasingly solid Islamization of the region, as well as the takeover of the Temple Mount as a Muslim holy site with the erection of the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa mosques. From the late 19th century onward, the Jewish religious longing for a return to Zion and Jerusalem would increasingly transform into the modern Jewish nationalist movement of Zionism. The fall of the Ottoman Empire and British takeover of the region following World War I led to the Balfour Declaration that facilitated the creation of a Jewish National Homeland. But in subsequent decades, British support for the formative Jewish state came into increased conflict with the British-supported Arab nationalist aspirations. Israel’s 1948 War for Independence followed the Jewish acceptance and Arab rejection of a partition plan that would have made Jerusalem an internationally

controlled city, and resulted in an Israeli victory, but loss of the Old City of Jerusalem to Jordanian forces. Between 1948 and 1967, there was no Jewish presence in either the Old City or East Jerusalem, and the Jewish holy places in the Old City fell into disrepair and sometimes outright desecration. The Six-Day War in 1967 resulted in the reunification of Jerusalem, and since 1967, Jerusalem has remained in Israeli control, with the religious control of the Temple Mount ceded to the Jordanian Waqf. But the status of Jerusalem, including as modern Israel’s capital, has not been generally accepted internationally. And since 1967, politically emboldened Jewish Messianic movements have called for a retaking of the Temple Mount and the building of a Third Temple. These efforts have periodically sparked new rounds of violence, most recently in the wave of stabbings sparked by the rumor of a change to the “status quo” on the Temple Mount. International efforts to broker peace, therefore, will ultimately depend on the ability to educate multiple sides to accept and respect the holy status of Jerusalem to all three Western faiths. Susan Roth Breitzer See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Bouillon, Godfrey de; Crusades (Overview); Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of; Jerusalem, Sieges of; Six-Day War; Urban II, Pope; Zionism and War; Primary Document: Remarks at the International Conference on the Question of Jerusalem (December 15, 2015) Further Reading Chapman, Colin. Whose Holy City? Jerusalem and the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict. Oxford: Lion Hudson, 2004. Hoppe, Leslie J. The Holy City: Jerusalem in the Theology of the Old Testament. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2000. Inbari, Motti. Jewish Fundamentalism and the Temple Mount: Who Will Build the Third Temple? Albany: SUNY Press, 2009. Walker, P. W. L. Jesus and the Holy City: New Testament Perspectives on Jerusalem. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1996.

Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of The Latin kingdom of Jerusalem was one of the four crusader kingdoms in the Holy Land that resulted from the

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First Crusade. The other three, all feudal dependencies of Jerusalem, were the Principality of Antioch, the County of Tripoli, and the County of Edessa. The Kingdom of Jerusalem began when the crusader armies defeated the Seljuk Turks and conquered the city of Jerusalem on July 15, 1099. A Latin patriarch of Jerusalem was established, but the kingdom would not be under ecclesiastical rule. The crusading leaders elected Godfrey of Bouillon, one of the heroes of the capture of Jerusalem, to be the first ruler of the kingdom. Godfrey refused the title of king and instead was named the “Protector of the Holy Sepulchre.” Most of the first crusaders from Europe returned home soon after securing Jerusalem from an Egyptian threat. Despite new crusaders steadily arriving from Europe, keeping an adequate army to defend the kingdom always remained a challenge. However, under Godfrey the boundaries of the kingdom would increase with the capture of Jaffa, Haifa, and Tiberius. Godfrey was succeeded in 1100 by his brother Baldwin, who was crowned the first king of Jerusalem. Baldwin I would prove to be a most effective leader by establishing a stable monarchy; expanding the kingdom by capturing the port cities of Acre, Beirut, and Sidon; and beginning a number of building projects including churches, monasteries, and defensive fortifications. Baldwin I was succeeded as king in 1118 by his cousin, Baldwin Count of Edessa. During this time the Kingdom of Jerusalem would reach its geographic zenith with the taking of the port city of Tyre. However, the fortunes of the kingdom would change in 1144 after the death of King Fulk, son-in-law of Baldwin II, when ‘Imad al-Din Zengi conquered the city of Edessa and the eastern half of the County of Edessa. The Second Crusade was called by Pope Eugenius III, promoted by Bernard of Clairvaux, and led by Louis VII of France and Conrad III of Germany, but ended when the crusaders were defeated while attempting to conquer Damascus. Fulk would eventually be succeeded by his son Baldwin III, who would capture the port city of Ascalon. Amalric succeeded his brother Baldwin III and failed in an attempt to conquer Egypt. Amalric was succeeded by his son Baldwin IV, who was afflicted with leprosy. Baldwin IV would rule with the aid of regents, but his disease advanced to the point that he had the five-year-old son of his sister Sibylla crowned co-king. Baldwin IV died in 1185 and his nephew Baldwin V died in 1186. Sibylla was named queen and she

crowned her husband, Guy of Lusignan, king. Guy lost a disastrous battle to Saladin on July 4, 1187, at the Horns of Hattin near Tiberius. The army was all but destroyed and Jerusalem fell on October 2. Although Guy continued as king of Jerusalem in Acre, which was reconquered in 1191 by crusader forces led by Richard the Lionheart, in reality the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem ceased to exist. James Kroemer See also Bouillon, Godfrey de; Hattin, Battle of; Jerusalem as Holy City; Jerusalem, Sieges of; Saladin Further Reading Asbridge, Thomas. The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land. New York: Ecco: 2010. Barber, Malcolm. The Crusader States. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: 2012. MacEvitt, Christopher. The Crusades and the Christian World of the East: Rough Tolerance. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. Madden, Thomas F. The Concise History of the Crusades. Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2013.

Jerusalem, Sieges of Located along a strategically and economically important corridor linking Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, Jerusalem has been one of the most besieged cities in the world for more than two millennia. The various sieges of Jerusalem often merged warfare and religion since the city is considered holy to the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic faiths. As these faiths alternately attacked and defended the city over the centuries, each one invested in Jerusalem greater amounts of militant religious zeal, leading the city to represent both intense physical suffering and sublime religious symbolism. In approximately 1000 BCE, King David laid siege to Jerusalem and captured it to serve as both the political and religious capital of the Hebrew nation. From this first recorded siege, religion and warfare combined in Jerusalem and made the city a target for empires and a source of rebellion from those empires. Assyria, the first empire in world history, attacked Jerusalem but did not take it in 701 BCE. Babylon besieged the city in 597 BCE, took it, and

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tried to break the back of Hebrew resistance by deporting its citizens. Those who were left rebelled a decade later with Babylon laying a second successful siege culminating in the destruction of Jerusalem, its temple, and the deportation of its remaining citizens. Roman armies besieged Jerusalem three times in less than two centuries, between 63 BCE and 70 CE, in their attempts to break the religious militancy of native Judaism. In addition to several hundred thousand deaths, these three sieges left Jerusalem and its holy sites, for the second time in its history, an uninhabitable ruin. Over the next 500 years, Jerusalem was rebuilt and became sacred to, and contested by, both Christians and Jews. Byzantine Christians purged Jerusalem of its Jewish citizens in 614, and in turn were placed under siege by invading Persians. The Persians captured the city and its holy relics but eventually gave them back to the Christian Byzantines who in 630 resumed the persecution of the surviving Jews. Just seven years later invading Arabs under the banner of Islam, a new religion with the same Abrahamic traditions as Judaism and Christianity and also holding the city sacred, besieged and captured Jerusalem. Though the city changed hands between Muslims and Christian crusaders in three sieges between 1099 and 1244, Jerusalem remained an Islamic stronghold until the 20th century. During the First World War, Jerusalem fell to British forces after a short siege in 1917, separating the city from the larger Muslim Middle East and opening the way for Jewish immigration. After the end of the Second World War and the Holocaust, Jewish immigration increased until by 1948, Jerusalem became the focal point of hostilities between the new Jewish state of Israel and the Muslim Palestinians native to the area. Jerusalem was besieged in 1948 and again in 1967 as Israel defended and expanded its political and military hold on the city. Despite this long record of sieges, Jerusalem continues to be contested by differing political and religious traditions. Russell S. Perkins See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Bar Kochba Revolt; Holocaust; Jewish Revolt; Yom Kippur War Further Reading Armstrong, Karen. Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths. New York: Knopf, 1996.

Benvenisti, Meron. City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. Montefiore, Simon. Jerusalem: The Biography. New York: Knopf, 2011.

Jesuits Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556) was the founder of and the first superior general of the Society of Jesus, known as the Jesuits. The Jesuit foundational document Formula of the Institute, in its first edition of 1540, describes the members of the Jesuits “as soldiers of God beneath the banner

Saint Ignatius of Loyola was the founder and first superior general of the Society of Jesus, also known as the Jesuits. A nobleman with a military background, Ignatius founded the society in 1534 after being wounded in battle and experiencing a religious conversion. (Library of Congress)

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of the cross.” The same edition determines “the propagation of faith and the progress of souls in Christian life and doctrine” as the primary goal of this new order. The 1550 edition added the idea that the Jesuits would also defend the Catholic faith in addition to proselytizing on its behalf. Indeed, the spread and the defense of Catholicism were the core ideas of the Jesuits. Accordingly, they engaged in the reconversion attempts in Europe during the wars of the Protestant Reformation as well as engaging vigorously in overseas missionary activity. They were the Catholic order with the largest overseas presence, and as a result, they counted the most martyrs to the faith among their ranks. The Jesuits were not the only Catholic body in the missionary field. History abounds with struggles among the Catholic orders concerning territorial divisions and evangelization strategies. For example, in China and India, the Jesuits and the Franciscans maintained different approaches to evangelizing the non-Christian population. The Franciscans were in favor of conversion by force. By contrast, the Jesuits were the creators and the main agents of an accommodation strategy. This strategy was based on the principle that the acceptance of certain aspects of the other’s heritage and culture is essential in conversion activity. While differences in evangelizing were present between the Catholic orders, the orders had some similarities. All of the Catholic apostolic orders founded during the 16th century, such as the Theatines, the Barnabites, the Oratorians, and the Jesuits, lived and worked among the local populations. Whether in China, India, or the Americas, including the French colonies in New France (Canada) and the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in contemporary South and Central America, Jesuits could be found evangelizing from their missions. Martin Luther (1483–1546) declared in his Large Catechism (1529): “I am both a doctor and a preacher.” The Jesuits led the Catholic response to Luther and the Protestants’ preaching. However, rather than concentrating only on preaching to the new adherents to the Protestant faith in Europe, the first edition of the Jesuit Formula listed the “ministries of the word” as the first ministries. The disputes that took place between the Jesuits and the Muslim ruler Akbar the Great (1542–1605) in India from 1580 to 1605 constitute one of the most quoted examples of the Jesuit strategy to convert through the appeal to reason. The

Jesuits also excelled in the use of external instruments to instill devotion, such as collective rituals, processions, pilgrimages, and decorative programs. The lavishness of these ceremonies was often contrary to the spirit of poverty of many religious bodies. The foundation and the history of the Society of Jesus provoked much controversy within and beyond the Catholic Church. Its suppression in the whole world with the brief Dominus ac Redemptor of July 21, 1773, by Clement XIV (1705–1774) was the most dramatic moment in its almost 500-year-old history. Illustrating the importance of this event, historiography uses the designation of Old Society for the period prior to 1773 and New Society after its official reestablishment in the universal church by the bull Sollicitudo Omnium Ecclesiarum enacted by Pius VII (1742–1823) on August 7, 1814. The Society of Jesus has a universal character. However, this aspect was not always that obvious for all members. Particularly illustrative of this point, the participants at the General Congregation 5 (1593) felt compelled to reaffirm the international character of the Society of Jesus, in particular of the members in authority, in the decrees 1, 40, and 77. The acceptance of new Christians and of nonEuropean converted candidates to the society was an issue of contention for many years. The first companions, in general, and Loyola, in particular, were strong opponents of the policy of limpeza de sangre, or “blood purity,” which was universally followed by other Catholic orders at the time. Ignatius often stressed in his writings the Jewish origin of Christianity and exhorted the Jesuits not to exclude candidates to the society for reasons of lineage. This policy, however, was soon questioned. In a letter dated 1545 the Spanish Jesuit Antonio de Araoz (1515–1573) recommended that Ignatius reconsider the question of the admission of new Christians. In particular, Decree 52 of the General Congregation 5 barred the door to descendants of both Hebrews and Saracens. Missionary activity overseas motivated the question of whether local converted people could be admitted to the Society of Jesus. The answer differed from region to region, reflecting the coeval feelings of racism and discrimination. Both in India and in Africa Jesuit missions remained European in their very essence, as only a handful of Africans entered the society, and the Brahman Pero Luis was the

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only Indian who was ordained a priest in India during the Old Society, in 1575. By contrast, the Japanese Bernardo from Kangoxima, also known as Bernardo the Japanese, was admitted to the society in the 1550s. Two Chinese entered the society in China in 1591, inaugurating a consistent stream of ordination of Chinese literati during the 17th century. The external opposition to the society led to the creation of the specific concept of anti-Jesuitism in the embryonic years. The designation itself, Society of Jesus, immediately raised suspicion of both the people in authority and of other Catholic agents. The question was: how do these men dare to call themselves the companions of Christ? Putting into practice the Ignatian determination that the Jesuits should influence those people holding influential positions, by the 17th century members of the Society of Jesus were reputed confessors of kings and other members of royal houses. The regular assignment of confessors to kings and princes may be attributed to the Jesuits. Such a close connection of the Jesuits with both secular power and Rome due to their direct vow of obedience to the pope was the source of upheaval. The Spanish predominance in the leadership of the society was often seen with disfavor by other nations such as France, England, and the Netherlands, traditional enemies of Spain. The French traditions of ecclesiastical independence from Rome and direct dependence of the church on the crown, in addition to classical sentiments against Spain contributed to raise suspicions about a new order directly dependent on Rome and founded by a Spaniard. The suppression of the society was preceded by its interdiction in many countries, starting with Portugal in 1759. Indeed, the suppression marks clearly the capitulation of Clement XIV to an anti-Jesuit campaign led by European rulers and parliaments and with the participation of other hostile religious. The Jesuits, who were often identified as papal agents, became natural enemies of the absolutist rulers aiming to control all aspects of the society in their states. The involvement with political affairs, also through control of the better administrative jobs, were two very common accusations made against the Jesuits by their enemies. The traditional close bond of the Jesuits with Rome caused them to be critics of the free thinkers of the Enlightenment age.

But the dispute was also of a dogmatic nature, as can be exemplified by the quarrel between the Jesuits and the Jansenists. The Jansenists, a Catholic movement following the Dutch theologian Cornelius Jansenius (1585–1638), were members of a Catholic theological movement that spread in the 17th and 18th centuries. The Jansenists accused the Jesuits of minimizing the role of grace in salvation as it had been defined by Saint Augustine in the fifth century, as the Jesuits stressed the possibility of earning salvation through a virtuous and meritorious life. When Pius VII (1742–1823) restored the Society of Jesus in the whole world with the brief Solicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum from August 7, 1814, 600 Jesuits existed. They lived mostly in Russia as Catherine the Great had refused to apply the suppression bull in her empire, but some also lived in other nations. As early as the 1790s members of the society were authorized by both Rome and by local powers to run colleges and other institutions, for instance in Belgium. Several kingdoms had already restored the society in their territories, beginning with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1804. The society counted around 1,300 members in Italy, Sicily, parts of present-day Belarus (“White Russia”), France, Spain, and England, by 1820. An exponential increase like this didn’t, nevertheless, mean an end to problems for the society. Internally, it was affected by the division among conservative and progressive factions on such fundamental subjects as the tenure of the general, which was eventually abandoned in 1983 with the abdication of Pedro Arrupe (1907–1991) due to illness, or on the distinct degrees of membership within the society. Albeit their exponential increase in number, many Jesuits coming from the Old Society were too old, whereas the new members often lacked the necessary knowledge to fulfill an immense quantity and variety of apostolic tasks. Anti-Jesuitical feeling continued to be so strong that the Jesuits were again expelled from more than 20 countries between 1814 and the early 20th century. Moreover, they became involved with the turbulence affecting the Catholic Church during the second half of the 19th century about the proclamation of the Dogma of the Immaculate Conception by the bull Ineffabilis Deus enacted by Pious IX on December 8, 1854, and the Dogma of the Papal Ineffability and Supremacy promulgated by the First Vatican Council in 1870.

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A major upheaval between the Society of Jesus and the papacy occurred in the 20th century during Pedro Arrupe’s generalate (1965–1983). Paul VI (1897–1978) and, in particular, John Paul II (1920–2005) were very concerned about the progressive approach made by various Jesuits to controversial subjects for the Catholic Church such as social justice, the use of contraceptive methods, or homosexuality. In 1981 Arrupe suffered a stroke. John Paul II then designated Paolo Dezza SJ (1901–1999) as vicar general instead of Vincent O’Keefe (1920–2012), who had been previously appointed by Arrupe to lead the society in case Arrupe was no longer able to act as general. This decision by John Paul II was considered by the Jesuits as an extremely dangerous attempt to discredit and interfere with the Jesuits’ affairs. The situation normalized with the convocation of the General Congregation 35 (1983) and the election of the Dutch Hans Peter Kolvenbach (born 1928) as the 29th superior general of the Society of Jesus. The election of the present pope reflects a radical step away from the original conception designed by Ignatius for the Society of Jesus. Cardinal Roberto Bellarmino (1542– 1621), canonized 1930, or more recently Carlo Maria Martini (1927–2012), cardinal and archbishop of Milan between 1980 and 2002, are but two of the more distinguished Jesuits who occupied important positions in the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. However, both the charge of positions in the church hierarchy and the care of parishes should be avoided according to the initial charter of the order. The two functions are antithetical to the Jesuit missionary task expressed by their distinguishing fourth vow to be prepared to be sent everywhere in the world at the pope’s notice or of the superior general ad Majorem Dei gloriam. Upon election, Jorge Mario Bergoglio chose to be called Pope Francis in remembrance of Saint Francis of Assisi. Quoting the Pope: “For me [Francis of Assisi] is the man of poverty, the man of peace, the man who loves and is responsible for the creation.” The promotion of social justice in relation to an ecological concern expressed in this quotation follows an intention reaffirmed as a priority of Jesuit identity since the 1990s. In particular, Decree 3 of the General Congregation 35 stressed the necessity for governments and institutions to foster studies and practices fighting against poverty combined with protecting

the environment. Previously, at the bishops’ meeting at Aparecida, Brazil, in 2007 the present pope had alerted the church to the social inequality resulting from globalization. Unsurprisingly, from the perspective of Pope Francis’s fight against poverty and seclusion, his first pontifical trip in October 2014 was the visit to the African refugees on the Italian island of Lampedusa. This island is one of the main ports of arrival in Europe for the Africans escaping hunger and war in their countries. Cristina Osswald See also Martyrs, Jesuit; Wars of the Reformation; Primary Document: Edicts Issued by the Japanese Shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa: “Closed Country Edict” (1635) and “Exclusion of the Portuguese Edict” (1639) Further Reading Caraman, Philip. Ignatius Loyola: A Biography of the Founder of the Jesuits. San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1990. Devine, E. J. Old Fort St. Marie: Home of the Jesuit Martyrs, 1639–1649. Whitefish, MT: Literary Licensing, 2013. Donnelly, John Patrick, ed. Jesuit Writings of the Early Modern Period: 1540–1640. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006. Höpfl, Harro. Jesuit Political Thought: The Society of Jesus & the State, c. 1540–1640. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Moran, J. F. The Japanese and the Jesuits: Alessandro Valignano in Sixteenth Century Japan. New York: Routledge, 1993. Tylenda, Joseph N. Jesuit Saints & Martyrs: Short Biographies of the Saints, Blessed, Venerables, and Servants of God of the Society of Jesus. Chicago: Loyola Press, 1998. Wynne, John J. The Jesuit Martyrs of North America: Isaac Joques, John de Brebeuf, Gabriel Lalemant, Noel Chabanel, Anthony Daniel, Charles Garnier, Rene Goupil, John Lalande. Whitefish, MT: Literary Licensing, 2013. Županov, Ines G. Missionary Tropics: The Catholic Frontier in India (16th–17th Centuries). Lansing: University of Michigan Press, 2005.

Jesus as Warrior The central figure of Christianity is Jesus Christ who Christians believe was and is the fullness of divinity incarnated in Jesus of Nazareth in the first century CE. In Christian

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theology Jesus is understood to be fully human and fully divine. Christians believe that Jesus is the fulfillment of the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament) prophecy in Isaiah 6:9 that tells of a coming “Prince of Peace.” However, there is also imagery of Jesus as a warrior, but in a unique sense—a spiritual warrior. In Christian theology there is also a belief that in the Old Testament there were instances of Christophany—a manifestation of the pre-incarnate Jesus Christ. One such instance is the encounter recorded in Joshua 5:13–15 between Joshua and the “captain of the host of the Lord” (vs. 5:14) on the eve of the battle of Jericho. In the story of this passage the “captain” appears to Joshua in order to reaffirm to him divine presence in the coming battle. Christians believe that Jesus appears twice in human history. The first appearance or advent was in the first century CE as recorded in the Gospels, the first four books of the New Testament. The second appearance of Jesus in human history will be at the end of time and will also be a physical appearance. This is known as the Second Coming or Second Advent. In the first Advent as recorded in the Gospels Jesus was not a warrior in the military sense, fighting with weapons or leading military forces. Jesus was a warrior in continuing the holy warfare tradition of the Old Testament and the symbolism of the divine warrior, but his enemies were not political (especially the Romans) as had been the enemies of the Israelites in the era of the Old Testament. Rather, as warrior, Jesus enters into martial conflict with the ultimate enemies of humankind and the earth and thus defeats disease, disobedience, death, the devil, demons, and others. The thoughtworld of Jesus as warrior was considerably different from his own contemporaries. While many of them, such as the Zealots, wanted independence from Roman rule, that was not the focus of the life and work of Jesus. As a warrior, Jesus emerges triumphantly over his enemies in various eschatological battles, so much so that John the baptizer, his forerunner, wondered if he was truly the Messiah (Luke 7:18–23). Jesus as warrior was victorious over disease, especially blindness and deafness, among many other diseases (Matthew 12:22); healing also was declared to be found in his atonement in fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy (Isaiah 53:4 and Matthew 8:17). Depending on how they

are counted, there are about 30 victorious episodes of healing by Jesus in the gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. Jesus Christ as warrior also entered into conflict with and was victorious over disobedience (Mark 2:5; 1 Peter 2:24) and death via his own death on a cross and via his resurrection life (Romans 6:23). Thus John Donne (1572– 1631) depicted this victory in his sonnet “Death Be Not Proud,” and so does Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528) in his woodcut of Jesus Christ on the cross. There is also in the New Testament the carrying over of the Old Testament phrase “day of Yahweh,” which had apocalyptic connotations, and casting it in the New Testament language of “day of our Lord Jesus Christ” or “day of the Lord Jesus” (1 Corinthinans 1:8; 5:5; 2 Corinthians 1:14; Philippians 1:6, 10; 2:16). Jesus also showed himself to be a victorious warrior in triumphing over the devil and demons (see Luke 11:14–20 and see Colossians 2:15). Though Jesus as warrior was accused of casting out the devil and the demons by Beelzebub, the demonic ruler, he responded logically and famously by saying these words (referred to by many, including Abraham Lincoln in his prepresidential “house divided” speech on June 16, 1858): Any kingdom divided against itself is laid waste; and any city or house divided against itself will not stand. If Satan casts out Satan, he is divided against himself; how then will his kingdom stand? (Matthew 12:25–26) Some Christians also see the New Testament references to the return of Jesus at the Second Advent on or in the clouds as a continuation and parallel of Yaweh in the Old Testament riding a storm cloud into battle against his enemies (Psalm 18:9–15). Though considered meek and mild as a lamb in his first coming, Jesus was actually an almighty warrior in his first Advent (the church as the body of Christ continues to fight spiritual battles), and will certainly return as a strong warrior in his second coming, lion-like, as predicted in Revelation 19:11–16, and as portrayed in another woodcut by Albrecht Dürer. It is in this biblical passage of the final

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book of the New Testament that many Christians understand Jesus to be not only a symbolic warrior, but an actual warrior at the end of time fulfilling biblical prophecy. For some Christians the book of Revelation portrays events in human history that are yet to be fulfilled: 11

And I saw heaven opened, and behold, a white horse, and He who sat on it is called Faithful and True, and in righteousness He judges and wages war. 12 His eyes are a flame of fire, and on His head are many diadems; and He has a name written on Him which no one knows except Himself. 13 He is clothed with a robe dipped in blood, and His name is called The Word of God. 14 And the armies which are in heaven, clothed in fine linen, white and clean, were following Him on white horses. 15 From His mouth comes a sharp sword, so that with it He may strike down the nations, and He will rule them with a rod of iron; and He treads the wine press of the fierce wrath of God, the Almighty. 16 And on His robe and on His thigh He has a name written, “KING OF KINGS, AND LORD OF LORDS.” The very last phrase of verse 11 of Revelation 19 summarizes Jesus the warrior’s evaluative and martial intent: “and in righteousness He judges and wages war.” Although the Christian portrayal of Jesus Christ is not primarily that of a warrior, the imagery does exist in the New Testament. As such, Christianity and Jesus Christ as warrior and deity within its teachings can be studied along with other religions and deities as warriors. David K. Naugle See also Apocalypticism and War, Christian; Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East; Peace in the New Testament; Yahweh as Divine Warrior Further Reading “Jesus the Divine Warrior.” In Leland Ryken, James C. Wilhoit, and Tremper Longman III, gen. eds. Dictionary of Biblical Imagery. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998, p. 213. Longman, Tremper, III. “The Divine Warrior: The New Testament Use of an Old Testament Motif.” http://beginning withmoses.org/bt-articles/229/the-divine-warrior-the -new-testament-use-of-an-old-testament-motif

Longman, Tremper, III, and Daniel G. Reid. God Is a Warrior. Studies in Old Testament Biblical Theology. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1995. Slattery, W. Michael. Jesus the Warrior? Historical Christian Perspectives & Problems on the Morality of War & the Waging of Peace. Marquette Studies in Theology. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007.

Jewish Revolt (66–70 CE) The Jewish Revolt (66–70 CE), also known sometimes as the First Jewish-Roman War (when the siege of Masada in 73 CE is included), was the first of three major Jewish rebellions against Roman rule in Judea. The second rebellion was the Kitos War (115–117 CE) and the third was the Bar Kochba Revolt (132–135 CE). The revolt was the result of the culmination of religious and economic tensions, including antitaxation protests, wherein Jews throughout what had become the Roman province of Judea coalesced to rebel against Roman control. For more than a century the Jewish people had suffered the humiliation of subjugation to Rome. Entering Jerusalem in 63 BCE, the triumphant Roman general Pompey had even dared to enter the Second Temple, the Jewish holy Temple on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, initiating a period of defilement for the sacred structure under Roman rule that intensified the loss of independence by the Jewish nation. Nevertheless, while the Temple stood and a Jewish vassal king ruled as symbols of the former independence, future independence remained a hope. Therefore, as the century came to a close, rising messianic expectation combined with nationalistic aspiration and conflicting political ambition among the Jewish religious sects. From Rome’s perspective, its continued toleration of Jewish religion was an insufferable autonomy, yet a justifiable compromise needed to keep Jewish nationalism in check. However, once religious ideals tempted Jews to express themselves in nationalistic terms and were coupled with other political and economic factors, Roman intervention was assured. In 44 CE, the death of the Jewish king Agrippa placed the whole of the country under direct Roman rule, removing one of the illusions of independence. Mounting Roman

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oppression, the siding of Roman authorities with the nonJewish element in the land as well as pro-Roman Jewish aristocrats, and repeated violations of the Temple’s sanctity created the atmosphere for revolt. In April 66 CE, when the Roman governor Florus confiscated 17 talents from the Temple treasury, Jewish nationalists staged a revolt, seizing the Temple, stopping the daily sacrifices in tribute to the Roman emperor, overrunning the Roman military garrison in Jerusalem, and capturing the stronghold of Masada. The revolt was unique in the history of the region because the Jews were the only people in the ancient Near East to launch a revolution on such a scale against the Roman Empire. Unique also is the fact that the events of the conflict have been preserved in detail by an eyewitness. This historian and eyewitness was the first-century Jew Yosef ben Mattityahu, better known as Josephus Flavius (37–ca. 100 CE). Josephus was a former Pharisee and commander of Jewish nationalist forces in the Galilee. Another important account is that of the Roman historian Dio Cassius (ca. 155–235 CE), who based his chronicle of events on official Roman military records. In response to the Jewish insurrection, which was staged primarily in Jerusalem, Vespasian (9–79 CE), a leading military and political figure, was dispatched by Rome to quell the uprising with four legions comprising some 50,0000 soldiers. Vespasian’s plan of attack began in northern Israel, which, unlike Jerusalem, offered little resistance to his legions. One example was the Galilean fortress of Jotapata (also known as Yodfat), defended by the forces under Josephus. The Jewish families at the fortress committed suicide rather than surrender and Josephus turned to the Roman side. One exception was the city of Gamla in the Golan Heights, which in the fall of 67 CE attempted to prevent the Roman advance toward Jerusalem. However, the Roman legions decimated the city, slaughtering some 4,000 Jews according to Josephus. Rather than allow their families to fall to Roman savagery, he claimed, more than 5,000 Jews took their own lives, plunging off the nearby cliffs to their deaths. This heroic stand, in comparison with the final Jewish resistance at the southern stronghold of Masada (73 CE), later earned the site the title “The Masada of the North.” By the summer of 70 CE, Vespasian’s Tenth Legion had made its way to Jerusalem and placed the city under siege.

Because of the influx of refugees from other Jewish cities destroyed by the Romans, as well as the Judean population fleeing in advance of the legions, the city’s population had increased to at least three times its normal size. Jerusalem’s reputation as one of the largest cities of the ancient world and as impregnable made it a significant challenge to the already wearied Roman soldiers. However, its role as the center of political and spiritual authority and as the center of the Jewish Revolt required it to be the foremost example of Roman punishment. At the time of the Roman siege, two of the most militant factions among the Jewish nationalists, the Zealots and the Sicarii, had gained control of the Temple Mount. This had been accomplished with the aid of Idumean mercenaries (descendants of the Edomites) who had ruthlessly killed the more moderate Sadducaic and Pharisaic elements in charge. The aim of the militant factions from the beginning had been to crush the Roman occupation of Israel and drive the Romans from the land. Now that the war had come to the Holy City, they were determined to fulfill their purpose or perish. To ensure that the Jewish population of the city would not flee but fight to the death, the Zealots destroyed the storehouses of food, while proclaiming the divine inviolability of Jerusalem. Since the only way out of the city was in a coffin, a leader of the Pharisaic sect, Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai, escaped by hiding in one and surrendering himself to Vespasian. Upon being delivered to the general, he addressed him as emperor, stating that God would only allow a great ruler to capture the city. According to tradition, a messenger from Rome arrived at the same moment, announcing to Vespasian that the emperor had died and he had been crowned as successor. Impressed by the rabbi’s prophecy, the new emperor permitted him to safeguard the Torah scroll and its sages in the city of Yavneh. Thus, while the Temple was destroyed, the Torah was not, and though Jerusalem was spoiled, Judaism was spared a death blow. Vespasian returned to Rome to assume his duties as emperor, giving his son Titus (39–81 CE), in command of the Tenth Legion, the charge of completing Jerusalem’s submission. Despite the famine inside the walls of the city, Jews celebrated a last Passover with their Temple and prepared for the Roman attack. It came days later with a catapult barrage that continued for two months until the Romans

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finally breached the walls. Proceeding house by house, the Romans set fire to the city, slaughtering every Jew in their wake. One archaeological testimony to the fierceness of the fighting is the “Burnt House” within the present Jewish Quarter. Here can be seen the debris of one of the houses destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE, along with a photograph of the remains of a woman and a spear. Though weakened by hunger, the Jewish defenders held back the Roman assault from the Temple Mount for three weeks. Then, on the ninth of the Jewish month of Av (August), the Roman invaders reached the Second Temple compound. This was the same day the First Temple had been destroyed by the Babylonians 656 years earlier. Dio Cassius describes the final opposition of the Jews nestled around the sacred precinct: “The populace was stationed below in the court and the elders on the steps and the priests in the Sanctuary itself. And though they were but a handful fighting against a far superior force, they were not conquered until part of the Temple was set on fire. Then they met their death willingly, some throwing themselves on the swords of the Romans, some slaying one another, others taking their own lives and still others leaping into the flames. And it seemed to everybody and especially to them that so far from being destruction, it was victory and salvation and happiness to them that they perished along with the Temple” (Roman History LXV.6). The Romans next plundered the Temple, taking out every item of value. After the destruction, these Temple treasures were displayed in Rome during a victory procession and carried by thousands of Jewish slaves. Portrayals of this event are etched in one of the reliefs on the monument the Arch of Titus in Rome. Once the Temple was ignited, the Romans chopped down the trees in the area to form a huge bonfire around the structure. This caused the moisture in the limestone blocks that comprised the Temple to expand and blow the stones apart, collapsing the Temple in a single day. Why was the Temple destroyed? Josephus notes that it was against the specific orders of Titus who wished to preserve the sanctuary. Indeed, Roman policy was to keep a conquered people’s temples under Roman control and grant a resumption of its services as an act of clemency when proper submission was restored. Some scholars believe that the Roman soldiers, half-crazed because of the

length of Jewish resistance and the desire to plunder the wealth of the Temple, deliberately set it ablaze. Some Jewish sources claim that it was accidental when a soldier’s torch caught the curtains of the sanctuary on fire. The rabbis had declared that the reason for the Temple’s destruction was sinat chinam, “senseless hatred” among Jews. According to this idea, the fierce rivalry between the Jewish sects erupted in a “civil war,” dividing Jews, angering God, and making the nation both liable to divine judgment and susceptible to the Roman onslaught. While the destruction ended the institution of the Temple and forced a reformulation of Judaism, it did not destroy the Jewish people or end the revolt. After Titus began his journey back to Rome to celebrate his victory, Roman troops under the command of a new military governor appointed from Rome, Lucilius Bassus (d. 72 CE), commenced the final operations against the Jewish revolutionaries. Troops marched on Zealot fortresses at Herodium, south of Jerusalem and Machaerus on the eastern side of the Dead Sea. Unable to complete his mission due to illness, Bassus was succeeded by Lucius Flavus Silva (b. ca. 40 CE), who went on to conquer the mountain fortress of Masada, defeating a band of Sicarii who had held out for three years. After his call for surrender was rejected, using Roman soldiers of Legio X Fretensis and thousands of Jewish prisoners, Silva established several base camps, circumvallated the fortress, and commenced a three-month construction of a siege ramp that was completed in the spring of 73. The Romans finally breached the wall of the fortress on April 16, 73 CE According to Josephus, when the Romans finally broke through the walls of the citadel, they discovered that 960 of the 967 defenders had committed suicide rather than face the humiliations of defeat and captivity. Because suicide was prohibited in Judaism, Josephus stated that the defenders had drawn lots and chosen 10 soldiers to kill all and then each other in turn, down to the last person, who would be the only one to actually take his own life (The Wars of the Jews 7.9). Though some scholars maintain that archaeological evidence does not support the account of Josephus, the symbolism and legacy of the defiance and defeat at Masada has been enormous. It is seen as a model of heroism and militant religious fervor. Randall Price

428  Jews and the Crusades See also Bar Kochba Revolt; Josephus; Masada, Siege of; Zealots Further Reading Bloom, James J. The Jewish Revolts Against Rome, AD 66–135: A Military Analysis. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2010. Rocca, Samuel, and Adam Hook. The Forts of Judaea 168 BC–AD 73. Oxford: Osprey, 2008. Sheppard, Si, and Peter Dennis. The Jewish Revolt AD 64–73. Oxford: Osprey, 2013.

Jews and the Crusades The Jews were the subjects of many spontaneous and organized anti-Semitic massacres during the crusades. The manifest cause of the First Crusade was the reports from Jerusalem concerning the maltreatment of Christian pilgrims, and the hostility of the Jews toward the Christians was also emphasized, so that from the very beginning of the crusades the Jews were included in the heterogeneous group of “unbelievers.” Therefore the crusaders had other intentions, not just the liberation of the Holy Land, but also the “purge” of the many “heretic” and “infidel” groups from the Christian Europe, changing Christian-Jewish relations for the rest of the Middle Ages.

The First Crusade

The crusade was first preached by Pope Urban II at Clermont-Ferrand on November 27, 1095. At first sight, the pontifical proclamation meant no threat to the Jews, but apparently the Jews of France sensed danger, since they sent emissaries to the Rhine communities to warn them of the possible threat from the crusaders who would soon be marching through their communities, as the first group of crusaders gathered in France for their long trip to the Holy Land. They might already have attacked some Jewish communities on their way, possibly in Rouen, and more certainly in Lorraine. It was already clear that the crusaders were gathering in the Rhine valley to follow the traditional land route to the Orient along the Rhine and Danube rivers. The presence of the wealthy Jewish communities along the Rhine acted as an encouragement to the crusaders, who decided to punish “the murderers of Christ” wherever they

passed, before their encounter with the Muslims. Soon it was rumored that Godfrey of Bouillon himself had vowed that he would not set out for the crusade until he had avenged the crucifixion by spilling the blood of the Jews, declaring that he could not spare any Jewish life. The first bands of crusaders arrived outside Cologne on April 12, 1096. For a month they left the Jews in peace, perhaps because the Jews of France had given Peter the Hermit a letter asking the Jewish communities he passed through on his journey to supply him and his followers with all the food they required. Aware of the clear and present danger, the leaders of the Mainz community urgently sent a delegation to Emperor Henry IV, who wrote immediately to the princes, bishops, and counts of the empire forbidding them to harm the Jews. Godfrey himself replied that he had never had any such intention. For their greater security, the communities of Cologne and Mainz each presented him with a gift of 500 pieces of silver, and he promised to leave them in peace, which he did. Meanwhile, the crusade had evolved into a cumbersome machine combining the various social elements from the greater nobility to the commoners. It was the last element that proved particularly receptive to the anti-Jewish slogans spreading rapidly among its ranks and it was less willing to obey the rules. It was in the region where the crusaders gathered that violence broke out, in the weeks between Passover and Shavuot. The rioting continued until June–July. On May 3, 1096, the crusaders surrounded the synagogue of Speyer: since they were unable to break into the building, they attacked any Jews they could find outside the synagogue, killing 11 of them. On May 18, 1096, the community of Worms suffered a similar fate. The crusaders first massacred the Jews who had remained in their houses, then, eight days later, those who had sought refuge in the bishop’s castle. The victims numbered about 800; only a few accepted conversion and survived. Being informed of the massacre, the Jews of Mainz asked for the protection of the archbishop, paying him 400 pieces of silver to this end. When the crusaders, led by Emicho, arrived outside the town on May 27, 1096, the burghers opened the gates, but the Jews took up arms. Weakened through fasting, the Jews had to retreat to the archbishop’s castle, but he could do nothing for them, having fled before the assault of the crusaders and burghers. More than 1,000 Jews met

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their deaths, either at the enemy’s hands or their own. A similar disaster occurred in Cologne, where the community was attacked on May 30, 1096. The bishop dispersed the Jewry of the town to hide them in nearby localities, but the crusaders located them and a bloodbath followed. At Regensburg, all the Jews were dragged to the Danube where they were forced to accept baptism. At Metz, Prague, and everywhere in Bohemia the communities were destroyed at the same way, until Emicho and his crusaders were decisively halted and crushed by the Hungarians. Meanwhile, the crusaders had reached Jerusalem (June 7, 1099), and the siege had begun. The city was captured on July 15, with Godfrey entering it through the Jewish quarter, where inhabitants defended themselves alongside their Muslim neighbors, finally seeking refuge in the synagogues, which were set on fire by the attackers. After the massacre, the survivors were sold as slaves, some being later redeemed by Jewish communities in Italy. The Jewish community of Jerusalem came to an end and was not restored for many years. Other Jewish communities, such as those in Ramleh or Jaffa, were dispersed, and the entire Jewish community of the Holy Land was greatly decreased.

After the fall of Jerusalem in 1187 and at the beginning of 1188, the Jews of Mainz, Speyer, Strasbourg, Worms, Wurzburg, and elsewhere left their towns to seek refuge in the nearby castles. The few Jews who remained at Mainz owed their lives to the Imperial Diet (Reichstag), which had convened there. The strict order of Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa and his warnings were repeated by the bishops, who threatened excommunication for those who persecuted Jews.

The Second Crusade

The Pontifical Interventions

On the loss of Edessa by the crusaders (1144) the Christian world became troubled over the fate of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, and a new crusade was preached by Pope Eugene III. As early as the summer of 1146, a Cistercian monk, Radulph, while preaching the crusade, violently attacked the Jewish communities of the Rhineland, encouraging the crusaders to avenge themselves on the “murderers of Christ” before fighting the Muslims. The spiritual leader of the crusade, Bernard of Clairvaux, succeeded in mollifying antiSemitic sentiment, which is why anti-Jewish riots were far less extensive than those in the First Crusade. The persecution began in August–September; some massacres occured at Cologne, Worms, Mainz, and Würzburg. By the summer of 1147, order had been restored, and the Jewish communities were left alone. In the Holy Land, the Second Crusade had concluded with the conquest of Ascalon by the crusaders. The crusaders found well-established Jewish communities throughout the Holy Land, in Ascalon, Ramleh, Caesarea, and other places. It would therefore appear that the Second Crusade left the Jewish communities relatively undisturbed.

The Third Crusade

In England, the Third Crusade had the gravest consequences for the Jews. England had taken no part in the first two crusades, but King Richard the Lionhearted decided to take part personally in the third. In January the first abuses struck in the port city of Lynn, where the Jewish community was massacred. The same occurred in Norwich, Stamford, York, and Bury St. Edmunds. Only in Lincoln did the Jews manage to save their lives through the intervention of royal agents. After these events, a major emigration started involving hundreds of communities, not only in England but throughout the Christian West.

The era of the crusades marked a turning point in the history of the Jews in medieval Western Europe. The church was forced to redefine its position on the problem posed by the large-scale persecution of the Jews. Clearly the situation of the Jews prior to the crusades was not always free from danger: the hostility of the Christians toward the Jews was not new at all, and the crusades did not lead to any reassessment of the Christian doctrine. However, it was probably in the wake of the First Crusade that Pope Calixtus II (1119–1124) promulgated the bull Sicut Judaeis, which was renewed after the Second and Third Crusades and on at least five other occasions between 1199 and 1250. It demanded that no new privileges should be granted to the Jews; however, they should not be deprived of a single one of the rights secured to them. Christians should take special care not to endanger the lives of Jews, not to baptize them by force, and not to violate their cemeteries. The papal protection was not extended to Jews who plotted against the Christian faith. It was sufficient for the church to protect them from the attacks of the crusaders,

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especially from the moment they took up the standard of the cross, for these crusaders were themselves placed under the jurisdiction of the church. The Jews therefore requested the popes to intervene on their behalf: thus Innocent III ordered the French bishops to take particular care that the crusaders did not harm the Jews. Pope Gregory IX accused the crusaders of conspiring to murder the Jews (1236). Such a crime committed in the name of sanctity could not be left unpunished.

The Importance of the Crusades

In the memory of the Jews, the crusades became the symbol of the opposition between Christianity and Judaism, and the tension caused by the oppression was far more severe than that which had existed since the origins of Christianity. The Christians saw the Jews as the unyielding enemies of their faith. From the 12th century comes the first expression of the idea of a Jewish plot against the Christian world: it was alleged that the Jews had to sacrifice one Christian each year, and held an annual council to decide the site of the sacrifice and the name of the victim. The first repression of these “plots” took place at Blois, France, in 1171, and all members of the Jewish community were burned at the stake following the accusation. The Jewish community found a source of inspiration in the memory of the martyrs. There being no hope of immediate retribution, the massacre of the innocents was glorified and compared to the sacrifice of Isaac. The death of the martyrs was seen as a collective act for the sanctification of the divine name of God; soon, it became an example of true piety and submission to the will of God. For the succeeding generations the martyrs were an object of admiration and even of envy, for they had been the generation whom God had put to the test and they had proved themselves worthy. A man of true faith could achieve no more than to be their equal. It became important for the Jews to protect the memory of the martyrs’ sacrifice. It was probably this era that gave rise to the custom, originating in Mainz, of reciting in public the deeds of the martyrs on the anniversary of their sacrifice and recording their names and dates in a Memorbuch, which was kept in the synagogue. The most well-known martyrs and the most severely affected communities and regions figured in the Memorbücher of all Jewish communities. The martyrs

became a symbol for the people, not just for their own communities; more than simply an object of pride, they became a common ideal in which the whole Jewish community celebrated. Their martyrdom was transformed into victory, for they had defied torture, finding in their faith the necessary strength for preferring death to apostasy. In their martyrdom lay the very justification of the sufferings of the Jewish people. Spiritual power proved the strongest force of all, and the martyrs were seen as a proof of the absolute truth of Judaism. Gábor Bradács See also Bernard of Clairvaux; Bouillon, Godfrey de; Crusade of the Poor; Edessa, County of; Emicho, Count of Leiningen; First Crusade; Innocent III, Pope; Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of; Second Crusade; Third Crusade Further Reading Benvenisti, Meron. The Crusaders in the Holy Land. Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1976. Blumenkranz, Bernhard. Kirche und Synagoge. Juifs et Chrétiens. Patristique et Moyen Age. London: Variorum Reprints, 1977. Cohen, Jeremy. Sanctifying the Name of God: Jewish Martyrs and Jewish Memories of the First Crusade. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004 Eidelberg, Shlomo. The Jews and the Crusaders: The Hebrew Chronicles of the First and Second Crusade. Hoboken, NJ: KTAV, 1996 Haverkamp, Alfred. Juden und Christen zur Zeit der Kreuzzüge. Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1999. Moore, Robert Ian. The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Authority and Deviance in Western Europe, 950–1250. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009. Prawer, Joshua. The History of the Jews in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.

Jihad See Islam and War (Jihad)

Joan of Arc (1412–1431) Joan of Arc was born in 1412 in Domremy, France. The daughter of poor tenant farmers, she was a quiet and pious

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young woman who was happy working on her family’s farm. Her early childhood coincided with the resumption of the Hundred Years’ War between England and France. In 1415 Henry V invaded France and shattered the French army at the battle of Agincourt. England occupied most of northern France, including Paris, and threatened to occupy the rest of the kingdom after entering into an alliance with the Burgundians, who controlled much of eastern France. France was a lawless war zone during Joan’s childhood and youth. Her family suffered greatly at this time, like many peasant families, because of English raids. Joan of Arc, around the age of 16, claimed to be hearing voices of Christian saints encouraging her to lead a pious life. One voice allegedly told her that she was the savior of France. Joan immediately went to a local French garrison and offered her help. The garrison commander realized that the girl was popular with locals and dispatched her to the court of the dauphin, Charles, the French heir to the throne. Joan asked the dauphin to support her in expelling the English from his kingdom. She claimed that God had told her to lead the French resistance to the English. The dauphin was a weak figure, who controlled little of his kingdom. Many have speculated that he was mentally unstable. Charles was impressed with the young girl. He came to believe that she had special powers after he had two theologians test her piety and faith. Joan and the dauphin had a private conversation, where it is said Joan revealed details of a solemn prayer Charles had to offer to God to save France. Charles gave Joan armor and a horse and ordered his commanders to help the inspired girl. Joan accompanied the French army to Orléans, where an English force was besieging the city. The ordinary people rallied to the young girl, and her popularity ensured that the French commanders treated her respectfully. Joan rallied the French troops outside Orléans and they went on the offensive. In a series of battles the French attempted to break the English siege of the city. The English, while besieging the city, had built a series of ramparts around their positions. This allowed them to besiege the French in Orléans and to defend themselves against the French relief force. The French army repeatedly attacked these fortifications during the summer of 1422. Joan participated in the fighting. This was unheard of as traditionally

Joan of Arc is shown marching victoriously through a French town (probably Orléans) in 1429. Joan was widely credited with inspiring the French victory against the British during the siege of Orléans (a turning point in the Hundred Years’ War) and was later declared a national symbol of France by Napoleon Bonaparte. (Library of Congress)

only males fought in battle. Joan was only able to participate in the battle because she was widely seen as a prophet or inspired by God. During the battle to relieve the siege of Orléans, Joan was wounded but returned to the battle. The English forces, under constant French pressure, retreated from Orléans. Joan was widely credited with inspiring the French victory and she became a national heroine. The lifting of the siege of Orléans was to change French fortunes in the war. They regained territory in the Loire after Joan had seized several key bridges. Joan advised the French commander, the Duke of Alençon, on strategy. She encouraged him to go on the offensive. The duke took her advice and attacked the English at the village of Patay and inflicted on them a significant defeat. The French army resumed their advance and rapidly took Troyes and Rheims. Joan’s encouragement and strategic vision

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had proven invaluable. She was now loved by the people and respected by the French army. Charles ennobled her and her family. Joan encouraged the prince to receive the crown of France in Rheims, where French monarchs were traditionally crowned. Emboldened by Joan, the prince traveled to Rheims and was crowned Charles VII, king of France. This was an event of huge symbolic significance and the ordinary people of France began to rally to Charles VII. However, the French advance was checked when they failed to capture Paris. Once again Joan was involved in the fighting and again received a minor wound. The French army seemed to be on the verge of taking Paris when it was ordered to withdraw by its commander. This has surprised many commentators and some have attributed it to a lack of supplies, the approach of winter, and even treachery. In 1430, King Charles VII ordered Joan of Arc to Compiegne, where the English and their Burgundian allies were besieging the town. During the fighting to break the siege, she was thrown off her horse and was taken captive by the Burgundians. The English entered into negotiations with the Burgundians for Joan. They had recognized that she had inspired the French army and they saw her as a clear threat to their position in France. Finally, the Burgundians exchanged Joan for 10,000 francs. She was abandoned by the dauphin and the French court. The English put Joan on trial on the capital charge of heresy and witchcraft. During the trial the simple country girl amazed the court with her articulate defense of her actions and her great knowledge of theology. During her imprisonment she was ill-treated and threatened with torture. On May 28, 1431, the tribunal announced that Joan of Arc was guilty of heresy. It claimed that the voices that she heard were voices of devils and that she was a witch. Two days later, on May 30, at 19 years of age, Joan was burned at the stake in Rouen. She died bravely, protesting her innocence: “My Voices did come from God and everything that I have done was by God’s order.” The new French king, who had done nothing to save her, declared Joan innocent. He designated her a martyr. Some 20 years after her death the pope declared her innocent of all charges. Joan of Arc was canonized by the Catholic Church as a saint in 1920. Wafa Hozien

Further Reading Brown, Mary Millbank. The Secret History of Jeanne d’Arc, Princess, Maid of Orléans. New York: Vantage, 1962. DeVries, Kelly. Joan of Arc: A Military Leader. Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton, 1999. DeVries, Kelly. “A Woman Leader of Men: Joan of Arc’s Military Career.” In Bonnie Wheeler and Charles T. Wood, eds. Fresh Verdicts on Joan of Arc. New York: Garland, 1996. Famiglietti, Richard C. Royal Intrigue: Crisis at the Court of Charles VI 1392–1420. AMS Studies in the Middle Ages, 9. New York: AMS Press. 1987. Seward, Desmond. The Hundred Years’ War: The English in France, 1337–1453. New York: Atheneum, 1978. Taylor, Larissa Juliet. The Virgin Warrior: The Life and Death of Joan of Arc. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009.

Jos Riots (2010) The Jos Riots of 2010 were a series of clashes between the Hausa-Fulani (Muslim) people and the Berom (Christian) people in the Plateau State in the central region of Nigeria, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,000 people. Jos lies at the boundary of the Muslim-majority north and Christian-majority south in Nigeria. The origin of this particular conflict is unclear; it is variously reported to have begun after a group of Muslim youths burned down a church filled with worshippers, or after a football (soccer) match, or due to the rebuilding of contested homes destroyed in the 2008 riots. The Plateau State has a history of violent religious conflict, with major riots and loss of life in 2001, 2004, and 2008. The 2010 violence began in Jos on January 16 and quickly spread to neighboring villages. Hundreds of people died in additional clashes in March 2010. According to the New York Times, in the latter phase, the slaughtered villagers were mostly Christians, slain by machete attacks from groups of Hausa-Fulani Muslims in retaliation for deaths in the earlier conflict. In an underdeveloped area governmental influence can be a key to economic and political advancement. The Berom (indigenes) have been settled in the Jos region for much longer and hold most of the political power, while the Hausa-Fulani people settled more recently and are thus

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seen as “immigrants” with little hope of having authority, or achieving justice in disputes. In addition, the Christians in the area accuse Muslim forces of trying to impose Islam on the people of the area. The weak to nonexistent response of the central government, along with recurring corruption and graft, has contributed to the continuing violence. R. Don Deal See also Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Further Reading Taft, Patricia, and Nate Haken. Violence in Nigeria: Patterns and Trends. New York: Springer, 2015.

Josephus (37–ca. 100 CE) Titus Flavius Josephus, a first-century Roman-Jewish scholar, historian, and hagiographer, was born in Jerusalem, then part of Roman Judea, the second son of Matthias. His mother claimed to be descended from the Hasmonean dynasty. Initially, Josephus fought against the Romans during the Jewish Revolt (66–70 CE) as head of Jewish forces in Galilee, until surrendering to Romans led by Vespasian after a six-week siege of Yodfat (Jotapata) in 67. While trapped at Yodfat Josephus claimed to have experienced a divine revelation that led to his predicting Vespasian would become emperor. After Yodfat fell, the Romans invaded, killing thousands; the survivors committed suicide. According to Josephus, he was trapped in a cave with 40 companions in July 67 CE. The Romans demanded surrender, but they refused. Josephus suggested a method of collective suicide: they drew lots and killed each other, one by one, counting to every third person. Two men were left who surrendered and became prisoners. In 69 the prediction concerning Vespasian came true and Josephus was released. At this time Josephus assumed the emperor’s family name of Flavius. He later defected to the Romans and was granted Roman citizenship, accommodations in Judaea, and a pension. He later became an adviser and friend of Vespasian’s son Titus, serving as his translator when Titus led the siege of Jerusalem, which resulted in the city’s destruction and the looting and demolition of Herod’s Temple.

The writings of Josephus are major sources of our understanding of Jewish life and history during the first century. His works include material about individuals, groups, customs, and geographical locations. His writings provide an extrabiblical account of the post-Exilic period of the Maccabees, the Hasmonean dynasty, and the rise of Herod the Great. He refers to the Sadducees, Jewish high priests of the time, Pharisees, Essenes, the Herodian Temple, Quirinius’s census, the Zealots, and to Pontius Pilate, Herod the Great, Agrippa I and Agrippa II, John the Baptist, James the brother of Jesus, and to Jesus Christ. His works include War of the Jews (sometimes referred to as The Jewish War, Jewish Wars, or History of the Jewish War), ca. 75; Antiquities of the Jews (sometimes referred to as Jewish Antiquities, or Antiquities of the Jews/Jewish Archeology), ca. 94; Flavius Josephus Against Apion (or Against Apion, Contra Apionem, or Against the Greeks), ca. 97; and The Life of Flavius Josephus (or Autobiography of Flavius Josephus), ca. 99. Josephus’s life remains ambiguous. He has been described as a law-observant Jew who believed in Hellenistic Judaism, and as a traitor whose work was not to be studied or translated. He is criticized for failing to commit suicide in Galilee and, after his capture, accepting Roman patronage. Because of the paucity of other sources, Josephus is our only source of knowledge for much of the history of Judaism in the first century CE. Approached with cautious skepticism, his books provide important background for an understanding of both the beginning of modern Judaism and the historical setting of the New Testament. His writings have been very influential, and his accounts of Roman warfare and the Jewish Revolt are important though biased writings. James Menzies See also Jewish Revolt; Masada, Siege of; Zealots Further Reading Hadas-Lebel, Mireille. Flavius Josephus: Eyewitness to Rome’s First-Century Conquest of Judaea. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. Josephus, Flavius. The Complete Works of Flavius Josephus. Translated by William Whiston. Green Forest, AR: New Leaf Publishing Group, 2008. Raphael, Frederic. A Jew Among Romans: The Life and Legacy of Flavius Josephus. New York: Random House, 2013.

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Joshua In the Hebrew scriptures, Joshua was the man chosen by God to replace Moses after his death as the leader of the Jewish nation as they entered the Promised Land. Over a period of decades Joshua had shown himself worthy of this new role. He was a brave and faithful leader. In addition, he had been prepared for it. Joshua saw all the miracles God performed in Egypt. Soon after leaving Egypt, he had been chosen by Moses to lead the fight against the Amalekites, an enemy of the Jews. In this battle Joshua experienced victory (Exodus 17:9). He became Moses’s right-hand man. When Moses went up Mount Sinai to receive the law, Joshua went with him until the final ascent. After the sin of the golden calf, Joshua remained in the meeting tent outside of the camp with Moses, separated from the people (Exodus 24:17; 33:11). When other prophets arose, Joshua was overly concerned with the honor of his mentor (Numbers 11:28). At Kadesh Barnea, Joshua was chosen to represent his tribe as one of the spies sent into the Promised Land (Numbers 13:16). Only he and Caleb believed in God’s promise of victory. They remained faithful to the Lord even when the people wanted to stone them (Numbers 14:10). No doubt, the faith of Joshua was strengthened by his seeing God’s actions and holiness in his previous experiences. After the people refused to enter the land, Joshua and Caleb were the only adults permitted to enter it. After God’s appointment of Joshua as the head of the nation, Moses publicly proclaimed it (Numbers 27:18; Deuteronomy 1:38; 31:7). Before the death of Moses, immediately before assuming this role, Joshua witnessed the defeat of two Transjordan kings (Deuteronomy 3:21). This prepared him for becoming the political and military leader who would lead the nation in battles to come as they crossed the Jordan. Not only did Joshua have military experience, the Pentateuch says that he was full of wisdom (Deuteronomy 34:9). Even with these qualifications, Joshua knew the enormity of following a leader like Moses. Moses spoke face to face with God and was called the servant of God (Joshua 1:1–3). Joshua needed to rely on the priests for revelation from God (Numbers 27:21). He only obtained the title “servant of the Lord” after his death (Joshua 24:29). From the beginning, however, God promised Joshua that he

would be with him, as he was with Moses. The Lord told the new leader to be strong, courageous, obedient, unafraid, and to be a follower of the ways of the Lord (1:1–9). Joshua proved to be all of these. The book that bears his name in the Hebrew scriptures is the first book of the second division of the Old Testament, known as the “Prophets.” It pictures him as one who is zealous for the law of Moses. From the beginning, he calls the people to faithfulness to this law (Joshua 1:7–8). At the end of his life, he calls for a renewal of the covenant the people made with God (Joshua 23–24). Joshua’s zeal for the law and the honor of God is seen throughout the book. He commands the new generation of males to undergo circumcision. He leads the first celebration of Passover in 40 years. At his insistence, the people erect a stone memorial to God’s actions. The Ark of the Covenant is to go before the army (Joshua 3:3–4; 4:19–24; 5:1–10). He knows that the people disobeyed God at Kadesh Barnea, and they are prone to repeat their lack of faith. The book of Joshua has a strong emphasis on the faithfulness of God to keep his promises. God had promised the Patriarchs to give the people the land. Joshua leads the people in obtaining this promise. In the first 12 chapters, the Jews conquer the land. In the last 12 chapters, each tribe receives their portion of the inheritance. The name Joshua means “the lord is salvation.” In the book, God is the savior who brings victory and Joshua is God’s agent who leads the way to this salvation. Even though God is the one responsible for military victory, Joshua’s wise tactics are also evident. After crossing the Jordan, Joshua cuts the land in half. He defeats Jericho and Ai in central Palestine (Joshua 6–8). Jericho was a strategic target since it was on an important trade route in the middle of the country. Once controlling the center, Joshua conquers the south (chapters 9–10). Afterward, the Jews turned their attention to the north (Joshua 11). In the south, instead of using time-consuming sieges, Joshua employs lightning-fast raids on key cities. This breaks the military might of the enemy. Joshua makes some mistakes. He does not seek the decision of the Lord and unknowingly enters into a treaty with the Gibeonites (Joshua 9). He seems to be overconfident before the battle of Ai and has a crisis of faith after the

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defeat there (7:1–3, 7). However, he remains faithful to God and continues to serve the people. He has learned from Moses about the key to victory. He goes to the Lord in prayer. After victory, Joshua builds an altar to God and offers sacrifices. Like Moses, he then reads the blessings and curses of the Lord from the law to the people (8:30–35). This is a preview of the renewal of the Covenant in Joshua 23–24. As a leader, Joshua acts as a bridge. Not only does he replace Moses, he completes the story of the Exodus. The people have gone from wandering in the wilderness to a nation in the new land. With his death, along with the death of the high priest Eleazar, who was the son of Aaron, the final ties to the age of Moses and Aaron came to an end (Joshua 24:29–33). How will the people respond? The rest of the Hebrew scriptures answer that question. In the New Testament, Jesus is the Greek equivalent of the Hebrew name Joshua. The conquest of the land by Joshua is pictured as a type of the rest Jesus provides for his people. Kenneth Wayne Yates See also Ai, Battle of; Gideon; Israelite Conquest of Canaan; Jericho, Battle of Further Reading Butler, Trent C. Joshua. Word Biblical Commentary. Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1983. Harris, J. Gordon. Joshua. New International Biblical Commentary. Peabody, MA: Paternoster Press, 2000. Howell, Don N. Servants of the Servant: A Biblical Theology of Leadership. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2003. Woudstra, Marten H. The Book of Joshua. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983.

Judaism and War As early as the narratives of the patriarchs, Jewish texts consider matters of war. In Genesis 14, Abraham (at this point in the narrative he is still known as Abram) mustered some 318 retainers and engaged the kings of Sodom and Gomorrah in battle to free his nephew Lot from captivity as a prisoner of war in the middle of a regional conflict. In

the Song at the Sea sung by Moses, at the splitting of the Sea of Reeds, God is styled a “warrior” who cast Pharaoh’s chariots and army into the sea (Exodus 15:3–4). At times, the Bible indicates that God is actually involved in fighting a particular battle—“See, I will deliver Jericho and her king [and her] warriors into your hands” (Joshua 6:2). At other times, the Ark of the Covenant or some other symbol is used to call upon the power of the divine to turn the tide in favor of the Israelites. When Amalek engaged Israel at Rephidim (cf. Exodus 17:8–13), Moses stood on a promontory above the fray, and “whenever Moses held up his hand, Israel prevailed; but whenever he let down his hand, Amalek prevailed” (Exodus 17:11). Yet when the Ark was brought on the battlefield against the Philistines (described in I Samuel 4:5–11), and the Philistines called out, “Woe to us! Who will save us from the power of this mighty God?” (I Samuel 4:8), the Philistines were nonetheless victorious, capturing the Ark and taking it back to their stronghold in Ashdod. The Bible is clear, then (and the later rabbinic tradition emphasizes with respect to the narrative of Rephidim, cf. Mishnah Rosh Hashanah 3:8), that the war-making power of the divine is not controlled theurgically, but rather God shapes the outcome of battle in accordance with the loyalty of the Israelites to divine will. Hence, the Israelites’ invasion of Ai (cf. Joshua 7) is unsuccessful because of the sins of the Israelites—specifically, the pilfering of the booty of Jericho by Achan, son of Carmi, transgressing the divine demand that no spoils be taken from that battle. In addition to the categories of obligatory war (Milhemet Misva) and discretionary war (Milhemet Reshut) established in the Mishnah, the Talmud establishes a third category of war, those “to diminish the heathens so that they shall not march against [the Jews]” (cf. Babylonian Talmud, Sot.ah 44b)—which some sages hold to be obligatory and others hold to be discretionary. Relying on this further category, some later authorities hold preemptive war to be obligatory, while others hold that preemptive action does not even fit the category of a discretionary war and is therefore never legitimate. As for those who hold that a preemptive war is discretionary, the requirement that such a war be waged at the behest of a king and sanctioned by a Great Sanhedrin (that is, the court of 71 judges) would preclude preemptive strikes in the contemporary period.

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In addition to describing the various categories of war itself, the Bible and rabbinic literature both deal in great detail with how a war might be prosecuted. These subtopics include defining the types of war, exempting certain individuals from participating in a war, offering the enemy peaceful surrender, treating captives and booty, and conducting a siege. The various types of wars identified by the Bible and Talmud have already been discussed, and the distinction drawn there between an obligatory and a discretionary war is important for understanding who is to participate in war and whom Jewish combatants are to engage. The Torah (Deuteronomy 20:5–8) outlines the various categories of individuals who are excused from a discretionary war, and correspondingly, whom the Israelites are to attack: obligatory wars such as those against Amalek are to be waged against the entire enemy (cf. I Samuel 15:2–3), while discretionary wars are waged against males only. Preceding an attack with an invitation to peace is enjoined by the Torah (Deuteronomy 20:10–12). The medieval commentator Rashi (France, 1040–1105 CE) limits this requirement to discretionary wars, though Maimonides (Egypt, 1138–1204 CE) disagrees. Where the city to be attacked includes a civilian population, Jewish law requires additional overtures for peace and surrender; Nachmanides (Spain, 1194–1270 CE) explains that “it is from this commandment that we learn to deal with compassion even with our enemies even at time of war.” Noncombatants are to be given one route by which to flee the scene of the battle (cf. Sun Tzu’s Art of War, chapter VII, in which the author teaches this as a military strategy against combatants who are otherwise surrounded and would fight to the death); this injunction led to controversy among contemporary authorities of Jewish law as to whether PLO terrorists were to be allowed to escape Beirut during the 1982 siege of Beirut. The Torah’s description of proper conduct during a siege includes an injunction not to destroy the fruit-bearing trees of a besieged city (Deuteronomy 20:19–20), although this is understood to apply to a discretionary war alone, and in Israel’s war with Moab, the prophet Elisha explicitly commanded the Israelites to fell such trees (cf. II Kings 3:19). While Israel is granted the spoils of war from a city that they capture, the taking of females as booty was strictly regulated. These individuals were to be treated as wives, not to be used and simply sold

off as slaves at a later date (Deuteronomy 21:10–14). Chattel may be taken as booty for the troops, although at times such booty is proscribed—King Saul’s failure to kill the entire Amalekite population as well as their animals, and his taking of their choice animals as booty, cost him the kingship of Israel (cf. I Samuel 15:7–23). Likewise, as mentioned, Achan’s misappropriation of the proscribed booty at Jericho cost the Israelites the battle at Ai. The Talmudic doctrine of the “pursuer” (cf. Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 73a), that one may even use lethal force to stop an individual who is pursing someone to kill him or her, is the basis for Jewish principles of individual self-defense. Some Jewish jurists have applied this doctrine to the law of war to be prosecuted by secular governments; this sort of campaign fits neither category of “war” according to the Jewish tradition. But the doctrine of the pursuer would seem best to describe operations against nonstate actors such as terrorists. One problem with this doctrine is that it is highly restricted by Jewish law, and these restrictions greatly hamstring the activities of modern armies. Thus, even where self-defense is mandated by Jewish law, one may neither kill an innocent third party to save a life, nor compel a person to risk his or her life to save the life of another, nor kill the pursuer after his or her evil act is over as a form of punishment. The doctrine of the pursuer also prohibits one from using more force than is minimally needed. The rise of such nonstate actors has rekindled ageold questions of who is an innocent civilian; Jewish tradition encourages innocent civilians to remove themselves from the battlefield and assumes that those who voluntarily remain in a city under siege have taken on the mantle of combatant. However, some contemporary Jewish jurists have relied on a more narrow understanding of the pursuer to argue that the doctrine does not include those who are merely political supporters. Rabbinic sources seem not to take on the question of the unintentional killing of innocent civilians who involuntarily remain behind in a war zone—although this would be forbidden under the doctrine of the pursuer, it may be seen as parallel to the death of Jewish soldiers who also may be killed without their consent. The founding of the State of Israel in 1948 has had a significant impact on the Jewish view of war, with rabbis and scholars considering the role that war would play in

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the preservation of a modern Jewish nation-state. The writings of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, first Ashkenazi chief rabbi of Israel, address the question of whether an individual may or indeed must sacrifice his or her life for others; Kook explains that when the existence of the Jewish people as a whole is at stake, one is indeed obligated to sacrifice one’s own life—though not every war of the State of Israel would necessarily fall into the category of obligatory war for which one would be obliged to serve. A distinction is drawn by some between wars for which Jewish nationhood is threatened and those for which Jewish political sovereignty over the land of Israel is at stake. Some scholars have argued that a contemporary Jewish ethic of war should rest on a modern conception of warfare, turning to just war theory rather than the Bible for its foundations. Modern rabbinic works on the conduct of war include the Mah.ane Yisrael (“The Camp of Israel”) of Israel Meir Kagan (1839–1933) and the Law of the Military in Israel (published 1949) by Alter David Regensberg, a student of Kook. The concept of purity of arms influenced early Zionist leaders to encourage restraint, in stark contrast to Biblical conceptions of the lex talionis; contemporary Israeli military ethics draw heavily upon purity of arms, including an understanding that noncombatants should be immune from deliberate attacks. Likewise, this ideal does not allow for the adoption of immoral elements in war even when used by an enemy, although it does allow for accommodation to the nature of threats caused by the enemy. The Israeli Defense Force sustains a Military Rabbinate unit similar to military chaplaincies in Western democratic states. Despite a developed law of war, Jewish sources give priority to peace while not being committed to pacifism. Maimonides explains that Joshua sued the inhabitants of the land of Canaan for peace three times before pursuing a military option, setting the role of armed conflict as a last resort. Phil Lieberman See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Bar Kochba Revolt; Bible and War; Christianity and War; Islam and War (Jihad); Jewish Revolt; Just War Tradition; Maimonides; Masada, Siege of; Milhemet Misvah; Milhemet Reshut; Six-Day War; Talmud and War; Yom Kippur War

Further Reading Bleich, J. David. “Preemptive War in Jewish Law.” Tradition 21 (Spring 1983): 3–41. Firestone, Reuven. Holy War in Judaism: The Fall and Rise of a Controversial Idea. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Kasher, Asa. “Jewish Ethics and War.” Iin Elliot N. Dorff and Jonathan K. Crane, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Ethics and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 487–99. Neusner, Jacob. War and Peace in Rabbinic Judaism: A Documentary Account. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2011. Schiffman, Lawrence, and Joel B. Wolowelsky. War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition. New York: Yeshiva University Press, 2007.

Just War Tradition Often referred to as “just war theory,” the classical just war framework provides the foundation for customary international law as well as the formal laws of armed conflict, in addition to ethical reflection. Its roots are in the classical (Greco-Roman) and Christian traditions, but its elaboration and expansion is clearly a Roman-Christian legacy associated with the late Western Roman Empire, specifically with thinkers like Augustine and Ambrose. As a Christian framework, it is intended to provide guidance that will diminish the frequency of war. In its current secular form just war proponents need not be Christian or religious although the foundations of the tradition are deeply rooted in Christian thought and history. Just war thinking begins with three criteria for the just decision (jus ad bellum) to use military force: legitimate authority acting on a just cause with right intent. Practical, secondary jus ad bellum considerations include: likelihood of success, proportionality of ends, and last resort. Just war thinking also has criteria regarding how war is conducted (jus in bello): using means and tactics proportionate (proportionality) to battlefield objectives and which limit harm to civilians, other noncombatants, and property (discrimination). This entry elaborates Christian just war thought, differentiates it from holy war and pacifism, and introduces some of the traditional Christian thinkers on the topic over the past two millennia.

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Just war theory argues that political actors should carefully examine the following principles when considering the implementation of military force:

• discrimination: Has care been taken to reasonably protect the lives and property of legitimate noncombatants?

Jus ad Bellum • legitimate authority: Supreme political authorities are morally responsible for the security of their constituents, and therefore are obligated to make decisions about war and peace. • just cause: Self-defense of citizens’ lives, livelihoods, and way of life are typically just causes; more generally speaking, the cause is likely just if it rights a past wrong, punishes wrongdoers, or prevents further wrong. (This formulation derives directly from the fourth-century Christian theologian Augustine, as recorded in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, Question 40, Secunda Secundae). • right intent: Political motivations are subject to ethical scrutiny; violence intended for the purpose of order, justice, and ultimate conciliation is just, whereas violence for the sake of hatred, revenge, and destruction is not just. • likelihood of success: Political leaders should consider whether or not their action will make a difference in real-world outcomes. This principle is subject to context and judgment, because it may be appropriate to act despite a low likelihood of success (e.g., against local genocide). Conversely, it may be inappropriate to act due to low efficacy despite the compelling nature of the case. • proportionality of ends: Does the preferred outcome justify this course of action in terms of the cost in lives and material resources? • last resort: Have traditional diplomatic and other efforts been reasonably employed in order to avoid outright bloodshed?

Classical just war thinkers, such as Augustine of Hippo (354–430), long held that the end of a just war is peace. More recently, some scholars have fleshed out a jus post bellum, justice following war segment to the just war tradition to give ethical and policy direction to this affirmation.

In these matters is the belief that peace can sometimes best be served by war. The ultimate goal is a just peace, not simply peace, for a tyrant or dictator can have peace. Jus in Bello • proportionality: Are the battlefield tools and tactics employed proportionate to battlefield objectives?

Jus Post Bellum • order: Beginning with existential security, a sovereign government extends its roots through the maturation of government capacity in the military (traditional security), governance (domestic politics), and international security dimensions. • justice: Getting one’s “just deserts,” including consideration of individual punishment and restitution policies when appropriate for those who violated the law of armed conflict. • conciliation: Coming to terms with the past so that parties can imagine and move forward toward a shared future. Much has been written on the history of the just war tradition and the thinkers, including Christians from the early centuries of the Common Era who addressed issues of war and Christians’ responses to war and the ethics of war. Early Christian writers such as Polycarp, Origen, Tertullian, and Eusebius each addressed questions of government and the military. Often, these thinkers have been wrongly identified as pacifists. The early Christian writers were most concerned with the pagan religious duties that Roman magistrates and soldiers had to perform as part of their everyday jobs, including kneeling to idols, acknowledging the deity of the emperor, participating in various sacral feasts and ceremonies, and the like. The second- and third-century church was deeply concerned about these activities as idol worship rather than questioning the efficacy of just magistrates, police, and security personnel. Augustine (354–430 CE) traveled across the Roman world and saw the glories and perversions of imperial Rome. As a Christian observing both the Pax Romana and the cruelties of the arena, Augustine pondered the

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conditions for when it was just to employ violence in political life. Augustine’s formulation of the just use of force relied heavily on the notion of caritas, or charity: “love your neighbor as yourself.” In domestic society as well as international life, how does one go about loving one’s neighbor? Augustine argued that within society adherence to the rule of law, including punishment of lawbreakers, was a way of loving one’s neighbors. When one loves one’s neighbors one refrains from harming them and supports the authorities in their efforts to provide security to the citizenry. Moreover, Augustine noted, caritas means protecting one’s neighbors when they are attacked, even if one is forced to employ violence to protect them. Augustine used Romans 13:1–5 from the Christian New Testament to argue that sovereign authorities have a responsibility to order and to justice, including the use of the sword: Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resists the power, resists the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he [the government official] is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid. For he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. (King James Version) Augustine suggested that this is also true with regard to foreign threats: loving our immediate neighbors (fellow citizens) means self-defense of the polity. Loving our foreign neighbors may mean using force to punish evildoers or right a wrong. He writes,“True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good” (quoted in Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part II, II, Question 40). In addition to charity (caritas), Augustine’s writings suggest a second reason for jus ad bellum: order. Augustine

consistently privileged political order over disorder. The Augustinian conception of the universe is one in which God is the ultimate Creator, judge, arbiter, and end. Although God allows sin and imperfection in this world, he nonetheless sustains the universe with a divine order. This order is mirrored in society by the political order with its laws and hierarchy. Augustine argued that although the City of Man, the temporal order, is a poor reflection of the City of God, the eternal order, nonetheless it is the political principle of temporal order—based on the concept of justice—that most approximates the eternal order. During his lifetime Augustine witnessed the alternative: the looting of Rome and ultimately the sacking of his home in North Africa in the final days of his life. Augustine’s fear of political disorder was more than a distaste for regime change, it was the dread of losing civic order with all of its attendant moral protections, duties, and opportunities. The distinction here between violence (outside the law) and force (at the hands of legitimate political authorities) is important. Augustine’s intellectual heir was the Dominican theologian Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), who argued that a war was just when it met three requirements: sovereign authority, just cause, and right intent. It is noteworthy that Aquinas began not with just cause or right intent, but with sovereign authority: In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war.  .  .  . And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers . . . so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies. (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part II, II, Question 40) Aquinas saw most violence as criminal and lawless. The fundamental purpose of the state was to provide a counterpoise to lawlessness.

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Aquinas also argued that states should be concerned with just cause. He writes: “Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.” He quotes Augustine: “Wherefore Augustine says: ‘A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly’” (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part II, II, Question 40). Aquinas’s conception of just cause, drawn from Augustine, is richer than contemporary debates focused singly on self-defense because it includes punishing wrongdoing and restitution of some sort to victims. Indeed, it seems that Aquinas’s just cause would support the use of force to curb aggressive nonstate actors, protect individual human life via humanitarian intervention, and punish rogue regimes that disrupt the international status quo. Finally, Aquinas said that the just resort to force required just intent. The dilemmas of ascertaining right intent have long been noted. For the average soldier, medieval theologians solved this problem by providing absolution to their troops before battle and sometimes providing it again after the battle for the survivors. This did not completely solve the problem of rage and bloodlust on the battlefield, but sought a spiritual solution to a very human dynamic. Aquinas further writes, “Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.” In other words, Aquinas’s idea of right intent is that states should seek to advance the security of their people and avoid wars based only on greed or vengeance. Aquinas again cites Augustine: “Hence Augustine says: ‘The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war’” (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part II, II, Question 40). All of this comports with the many statements of Jesus regarding intentions as well as actions, such as his admonition that lust was equivalent to adultery or teaching on greed: “God looketh on the heart” (see Matthew 5:28; Luke 16:15). It is beyond the scope of this entry to deal with all of the great Christian thinkers and their views on the ethics of

war, but nearly every question conceivable about the ethics of armed conflict and the responsibilities of the individual and the state can be found therein with a little study and most of it falls within the just war tradition. For example: Aquinas on self-defense against the Turks, Vitoria and Suarez criticizing Spanish treatment of native people in the New World (noncombatant immunity), Hugo Grotius articulating an international law outside of ecclesiastical mandates, Martin Luther and John Calvin discussing the importance of a robust government and the ethics of self-defense, and others in the 20th century, such as Paul Ramsey on just war in the nuclear age and Jean Bethke Elshtain on human rights violations and the possibilities of justice and forgiveness. Dietrich Bonhoeffer provided a heroic, personal example of standing up to gross tyranny while Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, and others called the West to oppose Nazism using categories of justice. C. S. Lewis refuted pacifism as irresponsible. Just war theory is not a middle point between holy war and pacifism, it is entirely different altogether. Religiously inspired pacifism is a commitment against violence and an allegiance to peace defined as nonviolence. However, the

Drones

Contemporary conflict has been irrevocably changed through the introduction of advanced technologies, especially evident in the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles, sometimes known as “drones.” Many of these types of weapons have presented a challenge to those seeking to integrate them into a just war template. Can the existing just war tradition incorporate these weapons in the manner that the founders of this tradition envisioned? Are the important tenets of proportionality and likelihood of success able to adjust to the incorporation of new weaponry, some of which may in fact be programmed to decide when and at whom to fire, without any human input? These “autonomous systems,” some of which are beginning to appear on today’s battlefields in Syria and Iraq, present a challenge to those hoping to be able to remain bound by the long-recognized body of thought known as the just war tradition.

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pacifist position in the West has been a small minority throughout the past 2,000 years because of the sense that Christians have a this-worldly vocation to public order and security. The holy warrior, on the other hand, believes that violence can be employed in defense of or to further eternal values. In practice, holy wars are often reactions to threats that seem to undermine the basic ideals and existence of one’s civilization. Holy war is different from just war theory in that the former usually lacks all restraint due to the holy ideals and ends of the war. In contrast, the just war tradition begins with the notion of restraint and limits, rooted in theological concepts of love and political stewardship. Finally, although it is true that the term “just war theory” is rooted in Western Roman-Christian thinking, it is also true that other major religious traditions do call for restraint on the battlefield. For instance, the Qur’an specifically forbids the destruction of life-sustaining agriculture

and the poisoning of wells; the Confucian code elevates virtue on and off the battlefield and advocates wise diplomacy and restraint; and Hindu sources such as the Maha­ bharata and Ramayana speak of the ethical and religious obligations of fighters. Eric Patterson See also Aquinas, Thomas; Augustine; Christianity and War Further Reading Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. New York: Christian Classics, 1981. Augustine. City of God. Translated by Henry Bettenson. New York: Penguin, 2003. Charles, J. Daryl, and Timothy J. Demy. War, Peace, and Christianity. Wheaton, IL: Crossways, 2010. Johnson, James Turner. The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Russell, Frederick H. The Just War in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

K Kamikaze

Having previously secured effective control of Korea in 1258, the Mongol ruler had already greatly diminished commerce between Song China and Japan. Firm control was secured when the Korean Koryo dynasty suppressed the last rebellion. The defeat of the last rebels on the island of Cheju-do in 1273 brought the Korean satellite firmly within the orbit of the Mongol dynasty. The next step involved the conquest of the islands of Tsushima and Iki-shima. The small garrisons of each island were quickly overcome but secured time for Japanese leaders to muster a large force to meet the Mongol landing at Hakata Bay. The Mongol invaders faced stiff resistance upon landing on November 19, 1274, but were able to advance inland. The senior Mongol commander, Liu Fuxiang, was wounded during the continuing battle. By that point, Liu had already ordered the withdrawal of his forces to the boats. The reason for the withdrawal is unclear, but at that point the weather intervened in the form of a typhoon. The Mongol forces are estimated to have lost as many as 13,000 troops. So convinced were Japanese leaders that the storm represented divine intervention that Shinto shrines were rewarded for their efforts in defeating a Mongol fleet. Japanese scrolls indicate that the Japanese leaders believed the “little-kamikaze” was a manifestation of the special, divine protection accorded to their land and people.

Kamikaze is a Japanese term that is popularly translated as “divine wind” and has been used to denote several events and ideas. The term was originally part of the Japanese poetic tradition dating to the seventh century CE. It is most commonly associated with a pair of fortuitous typhoons during the late 13th century that were instrumental in preventing Mongol invasions of the main Japanese islands. The idea of divine intervention on behalf of Japan in a desperate time of need propagated through Japanese culture and religious ceremony. The same imagery was used by Japanese propagandists during the closing stages of World War II in justifying and describing pilots who attacked enemy ships by crashing their aircraft into the enemy vessels. In the midst of the protracted campaign against Song China, the Mongol emperor Kublai Khan (1215–1294) and his advisers determined that the final reduction of the enemy capital of Hangzhou would require naval supremacy. Former Song commander turned Mongol general Liu Cheng recommended the construction of a Mongol fleet to nullify Song control of the Yangtze River. The initial flotilla was constructed between 1269 and 1270. After the successful siege of Hsiang-yang in 1273, a victory enabled by the new Mongol amphibious capability that opened the gates to the Song heartland, the khan embarked on a parallel effort to secure the seaward flank of the campaign. 443

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Kublai Khan subsequently concentrated his efforts on destroying the Song dynasty. After the surrender of the capital and the last Chinese coastal enclave at Quanzhou in 1277, the Mongols prepared for another attempt to invade Japan. Contemporaneous accounts state that the invading forces gathered in the spring of 1281 may have numbered as many as 140,000 troops in more than 4,000 vessels, dispatched from Korea and China. Japanese forces opposing this armada numbered no more than 40,000. The Mongols found the Japanese far better prepared than in 1274. The Eastern Route Army attempted to land on Tsushima but was repulsed with heavy losses as the island was garrisoned and fortified. Rather than await the scheduled rendezvous with the Southern Route Army, the force continued to Iki-shima before dividing into two segments. In late June, attempts were made to land at Nagato and Hakata Bay. Unable to gain lodgment, the invaders withdrew first to a pair of offshore islands and then to Iki-shima. The arrival of the Southern Route Army altered the circumstances and the combined force moved on to Takashima, anchoring in Imari Bay. Japanese forces mounted small boat attacks similar to those used at Hakata Bay in June. These attacks paralyzed the invaders, exposing them to the intervention of the weather. In mid-August 1281, a typhoon struck the southwestern coast of Japan. The Mongol armies appear to have lost more than two-thirds of their strength, either killed in combat, drowned, or abandoned by leaders who retreated to the continent in the remaining seaworthy craft. Before the battle, great emphasis had been placed on offering prayers to a variety of deities, ranging from the sun goddess Amaterasu to Hachiman, variously worshiped in Buddhist and Shinto sects as a spirit influencing warfare. The outcome of the battle produced a significant, if temporary, schism between the samurai class and the various Japanese religious shrines. Each faction sought rewards for having delivered Japan from the Mongol invasion. The samurai believed the successful defense of the shoreline and small boat attacks were key factors in repelling the Mongol invasion force. Representatives of the religious shrines asserted that their prayers had called forth the storm, hence the designation “divine wind” or kamikaze. The influence of spiritual factors is attested by the fact that

at least two Shinto shrines received monetary awards before any samurai were paid. The implications of these beliefs would resonate for centuries. The decisions of the Tokugawa shogunate in the 16th and 17th centuries, falling back on isolation following the disastrous attempt to occupy Korea, were based in part on the belief in the divine protection accorded to Japan. During the Second World War, Japanese propagandists used the legends and imagery of the 13th-century kamikaze to recruit pilots for suicide attacks against encroaching Allied warships, leading to the modern usage of the term. K. J. Delamer See also Bushido Further Reading Axel, Albert, and Hideaki Hase. Kamikaze: Japan’s Suicide Gods. London: Longman, 2002. Delgado, James P. Kubilai Khan’s Lost Fleet: In Search of a Legendary Armada. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. Hanson, Victor Davis. Ripples of Battle: How Wars of the Past Still Determine How We Fight, How We Live and How We Think. New York: Doubleday, 2003. Turnbull, Stephen R. The Mongol Invasions of Japan, 1274 and 1281. Oxford: Osprey, 2010. Zaloga, Steven. Kamikaze: Japanese Special Attack Weapons 1944–45. Oxford: Osprey, 2011.

Kappel, Wars of (1529–1531) As of 1529, Catholicism held sway in the seven cantons of Switzerland—Fribourg, Luzern, Schwyz, Solothurn, Unterwalden, Uri, and Zug; four cantons—Basel, Bern, Schaufhausen, and Zurich—were Protestant. Various incitements and alliances among the cantons brought about the First War of Kappel of 1529. However, negotiations forestalled actual fighting, even as armies in the field fraternized in a famous meal, Kappeler Milchsuppe (Milk Soup of Kappel) that came to symbolize a desired state of reconciliation. But the Second War of Kappel (1531) would prove to be far more lethal. Prior to the Second War of Kappel, interreligious tensions grew to the point of war. Note must be made of the

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primary role of Huldrych Zwingli in these currents of religion, politics, and international diplomacy. Zwingli, with Luther and Calvin, was a major leader of the Protestant Reformation. As was then common, he was also much involved in political arrangements and diplomatic negotiations. However, due in part to his insistence on distinctive doctrines, passionately held and advocated, such as opposing Luther’s doctrine of the real presence of Christ in communion, Zwingli found himself in 1531 isolated from many religious reformers, from other Protestant cantons, and even from Philip of Hesse, the Protestant prince who had sheltered Luther in crisis and who wished to enact a Protestant league. Zwingli’s Zurich, acting alone of the Protestant cantons, imposed a food embargo on five Catholic cantons. The Catholic cantons, in turn, hurting from the food embargo and also believing the Protestants to be imposing undue religious pressure on the Thurgau lordship, declared war on Zurich on October 9, 1531. A rapid buildup and meeting of forces ensued.

The Battle of Kappel and Aftermath

The forces of Zurich numbered just over 2,000; those of the five Catholic cantons, at least 5,000. Zurich had been surprised by the declaration of war. Its mobilization was ragged and its soldiers arrived on the field of battle fatigued and disorganized, but supported by Zwingli and other pastors acting as chaplains. They deployed in a passive defense. The battle went badly for them from the start as they faced confident, well-prepared, and aggressive foes. The Protestant forces were soon overwhelmed, suffering more than 500 dead—including Zwingli and many pastors. The tenor of the times is told in the victors’ treatment of Zwingli’s body, which was quartered and burned, and the ashes scattered, befitting a heretic. The Protestant cantons, disturbed by the defeat, joined Zurich to put a force in the field to defeat the victors of Kappel. That force, too, suffered defeat and significant loss of life at the Battle of Gubel on October 24. The Second War of Kappel ended in the victory of the Catholic cantons in the Second Peace of Kappel, signed on November 15, 1531. The terms recognized the primacy of Catholic cantons— though admitting the coexistence of Swiss Protestant cantons and areas, a tolerant arrangement almost unheard of

in that day. This status quo remained in place until Protestant victory in a war of 1712. Mark A. Jumper See also Wars of the Reformation; Zwingli, Huldrych Further Reading Armstrong, Alistair. The European Reformation: 1500–1610. Oxford: Heinemann Education, 2002. Gordon, Bruce. The Swiss Reformation. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002. Tarr, Russell, and Keith Randell. Access to History: Luther and the Reformation in Europe 1500–64. 4th ed. Abingdon, UK: Hachette, 1989.

Karbala, Battle of (680 CE) The Battle of Karbala on October 10, 680 CE, though militarily insignificant, resulted in the death of Husayn-ibn-Ali, grandson of Muhammad. Anger over al-Husayn’s death played a central role in the permanent split of the Islam umma (body of believers) into Sunni and Shi’a branches.

Background

Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, died in June 632 without naming a replacement, so his closest followers (the Helpers) were forced to choose a successor. After much deliberation, the Helpers chose Abu Bakr, a trusted member of Muhammad’s inner circle as the first righteously guided caliph. This decision was challenged by some southern Arab tribes, who favored Muhammad’s closest blood relative, Ali ibn Abu Talib. The dispute soon turned deadly as assassins killed Umar, the second caliph, in 644 and Caliph Uthman in 656. Medinan tribes took advantage of Uthman’s death and named Ali ibn Abu Talib the fourth rightly guided caliph. Mu’awiya, the Umayyad governor in Damascus, Syria, disputed the decision and both sides mobilized for war. Hoping to avoid bloodshed, Mu’awiya cleverly stopped a battle at Siffin in July 657 by having his men hoist Qur’anic scriptures on their spears. Afterward, arbitration failed when Ali’s coalition split over the legitimacy of the process, and Ali was subsequently murdered in 661. After Ali’s death,

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Mu’awiya proclaimed himself caliph. To keep things quiet, Mu’awiya sidelined Al-Hasan, the eldest son of Ali, with a generous subsidy. The younger son of Ali, Al-Husayn, refused a similar bribe and instead retired to Medina to wait for an opportunity to act. The moment came when Mu’awiya daringly broke with tradition and named his son Yazid caliph in 680. Encouraged by a letter of support from dissenters in al-Kufa, Al-Husayn marched from Arabia in September 680, leading a small band of followers to start a revolt in Iraq.

The Battle

Al-Husayn did not travel far as he was cornered by a much larger Syrian army in a patch of desert near Karbala. Hoping to pressure Al-Husayn into peaceful submission, the Syrians did not attack but simply blocked access to a nearby water source. Al-Husayn refused to submit, and on October 10, 680, he brought on a battle by riding toward the enemy with his infant son in his arms. Hopelessly outnumbered, Husayn’s army was butchered, and Al-Husayn’s decapitated head was delivered to Yazid as proof of his death.

Consequences

The death of Al-Husayn at the battle of Karbala spelled the end of open rebellion against the Umayyid caliphate, which remained in power for six more years. However, the disgraceful murder of Al-Husayn by fellow Muslims contributed to a permanent split in Islam as the Shi’a (the followers of Ali) refused to accept the legitimacy of a caliph who was not from Muhammad’s blood relatives. Today, the death of Al-Husayn at Karbala serves as a powerful symbol of the conflict between good and evil. Al-Husayn’s selfless sacrifice and martyrdom are commemorated annually during the festival of Ashura on October 10. H. Allen Skinner See also Caliphate; Mu’awiya; Siffin, Battle of; Sunni-Shi’a Conflict Further Reading Al-Husayn, Abi-`Abdilláh. The Battle of Karbala. n.p.: Apps Publisher, 2014. Hyder, Syed Akbar. Reliving Karbala: Martyrdom in South Asian Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Kashmir Conflict The Kashmir Conflict is a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan with Hindu and Muslim religious dimensions that predate the end of British rule in the region in 1947. Situated mostly in the Himalayan Mountains, the state of Kashmir comprises the territory of Jammu, the Kashmir valley, and Ladakh. Encompassing an area of 85,806 square miles, the state is bordered by China, Pak­ istan, and the Indian states of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Urdu is the official language although Kashmiri, Dogri, and Pahari are also spoken in Kashmir. The people of Kashmir have lived peacefully following the Sufi tradition for centuries under both Sikh and Hindu rulers. The Muslim-dominated kingdom of Kashmir joined the Indian Union after Maharaja Hari Singh (1895–1961) signed the Instrument of Accession on October 22, 1947. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah (1905–1982) of the National Conference became the prime minister of Kashmir in March 1948, and the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir ratified accession to India in February 1949. A portion of Kashmir designated as Azad Kashmir remained a part of Pakistan. Kashmir has remained a point of contention between India and Pakistan, culminating in limited wars that took place in 1965, 1975, and 1999. Kashmir has been affected by terrorism, resulting in a decrease in the once-lucrative tourism industry, as well as in the death of many innocent civilians, both Hindus and Muslims. In 2002, Osama bin Laden wrote in his “Letter to the American People” that one of the reasons he was fighting against the United States was because of U.S. support for India (predominately Hindu) against Pakistan (predominately Muslim). The conflict is based upon the political-religious conviction, held by some political leaders in both countries, that Hindus belong in India and Muslims belong in Pakistan. In Pakistan, this logic declares that Kashmir should be in Pakistan by virtue of the state’s Muslim majority. Secularism has remained one of the pillars of the Indian state and solving the Kashmir problem has become a test case for it. Pakistan insists on a plebiscite to determine the future status of Kashmir, whereas India demands an end of Pakistani help to the Islamic separatist groups operating in Kashmir. An

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atmosphere of understanding between the Indian government and the people of Kashmir is very much essential to ending this dispute. Patit Paban Mishra See also India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in; Indo-Pakistani Wars Further Reading Behera, Navnita Chadha. State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. Bhargava, Gopal K., and S. C. Bhatt. Jammu and Kashmir. Delhi: Kalpaz, 2006. Margolis, Eric S. War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet. New York: Routledge, 2002. Mishra, Patit Paban. “India Pakistani Wars.” Encyclopedia of World History. Vol. VI. New York: Facts on File, 2008, pp. 206–8. Panigrahi, D. N. Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi: Routledge India, 2009. Schofield, Victoria. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. London: I. B. Tauris, 2002. Swami, Praveen. India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004. New York: Routledge, 2007. Wolpert, Stanley A. India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation? Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010.

Khalid ibn al-Walid (d. 642 CE) Khalid ibn al-Walid was nicknamed the “Sword of God” and was born of the tribe of Quraysh. Khalid was one of the key generals at the head of the early Arab/Muslim conquest forces that secured the Arabian Peninsula and then Syria and modern-day Iraq in the final years of the reign of the Prophet Muhammad and in the years immediately following his death. Khalid’s military strategy and execution resulted in the successful Islamic foothold in these regions in the early phase of Islamic expansion. In the years following the emigration of the young Muslim community to Medina, Khalid had fought successfully against Muhammad and his followers, commanding, for example, the left flank of the Quraysh at the Battle of Uhud in 625 CE and leading the Meccans to victory. Sometime around 628 CE, Khalid converted to Islam and became a follower of Muhammad, and from that point forward his talents were employed in the cause of Islam.

Khalid’s early campaigns outside the Arabian Peninsula, at the direction of the first caliph, Abu Bakr, employed a strategy of initially securing the Arab-occupied countryside so as to build strength without appearing to the Byzantines and Sassanid Persians to be a serious threat to their land. Khalid’s successes in combat have generally been attributed to his skilled use of light cavalry, which enabled agility and quick maneuverability against the more regimented Byzantine and Sassanid opponents. Another often-cited factor in Khalid’s military success is that the Byzantines and Sassanid Persians had weakened themselves over the decadeslong conflict with each other, allowing Khalid’s forces to advance in some cases against little resistance. Umar, the second caliph, harbored a strong personal dislike for Khalid and removed him from command as his first official act. Later, he dispossessed Khalid of half his personal property. Even in his new position as a subordinate commander, Khalid’s talents and dedication remained central to the ongoing success of the Arab/Muslim armies during his tenure. In addition to his role as a military commander, Khalid is recorded as a hadith transmitter, and he was also a maternal cousin of one of the most important companion hadith transmitters, ʿAbdullah ibn al-ʿAbbas. The name Khalid remains popular among Sunni Muslims to this day and is often reminiscent of the heady years of Islamic ascendency and conquest of new territories. Daniel A. Brubaker See also Caliphate; Uhud, Battle of Further Reading al-T.abari, Abi Ja’far Muh.ammad b. Jarir. Biographies of the Prophet’s Companions and Their Successors. Translated by Ella Landau-Tasseron. The History of Al-t.abari. Edited by Said Amir Arjomand. 40 vols. Vol. xxxix. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. al-T.abari, Abi Ja’far Muh.ammad b. Jarir. The Challenge to the Empires. Translated by Khalid Yahya Blankinship. The History of Al-t.abari. Edited by Said Amir Arjomand. 40 vols. Vol. xi. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993. al-T.abari, Abi Ja’far Muh.ammad b. Jarir. The Foundation of the Community [in English]. Translated by M. V. McDonald. The History of Al-t.abari. Edited by Said Amir Arjomand. 40 vols. Vol. vii. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987.

448  Kha¯lsa¯ al-T.abari, Abi Ja’far Muh.ammad b. Jarir. The Victory of Islam. Translated by Michael Fishbein. The History of Al-t.abari. Edited by Said Amir Arjomand. 40 vols. Vol. viii. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997. Donner, Fred. Early Islamic Conquests. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Guillaume, Alfred. The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ish.āq’s Sirat Rasul Allāh [in English]. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 1955.

Kha¯lsa¯ On the occasion of the spring harvest festival of 1699, Guru Gobind Singh is said to have founded the khālsā, a revolutionary organization meant to break Sikh initiates free from their past and tie them entirely to the teachings of the gurus. The “five beloved ones,” or panj piāre, were the first members, each responding to the guru’s call to enter his tent, supposedly to be killed as an expression of loyalty. They instead emerged reborn, having symbolically discarded their old selves. Initiation into the khālsā is a spiritual and physical transformation: after adopting the name “Singh” (lion) for men, or “Kaur” (princess) for women, initiates adopt five symbols: a comb, loose shorts, a steel bracelet, a sword or dagger, and uncut hair. This “uniform” of the saint-soldier, or sant sipāhī, not only marks them physically as followers of the guru, but as armed and ready to defend the oppressed. Sikhs treat these symbols with the utmost respect and have launched numerous legal challenges across the world in seeking to guarantee their right to wear them. They have historically faced great difficulty in winning exemptions for uncut hair kept in a turban and for the personal dagger. Not all Sikhs are initiated into the khālsā, including those who keep their hair uncut. Many delay until they feel spiritually prepared, whilst others live out their faith without ever aspiring to join. The khālsā today nevertheless enjoys near-unchallenged status as the institution embodying the full articulation of Sikh spirituality and temporal authority. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn

See also Dharam Yudh; Sant Sipāhī; Sikhism and War; Singh, Guru Gobind Further Reading Deol, Jeevan. “Eighteenth Century Khalsa Identity: Discourse, Praxis and Narrative.” In Arvind-pal Singh Mandair, C. Shackle, and Gurharpal Singh, eds. Sikh Religion, Culture and Ethnicity. Richmond, UK: Curzon, 2001. Takhar, Opinderjit Kaur. Sikh Identity. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005.

Khandaq, Battle of (627 CE) Also known as the Battle of the Trench or the Battle of Coalitions, this battle took place in 627 CE and was one of the early Islamic military successes. Under the leadership of the tribe of Quraysh from the city of Mecca, a coalition of polytheist and Jewish tribes tried to attack the city of Yatrib (Medina) in which Prophet Muhammad had settled with his Muslim followers. This battle was a decisive Muslim victory, which allowed Prophet Muhammad to strengthen his reputation and consolidate his rule of the city of Yatrib. The inferior Muslim forces were able to defeat the superior Meccan-led coalition by digging a trench (khandaq, from Persian) along the unprotected region of the city, thus preventing the direct assault on the city. The background for this battle was the ongoing feud between the polytheist idol-worshiping tribe of Quraysh from Mecca and Prophet Muhammad’s community of early converts to Islam. Prophet Muhammad was originally an inhabitant of Mecca. It was in the city of Mecca that he first began to preach his divine message, initially being able to convert some of the inhabitants. However, his preaching was met with harsh opposition from the members of the ruling tribe of Quraysh, of which Muhammad himself was also a member. The merchants of Mecca opposed the religious reforms that the Prophet Muhammad presented, especially the notion of monotheism. In addition, the merchants feared that Prophet Muhammad’s actions might harm their trade. The Meccan polytheists persecuted the early converts to Islam. Eventually, some of the converts would flee the

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harassment by migrating to Abyssinia, now known as Ethiopia. In 622 CE, following the invitation of a group of pilgrims from the neighboring city of Yatrib, Prophet Muhammad himself would leave Mecca and migrate to Yatrib with a group of his followers. In Yatrib, Muhammad would establish himself as an important leader among the local Arab and Jewish tribes and would become the leader of the city, thus establishing himself as not only a religious but also a political authority. Eventually, the name of the city would be changed to al-Medina (the City), an abbreviation of Madinat al-Nabi (the City of the Prophet). However, the migration to Yatrib did not diminish the importance of Mecca for the Muslims. Even after the migration to Medina, Mecca remained the religious center of Islam, and the city’s shrine, the Kaaba, was declared as the direction of prayer (kibla) for all Muslims. A series of raids and battles took place between the Muslims of Yatrib and the polytheists of Mecca. The Muslims raided Meccan caravans in Nakhla (624 CE), leading to the death of a Meccan guard. Later in the same year, the Battle of Badr took place as the Muslims once again raided a Meccan caravan, defeating the Meccan mercenaries and killing many of the Quraysh leaders. However, later in the Battle of Uhud (625 CE), the Muslims suffered a defeat at the hands of the Meccan forces. After each battle, Muhammad used the opportunity to act against the Jewish residents of Yatrib, banishing the Banu Kaynuka tribe after the Battle of Badr and the Banu al-Nadir tribe after the battle of Uhud. In 627 CE, the Meccans were encouraged by the Jews of the Khaybar oasis to assault the city of Yatrib itself. For this purpose, a coalition was composed of various polytheist and Jewish tribes, supposedly 10,000 strong. In order to repel the invasion of the superior Meccan-led forces, a Persian convert to Islam by the name of Salman proposed to dig a khandaq (from Persian, meaning trench or moat) in the unprotected areas surrounding the city, in order to prevent the passage of the invading forces to the city. Salman’s advice was proved useful when the invading coalition was forced to lay siege to the city of Yatrib, which would fail and end with the Meccan-led coalition’s retreat. Emerging victorious, Muhammad strengthened his position by acting against the last remaining Jewish forces, the Banu Kurayza, in Yatrib. The Banu Kurayza were eventually overwhelmed, and the women and children were taken

into slavery. The Battle of Khandaq helped to strengthen the status of Prophet Muhammad, while it harmed the reputation of the tribe of Quraysh, whose leaders, unable to defeat the Muslims by force, decided to reach an agreement with Prophet Muhammad, eventually signing the 10-year peace treaty at al-Hudabiya a year after the battle, in 628 CE, allowing the Muslims to grow stronger. Leon Volfovsky See also Badr, Battle of; Khaybar, Battle of; Muhammad as Warrior; Uhud, Battle of Further Reading Gabriel, Richard A. Muhammad: Islam’s First Great General. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007. Rodgers, Russ. The Generalship of Muhammad: Battles and Campaigns of the Prophet of Allah. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012. Shabbar, S. M. R. Story of the Holy Ka’aba and Its People. Raleigh, NC: Lulu Press, 2014. Watr, Muhammad Dhahir. Military Management in the Battles of the Prophet. Raleigh, NC: Lulu Press, 2014.

Khartoum, Siege of (1884–1885) In mid-1881, a rural imam from Sudan named Muhammed Ahmed ibn-Abdullah declared a jihad (holy war) against the Turks, Egyptians, and all other infidels who corrupted Islam or refused to follow the true faith. He styled himself Mahdi (meaning “Expected One”): “I am the Mahdi, the Successor of the Prophet of Allah.” His aim was to cleanse Sudan of corruption and foreigners, to establish a new caliphate, and to rule by strict sharia law. His divine mission would clash with the strongest imperial power in the world on the banks of the River Nile at the city of Khartoum. Using the message of militant Islam, his own charisma, and the unhappiness of the native people, the Mahdi united Sudanese tribes to overthrow their Egyptian overlords who ruled through coercive governance, high taxes, and a rampant slave trade. The Egyptians proved incapable of putting down the uprising and turned instead to Britain—which had extensive financial and strategic interests in the Suez Canal and the Nile—for assistance. The Mahdi took Kordofan and El Obeid until a British expedition under Colonel

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William Hicks confronted him but was itself annihilated at the battle of Kashgil. Khartoum was the capital of Sudan and the center of the country’s administration. It was geographically important as a converging point between the White Nile and Blue Nile Rivers. Whoever controlled Khartoum controlled all trade and traffic down the rivers. The Mahdi sought to expand his Mahdyyah (Mahdi’s realm) and seize the capital. On February 18, 1884, Major General Charles Gordon arrived in the city as governor-general to take command of the garrison there. Rather than obey his government’s instructions to evacuate the city, Gordon decided to hold it. The besieging Mahdi army numbered 100,000 men all dressed in the jibba (cloak symbolizing Islamic purity) and carrying obsolete rifles or broadswords. Inside the walls of Khartoum were 40,000 civilians, 8,000 Egyptian troops, 12 pieces of 9” and 16” pounder guns, 2 million rounds of ammunition, and 9 paddle steamers. Gordon ordered a four-mile ditch dug interspersed with caltrops and chevaux-de-frise to prevent a land assault. An 11-month siege ensued. As the months passed the Mahdi’s grip on Khartoum tightened, preventing food columns from reaching the garrison city. On August 5 the British House of Commons approved an expeditionary force headed by General Sir Garnet Wolseley to come to Gordon’s aid after mounting pressure by the press and a concerned public. The relief expedition came too late to save Gordon. On January 6, 1885, Omdurman fell to the Mahdi’s forces. The psychological strain on the besieged garrison now took its toll and on January 26 Lieutenant Faraz Pasha opened the city gates to the Mahdi forces. It was estimated that up to 30,000 civilians were killed or made slaves. General Gordon’s decapitated head was presented to the Mahdi as a trophy. The fall of Khartoum was a humiliation for Britain’s empire and contributed to the fall of Gladstone’s government. The Mahdi himself died only five months later, thus ending the dynamic drive to spread militant Islam beyond Sudan. A subsequent British expeditionary force led by Horatio Kitchener retook Sudan and avenged Gordon’s defeat. Barry N. Whelan See also Islam and War (Jihad); Mahdi

Further Reading Butler, Daniel A. The First Jihad: The Battle for Khartoum and the Dawn of Militant Islam. Philadelphia: Casemate, 2007. Carruthers, Bob. The Siege of Khartoum. London: Coda Books, 2013. Collins, Robert O. A History of Modern Sudan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Regan, Geoffrey. Famous British Battles. London: O’Mara Books, 1997. Trench, Charles C. The Road to Khartoum: A Life of General Charles Gordon. New York: Carroll & Graf, 1989.

Khaybar, Battle of (629 CE) The Battle of Khaybar took place in 629 CE in the oasis of Khaybar, located in the Arabian Peninsula. Under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad, a Muslim force of about 1,400–1,800 men and 100 to 200 horses successfully raided the Jewish population that had lived in the oasis, located near the city of Yatrib (Medina). The Muslim raiders were able to surprise the Jewish forces, leaving them unprepared for the defense of their settlements. The Jews were left defenseless, as the Arab tribe of Ghafatan, which was hired by the Jews for protection, decided not to participate in the battle at all. The Jews were forced to retreat to their fortresses in an effort to hide from the raiders. In the course of the battle, the Muslim raiders moved from one house to another, trying to breach the fortifications. The battle was a Muslim victory, as the Jews eventually decided to surrender. The raid on Khaybar came after Prophet Muhammad was able to consolidate his rule in Yatrib (Medina), transforming himself from a leader of a persecuted religious minority into a powerful political and military leader. Prior to the raid on Khaybar, the Prophet and his followers successfully raided the caravans of the merchants of Mecca and fought against the Meccans in a series of battles, from which they rose victorious with an impressive victory in the Battle of Khandaq in 627 CE. Finally, Prophet Muhammad was also able to reach an agreement with his Meccan rivals, who after the defeat at the Battle of Khandaq agreed to sign a peace treaty with the Prophet, thus signing the al-Hudabiya treaty in 628 CE, in which both sides agreed to a 10-year period of peace.

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In addition, Prophet Muhammad used the ongoing feud with Mecca in order to eliminate his rivals at the city of Yatrib. After each battle, Muhammad turned to deal with the native Jewish tribes of Yatrib and was able gradually to diminish their influence. The Prophet was able to banish two of the Jewish tribes, the Banu Kaynuka tribe after the Battle of Badr (624 CE) and the Banu al-Nadir tribe after the Battle of Uhud (625 CE). Finally, the last tribe, the Banu Kurayza, was eliminated after the Battle of Khandaq in 627 CE. Thus, Prophet Muhammad was able to establish Islam as the sole religion in the city. It seems that the assault on Khaybar was motivated by several reasons. The al-Hudabiya treaty ensured that Muhammad would not face an assault by the Meccans, thus he was free to act against other targets in the Arab peninsula. In addition, the treaty did not allow the Muslims to raid Meccan caravans, thus depriving them of a convenient income source, while the wealthy Jewish merchants from the oasis of Khaybar presented an alternative target for raiding and looting. There was also a feud between the Muslims and some of the Jews of Khaybar. The Banu alNadir tribe of Yatrib (Medina), previously banished from the city by Prophet Muhammad, found refuge in the oasis and presented a threat to the Muslims because of a possible alliance with Mecca, if they combined their power with Prophet Muhammad’s foes, for instance as they did in the Battle of Khandaq. As the Muslims assaulted Khaybar, the local Jews were caught by surprise and were unprepared to defend themselves. In addition, the Jews of Khaybar relied on the Arab hired tribe of Ghatafan for protection and offered them rewards for their service. However, the Ghatafan chose not to participate in the battle, thus leaving the Jews alone to face the Muslim raiders. The Jews retreated to their fortresses, and the Muslim invaders had to lay siege to each fortress. Both sides exchanged arrow shots, and sometimes even fought in personal duels. After a month and a half of siege, the Jews surrendered and accepted Prophet Muhammad’s conditions. The raid turned out to be successful, as the Muslim raiders gained loot, which was distributed among the participating soldiers. According to the terms of surrender, the Jews of Khaybar were permitted to remain in the region and to continue the cultivation of their fields. However,

they had to provide half of their products to the Muslims; hence, their status was diminished, as they no longer were truly free men. The Jews remained in Khaybar until the days of Caliph Umar, who had decided to banish the Jews from the entire Arab peninsula. The battle encouraged the spread of Islam, as many Arab tribes recognized Prophet Muhammad’s authority. Leon Volfovsky See also Badr, Battle of; Caliphate; Khandaq, Battle of; Muhammad as Warrior; Uhud, Battle of Further Reading Battles of Muhammad, Including: Battle of Tabouk, Battle of the Trench, Battle of Mu’tah, Battle of Uhud, Battle of Hunayn, Battle of Khaybar, Siege of Ta’if, Assault on Banu Bakra, Expedition of Qatan, Battle of Waddan, Caravan Raids, Nakhla Raid. n.p.: Hephaestus Books, 2011. Gabriel, Richard A. Muhammad: Islam’s First Great General. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007. Rodgers, Russ. The Generalship of Muhammad: Battles and Campaigns of the Prophet of Allah. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012. Watr, Muhammad Dhahir. Military Management in the Battles of the Prophet. Raleigh, NC: Lulu Press, 2014.

Khilafat Movement (1918–1924) The Khilafat movement of 1918–1924 was an attempt by Indian Muslims to protect the Ottoman sultan, who was the khalifa, or caliph, of the Muslim community. As temporal and spiritual head of Islam, the caliphate was a respected institution through the centuries. The movment perceptibly changed the view Indian Muslims had of the nature of British rule and the nationalist movement launched in India under the Indian National Congress (INC). During the First World War, the weakness of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a loss of its major possessions. By the end of 1917, the British had taken Baghdad and Jerusalem, and the Ottoman Empire had also lost Palestine, Arabia, Transjordan, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey concluded an armistice with the Allied Powers on September 30, 1918, after the British offensive in Palestine. A pan-Islamic feeling in support of Turkey became conspicuous among Muslim

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communities in Asia, including India. Among the Indian Muslim community, a new middle-class leadership moved away from support of the loyalist politics of the Aligarh school. The Muslim clergy or ulemas were also emerging as a new political force, bringing about rapprochement between different Muslim groups. The demand for political reforms in India thus became intermingled with the religious agenda of the Islamic brotherhood and the call for settlement of the Ottoman question by Muslims alone. The Khilafat movement became a heady mixture of panIslamism, nationalism, and Islamic revisionism. The Indian Muslims supported the pan-Islamic program of Ottoman sultan Mehmed VI (r. 1918–1922), who wanted to protect the empire from dismemberment. In December 1919, the All India Muslim League (AIML) passed a resolution that declared its belief that only Muslims should decide the Khilafat question. Great weight was also given to the views of the ulemas. The Bombay (now Mumbai) meeting of Anjuman-i-Ziya-ul Islam in May 1919 demanded that the Ottoman Empire remain intact. The once-divided Muslim community had come together, and agitation over the Khilafat issue was launched in September 1919. The moderate wing of the movement was headed by the merchants of Mumbai, which soon lost ground to radicals like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958), the ulemas, and the Ali brothers, Muhammad Ali (1878–1931) and Shaukat Ali (1873–1938). A Central Khilafat Committee formed in Bombay with Seth Chotani as president and Shaukat Ali as secretary. Branches were opened in various provinces of British India. Besides the Ali brothers, important leaders of the Khilafat movement included M. A. Ansari (1880–1936), Maulana Azad, Abul Fazlul Huq (1873–1962), Hasrat Mohani (1875– 1951), Abdul Halim Ghaznavi (1879–1956), and Mohammad Akram Khan (1868–1969). On October 17, 1919, Khilafat Day was observed. The event was a great success and most of the Indian-owned merchant establishments remained closed in Calcutta (now Kolkata). Public meetings were held in Bombay and Calcutta. The first All-India Khilafat Conference convened in Delhi on November 23, 1919, with Fazlul Huq from Bengal as president. It was decided that pending a resolution of the Khilafat problem there would be a policy of noncooperation with the British government and a boycott of goods made in Britain.

The Lucknow pact of 1916 between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League had brought about a Hindu-Muslim rapprochement. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948), the leader of the INC, gave wholehearted support to the movement, as did the Home Rule League of Ms. Annie Besant (1847–1933). The noncooperation and Khilafat movements went hand in hand under Gandhi. The political activities of the Khilafat movement and the popular outcry raised on its behalf swept across the Indian subcontinent. In the December 1920 Nagpur Session, the INC linked swaraj (self-government) with Khilafat demands and launched the noncooperation movement against the colonial government. The year 1921 was the high water mark of the Khilafat movement with masses of Indians taking part in it. Participants in the movment passed resolutions in provincial committees, conducted strikes, and practiced noncooperation with the British government. In both urban and rural areas, a new class of Muslim leadership arose. Following a policy of repression, the colonial government banned the Khilafat movement and the Congress Party. Meetings were banned and prominent Khilafat leaders were arrested. However, ominious signs of Hindu-Muslim discord appeared and the Khilafat movement began to decline. Communal harmony suffered when Hindus objected to the migration of 18,000 Muslim peasants of Sind and the North Western Provinces. In the wake of the Moplah rebellion of August 1921 in South India, Muslims practiced the forcible conversion of Hindus and destroyed their property. Over the question of entry into the Legislative Councils, a rift emerged between a section of the INC and Khilafat leaders. The police fired on demonstrations on February 5, 1922, at Chauri Chaura in the Gorakhpur district of the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh). Afterward, the police station was attacked, resulting in the death of 22 police personnel. Gandhi was stunned by the rise in violence and suspended the noncooperation movement. The Khilafat leaders felt betrayed by this. In November 1922, Kemal Ataturk (1881–1938) rendered the Khilafat movement irrelevant by abolishing the Khilafat. In July 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne negotiated between Ataturk and the Allies resulted in establishment of the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1923, with Ataturk as the republic’s first president.

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The Khilafat movement, which had utilized a pan-Islamic symbol, has been criticized for generating a separate identity for Muslims that helped lead to the eventual partition of the Indian subcontinent. Certainly some Khilafat leaders, such as the Ali brothers, joined the Muslim League and endeavored to create a separate nation-state for Indian Muslims. But other leaders, such as M. A. Ansari and Maulana Azad, supported the Indian National Congress and fought for Indian independence from a secular and nationalist platform. Between 1919 and 1924, the Khilafat movement made great contributions toward Hindu-Muslim unity and the noncooperation movement. Although separated from Turkey by thousands of miles, the Khilafat leaders in India fought Turkey’s battle from British India and in the process raised the political consciousness of Indian Muslims. Patit Paban Mishra See also All India Muslim League; Caliphate; India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in; India, Religious Conflict in; Ottoman Empire Further Reading Alam, Abu Y. Khilafat Movement and the Muslims of Bengal. Kolkata: Raktakarabee, 2007. Azad, Abul K. India Wins Freedom. Madras: Orient Longman, 1988. Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar. From Plassey to Partition. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2004. Hasan, Mushirul, ed. Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India. New Delhi: Manohar, 1985. Minlaut, Gail. The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilisation in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982. Mishra, Patit Paban. “The National Struggle in Turkey and India: A Discourse on Khilafat Agitation.” Hindistan Turk Tarihi, the Journal of Indo-Turcica, pp. 207–17. Niemeijer, A. C. The Khilafat Movement in India. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972. Qureshi, M. Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918–1924. Leiden: Brill, 1999.

Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi (1902–1989) Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini was a Shi’a cleric who led the Islamic Revolution of Iran. He was born in 1902 at

Khomein, a small village in central Iran, and died as the rehbar-e enqelab or supreme leader in 1989 at Tehran. Khomeini’s family are Musavi seyyeds, that is, they claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter’s lineage and descendants of the seventh Shi’a imam. As a child, Khomeini attended a neighborhood maktab or religious school and later a government school. He learned the Qur’an, Persian poetry, religious stories, and calligraphy. When he was 17 he began attending a madrasa at Arak run by Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karim Ha᾽eri Yazdi. He followed that teacher to the city of Qom to study Arabic grammar, logic, philosophy, and especially religious law or fiqh. By the 1930s Khomeini, having completed the three stages of religious education, became a mujtahid— he was qualified to derive his own legal and religious rulings with no need to emulate other clerics. He went on to study Islamic mysticism and philosophy while teaching in Qom. After the fall of Reza Shah in 1941, who had attempted to limit the clergy’s authority, Khomeini’s militant political views began to emerge publicly. In a statement written during 1944 in the visitors’ book at a mosque in Yazd, Khomeini began by quoting a Qur’anic verse, “Recite: ‘I give you but one admonition, that you stand unto God, two by two and one by one’” (34:46), usually interpreted as encouraging readers to stage an uprising in the name of Allah or God. Another early, more elaborate statement of his emerging views found expression in a monograph titled Kashf al-Asrār (“The Discovery of Secrets”), published anonymously during 1942. In the Kashf, Khomeini expounded on the anticlerical activities of Reza Shah, reprimanded those who sought to subdue the clergy or challenge the validity of Islam, and proposed that a government can only be legitimate if it accepts the rule of God through implementation of sharia, that is, Islamic law. In 1961, when a new election bill was introduced to permit women to vote and to remove the requirement of being a Muslim for political candidates, Khomeini started his campaign against Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Khomeini successfully united senior Shi’a clergymen and bazaar guild members against the bill as “a threat to Islam.” Khomeini then worked with the merchants of the bazaar to establish the Coalition of Islamic Societies, an organization that funneled his views to the mercantile class of Iranian

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society. So in 1963 when the shah announced the six-point “White Revolution,” Khomeini linked the clergy and merchants in an unsuccessful nationwide boycott of the referendum on that legislation. Undeterred, Khomeini upped the ante by delivering a major antiregime sermon on June 3, 1963, during the Ashura festival—commemorating the martyrdom of the third imam, Husayn—at Qom in which he characterized the shah as an agent of Israel and the United States. In 1964, while in exile in Turkey, Khomeini wrote the Tahrir al-Wasilah (“Commentary on Salvation”), which covered not only traditional Shi’a theology but extended religion to sociopolitical issues such as jihad or holy war through the concept of “ordering [that which is] right and forbidding wrong.” He also returned to the question of Islamic government, discussing political issues such as the role of religion in foreign policy and extending the responsibilities of the imam or leader of the Muslim community to include civic activities necessary for establishing and maintaining Islamic society. These writing were smuggled into Iran, circulated among antishah activists, and radicalized the Shi’a clergy. In 1970, while exiled in Iraq, Khomeini delivered a series of lectures on the Islamic state in which he elaborated the theory of velāyat-e faqih (“guardianship of Islamic jurist”). Khomeini had assimilated that theocratic idea, unsuccessfully expounded by Ayatollah Fazlollah Nuri during the Constitutional Revolution seven decades earlier. Khomeini went on to augment Nuri’s belief—that clergymen must rule because secular governance fails to follow divine will— with maslaha or fundamentalist Muslim interests aimed at ensuring Islam’s welfare. All who failed to show pliancy toward velāyat-e faqih, be they persons in Iran or nations like the United States and Israel, fell under the rubric of those against whom violence was religiously justified. Khomeini’s statecraft not only went against the historically secular ideals of most Iranians but violated the politically quietist attitudes of most mullahs. Many Shiite clerics believe they should only be offering advice to lay administrators rather than wielding power. Khomeini, however, claimed that God’s will to establish a just society on earth by enforcing sharia law did not end with the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam, and that it was the intention of Prophet Muhammad and his direct descendants, the Twelve Imams, that Allah’s

law should be enforced by the faqihs or religious scholars until the hidden imam returned. Upon his return to Iran on February 1, 1979, after the successful Islamic Revolution that he helped inspire, Khomeini formed the Islamic Republic Party, and declared that his political authority was drawn from velāyat-e faqih and that his new government would be “based on the sharia.” He equated opposition to his regime as opposition to Islamic law and Allah. High officials from the ousted shah’s monarchy were executed as heretics. The Assembly of (Religious) Experts, dominated by activist clerics, produced a constitution that secured Khomeini’s position as supreme leader and laid out the foundation for a theocracy and a legal system based on Islamic jurisprudence. Continuing his fundamentalist policies, when the hostage crisis occurred at the U.S. embassy in Tehran between November 1979 and January 1981, Khomeini approved of the actions as “the second Islamic Revolution.” In September 1980, when Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army attacked Iran, Khomeini classified Saddam as an infidel and compared the Iranian counterattack to the Prophet Muhammad’s violent struggles to spread Islam among Arab tribes during the seventh century. By 1982, Khomeini was calling upon Iranians not only to “rid Iraq of its tyrannical leader” but to then “move on to liberate Jerusalem.” When Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, his last will and testament declared he “was proud to have implemented the rules of the holy Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet.” Jamsheed K. Choksy and Narges Nematollahi See also Iran-Iraq War Further Reading Algar, Hamid, ed. and trans. Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981. Moin, Baqer. Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah. London: I. B. Tauris, 1999.

King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) Martin Luther King Jr. was an American civil rights leader and Baptist preacher. He studied at Morehouse College,

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Crozer Theological Seminary, and Boston University. King grew up in Atlanta, Georgia, where his father, Martin Luther King Sr., was pastor of the Ebenezer Baptist Church. Four prophetic traditions shaped King’s thought: the black church, liberal Christianity, a Gandhian method of nonviolent social change, and American civil religion. Hegel was King’s favorite philosopher; they shared the belief that growth comes through struggle. King’s method of looking for partial truths in opposing positions, of rejecting extremes and affirming a creative synthesis of opposing views in a tension-ridden harmony was Hegelian. Liberal Walter Rauschenbusch’s Christianity and the Social Crisis left an indelible imprint on King’s thinking. But he also joined in Reinhold Niebuhr’s critique of liberalism as having an unwarranted optimism concerning human nature. For King, an adequate understanding of the human was found neither in the thesis of liberalism nor in the antithesis of neo-orthodoxy, but in a synthesis that reconciles the truths of both.

Martin Luther King Jr. led the African American struggle to achieve civil rights and equality during the 1950s and 1960s. His powerful speeches and message of nonviolence have continued to inspire people of all races and generations. (Library of Congress)

Ethical principles were important to King: “Destructive means cannot bring constructive ends, because the means represent the-ideal-in-the-making and the-end-inprogress. Immoral means cannot bring moral ends.” King reflected: “As I delved deeper into the philosophy of Gandhi my skepticism concerning the power of love gradually diminished, and I came to see for the first time that the Christian doctrine of love operating through the Gandhian method of nonviolence was one of the most potent weapons available to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom.” King articulated his political theology: “I have come to see more and more the need for the method of nonviolence in international relations . . . more and more I have come to the conclusion that the potential destructiveness of modern weapons of war totally rules out the possibility of war ever serving again as a negative good.” The choice for King was no longer between violence and nonviolence; it was either nonviolence or nonexistence. Idealistic pacifism was not relevant: “I am no doctrinaire pacifist. I have tried to embrace a realistic pacifism.” He saw tragic ignorance, rather than inherent evil, operating in many situations: “Some men still feel that war is the answer to the problems of the world. They are not evil people. On the contrary, they are good, respectable citizens whose ideas are robed in the garments of patriotism. They talk of brinkmanship and a balance of terror. They sincerely feel that a continuation of the arms race will be conducive to more beneficent than maleficent consequences.” But King saw that even limited wars would leave only “a calamitous legacy of human suffering, political turmoil, and spiritual disillusionment.” King proclaimed that the conditions that encourage Communism must be redressed: “After our condemnation of the philosophy of Communism has been eloquently expressed, we must with positive action seek to remove those conditions of poverty, insecurity, injustice, and racial discrimination which are the fertile soil in which the seed of Communism grows and develops.” King felt that multilateral institutions such as the United Nations were essential tools for working toward world peace. In addition to many thousands of human casualties, King saw that the American War in Vietnam had also brought “casualties of principles and values” in six areas.

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He charged that the United States had blatantly violated its obligation under the charter of the United Nations to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. A second casualty of the war for King was the principle of self-determination. “By entering a war that is little more than a domestic civil war, America has ended up supporting a new form of colonialism covered up by certain niceties of complexity.” King continued, “Whether we realize it or not our participation in the war in Vietnam . . . reveals our willingness to continue participating in neo-colonialist adventures.” A third casualty was the Great Society: “This confused war has played havoc with our domestic destinies. Despite feeble protestations to the contrary, the promises of the Great Society have been shot down on the battlefield of Vietnam.” A fourth casualty was the humility of the nation: “We are arrogant in our contention that we have some sacred mission to protect people from totalitarian rule, while we make little use of our power to end the evils of South Africa and Rhodesia, and while we are in fact supporting dictatorships with guns and money under the guise of fighting Communism.” The fifth casualty of the war was the principle of dissent. King was alarmed by “an ugly repressive sentiment to silence peace-seekers.” They were often depicted as “quasi-traitors, fools and venal enemies of our soldiers and institution.” When those who seek peace are vilified, “it is time to consider where we are going and whether free speech has not become one of the major casualties of the war.” The final casualty of the war was the prospect of human survival: “This war has created the climate for greater armament and further expansion of destructive nuclear power. . . . The large power blocs of the world talk passionately of pursuing peace while burgeoning defense budgets bulge, enlarging already awesome armies, and devising even more devastating weapons.” King spoke personally: “I oppose the war in Vietnam because I love America. I speak out against it not in anger but with anxiety and sorrow in my heart, and above all with a passionate desire to see our beloved country stand as a moral example of the world.  .  .  . I am disappointed with our failure to deal positively and forthrightly with the

triple evils of racism, extreme materialism, and militarism. We are presently moving down a dead-end road that can lead to national disaster.” King issued a call to active peacemaking: “Those of us who love peace must organize as effectively as the war hawks. . . . We must combine the fervor of the civil rights movement with the peace movement. We must demonstrate, teach, and preach, until the very foundations of our nation are shaken. We must work unceasingly to lift this nation that we love to a higher destiny, to a new plateau of compassion, to a more noble expression of humane-ness.” Dennis R. Koehn See also Cold War, Religious Dimensions of; Gandhi, Mahatma; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Just War Tradition Further Reading Baldwin, Lewis. There Is a Balm in Gilead: The Cultural Roots of Martin Luther King, Jr. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991. Harding, Vincent. Martin Luther King: The Inconvenient Hero. New York: Orbis Books, 2008. King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr. Edited by Clayborne Carson. New York: Warner Books, 1998. King, Martin Luther, Jr. “The Casualties of the War in Vietnam,” speech in Los Angeles. In Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Dr. John C. Bennett, Dr. Henry Steele Commager, and Rabbi Abraham Heschel Speak on the War in Vietnam. New York: Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, 1967. King, Martin Luther, Jr. Strength to Love. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. King, Martin Luther, Jr. A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr. Edited by James M. Washington. New York: Harper One, 1986. Oates, Stephen B. Let the Trumpet Sound: A Life of Martin Luther King. Edinburgh: Payback Press, 1998. West, Cornell. “Martin Luther King, Jr.: Prophetic Christian as Organic Intellection.” In Prophetic Fragments: Illuminations of the Crisis in American Religion & Culture. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1988. West, Cornell, ed. The Radical King. Boston: Beacon Press, 2015.

King David as  Warrior David, the second king of Israel, is one of the most wellknown characters in the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament),

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largely because of his love for God, Yahweh (as expressed in the psalms that are often connected with him) and his military prowess (such as the defeat of Goliath). These two aspects of David’s life were not separate parts of his character, but were inextricably connected throughout his entire life. According to biblical chronology, David lived in approximately 1000 BCE. The narrator introduces David to readers after Yahweh announced that he had rejected Saul as king of Israel, and David is chosen by Yahweh to be the next king (1 Samuel 15–16). His first military involvement comes with his battle against Goliath, the Philistine giant (1 Samuel 17). Saul, the tallest Israelite, should have been the one to fight the Philistine giant, but he remained behind the lines. When David visited the troops to bring food to his brothers, he was indignant that no one had attacked the blaspheming Philistine. He volunteered to fight Goliath, turned down Saul’s offer to wear his armor, gathered rocks for his sling, and ran toward the enemy. David was not as much of an underdog as he has often been portrayed, since the sling was a powerful weapon and he had the advantage of mobility. However, David attributed the victory to Yahweh, proclaiming to Goliath that “the battle belongs to Yahweh and he will give you into our hands” (1 Samuel 17:47). The story functions not only to show David’s martial prowess, but to begin the process of demonstrating that David (and not Saul) is the proper king of Israel. The next stage of David’s life largely involves his flight from Saul, in which he refused to kill Saul when given the opportunity. He gathered a small group of men around him in the wilderness (though he never fought Saul in open combat) and eventually fled to join the Philistines to escape Saul. David began his formal military command there as he led his troops into battle against various desert dwellers (while telling the Philistines that he was attacking the Judeans). He volunteered to join the Philistines in their battle against Saul, but he was sent back home and was running toward Egypt (chasing the Amalekites who had plundered his home) when Saul died. Upon Saul’s death, David assumed the kingship of Judah and entered into a series of wars with the remnant of Saul’s house. The climactic battle was fought at Gibeon, where an attempt at a hero battle failed when each of the 12 heroes killed his opponent. The melee afterward resulted in a

victory for Judah, and after the defection of Abner, the commander of the army of Saul’s house, their fate was sealed (2 Samuel 2–4). Two martial events mark the beginning of David’s reign over united Israel. First, David established his capital at Jerusalem, a city on the boundary between Judah (his own tribe) and Benjamin (the tribe of Saul). However, the city was currently in the hands of the Jebusites, leading David to launch a military campaign to conquer it (2 Samuel 5:6–10). Though the details are obscure, it appears that he conquered the city through an attack involving a water source (such as a water shaft). The conquest of the city established him as a warrior, as every king in the ancient Near East attempted to embark on a successful military campaign in his first year to prove that he was worthy of being a king. The establishment of his capital in Jerusalem was a politically astute move to indicate his desire to rule over all the tribes equally, without favoring his home tribe. The Philistines instigated the other martial event when they heard that he had become king over united Israel (2 Samuel 5:17–25). A David ruling over Judah was not a problem for them, since Judah was a small kingdom and David had good relations with the Philistines. However, a David ruling over a united Israel was too powerful to ignore, and they decided to address the issue by attacking him before he could consolidate power. Attacking through the Rephaim Valley (leading straight to Jerusalem, though it is unclear whether David has taken the city yet or not), they searched for David to kill him. However, David displayed his devotion to Yahweh by inquiring of Yahweh concerning what he should do. Yahweh promised he would give them into his hands, and David won the battle. The pattern repeated itself when the Philistines immediately attacked again, though this time Yahweh instructed David to attack them from the rear, perhaps with the help of a heavenly army (David was to wait until he heard the “sound of marching” in the trees), and David defeated the Philistines again. After consolidating his kingship and receiving the Davidic covenant from Yahweh promising him an eternal throne if he and his descendants obeyed Yahweh (2 Samuel 7), David set about expanding his kingdom. The precise order and strategy is unclear, as the battles are only summarized (2 Samuel 8), but we know that David conquered

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the Philistines to the west, the Moabites, Ammonites, and Edomites to the east (across the Dead Sea), the Arameans to the north, and the nomadic Amalekites. The narrator records that Yahweh gave David victory every place he went. The battle against the Ammonites (the only battle recorded in detail) also foreshadows the decline of David and the Davidic monarchy (2 Samuel 10–12). Instead of leading his troops in battle, David remained at home and began his affair with Bathsheba, leading to the murder of her husband Uriah in the battle against the Ammonites due to David’s orders. David’s life became greatly troubled after this event: David’s son Amnon raped Tamar, his half-sister (a daughter of David by another mother), and Absalom (Tamar’s full brother) eventually began a revolt against David that forced him to flee the land. Through deceptive advice to Absalom by a David sympathizer, David’s forces in exile defeated Absalom and killed the usurper, bringing great grief to David. Although the chronology might be disrupted (that is, the battles David fought against other nations may have been spread throughout his entire life rather than concentrated in the earlier part of his reign), the narrator presents David as fighting mainly rebellions after the Bathsheba affair. Alongside the Absalom rebellion, David was also forced to put down a rebellion by Sheba, a man from Benjamin who attempted to lead the northern tribes away from David (2 Samuel 20). Various martial events from the end of 2 Samuel include several stories of his battles with the Philistines and the heroics of his mighty men (2 Samuel 21, 23). Charlie Trimm See also Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare; Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy; Yahweh as Divine Warrior Further Reading Garsiel, Moshe. “David’s Warfare against the Philistines in the Vicinity of Jerusalem (2 Sam 5, 17–25; 1 Chron 14, 8–16).” In G. Galil and M. Weinfeld, eds. Studies in Historical Geography and Biblical Historiography: Presented to Zecharia Kallai. VTSup 81. Leiden: Brill, 2000, pp. 150–64. Hoffmeier, James K. “David’s Triumph over Goliath: 1 Samuel 17:54 and Ancient Near Eastern Analogues.” In S. Bar, D. Kahn, and J. J. Shirley, eds. Egypt, Canaan and Israel: History, Imperialism, Ideology and Literature: Proceedings of a Conference at the University of Haifa, 3–7 May 2009. Culture and History of the Ancient Near East 52. Leiden: Brill, 2011, pp. 87–114.

King Philip’s War (1675–1676) King Philip’s War pitted several Native American groups against English colonists from New England and their Indian allies in one of the bloodiest conflicts (per capita) in American history. The cause of the war is still debated. Many historians cite troubled diplomatic and economic relationships between the English and the Wampanoag, as well as the encroachment onto and destruction of Indian lands by settlers and their livestock, as points of possible tension. However, cultural differences, especially in regard to religion, are recognized as one of the greatest points of dispute. Several decades prior to the outset of war, Puritan missionaries, most notably the Reverend John Eliot of Roxbury in Massachusetts Bay, sought to convert Native Americans to Protestant Christianity. According to Eliot and other English missionaries, Indians who converted to Christianity had to leave Native American society behind and move to “Praying Towns” where they would be further instructed in Christianity, as well as other European cultural practices. The abandonment of Indian religions, as well as other forms of Indian culture as a whole, was one of the many points of contention that arose between the English and Native Americans. While colonial leaders encouraged the spread of Christianity among the Indians, many colonists had little regard for Indian converts and discouraged the practice of conversion, often making the efforts of missionaries all the more difficult. Even with these hurdles, Eliot remained anxious to convert as many Indians as possible. Metacom, later named King Philip, chief sachem of the Wampanoag, first encountered Eliot and his Protestant message during the 1660s. Because of Philip’s importance, Eliot believed that his conversion would compel other Indians to embrace Christianity. Although Philip was initially interested in Christianity, Eliot’s overall mission among the Indians progressed slowly. Famously, the Reverend Cotton Mather, in describing Philip’s reticence, noted that the sachem treated the offer of Christian salvation with disdain and indicated that he cared as little for the gospel as he did for a mere button on Eliot’s coat. Even so, Eliot selected John Sassamon—a well-educated Wampanoag minister—to become a missionary to Philip and his people. Sassamon

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attained a position of influence among the Wampanoag, but eventually left the tribe as relations between the Indians and English began to deteriorate in the early 1670s. Ultimately, Philip never converted to Christianity and most Wampanoag rejected the faith. The tribe’s religious leaders, or powwaws, had always resented the efforts of Puritan missionaries and actively encouraged Metacom to confront the English. As diplomatic relations between the Wampanoag and the English continued to worsen and issues pertaining to land and trade deteriorated, King Philip’s War was ignited by the murder of John Sassamon. Approximately five years after he resigned his influential position among the Wampanoag, Sassamon, for unknown reasons, returned to Metacom and his people. Sassamon determined that Philip was planning a war against the colonists. Fearing for his life, he fled to Plymouth to inform the English of his suspicions. Sassamon’s warning was ignored by the colonists, as they had done in the past when Christian Indians reported suspicious Wampanoag behavior. On January 29, 1675, soon after he left Plymouth, three Wampanoags killed Sassamon. His death was made to look like an accident and little attention was paid to the incident at first. Only after a witness came forward with evidence of murder did anyone give credit to Sassamon’s earlier warning. While it is not known if Philip ordered Sassamon’s death, the Indian minister embodied characteristics detested by many Wampanoags—Sassamon was not only a Christian, but also an Indian ally of the encroaching English. While religion was central to the tensions that incited war, it also played an important role during the war itself for both New England Puritans and their Native adversaries. The Puritans commonly looked for supernatural messages in the world around them. During the war, they continually tried to make sense of the increasing devastation in religious terms. Due to the extreme violence of the war and mounting loss of life and property, many colonists believed that God was punishing them for their sins, including their failure to convert the Indians to Christianity. Many colonists—and colonial leaders—believed God was using the Indians to wage war as a punishment. Increase Mather indicated that the sins of New England’s second generation invited judgment because they failed to follow God according to the plan established by the region’s

founders. In order to atone for their shortcomings and reacquire God’s favor, the colonies of New England— individually and as a collective—observed days of fasting, prayer, and humiliation throughout the war. Plymouth declared the war’s first fast day on June 24, 1675—the first day of hostilities—and Connecticut instituted weekly fasts approximately two months later. Individual towns and churches throughout New England also participated in their own days of fasting and humiliation. The colonies increased the number of these observances when the war effort flagged. The colonies also canceled days of thanksgiving and did not reinstitute them until the tide of war finally turned in the summer of 1676. Religion also remained an important point of consideration concerning the war at the community level. In order to fill the ranks of the militia, the New England colonies practiced impressment, or the forced recruitment of individuals into military service. Often the individuals selected to serve included those who were not church members or men who could be characterized as “sinful” troublemakers. For many English colonists, the war also reflected religion on a universal level. Like their counterparts in England, many Puritans in America not only saw King Philip’s War as God’s punishment for their sins, they also recognized the conflict as a holy war. The depiction of Indians as followers of the devil was a commonly held belief among English colonizers. King Philip’s War took on a duality that not only recognized God’s divine punishment, but also accounted for a larger battle between good and evil. Depicting Indians as satanic allowed Puritans to ignore limitations often placed on the conduct of war, thus increasing the ferocity of English actions toward the Indians. Just as the Puritans used religion as a means to prepare for and interpret King Philip’s War, so too did the Wampanoag and their Algonquian allies. War-circle rituals, such as those described in Mary Rowlandson’s captivity narrative, were intended not only to encourage Algonquian men to fight, they also allowed powwaws to call upon Manitou—spiritual life forces—to aid warriors in battle. Powwaws also sought visions of Manitou as a means for prophesying victory. During Philip’s attack on Bridgewater, Massachusetts, the Wampanoag saw a spirit in the form of a bear walking on its hind feet, causing the powwaw

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Tispaquin to order their withdrawal. If the spirit had been in the form of a deer, however, the Indians would have destroyed Bridgewater and killed all of the town’s residents. The Algonquians, knowing the importance Christianity played in the lives of the Puritans, openly mocked English religion. These attacks on Christianity were both verbal and symbolic. It was reported that during battle, many Indians chided the colonists, asking how their God could save them if they could not save themselves. Indians were also reported to have suggested that they were doing the Puritans a favor by sending them to heaven so soon. The symbolic attacks on Christianity by the Algonquians were much more direct. When attacking towns, Indians often made a point of assaulting Puritan meetinghouses directly, destroying them in the process. In order to terrify the colonists, Indians often attacked on the Sabbath or other declared days of religious observation. Not only did King Philip’s War degrade many Indians’ political allegiance to the English, but it also negated almost all of the attainments made by John Eliot and other Puritan missionaries prior to the war. During the war, Indian praying towns were dissolved. Christian Indians living in the western praying towns often joined Philip’s forces. However, those Indians who remained loyal to the English were still treated poorly. Despite the efforts of Eliot, many Christian Natives were imprisoned indefinitely on Deer Island off the coast of Boston, with a large portion being sold into slavery following the conflict. King Philip’s War marked the ultimate decline of English attempts to convert the Indians. The relationship between the colonists and Indians of New England was never the same after the war. Tyler A. Rotter See also Puritans and War; Primary Document: Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (July 8, 1663) Further Reading Lepore, Jill. The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity. New York: Knopf, 1998. Mather, Cotton. Magnalia Christi Americana; Or, The Ecclesiastical History of New-England (1702). Edited by Thomas Robbins. 2 vols. New York: Russell and Russell, 1967. Mather, Increase. “A Brief History of the Warre with the Indians in New-England [sic]” (1676). Early American Imprints, Series 1, no. 220.

Ranlet, Philip. “Another Look at the Causes of King Philip’s War.” New England Quarterly 61, no. 1 (1988): 79–100. Rowlandson, Mary. Narrative of the Captivity of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson (1682). Edited by Charles H. Lincoln. Facsimilie reprint ed. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. Salisbury, Neal. Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500–1643. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Stiles, Ezra. Extracts from the Itineraries and Other Miscellanies of Ezra Stiles, D.D., LL.D., 1755–1794. Edited by Franklin Bowditch Dexter. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1916. Zelner, Kyle F. A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen during King Philip’s War. New York: New York University Press, 2009.

Knighthood, Christian Ideal of In the eighth century CE, Frankish armies began a transition that put heavy cavalry in control of Western European battlefields for the next 800 years. Medieval Christian society is often described as consisting of three interdependent groups: the clergy who pray, the nobility who fight, and the workers who labor. The military reality was more complex. Infantry was levied from the laboring group, but infantry formations were not usually well trained. They could afford neither the war material nor the time away from their fields required to become proficient. The mounted arm of the Frankish armies was composed of two groups, the milites and the nobiles, known collectively as knights. The milites originally were not nobles, however. Milites, the Roman-era term for infantry, referred to the heavily armored and mounted soldiers who served the wealthy landed nobility (nobiles) as retainers. In contrast to the infantry, only the nobles and retainers of the knighthood could afford the expense of weapons, armor, and horses, and only they could devote the time needed to produce skilled warriors. In the 10th century, as centralized authority in the West disintegrated, many of the young knights skilled in mounted warfare engaged in widespread violence with little fear of penalty. In the absence of a competent secular authority, the Catholic Church undertook the task of quelling the violence endemic in Frankish society. Using

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persuasion, appeals to social status, and its control over individual salvation by threating excommunication, the church was able to assert limited control over the warriors’ conduct. Two early initiatives pursued by the church, the Peace of God and the Truce of God movements, show how the church worked to constrain the knighthood’s violent behavior. The Peace of God movement, announced at a church council at Le Puy (975), was intended to secure protected status for church property and to shield noncombatants. Later church councils regularly renewed calls for knights to abide by the principles of the movement. In the early 11th century another movement called the Truce of God sought to limit the number of days on which warriors could engage in warfare with the approval of the church. Neither movement had complete success in limiting war’s scope and duration, but together they helped reestablish some order where secular power was ineffective. The most important and longest lasting influence exerted by the church in its efforts to control the knighthood was through its definition of new standards of acceptable behavior, the ethical code called chivalry (from chevalier, French for horseman). Two influential churchmen, Odo of Cluny (878–942) and St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153), began in the 9th, 10th, and 11th centuries to set down acceptable standards for the use of force that were amalgamated with other writings into a code of knightly behavior. The mounted warriors who subscribed to the Christian chivalric code provided the basis for an idealized image of a Christian knighthood that survives into modern times. Rather than ending violence, the Peace and Truce movements and chivalry asserted a controlling influence by disapproving of some forms of violence and sanctifying others. For instance, the clergy’s condemnation of violence perpetrated on fellow Christians did not extend to the enemies of the church. By subscribing to chivalry, knights became soldiers of Christ, and those knights who died fighting God’s enemies were martyrs whose place in heaven was assured. Specific military orders like the Knights of the Order of the Temple of Solomon, Templars, and the Knights Hospitallers were founded by warrior-monks who fought to defend and expand Christendom. Like other monks, members of the orders had to take vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. Though small in number, these orders grew wealthy from

grants of land and money, and they became increasingly active politically as they grew in size and in wealth. Becoming a Christian knight was a complex process that began with the acquisition of the necessary military skills. Service in a subordinate role, as a page for example, was followed by an apprenticeship devoted to more advanced military instruction. Once judged ready to enter the knighthood, initiates participated in a formalized ceremony, called the dubbing ceremony, to mark the occasion. The ceremonial script of dubbing varied, but the fundamentally Christian character of the ritual reflected the bond that was forged between the knight and the church as the knight accepted Christianity as a basic part of his new identity. The years of training, the religious bond to the church, and the elaborate and expensive character of the initiation all served to emphasize the new knight’s final acceptance into an exclusive club of peers that effectively excluded anyone except wealthy property owners. The result was a knighthood that was both more Christian and more aristocratic. As the secular authority of the royal court reasserted itself in Western Europe, the relationship between knighthood and chivalry began to change. This was seen most visibly in the change that took place in tournaments. Tournaments originated around the turn of the 12th century, and originally they took the form of war games to train mounted warriors in realistic battlefield tactics. By the 13th century, Christian chivalry and the new ideals of courtly behavior had combined to create a new type of tournament. Stylized display replaced the less glamorous and purely military order of events as the tournament transitioned from war game to pageant. The image of medieval chivalry and of tournament life that developed in the next few centuries was widely portrayed in many works of art and literature written from the 12th to the 15th centuries in tales similar to those of King Arthur and his knights. The church disapproved of the violent tournaments and condemned those who participated. However, papal denunciations had no lasting effect, and the ban was lifted in the early 14th century. As tournaments spread through Western Europe, the scale of tournament spectacle increased until by the 16th century tournaments had become elaborate social events associated entirely with life at court. The successful aristocratic courtier-knight, though still concerned

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with at least the appearance of the Christian warrior ideal, added appropriate court manners, such as courtesy, affability, humility, eloquence, and musical skill, to his personal accomplishments. The development of gunpowder weapons and the rise of strong centralized monarchies ended the military dominance of the knighthood after the 16th century. Thereafter, the knighthood was transformed into a largely ceremonial and honorary social institution. The institution retains this form where it continues to exist in modern times, and entry into its ranks usually is awarded as a token of respect, in recognition of accomplishment, or as a reward for loyal service. Mounted fighting skill is no longer required. Larry A. Grant See also Christianity and War; Crusades (Overview); Knights Templar; Peace of God; Religious Military Orders; Truce of God Further Reading Barthélemy, Dominique. The Serf, the Knight, and the Historian. New York: Cornell University Press, 2009. Charny, Geoffroi de, et al. Middle Ages Series: Knight’s Own Book of Chivalry. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005. Cornish, Francis W. Social History of Chivalry. Reprint. New York: Routledge, 2010. Kaeuper, Richard W. Middle Ages Series: Holy Warriors: The Religious Ideology of Chivalry. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. Keen, Maurice H., ed. Medieval Warfare: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Kendrick, M. Gregory. The Heroic Ideal: Western Archetypes from the Greeks to the Present. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2010. Nicholson, Helen. Medieval Warfare: Theory and Practice of War in Europe, 300–1500. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Smith, Gene. Mounted Warriors: From Alexander the Great and Cromwell to Stuart, Sheridan, and Custer. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009. Wollock, Jennifer G. Rethinking Chivalry and Courtly Love. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011.

Knights Templar The Poor Knights of Christ and the Temple of Solomon were a military religious order whose charism was assisting

Christians in making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land during the era of the crusades. Known popularly as the Knights Templar, this initially involved providing armed escorts to pilgrims. As the order rapidly grew in numbers, fame, and wealth, this eventually led to maintaining fortifications throughout the Levant and in Iberia and their participation in numerous battles. Very little is known of Hugh de Payns, a knight from Champagne and the founder of the religious order. After the successful conquest of Jerusalem in the First Crusade, a community of nine knights resolved to stay in Jerusalem to assist pilgrims in making pilgrimage, as this could be a dangerous activity, especially for those who wished to visit the holy sites near the river Jordan. So in 1120, during the reign of Baldwin II, Hugh and his companions made a vow to defend the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Baldwin II accepted their pledge of aid and provided for them a portion of Al Aqsa mosque, which was then erroneously supposed to be part of the Temple of Solomon, hence the popular title of Knights Templar. At this humble initial stage they begged for alms and provided guarded escorts for pilgrims, and were indeed poor knights. The innovative marriage of two of the great ideals of Christendom—chivalry and holiness—was compelling and attractive to many. Hugh traveled to Europe to seek official ecclesiastical recognition and new recruits, and was successful on both counts. He attended the Council of Troyes (January 1129) where he met the enormously influential and dynamic St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153). Bernard was a key promoter of the crusades and would pen a letter praising the Knights Templar, De Laude Novae Militiae. Up to that point the Templars had no specific habit, but at Troyes the Rule of Benedict was adopted and the three evangelical vows were accepted, beside the original vow to protect the Holy Land and its pilgrims. After this the white habit of Cistercian monks with an embroidered red cross became the typical dress of the knights. Pope Innocent II recognized the Templars as a military order of the church in 1139. The Templars were taken under the direct protection of the pope, making them exempt from any other secular or ecclesiastical jurisdiction. While secular clergy in the Holy Land (that is, clergy not attached to a religious order) were not always pleased with the power of the Templars and

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other military orders, the popes of Rome affirmed the Templar privileges. They also received numerous gifts from royal patrons and established commanderies throughout France, Britain, Italy, the Low Countries, and Spain, where they aided in the Reconquista. Eventually, to these would be added properties in Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Ireland. They also established or fortified positions in the Holy Land. Famous among them are Safed, built in 1140, and the coastal Castle Pilgrim, built in 1217. Ruins of Templar fortifications remain visible throughout the Levant to this day. These constructions were simultaneously military fortifications and convents. The majority of Templars were laymen who were divided into knights and sergeants, which were heavy and light cavalry, respectively. There was also a rank of nonmilitant chaplains. The chaplains alone among the three ranks were ordained priests, and their concern was to minister to the spiritual and sacramental needs of the other ranks. In terms of power, it was generally the knights who held the top positions, including the highest position of grand master of the Temple. But Templar convents/ fortifications would usually have other people residing in or near them—servants, Muslim and Christian mercenaries, and visiting pilgrims. In spite of their fame and wealth, the Templars could not summon more than a few hundred knights in the Holy Land at any given time. They were generally considered to be excellent warriors and often did fight to the death because they were rarely allowed to be ransomed if captured during battle. Few of the Templars were from royal or noble families. An example of the ferocity of the Templars is the pivotal Battle of Hattin, which took place on July 4, 1187. This battle was between the collected armies of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and the superior army of Saladin. The Templars who did not fall in battle were captured and beheaded. The overall Templar casualties numbered around 230. The exception was the grand master, who was released after a ransom was paid. In keeping with their original and perpetual vocation of assisting Christians to make a pilgrimage, the Templars became instrumental in the development of international banking: pilgrims would deposit funds at a Templar treasury in Europe, and then be able to withdraw funds in the Holy Land. In practice, this system was a precursor to the

modern traveler’s check. They also became involved in money lending, including to European royalty. After the fall of Jerusalem to Saladin in 1187, the grand master operated from Acre, and after the fall of that city in 1291, from Cyprus. In common with other medieval religious orders, the Templars became objects of criticism. First, for a community of “poor knights of Christ,” they had become very wealthy. Second, despite their courage and military skill, they had not been able to withstand the advance of militant Islam led by the Mamluk sultans of Egypt. Third, there was destructive rivalry between the Templars and other military orders, most notably the Hospitallers. In response to this third complaint, the amalgamation of the military orders was discussed at the Second Council of Lyons (1274), but this was not implemented. Furthermore, after the loss of their final fortification in the Levant—Tortosa—it was not clear what the precise purpose of the Templars was anymore. The confluence of these factors allowed King Philip IV of France (r. 1285–1314) to initiate an inquiry into the order, probably with the aim of obtaining the Templars’ wealth to relieve his government’s financial difficulties. Secret orders were sent out to arrest all Templars in his lands on Friday, October 13, 1307, on charges of sexual and blasphemous crimes committed during secret rituals. As no material evidence of these crimes existed, the arrested were subjected to torture, and some of the brothers confessed to the alleged crimes. Even the grand master of the order, Jacques de Molay, confessed. The entire inquest had been conducted illegally, though. The Knights Templar were under the jurisdiction of the pope alone, and Philip did not have the authority to investigate such matters, much less to arrest and torture the Templars in his lands. Because of this, Pope Clement V declared the whole inquisition null and void. But crimes had been confessed, and further investigation was required, this time sponsored by the pope himself. Furthermore, the papal inquiry extended to all lands, and not just France. The Templars were found innocent in many regions, like Cyprus, Germany, and Spain. It seemed clear that some Templars had committed crimes, but the main question was at a higher level: did there exist a secret doctrine or ritual for the entire order that condemned the order as a whole?

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The Council of Vienne (1311–1312) was called in land outside of the dominion of King Phillip. The location may have been chosen to give the appearance of impartiality. While the council addressed other issues, the question of what to do with the Templars was the presenting issue. Unfortunately, the official acts of the council no longer exist. We do know that after depositions were read for several days, the majority voted that the order should continue to function, and that the evidence gathered by Philip was found to be insufficient. But Philip would not be stopped, and in February 1312 he appeared outside the city gates, reiterating his demand that the Poor Knights of Christ be suppressed. On March 22, 1312, Clement V issued the bull Vox in excelso (not Vox clamantis, as some sources report), whereby the order was suppressed. In it, the pope cited allegations of idol worship and explained that as the vicar of Christ he was forced by public scandal and notoriety to issue the bull. Furthermore, since the order no longer could continue in its principal mission of securing the Holy Land, the properties of the order must be distributed to other orders and persons for the good of the church. One of the most famous stories related to the Templars is that of the immolation of the last grand master of the Temple, Jacques de Molay. De Molay had confessed to sins and was to be reconciled to the church upon public confession of these sins. This was to be carried out in front of the cathedral church of Paris, Notre Dame. But at the last minute he recanted his confession and proclaimed his own innocence, the innocence of his order, and the falsity of the allegations made against it. For his failure in falsely confessing under torture he announced he would atone by sacrificing his own life. King Philip arrested him as a relapsed heretic and instructed him to be burned alive, which sentence was carried out in March 1314. Some of the people of Paris had been deeply affected by de Molay’s courage and zeal, and the story spread that the grand master had called for King Philip and Pope Clement V to meet him before the judgment throne of God within the year to account for their treachery against the Templars. It is impossible to either verify or disprove the historicity of this tale. However, both Clement and Philip were indeed dead within a year of the grand master’s execution, with the pope dying on April 20, 1314, and the king dying on November 29, 1314.

The Knights Templar ceased to exist. The properties and knights in Portugal and Aragon were designated to two new orders: the Order of Christ and the Order of Montesa, respectively. Some of the knights went back to ordinary lay life, and many were sent to monasteries to do penance for the alleged but unsubstantiated crimes of their order. There is no historical evidence connecting the Knights Templar to the Freemasons. As to the original purpose of assisting Christians in making pilgrimages, it would be the Franciscans and, after 1847, the revived Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem that would be the main sodalities that would carry out this ministry. Duane Alexander Miller See also First Crusade; Hattin, Battle of; Montesa, Order of Further Reading Barber, Malcolm. The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Forey, Alan. The Military Orders from the Twelfth to the early Fourteenth Centuries. New York: Macmillan, 1992. Nicholson, Helen. A Brief History of the Knights Templar. London: Constable and Robinson, 2010. Upton-Ward, J. M., translator. The Rule of the Templars: The French Text of the Rule of the Order of the Temple. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell and Brewer, 1992.

Knox, John (1514–1572) John Knox, a leader of the Protestant Reformation in Scotland, was a colorful figure, serving in his early years as the bodyguard of the preacher George Wishart (1513–1546), and bearing a two-handed sword to defend him. Later, in his reform program for the Church of Scotland, Knox presented himself not only as a pastor, but also as a prophet of God. His political thought in several senses stood in continuity with elements of medieval teaching and with perspectives articulated by Lutheran and Reformed theologians of his time. However, he embraced radical views in his commitment to private war and tyrannicide on the part of the common person. Knox presented his reforming agenda for the Scottish church in his Letter to the Commonalty (1558), written to

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John Knox was the predominant figure in the Scottish Protestant Reformation of the 16th century. Knox embraced radical views in his commitment to private war and tyrannicide on the part of the common person. (Library of Congress)

the common people of Scotland from Geneva. Knox drew attention to the problems that existed in Scotland, namely false religion and the tyranny of the political and church leaders. He captured both of these concerns in one sentence: “Your princes and rulers are criminal with your bishops of all idolatry committed, and of all the innocent blood that is shed for the testimony of Christ’s truth” (in On Rebellion, 124–25). The letter went on to assert that both magistrate and commonalty had the responsibility to seek the reformation of the church. The king along with “lords, rulers and powers” were to provide “true preachers” and “expel such as under the names of pastors devour and destroy the flock” (123). If the magistrates refused to do this, the people were to take action. “You may provide true teachers for yourselves,” Knox wrote, “be it in your cities, towns, or villages.” He then added, “Them you may maintain and defend against all that shall persecute them” (123).

This is a remarkable assertion, maintaining that the common people could not only support the clergy that they had selected for themselves, but they could also take up arms and defend them against government persecution. In a sense, Knox was advocating the role that he had once had of the sword-wielding bodyguard of the minister George Wishart. From another perspective, it was counsel that many would find problematic in light of Jesus’s statement regarding the sword-swinging activity of Peter, who as a private individual was seeking to defend Jesus from his enemies in the Garden of Gethsemane: “Put your sword back into its place; for all those who take up the sword shall perish by the sword” (Matthew 26:52). With respect to the issue of idolatry, Knox stood in continuity with medieval perspectives on the crime of heresy (see Aquinas, Summa Theologica 2a2ae, q. 11, art. 3). The sword, he believed, is committed to the magistrate to execute judicial punishment upon those who are guilty of religious criminality. Scotland, in his view, was in a covenant relationship with God, just as ancient Israel had been. Idolaters were to be put to death in Israel, and the same thing was to be done in 16th-century Scotland. In An Admonition or Warning (1554) Knox called on the civil magistrates to slay idolaters. On this issue, Knox was very much a man of his time. The doctrine that the crime of heresy merited capital punishment was embedded in the Justinian Code, which had been part of the civil law of Europe for 1,000 years. Knox, in harmony with the Lutheran Magdeburg Confession (1550) and Reformed thinking as well, affirmed that inferior magistrates had the right to engage in a defensive war against monarchical tyranny. They were authorized to take up arms against the armies of the prince who would seek to exterminate them. Knox considered the Scottish nobility to be the magistrates who were responsible for resisting a tyrannical monarch. The Scottish nobles had private armies and within their own areas they had rights of jurisdiction. In his letter to the nobility of Scotland in 1557, Knox wrote, “Your subjects” are “oppressed.” He continued, “You ought to hazard your own lives, be it against kings or emperors for their deliverance.” He added, “Your office and duty” is “to deliver your subjects . . . from all violence and oppression” (The Works of John Knox, I. 272).

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This was precisely the position of Theodore Beza (1519– 1605). Knox went beyond Beza, however, in his position that inferior magistrates had the responsibility of removing a tyrannical sovereign. In The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Women (1558), Knox maintained that inferior magistrates were to depose and execute a tyrannical monarch. In Beza’s thinking, inferior magistrates could only wage a defensive war, endeavoring to protect their people from harm at the hands of the tyrant. Knox stood more in line with the Strasbourg theologian Martin Bucer (1491–1551), who argued in his Explication of the Four Gospels that inferior magistrates (self-governing city authorities and territorial princes) held the power of the sword not only to defend their people against a godless tyrant who might fall upon them, but also had the right to remove him by force of arms. In addition to the institutional remedy provided by inferior magistrates, Knox espoused the idea of the servant avenger. As John Calvin had put it, there are men who are “sent by God’s lawful calling to carry out such acts, in taking up arms against kings” (Institutes of the Christian Religion IV.20.30). Knox expressed the same sentiment in his Faithful Admonition (1554). He blasted Mary Tudor (1516–1558) as a false and deceitful monarch and called upon God to provide a servant avenger in the biblical role of a Phinehas, Elijah, or Jehu to overthrow the Catholic regime. Knox went beyond the theological mainstream in his private resistance theory. The private person, according to Calvin, is not allowed to initiate active resistance by taking up arms against the tyrant. Calvin issued this warning to private individuals: “If the correction of unbridled despotism is the Lord’s to avenge, let us not at once think that it is entrusted to us, to whom no command has been given except to obey and suffer” (Institutes of the Christian Religion IV.20.31). With respect to the specific issue of tyrannicide, Calvin stated, “No deed is considered more noble, even among philosophers, than to free one’s country from tyranny. Yet a private individual who lays his hand upon a tyrant is openly condemned by the heavenly judge” (Institutes of the Christian Religion III.10.6). Knox dissented from Calvin’s teaching and accepted the idea that any private individual may use violence and take up arms against a tyrannical government. He believed that

the punishment of tyranny is a duty that is required of the whole people—of even the common man, the private individual (The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Women). Knox’s teaching at this point was radical not only in relationship to what Calvin taught, but also in terms of the doctrine of the medieval church, which limited the right of war to sovereign princes. Knox’s view was also extreme in comparison to the ancient feudal right of private war. In that arrangement, any person of military status had the right to levy war upon his enemies for a just cause. The medieval church opposed this principle with some success. Over time, the right of private war ceased to operate. Continual opposition and censure by the church had had an effect. It should be noted that Knox was not merely reverting back to the old feudal principle of legitimate private war. For Knox, the right of private war became the duty of private war for all people against the tyrant—not only the nobility, but the common person as well. Medieval political thought, along with Lutheran and Reformed ideas, informed Knox’s thinking on war. The most influential source for his ideas, however, was the Old Testament. He saw little distinction between Old and New Testaments. For him, the Old Testament history of Israel was being played out once again in Scotland. He was a prophet of God, and Scotland was Israel. This principle of interpretation helps to explain the points in his political theory that move in a radical direction. Mark J. Larson See also Calvin, John; Protestant Reformers and War Further Reading Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. 2 vols. Translated by Ford Lewis Battles. Library of Christian Classics, Vols. XX and XXI. Edited by John T. McNeill. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. Greaves, Richard L. Theology and Revolution in the Scottish Reformation: Studies in the Thought of John Knox. Washington, DC: Christian University Press, 1980. Knox, John. On Rebellion. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Reid, W. Stanford. “John Knox’s Theology of Political Government.” The Sixteenth Century Journal 19, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 529–40.

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Konishi Yukinaga (1558–1600) Konishi Yukinaga was an important Japanese daimyo (feudal lord) and became one of the most prominent generals in the various campaigns of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536 or 1537–1598) and his attempts to complete the unification of Japan in the late Sengoku era (1467–1603). Konishi was born the son of the merchant Konishi Ryūsa in Sakai, an important commercial harbor in Osaka Bay. He was, together with his father, an early convert to Roman Catholicism, which was brought to Japan by the Jesuits in the 16th century. Konishi is mentioned, mostly with his Christian name Agostino, in several Jesuit reports about Japan and introduced as one of the most prominent and zealous Japanese Christians (kirishitan) in close connection with the famous Takayama Ukon (1552–1616). Konishi met Toyotomi during the latter’s campaign in Chūgoku (1577–1582) and was given the castle of Udo and half of the province of Higo (on the southern island of Kyūshū) following Toyotomi’s Kyūshū campaign in 1587. The other half of Higo went to the daimyo Katō Kiyomasa (1562–1611), a devoted Nichiren Buddhist. While Konishi fostered Christianity in his half, Katō persecuted the kirishitan in the other. Konishi’s most successful military achievement was the invasion of Korea, which he spearheaded in 1592 together with his archrival Katō. He was able to conquer most of southern Korea and led his army from Pusan as far as Pyongyang, but had to withdraw due to Chinese reinforcements and his own weak forces (except the region around Pusan). After rather fruitless and endless negotiations Toyotomi launched a second Korean campaign beginning in 1596, where Konishi was participating a second time. His troops were successful once again, but just as the army encountered severe Ming Chinese resistance, Toyotomi himself died in 1598 and Konishi had to move back to Japan, as a major civil war broke out to determine who should rule Japan. Konishi joined the allies around Ishida Mitsunari (1559–1600) and supported the latter against Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616), who would lay the foundation for the following so-called Edo period (1600–1868). Konishi led 4,000 men in the crucial Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, but was severely defeated by Tokugawa. Because of his Christian beliefs he did not commit the ritualized suicide

(seppuku) as the moral code of his social class would have suggested. He was instead captured and executed in Kyoto along with Ishida and the feudal lord and Rinzai Zen monk Ankokuji Ekei (1539–1600). In the aftermath the whole Konishi family was literally destroyed to erase all knowledge of a zealous convert to a foreign religion and brave fighter for Japan’s cause. Franz Winter See also Bushido; Christian Daimyo; Zen and War Further Reading Boxer, Charles R. The Christian Century of Japan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967, pp. 180–2. Petrucci, Maria Grazia. “In the Name of the Father, the Son and the Islands of the Gods: A Reappraisal of Konishi Ryusa, a Merchant, and of Konishi Yukinaga, a Christian Samurai, in Sixteenth-Century Japan.” MA thesis, Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of British Columbia, 2002. Swope, Kenneth M. A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592–1598. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009. Turnbull, Stephen. Samurai Invasion. Japan’s Korean War 1592–1598. London: Cassell, 2002.

Kosovo, Battle of (1389) The Battle of Kosovo was fought on “The Field of Blackbirds” on June 28, 1389, between Christian and Muslim armies. Its outcome paved the war for the domination of the Balkan Peninsula for centuries to come by the Ottoman Empire. For Orthodox Christians their defeat displayed in their minds the heroic stance they made for the cause of European Christendom, a stance that led to centuries of subjugation under an Islamic power. The battle also showcased the ethnic and religious divisions between the Serbian, Bosnian-Serb, and Albanian communities whose historians and oral storytellers looked at the event from a national, rather than a collective perspective, most sharply expressed at the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. In the 14th century the Ottoman Empire spread rapidly under Sultan Murat I. His armies crossed the sea from Anatolia (modern-day Turkey) into the Balkan Peninsula thanks

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to God’s divine assistance (“Allah, oh thou God of Justice, pull the ocean back and let me o’er dry land lead forth the army”). Murat’s forces defeated the Orthodox Christian lords in several battles, most notably at Marica in 1371 and at Savra in 1385. In 1389 in Kosovo Polje, the Christians under the leadership of Serbian prince Lazar Hrebeljanović fought together to stem the Muslim onslaught and drive Murat’s forces back across the Dardanelles. The Christian forces were comprised of several contingents led by nobles but under the overall command of kings—the Bosnian-Serbs under King Tvrtko and the Bulgarians under King Marco. Albanian fighters were also present (Theodoro Mosachi). The largest force was under Serbian prince Lazar’s command. Both Lazar and Murat were killed in the battle but the Muslims triumphed over the Christian forces. Several Christian principalities remained in existence after the battle for several decades, paying tribute to the Ottomans, but their defeat at Kosovo paved the way for Muslim expansion north up the Danube toward Hungary and ultimately toward the gates of Vienna. The history of the battle has been passed down mainly through oral tradition with Serbian and Albanian storytellers disputing many of its facts. For Serbs, the defeat symbolized pride, not shame in losing but in defending Christian Europe from foreign domination. To them it was a spiritual victory. On June 28, 1989—the 600th anniversary of the battle—Slobodan Milošević, president of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, evoked the battle before hundreds of thousands of Serbs to claim the Kosovan battlefield as sovereign Serbian territory (“Kosovo is the heart of Serbia”). He also used the battle to claim Serbian martyrdom for the faith and more broadly for European civilization: “Serbia defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended European culture, religion and society.” For Albanians, Murat’s assassin—Miloš Obilić—was not Serb but Albanian (Millosh Kopiliq). To them the assassin and the battle highlight Albanian heroism, independence, and its Christian past prior to mass conversion to Islam. Barry N. Whelan See also Kosovo War; Ottoman Empire

Further Reading Di Lellio, Anna. The Battle of Kosovo 1389: An Albanian Epic. London: I. B. Tauris, 2009. Kostovicova, Denisa. Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space. London: Routledge, 2005. Sells, Michael. The Bridge Betrayed: Religion Genocide in Bosnia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. Spandounes, Theodore. On the Origins of the Ottoman Emperors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Vucinich, Wayne S., and Thomas A. Emmert. Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1991.

Kosovo War (1999) The Kosovo war began on March 24, 1999, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched Operation Allied Force against Serbia in an effort to stop escalating violence in Kosovo and the mass expulsion of ethnic Albanians, most of whom were Muslims, from the southwestern province of Serbia. The United States and European leaders had been negotiating unsuccessfully with Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic for more than 12 months, most recently as part of the Rambouillet talks. NATO’s air campaign was designed to accomplish three objectives: (1) begin another round of negotiations, (2) deploy an international peacekeeping force, and (3) secure political autonomy for Kosovo. The air campaign lasted for 78 days and ended when Milosevic pulled his forces out of Kosovo. In Tito’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo was a province of Serbia and attained autonomous status in 1974. Similar to the six republics that made up the Yugoslav federation, it had its own constitution, government, and judiciary, among other things. In multiethnic Yugoslavia, this decision was warranted by the fact that more than 80 percent of Kosovo’s population is ethnic Albanian and Muslim, while the Christian Orthodox Serbs constitute a minority. However, Kosovo lost this privileged status in 1989, two years after Milosevic assumed power and started repressing ethnic Albanians by taking away their political rights and driving them out of Kosovo. In response, Kosovar Albanians set up parallel state structures, led by

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Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo. While Kosovar Albanians were responding to increasing Serb repression, many of them had larger goals and either wanted to join a “Greater Albania” or create an independent state of Kosovo. Many Western observers viewed the Kosovo war as a continuation of the Croatian and Bosnian wars, which took place in the first part of the 1990s. According to this assessment, Kosovar Albanians fell victim to other, complex issues during the 1995 Dayton peace negotiations that ended the Bosnia war. While demanding that Milosevic change his treatment of Kosovar Albanians, the U.S.-led Western alliance continued to view Kosovo as a part of Serbia. As the smoldering conflict remained unresolved without so much as economic sanctions imposed on Milosevic, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an insurgent group that quickly grew in strength, took up arms against Serbia’s security forces in an effort to bring the issue to Western attention. However, the crisis escalated when Serbian forces killed 85 Kosovar Albanians in March 1998 in an attempt to push back against the KLA and execute ethnic “cleansing” along ethnic and religious lines. Kosovo has always had special importance for Serbs, who consider Kosovo the cradle of Serbian civilization and the location of numerous Christian Orthodox holy sites, monasteries, and churches. The Serbs continue to annually commemorate the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, also known as the Field of the Blackbirds, in which the army of Serbia’s Prince Lazar lost against the Ottoman Empire led by Sultan Murad. Consequently, Kosovo was mostly under Ottoman control until the early 20th century, bringing more ethnic Albanians to the region and leading to a Serbian exodus over the centuries. While Serbs feel they have special claims to Kosovo, ethnic Albanians have represented the majority group in Kosovo since the late 17th century. By the time NATO intervened in the conflict in March 1999, some 2,000 Kosovar Albanians had died and hundreds of thousands of refugees had been driven from their homes. A massive humanitarian crisis loomed, and instability threatened to affect Albania and Macedonia, both home to large Albanian populations, and even spread beyond the Balkans to Greece and Bulgaria. Genocide allegations issued by U.S. officials conjured images of Srebrenica

and other atrocities committed during the Bosnian war; the claims galvanized public support for the air campaign but subsequently were not validated. During the 11-week air campaign that was carried out by 14 of the 19 NATO members, almost 40,000 sorties were flown, both against targets in Serbia as well as Serbian forces in Kosovo. The war took longer than anticipated and did not bring military success until late April; the Chinese Embassy was accidentally bombed on May 7, marking one of the low points of the campaign. A common U.S. narrative holds that NATO’s poor start to the war was due to political disunity among NATO allies, with European NATO members seeking to micromanage the war, and convoluted over, these decision-making among NATO allies. More­ “war by committee” features restrained U.S. decision makers, who were in favor of a more decisive approach. An alter­native school of thought maintains that the United States was instrumental in formulating and implementing not only a cautious but also a disjointed strategy of coercive diplomacy that, inter alia, initially limited the range of targets and only allowed (imprecise) bombings from 15,000 feet above sea level to avoid casualties, and that, above all, suffered from too gradual an escalation. In the meantime, most of Kosovo’s 1.6 million ethnic Albanians were forced from their homes and/or expelled from Kosovo; hundreds of thousands were internally displaced. Some 10,000 Kosovar Albanians died during the air campaign, in addition to some 1,000 to 2,000 Serbs. After the war ended on June 10, 1999, a cease-fire paved the way for a NATO-led Kosovo force (K-FOR) of 50,000 troops (under United Nations [UN] Security Council Resolution 1244), ensuring that Kosovar Albanians could return to their homes. While NATO assumed military control over the province, Kosovo became subject to international administration, which, almost a decade later, led to Kosovo’s independence. At the end of 2015, about 4,600 troops and 31 countries participated in K-FOR. The Kosovo war was not only NATO’s first war since 1949, but it was also a war that was waged without a UN mandate. Two UN Security Council members, China and Russia, were opposed to military intervention on behalf of Kosovo Albanians, mindful of their own restive minorities and fearful of the precedent such actions might represent. The war also presents an example of NATO, composed of

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nations that are for the most part largely Christian, coming to the aid of a large Muslim population, which was persecuted by Serbian Christians. In the case of Russia, Serbia also represented a longtime ally, as Russia has traditionally been the protector of the Christian (Eastern Orthodox) Serbs. Russia proceeded to use NATO’s Kosovo war as justification for its own military actions against Georgia (and on behalf of the Russian population in South Ossetia) in 2008. Dorle Hellmuth See also Kosovo, Battle of Further Reading Bieber, Florian, and Zidas Daskalovsky, eds. Understanding the War in Kosovo. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Clark, Wesley. Waging Modern War. Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2001. Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O’Hanlon. Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Washington, DC: Brookings, 2000. Lambeth, Benjamin. NATO’s Air War for Kosovo. Arlington, VA: RAND, 2001. “NATO’s Role in Kosovo.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (November 30, 2015).

Kurds The Kurds, belonging to the Iranian branch of the IndoEuropean races, are the largest stateless minority or “nation without a state.” Kurdistan is a geo-cultural definition whose limits are not accurately known; the epicenter of the Kurdish-dominated region is the Zagros mountain chain, which lies in the border area between Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. Kurds are religiously diverse. Nearly 60 percent of the Kurds are Sunni Muslims and 40 percent are followers of Shi’a Islam, most of whom reside in Iran. The majority of Muslim Kurds are followers of one of several mystic Sufi orders, most importantly the Bektashi order in northwest Kurdistan, the Naqshbandi order in the west and north, the Qadiri orders of east and central Kurdistan, and the Nurbakhshi order of the south. There are minor communities of Yazidis, Jews, Christians, and Baha’is. Zoroastrianism

and Christianity are the two dominant beliefs that have been attracting Kurdish converts in recent years. The Kurdish language is a member of the Persian branch of the Indo-European family of languages. Kurdish, like Persian, has borrowed many words from Arabic. Kurds do not have a standard dialect. Kurdish has four distinct dialects: Kurmanji, Sorani, Gurani, and Zaza. Kurdish, constructed from centuries-long oral tradition, was not a written language until the end of the 19th century; for example, the Kurdish historian Saraf-al-Din Bedlisi wrote his Šarafnāma (Book of Honor), now renowned as the classic history of Kurdistan, in 1597 in Persian. Some Kurdish intellectuals wrote in Arabic. The most well-known Kurdish epic ballad, Ahmad Khani’s Mem-u Zin, which passed from generation to generation through oral tradition, was not written down until 1695. Living as nomadic tribes until the 19th century, the economy of the Kurds was based on sheepherding and their culture was molded with mountainous and folkloric symbols. Kurdish tribes were a mixture of blood ties and territorial allegiances associated with strong religious loyalties. Attempts to trace the origins of the Kurds tend to have a territorial and linguistic point of departure. There is a historical school of thought that Kurds are descendants of the Medes due to linguistic resemblances. In 612 BCE, the Medes conquered Assyria and spread their domination through the whole of Iran as well as central Anatolia. Kurdish principalities dwelled under the rule of the Medes. Prior to the rule of the Seljuk Turks, which began in the 11th century, the area around the Zagros mountain chain was divided among three Kurdish principalities: the Shaddadids (951–1174), the Hassanwahids (959–1015), and the Merwanids (990–1096). The term “Kurdistan” was first recorded in the early 12th century when the Turkish Seljuk prince Ahmad Saandjar created a province of that name in modern-day Iran. The province’s capital was the town of Bahar, near the ancient Ecbatana (now Hamadan), the capital of the ancestral Medes. Later in the 12th century, the existence of the Islamic dynasty of the Kurdish prince Saladin was recorded, which is known as the Ayyubids (1169–1250). The Ayyubids deteriorated under pressure from the Mongol invasions. Until the late 15th century, some Kurdish tribes survived the Mongolian invasions by establishing

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autonomous entities, united by language, culture, and civilization, but politically split up into principalities such as Ardalan, Badinan, Baban, Hakkari, and Soran. Following the rise of the Ottoman and Safavid empires from the 15th century onward, the land of the Kurds became a bone of contention for these two powerful empires due to its geographical location between them. The Battle of Chaldiran in 1514 saw northern Kurdistan being transferred into Ottoman hands. Subsequent to this, the dynamics of the relations between notable Kurds and the Safavid shah Ismail deteriorated due to Shah Ismail’s dictating Shi’a Islam to Sunni Kurds, while a relationship of greater cooperation was promised to the Kurds by Sultan Selim I. The sultan entrusted the organization of Kurdistan, the integration of the Kurdish autonomous principalities into the Ottoman imperial system, and granted powers to Idris Bitlisi, an Ottoman notable of Kurdish origin. This agreement led to Ottoman recognition of Kurdish autonomy in return for a military alliance against the Shiite Persian Empire. The annihilation of Kurdistan in the 16th century by the Ottoman Empire was a result of the quest of the Kurdish emirs or “mirs” (tribal leaders) who desired to break the dominion of Shah Ismail and his Shiite policies. The Ottoman Empire successfully integrated Kurdish geography into its political and administrative system up to the late 19th century. However, the incapacitation of the Ottoman Empire intensified Kurdish desire for independence, especially in the wake of a number of other independence movements. In order to ensure a centralized authority, Ottoman sultans removed special statutes and increased the taxes received from the Kurdish emirates. From 1847 to 1881, rebellions under the leadership of notable Kurdish emirs challenged the Ottoman authority. Significant attempts were led by Prince Muhammed of Rewanduz (1839), Bedir Khan Pasha of Botan (1847), and Sheikh Ubaydallah (1879–1881). The revolution of 1908 that restored the Ottoman constitution led to wider political and cultural rights. Kurdish intellectuals in Istanbul began to open cultural and political organizations. One such organization was the Society of Mutual Aid for Progress in Kurdistan. The society sought to promote educational and economic progress in Kurdistan. A more overtly nationalist organization, Hivi-ya Kurd

(Kurdish Hope), was founded in 1910. With its newspaper Roj-e Kurd (Kurdish Sun), the organization sought to standardize and promote written Kurdish and to pass Kurdish national sentiments to its readers. A full-scale Kurdish national movement began under the leadership of notable Kurdish families by the end of the 19th century. The First World War is of pivotal importance to the Kurds’ current position. The 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which dissolved the Ottoman Empire and created the modern states of Iraq, Syria, and Kuwait, included the possibility of a Kurdish state in the region. However, it was never implemented due to the success of the Turkish War of Independence and disputes among European powers over the partition of the strategic Middle East. In 1923, with the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey was recognized as an independent nation. Under its terms, Turkey was no longer obligated to grant Kurdish autonomy. The treaty divided the Kurdish region among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. The policies implemented in early republican Turkey with the purpose of converting the multicultural, multilingual, and Islamic-based social structure taken over from the Ottoman Empire into a structure with one official language, one nation, and a laic-secular state undermined the Kurdish identity. Any expression by the minorities of a separate ethnic identity began to be repressed. Several Kurdish rebellions broke out. Three of the rebellions are of vital importance: the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), the Mt. Ararat Rebellion (1930), and the Dersim Rebellion (1938). Today, “the Kurdish issue” is a term used in reference to the Kurdish demand to have a “homeland” in the southeastern part of Turkey. Kurds in Turkey make up 23 percent of Turkey’s population of 81 million. The government’s policies such as forbidding speaking in Kurdish or propagating the Kurdish language, preventing families from naming children with Kurdish names, and changing Kurdish place names have triggered the rise of Kurdish nationalism, particularly in the 1980s. The Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978, transformed itself into a paramilitary organization and commenced attacks upon the Turkish government in 1984. The conflict between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces has caused the deaths of more than 30,000 individuals from both sides. After the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in

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1999 and the Turkish government’s humanitarian efforts for minority rights, the tension lessened. However, the Kurdish question remains the primary foreign and domestic concern of the Turkish state. Reflecting the fact that Kurdistan is divided among three other countries, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, it is essential to note the position of Kurds in these regions. In Iraq, Kurds confronted deliberate segregation by the Ba’ath administration, and there were mass killings in Halabja through toxic gas assaults by the Iraqi government in 1988. In Iran, Kurdish political activists are regularly detained or sentenced to death. Kurds in Syria have confronted systematic discrimination and killings, including the Qamishli massacre of 2004. In Syria, where they make up 9 percent of the Syrian population, Kurds were not given nationality until some changes were made in 2011 as an outcome of the Syrian crisis. A number of Kurds live in the urban centers of the Middle East as active participants in politics and society. Many Kurds are émigrés to, or are refugees in Europe, making a sizeable and influential diaspora in Germany, France, Sweden, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. The future of the Kurds is unclear; hitherto Kurdish national identity and culture thrived substantially, which led to the opening of institutions such as the Istanbul Kurdish Institute, the Kurdish Institute of Paris, and magazines and newspapers—Kurdish Life, Studia Kurdica, Kurdistan Times, Kurdish Journal are published in various languages. Burcin Cakir See also Ottoman Empire; Sufism and War Further Reading Juwaideh, Wadie. The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006. McDowall, David. A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I. B. Tauris, 2000. Meho, Lokman. The Kurds and Kurdistan: A Selective and Annotated Bibliography. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. Michael, M. Gunter. Historical Dictionary of the Kurds. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2011. Michael, M. Gunter. The Kurds and the Future of Turkey. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997. Van Bruinessen, Martin. Kurds and Identity Politics. London: I. B. Tauris, 2001.

Van Bruinessen, Martin. Transnational Aspects of the Kurdish Question. Rome: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre, 2000.

Kurukshetra War The Kurukshetra War is a mythological conflict at the heart of the great Sanskrit epic, the Mahabharata. The Mahabharata tells of the conflict of the Kurus dynasty, torn apart by intrigue and strife between two sets of cousins: the rightful successors, the Pandavas, and their usurpers, the Kauravas. The conflict culminates in a “universal war” involving the men of earth and various intercessions by the gods, and ends in disaster with the victorious king, Yudhishthira, explaining that “one billion 660 million and 20,000 men have fallen in this battle. Of the heroes that have escaped, the number is 240,165” (“Strivilapaparva,” Section 26). The historicity of the Kurukshetra War is hotly debated. The five sons of Pandu (“the Pandavas”) are placed in the care of Pandu’s blind brother, Dhritarashtra, after Pandu’s death as the result of a curse. Dhritarashtra was to rule as regent until the five brothers, Yudhishthira, Bhima, Arjuna, Nakula, and Sahadeva, could assume the throne with Yudhishthira as the senior king. Dhritarashtra had one hundred sons of his own, the Kauravas, who were born out of jars of ghee through the boon of a sage. Through various plots, the Kauravas sought the demise of their senior cousins so that they might reign over the kingdom of the Kurus from its capital in Hastinapura. Failing, they eventually are able to secure the exile of the Pandavas from the kingdom through a series of dice games with Yudhishthira. The Pandavas spent 12 years in the forest and a final year incognito, performing amazing feats throughout. On the Pandavas’ return, the Kauravas refuse to surrender the kingdom even after the Pandavas’ generous offer to divide it. The Kurukshetra War resulted from these events. The Kurukshetra War took place over 18 days. Prior to beginning the battle, the rules of war were decided. While certainly colored by ideas of chivalry, these are strikingly liberal rules of engagement including that warriors are to

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be matched in skills and weapons, that no one should strike an unaware enemy or one retreating, that the injured should be free from attack, that prisoners of war are to be well treated, and that noncombatants are not to be engaged or injured (“Jamvu-khanda Nirmana Parva,” Section I). Having agreed to the rules of engagement, the two armies meet upon the battlefield. The Bhagavad Gita is delivered after Arjuna, upon whom the Pandavas’ victory depends, refuses to fight against his family and former teachers (Bhagavad Gita, 1.46, 11.36). In this central text, Krishna reveals his universal form to Arjuna, showing himself to be the god Vishnu, and provides a philosophical justification for the violence. This is the idea of karmayōga, or doing one’s duty without desire or aversion, and giving the “fruits” of one’s labors as a devotional offering to Vishnu (Bhagavad Gita, 3.9, 3.19, 3.30, 18.9). Many have seen a strong resemblance between karmayōga and Western forms of deontological ethics. Assured by Krishna, Arjuna returns and the battle of Kurukshetra begins. In the first 10 days of the battle the Kauravas are led by the grandsire of the Kurus, the great Bhisma. The Pandavas are unable to defeat him. Bhisma reveals to them a vulnerability: that he could not face a woman in combat. Therefore, Shikhandi, a warrior who was born a girl, is put into the field in front of Arjuna. Bhisma refuses to engage them and is literally filled with arrows by his grandnephew and other warriors (“Bhagavadgita Parva,” Section 120). He does not die, but rests incapacitated on his bed of arrows until the battle is over. He is replaced by the weapons instructor of the Kurus, Drona. Unable to overcome Drona, the Pandavas resort to subterfuge at the urging of Krishna. Drona’s son is named Aswatthaman. An elephant by the same name is killed by the Pandavas, and Yudhishthira, the embodiment of truth, calls out “Aswatthaman was dead,” murmuring the word elephant after the name (“Dronavadha Parva,” Section 191). In his grief over the supposed death of his son, Drona lays down his weapons and,

contravening the rules of engagement, another warrior slays him (“Drona-vadha Parva,” Section 193). With the defeat of Drona, Karna, the lost brother of the Pandavas, assumes leadership. Upon his death on the 17th day of battle, Shalya assumes command but at this point the greatest warriors of the Kauravas are already defeated. The following day the eldest Kaurava is slain by Bhima, and the war is over. However, that night the Pandava camp is raided, and their army is slaughtered as they sleep in clear violation of the terms of engagement. Although victorious, the Pandavas have inherited a kingdom befit of men with only the graves of their former teachers and friends. The historicity of the battle has its advocates. The 10th century before the Common Era has been suggested as a probable date, correlated with the Painted Gray Ware civilization. Archaeological research has also attempted to identify the location of the war, but most scholars agree that these efforts have so far been inconclusive. Jarrod W. B rown See also Hindu Mythological Wars Further Reading Chakrabarti, S. “The Mahabharata. Archaeological and Literary Evidence.” Case Studies in Archaeology and World Religion. British Archaeological Reports Study 755 (1999): 166–74. Ganguli, Kisari Mohan. The Mahabharata of Krishna-Dwaipayana Vyasa Translated into English Prose. Vols. 1–4. New Delhi: Munshiram Manorharlal, republished 2002. Haksrea, Kuoch, and Jeanne Jacob. Reamker (Rāmakerti): The Cambodian Version of the Rāmāyan.a. London: Routledge, 2013. Lal, Braj Basi. “Historicity of the Mahabharata and the Ramayana: What Has Archeology to Say in the Matter?” Indian Archaeology in Retrospect 4 (2002): 29–70. Patton, L. L. The Bhagavad Gita. Oxford: Penguin Books, 2008. Phalgunadi, I. Gusti Putu. The Indonesian Mahābhārata, Vols. 1–4. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture and Aditya Prakashan, 1990.

L Lachish, Battle of (701 BCE)

The Assyrian army first attacked Lachish, further isolating the Judean capital. A strong system of fortifications at Lachish slowed the Assyrian juggernaut—for perhaps a month or so. Lachish was built on a hill and protected by two rings of walls, plus a large double gate complex and an additional fortress in the center of the city. The Assyrians set up camp on a nearby hill and ringed the city with troops to seal it off. They immediately began constructing a siege ramp at one corner of the city. Some 19,000 tons of rubble went into it, finished off with a thick layer of mortar and paths paved with split trees for the battering rams to traverse. During the few weeks it took to construct the ramps, Assyrian officers went up to Jerusalem to try to convince the Judean king to surrender the capital. The Bible records the exchange in some detail, including the various Assyrian psychological tactics and the Judean refusal to capitulate (2 Kings 18:13–19:34). Once the Assyrian ramp at Lachish was finished and the battering rams were rolled into place, the city’s fall was imminent. Scores of arrowheads and sling stones recovered from Lachish and the carved reliefs from Nineveh testify to the battle’s ferocity. Assyrian archers and slingers provided covering fire for the rams to do their work. Judean defenders likewise fired bows and slung stones against the attackers and threw down rocks and burning torches in an attempt to stop the rams from creating a breach.

In 701 BCE, the Assyrian king Sennacherib and his army conquered Lachish, the second-largest city in the biblical kingdom of Judah. The victory helped reestablish Assyrian dominance along the eastern Mediterranean coast, which helped pave the way for Assyria to realize its ultimate goal—the conquest of Egypt. The fall of Lachish turned out to be the greatest achievement of the campaign in 701 BCE, so Sennacherib ordered a massive mural depicting the battle carved onto the walls of his new palace back in Nineveh. This mural, along with archaeological evidence from Lachish and textual records in the Bible and from Assyria, all combine to portray one of the best-attested battles in antiquity. Sennacherib assumed the Assyrian throne in 705 BCE and immediately began reconquering vassal states that used the change in power as an opportunity to rebel. By 701 BCE, Sennacherib turned his attention west. First the Assyrians subdued cities in Phoenicia on the northern Mediterranean coast, then they did the same to cities to the south. After defeating an Egyptian army that had come to the aid of its allies in the region (2 Kings 19:9; Isa. 37:9), Assyria turned inland. The conquerors decimated nearly all of Judah, until all that remained was the capital, Jerusalem, and Lachish, the district capital in the western foothills (2 Kings 18:13–14). 475

476  Lactantius (240–320 CE)

That attempt failed. The Assyrians breached the wall, stormed the city, conquered the citadel, and destroyed Lachish. Fifteen hundred bodies, apparently of people killed in the attack, have been recovered from several burial caves at the site. The residents of Lachish who didn’t die were deported to Assyria, never to return. The Assyrians clearly won the battle of Lachish. Although the textual records note that Jerusalem (barely) survived the campaign (2 Kings 19:35– 36), Judah could no longer resist and the Assyrian subjection of all the Levantine rebels was complete. Boyd Seevers See also Assyrian Warfare; Sennacherib’s Attack on Judah Further Reading Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2013. Shanks, Hershel. “Destruction of Judean Fortress Portrayed in Dramatic Eighth-Century B.C. Pictures.” Biblical Archaeology Review 10, no. 2 (March/April 1984): 48–65. Ussishkin, David. The Conquest of Lachish by Sennacherib. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1982.

Lactantius (240–320 CE) Lucius Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius was a Christian apologist whose account of the Christian attitude toward life, in his Divinae Institutiones (“Divine Precepts”), was both a refutation of early fourth-century anti-Christian tracts and highly critical of the heathen polytheism prevalent in ancient Rome. As one of the most reprinted of the Latin church fathers, Lactantius was called the “Christian Cicero” by many Renaissance humanists. Appointed a teacher of rhetoric by the Roman emperor Diocletian, Lactantius resigned his post when the emperor began persecuting Christians—only to later tutor the Emperor Constantine’s son Crispus. Lactantius is considered an uncompromising pacifist who thought that military violence ultimately stems from unconstrained passions. He distinguished sharply between legality and morality, asserting that while all political communities make certain activities illegal, such as banditry, an

activity’s juridical status is ultimately of no consequence to how it ought to be evaluated morally. One moral absolute, for Lactantius, was the sacrosanct nature of human life. This led him to characterize all killing as a violation of God’s will and forbade him to sanction any form of military service. Lactantius was harshly critical of military expansionism (including what today is called the international war crime of aggression), saying that an increase in the powers of the state through the extension of state borders—along with any resultant increased revenue—is the very opposite of virtue. Lactantius’s pacifism drew no distinction between the various means used to carry out violence, asserting that death as a result of warfare or resulting from the spoken word are both equally unjust. He also saw no moral difference between cases where a man commits a killing of some kind, or merely observes another person doing so. This shared responsibility has strong affinities with, and connects Lactantius to, the norms found in contemporary military service—where group identity and collective culpability override the individualized application of justice. Despite his overarching pacifism, Lactantius offered a more nuanced view in some of his (particularly later) writings. For example, when, during the persecutions, Diocletian wrote letters to his commanding officers stating that everyone was required to sacrifice on behalf of the emperor or be dismissed from their service, Lactantius lamented that soldiers were being forced into impiety. He also acknowledged the necessity of killing if a solder was made to go to war. Thus, Lactantius seemed to distinguish between free and involuntary coercion in the moral evaluation of violence. These exceptions imply that he may have been prepared to lay final blame for violence, in such cases, at the feet of those who gave the orders. Joseph M. Hatfield See also Christianity and War Further Reading Brock, Peter. Pacifism in Europe to 1914. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972. Cadbury, Henry J. “The Basis of Early Christian Antimilitarism.” Journal of Biblical Literature 37, no. 1/2 (1918): 66–94. Charles, J. Daryl, and David D. Corey. The Just War Tradition: An Introduction. Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2012.

Languedoc Revolts (1215–1229)  477 Charles, J. Daryl, and Timothy J. Demy. War, Peace, and Christianity: Questions and Answers from a Just-War Perspective. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2010.

Languedoc Revolts (1215–1229) The Languedoc Revolts marked the beginning of a partial military and territorial recovery by Languedocian nobles and townspeople against the forces of the Albigensian Crusade, which was a crusade to rid the Languedoc region of the religious sect known as the Cathars. The Cathars had been deemed heretics by the Catholic Church. Between 1209 and 1215, southern nobles and towns had repeatedly lost sieges, battles, and territory against Simon of Montfort (1208–1265), commander of the crusade since autumn 1209. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) formally granted Simon of Montfort lordship over most of the region and in the spring of 1216 Simon received political approval from the king of France as well. Simon’s actual control was tenuous, despite the confirmations from church and state. Lateran IV had in effect disinherited the young Count of Toulouse, Raymond VII (1197–1249), but soon after it concluded he told Pope Innocent III that since Simon had won his lands by conquest, perhaps Raymond might win them back that way. The pope neither supported nor condemned the idea, giving him tacit approval to raise a rebellion against Simon of Montfort. The revolt began in the spring of 1216 on the eastern edge of what Simon technically controlled, in the town of Beaucaire on the Rhône River. The Fourth Lateran Council had not settled who was to have legal possession of the city, which was held by a Montfortian garrison. At the time Raymond VII attempted to take it back, Simon was in northern France. Upon receiving the news, he scrambled to Beaucaire with small numbers of troops raised on the way. By the time Simon arrived the siege was well underway, and even though he repeatedly assaulted the southern siege works, he could not relieve the garrison within Beaucaire, which capitulated after negotiations in August 1216. This tactical victory encouraged further revolt, or at least Simon of Montfort thought it might.

Simon moved westward with what forces he had toward Toulouse after hearing rumors that an army from Spain recruited by the old Count of Toulouse, Raymond VI, was to liberate the city. Toulouse was the largest city in Languedoc, and Simon had failed to take it by siege in 1211. He had gained ostensible possession of it in spring 1215 via a papal bull, which ordered the townspeople to turn the city over to him. Many of the city’s defenses were dismantled at that time. For long-standing reasons the people of Toulouse and Simon despised each other. The army from Spain never materialized so the municipal leaders of Toulouse continued to accept his control. In the summer of 1217 the old Count eventually did make his way into the city, initiating a rebellion and forcing Simon to besiege Toulouse for a second time. The city’s size, however, meant that he could only invest part of the walls. Over the months of the siege his patience wore thin, and as he did at Beaucaire, at various times he tried assaulting the city, but these aggressive moves failed. During a southern sortie on June 25, 1218, Simon was killed by a trebuchet missile shot by the citizens of Toulouse. Bereft of its extremely capable leader, the crusade generally stagnated under Simon’s well-meaning but less talented son, Amaury of Montfort (1195–1241), but neither side gained any tangible advantage over the other. In 1219 Prince Louis, who had nominally crusaded in Languedoc in 1215, returned with a large army and besieged a number of places, including Toulouse. In spite of his large force and his own strong command abilities, Louis was unable to take the city. By 1222 Amaury, exhausted by the long conflict, attempted to cede his theoretical territories to the French crown but old king Philip refused. In 1224 Amaury tried again, and this time Louis, now king, agreed to the cession. In 1226 Louis VIII (r. 1223–1226) returned to the Languedoc region for the third time with a large royal army. He took many cities, including Avignon after a threemonth siege, but died shortly thereafter. Within three years, Raymond VII, who had spent his adult life attempting to win back his patrimony, agreed to a permanent peace in 1229 with the French monarchy. By its terms he remained the Count of Toulouse during his lifetime. Upon his death his lands went to his daughter, Jeanne, who was married to Alphonse of Poitiers, brother of King Louis IX. One of its provisions stated that should Jeanne and Alphonse fail to

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produce an heir, her lands would escheat to the French crown. Though no one anticipated this, in 1271 she died childless, and thus Languedoc passed to the king of France. Laurence W. M arvin See also Albigensian Crusade; Béziers, Massacre at; Cathars; Innocent III, Pope; Lateran Church Councils Further Reading Evans, Austin P. “The Albigensian Crusade.” In Kenneth Setton, ed. A History of the Crusades. 6 vols. 2nd ed. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1969. Marvin, Laurence W. The Occitan War. A Military and Political History of the Albigensian Crusade, 1209–1218. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pegg, Mark Gregory. A Most Holy War. The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Strayer, Joseph R. The Albigensian Crusades. With a New Epilogue by Carol Lansing. Lansing: University of Michigan, 1992. Sumption, Jonathan. The Albigensian Crusade. London: Faber & Faber, 1978.

Las Casas, Bartolomé de (1484–1566) Bartolomé de Las Casas, a Dominican friar, dedicated his life to defending the rights of the indigenous peoples of New Spain and encouraged their peaceful evangelization rather than their exploitation and forceful conversion to Christianity. Very little is known about his childhood other than that he was born in Seville, Spain. His ideas and his writings were influenced by his personal witness of the cruelty inflicted by the Spanish against the indigenous peoples of the New World in what is modern-day Central America and Mexico. His political and legal philosophy was influenced by the Salamanca school of the law of nations. In the 16th century, professors at the University of Salamanca, west of Madrid, Spain, questioned the legality of Spain’s use of force against indigenous peoples of the New World such as the Incas and Aztecs. However, they justified the use of force to stop the practice of human sacrifice. Las Casas did not believe the custom of human sacrifice was a

just cause for war and persecution. He believed that the only legal justification for the Spanish conquest of indigenous nations was the universal authority of the pope who granted the territories of the New World to Spain for the peaceful evangelization of its inhabitants. Las Casas was not always an advocate for the rights of indigenous people. On April 15, 1502, he arrived in Santo Domingo (Haiti) and became an ecomendero (similar to a slave owner). In 1510, he became a priest and a member of the Dominican order, which was one of the most influential Catholic organizations in the New World. After becoming a slave owner, he listened to the preaching of a Dominican priest who spoke about the duty of Christians to love indigenous people and treat them with respect. This message was the beginning of a radical transformation in Las Casas’s views about the nature of the Spanish presence in the New World. After he moved to Cuba in 1514, he completed his transformation and decided to dedicate his life to advocating for the rights of indigenous people and the construction of societies where Spanish and indigenous people could coexist peacefully. Las Casas’s strategy to alleviate the suffering of the people of the New World under Spanish authority was to influence the conscience of high-ranking Spanish government officials to change unjust laws and policies. In 1515, he returned to Spain to inform Ferdinand, the king of Spain, about the massacres, exploitation, and other unjust actions that he had observed in the New World since his arrival there. Because of his political skills, Las Casas obtained the favor of another Spanish king, Charles V, and in 1543 he was authorized to attend the meetings of the Council of the Indies, which was the most important entity for designing and implementing Spanish policies for the New World. That same year, he became the bishop of Chiapas, Mexico. Las Casas advocated for the creation and implementation of the New Laws (1542). He questioned the legal and moral validity of Spanish colonial normative instruments, such as the Requerimiento, which was used to justify the Spanish conquest by asking indigenous people to submit to Spanish authorities and jurisdiction, or face severe persecution. The main objectives of those laws were to end the encomienda and enable indigenous people to eventually become equal Spanish subjects. Like other Spanish

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thinkers and activists in the 16th century, Las Casas’s ideas were based on a Christian worldview of human nature, which included the understanding that all human beings were created in God’s image (imago Dei). Because of this, he believed in the defense of the rights of indigenous people. Two of the most significant publications of Las Casas arguing for humane treatment of indigenous people were In Defense of the Indians (1550) and A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies (written 1542, published 1552). The latter volume reported atrocities against indigenous peoples of the Americas by the Spanish. At the end of his life, he recognized that indigenous nations had the right to use force against Spanish conquerors because of the widespread violations of natural law. However, he never changed his view about the lawful nature of the Spanish presence in the New World because of the universal authority of the pope over both spiritual and territorial matters. One of the most important contributions of Bartolomé de Las Casas was his debate against Gines De Sepulveda (August 1550), published as In Defense of the Indians. The main objective of Sepulveda’s narrative was to justify the Spanish conquest of the New World because of the inherent inferiority of indigenous people. Contrary to that view, Las Casas objected to the Aristotelian ideas of natural slavery and advocated for respect of the dignity of indigenous people, who like all other human beings were created in God’s image (imago Dei). The debate of Valladolid, in essence, was about the theological and philosophical understanding of the concept of human nature. Yuri Mantilla See also Vitoria, Francisco de Further Reading De las Casas, Bartolomé. A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies. Translated by Nigel Griffin. London: Penguin, 2004. De las Casas, Bartolomé. In Defense of the Indians. Translated by Stafford Poole. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1992. Hanke, Lewis. The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965. Hanke, Lewis. All Mankind Is One. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994.

Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of (1212) The battle of Las Navas de Tolosa was a decisive turning point in the long struggle between Christians and Muslims for control and domination of the Iberian Peninsula. The overwhelming Christian victory in this battle was attributed to Divine Providence and saintly protection. The defeat of the Muslim forces led to the rapid decline of the Almohad Empire and advanced Christian territory beyond the Guadiana River in Spain. Las Navas de Tolosa cemented the dominant place of Castile as the leading Christian kingdom in the peninsula. During Pentecost (May 13–20, 1212) a meeting took place in Toledo, the ancient seat of Catholicism in Spain, between Alfonso VIII of Castile, Pedro II of Aragon, Archbishop Arnold Amaury of Narbonne, leading counts, and knights of the peninsular military orders and international orders of the Temple and the Hospital. The meeting was organized by Pope Innocent III who wanted to unite the Spanish Christian kingdoms to wage a renewed war against the Muslims. Participants would be given remission of sin, indulgence, and eternal life in heaven for fighting or financing a crusade in Spain, the same terms given to their brethren who crusaded in the Holy Lands. Afonso II of Portugal, Sancho VII of Navarre, and King Philip Augustus of France also offered support for the campaign. Castile alone raised reportedly 2,000 knights and squires, 10,000 sergeants on horseback, and 50,000 sergeants on foot to come to Toledo, all financed from ecclesiastical revenues. On June 20 the combined Christian forces left Toledo and soon took Calatrava before stopping at Las Navas de Tolosa—22 miles north of Baeza and Úbeda. On July 13 they confronted a Muslim army under Caliph al-Nasir. Before battle commenced on July 16 the Christians received absolution, celebrated mass, and received the Eucharist. Prelates blessed the men for taking up the sword in the name of God and in the service of Christendom. The battle was viewed at the time as a religious struggle against the heathen and infidel. The Christians marched under the standard of the Virgin Mary and prayed to Saint James, the patron saint of crusading conquests (Santiago Matamoros—James the Moorslayer), to fight with them in combat. Pedro II commanded the left wing of the Christian army, Sancho VII the right while the Castilians and military

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orders occupied the center. The caliph’s army was comprised of light companies of Arab and Berber cavalry supported by troops from Morocco and al-Andalus. The Christian forces routed the Muslims, who fled in panic. The tapestry covering the entrance to the caliph’s tent was captured and sent to the monastery of Las Huelgas near Burgos. The caliph’s lance, standard, and tent were sent to Rome. Pope Innocent III attributed the victory against the enemies of the cross to divine intervention. Te Deum laudamus was sung by the victors to mark the end of Muslim ascendancy in Spain. The victors soon turned captured mosques into churches as part of a process of cleansing and purification that signaled Catholic triumphalism. The battle tipped the balance of power decisively in favour of the Christians and made possible the territorial conquests of the greater part of al-Andalus over the next 40 years. The international element of the Christian campaign kept alive the crusading ideal, and its success encouraged the papacy to launch a Fifth Crusade in 1215. Barry N. Whelan See also Caliphate; Christian-Muslim Wars in Spain; Innocent III, Pope; Reconquista Further Reading Cabrer, Martín Alvira. Las Navas de Tolosa 1212: idea, liturgia y memoria de la Batalla. Madrid: Sílex, 2012. Linehan, Peter. The Spanish Church and the Papacy in the Thirteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Madden, Thomas F. The New Concise History of the Crusades. Oxford: Rowman, 2005. O’Callaghan, Joseph F. Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Pick, Lucy K. Conflict and Coexistence: Archbishop Rodrigo and the Muslims and Jews of Medieval Spain. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004.

Lateran Church Councils During the Middle Ages, four general church councils took place at St. John the Lateran Basilica in Rome. Scholarly consensus suggests they were ecumenical because of their attendance and that their “canons” or rules bound all

Christians. Some debate remains about the universality of two of them, even though popes at the time referred to them as “general.” The councils represent a number of important things about the times in which they were held. One, they were the first general councils for more than 300 years. Two, they were the first general councils held in what had been the western half of the Roman Empire; and three, they represented the concerns of an expanding Western Europe and Roman church. All four councils attempted to reform and regulate the church and Christianity. Popes convened the first three after significant crises forced the church to reach a broad consensus on issues concerning the Christian community. Lateran IV was the largest in attendance, broadest geographically, and most influential based on the policies enacted. Lateran I drew some 300 bishops, abbots, and other churchmen to Rome in 1123. The council served as a capstone to the Concordat of Worms of 1122, which had mostly resolved the respective jurisdictions of church and state in the appointment of ecclesiastical prelates. One of Lateran I’s main objectives was ensuring widespread ecclesiastical support for this concordat. Church reform, an ongoing concern, appeared in many of its canons, including prohibition of simony (the buying or selling of church offices) and other perceived abuses like clerical marriage or the keeping of concubines. Canon 10 more firmly established incentives for crusading, mainly the remission of sin (the indulgence), but also placing crusader families and their property under papal protection. Competing popes caused a leadership schism in the Latin church between 1130 and 1138. After one of those popes died, the other, Innocent II, called Lateran II in 1139 to heal this schism and prevent another. It attracted more than 500 ecclesiastical prelates, including the Latin patriarch of Constantinople. Like its predecessor, this council covered some of the same reform ground, including prohibiting clerical marriage or keeping of concubines, and reaffirming things like the Truce of God. This council, however, addressed new concerns, specifically anathematizing usurers (those lending money at interest) and denouncing the violence and deaths caused by jousts and tournaments. The council refused a church burial to those who died as a result, though permitting them last rites. Canon 29 also attempted to regulate something that appeared to be on

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the rise in the West: missile warfare. It prohibited the use of crossbows and archers against Christians, and anathematized those who used them. Lateran III occurred in 1179, again after a period of papal schism and problems between church and state. A schism between Alexander III and a series of rival popes elected by a faction of the College of Cardinals had existed since 1159. This was caused partly by those who supported the expansionist policies of Frederick Barbarossa, King of Germany and later Emperor of the Romans at Alexander’s expense. Alexander convened Lateran III to address both these issues. Though fewer prelates, about 300, attended Lateran III than Lateran II, this council represented a better cross-section of Christian leadership. Canon 1 attempted to prevent any future schisms by regulating papal elections, mandating a two-thirds majority for a candidate. Any acts or appointments of candidates elected with less than a two-thirds majority were neither legal nor binding. Besides attempting to regulate things earlier councils had sought to regulate, such as clerical marriage, enforcing the Truce of God, and anathematizing usurers, this council covered contemporary concerns, including the perceived growth of heresy and the practitioners of unorthodox violence. Heretics in southern France, that is, Cathars or Albigensians, or those who provided protection for them were condemned. The council also excommunicated and condemned pirates or robbers of Christians, certain categories of mercenaries, and those who employed them. Unlike the earlier councils Lateran IV did not end or address a specific crisis but rather focused Christian efforts on another crusade to the Middle East and in doing so promulgated reform and policies to facilitate that. Lateran IV is rightly famous for its comprehensiveness, composition, scope, and influence. To maximize attendance Pope Innocent III called it in 1213, well in advance, to convene in 1215. Innocent exerted more control over Lateran IV than any pope had over its predecessors. Its composition was huge: more than 400 bishops, 800 abbots, and other churchmen from both the Western and Eastern Latin churches attended, though few Greek-rite prelates showed up. The council produced 71 lengthy canons, thus in sheer words alone it outdid the ones before it. The council sought to clear the way for and promote a sustained crusade

effort in the eastern Mediterranean, resulting in the Fifth Crusade. Thus Canon 71 represents the most cohesive effort to date regulating finances, leadership, rewards, and a timeline for the projected crusade. Beyond this the council produced other things that were equally, if not more, influential over the next centuries. Canon 18, for example, prohibited clerics from participating in, witnessing, or endorsing any punishments that drew blood, or involved boiling or cold water, meaning that judicial duels or ordeals no longer had church sanction. In effect this removed the possibility of God’s judgment from the decision, and caused their use to wither over the next century. This prohibition caused kingdoms like England to place more reliance on juries to ascertain guilt or innocence. Canon 21 established church-wide policies for confession and communion. Each Christian was to confess at least once a year and receive communion at Easter. Canons 50–52 specified what constituted a canonical marriage and thus de jure established the church as the arbiter of what a legal marriage meant in the Western world. Lateran IV best represents the ideal state of the Western Christian church in the Middle Ages. The pope, surrounded by the leading lights of theology and administration, produced uniform, comprehensive pronouncements for Western Christians. Taken together, the four Lateran councils show how the church handled the important religious and secular concerns of the day. Laurence W. M arvin See also Albigensian Crusade; Cathars; Fifth Crusade; Innocent III, Pope; Investiture Controversy Further Reading Bartlett, Robert. Trial by Fire and Water: The Medieval Judicial Ordeal. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Duggan, Anne J. “Conciliar Law 1123–1215. The Legislation of the Four Lateran Councils.” In Wilfried Hartmann and Kenneth Pennington, eds. The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140–1234. Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 2008, pp. 318–66. Morris, Colin. The Papal Monarchy. The Western Church from 1050 to 1250. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Robinson, I. S. “The Papacy, 1122–1198.” In David Luscombe and Jonathan Riley-Smith, eds. The New Cambridge Medieval History Volume 4.2 c. 1024–1198. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 317–83.

482  Lawrence of Arabia (1888–1935) Tanner, Norman P., ed. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils I. London and Washington, DC: Sheed & Ward and Georgetown University Press, 1990.

Lawrence of Arabia (1888–1935) “Lawrence of Arabia,” the nickname of Thomas Edward Lawrence, also known as Thomas Edward Shaw, was a British archaeologist, military officer, and guerrilla leader of anti-Ottoman Arab forces in the Arab Revolt of 1916– 1918. He navigated religious and political factors, including Zionism, jihad, Wahhabism, the Ottoman caliphate, and control of Islam’s holy cities, to achieve military victory. Ill-advised postwar settlements and ensuing political volatility combined with Lawrence’s memoirs and untimely death romanticized his reputation as an insightful, prophetic observer of Arab political realities. Religion played a significant role within the contradictory aspects of Lawrence’s upbringing. His father ran off with the family governess; however, despite the questionable arrangement, his parents raised Lawrence and his four brothers by a strict moral code and under the pastoral care of Canon Alfred Christopher, a notable evangelical Anglican. After the family settled in Oxford, Lawrence attended Jesus College and showed interest in biblical studies, faithfully attending the weekly New Testament Greek lectures of William Griffith Thomas, a leading dispensational Anglican. While several of his brothers went on to missionary work, Lawrence drifted away from a devout life, content to appreciate religion within the framework of the growing archaeological sciences. His interests led him to the excavation of Carchemish in Syria from 1910 to 1914 under Sir Leonard Woolley. In 1914, he and Woolley pursued clandestine work in mapping the Sinai Peninsula. When the First World War broke out, Lawrence was assigned to Egypt to aid efforts to combat the Ottoman Empire, now a member of the Central Powers. In June 1916, Sharif Husein bin Ali, the Hashemite ruler of the Hejaz and the caretaker of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, initiated a revolt of Arab tribesmen against Ottoman forces. Realizing Lawrence’s valuable experiences in Arabic culture and geography, officials assigned him to work with the revolt.

Thomas Edward Lawrence, also known as “Lawrence of Arabia,” successfully navigated religious and political forces to achieve military victory on the Arabian peninsula during the First World War. The brutal warfare significantly influenced Lawrence’s personal beliefs, wearing away any attachments to evangelical Anglicanism and leaving him with a simple theistic creed similar to the Islamic shahada that acknowledged God’s existence. (Library of Congress)

Lawrence found the situation full of religious considerations that exerted significant influence over strategic military decisions. In addition to the inherent Christian versus Muslim tensions dating back to the crusades, Britain had to navigate the fight against Ottoman jihad without unsettling its own Muslim population in India. The revolt also undermined the concept of the caliphate, since the Ottoman Empire claimed leadership from Muhammad that extended over the entire Islamic umma or community. Despite the social and religious concerns, Husein pressed ahead with the revolt, supported by a combination of Arab nationalism, resentment against repressive Ottoman policies, fear of rivals like ibn Saud and Wahhabi Islam, and the supposed British support for a future Arab nation-state to be led by Husein.

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Lawrence partnered with Husein’s son Feisal, a young, charismatic leader, and conducted a guerrilla campaign to disable the Ottoman Hejaz railway. Lawrence soon won the Arabs’ respect through sharing their hardships and his innovative applications of dynamite. After Lawrence and the Arabs captured Aqaba in July 1917, British forces under General Edmund Allenby increased coordination with them, resulting in the fall of Jerusalem in late 1917, an event full of religious overtones for Muslims, Jews, and Christians. Lawrence and his allies captured Damascus in October 1918, but their military triumph failed to ensure an Arab nation. Despite earlier diplomatic indications, the British and French had been intent since 1916 on dividing the Middle East among themselves, a decision recorded in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The 1917 Balfour Declaration further exacerbated tensions by supporting a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Throughout the war and the postwar negotiations, Lawrence facilitated cultural understanding by keenly observing the contrasts and similarities between Islam and Christianity and seeking to appreciate how those beliefs affected cultural norms. Lawrence advised other British officers on those implications, hoping that greater understanding could lead to more effective military and political solutions. The brutal warfare also significantly influenced Lawrence’s personal beliefs, wearing away any attachments to evangelical Anglicanism and leaving him with a simple theistic creed similar to the Islamic shahada that acknowledged God’s existence. Frustrated by the postwar failures, Lawrence slowly faded from public life, writing several well-known works, including Seven Pillars of Wisdom, before dying in a motorcycle crash in 1935. Whether or not Lawrence’s proposed divisions of the region would have ensured stability remains a subject of debate since fighting over postwar settlements plagues 21st-century diplomats and generals. Sectarian warfare wracked Iraq and Syria. Jews and Arabs continue to vie for Palestine, leaving Jerusalem a divided city. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS claim their violence supports restoring the caliphate and overturning the Sykes-Picot boundaries. This continued violence and a romanticized Hollywood image have secured Lawrence’s reputation as a leader who understood the complex interactions of war, religion, and culture. Jonathan Edward Newell

See also First World War, Religious Dimensions of; Ottoman Empire; Primary Documents: Balfour Declaration (1917); The Palestine Mandate (July 24, 1922); U.S. Congress Endorsement of the Balfour Declaration (September 21, 1922) Further Reading Barr, James. A Line in the Sand: The Anglo-French Struggle for the Middle East, 1914–1918. New York: Norton, 2013. Barr, James. Setting the Desert on Fire: T. E. Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War in Arabia, 1916–1918. New York: Norton, 2008. James, Lawrence. The Golden Warrior: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia. London: Weidenfeld, 1990. Jenkins, Philip. The Great and Holy War: How World War I Became a Religious Crusade. New York: HarperCollins, 2014. Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom : A Triumph. New York: Knopf, 1991.

Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) The Lebanese Civil War raged from 1975 to 1990, resulting in about 250,000 casualties, as well as about 76,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and between 600,000 and 900,000 refugees. In the long term, it deeply affected the country’s traditional ethno-political balance, resulting in an increase in domestic polarization and in a large-scale involvement of foreign actors ranging from neighboring Israel and Syria to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. The formal end of the conflict, between 1990 and 1991, did not put an end to violence. Rather, Lebanon is still today one of the most troubled spots in the Middle East. After the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979), the country also became the forefront of a broader Sunni/Shi’a competition, as well as the test bed for new terrorist tactics (from car bombing to suicide attacks) that were widely adopted in the Middle East and elsewhere during the following decades. Divisions and rivalries between Lebanon’s religious groups date back as far as 15 centuries and played an important role in shaping the country’s institutional system. At the time of independence, the National Pact (1943), based on the results of the census of 1932 (which is still today the only official census held in Lebanon), laid the foundations of Lebanese politics by establishing a series of key points. With these points, the Maronite Christians

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pledged not to seek foreign intervention and accepted an Arab-affiliated Lebanon; on their side, Muslims abandoned aspirations to unite with Syria. Referring to the top political positions, the presidency of the republic was allotted to a Maronite Christian and the premiership to a Sunni. The Speaker of the Parliament always had to be a Shi’a Muslim; the deputy speaker and the deputy prime minister two Greek Orthodox Christians; the chief of the General Staff a Maronite Christian; and the chief of Army Staff a Druze. Finally, it was agreed that Parliament members always had to be in a ratio of 6:5 in favor of Christians. Preserving this fragile ethno-religious balance proved difficult, especially with the massive influx of Palestinian refugees in 1948. The different demographic patterns of Christians and Muslims contributed to the process, endangering the National Pact as early as the mid-1950s. The spreading of pan-Arabism—to which Egyptian president Gamal Abd el-Nasser (1918–1970) gave strong antiimperialistic undertones after his rise to power (1954)—and the contemporary decline of French influence in the Mediterranean pushed in the same direction. During the presidency of Camille Chamoun (in office 1952–1958), tensions were strong enough to support an effort to oust the president from power, a situation that prompted President Chamoun to appeal for assistance to the United States. The compromise brokered by the U.S. presidential envoy Robert D. Murphy was supported by some 14,000 troops hastily deployed in the country (Operation Blue Bat, July 15–October 25, 1958), resulting in the election of the moderate General Fuad Chehab (1902–1973) as the new president (in office 1958–1964) and allowing Chamoun to continue in power until the end of his term (September 22, 1958), but this arrangement proved unable to solve the basic problem of Muslim discontent. The origins of the Lebanese Civil War rest in the sectarian violence that affected the country in the mid-1970s, in its turn the product of the rather unsatisfactory solution to the constitutional crisis of 1958. During the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, while the situation in the Middle East dramatically deteriorated, the Lebanese community grew more and more militarized. In spring 1975, local clashes broke out between Christian Phalangists of the right-wing Kataeb Party and pan-Arab, pro-Syria activists of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a motley

coalition of organizations and parties led by the Druze leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, Kamal Jumblatt (1917–1977). Incidents continued during the following weeks, growing in intensity and involving the forces of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), relocated in Lebanon at the beginning of the 1970s after having been ousted from Jordan in the events of “Black September” (September 1970–June 1971). On April 15, 1975, a fullfledged battle between the PLO and the Kataeb militia led to the definition of a demarcation line dividing Beirut in two parts, with militias formed on both sides and hundreds of civilians killed or taken hostage. On January 18, 1976, an estimated 1,000–1,500 people were killed by Maronite forces in the Karantina Massacre, followed on January 20 by a retaliatory strike on Damour. These two massacres prompted a mass exodus of Muslims and Christians, as people fled to areas under the control of their own sect. East and West Beirut evolved into de facto Christian and Muslim Beirut. Government and armed forces too fractured along sectarian lines while the PLO sided with the LNM. On January 22, Syrian president Hafez al-Assad (1930–2000) brokered a truce between the parts and on June 1, 12,000 Syrian troops crossed the borders with Lebanon to support the newly elected president, Elias Sarkys (in charge 1976–1982). The civil war took the form of a clash between a Syrian-Maronite alliance supported by Israel (which had started supplying the Maronites with arms, tanks, and military advisers in May 1976) and the LNM-PLO. In October 1976, Syria accepted the proposal put forward at the Arab League’s extraordinary summit in Riyadh, mandating Damascus to keep 40,000 troops in Lebanon as the bulk of an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) charged with disentangling the combatants and restoring calm. An uneasy quiet returned to Beirut and most of Lebanon, although in the south the political climate began to deteriorate due to the influx of PLO combatants, required to vacate the country’s central areas under the terms of the Riyadh Accord. In 1978, violence erupted again. In the meantime, the Maronite political parties (the NLP—National Liberal Party, the Kataeb Party, and the Lebanese Renewal Party) had joined in the Lebanese Front, while their respective militias (the Tigers, the Kataeb Regulatory Forces—KRF, and the Guardians of the Cedars) had entered into a loose

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coalition known as the Lebanese Forces, acting as a sort of Lebanese Front’s military wing. In both the Front and the Lebanese Forces, the role of Phalange and its leader Bachir Gemayel (1947–1982), son of Pierre (1905–1984), founder of the movement, was prominent. On the opposite front, on March 16, 1977, the leader of the LNM, Kamal Jumblatt, had been killed in an ambush and replaced as the head of the PSP by his son Walid while the LNM disintegrated. Between February and April 1978, the Lebanese Forces engaged the Syrian troops of the ADF, expelling them from East Beirut. In the same months, in South Lebanon, as retaliation for Palestinian attacks in Northern Israel, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) occupied the region between the border and the Litani River (Operation Litani, March 14–21, 1978). The IDF later retired, abiding by UN Security Council Resolution 425 (1978) and was replaced by UNIFIL–UN Interim Force in Lebanon. However, IDF retained control of a 12-mile-wide strip along Lebanon’s southern border, garrisoned by the forces of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a Christian-Shi’a militia under the leadership of Major Saad Haddad (1936–1984). Violence escalated within the Lebanese Forces between KRF and NLP’s Tigers, culminating in the so-called “Day of the Long Knives” (Safra massacre, July 7, 1980); between the Lebanese Forces (LF) and the Syrian troops of the ADF; and, along the southern border, between the PLA, the IDF, and the various militias that sided with them. It was the inability to stop Palestinian attacks against Galilee that pushed the Israeli right-wing cabinet (especially Defense Minister Ariel “Arik” Sharon) to draw up plans to attack PLO military infrastructure in West Beirut, where headquarters and command bunkers were located. On June 6, 1982, IDF launched Operation Peace for Galilee, penetrating 25 miles into Lebanon with the tacit support of the Maronites and their militias and advancing on Beirut despite UN Security Council Resolution 509 (1982)—unanimously adopted on the same day—that demanded their unconditional withdrawal back to Israel’s internationally recognized border. On June 13, Israeli forces laid siege to Beirut with the goal of expelling the PLO either directly or through the action of the Maronite militias. On August 12, the U.S. special envoy for the Middle East, Philip Habib (1920–1992), secured an agreement allowing PLO militiamen to leave Beirut undisturbed

under the protection of a multinational force of military personnel from the United States, France, and Italy. On August 21 the first foreign contingent reached Beirut, while on August 23 Bachir Gemayel was elected as Lebanon’s new president. Although the evacuation of the PLO guerrillas and of the Syrian troops from Beirut proceeded undisturbed, on September 14 the assassination of President Gemayel plunged the country into chaos again. On September 16–18, Phalangist militias killed some 3,500 Palestinian refugees in the camps of Sabra and Shatila. On February 8, 1983, the Kahan Commission (established by the Israeli government to investigate the massacre) published its report blaming the indirect responsibility on Israel for having allowed the Phalangists to enter the camps without taking into consideration the potential danger for their inhabitants and without a proper examination of the means to prevent it. On September 23, 1982, Amine Gemayel (1942–) replaced his brother as president of the republic, and on May 17, 1983, he signed an agreement—together with Israel and the United States—on Israeli withdrawal conditioned on the departure of the Syrian troops. In the following months, the IDF gradually left the country, with the exception of the “security belt” in South Lebanon. This led to fresh outbursts of violence: between Druze and Christians in the Chouf region—southeast of Beirut—that fell under Druze control in September 1983, at the end of the socalled “War of the Mountain” between the government and the Muslim factions, which aimed at exploiting the withdrawal of the multinational contingent; and among the different Muslim factions trying to emerge into an extremely fragmented environment. On October 23, an Iraniansponsored suicide bombing targeted the headquarters of the U.S. and French forces in Beirut, killing 241 American and 58 French servicemen. After U.S. forces withdrew (February 1984), the attacks continued, including a bombing of the U.S. embassy annex in East Beirut on September 20, 1984. Another effect of the Iranian involvement was the emergence of a new Shi’a party—Hezbollah, the “Party of God”—which gradually supplanted Amal (the “Movement of the Dispossessed” founded in 1974 by Imam Musa alSadr) as the forefront of Shi’a political representation. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also established bases in the Beqaa Valley in eastern Lebanon,

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from which they actively participated in the final phase of the war. In 1985–1986, the so-called “Battle of the Camps” raged between the remains of the PLO militiamen (who had found shelter in the country’s many refugee camps) and a Syrian-backed coalition led by Amal militias. In 1987 violence spread further, with left-wing and Druze fighters joining the Palestinians, followed by Hezbollah in 1988. The killing of Prime Minister Rashid Karami, head of a government of national unity set up after the failed peace efforts of 1984 (June 1, 1987), opened a new crisis when President Gemayel appointed as acting prime minister the Maronite Michel Aoun, commanding general of the Lebanese Armed Forces, thus violating the principles of the National Pact. Muslim groups, in their turn, pledged support to Selim alHoss, and Lebanon was de facto divided between a Maronite military government in East Beirut and a civilian government in West Beirut. The opening of the Ta’if negotiations under the auspices of the Arab League provided the occasion to break the stalemate. On November 4, 1989, the national reconciliation process agreed in Ta’if and providing a large role for Syria in the Lebanese affairs was ratified by the Lebanese Parliament. On the same day, Rene Mouawad was appointed as the country’s new president despite Aoun’s violent opposition. Mouawad’s killing (November 22, 1989), while opening a new phase of sectarian violence, was unable to stop the process. A clash with the (now largely independent) Lebanese Forces pushed Aoun into a corner that he could not leave despite the military victory gained in the intra-Maronite fights of spring and summer 1990. On October 13, 1990, Syrian forces and their Lebanese allies launched a major military operation against Aoun’s strongholds, killing hundreds of Aoun’s supporters and establishing firm control of Beirut. Aoun fled to the local French embassy and later into exile in Paris. In March 1991, Parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment. Two months later, the militias (with the important exception of Hezbollah) were dissolved, and the Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild as Lebanon’s major nonsectarian institution. In August 1990, embodying some of the political reforms agreed in Ta’if, the Parliament (National Assembly) had expanded to 128 seats, equally divided between Christians and Muslims. However, reforms did not

end the violence and sectarian divisions that periodically resurfaced. Relations with Syria and Israel, too, remained tense, especially due to the role that Hezbollah had played in the final part of the civil war. In this perspective, the withdrawal of the Syrian forces after the so-called “Cedar Revolution” (2005) had limited impact, while the growing role of Iran fueled Israeli fears, paving the way to a largescale military intervention that took place between July 12 and August 14, 2006. Gianluca Pastori See also Druze and War; Hezbollah; Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of; Lebanon, Israeli Operations against Further Reading Daher, Massoud. The Socio-Economic Changes and the Civil War in Lebanon, 1943–1990. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1992. El-Khazen, Farid. The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967– 1976. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. Fisk, Robert. Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Harris, William W. Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1997. Khalaf, Samir. Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. O’Ballance, Edgar. Civil War in Lebanon, 1975–92. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. Picard, Elizabeth. Lebanon: A Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon. New York: Holmes & Meier, 2002. Rabinovich, Itamar. The War for Lebanon, 1970–1985. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986.

Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982) The Israeli invasion of Lebanon began on June 6, 1982, when Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, acting in full agreement with instructions from Prime Minister Menachem Begin, ordered Israel Defense Forces (IDF) troops into southern Lebanon to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) there. In 1977, Begin had become the first Israeli prime minister from the right-wing Likud Party. He sought to maintain Israeli hold over the West Bank and Gaza but also had a

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deep commitment to Eretz Israel, the ancestral homeland of the Jews that embraced territory beyond Israel’s borders into Lebanon and across the Jordan River. Israeli defense minister Sharon, also a prominent member of the Likud Party, shared Begin’s ideological commitment to Eretz Israel. Indeed, Sharon played an important role in expanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. He took a hard-line approach toward the Palestinians, endeavoring to undermine PLO influence in the West Bank and Gaza, and was also influential in the formation of Israeli foreign policy. In June 1978, under heavy U.S. pressure, Begin withdrew Israeli forces that had been sent into southern Lebanon in the Litani River operation. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) then took over in southern Lebanon. They were charged with confirming the Israeli withdrawal, restoring peace and security, and helping the Lebanese government reestablish its authority in the area. The Israeli failure to remove PLO bases in southern Lebanon was a major embarrassment for the Begin government. UNIFIL proved incapable of preventing PLO forces from operating in southern Lebanon and striking Israel, which led to Israeli reprisals. Attacks back and forth across the Lebanese-Israeli border killed civilians on both sides as well as some UNIFIL troops. Israel, meanwhile, provided weapons to the force later known as the South Lebanon Army, a pro-Israeli Christian militia in southern Lebanon led by Major Saad Haddad, and the force used them against the PLO and local villagers. In July 1981 U.S. president Ronald Reagan sent Lebanese-American diplomat Philip Habib to the area in an effort to broker a truce during the Lebanese Civil War. On July 24, Habib announced agreement on a cease-fire, but it was in name only. The PLO repeatedly violated the agreement, and major cross-border strikes resumed in April 1982 following the death of an Israeli officer from a land mine. While Israel conducted both air strikes and commando raids across the border, it was unable to prevent a growing number of PLO personnel from locating there. Their numbers increased to perhaps 6,000 men in a number of encampments, as PLO rocket and mortar attacks regularly forced thousands of Israeli civilians to flee their homes and fields in northern Galilee and seek protection in bomb shelters.

On June 3, 1982, three members of a Palestinian terrorist organization connected to Abu Nidal attempted to assassinate in London Israeli ambassador to Britain Shlomo Argov. Although Argov survived the attack, he remained paralyzed until his death in 2003. Abu Nidal’s organization had been linked to Yasser Arafat’s Fatah faction within the PLO in the past, and the Israelis used this as the excuse to bomb Palestinian targets in West Beirut and other targets in southern Lebanon during June 4–5, 1982. The PLO responded by attacking Israeli settlements in Galilee with rockets and mortars. It was this PLO shelling of the settlements rather than the attempted assassination of Argov that provoked the Israeli decision to invade Lebanon. The operation began on June 6, 1982. It took its name from the Israeli intention to protect the vulnerable northern region of Israel from the PLO rocket and mortar attacks launched from southern Lebanon. Ultimately, Israel committed to the operation some 76,000 men, 800 tanks, 1,500 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 364 aircraft. Syria committed perhaps 22,000 men, 352 tanks, 300 APCs, and 96 aircraft, while the PLO had about 15,000 men, 300 tanks, and 150 APCs. The Israeli mission had three principal objectives. First, Israeli forces sought to destroy the PLO in southern Lebanon. Second, Israel wanted to evict the Syrian Army from Lebanon and bring about the removal of its missiles from the Bekáa Valley. Although Sharon perceived Syrian forces in Lebanon as a major security threat to Israel, he maintained that the IDF would not attack them unless it was first fired upon. Third, Israel hoped to influence Lebanese politics. Israel sought to ally itself with the Maronite Christians, led by Bashir Jumayyil (Gemayel), the leader of the Phalange (al-Kata’ib) and head of the unified command of the Lebanese Forces. While the Phalange was mainly a political association, the Lebanese Forces was an umbrella military organization comprised of several Christian militias. Jumayyil had carried out a series of brutal operations to destroy the autonomy of the other Christian militias and had incorporated them into his Lebanese Forces. He was opposed to relinquishing the power held by the Maronites in traditionally Christian-dominated Lebanon to the Sunni and Shi’a Muslims of Lebanon. Many in the Phalange maintained that their heritage was Phoenician and not Arab, and they

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sought to maintain their historic linkages with France and the West. To this end, Jumayyil maintained a close relationship with Israel. As with the Israelis, he harbored intense opposition to a Syrian presence in Lebanon. Palestinian militias were not only entrenched in the southern part of the country but were also well established in West Beirut. Understandably, the Israeli cabinet was loath to place its troops into an urban combat situation that was bound to bring heavy civilian casualties and incur opposition from Washington and Western Europe. Begin and Sharon informed the cabinet that the goal was merely to break up PLO bases in southern Lebanon and push back PLO and Syrian forces some 25 miles, beyond rocket range of Galilee. Once the operation began, however, Sharon quickly changed the original plan by expanding the mission to incorporate Beirut, which was well beyond the 25-mile mark. Many in the cabinet now believed that Begin and Sharon had deliberately misled them. The IDF advanced to the outskirts of Beirut within days. Tyre and Sidon, two cities within the 25-mile limit, were both heavily damaged in the Israeli advance. The entire population was rounded up, and most of the men were taken into custody. Rather than standing their ground and being overwhelmed by the better-equipped Israelis, the Palestinian fighters and PLO leadership withdrew back to West Beirut. Sharon now argued in favor of a broader operation that would force the PLO from Beirut, and for some 10 weeks Israeli guns shelled West Beirut, killing both PLO forces and civilians. Fighting also occurred with Syrian forces in the Bekáa Valley. Unable to meet Israel on an equal footing and bereft of allies, Syria did not engage in an all-out effort. Rather, much of the battle was waged in the air. By June 10, the Israeli Air Force had neutralized Syrian surface-to-air missiles and had shot down dozens of Syrian jets. (Some sources say the ultimate toll was as many as 80 Syrian jets.) The Israelis employed AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships to attack and destroy dozens of Syrian armored vehicles, including Soviet-built T-72 tanks. The Israelis also trapped Syrian forces in the Bekáa Valley. Israel was on the verge of severing the Beirut-Damascus highway on June 11 when Moscow and Washington brokered a cease-fire. In Beirut, meanwhile, Sharon hoped to join up with Jumayyil’s Lebanese Forces. Sharon hoped that the Lebanese

Forces might bear the brunt of the fighting in West Beirut, but Jumayyil was reluctant to do this, fearing that such a move would harm his chances to become the president of Lebanon. Begin’s cabinet was unwilling to approve an Israeli assault on West Beirut because of the probability of high casualties. Meanwhile, the United States had been conveying ambiguous signals regarding its position in the conflict. This only encouraged Arafat to entrench himself and the PLO in West Beirut. Sharon disregarded cabinet opposition and placed the western (predominantly Muslim) part of the city under a siege from air, land, and sea. He hoped that this might convince the citizens to turn against the PLO. The bombing and shelling resulted in mostly civilian casualties, however, provoking denunciations of Israel in the international press. The PLO believed that it could hold out longer under siege than the Israelis could under international pressure, leading Israel to intensify its attack on Beirut in early August. Believing that there was an impending full-scale assault, the PLO then consented to a UN-brokered arrangement whereby American, French, and Italian peacekeeping forces, known as the Multinational Force in Lebanon, would escort the PLO fighters out of Lebanon by the end of the month. (The PLO relocated to Tunis.) Habib assured the PLO that the many refugees in camps in Lebanon would not be harmed. On August 23, 1982, Jumayyil was elected president of Lebanon. He was dead within two weeks, the victim of assassination on September 14, 1982, by a member of the pro-Damascus National Syrian Socialist Party. Jumayyil had indeed paid for his connection to the Israelis. While the National Syrian Socialist Party took responsibility for the murder of Jumayyil, some suspected an Israeli conspiracy to kill him owing to his more recent attempts to disassociate himself from Israel. Following the assassination of Jumayyil, Israeli forces occupied West Beirut. This was in direct violation of the UN agreement calling for the evacuation of the PLO and protection of the Palestinian refugees who remained behind. With the PLO removed, the refugees had virtually no defense against the Israelis or their Christian allies. Once Israel had control of the Palestinian refugee camps, in September 1982 Sharon invited members of the

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Phalange to enter the camps at Sabra and Shatila to “clean out the terrorists.” The Phalange militia, led by Elie Hobeika, then slaughtered more than 1,000 refugees in what he claimed to be retaliation for Jumayyil’s assassination. Estimates of casualties in the Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation vary widely, although the numbers may have been as high as 17,826 Lebanese killed and approximately 675 Israelis. Israel had achieved a number of goals. It had accomplished its immediate aim of expelling the PLO from Lebanon and temporarily destroying its infrastructure. It had also weakened the Syrian military, especially as far as air assets were concerned. The Israelis had also strengthened the South Lebanon Army, which would help control a buffer, or security zone, in the south. However, the invasion had negative repercussions as well. Much of Beirut lay in ruins, with damage estimated as high as $2 billion, and the tourist industry was a long time in recovering. The operation also became an occupation. In May 1983, with assistance from the United States and France, Israel and Lebanon reached an agreement calling for the staged withdrawal of Israeli forces, although the instruments of this agreement were never officially exchanged. In March 1984 under Syrian pressure, the Lebanese government repudiated it. In January 1985, Israel began a unilateral withdrawal to a security zone in southern Lebanon, which was completed in June 1985. Not until June 2000 did Israel finally withdraw all its forces from southern Lebanon. Rather than producing a stable, pro-Israeli government in Beirut, the occupation led to contentious new resistance groups that kept Lebanon in perpetual turmoil. There was also considerable unrest in Israel. A protest demonstration in Tel Aviv that followed the Sabra and Shatila massacres drew a reported 300,000 people. Responding to the furor within Israel over the war, the Israeli government appointed the Kahan Commission to investigate the massacres at Sabra and Shatila. The commission found that Israeli officials were indirectly responsible, and Sharon was forced to resign as minister of defense. Begin’s political career also suffered greatly. Disillusioned by the invasion and the high Israeli casualties, he resigned as prime minister in 1983, withdrawing entirely from public life. Brian Parkinson and Spencer C. Tucker

See also Judaism and War; Lebanese Civil War; Lebanon, Israeli Operations against; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Further Reading Friedman, Thomas. From Beirut to Jerusalem. New York: Anchor Books, 1995. Rabil, Robert G. Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003. Rabinovich, Itamar. The War for Lebanon, 1970–1985. Rev. ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986.

Lebanon, Israeli Operations against (2006) Fighting between the Israeli military and Hezbollah fighters carried out over a 32-day period in southern Lebanon and northern Israel was known to the Israeli military as Operation “Change of Direction.” It began on July 13, 2006, and ended on August 14, 2006. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah fighters crossed the IsraeliLebanese border into northern Israel, killed three Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers, and captured two others, evidently with the intent to use them for prisoner exchange purposes. This closely followed a similar operation mounted by Hamas in southern Israel in which one Israeli soldier was captured and two others were killed. Holding the Lebanese government responsible for not enforcing security in the southern part of its country, Israel on July 13 began implementing an air, land, and sea blockade against Lebanon. The Beirut International Airport was also bombed. There were a number of Israeli objectives in “Change of Direction.” The Israelis sought the return of the two kidnapped IDF soldiers but also wanted to remove the Hezbollah threat against Israeli territory by destroying its armaments and outposts and wanted to establish longterm stability along the northern border. They also hoped to strengthen the anti-Syrian and anti-Hezbollah forces within Lebanon. Israel’s operation consisted chiefly of air and naval strikes on Lebanon’s infrastructure, which destroyed a total of 42 bridges and damaged 38 roads. This effort also caused extensive damage to telecommunications,

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electricity distribution, ports, airports, and even privatesector facilities, including a milk factory and food warehouses. Roughly 70 percent of Lebanese civilians living in southern Lebanon fled north during the conflict. For its part, Hezbollah responded by launching an average of more than 100 Katyusha rockets per day into northern Israel, targeting such cities as Haifa and hitting hospitals, chemical factories, military outposts, and residential areas. Although the Israeli Air Force tried to strike at the launchers, they were virtually impossible to find, and many of the rockets were fired from residential areas, even near mosques. Israeli air strikes against Lebanon and Hezbollah Kat­ yusha rocket launches into Israel continued until July 21, 2006, when a new dimension was added to the conflict. Israel now began massing troops on the border and called up five battalions of army reservists (3,000 men) for a ground invasion. The ground offensive commenced on July 22, 2006, in the village of Marun al-Ras. IDF forces engaged Hezbollah fighters in Bint Jbayl, the largest Lebanese town near the border. One week later, Israel declared that it would occupy a strip inside southern Lebanon with ground troops. Meanwhile, four unarmed UN observers died when an errant Israeli air strike hit their observation post near the border. U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice visited the region during July 24–25 and again during July 29–31 in an effort to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. However, she opposed a cease-fire that would merely return the status quo. Meanwhile, discussions at the United Nations (UN) centered on how a negotiated solution to the conflict could prevent further violence and how an international— or Lebanese—force might control southern Lebanon and disarm Hezbollah. Talks were also undertaken in Rome among American, European, and Arab leaders in an attempt to reach a satisfactory end to the conflict, but to no avail. On August 5, 2006, Lebanon rejected a draft UN resolution, proposed by the United States and France, that called for a full cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. Lebanon claimed that the resolution did not adequately address Lebanese concerns. Nevertheless, the Lebanese government affirmed two days later that it would send 15,000 troops to the south as soon as Israeli troops

withdrew from the area. Lebanon’s prime minister, Fuad Siniura, repeatedly called for a quick and decisive ceasefire and for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. His demands were echoed by thousands of demonstrators in cities around the world. The IDF’s ground offensive into Lebanon and its fierce clashes with Hezbollah fighters continued until August 11, 2006, when the UN Security Council unanimously approved UN Resolution 1701 in an effort to end hostilities. The resolution, which was approved by both the Lebanese and Israeli governments, also called for the disarming of Hezbollah, Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, and for the deployment of the Lebanese Army and an enlarged UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon. Nevertheless, the 72 hours that preceded the effective date of the cease-fire on August 14, 2006, witnessed the fiercest fighting of the month-long conflict. The Lebanese Army began deploying into southern Lebanon on August 17, 2006. However, Israel’s air and sea blockade was not lifted until September 8, 2006. On October 1, 2006, the Israeli Army reported that it had completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon, although UNIFIL denied these assertions. The conflict killed an estimated 1,187 Lebanese civilians as well as 44 Israeli civilians, severely damaged Lebanese infrastructure, displaced some 1 million Lebanese and 300,000 Israelis, and disrupted life across all of Lebanon and northern Israel. By September, 60 percent of the towns and villages in the south had no water or electricity. Even after the cease-fire, 256,000 Lebanese remained internally displaced, and much of southern Lebanon remained uninhabitable because of more than 350,000 unexploded cluster bombs in some 250 locations south of the Litani River. Moreover, the Lebanese coasts witnessed a tragic oil spill that resulted from Israel’s bombing of fuel tanks. About 40 percent of the coastline was affected. Both Hezbollah and Israel were accused of violating international humanitarian law during the conflict. Hezbollah launched an estimated 3,970 rockets into Israel during the conflict, and the Israeli Air Force carried out about 15,500 sorties, striking more than 7,000 targets in Lebanon. Between 250 and 600 Hezbollah fighters were killed. Thirteen Hezbollah fighters were captured by the IDF during the conflict. The IDF reported 119 Israeli soldiers

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killed, more than 400 wounded, and 2 taken prisoner. The Lebanese Army suffered casualties as well: 46 killed and more than 100 injured. Finally, 7 UN personnel were killed, and 12 others were injured. The parties to the conflict were in fact tangled in asymmetric warfare. On one hand, Hezbollah’s munitions included some 14,000 short- to medium-range missiles and rockets in calibers ranging from less than 100 mm up to 302 mm, some of the warheads of which were loaded with ball bearings to maximize their lethality. In addition, Hezbollah possessed four types of advanced ground-to-ground missiles: Fajr 4 and 5, Iran 130, and Shahin 335-mm rockets with ranges of 54 to 90 miles. Hezbollah also possessed Iranian-built Zilzal 2 and 3 launchers, wireless detonators, Ra’ad 1 liquid fuel missiles, radar-guided ship-to-shore missiles, and a large number of optical devices. Israel, on the other hand, possessed an impressive diversity of munitions, including precision-guided munitions, made in Israel or imported from the United States. It also completely dominated the skies and, in addition to fixed-wing jet aircraft, employed AH-64 Apache and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters inside Lebanon. At least two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) provided 24-hour coverage over Lebanon, with the Israel Aircraft Industries’ Searcher 2 and the Elbit Systems Hermes 450 transmitting real-time targeting data directly into F-15 and F-16 cockpits. In addition, the Israelis used American GBU-28 bunker-buster bombs on Hezbollah’s Beirut headquarters. Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) platforms were heavily used, and phosphorous munitions, which are restricted under the third protocol of the Geneva Conventions, were used as well. Although Israel’s operation at first focused mainly on aerial and naval offensives, ground incursions became increasingly necessary. This was because most of Hezbollah’s forces were able to make use of an extensive network of underground tunnels. Israeli troops faced fierce resistance and an unexpectedly strong performance by Hezbollah fighters, who multiplied ambushes and surprise attacks. Indeed, Hezbollah fielded an impressively innovative military force well tailored to meet a specific foe on particular terrain. Israeli intelligence, on the other hand, proved inadequate in this operation. For example, during the war Israeli forces launched a commando raid on Baalbek, capturing the Imam Khomeini Hospital

where they supposedly found Iranians and a Syrian. No Iranians had been there for years, but a number of civilians were kidnapped and not returned. One may have been the central target of this raid, a grocer named Hasan Dib Nasrallah, unfortunately not the leader of Hezbollah. In fact, none of the objectives that the IDF had set for Operation Change of Direction were realized. In a significant sense, the conflict was the result of each side having misjudged the other. Hezbollah has stated that it would not have kidnapped IDF soldiers had it known the severity of Israel’s response. Israel, meanwhile, was taken aback by the effectiveness of the Hezbollah defenses. There was sufficient anger in Israel over the results of the operation that the government was forced to appoint an investigating committee. In January 2007 IDF chief of staff Dan Halutz resigned in the face of increasing criticism of the IDF’s performance in the war. Rana Kobeissi See also Hezbollah; Hybrid War of the 21st Century, Religious Dimensions of; Lebanese Civil War; Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of Further Reading Allen, Lori, Suheir Abu Oksa Daoud, Nubar Hovsepian, Shira Robinson, Rasha Salti, Samer Shehata, Joshua Stacher, and Michelle Woodward. “Life under Siege.” Middle East Report No. 240. Washington, DC, Fall 2006. International Crisis Group. “Israel/Hizbullah/Lebanon: Avoiding Renewed Conflict.” International Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 59. Brussels, Belgium, November 2006. Schiff, Ze’ev. “The Fallout from Lebanon.” Foreign Affairs Magazine (Nov.–Dec. 2006): 13–41. Sultan, Cathy. Tragedy in South Lebanon: The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006. Minneapolis, MN: Mighty Media Press, 2008. USG Humanitarian Situation Reports #30–#32, August 29–31, 2006.

Lepanto, Battle of (1571) The Battle of Lepanto took place on October 7, 1571, and was the climax of an attempt by the Ottoman Empire to consolidate gains in the eastern Mediterranean Sea following the failure of the siege of Malta and the successful invasion of Cyprus. While Lepanto did not end the attempts by

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the Ottoman Empire to extend its control westward into the Mediterranean, it did impact those later efforts as a result of both material losses and the loss of skilled warriors. Of even greater import, the religious implications of the Christian victory produced lasting effects that have resonated through the centuries down to the 20th-century epic poem by G. K. Chesterton. The advance of the Ottoman Empire was primarily on land. Victories ashore provided for control over the ports and populations of modern-day Lebanon, Syria, and Israel as well as the ethnically Greek coastal regions of Anatolia. While virtually all of the rowers in both fleets were slaves, many of the sailors who were skilled in maneuvering the squadrons were converts to Islam. The soldiers who provided the combat power of the Ottoman galleys were also notable for their religious fervor. As naval battles in the Mediterranean during this period resembled land battles and the ships served as floating platforms upon which

these contests were waged, the morale of these troops was particularly important. While Lepanto featured technical and tactical innovation, papal intercession drove the formation of the Holy League and the coordination of efforts among the Catholic powers. With the notable exception of France, it was the first time since the crusades that the majority of the Catholic powers had presented a unified front. Even during the crusades, warfare at sea was more common among Christian states vying for commercial advantage than between Christian and Muslim fleets. The deployment of a unified fleet including vessels from Genoa, Spain, Venice, and the Papal States represented a triumph of religious affiliation over commercial and political rivalry. Tactically, the battle was dominated by the Venetian galleasses. These converted merchant vessels mounted large numbers of cannon in a broadside arrangement instead of the bow guns of the galleys that had dominated naval

The Battle of Lepanto on October 7, 1571, was the largest rowed galley engagement of the gunpowder era and marked the beginning of the decline in Ottoman naval power in the Mediterranean. (Photos.com)

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warfare in the Mediterranean to that point. The high freeboard (distance from the waterline to the upper edge of the ship’s side) made traditional boarding tactics difficult. The greater firepower of the galleass allowed it to inflict significant damage on galleys bold enough to engage. While the tactical and technological shift was significant for the future, religious symbolism played a significant role in the outcome of the battle. Both fleets were endowed with banners with deep religious significance. The Christian banner was blessed by the pope and was flown aboard the flagship of John of Austria, Holy League commander. Ali Pasha, the Ottoman commander, also went into battle flying the “Banner of the Caliphs,” a green cloth with religious inscriptions embroidered in gold. Ali Pasha was also known by the sobriquet “Sufi” in recognition of his piety. The protracted battle between the two flagships ultimately resulted in the capture of both the Ottoman admiral and the banner. Contemporary observers credited the blow to Ottoman morale resulting from the loss of the banner and the beheading of Ali Pasha as the critical event in the battle. The intercession of the Virgin Mary was also credited by the Holy League with delivering the victory, in part due to the icon of Our Lady of Guadeloupe given to the commander of the Spanish squadron, Álvaro de Bazan, by King Philip II of Spain and carried aboard his flagship. This was reinforced by the feast day proclaimed by Pope Pius V in the wake of the battle and designated the Feast of Our Lady of Victory. Both the victors and the vanquished viewed the battle as having religious significance. The Ottoman Empire turned away from attempts at maritime conquest, seeing the defeat as a divine rejection of the policies of Sultan Selim II. Conversely, the members of the Holy League viewed the victory as a religious omen. In addition to the declaration of the new feast day, the banner flown on the flagship was displayed until World War II in the Cathedral of Gaeta where it was deposited after the battle by the victorious admiral. It is now in the diocesan museum in Gaeta and is still considered a religious relic by some Catholics. The battle has remained the centerpiece of religious painting, literature, and poetry into the 20th century when theologian, essayist, and poet G. K. Chesterton published his epic poem Lepanto. K. J. Delamer

See also Catholic (Holy) League; Malta, Siege of; Ottoman Empire Further Reading Chesterton, G. K. Lepanto with Explanatory Notes and Commentary. Edited by Dale Ahlquist. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2003. Crowley, Roger. Empires of the Sea: The Siege of Malta, the Battle of Lepanto, and the Contest for the Center of the World. New York: Random House, 2008. Guilmartin, John Francis, Jr. Gunpowder & Galleys: Changing Technology & Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the 16th Century, Rev. ed. London: Conway Maritime Press, 2003. Konstam, Angus. Lepanto 1571: The Greatest Naval Battle of the Renaissance. Oxford: Osprey, 2003.

Lex Rex Lex rex in Latin means “law is king.” This thesis is in contradistinction to a religious and legal doctrine commonly referred to as “divine right,” where a monarch was above the law, the source of law, and ruled by alleged divine law. The author of the book Lex, Rex, or the Law and the Prince, Samuel Rutherford (ca. 1600–March 1661), rector of St. Andrew’s Church in Scotland and a commissioner at the Westminster Assembly in London, openly defied the divine right of kings using the Bible to justify his opposition. Rutherford argued that all people are, without exception as to birthright, heredity, wealth, or class, under the law. He referenced Deuteronomy 17.18–20, which states, “And it shall be, when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom, that he shall write him a copy of this law in a book out of that which is before the priests the Levites: And it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life: that he may learn to fear the LORD his God, to keep all the words of this law and these statutes, to do them: That his heart be not lifted up above his brethren, and that he turn not aside from the commandment, to the right hand, or to the left: to the end that he may prolong his days in his kingdom, he, and his children, in the midst of Israel.” According to Rutherford, rulers derived their authority from God pursuant to Romans 13.1–4. Because rulers could disobey God, and the people may obey God, God

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may remove rulers by leading people to remove them, and God may lead people to establish rulers according to his will, citing, as cases in point, 2 Samuel 16:18, “Hushai said to Absalom, Nay, but whom the Lord and the people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide” and Judges 8:22, “The men of Israel said to Gideon, Rule thou over us.” He also cited Judges 9:6, “The men of Shechem made Abimelech king” and 2 Kings 14:21, “The people made Azariah king.” In his book Lex, Rex, Samuel Rutherford introduced the phrase “All men are created equal,” which was quoted in the American Declaration of Independence. He meant that all are equal under the law. Rutherford’s view of the source of authority is in contradistinction to the social contract of Rousseau. Rousseau posited that the right to rule derives exclusively from the people, who construct a “social contract.” Rutherford believed that God is the governing authority, with the right of all political power deriving from him. However, God speaks in, among, and through the people who listen to him. Accordingly, a tyrant who does not listen to God should be deposed by the governed who listen to God. This political theory, espoused by both John Knox and Oliver Cromwell, undergirds the execution of Charles I. Two years later in 1646, Rutherford would advance the same thesis that law rules, not persons, over the sphere of the church in his The Divine Right of Church Government and Excommunication. Because of the foreseen consequences of advancement of the thesis of the rule of law, not persons, the book was burned after the restoration of the monarchy after the Puritan Revolution, in Edinburgh, St. Andrews, and Oxford, and Rutherford was charged with high treason, but died in 1661 prior to trial, having written the words of the popular hymn, “The Sands of Time Are Sinking.” George Gatgounis See also Primary Document: Excerpt from Samuel Rutherford’s Lex, Rex (1644) Further Reading Cross, F. L., and E. A. Livingstone, eds. In The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Rutherford, Samuel. Lex, Rex, or the Law and the Prince. Reprint ed. Harrisonburg, VA: Sprinkle, 1982.

Liberation Theology Liberation theology is a term used to cover a number of theologies including the Latin American, Black, and feminist varieties. The common theme to all liberation theologies is the belief that there is an ongoing form of oppression such as capitalism, racism, or chauvinism with a bias toward the poor that must be addressed to change societies. In its most extreme form, violence and revolution are understood to be acceptable in order to accomplish the goals of liberation theology adherents. With a few notable exceptions, Latin American liberation theology has been a movement identified with the Roman Catholic Church. The presence of liberation theology in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s was one response, often blended with Marxist ideology, that was used to address social instability, political instability, corruption, economic deprivation, and dictatorships. Latin American liberation theology is historically traced to the writings of three European theologians: Jurgen Moltmann (b. 1926), Johannes Baptist Metz (b. 1928), and Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906–1945). Moltmann understands the kingdom of God as the transformation of society, Metz stresses a political dimension of faith, and Bonhoeffer seeks to apply theology in a secular context. Though liberation theology does not advocate Marxism, Marxist influence is evident. Economic and class advantages lead to exploitation and poverty. Such constraints must be overthrown for there to be unity and equity for all. Liberation theology maintains that defeating such forces is the will and kingdom of God. Unlike more traditional theologies that start a point of orthodoxy (fixed doctrine), liberation theology begins with orthopraxy (practice). Liberation theology is in flux; it changes and evolves based on culture and contemporary perceptions. Theology is not simply to be learned. Theology is to be lived by transforming society. Using such presuppositions, liberation theology redefines traditional Christian dogma. Doctrine is not applied personally, it is applied socially. The doctrine of sin (hamartiology) is not a matter of private wrong, it is a lack of love in relationships. Salvation (soteriology) is not viewed in terms of life after death for an individual, but in terms of bringing about a new social

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order of equality. The doctrine of the church (ecclesiology) moves from a definition of believers to a force of change in the context of poverty and injustice. Concerning the doctrines of God (theology) and Jesus Christ (Christology), liberation theology does not deny the existence of either, but does transform them. Traditional theology, it is argued, imagines God as a transcendent being who blesses capitalistic social structures. Liberation theology teaches that God is present and on the side of the downtrodden. To do the will of God is to do justice by bringing about social and economic equality. Liberation theology does not totally deny the deity of Jesus Christ, but his significance is in his example, not his nature. Christ is perceived as one who fights for the poor and the outcast. His incarnation represents God’s entrance into human history. He is not just “one of us,” he is one of the poor working class pushing back against the oppressors. His death is the expected outcome for those who speak truth to power. Liberation theology has undergone change since its inception. Its approval of violence to resist oppression has troubled many, and revolts against Marxist ideology in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc nations have led many to doubt the promise of a Marxist philosophy. Yet the ideology of liberation theology has been very influential. Its concern for poverty and its struggle against oppression, sometime violently, has had enormous social, religious, and political consequences in Latin America and beyond. James Menzies See also Bonhoeffer, Dietrich; Cold War, Religious Dimensions of; Marx, Karl Further Reading Berryman, Phillip. Liberation Theology: The Essential Facts About the Revolutionary Movement in Latin America—and Beyond. New York: Pantheon, 1987. Boff, Leonardo, and Clodovis Boff. Introducing Liberation Theology. New York: Orbis Books, 2001. Gonzalez, Justo L., and Catherine G. Gonzalez. Liberation Preaching. Nashville: Abingdon, 1980. Gutierrez, Gustav. A Theology of Liberation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1971. Sigmund, Paul E. Liberation Theology at the Crossroads. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Liberian Civil Wars The first Liberian Civil War began on December 24, 1989 with the violent overthrow of the Samuel Doe regime, and ended in August 1996 with a brokered cease-fire that left Charles Taylor in power. The second Liberian Civil War started in 1999 when dissident Liberians rebelled against Taylor’s corrupt government, and ended with Taylor’s exile on August 11, 2003.

Background

Located between Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire in southwest Africa, Liberia was created in 1847 as a republic for freed slaves from the United States. The original settlers were strongly influenced by Protestant Christian beliefs and work ethic, and rapidly evolved into the dominant ruling class. By 1980, Liberian society was deeply divided along religious and economic lines. For example, 40 percent of Liberians identified as Christians, another 45 percent observed a tribal religion, while the remaining 15 percent were Muslims. A large wealth disparity further divided elites from the rural tribes, as 4 percent of the population controlled 60 percent of the nation’s wealth. On April 12, 1980, an army master sergeant, Samuel Doe, led a coup in which President William Tolbert and many ruling class members were brutally murdered. Instead of establishing a democratic government, Doe formed a junta of fellow ex-military to rule the country. Widespread corruption and abuse soon lost Doe support from all but his native Krahn tribe. Hoping to regain a measure of legitimacy, Doe actively courted favor with the marginalized Muslim minority, who were mostly Mandingo tribespeople. On December 24, 1989, a National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) militia under Charles Taylor crossed from Côte d’Ivoire into Liberia to incite a Liberian revolution. Doe’s heavy-handed response triggered a bloody border war that saw the widespread use of torture and child soldiers. Especially vicious behavior was directed toward the Mandingo, not only for their links to the regime, but their supposed Islamic beliefs. As fighting grew more intense during early 1990, the NPFL split off a competing militia, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), headed by Prince Johnson. As thousands of innocent civilians were

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caught in the middle, Liberian Christian churches and a Christian-Muslim coalition group, the Religious Leaders of Liberia (RLL), repeatedly called for an end to the fighting. The efforts from the religious leaders ultimately failed as the factions vied for control of the national capital, Monrovia. Media attention toward NPFL brutality soon led to the deployment of an Economic Cooperation of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force in August 1990. While the rebel factions and ECOWAS contended for control of Monrovia, Samuel Doe was captured and executed on September 9, 1990.

The First Liberian Civil War

The war did not end with Doe’s death, as the warring factions turned their efforts toward control of lucrative diamond mining areas. In 1992, major fighting resumed when Taylor’s militia attacked the INPLF in Monrovia. Fighting soon spread throughout Liberia, as the factions routinely ignored ECOWAS-sponsored cease-fires and sometimes attacked Nigerian-sponsored Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeepers. The Liberian people caught in the fighting suffered heavily, and more than 2,000,000 Liberians died before the end of the war. In August 1996, the first civil war ended with a flawed ECOWAS peace accord. Besides leaving Taylor in power, the accord failed to enforce the demobilization of the militias before promised national elections. Taylor took advantage of his control of the militias and resources to silence the opposition with the threat of a new war, and he easily won national elections held in July 1997.

The Second Liberian Civil War

Once in power, Taylor ignored domestic matters to sponsor a proxy war over the diamond-producing areas along the Sierra Leone and Guinea borders. To do so, Taylor used sales of smuggled diamonds to fund Revolutionary United Front (RUF) militia fighting inside Sierra Leone, as well as for hiring mercenary units to maintain control of Liberia. Anger over Taylor’s corruption incited the forming of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in 1999. Composed largely of Mandinka and Krahn militiamen, LURD received support from Guinea and Sierra Leone as a form of retaliation for Taylor’s backing of the RUF. After some initial success, Taylor’s scheme ultimately

failed as RUF excesses led to international sanctions and a United Nations–backed intervention force in Sierra Leone in May 2000. By April 2003, Taylor was not only diplomatically isolated but out of money as LURD and the Côte d’Ivoire–backed Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) had overrun the diamond-producing region. By July 2003, LURD and MODEL militias had cut Monrovia off from food and reinforcements, which prompted the landing of U.S. Marines and ECOWAS peacekeepers to reopen Monrovia to humanitarian supplies. Besides the international pressure, Taylor faced internal pressure from an unlikely source—the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET). Started in late 2002 by women leaders in the Liberian Lutheran Church, WIPNET began to encompass Muslim and secular organizations dedicated to influencing the peace process. Throughout the spring and summer of 2003, WIPNET volunteers organized nonviolent protests and prayer meetings around Monrovia, which in time grew as other religious leaders joined the cause. Embarrassed by international media attention, Taylor agreed to a meeting where he received WIPNET demands for a cease-fire and peace settlement. WIPNET also leveraged the media attention to apply pressure to peace negotiators at Acra, Guinea. Surrounded by enemies, Taylor bowed to the inevitable and went into Nigerian exile on August 11, 2003. To enforce the provisions of the plan, the United States and later UN peacekeepers established a large presence in Liberia.

Aftermath

An interim government under Gyude Bryant took power on October 14, 2003. With help from UN officials, Liberia made history by electing the first woman president of an African nation, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, in November 2005. Charles Taylor was later extradited in June 2006 to stand trial for war crimes at the International Criminal Court. Taylor was convicted of 11 counts of war crimes in April 2012 and sentenced to 50 years in prison. H. Allen Skinner See also Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Further Reading Adebajo, Adekeye. Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa. London: Boulder, 2002.

Libraries and Religious Texts, Destruction of  497 Huband, Mark. The Liberian Civil War. New York: Frank Cass, 2013. Kieh, George Klay, Jr. The First Liberian Civil War: The Crises of Underdevelopment. New York: Peter Lang, 2008.

Libraries and Religious Texts, Destruction of Libraries, like people, have been casualties of warfare as long as there have been wars. Destructions of literary texts on various kinds of media were occurring centuries before books were invented. For example, clay tablets containing the Gilgamesh epics were found in the incinerated ruins of a seventh-century BCE Assyrian library. Tablets dating to 2500 BCE were found in the war-ravaged palace remains at Ebla in Syria. Roman generals learned early to enrich themselves with the scrolls they obtained from their conquered territories. Supposedly even the library of Aristotle himself was obtained this way. The practice stretches into contemporary times with the destruction of the Sarajevo National Library in the Bosnian civil war in 1992, the torching of Islamic libraries in Timbuktu, Mali, in 2012 by the rebel group Boko Haram, or monastery and mosque libraries destroyed in Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in 2014. Why do libraries become targets for such destruction? There are many reasons, from being the simple victims of circumstance, to the more cunning calculation of the benefits of wealth and power that destruction will bring. Libraries have been destroyed throughout history as part of the indiscriminate destruction of property caused by warfare. Parchment, papyri, and ancient paper can be easily set alight under the right conditions. For four centuries, the Bodleian Library at Oxford University has had anyone applying for a reader’s card personally and audibly swear not to kindle a flame in the library. In 1731 a substantial part of the Cotton manuscript collection in London was lost when the house next door accidentally caught fire and the flames spread to both buildings. Historically, though, libraries have often been targeted for special destruction as part of ideological campaigns to impose new political regimes. Libraries contain the cultural memories and resources that support societies. They preserve their

religious heritages, their histories, the records of resources, government and scientific achievement upon which local elites rely to maintain and extend their rule. Upon these cultural, political, economic, and religious supports a society builds and maintains its identity, and so these institutions become targets when an outside force seeks to destroy that identity and impose a new one. This is especially true when a new religious identity is tied to the political and cultural regime change. Warfare has always involved controlling resources, knowledge, and identity, and very early on the despoiling and destruction of libraries came to be seen as a legitimate and essential component of warfare. The value of their inherent ideas is not the only incentive for targeting books. As books came to be written on scrolls and later bound in codex form, and as they were illuminated with illustrations and artistic features around and throughout the text, they also became luxury objects in themselves and were sought for their beauty and rarity. Precious metals and semiprecious stones were used for the inks and illuminations, and jewels and precious metals were used in the bindings. Libraries were sacked for their valuable books. It is reported that Saladin, when short of money after his conquest of Fatimid Cairo, allowed his generals to pay the soldiers with luxurious copies of the Qur’an and other books taken from the royal libraries. Perhaps the most energetic destruction of libraries and texts occurs when religious motivations are involved. The fabled Library of Alexandria is said to have undergone numerous destructions over many centuries, some because of the normal effects of warfare, others possibly motivated by Christian or Islamic religious zeal. In 391, the Christian emperor Theodosius I, in his zeal to persecute Roman paganism, is reported to have ordered the destruction of the Serapeum, a sumptuous temple that also housed part of the collection of the library of Alexandria. In Islam’s early conquests Persian Zoroastrian libraries were destroyed in the 630s and possibly the great Christian library at Caesarea in the 640s. Caliph Umar is also said in medieval Islamic sources to have ordered the destruction of the library of Alexandria out of zeal to promote the Qur’an. Sectarian wars in Islam account for the destruction of the library amassed by the Abbasid caliph Al-Ma’mun, who was known for his Mu’tazilite views at odds with traditional Sunni Islam. Sectarian tensions also account for Saladin’s willingness to

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allow the Fatimid libraries of Cairo to be dismantled. The crusaders also demonstrated their religious zeal in their willingness to destroy Islamic books and libraries. Similar fates occurred to Buddhist libraries in Japan and India at the hands of competing religious groups. The intensive and focused annihilation of Aztec and Mayan libraries in the New World by conquistadors and agents of the Inquisition is incredible in the vast extent of cultural knowledge extinguished within 200 years. Only a handful of examples of what were once many, many thousands of volumes survive to testify to the sophistication and artistic opulence of a once extensive literary culture. The Spanish Inquisition was also successful in destroying thousands of Jewish and Islamic books and Qur’ans. Cardinal Jiminez de Cisneros’s bonfire of books in Granada in December 1499 was said to be such a grand spectacle that between one to two million books were burned. Such destruction continues into the present century with certain Islamic groups in Africa and the Middle East destroying libraries of competing Islamic groups and non-Muslim libraries as well. Even though one may rightly feel a deep, instinctive, even visceral revulsion at the thought of burning and destroying books, it is actually a relatively recent idea that libraries ought to be preserved inviolate as places where all views can be gathered and preserved for posterity. Rather, in the past and continuing to a great extent today, libraries are created to serve the interests of their institutional sponsors. They survive as long as they serve those interests, and like other institutions, in time of war, they suffer similar fates of being co-opted, refashioned, or discarded entirely in line with new political and ideological realities. Keith E. Small Further Reading Canfora, Luciano. The Vanished Library. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. MacLeod, Roy. The Library of Alexandria: Centre of Learning in the Ancient World. London: I. B. Tauris, 2002.

Liturgy of the Crusades The religious rites that were particular to the crusading situation, from the proclamation of the First Crusade in

1095 up to the 16th century, comprised various forms. They included single rites (usually within a definite liturgical field, such as pilgrimage, war, and knighthood); composite rites (consisting of single elements received from several fields and fused together into integral rites); and sets of complete rites (pertaining, usually, to several fields). These rites could be personal, in that they sustained the crusader’s progress on his journey, and communal, in cases where crusade-related rites were performed by collectivities in the field or in the crusaders’ home countries.

Rites of Inception

The inception of a crusading journey was solemnized through two rites: the new practice of “taking the cross,” mainly spontaneous and informal, and the traditional ritual of the pilgrim’s departure, which by 1099 was common and regular. They delineated two kinds of inception. The rite of taking the cross established the status of the wouldbe crusader, whereas the rite of the pilgrim’s departure initiated the actualization of that potentiality. Formal services in church for taking the cross, and departure services that combined the separate rites of the pilgrim’s departure and the taking of the cross, appeared by the late 12th century and were performed alongside the traditional rites. Taking the cross, an innovation commonly attributed to Pope Urban II at the Council of Clermont (1095), consisted in attaching the sign of the cross to clothing or armor. This rite remained largely informal during the 12th century and to some extent in the 13th. Many crusaders seem to have “crossed themselves”: whereas the frequency of “selfcrossing” terminology expressed the volitional and determinant role of the individual, it also reflected the prevalence of that practice. Although would-be crusaders usually received the cross from clerics and in ecclesiastical venues, it was also given by secular persons and in nonecclesiastical contexts (for example, Bohemund of Taranto distributed crosses to his soldiers during the siege of Amalfi in 1096). No regular formal ceremony of taking or giving the cross is documented prior to the late 12th century, and the public venues described are often characterized by disorderly ecstasy and inspired improvisation. Taking the cross was perceived as a public pledge to fulfill the crusading vow, but its largely informal makeup weakened the prospects of

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its enforcement. Explicit promises (documented vow attestations, though, were extremely rare), sworn oaths, and formal rites for taking the cross were therefore devised to secure implementation. Some of the new formal rites were very elaborate, especially those that attached the service of “crossing” to the sacrament of confession and penance and to a votive Mass. The traditional rite of pilgrimage inception was generally practiced on the crusader’s departure in his parochial church. He confessed, received penance, took part in an appropriate votive Mass (for example, the Mass for Those on the Road), and received his pilgrim’s scrip (satchel) and staff kneeling in front of the altar; these were blessed in a special service that comprised psalms, prayers, and formulas of blessing. The more evolved forms of this rite combined the two services of inception (pilgrimage as well as “crossing”) and provided the departing crusader with his cross in addition to the scrip and staff. Some of the ceremonies were quite elaborate: the Lincoln Pontifical service comprised no less than four psalms and four prayers, the imposition formulas of scrip and staff, a separate blessing of the cross, and a formula for its imposition, and it concluded with the Mass for Those on the Road and two afterMass prayers for the crusaders. Increasingly popular were sets of rites that combined rituals of pilgrimage, knighthood, and Christian kingship. In these sets, the traditional rites of “crossing” and of the pilgrim’s departure were supplemented with rites of penance (a corollary of the pilgrimage ritual), of the just war, and of the predeath ritual. When King Louis VII of France left on the Second Crusade, he visited several holy men in Paris and a leper asylum, kissed and adored the relic of St. Denis at the abbey of Saint-Denis, and received the banner of St. Denis from above the altar along with his scrip and staff. John of Joinville adopted an essentially similar set: on the eve of his departure he assembled his vassals and settled all disputes with them; he received his scrip and staff at the hands of a Cistercian abbot on the day of his departure, then went on foot, barefooted and in his shirt, and visited several places of pilgrimage where he adored holy relics. Only then did he proceed on his way to his port of embarkation. These rites declared the meanings of the crusade in a liturgical mode through the spoken word and in symbolic

gestures, objects, and performance; their subtexts and implied allusions were often explicated by nonliturgical sources. On the most basic level they defined the crusade as an imitation of Christ, the ultimate self-sacrifice of the martyr in total love and service of God. This idea was transmuted into the notion of pilgrimage, that is, the pilgrim’s journey as an encapsulating enactment of the ideal Christian life perceived as a permanent combat with the ancient foe and as a penitential, ascetic progress from sin to salvation in the heavenly Jerusalem. It was further transformed into the practicable Jerusalem pilgrimage and, finally, into the Jerusalem pilgrimage as a crusade. Combat in the service of God was seen as predominantly spiritual and only secondarily as martial and directed against worldly foes, while ascetic progress was realized in a penitential journey that culminated in the mimetic and redemptive visit to Jerusalem, a prefiguration of the heavenly city of salvation. The primacy of pilgrimage in this complex is best illustrated by the prevalent contemporary opinion that a crusader’s vow was deemed fulfilled only after he had visited the holy places or died as a martyr on the way.

Rites of Crusading Warfare

Crusaders on the road required ordinary and extraordinary formal rituals. The first category comprised the communal celebration of the cycles of liturgical time, ordinary rites applying to the individual (for example, penance, unction of the sick, and extreme unction), and rites that related specifically to the journey (for example, the invocation Veni creator spiritus [Come, creator spirit] to secure a propitious wind on the first hoisting of sails). The second consisted of liturgical remedies for unexpected emergencies and particularly grave crises, such as when exceptional liturgical and disciplinary measures were taken to purge the crusading host from corruption, as during the siege of Antioch in 1098. There was no shortage of clerics equipped with portable altars, books, and vestments to administer these rites, as most crusading expeditions consisted of distinct contingents that were served by their own clerics according to their liturgical uses. The liturgy of crusading warfare was grounded on war liturgies that had been regularly practiced in the Byzantine Empire and by Western armies since the Carolingian era,

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and also comprised innovations introduced by the crusaders. A battle was often preceded by various rites: fasts, penitential processions, almsgiving, the sacrament of penance, and the communion of the Eucharist. When crusaders entered the field they were accompanied by clerics in white stoles, who circulated among the combatants, bearing crosses and relics; they made the sign of the cross (often on crusaders’ foreheads), gave blessings, and promised plenary indulgence and remission of sins to those who would fall in the battle. The bishops did the same for the commanders and preached before them, while clerics in the base camp, dressed in their priestly vestments, prayed continuously for the combatants. This pattern appeared also in atypical operations: on the eve of his landing at Damietta (1249), Louis IX of France commanded the crusaders to confess and make preparations as before death and heard the Mass for Those at Sea before he armed himself. While the crusaders were going down to the assault boats, they were blessed by the legate, and the whole flotilla was led by a boat flying the banner of St. Denis. During fighting, formal collective war liturgy gave way to informal individual practices. Combatants made use of apotropaic objects such as the sign of the cross attached to clothes and armor or painted on foreheads, consecrated arms and war banners, relics carried on the person or attached to weapons, and scriptural quotations engraved on swords. Combatants also kneeled down and prayed for succor, made vows in desperate situations, and appealed to Christ, Mary, angels (such as the Archangel Michael), and patron saints (such as the military saints George, Demetrius, and Maurice). Formal liturgy reclaimed the battlefield once the fighting was over: clerics administered to the wounded and the dying the sacraments of unction of the sick and the viaticum, identified the dead, and gave them a full Christian burial. Rites of thanksgiving for victory were sometimes practiced on the spot, as when the crusaders took the beach at Damietta (1249). The same spirit of thanksgiving inspired the more elaborate victory ceremonies, but they were designed, in addition, as either rites of conquest and religious conversion or rites of triumphal homecoming. Trophies of victory were occasionally deposited in churches (for example, the standard of the vanquished Muslim emir in the Ascalon campaign of 1099). Permanent victory commemorations

were introduced into the liturgical calendars not only of the churches involved, but also abroad, as with the liberation celebrations of Jerusalem, Acre, and Damietta. In their innovations, the crusaders harked back to biblical war rites: the procession that encircled Jerusalem in July 1099 echoed Joshua’s march around Jericho, whereas the silver trumpets made for the Second Crusade corresponded to those produced for Moses. Battle cry and banner usually formed the semiliturgical sign of a military contingent, but the First Crusade broke with this tradition. Although the crusaders marched into battle behind the banners of their individual leaders, they adopted a single, common battle cry: Deus vult (“God wills it”), regularly shouted twice (or thrice, according to some sources) by the entire army with one voice. Contemporaries saw this as an expression of unity and a repudiation of “prideful diversity,” and they were certainly right as to its rationale. It went, however, against the grain of the common military ceremonial, and subsequent crusades reverted to particular battle cries. Crusading clerics in the field prayed mostly from common prayer books and used generic prayers traditionally said during war and crisis, but they also innovated, trying for specificity through the naming of protagonists and by adapting generic texts to particular events and situations. Such prayers related to events in a more direct mode, in contrast to general prayers, which required explication. A set of original war prayers composed during the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221), for example, contains a prayer that calls upon God’s power over wind and water in relation to the fighting in the Nile Delta with its seasonal rises and falls, two others that invoke miracles of fire in the specific context of harassment by fire during the siege—one of which supplicates “liberate us from that fire and from the hands of the sinful Saracens”—and finally, a prayer that beseeches: “Look at our true faith . . . in the cause of which we have assembled in this alien land, and do not let us perish at the hands of the cruel heathens” [“Gesta Obsidionis Damiate,” ed. Reinhold Röhricht, in Quinti belli sacri scriptores minores (Geneva: Fick, 1879), pp. 82–83, 98–99]. A striking example of such specification can be seen in a thanksgiving prayer said after the victory at Dorylaion in 1097. Composed of five heavily edited verses from Exodus (15:11, 6, 7, 9, 13, in this order), it concludes: “Now, Lord, we

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know that you carry us in your strength unto thy holy habitation, that is unto your Holy Sepulchre” [“Robert Monachi historia Iherosolimitana,” in Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux, 5 vols. (Paris: Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 1844–1895), 3:763].

Support from the West: Common Liturgical Practices and Dedicated Rites

Liturgical activity in support of crusades during the 12th century related to the catchment area of any given crusade and was usually of short duration. However, from the loss of Jerusalem to Saladin in 1187, sustained crusading agitation produced an intense liturgical activity throughout Europe that actually outlasted crusading to the Holy Land and continued well into the 16th century. This activity consisted of two types: single practices (mainly of penance) performed either singly or in sets, and dedicated rites, mostly connected with the celebration of Mass. Penitential practices employed in the cause of the crusade consisted of fasts (a bull in 1187 enjoined on all Christians a five-year Lent-like fast on Fridays as well as abstention from meat on Wednesdays and Saturdays), sumptuary regulation of dress, chastisement, and almsgiving. The most conspicuous and participatory penitential practice was the procession: clergy and laymen chanting litanies, responsories, and prayers marched toward a church, usually on Fridays, where an appropriate Mass (for example, Salus populi) was celebrated. The participants were given indulgences. Cloistered communities held their processions indoors; the Cistercians, for example, usually went in a procession to the high altar every Friday after “mournfully” chanting the seven penitential psalms and litanies, then held a special service and celebrated a Salus populi Mass. Other practices involved the celebration of Mass in the cause of the Holy Land: its time was fixed for the ninth hour, bells were rung in its course, and people outside the church knelt and said the Lord’s Prayer. Several gestures were expected of the congregation inside: stooping with humility whenever Christ’s name was mentioned, kneeling, and prostration. Exceptionally, relics were shown to the public, as in 1191, when relics of saints Denis, Rusticus, and Eleutherius were exhibited at the abbey of Saint-Denis in France in order to promote public intercession for the Holy Land and the crusade of King Philip II Augustus.

A liturgical innovation after 1187 was the Clamor for the Holy Land, a sequence of psalms, versicles, and prayers. The first such Clamor, which appeared in London in 1188, was interjected into the Mass between the Pater noster and the Agnus Dei and consisted of Psalm 78, several versicles, and a prayer, all said in prostration. With time, the Clamor evolved into more elaborate and expanded forms (with additional psalms, versicles, and prayers as well as alternative and additional objectives) and became a permanent component in both the Mass (that is, the celebration of the Eucharist) and the divine office (the recitation of prayers at fixed times during the day). The original London Clamor was a temporary seven-day program of seven daily masses, each one anchored on a different psalm and on the traditional Good Friday prayer for the emperor (Omnipotens sempiterne Deus in cuius manu). It was subsequently simplified by reducing the sequence of seven daily masses to one daily Mass: 12 different forms of such Clamors survive. Another contemporary Holy Land Clamor, anchored on Psalm 78 and on a specific Holy Land prayer (Deus qui ad nostre redemptionis), evolved in connection with both Mass and office. It was practiced quite extensively, but its use declined after the 13th century. The dominant Holy Land Clamor was promulgated by Pope Innocent III in 1213 in a drive to promote a new crusade. Anchored on Psalm 78 and a different prayer for the Holy Land (Deus qui admirabili), it was promulgated again by Pope Innocent IV in 1245, received into the pontifical of William Durand, and practiced universally. It acquired new versicles and prayers in the process, until it was reformed by Pope Nicholas III (1280) and Pope John XXII (1322 and 1328) from a crusade service to a general supplication for the church. One of its more durable variants was the Sarum Use permanent mass Clamor with its numerous strains. At the height of its evolution, it made intercession for the liberation of the Holy Land and for bishop and king with an expanded complement of three psalms, three prayers, and (usually) eight versicles, all aligned on these three objectives. It was abolished in the 16th century. Whereas the Clamor interrupted the normal performance of the Mass, another approach consisted in manipulating entire masses. Votive masses, because of their essentially intercessory nature, were particularly appropriate for this purpose, and at least eight such masses were

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performed in the cause of the Holy Land, either singly or in various sequences: the Masses of the Holy Ghost, St. Mary, the Angels, the Holy Cross, and the Holy Trinity; the Mass in Time of Tribulation; the Mass for Any Necessity; and the Mass for the Intercession of the Saints. Regular masses were converted into crusading masses by adding three dedicated prayers to the regular prayers of the Collect, the Secret, and the Postcommunion. Some eight local triple sets of this kind are known, of relatively limited diffusion and duration. In 1308 Pope Clement V launched a new version of the old triple set Contra Paganos anchored on the prayer Omnipotens sempiterne Deus in cuius manu, among other preparatory measures for a new crusade, and that set served the church in numerous crusades and conflicts until the 20th century. It was immensely popular, because as a generic crusading set it was compatible with an almost unlimited range of “crusades.” The last Holy Land triple set to be decreed by the Curia was the Deus qui admirabili set promulgated by John XXII in 1331–1333 in anticipation of a new crusade. The Trental of St. Gregory, a typical English rite based on a triple set, is documented from the late 14th century. It converted the 10 major feasts of the year into an instrument of intercession for the liberation of the Holy Land, on the one hand, and of designated souls from Purgatory, on the other, by the insertion of a triple set of special prayers into three masses said on the octaves of these feasts, making 30 masses in all. Practiced widely in England, it evolved into more complex forms combining the Mass with the office, personal piety with priestly mediation, and flexibility with rigidity in the actual practice of the Trental until it was finally abolished in the 16th century. A similar manipulation of regular masses involved the insertion of a prayer calling for the liberation of the Holy Land into the Bidding Prayers, the series of intercessory vernacular prayers said in parish churches during the Sunday masses. Documented in many parts of Europe from the late 13th century and well into the 17th, the easy accessibility of the Bidding Prayers to lay worshippers made them a potentially important vehicle of propaganda for the crusade. The complete crusading Mass, designed to serve the cause of the crusade through the alignment of the Mass’s variable components with the crusade and its objectives,

represents the perfect form of this kind of intercessory eucharistic service. Grounded on the traditional war Mass Contra paganos and on the Holy Land triple sets of Mass prayers, numerous masses of this type were created and practiced in the late Middle Ages. Mostly generic rather than specific and hence applicable to any non-Christian or heretical adversary targeted by a crusade, many of them were nevertheless specifically aimed at the Turks (recognized as the main enemy since the First Crusade and always perceived in relation to the Holy Land, even when they were seen as a threat nearer home). A handful were specifically dedicated to the liberation of the Holy Land. Amnon Linder See also Crusades (Overview); Vow (Crusade) Further Reading Brundage, James A. “‘Cruce signari’: The Rite for Taking the Cross in England.” Traditio 22 (1966): 289–310. Constable, Giles. “Jerusalem and the Sign of the Cross (with Particular Reference to the Cross of Pilgrimage and Crusading in the Twelfth Century).” In Israel Lee Levine, ed. Jerusalem: Its Sanctity and Centrality to Judaism, Christianity and Islam. New York: Continuum, 1999, pp. 371–81. Cowdrey, H. E. John. “Martyrdom and the First Crusade.” In Peter W. Edbury, ed. Crusade and Settlement. Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985, pp. 46–53. Erdmann, Carl. The Origins of the Idea of Crusade. Translated by Marshal W. Baldwin and Walter Goffart. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977. Hehl, Ernst Dieter. “Kreuzzug—Pilgerfahrt—Imitatio Christi.” In Michael Matheus, ed. Pilger und Wallfahrtssttäten in Mittelalter und Neuzeit. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999, pp. 35–51. Linder, Amnon. Raising Arms: Liturgy in the Struggle to Liberate Jerusalem in the Late Middle Ages. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2003. Maier, Christoph T. “Kirche, Kreuz und Ritual: Eine Kreuzzugspredigt in Basel im Jahre 1200.” Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters 55 (1999): 95–115. Maier, Christoph T. “Mass, the Eucharist and the Cross: Innocent III and the Relocation of the Crusade.” In John C. Moore, ed. Pope Innocent III and His World. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999, pp. 351–60. Markowki, Michael. “Crucesignatus: Its Origins and Early Usage.” Journal of Medieval History 10 (1984): 157–65. McCormick, Michael. “Liturgie et guerre des Carolingiens à la première croisade.” In “Militia Christi” e Crociata nei secoli XI–XIII. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1992, pp. 209–38.

Locke, John (1632–1704)  503 Pennington, Kenneth. “The Rite for Taking the Cross in the Twelfth Century.” Traditio 30 (1974): 429–35. Pick, Lucy K. “‘Signaculum caritatis et fortitudinis’: Blessing the Crusader’s Cross in France.” Revue Benedictine 105 (1995): 381–416.

Locke, John (1632–1704) John Locke is considered among the leading philosophical proponents of empiricism, as well as an influential figure in the development of both Western social contract theory and natural rights theory. Locke’s work also can serve as a helpful demarcation between the period in which political philosophy was largely discussed in Europe via theological terms (by, for example, the radical Calvinists) and the Enlightenment’s more nonconfessional, “secularized” discourse. In his work Two Treatises of Government (1690), Locke refutes the notion of government by divine right, arguing instead that the legitimacy of any rule originates first, and only, from the consent of the governed. His theories directly informed economic and political change during his own lifetime; Locke himself was involved in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Philosophy, religion, and political thought were directly impacted by Locke’s treatment of freedom, equality, and how each informs the creation of a population’s social contract and its resultant possibilities for civil government. His work challenged and informed that of contemporaries like David Hume and those who followed after him, such as Immanuel Kant. Locke’s empiricism often put him at odds with the philosophy of René Descartes (among others) who argued that humanity had some access to, form, or kind of innate knowledge. Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) remains a critical work within the Western philosophical canon and was instrumental in the further development of the scientific method prior to and throughout the Enlightenment. Nonetheless, Locke’s impact on the development of European politics away from absolute monarchs and toward representative governments was at least as vast as his contributions to epistemology and science. Starting with a theory of human life in a state of nature, an approach shared with both Thomas Hobbes and, later,

John Locke was a 17th-century English philosopher who is considered to be one of the earliest proponents of empiricism, as well as an influential figure in the development of both social contract theory and natural rights theory. (Library of Congress)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Locke argued that freedom is the inescapable condition for human beings. Human beings came, and continue to come, into existence as free entities; any infringement of that essential freedom is unnatural and unsustainable. Denial of human freedom, and with it the inescapable right of human freedom, renders any such denying action illegitimate, therefore thoroughly unreasonable, and thus worthy of confrontation. Locke differs with Hobbes as to whether the state of nature is necessarily and simultaneously a state of war. For Locke, war is ultimately the use of force without right. The complication in discussing war in Locke’s state of nature is in the latter’s definitive absence of authority. In the state of nature, there is no common authority through which to judge right and dispense force to resolve disputes, so to restore the injured party. While perhaps the state of nature is not so dire and savage as Hobbes suggests, Locke does

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advance the argument that civil society provides for a far more secure world, due to “those evils which necessarily follow from men’s being judges in their own cases.” Locke finds that it is reasonable for like-minded persons to join together in common defense of one another’s life and, perhaps just as importantly due to the following’s means to secure the former, one another’s property. Locke argues that the “right” to self-preservation arises from the preceding “obligation” of self-preservation, which is itself mutually informed by, and tied to, the obligation to preserve all human life. As such, any violation of another without right cause is a violation of oneself, and vice versa. To some degree, as goes one, so goes the other. Reason permits access to understanding the relationship between the specific and the general, which illuminates how common cause can be found between otherwise disparate, arguably self-interested individuals. The above therefore becomes both an aspect and consequence of Locke’s theory of natural rights, which Locke claims is grounded in the application of reason. While “God” might be the originator of human existence, such a deity created human beings within certain (admittedly complex and diverse) conditions that are, by definition, natural for and to human life. In all its forms, human life within these conditions is therefore reasonably accessible and attributable to its participants, so that events experienced by human beings need not be credited to some new or ongoing act of divine agency. This includes, perhaps especially, human political activity within civil society. While not quite as emphatically as the skeptic Hume, Locke can therefore be read to continue Hobbes’s (and Niccolo Machiavelli’s) differentiation between theology and ethics on one hand and politics on the other. While intimately interrelated to other disciplines, politics can comprise its own distinct field of study. There is a consequence to understanding political activity as possessive of its own character and integrity. It is natural for human beings to gather and form political orders, to better secure for themselves and others freedom and their concurrent rights as free people. So, given the inherent reasonableness of this kind of activity, such can be discussed in ostensibly rational terms and without recourse to any particular, explicit confessions of faith. This means that governance is possible within pluralistic

communities, as the terms from which governance arises do not need to reference commitments exclusive to any single community of faith. Locke argues that his purported obligation to live is characteristic of, and thus universal to, human beings. Such manifests and requires response in predominantly materialist ways (hence, again, Locke’s extensive discussion of property). Human life requires that certain material needs be met in concrete and quantifiable ways. The formation of governments to better meet these material needs is therefore an entirely rational process and is not to be primarily understood as evidence of divine forces, and especially not as any miraculous act on behalf of any particular faith community. Locke’s contribution to what is commonly discussed as pluralism is therefore especially noteworthy, as such has eventually become a common and often critical element of both past and ongoing discourse regarding Western democratic theory. In A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), Locke makes the case for a separation between explicitly religious concerns and the state interest. In doing so, Locke argues that the authority of the civil magistrate and the ecclesial magistrate are demonstrably different and do not cross over into each other’s jurisdiction. As such, the state and its agents have neither grounds nor means to investigate religious matters, especially should such investigations be in, on behalf of, or through any particular confession’s norms, rules, and terms. Only when religious activity is itself concurrently and explicitly action that impacts civil society does it fall under the civil magistrate’s judgment, and then only through the exclusive discourse, laws, and recourse of civil government. Locke’s delineation between civil and ecclesial authority forms not only the basis for his work on toleration, but also signifies the movement of several broader themes in the development of a theory of popular government and rights. It is in Locke’s time, if not stemming from Locke himself, that Protestant understandings of resistance depart from the religious language of duties in opposition to the heresy of tyranny and begin expression in a discourse of natural (and thus eventually universal) rights, regardless of religious identity. This movement, away from explicitly religious terms and theological justifications for forceful resistance, requires of Locke a more robust clarity

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and conceptual nomenclature with which to address his increasingly diversified world. Following its contributions to, and justifications of, the Glorious Revolution, Locke’s writings informed revolutionary political activity in what would become the United States, as well as France. In this way, as a theorist whose works were read in support of the American and French Revolutions, Locke was a theorist who rather uniquely contributed to the formation of the modern international order. His theories remain relevant today, especially given 21stcentury challenges to historically (since Locke) Western concepts of human rights, private property, and representative government. Locke’s arguments regarding legitimacy and toleration, especially in light of the state’s relationships to religion and war, demonstrate a compelling facet within his own larger body of work and, more broadly, the trajectory of Western commitments to democracy and representative republics. Troy Mack See also Hobbes, Thomas

initiated the German Reformation, he was a professor of theology at the University of Wittenberg. Holy war advocates, opposed by Luther, believed that the church had the authority to declare war. The First Crusade (1096–1099) had been proclaimed by Pope Urban II in 1095 to liberate Jerusalem from Muslim control and oppression. The crusade mentality continued into the 16th century. A crusade league—including Spain, Venice, and the papacy—defeated the Turks in the Battle of Lepanto on October 7, 1571. Luther spoke strongly against the medieval holy war tradition in his treatise On War against the Turk (1529). He focused upon the head of the Roman Catholic Church and insisted that it was not right for the pope to lead a church army. Even as Luther firmly rejected medieval holy war doctrine, he insisted that the civil magistrate alone is authorized by God to make war. In this sense Luther stood in continuity with the patristic foundation that had been laid by Augustine of Hippo in his classic Reply to Faustus the Manichaean (Contra Faustum). A just war, Augustine

Further Reading Goldwin, Robert A. “John Locke.” In History of Political Philosophy, edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 476–512. Locke, John. Political Writings. Edited by David Wootton. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1993. MacPherson, C. B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Luther, Martin (1483–1546) The Protestant reformer Martin Luther, who was born in Eisleben, Saxony (also the city of his death), which was then part of the Holy Roman Empire, espoused classical just war doctrine even as he vigorously dissented from holy war practices in the 16th century—wars initiated by popes and wars prosecuted without restraint by Turkish sultans. These views were in keeping with his education at Magdeburg, Eisenbach, and Erfurt University and his ordination as an Augustinian monk. When, in 1517, he

Martin Luther was a 16th-century German theologian who initiated the schism from the Roman Catholic Church known as the Reformation with his 1517 work The Ninety-Five Theses. (Library of Congress)

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insisted, depends on the conflict being authorized by the proper authority: “The natural order which seeks the peace of mankind, ordains that the monarch should have the power of undertaking war if he thinks it advisable” (XXII.75). The second constituent of classical justice of war doctrine related to the matter of just cause. A legitimate war assumes that wrongdoing has been committed. Luther embraced this perspective by raising the question: “What else is war but the punishment of wrong and evil?” (Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 95). In this position Luther reflected a long-standing position in the church. Augustine had asserted, “The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like; and it is generally to punish these things . . . that . . . good men undertake wars” (XXII.74). The medieval thinker John of Salisbury (ca. 1120–1180) wrote similarly about the duty of soldiers, affirming that “two-edged swords are in their hands to execute punishment on the nations” (Policraticus VI.8). Luther was particularly vehement in his denunciation of Islam for what he understood to be its lack of a commitment to a just cause in its waging of war. Its commitment to jihad meant that countries were attacked that had committed no wrong. Luther commented on the way in which the Islamic faith spread itself over the earth. “The Turkish faith,” he noted, “has not made its progress by preaching and the working of miracles, but by the sword and by murder” (On War against the Turk, 179). Their wars were nothing more than “robbing and murdering, devouring more and more of those that are around them.” As they engaged in such behavior, said Luther, “They . . . think that they are doing God a service” (On War against the Turk, 178). These were points that were also made by Luther’s contemporaries. John Calvin (1509–1564) called attention to the fact that Turkish geographical advances in Asia and Europe were accomplished by means of war. “All has been subdued by their arms,” he said (Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Isaiah, vol. 7, 2:345). The Zurich reformer Heinrich Bullinger (1504–1575) likewise drew attention to jihad as it was practiced in the seventh century. Muhammad, contended Bullinger, gave to his followers the mandate that they would “make war in the name of God, and that by fear and force . . . set forth the laws to the

disobedient.” Concerning Muhammad and his followers, Bullinger affirmed, “They broke into Mecca, they put down other religions, and beheaded such as resisted” (Sermon 41, A Hundred Sermons upon the Apocalypse of Jesus Christ, 123). Luther also believed that in the biblical era Israel had gone to war against the Canaanites without a just cause. “God’s hands are not bound,” he wrote, “so that he cannot bid us make war against those who have not given us just cause, as he did when he commanded the children of Israel to go to war against the Canaanites.” He added, “In such cases God’s command is necessity enough” (Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 125). In this interpretation, Luther differed from Calvin, who embraced the view that the Jews first offered mercy and peace to the Canaanites before they initiated war against them. Calvin had stated, “The Israelites were ordered to offer peace to all, that they might thereafter have a just and legitimate cause for declaring war.” Thus while Luther affirmed that the Jewish wars under Moses were initiated without just cause, Calvin insisted that there was just cause. “The blinded nations,” he wrote, “obstinately refused the peace thus offered” (Commentaries on the Book of Joshua, 99). A just war in the Augustinian tradition had a third requirement, namely, a right intention. Augustine affirmed in his Reply to Faustus the Manichaean that “the soldiers should perform their military duties in behalf of the peace and safety of the community” (XXII.74). Medieval teaching continued with the same perspective. Thomas Aquinas stated that a just war must have a “rightful intention,” which he explained in terms of seeking “the advancement of good,” as having the “object of securing peace” (Summa Theologica, 2a2ae, q. 40, art. 1). Luther reflected the same traditional sentiment. “Why does anyone go to war,” he wrote, “except because he desires peace and obedience” (Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 95). Luther maintained the traditional patristic and medieval position that a just war has three components—the proper authority, a just cause, and a right intention. These were the classical elements that Luther regarded as necessary for a war to be just. Calvin agreed with him at this point, even while he added a fourth component pertaining to the matter of the justice of war: the waging of war must be an act of last resort. Calvin affirmed concerning the civil

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magistrate, “If they must arm themselves against the enemy . . . let them not lightly seek occasion to do so: indeed, let them not accept the occasion when offered, unless they are driven to it by extreme necessity . . . surely everything else ought to be tried before recourse is had to arms” (Institutes of the Christian Religion, IV.20.12). He even expressed his appreciation for a diplomatic solution to the problem. In his Sermons on 2 Samuel, he proclaimed, “An ambassador ought to be favored because he tends to maintain peace among men, or to remove troubles which have already started” (Sermon 30, 451). Although Luther did not elaborate as much as Calvin did about war as a last resort, he nevertheless held to the view. He exhorted the European princes of his day, “Do not be tempted to think of yourself as though you were the Turkish sultan.” He counseled, “Wait until the situation compels you to fight when you have no desire to do so.” He then added, “You will still have more than enough wars to fight” (Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 118). Luther stood in continuity with the medieval teaching on what constitutes a just war. Indeed, the emphasis in the medieval period was upon the justice of war, jus ad bellum. Medieval writers, however, were not oblivious to the distinction between the justice of war and justice in war. While the justice of war focuses upon the preliminary issues that lead to war, justice in war concerns whether or not the war is being fought justly or unjustly. One of the customary restraints that medieval theologians insisted upon with respect to war related to the extent of harm that could be done in battle. An attempt by the medieval church to restrain war is seen in the Peace of God movement in the 13th century under Pope Gregory IX (ca. 1145/1170–1241). Eight kinds of people were specified in the treatise Of Truces and Peace as enjoying noncombatant immunity. The list included religious figures, travelers, merchants, and peasants. The animals and goods of such people were also to be protected. How did Luther relate to the medieval tradition with its restraint upon the amount of harm to be administered? Luther’s humanitarian commitment is seen in his reaction to Turkish warfare, which disregarded this aspect of the justice in war tradition. Ottoman disdain for the jus in bello practice of restraint in battle was reflected at Mohacs in 1526. Süleyman’s policy of taking no prisoners resulted in

the annihilation of some 30,000 soldiers. The captives that he temporarily held were put to death. Süleyman recorded the following in his diary entry for August 31, 1526: “The emperor, seated on a golden throne, receives the homage of the vizirs and beys: massacre of 2,000 prisoners; the rain falls in torrents” (Quoted in Rice and Grafton 1994, 137). Following his massacre of the Hungarians at Mohacs, Süleyman praised Allah for his victory: “Thanks to the Most High! The banners of Islam have been victorious, and the enemies of the doctrine of the Lord of Mankind have been driven from their country and overwhelmed.” He likewise boasted, “Thus God’s grace has granted my glorious armies a triumph, such as was never equaled by any illustrious Sultan, all-powerful Khan, or even to the companions of the Prophet. What was left of the nation of impious men has been extirpated” (Quoted in Rabb 1999, 113). Bullinger gave his view of this kind of arrogant expression: “Out of their mouths proceed not only blasphemous laws but also marvelous praises, great boasting of victories and abominable blasphemies” (Sermon 41, A Hundred Sermons upon the Apocalypse of Jesus Christ, 125). Luther likewise gave his view of the attitude and conduct of the Ottoman Turks. He did not hold back labeling them “the army of the devil” (On War against the Turk, 193). The Turks, he said, were a “wild and barbarous people.” Their lifestyle was “carnal” and “dissolute” (175). They were a people who regarded women as being “immeasurably cheap,” to be “bought and sold like cattle” (181). Their wars entailed murder and a lack of restraint, “devouring and destroying” all “around them” (178). Luther believed that even if they take prisoners from time to time, the humanitarian impulse reflected in the thinking of the justice in war doctrine was absent. “How cruelly the Turk treats those whom he takes captive,” he wrote. “He treats them like cattle, dragging, towing, driving those can move, and killing on the spot those that cannot move, whether they are young or old” (200). Luther broke with some of the theology of earlier centuries, especially the Semi-Pelagian teaching of the late medieval church on the doctrine of salvation as reflected in theologians such as Gabriel Biel (ca. 1420–1495). Luther’s fresh exegetical engagement with the biblical text led him to espouse what he regarded as the foundational doctrine of the Christian church, justification by grace

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through faith alone. In his moral theology, as it related to the subject of war, he was less innovative. He stood in continuity with the teaching of Augustine and the medieval tradition on just war doctrine. One incident where Luther received contemporary criticism from fellow Germans was in his rejection of the peasants in the German Peasants’ War (1524–1525). In this instance, though sympathetic to the injustices against and subjugation of the peasants, Luther sided with the established political order in the suppression of the revolt. He did, however, criticize the harsh measures taken in the subjugation. His seeking of a middle ground in the war drew criticism from both sides. Mark J. Larson See also Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (Luther); German Peasants’ War; On War Against the Turk (Luther); Protestant Reformers and War; Wars of the Reformation; Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved (Luther); Primary Documents: Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation (1520); Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (May 1525) Further Reading Bainton, Roland H. Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-evaluation. London: Abingdon Press, 1960.

Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. 2 vols. Translated by Ford Lewis Battles. Library of Christian Classics, Vols. XX and XXI. Edited by John T. McNeill. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. Hendrix, Scott. “Luther.” In David Bagchi and David C. Steinmetz, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Reformation Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 39–57. Johnson, James Turner. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Luther, Martin. The Christian in Society III. In Robert C. Schultz, ed. Luther’s Works. Vol. 46. Philadelphia: Concordia Publishing House, 1967. Miller, Gregory. “Fighting Like a Christian: The Ottoman Advance and the Development of Luther’s Doctrine of the Just War.” In David M. Whtiford, ed. Caritas et Reformatio. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2002, pp. 41–57. Rabb, Theodore K. “If Only It Had Not Been Such a Wet Summer.” In Robert Crowley, ed. What If? The World’s Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1999. Rice, E. F., and Anthony Grafton. The Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 1460–1559. New York: W. W. Norton, 1994. Whitford, David M. “Luther’s Political Encounters.” In Donald A. McKim, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Martin Luther. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 179–91.

M Maasai Warriors

their age set while walking through their territory. Before the final day of the ceremony, Maasai boys will sleep outside. The ceremony culminates in a staged raid on a makeshift collection of 30 to 40 houses. Following the Enkipaata, the most important ceremony for a Maasai boy who is soon to be a warrior is the Emuratare, or circumcision ceremony. The circumcision ceremony is done without an anesthetic. The circumcision is traditionally done by an elder. Following the ceremony, in which the boy is expected to remain quiet throughout or risk disgrace, the boy must then wear black robes for six to eight months. The healing process is long and painful—often taking up to four to five months before the boy is fully healed. After the Maasai boy is fully healed, he attains warrior status. The Eunoto ceremony is the transition ceremony of a Maasai warrior to a senior warrior. This ceremony occurs to an age set of Maasai warriors 10 years after their initiation as young warriors. The ceremony is important in Maasai culture because, while it is not only a transition to a senior warrior, it is a passage that allows a Maasai warrior to marry. The ritual takes place at a camp that is similar in size to the Emuratare ritual. Warriors that complete the ceremony must then have their red-ochre hair shorn by their mothers. Finally, at about age 35, Maasai warriors participate in the Orngesherr ceremony. The Orngesherr is the last ceremony of a Maasai warrior’s age set and is the transition from

Maasai warriors (also known as Masai) are a Nilotic (inhabitants of the Nile Valley) seminomadic people that live in eastern Africa, primarily in northern Tanzania and southern Kenya. The Maasai warriors’ primary responsibilities to their people are to protect their territory and livestock. The Maasai rely primarily on cows, sheep, and goats for survival. The cow, however, is considered the most important animal for their livelihood. A Maasai family’s wealth can be determined by how many head of cattle the family owns. A Maasai warrior can often be distinguished by his style of dress and ornamentation. Young warriors grow their hair long, braid it in intricate patterns, and dye it a red-ochre color. They also wear earrings, bracelets, and colored beads, and use white paint to mark their bodies. Maasai warriors, like all Maasai people, are often identified by their colorful dress, the Shúkà, a hand-woven cotton blanket that is typically dyed red; however, other colors are sometimes worn. Maasai believe in a single god called Ngai, which is neither male nor female. Religious beliefs permeate the ceremonies in which Maasai must participate throughout their lives. Boys, usually around puberty (14 to 16 years of age), must first participate in the Enkipaata, or precircumcision ceremony. Maasai boys form age sets, setting off in a group of 20 to 30 people, escorted by elders, as they announce 509

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senior warrior to junior-elder. Again, a warrior’s hair is shorn; however, during the Orngesherr, the warrior’s oldest wife will cut his hair. Following this ceremony, a Maasai man can move and start his own homestead. Maasai ceremonies, particularly female circumcision, have been routinely criticized and in some cases replaced by other ceremonies due to external pressures on Maasai culture. Christopher D. Nelson Further Reading Tepilit Ole Saitoti. The Worlds of the Maasai Warrior: An Autobiography. Oakland: University of California Press, 1988.

Maccabean Revolt (167–160 BCE) The Maccabean Revolt has traditionally been presented in history and legend as the heroic story of brave freedom fighters against an oppressive power, and as the triumph of the few over the many. The reality of the Maccabean saga, however, was actually somewhat more complex. To begin with, contrary to the popularly assumed centrality of the Maccabean Revolt to the celebration of the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah, for centuries the revolt was actually fairly marginal to the Hanukkah story, which emphasized instead the miracle of the oil. Second, in conception and accomplishment, the revolt was less about achieving complete independence from a foreign power than maintaining the more limited religious independence historically granted to the client state of an imperial power. Its legendary status in both Jewish and Catholic thought has furthermore outshone the historical reality of a highly significant but brief victory that was ultimately reversed by corruption and political division that weakened the kingdom for eventual Roman takeover. The conditions that led to the Maccabean revolt began with the breakup of the Hellenistic Empire following the death of Alexander the Great. When succession struggles led to the division of the empire into three mini-empires, the commonwealth of Judea found itself sandwiched between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic successor states. Although, under Alexander’s rule, Judea had become a client state that was little different from others in the empire, following Alexander’s death, it became a hotly contested province. The

trouble began in earnest with the 168 BCE acquisition of the province by the Syrian Greek ruler Antiochus III. Beyond the political pawn status of Judea, the period between the rule of Alexander the Great and that of the Antiochid rulers saw a marked decline in religious toleration within the empire. Much of it had to do with an attempt to achieve unity within the empire by forcing religious conformity, effectively abandoning the successful strategy of many empires of toleration and religious autonomy in exchange for loyalty to the empire. Although the local Jewish population was initially divided between pushing back against Hellenization and embracing it, the situation changed further with the ascent of Antiochus IV, known as Antiochus Epiphanies, whose name meant God Manifest. In an attempt to establish himself as a semidivine ruler and force the adoption of Greek worship, Antiochus sought to outlaw key Jewish practices ranging from circumcision to the Sabbath, taking advantage of an existing civil struggle between those who embraced Hellenism and the traditionalists, who included a pietist group known as the Hasideans. But what inspired more unified Jewish resistance was the attempt to remake the recently rebuilt Temple in Jerusalem into a house of pagan worship, bring statues of Greek gods into its precincts, and institute the sacrifice of pigs on the altar. Although the exact date of the beginning of the revolt remains a source of controversy, the demand for Mattathias, the high priest to perform pagan sacrifices, is identified as a spark of the revolt. The war that the Maccabees fought lasted for three years and was conducted mainly with the tactics of guerrilla warfare, with militarily trained leadership, but against much larger Syrian Greek forces. The Maccabean forces were led first by the Hasmonean priest Mattathias, and then, following his death, by his son Judah, who during this time took on the additional name of Maccabee, meaning “hammer.” When Judah died in battle before the full achievement of victory, leadership was taken over by his brother Jonathan, who in turn was succeeded by their brother Simon. Under Simon’s leadership, the Israelite kingdom would gain greater autonomy from the Seleucid dynasty and enjoy a period of relative independence for the next 80 years. The cleansing and rededication of the Temple, however, did not wait for a complete military victory and was

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This 19th-century illustration depicts the Battle of Elasa during the Maccabean Revolt, in 160 BCE. The revolt was a rebellion led by the Maccabees, a Jewish rebel army, against the Seleucid Empire of ancient Greece. (Jupiter Images)

celebrated in many ways as a belated observance of the Festival of Sukkot, one of the three major pilgrimage festivals. The story of the miracle of the oil that lit the menorah greatly outlasting its availability is largely a matter of apocrypha and legend, but in the centuries following the 70 CE Roman destruction of the Temple, the rabbis emphasized its importance, rather than that of the military victory, both to acknowledge the reversibility of victory in battle and to discourage Jewish paramilitary action, especially following the crushing of the Bar Kochba rebellion in 135 CE. It would not be until the turn of the 20th century, with the rise of the modern Zionist movement, that the military aspects of the Maccabean revolt were reemphasized in Jewish history and lore. In part because of this purposeful rabbinic distancing, the primary literary source for the Maccabean revolt, the first and second books of Maccabees, were excluded from the canon of the Jewish Tanakh, instead becoming part of the Catholic Bible, paving the way for the revering of Judas Maccabeus as a hero in Catholic Christendom. The stories

of the women of the Maccabean Revolt, Judith and Hannah, are even more apocryphal with less agreement on an official account. As a result of this more solid Christian acceptance of the primary texts, the Maccabean revolt has remained a popular subject of European Christian high and popular culture, resulting in numerous creative representations including George Friedrich Handel’s 1746 oratorio entitled Judas Maccabeus. Most recently, Mel Gibson, the devoutly Catholic actor and filmmaker, sought to direct a movie about the Maccabees, but the project was shelved over disagreements with his scriptwriter, who had accused Gibson of anti-Semitism. It is also possible that Gibson’s effort faltered on account of the more recent Jewish effort to reclaim Judas Maccabeus and the Maccabean Revolt for Jewish history that began with the modern Zionist movement and the founding of the State of Israel. But there is also a case to be made that Gibson’s effort was merely a continuation of the genuine admiration for the Maccabean story in the Catholic and Orthodox Christian world that has appeal across lines of faith. Yet recent research about the Maccabees has revealed a darker, more extremist side that calls into question their status as a role model of faith. This more nuanced picture of the Maccabees, however, is unlikely to diminish the significance of the Maccabean Revolt to the issue of war and religion. Susan Roth Breitzer See also Bar Kochba Revolt; Bar Kochba, Simon; Jerusalem as Holy City; Maccabeus, Judas; Zionism and War Further Reading Bar-Kochva, Bezalel. Judas Maccabeus: The Jewish Struggle Against the Seleucids. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Scolnic, Benjamin Edidin. Judaism Defined: Mattathias and the Destiny of His People. Studies in Judaism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2010.

Maccabeus, Judas (d. 160 BCE) Judas Maccabeus, also known as Judah Maccabee, has been one of the most widely revered military heroes in Western history, whose heroism has in some points in history been

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embraced more by the Catholic Church than the Jewish world. Indeed, the Jewish embrace of Judas Maccabeus as a military and leadership role model has been a relatively recent development, influenced by the modern Zionist movement and the rebirth of an independent Jewish state. Regardless of its source, the historic regard for Judas Maccabeus is as much for his military genius and leadership role in the Maccabean Revolt as for his status as a man of deep faith. Judas Maccabeus, who lived during the third century BCE, was the third of the five sons of the high priest Mattathias (Mattityahu) and scion of the priestly Hasmonean family. When the Maccabean revolt began, partly over an attempt by a rival to the priesthood, Judas, the third son, quickly assumed a leadership role and acquired the second name Maccabee, which meant hammer, that eventually extended to the entire Hasmonean family. Following Mattathias’s death, Judas took over the leadership of the military guerrilla effort, achieving major victories at Emmaus and Ben Horon. Although he also played a key role in the siege of Jerusalem, he died before the successful conclusion of the battle. His brother Jonathan, who succeeded him after his death in 165, led the Maccabees to victory, and his brother Simon was the first ruler of the Kingdom of Israel during a period of relative independence. Nonetheless, Judas Maccabeus has remained the hero of the Hanukkah story in history and legend. The chief historical accounts of the life of Judas Maccabeus have been the Book of Maccabees, the Catholic but not the Jewish canon, as well as accounts by the Roman Jewish historian Flavius Josephus. And despite the consigning of the Book of Maccabees to apocryphal status in the Jewish canon, Judas Maccabeus has been generally admired in subsequent rabbinic literature. Judas Maccabeus’s status as a hero and role model in Christian Western civilization has been sustained through numerous dramatic/ literary and operatic/musical accounts, including passing references in Shakespeare and other works. Probably the most famous non-Jewish portrayal of the life and heroism of Judas Maccabeus as well as of the Maccabean Revolt is none other than George Friedrich Handel’s oratorio, Judas Maccabeus, composed in 1746. The oratorio, composed five years after Handel’s more famous Messiah, was inspired by the chorus “See the Conquering Hero Comes,” which was

originally a Christian hymn before becoming the centerpiece of this oratorio on the Hanukkah story. Artistic renderings of Judas Maccabeus include the 14th-century mural of The Nine Worthies, portraying nine designated role models (few of which are Christian) of the late medieval ideal of chivalry. This predominantly Catholic Christian appropriation of Judas Maccabeus continued into the modern era and included entries in the Catholic Encyclopedia and other traditional Christian/European reference works. Leaving aside the ironic implications of possible canonization as a saint in both the Catholic and Orthodox churches, Judas Maccabeus has simply been more fully embraced as a hero by Christians than by Jews during the long period of Jewish exile. It was not until the 20th century with the rise of the modern Zionist movement that there was a serious Jewish literary effort, in Yiddish and Hebrew, to reclaim Judas Maccabeus. With the rise and establishment of the modern State of Israel, Judas Maccabeus was increasingly presented as a role model for a Jewish warrior, and pointedly as an alternative to the traditional image of the shtetl Jew. But the modern Jewish appeal of Judas Maccabeus was not limited to the spheres of military strength and nationalism. Rather, in a somewhat ironic embrace of the Greek ideal of athleticism, the Maccabiah movement began in 1895 with the founding of Jewish sports clubs in Eastern Europe. By the turn of the 20th century, these clubs had coalesced into a movement that promoted the ideal of “a healthy mind in a healthy body” among Jewish youth, a movement that spread to Mandatory Palestine and took on the name Maccabi. By 1921, the network was formalized as the Maccabi World Union (MWU), and the first Maccabiah Games (Olympic-style all-Jewish athletic contests) began. Following the Second World War, and recovering from the destruction of the Holocaust, the MWU relocated to Israel by 1950 and established the Kfar Maccabiah Sports Club to host the games in Ramat Gan, near Tel Aviv. But even after Judas Maccabeus was reclaimed as a Jewish model of military prowess and athleticism as well as piety, his appeal to traditional Christians has not faded, if the recent unsuccessful attempt by the devoutly Catholic actor and filmmaker Mel Gibson to make a movie about the Maccabees is any indication. The film, which was

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ultimately shelved over a dispute between Gibson and his Jewish scriptwriter that included accusations of antiSemitism, has not been the only effort at a popular portrayal of Judas Maccabeus in the cinematic age. Conversely, in recent times, Judas Maccabeus and all of the Maccabees have been the subject of controversies based on recent scholarship. The first of these involved the significance of the role he actually played in the Maccabean Revolt vis-àvis his brothers, Jonathan and Simon, the last of whom would actually head the restored Hasmonean dynasty. The second involves the increased recognition of the religious zealotry of Judas Maccabeus and his followers, and the dark side of their efforts to stamp out Hellenization and assimilation among the peoples of Judea well before the forced Hellenization by Antiochus IV united previously warring sides. These factors make a case for the continued emphasis of the miracle of the oil in the celebration of the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah, over the military victory that was less about religious freedom than about religious purity. These nuances, however, do not detract from the significance of Judas Maccabeus as a subject of study for the issue of war and religion in Jewish history. Susan Roth Breitzer See also Jerusalem as Holy City; Maccabean Revolt Further Reading Bar-Kochva, Bezalel. Judas Maccabeus: The Jewish Struggle Against the Seleucids. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Scolnic, Benjamin Edidin. Judaism Defined: Mattathias and the Destiny of His People. Studies in Judaism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2010.

Mad Mullah, Wars of the (1892–1920) Muhammad ‘Abd Allah al-Hasan (1856–1920), the “Mad Mullah,” was a religious and political leader who waged a long guerrilla war against British, Italian, and Ethiopian forces, leading to the establishment of a Dervish state in central Somalia. Born in the territory of British Somaliland and raised among the Dhulabahante subclan of the Harti Darods, he received a religious education, also traveling to

different centers of Islamic learning including Harar and Mogadishu. In 1894 he performed the ritual pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), where he stayed for a year and a half, coming under the influence of the newly founded, rigorist Salihiyyah tariqa and its founder, Mohammed Salih. After his return to Berbera in 1895, he started preaching against the dominant customs and the teachings of the Qadiriyyah order. In 1897 he transferred to the Dhulabahante territory where he continued its activity. In 1899, Hasan clashed with the local British authorities over the possession of some firearms, which the British vice-consul charged the Mullah with stealing. Hasan’s reply triggered the British reaction that, in its turn, led to the outbreak of the hostilities. It was the beginning of a more than 20-years-long conflict pitting Muhammad Hasan against the British, the Italians, and the Ethiopians, as well as the many tribes that did not recognize his leadership and refused to adopt the Salihiyyah doctrine. Between 1899 and 1904, the Dervish army inflicted heavy losses on their enemies. At the same time, its successes attracted to the Mullah’s banner even Somalis who did not follow his religious beliefs. However, on January 9, 1904, at the Jidaale (Jidballi) Plain, General Charles Egerton killed 1,000 Dervish warriors, a defeat that forced the Mullah and his remaining men to flee to Majeerteen country. In March 1905, the Mullah and his followers settled in Nugaal Valley, between Hobyo and the Majarteen, after having signed the Treaty of Illig (1904) with the Italian authorities. The Dervish remained in Nugaal until November 1911, at which time they reentered British Somaliland. On the eve of the First World War, they reached their main political and military strength, fielding some 10,000 men and extending their control to the outskirts of Berbera; however, the deposition of Emperor Lij Iyasu in Ethiopia (1916) forced them to adopt a more defensive posture. German and Ottoman promises failed to materialize, and Caliph Mehmet V’s appointment of the Mullah as emir of the Somali nation by did not help in boosting his position. Territorial control declined too. In British Somaliland the Dervish converged on Taleh (Taleex) and Jidaale (Jidballi) and in Italian Somalia on Beledweyne, near the Ethiopian border. In this same period, an anti-Mullah front finally coalesced, including forces from Italy, Great Britain, Ethiopia

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(now under the control of Empress Zewditu and Ras Makonnen), and the Somali sultanates of Hobyo and the Majerteen, now firmly in the Italian sphere of influence. The end of the war coincided with the final thrust against the Mullah’s forces. Between December 1919 and January 1920, the Royal Air Force Z Force, troops of the Somaliland Camel Corps, and one battalion of the King’s Africa Rifles converged at first on Jidaale, then on Taleh, where the Mullah had withdrawn. Taleh fell on February 9, while the heavily beaten Dervish troops retreated to the Ogaden region. Although Muhammad Hasan was able to regain a certain level of political power until his death on December 21, 1920, the defeat marked the end of the Dervish state, although in the following years the myth of the Mad Mullah would play a relevant role in shaping the narrative of modern Somali nationalism. Gianluca Pastori See also Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Further Reading General Staff, War Office. The Official History of the Operations in Somaliland 1901–04. 2 vols. London: HMSO, 1907. Jardine, Douglas. The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. London: Herbert Jenkins, 1923. Lewis, Ioan M. A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa. London: Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press, 1961. Sheik-Abdi, Abdi. Divine Madness. Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (1865–1920). London: Zed Books, 1993. Slight, John P. “British and Somali Views of Muhammad Abdullah Hassan’s Jihad, 1899–1920.” Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 10 (2011): 16–35.

Mahdi The Mahdi (Divinely Guided One) in Islamic eschatology is a prophesied deliverer who fills the Earth with equity, justice, and prosperity; restores true religion (Islam); and ushers in a short golden age before the Day of Judgment ends the world. As such, he is seen not as a harbinger of the end of the world, but as a reformer who comes before the end. He is sometimes referred to by the Shi’a as Sahib

Al-Zaman or Al-Mahdi al-Muntadhar, which translates as “The Lord of the Age” and “The Guided, Awaited One.” The major differences between the Shi’a and Sunni understandings of the nature of the Mahdi is that most Shi’a believe that the Mahdi was born in the eighth or ninth century, is still alive, though currently in occultation (ghayba), and is infallible in his pronouncements, whereas the Sunni generally believe that he will be born, will live a normal lifetime, and will be commissioned by Allah to fulfill his destiny. There is no direct reference to the Mahdi in the Qur’an, nor in the two most important Sunni collections of hadith, those of al Bukhari and Muslim. The sources for information on the Mahdi are contained primarily in the other four of the six Sunni canonical (sahih) collections of hadith, those of Muhammad ibn Isa at-Tirmidhi (824–892), Ibn Majah (dates unknown, but lived in the ninth century), al-Nisa’i (829–915), and Abu Dawood (d. 889). Abu Dawood devoted an entire book of his collection of hadith to the Mahdi (Kitab Al Mahdi). The Mahdi is also mentioned in the four hadith collections favored by Shi’a, those of the “Three Muhammads,” al-Kulayni (864–941), Ibn Babuya (dates unknown), and two collections by Tusi (1201–1274). The expansion and explication of the doctrine of the Mahdi reached its zenith in medieval times, with books by Muhyi ad-Din ibn al-Arabi (1165–1240), who wrote of the Mahdi in his book Meccan Illuminations; Ibn Kathir (1300–1373), who in his books The Beginning and the End, and Signs of the Hour wrote much on apocalypse and the Mahdi; and Al-Suyuti (1446–1505), who in his Treatise on Fatwas (religious rulings) did much to expand the understanding and details of the life and mission of the Mahdi. The lack of detail in the earliest Islamic writings has caused some Sunni Islamic scholars to question the necessity of believing in the Mahdi, and there is much disagreement as to the exact chronology or nature of the Mahdi’s reign. However, in 1976 the (Sunni) Muslim World League issued a fatwa declaring that belief in the Mahdi was “obligatory” for all Muslims. What follows is a broadly accepted narrative within Islamic communities.

Physical Characteristics

According to various sources, the Mahdi will be an Arab from the family of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad through

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his daughter Fatima and will carry the name Muhammad, and his father’s name will be Abdullah, as was Muhammad’s father. He will be handsome, between 30 and 40, with a broad forehead and a prominent nose, a beard, a birthmark or mole between his shoulders, and be of average height.

Mission

The Mahdi’s time on earth will be preceded by certain signs, among which are: most Muslims will be so in name only, two-thirds of the world’s population will die from war (red death) and plague (white death), there will be rampant sexual immorality and drunkenness (even among Muslim teachers), jihad will be forgotten as a duty; and supernatural signs, such as the sun rising in the West and earthquakes. The single most important precursor is a loss of true Islamic knowledge on Earth. There will be a great war that will destroy Syria, while in Iraq a fire will appear in the sky, and redness will cover the people. These signs are said to follow one another like the pearls on a necklace falling one after the other when its string is cut, that is, rapidly. The Mahdi’s mission will begin after the rise of other prophesied persons, the Sufyani, who begins his tyrannical rule of the Islamic world from Damascus, Syria, and the Islamic false Messiah, the Dajjal. After they appear, a man from Medina will arrive in Mecca, a man made pure and given perfect Islamic knowledge in a single day, the Mahdi. Because of his knowledge and steadfast devotion to Allah, the people will drag him out against his will and swear loyalty to him. When the Sufyani learns of the rise of the Mahdi, he will send troops to Arabia to put down the possible rival to the caliphate. The Sufyani’s army will be swallowed up in the desert. This will be the sign that all Muslim scholars will recognize as designating the time of the Mahdi. An army from the East (Khurasan) will then swear allegiance to the Mahdi at the Kaaba in Mecca. Isa, the Islamic version of Jesus, will reappear in Damascus, where he and the Mahdi’s army will defeat the Sufyani and conquer greater Syria. Next, the Mahdi’s army will conquer Jerusalem, where the Mahdi will base his caliphate. The conquest of Jerusalem will instigate an armed reaction from the Roman government in Constantinople (modern Istanbul).

After the Roman army destroys Medina, the Mahdi’s armies will march on and defeat the Roman army, then the empire. Many Muslims see the defeat of the Roman Empire as symbolic of the defeat of non-Islamic forces on the Earth. After setting up a true caliphate, the Mahdi will discover Second Temple artifacts that will lead Jews and Christians to join Islam en masse. The Mahdi will then rule for between 7 and 20 years of unparalleled prosperity, peace, and justice.

Historical Claimants to the Title

Though there have been thousands of claimants to the title of Mahdi in Islamic history, only a few have been successful in leading movements. The first person to be proclaimed the Mahdi was Muhammad al-Hanifiyya (633–700), a son of Ali Ibn Abi Talib. He was promoted by Mukhtar al-Thaqafi as the true caliph against the Umayyad caliphate in an abortive revolution referred to as the Second Fitna (Second Islamic Civil War, 680–685). Al-Hanifiyya died in Medina, but stories of his concealing and imminent return persisted. The earliest recorded successful Mahdist movement was initiated by Abu Abd Allah Muhammad bin Tumart al-Susi, better known as Ibn Tumart, who died in 1130. The movement he started (Almohad) was focused on repudiating the ruling Almoravid dynasty in Andalusia and Morocco, which was accused of compromising on the absolute oneness (Tawhid) of Allah. Though Ibn Tumart suddenly died in 1130, his reformation cause was championed by his successor (caliph), Abd al-Mumin, who defeated the Almoravids in 1132 and established a kingdom that stretched from Libya to Portugal, where he ruled for 30 years. The Almohad caliphate lasted for more than a century. At the start of the ninth Islamic century (on a lunar calendar), in 1496, Sayyid Muhammad Jaunpuri of Gujarat (1443–1505), in western India, announced that he was the Mahdi while on pilgrimage in Mecca. He instituted an ascetic form of Islam. His followers, the “Mahdavis,” lived in sequestered communities in a life of shared possessions, constant prayer, and pious behavior. The community did not engage in military actions until well after the death of Jaunpuri under the leadership of the second caliph, Sayyid Kundmir. The Mahdavi sect lost most of its influence after their predicted return of Jesus did not occur in 1591.

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In more recent times, Muhammad Ahmad (1848–1885) led a revolution to establish an authentic Islamic state in Sudan. In 1881 Ahmad announced that he was the Mahdi and began to gather followers in an effort to purify the land of non-Muslim (British and not sufficiently Islamic Turco/ Egyptian) rule. In January 1885 Ahmad’s forces captured the capital, Khartoum, but on June 22, 1885, Muhammad Ahmad suddenly died. The revolution continued under the leadership of Ahmad’s chosen caliph, Abdallahi Ibn Muhammad, eventually leading to the control of Sudan. The newly established state lasted until Egyptian forces under British command subjugated the Mahdi’s kingdom (Mahdiyah) in 1899, and the land returned to Egyptian control. R. Don Deal See also Islam and War (Jihad); Khartoum, Siege of; Mahdist Revolution in Sudan Further Reading Cook, David. Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 2002. Filiu, Jean-Pierre, and M. B. DeBevoise. Apocalypse in Islam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011. Furnish, Timothy. Holiest Wars: Islamic Mahdis, Their Jihads, and Osama Bin Laden. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005. Shauhat, Ali. Millenarian and Messianic Tendencies in Islamic Thought. Lahore, India: Publishers United, 1993.

Mahdia Crusade (1390) The Mahdia Crusade was a Franco-Genoese crusade, sometimes known as the “Barbary Crusade,” that attacked the port of Mahdia (modern-day Al-Mahdiya, Tunisia) in North Africa, but was abandoned after a siege of some nine weeks. The crusade originated as a Christian response to the piratical activities of the Barbary corsairs of the North African coast. For many years Muslim piracy had constituted a major disruption to Western shipping, particularly the commerce of the Italian maritime republics. In late 1389 Genoa sent an embassy to meet King Charles VI of France at Toulouse, which proposed a joint expedition to capture Mahdia, a major port on the North African coast. The Genoese were already interested in this region; in 1388

they had sent a fleet under the admiral Raphael Adorno to take part in a joint expedition with the Pisans and Sicilians, which had captured the island of Jerba in 1388. The Sicilians acquired the lordship of the island after paying for Genoa’s expenses. The republic thus had an interest not only in eliminating Mahdia as a pirate base, but also in acquiring a port that would serve as an entrepôt for its own trade goods and give it access to African products, above all gold from the sub-Saharan regions. Genoa was also keen to intensify relations with the French crown in order to secure an ally against its powerful northern neighbor, the duchy of Milan. At the Toulouse meeting, the Genoese ambassadors proposed to provide naval transport and provisions for a crusade army to be led by a French prince of the royal blood. They also offered to contribute and pay for a force of crossbowmen and men-at-arms for the duration of the proposed campaign. The Genoese plans were received enthusiastically by some at the French court, notably by Louis II, Duke of Bourbon, the king’s uncle, who asked for command of the crusade. Although initially hesitant about the proposal, King Charles and his advisers eventually agreed to allow a French force to join the expedition, and gave the command to Louis. However, each French participant had to have express royal permission to join it and also had to defray his own expenses. Genoa agreed to provide 28 galleys and 18 transport ships and their crews. It is possible that other ships were hired by some of the crusaders themselves. The fleet was commanded by the Genoese Giovanni Centurione, who had taken part in the conquest of Jerba, while Louis of Bourbon was to act as overall military commander. The mustering point for the army was originally fixed for late June 1390 at Genoa, but the difficulties of provisioning meant that this was changed to July 1 at Marseilles. Louis of Bourbon, a veteran of the Hundred Years’ War, had a great reputation as a knight, and the proposed expedition, coming as it did during a period of truce with England, appealed to the chivalric sensibilities of the French nobility and found recruits from all over France. Among those who signed up were Philip of Artois, constable of France; John de Vienne, admiral of France; and notable knights such as Enguerrand VII, lord of Coucy, and Geoffrey de Charny the Younger, whose father had been a

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famous crusader and author of a treatise on chivalry. Recognition for the expedition as a crusade was secured, not only from the Avignonese pope recognized in France, Clement VII, but also from his rival at Rome, Boniface VIII. This universal recognition helped secure some participation from England, Gascony, and Spain, including John Beaufort, Earl of Derby. The main sources for the course of the crusade are French works: the Chronique du bon duc Loys de Bourbon, written in 1429 by Jean Cabaret d’Orville, the Chroniques of Jean Froissart, and the chronicle by the anonymous writer known as the Religieux de Saint-Denis. The total number of crusaders is difficult to compute, as the sources give only partial or conflicting figures. The Genoese provided 1,000 crossbowmen and double the number of men-at-arms in addition to the ships’ crews. King Charles VI had tried to limit the number of French crusaders, but the response had been so enthusiastic that we should probably assume that the French numbers exceeded the Genoese. Some 200 crusaders, mostly French, are known by name. The fleet sailed from Marseilles via Genoa and Corsica to Sardinia, where it took on provisions, and then on to an island off the African coast then known as Conigliera (probably Kuriat on the Gulf of Hammamet). During a nine-day layover there caused by bad weather, the plan of campaign was worked out. As Mahdia was too strong to be taken by an immediate assault, it would be necessary to besiege the town. The Muslims of Mahdia were by now aware of the coming of the expedition but were not expecting it to be so strong, and decided not to contest the landing. On July 22 the crusaders disembarked unopposed and started the siege; they cut Mahdia off from the rest of the mainland, with the land forces watching the town’s three land gates while the fleet maintained a blockade of the harbor. On the third day of the siege the defenders made a sortie, which was beaten back by the crusaders, suffering considerable losses. Thereafter the crusaders took greater precautions to guard and defend their camp. Numerous, largely inconclusive skirmishes occurred over the next few weeks, which offered the Christian knights ample opportunities to satisfy their desire for combat and honor. It was only after about seven weeks that the crusaders began to make serious attempts to assault the walls with siege

machines assembled on land and mounted on galleys. Yet by this time they were suffering the effects of the North African summer climate, increasing illness, and the shortage of water and food supplies, much of which had gone bad, while relief forces were being gathered by the sultans of Tunis, Bougie (Bejaïa), and Tlemcen. The Genoese began to argue for raising the siege and gradually won the bulk of opinion in the crusader camp. Negotiations were opened after contacts were made through Christian merchants within Mahdia. Although Louis of Bourbon was disinclined to abandon the siege, the Genoese had by now clearly given up hope of taking Mahdia and were unwilling to waste further resources on the project. After four days of talks, the crusaders agreed to withdraw; in exchange the sultan Amad II agreed to pay the Genoese a cash indemnity of 10,000 ducats, plus an annual tribute to the value of the sultan’s revenues from Mahdia for the next 15 years. At the end of September 1390, the crusaders withdrew in good order, with military dispositions taken by Louis of Bourbon preventing a Muslim attack as their embarkation was carried out. Some of the crusaders wished only to return home, but others were keen to secure some more tangible success. The Genoese persuaded the French to mount an attack on Sardinia, then a possession of the Crown of Aragon, by convincing them that the port of Cagliari had assisted the North African corsairs. The fleet occupied Cagliari and the island of Ogliastra, installing Genoese garrisons in both places. The fleet then set sail for Naples, but storms forced the ships to assemble off Sicily. They then sailed on to Terracina on the Italian mainland, which also surrendered and was placed under Genoese control. The French crusaders, however, drew the line at an attack on the Pisan port of Piombino, although the mere presence of such a large seaborne army forced the Pisans into an accommodation with Genoa. The fleet then returned via Genoa (where Louis of Bourbon and other leaders refused to leave their ships) to Marseilles. The French crusaders were welcomed back as heroes. Despite the lack of success of the expedition, they were regarded as having acquitted themselves valiantly and with honor. The expedition revived French enthusiasm for crusading and undoubtedly contributed to the huge response to the Nikopolis Crusade in 1396. Indeed, many of the

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veterans of Mahdia are known to have fought at Nikopolis. The limited objective of the Mahdia Crusade was by no means unrealistic. The port had been taken by the Christians twice before in 1087 and 1148; Spanish conquests in Morocco and the recent capture of Jerba had demonstrated that it was possible to hold well-chosen bases in North Africa. In comparison with the fiasco of Nikopolis, the French forces seem to have been relatively well disciplined, and the successful landing and disembarkation of the army are tributes to Louis of Bourbon’s generalship. Yet whether the Franco-Genoese forces would have been sufficient to hold the mainland port of Mahdia if they had been successful is debatable; the majority of the French crusaders would have desired to return home, and would have needed to be replaced by a permanent and substantial garrison. In the event, the crusaders of 1390 wasted valuable time and provisions in many weeks of desultory combat while their enemies regrouped; the assaults with siege engines came too late to be effective, and it is questionable whether there was sufficient siege machinery for the task. Genoa was able to make good use of the expedition for its own political and commercial ends, but the gains of the expedition did nothing to advance the aims of the crusade movement. Alan V. M urray See also Crusades (Overview) Further Reading Atiya, Aziz S. The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages. London: Methuen, 1938. Delaville Le Roulx, Joseph. La France en Orient au XIVe siècle. Expéditions du maréchal Boucicaut. 2 vols. Paris: Thorin, 1886. Hazard, Harry W. “Moslem North Africa, 1049–1394.” In Kenneth M. Setton et al., eds. A History of the Crusades. 2nd ed. 6 vols. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–1989, 3: 457–85. Mirot, Léon. “Une expédition française en Tunisie au XIVe siècle: Le siège de Mahdia (1390).” Revue des études historiques 97 (1931): 357–406.

Mahdist Revolution in Sudan The Mahdist Revolution in Sudan was an Islamic revolt against the Ottoman Empire, under the local rule of Egypt.

The revolution and government that was formed lasted from 1881 to 1899 and gained control of most of modern Sudan. Initially led by Muhammad Ahmad Ibn al-Sayyid Abdallah (1848–1885), self-identified as the “Mahdi” (Divinely Guided One) of Islamic prophecy, the revolution was begun with the purpose of establishing a true Islamic state. Egyptian forces under British command conquered the Mahdi’s kingdom (Mahdiyah) in 1899, and the land returned to Egyptian control. Sudan had been governed as a province of the Ottoman Empire since being conquered by Egyptian forces in 1821. Turco-Egyptian rule was initially characterized by two themes: higher, non-Islamic taxes, and increased slavery. The taxes were meant to offset the costs of the war, and the increased slave trade was intended primarily to provide new soldiers for Egypt’s army. One European administrator of the time estimated that in a 14-year period more than 4,000 slaves were taken from south Sudan and sold in Egypt and Turkey, while many thousands more Africans were killed while defending their families. In 1873, Charles Gordon of England was chosen by Khedive Ismail of Egypt to govern the Equatoria region in Sudan and began an unpopular program for the abolition of slavery. This was seen as a double affront to Islamic sensibilities; having a Christian rule over Muslims, and his outlawing an activity made legitimate under traditional Islamic law. Muhammad Ahmad, the Mahdi, was born in Dongola on the Nile in northern Sudan. He acquired the title “The Renouncer” during his days as a student in a Samaniyya Sufi school from the other pupils, due to a combination of his rejection of any food provided through a government stipend, his extensive fasting, his simple lifestyle, and his devotion to prayer. During his time at the school Ahmad was profoundly influenced by the conservative medieval Islamic theologian al-Ghazali’s writings, which advocated for a more active approach to change within a corrupted Islamic society. Muhammad Ahmad’s fame as a religious ascetic soon grew beyond the school, and he began to draw his own band of disciples, Sudanese followers who were drawn by both his discipline and his physical appearance. He had a V-shaped gap in his front top teeth, seen as a sign of a lucky person, and a mole on his cheek, seen as the sign that he

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was one chosen by God. Muhammad Ahmad began to hear voices exclaiming to him “oh Mahdi of Allah,” and he claimed to have been commissioned by the Islamic Prophet Muhammad in a vision to be the Mahdi. He said that Muhammad told him that he would always be victorious in battle, and that the angel Azra’il would carry a banner of light above the Mahdi, bringing fire into the hearts of his warriors and terror into the hearts of his enemies. The Prophet told Ahmad that any who doubted Ahmad’s status as the Mahdi was an apostate from Islam and, minus repentance, under a death sentence. The Mahdi’s fight was not simply against unjust taxes, deprivations, and political oppression from outsiders. Muhammad Ahmad taught that any person who supported the Turkish government was no longer a genuine Muslim, and had therefore lost the right to rule. Ahmad was not simply a reformer, but a revivalist, attempting to bring back the idealized early, golden age of Islam. In this sense he was a Salafi, one who looks to the time of the “forefathers” (Arabic: Salaf) for guidance in the correct ordering of life, religion, and political governance. On June 29, 1881, Muhammad Ahmad declared publicly that he was “al Mahdi al Muntazar,” or “The Awaited Guided One.” When word of the new threat to government sovereignty reached officials in Khartoum, a two-pronged approach was decided upon. First a group of religious scholars (ulema) were sent to refute Ahmad’s claims to be the Mahdi. Second, a force consisting of two companies of soldiers was sent to force his appearance at the seat of government in Khartoum. He countered the scholars with a declaration of his direct commissioning by Muhammad, and when the troops attacked, the Mahdi’s followers routed them. After the battle, Ahmad and his disciples left for the more secure area of Kurdufan. He referred to the journey as his emigration (Arabic: Hijra) and called those who traveled with him the “immigrants.” The people who joined the Mahdi’s forces from Kurdufan were termed the “helpers,” in conscious replication of the original Muslims at Medina. While he was in Kurdufan the Egyptian government twice sent troops to stop the Mahdi’s growing army. Using traditional weapons of swords and spears, the Mahdi’s army routed the Egyptian forces each time, due to a combination of the Egyptian soldiers’ reluctance to attack fellow

Muslims, and because some of the Egyptians believed Ahmad’s claims of supernatural assistance. Muhammad Ahmad chose four men to act as his aidesde-camp, called “caliphs,” (deputies) after the method of early Islam. Ahmad’s army, estimated at more than 100,000, besieged and captured the capital of Kurdufan, El Obeid, at great cost of life. During the first attempt to storm the city, the Mahdi’s forces lost about 10,000 fighters to less than 300 government troops. It was after the battle that the Mahdi allowed modern weapons to be utilized by his troops. The Egyptian government responded to the loss of Kurdufan with heavier weapons and sent an army numbered at about 8,000 under the command of Colonel William Hicks of England to recapture El Obeid. The Mahdi’s army, numbered at about 30,000, attacked and destroyed most of Hicks’s troops, leaving about 300 survivors. In 1884, with the capital of Sudan, Khartoum, under threat, the Egyptian khedive Tewfik chose the British hero Charles “Chinese” Gordon to return as the governor-general of Sudan. The British government agreed, but secretly ordered Gordon to save as many foreigners as possible, then to abandon Khartoum. After realizing that there would be no way to rescue most of the foreign nationals, Gordon requested reinforcements to protect Khartoum. The siege of Khartoum was initiated by the Mahdi on March 13, 1884, and lasted until the fall of the city on January 26, 1885. Though the Mahdi had ordered that General Gordon be captured alive, Gordon, along with his troops and about 4,000 citizens, died. The British reinforcements, the Nile Expedition under Lord Garnet Joseph Wolseley, arrived two days later. On June 22, 1885, Muhammad Ahmad died after a short illness. After the death of Muhammad Ahmad, one of his closest companions, Abdallahi Ibn Muhammad (1846–1899), became the sole caliph, the successor to the Mahdi. The caliphate set up by Muhammad Ahmad followed an idiosyncratic version of Islamic law, with music, tobacco, and alcohol prohibited and the covering of women, fasting during Ramadan, and community prayers rigidly enforced. The Mahdist Revolution was effectively ended with the defeat of the Mahdist army at the Battle of Omdurman on September 2, 1898, by British forces led by General Sir Herbert Kitchener. R. Don Deal

520  Maimonides (1138–1204) See also Mahdi Further Reading Berman, Richard. The Mahdi of Allah: A Drama of the Sudan. New York: Macmillan, 1932. Clarke, John Henrik. “Muhammed Ahmed, (The Mahdi) Messiah of the Sudan.” Journal of Negro Education 30, no. 2 (Spring 1961): 156–62. Fradin, Murray. JIHAD: The Mahdi Rebellion in the Sudan. New York: Authors Choice, 1965. Furnish, Timothy. Holiest Wars: Islamic Mahdis, Their Jihads, and Osama Bin Laden. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005. Voll, John. “The Sudanese Mahdi: Frontier Fundamentalist.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 10, no. 2 (May, 1979): 145–66.

Maimonides (1138–1204) Moses Maimonides wrote about war and corollary matters in both his legal and communal works. His viewpoint was shaped by rabbinic sources; the broader Islamic context in Spain, North Africa, and the land of Israel in which he lived and traveled; and his personal experience under the oppressive rule of the Almohad regime in Spain and Morocco. Although he often strives for typological coherence in his writings, such coherence eludes him in his discussion of the justification and function of war. Indeed, one may find contradictions between his legal works, for example, the Book of Commandments, and the Mishneh Torah. Maimonides held that the basis for all war was ideological. Thus, even though he places much of the law of war in the section of his legal code devoted to royal behavior (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings and Their Wars/Hilkhot Melakhim u-Milh.amotehem), he explains in the Mishneh Torah 4:10 that the aim of war should be to “uplift the true religion, to fill the world with righteousness, to break the arm of the wicked, and to fight the battles of the Lord.” This is emphasized by the role of the priest in addressing the troops before battle (cf. Deuteronomy 20:3–4; Book of Commandments, Positive Commandment #191 and Negative Commandment #58). Yet he also deals with practical aspects of war in this section of his legal code, including explaining that a king may levy taxes to support his war

effort (Laws of Kings and Their Wars 4:1). Although he takes on the structure of obligatory war (Milhemet Misvah) and discretionary war (Milhemet Reshut) from his Talmudic predecessors, the requirement of a Great Sanhedrin (Jewish court) of 71 members and a high priest rules out the category of a discretionary war—including preemptive strikes. Yet he takes a broad view of obligatory war, incorporating both the definitions of the Babylonian Talmud— to wit, the wars of Canaanite conquest and wars to root out Amalek—and of the Talmud of the land of Israel—to wit, defensive war. It is also his innovation to include wars against idolatry in the category of obligatory war—an inclusion that scholars have attributed to Maimonides’s Islamic context. The force of broadening the category of obligatory wars and removing the category of discretionary wars may be to rule out wars fought by the king for dynastic or personal reasons. If the ultimate aim of war is to encourage righteousness and root out idolatry, the ultimate aim of his Laws of Kings is establishing righteous governance, and so much is made of the king’s authority. This explains the importance of the king’s ability to instill fear and respect in the population and to suppress rebellion. In the event that a war is understood to contravene divine law, however, Maimonides reserves the right of the citizen to protest it. Maimonides expands biblical and Talmudic laws governing conduct in war, eschewing the sorts of violence that often follow a successful siege. The prohibition of destroying a vanquished enemy’s fruit-bearing trees is enlarged to include nearly any form of ransacking with destructive intent under the rubric of the commandment “do not destroy” (Laws of Kings and Their Wars 6:10). Most difficult to discern, perhaps, is the influence of the Almohad environment on Maimonides’s writings. Some scholars claim that Maimonides’s insistence that Jews are responsible for the universal acceptance of the Noahide Laws—even if compulsion is required to affect this—was born of his experience under these “extreme monotheists.” The Laws of Kings and Their Wars gives prominence to fighting offensive wars in the name of God or to establish the unity of God, principles that also appear in the corresponding Islamic legal literature on jihad, but we cannot determine with certainty which (if any) of his contemporaries’ Islamic legal works he read. Phil Lieberman

Malta, Siege of (1565)  521 See also Judaism and War; Milhemet Misvah; Milhemet Reshut; Talmud and War Further Reading Blidstein, Gerald J. “Holy War in Maimonidean Law.” In Joel L. Kraemer, ed. Perspectives on Maimonides: Philosophical and Historical Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Stern, Josef. “Maimonides on Wars and Their Justification.” Journal of Military Ethics 11, no. 3 (2012): 245–63. Walzer, Michael. “War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition.” In Terry Nardin, ed. The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. Wilkes, George R. “Religious War in the Works of Maimonides: An Idea and Its Transit Across the Medieval Mediterranean.” In Sohail H. Hashimi, ed. Just Wars, Holy Wars, and Jihads: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Encounters and Exchanges. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Malta, Siege of (1565) The Siege of Malta was the climactic event in the 16thcentury contest between the maritime Christian powers of the Mediterranean and the Ottoman Empire for control of the central Mediterranean. The Ottoman forces were ordered to take the island by Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent near the end of his long reign. The sultan, far removed from the dramatic conquests of his early reign, had retreated from worldly affairs following the death of his wife Hurrem. Süleyman was increasingly under the influence of his pious daughter Mirhimah. The decision to destroy the Knights of St. John and seize their base at Malta may have been a result of successful operations by the order’s galleys, including the capture of ships belonging to court officials, resulting in the internment of members of the sultan’s household. The siege lasted from May 18 until the invading army withdrew on September 11 following the landing of Christian reinforcements on the island. Malta was the home of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, also known as the Knights Hospitallers, a military order of Christian knights originally founded in the mid-11th century to care for sick and injured pilgrims in the Holy Land. The order evolved into a military organization during the First Crusade. Following the Muslim reconquest of

the Levant, the order moved first to Rhodes and, following the Ottoman capture of that island, to Malta. The grand master of the order from 1557 until his death three years after the siege, Jean Parisot de La Valette, was a veteran of more than half a century of combat against the Turks. He fought during the Siege of Rhodes, served as captain of one of the order’s galleys, was captured by the Barbary corsairs, was forced to serve as a galley slave, and eventually rose to command the order’s fleet of galleys before becoming grand master. He retained his dedication to his Catholic faith throughout all these ordeals. While contemporary sources vary, the forces under the command of La Valette numbered between 6,000 and 8,500, roughly half of whom were Maltese men with limited training. Approximately 500 defenders were members of the order while the balance were funded by Spain and drawn from the Spanish tercios (highly disciplined infantry), soldiers assigned to the Spanish galleys, Italian troops in Spanish employ, and exiles from Greece and Macedonia. With the exception of roughly 500 galley slaves, the Christian forces enjoyed a significant cohesion based on the Catholic faith. The invading force shared the multiethnic character of the empire it served. It included adventurers from across the Mediterranean, not all of whom shared the devout objectives proclaimed by the court. Estimates of the size of the invading force range from 22,000 to 48,000 troops. Assessment crediting the lower numbers is based on Turkish archives and includes only those forces sent from the East, failing to include the large numbers of corsairs and other adventurers from the western reaches of the empire. The most widely accepted figure places the force at 30,000 troops, augmented by galley slaves. This force included 6,000 members of the elite janissary corps, an infantry force recruited from Christian boys who were converted to Islam and raised in military barracks. While this organization would become hereditary and corrupt following the “reforms” instituted by Süleyman’s successor, Selim II, at the time of the siege, it was a formation marked by powerful internal cohesion born in part of religious fervor. This infantry force was complemented by a somewhat larger force of sipahis, a cavalry force split between the household troops of the sultan and provincially raised troops. The balance of the Ottoman force consisted of “volunteers” from around the empire, many lured by the promise of

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spoils as much as politico-religious objectives. The religious composition of the force reflected the diversity of confession across Islam in the regions from which the troops were drawn. Some of the troops were not Muslims at all. Following the successful initial landings, the battle revolved around the attempts to reduce the defenses surrounding the protected harbors on the east coast of the island. Two long inlets were divided by a central promontory on which sat Fort Saint Elmo. The promontory to the north was undefended. To the south, flanking the best deep water harbor, lay the fortresses of Senglea and Saint Angelo. Inland, the old walled city of Mdina, which had served as the traditional refuge of the Maltese people, was lightly garrisoned, although the troops at this location included the limited contingent of Christian cavalry. The attacking Turkish army deemed Fort Saint Elmo to be the key to the defenses. Upon landing, Turkish forces moved quickly against Fort Saint Elmo. The leaders estimated that the fortress could be taken in four or five days with minimal casualties. After 10 days, the attackers had taken only one of the outer works. While this loss compromised the fortress, La Valette was determined to hold the main works for as long as possible while the two remaining fortresses were strengthened. Initially, appeals to soldiers’ traditional appetites, money and wine, bolstered the defense. As the Turks fortified the ravelin and mounted cannons pointed into the fortress, such measures declined in utility. The transfer of a charismatic preacher and the decision by several devout knights to volunteer to transfer to the doomed fort stiffened the will of the defenders. By the time the fort was taken, one month had passed and half of the janissaries were dead. Throughout July the Turkish forces raced against time as a large Christian relief force was massing in Sicily. Continuing to press forward in spite of heavy losses, breaches were made in the walls of the final fortress on August 7 and the Christian position appeared doomed. The grand master, embodying both martial and religious authority, appeared along the walls to inspire the defenders. The routine Christian cavalry patrol from Mdina was mistaken by the attackers for the arrival of the relief force. Unable to muster an effective assault during the next month, Turkish forces

were forced to withdraw by the arrival of the actual relief force on September 8 with the last invaders driven to their boats three days later. The siege was a seminal event. It raised fears of Turkish expansion even among such devoutly Protestant Christians as England’s Queen Elizabeth I. Almost two centuries later, even adversaries of the Catholic Church like Voltaire recognized the significance of the victory. Important effects were also felt within the Ottoman Empire. The heavy losses among the janissaries forced Süleyman’s successor, Selim II, to accede to their demands upon his succession. By granting rights of marriage and hereditary succession to these troops, the effectiveness, internal cohesion, and devout character of this key body of household troops was changed forever. K. J. Delamer See also Knights Templar; Ottoman Empire; Süleyman the Magnificent Further Reading Bradford, Ernle. The Great Siege: Malta, 1565. London: Open Road Integrated Media, 2014. Crowley, Roger. Empires of the Sea: The Siege of Malta, the Battle of Lepanto, and the Contest for the Center of the World. New York: Random House, 2008. Francesco Balbi di Correggio. The Siege of Malta, 1565. Translated by Ernle Bradford. London: Boydell Press, 2011. Murphey, Rhoads. Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999.

Manichaeism and War Manichaeism, a dualistic religion that developed in the third-century Persian Empire, was rooted in a narrative of cosmic war between good (light) and evil (dark). This mission-oriented religion, which contained elements of Judaism, Christianity (including gnostic versions of Christianity), Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism, as well as the new revelations of Mani, its founder, spread as far west as Rome and North Africa and as far east as China, Manchuria, and Siberia. Most recent scholars, working with the advantage of access to Manichaean documents newly discovered in the 20th century (especially the Cologne Mani Codex, found in Egypt) take the position that Christianity was the

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most important component of Manichaeism. Although Manichaeism disappeared from the West after the sixth century, its existence in China, despite persecution there after the mid-ninth century, continued until the 1600s. Later dualistic Christian heresies in the medieval period, such as Bogomilism and Catharism (Albigensianism) share some theological similarities with Manichaeism. Mani (born in 216 in Mesopotamia) grew up in a family of Elkaisite Christians, followers of a Jewish form of Christianity, and in the 240s traveled in India. After experiencing revelations (which he believed to be from his heavenly twin, the Paraclete [see Gospel of John 14:16]) in his youth, he believed he had been commissioned to complete the partial revelations of earlier apostles/prophets, going back to Adam’s son Seth and including Zoroaster, the Buddha, Jesus, and others. Mani and his writings (in Aramaic) had the support of the Persian rulers for 30 years, but later opposition from the Zoroastrian priesthood resulted in his execution (or death from mistreatment in prison) in 276 or 277 and the persecution of his followers. When Manichaeism spread into the Roman Empire, it was frequently persecuted by the government because it was a new religion from the Persian Empire, the rival power to the east with which the Roman Empire was often at war. From the perspective of Christian theologians (and later Christian Roman emperors upholding orthodox Christian theology), Manichaeism was dangerous because of both its similarities to Christianity and its significant differences (Manichaeism rejected monotheism, the goodness of the material creation, the Old Testament, and the orthodox interpretation of the New Testament, including the humanity of Jesus and his salvific mission). Of the many anti-Manichaean Christian writers, Augustine of Hippo (who had been a Manichaean himself as a young man) was the most influential. Later, under Islam, Manichaeism was also criticized and sometimes persecuted. In the Manichaean worldview, in the beginning the eternal good principle, God, called the Father of Greatness, ruled over the realm of light, the divine substance; the eternal evil principle, matter, sometimes called Satan, ruled over the separate realm of darkness. When the evil principle discovered the existence of the realm of light, he tried to capture it. Therefore the Father of Greatness brought forth, through a complex process, the Primal Human

(made of light), to defend light against darkness. Darkness, however, defeated the Primal Human and seized his light, and some of the evil demons were taken prisoner by the light. Now that light (good) and dark (evil) were mixed together, the Father of Greatness created the material world as part of his long-term plan to rescue the particles of light and restore them to their true home in his realm. The evil principle fought back by creating (through the sexual intercourse of demons) the first material humans, Adam and Eve, who were designed to (unknowingly) keep the light particles within the material world through the process of human reproduction. The good principle then sent a nonphysical Jesus to teach humans the truth of the relationship of good and evil and the way to rescue the particles of light from their imprisonment in matter. This rescue mission was the principal responsibility of the Elect (the leaders) of the Manichaean religion. The Elect carried out their role in this cosmic war through peaceful means: an ascetic lifestyle centered on spreading the teachings of the religion and consuming light-filled vegetarian food (fruit, grain, vegetables, and spices). When light-filled foods are eaten and digested, the particles of light are set free to return to the realm of light via the sun and moon (the waxing phases of the moon indicate the increasing numbers of particles of light gathered together to await the next stage of the journey). The Hearers, the majority of Manichaeans, had a less ascetic lifestyle than the Elect, who were required to pray seven times daily, observe many fasts, refrain from all killing (even the harvesting of crops, which meant that the Hearers needed to take responsibility for providing all the food for the Elect), and renounce sexual relations and the ownership of personal property. Hearers expected to be reborn as Elect in their next life. Manichaeans looked ahead to a distant future in which the Elect have rescued most (but not all) of the light. Then the defeated evil principle will be sent back into its separate realm (depicted as a pit with a stone on top) to be enclosed there forever. Light will have won the war, but at the cost of the eternal loss of some of its own light-substance. Manichaeism’s most powerful attraction was probably its ability to explain the presence of evil in the world without attributing any blame to the good God and its presentation of a method of involving everyone in the battle against evil. Nancy Weatherwax

524  Manifest Destiny See also Augustine Further Reading Augustine of Hippo. Confessions. Translation and notes by Henry Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. (See especially Books III–V, written from the critical perspective of a former Manichaean, now a Catholic Christian theologian and bishop.) Baker-Brien, Nicholas J. Manichaeism: An Ancient Faith Rediscovered. London and New York: T & T Clark International, 2011. Gardner, Iain, and Samuel N. C. Lieu. Manichaean Texts from the Roman Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Lieu, Samuel N. C. Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China: A Historical Survey. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985.

Manifest Destiny Manifest Destiny was a slogan adopted by supporters of westward expansion in the United States, which first surfaced in 1845 to suggest the inevitability of the nation’s extension to the Pacific Ocean through the acquisition of the Oregon Territory and northern Mexico. Such expansion was viewed by many at the time as being providential in addition to being inevitable. The phrase returned to prominence later in the 19th century as America’s western ambitions pushed beyond the continent toward Hawaii and the Philippines. In the 20th and 21st centuries the term has found common, if often vague, application as an epithet for American imperialism, particularly the perceived mandate to spread democracy through diplomatic or military intervention abroad. The phrase first appeared without much notice in the summer 1845 edition of John L. O’Sullivan’s United States Magazine and Democratic Review, coined by either O’Sullivan himself or his associate Jane McManus Storm in an anonymous article supporting the annexation of the Republic of Texas. A second, more celebrated usage occurred in O’Sullivan’s December 27, 1845, editorial for the New York Morning News, which defended the U.S. claim to Oregon by asserting that it was the nation’s “manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the

continent.” From this point “manifest destiny” quickly became shorthand for the expansionist creed. Its adherents believed the United States to hold a naturally, or even divinely endowed title to America’s western reaches, for the purpose of spreading democratic freedom and increasing the scale of a world-transforming model in republican government. Despite its seemingly ephemeral origins as an editorial comment on pressing concerns of the day, Manifest Destiny has been a lasting subject of fascination for genealogists of ideas. Some historians have seen it as Jacksonian America’s rendition of the translatio imperii, the ancient theory of civilization’s westward progress most famously summarized in George Berkeley’s 1726 verse, “Westward the course of empire takes its way.” Albert Weinberg, author of the classic work on the subject, traced it to a sense of “geographical predestinarianism” already evident in the late colonial and early national periods. Others have reached back even further, perceiving its roots in the Puritan notion of redemptive colonization. Scholars have also taken interest in Manifest Destiny’s theological underpinnings, especially the extent to which the doctrine may be connected to longstanding speculations that America would play a special role in the advent of Christ’s millennial kingdom. It is likely not a coincidence that the phrase emerged shortly after millennial expectations had reached their antebellum peak. Correlations between Manifest Destiny and varieties of Protestant millennialism should not be exaggerated, however. Opponents of westward expansion, antislavery Protestants in particular, often employed rhetoric just as apocalyptic as that of its supporters; U.S. Roman Catholics, meanwhile, despite their wariness of Protestant eschatology, generally embraced a modified version of the theory of divinely ordained expansion. Manifest Destiny’s manifold religious foundations cohered in the simple conviction that providence had appointed the United States a widening sphere of geographic influence for the good of humanity. By the time of the Spanish-American War, explicitly Christian justifications for the doctrine had largely given way to racial and civilizational conceits. A nebulous sense of divine commissioning endured—and arguably still endures—despite the lack of a coherent national theology. Andrew N. Denton

Mansurah, Battles of (1221 and 1250)  525 See also Mexican-American War, Religious Dimensions of; SpanishAmerican War, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Haynes, Sam W., and Christopher Morris, eds. Manifest Destiny and Empire: Antebellum American Expansionism. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997. Merk, Frederick. Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963. Stephanson, Anders. Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995. Tuveson, Ernest Lee. Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America’s Millennial Role. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. Weinberg, Albert K. Manifest Destiny. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1935.

Mansurah, Battles of (1221 and 1250) Mansurah, Egypt, also known as Al Mansurah, was the site of two battles between Christian crusaders and Muslims. The first occurred in 1221 and ended the Fifth Crusade, and the second took place in 1250, leading to the capture of King Louis IX of France, the end of the Seventh Crusade, and the end of all major military efforts to reclaim Jerusalem and the Middle East from Islam.

Battle of Mansurah (1221)

The Fifth Crusade was a Christian attempt to reclaim Jerusalem—captured by the Muslim ruler Saladin in 1187—by attacking Egypt, which was the center of Muslim power in the Middle East in the early 13th century. In November 1219, after a siege lasting more than a year, a Christian army captured the Egyptian port of Damietta. Although the Egyptian sultan Al-Kamil offered to restore Jerusalem to the Christians in exchange for Damietta, Cardinal Pelagius of Albano, the papal legate, who had been sent to take charge of the Egyptian campaign in 1219 by Pope Honorius III, refused the offer. This decision angered some of the lay leaders of the crusade, such as William, count of Holland, who returned home. John of Brienne, recognized by the crusaders as king of Jerusalem, also left the crusade over a dispute as to who should control

Damietta. In July 1221, after waiting in vain for more than a year for the promised arrival of Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II and his army, Pelagius, now rejoined by John of Brienne, led the crusader army southward toward Cairo. Against John’s recommendation, Pelagius, on July 24, took the crusaders down to a narrow sliver of land bounded by two branches of the Nile. In August, the flooding of the Nile blocked the crusaders’ advance. When a small canal to their rear flooded, the crusaders also found themselves cut off from Damietta. As the Christians began a forced withdrawal, Al-Kamil, who had been joined by Mulim forces from Syria, launched a night attack on August 30 at Mansurah that led to the death or capture of many of the crusaders. Al-Kamil demanded the restoration of Damietta in return for release of the captives, but agreed to an eight-year truce and to return the piece of the True Cross that had been lost at the Battle of Hattin in 1187. The crusaders withdrew from Egypt, ending the Fifth Crusade, but the piece of the True Cross was never returned because Al-Kamil had never possessed the relic.

Battle of Mansurah (1250)

The 1250 Battle of Mansurah occurred during what is known as the First Crusade of French king Louis IX, as well as the Seventh Crusade. This particular battle was a significant victory for the Muslim sultan Turanshah and a decisive battle in the history of the crusades in that it ended Christian attempts to recapture Jerusalem. By the mid13th century, the crusaders understood that Egypt was the stronghold and arsenal of Muslim armies, and they believed that victory there would entail the collapse of Islamic strength elsewhere. Following the loss of Jerusalem to the Muslims in 1244, Louis IX of France vowed to take up the cross. As the grandson of Philip II Augustus, one of the leaders of the Third Crusade, Louis came from a family with a long crusading tradition. Louis assembled a mostly French army of 15,000 crusaders and 5,000 crossbowmen. His campaign was well organized, well financed, and well provisioned. The French church provided two-thirds of Louis’s funding, with onetwentieth of all offerings to French church coffers going to campaign expenses, a figure that increased to 10 percent after a year. In June 1249, Louis captured the Nile delta town of Damietta after only light Muslim resistance, which

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was a result of the imminent death of the sultan and the likelihood of a succession struggle. With Damietta as a base, Louis began his southward march to Cairo, while the Muslim forces retreated before him to Mansurah, which by this time had become a semipermanent military base. In January 1250, Turanshah, who had consolidated his position as the new sultan, reached Mansurah with his elite Mamluk troops. Turanshah’s army at Mansurah was now upward of 70,000 men, and thus much larger than the approaching crusader force. Louis IX and his crusaders advanced to Mansurah in good order and, with the help of a local Coptic Christian, found a ford across the canal that separated them from the Muslim army. On February 8, 1250, Louis got a portion of his army across the canal, but this vanguard, commanded by Louis’s brother Robert of Artois, rashly attacked the Muslim camp before the rest of the army had crossed the canal. The crusaders quickly overran the surprised camp, but the Muslims, led by the Mamluks, quickly regrouped, surrounded, and nearly wiped out the French vanguard. Louis, with only part of his army across the canal, was then fiercely assaulted by the Muslim forces. The king was eventually able to get back across the canal, but he was now heavily outnumbered and nearly surrounded. Attempting a fighting retreat to Damietta, the crusader forces dissolved. Many crusaders were killed or captured, including, among the latter, King Louis. Turanshah agreed to release Louis upon payment of a large ransom. Half of Louis’s ransom of 400,000 livres was paid immediately for his release; the other half was never paid. After regaining his freedom, Louis sailed to Acre, where he remained until 1254, helping rebuild crusader defense and conducting diplomacy on behalf of the remaining crusader ports. The Second Battle of Mansurah was a resounding defeat for the European Christian crusaders, with at least 15,000 French soldiers killed and thousands taken prisoner. The battle became a source of inspiration for Muslim writers and poets and the name Al Mansurah, meaning “the victorious,” though dating from an earlier period, continued to give pride and motivation to Muslims and Muslim warriors. Thomas E. Creely See also Eighth Crusade; True Cross

Further Reading Devries, Kelly, et al. Battles of the Crusades 1097–1444 from Doryleaum to Varna. New York: Metro Books, 2007. Madden, Thomas F., ed. Crusades. London: Duncan Baird, 2008. Riley-Smith, Jonathan, ed. The Atlas of the Crusades. New York: Swanston, 1990. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The Crusades: A Short History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987.

Manzikert, Battle of (1071) The Battle of Manzikert is one of the most important battles in medieval Islamic history. The battle occurred near the fortress of Malazgirt near Lake Van in eastern Turkey on August 26, 1071. The Muslim army was led by the Turkish sultan Alp Arslan (1063–1072), who defeated the Byzantine army led by Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes (1030–1072). It was the first time in the history of the long Muslim-Byzantine conflict that a Byzantine emperor was taken captive in battle. The Seljuk Turks had been leading a large federation of horse-mounted warriors from Mongolia and the steppes north of the Aral Sea and Transoxiana. The Seljuks managed to form a Turkmen empire led by Tughril I (r. 1038– 1063) in Central Asia and the territory of modern Iran. The Seljuks also controlled the seat of the Sunni Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad in 1055. Tughril’s successor and nephew, Alp Arslan, expanded westward, claiming to fight the Shiite Fatimid caliphate in Syria and Egypt, and capturing Aleppo and Jerusalem in 1070. Despite severe famine and a civil war in Egypt, which had been ongoing since 1064, Alp Arslan moved to threaten the Byzantines at the same time that the Byzantine emperor Romanos IV Diogenes had marched eastward in Anatolia to defend his territories from the Seljuk threat. The Byzantine army, according to Byzantine historians, was composed of 100,000 soldiers, while the Muslim historians have reported that this army was much larger. The Byzantine army of this time was composed of diverse ethnic groups, including Greeks, Russians, Armenians, Abkhaz, Franks, Georgians, and even some Muslim Turkmen mercenaries. The Muslim chroniclers count the Muslim Seljuks as having had only 15,000 soldiers present for battle.

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The Byzantine emperor dispatched his commander, Joseph Tarchaneiotes, with a large force mainly of Russian soldiers to secure Akhlat, west of Lake Van, while Romanos himself advanced with some 65,000 soldiers from the city of Theodousiopolis (Erzurum). There were some skirmishes between Alp Arslan’s forces and Joseph Tarchaneiotes, but no heavy losses were suffered by either side. Alp Arslan knew he was outnumbered and had no time to send for military help from his empire in the east. After the fortress of Manzikert was secured by Emperor Romanos, he was contacted by Sultan Alp Arslan, who sent an envoy proposing a truce between the two sides. Alp Arslan was facing a large, sophisticated military force that possessed sophisticated weaponry. In fact, Muslim historians such as Ibn al-Athir and al-Isfahani wrote in admiration of the caliber of the Byzantine weapons and siege engines, like the mangonel, some of which needed more than 1,000 soldiers to operate. Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes, however, refused the truce with Alp Arslan and made it clear that he planned to invade the heartland of the Seljuk Empire. Despite having offered a truce, and because Romanos refused it, on August 26, 1071, the two armies were engaged in full confrontation at Manzikert. The light Turkmen horsemen, with their traditional hit and run tactics, managed to destroy the right wing of the Byzantine army, which eventually led to the defeat of the entire Byzantine force and the capture of the Byzantine emperor with his bodyguards. The outcome of the battle had profound effects on Muslim-Byzantine relations. Between 1071 and 1080, the demography of Anatolia changed due to the influx of Turkmen tribes from Central Asia into Anatolia, reaching westward to Nicaea. The Greek-Armenian population of the area was pushed further and further west. In 1081, the Seljuks had founded a Turkish kingdom in Konya which lasted until 1307—an empire that would eventually become the Ottoman Empire. The Byzantine emperor Alexius Komnenos (1081–1118) had written to Prince Robert of Flanders in 1088 urging him for military assistance against the Turks who were getting closer to the Byzantine capital of Constantinople. The Byzantine Empire tried to reverse the consequences of the Battle of Manzikert at the Battle of Myriocephalon in 1176 near Lake Egridir, but were defeated by the Seljuk sultan Qilij Arslan II. The

traditional frontiers between the Byzantines and the various Muslim dynasties since the seventh century had been the Taurus Mountains and the upper Euphrates, but after Manzikert were shifted to the heartlands of Anatolia. As a result, Manzikert was the harshest defeat inflected on the Byzantine Empire, surpassed only by the capture of Constantinople in 1204 by the Fourth Crusade and then again by the Ottomans in 1453. Taef Kamal El-Azhari See also Byzantine-Seljuk Wars; Constantinople, Arab Sieges of; Fourth Crusade; Ottoman Empire Further Reading Bryer, Anthony. Manzikert to Lepanto: The Byzantine World and the Turks, 1071–1571: Papers Given at the Nineteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, March 1985. New York: ACLS History E-Book Project, 2008. Carey, Brian Todd, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Road to Manzikert: Byzantine and Islamic Warfare, 527–1071. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Press, 2012. Catherwood, Christopher. A Brief History of the Middle East. London: Constable & Robinson, 2011. Donner, F. Early Islamic Conquests. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Hillenbrand, Carole. Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. Nicolle, David. Manzikert 1071: The Breaking of Byzantium. Oxford: Osprey, 2013. O’Shea, Stephen. Sea of Faith: Islam and Christianity in the Medieval Mediterranean World. New York: Walker, 2006. Peacock, A. C. S. Early Saljuk History: A New Interpretation. London: Routledge, 2010.

Maronites and War The Maronites are the dominant Christian sect in Lebanon and are the oldest Eastern Catholic entity in the Roman Church. Estimates indicate that Maronites currently comprise about 20 percent of the total population (not including Syrian refugees) and half of the total Christian population in Lebanon. Three million Maronites are estimated to live in diaspora around the world. The term Maronite derives from a fourth-century monk named Mar Marun whose followers

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created the Maronite sect and migrated in the following centuries to the area of their base at Bsharre in the Qadisha Valley of Lebanon. The Maronites oriented toward the West, having supported the Christian forces of the crusades. They achieved union with the Catholic Church in 1584 when the Maronite patriarch recognized the supremacy of the Vatican. Maronites flourished in recent centuries, becoming well established in the mountainous areas of Lebanon. The Druze, an ethnic and religious community whose faith has roots in Ismaili Shi’ism and other monotheistic philosophies, lived in proximity to the Maronites. As the Maronites expanded and became increasingly successful, competition between the Maronites and the Druze led to conflict in the 1860s, prompting French intervention to protect and guarantee that Maronite rights were respected. Following the cessation of hostilities, the Lebanon region was granted autonomy under a Christian governor by its Ottoman rulers, with political, economic, and judicial assignments based upon religious affiliation. This arrangement created the founding principle of the National Pact of 1943, an unwritten contract that institutionalized power sharing based upon religious identification to stabilize relations between Lebanon’s 18 religious communities. The National Pact granted the presidency to the Maronites, a position that consolidated Maronite dominance in the political, security, and economic life of the state. The position of prime minister is guaranteed for a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of Parliament is reserved for a Shiite Muslim, and the Christian-Muslim balance of parliamentary seats and government positions is based on a 5:5 ratio (before 1990, it was 6:5). Because of the pervasive sectarian system of governance, Lebanon has failed to develop a unified national identity in political, administrative, judicial, and military spheres. Politicians function as representatives of their religious communities rather than as representatives of the nation or of the districts that elected them. In addition, sectarian authority has allowed powerful families in the religious communities to retain power and influence, and it has encouraged the salience of external interests in domestic politics. Since independence, the Maronite orientation toward the West has proved to be an irritant in relationships with

the Muslim and Druze communities, who have generally leaned toward Syria, Iran, or the Arab world. The creation of Israel and the influx of more than 300,000 Palestinian refugees into Lebanon exacerbated sectarian pressures. The Palestinians were granted autonomy in political and security affairs by the Cairo Agreement of 1969, allowing them increased power and consequent Israeli and Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs. Palestinians continue to play a role in Lebanese politics, notwithstanding the repeal of the Cairo Agreement in 1987 and the expansion of Shiite power in the post–Civil War era. Divisions within the church hierarchy and between the predominant Maronite families complicate an understanding of the Maronite role in Lebanese society and politics. During the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1989), the patriarch worked to protect the Maronites while, at the same time, supporting the Vatican’s objectives in Lebanon to maintain Christian-Muslim dialogue, retain the National Covenant of 1943, and defend Palestinians from further injustice. However, the Maronite patriarch’s authority has been weakened by its divergence from the church hierarchy, which aligned more with the Maronite militias to support Lebanese nationalism and oppose the Palestinians. Influential Maronite families and their followers comprise another significant element of the Maronite power structure, and these families’ fluid alliances based on shifting and at times opportunistic considerations contribute to the complexity of understanding Maronite positions in conflict. Such changing allegiances have occurred in response to power struggles between Muslim and Christian forces, so that at varying times, prominent Maronites have aligned with Syria, Israel, the United States, and Hezbollah to meet their political and military objectives. For example, one of the most powerful of these is the Gemayel family, and its para-military party, the Phalange, has been a dominant political and military force since its founding in 1937. The Phalange stood for an independent Lebanon in opposition to integration with the Arab world, as well as centralization, law and order, and private enterprise. Its associated political party, al-Kataeb, played a controversial role in the Civil War when its leader Bashir Gemayel (assassinated in 1982) aligned with Israel against the Palestinians. Another powerful Maronite warlord and former president, Suleiman Franjiyah, invited the Syrians

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to intervene in Lebanon in 1975, following bloody clashes between the militias of the Phalange-led Lebanese Front with the Lebanese National Movement (led by Druze Kamal Jumblatt at the head of a coalition of Socialist, Communist, and other left-leaning parties). After the Civil War, Franjiyah continued to be active in politics, forming the pro-Syrian National Salvation Front with Sunni and Druze leaders Rashid Karami and Walid Jumblatt. There is General Michel Aoun, a fixture in Lebanese politics for decades. He currently heads the Free Patriotic Movement, one of the largest blocs in Parliament. He was prime minister from 1988 to 1990, during a period when two rival governments competed for legitimacy as the Civil War was ending. He opposed Syrian intervention in Lebanon in the post–Civil War period, going into exile in Paris in 1990 when the Syrians invaded Lebanon and returning upon their departure in 2005. However, with the Syrian Civil War raging, Michel Aoun signed agreements with Hezbollah in support of the al-Assad government. Opponents have alleged that this could have been based on personal political opportunism or as a bid to counter rising radical Sunni forces. These complex internal and external forces have combined with the failure to create an integrated national identity to produce intermittent violence. The first incidence of post-1943 conflict came in 1958, when President Camille Chamoun, head of another powerful Maronite family, refused to break relations with the Western powers in the aftermath of the Suez crisis and made statements supportive of the Bagdad Pact, a mutual defense treaty backed by the United States. Armed Muslim elements funded by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser caused unrest in Lebanon, prompting the Phalange to take up arms against them. A full-scale civil war was imminent. Meanwhile, in an unpopular move, President Chamoun proposed amending the constitution to allow him an unprecedented second term, but then became apprehensive when the pro-Western Iraqi monarch and prime minister were overthrown in a bloody coup d’état in July 1958. Fearing a similar fate, Chamoun called upon President Eisenhower to intervene to protect the Maronites and his presidency. The conflict was defused within three months when Chamoun agreed to step down at the end of his term, and General Fuad Chehab, a compromise candidate, took office.

Full-scale civil war broke out in 1975, caused by a mix of local, regional, and international factors. Within Lebanon, demographic changes, including the expanding Muslim population and Palestinian presence, socioeconomic problems, and internal tensions within the Maronite church led to conflict. The Arab defeats of 1967 and 1973 and growing Israeli power and influence contributed to Lebanon becoming a platform for conflict over Israel, oil, and Cold War competition in the Middle East. Clashes between the Phalange militia and the Palestinians in the wake of a violent demonstration in Sidon created the immediate spark that ignited the Civil War. A spiral of further demonstrations prompted militias to arm and commence the fight. There were three interrelated feuds during the 15-year war: inter-Christian competition for dominance, inter-Lebanese conflict between the various sects, and Lebanese-Palestinian rivalry for influence. The Shiites had been a dormant, disadvantaged minority, squeezed between the Maronites and Sunni Muslim communities. Civil war gave them an opportunity to coalesce around Hezbollah with the support of Syria and Iran. Key Shiite positions included a unified Lebanon aligned with the Arab world, solidarity with the Palestinians, and antipathy toward Israel. The Syrian army entered Lebanon in June 1976, in response to the invitation of President Suleiman Franjiyah to restore peace and contain the Palestinians. The MaroniteSyrian alliance lasted about two years, after which concern over growing Syrian influence prompted Bashir Gemayel to involve Israel as a counterbalance to the Palestinians. Israel began intervening in Lebanon in 1978, and it launched a full-scale invasion in June 1982, ostensibly in response to an assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London. In September, then president-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated by a Maronite member of the Syrian National Socialist Party. Days later, elements of the Phalange militia murdered up to 3,500 Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in retribution for Gemayel’s assassination. Later investigation showed that Israeli forces stood by while the massacre ensued, embarrassing the Israeli government and ultimately influencing the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Beirut. The Civil War devolved into a 15-year nationwide brawl, with an estimated 120,000–150,000 people killed, tens of

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thousands displaced, and upwards of one million Lebanese emigrants who fled to safety abroad. It left the Lebanese economy and infrastructure close to ruin. The Civil War ended in 1989 with the Ta’if Agreement, an initiative of the Arab League that reduced the power of the Maronite president, increased the authority of the Sunni prime minister, and rebalanced positions so the Maronite grip on political and economic dominance was loosened somewhat. Militias other than Hezbollah were disbanded; Hezbollah remained on the pretext that Israel still had occupying forces in southern Lebanon. With support from Syria and Iran, Hezbollah has become a powerful political and military force in Lebanon. The mainstream Maronite objectives in the Civil War were to retain dominance over Lebanese politics and to oppose constitutional reform of the sectarian balance of power. In hindsight, the Maronites failed to achieve these goals. The size of the Maronite population contracted by nearly 60 percent, Syria and its Lebanese allies weakened the Maronites militarily, and internal disagreements within the Maronite power structure crippled its effectiveness. Maronite influence in post–Civil War Lebanon has been diminished by a reduction in presidential powers and a rebalance in the equation of political positions. While the Maronites have retained sufficient political influence to place pressure on domestic affairs, divisions between the Maronite factions contribute to a lack of cohesion in Lebanese governance. Meanwhile, Syrian military occupation continued until its withdrawal in 2005. That year, alleged Syrian backing for the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri prompted severe domestic and international condemnation. Syria’s influence continues to be felt in its alliance with and support for Hezbollah, currently the dominant political power in Lebanon. Moreover, Iranian influence became apparent in Hezbollah’s provocation of Israel in 2006, which resulted in 1,000 Lebanese casualties. The Syrian Civil War erupted in 2011, with spillover to Lebanon in 2012. Armed clashes in Tripoli and Beirut occurred between Saudi-backed Sunnis and Iranian-backed Shiites. The proxy conflict has left the Maronites stuck in the middle. During 2014, lack of consensus on procedures for the next presidential election has prompted a government stalemate amidst fears of violence. The parliament

postponed presidential elections until 2017, and with Sunni prime minister Tammam Salam acting as interim president, the Maronites have less ability to influence political and security matters. Judith L. Katz See also Druze and War; Druze-Maronite Conflict Further Reading Hazran, Yusri. “The Confessionalism Triangle.” In Druze Community and the Lebanese State: Between Confrontation and Reconciliation. New York: Routledge, 2014. Schiff, Ze’ev, and Ya’ari, Ehud. Israel’s Lebanon War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. Shehadi, Nadim, and Mills, Dana Haffar. Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus. London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1992. Sisk, Timothy. Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011.

Mars, Roman God of War Mars is the name of the Roman god of war. Mars was different in character from Ares, the Greek god of war who was arbitrary and destructive. The object of Mars’s wars was peace, then prosperity. The Roman Ara Pacis (Altar of Peace) depicted Mars holding a spear topped by a laurel wreath, having obtained peace through victory. As father of Romulus, founder of Rome, Mars would protect Rome and its crops when publicly called upon by the priests of Mars: “Mars viglia” (Mars awaken!). He was considered second in importance only to Jupiter in the Roman pantheon. His festivals predominated in his namesake month of March—when planting and military campaigns commenced—and in October for harvest and the storage of weapons during winter. Mars’s importance to Rome grew over time. Emperor Augustus (r. 27 BCE–14 CE), under whom Rome transitioned from a republic to an empire and grew greatly in territory, especially emphasized the might and power of Mars. He erected the Mars Ultor (Mars the Avenger) temple to celebrate his victory over Julius Caesar’s assassins

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(44 BCE). It became central to Roman life during a time of worldwide conquest that also instituted the long-lived Pax Romana (Peace of Rome) that united the Mediterranean world during the life of Christ and the early church. Mars in modern times is the anthropomorphic representative of war and its ways in common discourse and literature. Shakespeare (King Richard II, Act II, Scene I) called England “This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars, This other Eden, demi-paradise, This fortress built by Nature for herself against infection and the hand of war,” thus entwining the martial and the pastoral as of old. The modern world features many references to Mars as convenient shorthand. These include the month of March; the martial arts; the names Marian, Marius, Mark, and Martin; and the blood-red planet, Mars. The Roman shieldand-spear logo of Mars has become the modern symbol of the male gender. H. G. Wells most famously evoked the embodiment of Mars in the fictional attack of Martians on Earth in The War of the Worlds. Mark A. Jumper See also Roman Army and Religion; Roman Religion, Mythology, and War Further Reading Dwight, W. A. Grecian and Roman Mythology. New York: George P. Putnam, 1849. Edmonson, J. C. Augustus: His Contributions to the Development of the Roman State in the Early Imperial Period. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. Fradenburgh, J. N. Departed Gods: The Gods of Our Fathers. Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe, 1891. Keazinan, Edward M. Peace and Peacemaking in Paul and the Greco-Roman World. New York: Peter Lang, 2014.

Martin of Tours (d. 397 CE) Martin of Tours was a Christian soldier-saint and ascetic bishop of late antiquity. Most of our knowledge of Martin comes from the biography written by Sulpicius Severus, an ascetic who visited Martin in the early 390s. Martin was born into a pagan family in Pannonia (Hungary), grew up in Pavia, Italy, and was early attracted to Christianity.

Unwillingly he followed his father into the army at the age of 15 as legally required. During his military service (which may have been only 5 years or as long as 20), he was baptized and lived as much as possible the life of an ascetic, following Christ’s teachings in Matthew 25 and giving nearly all his pay to the poor. The most famous (yet probably legendary) episode of Martin’s life took place outside Amiens, Gaul, when he cut his army cloak in half to divide it with a freezing beggar; that night in a dream, Christ appeared to him dressed in the beggar’s half of the cloak. Martin refused to fight, because he was a soldier of Christ and therefore not allowed to commit violence. He even offered to go unarmed into battle rather than bear arms. Since Martin’s army service took place after the legalization of Christianity in the Roman Empire, he was not forced, like the earlier soldiersaints, to choose martyrdom rather than participation in the imperial cult. After leaving military service, Martin, ordained an exorcist by Hilary of Poitiers, gained a reputation as a missionary and miracle worker (often doing combat against the devil, according to Sulpicius), defended Nicene Christianity against Arianism and paganism, became the first ascetic in Gaul, and later led what was probably the first ascetic community in Gaul. He became bishop of Tours ca. 372 and held that position for the rest of his life while continuing to live austerely in a cell. The choice of a popular but little educated ascetic of humble origins as bishop of a major city marked a radical break from the practice of drawing bishops from the ranks of Gallo-Roman aristocrats. Martin was disliked by many of his fellow bishops, who, according to Sulpicius, were jealous of his holiness. He pioneered the creation of rural parishes to evangelize outside the more Christianized cities. Martin protested the execution of Priscillian, bishop of Avila, in 386, because he opposed governmental intervention in the church. After his death, Martin was looked on as the protector of Tours (an example of the traditional Roman role of the aristocratic patron being transferred to the saints), and his tomb became a major pilgrimage shrine. Nancy Weatherwax Further Reading Gregory of Tours. The History of the Franks. Translated by Lewis Thorpe. New York: Penguin Books, 1974.

532  Martyrs, Jesuit Noble, Thomas F. X., and Thomas Head, eds. Soldiers of Christ: Saints and Saints’ Lives from Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.

Martyrs, Jesuit The vocation of martyrdom is an essential feature of the Jesuits, a religious body of men who called themselves companions of Christ and whose emblem IHS includes the cross and the three nails of the Passio Christi. In 1549, the Italian Antonio Criminale was the first Jesuit martyred at the hands of the people of Badagas, in South India. He was the first of many companions who was executed in the fulfillment of the distinguishing fourth Jesuit vow to be sent on mission at the commission of the pope for the greater glory of God, or “ad majorem dei gloriam.” From the onset, these men, who gave their lives for their faith in both the European religious wars and in their overseas missionary activities, were emulated as Ecclesiae militantis triumphi. As with other saints, these martyrs became part of the relics trade. While the Jesuit fathers disputed the bodily relics of the Italian Rodolfo Acquaviva and his four Portuguese companions Afonso Pacheco, António Francisco, Pedro Berna, and Francico Aranha, who had been killed in 1583 in Salsete of Goa, the faithful in Europe were still keen to acquire relics of them. In 1600, General Claudio Acquaviva eventually received the right arm of his nephew Rodolfo, a relic that can be still be revered at il Gesù, the Jesuit mother church in Rome. The other arm was taken in 1634 to the Jesuit College of Naples. In 1627, 25 martyrs, including the three Japanese Jesuits Paul Miki, Jacob Kisai, and John of Goto, who had been crucified in 1597 in Nagasaki, were declared blessed. Accordingly, a side altar was dedicated to them from the middle of the 17th century in Jesuit churches. All episodes of Jesuit martyrdom were subsumed, reproduced, and universalized as the society’s art and culture shortly after their occurrence. In 1583, the two books by the leader of the Catholic Church in England, Cardinal William Allan Parson (1532–1594) entitled Apologia Martyrum and Martyrium R. P. Edmundi Campiani S. J., written about the

first episodes of Jesuit martyrdom in England and also in Europe begun in 1581, were printed in Italy. Circignani adopted the illustrations of these books in his frescos of English martyrs in the College of St. Thomas in Canterbury in 1583. The Jesuits commissioned the depiction of frescoes on the walls of novitiates and colleges, and numerous engravings on the theme of pious suffering, which established a line of continuity with the earliest Christian martyrs. That was the case of the martyrdom of Ignatius of Azevedo and his companions by French Protestant Huguenots while at sea off the Canary Islands in 1570. The fact that there were 40 martyrs in this episode allowed a link to be established with the 40 martyrs of Sebaste killed in the Roman persecutions in the year 320 CE. The Jesuits commissioned all of the martyrdom illustrations depicted in Roman churches between the second half of the 16th and the second half of the 17th centuries. The illustrations at the novitiate of Saint Andrea al Quirinale that were probably begun as early as the 1560s and those at the church of Sant Tommaso di Canterbury dated 1583–1583 were the first commissions of considerable dimension representing various episodes of martyrdom in early modern Roman churches. In 1608, one year before the beatification of Jesuit founder Ignatius of Loyola, the German artist Johannes Bussemacher engraved a gallery of Jesuit martyrs illustrating 102 portraits of Jesuits who had been martyred between 1549 and 1606 arranged chronologically and geographically. These galleries, which were probably exclusive to the Jesuits, were specially produced to celebrate the beatification and canonization of Ignatius of Loyola and Francis Xavier. The subject was indeed stressed during the commemoration of the double canonization of these two Jesuit fathers. The decoration of the high chapel of il Gesú included pictures of all Jesuit martyrs. Indeed, the Jesuits were the Catholic order with the most martyrs falling for their faith both within and beyond Europe. The report written by the Bohemian Jesuit Mathias Tanner (1630–1692) and illustrated by the Augsburg engraver Melchior Küsel (1626–1683), Societas IESU usque ad sanguinis et vitae profusionem pro Deo, et Christiana Religione militans in omnibus Mundi partibus fortidunus suae trophea erigit (1675), is the more comprehensive report of martyrdom in early modern times, and it lists 304 Jesuit

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martyrs. Out of the 304 martyrs, 238 were killed outside Europe, of which 120 were killed in Asia, 68 in Africa, and 50 in America. Sixty-eight were killed in Europe. This work constitutes a detailed repertory of torture and martyrdom during the 16th and 17th centuries, as well as a list of the forms of torture and killing characteristic of the era in various parts of the globe. Being left nude under the snow, executed by submersion in a frozen lake, scalded in boiling water, or being buried in a pit and then fully covered with earth so to die by asphyxiation were apparently ways to meet the sweet death that were exclusive to the Japanese context. We also learn from Tanner’s report that the cadavers of those heroes were often quartered so as to avoid the formation of cult shrines at the places of their martyrdom. Understandably, Tanner attributed four entries to the blessed Japanese Jesuits. Tanner’s book symbolically combines the two areas where such episodes took place at the time: the European regions disputed by Catholics and Protestants, and the overseas missions. Tanner further fostered the devotion of Jesuits martyrs by emphasizing some virtues they may have embodied and which were part of the Christian conception of sainthood, such as noble ascendancy or being distinguished with visions. Tanner stressed the non-European nationality of the Japanese blessed martyrs, thereby emphasizing the international character of the Jesuits—the Society of Jesus. Cristina Osswald See also Jesuits; Primary Documents: Edicts Issued by the Japanese Shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa: “Closed Country Edict” (1635) and “Exclusion of the Portuguese Edict” (1639) Further Reading Boxer, Charles Ralph. The Christian Century in Japan: 1549–1650. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. Devine, E. J. Old Fort St. Marie: Home of the Jesuit Martyrs, 1639–1649. Whitefish, MT: Literary Licensing, 2013. Moran, J. F. The Japanese and the Jesuits: Alessandro Valignano in Sixteenth Century Japan. New York: Routledge, 1993. Tylenda, Joseph N. Jesuit Saints & Martyrs: Short Biographies of the Saints, Blessed, Venerables, and Servants of God of the Society of Jesus. Chicago: Loyola Press, 1998. Wynne, John J. The Jesuit Martyrs of North America: Isaac Joques, John de Brebeuf, Gabriel Lalemant, Noel Chabanel, Anthony Daniel, Charles Garnier, Rene Goupil, John Lalande. Whitefish, MT: Literary Licensing, 2013.

Županov, Ines G. Missionary Tropics: The Catholic Frontier in India (16th–17th Centuries). Lansing, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005.

Martyrs’ Mirror (1660) Martyrs’ Mirror of the Defenseless Christians who baptized only upon confession of faith, and who suffered and died for the testimony of Jesus, their Saviour, from the time of Christ to the year A.D. 1660, more commonly referred to as simply Martyrs’ Mirror, yet also known as The Bloody Theater, is a compendium of graphic testimonies of the persecution of Christians, particularly Anabaptists. The author, Thieleman J. van Braght, published the work in 1660 in Dutch in Holland. In 1685, a new edition of the book was produced that contained 100 illustrations etched in copper by Dutch artist Jan Luyken. Only 30 of these copper illustrations remain intact, and they are displayed at Bethel College in North Newton, Kansas. The work was translated into German from Dutch in 1745. During the French and Indian War, and subsequently from 1775 to 1783, Martyrs’ Mirror was the largest book printed in America. In 1837, an English translation by I. Daniel Rupp was printed by the publisher David Miller in Pennsylvania. The Handsard Knollys Society in England published their edition of Martyrs’ Mirror in 1850 in two volumes under the title A Martyrology of the Churches of Christ. In contradistinction to Foxe’s Book of Martyrs, Martyrs’ Mirror is a compendium of persecution of nonresistant Christians, as pacifism was a widely held interpretation of Matthew 5.39 and Luke 6.29 among Anabaptists (Matthew 5.39: “But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also”; Luke 6.29: “And unto him that smiteth thee on the one cheek offer also the other; and him that taketh away thy cloke forbid not to take thy coat also”). A common long-standing tradition in Amish and Mennonite circles (two branches of the Anabaptists) is to proffer newlywed couples a copy of Martyrs’ Mirror as a wedding gift. George Gatgounis See also Anabaptist Pacifism

534  Marx, Karl (1818–1883) Further Reading Braght, Thieleman Janszoon. The Bloody Theater: Or Martyrs Mirror of the Defenseless Christians. Whitefish, MT: Literary Licensing, 2011. Weimer, Adrian Chastain. Martyrs’ Mirror: Persecution and Holiness in Early New England. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Marx, Karl (1818–1883) Karl Marx was one of the revolutionary Socialist philosophers writing during the 19th century’s economically and politically momentous events of the Industrial Revolution and German unification. Together with Friedrich Engels and others, Marx developed his theory of communism, which remains an influential form of socialism into the 21st century. Because of communism and its guiding role in the establishment of Vladimir Lenin’s Soviet Union and Mao Tse-Tung’s People’s Republic of China (among other nation-states during the 20th century), Marx is arguably one of the most historically significant philosophers of all time. However, Marx’s impact extends beyond how his theories were posthumously used in statecraft. Along with figures like Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and W. E. B. DuBois, Marx was critical in the development of the social sciences as institutionalized disciplines. Marx’s role in the founding and early growth of sociology as an academic study, as well as economics, is particularly pronounced. Marx’s philosophical work was intrinsically tied to such avenues of concrete social analysis in ways that revolutionized future pursuits of both. Marx was deeply influenced by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, from whom Marx received his notion of dialectical forces at work both in and through human history. However, while Hegel was an idealist committed to the notion of an “absolute spirit,” which was somehow more than (or the culmination of) the human beings through which it became known, Marx was a strident materialist. Marx’s materialism, at least in part, developed from his encounter with Ludwig Feuerbach. Feuerbach read Hegel and accepted the idea of a substantive progression of human history, without joining Hegel in attributing such a process and outcome to

any force beyond human potential itself. In doing so, Feuerbach claimed that religion was itself substantively a product of human artifice, so that the study of religion was really the study of how human beings expressed themselves and how they understood that self-expression. Since Hegel had so intimately connected religion and the state, the latter was also to be examined in such ways. Feuerbach’s influence was significant not only upon Marx, but upon an entire generation of revolutionaries following in the aftermath of Hegel and the Napoleonic Wars. Marx’s most enduring work is The Communist Manifesto (1848), in which Marx explicitly lays out a justification and program for communist revolution against what he finds to be an insufficiently inclusive and responsive international order. This revolution is to be along economic class lines, as it is purely material class conflict that Marx claims is the actual motive force underneath Hegel’s, “absolute spirit” in history. Hegel and other German philosophers were correct, according to Marx, to note that history is the progression of human beings toward a greater realization of freedom. However, resonating with Feuerbach, such freedom is not related to any supernatural or transcendental power, but is actually the concrete and substantive freedom of human beings within their own world: human emancipation becomes the promise and culmination of world-historical forces. However influential The Communist Manifesto remains, it arose after Marx laid the groundwork for it in several earlier works. Marx’s own philosophy of history, as well as his strident critique of religion, was developed most fully in his Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1844). In that work, Marx claims religion has traditionally served as a means to occlude the class conflict at work in history, so that the working classes (the proletariat) are less and less aware of their manufactured (and thus both unjustified and unnatural) state of servitude in bondage to the classes that possess capital (the bourgeoisie). Marx’s characterization of religion, “It is the opium of the people,” attests both to his position that religion is a technology, a tool arising from human artifice rather than external revelation, as well as his assertion that, far from being multipurpose or neutral, this technology remains both devised and intended for only one task: the perpetuation of bourgeois dominance over a dehumanizing system of capital.

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In Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (1844), Marx expands on the foundations of the class conflict, providing the conceptual foundations for his future works. Both in that piece and onward, Marx accepts the assertion that freedom is the natural state of human beings, with the greater realization of such freedom the end toward which human life is lived. However, in the modern world, human beings have been denied their freedom and an essential, even definitive, element of their humanity. Current political systems, grounded in material economic interests, have produced an international order in which power is monopolized by those with control over the factors of production, access to which is necessary to produce shelter, food, medicine, and the other physical requirements of human life. Such access is now made available only through a system of externalized value (private property and its relevance as capital), which is the institutionalized means by which the bourgeoisie maintains its monopolization of power. Marx finds that the democratic revolutions of the preceding century did not go far enough in their push for liberation. While the Glorious, American, and French Revolutions argued for political emancipation, Marx claims the political order was symptomatic of a deeper, more underlying system of oppression. Political emancipation was therefore insufficient to truly liberate human beings from their servile state: nothing less than human emancipation, grounded in a revolutionary reestablishment of their material economic and social conditions, could realize the goal of human history that remains, for Marx, human freedom. This emancipation was necessarily revolutionary, as opposed to potentially incremental, because of the complete dehumanization inherent in its utter alienation of the proletariat from itself. The proletariat worker lived in a condition of alienation that was endured in at least three ways. First, the worker was alienated from himself or herself. Being forced by material needs to labor within an artificial system, in which the worker did not receive the full benefit of his or her efforts (only a percentage represented by his or her wages), the worker had no substantive time for the self-exploration and self-expression that Marx claims has been understood for millennia in the West to be a vital component of being human. As such, the worker’s

very identity is reduced from that of a complex and dynamic human being to that of a laboring unit. Second, this identity as a laboring unit means that the worker is alienated from the product of his or her daily labor. Since this daily labor is definitive of the worker’s existence, this functionally means that the worker is alienated from the product and outcome of his or her lived life. As a worker is paid only a percentage of the value he or she produces, the worker is unlikely to ever be able to actually afford the very products he or she brings, or aids in bringing, into existence. In a very real way, the worker’s life is externalized and alienated from the worker, including the creations stemming from such a life (a point Marx continues to explore elsewhere in his theory of commodity, addressed extensively in his later work, Capital (1867), through its analysis of capitalism). Lastly, should the worker think (in the inconceivable instance that one has time to think) of rebelling against such a system, the worker discovers he or she is alienated from fellow workers. Since work as a wage earner is necessary to acquire the means for sustaining human life in this system, the worker is set in competition against fellow workers in the pursuit of employment. Should one worker, individually, rebel against this system, that dissident will be replaced with little or no damage done to the overarching order. Individually, for Marx, the worker has few relationships with his or her fellow proletariat, and even less transformative power. Marx suggests this analysis of alienation further justifies his call for revolution, as opposed to incremental change. While Marx is direct in claiming that wages, as a percentage of the actual value of labor, are insufficiently compensatory and therefore exploitative and unjust, it is this institutionalized alienation of human beings from their neighbors that provides the motive force for his arguments. For Marx, no political order can provide political emancipation until the socioeconomic conditions that result in alienation are reorganized in favor of human freedom. Marx claimed that such reorganization was not simply a moral principle, but the actual trajectory of human history. This is how he interprets Hegel and translates that philosopher into Marx’s own philosophy of history. At some prehistoric point, the factors of production were shared among

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humanity equally: access and aptitude (in the form of technological efficiency) were common for human beings. However, at some point, one group of human beings acquired disproportionate access to either the factors of production themselves, or the technology by which use of the factors of production was rendered more efficient. This disproportionate access was codified into institutional control, which resulted in the formation of economic classes and their related political orders. Such was the birth and ongoing sustainment of class conflict: the divide between those with capital (the bourgeoisie) and those who have to offer only their labor (the proletariat). Over time, greater and greater innovation would produce more and more refined efficiency, positioning some bourgeois parties to better compete with their class fellows, thereby acquiring the capital assets of the less competitive and driving those unfortunate persons into the ranks of the proletariat. This cycle of boom and bust, whereby the bourgeoisie thinned its own ranks, developed more efficient technologies, and more thoroughly monopolized the factors of production, was the very dynamic by which human history progressed and human progress became known. Through entirely materialist discourse on economics and sociology, Marx’s philosophy of history is said to have “inverted,” and yet conserved, Hegel’s own. However, Marx claims that this cycle is also logically unsustainable. At some admittedly unknown point in the future, the monopolization of factors of production by an ever-dwindling number of bourgeois parties will simply dispossess too many human beings. Conditions will deteriorate to such a point that ultimately, Marx suggests, these dispossessed will overturn not just the political orders built upon their own socioeconomic oppression (as during the democratic revolutions), but also the very systems of material economic inequality at work in human history itself. The result will be that the entire system of bourgeois capital and private property must eventually collapse upon itself. So, Marx claims that human history has both a goal and an endpoint: the communist revolution, the restoration of universal access to the factors of production, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Of the latter, Marx himself provides few details. A state apparatus is presumably necessary for a transitionary period, during which the newly

liberated proletariat will dictate the terms of governance. However, Marx seems to intend such to be a finite thing, operating with the presumption that a new order will arise that will render past arrangements of material, social relations (themselves products of a now defunct class conflict) insufficient and irrelevant. Marx’s death prior to more robustly engaging this aspect of his work has left its implications open to a degree of interpretation greater than any other portion of his overarching philosophy. Marx remains relevant, especially as 21st-century crises challenge the presumed dominance of democratic and market systems. It is also important to note that Marx’s theories exist within a complex matrix of responses to, and extensions of, Western democratic theory. Certainly, Marx’s communism is only one kind of socialism, all of which understand themselves, in some way, to clarify the conceptual categories and frameworks of the Enlightenment’s democratic revolutions. Differences between these approaches are substantive and should not go unmentioned. It is also significant to note that debate is possible, and indeed ongoing, as to whether one can agree with Marx’s analysis of some aspects of capitalism, without having to concede to Marx’s program of revolution. Especially in terms of establishing a defensible method for social science and theory, Marx remains an influential resource. Nonetheless, Marx is perhaps defined by the fact that his work continues to present one of the clearest and most thorough theories of, and arguments for, revolution and societal change. Troy Mack See also Cold War, Religious Dimensions of; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Further Reading Althusser, Louis. Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx. London: Verso, 2007. Cropsey, Joseph. “Karl Marx.” In Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds. History of Political Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 802–28. Joas, Hans, and Wolfgang Knobl. War in Social Thought: Hobbes to the Present. Translated by Alex Skinner. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. Karl Marx on Society and Societal Changes: With Selections by Friedrich Engels. Edited by Neil J. Smelser. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.

Masada, Siege of (73–74 CE)  537 Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. On Religion. Various translators. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2008. Tucker, Robert. Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001.

Masada, Siege of (73–74 CE) At the beginning of the First Jewish Revolt in 66 CE, Jewish Zealots captured and occupied the mountain fortress at Masada. In 73 or 74 CE, after a several months–long siege, a Roman army assaulted the citadel. When the Romans entered the fortress, they discovered that—except for some small number of women and children—all the rebels and their families were dead. The Jews, determined to maintain control of their destiny to the end, had coordinated their

own self-destruction rather than submit to the Romans. In modern times, their act has become a symbol to many of a Jewish national determination to preserve their liberty in the face of overwhelming odds. The First Jewish Revolt, which began in 66 CE, grew out of the inept response of the administration of Gessius Florus, procurator of Judea (64–66), to the tensions that existed between the Jewish and Greek populations in Palestine. Florus lost control of the situation, and the Roman garrison of Jerusalem was annihilated. A relief force led by Cestius Gallus, legate of Syria, marched into Judea to rescue the situation and, initially meeting no effective opposition, encamped near the walls of Jerusalem. There, at Beth Horon, Gallus’s main force and his baggage train were attacked by insurgents and severely damaged. Gallus continued to assault Jerusalem for almost a week but then withdrew. Insurgent attacks quickly turned

At the beginning of the First Jewish Revolt in 66 CE, Jewish zealots captured and occupied the mountain fortress at Masada. After a siege that lasted several months, the Romans finally entered the fortress, only to discover that almost all the inhabitants had committed suicide rather than submit to them. The ruins of Masada, located in southern Israel, are now a popular tourist attraction. (iStockphoto.com)

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his retreat into a rout that cost the Romans almost 6,000 men. His defeat allowed the rebels to consolidate their control over Judea. The following year the Roman emperor Trajan sent a larger force to Judea under future emperors Vespasian and his son Titus. From 67 to 70 CE their army restored control over Judea. They burned the Temple and crushed Jewish rebels everywhere except at the fortress of Masada. When the Romans advanced on Masada, the terrain presented them with a difficult military engineering challenge. Masada is an imposing pale taupe–colored mountain composed of heavily fractured layers of sedimentary rock located in the Judean Desert about 65 kilometers (40 miles) south-southeast of Jerusalem. Known by geologists as a horst, the massive block overlooks the Dead Sea to the east from the western edge of the great Afro-Arabian Rift Valley, a fault system that extends roughly 4,000 miles from Jordan to Mozambique. The roughly diamond-shaped plateau at the top of the mountain rises 500 yards above the valley and about 65 yards above sea level. It measures approximately 710 yards along its north-northeast axis and 330 yards at its greatest width, giving the mountaintop a total area of about 18 acres. With its steep rocky sides, Masada is a natural redoubt. The mountaintop was first fortified sometime in the last half of the second century BCE during the Hasmonean dynasty. Descendants of an earlier group of Jewish guerrillas, the Maccabees, who formed the dynasty after they wrested control of Judea from the Seleucid Empire, the Hasmoneans ruled independently for about a century. They lost their independence in 63 BCE when Judea became a Roman client state. The last Hasmonean high priest–king, Antigonus Mattathias, was deposed and executed by the Roman general, Mark Antony, in 37 BCE. Following the Hasmonean kings, the Romans appointed Herod the Great as their client king in Judea. Herod used the site as a resort, but the grand retreat also was well–equipped with defensive measures in case he needed to escape to a secure refuge during periods of political unrest. Herod provided the royal citadel with palaces and luxurious baths, defensive walls and towers, storehouses for food and other provisions, and aqueducts and cisterns to deliver and store fresh water. Following Herod’s death in 4 BCE, a Roman garrison occupied Masada.

When the Jewish Revolt began in 66 CE, a group of Jewish rebels associated with the Zealots and led by Menahem ben Yehuda captured the mountain and massacred the Roman garrison posted there. The Jewish historian Josephus called them the Sicarii and described them as fanatics. Using captured weapons, the Sicarii marched on Jerusalem, but Menahem was killed, and they failed in their reported attempt to gain control of the wider Jewish revolt. Some of the surviving Sicarii, now commanded by Eleazar ben Jair, a relative of Menahem, retreated to Masada where they remained, occasionally raiding nearby settlements for supplies, until the Roman siege pinned them in place. Experts disagree on the exact date, but after reestablishing its authority throughout the rest of Judea, Rome sent an army under the command of Lucius Flavius Silva either in the winter of 72/73 or 73/74 CE to recapture the mountain. Almost 15,000 Romans and auxiliaries of the Legio X Fretensis (the 10th Legion) surrounded the fortress and the small defending force of fewer than 1,000 that held the citadel and set to work. The narrow existing and easily defended paths to the top of the mountain could easily be defended by the small Jewish force holding out in Masada. To provide a suitable approach route for an assault force that could not fail to carry the position, Roman engineers took advantage of a natural ridge that rose near one side of the plateau. Using the ridge as a foundation, they built an earthen ramp up the side of the mountain. The siege lasted for perhaps from two to nine months. Most scholars believe the final attack by the Roman army took place in the spring of 73 CE, though a few researchers believe the events occurred in 74 CE. In either case, when the Roman legionnaires charged up the ramp to carry out their final attack and forced their way into the mountaintop fortress, they were met by silence and the dead. Nine hundred sixty corpses of the defenders—men, women, and children—and a small group of survivors were the only occupants. The survivors told the Romans that the defenders, seeing their inevitable defeat and preferring death to enslavement, had taken their own lives. Masada was reoccupied briefly in subsequent centuries, but after about the sixth century it was abandoned except for a short time during the crusades. The Jewish priest and military leader Josephus Flavius, who was captured and

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later released by the Roman emperor Vespasian, wrote a history of the revolt, The Wars of the Jews. Many of the details in Josephus’s first-century history were later confirmed by archaeologists when they began to excavate the site in the 1960s. Masada became a popular tourist attraction in the 20th century. Despite disagreements by Israelis and scholars over the proper interpretation of the history of Masada, many visitors view the site and its history as symbols of heroism and liberty. Larry A. Grant See also Jerusalem, Sieges of; Jewish Revolt; Josephus; Maccabean Revolt; Zealots Further Reading Ben-Yehuda, Nachman. Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995. Dąbrowa, Edward. Legio X Fretensis. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993. Goldsworthy, Adrian Keith. The Roman Army at War: 100 BC–AD 200. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Josephus, Flavius. The New Complete Works of Josephus. Translated by William Whiston. Commentary by Paul L. Maier. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 1999. Rocca, Samuel. The Forts of Judaea 168 BC–AD 73: From the Maccabees to the Fall of Masada. Oxford: Osprey, 2013. Seward, Desmond. Jerusalem’s Traitor: Josephus, Masada, and the Fall of Judea. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009.

Masts, Battle of the (655 CE) The Battle of the Masts (655 CE), also known as the Battle of Phoenix, was a naval engagement between the forces of the caliph Uthman and the Byzantine emperor Constans II. Fought off the southern coast of Asia Minor, this battle marked the first major encounter at sea between these contending powers. While it occurred during 655 CE, the precise date of the engagement is unclear, as the most contemporaneous surviving sources date from approximately a century after the event. The early engagements of the Arab-Byzantine Wars were dominated by the Islamic armies serving the caliphs Umar

and Uthman. These forces were briefly checked by a strategy relying on raids by the Byzantine navy. In response to this development, Mu’awiya undertook a successful siege of Caesarea, a major Byzantine port on the Syrian coast. Subsequent raids on the island of Cyprus conducted by Mu’awiya in 649 CE created an opportunity for further maritime operations, provoking a strong reaction from Constantinople. Abdullah ibn Sa’ad, the governor of Egypt and a kinsman of Uthman, commanded a naval campaign in the eastern Mediterranean that coincided with Mu’awiya’s invasion of Cappadocia by land. Constantinople viewed the maritime challenge as a greater threat than the continued pressure of the Islamic campaign on land. While the official position under the Rashidun caliphs was that the Byzantines were enemies, there were some accommodations between the contend­­ ing powers ashore. The incorporation of Christian sailors in support of the maritime campaign represented a new threat. Emperor Constans II personally led the Byzantine fleet of approximately 500 ships. The Islamic forces opposing this armada were composed of approximately 200 galleys crewed by Syrian and Coptic Christians and carrying Muslim soldiers. A variety of oral traditions impart significant religious implications to the outcome of the contest. Among these traditions, as reported by the Byzantine chronicler Theophanes, Constans was said to have had a dream before that battle that his advisors interpreted as an omen of defeat. The Christian fleet reportedly nailed crosses to the masts of their vessels and sang psalms to ward off these ill omens. The Muslim forces responded by affixing the crescent to the masts of their ships and reciting suras from the Qur’an. Ultimately the Byzantine ships were routed in spite of their superior numbers, although casualties were heavy on both sides. The fixing of religious symbols to the masts of the contending ships gave the battle its most common name. Islamic chroniclers interpreted these events as an affirmation of their faith, and divine support for Constantinople’s cause was called into question. Faith in the Eastern Roman Empire was further shaken by the manner in which Constans was alleged to have escaped from the route, donning the garb of a subordinate to evade capture.

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Religious schisms within Christianity played a significant role in the outcome. The Council of Chalcedon in 451 CE had established a doctrine establishing the dual nature of Jesus as both divine and human. Many Eastern Christians rejected the results of the council and the authority of religious authorities in Constantinople, maintaining the doctrine of monophysitism—the singular nature of Jesus. The fourth ecumenical Council at Chalcedon also elevated the See of Constantinople to a position second only to Rome, a position formerly enjoyed by the See of Alexandria. This alienated the Coptic Christians of Egypt. As the Muslims had little experience in naval or maritime affairs, it was the adherence of these monophysite Christians to the caliph’s forces that facilitated the Islamic victory. This battle might have swung the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean even more dramatically, but for the assassination of Caliph Uthman in 656 CE. His death precipitated the first fitna, or civil war, within Islam, which gave the forces of Constantinople a respite. This pause in the contest between the contending religious and political powers allowed for the reorganization of the Christian defenses. Regardless of the internal conflicts within the Islamic camp, this battle proved to be a watershed event. It marked the emergence of the caliphate as a naval power in the Mediterranean, albeit one whose strength was based on dissenting Christian sects. It initiated a period of intermittent naval and maritime forays by Islamic forces that would continue until Ottoman sea power was finally broken by a unified Christian navy at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, more than 900 years later. K. J. Delamer See also Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035); Caliphate; Lepanto, Battle of; Mu’awiya Further Reading Donner, Fred McGraw. The Early Islamic Conquests. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Humphreys, R. Stephen. Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan: From Arabia to Empire. Oxford: Oneworld, 2006. Kennedy, Hugh. The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In. Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2007. Lewis, Archibald R., and Timothy J. Runyan. European Naval and Maritime History, 300–1500. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990.

Mau Mau Rebellion (1948) In 1948, the first reports of a violent uprising of Kenyan farmers reached provincial colonial administrators and the Kenyan national police (also administered by white settlers and colonialists). This uprising, which would later be called “Mau Mau,” was characterized as a savage, indigenous religious-political cult that was predominant among the Kikuyu people, and was threatening to undo the civilizing benefits of British colonial rule. Mau Mau fighters officially called their movement Kiama Gia Ithaka na Wiyathi or the Kenya Land and Freedom Army. However, opponents of the movement began referring to them as “Mau Mau,” a permutation of the agikuyu term uma uma or “vacate vacate,” a well-known slogan of Mau Mau fighters. The rise of Mau Mau was reminiscent of previous armed indigenous groups such as the Dini ya Msambwa, which violently resisted the spread of colonial rule in the hinterland, leading historians in the 1950s to similarly cast Mau Mau as a supposed atavistic, irrational, tribal, exclusively Kikuyu anticolonial rebellion, aimed at undermining development and state formation in Kenya. However, in the early 1960s, at the dawn of Kenyan independence, Kenyan historians who were either allied with Mau Mau or had served in Mau Mau crafted a revisionist history of the movement, rejecting the reductionist accounts of colonial historians. They recast Mau Mau as a critical—and admittedly radical—component of indigenous nationalism in Kenya, which they argued ultimately contributed to Kenyan independence on December 12, 1963. As scholarship on Mau Mau burgeoned in the late 20th century, earlier colonial representations of the movement as a violent tribal rebellion of the Kenyan proletariat gave way to more nuanced analyses of Mau Mau as a civil war that led to Kenyan independence, and even a revolution that birthed a Kenyan, national, and indigenous consciousness. While the nature and function of Mau Mau remains contested history, Kenyan young adults in the 21st century have evoked and appropriated Mau Mau imagery and symbolism, integrating these into practices and expressions of daily life. With the election of Mwai Kibaki in 2002, Kenya saw a resurgence of Mau Mau history in contemporary life, beginning with the statue of Dedan Kimathi, leader of Mau Mau, which was erected in downtown Nairobi in February 2007.

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In the first decade of the 2000s, Mau Mau developed a transethnic following based on age and popular consumer culture, rather than ethnic affiliation. For instance, matatus (public transportation minibuses) in large cities such as Nairobi, the capital, could be seen sporting the words “Mau Mau University,” a slogan from a popular clothing brand that prints Mau Mau sayings and symbols on apparel sold in stores that similarly sell international brands such as Giorgio Armani. The intent of the clothing line was simple—to inspire respect and admiration among young Kenyan consumers for a movement that the founder of the clothing line believed birthed the modern nation of Kenya. Despite these appropriations, Kenyans and scholars of Mau Mau alike remain divided as to the nature and ultimate purpose of Mau Mau and its ongoing influence on the Kenyan national consciousness. Georgette Mulunda Ledgister Further Reading Atieno-Odhiambo, E. S. “The Production of History in Kenya: The Mau Mau Debate.” Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines 25, no. 2 (1991): 300–07. Atieno-Odhiambo, E. S., and John Lonsdale. Mau Mau and Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration (Eastern African Studies). Oxford: James Currey, 2003. Berman, Bruce J. “Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Modernity: The Paradox of Mau Mau.” Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines 25, no. 2 (1991): 181–206. Githuku, Nicholas K. Mau Mau Crucible of War: Statehood, National Identity, and Politics of Postcolonial Kenya. London: Lexington Books, 2016. Kinyatti, Maina wa. Thunder from the Mountain: Mau Mau Patriotic Songs. London: Zed, 1980. Mwangi, Evan. “The Incomplete Rebellion: Mau Mau Movement in Twenty-First-Century Kenyan Popular Culture.” Africa Today 57, no. 2 (Winter 2010): 86–113.

Mazu-Tianfei Mazu is the Chinese goddess of the sea. She is also known as Mazupo (grandmother), Tianhou (empress of heaven), and Tianfei (heavenly princess). She has her roots in the legend of a young woman who lived during the Song

dynasty and is reputed to have saved her fishermen family members from drowning during a storm. Subsequently she was adopted as Mazu, a popular deity in Chinese religious practice, where she is known as the protector of fishermen and sailors. She is worshipped widely in southeast China and in Southeast Asia, as well as in Taiwan, where common worship unites parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The person who became the goddess of the sea, Lin Moniang, was born in 960 CE into a family of fishermen on Meizhou Island in Fujian Province in southeast China. It is said that she did not cry when she was born, learned to swim late but well, and would guide boats home standing in red clothing on the shore, even during the northeast winter monsoon. Several versions of a story are related about how she saved her father or one or more of her brothers from a typhoon while dreaming, carrying them to safety. When she was wakened by others, she dropped one of the brothers, who was lost. In one version of her death, she died of exhaustion swimming far out to sea to save her father, and was washed ashore on Nankan Island in what is known as the Matsu (Mazu) Islands. Her tomb is on this island, which is one of the islands disputed between the Communist and Nationalist Chinese after the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949. In 2000, a Fujian TV series dramatized the life of Mazu as a mortal in a show called Lin Moniang. Both Buddhist and Daoist religions borrowed the figure of Mazu for worship in their temples, where she is recognized and respected by both. In the Buddhist account, Mazu’s parents prayed to Guan Yin for a son, but had a daughter, whom they considered to be a reincarnation of Guan Yin. Hence, some Buddhists consider Mazu to be one of the manifestations of Guan Yin. In paintings, Mazu wears red robes, while in sculpture she is clothed in bejeweled clothing with a flat-top cap, with beads hanging down in both front and back. Her serene presence is worshipped in many temples in China, Southeast Asia, and Taiwan. Worship of Mazu, originally in Fujian, then spread south to Guangdong and north to Zhejiang. Eventually scores of temples were erected along the coast of China, from Hainan in the south to Tianjin in the north, where the Tianjin Mazu Temple became the main Daoist center in the 1950s.

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More than 90 temples to Mazu have been built in Hong Kong, where the goddess is known as Tin Hau. In 1407, the Ming Yongle emperor Zhu Di erected a temple to Tianfei, one of Mazu’s other names, as a token of thanks for protecting Zheng He’s first naval expedition to the Indian Ocean. Having been built by the emperor, this highest status Mazu temple was destroyed by Japanese bombing in 1937. However, the emperor’s tortoise-borne inscription stele still stands, and the temple was rebuilt south of Lion Hill in Nanjing to celebrate the 600th anniversary of Zheng He’s voyage. A second, smaller temple to Tianfei exists in the Nanjing boatyards where Zheng He’s treasure boats were built. The Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia often built a temple to Mazu in thanks for arriving safely by sea. At least 1,500 temples to Mazu have been built in about two dozen countries. Malaysia has famous Mazu (Thean Hou) temples in Kuala Lampur and Panang. The world’s tallest Mazu statue, 10 stories high, was scheduled to be erected in the Malaysian province of Sabah, but the project has been discontinued due to Muslim objections. Mazu temples have also been built in the Ryukyu Islands and in Japan. More than 500 temples to Mazu have been built in Taiwan, across the strait from where Mazu is entombed on Matsu Island. Pilgrims escort Mazu in processions on Taiwan every year. Although government decisions and policies emanating from Beijing and Taipei ultimately control the fate of cross-strait relations, religious practice through mutual worship of Mazu, including pilgrimages across the strait going in each direction, is a form of people-to-people diplomacy that provides an important symbol of the ability of parties on both sides of the strait to reduce tension and interact in a positive fashion. Direct contact between Taiwan and Fuzhou City in Fujian on the mainland via Mazu Island was implemented through “small three directs”— direct flights, voyages, and postal services—in 2001. They established the possibility of direct contacts across the Taiwan Strait. The contacts were upgraded in 2008 to the “big three directs”—flights, voyages, and postal services—to bypass Mazu and Jinmen, the other demilitarized island in the strait. In a development that maintained Mazu’s role in crossstrait relations, a five-day pilgrimage was arranged by Mazu worshippers in July 2008 to travel from Keelung in

northern Taiwan, to the Mazu islands to visit the tomb of Mazu, then to Ninde, Pingnan, Gutian, Fuzhou, Changle, and Mawei, Mazu’s birthplace in Fujian, before returning to Mazu. More than 300 pilgrims made this trip, which involved economic and social as well as religious activity. This initial pilgrimage established a precedent for worshippers of Mazu from both sides of the Taiwan Strait to subsequently visit Mazu temples on opposite sides of the strait, including as far away as Nanjing. A plaque on the Nanjing Tianfei temple indicates that the temple is an important tie to link the people of the mainland and Taiwan, where both engage in mutual worship of Mazu. Taiwanese politicians on both ends of the political spectrum have ties to Mazu. Chen Shui-bian, elected Taiwan president from the Democratic Progressive Party in 2000, has been called “Mazu’s son” in his native area of Tainan. Ma Ying-jeou, elected Taiwan president from the opposing Kuomintang Party in 2008, has visited a Mazu temple to pray for rain during drought conditions, as sea goddess Mazu represents a source of water. Ideas about Mazu have provided a barometer of Taiwan-mainland relationships, reflected in shared ritual life. Taiwan businesspeople have been involved in the renovation of temples on the mainland, with resulting religious and business relationships affecting the local economy. Mazu religious ties have provided a catalyst for enhanced social, political, and economic ties across the Taiwan Strait. This is a case where religious motivations and practices tend to inhibit war rather than lead to war. Grant Rhode See also Buddhism and War; Daoism and War Further Reading Lin, Wei-ping. “Virtual Recentralization: Pilgrimage as Social Imaginary in the Demilitarized Islands between China and Japan.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 56 (2014): 131–54. Sangren, P. Steven. “History and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy: The Ma Tsu Cult of Taiwan.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 30 (1988): 674–97. Watson, James L. 1985. “Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of Tien Hou (‘Empress of Heaven’) along the South China Coast, 960–1960.” In David Johnson et al., eds. Popular Culture in Late Imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

Melanchthon, Philip (1497–1560)  543 Yang, Mayfair Mei-hui. 2004. “Goddess across the Taiwan Strait: Matrilocal Ritual Space, Nation-State, and Satellite Television Footprints.” Public Culture 16 (2004): 209–38.

Megiddo, Battle of (15th Century BCE) With the beginning of the New Kingdom in Egypt, having expelled the Hyksos from the Nile Delta, the pharaohs began to expand Egyptian hegemony in the Levant. The famous battle between Thutmose III and the combined forces of the Canaanites and the Mitanni from the city states of Kadesh and Megiddo was recorded by the battlefield scribe Tjaneni. His account was later inscribed on the Hall of Annals in the Temple of Amun-Re at Karnak. The battle occurred on the 21st day of the first month of the third season of the year 23 of the reign of Thutmoses III. Based on which chronology one uses, the battle began between 1482 and 1457 BCE. The king of Kadesh and the king of Megiddo formed a coalition to withstand the power of the Egyptians. Megiddo was of paramount importance to an expanding Egyptian empire, as it sat strategically at the southwest corner of the Jezreel Valley. Not only was the Jezreel Valley significant agriculturally, but it controlled the Via Maris, the major transportation route from Egypt to Mesopotamia. According to the accounts of the battle, the Egyptians amassed an army of chariots and infantry of 10,000– 20,000. The Canaanite coalition was between 10,000 and 15,000. As the Egyptian forces moved north toward the Jezreel Valley and the fortified city of Megiddo, they had a precarious decision to make. Three passes traversed the Carmel Range from Yehem. The northern route through Zefti and the southern route of Taanach were safe thoroughfares to the Jezreel Valley. The middle pass through Aruna was narrow and dangerous for a large army, having to travel single file, losing all the advantage of their great numbers. The Egyptian leaders argued for the two safer routes. But Thutmoses III reasoned that his enemies would expect him to take the conventional choice. Therefore he chose the unexpected course. The Canaanite forces were waiting for the Egyptians at the northern and southern routes, but the middle route was ignored. Therefore the

Egyptian forces took the fastest, most direct route and were unengaged by the Canaanite forces as they had a free pass to Megiddo. The next morning the Egyptians quickly attacked the king of Kadesh and they collapsed their forces, which fled into the city of Megiddo. The Egyptians looted the abandoned camp and besieged the city for the next seven months. While the king of Kadesh eventually escaped the city, Megiddo eventually surrendered. According to the inscriptions at Karnak, the Egyptians took back to Egypt 340 prisoners, 2,041 mares, 191 foals, 6 stallions, 924 chariots, 200 suits of armor, 502 bows, 1,929 cattle, 22,500 sheep, and the royal armor, chariot, and tent poles of the king of Megiddo. Dean Andrew Nicholas See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of; Egyptian Warfare Further Reading Bright, John. A History of Israel. 4th ed. Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000. Pritchard, James B. Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament with Supplements. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969. Redford, Donald B. The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III. Leiden: Brill, 2003.

Melanchthon, Philip (1497–1560) Philip Melanchthon, a German Protestant Reformer and one of the intellectual leaders of the Reformation, became a professor of Greek at Wittenberg University at the age of 21. He produced the first Protestant theology text, entitled the Commonplaces (Loci Communes), in 1521, which was followed by several expanded editions in the ensuing years. Each edition presented important topics (loci) that arise out of the biblical text, including teachings on government and war. Melanchthon placed the doctrine of war within the over­all context of the distinction between two kingdoms, the kingdom of Jesus Christ and the kingdom of the world. In his 1528 biblical commentary on the New Testament

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book of Colossians (Scholia in Epistolam Pauli ad Colossenses), he asserted that the saints within the kingdom of Christ “tolerate all things, nor do they allow themselves to take up arms in a desire for vengeance against those who have injured them.” The kingdom of the world, in contrast, “defends public peace with the authority of magistrates with laws, judgments, punishments and war” (Scholia, 69, cited in Wengert 2003, 50). In the first edition of the Commonplaces, Melanchthon similarly distinguished between ecclesiastical and civil magi­strates. Ecclesiastical magistrates have one fundamental responsibility, being “enjoined only to preach the Word of God.” The civil magistrate, on the other hand, “is one who bears the sword and watches over the civil peace.” He further stated: “The fact that the magistrate wields the sword is pleasing to God” (1521 Loci Communes, 148–49). In the 1543 edition of the Commonplaces, Melanchthon asserted that the apex of power that is exercised by a government is seen in its capacity to wage war. He contended, “War is the highest degree of political power” (1543 Loci Communes, 68). He had to acknowledge that such political power “is the most abused, and just and lawful wars are very rare.” He nevertheless could refer to specific examples of just wars, “as when Constantine repressed the savagery of Licinius by force of arms” (1543 Loci Communes, 68). Melanchthon embraced the three classical components of the just war doctrine that had been espoused by Augustine (354–430) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). A given war could only be just if it were authorized by the proper authority on the basis of a just cause with a right intention. He agreed with Martin Luther (1483–1546) that “certain men are given” the “right to wage war.” He argues that “Christ permits a ruler to carry out his work” regarding “bearing arms” and “waging lawful war” (1543 Loci Communes, 214). The right to wage war was contingent upon an offense having been committed. The need for public vengeance assumes that a fault exists. War indeed is “the punishment of wrong and evil” (Luther, Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 95). Melanchthon concurred with this perspective and called attention to Israel’s first king, Saul, who started a war without a just cause. “People,” he said, “start unjust wars and controversies which are dangerous to themselves

and to their governments, as in the case of Saul. When he was moved by great jealousy and malice, he complained against David under the pretext that David was rebelling against him” (1543 Loci Communes, 219). Melanchthon also believed that a just war has the intention of keeping the peace, either confirming it or recovering it. He argued that David waged war so that “the church of God might be preserved” and that “the young people could gather in the schools and the people could come to hear sermons in safety.” He added, “David considered these purposes every time he led forth his army, as often as he drew up his battle line, and as often as he attacked the army of the enemy” (1543 Loci Communes, 218). Melanchthon differed not at all from Luther, who had commented, “Why does anyone go to war except he desires peace” (Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 95). Melanchthon’s fundamental concern was to avoid unnecessary wars. He affirmed that “the devil” is the one who “often stirs up great wars on the most flimsy pretexts.” He therefore insisted that wrongdoing did not necessarily mean that governments on all occasions ought to rush into battle. He cautioned, “But let us employ equity which, even if offense has been given, is more concerned to bring peace than to destroy the innocent and bring immeasurable harm to the churches and the nation because of the errors of the few” (1543 Loci Communes, 68). Mark J. Larson See also Luther, Martin; Protestant Reformers and War; Wars of the Reformation; Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved (Luther) Further Reading George, Timothy. Theology of the Reformers. Rev. ed. Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2013. Kusukawa, Sachiko. “Melanchthon.” In David Bagchi and David C. Steinmetz, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Reformation Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 57–67. Luther, Martin. “Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved.” In Robert C. Schultz, ed. Luther’s Works. Vol. 46. The Christian in Society III. Philadelphia: Concordia Publishing House, 1967, pp. 87–139. Melanchthon, Philip. Loci Communes (1543). St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992. Wengert, Timothy J. “Philip Melanchthon and a Christian Politics.” Lutheran Quarterly 17 (2003): 29–62.

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Melito of Sardis (d. ca. 180 CE) Saint Melito of Sardis was a second-century CE exegete and apologist who, prior to martyrdom, served as bishop of Sardis, the former capital of the Lydian Empire. He was Jewish by birth, yet immersed in Greek culture and greatly influenced by the Stoic philosophers Cleanthes and Poseidonius. Tertullian claimed he was esteemed a prophet by many of the faithful, and he is remembered primarily for developing the first Christian Old Testament Canon. A combination of Christian Jewish roots and Stoicism led to his Quartodeciman observance, believing that Christian Passsover, celebrated during Easter, should be celebrated on the evening of the 14th, when the Jewish Passover meal was being prepared. Melito expresses this in Peri Pascha, his homily called by F. L. Cross “the most important addition to Parasitic literature in the present century” (Cohick 2000, 52). The text reveals how Christians blamed the Jews for immorally allowing the mortal King Herod to kill immortal Jesus. Melito espouses supersessionism, the Christian theological view that Jews fail to fulfil the Old Covenant owing to their lack of faith in Jesus. The divergent views concerning the observance of Easter led to a dispute in Laodicea, where Eusebius records Melito presenting an Apology for Christianity to Marcus Aurelius in 169–170 CE. Melito beseeched that “Christian philosophy first grew up among the barbarians, but its full flower came among your nation in the reign of Augustus.” Christianity was claimed to tame belligerent peoples by overcoming the demons that incited them to war: Roman peace and Christian peace were thus supportive of each other, and the prophecy that swords should be beaten into ploughshares had received fulfilment in the Pax Romana (Bainton 1960, 87). Melito sought to demonstrate how Christianity brought success to Rome and urged Marcus Aurelius to intervene against Christian persecution. Melito’s teachings reveal that there were those in Smyrna who professed to be descended from the apostles and who refused to accept the authority of Rome. Melito himself did not accept all the books of the Old Testament, observed Passover instead of Easter Sunday, and advocated millenarianism. However, Catholics and Orthodox insist Melito was a saint, not a heretic, and his feast day is still celebrated on April 1. Hillary Briffa

Further Reading Bainton, Roland H. Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-evaluation. New York: Abingdon Press, 1960. Cohick, Lynn H. The Peri Pascha Attributed to Melito of Sardis: Setting, Purpose, and Sources. Providence, RI: Brown Judaic Studies, 2000. Thiel, Bob. “Melito of Sardis.” 2005. http://www.cogwriter.com /melito.htm.

Merton, Thomas (1915–1968) Thomas Merton was an American Roman Catholic monk who was born in Prades, France, on January 31, 1915. Merton is among the most well-known American Catholics of the 20th century, having written more than 70 books, many on the topic of peace and social justice. Merton, although a cloistered monk at the Abbey of Gethsemani in Louisville, Kentucky, from December 10, 1941 until his death exactly 27 years later, maintained an active correspondence with many intellectuals involved in the peace movement, including the Dalai Lama and a number of individuals residing in communist Eastern Europe. Thomas Merton spoke out against the Cold War nuclear arms race, even though he was warned by his superiors in the Trappist order that his writing was not appropriate for a monk. The 1950s and early 1960s were a time of conservatism and conformity in the United States, and a Catholic monk was not expected to speak out against America’s strategy of containment against the “godless” Soviet Union. However, Merton continued to publish journal articles such as “Religion and the Bomb” and other diatribes railing against the un-Christian nature of the nuclear arms race, which imperiled all of humanity. Merton found sympathetic voices among Eastern European, Latin American, and some Asian intellectuals, including the Japanese Zen Buddhist monk Daisetz Suzuki, the Dalai Lama, and the Polish poet Czeslaw Milosz. Merton also spoke out against the Vietnam War. He befriended the South Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh, and penned an essay entitled “Nhat Hanh Is My Brother.” Merton had met Hanh when Hanh visited the Gethsemani Abbey in 1966. Both of these monks provided

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impetus to the combination of religious and social action in the pursuit of world peace. The trio of Merton, Hanh, and Dr. Martin Luther King is an example of religiously and socially motivated voices speaking out against American actions in Vietnam, and in support of the cause of peace and social justice. Merton believed that America’s actions in Vietnam too closely mimicked those of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Party in the opening days of the Second World War; a war in which his brother John Paul was killed while serving as a bomber pilot in the Royal Canadian Air Force. Thomas Merton died in Thailand on December 10, 1968, while speaking at an interfaith conference of Christian and non-Christian monks. Ironically, his body was returned home to the United States in a U.S. Air Force aircraft returning home from service in Vietnam. On September 24, 2015, Pope Francis mentioned Thomas Merton (along with three other Americans) as an example of an individual who promoted peace between peoples and religions. Jeffrey M. Shaw See also Christianity and War; Cold War, Religious Dimensions of; Hanh, Thich Nhat; Just War Tradition Further Reading Baker, James Thomas. Thomas Merton: Social Critic. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1971. King, Robert H. Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh: Engaged Spirituality in an Age of Globalization. London: Bloomsbury, 2003. Merton, Thomas. The Cold War Letters. Edited by William H. Shannon and Christine M. Bochen. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008. Merton, Thomas. Emblems of a Season of Fury. New York: New Directions, 1961. Merton, Thomas. “Religion and the Bomb.” Jubilee 10 (1962): 7–13. Shaw, Jeffrey M. Illusions of Freedom: Thomas Merton and Jacques Ellul on Technology and the Human Condition. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2014.

Meskhetian Turks Meskhetian Turks are an ethnic group from the region of Meskheti in the Caucasus region of Eurasia. Throughout

history, this area has changed hands between the Russian Empire, Ottoman Empire, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). After Georgia regained independence from the collapsed USSR in 1991, the region became a part of the newly formed country of Georgia. Meskhetian Turks, who lived in the region for centuries, are ethnically different from Georgians. The greatest difference is religion, since Meskhetian Turks are Muslims, whereas Georgians are predominantly Christians. Thus, they are sometimes referred to as Muslim Georgians. However, there is a distinction between Georgians who are Muslims and Meskhetian Turks. As implied in their name, the group embraces components of Turkish culture, most notably the Turkish language. Although new generations were born and lived in various locations amid different cultures, the primary language is continually Turkish among group members and within families. Meskhetian Turks have a history of oppression, segregation, and displacement as a result of their ethnic identity. The group was subjected to forced relocation three times in recent history: the exile of 1944, relocation from Fergana Valley in 1989, and finally gaining refugee status in the United States in 2005. The first relocation, the exile of 1944, occurred in the heat of World War II, when Joseph Stalin issued an order for certain groups to be relocated within the Soviet Union. The Meskhetian Turks’ expulsion took place between November 14 and 18, 1944. Their involuntary journey took about 18 days from Georgia to Central Asia, during which thousands died or went missing. They lived under restrictions confining them to designated areas until 1956 when these restrictions were partially lifted, allowing the Meskhetian Turks to leave confinement; however, the group was prohibited from returning to Meskheti. In the decades following 1956, Meskhetian Turks moved to various locations in and around the USSR. Records regarding the Meskhetian Turks are mostly incomplete and sometimes incorrect. In certain places, members of the group were recorded as Muslim Georgians, Azeri, or Turks. As a result, the exact number of Meskhetian Turks is unknown, but it is estimated to be more than 250,000 scattered mostly in nine countries: Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, United States, and a small number still in Georgia.

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The second relocation occurred in June 1989 as a result of unrest and violence toward minorities in Uzbekistan’s Fergana Valley, which at the time was a part of the Soviet Union. On June 3, 1989, a group of young Uzbeks in Tashlak near Fergana set fires to Meskhetian Turkish homes, attacking and ultimately killing a number of people in the community. Riots in the region continued until June 11, when the Soviet Army gained control of the situation and relocated the Meskhetian Turks in the area to the Krasnodar Krai region of the USSR, where the group lived in relative peace until 1991 when the USSR collapsed and the Russian Republic was founded. The third relocation in 2005 to the United States was a direct result of the period following Russia’s establishment in 1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the local government in Krasnodar voided Meskhetian Turks’ citizenship rights. Since Meskhetian Turks settled in the Krasnodar area in 1989, they are not considered locals, but stateless persons who are in the region on a temporary stay, which denies them access to education, employment, health care, and any legal rights. In addition, being Muslims, they are prohibited from practicing their religion, celebrating any religious holidays, and performing any communal religious activity, such as praying, which is a communal ritual of Islam. The religious prohibitions started during the Soviet era, when all religions were restricted. In contemporary Russia religious restrictions for the Russian Orthodox have been lifted; however, the local government in Krasnodar Krai denies Meskhetian Turks all religious liberties. As their situation in Krasnodar Krai became more severe, diplomatic talks regarding Meskhetian Turks’ desire to go back to Meskheti reemerged. Since 1956, several diplomatic and official representatives have petitioned the Russian and Georgian governments for the Meskhetian Turks’ return to their homeland. After several attempts at a resolution, 250 Meskhetian families were allowed to go back in 1969. Afterward, the Georgian government refused to let any other Meskhetian Turks return. In recent years, ongoing negotiations between the Georgian government and the Council of Europe led the issue to resurface. As a condition of Council of Europe membership, Georgia agreed to a 12-year framework to let the Meskhetian Turks return home. However, there is one condition

that Georgia is demanding: for Meskhetian Turks to immigrate to Georgia, they have to take on Georgian names and assume Georgian identity, which is unacceptable for Meskhetian Turks. The Meskhetian Turks’ situation in Krasnodar Krai as well as the Georgian government’s policies evoked the protests of international organizations and various governments. Ultimately, these responses, facilitated by nongovernmental organizations, led the U.S. State Department to take action and grant refugee status to Meskhetian Turks. In 2005, the United States granted refugee status to 15,000 Meskhetian Turks. Today, there are Meskhetian Turkish communities in several states in the United States and the majority of the group are U.S. citizens. Nonetheless, the group’s attempts at gaining their rights and land in their original homeland, Meskheti, persist. Nurhayat Bilge See also Cold War, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Aydıngün, A., et al. Meskhetian Turks: An Introduction to Their History, Culture, and Resettlement Experiences. Washington, DC: Cultural Orientation Resource Center—Culture Profile, 2006. Trier, T., and A. Khanzihn, eds. Meskhetian Turks at a Crossroads: Integration, Reparation or Resettlement? Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2007.

Mexican-American War, Religious Dimensions of Commonly called “The Mexican War” in the United States, and in Mexico La Guerra del 47 or La Intervención estadounidense, the war erupted in April 1846 along the disputed boundary of Texas, whose recent annexation to the United States Mexico had refused to recognize. The war climaxed in the capture of Mexico City in September 1847 and resulted not only in the settlement of the Texas issue, but also in the cession of Alta California and New Mexico to the United States. Religious rhetoric flourished throughout the fighting, with certain parties on both sides styling the U.S. invasion as a Protestant crusade against a Roman Catholic

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nation. While the war for the most part failed to live up to such characterizations, it did intensify questions of religious identity within each of the young, internally conflicted republics and demonstrates the power of religious rhetoric in war. During the decade of mounting tension over Texas, a wide spectrum of Mexican scribes and statesmen—but especially those of the proclerical Centralist Party, such as Lucas Alamán and Carlos María Bustamante—voiced concern over the religious implications of U.S. territorial expansion and annexation of the Republic of Texas. The encroachment of the materialistic, slaveholding “heretics of the North” would, it was feared, lead to the fragmentation of the country’s Catholic faith and the dissolution of Mexican identity. When war came, the national cause was frequently construed in religious terms, drawing upon long-standing traditions of Mexico’s role as a people providentially appointed for the Roman Catholic Church’s prosperity. Wartime sermons emphasized the eternal stakes of the conflict: a U.S. victory would mean the desecration of churches, the introduction of heterodox sects, the forfeiture of Mexico’s divine mission, and the loss of innumerable souls. Some Protestants in the United States viewed the war along similarly theological and eschatological lines. Many evangelical leaders, particularly in the southern and western states, welcomed the invasion as a missionary opportunity and an advance in the struggle against “popery.” Bible and religious tract societies followed in the army’s wake, hoping to redeem the ignorance, superstition, and depravity of “priest-ridden” Mexico. Unconfined to evangelical pulpits, visions of moral and spiritual regeneration tinted more broadly based apologia for the war. Propelled by their own sense of providential nationhood—their “Manifest Destiny,” in the Democratic Review’s epochal phrase— boosters of U.S. expansion anticipated Mexico’s submission to a racially, politically, and religiously superior people. The war’s numerous and vociferous opponents held religious motives and employed biblical language as well. Concentrated in New England, antiwar clergy denounced the injustice of U.S. aggression and the dangerous moral precedents it had set. Abolitionist preachers tended to be especially apocalyptic, condemning the war as a conspiracy for the extension of slavery and warning of divine retribution.

Against the expectations of nativists and the hopes of antiwar Whigs, U.S. Catholics proved largely untroubled by the prospect of invading a Catholic country. Indeed, with nativist political activity having recently reached a crescendo, many Catholic immigrants volunteered for the fight as a proof of loyalty to their adopted homeland. Despite the efforts of Mexican army propagandists, who leafleted U.S. ranks with appeals for desertion on religious grounds, Catholics do not appear to have deserted in disproportionately high numbers. The famous San Patricio Battalion, composed of soldiers who defected to the Mexican army, provides an intriguing possible counterexample. Despite their name, however, the San Patricios were not predominantly Irish, and among the many motives for defection, religious ones do not seem to be prominent. On the home front, the U.S. Roman Catholic press supported the war but responded vigilantly to reports of church looting or disparaging characterizations of Mexican Catholicism. Eager to avoid any impressions of religious antagonism, the United States prosecuted the war with a controversial policy of deference to the Roman Catholic Church. President Polk appointed two Jesuit chaplains to the regular army, not only to minister to the large number of Roman Catholics in uniform but also to serve as goodwill ambassadors in occupied territory. General Winfield Scott sought cordial relations with the Mexican clergy and made a point of attending Mass in Veracruz; one of his subordinates caused an uproar back home by ordering his largely Protestant unit to kneel before a Eucharistic procession in Jalapa. While respect for local customs was the rule for regular troops, discipline was inconsistently enforced among the army’s large number of volunteer companies. Despoiling Mexican churches of costly sacred objects—an inducement occasionally advertised in enlistment drives— proved an irresistible pastime for some units. Such outrages only increased religious motivations for Mexican resistance. Several priests allied themselves with guerrilla bands fighting under the banner of Guadalupe, and even friars were observed taking up arms in defense of the capital. The fiercest wartime struggle over church property, however, came not at the hands of the U.S. Army but of the Mexican government. In January 1847, acting president

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Valentín Gómez Farías, an anticlerical federalist, authorized the appropriation of 15 million pesos from the Roman Catholic Church to fund the war effort. The bishops loudly objected, conservative periodicals protested, and a coalition of the president’s political opponents orchestrated a rebellion within the National Guard. The so-called “Polkos Revolt,” tacitly supported by the clergy, weakened Mexico’s military resources at a critical juncture in the war. This clash foreshadowed a larger conflict that would rupture in Mexico during the decade following the war. Mexican liberals took the U.S. victory as a painful lesson in political obsolescence and increased their efforts to reform society, largely by curtailing the church’s power. Proclerical conservatives, meanwhile, viewed the church as the one remaining basis for national restoration and reasserted the Roman Catholic basis of Mexican identity. These differing understandings of the war’s consequences surfaced throughout the debates over church property, clerical privilege, and religious toleration that led to the Reform of 1857 and subsequent waves of civil unrest. In the United States, the war’s aftermath was equally divisive. Though the army’s success seems to have stemmed nativist agitation for a short time, wartime controversies over immigrant loyalty and an increasingly public Catholicism prefigured the rise of Know-Nothing politics and the realignment of the party system in the 1850s. More significantly, wartime preaching deepened the sectional divides that had recently been formalized in the nation’s largest denominations (Methodists had split on a North-South basis in 1844, Baptists in 1845). Behind the U.S. clergy’s divided appraisals of the Mexican invasion stood theological differences over slavery that would only ossify in the years ahead. For both Mexico and the United States, religiously inflected interpretations of the legacy of 1847 would serve as prologues to civil war. Andrew N. Denton See also American Civil War, Religious Dimensions of; Manifest Destiny Further Reading Brack, Gene M. Mexico Views Manifest Destiny, 1821–1846. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975. García Ugarte, Marta Eugenia. Poder Político y Religioso: México Siglo XIX. Vol. 1. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autonóma de México, 2010.

Guardino, Peter. “La iglesia mexicana y la guerra con Estados Unidos.” In Brian Connaughton and Carlos Rubén Ruiz Medrano, eds. Dios, religión y patria: Intereses, luchas e ideales socioreligiosos en méxico, siglos xviii–xix. Perspectivas locales. San Luis Potosí: Colegio de San Luis, 2010, pp. 236–64. Johannsen, Robert W. To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Johnson, Tyler V. Devotion to the Adopted Country: US Immigrant Volunteers in the Mexican War. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2012. Pinheiro, John C. “‘Extending the Light and Blessings of Our Purer Faith:’ Anti-Catholic Sentiment among American Soldiers in the US-Mexican War.” Journal of Popular Culture 35 (2001): 69–96. Pinheiro, John C. Missionairies of Republicanism: A Religious History of the Mexican-American War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Milhemet Misvah Milhemet Misvah, or “obligatory war,” is an institution of armed conflict, which is to be differentiated from Milhemet Reshut or “discretionary war” according to the rabbinic tradition (cf. Mishnah Sotah 8:7). Rabbinic sages disagree as to what constitutes an obligatory or a discretionary war; in the Babylonian Talmud (cf. Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 44b) there is universal agreement that the wars of Canaanite conquest were obligatory (as well as the biblical injunction to root out Amalek, cf. Deuteronomy 25:19), while King David’s wars of territorial expansion were discretionary. In contrast, the Talmud of the land of Israel (cf. Sotah 8:10) explains that defensive wars are obligatory and offensive wars are discretionary. Moses Maimonides (1138– 1204 CE) includes both defensive wars and biblical wars of conquest of the land of Israel or to root out Amalek in the category of obligatory wars. All Israelites are commanded to give battle in the obligatory war, including women (although some authorities did not agree with this ruling and only granted women a supporting role in combat); exemptions from service for the discretionary war do not hold here. The obligatory war is fought on behalf of God and not on behalf of Israel, and therefore even the

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prohibitions from work on the Sabbath are lifted for the obligatory war. Phil Lieberman See also Judaism and War; Milhemet Reshut; Talmud and War Further Reading Bleich, J. David. “Preemptive War in Jewish Law.” Tradition 21 (Spring 1983): 3–41. Firestone, Reuven. Holy War in Judaism: The Fall and Rise of a Controversial Idea. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Kasher, Asa. “Jewish Ethics and War.” In Elliot N. Dorff and Jonathan K. Cran, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Ethics and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 487–99. Neusner, Jacob. War and Peace in Rabbinic Judaism: A Documentary Account. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2011. Schiffman, Lawrence, and Joel B. Wolowelsky. War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition. New York: Yeshiva University Press, 2007.

Milhemet Reshut Milhemet Reshut is the Hebrew term for the concept of “discretionary war.” Unlike a Milhemet Misvah or “obligatory war,” which is commanded by God, the purpose of a discretionary war is to expand territory or to initiate a preemptive strike against an enemy, although some rabbinic authorities hold that the latter is an obligatory war. Further, while all of Israel must take part in an obligatory war, certain individuals are exempt from participation in a discretionary war—namely those who are afraid or disheartened, those who have built but not yet dedicated their homes, those who have planted but not dedicated their vineyards, or those who have not consummated marriages. These exemptions can be found in Deuteronomy 20:5–8. Indeed, rabbinic literature specifies that communal officials address the troops with the specific biblical language describing the various exemptions from battle. The limitations placed on waging a discretionary war are designed to ensure that obligations that are primary to a discretionary war, such as observance of the Sabbath, are met: thus, as one finds in the Talmud Yerushalmi, Shabbat 1:8, “They do

not besiege a gentile town less than three days before the Sabbath.” The decision to wage a discretionary war is only to be made by the Jewish high court or Sanhedrin of 71 members, but it is the king himself who calls for this type of war. It is the position of some of the Talmudic sources that the priestly urim and tumim (devices used for divination) had to be consulted as well. Phil Lieberman See also Judaism and War; Milhemet Misvah; Six-Day War Further Reading Bleich, J. David. “Preemptive War in Jewish Law.” Tradition 21 (Spring 1983): 3–41. Lehrman, Simon M. “Obligatory War and Voluntary War.” Dor le-Dor 3, no. 1 (1974): 31–34. Schiffman, Lawrence, and Joel B. Wolowelsky. War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition. New York: Yeshiva University Press, 2007.

Militarism, Religious Religious militarism is militarism expressed in religious belief and practice. We do not need to move past standard definitions to clearly see that indeed traditional and world religions incorporate and even laud militarism. In human society, and thus religion, the military usually holds a privileged place; society prioritizes military preparedness and action, and glorifies the military profession. This in no way means that religion is expressed solely or mainly through militarism. Expressions of peace and even pacifist beliefs and actions are frequently present, but neither is peace the true essence of any religion. Textually and historically religion incorporates militaristic belief and action as a normal part of its expression. Currently, heated debates surround the question of whether religion is essentially pacifistic or militaristic. While the possibility exists that religion is one or the other, the fact that religion exists only as a human expression means that there is no black or white. Religion, like human society, is gray. Also, the contemporary debate shows a bias for pacifism and nonviolence against militarism. Militarism is seen as a primary culprit, or even a villain, behind

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all of history’s violence and repression linked to war. However, this has not always been the case as militaristic ideals have frequently dominated cultures throughout much of history. Whatever arguments contemporary religionists present in order to promote their religion, and sometimes all religion, as having always fundamentally promoted peace, the textual and historical records prove this line of argumentation erroneous. Militarism does not support any and all killing, though killing is inherent in its ethos. For the true militarist, military action, and above all combat, is a good in and of itself. The “good” of military action according to militarists, or warriors, lies in the self-actualization of the individual and war’s transforming power on society. Combat tests a man and his society, forcing them to confront their fundamental nature; war becomes a religious or spiritual activity. Combat lifts a man and his society to their pinnacle, leading to the destruction and rejuvenation of moribund societies. By this, combat is an expressive activity and not solely an instrumental one. Solving problems by military means is therefore an attractive option. Going to war to solve problems does not guarantee victory; but all participants, winners and losers, nonetheless benefit from war’s transcending virtues of transformation and rejuvenation. Modern militarist philosophers have attempted to capture both the individual and social feelings of transcendence of combat and war. Ernst Jünger in his writings, particularly “Combat as an Inner Experience,” and Julius Evola in his “Metaphysics of War: Battle, Victory and Death in the World of Tradition” continue the tradition of representing war as a good. Martial skill and its use represent a pinnacle of human endeavors. Evola shows the close links between much of religious teachings and militarism. Given that almost every society known, from huntergatherer to modern technically advanced nations, has raided or fought wars, it would follow that this be expressed by their religion, if not caused by their religion. Huntergatherer and polytheistic religions have their military necessity expressed through social conventions and through religion. A god of war is to be found among the pantheon. Sometimes as with Greek religion there are two gods of war, or rather here a god Ares and a goddess Athena. Here the brutality and bloodlust of war is separated from the gallant and philosophical. Although usually a prominent

god or goddess, a god of war functions the same as other gods representing other human activities. War is a part of the society, but so are many other things. In this sense we would not say that religion or the religion is militaristic unless we are willing at the same time to say that a polytheistic religion is commercialist, agriculturalist, and so on, because a god or goddess represents these activities. Nevertheless, this god of war is generally prominent in the society because war is generally prominent in society. Most heroes in myth are warriors who triumph or fall in combat; whether in battle or single combat, their example expresses the general societal militarism. Monotheistic religions put all responsibility and representations into one God who must represent all of society, including the militarist element. Scholars have traced the development of the Hebrew God with some concluding that early on Yahweh is primarily a war god who develops into a multifaceted God as monotheism takes hold. While Jesus and his teachings are generally taken as pacifistic and early Christianity followed that example, many Christians began early on to question a Christian’s place in the military and government. It should be no surprise that Christianity slowly militarized as it adapted to the personal and social conditions of its adherents. If Christianity was to be the religion of all people and all society, then by nature, soldiers and their career would need to be brought into the fold. We can also speculate that the addition of the Pentateuch to the New Testament to create the Bible was in part necessary to represent this adaptation. Muhammad militarized Islam after the hijra. Through the Qur’an, hadith, and Muslim legal opinions, the textual and historical facts are that Islam is a militaristic religion, particularly through jihad of the sword. While Max Weber may have overstated the case in calling Islam a warrior religion, it is undeniable that war is central to Islam. This is best represented in the separation of the world into the Dar al-Islam (House of Submission) and Dar al-Harb (House of War). Historically this militarism served Islam well as early Muslim armies conquered vast territories across North Africa and Asia. Muhammad’s early pietistic teaching did not succeed; however, his militarized teachings were a huge success. Another example of a fully militarized religion is Hinduism. The Vedas, Puranas, and especially the epics, the Ramayana and Mahabharata, express a militarized religion.

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The two great epics extoll the sorrows and triumphs of warriors with the Mahabharata’s most famous tract, the Bhagavad Gita, presenting a consummate militarist philosophy solidifying the duty of the Kshatriya class as warriors whose duty and glory is to war. It is often forgotten or simply not known that Krishna was a magnificent warrior. The militarist expressions of these religions correspond to militarist philosophy in that war should be a path to spiritual accomplishment through heroic achievement, an identification of war with the path of God. War united with religion or traditional purpose keeps the soldier human, while a soldier who fights with no higher purpose and only for and by animal instinct is left a lesser man by the experience. Struggling against one’s enemies in war is the opportunity to struggle against one’s own inner weakness. Something superior to victory and defeat exists—spiritual action with transcendent states of consciousness beyond life and death. A juxtaposition to this can be found in Buddhism, particularly early Buddhism and much of its expression in India. Glorification of war in Buddhist texts is extremely limited and usually nullified by more frequent condemnations. War can be necessary but every indication is that soldiers must suffer the negative consequences of killing. The Buddhist Chandrakirti writing in the seventh century lamented that kings committed all sorts of violence, justifying their actions by citing the Bhagavad Gita. Nevertheless, Buddhists would militarize. Some scholars argue that Tantric Buddhism and its popularity was an effort to provide kings with a Buddhism that allowed them their worldly life. Perhaps the most well-known example of Buddhist militarism is the Zen of imperial Japan, and modern Myanmar and Thailand have been dominated by military dictatorships. Lest we always think that religion is forced to militarize, particularly in the case of the world religions, modern nation-states have established secular militaries. However, pressure from soldiers to express their religion, whether Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, and so on, while performing military duty has led to a “religionization” of sections or even all of a secular military. A final note to consider is that components commonly thought to be part of nonviolent spiritual practice were in many cases part of military practice. Asceticism and

meditation are generally thought to be the milieu of religion. However, in referring to modern technological development, Ernst Jünger states that every new invention will be turned into a weapon. If we treat human belief and practice as survival technologies, then we can say that religious belief and practice can be weaponized and used in military affairs. Thus, for example, we find that asceticism and meditation, in myth and reality, frequently augment military training and increase the skill of warriors. Militarists are part of human society and war is their ultimate expression. Whatever its cause—evolution, social structure, economic materialism, or transcendent expression—war and the militarism that underpins it are part of human society and as such part of religion. Matthew Kosuta See also Bhagavad Gita and War; Bible and War; Hindu Mythological Wars; Qur’an and War; Talmud and War Further Reading Aho, James A. Religious Mythology and the Art of War: Comparative Religious Symbolisms of Military Violence. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981. Caillois, Roger. Bellone, ou de la pente de la guerre. Paris: Edition A. G. Nizet, 1963. Evola, Julius. Metaphysics of War: Battle, Victory and Death in the World of Tradition. London: Arktos Media, 2011. Jünger, Ernst. La guerre comme expérience intérieure. Translated by François Poncet. Paris: Christian Bourgois Éditeur, 1997. Schreiber, Jean-Philippe, ed. Théologie de la guerre. Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2006.

Military Chaplains Perhaps the oldest professional ministry outside the walls of a worship center, the military chaplain is recognized in the Old Testament as early as Deuteronomy 20:2–4. The name chaplain is derived from the word for cape, in Latin capelle, with origins attributed to a benevolent Roman soldier who converted to Christianity. He is known as St. Martin of Tours, who, while on horseback, met a near-frozen beggar alongside the road. Soldier Martin, later St. Martin, took his sword and cut his personal cape apart, giving half of it to the shivering beggar. Whether this story is entirely

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accurate may be arguable, but the functions of chaplaincy remain central to the actions of St. Martin. Military chaplaincy within the United States finds its basis on two clauses within the First Amendment of the Constitution. The establishment clause prohibits the government from recognizing and promoting any specific religion. The free exercise clause empowers individual citizens to worship according to the dictates of their personal conscience and conviction. It is at this intersection of establishment and free exercise that the military chaplain conducts professional ministry. Four recognized core functions of chaplains are providing, facilitating, caring, and advising. Chaplains perform worship services and provide sacramental rites and liturgies according to the requirements of their ordaining and licensing religious body. A rabbi performs Sabbath services for Jews. A Roman Catholic priest celebrates Mass for Catholics. A Protestant minister or pastor provides worship services according to the expectations of the chaplain’s endorsing religious body. Additionally, military chaplains facilitate the religious needs of anyone within their sphere of influence as defined by the armed forces. The chaplain does not perform the service or provide the rite, but has professional training and expertise in appointing or contracting with someone within the identified faith group. When there are members of the armed forces who are Muslim and they have no access to Muslim clergy, their assigned chaplain is trained to ensure their religious requirements are satisfied unless operational requirements prohibit or delay satisfying their religious needs. For example, the unit chaplain can contract with a local imam, or ensure the military member has transportation to a local mosque. Military chaplains are caring and compassionate toward all members within their sphere of influence. Typically assigned to an individual unit or overseeing several smaller organizations, chaplains ensure everyone, including those with no religious preference, as well as atheists and agnostics, understands that the assigned chaplain is available for counseling and caregiving. This often includes advocacy for individual service members who strain for their voice to be acknowledged within the military. This role of caring often takes a prophetic role, speaking truth to power. Counseling and caregiving represents the bulk of

Chaplain Kenny Lynch conducts a service north of Hwachon, Korea, for men of the U.S. 31st Infantry Regiment, on August 28, 1951. The word “chaplain” is derived from the word for cape, in Latin capelle, with origins attributed to the benevolent Roman soldier, Martin of Tours (later known as Saint Martin). Legend has it that Saint Martin encountered a near-frozen beggar alongside the road, cut his personal cape apart with his sword, and gave half of it to the shivering beggar. (National Archives)

time spent by individual chaplains within the military. Its form is most often not within an office but on the battlefield, flight line, or ship. However, communications made to a chaplain by a member of the armed services are considered confidential, and the communication is protected as privileged. Finally, military chaplains have the unique opportunity to advise their organizational leadership on ethical, moral, and morale issues both within and beyond the organization. The chaplain may identify and articulate issues of injustice within the organization or analyze situations for religious content and advise organizational leadership on the mitigation of religiously charged scenarios. Alan T. Baker See also Just War Tradition; Military Chaplains, African American

554  Military Chaplains, African American Further Reading Hansen, Kim Phillips. Military Chaplains and Religious Diversity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Patterson, Eric. Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond: Advertisement and Leader Engagement in Highly Religious Environments. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014. Whitt, Jacqueline E. Bringing God to Men: American Military Chaplains and the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014.

Military Chaplains, African American African American military chaplains played a major role in racial elevation in 19th-century America. African Americans have participated in every military conflict since the founding of America. Indeed, Crispus Attucks (1723– 1770), the first martyr to be slain in America’s fight for independence, was of African descent. General George Washington, midway through the Revolutionary War, began to include black soldiers in his army, and 15 percent of the Continental Army was black. The “mixed multitude,” as he called them, served as an integrated force and would stand as the only integrated American military force until the Korean War in the early 1950s. African American military service and religious leadership did not take real shape until the American Civil War in 1861. The Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863, allowed for the formation of black divisions in the Union Army under the command of white officers. Despite the efforts of several white officers to keep blacks out of positions of authority, men such as Martin Delaney, Garland White, Henry McNeal Turner, Robert Smalls, and Lewis and Charles Douglass (sons of Frederick Douglass) became officers and leaders in the military and the community. It was during the Civil War that the first 14 black chaplains got their appointment. The process to get African American chaplains assigned to black regiments became another point of contention in the process of allowing black men to serve in the military. The black chaplains who were eventually appointed were chosen because they provided a distinct religious perspective for African American soldiers. The first white chaplains appointed to

the black regiments demonstrated ineffectiveness in ministering to the black troops. The first black chaplains appointed were William Jackson (1818–1899?), a Baptist minister and leader from the Underground Railroad, and William Grimes, a Methodist minister; both were assigned to be “post chaplains” in Reedville, Massachusetts. Governor John A. Andrew (1818–1867), an early advocate for African American participation in the war effort, eagerly commissioned the army’s first black chaplains and assigned them to be the “post chaplains” at Camp Meigs, Massachusetts. William Jackson eventually received his commission on March 23, 1863, and became the regimental chaplain of the 55th Infantry of the USCI (United States Colored Infantry). One of the most influential and well-known black chaplains from the Civil War era was Henry McNeal Turner (1834–1915). Turner, born free in Newberry, South Carolina, rose to a role of prominence and leadership in the movement to end slavery. Bishop Turner saw himself as a “race man” and believed in racial uplifting. He used his position as the regimental chaplain for the 1st USCI to help fight against racial injustice. As a man of God, Turner had mixed feelings about the war and his role in the war. Black chaplains such as Henry McNeal Turner and William Jackson were chosen because they were already wellestablished leaders in their community and their roles as regimental chaplains provided the necessary leadership, education, and development for black soldiers that went beyond just caring for their religious needs. The responsibility of the chaplains in the black units went beyond spiritual guidance. They were responsible for both educating and ministering to the men of their regiments, and at times even for recruitment as with the case of the 28th USCI chaplain Garland White (1829–1894). White had returned to the United States from Canada so that he could serve as a chaplain in the Union Army. One of the responsibilities he had was to go out and recruit black free men to fight and join the 28th USCI. The chaplains’ experiences during the Civil War helped to lay the foundation for the black clergymen who would serve in the Buffalo Soldier regiments after the Civil War on the plains in the American West. African American military chaplains during the second half of the 19th century focused on the education and

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positive representation of their race while in uniform. The black community viewed military service as another component in the campaign to assert black citizenship and manhood. The black clergymen chosen to serve as regimental chaplains had to create a curriculum to educate enlisted black servicemen. However, this curriculum went beyond teaching them to simply read and write. They taught their men what their citizenship meant to them and to the black community. In 1884, Henry V. Plummer (1844–1905) became the first African American to serve as a chaplain in the regular army. He was appointed to the 9th Cavalry. He successfully served and educated the men of his unit until 1894, when he was court-martialed for intemperance. The black chaplains and officers of the second half of the 19th century serving in the regular army were Allen Allensworth of the 24th Infantry (1842–1914), Theophilus Gould Steward (1843–1924) of the 25th Infantry, William T. Anderson (1859–1910) of the 10th Cavalry, and George W. Prioleau of the 9th Cavalry (1856–1927). The primary role of these chaplains assigned to the Buffalo Soldier regiments was to be an educator and spiritual adviser. Allen Allensworth, while serving with the 24th Infantry, became the first African American to achieve the rank of lieutenant colonel, and he established a reputation within the black community as an educator and political leader. Allensworth, before his appointment to the 24th, served as the only black delegate from Kentucky to the Republican National Convention (1880–1884). T. G. Steward, while serving with the 25th Infantry, was able not only to educate his troops, but also to write several books. He became a professor at Wilberforce after his retirement from the army. Both of these men focused on racial uplifting while serving as leaders in and out of the military. Allensworth went on to found Allensworth, California, the only black town in the state run entirely by African Americans. Allensworth’s education policies differed from those of previous chaplains. Instead of handling the teaching load alone, he selected a group of men and trained them as teachers. Therefore, when the War Department made elementary education compulsory for all soldiers, he had a fully trained staff to handle the new influx of students. Allensworth completed a training manual in 1889 based

on the course structure he created while at Ft. Bayard. Allensworth earned the respect of the black community because of his efforts in education. Allen Allensworth served with such distinction as the chaplain of the 24th that when army regulations allowed for the promotions of chaplains to the rank of major, he was one of the first promoted. He wrote articles about race and remained politically active throughout his military career. He wrote one article for the New York Age entitled, “Social Status of the Race.” In this article, he argued that to change the laws of oppression in the United States, public opinion needed to change because the laws were a reflection of public opinion. The activism of Allen Allensworth with the 24th Infantry served as a possible model for T. G. Steward when he assumed the chaplaincy of the 25th Infantry. Steward wrote an article in 1894 entitled “The Colored American as a Soldier” to dispel the myths and stereotypes about black men as somehow being less honorable and efficient as soldiers. When he arrived at his post, he did not expect as warm a welcome as he received and this played a major role in his continued support of the army during the Spanish-American War (1898–1902). “What can elevate us? To elevate the blacks and place them beyond the reach of foul wrong, power, force, must be put in their hands. . . . the strength must be infused in the man. He must be made strong. This will come only from labor, study, and thought. The only way to elevate is to increase the intrinsic worth.” Chaplain Theophilus Gould Steward wrote these words in 1867 to inspire and elevate the black race. Steward was one of the most prominent thinkers of his time. He was a contemporary of W. E. B. Du Bois, Charles Young, Frederick Douglass, and Bishop Henry McNeal Turner. Steward used his position as army chaplain to continue his goal of uplifting and empowering the African American community. Therefore, because Steward was responsible for the education of the men of the 25th Infantry, it adds further doubt to the claims made by Lt. Moss in 1896 depicting the men as speaking in a slave-like dialect, when Steward had been teaching the men since 1894. Steward, once he retired from the army in 1904, would go on to be a professor of history, logic, and French at Wilberforce University. Albert Miller in his biography of Steward described him as a “race man, one who had a strong sense of racial identity and who

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constantly fought for racial pride, elevation, and self determination.” The students of T. G. Steward would surely have been taught to adhere to the ideology of racial uplifting and elevation. T. G. Steward was not the only chaplain responsible for the education of black troops after the Civil War. One of the key differences between the Buffalo Soldier regiments and the all-white regiments was the duties of the chaplain. During the Civil War, chaplains in the black volunteer regiments were responsible for teaching the men to read and write. This tradition carried over into the black regular regiments. Chaplains with the black regulars traveled with the men and were responsible for not only their spiritual guidance. The educational programs of Steward resembled Plummer’s and Allensworth’s, but he also had classes for the women of the post, teaching them European history on Sundays. The need to provide a complete education to the men of their regiments supports the idea that these chaplains, such as Steward, Plummer and Allensworth, helped inspire these men to be racially conscious and for some to become focused on formulating supportive communities outside of the Jim Crow South. The importance of the regimental chaplains is overlooked when discussing how these soldiers thought about themselves as both members of an oppressed group and members of an imperialist army. When historians view these men, it is often through the clouded lens of devout loyalty to the flag, arguing that they deserved citizenship. These men already thought of themselves as citizens. It was the chaplains, in particular the black chaplains Allen Allensworth, T. G. Steward, and Henry V. Plummer, who incorporated the ideology of racial uplifting within their teaching methods and taught these soldiers how to be productive and disciplined men. Le’Trice Donaldson See also American Civil War, Religious Dimensions of; Just War Tradition; Military Chaplains; Spanish-American War, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Alexander, Charles. Battles and Victories of Allen Allensworth, A.M., Ph.D., Lieutenant-Colonel, Retired, U.S. Army. Boston: Sherman, French, 1914.

Astor, Gerald. Right to Fight: A History of African American Soldiers in the Military. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001. Buckley, Gail. American Patriots: The Story of Blacks in the Military from the Revolution to Desert Storm. New York: Random House, 2002. Cornish, Dudley Taylor. The Sable Arm: Black Troops in the Union Army, 1861–1865. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987. Fowler, Arlen. Black Infantry in the West, 1869–1890. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971. Guthrie, J. M. Campfires of the Afro-American: or the Colored Man as a Patriot. Philadelphia: Afro-American, 1899. Kenner, Charles. Buffalo Soldiers and Officers of the Ninth Cavalry. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. Lamm, Alan K. Five Black Preachers in Army Blue, 1884–1901, The Buffalo Soldier Chaplains. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998. Miller, Albert. Elevating the Race: Theophilus Gould Steward, Black Theology, and the Making of An African American Civil Society, 1865–1924. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2003. Stover, Earl F. Up from Handymen: The U.S. Army Chaplaincy, 1865–1920. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2004.

Military Raid in Islam Within pre-Islamic Arabia most warfare involved conflict between rival tribes over grazing and access to water, or to impose alliances. Such tribes might also threaten merchant caravans to extort protection money. When nomadic tribes clashed with settled tribes the former tended to threaten the latter’s life-supporting groves of palm trees, again with minimal casualties. This razzia or ghazw warfare was essentially a form of economic pressure designed to weaken an enemy’s ability to survive in harsh ecological conditions. Though such campaigns tended to be prolonged, they resulted in few casualties, being governed by customary rules based on mutual self-interest. Thus, the Arab tradition of warfare was based on raiding rather than the seizure of territory, and the first Muslim campaigns against the neighboring Byzantine and Sassanian empires were again preceded by extensive raids that avoided the main local garrisons or fortified places. After the Byzantines retreated into Anatolia, caliphal forces advanced into Cilicia,

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which became a major springboard for raids into Anatolia. These were undertaken almost every summer, either from Cilicia in the west or Maras in the east. Occasionally a large raiding force would spend the winter within Byzantine territory, having seized a fortification and planted crops to harvest in spring. Meanwhile, Islamic advances on more distant frontiers halted, largely because they were no longer economically worthwhile and because Muslim manpower was overstretched. During the eighth and ninth centuries, caliphal armies proved particularly effective in long-distance raiding and the bringing together of separate columns deep within enemy territory. Smaller raids against the Byzantine Empire would then strike through one of the three main passes, sometimes entering by one and leaving by another to avoid being trapped by defending forces. Their objectives were to capture horse herds, take prisoners for ransom, and seize grain stores or the valuables kept in fortresses. In fact, they struck at the Byzantine Empire’s economic foundations and were thus in the same tradition as pre-Islamic Arabian warfare. Such warfare tended to decline in importance during the 11th to 13th centuries, when the Islamic world was largely on the defensive. Raiding strategies revived in a modified form during the early centuries of Ottoman history when Muslim forces advanced deep into Europe. Here Ottoman raids were not spontaneous but formed part of a broad strategic plan, being followed up by operations designed to seize and consolidate territory already weakened by raiding. By the late 14th century, the Ottoman army had, in fact, evolved its own patterns of campaigning, which normally ran from August to October. Horse-tail banners guarded by elite troops would march one day ahead of the main army within friendly territory but would pull back once the frontier had been passed. Next came an advance screen of raiders and reconnaissance troops, usually drawn from auxiliary horsemen, followed by the main forces. Light cavalry raiders now consisted of akinjis and delis who attempted to spread fear and confusion far ahead of this main force, while also gathering information and securing roads, bridges, and mountain passes. David Nicolle See also Sharia and War

Further Reading Inalcik, H. “Ottoman Methods of Conquest.” Studia Islamica 2 (1954): 103–29. Jandora, J. W. “Developments in Islamic Warfare: The Early Conquests.” Studia Islamica 64 (1986): 101–13. Nicolle, D. Crusader Warfare. Vol. II: Muslims, Mongols and the Struggle against the Crusades 1050–1300 AD. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007.

Milvian Bridge,  Battle of (312 CE) The Battle of Milvian Bridge between Constantine I, “the Great” (Flavius Valerius Aurelius Constantinus, ca. 280– 337 CE), and his imperial rival in the western Roman Empire, Maxentius (Marcus Aurelius Valerius Maxentius, ca. 282–312), marks the traditional date when Christianity in the Roman Empire transitioned in status from an institution oppressed by the Roman state to one sanctioned and promoted by it. The two and one-half centuries of Christian experience in the Roman Empire prior to 312 CE was a complex mix of practice and belief. While the policies of emperors and governors toward Christians alternated between indifference and occasional persecution, the Roman Empire’s internal infrastructure offered reliable advantages to the group, especially in the ready routes by which the faithful could travel and spread throughout the empire. The earliest Christian communities emerged in the eastern empire, but by following empire trade routes, Christians occupied footholds all around the Mediterranean periphery by 300 CE. The mistreatment of the Christians by the Roman establishment grew out of the Roman attitude toward religion. While Romans permitted those they conquered to continue to practice their local religions with little interference and even, in some cases, adopted gods and cults from other societies, their tolerance had limits. A central tenet of the Roman state religion was the belief in the pax deorum, or the peace of the gods. This belief postulated a mutually beneficial relationship between the citizens of the Roman Empire and their gods. Preservation of this bond depended on the proper observance of religious rituals by all Roman citizens. In return, the gods safeguarded Rome’s public

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welfare. When the citizenship was limited to Rome and Italy, this had little effect on the distant provinces of the empire. This changed in 212 CE when the Roman Eeperor Caracalla issued an edict (the Antonine Constitution) that granted Roman citizenship to nearly all free inhabitants of the empire. The edict meant that all the new citizens could be required to participate in Roman civic religion, including the imperial cult. Meant to safeguard Rome, the new law threatened Christian citizens by creating a conflict between their new status and their Christian duties related to eternal salvation. In particular, Christians refused to make the necessary sacrifices to emperors they viewed as no more worthy of worship than other mortal men. Though this was treasonous, most Roman bureaucrats paid little attention to Christians unless their rejections became the subject of official public notice. This happened occasionally, especially during the third century, when the empire suffered an extended period of political instability and civil war. Emperor Trajan Decius (r. 249–251 CE) blamed the ongoing turmoil on the failure of Roman citizens to properly propitiate the gods. Accordingly, he ordered all citizens to perform the appropriate sacrifices and prove compliance with an official certificate. Failure to obey could result in execution. Some Christians refused, and the persecutions that followed ended only after the emperor and his son died in battle. As Christians increased in number, Roman leaders began to accommodate them. Emperor Gallienus (r. 253–268) issued the first imperial edict of tolerance in 260 CE, and a period of persecution under Diocletian from 303 to 311 was ended by another edict of toleration by Emperor Galerius. The political events that led to the transformation of Christianity into the official religion of the Roman Empire began in 293, when Emperor Diocletian (r. 284–305) sought a solution to the pressing problems of succession, legitimacy, and the maintenance of effective administrative control over the empire. His solution was to establish a system—the tetrarchy—that divided ruling authority among four leaders, each of whom was responsible for ruling a different region in the empire. Two senior rulers with the title of Augustus divided authority between the eastern and western empire, and two junior rulers (Caesars) occupied subordinate positions in each region. In the

first tetrarchy, Diocletian, as senior, ruled in the east, and his co-Augustus Maximian controlled Italy and Africa. Caesars Constantius and Galerius governed Gaul and Britain and the Danubian region respectively. Constantius (Flavius Valerius Constantius), the father of Constantine, became the western Augustus in 305 when Diocletian and his co-Augustus Maximian abdicated, but in 306, while campaigning in Britain with his son, Constantius died at York. According to the tetrarchic system, the western Caesar, Severus, should have replaced Constantius, but Constantius’s soldiers ignored the system and proclaimed Constantine as the western Augustus. This disruption presented Galerius, the Augustus in the east, with a dilemma. His compromise solution secured the position of western Augustus for Severus but also made Constantine the western Caesar. However, Maxentius, son of the former emperor, Maximian, also sought power in the west. A tax rebellion in Rome provided him with an opportunity, and in October 306, citizens of the city declared Maxentius to be their emperor. Severus attempted to suppress the rebellion in early 307, but Severus’s troops mutinied. He was captured, and after an attack by Galerius to save him failed, Maxentius ordered him killed. Concerned that the empire was falling again into disorder, Diocletian, Galerius, and Maximian met in November 308 at Carnuntum and named Licinius to join Galerius as co-Augusti. Galerius subsequently named Maximinus II Daia and Constantine as Sons of the Augusti, rather than co-Caesars. In the summer of 312, Constantine gathered forces to deal with Maxentius. His army overran northern Italy and advanced on Rome. Traditional accounts record that prior to the battle Constantine beheld a vision that told him to march into battle bearing the emblem of Christ. The emblem with which Constantine was told to adorn his soldiers’ shields was later described as the Chi-Rho—the first two letters of Christ’s name (ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ) in the Greek alphabet. Lactantius, a scholar at Constantine’s court, reported that this vision appeared in a dream. A later account by Bishop Eusebius tells instead of the appearance to the army on the march of a cross of light in the sky together with the words in hoc signo vinces (in this sign you will conquer). Eusebius adds that Christ also appeared to Constantine in a dream to emphasize the command.

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Though there is no appearance of this emblem on the shields in the depiction of the battle on Constantine’s arch in Rome, accounts say Constantine placed the sign ΧΡ on his army’s battle standards and shields. The two armies met outside the city at the Milvian Bridge that led across the Tiber River into Rome. Maxentius’s soldiers fought with their backs to the river, but unable to stand against Constantine’s inspired soldiers and with only the single inadequate stone bridge by which to retreat over the Tiber, they were defeated with heavy losses that included Maxentius. Constantine, now sole emperor in the west, gave credit for his victory to the Christian God. In 313 CE Constantine and Licinius, his eastern counterpart, met at Milan and agreed on a statement of religious toleration, the Edict of Milan, that ended the persecution of Christians and also granted forbearance to all religions in the empire. Following the issuing of the edict, internal divisions between Christians over interpretations of church teachings rose in significance. Constantine called a council of church leaders at Nicaea in 325 CE to resolve these issues that included clarifying the nature of Christ. The Nicene Creed that resulted remains an important part of Christian belief in modern times. Christianity, while not yet the empire’s official religion at the time of Constantine’s death, had become the most important religion in the empire. In 380, Emperor Theodosius I established Nicene Christianity as the empire’s sole authorized religion. Larry A. Grant See also Christianity and War; Constantine; Roman Army and Religion Further Reading Barnes, Timothy. Blackwell Ancient Lives: Constantine Dynasty: Religion and Power in the Later Roman Empire. Somerset, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2013. Brent, Allen. Political History of Early Christianity. London: T & T Clark International, 2009. Holloway, R. Ross. Constantine and Rome. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004. Leithart, Peter J. Defending Constantine: The Twilight of an Empire and the Dawn of Christendom. Westmont, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2010. Lenski, Noel. The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Constantine. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pohlsander, Hans A. The Emperor Constantine. London: Routledge, 1996.

Van Dam, Raymond. Remembering Constantine at the Milvian Bridge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Missouri Mormon War (1838) The Missouri Mormon War was a short armed conflict in the United States between Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) and non-Mormon settlers resulting in the Mormons’ expulsion from Missouri. After the founder of the Mormon religion, Joseph Smith (1805–1844), identified Independence, Missouri in Jackson County as the site of the New Jerusalem in 1831, Mormon emigration to Missouri in the 1830s led to growing tensions between Mormon and non-Mormon residents. Community cohesion among the Mormons led to economic success, electoral influence in local politics, and limited assimilation with local non-Mormon communities. Additionally, Mormon evangelization of Native Americans, abolitionist sympathies, and conviction that their inheritance of the land was divinely ordained threatened local norms. Increasing tensions led to armed mobs driving the Mormons out of Jackson County to Clay County in 1833. In 1836, now numbering several thousand converts, Mormon settlers relocated northward to the newly created and sparsely populated Caldwell County to establish a new western center of Mormon settlement. Mormon emigration continued to increase in 1837– 1838, due to the demise of the other major Mormon settlement in Kirtland, Ohio. By the summer of 1838, more than 10,000 Mormons resided in Missouri and had begun settling in counties adjacent to Caldwell County. The growth of the Mormon population revived tensions and led to disagreement over the rights of Mormons to settle outside Caldwell County. Violence erupted on August 6, 1838, when a nonMormon group attempted to prevent Mormons from voting in Daviess County elections. On the same day in Carroll County, a ballot measure passed expelling Mormons from that county. Armed non-Mormons harassed and attacked Mormon settlers in both of these counties, burning and plundering homes and property and besieging Mormons

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in the town of DeWitt in Daviess County. Most Mormons fled or were driven out of surrounding counties to Caldwell County. Governor Lilburn Boggs, sympathetic to the non-Mormons, declined to intervene and local county militia proved ineffective in defusing the crisis as many threatened to join the non-Mormon bands. In response, Mormon leaders assembled the pro-Mormon Caldwell County militia and, joined by armed Mormon settlers, marched into Daviess County. They burned and plundered non-Mormon homes and property including most of the town of Gallatin, driving non-Mormon residents from the county. On October 25, 1838, at the Battle of Crooked River, a Mormon force attacked and drove off a militia unit that had been harassing Mormon settlers. Though casualties were light (four fatalities total), the ensuing panic caused Governor Boggs to call out 2,500 state militiamen and issue an executive order calling for Mormons to be driven from the state. At the same time, 240 non-Mormon militiamen attacked a Mormon settlement at Haun’s Mill, killing 17 Mormons. These included at least two children and one adult killed in cold blood after the Mormons had surrendered. Confronted with the overwhelming force of the state militia, the Mormons at the Caldwell County seat of Far West surrendered, giving up their arms and turning over their leaders to the militia. The militia then plundered the town once the Mormons were disarmed. Joseph Smith and other Mormon leaders were imprisoned and tried on charges of treason, murder, and arson, as well as other lesser charges.. Defenseless and facing the wrath of local residents, Mormons fled the state for Illinois during the winter of 1838–1839. Smith escaped prison in early 1839 and made his way to Illinois where he began organizing a new Mormon settlement. Joshua Michael See also Illinois Mormon War; Mormon Rebellion Further Reading Bushman, Claudia Lauper, and Richard Lyman Bushman. Building the Kingdom: A History of Mormons in America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. LeSueur, Stephen. The 1838 Mormon War in Missouri. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1987.

Mohammed Omar, Mullah (d. 2013) Born sometime between 1953 and 1960, Mullah Mohammed Omar became famous as the reclusive founder and spiritual leader of the Taliban. Omar was among the mujahideen warlords engaged in jihad and fighting against Soviet occupation in the 1980s. He was a Pashtun, but belonged to the Ghilzai tribe that pales in political influence and connections next to the Durrani tribe that elevated President Hamid Karzai into power. After founding the Taliban in 1994, Omar became emir and head of state of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, a title he would hold between 1996, when the Taliban took Kabul, and 2001, when his regime was ousted by U.S.-backed forces. The Taliban started as a group of vigilantes in an effort to fight back against warlords in Omar’s home village of Sangsar in Kandahar province. Omar became a mullah in Sangsar, trained in religious law and doctrine, but continued to refer to himself as a talib (seeking student or seekers of knowledge). His Taliban movement soon grew into a religious police force that went after corruption, extortion, and violence in all of Afghanistan, a country of anarchy in 1994. In 1996 the Taliban seized power in the Afghan capital. Mullah Mohammed Omar assumed the title Emir alMumineen (Leader of the Faithful) after briefly donning Muhammad’s cloak at a Kandahar mosque in 1996. He would continue to serve as military, political, and spiritual leader of the Taliban until his death in 2013. In this position, he led an ascetic life in poverty and supported a puritanical interpretation of sharia law. Like most Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line, Omar was strongly influenced by the fundamentalist Deobandi school of thought that established madrassas and seminaries along Pakistan’s western border. Similar to and supported by Saudi Wahhabism, the Deobandi branch teaches that Muslims need to return to the orthodox path in order to overcome Western corruption and restore the golden age of Islam. Beginning in 1996, Omar granted refuge to Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden officially pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar in 1999, giving rise to an alliance that has continued even after bin Laden’s death, as Ayman al-Zawahiri also pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar and his successor, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour. When the 9/11 attacks prompted the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Mullah Omar went into hiding. According to

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Taliban sources, he never left Afghanistan; however, others said he was in Pakistan, where he was supported and protected by the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency. He is believed to have died of tuberculosis at a hospital in Pakistan in April 2013, but his death did not become known until August 2015. The Taliban is thought to have kept his death a secret to implement unpopular decisions and policy reforms under his successor, Mansour, another founding member of the Taliban, as well as to maintain Taliban unity while U.S. and NATO forces were withdrawing from Afghanistan. Dorle Hellmuth See also Bin Laden, Osama; Islam and War (Jihad); Mujahideen; Sharia and War; Taliban Further Reading “An Interview with Abubkar Siddique: 5 Questions on the Taliban Leadership Transition.” Jamestown Foundation, July/August 2015.

“Obituary: Mullah Omar.” Economist, August 8, 2015. Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010. “The Taliban.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 2015. Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower. New York: Vintage, 2007.

Mongols Mongols are a nomadic people of Altaic stock who first appear in Chinese texts of the 11th century and who in the 13th century came to rule an empire embracing most of Asia. For several decades after the 1230s, they were Latin Christendom’s most formidable eastern neighbor. At a tribal assembly around the year 1206, the Mongol leader Temüjin, who had reduced the neighboring tribes of

This scene from the 14th-century Persian manuscript Jami al-Tavarikh depicts the capture of a Chinese town by Genghis Khan, the founder and emperor of the Mongol Empire. (Corel)

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the eastern Asian steppe, was proclaimed ruler of all the tent-dwelling peoples under the title of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan (probably Mong.“hard ruler” or “stern ruler”). Ching­ gis Khan (d. 1227) began the conquest of North China (1211), then ruled by the Chin dynasty; reduced the seminomadic Qara-Khitan Empire in Central Asia (1215–1218); and in the course of a seven-year campaign (1218–1224) to the west accomplished the destruction of the Muslim Empire of Khwarezm in what is now Iran and Turkmenistan. Why the Mongols came to be known as Tatars (the name of an enemy tribe crushed by Chinggis Khan in 1202) is unclear; in Latin Europe the term was corrupted to Tartars, reinforcing the West’s association of the Mongols with the hell (Lat. Tartarus ) of classical mythology. In any case, by the time they reached Europe most of the Mongols’ nomadic troops were of Turkic stock. At both the administrative and the ideological level, the Mongol Empire represented a significant advance on earlier steppe confederacies. Their early conquests had brought the Mongols into contact with other tribes, such as the Naiman and the Kereyid, which had been in the process of attaining statehood, and with the semisedentary Turkic Uighurs, who had possessed literate traditions of government for some centuries and whose script Chinggis Khan adopted for the written Mongolian of his chancery. It was probably also through the Uighurs, and other Turks whom they incorporated in their war machine, that the Mongols had access to long-established notions of imperial rule. At what stage they developed the idea that heaven (Mong. Tenggeri ) had conferred on them rulership of the entire world, we cannot be sure. It may postdate the flight of certain of their nomadic enemies into sedentary territories; conceivably, it belongs to the era of Chinggis Khan’s successor. The notion is articulated in the ultimatums that the Mongols sent out to rulers who had not yet submitted: formulaic documents that demanded from those rulers acknowledgment of their place in the Mongol world empire and threatened them with attack should they refuse. The earliest of such documents to survive dates from 1237. Various reasons have been put forward to explain the phenomenal pace of the Mongol conquests. Like those of other steppe nomadic peoples, their forces were highly mobile and maneuverable, which gave them an advantage over the armies of their sedentary opponents: each Mongol

warrior, whose main weapon was the composite bow, traveled with several spare horses. However, their decimal chain of command was not an innovation, and their proverbial discipline is unlikely to have exceeded that of the Chinese troops they encountered. What particularly distinguished them from their enemies was their cohesiveness. Chinggis Khan had eliminated the ruling elites of those peoples who resisted him and divided them up into new military units under trusted officers; even tribes that cooperated, and were therefore permitted to remain intact, were entrusted to new commanders from different tribal backgrounds. The imperial guard, his own creation, numbering 10,000 men and drawn from a wide range of peoples, served as the nursery of an officer class that owed allegiance to Chinggis Khan and his dynasty alone. In this fashion the conqueror surmounted the centrifugal effects of the old clan and tribal affiliations, forging a more homogeneous structure than had been available to the Mongols’ precursors. This cohesiveness contrasted sharply with the disunity of many of their opponents. During the early stages of the war in northern China, the conquerors benefited from the assistance of several elements that resented Chin rule and saw the Mongols as a means of deliverance. In Central Asia, Chinggis Khan’s generals won the support of the Muslims, who had been persecuted by the last QaraKhitan sovereign, and thereby incidentally undermined the ability of the shah of Khwarezm to portray his own struggle with them as a holy war. Territorial expansion continued under Chinggis Khan’s immediate successors who, with the title of qaghan (great khan), reigned from their principal base at Qaraqorum in Mongolia. Chinggis Khan’s son Ogodei (Ogedei) (1229– 1241) presided over the final destruction of the Chin Empire (1234), inaugurated the long-drawn-out war against the Sung in South China (from 1235), and dispatched fresh forces to eliminate the vestiges of Khwarezmian resistance in Iran (1229); these troops reduced Georgia and Greater Armenia to tributary status (1236–1239) and shattered the Seljuk sultanate of Rum at Kösedagh (1243). From 1236 the great khan’s senior nephew Batu commanded a major expedition that completed the subjugation of the steppe and forest peoples of western Asia, notably the Volga Bulgars (1237) and the Cumans or Qipchaq (1237–1239), and overwhelmed the fragmented

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principalities of Russia (1237–1240). Batu’s campaigns mark the foundation of the Mongol power known as the Golden Horde in the southern Russian steppe. After the enthronement of another of Chinggis Khan’s grandsons, Mongke (1251–1259), the conflict with the Sung was resumed in earnest, and the new sovereign’s brother Hulegu headed a campaign to southwest Asia, overthrowing in turn the Ismacili Assassins of northern Persia (1256) and the Abbasid caliphate at Baghdad (1258). By 1260, the Mongol Empire extended from the Siberian forests to the western Punjab and from the Yellow Sea to the eastern Mediterranean coast. But Mongke’s death was followed by a civil war in Mongolia between his brothers Qubilai (Kublai) and Arigh Böke, in which members of the imperial dynasty took opposing sides. In the west, Hulegu favored Qubilai, while the ruler of the Golden Horde, Batu’s brother Berke, supported Arigh Böke. With the outbreak of conflict among Chinggis Khan’s descendants, the unitary empire dissolved into a number of independent, and usually hostile, khanates: the Golden Horde, with its center at Sarai on the lower Volga; a polity in Central Asia ruled by the descendants of Chinggis Khan’s second son Chaghadai; the ilkhanate in Persia and Iraq, governed by Hulegu and his line; and the great khan’s own territory in the Far East. The Mongol dominions continued to expand only in the Far East, where the conquest of the Sung was completed in 1279, though seaborne invasions of Japan and Java failed. Qubilai reigned as a Chinese emperor rather than simply as a Mongol great khan: he abandoned Qaraqorum for Ta-tu (Mong. Khanbaligh, “the khan’s city”) close to modern Beijing, and adopted for his dynasty the Chinese name of Yuan (1271). The Yüan were expelled from China in 1368, and the ilkhanate collapsed after 1335, but the other two Mongol states survived for significantly longer: the Golden Horde until 1502 (and its successor state in the Crimea until 1783) and the Chaghadayid khanate until 1678. The Mongols menaced Latin Christendom on two fronts: in Eastern Europe and in Outremer. The first reports of the attack on the Khwarezmian Empire, reaching Egypt in 1221, prompted the commanders of the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221) to identify the newcomers with the long-awaited forces of the great Eastern king Prester John, though news of the defeat of the Cumans and their Russian

allies on the Kalka River (1223) was less encouraging. The Mongols attacked the Latin world only after the sack of Kiev (December 1240). While Batu and three separate armies entered Hungary, two divisions protected his flank by ravaging Poland, where they crushed Duke Henry II of Silesia and his allies near Liegnitz (modern-day Legnica, Poland) on April 9, 1241; ravaging the borders of Saxony and Bohemia, they then passed through Moravia into Hungary. Here King Béla IV was overwhelmed at Mohi near the Sajó River on April 11 and fled toward the Adriatic coast while the Mongols devastated his kingdom east of the Danube. In January 1242 they crossed the frozen river and harassed the western provinces before retiring into the steppes north of the Black Sea. In the Near East, the general Baiju sent a division into northern Syria in the summer of 1244: various Ayyubid Muslim rulers promised tribute, but Prince Bohemond V of Antioch defiantly rejected an ultimatum. One important consequence of this advance was that several thousand Khwarezmian horsemen, displaced from northern Iraq, moved south and sacked Jerusalem in August 1244 before joining forces with the Egyptian sultan and crushing the Franks and their Muslim allies at La Forbie in October. The Mongol attacks of the 1240s threw into relief the disharmony and unpreparedness of the West, where the Mongol menace had perhaps not been taken sufficiently seriously. Pope Gregory IX and Emperor Frederick II were unwilling to resolve their differences to cooperate against the Mongols, and a crusade mustered in Germany in 1241 dissolved before it could make contact with the invaders. Not until the pontificate of Innocent IV (1243–1254) did the Curia endeavor to negotiate with the enemy. Innocent dispatched three separate embassies—two, comprising Dominican friars, to the Near East and a third, composed of Franciscans, through the Russian steppes—with letters protesting the attacks on Christian nations and urging the Mongols to accept the Christian faith. The reports submitted by these friars in 1247 furnished the papacy with its first full dossier of information on the enemy, and they are among our most important Western sources, particularly that of the Franciscan John of Piano Carpini, who visited the court of the Great Khan Guyug. But this aside, they achieved little more than espionage, merely bringing back ultimatums that required the pope’s submission. When in

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1248 the general Eljigidei, who had superseded Baiju in northwestern Persia, sent a cordial message to the French king Louis IX in Cyprus, its moderate tone occasioned great excitement in the West; but most probably its aim was merely to deflect Louis’s crusading army from territories on which the Mongols had immediate designs. At this time, the Mongols had no allies, only subjects—or enemies awaiting annihilation. Following the cataclysm of 1241–1242, King Béla IV of Hungary made efforts to prepare for the next assault, instigating the construction of stone castles on his eastern frontiers and entering into marriage alliances with several of his neighbors, including a Cuman chief whose daughter married his son and heir Stephen (later Stephen V); he also recruited Cumans as auxiliaries. In 1259 Berke’s forces attacked Poland, sacking Sandomir and Kraków, but the splintering of the empire in 1261–1262 prevented the Mongols from following up this campaign. The Golden Horde remained content with exacting tribute and military assistance from the Russian princes and adjudicating their succession disputes. The khans were in any event probably more interested in operations south of the Caucasus at the expense of the Ilkhans than in Russia or, by extension, Hungary and Poland. Nevertheless, the Golden Horde remained a hostile power on the frontiers of Latin Christendom. In the Baltic region, the Mongols tended to act through their Russian satellites and the pagan Lithuanians, who paid them tribute intermittently, against external enemies such as the Teutonic Order. Further south the Golden Horde threatened for a time to draw into its orbit further non-Latin polities that might otherwise have succumbed to Latin pressure, such as Bulgaria and the Byzantine Empire. During the heyday of Noghai (d. 1299), a member of the dynasty who was virtually co-ruler in the western regions of the Pontic steppe, Mongol influence extended deep into the Balkans. However, Noghai’s amicable relations with Byzantium did not outlast him, and in the early 14th century the khans launched a series of invasions of Thrace. As late as 1341, when Emperor Andronikos III bought off a Mongol attack, the Golden Horde may still have constituted a greater menace than did the nascent Ottoman polity. The Mongols dealt with Hungary and Poland more directly. Although there were no further campaigns on the

scale of 1241–1242 or 1259, there were frequent raids and substantial attacks on both countries in the 1280s. The extinction of the client Russian princes of Galicia and Volh­ ynia in 1323 provoked fresh tensions, which were resolved when the new ruler, the Polish prince Bołeslaw of Mazovia, maintained payment of tribute. But after his death (1340), the Mongols reacted sharply to the occupation of Galicia by Kazimierz III of Poland with a series of attacks, and during the middle decades of the 14th century, the khan appears to have recruited Lithuanian assistance against him. If Polish appeals to successive popes elicited little or no military aid, they did at least secure the grant of crusading tenths and twentieths (taxes in support of crusading enterprises) rather more readily than did the simultaneous pleas of the Hungarian crown. Around 1360, however, the Golden Horde, already badly hit by the Black Death, succumbed to a prolonged phase of internecine conflict, and the attacks of the conqueror Timur (Tamerlane) in the 1390s dealt its commercial centers a severe blow. The khans were powerless to impede the rise of Lithuania and its appropriation of Russian territory, and by the early 15th century they had sunk to being merely auxiliaries in the conflicts of their western neighbors: a Mongol contingent fought at the battle of Tannenberg (1410) alongside the Poles and Lithuanians against the Teutonic Order. When Hulegu entered Syria early in 1260, King Hetoum I of Cilicia, who had been subject to the Mongols since 1246, joined forces with him and induced his son-in-law, Bohemond VI of Antioch, to become tributary to the conquerors and accept a Mongol resident in Antioch, for which the prince was excommunicated by the papal legate at Acre. Hulegu left in March for Azerbaijan with the bulk of his army, leaving his general Kitbugha, at the head of a rump force, to receive the surrender of Damascus and to confront the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The government at Acre (modern-day ‘Akko, Israel) rejected demands for submission, and the Mongols sacked Sidon in August 1260 in reprisal for a Frankish raid on the interior. When the Mamluk sultan Qutuz advanced against the Mongols, the Franks gave the Egyptian army safe-conduct and furnished it with provisions. The Egyptian defeat of Kitbugha at Ayn Jalut on September 3 relieved the kingdom of the Mongol threat, although Qutuz was murdered soon after and the new Mamluk sultan, Baybars, who was not bound by any

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agreement with the Franks, embarked on the piecemeal reduction of the Latin states of Outremer. Like the sudden retreat from Hungary in 1242, which has usually been linked with the death of the Great Khan Ögödei, Hulegu’s withdrawal from Syria in 1260 has been ascribed to the fortuitous demise of Mongke in the Far East, as both events would have required the Mongol princes and generals to assemble and elect a successor. It is at least as likely, however, that both the Hungarian and the Syrian campaigns were abandoned on logistical grounds, given the inadequacy of the available pasturage for the Mongols’ vast numbers of horses and livestock. The same circumstance perhaps underlay the Ilkhans’ efforts, from 1262 onward, to secure Western military collaboration against the Mamluks. In part this was a response to the internecine conflicts following Mongke’s death: menaced by the Golden Horde and other hostile kinsmen to their rear, and without access to the resources of the unitary Mongol Empire, the Ilkhans were compelled to seek external allies if they were to pursue the dynasty’s traditional mission of expansion. But just as in China, where ecological problems obliged the nomadic Mongols to rely on Chinese infantry in large numbers, so in Palestine they proposed to recruit the assistance of Frankish troops who were more accustomed to the terrain and the summer heat. The Ilkhans corresponded with successive popes and the kings of France and England, sometimes also with those of Aragon and Sicily. The Mongol ambassadors, who stressed their masters’ favor toward Christians and Christianity, were frequently expatriate Italians who had entered the Ilkhans’ service; on occasion, the ambassadors were Nestorian Christians, like the monk Rabban Sawma, who in 1287–1288 visited Naples, Rome, and Paris, and met King Edward I of England at Bordeaux. In any event, these exchanges, which persisted until 1307 (or possibly later), bore no fruit, despite the fact that the Mamluks posed a growing threat to the Latin states and eliminated them in 1291. In his crusading treatise, written in 1307 at the behest of Pope Clement V, the Armenian prince Hetoum (a nephew of King Hetoum I), strongly advocated LatinMongol collaboration, which he saw as offering his native country the best hope of avoiding a Mamluk conquest. Their past record, however, rendered the Mongols an object of widespread distrust, and the papacy was reluctant to

enter into firm commitments until the Ilkhan had accepted baptism. On crusade in 1271, before his accession, Edward of England tried unsuccessfully to coordinate his activities with the forces of the Ilkhan Abaka; but otherwise the few instances of military cooperation involved the Franks of Outremer and Cyprus. Some Hospitallers from Margat may have reinforced Abaka’s army when it invaded northern Syria in 1281; and after Abaka’s grandson, the Ilkhan Ghazan (1295–1304), launched his first attack on the Mamluks in 1299–1300, defeating the sultan and overrunning the whole of Syria and Palestine, King Henry II of Cyprus and the Templars tried to anticipate his return by occupying the island of Ruad (modern-day Arwad, Syria), off the coast near Tortosa. Ghazan’s later, and less impressive, Syrian campaigns in 1301 and 1303 did without Frankish assistance altogether. Ghazan and his brother and successor, Oljeitu (1304–1316), the last Ilkhan to invade Syria, were both Muslim converts. Yet it was seemingly the obstacles to a successful war with Egypt, rather than religious considerations, that led Öljeitü’s young son Abu Said (1316–1335) to make peace with the Mamluk regime (1323). The union of much of Asia under a single government (until 1261) facilitated long-distance commerce; the Mongol sovereigns, moreover, far from passively presiding over the growth of trade, actively fostered it. Western merchants who were already active in the eastern Mediterranean traveled east in quest of high-value, low-bulk commodities such as silk, spices, pepper, and precious stones. There was a Venetian presence in the Persian city of Tabriz by 1263, and within a few years the Genoese had bases at Caffa (modern-day Feodosiya, Ukraine) in the Crimea and Tana on the Sea of Azov. The Italians did not always enjoy friendly relations with the Golden Horde khans, who resented Genoese attempts to assert their own sovereignty within Caffa: the Mongols attacked the town in 1298, in 1308, and in 1345–1346, when Pope Clement VI sought to launch a crusade in its defense. At what point Western traders penetrated as far as China is uncertain. Although Marco Polo and his father and uncle were in China starting around 1275, Polo’s book suggests that all three were in Qubilai’s service; we do not know to what extent they engaged in commerce on their own account. The heyday of the Western mercantile presence in the Far East, for which physical evidence has survived in the form of two Latin

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tombstones in the city of Yang-chou (dated 1342 and 1344), was relatively short lived, from 1300 to 1350. The Black Death probably dealt a severe blow to Latin residents in China and Central Asia, while further west the Mamluks seized Ayas (modern-day Yumurtalık, Turkey) in Cilicia (1337), one of the termini of the trans-Asiatic routes, and in Persia the turbulence that followed the collapse of the ilkhanate made conditions for trade less propitious. Latin missionaries frequently accompanied Latin traders. The Mongol Empire and the khanates that superseded it were characterized by religious pluralism; and although certain taboos in Mongol customary law fell particularly heavily on the adherents of one or another faith (e.g., the prohibition of the Islamic method of slaughtering animals for food), generally speaking each of the various confessional groups was permitted to practice its faith in its accustomed fashion. In return for praying for the imperial family, Christian and Buddhist monks and priests and Muslim scholars enjoyed exemption from certain taxes, military service, and forced labor. For Christians in lands that had formerly been subject to Islamic rule, the new regime represented a marked amelioration in their condition; Western missionaries too were now able to preach uninhibitedly. The earliest known Latin missionary in Mongol Asia was the Franciscan William of Rubruck (1253–1255), though the lack of an adequate interpreter and the fact that he was mistaken for an envoy of King Louis IX of France caused him considerable difficulty. By the 1280s, however, Franciscans and Dominicans were established in the territories of the Golden Horde and the ilkhanate. The Franciscan John of Montecorvino was the first Western missionary to enter China, in about 1294. Pope Clement V subsequently placed him at the head of a new archdiocese of Khanbaligh (1307), with jurisdiction over all the Mongol dominions, and sent out a group of friars to act as his suffragans. In 1318, Pope John XXII withdrew Persia and India from Khanbaligh’s authority, creating a second archiepiscopal see at Sulaniyya, one of the Ilkhans’ residences. The Latin missionary effort flourished for a few decades, though in China the friars seem to have made no impact on the indigenous Han population; conversions for the most part involved Nestorians and other eastern Christians, like the Orthodox Alans, transported from their home in the Caucasus to form a corps of

the imperial guard. Reports of high-ranking conversions, designed in part to secure reinforcements, were often also grounded in misapprehensions about the Mongol rulers’ attitude toward religious matters. With the definitive conversion to Islam of the Ilkhans (1295), the khans of the Golden Horde (1313), and the Chaghadayid khans (c. 1338), Christian proselytism grew increasingly hazardous, and several friars were martyred in the 1320s–1340s. The route to China seems to have been abandoned, and when the Jesuits entered China in 1583, the earlier missions had fallen completely into oblivion. Peter Jackson Further Reading Allsen, Thomas T. “The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Rule in North China.” In Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, eds. The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 6, Alien Regimes and Border States 907–1368. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 321–413. Jackson, Peter. “The Mongols and Europe.” In David Abulafia, ed. The New Cambridge Medieval History. Vol. 5: 1198–c. 1300. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 703–19. Jackson, Peter. The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410. Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2005. Morgan, David. The Mongols. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.

Monophysitism Monophysitism was a theological doctrine that originated in the fifth century CE in Constantinople, which denied the dualistic nature of Jesus Christ and recognized only his divine essence. Monophysitism was based on the position of the theological school of Alexandria, representatives of which believed that Jesus Christ after his reincarnation possessed only one single essence—the divine. The patriarch of Alexandria, Cyril (376–444), is considered to be the first who expressed monophysitism as a doctrine in his preaching, and soon it was maintained by Eutyches of Constantinople (ca. 380–456). In 448, the latter was condemned for his suggestion that Jesus Christ possessed only a divine nature. The further development of monophysitism is connected with the activity of Pope Dioscoros I of Alexandria. He was condemned by the

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Fourth Ecumenical Council in Chalcedon in 451, which was followed by the Great Schism of monophysitism, dyophisitism, and miaphysitism. This council stated that Jesus Christ is single in all his three hypostases, which cannot be confused, changed, divided, or separated. This statement was directed also against Nestorian interpretations of two hypostases of Jesus as two independent individualities. In spite of its condemnation, monophysitism still remain widespread in the Eastern churches, and during the second half of the fifth century it was broadly shared in Egypt, Armenia, Syria, and Palestine, resulting in a series of revolts and insurrections, the most impressive of which took place in Jerusalem and Alexandria. In particular, Proterius I of Alexandria, who replaced Dioscoros I in the position of Alexandrian patriarch, was not recognized by Coptic Orthodoxes and was overthrown and killed in 457. It was the reason for Pope Leo I to make a special inquiry in 460 to all bishops and archimandrites about the appropriateness of the decision of the Council in Chalcedon and about the possibility of finding a compromise or any other form of consensus with monophysitism, and the overall reply was positive. In spite of the short period of tolerance toward monophysitism, soon the overall tendency to oppression predominated. During the sixth century Nubia and Arabia were also engaged in insurrections of monophysitism, and most of these actions, as well as protests in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Armenia, were connected with separatist tendencies and were directed against the Byzantine Empire and its authorities. Severus the Great of Antioch, a non-Chalcedonian monophysitic patriarch (465–538), was rather close to the Orthodox doctrine, suggesting that the composed nature of Jesus consisted of divine and human hypostases. In the contemporary world a broad range of churches are seen as monophysitic, or “non-Chalcedonian”; the most widespread of them are the Orthodox Churches of Ethiopia, Syria, and Eritrea, the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria, the Armenian Apostolic Church, and the Malankara Orthodox Church of India. Their interpretation of the nature of Jesus Christ is generally recognized by Orthodox churches in the world, while they are considered heretical by Roman Catholic and Protestant churches as well as by Eastern Orthodox churches. Olena Smyntyna

Further Reading Frend, W. H. C. The Rise of the Monophysite Movement. Cambridge: James Clark, 2008. Luce, A. A. Monophysitism, Past and Present: A Study in Christology. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1920. McGrath, A. E. Christian History: An Introduction. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2006.

Montesa, Order of The Order of Montesa was a Spanish military organization established by James II of Aragon to defend the Valencia coastline from raids by Moorish pirates. Its members dedicated themselves to Mary the Blessed Virgin and followed the Cistercian monastic rules. In 1587 King Philip II moved against Montesa to subordinate it to the authority of the crown. From then until its dissolution before the Spanish Civil War the order was mainly an honorific and aristocratic organization with no military function. The origins of the Order of Montesa lie in the suppression of the Order of the Temple of Solomon by Pope Clement V in 1312 after judicial trials that involved senior members of the order, including its grand master, James of Molay, and charged them with heresy, idolatry, immorality, secrecy, and financial impropriety. The disbandment of the Temple left many vacant properties and assets to be administered. In Spain the Temple held significant landed properties and estates across several kingdoms: 3 in Portugal (Soure, Tomar, Castelo Branco), 1 in Castile (Capilla), and 17 in Aragon (Puigreig, Monzón, Corbins, Gardeny, Grañena, Barbará, Miravet, Tortosa, Castellote, Orrios, Alfambra, Villarluengo, Cantavieja, Pulpís, Chivert, Villel, Libros). Neither the papacy nor the Christian kings of Spain wanted another dominant order to acquire such power, and the Temple’s assets were divided between the Hospital of Saint John of Jerusalem and a new military order established by James II of Aragon called Montesa, after a town in Valencia. Pope John XXII formally recognized the new order in 1317. At the time of its foundation most of the Iberian Peninsula had been liberated from Muslim rule apart from Granada. Under the leadership of its first grand master,

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Guillermo d’Eril, Montesa was subordinate to the Order of Calatrava because most of its first recruits came from Calatrava. This also ensured that the new order followed Calatrava’s strict Cistercian monastic life and its knights wore the white mantle with a red cross symbolizing the monks’ willingness to die for Christianity. Montesa’s primary role was to safeguard the coastlines of Valencia and Murcia from Moorish pirates. This was a unique function as all previous peninsular orders had been charged with protecting land frontiers. In 1318 Montesa expanded further after Pope John XXII decreed that another Spanish order, known as the Mercedarians, had to elect a priest as their leader, which was a clear signal that the pope wanted the Mercedarians to become a purely clerical order. Many lay knights left the Mercedarians and joined Montesa. Another military order, the Order of Saint George of Alfama, was likewise amalgamated into the Aragonese order in 1400. During the reign of King Peter IV of Aragon the order of Montesa was threatened with suppression because the king believed it was not strictly adhering to its monastic vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience and he viewed Montesa as militarily weak. He wanted to abolish the order and incorporate it into the Hospital. Montesa, however, proved its value as a military force during the long campaign for Aragonese supremacy over Sardinia. Montesa became the last of the peninsular orders to be incorporated under the crown in 1587 when King Philip II of Spain became its grand master. Barry N. Whelan See also Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of; Reconquista; Religious Military Orders Further Reading Cabrer, Martín Alvira. Las Navas de Tolosa 1212: Idea, Liturgia y Memoria de la Batalla. Madrid: Sílex, 2012. Forey, Alan. The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries. London: Macmillan, 1992. Lomax, Derek W. The Reconquest of Spain. London: Longman, 1978. Madden, Thomas F. The New Concise History of the Crusades. Oxford: Rowman, 2005. O’Callaghan, Joseph F. Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

More, Thomas (1478–1535) Thomas More, the renowned English statesman, political theorist, and humanist author, is noted for his stance against King Henry VIII, his defense of the Roman Catholic Church, and the publication of Utopia (1511). Born on February 7, 1478, More was the eldest son of lawyer John More (1451–1530) and Anges (née Graunger) More, and he was known throughout his various government positions as a premier intellectual who was incorruptible and extraordinarily loyal. More was educated at St. Anthony’s School in London and later attended Oxford (1492–1494). While at Oxford, More was a friend of Desiderius Erasmus, a humanist and advocate of the importance of biblical scholarship and the use of rationality. After Oxford, More was first employed in the service of Cardinal John Morton, the archbishop of Canterbury (1486–1500), then began studying law as a member of Lincoln’s Inn (1496), and by 1499 was a practicing barrister. In 1505, More married Jane Colt (1488–1511) and had four children, and after her passing he later married Alice Middleton (1471–1543). In 1516 More published his text Utopia, which extensively theorized and detailed the ideal political and social state, which was premised on public education, rationality, and toleration. In addition, he also published poetry, scholarly commentary of Erasmus’s New Testament (1519), treaties in defense of the Roman Catholic Church, and his incomplete histories of Richard III (1543). More became a member of Parliament at Westminster in 1504, though he was not successful under the reign of King Henry VII (1457–1509). However, his successor, Henry VIII (1491–1547), heralded More as a defender of the faith for his publication of the Defence of the Seven Sacraments (1521) and appointed him to a series of public offices including diplomat (1510–1517), member of the Privy Council (1518–1534), Speaker of the House of Commons (1523), and Lord Chancellor (1529–1534). Following Martin Luther’s critique of the Roman Catholic Church from 1517 to 1523, More garnered further support from the throne by drafting Responsio ad Lutherum (1523). More’s response was not simply out of reverence for his faith, but also because of the destabilizing sociopolitical threat that such heretical comments and a theological schism could have

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throughout Europe. As a result of his principles and social standing as well as the shifting political atmosphere, More’s writings and career were largely defined by the growing religious controversies of the period. However, despite holding Henry VIII’s favor, More’s opposition to the king’s divorce and remarriage to Catherine of Aragon (1485–1536) led to his resignation as Lord Chancellor in 1532. Soon after, having refused to swear the oath required by the Act of Succession (1534) affirming Henry’s subsequent marriage to Anne Boleyn (1501–1536), More was imprisoned in the Tower of London for 15 months, where he wrote A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation (1534). In 1534 More again defied the king and defended papal authority by opposing the Act of Supremacy, requiring him to swear an oath recognizing the English monarchy as head of the Church of England, which he believed to be heretical. As a result, Thomas More was condemned for treason and beheaded on July 6, 1535, on Tower Hill. In 1886, for defense of the faith, Pope Leo XIII beatified More and in 1935 Pius XI had More canonized. The subject of war is addressed in Book II of Utopia and incorporated into More’s discussions on statecraft and economic strength. A work of humanism and idealism, the approach to war advocated in the text reflects More’s disdain for immorality, political greed, and ambition, while subsequently acknowledging his understanding of political realism. For More, the goal of statesmanship was to ensure the continued peace, economic well-being, and political stability of the nation, which in turn would permit development of a just society within it. He argued that war undermined the economic progress of the well-regulated state, leading to increased lawlessness, immorality, and social unrest, and its influences should therefore be avoided. To this end, More advocated that the financial prosperity of Utopia would make the nation economically superior, grant it political authority, ensure social stability, and provide the means for foreign influence when necessary. From this position, other nations would hesitate or be wary of attacking, allowing for the development of a just society within the country. Regardless, More allowed for the necessity of engaging in just wars for the defense of Utopia, and also suggested that the nation’s economic security, commercial stability, trade, and the defense of allies were legitimate bases from which to engage in conflict.

Regardless of the causes of war, More emphasized the importance of rational decisions and strategy amid the process, highlighting the use of cunning rather than direct force, with the goal being to ensure the security of the nation and continuation of Utopia’s prosperous and just society. Utopians believe that a military victory should only be sought as a last resort, and disapprove of taking prisoners and slaughtering people, as well as destroying cities and farmlands. To this end, Utopian statesmen first seek to use economic and political power to ensure international supremacy, rather than endangering their own citizens and disrupting their own communities and culture. Hence, More advocates the purchase of mercenaries (Zapoletans), use of economic sanctions, distribution of propaganda, fermentation of social unrest, fostering of internal dissent in foreign nations, and the assassination of rival leaders. However, despite not utilizing their forces in foreign wars, Utopians nonetheless keep constantly trained to protect themselves if their nation should be directly invaded. For More, this method of a just war, which is only engaged out of necessity and rationally pursued, is expected to be more humane, result in fewer conflicts, and reduce the loss of life and prosperity. Sean Morton See also Just War Tradition; Luther, Martin; Protestant Reformers and War Further Reading Marius, Richard. Thomas More: A Biography. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. Surtz, Edward, and J. H. Hexter, eds. The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, 15 vols. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965.

Mormon Rebellion (1857–1858) The Mormon Rebellion was a state of armed hostility between the U.S. Army and the Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) inhabitants of the Utah Territory. Having been driven out of Missouri and Illinois, the Mormons settled in the sparsely populated Utah territory from 1847 onward seeking an area where they would be

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free to practice their religion without interference. They were granted territory status by the Compromise of 1850 and Brigham Young (1801–1877), the Mormon president, was appointed territorial governor. Other Mormon leaders were elected or appointed to political and civil offices across the territory so that the church hierarchy exercised control of the territory. While the Mormons saw this as a means to prevent outside government interference with their religion, it was perceived outside the territory as potentially preparing the way for the establishment of a semi-independent state or theocracy. This fear was reinforced by the Mormon practice of using church arbitration to settle legal disputes among church members instead of the civil judicial system. Some federal territorial officials abandoned or resigned their posts over disputes with Mormon officials or dissatisfaction with Mormon religious, legal, or political practices. Suspicion of Mormon religious doctrine, particularly the doctrine of plural marriage, as well as the recent conflicts in Missouri and Illinois also shaped public opinion against the Mormons. For their part, Mormons remained suspicious of the government’s intentions and occasionally hostile toward non-Mormons. In 1857, based on reports from federal officials about antigovernment actions in Utah Territory, newly inaugurated President James Buchanan appointed Alfred Cumming to replace Young as the governor of the territory and dispatched a military expedition under Colonel Edmund Alexander to establish order and garrison the territory. The army expedition and federal officials planned to enter Utah Territory in the fall of 1857 but the expedition’s late start made this more difficult. Mormon militia (the Nauvoo Legion) fortified the main northern approach to the territory and engaged in guerrilla attacks against the expedition’s supplies. This harassment caused no fatalities to either side, but along with the inclement weather, difficult terrain, and supply deficiencies, the expedition, now led by Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston, wintered at Fort Bridger and prepared for a spring campaign. After learning about the army’s approach in the summer of 1857, Young responded by declaring martial law in the territory, mobilizing the Mormon militia, and closing the territorial borders to any unapproved persons. Through sermons and proclamations, the Mormon leaders

announced their intention to fight in strident terms, though they also made preparations to flee if necessary. The war-like atmosphere and Mormon distrust of outsiders led the Nauvoo Legion in southern Utah territory to massacre more than 100 members of a wagon train at the Mountain Meadows Massacre on September 11, 1857. The Mormons disguised themselves as Native Americans, but their initial attacks on the wagon train were unsuccessful. Mormon negotiators then secured the surrender of the wagon train by promising to protect them from Native Americans. Once the settlers were disarmed, the Mormons murdered the men, women, and all but the youngest children. While local Mormon leaders had authorized the massacre, it is unclear if they did so on Brigham Young’s orders. During the winter of 1857–1858, Thomas Kane, a prominent citizen who was sympathetic to the Mormons, traveled to Salt Lake City from Washington, DC to negotiate with Young. Young agreed to accept Cumming’s appointment as governor and Kane persuaded Cumming to enter Utah without an army escort. Cumming proved to be sympathetic to the Mormons in contrast to the more antagonistic army officers who viewed the Mormons as engaging in armed rebellion against the government. Though welcoming Cumming as governor, Young still feared the army and planned to conduct a scorched earth campaign and evacuate the Utah Territory. Under congressional and popular pressure to end the standoff, President Buchanan dispatched an official peace commission to Utah in April. 1858. Arriving in June, the commissioners presented the president’s terms—a pardon for Mormon acts during the conflict if they submitted to the government’s authority, agreement for Johnston’s force to enter the territory, and a promise not to interfere with Mormon religion—which the Mormon leaders accepted. Shortly thereafter, Johnston’s force entered Utah unopposed and established a camp at some distance from the main Mormon settlements. U.S. Army troops were garrisoned in Utah Territory until the outbreak of the Civil War. Despite their acceptance of Governor Cumming and other federal officials, the Mormon Church retained significant political influence in the territory after the rebellion. Joshua Michael

Mughal-Maratha Wars (1659–1707)  571 See also Illinois Mormon War; Missouri Mormon War Further Reading Bigler, David L., and Will Bagley. The Mormon Rebellion: America’s First Civil War, 1857–1858. Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2011. Furniss, Norman. Mormon Conflict: 1850–59. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005. MacKinnon, William P. At Sword’s Point, Part 1: A Documentary History of the Utah War. Norman, OK: Arthur H. Clark, 2008.

Mu’awiya (602–680 CE) Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan was the founder of the Umayyad caliphate in the seventh century. Mu’awiya was the son of a prominent member of the Qarysh tribe that controlled Mecca and resisted the Prophet Muhammad in that city. Islamic tradition holds that, following the reconciliation between the Prophet and the Quraysh, Mu’awiya was chosen as one of the scribes who recorded the Qur’an. Mu’awiya came to political prominence as a military commander and was listed as one of the Muslim witnesses at the capitulation of Jerusalem in 637 CE (or 638 CE, sources vary). He subsequently commanded the Islamic forces at the completion of the siege of Caesarea, then a major Byzantine port. He then served as governor of Syria, during which time he was the principle proponent of expanding the contest with the Byzantine Empire into a maritime struggle. Mu’awiya remains a controversial figure. He combines religious authority as a companion of the Prophet and as one of the scribes who recorded the Qur’an with extensive military experience gained during the conquest of Palestine and Syria. He also displayed political aptitude during his governorship in Syria and military acumen including leading the successful invasion of Cyprus. This unique combination placed Mu’awiya at the center of the First Fitna, or civil war. Following the assassination of Uthman, Mu’awiya refused to acknowledge Ali as the successor to the caliphate unless the assassins were turned over for judgment. This impasse led to a stalemated conflict and ultimately to negotiations. When Ali was assassinated in 681 by hardline members of his own faction who were unhappy

with his willingness to negotiate, Mu’awiya emerged as the caliph. Mu’awiya’s reign saw the rapid expansion of the caliphate into North Africa as well as the continuing conquest in modern Iran. His rule was characterized by rapid expansion and assimilation of the conquered peoples into the Islamic religion. Upon his death, his son Yazid succeeded him, in contravention of Arabic tribal practice. This established the Ummayad dynasty, which lasted until 750 and set the stage for continuing religious-military conflict over the leadership of the Muslim community. While viewed skeptically for establishing a hereditary dynasty and for a reign in which the Ummayad clan amassed great wealth by leveraging political and military connections, Mu’awiya is nonetheless respected for bringing enormous swaths of Africa and Asia under the banner of Islam. He was a central figure in the fusion of political, military, and religious activity within the Islamic world. K. J. Delamer See also Caliphate; Masts, Battle of the Further Reading Donner, Fred McGraw. The Early Islamic Conquests. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Humphreys, R. Stephen. Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan: From Arabia to Empire. Oxford: Oneworld, 2006. Kennedy, Hugh. The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In. Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2007. Muir, William. The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline, and Fall. London: Religious Tract Society, 1891; reprint, London: Routledge, 2000.

Mughal-Maratha Wars (1659–1707) The Mughal-Maratha wars were fought between the Mughal Empire and the emerging Maratha state between 1659–1707. The Maratha lands, since the 14th century a part of first the Delhi sultanate and then the Bahmani state, were, after the disintegration of the latter, divided between the Deccan Muslim kingdoms of Bijapur, Ahmadnagar, and Golkonda. Since the beginning of the 17th century the Mughal Empire had been gradually and steadfastly

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expanding to the south. The Maratha military elite, Hindus by faith, who had made fortunes serving the Deccan sultans, participated in these wars, changing sides as convenient—this was the case, among others, of the influential chieftain Shahji Bhosle/Bhonsle (1599–1664), the father of the Maratha hero Shivaji Bhosle (1630–1680). Initially Shivaji succeeded in reshaping his Pune fief (jagir) into an independent principality by capturing forts and territories, first around Pune and then further to northern Konkan. This made it possible to encroach upon the authority of the Bijapur and Ahmadnagar sultanates, which resulted in a number of military conflicts with them, from which Shivaji emerged as a victorious ruler of almost the whole of Konkan and the greater part of Maharashtra. This made him strong enough to challenge the Mughals. In May 1657, Shivaji attacked the Mughal fortress of Junnar. In July 1659, shortly after ascending the throne, the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1659–1707) appointed his uncle Shaista Khan as viceroy of the Deccan and sent a huge force under his command to a punitive expedition against Shivaji. At the same time another Mughal general, Kartalab Khan, attacked Shivaji in the south of Konkan. As Shivaji was fighting Kartalab Khan, Shaista Khan succeeded in occupying many Maratha forts, including Pune where the Mughal viceroy made his residence in Shivaji’s own palace. Finally Shivaji’s forces defeated Kartalab Khan, who was blocked in Konkan and could escape only by ransoming his life. Shivaji’s army, small as it was, had many advantages over the Mughal forces, which were ponderous and overburdened with heavy artillery, baggage trains, bazaars, and even the harems of the generals. Conscripted from Maratha villages, inspired by patriotic and religious zeal and assisted by the local population, Shivaji’s cavalrymen were mobile, disciplined, and effective in guerrilla warfare. In 1663, Shivaji with 400 men dressed as Mughal soldiers made a daring covert attack on Shaista Khan’s Pune residence, and the Mughal viceroy narrowly escaped death at the cost of his fingers cut off by the Maratha sword. In 1664 Shivaji planned and executed a bold raid against the chief Mughal port city of Surat. It enriched the Marathas with indescribable booty robbed from the city’s rich merchants, custom house, and treasury. This was viewed as an insult to the whole Mughal Empire by the Marathas, whom

Aurangzeb had scorned as “mountain rats.” The Mughal emperor appointed Jai Singh Kachwaha, the Rajput ruler of Amber, viceroy of the Deccan, with the mission of crushing Shivaji. This episode of a Hindu general leading a punitive force against his Maratha co-religionists was perceived by the 19th- and 20th-century Hindu nationalists as “treason” against the “Hindu nation.” But in reality the religious factor in Mughal-Maratha conflict was much more controversial than its subsequent reconstructions by the proponents of nationhood, a concept that was totally alien to 17thcentury India. Emperor Aurangzeb was, to be sure, a Muslim bigot whose purpose was to consolidate the Mughal state on the basis of Muslim supremacy. His measures, like reimposition of jizya, a special tax on non-Muslims, and orders to destroy Hindu temples in various regions of India, added fuel to the fire of many anti-Mughal movements of the epoch, including the Maratha resistance. However, Jai Singh Kachwaha belonged to the Rajput clan, which had been for generations associated with the Mughal dynasty by marital bonds (Aurangzeb’s grandfather Jahangir’s mother was a Kachwaha princess). Therefore he, like many other Rajput lords, faithfully served the Mughals as a relative and vassal, against the Marathas with whom he shared no territorial or political affiliation—both were of much more significance to him than the religious one. This was viewed as something very natural by contemporary authors who listed Hindu chiefs fighting against Shivaji without any emphasis on “treason.” Similarly many Deccan Muslims loyally fought under Shivaji’s banners and were appointed to important posts by him and his successors. This shows that Mughal-Maratha conflict was rather about territorial control, political domination, state formation, and regional identity than about religion. Jai Singh succeeded in securing the assistance of some Maratha feudal lords who had been Shivaji’s rivals and enemies. Meanwhile Jai Singh’s forces, thrice as big as Shivaji’s, occupied Pune, besieged the Maratha strongholds of Purandhar and Singhgad, and thus drove a wedge between the north and south of the Maratha domain. This forced Shivaji to begin talks with Jai Singh and to sign the Treaty of Purandhar on June 12, 1665, which made him cede his 23 forts with adjacent areas to the Mughals. In May 1666, as suggested by Jai Singh, Shivaji went to Agra to present

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himself to Aurangzeb. There, at a public reception, he was humiliated and detained. His escape from Agra became the theme of many heroic narratives. Back in Maharashtra, Shivaji resumed talks with the Mughals. Aurangzeb was also inclined toward peace with the Marathas as he had to deal with the disturbances by Afghan tribes. The peace treaty, or, more correctly, armistice, was signed in 1668: Shivaji was recognized as a raja, got back some of his fortresses including Pune, and had his son Sambhaji enter Mughal service. The war resumed in 1669 with a significant change in Shivaji’s tactics as he began harassing the Mughal empire on its provinces and territories like Gujarat, Berar, and Khandesh, extracting tribute (cauth). His task was made easier by the scramble between the Mughal generals in the Deccan. In 1670 Shivaji raided Surat again and exacted a huge tribute; two years later the raid was repeated. In 1671 the Mughals launched a counteroffensive and succeeded in taking Pune and massacring its residents. However, in 1672 a 25,000-strong Mughal army was defeated by the Marathas near the Salher fort. On June 6, 1674, Shivaji was crowned as chatrapati (emperor) of an independent Maratha state. In 1677 Shivaji expanded his domain southward and conquered large territories in Karnataka and Tamilnadu. In 1680 Shivaji died. His eldest son Sambhaji (1657– 1689), after a bloody tussle with the party supporting his half-brother Rajaram (1670–1700), ascended the Maratha throne. Brave and arrogant, he lacked his father’s statesmanship and strategic prowess. Meanwhile Aurangzeb was distracted by the unrest in Rajputana and the rebellion of his son, Prince Akbar. Instead of strengthening the Maratha state and army under those favorable conditions, Sambhaji chose to wage useless wars against the Sidi rulers of Janjira Island and the Portuguese of Goa. The Mughals organized a number of expeditions against the Marathas and forced them to abandon the siege of Goa. In 1684– 1685 the Mughal army undertook a new offensive against Maharashtra and succeeded in taking a few important forts and the Karwar port. Sambhaji, however, found it more important to fight not the Mughals but the Shirkes, a hostile Maratha clan. In 1686–1687 Aurangzeb diverted his armies from Maharashtra and used them against Bijapur and Golkonda. Both sultanates were vanquished and acceded to the empire. Sambhaji neither assisted the

sultanates nor made an attempt to strike the Mughals from the back. After the two sultanates were conquered, Aurangzeb invaded Maharashtra again. In a covert operation, a Mughal force captured Sambhaji, who was sentenced to a torturous death on March 11, 1689. Proud of his victory and the destruction of the Maratha state, Aurangzeb recalled his army from Maharashtra, leaving only a small force in the devastated land. However, the Maratha chieftains, fully supported by the local population, launched a guerrilla war against the victors. Sam­ bhaji’s half-brother Rajaram, who successfully fled from the Mughals, found shelter in the Jinji (Senji) fort (modern Tamil Nadu) and proclaimed himself a lawful Maratha king. Nominal ruler as he was, Rajaram became a symbol of Maratha resistance. From 1692 the Marathas seized the initiative, scored several victories against the imperial forces, and resumed their incursions into the Mughal domain. The Mughal army was hit by discord and corruption: besieging Jinji, the Mughal general Zulfikar Khan, in conflict with Prince Kam Baksh, took bribes from the Marathas and allowed Rajaram to flee to Maharashtra (1698). Two years after, Rajaram died and was succeeded by his wise and able widow, Tara Bai, as a regent for their infant son Shivaji II. For Aurangzeb suppression of the Marathas became an idée fixe. In 1699 the 81-year-old emperor personally led the Mughal army against the Marathas. He took a number of forts; most of them were abandoned by their garrisons and retrieved after the departure of the Mughal forces. Monsoon rains, floods, epidemics, mismanagement, and guerrilla raids by the Maratha troops caused heavy losses in the Mughal army. Meanwhile the Maratha chieftains raided the Mughal provinces of Malwa and Berar, cutting all communications between Aurangzeb’s army and Hindustan. In 1706 the 80,000-strong Maratha army invaded Gujarat, Berar, and Aurangabad. Besieged by the Marathas, with his exhausted army that could move no more than a few miles a day, Aurangzeb finally retreated toward Ahmadnagar where he died on February 20, 1707. His death signaled the disintegration of the Mughal Empire, while the Marathas, after the period of chaos and guerrilla wars, succeeded in building their own empire, which strove to dominate 18th-century India. Eugenia Vanina

574  Mughal-Sikh Wars (1628–1715) See also Mughal-Sikh Wars Further Reading Eaton, Richard Maxwell. A Social History of the Deccan, 1300– 1761: Eight Indian Lives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Gordon, Stewart. “The Marathas, 1600–1818.” In The New Cambridge History of India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Kincaid, C. A., and Dattatreya Balwant Parasnis. A History of the Maratha People. Vol. I. London: Henry Milford, 1919. Kulkarni, A. R. The Marathas (1600–1848). Delhi: Books and Books, 1996. Laine, James W. Shivaji: Hindu King in Islamic India. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Richards, John F. “The Mughal Empire.” In The New Cambridge History of India. Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Sardesai, Govind Sakharam. New History of the Marathas. Vol. I. Bombay: Phoenix Publications, 1946. Sarkar, Jadunath. Shivaji and His Times. Calcutta. M. C. Sarkar and Sons, 1919.

Mughal-Sikh Wars (1628–1715) The Mughal-Sikh wars were fought between the Mughal Empire and the Sikh community of the Punjab (in modern political geography, northwest of India and east of Pakistan) between 1628 and 1715. Sikhism emerged at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century as a variety of Bhakti, a complex of mystical trends in medieval Hinduism. Guru Nānak (1469–1539), the founder of Sikhism, was a member of a mercantile caste and enjoyed wide popularity among urban folk and peasants of the Punjab. He criticized Hindu concepts like polytheism, idol worship, asceticism, the supremacy of Brahmans, purity, and pollution, along with caste discrimination. To his followers, Hindus and Muslims alike, Nānak preached strict monotheism, personal devotion to God, humility, equality, and honest labor as the pathway to salvation. To a certain degree, Sikh ethics and idioms were akin to Protestantism in contemporary Europe. Unlike other Bhakti sects of the epoch, Nānak established strict discipline and total submission to the guru (preceptor) among his numerous followers, styled Sikhs (i.e., pupils).

In 1604, the Adi Granth or Guru Granth Sāhib (“The Initial Book” or “The Lord Book of the Guru”) was established as the holy book of the Sikhs, containing hymns from Sikh gurus and some Bhakti poets close in spirit to the Sikh teachings. After Nānak’s death, the Sikh community developed a spatial organization into 22 divisions headed by masands (the guru’s agents) who collected tithes from all community members and controlled them. The gurus formed a line of succession (every guru nominating his heir from among his sons, relatives, or chosen disciples), and accumulated wealth and power. Under Guru Arjun (ruled from 1581 to 1606) the divinity of the guru was proclaimed while his successor Guru Har Gobind (ruled from 1606 to 1644) declared himself Sachcha Badshah (True Padishah). A humble religious sect was transformed into a theocratic polity controlling a large and rich territory (Amritsar was its capital) with thousands of militant followers to defend it. The relations between the Sikhs and the Mughal Empire were initially peaceful; the wise and tolerant emperor Akbar (reigned 1556–1605) was appreciative; he visited Guru Amar Das in 1567 and even joined his Sikhs for a ceremonial meal. But in 1606 Prince Khusraw, the son of Mughal emperor Jahangir, rebelled against his father. Guru Arjun blessed and supported him. This added fuel to the long-smoldering fire of the emperor’s wrath—as Jahangir himself admitted in his memoirs, the Sikh teaching was extremely popular not only with Hindus but with “ignorant and foolish” Muslims as well. Guru Arjun was summoned to Lahore and there tortured to death; according to the Sikh lore, he immersed his body in the Ravi River and mysteriously disappeared, thus attaining union with God. His son and successor, Guru Har Gobind, wore two swords as symbols of combining piri and miri, spiritual and mundane power. The guru behaved in a regal way: as was reported to the Mughal court by a secret agent, “his predecessors used to sit on coaches, he sits upon a throne. He wears arms, calls himself the true king, takes presents like an emperor, maintains an army of a thousand brave youths and cares for nobody.” In a departure from Nānak’s preaching of humility, Gurus Arjun and Har Gobind proclaimed armed struggle against the Mughals a religious duty of all Sikhs. Their army now had infantry and cavalry, even artillery. In 1612 Guru Har Gobind was summoned to

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Jahangir’s court, accepted imperial service, but was later imprisoned in the Gwalior fort, the Bastille of medieval India. However, after some time Jahangir found it possible to release the guru. Back in the Punjab, Guru Har Gobind continued his struggle against the Mughals, which became especially violent under Emperor Shah Jahan (1628–1658). From 1628 to 1643 Mughal viceroys of the Punjab undertook four punitive expeditions against the Sikhs with no major success. The Sikhs obtained fighting experience, wealth, and popular support. After the death of Guru Har Gobind in 1644, his grandson Guru Har Rai (ruled from 1644 to 1661) succeeded him. He was of a more peaceful character; however, he assisted Dara Shukoh, Shah Jahan’s eldest son, in his struggle for the throne against his brother Aurangzeb. Although the guru’s men simply helped Dara Shukoh, chased by Aurangzeb’s troops, to cross the river, it outraged Aurangzeb and turned him against the Sikhs. After Guru Har Rai’s death in 1661, his five-year-old son, Har Krishan, was proclaimed guru. Three years later the baby guru was summoned by Aurangzeb to Delhi where he died of smallpox. Tegh Bahadur, the younger son of Guru Har Gobind, was proclaimed guru in 1664. He fought the Mughals even more consistently, matching the telling military symbolism of his name (tegh means “sword” and bahadur “heroic warrior”). In a mountainous area near the upper reaches of the Sutledge River he founded the fort of Anandpur from which he raided Mughal lands. When Aurangzeb ascended the throne in 1659, he sent an ultimatum to Guru Tegh Bahadur requesting him to renounce militancy and “live peacefully in the corner like the poor fakirs (ascetics) of the Nānak sect.” The guru declined; in 1675 he was arrested and beheaded in Delhi. Contemporary sources as well as subsequent historical interpretations disagree in explaining the reasons for his execution: some assert that the guru was punished for his public condemnation of Aurangzeb’s Muslim fanaticism; some view the reason to be not religious but political so that the guru was beheaded as a strong separatist leader who had challenged the Mughal supremacy in the Punjab. Whatever the reason, martyrdom of the guru added fury to the Mughal-Sikh conflict. Gobind Singh, the nine-year-old son of the executed guru, succeeded his father. He was a multifaceted personality–a

brave warrior, an able general, a talented writer of religious and philosophic hymns, moral stories, and the historicalbiographical poem “Bachittar Natak” (“Variegated Drama”). As he grew to maturity his military fervor to fight the Mughal Empire manifested itself in full. “Have bread for the hungry in one hand and a sword to fight the tyrants in the other,” he taught his followers. Hill forts like Anandpur, Chamkaur, and Paonta were his strongholds. But the guru understood well that to successfully fight the Mughals the Sikh community needed reform. He began with the liquidation of the post of masands, the agents and tithe collectors who had with the passage of time emerged as independent lords, intimidated and robbed the rank and file Sikhs, embezzling the collected tithes. But the most crucial reforms were proclaimed on April 13, 1699, at a huge gathering of Sikhs on the occasion of Baisakhi (spring harvest festival). There Guru Gobind Singh introduced initiation into the Sikh community in the form of baptizing with water, sweetened and stirred by the sword. Thus he baptized five Sikhs who, in response to his call, volunteered to sacrifice their lives for the faith. These Panch Pyare (Five Beloved), in their turn, baptized the guru. Then a crucially important move followed: the very post of the guru as a divinized preceptor was abolished and the khālsā, the Sikh community, was declared as a collective guru. For himself Gobind left only the duty of military commander. The khālsā was enforced as a brotherhood of warriors free from any caste divisions. All male Sikhs had henceforth to add the word “Singh,” that is, Lion, to their personal names. This used to be a centuries-long tradition of Rajput feudal nobility: by spreading it to the Sikhs Gobind “knighted” his followers, mainly peasants, craftsmen, and traders, thus raising their dignity as noble warriors who were not inferior to the Rajput gentry. Sikh women were to be given male names with the addition of the word “Kaur” (Lioness). On the fateful Baisakhi day of 1699 Guru Gobind introduced five signs of belonging to the Sikh community to be observed by all male Sikhs. These five Ks (kesh or uncut hair and beard; kangha, a wooden comb; karah, a steel bracelet; kirpan, a dagger; and kachcha or kachchera, undergarment) were to delineate the Sikhs from people of other faiths, first and foremost Hindus. The Sikhs, who had previously been viewed as a Hindu sect and perceived

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themselves as such too, were now identified as followers of a separate religion. These reforms helped to consolidate and democratize the Sikh movement. But to fight the Mughals they needed allies. Guru Gobind tried to find ones in the so-called “Hill Rajas” or the Hindu rulers of small Himalayan principalities. But instead they showed hostility to the Sikhs and tried to evict them from their hill fortresses, especially Anandpur. When their first attacks on the Sikhs failed, the Rajas appealed to the Mughal court for help. Two Mughal generals were sent with 5,000 troops each to suppress the Sikhs (1701), but they were defeated in the first battle of Anandpur. This was followed by three more campaigns by the Hill Rajas assisted by Mughal armies in 1702–1704, each resulting in a defeat of the attackers near Anandpur. Ultimately, in 1705 a huge army of Hill Rajas, assisted by the Mughal forces sent by the governors of Sirhind, Lahore, and Kashmir, prevailed. The guru was locked in Anandpur and, after a siege, consented to vacate the fort as Aurangzeb sent him a written promise to guarantee his life. But when on December 21, 1705, the guru with his family and followers left the fort, they were attacked by the Mughal army. In the skirmish the guru’s mother with two of his younger sons got separated from the guru’s convoy, and after some wandering fell into the hands of Wazir Khan, the governor of Lahore. The brave boys refused to accept Islam and were walled up. Their grandmother died of shock. Meanwhile the guru with a small band of followers found shelter with his Muslim friend and disciple Nihang Khan; when he learned about the approach of a huge army from Sirhind to capture him, he shut himself in the fort of Chamkaur. The fort was soon besieged, and in the bloody battles two elder sons of the guru found a heroic death. As it was impossible to repel the attacks and retain the fort, the guru wanted to die in battle but, persuaded by his disciples, he secretly left the fort. Assisted by two Muslim horse traders, his loyal friends, who disguised him as their spiritual preceptor and carried him away in a palanquin, the guru escaped danger. He wandered in the hills and mountains of the Punjab, assembling new followers. Defeat and personal losses did not dishearten the guru, who answered Aurangzeb’s appeal to surrender with “Zafar Namah” (The Book of Victory), an epistle in Persian verse,

in which he condemned the Mughal emperor as a hypocrite and promised to replace his martyred sons with thousands of brave warriors ready to “foment fire under Aurangzeb’s feet.” Sikh lore informs us that Aurangzeb was greatly impressed by the guru’s courage and invited him to the Deccan where the Mughal emperor was engaged in fruitless skirmishes with the Marathas. The guru gave his consent and moved toward the south, but on the road he received the news of Aurangzeb’s death (1707). In the scramble for power between the sons of the deceased emperor, the Sikhs supported Prince Mu’azzam, who finally was enthroned as Bahadur Shah. Guru Gobind visited the new emperor, got favors from him, and for some time served under his command. But quite soon the guru became disappointed in this alliance. He left imperial service and rejoined his followers in the Punjab. There in October 1708 he was stabbed to death by a killer sent by his archenemy Wair Khan, the governor of Sirhind. The Sikhs were savagely persecuted: a decree signed by Bahadur Shah prescribed killing “any member of this sect” at sight. Some time before his death Guru Gobind conferred military leadership on his disciple Madho Das, who became known as one of the most popular Sikh heroes, Bandā Singh Bahādur. At the end of 1709 Bandā proclaimed himself “true king” Fath Singh, one of Guru Go­ bind’s sons. Thousands of persecuted Sikhs and Hindus rallied around him. In May 1710 Bandā’s army stormed Sirhind, captured Wazir Khan, and beheaded him. The road to Delhi was open, but, as the Sikh army met with strong resistance from the Mughal forces, Bandā chose to move to the Punjab. He captured Saharanpur and tried to occupy Jallandhar but could not take the city. The Sikh army devastated the suburbs of Lahore and captured Karnal. It became so dangerous for the Mughal Empire that Emperor Bahādur Shah personally led a huge punitive army against the Sikhs. In the decisive battle near Sadaura on December 5, 1710, Bandā’s army fought bravely but was overpowered and defeated. The battle resulted in a slaughter of the captured Sikhs. Bandā with a small group of followers shut himself in the Lohgadh Fort but the Mughal army besieged it. Bandā managed to secretly leave the fort while one of his warriors, a tobacco trader, Gulab Singh, presented himself as Bandā and was brutally killed when

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the Mughals occupied the fort. Bandā found a secret refuge in the Himalayas. In 1711, he came back to the Punjab and very quickly assembled a 20,000-strong army. However, the Mughal army was able to press the Sikhs back to the Himalayas. In 1712, after the death of Bahādur Shah, his sons began to fight for power. Jahandar Shah won the battle and was enthroned for 11 months; on January 10, 1713, he was dethroned and confined by his nephew Farrukhsiyar, who was proclaimed emperor on January 11, 1713. This internal feud in the Mughal Empire was a welcome pause for the Sikhs, which they used to consolidate their military might. The new emperor appointed Abd us-Samad Khan as viceroy of the Punjab with the mission of crushing the Sikhs. For almost the whole of 1714 Bandā’s forces waged a guerrilla war against the Mughal army, avoiding open battles. The Sikhs even approached Lahore and burned down its suburbs. But ultimately the Mughals succeeded in pressing Bandā’s army away from Lahore and surrounding it near Gurdaspur. Even the Mughal chroniclers recorded the bravery and courage of the Sikhs who withstood an eightmonth siege of Gurdaspur. Only mass starvation made them surrender.Bandā, along with hundreds of imprisoned Sikh commanders, was brought to Delhi and subjected to torturous death on June 9, 1716. After the defeat of Bandā, Abd us-Samad Khan unleashed a brutal terror campaign against the Sikhs. Anyone who could produce a severed head of a Sikh was rewarded with 20 rupees. Most of the Sikhs shaved away their hair and beards and merged with Punjabi peasantry. But a considerable number of them formed guerrilla groups (jathas) in the Himalayan foothills and in other remote places of the Punjab. A popular song of the epoch compared the Sikhs with grass: the more it was mowed away, the longer it grew. One of the guerrilla commanders, Kapur Singh, united all militant groups into an army, dal Khālsā (the army of Khālsā). Neither Abd us-Samad Khan, nor his son Zakariya Khan who succeeded him as viceroy of the Punjab were able to suppress the Sikhs. The Sikhs were the only force that offered resistance to the Persian king Nadir Shah when in 1739 he invaded India and captured Delhi. After 1739 the Sikhs fought bravely against the Mughal governors who, with the collapse of the empire, spared no efforts to rule the Punjab independently, and then the Afghans

who, under the empire-builder Ahmad Shah Durrani (Abdali), invaded India in 1748–1749, 1752, 1756–1757, and 1761. Their brave resistance made it possible to liberate the Punjab and paved the way for the establishment of the Sikh state by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1799. Eugenia Vanina See also Nānak, Guru; Sikhism and War; Singh, Guru Gobind; Sirhind, Battle of Further Reading Cunningham, J. D. History of the Sikhs from the Origins of the Nation to the Battles of Sutledge. London: John Murray, 1915 (reprinted 1981). Fenech, Louis E., and W. H. McLeod. Historical Dictionary of Sikhism. 3rd ed. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014. Grewal, J. S., and Indu Banga, eds. History and Ideology: The Khalsa Over 300 Years. Delhi: Tulika Books, 1999. Grewal, J. S., and Irfan Habib. Sikh History from Persian Sources. Translations of Major Texts. Delhi: Tulika Books, 2001. Macauliffe, Max Arthur. The Sikh Religion, Its Gurus, Sacred Writings and Authors. 6 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909. McLeod, W. H. Sikh and Sikhism. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. Richards, John F. The Mughal Empire. The New Cambridge History of India. Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Singh, Ganda. Contemporary Sources of Sikh History. Amritsar: Compiler, 1938. Singh, Khushwant. A History of the Sikhs. Vol. I. 1469–1839. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Singh, Prithi Pal. The History of Sikh Gurus. Delhi: Lotus Press, 2006.

Muhammad as Warrior Through conquest and conversion Muhammad unified Arabia into a single religious and political entity under Islam. He was born at Mecca, a city in the western region of the Arabian Peninsula, around 570 CE, into the Banu Hashim clan of the Quraysh tribe. By the time he died in 632 CE, at Medina located about 200 miles northward, Muhammad was regarded by his followers, Muslims, as the final messenger of God (rasūl Allāh) and the Prophet of Islam. As the Prophet of Islam and sociopolitical leader of the earliest Muslims, Muhammad oversaw their initial

578  Muhammad as Warrior

transformation from refugees to elites via both religious missionizing and military action. After speaking of receiving revelation from Allah via the archangel Gabriel in his early 40s—recorded in the Qur’an—and drawing upon the monotheistic Abrahamic tradition, Muhammad preached the religion of Islam, meaning “submission to God.” His denunciation of Arab polytheism resulted in attacks on his followers and him from the elites of Mecca. So, in September 622 CE, the first Muslims fled to the city of Yathrib, which they subsequently called Medina, “the city”; this migration (hijra) came to mark the first year of the Muslim lunar calendar. Arab tribes in Medina converted to Islam over the next few years—some from conviction, others due to pressure, yet others for gain and as a form of political affiliation. They became part of the growing Muslim community (umma). Upon reaching Yathrib/Medina, Muhammad entered into a covenant of coexistence with Jews living there. But as leadership, religious, and commercial differences arose, conflict broke out and eventually Medina’s Jews were either forced into Islam, killed, or driven away. The Banu Nadir were expelled to Syria after a siege in August 625 CE where their chief was subsequently assassinated by a Muslim in May 626 CE; the Banu Qurayza had their fortress attacked, men executed, and women and children enslaved in April 627 CE. Subsequently, in May and June 628 CE, Muhammad’s forces attacked Jewish settlements in the oasis of Khaybar, overran their castles, and forced the locals into a treaty of economic subservience to Muslim overlords. Not long after his relocation to Medina in 622 CE, Muhammad spoke of a revelation in which “permission of fight” was given unto “those who fight because they have been wronged” so that “God may grant them victory” (Qur’an 22:39–42). So the early Muslims resumed the Arab practice of raids (razzia) on passing, particularly Meccan, mercantile caravans. The action of raiding was linked to the notion of religious striving (jāhada) via Qur’anic verses (5:39 for example) to produce the concept of religious striving or holy war (jihad). When Muhammad learned of a convoy of trade-laden caravans heading to Mecca from Syria, he led a force of approximately 300 Muslim men to ambush it at the site of Badr by the Red Sea coast in March 624 CE. The caravans, however, were able to elude capture. Meccan forces that had

rushed there to safeguard the trade caravans, however, clashed with Muhammad’s followers—supposedly because Islam’s Prophet instigated the confrontation to demonstrate that God was on his side—and the Muslims won decisively. Some Meccan commanders were killed in battle, others executed, still others ransomed. The Prophet Muhammad did not himself take part in the fighting; rather, he directed the Muslims from a nearby location. The Battle of Badr permitted Muhammad to claim Allah was leading Muslims to victory: “You did not kill them, God did” (Qur’an 8:17) and so the cry of “God is great” (Allāhu ’akbar) would become a standard for Muslim fighters. So other Arabs began pledging allegiance to him and his faith. Conflict between the Muslims of Medina and the nonMuslims of Mecca ratcheted up in March 625 CE after another caravan was successfully ambushed by Muhammad’s forces five months earlier. Approximately 3,000 soldiers, including armored horse and camel cavalries, advanced from Mecca to the hilly oasis of Uhud just north of Medina. Fighting from the hill slopes, Muslims could not be reached by the Meccan cavalry, whereas Muslim archers cut down the horsemen and supporting infantry. Yet a Meccan counteroffensive injured Muhammad, the Muslims were forced to retreat to higher ground, and after mutilating a few Muslim corpses the Meccans headed back home. It is said that initially Muhammad vowed to mutilate Meccans at their next encounter but changed his mind upon receiving revelation that: “If you inflict punishment, then inflict only so much as you have suffered; but if you can endure patiently, that is better” (Qur’an 16:127). So, he expressly forbade mutilation after battle. The burgeoning military dimension of Islam’s spread triggered internal reconfigurations with the umma. As its leader Muhammad had to institute changes in traditional Arab customs so as to provide for widows, orphans, and others who lost family members. Sometime after the Battle of Uhud, Muhammad received revelation (Qur’an 4:3) that became the basis of the Islamic system of polygyny. Quranic revelation (4:12–13) later also became the foundation of the Muslim inheritance system, which stipulates exact shares to various individuals related to the deceased. The siege of Medina, known as the Battle of the Trench because the Muslims dug a trench to prevent the Meccans’ cavalry from advancing into the city, occurred at the end of

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March 627 CE. Muhammad’s tactic proved decisive and a fortnight later his non-Muslim enemies gave up their assault. Some Islamic sources attribute the idea of building the trench to Salman al-Farisi, an Iranian companion of the Prophet, because the word of that defense entered the Arabic language from Persian at that time. The crowning glory of Muhammad’s religious and political activities was the capitulation of Mecca in January 630 CE., followed by an amnesty for its inhabitants, destruction of nearby shrines to pagan deities, and rededication of the Kaaba or cube shrine there to Allah. When confronting forces allied with the two empires to the north of Arabia, the Byzantine and Sassanian ones, however, Muhammad had more mixed success. Attempts to take control of the trade route running northward into Syria during September and October 629 CE resulted in the death of the Prophet’s adopted son and other Muslim commanders at the Battle of Mu’ta (now located in Jordan). Later, between October and December 630 CE, the Prophet Muhammad led an expedition against the Byzantines in response to growing rumors about Emperor Heraclius’s preparations for a lengthy campaign against Medina. Muhammad supposedly mustered a large army of 30,000 Muslims (it should be noted that numbers provided by the earliest sources on the rise of Islam are probably exaggerated). But when they reached the spring of Tabuk (near the Gulf of Aqaba) on the frontier with Byzantium, it became clear they had been misinformed; however, chiefs of Christian and Jewish tribes there entered into peace treaties with the Muslims. Sensing that Sassanian power in the Arabian Peninsula was waning, Muhammad sent envoys to Bahrain, Oman, and Yemen. Between the years 630 and 632 CE, Yemen gradually slipped out of the Iranian Sassanian Empire’s control and into Muslim hands. Muslim tradition asserts that before his demise in June 632 CE, Muhammad even wrote to the Sassanian king of kings Khusro II and the Byzantine emperor Heraclius, calling upon them and their subjects to espouse Islam rather than lose in battle to Arab Muslims. Documents purporting to be correspondence from Muhammad to foreign monarchs appear to have been produced after the conquest of those two empires by the Prophet’s successors, the early caliphs, during the mid-seventh through eighth centuries, to meet oracular expectations by Muslims that the founder

of Islam had indeed foreseen the rise of the medieval caliphate that ruled from North Africa and the Levant across the Iranian plateau to Central Asia. More important for the spread of Islam—both religiously and politically— during and after Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime was the establishment of treatises of capitulation under which conquered groups could retain their own faiths such as Judaism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism by accepting protected minority (dhimmi) status and paying a poll or religious tax (jizya) (Qur’an 9:29, 22:17). Jamsheed K. Choksy and Narges Nematollahi See also Islam and War (Jihad); Jesus as Warrior Further Reading Hamidullah, Muhammad. The Battlefields of the Prophet Muhammad. 4th ed. New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1992. Muhammad ibn Ishāq. Sīrat rasūl Allāh. Translated by Alfred Guillaume. In The Life of Muhammad. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955, reprint. 1982. Watt, W. Montgomery. Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Mujahideen The mujahideen (holy warriors) were Afghan resistance fighters who, beginning in the late 1970s, rebelled against communist rule by various factions of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The movement drew heavily from religious as well as cultural influences. The harsh geography of the country emphasized local communities and made central government difficult, especially for external powers. Islam was a unifying factor for the mujahideen, as it was the predominant religion throughout Afghanistan. Mujahideen groups ranged in strength from a couple hundred to several thousand combatants and were usually organized along tribal lines such as the lashkar (fighting force). By 1980, several thousand Islamists had joined the mujahideen and the movement was a factor in the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. In April 1978, a communist coup in Kabul overthrew Mohammed Daoud, who had most recently ruled Afghanistan from 1973 after he overthrew the traditional monarchy

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An Afghan mujahid demonstrates the firing technique for a surface-to-air Stinger missile in 1988. The mujahideen (holy warriors) were resistance fighters whose insurgency was largely a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. (U.S. Department of Defense)

at that time. The communists labeled their 1978 coup the Saur Revolution and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. It resulted in a new government led by Nur Muhammed Taraki, as well as subsequent purges of Afghanistan’s middle- and upper-class leaders, including the death of Daoud and his family. A series of leadership changes ensued, as Hafizullah Amin replaced Taraki upon the latter’s death. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to strengthen the fledgling communist government there. More than 80,000 Soviet troops initially deployed to the country and commenced an almost decade-long occupation of Afghanistan. Over time, the force swelled to more than 100,000 Soviet soldiers. In late 1979, communist leaders installed Babrak Karmal as head of state upon Amin’s death and established a Revolutionary Council to rule the government.

The Soviet invasion sparked the mujahideen insurgency. Local leaders characterized the foreign presence as illegitimate occupation of Muslim land requiring violent jihad (struggle) in response. Over time, volunteers known colloquially as Afghan Arabs joined the mujahideen and key Islamist figures helped them. For example, Abdullah al-Azzam, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, organized the mujahideen with the help of Osama bin Laden. Azzam and bin Laden provided funds, training, and recruits, while Umar Abd al-Rahman and Ayman al-Zawahiri also assisted. They established the Maktab al-Khidamat (Services Office), which funneled money, personnel, and weapons to the mujahideen. Thousands volunteered to join the campaign, many from outside Afghanistan. The mujahideen trained in the use of weapons and explosives and became increasingly proficient in

Münster Rebellion (1534–1535)  581

waging guerrilla warfare against Soviet forces. Eventually the resistance numbered in the tens of thousands. The mujahideen also received significant external support, most notably from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United States. Pakistan channeled much of their aid through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. The U.S. government provided assistance because U.S. officials at that time perceived the mujahideen as a useful local ally to counter Soviet expansion. In 1986, Soviet leaders replaced Karmal with Mohammed Najibullah. In 1988, American and Soviet diplomats agreed to the Geneva Accords, which outlined a framework for a Soviet Union withdrawal that both the United States and the Soviet Union supported. The agreement stipulated that all Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan no later than February 15, 1989. As the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended, Azzam and bin Laden leveraged their heightened profiles resulting from their efforts with the mujahideen to found Al Qaeda, a violent Sunni Islamist terrorist organization. In 1989, the United States closed the American embassy located in Kabul due to heightened security concerns. That same year, Azzam died and Osama Bin Laden rose to the unrivaled leadership of Al Qaeda. Upon his return to Saudi Arabia, bin Laden argued for a Saudi Arabian response to Saddam Hussein’s provocations based on the mujahideen model, but Saudi officials instead allowed U.S. troops into Saudi Arabia as a deterrent. Bin Laden exploited that decision to push Al Qaeda toward identifying the United States and its citizens as primary targets. In 1989, Soviet military forces withdrew from Afghanistan after a lengthy, costly, and unpopular war. The Sovietbacked government in Kabul remained, led by Afghan president Najibullah. At the end of 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed, which severely limited Soviet influence in Kabul. The following year, mujahideen forces captured Kabul and ruled briefly. Throughout 1989–1992, Afghanistan experienced anarchy and civil war. Shuras (consultative councils) ruled locally, and the mujahideen increasingly suffered from internal divisions and competing factions. A new constitution renamed the country the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The Taliban, many of whose members were recent graduates of madrasas (Islamic schools) in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, rose in

influence. Mullah Mohammed Omar led the Taliban, first capturing Kandahar in 1994 and then Kabul in 1996. Over time, the mujahideen resistance hampered the Soviet occupation and eventually contributed to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The mujahideen experience also initiated the significant relationship between Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and Afghanistan that would enable Al Qaeda to grow in influence, reach, and capability. William A. Taylor See also Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Islam and War (Jihad); Mohammed Omar, Mullah; Muslim Brotherhood; Sharia and War; Taliban Further Reading Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin, 2004. Grau, Lester W., and Michael A. Gress, trans. and eds. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Johnson, Robert. The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Kakar, M. Hassan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. Saikal, Amin. Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004.

Münster Rebellion (1534–1535) In 1534, a radical religious group known as Anabaptists seized control of the German city of Münster and declared a “New Jerusalem” where God would protect his chosen people and deliver them into the kingdom of heaven. Both Catholic and Protestant princely rulers viewed Anabaptism as seditious and perverse. They laid siege to the city and in June 1535 crushed the rebellion. The leaders of the Anabaptists were tortured and their mutilated corpses were hung in iron cages that still hang from the church steeple. The origins of the Anabaptist movement lie in the period of early modern history known as the Reformation.

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For some time the Catholic Church was under attack by spiritualists, intellectuals, and secular leaders who undermined its power and theological authority. Its strongest challenge came on October 31, 1517, when an Augustinian monk named Martin Luther publicly pinned “Ninety-five Theses or Disputations on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences” to the door of Wittenberg Church. His protest about institutional abuses spread, thanks to the printing press and his decision to write in the vernacular. Luther’s stance ushered in the era of “protest” known as Protestantism—to bear witness (from the Latin pro meaning “for” and testari meaning “witness”). This protest encouraged religious debate and individual perceptions of the Bible with diverse interpretations of the scriptures being made as each protest group sought to define its relationship with God. One such group was named the Anabaptists. Influenced by the Protestant reform movement, Anabaptist groups spread throughout Europe in Zurich, the Netherlands, Italy, and Poland. The Anabaptists rejected infant baptism and instead rebaptized their brethren as adults when individuals were at a more suitable age and had acquired more advanced education to manifest their faith in a truer sense and commit their lives to God. The Anabaptists wanted to implement “godly” living and so rejected the sinful ways of the secular world for spiritual isolation. They opted for a congregational church that accepted everyone as equal, living in a commune and practicing polygamy. These observances were seen as nonconformist by Catholics and subversive by Protestants. At the Diet of Speyer in 1529 the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V declared Anabaptism to be a crime punishable by death. As a result of persecution by Catholics and Protestants, Anabaptists moved throughout Europe in search of a settlement or “New Jerusalem” in the hope that God would protect his chosen people. In 1534 they arrived in the German city of Münster and took over its council. This council of 12 appropriated Catholic property, redistributed wealth, outlawed money for a bartering economy, and burned all books. Most controversially, they permitted polygamy as there were four times as many women as men in Münster. Their new king—John of Leiden—led by example and took 16 wives. In June 1535, the besieging Catholic and Protestant forces stormed the city, arrested the Anabaptists, and

executed their leaders. The Anabaptist movement survived this persecution with many moving to the New World to establish settlements. Mennonites, Hutterites, and Unitarians trace their origins to the Anabaptist movement in Europe. Barry N. Whelan See also Anabaptist Pacifism; Holy Roman Empire; Luther, Martin; Protestant Reformers and War Further Reading Merriman, John. A History of Modern Europe: From the Renaissance to the Age of Napoleon. New York: W. W. Norton, 1996. Moeller, Bernd. Imperial Cities and the Reformation: Three Essays. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972. Roth, John D. Teaching That Transforms: Why AnabaptistMennonite Education Matters. Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 2011. Roth, John D., and James M. Stayer. Companion to Anabaptism and Spiritualism, 1521–1700. Leiden: Brill, 2007. Spitz, Lewis W. The Rise of Modern Europe: The Protestant Reformation 1517–1559. New York: Harper & Row, 1985.

Muslim Armies of the Crusades The crusades to the Near East, Egypt, and the Balkans encountered a variety of Muslim armies between the late 11th and the 15th centuries. The earliest crusades were confronted by the Great Seljuk Empire and its dependencies (covering Persia, Iraq, and Syria), the Seljuk sultanate of Rum in Anatolia, and the Fatimid caliphate in Egypt. Later the main enemies were the Ayyubids in Syria and Egypt (the later 12th and earlier 13th centuries), the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria (13th century and later), and the Ottoman Empire (14th–16th centuries).

Recruitment

Military recruitment in the Islamic world during the period of the crusades reflected established traditions until the coming of the Mongols in the 13th century. Most eastern Muslim states recruited multiethnic armies, which included local volunteers and large numbers of soldiers of slave origin called Mamluks or ghulams. Even the Seljuk Turks turned to such traditional methods as their authority

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spread across most of the Middle and Near East. Paradoxically, however, it seems that many of the first so-called Turks who erupted into Byzantine Anatolia around 1025 were actually Persians, Daylamis, or Kurds. Non-Turks, including Armenians and Arabs, also played an important role in the armies of several Seljuk successor states in 11th-century Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, by the end of the 11th century, some of the Christian Greek and Armenian military elites of Anatolia had also been Turkified through intermarriage. The Khwarezm shahs, who took over Trans­ oxania and eastern Persia following the decline of the Seljuks, recruited numerous troops of slave origin, though their garrisons also included freeborn Turkish and Persian professional soldiers. Traditional Islamic military recruitment reappeared in Mongol Persia and Iraq during the 14th century, but was more characteristic of the post-Mongol successor states. The most significant military development in the heartlands of Islamic civilization was a continuing professionalization of most armies, because the skills demanded of a soldier were now so high that the old militias and tribal forces could not compete. This trend prevailed despite the fact that, after the fragmentation of the Great Seljuk sultanate, many of the states involved were remarkably small and could only maintain small armies. Most rulers could only afford a small ’askar (bodyguard of slave-recruited Mamluks), which formed the core of a larger force of provincial soldiers, mostly Turks or Kurds plus a few Arabs. Ahdath (urban militias) played a minor role in some cities, while, further south, Bedouin Arab tribes continued to dominate the semidesert and desert regions. Saladin and his Ayyubid successors built a large and powerful military system in Egypt, Syria, and northern Iraq, making use of existing Zangid-Turkish and FatimidEgyptian structures. Though Saladin was of Kurdish origin, the role of Kurds in Ayyubid armies has been greatly exaggerated, and the alqa (elite) of Saladin’s army were slave-recruited Turks. Thereafter Mamluks continued to form the elites of subsequent Ayyubid forces. Among the more exotic troops in Saladin’s army were ex-Fatimid infantry of black African slave origin, but these proved unreliable and were soon disbanded. The same applied to most of the ex-Fatimid Armenian soldiers. Many North Africans were recruited by the Ayyubid navy, while large numbers

of renegade European warriors served Saladin and his successors after Saladin’s reconquest of most of Outremer. The army of Mamluk Egypt was essentially the same as that of the preceding Ayyubid dynasty, except that Mamluks now formed the ruling caste as well as forming the military elite. Under the Bari, or first “dynasty” of Mamluk sultans, the majority were of Turkish origin, but in the late 14th century larger numbers of Circassians, Russians, Greeks, and western Europeans were enlisted. Meanwhile, freeborn troops had a far lower status in the Mamluk army. The Seljuks of Rum who ruled central Anatolia attempted to model their army on that of the Great Seljuks of Iraq and Persia. At first their military forces consisted of Turkoman tribesmen around an elite of slave-recruited ghulams that included many Greek prisoners of war, but by the later 12th and early 13th centuries, the bulk of the professional cavalry were probably freeborn Turks. Other characteristics of the army of the Seljuks of Rum were its assimilation of existing Byzantine, Armenian, and Georgian military elites and the use of professional mercenaries (at the height of the sultanate’s prosperity). Rum and the subsequent Turkish principalities (beyliks) also encouraged urban Islamic brotherhoods as a source of religiously motivated volunteers. Like the other western beyliks, the Ottomans attracted military and civil refugees from the Mongol occupation of central Anatolia. Nevertheless, the earliest Ottoman armies were entirely traditional, consisting of a majority of Turkoman tribal cavalry, perhaps a tiny elite recruited from slaves or prisoners, and a few ill-trained infantry. By 1338, the Ottoman ruler already had a small force of ex-prisoner or slave-recruited soldiers, and although these were not as yet known as such, the famous Janissary (Turk. yeni çeri ) infantry may have developed out of this earlier formation. The Janissaries also differed from previous slave-recruited formations because they eventually came to be drawn from enslaved members of the Ottoman sultan’s own non-Muslim population.

Organization

Traditional systems of military organization characterized the Islamic world until the Mongol invasions. Military ranks remained much the same as they had been for centuries. The Great Seljuk sultanate was theoretically divided

584  Muslim Armies of the Crusades

into 24 military zones, each commanded by an officer whose Turkish or Persian title reflected the culture of his district. Each had to raise, train, equip, and lead a specified number of local troops. However, this idealized system proved inadequate, and the sultan soon created a palacebased army loyal to himself. The inadequacy of traditional structures also led to a great extension of the iqa‘ system of allocations of revenue. Although this system was largely destroyed by the invading Mongols, it was partially recreated by the Ilkhans (the Muslim Mongol rulers of Persia) and their successors. The success of the Ayyubids, Mamluks, and Ottomans in expelling the Franks of Outremer and defeating later crusading expeditions was not a result of superior numbers but reflected superior organization, logistical support, discipline, and tactics. Such sophistication could even be seen in the small forces of some city-states, such as that of 12th-century Damascus. This force was divided into five sections, according to the origins of the soldiers or their specific role. The militia, though primarily defensive, sometimes took part in offensive campaigns. The mutaawwi’a (religious volunteers) also formed a permanent though part-time force. There were three senior military ranks: the isfahsalar (commander), who was often the ruler himself; the ra’is (head of the militia); and the shina (head of internal security forces). Many grants of iqa‘ appear to have become hereditary and were largely reserved for the ruler’s ‘askar of regular cavalry. This force was in turn divided into ulb (platoons), whose weapons were normally held in the ruler’s own zardkhanah (arsenal). Cavalry was now the dominant arm, but Egypt, the primary center of Ayyubid power, was seriously short of pasture. Consequently, the Egyptian army relied on small numbers of exceptionally well-trained and equipped horsemen, with larger mounted forces being stationed in Syria. In Egypt the Ayyubids also inherited the sophisticated Fatimid Diwan al-Jaysh (ministry of war). The elite of the Ayyubid army was the jandariyah, which largely consisted of regiments of Mamluks, while the bulk of the army consisted of the professional but nonelite alqa. Infantry remained essential for siege warfare but mostly consisted of mercenaries and volunteer auxiliaries. On campaign, Ayyubid tactical units were not necessarily the same as the administrative formations, and they varied

considerably, often overlapping or being created in response to circumstances. These included a yazak (advance guard) selected from the best cavalry and the jalish, which appears to have been a cavalry vanguard carrying banners. The term qufl (literally “fortress”) may have referred to soldiers sent to secure the main routes; the term arafisha (rabble) seems to have referred to guerrillas operating inside enemy territory; and the liu were light cavalry sent to attack enemy supplies or caravans. Ayyubid logistical organization was even more sophisticated and was based upon an atlab al-mira (supply train) commanded by a senior officer. There was also a recognized military market (Arab. suq al-’askar) of civilian, specialized merchants. The army of the Mamluk sultanate was a development of that of the preceding Ayyubid dynasty and consisted of three main elements. The most important were the Royal Mamluks (Arab. mustakhdamun), while the khaakiya formed an elite bodyguard within the Royal Mamluks. Lower in status were the Mamluks of senior officers, and third there was the alqa, the freeborn cavalry. However, the status of the alqa steadily declined and, within Egypt, had little military value by the end of the 14th century. The Mamluk army’s ranking structure was equally elaborate. Until the late 13th century, the most senior officer was the na ‘ib al-salana (viceroy of Egypt), but later the atabak al-’asakir (father-leader of soldiers) was considered senior. The amir silah (master of arms) was in overall charge of government arsenals, the ra’is nawbat al-nawab commanded the Royal Mamluks, the ustadar was in charge of Mamluk pay, and the dawadar al-kabir selected which members of the alqa went on campaign. Other officers were in charge of government stables, arsenals, garrisons, and so on. Ordinary officer ranks were based on the number of soldiers the man maintained as his own retinue rather than the number he commanded on campaign. Provincial forces remained vital for the Mamluk state, each qira (military district) theoretically supplying 1,000 soldiers. Syria was by far the most important region outside Egypt. Its army commander was called the ‘atabak ‘amir kabir and was directly responsible to the sultan in Cairo. Syria itself was divided into small mamlaka (districts), each with a local administration with an officer called na ‘ib al-salana in charge of local military forces.

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The army of the Seljuks of Rum was divided into two parts: an “old,” or traditional, force and a “new” army. The Old Army mainly consisted of Turkoman tribesmen and the ruler’s Mamluks, plus the havashvi (armed retainers) of iqa‘ holders and urban governors. The New Army was essentially a mercenary force under the ruler’s immediate control. Following the Mongol conquest of Anatolia, these elite forces were replaced by Turkoman tribesmen whose loyalty was gained by giving them grants of freehold land rather than grants of revenue, while urban militias known as igdish were responsible for maintaining security under their own igdishbashis. The little beyliks that then emerged had small military forces under the command of the local ruler. Many of the ghazis (fighters for the faith) who typified this period formed religious brotherhoods (Arab. futuwa ) characterized by a very egalitarian spirit. The Ottoman Turks absorbed a variety of military traditions, of which that of the Mamluks was most important. At the start of the 14th century, the Ottomans’ Turkoman tribal forces were led by their own chiefs, whose loyalty was based on traditional Turko-Mongol rather than Islamic concepts. But by the late 14th century the Ottoman army consisted of two parts. The freeborn timarli (holders of estates) were mostly sipahi (cavalry), while the maasli (troops recruited from slaves or prisoners of war) received salaries from the government. Irregulars and auxiliaries formed an unrecognized third part of the Ottoman army. At the very heart of the later 14th-century Ottoman army were the elite silahdar (guardians of the ruler’s weapons) who formed one of six palace cavalry regiments. Quite when the two Janissary cavalry regiments were established is unclear, though another elite Janissary unit, the solak (infantry bodyguard), certainly existed from an early date. The Janissary infantry were part of the Ottoman sultan’s birun (outer service) and consisted of a single ocak (hearth), a corps commanded by the Yeniçeri Agasi. This ocak was divided into orta (companies), each commanded by a Çorbaci basi (soup chief). Ottoman provincial forces were divided into European and Asian armies, those in the Balkans consisting of three uc (frontier marches), which had, in fact, existed even before the Ottomans crossed into Europe. By the late 14th century, the fast-expanding Ottoman Empire was divided into sanjaq (provinces), each of which fielded a specified number of cavalrymen. The

timarli of these provinces were grouped into alay (regiments) under alay bey (officers), who were in turn led by the sanjaq bey (provincial governor). Several sanjaq beys were commanded by the beylerbeyi of the wider eyalet (military province). David Nicolle See also Crusades (Overview) Further Reading Ayalon, David. “Studies in the Structure of the Mamluk Army, I: The Army Stationed in Egypt.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 15 (1953): 203–28. Ayalon, David. “Studies in the Structure of the Mamluk Army, II: The Halqa.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 15 (1953): 448–76. Ayalon, David. “Studies in the Structure of the Mamluk Army, III: Holders of Offices Connected with the Army.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 16 (1954): 57–90. Bombaci, Alessio. “The Army of the Saljuks of Rum.” Istituto orientale di Napoli, Annali n.s., 38 (1978): 343–69. Elbeheiry, Salah. Les Institutions d’Egypte au Temps des Ay­ yubides. Lille, France: Service de Reproduction des Thèses, 1972. Jandora, John W. The March from Medina. Clifton, NJ: Kingston, 1990. Kennedy, Hugh. The Armies of the Caliphs. London: Routledge, 2001. Nicolle, David. Armies of the Caliphates, 862–1098. Oxford: Osprey, 1998. Nicolle, David. Armies of the Muslim Conquest. London: Osprey, 1993.

Muslim Brotherhood The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin), also known as “The Society of Muslim Brothers,” was founded in Ismailia, Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. Al-Banna instituted the organization as an Islamist group committed to freeing the Egyptian (Muslim) people from what he saw as corrupting, Western influences brought about by British rule and the corrosion of Islamic faith caused by Christian missionaries. He described the organization as a combination of a Salafi message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political

586  Muslim Brotherhood

organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea. The Muslim Brotherhood was initially dedicated to educating and encouraging Muslims to commit to an authentic Islamic lifestyle. The organization grew rapidly from 4 branches in 1929 to 2,000 by 1949, and membership grew from the initial 6 people to an estimated 500,000 by the end of the 1940s, and from 1 country in 1928 to more than 80 countries by the end of the 20th century. Hassan al-Banna’s manifesto from 1947 clearly spelled out his ideas for reforming Islamic societies, starting with Egypt. His guiding principle was that a truly Islamic society (umma) must be built from the ground up, starting with the individual, the family, the community, the nation, then the world. This process would inevitably lead to a renewed emphasis on jihad, a system of government ruled by Islamic law, and a world governed by a caliphate. At the beginning of this process al-Banna called for the retaking of the Iberian Peninsula, Sicily, the Balkans, the Italian coast, as well as the islands of the Mediterranean. The organization began with social and educational work, but soon determined that political activity was necessary to end British influence and to strengthen the impact of Islam in society. As such, in the 1930s the Muslim Brotherhood began a relationship with Nazi Germany and through a new unit, the “Secret Apparatus,” began covert bombing and assassination attempts in Egypt. After World War II and the partition of Palestine in 1947, the Brotherhood began working with then Major Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers Movement, leading to an active military involvement, with Brotherhood troops fighting in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War in support of Arabs. In 1948, after rumors spread that the increasingly popular Brotherhood would attempt a coup against King Farouk I, Egyptian prime minister Muhammad Al-Nuqrashi Pasha declared the Brotherhood illegal. Abdel Meguid Ahmed Hassan, a member of the Secret Apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood, assassinated Prime Minister Pasha on December 28, 1948. In retaliation, on February 12, 1949 Egyptian government agents killed Hassan al-Banna in Cairo. The assassination of al-Banna was followed by a harsh, official crackdown on all Brotherhood activities. In 1952 the Free Officers Movement, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, gained control of the Egyptian government.

The Muslim Brotherhood attempted to influence the new government in a more Islamic direction. Following failed attempts at co-option by the government, a member of the Brotherhood’s Secret Apparatus, Mahmud Abd al-Latif, attempted to assassinate Nasser on October 26, 1954. The results of the failed attempt were the execution of Latif and five other Brotherhood members, and the imprisonment of hundreds of brothers, including prominent ideologue Sayyid Qutb. While in prison Qutb wrote the influential book Milestones along the Way, in which he called for revolt against Muslim governments that did not rule by Islamic law, as they were part of the world of pre-Islamic “ignorance” (Jahiliyyah), and therefore non-Muslim. Qutb was executed by the Egyptian government on August 29, 1966 for being a part of another plot to kill President Nasser. In the 1970s the new president of Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat, gradually released imprisoned brothers as a bulwark against the political left. However, after Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel and had several Brotherhood leaders arrested, a violent Islamist group, Tanzim al-Jihad, a group whose leadership was made up primarily of former brothers, assassinated Sadat on October 6, 1981. The Muslim Brotherhood remained an illegal, but tolerated organization during the next two decades of President Hosni Mubarak’s rule, growing in influence among and coming to dominate the professional and student associations of Egypt. It became renowned for its network of social services in the more needy areas of the country. By 2002 the Muslim Brotherhood was established in society sufficiently to field candidates for parliamentary office, winning 17 seats, and by 2005 won 88 seats, running as independents. In the 2010 elections, the Brotherhood’s candidates did much less well, under purported massive voter intimidation and fraud. The symbol devised to represent the group consists of a green circular background (the color signifying Islam), a Qur’an at the top (representing the centrality of its teachings), and two crossed swords with the words “Make Ready” below (denoting the importance of being ready to take part in jihad as cited at Surah 8:60). The symbol’s meaning is reflected clearly in the original motto of the organization: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the

Muslim Civil War, First (656–661 CE)  587

way of Allah is our highest hope.” The motto has sometimes been modified in political situations to “Islam is the Solution.” A prospective male member of the Brotherhood begins as a “follower” (muhib) with his indoctrination and observation lasting from six months to four years. The follower is part of a “family” consisting of four or five established members, which closely monitors his piety and ideological commitment. The next level of membership, “supporter” (muayyad), is a nonvoting member. The supporter’s duties include tasks such as teaching, preaching, and recruiting. After demonstrating sufficient devotion and knowledge, the supporter can then become an “affiliated” (muntasib) member, with the added responsibility of contributing 5 percent to 8 percent of his income to the Brotherhood. After another period of close scrutiny, the “affiliated” member can then become an “organizer” (muntazim) and can take on a lower-level leadership role, such as forming a “family” or heading a chapter of families. Only after this period of dedication can the man become a full member (ach’amal) with the right to vote in governing body elections, participate in the society’s working groups, and run for office within the Brotherhood. The lowest level of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ruling structure is the Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura), consisting of approximately 100 Muslim Brothers, which votes on important decisions and elects members of the next higher authority, the Guidance Council (Maktab alIrshad). The Guidance Council consists of approximately 15 longtime Muslim Brothers, headed by the Supreme Guide (Murshid). In addition to the formal leadership structure, there are also stand-alone committees dealing with such subjects as issues of finance, legal concerns, propagation of the message, and physical training. The Muslim Sisterhood is the only section open to female members. The Supreme Guide is the ultimate authority in the Brotherhood. All members swear an oath of loyalty (Bayah) to the Supreme Guide, pledging to support his decisions. This is in conscious emulation of the model of the earliest Islamic community’s oath of loyalty to the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad. After the Arab Spring of 2011, the Brotherhood announced that it was fielding a slate of candidates for political

office in Egypt under its own Freedom and Justice Party. The Brotherhood candidate, Muhammad Morsi, was elected president on June 24, 2012, and remained in power until his ouster by a military coup led by Defense Minister Abdul Fatah al-Sisi on July 3, 2013. By the end of that year the Muslim Brotherhood was declared not only an outlawed group, but also a terrorist organization by the Egyptian government. Within a short time more than 80 countries included the Muslim Brotherhood in their lists of terrorist organizations. R. Don Deal See also Islam and War (Jihad); Sayyd Qutb Further Reading Kandil, Hazem. Inside the Brotherhood. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015 Lia, Brynjar. The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928–1942. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2006. Mitchell, Richard. The Society of the Muslim Brothers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969. Ziad, Abu-Amr. Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

Muslim Civil War, First (656–661 CE) The First Muslim Civil War was a conflict over succession to the spiritual and political leadership of Islam when the aging caliph, Uthman ibn Affan, was murdered by members of a small political rebellion. The caliphate fell upon a reluctant Ali ibn Abi Talib who sought to restore order by placing his relatives in positions of power throughout Muslim territory. Mu’awiya, governor of Syria and relative of Uthman, refused to yield his position or control over his military forces until Uthman’s murderers were brought to justice. Aisha bint Abi Bakr, daughter of the first caliph and widow of the Prophet Muhammad, stepped into this political and religious impasse. Seeking justice against Uthman’s murderers, she precipitated the first battles in Islamic history featuring Muslims on both sides. Marching a small force into Mesopotamia to hunt down Uthman’s killers, Aisha met Ali’s army moving northward to deal with Mu’awiya in Syria. Both sides negotiated well

588  Muslim Civil War, First (656–661 CE)

In this 15th-century illuminated manuscript, Aisha, widow of the Prophet Muhammad, is depicted at the Battle of the Camel which took place in Basra, present-day Iraq, in 656. The Battle of the Camel is significant because it was the first time in history that Muslims took up arms against each other. (Yale University Gallery of Art)

into the night of November 6, 656, when each was attacked by a group sympathizing with Uthman’s murder. In the confusion of night fighting and with both Ali’s and Aisha’s armies believing the other guilty of the attack, a general battle ensued. At daybreak, Aisha mounted a camel and led her smaller forces against Ali. Her attacks were strong but with the fall of Aisha’s camel and the weight of Ali’s numbers, the battle soon ended. Triumphant, Ali spared Aisha and sent her home. The survivors were incorporated into Ali’s army and Mu’awiya, forewarned of Ali’s approach, made further preparations for battle. That battle occurred at Siffin in Syria during the summer of 657, and like its predecessor, began with tense negotiations and an unexpected battle. In an effort to avoid further Muslim on Muslim bloodshed, both leaders sought a political solution. The armies, chafing at the delay, began fighting without orders for more than two days, yielding

no significant results other than a swelling death toll. Ali and Mu’awiya stopped the fighting and submitted their disagreements to expert arbitration. After several weeks it was determined that the future caliph should be chosen by the people. When Ali refused to step down, the Muslim religion splintered and a new group formed. Called Kharijites and rooted in the original protest movement that assassinated Uthman, they feared political retribution from Ali while disrespecting his religious authority for having submitted his caliphate, a gift from God, to human determination. The First Muslim Civil War moved from confrontation between contenders for the caliphate to campaigns by Ali against the Kharijites. Decisively defeating them in the Battle of Nahrawan in 659, Ali failed to end their movement and was, in turn, assassinated in 661 by a surviving Kharijite. Ali’s death paved the way for Mu’awiya to

Muslim Civil War, Second (680–692 CE)  589

consolidate his strength against his few remaining rivals to become the first Umayyad caliph. Mu’awiya’s success ended the First Muslim Civil War with order restored but questions over how to select future caliphs lingering. Within decades these questions again brought Muslims into military and religious conflict. Russell S. Perkins See also Caliphate; Mu’awiya; Muslim Civil War, Second Further Reading Ames, Christine. Medieval Heresies: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Hughes, Aaron. Muslim Identities: An Introduction to Islam. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. Marsham, Andrew. Rituals of Islamic Monarchy: Accession and Succession in the First Muslim Empire. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

Muslim Civil War, Second (680–692 CE) With questions over succession to the political and military leadership of Islam left unanswered at the end of the First Muslim Civil War, the death of the Umayyad caliph Mu’awiya in 680 began a new round of violence between competing interpretations of God’s will for the Muslim community. Mu’awiya’s son Yazid was proclaimed the new Umayyad caliph while others, fearing the rule of a secular dynasty, supported Husayn, the son of Mu’awiya’s enemy from the First Muslim Civil War. Still other factions supported local favorites, like Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr in Mecca, or in the case of the Kharijites, rebelled against the entire process and established independent enclaves against all sides. The caliphates of the first two contenders ended relatively quickly. Husayn and his entire force of a few hundred men were killed at the Battle of Karbala in 680 by an Umayyad army several thousand strong. Yazid was barely able to consolidate his early successes before his own accidental death in 683. These two events brought new contenders into the fray. The Umayyads, in keeping with dynastic traditions, named Yazid’s son Mu’awiya II as

caliph while supporters of Husayn, devastated by his death in battle, selected Zubayr since he was related to both the Prophet Muhammad’s wife Aisha and was the grandson of the first caliph, Abu Bakr. Mu’awiya II, unable to enforce peace between Muslims, served only a few months before turning the caliphate over to Marwan ibn al-Hakam. The swift changes in Umayyad caliphs allowed Zubayr to increase his hold upon territory within the Muslim empire and over most of its people. In Damascus, the seat of Umayyad power, the local governor was persuaded to support Zubayr’s caliphate rather than that of Marwan. In the summer of 684, Umayyad forces won another crucial victory at the Battle of Marj Rahit outside Damascus where Zubayr’s forces were crushed and Syria retained as an Umayyad stronghold. From there, Marwan was able to reconquer Egypt and other areas before his death in 685. Marwan’s son Abd al-Malik became caliph and quickly resumed the war. In 692, with all other resistance groups throughout the Muslim empire defeated, Zubayr and his remaining followers were contained under siege at Mecca. The siege, and the Second Muslim Civil War, ended in late 692 when Zubayr was killed during the fighting inside Mecca’s Sacred Mosque. The end of the Second Muslim Civil War still left succession to the caliphate an open question while making adherents of competing viewpoints even more distinct within the Islamic faith. Sunni Muslims, the majority viewpoint, held that Muslims should exercise some sort of agreement when selecting a new caliph while minority Shiites required new caliphs to have blood relationships with either Ali or the Hashimite tribe. The Kharijites, opposed to both views and fighting against each contender for the caliphate during the Muslim civil wars, rejected both blood and community agreement as too subject to human frailty when only God could indicate a caliph through the religious devotion of an individual. Russell S. Perkins See also Caliphate; Mu’awiya; Muslim Civil War, First Further Reading Gordon, Matthew. The Rise of Islam. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2005. Hawting, G. R. The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate AD 661–750. New York: Routledge, 2000.

590  Muslim Conquest of Egypt

Muslim Conquest of Egypt The Muslim Arab conquest of Egypt, 639–642 CE, was a miraculous breakthrough to Muslim expansion in the Middle East, seizing the first state in Africa and expanding the Islamic Empire. The seizure of a very wealthy centralized state from the Byzantine Empire resulted in Muslim control of a large, influential commercial center with its capital at Alexandria, a city second in importance to Byzantium only to Constantinople. Muslim control of Egypt ensured a safeguard for their recent conquest of Syria and headquarters for their future conquest of North Africa.

Eve of the Conquest

Between 634 and 639, Muslim armies conquered both the Sassanid Persian Empire, seizing Iraq, and portions of the Byzantine Empire, seizing Syria and Palestine in a series of astounding military victories, fighting on both fronts at the same time. Egypt, which was at the time a part of Byzantium, was ruled for a millennium under the Greco-Roman administration as one political unit along with Byzantium. Although Coptic Egyptians were Christians like the Byzantines, they had a powerful church in Alexandria that followed the Monophysite creed, unlike the church in Constantinople, which followed the Duophysite creed. This doctrinal split resulted in widespread persecutions in Egypt, especially from 631. These persecutions were led by Cyrus, the Byzantine prefect of Egypt. In 639, near Damascus, the Muslim commander of Palestine, Amr Ibn Al-Aas, suggested to Caliph Umar that he lead his armies in an invasion of Egypt, due to its massive wealth, which Amr had witnessed as a merchant. An invasion of Egypt would also help to secure the newly acquired Muslim territory of Syria from Byzantine attack coming from Egypt.

Conquest

More than 4,000 Muslim soldiers led by Amr, now in his late sixties, crossed into the Sinai Peninsula in December of 639. They faced stern resistance from both the Egyptians in the area and from the Byzantine garrison at Pelusium, resistance that lasted for two months. The final victory was obtained by Amr, which led to a rapid Muslim advance into Egypt, avoiding most populated areas and seizing

Belbais in April 640. Days later, Amr’s army appeared before Heliopolis, the ancient capital of Egypt, and defeated its garrison. Due to the arrival of 8,000 reinforcements sent from the caliph Umar, the Arab army managed to besiege the chief strategic fort of Memphis in May 640. Although the Arabs numbered around 10,000 and the Byzantine forces in Egypt numbered 30,000, Cyrus negotiated with Amr’s Arabs after a bitter siege of Memphis. Cyrus’s motives for negotiating are unclear. Perhaps the Persian occupation of Egypt of 616–629 had resulted in a weak administration, unable to function in the face of the Muslim siege, or perhaps the Byzantine army was exhausted, especially after the heavy defeats suffered earlier in Syria. Or perhaps the Muslim armies presented too formidable a foe for the Byzantines to resist. Amr was negotiating for three possible outcomes: Byzantine conversion to Islam, Byzantine payment of the jizya (tax for dhimmi), or continuing the fight. Cyrus agreed to pay the jizya and proposed a truce, giving him time to travel to Constantinople to meet with the Byzantine emperor Heraculius. The Prophet himself had written to Cyrus before, around 627, inviting him to convert to Islam, but Cyrus declined and sent him many gifts, including some slave women, one of them named Maryya, whom Muhammad married. Cyrus also requested that should the Muslims conquer Egypt, they treat its citizens well. Emperor Heraclius was angered by Cyrus’s correspondence with Muhammad, but the emperor died in February 641, resulting in a domestic political struggle. His successor, Konstas II, agreed to surrender Egypt to recall the Byzantine army, which was now badly needed in the Balkans. While Cyrus was away, Muslim forces sacked much of Egypt and besieged Alexandria itself. They faced different levels of resistance according to John, bishop of Nikiu, while the chief Muslim chronicler, Ibn Abd Al-Hakam, wrote that the conquest of Egypt demonstrated that the Egyptians themselves were pleased to see Muslim forces save them from Byzantine oppression. Cyrus signed the Treaty of Alexandria with the Muslims, although the Egyptians themselves were not consulted. The treaty stipulated an 11-month truce between the Byzantines and Muslims. Byzantine forces evacuated Egypt and were sworn not to launch any more attacks against the Islamic caliphate. The

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Egyptians were allowed freedom of worship, and Jews were allowed to remain in Alexandria. Every male paid 2 dinars annually in jizya tax in return for Muslim protection, and Egyptians were not required to serve in the Muslim army.

Muslim Administration

In 642, Amr marched to the city of Pentapolis in Egypt and to Tripoli in Libya in 643. He had no vision of expanding Muslim lands without settling in Egypt first, establishing Egypt as a firm addition to the caliphate. Muslim raids on Libyan tribal territories continued on an irregular basis to protect western Egypt from exterior threats. Amr sent a campaign to explore Nubia in the south, and a decade later in 652, the Muslim administration after him concluded a treaty of peace with Nubia. Here the Arabs wasted a great opportunity to use the Nile valley and water supplies to spread Islam south in Africa. It would not be until the year 1820 that Islam spread into what is now Sudan. Amr had founded the first Muslim capital of Egypt, Fustat, and avoided the heavily populated Alexandria. Fustat was also founded to avoid Byzantine naval attack, as the Muslim navy was not yet capable of taking on the Byzantine fleet. Fustat was a small center with a mosque named after Amr. Egypt was used as the base for Muslim conquests in North Africa for the following 50 years. Taef Kamal El-Azhari See also Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035) Further Reading Al Hakam, Ibn Abd. The History of the Conquest of Egypt, North Africa and Spain. Translated by Charles Correy. New York: Cosimo Classics, 2010. Mikhail, Maged S. A. From Byzantine to Islamic Egypt: Religion, Identity and Politics after the Arab Conquest. London: I. B. Tauris, 2014.

Muslim Conquest of Iraq Caliph Abu Bakr (632–634 CE) began the initial campaign to conquer modern-day Iraq in 633. At the time most of the region was under the sway of the Sassanian Empire (Persia). The goals of these campaigns included both the

advance of Islam and the securing of the Arabian Peninsula from neighboring nations. Even before 633, Arab tribal chiefs, such as Muthanna bin Haritha, had been leading raids into Iraq. According to the Iranian historian Parvaneh Pourshariati, these raids prove that the Arab invasion of Iraq actually began in 628, and not 633 as usually claimed. He also notes that there were Parthian rebellions (628–632) in Iraq against the Persians, which were also part of this larger conflict. The buffer region between Arabia and Iraq also included a number of (mostly Christian) Arab nomads. These Arabs joined forces against the Persians because leaders of the Persian Zoroastrian faith had a long history of persecuting Christianity. A lack of cultural unity in Iraq also encouraged some local leaders to make peace agreements directly with Arab invaders, ceding control over their regions in exchange for political autonomy. Arab scholars claim that the first campaign for Iraq began in Muharram 12th Hijrah (the third week of March 633). Arab armies encountered a Persian foe already weakened by decades of warfare with the Byzantine Empire. Arab forces were led by Khalid ibn-Walid, considered their most capable military leader. Ibn-Walid led an allvolunteer army of at least 18,000 troops, which included at least 2,000 Iraqi Arabs. This army relied on light cavalry forces that moved quickly and relied on the element of surprise. Crossing from Arabia through Syria, a large Arab force moved up the Tigris-Euphrates Delta and spread out westward, winning four consecutive battles. Arab historians refer to these battles as the Battle of the Chains (April), the Battle of the River (April), the Battle of Walaja (May), and the Battle of Ullais (May), boasting that these victories were marked by brilliant tactical maneuvers that entrapped the Persians. These victories were followed by the sieges of al-Anbar and Ein ul-Tamr in July. Even though the Persians had been thrown into chaos, local forces continued to fight in hopes of allowing the Persians time to regroup for a counterattack. When Khalid ibn-Wallid left Iraq to quell an uprising in northern Arabia, the Persians seized this opportunity and assembled a large army. In November, Arab general Khalid divided his army into three units and led a coordinated strike against each of the Persian garrisons at Muzieh, Sanni, and Zumail. Finally, in December the border town of Firaz, defended by Persians, allied Christian Arabs, and even some Byzantines, was

592  Muslim Conquest of Persia

captured by Khalid’s forces. Most of Iraq was now under Arab rule. The Second Battle for Iraq began in 634 when the Persians attempted to recapture Iraq. Caliph Umar (634– 644 CE) appointed Abu Ubaid al-Thaqafi to respond to the Persians. Abu Ubaid’s leadership was weak, which resulted in a Persian victory at the “Battle of the Bridge” and the death of Abu Ubaid, who was trampled beneath the armor-clad war elephants of the Persians. Caliph Umar then placed Muthanna bin Haritha as general over the Arab forces, a choice rewarded with a victory at the Battle of Buwayb (634). This victory allowed Arab territorial expansion to continue. Not accepting defeat, however, the Persians formed an alliance with their ancient foes, the Byzantines. Their treaty called for Emperor Yazdgerd III (Yazdigird) to employ Persian forces against the Arabs in Iraq while Byzantine emperor Heraclius attacked Syria. Caliph Umar responded to this treaty by ordering Arab troops in Iraq to return to Arabia before attacking Syria, where they faced a looming Byzantine threat. In spite of their alliance, Persian troops failed to join the Byzantines who were defeated at the Second Battle of Yarmuk (August 636). This victory allowed Umar to reassign his Syrian forces to Iraq. Caliph Umar placed Sa’ad ibn Abu Waqqas over these forces. The Arabs advanced into Iran where they defeated a massive Persian army at the pivotal Battle of Qadisiyyah. City after city fell to General Sa’ad until the Persian capital of Ctesiphon fell in March 637. After losing their capital, Persian troops reassembled at the crossroads city of Jalaula under the command of General Mihran. Even though a number of fortified Persian armies remained in Tikrit, Mosul, and the border towns of the Byzantine Empire, Caliph Umar decided to attack General Mihran. Although the Arabs won this battle they were ordered not to pursue the fleeing Persians after Caliph Umar famously declared, “I prefer the safety of my fellow Muslims rather than the spoils of war.” The surrender of Persian garrisons in Tikrit and Mosul guaranteed the Arabs the overall military control of Iraq. The region, however, continued to experience frequent raids by Persian forces across the Zagros Mountains. The most successful Persian general of these raids was Hormuzan, but his forces were cornered in 638 at the Battle of Ahvaz. Hormuzan was forced to sue for peace. Hormuzan,

however, broke this treaty, which obligated Caliph Umar to send the governor of Basra, Abu Musa Ashaari, to defeat Hormuzan a second time. Amazingly, Hormuzan was once again sued for peace, which, not surprisingly, he violated at the first opportunity to receive Persian reinforcements (640). Defeated again, Hormuzan converted to Islam and became an adviser to the Arab forces. Mosul fell in 641. Defeated Persian soldiers who survived these defeats fled to Merv (Turkmenistan) where they attempted to lead raids into Iraq and Persia. Finally, after amassing yet another army, Emperor Yazdgerd launched his final attack against the Arabs. Yazdgerd named Mardan Shah general over as many as 100,000 Persians. This forced Caliph Umar, in 642, to order an invasion of the last vestiges of the Persian Empire. Arab troops under General Nouman ibn Muqarrin entered Persia and were victorious at the Battle of Nahawand (December 642). Although this victory was decisive, it was not until 651 that the last remaining Persian general surrendered. In that same year, Emperor Yazdgerd, who had been a fugitive for years, was assassinated in Merv. The compelling history of these wars is complicated by the fact that scholars examining events are forced to rely on sources that were either written by very biased writers or that were not transcribed until decades after the actual battles. Chris Van Gorder See also Caliphate; Muslim Conquest of Persia Further Reading Mikaberidze, Alexander. Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011. Morony, Michael G. Iraq After the Muslim Conquest. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2005. Robertson, John. Iraq: A History. London: OneWorld, 2015.

Muslim Conquest of Persia The Muslim conquest of Persia took place during the seventh and eighth centuries CE, during which the Muslim Rashidun caliphate invaded and conquered some of the territories of the Persian Sassanid Empire. The conquest began with the Muslim invasion of the territory of what is

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today Iraq, then under the rule of the Persian Sassanid dynasty, and continued with further advances into the Iranian Plateau, where the Muslims defeated the Sassanid armies and brought the dissolution of the Sassanid dynasty. The conquest of Persia concluded during the period of the Umayyad caliphate (661–750 CE). As the result of the conquest, the Persian region was incorporated into the territories of the Muslim caliphate, and gradually the local population was converted into the new religion of Islam. After the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE, his closest friends and allies appointed a series of new leaders to succeed him, known as the caliphs (from Calipha Rasul Allah, the replacement of the messenger of God). The first four caliphs are known collectively as the Rashidun Caliphs, meaning the rightly guided caliphs. Before expanding Muslim rule over new territories, Muhammad’s first successor, the caliph Abu Bakr, had to wage war against Arabian tribes who had abandoned the religion of Islam after the Prophet’s death. This campaign is known as the Ridda Wars and was concluded with Muslim rule over the Arabian Peninsula and its inhabitants’ conversation to Islam, The invasion of Iraq, then under Sassanid control, begun as an extension of the Ridda Wars during the last years of Abu Bakr’s reign (632–634 CE). The Muslim commander Khalid b. al-Walid (known as the “Sword of God”) and his forces invaded Iraq to deal with non-Muslim Arab tribes. In Iraq, Khalid and his soldiers encountered the Sassanid frontier forces. The Muslims defeated the Sassanids several times during their campaign in Iraq in 633 CE. Khalid defeated a Persian force under a commander named Hurmuzd in the battle of Dhat al-Salasil. Khalid defeated another Persian force in the battle of Madar. In a later battle in Walaja, Khalid defeated a mixed force of Persian and Christian Arabs. Later in the same year, Khalid was able to arrange a tribute with the city of Hira after defeating the Persian cavalry of the city and forcing additional forces to flee. Khalid’s campaign in Iraq destroyed the majority of the Sassanid fortifications along the border with Arabia. Khalid, however, did not advance into Persia; instead, he participated in the military campaign along the Byzantine front against the Christian Byzantine Empire. Caliph Abu Bakr passed away in 634 CE and the conquests continued during the reign of the second caliph,

Umar b. al-Khattab (r. 634–644 CE). The Muslim advancement halted as the Sassanid dynasty, under the leadership of the emperor Yazdegerd III, alarmed by the Muslim achievements in Iraq, now took the Muslim threat more seriously. Under the command of Rustam, the Persian forces were able to defeat the Muslim forces of Abu ‘Ubaida in the battle of the Bridge in 634 CE, eventually leading to the withdrawal of the Muslim armies under the command of al-Motanna. The Muslim confrontation with the Sassanid dynasty continued in 635 CE, when Jarir b. Abdallah al-Bajali was sent to Iraq to reinforce al-Mutanna’s army. In 635, with the assistance of local Christian Arabs, this Muslim force was able to defeat the Persians in Nokayla. In addition, a force of several hundred men under ‘Otba b. Gazwan was sent to Iraq and successfully defeated Persian local forces in 636, conquering several territories. In the same year, Sa’ed b. Abi Waqqas, an early convert to Islam, was sent with an army of 6,000–10,000 men to Iraq. Sa’ed led the Muslim armies in the Battle of al-Qadisiyya in 636 CE, where the Muslim army confronted a great Sassanid force, escorted by 30 war elephants, under the command of Rustam. The battle of al-Qadisiyya became the first major Sassanid military defeat; a large part of the Sassanid military force was destroyed, with Persian regional rulers now supporting the Muslims and with Persian soldiers joining the Muslim army. The next major battle between the Muslims and the Sassanids occurred in 641 CE near the Persian city of Nahawand. Known as the “Victory of Victories,” the battle of Nahawand concluded with another Persian defeat. The Muslim army defeated an army raised by the last Sassanid emperor, Yazdegerd III. The victory at Nahawand, just like the victory at Qadisiyya, allowed the Muslims to consolidate their rule over previously conquered territories of Iraq and Khuzistan and to advance deeper into the Iranian plateau without facing any significant resistance. The conquest of Persia by the Muslims continued during the reign of the third caliph, ‘Uthman b. Affan (r. 644– 656 CE). However, ‘Uthman was assassinated in 656 and replaced by Ali b. Abi Taleb, the cousin of Prophet Muhammad. During Ali’s reign, the first Muslim civil war (Fitna, 656–661 CE) took place, with different Muslim factions fighting each other. During that civil war, the majority of

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Iran was lost to the Muslims. Ali himself was assassinated (661 CE), leaving his major rival, Mu’awiya, a relative of the third caliph, ‘Uthman, powerful enough to declare himself caliph. By passing his title to his son, Mu’awiya established the first Muslim dynasty, the Umayyads. During the period of the Umayyad dynasty, eastern Persia was reconquered by the Muslims. The Muslim conquest of Persia became an important event in the history of the region. As the result of the battles, many refugees migrated from the western parts of Persia to the eastern parts, establishing the roots of the Persian culture in the region. In addition, Arab settlers migrated to Persia, while Persians gradually converted to Islam and migrated throughout the Muslim-conquered territories. Finally, the Arabic language became prominent in the region as a language of religion, science, and literature. Leon Volfovsky See also Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035); Caliphate; Khalid ibn al Walid; Mu’awiya; Nahawand, Battle of; Qadisiyya, Battle of; Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) Further Reading Frey, R. N., ed. The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 4, The Period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Kennedy, Hugh. The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In. New York: Da Capo Press, 2007.

Muslim Conquest of Sindh Located at the southern end of the Indus valley, Sindh (Sanskrit, Sindhu), which is today one of the provinces of Pakistan, was historically a region that extended from the city of Multan in the north to the Indus delta and the Indian Ocean in the south. A center of the Indus Valley civilization (2500–1500 BCE), Sindh fell variously under the control of the Persians, the Macedonians under Alexander the Great, the Mauryas, the Sakas, the Kushans, and the Huns, successively. The region was on the trade route between northern India and the Persian Empire, and its seaports were famous for establishing trade links with

Africa and Asia. A thriving commercial relationship developed between the eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula and the western coast of India and Ceylon (Sri Lanka). The fabulous wealth of the Indian subcontinent attracted the Arabs, who also benefited from the established trade routes. Interaction between the Arabs and the peoples of India, whether through trade or through conquest, brought the peoples of Africa and the Indian subcontinent into contact on an increasingly frequent basis. The Islamic faith emerged in Arabia after the revelation of Prophet Muhammad (570–632 CE) in 610 CE. Over the next few centuries, it spread to neighboring regions. The vast Islamic empire soon encompassed Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, and Egypt. After defeating the Persian Sassanids, Arab Muslim armims moved east to bring the region of Sindh under Islamic rule. In 637 CE, the governor of Oman and Bahrain launched a naval attack of small raids on the towns of Thane, Debal, and Bharoaj, which lay on the western coast of Sindh in what is now Pakistan. These raids constituted the first instance of an Arab army attacking the Sindh region. Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644 CE) reprimanded the governor of Oman and Bahrain because the expedition was launched without the caliph’s permission. Sporadic Hindu incursions into Sindh led by the Brahmin king Chach (r. 632–700 CE) continued up to the late seventh century. In the beginning of the eighth century, the power of the Umayyad caliphate, which had begun to rule Arabia from 661 CE, had reached its zenith in the Middle East. It was during the reign of Caliph Al-Walid I ibn Abd al-Malik (705–715 CE) that Sindh was brought under the control of the Islamic caliphate. The conquest of Sindh was made a priority because the caliphate sought to suppress the piracy in the region, which emerged from the Sindh ports. Merchant ships operating between Ceylon, the west coast of India, and the Arabian Peninsula suffered greatly from these pirates. The caliph sent an ultimatum to Dahir (r. 700–712 CE), the ruler of Sindh, in 707 CE to return a trading vessel bound for Basra that had been captured by pirates. After Dahir’s refusal, the caliph dispatched an expedition under Ubaidullah bin Binhan, but the expedition was a failure and Ubaidullah bin Binhan was killed. In 711 CE, the caliph entrusted a new Sindh expedition to his 20-year-old nephew and son-in-law Muhammad bin Qasim (591–716 CE).

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In 712 CE, Qasim marched into Sindh from Baluchistan with a cavalry force of 7,000. A flotilla with heavy weapons and supplies also advanced on Sindh by sea. Qasim also possessed an effective assault weapon, the minjanique, a catapult that could throw large stones. Qasim captured the cities of Panjgore and Armabel as well as the port of Debal (near modern Karachi). Fierce fighting ensued at the fortress of Rawar, and Dahir was killed on the battlefield. When Rawar was besieged, the queen of Sindh and other women in the fortress immolated themselves when their husbands died in battle. Qasim murdered about 6,000 men inside the fortress and seized all the treasure. The Muslim army then subjugated the towns of Brahmanbad and Alor. Initially, the Muslims destroyed temples and proselytized and persecuted their non-Muslim subjects. But the Arabs soon realized the folly behind this and adopted a policy of toleration and conciliation, leaving places of worship untouched. Hindu revenue collectors and middle-level administrators were retained. The prime minister and revenue minister of Qasim were the same officials who had served under Raja Dahir. According to local tradition, Qasim even banned cow slaughter. As dhimmis (taxpaying non-Muslims), the Hindus were treated on par with Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians, the “people of the Book.” Some of the Hindu principalities retained their earlier administrative and judiciary systems. The village Panchayats or councils remained filled with only Hindu members who decided criminal cases pertaining to their co-religionists. The advent of Islam in Sindh resulted in a cultural rapprochement between the Indian subcontinent and the Arab world. Indian music, painting, and medicine came to the Arab world, which also learned elements of astronomy and mathematics from Indian pundits. Sufism became entrenched in Sindh and Sufi saints were venerated by both Muslims and non-Muslims. The extensive

commercial transactions carried out by Arab merchants transformed towns like Debal, Nairun Kot, Sehwan, Khuzdar, Aror, Multan, and Mansura into flourishing urban centers. With the decline of the Umayyad caliphate, Sindh, which had become the easternmost province of the Umayyad state, witnessed a period of chaos and anarchy. The province was ruled by governors paying nominal allegiance to the caliph. After the rule of the Ghanavids (977–1187 CE), Sindh fell intermittently under the domination of the Delhi sultanate and the Mughal Empire, the great Muslim states of India. Sindh eventually became part of the Bombay presidency under British colonial rule in India. Patit Paban Mishra See also Caliphate; India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in; India, Muslim Conquest of Northern; Islam and War (Jihad) Further Reading Ahmad, Fazl. Muhammed Bin Qasim. Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1984. Hasan, Masudul. History of Islam (Classical Period 571–1258 C.E.). New Delhi: Adam, 2002. Hawting, G. R. The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate AD 661–750. New York: Routledge, 2000. Kulke, Hermann, and Dietmar Rothermund. History of India. Calcutta: Rupa, 1994. Lari, Suhail Z. A History of Sindh. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994. Maclean, D. N. Religion and Society in Arab Sind. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989. Malik, Iftikhar H. The History of Pakistan. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008. Mishra, Patit P. “India: Medieval Period.” In D. Levinson and K. Christensen, eds. Encyclopedia of Modern Asia. Vol. 3. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2002, pp. 22–25. Siddiqi, Nasir-ud-Din. Muhammad bin Qasim. Lahore: Ferozsons, 1969.

N Nachmanides (1194–1270)

The disputation itself centered around three questions: (1) whether the Messiah had already appeared; (2) whether the Messiah presented by the prophets in the Torah/ Hebrew Bible/Old Testament was understood as divine or the son of human parents; and (3) whether Christians or Jews were in possession of the true faith. So successful was Nachmanides in his argumentation and responses, framed consistently by a gracious magnanimity of spirit, that King James presented him with 300 gold pieces. Nachmanides later published his comments to the ire of the Dominicans, who engineered an initial two-year exile that, upon further appeal to Pope Clement IV (1190–1268), resulted in permanent exile to the Land of Israel after a brief three-year sojourn in either Catalonia, Spain, or southern France, but, much to his sadness, without his family. Arriving and settling first in Acre, he later moved to Jerusalem where he continued his literary output and religious leadership, resulting in a significant revival of Jewish religious life and learning until his death in 1270. Nachmanides’s views on both war and exemptions are found within his biblical commentaries on the Torah/ Hebrew Bible/Old Testament and further framed by the rabbinic tradition of exploration and expansive discussions of those texts and postbiblical realities. Jewish religious tradition draws what it considers a critical distinction between “commanded” or “obligatory” war (milhemet misvah

Rabbi Moses ben [son of] Nachman was born in Girona, Spain, in 1194, and died in the Holy Land of Israel in, it is believed, 1270. His actual burial place is something of a dispute: some claim he was buried in the port city of Haifa, and others that he was buried in Jerusalem, where he established a synagogue known today as the Ramban Synagogue and where he directed much of his energies toward revitalizing Jewish religious life. A prodigious religious scholar, whose works were infused with kabbalistic or mystical insights and a civil discourse even with those with whom he stridently disagreed, he is also known today by both his acronyms: Ramban and/or Nachmanides. Early on, he studied medicine and earned his livelihood and the financial support of his family by that practice, while at the same time publishing a number of religious texts both philosophical in nature and biblical commentaries, which quickly established his acknowledged leadership by both Jews and non-Jews. So much so that, in 1263, he found himself forced to publicly defend and debate Judaism against the vitriolic and conversionary demands of the Dominican friar Pablo Christiani, himself a convert from Judaism. Since this public disputation was to be held in the presence of King James I of Aragon (1208–1276), Nachmanides asked for and received permission to speak freely and without restriction. 597

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or milhemet hovah) and “permitted” or “discretionary” war (milhemet reshut) for reasons other than defense (e.g., geographic expansion or economic gain). No matter the argument, biblically based Israelite and later Jewish behaviors in wartime were to be governed by the highest standards of morality. Further, basing themselves, Nachmanides included, on Deuteronomy 20, four categories of men were to be exempted from military service: 5

Then the officers shall speak to the people, saying, “What man is there that has built a new house and has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his house, lest he die in the battle and another man dedicate it. 6 And what man is there that has planted a vineyard and has not enjoyed its fruit? Let him go back to his house, lest he die in the battle and another man enjoy its fruit. 7 And what man is there that has betrothed a wife and has not taken her? Let him go back to his house, lest he die in the battle and another man take her.” 8 And the officers shall speak further to the people, and say, “What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted? Let him go back to his house, lest the heart of his fellows melt as his heart.” (Revised Standard Version translation) That same chapter also supplied four additional rules governing warfare: (1) before attacking a city, offer terms of peace, and, if accepted, allow the inhabitants to live— but as forced laborers (10–11); (2) if the inhabitants reject the offer, only the males are “to be put to the sword”; women, children, and cattle are to be spared—but are to become booty (12–15); (3) when confronting those who are already understood to be Israel’s enemies (Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites, Jebusites, and Girgashites), they are to be “utterly destroyed” because of their “abominable practices which they have done in the service of their gods” (16–18); and (4) food-bearing trees are to be spared the ravages of war (19–20). Nachmanides most assuredly supported these understandings and conclusions and reflected such in his writings, albeit he tended always toward a more conservative and narrower interpretation of certain proscriptions. For example, as regards the last requirement against destroying food-bearing trees, Nachmanides contended that all

trees were to be destroyed if the agenda was the total destruction of the city and all its inhabitants. Then, too, basing himself upon Numbers 33:53 (“and you shall take possession of the land and settle in it, for I have given the land to you to possess it”), Nachmanides consistently argued that it was a Jewish duty to always be the total overseers of the Land of Israel, to wrest ownership of it when others were in control, both at the present moment and in perpetuity, though this latter conclusion is somewhat specious. Regardless, his views were based on his profound love for the Land of Israel and his certainty that it was a Jewish religious obligation of the highest order to settle in the Holy Land, given to the Jewish people by God himself, and if war was the ultimate means of securing that place, then so be it. Thus he wrote in comparing himself to the great sage Maimonides (Moshe ben Maimon, 1135–1204): Do not assume erroneously that the obligatory war applies only to the seven [Canaanite] nations. This is untrue. We will not abandon this land to idolatrous nations throughout the [subsequent] generations. Even if these nations will run from us and leave the land, we are still commanded [today] to come to the land, conquer it and settle it with our people. Hence this is a command for all generations and is an obligation for every individual. Arguably, among some contemporary Jewish Israelis on the religious right—including some who resort to violence against the Arab populations in Israel—in the contentious politics of the Middle East and the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict, there are those who are able to derive their support from his writings. Whether or not he would sanction their interpretations remains open to question and debate. Steven Leonard Jacobs See also Judaism and War; Milhemet Misvah; Milhemet Reshut Further Reading Drazin, Israel. Unusual Biblical Interpretations: Five Books of Moses. Jerusalem: Gefen, 2014. Jacobs, Joseph, et al. “Moses ben Nahman Gerondi.” The Jewish Encyclopedia. 1906. www.jewishencyclopedia .com.

Na¯nak, Guru (1469–1539)  599 Kaplan, Joseph, et al. “Nachmanides.” In Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik, eds. Encyclopedia Judaica. 2nd ed. Vol. 14. Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2007, pp. 739–48.

Nahawand, Battle of (642 CE) A battle between the forces of the Rashidun caliphate and the Persian Sassanid Empire that took place near the city of Nahawand in 642 CE. The battle was part of the Muslim conquest of Persia and was the last major attempt by the Persian Sassanid Empire to repel the invading Muslim forces. Known as “The Victory of Victories,” the battle concluded with yet another Muslim victory against the Sassanid forces. After the victory at Nahawand, the Sassanid Empire lost its ability to oppose the Muslim invaders and the rule of the Sassanid dynasty was brought to an end shortly afterward. Prior to the battle of Nahawand, the Muslim forces had already successfully defeated the armies of the Sassanid several times and annexed Persian territories to the expanding Muslim caliphate. After securing complete control over the Arab peninsula, the Muslims sought to conquer additional regions. The invasion of the Sassanid Empire began during the reign of the Prophet Muhammad’s first successor, the caliph Abu Bakr, and later continued during the reign of the second caliph, Umar. The campaign against the Sassanid Empire began with the invasion of what is now the nation of Iraq, where the Muslim commander Khalid ibn al-Walid, known as “The Sword of God,” successfully defeated several Persian forces. The most significant battle between Muslims and the Sassanid forces prior to the battle of Nahawand was the Battle of Qadisiyya in 636 CE. In that battle, the Muslims had their first important victory over the Sassanids, as a Muslim army under the leadership of Saad ibn Abi Waqqas was able to defeat a Sassanid army under the command of the Persian general Rustam—an army that was comprised of the majority of the entire Sassanid military force. In 642 CE, the Sassanid emperor, Yazdegerd, gathered an army in the Jebal region of Persia in order to prevent further Muslim advances and possibly to reclaim lost territories. Alarmed by the force gathered by Yazdegerd,

Caliph Umar decided to organize an army under the leadership of a commander named Nu’man in order to secure Muslim control over the already conquered regions. The two armies met in 642 CE near Nahawand and clashed for several days. In the aftermath of the harsh battle, both sides suffered many casualties, and Nu’man himself perished. The battle was won by the Muslim forces and the Sassanid soldiers fled the field in defeat. The Muslim victory at Nahawand allowed the Muslims to secure their hold over the previously conquered regions of modern Iraq and Khuzistan, and it also allowed the Muslim armies to advance further into Persia, facing little resistance in the Jebal region. After the battle of Nahawand, the Muslims seldom faced any opposition from the local inhabitants, and eventually all of Persia was conquered during the reign of the third caliph, ‘Uthman. Leon Volfovsky See also Caliphate; Khalid ibn al Walid; Qadisiyya, Battle of Further Reading Crawford, Peter. The War of the Three Gods: Romans, Persians and the Rise of Islam. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2013. Frey, R. N., ed. The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 4, The Period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Sykes, Sir Percy Molesworth. A History of Persia, Volume 2. London: Macmillan, 1921.

Na¯nak, Guru (1469–1539) As the founder of the Sikh religion and the first of 11 Sikh gurus, Guru Nānak occupies a central role in formulating Sikh spiritual life. He is the second most prolific hymn writer of the Adī Granth; the subject of numerous janamsākhis, or hagiographical “life stories”; and the formulator of Sikh teachings on God and the method by which believers may unite with the divine. Guru Nānak was born in 1469 to a Punjabi Hindu family in modern-day Pakistan. His father was the village accountant and, as was customary, was intent on his son following the same professional path. Tradition instead

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emphasizes Nānak’s early predilection toward spiritual and moral pursuits: one famous story recounts Nānak using the money his father had given him to deliver on charity. Though he briefly flirted with asceticism in his youth, he then took a wife, fathered two children, and adopted his father’s trade. At age 33, he is said to have disappeared into a river, returning three days later reborn as the first guru. The spiritually reborn Guru Nānak is then said to have traveled extensively throughout all of South Asia, Tibet, and the Middle East, including the Arabian Peninsula, Persia, Mesopotamia, and the Levant. With him he brought a simple message: true religiosity is lost in complex ritual, which does not strengthen one’s connection to the divine. God is open to all human beings and is the source of all creation. Numerous episodes revolve around his rejection

of contemporary tradition and his purposeful offense of Hindu brahmins and Muslim clerics. For example, according to the janamsākhis, Nānak was rebuked after his arrival in Mecca when he lay down with his feet facing the Kaaba, considered a profound demonstration of disrespect. As he moved his feet in response, so did the Kaaba shift with them, illustrating the spiritual emptiness in focusing piety on a structure rather than God. His most famous quote on this subject, “There is no Hindu, there is no Muslim,” is a proud source for Sikhs today in their espousal of religious pluralism. Nānak’s teachings as found in his authored works focus primarily on bringing the believer close to a formless God through a form of meditation known as nām simran, or the repetition of God’s name, and kīrtan, the singing of

Guru Nānak was the founder of the Sikh religion and the first of the ten human Sikh gurus. A prolific writer, his work forms the basis of Sikh teachings on God and the methods by which believers may unite with the divine. This 18th-century watercolor depicts an imaginary meeting between Guru Nānak and Gobind Singh, the tenth and last human Sikh guru. In the Sikh religion, there are technically eleven gurus, but only ten are human. The Sikhs consider their central scripture, Guru Granth Sabib, to be the final, sovereign, and eternal guru. (Los Angeles County Museum)

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religious hymns. He fiercely attacked the human ego and the obsession with worldly pursuits as the source of the divide between God and humanity, but emphasized the importance of living as a householder rather than an ascetic. In engaging with the world he also taught the importance of seva, or selfless service. Guru Nānak’s successor, Guru Angad, was chosen due to his piety, as well as Guru Nānak’s faith in his ability to further expound upon this basic theological framework and guide the growing Sikh community. Sikhs today continue many of the early traditions established by Guru Nānak. In gurdwāras, Sikh houses of worship, all sit side-by-side on the floor and share in eating food served free of charge. This was a radical practice established to erase all social divides between human beings before God. As worshipers eat, the shoes they have removed are cleaned by volunteers. They also sit together in the main prayer hall as they listen to the hymns contained within Sikh scripture. Some of Guru Nānak’s teachings were contemporary with the teachings of other North Indian devotional preachers, known as bhagats. Many of the writings of these figures are even included in the Adī Granth. Sikhs nevertheless reject any characterization of Guru Nānak as a Hindu. They also reject the argument made by early European commentators that Sikhism seemed to fuse Hindu spirituality with Sufism and adopt the Islamic focus on written scripture, a convenient way to describe a community embedded within territory that was overwhelmingly Muslim. Instead, Sikhs argue that Guru Nānak established a wholly unique religious community with theology that found full expression throughout the lives of all 10 human gurus, and which continues to be interpreted through community reflection on the 11th guru, the Guru Granth Sāhib, in which Guru Nānak wrote the plurality of hymns. By the time of Nānak’s death, his followers had begun to include members of other social groups. While Guru Nānak was a Khātri, a member of a mercantile caste, many of Punjab’s semipastoralist Jat.t.s began to attend Sikh centers of worship. The community also expanded to include low-caste members and craftsmen. Nānak specifically taught against caste-based discrimination and inequality. However, the Jat.t. community today is Indian Punjab’s largest land-owning caste and wields disproportionate influence over political and religious Sikh bodies.

Little can be said of a direct relationship between Guru Nānak’s teachings and Sikh perspectives on war, but it is important to emphasize that Sikhs believe all of their gurus to have shared the same jot, or light. Some authors describe the gurus as “Nānaks.” For example, Guru Gobind Singh, the 10th guru, may be described as the “10th Nānak.” It therefore is not considered theologically sound to attribute any theological innovation to the later gurus who armed the community and articulated teachings on temporal Sikh sovereignty. Sikhs find the roots of these developments in Nānak’s rejection of asceticism and emphasis on selfless service. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn See also Adī Granth Further Reading Mandair, Arvind-Pal Singh. Sikhism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. McLeod, Hew. Sikhism. New York: Penguin Books, 1998.

Native American Warfare The warfare practiced by Native Americans was dynamic. Differences between tribes in varied environments and in multiple stages of societal development created several different types of warfare. Despite these societal and environmental differences, Native Americans waged war, like all tribal and early-state societies throughout history, as an expression of religious belief. Warfare, for the Native American, was rarely independent of spirituality. Upon introduction to new war-making methods brought by European explorers and conquerors, Native American societies that were not immediately destroyed by war or disease adapted by grafting old beliefs onto new tactics and technology. Native American societies were mainly tribal groups spread throughout the Americas with each one making war on their neighbors by combining resource, reproduction, and territorial needs with their individual tribal beliefs. Religious customs were not the cause of warfare, but once fighting broke out, it often provided context to the conflict. Accusations of sorcery or other uses of magic were enough to ignite raids between tribes which, if

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successful, often invoked a response based on avenging the spirits of the dead. Tribal warfare, though difficult to break cycles of retaliation, was not often lethal and rarely resulted in battle. Instead, warriors faced each other, demonstrated their prowess, and hurled curses against their enemies while spiritual leaders prayed and held ceremonies to strengthen their warriors and diminish their foes. Some Native American societies developed beyond the tribe and formed full political states. In these civilizations, religion became much more institutionalized and replaced resource and reproductive causes for war with the requirements of worship. The Maya and the Aztec civilizations in what is today Mexico engaged in battle with neighboring tribes as a result of religious beliefs requiring human sacrifices. These conflicts featured battles that were less lethal since the goal was to capture enemies for sacrifice while the opposing tribe sought to escape. The captured were sacrificed atop large pyramidal temples to ensure that the gods brought rain or continued to make the sun rise and set on schedule. While political and economic domination of weaker tribes was a major factor in these formal wars, religious considerations were still at the heart of conflict in advanced Native American societies. The arrival of Europeans in the Americas introduced devastating diseases that annihilated many Native American cultures and changed both the warfare and religion of surviving tribes. Spanish introduction of the horse to North America in the 1500s created the “Horse Cultures,” which, when combined with rifles, gave a more fearsome character to Native American warfare. Though many tribes did not stop fighting their neighbors, they did sometimes combine to inflict defeats on European-style armies in battles, like the Battle of Little Big Horn that more closely resembled modern cavalry engagements. When fighting proved unable to halt westward expansion, many tribes turned to new cross-cultural religions. Fusing traditional worship with a Christian Messiah, the “Ghost Dance” movement sought to redeem Native American losses. Fearing a resumption of warfare on the plains, the U.S. government destroyed the dancers and their religion at Wounded Knee in 1890. Russell S. Perkins See also Ghost Dance Movement; King Philip’s War; Puritans and War

Further Reading Brown, Dee. Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee. New York: Henry Holt, 1970. Brown, Joseph Epes. Teaching Spirits: Understanding Native American Religions. New York: Oxford, 2001. Gat, Azar. War in Human Civilization. New York: Oxford, 2006. Hassig, Ross. War and Society in Ancient Mesoamerica. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. Mails, Thomas E. Mystic Warriors of the Plains. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972. Somervill, Barbara A. Empires of the Aztecs. New York: Chelsea House, 2010.

Nazism, Religious Aspects of Religion played a major, albeit controversial role in the political party known as the National Socialist German Workers Party, also known as the Nazi Party. As with many aspects of the German Third Reich in the 1930s, religion became the sole property of the Nazi government after the introduction of the Reich Church. The German führer (leader) Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) had been raised a Catholic in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but as an adult, he rejected this faith and most Christian beliefs. In his 1923 book Mein Kampf, he wrote that religion should be rejected because it protected the weak. He further asserted that Christianity was based on Judaism and that the Christian ideas of mercy, among other beliefs, were absurd. When Hitler took power in 1933, which was also before Germany annexed Catholic Austria, the nation was approximately 67 percent Protestant and 33 percent Catholic. Six years later, on the eve of the Second World War, with Austria included in the census, 54 percent identified as Protestant, 40 percent as Catholic, while 3.5 percent self-identified as Deist and 1.5 percent as nonreligious. Jews made up a miniscule percentage of the population. While Hitler and the Nazis denigrated mainstream religion on numerous occasions, there were aspects of religion within the Nazi creed. Nazism can also be seen as a political religion, with Adolf Hitler as a messiah-type figure. This was an idea and a culture furthered by the Nazi regime throughout their rule over Germany. While there have been numerous scholars who have written on the

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topic of Hitler’s fascination with, and the Nazi Party’s connection to, the occult, today this topic is largely dismissed. The more relevant topic is how Nazism incorporated aspects of religion into its doctrine, including Christianity. Individual Nazis, such as Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946), head of the Foreign Office of the Nazi Party, wrote that Jesus Christ was not Jewish, but rather Nordic, and that people should not follow the Old Testament since it came from Jewish tradition, but rather Nordic lore. These ideas originally came from German philosopher and theologian Ernst Bergmann (1881–1945). He first floated the idea that Hitler was the Messiah, and that Jesus Christ was of Aryan origin. Martin Luther’s anti-Semitism has often been described as an inspiration for Nazism as well. Individual Nazi Party members had varying views on religion and used aspects of religion in different facets of the regime. Heinrich Himmler (1900–1945), head of the German Schutzstaffel (protection squadron), was interested in myths and legends, and there have been ties made to astrology and cults as well as the search for and quest to find mythical lands and objects. Hitler’s deputy Rudolf Hess (1894–1987) had been involved in lodge-type

German Christians (Deutsche Christen)

The German Christians (Deutsche Christen) were Protestants in Germany who were especially loyal to the National Socialist Party and to its agenda of nationalism and anti-Semitism. German Christians supported racial and ethnic policies such as the ban on marrying non-Aryans and the removal of the “Jewish” books from the Bible. Hitler’s Nazi Party relied on the support of these Protestants. The German Christians movement looked to the Bible, specifically emphasizing Romans 13, which stated generally that state governing authorities are established by God, and declared that to go against the dictates of the government is to rebel against God’s authority. Many other German Protestants disagreed with the pro-Nazi platform of the German Christians, and those groups signed the Barmen Declaration in 1934, which rejected the subservience of the church to state authority. German theologian Karl Barth was the primary author of the Barmen Declaration.

organizations, one of which was the Thule Society, a group that followed the belief that only a small group of people, Aryans in this case, were destined to rule Western Europe, Europe, and ultimately the world. The society had originally been founded in 1918 and later regenerated as the German Workers’ Party, and eventually the National Socialist German Workers Party (Nazi). Nazism and religion had a contentious and confusing past, and the role it played within the state and the belief system is still debated today. While its role may be perplexing, one can find aspects of religion within Nazism, and it did permeate all levels of Germany society from 1933 to 1945. Seth A. Weitz See also Holocaust; Second World War, Religious Dimensions of; Primary Document: Christianity in Nazi Germany: Karl Barth’s Theological Declaration of Barmen (1934) Further Reading Kershaw, Ian. Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris. London: W. W. Norton, 2000. Lewy, Gunther. The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959. Steigmann-Gall, Richard. The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Neo-Assyrian Warfare The Neo-Assyrian Empire influenced and ultimately dominated the ancient Near East between roughly the years 900 and 600 BCE. The Assyrians expanded from northern Mesopotamia through their fearsome military with its cruel but effective tactics. That military made the Assyrians the undisputed masters of the entire ancient Near East in the early first millennium BCE, dominating the lands from the Persian Gulf all the way to Egypt. The Assyrian nation began in their heartland on the upper Tigris River, initially settled by Amorites from the west who established strong and progressive city-states throughout much of Mesopotamia. The region’s fertile land, watered by rain and irrigation, produced a sizeable population. The

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region opened to the south, from which the Assyrians adopted the dominant Sumerian culture, as well as to the west, with which the Assyrians had extensive trade. The first Assyrian capital was named Ashur after the people’s chief god, a name also applied to the people and the nation. The Assyrians began to establish an effective military in the early second millennium BCE, originally for defense, but soon primarily to attain plunder. What Assyria lacked in natural resources (iron, timber, precious metals, horses and other animals), it acquired through military conquest. Assyrian history included three periods of strength. The Old Assyrian period in the early second millennium saw Assyria dominate its immediate region, then decline. During a resurgent Middle Assyria period in the 14th–11th centuries BCE, its influence reached to the Persian Gulf in the south and the Mediterranean Sea in the west. Another brief decline preceded the rise of the great Neo-Assyrian Empire, which would last from the 10th to the 7th centuries and peak during the 8th–7th centuries. By the mid-ninth century, Assyrian armies reached the region of Damascus and began interacting with biblical persons (Ahab of Israel at the Battle of Qarqar in 853 BCE; Jehu of Israel as portrayed on Shalmaneser III’s Black Obelisk in 841). By the later eighth century, Assyria had conquered or subjected both Israel and Judah as Assyria advanced toward Egypt, which fell in 671 BCE. This gave Assyria control of the entire Fertile Crescent. This zenith would not last long, as civil war in the mid-seventh century weakened the empire, and it fell to the Babylonians and Medes from the south and east in 612 BCE. Assyria owed its rise and dominance to its military. Originally known for their numerous and skilled traders (cf. Nah. 3:16), the Assyrians and their culture were also highly militaristic. The king and other high officials doubled as military officers. In the general population, many men served as career soldiers. Others contracted to use land in exchange for periodic service, both civil (road building, canal maintenance, etc.) and military. All other able-bodied males were subject to temporary military service when the need arose, and an ever-expanding empire often had such needs. Over time, the Assyrian military also drew more and more on conscripted troops from conquered territories.

In many ways, the Assyrian military resembled that of other land-based militaries of the time. They relied heavily on infantry supported by chariotry, cavalry (during the Neo-Assyrian period), and engineers. Many troops came from major cities, which often supplied entire regiments of infantry. Rural regions contributed foot soldiers through levies, commanded by local officials who doubled as military officers. Sometimes, when ships were needed to carry troops along the great Mesopotamian rivers or the Mediterranean Sea, the Assyrians used shipbuilders and sailors from places like Phoenicia. Regional officers formed the base of the command structure. They reported to provincial officials/officers, who reported in turn to palace officials/officers such as those listed in 2 Kings 18:17 and Isaiah 36:2. These included the field marshal (“Tartan” in 2 Kings 18:17), who carried out the king’s orders and commanded the army in the king’s absence; the vice-chancellor, who advised the commanders on affairs of state; and the chief steward, who controlled access to the king. At the top was the king, who often but not always led the army on campaign. Such officers commanded units in the various military branches, which reflected differences in armament, weaponry, and function. The infantry included the elite royal guards who always accompanied the king. Regular infantry typically served as attack troops, fighting with spears perhaps five feet long, protected by metal helmets, body armor, and shields. The infantry also included archers and slingers, many barefooted and lightly armed, but some wore boots and body armor, protected by full-body shields. The infantry also included engineers who cut or enlarged roads with copper or iron picks or axes and built rafts or pontoon bridges, as well as assembling siege equipment. Other personnel were in charge of the supply train with food, weapons, tools, and other supplies. By the first millennium BCE, equestrian units such as chariotry and cavalry had become a vital part of major militaries like Assyria’s. The Assyrians conquered horseproducing regions in the mountains to their north and northeast to supply thousands of these much needed animals as well as men skilled in horse training. Texts rarely give precise numbers of horses or chariots, but suggest that they numbered in the hundreds or sometimes low thousands. Assyrian reliefs in palaces and temples often depict

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military scenes that included impressive-looking chariot and cavalry troops and officers. The style of their equipment and weaponry changes over time, as one would expect from a military empire that lasted for centuries and included troops drawn from a wide range of regions. Such reliefs help us understand much of how Assyrian military elements appeared, but give little aid in trying to figure out the numbers of their troops. Like most militaries of the ancient Near East, the size of the Assyrian army grew with the empire, but even its approximate size at any given time is difficult or impossible to determine. When texts do give numbers for Assyrian or enemy troops, they often appear exaggerated and hard to evaluate. Nonetheless, the Assyrian military seems to have numbered as much as the tens of thousands in the early first millennium BCE, and grew to perhaps a few hundred thousand at its peak a century or two later. What is clear is the major role played in the Assyrian military by its kings and its gods, also similar to other militaries at the time. Usually the king led the army and made command decisions on the spot, and often personally fought in battle. If the king didn’t accompany the army for some reason, he kept in constant communication with its leaders and passed on orders through the Assyrian system of communication. Assyrian kings commanded their armies and credited their success to themselves and to their gods. The Assyrians believed that Ashur and their other gods ruled Assyria and other nations. This gave theological justification for almost any military activity, including conquest of new regions, extraction of plunder and annual tribute, and suppression of rebellion by peoples who refused to continue paying often exorbitant amounts of tribute. The Assyrians relied on their gods, and their military relied on varied and effective weaponry. The Assyrian empire spanned the time that witnessed the transition from bronze to iron for producing weapons. Since the home region lacked both the metal ore and technology for producing effective metal weaponry, weapons made from both had to be imported in large quantities to Assyria. By way of illustration, modern excavators at Sargon’s military compound of Dur-Sharrukin unearthed some 160 tons of iron weapons and implements collected during Sargon’s campaigns.

Typical of their age, the Assyrians used short-, medium-, and long-range weapons as well as shields and armor for defense and equipment such as chariots and siege engines. Short-range weapons included spears, swords, and daggers in a variety of shapes, sizes, and decoration. Assyrians threw javelins a moderate distance, especially in chariot combat. Bows and arrows served as their primary longrange weapons, but the sling remained an important longrange weapon as well. Assyrian reliefs reflect a wide range in styles of helmets and shields over time, as well as for chariots and siege engines. Assyrian military strategies also generally reflect those of contemporary militaries. Typically they would campaign from late spring through late summer, beginning after spring harvest and ending before fall harvest. The army often assembled at a staging area at the royal palace and departed after priests had performed the requisite religious rites. The army might march 15 to 30 miles per day depending on terrain and conditions as well as on availability of needed supplies. Perhaps the greatest difference between Assyrian military practice and that of their contemporaries was the Assyrians’ apparent eagerness to act with cruelty and use it as a psychological weapon. When conquering a new region, the army often focused on a particularly weak town or city and devastate it with acts like beheading prisoners or skinning people alive, then displaying these acts as a warning to others. They might make piles of decapitated heads in front of enemy cities or spread the skins of enemy leaders on their city walls. The Assyrians also had their artists decorate their palaces and temples with scenes of such atrocities to warn others to submit or suffer similar fates. While one might argue that every great military has probably practiced cruelty to some degree, the Assyrians perfected the art and used it to effectively dominate their world for a very long time. Boyd Seevers See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of; Assyrian Warfare; Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East Further Reading Saggs, H. W. F. The Might That Was Assyria. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984.

606  Nicopolis, Crusade of (1396) Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2013.

Nicopolis, Crusade of (1396) The Crusade of Nicopolis (sometimes written as Nikopolis) was a conflict between Hungary, along with several other states, and the Ottoman Empire. The decisive battle took place in Nikopol in modern Bulgaria. The movement to launch a crusade against the expanding Ottomans was, in part, spearheaded by Pope Boniface IX in 1394. The loss of Nicopolis in 1395 to the Ottomans deprived the Second Bulgarian Empire of its capital and Ivan Shishman, the czar of the Bulgarian Empire, was executed. The battle further solidified Ottoman control over the Balkans after victories at Mariza (1371) and Kosovo (1389). The response to Ottoman advances into Bulgaria, rather than being seen as a “crusade” similar to the crusades of the 11th and 12th centuries, was really a Hungarian-led coalition’s attempt to check Ottoman expansion in the Balkans. To accomplish this, the idea of the crusade was used by the papacy and the Hungarians to gain support from Western Europe for their campaign. The background of the crusade of Nicopolis was the fragmentation of the states of the Balkans, weakness of the Byzantine Empire, and fear of Ottoman expansion on the part of the Hungarian kingdom. With this, the Hungarian king Sigismund III turned toward the rhetoric of crusade. He was supported by Pope Boniface IX with a declaration of crusade on June 3, 1394. Aside from simply checking Ottoman expansion, this declaration was made by Boniface to bolster his power in the face of the rival pope in Avignon, Clement VII, who later supported the crusade as well. Slowly support for the crusade spread. Contingents from France, England, Burgundy, and elsewhere in Western Europe were pledged and gradually made their way to Buda to join the Hungarians, Transylvanians, and Wallachians who were waiting. A lull in the fighting between the English and the French during the Hundred Years’ War gave English and French soldiers the opportunity to jointly

participate in the crusade. By the beginning of July 1396, the crusader army was assembled. Later, in August, they were joined by naval contingents from the knights of Rhodes, Genoa, and Venice, who had sailed up the Danube from the Black Sea. The Ottomans, for their part, were aware of the gathering of a crusader army. Sultan Bayezid I had been very active in the Balkans in the early 1390s, which, in part, stimulated the Crusade of Nicopolis. In the months leading up to the arrival of the crusader army, Bayezid had unsuccessfully attacked Wallachia, forcing the Wallachians into the crusader camp. Aside from Balkan affairs, Bayezid also had to be mindful of the campaigns of Tamerlane in the Middle East and Russia as well as his Muslim rivals in Anatolia. Early in September 1396, the crusader army arrived at the border of Ottoman territory. The main Ottoman army was still in Edrine (Adrianople), which at that time was the Ottoman capital. The crusader army struck Vidin in early September 1396. The ruler of Vidin was a Bulgarian vassal of the Ottomans who had no desire to face a siege by the crusaders and promptly surrendered. The Ottoman garrison was massacred. Moving from Vidin, the crusader army came to Rahova/Oryahovo, 75 miles southeast of Vidin. French knights struck the city with a dawn attack, but it was beaten back by Ottoman defenders. Hungarian and other crusader forces arrived later and besieged the city. Incredibly outnumbered, the Ottomans sent a delegation in the hope of obtaining a surrender. Sigismund initially agreed; however, the other crusaders, anxious for plunder, finally scaled the walls and massacred the Ottoman inhabitants of the city. On September 10, 1396, the crusader flotilla sailed up to Nicopolis, where they were joined by the crusader army on September 12, 1396. The combined forces attacked the city, but they were driven back and settled in for a siege. However, the crusader army had failed to bring siege engines. While the crusaders were besieging Nicopolis without the proper equipment, the Ottoman army was on the move from Edirne. They arrived at Tarnavo on September 21/22, 1396. Here, Bayezid joined with Stefan Lazarević, his vassal, who brought Serbian cavalry to the Ottoman side. Not far outside of Tarnavo the Ottoman army was discovered by scouts from the crusader army. As the Ottoman army made their way from Tarnavo to Nicopolis, they were

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drawn into an ambush by Enguerrand VII de Coucy, killing several hundred Ottoman troops. Easy victories at Vidin, Rahova, and the successful raid led by de Coucy gave many of the Western knights the impression that the Ottoman army had no stomach for a fight—a notion of which the Hungarians and Wallachians tried to dissuade them. On September 25, 1396, the culminating battle of the crusade occurred on the outskirts of Nicopolis. The Ottoman camp was positioned on a hilltop overlooking the city. The Ottoman garrison in Nicopolis remained intact in the city, although they were under siege. The French and Burgundian knights, anxious for a fight, led a direct attack on the Ottoman camp. The camp was surrounded by a wall of sharpened spikes. The knights, led by the Count of Nevers and the Count of Eu, hastily made their way up the hill, separating themselves from the Hungarians. Ottoman archers rained arrows down on the crusader army, but the heavy armor of the Western knights meant that the light Ottoman arrows infrequently penetrated. The French and Burgundian knights then dismounted, either by choice or because they were forced to do so, sources vary. The archers and skirmishers met the knights as they cleared the stakes. The Western knights inflicted heavy casualties and forced most of the Ottoman forces to retreat uphill toward Bayezid’s camp. In the meantime Sigismund and the Hungarian army was much further down the hill closer to the city of Nicopolis. A great gap opened between the Franco-Burgundian forces and the Hungarian army. The Western knights made their way uphill toward Bayezid’s camp in pursuit of the fleeing Ottoman infantry. As the crusaders made their way up the hill, they struck the Ottoman provincial cavalry and after a desperate struggle dispersed them. The uphill battle and the hot sun of the day began to take their toll. As the Western knights neared the summit, believing that they had won the day, Bayezid and his heavy cavalry appeared at the crest of the hill. This shocked and demoralized the crusaders. Ottoman forces closed in from three sides; they crashed into the somewhat disorganized crusader forces, cutting many down and driving the rest back. The Hungarians struggled to close the gap and reach the foundering FrancoBurgundian forces. As the Hungarians made their way forward, they encountered the Ottoman archers and infantry. While engaging them, the Ottoman cavalry appeared. The

Transylvanian and Wallachian auxiliaries fled as they felt defeat approaching. Without his allies and with the French and Burgundian knights being driven back, Sigismund took on the Ottoman cavalry. The struggle was intense and both sides suffered significant casualties. As the melee was ongoing, the Serbian cavalry of the Ottomans crashed into the rear of the Hungarians, halting their advance and forcing a retreat. The retreat was initially orderly, but soon devolved into an all-out rout and a desperate race of the crusader army toward the boats in the Danube. The waiting boats were able to accommodate many of the Western nobles and some of their troops, but they soon became overloaded and were forced to repel desperate crusaders who were trying to climb aboard. Many crusaders surrendered, some escaped across the river or in other directions, but the defeat was complete. The Crusade of Nicopolis was a terrible failure. Many of the knights who were defeated by the Ottomans were ransomed, but many others faced Bayezid’s wrath. The massacres at Vidin and Rahova were avenged in brutal fashion. Hundreds, if not thousands of crusaders were put to the sword. The carnage was terrible. Eventually, Bayezid called for the killing to stop. The remainder of the crusader army was sold into slavery. Bayezid’s victory was complete and the aftermath of the crusade unfolded. Defeat at the hands of the Ottomans led Sigismund III to enact new laws to construct a frontier defensive system that would slow the Ottoman advance. This system would, to some degree, last until the end of the Hungarian kingdom and, arguably, laid the groundwork for the Militärgrenze (military frontier) of the Habsburgs, who ruled portions of Hungary. This move shifted Hungarian crusading from offensive to defensive. In this view, Hungary became the Antemurale Christianitatis (Bulwark of Christianity) against the Ottoman threat. James N. Tallon See also Crusades (Overview); Ottoman Empire Further Reading Alexandru, Simon. “Annus mirabilis 1387.” In Ekaterini Mitsiou, ed. Emperor Sigismund and the Orthodox World. Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2010, pp. 127–52.

Ninth Crusade (1271–1272)  609 Atiya, Aziz Suryal, Eustache Deschamps, and Philippe de Mézières. The Crusade of Nicopolis. London: Methuen, 1934. Froissart, Jean, Henry John Newbolt, and Gordon Browne. Stories from Froissart. London: Wells, Gardner, Darton, 1899. Kaldy-Nagy, Gyor. “The First Centuries of Ottoman Military Organization.” Acta Orientalia (Budapest) XXXI (1977): 147–83. Nicolle, David. Nicopolis, 1396: The Last Crusade. Westport, CT: Praeger. 2005. Rosetti, R. “Notes on the Battle of Nicopolis (1396).” Slavonic and East European Review 15, no. 45 (1937): 629–38. Schiltberger, Hans, and Philip Brunn. The Bondage and Travels of Johann Schiltberger: A Native of Bavaria, in Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1396–1427. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Stoicescu, N. “Organisational Structure of the Armies of the Romanian Principalities 14th-18th Centuries.” In A. V. Savu, ed. The Army and Romanian Society. Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1980, pp. 165–91. Veszprémy, László. “Some Remarks on Recent Historiography of the Crusade of Nicopolis (1396).” In Zsolt Hunyadi and Steven Runciman, eds. The Crusades and the Military Orders: Expanding the Frontiers of Medieval Latin Christianity: In Memoriam Sir Steven Runciman. Budapest: Department of Medieval Studies, Central European University, 2001, pp. 223–33.

Ninth Crusade (1271–1272) The Ninth Crusade was the second of two crusades launched in an effort to restore the deteriorating military situation in the territories still left to the crusader states after a series of Muslim victories. As European Christians organized another crusade, the city and state of Antioch were destroyed by Muslim forces in 1268. Two years later, the Eighth Crusade under French king Louis IX arrived at Tunis in North Africa, prepared to capture the city to draw Muslim forces away from the remaining crusader-held territories and to establish a base of operations for future military campaigns. The death of Louis IX of disease and failure to capture Tunis set the stage for the offensive of the Ninth Crusade into the Holy Land. Christian forces sent by English king Henry III, commanded by his son Edward, arrived off the coast of Tunis in 1271. Edward, linking with the French survivors under

Charles of Anjou, sailed for the city of Acre to break the Muslim siege of the city and preserve the last stronghold of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. English and French forces were strong enough to break the siege of Acre but were insufficient to fight a conventional war against powerful Muslim armies pressing on nearly all sides of the shrinking crusader states. Edward’s strategy shifted to a combination of military maneuver and diplomacy. The crusaders maneuvered to attack several weakly defended Muslim outposts, inflicting close to 3,000 civilian and military casualties. Much more potential was realized on the diplomatic front as Edward brokered a military alliance with the Mongols, who agreed to attack Syria in the autumn of 1271. The effort did not prove as decisive as Edward might have hoped when Mongol forces turned the invasion into a raid that proved a rich haul for them but was barren of militarily significant victories. With the Mongol threat too ephemeral, his own forces too weak, and the political powers of the crusader states too divided, Edward turned to direct negotiations with Baybers, the Muslim sultan. These negotiations resulted in a 10-year truce between Muslim and Christian forces in the summer of 1272. Like the Mongol alliance, the treaty with Baybers did not hold. Edward left the Holy Land in late 1272 in time to arrive in England and be crowned King Edward I in 1274. In the meantime, the surviving crusader states descended into civil war. The Ninth Crusade had little effect on the course of the religious and military situation in the Holy Land. Muslim forces continued to press the squabbling crusader states until the last city fell in 1291. Tiring of nearly two centuries of religious-based warfare, Christians in Europe weakly supported the Ninth Crusade and even Pope Gregory X, himself a participant in the voyage to Tunis, was unable to rouse enthusiasm for further efforts to reclaim the Holy Land from Islam. Though crusades were continually called for the next two centuries, they became more politically and economically motivated rather than reflections of religious zeal. Russell S. Perkins See also Acre, Sieges of; Crusades (Overview) Further Reading Falk, Avner. Franks and Saracens: Reality and Fantasy in the Crusades. London: Karnac, 2010.

610  Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict Jotischky, Andrew. Crusading and the Crusader States. New York: Routledge, 2013. Powell, James M. Anatomy of a Crusade. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986. Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War: A New History of the Crusades. New York: Penguin, 2006.

Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict The partition of Ireland in 1921 created two states governed by separate parliaments, one in Dublin and one in Belfast. This event served to accentuate the sectarian geography of the island with a Roman Catholic majority dominating the government of the Free State (later known as the Republic of Ireland) in the south, and a Protestant majority presiding in Northern Ireland’s parliament in Stormont, which is in Belfast. The relationship between religious belief and conflict in Ireland has been contentious, and the struggle between Catholics and Protestants continues to be an intractable issue in much of Ireland. Whilst the Protestant minority in the southern part of Ireland either emigrated or acquiesced to the Catholicdominated state, Catholics in Northern Ireland (alongside working-class Protestants) also suffered socioeconomic deprivation and discrimination. Denied equal access to housing and spurred on by a new middle class created by the grammar school system, Catholics eventually came together to found the nonsectarian Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association to challenge this discrimination. This organization was peaceful in its methods, using sit-ins, protests, and the media as a means of publicizing its desire for civil rights for Catholics in Northern Ireland, and was successful, with many of its demands being conceded by 1970. Despite this, however, the Stormont government, led by James Chichester-Clark (1923–2002), found itself unable to deal with the growing civil unrest and in 1969 troops were sent in by the British government to restore order. This led to a change in the mood of the conflict as three sets of combatants, the British Army, the Provisional IRA, and Loyalist paramilitary organizations, engaged with one another, leaving in excess of 3,600 dead and thousands more injured. This situation continued until 1994 when the

Provisional IRA declared a cease-fire on August 31, shortly followed by the Combined Loyalist Military Command on October 13. Although these cease-fires broke down on February 9, 1996, when an IRA bomb was detonated in London’s Docklands (this cease-fire was to be reinstated on July 9, 1997 by the IRA), the conditions for a peace process had been set, and from 1994 onward, the people of Northern Ireland saw a series of negotiations take place between the British and Irish governments and the main political parties (with the exception of Sinn Fein, who were refused entry during the breakdown of the cease-fires as a result of its relationship with the IRA). These talks, chaired by U.S. senator George Mitchell and vigorously supported by President Clinton’s administration, eventually led to the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement, reached on April 10, 1998. The years immediately after the agreement saw political instability continue in Northern Ireland: the devolved government that had been the centerpiece of the accord was suspended, dissident republican groups continued with their paramilitary campaigns, and violent confrontations occurred with regularity between Protestant and Catholic communities over issues such as Orange Order parades. However, progress was made on matters such as decommissioning of weapons and policing, which had been key motivators for violent conflict. On May 7, 2007, the Rev. Ian Paisley (1926–), leader of the Democratic Unionist Party and the Free Presbyterian Church, and Martin McGuinness (1950–), deputy leader of Sinn Féin, entered government together, signaling the willingness of the more extreme political elements of the conflict in Northern Ireland to work together and demonstrating that, despite the presence of spoilers, the violent stage of the conflict was over. The role of religion in the conflict in Northern Ireland has been the subject of endless debate. The question centers upon whether the conflict is fundamentally motivated by religious belief and sectarianism or whether the use of terms such as Protestant and Catholic to identify the two communities is simply shorthand in a conflict based upon economic, social, and political issues. Although “the Churches are not sending their faithful out to shoot and bomb in the name of the Lord,” there can be no doubt religion played some part. This happened on a number of levels ranging from the use of religious language to

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make political points to the integral role played by religion in the formation of the identity of the Nationalist, Republican, Unionist, and Loyalist communities. Religious and political leaders, such as the Rev. Ian Paisley, have employed religious rhetoric to further their political causes, for example in the aftermath of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, while Sinn Fèin employed a version of just war doctrine to justify their actions. More crucially, however, the conflict in Northern Ireland was one of identity, and religion played a central part in the formation of political identities there. Religion had overlapped with ethnonational, economic, and cultural differences since the 17th century, providing institutional support, language, values, and often leadership to the Protestant and Catholic communities. Moreover, the role of the churches in structuring social as well as religious life led to high levels of physical and ideological segregation between the two groups and fueled sectarianism, a fundamental cause of the conflict, within Northern Irish society. In this context, then, it is unsurprising that a recent survey found that the population of Northern Ireland ranked among the most religious in Western Europe: nearly 90 percent were affiliates, 57 percent were regular churchgoers, 75 percent believed in God and heaven, 70 percent prayed at least once a month, 62 percent believed in hell, 53 percent in miracles. Such factors have manifested themselves in different ways in the Protestant and Catholic communities with theology and religious belief being more influential within Protestantism and church structures being more important within Catholicism. The relationship of Protestantism to the Roman Catholic Church, and the resulting anti-Catholicism, has often been viewed as a key feature in the sectarianism that stimulated the conflict. This was based not only upon a theological fear of Catholicism that fed directly into the vision of the state articulated by some Protestant politicians, such as the Rev. Ian Paisley, but also upon a belief that the reunified Ireland desired by the Nationalist/Republican community would be controlled by the Roman Catholic Church, thus impinging upon the religious liberty of the Protestant community. Most of the theological fears of Catholicism can be traced back to the disagreements of the Reformation. The practices of Catholicism were viewed as abhorrent and nothing more than superstitious idolatry.

Thus, the doctrine of transubstantiation, the seven sacraments instead of two, the idea of one Universal Church, and finally attitudes toward grace and salvation were all cited by Protestants as examples of the dangerous nature of Catholicism. Such ideas and attitudes are enshrined in the articles of the various denominations of the Protestant Churches. For example, Chapter 25, Article 5 of the Presbyterian Church’s Westminster Confession of Faith speaks of the infallible nature of the Catholic Church thus: “[t]he Purest churches under heaven are subject both to impurity and error. Some churches have so degenerated that they are not Churches of Christ, but synagogues of Satan.” Although most Protestants would not go as far as calling a Catholic church a “synagogue of Satan,” it is evident that within the broad spectrum of Protestantism antiCatholicism existed in some form, and that this was fueled by the monolithic nature of the Catholic Church and its relationship to the government in the Republic of Ireland throughout the 20th century. Even though Article 44 of the Irish Constitution stated that “[f]reedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen,” Protestants in Northern Ireland feared that the reunification of Ireland would lead to their subjugation under Rome. They pointed to the articles in the Constitution that upheld Catholic moral and social teaching and the key role that this played in shaping the policies of the state. Protestants thus cited a fear of “Rome Rule” as a factor in the conflict as any attempt to make Ulster part of the Republic of Ireland would have prevented them from exercising their religious liberties and force them to yield to the direction of the Catholic Church. This fusion of religion and politics was personified by the Rev. Ian Paisley, who throughout the “Troubles” was both the leader of a church, the Free Presbyterian Church, and a political party, the Democratic Unionist Party. Paisley was the personification of Northern Ireland’s religio-political landscape during the conflict. His electoral success would suggest that this blend resonated with the voters as Paisley’s rhetoric, with its evangelical zeal, echoed the feelings of many working-class Protestants, who believed that their rights were being corroded by the concessions offered to the Catholic community during this period. Protestantism then contributed to the conflict in Northern Ireland by the fear of “Rome Rule,” which

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led to sectarianism and the employment of religious rhetoric to make political points, thus fueling an identity based upon opposition to Catholicism. The Catholic Church and Catholicism played a significant role in shaping the identity of the Nationalist/ Republican community. Indeed, in a relationship dating back to the 20th century, for many Catholicism and Nationalism were the same thing, with their experiences of Catholicism feeding directly into the formation of their identity. In the aftermath of partition, the Catholic Church, as a consequence of the Nationalist community’s refusal to engage with the new Stormont parliament, pursued the community’s interests through pillarization, rigorously and passionately defending its right to a separate education system and establishing the parish as the main civic unit. The Catholic Church thus became the main source of authority for its community. In engaging in such actions, the Catholic Church was exerting social control through the dissemination of its values, both cultural and religious, to the community, becoming one of the main agents of civil society. The best example of this can be seen in the Catholic Churches’ role in the education of the Catholic/ Nationalist community. The education system was seen as one of the main ways in which the Catholic Church retained control over Catholic communal identity. (The fact that all Catholic children are expected to attend Catholic schools and that the church authorities make it difficult for them to do otherwise by refusing those at non-Catholic schools preparation for the sacraments of First Communion and Confirmation is cited as evidence of this.) Education was one of the main avenues through which children were socialized into the Catholic community and during the conflict, most of their understanding of their own identity came from school. In the years after partition, the ethos of Catholic schools was dominated by antipathy toward the state. Children were being taught that as a community Catholics should have very little to do with the British-Protestant government and that their allegiance should be to a Catholic state. It could therefore be argued that through their retention of a segregated education system the Catholic Church in Northern Ireland contributed to notions of separateness felt by many Catholics and through their use of canon law, which virtually prohibits a Catholic child from receiving anything other than a

Catholic education, were providing an alternative power system to which allegiance could be pledged, thereby fueling the ideas of separateness and sectarianism that have played a substantial role in the conflict. However, religion has also played a significant role in the amerlioration of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Since the 1960s, the churches and faith-based organizations have been working together to build peace between the two communities, with groups like the Corrymeela Community becoming household names. This work saw Protestant and Catholic churches engage with one another to develop relationships and overcome the misunderstandings and stereotypes that have fueled the conflict in Northern Ireland. Schemes included cross-community holidays, workshops dealing with identity, and ecumenical services and dialogue. This work demonstrated another dimension of the role of religion in the conflict and highlighted that while it contributed to its continuation, it also played a part in the peace process. Ireland was a country riven by conflict and one in which history and religion served to motivate combatants. For the Protestant community, a strong belief in the pillars of their faith and a fear of its destruction by Rome was the key. It was thus argued that a separate state in the north of the island was needed to protect their religious liberty. This foundation stone of their identity translated itself into sectarianism, the main cause of the conflict. For Catholics, the roots of this sectarianism were slightly different and were based upon a disengagement from the state that was fueled by the behavior of the Catholic Church. Therefore, the contribution of religion to the conflict in Northern Ireland was more substantial than some would admit as it was driven by sectarianism, the basis for which came from the belief systems of the cchurches. Maria Power See also Sinn Féin Further Reading Brewer, John D., and Gareth Higgins. Anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland, the Mote and the Beam. London: Macmillan, 1998. Bruce, Steve. Paisley Religion and Politics in Northern Ireland. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Cochrane, Feargal. Northern Ireland: The Reluctant Peace. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013.

Nostra Aetate (Paul VI, 1965)  613 Elliott, Marianne. The Catholics of Ulster: A History. London: Penguin, 2000. Elliott, Marianne. When God Took Sides: Religion and Identity in Ireland, Unfinished History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Power, Maria. From Ecumenism to Community Relations: Inter-Church Relationships in Northern Ireland, 1980–2005. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006.

Nostra Aetate (Paul VI, 1965) An enormously influential if comparatively brief declaration promulgated in the last year of the Second Vatican Council by Pope Paul VI on October 28, 1965, Nostra Aetate (In Our Time) is responsible for a revolution in Roman Catholic thinking toward the Jewish people and for a critical retrieval of the historical memory of Christian encounters with Jews and Judaism. As well, the declaration expresses sincere reverence for the truth and goodness found in other religions and names points of similarity that the Christian faith shares with them. As a result, a new history of relations marked by fellowship and solidarity between Catholics and their religious neighbors began to take shape in the decades following the council. Unity, fellowship, and love are stated goals of section one, rendering Nostra Aetate a declaration with important pastoral aspirations as well as theological commitments. The declaration represents a new beginning of reverence and relationship, with an open future and much to be developed, more than a final, exhaustive statement. Nostra Aetate spends fewer than 1,600 words across five sections of text. Section one affirms the unity of the human family consisting in one and the same origin and destiny— God—and affirms the mystery and quest of the human condition in positive terms and as universal. This is the context in which first Hinduism and then Buddhism are appreciated, in section two, as examples of religions that originate from advanced cultures and demonstrate advanced language. Some of the most important language from the conciliar documents appears in section two of the declaration, where the council affirms both a universal human search for the holy and the role of non-Christian religions as ways to address it, all that is true and holy in the religions, and

relates those ways of truth and goodness to the truth of Jesus Christ as “the way, the truth, and the life (Jn. 14:6).” Christians are exhorted to “recognize,” “preserve,” and “promote” the spiritual and moral goods found among other believers. Section three addresses similarities with Islam and respect for Muslims and includes, in light of complicated and vexed historical relationships between Christians and Muslims, an appeal “to forget the past.” Section four, the longest and most theologically developed, reveals the declaration’s draft origin in 1961 with the Subcommission for Jewish Questions whose scope was subsequently broadened to treat other religions over the course of the council at the request of bishops from Asia and Africa and under the influence of Cardinal Augustin Bea, S.J. Section four affirms the church’s origin in the prophets and patriarchs of the Hebrew Bible, offers an organic metaphor (olive tree) to express the integral relationship of Christians to Jews, and clarifies that the covenant of God with the Jewish people endures. Section four also characterizes the church as the new people of God, yet repudiates long-held anti-Jewish misunderstandings that blamed ancient and contemporary Jews for the death of Christ, since the cross is a sign of God’s universal love for the world rather than an occasion for antiJewish and anti-Semitic prejudice. Section four blends into section five’s rejection of persecution against any person as fundamentally inconsistent with Christian faith and discipleship, and entreats Christians to make peace and enter into fellowship with all in the world. John N. Sheveland See also Anti–Semitism; Christianity and War Further Reading Connelly, John. From Enemy to Brother: The Revolution in Catholic Teaching on the Jews, 1933–1965. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. Fitzgerald, Michael L., and John Borelli, Interfaith Dialogue: A Catholic View. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2006. Fredericks, James L., and Tracy Sayuki Tiemeier, eds. Interreligious Friendship After Nostra Aetate. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Grundmann, Christoffer H., ed. Interreligious Dialogue: An Anthology of Voices Bridging Cultural and Religious Divides. Winona, MN: Anselm Academic, 2015. Heft, James L. Catholicism and Interreligious Dialogue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

614  Nur Al-Din (1118–1174) Knitter, Paul F. Introducing Theologies of Religions. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002. McCarthy, Kate. Interfaith Encounters in America. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2007. Phan, Peter C. Being Religious Interreligiously: Asian Perspectives on Interfaith Dialogue. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004. Rahner, Karl, S.J. “Anonymous Christianity and the Missionary Task of the Church.” In David Bourke, trans. Theological Investigations, Volume XII. New York: Seabury Press, 1974, pp. 161–78. Rahner, Karl, S.J. “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions.” In Karl-H. Kruger, trans. Theological Investigations, Volume V. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966, pp. 115–34. Stransky, Rev. Thomas F., C.S.P. “The Declaration on NonChristian Religions.” In John H. Miller, ed. Vatican II: An Interfaith Appraisal. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966, pp. 335–48. Vatican II. Nostra Aetate: Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions. October 28, 1965. In Austin Flannery, ed. Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post-Conciliar Documents. Northport, NY: Costello, 1992, pp. 738–42.

Nur Al-Din (1118–1174) Nur Al-Din, the Turkish ruler of Aleppo and Damascus, was best known for uniting most of the Muslim Near East against the crusaders. Nur al-Din was the second son of Zangi (d. 1146), the ruler of Mosul and Aleppo, who captured the city of Edessa (mod. Sanliurfa, Turkey) from the Franks in 1144. After the death of Zangi, Mosul and the territories of upper Mesopotamia were inherited by his eldest son, Sayf al-Din Ghazi (d. 1149), while Nur al-Din received the western half of Zangi’s territories, including Edessa and Aleppo. Inheriting only part of his father’s lands reduced the resources Nur al-Din could draw on for his campaigns, and relations between him and Sayf al-Din became temporarily strained until Nur al-Din paid formal homage to his brother, who confirmed the eastern extent of his territories and charged him with the jihad (holy war) against the Franks. Thereafter, the generally cordial relations Nur al-Din maintained with his brother enabled him to devote his attention entirely to his Syrian interests without having to worry about his eastern borders.

When the Armenian populace of Edessa heard of Zangi’s death, they neutralized the city’s Muslim garrison and appealed to their former Frankish ruler, Count Joscelin II. Nur al-Din arrived at the city first, defeated the Franks, and crushed the Armenians. In May 1147 Nur al-Din and Mu‘in al-Din of Damascus repelled the Franks from the Hauran. Then, in July 1148, Damascus was attacked by the combined armies of the Second Crusade (1147–1149) and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Responding to appeals from Mu‘in al-Din, Nur al-Din advanced on the city. In the face of this threat the Franks withdrew. In June 1149 Nur al-Din attacked the region of Apamea in northern Syria and defeated the Franks near Inab. He then besieged Antioch (mod. Antakya, Turkey), where a treaty was made after he had taken Apamea (mod. Afamiyah, Syria) and Harenc (mod. Arim, Syria). In August Mu‘in al-Din died. Nur al-Din attempted to intervene in Damascus, appealing to the city’s inhabitants for support against the Franks, but instead they sought Frankish aid against him. Nur al-Din encamped near Damascus, but on hearing that Joscelin II of Edessa had been captured, he returned to Aleppo. In the summer of 1150, in cooperation with the Seljuk sultan of Rum, Mas‘ud (d. 1155), Nur al-Din attacked territories around Antioch, and by autumn he held the region downstream of Bira (mod. Birecik, Turkey), thus shifting the western border of Muslim lands from the Euphrates to the Orontes. In 1151 Nur al-Din advanced on Damascus again but could not prevent its inhabitants from making terms with the Franks. However, he did secure their nominal recognition of his sovereignty. In 1152 he took Tortosa (mod. Tartus, Syria) temporarily, severing communications between the county of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch. To win Damascus to his side, Nur al-Din cut off its supplies, while his agents engaged in propaganda. The city’s ruler, Mujir al-Din Uvak, appealed to the Franks, but Nur al-Din acted first, entering Damascus in April 1154. There was some rioting, but he restored order and distributed provisions, and the city’s leadership capitulated. Muslim Syria was now united under Nur al-Din. The following year Nur al-Din subdued Baalbek, made treaties with the Franks of Jerusalem and Antioch, and intervened in the inheritance struggle that broke out after the death of Mas‘ud of Rum. As a result he gained

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territories on the right bank of the Euphrates, including Bira. In the spring of 1156 he supported an attack made by troops from Damascus on Harenc. Eventually a treaty was concluded: Harenc remained in Frankish hands, but its revenues were split between them and Nur al-Din. Then, in February 1157, King Baldwin III of Jerusalem raided the Golan (Jawlan). In April Nur al-Din retaliated, sending troops to attack the town of Banyas. Its walls were breached, but hearing that Baldwin was marching to the rescue, Nur al-Din ordered a withdrawal. Baldwin followed the Muslims to Galilee, where they ambushed him: the Frankish troops were captured, but Baldwin escaped. In July earthquakes struck the region, forcing Nur al-Din to return to Damascus to repair its damaged defenses. Then, in October, he fell seriously ill. He was transferred to Aleppo, where he recovered, returning to Damascus in April 1158. There he mustered an army to take revenge for recent Frankish raids. An inconclusive engagement was fought near the Jordan in July; then, in December or January, Nur al-Din fell ill a second time. Again he recovered, and learning of a proposed Frankish-Byzantine coalition, he fortified Aleppo and set out to meet the allies. Long negotiations followed, and in May 1159 Nur al-Din concluded an alliance with Emperor Manuel I Komnenos, which included an agreement to cooperate against the Seljuk sultan of Rum, Qilij-Arslan II (d. 1192). While the Byzantines attacked Eskiflehir, Nur al-Din occupied a number of Seljuk territories and cities. In 1160 Qilij-Arslan negotiated a truce. While Nur al-Din was in the north, Baldwin III of Jerusalem invaded Damascene territory. Najm al-Din Ayyub, Nur al-Din’s lieutenant there (and the father of Saladin), negotiated a three-month truce. When it expired, the Franks invaded again. In the autumn of 1161 Nur al-Din returned and made a truce with Baldwin, before performing the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). Upon his return in 1162 he again fought the Franks near Harenc, but bad weather cut the battle short. In the spring of 1163 Nur al-Din suffered a second setback when he was surprised by the Franks at the foot of Krak des Chevaliers and his army routed. In early 1164 Nur al-Din received an appeal for aid from Shawar, the deposed vizier of Fatimid Egypt. In exchange for promises of a third of the revenues of Egypt and other

inducements, Nur al-Din sent troops under Asad al-Din Shirkuh, the brother of Ayyub, to restore Shawar to power. The new Egyptian vizier, Dirgham, appealed to the Franks, but, harassed by Nur al-Din further north, they were unable to prevent Shirkuh and his army from entering the Nile delta. Shawar was restored but refused to fulfill his promises, although he eventually paid the costs of the expedition. Meanwhile, in August, Nur al-Din had defeated the Franks near Harenc and taken the city. Banyas followed in October. In January 1167 Shirkuh set out for Egypt again. Meanwhile Nur al-Din occupied Hunin, near Banyas. Shirkuh returned in September, having fought and then come to terms with both Franks and Egyptians, and obtained a large payment from Cairo. Nur al-Din then took a number of fortresses on the coastal plain. He planned to take Beirut but was unable to because of dissension in his army. In 1168 the Franks attacked Egypt. The Fatimid caliph, al-‘Aid (d. 1171), appealed to Nur al-Din for aid, and in December Shirkuh set out with an army. The Franks withdrew, and Shirkuh entered Cairo in January 1169. Shawar was executed, with Shirkuh becoming the new vizier. He died shortly after and was succeeded by his nephew Saladin. In April 1170 Nur al-Din, apparently concerned about Saladin’s ambitions, sent Ayyub to remind his son of his loyalties. In June another earthquake shook Syria. Nur al-Din spent time overseeing repairs, and then, in September, following the death of his brother Qub al-Din, who had succeeded Sayf al-Din at Mosul, he intervened in the succession, confirming the authority of Qub al-Din’s son Sayf al-Din Ghazi II (d. 1180). In September 1171 Saladin suppressed the Fatimid caliphate of Egypt. Then he attacked Kerak in Frankish Transjordan, while Nur al-Din attacked the county of Tripoli. However, when Kerak offered to surrender, Saladin withdrew, citing unrest in Cairo as an excuse, although it seems more likely that he was reluctant to remove obstacles between his territory and that of Nur al-Din. The angry Nur al-Din announced his intention of deposing his subordinate, but he relented when Saladin reaffirmed his loyalty. In the autumn of 1172 Nur al-Din again repelled Frankish raids in the Hauran and intervened in northern Syria, where Qilij Arslan, obeying a warning from Manuel Komnenos,

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had refused Nur al-Din aid. Nur al-Din took several Saljuk territories on the right bank of the Euphrates, including Marash (mod. Karamanmarafl, Turkey) in July 1173. Soon afterward Qilij Arslan sued for peace, and Nur al-Din instructed him to participate in the jihad. Meanwhile, Nur al-Din had instructed Saladin to attack Kerak again. Saladin obeyed in May 1173, but upon hearing at the end of July that Nur al-Din had come south and was two days’ march away, he retired, claiming that his father was ill and that he was thus needed to keep order in Cairo. This time Nur al-Din accepted his excuse, but he began to prepare an expedition to bring Saladin to heel. He set out for Egypt in early May 1174 but fell ill again. He died on May 15, 1174. Like those of his father, Zangi, Nur al-Din’s military forces consisted of a personally maintained core regiment (Arab. ‘askar), consisting of cavalry made up of Turkish Mamluks (slave soldiers) and free Kurdish troops, supplemented by Turkomans and Arab tribal auxiliaries. All of these troops were usually skilled with both bows and closecombat weapons. Nur al-Din’s armies were then usually augmented by the ‘askars of his subordinates and locally recruited cavalry armed for close combat. In siege operations infantry would also be employed. It is not clear how far Nur al-Din’s jihad against the Franks was motivated by genuine piety and zeal, and how

far it was a political tool for him. After his first two bouts of illness and his defeat at Krak des Chevaliers in 1163, he is said to have adopted a pious, ascetic lifestyle. However, he still spent much of his time campaigning against other Muslims as well as against the Franks. Whatever the truth of this, he was viewed by many of his contemporaries as a great mujahid (holy warrior), and his tomb in Damascus remains a site of popular veneration. Niall Christie See also Saladin; Second Crusade Further Reading Elisséeff, Nikita. Nur ad-Din: Un grand prince musulman de Syrie au temps des croisades. 3 vols. Damascus, Syria: Institut Français de Damas, 1967. Hillenbrand, Carole. The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999. Holt, Peter M. The Age of the Crusades. London: Longman, 1986. Lev, Yaacov. “The Social and Economic Policies of Nur al-Din (1146–1174): The Sultan of Syria.” Der Islam 81 (2004): 218–42. Sivan, Emmanuel. L’Islam et la Croisade. Paris: Maisonneuve, 1968. Tabbaa, Yasser. “Monuments with a Message: Propagation of the Jihad under Nur Al-Din.” In Vladimir P. Goss, ed. The Meeting of Two Worlds. Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1986, pp. 223–40.

O Odin, Teutonic God of War

Odin’s Spear

The eminence of the Teutonic god of battle and warfare, Odin, in early Germanic worship reached especial prominence in eighth- and ninth-century Nordic culture. In the Norse pantheon, Æsir, Odin represents various traits associated with battle and war but also victory and death. Perhaps even more indicative of Odin’s influence in northern European worship is his various associations with poetry, prophecy, wisdom, and even deception. The root of his name, something akin to fury, invokes fear and respect in warriors and invokes musing in poets. The father of Thor, Odin is most directly associated with warfare and battle, both historically and in the future. This association has deep historical roots because when the Romans invaded Germanic territories, they assumed Odin was equivalent to their god Mercury. As the god of war, Odin’s place among soldiers was nuanced because he was associated with starting battle and its eventual victory. When a soldier was slain in battle, he was taken by Odin’s spirits (called Valkyries) to Valhalla, or a place where Odin would regale him until the final battle. At the height of Germanic and Nordic worship, human sacrifice was performed (most often by hanging a person by the neck on a tree) to affect a desired outcome; this is significant because, in the course of human history, human sacrifice was a rarity.

Odin’s spear was called gungnir and was believed to have been manufactured by dwarves. The spear never missed its target when thrown, and it always returned to Odin after he threw it. The opera composed by Richard Wagner, The Ring of the Nibelung (Der Ring des Nibelungen), features Odin and his spear. Once the spear breaks in the opera, Odin does not appear onstage again, signifying that his power has been overcome.

Images of Odin often portray him with one eye because he willingly sacrificed an eye to see the totality of time and earthly existence. This mythological rendering of Odin, coupled with the ambiguities of his personage (i.e., inspiration to warriors and poets alike), make for a compelling philosophical intersection. Odin’s sacrifice allows him to make sense of the past and how it affects the present, but he is also able to know what happens in the future. He knows that the final battle, which he is preparing with the slain soldiers in Valhalla, is ultimately a doomed outcome for all involved. This determinism speaks to two separate ideas. Worship and sacrifice to Odin, though part of a religious ritual, may ultimately be futile because he already knows the outcome and human history is already determined. 617

618  On War against the Turk (Luther, 1529)

This eighth-century Viking stele depicts the Norse god Odin riding Sleipnir, his eight-legged horse, and Valkyries guarding the gates of Valhalla. The Teutonic god of battle and warfare, Odin’s eminence in early Germanic worship reached special prominence in the eighth and ninth centuries. (CM Dixon/Print Collector/Getty Images)

Additionally, the characterization of Odin’s various affiliations, along with the fury in the etymological understanding of his name, speaks to the warrior culture that grew up around his Teutonic worship: battle and warfare are inevitabilities, but the meaning is already couched in loss and death. Odin is today worshipped in Germanic neo-pagan religions, including an entire movement called Odinism. The calendar’s Wednesday stems from the word Woden, which is the Old English name for Odin. James E. Willis III See also Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East; Mars, Roman God of War; Tyr, Norse God of War Further Reading Crossley-Holland, Kevin. The Norse Myths. New York: Pantheon, 1980.

Fee, Christopher R. Gods, Heroes, and Kings: The Battle for Mythic Britain. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Leeming, David. The Oxford Companion to World Mythology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Lindow, John. Handbook of Norse Mythology. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2001.

On War against the Turk (Luther, 1529) Protestant reformer Martin Luther (1483–1546) published his treatise On War against the Turk in April 1529. The historical context was the march of the 10th and longestreigning Ottoman sultan, Süleyman the Magnificent

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(1494–1566), toward Vienna in the spring of 1529. The Ottoman incursion and successes in Europe prior to the siege alarmed Protestant and Roman Catholic ecclesiastical leaders and political leaders who feared that if the Ottomans were victorious, the end of European Christendom would ensue. Some religious interpretations gave the Ottoman advance apocalyptic significance. Luther referred to this event with the words “Now that the Turk is actually approaching” (On War against the Turk, 161). Luther understood that the future territorial integrity of the European heartland looked ominous as the 1520s were drawing to a close. No one had been able to stop the Turkish military. Before the forces of Süleyman (also spelled Suleiman or Suleyman), two citadels had fallen in succession, Belgrade (1520) and Rhodes (1521). The Hungarians had been massacred at Mohacs (1526). When Luther penned his treatise, Süleyman was poised to strike again. Luther wrote, “It is a fact that the Turk is at our throat” (204). The Ottomans, he contended, were invincible due to the fact that they were energized by the devil himself. “I believe,” he said, “that the Turk’s Allah does more in war than they themselves. He gives them courage and wiles; he guides sword and fist, horse and man” (183). Because of this, Luther reasoned, it would take a miracle to defeat them: “The Turk is such a mighty lord that no kingdom or land, whatever it is, is strong enough to resist him alone, unless God performs a miracle” (184). Apart from the fact, as Luther saw it, that the Turks were “the army of the devil,” much of their power resided in their overwhelming size (193). Luther differentiated the strength of the sultan from that of various European governments. “Fighting against the Turk,” he wrote, “is not like fighting against the king of France, or the Venetians, or the pope; he is a different kind of warrior.” Here, Luther drew attention to the size of his army. “The Turk has people and money in abundance,” he said. “His people are always under arms so that he can quickly muster,” he conjectured, “three or four hundred thousand men” (202). In his treatise on war and the Turks, Luther saw fit to give not only spiritual counsel, but also some military advice as well. To the Christian community, Luther gave the exhortation that it must “fight against” the Turk “with repentance, tears, and prayer” (184). The beginning point

was repentance. “The fight,” he said, “must begin with repentance, and we must reform our lives, or we shall fight in vain” (171). Prayers should be offered during the everyday activities of life. It would be good, Luther wrote, for “everyone, even at home by himself, [if he] constantly raised to Christ at least a sigh of the heart for grace to lead a better life and for help against the Turk” (173). The content of the Christian’s prayer was to be directed against the Ottoman army, which seemed poised to overrun all of Europe. “In order not to lose our Lord Jesus Christ, his word and faith, we must pray against the Turk as against other enemies of our salvation and of all good, indeed, as we pray against the devil himself ” (175). Luther added the admonition, “Let everyone pray who can that this abomination not become lord over us” (178). To the political and military leaders of his time, Luther provided advice that he believed they needed to hear with respect to their future engagements against Süleyman and his massive army. Luther began by urging the princes of Europe to unite together so that they would confront Süleyman with a massive army. They must “not, as before, let individual kings and princes set upon him—yesterday the king of Hungary, today the king of Poland, and tomorrow the king of Bohemia—until the Turk devours them one after another” (202). Luther was here referring to the disaster at Mohacs on August 29, 1526, in which Süleyman obliterated the army of King Louis, wiping out the Christian kingdom of Hungary. The fundamental problem at Mohacs was that the Hungarians were outnumbered three to one. Süleyman had at least 70,000 men, while Louis fielded a much smaller force of some 24,000 men. Luther also gave advice regarding the makeup of the fighting force that needed to be assembled against Süleyman. Here Luther expressed his outrage concerning the use of the temporal sword by the clergy. “The pope and his bishops,” he insisted, “would be deserting their calling and office to fight with the sword against flesh and blood. They are not commanded to do this; it is forbidden” (165). Luther did not leave his readers guessing as to which pope he had in mind, referring to Pope Julius II (1443–1513) and his “arms,” and “this present pope, Clement, who people think is almost a god of war” (169). As to the bishops engaged in combat upon the field, he asked, “How many wars .  .  . have there been against the Turk in which we

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would not have suffered heavy losses if the bishops and clergy had not been there?” (167). It could be that Luther had in mind the slaughter at Mohacs of not only the king of Hungary, but also two archbishops and five bishops. From Luther’s perspective, the bishops of the church must give themselves to their calling, to pastor the flock of Jesus Christ and preach the word of God (165–167). While they were to stay in their churches attending to the duties of their office, Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (reigned 1519–1566) and the princes were to take the military initiative, to unfurl the banner upon which was written: “Protect the good; punish the wicked.” Luther believed that if the emperor had done what he was called to do, the princes would have followed his leadership, and the Turk would not have become so mighty (190). Addressing a contemporary problem, Luther provided directives as to how to deal with the problem at hand, the advancing Ottoman army. He exhorted Christians and rulers as to what he believed God required of them, insisting upon a distinction between church and state—pastors are called to preach and rulers to fight. His publication is an illustration of one of the many writings of the era dealing with religious and military matters. The publication’s wide distribution was made possible by the advent of the printing press. Mark J. Larson See also Luther, Martin; Süleyman the Magnificent; Vienna, Siege of (1529) Further Reading Fisher-Galati, Stephen. “The Protestant Reformation and Islam.” In Abraham Ascher, Tibor-Halasi-Kun, and Béla K. Király, eds. The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds: The East European Patterns. Brooklyn, NY: Brooklyn College Press, 1979. Luther, Martin. “On War against the Turk.” In Luther’s Works. Vol. 46. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1967, pp. 155–206.

Operation Enduring Freedom See Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–)

Origen and War (ca. 185–ca. 254 CE) Origen was one of the leading Christian intellectuals of the eastern Mediterranean world, based in Alexandria (Egypt) until 232 and in Caesarea (Palestine) from 234 until the end of his life. He interacted with contemporary Middle Platonist thinkers (who influenced his theology), Gnostic and Maronite Christian thinkers, and Jewish scholars of scripture. Origen, more than any Christian thinker before him, developed the allegorical interpretation of scripture. According to Origen, everything in scripture has three levels of meaning: the literal/historical, the moral, and the allegorical (mystical/spiritual). On the mystical/spiritual level, for example, the Exodus is the soul’s leaving the body on its journey toward unity with God. This method of biblical interpretation allows the construction of speculative, creative, yet scripturally based theologies. Allegory also makes it possible to provide edifying spiritual interpretations of violent or apparently immoral biblical texts, a practice that predates Origen. Origen’s most important theological work, On First Principles, which has survived only in part, presents a Platonist-influenced cosmic scenario of preexistent souls/ minds and a premundane fall. All souls/minds (of the later angels, humans, and demons) were originally united in the contemplation of God, their creator; misusing their free will, all except the soul/mind of Christ fall away from God to varying extents. Through a long process of purification by suffering and education in many worlds designed by God for that purpose, all the souls/minds (including that of Satan) will ultimately be restored to their original unity in contemplation of God. A theological problem such as the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart in Exodus (if God hardened his heart, how can Pharaoh be responsible?) is solved by interpreting it as educational and thus ultimately beneficial for Pharaoh (III.1). This is a hopeful theology of universal salvation in which evil and conflict are explained as necessary, temporary parts of the transforming and redeeming process. Origen’s most explicit discussion of Christian attitudes toward war is found in Contra Celsum (ca. 248), a refutation of an anti-Christian work (ca. 178) by the philosopher Celsus, who argued that Christianity was unreasonable, narrowly exclusivist in its claim to have the only truth, and

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attractive only to the uneducated. In Celsus’s view, Christianity, if universally adopted, would destroy human society through offense to the gods and Christian refusal to participate in public affairs. Origen’s response praised Christianity’s power to change the lives of the uneducated faithful and the philosophically educated who receive Christian truths on the allegorical level. Origen wrote that Celsus’s wish for the entire world to live in unity would be fulfilled if all accepted the Christian faith and were healed of evil by the power of Christ. To the complaint that Christians refuse to serve in the army, Origen explained that Christians actually provide a greater help to the emperor than the entire army. Christians, whose faith forbids them to enlist, are actually a secret army protecting the empire through their prayers, which have more power than the demons, whose machinations are the cause of wars. Likewise, the refusal of Christians to hold public office is not a failure to protect social order but rather a prioritizing of the higher task of church office, which benefits all (VIII. 70–75). Although Origen rejected Christian participation in violence, he had, as a young man, committed an act of violence against himself. In his zeal for chastity and avoidance of scandal with female students, he had himself castrated, a measure taken by some ascetics in response to Jesus’s praise of “eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven” (Matt. 19:12). Self-castration was repeatedly forbidden by the church. Origen later regretted this action. Origen’s biography is a reminder that Christians remained vulnerable to state-sponsored violence before the legalization of Christianity. His father was martyred ca. 202. Although Origen was an admired public figure and in the mid-230s gave tutorials to the emperor’s mother, when the Decian persecution (the first systematic and empire-wide persecution) began 20 years later, he was imprisoned and tortured so severely that he never recovered. After Origen’s death, the more speculative aspects of his theology became increasingly controversial. A number of Origenist-inspired proposals (often in revised forms produced by later thinkers) were condemned at the Council of Constantinople (553). Nancy Weatherwax See also Christianity and War

Further Reading Origen. Contra Celsum. Translated and edited by Henry Chadwick. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953. Origen. On First Principles. Translated by G. W. Butterworth. New York: Harper & Row/ Torchbook, 1966. Trigg, Joseph. Origen: The Bible and Philosophy in the ThirdCentury Church. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Oslo Accords (1993) The agreement commonly called the Oslo Accords and formally known as the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements was signed on September 13, 1993, in Washington, DC, by Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chair Yasser Arafat, and U.S. president Bill Clinton. In the Oslo Accords, the PLO, the Palestinians’ major representative party and de facto government-in-exile, formally recognized Israel’s right to exist, recognized Israel’s sovereignty over 78 percent of historic Palestine, and pledged to end military actions against Israel. Israel, although failing to recognize Palestinian statehood, did recognize Palestinian nationhood, including the right of self-determination, and the PLO’s role as the Palestinians’ legitimate representative body. The document spelled out ways in which the Palestinians could achieve a degree of autonomy in parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which had been occupied by Israeli forces since the June 1967 Six-Day War. The hope was that by the PLO’s demonstration of competent selfgovernance and control over anti-Israel violence, the Israelis would gain the confidence needed to make a phased withdrawal from the occupied territories and grant the Palestinians an independent state alongside Israel. Similarly, it was hoped that the removal of foreign occupation forces from certain areas, increasing levels of self-government, and the prospects of a viable independent state would give the Palestinian population the incentive to end the violence against Israelis. The interim peace period was to be completed by 1998, at which time a permanent peace agreement would be signed. Although the U.S. government became the guarantor of the Oslo Accords, Washington had little to do with the agreement itself. Soon after the election of a more

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moderate Israeli government in 1992, direct talks began in secret between representatives of Israel and the PLO. They were first facilitated by Norwegian nongovernmental organizations and later with the assistance of Norway’s foreign ministry. This apparently took place without the knowledge of U.S. officials, who still took the position that the PLO should not be allowed to take part in the peace process, excluding it from the stalled peace talks then going on in Washington. As the secret negotiations in Norway progressed during the summer of 1993, the Clinton administration put forward what it called a compromise proposal for Palestinian autonomy. This compromise was actually less favorable to the Palestinians than what was then being put forward by the Israelis. The U.S. role in the Oslo process began with a historic signing ceremony on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993. The agreement had been finalized in Oslo on August 20. Given the ambiguities in the agreement, both parties agreed that the United States should be its guarantor. Indeed, the Israelis saw the U.S. government as the entity most likely to support its positions on outstanding issues, and the Palestinians saw the U.S. government as the only entity capable of forcing Israel to live up to its commitments and able to move the occupying power to compromise. Peace talks resumed in Washington in the fall of 1993 within the Oslo framework. Over the next seven years, the United States brokered a series of Israeli-Palestinian agreements that led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from most of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. By the end of the decade, about 40 percent of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including most of its towns and cities, had been placed under the rule of the new Palestinian Authority ( PA), headed by Arafat, and divided into dozens of noncontiguous zones wherein the Palestinians could for the first time exercise some limited autonomy within their sphere of control. During this period, the Israeli government severely limited the mobility of Palestinians within and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dramatically expanded its expropriation of land in the occupied territories for colonization by Jewish settlers, and refused to withdraw from as much territory as promised in the U.S.-brokered disengagement agreements. In addition, the United States tended to side with the Israelis on most issues during talks

regarding the disengagement process, even after a rightwing coalition that had opposed the Oslo Accords came to power in Israel in 1996. This served to alienate many Palestinians who had been initially hopeful about the peace process and hardened anti-Israeli attitudes. Meanwhile, much of the PA proved itself to be rather inept, corrupt, and autocratic in its governance of those parts of the occupied territories under its control. The corruption alienated much of the Palestinian population, and the PA’s lack of control made it difficult to suppress the growth of radical Islamic groups. On more than two dozen occasions between 1994 and 2000, Islamic extremists from the occupied Palestinian territories engaged in terrorist attacks inside Israel, killing scores of Israeli civilians and thereby hardening anti-Palestinian attitudes. The Palestinians had hoped that the United States would broker the negotiations based on international law that forbids the expansion of any country’s territory by military force and prohibits occupying powers from transferring their civilian population into occupied land. The Palestinians also hoped that U.S. officials would support a series of specific United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions demanding that Israel honor these principles. From the Palestinians’ perspective—as well as that of the UN, most U.S. allies, and most international legal experts— the onus of the burden was on Israel, as the occupying power, to make most of the compromises for peace. The Clinton administration, however, argued that the UN resolutions were no longer relevant and saw the West Bank and the Gaza Strip simply as disputed territories, thereby requiring both sides to compromise. This gave the Israelis a clear advantage in the peace process. In signing the Oslo Accords, the Palestinians operated on the assumption that the agreement would result in concrete improvements in the lives of those in the occupied territories. They hoped that the interim period would be no more than five years and that the permanent settlement would be based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which called on Israel to withdraw from the territories seized in the 1967 war. For their part, the Israelis had hoped that the Oslo Accords would lead to the emergence of a responsible Palestinian leadership and greater security. None of these wishes, however, came to pass. Stephen Zunes

Otranto, Battle of (1480–1481)  623 See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Six-Day War; Yom Kippur War; Primary Documents: Last Speech of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (November 4, 1995); Wye River Memorandum (1998) Further Reading Brown, Nathan J. Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. Freedman, Robert Owen, ed. The Middle East and the Peace Process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998. Peres, Shimon. The New Middle East. New York: Henry Holt, 1993. Weinberger, Peter. Co-opting the PLO: A Critical Reconstruction of the Oslo Accords, 1993–1995. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.

Otranto, Battle of (1480–1481) The Battle of Otranto was an attempt by the Ottoman Empire to invade Europe, capture Rome, and convert the Europeans to the Muslim faith. Mehmet the Conqueror (Sultan Mehmet II), who declared himself the “Caesar of Rome,” dispatched an Ottoman force led by Gedik Ahmed Pasha to accomplish this task. Initially, Pasha’s forces attempted to land in the Italian coastal city of Apulia, but weather intervened. They were pushed further south some 50 miles. Then on July 28, 1480, Gedik Ahmed Pasha’s force, consisting of more than 100 ships carrying a total of around 18,000 troops and 700 cavalry, landed in Roca, Italy, near Otranto, located on the eastern coast of the Salento peninsula. By 1480 Otranto was a part of the Kingdom of Naples, ruled by Ferdinand I. Otranto, however, was not believed to be the focus of an attack by Ottoman forces. Rather, in 1480, Otranto was a small town and of little importance. And while the city had walls, the town did not have sufficient forces—cannons or a large army— defending it. Following the landing, Turkish forces besieged the city for two weeks, firing cannon balls into the citadel’s walls. When the Turkish forces landed, there were a small number of soldiers, around 400, guarding the castle. The people

of Otranto successfully held out for some time, and even used boiling oil, water, and rocks to repel attackers. On August 11, 1480, Turkish forces succeeded in breaching the city’s walls. The Turkish forces killed citizens in the streets as they made their way to the town’s cathedral. According to some accounts, 12,000 people were killed and another 5,000 were enslaved by the Turkish forces. However, some historians discount these numbers as being too high; the city did not likely have a population that large at the time. The most well-known or infamous result of the Turkish capture of Otranto was the mass beheading of Roman Catholic men, often referred to as Otranto’s Martyrs. Following the city’s capture, the Turks captured 800 ablebodied men, all of them Roman Catholics, and told them to convert to Islam or they would be killed. The men refused. They were then led to a hill, what was then called the Hill of Minerva, and they were decapitated. Following the massacre, throughout August, Gedik Ahmed Pasha continued to attack the neighboring Italian towns of Vieste, Lecce, Taranto, and Brindisi. However, a food shortage and fear of winter storms forced Gedik Ahmed Pasha to withdraw many of his forces and sail back to Constantinople. Pasha left a small contingent of troops—800 infantry and 500 cavalry—to garrison the town of Otranto. Following the news of the massacre of 800 Christian men on the Hill of Minerva, Pope Sixtus IV became so concerned that he reissued calls for another crusade. France and Hungary responded by sending forces down into Italy to defeat the invading Ottomans. However, the powerful port city of Venice did not send any support. The Venetians had signed a peace treaty with the Turks in 1479 ending the First Ottoman War (1463–1479). In 1481, Ferdinand I sent his son, Alfonso II, to lead the Christian forces and retake the city. Alfonso arrived at Otranto with his troops in May 1481. The remaining Ottoman forces garrisoned themselves in the castle of Otranto. After several months, the Christian forces led by Duke Alfonso broke through the Turkish defense. The Ottoman defenders fell by September 1481. The remaining Turkish forces were destroyed and none survived. Mehmet II died shortly after the siege ended, destroying any hopes for future Turkish attempts to invade Rome and conquer Italy. Following the massacre, the bones of some of the 800 martyrs were placed in the cathedral in Otranto.

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Today, the Hill of Minerva is now called the Hill of the Martyrs. A canonization process began in 1539 for the Martyrs of Otranto. The 800 martyrs were beatified by Pope Clement XIV in 1781. In 1980 Pope John Paul II visited Otranto and celebrated mass. Then in 2007, Pope Benedict XVI said that the defenders of Otranto were killed for their faith. And finally, in May 2013, in one of his first acts, Pope Francis canonized the martyrs of Otranto. In his canonization speech, Pope Francis said, “As we venerate the martyrs of Otranto, let us ask God to sustain the many Christians who, today and in many parts of the world, now, still suffer from violence, and to give them the courage to be devout and to respond to evil with good.” Christopher D. Nelson See also Ottoman Empire Further Reading Bisaha, Nancy. Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Sugar, Peter F. Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.

Ottoman Empire Oghuz Turks under the leadership of Osman I (r. 1280– 1324), given land by the Seljuk Turks in return for help fighting against the Mongols, began the Ottoman dynasty. Bafeus’s victory of 1302 against the Byzantine Empire led to the rooting of the Ottoman state. Osman I made Bursa its capital in 1305 and laid the foundations of what was to become the Ottoman Empire. For the next 300 years, Ottoman rule expanded into Western Asia, North Africa, and Europe. Based on a Turkic-Islamic orientation dominated by the Sunni sect of Islam, the Ottoman Empire was among the largest and longest lasting empires of history. The Ottomans served under the ideology of Nizam-i Alem, which means “World Order,” and combined it with Gaza, meaning “holy war” policy. This ideology was the essential part of the Ottoman expansion policy, and it designed the state structure and Ottoman identity. United by the Islamic ideology of war, jihad, the highest responsibility of

the empire was to implement Islamic organizational and administrative structures in the conquered territories. The Ottoman Empire was dynastic and centralized in structure. Ottoman subjects from all the conquered territories were under the protection of the empire and called Teba-i Osmaniye. Ottomans applied a system for nonMuslim communities. The “millet” system aimed to give minorities limited power to regulate their own affairs under the overall supremacy of the Ottoman administration. The intention was to encourage loyalty. Some millets paid tax to the state, while others were exempt because they were seen to be performing services of value to the state such as protection and commercial exchange. Both to establish security and recruit soldiers for the army, the Ottomans developed a unique system known as the Devshirme system. Devshirme meant collecting Christian boys, converting them to Islam, and educating them to be soldiers or officials for the empire. The Devshirmes became soldiers for the empire under the title of janissaries. Power was exercised only by the sultan or padishah. The Ottoman Empire was successfully ruled by a single bloodline for almost seven centuries, passing the throne on to one of the sultan’s sons (usually the eldest one). When a son became the sultan, his mother became known as Valide Sultan, meaning queen mother. The sultan had an adviser/ minister, the grand vizier. Topkapi Palace was the center of the sultan’s power. Built by Mehmet II, it had an administrative function and was the residence of the ruler and his family. The sultan’s private domain was called the harem. The harem was under the control of the queen mother. The harem could bring benefits to a family who had a family member in the harem. It meant patronage, wealth, and power; it meant access to the sultan. Ottomans were Sunni Muslims. Religion was incorporated in the state structure, and the sultan was regarded as “the protector of Islam.” The education and judicial system were all run by the state. Islamic law (sharia) was implemented and controlled by the ulema, which meant “class of man of religion.” “Osman’s dream,” the vision of establishing an Islamic empire, was realized by Osman’s son, Orhan I (r. 1326– 1359). The Ottomans made a series of attacks on the declining Christian Byzantine Empire and quickened their expansion toward the West with the aim of controlling the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to access the Marmara, Black,

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and Aegean Seas. Ottomans settled in Rumeli (European lands) in 1352 and by 1400 began to establish military posts in the Balkans. Within 50 years, through military conquest, diplomacy, dynastic marriages, and the opportunistic exploitation of the Byzantine civil wars, Murad I (r. 1362–1389) more than tripled the territories. His son, Bayezid I (r. 1389–1402), was the first Ottoman ruler to use the title “sultan” (“sovereign,” ruler with supreme authority). He extended Ottoman control over much of southeastern Europe and Asia Minor, up to the Danube and Euphrates. Alerted by Ottoman conquests, Europeans organized a crusade to halt the Ottoman advance, but were

defeated in 1396. The major event of Bayezid I’s rule was the Battle of Ankara in 1402 in which Bayezid I was captured by Timur and the Ottoman army was defeated. Bayezid I died in captivity, and four of his sons contested for power during the Ottoman Interregnum (1402–1413), a civil war for the Ottoman throne. Mehmet I killed all four and became the next sultan. It was during Mehmed II’s reign (r. 1451–1481) that the dream of the conquest of Constantinople, the capital of the 1,000-year-old Byzantine Empire, was realized on May 29, 1453. Mehmed II took the name “the Conqueror.” The siege of Constantinople empowered the Ottomans to

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control the Straits and the southern shore of the Black Sea. Constantinople remained the capital of the empire until the Turkish Republic was proclaimed and Ankara became the republic’s new capital. With the conquest of Constantinople, the economic power of the empire flourished. Mehmed II attracted traders and artisans from Europe. Jewish traders, mainly, were encouraged to set up business in Istanbul, and certain privileges were prearranged. The idea of an empire was fulfilled; Mehmed II, for the first time, ordered gold coins to be published to mark this. Selim I, known as Yavuz Sultan Selim (translated as “Grim”) (r. 1512–1520), conquered Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Arabia, including the holy cities of Jerusalem, Mecca, and Medina. With the control of Egypt in 1517, the Ottoman sultan took the title of Halife-i Műslimin, which means “Caliph of all Muslims” and indicates the supreme religious authority in Sunni Islam. When Selim I died in 1520, the empire had territories covering the region from the Red Sea to the Crimea and from the Middle East to Bosnia. The Ottoman Empire became a substantial international power, a threat to the European balance of power, and the most powerful state in the Islamic world. The reign of Süleyman I led to more attacks on Europe. Süleyman, known as “the Magnificent,” was called “Lawgiver” by his people. Süleyman I who reigned for 46 years, systematized the law. The sultanic laws were first collected together by Mehmed II. It was under Süleyman that the laws took their final form; no more revisions were made after his reign. This code of laws was called Kanun-i Osmani, which means “Ottoman laws.” The Ottomans seized Belgrade and advanced as far as Vienna, where they finally were defeated in 1529. Süleyman I created a powerful navy under the leadership of the pirate governor of Algeria, Grand Admiral Hayruddin Barbarossa, the commander who turned the entire Mediterranean into an Ottoman lake. Ottomans extended their power into the western Mediterranean until the Spanish Empire defeated them at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. Süleyman I also expanded Ottoman power in the East, conquering Iraq and the southern Caucasus from the Safavids (1534). The reign of Süleyman in Ottoman history is generally regarded as the period of greatest justice and harmony in any Islamic state.

The stagnation and later on the decline of the Ottoman Empire began during the reign of Selim II (r. 1566–1574). His successor Murad III (1574–1595) made conquests in the East. Eastern conquest meant conflicts with the Safavid Empire. The war would drag on for 12 years, ending with the Istanbul Treaty of 1590. With the treaty, the Ottoman Empire reached its largest size. However, the army and economy were worn out. In 1683, with Vienna under siege, the Ottomans were defeated by an alliance of European forces and faced the reality of the industrial artillery of European armies. After the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz, the first treaty in which the Ottoman Empire lost territories to European powers, the empire went into a rapid decline. Several factors contributed to the empire’s decline. The Ottoman Empire had reached its “natural borders”; geographic obstacles such as the Grand Desert in Africa or the Zagros Mountains on the Iran border were difficult limits to push beyond. The monarchies that were ruled by a single king, the absolute or parliamentary monarchies in Europe, resulted in the more powerful European empires, which were harder to conquer. Europeans began to expand their economies as a result of explorations of new trade routes and new settlements. The Spice and the Silk Roads, which were under the control of the Ottomans, began to lose their importance. Most notably, the Ottoman economy was weakening fast. Capitulations, the trade agreements made with European powers, had turned the Ottoman Empire into an open market for the Europeans. Mehmet II gave the first capitulations to the traders from Genoa and Venice, and later Süleyman I gave capitulations to the French. The first loan from European banks was taken out in 1854 during the Crimean War. Ottomans continued to borrow money from Europe. Inflation, rural overpopulation, unemployment, and heavy taxation led to local revolts and discontent. And lastly, Ottoman sultans and their administrators failed to see the fact that European powers were advancing while they were falling behind, mainly in terms of intellectual thought, science, and technology. The Ottoman Empire closed itself to intellectual and scientific improvements due to its traditional structure. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the Ottoman Empire was almost continuously at war with one or more of its enemies—Persia, Poland, Austria, and Russia. The Crimean

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War (1853–1856) initiated a breakdown in Ottoman morale and helplessness. Although the empire was theoretically among the victors of the Crimean War, it was economically exhausted. The Congress of Paris (1856) recognized the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but it also marked the confirmation of the empire’s dependency rather than of its rights as a European power. The periodic crises in the Ottoman Empire became collectively known to European diplomats as “the Eastern Question.” In 1853, Czar Nicholas I of Russia described the Ottoman Empire as “the sick man of Europe.” The European powers’ concern was how to dispose of the empire in such a manner that no single power would gain an advantage at the expense of the others and challenge the political balance of Europe. An era known as the period of Tanzimat-i Hayriye (beneficial reforms, simply referred to as the Tanzimat, literally reorganization) started by leading civilian reformers who had received a higher education abroad. These statesmen entered Ottoman officialdom through the diplomatic service, which held effective power during these years. These reforms during the Tanzimat period, planned under Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839), were carried out under his sons Abdulmecid (r. 1839–1861) and Abdulaziz (r. 1861– 1876), and were brought to successful culmination under Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876–1909). The army had to be modernized, the bureaucracy to be arranged, new laws to be passed, the educational system to be reformed, as well as the economy to be strengthened as part of the preliminary stage of reforms that needed to be undertaken. Tanzimat reformers also issued decrees designed to safeguard the rights of subjects: guaranteed public trials, rights of privacy, and equality before the law for all Ottoman subjects, to limit the authority of the ulema and centralize the authority of the government. In all these reforms, the utmost intention was to appease internal struggles and handle external pressure through the reformation of the state. Foreign officers, especially from Germany and France, came to advise the Ottomans, and many Ottomans were sent to Europe to be educated in a Western manner. European weapons were introduced and war strategies were taught. After 1870 the newly unified German government welcomed the opportunity to assist the army. In 1902,

Germany was granted a 99-year concession to build and operate a Berlin-Baghdad railroad. Exchanges between Germany and the Ottoman Empire increased German influence and presence. However, the reforms were instituted from top to bottom and did not get the support of the public. Thus they could not meet the demands of the Ottoman subjects. As a result, they had little or no impact on the vast majority of the Ottoman population, which was rural. It was during the times of the reform process that the empire lost most of its territory. The rebellions started with the Greek War of Independence (1821–1832). Inspired by the Greeks, local elites in the Balkans and Arab regions began to organize nationalist rebellions. In 1875, the Slavic people living in the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina led an uprising. The rebellion (1875) of Bosnia and Herzegovina precipitated the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, in which Turkey was defeated. Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, as well as part of Bulgaria became independent as part of the Treaty of San Stefano. In 1881, Tunisia was taken by the French and in 1882, Egypt was occupied by Britain. The breakup of the state gained impetus. The decade of the 1870s saw the emergence of the Young Ottoman movement. The Young Ottomans’ political agenda was to adopt Western political institutions, including an efficient centralized government, a parliament, and a written constitution. The Ottomans hoped to prevent European intervention into Ottoman affairs with the promulgation of the constitution, since it included provisions about the equality of all the subjects of the empire. Abdulhamid II declared the First Constitutional Period (1876– 1878) but dissolved the parliament within a year. Opposition to the sultan’s regime continued to assert itself among Westernized intellectuals and liberal members of the ruling class. Some continued to advocate “Ottomanism,” whereas others argued for pan-Turanism, the union of Turkic-speaking people inside and outside the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal (later known as Atatürk) organized a society among fellow officers in Thessaloniki (Salonika) in present-day Greece. Mustafa Kemal’s group merged with other nationalist reform organizations in 1907 to form the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Also known as the Young Turks, this group sought to restore the 1876 constitution and unify the diverse elements of the empire into a homogeneous nation through greater

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government centralization under a parliamentary regime. In 1908, the Young Turks inspired a military coup that forced the restoration of the parliament and the constitution of 1876. In 1909, Abdulhamid II was forced to abdicate. The second constitution was declared by Mehmet V. In the elections, the CUP won the majority and entered parliament as a political party. In the two successive Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the Ottoman Empire lost nearly its entire territory in Europe to Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and newly independent Albania. In 1912, Libya was annexed by Italy. In January 1913, in a coup led by Enver Pasha, the Young Turk movement gained full authority over the empire. The Ottoman Empire entered World War I in alliance with Germany. Although Turkish troops succeeded against the Allies in the Gallipoli campaign (1915), Arab revolts and the British occupation of Baghdad and Jerusalem in 1917 led to Ottoman defeats. Greece attacked Anatolia at Smyrna and took control over western regions. In 1920, the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Sèvres, leading to the loss of Arab territories and a partition of Anatolia. However, the Turkish nationalists under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal conducted a liberation movement and drove the Greeks out of western Anatolia. The Turkish Republic was officially recognized with the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923. The Ottoman sultanate was abolished on November 1, 1922, and the caliphate was abolished on March 3, 1924. The dissolving of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the Republic of Turkey resulted in the creation of modern Balkan and Middle Eastern states, which forecast the current international political and world economy and culture at a global level. Burcin Cakir See also Crimean War, Religious Dimensions of; First World War, Religious Dimensions of; Jaffa, Treaty of; Lepanto, Battle of; Malta, Siege of; Otranto, Battle of; Ottoman-Persian Wars; Süleyman the Magnificent; Vienna, Siege of (1529); Vienna, Siege of (1683); Primary Document: Issuance of Ottoman Fetva by Essad Effendi, Sheik-Ul-Islam in the Name of Sultan Mehmed V (November 1914) Further Reading Faroqhi, Suraiya. Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire. London: I. B. Tauris, 2000. Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Inalcik, Halil. The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300– 1600. London: Phoenix Press, 2000. Inalcik Halil, and Quataert, Donald, eds. An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Quataert, Donald. The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Ottoman-Persian Wars When the Ottoman State emerged in Anatolia and in the Balkans in the 13th century, the Safavids came to power in modern-day Iran. An Ottoman-Persian official diplomatic relationship began with the establishment of the Persian Safavid state (1501–1736) and continued during the Afshar (1736–1747), Zand (1749–1779) and Qajar (1794–1925) dynasties. Sectarian differences and frequent border violations between the Ottoman Empire and Persia were the two major reasons for conflict between the Ottoman and Persian Empires. The Safavids were Shiite Muslims while the Ottoman Empire was the dominant Sunni Muslim state. Beginning in the early years of the Safavid dynasty (1502–1726), particularly under the rule of Shah Ismail, Sunni-Shiite conflict flamed the deterioration of relations between the Ottomans and Persians. Border problems caused by the Kurdish and Turkoman tribes and the struggle to dominate eastern Anatolia, Iraq, and the Caucasus became the other main triggers of conflict as each empire faced difficulties in these regions. The Battle of Chaldiran in 1514 was the first major conflict between the Persians and Ottomans. The Ottoman sultan Selim I’s victory over Shah Ismail led to the Persians losing eastern Anatolia, and the Ottoman expansion into Azerbaijan and the territory of modern-day Iraq enlarged Ottoman territory and changed the Persian frontier. In 1534 and 1548 the Ottoman sultan Süleyman I temporarily captured the Persian capital, Tabriz. In 1534, Baghdad was conquered. Due to its strategic location between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, the city was the main zone for the control of international trade. In 1555, the first treaty between the Persians and the Ottomans was signed. According to the Treaty of Amasya, Persia took eastern

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Armenia, north and south Azerbaijan, and eastern Kurdistan, whereas the Ottoman Empire took western Kurdistan. The Treaty of Amasya recognised Ottoman conquests in Iraq and Baghdad, territory that remained in Ottoman hands until 1918 except for the short period of 1623–1638, when the Persians regained control of the city. In return, the Ottoman Empire accepted the Persian Empire as a state. The Treaty of Amasya remained the cornerstone for resolution of territorial conflicts between the Ottomans and Persians until 1823. The Ottoman-Persian Wars of 1578–1590 were the result of Persian border violations and a succession crisis following the death of Shah Tahmasb in 1576. The Ottomans intended to conquer Crimea to establish a land connection for future eastern campaigns to arrest the expansion of the Russian state. After fighting for 12 years, the Persians were defeated and the city of Tiflis fell to the Ottomans in 1578. In 1580, the Ottomans conquered Azerbaijan and took control of the the Caspian Sea. The Treaty of Istanbul was signed in 1590, at which time the Persian capital had to be moved from Tabriz to Isfahan. With the Treaty of Istanbul, the Ottomans’ eastern expansion reached its farthest limit. Persia’s golden years were under Shah Abbas (r. 1588– 1629), a bold leader who oversaw the restructuring of the government and military. Abbas launched campaigns against the Ottomans beginning in 1603. He took back the lost eastern borders from the Ottomans and captured Baghdad and Diyarbakır, albeit only temporarily. According to the Treaty of Nasuh Pasa, which was signed in 1611, the lands taken by the Ottomans by the Treaty of Istanbul were given to Persia. Violations of the Treaty of Nasuh Pasa laid the foundation for the next conflict between two empires. The Persian Safavid dynasty began to lose its power after Shah Abbas’s death in 1629. Under the rule of Shah Hussein, Afghan rulers took control of the Afghan-Persian border and a long period of civil war began. The Ottomans took advantage of this period of disunity, invading some territories such as Yerevan, Tabriz, and Hamadan, and recapturing Baghdad in 1638. The Treaty of Zuhab (Treaty of Kasr-i Shirin) was signed in 1639. With the treaty, the 1555 borders between Persia and the Ottoman Empire were restored. Among the numerous treaties, the Treaty of Zuhab is considered the central treaty between the Ottomans and

Persians, since it remained unchanged in principle until the First World War in 1914. The Ottoman-Persian War of 1722–1727 was a series of conflicts fought between the Ottomans and the Afghan Hotaki dynasty of Persia. Ashraf Hotaki, claiming to be the legitimate inheritor of the Iranian throne, organized a campaign against the Ottomans and defeated them in 1726. However, with the Treaty of Hamedan in 1727, Ashraf Hotaki gained official recognition as the shah of Persia in return for abandonment of territorial claims, and Ottoman sovereignty was once again confirmed over the western territories of Iran. Nader Shah expelled the Afghan Hotaki dynasty in 1729 with the help of his cooperation with Tahmasb II. The campaigns of Nader Shah against the Ottomans led to the wars of 1730–1736 and 1743–1746. Ottoman forces were expelled from Persian territory. A new Persian state and dynasty were established. The Treaty of Ahmet Pasha in 1732 and the Treaty of Istanbul in 1736 confirmed Nader Shah’s territorial claims and his hold on the Persian throne. Nader Shah fought the Ottomans until 1746, advancing the cause of Shi’a Islam against Sunni oppression. Although he laid siege to the cities of Mosul and Kars, he did not succeed. Eventually, he ended the war with the Ottoman Empire by signing the Treaty of Kerden in 1746. Beginning in the early 19th century, Ottoman-Persian relations entered a new period. The Qajar dynasty came into power in Persia in 1795 under the leadership of Fath-Ali Shah. Both the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Persia (1796–1925) faced many challenges, including Russian expansion, the political and economic influence of the leading European empires, British power in the Middle East, and the need for domestic military, administrative, and economic reforms. Largely due to these pressing foreign and domestic problems, relations between the Ottomans and the Qajar dynasty became less hostile and there were no major wars, except for the 1820–1823 war and minor border problems, which were resolved with the Treaty of Erzurum in 1823. The impetus behind the Ottoman-Persian rivalry can be summarized by the fact that both empires claimed to be the representative of Islam. They both utilized religion as a binding force among their people and to secure domestic support. Three centuries of constant wars between the

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Sunni Ottomans and Shi’a Persians had significant political, territorial, and religious consequences. The border between present-day Turkey and Iran (Persia officially became known as Iran in 1935) is the result of the many Ottoman-Persian conflicts and has had a significant impact on politics in Europe and Asia. European powers, especially Russia and Britain, maintained a close watch on Ottoman-Persian relations. In terms of political significance in the Middle East, the Kurdish and Turkoman tribes and their local leaders played the Persian and Ottoman Empires against each other and managed to establish themselves along the mountainous frontier regions with complicated religious and political consequences that are felt today. Burcin Cakir See also Anglo-Afghan War; Kurds; Ottoman Empire Further Reading Aksan, Virginia. Ottoman Wars, 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged. Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2007. Allouche, Adel. The Origins and Development of the OttomanSafavid Conflict, 906–962/1500–1555. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983.

Cambridge History of Iran. 8 vols. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968–1991. Holt, P. M., Ann K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis. The Central Islamic Lands from Pre-Islamic Times to the First World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Newman, Andrew J. Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire. London: I. B.Tauris, 2006. Rizk Khoury, Dina. State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540–1834. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Savory, Roger. Iran under the Safavids. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Shaw, Stanford J. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. 1: Empire of Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1290–1808. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Tucker, Ernest. “The Peace Negotiations of 1736: A Conceptual Turning Point in Ottoman-Iranian Relations.” Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 20 (Spring 1996): 16–37. Walsh, J. R. “The Historiography of Ottoman-Safavid Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.” In Bernard Lewis and Peter Malcolm Holt, eds. Historians of the Middle East. London, 1962, pp. 197–211. Ward, Steven R. Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces. Georgetown, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009.

P Pacem in Terris (John XXIII, 1963)

Pacem in Terris thus begins by stating that peace can only be established if the natural order laid down by God, who ordered all creation, is faithfully observed (§1). Human relationships are marked by turmoil, but human nature reveals a divinely imprinted order, which can be discovered within the conscience. Human nature tends toward certain modes of acting; human beings thus have the obligation and the right to act in certain ways, rights and obligations founded in nature (§9). The encyclical lists these rights and duties at length (§11–30). Social structures that promote these rights and duties constitute “the common good” (§65). Civil authority is part of God’s intention for human society; without it, order among human beings would be impossible (§46). However, because civil authority finds its basis in natural law, it must order human relations in accordance with the natural law; civil laws opposed to natural law are necessarily illegitimate and must be disobeyed (§47, §51). Civil power exists for the purpose of promoting the “common good” of all (§56); a government that fails in this respect “lacks juridical force” (§61). John XXIII writes that social and historical factors render it impossible to insist that one particular form of government is suitable for every nation (§67), but that any just political order must include division of power (§68), a clear constitution (§75), and the protection of individuals’ God-given rights and conscience (§77–78).

Pacem in Terris (“Peace on earth”) are the opening words of the final encyclical letter of Pope St. John XXIII (Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, 1881–1963; reigned 1958–1963), a widely admired reforming leader of the Roman Catholic Church known for convoking the momentous Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). An encyclical, or letter by the bishop of Rome (the pope) to all Catholic bishops and faithful, is the most authoritative exercise of the pope’s ordinary teaching authority, meaning that while the content of an encyclical is not to be accepted as dogma, it becomes instead the authoritative teaching of the Roman Catholic Church, to which the faithful are expected to give obsequium (submission) of will, rather than dissent. Pacem in Terris falls in the line of “social encyclicals” begun by Leo XIII’s 1891 Rerum Novarum. This body of Catholic social teaching developed in response to social challenges brought on by industrialization, unregulated capitalism, and communism, drawing particularly upon natural law theory to articulate defenses of human dignity and standards of human rights. Natural law allowed church leaders to engage the nonconfessional modern world not by appealing to religious texts but with a philosophical vision of what human nature requires to thrive and, therefore, the actions each human person both has a right to demand and a duty to perform. 631

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Pacem in Terris argues that international relations are analogous to human relationships in the sense that they, too, must be ordered according to natural law (§80). Disagreements must be settled “not by arms,” but by the same sense of justice that governs the relations of individuals (§93, §126). The encyclical particularly condemns stockpiling weapons as part of a strategy of mutually assured destruction: a peace maintained by such fear not only carries the risk of accidental destruction, but, since it is not founded upon trust, it is hardly “peace” at all (§113). Just as civil authority exists solely to promote the common good, international relations must be animated by a desire to promote general welfare (§98). In that respect, developed nations bear a special responsibility for aiding developing nations (§125). The imperative for nations to cooperate in promoting the common good at the international level requires that the obligations of natural law be codified into international law (§133) and protected by an effective, global authority (§137). This global authority must not be one imposed by force, but rather voluntarily embraced by the community of nations (§138). Such a global authority would be restricted in its field of action by the principle of subsidiarity: while it would address those problems whose vastness and complexity would overwhelm individual states (§140), local and national political structures must address all the issues they can (§141). Active political involvement at all levels must be fostered, as political participation ennobles citizens. In this context, the encyclical praises the United Nations and its 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In closing, John XXIII admits that achieving this revolutionary vision is ultimately beyond human power. The injustice of the world’s political order is ultimately rooted in a common human inclination toward sinfulness, and peace can come only from the gift of divine charity (§169). Nonetheless, the encyclical ends with a call for Catholics to cooperate with all “people of good will” in achieving a gradual transformation. John XXIII died shortly after the release of Pacem in Terris, but not before he glimpsed the unprecedented enthusiasm the text received. The secretary-general of the United Nations held a symposium on it. John F. Kennedy expressed his pride in the document, whose call for disarmament

added moral authority to the SALT negotiations and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The bishops of the United States, many of whom had supported military intervention in Vietnam, began issuing regular calls for peace and disarmament, culminating in the famous 1983 document The Challenge of Peace. This enthusiasm was not universal; Reinhold Niebuhr, an influential American political theologian, viewed its optimism as unrealistic, perhaps dangerous. The influence of Pacem in Terris on Catholic teaching continues. Its dramatic renunciation of war was included in the Second Vatican Council’s 1965 Gaudium et Spes; its call for a political order whose legitimacy is rooted in the maintenance of order and the recognition that human rights are rooted not in the will of the state but in natural law was incorporated into the 1992 Catechism of the Catholic Church (§1886, §1897, §1930); it shaped sections from the 2005 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church on the foundation and purpose of political communities, the nature of political authority, and the rules that ought to govern the international community. Andrew Benjamin Salzmann See also Christianity and War; Primary Document: Pacem in Terris, a Papal Encyclical Issued by Pope John XXIII (April 11, 1963) Further Reading Fremillion, Joseph. The Gospel of Peace and Justice: Catholic Social Teaching Since Pope John. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1976. Niebuhr, Reinhold. “Pacem in Terris: Two Views.” Christianity and Crisis (May 13, 1963), 81. Witte, John, Jr., and Frank S. Alexander, eds. The Teachings of Modern Roman Catholicism on Law, Politics, and Human Nature. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Pacifism, Religious Pacifism connotes nonresistance as demonstrated by opposition to war, militarism, or violence. Such opposition is not directed at any specific war, but rather to the general concept itself; it is a lifestyle of nonviolence, not an antiwar conviction. Émile Arnaud coined the term pacifism in a newspaper article he wrote in 1901. Arnaud wanted an

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“ism” to give peace lovers an ideological parallel for other political and social “isms” of the time, such as socialism, anarchism, and liberalism. Although the term may be relatively recent, the idea goes back several millennia. A similar term, ahimsa, meaning to do no harm, is a core philosophy in Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism. Western pacifism and Eastern ahimsa developed separately, but in more recent years Western and Eastern influences have begun to overlap. Although Arnaud coined the term “pacifism” to parallel the other “isms” developing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the word is derived from the word “pacific,” which means “peacemaking” [Latin, paci- (from pax) meaning “peace” and -ficus meaning “making”]. In that sense, pacifism, or the term that connotes peacemaking, began with Christianity. The most famous use of the concept is found in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5), where Jesus calls the “peacemakers” blessed. The original Greek word eirenopoios is a compound word that comes from combining two Greek words: eirênê, which means peace, and poiesis, which means to make. The original Greek phrase is translated into Latin as pacifici, which, accordingly, means those who “make peace.” Not surprisingly, it is to Jesus’s ministry, and in particular the Sermon on the Mount, to which religious pacifists primarily look for their injunction for nonresistance. However, pacifists can and do look back to the Old Testament as well. They view the commandment against murder as indicative of the preference for pacifism. Pacifists also point to the fact that David was not allowed to build a house of worship for God because he had shed so much blood and been involved in so much war. The most famous Old Testament indication of a preference for pacifism appears in the writings from the prophet Isaiah, who wrote of a time in which nations would “beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks” and nations would no longer go to war against one another. The Sermon on the Mount, which advocated blessings upon peacemakers, was not the only portion of Jesus’s ministry to which religious pacifists point. Pacifists point to Jesus’s injunctions to “love your enemies” and “turn the other cheek” when struck. During the first three centuries of the Christian church, however, it was the fear of idolatry that underlay much (but not all) of the pacifist attitudes of

early Christians. Serving in the military or in the government required being part of the worship of the emperor. Tertullian’s On Idolatry warns that serving in the military, although not specifically prohibited to Christians, was a vocation that could endanger one’s faith. He equates both civil and military service to pagan sacrifice, connected to the worship and ceremonial swearing of oaths to the emperor. Another early Christian writer, Origen, acknowledged that although some Christians served as soldiers, killing was not the desired trait of Christians. The pacifism that appeared in the first three centuries of Christianity vanished in the fourth century as Constantine made Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire. Constantine made Jesus into a god of battle. He, and later Saint Augustine as well, advocated the concept of a “just war.” In 312 CE at the Battle of Milvian Bridge, Constantine claimed that he looked up to the sun prior to the battle and saw a cross in the sky with the words “in this sign, you will conquer” written above it. Constantine had his troops write the “Chi-Rho” symbol—the first two Greek letters of the word Christ: chi (X) and rho (ρ)—on their shields before going into battle. Later, Constantine took the nails from the cross (claimed to have been found by his mother, Helen) and had them put into bridle bits and on his helmet in order to wear them on military expeditions. Hence the phrase “by this, conquer” was taken quite literally. By 416 the entire army was Christian, as non-Christians were forbidden from serving. Once Christianity became the state religion, earlier fears of idolatry through service to the state vanished, as did the dominant pacifist strain. When, at the end of the fifth century, the western portion of the Roman Empire ceased to exist, and the Roman Catholic Church filled the void by rising to dominance in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, religious pacifism reappeared among small, heretical groups. This reappearance came as a result of reading the Bible in the vernacular and an emphasis on strict obedience to the “Law of Christ” by taking the scriptures more literally. That meant emphasizing the message Jesus preached in the New Testament, including, especially, the Sermon on the Mount. The three main heretical groups of the Middle Ages were the Waldensians of France and northern Italy, the Lollards of England, and the Moravian Brethren of Bohemia (modern Czech Republic). The Waldensians were named after Peter Waldo, who in

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1170 sold his possessions, gave to the poor, and emphasized a more literal interpretation of the scripture. Waldensians distributed vernacular versions of the Bible eagerly. Their emphasis on biblical literalness, especially as related to the Sermon on the Mount, is a common hallmark of Christian religious pacifism. Oxford theologian John Wycliff translated the Bible into English; his followers, who embraced the vernacular Bible, were known as Lollards. Reliance on scripture led the Lollards into a pacifist position. The Lollards noted that connection in their 1395 petition to the English parliament when they stated: “manslaughter by battle or by law . . . is contrary to the New Testament.” The Lollards did allow fighting in special circumstances, or “justified by express revelation” as they put it. One of the ongoing and recurring issues for religious pacifists is the issue of selfdefense or the possibility of a just war—an issue Constantine brought up. John Hus founded the third significant heretical group of the Middle Ages, the Brethren, in 1457. A Catholic priest, he advocated a vernacular liturgy and literal interpretation of the scriptures, including taking a pacifist stance. Early Moravian Brethren did not fight on behalf of the state; neither did they serve in juries since that might result in harming others. Starting in the 16th century, pacifist religious groups became a larger and more permanent fixture. The emphasis on literal scriptural obedience, which underlay the religious pacifism of the Middle Ages, continued into the 16th century with the added element of the “martyr church” concept. Thus being heavily persecuted for being a heretic became a chance to prove one’s faith. After 1517, with the beginning of the Protestant Reformation, the Catholic Church lost its dominance in Western Europe as princes and principalities opted to adopt Lutheranism or mainstream Protestantism as the state religion. Pacifist religious groups, which advocated nonviolence and would not fight on behalf of the state, never became a national religion, thus they existed as congregations within national states; some states treated them more favorably than others. In 1575, Holland granted Anabaptists exemption from military service. The conflict of the era, fueled by the changing religious landscape, gave the “martyr church” concept power as Anabaptist pacifists were viewed with disfavor by both Protestants and Catholics alike. Next to the Bible, the most significant work in Anabaptist history may well be The

Bloody Theater or Martyrs’ Mirror of the Defenseless Christians who baptized only upon confession of faith, and who suffered and died for the testimony of Jesus, their Saviour, from the time of Christ to the year A.D. 1660. The volume contained stories such as that of Dirk Willems, an Anabaptist who, when his pursuer fell through ice, turned around to save him, only to be captured, tortured, and killed as a result. Viewing such actions as “opportunities” to show faith, the pacifist Anabaptists stayed intact organizationally. The English Quakers of the 17th century urged pacifism on the grounds of the “Dignity of Man.” In the aftermath of the English Civil War, Quakers went even further than their contemporaries in rejecting an intermediary between themselves and God. George Fox preached that Christ, and Christ alone, would work with individuals directly. He and his followers rejected the priesthood and the sacraments, believing everyone had Christ within them, an Inner Light, which allowed them direct communication with Christ. That belief gave great dignity to each individual person and underlies the Quakers’ pacifist stance. It is that same belief which led them to becoming the first group to officially ban slaveholding.

Plowshare Movement

“And they shall beat their swords into plowshares” proclaims Isaiah 2:3–4. This verse was the motive for the Plowshare Movement—a pacifist movement begun in the early 1980s when Roman Catholic priest Daniel Berrigan (1921–2016) led a group of eight pacifists onto the property of a General Dynamics plant in Pennsylvania, damaging the pointy tips of missiles that were produced to be fitted to the ends of nuclear weapons. Plowshare activists have acted against other U.S.-based weapons facilities, and the practice of pouring blood has been emblematic of the movement. To shock the viewer into the realization that war is an act of deadly violence, and not a high-tech video game as it has seemingly become in the contemporary world, Plowshare activists would donate their own blood to be poured at the protest site, visually reaffirming war’s deadly purpose. Plowshare members include clergy, laypeople, and former members of the U.S. military.

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Although there are many groups or individuals who currently espouse pacifism, the so-called “historic peace churches” are only three: Mennonites (including Amish, Old Order Mennonites, and Conservative Mennonites), Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), and Church of the Brethren (Dunkers, or German Baptists). In the modern era, religious pacifists emphasize pacifism as a means of redemption. One modern pacifist writer, John D. Roth, wrote, “A worldview that assumes that reality is ultimately based on coercion and force is literally atheistic and one, therefore, that Christians should want to challenge.” Religious pacifism in the modern era is also increasingly complicated. In Nevertheless: The Varieties and Shortcomings of Religious Pacifism, John Howard Yoder, theologian and ethicist, mentions 29 different types of pacifism. Religious pacifists struggle with issues of whether or not any war can be a “just war,” whether or not to serve on juries and thus inadvertently harm others, how far one can go to defend oneself, whether or not to actively promote peace or simply refrain from violence, and so on. Similar arguments, such as whether or not any war can be just and how one should defend oneself, have historically been seen in Eastern concepts of religious pacifism as well. Ahimsa (to do no harm) is a significant aspect of three major religions: Jainism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. The term originates from the Sanskirt root hims (meaning to strike); himsa (meaning to cause injury or harm). Adding the a in front makes it a negative. Thus ahimsa means “to avoid causing injury or harm.” The motive for avoiding injury or harm is tied to the concept of karma. Karma is related to cause and effect and intimates that good intent or deeds result in future happiness. The concept is also tied to Eastern concepts of rebirth. Thus violence has karmic consequences that impact both one’s current and future life. Quite literally, hurting others would result in hurting oneself. Unlike Western concepts, which focus on interaction between people, the Eastern concept ahimsa includes all living beings. Vegetarianism or veganism is a way of avoiding harm to other animals. In Hinduism, ahimsa began evolving in the most ancient Vedas and became increasingly central over time. The term includes not just violence done to another, but also hurtful words. Injury could be done mentally or verbally, not just physically.

Jainism is the most extreme manifestation of ahimsa. Like Hinduism, Jainism seeks to prevent negative karmic accumulation. “Just war” concepts and violent treatment of criminals were exceptions found in Buddhism and Hinduism, which led Jainists to accuse them of inconsistently applying the principals of ahimsa. Jainists believe accidental injury is just as harmful as deliberate acts. Thus, many refrain from venturing out at night in order to avoid accidentally stepping on an insect. Although all forms of life deserve protections, Jainists do have a hierarchy of living things; the more senses a being has, the more it should be protected. Jainists also accept self-defense and the use of military might for their protection. The most famous proponent of ahimsa, Mohandas Karam­chand Gandhi, was influenced by Western writers and was himself an influence on Western leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. The 20th century has seen Western and Eastern concepts of religious pacifism overlap, complementing each other. Melissa Fulgham See also Ahimsa; Anabaptist Pacifism; Augustine; Buddhism and War; Christianity and War; Gandhi, Mahatma; Hinduism and War; Islam and War (Jihad); Jainism and War; Just War Tradition; Milvian Bridge, Battle of; Protestant Reformers and War Further Reading Applebaum, Patricia. Kingdom to Commune: Protestant Pacifist Culture between World War I and the Vietnam Era. Raleigh: University of North Carolina Press, 2009. Charles, Daryl. Between Pacifism and Jihad: Just War and Christian Tradition. Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2005. Fiala, Andrew. Against Religion, Wars, and States: The Case for Enlightenment Atheism, Just War Pacifism, and Liberal Democratic Anarchism. Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. Yoder, John Howard. Nevertheless: The Varieties and Shortcomings of Religious Pacifism. New York: Herald Press, 1992.

Pakistan, Religious Violence in Pakistan was created as a Muslim majority state on August 14, 1947, by the Partition agreement between Great Britain, the All India Muslim League, and India’s Congress Party.

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The northwest region of India, including the Punjab, Baluchistan, Sindh, the Northwest Frontier Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Bengal were separated from India to form East and West Pakistan. The character of the new country was intended by its first leader, the British-educated Muhammad Ali Jinnah, to reflect the British constitutional and political system imbued and improved by Muslim culture. He also intended that all religions would live in Pakistan in unity and harmony, even though he had often spoken of the impossibility of such harmony in the political debates leading up to Partition. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s birth was bathed in sectarian violence and bloodshed, a continuing theme today. The regions initially assigned to Pakistan and India did not accurately reflect the religious affiliation of the population, and as many as 10 million people migrated to areas represented by their own beliefs. In the chaos that ensued, sectarian mobs attacked and killed many of the migrants. While Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs participated in the violence, the Sikhs have been singled out as particularly destructive, as Muslim Pakistan was created out of historic Sikh areas of the Punjab. It has been estimated that as many as a million people died in the Partition catastrophe. Created as a democracy with equality of all religions, Pakistan gradually evolved into an oligarchy composed of the ruling elite, the business class, and the military. Its culture is deeply divided between Islamists and Westernminded liberals. General Zia ul-Haq’s coup in 1977 replaced the secular government and followed a generally Islamist agenda. Although sharia law was never fully implemented, General Zia’s lasting impact was to deepen the cultural divide that exists between the Islamist factions and more modern elements. Pakistan has always been a religiously diverse country. The majority religion is Sunni Islam, comprising about 80 percent of the population. The two largest religious minorities include Shi’a Islam (about 16 percent) and Ahmadis (2.3 percent). The remaining 1.7 percent are Hindu, Christian, Baha’i, Sikh, Buddhist, Parsi, and Jain. Violence against these minority religious groups has been a common occurrence. Shi’as and Ahmadis have been the main targets, although all minorities have experienced persecution. The Shi’as, due to the historic religious and political rivalry within Islam, have experienced the vast majority of

violent attacks. Marketplace bombings and attacks on mosques, buses, and individuals returning from pilgrimage have claimed thousands of lives. The killings have been indiscriminate, claiming the lives of men, women, and children. Between 2012 and 2013, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) reports that 635 Shi’as were killed while 834 were injured in 77 different attacks. Ahmadis, who claim to be Muslim, are also a major recipient of violence. They follow a form of Islam that is particularly unpalatable to Salafist Muslims. In 1974, the Pakistani government determined that the Ahmadis are not a Muslim sect, and, in 1986, forbade them to worship publicly and declared that elements of their beliefs are in violation of the blasphemy laws. They have endured successive waves of violence, with hundreds killed in riots in Lahore (1953) and the widespread anti-Ahmadiyya riots of 1974. The violence included murders, destruction of mosques, and the burning of Ahmadi shops and homes. Between 2012 and 2013, the USCIRF reports that 22 Ahmadis were killed and 39 injured in 54 attacks. Christians and other minorities have also been targeted. Complicating and adding fuel to the sectarian violence are Pakistan’s many Islamist militant factions that follow Salafist beliefs. These organizations target religious groups and individuals they deem takfir, or heretical. Militant groups include the Lashkar-e-Taiba (who launched the 2008 Mumbai attack), Al Qaeda (linked to the 2007 Benazir Bhutto assassination), the Taliban, and Lashkar-eJhangvi, who target mostly Shi’as and have killed hundreds. These organizations claim membership in the tens of thousands and recruit many of their followers from the more than 40,000 conservative religious schools, called madrassas. Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, which make it illegal to speak against the Prophet or the Qur’an, also fuel the sectarian violence. The punishment for blasphemy is death, with numerous instances of minor village grievances being elevated to charges of blasphemy. It is common for the courts to find in favor of defendants only to have them murdered by Muslim vigilantes upon their release. Political leaders who have supported the repeal of the blasphemy laws have also been assassinated. Pakistan’s geopolitical relations also reflect a sectarian element. Since its creation, Muslim Pakistan has experienced

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conflict with Hindu India. Historic grievances include the failure of India to live up to the accords dividing the two countries, the territorial dispute over Kashmir, and continuing border tensions. Three wars have been fought between the two countries, with India winning all three. In 2008, the Pakistan Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba launched a terrorist attack on Mumbai, resulting in 164 killed and 308 wounded during four days of violence. Similar attacks have been perpetrated in the past, with the rationale provided being retaliation for attacks on Muslims in India or the wider controversies over geopolitical issues. In 2014, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended that Pakistan be designated as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC), its most serious designation. The commission stated that in 2014 “conditions hit an all-time low due to chronic sectarian violence targeting mostly Shi’a Muslims, but also Christians, Ahmadis and Hindus. The previous and current governments failed to provide adequate protection or to arrest perpetrators.” The commission recommends that Pakistan take immediate action to protect its citizens from sectarian violence and guarantee their basic human rights. It is incumbent upon Pakistan to take these steps if it is to be considered a responsible member of the international community. Dayne E. Nix See also Al Qaeda; All India Muslim League; Hinduism and War; Indo-Pakistani Wars; Islam and War (Jihad); Sikhism and War Further Reading Cohen, Stephen Philip. The Idea of Pakistan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004. Hardy, P. The Muslims of British India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Jaffrelot, Christophe, ed. A History of Pakistan and Its Origins. London: Anthem Press, 2002. James, Lawrence. Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997. Kronstadt, K. Alan. Major Islamist Militant Groups in Pakistan. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. Weaver, Mary Anne. Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001. Wolpert, Stanley. A New History of India. 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 by Palestinian representatives from the West Bank, Gaza, and the Palestinian Diaspora with the support of the Arab League. The idea of a Palestinian national body was proposed by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser, constantly concerned with Israeli military power and his own people’s unfulfilled political-economic desires, championed the new organization that would demonstrate to the Arab world, and to Nasser’s domestic constituency, that he was doing something constructive for the Palestinians while effectively shifting the burden of representation to the new body. The existence of the PLO would place even greater military pressure on Israel, Egypt’s most powerful and feared enemy. Initially, the PLO, which was headed by Ahmad alShuqayri, was a weak organization that was under the military control of the countries in which it operated (Egypt, Syria, and Jordan). Following Israel’s lightning victories over Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967 and its subsequent military occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, which brought the majority of Palestinians under Israeli control, Yasser Arafat was able to take control of the PLO. Arafat, an Egyptian-educated Palestinian who had fought in the 1948 war, aimed to liberate all of the Palestine mandate, including the 78 percent that had become the State of Israel, to create a secular Palestinian state. He had previously founded al-Fatah, a secular group that was nevertheless influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, to conduct raids against Israeli targets and to help build a Palestinian military force. His fellow al-Fatah commanders also came to dominate the PLO’s leadership after the 1967 war. By the early 1970s, the PLO had established a state within a state in Jordan, which was home to a sizable Palestinian minority. Worried that Palestinian military activities were undermining his nation’s sovereignty, Jordan’s King Hussein attacked the PLO in September 1970. Although the conflict threatened to escalate into a regional war, Jordan was eventually successful and drove the PLO leadership out of Jordan and into Beirut. Following this event, however, the PLO leadership soon rebounded, and by the mid-1970s, the PLO had established itself as the global representative of the Palestinian people.

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During their stay in Lebanon the PLO leadership again established a state within a state and continued to launch raids against Israel. In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon in an attempt to drive the PLO out of Beirut. Although this invasion had disastrous public relations and political ramifications for Israel, by late 1982 the PLO leadership had agreed to leave Lebanon, and the United States guaranteed their safe passage. The PLO leadership soon relocated to Tunisia. In the late 1980s two key events helped transform the PLO: the first Palestinian intifada (uprising) and the U.S.PLO dialogue. The intifada against Israel’s 20-year occupation began in Gaza and soon spread to the West Bank, bringing international attention to the Palestinian cause. At the same time the PLO leadership announced its intention to honor previous United Nations resolutions that called for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Following this announcement, U.S. president Ronald Reagan’s administration entered into its first official dialogue with the PLO. Although short-lived because of Arafat’s subsequent support of Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War, this marked the beginning of the U.S.-PLO dialogue. By the early 1990s the Israeli government and the PLO had entered into secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, regarding a future peace settlement. In 1993 Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo Accords at the White House, thus ushering in a new era of Israeli-Palestinian relations. Unfortunately, Rabin came under significant attack by right-wing politicians in Israel, such as Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu, and Arafat was challenged by a new Palestinian Islamist movement, Hamas, that rejected the idea of a two-state solution and aimed to establish an Islamic government in the entire Palestine mandate. The situation continued to deteriorate. In 1995 Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish militant, and during the mid to late 1990s Hamas unleashed a series of suicide bombings inside Israel. Meanwhile, Israel continued to build settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and the PLO leadership was accused of large-scale corruption by Palestinians and foreigners. By 2000 the Oslo Accords had proven to be a failure, as Arafat and then Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak could not come to a final agreement over a future peace.

In 2000 a new, more violent intifada broke out in the West Bank and Gaza that included suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. Israel responded by using collective punishment against Palestinian militants and civilians. In 2005 Arafat died, and the Palestinians held a new election, voting Hamas into office and thus ending al-Fatah’s (in reality the PLO’s) 38-year rule. In 2007 a civil war erupted in Gaza in which Hamas drove al-Fatah supporters from the area. Al-Fatah responded by taking control of the West Bank with international support. The factional struggle continued throughout 2008 and 2009 but the two sides also began reconciliation talks, which, as of 2011, produced no results. Thus, not only are the Palestinians without their own state, but they also lack any semblance of national unity. Jonathan Sciarcon See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Hamas; Six-Day War; Yom Kippur War; Primary Document: Wye River Memorandum (1998) Further Reading Khalidi, Rashid. Under Siege: P.L.O. Decision Making During the 1982 War. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. Kimmerling, Baruch, and Joel Migdal. The Palestinians: The Making of a People. New York: Free Press, 1993. Nasser, Jamal. The Palestinian Liberation Organization: From Armed Struggle to the Declaration of Independence. New York: Praeger, 1991. Sayigh, Yazid. Armed Struggle and the Search for a State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Papal-Imperial Conflict The papal-imperial conflict revolved around the issue of which of the two competing authorities, the pope or the secular rulers of European kingdoms and principalities, had the right to invest key religious figures such as the bishops of the cities and the abbots of the monasteries. The crisis emerged during the 11th and the 12th centuries, due to the increasingly important role that towns and monasteries were assuming in social, political, and economic life and to the efforts of secular authorities to take control over them, developing a centralized and self-sufficient political order,

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no longer bound to any external source of legitimization. The conflict ended with the signing of the Concordat of Worms (1122) between Pope Calixtus II and Henry V Salian, Holy Roman Emperor, that differentiated between the royal and spiritual powers and gave the emperors a limited role in selecting bishops. The origins of the conflict (often labeled the Investiture Controversy) date back to the end of the 11th century, when the Gregorian reform (named after Pope Gregory VII, Hildebrand of Sovana, r. 1073–1085) began, with the aim of restoring the moral integrity and independence of the clergy. Eradication of simony was one of the pillars of the reform and a key passage in the effort to assert the church’s superiority over all human structures, especially the secular state. The direct product of this vision was the central role of the pope according to the doctrine of the Petrine commission (Mt. 16:18), a role that made the pope and the church an indispensable medium between God as the only source of authority and every single mundane power. Although Gregory VII saw the coexistence of church and state as a divine ordinance and emphasized the necessity of union between sacerdotium and imperium, the superiority of church to state was to him a fact that admitted of no discussion. This vision had two main implications. The first was the need to subtract the pope’s nomination to the political power, making the church responsible for his choice and his appointment. The other was the need to subordinate the emperor’s investiture to the religious approval, making the pope responsible for this highly symbolic act. In April 1059, a synod held in Rome stated that leaders of the nobility would have no part in the selection of popes, making the College of Cardinals the sole elector in the conclave. The decisions of the synod entered in the bull In nomine Domini issued on April 13 by Pope Nicholas II (r. 1059– 1061). The bull heavily curtailed the rights of the emperor in papal elections, since the right of approbation of the Roman pontiff was abolished and the right of imperial confirmation of the pope was reduced to a personal privilege that could be revoked at any time. In 1075, the statements of the Dictatus Papae reaffirmed the church’s superiority to the state by confirming that Roman pontiff power alone could be legitimately called universal (Quod solus Romanus pontifex iure dicatur

universalis) and that the pope alone could depose or reinstate bishops (Quod ille [the Pope] solus possit deponere episcopos vel reconciliare); a synod held on February 24–28 the same year confirmed that the pope alone could appoint and depose churchmen or remove them from their see. Henry IV, king of Germany and later Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1084–1105), reacted by retiring his support of the pope and asking for his deposition. With the support of a “loyalist” faction inside the clergy, he installed his chaplain, Tedald, as archbishop of Milan against Atto, who had been appointed by the local chapter (under a strong influence of the Patarines, a movement dedicated to reforming the city’s corrupt higher clergy) and recognized by a papal legate as the legitimate holder of the see. Unable to obtain the imperial approbation (placet), Atto was forced to repair to Rome, while Gregory excommunicated Henry, deposing him as German king and releasing all his Christian subjects from their oath of allegiance (1076). Facing a mounting rebellion of German aristocracy, who seized the occasion to affirm their independence from imperial power, Henry had to step back and to ask for the papal pardon, which Gregory conceded in January 1077 after Henry’s public humiliation in Canossa. However, the lifting of the excommunication did not end the rebellion of the German (especially Saxon) nobles. Indeed, the rebels proclaimed Henry dethroned and elected in his place Rudolf von Rheinfeld, duke of Swabia and brother-in-law of Henry IV himself (ca. 1025–1080). With Rudolf gaining the support of Pope Gregory, Henry promoted the election of the excommunicated former archbishop of Ravenna, Guibert (Wibert), as Antipope Clement III (r. 1080–1100). In 1081, after the death of Rudolf of Swabia in the battle of Merseburg (battle on the Elster, October 14, 1080), Henry turned to Rome and marched to the city to depose Gregory, instate Clement as the new pope, and receive from his hands the imperial consecration. Gregory VII—who had excommunicated Henry for a second time on March 7, 1080—could count on the alliance of Matilda of Tuscany (Matilde di Canossa, 1046– 1115), whose troops, despite a setback in the battle of Volta Mantovana (October 15, 1080), played a key role in slowing down the march of Henry’s forces through the Apennines in winter 1080–1081. In spring 1081, Henry laid a siege on Rome that lasted, among ebbs and flows, until March 21,

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1084. Gregory retired into Castel Sant’Angelo, refusing any intercourse with the rival, while Clement took up his abode in the Lateran Palace. On March 24, Clement III was invested as the new pope, and on March 31, Henry received by his hands the imperial crown, officially assuming the title of Holy Roman Emperor. The effort to subdue Gregory VII’s last strongholds was frustrated by the intervention of Robert Guiscard, Duke of Apulia (ca. 1015–1085), who came to the rescue of the pope. In May, Robert marched north with 36,000 men and entered Rome, forcing Henry to retire to Civita Castellana. A rebellion (émeute) of the citizens led to a three-day sack of the city, after which Guiscard escorted the pope to Rome. However, the excesses of his Norman allies soon compelled Gregory to withdraw to Monte Cassino and later to Salerno, where he died on May 25, 1085. Three days before his death, he withdrew all the censures of excommunication that he had pronounced, except those against Henry and Guibert. Also in 1085, Henry declared the Truce of God throughout the empire, restoring rights to the Saxons and finding other ways to quell Germany’s civil wars. On May 30, 1087, he had his son Conrad II crowned king of Germany. Gregory VII’s death and the weakness that followed in the church’s position opened a period of relative stability that ended in 1088 with the election of Odo of Châtillon as Pope Urban II (r. 1088–1099). The new pope maintained vigorous support for Gregory’s reforms and took up his policies, although with greater flexibility and diplomatic finesse. While staying away from Rome, where Clement III was installed, he repeatedly condemned simony, lay investitures, and clerical marriages, and reaffirmed his supremacy in the face both of the emperor and his antipope. On the political side, Urban promoted the marriage of Matilda of Tuscany with Welf II (V in the Welf genealogy), Duke of Bavaria (r. 1101–1120), and also supported the rebellion of Prince Conrad against his father by helping to arrange his marriage with Maximilla, daughter of Count Roger of Sicily (ca. 1031–1101) and niece of Robert Guiscard. Urban reaffirmed the excommunication of Henry and Clement and assembled a large coalition against the empire including, together with the Normans, the Kievan Rus’, Matilda of Tuscany (since 1089 married to Welf of Bavaria), and the Patarine-minded communes of Milan, Cremona, Lodi, and Piacenza. After having crushed a new Saxon

rebellion in 1088–1090, in 1090 Henry descended to Italy again but his defeat in 1092 resulted in the uprisings of Lombardy. The rebellion of Conrad II—who was crowned king of Italy by the Lombards in 1093—cut the emperor off from Germany, to which he was unable to return until 1097 after Welf II had separated from Matilda (1095) and after he and his father (Welf I of Bavaria) had shifted their allegiance back to the emperor. In April 1098, the diet of Mainz deposed Conrad, designating in his place his brother Henry (later Henry V) under an oath that he would take no part in the business of the empire during his father’s lifetime. On January 6, 1099, Henry was crowned king of Germany at Aachen. However, the situation remained chaotic, due also to a new excommunication against Henry launched by the new Pope Paschal II (r. 1099–1118). Despite the adoption of a a new peace mechanism for the entire empire (Landfrieden, 1101) and a promise to join the crusade in exchange for the withdrawal of the excommunication (1103), in 1104 Henry V declared war on his father, on the grounds that he owed no allegiance to an excommunicated emperor. In the civil war that ensued (in which Henry V enjoyed the support of the pro-Roman noblemen, especially in Bavaria, Thuringia, and Saxony), Henry IV was defeated and forced to abdicate (December 31, 1105), before being imprisoned in Böckelheim Castle. However, his deposition triggered a loyalist rebellion centered in Lower Rhineland, which the former emperor joined after having escaped from his captivity. The loyalist forces defeated Henry V in the battle of Visé (March 2, 1106), but the death of Henry IV a few month later (August 7) allowed the son to promptly reassert his power. Despite the support that the clergy had offered him, after accession to the imperial throne Henry V did not change his father’s politics and was even more persistent in maintaining the right of investiture than Henry IV had been before his death. In the long run, this led to increasing tensions with the papacy. In 1110, Henry marched on Italy to be crowned and imposed on the pope an agreement— Privilegium or Iuramentum Sutrinum, February 9, 1111— by which the church would surrender all the possessions and royalties it had received from the empire and the Kingdom of Italy since the days of Charlemagne; Henry V, on his side, whould renounce lay investiture. However, the

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failure of the Sutri agreement and the turmoil of the Roman population forced Henry to withdraw, taking the pope and a number of cardinals with him. With Paschal held in captivity, Henry was crowned emperor in St. Peter’s on April 13, 1111 before returning to Germany. Less than one year later, the Lateran synod (March 1112) declared the coronation null and void since it had been extorted by violence, while the previous October a synod held in Vienna had excommunicated the emperor. In 1115, following a controversy about Matilda of Tuscany’s heritage, Henry V returned to Italy, forcing Paschal to flee again from Rome, where he returned after Henry’s withdrawal at the beginning of 1118. On January 21, 1118, Paschal II died; three days later, on January 24, 1118, Gelasius II (Giovanni Caetani, r. 1118– 1119) was elected in his place, while the emperor enthroned Gregory VIII (Maurice Bourdin, r. 1118–1121) as the antipope. He was the fifth antipope in 40 years, after Clement III (r. 1080–1110), Theodoric (1110–1101), Adalbert (1101), and Sylvester IV (1105–1111). Forced to flee Rome by the pressure of the pro-imperial faction (March 1118), Gelasius could return under Norman protection but had to flee again (September 2, 1118) and repair to France, where he died in Cluny the following January. His legacy was taken up by Callixtus II (Guy of Burgundy, 1065–1124), who solemnly excommunicated Henry and his antipope (Council of Rheims, October 30, 1119) after the aborted negotiations at Château de Mousson. The following year, he marched on Rome while Gregory fled to the fortress of Sutri. Having reestablished his power in Italy, Callixtus finally resolved to reopen negotiations with Henry V on the question of investiture. After more than 60 years of conflict, and having both reasserted their authority in their respective territories, both parties were ready to negotiate a permanent settlement. In October 1121 at Würzburg, a truce was agreed throughout Germany, allowing the church to have free use of its possessions and restoring the lands of those in rebellion. A synod was also convoked at Worms, where on September 23, 1122, a concordat was concluded, later ratified in the First Lateran Council (1123). With the concordat, the emperor renounced his claim to invest bishops “with ring and crosier” and granted freedom of election to the church. In his turn, the pope conceded that bishops

should receive investiture “with the scepter,” that episcopal elections should be held in the presence of the emperor or his representative, and that in case of disputed elections the emperor should confirm the rightfully elected candidate. In Germany, the imperial investiture of the temporal properties connected to an episcopal see should take place before the consecration; beyond the borders of the empire, in Burgundy and Italy, the imperial investiture should take place within six months after the consecration; while in the Papal States, the pope alone had the right of investiture, without any interference on the part of the emperor. Gianluca Pastori See also Holy Roman Empire; Investiture Controversy; Lateran Church Councils; Truce of God; Urban II, Pope Further Reading Blumenthal, Uta-Renate. The Investiture Controversy: Church and Monarchy from the Ninth to the Twelfth Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988. Cowdrey, Herbert E. J. Pope Gregory VII, 1073–1085. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Leyser, Karl. Communications and Power in Medieval Europe: The Gregorian Revolution and Beyond. London: Hambledon Press, 1994. Malegam, Jehangir Yezdi. The Sleep of Behemoth. Disputing Peace and Violence in Medieval Europe, 1000–1200. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013. Morrison, Karl F., ed. The Investiture Controversy: Issues, Ideals, and Results. Huntington, NY: Krieger, 1971. Robinson, Ian Stuart. Henry IV of Germany, 1056–1106. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Tellenbach, Gerd. The Western Church from the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Peace in the Hebrew Scriptures Peace in the Hebrew scriptures is much broader than an absence of fighting between factions, nations, or military forces. The Hebrew word for peace in the Hebrew scriptures is shalom or salom, used more than 250 times, and it is always translated as “peace” in various English versions of

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the Hebrew scriptures. In the Hebrew scriptures, peace or shalom/salom denotes the absence of any disturbance in an individual, or of the communal well-being of the nation of Israel, and about the circumstances regarding a war. Hence, King David inquired about the welfare (shalom/salom) of Joab, the people of Israel at a national level, and about the war in which Uriah was fighting (2 Samuel 11:7). In the Hebrew scriptures, peace can also be used as an expression of well-wishing and/or as a salutation (Genesis 43:23). In the Hebrew scriptures in general, shalom or salom, peace, is seen as a gift from God as the ultimate source—“The Lord is peace” (Judges 6:24). In the Hebrew scriptures, peace (shalom/salom) covers well-being in the most generous sense of the term— soundness, wholeness, well-being, even the “prosperity” or the shalom/salom of the depraved (Psalm 73:3). Shalomic blessings may include bodily health (Psalm 38:3), a blessing upon departure (Genesis 26:29), sleep (Psalm 4:8), at death (Genesis 15:15), good relations (Judges 4:17), and even temporal salvation (Jeremiah 29:11). Shalom/salom in the Hebrew scriptures often suggests fulfillment or completion in a comprehensive manner for an individual. This is something that is beyond any single event, success, or victory. It is also viewed as something that is attained with divine assistance, blessing, or guidance. Thus, peace or shalom/salom is also found at the very end of the famous benediction (technically to Aaron and his sons, who were to convey the blessing of God’s name and presence to the blessed, kept, favored, and graced people of Israel) of Numbers 6:24–26. May the Lord bless you, and watch over you. The Lord cause His countenance to shine to you and favor you. May the Lord raise His countenance to you and give you peace [Shalom]. (Rosenberg Tanach translation) The Hebrew concept of peace is much broader than that which is derived from military victory and political stability. It looks more to the individual than to a nation and is understood as a consequence of divine favor and assistance. David K. Naugle

See also Peace in the New Testament; Peace in the Qur’an Further Reading Brown, Colin, gen. ed. The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology. Translated, with additions and revisions from the German. Vol. 2. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1976, pp. 776–83. Douglas, J. D., ed. The New Bible Dictionary. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1962, p. 965. Richardson, Alan, ed. A Theological Word Book of the Bible. New York: Macmillan, 1950, pp. 165–66. Ryken, Leland, James C. Wilhoit, and Tremper Longman III, gen. eds. Dictionary of Biblical Imagery. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998, pp. 632–33.

Peace in the New Testament “Peace” in the Christian scripture of the New Testament is a translation of the Greek word eirene from which the English feminine name Irene is derived. This word carries forward the meaning of peace (shalom/salom) in the Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament). The New Testament was written during the first century of the Common Era and under the shadow of the Roman Empire and occupation by the Roman military of Judea, designated a Roman province. While in the Hebrew scriptures the concept of peace could refer to the cessation of hostilities between nations, in the New Testament eirene normally has little to do with military force, the political atmosphere of the age, or the famed Pax Roma (Roman Peace) written of by such classical writers as Seneca, Pliny the Elder, Lucan, and Tacitus. It spanned the years 27 BCE to 180 CE—years that encompassed the era of the New Testament. The exception to this were the expectations of a coming Jewish Messiah who would bring spiritual and political peace to the Jewish people. Among those people looking for political peace and independence from the authority of Rome were the Zealots. Pax Roma is also alluded to in Acts 24:2. Eirene in the New Testament emphasizes soundness, wholeness, and well-being like its Hebrew Old Testament counterparts, shalom/salom. Eirene/peace in the New Testament also refers to a time that is characterized by the

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opposite of war (Luke 14:32; Acts 12:20). There is, indeed, a time for war and a time for peace, as Ecclesiastes 3:8b states. Eirene is used 91 times in the New Testament in a highly theological way—24 times in the four gospels (e.g., Matthew 10:13, 34), the rest in the epistles or letters. However, eirene/peace refers only secondarily to humanity’s relationship with God and to a human’s relationship with other humans (Brown 1976, vol. 2, p. 780). Peace in its primary sense refers to the peaceful rule of God in Jesus Christ by the Holy Spirit over all things. There is also a “way of peace” that is a reference to the messianic age (Luke 1:79). Hence, the good news or gospel message proclaimed by Christians is said to be a “gospel of peace” (Ephesians 6:15) and it applies to the entirety of creation. Christians are told to be at peace with all people at all times, if possible (Romans 12:18), but implicit in the grammar and language of the exhortation is the realization that peace is not always possible. Yet, for Christians, the concept of peace as presented in the New Testament is the extreme opposite of war and an environment that encompasses much more than the peace offered and enforced by the Roman Empire. David K. Naugle See also Christianity and War; Peace in the Hebrew Scriptures; Peace in the Qur’an; Peace of God; Zealots Further Reading Brown, Colin, ed. The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology. Vol 2. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1976. Ryken, Leland, James C. Wilhoit, and Tremper Longman III, eds. Dictionary of Biblical Imagery. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998.

Peace in the Qur’an The Arabic term in the Qur’an most closely associated with peace is salam. Other closely related terms in the Qur’an include sakinah (calm) and islah (goodness, renewal, reconciliation). In the Qur’an, “peace” is repeated more than 60 times while “war” is repeated more than 30 times. The

Qur’an refers to peace both in this life on earth and in the hereafter. Regarding peace on earth, the Qur’an contains references both to the time before Muhammad (e.g., Qur’an 11:48 refers to Noah descending from the ark “with peace” and peace being on John the Baptist and Jesus the day they were born, Qur’an 19:15 and 19:33, respectively), as well as during and after the coming of Muhammad. Choosing peace is portrayed in the Qur’an positively and as an alternative to aggression in conflict. For example, in the Qur’an peace is a form of action, such as the following of divine guidance (Qur’an 5:16), or the way one responds to aggression and foolishness, as in Qur’an 25:63: “The servants of the Lord of Mercy are those who walk humbly on the earth, and who, when aggressive people address them, reply with words of peace.” In Qur’an 28:55, those who follow God’s ways are those who “turn away whenever they hear frivolous talk, saying, ‘We have our deeds and you have yours. Peace be with you! We do not seek the company of foolish people.’” In conflict, interpersonal or otherwise, the Qur’an calls peace “the best” option (e.g., Qur’an 4:94). The Qur’an also refers to peace in the context of reaching a settlement or a treaty after conflict (e.g., Qur’an 4:90, 4:94) or as a form of nonaggression during conflict (e.g., Qur’an 8:61). The Qur’an refers to a “realm of peace” (e.g., Qur’an 10:25) and contrasts this with a “realm of war.” Whether this refers to the interior realm of the believer’s heart or to geographic space is disputed among Muslims. Peace also has an eschatological dimension, which is understood to be the peace the believer will experience in the afterlife (e.g., 6:127, 10:10, 10:25). Another aspect of peace in the Qur’an is in the names of God that are mentioned, which are traditionally numbered 99 by Muslims. One of these names is “Al-Salam,” that is, Peace or the Source of Peace (Qur’an 59:23). These names or attributes of God both reflect how Muslims understand God and also identify attributes held in high esteem for human behavior. Overall, 63 of these names are claims about God’s power, 30 suggest engagement contributing to peace, and 6 connote force and coercion. Yet, as with any reference in the Qur’an, it is vital to consider the interpretation of this by Muslims themselves. So, for example, with the six names suggesting force and coercion, many

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Muslims, such as the great Muslim theologian al-Ghazali (1058–1111 CE), interpret these to be attributes humans should develop and exercise internally in their own spiritual struggles against sin. Jennifer S. Bryson See also Peace in the Hebrew Scriptures; Peace in the New Testament; Qur’an and War Further Reading Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2003. Bryson, Jennifer. “Peace Tendencies in Islamic Theology.” In Alejandra Vanney, ed. Violence in Civil Society: Monotheism Guilty? Hildesheim: Olms, 2013, pp. 87–98. Haleem, M. A. S., trans. The Qur’an. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Huda, Qamar-ul, ed. Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010. Kalin, Ibrahim. “Islam and Peace.” English Monograph Series, Book No. 11. Amman: Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, 2012.

Peace of God The Peace of God originated as a movement in medieval France. Although it later spread to Germany, as well as to Catalonia and Barcelona in modern-day Spain, it manifested itself to the greatest degree in France. Scholars argue that the Peace of God emerged in its simple form in the year 980 and was later developed into the Truce of God in 1040. The French provinces where the Peace of God appeared to be the most powerful were Bordeaux and Bourges. The Peace of God formed as a response to the violence that broke out in France toward the end of the 10th century. The chaos and lack of any restraint that reigned at those times prompted bishops and monks to act to bring about a better state of peace. The aims of the Peace of God were as follows: to guarantee protection to clergymen as well as to property, precisely, the land and valuable possessions that belonged to churches (this factor was the key

one at early stages of the movement), to stop violent attacks on churchmen, and to provide help and protection to the poor, who strongly suffered from robberies of their wretched farms. This unique movement consisted mainly in the idea that the power to provide for defense was put into the hands of the church, whereas initially it was the task of the king. The movement, therefore, chiefly focused on vulnerable members of society, taking care of the lower classes and members of the church. Hence, it is rather inaccurate to state that the main purpose of the movement, that is, to bring the peace of God to everyone, was satisfied. Technically, however, it was, since the movement helped balance social order, reducing feudal violence and outrage. In addition to social inequality, the Peace of God was aimed at fighting other factors that were bringing chaos, including illnesses and starvation. The followers of the movement were largely the poor who were joining and trusting in the Peace of God after having witnessed holy miracles, as the monks were bringing religious relicts and artifacts for people. However, the movement could not have existed if it were not supported by members of the upper class, which proves that the Peace of God, although initially targeted at specific categories, managed to gain followers from all social classes. It is also claimed that the Peace of God was crucial in helping initiate crusades and pilgrimages. Tatiana Prorokova See also Truce of God Further Reading Cowdrey, H. E. J. “The Peace and the Truce of God in the Eleventh Century.” Past & Present 46 (February 1970): 42–67. Goetz, Hans-Werner. “Protection of the Church, Defense of the Law, and Reform: On the Purposes and Character of the Peace of God, 989–1038.” In Thomas Head and Richard Landers, eds. The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the Year 1000. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992, pp. 259–79. Lauranson-Rosaz, Christian. “Peace from the Mountains: The Auvergnat Origins of the Peace of God.” In Thomas Head and Richard Landers, eds. The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the Year 1000. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.

Penance (Christian) and War  645 Paxton, Frederick S. “History, Historians, and the Peace of God.” In Thomas Head and Richard Landers, eds. The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the Year 1000. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.

Penance (Christian) and War In Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Roman Catholicism, and in Protestantism, penance is a private and sometimes public act of confession of sin whereby the penitent is restored to full communion and membership within the religious community. It is considered a sacrament (except in Protestantism) in which the priest gives absolution to a repentant individual confessing the sin, and it is often accompanied by outward acts to give visible confirmation of the repentance. In Eastern Christianity, theologian and bishop Basil of Caesarea (ca. 330–379 CE) recognized and commended some soldiers for their spirituality and defense of others but advised, though not required, that after combat soldiers abstain from receiving the sacrament of Holy Communion (“Holy Mysteries” in Eastern Orthodoxy) for up to three years. Penance has a long history in Christianity and during the medieval era there were often specific acts of contrition designated for soldiers returning from combat. Some of these requirements were for soldiers who fought unjustly. In the West, much of this was related to the just war tradition and pertained to any solider who fought, even justly. One well-known penitential list pertained to the Battle of Hastings (1066) and those who fought under the command of the Norman-French leader William II of Normandy. Victorious warriors from that battle were required to do penance for one year for every person the warrior was known to have killed. Similarly, archers who killed some people and wounded others, but were uncertain as to how many due to the nature of their weapon, were required to do penance for three Lents (in the liturgical calendars of Christianity, the period from Ash Wednesday to either Maundy Thursday morning or Easter Eve). The idea of penance was also tied to the concept of the Christian knight and the ideals of piety and virtue expected of him wherein, according to theologians such as

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and Ambrose (337–397), participation in war was seen as an extension of charity in that the knight participated in war out of love of God and neighbor, which compelled him to protect others from evil-doers and also, following the earlier thought of Augustine, with reluctance. However, according to this line of thinking, because there were no perfectly virtuous soldiers, there are no perfect battles, and penance became necessary after conflict. Other theologians, such as the influential Peter Lombard (ca. 1096–1194), believed that penance for soldiers was irrelevant because the soldier could not exercise his position without committing sin, and therefore the only true remedy was to abandon the position of soldier. The idea of penance for acts committed in warfare was part of larger discussions in the Middle Ages of holy and just war as well as the idea that all wars were tainted by sin. While some Christian theologians such as Augustine stressed the theological significance of the intent behind an action, others focused on the theological significance of the act itself. Across this spectrum of thought were religious guidelines and guidebooks (penitentials) for individual usage. After the 10th century there was a strong effort by religious leaders to limit the amount of warfare occurring in Europe and to limit the violence of the nobility through expanded ecclesiastical laws and regulations in canon law. Part of this effort occurred at the Council of Clermont (1095). During the era of the crusades, the crusades were understood to be acts of penance and tied to the idea of the pilgrimage. Also associated with this was a declaration at the Council of Clermont (1095), summoned by Pope Urban II in part for the preaching of the First Crusade. One of the declarations of the council was: “Whoever might set forth to Jerusalem to liberate the church of God, can substitute that journey for all penance” (cited and documented in Rubenstein 2011, 24). Penance for warriors during the medieval era was one means of reminding Christians of the tragedy and horrors of warfare as well as the ethical and moral damage that can be done to self and others in the midst of conflict. It is still used today in Christianity but without the highly specific guidelines for warriors of previous centuries. Timothy J. Demy

646  Penn, William (1644–1718) See also Aquinas, Thomas; Augustine; Clermont, Council of; Knighthood, Christian Ideal of Further Reading Cole, Darrell. “Just War, Penance, and the Church.” Pro Ecclesia XI, no. 3 (2002): 313–28. Kaeuper, Richard W. Holy Warriors: The Religious Ideology of Chivalry. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. Madden, Thomas F. The New Concise History of the Crusades. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. McNeill, John T., and Helena M. Gramer, eds. and trans. Medieval Handbooks of Penance: The Prinicpa Libri Poenitentiales and Selections from Related Documents. Reprint ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Rubenstein, Jay. Armies of Heaven: The First Crusade and the Quest for Apocalypse. New York: Basic Books, 2011. Russell, Frederick H. The Just War in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Verkamp, Bernard J. “Moral Treatment of Returning Warriors in the Early Middle Ages.” Journal of Religious Ethics 16, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 223–49. Webster, Alexander F. C., and Darrell Cole. The Virtue of War: Reclaiming the Classic Christian Traditions East and West. Salisbury, MA: Regina Orthodox Press, 2004.

Penn, William (1644–1718) The British colony of Pennsylvania’s inhabitants enjoyed prosperity and decades of peace with Native Americans for much of the colonial era. William Penn (1644–1718) built upon the cultural understanding between early European settlers and the Lenni Lenape (also known as the Delaware Indians) that stressed trade and diplomacy, and instilled a spirit of community based on his Quaker outlook and defense of liberty of conscience and the rights of Englishmen. Community blossomed to varying degrees among colonists and with natives, as Penn’s communal strategy for social harmony left a lasting impact on the colony. William Penn’s experiences in Ireland, Quakerism, and defending civil rights provided him with the communal outlook that brought initial success in the establishment of the colony of Pennsylvania. As a young adult Penn conducted business and traveled among the Irish, who stood

in the English view as a lesser people because of their ethnicity and Catholic faith. His conversion to the Society of Friends in 1667 exposed him to a well-integrated community who offered mutual support against persecution. Imprisoned on multiple occasions, Penn became a leading proponent of liberty of conscience and defended the rights of Englishmen. He argued that a peaceful and prosperous society rested on removing seeds of discord and emphasized principles of religious toleration, justice, and respect in the settling of Pennsylvania from 1681 to 1684. He initially held good relations with colonists and assured those already present that they had nothing to fear by the change in government and Penn’s position as proprietor. Pennsylvania’s Welsh and German immigrants built their communities under the protection of Penn’s ideal for religious toleration and respect for differing ethnicities. Penn also recognized the diplomatic and trade practices of the Lenape, secured land purchases from them, and made an effort to learn their language and culture. By infusing community and brotherhood into a tolerant society, Penn built a “chain of friendship” with natives that secured his colony from war. Community among colonists in Pennsylvania did suffer setbacks during Penn’s lifetime. Penn could not devote his full attention to Pennsylvania and the promotion of community because he spent considerable energy defending his colonial charter and demonstrating his loyalty in England. His absence allowed for factionalism to weaken the communal aspect of his “holy experiment.” In the early 1690s the Quaker George Keith called for reform over church discipline and questioned whether Quakers should exercise magistracy. When he would not relent, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting disowned him to root out the threat to the greater body. During a brief return from 1699 to 1701 Penn reluctantly let the three Lower Counties of Delaware form their own government to address security fears stemming from pirate raids. Finally, colonists resisted paying quitrents to their proprietor. Penn, broke, in failing health, and witnessing the deterioration of the community, tried unsuccessfully to sell his colony. Despite these setbacks with colonists, peace between natives and settlers lasted for 70 years in a lasting testament to Penn’s emphasis on community. Patrick Cecil

Philistines 647 See also Delaware River Valley, Toleration and Conflict Further Reading Dunn, Mary Maples. William Penn: Politics and Government. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967. Geiter, Mary. William Penn. Harlow, UK: Pearson Education, 2000. Moretta, John A. William Penn and the Quaker Legacy. New York: Pearson Education, 2007. Murphy, Andrew R. Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern English America. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. Nash, Gary B. Quakers and Politics: Pennsylvania, 1681–1726. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968. Pencak, William A., and Daniel K. Richter, eds. Friends and Enemies in Penn’s Woods: Indians, Colonists, and the Racial Construction of Pennsylvania. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004. Schwartz, Sally. “A Mixed Multitude”: The Struggle for Toleration in Colonial Pennsylvania. New York: New York University Press, 1987. Smolenski, John. Friends and Strangers: The Making of a Creole Culture in Colonial Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010. Soderlund, Jean R. Lenape Country: Delaware Valley Society Before William Penn. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015. Tolles, Frederick B. Meeting House and Counting House: The Quaker Merchants of Colonial Philadelphia, 1682–1763. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948.

Philistines The Philistines were a group of people that migrated to the eastern Mediterranean ca. 1200 BCE, settled along the southern coast of Canaan, and dominated the region for about 150 years. The Philistines appear frequently in the Hebrew scriptures (Christian Old Testament), particularly in the books of Judges and 1 Samuel. They are portrayed as militaristic but pagan (“uncircumcised”) enemies of Israel, oppressing the weaker Israelites from the time of Judges through the reign of King Saul. After David succeeded Saul as king of Israel, the Israelites finally managed to gain the upper hand over these long-dominant neighbors.

Based on biblical and archaeological evidence, the Philistines apparently came from the region of the Aegean Sea, perhaps from the island of Crete. Biblical texts (Amos 9:7; Jeremiah. 47:4) link the Philistines to Caphtor, usually understood as Crete, though some connect it to Cilicia in Asia Minor. Several of the Philistines’ cultural characteristics (pottery, architecture, armor, weaponry) also have close parallels in Aegean culture. The Philistines came to the eastern Mediterranean during a time of great migrations and the destruction of major cities and civilizations in the region. The Philistines and related Aegean tribes left their homes and migrated west and south around the eastern Mediterranean, apparently destroying much in their path. They tried but failed to conquer Egypt, whose records call these invaders “Sea Peoples” since they arrived by sea as well as by land. Unable to conquer Egypt, they established new homes along the coast of Canaan at the expense of the Canaanites, Israelites, and others in the vicinity. After settling in Canaan, the Philistines are described in the Bible as dominating other groups in statements like: “At that time the Philistines ruled over Israel. . . . ‘Don’t you realize that the Philistines are rulers over us?’” (Judges 14:4; 15:11). This dominance resulted largely from the Philistines’ superior metallurgical skill and weaponry (1 Samuel. 13:19–22), as well as military organization and tactics. The stories of Samson (Judges 13–16) and David vs. Goliath (1 Samuel 17) reflect border skirmishes between the two peoples. At one point the Philistines even penetrated to the very heart of Israelite territory (1 Samuel 13–14). In perhaps their greatest victory, the Philistines decapitated King Saul and decimated his army (1 Samuel 27–29, 31), but the subsequent king, David, blunted the Philistine threat and subdued them so they could never seriously threaten Israel again (2 Samuel 5, 8). Though they were clearly superior, only limited information is available about the Philistine military. From biblical texts and Egyptian reliefs we learn that the Philistines had large and effective infantry and chariot forces, and perhaps cavalry (the Bible uses the term “horse” to describe Philistine equestrian troops, but what kind is not always clear). The Philistines used helmets, body armor, and shields for defense, and fought with bows, javelins, spears, and swords, much like other contemporary militaries. In

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fact, the Philistines and Sea Peoples apparently brought the straight, double-edged sword to the eastern Mediterranean, which gradually replaced the traditional sicklesword. Egyptian reliefs also depict Philistine warships carrying marine troops, and the reliefs give us the only known picture of a Philistine chariot. Such military capabilities gave the Philistines regional superiority for more than a century. Even after Israel defeated them, their culture and identity survived for several more centuries before the Philistines finally disappeared into history. Boyd Seevers See also Gideon; Israelite Wars of the Judges; Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy Further Reading Dothan, Trude. The Philistines and Their Material Culture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982. Dothan, Trude, and Moshe Dothan. People of the Sea: The Search for the Philistines. New York: Macmillan, 1992. Sandars, N. K. The Sea Peoples: Warriors of the Ancient Mediterranean 1250–1150 B.C. Rev. ed. London: Thames and Hudson, 1985. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2013.

Pius XII, Pope (1876–1958) Pius XII served as pope during one of the darkest periods of European history: the Second World War and the Holocaust. A man who hoped for peace, Pius XII dealt with various despotic regimes. Like his predecessor, Pius XI, Pius XII conducted aid to Jews, instrumental in saving thousands from death during the Holocaust. His reign as pope extended into the tumultuous Cold War. Eugenio Maria Giuseppe Giovanni Pacelli was born in Rome, Italy, on March 2, 1876, the second of four children of an attorney, Filippo Pacelli, and Virginia Graziosi. Pacelli studied philosophy at Gregorian University and theology at Sant’ Appollinare, known today as Latern University. Ordained on April 2, 1899, Pacelli earned a doctorate in canon law (1902) and worked with Pietro Gasparri in the

In this photo from February 1950, Pope Pius XII is shown seated in the Vatican throne room. Recent historians have severely criticized Pius for his alleged failure to speak out against Hitler and the Nazi Party’s genocidal policy against Jews. (Library of Congress)

papal Secretariate of State. He later served as a professor of diplomacy at Pontificia Accademia dei Nobili from 1909 to 1914. During this time he also served as an assistant to the papal secretary of state, Cardinal Gasparri. Pacelli served as a nuncio to Germany from 1920. His distrust for the rising Nazi Party is reflected in a vast majority of his speeches while nuncio, referring to what Hitler called “Germanism” as “neo-Paganism.” Pacelli then succeeded Gasparri as secretary of state on February 7, 1930, and administered concordats with Austria (June 5, 1933) and Germany (July 20, 1933). Pacelli in 1935 delivered an anti-Nazi speech at Lourdes, with 250,000 in attendance (Lapide 1967). Pacelli traveled widely, and visited American president Franklin Roosevelt in October 1936. Even during this time, Pacelli expressed his opposition to atheistic communism to Myron Taylor (1874–1959). Subsequently, in December 1939, Roosevelt appointed Taylor as an envoy to the Vatican. Following his election as pope on March 2, 1939, Pacelli was crowned as Pius XII on March 12. Over the next six

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months he worked to prevent war, continuing Pius XI’s aid to Jews, and repeating his predecessor’s announcement that “it is impossible for a Catholic to be an anti-Semite; spiritually all of us are Semites.” On the eve of World War Two, one week prior to the German Blitzkrieg into Poland, on August 24, 1939, Pius XII stated, “Nothing is lost by peace, everything is lost by war.” But Pius XII also acted as a conduit of information between the German resistance and the Allies during late 1939 and early 1940. With two conflicting totalitarian systems rising in Europe (Germany and the Soviet Union), Pius XII opposed both National Socialism and Bolshevism, but assigned a greater level of danger to Communism. This reflects the view of his predecessors, popes Leo XIII (1810–1903) and Pius XI (1857–1939). In spite of this, Germans held a very unfavorable view of Pacelli’s election as pope. While the Gestapo had called Pius XI a “pope of Moscow,” their term for his successor was more like Bolshevik. This perception was echoed by Baron Ernst von Weizsaecker, a diplomat familiar with Pacelli’s attitudes. Upon his appointment as the German ambassador to the Vatican, he said, “I am actually leaving for enemy country.” Pope Pius XI had provided covert assistance to German Jews, and Pius XII continued this practice. Robert Almagià (1884–1962), a Jewish cartographer/librarian who had lost his position in an Italian university due to his Judaism, was hired by Pius XII at the Vatican Library, which displeased the Germans tremendously. One agency of the papacy searched for Jews and aided 37,000. Pius believed that Jews would be sent to ghettos and could not imagine the extermination camps; not until 1942 did he learn of camps such as Auschwitz. But Pius XII has been criticized for not publicly condemning the genocide committed by the Third Reich, particularly by Myron Taylor, the U.S. ambassador to the Vatican, and his assistant Harold H. Tittmann (1893–1980). The pope did denounce this genocide in his Christmas message (December 24, 1942) and in a speech to the cardinals (June 2, 1943). Chaim Barlas, head of the Jewish Agency’s Rescue Committee in Turkey, in 1943, requested that the papacy assist in preventing Slovakian Jews from being deported to German labor camps. Nuncio Angelo Roncalli (later Pope John XXIII) was instrumental in this aid. Indeed, Pius XII

supported similar efforts by all of his nuncios. Some of these nuncios assisted Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg (1912–1947) in his efforts to save thousands of Jews. Jewish author Pinchas Lapide estimated that more than 860,000 Jews were saved from death by Pius XII and his nuncios. After World War Two concluded, Pius XII met with Holocaust survivors who presented him with a special menorah. He said, “You will soon have a Jewish state.” But in 1948 Pius XII also asked American president Harry Truman to commute the sentences of certain German war criminals, including Oswald Pohl (1892–1951) and Otto Ohlendorf (1907–1951). During the postwar period, Pius XII developed a belief that military conflict would occur between the Soviet Union and the Western nations. As the war ended, the pope became concerned about the oppression of Polish Catholics by the atheistic Stalinist regime. In April 1944, President Roosevelt sought to quell fears of the pope by sending the Polish American priest Stanislav Orlemanski to the USSR. Stalin assured Orlemanski there would be no persecution of the Catholic Church, but Pius was not swayed. Pius XII also became anxious about aggression along Italy’s border with Yugoslavia and about its dictator, (Josip Broz) Marshal Tito (1892–1980), who had risen in the wake of the genocidal Ustaša regime. In 1946, the pope sent American bishop Joseph Patrick Hurley to Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to discuss peaceful relations with Tito. Giovanni Montini (1897–1978), who later became Pope Paul VI, had been an adviser to Pius XII in the Secretariate of State and had facilitated meetings. However, Tito accused Bishop Gregorij Rozman (1883–1959) of Ljubljana of war crimes and Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac (1898–1960) of encouraging the Croatian Peasant Party to overthrow his government. Stepinac’s conviction caused tension between the Vatican and the United States. The pope’s postwar Christmas messages and an encyclical issued in 1947, Mediator Dei, labeled communism as a threat to Catholicism’s continued existence. In 1948 he warned of the hazards and consequences of nuclear war, yet maintained his view that Russian communism would prove the most dangerous expansionist totalitarian philosophy. The pope also excommunicated Catholics who joined a community party. Ralph Hartsock

650  Political Theology and War See also Cold War, Religious Dimensions of; Holocaust Further Reading Friedländer, Saul. Pius XII and the Third Reich: A Documentation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Friedländer, Saul. The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939–1945. New York: HarperCollins, 2007. Lapide, Pinchas E. The Last Three Popes and the Jews. London: Souvenir Press, 1967. McInerny, Ralph. The Defamation of Pius XII. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2001. Phayer, Michael. Pius XII, the Holocaust, and the Cold War. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. Tittmann, Harold H. Inside the Vatican of Pius XII: The Memoir of an American Diplomat During World War II. New York: Image Books/Doubleday, 2004.

Political Theology and War Political theology is a branch of both political science and theological studies in which the analysis of various theological worldviews is used to arrive at political, economic, and social considerations. War and religion are as old as humanity, and thus theological influences in a political decision to go to war cannot be limited to any single religious movement or age. The compartmentalized nature of life, where some have attempted to separate religion from politics, is a modern phenomenon unknown in the ancient world (Athens, Sparta), the premodern world (Alfred the Great), and the early modern world (English Civil War, the American Revolution). In theocratic societies (theocracy meaning the rule of God), the decision to wage war can only be made after consulting the deity. One of the major issues facing Christianity, after the conversion of the Emperor Constantine, was the nature of the relationship between political and religious authority. The Pauline injunction that “there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God” (Rom 13:1) needed to be worked out in practice. St. Augustine’s The City of God sought to explore this relationship and is regarded not only as a seminal theological text but also the founding text of political theology. Augustine played a central role in the merging of Greek philosophical thought with a Judeo-Christian religious

and scriptural tradition. He wrote The City of God partly to convince non-Christians that the fall of Rome and the Western part of the empire was not the result of its adoption of Christianity and that God was active in human history. The Roman Empire was not eternal or, indeed, ultimate. Augustine introduces the idea of two cities: the city of God and the earthly city. Both are intimately interrelated. Woven throughout The City of God are Augustine’s thoughts on war, specifically stating in chapter 22 that “The Durations and Issues of War Depend on the Will of God.” As long as certain criteria could be met, war was not incompatible with Augustinian Christianity. The relationship between Christianity and war is complex and deeply contested within its various dominations; the same is no less true for the other major world religions. Inherent within the liberal tradition that underpins the West is the notion that an individual’s faith is a private matter, whereas politics, by its nature, is public. In the second half of the 20th century, particularly in Western democracies, some have attempted to create a sharp divide between religion and politics, whereas others have argued that such a divide is impossible. The remainder of this entry will briefly consider three prominent thinkers who reflect different positions in this debate on the relationship between religion and politics. Reinhold Niebuhr, an American Protestant theologian and political thinker, was regarded during his life as one of America’s greatest philosophers. Born of German descent, Niebuhr is best known for his “Christian Realism,” which emphasized the persistent roots of evil in human life. While this can be subdued by an individual, large social groups like nations strive for dominance in their relationships. After the First World War, Niebuhr became a pacifist and a critic of capitalism, even running for public office on the Socialist ticket. Central to his thinking was the relationship between love and justice. Love was a rigorous ideal, whereas justice required the enforcement of rights. In the 1930s Niebuhr became one of the strongest opponents of any form of pacifism and persuaded many Christians to support the war against Hitler. For him peace among nations was achieved by force, making conflict inevitable. Power had to be challenged by power. His Serenity Prayer (1943) captures his desire to balance idealism and realism.

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Stanley Hauerwas is one of the world’s most influential living theologians. Unlike Niebuhr, whose thinking he frequently interacts with, Hauerwas is a leading representative of Christian nonviolence, something he learned from John Howard Yoder. Hauer’s critique of liberalism and its influence on American political thought and on Christian practice in America is key to understanding his work. Historically, liberalism has its roots in the work of the English philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Both emphasized the autonomy of the individual and, according to Hauer, established the concept of self-interest as the basis of social order. Consequently, liberalism is not well suited to make us good humans or as a principle for faithful Christian communities. The role of the church, therefore, should not be as a buttress of the liberal state, but to provide an “alternative polity” and witness of the kind of community possible when trust, and not fear, rules the lives of Christians. Jürgen Habermas currently ranks as one of the most influential philosophers and political thinkers today. Born in Germany (1929), Habermas is associated with West Germany’s postwar scepticism. In his early academic career, he was influenced by critical social theory, which explored the conditions for social change and the establishment of rational institutions. His analysis of the public sphere provided the basis of his understanding of discourse ethics. His position on religion has been developmental, describing it as “methodological atheism.” From a Marxist position, viewing religion as an alienating reality, his dialogue with Cardinal Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI) was his public acknowledgment of how much Western philosophy, and thereby political thought and dialogue, owes to its Christian heritage. For Habermas, religion is an indispensable point of reference, which requires dialogue between secular and religious forms of thought. Any political decision, therefore, to go to war must engage with religion as dialogue partner in the public sphere. The decision to go to war is one of the gravest decisions any government can take. History did not end with the end of the Cold War and the New World Order imagined by many did not emerge. Today the overwhelming majority of the world is deeply religious, with faith playing a significant part in every aspect of life. Political theology is

therefore an essential component in any attempt to understand the relationship between politics and war. Philip J. McCormack See also Augustine; Christianity and War; Cold War, Religious Dimensions of; Constantine; Hobbes, Thomas; Just War Tradition; Locke, John; Marx, Karl Further Reading Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Scott, Peter, and William T. Cavanaugh. The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. Sölle, Dorothy. Political Theology. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1974. Taubes, Jacob, and Aleida Assmann. The Political Theology of Paul. Translated by Dana Hollander. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.

Ponet, John (ca. 1514–1556) John Ponet was bishop of Winchester (1551–1553) under Edward VI (r. 1547–1553). When Mary I (r. 1553–1558) ascended the throne in 1553, Ponet fled to the European continent with a number of other evangelical émigrés, eventually settling in Strasbourg. Shortly before he died, he composed A Shorte Treatise of Politike Pouuer (1556), one of the most extensive 16th-century justifications for regicide. Ponet may have been involved in Sir Thomas Wyatt’s 1554 rebellion, which attempted to remove Mary from the throne. In his Annales (1605), the London antiquarian John Stow claimed that Ponet was a counselor of Wyatt’s; the historian and clergyman Gilbert Burnet denied Ponet’s involvement in his History of the Reformation of the Church of England (1681). The Short Treatise marked a serious break in the history of Western Christian political thought by claiming that private citizens could commit regicide. Earlier political theorists such as Thomas Aquinas claimed that only those in political office had the right to remove tyrants from authority. Ponet, drawing upon biblical and ancient (Greek and Roman) history, denied any such restriction. One of his biblical proof texts came from the book of Judges,

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which recounted that an Israelite named Ehud had taken matters into his own hands by assassinating the idolatrous tyrant King Eglon. Aquinas dealt with this same story in his De Regimine Principium (On Kingship) and denied that Ehud could be an example for Christians. Ponet, however, claimed that Ehud was justified because he was “stered up only by the spirite of God.” Divine inspiration could therefore justify the most extreme rebellion. Borrowing a metaphor as old as Aristotle’s Politics, Ponet claimed that despite being its head, monarchs were, like other citizens, members of the body politic. Christian writers had long used corporeal imagery when writing about both church and state, but they had also treated this metaphor differently, viewing the head as the one member of the body that could not be removed without depriving the entire body of its life. Influenced by theories set forth at the Council of Basel (1431–1449), Ponet treated the head in a more symbolic fashion, denying that its removal was any more serious than the removal of any other member. Writing at a time when Mary I had restored Catholicism in England, Ponet hoped that his fellow Englishmen would take up his arguments and overthrow their queen. They did not. If Ponet’s Catholic critic Miles Huggarde was correct, Ponet’s writing caused such offense in England that Protestantism became synonymous with sedition. The influence of Ponet’s Short Treatise is unclear. In the last edition of his Institutio Christianae Religionis (1559), John Calvin maintained the traditional view that only magistrates had the right of resistance. However, Calvin’s associates John Knox and Christopher Goodman, two of the major ideological exponents of the Scottish Reformation, had known Ponet; Goodman, like Ponet, wrote in support of popular regicide. It was only during the British civil wars of the 1640s that Ponet’s arguments were again given attention. This is well exemplified by the print history of the Short Treatise; originally published in 1556, it did not appear again until 1639, during the Bishops’ Wars in Scotland. A third edition appeared in 1642, after the civil wars had begun. The restoration of the English church and monarchy in 1660 saw a sweeping repudiation of all things associated with Calvinism, although the Short Treatise did not disappear. The copy reproduced in the digital database Early English Books Online contains notes from a reader dated September 18, 1756. One of Ponet’s Eucharistic

treatises reappeared in 1688, and his catechetical writings reappeared in the mid-19th century, but the Short Treatise was not reprinted again until 1942, 300 years after its last impression. Benjamin M. Guyer See also Knox, John; Wars of the Reformation Further Reading Beer, Barrett L. “John Ponet’s Shorte Treatise of Politike Power Reassessed.” Sixteenth Century Journal 21, no. 3 (Autumn 1990): 373–84. Beer, Barrett L. “John Stow and Tudor Rebellions, 1549–1569.” Journal of British Studies 27, no. 4 (Oct. 1988): 352–74. Hudson, Winthrop. John Ponet (1516?–1556): Advocate of Limited Monarchy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. Kingdon, Robert M. “Calvinism and Resistance Theory, 1550– 1580.” In J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds. The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 193–218. Ponet, John. A Shorte Treatise of Politike Pouuer. Strasbourg: Printed by the heirs of W. Köpfel, 1556.

Popular Crusades Popular crusades were an ongoing feature of the crusading movement. Scholars use a variety of terms to describe them, such as people’s crusades, peasants’ crusades, shepherds’ crusades, and crusades of the poor. But all these terms carry much the same meaning. First, these were not typical crusades; and second, those participating in them were not conventional crusaders. Individually, popular crusades were passing episodes of short duration. Collectively, however, their lifespan in the history of the crusades stretches from the crusade of Peter the Hermit’s followers of 1096 to the Hungarian Peasants’ Crusade of 1514. None of these episodes created lasting institutions, although contemporary chroniclers acknowledged their power to mobilize vast crowds of enthusiasts and were dismayed by the violence that often accompanied them. It is no small thing, moreover, that memorable figures like Peter the Hermit and enthusiasms like the Children’s Crusade (1212) survived in the popular imagination. Historians have recently begun to take social memory

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seriously. In fact, nowadays scholarly interest in the popular crusades thrives on such topics as prophecy, crowd psychology, charismatic leadership, social dislocation, religious arousal, and the transmission of religious ideology in medieval society by means of preaching, processions, and visual culture. Popular crusades provide conclusive proof of three phenomena: first, of the enduring power of the idea of the crusade; second, that ordinary believers (peasants, burgesses, urban artisans, and workers) were neither indifferent to nor cut off from the great events of Latin Christendom, as some historians previously maintained; and third, that exclusive concentration on the role of churchmen (Lat. oratores) and knights (Lat. bellatores) in the crusades considerably underestimates the significance of the movement, for it is unquestionable that the impact of the crusades was felt right across medieval society.

Definitions

Defining the popular crusades is by no means as easy as it might seem. At first glance the distinction between “popular” and “professional” crusades would appear to be clear-cut. Popular crusades were composed of noncombatants, or at least of those of nonknightly origin. “Professional” crusades, by contrast, rested upon the shoulders of well-trained and well-equipped warriors, the knights of Christendom. If this distinction is applied simplistically, however, it means that the first People’s Crusade (1096), which included a surprising percentage of nobles and knights, paradoxically fails to meet the test. This intermingling of “popular” and “professional” participants in the First Crusade solidified when the remnants of the followers of Peter the Hermit joined the main crusading host. Thereafter, one can speak of a “popular element” attaching itself to the armies of knights. Such a “popular element” might be composed not only of noncombatants, such as women, but also of potential combatants: irregularly armed peasants, for instance. Noncombatants attached themselves to the armies of the Second Crusade (1147–1149), much to the anger and despair of military strategists, who found their adherence dangerously burdensome. In the Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229) peasants or low-born foot soldiers were to be found among the camp followers. Reputedly craving only

booty, they served as lightly or unconventionally armed fighters. But with the high costs of sea voyages restricting mass participation in the Third Crusade (1189–1192) and the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204), the “popular element” ultimately became minimal. Military crusading thereafter was becoming professionalized, although the presence of St. Francis of Assisi and his companions at Damietta in Egypt during the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221) shows that noncombatants could still find a place. So if the popular crusades are defined as autonomous movements, divorced from the more or less disciplined troops of armed knights and lacking knightly (or clerical) leadership, then the Children’s Crusade, which included no “professionals,” should be regarded as the first truly popular crusade. Interestingly, one year after the Children’s Crusade, Pope Innocent III, in his new recruitment strategy for the Fifth Crusade, allowed ordinary laypeople to take the cross as well as knights. While popular enthusiasm for crusading was to be encouraged, unsuitable crusaders (broadly, those deemed unfit for military service) would be allowed to redeem their vows for cash. The money thus raised would then be used to fund an army of professional fighting men. Thus, by a clever division of labor, the two worlds of crusading, “popular” and “professional,” were tacitly recognized. After the Children’s Crusade, these two worlds were finally disentangled. Although popular crusades persisted after the fall of Acre (mod. ’Akko, Israel) to the Mamluks (1291), the knights were absent. Thus, the near-contemporaneous Crusade of the Poor (1309) and the crusade of the fully professionalized Hospitallers, both stemming from the same papal appeal, represent the two worlds of crusading, fundamentally based on social composition and military expertise, as parallel universes. What, then, of the distinction between “popular” and “official” crusades? Here we seem to be on secure ground with regard to canon law. Only the pope, after all, could lawfully summon a crusade. All crusades not officially preached, that is, decreed and promulgated, by the papacy were, consequently, illicit, unauthorized, and unblessed. Moreover, official papal crusade armies were always to be accompanied by the pope’s legate, who functioned as his special representative and other self (Lat. alter ego). In contrast, bands of popular crusaders went on their way

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unaccompanied by a papal legate. Of course, the clergy were aware that these “crusaders” were setting off without a papal blessing. Indeed, clerical chroniclers, at least from the Children’s Crusade onward, made their disapproval of any crusading venture that the pope had not authorized perfectly clear. Yet when the chroniclers denounced such crusades, they were voicing their own opinions. Papal condemnation was what mattered, and it came remarkably late. The first popular crusade to be disavowed explicitly by the papacy was the Second Shepherds’ Crusade (1320). Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that even in the case of a papally unauthorized crusade, crusader vows, once taken, remained valid and binding. To be released from crusader vows involved successfully completing the canonical procedures laid down by the church. All of this implies that, although fundamentally sound, the distinction between “popular” and “official” crusades was in reality more blurred than was implied by the precise definitions of canon law. Furthermore, the chroniclers, even while disparaging the popular crusades, frequently described them in the standard terminology applied to “official” crusades (Lat. iter, expeditio, crucesignatio, and so on). Popular crusaders, in addition, nearly always started out by professing conventional, orthodox crusade goals, precisely the same goals professed by “official” crusaders. Often reiterated, for example, was the ardent desire to regain Jerusalem and the Holy Land; and the First Shepherds’ Crusade (1251) set out with the aim of rescuing King Louis IX of France from his Saracen captors. Likewise, the chroniclers noted that these “crusaders” often displayed the regular emblems of pilgrimage and crusade, including the cross. This is compelling evidence that they perceived themselves as authentic crusaders.

Causes

Understanding the historical circumstances behind the coming of the popular crusades tends to undermine the idea of rigid canonical partitions effectively dividing “popular” from “official” crusades. A quick historical survey demonstrates that both kinds of crusade were, so to speak, born of the same womb. The paradigmatic example is the First Crusade. Inaugurating papal legislation on the crusading movement, the Clermont conciliar decree (1095) begins with an open invitation to all the faithful. Addressing

potential recruits for the grand enterprise, its first word is “Whosoever” (Lat. Quicumque), meaning anyone and everyone. Despite Pope Urban II’s subsequent efforts to qualify and restrict such an overtly populist appeal, this foundational all-inclusiveness continued to adhere to the ideology of the crusades. Thus, the populist character of the first wave of the First Crusade, the People’s Crusades of 1096, which included both knights and peasants, was in direct response to Urban’s appeal at Clermont. The Council of Clermont set the pattern. Throughout the long span of popular crusades, virtually the same collective reaction occurred again and again. Thus, the Children’s Crusade began in the aftermath of preaching for the Albigensian Crusade and in the midst of fervent processions imploring God’s help for crusading in Iberia. With its inception at the junction of two crusades and its genesis in an atmosphere of crisis-driven, officially sponsored crusade enthusiasm, the coming of the Children’s Crusade makes sense only within the context of papally sponsored crusading. The First Shepherds’ Crusade also sprang to life at just such an intersection. Self-proclaimed would-be saviors of Louis IX, the Shepherds (Lat. pastores) would have been unthinkable without the unfinished business of Louis’s Crusade to the East. While they can almost be thought of as constituting the last wave of his “official” crusade, the simultaneous preaching of the papally promoted crusade against the German-Sicilian Staufen dynasty would have added further fuel to their crusading flames. The adherents of the Crusade of 1309 (also known as the Crusade of the Poor) believed implicitly that their movement was brought into being by Pope Clement V’s crusading summons of 1308. That theirs was a pious misapprehension is beside the point. In the case of the Second Shepherds’ Crusade, however, the ties that bound it to an “official” crusade are less conspicuous, although no less real. Talk of an “official” royal crusade had been in the air from at least 1318 onward. It could also be argued that by 1320 a tradition of popular crusades, and especially shepherds’ crusades, was well established in France. Then, in 1345–1346, particularly in the Lombard and Tuscan cities, news of a Christian victory against the Turks at Smyrna (mod. İzmir, Turkey) in 1344 aroused mass enthusiasm, which was intensified by miracles and preaching. Papal approbation soon followed. The Hungarian Peasants’ Crusade

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of 1514 was the last of the medieval popular crusades. Beginning as an officially declared holy war against the Turks, it turned into an uprising against the Hungarian nobility. Once again, the histories of “popular” and “official” crusades became inextricably intertwined. Certainly by the late 12th century both “popular” and “official” crusades largely shared a common geography. In addition, they tended to occur around the same time. Lands already crisscrossed by crusade preachers and already familiar with crusading appeals and recruitment drives were territories in which a tradition of crusading had become established. Enthusiasm for the crusade was thus localized and latent in certain regions. So a mere spark, an immediate cause, was all that was needed to provoke a collective response. That is why the precise historical circumstances of chronology and geography, taken together, make canon law distinctions (whatever their undeniable value and utility) appear artificial.

Characteristics

Another approach to defining the popular crusades is to ask whether they had peculiar characteristics that set them apart from “official” crusades. To summarize what a number of scholars believe, popular crusades were (1) recurrent and (2) charismatically led; they were (3) eschatologically influenced movements and (4) associated with anti-Jewish outbursts; and they were (5) composed of diverse, sometimes marginal, elements of society, united by the potentially revolutionary conviction that poverty was a sign of divine election. How helpful are these five major characteristics in differentiating “popular” from “official” crusades? It is certainly true that popular crusades recurred at irregular intervals from 1096 to 1514. But so too did officially promulgated crusades. Were they not two sides of the same crusade tradition? Similar arguments apply in the case of charismatic leadership. In a broad sense, many of the most illustrious crusading figures were charismatic, for they proved inspirational to their followers and enjoyed fame long after their death. One thinks of Godfrey of Bouillon, Bohemund of Taranto, Richard the Lionheart of England, and Louis IX of France. These “official” leaders, important rulers or outstanding field commanders (sometimes both), possessed rank and authority as well as an aura of personal

glamour. With the possible exception of Louis IX, however, they were not regarded as holy men. Medieval personal charisma depended on holiness made manifest; Bernard of Clairvaux, the “official” preacher of the Second Crusade, was charismatic, but so too was Radulf, the unauthorized “popular” preacher of the same crusade. In this respect, the charismatic leaders of the popular crusades do present a striking contrast: Peter the Hermit (1096), Stephen of Cloyes and Nicholas of Cologne (1212), and Jacob, the Master of Hungary (1251). These men lacked any “official” authority. What authority they radiated appeared to come directly from God. Verification, if it were needed, was provided by heavenly letters or emblems like Nicholas of Cologne’s tau cross. As for György Dózsa, leader of the 1514 Hungarian Peasants’ Crusade, it is unclear whether his leadership can be called charismatic in a religious sense. The 14th-century popular crusades seem to have lacked charismatic leaders. Notions of an apocalyptic end of the world and of the central role of the crusades in the sacred drama of providential history are well documented in crusade history. When Bernard, while preaching the Second Crusade, stressed that “now” (Lat. nunc) was a special moment, he meant that the forthcoming crusade was to play a vital role in the divine plan. Similarly, when Joachim of Fiore, the Calabrian prophet of divine and human history, was interviewed by Richard the Lionheart at Messina in advance of combat on the Third Crusade, Joachim’s prophecy gave hope of victory. Again, when the legate Pelagius sought morale-boosting confidence from Arabic prophetic texts at Damietta during a critical point of the Fifth Crusade, prophecy did matter. All of these incidents of anticipated divine intervention in the Christian cause occurred on or before “official” crusades. The same goes for miracles, signs, and wonders. At one time historians mocked the lowly popular crusaders for their credulity, but chroniclers’ accounts of providential signs on the Peoples’ Crusades of 1096 need to be compared to the reports of crosses in the sky when Oliver of Cologne was preaching the Fifth Crusade. As the crusaders’ acclamation “God wills it!” proclaimed, these were God’s wars. Hence a providential sensibility, prophetic rather than eschatological, pervaded the crusading movement as a whole. Attacks on Jews, on the contrary, do point toward an eschatological sensibility, if only because the conversion of

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the Jews was destined to occur during the Last Days. Of course, bringing this about was far from being the only factor in anti-Judaic violence on the crusades. Nevertheless, the option of baptism or death was offered to the Jews time and time again, and not only on the Peoples’ Crusades of 1096. Massacres of Jews punctuated the crusades, both “official” and “popular.” The massacre of the Jews of York in 1190, for example, occurred during English preparations for the Third Crusade, and gathering French crusaders attacked Jews in 1236. Still, on the whole, the record of the popular crusades is more consistently anti-Judaic than that of the “official” crusades. Only the Children’s Crusade was never implicated in violence or threatening behavior against the Jewish communities along its route. It is not hard to see that the idea of poverty as proof of divine election would be especially appealing to poor crusaders. “Blessed are the poor” (Matt. 5:3) would have been music to their ears. Many historians have made much of poverty as the very ideological heart of the popular crusades. Yet there is a nagging problem: that of historical evidence. Did the poor on the various crusades, including knights who fell into destitution, actually perceive themselves as a religiously privileged class? For the concept of poverty was theological, rather than social. The medieval theology of poverty, while encompassing the weak and the vulnerable, gave pride of place to the voluntary poor, Christ’s poor (Lat. pauperes Christi), such as pilgrims, monks, and friars. For the involuntary poor, deprivation alone was insufficient. God’s poor were blessed because they were “poor in spirit.” Although an ideology of poverty has been postulated as underlying the Children’s Crusade (Raedts 1977), there is little evidence to sustain it. Only around the mid-13th century was an exalted notion of spiritual poverty widely diffused in northern Europe by preachers, particularly Franciscans. By that time poor peasants were beginning to be familiar with this idealization of poverty applicable to themselves, as God’s elect. That was what most of the 14th-century popular crusaders took it to mean. Norman Cohn (1970) stresses the revolutionary implications of this idea.

Conclusions

Analysis of these five supposedly defining characteristics of the popular crusades highlights how difficult it is to

identify common features across the entire range of medieval popular crusading enthusiasms. Charismatic leadership is verifiable up to the 14th century; an eschatological sensibility, reflected primarily in anti-Judaic violence, may be partially correct; and a consciousness of election on the part of the involuntary poor has some validity, but probably only after around 1250. What this exercise in singling out behavioral attributes indicates is that the popular crusades were more diverse than is often thought. As the most useful rule of thumb, therefore, we are left with the twin dichotomies of “popular” and “professional” and “popular” and “official,” always flexibly interpreted and never for a moment ignoring the unique historical circumstances pertaining to each individual popular crusade. Gary Dickson See also Crusades (Overview) Further Reading Alphandéry, Paul, and Alphonse Dupront. La chrétienté et l’idée de croisade. 2 vols. Paris: Michel, 1954–1959. Barber, Malcolm. Crusaders and Heretics, 12th–14th Centuries. Aldershot, UK: Variorum, 1995. Brundage, James A. Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969. Cardini, Franco. “Per una ricerca sulle crociate popolari.” Quaderni medievali 30 (1990): 156–67. Cohn, Norman. The Pursuit of the Millennium. 3rd ed. London: Random House, 1970. Dickson, Gary. “Medieval Christian Crowds and the Origins of Crowd Psychology.” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 95 (2000): 54–75. Dickson, Gary. Religious Enthusiasm in the Medieval West: Revivals, Crusades, Saints. Aldershot, UK: Variorum, 2000. Dickson, Gary. “Revivalism as a Medieval Religious Genre.” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 51 (2000): 473–96. Duncalf, Frederic. The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305–1378. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Duncalf, Frederic. “Crusading as Social Revolt: The Hungarian Peasant Uprising of 1514.” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 49 (1998): 1–28. Duncalf, Frederic. “The Peasants’ Crusade.” American Historical Review 26 (1921): 440–53. Housley, Norman. “Pope Clement V and the Crusades of 1309–10.” Journal of Medieval History 8 (1982): 29–42. Mentgen, Gerd. “Kreuzzugsmentalität bei antijüdischen Aktionen nach 1190.” In Alfred Haverkamp, ed. Juden und Christen zur Zeit der Kreuzzüge. Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1999, pp. 287–326.

Protestant Reformers and War  657 Raedts, Peter. “The Children’s Crusade of 1212.” Journal of Medieval History 3 (1977): 279–323. Riley-Smith, Jonathan S. C. “The First Crusade and the Persecution of the Jews.” Studies in Church History 21 (1984): 51–72. Rogers, Randall. “Peter Bartholomew and the Role of ‘The Poor’ in the First Crusade.” In Timothy Reuter, ed. Warriors and Churchmen in the High Middle Ages. London: Hambledon, 1992, pp. 109–22. Schein, Sylvia. “Die Kreuzzüge alsolkstümlich-messianische Bewegungen.” Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters 47 (1991): 119–38. Tyerman, Christopher. “Who Went on Crusades to the Holy Land?” In Benjamin Z. Kedar, ed. The Horns of Hattin. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1992, pp. 13–26.

Prayer Book Rebellion (1549) The Prayer Book Rebellion, or Western Rising, began in 1549 in the village of Sampford Courtenay in Devon, England. It was a response to religious changes imposed by the government of Edward VI (r. 1547–1553), and the second of three conservative religious uprisings in Tudor England. The Pilgrimage of Grace happened in 1536 against Henry VIII; the Northern Rebellion took place in 1569 against Elizabeth I. All of these appealed for the retention of more traditional religious services and devotional practices, and in each rebellion, banners were displayed that contained Catholic iconography traditionally used in the crusades. On June 10, 1549, the newly issued Book of Common Prayer, which contained vernacular liturgies slightly altered from the traditional Latin mass, was used at the parish of St. Andrew in Sampford Courtenay. The villagers protested and on July 6 were joined by protesters from Cornwall. The Cornish had already protested recent religious changes and also opposed the new liturgy. The two groups comprised at least 2,000 protesters, and as they marched, their number grew. As in other Tudor rebellions, those who marched in 1549 published a collection of articles that contained their grievances. The first demanded, “we wyll have all the general counsell and holy decrees of our for-fathers observed, kept and performed.” The remaining articles specified this demand, calling for the return of the Latin mass and other matters. For the Cornish, opposition to the English

liturgies was practical as much as anything else; Cornish and English are different languages. The rebels’ demands differed from those issued during the Pilgrimage of Grace in one key respect: in 1549, no one demanded the restoration of papal primacy. They instead called for the reinstitution of the Six Articles (1539), a confessional document published under Henry VIII, which enforced the royal supremacy. The government response was twofold. Edward Seymour, the duke of Somerset and Lord Protector, composed a rejoinder to the rebels, denouncing their rebellion and condemning their religious motivations as ignorant. He described the new liturgies as a translation of the Latin mass in which “a fewe thynges, so fond” had simply been removed. The second response involved the military, and recent estimates place the rebels’ death toll as high as 4,000. The Prayer Book Rebellion influenced subsequent English history in a surprising way. Protector Somerset’s description of the English liturgy shaped how later generations understood mid-16th-century liturgical change. John Hayward (ca. 1571–1631), the first to write a history of Edwardian England, portrayed the Book of Common Prayer as a translation of the Latin mass. Beginning in the reign of Charles I (1625–1649), Hayward’s work helped enshrine a largely conservative vision of the Edwardian religious past. Benjamin M. Guyer See also Henry VIII, King of England Further Reading Beer, Barrett L. Rebellion & Riot: Popular Disorder in England during the Reign of Edward VI, rev. ed. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2005. Fletcher, Anthony, and Diarmaid MacCulloch. Tudor Rebellions. 6th ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2016. Hayward, John. The Life and Raigne of King Edward the Sixth. Edited by Barrett L. Beer. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1993.

Protestant Reformers and War The magisterial reformers (those in the tradition of Martin Luther, John Calvin, and Huldrych Zwingli as opposed to the Anabaptist tradition), by embracing medieval just war

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thinking, steered a middle course between the extremes of Anabaptist pacifists and holy war advocates. While the Anabaptists rejected classical just war doctrine, the proponents of holy war deviated from the classical tradition by asserting that the church has the authority to declare war. Lutheran and Reformed theologians conversely accepted a mediating viewpoint, positioning themselves in the Augustinian trajectory that asserted that the civil magistrate may declare war on the basis of a just cause with a right intention. Several of the leading Protestant theologians presented their teaching on war in the context of discussions on church and state. The reformers insisted upon a distinction between the office of magistrate and minister with a different jurisdiction given to each office. Martin Luther (1483– 1546) affirmed that the popes would be “deserting their calling and office to fight with the sword.” They in fact were “forbidden” to do this (On War against the Turk, 165). It was the emperor who was to take the initiative against the advancing Turks, to unfurl the banner upon which was written: “Protect the good; punish the wicked” (On War against the Turk, 190). Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) similarly asserted that the civil magistrate “bears the sword and watches over the civil peace,” while ecclesiastical magistrates have one fundamental duty, being “enjoined only to preach the Word of God” (1521 Loci Communes, 148–49). John Calvin (1509–1564) likewise taught a doctrine of two spheres, separating church and state with respect to their distinct jurisdictions and giving different roles to ministers and magistrates. He insisted that the pastors in Geneva would “have no civil jurisdiction.” With respect to the constitutional arrangement in the Republic of Geneva, he affirmed that “the authority” of the “magistracy” would “continue in its entirety” (Ecclesiastical Ordinances, 49). It was the civil magistrates in his thinking who had the authority to declare war, not the church. Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531) also asserted that the minister is to teach the Word of God (An Exposition of the Articles, art. 36). Rulers, he contended, “look after the office of the sword” (An Exposition of the Articles, art. 41). The proponents of holy war within the Roman Catholic Church had long maintained that the church may declare war. The First Crusade had been proclaimed by Pope Urban II in 1095 to liberate Jerusalem from Muslim control

and oppression. The crusade mentality continued into the 16th century. A crusade league, which included the papacy, defeated the Turks in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. The reformers stood in opposition to the doctrine that war can be initiated by religious figures, either Catholic bishops or Turkish sultans. Luther spoke against the medieval holy war tradition in his treatise On War against the Turk (1529). He focused upon the head of the Roman Catholic Church and insisted that it was not right for the pope to lead a church army. The civil magistrate alone, Luther declared, is authorized by God to make war. All of the reformers stood with Luther on this point, several of them linking themselves with the views of either Augustine of Hippo (354–430) or Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), both of whom placed the war-making authority in the hands of the government. Key medieval thinkers affirmed that the right to make war was no means restricted to the king or the prince. Christine de Pisan (1364–1430), for example, had asserted that the right to do battle belongs not only to emperors and kings, but also to dukes and secular lords. Lutherans and particularly the Reformed embraced the same perspective. Calvinists asserted the right of resistance on the part of parliamentary bodies and inferior magistrates; Lutherans concurred that inferior magistrates may resist tyrannical encroachments. John Calvin is famous for his assertion that there is an institutional remedy for the problem of tyranny. He appealed to the existence of populares magistratus, designating them the “magistrates of the people, appointed to restrain the willfulness of kings.” Parliamentary bodies, such as the French Estates-General, had the responsibility to take up arms, if necessary, in behalf of the people for whom they had been “appointed protectors by God’s ordinance” (Institutes IV.20.31). Theodore Beza (1519– 1605) had the same perspective, affirming that the EstatesGeneral had the authority to “oppose the tyrant and even, if need be, inflict just and deserved punishment upon him” (Concerning the Rights of Rulers over Their Subjects and the Duty of Subjects toward Their Rulers, 63). In contrast to the Calvinist perspective, Luther rejected the doctrine of parliamentary resistance to tyranny. While Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562) approved of the deposition of King Christian II by the parliamentary body

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in Denmark, Luther firmly repudiated the deposition. He exclaimed, “A rebellious noble, count, or prince should have his head cut off ” (Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 116). Lutherans and Calvinists agreed, however, on the resistance of inferior magistrates. In the Augsburg Interim (1548), Charles V attempted to suppress Lutheranism within the German Empire. Lutheran pastors in the city of Magdeburg defied imperial law and produced the Magdeburg Confession (1550) by way of response. It made this declaration: “If the high authority does not desist from eradicating true doctrine and true worship of God, then the lower magistracy is required by God’s divine command to attempt, together with their subjects, to stand up to such superiors as far as possible” (Preamble). Reformed thinkers such as Amandus Polanus á Polansdorf (1561–1610) asserted that scripture allows for wars to be waged by inferior magistrates to defend their people against tyranny. Theodore Beza (1519–1605), John Knox (1514–1572), and Martin Bucer (1491–1551) made similar arguments. Luther himself came down on the side of the legitimacy of a defensive war on the part of the inferior magistrates in his Warning to His Dear German People. Civil authorities at different levels of government had the right to make war, but they ought to do so only on the basis of a just cause. Melanchthon condemned Saul, who started a war against David without a just cause (1543 Loci Communes, 219). Zwingli likewise repudiated the tradition of Swiss mercenary service due to the fact that Swiss soldiers ended up participating in campaigns that were initiated without a just cause. “How do you explain the fact,” he asked, “that you take money from a foreign lord to aid him wantonly destroy, damage, and ravage countries innocent of all guilt?” (Works I, 142). The criterion of a just cause looks to the past. A fault exists, wrongdoing has been committed. Evil calls for the execution of public vengeance. Calvin drew attention to people who disturb “the common tranquility of all,” raise “seditious tumults,” and commit “vile misdeeds” (Institutes IV.20.11). War is, as Luther noted, “the punishment of wrong and evil” (Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 95). It also includes the defense of the true religion. With respect to the issue of a just cause, Johannes Wollebius (1586–1629) stated, “Religion may be defended by arms.”

He added, “Although the church is built by the Word, not by the sword; yet being built, is justly defended by the sword against unjust violence” (Compendium of Christian Theology, Book II, Chapter 4). Similar statements appear in Calvin and Johannes Hoornbeek (1617–1666). The third element in justice of war doctrine included what Aquinas had designated a “rightful intention,” having the “object of securing peace” (Summa Theologica, 2a2ae, q. 40). The reformers embraced this position as well. A person goes to war, Luther wrote, because he “desires peace” (Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 95). Melanchthon called attention to David, who waged war with the proper intention of keeping the peace (1543 Loci Communes, 218). Calvin expressed his agreement with the perspective that “wars must not be undertaken except that we may live in unmolested peace” (Commentaries on the Last Four Books of Moses, 52). Both the Lutheran and the Reformed tradition added a fourth component to the medieval justice of war doctrine that they had inherited from Augustine and Aquinas. War ought to be a last resort. Luther reflected this perspective in his counsel to the European princes of his day: “Wait until the situation compels you to fight when you have no desire to do so” (Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 118). Melanchthon moved in a similar direction, insisting that wrongdoing did not necessarily mean that governments ought to rush into battle (1543 Loci Communes, 68). Calvin argued that governments ought not to go to war “unless they are driven to it by extreme necessity” (Institutes IV.20.12). Beza elaborated upon the same issue in Concerning the Rights of Rulers over Their Subjects and the Duty of Subjects toward Their Rulers. “Recourse should not be had to arms,” he said, “before all other remedies have been tried.” The movement to war should not occur “before the question has been thoroughly examined, not only as to what is permissible, but also as to what is expected, lest the remedy prove more hazardous than the very disease” (Question VII, 73–74). Beza provided this maxim: “It befits a wise man to make trial of all things by deliberation before armed force” (Question VIII, 80). Christian moral theology in the medieval period insisted that a given war had to be just, and it also affirmed that it had to be fought in a just way. There had to be restraints upon violence within the bounds of military

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necessity. This would include the sparing of noncombatants and respect toward prisoners. Luther was sympathetic to the medieval tradition at this point. This is reflected in his vigorous disapproval of Ottoman warfare, which entailed murder and a lack of restraint, “devouring and destroying” all “around them” (On War against the Turk, 178). Calvin likewise opposed “indiscriminate and promiscuous slaughter, making no distinction of age or sex, but including alike women and children, the aged and the decrepit” (Commentaries on the Book of Joshua, 97). Heinrich Bullinger (1504–1575), in contrast to Luther and Calvin, drew away from the medieval Peace of God trajectory, which culminated in the doctrine of noncombatant immunity. He taught that war at times is to be prosecuted without humanitarian restraint and that the Lord bids the civil magistrate on occasion “to kill without pity or mercy” (Second Decade, 376). In the 17th century Puritan armies put Bullinger’s maxims into practice, prosecuting the war effort against the Cavaliers and their supporters with ruthless abandon—eliminating not only men, but also women and children in their engagements. The Protestant Reformers broke with the Semi-Pelagian teaching of the medieval church on the doctrine of salvation, espousing the doctrine of justification by grace through faith alone. In their teaching, however, on war, Lutherans and Calvinists stood in continuity with classical medieval perspectives. They were adamantly opposed to pacifism. Luther even asserted that war from a certain perspective is “precious and godly” because of what it achieves (Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 95). He thus distanced himself from the Anabaptist position that a Christian ought not to have anything to do with the military. There was no incompatibility between the service of a soldier and the obtaining of salvation. Calvinists likewise stood on the opposite side of the spectrum from Anabaptist thought on war. Numerous examples could be cited. In the first war of religion in France, Beza served as a chaplain and later witnessed the battle of Dreux. Knox served at one time as the sword-wielding bodyguard for the minister George Wishart. Zwingli died at the battle of Kappel having taken up the sword to fight alongside the soldiers from Zurich. In these actions, Zwingli moved away from the medieval perspective that prohibited ministers from shedding the blood of others.

His conduct was also antithetical to the Anabaptist mentality, but at the same time in harmony with the thinking of Vermigli, who stated that a minister in an emergency may lawfully take up arms. Mark J. Larson See also Anabaptist Pacifism; Augustine; Beza, Theodore; Bullinger, Heinrich; Calvin, John; Holy War, Medieval Roman Catholic Conceptions of; Just War Tradition; Luther, Martin; Peace of God; Zwingli, Huldrych; Primary Documents: Excerpt from Martin Luther Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation (1520); Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (May 1525) Further Reading Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Translation by the Fathers of the Dominican English Province. Allen, TX: Christian Classics, 1948. Beza, Theodore. Concerning the Rights of Rulers over Their Subjects and the Duty of Subjects toward Their Rulers. Capetown and Pretoria, SA: H.A.U.M., 1956. Bullinger, Henry. The Decades of Henry Bullinger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1849. Calvin, John. Calvin’s Commentaries. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1979. Calvin, John. Ecclesiastical Ordinances. In The Register of the Company of Pastors of Geneva in the Time of Calvin. Translated by Philip E. Hughes. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1966. Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion (1559). 2 vols. Translated by Ford Lewis Battles. Library of Christian Classics. Vols. XX and XXI. Edited by John T. McNeill. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. Kelly, Douglas F. The Emergence of Liberty in the Modern World: The Influence of Calvin on Five Governments from the 16th through the 18th Centuries. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1992. Luther, Martin. The Christian in Society III. In Robert C. Schultz, ed. Luther’s Works. Vol. 46. Philadelphia: Concordia Publishing House, 1967. Melanchthon, Philip. Loci Communes (1543). St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992. Whitford, David W. Tyranny and Resistance: The Magdeburg Confession and the Lutheran Tradition. Saint Louis: Concordia, 2001. Wollebius, Johannes. The Abridgment of Christian Divinity. London: T. Mabb, 1660. Zwingli, Huldrych. The Latin Works and the Correspondence of Zwingli, Vol. 1: 1510–1522. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1912.

Pueblo Revolt (1680)  661 Zwingli, Huldrych. Selected Writings of Huldrych Zwingli, I: In Defense of the Reformed Faith. Translated by E. J. Furcha. Allison Park, PA: Pickwick Publications, 1984.

Pueblo Revolt (1680) Following nearly a century of political and religious oppression and several failed attempts at rebellion, the Pueblo Indians, aided by their Apache allies, successfully overthrew Spanish rule of the colony of New Mexico during the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. In 1598, Don Juan de Oñate established the first permanent Spanish colony in North America, known as New Mexico. The Spanish presence in this territory had dramatic consequences for the area’s scattered, ethnically diverse, and traditionally peaceful indigenous peoples. Many were killed by the introduction of European epidemic diseases, while others were forced to labor for the Spanish. Additionally, Franciscan priests established a series of missions, expecting the Indians would abandon their religious beliefs and convert to Christianity. Franciscan missionaries’ efforts were initially successful. As the Pueblo became acquainted with the friars and their message, they reportedly welcomed the Spanish priests, expressed polite interest in their ideas, and asked to know more. However, as a half-century of disease, forced labor, drought, and meager maize production took their toll, curiosity turned to disdain. By the mid-17th century, frequent tensions arose between Natives and Spanish priests—some marked by outbursts of hostility. To further complicate matters, the Apache and Navajo—who were also affected by drought and growing hunger—began attacking pueblos with unprecedented regularity, killing and stealing whatever food they found. The Puebloans’ discontent was palpable. After decades of growing resentment, the Pueblo spoke openly of rebellion against the Spanish. The first group to defy colonial rule was the Tewa, who were closest to the Spanish missionaries. Medicine men told their tribesmen that their suffering was because the ancient gods, or katsina, were angry. If they once again offered the katsina gifts and respect, they would be blessed. In 1673, the Tewa publicly performed prohibited dances, made offerings to their

ancient gods, and begged the katsina to return. Because of such actions, Spanish authorities renewed their efforts to eradicate every remnant of Indian religious life. By 1675, the clash between the Pueblo and the Spanish was at a tipping point. For the first time since the missions’ founding, Spanish prohibitions against Native ceremonies and sacred objects were strongly enforced. Governor Juan Francisco Treviño, who had arrived in the province in 1675, sought to end Indian agitation by launching a campaign against idolatry. The Spanish seized Indian ceremonial chambers and altars, strictly forbade religious dances, and destroyed masks and prayer sticks. However, the strictest measure was the imprisonment, flogging, and hanging of Native priests and medicine men. Likely threatened by impending execution, Popé—a San Juan medicine man—moved to Taos, the province’s northernmost pueblo, which is the name for the towns in which the Pueblo lived. Convinced that Spanish subjugation could no longer be tolerated, Popé plotted a provincewide revolt. Hoping to unify the various ethnic groups that comprised the Puebloan people, Popé sent messengers throughout the region in order to establish a single path toward rebellion. In addition to informing the pueblos that they must once again respect the katsina and worship them, Popé further claimed that the ancient gods would not return with gifts of happiness and prosperity until the Christians and their God were dead. After offering several prayers and offerings, Popé claimed that the katsina had shown him how to defeat the Christians. In August 1680, an uprising of Native peoples from every pueblo, led by Popé, rose to destroy the Spanish north of El Paso. The Indians successfully rid themselves of every reminder of the Spanish influence in their region, in particular anything related to the Franciscans and Christianity. According to Spanish accounts, piles of mutilated bodies were scattered among the ashes of smoldering fires found in every village. At Sandía Pueblo, the mission’s statues were covered with excrement and the arms of a statue of Saint Francis were hacked off with an ax. This profanation of Christian sacra was reported at every mission along the Spaniards’ path of retreat from Santa Fe to El Paso. Renouncing Christianity, the Pueblo bathed to cleanse themselves of the effects of baptism. Hoping to rid themselves of

662  Puritans and War See also Native American Warfare Further Reading Bowden, Henry Warner. “Spanish Missions, Cultural Conflict and the Pueblo Revolt of 1860.” Church History 44, no. 2 (1975): 217–28. Gutiérrez, Ramón A. “The Seventeenth Century: The Pueblo Revolt and Its Aftermath.” In When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500–1846, 130–140. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991. Knaut, Andrew L. The Pueblo Revolt of 1680: Conquest and Resistance in Seventeenth-Century New Mexico. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997. Reff, Daniel T. “The ‘Predicament of Culture’ and Spanish Missionary Accounts of the Tepehuan and Pueblo Revolts.” Ethnohistory 42, no. 1 (1995), 63–90.

Puritans and War

This statue, sculpted by New Mexican artist Cliff Fragua, shows Popé, Tewa spiritual leader and organizer of the Pueblo Revolt in 1680, holding the knotted cord which was used to determine when the Revolt would begin. (Architect of the Capitol)

all other Spanish practices, the Pueblo also abandoned foreign dress, stopped using Spanish names, and many men left their Christian wives. Following these measures, the Indians sought to fully restore their traditional ways of life. The Pueblo Revolt of 1680 effectively ended Spanish rule and influence in the colony of New Mexico for the next 12 years. However, the united Pueblo front eventually disintegrated, leaving them vulnerable to reconquest. In 1692, Diego de Vargas entered the region and reestablished a series of Spanish settlements. The Franciscans also reestablished missions in Pueblo villages. Despite the return of the Spanish, many modern Pueblo peoples credit the revolt with preserving their Native beliefs and cultural ways. Tyler A. Rotter

Puritan beliefs about war were developed during a period of social, political, and religious upheaval in England and Europe largely during the first 50 years of the 17th century and drew from both just war and holy war ideology. From the 1570s when Puritanism emerged as a distinct party of reform within the Church of England until 1641 when the Long Parliament convened, English Puritans developed a considerable body of literature dealing with the nature, purpose, and limits of warfare. Protestant reformers John Calvin (1506–1564) and Heinrich Bullinger (1504–1575) were among the more popular Reformed perspectives that informed the Puritans and, with varying degrees of emphasis, transmitted to the Puritans elements of both just war and holy war theories. There is in fact a noticeable drift in pre-1640 English Puritan thought from just war to holy war rationale. Reflecting many of the political and theological ideas of the Reformation in continental Europe, Puritanism inherited from earlier Protestant reformers an already well-defined concept of Christian warfare. Puritan discussions of war reveal awareness both of its nobility and its degradation. William Ames (1576–1633) declared that war by itself, “nakedly and entirely considered is a kind of evill,” albeit a necessary evil (Conscience with the Cases and Powers thereof, 1643, p. 184). The barbarity of war

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was recognized fully. The works of the Dutch Renaissance humanist and Roman Catholic priest Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536), were quoted as supporting evidence for the calamities of war. The devastation of the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) served as a contemporary reminder of human suffering wrought by war. Still, the Puritans recognized the necessity of civil coercion and accepted the mainline Protestant view of war as expressed in the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England: “It is lawfull for Christian men, at the commaundement of the Magistrate, to weare weapons, and serve in the warres” (Article 37). Within this context William Ames among the Puritans offered the most consistent defense of just war theory. In a 1643 book on casuistry, or casedivinity, titled Conscience with the Cases and Powers thereof, he presented war as a possible “case of conscience” for the individual Christian. In listing the conditions that are requisite to make a war lawful, Ames deals with both aspects of just war tradition: the jus (or ius) ad bellum, the right to make war, and the jus (or ius) in bello, the proper mode of fighting in war. Concerning the former he lists three conditions that must be met: (1) a just cause that cannot be redressed through peaceful means; (2) a just authority, which means for him the supreme civil power; there is no hint of a just war invoked by the authority of a lesser magistrate; (3) a right intention, that is, with a view toward restoring peace and tranquility. Calvin’s note on moderation in warfare is picked up in Ames’s treatment of the jus in bello. Nothing in war must be done contrary to the law of God or natural law, what he termed “the received law of Nature.” Only the guilty party may be damaged lawfully in warfare. Noncombatant immunity must be observed. Ames recognized that legitimate military operations might result in the injury or death of noncombatants but argued that the actions during war must be conducted in such a way as to protect the innocent. Significantly, Ames condemned the Old Testament record of the Israelite slaughter of the children of Benjamin (Judges 20) as an act of wanton violence. The same text will emerge in later Puritan writings as a locus classicus for holy war, including especially holy civil war. While not abandoning the formal framework of just war theory, Puritan discussions on warfare move markedly

in the direction of holy war justification. This trend is exemplified in the treatises of Thomas Adams, Thomas Sutton, Alexander Leighton, Thomas Barnes, and William Gouge, among others. All of these writers agree in exalting the calling of soldiers as a worthy vocation. Moreover, they argue that war derives not merely from the sinful condition of humanity (as it had for Ames), but also from the very nature of God. For them, the bellicose nature of God is affirmed in scripture: Jehovah is a Man of War (Exodus 15:3). God has angelic soldiers in heaven, human soldiers on earth, even angelic soldiers in hell that fight under his press. For Puritans, in determining the jus ad bellum, then, the most important factor is that the soldiers fight on the side of God. The cause not only must be just; it must be holy. It is true that God by his general providence supervenes in all conflicts of war. Yet the Christian soldier must be sure of God’s particular providence in the undertaking. Only then, the Puritans believed, could they know that God was with them as their captain. If the cause of the conflict is unsure, God sits on the sidelines, as it were, engaging himself on neither side. The Puritans did not hesitate to find a clear analogy to their own situation in the biblical accounts of Jewish exploits, and the Bible, especially the Old Testament, was a document of primary importance in determining the holiness of a particular war. For most Puritans the New Testament, while containing a precise pattern of ecclesiology (the doctrine of the church), did not address sufficiently the mundane questions of governance and order in a civil society. As God had provided a blueprint for holy war in scripture, so he had provided ministers to interpret the Bible in matters of war and peace, and Puritans stressed the importance of military chaplains. The only notable pacifist to emerge from among the Puritans prior to the Quakers was John Smyth (1554–1612), the famous Separatist-Baptist, who eventually embraced an Anabaptist, apolitical view of the state. An essential aspect of the Puritan theory of war focused on the personal sanctity or holiness of the soldier himself. Holy war demanded holy warriors. The soldier should excel in true piety and not merely feign religious sentiments, as Machiavelli had suggested. The Puritans recognized, of course, that not everyone enlisted for armed service would be a duly converted Christian.

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The Puritan spirituality of warfare presupposed a direct link between the Christian life as a spiritual conflict and earthly soldiering. Here we see the genius of the Puritan ideology: it combined the ancient monastic ideal of the militia Christi, a disciplined company of spiritual warriors fighting against the invisible powers of darkness, with the crusading ideal of the godly knight who wields the literal sword in a holy cause. To be sure, the transformation of the meaning of the militia Christi already had been effected in the Middle Ages during the Crusades, especially with the monastic orders of crusading knights who fought, according to Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153), a double war: first, the physical war against human enemies; second, the spiritual war against Satan and vice. This principle reappeared in the Puritans whose intense this-worldly asceticism and adherence to the priesthood of all believers led them to extend the ideal of double warfare to the whole community of faith. The Puritan ascetic ideal also is transferred to the organization and discipline of the military units. The camps should be pitched at some distance from the cities, warned one writer, that the soldiers be not enticed by the manifold temptations therein. In the evening hours the soldiers should read the Bible, not the secular writings of the day. A Christian army must also be careful in fixing its colors and standards that no idol or badge of supersitition be displayed. How can God be expected to rout the wicked enemy when his own troops march under heathen banners? Only the images of lofty animals such as the eagle should be emblazoned on the banners of a godly army, not the images of beasts associated with the strategems of Satan such as the dragon, the frog, and the serpent. Likewise, the Christian soldier is free to disregard the traditional strictures against fighting on certain holy days. He is free to fight on any day (including the sabbath if military necessity dictates it) and at all seasons of the year. Here we have the removal of the last vestige of the medieval Truce of God—intended to limit the time for military operations— in the interest of an overriding religious purpose. The Puritan rhetoric of holy war was developed during a period of great religious strife in Europe. Whenever the Puritans looked on the continent—in France, the Netherlands, the Palatinate, Sweden—their Protestant comrades in the faith were seen by them to be locked in a bloody

conflict with the forces of what they considered to be the Romish Antichrist. They persistently appealed to their Stuart monarchs to intervene in the Thirty Years’ War on behalf of the beleagured Protestants. Puritan holy war rhetoric initially was directed against Catholics abroad, but with slight adjustment it also could be turned against Anglican Laudians at home. The possibility of a holy civil war was mentioned with dread by Englishmen of this time. Already in 1631 William Gouge was answering the objection that war should not be waged against fellow Christians, but only against infidels, idolators, and open enemies of the church. He has a twofold response to this objection. First, there are many who outwardly profess the Christian faith but are in reality as great enemies of God as plain infidels. For him, Roman Catholics are a prime example of this category. More significantly for the English context, he reasoned that the cause of war was more important than the persons against whom it was waged. He goes so far as to say that if other Protestants gave just cause for war, then war against them was permissible. The biblical precedent for holy civil war was the Israelite slaughter of the tribe of Benjamin. Even though they were a part of the covenant community, they had to be destroyed since they had become what Alexander Leighton (1568–1649) termed “God’s enemies and enemies of the commonwealth” (Speculum belli sacri, 1624, p. 40). As the Laudian campaign for enforced conformity intensified, the Puritan mood turned apocalyptic. Although God had for a time forsaken his inheritance in England, even though Babylonians were now roaring and displaying their banners in the midst of the sanctuary, “yet God will return, and set his feet upon the Dragon, and require, with vengeance, the bloud of his Saints” (Speculum, p. 58). It must be reiterated that the emergence of the Puritan doctrine of holy war in prerevolutionary England was developed in the context of just war theory. None of the Puritan writers was much concerned with the niceties of resistance theory, already formulated by earlier Puritans such as John Knox (1514–1572) and Christopher Goodman (1520–1603), and later to be taken off the shelf by the parliamentarians of the 1640s. Nor is the note of moderation in warfare, the jus in bello, completely ignored. Although the saints in arms may be called to drastic actions

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for which they are equipped with “a special habit” of cruelty, they are not to engage in wanton violence indiscriminately or to rejoice in the spilling of innocent blood. Still, there is a noticeable drift in Puritan thought from justifiable war, mitigated by human compassion and waged under strictly prescribed conditions, to justified war, sanctioned by the holiness of its cause and the thorough elimination of its evil opposition. The move from just war to the crusade did not arise merely from the exigencies of the English Civil War; it was prepared for already in Puritan sermons and treatises of the preceding generation. Beyond the shores of England, Puritan ideas of war also came to the British colonies in America and influenced early American attitudes of war, especially against Native Americans in conflicts such as the Pequot War (1634–1638) and King

Philip’s War (1675–1678), and the American Revolution (1775–1783). Timothy George See also Bullinger, Heinrich; Calvin, John; English Civil Wars; Goodman, Christopher; Holy War (Bellum Sacrum); Just War Tradition; Three Kingdoms, War of the Further Reading George, Timothy. “War and Peace in the Puritan Tradition.” Church History 53, no. 4. (December 1984): 492–503. Greaves, Richard L. Theology & Revolution in the Scottish Reformation. Washington, DC: Christian University Press, 1980. Larson, Mark J. “The Holy War Trajectory Among the Reformed: From Zurich to England.” Reformation and Renaissance Review 8, no. 1 (2006): 7–27.

Q Qadesh, Battle of (1274 BCE)

to the Egyptian account, Ramses II appeared from the other side of Qadesh and charged into the Hittite troops by himself. In the midst of this charge he called on Amun, the patron god of Thebes, to help him because he had made many temples and monuments for the god and had done a variety of other great deeds for him. Ramses declared that Amun was more helpful in battle than thousands of his troops. In response, Amun spoke an encouraging word to Ramses and the pharaoh went on to defeat the Hittites. After the battle, the Egyptian troops praised Pharaoh for his bravery who, in turn, berated them for their lack of courage. The battle continued the next day, but the Hittite king begged the Egyptian pharaoh to stop the battle. Pharaoh asked his officers what they thought, and everyone agreed that “peace was better than battle.” Although Ramses II portrays the battle as a great Egyptian victory, the lack of plunder taken and the immediate return to Egypt indicate that it was at least a draw, if not an Egyptian defeat. The city of Qadesh remained under Hittite control. The two empires later signed a peace treaty in 1269 BCE, one of the first times that Egypt had officially recognized the existence of another major empire as an equal. However, the coming of the Sea People just under a century later spelled the end of the Hittites, the destruction of Qadesh, and the weakening of Egyptian power in Canaan and Syria. Charlie Trimm

The battle of Qadesh between the Hittite forces of Muwatallis II and the Egyptian forces of Ramses II in 1274 BCE represented a clash of two major empires. Ever since the expulsion of the Hyksos rulers of Egypt (1550 BCE), Egypt had been becoming more involved in the land of Canaan, routinely sending expeditions to gather plunder and eventually developing various administrative centers in the land to facilitate their control. This brought them into conflict not only with the Canaanites but also with other empires that also desired to control the land of Canaan and Syria, including Mitanni and the Hittites. The Hittites defeated Mitanni (approximately 1300 BCE), but the Egyptians continued to fight against local Canaanite kings and Seti I (1294–1279 BCE) fought the Hittites in Amurru (modern-day Syria), a region that the Egyptians attempted to control but which consistently reverted to Hittite influence due to the close proximity to Hittite cities (such as Carchemish). Ramses II campaigned against the Hittites in his fifth year (1274 BCE) to secure control of the area for Egypt. On his journey north two spies deceived Ramses II into thinking that the Hittite king had stayed in the north, causing him to lower his guard. When he arrived at Qadesh, the Hittites employed a surprise attack against one of Ramses’ divisions, causing panic among the Egyptians. But according 667

668  Qadisiyya, Battle of (636 CE) See also Egyptian Warfare; Hittite Warfare Further Reading Gardiner, Alan. The Kadesh Inscriptions of Ramesses II. Oxford: Oxford, 1960. Goedicke, Hans, ed. Perspectives on the Battle of Kadesh. Baltimore: Halgo, 1985. Kitchen, K. A. Ramesside Inscriptions: Translated & Annotated: Ramesses II, Royal Inscriptions. Ramesside Inscritpions 2. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. Spalinger, Anthony J. War in Ancient Egypt: The New Kingdom. Ancient World at War. Malden, UK: Blackwell, 2005.

Qadisiyya, Battle of (636 CE) The Battle of Qadisiyya was fought in 636 CE near Al-Hirah, in modern Iraq, between the invading Arab army and the Sassanid Persian forces of the region. Strategically, the battle was a decisive five-day engagement between expansionist Arabs and Persians whose control over the region was slipping. The defeat of the Persians, contextualized within the wider Arab conquests of the early seventh century, ultimately led to the rise of Islamic rule throughout Palestine, Syria, Persia, Egypt, northern Africa, and Spain. As such, the outcome of the battle is a factor that delineates the conclusion of the ancient or Roman world and the commencement of the Middle Ages in Europe. Following the successful conquests of Abu-Bakr (573– 634) and the rise of his successor, Caliph Umar ibn alKhattab (634–644), the Persian Sassanid emperor Yazdegerd III formed a military alliance in 635 with the Byzantine emperor Flavius Heraclitus Augustus (575–641) in an attempt to reclaim disputed territories. However, while negotiating for peace, Umar simultaneously resupplied the Muslim outpost at Yarmouk. In 636, the Byzantine army attacked the Muslim forces, but suffered catastrophic losses in the Battle of Yarmouk, which effectively concluded the Byzantine military’s presence in the region. Despite this loss, Yazdegerd sought to reassert his authority in Iraq, leading Umar to raise a larger army, and in early 636 Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas (595–674), the Arab commander, requested veteran forces from Yarmouk and began establishing fortified camps at Qadisiyya.

Following the breakdown of negotiations in November 636, the larger Persian army crossed the Ateeq River, led by Rostam Farrokhzād, and established itself on the western bank to confront Umar’s invading Arab forces. The first day of hostilities commenced with a number of personal duels being fought between opposing champions from each army. Afterwards, the Persians commenced the battle by attacking the Muslim forces, leading the Muslims to initially withdraw in panic prior to launching their own unsuccessful counterattack. On the second day, following another round of personal duels, the Muslim army received reinforcements, allowing Saad to order an unsuccessful attack against the Persian defenders. On the third day, Rostam ordered a Persian attack, which was repulsed, leading to heavy casualties on both sides. Similarly, the fourth day culminated in an unsuccessful Muslim attack upon the Persian position in an attempt to conclude the conflict. The final day of the battle took place in the midst of a large sandstorm, during which Rostam was killed and the Persian army was demoralized, leading them to retreat and eventually be defeated. Following the Arab victory in the Battle of Qadisiyya, Persian and Sassanid control disintegrated, allowing Muslim forces to control the territory of what is modern-day Iraq and to slowly but effectively conquer the surrounding region, including Persia, by 649. As a result, Yazdegerd served as the last Persian emperor until 653, at which time the Sassanid Empire fell. Soon afterward, Arab forces invaded and conquered Egypt, northern Africa, and Spain, much of which would not be reclaimed until the First Crusade (1096–1099). Sean Morton See also Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035); First Crusade; Muhammad as Warrior; Yarmouk, Battle of Further Reading Belyaev, E. Arabs, Islam, and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages. London: Pall Mall Press, 1969. Gabriel, Richard A. Muhammad: Islam’s First Great General. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007. Hawting, G. The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987. Rodgers, Russ. The Generalship of Muhammad: Battles and Campaigns of the Prophet of Allah. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012.

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Qarmati Uprising (923–951 CE) The Qarmati Shi’a Muslim uprising during the years 923– 951 CE wreaked havoc throughout the Abbasid heartland of modern-day Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq. There were several ways in which the Qarmatis boldly proclaimed the end of Islam and the beginning of a new religious era characterized by justice and prosperity. The Qarmatis were so powerful that they were able to seize vast amounts of land and to exact substantial tribute from the Abbasids. In 874, Hamdan Qarmat (d. 899) and his brother-in-law Abdan (d. 899) started proclaiming the imminent return of the imam Muhammad ibn Ismail. Although this was consistent with what most Ismailis had believed since 765, his followers became known as Qarmatis. One of his followers, Abu Sa’id Jannabi (d. 913), founded a Qarmati state in Bahrain in 893. In 899, Ubayd Allah (d. 934) proclaimed himself to be the living imam, but most Ismailis could not accept this claim, so a relative of Ubayd Allah commissioned Zikrawayh to murder Abdan while Hamdan disappeared. History documents three periods in which the Qarmatis were particularly active militarily. During the 899–907 schism following Ubayd Allah’s claim of authority over all Ismailis, battles raged throughout Syria. During the period 923 to 951, the Qarmatis expanded their influence from their base in Bahrain. During the period immediately following the Fatimid conquest of Egypt, conflict raged between these two Ismaili camps throughout Egypt, Arabia, and Syria. The focus of this entry is on the second period. From his base in Bahrain, Abu Tahir (d. 944) the son of Abu Sa‘id, started attacking pilgrimage caravans and southern Iraq (Basra, Kufa, Anbar, al-Wasit, and Baghdad) in 923–929. Then in 930, the Qarmatis symbolically proclaimed the end of Islam by conquering Mecca and carrying off the Black Stone. The events of 931 halted their ascension and forever discredited their religious claims. The 928 conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn prompted Abu Tahir to predict the imminent end to the era of Islam, and then during Ramadan in 931, he recognized a Persian magi as the expected Mahdi. During his brief 80-day reign, this magi cursed the prophets and executed several prominent Qarmatis. Demoralization and defection became the order of the day and for the next few years, only minor raids against the pilgrimages, coastal Persia, and southern Iraq

persisted. Dropping all pretense of religion, Abu Tahir agreed to protect pilgrimage caravans in return for regular tribute starting in 939. In exchange for yet more money, his brothers, who jointly ruled following his death, agreed to return the Black Stone to the Kaaba in 951. The Rasa’il Ikhwan al-Safa, one of the great works of Arabic literature, likely written during this period of decline, may have been written to unite and breathe new life into the Qarmati movement. The Buyids achieved a decisive victory that limited Qarmati influence to Bahrain until their final demise in 1077. W. Richard Oakes Jr. See also Buyids; Fatimid Conquest of Egypt; Fatimid Conquest of North Africa Further Reading Daftary, Farhad. The Ismā‘īlīs: Their History and Doctrines, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Encyclopedia of Islam. 2nd ed. Edited by P. Bearman et al. Brill Online. Stern, Samuel M. Studies in Early Ismā‘īlism. Leiden: Brill, 1983.

Qur’an and War The Qur’an contains terms that are frequently used in the context of warfare in Islamic history and law. These terms are jihad, qital, and harb. Jihad is the broadest term among these three and its basic Qur’anic signification is “struggle,” “striving,” “exertion.” The full Arabic locution al-jihad fi sabil Allah consequently means “struggling/striving for the sake of God,” and the Qur’an often refers broadly to those who “strive with their wealth and their selves” (jahadu biamwalihim wa-anfusihim; e.g., 8.72). Qital is the term that specifically refers to “fighting” or “armed combat” and is a component of jihad in specific situations. Harb is the Arabic word for war in general. The Qur’an employs this last term to refer to illegitimate wars fought by those who wish to spread corruption on earth (5:64); to the thick of battle between believers and nonbelievers (8:57; 47:4); and, in one instance, to the possibility of war waged by God and his Prophet against those who would continue to practice

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usury (2.279). This term is never combined with the phrase “in the path of God.” The term jihad, which has come to be most commonly used by jurists and historians in particular to connote military activity, is a much more complex and multilayered word in the Qur’an itself. Jihad is used in both the Meccan and Medinan periods of the Prophet Muhammad’s life with significations specific to these time periods. A specific chronology of events based on the Prophet’s biography, as recorded in the traditional Arabic sources, is mapped out in this entry so that the progression in the Qur’anic ethics of warfare and peacemaking may be understood against its historical backdrop.

The Meccan Period (ca. 610–622 CE)

From the onset of the revelations to Muhammad circa 610 CE until his emigration to Medina from Mecca in 622 during the period known as the Meccan period, the Muslims were not given permission by the Qur’an to physically retaliate against their persecutors, the pagan Meccans. Verses revealed in this period advise the Muslims instead to steadfastly endure the hostility of the Meccans and to forgive those who cause them harm. Three significant verses (42:40–43) reveal a highly important dimension of jihad in this early phase of Muhammad’s prophetic career: The requital of evil is an evil similar to it: hence, whoever pardons and makes peace, his reward rests with God—for indeed, He does not love evil-doers. Yet surely, as for those who defend themselves after having been wronged—no blame whatever attaches to them: blame attaches but to those who oppress people and behave outrageously on earth, offending against all right; for them is grievous suffering in store! But if one is patient in adversity and forgives, this is indeed the best resolution of affairs. Further, Pardon and forgive them until God gives His command. (2.109; cf. 29.59; 16.42) Sabr (“patience,” “forbearance”) is thus an important component of jihad, understood as the overall human struggle against harm and wrongdoing. The verses quoted

above emphasize the nonviolent dimension of jihad during the Meccan period, which lasted 12 years compared to the Medinan period of 10 years. For the most part, this meant resisting the pagan Meccan tribal elite by first secret and then active, public propagation of the faith. Thus Qur’an 25:52, a Meccan verse, counsels Muslims to put up “a mighty struggle” (jihad kabir) against unbelievers by means of the divine revelations vouchsafed to them in the Qur’an. Another Meccan verse, Qur’an 22:78, exhorted Muslims “to strive sincerely (jahidu) for the sake of God,” which was glossed by the exegetes to refer to the commission of a wide range of good deeds, including striving against one’s carnal self to purify it. The Meccan period is therefore of great importance in understanding the development of the Qur’anic doctrine of jihad, for it is practically impossible to contextualize the Qur’anic discourse on the various aspects of jihad without taking it into consideration. The introduction of the military aspect of jihad in the Medinan period can then properly be understood as a defensive response to the verbal and physical attacks directed at Muslims by the pagan Meccans for peacefully proclaiming their faith during the Meccan period.

The Medinan Period (622–632 CE)

In 622 CE, which corresponds to the first year of the Islamic calendar, the Prophet received divine permission to emigrate to Medina, along with his loyal followers. Within a year of the emigration to Medina, he received a revelation allowing him and his followers to physically retaliate against their Meccan persecutors. The following verses are widely acknowledged to be the first to grant Muslims permission to bear arms: Permission [to fight] is given to those against whom war is being wrongfully waged, and indeed, God has the power to help them: those who have been driven from their homes against all right for no other reason than their saying, “Our Provider is God!” For, if God had not enabled people to defend themselves against one another, monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques—in all of which God’s name is abundantly glorified—would surely have been destroyed.

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In these verses, the Qur’an states, if people were not allowed to defend themselves against aggressive wrongdoers, all the houses of worship—it is worthy of note that Islam is not the only religion indicated here—would be destroyed and thus the word of God extinguished. Another verse states (2:217): They ask you concerning fighting in the prohibited months. Answer them: To fight therein is a serious offence. But to restrain men from following the cause of God, to deny God, to violate the sanctity of the sacred mosque, to expel its people from its environs is in the sight of God a greater wrong than fighting in the forbidden month. [For] discord and strife (fitna) are worse than killing. Wrongful expulsion of believers—Muslims and other monotheists—from their homes for no other reason than their proclamation of belief in the one God is clearly one of the reasons that justify armed combat (casus belli), according to these verses. Earlier revelations (Qur’an 42.40–43) had allowed only nonviolent self-defense against the harm inflicted by the enemy. The Qur’an also has specific, unambiguous directives with regard to initiation of hostilities. The frequently cited Qur’an 2.190 states,“Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not commit aggression, for God loves not aggressors.” This clear injunction forbids Muslims from attacking an enemy first, for armed combat can be undertaken only in response to a prior act of aggression committed by the opposite side. In the following verse (2:191), the Qur’an acknowledges the enormity of fighting and thus the potential taking of human life, but at the same time asserts the higher moral imperative of maintaining order and challenging wrongdoing. Therefore, when both just cause and righteous intention exist, war in self-defense becomes obligatory. Fighting is prescribed for you, while you dislike it. But it is possible that you dislike a thing which is good for you, and that you love a thing which is bad for you. But God knows and you know not. (2.216) The Qur’an further declares that Muslims are obliged to defend those who are oppressed and who seek help from

them (4:75), except against a people with whom the Muslims have concluded a treaty (8:72). In the month of Ramadan in the third year of the Islamic calendar (624 CE), full-fledged hostilities broke out between the Muslims and the pagan Meccans in what became known in Islamic history as the battle of Badr. In this battle, a small army of Muslims decisively routed a much larger and more formidable Meccan army. Shortly thereafter, the battle of Uhud was fought in which the Muslims suffered a reversal, followed by the battle of Khandaq in 627. Apart from these three major battles, a number of other minor campaigns were fought until the Prophet’s death in 632. Some of the most trenchant verses commanding the Muslims to fight were revealed concerning these military campaigns. One such verse, Qur’an 9:5, which has been termed the “sword verse” (ayat al-sayf) in later literature, states: And when the sacred months are over, slay the polytheists wherever you find them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every conceivable place. Another verse (Qur’an 9:29) is often invoked in the context of fighting, which states: Fight against those who—despite having been given revelation before—do not believe in God nor in the Last Day, and do not consider forbidden that which God and His messenger have forbidden, and do not follow the religion of the truth, until they pay the jizya with willing hand, having been subdued. Qur’an 9.5 with its internal reference to the polytheists who may be fought after the end of the sacred months would circumscribe its applicability only to the pagan Arabs of Muhammad’s time; this is how, in fact, a number of premodern exegetes and jurists, such as ‘Ata b. Abi Rabah (d. 733), ‘Ali b. Ahmad al-Wahidi (d. 1076), and al-Shafi‘i (d. 820), understood the verse. Qur’an 9:29 is seemingly directed at the People of the Book, that is, Jews and Christians as a collectivity, but again, a careful reading of the verse clearly indicates that it does not intend all the People of the Book but only a faction from among them who do not, in violation of their own laws, believe in God and the

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Last Day and, in a hostile manner, impede the propagation of Islam. The Qur’an in another verse (2.193) makes clear, however, that should enemy forces refrain from hostilities, then Muslims may no longer fight them. This verse states: And fight them on until there is no chaos (fitna) and religion is only for God, but if they cease, let there be no hostility except toward those who resort to oppression. The seeming harshness of Qur’an 9:5 and 9:29 is thus considerably mitigated and their general applicability significantly restricted by the invocation of such conciliatory verses, such as the one cited immediately above, and other such verses. Among other such verses is the one that has been characterized as the “peace verse” (8.61): If they incline toward peace, incline you toward it, and trust in God. Indeed, He alone is all-hearing, all-knowing. And: Slay them wherever you catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for persecution is worse than slaughter. But if they cease, God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. (2.191–92) God does not forbid you from being kind and equitable to those who have neither made war on you on account of your religion nor driven you from your homes. God loves those who are equitable. (60.8) These verses make fighting against those who oppose the peaceful propagation of the message of Islam and who resort to violent persecution of Muslims conditional upon their continuing hostility. Should they refrain from hostile behavior and sue for peace instead, Muslims are commanded to accept their request. Qur’an 60.8 further makes clear that non-Muslims of goodwill and peaceableness cannot be the objects of warfare simply on account of their different religious affiliation.

This point is strenuously and unequivocally made elsewhere in the Qur’an. “There is no compulsion in religion; the truth stands out clearly from error,” declares the Qur’an (2.256). Another verse (10.99) states, “If your Lord had so willed, all those who are on earth would have believed; will you then compel mankind to believe against their will?” In accordance with these Qur’anic commandments, a majority of the premodern jurists agreed that the purpose of jihad in the sense of armed combat was not to compel non-Muslims to convert to Islam. However, the political and historical circumstances in which the Muslims found themselves, particularly during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods (spanning 661–1258 CE), led the jurists in particular to articulate a code of religiously mandated war that was partly based on a particularistic reading of specific Qur’anic verses and partly based on realpolitik. Within legal-administrative contexts, jihad became primarily armed combat, which activity could be both defensive and offensive based on the security concerns of the state. Realpolitik therefore allowed for distinctive—and contested—juridical perspectives to emerge on this topic that frequently undermined the Qur’an’s conception of war as exclusively defensive and limited in nature and violated its fundamental directives against the commission of military aggression. Asma Afsaruddin See also Bible and War; Islam and War (Jihad) Further Reading Afsaruddin, Asma. “The Siyar Laws of Aggression: Juridical Re-interpretations of Qur’anic Jihad and Their Contemporary Implications for International Law.” In Marie-Luisa Frick and Andreas Th. Müller, eds. Islam and International Law: Engaging Self-Centrism from a Plurality of Perspectives. Leiden: Brill/Martinus Nijhoff, 2013, pp. 45–63. Afsaruddin, Asma. Striving in the Path of God: Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Al-Dawoody, Ahmed. The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Hashmi, Sohail.“Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace.” In Terry Nardin, ed. The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. Kelsay, John. Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993.

R Radical Islam in the 20th Century

embraced by extremist groups, grew largely in response to a number of late 20th-century factors: the failure of secular Arab political and military initiatives, the 1979 revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the end of Soviet support for Arab regimes in the Middle East, the Palestinian intifada, and the Persian Gulf War. Radical Islam is sometimes referred to as Islamic fundamentalism or Islamic extremism. Some Muslim writers refer to it as a variant of Islamic revivalism. Radical Islamic beliefs combine an anti-Western political agenda with a set of theological principles. In the mid-20th century, radical Islam grew in the Middle East in response to Western imperialism and the spread of Western values in the region. In 1929, Hassan al-Banna, an Egyptian opposed to the growing secularism in the Muslim world, founded the Ikhwan Islamiyya (Muslim Brotherhood). His goal was to transform Egypt into an Islamic state modeled after the ideal days of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. The organization began as an Islamic charity but evolved into a more radical group, and in the 1940s it assassinated several prominent Egyptian officials. However, in 1949 al-Banna was killed by one of the Egyptian intelligence services. At the time of al-Banna’s death another Egyptian, Sayyid Qutb, was working toward an education degree at the

Radical Islam may be defined as a militant form of Islamic thought that claims religious validation for a variety of political, military, and paramilitary activities, frequently directed against Israel and the West. A common view in the West, supported to some extent by the popular media, suggests that contemporary terrorism and insurgency proceed from the Islamic notion of jihad, or holy war, articulated in the Qur’an. It is certainly true that contemporary Muslim extremists tie their attacks explicitly to jihad and its basis in Islamic tradition. However, such ideas do not represent a continuous, dominant strain in Islamic or Arab thought over the past 1,400 years. Although the idea of holy war clearly played a role in the initial Arab conquests of the early Middle Ages, in later medieval conflicts, and in some anticolonial movements of the late 19th century, it does not act as the dominant ideological justification for modern Arab unity or for political and military conflict in the period after the Second World War. On the contrary, in the 20th century Arab nationalism in the guise of Baathism or Nasserist Arab socialism served as the primary ideological basis for conflict in the Middle East. Arab political leaders of the mid-20th century did not employ the idea of jihad to a great extent, even in their opposition to Israel. The notion of holy war, as it is currently 673

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University of Northern Colorado. He had been sent to the United States in 1948 by the Egyptian government to study the U.S. educational system. However, the more he saw of Western society, the more alienated he became. He returned to Egypt in 1950 and joined the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb wrote several influential works, including Social Justice in Islam, a lengthy commentary on the Qur’an, and a shorter book, Ma’alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones, or Signposts on the Road). In these he argued that before the coming of the Prophet Muhammad, the world was in jahiliyah (spiritual darkness), a condition dominated by opposition to Allah. For a brief time the Prophet Muhammad and his companions lived in a pure Islamic society ruled by submission (Islam) to the will of Allah. According to Qutb, modernity was a time of great danger, as Islam faced a new kind of jahiliyah. The new jahili societies included the atheistic communists, the corrupted Christian and Jewish societies, Arab nationalist states, and Muslim states that cooperated with the West. All these opponents had to be defeated through jihad for Islam to prevail. Qutb was hanged by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s government in 1966, and his fate illustrates the opposition of secular Arab authorities toward Islamic radicalism for much of the 20th century. The Muslim Brotherhood and the views of Qutb influenced many radical organizations: the Egyptian Islamic Liberation Movement, the Islamic Group Movement, and, ultimately, the Palestinian group Hamas. It is important to point out that Arab governments largely opposed the growth of Islamic radicalism during the period from the Second World War to the 1980s. Arab regimes in the mid20th century based their identity and their warfare with Israel primarily in terms of Arab nationalism rather than Islamic unity. Indeed, such regimes, supported by the Soviet Union, often viewed activist Islam as a threat. Even the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) framed its foundational documents in terms of nationalism, Arab socialism, and anti-Zionism. However, this pattern changed in the closing decades of the 20th century. In 1979, a theocratic Shiite regime headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini took power in Iran and confronted the United States by seizing the U.S. embassy in Tehran and holding its staff hostage. That same year, the Soviet Union invaded the nation of Afghanistan and installed a puppet

regime there. Both events would fuel the growth of radical Islamic political activity. The Iranian regime sponsored Islamic fundamentalist political and paramilitary activity against Israel and the West, most particularly the Shiite group Hezbollah, active in Lebanon and Israel. In Afghanistan, Soviet occupation produced native opposition, creating a generation of mujahideen motivated primarily by radical Islamic ideas and encouraged and supplied by the United States as a counter to Soviet influence. Although the Afghan resistance resulted in the withdrawal of the Soviets from the country after nine years of warfare, it also resulted in the establishment of Afghanistan as a haven for radical Islamic activity. Indeed, during the 1980s, thousands of recruits from Arab nations went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. Already immersed in Wahhabism, the strict version of Islam prominent in Saudi Arabia, they developed an anti-Western agenda based on the writings of Qutb, among others. One of the Saudi Arabian citizens fighting in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden, ultimately went on to found the Al Qaeda organization in 1989. In the closing decades of the 20th century, as conventional warfare against Israel fueled by Arab nationalism failed, as receding Soviet power freed former Middle Eastern client states of communist influence and deprived them of military and financial aid, and as the Iranian and Afghan crises produced a generation of anti-Western fighters motivated largely by radical Islam, anti-Israeli and anti-Western activity in the Muslim world adopted a religious character. Such feeling inspired the first Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the intifada, in 1987. Groups such as Hamas played a leading role in the intifada, as radical Islam came to rival Arab nationalism as the defining ideology behind the struggle against Israel. Such ideas appealed particularly to the powerless and the disenfranchised in Palestinian society. The rhetoric of the PLO is indicative of this change. Whereas once its agenda centered on secular Arab socialism and nationalism, the PLO adopted the language of martyrdom and holy war and gave rise to its own radical group, the al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade. Fundamentalist Islam has remained a potent force in Middle Eastern politics to the present day. Andrew J. Waskey and Robert S. Kiely

Reconquista 675 See also Al Qaeda; Hamas; Hezbollah; Intifada; Muslim Brotherhood; Sayyd Qutb; Wahhabism Further Reading Dekmejian, R. Hrair. Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996. Euben, Roxanne Leslie, and Muhammad Qasim. Princeton Readings in Islamic Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Bamma to Bin Laden. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. Mitchell, Richard P. The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. Mawdudi & the Making of Islamic Revivalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Sivan, Emmanuel. Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985.

Reconquista In Iberian history, the word Reconquista indicates the approximately 750-year-long period between the Battle of Covadonga (718 CE, or 722 CE according to other sources) and the fall of Granada (1492) during which the Catholic kings of the Iberian Peninsula progressively expelled the Muslim presence from the region and unified the two countries under their respective crowns. In a narrower sense (that is typical of the Spanish Catholic historiography, which coined the term during the 16th century) the Reconquista began with the military campaigns of Alfonso I (739–756) and Alfonso II (792–842), kings of Asturias and León and ancestors of Isabella I of Castile (1451– 1504), who reigned, together with her husband Ferdinand II of Aragon (1452–1516), when Granada fell. This narrative helped to shape the myth of Reconquista, which, in turn, played a pivotal role in shaping the identity of the Spanish monarchy even in the years following the conquest of Granada. Arab expansion in the Iberian Peninsula started in the eighth century, when the Umayyad dynasty conquered the country, extending their domination to a large part of contemporary Spain and Portugal as well as to a part of southern France roughly corresponding with today’s region of

Languedoc-Roussillon (Latin—Septimania). In this process, which also led to the fall of the previous Visigoth power, some small Christian potentates gradually emerged in the mountainous regions of northern Spain (Cantabrian Range) and along the Atlantic coast. Among them was the Kingdom of Asturias, which, under King Pelagius (Pelayo, ca. 685–737), soon became the focus of anti-Arab opposition. The influx of immigrants from the south fleeing al-Andalus helped to strengthen the country, although in its first decades Asturian dominion was still lax and had to be continually strengthened through matrimonial alliances. Through one of these marriages, Alfonso “el Católico” (ca. 693–757), son of the neighboring Duke Peter of Cantabria, acceded the Asturian throne in 739, starting the kingdom’s expansion toward Galicia (conquered in 740) and León (conquered in 754). After a period of protracted turmoil, expansion took new momentum under Alfonso II “the Chaste” (791–842). With his predecessors (Fruela I, Aurelio, Silo, Mauregatus, and Bermudo I), Asturian rulers had strengthened their grasp on Galicia in the west and extended their domains in the east toward Vizcaya. In face of the constant Arab pressure from the south and east, Alfonso established ties with the Basque Frankish vassal Belasco of Álava and with Emperor Charlemagne (742 or 747 or 748–814), whom he claimed allegiance to, gaining in return acknowledgment of his royal status. Due also to the Frankish influence, during the reign of Alfonso II religious practice received a strong impulse. The discovery of the remains of Saint James the Greater in Compostela (814) led to the founding of the sanctuary of Santiago and the opening of the Camino (Peregrinatio Compostellana), one of the most well-known pilgrimage routes of the Middle Ages. Also, the transfer of the capital city from Pravia to Oviedo was marked by a flourishing of churches and by an emphasis on the king’s Christian virtues that largely accounts for his attribute of “Chaste.” Beatus of Liébana (ca. 730–800) was another prominent figure in Asturian religious culture of this time, and his Commentary to the Apocalypse played a pivotal role in the development of Spanish (more generally, European) millenarianism. From a military point of view too, the approaching of Asturias to the Frankish orbit had positive impact. In 798, Asturian forces raided and sacked Lisbon, then part of

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al-Andalus. Alfonso II also started to repopulate the uninhabited region between the Cantabrian Range and the Duero River (“Desert of Duero”). His successors, Ordoño and Fruela II, successfully continued this process (repoblación). The process of repopulation also included part of Galicia, León, and Castile, which were incorporated into the kingdom and gradually garrisoned with the building of castles and fortresses. In 919, after the forced abdication of Alfonso III “the Great” (ca. 848–910), the Kingdom of Asturias split into three separate kingdoms of León, Galicia, and Asturias, which kept on slowly pushing their borders southward. In 924, the three kingdoms reunited again under King Ordoño II of León (ca. 873–924), who in 914 had also assumed the crown of Galicia. However, the 10th century was—generally speaking—a period of decay for the Christian kingdoms, due also to the increasing pressure of the Umayyad Emirate (which since 929 served as the caliphate) of Córdoba and to the domestic turmoil that weakened the kings’ authority, leading to the emergence of a semi-independent nobility of whom the Castile national hero, El Cid Campeador (Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, ca. 1043– 1099), was perhaps the best-known expression. The experience of the Kingdom of Asturias is quite similar to that of other Christian principalities of the north of the Iberian Peninsula. Since the first decades of the ninth century, for example, the Kingdom of Navarre had followed a more or less similar path, gradually extending its influence from Pamplona to the western Pyrenees, alongside the Atlantic Ocean, on both sides of the border between present-day Spain and France. In this case too, the accession to the throne of a strong house—the House of Jiménez (ca. 905)—proved pivotal in providing the kingdom with a new dynamism, although it was only under the reign of Sancho Garcés III “the Great” (r. 1004–1035) that Navarre could definitively get rid of the influence of the Caliphate of Córdoba. This kind of interaction between Christian and Muslim potentates was common in this period. Familial bonds sometimes existed between Christian and Muslim rulers; for example, the first Umayyad caliph of Córdoba, Abd-ar-Rahman III (r. 929–961), was a cousin of King García Sánchez I (r. 925–970) of Navarre, the regent Toda Aznárez (876–958). Fragmentation of power was another recurring trait. Almost endemic power struggles within the different ruling

families led to frequent splitting and reunifications of their domains and favored a situation of permanent instability. It was only after the collapse of the Umayyads that a new southward push helped to overcome this state of things. It was largely this process that shaped the political geography of the Iberian Peninsula, with a Christian North comprising the Kingdoms of Navarre (824–1620), León (910– 1230), Aragon (1035–1706), Castile (1037–1230), and the short-lived Kingdom of Galicia and Portugal (1065–1128, when Portugal gained its independence, Galicia being absorbed into Castile in 1230) opposed to an increasingly fragmented Muslim South, where the fall of the Caliphate of Córdoba (1031) led to the emergence of a host of small independent kingdoms. These small kingdoms feared the expansionism of their Christian counterparts (especially León and Castile under Alfonso VI “the Brave”), inducing them to call for help from the Almoravid sultan of Morocco, Yusuf ibn Tashfin (r. 1061–1106), who established his power over the fragmented South between the end of the 11th and the beginning of the 12th century. The emergence of the Almoravid power coincided with a sharp lull in the Reconquista. In 1086, Yusuf ibn Tashfin defeated Alfonso VI in the battle of Sagrajas, forcing him to stop his advance beyond Toledo, which he had conquered the previous year. As a reaction, the political geography of the Christian kingdoms further evolved, with the decline of Navarre, troubled by dynastic rivalries, and the emergence of Castile and Aragon as the spearheads of the Christian front. In the same period, Portugal too—until that moment marginalized by its geographic position—gained its independence under Afonso Henriques “the Conqueror” (1109– 1185), who defeated Fernando Peres de Trava of Galicia in the battle of São Mamede (near Guimarães, 1128) and proclaimed himself prince (1129) and later king of Portugal (1139). In 1149, Afonso’s new status was recognized by the country’s nominal sovereign, King Alfonso VII of Castile and León, with the Treaty of Zamora. In 1179, Pope Alexander III also recognized the new king who, in 1143, had written to his predecessor, Innocent II, declaring himself and his kingdom servants of the church and swearing to drive the Muslim “Moors” out of the Iberian Peninsula. In the meantime, Afonso gained some important victories, such as the battle of Ourique in 1139, culminating in the conquest of Santarém (March 15) and Lisbon (October 25, 1147).

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The decline of the Almoravids (due to the joint pressure of the Christian kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula and of the Almohad rebellion in Morocco) paved the way to a new period of fragmentation of power (“second taifa period”), replaced by the Almohad rule between 1147 and 1269. However, although the Almohads could build a stronger state than the Almoravids, the Christians too were becoming increasingly organized. With the borders moving southward, a series of military orders emerged (among the others the Order of Aviz in 1146; the Order of Saint Michael of the Wing in 1147; the Order of Calatrava in 1158; the Order of Santiago in 1170; the Order of Mountjoy in 1173, the Order of Alcántara in 1177; the Order of Saint George of Alfama in 1201; the Order of Monreal in 1231; as well as the later and well-known Order of Montesa in 1317) to carry out the Reconquista and preside over the newly acquired territories. Repopulation was promoted too, conceding charters (fueros or forais) and privileges to the people repopulating a town. Fueros or forais made town councils dependent on the monarch alone and imposed on them the obligation of providing the auxilium (military assistance) to their lord. All the most important towns of medieval Iberia had fueros or forais. In Navarre, they were the main repopulating system and in Aragon too they were largely employed during the 12th century. On July 18, 1195, the Almohad caliph Yusuf Ya’qub alMansur (r. 1184–1199) defeated Alfonso VIII of Castile in the Battle of Alarcos. However, Alarcos was the last great Muslim success in the Peninsula. On July 16, 1212, the joint armies of Alfonso VIII, Sancho VII of Navarre, Peter II of Aragon, and Afonso II of Portugal routed Caliph Muhammad al-Nasir (Miramamolín in the Spanish chronicles, r. 1199–1213) in the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, marking a turning point in both Almohad history and the history of the Reconquista. Although the Christian kingdoms were too much divided to effectively exploit the success, the death of Miramamolín in 1213 and the rise to the throne of his 10-year-old son Yusuf II ‘al-Mustansir’ (r. 1213–1224) forced the the Almohad ministers to negotiate a series of truces with the Christian kingdoms, which remained more or less in place for the next 15 years. With the Almohad power weakened by internal strife, starting in 1225 the Castilians, Portuguese, and Leonese began raiding deep into Muslim territory, almost unchecked; in a wave

of popular uprisings, cities throughout al-Andalus deposed their hapless Almohad governors and installed local strongmen in their place. In October 1228, with Spain practically all lost, Caliph al-Ma’mun abandoned Seville, taking his army to Morocco. Local strongmen (whose emergence opened a third taifa period) proved unable to contain the rising flood of attacks launched by Sancho II of Portugal (r. 1223–47), Alfonso IX of León (r. 1188–1230), Ferdinand III of Castile (r. 1217– 1252) and James I of Aragon (r. 1213–1276). The next 20 years saw a massive advance in the Reconquista: Mérida and Badajoz fell in 1230 to León; Majorca in the same year to Aragon; Beja in 1234 to Portugal; Cordova in 1236 to Castile; Valencia in 1238 to Aragon; Silves in 1242 to Portugal; Murcia in 1243 to Castile as well as Alicante in 1248. Ferdinand III of Castile (who had assumed the title of King of León in 1230 and King of Galicia in 1231) entered Seville on December 22, 1248. By the beginning of 1250 the Nasrids of Grenada were the only Muslim power still present in the Iberian Peninsula. The Reconquista thus came to an end, although it revived at the end of the 15th century when the armies of the Catholic Monarchs (Reyes Católicos), Queen Isabella I of Castile and King Ferdinand II of Aragon, conquered Granada in a war that lasted from 1482 to 1492. Gianluca Pastori See also Almohad Revolution; Calatrava, Order of; Charlemagne’s Conquests; El Cid (Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar) Further Reading Fernández-Morera, Darío. The Myth of the Andalusian Paradise: Muslims, Christians, and Jews under Islamic Rule in Medieval Spain. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2016. Kennedy, Hugh. Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of al-Andalus. London: Longman, 1996. Linehan, Peter. History and the Historians of Medieval Spain. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. O’Callaghan, Joseph F. The Last Crusade in the West: Castile and the Conquest of Granada. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. O’Callaghan, Joseph F. Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002. Ray, Jonathan. The Sephardic Frontier. The Reconquista and the Jewish Community in Medieval Iberia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.

678  Religious Military Orders

Reformation See Wars of the Reformation

Religious Military Orders The religious military orders were a medieval creation that combined the spiritual devotion of the monastic life with the combative mentality of a knight. The theological justification was provided by Bernard of Clairvaux in his treatise “In Praise of the New Knighthood” (In laude novae militae) written around 1130. Bernard called this type of monastic order a new kind of knighthood that waged a twofold combat against flesh and blood and against the spiritual hosts of evil in the heavens. Bernard reasoned that these knights of Christ were ministers of God in the punishment of evildoers and the praise of welldoers. Should a knight be killed in carrying out his duties, Bernard said, he could be assured he would not perish but be rewarded by God. The concept of a religious military order was first seen in Italy. Augustinian monks established a hospital in 952 at Altopascio near Lucca for pilgrims making their way to Rome and began providing an armed escort for pilgrims by 1056. They were called the Order of St. James of Altopascio, or the Knights of the Tau because of their insignia, a “tau” cross. They were approved as a military order by Pope Gregory IX on 1239. The first order begun solely as a religious military order was created around 1115 by Hugh de Payens of Burgundy and Godfrey de Saint Adhemer. The lack of secular knights remaining in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem following the First Crusade left Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land vulnerable to Muslim attacks. Hugh and Godfrey, along with seven other knights they had recruited from northern France, escorted religious pilgrims from the port of Jaffa to Jerusalem and other sacred sites in the kingdom. They took an oath of poverty, chastity, and obedience to the Latin patriarch of Jerusalem and, when King Baldwin II gave them quarters on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, they became known as the Knights of the Temple or Knights Templar. They were recognized as a religious order at the Council of Troyes in 1129, resulting in a great amount of donations

and volunteers to become knights. By 1147 they had nearly 600 knights, and with another religious military order, the Hospitallers, provided almost half of the available knights in the Holy Land. They became one of the leading landowners in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and would develop a banking system throughout the Western world where pilgrims could deposit their funds at a local preceptor and withdraw them when they arrived in the Holy Land. Despite their papal approval, the Knights Templar had their critics, including King Amalric who in 1174 believed they had abandoned their obedience to the patriarch of Jerusalem and were causing trouble throughout the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Yet the Knights Templar were crucial to the defense of the kingdom. They built a number of castles and isolated towers along welltraveled roads to protect pilgrims. They led a victory over Saladin’s forces in 1177. However, it was the foolish advice their grand master, Gerard de Ridefort, gave to King Guy that would lead to their defeat to Saladin at the Horns of Hattin and, eventually, the fall of Jerusalem in 1187. The Knights Templar would continue defending what remained of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem until a final defeat to the Mamluk sultan Khalil at Acre in 1291. After this defeat, the Knights Templar would become primarily a banking institution. They were finally disbanded by the church in 1314 after a trial on numerous charges of impropriety. A second religious military order in the Holy Land, the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem or the Hospitallers, actually had its beginning prior to the Knights Templar. Around 1070 the Hospice of St. John the Almoner was founded near the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. The hospice was run by Benedictine monks and nuns under the leadership of Brother Gerard. It was a place where pilgrims could receive food and rest from their journey to Jerusalem. The first leader of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, Godfrey of Bouillon, made a gift of land to the Hospitallers in recognition of their valuable work. Soon the order received so much money and land that by 1120 they had established a chain of hospices throughout the Holy Land. Gerard’s successor was a French knight, Raymond du Puy, who expanded the function of the order to protect pilgrims as they made their way to Jerusalem. In 1136 King Fulk gave the Hospitallers the fortified town of

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Bethgibelin, which was just southwest of Jerusalem, and the task of guarding the southern frontier from attack. The Hospitallers began to receive other fortified castles including the Krac de Chevalier on the eastern border of the kingdom, indicating that they had developed into a military order in addition to running their hospices. It would not be until 1206 that the statutes of the order were officially changed to allow for a military role. By this time the Hospitallers had as many as 600 knights and often clashed with the Knights Templar, including a battle over Antioch in 1216. After the loss of Jerusalem, the Hospitallers could not prevent the loss of their fortresses to the Muslims. In 1271 they lost their greatest fortress, the Krak des Chevaliers, because they did not have sufficient men to defend it. In 1291 the Hospitallers fought with the Knights Templar to defend the last remnant of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem in Acre, but were defeated. They then established their headquarters on the island of Cyprus and from there utilized their fleet to harass the Muslims on the mainland. They used their growing fleet to capture the island of Rhodes and built massive fortifications there. They would continue growing as a naval power, focusing on harassing Turkish shipping along the coast of Asia Minor. In 1522 the Ottoman sultan Süleyman launched an attack on Rhodes, and the Hospitallers surrendered on December 20, 1522. The Hospitallers were resettled on the island of Malta by Emperor Charles V and in 1565 fought back an Ottoman invasion. Their focus would now be to protect Christian fleets in the Mediterranean from piracy. Weakened by the loss of their estates in Europe during the French Revolution, they finally surrendered Malta to Napoleon in 1798. Today the order is known as the Knights of Malta and is devoted to the care of the poor and sick. Other smaller military orders in the Holy Land included the Knights of St. Lazarus and the Hospitallers of St. Thomas of Canterbury in Acre. The Knights of St. Lazarus were made up primarily of those who suffered from leprosy. They were headquartered in Jerusalem and perhaps fought at Hattin. They moved to Acre after the fall of Jerusalem, were saved from destruction by Louis IX during an attack on Ramleh, and fought in defense of Acre. King Richard I funded the Hospitallers of St. Thomas for the purpose of running a hospital for Englishmen in Acre. However, they all died while fighting in defense of Acre.

A German military order eventually known as the Teutonic Knights began in 1190 during the Third Crusade. A group of German merchants established a hospital to care for the many wounded and sick German crusaders during the siege of Acre. When Acre was captured, Duke Frederick of Swabia gave them financial support to make their hospital permanent, and Pope Clement III made them a religious order in 1191. By 1198 they had taken on military responsibilities and were recognized as a military order by Pope Innocent III in 1199. In 1226 they acquired substantial land northeast of Acre and, with the arrival of numerous German pilgrims in 1227, built a castle known as Montfort. They took part in the invasion of Egypt during the Fifth Crusade, and when Frederick II took control of Jerusalem after making a treaty with the Ayyubid sultan el-Malik el-Kamil in 1229, he gave the Teutonic Order a hospice (St. Mary’s of the Germans) in Jerusalem. Although the Teutonic Knights had a presence in the Holy Land until the fall of Acre in 1291, they gradually transferred their activity to Eastern Europe. In 1211 they fought in Hungary against the pagan Cumans on the Transylvanian border, but were asked to leave by the Hungarian king in 1225 because of their growing power. They were then invited by the Duke of Masovia in west-central Poland to conquer the pagan Baltic Prussians. Those Prussians who did not convert to Christianity were enslaved, killed, or exiled. In 1226 Emperor Frederick II gave the Teutonic Knights the Golden Bull of Rimini, an imperial privilege to possess the lands of Prussia that they conquered. Although they failed in their attempt to conquer and convert Lithuania to Christianity, the Teutonic Knights had by 1309 created a feudal state that included Prussia, Estonia, Pomerania, the city of Danzig, and areas in southern and central Germany, and could field more than 2,000 military brethren. However, their power began to wane when they lost a battle to Lithuanian and Polish forces at Grunwald in 1410. By 1525 their rule in Prussia came to an end, and they gradually lost their remaining holdings until Napoleon declared their order dissolved in 1809. The Teutonic Knights are today primarily a charitable organization headquartered in Vienna. A number of Iberian religious military orders began in the 12th century. The first was the Knights of Calatrava. Calatrava was a Moorish castle that guarded the road to Toledo and had been captured in 1147 by King Alfonso VII

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of Castile. He gave the castle to the Knights Templar, who abandoned the castle in 1157, claiming it was indefensible. A Cistercian abbot from Navarre, Ramon Sierra of Fitero, moved his monks to the castle and with the help of a number of Navarrese soldiers, cleared the area of Moorish raiders. The order followed the Cistercian rule and was recognized in 1164 by Pope Alexander III. The castle at Calatrava was lost to the Moors in 1197 and the order moved their headquarters to Salvatierra. Calatrava was retaken in 1212, but eventually the order moved to Calatrava la Nueva. The order provided the only standing army in Castile and was wealthy and powerful. In 1254 members of the order had to swear their loyalty to the king of Castile. By 1482 they became a royal Spanish order that was purely honorific. A second Spanish religious military order began near Cáceres in Castile around 1158 to protect pilgrims traveling to the shrine of Santiago de Compostela from the Moors. They were originally called the Knights of Cáceres, but in 1171 took the name Knights of Santiago. They were recognized as a religious order by Pope Alexander III in 1175, but although they lived in community, they were allowed to marry and have personal possessions. The order had its headquarters in the city of Uclés in Castile, but acquired lands throughout Europe. They were effective fighters against the Moors and had a prominent role in the victory of the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, a turning point in the Spanish Reconquista. They were annexed to the crown of Spain in 1485. The Knights of Our Lady of Montjoie was founded in the Holy Land in 1176 by Count Rodrigo Alvarez de Sarrià, a knight from the Order of Santiago. He intended to have his order be a purified version of the Order of Santiago. Their headquarters was a castle on the hill Montjoie outside of Jerusalem. King Baldwin IV gave them several towers to defend in Ascalon. A small detachment of these knights fought and were killed at the Battle of Hattin, and the remaining retired to Aragon. In 1196 they were joined to the Knights Templar by King Alphonso II of Aragon. Other important Iberian military religious orders include the Évora and Aviz orders, the Knights of St. Julian and Alcantara, and the Knights of St. George of Alfama. James Kroemer See also Acre, Sieges of; Bernard of Clairvaux; Bouillon, Godfrey de; Calatrava, Order of; In Praise of the New Knighthood

(Bernard of Clairvaux); Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of; Knights Templar; Reconquista; Santiago, Order of Further Reading Barber, Malcolm. The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Forey, Alan. The Military Orders from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth Centuries. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. Hospitallers: The Knights Hospitaller in the Levant, c. 1070–1309. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Rodriguez-Picavea, Enrique. “The Military Orders in Medieval Iberia: Image, Propaganda and Legitimacy.” Mirator 13 (2012): 1–35. Urban, William. Teutonic Knights: A Military History. London: Greenhill, 2003.

Religious Propaganda and War In the face of death, victory and defeat, religion and war have traveled together since time immemorial. So have the urges to justify deadly force and fortify both combatants and regimes to exert it. The use and abuse of religious images, dogma, music, and objects of veneration, followed by cumulative additions of every media known to persuade or dissuade belligerents, characterizes the complex history of religious propaganda and war. The term propaganda, used to describe the spread and defense of truth in foreign areas, was coined by the Roman Catholic Church during the 17th century to include both foreign missions in new lands and efforts to reconvert lands lost through the Protestant Reformation. During the French Revolution, the term was adopted by revolutionaries to spread liberty and denigrate those opposed to them. In modern times, propaganda was a neutral term during the early days of the advertising industry. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, however, the term became generally pejorative, applied to politically oppressive and expansionist ideologies and regimes involved in the two world wars and the Cold War. In war, propaganda draws on cultural archetypes, wellknown stories, religious figures and icons, using any form of media available to influence the ideas and actions of societies and individuals. Positive forms promote and

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defend, while negative forms denigrate, dissociate, depersonalize, delegitimize, and demoralize those opposed to or in conflict with the propagandists. Propaganda is not meant to inform, but to mobilize emotions, and presents only one side of an issue rather than trying to educate observers, though it often is presented as fact or news, or journalistic reporting. Its claims must be compelling, stark, and manipulative. Although this entry concerns itself primarily with modern examples, religious propaganda in war has been in use since the beginning of civilization. In Mesopotamian, Indian, Egyptian, and biblical accounts, religious propaganda accompanies accounts of war and conquest. City states, kingdoms, and empires portrayed war as contests between their gods, with the people of the strongest deity sweeping to victory, advertising their god’s victories to consolidate dominance and intimidate rivals. (A wellknown example would be Darius I’s inscriptions at Behistun.) The use of the ban (annihilation of captured goods, livestock, and even populations) at the commands of the gods spread terror to nearby communities, as were military atrocities used by the Assyrians to demonstrate the superiority of their gods and armies. Wars were acts of obedience and necessity initiated and presided over by divinities. For monotheistic religions, victory was celebrated as divine judgment against the defeated, publicized by oracles, pronouncements, monuments, and the ruins left behind. During the Axial Age—roughly 800–200 BCE—a prophetic note arose: moral and ethical purity became more important than correct performance of ritual or ceremonial obligations. The Axial Age is a term coined by German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) and is considered to have been an era in which developments in religions and philosophy flourished. In the days of the prophets of Israel and Judah, victory or defeat depended on the will of Yahweh, who judged between those combatants characterized by faithfulness or apostasy, and freely used heathen and apostate armies (such as Babylon) to punish his own nation. The devastation, especially ruined temples and burned city gates, remained silent examples of triumphalist propaganda. During Hellenistic times the adoption of divine status by kings and emperors, led by Alexander the Great (356–323 BCE), established cults of devotion linked

to the prowess of armies, and the conquests arising as kings and emperors strove for supremacy led to imperial cults into Roman times. Legion commanders served as pontifeces to their units, taking auguries, lending religious confidence or dismay to accounts of victories and defeats. In the Judeo-Christian traditions and in modern Western ideologies (which form the remainder of this entry) war became the enterprise under which Christians, originally repelled from service in the Roman Army for its emperor-worship, could serve enthusiastically as the Godordained instrument to defend and spread the faith. Eusebius’s accounts of the Christian Empire as God’s servant opened military service and Roman military propaganda to messages of Christian providence. The Greek and Latin fathers set out criteria for just and unjust wars, and guidelines for the conduct of generals and soldiers. Popes proclaimed crusades, or holy wars, to recover and protect the Holy Lands of the Bible, promising indulgences and other spiritual benefits for those who served or fell in battle. The old Latin cry, “Deus vult!” (“God wills it”), appeared again during the Wars of the Reformation, ironically used between Christian armies fighting each other rather than non-Christian adversaries. The use of the printing press added new media in word and cartoon or print to motivate Christendom for religious war. Numerous examples of what today is called psychological warfare featured in cartoons, satirical sculptures, songs, plays, and battle cries used by belligerents on both sides. Lucas Cranach’s (1472– 1553) earthy woodcuts, reams of pamphlets, as well as Catholic depictions of Luther as a seven-headed monster still appear in standard textbooks on the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. At the same time, similar methods were used to rally support and soldiers for ongoing wars with the Ottoman Turks. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, religious and military propaganda again worked hand in glove. Abolitionists stoked the fires for war against slavery with appeals to religion on both sides of the Atlantic. Nationalists drew on their nation- and culture-founding saints and religious heroes, history, mythology, iconography, religious epics, and hymns. Leafing through the posters used for recruiting, fund drives, material conservation, or industrial production produces handfuls of examples of such symbols in use, while strategic use of hymns, maxims, and

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scriptural quotations to delegitimize the enemy and enhance national self-righteousness abound. Depictions of atrocities or historical disinformation were juxtaposed with religious icons, especially portraying soldiers as redemptive sacrifices in the footsteps of Christ, while burning cathedrals and churches desecrated as stables branded enemy forces as barbaric and even demonic. God was invoked, for example, by governments, churches, and sometimes other public institutions doing war work, and religious publications carried throughout the war advertisements for war work, income taxes, and enlistment as all being forms of religious service—as missionary work in the greatest test of Christian civilization, total war. Canadian religious magazines such as the Methodist Christian Guardian and Anglican Canadian Churchman promoted war measures ranging from income tax to war bonds with advertisements implying, and in 1918 stating, that had God not been on Britain’s—and Canada’s—side, the 1914 German offensive against an unprepared empire would have prevailed. During the First World War this religious tone was often shrill and became so excessive that a postwar backlash away from any use of overtly religious propaganda in the service of war arose. Ironically, it was during this interwar period that religious-based propaganda was used to incite violence and hatred against religiously unique and isolated social groups, and at the same time prepare nations for war in future. Russian revolutionaries developed anticlerical propaganda and exploited every means available to impress citizens with the socialist faith in the progress of the workers, later the godlike paternal characteristics of Stalin. Totalitarian societies blended the courting of some religious authorities with subverting and reinterpreting doctrines, church identities, and national concerns. The most obvious case was the use of religious symbolism by the Nazi Party in Germany during the 1930s (though the concordats signed by Franco and Mussolini gave their fascist regimes the appearance of Catholic defenders). Here opposition to atheistic Bolshevism by fascists and Nazis alike wooed anxious churchgoers and lowered their resistance to extreme policies against minorities such as Jews and other groups characterized as sub- or anti-Christian. During the Second World War religious motives were a basis of appeal to all Western nations, ranging from posters promoting Hitler’s German

Christian movement to American appeals to Christianity and Judaism. In one poster Hitler hoists the swastika banner as a brown-shirted crusader, an eagle appearing over his right shoulder descending from the heavens, bordered by oak leaves and Gothic archways. An Allied poster depicts a Bible stabbed through by a bayonet held by a swastikabearing hand. Americans were told by the bayonet-wielding boxer, Joe Lewis, that blacks would enlist, confident of Allied triumph because they were on God’s side. Postwar decolonization and the Cold War era led to both retrenchment and expansion of religion-based political and ethnic propaganda. Western Christian societies were warned repeatedly of the atheistic policies and atrocities committed by Communists in China, Vietnam, and North Korea. Broadcast media leaped across the electronic spectrum to high-frequency radio and television. During and after the Korean War the general fear in the West of “Communist brainwashing” contributed to general paranoia as well as church leaders endorsing nuclear war. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Balkans became a war zone where ethnicity and religious identities marked friend from foe and justified near-genocides. As angry fragments of most world religions link their survival with political and military power, often replacing secular political movements, internal crusades, or religious battles, riots, atrocities, and even wars have perpetuated concepts such as crusade, the warlike jihad, persecution of religious minorities caught within boundaries of nationstates, and the battle of Israel for survival. Every media available lends itself to editorials passing as advertisements and by pseudo-documentaries or well-produced “advertorials.” Logical fallacies and old blood-libels still are propagated as truth, to isolate, denigrate, and undermine the “other,” often with claims that a theoretical window of opportunity is about to close. Many examples of Internet propaganda range from biased news reporting to selectively edited and sensationalized quotations of the Qur’an, as well as depictions of atrocities past or present, real or immortalized in folk memory, intended to break down social solidarity, undermine accommodations, and wreck the internal peace of societies around the world. In war the first casualty is truth, and religious truth is not immune from the same effects. Duff Crerar

Religious Wars and Mortality Rates  683 See also Al Qaeda; French Wars of Religion; Spanish Civil War, Religious Dimensions of; Wars of the Reformation Further Reading Cunningham, Stanley B. “Reflections on the Interface Between Propaganda and Religion.” In P. Rennick, S. Cunningham, and R. H. Johnson, eds. The Future of Religion. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars, 2010, pp. 83–96. Dickens, A. G. Reformation and Society in Sixteenth Century Europe. London: Thames and Hudson, 1971. Ebel, Jonathan. Faith in the Fight: Religion and the American Soldier in the Great War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Ellul, Jacques. Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes. Translated by Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner. New York: Knopf, 1965. Heath, Gordon. A War with a Silver Lining: Canadian Protestant Churches and the South African War, 1899–1902. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009. Hindery, Roderick. “The Anatomy of Propaganda within Religious Terrorism.” Humanist (March–April 2003): 16–19. Stoll, Mark. “Crusaders against Communism, Witnesses for Peace: Religion in the American West and the Cold War.” In Kevin Fernlund, ed. The Cold War American West, 1944– 1989. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998.

Religious Wars and Mortality Rates The term religious war refers to the notion that there is an identifiable class of warfare compelled and validated by the desire to propagate or defend a religious faith. The phrase religious wars and mortality rates implies an identifiable link between religious wars and the rate at which war deaths occur. If many scholars reject the claim that religion caused the bloodiest wars in history, it is indisputable that religion, violence, and war are fixed features in human experience. Religious significance has been assigned routinely to all aspects of war. Historically, religious signs justified going to war, validated victories as evidence of godly power, and explained defeats as failures of faith. The earliest war fought for religious reasons was the second-century BCE revolt by Jewish dissidents called Maccabees against the Seleucid Empire. At Emmaus, the Maccabees ambushed, and then pursued and slaughtered Seleucid soldiers as they fled. In this case, the Maccabees

rebelled to gain the freedom to practice their own religion and not to impose their religion on others. The first army in history motivated by a coherent religious ideology was created and led by Muhammad (d. 632 CE) in the last decade of his life. His soldiers saw themselves as the instruments of God’s will and believed they fought under God’s instructions against nonbelievers. Other armies, including some crusader armies, also fought with the approval of religious authority as divine instruments, killing and pillaging heretics with impunity. Such wars are exceptions, however. The crusades, often portrayed as exclusively fought between Christian and Muslim, included campaigns against Christians, as when Venice sacked Christian Constantinople in 1204. Also, despite clear commands that a believer should never kill another believer, Islamic armies regularly risked eternal punishment to fight their co-religionists, such as in the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War, for political and economic advantage. Both examples suggest that religion is not the only operative motive. The concept of mortality rates in religious war is also confused, especially before the 20th century when the most prolific wartime killer was disease. Rate refers to a measureable change in a quantifiable variable over time, so mortality rates ought to measure the number of deaths over time, possibly by engagement, battle, campaign, or war. However, there is great uncertainty in wartime statistics and in scholars’ ability to construct valid comparisons to show that religious wars were significantly different. For example, a battle may be defined as a military engagement between opposing groups of soldiers. Valid comparisons must indicate numbers engaged, weapons used, and duration, to name a few of the key elements. At Emmaus, only a few thousand soldiers fought using hand weapons, the battle was over in hours, and the bloody chase of the fleeing enemy extended only a few miles. These elements, however, indicate that despite the religious motive, Emmaus was quite unremarkable. At Marathon (490 BCE), the outnumbered Greeks chased thousands of panicked Persians into the surf and killed them. The historian Arrian recorded that at Issus (333 BCE) Alexander the Great’s pursuit of the Persian king, Darius, led across a ravine filled with the bodies of dead Persians. The same pattern endured for centuries in other wars without religious consequence.

684  Rhodes, Siege of (1522–1523)

Even at its worst, the most extreme violence done by these armies was constrained in the end, since it was necessary to preserve an underclass to tax, to exploit, and to rule. For example, successful wars of conquest by Islamic armies eventually led to compromises with nonbelievers, most of whom were tolerated with diminished status in return for paying special taxes and other considerations. This is not unique; the same pattern recurs in nonreligious conquests throughout history, such as by Manchus in China, British rule in India, Japanese rule in 1940s Southeast Asia, and Europeans in Africa, to name a few. If religious wars cannot be distinguished from other conflicts of their times by their mortality rates, neither are they notable historically for the total numbers engaged and killed. The wars that have produced the largest total number of dead were the world wars of the 20th century. Neither was a religious war, unless fascism and communism are viewed as secular quasi-religions. During the French Revolution such a faith was deliberately constructed in service to the revolutionary state, and many scholars now accept that some definitions of religion are broad enough to admit some nontheistic secular systems such as secular humanism, nationalism, and Marxism, to be listed among religious faiths, perhaps providing new evidence to the contention that religious wars cause the greatest destruction and inflict the most casualties. Larry A. Grant See also Crusades (Overview); Constantinople, Arab Sieges of; Iran-Iraq War; Maccabean Revolt Further Reading Armstrong, Karen. Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence. New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2014. Benthall, Jonathan. Returning to Religion: Why a Secular Age Is Haunted by Faith. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2008. Block, Thomas. Fatal Addiction: War in the Name of God. New York: Algora, 2012. Gabriel, Richard A. Muhammad: Islam’s First Great General. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014. Hedges, Chris. War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning. New York: PublicAffairs, 2002. Pearse, Meic. The Gods of War: Is Religion the Primary Cause of Violent Conflict? Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2007. Popovski, Vesselin, et al., eds. World Religions and Norms of War. New York: United Nations University Press, 2009.

Rhodes, Siege of (1522–1523) The Siege of Rhodes, part of the Ottoman Wars, began on July 26, 1522, and lasted until the cessation of fighting on December 22 and the final withdrawal of Christian troops on January 1, 1523. The conflict involved a long-term besieging by the Ottoman Empire of the island fortifications of Rhodes, which at the time were controlled by the Christian alliance of the Knights Hospitaller and the Republic of Venice, led by Philippe Villiers de L’Isle-Adam (1464– 1534). The goal of the Ottoman attack was to rid the region of Christian influence and reassert Turkish authority in the eastern Mediterranean along an important trade route. The result of the assault was the Ottoman annexation of Rhodes, which demonstrated Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent’s (1494–1566) strength and ensured Turkish control of the region until the 17th century. While both the settlement and fortifications on Rhodes, located off the coast of Asia Minor, had existed since the second century BCE, each had repeatedly been rebuilt and redesigned throughout the 15th and 16th centuries in response to new weaponry and military tactics. Since 1309, the island of Rhodes had been controlled by the Knights of St. John and developed as a Christian settlement. It also included an extensive system of fortifications, which had successfully repulsed the first series of Ottoman attacks, led by Sultan Mehmed bin Murad Khan, known as Mehmed the Conqueror (1432–1481), in 1480–1481. The geographic, strategic, and economic importance of Rhodes, along with the Ottoman sultan’s growing desire to control the island, led concerned members of the Knights Hospitaller to strengthen the settlement’s fortifications in the early 16th century. As a result, by 1520 Rhodes was among the strongest fortifications of the period, having thicker walls and internal defences divided into sections, each manned by dedicated legions or langue of knights from different nations. The island’s location meant that Rhodes had also become part of regional trade and shipping routes and was being utilized by Christian forces to disrupt Turkish-Muslim trade networks and limit Ottoman expansion into the region. Given Süleyman’s interest in the island, noted military successes, and expertise in the use of cannon and siege strategy, Villiers, the ruler of Rhode’s forces, had anticipated

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an attack and requested assistance from other European nations and Christian orders. Despite receiving only a few responses, given the size of the Turkish naval fleet and army, the defenders at Rhodes had sufficient time to make preparations, which included chaining and protecting the main harbor, as well as removing potential supplies from around the island. On July 28, 1522, Süleyman’s naval forces, several hundred strong, blockaded the island and began a cannon and mortar barrage on Rhodes, which was soon followed by the landing of between 100,000 and 200,000 soldiers. By comparison, the Knights of Rhodes were composed of an army that was between 6,000 and 8,000 strong. In the fall of 1522, following several months of sustained bombardment, Süleyman’s army began assaulting Rhodes and strove to undermine the fortification’s walls with sappers. Despite the constant barrage, overwhelming forces against them, repeated Ottoman assaults, and deteriorating fortifications, the Knights of Rhodes defended their stronghold throughout much of the year. In late September, Süleyman’s sappers collapsed a number of wall sections, shifting much of the fighting into the settlement and leading a number of districts in Rhodes to be briefly conquered, including the Tower of Spain. By November 1522, it became apparent that the Knights of Rhodes, as well as the citizens of the region, could no longer resist the ongoing siege. Therefore, the grand master of Rhodes, Philippe Villiers de L’Isle-Adam, having few soldiers and knights remaining, contending with breached walls, declining food provisions, and dwindling gunpower supplies, accepted Süleyman’s terms for surrender on December 20, 1522. The remaining Christian forces left Rhodes on January 1, 1523, and were allowed to take religious relics and promised the protection of Christian churches. The released Knights Hopitaller would soon move to defend Malta, where they would again face Süleyman. Ultimately the Siege of Rhodes resulted in a victory for the Turkish forces and the annexation of the island fortification by the Ottoman Empire. This victory demonstrated Süleyman’s strength and resolve to secure the region, expand the Ottoman Empire, and control trade in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, given his success at Rhodes, Süleyman went on to attack Mohacs (1526), Vienna (1529), Baghdad (1534), and Malta (1565), solidifying his authority

and the influence of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and Europe until the 17th century. Sean Morton See also Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035); Knights Templar; Malta, Siege of; Ottoman Empire; Süleyman the Magnificent Further Reading Atil, Esin. The Age of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent. Washington, DC: National Gallery of Art, 1987. Brockman, E. The Two Sieges of Rhodes: The Knights of St. John at War, 1480–1522. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1996. Imber, C. The Ottoman Empire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Sahin, Kaya. Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman: Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) (632–633 CE) Prophet Muhammad’s death on June 8, 632, in Medina sparked a struggle over power that developed into the Ridda Wars, or Wars of Apostasy (ridda, riddah), which lasted until June 633. The Quraish leadership at Medina, under Abu Bakr, ultimately triumphed, and the stage was set for the vast Islamic conquests that followed. As the Muslims considered who should succeed Prophet Muhammed, Abu Bakr, the Prophet’s father-in-law, and two close companions discreetly solicited the support of major political leaders within the umma (Muslim community). In a hastily assembled tribal election (shura), they secured the vote (bay‘ah) for Abu Bakr. Yet, recognizing Abu Bakr as the Prophet’s successor (caliph) did not resolve the problems facing the nascent Islamic polity, which was confronted by strong tribal insurrections. The Islamic chroniclers claim that Muslim armies were forced to take the field against Arab converts who abandoned Islam. But it would appear that the campaigns were initiated by Muhammad’s successor to strengthen the very tenuous hold the Muslims had over areas in Arabia. Many tribes were upset by the rapid rise of the Muslim faction in Medina

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and Mecca; some of them joined Muhammad to get a share of the Muslim booty, and their act may have been simply political. Other tribes appear to have reacted against the Prophet’s teachings and proclaimed their own prophets as well. Musailima, a self-proclaimed prophet, was supported by the Banu Hanifa in the Yamamah region (central Arabia), while another self-proclaimed prophet, Tulaiha, led a tribal alliance in north-central Arabia. The Ridda campaigns involved a combination of diplomacy and force. In July 632, Abu Bakr sent envoys to the apostate tribes, calling upon them to remain loyal and continue paying zakat (alm-giving tax). Many tribes refused the demand and mobilized their forces at Dhu al Qassa (about 30 miles east of Medina) in preparation for an attack on the Muslim capital city. However, on August 1, Abu Bakr led his Muslim forces in a dawn attack that drove the Bedouins into the desert. In September, as the Muslim troops campaigning in Palestine returned home, Abu Bakr divided his army into 11 corps, entrusting them to experienced commanders, including Amr ibn al-As (the future conqueror of Egypt) and Khalid ibn al-Walid, who was given command of the largest contingent. Each commander was given a specific objective and required to offer the apostates the choice of returning to Islam or facing the consequences. The Muslim corps soon fanned out throughout the Arabian peninsula, attacking tribesmen as far as Bahrain, Oman, and Yemen. In September-October, Khalid ibn al-Walid conducted a victorious campaign in central Arabia, defeating the Tulaiha-led alliance at Buzakha and Ghamra and scoring victories over rebellious tribes at Naqra, Zafar, and Butah, forcing local tribes to recognize the caliph’s authority. Khalid’s campaign, however, also caused a major political scandal following his violent attack on Banu Tamim (Temeem), whose leader, Malik ibn Nuwayrah, was a Muslim and appointed by the Prophet himself to collect taxes in northeastern Arabia. Suspecting these tribesmen of apostasy, Khalid had Malik and his supporters killed in cold blood, despite their professions of being Muslims. His decision to marry Malik’s wife Layla (Leila), renowned for her beauty throughout Arabia, within just 24 hours of her husband’s death and his plundering of the tribal property, gave rise to the suspicion that Khalid acted out of personal interests rather than religious or political considerations. Outraged Muslims complained

about Khalid’s actions to Abu Bakr but he chose to ignore them, well aware of the military prowess of the man some called “the Sword of Allah.” At first, the Muslim campaign was less successful in eastern Arabia, where Musailima scored a victory over the Muslim commander Ikrimah ibn Abi-Jahl, who ignored his orders to wait for Khalid and rushed to battle. In late December 632, however, the Muslims concentrated their forces, including the victorious Khalid ibn al-Walid, and scored a decisive victory over Musailima’s army in the battle of Yemama (Yamama). This victory proved to have enormous consequences as the destruction of major rebel forces sapped resistance in the region. In the meantime, Muslims scored important successes elsewhere. In November, Hudaifa ibn Mihsan, later supported by Ikrimah, defeated the Omani chief Dhul Taj at Daba and subdued most of Oman by early 633. By the spring of 633, the Muslims also expanded their control to Yemen, where a series of self-proclaimed prophets incited anti-Muslim rebellions. Ula bin al Hadhrami also successfully campaigned in Bahrain, which accepted Islam and the caliph’s authority. In the Handhramaut region (south Arabia), the Muslims overcame the resistance of the powerful Kinda tribe, scoring an important victory at Nujair. Thus, by April 633, the Ridda Wars gave Abu Bakr control of the Arabian Peninsula and its warring tribes. Emphasizing the unity of all Muslims, the caliphs prohibited tribes from raiding for sport or conducting warfare to offset economic hardship. Yet with limited grazing and agricultural lands, and no longer able to target enemies to relieve distress, Arabia came to resemble a boiling pot about to spill its contents. Had nothing changed, there is the possibility, indeed the probability that the umma would have imploded. The solution, however, was to direct this energy outward, initiating the Islamic conquests. Andrew J. Waskey See also Khalid ibn al Walid; Muhammad as Warrior Further Reading Donner, Fred M., trans. The History of al-Tabari: The Conquest of Arabia. Vol. 10. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993. Glubb, John Bagot. The Great Arab Conquests. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1963.

Ritual and War  687 Kennedy, Hugh. The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In. Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2007. Shufani, Ilyas. Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.

Ritual and War Since antiquity, religious ritual has been inextricably linked with the practice of warfare. The importance of sacred ritual, which may be defined as a formalized, collective, or institutionalized kind of repetitive action having religious meaning, to organized warfare may be discerned not only in societies’ preparations for war but also in their conduct of war itself. The performance of sacred ritual during preparations for war was generally considered necessary for battlefield success, especially during the ancient and medieval eras. In ancient Greece, a ritual sacrifice and study of omens by prophets and oracles—such as that at Delphi—were standard prebattle procedures. The ancient Romans also valued the correct performance of sacred rites and ritual observances in times of war, believing that if war were waged without divine approval, Rome would suffer defeat. In late republican and early imperial Rome, the Senate proscribed military operations on days deemed sacred to Juno and Jupiter. Priests played key roles in war deliberations and official ceremonies accompanying declarations of war. One of the most ancient Roman rites involved the fetiales, 20 priests who conducted ritual declarations of war and peace. While the Senate and people formally declared war, the fetiales ensured that divine agreement with a decision for war was fulfilled correctly. When an offense was committed by a neighboring state, three fetial ambassadors went to demand redress. If Roman demands were rejected, the priests stood at the border, promised the gods that Rome was innocent of provoking war, and heaved a bloody spear with a fire-hardened tip into enemy territory. The fetiales also prayed to the gods for success in war and consecrated subsequent peace treaties by sacrificing a pig. On campaign, the most important camp ritual appears to have been the suovetaurilia, a purificatory offering performed before

battle, in which a ram, pig, and bull were ritually garlanded, led around the camp’s perimeter, and then sacrificed. The centrality of religious ritual to the conduct of war is perhaps illustrated most aptly in the case of the Aztecs, whose empire flourished in central Mexico from the 1420s until 1521. A collection of Nahuatl-speaking peoples, the Aztecs often employed warfare as a means of procuring captives for human sacrifice, even if the extent of warfare and the Aztec practice of it exceeded any religious imperative. Aztec warriors entered battle painted and adorned with sacred regalia and attempted to subdue individual captives in single combat. Priests accompanied Aztec armies on the march, bearing statues of their deities and performing the sacrifice of the first enemy captured in battle. Seizing and burning an enemy town’s main temple was a classic symbol of conquest, though this act was also performed to obliterate the most visible sign of the adversary’s wealth and importance. At the conclusion of battles, priests administered religious rituals surrounding the cremation of the dead. Ritual practices of piety on campaign were not always explicitly connected with the enactment of violence, as the 16th- and 17th-century European Wars of Religion reveal. Both Catholic and Protestant warrior nobles in France, for instance, routinely attended religious services on campaign and performed acts of personal devotion and lay religiosity. Members of new Catholic religious orders such as the Jesuits served as military chaplains, conducting Mass and hearing soldiers’ confessions. While the more overtly religious aspects of war-related ritual have largely diminished in Western culture, such characteristics persist, in particular among Muslims who esteem the ideal of martyrdom. In light of post-Qur’anic traditions exalting the heavenly rewards of martyrdom in combat, many Muslims have actively sought to participate in the “ritual of martyrdom” in battle against sectarian opponents and non-Muslim armies. According to certain Muslim teachings, battlefield martyrs attain the highest level of martyrdom, as a martyr’s death in combat is the pinnacle of the believer’s aspirations and the most honorable way to depart this life. Some late 20th-century Islamic martyrological literature praises jihad and self-sacrifice in battle as both a ritual act and the enactment of God’s will. Gregory D. Bereiter

688  Roland, Song of (La Chanson de Roland) See also French Wars of Religion; Islam and War (Jihad); Martyrs, Jesuit; Religious Propaganda and War Further Reading Bahrani, Zainab. Rituals of War: The Body and Violence in Mesopotamia. New York: Zone Books, 2008. Berchman, Robert M. “Religion, Ritual and War in the Late Roman Republic.” In Jacob Neusner, Bruce D. Chilton, and R. E. Tully, eds. Just War in Religion and Politics. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2013, pp. 51–68. Harrison, Simon. The Mask of War: Violence, Ritual, and the Self in Melanesia. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993. Hassig, Ross. Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995. Hatina, Meir. Martyrdom in Modern Islam: Piety, Power, and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Seeman, Erik R. The Huron-Wendat Feast of the Dead: IndianEuropean Encounters in Early North America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011.

Roland, Song of (La Chanson de Roland ) This millennium-era French epic poem (written approximately 1040–1115 CE by the Norman poet Turold) is a seminal classic describing and defining the essence of knighthood, war, interfaith conflict between Christians and Muslims, kingly leadership, France, and the narrative art that it so profoundly exhibits. It portrays a military expedition to northwest Spain that went profoundly awry, particularly in the Battle of Ronceveaux in 778 AD. It is considered the earliest and in many ways the best of the “songs of deeds” (chansons de geste) that mark the genesis of recognizably French literature. The battle’s background lies in Charles Martel’s decisive halt of Muslim expansion in Europe at the Battle of Tours (732), followed by recovery of Frankish lands up to the Pyrenees mountains by himself and his sons. His grandson Charlemagne made a foray across the mountains into northwest Spain, for reasons including expansion of his kingdom and recovery of that land, too, from Muslim rule. This campaign stands out as his only military failure. He could not prosecute the siege of Saragossa to success; then

withdrew through then-pagan Basque lands, ravaging their cities and raising their revengeful ire. They attacked and annihilated his rear guard, led in part by his nephew Roland, prefect of the March of Brittany, near the mountain pass village of Ronceveaux, as Roland’s guard force protected Charlemagne’s main force moving homeward. The Song of Roland was not written until three centuries later, though its oral sources and expression may have been widely known. It is not primarily focused on MuslimChristian conflict—though the foes in the battle are changed from Basques to Muslims. That larger conflict, rather, serves as background for an internal conflict—indeed, an interfamily conflict—among Charlemagne’s forces. It is this internal conflict, complete with betrayal, treachery, valiant response, and tense aftermath, that makes for the meat of the song. Following the Muslim king Marsile’s surrender and submission to Charlemagne—and even his putative conversion to Christianity—Roland proposes that his stepfather Ganelon serve as ambassador at Marsile’s court. Ganelon, fearing his murder at Muslim hands, betrays the Franks’ marching plan to the Muslims, who mount a surprise attack on the Frankish rear guard—led by Roland, the object of Ganelon’s revenge. Roland heroically refuses to use his signal horn to request reinforcement from the main body, enabling their escape, but at the cost of his own noble death and the deaths of all his soldiers. Ganelon is later accused by a witness to his treachery, is tried by Charlemagne, and is judged guilty by his loss in single combat with his accuser. The song highlights idealized Christian character, knightly virtues, chivalrous code, self-sacrifice, and cheerful constancy in the face of betrayal. It implicitly teaches that the greatest challenge to character and success is internal, not external, opposition. Internal strife was in fact the bane of both Christian and Muslim states in Spain throughout the seven centuries of their conflict. The side that could best address such debilitating challenges would win. The song is brilliant and beautiful in its language, pathos, poetic structure, storytelling power, and overall literary merit. It is a core treasure of French language and culture that still speaks of the highest of humanity’s themes. Mark A. Jumper

Roman Army and Religion  689 See also Charlemagne’s Conquests; Knighthood, Christian Ideal of; Tours, Battle of Further Reading Brault, Gerard J. The Song of Roland: An Analytical Edition. University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978. Fouracre, Paul. The Age of Charles Martel. Medieval World. London: Longman, 2000. Nicolle, David. Poitiers AD 732: Charles Martel Turns the Islamic Tide. Vol. 190 of Osprey’s Campaign Series. Illustrated by Graham Turner. London: Osprey, 2008.

Roman Army and Religion Various religious sentiments impacted the Roman army. There was an official state religion that focused upon the emperor, the state gods, and the military unit. Foreign religions also influenced the army. There was no separation of religion and the state. During the early years of the Roman Empire, the majority of soldiers were citizens and had a common religious background. However, auxiliary soldiers brought their own religious beliefs. These soldiers increased in number as time went on. Within the army, the official state religion included ceremonies and rituals with sacrifices to the state gods, the emperor, and his family. Rome’s ideological power was united with its imperial theology. The emperor was afforded certain honors of deity during his life. The logic was that the gods run the world and because the emperor runs the world he was associated with the gods. Auxiliary soldiers were included in the official state religious ceremonies. These ceremonies promoted unity within the military, a kind of “religious Romanization” of foreign soldiers. The officers of the unit were responsible for these ceremonies. The official state religion did not require priests. The papyrus Feriale Duranum, which dates from the early third century CE, lists the official religious festivals and sacrifices for a typical Roman military unit. Vows and sacrifices are made to Roman leaders and gods, including Jupiter and Mars. There is a celebration for the emperor’s birthday as well as his accession to the throne. Even though many foreign auxiliary soldiers are in the unit, the papyrus

contains no mention of foreign gods. This indicates that one of the purposes of the official religion was to Romanize auxiliary soldiers. By their participation they showed their loyalty to Rome and the emperor. Religious significance was also attached to the military standards carried by each legion. The standards were in the form of an eagle and were called the aquila. Sacrifices were made to this sacred emblem of military unity. In camp, it was kept in a chapel-like structure. The standards were emblems of divinity. With the expansion of the Roman Empire, as well as through contact with auxiliary soldiers, soldiers came into contact with foreign gods and mystery religions from the East. In the case of the mystery religions, in many instances, they provided things the official state religion did not. These included a more personal relationship with the divine as well as mystical experiences. Many scholars feel they sometimes offered the hope of life after death. The mystery religions flourished in the Hellenistic period among those who wanted a more personally satisfying religious experience. They were secret groups of individuals who were initiated into the teachings of a particular god. They put a premium on inward and private worship within these private groups, as opposed to official religions that were outward and public. Soldiers, however, joined the mystery religions for a number of reasons. Some joined, no doubt, because of loneliness, alienation, or boredom. They may have simply wanted to be a member of a kind of social club. Others probably joined out of curiosity, since they were popular among the general population. Since many officers dedicated altars to the god Mithras, it was also in some cases beneficial for career progression. The idea that soldiers would participate in the official state religion as well as in mystery religions is a demonstration of the polytheistic nature of Roman religion. Soldiers were syncretistic in their religious practices. They would incorporate local gods into their religious system. They were superstitious and believed that the local gods would be of assistance when soldiers were in the area under the control of these gods. Soldiers would often adopt the local religious practices. This probably explains the actions of Roman soldiers such as the centurion at Capernaum and Cornelius (Luke 7; Acts 10). Auxiliary soldiers would

690  Roman Emperor Worship

continue worshiping the gods of their home countries while participating in the state religions. A few mystery religions had large followings in the military. One, Iuppiter Dolichenus, involved the worship of the Hittite storm god. Its influence began in 64 BCE with Rome’s annexation of Syria. It infiltrated the army due to its emphasis on power. In the second century there are altars dedicated to the god by Roman military leaders. Like some emperors and other gods, this god was proclaimed to be the savior of the world. The mystery religion that had the greatest following in the Roman army was probably the worship of Mithras. There is wide disagreement about the origins and teachings of the cult, but there is general agreement that it promoted an emphasis on certain ethics. Later Christian writers said it was a counterfeit of Christianity. Kenneth Wayne Yates See also Mars, Roman God of War; Roman Emperor Worship; Roman Religion, Mythology, and War Further Reading Beard, Mary, John North, and Simon Price. Religions of Rome. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Cumont, Franz. The Mysteries of Mithra. Translated by Thomas J. McCormack. New York: Dover Publications, 1956. Goldsworthy, Adrian. The Complete Roman Army. London: Thames & Hudson, 2003. Meyer, Marvin W., ed. The Ancient Mysteries: Sacred Texts of the Mystery Religions of the Ancient Mediterranean World. San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1987. Price, S. R. F. Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Speidel, Michael P. The Religion of Iuppiter Dolichenus in the Roman Army. Leiden: Brill, 1978. Vermaseren, M. J. Mithras, the Secret God. London: Chatto & Windus, 1963.

Roman Emperor Worship In the Roman Empire, the idea of worshipping the emperor is summarized in the Greek word apotheosis. It is the granting of god-like stature to a man. Deified people would be awarded the title divus. Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE) was

the first Roman divus and was even considered a god while living. This practice was facilitated by a couple of factors. The gods provided benefits to the people and the emperor did as well. He was therefore the representative of the gods on earth. In addition, as Rome conquered more territory, some of these nations worshipped their kings as gods. This morphed into the worship of the emperor. The Roman emperors Augustus (r. 27 BCE–14 AD) and Tiberius (r. 14 AD–37 AD) tried to stem the tide by saying that the power in the emperor, and not the living emperor himself, should be worshipped. Even though Augustus prohibited the worship of the living emperor, it was done in the provinces. The army was more prone to worship the living emperor than the common people. Deceased emperors would be granted apotheosis by their successor and a vote of the Senate. Temples would be built and columns erected in their honor. This resulted in an imperial cult. This cult offered the citizens identity and stability. This worship became a test of loyalty to Rome. Devotion, even to the living emperor, was devotion to the one on whom the survival of all depended. His birthday, marriage, and even important dates in his family were celebrated. After his death, on the occasion of his “ascension” to the gods, the doors of houses were adorned with laurels, lamps were lit, and the people celebrated. He acted like a god during his lifetime. After death he was properly deified. Kenneth Wayne Yates See also Mars, Roman God of War; Roman Army and Religion; Roman Religion, Mythology, and War Further Reading Fantin, Joseph D. The Lord of the Entire World: Lord Jesus, a Challenge to Lord Caesar? New Testament Monographs, vol. 31. Edited by Stanley E. Porter. Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2011. Gates, Marie-Henriette. “Dura-Europos: A Fortress of SyroMesopotamian Art.” Biblical Archaeologist 47 (1984): 166–81. Herz, Peter. “Sacrifice and Sacrificial Ceremonies of the Roman Imperial Army.” In Albert I. Baumgarten, ed. Sacrifice in Religious Experience. Numen Book Series Studies in the History of Religions. Edited by W. J. Hanegraaff. Vol. 93. Leiden: Brill, 2002, pp. 81–100.

Roman Religion, Mythology, and War  691 Kavanaugh, Dennis J. “The Ambiguity of Mark’s Use of Huios Theou in Mark 15:39.” PhD diss., Dallas Theological Seminary, 2011. Nilsson, Martin P. Imperial Rome. New York: Schocken Books, 1962. Orlin, Eric M. Temples, Religion, and Politics in the Roman Republic. Leiden: Brill, 2002. Turcan, Robert. The Gods of Ancient Rome: Religion in Everyday Life from Archaic to Imperial Times. Translated by Antonia Nevill. New York: Routledge, 2000.

Roman Religion, Mythology, and War Warfare was a significant part of Roman mythology and religion. The Romans were generally very polytheistic, worshipping many gods, most of which were very similar to those found in Greek mythology. The Romans were also syncretistic, which means that they added the gods of other nations to their religious beliefs. Roman mythology was not as highly developed as was that of the Greeks. In ancient Rome, the gods were seen as spirits or powers, and as both natural and abstract forces. The Greek gods were more anthropomorphic and had personalities. The Greeks did have an influence on Roman mythology, but throughout the time of the Roman Empire the Romans continued to worship vague spirits who were associated with a place or activity. The gods represented the practical needs of daily life. One influence that the Greeks had on Roman mythology is that the major Roman gods were made parallel to the Greek gods. A triad of Roman gods emerged. Originally, this triad was Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus. Later, it was Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva. Even though there were many religions in the empire, there was an official state religion. The growth of the state religion can be traced to two objects. The first object was the triad of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva. The second was the emperor. One important myth for Rome concerned its founding. It was founded by the twins Romulus and Remus. Their mother was the daughter of a deposed king. She was impregnated by the god Mars. After being thrown into the Tiber River to drown, the twins were saved and then nursed by a she-wolf. They reestablished the throne of their grandfather in the

place where they were rescued. Through the flight of birds, the gods revealed that the capital would be called after Romulus. Romulus became a successful general and founded the first temple to Jupiter. He offered the spoils of war to this god. Romulus did not die. He was transported to heaven during a military parade. He was given divine stature and the name Quirinus. This paves the way for later emperors to be declared divine after their deaths. At the death of the emperor, soldiers would give the deceased ruler military honors. He was set upon a pyre, which was set on fire. An eagle was placed on the corpse. When it flew off, this signified that the soul of the emperor had flown to the gods. He became one of them. Later Roman generals would follow the example of the myth of Romulus. After approval by the Senate, victorious ones would enter Rome in a military procession. Sometimes, they would dress up as the god Jupiter. Strict religious rules would apply, with the general riding a chariot, followed by magistrates, senators, soldiers, the spoils of war, and sacrifices. The temple of Jupiter would often be the site of these sacrifices. Temples were also often built in Rome to the gods because of the vows made to them. The generals would build these temples, perhaps funded by the spoils of war. These temples would be an offering of thanks to the god as well as a permanent reminder to the people of the general’s success. It was also common before battle to make vows to the gods. During the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE), for example, the commander made a vow to Jupiter that every animal born in the spring of a particular year would be sacrificed to him if he would give the army success for five years. If the gods did not fulfill what was asked of them, what was vowed to them would be withheld. In wartime, this amounted to a contract between the soldiers and their gods. The army leaders would dedicate altars and monuments to these gods. These gods could be foreign gods as well. Mars was the Roman god of war, and many such dedications were made to him. They would also make sacrifices to him. Even though the official office did not exist, in this way the leaders of the army would act as priests. These monuments and altars were often erected on foreign soil.

692  Roman Religion, Mythology, and War

The gods inhabited the upper heavens and the underworld. There were domestic gods to appease. They could cause disease or prevent them. Other gods were the ones responsible for victory in war, and the people saw their success as the result of the approval of the gods. The state needed to obtain this approval before action could be taken. The gods could communicate their will or feelings through a variety of ways. Reading the inner organs of sacrificed animals was one method. Another was astrological signs. This may help explain the confession of the Roman centurion at the cross when he witnessed the darkness in the skies. When Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon, a civil war erupted. The unrest was believed to be caused by a neglect of the state religion. Augustus did much to revitalize the state religion by building temples. He also encouraged the people to attend religious ceremonies related to the state religion. The polytheistic and syncretistic nature of Roman religion was amply exhibited in the practices of the common soldier. They not only worshiped the emperor and state gods in military rituals and sacrifice, they also were often devotees to foreign gods and the mystery religions. However, unlike their Greek counterparts, Roman soldiers also worshipped abstract principles like discipline (Disciplina), honor, virtue, fortune, and victory. These things promoted success on the battlefield and military efficiency. As a general rule, Roman soldiers were superstitious. The foreign gods they worshipped included even the gods of nations they conquered. They also adopted the religious practices of such people. The idea was that the

local foreign gods could perhaps help them, especially if the soldiers were living in the area where that god was worshipped. By monuments and altars found near Hadrian’s Wall in England, we find that the Celtic war god Cocidius was worshiped by the Roman legions. They would combine this worship with the worship of the Roman war god Mars. The adoption of the religious practices of conquered peoples is perhaps seen in the actions of Roman soldiers such as the centurion in Luke 7 and Cornelius in Acts 10. Kenneth Wayne Yates See also Mars, Roman God of War; Roman Army and Religion; Roman Emperor Worship Further Reading Adkins, Lesley, and Roy A. Adkins. Handbook of Life in Ancient Rome. New York: Facts on File, 1994. Davies, Roy W. “The Daily Life of the Roman Soldier under the Principate.” Austieg und Niedergang der römichen Welt 1:299–338. Part 2, Principat 1. Edited by H. Temporini and W. Haase. New York: de Gruyter, 1974. Dobson, Brian. “The Significance of the Centurion and ‘Primipilaris’ in the Roman Army and Administration.” Austieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt 1:392–434. Part 2, Principat, 1. Edited by H. Temporini and W. Haase. New York: de Gruyter, 1974. Goldsworthy, Adrian. The Complete Roman Army. London: Thames and Hudson, 2003. Orlin, Eric M. Temples, Religion, and Politics in the Roman Republic. Leiden: Brill, 2002. Turcan, Robert. The Gods of Ancient Rome: Religion in Everyday Life from Archaic to Imperial Times. Translated by Antonia Nevill. New York: Routledge, 2000.

WAR AND RELIGION

WAR AND RELIGION An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict VOLUME 3: S–Z

Jeffrey M. Shaw and Timothy J. Demy Editors

Copyright © 2017 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Shaw, Jeffrey M., editor of compilation. | Demy, Timothy J., editor of compilation. Title: War and religion : an encyclopedia of faith and conflict / Jeffrey M. Shaw and Timothy J. Demy, editors. Description: Santa Barbara, California : ABC-CLIO, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and indexes. Identifiers: LCCN 2016038200 (print) | LCCN 2017005624 (ebook) | ISBN 9781610695169 (set : acid-free paper) |  ISBN 9781440847615 (volume 1 : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9781440847622 (volume 2 : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9781440847639 (volume 3 : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9781610695176 (ebook) | Subjects: LCSH: War—Religious aspects—History—Encyclopedias. | Religions—History—Encyclopedias. | Social conflict—   History—Encyclopedias. | Military history—Encyclopedias. Classification: LCC BL85 .W37 2017 (print) | LCC BL85 (ebook) | DDC 261.8/73—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016038200 ISBN: 978-1-61069-516-9 (Set) ISBN: 978-1-4408-4761-5 (Volume 1) ISBN: 978-1-4408-4762-2 (Volume 2) ISBN: 978-1-4408-4763-9 (Volume 3) EISBN: 978-1-61069-517-6 (Set) 21 20 19 18 17  1 2 3 4 5 This book is also available as an eBook. ABC-CLIO An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 www.abc-clio.com This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Volume 1: A–G

Volume 3: S–Z

Alphabetical List of Entries—vii List of Primary Documents—xv Preface—xvii Acknowledgments—xix Introduction—xxi Chronology—xxiii Guide to Related Topics—xxxix Entries: —1

Alphabetical List of Entries—vii List of Primary Documents—xv Guide to Related Topics—xvii Entries: S–Z—693 Primary Documents—887 Bibliography—1009 Editors and Contributors—1017 Index—1021

Volume 2: H–R Alphabetical List of Entries—vii List of Primary Documents—xv Guide to Related Topics—xvii Entries: H–R—323

v

Alphabetical List of Entries

Volume 1: A–G

Anabaptist Pacifism Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842) Anglo-Sikh Wars (1845–1846, 1848–1849) Antioch, Siege of (1097–1098) Anti-Semitism Apocalyptic Literature Apocalypticism and War, Christian Apocalypticism and War, Jewish Apocalypticism and War, Muslim Aquinas, Thomas (1225–1274) Arab-Israeli War of 1948 Arianism and War Armenian Massacres Arnaud Amaury (Arnaud Amalric) (d. 1225) Art and the Crusades Ascalon, Battle of (1099) Ashoka (304–232 BCE) Ashur Ashurbanipal (ca. 685–ca. 627 BCE) Assassins Assyrian Warfare Audita Tremendi (1187) Augustine (354–430 CE) Aum Shinrikyo

Abbasid Revolution (747–750 CE) Acre, Sieges of (1189–1191, 1291) Adī Granth Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1979–1989) Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–) Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (Martin Luther, 1525) Ahimsa Ahura Mazda Ai, Battle of (ca. 1400 BCE or 1200 BCE) Alarcos, Battle of (1195) Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229) Alcántara, Order of Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857) All India Muslim League Almohad Revolution (12th Century CE) Al Qaeda Al Shabaab Alsted, Johann Heinrich (1588–1638) Ambrose, Bishop of Milan (ca. 339–397 CE) American Civil War, Religious Dimensions of American Revolution, Religious Dimensions of Ames, William (1576–1633) Amun vii

viii  Alphabetical List of Entries

Austro-Ottoman Wars Ayodhya Conflict (1992) Ayyubids Baal Babylonian Conquest of Israel (597–586 BCE) Bacon, Roger (ca. 1214–1294) Badr, Battle of (624 CE) Bahādur, Bandā Singh (1670–1716) Baha’i Faith and War Balfour Declaration (1917) Balkan Wars (1912–1913) Bar Kochba Revolt (132–136 CE) Bar Kochba, Simon (d. 135 CE) Barons’ Crusade (1239–1241) Bartholomew, Peter (d. 1099) Basmachi Rebellion (1918–1933) Belatucadros, Celtic God of War Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) Beth Zechariah, Battle of (162 BCE) Beth Zur, Battle of (164 BCE) Beza, Theodore (1519–1605) Béziers, Massacre at (1209) Bhagavad Gita and War Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh (1947–1984) Bible and War Bin Laden, Osama (1957–2011) Bishops’ Wars (1639–1640) Boko Haram Bonhoeffer, Dietrich (1906–1945) Bouillon, Godfrey de (1060–1100) Brown, John (1800–1859) Buddhism and War Bullinger, Heinrich (1504–1575) Bushido Buyids Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035) Byzantine-Seljuk Wars Calatrava, Order of Caliphate Calvin, John (1509–1564) Camel, Battle of the (656 CE) Camisards, Revolt of (1702–1704) Camp David Accords (1978) Canon Law on War

Carlist Wars (1833–1840, 1846–1849, 1872–1876) Cathars Catholic (Holy) League Central Asia, Russian Conquest of Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response (1983) Chamkaur, Battle of (1705) Charlemagne’s Conquests (ca. 747–814 CE) Chemosh Christian Daimyo Christianity and War Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Christian-Muslim Wars in Spain Cistercian Order Clement V, Pope (ca. 1260–1314) Clermont, Council of (1095) Cold War, Religious Dimensions of Cologne War (1583–1588) Confucianism and War Constantine (272–337 CE) Constantinople, Arab Sieges of (674–678, 717–718) Covadonga, Battle of (ca. May 28, 722 CE) Cresson, Battle of (1187) Crimean War, Religious Dimensions of Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658) Crusade (as term) Crusade of 1101 Crusade of Henry VI (1197–1198) Crusade of the Poor (1309) Crusades (Overview) Crusades and Religious Relics Crusades, Naval History of Crusades, Women in the Cyprus, Kingdom of Cyrus Cylinder Cyrus II, King of Persia (ca. 600 or 576–530 BCE) Dalai Lama XIV (1935–) Damascus, Arab Conquest of (634 CE) Damietta, Siege of (1218–1219) Daoism and War Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb Dasam Granth Deborah Deborah, Defeat of Sisera

Alphabetical List of Entries  ix

Decades (Bullinger, 1552) Decretum (Decretum Gratiani) (Gratian, 12th Century CE) Deeds of the Franks (Gesta Francorum) (ca. 1100) Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East Delaware River Valley, Toleration and Conflict (1609–1681) Despenser’s Crusade (1383) Dev, Guru Arjan (1563–1606) Dharam Yudh Dhimma Divine Kingship and War Druze and War Druze-Maronite Conflict (1840–1860) Duc, Thich Quong (1897–1963) Easter Rising (1916) Edessa, County of Edict of Fontainebleau (1685) Egyptian Warfare Eighth Crusade (1270) Eighty Years’ War, or Dutch War of Independence (1568–1648) El Cid (Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar) (ca. 1043–1099) Emicho, Count of Leiningen (Late 11th Century) English Civil Wars (1642–1651) Erasmus, Desiderius (1466–1536) Ethiopian-Adal War (1529–1543) Fatimid Conquest of Baghdad (1058) Fatimid Conquest of Egypt Fatimid Conquest of North Africa Fatimids Fifth Crusade (1217–1221) Fifth Monarchists First Crusade (1096–1099) First World War and Religious Art First World War, Religious Dimensions of Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) Frederick II and the Papacy, Conflict of French and Indian War, Religious Dimensions of French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900) French Wars of Religion (1562–1598) Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948) Gaza War (2006) German Peasants’ War (1524–1525) Ghost Dance Movement

Gideon Golden Temple, Battle of (1984) Goodman, Christopher (1520–1603) “Gott mit uns” Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922) Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645)

Volume 2: H–R

Hachiman, Japanese God of War Hadith and War Haganah Hamas Hanh, Thich Nhat (1926–) Harbiyah, Battle of (1244) Harran, Battle of (1104) Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) Hattin, Battle of (1187) Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831) Henry VIII, King of England (1491–1547) Herem Hezbollah Hindu Mythological Wars Hinduism and War Hittite Warfare Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679) Holocaust Holy Roman Empire Holy Sepulchre, Church of the Holy War (Bellum Sacrum) Holy War, Medieval Roman Catholic Conceptions of Huguenots Hus, Jan (ca. 1370–1415) Hybrid War of the 21st Century, Religious Dimensions of Ibn Khaldun (1332–1402) Ibn Taymiyah (1263–1328) Ikko-ikki Illinois Mormon War (1844–1846) In Praise of the New Knighthood (Bernard of Clairvaux, 1128–1136) India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in India, Muslim Conquest of Northern India, Religious Conflict in Indian Mutiny (1857)

x  Alphabetical List of Entries

Indo-Pakistani Wars Indra, Hindu God of War Innocent III, Pope (1160–1216) International Religious Freedom and Human Rights Intifada Investiture Controversy Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938) Iranian Revolution (1979) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Ishtar Islam and War (Jihad) Islamic State Israelite Conquest of Canaan Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy Israelite Wars of the Judges Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy Jaffa, Treaty of (1192) Jahiliyya and Asabiyyah Jainism and War Jericho, Battle of (ca. 1400 BCE or 1200 BCE) Jerusalem as Holy City Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, Sieges of Jesuits Jesus as Warrior Jewish Revolt (66–70 CE) Jews and the Crusades Joan of Arc (1412–1431) Jos Riots (2010) Josephus (37–ca. 100 CE) Joshua Judaism and War Just War Tradition Kamikaze Kappel, Wars of (1529–1531) Karbala, Battle of (680 CE) Kashmir Conflict Khalid ibn al Walid (d. 642 CE) Khālsā Khandaq, Battle of (627 CE) Khartoum, Siege of (1884–1885) Khaybar, Battle of (629 CE) Khilafat Movement (1918–1924)

Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi (1902–1989) King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) King David as Warrior King Philip’s War (1675–1676) Knighthood, Christian Ideal of Knights Templar Knox, John (1514–1572) Konishi Yukinaga (1558–1600) Kosovo, Battle of (1389) Kosovo War (1999) Kurds Kurukshetra War Lachish, Battle of (701 BCE) Lactantius (240–320 CE) Languedoc Revolts (1215–1229) Las Casas, Bartolomé de (1484–1566) Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of (1212) Lateran Church Councils Lawrence of Arabia (1888–1935) Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982) Lebanon, Israeli Operations against (2006) Lepanto, Battle of (1571) Lex Rex Liberation Theology Liberian Civil Wars Libraries and Religious Texts, Destruction of Liturgy of the Crusades Locke, John (1632–1704) Luther, Martin (1483–1546) Maasai Warriors Maccabean Revolt (167–160 BCE) Maccabeus, Judas (d. 160 BCE) Mad Mullah, Wars of the (1892–1920) Mahdi Mahdia Crusade (1390) Mahdist Revolution in Sudan Maimonides (1138–1204) Malta, Siege of (1565) Manichaeism and War Manifest Destiny Mansurah, Battles of (1221 and 1250) Manzikert, Battle of (1071) Maronites and War

Alphabetical List of Entries  xi

Mars, Roman God of War Martin of Tours (d. 397 CE) Martyrs, Jesuit Martyrs’ Mirror (1660) Marx, Karl (1818–1883) Masada, Siege of (73–74 CE) Masts, Battle of the (655 CE) Mau Mau Rebellion (1948) Mazu-Tianfei Megiddo, Battle of (15th Century BCE) Melanchthon, Philip (1497–1560) Melito of Sardis (d. ca. 180 CE) Merton, Thomas (1915–1968) Meskhetian Turks Mexican-American War, Religious Dimensions of Milhemet Misvah Milhemet Reshut Militarism, Religious Military Chaplains Military Chaplains, African American Military Raid in Islam Milvian Bridge, Battle of (312 CE) Missouri Mormon War (1838) Mohammed Omar, Mullah (d. 2013) Mongols Monophysitism Montesa, Order of More, Thomas (1478–1535) Mormon Rebellion (1857–1858) Mu’awiya (602–680 CE) Mughal-Maratha Wars (1659–1707) Mughal-Sikh Wars (1628–1715) Muhammad as Warrior Mujahideen Münster Rebellion (1534–1535) Muslim Armies of the Crusades Muslim Brotherhood Muslim Civil War, First (656–661 CE) Muslim Civil War, Second (680–692 CE) Muslim Conquest of Egypt Muslim Conquest of Iraq Muslim Conquest of Persia Muslim Conquest of Sindh Nachmanides (1194–1270)

Nahawand, Battle of (642 CE) Nānak, Guru (1469–1539) Native American Warfare Nazism, Religious Aspects of Neo-Assyrian Warfare Nicopolis, Crusade of (1396) Ninth Crusade (1271–1272) Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict Nostra Aetate (Paul VI, 1965) Nur Al-Din (1118–1174) Odin, Teutonic God of War On War against the Turk (Luther, 1529) Origen and War (ca. 185–ca. 254 CE) Oslo Accords (1993) Otranto, Battle of (1480–1481) Ottoman Empire Ottoman-Persian Wars Pacem in Terris (John XXIII, 1963) Pacifism, Religious Pakistan, Religious Violence in Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Papal-Imperial Conflict Peace in the Hebrew Scriptures Peace in the New Testament Peace in the Qur’an Peace of God Penance (Christian) and War Penn, William (1644–1718) Philistines Pius XII, Pope (1876–1958) Political Theology and War Ponet, John (ca. 1514–1556) Popular Crusades Prayer Book Rebellion (1549) Protestant Reformers and War Pueblo Revolt (1680) Puritans and War Qadesh, Battle of (1274 BCE) Qadisiyya, Battle of (636 CE) Qarmati Uprising (923–951 CE) Qur’an and War Radical Islam in the 20th Century Reconquista Religious Military Orders

xii  Alphabetical List of Entries

Religious Propaganda and War Religious Wars and Mortality Rates Rhodes, Siege of (1522–1523) Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) (632–633 CE) Ritual and War Roland, Song of (La Chanson de Roland) Roman Army and Religion Roman Emperor Worship Roman Religion, Mythology, and War

Volume 3: S–Z

Sacred Space and Conflict Sacred Swords Saffron Revolution (2007) Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (1572) Saint George Saint Ursula (d. 383 CE) Saladin (1138–1193) Salafism Sant Sipāhī Santiago, Order of Saracens Saudi-Hashemite Wars (1917–1925) Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar (1883–1966) Saxon Wars Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) Schmalkaldic War (1546–1547) Second Crusade (1147–1149) Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) Second World War, Japanese Empire, and Islam Second World War, Religious Dimensions of Seljuks Sennacherib’s Attack on Judah (ca. 701 BCE) Seventh Crusade (1248–1254) Sharia and War Shimabara Rebellion (1637–1638) Shinto and War Shoko Asahara (1955–) Shouren, Wang (1472–1529) Shrine Cults, East Indies Siffin, Battle of (657 CE) Sikhism and War Simons, Menno (1496–1561) Singh, Bābā Dīp (1682–1757)

Singh, Guru Gobind (1666–1708) Sinn Féin Sirhind, Battle of (1710) Six-Day War (1967) Sixth Crusade (1227–1229) Sōen Shaku (1860–1919) Sōhei South Vietnamese Buddhist Uprising (1966) Southeast Asia, Religious Conflict Spanish-American War, Religious Dimensions of Spanish Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Suarez, Francisco (1548–1617) Sufism and War Süleyman the Magnificent (1494–1566) Sunni-Shi’a Conflict Syrian Orthodox Church Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) Tajikistan Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Talas, Battle of (751 CE) Taliban Talmud and War Tamil Tigers Tannenburg, Battle of (1410) Taraori (Tarain), Battles of (1191–1192) Tarsusi, Ali ibn Mardi al (12th Century CE) Ten Kings, Battle of (2900 BCE) Terrorism and Religion Third Crusade (1189–1192) Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) Three Kingdoms, War of the (1638–1660) Tibetan Rebellion (1959) Tours, Battle of (732 CE) Transcendentalism and War Tripoli, County of Tripolitan War Truce of God True Cross Twelve Articles (1525) Tyr, Norse God of War Tyrannicide Uhud, Battle of (625 CE) Uighur Unrest in Xinjiang Urban II, Pope (ca. 1035–1099) Vattel, Emmerich de (1714–1767)

Alphabetical List of Entries  xiii

Venetian Crusade (1122–1124) Verden, Massacre of (782 CE) Vermigli, Peter Martyr (1499–1562) Vienna, Siege of (1529) Vienna, Siege of (1683) Viret, Pierre (1511–1571) Vitoria, Francisco de (1483–1546) Voetius, Gisbertus (1589–1676) Vow (Crusade) Wahhabism Walter the Penniless (d. 1096) Warrior Saints Wars of the Reformation Weapons in the New Testament Wendish Crusade (1147) West Africa, French Wars of Conquest in West Semitic Warfare Westphalia, Peace of (1648)

Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved (Luther, 1526) William of Adam (ca. 1275–1338/39) Wingate, Orde (1903–1944) Wollebius, Johannes (1586–1629) Wounded Knee, Massacre of (1890) Wyatt’s Rebellion (1554) Yahweh as Divine Warrior Yarmouk, Battle of (636 CE) Yasukuni Shrine Yom Kippur War (1973) Young Turks Zab, Battle of (750 CE) Zanj Rebellion (869–893 CE) Zealots Zen and War Zionism and War Zoroastrianism and War Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531)

List of Primary Documents

An Account of the First Crusade: Anselme of Ribemont’s Letter to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims (1098) An Account of the First Crusade: Letter of Daimbert, Archbishop of Pisa; Godfrey of Bouillon; and Raymond, Count of St. Gilles to Pope Paschal II (1099) Crusading in the Thirteenth Century: A Letter to All the Faithfull by the Patriarch of Jerusalem (1229) Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation (1520) Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (May 1525) Excerpts from the Peace of Augsburg (1555) Excerpt from Jacques-Auguste de Thou’s Account of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day in Paris (1572) Granting Religious Toleration to Huguenots: Henri IV’s Edict of Nantes (1598) The Dutie of a King in His Royal Office by Sir Walter Raleigh (1599) Edicts Issued by the Japanese Shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa: “Closed Country Edict” (1635) and “Exclusion of the Portuguese Edict” (1639) Excerpt from Samuel Rutherford’s Lex, Rex (1644) Declaration of Breda (April 4, 1660)

Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (July 8, 1663) Withdrawing Religious Toleration for Huguenots: Louis XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) Government and Religion in British Canada: The Quebec Act (October 7, 1774) Treaty of Tripoli (January 3, 1797) President Abraham Lincoln’s Proclamation Declaring a National Fast Day (March 30, 1863) Max Nordau’s Address to the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland (August 29, 1897) “At the Battle of Nan Shan Hill” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk Sōen Shaku (December 1904) “Buddhist View of War” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk Sōen Shaku (1904) Issuance of Ottoman Fetva by Essad Effendi, Sheik-UlIslam in the Name of Sultan Mehmed V (November 1914) Balfour Declaration (1917) Pacem, Dei Munus Pulcherrimum, a Papal Encyclical Issued by Pope Benedict XV (May 23, 1920) The Palestine Mandate (July 24, 1922) U.S. Congress Endorsement of the Balfour Declaration (September 21, 1922)

xv

xvi  List of Primary Documents

Christianity in Nazi Germany: Karl Barth’s Theological Declaration of Barmen (1934) British House of Commons Discussion Expressing Outrage Following the Zionist Terrorist Attack on the King David Hotel in Jerusalem (1946) UN Partition Plan for Palestine: UN Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine (November 29, 1947) Statement by the Arab League upon the Declaration of the State of Israel (May 15, 1948) President Dwight Eisenhower’s Message to Congress Setting Forth the “Eisenhower Doctrine” (January 5, 1957) Pacem in Terris, a Papal Encyclical Issued by Pope John XXIII (April 11, 1963) UN Resolution Declaring Zionism to Be Racism (1975) Camp David Accords: A Framework for Peace Between Israel and Egypt and a Framework for Negotiations (September 17, 1978) Article 27 of the Hamas Charter (August 18, 1988) Speech by Nelson Mandela at the Zionist Christian Church Easter Conference (April 20, 1992) Parliament of the World’s Religions: Hans Kung’s Declaration Toward a Global Ethic (September 4, 1993) Last Speech of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (November 4, 1995) Wye River Memorandum (1998) United Nations Secretary-General’s Statement Calling for Support of All Religions (September 10, 2001)

Defining Terrorism: UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (October 8, 2004) Declaration of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation from the First Jewish-Hindu Leadership Summit (February 5–6, 2007) Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France, in Commemoration of the Mumbai Terrorist Attacks (December 7, 2010) UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Message to the International Conference on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (April 15, 2013) UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Message to the Religions for Peace Assembly: People of Faith Can Pave Way for Tolerance, Solidarity among All Groups (November 20, 2013) Excerpt from the Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan (2015) UN Resolution 2199: The UN Security Council Condemns Trade with Al-Qaida-Associated Groups (2015) UN Security Council Statement on Boko Haram (January 19, 2015) Guidelines Proposed at the UN General Assembly Meeting on the Syrian Refugee Crisis (November 20, 2015) Remarks at the International Conference on the Question of Jerusalem (December 15, 2015)

Guide to Related Topics

Battles and Sieges

Kosovo, Battle of Lachish, Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of Lepanto, Battle of Malta, Siege of Mansurah, Battles of Manzikert, Battle of Masada, Siege of Masts, Battle of the Megiddo, Battle of Milvian Bridge, Battle of Nahawand, Battle of Otranto, Battle of Qadesh, Battle of Qadisiyya, Battle of Rhodes, Siege of Siffin, Battle of Sirhind, Battle of Talas, Battle of Tannenberg, Battle of Taraori (Tarain), Battles of Ten Kings, Battle of Tours, Battle of Uhud, Battle of Vienna, Siege of (1529)

Acre, Sieges of Ai, Battle of Alarcos, Battle of Antioch, Siege of Ascalon, Battle of Badr, Battle of Beth Zechariah, Battle of Beth Zur, Battle of Camel, Battle of the Chamkaur, Battle of Constantinople, Arab Sieges of Covadonga, Battle of Cresson, Battle of Damietta, Siege of Golden Temple, Battle of Harbiyah, Battle of Harran, Battle of Hattin, Battle of Jericho, Battle of Jerusalem, Sieges of Karbala, Battle of Khandaq, Battle of Khartoun, Siege of Khaybar, Battle of xvii

xviii  Guide to Related Topics

Vienna, Siege of (1683) Yarmouk, Battle of Zab, Battle of

Crusades

Acre, Sieges of Alarcos, Battle of (1195) Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229) Alcantara, Order of Antioch, Sieges of (1097–1098) Art and the Crusades Ascalon, Battle of (1099) Audita Tremendi (1187) Barons’ Crusade (1239–1241) Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) Bouillon, Godfrey de (1060–1100) Calatrava, Order of Clement V, Pope (ca. 1260–1314) Clermont, Council of (1095) Cresson, Battle of (1187) Crusade (as term) Crusade of 1101 Crusade of Henry VI (1197–1198) Crusade of the Poor (1309) Crusades (Overview) Crusades and Religious Relics Crusades, Naval History Crusades, Women in the Cyprus, Kingdom of Damietta, Siege of (1218–1219) Despenser’s Crusade (1383) Edessa, County of Eighth Crusade (1270) Fifth Crusade First Crusade (1096–1099) Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) Harbiyah, Battle of (1244) Harran, Battle of (1104) Hattin, Battle of (1187) Holy Sepulchre, Church of the Holy War (Bellum Sacrum) Holy War, Medieval Roman Catholic Conceptions of Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of

Jews and the Crusades Knighthood, Christian Ideal of Knights Templar Liturgy of the Crusades Mansurah, Battles of (1221 and 1250) Montesa, Order of Muslim Armies of the Crusades Nicopolis, Crusade of (1396) Ninth Crusade (1271–1272) Popular Crusades Religious Military Orders Saladin (1138–1193) Santiago, Order of Saracens Second Crusade (1147–1149) Seventh Crusade (1248–1254) Sixth Crusade (1227–1229) Tannenburg, Battle of (1410) Third Crusade (1189–1192) Tripoli, County of True Cross Urban II, Pope (d. 1099) Venetian Crusade (1122–1124) Vow (Crusade) Walter the Penniless (d. 1096) Wendish Crusade (1147)

Deities

Ahura Mazda Amun Ashur Baal Belatucadros, Celtic God of War Chemosh Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East Hachiman, Japanese God of War Indra, Hindu God of War Ishtar Mars, Roman God of War Odin, Teutonic God of War Roman Emperor Worship Tyr, Norse God of War Yahweh as Divine Warrior

Guide to Related Topics  xix

Individuals

Alsted, Johann Heinrich Ambrose, Bishop of Milan Ames, William Aquinas, Thomas Arnaud Amaury (Arnaud Amalric) Ashoka Ashurbanipal Augustine Bacon, Roger Bahādur, Bandā Singh Bar Kochba, Simon Bartholomew, Peter Bernard of Clairvaux Beza, Theodore Bhindranale, Jarnail Singh Bin Laden, Osama Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bouillon, Godfrey de Bullinger, Heinrich Calvin, John Clement V, Pope Constantine Cromwell, Oliver Cyrus II, King of Persia Dalai Lama XIV Deborah Dev, Guru Arjan Duc, Thich Quong El Cid Emicho Erasmus, Desiderius Frederick II and the Papacy, Conflict of Gandhi, Mahatma Gideon Goodman, Christopher Grotius, Hugo Hanh, Thich Nhat Hassan al-Banna Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Henry VIII Hobbes, Thomas Hus, Jan

Ibn Khaldun Ibn Taymiyah Innocent III Iqbal, Muhammad Jesus as Warrior Joan of Arc Josephus Joshua Khalid ibn al-Walid Khomeni, Ruhollah al-Musavi King, Martin Luther, Jr. King David as Warrior Knox, John Konishi Yukinaga Lactantius Las Casas, Bartolomé de Lawrence of Arabia Locke, John Luther, Martin Maccabeus, Judas Mahdi Maimonides Martin of Tours Martyrs, Jesuit Marx, Karl Melanchthon, Philip Melito of Sardis Merton, Thomas Mohammed Omar, Mullah More, Thomas Mu’awiya Muhammad as Warrior Nachmanides Nānak, Guru Nur Al-Din Origen and War Penn, William Pius XII, Pope Ponet, John Saint George Saint Ursula Saladin Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar

xx  Guide to Related Topics

Sayyid Qutb Shoko Asahara Shouren, Wang Simons, Menno Singh, Bābā Dīp Singh, Guru Gobind Sōen Shaku Suarez, Francisco Süleyman the Magnificent Tarsusi, Ali ibn Mardi al Vattel, Emmerich de Vermigli, Peter Martyr Viret, Pierre Vitoria, Francisco de Voetius, Gisbertus Walter the Penniless Warrior Saints William of Adam Wingate, Orde Wollebius, Johannes Zwingli, Huldrych

Rise of Islam

Abbasid Revolution (747–750) Almohad Revolution Assassins Ayyubids Badr, Battle of (624) Buyids Caliphate Camel, Battle of the (656) Covadonga, Battle of (ca. May 28, 722) Cresson, Battle of (1187) Damascus, Arab Conquest of (634 CE) Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb Egypt, Fatimid Conquest of Fatimid Conquest of Baghdad Fatimid Conquest of North Africa Hadith and War Ibn Khaldun Ibn Taymiyah India, Muslim Conquest of Northern Islam and War (Jihad) Jerusalem, Sieges of

Karbala, Battle of (680 CE) Khalid ibn al Walid (d. 642 CE) Khandaq, Battle of (627 CE) Khaybar, Battle of (629 CE) Mahdi Masts, Battle of the (655) Military Raid in Islam Mu’awiya Muhammad as Warrior Muslim Armies of the Crusades Muslim Civil War, First (656–661) Muslim Civil War, Second (680–692) Muslim Conquest of Egypt Muslim Conquest of Iraq Muslim Conquest of Persia Muslim Conquest of Sindh Nahawand, Battle of (641) Nur Al-Din (1118–1174) Peace in the Qur’an Qadisiyya, Battle of (636 CE) Qarmati Uprising (923–951 CE) Qur’an and War Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) (632–633CE) Saladin (1138–1193) Salafism Saracens Sharia and War Siffin, Battle of (657 CE) Sufism and War Süleyman the Magnificent and War Sunni-Shi’a Conflict Talas, Battle of (751) Tarsusi, Ali ibn Mardi al Uhud, Battle of (625) Yarmouk, Battle of (636) Zab, Battle of (750) Zanj Rebellion (869–893)

Sacred Texts and Traditions

Ahimsa Apocalyptic Literature Apocalypticism and War, Christian Apocalypticism and War, Jewish Apocalypticism and War, Muslim

Guide to Related Topics  xxi

Arianism and War Baha’i Faith and War Bhagavad Gita and War Bhindranale, Jarnail Singh Bible and War Buddhism and War Bushido Canon Law on War Christianity and War Confucianism and War Daoism and War Dasam Granth Hadith and War Hinduism and War Islam and War (Jihad) Jahiliyya and Asabiyyah Jainism and War Jerusalem as Holy City Judaism and War Just War Tradition Milhemet Misvah Milhemet Reshut Pacifism, Religious Peace in the Qur’an Qur’an and War Sharia and War Shinto and War Shrine Cults: East Indies Sufism and War Syrian Orthodox Church is Christian Talmud and War Transcendentalism and War Zen and War Zionism and War Zoroastrianism and War

20th and 21st Centuries

Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1979–1989) Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–) Al Qaeda Al Shabaab Antisemitism Arab-Israeli War of 1948 Armenian Massacres

Aum Shinrikyo Ayodhya Conflict (1992) Balfour Declaration (1917) Balkan Wars (1912–1913) Bin Laden, Osama Boko Haram Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Camp David Accords (1978) Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Cold War, Religious Dimensions of Druze and War Duc, Thich Quong (1897–1963) Easter Rising (1916) First World War and Religious Art First World War, Religious Dimensions of Gandhi, Mahatma Gaza War (2006) Gott mit uns Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922) Haganah Hamas Hanh, Thich Nhat Hassan al-Banna Hezbollah Holocaust Hybrid War of the 21st Century, Religious Dimensions of India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in India, Religious Conflict in Indo-Pakistani Wars International Religious Freedom and Human Rights Intifada Iqbal, Muhammad Iranian Revolution (1979) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Islam and War (Jihad) Islamic State Jos Riots (2010) Kamikaze Kashmir Conflict Khilafat Movement Khomeni, Ruhollah al-Musavi King, Martin Luther, Jr. Kosovo War (1999)

xxii  Guide to Related Topics

Kurds Lawrence of Arabia Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982) Lebanon, Israeli Operations against (2006) Liberation Theology Liberian Civil Wars Mau Mau Rebellion Merton, Thomas Meskhetian Turks Militarism, Religious Military Chaplains Military Chaplains, African American Mohammed Omar, Mullah Mujahideen Muslim Brotherhood Nazism, Religious Aspects of Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict Nostra Aetate Oslo Accords (1993) Pacem in Terris Pakistan, Religious Violence in Palestine Liberation Organization Pius XII Radical Islam in the 20th Century Religious Propaganda and War Religious Wars and Mortality Rates Saffron Revolution (2007) Saudi-Hashemite Wars Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar Sayyid Qutb Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) Second World War, Japanese Empire, and Islam Second World War, Religious Dimensions of Shoko Asahara Sinn Fein Six-Day War (1967) Sōen Shaku South Vietnamese Buddhist Uprising (1966) Southeast Asia, Religious Conflict Spanish-American War, Religious Dimensions of Spanish Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Sufism and War Sunni-Shi’a Conflict

Taiping Rebellion Tajikistan Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Taliban Tamil Tigers Terrorism and Religion Tibetan Rebellion (1959) Uighur Unrest in Xinjiang Wahhabism Wingate, Orde Yasukuni Shrine Yom Kippur War (1973) Young Turks Zionism and War

Wars, Conflicts, and Rebellions

Afghanistan, Soviet War in Afghanistan, U.S. War in American Civil War, Religious Dimensions of American Revolution, Religious Dimensions of Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of Anglo-Afghan War Anglo-Sikh Wars Arab-Israeli War of 1948 Austro-Ottoman Wars Ayodhya Conflict Balkan Wars Bar Kochba Revolt Basmachi Rebellion Bishops’ Wars Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035) Byzantine-Seljuk Wars Camisards, Revolt of Carlist Wars Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa Christian-Muslim Wars in Spain Cold War, Religious Dimensions of Cologne War Crimean War, Religious Dimensions of Druze-Maronite Conflict Easter Rising Eighty Years’ War, or Dutch War of Independence English Civil Wars Ethiopian-Adal War First World War, Religious Dimensions of

Guide to Related Topics  xxiii

Frederick II and the Papacy, Conflict of French and Indian War, Religious Dimensions of French Wars of Religion Gaza War German Peasants’ War Greco-Turkish War Hindu Mythological Wars Hybrid War of the 21st Century, Religious Dimensions of Illinois Mormon War India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in India, Hindu-Sikh Violence in India, Religious Conflict in Indian Mutiny Indo-Pakistani Wars Intifada Iran-Iraq War Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy Israelite Wars of the Judges Israelite Wars of the United Monarchy Jewish Revolt Kappel, Wars of Kashmir Conflict King Philip’s War Kosovo War Languedoc Revolts Lebanese Civil War Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of Liberian Civil Wars Maccabean Revolt Mad Mullah, Wars of the Mahdist Revolution in Sudan Mau Mau Rebellion Mexican-American War, Religious Dimensions of Missouri Mormon War Mormon Rebellion Mughal-Maratha Wars Mughal-Sikh Wars Münster Rebellion Muslim Civil War, First Muslin Civil War, Second Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict Ottoman-Persian Wars Pakistan, Religious Violence in Papal-Imperial Conflict

Prayer Book Rebellion Pueblo Revolt Qarmati Uprising Ridda Wars (Wars of Apostasy) Saudi-Hashemite Wars Saxon Wars Schmalkaldic War Second Sudanese Civil War Second World War, Religious Dimensions of Shimabara Rebellion Six-Day War South Vietnamese Buddhist Uprising Spanish-American War, Religious Dimensions of Spanish Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Sunni-Shi’a Conflict Taiping Rebellion Tajikistan Civil War, Religious Dimensions of Thirty Years’ War Three Kingdoms, War of the Tibetan Rebellion Tripolitan War Wars of the Reformation Wyatt’s Rebellion Yom Kippur War Zanj Rebellion

Wars of the Protestant Reformation

Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants Alsted, Johann Heinrich Ames, William Anabaptist Pacifism Beza, Theodore Bullinger, Heinrich Calvin, John Camisards, Revolt of (1702–1704) Catholic (Holy) League Cologne War (1583–1588) Edict of Fontainebleau Eighty Years’ War or Dutch War of Independence (1568–1648) English Civil War Erasmus, Desiderius French Wars of Religion German Peasants’ War (1524–1525)

xxiv  Guide to Related Topics

Goodman, Christopher Kappel, Wars of (1529–1531) Knox, John Locke, John Luther, Martin Melanchthon, Philip More, Thomas Münster Rebellion (1534–1535) On War Against the Turk Ponet, John Prayer Book Rebellion (1549) Protestant Reformers and War Puritans and War Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (1572)

Simons, Menno Suarez, Francisco Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) Three Kingdoms, War of the (1638–1660) Viret, Pierre Vitoria, Francisco de Voetius, Gisbertus Wars of the Reformation Westphalia, Peace of (1648) Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved Wollebius, Johannes Wyatt’s Rebellion (1554) Zwingli, Huldrych

S Sacred Space and Conflict

sites, devotional shrines, and processional routes. For Roman Catholics, particular locations were invested with sacredness, such as church buildings in which Mass was celebrated and altars on which the Eucharistic miracle of transubstantiation was thought to occur. Protestants denied that one location could be holier than another, and typically did not invest their churches with sacred significance. Catholics in France and elsewhere excluded Protestants from communal burial grounds, and the passage of Protestant funeral processions often provoked riots. The construction of church buildings by minority groups symbolized the presence of “heretical” worship in the midst of the community, providing distinct targets for religious hostility. Denied the use of public churches, Catholics in Elizabethan England and the 17th-century Netherlands consecrated chapels within private houses for the covert celebration of Mass. Clashes over religious reform spurred the devastating European Wars of Religion in the 16th and 17th centuries, during which partisans on all sides battled to occupy sacred spaces and assert confessional supremacy. While the intense confessionalism that drove civil conflict in 16th- and 17th-century Europe has diminished somewhat in the contemporary world, communities and groups continue to contest physical locations that one or both sides consider sacred, particularly in regions where religious and political boundaries coincide. Catholics and

The concept of sacred space lies at the core of philosophical distinctions between the sacred and the profane, or the nonsacred. When war and conflict occur on or for space considered sacred, there can be intensity and ramifications beyond that which is otherwise experienced and is not limited to any single religion. First elaborated by philosopher and historian Mircea Eliade (1907–1986) in 1959, “sacred space” denotes locations that are physically or symbolically set apart for religious, supernatural, or commemorative purposes. Drawing on French sociologist Émile Durkheim’s (1858–1917) contention that the distinction between sacred and profane is characteristic of all religions, Eliade understood sacred space as a specific area where various cosmic levels are represented and concurrently interact. Anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and religious studies scholars have usefully developed and extended Eliade’s paradigm to investigate topics such as religious life, cultural practices, sectarian violence, and civil conflict. Local conflict over sacred spaces was widespread in early modern Europe, especially during the social disorder and civil unrest associated with the Protestant and Catholic Reformations of the 16th century. Notions of pollution and contamination led opposing religious groups during this time to clash over churches, cemeteries, commemorative 693

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Protestants in Northern Ireland clashed throughout the 19th and 20th centuries over the use of public squares and city streets deemed sacred due to their connection to a particular figure or event in historical memory. Persistent conflict over Jerusalem’s Temple Mount and surrounding Old City—considered sacred spaces by Jews, Muslims, and Christians alike—has been increasingly strident since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six-Day War), hampering efforts to resolve the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the Six-Day War, the taking of the Old City portion of Jerusalem and the Temple Mount had enormous religious and political consequences far beyond the strategic significance. Tensions between Hindus and Muslims in Ayodhya, a town in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, over a plot of land that both groups deem holy spawned violent clashes in the 1990s and 2000s, which resulted in the deaths of several thousand people. Moreover, collective violence among sectarian groups in countries such as Iraq, Egypt, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia frequently targets religious buildings and sacred shrines. However, there are also prohibitions against the intentional targeting of sacred spaces unless there is clear military justification. In the West this tradition goes back centuries within the just war tradition into the medieval era. Although it has not been upheld consistently, there is a recognition in the just war tradition and within the law of armed conflict of the sacredness of some sites and the belief that they should not be subjected to the ravages of war unless absolutely necessary. It is also understandable how the destruction of religious sites, whether intentional or not, can be used to gain public support during time of war. Thus, for example, the destruction of Coventry Cathedral during the Second World War enabled the British to rally support on the home front for the war effort. Similarly, the destruction by the Allies of the Italian Benedictine monastery at Monte Cassino drew criticism and debate that lasts to the present. Because notions of sacred space are closely connected to issues of communal identity, religious adherence, and political association, conflict between parties contesting the ownership or control of sacred space has historically been extremely difficult to manage. Religious groups routinely defend their sacred spaces from encroachment; perceived violations of sacred space by sectarian opponents,

government agents, or military forces are often seen to legitimize retributory violence. Conflict over sacred space thus remains a persistent feature of civil strife and sectarian antagonism throughout the world. Gregory D. Bereiter See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; French Wars of Religion; Thirty Years’ War; Wars of the Reformation Further Reading Breger, Marshall J., Yitzhak Reiter, and Leonard Hammer, eds. Sacred Space in Israel and Palestine: Religion and Politics. New York: Routledge, 2013. Cole, Juan. Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ite Islam. London: Tauris, 2002. Coster, Will, and Andrew Spicer, eds. Sacred Space in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Eliade, Mircea. The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion. Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 1987. Fair, C. Christine, and Sumit Ganguly, eds. Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Hassner, Ron E. War on Sacred Grounds. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009. Luria, Keith P. Sacred Boundaries: Religious Coexistence and Conflict in Early-Modern France. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005. Roberts, Penny. “Contesting Sacred Space: Burial Disputes in Sixteenth-Century France.” In Bruce Gordon and Peter Marshall, eds. The Place of the Dead: Death and Remembrance in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 131–48. Schäuble, Michaela. “Sacralized Landscapes in the CroatianBosnian Border Region.” History and Memory 23 (2011): 23–61. Spicer, Andrew, and Sarah Hamilton, eds. Defining the Holy: Sacred Space in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006.

Sacred Swords Sacred swords are part of many religious and military traditions. From the earliest times of sword use, the complicated production process made swords objects of high value. At times they were left with their important owners during burial as a status symbol. The Celts seemed to have

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given swords as sacrificial offerings by sinking the swords in lakes. As no written sources exist, it is not clear if the sword as such was seen as a sacred object or as a valued item to be sacrificed to some sort of deity. Stories of swords with some divine connection have survived in many Celtic, Germanic, and Nordic legends. Some of these legends later mixed with the Christian tradition. The most famous example is the sword Excalibur of the legendary King Arthur, whereby the Arthurian myth of Celtic and Northern European origin changed and was transformed during the Christianization process of these areas while keeping key elements like the sacred sword. Swords as a tool to defend faith had a special role during the Christian crusades, whereby the cross-like shape of many swords was important. This resemblance between the shape of a cross and a sword is symbolically incorporated into some memorials honoring the fallen of the two World Wars. In Islam, the sword has played a role since Muhammad’s conflict with Mecca while in Medina, as the faith was literally defended and spread by fire and sword. Many holy swords found their way into royal or imperial treasuries. Some of the so-called swords of Muhammad are preserved in the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul (Turkey); the imperial sword of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation with Christian inscriptions is in the Hofburg Palace in Vienna (Austria); and the never publicly shown imperial Japanese sword is said to be stored in a shrine in Nagoya (Japan). In the Japanese tradition this sword was directly handed down from the godly ancestors to the first emperor. Holy swords in the diverse religious traditions differ, as in some traditions they were real fighting equipment in the name of faith or God against real enemies, whereas in other traditions they are purely symbolic of the willingness to defend faith or God. Oliver Benjamin Hemmerle See also Christian Daimyo; Crusades (Overview); Religious Military Orders Further Reading Roach, Colin M. Japanese Swords. Cultural Icons of a Nation. New York: Tuttle, 2014. Withers, Harvey J. S. The Illustrated World Encyclopedia of Knives, Swords, Spears & Daggers through History. London: Lorenz, 2013.

Saffron Revolution (2007) The Saffron Revolution refers to a series of economic and political protests against the military-controlled government of Burma (also known as Myanmar) from August to October 2007. The protests involved a diverse segment of the population, including political activists, students, ordinary citizens, and religious leaders. Because Buddhist monks took a central role in leading a campaign of nonviolence and civil resistance, Western journalists ascribed the name saffron to the series of uprisings. Saffron refers to the color of the robes worn by Buddhist monks in Southeast Asia; however, those in Burma typically wear maroon. The Saffron Revolution was considered the largest antigovernment protests since 1988, when the military quickly suppressed demonstrations with force, resulting in approximately 3,000 deaths. On August 1, 2007, the government, led by Senior General Than Shwe, ended fuel subsidies. This unannounced decision became the catalyst for uprisings that would occur over the next few months. The end of the subsidies resulted in the price of fuel increasing nearly 100 percent and the price of compressed gas increasing approximately 500 percent within weeks. This, in turn, led to higher transportation and food prices for an already impoverished populace. Greatly affected was the Sangha, the monastic community of Buddhist monks and nuns, which relied heavily on offerings for sustenance. The Buddhist monks were highly regarded by both the populace and the military. Buddhist clergy made up the largest civilian institution in the country. From mid-August to early September, protests were small, isolated, and led by political activists who demanded lower fuel and gas prices. They were met with little government resistance. Later, the scope of the protests widened to include economic reforms with Buddhist monks participating in the uprisings. With the larger protests, the government began its crack down. Buddhist monks were beaten and arrested. This disrespect toward the Buddhist monks particularly angered the populace and ignited even more demonstrations. By September 22, the uprisings took a more political and religious tone. The Alliance of All Burma Buddhist Monks, led by U Gambira, was established and challenged

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the legitimacy of the government. The group called for an apology by the government for its treatment of the Buddhist monks and refused to offer religious sacraments to members of the military. A procession of more than 2,000 Buddhist monks gathered at the residence of prodemocracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was under house arrest, and offered her a blessing. This signified a united call for democracy, which led to harsher governmental responses. However, large nonviolent demonstrations continued. The largest mass gathering was held on September 24 in Yangon and comprised more than 100,000 people, including members of the National League for Democracy. Days later, the junta placed curfews, banned gatherings, raided monasteries, barricaded pagodas, and brutally arrested and killed citizens. By October, political protests slowed, as the government continued to search for and arrest protesters and sympathizers. It is estimated that during the months of the Saffron Revolution there were at least 227 distinct protests in approximately 66 cities throughout each state and division of the country. While reports vary, it is estimated that 3,000– 4,000 people were arrested and several thousand Buddhist monks detained. Military police reportedly killed at least 31 unarmed citizens with another 16 dying in their custody. Technology played an integral part in elevating the plight of the people. Portable electronic devices captured the military crackdown, along with numerous human rights violations. Despite the government’s attempt to censor the media and block Internet access, images and video footage were leaked to international news outlets. The broadcast of the killing of Japanese journalist Kenji Nagai by military police sparked global outrage. The United Nations sent a special envoy to Burma, and economic sanctions were tightened by the United States, Canada, Australia, and the European Union. While the Saffron Revolution did not bring about the desired political change in its immediate aftermath, it did call attention to the growing desire for democratic reforms. Judy T. Malana See also Buddhism and War Further Reading Rogers, Benedict. “The Saffron Revolution: The Role of Religion in Burma’s Movement for Peace and Democracy.”

Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions 9, no. 1 (June 2008): 115–18. Selth, Andrew. “Burma’s ‘Saffron Revolution’ and the Limits of International Influence.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 3 (September 2008): 281–97. Steinberg, David. “Globalization, Dissent, and Orthodoxy: Burma/Myanmar and the Saffron Revolution.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 9, no. 2 (2008).

Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (1572) The events collectively known as the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre represent the most notorious incident of confessional violence in early modern Europe. The killing of 5,000–6,000 French Protestant men, women, and children by Catholic troops and civilians in August and September 1572 affected not only the course of France’s Wars of Religion but also broader processes of state development and international diplomacy. Far from a spontaneous eruption of violence, the massacre was a complex and multifaceted event involving numerous actors and four distinct but interrelated phases. The chief incident that ignited the widespread violence that broke out in Paris on August 24, 1572, was an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Admiral Gaspard de Coligny. The Protestant admiral had remained in the capital along with many Huguenot leaders after the wedding of the king’s sister to the Protestant prince Henri de Navarre on August 18. While returning from a meeting with King Charles IX on August 22, Coligny was shot in the arm and hand from an upper-story window. Against the advice of his lieutenants, Coligny insisted on remaining in Paris. Other Huguenot nobles also opted to remain, blaming the Guise family for the attack and calling for retribution. As word of the attack spread, the Huguenots’ anger was thought to foreshadow a Protestant uprising. A rumor that 4,000 Protestant troops were waiting outside the city to seize the royal family and take revenge on their enemies drove tensions higher. Although there was no truth to the rumor, it was widely believed, even in the highest circles. Late in the evening of August 23, the king, his mother,

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Catherine de’ Medici, and several of his key advisers decided on a preemptive strike against not just Coligny but all Huguenot nobles still in Paris. The organized murder of Coligny and several dozen Huguenot nobles early in the morning on August 24—the feast day of Saint Bartholomew—comprises the second stage of the massacre. On the king’s orders, Henri, duc de Guise led troops to Coligny’s lodgings. After killing the admiral, the duke’s men tossed his corpse out of the window, so that Guise, who was waiting below, might confirm his identity. Simultaneously, members of the king’s guard and other soldiers fanned out to find and kill the other Huguenot leaders. The commotion they made on a night tense with fear alerted Parisians and brought them into the streets. The duke, urging his men on, was heard saying that they killed by “the king’s command,” words that spread quickly through the populace. Parisians took them as permission to finally rid their city of the “pollution” of heresy by slaughtering their Protestant neighbors. Members of civic militia companies, stationed about the city, were among the first to take up arms against the Protestants, though other civilians also participated. The strike on Coligny and other nobles ignited a wave of popular violence across Paris, which comprises the massacre’s third phase. Over the next several days, groups of Catholics sacked Huguenot houses and killed their inhabitants, despite repeated decrees that Charles IX wished the killing to halt. Catholics perpetrating the bloodshed saw themselves as carrying out clerical roles of priests and magisterial roles of judges and executioners. They forced victims to recant Protestantism or repeat Catholic prayers. They burned Protestant books and subjected their victims’ bodies to crude parodies of judicial rites. Youths mutilated and dragged Coligny’s corpse through the streets, conducting mock trials as they pulled him along. They eventually burned his body—parodying the punishment for heretics— and tossed it into the Seine, from which it was later retrieved and hung from the gallows. While some killers attempted to coerce their victims into converting, others killed to settle private scores or tried to profit from their victims’ suffering. Looting and pillaging were common, as was extortion. Pregnant women seem to have been subjected to especially gruesome deaths. Conservative estimates put the death toll in Paris at around 2,000–3,000 Protestants.

A fourth and final phase of the massacre involved the spread of violence from Paris into provincial cities over the next six weeks. Killings broke out in at least 12 cities across the kingdom, including Rouen, Orléans, Troyes, Lyon, Toulouse, and Bordeaux. In many towns, violence erupted as soon as news arrived of the bloodbath in Paris. Another 2,000–3,000 people lost their lives. All cities where provincial massacres occurred had one feature in common: they were municipalities with Catholic majorities that had once had significant Protestant minorities. All of them had experienced profound religious divisions during the initial Wars of Religion. Seven cities shared the experience of having been taken over by Protestants during the first civil war. While all had since been returned to Catholic control, feelings of hostility and confessional strife—similar to those in Paris—lingered. In most of the 12 cities, the principal agents of violence were the local citizens. Like their Parisian counterparts, they believed they acted on the king’s behalf and with divine authorization. The Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre represented a watershed in France’s Wars of Religion. It marked the shattering and decline—though not the complete elimination—of the Protestant movement. It also signaled the birth of a new form of Protestantism that was openly at war with the French crown. This was far more than a war against the crown’s policies, as in the first three civil wars; it was a campaign against the very existence of the French monarchy. The solitary calls for resistance to the crown heard before 1572 now became louder and more frequent. Huguenot rhetoric after 1572 brought resistance theory into the public arena. Huguenot opposition to the crown also triggered the renewal of warfare, as Protestant towns like La Rochelle and Montauban refused to recognize the authority of a king who had ordered the murder of their leaders. Moreover, these same Protestant strongholds began negotiating with foreign powers such as England and the Dutch rebels for protection from their own king. Gregory D. Bereiter See also French Wars of Religion: Primary Document: Excerpt from Jacques-Auguste de Thou’s Account of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day in Paris (1572)

698  Saint George Further Reading Bourgeon, Jean-Louis. Charles IX devant la Saint-Barthélemy. Genève: Droz, 1995. Crouzet, Denis. La Nuit de la Saint-Barthélemy. Un rêve perdu de la Renaissance. Paris: Fayard, 1994. Diefendorf, Barbara B. Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Diefendorf, Barbara B. The Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre: A Brief History with Documents. Boston: St. Martin’s, 2009. Garrisson, Janine. La Saint-Barthélemy. Brussels: Complexes, 1987. Jouanna, Arlette. The St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre: The Mysteries of a Crime of State. Translated by Joseph Bergin. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013. Kingdon, Robert M. Myths about the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacres, 1572–1576. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Saint George The expansive and intriguing power of legend is vividly manifested in Saint George, patron saint of England. Stories of his exploits and miracles associated with him are countless. Historically, little is known about him. But as a towering legendary figure, he is enthroned as the patron saint of 10 additional countries. George is venerated for his defense of the Christian faith, for his bravery, and for his compassion for the poor. By many, accounts of the saint’s life are still received as settled history. Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Anglican Christians normally celebrate a Feast of Saint George on April 23. For Orthodox Christians the feast is called the Feast of the Holy Great Martyr George the Trophy-Bearer. The Russian Orthodox Church celebrates three Saint George Feast Days. The Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria celebrates Saint George as “the Prince of Martyrs” on May 1 and November 17. On April 23, at the historic Monastery of Saint George on Prince Island near Constantinople, pilgrims by the tens of thousands, including many Muslims who name George a saint, gather for celebration. Palestinian Christians and Muslims hold Saint George (also spelled al-Khader) to be a local hero. Both religions celebrate the Palestinian Feast of Saint George on May 5–6.

It is possible that the historical basis for a “Saint George” appears in Eusebius Pamphilius’s Ecclesiastical History (ca. 324), which catalogues the great Diocletian persecution of the early church (303–311 CE). Although Eusebius is often cited as providing the first historical reference to “Saint George,” nothing in the text necessitates such a conclusion. The text describes a “very highly honored” man of Nicomedia (Diocletian’s chief residence) as possessing “distinguished temporal dignities.” On February 24, 303 CE, he seized and “tore to pieces” Diocletian’s decree against the Christians as it was being posted. The tradition is that this was “Saint George,” a young man who had quickly risen to the rank of tribune in the Roman military. A devout Christian, allegedly “Saint George” was highly favored by Diocletian. The emperor was shocked by the young officer’s refusal to renounce his faith. After repeated efforts to convince him otherwise, Diocletian put Saint George to death. As inspiring and cherished as the treasury of “Saint George” stories is, the wonderful tales must be recognized as hagiography. There is no chronological or geographical agreement regarding the details of his activities. Each geographical and religious setting has used an inspiring, but historically vaporous, figure to create and embellish stories that serve their interests. The stories live on as true for those who treasure them as such, and as colorful legends by others. Some of the more prominent parts of George’s story are that he was born to Christian parents who were among the local nobility. His father was a Roman military officer. As a youth, George embraced the Christian faith.When he grew up, George was welcomed into Diocletian’s army where he advanced rapidly. In his late twenties he became a tribune and served as an imperial guard for Emperor Diocletian. When Diocletian’s persecution of Christians began, he ordered each soldier to offer a sacrifice to the Roman deities. George refused to deny his faith and announced his refusal to his peers. Diocletian was angry over his young friend’s refusal and attempted to bribe him into apostasy. Unable to dissuade George, on April 23, 303, Diocletian had George decapitated. He was buried in Lydda and was immediately honored as a martyr by other Christians. Saint George was known in England as early as the eighth century. English soldiers adopted him as their patron saint after he supposedly appeared to the crusader army at

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The English story of Saint George and the dragon was of Middle Eastern origin and was probably brought to England by returning crusaders. Lebanon and Libya provided original settings for England’s own version of Saint George slaying a dragon. In Lebanon, George was reported to have killed a dragon near the sea. In Libya he rescued a king’s daughter from a dragon. George killed the dragon after the king promised to have his subjects baptized as Christians. In England the legend of Saint George and the dragon was often modified to serve changing national and religious interests. For example, in The Pilgrim’s Progress (1679, 1684), John Bunyan transformed the story into a fight between Christian and Apollyon—“a foul fiend coming over the field to meet with him.” Al Truesdale See also Warrior Saints Further Reading Morgan, Giles. St. George: Knight, Martyr, Patron, Saint, and Dragon Slayer. New York: Chartwell Books, 2009. Riches, Samantha. St. George: Hero, Martyr, Myth. London: Sutton, 2005. Saint George was a Roman soldier who was put to death for failing to recant his Christian faith. He is most commonly identified with the myth of Saint George and the dragon, as portrayed in this painting from Saint Barnabas Monastery in North Cyprus. (Steve Allen/Dreamstime.com)

the Battle of Antioch (1098). Richard I (1157–1199) placed his army under the protection of Saint George while campaigning in Palestine (1191–1192). He might have been the one who adopted the banner of Saint George—the red cross of a martyr on a white background—for the uniforms of English soldiers. Byzantine soldiers told stories of Saint George to English troops, who then carried the mesmerizing tales home to England. Returning crusaders probably imported the cult of Saint George, which likely originated in the fifth century. Troubadours spread captivating Saint George stories throughout the land, giving them a distinct English flavor. The Acts of St. George, first written in Greek in the fifth century (Syriac ca. 600, and later translated into Anglo-Saxon), recount George’s visits to Caerleon and Glastonbury while on military service in England. By the end of the 14th century George had become recognized as the patron saint of England.

Saint Ursula (d. 383 CE) The life and martyrdom of Saint Ursula and her 11,000 virginal companions constitutes one of the more curious episodes of Catholic hagiography on martyrdom. This incredible and unsurpassable number, which may have been derived from the fact that a medieval copier misread the term 11M, which indicated 11 martyrs, for 11,000, provided an almost unlimited array of first-quality relics, such as bodies, heads, and other bodily relics, objects of martyrdom, and objects used and touched by them. These types of relics were an important part of medieval Catholicism. The legend tells that Ursula was the daughter of Dionutus, the Christian king of the Britons, and that she took a vow of chastity. However, the pagan king of the Britons, Conanus, moved by her beauty, honesty, and kindness, wanted her as his son Aetherius’s wife. She agreed to marry Aetherius in three years’ time on the condition that he would convert to Christianity and that she would make a

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pilgrimage to Rome first. On the way back, in approximately the year 383, she was tortured and killed by the Huns near the modern-day city of Cologne, along with her entire entourage, which consisted of a large number of virgins, several bishops, and the legendary Pope Cyriac. This rather bizarre story was recorded by Jacopo da Voragine (ca. 1230–1298) in the Legenda Aurea, and the cult of Saint Ursula was fostered throughout the Middle Ages. The illustration of this episode was diffused in 15-century Flemish, German, and Italian painting, identifying the Huns with the contemporary Turkish menace. From the early 16th century, relics began to be taken in large numbers to Spain and Portugal as well as to their respective overseas territories. In 1517, following the request of Emperor Maximilian, the body of Saint Auta, the daughter of Quincian and Gerasima, the royal couple of Sicily, was transferred from Cologne to Lisbon where it was taken in triumphant progress to the Convent of Madre de Deus. In particular, Philip II from Spain owned 70 heads of the Cologne virgins. Apparently, Queen Anne herself was offered four heads during her trip to Cologne in 1570, well over 1,000 years after the martyrdom of St. Ursula and her entourage. The Jesuits, who were the first to take bodily relics of the companions of Ursula to Asia and America, may have had a monopoly on the sale of these relics throughout the Portuguese Empire. Both text and image demonstrate their close involvement with this devotional practice. The subject was stressed in paintings and engravings commissioned by the Jesuits, beginning with the frescoes of the Roman church of Santo Stefano Rotondo dated 1582. Pedro de Ribadeneira (1526–1611) reaffirmed the thesis that the church of Saint Ursula in Cologne corresponded to the place of their martyrdom in his Vidas de los Santos (1599). The German Jesuit brother Herman Crombach (1598– 1680) demonstrated the veracity of the large number of travelers in St. Ursula’s entourage by tracing genealogies that eventually arrived at the number 9,816 virgins in his opus magnus Vitae e Martiriy SS. Ursulae (1647). A favorite iconography shows Ursula as a maiden shot through with arrows and accompanied by a large number of companions being pierced by swords and other weapons such as darts and arrows. Because they embarked by sea for Rome (although they returned overland), seafarers have since sought their special intercession. The cult of St. Ursula was

also fundamental as an instrument of conversion. In a letter written in Daman, India, in 1560, the Portuguese Jesuit António Gomes asked General Francesco de Borja for relics related to Saint Ursula, arguing that this area was especially dangerous. In particular, missionary reports mention the frequency of mass baptisms taking place on October 21, which is Saint Ursula’s day, from Asia to America. The long and dangerous sea travels, the prophetic dream that Ursula may have had of her martyrdom, and the collective martyrdom at the hands of the Huns corresponded to the life trajectory of many missionaries. To conclude, the representations of Ursula and her companions holding banners, crowned and with the nimbus of sainthood, illustrate their glorification and therefore the idea of martyrs as main agents of the Jesuit ideal of ecclesia triumphi, or the practice of martyrdom in the face of persecution. Cristina Osswald See also Martyrs, Jesuit Further Reading Hatfield, Edmund, and Wynkyn de Word. The Legend of St. Ursula and Her Companions. London: John Camden Hotten, 1869. Montgomery, Scott B. St. Ursula and the Eleven Thousand Virgins of Cologne. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010.

Saladin (1138–1193) Saladin was the vizier (1169–1171) and sultan of Egypt (1174–1193) and the main Muslim opponent of the Franks of Outremer in the last quarter of the 12th century. His original name was Yusuf ibn Ayyub; the name Saladin is a European corruption of his honorific Arabic title ala al-Din (goodness of the faith). Saladin was a Kurd who was born at Tikrit (in mod. Iraq) in 1138. His family originated in Dvin in the Caucasus (near mod. Yerevan, Armenia), but employment opportunities brought members of the family to Iraq. Saladin’s father, Najm al-Din Ayyub, and uncle, Asad al-Din Shirkuh, served as governors of Tikrit on behalf of the Seljuk sultan Muhammad ibn Malik Shah. However, in 1138 they had to flee Tikrit after Shirkuh committed a murder. They both

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found employment at the court of Imad al-Din Zangi, emir of Mosul. For some years the careers of the two brothers took separate courses, but beginning in 1154 they were both in Damascus in the service of Zangi’s son Nur al-Din, ruler of Muslim Syria. Saladin spent his formative years in Damascus: for a short period he served as chief of police, but he was mostly known as Nur al-Din’s highly skilled polo-playing companion. Between 1164 and 1169, Nur al-Din found himself obliged to intervene militarily in Egypt to counter invasions of the country mounted by the Franks of Jerusalem in alliance with the Byzantines. Saladin accompanied the expeditionary force commanded by Shirkuh, gaining his first military experience at the Battle of Babayn and the defense of Alexandria (1167). On the death of Shirkuh (March 26, 1169), Saladin became commander of Nur alDin’s forces in Egypt and was also appointed vizier, governing in the name of the Fatimid caliph. The period from this point to the death of the caliph al-Adil (September 1171) saw the consolidation of Saladin’s power, the undermining of the Fatimid state, and the growth of tension with Nur al-Din. Saladin bought the loyalty of the officers of the Syrian army in Egypt by rewarding them with rural and urban property. His personal standing was much strengthened with the arrival of his father and older brothers from Damascus. His brother, Turan Shah, fought and destroyed the Fatimid infantry regiments in Cairo, thus curtailing the Fatimid regime’s ability to oppose Saladin. Saladin’s father, Najm al-Din Ayyub, governed provinces of Egypt, and his nephew, Taqi al-Din, emulated Saladin by establishing educational and religious institutions that emphasized the new Sunni character of Egypt. In the struggle against the Fatimid state Saladin was assisted by Sunni Muslims within the Fatimid administration, who had a deep dislike for the incompetent and religiously abhorrent Shiite regime. Among these, the cooperation of Qadi al-Fadil, head of the Fatimid chancery, proved invaluable. The death of al-Aid in 1171 brought the tension between Saladin and Nur al-Din into the open: Nur al-Din now realized that Saladin and his Ayyubid kinspeople had developed a taste for power in Egypt, but he found himself unable to enjoy the fruits of the military investment he had made in sending his armies there. This tension, although it did not burst into open conflict, continued until the death

of Nur al-Din in 1174. After the death of his former overlord, Saladin set out to conquer Syria from the hands of Nur al-Din’s young heirs. This intra-Muslim war was presented in Qadi al-Fadil’s propaganda as having a different motive: the desire to wage holy war on the Franks. Damascus, Homs, and Hama came under Saladin’s rule in 1174. However, it was only after two battles against Zangid forces, in 1175 and 1176, that Saladin was able to conquer Aleppo in 1183. Mosul remained a Zangid possession, while recognizing Saladin’s sovereignty and contributing forces to his campaigns (1186). Other victories by Saladin included the conquest of the Artuqid towns of Mayyafariqin, Mardin, and the fortress of Amida (modern Diyarbakir, Turkey) in 1183. Saladin’s expansion at the cost of other Muslim dynasties took place intermittently, interspersed with wars against the Franks of Outremer and clashes with the Assassins, who were regarded as Muslim heretics. In 1177, Saladin suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Franks in the Battle of Mont Gisard in southern Palestine. However, he was able to recover from this and successfully fought the Battle of Marj Uyun (1179). Special animosity developed between Saladin and the lord of Transjordan, Reynald of Châtillon, who intercepted pilgrim caravans to Arabia and launched a naval raid in the Red Sea aimed at the holy city of Mecca, which was defeated by Saladin’s forces in Egypt. Saladin’s invasions of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1182 and 1183 were quite futile; in 1183, for example, the refusal of the Franks to be dragged into an all-out battle led to a stalemate and forced him to withdraw from the kingdom. The campaign of 1187 was marked by Saladin’s numerical superiority and tactical mistakes committed by the Franks. On June 27, Saladin rounded the southern tip of Lake Tiberias and, on June 30, took up a position to the northwest at Kfar Sabt. This well-watered place controlled one of the roads from Saforie, where the Franks had concentrated, to Tiberias. On July 2, Saladin left most of his army at Kfar Sabt and attacked Tiberias with his personal guard. The town was quickly taken, but Eschiva of Galilee, the wife of Raymond III of Tripoli, held out in the strongly fortified citadel. On July 3, the Franks left Saforie in an attempt to relieve Tiberias. Saladin’s army seized the springs of Turan as they left, cutting the Franks off from water supplies; the nearest springs were at the Horns of Hattin, but

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these had also been seized by Saladin’s troops. Saladin made effective use of his numerical superiority, attacking the rear of the Frankish army, held by the Templars, from the high ground of Turan. At this point King Guy de Lusignan of Jerusalem decided to establish a camp, and the Franks endured a night of thirst on the arid plateau (July 3–4). In the ensuing Battle of Hattin, Raymond of Tripoli and some of his troops were able to escape the Muslim encirclement, but the Frankish army, although it fought gallantly, finally collapsed, and most of the Franks were killed or taken prisoner. Saladin spared King Guy, but executed Reynald of Châtillon along with the Templar and Hospitaller captives. Vast numbers of prisoners were sent to Damascus. Saladin took full advantage of this victory and went on to capture the city of Jerusalem (October 20, 1187) and numerous other territories held by the Franks in Palestine and Syria in intense campaigns during 1187– 1189, which occasionally continued into the winter months as well. Only Tyre and Tripoli remained in Christian hands, but this was enough for the Franks, aided by crusader forces, to begin their attempt at reconquest. Saladin’s great achievements in fighting the holy war had already become a myth during his lifetime, obliterating almost every feature of his personality and deeds that did not tally with the myth. Only rarely, if at all, is the nonmythical Saladin discernible from what is recorded about him. The myth of Saladin was created and propagated by a group of three historian-admirers: Qadi al-Fadil, Imad al-Din al-Ifahani, and Baha al-Din ibn Shaddad, who also served Saladin in various capacities and accompanied him on campaigns. Saladin’s critics were few, and even they could not deny his real achievements. Scholars are left with Saladin’s depiction by his historian-admirers, and these accounts must be examined on their own merits. Saladin is portrayed as a religious person who scrupulously performed the rites of Islam, and there is nothing unbelievable in this description. Medieval people, both humble and high-born, were deeply religious, and for many the strict observance of religious rites was a way of life. Far more problematic is the description of Saladin’s religious beliefs and inclinations, as these are presented as conforming to the Sunni orthodoxy of his time. It can certainly be asked whether Saladin was indeed much concerned with theological problems such as God’s attributes, or whether the

views attributed to him by his historian-admirers were the reflections of their own inner religious world rather than his. No less questionable are the descriptions crediting him with great interest in religious learning and the sessions of transmission of prophetic traditions. It is true that Saladin and his extended family were linguistically and culturally fully Arabicized—Saladin was fluent in both Kurdish and Arabic. The religious education of his many sons was important to him, and he tried to provide them with the best available. Attendance at sessions of the transmission of traditions, however, was not only a personal religious act. It had public implications and was politically useful in forging ties with the religious class, which was a group that rendered intermediary services between the ruling military elite (mostly Kurdish and Turkish) of Egypt and Syria and the subject populations. Participation in public sessions was only one minor aspect of Saladin’s manifold relations with the religious class. The establishment of law colleges supported by vast pious endowments was a far more significant aspect of these relations. In this respect, Saladin’s religious policy lacked originality, as it was the continuation of a pattern that had evolved in the 11th and 12th centuries in the Iranian world and the Near East. The main problem is, however, the depiction of Saladin as an unselfish warrior of the holy war. This image was propagated long before there were any real achievements and was used to justify wars against Muslims. By his time, the manipulation of the holy war for political purposes was common, and the fact that it was used in Saladin’s propaganda should not necessarily automatically discredit him. Judging from the tenacity with which he fought the Third Crusade, Saladin’s commitment to the ideology of the holy war was deep and real. Saladin’s financial and material generosity toward members of the ruling elite is widely reported and must have been a very basic trait of his character. He is also characterized as humanely generous and attentive to the plight of captured and suffering enemies. This characterization prevailed in spite of the well-known executions of prisoners of war carried out on his orders and his quite callous attitude toward his own men in captivity. His failure to ransom the captured garrison of Acre, eventually executed by the crusaders, subsequently affected his relations with his emirs.

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Saladin was a Muslim warrior and sultan who established the Ayyubid dynasty that ruled Egypt and much of the Middle East from 1171 until 1260. He is famous for his frequent successes in battle against the European crusaders. (Jupiter Images)

During the Third Crusade (1189–1192), one of Saladin’s major problems, the lack of adequate naval power, came to the fore. Saladin built a fleet, but it was much smaller than the European fleets operating in the eastern Mediterranean and performed poorly in combat, notably at Tyre in 1187. This naval shortcoming contributed greatly to Saladin’s failure in the battle for Acre from September 1189 to July 1191. Although the Third Crusade failed to reconquer Jerusalem, Saladin suffered further military setbacks,

losing the port of Jaffa and being defeated at the Battle of Arsuf (September 7, 1191). Fearing for the safety of Egypt, he decided to dismantle the fortifications of Ascalon. The truce of September 2, 1192, known as the Treaty of Jaffa, confirmed what the Franks held and gave the two sides a much needed respite, but events had taken a heavy toll on Saladin’s health: he died on March 3, 1193, after an illness lasting only a few days. Yaacov Lev

704 Salafism See also Hattin, Battle of; Third Crusade Further Reading Ehrenkreutz, Andrew S. Saladin. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1972. Gibb, Hamilton A. R. The Life of Saladin. Oxford: Clarendon, 1973. Humphreys, R. Stephen. From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ay­ yubids of Damascus, 1193–1260. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. Lev, Yaacov. Saladin in Egypt. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1999. Lyons, Malcom Cameron, and D. E. P. Jackson. Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Sivan, Emanuel. L’Islam et la croisade. Paris: Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient, 1967.

Salafism Salafism is a Sunni Muslim movement that adheres to a literalist theology and often, though not always, rejects following (taqlid) the four Islamic schools of law (madhahib, sing. madhhab). Instead, Salafis argue that Muslims must look only to the Qur’an and the hadith for correct Islamic belief and practice since those were the only sources of guidance followed by the three earliest generations of Muslims—al-salaf al-salih (the pious predecessors), from which the movement takes its name. Insisting that these early generations represent the best Muslims, Salafis hold that only what they and the Prophet Muhammad did and permitted is licit, while anything that was not in line with their teachings or which came after them is an “innovation” (bid’a) and is to be avoided. Salafis accuse Shi’as and Sufis of committing bid’a for practices such as grave visitation and seeking intercession through pious figures— rituals that, to Salafis, lack basis in the religion’s sources. The movement’s theology is based on the creed of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855) and his circle, known as the Ahl al-Hadith (the people of hadith). They maintain that the Qur’anic verses dealing with God’s attributes must be understood literally and not interpreted, and that any deviation from the literal meaning of the Qur’anic text could result in an erroneous understanding of God, leading to

kufr (unbelief). In time, these ideas were taken up by the Syrian polymath Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350), who criticized groups that had been influenced by Greek philosophy. They criticized them for promoting reason over scripture when the latter is sufficient for understanding Islam’s truths. Salafis today see these two figures as the movement’s most important premodern scholars. From the mid-18th to the early 19th centuries, reform movements across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia took up various aspects of the Salafi legacy. Notable leaders in this movement were Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), a preacher in Arabia who emphasized tawhid (divine unicity) and condemned popular practices such as grave visitation, and Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Shawkani (d. 1834) in Yemen, who opposed emulation of the legal schools and insisted on deriving rulings from the Qur’an and hadith. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s pact with Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud (d. 1765) led to the formation of the first Saudi state. His ideas, later known as Wahhabism, remain closely aligned to those of Salafis. It is for this reason that Saudi Arabia currently funds many Salafi centers, publications, and groups. Wahhabism and Salafism differ, however, in that the former is closely aligned with the Saudi state and in legal matters generally follows the Hanbali madhhab, whereas many Salafis tend to reject allegiances to legal schools because the salaf did not adhere to them. In the late 19th to the early 20th century, the Salafi label was incorrectly assigned to Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897) and his student, the Egyptian Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), who, responding to the success of European colonial powers in the region and a perceived decline among Muslims, promoted the rejection of taqlid and the embrace of ijtihad (independent reasoning) as a way of reclaiming their status and former glory. Afghani and ‘Abduh did not aver that they held to the Salafi creed and argued that Muslims should look to Western methods and ideas in breaking free from their stagnant ways. ‘Abduh’s student, Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935), was pivotal in popularizing Salafism in the early 20th century. He embraced the study of hadith, especially after his teacher’s death in 1905. Later, after witnessing the progress of the Saudis in the 1920s and 1930s, he openly supported them and to some extent the Hanbali theology they

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professed. Rida, who was based in Egypt and Syria, was also instrumental in shaping Salafi reformist circles across the region through his influential and widely disseminated journal al-Manar (The Lighthouse), which was read by many of the leading Salafi figures of the 20th century. From the mid-20th century onward, Salafi groups developed political responses to the policies of Arab states in the Middle East, especially those that adopted the secular ideologies of Socialism and Arab nationalism. As the most powerful Sunni state opposing these secular ideologies, Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in bolstering Salafism during this period, funding Salafi publications and centers around the world, founding several Islamic universities— institutions inside Saudi Arabia that taught Wahhabi theology and hosted foreign students and faculty, thereby allowing different groups to exchange ideas—and, most recently, funding political parties and groups that represent the Salafi cause. With respect to politics, Salafis generally fall into one of the following three camps: 1. “Quietists” argue that since nation-states, elections, and other forms of political and civic engagement, as well as ideologies such as nationalism did not exist during the time of the Prophet Muhammad, Muslims should not participate in them. Rather, they should focus, instead, on refuting non-Salafi Muslim groups, especially Sufis, Shi’as, and the Muslim Brothers, who, in their view, lost sight of Islam’s original message. 2. “Salafi-Jihadists” argue, based on the reasoning of the Quietists, that those groups and individuals who have lost sight of the true message of Islam are no longer considered Muslims, thus are unbelievers (kuffar, sing. kafir) and should therefore be excommunicated (takfir). Moreover, seeing how secular Arab governments persecuted Salafis and Muslim Brothers, Salafi-Jihadists often advocate violence toward them. Salafi-Jihadism was heavily influenced by a violent strain of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially the ideas and practices of the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), a literary critic imprisoned for alleged assassination attempts and later hanged in an expedited sentence, who argued

that the entire Muslim world was in a state of jahiliyya, or pre-Islamic ignorance, and thus God’s rule and sovereignty, hakimiyya, had to be restored. After Qutb’s death, his ideas were developed further in the same prison system by groups calling for violent action. These included al-Jihad, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri (currently the head of Al Qaeda): al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra, led by Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj (d. 1982), who inspired Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s assassin: and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, led by Omar ‘Abd al-Rahman, “the Blind Sheikh” who later masterminded the 1993 World Trade Center attack. 3. “Activists” argue for political engagement, especially a restitution of divine law instead of secular laws. They single out secular Arab states for not enforcing Islamic laws and the Muslim Brotherhood for being too compromising with their religious positions. One example is the Sahwa (Awakening) movement, which emerged after Saudi Arabia allowed the arrival of U.S. troops on Saudi soil during the First Gulf War in 1991. The Sahwa criticized their government for partnering with non-Muslim powers and for stationing non-Muslim troops in the kingdom. More recent examples of Salafi Activists include the Al Nour Party in Egypt, which was formed after the ouster of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, as well as Salafi political parties in Gulf states, especially in Kuwait. Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, which were committed by Al Qaeda (a Salafi-Jihadist group), Salafi-Jihadists have been the most visible strain of the movement, given their violent agenda. Following the Arab uprisings of 2011, local groups, often with links to the global Al Qaeda network, have taken root in conflict areas. These include the Nusra Front in Syria and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Ansar al-Sharia in North Africa, among others. Most Salafis, however, are not jihadists and are critical of Al Qaeda’s approach, especially its excessive violence and its excommunication of fellow Muslims through the practice of takfir. Their activities range from holding study sessions and publishing works on creed and law, to engaging in political criticism, often with theologically laden arguments against non-Sunni governments such as those

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of Syria and Iran, and refutations of other Muslim groups, especially politically engaged ones (like the Muslim Brotherhood), other sects (such as Shi’as and Ahmadis), and Sufis. Jacob Olidort See also Al Qaeda; Islam and War (Jihad); Muhammad as Warrior; Qur’an and War; Wahhabism Further Reading Commins, David. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I. B. Tauris, 2006. Haykel, Bernard. “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action.” In R. Meijer, ed. Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement. London: Hurst, 2009, pp. 33–57. Meijer, R. ed. Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. Wagemakers, Joas. A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Weisman, Itzchak. Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus. Leiden: Brill, 2001.

community, or panth, through elected members of the Akāl Takht in Amritsar, which is the seat of Sikh temporal authority. The community is thus a soverign political force independent of any other temporal sovereign and is invested with the power to pronounce on spiritual and temporal matters through internal consensus-building. Guiding the community is the 11th and final guru: the central Sikh scripture, the Guru Granth Sāhib. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn See also Dharam Yudh; Khālsā; Sikhism and War; Singh, Guru Gobind Further Reading Deol, Jeevan. “Eighteenth Century Khalsa Identity: Discourse, Praxis and Narrative.” In Arvind-pal Singh Mandair, C. Shackle, and Gurharpal Singh, eds. Sikh Religion, Culture and Ethnicity. Richmond, UK: Curzon, 2001.

Santiago, Order of Sant Sipa¯hı¯ The sant sipāhī, or saint soldier, is the ideal to which Sikhs are taught to aspire: an individual with a sense of justice who is prepared to defend victims of oppression, a concept rooted deeply in Sikhs’ understanding of the spiritual teachings of the 10 Sikh gurus. The Sikhs were first forced to adapt to changing political realities with the Mughal execution of their fifth guru, Guru Arjan, in 1606 under the Mughal charge of treason. The next Sikh leader, Guru Hargobind, instituted the concept of m`rī-pīrī, describing both the spiritual and temporal authority of his teachings and Sikhs themselves. Just as the two are linked for the community as a whole, so are individuals to develop both their spirituality and their ethical engagement with the world around them. The concept of mīrī-pīrī was further developed with Guru Gobind Singh’s creation of the khālsā, a community of believers who renounce past attachments and devote themselves entirely to the gurus’ teachings. The khālsā is made up of aspirant sant sipāhīs who lead the entire Sikh

The Order of Santiago was the most powerful military and religious order in the Iberian Peninsula. It possessed vast estates, revenues, property, and jurisdiction over thousands of vassals. Its independence, power, and wealth were viewed as a threat over time, and in 1476 the death of the grand master of Santiago provided an opportunity for the Spanish royal crown to exercise full authority over the order. In 1523, a papal bull definitively incorporated the order under royal control. Famous members of Santiago include Diego Velázquez, royal artist in the court of King Philip IV. The Order of Santiago was established in 1170 in Cáceres León by its first grand master, Pedro Fernández de Castro. The order was designed on the same lines as the military Order of the Temple and Hospital of Saint John to defeat Islam and restore Christian dominance over the Iberian Peninsula. Members of Santiago took the monastic vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience and followed the milder rule of the canons of Saint Augustine. The order was named after Saint James the Moorslayer (Matamoros), who fought in the legendary battle of Clavijo in the reign of Ramiro I and whose remains lay in Santiago de

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Compostela. The order took as its symbol a red cross simulating a sword. Knights wore the symbol of Santiago on a white cape in combat. Shortly after its foundation Santiago was augmented by the incorporation of the friars of Ávila in 1172. Within a few years the order had expanded into Portugal and Castile. The rapid expansion of the order from its foundation can be attributed to broader factors including the fall of Jerusalem in 1187 and the expansion of the Almoravids on the Iberian Peninsula, which created a heightened fear that Islam was ascending over Christianity. Under these circumstances Santiago found an important role for itself as a military unit that could be quickly assembled and mobilized to hold important frontier castles along the Leonese border and to fight in pitched battles. Members of Santiago enjoyed the same crusading privileges as the military orders in the Holy Lands as Spain became an alternative to service for the cause of Christendom. The bravery of the order’s members was recognized by the generous royal patronage it received. In May 1212 senior members of Santiago attended a meeting in Toledo to prepare for a major offensive against the Moors. The order fought bravely in the center of the Christian lines at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, a battle that signaled the decline of Muslim authority over the peninsula. The success of this campaign led to Santiago expanding its activities to help in the reconquest of Portugal, Castile, and the Levant. At this time it controlled more than a dozen castles (Montalbán, Anna, Enguera, Uclés, Alharilla, Oreja, Cáceres, Monsanto, Aljustrel, Mértola, Ayamonte, Alhambra, and Segura) and ran nine hospitals (Toledo, Cuenca, Alarcón, Moya, Huete, Talavera, Uclés, Castrotoraf, and Salamanca). By 1280 the large military demands required Santiago to absorb smaller orders such as the Order of Santa María de España to replenish its numbers after its master and 55 knights were killed at the battle of Moclín. After the incorporation of Santiago under the authority of the Catholic Monarchs and with the end of the Reconquest, the order’s influence declined. In 1873 it was suppressed under the First Spanish Republic but was restored by King Juan Carlos I as a civil and aristocratic organization. Barry N. Whelan

See also Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of; Reconquista; Religious Military Orders Further Reading Cabrer, Martín Alvira. Las Navas de Tolosa 1212: Idea, Liturgia y Memoria de la Batalla. Madrid: Sílex, 2012. Forey, Alan. The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries. London: Macmillan, 1992. Lomax, Derek W. The Reconquest of Spain. London: Longman, 1978. Madden, Thomas F. The New Concise History of the Crusades. Oxford: Rowman, 2005. O’Callaghan, Joseph F. Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Saracens “Saracens” was a term used to denote Arabs in pre-Islamic times (first–sixth centuries CE), and later in medieval Europe as a reference to Muslims. With respect to its general usage, the exact nature of its etymon as it has been traced through Greek, Aramaic, Syriac, Nabataean, and, finally, Arabic is somewhat vague. However, the most likely derivation of the word Saracens is from the Semitic root s-r-q. Among the Bedouins of northern Arabia, s-r-q or sarraqa has been used with the meaning “to migrate to the inner desert (serq).” Thus it provided the Greek (sarakānoi) and Latin (Saracenus) words for Arabian nomads. During the medieval period, the term Saracens (OFr. Sarrazin/Sarracin; OEng. Sarracene) was employed in the West along pejorative lines to denote Arabs or Muslims, depending on the context. The geographic location of Islam, moreover, contributed to the Western perception of a Saracen, and contact with Muslims in the various regions during war further disparaged the term. When crusaders encountered the Seljuks of Rūm in the 12th century and the name Turcia began to be adopted for Asia Minor, Saracen gave way to Turk in the sense of Muslim with the rise of the Ottomans. Further, in Andalusia (Iberian Peninsula) and in North Africa as the Reconquest by Christians continued, Saracen in the general sense of Arab became replaced by Moor (Mauri/Moros) around the 15th century as used for Arab-Berbers in those lands.

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Another use of the term in modern times comes directly from the literary heritage of the medieval period and its function within the compositions of that epoch. The chansons de geste (songs of deeds), or Old French epic poems, are historical fictions set in the time of Charlemagne or his son, Louis (the Pious). The genre developed in the 11th–14th centuries and contains the “unofficial” view of Saracens as dictated by what seemed to be an endless war between Christians and Muslims. These poems were composed primarily for soldiers, though they appealed to all social classes. The term was also used to indicate a biblical people, the sons of Ishmael, who were the children of Hagar and thus outside of the covenant. The argument that Saracens were not related to Sara led some to agree that they be called rather Agarenes, from Agar; the polemic significance of this claim cannot be overstated. Thus, Peter the Venerable in the 12th century could insist that Arabs were committed to the Jewish Holy Books on the basis of this connection. In the 13th century, both William of Auvergne and William of Tripoli saw two distinct fulfillments of divine purpose in the Saracens: “I will make the son also of the bondwoman a great nation” and “wild and powerful to pitch his tents against all men,” respectively. Here the seeds that were sown eventually grew into an expansive field of polemic literature that portrayed Saracens as warmongers and heretics who followed the “blasphemous Mahomet,” therefore rightfully deserving the scorn and disdain of the Christian West. These sentiments, however, were a product of their time as the Ottoman Empire continued to expand and fear in the Western world provoked a response that was both prejudiced and undeserved. Islam needed to fit into the Western worldview, and at that time the West operated within a biblical framework. Today the term Saracens is antiquated, and its usefulness in dialogue is far removed from the de rigueur status it held in centuries past. Roy Michael McCoy III See also Crusades (Overview); Ottoman Empire Further Reading Daniel, Norman. Heroes and Saracens: An Interpretation of the Chansons de Geste. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984.

Fisher, Greg. Between Empires: Arabs, Romans, and Sasanians in Late Antiquity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Macdonald, M. C. A. “On Saracens, the Rawwāfah Inscription and the Roman Army.” In Literacy and Identity in Pre-Islamic Arabia. Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009. Tolan, John V. Saracens: Islam in the Medieval Imagination. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. William of Adam. How to Defeat the Saracens. Translated by Giles Constable. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.

Saudi-Hashemite Wars (1917–1925) The Saudis and the Hashemites were nominal allies during the First World War with the backing of the British. While the Hashemites challenged the Ottomans in the Hijaz, the Saudis besieged the Rashidis, the Ottomans’ allies, in central Arabia. Toward the end of the First World War, the Hashemites were promised the Hijaz and the Saudis the Najd. As the peace treaties were being signed in Paris and postwar agreements were made, the Saudis asserted their own agenda. Despite Saudi advances, the Hashemites still had strong backing from the British and support in the Hijaz. However, without a common enemy and with an ill-defined border between the new Kingdom of the Hijaz and the emerging Saudi state, conflict began to bubble to the surface. Additionally, in the aftermath of the war, the Ikhwan (the Brethren), a zealous religious militia drawn from numerous tribes, became increasingly uncontrollable. They raided British-controlled Transjordan and Kuwait as well as making inroads into the Hijaz. The actions of the Ikhwan often undermined Ibn Saud’s desire for reconciliation with overzealous behavior. The Hashemites were led by Husayn ibn ‘Ali al-Hashimi, often referred to as King Husayn. He crowned himself as king of the Hijaz and the Arab Lands in 1916 during the Arab Revolt and was recognized by the British. With the Hashemite capture of Medina, the last Ottoman holdout in Arabia, in January 1919, Husayn cast an eye toward Saudi intentions. Both the Hashemites and the Saudis began to compete for the loyalty of the tribes of the Hijaz and Najd; in fact, this had already begun in December 1917 with the

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Husayn ibn ‘Ali (center), a descendant of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, was the Hashemite ruler of Mecca and Medina before his kingdom fell under Saudi expansion. He is shown here at the home of his son, Amir Abdullah, in Amman, Transjordan, in 1921. (Library of Congress)

first raid by the Saudi Ikhwan against the Hashemites. Numerous tribes in the Hijaz and surrounding territories began to declare for the Saudis. In response to this and other provocations, King Husayn began to imprison Saudi sympathizers. The first major encounter between the Saudis and the Hashemites occurred before 1919 at al-Khurma, about 195 miles (315 kilometers) northwest of Mecca, a town on the fault line between Hashemite and Saudi supporters. Both

sides sought to rally this strategic point to their cause. When the emir of al-Khurma, Khalid ibn Mansur, defected to the Saudis, King Husayn sent a punitive expedition. However, Ibn Saud used this opportunity to confront the Hashemites. After being informed by spies in the area, he secretly sent a group of Ikhwan and other Saudi soldiers to defend Khalid ibn Mansur. In July 1918, the Saudi forces pushed the Hashemites back from al-Khurma. In May 1919, the Hashemites returned. An army led by Husayn’s

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son Abdullah marched on al-Khurma with 5,000 troops. This force was met by Khalid ibn Mansur and the Saudi Ikhwan at Turaba about 60 miles (100 kilometers) south of al-Khurma. The Hashemites were taken by surprise in their camp, and the Ikhwan brutally massacred the unsuspecting Hashemite troops. The Hashemite defeat was crushing. Nearly 1,400 Hashemite fighters were dead, Abdullah barely escaped the battlefield, and, more importantly, the prestige of King Husayn was shaken. After the overwhelming victory at Turaba, Ibn Saud withdrew back into the Najd, rightly fearing a British reaction if he pressed his advantage further into the Hijaz. Furious after the defeat at Turaba, King Husayn demanded action on the part of the British. His overbearing tone along with the evaporating prestige of the Hashemites in the Hijaz led the British to consider alternatives in Arabia. Ibn Saud dealt with matters in northeast Arabia. The Saudis inflicted a definitive defeat on the Rashidis with the capture of Ha’il, the Rashidi capital, in November 1921. This victory resulted in the annexation of most of the Najd (northern and central Saudi Arabia) and doubled Saudi territory. Aside from defeating their longtime rival, the Rashidis, the Saudis received further recognition from the British as a power in Arabia. In order to establish an understanding between the Saudis and the British Mandates, which had faced raids from the Ikhwan, both sides penned the ‘Uqair Protocol of 1922. This treaty built upon previous agreements and defined the frontier between Saudi territory as well as the British Mandate in Iraq and the protectorate in Kuwait. The Hashemites were left out of this agreement. After the ‘Uqair Protocol, the Saudis continued to pick away at the Hashemites’ authority in Arabia. Low-grade raiding by the Ikhwan and conversion of Arabian tribes and urban elites to the Wahhabi creed gradually undermined Hashemite authority. The Saudi move into the Hijaz should be seen as a gradual process. There were flashes of action, but for the most part the takeover occurred slowly. All the while, King Husayn alienated locals in Arabia and foreign powers with military ineffectiveness and brutal repression of dissent. The breaking point occurred in 1924 with the end of British subsidies to the Arabian tribes. This was a major blow to the Hashemite cause. In early March 1924,

the parliament of the newly formed Turkish Republic abolished the Ottoman caliphate. Husayn quickly adopted the title of caliph in the hope that it would help buttress his position in Arabia. The titles, along with his kingdom, were, however, contested by the Saudis. With Husayn foundering, the Saudis moved against Ta’if in late August 1924. Prince ‘Ali and the Hashemite army fled before the Ikhwan and the city fell on August 3. This resulted in the massacre of 300–400 civilians by the Ikhwan. Furthermore, the British decided not to come to the aid of the Hashemites and Husayn. As a result, King Husayn abdicated and fled to Cyprus in early October 1924. Husayn’s son, ‘Ali, assumed the throne. The departure of Husayn made ‘Ali’s position difficult. The Saudis moved on the major cities of the kingdom. Many notables within the Kingdom of the Hijaz began to migrate toward the Saudis and called for the ouster of ‘Ali. With Husayn gone, ‘Ali struggled to hold on to the city of Mecca and finally abandoned it. The city surrendered to the Saudis in the middle of October 1924. With the Hashemite army disintegrating, Medina was captured on December 9, and Ibn Saud arrived in Mecca in early December 1924. Yanbu, the port of Medina, fell on December 21. ‘Ali continued to hold out in Jeddah, a port city near Mecca. The Saudis besieged the town, and the British negotiated an agreement to allow ‘Ali to leave and grant amnesty to Hashemite officials. Once this was concluded, the city was handed over to the Saudis in early December 1925. With this, the Kingdom of the Hijaz was in the hands of the Saudis. On January 27, 1927, the new Saudi Kingdom of the Hijaz and Najd replaced the Hashemite Kingdom of the Hijaz. It was officially recognized by the British with the Treaty of Jeddah. This recognition added to Saudi legitimacy already bolstered by earlier recognition from many other powers. The remaining Hashemites took refuge in Jordan and Iraq. The Hashemites in the Hijaz alienated local tribes and played into the hands of the Saudis. The Saudis used the growing animosity in the Hijaz with Hashemite rule. The Saudis specifically proselytized to many of these groups and slowly gained support within the Hijaz. In many ways, the Saudis didn’t really win the war, the Hashemites lost it. James N. Tallon

Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar (1883–1966)  711 See also Caliphate; First World War, Religious Dimensions of; Ottoman Empire Further Reading Alangari, Haifa. The Struggle for Power in Arabia: Ibn Saud, Hussein and Great Britain, 1914–1924. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998. Alon, Yoav. The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State. London: I. B. Tauris, 2007. Al-Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Commins, David Dean. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I. B. Tauris, 2009. Habib, John S. Ibn Sa’ud’s Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa’udi Kingdom, 1910–1930. Leiden: Brill, 1978. Kostiner, Joseph. The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916–1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Paris, Timothy J. Britain, the Hashemites, and Arab Rule, 1920–1925: The Sherifian Solution. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Teitelbaum, Joshua. The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom of Arabia. New York: New York University Press, 2001.

Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar (1883–1966) Vinayak Damodar Savarkar was an Indian revolutionary and exponent of militant Hinduism. He was born on May 28, 1883. He was inspired by the ideals of the radical wing of the Indian National Congress and joined a clandestine organization called Mitra Mela (gathering of friends), which had as its objective the liberation of colonial India from British rule by use of violent means, if necessary. As a student at Fergusson College in India from 1902 onward, he motivated fellow classmates to rise against British rule. Savarkar established the revolutionary organization Abhinav Bharat (New India) in 1904 and was involved in the indigenous revolutionary movement Swadeshi that engulfed India in 1905. The goal of the leaders of the extremist wing of the Indian National Congress (INC) was swaraj (self-government), and this movement was imbued with these sentiments. This extremist brand of politics brought

about a revolutionary change in the struggle against British colonial authority, and Savarkar was an active participant in it. In 1906, Savarkar went to London to study law at Gray’s Inn. While there, he organized the Free India Society, which aimed at achieving Indian freedom by revolutionary means. The autobiography of Giuseppe Mazzini (1805– 1872), the romantic revolutionary of Italian unification, had been a source of inspiration for freedom fighters worldwide. In 1907, Savarkar published the Marathi translation of Mazzini’s autobiography, and it was well received. Savarkar also wrote about the 1857 revolt that engulfed British India. His treatise on this event, published in 1909, was entitled Indian War of Independence, 1857. This work remained a classic of Indian nationalist historiography. Published in the Netherlands, the book was banned throughout the British Empire. In 1909, British intelligence began actively following Savarkar, who had taken charge of India House, a meeting place for Indian revolutionaries in London. Madan Lal Dhingra, a follower and friend of Savarkar, assassinated British MP Sir William Curzon, an act endorsed and encouraged by Savarkar, who was arrested in March 1910 and sentenced to life imprisonment. To secure his release from prison, Savarkar agreed to renounce radical activities. He was transferred to prison in India in 1921; three years later, he was finally released upon his promise to refrain from joining in or contributing to any political/revolutionary activity. Savarkar’s lengthy incarceration resulted in his move to the extreme right, and his Indian nationalist aspirations soon gravitated toward a Hindu-centric view of a new India. Events of the 1920s, such as the Khilafat movement, increased his antagonism toward Muslims. His Essentials of Hindutva (1922) and Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? (1928) made him a champion of the cause of Hindu nationalism rather than simply an Indian who desired to see all India become a single, multiethnic, multireligious political entity free from British rule. Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? became a bible for protagonists of Hindu Rashtra (Hindu Nation). For Savarkar, India was the Punyabhumi (Holy Land) for Hindus only, and the Indian nation would become a Hindu nation after attaining freedom. Hindutva or “Hinduness” became the driving force that motivated Savarkar.

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Savarkar joined the right-wing Hindu Mahasabha and became its president, serving in this capacity between 1937 and 1943. The Hindu Mahasabha under Savarkar’s leadership collaborated with the British and did not support the Quit India Movement of 1942, the clarion call given by Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) asking the British to leave India. Savarkar also supported the British against the Japanese in the Second World War, unlike many Indian nationalists who took a more neutral stance. Savarkar actively supported the British war effort and asked the authorities to impart military training to the Hindus, hoping that this training would come into use after the war ended. However, as a staunch Hindu nationalist, he strongly believed in Akhand Hindustan (indivisible India) and was opposed to the partition of British India. Savarkar was a lifelong critic of Gandhi’s policies and wrote a book in Marathi entitled Gandhi Gondhal (Gandhi’s Confusion). He was well known to Nathuram Godse (1910–1949), Gandhi’s assassin. Savarkar was arrested for complicity in Gandhi’s murder, but was acquitted. It was reminiscent of 30 years earlier, when Savarkar was arrested as an accomplice in the assassination of British politician Sir William Curzon. In both cases, he did not wield any arms and was not actively involved in the shootings. In independent India, he was arrested in 1950 by the Congress government for arousing communal passion through his public speeches. He was released after agreeing to refrain from political activities and from encouraging Hindu nationalism. Savarkar continued his writing and immersed himself in cultural activities. However, ill health prevented him from leading an active public life. Savarkar died on February 27, 1966, at the age of 83. Savarkar’s vision of Hindu cultural and political nationalism left a lasting legacy in India that persists to this day. He has earned the epithet Veer (brave) for his association with revolutionary activities and his desire to see India liberated from British rule. Patit Paban Mishra See also Gandhi, Mahatma; India, Hindu-Muslim Conflict in; Indian Mutiny; Khilafat Movement Further Reading Keer, Dhananjay. Veer Savarkar. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1988.

Grover, Verinder. V. D. Savarkar. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1993. Noorani, Abdul G. M. Savarkar and Hindutva: The Godse Connection. New Delhi: Left Word Books, 2002. Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust. The Savarkar Controversy. New Delhi: Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust, 2004. Savarkar, Vinayak D. Echoes from Andaman. Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1984. Singh, A. K. Encyclopaedia on Savarkar. New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 2008.

Saxon Wars The Saxon Wars were a series of campaigns and battles in the eighth century that resulted in the conversion of the Saxons from Germanic paganism to Christianity. The sources for the Saxon Wars support the impression that they were fought persistently by both sides over a long period of time. Charlemagne’s biographer Einhard emphasized that it was the longest war the Franks ever waged. However, the nature of the conflict changed between 772 and 804. It is unlikely that religious considerations played a role at the beginning of the struggle in 772, although religious elements would become apparent as the conflicts between Christian Franks and the pagan Saxons intensified. The Franks had been fighting the Saxons during the time of Charlemagne’s grandfather, Charles Martel, and Charlemagne’s father, Pepin. Charlemagne initially shared Pepin’s empire with his brother Carloman, which caused additional conflicts between the two brothers until Carloman’s death by the end of 771. The campaign that started shortly afterward can be considered to be a joint military venture, the aim of which was to guarantee Charlemagne the loyalty of people who previously had been under Carloman’s command. Charlemagne initiated the conquest of Eresburg, a Saxon headquarters, and the destruction of the Saxon sanctuary, Irminsul. There was no mention of Saxon conversions yet, though. Charlemagne could not always devote his full attention to the Saxons. This caused new upheavals, which in turn were followed by military counterstrikes from the Frankish side. Meanwhile, Frankish historiography repeatedly mentions potential peace treaties with the

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Saxons. The Saxon constitution was nonhierarchical, compared to the Frankish one. Therefore, only certain groups of the Saxons felt bound by the arrangements while others kept rebelling. The sources first mention Saxons promising to convert to Christianity and to keep peace in 776. In 777, Charlemagne established his court in Paderborn in Saxony and held an imperial assembly during which many Saxons were baptized. Whether their baptism led the Saxons to completely renounce pagan practices is unclear. Charlemagne faced a very severe crisis in 778, when a campaign over the Pyrenees failed and he had to withdraw while a Saxon revolt broke out at the same time. This revolt led to the destruction of his new residence and to the recapture of the territory stretching to Deutz (today a part of Cologne) by the Saxons. In 782, the Franks suffered a further military defeat in which many members of the Frankish elite were killed. Charlemagne’s reaction to this is known as the Massacre of Verden. He marched to Saxony, demanded the delivery of the leaders of the revolt, and reportedly had 4,500 Saxons executed. Around the same time of the massacre, Charlemagne might have enacted the Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae, a capitulary containing new laws for the conquered Saxon regions. Pagan religious practices such as cremation and worshipping gods other than the Christian God were forbidden on pain of death. The Saxons could avoid these draconic punishments by seeking church asylum or confessing to a Christian priest, hence by adopting Christian practices. At this stage it became clear to Charlemagne that he could only restrain the revolts by completely integrating the Saxons into the Frankish empire; in doing so he could control and Christianize them. As a result of this effort to convert the Saxons, their resistance intensified under the leader Widukind, who eventually received sufficient security guarantees by Charlemagne to meet him and be baptized in the Frankish realm in 785. Around 790, the fights intensified once again, while at the same time some Saxons were fighting against the Avars together with the Frankish army. It is possible that the Capitulatio was only released by then; we lack precise information about the implementation of its rules. Another edict from 797 called the Capitulare Saxonicum was much more lenient, although none of the rules of the Capitulatio were explicitly revised.

Charlemagne even allied with the pagan Abodrites against those Saxons who still revolted in the north of Saxony. This makes it unlikely that Charlemagne’s war against the Saxons was exclusively motivated by religion. Only after Charlemagne’s coronation in 800 did the fights become less intense. It is possible that Charlemagne’s rise to a higher dignity made the integration into the Frankish empire much more bearable for the Saxons. From the end of the eighth century onward, Charlemagne’s goals in his struggle with the Saxons changed from conquering them to making them true Christians. He prohibited pagan practices and forced all Saxons to become baptized. This contradicted Christianity’s original prerequisite for conversion as it had been defined since late antiquity, which stipulated that voluntary conversion after prior education about the Christian belief was crucial. Already Charlemagne’s adviser Alcuin of York and other contemporaries criticized this. The Franks were able to put an end to the struggle by including the Saxons into the organizational structure of the Frankish Empire on one hand and by allowing the Saxon upper class to hold high clerical and secular offices as early as 782 on the other hand. Nevertheless, the so-called Stellinga Revolt in 841–843 during which some parts of the Saxon population wanted to go back to paganism proved that the Christianization of large groups still had been rather superficial. Julian Führer See also Charlemagne’s Conquests; Verden, Massacre of Further Reading Einhard. The Life of Charlemagne. Translated by Samuel Epes Turner. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1880. Reuter, Timothy. Germany in the Early Middle Ages 800–1056. New York: Longman, 1991.

Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) Sayyid Qutb was an important member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and an influential author and Islamic thinker. Qutb’s political and Islamic thought influenced modern Sunni Islamic radical thought and organizations. Born in 1906 in the village of Musha, Qutb graduated from

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the Dar al-‘Ulum teacher training college, and worked as a teacher for several years before joining the Egyptian Ministry of Education. In 1948, the Ministry of Education sent Qutb to the United States, where he stayed for several years and received a master’s degree in education. His stay in the United States deeply influenced him. Qutb, who initially adopted Westernization, felt alienated from Western society and culture, and eventually returned to the roots of his own culture. While staying in the United States, Qutb published his book Al-‘Adala al-Ijima’yya fi al-Islam (Social Justice in Islam). In this book he propagated Islam not only as a religion but as a complete way of life as well as a political agenda. After returning to Egypt, Qutb resigned from the Ministry of Education and joined the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1950s, where he became an active member in the organization’s intellectual circles and published many articles in the Brotherhood’s journals. Qutb’s radicalization developed simultaneously with the political changes in Egypt. In 1952, Egypt saw a revolution and the establishment of the “Free Officers” regime. After initially supporting the revolting officers, the Muslim Brotherhood begun criticizing the new regime. Qutb criticized the new regime and its leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser in turn persecuted the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Qutb, like many other members of the Brotherhood, was arrested several times in the 1950s and sentenced to prison. Eventually, in 1966, Qutb was convicted of plotting an assassination of Nasser and was executed. During the 1950s and 1960s, Qutb introduced radical concepts in his books. Qutb promoted the establishment of an Islamic society. According to Qutb, such a society should be based on sharia religious law, rather than on secular law. In addition, Qutb believed Islam was also an economic ideology, providing answers to economic questions, and deemed communism, socialism, and capitalism as not fit for an Islamic society. In his book Ma’alim gi al-Tariq (Milestones), published in 1964, Qutb presented his ideology of Jahiliya. Jahiliya is an Islamic term that describes the era prior to the rise of Islam as an era of paganism and ignorance. Qubt broadened the term to describe all non-Islamic societies and regimes of his time. In addition, the term included Muslim regimes that did not

uphold sharia law, deeming such regimes non-Islamic (takfir). Qutb also promoted an Islamic revolution, whose purpose was to abolish non-Islamic regimes and establish an Islamic society. Qutb also promoted jihad, meaning encouraging the active propagation of Islam, not necessarily a campaign of violence. Qutb’s ideology influenced radical Sunni Islamic organizations in the 20th century, inspiring radicals and terrorists. For instance, fighters inspired by Qutb’s ideas participated in the Soviet-Afghan War. Leon Volfovsky See also Islam and War (Jihad); Jahiliyya and Asabiyyah; Muslim Brotherhood Further Reading Akbarzadeh, Shahram, ed. Routledge Handbook of Political Islam. London: Routledge, 2012. Calvert, John. Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Toth, James. Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Schmalkaldic War (1546–1547) The Schmalkaldic War in Germany between Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (1500–1558) and the Protestant Schmalkaldic League lasted from July 1546 to April 1547. At its core a religious conflict, the war was shaped by political considerations that were distinctively bound up with the constitutional structure of politics in Germany, especially the relations between the princes and their by now “transnational” Habsburg overlord. The Schmalkaldic League emerged after the Imperial Diet of Augsburg in 1530 failed to restore religious unity in Germany and passed a resolution that incorporated extreme Catholic positions (November 19, 1530). Emperor Charles V reconfirmed the Edict of Worms (1521), effectively outlawed the evangelicals, and demanded their return to the Catholic fold. As abjuration of the evangelical faith was out of the question, and the hopes for a convocation of a general council of the German nation to resolve

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the religious differences futile, the Protestants signed, in the Hessian town of Schmalkalden, the treaty that founded the Schmalkaldic League (February 27, 1531). The league’s declared aim was to preserve Christian truth and peace in the Holy Roman Empire. The princes, although outnumbered by member cities and towns, dominated the league; Duke (and Elector) Johann of Saxony and Landgrave Philipp of Hesse were appointed commanders in chief. Various factors conspired to preclude an immediate military confrontation. Charles V was tied down by the French and the Turks, and his potential allies among the German Catholic princes had no interest in an internecine war that was likely to reinforce Habsburg power in Germany. His absence from the empire in the 1530s gave the Schmalkaldic League large scope to consolidate and expand. Most notable was the recapture of the duchy of Württemberg from the Habsburgs, engineered by Philipp of Hesse with French assistance in May 1534. Efforts to resolve the religious differences peacefully resumed under the emperor’s aegis in 1540, but failed. Even if Charles had at that point considered the use of force as the only way to restore religious unity in Germany, his armies were engaged in campaigns in other parts of the Habsburg conglomerate. This Habsburg weakness in Germany facilitated another bout of Protestant expansion: in the summer of 1542 the Schmalkaldic League conquered the duchy of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, the last lay Catholic principality in northwestern Germany. And the major ecclesiastical prince in that area, the archbishop (and elector) of Cologne, went over to the evangelical camp. These two developments posed a formidable double threat to the Habsburg emperor: an entirely Protestant Lower Rhine and the prospect of a Protestant majority in the Electoral College. The strategic danger in the Lower Rhine zone took on pressing relevance when the duke of Jülich, Cleves and Berg laid hereditary claim to the duchy of Geldern, which bordered the Habsburg dominions in the Netherlands, and requested admittance to the Schmalkaldic League. Charles responded with a military expedition in the summer of 1543, swiftly defeating the duke. In the wake of this victory and the resulting change in the balance of power, Charles returned to the empire for a longer spell marked by greater ambitions. He now sought to put into effect his conception of “monarchia universalis”: to

reshape the German political structure in terms of a hereditary Habsburg monarchy and restore Christian unity, as well as to draw on German resources to defeat France. These aims were not internally coherent: Charles had to make concessions to the Protestant Estates to secure the Imperial Diet’s aid against France. The campaign against France opened in July 1544 and concluded a mere few weeks later in the crucial Peace of Crépy in September: in the secret clauses of the treaty King François I of France agreed to support a General Church Council and eventually to provide military assistance against the German Protestants. The pope responded to the Peace of Crépy by convening a General Council in Trent (opened December 13, 1545), thereby obviating a general council of the German nation. Another round of religious talks during the Imperial Diet of Regensburg in 1546 failed, and the Protestants refused Charles’s summons to send representatives to the Church Council. A war to break the Protestant opposition and force them to attend the Church Council became for Charles the only practical policy. He concluded an alliance with the pope, who pledged to supply money and soldiers; a truce with the Ottomans secured him from attack from that direction; a treaty with the duke of Bavaria granted Charles free passage through their territories; and he won over several Protestant princes, most crucially Duke Moritz of Saxony, who was promised possession of lands he would conquer from his cousin, Elector Johann-Friedrich, as well as transference of the electoral title. On July 20, 1546, Emperor Charles V outlawed Landgrave Philipp and Elector Johann-Friedrich as leaders of the Schmalkaldic League on the ground that their (second) attack on Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel and imprisonment of its duke in 1545 constituted a breach of the General Peace. Charles admitted in private that the imperial ban was a pretext designed to counteract the notion that his was a religious war and give his Protestant allies legal justification for their support. The Schmalkadic League initially had the advantage: while its army had already been fully mobilized, the emperor had only a small force with him in Regensburg. However, divisions within the league’s council of war prevented decisive action and resulted in aimless maneuverings in the Donau Valley. Nor did the leaguers manage to block the arrival of the papal and imperial troops from Italy

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(mid-August) and of those marching from the Netherlands (mid-September). The experienced Protestant general Sebastian Schertlin von Burtenbach had his strategic plans overruled by the league’s two chiefs. His counsel to assault the emperor’s army near Ingolstadt following a ferocious bombardment on August 31 was possibly their best chance to win the war; they rejected it and withdrew their forces. After further maneuvers and feint attacks by both sides, the onset of cold weather and the lack of money sent them to winter quarters. In late October King Ferdinand, the emperor’s brother, invaded Saxony from Bohemia, followed by Duke Moritz. Johann-Friedrich of Saxony, having returned home, managed to push Moritz back. As the military struggle in Saxony became deadlocked, Emperor Charles marched his army to Saxony. On the morning of Sunday, April 24, 1547, he defeated Johann-Friedrich at the Battle of Mühlberg and took him prisoner. The Wittenberg Capitulation, signed by Johann-Friedrich on May 19, stripped him of the electoral title and some of his lands, and conferred them on Moritz. Landgrave Philipp surrendered a few weeks later. At the end of the Schmalkaldic War, Charles V was at the height of his power and pride. He set out both to impose a religious solution and make the empire over into a monarchical state. Both projects met with stiff resistance. Protestant and Catholic princes alike dreaded the prospect of an overmighty emperor. The Catholic princes deemed the cost of political unity under Habsburg absolutism greater than the cost of continued religious division. The slogan of “Spanish Servitude” gained wide currency. Moritz, who had earlier betrayed his Protestant brethren and helped Charles V defeat them, now entered secretly into an alliance with Protestant princes against the emperor. With the Treaty of Chambord (January 15, 1552) they brought in King Henri II of France. In March they launched their attack. Charles, distracted by Habsburg interests outside Germany, was taken unawares. He fled to his brother Ferdinand in Villach. It was Ferdinand who in the summer of 1552 concluded the Treaty of Passau with Moritz. It aimed at a perpetual religious peace. Thus ended the “decade of the emperor” in Germany. Charles V was unable to reap lasting benefits from his victory in 1547, and Germany was not to be shunted to a new path of a monarchical state. Hillay Zmora

See also Holy Roman Empire; Luther, Martin; Wars of the Reformation Further Reading Brady, Thomas A., Jr. German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 1400–1650. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Brandi, Karl. The Emperor Charles V: The Growth and Destiny of a Man and of a World-Empire. Translated by C. V. Wedgwood. London: Jonathan Cape, 1965 (1939). Maltby, William. The Reign of Charles V. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.

Second Crusade (1147–1149) During the Second Crusade, which lasted from 1147 to 1149, European political and religious leaders sought to protect the crusader states, established during the First Crusade in 1096, from the Seljuk Turks. Unable to cooperate with each other or conquer their enemy, the crusaders returned to Europe without accomplishing their goal. Europeans had seized territories in the Levant from Seljuk Turks during the First Crusade, which had sought to protect the European pilgrimage from Jerusalem and defend Christians from the Byzantine Empire against the Turks. After the crusade, the Europeans established four crusader states: the County of Edessa, the Principality of Antioch, the County of Tripoli, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Those kingdoms were defended by elaborate castles but were essentially in hostile territory. In 1144, the Turkish ruler of Aleppo and Mosul, Zangi, conquered Edessa. Unable to drive Zangi out of Edessa, the crusader states asked Europe for help. In response to that new threat to European settlement in the Levant, Pope Eugenius III issued a crusade bull in 1145 that encouraged Europeans to live up to the accomplishments of the first crusaders, promised forgiveness of sins to those who died on the way to fight the crusade, and protected the lands of crusaders while they were gone. The monk Bernard of Clairvaux preached the crusade throughout Europe. Following the lead of the pope and Bernard, German king Conrad III and King Louis VII of France led large crusader armies to the Levant. Conrad left Germany in May 1147. When he reached the territory of the Byzantine emperor Manuel I Comnenus, Manuel offered him guides, supplies, and advice. The

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Byzantine emperor had reason to distrust the crusaders, though, as Europeans had claimed as their own the formerly Byzantine territories that they had seized from the Muslims during the First Crusade. Manuel, however, also feared Zangi’s son and successor, Nureddin. Both kings were also anxious about the activities of King Roger II of Sicily, who was attempting to increase his holdings in the region. Nonetheless, Manuel’s help could not ensure victory. The Turks demolished Conrad’s army near Nicaea on October 25, 1147.

Louis VII, accompanied by his wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine, arrived in Constantinople that same October and reached Nicaea in November. There he joined forces with what remained of Conrad’s troops. The French arrived in Antioch in March 1148. Refusing the ruler of Antioch’s advice that they attack Aleppo, which was held by Nureddin, they pressed on to Jerusalem. The crusaders assembled in Jerusalem decided to attack Damascus even though the ruler of that city had previously enjoyed friendly relations with the Christian crusader states.

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Although the crusaders had an army of approximately 50,000 men, they failed to take Damascus because they suffered from internal strife and a lack of organization. Finding themselves outside the city, which was waiting for Nureddin to arrive and rescue it; they decided to retreat in July 1148, a little over a year after Conrad had left Germany. The failed Second Crusade considerably weakened the European position in the Levant because it helped the Turks to overcome their differences and consolidate their rule in the region. The last crusader state fell to the Turks in 1291. Nancy McLoughlin See also First Crusade; Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of; Wendish Crusade Further Reading Phillips, Jonathan. The Crusades: 1095–1197. New York: Longman, 2002. Phillips, Jonathan. Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and the West, 1119–1187. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Riley-Smith, Jonathan, ed. The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) The second Sudanese civil war saw Khartoum’s regular forces face the insurgency of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The war started in the country’s southernmost provinces (Bahr el-Ghazal, Greater Upper Nile, and Equatoria) and then extended to other areas, such as the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile region. The war began in 1983 largely as a product of the outcomes of the first Sudanese civil war (1955–1972) and lasted until 2005, when a Comprehensive Peace Agreement paved the way to the independence of South Sudan, formally acquired on July 9, 2011. During the 22-year-long conflict, protracted instability together with war-related diseases and famine led to the death of some two and a half million people and to the displacement of some four millions, as well as to widespread violation of human rights perpetrated by both the regular and the insurgent forces.

The origin of the conflict can be traced back to the decision of Sudanese president Colonel Ja’far al-Nimeiry (1930–2009) to abolish the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region established after the end of the first Sudanese civil war (1972). The discovery of rich oil reserves along the northern border of the region (in Bentiu, Unity State, in 1978–1980; in South Kurdufan and Upper Blue Nile in 1979; in Adar, Upper Nile State, in 1981; in Heglig, between South Kurdufan and Unity State, in 1982) is often quoted as an important reason behind Nimeiry’s decision. Armed resistance started soon after the withdrawal of autonomy, gaining further strength when the Khartoum government, in an effort to appease its most radical supporters, proclaimed Sudan an Islamic state and announced it would implement sharia law in the country, although with exceptions to protect the rights of the country’s non-Muslim minority. The bloodless coup that ousted Nimeiry from power in 1985 did not end the conflict. Political instability in Khartoum led at first to the opening of negotiations between the central government—now led by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi (1935–)—and John Garang de Mabior’s SPLA (May 1986), then to their abandonment after a new putsch led by Colonel Omar al-Bashir (1944–) and supported by the National Islamic Front of Hasan al-Turabi (1932–2006) (June 1989). The establishment of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC) and the concentration of all power in al-Bashir’s hands widened the North/South gap. At the same time the ideological bond existing between the RCC and the NIF, albeit problematic, strengthened the “Islamic” character of the central government and fueled the fears of Christians and Animists in the country, especially after the adoption of the Criminal Act of 1991. Neither the government nor the resistance were homogeneous fronts. Relations between al-Bashir and al-Turabi often proved difficult, and Turabi was repeatedly imprisoned on allegations of conspiracy. Among the insurgents, in 1991 tensions within the SPLA led to different armed clashes. Fragmentation increased in the following years, often along ethnic or regional lines. From a military point of view, until the mid-1990s regular forces almost always had the upper hand due also to the SPLA’s divisions: in July 1992, government forces seized Garang’s headquarters

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in Torit and controlled a number of the major southern centers, including Juba, Wau, and Malakal. The SPLA and its many splinters, in their turn, controlled large areas of Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Upper Nile provinces and were active in the southern portions of Darfur, Kurdufan, and Blue Nile provinces, despite the setbacks suffered in this period. In 1995, opposition forces in the North joined hands with Garang’s SPLA-Torit in the National Democratic Alliance. This led to the spreading of violence to Sudan’s northeastern regions and transformed the North/South conflict into a more complex core/periphery confrontation. The foreign presence increased too, with Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda sending troops to Sudan. However, a number of rebellious leaders could find agreements with the central government to end hostilities in the areas under their control. Among them were the Political Charter between the Government of Sudan, the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army, and the SPLM/A Bahr el-Ghazal Group (April 1996); the Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Nuba Mountains’ Problem between the Government of Sudan and the Nuba Mountains SPLM/A-United (July 1996); the Khartoum Agreement between the Government of Sudan, the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), the SPLM/A Bahr el-Ghazal Group, the Equatoria Defence Force, and the South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG) (April 1997); and the Fashoda Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A-United (September 1997). While different former guerrilla commanders shifted their allegiance and sided with the government, incentives to achieve a diplomatic end of the conflict grew stronger. Since 1993 the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was pursuing a peace initiative for Sudan, while Libya and Egypt started their Joint Initiative on the Sudan in 2000. The United States was involved too, with former senator John Danforth designated Presidential Envoy for Peace in Sudan in September 2001. These efforts led in 2005 to the signing of the Naivasha Agreement (CPA—Comprehensive Peace Agreement) between the Government of Sudan and the political branch of the SPLA, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. Besides ending the civil war, the CPA aimed at developing

democratic governance throughout the country, sharing oil revenues, and setting a roadmap for a referendum on South Sudan’s independence. However, neither the Naivasha Agreement nor the independence that South Sudan attained on July 9, 2011, could really end the violence that still rages both between Sudan and South Sudan and within the two countries. Gianluca Pastori See also Christian-Muslim Conflict in Africa; Primary Document: Excerpt from the Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan (2015) Further Reading Barltrop, Richard. Darfur and the International Community. The Challenges of Conflict Resolution in Sudan. London–New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011. Idris, Amir H. Conflict and Politics of Identity in Sudan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Johnson, Douglas H. The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Bloomington: International African Institute in association with James Currey, Indiana University Press, Fountain, 2003. Malwal, Bona. Sudan and South Sudan: From One to Two. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Massoud, Mark Fathi. Law’s Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian, and Humanitarian Legacies in Sudan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Second World War, Japanese Empire, and Islam China has been home to a large Muslim population ever since Islam was introduced into China within 20 years of the death of the Prophet in 632 CE. His maternal uncle, Saad Ibn Abi Waqqas, was sent along with envoys over the Silk Road to meet Emperor Gaozong (r. 647–683) of the Tang Dynasty (618–907). These people are the ancestors of the Muslims that are today known in English as SinoMuslims and in Chinese as the Hui. There are also Turkic (or Uighur) Muslim populations who live in western China and who are ethnically, linguistically, and culturally different from Sino-Muslims. These Muslim populations came under the watchful eye of Japanese Pan-Asianists as early as the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), as Japanese

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imperialists and militarists began to understand the incredible value of Muslims from China for creating relationships with the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as with Muslim networks in Southeast Asia and British India. By the outbreak of the Second World War in China on July 7, 1937, Japanese imperialists had long been cultivating relationships with Muslims throughout East Asia, and in China in particular, in their ongoing efforts to destabilize the Soviet presence in Central and North Asia, as well as to foment anti-imperial sentiments among Muslims throughout the Islamic world. After the Second World War in the Pacific started on mainland China in July 1937, but before the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, inter-Axis cooperation allowed five Muslims from Beijing to go on a Japanesesponsored hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. Without visa sponsorship from the Italian consulate in Shanghai and passage on an Italian steamship, the Chinese pilgrims never would have made it from Japanese-occupied China to Italianoccupied Eritrea. From Eritrea, they boarded another Italian vessel that ferried them across the Red Sea to Jeddah with East African pilgrims headed to Mecca. Supported in their religious journey by the Axis powers, in some ways these five men were pawns, deeply involved in the international diplomacy of the war; in other ways, the hajjis from North China actively navigated and circumvented the obstacles they faced with the help of the Japanese, the Italians, and the Germans. This inter-Axis cooperation forged connections between Muslims around the globe and provided the Japanese with the means to expand their influence in both northern China and within the greater Islamic world. The Japanese also built a number of mosques throughout Asia during the Second World War, and on Friday, May 11, 1938, the Tokyo Mosque opened with great fanfare. Delegates from all over the Muslim world made their way to the capital of imperial Japan to participate in the opening ceremonies. The events were presided over by the charismatic and infamous Imam Abürreşid Ibrahim, a Crimean Tatar exiled from Russia who had found a place for himself among the growing Tatar émigré community seeking exile in Japan after the Bolshevik Revolution. Six Muslims from occupied China made the journey to Tokyo to take part in the opening ceremonies, and among the important

Muslim dignitaries present at the inaugural Friday prayers was the king of Yemen (who, at the time, was closely allied with the Italians); the Afghan, Turkish, and Egyptian consuls; and diplomatic representatives from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, West Africa, Indonesia, India, and the Philippines. Also in attendance at the opening of the mosque was Pugong of the Manchu Aisin-Gioro house. Pugong was the younger and lesser known cousin of the last emperor of China, Puyi, who had been installed by the Japanese as the “emperor” of the puppet state of Manchukuo. Incidentally, Pugong had converted to Islam when he married a Hui Muslim woman named Huang Yongni. Huang was a famous opera signer from Jinan and was better known by her stage name, Xue Yanqin. Puyi’s Muslim convert cousin was an asset to the Japanese: one of Puyi’s direct relatives and a member of the important Manchu Aisin-Gioro household was not only a supporter of Islam, but a Muslim himself. Pugong’s presence at the opening of the Tokyo Mosque surely helped the Japanese to imagine themselves as the legitimate protectors of Islam in the region. Representatives from all over the Muslim world participated in a variety of events meant to showcase Japanese modernity as well as their benevolent support for Islam. In the Japanese imperial capital, this group of Muslim men was able to witness for themselves how Japan imagined its changing role vis-à-vis the Islamic world after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Japan’s quest to legitimize itself within the Islamic sphere did not end here: they built schools for Muslims in China and began teaching the Japanese language to Muslim children living under occupation; they encouraged Muslims from all over Southeast Asia to study in Tokyo; they created origin myths that tied the cultural and historical heritage of Muslims from Asia to the Japanese Empire; and they published extensively in a variety of languages about the similarities between Pan-Asianism and PanIslam. By drawing attention to the transnational character of the Muslim community in the first half of the 20th century, the Japanese were trying to help Muslims who strived to elevate their social status by forging connections with groups such as Jadid reformers, who were groups of modernist Muslims in Central Asia and Turkey, and other Islamic reformers throughout the Middle East. Muslims in

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China used Japanese connections with the Germans and the Italians to create relationships beyond occupied China. At the same time, the Sino-Muslim community was under the watchful eye of Japanese Pan-Asianists, who were developing elaborate plans to make use of these transnational networks as part of their strategies for imperial expansion into Southeast Asia coupled with their efforts to foment anticolonial and anticommunist dissent among Muslim populations from Morocco to the Philippines. The enduring question of how to properly “manage Muslims” under their control was something that the Germans, the Italians, and the Japanese all had in common, and Japanese militarists used their connections with the Axis as a powerful rhetorical tool to position themselves as liberators from British, French, and Soviet colonial oppression throughout Asia. Kelly Anne Hammond See also Second World War, Religious Dimensions of Further Reading Aydin, Cemil. “Overcoming Eurocentrism? Japan’s Islamic Studies during the Era of the Greater East Asia War (1937– 45).” In Renée Worringer, ed. The Islamic Middle East and Japan: Perceptions, Aspirations, and the Birth of Intra-Asian Modernity. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2007, pp. 137–63. Duus, Peter. “Introduction: Japan’s Wartime Empire: Problems and Issues.” In Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark Peattie, eds. The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. xi–xlvvi. Hisao, Komatsu. “Muslim Intellectuals and Japan: A PanIslamist mediator, Aburreshid Ibrahim.” In Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Komatsu Hisao, and Kosugi Yasushi, eds. Intellectuals in the Modern Islamic World: Transmission, Transformation and Communication. New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 274–96. Hotta, Eri. Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 1931–1945. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Krämer, Hans Martin. “Pan-Asianism’s Religious Undercurrents: The Reception of Islam and Translation of the Qur’ān in Twentieth-Century Japan.” Journal of Asian Studies 73, no. 3 (August 2014): 619–40. Saaler, Sven. “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Overcoming the Nation, Creating a Region, Forging an Empire.” In Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann, eds. Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders. New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 1–19.

Tanada, Hirofumi. “Islamic Research Institutes in Wartime Japan: Introductory Investigation of the ‘Deposited Materials by the Dai-Nippon Kaikyo Kyokai (Great Japan Muslim League).’” Annals of the Japanese Association of Middle East Studies 28, no. 2 (2012): 85–106.

Second World War, Religious Dimensions of The Second World War was a global war in which the Allied Powers, most prominently the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China, defeated the Axis Powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. From the Allied perspective, it was a war against the destructive political ideologies of Nazism, fascism, and militarism. But it may also be viewed as a religious conflict. With its cultish fixation on the German chancellor, Nazism contained religious aspects. The Holocaust fundamentally involved Germany’s systematic, state-sponsored plan to destroy Europe’s Jewish population. There was also the role, perhaps “silence,” of Pope Pius XII and the Vatican during the war years. Less examined is the impact of religion on imperial Japan and its efforts to expand its empire throughout the Far East and the Pacific. It was a war for Shinto and for the glory of the emperor. Religion was also present in the war effort of the United States. President Franklin Roosevelt rallied his country to fight a war to defend the country and save world civilization. He believed that God had blessed the country with “strong arms with which to strike mighty blows for freedom and truth.” The Allies would win and the evil committed by the Axis would be replaced by “an international order in which the spirit of Christ shall rule.” Shinto, or Kami-no-michi (the way of the gods or spirits), is commonly described as an indigenous Japanese religion that can be traced to the early history of Japan. It is an inclusive, flexible religion that has comfortably coexisted with Buddhism and Confucianism. In Shinto, the expectation is to live in purity and in harmony with the kami. The kami, or spirits, exist in all aspects of nature, such as wind, rain, trees, mountains, and animals. Human beings become kami after death. Religious duty involves pleasing the kami with rituals, prayers, offerings, or dances.

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The most important of all the kami is the sun goddess Amaterasu. This remains evident with the sun featured prominently on Japan’s national flag. The imperial family of Japan is said to be her direct descendants. Shinto belief has held that the emperor comes from a continuous line of rulers going back to the first emperor and founder of Japan, Jimmu Tenno. While the emperor was not recognized as a mighty god, he was the living connection to Japan’s divine past. For most of Japan’s history, the emperor was not a strong figure. This changed in the late 19th century with the establishment of State Shinto. Under Emperor Meiji (1867– 1912), a religious nationalism was embraced. The doctrine of an emperor of divine lineage was critical to strengthening and unifying the nation around a single figure and in building a strong central economic, political, and military system. Devoted service to the emperor made the political and religious life of Japan inseparable. Public funds were used for the upkeep and sponsorship of Shinto shrines and for the support of Shinto priests. It was common for kami-dana, “god-shelves,” to be located inside public buildings. Shinto was promoted and taught in schools to inculcate Japanese nationalism, particularly the idea that because the Japanese emperor and the people were descended from kami, they were superior to all other people and destined to rule them. Japan aimed to test this on December 7, 1941, as it widened its war in Asia far into the Pacific Ocean by attacking the United States at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The Greater East Asian War, as the Japanese called it, was fought in the emperor’s name and according to the imperial will. As Shinto’s high priest, Emperor Hirohito (1926–1989) sanctioned and sanctified the state and its military campaigns. His power was symbolic, ceremonial, and the living essence of State Shinto. As the war turned against them, the Japanese became desperate. The emergence of the kamikaze in 1944 and 1945 reflected the changing fortunes. Meaning “divine wind,” the kamikaze were pilots who engaged in suicide attacks by crashing their planes into enemy warships. With little hope of victory, many Japanese soldiers charged into battle rather than experience the shame of surrendering to American and British troops. Banzai was their battle cry—“Long live the emperor!” Preserving their honor was Shinto, the way of the samurai and the Bushido code.

After the United States dropped two atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet Union declared war, Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945. Under American occupation, Japan and Japanese religion were reconstructed. In December 1945, the United States issued guidelines for the postwar role of religion. Known as the “Shinto Directive,” the guidelines required an immediate end to “the sponsorship, support, perpetuation, control and dissemination of State Shinto.” The purpose of this was to rid Japan of religiously inspired nationalism and militarism to prevent future wars of Japanese aggression. On January 1, 1946, Emperor Hirohito renounced his divinity. He said this concept was a “false conception.” He further declared that the Japanese people should no longer consider themselves superior to others and destined to rule Asia. This was done at the direction of the United States. It was one of the consequences of Japan’s surrender. Central to its pacification program, the United States insisted upon the separation of Shinto and the postwar Japanese state. While Emperor Hirohito renounced his supposed divinity in his imperial rescript, he never renounced his direct descent from the sun goddess. Shinto remains part of Japanese politics. The Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo is a memorial to modern Japan’s war dead, soldiers and civilians. Emperor Meiji once wrote, “I assure those of you who fought and died for your country that your names will live forever at this shrine.” The war dead include those who died in the Second World War in service to the emperor and in the “public duty of protecting their motherland.” Because of their sacrifice, the dead are viewed as kami. According to the Yasukuni Shrine website, “These people, regardless of their rank or social standing, are considered to be completely equal and worshipped as venerable divinities of Yasukuni.” “These people” include Japanese war criminals, such as General Hideki Tojo, Japan’s wartime prime minister from 1941 to 1944. Although Emperor Hirohito made his last visit to the shrine in 1975, a few prime ministers (e.g., Yasuhiro Nakasone, Junichiro Koizumi, and Shinzo Abe) and several cabinet members have made controversial visits to the shrine during their time in office. In 2000, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori said he hoped “the Japanese people acknowledge that Japan is a divine nation centering on the emperor.” He

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later apologized for violating the postwar consensus. The shrine visits and nationalist comments anger Japan’s Asian neighbors, who see them as continuing denials of Japanese war crimes and perhaps signal a return to an aggressive nationalism and support for the reestablishment of Shinto. For the United States, the Second World War began on December 7, 1941, when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands. The country was stunned and saddened by the news of the attack. It was a “day of infamy.” The following day, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress for a declaration of war. After recounting Japan’s diplomatic deceptions and its subsequent series of attacks throughout the Pacific, he concluded his remarks with a religious tone. Roosevelt pledged that “the American people in their righteous might will win to absolute victory.” With God’s aid, he believed the United States would prevail. “With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounding determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph—so help us God.” Roosevelt was a great communicator. To rally and uplift his country during the Second World War, he often spoke of the war in religious terms. Evidence of this can be readily found in his annual Thanksgiving proclamations and Christmas messages. For Roosevelt, World War II was a modern form of holy war. In his first fireside chat after the Japanese attack on Hawaii, Roosevelt declared that the war was for “liberty under God.” As a wartime president, he regularly invoked the name of God. He asked the country to pray for military victory and for the safety of the soldiers. To demonstrate the country’s gratitude to God, he once suggested “a nationwide reading of the Holy Scriptures.” On January 6, 1942, in his State of the Union address, Roosevelt asserted that victory for the Allies meant a “victory for religion,” by which he meant a victory for the Christian faith. Roosevelt was convinced that Germany, in particular, plotted to destroy Christianity and replace it with a perverted Nazi “pagan” religion “all over the world.” He wanted his fellow Americans to understand that evil was real and powerfully present on earth. Germany, he claimed, had “a plan by which the Holy Bible and the Cross of Mercy would be displaced by Mein Kampf and the swastika and the naked sword.”

Roosevelt believed that the Earth was not big enough for God and the German chancellor, Adolf Hitler (1933– 1945). God would win. While the Axis forces stood for brutality and an “unholy contempt” for all peoples, the United States and the Allies were animated “by a faith that goes back through all the years to the first chapter of the book of Genesis: ‘God created man in His own image.’” The Allies would vanquish their enemies, liberate the occupied, and bring to the world the Four Freedoms he first enunciated in his January 1941 State of the Union address: the freedom of speech, the freedom to worship God, the freedom from want, and the freedom from fear. These freedoms were also codified in the Atlantic Charter, a joint statement of principles issued by President Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill on August 14, 1941. In this fight, there would be no compromise. “Only total victory can reward the champions of tolerance, and decency, and freedom, and faith.” Evoking images of millennial peace, Roosevelt said in an October 1942 fireside chat the Allied effort was “to destroy completely the military power of Germany, Italy, and Japan” and create a world “free from the constant threat of invasion, destruction, slavery, and violent death.” On June 6, 1944, the Allies launched a full-scale invasion of northern France. It was one of the largest military operations in human history, involving more than 150,000 soldiers, mostly American, British, and Canadian, landing on the French beaches. It was a major turning point in the war. In one of his most memorable and poignant fireside chats, Roosevelt offered a prayer for the country and the military mission. It was his D-Day prayer. In his remarks, Roosevelt asked for faith. “O Lord, give us Faith. Give us Faith in Thee; Faith in our sons; Faith in each other; Faith in our united crusade.” He pleaded to God for ultimate victory over the “unholy” Axis Powers. “With Thy blessing, we shall prevail over the unholy forces of our enemy. Help us to conquer the apostles of greed and racial arrogancies.” In conclusion, he said, “Thy will be done, Almighty God. Amen.” D. Jason Berggren and Bonnie K. Levine-Berggren See also Bushido; Holocaust; Nazism, Religious Aspects of; Second World War, Japanese Empire, and Islam; Yasukuni Shrine; Zen and War

724 Seljuks Further Reading Alley, Robert S. So Help Me God: Religion and the Presidency, Wilson to Nixon. Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1972. Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York: HarperCollins, 2000. Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999. McCollister, John C. God and the Oval Office: The Religious Faith of Our 43 Presidents. Nashville, TN: W Publishing Group, 2005. Rubenstein, Richard L. “Religion, Politics and Economic Competition: The Case of the United States and Japan.” In Richard L. Rubenstein, ed. Spirit Matters: The Worldwide Impact of Religion on Contemporary Politics. New York: Paragon, 1987. “The Shinto Directive.” Contemporary Religion in Japan 1, no. 2 (1960): 85–89. Smith, Gary Scott. “Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Quest to Achieve an Abundant Life.” In Faith and the Presidency: From George Washington to George W. Bush. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Smith, Gary Scott. “Religion and the Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.” In Gastón Espinosa, ed. Religion and the American Presidency: George Washington to George W. Bush with Commentary and Primary Sources. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. Snape, Michael. God and Uncle Sam: Religion and America’s Armed Forces in World War II. Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer, 2015. Toyoda, Maria A., and Aiji Tanaka. “Religion and Politics in Japan.” In Ted Gerard Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, eds. Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, the Few, and the Many. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Seljuks Known as the Great Seljuk Dynasty, the Seljuks were a Muslim dynasty that established a vast empire in the Middle East and Central Asia during the 11th–12th centuries CE. The dynasty, established by Seljuk b. Duqaq after whom it is named, led a group of Oghuz Turkish tribes from the region of Transoxiana into Persia and Mesopotamia, where the Seljuks and their Oghuz supporters were able to defeat several local Muslim dynasties and eventually conquer Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid caliphate. While the Seljuks were not the first Muslim dynasty of Turkish origin,

they were the first Muslim Turkish dynasty to conquer the central regions of the Muslim world, establishing an empire that rivaled in territory the Abbasid caliphate itself. The Seljuks are mostly known for their successful conflicts with the Byzantine Empire and for conquering large parts of Anatolia, adding them to the Muslim domains for the first time. Seljuk and his descendants belonged to the Oghuz Turkish tribes, who had migrated to Central Asia from the Eurasian steppe after the fall of the Second Gök Türk Khanate in 744 CE. The Oghuz tribes had been migrating to Central Asia during the 8th–10th centuries, eventually establishing there a state of their own in the regions of modern Kazakhstan and Russia that collapsed in the 10th century. Seljuk himself was a chieftain of the Qiniq tribe of the Oghuz. In the second half of the 10th century, Seljuk and his Oghuz supporters migrated to a province dominated by the Oghuz Turks who served as vassals of the Muslim rulers of Khwarazm. Here, Seljuk converted to Islam before his death. Seljuk’s sons, Arslan Isra’il, Mikhail, and Musa, replaced him as the leading members of the family. Under the leadership of Arslan Isra’il, the Seljuks became involved in the political struggles between the Turkish Qarakhanid and the Ghaznavid dynasties, which emerged as the result of the decline of the Persian Sassanid dynasty. Under the leadership of Arslan Isra’il, the Seljuks supported ‘Ali Tegin, a prince of the Qarakhanid dynasty. For that reason, Arslan Isra’il was imprisoned by the Ghaznavid sultan Mahmud, who himself supported another Qarakhanid prince, Ilek Khan. Following Arslan Isra’il’s imprisonment, Seljuk’s other descendants struggled for succession. Arslan Isra’il’s imprisonment led to the emergence of a new generation of Seljuk leaders who eventually would lead the dynasty to greatness. Under this leadership, the Seljuks eliminated their connections to ‘Ali Tegin and eventually were forced to flee after ‘Ali Tegin and his allies were able to defeat them in 1034. Following the defeat, the Seljuks settled in Ghaznavid in the province of Khurasan. The Seljuks’ primary concern, as the leaders of a nomadic population, was to secure pasturelands that would allow them to keep their nomadic lifestyle. The Seljuks requested that the Ghaznavid sultan Mas’ud grant them territories in his domains. Mas’ud initially refused and tried to defeat

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the Seljuks in a military conflict; however, the Ghaznavid army’s loss to the Seljuk forces at the battle of Nasa in 1035 forced him to recognize Seljuk legitimacy. In 1036, the Seljuks asked Sultan Mas’ud to grant them additional territories. The Seljuks’ Oghuz supporters continued to execute raids, and eventually the Seljuks conquered the majority of the province of Khurasan. Alarmed by Seljuk expansion, Mas’ud decided to confront them. However, the Ghaznavid armies appeared inferior to the Seljuk forces and were not able to carry out this task. The Ghaznavid soldiers were equipped with heavier equipment; the Ghaznavids’ tendency to deploy war elephants also did not play in their favor; in addition, the Ghaznavids suffered from logistical and tactical difficulties. The decisive victory was at the battle of Dandanqan in 1040, following which the Seljuks conquered the majority of the Ghaznavid territories, including the city of Ghazna. Following the victory over the Ghaznavids at Dandanqan, the Seljuks advanced further into Persia and Mesopotamia. In this stage, the Seljuk leadership was divided between Tughril and Chaghri, who was charged with continuing the conquest to the west. The Iranian plateau was under the dominance of several princes of the Persian Shi’a Buyid dynasty, as well as under the control of smaller local dynasties of various ethnic origins. Under Tughril’s leadership, the Seljuk forces were able to conquer the Iranian Plateau, and in 1044, the Abbasid caliph al-Qa’im, in an attempt to prevent Tughril from advancing further to the east, granted him official titles and recognition. However, the Seljuks continued to advance into Iraq. The Sunni Tughril appeared as the opposition to the Shi’a Fatimid dynasty centered in Egypt. Ibn Muslima, the vizier of Caliph al-Qa’im, contacted Tughril and promoted him as a worthy Sunni ruler to the local population. Eventually, the Seljuks advanced into Iraq and conquered the capital city of Baghdad in 1055. The caliph eventually recognized the Seljuks and Tughril officially received from him the title of sultan, recognizing him and his dynasty as legitimate Muslim rulers. The Seljuks continued to expand under Tughril’s successor, Alp Arslan. Tughril, who died childless, appointed his nephew Sulayman as his heir. However, Sulayman’s older brother, Alp Arslan, who had served as the ruler of Khorasan at the time, seized control of the Seljuk Empire,

as well as deposing Tughril’s vizier, Kunduri, installing instead his own vizier, Nizam al-Mulk. Alp Arslan’s ascension to power meant the unification of the territories held formerly by his father, Chaghri, and of the territories conquered by Tughril. The periods of Alp Arslan and of Malikshah are considered to be the height of the Seljuk dynasty. One influential person in the process of the consolidation of the Seljuk Empire in this period was the vizier, Nizam al-Mulk. During the reign of Alp Arslan, the vizier enjoyed extensive authority, and he continued to do so under Malikshah, who relied on the vizier’s assistance and feared to act against him. Nizam al-Mulk acted against the Turkish aristocracy in order to secure his and his master’s positions, as well as created a strong bureaucracy. Some historians even describe the 30 years during which he served by the name al-Dawla al-Nizammiya (the State of Nizam), suggesting the measure of his influence on the consolidation of the Seljuk Empire. Eventually Nizam al-Mulk was executed. Following the death of Malikshah, traditional succession struggles ensued once again, with different factions seeking to secure their rule. As a result of the struggle and the lack of a vizier as strong as Nizam al-Mulk, Seljuk territories were divided among different potential heirs. Iraq and Persia were divided between two Seljuk dynasties; additional dynasties were established in Kirman and Anatolia. The period following Malikshah’s death is considered a period of Seljuk decline and the rise of local powers that challenged the central authority. Local governors, or emirs, sought additional authority for themselves, legitimizing their autonomy by assuming the title of atabeg, literally the “father of a prince,” in the meaning of a tutor of a certain Seljukid prince. These emirs’ rise to power was promoted by the Seljuks’ tax farming system known as the Iqta. Each emir was assigned a territory to govern and was in charge of collecting its taxes. Gradually, the emirs based themselves in their territories, securing their rule and the support of the local population that they governed. Thus, the Seljuks’ hold over their territories weakened, as the emirs formed local dynasties. Interestingly, following Alp Arslan’s success in Manzikert in 1071 and the conquest of Anatolia that followed, the Byzantine Empire sought the assistance of Christian

726  Sennacherib’s Attack on Judah (ca. 701 BCE)

European kingdoms, thus leading to the launch of the crusades. The first crusade arrived in the Middle East in 1097. Fighting one another, Malikshah’s heirs paid little attention to the crusaders, even though they had captured Muslim territories in Syria. The Seljuks’ central territories never came under direct threat from the crusaders, and it was up to local rulers such as Zangi, emir of Mosul, to repel the crusaders. The Seljuk sultan mostly coordinated assaults on the crusaders, rather than participated in the battles. An additional important external threat to the Seljuk dynasty came from the Ismailis. The Ismailis were a Shi’a faction, originally linked to the Fatimid dynasty. The Ismailis established themselves in the mountainous regions of Persia, expanding their influence after the death of Malikshah. The Ismailis were famously known as the Assassins because of their assassinations of senior bureaucrats and other important figures. The Ismailis rejected Seljuk legitimacy and sought to establish Shi’a dominance in the territories of the Seljuk Empire. In conclusion, the advancement of the Seljuks to Persia and Mesopotamia had great effects on the Muslim world, specifically ending a period of Shi’a dominance. By establishing their vast empire, a Sunni sultanate loyal at least in theory to the Sunni Abbasid caliph, the Seljuks ended the dominance of the Shi’a Buyid dynasty in Persia and became bitter enemies of the Shi’a Fatimid dynasty that was based in Egypt. From an inter-Islamic perspective, the Seljuks restored Sunni dominance in the Muslim world. In addition, the Seljuks became great champions of Islam, confronting non-Muslim neighbors, most importantly the Byzantine Empire. The Seljuks became the first Muslim dynasty to successfully conquer and hold large parts of Anatolia, allowing a massive settlement of Muslim Turkish population into the region, eventually leading to the creation of the Seljuk of Rum dynasty as well as several other Muslim Turkish principalities, a precedent of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Seljuks also led to the decline of the Byzantine Empire’s influence in the region and to the spread of Islam into Asia Minor. Leon Volfovsky See also Assassins; Byzantine-Seljuk Wars; Manzikert, Battle of; Ottoman Empire

Further Reading Bryer, Anthony. Manzikert to Lepanto: The Byzantine World and the Turks, 1071–1571: Papers Given at the Nineteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, March 1985. New York: ACLS History E-Book Project, 2008. Carey, Brian Todd, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Road to Manzikert: Byzantine and Islamic Warfare, 527–1071. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Press, 2012. Catherwood, Christopher. A Brief History of the Middle East. London: Constable & Robinson, 2011. Donner, F. Early Islamic Conquests. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Faroqhi, Suraiya. Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire. London: I. B. Tauris, 2000. Hillenbrand, Carole. Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Inalcik, Halil. The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300– 1600. London: Phoenix Press, 2000. Inalcık Halil, and Donald Quataert, eds. An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914. 2 vols. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Nicolle, David. Manzikert 1071: The Breaking of Byzantium. Oxford: Osprey, 2013. O’Shea, Stephen. Sea of Faith: Islam and Christianity in the Medieval Mediterranean World. New York: Walker, 2006. Peacock, A. C. S. Early Seljuq History: A New Interpretation. London: Routledge, 2009. Peacock, A. C. S. The Great Seljuk Empire. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015. Quataert, Donald. The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Sennacherib’s Attack on Judah (ca. 701 BCE) Sennacherib was an Assyrian king who led an attack on Judah and Jerusalem in approximately 701 BCE. With the death of the Assyrian king Sargon II (r. 725–702 BCE), Assyria’s western vassal states began to rebel against Assyrian power in 701 BCE, with the Judahite king Hezekiah joining Babylon, Egypt, and Ashkelon, and Ekron from the Philistine city-states. Padi, the puppet ruler in Ekron loyal to

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Assyria, was dethroned, fettered, and held captive in Jerusalem by Hezekiah. The new Assyrian monarch, Sennacherib (r. 705–681 BCE), responded quickly, heading west to stabilize the empire. He began subduing the coast from Phoenicia south to the Philistine city-states. Realizing that Judah’s fate looked bleak, Hezekiah responded by seeking military support from the Egyptian army, but the Egyptians were quickly defeated as they attempted to support Ekron. Sennacherib then turned on the rebellious Judah. He reports that he seized 46 fortified cities of Judah, using earthen ramps and battering rams. He led away 200,150 people as well as horses, mules, donkeys, camels, and cattle. At this point, defeat appeared inevitable to Hezekiah in Jerusalem. So he sent word to Sennacherib, who was laying siege to Lachish, that he would surrender and pay whatever tribute was required. He agreed to pay 300 talents of silver and 30 talents of gold, which he had to take from various parts of the temple such as doors and doorposts. And in an interesting historical dilemma, our two sources diverge at this point and tell two very different conclusions to the story. Sennacherib reports that he laid siege to Hezekiah in Jerusalem. He reports that he gave his towns over to the Philistines and that Hezekiah increased his tribute to 30 talents of gold, 800 talents of silver, various precious stones, furnishings, rare woods, treasures, his daughters, concubines, and male and female musicians. In the biblical account from II Kings, when Sennacherib sent his army to Jerusalem, the royal officials of Assyria shouted to the officials of Hezekiah’s court, mocking their forces and the foolishness of depending on their god because all peoples did the same thing but cannot withstand the forces of Assyrian might. Speaking Aramaic aloud, he terrified the inhabitants of Judah. The king’s officials begged him to stop speaking. When King Hezekiah heard this, he went into mourning and prayed in the Temple. The prophet Isaiah assured the king that Yahweh heard and would defend the city so that Sennacherib could not enter. That evening, according to II Kings 19:35–36, the angel of Yahweh struck down 185,000 in the Assyrian army and the people awoke to see the bodies on the ground. Sennacherib returned home, where he was later assassinated by his own sons as he worshipped.

Ancient Jewish tradition argued that the angel Gabriel functioned as the angel of death on what was actually Passover night. The Greek historian Herodotus tells the story that mice attacked Sennacherib’s camp, causing some to wonder whether a disease like bubonic plague might have decimated the Assyrian forces. Historians are left to puzzle over two accounts of the same event in which both sides ultimately claim a victory—one for Asshur and one for Yahweh. Dean Andrew Nicholas See also Assyrian Warfare; Israelite Wars of the Divided Monarchy; Lachish, Battle of; West Semitic Warfare Further Reading Dever, William G. The Lives of Ordinary People in Ancient Israel: Where Archaeology and the Bible Intersect. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012. Hobbs, T. R. A Time for War: A Study of Warfare in the Old Testament. Wilmington, DE: Glazier, 1989. Pritchard, James B. Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament with Supplements. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969. Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2013.

Seventh Crusade (1248–1254) The Seventh Crusade was a personal crusade led by King Louis IX of France. Its goal was to recapture Jerusalem, which in 1244 fell to the Muslims. To secure Jerusalem, Louis made Egypt the object of conquest of his crusade. Using the logic of the Fifth Crusade, Louis believed that Egypt with its wealth would provide a solid base from which to attack Jerusalem. Much like the Fifth Crusade, Louis’s crusade would end in failure. In addition, the Seventh Crusade witnessed the initial incursions by the Mongols into Asia Minor. Although the fall of Jerusalem was no longer an event that turned the world upside down, the fall of Jerusalem, coupled with the disastrous defeat of the crusaders at the Battle of La Forbie in 1244, may have contributed to Louis’s decision to take the cross in 1245. Louis, seriously ill when

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he made his vow, prepared to set off for the Holy Land along with his brothers Robert of Artois and Charles of Anjou. France was probably the strongest state in Europe at the time. Once Louis had made his decision, he threw himself into preparations, but he had to remain on good terms with both Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II and Pope Innocent IV. The feud between the two threatened to embroil all of Europe in war. That meant that Louis would have to rely on his own resources. For the next three years, Louis collected money and men, and on August 25, 1248, he sailed to Cyprus with an army approximately 20,000 strong. Louis spent the next several months on Cyprus negotiating with various powers in Asia Minor. The various crusader states asked for his help, but he was determined not to repeat past mistakes. Ignoring their bickering, Louis was determined to attack Egypt with maximum force. By the end of May 1249, Louis sailed for Egypt. Upon his reaching the Damietta, Egyptian opposition was brushed aside, which is evidence of Louis’s meticulous preparations. Damietta was established as a base of operations for action against the Muslims in Syria and Egypt. On November 20, Louis began his march into interior Egypt, which coincided with the death of the sultan and near panic among the Egyptians. By February 1250, his army had reached the main Egyptian defensive works, beginning the Battle of Mansurah. The attack was initially successful when the advance guard under Louis’s brother, Robert of Artois, penetrated Mansurah; however, the attack ended poorly. Robert was killed, and Louis could not break the Muslims. Meanwhile, his army was starving and being ravaged by disease. On April 5, Louis began to retreat to Damietta. The army had managed to struggle only partway back to Damietta when Louis was forced to surrender. The most carefully planned and organized crusade of all had been defeated, and Louis was a prisoner. In May, Louis was released for a ransom that included possession of Damietta. Afterward, most of his fellow crusaders returned to Europe, but Louis sailed for Acre. He stayed there for nearly four years, becoming the de facto ruler of all the crusader states. Louis negotiated a treaty with Egypt in 1252, which came to nothing but did allow him to refortify Acre, Caesarea, and Jaffa on a massive

scale. Meanwhile, the Mongols showed up in Asia Minor under Khan Mongke, and Louis attempted to convert them to Christianity and become allies against the Muslims. The khan rejected his overtures and retorted that Louis should submit to him. Louis ended the Seventh Crusade when he left Asia Minor on April 24, 1254, in part because his mother had died. The disaster of the Seventh Crusade was personally interpreted by Louis as punishment for his sins. Louis is considered a saint in French history because of his devotion, simple dress, dedication to the poor, and attempt to refocus the French monarchy on good kingship after the crusade. Tim Barnard See also Eighth Crusade; Sixth Crusade Further Reading Armstrong, Karen. Holy War: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today’s World. New York: Anchor Books, 2001. Madden, Thomas F. A Concise History of the Crusades. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. Richard, Jean. The Crusades, c. 1071–c. 1291. Translated by Jean Birrell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The Crusades: A Short History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.

Sharia and War Sharia, literally “the path leading to the watering place,” is an Islamic law as ordained by Allah. Systematized during the eighth–ninth centuries, it represents the legal and social modality of a people based on the revelation of the last prophet, Muhammad. Unlike canon law, sharia does not only represent religious law but also covers a wide range of secular laws and ordinances, including military law. Sharia, however, was (and still is) subject to various interpretations and, over the centuries, four major schools—Maliki, Shafii, Hanbali, and Hanafi—have emerged within Sunni Islam, while Shi’a jurisprudence developed its own variations. This entry will deal with the sharia of Sunni Islam. Under sharia, an Islamic state’s principal goals were to carry out God’s law and seek to establish Islam as the dominant world ideology. To achieve them, Muhammad’s

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successors were willing to embark on prolonged conquests in the name of Islam, justifying such actions with the concept of jihad. Yet, as the Muslim expansion ground to a halt, Muslim authorities had to adjust to the reality of Muslim and non-Muslim realms. As a result, the world was divided into two spheres: the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam), the area under Muslim rule and subject to Islamic law where Muslims enjoy full rights of citizenship while nonMuslims were tolerated but granted only partial rights and subject to special rules; and the dar al-Harb (abode of war), territory outside the world of Islam whose inhabitants were denoted as unbelievers. Because sharia called for Islam’s worldwide dominion, the two abodes are, in theory, constantly at war with each other. Some Muslim jurists also made subdivisions within this division, adding dar al-Muwadaah or dar al-Sulh (abodes of truce), where the non-Muslim rulers have reached a truce with the Muslims, generally in return for the payment of tribute. An Islamic state was under obligation to enforce sharia, to recognize no authority but its own, and to spread Islam. If non-Muslims refuse to accept Islam or pay the poll tax (jizya), they are subject to a jihad (commonly described as holy war), which sought to transform the dar al-harb into the dar al-Islam. This legal responsibility to wage war was a product of early Arab society that came about as a result of rapid expansion. Sharia condemned the pre-Islamic Arab practices (e.g., intertribal raids, vendetta) and prohibited all types of violence (whether directed against Muslims or non-Muslims), leaving a jihad as the sole legal violence, though it had to be directed against non-Muslims. Yet, the jihad was not the only legal means of interacting with nonMuslims, and the sharia recognized negotiation, arbitration, and treaty-making as legitimate alternatives. Although sharia prohibited all forms of violence and declared jihad as the sole legal war, Islamic history is full of conflicts between Muslim rulers or factions, who, in theory, violated the doctrine. Muslim jurists often considered these conflicts as harb (secular) wars caused by human sins, recklessness, and pride. The Qur’an specifies, “If two parties among the Believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between them: but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight ye (all) against the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah; but if it complies, then make peace between

them with justice, and be fair: for Allah loves those who are fair (and just)” (49:9). Muslim jurists have distinguished four ways in which a believer can stay true to God (Allah): by his or her heart, tongue, or hands, and by the sword. The first type refers to the internal struggles all people experience to remain true to the laws of God, and Prophet Muhammad considered it the most important type of jihad, often called the greater jihad. The second and third types refer to a person’s daily struggles to be good and honest, support the right, and battle the wrong. However, the fourth type, often called the lesser jihad, implies the outer, often violent struggle in defense of the true religion, Islam. Sharia declares that Islam cannot tolerate shirk (associating other gods with Allah) and mandates that all Muslim religious leaders must ensure that no unbeliever denies Allah and his favors (Nizam). This concept was initially developed in an effort to combat polytheism and allowed exception for the dhimmis (e.g., Christians, Jews) who agreed to pay the poll tax. Although in theory the jihad implied a state of permanent war between dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb, in reality Islamic states often made peace with non-Muslims, and Muslim jurists had to produce new interpretations of sharia to justify such suspensions of jihad. Thus, they agreed that when an Islamic state entered a period of decline, the jihad had to be interrupted by a peace during which the jihad duty became dormant. In its basic form, the lesser jihad can be directed against non-Muslims or against Muslims who have reneged from Islam, espoused dissenting views, or threatened public order. The great Muslim jurist Al-Mawardi, known as Alboacen in the West, distinguished between the “wars against polytheists and apostates” and “wars of public interest.” In the first group, the most violent form of jihad is reserved for those who refuse to acknowledge Allah. They are denounced as pagans or idolaters and are subject to death: “Fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)” (Qur’an 9:5) and “So when you meet in battle those who disbelieve, then smite the necks until when you have overcome them” (Qur’an 47:4). Muslim jurists argued that the dhimmis (often called “the people of the book” or “Scriptuaries”), who believe in Allah but have distorted their scriptures, are subject to the jihad

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but are only partially liable to punishment. Thus, unlike “pagans,” who have a choice of Islam or war, the dhimmis can also choose to pay a poll tax. Among other types of jihad, the al-ridda or the apostasy jihad is directed against those Muslims who have reneged from Islam. Muslim jurists suggested first starting mediation to convince such apostates to return to Islam and, if they refuse, to declare jihad, which would be subject to the same rules as the war against dar al-Harb. The same principles applied to al-baghi, the type of jihad directed against those Muslims who embrace unorthodox forms of Islam. “Wars of public interest” included fighting belligerents, highway robbers, and deserters who harassed the peaceful population. As the Qur’an states, “The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter” (5:33). Another type of war, the ribat, is based on the Qur’anic instruction to protect the frontiers of dar al-Islam and refers to military outposts set up along the frontiers of the Islamic realm. As the Qur’an explains, “Make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know” (8:60). Muslim jurists disagree whether this directive has a defensive character or not; some hadith specify that jihad is offensive in character because its goal is to combat the unbelievers, whereas the ribat is defensive, aiming at protecting the believers. The ribat was particularly significant in Spain, where the Muslims endured the centuries-long Reconquista conducted by the Christians; thus, the medieval Muslim scholars, such as Ibn Hudhayl, argued that the ribat in Spain was the most indispensable duty of the believers. Sharia recognizes jihad as a collective responsibility of the Muslim community, not an individual duty (fard ‘ayn ), such as the Five Pillars of Islam. As such, jihad is considered a state instrument and must be declared and conducted under specific rules outlined by sharia. It cannot be launched by an individual—although if the dar al-Islam is attacked, jihad becomes the duty of every believer—and

only an imam (ruler, head of state) had the responsibility of declaring it. Such a call could be made at a public speech, prayer, or special communication issued in the name of amir al-muminin (commander of the faithful). Yet, the jihad does not imply an immediate start of hostilities as the Qur’an (17:16) required a request to be made to the adversary to embrace Islam or pay the poll tax. A refusal to accept either offer would then provoke the fighting, although some Muslim jurists argue in favor of renewing an invitation before attacking. Once the invitation was issued, a Muslim leader could wait for a response for several days (usually three), during which he was allowed to negotiate with the enemy. During early Muslim conquests, this grace period often led to surrender and peaceful settlement in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. This practice was also quite prevalent during the crusades. Once the invitation to embrace Islam was rejected, sharia allowed the start of actual war, which, however, had to be conducted for the glory of Islam, not material aggrandizement or personal glory. Muslim jurists agreed that unnecessary destruction and excessive killing was prohibited but, as expected, disagreed on details. The jihadists, in theory, had the right to kill any harbi—resident of dar al-harb—who refused to accept Islam, provided they were not killed perfidiously or with unnecessary cruelty. But the jurists agreed that noncombatants (women, children, monks, the old, or the physically or mentally disabled) could not be maltreated, unless they directly participated in violence by action or advice. The killing of craftspeople, wage earners, and farmers who do not do battle or those who follow the army but do not participate in battle (e.g., merchants) was also prohibited. Jurist Malik ibn Anas prohibited the destruction of flocks and beehives, Muhammad ibn Idris ash Shafii believed all inanimate objects (including plants) had to be destroyed, and Abu Hanifa anNuman argued that everything a jihadist could not take had to be destroyed, thus authorizing wholesale destruction of settlements. Muslim armies were not allowed to start a war during the sacred months, although Qur’anic dictates conflict in this respect: “They ask thee concerning fighting in the Prohibited Month. Say: ‘Fighting therein is a grave (offence); but graver it is in the sight of Allah to prevent access to the path of Allah, to deny Him, to prevent access to the Sacred Mosque, and drive out its members’ ”

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(Qur’an 2:217). Some jurists prohibited Muslims from using some weapons, for example, poisoned arrows, though poison or other materials were permitted for despoiling enemy water supplies. If the defenders of a besieged city took Muslim captives, the Muslim army was advised to use limited means of violence, and some jurists even call for complete cessation of assault. Abu Hanifa argued that the Muslims could use siege machines and arrows against besieged towns, even if such weapons could kill the captive Muslims, as long as the intention was to kill the harbis. Shafii, however, stated that catapults could be used against military installations but not toward inhabited houses. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali believed the killing of captive Muslims during a siege was justified on the basis of public interest (istislah). During combat, sharia denied the Muslim combatant the right to kill his foe if the latter withdraws and ceases to fight: “if they withdraw from you but fight you not, and [instead] send you [guarantees of] peace, then Allah hath opened no way for you to war against them” (Qur’an 4:90). However, the enemy can be killed by surprise through the use of agents, rumors spread to undermine morale, or ruses and stratagems. Upon victory, the Qur’an prohibited collective punishment of the defeated, proclaiming that “no bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another” (53:38). Nevertheless, the Qur’an also tolerates acts of vengeance and reciprocation of punishment: “as for those who have piled up evil deeds, the recompense of an evil deed is the like” (40:40) and “the recompense of any evil deed is an evil like it” (53:31). Once a siege or battle was finished, sharia prohibited mutilation of the bodies of dead harbis and advised burial of the dead. War has traditionally produced plenty of spoils, and sharia regulated the process of acquiring, dividing, and maintaining these spoils. Sharia distinguished between ghanima (property), asra (prisoners of war), and sabi (women and children) as types of spoils Muslims could obtain during war. Sharia made a distinction between property acquired by Muslims by force and property acquired by chance or occupied as a result of peace. Although Islam recognized non-Muslims’ right to ownership, taking such property as spoils during the war was considered just punishment because of the victims’ refusal to embrace Islam. Nevertheless, taking this property required an imam’s

permission because otherwise it would be considered objectionable (makruh), and potentially a theft. Muslim jurists agreed that only those who participated in a battle could claim spoils, but some recommended that reinforcements that were on the way to the battle or were prevented from participating by some extraordinary event should also receive a share. If a Muslim perished in battle, his share had to be given to his offspring. The division of spoils had to take place after the Muslim victory was complete but could be done on the battlefield or back home; the final decision was in the hands of the imam. Hanafi jurists, however, prohibited sharing spoils outside the dar al-Islam. The Qur’an (8:41) specifies that “out of all the booty that ye may acquire [in war], a fifth share is assigned to Allah, and to the Messenger, and to near relatives, orphans, the needy, and the wayfarer.” Thus, one-fifth of the spoils had to be given to the state, but Islamic law schools were divided over how this share should be managed. Maliki jurists believed the share should be distributed evenly among the members of the Muslim community; Hanafi scholars argued that it should be divided into three parts (for the Prophet, and the caliph as his successor; the Prophet’s relatives; and the poor, orphans, and wayfarers); and the Hanbali school recommended dividing it into six parts for every group mentioned in the Qur’anic ayat. The remaining four-fifths of the booty were divided among the male participants in the battle; any women and children present received either no shares or smaller shares. Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali jurists agreed that a cavalryman should receive three parts (two for the horse and one for the rider) and an infantryman one part. Exercising the power of tanfil (supererogation), an imam could grant an additional share or shares (nafal) to certain participants, but the jurists disagreed on the amount that could be dispersed in such a way. Historically, prisoners of war (asra) often constituted a large proportion of the spoils and could be released on ransom payment (fida), exchanged for Muslim captives, turned into slaves, or executed. Sharia prohibited killing the sabi (women and children) but permitted their enslavement. Alexander Mikaberidze See also Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb; Islam and War (Jihad); Qur’an and War

732  Shimabara Rebellion (1637–1638) Further Reading Firestone, Reuvan. Jihād: The Origin of Holy War in Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Haleem, Harfiyah Abdel. The Crescent and the Cross: Muslim and Christian Approaches to War and Peace. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. Johnson, James Turner. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions. University Park: Penn State University Press, 1997. Khadduri, Majid. War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955. The Quran, Center for Muslim-Jewish Engagement at University of Southern California. http://www.usc.edu/schools/college /crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/quran/.

Shimabara Rebellion (1637–1638) The Shimabara Rebellion took place in Japan in the year 1637. A revolt that pitted peasants against their lords, this rebellion was the result of economic oppression, although religious elements served to intensify the peasants’ resistance. Jesuit missionaries had brought the Roman Catholic faith to the islands of Japan in 1549. Initially, Catholicism was accepted and the Japanese who converted to the new faith lived peacefully with their mostly Buddhist neighbors. However, the promulgation of Catholicism in Japan soon became entangled in the geopolitical struggle between Spain and Portugal. According to the Treaty of Tor­ desillas of 1494, Spain and Portugal had divided the world into two separate spheres of influence. Japan fell into the Portuguese sphere, and so Portugal benefited from trade with Japan, and was also privileged to take the lead in proselytizing Catholicism in Japan. As Dutch and English traders found their way to Japan in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the Catholic-Protestant rivalry was introduced into Japan, adding a new dimension to proselytization. Once Japan became nominally unified under the rule of Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the last decade of the 16th century, suspicion arose over Christian missionaries in Japan. Hideyoshi and his court suspected that there was a link between the missionaries, tradesmen, and military forces of the Western powers that had established trading posts in Japan. When a Spanish ship wrecked off the Japanese coast

and required assistance, it is alleged that the Spanish captain gave the impression that the ship was involved in preparing Spanish forces for an invasion of Japan. This incident, known as the San Felipe Incident, led Hideyoshi to turn his mind against the Christian missionaries for good. Not wanting to repeat the need to suppress another religious uprising, such as the one that resulted in the defeat of the Ikko-ikki, Hideyoshi in 1587 abolished the Jesuit order and expelled them from Japan. The Jesuits resisted, and in 1597, 26 Christians were crucified in Nagasaki. Finally deciding to cease their involvement in politics and trade, the Jesuits and Christians in general ceased their involvement in government, politics, and trade. Although there were occasional persecutions, there would not be a major military operation directed against Christians until the Shimabara Rebellion in 1637. Following Hideyoshi’s death, Japan was finally united under the Tokugawa shogunate in 1600. Believing themselves to be overly oppressed by crushing taxes and lack of land ownership, the peasants in the province of Shimabara rebelled against their lords. Many of these peasants were Christians, and their presence in the ranks of the uprising imparted an urgency to bring the uprising to an end. Led by the young Catholic peasant Amakusa Shiro, the rebels fortified Hara Castle and held out for months. However, the shogun requested help from the Dutch, who sent ships to bombard the castle in hopes that by participating in the rebellion’s demise, they would gain more favorable trading rights with Japan. This Dutch action lends more credence to the idea that economic issues in Japan at this time were more important to both sides than religious identity. The Shimabara Rebellion ended on April 15, 1638. Approximately 30,000 rebels, mostly Christians, were beheaded. The remaining Japanese Christians were forced underground; known as “Kirishitans,” they would practice their faith in private until the ban on Christianity, which had been put into force in 1597, was lifted in 1873. Jeffrey M. Shaw See also Christian Daimyo; Ikko-ikki; Jesuits; Konishi Yukinaga Further Reading Boxer, Charles Ralph. The Christian Century in Japan: 1549–1650. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951.

Shinto and War  733 Turnbull, Stephen. Japan’s Hidden Christians: 1549–1999, Vol. 1. Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 2000. Turnbull, Stephen. The Kakure Kirishitan of Japan: A Study of Their Development, Beliefs and Rituals to the Present Day. Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 1998. Turnbull, Stephen. The Samurai and the Sacred. Oxford: Osprey, 2006. Zomber, Michael. Jesus and the Samurai: The Shining Religion and the Samurai. New York: iUniverse, 2009.

Shinto and War Shinto (Way of the Gods) refers to the indigenous spiritual “religion” of Japan. It consists of various legends, folklore, and stories, which together comprise the beliefs that are inherent in Japanese national identity. Shinto is an integral part of the Japanese character. Unlike most religions, including Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, Shinto has no single founder, and there are no written texts such as scriptures or sacred books. According to Japan’s founding myths as told in the oldest Japanese literary works, the Kojiki or the Nihon Shoki, Japan was created by the two gods Izanagi and Izanami. Their progeny included other gods, such as the sun goddess Amaterasu Omikami, the moon god Tsukiyomi, and the storm god Susano-o Shinto. The various gods (kami) had created the Japanese isles, and the emperor and noble families were seen to be the descendants of these kami. But Shinto was not just about worshipping these particular kami; there was also an inherent pantheism in Shinto that involved the worship of mountains, rivers, and other natural phenomena. Furthermore, important historical figures could also be worshipped as gods and, in general, the Japanese tradition regarded the whole sum of one’s own ancestors as being part of the kami pantheon. All in all, countless gods are worshipped, some of which have regional importance within Japan. Throughout Japanese history, Shinto and Buddhism developed side by side, with Shinto shrines often located on the grounds of Buddhist temples. Buddhism was introduced into Japan in the seventh century CE, and Shinto beliefs were able to adapt to Buddhism with little resistance.

Over time, Buddhism became the dominant religion in Japan, and Shinto had begun to be regarded as a remnant of the past. As Buddhism rose in prominence in the religious realm, Shinto (along with Zen Buddhism) began to be seen as the basis for the samurai’s code of bushido, which demanded strict discipline. When the Tokugawa family united Japan in 1600 and Tokugawa Ieyasu became shogun in 1603, Shinto was a secondary religion behind Buddhism, but the relationship between the two main religions of Japan remained amicable until the country was opened by the American commodore Matthew C. Perry (1794–1858) and his fleet of “black ships” in 1853. Japanese society and government underwent a radical change following this event. The Boshin War began in 1868, and the shogunate in Japan came to an end. Thus began the Meiji Restoration, a transformational process that would lead to the modernization of the Japanese military and economy to protect the country from the ambitions of Western imperialism, and to preclude a fate similar to that which befell China, which had been carved up by the Western powers. During these times of tremendous change, religion became part of the transformation process as well, and the Meiji leaders ended Buddhism’s dominance as the religion which most people identified with and practiced regularly. With the emperor returning to power again, the way was made clear for a return of Shinto to Japanese daily life, as the Japanese emperor was a descendant of the Shinto kami. In contrast to the Tokugawa period, Shinto would now become the new main religion of the country, because it could be used to create an emperor-centered state. The emperor, a direct descendant of the Shinto sun goddess Amaterasu, became the unquestioned symbol of the modern Japanese state. Consequently, a centralized system of Shinto shrines was installed, which would support the new cult of the Meiji emperor. Shinto was employed as a unifying factor, which could provide another level of identification for the new nation and the growing sense of Japanese nationalism. Consequently, Shinto became a major element of the Meiji constitution. The Shinto religion received protection and financial support again, and the state was eager to centralize the shrine system as well as the education of its

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Shinto priests. The so-called “State Shinto” was supervised by the Ministry of Home Affairs and was defended against critics like Minobe Tatsukuchi (1873–1948), who was determined to regard the emperor merely as an organ of the state and not as a living god. However, the interrelationship between the emperor system and Shinto seemed to be successful, and it was also broadened by intermingling war with the new state religion. After the Boshin War the fallen soldiers would be commemorated by war memorials, for which the Yasukuni Shrine of Tokyo, established in 1869, became the most well-known symbol. Soldiers interned in Yasukuni would be remembered and worshipped as kami. It is said that more than 2.5 million soldiers who died during the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian Incident, the Chinese Incident, or the Great East Asian War have been enshrined. In the first decades of the 20th century, State Shinto was further radicalized to protect its teachings against the liberal ideas of the 1920s, which were also a consequence of the economic boom created by the First World War and increasing exports to Europe and East Asia. Ideologues like Uesugi Shinkichi (1878–1929) and Kakehi Katsuhiko (1872–1961) were preaching a radical State Shinto and finally, in 1939, shrines that would protect Japan from its enemies were built throughout the country. Shinto and the former samurai code of bushido were brought together to create an ideology that created an aggressive and determined military that fought in the Second World War. Most notable were the Japanese kamikaze pilots. These suicide pilots became a symbol of Japanese radicalism in the later war, even if they were not able to reverse the tide of defeat. With the end of the war the period of Shinto supremacy also ended. There were 218 national and 110,000 local shrines by the end of the Second World War, all resembling the centralized system of State Shinto, but the supreme commander of the Allied Powers, American general Douglas MacArthur, was eager to separate Shinto beliefs from Japan’s military. While MacArthur was willing to promote Christianity in Japan, the Civil Liberties Directive of October 4, 1945, would secure freedom of religion for the Japanese people. However, even today the Yasukuni Shrine still represents a link between Shinto and war.

Shinto is an essential element of the Japanese national identity. It is not inherently militaristic, but like many religious and sacred beliefs, it was used by particular individuals in Japanese history to justify an aggressive posture both within Japan, as part of the samurai bushido code, and against Japan’s external enemies during the 20th century. Frank Jacob See also Christian Daimyo; Kamikaze; Yasukuni Shrine Further Reading Havens, Norman. “Shinto.” In Paul L. Swanson and Clark Chilson, eds. Nanzan Guide to Japanese Religions. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006, pp. 14–37. Motohisa, Yamakage. The Essence of Shinto, Japan’s Spiritual Heart. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2007. Pye, Michael. “Religion and Conflict in Japan with Special Reference to Shinto and Yasukuni Shrine.” Diogenes 50, no. 3 (2003): 45–49. Shigeyoshi, Murakami. Japanese Religion in the Modern Century. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1968. Skya, Walter A. Japan’s Holy War: The Ideology of Radical Shinto Ultra Nationalism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. Ueda, Kenji. “The Concept of Kami.” In John Ross Carter, ed. The Religious Heritage of Japan: Foundations for Cross-Cultural Understanding in a Religiously Plural World. Portland, OR: Book East, 1999, pp. 65–72.

Shoko Asahara (1955–) Born partially sighted in 1955 to an impoverished family in Kumamoto (southern Japan), Shoko Asahara (birth name Matsumoto Chizuo) experienced a sense of alienation from an early age. The sixth of seven children, Asahara attended a boarding school for the blind starting at the age of five and upon graduating in 1977, moved to Tokyo to study medicine. Yet despite his most earnest efforts, Asahara failed his entrance exams and, in the case of another university, was turned down due to his disability. Little at this point foreshadowed Asahara as the future founder of the new religious movement Aum Shinrikyo (Aum), a group most notorious for its March 20, 1995, sarin gas attack on multiple Tokyo subway trains.

Shoko Asahara (1955–)  735

Despite these early personal setbacks, Asahara’s interest in religion, health, and healing led him to study acupuncture and traditional Chinese medicine while in Tokyo. In 1978, Asahara married Matsumoto Tomoko (who would come to hold a high position in Aum), with whom he sold herbal remedies, medicines, and natural foods, resulting in a 1982 fine for selling herbal remedies without a license. During this time, in addition to continuing his study of acupuncture, Asahara’s interest in religion intensified, culminating with his joining Agonshu, a “New New Religion” that stressed liberation from bad karma through meditation. However, a growing dissatisfaction with Agonshu’s lack of ascetic practice and discipline led Asahara, along with his wife, to leave the group in 1984 in order to establish a yoga and meditation center in Tokyo. Originally calling the movement Aum Shinsen no Kai (“Aum Hermit’s Society”), Asahara initially assumed the role of sensei (teacher), helping guide others on their own journeys of faith. Yet with time and growing influence, Aum members began referring to Asahara as guru, capturing his assumed position as spiritual master holding ultimate truth. As a skilled practitioner of asceticism, his teachings expected devotees to fast and perform harsh austerities in order to purify their bodies and, as a result, attain higher spiritual states. In adhering to Asahara’s teachings and performing the austerities he deemed necessary, his students could gain salvation; to reject his teachings, or to reject the ascetic rituals of Aum, opened one to the strict and harsh responses that came to define the internal ordering of Asahara’s movement. For example, whereas the Agonshu system advocated overcoming bad karma through meditation, Asahara emphasized that bad karma can ultimately be removed by enduring various sufferings (physical, mental, emotional), a belief that legitimated and justified the abuse of members, while strengthening the conviction among Aum disciples that Asahara was owed total and undying obedience. In order to further his studies of Buddhist and Hindu teachings, Asahara traveled to India in 1986, along the way meeting several important religious leaders, including the Dalai Lama. During this journey of spiritual discovery, Asahara claimed that he achieved enlightenment while performing ascetic yogic practices alone in the Himalayan Mountains, securing his (proclaimed) divine orientation.

According to his account, after receiving a succession of religious experiences, including various spirits speaking to him (for example, the Hindu deity Shiva), Asahara was entrusted with the mission to renew the world through religious salvation, a belief highlighted by devotees who Asahara understood as forming a cadre of sacred warriors selected to fulfill his divine mission. Drawing on elements of Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu teachings, along with Chinese astrology, Taoism, and esoteric (mystical) traditions of East and West, he declared himself savior of the world, complete with supernatural powers. Upon returning to Tokyo in 1987, he officially changed his name from Chizuo Matsumoto to the “holy” Shoko Asahara, while also renaming his group Aum Shinrikyo (roughly, “supreme truth”) to capture the group’s mission to teach the truth about Asahara and the cyclical creation and destruction of the universe. Clearly charismatic, Asahara drew attention to his movement through public talks and publicity stunts, including his claimed ability to levitate, which garnered enough attention to warrant a 1995 article in Twilight Zone, a spiritually oriented Tokyo magazine. According to Aum beliefs, Asahara was more than a public face—in fact, only by undergoing purification initiations at the hands of Asahara could a devotee remove negative karma in order to achieve a higher spiritual status. Throughout the 1980s, Asahara and Aum continued to gain converts (at its height, the group numbered more than 40,000) by promising religious rebirth and supernatural powers to young Japanese who felt uncomfortable existing within their country’s rigidly homogenous society and who felt disenfranchised by the spiritual vacuum left by Japan’s economic boom years. With time, this power of persuasion, when combined with Asahara’s ability to lucidly unpack and articulate solutions to the problems facing the contemporary moment, transformed his most devout students into fervent disciples who clung to his every word and who, as events would prove, followed his every command. By the late 1980s, Asahara’s teachings grew darker and more apocalyptic as he began preaching about the inevitability of a nuclear war that, while obliterating much of the world, would spare his most devoted followers. In 1992, Asahara proclaimed that he was the reincarnation of Gautama Buddha and declared himself “Christ,” identifying

736  Shoko Asahara (1955–)

with the “Lamb of God” as the world’s only fully enlightened master. Simultaneously, Asahara outlined his doomsday prophecy, highlighted by a Third World War declared by the United States against Japan, and culminating in a nuclear Armageddon primed culturally and politically by various conspiracies being promulgated everywhere by secret societies like the Freemasons and the Illuminati, national governments such as the Dutch and the British Royal Family, traditional religions (primarily adherents of Judaism), and rival Japanese religions. Based on his readings of the book of Revelation 16:16 and the Prophecy of Nostradamus, Asahara predicted major disasters to occur in the final years of the millennium, culminating with the “end of times” prophesied for 1997. Around this time, Asahara began calling himself Shiva, identifying his divine mission as that of the Hindu god of destruction. For Aum members seeking to attain a higher state of being through Asahara’s teachings, the path for final salvation now required active preparation for Armageddon. Initially, Asahara taught that members must work to transfer evil energy into positive energy in order to avoid mass destruction vis-à-vis nuclear war. To do so, Asahara wanted to expand Aum’s ranks to 30,000 monks who, after achieving liberation through Asahara’s teachings, could save the world from such a fate. In tandem with this spiritual solution, Asahara politicized Aum through the creation of the Shinrito (“Supreme Truth Party” or “Party of Truth”) political party, hoping to use the Japanese government as a tool for support and growth. Following total electoral defeat of the Shinrito Party (including Asahara) in the February 1990 election cycle, this theory of prevention shifted dramatically as the 1990s progressed, leading Asahara to stress the survival of Aum exclusively— rather than the preservation of the world—following Armageddon. Fortified in Asahara’s claim to have time traveled to 2006 in order to talk with those who survived World War III, this need to outlive the apocalypse included preparation in the form of “protective” violence. Based largely on his idealization of Shoho, or the first 500 years of Buddhist teachings regarding dharma (roughly, cosmic law), Asahara advocated that Aum actively help bring about the end of times in order to pave the way for Aum to rebuild Japan and the world through Asahara’s divine leadership. In June 1994, Aum declared its secession

from Japan by announcing the formation of a “sacred government” headed by Asahara as its holy leader. That same year, under the ordering of Asahara, Aum initiated a series of religiously based terrorist attacks. Beginning with individual acts of murder, small-scale chemical attacks aimed at opponents and dissidents of Aum, including judges overseeing a legal case against the group, and culminating with the March 20, 1995, sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, Aum officially moved to a war footing in an effort to pave the way for the survival of Asahara’s sacred rule when the nuclear apocalypse finally hit. Asahara, who strove “to take over Japan and then the world” according to the State Department of the United States of America, was arrested on May 16, 1995, for his role in the subway attack. By the time of Asahara’s arrest, senior Aum officials and organizers of the subway attacks had made full confessions, while also alerting police to earlier crimes committed in the name of Aum, including, for example, the murder of anticult lawyer Tsutsumi Sakamoto and his family. Following a succession of trials, which lasted from 1996 until 2004, Asahara and 12 other key figures within Aum—those directly responsible in Aum killings or in the manufacturing of sarin—were sentenced to death; more than 180 additional members received prison sentences. Refusing to cooperate with both the court and his lawyers, Asahara’s avenues for appeal were exhausted in 2006. His execution, however, was postponed in June 2012 due to new arrests of Aum Shinrikyo members. Asahara remains on death row. Morgan Shipley See also Aum Shinrikyo Further Reading Baffelli, Erica, and Ian Reader. “Impact and Ramifications: The Aftermath of the Aum Affair in the Japanese Religious Context.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 39 (2012): 1–28. Hardacre, Helen. “Aum Shinrikyo and the Japanese Media: The Pied Piper Meets the Lamb of God.” History of Religions 47 (2007): 171–204. Kaplan, David E., and Andrew Marshall. The Cult at the End of the World: The Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear Arsenals of Russia. New York: Crown, 1996. Kisala, Robert. J. “The AUM Spiritual Truth Church in Japan.” In Anson Shupe, ed. Wolves Within the Fold: Religious

Shouren, Wang (1472–1529)  737 Leadership and Abuses of Power. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998. Kisala, Robert. J., and Mark R. Mullins, eds. Religion and Social Crisis in Japan: Understanding Japanese Society through the Aum Affair. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001. Lifton, Robert J. Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence and the New Global Terrorism. New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999. Reader, Ian. “Imagined Persecution: Aum Shinrikyo Millennialism and the Legitimation of Violence.” In Catherine Wessinger, ed. Millennialism, Persecution and Violence: Historical Cases. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999. Reader, Ian. Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000. Shimazono, Susumu. “In the Wake of Aum: The Formation and Transformation of a Universe of Belief.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 22, no. 4 (1995): 381–415. Shoko Asahara. Supreme Initiation: An Empirical Spiritual Science for the Supreme Truth. n.p.: AUM USA Inc., 1988.

Shouren, Wang (1472–1529) Wang Shouren, a Chinese scholar-official from Zhejiang province who served the Ming Dynasty, has been known more widely in the West as Wang Yangming, a name given to him by his students. He contributed in important ways to both the philosophy and practice of Chinese governance and has left a legacy of influence that continues to the present day. During the course of his career, he blended ritual religious practices of neo-Confucianism, informed by studies of both Buddhism and Daoism, which he tried to purify, with implementation of military arts in his roles as field general and later as the Ming dynasty minister of war. Considered by many to be one of the most important Confucian philosophers after Confucius and Mencius, Wang’s thought is often contrasted with that of Song dynasty thinker Zhu Xi. Central to Wang’s thinking was the concept of the inseparability of knowledge and action. In this philosophy, one may only know by doing and all action should be informed by knowledge. The legacy of Wang Shouren’s thought widely influenced not only late Ming dynasty practitioners of statecraft in the 16th century, but

also influenced Japanese military modernizers in the 19th century, and Chinese modernizers in the 20th century. In 1492 at age 20, Wang passed the examination for the juren degree (“recommended person”). Subsequently he fell ill while meditating for seven days in front of some bamboos, trying to discern their principles, as he thought was taught by Zhu Xi. Continuing his studies, he tried and failed the examinations for the jinshi (“advanced scholar”) degree in 1493 and 1495, and finally passed the jinshi examination in 1499, placing second in the national exam. Wang may have turned toward military thinking partially because of the failures in his first two attempts at the jinshi exams. Wang Hua, Wang Shouren’s father, had placed first in the jinshi examination in 1481 when Shouren was nine. Thus by passing the jinshi examination, Wang continued the distinguished scholarly line of his family. After declining health around 1500, Wang spent a period of recuperation in the Yangming ravine between civil service appointments. He practiced Daoist longevity techniques as well as developed his own thought. In 1505, scholars became his students, and he lectured on becoming a Confucian sage, arguing against reciting the classics and writing flowery compositions. Returning to service, Wang was punished with 40 strokes in 1506 for defending a colleague against a corrupt eunuch. Banished to a remote post in Guizhou, he experienced hardship and solitude that led him to the realization at age 36 that discovery of the principle of things could not be done by seeking them in the actual objects, as taught by Zhu Xi, but rather by seeking them in one’s own mind. Thus, Wang Yangming set up a clear dichotomy between his school of mind and Zhu Xi’s school of principle. For Zhu Xi, knowledge guides action, while for Wang Yangming, action is necessary to gain true knowledge. Wang also believed that people had innate knowledge, allowing them to know the difference between good and evil intuitively, without rationalization. For Wang Yangming, knowledge and action are one. As an example, one knows filial piety when one acts upon it. Upon passing the jinshi exam in 1499, Wang recommended to the emperor eight measures for frontier defense, strategy, and administration, which gained him early recognition. In 1500–1501, as a junior Ministry of Justice secretary, he checked prisoners’ records and corrected injustices. In 1510, he established a joint registration system

738  Shouren, Wang (1472–1529)

in which 10 families shared responsibility for security. He was given successively more responsible positions in the Ministry of Justice before he was appointed governor of southern Jiangxi Province in 1516 at age 44. Bandits had controlled much of Jiangxi for decades. In 1517–1518, Wang carried out successful military campaigns to eliminate the bandits, consolidating his military reputation. On the civilian administration side, he established schools, implemented tax reform and joint registration, and improved community morals and solidarity through a “community compact.” By this point in his career, Wang was a model of the ideal Confucian scholar-official. In 1519 he was on his way to Fujian to suppress a rebellion there, when he learned that Zhu Chenhao, the prince of Ning, was rebelling in his home province of Jiangxi. Wang Shouren turned from the south to surround the prince’s base in Nanchang, south of Po Yang Lake, successfully stalling the prince of Ning’s movement toward Nanjing by disseminating disinformation about imperial troops approaching from the north. He defeated the prince in a decisive battle on Po Yang Lake as the prince returned south, weak and tired from his expedition. Small boats were set afire to drift into the prince’s fleet, setting the prince’s ship afire and leading to his capture. The dissolute and usually drunk emperor Zheng De, against Wang Yangming’s counsel, traveled south to Nanjing along with his generals so that they could claim the victory already won by Wang. Emperor Zheng De lost his life in the aftermath of a boating accident while returning to Beijing. In 1521, the new Jiajing emperor appointed Wang minister of war and earl of Xinjian. In 1522, Wang’s father died, and Wang remained home for five years to mourn him. In 1527 Wang was called to fight rebels in Guangxi, leading to his death by fever in 1529. After his death, court intrigue prevailed, and Wang was stripped of his titles. In 1567, 38 years after his death, the new Lung Qing emperor restored Wang’s reputation by naming him marquis of Xinjian with the title of Wencheng (“completion of culture”). Wang’s stature was further enhanced by the highest honor in 1584, when he was offered sacrifice in the Confucian temple. As a Ming official, Wang Shouren sought peace in his region through exercising Neo-Confucian principles of just and equitable government. But he was also successful in war as a military commander when the state he served

was threatened. Due to both his civil and military prowess, Wang left a legacy of peace in his region that lasted for a century. He helped stabilize the late Ming dynasty, after preventing its breakup by quelling the prince of Ning’s rebellion in 1519. During this late Ming period, Wang’s unity of knowledge and action philosophy became a vibrant contender for leadership in Confucian thought. Wang’s influence in China was less pervasive during the Manchu Qing dynasty than during the earlier Ming dynasty, but his principles and career were studied in Japan during this period and became important in the formulation of Japanese bushido, the way of the warrior. His influence on 19th-century Japanese reformers was profound, particularly on the three samurai from Kagoshima who were central to the Meiji restoration: Saigo Takamori, Okubo Toshimichi, and Admiral Togo Heihachiro. Admiral Togo, commander of the Japanese fleet that sank the Russian fleet at Tsushima in 1905, kept a reminder stamp of the Oya-mei Gaku (Yang Ming School) teaching that read, “One’s whole life followed the example of Yangming.” Togo’s defeat of a European power, while steeped in Yangming’s philosophy of unified thought and action, influenced Chinese reformers ready to leave the Chinese imperial tradition behind. Wang’s religious practice of meditation, called “tranquil repose” or “sitting still,” is similar in form to the practice of Zen meditation in Buddhism, except he thought Buddhist meditation involved selfishness in its quest for release from the cycle of life and death, and Daoist meditation involved selfishness in its quest for personal immortality. In 1906, Chiang Kai-shek came under the influence of Wang Yangming’s career example and thinking when he studied at the Dragon River School. He internalized the thought that ethics only had meaning when converted to direct, decisive, and spontaneous action, especially when combined with Confucian virtues of rectitude, integrity, honesty, and loyalty. For a few minutes on most mornings throughout his life, Chiang stood erect in concentrated meditation on his daily and life goals, and then put these thoughts into action for the rest of each day. Later in life, Chiang renamed the attractive mountain to the northwest of Taipei Yangmingshan after the philosopher he admired. Grant Rhode

Shrine Cults, East Indies  739 See also Daoism and War Further Reading Chan, Wing-tsit, trans. Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Geiss, James. “The Cheng-te Reign, 1506–1521.” In Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett, eds. The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 7: The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Henke, Frederick Goodrich, trans. The Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming. London: Open Court, 1916. Ivanhoe, Philip J. Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought of Mengzi and Wang Yangming. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990. Taylor, Jay. The Generalissimo: Chiang Kei-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009. Tu Wei-ming. Neo-Confucian Thought in Action: WangYang Ming’s Youth (1472–1509). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

Shrine Cults, East Indies Religious shrines in early modern Java, South Kalimantan, and Sulawesi were commonly believed to hold sacred (kesaktian in Malay) and supernatural (karāmat in Arabic) powers. Such powers drew devotees to worship as well as sacrifice. Through the glorification of deities and holy men, believers entered cults guided by religious and secular lords associated with shrines. In turn, shrine lords used their followers for political causes, including war. Religious initiation led to military recruitment, while invulnerability rituals (e.g., the kanuragan ritual in Javanese) and charismatic leadership prepared troops to run amok. Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam all produced brotherhoods with a martial edge and together with animist traditions embedded cults in a landscape of venerated ancestral gravesides (punden in Javanese or Kabuyutan in Sundanese) and prominent natural sites, often on elevated terrain. Most shrine cults from these religions around the Java Sea appealed to a multifarious crowd while bolstering the armies of kings, sultans, insurgents, and European trade companies alike. However, more than these multireligious

influences, the cults’ wide-ranging impact became rooted in the political tradition of shrine lords granting royal power to kings. Such political traditions differed on Java, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. In Central and East Java, the Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit (1293–1527) was characterized by shrine tributaries of the king, some of which were created by the court directly. In return for their acknowledgment of royal rule, holy sites were graced by the king with economic privileges. Whereas shrine lords mainly cleared land for agriculture and extended royal control over peripheries, they could also recruit troops. Although subservience to the king fluctuated, royal ties kept shrines bound to the court. With increasing Islamization in the 16th century, however, the independence of shrines grew. But this was mainly due to the overhaul of political hierarchies that accompanied proselytization and which allowed shrine lords to pursue commerce as well as warfare on their own terms. The myth of the Nine Saints (Wali Sanga) later came to characterize this transition, and their sacred power features in tales of cultural transition as well as military campaigns. The Nine Saints reputedly used their sacred power to constitute and protect provinces like those of Demak and Pajang in Java. Legend has it that saints now guarded states, not vice versa. And indeed monarchical control over such cults was restrained, even while kings or sultans still sought recognition from shrines coercively or at least assertively. Sometimes the court did so successfully. The Mataram sovereign known as Sultan Agung (1613–1645) sought recognition from the Giri and Tembayat shrines and eventually Mecca, and thus put royal control over the most important Javanese shrines. The concept of mortmain, which historically refers to church ownership of land, was used as a royal reward to gain favor from shrine cults, this time through declaring certain shrines as pradikan (tax-free). Still, resistance to royal supremacy surged and eventually led to the destruction of the court at the centurial turn of the Javanese calendar in the Gregorian year 1677. In the wake of these events, the most important shrine polities faced aggression from the surviving royalty and the Dutch East India Company, eventually leading to loss in war and finally a royal charter imposing serious restraints on the military activities of the pradikan and on the shrine cults themselves in 1742. In West Java and South Sumatra, shrine

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cults underwent similar developments. Yet, for the other islands around the Java Sea, the scarce number of sources indicates different trends. The coastal Malay and Javanese communities in South Kalimantan equally witnessed a shift from HinduBuddhist shrines to Islamic ones. However, the Islamic proselytization was achieved through intracourt war and newly constructed shrines. Even more, these shrines connected to those of coastal Java via strong genealogical ties. More than on Java, a new shrine landscape developed that was associated with a specific migrant community in contrast to the largely animist Dayak tribes or former HinduBuddhist kingdoms. In South Sulawesi, on the other hand, animist traditions like that of the Bissu incorporated with Islamic notions of supernatural power (karāmat) and pilgrimage (Ziarah) more easily. Both tendencies impacted how shrine cults were applied in military confrontation or alliance with non-Islamic opponents, be they Dayaks, Torajans, or the Dutch East India Company. Moreover, they equally impacted the connection to shrine cults overseas, mainly via shared genealogies (silsilah). Whereas Malays from Kalimantan associated with the Javanese Nine Saints, including the polities they created and the struggles they fought, the Bugis and Makassarese from Sulawesi conflicted with such cults. For instance, the latter’s massive presence on Java during the insurgence of the Madurese prince Trunajaya between 1675 and 1680 led to open conflict with the main Javanese shrine authorities. The varying developments of shrine cults around the Java Sea and their impact on early modern conflict can be studied best via shrine chronicles and genealogies (e.g., the Babad Gresik) as well as oral histories. The saints related to these cults are still hallowed today, and tomb guards (Juru Kunci in Javanese) tell their tale. Like the South Asian Sajjada Nashins or Khalifa, they evoke the power of their predecessors to bless pilgrims. Four centuries ago, this blessing was given to warlords and troops too. Simon C. Kemper See also Buddhism and War; Hinduism and War Further Reading Andaya, L. Y. “Nature of War and Peace among the BugisMakassar People.” South East Asia Research 12, no. 1 (2004): 53–80.

Chambert-Loir, Henri, and Anthony Reid, eds. The Potent Dead: Ancestors, Saints and Heroes in Contemporary Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002. Charney, Michael W. Southeast Asian Warfare 1300–1900. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2004. Christie, Jan Wisseman. “Negara, Mandala, and Despotic State: Images of Early Java.” In David G. Marr and A. C. Milner, eds. Southeast Asia in the 9th to14th Centuries. Singapore and Canberra: Australian National University, 1986. Christie, Jan Wisseman. “Raja and Rama: The Classical State in Early Java.” In Lorraine Gesick, ed. Centers, Symbols, and Hierarchies: Essays on the Classical States of Southeast Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1983. Christomy, Tommy. Signs of the Wali: Narratives at the Sacred Sites in Pamijahan, West Java. Canberra: ANU Press, 2008. Esteban, Ivie Carbon. “The Narrative of War in Makassar: Its Ambiguities and Contradictions.” Sari-International Journal of the Malay World and Civilization 28, no.1 (2010): 129–49. Fox, James. “Sunan Kalijaga and the Rise of Mataram: A Reading of the Babad Tanah Jawi as a Genealogical Narrative.” In P. Riddell and A. Street, eds. Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought & Society. Leiden: Brill, 1997, pp. 187–218. Fox, James. “Ziarah Visits to the Tombs of the Wali, the Founders of Islam on Java” In M. C. Ricklefs, ed. Islam in the Indonesian Social Context. Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1991, pp. 19–38. Laffan, Michael. The Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi Past. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. Ricklefs, Merle C. War, Culture, and Economy in Java, 1677– 1726: Asian and European Imperialism in the Early Kartasura Period. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993. Ricklefs, Merle C. Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries. Norwalk, CT: East Bridge Signature Books, 2006. Ricklefs, Merle C. The Seen and Unseen Worlds in Java: History, Literature and Islam in the Court of Pakubuwana II 1726–49. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998. Rinkes, A. D. Nine Saints of Java. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 1996. Sunyoto, Agus. Atlas Wali Songo. Jakarta: Mizan, 2012.

Siffin, Battle of (657 CE) The Battle of Siffin, on the shores of the Euphrates River in the summer of 657 CE, was a turning point in what came to be known in Islam as the First Civil War. Laden on both

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sides with pious rhetoric, the unfolding of events revealed theological fault lines in the young Islamic community concerning the right to rule. At a key moment, a decision by Ali (r. 656–661 CE; Muhammad’s first cousin, one of the very first of his converts, and by this time Islam’s fourth caliph) to submit to the judgment of men, rather than assert the justice of his cause and allow Allah to decide the battle, did him irreparable harm and impelled his already troubled rule further on a downward course. This conflict, whose pretext had been the accusation that Ali had allowed the murderers of the previous caliph, Uthman, to go unpunished, was in a practical sense also a struggle for power along tribal lines between the Quraysh who supported their kinsman Ali and those who supported their kinsman Mu’awiya, the governor of Syria previously appointed by the murdered third caliph, also a close relative. Ali did not enter this conflict from a position of great political strength. It was not that he was considered unworthy, but grumbling about him having become caliph in the wake of an “unrighteous act” cast a shadow upon his authority. Although no accusation of his actual involvement was advanced, his failure to punish the perpetrators was held against him. Furthermore, he had enemies of high rank. Three such, T.alha and al-Zubayr, both companions of Muhammad, as well as Muhammad’s favorite and youngest wife, A’isha, who had herself harbored deep animosity toward Ali for a number of years following an incident in which aspersions had been cast upon her honor, challenged him quickly upon his elevation to office in what came to be known as the Battle of the Camel, which preceded Siffin by about six months. The battle, we are told, began on a Wednesday, was engaged daily for several weeks, and took a heavy toll of lives on both sides. On at least one occasion, some of Ali’s troops began to desert the battlefield but were shamed into returning to the fray. At a key moment, when it is supposed that Ali’s forces had the upper hand, Mu’awiya, at the suggestion of Amr ibn al-As, ordered his Syrian troops to attach copies of the Qur’an to their lances and raise them in the air. The call was made for peaceful arbitration and Ali reluctantly accepted at the urging of his Iraqi Arab troops. The two parties ceased fighting and returned to their respective capitals of Damascus and Kūfa. However, those

who had urged Ali to accept arbitration had second thoughts, became convinced they had sinned, and urged him to return to battle. When he refused, they withdrew their support from him and became known as the Kharijites (khawarij), or “seceders.” Among the fighters at Siffin was the companion and famous hadith transmitter Abdullah ibn ‘Abbas, who fought on the side of Ali. Notable on the side of Mu’awiya was Amr ibn al-As, who had been one of the key generals of the early Islamic conquests. The outcome of Siffin was a politically weakened Caliph Ali and a series of events that by 661 had led to his own murder and the inauguration of the Umayyad period, Mu’awiya rising to become the first caliph of that dynasty. The latter’s rule lasted nearly two decades, from 661 to 680. Daniel A. Brubaker See also Caliphate; Camel, Battle of the; Mu’awiya Further Reading Donner, F. Early Islamic Conquests. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Hawting, G. R., trans. The History of al-T.abari. Series in Near Eastern Studies, Vol. XVII. Edited by S. A. Arjomand. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996. Robinson, C. F. The Rise of Islam, 600–705. In C. F. Robinson, ed. The New Cambridge History of Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Wellhausen, J. The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall. Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1927.

Sikhism and War Though the Sikh tradition does not have a theology of military ethics akin to those found in classical Christian just war theory or Islamic jurisprudence, the just use of force features prominently in mainstream Sikh self-understanding and the institution of the khālsā (the collective body of initiated Sikhs). Distinguishing Sikhism’s approach from other religious theories of just war is the degree to which the answers on the use of armed force are drawn from the community’s understanding of its own history rather than direct extracts from scripture or theological works. Still,

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scripture is so central to Sikhism that it must be considered as a starting point for this subject.

Scripture

The primary Sikh scripture, the Guru Granth Sāhib, was elevated into the role of a living guru for the Sikhs by the 10th and final human guru, Guru Gobind Singh. It occupies a central role in Sikh theology. Its hymns are credited to numerous writers, including six Sikh gurus, Hindu and Islamic bhagats, and courtly poets (bhat.t.s). These writings are primarily concerned with the individual’s relationship with God through meditation on his nām, or name. Very few hymns, however, contain material easily translated into a theory of just war. Indeed, it may appear at first glance that a literalist reading of select hymns, particularly the writings of bhagat Kabīr, might lend itself to a theology of strict pacifism: You kill living beings, and call it a righteous action. Tell me, brother, what would you call an unrighteous action? You call yourself the most excellent sage; then who would you call a butcher? Kabīr, they oppress living beings and kill them, and call it proper. When the Lord calls for their account, what will their condition be? Kabīr, it is tyranny to use force; the Lord shall call you to account. When your account is called for, your face and mouth shall be beaten. Other passages may seem to allow for armed violence: The spiritual warriors enter the field of battle; now is the time to fight! He alone is known as a spiritual hero, who fights in defense of religion. He may be cut apart, piece by piece, but he never leaves the field of battle. Kabīr, kill only that, which, when killed, shall bring peace. Everyone shall call you good, very good, and no one shall think you are bad. Contextualized, this language ties into broader themes in the spiritual text: criticism of forms of religiosity not rooted in a direct relationship with God and the struggle

inherent in establishing that relationship. So these hymns have not historically formed a basis for a detailed theory of the just use of force. The Dasam Granth, a text of disputed legitimacy within the Sikh community, is more prolific in its use of martial imagery. Said to have been written and compiled by Guru Gobind Singh, much of the poetry is rooted in the martial exploits of the archetypal Hindu goddess and epic heroes. As per tradition, the text itself was intended to rouse a passionate response against the Sikh communities’ many persecutors in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Consider the following examples: He is the remover of darkness, the masher of the Pathans of Khorasan, perisher of the egoists and idlers, He is described as the destroyer of people full of vices. Whom should we worship except the Lord who is the Vanquisher of the Conquerors, giver of the Glory of conquest and who shoots the miraculous arrows from His bow. He, who wields the sword in his hand, he is the remover of millions of sins. . . . The sword appears impressive in his hand, seeing which the sins run away. With the use of weapons and arms, the winsome armours were being cut; And the warriors performed the irreligious duties in a nice manner. The text also contains the most direct commentary on the ethics of war found in Sikh scripture: When all other methods fail, it is proper to hold the sword in hand. This extract appears in the Zafarnāmā, a letter said to have been written by Guru Gobind Singh to the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. It features prominently in Sikh commentary on the ethics of warfare.

A History of Resistance

Ultimately neither of the scriptures, the Guru Granth Sāhib and the Dasam Granth, feature centrally in the Sikh community’s understanding of its approach to the question of

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just war. It is rather their reflection on a history of endured persecution and martyrdom. Following Guru Arjan’s execution at the order of the Mughal authorities, his successor and sixth guru, Hargo­ bind, established the concept of mīrī-pīrī: the temporal and spiritual authority of the guru. Guru Hargobind was the first guru to call the Sikhs to arms, but it was the 10th guru, Guru Gobind Singh, who would codify martial symbols with the founding of the khālsā. Each initiate into the khālsā is to adopt the uniform of the guru by keeping the hair uncut, carrying a comb for personal grooming, arming themselves with a sword or dagger, wearing a steel bracelet, and donning a loose pair of shorts as an undergarment. Today, the distinction between the khālsā and mainstream Sikhism is blurred. The majority of Sikhs are not members of the khālsā, but nevertheless hold the institution in esteem, viewing initiation as the logical endpoint for any individual serious about his faith. From the khālsā perspective, the ideal Sikh is a sant sipāhī, a saint soldier; wholly devoted to the guru in faith and in action, including armed action. What, exactly, “action” means is understood through the prism of the community’s shared history of persecution. As referenced above, Guru Arjan was the first guru to be martyred, followed by the ninth guru, Guru Tegh Bahadur, and Guru Gobind Singh himself. The 18th century is remembered as a time of even greater hardship, as the Sikhs suffered under harsh Mughal governors and Afghan invaders. The community remembers two large ghallūgārās, or massacres, and the martial exploits of Sikh community leaders such as Baba Dip Singh and Bandā Singh Bahādur. Central to the Sikhs’ reading of their history is the Sikh role as defenders of the weak and punishers of tyrants. Guru Tegh Bahādur is said to have been martyred for his aggressive defense of Kashmiri Hindus, for example, and military commander Bandā Singh Bahādur is remembered for his raid on the Mughal provincial capital of Sirhind. This history of martyrs and sant sipāhīs revolves entirely around an acceptance of the use of force, so long as it is justified by the aggression of the opposing party. These same perspectives inform the community’s reflection on its role during the colonial period. Though Sikhs are famed for their extensive participation as soldiers in Britain’s imperial army, serving across continents in both

world wars, Sikhs remember in equal measure their role in anticolonial resistance. Sikhs were disproportionately imprisoned and executed by imperial authorities following acts of protest. Bhagat Singh, a young revolutionary born into a Sikh family and executed in his early 20s after throwing bombs into the central legislature of British India, is most emblematic of the era in the popular imagination. Also important is the Gadar Party, an armed revolutionary group founded by diasporic Sikhs on the West Coast of North America in the early 20th century. The Jallianwala Bagh massacre of 1919 led by Colonel Reginald Dyer of the British Indian Army was an especially potent turning point for the Sikh community after which armed resistance appeared to be wholly justified.

Contemporary Concerns

Postindependence, the 1984 raid by the Indian military on the Sikhs’ most holy place of worship, the Golden Temple, and the chaos that followed have been interpreted by many Sikhs through the same framework of just violence against oppressors. The raid followed several decades of growing tension between Sikh politicians and the central government. Sikhs felt that promises made as the British left South Asia were still not being honored. The rise of the fiery Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale was supported initially by senior figures in the Indian central government. They sought to discredit the Sikh Shiromani Akali Dal party by forcing it toward extremism in attempting to match Bhindranwale’s growing popularity. This plan spiraled out of control as he and his followers occupied the Golden Temple and smuggled arms into the complex. Sikhs debated the actions of Bhindranwale among themselves, but few could support the military’s decision to conclude the crisis with a Golden Temple raid, particularly one coinciding with the day of commemoration of the martyrdom of Guru Arjan. Hundreds of pilgrims were killed alongside Bhindranwale and his followers, while the complex itself was extensively damaged. The months that followed saw the mutiny of Sikh army soldiers, the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards, and pogroms against ordinary Sikhs in Delhi and other cities across North India. An armed insurgency against the state simmered in Punjab through the mid-1990s, and tens of thousands of Punjabis

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left to settle abroad in Canada, the United Kingdom, and several other Western countries. Those who left India as refugees and economic migrants during this period played a central role in rallying the wider diaspora against the actions of the Indian state. They used the language of martyrdom to describe Bhindranwale and his close associates, as well as the assassins of Indira Gandhi and other famous militants. They won elections to the boards of local gurdwārās and installed framed photographs alongside paintings depicting the martyrdom of 18th-century Sikhs and Sikh gurus. They also raised the slogan of Khalistan—a proposed Sikh homeland to be carved primarily out of Indian and Pakistani Punjab as an independent country. Though the vast majority of diasporic activists agitated peacefully against the Indian government, a small group of Sikhs in Canada organized the placement of bombs aboard two Air India flights in 1985, causing more than 300 deaths. It is important to note that attitudes towards these events, the way they are remembered, and the calls for Khalistan are often contested by both diasporic and Indian Sikhs. Some argue that Indian Sikhs will continue to prosper so long as Punjab remains at peace, uncomfortable with Khalistan being held up as a panacea for political ills. The underlying value afforded to bravery and just resistance in these narratives nevertheless remains inseparable for most, especially when contemplating what it means to be a khālsā Sikh. As the Sikh community has become truly global in reach via its large diaspora, new voices have entered the conversation on the just use of force. A generation of politically active youth draws inspiration from Sikh anticolonial resistance and brings a critical eye to Western foreign policy in the post-9/11 era. They reflect on the actions of figures such as Bhagat Singh or the wider anti-imperialist struggle of the diasporic Gadar Party, mentioned earlier. Others choose to enlist in the military in countries like Canada and Australia, an opportunity now available to khālsā Sikhs despite earlier institutional hostility toward Sikh articles of faith. The most recognizable such figure is Harjit Singh Sajjan, Canada’s minister of national defense following the election of Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party in 2015. Sajjan, a baptized khālsā Sikh, is a former police officer and military veteran. The majority of vocal Canadian

Sikhs expressed pride in his achievement and the place of their community within Canadian society rather than questioning whether the interests of the khālsā align with those of the Canadian armed forces. But there remains a wide range of channels through which Sikhs engage with the question of the use of armed force. New voices in academia now critique traditional historical narratives, while others use the Internet and other modern tools to share these narratives in novel, creative ways. Rather than the 21st century finally seeing the authorship of a grand work on the just use of force emerging from theological circles in Punjab, it is much more likely that it will be defined by a multiplicity of perspectives on the question, expressed both by the Sikhs of India and the global diaspora. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn See also Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh; Dasam Granth; Dev, Guru Arjan; Golden Temple, Battle of; Khālsā; Sant Sipāhī Further Reading Dasam Granth Sahib (2010 [18th century]) Surinder Singh Kohli, trans. Birmingham: Sikh National Heritage Trust, 2000. http://www.searchgurbani.com/dasam_granth /introduction. Dorn, A. Walter, and Stephen Gucciardi. “The Sword and the Turban: Armed Force in Sikh Thought.” Journal of Military Ethics 10, no. 1 (2011). http://www.walterdorn .net/87. Guru Granth Sahib (2010 [1604; 1707]) Sant Singh Khalsa, trans. Gurbani Files. http://www.searchgurbani.com/dasam _granth/introduction; available in one-volume text (pdf) at http://www.gurbanifiles.org/translations. Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley. Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1997.

Simons, Menno (1496–1561) Menno Simons was a Reformation-era religious leader whose respected leadership, based on his pacifist approach and desire to separate church and state, provided desperately needed direction at a crucial period in Anabaptist history and ensured the survival of Anabaptism. For Menno and his Anabaptist followers, known as Mennonites,

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pacifism was an integral element of their religion, not a peripheral characteristic. The 16th century saw the fall of the Catholic Church from its place of unquestioned authority in Western Europe. When the western portion of the Roman Empire fell, the Catholic Church filled the void of organized leadership and dominated the region throughout the Middle Ages. When Martin Luther challenged certain teachings of the Catholic Church in the early 16th century, a few German leaders protected him. Some political leaders supported Protestantism as it gave them a chance to bolster their power at the expense of the church. However, Radical Reformers such as the Anabaptists went further than Martin Luther by completely rejecting the world and its authority—both religious and secular. This was a far more dangerous heresy, which political leaders could not support at the time. It was into this controversy that Menno ultimately found himself thrust. Menno Simons grew up in war-torn Friesland (northwestern portion of present-day Holland). In 1516, Menno

Menno Simons was a 16th-century Dutch priest who left the Catholic Church and became an influential leader of the Anabaptist movement in the Netherlands. The Mennonites are modern-day followers of Simons’s reforms. (Rijksmuseum)

became a Roman Catholic priest. He did not take himself or his profession too seriously, as he enjoyed “playing cards, drinking, and frivolities of all sorts.” He initially chose not to read the Bible in case it confused him. However, when he began to have doubts about the issue of whether or not the bread and wine actually became the body and blood of Christ (transubstantiation) or merely symbolized it, Menno began reading the Bible. More reading ensued after learning of the death of an Anabaptist in a neighboring town, and he became curious about the concept of adult baptism. His superior admitted that infant baptism was dictated by need, not scripture, a view held by both the Catholic Church and the Protestant Reformers of the day. Despite these theological differences and an increasingly literal interpretation of the Bible, Menno remained in the Catholic Church. In the meantime, the Anabaptists struggled as their leaders were killed, imprisoned, or increasingly radicalized. In 1533 Jan Matthys began preaching a messianic message about preparing for Christ’s imminent return. One of those baptized by Matthys went to Münster and succeeded in turning many to radical Anabaptism. On January 23, 1534, Münster’s ruling Catholic prince bishop ordered that all Anabaptists be imprisoned. In response, religious radicals seized the city hall. News spread of Münster’s defiance of the Catholic prince bishop and resistance to Lutheran influence. Anabaptist sympathizers moved into Münster in large numbers and the city became increasingly radicalized. The large number of single women living in the city brought about the introduction of polygamy. Jan van Leiden had one of his 16 wives executed for impertinence and then trampled her body in front of his other wives as a lesson to them. The city embraced communism, based on biblical ideals of sharing all goods. In June 1535 the besieging forces took the city. The Anabaptist leaders were hung in cages from the steeple of the largest church. Persecution of Anabaptists elsewhere increased as news of the unusual practices in Münster spread. Although Menno agreed with the Anabaptist doctrine of adult baptism, he could not go along with their revolutionary actions and vigorously denounced them in his sermons. Denouncing the Münsterites, he asked, “This only I would learn of you, whether you are baptized on the sword or on the cross?”

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The more vigorously Menno denounced the Anabaptist extremists, the more he appeared to be defending the Catholic Church, to his chagrin. The inner conflict he faced came to a head in March 1535 when his brother joined an Anabaptist group that seized an old monastery outside of Bolsward. Authorities drove them out of the monastery on April 7, but nearly a hundred died in the fighting. Menno lost his own brother as a result of violence. On January 30, 1536, Menno renounced the Catholic Church and spent the next year meditating, praying, and traveling. A few Anabaptists approached him and urged him to become their leader. He at first refused, but after a second request, he acquiesced. At that point, the Anabaptists were scattered and on the verge of annihilation. Those disturbed by the events in Münster wandered confused and leaderless. Other fanatics followed a program of violent vengeance, which degenerated into simple banditry. Menno wandered from congregation to congregation, seeking to unify them and persuade them to a pacifist outlook. In 1552, in “A Humble and Christian Apology,” Menno wrote, “how can a Christian defend scripturally retaliation, rebellion, war, striking, slaying, torturing, stealing, robbing and plundering and burning cities, and conquering countries?” According to Menno, Christians “are the children of peace; their hearts overflow with peace, and they walk in the way of peace; they are full of peace. They seek, desire, and know nothing but peace; and are prepared to forsake country, goods, life, and all for the sake of peace.” The more the Anabaptists faced suffering, the more they were to practice nonresistant pacifism and demonstrate their faith—an integral aspect of their beliefs and the martyr church concept that they held. Menno and his followers were soon recognized as different from other radical sects. In 1545, Countess Anna of Oldenberg used the term “Mennonite” for the first time to differentiate Menno’s followers from other radical Anabaptists and treated them more leniently. In 1575 Mennonites in Holland were exempted from mandatory military service. For Menno and his followers, nonviolent resistance became the very essence of the Christian gospel. They took a literal interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount—no oaths, no war, no participating in civil government. Modern concepts of the separation of church and state as well

as the power of nonviolent resistance can be traced back to Menno. Melissa Fulgham See also Anabaptist Pacifism; Christianity and War; Luther, Martin; Pacifism, Religious; Protestant Reformers and War Further Reading Bender, Harold S. “The Anabaptist Vision.” Church History 13, no. 1 (1944): 3–24. Bender, Harold S. “The Pacifism of the Sixteenth Century Anabaptists.” Church History 24, no. 2 (1955): 119–31. Friedmann, Robert. “Conception of the Anabaptists.” Church History 9, no. 4 (1940): 341–65. Friesen, Abraham. “The Marxist Interpretation of Anabaptism.” Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies 1 (January, 1970): 17–34. Friesen, Abraham. “Toward an Anabaptist Political Philosophy.” Transformation 14, no. 4 (1997): 1–6. Horsch, John. Menno Simons: His Life, Labors, and Teachings. Scottsdale, PA: Mennonite Publishing House, 1916. Magedanz, Stacy. “Public Justice and Private Mercy in ‘Measure for Measure’.” Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900 44, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 317–32. Oyer, John S., and Robert Kreider. Mirror of the Martyrs. Purcellville, VA: Good Books, 1990. Smolin, David M. “A House Divided? Anabaptist and Lutheran Perspectives on the Sword.” Journal of Legal Education 47, no. 1 (March 1997): 28–38.

Singh, Ba¯ba¯ Dı¯ p (1682–1757) Bābā Dīp Singh is remembered by Sikhs as an 18thcentury scholar, military leader, and martyr. He is said to have continued battling the Afghans to retake Amritsar’s Golden Temple even after his head was nearly, or entirely, severed. He is popularly depicted holding his head in his left hand and a large sword in his right. The 18th century was an era of instability and chaos across the Mughal Empire, but it was particularly difficult for the Sikhs as they were hunted by the Mughals and bore the brunt of Afghan invasions of the subcontinent. Bābā Dīp Singh is said to have vowed revenge after Ahmad Shah Durrani had the Golden Temple destroyed. Though the

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Afghans were defeated by Bābā Dīp Singh’s forces in 1757, they would return in 1762, massacring thousands of Sikhs in an incident remembered as the “Great Holocaust.” Bābā Dīp Singh is therefore popularly lauded as a significant Sikh military figure and martyr in an era of great struggle. Bābā Dīp Singh is also claimed by the Damdami Taksal as the educational organization’s first head, though Guru Gobind Singh is identified as its founder. In recent history, the organization was led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a preacher and militant leader killed during the Indian government’s Operation Blue Star against his armed followers in the Golden Temple in 1984. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn See also Anglo-Sikh Wars; Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh; Golden Temple, Battle of; Mughal-Sikh Wars; Singh, Guru Gobind Further Reading Dhavan, Purnima. “Sikhism in the Eighteenth Century.” In Pashaura Singh and Louis E. Fenech, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Sikh Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Fenech, Louis. Martyrdom in the Sikh Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Singh, Guru Gobind (1666–1708) The 10th and final human guru, Guru Gobind Singh was born in 1666 and made guru after the death of his father, Guru Tegh Bahādur, in 1674. An accomplished military leader, Guru Gobind Singh made pivotal changes to the Sikh community with the institution of the khālsā and his directive for the guruship to pass on to scripture rather than to any living person. Guru Gobind Singh’s life is marked by numerous military campaigns as neighboring leaders and the Mughal Empire became increasingly alarmed with the growing number of Sikhs in the region. After the 1699 founding of the khālsā, an order of armed Sikhs who symbolically renounce their former identities and pledge themselves entirely to their guru, Guru Gobind Singh fought numerous battles until his assassination in 1708.

The periods of peace in his life were marked by scholarly pursuits; he was a lover of poetry and composed numerous works in a variety of languages, many supposedly attributable to him in the Dasam Granth. His most famous attributed work, the Persian Zafarnāmā, was written in response to the murder of Sikh soldiers and family members by the Mughal emperor’s forces following the latter’s betrayal of a shared agreement. In this letter, he writes the most famous line in discussions of Sikh military ethics: “When all else fails, it is righteous to draw the sword.” He also finalized the Adī Granth with the addition of his father’s hymns. This finalized form was invested with the guruship upon his death, hence its title Guru Granth Sāhib, “sāhib” being a term of respect. While some are tempted to frame Guru Gobind Singh’s military concerns against the seemingly peaceful, grandfatherly Guru Nānak, Sikhs vehemently deny any true theological innovation on behalf of any of their gurus. They argue that there is no internal contradiction in any of the writings or actions of the 10, and that the militaristic shift under Guru Hargobind and Guru Gobind Singh were natural products of the pressures of their particular eras. This is justified with Guru Hargobind’s articulation of mīrī-pīrī, according to which the guruship and Sikh community are invested with both spiritual and temporal authority. Guru Gobind Singh’s creation of the khālsā furthered this concept by demanding a body of loyal saint soldiers, or sant sipāhīs, who would be willing to abandon all previous attachments in following the guru. The majority of Sikhs today interpret Guru Gobind Singh’s creation of the khālsā as the establishment of a community to which all Sikhs are to aspire to join, though a significant proportion do not follow through in practice. The creation of the khālsā and elevation of the Guru Granth Sāhib lay two cornerstones of contemporary Sikhism, making Guru Gobind Singh the community’s most influential head after its current guru (scripture itself) and its founder, Guru Nānak. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn See also Adī Granth; Dasam Granth; Khālsā; Sant Sipāhī Further Reading Mandair, Arvind-Pal Singh. Sikhism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. McLeod, Hew. Sikhism. New York: Penguin Books, 1998.

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Sinn Féin Sinn Féin (meaning “Ourselves” in Gaelic Irish) is the oldest surviving political party from which most modern political organizations in Ireland are derived, as a result of successive splits within the ranks of the organization. Its impact on Irish and international opinion has been significant due to its revolutionary tradition; its association with militarism, Catholicism, and armed resistance; its radical social agenda; and its transformation into a mainstream political movement. In 1904, political activist and journalist Arthur Griffith wrote The Resurrection of Hungary, a treatise that outlined how passive resistance by Hungarian representatives who abstained from the Austrian parliament in Vienna had led to greater freedoms for Hungarians and their own parliament. Using the Austro-Hungarian imperial model, Griffith argued that direct rule from Westminster (London) made Ireland a mere vassal province of the British Empire. In 1905 he founded the Sinn Féin party as a nationalist, nonrepublican, nonviolent, promonarchist political movement that championed abstention from Westminster, complete political and economic independence for Ireland, and a dual monarchy where England and Ireland would rule themselves separately under the same monarch. Although a marginal political force, Sinn Féin offered the Irish electorate another avenue between traditional revolutionary violence advanced by the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and Home Rule advanced by the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP). The original essence of what Sinn Féin stood for changed dramatically over the next few years. In 1912 the House of Commons passed the Third Home Rule Bill. Its passage through Parliament emboldened the IPP—the largest political party in Ireland—but frightened Unionists and Protestants in the northeastern part of the island who campaigned against any devolution of power to a predominantly Catholic assembly. In response Unionists formed the Ulster Volunteer Force in 1913 to resist Home Rule in Ireland by force. Nationalists and Catholics responded by forming the Irish Volunteers to implement the bill once enacted by law. The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 delayed passage of the bill through the House of Lords, yet the IPP leader John Redmond and more than 200,000

supporters enlisted in Britain’s armed services as a goodwill gesture of friendship to Britain and to northern Unionists. The war’s bloody and long duration shattered public confidence in the IPP and in the Home Rule movement. The critical turning point for Sinn Féin as a political movement came in 1916 when armed rebels based at the General Post Office in Dublin declared an Irish republic. The rebellion’s defeat, the execution of its leaders, and the incorrect dubbing of the rebellion as a “Sinn Féin Rising” by the British authorities brought the party to national and international prominence and awakened Irish public consciousness to the idea of an independent, sovereign Irish state. British efforts to introduce conscription emboldened Sinn Féin in the 1918 general election when the party, now promoting itself as a republican and separatist movement, won 73 seats compared to just 6 for the IPP. The party was now the largest political force on the island and was supported, critically, by the Catholic hierarchy. Refusing to take their seats in Westminster, the Sinn Féin deputies met in the Mansion House, Dublin, on January 21, 1919, to constitute an Irish parliament (Dáil Éireann). The delegates declared a sovereign and independent republic, framed a democratic program, and identified the party with Ireland’s Gaelic and Catholic heritage. That same day an armed attack by members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) killed two members of the Royal Irish Constabulary and started the War of Independence (1919–1921). The patriotic idealism, unity, and resolve of the Sinn Féin political movement and the concurrent success of its militant wing, the IRA, against the British authorities led the British government to enact a cease-fire on July 11, 1921. For several months the Sinn Féin president—Éamon de Valera—corresponded with the British prime minister —David Lloyd George—until both sides sent a team of plenipotentiaries to negotiate a lasting settlement to Ireland’s future. On December 6, 1921, the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed. The treaty granted Ireland a 26-county state control and full control over domestic policy, but also included an oath of allegiance to the British crown and formalized the partition of the island. The treaty shattered the collective unity of Sinn Féin for the first time with supporters like Arthur Griffith viewing it as a stepping stone to

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complete independence while opponents like Éamon de Valera viewed it as a betrayal of republican ideals and a united island. The treaty was approved by the Irish cabinet. The Dáil then voted by 64 votes to 57 to accept the treaty, and in a general election held on June 16, 1922, the electorate overwhelmingly voted for protreaty candidates (486,277 protreaty votes to 132,161 antitreaty votes). The antitreaty members of the IRA and Sinn Féin refused to accept this popular mandate, which resulted in the outbreak of the Irish Civil War on June 28. On December 6, 1922, the Irish Free State formally came into existence. The antitreaty Sinn Féin—led by Éamon de Valera but subordinate to the IRA—refused to recognize its legitimacy. The Free State defeated the antitreaty forces whose members had been sidelined by the Catholic hierarchy, threatened with excommunication, and denied the sacraments. The Free State set about establishing the institutions of the new state under a new political name, Cumann na nGaedheal (Party of the Gaels). Sinn Féin contested the 1923 Irish general election but won only 27 percent of the popular vote and abstained from recognizing or attending the Free State parliament. Electorally the party was in decline, and at its 1926 Ard Fheis (“high assembly”) de Valera stated his intention to end abstention, enter the Free State parliament, and oppose its policies through parliamentary means. For the second time Sinn Féin split with de Valera’s supporters, creating a new political party—Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Destiny). Art O’Connor became the new Sinn Féin president. In a general election held in June 1927, Sinn Féin won just five seats but lost them all again in another election that September. The party’s fortunes declined further over the next two decades as Fianna Fáil replaced Sinn Féin as the popular republican party once it came to power in the 1932 Irish general election and set about immediately dismantling the more odious terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty through parliamentary means. Sinn Féin only emerged publicly to hold occasional rallies and pass resolutions of a doctrinaire republican nature. The IRA—itself ripe with divisions and splits throughout the 1930s—declared itself as the reconstituted Irish republican government in 1938. By the 1940s Sinn Féin had been outmaneuvered by both

Fianna Fáil and the IRA and was on the periphery of national affairs. Ireland’s exit from the British Commonwealth and the declaration of a 26-county republic on April 18, 1949, forced extremist republicans in the IRA to concentrate all military operations from then on against the remaining 6 counties still under British control—Northern Ireland. The IRA Border Campaign (1956–1962) reactivated Sinn Féin, which focused all political efforts on unifying the last portion of the island in tandem with the IRA’s military campaign. In the 1957 general election four abstentionist Sinn Féin delegates were elected, but the party’s influence on Irish affairs was still marginal. Under the leadership of Tomás Mac Giolla and Cathal Goulding the Sinn Féin leadership moved away from a rigid political policy centered on reunification of the island and instead concentrated on social and economic issues. This move to the radical left along Marxist lines alienated Catholic and more conservative members and led to another split in the republican movement. Supporters of change through political action become known as Official Sinn Féin while opponents advocating continued military action formed a new organization—the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The outbreak of intercommunal violence in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s and the collapse of the Protestant-dominated assembly in Stormont in March 1972 resulted in direct rule over Northern Ireland from Westminster and emboldened the arguments advanced by supporters of military action. For the next two decades Sinn Féin’s influence on affairs was subordinated to the military interests of the PIRA. The final phase in Sinn Féin’s transformation as a political force began in the late 1970s when PIRA prisoners staged “blanket” and “dirty” protests in prison cells. The prisoners then upped their protest through hunger strikes. Bobby Sands, a Sinn Féin elected member of Parliament (MP), became the first of 10 prisoners to die. His death marked a watershed moment for the party, who drew on Sands’s youth, self-sacrifice, and working-class background to depict the party as being more representative of broader issues than simply being anti-British and ideologically rigid. The party began to grow in popularity in Northern Ireland and attracted young working-class activists into its

750  Sirhind, Battle of (1710)

ranks and away from the PIRA. The party’s gradual reemergence as a political force gave Nationalists in Northern Ireland the option of choosing between the “Armalite and the ballot-box.” In the Republic, however, the conflict in Northern Ireland was viewed from a distance and Sinn Féin only received just over 1 percent of first-preference votes in the 1982 Irish general election. Over time the inability of either the PIRA or the British and Unionist forces to win an overall victory in the Troubles prompted behind-the-scenes peace negotiations in the 1990s involving the British and Irish governments, clergy members from both religious denominations, Sinn Féin, and other Nationalist party officials. The Sinn Féin president—Gerry Adams—persuaded the PIRA leadership to call a cease-fire on August 31, 1994, which, despite attempts by dissident republicans to undermine, culminated in a joint governmental and cross-party political solution to the Troubles. The signing of the Good Friday Agreement on April 10, 1998, and its ratification by popular vote ended a 30-year intercommunal and sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland that claimed the lives of more than 3,500 people. Since 1998 Sinn Féin has been in government in Northern Ireland sharing power with first the Ulster Unionist Party and then the Democratic Unionist Party, implementing the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, which, despite preserving peace, still has lasting legacy issues over the past, the disappeared, and the association of Sinn Féin with militant republicanism during the conflict. In Northern Ireland the organization is the largest political party supported by the Nationalist and Catholic community. In the Irish Republic the party has grown in popularity by increasing its representation in Parliament and has remodeled its image as an all-island working-class party to attract a new and youthful generation of activists to contest local and European elections. In the 2011 Irish general election, 13 years after the Good Friday Agreement was signed, Sinn Féin took just under 10 percent of the vote and 14 seats in Dáil Éireann. The party’s entry into mainstream politics and its broad vision of society, North and South of the island, is part of the long transformation, soul searching, and reinvention undergone by the movement since its foundation in 1905. Barry N. Whelan

See also Northern Ireland and Religious Conflict Further Reading English, Richard. Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA. London: Macmillan, 2003. Kearney, Richard. Post-Nationalist Ireland: Politics, Culture, Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1997. Laffan, Michael. The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party, 1916–1923. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Maillot, Agnes. New Sinn Féin: Irish Republicanism in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2005. Manning, Maurice. Studies in Political Culture. Irish Political Parties: An Introduction. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1972. Patterson, Henry. Ireland Since 1939: The Persistence of Conflict. Dublin: Penguin Ireland, 2006.

Sirhind, Battle of (1710) A local administrative center of the Mughal Empire, Sirhind is famous in Sikh history as the location where the local Mughal governor, Wazīr Khān, ordered the execution of the mother and two youngest children of Guru Gobind Singh, the 10th Sikh guru, in 1705. Five years later on May 12, 1710, the Sikh commander Bandā Singh Bahādur led a siege against the city, having been granted command of the Sikh community by Guru Gobind Singh on his deathbed. Following the Sikh army’s success, Bandā Singh Bahādur had Wazīr Khān executed and declared the founding of the first Sikh state. The avenging of the martyrdom of the 10th guru’s close family members completes a story that continues to have weight among Sikhs. Wazīr Khān ordered the guru’s children to be bricked up alive, the brutality of the order quite characteristic when viewed alongside other famous Sikh stories of martyrdom. The incident was dramatized in a successful 2014 Punjabi film, Cār Sāhibzāde, which was shown in theaters both in India and across the Sikh diaspora. Bandā Singh Bahādur’s establishment of the Sikh state stands in stark contrast to the persecution the community would face following his execution five years later and the disintegration of organized Sikh political power. The Sikhs would not unite under a single ruler and state until

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Maharaja Ran.jīt Singh’s Sikh Empire was established at the turn of the 19th century. Stephen Gucciardi and A. Walter Dorn See also Bahādur, Bandā Singh; Mughal-Sikh Wars; Sikhism and War; Singh, Guru Gobind Further Reading Dhavan, Purnima. “Sikhism in the Eighteenth Century.” In Pashaura Singh and Louis E. Fenech, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Sikh Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 49–58. Fenech, Louis. Martyrdom in the Sikh Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Six-Day War (1967) The Six-Day War, also known as the Third Arab-Israeli War and in the Arab world as “the Setback” (an-Naksah), lasted from June 5 to June 10, 1967, and included the Israeli capture of the Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, the Old City of Jerusalem, Sinai Peninsula, and West Bank. While the war was not a religious war in the sense of religion being the primary motivation or element of the conflict by any of the belligerents, it was a war in which religion and religious history informed some of the tactical and political decisions (such as the disposition of the Muslim holy site of the Dome of the Rock), especially with respect to the control and governance of Jerusalem, a holy city for the three monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In addition, the outcome of the war led to a different conception of redemption among religious Zionists both within Israel and around the world. As a result of the Six-Day War, redemption was held to be close at hand, and exile was no longer the predominant religious manifestation. Israel’s 1948 War of Independence was understood by Zionists as a war for the establishment of the nation and the Six-Day War as a war of sovereignty over conquered territory that had divine approval and blessing. The swift and extraordinary military success of the Israelis caused many Zionists and religiously devout Jews to understand the victory as being a miracle. Further, a key sermon delivered by Rabbi Tzvi Yehudah Kook on the eve of

Independence Day on May 12, 1967, in which he spoke of the partition of the biblical and historic Land of Israel (Eretz Israel) and the inability of Jews to return to the holy cities of Hebron and Nablus, was interpreted after the victory as being prophetic. The victory provided real social, political, and military gains that were much needed in religious Zionism and reenergized the movement with long-term religious, political, and international ramifications. Messianic redemption was seen by many religious Jews as being near, and many Jewish religious publications cited biblical passages and terminology as confirmation of the imminent national redemption. Parallels were made in literature between the conquest of Canaan under Joshua’s leadership and the recent Israeli victory, and Rabbi Shlomo Goren (1917–1994), the chief rabbi of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) at the time of the war, was likened to a priest sanctioning soldiers for battle in the book of Deuteronomy. Especially for Zionists religious and nonreligious, the war raised questions about the relationship between Zionism and the state, the significance of newly acquired territories and the settlement of them, biblical boundaries of the land versus borders established by the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 and armistice agreements established after the 1948 War of Independence, and the importance of the Israeli military. Each of these questions would continue to be discussed in Israel and the region in future years and to the present. During the Six-Day War, the Israeli Defense Forces decisively defeated the combined forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria (and some air elements of Iraq and Lebanon) in a brilliantly planned and executed campaign. The war altered not only the religious mindset among Zionists, but also the political and military dynamics of the Middle East, with repercussions that continue to the present. Responding to a series of aggressive actions and threats by Arab leaders to destroy the Jewish state, the IDF launched a preemptive strike against Egypt. Israeli action resulted in the near complete destruction of the Egyptian air force on the first day. The IDF also routed the Egyptian army and occupied the Gaza Strip and most of the Sinai Peninsula after four days of fighting. The Syrian air force was likewise crippled on the first day of the war. Fighting between Israeli and Syrian ground forces continued, and on the fifth day, the IDF removed the Syrian threat from

752  Six-Day War (1967)

An Israeli gunboat passes through the Straits of Tiran during the Six-Day War on June 8, 1967. The Six-Day War (also known as the Third Arab-Israeli War) resulted in the capture of significant territory by the Israelis, including the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. The swift and extraordinary military success of the Israelis caused many religiously devout Jews to perceive the victory as a miracle. (Israel Government Press Office/Yaacov Agor)

the Golan Heights. The removal of Syrian forces from the Golan Heights brought the military phase of the Six-Day War to a close. Many Israelis and Jews around the world considered that the IDF victory over such overwhelming Arab forces could only be construed as a manifestation of divine will and a miraculous victory, and many believed the messianic times to be at hand. Jewish notions of just war and traditional understandings of the relationship between the employment of military force and the final process of redemption were fundamentally altered after the resounding Israeli victory in the Six-Day War. What had previously been held in Jewish thought to be a requirement to allow God to determine when and how the Jewish people would be allowed to return to the biblical boundaries of a Jewish

homeland had now passed to the point where the Jewish people themselves were able to fulfill their destiny. The Talmudic “Three Vows,” which generally decreed that the Jews would not try to reconquer their ancestral lands, nor would they rebel against other nations, and finally that other nations would not suppress the Jews, were declared invalid by some ultrareligious nationalists after the SixDay War. The Three Vows prohibited the Jews from reconquering their ancestral lands from the outside. Following the dramatic victory in 1967, leading rabbis declared that the vows were no longer applicable, ushering in a new understanding of the Jewish people’s role in bringing about national and religious redemption. Much of the religious enthusiasm surrounding the swift Israeli victory focused on the capture of East Jerusalem, the

754  Sixth Crusade (1227–1229)

Old City of Jerusalem, and especially the Temple Mount upon which Solomon’s Temple stood and the Western Wall as the only remaining portion of the temple after the Roman destruction of the temple in 70 CE. Subsequent religious interpretation of the war within Judaism (as well as some interpretation during the war) focused on whether the conflict should be understood according to the Mishnah and rabbinic thought as a milhemet misvah (obligatory war) and milhemet reshut (authorized war), or whether such categories were and are still valid in Judaism. Also part of postwar discussions was the validity of preventive and preemptive war based on interpretations from the Talmud. While not part of the political discourse of the secular state of Israel, the strong religious and nationalist parties used the categories in political discourse and decision-making and the categories became part of Zionism. From a broader religious and international perspective, the Six-Day War energized support for Israel by many American Christian conservatives and evangelicals. They interpreted the war to be part of the fulfillment of a larger plan of Bible prophecy with Israel as a major component of it. Discussion of many of the religious dimensions of the conflict from a Jewish perspective were significant beyond the war itself because of the influence the war and religious ideas about it have had on subsequent military and political conflict in Israel, especially during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. From a Muslim perspective, the defeat of the Arab armies and the subsequent economic struggles in the defeated nations caused a decline in secular and national politics in those nations. Based on passages from the Qur’an that state that devout Muslims can defeat opponents who are more powerful if the former are faithful to Allah, the defeat of the war was interpreted by Islamists as divine defeat. They argued that the defeat came only because faithful Muslims had allowed themselves to be ruled by apostate and secular rulers. The solution therefore was to overthrow secular regimes and replace them with religious rule. Countering the decline of Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and Ba’athism was the steady rise of Islamist ideology that would continue to shape religious and political forces in the Middle East to the present. The Six-Day War was a pivotal event in the recent history of the Middle East. Though it was not fought as a

religious war or a war instigated by religion, postwar religious interpretation of it within the three monotheistic religions of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity have been important components in mobilizing each religion’s adherents in the larger national and international political processes of seeking stabilization, economic development, and peace in the Middle East. Jeffrey M. Shaw and Timothy J. Demy See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Judaism and War; Sharia and War; Yom Kippur War; Zionism and War Further Reading Collins, Larry, and Dominique Lapiere. O, Jerusalem. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972. Firestone, Reuven. Holy War in Judaism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Firestone, Reuven. “Holy War in Modern Judaism? ‘Mitzvah War’ and the Problem of the ‘Three Vows.’” Journal of American Academy of Religion 74, no. 4 (December 2006): 954–82. Oren, Michael B. Six Days of War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Schiffman, Lawrence, and Joel Wolowelsky. War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition. London: Routledge, 2012.

Sixth Crusade (1227–1229) There is an element of irony in the naming of the crusades. The Venetian Crusade, for instance, involved a papal indulgence, substantial victories at sea and on land, and a completed pilgrimage to Jerusalem. But it is nestled between the First and Second Crusades. This crusade, also called the Crusade of Frederick II, was primarily diplomatic in nature and was carried out by an emperor who had been excommunicated. It ultimately resulted in the granting of temporary and limited rule of Jerusalem to Frederick II. In July 1215, Frederick of Hohenstaufen made a crusader’s vow, and in 1218 Pope Honorius III encouraged him to take part in the Fifth Crusade. He asked for deferrals for the fulfillment of his vow three times (in 1219, 1220, and 1221) and these were granted. In 1220 Frederick was crowned emperor. While Frederick was distracted by problems in Sicily, the Fifth Crusade, which had seemed so

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promising, met its unfortunate end, and the absent emperor was blamed for this by many. In November 1225 Frederick II, a widower, married Isabella, queen of Jerusalem. Frederick promptly added King of Jerusalem to his titles. This gave him a personal stake in the success of the crusade, but it also provoked John of Brienne, who had been promised the position of regent of Jerusalem for the rest of his life. Consequently, the emperor’s crusading strategy shifted to regaining and consolidating control of Jerusalem rather than attacking Egypt. In March 1227 Pope Honorius III died and Gregory IX (r. 1227–1241) was consecrated bishop of Rome. This new pope would not be so lenient with the reluctant crusaderemperor. In august of that year the crusader force set sail for the Levant. The emperor made port due to sickness and in spite of his request for a delay was excommunicated by the new pope on September 29. In April 1228 his wife Isabella died in childbirth, but the heir, Conrad, survived. The death of his daughter further provoked John of Brienne, who would prove a dogged opponent of Frederick. Frederick recovered and finally arrived in Acre in September 1228. His request for absolution from Rome was denied, and the pope had instructed the military orders and the patriarch of Jerusalem to have nothing to do with him. It was, after all, theologically impossible for an excommunicate to crusade because the vow, indulgence, and pilgrimage were all thoroughly Christian and religious in character. This does not seem to have troubled Frederick. Frederick did not desire to fight because his army was not large and some did not want to fight under an excommunicated leader. Al Kamil, the sultan of Egypt, controlled Jerusalem and he, likewise, did not want to fight as he was occupied with laying siege to Damascus. Meanwhile, John of Brienne, who had been provoked by the emperor, was invading southern Italy. Negotiations between the sultan and the emperor yielded odd results that scandalized both Muslims and Christians. On February 18, 1229, a truce was signed that yielded Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth and a strip of land connecting them to the coast to Frederick for the term of 10 years, 5 months, and 40 days. Furthermore, the Temple Mount was to remain in Muslim hands, they would have freedom to worship there, Muslims would administer

their own legal affairs, and the fortifications of Jerusalem were not to be rebuilt. Frederick entered Jerusalem in March and was crowned in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The coronation was boycotted by many of the barons, the Knights Templar, and the Knights Hospitaller, and the patriarch of Jerusalem refused to participate. Frederick tried to consolidate his position by having the Teutonic Knights (allies of his) establish a headquarters near Acre, destroying or removing many of the arms of the crusaders, and leaving a garrison in Acre. His time in the Holy Land ended when he departed early in the morning from Acre in May 1229. He had hoped to depart undetected but when the people of the city learned of this, they showered him with garbage, rotten meat, and curses. Frederick returned to Europe to deal with problems there—John of Brienne, sponsored by the pope, had been successful in attacking some of Frederick’s lands in Italy. Christians were scandalized that this excommunicated emperor had reached this unsatisfactory and temporary truce with the Muslims, and among his main detractors were the Knights Templar and the Latin patriarch. Frederick’s excommunication was eventually lifted in 1230. After the truce expired, the unfortified city returned to Muslim rule. Duane Alexander Miller See also Acre, Sieges of; Frederick II and the Papacy, Conflict of; Fifth Crusade; Knights Templar; Seventh Crusade Further Reading Armstrong, Karen. A History of Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths. New York: HarperPerennial, 2005. Boas, Adrian J. Jerusalem in the Time of the Crusades: Society, Landscape and Art in the Holy City under Frankish Rule. London: Routledge, 2001. Humphreys, R. Stephen. From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus 1193–1260. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. Masson, Georgia. Frederick of Hohenstaufen: A Life. London: Secker and Warburg, 1957. Mundy. John H. Europe in the High Middle Ages, 1150–1309. New York: Basic, 1973. Tierney, Brian. The Crisis of Church and State 1050–1300. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988. van Cleve, Thomas Curtis. Immutator Mundi. The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.

756  So¯en Shaku (1860–1919)

So¯en Shaku (1860–1919) Sōen Shaku, also known as Kōgaku Sōen, was a Japanese monk of the Rinzai school of Buddhism. He was one of the first Buddhist Zen masters—or Rōshi—to teach Buddhism in the United States. Sōen Shaku was born in 1860 in Takahama, Japan. The youngest of six children, he was influenced by his oldest brother, Chūtarō, in his decision to become a monk. In 1870, when he was still a young boy, a Renzi monk, Ekkei Shuken (1817–1884), visited the family in Takahama. Chūtarō persuaded the monk to take his brother into his care and teaching. After his initial instruction with Shuken, Shaku would then study under the Buddhist monk Shungai Tōsen (1830–1875), the abbot of Ryōsokuin. Finally, in 1883, Shaku would achieve dharma transmission—or the transmission of an unbroken lineage of teachers and Zen’s deepest realization—from Kōsen Sōon, also known as Imakita Kosen (1816–1892). Sōen Shaku traveled extensively outside Japan and published notes, articles, and travel diaries throughout his life. He traveled to Sri Lanka in 1887–1889, following which he published Buddhism in the Southwest and Chronicles of the Island of Ceylon. In 1904, after the beginning of the Japanese-Russo War, Sōen traveled to Manchuria, to the front, providing religious services to Japanese soldiers. After the war he published a journal titled On Defeating Demons. In 1912 and again in 1917, Sōen Shaku traveled to Korea and China, following which he published A Guidebook to Practice (1913) and The Clouds of Yan and the Water of Chu (1918). Shaku, however, is most well known for his trip in 1893 to Chicago as the lead Japanese delegate at the Parliament of the World’s Religions. The Parliament is considered the first formal interfaith dialogue in the world. Shaku wrote a speech for the Parliament, titled “Arbitration Instead of War,” which was translated into English by his then-student Daisetsu Teitaro Suzuki (D. T. Suzuki) and read by the Presbyterian minister and Parliament organizer John H. Burrows. Shaku makes a strident plea for equality, understanding, and tolerance among races and religions, saying: “We must not make any distinction between race and race, between civilization and civilization, between creed and creed, and faith and faith. You must not say ‘Go away,’ because we are not Christians. You must not say ‘Go away,’ because we are yellow people. All beings on

the universe are in the bosom of truth. We are all sisters and brothers; we are sons and daughters of truth, and let us understand one another much better and be true sons and daughters of truth. Truth be praised!” Shaku returned to the United States in 1905 and stayed with the family of Mr. and Mrs. Alexander Russell in San Francisco. While staying with the family he taught them Zen Buddhism. In 1906 Shaku traveled through the United States by train, teaching Americans about the Buddhist understanding of enlightenment. He returned to Japan following his stay in the United States. His pupil, D. T. Suzuki, would become well-known for translating Sōen Shaku’s works and spreading Buddhism in the United States. Sōen Shaku died on October 29, 1919, in Kamakura, Japan. Christopher D. Nelson See also Buddhism and War; Zen and War; Primary Documents: “At the Battle of Nan Shan Hill” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk Sōen Shaku (December 1904); “Buddhist View of War” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk Sōen Shaku (1904) Further Reading Fields, Rick. How the Swans Came to the Lake: A Narrative History of Buddhism in America. Boston: Shambhala Publications. 2014. Heine, Steven, and Dale Wright. Zen Masters. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Snodgrass, Judith. Presenting Japanese Buddhism to the West: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and the Columbian Exposition. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

So¯ hei The Japanese term sōhei can be translated literally as “monk warrior,” but this term is fraught with complications. In the popular imagination, sōhei refers to monks with robes, wooden sandals, and a distinctive cowl who emerged from monasteries to do battle, usually armed with a naginata, a pole with a three-foot blade on the end. The most famous sōhei is Benkei (d. 1189), a giant monk shrouded in legend who purportedly fought as the loyal protector of the tragic warrior-hero Minamoto no Yoshitsune (1159–1189). Most Japanese construe sōhei as worldly

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if not corrupt monks who applied pressure on the government to promote their secular interests or fought monks from other monastic complexes, as seen in battles from the 10th through 14th centuries between monks from Enryakuji on Mt. Hiei north of Kyoto and monks from Onjōji (Miidera) at the eastern foot of the mountain or from Kōfukuji in Nara. The term sōhei, however, is much more complicated than that. Although it does not appear until 1715, and in a Confucian, not a Buddhist text, historians have used the term retroactively to refer to individuals in earlier periods of Japanese history. In particular, they have used the term loosely and broadly to denote armed individuals who fought for major Japanese Buddhist monasteries and temples, and the term connotes that these fighters were monks: ordained members of the clergy who engaged intensively in Buddhist meditation and rituals in monasteries. Research has shown, however, that in many cases those who took up arms on behalf of Buddhist monasteries were not monks per se. For this reason, a better translation of sōhei is “monastic warrior,” in the sense of someone fighting for a monastery. Determining whom, exactly, these fighters were is a daunting task, but historian Mikael Adolphson has clarified that while some of the people referred to by scholars as sōhei were ordained monks, most were not. In large part they were monastic employees such as administrators, menial workers, and servants from surrounding communities; warriors who guarded the monasteries’ estates; and secular retainers of the elites who had become monks. The Japanese language includes an array of terms for these various types of individuals, but most historians have lumped them together under the label sōhei. Given that the fighters connected to major monastic complexes were not necessarily fully ordained monks, one should not, as many Japanese have done, view sōhei as “evil monks” (akusō). And one should not view them as an idiosyncratic group that was engaged in atypical forms of violence, for in key respects they were similar to secular warriors, and their violence fit broader patterns of violence in Japanese society at that time. One other issue emerges in discussions of sōhei. Some people have conflated sōhei with Ikko-ikki. This expression refers to warfare by devout followers of True Pure Land

Buddhism who, with their single orientation (ikko) in their faith, engaged in uprisings or disturbances (ikki). In the 15th and 16th centuries, these Buddhists, most of whom were laypeople, rose up against warlords and military governors. From one of their strongholds, Ishiyama Honganji, on the site of what is now Osaka Castle, they fought against the great warlord Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582), who defeated them in 1580. Given that most of these sectarian Buddhist fighters were not monks, historians have usually not classified them as sōhei, but some writings on Buddhist violence in Japanese history do not adequately distinguish the two groups. Christopher Ives See also Buddhism and War; Bushido; Christian Daimyo; Ikko-ikki; Zen and War Further Reading Adolphson, Mikael S. The Gates of Power: Monks, Courtiers, and Warriors in Premodern Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000. Adolphson, Mikael S. The Teeth and Claws of the Buddha: Monastic Warriors and Sōhei in Japanese History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007. Tsang, Carol Richmond. Ikkō Ikki in Late Muromachi Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007.

South Vietnamese Buddhist Uprising (1966) The Buddhist Crisis of South Vietnam refers to the political activism of Vietnamese Buddhists during the period of 1963 to 1966. It is also known as the Buddhist Uprising, the Buddhist Movement, the Buddhist Struggle, or the Buddhist Coup. It was a series of protests and demonstrations against the government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN), which first escalated under President Ngo Dình Diem. Initially, the movement was a response to the GVN’s pro– Roman Catholic bias and aimed to bring attention to social injustice and religious persecution. After Diem’s assassination, the crisis widened as Buddhist leaders proactively engaged to end the war and establish a neutral government free from Communist or American entanglement.

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During the mid-1960s, more than 80 percent of the population identified themselves as Buddhists, 13 percent as Roman Catholics, and 3 percent as Confucianists. Under French colonial rule, Buddhists experienced opposition and restrictions. This continued under the newly formed GVN. Diem, the GVN’s first president, was from a prominent Roman Catholic family. Under his regime, Roman Catholics were appointed to high-level government and military positions and were favored in middle-class landownership, business dealings, and government-sponsored scholarships. A seminal event of the crisis occurred on May 8, 1963, when thousands gathered in Hue to celebrate Vesak, the 2,527th birthday of the Buddha—Siddhartha Gautama. In defiance of an executive order that prohibited the flying of religious banners, crowds marched through the city carrying Buddhist flags. A local military official enforced the restriction, despite the fact that a week earlier papal flags had been flown in a ceremony honoring the 25th anniversary of the ordination of the archbishop of Hue, Diem’s brother. Thousands gathered in front of a radio station to hear an address by Thích Trí Quang, a popular Buddhist leader, only to be told the speech was canceled due to lack of government censorship. As the crowd became agitated, military police opened fire, killing nine and injuring four. Diem blamed the deaths on Communist terrorists. This false account incited the general population, who called for Diem’s resignation. The momentum of the crisis grew as Buddhist leaders called for social equality and religious freedom. On June 11, 1963, Thich Quong Duc, a highly respected monk, sat in the lotus position on a busy Saigon intersection, was doused with gasoline, and was set on fire. This act of selfimmolation called attention to the plight of Buddhists. The GVN reacted by attacking and imprisoning Buddhists, raiding pagodas, censoring the press, and declaring martial law. Monks, nuns, laypeople, and students continued to demonstrate. More self-immolations followed as 30 monks and nuns sacrificed themselves to their cause. On November 2, 1963, Diem was assassinated in a coup that also killed his brother. Although the Buddhists were not directly involved in the coup, their impact was significant in turning support away from Diem both with the Vietnamese people and in global public opinion.

The political activism of the Buddhists added to the instability of the GVN. South Vietnam faced increasing pressure from internal discord, American intervention, and efforts by North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front (NLF). Buddhist leaders proactively organized massive protests, peace movements, and student demonstrations, which sparked a strong anti-American sentiment. Protestors commandeered radio stations and members of the GVN forces defected. Buddhist leaders denounced communism and governance through military control, and contributed to the downfall of Diem’s successors, General Nguyen Khanh in 1964 and Tran Van Huong in 1965. Under the regime of Nguyen Cao Ky, the crisis escalated to its highest point in 1966. General Nguyen Chanh Thi, a Buddhist in command of the I Corps region of South Vietnam, garnered strong provincial support. He was viewed as a threat to the GVN as he was sympathetic to the Buddhist cause, which advocated an elected civilian government, neutral state, and negotiations with the NLF. Thi did nothing to stop the armed struggles that ensued in the northern cities with strongholds in Danang and Hue. Thousands of Buddhist monks, students, civilians, and even soldiers with the GVN army participated in the demonstrations. Fearing I Corps would declare autonomy, Ky dispatched military forces to quell the uprising. With strong backing from the United States, Ky was able to regain the allegiance of the military in the region. The protestors failed to stand against the military force and their support for the Buddhist cause lost momentum. While Buddhist leaders remained politically active, their influence decreased, as the war effort intensified with American support. After the fall of Saigon, the Communist government outlawed nonsanctioned religious organizations. The Buddhist Crisis was not monolithic in nature. The groups involved in the movement were decentralized. There were divisions between moderate and liberal groups, as well as regional components and sects. The major organizations during the time of the crisis included the General Association of Buddhists formed in 1951, the Buddhist Institute for the Promotion of Faith formed in 1963, and the Unified Buddhist Church formed in 1964. These groups gave a voice to the general population in calling attention to social injustice, religious persecution, and opposition to the war by orchestrating religious and political activities.

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They were motivated by the ideals of their faith, yet failed to achieve a peaceful end to a conflict that resulted in 3 million Vietnamese and 58,000 American lives lost. Judy T. Malana See also Buddhism and War; Duc, Thich Quong; Hahn, Thich Nhat Further Reading Gheddo, Piero. The Cross and the Bo-Tree: Catholics and Buddhists in Vietnam. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1970. Queen, Christopher S., and Sallie B. King. Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Topmiller, Robert J. The Lotus Unleashed: The Buddhist Peace Movement in South Vietnam, 1964–1966. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006.

Southeast Asia, Religious Conflict Two religions dominate Southeast Asia, Theravada Buddhism and Islam at just over 40 percent each, while Catholicism comes in a distant third at about 10 percent and is mostly in the Philippines. However, all three are heavily influenced by animist traditional religions. A vast array of ethnic groups fall under, but rarely across, these religious lines. To be Thai, Burmese, Khmer, or Mon is to be Buddhist; to be Malay or Javanese is to be Muslim. This dynamic plays out to a lesser extent throughout Southeast Asia with the plethora of minor ethnic groups.

Historical Context

Religious conflict in Southeast Asia is nearly inseparable from ethnic conflict, with ethnicity largely defined as race, language, and culture, of which religion is one extremely important component. An argument can be made that since the Second World War, ethnic conflict is more frequently the main factor in disputes rather than a specific religion. Before European colonialism, wars went across and within ethnic groups but were mainly concentrated within the same religious culture. Thus, mainland Theravada Buddhists were frequently at war with each other across ethnic lines as Burmese, Mon, Tai, and Khmer, and sometimes within an ethnic group. Similarly, Malay and

Javanese Hindu and Buddhist polities had fought across and within ethnic lines, and after Islamization these wars continued under the banner of Islam. In contemporary Southeast Asia an interreligious conflict is often an interethnic conflict at the same time. Before European colonial conquests wars between coreligionists were commonplace. Mainland Theravada kingdoms and states were frequently at war with one another, as were maritime sultanates and minor Muslim states. An overarching Theravada or Islamic culture did not create a common shared social identity that quelled political, economic, or ethnic disputes. Except in the Rakhine and on the Malay Peninsula, wars between Buddhists and Muslims were infrequent, and when they did occur they were seldom specifically about religion. The wars between Siam and Northern Malay Muslim states were primarily territorial and political, and while religious identity was a very important aspect, one would not categorize these as religious wars.

Contemporary Cases of Conflict

A good starting point for contemporary conflicts is the aftermath of the Second World War and decolonization. The fixing of state borders, nationalist aspirations to create common identities (Thai, Malaysian, etc.), colonial privileging of minorities (religious and ethnic), past colonial policies of immigration—all led to tensions between minority religious and ethnic groups in newly formed and forming Southeast Asian nations. The significant disputes and conflicts that broke out after the Second World War and during decolonialization mostly involved ethnic-religious minorities either desiring to avoid joining or avoid remaining in a majority Muslim nation, or Muslim minorities desiring to separate from or at least have autonomy within majority non-Muslim nations. Among the exceptions were Ache Muslims seeking autonomy from Muslims and the plethora of rebellions in Myanmar. All these conflict areas are continuing sources of tension and even conflict. The Straits Chinese in Malaysia and the Christian Moluccans in Indonesia represent two groups desiring to withdraw from majority Muslim nations. The case of the Straits Chinese is usually treated as an ethnic and economic issue rather than religious. The case of the Moluccas

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is more clearly religious motivation as Moluccan Christians did not want to be part of the new majority Muslim nation of Indonesia. In both cases while tensions ran high, no physical violence erupted and both groups gave up their demands and were incorporated into the nations of Malaysia and Indonesia, respectively. However, violence did erupt in the 1969 anti-Chinese riots in Malaysia and in 1998 in Indonesia. Although the Chinese case was again ascribed to ethnicity and economics, we can question whether these riots would have been so severe or perhaps happened at all if Chinese immigrants had adopted Islam and MalayIndonesian culture after establishing themselves. In Indonesia the fall of President Suharto after 30 years in office destabilized Indonesia, and ethnic-religious violence broke out particularly in Java with the above attacks on Indonesia Chinese, and in the Moluccas and Sulawesi with violence between Muslims and Protestant Christians. The Moluccas saw severe violence in 1999 through early 2002 with an estimated 5,000 killed and tens of thousands displaced. Violence erupted in Sulawesi in 1998, continuing until 2004 with most of the violence occurring in the first three years. Estimates put the death toll at 1,000 to more than 2,000 dead. Two cases involved Muslim minorities within predominately Buddhist countries with ethno-religious compatriot majorities across the border in Bangladesh and Malaysia. These conflicts involve a strict ethno-religious divide: ethnic Bengali Muslims (now self-identifying as Rohingya) in Myanmar and the Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand. In the first case, British colonial rule allowed very large numbers of Bengali Muslims to migrate into Buddhist Rakhine. The years 1930–1931 saw serious anti-Indian violence across lower Burma and in 1938 specifically against the Indian Muslim communities. World War Two produced bitter Muslim-Buddhist killings in Rakhine, and just after Myanmar independence in 1948 the Muslims in North Rakhine bordering East Pakistan declared jihad with the goal of separating and joining East Pakistan; by 1954 the main rebellion was defeated. The Myanmar government does not recognize the right of citizenship for hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, claiming they are more recent illegal immigrants. Major tensions arose in 2012 when interethnic-religious violence between Buddhists and Muslims flared across Myanmar but mainly in

Rakhine State. While the death toll did not reach 100, an estimated 140,000 Rohingya were displaced and remain housed in refugee camps. While the violence subsided, tensions remain high. Nationalist Thai policies both before and after the Second World War mandated using the Thai language, attending government schools, and so on in an effort to create a unifying “Thainess.” This put pressure on the Malay Muslims in the extreme southern provinces of Thailand bordering Malaysia where they constitute a majority. While the Thai government policies did not mandate giving up Islam, it meant placing the Malay language, culture, and Islam in a subordinate position. Low-level clashes took place in the 1950s and then the situation died down. However, since 2001 there has been a renewed effort by Muslim militants to seek full autonomy, if not independence, from Thailand. This conflict is frequently self-identified by the Muslim militants as a jihad. To date more than 5,000 people have been killed and 100,000 injured, mainly due to Muslim insurgent attacks. On the Philippine island of Mindanao local ethnicities do differ; however, religion plays a greater factor in creating conflict. Soon after taking control from Spain, the U.S. colonial administration abolished the sultanates, ending direct Muslim rule, and in the 1930s encouraged migration of Filipinos to less populated Mindanao. However, the migrants were Catholic Filipinos moving to predominantly Muslim Mindanao, which exacerbated the centuries-long tense relationship between Muslims and Catholics, and finally led to open rebellion by Mindanao Moros in the 1970s with an estimated death toll from religious-political violence climbing to 120,000 people by 2010. A common factor in nearly all the above cases was lack of control of immigration by local ethno-religious communities, resulting in an influx of peoples of different ethnicity and religious affiliation. Among the more material concerns of land and resources, loss of cultural and religious identity are prominent factors in the conflicts. The case of Ache in North Sumatra provides an exception to the rule because it involved a Muslim area wishing a high degree of autonomy from a majority Muslim nation (Indonesia) because the Achanese felt this new nation to be both too secular and too lax in its Islam. Armed conflict continued on and off into the 21st century, finally ending

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in an accord that granted a great deal of autonomy to Ache Province. The Karen rebellion, and several others like it in Myanmar, breaks the pattern of conflicts pitting Muslims against either Buddhists or Christians. Here both Buddhist and Christian Karen have fought for independence or at least autonomy from the Burmese Buddhist-dominated government. In fact, Myanmar has the highest percentage of minorities relative to the majority of Southeast Asian countries: minorities make up roughly 32 percent of the population (primarily Shan and Karen); the Burmese majority represents 68 percent. This has meant that ethnic rebellions are both more frequent and more destabilizing for the country than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Given that Shan Buddhists, Mon Buddhists, Karen Buddhists and Christians, Chin Christians, Bengali Muslims (Rohyngia), and so on have fought for autonomy or independence from the Burmese Buddhist majority, the ultimate cause of these conflicts appears to be ethnicity as a whole and not religion singularly. A final case arose much later in 1963 when South Vietnam experienced the “Buddhist Crisis” caused by the political favoritism of the Diem government toward Catholicism and political discrimination against the majority Buddhists. When Buddhists protested against these discriminatory policies, the Diem government moved to suppress the protests through state violence involving both the police and the military. It was during this crisis that the Buddhist monks immolated themselves in protest. The Buddhist Crisis persisted until near the end of the year when it and other factors caused Diem to lose the support of the United States. He was deposed in a coup and assassinated.

Conclusion

Conflict in Southeast Asia, as nearly everywhere, involves religion at some level. Whether religion is a proximate cause or the ultimate cause of conflict is often difficult to discern. In Southeast Asia religion thrives and secularism is a theory only; religion is most often seen only as good. Conflict is said to come from bad people misusing that common good. Nevertheless, religion defines people in Southeast Asia and it defines their worldview. Even if we grant that religion has not itself caused a conflict, religious

beliefs obscure the ultimate cause(s). Understanding conflicts involving religion in Southeast Asia will necessitate an honest, nonapologetic look at religion in the same way the religious look at ethnicity, politics, and other human expressions and constructs. Matthew Kosuta See also Buddhism and War; Christianity and War; Islam and War (Jihad); Second World War, Japanese Empire, and Islam Further Reading Bouma, Gary D., Rod Ling, et al. Religious Diversity in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. London: Springer, 2010. Camilleri, Joseph, and Sven Schottmann, eds. Culture, Religion and Conflict in Muslim Southeast Asia: Negotiating Tense Pluralisms. London: Routledge, 2013. Christie, Clive J. A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism. London: I. B. Tauris, 1996. Tan, Andrew T. H., ed. A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia. London: Edward Elgar, 2007.

Spanish-American War, Religious Dimensions of The Spanish-American War was fought between April 25, 1898, and August 12, 1898. The war was not a religious war, but certainly the two antagonists represented different religious and cultural traditions. The creaking Spanish empire was authoritarian, hierarchical, mercantilist, static, and Catholic; the American republic, led by a Protestant elite, was youthful, increasingly wealthy, commercial, and ready to play a larger role on the world stage. Both sides understood religion to be an important part of the cultural differences between them, although religion was not a direct cause of the U.S.-Spanish conflict. A campaign poster for the reelection of President McKinley in 1900 stated: “The American flag has not been planted on foreign soil to acquire more territory, but for humanity’s sake.” The McKinley–Theodore Roosevelt campaign was arguing that the Spanish-American War was humanitarian in focus, liberating Cubans from Spanish reconcentrado (concentration) camps, despite the fact that

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it resulted in the United States acquiring the territories of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. The campaign advertisement was buttressed by the well-known fact that President McKinley was devoutly religious and skeptical about going to war until the destruction of the USS Maine in Havana Harbor in 1898. Although some religious leaders were publicly concerned about the humanitarian plight of Cuba, many religious voices—such as future secretary of state William Jennings Bryan—took firm anti-imperialist and antiwar stances, and thus were skeptical of any armed involvement by the United States against Spain. From a historical perspective, Spanish territories in North America, from Florida to California, had long been seen as potential American prizes, with Cuba causing political controversies in the antebellum period because of the widely held belief, in the American North and South, that the South wanted to annex Cuba as a slave state. Abolitionists, usually religious but the unreligious as well, saw the potential of Cuba falling into U.S. hands in moral terms. After the U.S. Civil War, Cuba continued to be a controversial topic. Some abolitionists called for U.S. intervention in Cuba to end slavery there (it was abolished in 1886). By the 1880s Cuba was largely ungovernable following a series of failed attempts by Cuban dissidents to overthrow the regime. By the 1890s it seemed that conflict over Cuba was inevitable, but many Americans were not supportive of intervention despite lurid press reports of the concentration camps. While all of this was occurring, the Philippines were undergoing their own struggle for independence. The next 20 years were marked by rebellion and Spanish repression, so when the Spanish-American War began, the Philippines too became a theater for action. The war only lasted a few months and by August 13, the Spanish fleet in the Philippines had been destroyed and Manila had surrendered; Guam, Puerto Rico, and Cuba had also surrendered; and the U.S. Congress voted to annex Hawaii. Six weeks later, a peace conference convened in Paris. The Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10, 1898. It is a short document and it essentially did two things. The first was to acknowledge in law what was already a fact: the United States had beaten the Spanish military and had

control of Cuba, the Philippines, and other territories such as Guam and Puerto Rico. The second theme in the document was the protection of individual and commercial rights, including an explicit guarantee of religious freedom for citizens (including those of Spanish descent) now living under U.S. jurisdiction. The United States was to pay Spain $20 million in compensation for Puerto Rico and its Pacific possessions within three months of a signed treaty. As promised under the Teller Amendment, U.S. troops departed Cuba in 1902 under the terms of a second proviso, the Platt Amendment. However, conditions in the Philippines were quite different because a bloody insurgency broke out in February 1899 that took nearly three years to quell. When rebel forces finally surrendered to U.S. forces (April 1902), they were usually told to go home, and a general amnesty was issued in July. The Taft Commission, appointed in 1900 and led by federal judge and future U.S. president William Howard Taft, had arrived and developed an ambitious program for moving the Philippines beyond its pastoral and Spanishcolonial past to a 20th-century future that included medicine, sanitation, an enfranchised citizenry, and most importantly, literacy. Taft became the first governor of the Philippines on July 4, 1901, and was confirmed in that position a year later (July 1902) when the U.S. Congress passed an organic act setting up the institutions of the government of the Philippines. The Taft Commission issued thousands of pages of reports and we have records of its many activities, what Taft called in 1907 a “great experiment” that had never been tried before in world history: the “improvement” of a people and society that would “logically end .  .  . U.S. sovereignty” [over the Philippines] and result in a “stable, democratic Filipino country.” Taft candidly said that he believed the full evolution would take longer than a generation, but that the first steps toward enduring political order and justice had been taken. Among those efforts were port dredging, road building, school start-ups, and literacy programs. Among the greatest challenges Taft said he faced as governor-general of the Philippines—such as an epidemic that decimated 70 percent of Filipino cattle—was the legacy of the Catholic Church. Taft noted in his 1907 speech

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that in the United States there was a strict separation of issues of church and state and that the commission was reluctant to get involved in matters of faith, but the real issue here was land ownership, redistribution, and access to public education. The commission did work out a land redistribution scheme as well as a way for 60,000 untitled tenants to finally gain title to the lands that the four dominant Catholic religious orders had previously owned. Public education was another postwar issue with religious features. Previously education had been in the hands of the church and was not widely available, so Taft hired a thousand American teachers to come to the Philippines to provide modern education, including English language instruction, to children. In sum, the Taft Commission operated from the perspective that the religious orders and some Catholic elites were not helping the people, although the Catholic faith was still a very important part of life in the Philippines. The Taft Commission did not want to get into a church-state controversy, but moved to redistribute land to make it available to people who had largely been serfs on church land. The Spanish-American War was not a religious war, but it involved religious actors and sentiments, from humanitarian arguments against concentration camps and religious arguments against imperialism to the disestablishment of Catholic institutions in the Philippines to open up access to property ownership and education. Eric Patterson See also Manifest Destiny Further Reading Beede, Benjamin R. The War of 1898 and US Interventions, 1898–1934: An Encyclopedia (Military History of the United States). New York: Routledge, 1994. Funston, Frederick. Memoirs of Two Wars, Cuba and Philippine Experiences. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1911. Hamilton, Richard. President McKinley, War, and Empire. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 2006. Preston, Andrew. Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy. New York: Anchor Books, 2012. Smith, Joseph. The Spanish-American War: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific, 1895–1902. London: Longman, 1994.

Spanish Civil War, Religious Dimensions of The Spanish Civil War lasted from July 17, 1936, to April 1, 1939. More than 500,000 military personnel and civilians died; many more were wounded or forced to live in exile. The civil war was fought between the Republicans, who supported the constitution, and the Nationalists, who wanted to return Spain to a monarchy. The war attracted the attention of outside interests and was transformed into a proxy war between fascism and communism with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy supporting the Nationalist side and the Republican side being aided by the Soviet Union. Religion was a key component in the gradual slide of Spain into civil war. It was used to justify armed rebellion against a legitimate government and to identify the victorious regime of General Francisco Franco (1892–1975), the leader of the Nationalists, as a defender of faith and Christian moral values. In addition, religion became a dominant theme in historical analysis of the conflict and in propaganda works. The origins of the Spanish Civil War lie in the anticlericalism of the Second Republic, which was constituted on April 14, 1931, by majority consent. The Republican constitution contained six articles that severed any links between the civil and spiritual authorities, and it subordinated the power of the Roman Catholic Church to the state. Divorce, abortion, and contraception were legalized, civil marriage was introduced, women were given more equality in society and in employment, the Jesuit order was expelled, and education and cemeteries were secularized. Moreover, religious festivals would no longer have any official endorsement. Attempts by the Republican government to move religion to the private sphere failed as religion became a burning political issue for the Nationalist forces, composed of the Spanish Army, the Roman Catholic Church, landed gentry, and industrialists. Republican forces, eager for land redistribution, violently attacked religious property. Church-burnings by anarchists and socialists—members of the Republican faction—broke out on May 11 in Madrid, Barcelona, and Málaga. Religion became a key determinant in one’s support of or opposition to the republic. To the Nationalist forces of the right, the renewal of churchburnings again from February to April 1936, during which

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Considered by many to be the most dominant figure in Spanish history since the 16th century, Francisco Franco was the generalissimo of the Spanish armed forces and the authoritarian leader of Spain from 1936 until his death in 1975. (The Illustrated London News Picture Library)

106 churches and religious properties were destroyed by fire, compelled senior military officers to plan a coup against the state. On July 17, 1936, garrisons in the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco rose up in armed opposition to the Republican government. The Spanish Civil War also divided Spain on geographical lines. The Basque country, Catalonia, central Castile, and the eastern seaboard supported the Republic while the Nationalist rebels enjoyed support in Galicia, northcentral Spain, the south, and the Balearic Islands. Between July and October General Francisco Franco and his colonial troops in Spanish Morocco received important military equipment from Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler (Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM81 and Junkers JU52 transport/bombers) to begin the largest airborne transport then in history. More than 800 flights carried 14,000 Nationalist soldiers with 44 artillery guns and 500 tons of equipment

onto mainland Spain. The Republican forces, by contrast, were slow to mobilize. In rural areas, anarchists and socialists vandalized shrines, smashed religious images, and began killing members of religious institutes in spontaneous acts of violence against the church, which was seen on the left as antidemocratic and counterrevolutionary. In all 13 bishops, 4,184 priests, 2,365 members of religious orders, and 283 nuns were killed, mostly in the initial months of the conflict. Such acts solidified the impression that the Republic was lawless and harbored Communist sympathizers. It hardened international opinion against the Republican government with Catholic states such as Portugal and the Vatican quickly recognizing the Nationalist rebels as the de facto legitimate authority in Spain. General Franco’s defense of Roman Catholicism against godlessness became a recurring theme in Nationalist propaganda. On his march to Madrid, Franco diverted his Army of Africa to lift a siege in the Alcázar (Fortress) of Toledo— seat of the archbishopric of Spain and center of Catholicism in the country. This political action won widespread international support in Roman Catholic states like Ireland where the hierarchy there called for public donations to the Nationalist cause and the establishment of a volunteer Irish brigade to defend Catholicism from Bolshevism. The lexicon of the war also changed from this point onward as the Nationalist rebels and their supporters, both clerical and lay, described the war as a religious cruzada (crusade). A famous photograph captured Navarrese soldiers blessing themselves in front of a priest before going into combat, which highlighted the righteousness of the war for the Nationalist side. Militarily, however, the diversion to Toledo gave the Republican forces critical time to receive reinforcements of men and vital munitions and supplies to defend the capital. The conflict now took on a slow, gradual process with Franco’s foreign allies supplying the Nationalists with more advisers, “volunteers,” and equipment than the Republicans were receiving from the Soviet Union and from other nations. Most other European nations agreed on a policy of nonintervention. The thorny issue of religion continued to be used as the justification for a legitimate uprising as the Nationalists assumed the mantle of defenders of the faith against a government that they saw as unlawful due to its anticlericalism. However, this stance was compromised by

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mass killings, executions, and other unchristian crimes committed by Franco’s Nationalist forces throughout the civil war. Beginning in Badajoz, more than 1,500 Republican prisoners were executed in cold blood in a bull ring, while during the relief of the Alcázar more than 200 wounded hospitalized Republicans were killed by hand grenades. Franco himself was central to the intensification of violence, which made any truce in the conflict impossible from an early stage. He signed pages of death warrants and ignored overtures from religious elements for clemency and peace. Franco saw the Spanish Civil War as a second Reconquista (Reconquest), and he linked the struggle to the historic expulsion of the Moors in 1492 under the Catholic Monarchs. He believed in the theory of limpieza de sangre (cleanness of blood) whereby every village had to be “cleansed” by his forces of Communist contagion to save Christian Spain. He also supported the genetic theories propounded by Dr. Antonio Vallejo Nájera that Republicans were Communists because of a Red gene in their genetic makeup and only total eradication could prevent another crusade in the future to save Spain as a Catholic state. In the broader proxy war between fascism and communism, the Spanish Civil War allowed both sides to test new military tactics and innovations that became a precursor to the Second World War. Large mobile tank formations in support of infantry units clashed in the battles of the Jarama, Guadalajara, and Belchite, while in the air, dive bomber formations engaged in aerial dogfights and brought the war to a new destructive phase by targeting civilian-populated areas. In the ancient Basque town of Guernica a sustained bombing attack by German and Italian planes on April 26, 1937, killed 1,685 people and injured 900. A religious eyewitness to the atrocity, Father Alberto Onaindía, refuted Nationalist claims that Republicans had destroyed the town when retreating, and artist Pablo Picasso later immortalized the crime in a wellknown painting. The support of the Basque country for the republic showed that religion was not a simple for-or-against issue. The Basque people were deeply conservative and Catholic and could not be tainted with the Communist brush as Catalans and other Spaniards frequently were. The Basque clergy openly sided with the Republicans in marked

contrast to the attitude of the Spanish hierarchy, which showed that the conflict caused divisions and a blurring of lines within the religious body as well as within society at large. The decisive turning point in the war came when the Republicans launched a desperate counterattack on July 25, 1938, across the River Ebro. The four-month campaign cost the Republicans 15,000 casualties and weakened their defences around Catalonia, which the Nationalists exploited in December. Barcelona fell the following month and with its capture central political authority in the republic crumbled. President Manuel Azaña and Prime Minister Juan Negrín fled the country. Only Madrid remained as the last major city for Franco’s Nationalists to conquer. On April 1, after a three-year siege, the Spanish capital finally surrendered to the besieging Nationalist forces. The Spanish Civil War reinvigorated international Roman Catholicism, which believed that the Nationalist victory reflected the triumph of faith over atheism. Ecclesiastics from all corners of the world traveled to Spain to help rebuild the nation and were encouraged to write about the destruction of religious property they witnessed. Franco restored the church to its central place in society by revoking the Republican constitution and granting the church increased authority over education and health care. Artists were commissioned to portray the conflict as a just, religious war with portraits of Franco carefully selected to depict him as a warrior-crusader bowing before God. Religion became intertwined in all aspects of Spanish life. Public rallies extolling “Franco by the Grace of God” identified the dictator with religion, while the Spanish hierarchy in pastoral letters thanked him for saving the very soul of the nation. The killings did not stop on April 1 but continued well into the 1940s, when cemeteries and other consecrated land were used as burials for mass victims of Franco’s repression. Religion became a passport to safety for many denounced and condemned Republican prisoners as the word of a priest could save a victim from execution. Prisoners were ordered to “atone” for their sins by rebuilding churches, and an enormous monument to the Nationalist dead, known as the Valley of the Fallen (El Valle de los Caídos), was designed and overseen by Franco. For 20 years Republican prisoners carved out a mausoleum inside the

766  Suarez, Francisco (1548–1617)

granite hill and built a towering cross on top to symbolize the triumph of Roman Catholicism. Franco contracted historians to record the official history of the Spanish Civil War as a righteous armed conflict and a religious war. All traces of parliamentary democracy or popular sovereignty associated with the republic were erased from the record, while the close connection between the rebels and the Catholic Church was stressed to legitimize the dictatorship. Annual military parades and retrospective legislation kept the wounds of the nation open as the dictator refused any amnesty or reconciliation to the defeated. Franco, the central figure in the Spanish Civil War, ruled Spain until his death on November 20, 1975. In his last will and testament Franco again identified religion as the major factor in the cause of the conflict and used it to seek absolution for his own actions: “I beg forgiveness of everyone, just as with all my heart I forgive those who declared themselves my enemies.” Barry N. Whelan See also Reconquista; Religious Propaganda and War Further Reading Beevor, Antony. The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936–1939. London:Phoenix, 2007. Meneses, Filipe Ribeiro de. Franco and the Spanish Civil War. London: Routledge, 2001. Nerín, Gustau, and Alfred Bosch. El Imperio que Nunca Existió. Barcelona: Plaza Janés, 2001. Payne, Stanley G. The Franco Regime 1936–1975. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. Preston, Paul. The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution and Revenge. London: Harper Perennial, 2006. Vincent, Mary. Spain 1833–2002: People and State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Suarez, Francisco (1548–1617) Francisco Suarez was a Jesuit priest, philosopher, and theologian. He was born in Granada, Spain. He contributed to the formation of the just war tradition with his assertion that war was justified under certain conditions. He believed that one of the main just causes to wage war was to protect the lives of innocent human beings. Suarez had an

expanded view of the concept of the defense of innocents as a just cause for war. For him, this included the defense of persons whose sovereigns prohibited them from accepting Christianity. In 1564 Suarez joined the Roman Catholic Jesuit order, which at that time was very influential in the intellectual and political life of Spain. That same year, he was accepted to study at the University of Salamanca—one of Europe’s premier schools. His studies focused on theology, philosophy, and canon law. Initially he did not demonstrate adequate intellectual abilities. However, in 1566 his grades and his schoolwork dramatically improved, and he was recognized as one of the best students. He attributed this to God’s divine intervention. After finishing his studies, he began a successful academic career. Between 1571 and 1597, he held a variety of teaching positions throughout Spain at universities including Segovia, Avila, Valladolid, and the prestigious Roman College of the Jesuit Order. The majority of his writing was done at the University of Coimbra, Portugal. There, in 1597, he became the chair of the school of theology. In 1615, he retired from the University of Coimbra and moved to Lisbon, Portugal, where he died in 1617. One of his greatest contributions in the history of ideas on the use of force is his legal doctrine on the law of nations. He believed in the existence of diverse systems of law: eternal, natural, and positive (divine and human). For him, the law of nations existed between natural and positive law. The source of this law was the customary practice of nations. Suarez believed that there was not a single state that was completely self-sufficient. Because of this, all states are part of the international community and should observe the norms of the law of nations in their mutual interrelations. He rejected power politics as a justification for war. Following the teaching of Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine, Suarez believed in using normative principles and norms to determine the justice of wars. Suarez did not believe that wars were inherently evil. Contrary to some views of his time, he thought that Christians could participate in just wars. Those wars had to be waged by legitimate authority, have a just cause, and their conduct should be consistent with natural law and the law of nations. For Suarez, although wars are not inherently evil, they often could be waged in an evil manner.

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Because of this it is essential to follow the norms of the law of war. For Suarez, the main just cause for war was an injury against a sovereign state. The authority to wage war belonged to the injured state, which had the right of selfdefense and could punish unjust actions of the aggressor state. He rejected the authority of a state to intervene and use force to avenge an injury committed against another state. Despite the deep influence of the ideas of the Salamanca school of thought in Suarez’s ideas, he did not analyze the legality of the Spanish conquest of the New World. One exception is a brief justification of the use of force against nations that had no political organization and were constantly violating natural law by practicing human sacrifices and cannibalism. The objective of that type of war was not the destruction of “uncivilized” nations, but to help establish just governments and stop the systematic killings of innocent people. Because of this, Suarez believed that this was a defensive type of war. Suarez believed that before a state could begin a war, it was necessary to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict by diplomacy. For Suarez, during the conduct of war, it was essential to avoid injuries against innocent persons and respect the right to life. After the war, the winning side was allowed to punish the defeated state for the wrongs committed during the armed conflict. For Suarez, war was a means of achieving a just judgment. Therefore, the unjust side could be punished only proportionally to its unjust actions. Yuri Mantilla See also Christianity and War; Just War Tradition Further Reading Brown Scott, James. The Catholic Conception of International Law, Francisco de Vitoria, Founder of the Modern Law of Nations, Francisco Suarez, Founder of the Modern Philosophy of Law in General and in Particular of the Law of Nations. Washington, DC: George Washington University Press, 1934. Doyle, John P. “Francisco Suarez on the Law of Nations.” In Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans, eds. Religion and International Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 103–20. Doyle, John P. “Francisco Suarez: On Preaching the Gospel to People Like the American Indians.” Fordham International Law Journal 15, no. 4 (1992): 879–951.

Suarez, Francisco. De Legibus (III 1–6) De Civili Potestate. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Francisco de Vitoria, Madrid, 1975. Suarez, Francisco. Selections from Three Works. Buffalo, NY: Williams S. Hein, 1995. Suarez, Francisco. “A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver.” In James Brown Scott, ed. Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suarez. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944. Suarez, Francisco. “A Work on the Three Theological Virtues Faith, Hope and Charity.” In James Brown Scott, ed. Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suarez. Buffalo, NY: Williams S. Hein, 1995. Suarez, Francisco, Gracia Jorge J. E., and Davis Douglas, eds. The Metaphysics of Good and Evil According to Suarez. Munich: Philosophia Verlag GmbH, 1989. Suarez, Francisco, L. Pereña, V. Abril, and P. Suñer, eds. De Legibus, II 13–20, De Iure Gentium. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1973.

Sufism and War Sufism, from the Arabic term tas.awwuf, is the organizational form of the mystical dimension of both Sunni and Shi’a Islam. The primary doctrine of Sufism is inwardturning and introspection, which results in tolerance and pacifism. However, the later development of Sufism reveals that this spiritual movement also has the capacity to become a militant form of mysticism. There is disagreement between scholars about the origin of the term Sufism. It is said that the term may refer to s.afāa (purity), or to As.hab al-S.uffa (al-S.uffa Companions: a poor group of companions of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad [570–632 CE]), or to bani S.ufiyya (a group of ascetic Arabs who were the servants of the Kaaba, the most important holy shrine for Muslims), or to sophia (the Latin word for wisdom). However, the most common explanation is that the word Sufism lexically derives from s.ūf (rough wool), and Sufi literally means one who dresses in woolen clothing. This name was chosen to indicate the asceticism of pious Muslims in early Islamic history manifested in the wearing of coarse woolen clothes. Sufism developed as a peaceful movement during a period of time between 630 and 950 and was consolidated between 950 and 1100 in reaction to the secular tendencies

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of the Umayyad empire (r. 661–750) and the Abbasid caliphate (r. 750–1258), which were considered to be a deviation from the sacred aims of the Prophet of Islam. By emphasizing the individual unmediated experience of God, Sufism represented a passive protest against the institutionalized formalistic mainstream of Islam. The ultimate objective of Sufism is the experience of unity with divinity. To achieve this aim, a Sufi should begin by practicing sharia (Islamic laws and rituals), but she or he does not need to practice sharia for a long time. Sufis believe that the esoteric and spiritual path toward God (t.ariqa), as the second stage in attaining communion with God, is much more important than the exoteric and ritualistic way (sharia). As a result of this spiritual practice, Sufis will receive ma‘rifa (gnosis), and consequently achieve haqiqa (the truth of God). The mysticism of Sufism has fascinated countless Muslims around the world; however, this movement has considerable opponents. Foremost among these adversaries of Sufism are Wahhabi Salafists who seek to restore Islam to its early Golden Age. Their fanatical ideology considers the principles of Sufism as an aberration and blasphemous innovation (bid‘a) of the original Islamic faith. Another antagonist of Sufism is Islamic legal formalism. The antiritualistic attitude of Sufism has resulted in the deeply rooted hostility of the fuqaha (Muslim cleric-jurists). This antagonism has been evident both theoretically (in the form of excommunications and issuing fatwas, or religious decrees) and practically (in the form of violent clashes). Sufism is also criticized by some modern Muslim reformists. They perceive this mystical movement as the cause of neglect by numerous Muslim elites of sociopolitical changes, which has consequently led to the backwardness of Islamic societies. Most Sufi wars, however, occurred with other enemies. The political crises of the Islamic world from the 11th century onward transformed Sufism into a more collectively organized movement with considerable potential power. From the 13th century onward, members of these Sufi orders have actively taken part in numerous forms of resistance, including struggles for independence and civil wars around the Islamic world, a fact that violates the Sufi doctrine of total peace and compromise with all peoples and shows that Sufism is more than just a fully peaceful

movement. The following are examples of some of the most remarkable Sufi wars: a series of holy wars by Sufi organizations to get political power in West Africa, particularly in what is now Mali, southern Mauritania, Guinea, and northern Nigeria, which took 255 years from 1645 to 1900; more than 20 years of struggle against the Italian, British, and Ethiopian militaries (from 1900 to 1920) by Muhammad Abdullah Hasan (d. 1920), who founded the Dervish state in Somalia (1896); the 11 years of conflict by the Sanusi order against French expansion in the Sahara (1902 to 1913), and its opposition to the Italian invasion and occupation of Libya in 1911 (remarkably under the leadership of Omar Mukhtar [1862–1931]); the struggle of the Sanusi order in the First World War against the British in Sudan and Egypt; the resistance of the Qadidiyya, Rahmaniyya, and Sanusiyya orders against the French conquest of Algeria in 1830; the conflicts between the Qadidiyya order and other Sufi orders such as the Darqawa, T.ayyibi, and Tijani orders in Algeria during the first half of the 19th century; the military campaign of the Dervish army of Muhammad Ahmad, the leader of the Samaniyya order, against the Turkish-Egyptian government of the Sudan and their clash with and triumph over British forces in the Battle of Khartoum (1885); the conflict in 1888 between Egypt and Muhammad Ahmad’s successor, Khalifah ‘Abd Allah, who established a new Sufi order; the insurgency of the S.alihiyya order in Somalia in 1899; the jihad led by Chechens and Dagestanis against the Russians in 1785 and 1824 at the Sunzha River under the leadership of some Sufi members of the Naqshbandiyya order, as well as the announcement of the creation of the North Caucasian Emirate by the Qadida and Naqshbandiyya orders in Chechnya and western Dagestan (1919), which included a battle with the Russian army; the organization of rebellions against the Manchu government in China in the first half of the 19th century by the Sufis of the Naqshbandiyya order; the Rif war, a 14-year anticolonial struggle in Morocco against Spain and France (1920–1934); the battles of the Sufi brotherhood known as the Muridiyya order in Senegal against French colonial rule in the late 19th century; the encouragement and religious legitimation of confrontations with Dutch colonists by the Naqshbandiyya, Qadidiyya, and Shat.t.ariyya Sufi orders in the Java War (1825–1830) and the Aceh War (1914–1973) in

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Southeast Asia; a jihad (holy war) movement against the Sikh state, which was protected by the British government, in 1826 in Punjab by Sayyid Ahmed of Bareilly (1786–1831), a famous revolutionary Islamic reformer in India, who was a member of the three Sufi orders of Naqshbandiyya, Chisti, and Qadidi; and taking up arms against Spanish and French colonization in 1885 in North Africa. A brief review of these Sufi conflicts reveals that most of these wars were political and not religious in nature. Following the doctrine of pacifism, and in contrast to Wahhabi Salafists, Sufis do not legitimize religious offensive jihad, which is waged to force non-Muslims to convert to Islam. For a Sufi, the greater jihad (jihad al-Akbar) is a struggle against one’s ego (nafs) and its desires. Most Sufis will only involve themselves in defensive jihad, which is religiously permitted in order to protect Muslims and Islamic countries from non-Muslims’ attack. This is particularly evident in the many anticolonial wars in which Sufis fought non-Muslims who had occupied Muslim societies. In these cases the sense of nationalism which the war aroused was combined with and reinforced by the religious motivation of defensive jihad against nonbelievers. It is remarkable that Sufi participation in the struggle against attacking unbelievers has strengthened their status among other groups of Muslims. Abbas Mehregan See also Islam and War (Jihad); Wahhabism Further Reading Trimingham, J. Spencer. The Sufi Orders in Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. Woodward, Mark, Muhammad Sani Umar, Inayah Rohmaniyah, and Mariani Yahya. “Salafi Violence and Sufi Tolerance? Rethinking Conventional Wisdom.” Perspectives on Terrorism V, no. 7/6 (2013).

Süleyman the Magnificent (1494–1566) Süleyman the Magnificent is remembered in the East as Süleyman Kanuni, or the Lawgiver. This sultan, who was not only the longest-reigning (1520–1566) sultan

of the Ottoman Empire but also arguably the sultan with the longest-lasting influence on the empire, launched 13 military campaigns that resulted in the growth of the empire. These campaigns were in addition to other campaigns, led by his subordinates, as they were led by him personally over 10 years and 3 months. The imperial campaigns can be divided into three categories: campaigns in Europe, in the Near East, and in the Mediterranean. Most campaigns, eight to be exact, belong to the first category: the First Hungarian campaign (1521), the Second Hungarian campaign (1526), the first attempt to capture Vienna (1529) and the second attempt to capture Vienna (1532), the invasion of Moldavia (1538) and Hungary (1541), and another invasion of Hungary (1543), and his last campaign of all, which aimed to capture the fortress of a Croatian nobleman in Szigetvár (1566). In the Near East he fought two campaigns, both in Persian territories, in 1534–1536 and 1548–1549. In the first campaign he captured Baghdad, and in the second one he only earned some temporary gains, mainly in the area of Persian Armenia. Both campaigns were a part of the OttomanSafavid War (1532–1555). Lastly, he fought two campaigns in the Mediterranean: Rhodes (1522–1523) and Corfu (1537). His success was incredible. He managed to seize Belgrade within weeks. Then, with 300 ships, 10,000 engineers and artillerymen, and 100,000 infantrymen, he set out to conquer Rhodes. He conquered Rhodes after 145 days of siege. His 1526 campaign in Hungary utilized marching with a band as a tool of psychological warfare, and indeed within two hours King Louis was found to have died. In the years that followed he conquered Buda, hence completing his annexation of central Hungary. He also won lands in Persia around modern-day Tabriz. In 1543, his fleets participated in the raid of Italy and in securing French control over Nice. In fact, his conquests made it all the way to Tripoli in modern-day Libya. At the end of his reign, the Ottoman Empire began in Vienna and ended in the Upper Arabian Peninsula, began in Crimea and ended in Sudan. From 1538 to 1571, the Ottoman navy was the strongest navy of the Mediterranean. Under Admiral Khayer al-Din, known in the West by the nickname “Barbarossa” (Italian for “redbeard”), the Ottoman navy won the Battle of

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Preveza. After the siege of Nice, Francis I of France allowed the Ottoman fleet to overwinter, or essentially occupy, the harbor of Toulon. From that harbor, the navy could easily attack Habsburg Spain and Italy, enemies of the French state. In the Indian Ocean, the navy succeeded in defeating Portuguese forces in areas close to Arabia from their bases in Suez and Basra. In 1538–1539, the navy conquered Aden and Yemen in the south of the peninsula along with Jeddah and Djibouti on the Red Sea. Until 1522, they not only reconquered Yemen but also attained further ports such as Oman and Qatar. In light of these conquests, he attributed great titles to himself, such as “Master of All the Lands of Caesar and Alexander the Great.” Even failed attempts to defeat Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire and to conquer Vienna and Malta were not enough to break his spirit. His art of war, however, was not the only type of art he was engaged in. Europeans, such as Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, an Austrian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, admired his court and his ability to discuss philosophy and compose poetry in multiple languages. His reign highlights and underscores the Renaissance idea of kingship and virtú, and Süleyman the Magnificent can definitely be seen as a “Renaissance king,” mastering the art of warfare and fine arts. The glory of the expansion could not be preserved easily. Shortly after his death, the empire entered a period of stagnation that lasted until 1827, followed by a period of decline and attempts at modernization, which was followed by its final defeat and dissolution. This is why, perhaps, Süleyman is remembered in such a positive light, and why his laws were the point of reference for every future Ottoman reform. It is not only for his legal skills but also for his ability to extend the empire, bringing it to one final climax before the stagnation. Orel Beilinson See also Lepanto, Battle of; Ottoman Empire; Vienna, Siege of (1529) Further Reading Atil, Esin. The Age of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent. Washington, DC: National Gallery of Art, 1987. Sahin, Kaya. Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman: Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Sunni-Shi’a Conflict The Muslim world consists of two major denominations, Sunni (“orthodox”), who comprise more than 80 percent of the world’s Muslims, and Shi’a (“party” or “partisans” of Ali), who numbered more than 175 million in 2016). Most Shi’as live in either Iran or in neighboring countries such as Iraq, Azerbaijan, or Saudi Arabia. There are also large Shi’a communities in Lebanon, Yemen, Oman, Afghanistan, Bahrain, East Africa, and Central and South Asia. Shiites share the same beliefs of the Sunni that God revealed the Qur’an and that believers should follow the example of the Prophet. They do not always believe in the authority of the same hadith. Although the Sunni-Shi’a divide has been theologized, distinctions are primarily rooted in social and cultural terms that originate in political and historical realities. The key differences between the two groups are found in issues relating to the leadership of the Muslim community (umma). Shi’as were convinced that Ali ibn Abu Talib, and not Abu Bakr, should have been chosen to lead the Muslim umma after the death of the Prophet. Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, his closest male relative, is often described as the first convert to Islam. Shi’as believe that the Prophet conferred the calling of imam (“guide”) on Ali at the pool of Ghadir Khumm near the end of his life. Ali was eventually named the fourth caliph and is considered by Shi’as to be the first imam. Ali was tragically murdered in Kufa (661 CE) and buried in Najaf, Iraq. Eleven in the line of the imamate (imama) that followed Ali were his sons and grandsons. The martyrdom of Ali’s son Husayn at the Battle of Karbala (680 CE) is observed by Shi’as with devotion because, like Christ, Husayn chose to die for his people. After the last imam, a highly structured system of clergy and scholarly leadership was established. These clerics reveal hidden meanings of the Qur’an that only they can decipher because they are Godordained trustees (wasi) of the light of the Prophet. Sunnis reject this claim, asserting that the Qur’an is literal and can be understood by all Muslims. There are also distinctions between Sunni and Shi’a legal interpretations including opinions about inheritance and marriage issues. These groups also have minor variances in ritual practices relating to the call to prayer, postures when praying, how one should prepare for prayer

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(wudu), and varying holidays for remembrance. Some rituals are culturally specific and vary from region to region. These differences, however, do not keep most Sunni clerics from regarding Shi’as as fellow believers and, thus, Shi’as are also welcome to participate in the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca. Shi’as believe God provided the umma with imams who were a source of revelation in aiding Muslim responses to their changing world. These imams were free from sin or any error (ma’sum). The imamate also provides intercession between God and humanity. Such views forged a distinct eschatology centered on the return to the earth of the 12th or “hidden” imam in an apocalyptic future. The hidden imam will return to vanquish injustice and provide ultimate vindication for Shi’a believers. In contrast, the Sunnis reject Shi’a claims about the intercessory role of the imams because they hold that the Qur’an alone is the only flawless intercession between God and humanity. For the Shi’as, God equips each imam with extraordinary powers given only to those in the Prophet’s family lineage. Unfortunately, this lineage failed, first with Ali and then with Husan and Husayn, in a number of military battles and political maneuvers that left Sunni leaders in control over the umma. Shi’a followers developed a “cult of martyrdom,” which recast these failures as spiritual tests with divine truth revealed through suffering. In contrast, Sunnis view these failures as proof that the Shi’a faith is misled. While the events of history have further divided Shi’a groups, the Sunnis have maintained a relatively uniform response to issues of divine authority and their relation to variant Shi’a factions. Throughout history, but especially during the fall of the Abbasid caliphate, these groups have sparred over the claim to have the most accurate expression of Islam. The rise of the Ottoman Empire, for example, greatly inhibited the rise of Shi’a Islam in regions such as Egypt. In recent history there have been violent clashes between Shi’a and Sunni communities whenever these groups have lived in tense political proximity. Rivalries have resurfaced in previous contexts of competition, particularly between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Violent clashes, undergirded by social instability, have also been frequent in Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. Theological debates between these groups generated by Sunni Islamists and fanatical Shi’as have further fueled animosities.

The passionate emotion displayed by many Shi’as is seen by some Sunni clerics as counter to the ideal of reason and bordering on the worship of a human being when all devotion should be directed only toward God. While there are clear divisions between the Sunnis and Shi’as, both groups cherish the same faith and core convictions. Both communities are undergirded in opposite directions by an assumed sense of destiny and divine guidance. The vast majority of Sunnis and Shi’as hope for intrareligious peace and an end to sectarian extremism. Chris Van Gorder See also Caliphate; Islam and War (Jihad); Islamic State Further Reading Cockburn, Patrick. The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution. London: Verso, 2015. Gonzalez, Nathan. The Sunni-Shia Conflict: Understanding Sectarian Violence in the Middle East. Mission Viejo, CA: Nortia Press, 2009. Hazelton, Lesley. After the Prophet: The Epic Story of the ShiaSunni Split in Islam. New York: Doubleday, 2009. Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006.

Syrian Orthodox Church The Syrian Orthodox Church was one of the Eastern churches the crusaders came into contact with when they arrived in the Near East. To Westerners, the Syrian Orthodox Church and community have often been known as Jacobites. The official English name of the church today (since 2000) is the Syriac Orthodox Church.

Origins

The dogmatic position of the Syrian Orthodox Church was (and is) that of the theological tradition of Severus, patriarch of Antioch (d. 538), who opposed the Christological dogma promulgated by the Council of Chalcedon (451). The Syrian Orthodox Church rejected the Monophysite Christology of Eutyches (d. after 454). It venerated Christ as truly man and truly God, the divine and the human neither being separated nor mixed. But, as the Aristotelian

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term nature could not be conceived in the plural, Christ’s nature was thought of as single (i.e., verbal monophysitism, or miaphysitism). The Latin sources usually refer to the Syrian Orthodox as “Jacobites.” This name refers to Jacob Baradaeus (d. 578), who was instrumental in organizing the miaphysite resistance against the Chalcedonian imperial church in the decades following the expulsion of Patriarch Severus in the year 518. In the middle of the sixth century, a separate, non-Chalcedonian hierarchy was created with an independent patriarch of Antioch (mod. Antakya, Turkey), who, however, never resided in that city. Originating in the context of an inner miaphysite schism, to distinguish Jacob’s adherents from those of Paul of Beth Ukkome (d. 581), the name Jacobites later came to be used by outsiders to designate miaphysite Christians in Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. By the time of the crusades, a second meaning had developed. The term “Jacobite” was used to designate the Syrian Orthodox to differentiate them from the Chalcedonian (Greek Orthodox) Christians of Syria and Palestine; these were called “Syrians” in Arabic and Latin, or “Melkites” and “Greeks” by the non-Chalcedonians. Often the term was used in a pejorative sense. By contrast, the combination of the term “orthodox” with “Syriac” was already in use by the church itself during the time of the crusades. Syriac, the classical Aramaic dialect of the school of Edessa (mod. Şanliurfa, Turkey), was always the language of the theology and liturgy of the church, and in many of its communities Aramaic dialects were spoken.

Church Organization and Hierarchy

In the 12th and 13th centuries, the area called the “West” in Syriac sources, that is, from Cappadocia in the north as far as Arabia in the south, was under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Syrian Orthodox patriarch of Antioch and bordered on the Coptic patriarchate of Alexandria. The Syrian Orthodox and Coptic patriarchates recognized each other’s full authority as Orthodox sister churches. From 726 this was also usually the case with the Armenian Orthodox (Apostolic) Church. What was called the “East,” that is, Mesopotamia, Assyria, Azerbaijan, and Iraq, was under the authority of the metropolitan of Tagrit (mod. Tikrit, Iraq), called the maphrian, who resided in the

monastery of Mor Mattai near Mosul. During this time he always was a cleric from the West and acted as primate. The Frankish states of Outremer included the Syrian Orthodox archdioceses of Edessa, Samosata (mod. Samsat, Turkey), Manbij, Tarsos (mod. Tarsus, Turkey), Antioch, and Jerusalem, and many bishoprics, such as Acre (mod. ‘Akko, Israel), Tripoli (mod. Trâblous, Lebanon), Cyprus, Marash (mod. Kahramanmarafl, Turkey), Raban, Kesoun (mod. Kaysun, Turkey), and Saruj (mod. Suruç, Turkey). The new political borders cut into the Syrian Orthodox administrative structures; for example, the important archdiocese of Melitene (mod. Malatya, Turkey) was split between the rule of the Dānishmendid emirate and the Frankish county of Edessa. The communities in the Middle and Far East remained beyond Frankish rule. The Syrian Orthodox communities played an active part in church politics along with the secular clergy: they proposed candidates for the bishoprics and opposed others successfully. Their elites, who were mainly occupied as physicians, scribes, courtiers, and merchants throughout the Middle East, supported the infrastructure of the church financially. The Syrian Orthodox are not normally considered to have held feudal estates of substantial size. The existence of estates is, however, detectable, especially in the north. Cenobites and anchorites, whose life was deeply rooted in the early Christian Syriac spirituality, were another important factor. The patriarch usually sought formal recognition from the Frankish authorities, as he did with the Muslim governors in the area of his jurisdiction. During the 12th century, the patriarchs were based mostly in Upper Mesopotamia and Syria. They resided partly in monasteries in Frankish territory and partly in Muslim areas. The monastery of Mor Barsaumo on the northern frontier in the archdiocese of Melitene was one of the favorite places. Insecurity in the Middle East on the one hand, and protection by the Rupenid dynasty on the other, made the kingdom of Armenia in Cilicia a favorite place of residence, notably at Hromgla (mod. Rumkale, Turkey) and Sis (mod. Kozan, Turkey) in the 13th century. The official residence of the patriarch remained beyond the borders of Outremer, first in Amida (mod. Diyarbakir, Turkey), and from 1166 in Mardin.

Syrian Orthodox Church  773

Ecclesiastical integration of the entire area of patriarchal jurisdiction was increasingly difficult. The hostility of secular powers and general insecurity were problems that the Syrian Orthodox authorities could do little about. Both the Mesopotamian and Cilician residences were occupied simultaneously during cases of schism, which occurred three times between 1180 and 1261 (1180–1193, 1199– 1220, and 1253–1261), and as a result the regions drifted further apart. In 1292 a more serious schism in the Syrian Orthodox West began, which lasted until 1493. Several patriarchs, however, won the support of the greater part of the suffragans and the communities. They used their spiritual authority and central administrative position to improve the situation of the church according to Christian principles. Two of them, Michael I the Great (1166–1199) and Ignatius III David (1222–1252), are especially remembered as great patriarchs of that period, praised for their piety and their wisdom, their reform measures, and their generous support of the material infrastructure of the church.

Syrian Orthodox Life in Outremer and Beyond

The Syriac narrative sources paint rather a bleak picture, underlining the hardship caused by war, bandits, and encroachments on the Syrian Orthodox Church and communities. They name numerous churches destroyed by or lost to the Muslims. Syrian Orthodox refugees were swept into Frankish territory after the conquest of Edessa in 1146 and again during the swift and deadly advance of the Mongols. A slow deterioration in relations between the Syrian Orthodox and the Muslim population can be detected. Neither Muslims nor Franks sufficiently protected the Syrian Orthodox population, and on occasion even turned violently against them. Authorities on both sides did not hesitate to put pressure on Syrian Orthodox prelates for their own ends. To find explanations for their experiences and their losses, the communities turned toward their own religious and ethical conduct. Their introspection resulted in the harsh moral self-criticism reflected in the historical works of the time. The reports in these works, however, have to be put into perspective. Scholars have even raised doubts as to the actual severity of the crisis. The situation under Muslim rule was often stable enough to allow for the construction of

new churches, monasteries, and representative ecclesiastical buildings. The originality of 12th-century artists is increasingly attracting scholarly interest. It is obvious that for literature and science this also was a period of consolidation as well as of new departures. The classical Syriac language was studied with renewed effort and used as a language of scholarship. The libraries and schools in the cathedrals and monasteries were actively sponsored by the higher clergy, and the entire traditions of church and community were gathered in encyclopedic works. At the same time, Syrian Orthodox scholars took notice of the latest developments in the philosophical and medical schools of the Middle East, shared by Muslims and Eastern Christians alike. Works by authors such as Dionysius bar Salibi or Bar Ebroyo (Bar Hebraeus) have remained standard points of reference in exegesis, theology, and legal decisions for the church and community to the present day. A synthesis of Syrian Orthodox life in Outremer is a desideratum. In the city of Jerusalem the community had the representative monastery and church of St. Mary Magdalene, which also served as the residence of the metropolitan of Jerusalem. It was lost to the Muslims after the reconquest by Saladin in 1187. For its maintenance, the church possessed villages protected by Queen Melisende (d. 1161), while Patriarch Michael I regained a chapel in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre during his visit in 1169. The writings of James of Vitry suggest that the community of Acre was rather neglected at the beginning of the 13th century. However, an active scriptorium can be detected there, and a bishop was probably present throughout the time in question. In 13th-century Tripoli, an Eastern (Nestorian) rhetor named Jacob attracted several young men to undertake studies in medicine and rhetoric; it remains to be seen whether Tripoli was also an intellectual center for the Syrian Orthodox. The city of Antioch certainly was such a center in the 13th century, and Greek and Syriac as well as secular sciences were studied. Several churches and monasteries were maintained by the Syrian Orthodox in Antioch and environs, among them a Church of Our Lady and a new Church of Mor Barsaumo, consecrated in 1156. In the mid-13th century, Ignatius III David even built a new patriarchal residence in Antioch. The clerical hierarchy provided not only the religious infrastructure but also the framework for the cultural and

774  Syrian Orthodox Church

social cohesion of the communities and acted as political representatives in dealings with the Franks. In the county of Edessa, they also became involved in the Frankish administration and even in military activities to some extent. However, on several occasions the Franks are known to have intervened directly in the government of the church. Their interference undermined the central administration of the patriarch and consequently prolonged conflicts between him and the suffragans. In Cilicia, the Syrian Orthodox communities shared in the cultural and economic upswing of 13th-century Cilicia, and the patriarch occasionally joined the Armenian catholicos on diplomatic missions concerning the kingdom. Some scholars consider relations between Franks and Syrian Orthodox in Outremer to have been cordial. This certainly holds true for some individual personal relationships, such as that between Patriarch Michael I and the Latin patriarch of Antioch, Aimery of Limoges (d. 1193). Yet neither the Latin nor the Syriac sources justify this as a general assessment. The Latin sources on the whole appear rather detached and incompetent in their reports on the Syrian Orthodox, exhibiting little interest in this section of their subject population. As the Syrian Orthodox were considered to be heretics, their hierarchy on the whole was left intact. The discriminatory poll tax that they had been required to pay under Muslim rule was lifted. In theological terms, a mutual pragmatic recognition seems to have taken place, making practical cooperation on all levels easier. At a council held in Jerusalem in 1141, dogmatic differences were not perceived as being as serious as the Franks had previously believed. Friendly encounters, joint religious practices, and also theological disputations took place. Some Franks in the north venerated the Syrian Orthodox saint Mor Barsaumo, and they occasionally accepted the service of Syrian Orthodox priests in extraordinary situations, for example, in the cases of prisoners of war outside Outremer. The Syrian Orthodox were also able to improve their position by the circumstance that the Frankish governments were largely unsympathetic to the Greek Orthodox church. Their interpretation of what the Latin Church understood as achievements of a union in the time of patriarch Ignatius III David is, however, controversial.

As with the other powers in the Middle East under which their flock was dispersed, the Syrian Orthodox authorities had to seek a modus vivendi with the secular and religious hierarchy of the Frankish principalities. They also made ample use of the possibility of establishing themselves in Antioch. Bar Ebroyo reported that it became a custom to ritually enthrone the Syrian Orthodox patriarch after his election on St. Peter’s chair in the Latin-held cathedral of Antioch. Nevertheless, they avoided becoming too close to the Franks and preferred to reside under Armenian protection. The complicated relations between Syrian Orthodox subjects and Frankish lords, the motives and interests of prelates, dignitaries, and populace, respectively, require differentiated and nuanced treatment. Dorothea Weltecke See also Crusades (Overview); Edessa, County of Further Reading Balicka-Witakowski, Ewa, Sebastian Brock, David G. K. Taylor, and Witold Witakowski. The Hidden Pearl: The Syrian Orthodox Church and its Ancient Aramaic Heritage. Vol. II. Rome: TransWorld Film Italia, 2001. Baumstark, Anton. Geschichte der syrischen Literatur mit Ausschluß der christlich-palästinensischen Texte. Bonn: Marcus, Weber und Ahn, 1922. Brincken, Anna-Dorothee von den. Die “Nationes Christianorum Orientalium” im Verständnis der lateinischen Historiographie von der Mitte des 12. bis in die zweite Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts. Köln: Böhlau, 1973. Brock, Sebastian. Syriac Studies: A Classified Bibliography, 1960–1990. Kaslik: Université Saint-Esprit de Kaslik, 1996. Fiey, Jean-Maurice. Pour un Oriens Christianus Novus: Répertoire des diocèses syriaques orientaux et occidentaux. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993. Hamilton, Bernard. The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church. London: Variorum, 1980. History of Syriac Literature and Sciences (Kitab al-Lulu al-Manthur fi Tarikh al-Ulum wa al-Adab al Suryaniyya) by Ignatius Aphram Barsaum (1887–1957). Edited by Matti Moosa. Pueblo: Passeggiata, 2000. Kawerau, Peter. Die jakobitische Kirche im Zeitalter der syrischen Renaissance: Idee und Wirklichkeit. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1960. Leroy, Jules. Les manuscrits syriaques à peintures. 2 vols. Paris: Geuthner, 1964. Moosa, Matti. “The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective, with Emphasis on Syriac Sources.” Muslim World 93 (2003): 249–89.

Syrian Orthodox Church  775 Prawer, Joshua. “Social Classes in the Crusader States, the Minorities.” In Kenneth M. Setton et al., eds. A History of the Crusades. 2nd ed. 6 vols. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–1989, 5: 59–116. Richard, Jean. La papauté et les missions d’Orient au Moyen Age (XIIIe–XIVe siècles). 2nd ed. Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1998. Segal, Judah B. Edessa: The Blessed City. Oxford: Clarendon, 1970.

Ter-Minassiantz, Erwand. Die armenische Kirche in ihren Beziehungen zu den syrischen Kirchen bis zum Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1904. Weltecke, Dorothea. “Contacts between Syriac Orthodox and Latin Military Orders.” In East and West in the Crusader States. Context—Contacts—Confrontations, III: Acta of the Congress Held at Hernen Castle in September 2000. n.p.: Peeters, 2004.

T Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864)

offensive of private provincial armies reinforced by British and French forces. Under the Manchus, the Chinese majority was forced to subjugate themselves to the new rulers, who were eager to prohibit any interrelationship between the new ruling class and the rural Chinese population. The Manchu rulers also prohibited the Chinese from settling in Manchuria, Manchu home territory. Local Manchu officials as well as landlords largely mismanaged many important governmental functions, including tax collection, resulting in widespread corruption and mismanagement. This situation led to harsh conditions for the peasantry. The Chinese population increased by 250 million people between about 1750 and 1850, reaching a total of 430 million. Consequently, the living standard of the peasantry declined while impoverishment and hunger increased. In addition, the British had begun to import opium, which led to many social problems and a general decline in the social order. The First Opium War (1840–1842) was a Manchu attempt to try to stem the flow of opium into China. Britain won this conflict, essentially relegating China to the status of a Western colony. The Treaty of Nanking (1842), which sealed Western dominance in China for years, led to an increase in Western trade goods coming into China. This had a negative impact on Chinese artisans, who gradually became impoverished, unable to sell their goods within their

The Taiping (Great Peace) Rebellion lasted from 1851 until 1864 and was one of the greatest rebellions in modern Chinese history and a conflict in which an estimated 20 million people died, mostly civilians. It was a civil war in part fueled by the millenarian beliefs of its founder. Under its leader Hong Xiuquan (1814–1864), a former teacher who was inspired by aberrant Christian beliefs blended with Confucianism, Buddhism, and mysticism, the movement was able to conquer and control large parts of China for more than 10 years. The rebellion is not just an important part of modern Chinese history, but also of the history of imperialism in Asia. It is also an example of the interrelationship of war and religion, as the rebellion was a religiously motivated war for freedom, liberation, and justice. A primary cause of the Taiping Rebellion was the occupation of China by the foreign Manchu dynasty, also known as the Qing or Ch’ing dynasty, which had overthrown the Chinese Ming dynasty in 1644. The Taiping Rebellion was also directed against the imperialist encroachment of Western powers, which had accelerated in the early 19th century. While there were many peasants participating in the rebellion, it was not solely an agrarian revolt. Many other classes of Chinese citizens joined in the rebellion, which was finally defeated by a combined 777

778  Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864)

own country. Consequently, it was no longer just the Chinese peasants who were suffering under the social and economic conditions of the time, but the artisan class and former workers of the transportation sector who were largely unemployed as a result of Westerners working the docks in the major Chinese ports. Conditions had conspired to make the teachings of the Taiping attractive to many sectors of the Chinese population—peasants, artisans, and workers. It also attracted Chinese intellectuals, who longed for a reestablishment of the Ming dynasty and an end to Manchu rule, because their loyalty remained with the former Chinese rulers. In this situation, anti-Western and anti-Manchu sentiments combined, leading to an early form of Chinese nationalism. Hong Xiuquan, influenced by Christianity, considered himself to be the second messiah and brother to Jesus. He preached a new way of life based on the teachings of social, economic, political, and gender equality. In 1851 the Taiping Rebellion finally broke out in the city of Tzu-chin in Kwangsi Province. It spread rapidly, reaching Beijing, Shanghai, and even the Tibetan borderland. Nanking was chosen as the Taiping Rebellion’s capital and home of the Taiping Tien-kuo (Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace). The early success of the uprising can be explained by the high support of the population on one hand and the military mismanagement of the Manchu rulers on the other. While the Manchu dynasty was not able to contain the rebellion, it was praised in the West, because a Christianmotivated movement had been able to achieve power in China. The rebels appeared to be introducing Western values into China. Longing for a Christian kingdom, the rebels were considered better negotiating partners than the Manchu officials. But the anti-Western sentiments of the Taiping led to a change of heart, and the British and French troops began to support the Manchu efforts against the Taiping Kingdom in 1861, heralding the end of the movement. From the British and French perspective it was easier to deal with the weak Manchu dynasty than to negotiate with an anti-Western regime that might even become strong enough to check the threat of imperialism. They combined their forces with new private armies, which had been established in some provinces, when the Manchu rulers authorized officials like Zeng Guofan (1811–1872) in

Hunan or Li Honghzhong (1823–1901) in Anhui to raise such armies. These forces, supported by Western-equipped contingents, were finally able to check the growing influence of the Taiping. The rebels, driven from Nanking in 1864, had no chance of fighting back against these combined forces, which were better trained and much better equipped than the Taiping rebels. Furthermore, there were internal struggles regarding Hong’s leadership, as he began to live like a Chinese emperor, not an equal leader of the common people. For example, Hong lived with several concubines, although he had previously preached monogamy. Consequently, the spontaneous war of the people against the ruling elite ended and Hong died, while his son and his followers were captured and killed. Despite the fact that the Taiping Rebellion was not successful, it was able to shake the existing rule of the Manchu dynasty for more than 10 years. The Taiping Rebellion was suppressed at last, but it had shown that the Manchus could be challenged and that there were several weak points in the existing system—especially corruption and military disunity—that could be used against the rulers in future situations of the same gravity. The rebellion is one of the major events of 19th-century Chinese history that not only helps us to understand the effects of Christian teachings in a socially unequal society, but also the impact of Western imperialism on semicolonial countries. Four decades after the end of the Taiping Rebellion, the Boxer Rebellion would again attempt to forge major changes to Chinese government and society. A religiously motivated revolt, the Taiping Rebellion was one of the first steps in the decline of the Manchu dynasty. Hong Xiuquan’s objective was to revive Chinese society, initiate land reform and equality for women, and abolish the opium trade, as well as other economic reforms, and even introduce a new calendar. These aims were revolutionary, and the Taiping Rebellion is often considered a predecessor of the Chinese Communist movements. Motivated by religion and leading to a decade-long war, the Taiping Rebellion was one of the first steps in the dissolution of Manchu rule in China, which finally came to an end in 1911. Frank Jacob See also Apocalyptic Literature

Tajikistan Civil War, Religious Dimensions of  779 Further Readings Chesneaux, Jean. Peasant Revolts in China 1840–1949. London: Thames & Hudson, 1973. Feuerwerker, Albert. Rebellion in Nineteenth-Century China. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975. Franke, Wolfgang. A Century of the Chinese Revolution 1851– 1949. Oxford: Blackwell, 1970. Jen, Y. W. The Taiping Revolutionary Movement. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993. Moore, Barrington, Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993. Shih, Vincent. The Taiping Ideology: Its Sources, Interpretations, and Influences. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972. Spence, Jonathan D. God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan. New York: W. W. Norton, 1996.

Tajikistan Civil War, Religious Dimensions of The civil war in Tajikistan lasted from 1992 to 1997 and resulted in an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 dead. The war pitted the government of Tajikistan against a coalition of opposition groups, including the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). The IRPT was formed before the war and its Sunni Muslim supporters and advocated the adoption of sharia law through democratic means. During the war the IRPT was the opposition’s most effective fighting force, and in 1997 the government and IRPT finalized a peace accord. The origins of the civil war in Tajikistan lay in the political chaos that engulfed the republic in the early 1990s. In February 1990, on the eve of the first multiparty elections to be held in the Soviet Republic of Tajikistan, government agents opened fire on protesters peacefully demonstrating outside a government building in the capital, Dushanbe. The shooting resulted in public outrage and days of rioting, which official government media blamed on criminals and Islamic fundamentalists, a claim that was rebuked in a Human Rights Watch report that placed the blame for the violence on government agents. Although the ruling Communist Party of Tajikistan handily won the elections, opposition to the government intensified. In October 1990 the IRPT was founded under the leadership of Said Nuri, a

former Soviet dissident who had been imprisoned in 1986 on charges of leading a circle of underground Islamic religious study groups and voicing opposition to the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Official media vilified the IRPT and the party was promptly banned, but the IRPT continued to operate openly. In August 1991 an attempted military coup in Moscow was the catalyst that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in September 1991 Tajikistan was declared an independent country. Elections were scheduled for November to select a new president. The IRPT joined a coalition of opposition political parties that included the secular Democratic Party of Tajikistan and Lali Badakhshan, which represented the minority Pamiri nationality that espouses the Ismaili Shi’a sect of Islam. The IRPT threw its support behind the candidacy of Davlatnazar Khudonazarov, a noted Pamiri filmmaker, while government backers supported Rahmon Nabiev, the former head of Tajikistan who was ousted in a corruption scandal in 1985. While Nabiev was victorious in the election, Khudonazarov won the support of urban intelligentsia, Pamiris, and IRPT supporters from the Gharm region in central Tajikistan and communal farms in the southwest of the country. Animosity between government and opposition supporters only intensified following the election and in March 1992 opposition supporters descended on Dushanbe in protest. The IRPT was among the most active of opposition groups and was able to call upon a network of mullahs from across southwestern Tajikistan. In May Nabiev distributed rifles to his supporters, who promptly attacked the opposition camp, an event that marked the beginning of the civil war in Tajikistan. In response the IRPT utilized its network of mullahs to recruit supporters into militias. In the ensuing months progovernment and opposition militias massacred rival communities. Fighting was most intense in southwestern Tajikistan, where collective farms became battle zones and entire communities were slaughtered due to their political allegiance. By the fall thousands of people had been murdered in reprisal attacks across the country. Victims were often selected by region of origin, which was printed on identification cards, and progovernment militias targeted Gharmis and Pamiris for killing. In September opposition supporters forced President Nabiev to resign at gunpoint and flee

780  Talas, Battle of (751 CE)

the capital, but in November Emomali Rakhmonov, a supporter of the old regime, was appointed president of Tajikistan by the national assembly. In December progovernment militias, with the support of the governments of Uzbekistan and Russia, captured Dushanbe and opposition supporters were slaughtered or fled to sanctuary in Afghanistan and Gorno-Badakhshan. Supporters of the government painted the war as a victory over Islamic fundamentalism, and President Rakhmonov strengthened his grip on power, even while the civil war in Tajikistan continued to simmer along the border with Afghanistan. In early 1993 the opposition regrouped in eastern Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan, and in 1995 the opposition reorganized under the umbrella organization called the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). In Afghanistan the UTO made an alliance with the Jamiat-e Islami party, which was led by Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani (1940–2011) and renowned field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud (1953–2001). With the assistance of their Afghan allies and the use of sanctuaries in central Tajikistan, the UTO fought the government into a stalemate, and in 1995 the two sides began peace negotiations under the sponsorship of Russia and Iran. In 1997 peace accords were finalized and the opposition began to integrate into the Tajik armed forces, but the country remained unstable as individual field commanders on both sides refused to disarm. In 1997 and 1998 Colonel Mahmud Khudoiberdyev staged a pair of coup attempts, and in July 1998 three United Nations observers were murdered by IRPT militants in central Tajikistan. Some IRPT commanders in central Tajikistan refused to disarm, including a number of militants from Uzbekistan, most notably Jumma Namangani (1969–2001). In 1998 the Taliban, who had taken control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, in 1996, secured control of most of northern Afghanistan. That same year Namangani and his Uzbek followers relocated to Afghanistan, where they established the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) under the protection of the Taliban and the international terrorist organization Al Qaeda. In 1999 and 2000 the IMU used bases in central Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan to launch deadly raids in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In 2001, following Al Qaeda–sponsored terrorist attacks in the United States, a U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan. In the

ensuring fighting Namangani was killed and the IMU was decimated. David P. Straub See also Islam and War (Jihad) Further Reading Abdullaev, K. N., and Shahram Akbarzadeh. Historical Dictionary of Tajikistan. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2002. Heathershaw, John. Post-conflict Tajikistan: The Politics of Peacebuilding and the Emergence of Legitimate Order. London: Routledge, 2009. Kilavuz, Idil T. Power, Networks and Violent Conflict in Central Asia: A Comparison of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2014.

Talas, Battle of (751 CE) The Battle of Talas was fought in the summer of 751 between the forces of Tang dynasty China and a combined Arab and Tibetan army. Though the Chinese were defeated, the Arabs and Tibetans suffered heavy losses in the battle fought at the extreme edge of the political and cultural areas that both sides controlled. The Arabs fought to ensure that Islam, under its new caliph, would remain unchallenged in Central Asia, but the armies lacked the strength to fully consolidate their victory. The Chinese fought to ensure Chinese culture and religion would dominate the area, but military defeat and massive internal rebellions prevented the armies from further attempts to block Arab expansion. After a period of internal division over the leadership of the Islamic political and religious empire, the Abbasid caliphate won ascendency and launched military campaigns designed to ensure control over territory conquered over the previous century of expansion. In the east, this territory included a semi-independent kingdom along the Talas River where both the Arabs and the Chinese maintained an interest that led to several military collisions in the decades before the battle. In the spring of 751, the Arabs sent an army to the banks of the Talas River to assert their dominance and end Chinese influence in the region. The Arabs were reinforced by a large number of Tibetans that had their own grievances against the Chinese. Tang dynasty forces, similarly reinforced by Turkish tribal mercenaries, were

Taliban 781

already in the area looking for an opportunity to end Arab expansion at the expense of Chinese territorial ambitions. The site of the Battle of Talas has been lost and many of the details of the battle have not survived. Each side inflated the number of the enemy, sometimes by a factor of 10, to explain why, on the Chinese side, there was a defeat and to glorify, on the Arab side, the strength of its army and of Islam. During the fighting, the Turkish tribal mercenaries switched sides, and with an Arab frontal assault, the Chinese were crushed. Though the Chinese army retreated in haste and lost most of its strength to death in battle or capture, the Arab forces were also severely battered and unable to mount a further pursuit. With the Battle of Talas won, Islam gained a much stronger foothold in Central Asia but was unable to stamp out Chinese cultural influences or military and political meddling in the area. Further, the Buddhist religion survived and would play an important role in challenging Islamic supremacy in later centuries. This mixed result was created by the inability of the Arab armies, operating on the edges of empire, to fully control the people, or their beliefs, in Central Asia. Tang dynasty China also had a hand in creating the cultural and religious divisions within Central Asia when devastating internal rebellions forced its armies to fight within the homeland rather than become involved in a long war against the slowing pace of Arab and Islamic influence. Russell S. Perkins Further Reading Kennedy, Hugh. The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In. Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2007. Millward, James A. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Park, Hyunhee. Mapping the Chinese and Islamic Worlds: Cross-Cultural Exchange in Pre-modern Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Taliban The Taliban is a political and religious movement begun in Afghanistan in the 1990s. The word Taliban means

“students” and is an Arabic word used in many Muslim countries to signify students from madrassas (Islamic schools). In the mid-1990s, however, Afghan students from Pakistani madrassas adopted the name for a politicalreligious movement that eventually established an Islamic theocracy in much of Afghanistan. When Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1979, many young Afghan boys and other noncombatants fled the country and were lodged in refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan. During the 10-year Soviet occupation, more than 2 million refugees, mainly Pashtuns, found refuge in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), especially the tribal areas. The NWFP was also home to hundreds of fundamentalist madrassas run by the Deobandi sect, as well as Wahhabi schools established by wealthy Saudi donors. Tens of thousands of Afghan and Pakistani boys thus received a fundamentalist/Islamist education in these madrassas. Soviet forces departed Afghanistan in 1989, and Afghan communist forces met defeat in 1992, but civil war between rival mujahideen leaders erupted soon afterward. Much of the fighting pitted Pashtuns against ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras of northern and central Afghanistan. Pakistan, which hoped to establish lucrative trade routes with Central Asia, sought a strong Pashtun-dominated government to provide stability. By the mid-1990s, many refugee children were old enough to fight, and their strict, fundamentalist Islamic education made them ideal recruits for the Taliban. The Taliban emerged in 1994 when Mullah Mohammed Omar led a small group of fighters in liberating several villages from local warlords. In late 1994, Pakistan enlisted the Taliban’s support. Omar and approximately 200 fighters overran Spin Boldak and Kandahar and in the process captured many weapons, including tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Their success prompted thousands of Afghan and Pakistani students to join them. By early 1995, the Taliban controlled much of the Pashtun regions of the country. Thereafter, the Taliban confronted better organized non-Pashtun forces in northern Afghanistan. Both sides committed numerous atrocities, mainly against rival ethnic groups. Despite several defeats, the Taliban captured Herat in 1995, Kabul in 1996, Mazar-i Sharif in 1998, and Taloqan in 1999. By 2000, fighting had largely stalemated

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with the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance bottled up in northeastern Afghanistan and portions of central Afghanistan, although it still controlled Afghanistan’s United Nations (UN) seat. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries to recognize the Taliban government. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and various Arab Gulf states also provided weapons to the Taliban, while India, Iran, Russia, and the Central Asian states supported the Northern Alliance. Ironically, the United States initially leaned toward supporting the Taliban, but that changed after the Taliban offered sanctuary to the terrorist group Al Qaeda. Widespread human rights violations provoked international condemnation, but the Taliban consistently ignored outside criticism. Their version of an Islamic theocracy was perhaps the harshest ever seen in the Muslim world. Women were virtually imprisoned in their homes, medieval-like Islamic punishment became routine for criminal offenses, and international aid organizations were expelled, with no attempt to provide for millions of destitute Afghans. The Taliban even went so far as to destroy priceless historical and cultural treasures, such as the Buddhas of Bamiyan, which they claimed were blasphemous to Islam. The Taliban’s downfall came following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, when the Americans and other allies launched major military operations in support of the Northern Alliance in October 2001. The United States sought to topple the Taliban because it had failed to turn over Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden after the attacks and because it continued to give refuge to terrorists. Disenchanted Pashtuns rose up as well and established a Southern Alliance. Within weeks, most of the Taliban and foreign jihadists had fled to the tribal areas, where they found sanctuary. This autonomous region had historically resisted British and Pakistani control. Fearing the internal consequences, the Pakistani government refused to conduct sustained counterinsurgency operations there after the September 11 attacks. Consequently, the Taliban used the area to rebuild its forces. Although weakened, the Taliban remains a potent threat in the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan, and Pakistan and coalition forces continue to do battle with its fighters in Afghanistan. Since 2007, the number of Talibaninspired attacks in Afghanistan has risen steadily, so much

so that the United States and other coalition nations have had to expend more troops and resources to counter the Taliban resurgence. Chuck Fahrer See also Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Cold War, Religious Dimensions of; Islam and War (Jihad); Mujahideen; Radical Islam in the 20th Century; Wahhabism Further Reading Abbas, Hasan. The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Press, 2004. Euben, Roxanne Leslie, and Muhammad Qasim. Princeton Readings in Islamic Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Bamma to Bin Laden. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. Goodson, Larry P. Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001. Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001. Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010. Zaeef, Abdul Salem. My Life with the Taliban. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Talmud and War The Talmud is the most important and authoritative corpus of Jewish law and lore. The writing and editing of the Talmud’s multiple layers of legal and nonlegal disputes spanned several centuries, roughly the first halfmillennium of the Common Era. Its earliest stages were commenced at the twilight end of Jewish monarchy, but the overwhelming majority of the Talmud’s elements antedate the total demise of national sovereignty. Hence, the Talmud’s handling of war bears the imprint of exile, as it was contemplated under conditions of de facto Roman conquest. As a consequence, the concept of war oscillates between a purely theoretical construct and a real-life reality concerning which the sages of the Talmud typically

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found themselves at the receiving end. Moral dilemmas relating to war were typically tackled from the perspective of the unempowered party in self-defense. Additionally, writing under Roman occupation may have inhibited the sages of the Talmud from developing nationalist themes, particularly of armed conflict. This has been suggested as a reason why the story of Hanukkah is conspicuously sidelined in Talmudic literature. The sages of the Talmud also theorized about war as a future apocalyptic reality. War constitutes the prelude to the ultimate period of messianic peace. Perhaps precisely because of this semi-unreality of the concept of war, it became a ready metaphor for the Talmudic sages’ own interaction and debates. Terminology of armed battle was sublimated in exile to relate to the very act of intellectual conflict in which the Talmud itself is involved. And so, the authors of the Talmud speak of war in four senses: as a theoretical idea, as a reality imposed upon them by external threats, as a messianic future event, and as a metaphorical literary construct.

War As a Theoretical Reality

As a work of legal theory, the Talmud discusses religious rules of law for a reality of war that was on the whole no longer applicable. The Talmud develops the categories of Milhemet Misvah and Milhemet Reshut, distinguishing obligatory and discretionary war, respectively. It speaks of the rules under which a king may declare war and the political and religious support he must receive, and it analyzes biblical obligations relating to how to carry out battle and pursue peace, laws of setting siege and distributing booty, and so on. From the perspective of the Talmud these issues are real legal concerns. But the sages who discussed these issues did not themselves experience the application of these laws, nor did they, on the whole, have experience of the reality of a Jewish monarchy and army concerning which they theorized. For this reason, the practical component of these discussions lacks much of the rich nuance that ensues from practical contingency and is the Talmud’s signature in other areas. This fact has become a challenge in recent decades with the new reality of a Jewish state, albeit secular. Rabbinic analysis of the laws of war requires a degree of analogous borrowing from other similar areas of religious law. These include, particularly, Talmudic discussions that deal with

comparable life-threatening situations that were more practically relevant over Jewish history, such as self-defense killing. Issues of sovereignty, however, are not fully taken account of in these discussions. The direct application of laws of killing out of self-defense to military matters has created two types of limitation: It provides insufficient tools for strategic considerations, such as preemptive strikes and military follow-up, and it lowers the sovereign itself onto an equal playing field with common citizens. This last complexity can cause misunderstanding of the basis of sovereign war, and it become an alibi for extremist paramilitary organizations or even support for assassination of political leaders.

War As an Imposed Reality

Even without the sovereign possibility of declaring and making war, imposed military threats were of course a reality throughout Jewish history. The Talmud analyzes complex moral dilemmas relating to handing over individuals when named by a military force that threatens an entire town’s destruction (Jerusalem Talmud, Terumoth 8:4). The Talmud also discusses at length the complex problem of paying exorbitant ransoms for kidnapped individuals (Gittin 45–46, Ketuboth 52a). Both issues were typical of foreign occupation and have been discussed considerably by Talmudists for close to 2,000 years. While such issues are not themselves necessary components of war, they are commonly associated with warlike situations and naturally occur in battle. As a consequence, these rulings have been raised in modern Israel in the context of terrorist kidnappings. Naturally, some current authorities have noted the distinction that soldiers taken captive in battle should be viewed differently from kidnapped noncombatants. Another relevant moral ruling is the prohibition against selling arms, in order to be clear of responsibility ensuing from their use (Avoda Zara 15b–16a). The very existence of this prohibition shows that Jews in ancient times, while not directly involved in battle, were not divorced from its moral trappings. More directly relevant to classical war, the Talmud rules battle of self-defense permitted on the Sabbath, since it is a life-threatening situation. The Talmud even sanctions battle on the Sabbath in response to a non-life-threatening attack of plunder when it takes place on the geographical

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periphery of a country, and as such represents a wider threat (Eruvin 45a). This wider conception of physical danger provides the basis of abstract legal thinking to relate to the concept of an existential threat in battle from a strategic perspective.

War As a Premessianic Event

The sages of the Talmud envisioned a future messianic period of national sovereignty. They disputed whether war would be a reality in messianic times, but it was clear to them that it would be a feature of the prelude to the messianic era. During the Bar Kochba revolts a short-lived Jewish paramilitary force was in place in Israel. Rabbi Akiva, the greatest sage of the period, believed Bar Kochba to be the Messiah (Jerusalem Talmud, Ta’anit 4:5), and there is even a tradition that he was Bar Kochba’s arms carrier (Maimonides, Hilchot Melachim 11:3). Indeed, the Talmudic sages envisioned the future messiah as initially “fighting the wars of God.” The question of the reality of war after the commencement of the messianic era was, for the Talmudic sages, dependent upon one’s interpretation of biblical verses that seem to foretell the redundancy of arms and military training. It was particularly disputed whether Isaiah’s prophecy foretelling the grinding of swords into plowshares (Isaiah 2:4 and Micha 4:3) should be read literally. The Talmudic sages who interpreted the verse metaphorically understood it to declare that the messianic period would exemplify a de facto peace, due to the Messiah’s ascendancy, rather than an unnatural reality in which militarism is no longer relevant. Other sages read this verse, which foretells the cessation of military training, as describing a future era in which militarism is literally rendered redundant, due to divine miraculous intervention (Shabbath 63a). This dispute was interpreted within Talmudic literature as hinging on the issue of whether the messianic era will be miraculous (ibid.). According to this interpretation, the redundancy of militarism would require a miracle. An important corollary of the dispute relating to the continued existence of war in the messianic era concerns how arms should be viewed today from a religious perspective. The position that maintains that at the time of the Messiah militarism will no longer exist holds as a corollary

of this that religious perspectives upon arms should be negative even today (ibid.). This position was developed further in 13th-century pietistic literature.

War As Metaphor for Talmudic Debate

Perhaps due to the de facto unreality of active war under Roman occupation, the concept of war seems to have been sublimated in the Talmud into the concept of intellectual conflict. A singular Talmudic source suggests that intellectual debate actually turned physically violent on one particular occasion (interestingly, prior to the total demise of national sovereignty) (Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 1:4, Babylonian Talmud 17a). Barring this singular occurrence, we have no account of physical violence in intellectual disputes. Nevertheless, the Talmudic sages typically employed metaphors of battle to describe their own study. They applied analogically militaristic verses from Psalms, written during Jewish national sovereignty, to their own very different situation. “Enemies at the gate” (Psalms 127) became study partners, even “father and son, master and student” (Kidushin 30b). “Arrows” (Psalms 45, 120, 127) became intellectual arguments (Kidushin ibid.). Such metaphors are telling. Some of the more public occurrences of Talmudic debate exhibited extreme social tension. On rare occasions the tension led to personal grudge (Moed Katan 16a–b), social fissure (Bava Metzia 84b), or even excommunication (Bava Metzia 59b). But even common intellectual debate seems to have included a challenging element, often far from tranquil. Talmudic sages even spoke self-consciously of themselves in such terms (Sanhedrin 24a). One rabbi praised for his challenging intellectual approach had indeed been a gangster before becoming a sage, and he himself compared his two careers (Bava Metzia 84a). In a culture robbed of national sovereignty and centered around faith, conflict became sublimated into the manner of religious intellectual debate. Elements of Talmudic literature over the generations and some traditions of Talmudic study retain and exemplify this theme of active conflict in study. However, the Talmud itself clarifies that this mode of conflict should ideally be restricted to form and should ultimately lead to comradeship and “love in the end” (Kidushin 30b). S. D. Rosen

Tamil Tigers  785 See also Bar Kochba Revolt; Judaism and War; Maimonides; Milhemet Misvah; Milhemet Reshut Further Reading Bosker, Ben Zion. The Wisdom of the Talmud: A Thousand Years of Jewish Thought. New York: Citadel, 2001. Bosker, Ben Zion, and Baruch M. Bosker. The Talmud: Selected Writings. New York: Paulist Press, 1989. Gersh, Harry. Talmud: Law and Commentary. Springfield, NJ: Behrman House, 1986.

Tamil Tigers The Tamil Tigers (also known as the LTTE, for Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) was an organization dedicated to establishing an autonomous state in Sri Lanka for the Tamil people, an ethnic and religious minority within Sri Lanka. The majority ethnic group in Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese, make up about 75 percent of the population of the island of nearly 20 million people. Most Sinhalese are Buddhists, while the majority of Tamils are Hindu. The existence of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka was a consequence of British colonial history. Hindu Tamils were brought to Sri Lanka by the British in the 18th and 19th centuries to work on the plantations. Over time the Tamil families grew, eventually becoming a larger percentage of the population. Following Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948 (the country was known as Ceylon at the time), relations between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese population broke down. Under British rule, the Tamils maitained rough parity with their Sinhalese neighbors, but as an ethnic as well as political minority in the newly independent country, they were relegated to second-class citizenship. The Sinhalese government implemented several laws that worked against the Tamils and their culture, isolating them both politically and socially. As a response to these developments, the first groups of the Tamil Tigers were founded in 1976. Their charismatic leader was Vellupilai Prabhakaran (1954–2009), who led the military group of separatists and liberationists against the official government of Sri Lanka. At first, the Tigers waged only small-scale attacks against the military, but due to the radicalization of both sides the violence and

radical nature of the conflict increased. In 1979 the Tamil groups united in the LTTE and started to coordinate their actions more efficiently. From that point, the Tamil Tigers started a violent campaign, which was to overthrow the government and secure Tamil autonomy in the northeast of Sri Lanka. When the LTTE killed 13 government soldiers, the officials in Colombo answered with anti-Tamil actions, leading to several thousand dead. This event marked the beginning of the civil war in Sri Lanka. As a consequence, the Tamil unrest became more violent and a relatively low-level of violence erupted to become a cruel civil war in which both sides fought mercilessly. The Tamil Tigers now adapted tactics of organized terrorism in addition to their usual guerrilla tactics. Furthermore, they formed special units (Black Tigers) for terrorism or assassinations and their own navy (Sea Tigers) and air force (Air Tigers). Step by step the Tamil Tigers were able to export the violence from their territory in the northeast to the center of Sri Lanka, where they attacked the Sinhala majority. Even the capital of the country, Colombo, was attacked by the rebels several times. The government and the military remained unable to solve this problem until the leader of the Tamil Tigers was shot in 2009 and the group was defeated through a major campaign. However, the Tamil Tigers were not a national problem, because they became a part of the international Tamil diaspora. Following the radicalization in 1983, many Tamils had left their country to start a new and more secure life abroad. Just one year later, the first LTTE Front organization was opened in London. The international network of the Tamil Tigers was used to collect financial aid to support their fight for independence, so the guerrilla organization established itself as a visible part of the diaspora. Front organizations were established in 48 countries around the globe and the money kept the Tamil Tigers alive for a long time. When India intervened in 1988 they were able to achieve a cease-fire, and Indian soldiers were sent to Sri Lanka to keep the peace. They became part of the conflict and until 1990, when the Indian soldiers retreated again, 1,200 of them had lost their lives in the struggle. The Tamil Tigers had exported their fight to India to take revenge for Indian interference, and they killed the Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi just one year after the retreat of the Indian troops.

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The conflict continued for another 18 years. When Mahinda Rajpakasa became president of Sri Lanka in 2005 he promised to end the fighting, and unrelenting action was taken by government troops to crush the Tamil Tigers once and for all. Government troops finally defeated the Tamil Tigers in a series of vicious military campaigns and Vellupilai Prabhakaran was killed in 2009. Even if his subordinates had been able to take over his leadership, they were not able to continue the fight against the government, which was able to find a military solution to this ethnic conflict. Due to the fact that the most Tamils living abroad are not willing to return, this could mean the end of the conflict, but as long as the Tamils are not accepted as equals in Sri Lanka, the conflict might erupt again in the future. Frank Jacob See also Buddhism and War; Hunduism and War Further Reading Balasinghame, Adele. The Will to Freedom: An Inside View of Tamil Resistance. Mitcham: Fairmax, 2001. Hassan, S. Azmat. Countering Violent Extremism. The Fate of the Tamil Tigers. New York: EastWest Institute, 2009. Smith, Niel A. “Understanding Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers.” Joint Force Quarterly 59, no. 4 (2010): 40–44.

Tannenburg, Battle of (1410) The Battle of Tannenburg, also known as the Battle of Grunwald, was the decisive engagement in the war fought by the Teutonic Knights against an alliance between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The outcome of the battle changed social and religious dynamics and the bounds of power in northern Europe. The Teutonic Knights were a crusading order founded in 1143 to protect pilgrims in the Holy Land. Never achieving the level of influence or renown of the older Knights Templar or Knights of St. John (Hospitallers), the order focused its efforts in Eastern Europe. Initially coming to the aid of the court in Hungary, the order was later expelled from Hungary due to its growing influence. Subsequently granted permission by the Holy Roman Emperor to crusade against the pagan Baltic Prussians, the Knights

subjugated the region and were subsequently granted charters by both the emperor and the pope to rule Prussia. The order continued to proselytize by the sword along the Baltic coast, expanding the area under their control northward from their Prussian base (modern coastal Poland), eventually encompassing modern-day Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. All of these conquests were conducted with the sanction of the church for the purpose of converting the native populations to Christianity. The Knights reached the height of their power in the late 14th century. The expansion of their temporal power brought them into conflict with Catholic Poland as well as yet unconverted Lithuania. In 1385, the marriage of the grand duke of Lithuania to the queen of Poland and his assumption of the throne in Poland under the regnal name Wladyslaw II Jagiello began the formal process of converting Lithuania to Christianity, thus removing the religious rationale for the ongoing operations of the Teutonic Knights in the region. Driven by ongoing territorial disputes with both Lithuania and Poland as well as festering commercial disputes resulting from Teutonic control of access to the Baltic for the region’s largest rivers, the grand master of the order, Ulrich von Jungingen, engaged in diplomatic and religious maneuvering in addition to preparations for war. He engaged in diplomacy with Hungary, King Wenceslas of the Romans, and the Holy Roman Emperor. His predecessor had also attempted to challenge the sincerity of the conversions of Wladyslaw and his cousin, who succeeded him as grand duke. Differences over the propriety of this approach and resistance to the rule of the order among Prussian nobles led to the formation of the Lizard Union, which nominally sought to combat lawlessness. This group, predominantly from Chelmno Land, appears to have sought to transfer allegiance of the region to Poland. Declaring war in August 1409, the grand master hoped to divide Poland and Lithuania and defeat each in detail. His adversaries countered by spurning diplomatic efforts to divide them and sending a unified force against the Teutonic Knights. Sources vary widely regarding the number of troops fielded by each side, but the general consensus suggests that the Polish-Lithuanian contingent enjoyed a significant advantage with at least half again, and perhaps as many as twice as many troops as the Teutonic forces.

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Both sides employed significant numbers of mercenaries and troops from sympathetic powers, giving each army a multiethnic character. Relying on military discipline, the Teutonic forces attempted to provoke their adversaries into attacking a prepared position. Part of this tactic included the dispatch of two emissaries to the Polish king and Lithuanians bearing swords to assist them. Meant as an insult and provocation, the weapons, the Grunwald Swords, instead became a patriotic symbol in Poland following the Polish victory. The attack began with an advance by the Lithuanian contingent, which was repulsed largely due to a countercharge by the Teutonic heavy cavalry. The subsequent pursuit left this force unable to recover in time to aid their confederates when the Polish contingent advanced to exploit the disorganization within Teutonic ranks. The advance of the Polish troops forced Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen to commit his reserves, personally leading the countercharge. The death of the Teutonic commander during this action led to the collapse of the entire line. The troops that had earlier pursued the Lithuanians could not recover in time and a general rout ensued. Several accounts suggest that the Knights attempted to reform amid the baggage, creating temporary fortifications from the wagons. The same sources report that the casualties were higher during this final, confused phase of the battle than during the earlier action. The war did not end immediately. The heavy losses suffered by the Teutonic Knights led to the surrender of several castles without significant resistance. The Knights were able to hold their Prussian capital of Marienburg as the Polish-Lithuanian forces were slow to advance following the battle. The conflict terminated with the Treaty of Thorn in February 1411. King Wladyslaw and Grand Duke Vytautus were unable to translate military victory into significant territorial gains. They were successful in imposing a crippling indemnity on the Teutonic Knights. Two additional short wars were subsequently fought in the region before the Treaty of Melno settled the territorial disputes. The financial burdens imposed on the order and the recognition that the disputed territories had been christened led to a dramatic decline in the fortunes of the Teutonic Knights. The former factor led to the imposition of taxes that drove several prominent cities to revolt. The

recognition of the Christian character of the disputed lands also led to a decline in recruitment of replacements for the significant losses suffered during the battle. This in turn forced the order to rely increasingly on mercenary troops, the expense of which further aggravated its financial problems. The decline in influence experienced by the Teutonic Knights also created political space for the rise of the Hohenzollern dynasty, with a significant impact on future religious conflicts. K. J. Delamer See also Crusades (Overview); Religious Military Orders Further Reading Christensen, Eric. The Northern Crusades. 2nd ed. New York: Penguin, 1997. Turnbull, Stephen R. Tannenburg 1410: Disaster for the Teutonic Knights. Oxford: Osprey, 2003. Urban, William. The Teutonic Knights: A Military History. London: Greenhill, 2003; reprint, St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2005.

Taraori (Tarain), Battles of (1191–1192) The Battles of Taraori (Tarain) were two battles that contributed to the establishment of Muslim rule in India. Islam had been known in India through Muslim traders soon after the death of Muhammad. The first Muslim military expedition against India occurred in the late seventh century, and in 712, Muhammad ibn Kasim invaded and conquered the impoverished north Indian province of Sind. There was, however, no Arab military move against the interior of the subcontinent. It would not be the Arabs but the Turkic tribes of the Central Asian steppes who, having conquered Persia and Afghanistan, would carry the Muslim faith into India. In 1000, Mahmud of Ghazna launched the first of more than a dozen military expeditions into Hindustan, in north India, over a 26-year period. His objectives were monetary and religious. He sought to acquire the wealth of India, but he also wanted to propagate the faith and eradicate what he regarded as the false Indian religions. He became known as the “Idol Breaker” because of his wanton destruction of Indian temples. Mahmud looted but did not build, yet for a

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time his capital of Ghazna was one of the world’s wealthiest cities. Early in the 12th century, Ghazna came under challenge from the Afghan fortress city of Ghur. The struggle between Ghur and Ghazna was at first inconclusive, but in 1174 the soldiers of Ghur triumphed when Ghiyas-ad-Din captured Ghazna and placed his brother Mu’izz al-Din on its throne. The latter came to be known as Muhammad of Ghur. Muhammad of Ghur immediately set out to expand his influence into India. In 1182, he conquered Sind, and three years later he secured control of Punjab in northwestern India and westernmost Hindustan. Where his predecessors had relied on Hindu levies, Muhammad employed only Ottomans and Afghans, reliable Muslims who would be zealous in carrying out a religious war against the Hindus. In the winter of 1190–1191, Muhammad invaded south from the Punjab into Rajputana. That state’s soldiers were well disciplined and skilled fighters, loyal to their ruler, King Prithvaraja, who was also a capable general. Muhammad’s troops soon captured the border fortress town of Bathinda and garrisoned it with 1,200 cavalry. King Prithvaraja immediately responded; the battle between the two sides occurred near Panipat, some 90 miles north of Delhi. It is known variously as Tarain, Narain, and, most recently, Taraori. No precise date for the battle is available, but it took place in 1191. The size of the armies is also not known, although reputedly the Rajputs were the more numerous. The battle began with Muhammad of Ghur launching a cavalry attack against the Rajput center, firing arrows. The Rajputs stood firm, mounting flanking attacks that forced a Muslim retreat. To save the situation Muhammad led a charge at the enemy line. Reportedly, he fought personally with King Prithvaraja’s brother, Govind Tai, viceroy of Delhi. Govind Tai was mortally wounded but managed to wound Muhammad seriously in the arm. Muhammad escaped and joined his retreating army, which withdrew to Ghur. Rather than pursue, the Rajputs proceeded to Bhatinda, which they recaptured after a 13-month siege. Muhammad recovered from his wound and mounted a new campaign the next year with a large force of Afghans, Persians, and Ottomans that may have totaled 120,000 men. The battle occurred on the same battlefield sometime in 1192, although this time Muhammad was careful not to engage with the well-disciplined Rajputs. He formed his

army in five divisions and sent four of these to attack the Rajput flanks and rear. If pressed, they were to feign retreat to try to break the Rajput unit cohesion. The flanking attacks failed in their design, and the fighting continued for most of the day, but when Muhammad ordered his fifth division to pretend to withdraw in panic, the ruse worked and the Rajputs charged, breaking their unit cohesion. Muhammad then threw a fresh cavalry unit of 12,000 men into the battle, and they threw back the Rajput advance. The remaining Muslim forces turned and pursued, sending the Rajputs fleeing in panic. With the Muslims almost on him, King Prithvanaja abandoned his elephant for a horse in an attempt to escape. He was ridden down and captured some miles from the battlefield, and promptly executed. Most of his subordinate commanders were also killed. Muhammad annexed Rajputana, but he was not content with this. With the victory at Taraori, there was no armed force in India capable of withstanding him. In 1193, his forces took Bihar Province, the center of Buddhism. Buddhism was virtually eradicated there, forcing its practitioners to flee to Tibet and Nepal and ensuring that this religion would spread in China and not India. Over the next several years Muhammad’s armies expanded his control to the east and throughout northern India. In 1202, one of the armies reached Bengal, completing the annexation of Hindustan. Spencer C. Tucker See also India, Muslim Conquest of Northern Further Reading Haig, Sir Wolseley, ed. The Cambridge History of India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965. Kar, Hemendra C. Military History of India. Calcutta: Firma, 1980. Narvane, M. S. Battles of Medieval India. New Delhi: APH, 1996.

Tarsusi, Ali ibn Mardi al (12th Century CE) Ali ibn Mardi (or Murda) al-Tarsusi (known also as Mardi ibn Ali al-Tarsusi) was the author of a 12th-century military treatise. He supposedly hailed from Alexandria, Egypt,

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but his family was of Armenian origin. His treatise, often cited by the shortened title Tabsirat arbab al-albab but whose full English translation is rendered Information for the Intelligent on How to Escape Injury in Combat and the Unfurling of the Banners of Instruction on Equipment and Engines Which Assist in Encounters with Enemies, was composed for the Ayyubid sultan Salah al-Din (Saladin). The treatise provides a record of many well-known weapons but details newer innovations in siege weaponry as well. The definitive date when the Tabsirat was written is disputed. Scholars place the date of authorship between 1169 and 1193 with some scholars ascribing dates such as 1174 and 1187. A manuscript of al-Tarsusi’s treatise containing illustrations of some weapons is still in existence and has been edited and partially translated into French. The treatise is divided into sections wherein various military equipment is described including swords, bows and crossbows, lances, shields, armor, maces and clubs, rams, mangonels/trebuchets, towers and shelters, incendiary weapons, and ordnances. Generally in each section, al-Tarsusi provides an introduction to the category of weapon/device; different varieties of the weapon, their names and production method; and additional citations and references about the weapon/device. He also describes the most effective applications of these, the types favored by different armies, and, on occasion, tactics. Frequently mentioned in the treatise as a source of al-Tarsusi’s knowledge is a fellow Alexandrian schooled in warfare, Abu Hasan al-Abraqi al-Iskandarani. Scholars have found interest in a number of the different portions of the Tabsirat. Much attention has been given to the section addressing bows and crossbows (qaws). Al-Tarsusi is brief when describing two crossbows he referred to as the ‘aqqar and jarkh, variations of the crossbow, which scholars have assumed were quite well known. Instead, he devotes a larger portion of that section to familiarize readers with the ziyar, thought to be similar to an espringal, qaws al-rijl, and husban. Another section of interest provides details regarding incendiary weapons, which focuses primarily on Greek fire (naft). In that section, al-Tarsusi enumerates multiple ingredients and various ways the substance could be concocted. The most important contribution of the Tabsirat is the section on mangonels/trebuchets (manjaniq). He identifies

three primary types: Arab; Turkish, which is also called Persian; and Frankish. A fourth type is also identified, which is called a lu‘ba. After initially describing the Turkish/Persian manjaniq, he then provides a description of a device referred to only as the Persian manjaniq. This device is the first occasion a counterweight projectile launcher, commonly referred to as a trebuchet, has ever been described and illustrated. Other projectile launchers relied on human power for operation, which is either referred to as a mangonel or a torsion/traction trebuchet. Al-Tarsusi described how weights on the opposing arm of the Persian manjaniq would allow the device to launch its projectiles instead of needing to apply human force. Al-Tarsusi’s Tabsirat has thus been solidified as an important contribution to the study of medieval weaponry. Matthew Long See also Saladin Further Reading al-Tarsusi, Mardi ibn Ali. Contribution à l’étude de l’archerie Musulmane, Principalement d’après le manuscrit d’Oxford Bodléienne Huntington No 264. Edited and translated by Antoine Boudot-Lamotte. Damacus: Institut français de Damas, 1968. Cahen, Claude. “Un traité d’armurerie composé pour Saladin.” Bulletin d’Etudes Orientales 12 (1947): 103–63. Chevedden, Paul. “The Artillery of King James I the Conquerer.” In P. Chevedden et al., eds. Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages. Vol. 2. Leiden: Brill, 1996. Hillenbrand, Carole. The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 2000.

Ten Kings, Battle of (2900 BCE) The Rig Veda, one of the oldest Indian religious texts, provides reference to the Battle of the Ten Kings, also known as Dashradnya Yuddha, which occurred in approximately 2900 BCE. In the Rig Veda, the Vedic hymns in book 7, hymns 18, 33, and 83.4–8 sing in praise of the gods, including Soma the moon god, Agni the fire god, Varuna the wind god, and Indra the rain god. The battle is one of many such battles and wars that are included in Hindu mythology.

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King Sudas of the North Panchal kingdom, the hero of the battle, defeated other Vedic tribes assisted with and guided by the sage Vasishtha. Sudas, the king of the Puru clan, reestablished the dominance of the Trtsu-Bharata over smaller tribal chieftains and royal kingdoms of the Septa-Sindhu region and laid the foundations of Bharatvarsha from Afghanistan in the west to the foothills of the Himalayas in the east. The battle also helped in spreading the Vedic culture and belief system to other parts of the world. It is believed that King Sudas wanted to promote spiritual values, and this led to Aryan migration to other foreign lands. Aryans spread into what is today Iran, Iraq, and Egypt. The Rig Veda hymns 7.18, 7.19, and 7.33, composed by Vasishtha, describe the war in detail. Hymn 7.18.5 locates the battle along the banks of the Parushi River in Punjab. The enemies of King Sudas were the 10 kings Bhrugu, Matsya, Turvasha, Druhyu, Vaikamas, Pruthus, Parshus, Simyu, Shivi, and Vishanim. King Sudas’s warriors are described as white-robed with flying banners. King Sudas’s enemies, the 10 kings, were defeated. The Rig Veda reports that a total of 6,666 people lost their lives. As a result of the battle and the subsequent migration, King Sudas, the ancestor of Lord Shri Ram, is considered to be responsible for the establishment of Aryan culture across the region of contemporary Iraq and Iran. Amitabh Vikram Dwivedi See also Hindu Mythological Wars; Hinduism and War Further Reading Gowen, H. H. A History of Indian Literature from Vedic Times to the Present Day. New York: Greenwood Press, 1968. Shastri, G. B. A History of Vedic Literature. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1982.

Terrorism and Religion Terrorism is a tactic used by publicly subversive violent movements, including some movements that involve religious factors. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014) defines terror as “violent or destructive acts (such as bombing) committed by groups to intimidate a population or government into granting their demands.” At its core, terrorism is

the intentional targeting and abuse of innocent civilians and noncombatants for political power. Terrorism occurs entirely apart from religion. Thus terrorism is not a religious phenomenon per se, but when coupled with the catalyst of religion and religious fervor, it can become extremely difficult to combat and its intensity can increase. Terrorism researchers find that core tendencies and motivations for terrorism tend to be primarily secular in orientation, aiming to achieve political objectives in the here and now. The fundamental thrusts of terrorism often include pursuing social causes, reacting to grievances, and seeking to recover hurt dignity. However, some terrorists combine religious factors (e.g., beliefs, group identity, symbols) together with terrorism. In some instances, this may result in an intensification of terrorism. Religiously motivated terrorism is not limited to any single religion. Throughout the centuries the tactics of terrorism have been utilized by fringe elements of many of the world’s religions and religious movements. As an example of the latter, the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin chemical attack by the Aum Shinrikyo (“Supreme Truth”) movement killed 12 people and injured 5,500. There are a number of different categories through which the phenomenon of the mixture between terrorism and religion can be viewed. They are as follows: • Cosmic Significance. Cosmic, transcendent meaning can be attached to and thus may amplify stated motivations and the power of identity markers such as symbols. • Eschatology. Religious narratives of “end times” or “day of judgment” may extend the time terrorists are willing to struggle if they claim the redemption they seek can happen only during the “end times.” Such eschatological narratives may also be used by groups to justify extreme use of violence, if they come to believe that an end of such staggering proportion justifies any means. • Identity. Affiliation with a religion may be used to define the identity of a group or a movement and thus to separate it from other groups. This may include conflation of an ethnic identity with a religious identity, and this may even involve nonbelievers identifying themselves by religion.

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• Ideology. Sacred texts of a religion may be used in the rhetoric and slogans of terrorist movements. This often involves use of a few selected passages of texts a religion considers sacred, used apart from their context and apart from the religion’s own more nuanced, complex interpretive traditions. • Sacrifice. Some terrorists associating themselves with religion have a heightened emphasis on sacrifice, both the self-sacrifice of martyrdom and the ritual-like sacrifice of victims. • Satanic Conceptualization of the Enemy. When religion is a factor in terrorism, some fighters may develop cosmically extreme notions of their opponents, sometimes even labeling their opponents as satanic. One consequence of this can be that fighters begin to consider transformation of or peaceful coexistence with their opponents utterly impossible and thus the fighters tell themselves that outright elimination—not just fighting against, but elimination—of their opponents is both justified and necessary. For the religiously motivated terrorist the act of violence is often understood as being divinely directed or commanded. The terrorist is acting primarily out of religious fervor and is committing the act as a religious obligation. There is often a heightened sense of the cosmic or spiritual importance of the act and the expectation that it will make a significant change in history. It is viewed as cosmic conflict in worldly warfare—heavenly warfare on earthly battlefields. For the religious terrorist, there is symbolism, sacrifice, and sacredness in the violent act being performed. The fusing of religion and violence is not new. In the first century CE, Jewish radicals opposed to occupation by Rome used tactics such as poisoning wells and granaries and became known as “zealots.” During the age of the crusades an offshoot of the Ismaili branch of Islam mixed apocalyptic hopes with terrorist acts and gained the name “assassins.” For centuries in India, religious extremists systematically strangled travelers with a silk tie as sacrificial offerings to the Hindu goddess Kali and became known as “thugs.” More recently, the rise of religious terrorists or terrorists and organizations with religious sympathies or compo-

nents in their terrorist acts are illustrated by such groups in the Middle East as Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State. In Africa, Boko Haram has been very active in Nigeria, and in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, the Al Qaeda affiliate Al Shabaab has engaged in terrorism. In the Philippines, radical Islamist groups such as Abu Sayyaf have been very active since 2000. In India, terrorism associated with rising Hindu nationalism has also occurred, illustrating the blending of nationalism with religion in some terrorist acts. Shifting allegiances and alliances within terrorist groups occurs frequently, and whether the terrorist group or individual is motivated primarily by religion or something else, the tactic of terrorism remains a 21st-century concern. When it is tied to religion, terrorism is a powerful force for violence. Jennifer S. Bryson See also Al Qaeda; Al Shabaab; Bin Laden, Osama; Boko Haram; Hamas; Hezbollah; Islamic State; Wahhabism; Primary Documents: Defining Terrorism: UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (October 8, 2004); Declaration of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation from the First Jewish-Hindu Leadership Summit (February 5–6, 2007) Further Reading Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. Juergensmeyer, Mark, Margo Kitts, and Michael Jerryson. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Kakar, Sudhir. The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion, and Conflict. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Murphy, Andrew, ed. The Blackwell Companion in Religion and Violence. London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. Staub, Erwin. Overcoming Evil: Genocide, Violent Conflict, and Terrorism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Third Crusade (1189–1192) Initiated in response to Saladin’s defeat of the forces of the Kingdom of Jerusalem at the Battle of Hattin (July 4, 1187) and his subsequent capture of the city of Jerusalem (October 2, 1187), this campaign did not recapture the Holy City,

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but did reestablish the Kingdom of Jerusalem in much reduced form and laid the basis for its continued existence for another century. It is arguably the best-known crusade to modern readers after the First Crusade, because of the involvement of Saladin and of King Richard I of England. Nevertheless, the Third Crusade has received less modern critical analysis than others, perhaps because of the complexity of the campaigns and of the extensive primary sources that have survived.

Origins

At Hattin the Muslims captured Guy of Lusignan, King of Jerusalem, and many leading nobles, along with the True Cross, the sacred symbol of the kingdom. This defeat left very few able-bodied warriors for the defense of Christian Palestine. Saladin went on to capture the important port of Acre (mod. ‘Akko, Israel), as well as Beirut, Sidon (mod. Saïda, Lebanon), Ascalon (mod. Tel Ashqelon, Israel), and Jerusalem itself. He failed to take the coastal city of Tyre (mod. Soûr, Lebanon), which was defended by Conrad, Marquis of Montferrat, who had recently arrived by ship on pilgrimage; his naval attacks were repelled by ships from the powerful Italian maritime cities of Genoa and Pisa. With fortresses such as Kerak and Montréal in Transjordan and Saphet and Belvoir in Galilee also resisting, Saladin went on to make other conquests in Palestine, and in late spring 1188 moved north, campaigning against the Frankish states of Tripoli and Antioch. Saladin released King Guy from prison in May 1188, on condition that he should return to the West. Instead Guy went to the island of Ruad (mod. Arwād, Syria) opposite Tortosa to meet Queen Sibyl, and they proceeded to Antioch (mod. Antakya, Turkey), where they assembled an army. Crusaders were already beginning to arrive in the East.

The Beginnings of the Crusade

The news of the disaster at Hattin and the fall of Jerusalem was transmitted to the West in letters written by various individuals and groups, such as Patriarch Eraclius of Jerusalem, the Genoese consuls, and the grand commander of the Order of the Temple. Pope Urban III died shortly after hearing the news of the disaster at Hattin. His successor, Gregory VIII, issued a crusading bull entitled Audita tremendi, describing the terrible events in the East and

urging all Christians to take up arms and go to help their fellow religionists. They would receive certain benefits, such as release from penance imposed for all sins for which they had made proper confession. Archbishop Joscius of Tyre traveled to the West to seek aid and was given papal permission to preach the crusade north of the Alps. In January 1188, he succeeded in negotiating a peace settlement between Philip II of France and Henry II of England, in which both kings agreed to take the cross and lead a joint expedition to the East. They planned to set out at Easter 1189, but a renewed outbreak of war delayed their departure. Other individuals and groups set out in the meantime. Geoffrey of Lusignan, elder brother of King Guy of Jerusalem, reached the East in the second half of 1188 or early 1189; King William II of Sicily sent a fleet of 50 ships under his admiral Margarit. By August 1189 Guy had (according to one contemporary writer) a force of around 9,000, including 700 knights, and the support of the Pisans, whose ships gave him valuable sea power. With this army he began to besiege the port of Acre. If the city could be recaptured, it could act as the base for a counterattack on Saladin in Palestine. But Marquis Conrad, who still held Tyre, refused aid.

The First Stage of the Crusade: The Siege of Acre

Other crusaders flocked to join the siege of Acre during the autumn of 1189, including 50 ships from Denmark, Frisia, Flanders, and England, carrying 12,000 warriors (according to contemporary writers). Landgrave Ludwig III of Thuringia was appointed leader of the crusading army, and in September 1189 he persuaded Conrad to come from Tyre to Acre to assist the siege. In March 1190 the barons of the kingdom and the crusaders succeeded in working out a peace settlement between the marquis and King Guy: Conrad would hold Tyre, Beirut, and Sidon (when the latter two cities were recaptured from Saladin) and assist Guy as king. Saladin had moved his army to Acre soon after the siege had begun, and he effectively surrounded the besieging Christian army. He was not able to prevent the crusaders from receiving reinforcements by sea, but neither were they able to prevent Muslim vessels from entering the port of Acre. Saladin’s naval forces held the advantage until the

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end of March 1190, when the marquis’s ships, based at Tyre, returned to the crusader camp at Acre with supplies. The Muslims in Acre sent out their ships to challenge the crusaders, but were defeated. Christian control of the sea made it difficult for Saladin to supply Acre by ship, but sufficient ships slipped through the crusader blockade to enable the defense to continue. Sometimes these vessels were disguised as Christian ships, flying banners with crosses and carrying pigs on the decks. Swimmers were also used to carry supplies and information between Saladin’s army and the defenders of Acre.

Neither the crusaders nor Saladin could gain the advantage. The crusaders lacked the forces to make a decisive assault and to drive back Saladin’s surrounding army, while Saladin experienced problems in keeping his army together for the duration of the long campaign. In the late summer of 1190, many small groups of crusaders arrived at Acre from France, Italy, and England, including Count Henry of Champagne and Archbishop Baldwin of Canterbury. Count Henry was elected leader of the crusade in place of Landgrave Ludwig, who had had to leave the crusade because of ill health.

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The political situation was complicated by the death of Queen Sibyl and her two daughters, Alice and Maria, in early autumn 1190. Guy of Lusignan, who had ruled as Sibyl’s consort, now had no right to the title of king. The heir to the throne was Sibyl’s sister Isabella, but her husband, Humphrey IV of Toron, did not want to be king. Conrad approached the leaders of the crusade with the proposal that Isabella’s marriage be nullified and she be married to him instead; he would then provide effective military leadership for the crusade, with supplies brought in through Tyre, and strong naval support. Despite vehement opposition from Archbishop Baldwin, acting in place of Patriarch Eraclius (who was ill), and Isabella’s own reluctance, and although the marquis already had two wives (in Montferrat and Constantinople), the nobles of the kingdom and the leaders of the crusade agreed to Conrad’s scheme. Isabella was married to the marquis, who then retired to Tyre rather than remaining at Acre to lead the siege.

The Crusades of the Kings

The Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick I Barbarossa, held an assembly at Metz in March 1188 to make preparations for the crusade, and set out in May 1189. He traveled overland, down the river Danube, crossing the Hellespont and marching across Asia Minor. This was a shorter route from Germany than the sea route via the North Sea, and Frederick lacked the ships to transport his whole force by sea. The emperor was accompanied by his son Frederick V, Duke of Swabia, and left his son Henry (later Emperor Henry VI) as regent in Germany. Frederick Barbarossa’s arrival was eagerly awaited by the crusaders for the forces he was bringing, for his military experience, and for his authority as emperor of the West. He defeated the forces of the sultan of Rūm, but on June 10, 1190, he drowned in the river Selef in Cilicia. The remnants of his army reached Antioch late in June, where many abandoned the crusade. A small force led by Frederick of Swabia continued to Tripoli (mod. Trâblous, Lebanon), where Marquis Conrad, the duke’s kinsman, met them and escorted them to Acre. The duke began renewed assaults on the city, but the city was still holding out when he died in January 1191 from plague. The kings of England and France were still expected at the siege. Henry II of England had died on July 6, 1189. His

son and successor, Richard (the Lionheart), Count of Poitou, had been one of the first to take the cross in the West, and he was anxious to set out on his crusade. While Richard’s speed in setting out on crusade soon after he was crowned king of England indicates that he was genuinely devoted to the crusading cause, he was also bound by family and feudal obligations. Queen Sibyl of Jerusalem and her sister Isabella were related to Richard: the royal family of Jerusalem was descended from Count Fulk V of Anjou (d. 1143), who was Richard’s great-grandfather. The family of King Guy were Richard’s vassals, as Lusignan was in Richard’s county of Poitou. As his cousin and his vassal were in need of his aid, it was Richard’s duty to go to their assistance. King Philip II of France also crusaded partly from family obligations. His father, Louis VII, had taken part in the Second Crusade (1147–1149) with his then queen, Eleanor of Aquitaine, who later became Richard’s mother. Many of the nobles of the kingdom of Jerusalem were members of French families, vassals of Philip. Richard and Philip agreed to travel together and to share any booty they won. They set out in July 1190 and traveled overland across France, taking ship from Marseilles (Richard) and Genoa (Philip) to Sicily. The island was an obvious meeting point, as it was centrally located in the Mediterranean, it could supply the fleets with food for the voyage, and King William II of Sicily was dedicated to the crusade and was also married to Richard’s younger sister Joanna. William’s death in November 1189 changed the situation, as his successor, Tancred, was not well disposed toward the king of England and refused to surrender Joanna’s dowry, which Richard wanted to help finance his crusade. Philip had engaged Genoese ships to carry his force; Richard had assembled a fleet of English ships, which sailed via the Strait of Gibraltar to meet the king at Sicily in September. Some crusaders, such as the archbishop of Canterbury, continued directly to the Holy Land; the rest waited for Richard. After the arrival of the two kings, skirmishing broke out between crusaders and Sicilians, culminating in open warfare. On October 4, 1190, Richard captured the city of Messina. Eventually he agreed on peace terms with King Tancred, who surrendered Joanna’s dowry. As it was now too late in the year to continue to the East, the crusaders wintered in Sicily and proceeded in early April.

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While Philip sailed directly to the Holy Land, Richard and his fleet landed on Cyprus, whose self-professed emperor, Isaac Doukas Komnenos, took some of the crusaders prisoner. Richard counterattacked and conquered the island, which came to prove a valuable source of supply for the crusade and a useful haven for crusaders on their way to and from the Holy Land. It is possible that Richard had deliberately set out to conquer it for this reason. Richard finally reached Acre early in June 1191. The Muslim defenders of the city were suing for peace; although King Philip agreed to the terms, Richard refused, as the defenders wished to take all their possessions with them, which would leave no booty for the crusaders. After further assaults, part of the wall of Acre was undermined and collapsed. On July 12, 1191, the defenders surrendered, in exchange for life and limb only. The peace terms included the return of the True Cross lost at the battle of Hattin, the payment of a sum of money, and the return of Christian captives; the Muslims gave hostages as a guarantee. They evacuated the city and the crusaders entered, but many were furious when Philip and Richard took all the property within the city as their own booty and divided it between themselves, rather than allowing it to be divided between all the crusaders who had taken part in the siege. The conflicting claims of King Guy and Marquis Conrad were settled: Guy would hold the Kingdom of Jerusalem until his death, and Conrad would succeed him. Philip of France then departed for the West, although the crusade was far from over. Various explanations were given for his sudden departure, including claims that he was worried by news that his young son Louis was sick, or that he was afraid that Richard of England was trying to poison him. Other French crusaders remained under the overall command of Hugh III, duke of Burgundy. Richard, claiming that Saladin had not fulfilled the terms of the treaty of surrender, had most of the Muslim hostages executed and then set out on the next stage of the crusade: the recapture of Jerusalem.

The Second Stage of the Crusade: The Campaign for Jerusalem

King Richard advanced cautiously, having decided that the army should march down the coast to Jaffa (mod. Tel AvivYafo, Israel) and then move inland toward Jerusalem by the

most direct route. This would enable him to keep his army supplied by sea for most of the journey, making use of the ships that he had brought from England, as well as those of Pisa and Genoa. The army set out late in August and marched along the coast road, harassed by Saladin’s army, which marched on its left, until September 7, 1191, when a skirmish at Arsuf became a major engagement. The Muslims withdrew, and the Christians remained in control of the field. Saladin then destroyed most of the fortresses in Palestine, so that they could not be repossessed and defended by the crusaders. At Jaffa, Richard set about repairing the city’s fortifications and other neighboring fortresses on the road to Jerusalem. Negotiations between the crusaders and Saladin had been in train for many months. Marquis Conrad was in negotiation with Saladin, while Richard himself had contacted Saladin almost as soon as he entered the kingdom. During the period at Jaffa, negotiations between Richard and Saladin reached an advanced stage, but broke down because neither side trusted the other. In late November the crusaders moved toward Jerusalem, reaching the town of Ramla. The army spent Christmas 1191 in this area, divided between various fortresses on the Jerusalem road. But early in January 1192, on the advice of the Templars, the Hospitallers, and the barons of Outremer, the leaders of the crusade decided to withdraw to Ascalon and refortify that city. As Ascalon controlled the road from Egypt, this move would prevent Saladin bringing up reinforcements and supplies from there. Yet this decision was a serious blow to the crusaders’ morale, and during the long march back through the cold, wet winter weather the French contingent left the main army and split up. At Ascalon, King Richard supervised the refortification of the city, and the crusaders ravaged the Muslim-held countryside. The various factions among the crusaders now broke into open dispute: supporters of the marquis against supporters of King Guy, the “French” against the “Normans” or “English,” and the Genoese against the Pisans. In addition, Richard received news from England that the government he had left in his absence was in disarray. Realizing that he would have to return home, Richard sought a settlement as a matter of urgency. The leaders of the army chose Marquis Conrad as king of Jerusalem, but late in April 1192 he was murdered by two members of

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the Ismaili Assassin sect. The French then chose Count Henry of Champagne, nephew of both Philip of France and Richard of England, as king. Richard agreed to this settlement, and Henry married Conrad’s widow Isabella, the heiress of the kingdom. Although they were acknowledged as rulers of the kingdom, the pair were not actually crowned. Guy, the former king, purchased the island of Cyprus from the Templars, who had bought it from Richard. The crusaders continued to ravage the land in order to undermine Saladin’s hold on it, but their ultimate aim was the reconquest of Jerusalem. The leaders were aware that as soon as the city was captured the crusade would break up and most of the warriors would return to the West, and so they preferred to delay an attack until they had recovered as much territory as possible and thus laid the basis for retaining the kingdom. Yet the crusaders were running out of funds and could not stay much longer in the East. In June 1192 it was decided to make another advance on Jerusalem. The army advanced as far as Beit Nūbā, around 20 kilometers (13 miles) from the Holy City. Debate continued within the army: the Franks and the military orders argued that the city could not be held if it were captured at this juncture, while King Richard argued that their supply lines were too long and that in summer there would be too little water in the countryside around Jerusalem to support the besiegers. He preferred to make an attack on Egypt, using ships to support his land army. The eventual decision was to withdraw to Ascalon. After this second withdrawal, the crusade effectively broke up. Many crusaders went home. Richard withdrew to Acre, from where he launched an attack on Beirut. His plans to return to the West were interrupted by the news that Saladin had attacked Jaffa. The town fell, but the citadel was saved by Richard’s arrival with his ships from Acre. Richard’s forces drove back Saladin’s army, which was none too willing to fight (August 5). Clearly neither side was in a position to fight any longer.

The Treaty of Jaffa (1192)

The two sides negotiated a three-year truce, the Treaty of Jaffa (September 2, 1192), which effectively ended the crusade. The important strongholds of Ascalon, Gaza, and Darum were returned to Saladin, but their fortifications were to be demolished. The Franks retained Jaffa; both

Christians and Muslims would have free passage through each other’s lands; Christian pilgrims could visit the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem without paying tolls; and trade could be exercised freely. The treaty effectively acknowledged the continuing existence of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, albeit in a much reduced state. After this treaty was made, many of the pilgrims visited Jerusalem to see the holy sites. Richard sent Hubert Walter, bishop of Salisbury, as his representative, but did not visit the city himself. The crusaders left the Holy Land in autumn 1192.

Conclusions

The crusade was undermined from the beginning by disputes between the leaders. The rivalry between King Guy of Jerusalem and Conrad of Montferrat developed early in the undertaking. Conrad had taken the initiative in trying to encourage powerful lords in the West to assist the Holy Land: without his efforts in 1187–1188, the whole of the kingdom would have been lost to Saladin. As a renowned warrior who was related to the king of France and Emperor Frederick I, Conrad may have intended to use Tyre as a base from which to reconquer the kingdom of Jerusalem and make himself king. Philip II of France and the Genoese supported Conrad’s claim to the throne of Jerusalem, while Richard of England and the Pisans supported Guy’s claim. The dispute was only resolved by Conrad’s death and Guy’s replacement by Henry of Champagne. The Italian city republics also brought their rivalries to the Holy Land. Genoa and Pisa had lost their trading rights in the Byzantine Empire and were anxious to ensure their rights in Outremer by winning concessions from the rival claimants to the kingdom of Jerusalem in return for their support. Philip of France and Richard of England also brought their rivalry to the Holy Land. Although Richard was Philip’s vassal for his lands in France (Normandy, Anjou, and Aquitaine), he seems to have taken the lead in military affairs, to Philip’s annoyance. The French accused Richard of arranging the assassination of Marquis Conrad, and by June 1192, according to the contemporary writer Ambroise, King Richard and Hugh III of Burgundy, the chosen leader of the French contingent, were singing insulting songs about each other. The crusading army was also divided over strategy. Richard preferred to advance cautiously, establishing a

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base and securing his rear and supply lines before proceeding. By summer 1192, he had decided that the best strategy was to attack Egypt rather than Jerusalem, which could not be held securely against a well-organized, well-supplied enemy. This strategy was supported by many of the Franks, but many in the crusading army wanted to attack Jerusalem and regarded the diversion to Ascalon and the policy of raiding into Muslim territory as a distraction from the crusade’s true purpose. The argument over strategy eventually led to the disintegration of the army in the summer of 1192. In effect, the crusade ended in stalemate, with neither side able to inflict final defeat on the other, and both sides divided, demoralized, and short of resources. Helen J. Nicholson See also Crusades (Overview); Muslim Armies of the Crusades; Saladin Further Reading Cardini, Franco. “Gli italiani e la crociata di Federico.” Bullettino dell’Istituto italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano 96 (1990): 261–81. Edbury, Peter W. “The Templars in Cyprus,” in The Military Orders: Fighting for the Faith and Caring for the Sick. Edited by Malcolm Barber. Aldershot, UK: Variorum, 1994. Eickhoff, Ekkehard. Friedrich Barbarossa im Orient: Kreuzzug und Tod Friedrichs I. Tübingen: Wasmuth, 1977. Flahiff, George B. “Deus non vult: A Critic of the Third Crusade.” Mediaeval Studies 9 (1947): 162–88. Gibb, Hamilton A. R. “The Rise of Saladin: 1169–1189.” In Kenneth M. Setton et al., eds. A History of the Crusades. 2nd ed. 6 vols. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–1989. Gillingham, John. Richard Coeur de Lion: Kingship, Chivalry and War in the Twelfth Century. London: Hambledon, 1994. Gillingham, John. Richard I. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999. Gillingham, John. “Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages.” In John Gillingham and J. C. Holt, eds. War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J. O. Prestwich. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell, 1984. Gillingham, John. “Roger of Howden on Crusade.” In D. O. Morgan, ed. Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1982. Hiestand, Rudolf. “Precipua tocius christianismi columpna: Barbarossa und der Kreuzzug.” In Alfred Haverkamp, ed. Friedrich Barbarossa: Handlungsspielräume und Wirkungsweisen des staufischen Kaisers. Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1992.

Jacoby, David. “Conrad, Marquis of Montferrat, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem (1187–1192).” In Laura Bolletto, ed. Atti del Congresso Internazionale “Dai feudi monferrini e dal Piemonte ai nuovi mondi oltre gli Oceani,” Alessandria, 2–6 aprile 1990. Alessandria: Accademia degli Immobili, 1993. Johnson, Edgar N. “The Crusades of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry VI.” In Kenneth M. Setton et al., eds. A History of the Crusades. 2nd ed. 6 vols. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–1989. Lyons, Malcolm C., and D. E. P. Jackson. Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Markowski, Michael. “Richard Lionheart: Bad King, Bad Crusader?” Journal of Medieval History 23 (1997): 351–65. Mayer, Hans Eberhard. The Crusades. 2nd ed. Translated by John Gillingham. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Möhring, Hannes. Saladin und der Dritte Kreuzzug: Aiyubidische Strategie und Diplomatie im Vergleich vornehmlich der arabischen mit den lateinischen Quellen. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980. Nicholson, Helen J. “Women on the Third Crusade.” Journal of Medieval History 23 (1997): 335–49. Painter, Sidney. “The Third Crusade: Richard the Lionhearted and Philip Augustus.” In Kenneth M. Setton et al., eds. A History of the Crusades. 2nd ed. 6 vols. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–1989. Pringle, R. Denys. “King Richard I and the Walls of Ascalon.” Palestine Exploration Quarterly 116 (1984): 133–47. Richard, Jean. “1187: Point de depart pour une nouvelle forme de croisade.” In Benjamin Z. Kedar, ed. The Horns of Hattin. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1992, pp. 250–60. Richard, Jean. “Philippe Auguste, la croisade et le royaume.” In Robert-Henri Bautier, ed. La France de Philippe Auguste: Le temps des mutations. Paris: Editions du C.N.R.S., 1982. Rogers, Randall. Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century. Oxford: Clarendon, 1992.

Thirty Years’  War (1618–1648) The Thirty Years’ War was the most destructive European conflict prior to the 20th-century world wars. It began with the Bohemian Revolt against Austrian Habsburg rule in May 1618 and at its peak in the early 1630s involved more than 250,000 combatants fighting across all Germany. More than 5 million people died in the Holy Roman Empire, reducing its population by at least a fifth, with some regions suffering a decline of 75 percent through war-related deaths and migration. Devastation during the Thirty Years’ War

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occurred in a preindustrial age, when it was much harder to substitute machines for missing human labor. The postwar recovery was slowed by further wars later in the 17th century, and the population only returned to the prewar level around 1713. The scale, intensity, and duration of the Thirty Years’ War have given it a benchmark character in scholarly literature and Europeans’ memory. Later conflicts are often

perceived as less severe. Above all, it has entered both history and popular consciousness as the last and greatest of a supposed “age of religious wars” widely believed to have begun with the Protestant Reformation in 1517. Thus, the war and its conclusion in the Peace of Westphalia assume the position of a milestone in the chronological shift between a supposed premodern age of faith and secular modernity.

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Interpretations of the Thirty Years’ War as a religious conflict divide broadly into two camps. The older, majority view cites religion to explain the war’s causes, destruction, and duration. The usual sequence is to argue that the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 failed to settle differences between Roman Catholics and Protestants within the empire. It is thought that imperial institutions were overwhelmed by demands to resolve the diverging interpretations of the 1555 agreement. Religion supposedly divided the empire’s inhabitants so completely that trust collapsed and communication became impossible. The empire is then described as polarizing into two “armed camps” through the formation of the Protestant Union (1608) and Catholic League (1609). Conflict is assumed to have been inevitable, with events in Bohemia simply providing the spark for a general conflagration. The subsequent spread of the war is also assumed to have been inevitable and is presented sequentially, associating each stage with the entry of a new belligerent, making the war progressively less “German” and more European. The decision of Elector Frederick V of the Palatinate to accept the Bohemian rebels’ offer to be their king undoubtedly frustrated efforts to contain the conflict and led to more extensive military operations in western Germany. Thereafter, each phase is identified with the intervention of ever more powerful outsiders: Denmark in 1625, Sweden in 1630, and finally a French phase following that country’s open support of Sweden in 1635. The war’s religious dimension is generally seen as developing in two broader stages that map onto the standard four-phase explanation. The successive intervention of the Palatinate, Denmark, and Sweden is explained in language borrowed largely from the contemporary discussion of a “Protestant Cause”: each power enters the war to save the German Protestants from being crushed by the combined forces of Catholic Habsburg Austria, Bavaria, and their Spanish and papal backers. Religious conflict appears to peak in 1629 when Emperor Ferdinand II capitalized on his victory over Denmark to issue the Edict of Restitution, unilaterally imposing the Catholic interpretation of the disputed points of the Peace of Augsburg. Only Sweden’s intervention saved German Protestantism from extinction; or at least that is what the Swedes themselves said once their king, Gustavus Adolphus, died a martyr’s death

at the battle of Lützen (1632). Throughout this first, broadly “religious” stage, violence is explained by reference to alleged religious hatred. The entry of Catholic France in support of Lutheran Sweden signals a move to a more secular stage in the conflict for many historians. Religious hatred appears to burn itself out in the orgy of (seemingly) pointless, uncontrolled violence, thus apparently paving the way for a secular peace by 1648. As already suggested, the standard interpretation of the war draws heavily on contemporary propaganda, but in fact fails to capture how many participants conducted and experienced the conflict. It is also inherently contradictory. War is supposedly inevitable, due to mounting sectarian hatred, which in turn is blamed for the extent and level of violence. Yet, many standard accounts also claim the war escaped political control, because it was waged by supposedly disinterested mercenaries bent on plunder and self-enrichment. The alternative, minority interpretation is equally unsatisfactory. This disputes religious motivation and presents the war as a great power struggle, often subsuming the Thirty Years’ War within a much longer running FrancoHabsburg struggle starting before 1618 and continuing beyond 1648. These interpretations point out—rightly—that it is much easier to analyze how the protagonists legitimated their actions than to ascertain their true motives. However, it seems questionable to minimize (still less, to dismiss) religion as a motive given that the war was fought in what was undoubtedly an age of faith. Moreover, recent research has undermined the long-held belief that religion ceased to be an important factor in European relations after 1648, and instead has demonstrated its continued significance in conflicts into the 18th century and, perhaps, even beyond. The solution is to recognize that the religious dimension of the Thirty Years’ War is not a simple “either/or” question. The evidence is contradictory, because the political entities involved were not unitary actors with homogenous populations clearly united in religious orthodoxy, nor did contemporaries agree on the proper relationship between faith and public policy. It is helpful to identify militants and moderates. These should not be understood as fixed categories, as individuals slipped between both positions, in some cases repeatedly, during the war. Nor is this

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a distinction between “religious” and “secular” views. Both were religious as hardly any European, for whom we have evidence, believed in a world without God. Militants were characterized by their conviction that religious goals were within their grasp. They were more likely to interpret setbacks as only temporary, or as tests of faith. They were much more likely to interpret events in providentialist terms, believing that God was revealing his divine plan through signs, such as comets, or through the outcome of diplomacy and military action. For many militants, this was not merely a religious but a holy war to which they had been personally summoned by God. Moderates rejected this approach on theological grounds, regarding providentialism as unorthodox, and for pragmatic reasons as jeopardizing political and religious objectives. They usually believed that the reunification of Christians under their own faith lay far in the future, and that this goal was better served by negotiation, or by carefully building up their political and military position. Many also felt the pursuit of unrealistic religious objectives was sinful, because it was needlessly prolonging violence. Some, especially Catholics whose lands were more exposed to the Ottomans, believed the war was distracting from the more general Christian duty of opposing Islam. Militants and moderates exerted differing influence on events, and it would be simplistic to praise moderates as farsighted, or more humane, while blaming the war on zealots. Generally, militancy was most pronounced among clergy (predictably), outside observers, and those within the empire until they were actually caught up in military operations. Militant language featured prominently in diplomacy and propaganda directed at eliciting support from co-religionists or potential allies outside the empire, since confessional solidarity often appeared the only way to bridge political and geographical distance. Militants did influence crucial decisions, notably Frederick V’s acceptance of the Bohemian crown and Ferdinand II’s Edict of Restitution, both of which proved serious political miscalculations. However, none of the major decision-makers saw the conflict in exclusively religious terms. They defined themselves and their opponents politically as rulers of different kingdoms and principalities. Soldiers who appear in later accounts as “Catholics” or “Protestants,” for ease of explanation, were encountered by contemporaries as, for

example, “Bavarians” or “Danes,” or were known by the names of their commanding officers. Many soldiers had strong religious convictions, but all armies included men of different faiths, often in senior ranks. Militants were primarily confined to exiles, especially Protestants driven from Bohemia and Austria early in the war, who lost everything and had little choice but to fight on. For most participants, the war was a struggle over the political and religious order within the empire. The Peace of Augsburg sought to absorb confessional tensions by stabilizing the empire as a mixed monarchy where the emperor shared powers with the German princes and imperial cities. These powers expanded as both Catholic and Lutheran princes and cities gained new political rights to supervise religious organizations (churches), assets, and behavior within their territories. Though it entered history as the Religious Peace, the Augsburg treaty defined jurisdictions, not religion. The peacemakers compromised, because they still hoped the theologians would reach an ecumenical solution. Contrary to the received interpretation, the Peace was extraordinarily successful, ensuring 63 years without a major war—the longest period of tranquillity in German history prior to that after 1945. There were several breaches, like the Cologne War in 1583, but these were local and contained. Many hoped that the Bohemian Revolt would also end quickly, and there was little to suggest that prolonged, large-scale war was inevitable. Four problems emerged by the 1590s. The most serious concerned the fate of the remaining Catholic spiritual principalities, collectively constituting a seventh of the empire’s territory. Catholics believed the Augsburg Peace reserved these for them, securing not only their faith, but their political dominance of imperial institutions. Though individually small, the ecclesiastical principalities were numerous, and their possession ensured that Catholic princely families could outvote their Protestant neighbors. While confession sharpened perception, rivalry for possession predated the Reformation, as all princely families saw the church lands as convenient accommodation for their younger sons and unmarried daughters whose status as ecclesiastical imperial princes simultaneously advanced family influence. Protestant dynasties were not prepared to forego these advantages, simply because they had

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abandoned Catholicism. A second issue was the status of the remaining Roman Catholic Church assets within principalities where the ruling family had embraced Lutheranism. Again, this involved both faith and politics, since Lutheran princes argued their enhanced jurisdiction over religion excluded that of Catholic bishops over their lands. Likewise, both Lutheran and Catholic authorities refused to tolerate dissenters in their own lands, while loudly protesting against persecution of co-religionists elsewhere. This helped equate religious dissent with political subversion, hardening the political drive for confessional conformity. Finally, Calvinism emerged as a significant new form of Protestantism in the empire after 1560. Lutherans usually denied that Calvinists enjoyed constitutional rights, because this faith made most of its converts at their expense. Catholics took Calvinism’s emergence as further proof that all Protestants could not be trusted. Even combined, these problems were insufficient to cause a major war. Despite their religious labels, neither the Protestant Union nor the Catholic League united all princes and cities of these faiths. Most Lutherans, led by Saxony, refused to join the union, which was bankrupt by 1618. The league had been dissolved in 1617, following Habsburg pressure. The alliances were vehicles for the ambitions of the rival Palatine and Bavarian branches of the Wittelsbach family. Most other members regarded their involvement as insurance in case war broke out. Neither organization had an army, while the Habsburgs were in the process of reducing theirs when the Defenestration of Prague signaled the Bohemian Revolt. Habsburg weakness provided the critical factor in explaining why the union and league were formed and the failure to contain the Bohemian Revolt. Infighting within the Habsburg family eroded confidence among Catholics and Protestants, creating a political vacuum in the empire. The Palatinate represented both a religious minority (Calvinists) and those disadvantaged politically within the imperial constitution (minor princes and counts). The emperor’s initial failure to resolve the Bohemian crisis provided the Palatinate with an opportunity to push confessional and political goals. Bavaria extracted political and territorial concessions in return for backing the emperor. Ferdinand II saw a chance to stabilize both his authority in his own lands and the empire by expropriating his

opponents and redistributing their lands and rights to his supporters, Bavaria included. For the emperor, this was a rebellion rather than a war. Other powers intervened, either to help or hinder the Habsburgs as it suited their own interests elsewhere in Europe, or because they felt their own security threatened by the emperor’s growing authority. Throughout, military operations were related to ongoing negotiations that periodically reduced the war, even effectively ending it in June 1629 when Denmark withdrew, only for it to be restarted by Sweden’s invasion a year later. Despite external intervention, the root causes remained the religious and political disputes expressed through differing interpretations of the imperial constitution. All participants legitimated their actions as defending the “true” constitution, and the war’s outcome was reflected in constitutional adjustments enshrined in the Peace of Westphalia. Despite the impossibility of paying their armies properly, none of the belligerents resorted to the cheaper expedient of using sectarianism to incite their populations to fight. Instead of holy war, state and church preached that the population had incurred divine wrath through sinfulness. The true enemy lay within, and the best way for people to hasten the return of peace was through their inward transformation into true Christians and obedient subjects. Official peace celebrations and postwar commemoration cemented this message of piety and subservience to a strong state as the best safeguard against the return of such horrors in the future. Peter H. Wilson See also Catholic (Holy) League; Holy Roman Empire; Westphalia, Peace of Further Reading Asch, Ronald G. The Thirty Years’ War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe 1618–48. London: Palgrave, 1997. Bussmann, Klaus, and Heinz Schilling, eds. 1648: War and Peace in Europe. 3 vols. Munich: Bruckmann, 1998. Parker, Geoffrey, ed. The Thirty Years’ War. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1987. Wilson, Peter H. “Dynasty, Constitution and Confession: The Role of Religion in the Thirty Years’ War.” International History Review 30 (2008): 473–514. Wilson, Peter H. Europe’s Tragedy. A History of the Thirty Years’ War. London: Penguin, 2009.

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Three Kingdoms, War of the (1638–1660) The War of the Three Kingdoms is a term used to encompass the broader complexities of the English Civil Wars. Other terms have included the English Revolution; the Puritan Revolution; the Great Civil War; and the British Civil Wars. The new nomenclature is also inclusive of international interests from the Spanish Habsburgs, French Bourbons, and the Republic of Holland based on financial and military promises and assistance, which ties the War of the Three Kingdoms to the Thirty Years’ War. Unrest began in England in the 1620s due to the fiscal misrule of Charles I and his interference in Protestantism, and spread to Scotland. Charles I continued the efforts of James VI and I to bring the Presbyterian Kirk, the Established Church of Scotland, under crown control. The introduction of the Common Prayer Book in 1637 triggered riots starting at St. Giles in Edinburgh and led to the National Covenant in January 1638 at Greyfriars Church and the Covenanters movement. Charles expected to subdue Scotland as he controlled Edinburgh and Dunbarton castles and enjoyed support from elements within Scotland including clan Gordon. The Covenanters, including Archibald Campbell, Marquis of Argyle, waged two campaigns against Charles, pausing for the Treaty of Brekwick (June 1639) and the Treaty of Ripon (October 1640). Because the Treaty of Ripon needed funding, Charles was forced to call what would become the “Long Parliament” (October 1640—April 1653). During the Long Parliament, church reform, loans for the Scottish conflict, and protocol for calling and dissolving of Parliament were addressed. These reforms caused friction between the king and Parliament and Charles retired to Edinburgh, where his stay gave rise to suspicions from the Scots. In 1641 as a result of England’s anti-Irish, specifically anti-Catholic policies, and inspired by the success of the Covenanters, the Ulster Uprising raised concerns in both England and Scotland, although no decisive action was taken until 1649. The conflict has been called the Irish Civil War, the Confederate War, or the Eleven Years’ War and lasted from 1641 to 1653. Beginning with the Ulster Uprising, it concluded after the surrender of Galway in April 1952. An early August victory for Parliamentarian Colonel

Michael Jones over Irish Confederacy ally Royalist Ormond (James Butler, 12th Earl of Ormond), at Rathmines paved the way for Oliver Cromwell’s nine-month campaign breaking Irish resistance (August 1649 to April 1650). Major actions in Cromwell’s campaign included the atrocities at Drogheda and Wexford, and Cromwell’s taking of Clonmel from Hugh Dubh O’Neill. Cromwell did not complete the conquest of Ireland, leaving the defeat of the remaining Irish general, Ever MacMahon, to his son-in-law Henry Ireton. After the conquest, Parliament planned to use Ireland to test Cromwellian concepts. With the collapse of Irish society, Ireland was considered a “clean slate” on which to build a new “godly society” by restructuring the legal system and government. The Irish Parliament would be abolished, and Ireland would be governed by parliamentary commissioners and send 30 representatives to London’s Parliament beginning in 1653. In 1648, Parliament rebuffed the Scottish incursions along with English revolutionaries as Charles tried to regain the throne. This effort failed, and in 1649 Parliament executed Charles I, abolishing the monarchy in England, after which the Scottish Kirk Party crowned Charles II king of Great Britain and Ireland in January 1651. Returning from Ireland in 1650, Cromwell went to Scotland. After diplomatic attempts failed, Cromwell routed the Scots at the Battle of Worcester in September 1651 and Scottish resistance collapsed. Scotland was given the pretense of choice in joining the Union; however, the reality was that Scotland could not refuse England’s offer and most of the negotiation was for show. The Declaration was in 1651, and it was made public in February 1652. As in Ireland, parliamentary commissioners were assigned to administer Scotland. In 1654, now Lord Protector Cromwell issued the Ordinance of Union, but Parliament did not approve it until 1657. The discontent continued as conflict between the military and Parliament destabilized the commonwealth. In 1658 Cromwell died, leaving his son, Richard, as Lord Protector. Richard was quickly overthrown and on May 29, 1660, Charles II was restored to the throne. Within this period, each of the regions was troubled by internal division. The country gentry of England did not identify themselves as either Royalists or Parliamentarians. Instead, these groups appeared to be neutral unless forced to choose sides. When this occurred, they

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pragmatically chose the side that would further the local interests, rather than loyalty at the national level. Within Ireland, the Irish Catholics and the “Old English” Catholics created the Confederacy in support of Charles I. The Confederacy faced opposition from English and Scottish Protestants and the Roman Catholic Church. Scotland also fell prey to internal disputes with the split between the Engagers and the Kirk Party. Additionally, there was infighting between the Western Association of Lowland extremists and the Remonstrants (from “Western Remonstration”). The war was not only fought on land. In 1642 Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick, in command of the Royal Navy, defected to Parliament, gaining control over the ports and waterways around Britain. Additionally, parliamentary forces were now able to use the sea to bring men to coastal strongholds, block support efforts for the Royalists, and combat English and Irish privateers. Fleet loyalty was a nagging worry to Parliament and in 1647 the dissatisfaction affecting the army carried over to the navy. In 1648 six ships of the navy resisted Parliament and mutinied, which inspired part of the fleet to defect to Prince Rupert. This incident encouraged Parliament to reformulate the navy to ensure its loyalty before turning to defeat the Royalist fleet. In the end, the majority of the Royal Navy fell prey to the hazards of the Atlantic and wear rather than to Parliamentary cannons. Tracy M. WESCOTT See also Cromwell, Oliver; English Civil Wars Further Reading Bennett, Martyn. The Civil Wars Experienced: Britain and Ireland, 1638–61. London: Routledge, 2000. Fitzpatrick, Brendan. Seventeenth-Century Ireland: The War of Religion. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1989. Kenyon, John, Jane Ohlmeyer, and John Morrill, eds. The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland 1638–1660. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Morrill, John. The Nature of the English Revolution. Harlow, UK: Longman Group UK, 1993. Morrill, John. “The Religious Context of the English Civil War.” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 34 (1984): 155–78. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3679130 Morrill, John. Revolt in the Provinces: The People of England and the Tragedies of War, 1630–1648. London: Longman, 1999.

Ohlmeyer, Jane. “Seventeenth-Century Ireland and the New British and Atlantic Histories.” American Historical Review 104 (April 1999): 446–62. Prior, Charles W. A., and Glenn Burgess, eds. England’s Wars of Religion, Revisited. Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011. Tait, Codagh, David Edwards, and Pádraig Lenihan, eds. Age of Atrocity: Violence and Political Conflict in Early Modern Ireland, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007.

Tibetan Rebellion (1959) The Tibetan Rebellion erupted in Lhasa on March 10, 1959, and lasted until March 23, with the local population engaged against the Chinese forces occupying the country. The uprising ended with 85,000–87,000 casualties (but the figure is contested) and led to the flight of the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (1935–), the country’s political leader and the spiritual head of Tibetan Buddhism. It also fueled a diaspora of about 80,000 people between 1959 and 1960 (currently the Tibetan diaspora accounts for some 128,000 people according to the figures of the Central Tibetan Administration, i.e., the Government of Tibet in Exile), most of them direct to India, which is still today the country with the greatest number of Tibetan refugees. After crushing the rebellion, Chinese authorities engaged in a long effort of eradication of Buddhism from Tibet and of reshaping the country’s traditional social structures. At the same time, Beijing authorities engaged in a long-term strategy of “Chinaization” of Tibet, promoting the immigration of Chinese natives in the region and cultural politics aimed at diluting its ethnic and historical specificity. Chinese military presence in Tibet dated back to the early 1950s. Chinese authorities had gradually lost the grip on their former protectorate during the 19th century, and in 1904 the Treaty of Lhasa had replaced Chinese with British influence. The relations between the two powers were settled with the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, which—after the fall of the Qing dynasty and the Xinhai Lhasa turmoil (1912)—left most of the country under the control of the government of Tibet, supervised by the British; only some border areas (Amdo and Eastern Kham) remained under Chinese control, a state of things that survived until the end of World War Two. In 1949, both

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before and after its proclamation, the People’s Republic of China reaffirmed its sovereignty over Tibet, backing their historical rights with the ideological imperative of liberating the Tibetans from a “theocratic feudal system.” The failure to find a diplomatic compromise paved the way for the Chinese military intervention. Between October 6 and 7, 1950, units of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossed Tibet’s eastern border and gained an easy success over the small and poorly trained Tibetan army (October 19). Following this defeat, Tibetan authorities were forced to sign the already finished “Seventeen-Point Agreement” (Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, May 23, 1951). While recognizing for Tibet the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the leadership of the Central People’s Government of the PRC, the agreement firmly established China’s sovereignty over the country and allowed it to station forces of the People’s Liberation Army within Tibet’s borders “to consolidate [Tibet’s] national defenses.” In October 1951, the Dalai Lama—who had just acceded to the throne after the end of the regency of the third Taktra Rinpoche, Ngawang Sungrab Thutob (1874– 1952)—formally accepted the Seventeen-Point Agreement, although he repudiated it after his flight to India. Tibetan authority remained in place in all the areas that they ruled until the outbreak of the hostilities, except for the Qamdo area, which was occupied by the PLA and placed under the authority of a Qamdo Liberation Committee. While Tibet’s social and political structures were quite unaffected (at least in the central and western regions, roughly corresponding to historical Ü-Tsang) by the country’s incorporation into the PRC, Chinese military buildup (20,000 men in early 1950s) was a matter of concern, especially in India. Indeed, China’s claims on Tibet also referred to 25,000 square miles of Tibetan territory ceded to British India after the Simla Accord (1914) and forming part of the present-day state of Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese influence was far deeper on the periphery. In Qinghai (part of the Amdo) land redistribution was implemented, largely at the expense of noblemen and monasteries; the same happened in Eastern Kham (which was incorporated into Sichuan Province) and Western Kham (which was put under the Chamdo Military Committee).

In these regions, the process entailed a certain degree of violence (which differed from one region to another), often fomented by Chinese agitators against the local “landlords.” Throughout the country slavery and serfdom were abolished; secular schools were created, thus breaking the educational monopoly of the monasteries; and running water and electrical systems were built in Lhasa. The Chinese also built roads and railways to reach Lhasa and the Indian, Nepalese, and Pakistani borders and held a census (1954) counting 2,770,000 ethnic Tibetans, 1,270,000 of whom lived within the borders of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). In 1956 the first unrest happened in Amdo and Eastern Kham, soon spreading to Ü-Tsang, with land redistribution as the main bone of contention. Incidents continued throughout the whole of 1956–1957, while Tibetan guerrillas gained increasing support from the United States and the neighboring countries, especially Nepal, which provided training infrastructures and safe havens. It is difficult to ascertain the impact of the rebellion on the civilian population; according to the sources, popular participation varied from “many thousands” to almost nil. However, a good many of the leaders of this first wave of revolt were members of the country’s former economic and political elite; in the same years, also two of the Dalai Lama brothers—the Taktser Rinpoche Thubtan Norbu (1922– 2008) and Gyalo Thondup (1928–)—engaged at different levels in the Free Tibet movement. In 1957 widespread turbulence affected Kham, with the network of local monasteries actively involved in the antiChinese resistance. Chinese reaction grew increasingly militarized, although a “gradualistic” approach still seemed to prevail in Beijing about the issue of the political and social reforms to implement in Tibet. Lhasa’s efforts to mediate led to nothing, while the U.S. administration put pressure on the Dalai Lama to side with the rebellion. Widespread violence also fostered internal displacement, with refugees pouring into Lhasa, spreading tensions and instability. According to Beijing, by early 1959, the situation in Tibet was almost out of control: rebellion had gathered pace and evolved into a “nearly full-scale rebellion,” while ethnically based uprisings were gaining strength in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai. In this framework, the Khamba uprising of December 1958 was only the final

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step on the way that led to the Lhasa uprising of the following March. On March 10, 1959, a crowd gathered around the Potala Palace, after rumors of a possible abduction of the Dalai Lama by the Chinese authorities had spread throughout Lhasa. Violence was aimed at first against Tibetans officials perceived as supportive of the Chinese presence; only in a second moment was it directed against Hans living in Lhasa. On March 12, protests took more openly nationalistic tones, with the mob explicitly calling for Tibetan independence. Since the early disturbances, the PLA’s units had prepared for an armed clash, while barricades were built by the insurgents. On March 17, artillery shells landed near the Potala, convincing the Dalai Lama to speed up preparations for an eventual flight. Two days later the PLA started shelling Norbulingka (“The Jeweled Park,” the Dalai Lama’s Summer Palace), sparking a two-day-battle that ended with the total crushing of the uprising. Between March 30 and 31, the Dalai Lama and his court crossed into India, where in 1960 the Government of Tibet in Exile was constituted in Dharamshala, in present-day Himachal Pradesh. No reliable figures exist on the extent of the Chinese repression. The Government of Tibet in Exile stated that, in 1959, Chinese troops in Lhasa numbered between 30,000 and 50,000 men with the Tibetans “outnumbered 25 to 2.” Reportedly, the PLA also possessed 17 heavy guns employed against the Norbulingka as well as against other palaces and monasteries, such as Gaden, Sera, and Drepung, Lhasa’s three main monasteries. According to the same source, the victims of both the violence of March 19–21 and the repression that followed numbered in the thousands, especially monks and personnel of the Tibetan armed forces but also common people, killed on the spot, imprisoned, or deported. In April 1959, the 10th Panchen Lama, Lobsang Trinley Lhündrub Chökyi Gyaltsen (1949–1989), called on Tibetans to support the Chinese government, but in the following years his attitude became somehow ambiguous. The impact of the Lhasa rebellion was momentous. The decision of the Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), to give shelter to the Government of Tibet in Exile further deteriorated Indian-Chinese relations, already tense due to a series of border issues. At the same time, the existence of a Government of Tibet in Exile provided the United States with a legitimate reason to support the

Tibetan guerrillas until the beginning of the détente with the PRC in the early 1970s. Finally, the flight and exile of the Dalai Lama and the memory of the events of 1959 soon became key elements in forging modern Tibetan nationalism. Indeed, although the clashes that troubled the country since the beginning of the Chinese occupation were the result of different concurring factors—a widespread socioeconomic malaise, religious tensions, the activism of the country’s traditional elites defending their endangered positions of power, and so on—the nationalist discourse, after 1959, was the main (often the only) frame of reference in which to read Tibet’s contemporary history and politics. Gianluca Pastori See also Dalai Lama XIV Further Reading Dunham, Mikel. Buddha’s Warriors: The Story of the CIA-Backed Freedom Fighters, the Chinese Invasion, and the Ultimate Fall of Tibet. New York: Penguin Books, 2004. Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of Modern Tibet. 1913–1951. 3 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989–2014. Powers, John. History as Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People’s Republic of China. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Qing, Simei. From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945–1960. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. Shakya, Tsering. The Dragon in the Land of Snows. A History of Modern Tibet since 1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Smith, Warren W., Jr. Tibetan Nation. A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. Whalen-Bridge. John. Tibet on Fire: Buddhism, Protest, and the Rhetoric of Self-Immolation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Tours, Battle of (732 CE) The Battle of Tours was fought on or about October 10, 732 CE in what is now the region of Poitou, France, near the town of Tours. The primary combatants were Umayyad caliphate forces from Spain and Berber North Africa led by Abdul Rahman al-Ghafiqi pitted against the army of

806  Tours, Battle of (732 CE)

Charles Martel (Charles “the Hammer”), the mayor of the palace of the Merovingian dynasty, which was acting to defend the kingdom of the Franks from Moorish invasion. Mercenary and other contingents, notably the Burgundians, also served in his army. Actual troop strengths on either side are unknown, as the battle was little documented at the time. However, various historical estimates assert that the Frankish forces were substantially smaller than the Umayyad. Different commentators, chroniclers, and historians have suggested between 15,000 and 50,000 on the Frankish side opposed to 30,000 to 80,000 for the Umayyads. Historians have attributed Charles’s victory in

this battle to an establishment of the foundations for the later Carolingian kingdom and to the rescue of Christian Europe. Certainly near-contemporary chroniclers praised the action as Christianity’s salvation. While Christianity would not have disappeared as the result of an Umayyad victory, the history of France would have undoubtedly taken a different course and Charlemagne, Charles’s grandson, would have faced very different challenges to his rule or might not even have come to power as the great Carolingian king and first Holy Roman Emperor. As the conquerors of much of the old Roman Empire in the Mediterranean region, the first Umayyad caliphate

This 14th-century illuminated manuscript depicts Charles Martel at the Battle of Tours in 732 CE. The Franks, under Charles Martel’s leadership, defeated the Muslims, halting the Moorish advance in Western Europe. (The British Library)

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represented the largest and most powerful Islamic state of the early medieval period, defeating both the Sassanid Persians and the Byzantines during their expansionary phase in the early 700s. By 711 they had conquered all of North Africa and had crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, where they rapidly overran most of the existing Visigothic “kingdoms,” actually dukedoms, which had been the inheritors of the Roman Iberian peninsula. By 719 they began raiding into the old Western Roman province of Gaul. In 720 they captured and secured the port of Narbonne in southern France. They moved into central France but were momentarily checked by Duke Odo of Aquitaine at the Battle of Toulouse in 721. There ensued a lull in the fighting for a few years and Odo used the time to ally himself with a breakaway state in the Iberian Peninsula. However, the Umayyads resumed raids shortly thereafter and, after dispatching Odo’s ally, they turned on him and defeated him in summer 732 at Bordeaux and then again at the Battle of the River Garonne. Bordeaux and the surrounding area was sacked and looted. The Umayyads proceeded to raid further and further north, targeting the rich monastic centers within the Frankish kingdom of Aquitaine and Neustria. Some historians believe that this was the true goal of the Umayyads and not the conquest of territory. However, their ultimate goals did not concern Odo. He pleaded with the Merovingian Franks and agreed to submit to Charles Martel’s overlordship if Charles would help him drive out the advancing Umayyad army. Charles gathered his forces together, many of whom were battle-hardened and well trained, and moved south during the summer to engage the invaders. Nevertheless, he acted cautiously and was determined to choose his own time and his own ground upon which to meet Abdul Rahman’s army, which was moving northeast from Bordeaux toward the town of Tours. Consequently he took up position on a wooded hill near Tours and then waited for his enemy to approach. Frankish armies, which were made up largely of infantry, had generally proven themselves to be no match for the heavily armored, mostly cavalry Umayyad forces. Umayyad cavalry used stirrups, thus allowing them to wear much heavier armor than their Frankish counterparts, and projecting tremendous force and momentum during a charge, momentum that time after time had routed the more

lightly armored infantry of the early medieval Western armies. Some historians believe that the Umayyad army therefore had expected little to no effective resistance and thus were completely surprised upon encountering Charles’s army in its square formation and determined to resist. Because of Charles’s position within what was probably a fairly wooded area, they were also unable to determine his exact strength. In any event, the Umayyads knew the power of heavy armored cavalry and felt that they would be able to see off any Frankish infantry that might be foolish enough to come out in the open. For seven days the two foes skirmished and probed each other’s weaknesses while awaiting further reinforcements and stragglers to come in, especially as Umayyad raiding parties were scattered across half of France. Finally, Abdul Rahman felt that the weather would soon be worsening enough that he would lose his opportunity to take the monastery at Tours, and he attacked. Abdul Rahman and his cavalry made numerous charges over the next day (or possibly two), which did little to break the giant Frankish square. Occasionally Umayyad horsemen would break through, but they would always be dispatched. At one point Charles’s life was in danger, but the men defending his person proved to be unbreakable. As Charles had surmised, the combination of the hill and the woods and the (assumed) hollow square formation combined to reduce the effectiveness of the Umayyad attacks and led to their defeat. It did not help matters when Charles sent parties to raid the Umayyad camp in the rear both to rescue prisoners and to threaten the loot the Umayyads had taken from Bordeaux and other places in France (note that it is presumed but not known for sure whether he ordered this action). Whether planned or not, the effect was to cause a number of Umayyad soldiers to run back to the camp to protect their booty, and this seemed to set off a general retreat on the part of the main body of Umayyads. While trying to rally his troops, Abdul Rahman was struck down and killed. The Umayyad army withdrew during the night and the next day; however, as Charles did not trust that it was not a trap to draw him into the open, he rested his troops and waited. Once Charles was confident he could pursue the Umayyad army, he did so with vigor and prosecuted a long campaign to expel them from all of France. In 736,

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however, a second Umayyad invasion, more powerful than the first, threatened to undo his victories. Charles conducted a series of complicated but quite effective operations over several years. By 739 the caliphate forces had been confined to a few towns in Provence, which all fell to Charles within a few years, except Narbonne. It was Charles’s son Pépin le Bref (Pepin the Short) who captured this last Umayyad stronghold in southern France. By that time, the Umayyads had also been checked by the Byzantines at the Battle of Akroinon and as well had fallen into fighting between rival dynasties; the Iberian region thus was plunged into civil war. Islamic Umayyad forces never returned to French soil. It is this fact that makes Tours important, not in its own right as some have claimed, but as part of the larger campaign by Charles to establish a dynastic supremacy over southern France and to put an end to what were largely raids of plunder by Iberian Islamic forces. While Christianity would have survived a defeat at Tours, the history of France and neighboring territories would have likely taken a different course. Attacked from both the south by the Umayyads and from the north by the Vikings, European development might have been far different than it turned out to be. Robert Jay Fulton See also Caliphate Further Reading Bachrach, Bernard S. Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire. The Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. Fouracre, Paul. The Age of Charles Martel. Medieval World. Longman, 2000. Hawting, G. R. The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate AD 661–750. 2nd ed. London: Taylor & Francis, 2002. Nicolle, David. Poitiers AD 732: Charles Martel Turns the Islamic Tide. Vol. 190 of Osprey’s Campaign Series. Illustrated by Graham Turner. London: Osprey, 2008.

Transcendentalism and War Transcendentalism was a major spiritual and intellectual movement that emerged in New England among a group of thinkers associated with Unitarianism during the 1830s

and 1840s. It grew in a climate of sectionalist hostility, conflict related to westward expansion, and an intense debate over the morality of slavery that ultimately led to a bloody civil war. War and warfare, then, served as an important backdrop for the Transcendentalists who, through introspection and self-reflection, constantly wrestled with the autonomous individual’s place in the universe. Generally, the Transcendentalists’ position on war depended on whether it could be used to promote or restrict individual liberty. In the context of the time, this depended on whether an instance of war would help extend or limit the institution of slavery. As several recent studies have shown, some Transcendentalists justified war and even praised it, if it served the ends of human liberty and justice. When Transcendentalists did support a particular war for the enlargement of human freedom, they often did so in expressly spiritual or religious terms. This approach to war is best illustrated in Henry David Thoreau’s (1817–1862) opposition to the Mexican War. Thoreau saw the Mexican-American War as a means of expanding the institution of slavery further across the continent. In protest, he exercised civil disobedience and refused to pay a poll tax to a government that he believed sanctioned slavery. This led to Thoreau’s arrest and imprisonment, which inspired his 1849 tract “Resistance to Civil Government,” posthumously published as “Civil Disobedience” in 1866. This work has helped promote the conventional, and inaccurate, view that Transcendentalism was, as a whole, an ideology of nonviolence and pacifism. As perhaps the singular leader of the Transcendentalist movement, Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) offers a great insight into the relationship of Transcendentalism and war. As one scholar has pointed out, Emerson was never a pacifist and viewed war as a necessary evil, especially if it served to rid society of moral wrongs like slavery. This is seen in Emerson’s 1838 tract “War.” Although Emerson and other Transcendentalists espoused a nonviolent solution to emancipation throughout the 1840s, rising tensions over slavery exacerbated what one historian has called the Transcendentalists’ “violent instincts.” Galvanized by the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, leading Transcendentalists like Emerson, Theodore Parker, and Amos Bronson Alcott committed themselves to a view of social reform that was anything but pacifistic.

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In the wake of the Fugitive Slave Act during the 1850s, many Transcendentalists not only tolerated but indeed supported partisan warfare in Kansas in the name of emancipation. This support for antislavery militarism culminated in some Transcendentalists supporting John Brown’s private holy war against Kansas slaveholders during the 1850s. Most outspoken in this campaign were Thomas Wentworth Higginson and Theodore Parker, both Unitarian ministers and central figures in Transcendentalism during the 1850s. Higginson and Parker gained notoriety as members of the “Secret Six,” a group of well-to-do New Englanders who had supported Brown before and helped fund his 1859 raid on Harper’s Ferry, Virginia. Thoreau, too, sanctioned Brown’s personal religious war against slavery, first in Kansas and then in Virginia, in his 1859 “Plea for John Brown.” Emerson shared a similar perspective and cast Brown’s war in religious terms, noting that Brown was a “new saint awaiting his martyrdom” whose death would “make the gallows glorious like the cross.” The coming of the Civil War further demonstrated Transcendentalists’ comfort with warfare when it was used to limit or eliminate slavery, as many leading Transcendentalists supported the war effort and saw it as a righteous cause. One scholar has noted that during the war, the Transcendentalists became “religious nationalists” and preached that the war was a “remission by blood for the salvation of man and nation.” At stake was the soul and morality of the nation. In this view, the blood of Union soldiers would wash away the sin of slavery from the nation. The cause was righteous enough to lead Thomas Wentworth Higginson to volunteer for military service, first as captain of the 51st Massachusetts Infantry, and later as colonel of the 1st South Carolina Volunteers—the first actively serving Union regiment composed of former slaves. Ultimately, for Higginson—like other Transcendentalists—the cause of emancipation was important enough to support the cause of the Union, if not the war itself. War, then, in the minds of many Transcendentalists, remained an unfortunate reality of life that could, at times, be harnessed for good. Scott Schubitz See also American Civil War, Religious Dimensions of; Christianity and War

Further Reading Albrecht, Robert C. “The Theological Response of the Transcendentalists to the Civil War.” New England Quarterly Review 38, no. 1 (March 1965): 21–34. Garvey, Gregory T. “Simular Man: Emerson and Cosmopolitan Identity.” In Barry Tharaud, ed. Emerson for the Twenty-First Century: Global Perspectives on an American Icon. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2010. Gougeon, Len. “’Only Justice Satisfies All’: Emerson’s Militant Transcendentalism.” In Barry Tharaud, ed. Emerson for the Twenty-First Century: Global Perspectives on an American Icon. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2010. Grodzins, Dean. American Heretic: Theodore Parker and Transcendentalism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. Gura, Philip F. Transcendentalism: A History. New York: Hill & Wang, 2008.

Tripoli, County of The County of Tripoli was formed as a crusader principality on July 12, 1109, upon the surrender of the city of Tripoli, a city in modern-day Lebanon. The county fell to the Mamluks in 1289 under the sultan al-Mansur K.alawun. The establishment of Tripoli as a crusader state was one of the key events of this period. It became one of the four Latin kingdoms during the crusades, along with Jerusalem, Antioch, and Edessa. The Phoenicians first established the city in approximately 7000 BCE, though the exact epoch is debated by historians. Its name, Tri-polis, comes from the Greek meaning “three-cities” due to the walled division of Tyre, Sidon, and Arad into three quarters. The County of Tripoli occupied land in what is present-day Lebanon, with the Principality of Antioch directly to the north, as well as the County of Edessa lying northeast and the Kingdom of Jerusalem to the south near Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea. As with the circumstances surrounding the crusader takeover of Edessa, Baldwin I played an integral role in capturing Tripoli in 1109. Credit for the birth of the state, however, belongs to Raymond IV (or Raymond of St. Gilles), Count of Toulouse. Raymond IV was responsible for building the Castle of Mount Pilgrim (“Pilgrims’ Hill”) in 1103 outside the walls of the city as a base for military

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attack. During the siege of 1105 Raymond died, but his son Bertram would take Tripoli in 1109 and claim lordship over the city. The counts of Toulouse remained in control of the Latin state from 1109 to 1187. During this period of occupation one of the most recognized figures is Raymond III (r. 1152–1187), aptly known as Raymond III of Tripolis. Three renowned Muslim leaders, Zangi, Nur al-Din, and finally Salah. al-Din (Saladin), rose to power during Raymond III’s lifetime. It was the latter ruler, however, that provided the impetus for invading Jerusalem and fulfilling his lifelong goal of crushing the Frankish forces, thereupon reestablishing Muslim control of the Holy City at what would become the end of the Second Crusade. After the Battle of Hattin (July 4–5, 1187), in which Saladin defeated the crusaders, Raymond III returned to Tripoli and died from an illness, thereby effectively ending his dynasty. From 1187 to 1275, the County of Tripoli was subsumed by the Principality of Antioch and ruled by its princes. It continued as a prominent Christian base during that time as one of two remaining crusader states in the East. Under the auspices of Bohemond VII, Count of Tripoli (r. 1275– 1287), the Mamluks reinforced strongholds around the city in 1285 and cut off any possible support. Crusader lordship over Tripoli would come to a rather ominous end. Bartholomew Embriaco and Genoese merchant Benito Zaccaria took charge of the city’s government after Bohemond VII and were suspected to be in league with Genoa to establish a commercial “empire” in the Levant with Tripoli serving as the base. The decision by the Mamluks to move on the city was prompted by suspicion over these plans. Once the city was taken by the Muslims in 1289, Sultan al-Mansur Kalawun rebuilt Tripoli on Pilgrims’ Hill and it continued to flourish under Muslim control in the centuries that followed. Roy Michael McCoy III See also Antioch, Siege of; Edessa, County of; Hattin, Battle of; Saladin; Second Crusade; Third Crusade Further Reading Baldwin, M. W. Raymond III of Tripolis and the Fall of Jerusalem (1140–1187). Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1969. Hawting, Gerald, ed. Muslims, Mongols and Crusaders. London: Routledge, 2007.

Kostick, Conor, ed. The Crusades and the Near East. London: Routledge, 2010. Phillips, Jonathan. The Crusades, 1095–1204. London: Routledge, 2014. Setton, Kenneth M., ed. A History of the Crusades. Vol. 1: The First Hundred Years Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.

Tripolitan War The North African Barbary States (Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli) had sanctioned sea raiders called the Barbary pirates to attack the ships of other nations in the Mediterranean Sea since the 16th century. Since 1786, the United States had made tribute payments to the Barbary States to protect its shipping from pirate raids, but in 1801, when the pasha of Tripoli demanded a higher payment, U.S. president Thomas Jefferson refused to pay. The pasha declared war on May 14, 1801, and began seizing American ships, but only minor skirmishes between Tripoli’s pirates and U.S. naval forces ensued. When the United States’ blockade of Tripoli failed to daunt the pirates, Jefferson pursued diplomatic negotiations, but no agreement with the pasha could be reached. For a short time, the blockade was lifted, and the United States resumed its tribute payments. In 1803, however, sustained military action between the two countries erupted. The U.S. forces, led by Commodore Edward Preble and Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, dealt deadly blows to the pirates. Preble sent the U.S. frigate Philadelphia to resume the blockade, but the ship was captured when a storm drove it aground. Then, on February 16, 1804, Decatur and his crew raided the Tripoli harbor to set fire to and destroy the Philadelphia. The major U.S. victory in the Tripolitan War occurred when William Eaton, the U.S. consul to Tunis, captured the port city of Derna as part of his mission to replace the Tripolitan pasha with the rightful ruler. Eaton and his troops, which consisted of U.S. marines and some Arab mercenaries, landed in Egypt and marched to Derna, where U.S. naval vessels aided them in the attack. The conflict at Derna was later memorialized in the U.S. Marine hymn, “From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli.” Before

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Eaton could proceed with his mission to unseat the pasha, a peace agreement was reached in June 1805. It dictated that the United States would no longer pay tribute to Tripoli. The other Barbary States continued to receive some tribute until 1816. Alexander Mikaberidze See also Primary Document: Treaty of Tripoli (January 3, 1797) Further Reading Chidsey, Thomas B. The Wars in Barbary: Arab Piracy and the Birth of the United States Navy. New York: Crown, 1971. Malone, Dumas. Thomas Jefferson as Political Leader. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. Whipple, A. B. C. To the Shores of Tripoli: The Birth of the US Navy and Marines. New York: Morrow, 1991.

Truce of God Following the Peace of God, the Truce of God emerged as a movement toward the second quarter of the 11th century. Just like the Peace of God, the Truce of God was a religious movement, yet it demonstrated a much stronger adherence to the laws of God. While the purpose of the Peace of God was only to guarantee protection, the aim of the Truce of God was to eradicate or at least minimize violence as much as possible. The movement’s main target was the military, which according to churchmen abused its power to use weapons, causing chaos and bringing death to peaceful, unarmed people. In its early stages, although aiming at bringing permanent peace, the movement was rather unpopular as it preached an abandonment of the use of arms. Later, however, as the policy was changed and the goals were deprived of this threatening tone of prohibition, the Truce of God gained popularity among the masses. The main purpose of the movement became to limit violence, thus glorifying God. Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday were declared days of peace and days on which violence was prohibited in remembrance of the Last Supper, the Crucifixion, the Entombment, and the Resurrection of Christ. Additionally, all significant religious holidays also became days of no war and violence.

It was believed that the abstention from violence and the use of arms was as necessary as the abstention from food, drinking, and so on that Christians followed while fasting or at other times when the church required them to do so. However, the mission of the Truce of God soon became perceived as rather ambivalent, and people started asking, if violence is against God’s laws, should it not be completely banned on all days? Thus, another proposal was promoted before long, namely that a Christian is not allowed to kill another Christian as this crime would be the equal of killing Christ, which would of course be a mortal sin. Both the Truce of God and its precursor, the Peace of God, were not just aimed at but actually rescued the society of medieval Europe from the feudal violence and chaos that the fighting brought, especially to less protected social classes. Tatiana Prorokova See also Peace of God Further Reading Cowdrey, H. E. J. “The Peace and the Truce of God in the Eleventh Century.” Past & Present 46 (February 1970): 42–67. Paxton, Frederick S. “History, Historians, and the Peace of God.” In Thomas Head and Richard Landers, eds. The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the Year 1000. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992, pp. 21–40. Perraud, Mgr. “The ‘Truce of God.’” American Advocate of Peace and Arbitration 52, no. 1 (January–February 1890): 15.

True Cross The True Cross is the name of the physical artifact carried into some battles of the crusades that, according to various traditions in Christianity, is the remnant of the wooden cross on which Jesus of Nazareth was crucified by the Romans in the first century CE as recorded in the New Testament. During the era of the crusades, fragments of the cross were understood by many crusaders to be relics of divine favor and assistance in warfare and were thus carried into battle.

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The disparate traditions surrounding the existence and recovery of the True Cross by Empress Helena, the mother of Constantine, the first Christian emperor of Rome, during a visit to the Holy Land during 326–328 CE, are not universally accepted by all Christians but have a strong presence in Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. Early ecclesiastical histories recording the finding of the True Cross include those of Eusebius of Caesarea (d. 339), Socrates Scholasticus (b. ca. 380), Sozomen (d. 450), and Theodoret (d. 457). Much of the awareness and appreciation of the tradition of the True Cross were recorded in the popular medieval book Golden Legend written in 1260 by Jacopo de Voragine (d. 1298), Bishop of Genoa. Many churches possess small fragmentary remains attested to be pieces of the True Cross, and during the medieval era there was great significance and spiritual value placed on the True Cross and other sacred relics. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem was completed by 335 and within a decade alleged relics of the True Cross were being venerated in the church. After the siege and capture of Jerusalem in 614 by the Sassanid (Persian) emperor Khosrau II, part of the True Cross was removed as a trophy of war. It was regained from a subsequent ruler, Shahrbaraz (d. 629), by Byzantine emperor Heraclius. In the early 11th century it was hidden by Christians in Jerusalem and remained hidden until Jerusalem was besieged and captured in 1099 by European knights during the First Crusade. It became part of the sacred relics of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and was carried into battle by crusaders with the Latin patriarch of Jerusalem marching before it. It was present in at least four battles won by crusaders in Egypt between 1099 and 1105. In 1187, during the Battle of Hattin, it was captured by Saladin. Its recovery was a fervent hope during the Third and Fourth Crusades. Attempts by Richard the Lionheart and others to ransom it from Saladin were unsuccessful and it disappeared from historical records. Additional alleged fragments of the True Cross were kept in Constantinople and became part of the spoils of war, and were dispersed throughout Europe after the 1204 siege of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade by Latin crusaders. Relics like fragments of the True Cross were an integral aspect of crusader spirituality both as talismans in battle and acquisitions for self and others,

especially religious communities and churches. Fragments remain today in churches primarily in Europe, although the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church claims to have the right wing of the True Cross in the monastery of Gishen Mariam. Timothy J. Demy See also Crusades and Religious Relics; Fourth Crusade; Hattin, Battle of; Jerusalem, Sieges of; Saladin Further Reading Freeman, Charles. Holy Bones, Holy Dust: How Relics Shaped the History of Medieval Europe. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011. Housley, Norman. Fighting for the Cross: Crusading to the Holy Land. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008. Murray, Alan V. “’Mighty Against the Enemies of Christ’: The Relic of the True Cross in the Armies of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.” In J. France and W. G. Zajac, eds. The Crusades and Their Sources: Essays Presented to B. Hamilton. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 217–38.

Twelve Articles (1525) During the German Peasants’ War, the peasant insurgents drew up a large number of manifestos, which usually contained a list of grievances and demands for reform. The most widespread and influential manifesto of the war, The Twelve Articles of the Upper Swabian Peasants, was composed between late February and early March 1525 in what became known as the “Peasants’ Parliament” in Memmingen, a town in the region of Swabia in south Germany. Both Sebastian Lotzer, a fur trader and lay preacher in the city, and Christoph Schappeler, a Memmingen preacher strongly influenced by Huldrych Zwingli, helped to shape the document. The Twelve Articles was reprinted at least 25 times during the insurrections and became the key document of the war, providing a clear set of goals that was used, sometimes in modified form, by bands of peasants in virtually every area where the rebellion took place. The Twelve Articles arose in the context of the Protestant Reformation, whose principles—such as sola fide, the priesthood of all believers, and sola scriptura—had heightened the peasants’ desire for social and political reforms.

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As the ideals of the Reformation were fused with existing economic and political grievances, the peasants and the poorer classes concluded that their cause had divine support. In The Twelve Articles, the commoners put forth both their secular grievances and religious concerns. The Twelve Articles opens with the belief that “the gospel is not a cause of rebellions or insurrections” because Christ taught “nothing but love, peace, patience, and unity.” The first two articles of the 12 have to do with church: they express the desire for the congregation to have the power to appoint their own minister (who “preaches the holy gospel to us purely and clearly”) and to determine where their tithe is distributed (“it should be given to God and distributed to his people”). The third article, which was the most radical of the set, was the demand to be released from serfdom (a condition that the peasants viewed as “deplorable since Christ redeemed us all with the shedding of his precious blood”). Subsequent articles dealt with access to resources and financial abuses, such as demanding the right to fish and hunt (“When the Lord God created man, he gave him dominion over all animals, birds in the air, and fish in the water”), as well as demanding that death dues, which tended to impoverish widows and orphans, be abolished (as these are “contrary to God and honor”). Various other articles called for the end of high feudal demands, compulsory labor, inflated rents, and the cancellation of new laws that favored the interests of landlords, among other demands. The Twelve Articles conceded that any demand not in accordance with the Word of God should be retracted. The articles conclude with the hope that “the peace of Christ” will be with all. Each article provided biblical citations to prove that the Word of God supported the peasants’ articles. The Twelve Articles were in some ways quite moderate, refraining from calling for an end to traditional lordship. If realized, however, they would have radically shifted the power away from lords and ecclesiastical leadership in favor of the “common man.” Ashlee R. Quosigk See also German Peasants’ War Further Reading Bak, Janos, ed. The German Peasant War of 1525. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Baylor, Michael. The German Reformation and the Peasants’ War: A Brief History with Documents. Boston: Bedford/ St. Martin’s, 2012. Blickle, Peter. The Revolution of 1525: The German Peasants’ War from a New Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

Tyr, Norse God of War Tyr was described as the god of war, the Germanic equivalent of Mars, by the Roman author Tacitus in his work Germania. Tyr has over the centuries become less well known among the Old Norse gods than has Odin, who tends to be more popularly known as the god of war as well as the chief god, or asa, among the Norse pantheon. The reason for this seems to be that Tyr was more widely worshipped in earlier times and primarily in the area of modern Denmark. This is seen in the large number of places in the region that include Tyr in their names. The further north one travels, Thor becomes better known and Tyr fades into a subsidiary role. It seems that in the northern Germany/Denmark region warrior gods ranked higher in society, whereas to the north fertility gods seem more popular. In Tacitus’s time, however, Tyr seems not only to have been the god of war but in some cases the premier divinity. His proto-Germanic name of Tiwaz can be traced to the proto-Indo-European god Dyeus, which comes from the root word “deiwos” meaning the daytime sky. This would imply the top rank in the pantheon; the Roman Jupiter came from Dyeus Phater, or Sky Father. Dyeus is also the root word for the modern English “deity.” Thus, in more northern lands, the word tyr becomes synonymous with “god.” For example, Odin was known (among many other names) as Sigtyr, god of victory. Many other gods are known by having the last part of their name being “–tyr.” In the Edda of Snorri Sturlsson, Tyr is described as “very daring and stout-hearted. He sways victory in war, wherefore warriors should call on him. There is a saw, that he who surpasses others in bravery, and never yields, is Tyrstrong. He is also so wise, that it is said of anyone who is specially intelligent, that he is Tyr-learned.” In spite of this

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high praise, the only mention of Tyr actually fighting comes in the description of the great battle at the end of time when he, along with all the other gods, is killed. The primary story concerning Tyr deals with the gods’ problem with the great wolf Fenrir, child of the god Loki. Tyr was the only one who would approach Fenrir and would feed and water him. The prophecies foretold that at the great end-of-the-world battle Fenrir would kill one or more of the gods, so the gods commissioned the elves to create a magic cord with which they could bind him. After having broken the strongest chains earlier, Fenrir was suspicious and would only take the dare that he could not break this cord if one of the gods would put his hand in the wolf ’s mouth during the binding. Tyr volunteered and, as the magic cord proved unbreakable, Fenrir bit off Tyr’s hand. Tyr showed no emotion at this, and thus became for many the ideal of the Nordic trait of stoicism. The modern word Tuesday has its origin in “tyrsdagr,” the second day of the week. The second day of the Roman calendar was “dies Martis” or Mars’s day, thus confirming the war-god connection between the societies. Paul K. Davis See also Mars, Roman God of War; Odin, Teutonic God of War Further Reading Davidson, H. R. Ellis, Gods and Myths of Northern Europe. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1964. Grimm, Jacob. Teutonic Mythology. Vol. 1. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004.

Tyrannicide Tyrannicide (literally, the killing of a tyrant) is most often understood as the killing of a tyrant by a private person or group for the good of the people or broader political community. It is distinguished from political assassination, where concern for the common good is usually absent. Regicide (the killing of a king) can be a form of tyrannicide when the king arbitrarily and unjustifiably oppresses his subjects. The word can also express a doctrine, wherein the killing of a coercive ruler is both justified and championed.

As a form of government, tyranny has been discussed since ancient times. Both Plato and Aristotle were highly critical of tyranny, the former describing it in both the Republic and Statesman as the lowest stage in the development of any political community. In his Politics, Aristotle understood that the greatest crimes come from volitional excess rather than necessity. He therefore contrasted thievery, driven by want of food or other items of subsistence, and tyranny, which is driven by a ruler’s will and lack of constraint. For this reason, Aristotle said that great honor is bestowed upon the person who commits tyrannicide. Justifications for tyrannicide also appear in the writings of Christian philosophers and theologians. Although his thoughts were subject to varying interpretations, John of Salisbury (1115–1176), for example, arguably justified tyrannicide and did so within the broader context of a political theory that understood the various parts of a political community as analogous to the parts of a human body— the working interrelations of which are necessary for systemic health. Similar to removing a cancerous tumor, a tyrant, in John’s view, must be killed in order to return the body politic to its proper functioning. John held that not every tyrant must be killed, since other virtuous parts of the political system might act to mitigate the tyrant’s illeffects. However, absent such mitigating forces, tyrannicide was, for John, justified. Indeed, not only was it justified but those who fail to kill a tyrant, under such circumstances, become morally blameworthy themselves. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) argued that an authority ought to be disobeyed when it exceeded the purpose for which it was constituted—even if such disobedience took the form of the killing of a tyrant in order to liberate the country. Another defense of tyrannicide can be found in the writings of John Ponet (1514–1556), an English Protestant churchman and Bishop of Winchester, whose A Shorte Treatise of Politike Power argued that civil authority is merely a delegated power, which can be withdrawn from the king, even by means of regicide, if his rule degenerates into tyranny. Moreover, John Knox (1514–1572), whose uncompromising Protestantism was so highly influential for the English Puritans, taught the doctrine of resistance to tyrants in the most emphatic of terms—which some have argued justified tyrannicide. Furthermore, the 1598 work De rege et regis institutione (On the Killing of Despots) by

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Juan de Mariana (1536–1624), a Jesuit scholar, argued in favor of killing political rulers who, without public approval or legal authority, seize power illegitimately through the use of force. Perhaps no event generated more reflection on the doctrine of tyrannicide than did the execution of King Charles I of England on January 30, 1649. That same year, for example, John Milton (1608–1674) published The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, which argued that the execution of the king was the natural extension of Parliament’s just war against an unrepentant tyrant. Milton, who after the regicide became a minister in the government of Oliver Cromwell, asserted that even kings derive their authority from their role in the protection of the polity, and can therefore be justly deposed, even by means of execution, when they oppress their own people and thereby themselves threaten the political community. This cumulative sense of the permissibility of tyrannicide represented the logical extension of the prevailing doctrine of the Middle Ages regarding political legitimacy: that supreme ruling authority derives from God through the people for the common public good. Because the people were understood to be the medium through which God’s sovereignty passes to the ruler, so too might that

ruler be deprived of sovereignty when he has used it in an arbitrary and oppressive manner. Increasingly into modernity, it was held that the means that were permissible in retaking sovereignty from a tyrant included tyrannicide— especially when no other recourse is available. Joseph M. Hatfield See also Aquinas, Thomas; Christianity and War; Cromwell, Oliver; English Civil Wars; Knox, John; Ponet, John; Three Kingdoms, War of the Further Reading George, David. “Distinguishing Classical Tyrannicide from Modern Terrorism.” Review of Politics 50, no. 3 (1988): 390–419. Milton, John. The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 2010 [1649]. Nederman, Cary J. “A Duty to Kill: John of Salisbury’s Theory of Tyrannicide.” Review of Politics 50 (1988): 365–89. Osgood, Herbert L. “The Political Ideas of the Puritans.” Political Science Quarterly 6, no. 1 (1891): 1–28. Robertson, Geoffrey. The Tyrannicide Brief: The Story of the Man Who Sent Charles I to the Scaffold. New York: First Anchor Books, 2005. Zaller, Robert. “The Figure of the Tyrant in English Revolutionary Thought.” Journal of the History of Ideas 54, no. 4 (1993): 585–610.

U Uhud, Battle of (625 CE)

he donned his armor and prepared to go out; those who had so urged him meantime expressed regret. But Muhammad said, “It is not fitting that a prophet who has put on his armor should lay it aside until he has fought,” and he marched out with 1,000 fighters. Partway to the valley of Uhud (located about one mile north of Medina’s center), ‘Abdullah b. Ubayy, who had agreed with Muhammad regarding his earlier plan to remain in the city, turned back with a third of the fighters. In this circumstance, it was suggested to Muhammad that the Medinan Jews might be enlisted to help, but Muhammad felt this unnecessary. He liked auguries and had read the swishing of a horse’s tail, knocking a sword from its sheath, as a sign of looming battle. In command of the Quraysh from Mecca was Abū Sufyān b. H.arb. Muhammad himself commanded his company, deputizing the haughty Abū Dujāna by giving him a sword. Khalid b. al-Walid, who later would join Muhammad’s followers and become one of the notable generals, here commanded the left flank cavalry of the Quraysh against Muhammad; heading the right flank was ‘Ikrima b. Abū Jahl. Muhammad, 55 years old and having gained weight, wore two coats of mail and actively participated in the fighting, shooting with a bow. Muhammad’s men numbered about 700; the Quraysh about 3,000.

The Battle of Uhud was the second major battle of the nascent community of the followers of Muhammad. Muhammad had by this time been resident and in authority in Medina for several years and was beginning to flex his newfound political muscle against the Meccans. This battle came to carry theological significance: Uhud was a defeat for the followers of Muhammad at a time when victory against steep odds was taken as a sign of the righteousness of the victors’ cause and the favor of God. Deep soulsearching on the part of Muhammad’s young Muslim community is reported to have followed this rout. The Battle of Uhud was initiated by the Quraysh tribe in a desire for revenge by these Meccan survivors of Muhammad’s aggression, one year prior, at the Battle of Badr. The violence at Badr for them had been a great shock; the Qurayshī merchants, on word that Muhammad was intending to intercept their caravan and steal their property, had merely set out to defend it. Having expected only robbery, the bloodshed that Muhammad’s followers (by and large their own kin) inflicted upon them cut deep. Licking their wounds, the Quraysh returned the following year intending to address the injustice. Muhammad, hearing of the Meccans’ approach, had decided not to leave Medina but rather to engage them as they tried to enter the city. However, on the urging of some, 817

818  Uighur Unrest in Xinjiang

Uighur Unrest in Xinjiang

This miniature from the Turkish epic illustrated manuscript Siyer-i Nebi, ca. 1594, shows the Prophet Muhammad and the Muslim army at the Battle of Uhud. (Fine Art Images/Heritage Images/Getty Images)

The mothers and sisters of those who had been killed at Badr figure prominently in the leadup and the battle. The Qurayshi women, led by Hind d. ‘Utba, incited their men from behind with tambourines and chants. In the heat of battle, Abū Dujāna, to whom Muhammad had given his sword, encountered Hind but refrained from killing her, saying later, “I respected the apostle’s sword too much to use it on a woman.” A total of 65 followers of Muhammad were killed at Uhud; the losses to the Meccans were only 22. Daniel A. Brubaker See also Badr, Battle of; Muhammad as Warrior Further Reading Guillaume, Alfred. The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ish.āq’s Sīrat Rasūl Allāh. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 1955. Muhammad, Hamidullah. The Battlefields of the Prophet Muhammad. 4th ed. New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1992. Watt, W. Montgomery. Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.

The Uighurs are the indigenous peoples of the autonomous Xinjiang province in the northwestern corner of China. Xinjiang has been ruled by China since the 18th century, but Chinese rule has been viewed as occupation by many Uighurs, leading to the Xinjiang wars in the early and mid20th century. The uprising during the Chinese Civil War culminated in the declaration of the East Turkestan Republic in 1949, supported by the Soviet Union, but Xinjiang became incorporated into Communist China later that year when Mao Zedong founded the People’s Republic of China. The province was named Xinjiang Autonomous Region (XAR) in 1955. The majority of Uighurs are Sunni Muslim. Uighurs share ethnic and linguistic ties with Turkic peoples in Central Asia and refer to Xinjiang as East Turkestan or Uighuristan. Some Uighurs have taken up arms against a central government they argue is threatening their religious, ethnic, and cultural roots by facilitating Han Chinese migration to Xinjiang, for example, by means of the “Go West” campaign. Han Chinese have also been attracted by large-scale development projects and Xinjiang’s thriving job market. In 2008, Han Chinese made up at least 40 percent of Xinjiang’s total population of approximately 21 million, which is a 33 percent increase since 1949, with Uighurs accounting for about 45 percent of the population of Xinjiang. Xinjiang is the largest of China’s administrative regions at roughly the size of Alaska, and it is famous for its fertile farmlands and vast natural resources, including China’s largest coal reserves and highest concentrations of natural gas and oil reserves. It also serves as a vital transit hub for pipelines that transfer natural gas from Central Asia to China. Once part of the elaborate Silk Road trade network, Xinjiang is now at the center of President Xi Jinping’s “New Silk Road” strategy, which has led to a series of trade and infrastructure (roads, railways, and ports) agreements with regional neighbors. Unrest in Xinjiang is also related to what Uighurs perceive as the systematic discrimination, marginalization, and destruction of Uighur identity and culture. The curtailing and criminalizing of religious activities has included mosque closings, veil bans in public spaces and on buses, and a fasting ban for Muslim civil servants, teachers,

Uighur Unrest in Xinjiang  819

and students during the holy month of Ramadan. In 2009, Beijing authorized the razing of the Old City section in Kashgar, an ancient Islamic city and Uighur cultural capital, to make room for new apartment buildings, schools, shopping centers, and public plazas. The armed struggle of the Uighurs intensified in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in line with various other independence movements in Central Asia. Uighur insurgents have traditionally launched attacks against Chinese state security forces, mostly police stations. The deadliest attack took place in 2009, when about 200 mostly Han Chinese were killed during mass riots in the region’s capital, Urumqi, and thousands were injured. The unrest was sparked by an argument between Han Chinese and Uighur factory workers in Guangdong Province that left two Uighurs dead. Other notable attacks include an attempted hijacking of a plane from Hotan to Urumqi in June 2012, mass knife attacks in local government buildings in Shanshan County in April and June 2013, and knifewielding militants attacking police stations and government offices in Yarkant in July, leaving some 100 people dead. In September 2015, explosions in Luntai County killed about 50 outside police stations, and also targeted were a market and a store. In what some argue indicates a shift toward organized terrorist tactics, Uighur separatists in spring 2014 started focusing on civilian targets, including a knife attack at Urumqi’s south railway station and militants driving cars into a food market in Urumqi and throwing explosives into the crowd. In September 2015, at least 60 coal miners, most of them Chinese migrants, were knifed to death at the Sogan coal mine. Uighur-inspired violence has also spilled into other parts of China. A March 2014 stabbing spree in Kunming in Yunnan province was attributed to the Xinjiang separatists. When a car drove into a crowed and burst into flames in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square as part of a suicide mission in October 2013, China’s foreign ministry blamed the attacks on the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, ETIM, calling the group “the most immediate and realistic security threat in China.” China has consistently blamed ETIM and other Uighur groups like the Turkistan Islamic Party (considered ETIM’s successor by some) and the World Uighur Congress for attacks or inspiring people to carry out violent acts in both Xinjiang and other parts of the country. According to Bei-

jing, ETIM is looking to separate the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region from China and form an independent East Turkestan (that would potentially span parts of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) and has been responsible for more than 200 terrorist attacks over the years. Others question ETIM’s organizational proficiencies, and also argue that China is exaggerating the threat and involvement of organized groups to justify repressive measures, allowing Chinese authorities to crack down on street protests in the 1990s and before the 2008 Beijing Olympics, or launch a “year-long campaign against terrorism” in response to the May 2014 marketplace attacks in Urumqi. While Uighur separatism is considered a threat to the domestic stability and territorial sovereignty of China, Beijing has played up radical Islamist objectives of Uighur nationalists and consistently alleged links between militant Uighurs and Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and, more recently, the Islamic State. China’s concerns about Uighur unrest in Xinjiang are compounded by its strategic importance for energy supplies and pipelines, as well as its restive neighborhood. Xinjiang not only shares borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India, but also Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Mongolia. Recent hardened security measures include a stepped-up police and military presence in the region and have been accompanied by mass arrests and sentencings of terrorist suspects and groups. Among the most highprofile detainees is Uighur academic Ilham Tohti, who was found guilty of separatism and jailed for life in September 2014. Dorle Hellmuth See also Islam and War (Jihad) Further Reading Hayes, Anna, and Michael Clarke. Inside Xinjiang: Space, Place and Power in China’s Muslim Far Northwest. New York: Routledge, 2015. Hillman, Ben, and Gray Tuttle. Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China’s West. New York: Columbia University, 2016. Larroca, Isabel. “The Self-Fulfilling Prophesy of China’s AntiTerrorism Efforts.” Wilson Quarterly, August 2015. http:// wilsonquarterly.com/stories/the-self-fulfilling-prophecy-of -chinas-anti-terrorism-efforts/

820  Urban II, Pope (ca. 1035–1099) Mackerras, Colin, and Michael Clarke. China, Xinjiang and Central Asia: History, Transition and Crossborder Interaction into the 21st Century. New York: Routledge, 2011. U.S. Government. Complete Guide to China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Progressive Management, 2013. Xu, Beina, Holly Fletcher, and Jayshree Bajoria. “The East Turkestan Islamic Movement ETIM.” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, September 2014. http://www.cfr.org/china /east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim/p9179 Zambelis, Chris. “Uighur Dissent and Militancy in China’s Xinjiang Province.” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 3, no. 1 (January 2010).

Urban II, Pope (ca. 1035–1099) Born Odo of Châtillon or Otho of Lagery, the 159th bishop of Rome (March 12, 1088–July 29, 1099) was famous for further development of reforms in the Catholic Church started by Gregory VII and as an initiator and inspirer of crusades. He made the papacy a powerful and effective political institution by centralization of ecclesiastical power, which further resulted in implementation of the Holy See administration (Roman Curia) whose functions were similar to European royal courts. He was born about 1035 (or 1042) in the noble family of Châtillon-sur-Marne (Champagne, France) and was educated in Soissons and Reims (under St. Bruno), which were the leading Catholic centers and the biggest cities of France of that time. He was ordained archdeacon by the archbishop of Reims, whom he assisted in administration in his diocese during 1055–1067. After that he became a monk and during 1070–1074 was the grand prior in the monastic center in Cluny. His penance both in Reims and Cluny contributed a lot to his experience of church life and internal policy and opened the road to Rome for him, where he was sent with a special assignment in 1079 by the Cluniac abbot Hugh. Pope Gregory VII (1073–1085) took him under his patronage, raised him to the rank of cardinal, and ordained him the bishop of Ostia, the seaport near Rome. In 1084 he was sent as a papal legate to the Holy Roman Empire (modern Germany), and during his service under the rivalry of Gregory VII with the Holy Roman Emperor Henry

IV he remained loyal to the pope even after the death of Gregory VII, under the rule of Victor III (1085–1087). In the course of pending papal elections after Victor’s death, he had managed to thwart the attempt of Henry IV to proclaim Guibert of Ravenna pope. On March 12, 1088, Odo of Lagery was elected pope under the name of Urban II by the restricted group of prelates and bishops in the small town of Terracina located south of Rome; nevertheless, for a long time he had no chance to be settled in Rome due to the Investiture Controversy. Pope Urban II’s strongholds included France and south of Italy, and he permanently worked to enlarge his influence. His contribution to the war against Muslim control of the Holy Land was the reason that Spain and Sicily supported him, and at the height of his glory in 1095, England also had joined his alliance. Nevertheless, he was never recognized by Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV or by most of the German Catholic Church. Due to his origins, Urban II understood the needs and aspirations of the nobility; on the other hand, his diligent penance offered him the unique possibility of understanding the needs and claims of representatives of different groups of clergy; this was fundamental to his activity as pope, which contributed to his authority and helped him to establish himself as the only legal pope. A series of synods with the participation of a broad clerical audience were held in Rome, Amalfi, Benevento, and Troia, aimed at the discussion of strategic issues of ecclesiastic life and further reformation of the Catholic Church, the most important of which was the formation of opposition to clerical marriages. Pope Urban II often acted as mediator in many important negotiations of that time, particularly in the relations between the king of England, William II, and Anselm, the archbishop of Canterbury (this mission was complicated by the obvious support demonstrated by Urban toward Anselm). Moreover, due to his mediation, many important dynastic marriages among European monarchs were settled. Being tolerant, flexible, and moderate in his reforms, Pope Urban II had managed to overshadow the Investiture Controversy, which is considered to be one of the most crucial disputable issues that provoked many armed conflicts of that time. Urban proposed crusades to the Holy Land in

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the name of God. His thoughts on the holy war against Muslims who occupied the sacred places in Jerusalem were pronounced at the Council in Piacenza in March 1095 in the presence of the ambassador of the Byzantine emperor Alexios I Komnenos, who was seeking assistance in his campaign against the Seljuk Turks. At the next council, which took place in Clermont on November 27, 1095, with the participation of 13 archbishops, 225 bishops, and more than 90 abbots, Urban II in his emotional speech and sermon (which was later written in five different versions) was successful in persuading Christians to embark on the First Crusade against the enemies of the Christian faith. It was decided to send an army of horse and foot soldiers to Jerusalem to fight against the Saracens, and a plenary indulgence would be granted to all participants of this campaign. Pope Urban II died on July 29, 1099, 14 days after the crusaders had entered Jerusalem, but this information

arrived in Rome after his death and only reached his successor, Pope Paschal II (1099–1118). Urban II was buried at Badia di Cava (Trinity of Cava), the Benedictine abbey near Salerno that he had endowed with many privileges. In 1881 he was beatified by Pope Leo XIII; the day of his celebration is July 29. Olena Smyntyna See also Emicho, Count of Leiningen; First Crusade; Investiture Controversy Further Reading Cowdrey, H. E. J. Pope Gregory VII, 1073–1085. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Rubenstein, Jay. Armies of Heaven: The First Crusade and the Quest for Apocalypse. New York: Basic Books, 2011. Tellenbach, Gerd. The Western Church from the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993.

V Vattel, Emmerich de (1714–1767)

being human, Vattel attempted to outline the consequences of this idea for international relations. Whereas later jurists would come to see international law as “positive” (in the sense that nations can simply create it for themselves by signing treaties and honoring implied customs), Vattel found such an understanding unacceptable. If the sole foundation for international law was consent, without any regard to the inherent humanity of the individual or the equal sovereignty of all nations, then governments could easily legalize and justify immoral practices, such as the slave trade, without any threat of punishment. This particular application of the philosophy of natural law did not shape later jurists’ efforts to systematize international relations, but Vattel’s ideas have had a profound impact all the same. In his writings, Vattel articulated many of the essential concepts of modern international thought. For instance, he emphasized the importance of achieving a balance of powers between nations. Vattel’s understanding of the principle derived from his belief in the legal equality of all nations, regardless of their size or military power, and he even tacitly sanctioned preventive war to keep one state from becoming too powerful and threatening that balance. For Vattel, equality under international law also meant that the rules of war had to be applied equally to all parties in a conflict, regardless of which side’s reason or reasons for going to war were actually “just.” At the broadest level, through

Emmerich de Vattel was a Swiss philosopher, jurist, and diplomat whose treatise The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (1758) became one of the most significant texts in the field of international law in the century following its initial publication. Although his diplomatic career was generally unremarkable, Vattel found greater success as an author, and his popularization of the ideas of German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679–1754) strongly influenced many statesmen, including the founding fathers of the United States. A transitional figure, his work has been described by some experts as one of the last attempts to address issues of international relations by looking to earlier notions of natural law. Other scholars instead claim that Vattel’s effort was one of the first examples of a distinctly “modern” approach to international law. Though not an international relations textbook in the contemporary sense, Vattel’s The Law of Nations did achieve a wide readership as well as translation into numerous languages. Vattel envisioned a broad audience of diplomats and other governmental officials for his work, and so he abandoned some of Wolff ’s theoretical and metaphysical concerns in favor of a more practical approach. Grounding his discussion in natural law, or the concept that human beings have inherent rights simply by virtue of 823

824  Venetian Crusade (1122–1124)

the publication of works like The Law of Nations, Emmerich de Vattel and contemporary legal theorists helped establish international law as a field unto itself, separating it from the realm of domestic law and developing new methods of regulating international relations. John M. Young See also International Religious Freedom and Human Rights; Just War Tradition Further Reading Brown, Chris, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger, eds. International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Vattel, Emmerich de. The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law. Translated by Charles G. Fenwick. Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution, 1916.

Venetian Crusade (1122–1124) After the success of the First Crusade (1096–1099), the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was established. The venture known to history as the Second Crusade (1147–1149) would not take place for decades. But between these two major instances of armed, redemptive pilgrimage, there was a lesser-known but very successful venture known as the Venetian Crusade. After a major defeat of the Franks of the Kingdom of Jerusalem at the Field of Blood (Ager Sanguinis) in June 1119, Pope Calixtus II (d. 1124) and Doge Domenico Michiel of Venice received a request for aid from King Baldwin II of Jerusalem. A papal nuncio was sent to Venice, who encouraged action. The doge summoned the populace and championed launching a new crusade to aid the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The Venetians accepted this summons with vigor, and 15,000 crusaders with some 120 vessels set sail for Outremer in August of 1122. The First Lateran Council confirmed that the Venetians were to receive the spiritual benefits conveyed on previous pilgrims/ crusaders. At Corfu they laid siege to some Byzantine properties, punishing the empire for the emperor’s refusal to acknowl-

edge their claimed commercial rights. Baldwin II was captured by the Balak of Mardin, emir of Aleppo in 1123. Upon hearing of this they broke their siege and set sail for the Levant where they arrived in May. Rumors had reached them that a large fleet from Egypt was departing from Jaffa, of biblical fame. The doge swiftly opted to intercept the enemy fleet and destroy it. His plan was deceit: placing his small ships behind a number of large vessels that looked like commercial ships, the small ships would have appeared to be unarmed pilgrim vessels. Once the subterfuge was revealed, it was too late for the surrounded Fatimid fleet. In an overwhelming defeat, it was completely destroyed or captured near the port of Ascalon. After this they proceeded the short distance north to the crusader stronghold of Acre, then fulfilled their vow to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem and Bethlehem over the Christmas season. In Acre an agreement was made between the Venetians and the Franks stipulating that the Venetians would aid the Franks in the capture of the city of Tyre, and that as a reward they would control one-third of that city, and then one-quarter of each city in the kingdom. The siege commenced in February 1124. The Franks were only a minority in the endeavor, and since the Venetian maritime siege of Tyre was not successful, they beached their ships and aided the Franks in a land-based siege. Islamic forces were sent to aid Tyre, but were repelled by Count Pons of Tripoli and Constable William. The siege was eventually successful and the city fell in July 1124. The terms of settlement allowed for some families to retain their properties in the city, which was unpopular with some crusaders. A perpetual weakness of the Kingdom of Jerusalem was that after military victories and the completion of the vow of pilgrimage, most warriors would return to Europe. Many of the Venetians did just this shortly after this series of resounding military successes. This crusade was instrumental in helping the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem to expand to its maximum extent, and presaged later military endeavors against Byzantium, especially the siege of Zara in the Fourth Crusade. The city of Tyre prospered as part of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Furthermore, its conquest deprived the caliphate’s navy of a key port for replenishing water and supplies. Duane Alexander Miller

Vermigli, Peter Martyr (1499–1562)  825 See also Caliphate; First Crusade; Jerusalem, Latin Kingdom of; Second Crusade Further Reading Madden, Thomas F. Venice: A New History. New York: Penguin, 2012.

Verden, Massacre of (782 CE) The Verden massacre was the death of about 4,500 captive Germanic pagan Saxons in October 782 by Christian forces under Charlemagne. Their deaths were commemorated in Nazi Germany in 1935. Charlemagne’s Saxon Wars extended over several decades (772–804) during which upheavals consistently occurred. In 782, Charlemagne assembled a joint Frankish-Saxon army. Yet he did not anticipate the outbreak of a revolt in Saxony. Consequently, a Frankish expedition army including high-ranking members of the Frankish upper class was defeated in the Süntel Mountains (now part of Lower Saxony, Germany). Charlemagne pressured the Saxons to deliver the leaders of the revolt. The wanted leader, Widukind, could not be captured but the Saxons are said to have delivered 4,500 people involved in the revolt to the Franks. Charlemagne allegedly gave orders to execute them all within a single day in Verden at the Aller River. This report has been considered controversial, especially in research conducted since the 20th century. Some researchers have expressed doubts concerning the high number, others assumed the deportation instead of the execution of so many Saxons. Nowadays, most people share the view of an actual execution of a great number of Saxons, but the number 4,500 is not to be understood literally. To break the Saxon resistance, Charlemagne decreed the Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae, a collection of orders with sometimes draconic threats of punishment. Based on Charlemagne’s strategy at the time, the Capitulatio has been dated to 782, too. However, this dating is uncertain. Charlemagne seems to have taken revenge for the loss of a Frankish army in Verden. In doing so, he also demonstrated his rigor to his own followers. Although a religious motive for the mass execution is quite unlikely, German research before 1945 put much weight on Saxon independ-

ence, seeing the Saxons’ refusal to be Christianized as the main reason for the upheaval and stressing it as a positive factor. Julian Führer See also Charlemagne’s Conquests; Saxon Wars Further Reading Barbero, Alessandro. Charlemagne: Father of a Continent. Translated by Allan Cameron. Oakland: University of California Press, 2004.

Vermigli, Peter Martyr (1499–1562) Peter Martyr Vermigli was an Italian Reformed theologian who finished his career in Zurich laboring as a colleague of Heinrich Bullinger (1504–1575). He entered the University of Padua at the age of 19, and he received his doctorate in theology, probably at the age of 26. While at Padua, he mastered the theology of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). In Vermigli’s treatise Of War he reflected the methodological style of medieval scholastic theology. He also reproduced the actual substance of Aquinas’s teaching on the just war, presenting instruction on the classical just war doctrine for the benefit of the Reformed churches of his time. At the same time, as we shall see, he deviated somewhat from classical just war teaching when it came to the matter of just war doctrine. In his famous discussion of war, Aquinas had affirmed that for a war to be just, there are three things that are necessary. There must be the authority of the sovereign who gives the command that initiates the war. There must be a just cause that provides the reason for the war; and there has to be a rightful intention in going to war, namely, prosecuting the war on behalf of peace. It was this teaching that Vermigli promulgated in the 16th century. Vermigli’s treatment on war originally appeared at the end of his biblical commentary on 2 Samuel 2. After Vermigli died, the essay on war was extracted from his commentary and placed in the fourth part of what became The Common Places. His discussion of war is presented in chapter 17, and it consists of 33 sections.

826  Vermigli, Peter Martyr (1499–1562)

Italian theologian Peter Martyr Vermigli was an Italian Reformed theologian who was considered an authority on the Christian rite of the Eucharist within the church and had signficant influence on the Edwardian Reformation in England. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

The methodological approach of the medieval schools appears throughout his essay on war—the introduction of the quaestio, followed by the disputatio. The first of these questions that Vermigli raised concerns whether or not it is lawful to wage war. The disputation begins with a presentation of the objections to war posed by the Anabaptists. Vermigli then moved from the objectio to his reponsio. Vermigli began his response to Anabaptist objections by providing arguments in support of his case that just wars are lawful. Vermigli defined war in these terms: “It is an hostile dissension whereby through the prince’s edict mischiefs are repressed by force and arms, to the intent that men may peaceably and quietly live by justice and godliness” (IV.17.1). Vermigli’s one-sentence definition of what a just war actually is follows the order of Aquinas’s delineation of

the three things that are necessary for a just war—the authority of the sovereign, a just cause (there is a fault in those that are attacked), and a rightful intention (the advancement of the good). This statement shows that Vermigli did not embrace the holy war doctrine that the church has the authority to initiate armed conflict. He stood within the classic just war tradition maintaining that the civil magistrate alone has the right given to him by God to declare and prosecute war when there is a just cause. Although the papacy continued to embrace the crusade ideology—asserting that it is legitimate for a bishop, including the pope, to wage war— such a holy war perspective found no advocate in the thinking of Vermigli. Key medieval thinkers affirmed that the right to make war was by no means restricted to the king or the prince. Christine de Pisan (1364–ca. 1430), for example, had asserted that the right to do battle belongs not only to emperors and kings, but also to dukes and other secular lords. Aquinas agreed with this perspective and moved the discussion along toward the possibility of a civil war that might legitimately result from tyrannical actions by a monarch. One government body, he maintained, could legitimately raise arms against the king. If a body had placed a man into kingship, it could depose him and move against him militarily, if he abused his power in a tyrannical way. The position of Aquinas at this point was revived in the political theory of Vermigli, who justified a war against a tyrant on the same basis. Vermigli drew attention to ancient political arrangements, mentioning both ephors and tribunes. The ephors and the tribunes elected kings and consuls to office. Then in a move reminiscent of Aquinas, Vermigli drew the conclusion that the principle of installation brings with it the principle of deposition. He cited the electors of the Holy Roman Empire as an example. The electors not only selected the emperor, but they also had the power of compulsion against him, including the right to make war against an emperor who had become a tyrant. Vermigli dissented from Aquinas at one point with respect to the issue of the defense of the commonwealth against foreign aggressors. Nature itself teaches that a citizen must rise to defend his country. Aquinas had maintained that on such occasions it was not lawful for ministers

Vienna, Siege of (1529)  827

to fight. It was unbecoming for them to shed the blood of others. They should rather be ready to shed their own blood for Jesus Christ. Vermigli agreed that generally speaking ministers were not to bear arms. He did, however, contemplate an exception to this general rule. In an emergency situation, such as when the enemy had laid siege to the city and were storming the walls, ministers may lawfully take up arms in defense of the city, like any other good citizen. As noted, Vermigli opened the door somewhat to holy war practice when it comes to his teaching on just war. Holy war differs from just war on whether or not the war is prosecuted with humanity and restraint or not. In the just war tradition there will be respect toward prisoners, the sparing of noncombatants, and the restraints of violence within military necessity. Holy war is just the opposite. Such a war is to be prosecuted unsparingly against any number of possible victims including combatants and noncombatants, men, women, and children, and prisoners as well. An example of this is to be found in battles in the Middle Ages. It was a widespread practice for victorious knights to massacre defeated peasant infantry. Another instance comes from Vermigli’s own time at the Battle of Mohacs in 1526. Süleyman, the Ottoman sultan, had a policy of taking no prisoners. It resulted at Mohacs in the annihilation of some 30,000 soldiers. The captives he temporarily held were put to death after the battle. Vermigli devoted a full discussion to the issue of the proper treatment of captives in his essay Whether Captives Ought to Be Kept or Put to Death. It constitutes chapter 18 in The Common Places. On the ethical question at hand, Vermigli stated that the issue is highly nuanced. He argued that, if possible, it would be better to spare captives. He did not believe, however, that they ought always to be spared. The policy was not absolute and universal. There might well be exceptions to the general rule. There were indeed occasions when captives ought to be put to death. For example, how should a government respond if the enemy slaughtered its prisoners of war? In such a case, the vengeance of a government ought to be unleashed by way of reciprocal response. Vermigli reasoned that if the enemy massacred our soldiers, we ought to do the same to their prisoners whom we have captured. To cite one more example, a government must distinguish between captives that

are curable and those who are incurable. The incurable should be executed. Vermigli stood within the justice of war tradition articulated by Augustine of Hippo (354–430) in the ancient church and later restated by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. He was willing, however, to make slight revisions to the classical teaching on justice in war by maintaining that captives may at times be put to death. Mark J. Larson See also Aquinas, Thomas; Bullinger, Heinrich; Holy War (Bellum Sacrum); Just War Tradition; Protestant Reformers and War Further Reading Anderson, Marvin W. “Vermigli, Peter Martyr.” In The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation. Vol 4. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 229–31. Donnelly, John Patrick. “Peter Martyr Vermigli’s Political Ethics.” In Peter Optiz, ed. Peter Martyr Vermigli: Humanism, Republicanism, Reformation. Geneva: Droz, 2002. James, Frank A. “Peter Martyr Vermigli: At the Crossroads of Late Medieval Scholasticism, Christian Humanism and Resurgent Augustinianism.” In Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark, eds. Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment. Carlisle, PA: Paternoster Press, 1999. Kingdon, Robert M. “The Political Thought of Peter Martyr Vermigli.” In Joseph L. McLelland, ed. Peter Martyr Vermigli and Italian Reform. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980. Vermigli, Peter Martyr. “Of Warre or Battell.” In The Political Thought of Peter Martyr Vermigli. Geneva: Droz, 1980.

Vienna, Siege of (1529) In October 1529, the Turks (Ottomans) under the leadership of Süleyman the Magnificent besieged Vienna, where for three weeks close to 23,000 Christian mercenaries, city militia, Spanish pikemen, and German landsknecht held off approximately 120,000 Ottoman troops. The Turks assaulted breaches in the walls made by huge gunpowder charges and were met by Christian artillery at point-blank range and savage hand-to-hand fighting. His forces weakened by casualties, disease, poor weather, and overextended communications, Süleyman lifted the siege,

828  Vienna, Siege of (1529)

pursued by frost and early snow as he retreated toward Buda (modern-day Budapest). In 16th-century Europe, Turkish wars provided an apocalyptic backdrop to the general dread of God’s wrath poured out on a corrupt and divided Christendom. Martin Luther (1483–1546) declared that the Turks were a plague sent by God in the days before the Last Judgment. Many Europeans also feared the threat of a militant Catholic Habsburg hegemony under Charles V (1500–1558), especially German princes who had embraced the Protestant Reformation and the Valois kings of France under Francis I (1494–1547). Although the Valois were fellow Catholics, they feared that the Habsburgs and not the Valois would be the strongest monarchy in Europe. The Turkish threat distracted Charles V from his campaigns against both the French and the Protestants. Defeated at Pavia in 1525, Francis I conspired with Süleyman to attack the eastern Habsburg lands. When their correspondence became public, outraged Catholic Christendom blamed Francis I for the siege of Vienna and, with less justification, the Battle of Mohacs (1526), in which the death of their warrior bishops in battle appeared to be a divine judgment on the old church. In 1533, Francis I and Süleyman became formal allies, France receiving naval aid from the Ottoman fleet and the Turks safe harbor on the French Mediterranean coast. The Franco-Ottoman alliance, like Süleyman’s early offensives in Eastern Europe, provided valuable breathing space for German princes aligned with Lutheranism (though they knew better than to refuse aid to Charles’s attempts to rescue Vienna) and effectively dissolved the Diet of Speyer (1529), formation of the Schmalkaldic League (1546), and the Declaration of Augsburg (1548). All of these events were steps along the road to Protestantism’s acceptance in Europe. The rebel German princes opened diplomatic channels to Francis I and his ally Catholic Bavaria. Meanwhile, Catholic disarray and Ottoman tolerance in Turkish-occupied Hungary provided opportunities for Protestant churches to continue to grow. The Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand I of Austria (1503–1564), distracted by Turkish threats, was unable to assist Charles against the German nobles, nor was Charles, who campaigned briefly and successfully in Austria and Hungary in the 1530s, able to put an end Ottoman pressures, owing to Protestant resistance and further military and naval cam-

paigns against France and Turkey in the Mediterranean. Taking a cue from Francis’s diplomacy, Charles attempted in vain to forge a treaty with the Persian Shiites. Eventually, Charles’s stalemate in Germany led first to the 1552 Peace of Passau and the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, his abdication, and retirement. Religious influences were central to the conflicts in and around European Christendom in the late 15th and 16th centuries. During the Age of the Reformation both rulers and churchmen were convinced that religious pluralism was a deadly threat to Christendom on the eve of divine judgment, which contributed to their intransigence and fanaticism. Süleyman the Magnificent believed that his mission was the spread of Sunni Islam against both Christendom in the West and Shiite realms in the East. Older historians of Turkey and many Western scholars have emphasized the economic motives for war, in particular the Ottoman dependence on new conquests to maintain their economy, but recent scholars place renewed emphasis on religious forces. The young Süleyman, heir of Selim, who had been proclaimed Leader of the Faithful and Greatest of Ghazis, though tolerant of conquered Jewish and Protestant minorities less prone to use of images, was a fierce opponent of infidels or heretic Shiites on the borders of his realm. While both Protestant and Catholics could make common cause against the Turks (endorsed by Luther in his later years), keeping alive the much abused idea of the crusade, their own religious and dynastic divisions, combined with Turkish threats such as the Siege of Vienna in 1529, kept the Habsburgs from coordinated and decisive action against the Reformers. The Siege of Vienna thus marks a critical point not only in the Christian conflict with the Muslim world, but as a significant event within the wider European conflict between Catholics and Protestants. Duff Crerar See also Luther, Martin; On War Against the Turk (Luther); Vienna, Siege of (1683) Further Reading Cameron, Euan. European Reformation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Duffy, Christopher. Siege Warfare: Fortresses in the Early Modern World 1494–1660. London: Routledge, 1996.

Vienna, Siege of (1683)  829 Iyigun, Murat. “Luther and Suleyman.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (November 2008): 1465–94. MacCulloch, Diarmaid. Reformation: Europe’s House Divided 1490–1700. New York: Penguin, 2003. Murphey, Rhoads. Ottoman Warfare 1500–1700. New Bruns­ wick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999. Reston, James, Jr. Defenders of the Faith: Charles V, Suleyman the Magnificent, and the Battle for Europe, 1520–1536. New York: Penguin, 2009.

Vienna, Siege of (1683) Süleyman the Magnificent’s inability to take Vienna in 1529 did not end the fighting in Eastern Europe between Christians and Muslims, and the Turkish shadow remained, despite temporary interludes, into the 17th century. In their many campaigns the Ottomans occasionally threatened Vienna (as did Sweden in the 1640s), but the most violent assault since the great siege of 1529 occurred in 1683. Turkish general Mustafa Pasha’s (1634–1683) army (supported by the energetic Köprülü Viziers), having taken most of the campaign season to dig massive siege works, prepared to take the city. As the Turks commenced their final assault, a combined army of Poles, Germans, and Austrians, led by Polish king Jon Sobieski (1629– 1696), relieved the city on September 11–12, driving Turkish forces into Hungary with great losses. Joined by Russia in 1686, the combined forces of Poland and Austria continued the war until 1691 where, at Zenta, Eugene of Savoy (1663–1736) crushed the Turks, leading to the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699. The siege of Vienna was characterized by desperation and brutality, first when thousands of Christian hostages were massacred by the defeated Turks, then by the killing of thousands more by the victorious Catholic forces, especially in Buda (modern-day Budapest). Christian forces considered the Turks outside the common pale of humanity, and Turkish practices continued as before with militant unbelievers. This mutual dehumanization left a lasting legacy of brutalization, noted by Europeans encountering Habsburg, Cossack and Muscovite troops. As in the siege of Vienna that took place in 1529, the combatant forces were bitter religious opponents. The

Ottoman sultans were committed to the war against Christendom, and the relieving army had been welded together under the banner of the Holy League by Pope Innocent XII (1615–1700). Earlier popes had tried in vain to rekindle crusading passions against the Turks; though during the Counter-Reformation, Austria had managed to rally some of its dissenting minorities by pointing to the Muslim threat. Thus for two or three generations, the Turks played a constructive role in the Catholic Counter-Reformation just as it earlier had assisted the Reformation. Except for Hungary (where the Calvinist churches saw themselves as a holy remnant undergoing a Babylonian captivity by the Turks), and a turbulent period when Transylvanian rebels engaged in a generation of anti-Habsburg crusade, Pope Innocent’s achievement signaled a unity Catholic Europe had not experienced for two centuries. The pope extended the feast of the Holy Name of Mary (celebrated September 12) from Spain and the Kingdom of Naples to the rest of Catholic Christendom. Papal influence in Poland reached new heights. Hungary was restored to the Habsburgs, Austria now bordered the Balkans, and Russia was freed to establish itself in Ukraine. In contrast to the treatment of Turks, Leopold I of Austria (1640–1705, and Holy Roman Emperor since 1658), whose deep piety sustained him through the Vienna crisis, overruled his advisers, preventing savage repression of Hungarian Protestants. Catholic Austria had acquired the prestige and power to diminish Reformed influence in Hungary and Transylvania, leading to the triumph of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe. Poland achieved its most famous victory, though Sobieski’s preoccupation with the war weakened both his dynasty and nation. Ottoman military decline became clear when, in 1703, the new grand vizier, Rami Mehemed Pasha (1645–1706), pursued a bureaucratic rather than military policy. The relief of Vienna and the ensuing war, while by no means the end of religious strife, has been described by some historians as Europe’s last religious war. The great conflict between Islam and Christendom was now reduced to the question of the Balkans. After centuries of defining itself against the Turkish threat, the old concept of Christendom would give way to the more secular identity of Europe. Two mutually antagonistic civilizations that had

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dueled for centuries faced a new reality. Europe combined absolutism and national religious conformity with the rise of Enlightenment thought, and Turkey, after almost two centuries of fighting wars on three fronts, entered into decades of preoccupation with economic and internal difficulties, becoming, to Europeans, the antithesis of the secular idea of Progress. Duff Crerar See also Vienna, Siege of (1529)

Further Reading Anderson, M. S. War and Society in the Europe of the Old Regime, 1618–1789. Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 1998. Davies, Norman. God’s Playground, A History of Poland: The Origins to 1795. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. Palmer, Alan. The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1992. Stoye, John. The Siege of Vienna: The Last Great Trial between Cross & Crescent. Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2000. Yapp, M. E. “Europe in the Turkish Mirror.” Past and Present 137 (November 1992): 134–155.

Viret, Pierre (1511–1571)  831

Viret, Pierre (1511–1571) Swiss-born theologian Pierre Viret was a close friend and associate of Protestant Reformer John Calvin (1509–1564). Viret’s influence among Protestants in French-speaking Switzerland and France during the Reformation was enormous. Viret was born in Orbe, Switzerland, into a staunch Roman Catholic family. He attended the University of Paris and Còllege de Montaigu, where he was preceded by Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536) and Calvin. It was here that he converted to the theology of the Protestant Reformation. He spent much of his time in Lausanne and Geneva, Switzerland, but also preached throughout France with great popularity. He died in Orthez, France, in 1571. He is best known as a popularizer of the views of Calvin and for advocating the right of resistance by religious and political dissenters as well as a philosophy of political toleration for religious dissenters. He also was an advocate of the Christian just war tradition. However, not everyone liked his message and Viret survived an assassination attempt by stabbing. While in Geneva in 1534, the city came under siege from the duke of Savoy in alliance with an exiled bishop of Geneva. This allowed Viret and his associate William Farel (1489–1565) to link Protestantism with the city’s struggle for political independence and in 1536, based upon the unique political process in Switzerland at the time, the city became a Protestant city. Throughout the mid-16th century religious and political dissent in Scotland, England, and Europe was fueled by the religious writings and sermons of leaders such as Knox, Ponet, and Goodman. These reformers drew from each other as well as earlier Christian writers and other contemporaries such as Viret. During the tumultuous era of the Reformation, Viret articulated what was the earliest known presentation of resistance theory from a Calvinist perspective. In 1547 he wrote in a work titled Remonstrances aux fideles qui conversent entre les Papistes that Christians had the political and religious right and obligation to take up arms and oppose the state for reasons of both religious and political tyranny. However, this was permissible only in a circumstance where the legitimately constituted magistrates were leading the resistance. It was not to be done by individual Christians acting on their own initiative.

Much of the religious thought during the era with respect to war and political resistance was the result of the breakup of the monolithic political structure of Christianity from medieval Europe. With the rise of the Reformation two or more expressions of Christianity were present where there had previously only been one—Roman Catholicism. Now Protestants and Roman Catholics had to address the question of what happened when the civil government and the church (whichever variety) opposed each other. The answers to this question varied considerably depending upon where one lived geographically. In France, political and religious circumstances were entirely different than in England and the course of political ideas (including religious freedom, rights, and the nature of government) followed a separate history. The course of the Protestant Reformation in France included the rise of the French Calvinists known as Huguenots, religious and political tensions of eight civil wars known as the French Wars of Religion (1562–1598), the famous St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (August 23, 1572), and the Edict of Nantes (1598) wherein Henry IV of France granted substantial civil rights to Protestants. Also included in the edict was the famous phrase cuius regio, eius religio (“Whose realm, his religion”). Although the edict was a step toward religious toleration of some Protestants, it was only a beginning that would not be finalized for French Calvinists until the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. While scholars previously believed that the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre was a beginning point for Protestant resistance thought in France, Viret’s writings show that is not the case and that religious views on political resistance were influencing individuals and events for almost 30 years before the tragic massacre. Timothy J. Demy See also French Wars of Religion; Huguenots; Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre Further Reading Kaplan, Benjamin J. Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. Kingdon, Robert M. “The Political Resistance of the Calvinists in France and the Low Countries.” Church History 27, no. 3 (September 1958): 220–33.

832  Vitoria, Francisco de (1483–1546) Linder, Robert D. “Pierre Viret’s Concept of a Just War.” Andrews University Seminary Studies 22 (1984): 213–30. Linder, Robert D. “Pierre Viret and the Sixteenth-Century French Protestant Revolutionary Tradition.” Journal of Modern History 38, no. 2 (June 1966): 125–37.

Vitoria, Francisco de (1483–1546) Francisco de Vitoria was a prominent Spanish intellectual, and his thought has contributed not only to the continued development of the just war theory, but to international law as well. Vitoria was born in the Spanish city of Burgos on October 4, 1483. In that city and at a young age, he joined the Dominican monastery of San Pablo. He was there for three years and in 1508, he went to Paris, France, to study and develop his spiritual life in the college of Saint Jacques, part of the University of Paris. There, he studied under leading theologians of his time such as Peter Crockaert, a Dominican theologian from Brussels. Crockaert encouraged Vitoria to study Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologia as the foundation for his studies. After Vitoria obtained his bachelor’s degree in philosophy, he began his studies in theology. On June 27, 1522, Vitoria obtained his doctoral degree in theology. After his studies in Paris, Vitoria returned to Spain. From 1523 to 1526, he taught theology at San Gregorio College in Valladolid. At that time, the Council of Indies was established in that city, where there was a constant dialogue about the conquest and colonization of the New World. Vitoria received first-hand information from Dominican and other missionaries about the events of the New World, including the atrocities committed by Spanish conquerors. In the 16th-century European context, theology was the most important area of study and teaching. Because of this, the professorship of theology at the University of Salamanca, one of the most prestigious universities in Europe, was very influential and difficult to obtain. Vitoria won this position in a contest with Pedro Margallo who was professor of moral theology in Salamanca. Vitoria taught at the University of Salamanca from August 1526 until his death in 1546, becoming a prominent member of what is known as the School of Salamanca.

The School of Salamanca, with Vitoria as a leading member, wrote on topics such as the law of war, international law between nations, and the right to life. Vitoria’s work on these topics can be found in the following writings: On Homicide (1530), On the Indies (1532), and On the Law of War (1532). In addition, his commentaries on the Secunda Secundae of Thomas Aquinas also contain doctrines regarding the topics mentioned above. On the Law of War was a continuation of his analysis about the conquest of the New World and the use of force, which he started in On the Indies. Once a year, as part of the academic system at the University of Salamanca, professors were required to lecture to the entire campus. These were known as the relectiones (rereadings), which were conferences on topics of special importance. The relectiones are the main source of Vitoria’s doctrines on the law of war, the law of nations, and the conquest of the New World. Vitoria gave 15 relectiones, from which 13 were published based on notes taken by his students. Vitoria’s relectiones include De potestate civili (On Civil Power), 1528; De homicidio (On Homicide), 1530; De matrimonio (On Marriage), 1531; De potestate ecclesiae prior (On the Power of the Church I), 1532; De potestate ecclesiae posterior (On the Power of the Church II), 1533; De potestate papae et concili (On the Power of the Pope and Council), 1534; De argument charitatis (On Charity), 1535; De eo ad quod tenetur homo cum primum venit ad usum rationis (Concerning the Obligations of a Human Being When He Attains the Use of Reason), 1535; De simonia (On Simonian), 1536; De temperatia (On Self-Restraint), 1537; De indis (On the American Indians), 1539; and De indis relectio posterior sive de iure belli (On the Law of War), 1539. Of special importance is Vitoria’s thought concerning the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire and the battle of Cajamarca, which is mentioned in his Letter to Father Arcos. This was one the most important historical episodes about which Francisco de Vitoria wrote. His doubts about the legality of the conquest of the New World emerged as a result of the atrocities committed by Francisco Pizarro in the Spanish war against the Inca Empire. For Vitoria, a sovereign king had to ensure the justice of his actions before starting a war and during a war. Therefore he had to receive the advice of experts, carefully examine the causes for war, and try to find a diplomatic

Vitoria, Francisco de (1483–1546)  833

resolution of the conflict with his enemies. If a sovereign falsely believed that his side was just in a war, he had the obligation to restore what was taken from the enemy. For Vitoria, wars could not be just for both sides of the armed conflict. There was an exception when there was ignorance of the facts or the law, and the wrong side waged the war in good faith. In any war, the sovereign had the obligation to pursue justice and the self-defense of his commonwealth, and not the destruction of his opponents. The final objective of war was the restoration of peace. Once victory was achieved, the winner had the obligation to behave as an impartial judge between the two sides. Vitoria also believed that one of the fundamental principles of the law of nations was the right to communication and fellowship. This principle was the foundation for what he believed was the right of Spaniards to trade, evangelize indigenous people, emigrate, and become citizens of the New World, among others. Violations of those norms were considered injuries that justified the Spanish use of force against indigenous nations. Vitoria’s analysis focused on the Spaniards who were already in the New World. It is important to point out that Vitoria required the peaceful exercise of those rights and the consideration of indigenous nations’ interests. Vitoria wrote that war was a punishment for injuries done against a state or the entire world. In their internal jurisdiction, states had the authority to punish evil actions. When a state was injured by a foreign country, it also acquired jurisdiction and could use force in self-defense and as a punishment. In addition, a state could use force against a foreign nation when domestic customs or laws did not punish widespread injuries against natural law. Vitoria rejected “the right of discovery” as a justification of the Spanish conquest of the New World. This reasoning was based on the fact that indigenous nations were rightful owners of their territories. Therefore, Spain could not discover and take over territories that already had an owner. Vitoria indicated that indigenous nations could also have “discovered” Spain. However, this would not have justified the use of force against Spain. For Vitoria, the expansion of an empire or the personal interests of princes were not just causes for war. Vitoria also rejected general violations of natural law as a just cause for war. Vitoria rejected God’s will to give the indigenous lands to the Spanish conquerors as a justification to conquer the New World.

Respect for innocent human life, in the internal jurisdiction of nations and during war, was a fundamental norm of natural law and the law of nations according to Vitoria and the School of Salamanca. Because of this, grave violations against the sanctity of human life, such as human sacrifice and cannibalism, were valid justifications to use force against indigenous nations. Innocent persons from the unjust side of a war could not be killed, but they could be made slaves. For Vitoria, children, women, visitors, clergy, and monks were considered to be innocent persons in war. However, there were exceptions, such as deaths because of collateral damage to accomplish the objectives of a just war. For Spanish scholastic thinkers, the peaceful evangelization of indigenous people was a central priority. Because of this, Vitoria justified the Spanish presence in the New World and even the use of force to guarantee the right of Spaniards to share their Catholic Christian faith. The principle of friendship as part of the social nature of human beings was another of Vitoria’s justifications to use force to protect indigenous converts to Christianity and defend indigenous allies. In the first case, converts to Christianity became brothers and sisters of Spanish Christians because of their common faith and in the second case, there was a political friendship. Another justification in Vitoria’s doctrine is the imposition of a Christian prince by the pope in cases when the majority of indigenous persons in a commonwealth became Christians. Vitoria was a theologian who used his influence as a professor at one of the most important universities in Spain to promote ideas that he considered to be consistent with the Christian worldview. Vitoria’s normative doctrines were shaped by the 16th-century Spanish intellectual, religious, and political context. Vitoria challenged prevalent views of his time, including the ones about the conquest of the New World. Consistent with his faith, Vitoria believed that he had the moral obligation to speak truth to powerful decision makers and influence their conscience for the salvation of their souls. Yuri Mantilla See also Aquinas, Thomas; Augustine; Christianity and War; International Religious Freedom and Human Rights; Just War Tradition

834  Voetius, Gisbertus (1589–1676) Further Reading García, Marcelino Ocaña. El Hombre y Sus Derechos en Francisco de Vitoria. Madrid: Ediciones Pedagógicas, 1996. Hernández, Ramón. Un Español en la ONU, Francisco de Vitoria. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1977. Hernández, Ramón. Francisco de Vitoria y su ‘Relecion Sobre los Indios,’ Los Derechos de los Hombres y de los Pueblos. Madrid: EDIBESA, 1998. Hernández, Ramón. Francisco de Vitoria, Vida y Pensamiento Internacionalista. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1995. Pagden, Anthony, and Jeremy Lawrence, eds. Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. Pereña, Luciano, ed. Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio De Iure Belli o Paz Dinámica, Escuela Española de la Paz Primera Generación 1526–1560. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1981. Reichberg, Gregory, Henrik Syse, and Nicole Hartwell. Religion, War, and Ethics: A Sourcebook of Textual Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Scott, James Brown. The Spanish Origin of International Law, Francisco de Vitoria and His Law of Nations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934. Vitoria, Francisco de. Relection de Indis, Carta Magna de los Indios, 450 Aniversario, 1539–1989. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1989.

Voetius, Gisbertus (1589–1676) Gisbert Voet, also known by his Latinized name Gisbertus Voetius was a Dutch Reformed pastor and university professor at Utrecht from that institution’s inception in 1636 until his death. He was remarkable for an indefatigable polemic fueled by a modified scholastic methodology with which he approached theological and philosophical questions alike, without distinction. With his primary focus on training ministers for the Dutch Church, Voet made his scholasticism transferable and demonstrated its usefulness in refuting competing ideologies: Arminianism, Cartesianism, Anabaptism, and even Islam. Despite the then popular assumption that his followers held rigid scruples (even by 17th-century standards), “Voetians” represented a livelier form of Calvinism known as Nadere Reformatie (“Further Reformation”). The new movement stressed that

dogmatic precision, albeit necessary, was insufficient and ought to lead to altered living. It was an open secret that Voet’s close connections to English Puritans influenced the Further Reformation. Thus, charges of Anglophilia cropped up during three Anglo-Dutch wars in Voet’s lifetime (1652–1654, 1665–1667, and 1672–1674). Voet particularly lamented during the first of these wars because he saw the Commonwealth English as co-religionists. Nevertheless, Voet’s personal influence never waned during his long life given his international reputation and the fact that he prepared more ministers for service to the Dutch Church than any of his contemporaries. He did this during a time when the Reformed Church exercised considerable influence in the Dutch republic. Much of Voet’s teaching concerning war did not vary from established Reformed thinking: War can only be waged by properly constituted authority and must be conducted in an upright manner, in a just and defensive cause. No matter how greatly religion shapes a country’s identity, the church is free from state coercion and neither over nor under the authority of the state. The state cannot use warfare to advance the church beyond its borders—indeed, the church cannot be extended by coercion. Defense of the church may include the force of arms when there is a physical threat to it. However, Voet made a unique contribution to the understanding of women and warfare that comported well with his more exceptional views of female education. Because human political structures were a matter of indifference, it was both possible and acceptable for a woman to ascend to political leadership as Deborah did in the Old Testament account. In this exalted position, it was thus possible for a woman to be the properly constituted authority to wage war. Women can also be active in munitions and supply. While he did not approve of men and women fighting together in a battle for reasons of chastity and modesty, he believed that women could act as soldiers in emergency situations to defend their families, property, and persons. He held that females could also wage offensive battles, particularly in the absence of male soldiers. Liam J. Atchison See also Anabaptist Pacifism; Protestant Reformers and War

Vow (Crusade)  835 Further Reading Beeke, J. R. Gisbertus Voetius. Toward a Reformed Marriage of Knowledge and Piety. Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 1999. Groenhuis, G. “Calvinism and National Consciousness: The Dutch Republic as the New Israel.” In A. C. Duke and C. A. Tamse, eds. Britain and the Netherlands. Vol. VII. The Hague, 1981, pp. 118–33.

Vow (Crusade) The crusade vow was the means that transformed an individual’s inner conversion and intention to participate in an armed expedition in defense of the Holy Land or Christendom against Muslims, pagans, heretics, or other enemies of the church into a penitentially and legally binding obligation.

Development and Implications of the Crusading Vow

Retrospectively described by chroniclers and scholars as the fusion of holy war with the Jerusalem pilgrimage, the First Crusade (1096–1099) appealed to the knightly classes as a form of arduous yet temporary renunciation of the world close in penitential efficacy to the permanent adoption of the monastic life, which was unavailable to those committed to a life of temporal warfare. At the same time, although Pope Urban II seems to have intended to recruit knights to serve the Byzantine emperor against the Muslims, it was the pope’s focus on the popular pilgrimage site of Jerusalem as the ultimate goal of service in the militia Christi (knighthood of Christ) that led many noncombatants to join the crusade. The terminology, ritual, and spiritual imagery of the new expeditions to the Holy Land remained tightly tied to the concept of pilgrimage. Legally and spiritually, crusaders were viewed as pilgrims. From the Council of Clermont (1095) onward, crusaders usually had crosses sewn on their clothing as an outward sign of the obligations inherent in their vows. Yet a distinctive liturgical rite for bestowing the crusader’s cross was slow to develop; when it did, it was modeled closely on existing ceremonies used to mark

an individual’s solemn vow of pilgrimage through the blessing and bestowal of the pilgrim’s distinctive insignia, the staff and scrip (wallet), before his or her departure. Some individuals received their tokens from a priest or chaplain in a relatively private atmosphere, while others took their crosses and vows in the rather more public setting of a clerical or secular court or during the revivalism that characterized the galvanizing sermons preached by local clergymen or crusade recruiters. Moreover, the term crucesignatus (one signed with the cross) gradually began to supplement the term peregrinus (pilgrim) as a title for individuals who had taken the crusade vow only during the 12th century. The full or partial remission of the penance enjoined for confessed sins (known as the indulgence) granted to crusaders also remained mentally linked to the full remission believed to be earned by an unarmed pilgrimage to Jerusalem and the partial remissions granted to those journeying to other holy sites. Not until the period of the late 12th to late 13th centuries was the theory of the crusade vow fully developed in canon law and the privileges and rules governing the vow’s obligations and the legal enforcement of them systematically defined and elaborated. For, as in the case of a vow of pilgrimage, the crusader’s vow placed him in a category of persons temporarily granted privileges and responsibilities normally reserved for secular ecclesiastics or those who had taken the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience required for entry into a religious order. Such privileges and responsibilities included the adoption of distinctive clothing or habit and varying degrees of dietary and sexual abstinence. In fact, the crusade was often viewed as an ideal preparation or substitution for entry into monastic life. The crusade vow and the penalty of excommunication for failing to fulfill it (or for doing so in a dilatory fashion) enabled the mustering of organized military campaigns, and the obligations and privileges attached to its adoption evolved over time, as did the categories of persons considered capable of taking it. From the First Crusade onward, attempts were made to prevent unfree serfs, minors, secular clergymen, and monks and nuns sworn to obedience and stability in the cloister from making the crusade vow without their superior’s permission. Married persons were also urged not to take the cross without their spouse’s

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consent. Other groups considered to present logistical burdens or temptation to crusading armies were periodically discouraged from taking the cross or from fulfilling their crusade vow by personally participating in a military expedition, including young single women, the poor or physically debilitated, the aged and very young, and those lacking both military skill and the funds necessary to subsidize contingents of trained fighters. For this very reason, until the pontificate of Innocent III (1198–1216), individuals were urged to confess their sins and be vetted by a clergyman for suitability before taking the cross. However, limited numbers of some categories of noncombatants were considered potentially valuable to the crusader host, including clergymen necessary for moral leadership and provision of the sacraments, experienced albeit aged fighters, merchants, artisans, laundresses, and farmers. Confessors and ecclesiastical and secular courts in regions with a long tradition of penitential pilgrimages also imposed the crusade vow upon those guilty of serious crimes or notorious sins, including violence against ecclesiastics, murder, arson, sacrilege, sorcery, illegal trading with Muslim powers, heresy, and clerical incontinence or pluralism. Such a penance or judicial penalty was viewed by many as an honorable or attractive alternative to humiliating public penances, heavy fines, mutilation, or the death penalty. Increasingly, deceased individuals’ heirs were considered liable to fulfill crusading vows assumed both voluntarily and involuntarily, whether in person or through the provision of a substitute or donation. Although in principle the crusade was meant to enable perpetrators to expiate their sins and earn spiritual benefits for their victims while temporarily shielding them from vengeance, reformers complained that the Holy Land had become a dumping ground for moral undesirables, who, removed from the strictures of their kin, culture, and native laws, earned God’s ire by their recidivist turpitude.

Privileges Attached to the Crusading Vow

As the privileges attached to the crusading vow were increasingly defined, elaborated, and enforced, many assumed the cross in order to obtain the temporal and spiritual benefits it provided. In addition to the various indulgences offered to those participating in the crusading movement, crucesignati shared in the spiritual credit gen-

erated by prayers and liturgies organized for the crusades. As pilgrims, they were allowed to deal with excommunicates and receive the sacraments in regions under interdict. They could sometimes choose their own confessors, who like crusade preachers were often granted the ability to absolve crucesignati from excommunication and other irregularities normally requiring an arduous journey to Rome. Reformers complained that the cynical used these concessions to escape the penitential jurisdiction of their local parish priests and bishops, to circumvent the arduous penances or excommunications imposed upon them for sins or crimes, and to avoid making restitution to their victims. From the First Crusade onward, crusaders were also promised papal protection of their persons, property, and households until their return or certain evidence of their death, a privilege enforced by the power of excommunication and interdict wielded by local prelates. However, surviving petitions and court records show that these spiritual penalties were disregarded by many eager to wreak revenge upon the crusader’s vulnerable family or encroach upon undefended lands by violence or lawsuits. Some crusaders obtained individualized papal letters of protection; popes threatened to punish prelates who failed to shield crusaders and called upon secular rulers to stop encroachments by force if necessary. Crusaders also enjoyed certain legal and financial privileges that evolved over time. Enumerated, extended, and clarified in papal letters written in response to specific cases, they received one of their most elaborated and authoritative descriptions in Innocent III’s bull Ad liberandam (1215), which became a crucial authority cited by canon lawyers who continually redefined crusaders’ privileges and the institutions of the crusading movement. To enable clergymen to personally participate in various expeditions, ecclesiastical crusaders were exempted from the income taxes levied on diocesan and regular churches for the crusade. Those with benefices were freed from the usual residence requirements and were allowed to either mortgage or continue receiving the incomes attached to them for up to three years, provided that they remained on crusade and appointed a vicar to minister in their absence if pastoral responsibilities were attached to their office. By 1145, if their lords or relatives were unable or unwilling to lend them money, laypersons were allowed to sell or

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mortgage inalienable lands to raise funds for their journey and were also granted a moratorium on paying interest on debts contracted before and in some instances after they took the cross, until their return. Later popes attempted to extend these financial privileges to include freedom from payments on the principal of debts and exemption from all taxes and tolls, as well as from levies instituted for the crusade such as the Saladin Tithe (1188). Prelates were called upon to enforce these privileges with excommunication and interdict, and secular rulers were urged to force Jews in their lands to remit interest on crusaders’ debts and make restitution of any interest already charged. Crusaders soon found, however, that creditors were reluctant to lend them money unless they waived their privileges, and some secular and ecclesiastical magnates proved notoriously reluctant to restrict the incomes of the Jewish and Christian moneylenders to whom they lent protection in return for lucrative taxation. Secular rulers also proved loath to exempt crusaders from feudal duties (including military service), taxation, and tallages, particularly in times of war or when a significant percentage of the population took the cross. As pilgrims, crusaders were also entitled to expedite or delay legal proceedings initiated after they took the cross and to enjoy freedom from all lawsuits concerning possessions held peacefully and without dispute before taking the crusade vow. As temporary religious, they could also opt for trial in ecclesiastical courts. As with clerical immunity from prosecution in secular courts, this privilege became the object of much jurisdictional wrangling between secular rulers and the papacy and local ecclesiastics, resulting finally in compositions that specified that in cases arising after individuals took the cross, they could be tried in church courts except in instances involving property or serious crimes, which fell under feudal and royal law. These compositions redressed rulers’ concerns regarding lawlessness, defaulting on loans, and the abuse of legal privileges by those who, like Gerald of Wales, became crucesignati in order to gain advantage in ongoing lawsuits. By the 13th century, popes sought to restrict abuses by stressing that those who took the crusade vow in prison forfeited any special legal privileges, while appointing crusade preachers and legates to supplement local prelates as official protectors of crusaders’ rights. Innocent III extended many of

these rights to those involved in crusades other than those destined for the Holy Land, including the crusade against heretics in southern France, and enshrined them in Ad liberandam, which became the basis for crusading bulls’ declarations of crusaders’ privileges and obligations throughout the 13th century.

Dispensation from and Redemption of Crusading Vows

From the 1190s onward, immense developments took place in the definition of the precise nature of the duties attached to the crusade vow and the possibility of dispensations from it. A dispensation meant the relaxation of the original terms of the vow because of unavoidable circumstances preventing its fulfillment, such as grave or permanent disability, illness, poverty, public necessity such as the safety of the realm, or old age. Dispensations could include fulfilling one’s pilgrimage through a hired substitute, the commutation of its obligations into an alternative pilgrimage goal or charitable work, and its redemption through a donation of the funds that would otherwise have been spent in personally fulfilling the vow to a crusade or another charitable cause. Boundaries between redemptions of the full crusading vow and voluntary donations to the crusading effort rewarded by partial indulgences could be easily blurred, particularly when groups of impoverished crusaders banded together to subsidize one fighter as a substitute. During the period when individuals were required to seek the permission of their spouse and temporal and spiritual superiors before taking the vow, and were theoretically examined for their ability to fulfill its obligations before being allowed to take it, dispensations were granted only under strict circumstances. Although bishops possessed the ability to dispense from pilgrimage vows, popes attempted to reserve the ability to absolve individuals from the crusade vow to themselves and their delegates, who were ideally meant to weigh the particulars of each case and prescribe fitting penitential alternatives. Typically, until and throughout the pontificate of Innocent III, a combination of poverty and infirmity was necessary to justify redeeming the crusade vow. Those unable to fight in person or provide aid to the crusading army through providing sacramental services, spiritual exhortation, military advice, or contingents of fighters could redeem or commute their vows, and

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those whose absence on crusade would prove dangerous to their lands or realm could delay their fulfillment. These general guidelines partly reflected the attempts of secular rulers to rid crusading armies of noncombatants and convert the desire of pious noncombatants for personal participation in the crusade enterprise into monetary subsidy of trained fighters. The priorities of noblemen often responsible for organizing crusade contingents thus often conflicted with the desire of many poor noncombatants to personally participate in expeditions. And even though some popes often wanted to enable the participation of as many penitents as possible and believed that all physically capable of fulfilling their vows ought to make the journey, they were also responsible for ensuring the military viability of crusade expeditions. From the First Crusade onward, attempts were made to discourage monks, women, the poor, the weak, and the elderly from taking the cross, until Innocent III called for crusade preachers to give the vow to whoever desired it without first examining their ability to fulfill it or requiring permission from their spouse or superiors. Many historians have seen in this declaration a prescient attempt to hijack the crusade vow and use it to secure support for papal crusade policy or deliberately convert the devotion of the faithful into the financial subsidy of professional fighters. In fact, Innocent III seems to have followed reformers from Peter the Chanter’s school in Paris who saw the crusade vow as the means of signifying and institutionalizing the penitential fervor required of the home and foreign fronts for the crusades’ success. He appears to have intended that alms gathered during crusade preaching and processions and the institution of a clerical income tax would subsidize the financially insolvent but hardy poor. To this end, he deferred the examination and dispensation of crusaders until just before the crusading expedition departed, when those who could not be subsidized or were unfit to participate could commute, redeem, or delay their vows. By the time of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), however, Innocent had come under pressure from military leaders who worried about being burdened with the poor and militarily useless. Ad liberandam made no mention of indiscriminate signing, and soon weak or poor individuals were urged and, by the mid-13th century, often forced to redeem their vows by donating money to the crusade.

Commutations followed a similar pattern, from the voluntary commutation of goals from the Holy Land to the antiheretical crusade and vice versa under Innocent III, to attempts by Gregory IX and Innocent IV to force individuals to transfer their vows for the Holy Land to aid for the Latin Empire of Constantinople and the papal struggle against Emperor Frederick II. Gradually, despite continuing manifestations of populist enthusiasm for personal participation, the vast majority of vows made during preaching tours, which were increasingly organized by members of the mendicant orders, were almost immediately redeemed for money granted to those organizing crusade contingents to subsidize trained milites and professional soldiers.

Terms for the Fulfillment of Crusading Vows

In this and other instances, policies were not merely mandated in a top-down fashion by the papacy, but were formed as the result of a dialogue between the pope, legates and crusade preachers, local clergymen, the military leaders of the crusade, and crucesignati of all stripes. This is particularly true in the case of the discussion of precisely what kind and what length of service was considered necessary to fulfill the crusade vow. Although many crusaders considered their vows completed when they had attained their pilgrimage goal of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, once the vow became severed from the journey to Jerusalem, the period of military service considered necessary to fulfill one’s vow became the subject of debate. Popes occasionally set a period of one to three years for crusades to the Holy Land in papal bulls, although the term needed to gain the plenary indulgence was often left unspecified. In the case of the Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229), Innocent III delegated the decision to the men he appointed to organize the crusade in France, who specified the 40-day period typical of the military service owed by vassals to their lord as the minimum needed to earn the plenary indulgence. Departure dates and locations were often set in bulls outlining the organization of a crusade, and papally appointed preachers responsible for organizing crusading contingents in a certain diocese or region were often urged to ensure that a sufficient army materialized by threatening to excommunicate those who did not leave in a timely fashion from the appointed ports. However, dates and de-

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parture points often became the subject for negotiation, as local crusaders experienced trouble in finding funding or settling disputes. For example, many of the common crusaders in the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221) complained that while delays had been granted to the noblemen expected to lead local contingents, they were being threatened with excommunication if they failed to depart at the date set by the Fourth Lateran council, despite the fact that the funding meant to subsidize them had been granted to these same noblemen, who refused to disburse it. Some became so frustrated that they simply tore off their crosses and refused to fulfill their vows. Similarly, crusaders often considered their vow fulfilled and left the army once their funding ran out or once a significant military or devotional objective had been obtained. During the Third Crusade (1189–1192), Richard I of England refused to proceed directly to Jerusalem, for fear that his army would dissolve before the outlying regions necessary to protect the city had been taken. During the Fifth Crusade, the papal legate Pelagius attempted to stem the flood of crusaders planning to depart after the capture of Damietta (1219) before crucial reinforcements arrived, by threatening to excommunicate anyone who left without obtaining a letter of permission from him. Letters were also sent to recruiting centers in Europe broadcasting the legatine excommunication of those who had deserted the army prematurely or had failed to join the army in Egypt, demanding that they be forced to return to fulfill their vows. These events illustrate that, in the end, the conditions for the fulfillment of the crusade vow remained open to debate, even during a period that saw great advancements in the institutionalization of the crusading movement. Jessalynn Bird See also Crusades (Overview)

Further Reading Bird, Jessalynn. “Innocent III, Peter the Chanter’s Circle, and the Crusade Indulgence: Theory, Implementation, and Aftermath.” In Andrea Sommerlechner, ed. Innocenzo III: Urbs et Orbis. 2 vols. Roma: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 2002. Brundage, James A. Canon Law and the Crusader. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969. Brundage, James A. “Crusaders and Jurists: The Legal Consequences of Crusader Status.” In Le Concile de Clermont de 1095 et l’appel à la croisade, Clermont-Ferrand, June, 1995. Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1997. Brundage, James A. “’Crucesignari’: The Rite for Taking the Cross in England.” Traditio 22 (1966): 289–310. Brundage, James A. “Immortalizing the Crusades: Law and Institutions.” In Benjamin Z. Kedar, Jonathan Riley-Smith, and Rudolf Hiestand, eds. Montjoie: Studies in Crusade History in Honour of Hans Eberhard Mayer. Aldershot, UK: Variorum, 1997. Brundage, James A. “The Votive Obligations of Crusaders: The Development of a Canonistic Doctrine.” Traditio 24 (1968): 77–118. Evans, Michael R. “Commutation of Crusade Vows: Some Examples from the English Midlands.” In Alan V. Murray, ed. From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies, 1095–1500. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1998. Markowski, Mark. “Crucesignatus: Its Origin and Early Usage.” Journal of Medieval History 10 (1984): 157–65. Pennington, Kenneth. “The Rite of Taking the Cross in the Twelfth Century.” Traditio 30 (1974): 429–35. Purcell, Maureen. Papal Crusading Policy: The Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy and the Crusade to the Holy Land from the Final Loss of Jerusalem to the Fall of Acre, 1244– 1291. Leiden: Brill, 1975. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The First Crusaders, 1095–1131. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Siberry, Elizabeth. Criticism of Crusading: 1095–1274. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. Tyerman, Christopher. England and the Crusades, 1095–1588. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. Tyerman, Christopher. The Invention of the Crusades. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998.

W Wahhabism

without any intermediaries. Because Muhammad branded other Muslims as unbelievers, he became a controversial figure. He was expelled from two Arabian towns before he formed an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud in 1744. Sheikh Muhammad gave religious legitimacy to Saudi military expeditions in the guise of Muslim holy war against unbelievers in return for Saudi political support. By 1800, Saudi-Wahhabi forces had conquered much of Arabia. The major Muslim power of the time, the Ottoman Empire, responded to the Saudi conquest of the holy city of Mecca with a military campaign to crush the first Saudi state. That war lasted from 1811 to 1818 and ended in an Ottoman victory. However, the Saudis staged a comeback in the early 1820s to rule over a smaller Arabian realm. The second Saudi state refrained from aggression against Ottoman territories. Because the Saudis would not wage holy war, Wahhabi leaders urged followers to avoid all contact with outsiders, such as Egyptian or Iraqi Muslims, on the grounds that strangers were unbelievers whose company would threaten the purity of true Muslims’ belief. The second Saudi state fell to a rival Arabian power in 1891. The present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia began to emerge when Saudi prince Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, also known as Ibn Saud, seized Riyadh in 1902. Over the next 30 years, he conquered the territories that presently make up the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A major element in those conquests

Wahhabism is a Muslim religious reform movement that appeared in central Arabia in the 1740s. The term “Wahhabi” was coined by foes of the reform movement in reference to the movement’s founder, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1702–1792). Wahhabism derives its influence from its association with the Saudi dynasty. The unique feature of Wahhabism as a religious doctrine is its view of other Muslims as unbelievers, which makes them legitimate targets of Muslim holy war, or jihad. This view provided justification for the Saudi dynasty’s military expansion in much of Arabia. In the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism is the official religious doctrine propagated in mosques and schools. When it comes to Saudi policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, Wahhabism is subordinate to government calculations of the national interest. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was a religious scholar from a small town near the present-day Saudi capital of Riyadh. In 1740 he composed a theological essay condemning common Muslim religious practices. For example, many Muslims went to holy men to seek their blessings. Other Muslims visited the tombs of holy men to ask that they intercede with God on their behalf. Sheikh Muhammad considered such actions to be idolatry because they violated Islam’s central belief in worshiping God alone 841

842  Walter the Penniless (d. 1096)

was a new branch of the Wahhabi movement called Ikhwan (Brethren). The Brethren were tribesmen who gave up their nomadic way of life to settle in agricultural communities, where they learned Wahhabi doctrine. The Brethren became fierce warriors for Wahhabism and gained a fearsome reputation for their savage treatment of defeated enemies. They provided the shock troops for Ibn Saud’s military campaigns, but in the mid-1920s he had to restrain them from pursuing holy war against tribes in Iraq and Transjordan. At the time, those two countries were governed by British-appointed monarchs. Consequently, Brethren raids threatened to embroil Ibn Saud in a confrontation with Great Britain. When he ordered the Brethren to cease their raids they rose up in rebellion, but he was able to crush them by 1930. Three years later, Ibn Saud granted American oil companies the right to explore for petroleum. Wahhabi clerics were unhappy to see Americans permitted into the kingdom, but Ibn Saud and the oil companies minimized contact between Saudis and foreign workers by creating special residential compounds for non-Saudis. The first test of U.S.-Saudi relations came in 1947, when the United States supported the United Nations (UN) resolution for the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. Ibn Saud made clear his opposition to the creation of Israel but was careful not to jeopardize his ties with American oil companies. The only time that Saudi opposition to U.S. support for Israel disrupted relations came during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War. Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal responded to the U.S. emergency airlift of military supplies to Israel by imposing an embargo on oil sales and joining with other major oil producers to dramatically raise the price of oil. Throughout the Cold War, Saudi Arabia joined forces with the United States to combat the spread of communism in the Muslim world. Saudi efforts included support for exporting Wahhabi doctrine, which is firmly anticommunist. It is also firmly anti-Jewish because of its attachment to historical religious texts emphasizing early clashes between the Prophet Muhammad and Jewish clans in Arabia. When it comes to setting foreign policy, however, Saudi rulers take a practical approach and only consult Wahhabi leaders when seeking their approval for sensitive initiatives. David Commins

See also Cold War, Religious Dimensions of; Yom Kippur War Further Reading Bronson, Rachel. Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Commins, David. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: Tauris, 2006. Euben, Roxanne Leslie, and Muhammad Qasim. Princeton Readings in Islamic Thought: Texts and Contexts from AlBamma to Bin Laden. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. Kostiner, Joseph. “Coping with Regional Challenges: A Case Study of Crown Prince Abdullah’s Peace Initiative.” In Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, eds. Saudi Arabia in the Balance. London: Hurst, 2005, pp. 352–71. Piscatori, James. “Islamic Values and National Interest: The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia.” In Adeed Dawisha, ed. Islam in Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 33–53.

Walter the Penniless (d. 1096) Walter the Penniless, also known as Walter San Avoir, was a Burgundian knight and leader of the People’s Crusade, which was a movement of pesants and minor knights that organized and departed for the Holy Land in 1096 prior to the organization and departure of the papally sanctioned First Crusade. The People’s Crusade was a response to the preaching of Peter the Hermit, a French priest who, with Walter, became the movement’s most recognized leader. Other than knights such as Walter, the participants in the people’s crusade were mainly French clergy and peasant pilgrims—men, women, and even children with little or no military skill or experience. Although born into high social status and wealth, Walter, according to legend, lost everything he owned except for his horse, armor, and military skills, and thus was given the name Walter the Penniless. Peter the Hermit, having gathered his followers from France and Germany at Cologne, departed for the Holy Land in early May 1096, some months before the official launch of the crusade planned by Pope Urban II, which, led mainly by French aristocrats, became known as the First Crusade. Eager to reclaim Jeru-

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salem and the Holy Land, Walter and his band of French knights were unwilling to wait for the peasant army led by Peter, and thus traveled on their own to Hungary, which they reached by May 8. After passing uneventfully through Hungary, Walter and his knights reached the Byzantine frontier at Belgrade, where the imperial governor, surprised by the arrival of such a large force, denied them permission to enter Byzantine territory. In need of food and other supplies, Walter’s knights looted the countryside around the town of Semlin. The outraged locals attacked the knights and captured 16 of them, who were then stripped of their armor and clothing. After these disorders, Walter and his crusaders were allowed to proceed to Nish (now Serbia), where they waited for an escort from the Byzantine emperor to conduct them to Constantinople, where they eventually rendezvoused with Peter the Hermit and his 20,000 peasant crusaders. The Byzantine emperor Alexius I Comnenus advised Peter not to engage the Seljuk Turks who controlled Anatolia and to wait for the main body of crusaders, but Peter, by this time, had lost control of the movement to Walter and the leaders of the other contingents of knights. Led by these knights, the crusaders forged ahead into Seljuk territory, while Peter returned to Constantinople to seek Byzantine help. Upon reaching Turkish-held Nicacea, the undisciplined People’s Army began pillaging the countryside. In October 1096 at Civitot, an experienced and wellequipped force of Turkish archers decimated the peasant crusaders. Walter and most of his knights died in the battle. The bones of Walter and his crusaders were eventually piled into a pyramid, becoming the first monument to the crusading movement. Thomas E. Creely See also First Crusade; Popular Crusades Further Reading Murray, Alan V., ed. The Crusades: An Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006. Phillips, Charles. A Complete Illustrated History of the Crusades and the Crusader Knights. London: Lorenz Books, 2009. Riley-Smith, Jonathan, ed. The Atlas of the Crusades. New York: Swanston, 1990. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The Crusades: A Short History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987.

Warrior Saints The title “warrior saints” can refer narrowly to a special group of early Christian martyrs and more broadly to those who defend violence as service to the Kingdom of God. Both iterations must be considered. At the heart of the Christian faith resides a conflict over the role of violence in securing the Kingdom of God. The conflict is noticeably present in the Christian scriptures. Read one way, the New Testament resolutely precludes the use of violence in service to the Kingdom of God. Read another way, under certain circumstances, employing violence is not only permissible, but necessary. Support for violence of this sort mines the Old Testament for warrior saints such as Moses, Joshua, and David. More importantly, it is mentored by “divine violence” in the Apocalypse (the book of Revelation). Preclusion of violence rejects Old Testament violence as resolutely eliminated in the new order established by Jesus Christ. This position privileges the pacifist Christ of the Gospels over the sometimes militaristic Christ of the Apocalypse, or reserves eventual coercion for God alone. But all four Gospels tell of Jesus using holy force to “cleanse the Temple” (Matt. 21:12–27; Mk 11:15–19; Lk. 19:45–48; Jn. 2:13–22). Nevertheless, Jesus repeatedly rejects violence as incompatible with the Kingdom of God now arriving in his ministry. In the Beatitudes, for instance, the “meek shall inherit the earth.” The “blessed” are the “poor in spirit,” those who “mourn,” who “hunger and thirst for righteousness,” the “merciful,” the “peacemakers,” and “those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake” (Matt. 5:3–10). In each Gospel, when Jesus faces crucifixion, he rejects violence for defending himself and rebukes Peter for electing the sword (Matt. 26:51–52). Nothing in the Epistles contravenes Jesus’s prohibition of violence. Yet the Apocalypse, the final book of the New Testament, is laced with military imagery, and divine imagery at that, although some of it permits both militaristic and pacifist interpretation. The Lamb of God—Christ—is presented as a conquering power no one can resist (6:2). Seven bowls of God’s wrath are poured out upon those who refuse to receive the reign of God’s Messiah (15:1–16:21). An impending, horrific divine destruction of Rome (code named “Babylon the great harlot”) is predicted and detailed in 17:1–18:24. Because of Rome’s persecution of

844  Warrior Saints

Christians, its greed, and its abuse of power, God will “repay her double for her deeds.” A double draught of “torment and mourning” will be levied (18:6–7 RSV). Then, as history approaches its termination, a final judgment occurs (20:11–15). Those who have refused to receive the Kingdom of God willingly and with joy are violently “thrown into the lake of fire” (20:15). Interestingly, in chapter 19, preparation is made for a mighty and decisive battle between Christ—called “Faithful and True,” sitting astride a white horse—and his enemies. But the battle never occurs, even though paradoxically his enemies are forcefully and permanently cast into a “lake of fire”—coercion without violence (20:21). So the stage for subsequent “Christian violence” was set in the New Testament. However, for the first 300 years and more, in obedience to the Christ of the Beatitudes, Christians were martyred without resorting to violence or retaliation. Mostly, they would not serve in the Roman army, partly because of Jesus’s teachings and model, and partly because they could not swear allegiance to the emperor as Lord. But then, according to tradition, at the Battle of Milvian Bridge (October 28, 312 CE), as Constantine prepared for battle against Maxentius, he looked into the sun and saw the sign of the Chi-Rho (the first two letters of the Greek word Christos), emblazoned with the message in hoc signo vinces, “in this sign you will conquer.” Supposedly, the vision and subsequent victory spurred Constantine to become a Christian. With the fourth-century marriage between the Christian faith and the Roman Empire, adherence to the Christ of the Beatitudes and a Kingdom of God consummated apart from violence became a hopelessly conflicted ideal in civil affairs. Add to that the violence associated with securing doctrinal orthodoxy in the church (e.g., violent conflict and intrigue between Alexandria, Antioch, and Constantinople, and between the Arians and the Nicene Orthodox), the subsequent Holy Roman Empire, and the political power of the papacy in the Middle Ages. Then came violent opposition to the rise and conquests by Islam in the seventh century, the crusades of the 11th–13th centuries, Martin Luther’s permission to oppress Jews who would not receive the gospel, the post-Reformation Wars of Religion, the violence spawned by Henry the Eighth’s break with Rome, providing a Christian rationale for the American

Revolution, conflicting “Christian” impulses in the American Civil War, and “Christian” opposition to tyranny in two world wars. Clearly, as problematic as it may be, Christian history offers fertile soil for growth of a stout forest of “warrior saints” in the religion of the lowly Galilean. The most prominent “warrior saint” among Christians is the Archangel Saint Michael, said to be the leader of God’s army. He fights against Satan and his minions (Dan. 12:1; Jude 1:9; Rev. 12:7) and defends the church and all God’s people. For accuracy, a distinction should be drawn between martyr “warrior saints” and militaristic “warrior saints.” The church in the East and West identifies many martyr “warrior saints,” often places them on icons, and appeals to many of them for daily protection. Often the martyr “warrior saints” are identified as having been members of the Roman military before their martyrdom. They were martyred for refusing to renounce their faith during persecution. They are often pictured as holding a sword and are often on horseback. The first “warrior saint”—Saint Longinus—was the centurion who witnessed Jesus’s crucifixion and confessed, “Truly this was the Son of God” (Mt. 27:54). The long train of subsequent martyr “warrior saints” includes Saint Demetrius of Thessalonica, Saint George, Theodore “the recruit,” Andrew “the general,” Procopius, and Niketus. Saints Ursus and Victor were soldiers in the Theban Legion, an Egyptian contingent of the Roman army. They were beheaded (ca. 286) in Solothurn, Switzerland, for refusing to sacrifice to pagan gods. For the same reason, Saint Maurice was martyred (ca. 287) by Emperor Maximian (286–305). Saint Sebastian (d. 287), a Roman soldier who defended Christian martyrs, was beaten to death with clubs during the great Diocletian persecution. Also during the Diocletian persecution, Julius the Veteran (served Rome for 27 years, d. 304) and seven others were beheaded in Durostorum, Bulgaria, for refusing to denounce their faith. Saint Martin of Tours (d. 397), a member of the Roman Calvary, announced after his conversion that he was “a soldier of Christ” and therefore could not fight. Accused of cowardice, he offered to go to the front unarmed. Later, Martin became Bishop of Tours. In the ninth century, the Spanish soldier Saint Santius was martyred under Muslim rule (one of 48).

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The lauded roll of militaristic “Warrior Saints” would range from Constantine in the fourth century to Joan of Arc in the 15th century. It would include Charlemagne (742–814) and his successors who ruled as Christ’s secular emissaries on earth; they utilized force to preserve and enlarge God’s kingdom. Warrior saints among the crusaders were the Hungarian Saint Ladislaus (d. 1095) and the Saint of France, Saint Louis (d. 1270). On occasion, all the combatants in a conflict can be identified as “warrior saints,” as was illustrated by some Christian leaders in the American South who thought of Confederate soldiers and officers as defenders of Christian orthodoxy against the “apostate” Union states. Obviously this creates a problem when each side, appealing to the same source (scripture), claims the moral high ground. Al Truesdale See also American Civil War, Religious Dimensions of; Charlemagne’s Conquests; Constantine; Joan of Arc; Milvian Bridge, Battle of; Protestant Reformers and War; Saint George Further Reading Buc, Philippe. Holy War, Martyrdom, and Terror, Violence and the West. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015. Carwardine, Richard. “America’s Holy War.” Books and Culture, March/April 2000. http://www.booksandculture.com/arti cles/2000/marapr/11.34.html. Accessed April 10, 2016. Jenkins, John Philip. Jesus Wars: How Four Patriarchs, Three Queens, and Two Emperors Decided What Christians Would Believe for the Next 1,500 Years. New York: Harper One, 2011. Richey, Stephen W. Joan of Arc: The Warrior Saint. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. Walter, Christopher. The Warrior Saints in Byzantine Art and Tradition. Burlington, VT: Aldershot, 2003.

Wars of the Reformation The Reformation era of the 16th century can be characterized as a series of overlapping conflicts of authority, waged by groups with limited identities fighting to preserve traditional privileges. The century and a half of struggle that followed produced scores of wars, hundreds of violent clashes, numberless deaths, and continent-wide suffering.

Despite the theological ferment and the constant invocation of conflicting religious ideas as justification, to declare religion the sole cause of war distorts and submerges scores of campaigns and revolts that expressed conflicting identities and interests across the entire social, economic, and ideological spectrum. In the century before 1517, Christendom had experienced divisions over papal power and legitimacy, frequent Turkish aggression, unease with wealth in the face of widespread poverty, and increasing alienation from clergy who were ignorant and selfindulgent. Christendom dwelt under a persistent dread of God’s wrath about to be poured out on a corrupt world. For those existing on a constant diet of tragedy, fear, and need, sharpened by the sense of eschatological crisis, there was little room for uncertainty, which sharpened intolerance and drove many combatants to a desperate fury. During the Reformation era that followed, facing fundamental challenges to every feudal authority on the basis of the new authority of scripture interpreted outside the old church, violent conflict was constant, with little quarter requested or given between dissenters and reactionaries. Ironically, belligerents proclaimed that their wars were fought for life, and eternal life; rarely if ever were they started by variant interpretations of the Gospel alone. At the heart of the Reformation wars lay the problem of authority rather than doctrine. Authority in religion and in political and military realms originally lay with the Roman Catholic Church, dynastic rulers, privileged cities, and lesser princes. These often overlapping powers were each and all under threat, owing to emerging radical economic forces and military innovations, in a complex network where violence already was in wide use to deter or suppress dissent, to discipline, to punish, or to eliminate threats to traditional authority. Local loyalties, privileges, and liberties were threatened by the rise of ambitious monarchs; at the same time the unifying framework of Roman Catholicism itself underwent multiple attacks on dogmatic and institutional foundations. As most European monarchies already had achieved direct or indirect control of the appointments of bishops in their territories, dogmatic reform threatened authoritarian institutions, tax, legal, and other privileges and immunities. Such disputes were the foundation of the most profound revolution of the Reformation: the

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successful emergence of the Dutch as a republican, Calvinist nation. Yet dissent on both religious and material fronts there began long before the iconoclasm and fighting of the 1560s, beginning with devotio moderna, Erasmus’s translation of the New Testament, and medieval religious prophetic movements spread by the independent printers of the Low Countries. Ironically, much of the Spanish ferocity that fired this defiance was caused by imperial and Spanish regal bankruptcy more than dogmatic intensity. Only by the 1560s had the certainties of Calvinism given a sense of coherence, producing a stern and fighting faith that also had little place for internal dissent. The Dutch insurrection, owing to the challenges to princely and religious authority, was only a single part of a general crisis of authority at the heart of the continent. Many Europeans dreaded the threat, after 1519, of a Christendom dominated by Habsburgs, led by newly elected Holy Roman Emperor Charles V. The Valois dynasty of France and even the Vatican constantly dueled with Habs­ burgs in Italy and elsewhere, though most of their subjects were Roman Catholic. Ironically, Francis I in particular and some of the German princes (both Lutheran and Roman Catholic, such as the kings of Bavaria), in their struggle to resist the Counter-Reformation Habsburg imperium, banded together and occasionally lobbied for aid from the greatest outside threat to Christendom, the Muslim Ottoman Empire. One of the oldest interpretations of the wars of the Reformation still has strong explanatory power: the princes and cities of Germany found Protestantism an ideal faith to inform their resistance to the Habsburgs. It was this stubborn fight to keep their liberties while united by Protestant particularism that, along with French dynastic ambition and Turkish aggression, thwarted the Habs­ burgs and limited the Counter-Reformation in northern Germany. Violent popular manifestations of discontent long preceded Martin Luther’s theological protests. While Renaissance kings and princes dueled for supremacy with increasingly deadly weapons and tactics, primarily with soldiers for hire, middle and lower classes suffered increasing taxation and loss of economic and social privileges hard-won during the decades of the Black Death, and endured precarious climate and crop failures, and the steady, almost inexplicable rise of prices. Such tensions

underlay the many Bundschuh peasant rebellions of Germany long before the Reformation, and again during the Peasants’ War in Germany (1524–1525). Yet the conflict over religious authority justified both the peasants’ use of scripture and Luther’s condemnation of rebellion and the ruthless suppression of the rebels by the princes of Germany. Religious, political, and economic forces combined in open warfare, though in this case the outcome entrenched the power of the princes and an authoritarian social order. In the aftermath, the disillusioned did not turn to cynicism, but created a distinct but equally militant rejection of both old and new religious authorities in Switzerland, Germany, and especially the Low Countries. Nor were these manifestations entirely without war. Anabaptists, contrary to the modern stereotype, even Menno Simons (1496–1561), did not immediately oppose taking up the sword, though after the sensational siege and conquest of the revolutionary Anabaptist commune at Münster in 1535, their ultimate rejection of the sword and the world led to waves of unshakeable martyrs. Europe experienced the rise of militant other-worldliness as a product of its protest against both religious and secular authorities. By the latter half of the 16th and the first half of the 17th centuries, the Calvinists proved both religiously and politically well equipped for their wars against Catholic political and ecclesiastical powers. Calvin’s teaching that there indeed existed a scriptural justification for rebellion against tyrannical sovereigns inspired rebels from all social and dynastic groups seeking new religious and political privileges. Reformed Swiss burghers dueled with Catholics while, in France, some of its greatest families, especially the Bourbons of Navarre and the well-to-do of central and Northern France, formed their own armies. Bloodshed in France, including the sensational St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in 1572, punctuated the generation of war between Huguenot and increasingly radical Catholic forces, only resolved when Henry of Navarre (1553–1610) converted to Catholicism to ascend the throne. The subsequent Edict of Nantes, however, led not to religious toleration, but the obsession of the Bourbon dynasty with restoring Gallican rights and ensuring royal absolutism. In England, Elizabeth I

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Cuius regio, eius religio

Cuius regio, eius religio is the Latin phrase for “Whose realm, his religion.” It meant that the religion of the ruler was the religion of the ruled. Cuius regio, eius religio was the rule throughout Europe with the legitimating document of the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, which was to eliminate armed conflict between Roman Catholic and Protestant forces. Cuius regio gave legitimacy only to Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism, excluding Reform Christianity and the system of Anabaptism. The exercise of faith outside of Catholicism and Lutheranism was considered heretical and punishable by death. Even though other Protestant faiths could not be practiced, people were allowed to leave the country to find refuge of faith as freedom of conscience. The Augsburg Peace provided that if the ruler changed his religion, he would have to relinquish the ruling power and authority for a Catholic successor to be appointed. The phrase ciuis regio, eius religio was coined in 1582 by the legist Joachin Stepani of the University of Greifswald. Ciuis regio, eius religio was believed to bring about internal religious unity and the production of good fruits that would prevail over political infighting and church divisions. This went against an earlier Catholic teaching, which held that the king should obey the pope. Even though ciuis regio, eius religio was the standing order, some rulers opted to allow for religious tolerance, believing that existing Protestant groups would coalesce with Catholic and Lutheran faiths for political and economic unity. Thomas E. Creely

established a delicate balance between sects, churches, and the crown, though by the time of her death, militant Calvinists in cities, Parliament, and the middle elites were equipped to bring down the Stuart absolutists who succeeded her. The continental Wars of Religion in the 17th century on the continent developed out of the mingling of Bohemian nationalism, dread of renewed Habsburg dominance, and with it the reversal of the Peace of Augsburg established by Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in 1555. At its outset the Thirty Years’ War pitted Protestant against Catholic, yet ended with the showdown between Catholic absolutist rivals that left France predominant. Though religious loyalties shaped the Thirty Years’ War, it was the Catholic absolute monarchy, best organized and financed for fighting, that triumphed. Though internal revolts and dissent continued for another half century, by 1700 the religious matter of the Reformation had been harnessed by national churches and national monarchies. The Reformation wars expressed the immense hold that limited identities and ultimate religious concerns had on all groups of 16th- and 17th-century Europe. Only after two centuries of desperate and disruptive conflicts of what seemed to be all-consuming fury did Christendom abandon the war over religious truth for the more certain and

mutually limiting wars of secular wealth and power. Outside of the West, however, contemporary battles over old and new identities, material forces, ideas, and authorities still resemble the religious wars of the Reformation. There, as in early modern Europe, the fighting is edged by the urge to vindicate or eradicate. Duff Crerar See also Eighty Years’ War, or Dutch War of Independence; German Peasants’ War; Holy Roman Empire; Luther, Martin; Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre; Thirty Years’ War; Primary Document: Excerpts from the Peace of Augsburg (1555) Further Reading Cameron, Euan. The European Reformation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Cunningham, A., and O. P. Grell. The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and Death in Reformation Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. MacCulloch, Diarmaid. The Reformation: A History. New York: Viking, 2003. Parker, Geoffrey. The Dutch Revolt. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977. Strauss, Gerald. Manifestations of Discontent in Germany on the Eve of the Reformation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971.

848  Weapons in the New Testament

Weapons in the New Testament Both defensive and offensive weapons of war are mentioned in the Christian New Testament, which was written during the first century CE, an era of Roman domination of the Mediterranean world. While in some places weapons mentioned are literal, in many cases the references are metaphorical. The metaphorical uses often describe their use in conflicts between good and evil. The Greek historian Polybius describes some of these weapons. The Roman soldier carried a shield (Greek: thureos), which was four feet in length and two and a half feet in width. He carried a sword (Greek: machaira) on his right thigh. It was excellent for thrusting, very strong, firm, and able to cut effectively with both edges. It was about two feet long and two inches wide. Polybius also speaks of the helmet (Greek: perikephalaia) that was made of brass. To the helmet was added a circle of feathers that made the soldier look taller and helped strike terror in the enemy. In Ephesians 6:10–17, Paul describes the armor of God. He uses some of the same words that Polybius uses, leading some to surmise he was using the weapons he saw on Roman soldiers while in prison. The Apostle applies them to the Christian who is in combat against the evil one. Both Polybius and Paul mention a breastplate, although they use different words. It covered and protected the heart. The Christian’s breastplate is righteousness. Paul also mentions a girdle, and this probably has references to the apron that hung over the armor of a soldier and protected the thighs. It was made of leather. It is a girdle of truth, which probably refers to either integrity or the Christian gospel. The Christian, Paul declares, also needs to shod his feet. This refers to the heavy sandals worn by Roman legionnaires. They were made with several layers of leather with hobnails to dig in against an enemy. All of these pieces of armor speak of the Christian defending against the devil and his evil forces. With the same words as Polybius, Paul describes the shield, sword, and helmet of the Christian. The believer is to take up his shield. But this shield is one of faith. His helmet is his salvation from the evil one. These two are defensive weapons. Paul also mentions the sword. For the Christian, it is the Word of God. This is the only offensive

weapon mentioned by him. It is given by the Spirit and empowers the Christian to do spiritual battle. An example of this is when Jesus used the Word of God when tempted by the devil in the wilderness. This battle, however, in Ephesians is not simply an individual concern. In this book, there is an emphasis on the church, the Body of Christ. Just as the Roman soldier did not fight alone, so the Christian belongs to a group that does battle against evil forces. In 1 Thess 5:8, Paul mentions a couple of these defensive weapons. The helmet is again called a helmet of salvation, and it may be influenced by Isa 59:17. The breastplate, however, is called one of faith and love. As in Ephesians, the picture is one of the Christian in warfare and these were needed Christian virtues. These weapons allow the Thessalonian believers to remain steady in that spiritual combat. Other references to weapons are found scattered throughout the New Testament. In the Gospels, another word for sword is also used. In Luke 2:35, Mary’s heart will be pierced through by one (Greek: hromphaia). This word is also used in Revelation (Rev 1:16; 2:12; 19:15). It may be that this type of sword was longer than the machaira and was used more for piercing. It was also not as sturdy and may not have been used as often by the military. In Revelation, the sword is said to come out of the mouth of Jesus. It is double-edged and symbolizes divine judgment against the church or the fallen world. It has a strong association with the word of Christ directed toward those who are disobedient toward him, whether in the church or outside. The sword is also said to be wielded by civil authorities. In Romans 13:4, it designates legitimate power in such hands. This may be a reference to capital punishment or to the police force of a state. The Philippian jailer has a sword and is in the process of killing himself when Paul stops him (Acts 16:27). King Herod executes the Apostle James with the sword (Acts 12:2). Other people of God were killed by the sword in the past. These deaths happened both in Old Testament and intertestamental times (Heb 11:37). In Heb 4:12, the sword is used in a metaphorical sense once again as the Word of God. It is able to penetrate to the innermost part of his peo-

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ple. As such, it is able to pierce through to reveal the thoughts and intentions of the heart. These thoughts are either godly or from the flesh. The passage carries with it the idea of divine punishment for those who are disobedient. This word was spoken in past generations and is still active and alive. A type of combination between the literal and metaphorical uses of the sword occurs in Luke 22:36. On the night of his arrest, Jesus tells the disciples to buy swords. His comment in 22:38, as well as his reaction to Peter’s actions at the arrest (22:51), indicated that he did not want his disciples to engage in battle. However, he does indicate that they will live in a hostile world. The group of soldiers that arrests Jesus carries both swords and clubs. The clubs were made of wood. The makeup of the arresting party is unknown. There may have been Roman or auxiliary soldiers who carried swords, while Jewish soldiers of various stripes carried the clubs. It is also possible that all of them were Jewish. Polybius mentions a spear carried by the Roman soldier. Acts 23:23 uses a rare word to describe certain soldiers. It is a different word than the word used by Polybius. Although the word could refer to slings, it has the basic meaning of something carried in the right hand and evidently refers to soldiers who carry spears. Kenneth Wayne Yates See also Bible and War; Yahweh as Divine Warrior Further Reading Aune, David E. Revelation 1–5. Word Biblical Commentary. Vol 52a. Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1997. Bock, Darrell L. Acts. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007. Brown, Raymond E. John XIII–XXI. The Anchor Yale Bible. Vol 29a. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970. Bruce, F. F. The Book of Acts. New International Commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988. Fee, Gordon D. The First and Second Letters to the Thessalonians. New International Commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009. Hoehner, Harold W. Ephesians: An Exegetical Commentary. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2002. Mounce, Robert H. The Book of Revelation. New International Commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997.

Wendish Crusade (1147) Wendish Crusade is the name traditionally given to the expeditions that developed as part of the Second Crusade (1147–1149), mounted by German, Danish, and Polish armies against the pagan Slavic tribes (known as Wends in the Germanic languages), living between Poland and Saxony in the regions bounded by the rivers Oder and Elbe.

Antecedents and Origins

The Wendish Crusade was not the first attempt by neighboring Christian powers to convert and dominate the Wends. In fact some, although by no means all, of the Wendish tribes had already been Christianized after coming under the administration of the system of marches set up on the frontiers of the early German kingdom (the socalled Nordmark, the March of the Billungs, and other marches), but they had risen against German supremacy in 983 and resumed paganism. Later attempts to reintroduce Christianity, usually by indigenous Christian princes, met with new pagan insurrections in 1018 and 1066, leading to the abandonment of bishoprics that had been established at Oldenburg in Holstein, Havelberg, and Brandenburg. This in itself provided a perfect foundation for future crusades. In 1108 Adelgoz, archbishop of Magdeburg, had already thought of applying the idea of crusading against the Wends, calling upon the seasoned crusader Count Robert II of Flanders and other rulers to join the Danish and German kings. Together they were to follow the example of those who had freed Jerusalem by freeing what the archbishop called “our Jerusalem” from defilation by local pagans. This would be an occasion to “save their souls” and, if they wished, “acquire the best land in which to live” [Urkundenbuch des Erzstifts Magdeburg, vol. 1, ed. Friedrich Israël and Walter Möllenberg (Magdeburg: Landesgeschichtliche Forschungsstelle für die Provinz Sachsen und für Anhalt, 1937), pp. 249–252]. It is worth noting that, in contrast to the Wendish Crusade of 1147, the archbishop did not envisage converting the Wends but contemplated only (in a similar fashion to the First Crusade) defending Christianity. This “crusade” probably did not come off, but the double promise of remission of sins and acquisition of land may well have been an important stimulus for those who in

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1146–1147 advocated a Wendish crusade as an alternative to a crusade to the Holy Land. Soon after the Magdeburg initiative, Bolesław III of Poland (1102–1138) began to put the Wends under pressure from the east when he started a drawn-out conquest of Pomerania, culminating in the capture of Stettin (mod. Szczecin, Poland) in 1121. Although this campaign was described as a missionary war by the contemporary writer known as Gallus Anonymus, the Poles failed to convert the Pomeranians. Bolesław therefore invited Bishop Otto of Bamberg, former chaplain at the Polish court, to undertake a mission to the region in 1124–1125. This led at least to the nominal conversion of the Pomeranians. At this point, however, Germany, under Lothar of Supplingenburg (first as duke of Saxony and from 1125 as king), began a more active policy toward the Wends. Lothar supported the Pomeranian prince Vartislav (who had been one of Otto’s earliest converts) in his attempt to regain independence from Poland by enfeoffing him with the pagan lands west of Pomerania. With Lothar’s support, Vartislav in 1127 invited Otto of Bamberg to undertake a second mission. This brought Vartislav, Otto, and indirectly Lothar into conflict not only with Bolesław but also his ally, King Niels Svensen of Denmark, who laid claim to the pagan-inhabited island of Rügen. Lothar, however, managed to weaken Niels by installing Niels’s nephew Knud Lavard as prince of the pagan Abodrites. The murder of Knud in 1131 and the ensuing civil war in Denmark, together with internal pressures on Lothar, however, gave paganism in the region a breathing space. It was not only in the north that Lothar activated German policy toward the Wends. While still duke of Saxony, he had installed Albert the Bear, a nobleman of the Ascanian dynasty, in the march of Lusatia. However, on becoming king, Lothar wished to avoid having too powerful a vassal and refused to bestow the duchy of Saxony on Albert. Instead, he installed a member of the Welf dynasty, Henry the Proud of Bavaria, who was succeeded in 1143 by his son Henry the Lion. Supported in turn by the archbishops of Magdeburg and Hamburg-Bremen in their attempts to regain their former influence among the Wends, the Ascanians and Welfs thereafter competed in seeking to extend their rule into the former Wendish marches, often in changing alliances with successive kings and emperors. In the 1130s Albert had already managed to establish himself

beyond the Elbe in Havelland, where he began to settle colonists from the west, and by the 1140s he had taken the title margrave of Brandenburg, although the territory was as yet unconquered.

Preaching and Recruitment

This was the situation when Bernard, abbot of Clairvaux, began preaching in Germany in 1146, following the proclamation of the Second Crusade by Pope Eugenius III. King Conrad III and many German nobles decided to go to the Holy Land, but a number of aristocrats, primarily Saxons, and churchmen such as Bishop Anselm of Havelberg thought that a crusade nearer to home was called for: they argued that if many crusaders left for Outremer, Christianity at home would be exposed to attacks from pagan Wends east of the Elbe. Such a threat was scarcely real: when the chronicler Helmold of Bosau and the author of the Annales Palidenses described events from a distance of a generation, they were only able to point to some Wendish raids against the fairly distant Danes. Nevertheless, at a diet in Frankfurt am Main on March 13, 1147, Bernard accepted this view. He managed to construe the crusade as a war of defense by arguing that the devil, fearing the impending salvation of Israel, had incited the wicked pagans, who now “with evil intent lie in wait.” Therefore, in order to keep the “road to Jerusalem” open, the “enemies of the cross of Christ,” across the Elbe, had to be attacked [Bernardus abbas Claravallensis, “Epistolae,” in Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Latina, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, 225 vols. (Paris: Migne, 1844–1865), 182, no. 457]. Consequently, Bernard promised those who took the cross against the Wends the same privileges as those who departed for the Holy Land. A delegation from the diet, which included Anselm of Havelberg, was sent to Pope Eugenius, who responded on April 11 by issuing the bull Divini dispensatione. The pope officially proclaimed the crusade against the Wends and appointed Anselm as legate to it. Eugenius explicitly confirmed Bernard’s promised remission of sins but also made a point of threatening with excommunication those who agreed to take money or other benefits for allowing the Wends to remain infidels. Bernard was even more outspoken in a letter he circulated soon after the diet to rulers in order to rally crusaders. There he forbade them in any circumstances to come

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to terms with the pagans, until “either the religion or the nation be wiped out (Lat. aut ritus ipse, aut natio deleatur)” [Bernardus abbas Claravallensis, “Epistolae,” no. 457]. This stipulation and other passages in the letter have been the subject of intense debate as to Bernard’s exact intentions. Did Bernard envisage the outright extermination of the pagan Wends unless they converted to Christianity, as argued by Hans-Dieter Kahl? Or was the choice, as Friedrich Lotter suggests, not between baptism or death but between voluntary baptism with preserved independence on the one hand and coerced destruction of communal bonds and traditions under foreign Christian rule on the other? In any case, it does seem that Bernard changed his view on how to treat pagans during his preaching of the Second Crusade. In a letter from the autumn of 1146, touching on why Jews under Christian rule should not be destroyed, Bernard made a point of stating that “if the pagans were similarly subjugated to us then, in my opinion, we should wait for them [to convert] rather than seek them out with swords.” Then, however, as an afterthought, he continued, “but as they have now begun to attack us, it is necessary that those of us who do not carry a sword in vain repel them with force” [Bernardus abbas Claravallensis, “Epistolae,” no. 363]. This may suggest that Bernard thought the situation of the Christians on the Elbe to be desperate. At any rate, in connection with the Wendish Crusade, conversion of pagans came to play a role it had not done during earlier crusades. In that respect it seems that Bernard and the pope deliberately wished to widen the scope of crusading so that all pagans could be targeted.

Course of the Crusade

According to Bernard of Clairvaux, the crusaders were to muster on June 29, 1147, in Magdeburg. It took, however, another month before they were ready. By then the forthcoming crusade had already forced Count Adolf of Holstein to abandon the agreement with the Abodrite prince, Niklot, that had allowed him to reestablish the town of Lübeck, restore churches, and even establish a monastery. Not wishing to wait for the crusaders to strike, Niklot took the offensive by attacking Lübeck and ravaging the surrounding country.

When the crusaders were finally ready, at least four armies moved against the Wends: two from Saxony (a northern and a southern one), one from Poland, and one from Denmark. According to the Annales Magdeburgenses, a Polish army also joined the Orthodox Russians in an attack on the pagan Prussians. Since the pope had targeted the crusade not only against Wends but also “other pagans” in the north, this campaign would qualify as the first crusade against the Prussians. The northern Saxon army under Archbishop Adalbero of Bremen, Conrad of Zähringen, and Henry the Lion was the first to depart, moving against Niklot’s Abodrites. When they laid siege to his stronghold, Dobin, they were joined by the Danes, who had arrived by sea. A Wendish attack on the Danish fleet, however, forced it to retreat. The Saxons, disregarding the papal ban, then made peace, in return for a Wendish promise to convert. Soon afterward Count Adolf reestablished his pact with Niklot, who remained a pagan. The southern Saxon army, led by Bishop Anselm of Havelberg and Albert the Bear, moved toward Pomerania, probably cooperating with the Poles. Part of the army laid siege to Demmin on the river Peene but gave up in September and returned home. Another part invested Stettin. The people of Stettin demonstrated their Christian faith by displaying crosses on the walls, and through their bishop, Adalbert, they rebuked the crusaders for wishing to conquer the land instead of strengthening the faith by preaching. Having lost many knights without taking the town, the crusaders finally decided to make peace with the Pomeranian prince, Ratibor, and return home. Next year Ratibor appeared in Havelberg in order to profess his Christian faith as he had received it from Otto of Bamberg. In choosing to target Stettin, Albert the Bear and the archbishopric of Magdeburg probably hoped to achieve precisely what they had failed to accomplish through Otto’s mission in 1128: to bring Pomerania under their influence.

Consequences

The poor results of the Wendish Crusade (one pagan temple is recorded to have been destroyed) led to severe criticism from several quarters. Helmold of Bosau, with hindsight, explained the crusaders’ lame performance by their disinclination to devastate the land they saw as future possessions.

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Yet even if the crusade accomplished little, it did begin a kind of permanent crusade against the Wends throughout the remainder of the 12th century, perhaps still based on the bull Divini dispensatione. Step by step, the Wends were converted and subjugated to foreign rule. In 1157 Albert the Bear finally managed to make good his title as margrave of Brandenburg by capturing the town of Brandenburg itself. Soon afterward Henry the Lion intensified his activity among the Wends, partly in collaboration and partly in competition with a rejuvenated Denmark under Valdemar I the Great. During the 1160s most of the Wends along the Baltic coast between the Oder and Elbe were brought under either Saxon or Danish rule, culminating in the Danish conquest of the important temple-fortress at Arkona. When Henry the Lion fell out with Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa in 1180, the Danes managed to take political control over most of the region as a basis for their further crusades into, and temporary domination of, the Baltic region. The Saxon-Danish expansion was accompanied by colonization by peasants from northern Germany, Holland, and Frisia, similar to that which Albert the Bear had begun in his territory in the 1130s. This gave rise to a layer of indigenous Germanized princes, who managed to stay in power as vassals, while Wendish peasant villages managed to coexist with German settlements for several centuries. By the end of the 12th century churches and monasteries had been established in all former pagan regions and linked to one or other of the surrounding archbishoprics. Only the Pomeranian church, now centered in Kammin (mod. Kamień Pomorski, Poland), managed to remain exempt. John H. Lind See also Second Crusade Further Reading Constable, Giles. “The Place of the Magdeburg Charter of 1107/08 in the History of Eastern Germany and of the Crusades.” In Franz J. Felten and Nikolas Jaspert, eds. Vita Religiosa im Mittelalter: Festschrift für Kaspar Elm zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999. Gaethke, Hans-Otto. Herzog Heinrich der Löwe und die Slawen nordöstlich der unteren Elbe. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1999. Guth, Klaus. “The Pomeranian Missionary Journeys of Otto I of Bamberg and the Crusade Movement of the Eleventh to Twelfth Centuries.” In Michael Gervers, ed. The Second Crusade and the Cistercians. New York: St. Martin’s, 1992.

Hill, Thomas. “Von der Konfrontation zur Assimilation: Das Ende der Slawen in Ostholstein, Lauenburg und Lübeck vom 12. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert.” In Michael Müller-Wille, Dietrich Meier, and Henning Unverhau, eds. Slawen und Deutsche um südlichen Ostseeraum vom 11. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert. Neumünster: Wachholtz, 1995. Jensen, Kurt Villads. “Denmark and the Second Crusade: The Formation of a Crusader State?” In Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch, eds. The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001. Kahl, Hans-Dietrich. “Die weltweite Bereinigung der ‘Heidenfrage’—ein übersehenes Kriegsziel des Zweiten Kreuzzuges.” Spannungen und Widersprüche, Gedächtnisschrift für František Graus. Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1992. Kahl, Hans-Dietrich. “Wie kam es 1147 zum ‘Wendenkreuzzug’?” in Europa Slavica—Europa Orientalis: Festschrift für Herbert Ludat zum 70. Geburtstag. Edited by Klaus-Detlev Grothusen and Klaus Zernack. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980. Lotter, Friedrich. “The Crusading Idea and the Conquest of the Region East of the Elbe.” In Robert Bartlett and Angus McKay, eds. Medieval Frontier Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Lotter, Friedrich. Die Konzeption des Wendenkreuzzugs: Ideengeschichtliche, kirchenrechtliche und historischpolitische Voraussetzungen der Missionierung von Elb- und Ostseeslawen um die Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts. Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1977. Lübke, Christian. “Die Beziehungen zwischen Elb- und Ostseeslawen und Dänen vom 9. bis zum 12. Jahrhundert: Eine andere Option elbslawischer Geschichte?” In Ole Harck and Christian Lübke, eds. Zwischen Reric und Bornhöved. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2001. Neumeister, Peter.“Die slawische Ostseeküste im Spannungsfeld der Nachbarmächte (bis 1227/1239).” In Ole Harck and Christian Lübke, eds. Zwischen Reric und Bornhöved. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2001. Szacherska, Stella Maria. “The Political Role of the Danish Monasteries in Pomerania, 1171–1223.” Mediaeval Scandinavia 10 (1977): 122–55.

West Africa, French Wars of Conquest in In 1854, French possessions in western Africa, like those of other European powers, were miniscule coastal and riverine trading enclaves, more or less under African control. In that

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year, however, taking advantage of their exclusive possession of the navigable lower and middle Senegal River, the French military began to intervene forcibly among the Senegalese states to impose favorable terms of trade for French merchants. The French conquest of western Africa had begun. These first French actions against their Woloff, Mauritanian, and Toucouleur neighbors drew inspiration from the French conquest of Algeria that, having begun in 1830, offered a model of apparently successful military colonialism. Ambitious infantry and artillery officers adopted this model, including the willful manipulation of military reports and multiplication of campaigns, to earn rapid promotions by extending French domination. In addition, these officers exploited the bogey of militant Islamic opposition to French rule to justify actions to eliminate Muslim rulers. After 1871, French officers and civilian administrators would additionally become imbued with Jacobin-influenced republican ideals that would move them to reject most power sharing with west African traditional rulers, Muslim or non-Muslim, except as temporary expedients. Eventually most African rulers and their states were eliminated. Two periods (1854–1861 and 1861–1863) during which General Louis Faidherbe, an engineer officer with Algerian experience, governed Senegal served as a prelude to post1878 French conquests. Adapting orders from Paris to local realities, Faidherbe led a series of limited river- and landbased operations against the Mauritanian, Woloff, Toucouleur, and Sarakhollé states of the Senegal River valley, resulting in French military control of the banks of the navigable western portion of this river. Faidherbe’s forces undertook similar actions along the Atlantic coast south of Saint-Louis and inside the navigable reaches of the Saloum and Casamance rivers. Faidherbe’s campaigns also forced the Toucouleur state builder, El Hadj Omar, to move his center of operations to Ségou on the middle Niger River. In 1857, Faidherbe created the first companies of Senegalese Riflemen, a model of native African military recruitment that French commanders would replicate as they moved inland. Native levies and the warriors of African allies would provide the bulk of French military manpower in western Africa. The fabled (but mythical) wealth of Timbuktu, to which was added the assumed strategic value of Lake Chad, con-

stituted the magnets that attracted French expansion inland from the upper Senegal as well as from Algeria and the coastal points that would become Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Dahomey (Benin), and Gabon. The decision taken in 1880 to open a series of fortified posts and to build a railway linking Kayes, at the head of navigation on the Senegal River, to Bamako, on the middle Niger River (occupied in 1883), led to armed conflict with the Toucouleur Empire, ruled since 1864 by El Hadj Omar’s eldest son, Ahmadou, and with the empire of the Dioula state builder, Samori Touré. To successive French commanders of the Upper River/ western Sudan, particularly Gustave Borgnis-Desbordes (1880–1883), Joseph Simon Galliéni (1886–1888), and Louis Archinard (1888–1891 and 1892–1893), the Toucouleur Empire, because it blocked the way to Timbuktu, had to be destroyed. This task, completed in 1893, was accompanied by lesser campaigns against former Bambara, Toucouleur, Sénoufo, and other African allies who were no longer needed. As the French communication lines linking the upper Senegal and the upper and middle Niger regions grazed the northern rim of the area where Samori Touré was building his empire, a clash occurred at Keniéra, south of the Niger River, in February 1882. Later, periods of hostilities alternated with periods of uneasy peace as Samori, attempting to avoid the French, shifted his area of state building from upper Guinea to northern Côte d’Ivoire. In September 1898 Captain Henri-Joseph Gouraud, commanding a small detachment of mostly African troops, captured Samori inside Liberian territory. While the French were combating these African adversaries, they were also contending with instances of dissidence among presumed allies and suppressing numerous rebellions. The establishment of the Upper River/western Sudan region as an autonomous military command in 1880 was a stimulus to independent actions on the part of its commanders. The French occupation of Timbuktu in 1894 was one such action. The eastward-moving struggle against Samori offered the French an impetus to link the French enclaves farther down the west African coast to the interior. This process sped up and expanded after the 1885 Berlin West Africa Conference established rules for the effective European occupation of African territory.

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In 1899, French columns from Algeria, the western Sudan, and the French Congo converged near the southern shore of Lake Chad at Kousséri. Here the combined forces defeated the Sudanic state builder Rabah Zoubeir. Although this battle is often viewed as marking the close of the era of the French conquest of western Africa, French forces, for many more years, would fight smaller campaigns in outlying areas, such as the region of southern Côte d’Ivoire. As a kind of afterthought, France began the pacification of Mauritania in 1905, a task that would drag on until 1938. Leland Conley Barrows See also Algeria, French Conquest of Further Reading Daughton, J. P. An Empire Divided: Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism, 1880–1914. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Kanya-Forstner, A. S. The Conquest of the Western Sudan: A Study in French Military Imperialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Porch, Douglas. The Conquest of the Sahara. 2nd ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.

West Semitic Warfare As with most of the cultures of the ancient Near East, warfare and religion were closely associated in the west Semitic world, which includes the areas that roughly correspond to the land occupied by modern Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan (Israel is examined in separate entries). Only a few texts remain from the kingdom of the Moabites, just east of the Dead Sea, but the largest Moabite text is the Moabite Stone from King Mesha dating to about 850 BCE. Mesha described how Chemosh, the god of the Moabites, was angry with the Moabites and had handed them over to the Israelites, but now Chemosh had given Mesha victory over their bitter enemies. As part of the battle, Mesha had defeated the city of Ataroth and killed all the inhabitants of the city for Chemosh, putting the city to the ban (a concept also found in the Old Testament). Mesha also took plunder (including the vessels of Yahweh, the Israelites’ God) and brought them before Chemosh.

Many Aramean inscriptions have been recovered (ancient Aram was a group of largely independent cities loosely found in modern-day Syria). Unlike King Mesha, some of these kings proudly served as vassals of the Assyrian empire. For example, King Kulamuwa in about 820 BCE boasts that he defeated the Danunians with the help of the Assyrians, something that had not been done by his ancestors. This kind of inscription tends to minimize the role of the divine warrior and focus instead on the power of the human king and the Assyrian emperor. Other kings emphasize the work of the divine warrior on their behalf, such as Azatiwada (about 700 BCE), and ignore the Assyrian emperor. A commonality between all these texts is the resulting prosperity the victory brings to the people through a combination of religious belief and warfare. Much more literature remains from the city of Ugarit, on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea in modern-day Syria. The literature found there is the closest witness we have to Canaanite culture and mythology (Ugarit was destroyed about 1200 BCE). Baal, the son of El, was known as a powerful divine warrior who defeated Yam (the Sea) and Mot (Death) in the Baal Cycle, a myth about the ascendancy of Baal to the throne. Baal helped his people in battle, reflected in such texts as the prayer to Baal during a siege. The goddess Anat also acts as a divine warrior in the myths, but less material connects her to the human military. Information about more mundane matters related to warfare in Ugarit is lacking in many ways, but some genres found at Ugarit give us a greater sense of the practicalities of warfare. For example, it is recorded in a letter from a general that his men were victims of pestilence. The Kirta myth, an Ugaritic epic poem, also provides further information on the connection between warfare and religion. When Kirta went to war against Udum at the command of El, he offered a sacrifice to El and made a vow to the mother goddess Asherah before he left. This sort of connection between religious belief and warfare characterized much of the West Semitic culture. Charlie Trimm See also Ancient Near Eastern Warfare, Religious Dimensions of; Baal; Egyptian Warfare; Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare; Yahweh as Divine Warrior

Westphalia, Peace of (1648)  855 Further Reading Dearman, Andrew, ed. Studies in the Mesha Inscription and Moab. Archaeology and Biblical Studies 2. Atlanta: Scholars, 1989. Hallo, William W., and K. Lawson Younger Jr., eds. Context of Scripture. 3 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1997. Kang, Sa-Moon. Divine War in the Old Testament and in the Ancient Near East. BZAW 177. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1989. Parker, Simon B. Stories in Scripture and Inscriptions: Comparative Studies on Narratives in Northwest Semitic Inscriptions and the Hebrew Bible. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Westphalia, Peace of (1648) The Peace of Westphalia derives is name from the location of the international congress convened to end three major European wars—the Franco-Spanish War (1635–1659), the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), and the Dutch Revolt (1568–1648). It successfully dealt with the latter two, bringing to an end the religious wars that had ravaged central Europe for decades, fostering the legal and philosophical idea of religious freedom, and establishing the basis of the concept of the nation-state and national selfdetermination and state sovereignty. The congress opened in August 1643 and got fully underway around a year later. Delegates from Roman Catholic powers met in the Westphalian town of Münster, while those from Protestant belligerents assembled a few miles away in Osnabrück. Both venues were declared neutral, with safe passage guaranteed between them and for postal communication to the home governments. Nonetheless, military operations continued and were increasingly related to boosting each party’s position in the negotiations—something that both prolonged the talks and added to the urgency to conclude them. Diplomacy failed for one conflict (Franco-Spanish War), despite discussions dragging into 1649. The FrancoSpanish War began in 1635 and was related to the other two struggles through France’s offensive alliance with the Dutch Republic against Spain and Spain’s support for the Holy Roman Emperor (Ferdinand II) in the Thirty Years’ War against France and Sweden. However, Spain disengaged from the latter conflict by 1642, when it stopped

subsidizing the imperial war effort, while the emperor and the Dutch consciously avoided hostilities. Franco-Spanish talks began well, but collapsed as both (but especially France) believed the end to the other two wars improved their military prospects. France eventually accepted terms at the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659) that were scarcely better than those on the table in 1648. The congress settled the Spanish-Dutch conflict more speedily. The two had renewed their long struggle (known alternately as the Revolt of the Netherlands, Eighty Years’ War, or Dutch Revolt) in 1621 after failing to extend a 12-year truce. Spain accepted the peace agreed to in Münster on January 30, 1648, that entailed recognizing Dutch independence and closing the Scheldt River to commerce. This confirmed the demise of Antwerp as northern Europe’s principal port and secured the dominance of Dutch traders in Amsterdam. The Thirty Years’ War was the third and most complex conflict, but it was successfully settled by two treaties signed simultaneously in Münster and Osnabrück on October 24, 1648. The treaty of Münster (hereafter referred to as the IPM) consisted of 97 articles concluding hostilities between France and the emperor and his German allies. That agreed in Osnabrück (hereafter IPO) ran to 225 paragraphs grouped into 17 articles, settling issues between Sweden and the emperor and his allies. Though distinct, there was a substantial overlap between both treaties, with some clauses repeated verbatim. Of the four common elements, the first intended the entire settlement as a permanent peace (pax perpetua) for Europe through a general amnesty and mutual obligations to “forgive and forget” wartime transgressions. Though the negotiators accepted their failure in the Franco-Spanish War, all regarded the IPO, IPM, and the Spanish-Dutch treaty of Münster as part of a general peace. This gave a benchmark character to the Westphalian settlement that continued to be invoked in later European treaties that presented themselves as adjustments to the original terms. The second, more substantial element settled the struggle over the political and religious order in the Holy Roman Empire. This was addressed primarily by Articles III to IX of the IPO running to 129 paragraphs and has been the most widely misunderstood part of the peace. Contrary to the textbook view, the terms did not make the

856  Westphalia, Peace of (1648)

The conference at Münster in 1648, where the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War, is depicted in this 17th-century painting by Dutch artist Gerard Ter Borch. The treaties signed at Münster and Osnabrück effectively ended the Thirty Years’ War in the Holy Roman Empire and the Eighty Years’ War between Spain and the Dutch Republic. (PHAS/UIG via Getty Images)

German principalities independent, nor end the empire as a viable polity. Instead, they restated existing rights in ways that, over time, did enhance princely powers, but nonetheless fell short of full sovereignty. Article V actually curtailed princely powers by fixing the official religion of each German territory as it had been in 1624 (known henceforth as the “normative year”). Extensive safeguards were provided for religious minorities that further restricted princely powers and allowed the two imperial supreme courts to intervene in territorial affairs. Though Article VII extended recognition to Calvinists, as well as Lutherans and Roman Catholics, the peace was not fully secular, since other faiths (e.g., Anabaptists) were denied rights, while

toleration rested on legally sanctioned coexistence rather than mutual acceptance. Nonetheless, these arrangements proved remarkably successful, shifting religious conflict from arguments over absolutes (religious truths and doctrines) and channeling it instead into disputes over local and particular rights that could be resolved through judicial arbitration. Other clauses (largely Articles IV and VIII) confirmed the empire as a mixed monarchy where the emperor shared formal authority with the princes. Nonetheless, the Austrian Habsburgs, who held the imperial title, emerged with special exemptions from many of the religious clauses, allowing them to continue their policy of stabilizing their rule in their own hereditary lands on the

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basis of Roman Catholic conformity. Bavaria, which had consistently backed the emperor, obtained similar privileges and likewise emerged as one of the “winners.” Articles X to XV redistributed territory within the empire to settle disputes with external powers, which formed the treaties’ third key issue. Sweden gained more than 16,000 square kilometers (9,940 miles) along the north German coast, but accepted this as remaining within the empire. The war had already revealed the structural weaknesses in Sweden as a great power, and within two decades it became one of the principal champions of the empire’s constitutional order as the best defense for its new German possessions. Brandenburg-Prussia was given nearly 30,000 square kilometers (18,640 miles), largely in Pomerania, but also by secularizing some Roman Catholic ecclesiastical lands (bishoprics of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, Kammin, and Minden). Though it had been consistently defeated during the war, the emperor saw Brandenburg’s enlargement as a bulwark against Sweden. Brandenburg’s gains contributed to its rise as the second most powerful German territory after Austria. The IPM repeated all these terms (except Sweden’s gains), plus granted Austria’s rights and lands in Alsace completely to France, which refused to accept them as remaining part of the empire. The final clauses concerned the implementation and maintenance of the peace, providing for the restitution of property and military withdrawal. The latter was overseen by a congress of generals and diplomats at Nuremberg (1649–1650) and saw the disbandment of 160,000 soldiers by 1654, a major achievement. All signatories mutually guaranteed the peace. France and Sweden later used this to claim a special role in upholding the imperial constitution (as a means to hinder Habsburg management of the empire). In practice, this meant little for Sweden, while France’s influence actually depended on its military preponderance and financial leverage. Recognizing the sensitivity of the religious terms, all parties declared that the peace remained valid regardless what others might say. This neutralized the subsequent papal protest and helped advance the superiority of voluntary contractual international law over other possible guidelines for international relations, especially religious ones that had previously resulted in warfare. Peter H. Wilson

See also Eighty Years’ War, or Dutch War of Independence; Thirty Years’ War Further Reading Croxton, Derek. “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty.” International History Review 21 (1999): 569–91. Croxton, Derek, and Anuschka Tischler, eds. The Peace of Westphalia. A Historical Dictionary. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. Duchhardt, H., ed. Der Westfälische Friede. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998. Kaplan, Benjamin. Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007.

Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved (Luther, 1526) Martin Luther (1483–1546), leader of the German Reformation, produced his treatise Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved in 1526 in response to the spiritual concerns of a soldier who was troubled about whether or not he could be a Christian and a soldier. Was his occupation compatible with his pursuit of salvation? Luther answered in the affirmative. He argued that the military profession was perfectly legitimate in the service of God. With the rise of printed books due to the advent of the printing press in Germany 75 years earlier, it was much easier to disseminate ideas and address current events such as war. Luther took a matter-of-fact approach about the perpetual wars that plague the human race. “War and killing,” he wrote, “have been instituted by God.” He meant, building upon the perspective of the New Testament book of Romans chapter 13, that “the sword has been instituted by God to punish evil, protect the good, and preserve the peace” (Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 95). Luther even recognized that because of what warfare achieves it is a work that is “precious and godly.” He urged the pacifists of his time that “they should also consider how great the plague is that war prevents.” Luther elaborated upon what he meant, “If people were good and wanted to keep the peace, war would be the greatest plague on earth.” He

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asked, “But what are you going to do about the fact that people will not keep the peace, but rob, steal, kill, outrage women and children, and take away property and honor?” He then put matters into perspective, “The small lack of peace called war or the sword must set a limit to this universal, worldwide lack of peace which would destroy everyone” (96). Perhaps the most interesting teaching in the treatise relates to Luther’s rejection of the doctrine of parliamentary resistance to tyranny. We are here reminded of a major difference between Lutheran and Reformed thinking in the area of political doctrine. While the Reformed theologian Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562) approved of the deposition of King Christian II by the parliamentary body in Denmark, Luther firmly repudiated the deposition. Luther also differed with later Scottish and English reformers. He based his position on his interpretation of Romans 13. “No one shall fight or make war against his overlord,” he contended, “for a man owes his overlord obedience, honor, fear” (103). Is there an exception to this fundamental law? Luther answered with a negation. “What I say about ‘subjects,’” he asserted, “is intended for peasants, citizens of the cities, nobles, counts, and princes as well.” No one was exempt. “A rebellious noble, count, or prince,” he maintained, “should have his head cut off the same as a rebellious peasant” (116). Luther’s position at this point likewise stood in opposition to an old medieval idea. An example of this is seen in the Magna Carta of 1215. King John conceded that a baronial committee should be set up to hear complaints and that it should, furthermore, have the authority to wage war against the king if he failed to give redress. In 1258 the principle of a baronial war against the king came to fruition in the uprising led by Simon de Monfort, who led the barons to victory over the royal army. For the sake of clarification and completeness of presentation, it should be pointed out that there was a point of overlap between Luther and Reformed theologians on the matter of resistance to tyranny. Theodore Beza (1519– 1605), for example, taught that the inferior magistrates had the right to engage in a defensive war against a tyrannical monarchy. They were authorized to take up arms against the armies of the prince who would seek to exterminate them. This was the same position that Luther had articu-

lated in his Warning to His Dear German People (1531). Both Beza and Luther took the view that although the inferior magistrates could defend themselves against a king who moved against them, they did not have the authority to move against and to depose, and even to execute a king. In response to the spiritual needs of a troubled Christian soldier, Luther distanced himself from the Anabaptist position that a Christian ought not to have anything to do with the military. Luther asserted that there is no incompatibility between the service of a soldier and the obtaining of salvation. Mark J. Larson See also Anabaptist Pacifism; Luther, Martin; Beza, Theodore; Vermigli, Peter Martyr Further Reading Luther, Martin. “Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved.” Christian in Society III. In Robert C. Schultz, ed. Luther’s Works. Vol. 46. Philadelphia, PA: Concordia Publishing House, 1967, pp. 87–138.

William of Adam (ca. 1275–1338/39) William of Adam was a Dominican priest who used his extensive travel experience to write a book that presented a strategic answer to defeating Islamic forces in the aftermath of the defeat of the Christian crusaders in 1291. Little is known of him beyond his writing and there is even confusion with respect to his name. At the beginning of his writing, he referred to himself as “G. Ade” and others have referred to him as Guillaume Adam. He was born in southern France in the latter half of the 13th century. He appears to have been in Constantinople in 1307 and to have traveled extensively in the east prior to 1316/17, after which he returned to France. William of Adam is noted for his historical and strategic account How to Defeat the Saracens (Tractatus quomodo Sarraceni sunt expugnandi), which he authored in 1317, although he did not give the work a specific title. In addition to William, the significant Muslim defeat of Christians at Acre in 1291 led several strategists to develop plans for taking Jerusalem. His intent was to write a guide for a gen-

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eral crusade that could be readily used. William’s strategy for recovering Jerusalem and the Holy Land is included in the genre known as “recovery literature.” Of the writers of “recovery literature,” William was most likely the best qualified to develop a well-thought-out and detailed plan. His writing is significant because of his extensive travels in the region and his broad experiences. Although he was not a military person, he had first-hand experience “on the ground,” giving him credibility to his readers. His work is also interesting in that he saw a link between crusade efforts and present and future commerce in the Indian Ocean region. He understood the economic significance of a crusade beyond any religious connotations or motivations associated with it. William joined the Dominican order that had a mission in Iran with concern for Armenian Christians. As a Dominican priest, he traveled extensively throughout the Mediterranean, Middle East, and parts of India between 1307 and 1317 experiencing the environment, cultures, peoples, politics, economics, and stories. His intimate study of the battles between the Christians and Muslims from local perspectives compelled William to act on his knowledge. His objective was to influence crusade leaders to launch a large-scale operation. William’s plan was a fivepronged strategy, which primarily focused on cutting off economic and political support for Egypt. By implementing trade embargos and sanctions against Egypt, help from Mongols, Greeks, and Latins would dry up. Importantly, he thought a blockade at the southern end of the Red Sea would eliminate an essential trade route with India that would diminish the flourishing of Alexandria. William believed the blockade could be successful with strategic placement of three or four galleys with the support of the Mongol ruler of Persia. Unfortunately for William, his book of fine scholarship and strategy did not catch the attention of leaders at the time. William’s thought offered a plausible strategy and an understanding of the complexity in defeating the Muslim Mamluks and recovering Jerusalem. He had several appointments as a bishop and archbishop before his death in 1338/39. In 1318, William was a suffragan of the archdiocese of Sultanieh and in later years became the bishop of Smyrna and then Antivari. He remained active in the papal inner circle for the remainder of his life. His life and writing are important in that beyond

the treatise, he provides an example of how deeply fused together some religious orders and individuals were with military forces, especially religious military orders, such as the Knights Templar. Thomas E. Creely See also Acre, Sieges of; Crusades (Overview); Knights Templar Further Reading Nicolle, David. Acre 1291. New York: Osprey, 2005. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The Crusades: A Short History, 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005. William of Adam, and Giles Constable, trans. How to Defeat the Saracens. Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2012.

Wingate, Orde (1903–1944) Orde Charles Wingate (February 26, 1903–March 24, 1944) was born in a family with a mixed military and Christian background, strongly marked by the expansion of the British Empire during the 19th century. He came to fame both by his religiously motivated support for the Zionists in Palestine, and by his development of tactics for fighting in what today would be called counterinsurgency warfare in the Middle and Far East. His special forces were the Special Night Squads, the Gideons, and the Chindits. His spectacular career was cut short by his early death in an airplane crash in India. After his birth in India he was raised in the faith of the Christian Plymouth Brethren, who saw a Jewish presence in what was then still the Ottoman Empire as God’s plan. Wingate attended boarding school and later the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich. At the same time he broadened his knowledge of the Middle East. His first military assignment brought him to Sudan, where during the defense of the frontier he started to build a reputation for combating irregular warfare by enemies with newly adapted military tactics. In the 1930s, his life changed by an assignment to Palestine during the time of the uprising of the Arabs of this region under Grand-Mufti al-Husseini, who later continued his fight under the moral and financial sponsorship of

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Hitler. Wingate gained access to Zionist circles, whose aims he supported as a non-Jew due to his particular Evangelical version of Christianity. Whereas most of the British at the time were not supporters of Zionism, Wingate embraced Jewish culture and the Zionist aims for statehood. To smash the ongoing “Arab Revolt” against the indigenous Jewish population of Palestine, Wingate proposed night patrols against rebel Arab fighters. Instead of rebuffing Arab attacks on Jewish enclaves or British installations only, he proposed preemptive strikes against possible attackers. He envisioned smashing the Arab activities by such actions. To accomplish this goal he created a special British-Jewish unit, which was named Special Night Squads (SNS) and can be seen as a forerunner of the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) or the Special Air Service (SAS) during and after World War II. For the Jewish population these mixed units provided access to better military training. Important Israeli military leaders like Moshe Dayan served under and learned from Wingate. These units are sometimes described as the embryo of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), which were established after Israeli statehood in 1948. Intelligence was essential for Wingate’s way of war. He closely collaborated with the Jewish Agency. His pacification actions in the northern region bordering on Lebanon proved quite successful. The influence of this experience shaped the pre-statehood Jewish Haganah forces and the later IDF. Wingate obviously took great inspiration from the Bible for his actions, which greatly supported the Zionist cause for a Jewish homeland on the traditional soil of biblical Israel. His political stance contrasted with conventional British politics in Palestine at the time, when the British halted Jewish immigration during the beginning of the Holocaust to appease the Arab population under the influence of the pro-Nazi Mufti. This had influence on his further military career, as he was recalled from Palestine to Britain in 1939. He fought with indigenous troops, which included some of his former Jewish subordinates, in Sudan against the Italian presence in the region. These units were named “Gideon Force” after the biblical hero. The tactics first used in Palestine proved successful despite a general and pervasive lack of logistics and supplies. Wingate was instrumental in bringing back Haile Selassie to the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, an act that also had a religious significance due

to the spiritual role of the Ethiopian emperor. This again brought Wingate in conflict with some of his superiors both in Africa and London. After being called back to Britain, he was sent to Burma to fight against the Japanese. There he employed his at the time revolutionary approach to attack the enemy proactively in his own hinterland. He formed the “Chindits,” which were modeled on his units in Palestine and Sudan, and named after an animal within Buddhist mythology. Within the military hierarchy he still faced opposition, but he had supporters in high places (including Prime Minister Winston Churchill). An airplane crash cut his life short in 1944. He is buried at Arlington Military Cemetery in Washington, D.C. His fame in the Anglophone world is greatly surpassed by his memory in Israel, where he is seen as one of the most important non-Jews who helped bring about the Jewish state on its historical Biblical soil. Oliver Benjamin Hemmerle See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Haganah; Zionism and War Further Reading Anglim, Simon. Orde Wingate. A Man of Genius. Havertown, PA: Pen and Sword, 2014. Beinhart, Peter. The Crisis of Zionism. New York: Times Books, 2012. Ellis, Marc H. Toward a Jewish Theology of Liberation. Mary­ knoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987. Hertzberg, Arthur. The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1997. Laqueur, Walter. A History of Zionism: From the French Revolution to the Establishment of the State of Israel. New York: Schocken Books, 2003. Royle, Trevor. Orde Wingate. Irregular Soldier. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995. Sykes, Christopher. Orde Wingate. London: Collins, 1959.

Wollebius, Johannes (1586–1629) Johannes Wollebius was a Protestant Reformed theologian and professor of the Old Testament at the University of Basel. His theological system is presented in Compendium of Christian Theology (1626), an influential book that was published in English in 1660. It became a theological text-

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book at Harvard College in the late 17th century and at Yale College in the early 18th century. The Compendium consists of two books, the second volume containing Wollebius’s ethics. Chapter 10 in Book Two presents his discussion on war. He began by asserting,“War is public hostility which the magistrate exercises with armed power, for ends pleasing to God, and profitable to the state.” After defining war, he set forth eight rules with respect to war that reflect the medieval concerns of justice on the way to war (jus ad bellum) and justice in war (jus in bello). He embraced the three classical constituents by which to judge the justness of a war: the proper authority, a just cause, and a proper end. With respect to the first issue, he said in Rule II, “War is to be managed by the magistrate, not by private authority.” In Rule III, Wollebius mentioned the just cause criterion: “War must not be made, but that which is just and necessary.” In Rule IV, he included the third element, declaring that the war will be just, “if it be made . . . for a good end.” With respect to the issue of a just cause, Wollebius included the defense of the true religion in Book Two, Chapter 4. In proposition IX, he stated, “Religion may be defended by arms, but not propagated by arms.” In defense of his thesis, he appealed to “examples of pious kings, the Maccabees, emperors, as Constantine and Theodosius.” He had made the same point in proposition VIII: “Although the church is built by the Word, not by the sword; yet being built, is justly defended by the sword against unjust violence.” In his affirmation that arms may defend the true religion, Wollebius stood in continuity with Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), who saw the just war as being a defense of the Christian community. It entails “safeguarding the common weal of the faithful” (Summa Theologica 2a2ae, q. 40, art. 4). This necessarily included the defense of the freedom to practice the Christian religion in public. John Calvin (1509–1564) had articulated the same perspective in his sermons on 2 Samuel, asserting that a defensive war protects not only the liberty of the commonwealth but also the true religion that flourishes within it (Sermon 31). Wollebius’s position that the sword may defend the church had particular relevance in his lifetime when Protestantism was under attack at multiple points. In the Augs-

burg Interim (1548) Charles V attempted to suppress Lutheranism within the German Empire. Nicholas von Amsdorf and other Lutheran pastors in the city of Magdeburg defied imperial law and produced the Magdeburg Confession (1550), which stated, “If the high authority does not desist from eradicating true doctrine and true worship of God, then the lower magistracy is required by God’s divine command to attempt, together with their subjects, to stand up to such superiors as far as possible” (Preamble). Suppression of the Reformation gospel occurred elsewhere. The Reformed community, as well as the Lutherans, found themselves on the defensive. The Dutch revolt that began in 1566 was a defensive war fought in part for the sake of the Reformed religion that was being repressed by Philip II, the king of Spain. Similar developments were happening in France at the same time. On August 24, 1572, Charles IX, the king of France, began to slaughter Huguenots in Paris and throughout France. The Calvinists, like the Lutherans at Magdeburg, appealed to the lesser magistrates to resist with the sword such tyrannical encroachments. Theodore Beza (1519–1605) produced a biblical case for such resistance. Amandus Polanus à Polansdorf (1561–1610), the professor with whom Wollebius studied at Basel, likewise asserted that scripture allows war to be waged by inferior magistrates. Although Wollebius emphasized justice on the way to war (jus ad bellum), he nevertheless referred to the issue of justice in war (jus in bello). In Book Two, Chapter 10, he stated in Rule VII: “Policy joined with lying and breaking of covenants, is not to be allowed; but it may be approved with dissimulation.” The difference between illegitimate lying and legitimate dissimulation was a standard theological distinction. Aquinas had argued that “the plan of campaign” (which may include the tactic of an ambush) “ought” to be “hidden from the enemy.” Conversely, “the breaking of a promise” is “always unlawful.” Aquinas emphatically declared, “No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies” (Summa Theologica 2a2ae, q. 40, art. 3). Wollebius presented a succinct abridgment of classic medieval and Reformed teaching on a central concern of moral theology, the doctrine of a just war. He paved the

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way for later Reformed theologians of the 17th century such as Johannes Hoornbeeck (1617–1666), who also taught that the true religion may not be propagated by force, but it is to be defended by arms when it is attacked by others. Mark J. Larson See also Aquinas, Thomas; Beza, Theodore; Just War Tradition Further Reading Wollebius, Johannes. The Abridgment of Christian Divinity. London: T. Mabb, 1660.

World War I See First World War, Religious Dimensions of; First World War and Religious Art

World War II See Second World War, Japanese Empire, and Islam; Second World War, Religious Dimensions of

Wounded Knee, Massacre of (1890) The Ghost Dance was the proximate driver of events leading to this calamitous event, which took place on December 29, 1890. The battle of Wounded Knee cannot accurately be called a battle, but does fit the meaning of “massacre.” The Ghost Dance was itself driven by the desperation of American Indians suffering complete violation of their land and treaty rights. The massacre and its aftermath were historically significant in marking the last of the major violent encounters between Indians and whites in the American West. The Ghost Dance was a new practice on the reservations of several defeated Indian tribes in South Dakota in 1890. It was popularized by the prophet Wokova, a Paiute who

lived a white life in many ways, including clothing, and who had experienced Christian church life. Wovoka stated that the whites had displeased Christ, who now instructed the Indians to dance the Ghost Dance for five days at a time in order to bring the return of the old days of a plentiful Plains life. Should the dancers be attacked, they would either have the power to destroy their enemies with a wave of their arms, or be invulnerable to bullets. There would follow a major flood or natural event that would wipe the offenders off the face of the earth—a millennial Second Coming for the Indians’ benefit. The Ghost Dance involved groups moving in a circle and holding hands—both of these features were innovations to the northern Sioux—engendering feelings of unity and strength. Various members collapsed in trances, then revived to share their vision, typically seeing deceased relatives happy in a plentiful land free of white despoliations. The dance soon spread to many reservations. It was often opposed by government agents who ran the reservations—though some were not worried and predicted that the dance would eventually die out. President Harrison, taking office in 1889, sent forth a patronage flood of new and inexperienced government agents just as the dance peaked in intensity and popularity. These new agents felt even more threatened by the critique of Christian civilization and the growing number of seemingly hostile gatherings that appeared to encourage dissension and even rebellion. The new agents wanted the army to provide security in this flammable environment. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had long insisted that it no longer needed the army for security purposes, having its own Indian Police, and resisted this outside intervention. But the death of famed Indian leader Sitting Bull, killed while being arrested by BIA agents due to his support of the Ghost Dance, sparked a dramatic increase in tensions and tribal movements, leading to the army’s intervention in its largest mobilization since the Civil War, involving about one-third of all army units. The U.S. Seventh Cavalry, reconstituted after General Custer’s disastrous defeat 14 years before, arrived on the scene, not averse to feelings of revenge. These soldiers worked to round up large groups of Indians who fled reservations in panic after Sitting Bull’s death. The soldiers

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feared that the groups would unite and attack, incited by the Ghost Dance. The groups in reality were destitute and frightened as men, women, and children frantically traversed the plains seeking safety. The army convinced a group of 300-plus Lakota Sioux, led by Minneconjou chief Big Foot, dying of pneumonia, to go to Pine Ridge Reservation. Big Foot was known as a consummate diplomat who often arranged peace, and the army placed him in an ambulance to convey him safely and comfortably. The Sioux band gathered at Wounded Knee creek where they were fed by the soldiers on the night of December 28, 1890. The soldiers sought the next morning to disarm the Indian braves, numbering about 120—separating them from the women and children—before giving out rations and proceeding to Pine Ridge. The troops, led by Colonel Forsyth, were arranged in a square around the Indians, a tactical arrangement worthy of General Custer’s acumen as it ensured they would be in each other’s line of fire should trouble erupt. Some Indians hid their weapons during the initial search and confiscation. The soldiers commenced another, more intrusive round of searches. A medicine man started a Ghost Dance chant. A deaf Indian reacted with surprise and resistance when grabbed by several soldiers from behind. Somehow as they struggled, his rifle discharged. At that moment all the mutual fear, racial animus, and distrust erupted in fire from the soldiers’ ranks, including from four light Hotchkiss cannon that could fire a shrapnel shell every second or two. A few Indians managed to grab their own or soldiers’ guns lying about. They returned fire, killing a few troopers before being overcome, but many of the 25 soldier deaths (and 39 wounded) may be attributed to “friendly fire.” The Indians, especially the women and children, fled wildly, with many retreating into a ravine that soon became a killing field as soldiers surrounded it and poured in pistol, rifle, and cannon fire. Chief Big Foot and his daughter were shot together. Cavalry rode down other fleeing Indians—some men, but mostly women and children—killing nearly all of them, most of whom had been unarmed. The army later buried 157 Lakota Sioux and transported 51 wounded. More bodies are known to have been removed and buried by the Sioux. The Sioux death count almost certainly exceeded 200.

The exoneration of the Seventh Cavalry by a Washington board of inquiry, dealing with angry charges by area commander General Miles, has been substantially undermined by historical studies. The indiscriminate award of 23 Medals of Honor to soldiers in the action represents the nadir of that medal’s history. Following Wounded Knee there was no spirit or possibility of organized Indian resistance to white encroachments on their treaty lands. They became for many decades the powerless and impoverished wards of the U.S. government. Wounded Knee itself cannot be described as organized resistance, or a battle, as much as a tragedy from the tension of mutual fear, religious intensity, racial animus, mistrust, and miscommunication, all culminating in massacre. Mark A. Jumper See also Ghost Dance Movement Further Reading Brown, Dee. Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1970. Brown, Dee, and Amy Ehrlich. Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West. New York: Henry Holt, 1974. Coleman, William S. E. Voices of Wounded Knee. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000.

Wyatt’s Rebellion (1554) Wyatt’s Rebellion is named for Sir Thomas Wyatt (1521– 1554), one of the leaders of the unsuccessful revolt. It occurred in England primarily over the marriage plans of Queen Mary I of England and Prince Philip of Spain. Scholars debate the exact reason or reasons for the rebellion, but foreign policy, marriage, and religion were all issues that created crises during the tumultuous reign of Mary from 1553 to 1558. This shows the explosive mixture of religion and politics in the 16th century and concerns that ran the gambit from religious toleration to religious persecution and political assent to political revolt. Mary was a devout Roman Catholic and when she became queen she wanted to revoke the Protestant policies of her predecessor and half-brother Edward VI. For example, she issued a proclamation prohibiting Protestant

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preaching and banning the distribution of literature deemed heretical. The House of Commons disagreed with Mary’s endeavors and refused a restoration of papal authority over England, granting instead only the return to the established religion (Anglicanism) developed by Henry VIII under the Act of Supremacy of 1534. In January 1554, rather than acquiesce to any of Queen Mary’s policies, some Protestants went into exile in Europe, both voluntarily and involuntarily creating what became known as the Marian exiles. In exile, primarily in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Germany, but also in France, Italy, and Poland, they lived among and worshipped with other Protestants with the result being the exchange of many theological and political ideas, including ideas about political resistance and rebellion. Members of Parliament were also opposed to Queen Mary’s marriage to Prince Philip of Spain, fearing that the marriage would result in bringing the Spanish Inquisition to England and that Mary and Philip would produce a Catholic heir for the throne of England. Parliamentary debates about her marriage provided the catalyst for the plot against her. On November 16, 1553, a delegation from Parliament met with the Queen and formally asked her to consider marriage to an Englishman rather than someone from another country to preserve the monarchy from foreign blood and influence. Opposition to the marriage coalesced among a small group of prominent gentlemen who had close family, political, and religious ties with one another. All of the major figures in the rebellion were Protestant. The revolt was originally planned for March 1554 and leaders expected to raise forces from their home areas. As plans progressed and the number of those aware of it grew, it was decided that the timeframe should be moved forward to January 1554. When government agents intercepted plans of the planned rebellion against the throne in the form of letters to the Duke of Suffolk, some of the dissent dissipated and the number of conspirators diminished. Thomas Wyatt also sent an intercepted letter to Elizabeth, the half-sister of Queen Mary and a Protestant,

telling her of the plan. This put Elizabeth in extreme danger, and another intercepted letter to the French ambassador to England could be interpreted as indicating that Elizabeth had prior knowledge of the plans. After Mary’s ascent to the throne Elizabeth, a favorite of Protestants, retreated away from London and the politics and intrigues of the court, but the rebellion had the potential of implicating her as a co-conspirator and she was the person the conspirators wanted to be the replacement for Queen Mary. Queen Mary announced an amnesty for any followers of the conspirators who would return to their home within 24 hours and also declared Wyatt a traitor. Wyatt reached London in early February with an army of several thousand, but when he was unable to make progress into the city many of his supporters fled. He and a remnant group of about 60 men were captured and the rebellion was over. He was charged with high treason and executed in April 1554. About a hundred other participants were also hunted down and killed. While religion was not the only factor in the rebellion, it was one of them. Conspirator Sir Nicholas Throckmorton (ca. 1515–1561) was extremely outspoken at his trial about the queen’s religious policies and lack of religious toleration. Similarly, Henry Grey, 1st Duke of Suffolk (1517– 1554), was well known for his Protestant beliefs. He was a good friend of Swiss Protestant Reformer Heinrich Bullinger (1504–1575), who dedicated several of his Decades (1552) to him. John Ponet (1514–1556), a staunch Protestant and former bishop of Winchester, is also said to have participated in the revolt. In an era when sharp distinctions between sacred and secular were not made and religious ideals invigorated many people’s actions, the rebellion remains a strong example of the power of religion with respect to political action. Timothy J. Demy See also Decades (Bullinger); Goodman, Christopher; Ponet, John Further Reading Thorp, Malcolm R. “Religion and the Wyatt Rebellion of 1554.” Church History 47, no. 4 (December 1978): 363–80.

Y Yahweh as Divine Warrior

13:10) or atmospheric forces (2 Samuel 22:10–16; Psalms 97:2–5) play a role in the battle, usually as Yahweh’s allies and weapons. The divine warrior texts often affirm that Yahweh’s actions and status as the divine warrior display his incomparability among the gods (Exodus 15:11; Deuteronomy 33:26; 2 Samuel 22:32) and lead to the entire world recognizing his power (Deuteronomy 33:28–29; 2 Samuel 22:50–51; Zachariah 14:9, 16–19). In all the texts Yahweh acts as the divine warrior to rescue his people from oppression. Yahweh’s role as a divine warrior can be further clarified by examining the link between it and his role as king. The kings of the ancient Near East frequently portrayed themselves as powerful warriors to legitimate their status as kings. New kings often went on military campaigns in their first year to demonstrate to their people that the gods had chosen them to be the king. In the two most extensive divine warrior myths in the ancient Near East, Enuma Elish and the Baal Cycle, Marduk and Baal respectively were proclaimed as kings after the defeat of their enemies as divine warriors. In the Old Testament, strength was a necessary quality of a king, who was a warrior and led the people in battle (Psalms 45:3; 89:19). The royal chronicles often recorded the “might” of kings (1 Kings 15:23; 2 Kings 20:20). Another key martial role of the king was to lead the troops into battle (2 Samuel 11:1; 1 Kings 22:29–36). In the

Although the God of the Bible is most often associated with love and peace in the minds of Westerners, one of his most common roles in both the Old and New Testaments is that of a warrior. In the biblical outlook on life, a world with oppression requires not just a God who loves, but a God who removes oppression and punishes evildoers to restore peace and order in the world. Each nation in the ancient Near East had its own patron god, and usually these gods were also divine warriors who fought on behalf of their people. The Hebrew scriptures (Old Testament) directly refers to Yahweh as a divine warrior with several martial epithets, including a “man of war” (Exodus 15:3; Isaiah 42:13) and a “hero” (Psalms 24:8; Isaiah 42:13). Yahweh is described as “fighting” his enemies (Joshua 10:14; Zachariah 14:3). Old Testament poetic texts frequently describe Yahweh as a divine warrior. A common part of these divine warrior texts involves the narrative pattern of Yahweh’s march from a southern territory, the trembling of the earth and mountains, and his entrance into his house, where he is proclaimed as king (Exodus 15:1–18; Psalms 24; Habakkuk 3:3–7). Another shared element of the texts is the presence of a heavenly army accompanying Yahweh to battle (Deuteronomy 33:2; Zachariah 14:5). In many texts the heavenly entities (Joshua 10:12–13; Judges 5:20–21; Isaiah 865

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narrative pattern of the divine warrior hymn, Yahweh’s action as the victorious warrior led to his enthronement as king over Israel and his recognition by the entire world (Zachariah 14:9, 16). Most likely, the role of the divine warrior is to be viewed as a subset of the role of divine king. The god’s role as king includes his duty to defend his people and bring order to the world, which necessitated taking on the role of a warrior. One of the clearest and earliest divine warrior texts is the Song of the Sea, sung by Moses and the Israelites after Yahweh had defeated the Egyptians at the Red Sea (dated to approximately 1450 or 1250 BCE). Yahweh threw the horse and rider into the sea (Exodus 15:1), along with Pharaoh’s chariots and his army (Exodus 15:4). The Song of the Sea describes the distress, trembling, anguish, dismay, melting away, terror, and dread that would be experienced by the nations when they heard what Yahweh had done (Exodus 15:14–16). The song employs common martial metaphors employing anthropomorphism, the most prominent of which is Yahweh’s hand. The strong hand was a common anthropomorphism in the ancient Near East, as illustrated by the extensive iconographic record of deities holding weapons in their hands, and signified power, as the strong hand of a king often represented armies and military power. In the song Yahweh’s hand brought the military defeat of the Egyptian army (Exodus 15:6, 12). The song also refers to Yahweh’s arm. Like the hand, the metaphor involves the arm of the human warrior and signifies power. In the Old Testament, the arm symbolized primarily strength (1 Samuel 2:31; Job 22:8; Psalms 71:18; 79:11). The Song of the Sea proclaims that the arm of Yahweh caused the nations to be still as a stone before the Israelites (Exodus 15:14–16). The song connects Yahweh’s role as the divine warrior with his role as king. The first half (Exodus 15:1–12) recounts Yahweh’s defeat of the Egyptian army at the Red Sea, while the second half (Exodus 15:13–18) describes the results of the battle, as Yahweh took his people safely through hostile territory to their final destination, where Yahweh would reign as king on his mountain. Yahweh’s military victory permits him to be the king, since it demonstrates his worthiness to be the king. Yahweh’s role as the patron of Israel demanded that he act as the divine warrior to rescue his people from their bondage. The second half of

the song portrays Yahweh’s safe guidance of Israel through the midst of hostile nations on their way to a place where Yahweh dwelled in holiness as their king. Yahweh’s power as the divine warrior also leads the song to highlight Yahweh’s incomparability in the center of the song (Exodus 15:11). Other gods might act as divine warriors in the ancient Near East, but no other deity compares with Yahweh in terms of power. Yahweh also appears as a divine warrior in prose texts in the Old Testament. One example is the Exodus narrative, in which Yahweh defeated the Egyptians through the plagues and the Red Sea (Exodus 1–14). When Joshua approached Jericho, the “general of the army of Yahweh” affirmed Yahweh’s presence in the upcoming battle (Joshua 5:13–15). In the campaign against the kings who attacked Gibeon, Yahweh hurled “large stones from heaven” down on the Amorite armies (Joshua 10:11). Samuel experienced the help of the divine warrior when Yahweh thundered from heaven and threw the Philistines into a panic (1 Samuel 7:10). However, Yahweh would not only fight for Israel, as biblical authors frequently declared that Yahweh would fight against his own people. In Deuteronomy, Yahweh often threatened Israel that if they did not follow him he would act as a divine warrior against them (Deuteronomy 4:26; 6:15; 7:4; 8:19–20; 11:17). The hand that had fought for them and had thrown their enemies into confusion threw the Israelite men of war into a panic in the wilderness because they had refused to enter the land of Canaan (Deuteronomy 2:14–16; see also Exodus 14:24). In the curses Yahweh threatened to attack Israel with pestilence, famine, boils, and blindness if they rejected him (Deuteronomy 28:15–68; see also Leviticus 26:14–45). This development of the divine warrior motif shows that human enemies were not his main concern. Like other divine warriors, Yahweh often fought to defend his people as he had promised in the covenant. However, he also fought against nations based on their actions (even when those actions were not directed at Israel [Amos 1–2]) and their attitude toward him. When these two reasons for war conflicted (that is, when his people acted in ways that displeased Yahweh), he attacked his people because of their sin. Their status as the elect people of Yahweh did not protect them from Yahweh’s wrath when they sinned. Yahweh’s

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ultimate target in warfare was sin, because he desired to neutralize and punish wrongdoing, regardless of who was sinning. The Old Testament even describes Yahweh fighting as a divine warrior for other nations. In the midst of an attack against Israel, Amos proclaimed that Yahweh’s involvement in Israel’s exodus from Egypt was not unique (Amos 9:7), though no more details are given about these events. Most surprisingly, Isaiah 19:16–25 describes Yahweh fighting for Egypt against their enemies in the future. The divine warrior had not only fought for his people, but would also fight for other nations and free them from their oppressors. Even an enemy like Egypt, which had oppressed Israel so severely, could experience Yahweh’s grace through his activity as a divine warrior on their behalf. Yahweh as the divine warrior fought sin among his own people and for other nations. The motif of the divine warrior continued through the intertestamental period into the New Testament, where it is further developed in the person of Jesus. In his time, many Jews expected the Messiah to fight against their enemies and free them from their oppressors (Psalms of Solomon 17:21–46), just as Yahweh had rescued Israel from their oppressors in Egypt. Although Jesus did not attack the Romans or free Israel from their imperial overlords, he is still portrayed as a divine warrior. The story of Jesus walking on the water reflects Yahweh’s control of the sea in the Exodus, as he identifies with Yahweh the divine warrior by conquering the chaos that threatened his people and demonstrating his control over the sea and other natural elements. However, Jesus’s most visible battles involved demons. In one instance, some in the crowd accused Jesus of casting out the demon by Beelzebub (Luke 11:14–26). Jesus answered that Satan could not be divided against himself and asked by whom the Jews cast out demons if he cast out demons by Satan? Instead of Satan, he said that he cast out demons by the finger of God, an allusion to the statement of the Egyptian magicians that the plagues were done by the finger of God (Exodus 8:19). The connection with the exodus indicates that the same God who defeated the Egyptians now defeated demons and Satan. Although Jesus would not fight the Romans, the earthly oppressors of the Jews, he would act as a divine

warrior and defeat his enemies, who were now identified as evil spiritual beings who caused harm to his people. The human enemies are no longer a target for the divine warrior, who instead defeats the demonic enemy to save his people who have been afflicted by them. He does not cast demons out of Roman soldiers, but from his own people. The clearest reference to the divine warrior motif in the New Testament comes in the book of Revelation, where Yahweh sends numerous attacks against those who resist his will. Several of the trumpets in Revelation even recall the divine warrior actions in the Exodus (hail and fire, water becoming blood, and darkness). The divine warrior still possessed his weapons and could strike any enemy just as he attacked Egypt. The final story of the Bible involves the return of Jesus on a white horse with a sword coming out of his mouth to judge the nations and bring peace and righteousness to the world. In the biblical worldview, this apocalyptic image shows the need for a divine warrior to come to provide the final answer to oppression and sin in the world and to restore the idyllic conditions that have not been seen since the Garden of Eden at the beginning of the Bible. Charlie Trimm See also Assyrian Warfare; Egyptian Warfare; Hittite Warfare; Israelite Religious Guidelines for Warfare; West Semitic Warfare Further Reading Kang, Sa-Moon. Divine War in the Old Testament and in the Ancient Near East. BZAW 177. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1989. Miller, Patrick D., Jr. The Divine Warrior in Early Israel. HSM 5. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973. Trimm, Charlie. “YHWH Fights for Them!”: The Divine Warrior in the Exodus Narrative. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias, 2014.

Yarmouk, Battle of (636 CE) The Battle of Yarmouk was a battle that took place in 636 CE, near the river of Yarmouk in what is now the modernday states of Lebanon and Syria, fought between the Muslim Rashidun caliphate and the Byzantine Empire. The battle was one of the most important battles in the early Muslim conquests, since the Muslim victory over the

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Byzantine forces in Yarmouk eventually allowed the Muslims to draw away the Byzantine forces from the Near East and to conquer Syria and Palestine. After the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE, his successor, Caliph Abu Bakr, successfully consolidated Muslim rule over the Arab peninsula and the Arab tribes who lived in the region. During the last days of Abu Bakr and during the reign of Muhammad’s second successor, Caliph Umar b. al-Khatyab, the Muslim caliphate continued its expansion, leaving the Arab peninsula and launching a military campaign against the Persian Sassanid dynasty to the east and against the Byzantine Empire to the west. The Muslims began their expansion into Byzantine territory in 633 CE, when a Muslim force under the command of Abu ‘Ubayda successfully attacked the Byzantine city of Areopolis (Ma’ab in Arabic), located in modern-day Jordan. The Muslims then advanced into Palestine, defeating a Byzantine force led by Emperor Heraclius’s brother, Theodore, in 634 CE in the battle of Ajnadayn. After the battle of Ajnadayn the Byzantines preferred not to engage in combat with the Muslim forces and instead relied on walled cities and natural barriers for defense, while the Muslim forces continued to conquer cities in the region. In 635 CE, the Byzantines were defeated at the battle of Pella, located east of the Jordan River, allowing the Muslims to advance to the north, forcing Damascus to surrender in 636 CE. In the same year, Emperor Heraclius mustered an army for a counterattack in order to repel the Muslims from Syria. The Muslims decided to retreat, abandoning recently conquered territories, including Damascus, finally settling near the Yarmouk River where they later faced the Byzantines. The Byzantine army was under the leadership of a commander of Armenian origin named Vahan. An additional commander was Theodor Trithurios, who came to the region earlier from the city of Emesa. The Byzantines also relied on an allied Arab force led by Jabala al-Ayham. The opposing Muslim forces were under the leadership of several Muslim commanders, among them Abu ‘Ubayda and Khalid al-Walid. The battle at Yarmouk between the Byzantines and Muslims lasted for several days, as both sides clashed several times. The first day of battle begun with a series of skirmishes between lead elements of both armies. Later,

the Byzantines successfully attacked the Muslim main body of troops; however, on the fourth day, the Byzantine cavalry forces were separated from their infantry and suffered substantial losses. The Muslims exploited the situation and were able to inflict harsh casualties. After several more days, the Muslims finally defeated the Byzantines. The Byzantine soldiers panicked, some laid down their weapons, and some tried to escape. The fate of the Byzantine commanders is subject to speculation as scholars cannot agree on their fate. Leon Volfovsky See also Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035); Caliphate; Damascus, Arab Conquest of; Islam and War (Jihad) Further Reading Kaegi, Walter Emil. Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Nicolle, David. Yarmuk, AD 636: The Muslim Conquest of Syria. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005. Treadgold, Warren. A History of the Byzantine State and Society. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997. Whittrow, Mark. The Making of Byzantium, 600–1025. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Yasukuni Shrine The Yasukuni Shrine (originally called Tokyo Shokonsha) is a Shinto shrine in Tokyo, Japan. It was established in 1869 after the victory of the emperor Meiji and his supporters against the Tokugawa troops in the Boshin War. While the shrine was established to commemorate Japanese warriors killed in action, it has also become the resting place for a number of war criminals, who had been judged during the Tokyo War Tribunal after the Second World War and were interred at Yasukuni in the late 1970s. The Yasukuni Shrine is a unique symbool of the overlay of war and religion. In 1870, the shrine, following a proposal made by the Meiji emperor, was renamed the Shrine of the Peaceful Land (Yasukuni jinja). In contrast to wellknown Shinto shrines, like the Ise shrine or local shrines in other regions of Japan, Yasukuni was established to honor all soldiers who had given their lives to defend Japan,

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Japanese officers visit the Yasukuni Shrine, a war memorial in Tokyo, Japan, established in 1869 by Emperor Meiji. The existence of the shrine has frequently been a source of controversy, due to Japan’s history of militarism and imperialism, and the enshrinement of Japanese war criminals there. (Library of Congress)

whether they died in battle or were casualties of disease or any other cause of death during wartime. The shrine thus became a vital aspect of religious life in modern Japan, where the names of the deceased soldiers were written into the Book of Souls, becaming part of the national spiritual collective. They could be worshiped as a single unit by the visitors to the Yasukuni Shrine, and it is uncommon to recognize just one or two individuals when visiting the shrine. Rather, the collective pantheon of warriors is usually the object of veneration. The message of the collective deification was a suitable and a visible continuation of the strong ideology of kokutai (national body). This

ideology was employed during the Meiji era to create a sense of Japanese nationalism in the face of growing Western expansion into Asia in the mid to late 19th century. In the following years, Yasukuni became intertwined with the advancement of Japanese expansionist policies. The head priests at the shrine usually had some kind of military background rather than religious training, a fact that became more visible after the militarization of Japan in the 1930s. Furthermore, the Yasukuni Shrine was not supervised by the Ministry of Home Affairs but by the military, mainly the ministries of the army and navy. When military victories had been celebrated in the former

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decades as well, especially the 1930s, the government institutionalized such procedures. This close relationship ended after the Second World War, when the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers prohibited Japanese officials from attending any ceremonies that commemorated the war and its Japanese victims. The Allied occupation wanted to end the close relationships between Shinto and Japanese politics to prevent another wave of religiously supported militarism. The Yasukuni Shrine was intended to be transformed into a private institution. Even if the formal bonds between politics and the shrine were abandoned, official support of the religious institution continued. After the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in September 1951, officially ending the war against Japan, legal restrictions against the public memorials of war deaths were relaxed over time. In October 1951 Prime Minister Yoshida became the first Japanese postwar politician to visit the shrine. In 1966 more than 900 Class B and C war criminals were enshrined at Yasukuni, where they were remembered as war heroes, like all the other soldiers interred there. While this event did not receive very much internatinoal attention, the enshrinement of 14 Class A war criminals in 1978 created much fanfare. Controversy over this internment has grown, and the Yasukuni Shrine has become an international issue, discussed every year when a Japanese premier officially visits the shrine on August 15. Consequently the Yasukuni Shrine remains an issue of war commemoration and the national identity of Japan. Despite the Shinto Directive of the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers in 1945, which sought to dismantle State Shinto in Japan, the shrine still exists as symbolic proof of the political level of Shinto in Japan. A religious institution, the shrine has becomne a symbol of the issues surrounding Japanese historical interpretation and Japan’s relationship with other Asian countires, most especially those that suffered under Japanese rule during the Second World War. Frank Jacob See also Shinto and War Further Reading Mochizuki, Mike M. “The Yasukuni Shrine Conundrum: Japan’s Contested Identity and Memory.” In Mikyoung Kim and

Barry Schwartz, eds. Northeast Asia’s Difficult Past. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 31–52. Okuyama, Michiaki. “The Yasukuni Shrine Problem in the East Asian Context: Religion and Politics in Modern Japan.” Politics and Religion 3, no. 2 (2009): 235–51.

Yom Kippur War (1973) Yom Kippur or the Day of Atonement is the holiest day of the year for the Jewish people and it falls on the 10th day of the month of Tishrei or nine days after the Jewish New Year. With atonement and repentance for the wrongs committed during the previous year, Jews mark this day with sunset-to-sunset fasting that lasts about 25 hours. Most Jews spend the day in prayers, visits to the Western Wall in Jerusalem, or to their local synagogue. In some form or another even secular and nonreligious Jews observe the day in reflections and prayers. The Yom Kippur War refers to the combined military offensive launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel on Yom Kippur in 1973. The war, which took place in the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, is known in the Arab and Islamic countries as the Ramadan War and by the international community as the October War, but in Israel it is known as the Yom Kippur War. The war was the fallout of the Six-Day War of 1967 during which Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the Palestinian territory of the Gaza Strip (then administered by Egypt) and West Bank including Jerusalem (then part of Jordan). The United Nations Security Council Resolution adopted on November 22, 1967, advocated a political settlement based on “recognized and secured” borders of all the states of the Middle East, including Israel. Egypt and Syria were determined to regain their sovereign territories but they were not prepared for a political settlement with Israel. Meeting in Khartoum in August 1967, members of the Arab League decided on a policy of “no recognition, no negotiation and no peace” with Israel. Prevailing détente between the United States and the USSR precluded any superpower involvement in the resolution of the conflict. To circumvent the stalemate and to regain its territories, in collaboration

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with President Hafiz al-Assad, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat pursued a limited military option vis-à-vis Israel. On the afternoon of October 6, 1973, Egypt launched a surprise military offensive against Israel in coordination with Syria. Egyptian divisions comprising about 70,000 troops crossed the Suez Canal and overpowered the 500odd Israeli soldiers who were defending the sparse and scattered defensive fortification known as the Bar-Lev Line. With the collapse of the Israeli resistance, the Egyptian forces overran Israeli positions and advanced further into Sinai. Meanwhile Syrian forces launched an attack on the Golan Heights and advanced toward Nafah—an important crossroad on the Heights. An unplanned and uncoordinated Israeli counteroffensive launched on October 8 was ineffective and suffered heavy losses. The air force, which dominated the skies during the Six-Day War, was ineffective initially and could not support the ground forces. The military setback led to Defense Minister Moshe Dayan fearing the fall of the Third Temple, and with it, the State of Israel, and there were suggestions around October 8 that Israel was prepared to use the nuclear option to ensure its survival. After some initial setback, Israel launched a successful military offensive against Syria on the Golan Heights and made some territorial gains. The initial Egyptian war plan revolved around crossing the Suez Canal and establishing a foothold on the eastern bank. The relative ease with which its army crossed the canal and overran limited Israeli resistance expanded the Egyptian plans. Partly in response to urgent pleas from Syria, which was facing reversal on the Golan Heights, Egyptian president Sadat ordered an offensive strategy in regaining more areas in the Sinai Peninsula, capturing the Milta and Gidi passes, about 50 kilometers (31 miles) from the canal. This unplanned expansion of war aims exposed the Egyptian rear and limitations of supplies. On the night of October 15–16, Israel launched a counteroffensive and a small Israeli force crossed the canal, cut off supply lines, and in the process encircled the 45,000-strong Egyptian Third Army. This reversal compelled Egypt to accept a cease-fire that it had rejected earlier. When the cease-fire came into force on October 22 as demanded by UN Security Council Resolution 338, Egypt was controlling about 1,000 square kilometers (621 miles) of territory east of the Suez Canal, while Israel managed to

capture about 1,600 square kilometers (994 miles) of Egyptian territory west of the Canal. On the Syrian front, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had captured about 600 square kilometers (372 miles) of additional Syrian territory beyond what had been captured during the Six-Day War. Both sides endured large casualties during the Yom Kippur War; the combined Egyptian and Syrian casualties are estimated at 15,000, and the IDF suffered 2,700 deaths and 5,000 injuries. In response to urgent pleas from Israel throughout the Yom Kippur War, the United States carried out the largest military airlift since the Berlin blockade of 1948–1949. The Israeli request for military aid resulted in tension between the U.S. State Department and the Pentagon, thereby delaying the airlift. The personal intervention of President Richard Nixon resolved the issue and the airlift began on October 14 and continued for one month. The United States supplied 40 F-4 Phantom II fighter jets and was prepared to transport an armored brigade to Israel to underscore its political willingness and military capability in support of its ally. The Egyptian-Syrian military offensive galvanized the Arab countries, and as an expression of solidarity Arab oilexporting countries met in Kuwait on October 16 and agreed to impose a production cut. Abu Dhabi decided to halt oil exports to the United States, Saudi Arabia decided to impose an embargo against the United States, and other Arab countries decided to impose production cuts or halting of supplies to those countries that supported Israel during the war. Production cuts and supply disruptions spiked oil prices, which rose from $3 per barrel on October 16, 1973, to $12 per barrel in mid 1974. Due to Arab boycott threats, a number of European allies of the United States refused refueling or overflight facilities for the U.S. airlift of military supplies to Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The oil embargo brought about a fundamental shift in European policy toward Arab-Israeli conflict. In early November, the six-member European Council, the forerunner of the European Union, called on Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories and endorsed the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. A high degree of dependence upon the Middle East for oil supplies compelled Japan to modify its pro-Israel policy. For its part,

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Israel derided the Western policy shifts as surrender to Arab “blackmail.” Even though there were periodic calls for the use of embargo to force Israel to accept the Palestinian demands, oil was never used as a political instrument in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Within Israel, the war evoked strong criticisms over the failure of the IDF to anticipate the Arab offensive. On November 19 the government appointed an official commission of inquiry headed by the president of the Supreme Court, Shimon Agranat (1906–1992), to investigate the events leading up to the Yom Kippur War. The five-member commission, which also included two former army chiefs of staff, submitted two interim reports in 1974 and a final report on January 30, 1975. The commission criticized the IDF for its failure to read the intelligence inputs correctly and attributed the element of surprise to IDF’s “conception”; namely, that Egypt would not initiate an attack against Israel without having superior airpower. According to this, the military intelligence was confident that so long as Egypt did not receive offensive airpower from the USSR, it would not initiate an armed conflict to regain the Sinai Peninsula. Such an understanding, however, did not factor in limited war whereby Sadat sought to undermine the unfavorable territorial status quo vis-à-vis the Sinai Peninsula. The Agranat Commission absolved the political leadership of any direct responsibility for the lack of military preparations on the eve of the Yom Kippur War. The Yom Kippur War resulted in the complete overhaul of the Israeli political and military leadership. In the following months, all the key personalities associated with the war, namely, Prime Minister Golda Meir (1898–1978), Defense Minister Moshe Dayan (1915–1981), chief of army staff Lt. Gen. David Elazar (1925–1976), and head of Military Intelligence Major General Eli Zaira (b. 1928) were forced to resign. On June 3, 1974, Yitzhak Rabin (1922–1995), who was not part of Meir’s cabinet, became Israel’s prime minister. The Yom Kippur War eventually contributed to erosion of the monopoly of the Labor Party that had governed Israel since its founding in 1948, and while the party managed to win the Knesset elections held in December 1973, it lost power to the Likud Party in the 1977 elections. Both Israel and its Arab adversaries remember the Yom Kippur War for its initial days more than its end. Despite

controlling more territories when the cease-fire came into force, Israel remembers the war for the initial hours and the failure of the IDF to read the intelligence inputs correctly and to foresee Egyptian military intentions. For their part, the Arabs remember the war for the military surprise they managed to inflict upon Israel more than for the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army at the end. Hence, the Yom Kippur War has been depicted by both sides as a “surprise” for Israel and hence an Arab “victory.” Thus, the Yom Kippur War shattered the myth of Israel’s invincibility and enabled the Arabs, especially President Sadat, to come to terms with Israel’s existence and make peace. His decision to visit Jerusalem and address the Knesset in November 1977 broke the psychological barrier and eventually paved the way for the Camp David Accords that brought formal peace between the two countries, and Israel completed its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in April 1982. Formal peace with Israel, however, was unpopular in the region and Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Conference (now Organization of Islamic Cooperation). Even within the country, he faced strong opposition from the Islamists and while reviewing the parade marking the “victory” of the Yom Kippur War, on October 6, 1981, President Sadat was killed by a member of an Islamist group. By deciding to launch a war on the holiest and least expected day of the Jewish calendar, President Sadat exhibited his military strategic thinking. At the same time, the date selection of the Yom Kippur War also symbolized the Arab-Islamic insensitivity toward Jews and their religious sanctity. P. R. Kumaraswamy See also Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Judaism and War; Six-Day War Further Reading Dunstan, Simon. The Yom Kippur War 1973. London: Osprey, 2003. Kumaraswamy, P. R. Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. London: Routledge, 2000. Oren, Michael B. Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. San Francisco, CA: Presidio Press, 2003. Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East. Prague: Schocken, 2005.

Young Turks  873 Siniver, Asaf. The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy. London: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Young Turks The Young Turks were a coalition of groups that brought about the fall of Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II in 1909. Initially welcomed for their democratic aspirations and modernizing goals for the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks did not fare well in the destructive geopolitics of World War I and presided over the disintegration of the Ottoman state and the rise of Turkish nationalism. In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating because of the failure of the ruling sultans to stem the tide of decay and the rise of ethnic nationalism inside their nation, to which the stronger Western powers responded by creating new states and annexing Ottoman territory into their own empires. In response, the Tanzimat reforms were instituted by the Ottoman sultans in the mid-19th century, which resulted in the modernization of many parts of the government of the Ottoman Empire. Hundreds of government officials were trained in Western methods and concepts, but some became dissatisfied with the pace of reform. They believed the Tanzimat reformers were not interested in real change, but in accumulating power in their own hands. Some of those men organized the Young Ottoman organization. The Young Ottomans promoted constitutionalism and parliamentary government. Many worked in such agencies as the Bureau of Translation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where they had constant contact with Western institutions and publications. When Abdulhamid II became ruler in 1876, he first approved and then suspended a new constitution. In response to the authoritarian rule of Abdulhamid II after 1876, the Young Ottomans involved themselves in plots to reform the government. Many of the principal civilian leaders were exiled to Paris once their plans were uncovered by government agents. Those young men formed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889 and the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization around 1902. (The CUP was the first to adopt the name Young

Turks, after the name of a journal produced by one of its members. Later, the name became loosely identified with other factions advocating the overthrow of Abdulhamid II.) Both the CUP and the league called for the military and moral strengthening of the Ottoman Empire, equal rights for all ethnic and religious groups, and the restoration of the Constitution of 1876 that Abdulhamid had set aside. The CUP favored a strong central government, however, while the league preferred a more decentralized government and European assistance. Spurred on by the revolutionary publications of the exiles, the CUP steadily gained members in Turkey. It included not only teachers and students but also bureaucrats, army officers, and members of the Muslim clergy. Chapters were formed in the major cities of Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. An attempt to overthrow the Turkish government in 1895 failed, and Abdulhamid dispersed the revolutionaries to such remote parts of the empire as Macedonia, believing that the revolutionary spirit would fade. However, Abdulhamid’s move only increased their revolutionary fervor. Next, Abdulhamid offered amnesty and high positions to exiles to get them to return and work with the government. Still, the CUP continued to add followers. The new secular schools instituted under the Tanzimat reforms produced thousands of educated bureaucrats, officers, and intellectuals who came from the lower classes and resented restrictions placed on them. Many were strong patriots who believed that if the sultan’s corrupt regime were swept away, they could build a stronger country. The growing strength of reformers and the increasing attacks of nationalistic minorities caused the government to become more and more repressive. By the beginning of the 20th century, followers of the CUP were increasingly convinced that only radical change would save Turkey. The initiative for the Young Turk revolution came from military officers within the Ottoman Empire, especially those of the Third Army Corps in Macedonia. Led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, they formed the Ottoman Liberty Society in 1906. In 1907, the group agreed to merge with the CUP, a key development that brought the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization and the CUP together to work toward mutual goals. Events in 1908 spurred them to action. Bosnia and Herzegovina was annexed by the

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Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Bulgaria and Crete declared their independence from Ottoman rule. On July 3, the Third Corps launched a revolt that quickly spread to other military units throughout the empire. Unable to rely on his troops, Abdulhamid restored the Constitution of 1876 and reconvened the parliament, hoping to undercut the rebellion, but his rule lasted only another year. The Young Turks took charge of the government and began to introduce numerous and diverse reform programs, though by 1911, the CUP’s political agenda was contested by liberal, conservative, and nationalistic forces internally. In 1913, the CUP gained effective control, thanks in part to rigged elections and in part to the chaos of the Balkan Wars. By the time it consolidated its power, not only had it lost the Balkans (and therefore most of the empire’s Christians), but its ideals of a multinational Ottomanism had faded somewhat to be replaced by a preference for congressional representatives who were ethnic Turks and members of the CUP. The new CUP leadership included Enver Pasha as war minister, Jemal Pasha as naval minister, and Talat Pasha as interior minister. Those men carried out many reforms of the provincial administrations, which led to greater centralization. They also secularized the legal system and provided a better system of elementary school education, especially for girls. The Young Turks are hailed for those modernizing programs. The CUP government also made Turkish the language of administration and instruction, however, which alienated the large number of Arabs in the empire. With the onslaught of the First World War, the Young Turks chose to ally with Germany, though in their admiration for the German military, they overestimated its effectiveness. They also wished to reconquer Egypt from the British and the Caucasus Mountains from Russia, which made alliance with Germany logical. The Young Turks began to fear that the Armenians (Christians living in eastern Anatolia) would support the Russians, though they had shown no sign of disloyalty to the Ottoman government since the overthrow of Abdulhamid II. Acting with German assistance, the Young Turks ordered the deportation of the Armenians from the Ottoman state. When the Armenians resisted, the Ottoman Army unleashed local Turkish and Kurdish brigands who killed an estimated 1

million during the Armenian Genocide and scattered the rest. Their genocidal persecution of the Armenians did not endear the Young Turks to the Arabs. Though theoretically united by Islam, many Arabs were suspicious of the way the Young Turks combined religion with nationalism. More damage was done, however, by the former naval minister, Jemal, as he and his troops rested in Syria during 1915 to reorganize an attack on the British and the Suez Canal. Jemal’s treatment of the Syrians was so cruel and arbitrary that he inspired them to join in the British-sponsored Arab Uprising, led by the Hussein clan from Mecca. That revolt forced Jemal to withdraw from Syria, ceding control of the entire region south of Anatolia to the French and the British. By late 1918, military defeat appeared imminent, and the CUP leaders resigned from the government in October, just a month before the Armistice of Moudros ended the war. In spite of their misfortunes and their mistakes, however, the Young Turks are regarded by Turkish people as having led an important phase in the regeneration of the nation. Their transformation from Ottoman to Turkish nationalism and their ideas about Islam allowed for subsequent rulers to progress more rapidly. Arguing that religion should be a matter of conscience and that the legal aspects of Islam should be surrendered to secular legislation, they called for a split between Islam and the state. That idea became the foundation for the policy of secularization later adopted by the Turkish republic under Atatürk. Alexander Mikaberidze See also First World War, Religious Dimensions of; Ottoman Empire Further Reading Ahmad, Feroz. The Young Turks. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. Berkes, Niyazi. The Development of Secularism in Turkey. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964. Hanioglu, M. Sukru. The Young Turks in Opposition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Kinross, Lord. The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson, Jr. The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957. Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Z Zab, Battle of (750 CE)

across the bridge, but in his haste, he destroyed it before the remainder of his army could escape. With the Umayyad army broken at the Zab, the Abbasids continued their march west, capturing Damascus later that year and killing Marwan. Matthew Long

During the Muslim Abbasid revolution, the Battle of Zab was a pivotal encounter at the Zab River between the Umayyad army, led by Marwan II, and the Abbasids in 750 CE with the latter faction emerging victorious. With the Umayyad army defeated, it was shortly thereafter that the Umayyad dynasty dissolved, and the Abbasid caliphate was established. Unrest and civil discord were prevalent through the reign of the final Umayyad caliph, Marwan II. In 747, descendants of Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib, the uncle of the prophet Muhammad, and their supporters openly opposed the Umayyads. Led by Abu Muslim (Khorasani), the Abbasids moved from their strongholds in east Khurasan, capturing Merv and then Kufa in 749. In the early months of 750, the Umayyad army led by Marwan met the Abbasid forces at the banks of the Upper, or Greater, Zab River, a tributary of the Tigris River in modern-day Iraq. While estimates vary, it is agreed that the Umayyad force greatly outnumbered the Abbasid army. The Abbasid army was stationed on the southern side of the Zab. Marwan’s fatal flaw, according to all accounts, was his decision to build a bridge enabling his army to cross the river. The Abbasids, led by Abd Allah b. ‘Ali, relied on a defensive strategy that succeeded in halting the Syrian cavalry advances of the Umayyads. Sensing defeat, Marwan fled back

See also Abassid Revolution; Caliphate Further Reading Hawting, G. R. The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate AD 661–750. London: Routledge, 2000. Kennedy, Hugh. The Early Abbasid Caliphate: A Political History. London: Croom Helm, 1981. Shaban, M. A. The Abbasid Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Zanj Rebellion (869–893 CE) Lasting from 869 to 893, the Zanj rebellion cost tens of thousands of lives and caused substantial property damage. Occurring in the heartland of the Abbasid caliphate, this most significant slave uprising in the history of the Muslim world was threatening to both the local residents and to the Muslim realm. 875

876 Zealots

The term Zanj, assimilated into medieval Arabic from another language, refers to the black African Bantu tribes living along the east coast of equatorial Africa, mostly Kenya, Somalia south of Mogadishu, and northern Tanzania. While present in Iraq during Umayyad times, the number of Zanj in Iraq grew significantly during Abbasid times. The Zanj were slaves who were captured, purchased, or received as tribute. They were made to work in the hot, humid Tigris-Euphrates-Karun River delta near Basra, now known as Shatt al-Arab. Their work was to prepare the soil in the salt flats for planting crops. While there were two minor late seventh-century Zanj rebellions, in 689–690 and 694, the 15-year ninth-century rebellion is the subject of this entry. Modern historians discuss how race, class, economics, social injustice, slavery, mistreatment, abuse, and oppression may have motivated the uprising. It is, however, clearer that religion played the central role in legitimizing the uprising. The Khawariji doctrine that unjust rulers are disbelievers who are worthy of death legitimized rebellion against the oppressive Abbasid caliphate. The Shi’a doctrine that the political and religious legitimacy of the house of Muhammad passes through his cousin and son-in-law Ali also played a role. Ali b. Muhammad (d. 883) led oppressed slaves in the Zanj rebellion by claiming direct descent from Ali through at least two lineages. Ali b. Muhammad gained military and leadership experience by leading earlier rebellions in both Basra and Bahrayn that failed to overthrow the Abbasids; he was also a well-educated man who was skilled in poetry. His forces quickly sacked and pillaged half a dozen poorly protected cities in the delta. Rather than directly engaging Abbasid forces, he hid his forces in inaccessible places from where he launched devastating ambushes. He established a capital city, minted his own coins, and negotiated alliances with other anti-Abbasid forces, including the Qaramita. After 10 years of success, the Abbasid realm rose to the Zanj challenge during the next five years, which witnessed the slow calculated pushing of the Zanj into the area of the canals, where they were besieged until Ali b. Muhammad was killed. W. Richard Oakes Jr. See also Qarmati Uprising

Further Reading Al-T.abarī. The History of al-Tabari, a translation of Ta’rīkh alrusul wa’l-mulūk. Albany: SUNY, 1985–1999. Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. Edited by P. Bearman et al. Brill Online. Popovic, Alexandre. The Revolt of African Slaves in Iraq in the 3rd/9th Century. Translated by Leon King. Princeton, NJ: M. Wiener, 1999. Silkaitis, Emily Martha. “Modern Takes on Motivations Behind the Zanj Rebellion.” Lights: The MESSA Journal 3, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 56–63.

Zealots The Zealots were political activists in first-century Second Temple Judaism who were radically opposed to Roman rule. They sought to incite the citizens of Judaea to revolt against the Roman Empire and expel it by force, leading to the Jewish Revolt, 66–70 CE. The term zealot is a translation of the Hebrew word that is transliterated kanai or frequently in plural form, kana’im. It was understood as someone who was zealous on behalf of God. The English term derives from the Greek zelotes, understood as an emulator, zealous admirer, or follower. In his Jewish Antiquities, historian Josephus (37–ca. 100) states that there were three main Jewish sects in existence in his time, the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the Essenes. The Zealots he labeled a “fourth sect,” founded by Judas of Galilee (also called Judas of Gamala) in the year 6 against Quirinius’s tax reform, shortly after the Roman Empire declared what had most recently been the tetrarchy of Herod Archelaus to be a Roman province. Some scholars question this account of the group’s origin by the fact that Hezekiah, the father of Judas the Galilean, had already organized a band of so-called “robbers,” which made war against the Idumean Herod, and by the fact that the system of organized assassination practiced by the Zealots was in existence during the reign of Herod, if not before. The Zealots sought to eradicate Roman rule by targeting Romans and Greeks. Another group, likely related, were the Sicarii, who raided Jewish towns and killed Jews they considered apostate or collaborators, while at the same time urging Jews to fight against the Romans and

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other Jews for the cause. Josephus paints a dismal picture of their activities as they instituted what he characterized as a murderous “reign of terror” prior to the Jewish Temple’s destruction. According to Josephus, the Zealots who fought the Romans in Galilee escaped, came to Jerusalem, and inspired the locals to a fanatical position that led to the Temple’s destruction. They succeeded in taking over Jerusalem and held it until the year 70, when Titus, the son of Roman emperor Vespasian, retook the city and destroyed Herod’s Temple during the destruction of Jerusalem. In the Talmud, the Zealots are considered the nonreligious, meaning they did not follow the religious leaders, and they are referred to as the Biryonim, meaning ruffian or wild; they are condemned for their aggression, their unwillingness to compromise so as to save besieged Jerusalem, and their militarism against the rabbis’ opinion to seek peace. They are further blamed for having contributed to the demise of Jerusalem and the Second Temple, and for ensuring Rome’s retributions and stranglehold on Judea. The few Zealots who survived the fall of Jerusalem were taken as captives to Rome to glorify Titus’s triumph by being hanged or dragged to the Forum and cast down from the Tarpeian rock. In the New Testament, one of the disciples of Jesus of Nazareth, Simon, is referred to as a Zealot (or “the Canaanite,” a corruption of ha-K.anna’i, “the Zealot”, cf. Matthew 10:4; Mark 3:18; Luke 6:15; Acts 1:13). The term shows how words that originate in the language of religion and war can become commonplace in usage. James Menzies See also Jewish Revolt; Josephus; Masada, Siege of Further Reading Bohrmann, Monette. Flavius Josephus, the Zealots and Yavne: Towards a Rereading of The War of the Jews. New York: Peter Lang, 1994. Brandon, Samuel George Frederick. Jesus and the Zealots: A Study of the Political Factor in Primitive Christianity. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1967. Josephus, Flavius. The Complete Works of Flavius Josephus. Translated by William Whiston. Green Forest, AR: New Leaf Publishing Group, 2008.

Zen and War Zen, like most forms of Buddhism, affirms nonharming, compassion, detachment, and other values that imply opposition to war. Historically, however, Zen Buddhist institutions have been involved in wars. More often than not, this involvement has taken the form of supporting the government rather than instigating military conflict or waging wars themselves. We see this pattern especially during World War Two in Japan, when Zen leaders donated funds to the war effort, chanted scriptures and performed rituals to promote Japanese victory, ran officer-training programs, aligned Buddhist teachings with the ideology surrounding the emperor, participated in propaganda campaigns, and served overseas as military chaplains. Such support for the government and its endeavors in the 20th century was nothing new. Despite popular images of Zen Buddhists as eccentric hermits secluded in the mountains and detached from politics, since Zen was formally introduced to Japan in the 12th and 13th centuries it has existed in a symbiotic relationship with rulers and other elites. In exchange for protection and patronage, Zen leaders have, for example, performed rituals to secure such benefits for rulers as good health, success in battle, law and order across the land, and national security. This pattern goes back to Myōan Eisai (or Yōsai, 1141– 1215), the monk who brought the Rinzai strand of Zen from China to Japan. Soon after returning from China, Eisai started advocating that his variety of Zen offered the best way to protect the country. Specifically, in his Propagation of Zen for the Protection of the Country (Kōzen gokokuron), Eisai argued that Japan would flourish and be a model Buddhist country if the rulers were to patronize Zen, and in return Zen leaders were to serve as moral exemplars and thereby help foster a moral society while also performing rituals that would contribute to national security. He prescribed a set of rituals aimed at such goals as promoting the emperor’s rule, repaying debt to the emperor, and securing protection by local deities, who would look approvingly on moral monks and proper ritual performance. Eisai was later joined by other prominent Zen leaders in offering support for the government. Dōgen (1200–1253), who returned from China with the Sōtō strand of Zen, reportedly submitted to Emperor Go-Saga a treatise titled

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“Principles of the True Dharma [Buddhist teachings] for the Protection of the Country” (Gokoku-shōbōgi; no longer extant). In the next century, Zen master Musō Soseki (1275–1351) worked with the Ashikaga military government to erect 66 regional “temples for the protection of the country” (ankokuji); though ostensibly these temples functioned to memorialize those who had died in the war that had brought the Ashikagas to power, they also served as de facto fortifications that enabled the Ashikaga warriorleaders to defend distant reaches of their territory and keep an eye on the populace. What Zen figures like Eisai, Dōgen, and Musō were doing was not unique to Japanese Zen, for such symbiosis with the government can also be seen in the history of Chinese Zen (Chan) and Korean Zen (Son) and in the history of other denominations of Buddhism in Japan. Unlike the Western emphasis on the separation of church and state, from the time Buddhism was introduced to Japan in the sixth century the religion has generally been intertwined with the government. Buddhist leaders have actively supported Japanese rulers and their endeavors, and more often than not they have viewed this support as their duty. Priests in Zen and other denominations have, among other things, chanted scriptures thought to protect the ruler, promote victory in battle, and keep the country safe. Foremost among these scriptures are the “Three Nation-Protecting Sutras” (Chingo kokka sanbukyō): the Lotus Sutra, the Sutra of the Sovereign Kings of the Golden Light, and the Wisdom Sutra Explaining how Benevolent Kings Protect Their Countries. This ongoing symbiosis between Buddhism and the government has been encapsulated in such expressions as “the interdependence of the sovereign’s law and the Buddha’s law” (ōbō-buppō sōi), with “Buddha’s law” referring to the Dharma or the teachings of the Buddha. A term for Buddhism collaborating in this way is “Buddhism that protects the country” (gokoku-bukkyō). In addition to assisting the government in its efforts to protect the country, historically Zen has offered support to warfare by making claims about how Zen practice and the mental states it cultivates can aid warriors in battle. For example, the renowned Zen master Takuan (1573–1645) taught master swordsman Yagyū Munemori (1571–1646) that such Zen mental states as no-mind, no-thought, non­ abiding, and immovable wisdom can serve a samurai when

fighting. Warrior-turned-priest Suzuki Shōzan (1579– 1655) argued that the power of Zen meditative states (zenjōriki) was a crucial element of martial prowess. Other Zen figures celebrated how Zen meditation liberated warriors from the fear of death and hence made them even more proficient in combat. Military ruler Hōjō Tokimune (1251–1284), facing the threat of a Mongol invasion, purportedly drew courage from his practice of Zen under a Chinese master, Wuxue Zuyuan (1226–1286), who was teaching in Japan as an expatriate and benefiting from Tokimune’s patronage. We see modern claims about the martial fruits of Zen in the discourse of nationalistic Zen masters during World War Two. The history of such Zen contributions to samurai and their swordsmanship has been encapsulated in the expression, “the unity of Zen and the sword” (kenzen-ichinyo). This connection between Zen and the samurai has been celebrated by D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966), who played a major role in the introduction of Zen to the West in the 20th century, and denounced by Brian Victoria, a Sōtō Zen Buddhist who sees this connection as playing a causal role in modern Japanese imperialism and Zen collaboration with it. Though these two writers take divergent stances on the Zen-samurai connection, they both see that connection as deep and longstanding. One question worth asking, however, is the extent to which Zen leaders and their discourse about the martial benefits of Zen training actually shaped the mindset of samurai and affected how they engaged in combat. Warrior rulers did have a connection to Zen insofar as they patronized Zen by doing such things as building monasteries, but it is not necessarily the case that samurai engaged in Zen meditation to such an extent that they cultivated the mental states that Takuan and others saw as crucial to skill with weapons. This is especially an issue with rank-and-file warriors, many of whom were affiliated with other denominations of Japanese Buddhism and most likely did little if any meditation. For this reason it is reasonable to conclude that the connection between Zen and the samurai was more social and political than psychological or spiritual. Needless to say, regardless of the exact form it took, Zen support for the war efforts of Japanese warriors—premodern or modern—stands in tension with the core Buddhist value of nonharming, as encapsulated in the first of the

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Five Precepts, the five core moral guidelines that admonish Buddhists to refrain from harming, stealing, engaging in sexual misconduct, lying, and using intoxicants. Like such other lists of guidelines as the Ten Commandments, Buddhists have not seen the first precept as absolute. When put into practice, especially in the complex arena of war and national defense, the call to “refrain from harming” is open to interpretation, and throughout the history of Buddhism we see exceptions being made. Some Buddhist scriptures talk of how killing can be justified if it is done with compassionate intention to prevent greater harm that might otherwise be caused by the person being killed. Other scriptures make the case that warfare by the government is morally acceptable if it protects Buddhism and on this basis claim by extension that Buddhist support for warfare in that case is morally acceptable as well. This stance is reflected in the aforementioned expression, gokoku-bukkyō, “Buddhism that protects the country,” which from the Buddhist perspective amounts to Buddhism protecting the country that protects Buddhism. In the case of Zen, the commitment to supporting the country or its rulers is strengthened by historical Zen acceptance of Confucian values, including loyalty and obedience in hierarchical social structures, which in the case of Japanese Confucianism had the warriors on top, followed by farmers, artisans, and merchants in descending order. As a further way of dealing with the tension between the first precept and Zen support for warriors, several Zen masters have claimed that samurai steeped in Zen wield “the sword that gives life” not the “sword that takes life,” or have drawn from the doctrine of emptiness—the notion that people lack any separate, permanent essence like a soul—to argue that cutting someone down in battle is not an act of murder, for there is no substantial person being killed. One Zen text has claimed that if the killing happens effortlessly and spontaneously, like how a fire burns a hillside or the wind breaks trees, the action is not morally problematical. Although these claims are not normative in most forms of Zen, in recent years Zen Buddhists have been critically examining such rhetoric and overall Zen collaboration with warfare while also envisioning how Zen might reform its approach to war and those who wage it. Zen priest and professor Ichikawa Hakugen (1902–1986) spent much of

his career in postwar Japan criticizing Zen collaboration with militarists during World War Two and calling for the tradition to formulate a critical social ethic that could help Zen avoid repeating its mistakes. Partly inspired by Ichikawa, Brian Victoria has written several books highly critical of wartime Zen, especially in relation to such Buddhist ideals as nonviolence and compassion, and his criticisms have recently prompted Zen leaders in Japan to issue proclamations of regret about wartime Zen activities and pledges to work for peace and human rights. Zen teacher and activist Robert Aitken (1917–2010) helped found in 1978 the Buddhist Peace Fellowship, which supports Zen practitioners and other Buddhists in a range of activities to promote peace and justice. Another North American Zen teacher, Bernie Glassman (b. 1939), founded the Zen Peacemaker Order, which has engaged in such activities as bearing witness at places of strife and violence (including Auschwitz), engaging in peaceful coexistence projects in Israel with Palestinians and Israelis, and doing nonviolence trainings. As one expression of their commitment to peacework, Glassman and other members of Zen Peacemakers have augmented the Five Precepts with Five Commitments, which include nonviolence and the reverence of life, solidarity and a just economic order, tolerance, and equal rights. In the middle of the Vietnam War, Thich Nhat Hanh (b. 1926) and other Vietnamese Zen Buddhists started the Order of Interbeing, which has expanded the Five Precepts into 14 “mindfulness trainings,” a number of which aim at reducing the likelihood of war. For example, the trainings caution against fanaticism, intolerance, attachment to one’s political views, and forcing one’s views on others, and the 12th training reads, “Aware that much suffering is caused by war and conflict, we are determined to cultivate nonviolence, understanding, and compassion in our daily lives, to promote peace education, mindful mediation, and reconciliation within families, communities, nations, and in the world. We are determined not to kill and not to let others kill. We will diligently practice deep looking with our Sangha [Buddhist community] to discover better ways to protect life and to prevent war.” Robert Aiken, Bernie Glassman, and Thich Nhat Hanh have been prominent figures in what has been called “Engaged Buddhism,” a contemporary progressive

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movement that is fostering forms of Buddhism that are generally critical of war and other forms of violence and committed to peace, human rights, and environmental sustainability. Christopher Ives See also Buddhism and War; Shinto and War Further Reading Ives, Christopher. Imperial-Way Zen: Ichikawa Hakugen’s Critique and Lingering Questions for Buddhist Ethics. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009. King, Winston L. Zen and the Way of the Sword: Arming the Samurai Psyche. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Nhat Hanh, Thich. Interbeing: Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism. 3rd ed. Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1998. Suzuki, Daisetz T. Zen and Japanese Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Victoria, Brian. Zen at War. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. Welter, Albert. “Buddhist Rituals for Protecting the Country in Medieval Japan: Myōan Eisai’s ‘Regulations of the Zen School.’” In Steven Heine and Dale S. Wright, eds. Zen Ritual: Studies of Zen Buddhist Theory in Practice. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 113–38. Welter, Albert. “Zen Buddhism as the Ideology of the Japanese State: Eisai and the Kōzen gokokuron.” In Steven Heine and Dale S. Wright, ed. Zen Classics: Formative Texts in the History of Zen Buddhism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 65–112.

Zionism and War One of the most tragic events of the 20th century was the Holocaust, an event that involved the murder of approximately six million European Jews. Another major event was the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel in the Holy Land. The creation of this state was the fulfillment of the Zionist dream, and Jews from around the world have made “aliyah” to make Israel their home. This was an ancient goal. It was also a modern one. To secure the Jewish state, whether in antiquity or modernity, the use of force was necessary. Since 1948, Israel has waged several wars. These actions have produced what some have termed a crisis in Zionism.

While it may have ancient roots, Zionism is a modern Jewish nationalist movement. The term was first coined by Nathan Birnbaum (1864–1937), a Zionist leader from Austria. Zionism was a response to endemic anti-Semitism in Europe. Early Zionists, such as Moses Hess (1812–1875), argued that Eretz Yisrael (the land of Israel) was the only place that could serve as a Jewish homeland and enable the Jewish people to reidentify as a nation. Some even argued that a Jewish homeland would prepare the way for the coming of the messiah as promised in the Hebrew scriptures. Because European governments had repeatedly failed their Jewish populations, the Zionists argued that only a homeland could provide Jews the greatest degree of peace and security in the world. Abandoning further efforts for Jewish assimilation, Zionist leader Theodor Herzl (1860– 1904) advocated the creation of a Jewish homeland in his book Der Judenstaat, “The Jewish State.” A Jewish state alone would solve the Judenfrage, the perennial question of what to do with Europe’s Jews. Palestine was the preferred location for this homeland. Herzl wrote, “Palestine is our unforgettable historic homeland.” But other places were entertained. He added, “We shall take what is given us, and what is selected by Jewish public opinion.” After the Exodus from Egypt, the early Israelites reentered and inhabited the land of Canaan. This they viewed as their divine right. They believed that the land was given to them by God as part of the covenant made with Abraham and his descendants as recorded in the book of Genesis (12:1–3). God promised to make them a great nation and to bless those who blessed Abraham’s family and curse those who cursed them. Moses led the people in a reaffirmation of the Abrahamic covenant when they stood at Mount Sinai. The Israelites, under the leadership of Joshua, waged an armed campaign to take the land and establish a theocratic kingdom, first under the judges and then the kings. The conquest of Canaan was a holy war and God a warrior god. “The Lord is a man of war, the Lord is His name” (Exodus 15:3). God was the leader of the Israelite forces. “The Lord will fight for you” (Exodus 14:14). He commanded the troops as to when and where to strike and gave the Israelites authority to seize the land in his name. With the rise of the monarchy under the reign of kings Saul, David, and Solomon, Israel furthered its expanse in

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the Near East. The reigning king was considered the Messiah, or anointed one, chosen by God to protect the people of Israel and lead them in military victory. “Saul hath slain his thousands, and David his ten thousands” (I Samuel 18:7). Under King David, through conquest, Jerusalem was established as Israel’s capital. Under his son Solomon, the Temple was built on Mount Zion as a permanent home for God, making Zion the heart of Israel and making the land forever sacred because the God of the Israelites dwelt among them. After Solomon’s reign, Israel split in two, Israel and Judah. The two weakened halves of the kingdom were subject to foreign invasion and control. Over the next several hundred years, there were periodic Jewish uprisings and other messianic figures who promised to restore the Kingdom of Israel and return it to its previous unified glory. After the Romans put down the Jewish revolt of 132– 135 CE and killed its messianic leader, Simon Bar Kochba, at the battle of Betar, ancient Israel ceased to exist. The remaining Jews in the area became displaced persons and scattered to lands far away. Going forward, Jewish leaders recognized the futility of further warfare and renounced violence as a solution to their disparate and precarious situation. Zionism rejected the centuries-long passivism. In a world where they were not always welcome and often the victims of violence, Jews must arm and defend themselves. They must create a place of their own, and this Jewish homeland would possess the capacity to wage war. As Herzl wrote, the Jewish state would establish a “professional army” and be armed with “every requisite of modern warfare.” In the decades leading up to the independence of Israel, there were several notable instances of Jewish armed resistance. In Palestine, from 1920 to 1948, various Jewish groups, such as the Haganah, the “Stern Gang,” and Irgun, were formed to protect Jewish communities from Arab attacks and to disrupt British efforts to restrict further Jewish immigration from Europe. In Europe, many Jews violently resisted Nazi German forces and their collaborators. One notable instance took place in 1943 in Warsaw, Poland. There, Mordecai Anielewicz led an uprising of approximately 15,000 Jews in the

Warsaw ghetto. The partisans of the Vilna Ghetto in Lithuania provided another example of resistance. Abba Kovner, a leader of the resistance, exclaimed, “We will not be led like sheep to the slaughter! True, we are weak and defenseless, but the only reply to the murderer is revolt!” Though they were futile, ineffective efforts against overwhelming Nazi power, the ghetto uprisings echoed the Jewish rebellions of antiquity. The ghetto fighters have been hailed as modern-day Zealots who protected the honor of all Jews. Since the establishment of the independent State of Israel in 1948, Israel has been in four general Arab-Israeli wars— the wars of 1948–1949, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Israel’s main opponents were the neighboring Arab countries of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The Arab-Israeli war of 1948–1949 is known as the War of Independence. The State of Israel was proclaimed on May 15, 1948, and the war secured Jewish control over much of Palestine against advancing Arab armies. This war gave birth to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Postindependence Zionism contends that Israel must aggressively protect its independence. Such protection includes defensive war and preemptive war. Israel’s security may also entail the expansion of its borders. A prime example of this is the 1967 Six-Day War. The war was a tremendous success for Israel. In this campaign, the Israelis acquired the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The taking of East Jerusalem was of great religious significance. For the first time since antiquity, the Temple Mount and the Western Wall were back in Jewish hands. In 1973, the Yom Kippur War started when Egyptian and Syrian military forces invaded Israel in the hope of regaining their lost territories. After initial success, they were repelled. In subsequent years, Israel and Egypt reached a peace accord and the Sinai was returned. This peace effectively ended direct military conflict between Israel and its neighbors. It further proved that Israel was not going to be pushed into the sea by its enemies and that it would not easily relinquish the gains from 1967. Supporting its capacity to wage war, Israel has had strong allies, particularly in the United States. Notably, American Jews, an important constituency in the Democratic Party, and evangelical Protestants, an important constituency in

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the Republican Party, provide the most consistent and enthusiastic support. Both groups have been ardent supporters of Israel’s territorial claims, West Bank settlements, and moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem to symbolize American recognition of the city being the indisputable, indivisible capital of the Jewish state. Since 1948, American presidents have been very supportive of Israel as well and have often provided it diplomatic cover in international affairs. Presidents have even used explicit Zionist language to justify American allegiance. It has been argued that there exists a crisis with Zionism. While it envisioned an independent, secure Jewish state in the land of their ancestors, Zionism also promised a state that would be at peace, fully democratic, just, enlightened, and open to all religious faiths. Israel, however, is a democracy with certain illiberal tendencies that undermine the original dream for the Jewish state and isolate it in the world. Israel’s continued occupation of Arab lands gained in the Six-Day War and subjugation of the Palestinians has severely damaged its relations with other countries. A martial, muscular Zionism, critics contend, fuels resentment and anti-Semitism. What is needed is a review and reexamination of Zionist thought and reorientation toward responsible action, the pursuit of justice, and inclusiveness. A more complete and wholesome Zionism involves the principle of tikkun olam, “repairing the world,” for all Jews and all peoples. D. Jason Berggren and Bonnie K. Levine-Berggren See also Apocalypticism and War, Jewish; Arab-Israeli War of 1948; Deities as Warriors in the Ancient Near East; Judaism and War; Six-Day War; Yom Kippur War; Primary Documents: Max Nordau’s Address to the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland (August 29, 1897); British House of Commons Discussion Expressing Outrage Following the Zionist Terrorist Attack on the King David Hotel in Jerusalem (1946); UN Resolution Declaring Zionism to Be Racism (1975) Further Reading Avineri, Shlomo. Herzl’s Vision: Theodor Herzl and the Foundation of the Jewish State. Katonah, NY: BlueBridge, 2014. Beinhart, Peter. The Crisis of Zionism. New York: Times Books, 2012. Ellis, Marc H. Toward a Jewish Theology of Liberation. Mary­ knoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987.

Hertzberg, Arthur. The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1997. Laqueur, Walter. A History of Zionism: From the French Revolution to the Establishment of the State of Israel. New York: Schocken Books, 2003. Merkley, Paul Charles. American Presidents, Religion, and Israel: The Heirs of Cyrus. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004. Rubenstein, Richard L., and John K. Roth. Approaches to Ausch­ witz: The Holocaust and Its Legacy. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1987. Weber, Timothy P. On the Road to Armageddon: How Evangelicals Became Israel’s Best Friend. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004.

Zoroastrianism and War Zoroastrianism is a monotheistic religion founded in ancient Persia in approximately the second millennium BCE. The religion is based on belief in the god Ahura Mazda. The entire Zoroastrian religious ethos is structured around a holy war, fought on the spiritual and material levels in domains both otherworldly and of this world. It is a struggle believed to last from cosmogony to eschaton and to involve all creatures. The dominant version of Zoroastrian religious history, narrated most coherently in medieval or Middle Persian sources, relates that in the beginning Ohrmazd (Avestan: Ahura Mazda “the Wise Lord”; Old Persian: Ahura Mazda), the chief divinity, dwelled in endless light, while Ahreman (Avestan: Angra Mainyu “the Angry [or Evil] Spirit”), the archdemon, lurked in deepest darkness. The universal war began when Ohrmazd brought forth creation in the spiritual state. Ahreman then rushed to the boundary of hell, envied the good creation of Ohrmazd, and fashioned a spiritual counter-creation to destroy Ohrmazd’s good one. Ohrmazd, knowing the outcome of the coming war due to omniscience but seeking to avoid conflict, offered a truce on the condition that Ahreman praise the good creation. Ahreman refused this offer, claiming that he would be able to destroy Ohrmazd and the good creation. Ohrmazd then suggested that they stage the battle within a time framework of 9,000 years. To this Ahreman agreed, believing the offer revealed Ohrmazd to be weak and therefore desper-

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ate. But Ohrmazd struck the first blow—the god uttered the Ahunwar, considered the holiest prayer in Zoroastrianism, which stunned Ahreman into a stupor. With Ahreman temporarily out of action, Ohrmazd created the physical world in its ideal state as both the arena for the next stage of the battle and as a trap in which to capture Ahreman. After 3,000 years, Ahreman regained consciousness, beheld Ohrmazd’s material creation, and attacked it with evil, pain, pollution, and death. Since then, the world has been in a state of combative mixture between good and evil. So next, Ohrmazd ensured the birth of Zarathustra, who as the prophet of Zoroastrianism brought the Mazdaworshipping religion to humans and thus equipped them to fight evil successfully. In battling Ahreman and his evil followers on behalf of Ohrmazd, Zoroastrians are expected to keep evil away from their thoughts, words, and deeds and thereby assist their god in the universal war. Eventually, three saviors—descendants of the Zoroastrianism’s prophet—are expected to arrive to help other humans render Ahreman and his evil legions powerless. Thereafter, with the cosmic war over and good proving victorious, Ohrmazd will restore the world to its initial perfect state. Ancient Iran witnessed various martial deeds and political activities that relied on the notion of battle between good and evil. Doctrinal justification lay in viewing those events as occurring within the period and subconflicts of the universal war. The Achaemenid king Darius I (r. 522–486 BCE) justified both his ascension to power and his military suppression of rivals with the phrase “the Lie became great” (Behistun inscription 1:10)—presenting contestation of his rule as the demonic personification of evil, that is, drauga, “lie,” and representing himself as the one who followed the will of Ahura Mazda. Later, Darius’s son and successor Xerxes I (r. 486–465 BCE) stated in what is known as the Daiva “demon” inscription that, following the will of Ahura Mazda, he destroyed the temple of daivas (Avestan: daiva, originally a group of Indo-Iranian deities who were demonized in Zoroastrianism). Xerxes is also well known for flogging the Hellespont in 480 BCE after a storm set back his attempt to subjugate the Greeks—apparently he was punishing the strait for allegedly cooperating with his opponents rather than with him and his god.

Centuries later Ardeshir I, founder of the Sassanian dynasty (224–650 CE), presented his ascent to power as good vanquishing evil. On commemoratory rock reliefs at Naqsh-e Rostam and elsewhere, Ardeshir (r. 224–240 CE) was depicted on horseback stomping upon the dead body of Ardawan IV, the last king of the preceding Parthian or Arsacid regime, while facing the Sassanian king was Ohrmazd whose horse stomps upon the defeated devil or Ahreman. His son and successor, King Shapur I (r. 240–272 CE), claimed the main reason for going to war against the Romans was that untruths had been spoken: “Caesar lied again and invaded Armenia, so we attacked the Roman Empire” (Naqsh-e Rostam inscription 4)—thus portraying the Roman leader as allied through bad words and harmful deeds with Ahreman. In the early fourth century CE, when Armenian rulers, who had been Zoroastrian, allied religiously and politically with Byzantium against Iran and adopted Christianity, the then Sassanian king Shapur II (r. 309–379 CE) resorted to military campaigns in futile attempts to reconvert them to Zoroastrianism and re-ally Armenia with Iran. During the seventh century CE, Arab Muslim troops invaded Iran, defeated the Sassanian Empire, and reduced Zoroastrians to subject status within the Muslim caliphate. During the following century, a breakdown in cooperation between Muslim authorities and lay Zoroastrians contributed to several unsuccessful rebellions led by heterodox Zoroastrians, such as Bihafrid-e Mahfravardin (from 747– 749 CE) and Sinbad (in 754–755 CE), who denounced the Muslim elites as henchmen of Ahreman against whom Iranians had to rise up on behalf of Ohrmazd. By the 13th century CE, the conversion of most Zoroastrians to Islam and the unsuccessful resistance against Muslims had been rationalized by incorporating those events into eschatology. The textual tradition, therefore, put forward an interpretation that the subjugation of Zoroastrians was unjust and violent, and identified Arab Muslims with the devil’s evil corporeal hordes. Much later, in 1645 CE, Parsi or Indian Zoroastrians fought futilely alongside Hindus against the Muslim troops of the Muzaffarid sultan Mahmud I Bagath (r. 1458–1511 CE). Their steadfast resistance, however, bought time to facilitate transfer of their holy fire to a safe place. During the 20th century, Parsi Zoroastrians as citizens of colonial

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India volunteered for service in the armed forces of the British Empire for World War I. One publication, commemorating Parsi servicemen in that war, referred to it as “the great war between the forces of the Good Spirit versus the Evil one, of humanity versus the devil.” Parsi Zoroastrian men and women enlisted in the British Army during World War II as well. They served against Japanese forces in Burma and Southeast Asia, fighting for the Allied cause, which they believed to be both good and just. The concept of assisting communities and nations that provide safety for followers of the faith continues to the present day, as evidenced by Parsis in modern India serving with the country’s armed forces at all levels. Jamsheed K. Choksy and Narges Nematollahi See also Ahura Mazda

council in January 1523 known as the First Disputation. He presented his views on government in 10 of the Articles (Art. 34 to 43). He set forth his biblical doctrine of war in the context of a discussion on church and state relations. His views illustrate the enormous attention given to political thought and resistance theory during the 16th and 17th centuries and how religion and war became recurring items that intersected throughout the age. Zwingli’s teaching on war was also informed by his experience. At this time the Swiss Confederation was involved in several campaigns against the French, the Habsburgs, and the Papal States. At this time, prior to the Reformation, Zwingli was a devout Roman Catholic priest who served as a chaplain with Swiss mercenary forces on the side of the Papal See and served in several campaigns in Italy as a chaplain, most notably the Battle of Novara

Further Reading Choksy, Jamsheed K. Conflict and Cooperation: Zoroastrian Subalterns and Muslim Elites in Medieval Iranian Society. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Choksy, Jamsheed K. “Justifiable Force and Holy War in Zoroastrianism.” In John Renard, ed. Fighting Words: Religion, Violence, and the Interpretation of Sacred Texts. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012, pp. 158–76. Dhalla, Maneckji Nusservanji. History of Zoroastrianism, New York: Oxford University Press, 1938. Foltz, Richard. Spirituality in the Land of the Noble: How Iran Shaped the World’s Religions. Oxford: Oneworld, 2004.

Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531) Huldrych Zwingli was the first of the Protestant Reformed theologians in the 16th century. He was born on New Year’s Day, 1484, a little over seven weeks after the birth of Martin Luther. He is remembered primarily for his reforming work as the leading pastor in the Swiss city of Zurich, but he also wrote on issues of war and peace and died in battle. He addressed major theological topics in An Exposition of the Articles (1523), a writing that developed the SixtySeven Articles that Zwingli previously had set forth at a public civic-religious meeting held by the Zurich city

Huldrych Zwingli was an influential leader of the Reformation in Switzerland during the 16th century. Although not as well known as his contemporaries Martin Luther and John Calvin, he is often referred to as the “Third Man of the Reformation.” (Library of Congress)

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(1513). He later witnessed the devastation of war at the Battle of Marignano in 1515, which pitted French forces led by Francis I against the Old Swiss Confederacy. The battle was a decisive French victory—the Swiss were heavily outnumbered and outgunned. Six thousand Swiss soldiers lost their lives. The carnage was a turning point in Swiss history. Fought in Italy, it was the last battle fought by a Swiss army on foreign soil. The Swiss Confederacy never again mounted a military offensive against an external enemy. The bloodshed no doubt had a sobering effect on Zwingli as well. After this battle he rethought his political position and also his views on the popular use of Swiss mercenaries and came to the conclusion that mercenary service was immoral. Zwingli labored in a setting in which church and society, especially the political realm, were identical. The church was not a distinct entity in the larger society. Especially in Switzerland, the church and Zurich were one and the same thing. Zwingli nevertheless distinguished between minister and magistrate. For him, the office of the minister is to teach the Word of God (Art. 36). Rulers, on the other hand, “look after the office of the sword” (Art. 41). In this connection, Zwingli addressed the pope, who wanted to take up arms against the Ottoman Turks who were threatening Europe. Zwingli exhorted, “Listen to Christ, oh pope, ‘Put it away’”—referring here to the sword. “The secular princes,” he said, “are undoubtedly quite capable of protecting their own land.” He then added, “Take no other sword into your hand than the sword of the Spirit which is the word of God” (Art. 36). Bishops in addition were not to rule temporal domains. “Priests should not govern at all, not even in the office which God has given them.” He wanted clear separation of duties. “They are to govern,” he contended, “even less extensively in worldly matters” (Art. 34). Here it should be pointed out that there is a disconnect between what Zwingli taught and what he did as a minister. He actually did become involved in the political affairs of Zurich. After his early death, the Zurich Council determined that his successors would not participate in civic affairs in the way that Zwingli had done. Zwingli preferred an aristocracy—the kind of government reflected in the Zurich Council—to democracy or monarchy. Monarchies were particularly dangerous be-

cause they tended to degenerate into tyranny. Where monarchies existed there needed to be a constitutional provision for deposition. The tyrant “may be deposed in the name of God.” But he continued, “It is not to be done,” however, “with killing, war and rioting.” He reasoned that the individuals who installed the king had the right to remove him. If the common people elected him, “then the people are also to depose him.” If the princes elevated him, they had the authority to “order him to be deposed” (Art. 42). Zwingli believed that the magistrates were to rule in accordance with the divine law. They were to see to it that “all laws ought to be brought into harmony with the law of God” (Art. 39). In this general sense, Zurich became somewhat theocratic under Zwingli’s reform program. It was not, however, a theocracy in the strict definition of a state that is ruled by ministers or the church. This is underscored, for example, in the elimination of church courts. Zwingli wrote, “All judicial authority and the administration of justice which the so-called priestly estate appropriates to itself, really belongs to the temporal authority” (Art. 36). This position corresponds with Zwingli’s view that the sins of Christians should be punished by the state, not the church (this position will later be designated Erastianism, named after Thomas Erastus, who embraced the Zwinglian position on discipline in the church). Zwingli gave to the magistrate the authority to excommunicate, to remove members from the church for the good of the church. The problem in the church, Zwingli noted, was that “there are still some rams among the flock of Christ who are so bold as to give no heed either to teaching or ban.” In such a case, the “government has to see to it that the strong, well-fed rams do not destroy the poor, weak sheep.” This means that “they ought to see to it that they protect and punish” (Art. 39). Zwingli noted that there are people in the visible church who are “insolent and hostile,” who “have no faith.” It is because of this reality that “there arises the need of government for the punishment of flagrant sinners, whether it be the government of princes or that of nobility” (Bromiley 1963, 266). In addition to his care of the church, the magistrate in Zwingli’s thought held the office of the sword. He alone in the domestic sphere had the authority to “impose the death

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penalty” (Art. 40). He also was to use the sword against foreign aggressors. With respect to this issue, Zwingli alluded to the classical just war concerns of medieval theology, the justice of war (jus ad bellum) and justice in war (jus in bello) categories. Zwingli’s most intense political and military concern related to the tradition of Swiss mercenary service. From the 13th to 16th centuries the soldiers of the Swiss cantons had developed a reputation as skilled combatants and were in high demand as paid soldiers in foreign governments throughout Europe. They were renowned for attacks in huge columns with the weapon of the long pike. From the very beginning of his ministry as a parish priest at Glarus, Zwingli attacked the mercenary trade as immoral and preached against it. He asserted later that “professional warfare is inhuman, shameless and sinful” (Art. 40). A major problem with the mercenary system was that Swiss soldiers ended up participating in campaigns that were initiated without a just cause. “If in war one only injured the disobedient,” Zwingli reasoned, “we could put up with it.” He then asked, “But how do you explain the fact that you take money from a foreign lord to aid him wantonly destroy, damage, and ravage countries innocent of all guilt?” (Works I, 142). Five Roman Catholic cantons declared war on Protestant Zurich in 1531. A small Zurich army of 2,000 men confronted a larger Catholic force of 8,000 near Kappel on October 11 when Protestant cantons failed to support

forces from Zurich. Zwingli joined the Zurich forces as a chaplain. He had taught that ministers ought not to wield the sword, but he decided in the emergency of the moment to take up the sword and to fight alongside his soldiers. He died in the ensuing engagement that lasted less than an hour. The Catholic soldiers desecrated his body, quartering and burning it, and then mixing it with cow dung. Interpretations are varied on the tragedy at Kappel. Reformer Martin Luther regarded Zwingli’s death on the field of battle as the judgment of God upon him. From another perspective, Zwingli can be seen as a brave patriot who gave his life in defense of his beliefs and the church in Zurich. Mark J. Larson See also Kappel, Wars of; Protestant Reformers and War; Wars of the Reformation Further Reading Bromiley, G. W., trans and ed. Zwingli and Bullinger: Selected Translations. Library of Christian Classics. Vol. XXIV. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963. Walton, Robert C. Zwingli’s Theocracy. University of Toronto Press, 1967. Zwingli, Huldreich. The Latin Works and Correspondence of Huldreich Zwingli. Vol. 1: 1510–1522. Edited by Samuel Maccauley Jackson. New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1912. Zwingli, Huldrych. The Defense of the Reformed Faith. Allison Park, PA: Pickwick Publications, 1984.

Primary Documents

An Account of the First Crusade: Anselme of Ribemont’s Letter to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims (1098)

In as much as you are our lord and as the kingdom of France is especially dependent upon your care we tell to you, our father, the events which have happened to us and the condition of the army of the Lord. Yet, in the first place, although we are not ignorant that the disciple is not above his master, nor the servant above his lord, we advise and beseech you in the name of our lord Jesus to consider what you are and what the duty of a priest and bishop is. Provide therefore for our land, so that the lords may keep peace among themselves, the vassals may in safety work on their property, and the ministers of Christ may serve the lord, [l] eading quiet and tranquil lives. I also pray you and the canons of the holy mother church of Reims, my fathers and lords, to be mindful of us, not only of me and of those who are now sweating in the service of God, but also of the members of the army of the lord who have fallen in arms or died in peace. But passing over these things, let us return to what we promised. Accordingly after the army had reached Nicomedia, which is situated at the entrance to the land of the Turks, we all, lords and vassals, cleaned by confession, fortified ourselves by partaking of the body and blood of our lord, and proceeding thence beset Nicaea on the second

This letter, written in 1098 by Anselme of Ribemont, Count of Ostrevant and Valenciennes, and a participant in the First Crusade, provides an overview of the mindset that both guided and motivated the crusaders. In the letter, the writer describes some of the combat in which the crusaders engaged upon entering Anatolia. Of the surviving letters from this era, this particular one allows contemporary readers to evaluate the many factors with which the crusaders grappled on their way to the Holy Land. The First Crusade began in 1095, and was the first of a series of military and religious campaigns launched to regain control of the Holy Land for Christendom. Crusading was influenced by significant social, political, economic, and military factors, which made every crusade unique. To his reverend lord M., by God’s grace archbishop of Reims, A. of Ribemont, his vassal and humble servant—greeting.

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day before the Nones of May. After we had for some days besieged the city with many machines and various engines of war, the craft of the Turks, as often before, deceived us greatly. For on the very day on which they had promised that they would surrender, Soliman and all the Turks, collected from neighboring end distant regions, suddenly fell upon us and attempted to capture our camp. However the count of & Gilles with the remaining Franks, made an attack upon them and killed an innumerable multitude. All the others fled in confusion. Our men moreover, returning in victory and bearing many heads fixed upon pikes and spears, furnished a joyful spectacle for the people of God. This was on the seventeenth day before the Kalends of June. Beset moreover and routed in attacks by night and day, they surrendered unwillingly on the thirteenth day before the Kalends of July. Then the Christians entering the walls with their crosses and imperial standards, reconciled the city to God, and both within the city and outside the gates cried out in Greek end Latin, “Glory to Thee, O God.” Having accomplished this, the princes of the army met the emperor who had come to offer them his thanks, and having received from him gifts of inestimable value, some withdrew with kindly feelings, others with different emotions. We moved our camp from Nicaea on the fourth day before the beginning of July and proceeded on our journey for three days. On the fourth day the Turks, having collected their forces from all sides, again attacked the smaller portion of our army, killed many of our men and drove all the remainder back to their camps. Bohemond, count of the Romans, count Stephen, and the count of Flanders commanded this section. When these were thus terrified by fear, the standards of the larger army suddenly appeared. Hugh the Great and the duke of Lorraine were riding at the head, the count of St. Gilles and the venerable bishop of Puy followed. For they had heard of the battle and were hastening to our aid. The number of the Turks was estimated at 260,000. All of our army attacked them, killed many and routed the rest. On that day I returned from the emperor, to whom the princes had sent me on public business. After that day our princes remained together and were not separated from one another. Therefore, in traversing the countries of Romania and Armenia we found no obstacle, except that after passing Iconium, we, who formed the

advance guard, saw a few Turks. After routing these, on the twelfth day before the Kalends of November, we laid siege to Antioch, and now we captured the neighboring places, the cities of Tarsus and Laodicea and many others, by force. On a certain day, moreover, before we besieged the city, at the “Iron Bridge” we routed the Turks, who had set out to devastate the surrounding country, and we rescued many Christians. Moreover, we led back the horses and camels with very great booty. While we were besieging the city, the Turks from the nearest redoubt daily killed those entering and leaving the army. The princes of our army seeing this, killed 400 of the Turks who were lying in wait, drove others into a certain river and led back some as captives. You may be assured that we are now besieging Antioch with all diligence, and hope soon to capture it. The city is supplied to an incredible extent with grain, wine, oil and all kinds of food. I ask, moreover, that you and all whom this letter reaches pray for us and for our departed brethren. Those who have fallen in battle are: at Nicaea, Baldwin of Ghent, Baldwin Ghalderuns, who was the first to make an attack upon the Turks and who fell in battle on the Kalends of July, Robert of Paris, Lisiard of Flanders, Hilduin of Mansgarbio [Maxingarbe], Ansellus of Caium [Anseau of Caien], Manasses of Glaromonte [Clermont], Laudunensis. Those who died from sickness: at Nicaea, Guy of Vitreio Odo of Vernolio [Verne uil (?)], Hugh of Reims; at the fortress of Sparnum, the venerable abbot Roger, my chaplain; at Antioch, Alard of Spiniaeco Hugh of Galniaco. Again and again I beseech you, readers of this letter, to pray for us, and you, my lord archbishop, to order this to be done by your bishops. And know for certain that we have captured the Lord 200 cities and fortresses. May our mother, the western church, rejoice that she has begotten such men, who are acquiring for her so glorious a name and who are so wonderfully aiding the eastern church. And in order that you may believe this, know that you have sent to me a tapestry by Raymond “de Castello.” Farewell. Source: Dana Carleton Munro, ed. Letters of the Crusaders. Vol. 1 in the Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania History Department, 1898, no. 1, 2–5. Available online at https://history.hanover.edu/texts/1stcrusade1 .html.

An Account of the First Crusade: Letter of Daimbert, Archbishop of Pisa  889

An Account of the First Crusade: Letter of Daimbert, Archbishop of Pisa; Godfrey of Bouillon; and Raymond, Count of St. Gilles to Pope Paschal II (1099) This letter, written by three leaders of the First Crusade, provided the new pope, Paschal II (r. 1099–1118), with an account of the siege of Antioch and of the capture and subsequent defense of the city of Jerusalem. This letter provides readers with a sample of the emotions and the thought processes of those involved in this cataclysmic historical era. Letters such as this one, written by participants in the upheavals of the crusading era, served as significant news sources, resembling the dispatches and military bulletins of our day. They also provide us with insights into the political, military, and religious issues that confronted the crusaders as they sought to establish Christian Latin states in the Muslim Middle East. To lord Paschal, pope of the Roman church, to all the bishops, and to the whole Christian people, from the archbishop of Pisa, duke Godfrey, now, by the grace of God, defender of the church of the Holy Sepu[l]chre, Raymond, count of St. Gilles, and the whole army of God, which is in the land of Israel, greeting. Multiply your supplications and prayers in the sight of God with joy and thanksgiving, since God has manifested His mercy in fulfiling by our hands what He had promised in ancient times. For after the capture of Nicaea, the whole army, made up of more than three hundred thousand soldiers, departed thence. And, although this army was great that it could have in a single day covered all Romania, and drunk up all the rivers and eaten up all the growing things, yet the Lord conducted them amid so great abundance that a ram was sold for a penny and an ox for twelve pennies or less. Moreover, although the princes and kings of the Saracens rose up against us, yet, by God’s will, they were easily conquered and overcome. Because, indeed, some were puffed up by these successes, God opposed to us Antioch, impregnable to human strength. And there He detained us for nine months and so humbled us in the siege that there were scarcely a hundred good horses in our whole army.

God opened to us the abundance of His blessing and mercy and led us into the city, and delivered the Turks and all of their possessions into our power. In as much as we thought that these had been acquired by our own strength and did not worthily magnify God who had done this, we were beset by so great a multitude of Turks that no one dared to venture forth at any point from the city. Moreover, hunger so weakened us that some could scarcely refrain from eating human flesh. It would be tedious to narrate all the miseries which we suffered in that city. But God looked down upon His people whom He had so long chastised and mercifully consoled them. Therefore, He at first revealed to us, as a recompense for our tribulation and as a pledge of victory, His lance which had lain hidden since the days of the apostles. Next, He so fortified the hearts of the men, that they who from sickness or hunger had been unable to walk, now were endued with strength to seize their weapons and manfully to fight against the enemy. After we had triumphed over the enemy, as our army was wasting away at Antioch from sickness and weariness and was especially hindered by the dissensions among the leaders, we proceeded into Syria, stormed Barra and Marra, cities of the Saracens, and captured the fortresses in that country. And while we were delaying there, there was so great a famine in the army that the Christian people now ate the putrid bodies of the Saracens. Finally, by the divine admonition, we entered into the interior of Hispania, and the most bountiful, merciful and victorious hand of the omnipotent Father was with us. For the cities and fortresses of the country through which we were proceeding sent ambassadors to us with many gifts and offered to aid us and to surrender their walled places. But because our army was not large and it was the unanimous wish to hasten to Jerusalem, we accepted their pledges and made them tributaries. One of the cities forsooth, which was on the sea-coast, had more men than there were in our whole army. And when those at Antioch and Laodicea and Archas heard how the hand of the Lord was with us, many from the army who had remained in those cities followed us to Tyre. Therefore, with the Lord’s companionship and aid, we proceeded thus as far as Jerusalem. And after the army had suffered greatly in the siege, especially on account of the lack of water, a council was held

890  Crusading in the Thirteenth Century: A Letter to All the Faithfull by the Patriarch of Jerusalem

and the bishops and princes ordered that all with bare feet should march around the walls of the city, in order that He who entered it humbly in our behalf might be moved by our humility to open it to us and to exercise judgment upon His enemies. God was appeased by this humility and on the eighth day after the humiliation, He delivered the city and His enemies to us. It was the day indeed on which the primitive church was driven thence and on which the festival of the dispersion of the apostles is celebrated. And if you desire to know what was done with the enemy who were found there, know that in Solomon’s Porch and in his temple our men rode in the blood of the Saracens up to the knees of their horses. Then, when we were considering who ought to hold the city, and some moved by love for their country and kinsmen wished to return home, it was announced to us that the king of Babylon had come to Ascalon with an innumerable multitude of soldiers. His purpose was as he said, to lead the Franks, who were in Jerusalem, into captivity, and to take Antioch by storm. But God had determined otherwise in regard to us. Therefore, when we learned that the army of the Babylonians was at their weapons, so that if they wished afterwards to attack us, they did not have the weapons in which they trusted. There can be no question how great the spoils were, since the treasures of the king of Babylon were captured. More than 100,000 Moors perished there by the sword. Moreover, their panic was so great that about 2,000 were suffocated at the gate of the city. Those who perished in the sea were innumerable. Many were entangled in the thickets. The whole world was certainly fighting for us, and if many of ours had not been detained in plundering the camp, few of the great multitude of the enemy would have been able to escape from the battle. And although it may be tedious, the following must not be omitted: on the day preceding the battle the army captured many thousands of camels, oxen and sheep. By the command of the princes, these were divided among the people. When we advanced to battle, wonderful to relate, the camels formed in many squadrons and the sheep and oxen did the same. Moreover, these animals accompanied us, halting when we halted, advancing when we advanced, and charging when we charged. The clouds protected us from the heat of the sun and cooled us.

Accordingly, after celebrating the victory, the army returned to Jerusalem. Duke Godfrey remained there; the count of St. Gilles, Robert, count of Normandy, and Robert, count of Flanders, returned to Laodicea. There they found the fleet belonging to the Pisans and to Bohemond. After the archbishop of Pisa had established peace between Bohemond and our leaders, Raymond prepared to return to Jerusalem for the sake of God and his brethren. Therefore, we call upon you of the Catholic Church of Christ and of the whole Latin church to exult in the so admirable bravery and devotion of your brethren, in the so glorious and very desirable retribution of the omnipotent God, and in the so devoutedly hoped-for remission of all our sins through the grace of God. And we pray that He may make you—namely, all bishops, clergy and monks who are leading devout lives, and all the laity—to sit down at the right hand of God, who liveth and reigneth God for ever and ever. And we ask and beseech you in the name of our Lord Jesus, who has ever been with us and aided us and freed us from all our tribulations, to be mindful of your brethren who return to you, by doing them kindnesses and by paying their debts, in order that God may recompense you and absolve from all your sins and grant you a share in all the blessings either we or they have deserved in the sight of the Lord. Amen. Source: Dana Carleton Munro, ed. Letters of the Crusaders. Vol. 1 in the Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History Series. Philadelphia: Department of History, University of Pennsylvania, 1894, vol. 1, no. 4, 8–11.

Crusading in the Thirteenth Century: A Letter to All the Faithfull by the Patriarch of Jerusalem (1229) This letter, addressed to all the faithful, was written by Gerold of Lausanne, the patriarch of Jerusalem, in 1229, the year the Sixth Crusade ended with a negotiated settlement between Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II and Al-Kamil, the sultan of Egypt. The patriarch of Jerusalem, like the pope and many others in the West, considered Frederick’s treaty to be a betrayal of the crusader cause because it resulted in a

Crusading in the Thirteenth Century: A Letter to All the Faithfull by the Patriarch of Jerusalem  891

10-year truce with the Muslims, left the Muslims in control of the holy sites in Jerusalem, and left the city without fortifications. As this letter indicates, Frederick’s critics charged the emperor with failing to provide for a lasting defense of Jerusalem and the surrounding Crusader States. This scathing letter illustrates the divisions within the Christian community in the Holy Land, and within Christendom in general in the 13th century. Gerold, patriarch of Jerusalem, to all the faithful—greeting. If it should be fully known how astonishing, nay, rather deplorable, the conduct of the emperor has been in the eastern lands from beginning to end to the gre[a]t detriment of the cause of Jesus Christ and to the great injury of the Christian faith, from the sole of his foot to the top of his head no common sense would be found in him. For he came, excommunicated, without money and followed by scarcely forty knights, and hoped to maintain himself by spoiling the inhabitants of Syria. He first came to and there most discourteously seized that noble man J. [John] of Ibelin and his sons, whom he had invited to his table under pretext of speaking of the affairs of the Holy Land. Next the king, whom he had invited to meet him, he retained almost as a captive. He thus by violence and fraud got possession of the kingdom. After these achievements he passed over into Syria. Although in the beginning he promised to do marvels and although in the presence of the foolish he boasted loudly, he immediately sent to the sultan of Babylon to demand peace. This conduct rendered him despicable in the eyes of the sultan and his subjects, especially after they discovered that he was not at the head of a numerous army which might have to some extent added weight to his words. Under the pretext of defending Joppa, he marched with the Christian army towards that city, in order to be nearer the sultan and in order to be able more easily to treat of peace or obtain a truce. What more shall I say? After long and mysterious conferences and without having consulted any one who lived in the country, he suddenly announced one day that he had made peace with the sultan. No one saw the text of the peace or truce when the emperor took the oath to observe the articles which were agreed upon. Moreover, you will be able to see clearly how great the malice was and how fraudulent the tenor of certain articles of

the truce which we have decided to send to you. The emperor for giving credit to his word wished as a guarantee only the word of the sultan, which he obtained for he said among other things that the holy city was surrendered to him. He went thither with the Christian army on the eve of the Sunday when “Oculi rnei” is sung [third Sunday in Lent]. The Sunday following, without any fitting ceremony and although excommunicated, in the chapel of the sepulchre of our lord, to the manifest prejudice of his honor and of the imperial dignity, he put the diadem upon his forehead, although the Saracens still held the temple of the lord and Solomon’s temple, and although they proclaimed publicly as before the law of Mohammed—to the great confusion and chagrin of the pilgrims. This same prince, who had previously very often promised to fortify Jerusalem, departed in secrecy from the city at dawn on the following Monday. The Hospitalers and the Templars promised solemnly and earnestly to aid him with all their forces and their advice, if he wanted to fortify the city, as he had promised. But the emperor who did not care to set affairs right, and who saw that there was no certainty in what had been done, and that the city in the state in which it bad been surrendered to him, could be neither defended nor fortified, was content with the name of surrender, and on the same day hastened with his family to Joppa. The pilgrims who had entered Jerusalem with the emperor, witnessing his departure, were unwilling to remain behind. The following Sunday when “Laetare Jerusalem” is sung [fourth Sunday in Lent], he arrived at Acre. There in order to seduce the people and to obtain their favor, he granted them a certain privilege. God knows the motive which made him act thus, and his subsequent conduct will make it known. As, moreover, the passage was near, and as all pilgrims, humble and gre[a]t, after having visited the Holy Sepulchre, were preparing to withdraw, as if they had accomplished their pilgrimage, because no truce had been concluded with the sultan of Damascus, we seeing that the holy land was already deserted and abandoned by the pilgrims, in our council formed the plan of retaining soldiers, for the common good, by means of the alms given by the king of France, of holy memory. When the emperor heard of this, he said to us that he was astonished at this, since he had concluded a truce with

892  Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation

the sultan of Babylon. We replied to him that the knife was still in the wound, since there was not a truce or with the sultan of Damascus, nephew of the aforesaid sultan and opposed to him, adding that even if the sultan of Babylon was unwilling, the former could still do us much harm. The emperor replied, saying, that no soldiers ought to be retained in his kingdom without his advice and consent, as he was now king of Jerusalem. We answered to that, that in the matter in question, as well as in all of a similar nature, we were very sorry not to be able, without endangering the salvation of our souls, to obey his wishes, because he was excommunicated. The emperor made no response to us, but on the following day he caused the pilgrims who inhabited the city to be assembled outside by the public crier, and by special messengers he also convoked the prelates and the monks. Addressing them in person, he began to complain bitterly of us, by heaping up false accusations. Then turning his remarks to the venerable mat[t]er of the Templars, he publicly attempted to severely tarnish the reputation of the latter, by various vain speeches, seeking thus to throw upon others the responsibility for his own faults which were now manifest and adding at last, that we were maintaining troops with the purpose of injuring him. After that he ordered all foreign soldiers, of if they valued their lives and property, not to remain in the land from that day on, and ordered count Thomas, whom he intended to leave as bailiff of the country, to punish with stripes any one who was found lingering, in order that the punishment of one might serve as an example to many. After doing all this he withdrew, and would listen to no excuses or answers to the charges which he had so shamefully made. He determined immediately to post some cross-bowmen at the gates of the city, ordering them to allow the Templars to go out but not to return. Next he fortified with cross-bows the churches and other elevated positions, and especially those which commanded the communications between the Templars and ourselves. And you may he sure that he never showed as much animosity and hatred against Saracens. For our part, seeing his manifest wickedness, we assembled all the prelates and all the pilgrims, and menaced with excommunication all those who should aid the emperor with their advice or their services against the church, the

Templars, the other monks of the holy land, or the pilgrims. The emperor realizing that his wickedness could have no success, was unwilling to remain any longer in the country. And, as if he would have liked to ruin everything, he ordered the cross-bows and engines of war, which for a long time had been kept at Acre for the defense of the Holy Land, to be secretly carried onto his vessels. He also sent away several of them to the sultan of Babylon, as his dear friend. He sent a troop of soldiers to Cyprus to levy heavy contributions of money there and, what appeared to us more astonishing, he destroyed the galleys which he was not able to take with him. Having learned this, we resolved to reproach him with it, but shunning the remonstrance and the correction, he entered a galley secretly, by an obscure way, on the day of the Apostles, St. Philip and St. James, and hastened to reach the island of Cyprus, without saying adieu to any one, leaving Joppa destitute; and may he never return. Very soon the bailiffs of the above-mentioned sultan shut off all departure from Jerusalem for the Christian poor and the Syrians, and many pilgrims died thus on the r[o]ad. This is what the emperor did, to the detriment of the Holy Land and of his own soul, as well as many other things which are known and which we leave to others to relate. May the merciful God deign to soften the results! Farewell. Source: Dana Carleton Munro, ed. Letters of the Crusaders. Vol. 1 in the Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History Series. Philadelphia: Department of History, University of Pennsylvania, 1894, vol. 1, no. 4, 2–5; available online at http://history.hanover.edu/texts/ger old.html.

Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation (1520) In 1520, the German reformer Martin Luther (1483–1546) published a series of major works that defined his most important points of disagreement with the papacy and the

Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation 893

church hierarchy. The first and most popular of these tracts was entitled Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation. Addressed, as the title indicates, to the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (1500–1558) and the German nobility, the tract urged these secular leaders to undertake a reform of the papacy and the church in Germany. In the following excerpt from the Address, Luther refers to the “three walls” that the “Romanists” had created to protect themselves from reform. These three walls comprised the following claims: first, that temporal, or secular, authority had no jurisdiction over church leaders themselves; second, that only the pope was able to explain scripture; and third, that nobody but the pope himself could call a general church council. Using these three walls, or excuses, Luther accused the church leaders of refusing to consider any reforms that he, and many other reformers, believed were long overdue. The church’s refusal to consider reform would lead eventually to the irreparable chasm within Christianity known as the Protestant Reformation. The Romanists have, with great adroitness, drawn three walls round themselves, with which they have hitherto protected themselves, so that no one could reform them, whereby all Christendom has fallen terribly. First, if pressed by the temporal power, they have affirmed and maintained that the temporal power has no jurisdiction over them, but, on the contrary, that the spiritual power is above the temporal. Secondly, if it were proposed to admonish them with the Scriptures, they objected that no one may interpret the Scriptures but the Pope. Thirdly, if they are threatened with a council, they pretend that no one may call a council but the Pope. . . . Now may God help us, and give us one of those trumpets that overthrew the walls of Jericho, so that we may blow down these walls of straw and paper, and that we may set free our Christian rods for the chastisement of sin, and expose the craft and deceit of the devil, so that we may amend ourselves by punishment and again obtain God’s favour. Let us, in the first place, attack the first wall. It has been devised that the Pope, bishops, priests, and monks are called the spiritual estate; princes, lords, artificers, and peasants, are the temporal estate. This is an artful

lie and hypocritical device, but let no one be made afraid by it, and that for this reason: that all Christians are truly of the spiritual estate, and there is no difference among them, save of office alone. As St. Paul says (i Cor. xii), we are all one body, though each member does its own work, to serve the others. This is because we have one baptism, one Gospel, one faith, and are all Christians alike; for baptism, Gospel, and faith, these alone make spiritual and Christian people. As for the unction by a pope or a bishop, tonsure, ordination, consecration, and clothes differing from those of laymen—all this may make a hypocrite or an anointed puppet, but never a Christian or a spiritual man. Thus we are all consecrated as, priests by baptism, as St. Peter says: ‘Ye are a royal priesthood, a holy nation’ (i Pet. ii. 9); and in the book of Revelation: ‘and hast made us unto our God (by Thy blood) kings and priests’ (Rev. v. io). For, if we had not a higher consecration in us than pope or bishop can give, no priest could ever be made by the consecration of pope or bishop, nor could he say the mass or preach or absolve. Therefore the bishop’s consecration is just as if in the name of the whole congregation he took one person out of the community; each member of which has equal power, and commanded him to exercise this power for the rest; in the same way as if ten brothers, co-heirs as king’s sons, were to choose one from among them to rule over their inheritance, they would all of them still remain kings and have equal power, although one is ordered to govern. And to put the matter more plainly, if a little company of pious Christian laymen were taken prisoners and carried away to a desert, and had not among them a priest consecrated by a bishop, and were there to agree to elect one of them and were to order him to baptise, to celebrate the mass, to absolve and to preach, this man would as truly be a priest, as if all the bishops and all the popes had consecrated him. That is why, in cases of necessity, every man can baptise and absolve, which would not be possible if we were not all priests. This great grace and virtue of baptism and of the Christian estate they have quite destroyed and made us forget by their ecclesiastical law. . . . Since then the temporal power is baptized as we are, and has the same faith and Gospel, we must allow it to be priest and bishop, and account its office an office that is proper and useful to the Christian community. For

894  Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants

whatever issues from baptism may boast that it has been consecrated priest, bishop, and pope, although it does not beseem every one to exercise these offices. For, since we are all priests alike, no man may put himself forward or take upon himself without our consent and election, to do that which we have all alike power to do. For if a thing is common to all, no man may take it to himself without the wish and command of the community. And if it should happen that a man were appointed to one of these offices and deposed for abuses, he would be just what he was before. Therefore a priest should be nothing in Christendom but a functionary; as long as he holds his office, he has precedence of others; if he is deprived of it, he is a peasant or a citizen like the rest. Therefore a priest is verily no longer a priest after deposition. But now they have invented characteres indelibiles, and pretend that a priest after deprivation still differs from a simple layman. They even imagine that a priest can never be anything but a priest—that is, that he become a layman. All this is nothing but mere ordinance of human invention. It follows then, that between laymen and priests, princes and bishops, or, as they call it, between spiritual and temporal sons, the only real difference is one of office and function, and not of estate. . . . . . . Therefore I say, Forasmuch as the temporal power has been ordained by God for the punishment of the bad and the protection of the good, we must let it do its duty throughout the whole Christian body, without respect of persons, whether it strike popes, bishops, priests, monks, nuns, or whoever it may be. . . . Whatever the ecclesiastical law has said in opposition to this is merely the invention of Romanist arrogance. . . . Now, I imagine the first paper wall is overthrown, inasmuch the temporal power has become a member of the Christian body; although its work relates to the body, yet does it belong to the sp[i]ritual estate. . . . The second wall is even more tottering and weak: that they end to be considered masters of the Scriptures. . . . If of our faith is right, ‘I believe in the holy Christian church,’ the Pope cannot alone be right; else we must say, ‘I believe in the Pope of Rome,’ and reduce the Christian Church to one man, which is a devilish and damnable heresy. Besides that, we are all priests, as I have said, and have all one faith, one Gospel, one Sacrament; how then should we not have

the power of discerning and judging what is right or wrong in matters of faith? . . . The third wall falls of itself, as soon as the first two have fallen; for if the Pope acts contrary to the Scriptures, we are bound to stand by the Scriptures to punish and to constrain him, according to Christ’s commandment. ‘tell it unto the Church’ (Matt. xviii. 15–17). . . . If then I am to accuse him before the Church, I must collect the Church together. . . . Therefore when need requires, and the Pope is a cause of offence to Christendom, in these cases whoever can best do so, as a faithful member of the whole body, must do what he can to procure a true free council. This no one can do so we as the temporal authorities, especially since they are fellow-Christians, fellow-priests. . . . Source: James Harvey Robinson, ed. Readings in European History. Vol. 2. Boston: Ginn, 1906, 74–78.

Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants (May 1525) The German Peasants’ War of 1524–1525 resulted in the deaths of more than 100,000 peasants. The peasants turned to violence when they became convinced that they would never receive a fair hearing of their grievances through the existing legal framework of the time. Martin Luther (1483– 1546) was outraged by the peasants’ resort to violence and rebellion, even though his own writings on reforming the church had contributed to the peasants’ desire for redress of their grievances. Luther called attention to their insubordination, rebellion, murder, and robbery, reminding the peasants of the biblical duty of submission, quoting from Romans 13:1: “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities.” He also referred to 1 Peter 2:13: “Be subject to every ordinance of man.” Luther also expressed his belief that the devil was behind the uprising, although he also urged in his writings that the nobility deal fairly with the peasants and give due consideration to their more reasonable demands. In my preceding pamphlet [on the “Twelve Articles”], I had no occasion to condemn the peasants, because they

Excerpt from Martin Luther’s Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants 895

promised to yield to law and better instruction, as Christ also demands (Matt. vii. i). But before I can turn around, they go out and appeal to force, in spite of their promises, and rob and pillage and act like mad dogs. From this it is quite apparent what they had in their false minds, and that what they put forth under the name of the gospel in the “Twelve Articles” was all vain pretense. In short, they practice mere devil’s work, and it is the arch-devil himself who reigns at Muhlhausen, indulging in nothing but robbery, murder, and bloodshed; as Christ says of the devil in John viii. 44, “he was a murderer from the beginning.” Since, therefore, those peasants and miserable wretches allow themselves to be led astray and act differently from what they declared, I likewise must write differently concerning them; and first bring their sins before their eyes, as God commands, whether perchance some of them may come to their senses; and, further, I would instruct those in authority how to conduct themselves in this matter. With threefold horrible sins against God and men have these peasants loaded themselves, for which they have deserved a manifold death of body and soul. First, they have sworn to their true and gracious rulers to be submissive and obedient, in accord with God’s command (Matt. xxii. 21), “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s,” and (Rom. xiii. 1), “Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers.” But since they have deliberately and sacrilegiously abandoned their obedience, and in addition have dared to oppose their lords, they have thereby forfeited body and soul, as perfidious, perjured, lying, disobedient wretches and scoundrels are wont to do. Wherefore St. Paul judges them, saying (Rom. xiii. 2), “And they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.” The peasants will incur this sentence, sooner or later; for God wills that fidelity and allegiance shall be sacredly kept. Second, they cause uproar and sacrilegiously rob and pillage monasteries and castles that do not belong to them, for which, like public highwaymen and murderers, they deserve the twofold death of body and soul. It is right and lawful to slay at the first opportunity a rebellious person, who is known as such, for he is already under God’s and the emperor’s ban. Every man is at once judge and executioner of a public rebel; just as, when a fire starts, he who can extinguish it first is the best fellow.

Rebellion is not simply vile murder, but is like a great fire that kindles and devastates a country; it fills the land with murder and bloodshed, makes widows and orphans, and destroys everything, like the greatest calamity. Therefore, whosoever can, should smite, strangle, and stab, secretly or publicly, and should remember that there is nothing more poisonous, pernicious, and devilish than a rebellious man. Just as one must slay a mad dog, so, if you do not fight the rebels, they will fight you, and the whole country with you. Third, they cloak their frightful and revolting sins with the gospel, call themselves Christian brethren, swear allegiance, and compel people to join them in such abominations. Thereby they become the greatest blasphemers and violators of God’s holy name, and serve and honor the devil under the semblance of the gospel, so that they have ten times deserved death of body and soul, for never have I heard of uglier sins. And I believe also that the devil foresees the judgment day, that he undertakes such an unheard-of measure; as if he said, “It is the last and therefore it shall be the worst; I’ll stir up the dregs and knock the very bottom out.” May the Lord restrain him! Lo, how mighty a prince is the devil, how he holds the world in his hands and can put it to confusion: who else could so soon capture so many thousands of peasants, lead them astray, blind and deceive them, stir them to revolt, and make them the willing executioners of his malice. . . . And should the peasants prevail (which God forbid!),—for all things are possible to God, and we know not but that he is preparing for the judgment day, which cannot be far distant, and may purpose to destroy, by means of the devil, all order and authority and throw the world into wild chaos,—yet surely they who are found, sword in hand, shall perish in the wreck with clear consciences, leaving to the devil the kingdom of this world and receiving instead the eternal kingdom. For we are come upon such strange times that a prince may more easily win heaven by the shedding of blood than others by prayers. Source: James Harvey Robinson, ed. Readings in European History. Vol. 2. Boston: Ginn, 1906, 106–108.

896  Excerpts from the Peace of Augsburg

Excerpts from the Peace of Augsburg (1555) The principle known as “Cuius regio, eius religio”(Whose realm, his religion) was established with the signing of the Peace of Augsburg in 1555. The individual princes within the Holy Roman Empire were free to select either Lutheranism or Catholicism within their domains, reaffirming the independence they had over their particular states and principalities. Their subjects who did not wish to conform to the prince’s choice were given a period of time in which they were free to leave the state and settle in different regions, allowing them to find a home with other adherents of their faith. The Peace of Augsburg was a treaty between Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (1500–1558) and the forces of the Schmalkaldic League, an alliance of Lutheran princes. The agreement was signed on September 25, 1555, in the city of Augsburg, which is in present-day Bavaria, Germany. It officially ended the religious struggle between Lutherans and Catholics and recognized the legal division of Christendom within the Holy Roman Empire. Constitution of the Peace between their Imperial and Royal Majesties, on the one hand, and the electors and estates of the realm, on the other: . . . Whereas, at all the diets held during the last thirty years and more, and at several special sessions besides, there have often been negotiations and consultations to establish between the estates of the Holy Empire a general, continuous, and enduring peace in regard to the contending religions; and several times terms of peace were drawn up, which, however, were never sufficient for the maintenance of peace, but in spite of them the estates of the Empire remained continually in bitterness and distrust toward each other, from which not a little evil has had its origin; . . . to secure again peace and confidence, in the minds of the estates and subjects toward each other, and to save the German nation, our beloved fatherland, from final dissolution and ruin; we, on the one hand, have united and agreed with the electors, the princes and estates present, and with the deputies and embassies of those absent, as they, on the other hand, with us. 1. We therefore establish, will, and command that from henceforth no one, whatsoever his rank or character, for

any cause, or upon any pretense whatsoever, shall engage in feuds, or make war upon, rob, seize, invest, or besiege another. Nor shall he, in person or through any agent, descend upon any castle, town, manor, fortification, villages, estates, hamlets, or against the will of that other seize them wickedly with violence, or damage them by fire or in other ways. Nor shall any one give such offenders counsel or help, or render them aid and assistance in any other way. Nor shall one knowingly or willingly show them hospitality, house them, give them to eat or drink, keep or suffer them. But every one shall love the other with true friendship and Christian love. It is provided also that no estate or member of the Holy Empire shall deprive or cut off any other estate from free access to provisions and food, or interfere with its trade, rents, money, or income; for justice should be administered not irregularly but in suitable and fixed places. In every way shall his Imperial Majesty, and we, and all the estates, mutually adhere to all the contents of this present religious and general constitution for securing the peace of the land. 2. And in order that such peace, which is especially necessary in view of the divided religions, as is seen from the causes before mentioned, and is demanded by the sad necessity of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, may be the better established and made secure and enduring between his Roman Imperial Majesty and us, on the one hand, and the electors, princes, and estates of the Holy Empire of the German nation on the other, therefore his Imperial Majesty, and we, and the electors, princes, and estates of the Holy Empire will not make war upon any estate of the empire on account of the Augsburg Confession and the doctrine, religion, and faith of the same, nor injure nor do violence to those estates that hold it, nor force them, against their conscience, knowledge, and will, to abandon the religion, faith, church usages, ordinances, and ceremonies of the Augsburg Confession, where these have been established, or may hereafter be established, in their principalities, lands, and dominions. Nor shall we, through mandate or in any other way, trouble or disparage them, but shall let them quietly and peacefully enjoy their religion, faith, church usages, ordinances, and ceremonies, as well as their possessions, real and personal property, lands, people, dominions, governments, honors, and rights. . . .

Excerpts from the Peace of Augsburg  897

3. On the other hand, the estates that have accepted the Augsburg Confession shall suffer his Imperial Majesty, us, and the electors, princes, and other estates of the Holy Empire, adhering to the old religion, to abide in like manner by their religion, faith, church usages, ordinances, and ceremonies. They shall also leave undisturbed their possessions, real and personal property, lands, people, dominions, government, honors, and rights, rents, interest, and tithes. . . . 5. But all others who are not adherents of either of the above-mentioned religions are not included in this peace, but shall be altogether excluded. 6. And since, in the negotiation of this peace, there has been disagreement about what should be done when one or more of the spiritual estates should abandon the old religion, on account of the archbishoprics, bishoprics, prelacies, and benefices that were held by them, about which the adherents of both religions could not come to an agreement; therefore, by the authority of the revered Roman Imperial Majesty, fully delegated to us, we have established and do hereby make known, that where an archbishop, bishop, prelate, or other spiritual incumbent shall depart from our old religion, he shall immediately abandon, without any opposition or delay, his archbishopric, bishopric, prelacy, and other benefices, with the fruits and incomes that he may have had from it,—nevertheless without prejudice to his honor. 7. But since certain estates or their predecessors have confiscated certain foundations, monasteries, and other spiritual possessions, and have applied the income of these to churches, schools, charitable institutions, and other purposes, such confiscated property, which does not belong to them, shall . . . be included in this agreement of peace, shall be considered as confiscated, and shall be regulated by the rules governing each estate in dealing with confiscated properties. . . . 10. No estate shall urge another estate, or the subjects of the same, to embrace its religion. 11. But when our subjects and those of the electors, princes, and estates, adhering to the old religion or to the Augsburg Confession, wish, for the sake of their religion, to go with wife and children to another place in the lands, principalities, and cities of the electors, princes, and estates of the Holy Empire, and settle there, such going and com-

ing, and the sale of property and goods, in return for reasonable compensation for serfdom and arrears of taxes, . . . shall be everywhere unhindered, permitted, and granted. . . . 13. And in such peace the free knights who are immediately subject to his Imperial Majesty and us, shall also be included; and it is further provided that they shall not be interfered with, persecuted, or troubled by any one on account of either of the aforesaid religions. 14. But since in many free and imperial cities both religions—namely, our old religion and that of the Augsburg Confession—have hitherto come into existence and practice, the same shall remain hereafter and be held in the same cities; and citizens and inhabitants of the said free and imperial cities, whether spiritual or secular in rank, shall peacefully and quietly dwell with one another; and no party shall venture to abolish the religion, church customs, or ceremonies of the other, or persecute them therefor. . . . 15. In order to bring peace to the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic Nation between the Roman Imperial Majesty and the Electors, Princes and Estates, let neither his Imperial Majesty nor the Electors, Princes, etc., do any violence or harm to any estate of the empire on the account of the Augsburg Confession, but let them enjoy their religious belief, liturgy and ceremonies as well as their estates and other rights and privileges in peace; and complete religious peace shall be obtained only by Christian means of amity, or under threat of punishment of the Imperial ban. 16. Likewise the Estates espousing the Augsburg Confession shall let all the Estates and Princes who cling to the old religion live in absolute peace and in the enjoyment of all their estates, rights, and privileges. 17. However, all such as do not belong to the two above named religions shall not be included in the present peace but be totally excluded from it. 18. And since it has proved to be a matter of great dispute what was to happen with the bishoprics, priories and other ecclesiastical benefices of such Catholic priests who would in course of time abandon the old religion, we have in virtue of the powers of Roman Emperors ordained as follows: where an archbishop, bishop or prelate or any other priest of our old religion shall abandon the same, his archbishopric, bishopric, prelacy and other benefices together with all their income and revenues which he has so

898  Excerpt from Jacques-Auguste de Thou’s Account of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day

far possessed, shall be abandoned by him without any further objection or delay. The chapter and such are entitled to it by common law or the custom of the place shall elect a person espousing the old religion who may enter on the possession and enjoyment of all the rights and incomes of the place without any further hindrance and without prejudging any ultimate amicable transaction of religion. 19. Some of the abbeys, monasteries and other ecclesiastical estates having been confiscated and turned into churches, schools, and charitable institutions, it is herewith ordained that such estates which their original owners had not possessed at the time of the Treaty of Passau [1552] shall be comprised in the present treaty of peace. 20. The ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the Augsburg Confession, dogma, appointment of ministers, church ordinances, and ministries hitherto practiced (but apart from all the rights of Electors, Princes and Estates colleges and monasteries to taxes in money or tithes) shall from now cease and the Augsburg Confession shall be left to the free and untrammeled enjoyment of their religion, ceremonies, appointment of ministers, as is stated in a subsequent separate article, until the final transaction of religion will take place. . . . 23. No Estate shall try to persuade the subjects of other Estates to abandon their religion nor protect them against their own magistrates. Such as had from olden times the rights of patronage are not included in the present article. 24. In case our subjects whether belonging to the old religion or the Augsburg confession should intend leaving their homes with their wives and children in order to settle in another, they shall be hindered neither in the sale of their estates after due payment of the local taxes nor injured in their honour. 25. Also herewith, and by the authority of this our imperial edict, we command and order the judges of the imperial courts, and their colleagues, to hold and conduct themselves in conformity with this treaty of peace, as well as to give fitting and necessary relief of the law to the appealing suitors themselves, no matter to which of the aforesaid religions they belong, and against all such to recognize and decree no citation, mandate, or process. . . . Given in the imperial city of Augsburg belonging to us [namely, Charles V], King Ferdinand, and to the Holy Empire, on the twenty-fifth day of the month of September,

since the birth of Christ our dear Lord one thousand five hundred and fifty-five. . . . Source: James Harvey Robinson, ed. Readings in European History. Vol. 2. Boston: Ginn, 1906, pp. 113–117; and Reich, E., ed. Select Documents. London, 1905, 230–32.

Excerpt from Jacques-Auguste de Thou’s Account of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day in Paris (1572) The St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre took place in August 1572 during the French Wars of Religion. This massacre consisted of the outright assassination of Protestants, resulting from a wave of Catholic mob violence directed against the French Calvinist Protestants known as Huguenots. The massacre took place over five days, beginning during the night of August 23–24, 1572 (the eve of the feast of Bartholomew the Apostle), and two days after the attempted assassination of Admiral Gaspard de Coligny (1519–1572), the military and political leader of the Huguenots. The young French king, Charles IX (1550–1574), who was heavily influenced by his mother, Catherine de’ Medici (1519–1589), ordered the killing of a group of Huguenot leaders, including Coligny, and the slaughter then spread throughout strongly Catholic Paris. Lasting several weeks, the massacre expanded outward to other urban centers and the French countryside. Estimates for the number of Protestant Huguenots killed across all of France vary from 5,000 to 30,000. So it was determined to exterminate all the Protestants, and the plan was approved by the queen. They discussed for some time whether they should make an exception of the king of Navarre and the prince of Conde. All agreed that the king of Navarre should be spared by reason of the royal dignity and the new alliance. The duke of Guise, who was put in full command of the enterprise, summoned by night several captains of the Catholic Swiss mercenaries from the five little cantons, and some commanders of French companies, and told them that it was the will of the king that, according to God’s will, they should take vengeance on the band of rebels while they had the beasts in the

Excerpt from Jacques-Auguste de Thou’s Account of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day  899

toils. Victory was easy and the booty great and to be obtained without danger. The signal to commence the massacre should be given by the bell of the palace, and the marks by which they should recognize each other in the darkness were a bit of white linen tied around the left arm and a white cross on the hat. Meanwhile Coligny awoke and recognized from the noise that a riot was taking place. Nevertheless he remained assured of the king’s good will, being persuaded thereof either by his credulity or by Teligny, his son-in-law: he believed the populace had been stirred up by the Guises, and that quiet would be restored as soon as it was seen that soldiers of the guard, under the command of Cosseins, had been detailed to protect him and guard his property. But when he perceived that the noise increased and that someone had fired an arquebus in the courtyard of his dwelling, then at length, conjecturing what it might be, but too late, he arose from his bed and having put on his dressing gown he said his prayers, leaning against the wall. Labonne held the key of the house, and when Cosseins commanded him, in the king’s name, to open the door he obeyed at once without fear and apprehending nothing. But scarcely had Cosseins entered when Labonne, who stood in his way, was killed with a dagger thrust. The Swiss who were in the courtyard, when they saw this, fled into the house and closed the door, piling against it tables and all the furniture they could find. It was in the first scrimmage that a Swiss was killed with a ball from an arquebus fired by one of Cosseins’ people. But finally the conspirators broke through the door and mounted the stairway, Cosseins, Attin, Corberan de Cordillac, Seigneur de Sarlabous, first captains of the regiment of the guards, Achilles Petrucci of Siena, all armed with cuirasses, and Besme the German, who had been brought up as a page in the house of Guise; for the duke of Guise was lodged at court, together with the great nobles and others who accompanied him. After Coligny had said his prayers with Merlin the minister, he said, without any appearance of alarm, to those who were present (and almost all were surgeons, for few of them were of his retinue): “I see clearly that which they seek, and I am ready steadfastly to suffer that death which I have never feared and which for a long time past I have pictured to myself. I consider myself happy in feeling the

approach of death and in being ready to die in God, by whose grace I hope for the life everlasting. I have no further need of human succor. Go then from this place, my friends, as quickly as you may, for fear lest you shall be involved in my misfortune, and that some day your wives shall curse me as the author of your loss. For me it is enough that God is here, to whose goodness I commend my soul, which is so soon to issue from my body.” After these words they ascended to an upper room, whence they sought safety in flight here and there over the roofs. Meanwhile the conspirators, having burst through the door of the chamber, entered, and when Besme, sword in hand, had demanded of Coligny, who stood near the door, “Are you Coligny?” Coligny replied, “Yes, I am he,” with fearless countenance. “But you, young man, respect these white hairs. What is it you would do? You cannot shorten by many days this life of mine.” As he spoke, Besme gave him a sword thrust through the body, and having withdrawn his sword, another thrust in the mouth, by which his face was disfigured. So Coligny fell, killed with many thrusts. Others have written that Coligny in dying pronounced as though in anger these words: “Would that I might at least die at the hands of a soldier and not of a valet.” But Attin, one of the murderers, has reported as I have written, and added that he never saw any one less afraid in so great a peril, nor die more steadfastly. Then the duke of Guise inquired of Besme from the courtyard if the thing were done, and when Besme answered him that it was, the duke replied that the Chevalier d’Angouleme was unable to believe it unless he saw it; and at the same time that he made the inquiry they threw the body through the window into the courtyard, disfigured as it was with blood. When the Chevalier d’Angouleme, who could scarcely believe his eyes, had wiped away with a cloth the blood which overran the face and finally had recognized him, some say that he spurned the body with his foot. However this may be, when he left the house with his followers he said: “Cheer up, my friends! Let us do thoroughly that which we have begun. The king commands it.” He frequently repeated these words, and as soon as they had caused the bell of the palace clock to ring, on every side arose the cry, “To arms!” and the people ran to the house of Coligny. After his body had been treated to all sorts of insults, they threw it into a neighboring stable, and

900  Granting Religious Toleration to Huguenots: Henri IV’s Edict of Nantes

finally cut off his head, which they sent to Rome. They also shamefully mutilated him, and dragged his body through the streets to the bank of the Seine, a thing which he had formerly almost prophesied, although he did not think of anything like this. As some children were in the act of throwing the body into the river, it was dragged out and placed upon the gibbet of Montfaucon, where it hung by the feet in chains of iron; and then they built a fire beneath, by which he was burned without being consumed; so that he was, so to speak, tortured with all the elements, since he was killed upon the earth, thrown into the water, placed upon the fire, and finally put to hang in the air. After he had served for several days as a spectacle to gratify the hate of many and arouse the just indignation of many others, who reckoned that this fury of the people would cost the king and France many a sorrowful day, Francois de Montmorency, who was nearly related to the dead man, and still more his friend, and who moreover had escaped the danger in time, had him taken by night from the gibbet by trusty men and carried to Chantilly, where he was buried in the chapel. Source: James Harvey Robinson, ed., Readings in European History, 2 vols. Boston: Ginn, 1906, vol. 2:179–183.

Granting Religious Toleration to Huguenots: Henri IV’s Edict of Nantes (1598) The Edict of Nantes, signed by the French king Henri IV (1553–1610) in 1598, granted French Protestants, known as Huguenots, civil and religious rights in a Catholic state. The excerpts that follow clearly delineate the religious clauses that appear in the edict. The edict itself was aimed primarily at ending the disruptive French Wars of Religion. Henri IV also had a very personal reason for supporting the edict, since prior to assuming the throne in 1589 he was a Protestant, and he would remain sympathetic to the Protestant cause even after converting to Catholicism in 1593. This conversion was not based on any great conviction of the righteousness of his new faith, but was done to secure his position as king of France, for France’s Catholic majority would not

accept a Protestant king. The edict succeeded for a short time in restoring peace and internal unity to France, although Catholics rejected the recognition of Protestantism as a permanent element in French society. Catholics hoped to restore religious uniformity to the country, and Protestants aspired to parity with Catholics, an aspiration that was ultimately not achieved. However, reestablishing royal authority in France in the wake of the devastating Wars of Religion required internal peace, which was achieved by the limited toleration provided by the Edict of Nantes. During the course of the 17th century, the Catholic monarchy gradually whittled away at the rights of Huguenots until Henri’s grandson, King Louis XIV (1638–1715), revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685. Henry, By the Grace of God, King of France, and Navarre, To all Present, and to Come, greeteth. Among the infinite Mercies that God hath pleased to bestow upon us, that most Signal and Remarkable is, his having given us Power and Strength not to yield to the dreadful Troubles, Confusions, and Disorders, which were found at our coming to this Kingdom, divided into so many Parties and Factions, that the most Legitimate was almost the least, enabling us with Constancy in such manner to oppose the Storm, as in the end to surmount it, reducing this Estate to Peace and Rest; For which, to Him alone be given the Honour and Glory, and us the Grace to acknowledge our obligation, in having our Labours made use of for the accomplishing so good a work, in which it hath been visible to all, that we have not only done what was our Duty, and in our Power, but something more than at another time, would (peradventure) have been agreeable to the Dignity we now hold; as in not having more Care, than to have many times so freely exposed our own Life. And in this great concurrence of weighty and perillous Affairs, not being able to compose all at one and the same time, We have chosen in this order, First to undertake those who were not to be suppressed but by force, and rather to remit and suspend others for some time, who might be dealt with by reason, and Justice: For the general difference among our good Subjects, and the particular evils of the soundest parts of the State, we judged might be easily cured, after the Principal cause (the continuation of the Civil Wars) was taken away, in which we have, by the

Granting Religious Toleration to Huguenots: Henri IV’s Edict of Nantes  901

blessing of God, well and happily succeeded, all Hostility and Wars through the Kingdom being now ceased, and we hope he will also prosper us in our other affairs, which remain to be composed, and that by this means we shall arrive at the establishment of a good Peace, with tranquility and rest, (which hath ever been the end of all our vows and intentions) as all the reward we desire or expect for so much pain and trouble, as we have taken in the whole course of our Life. Amongst our said affairs (towards which it behooves us to have patience) one of the principal hath been, the many complaints we received from divers of our Provinces and Catholick Cities, for that the exercise of the Catholick Religion was not universally reestablished, as is provided by Edicts or Statutes heretofore made for the Pacification of the Troubles arising from Religion; as also the Supplications and Remonstrances which have been made to us by our Subjects of the reformed Religion, as well upon the execution of what hath been granted by the said former Laws, as that they desire to have some addition for the exercise of their Religion, the liberty of their Consciences and the security of their Persons and Fortunes. . . . For this cause, acknowledging this affair to be of the greatest importance, and worthy of the best consideration, after having considered the papers of complaints of our Catholick subjects, and having also permitted to our Subjects of the Reformed Religion to assemble themselves by Deputies, for framing their complaints, and making a collection of all their Remonstrances; and having thereupon conferred divers times with them, viewing the precedent Laws, we have upon the whole judged it necessary to give to all our said Subjects one general Law, Clear, Pure, and Absolute, by which they shall be regulated in all differences which have heretofore risen among them, or may hereafter rise, wherewith the one and other may be contented, being framed according as the time requires: and having had no other regard in this deliberation than solely the Zeal we have to the service of God, praying that he would henceforward render to all our subjects a durable and Established peace. Upon which we implore and expect from his divine bounty the same protection and favour, as he hath alwayes visibly bestowed upon this Kingdom from our Birth, during the many years we have attained unto, and give our said Subjects the grace to understand, that in observation of this

our Ordinance consisteth (after that which is their duty toward God and us) the principal foundation of their Union, Concord, Tranquility, Rest, and the Re-establishment of all this Estate in its first splendor, opulency and strength. . . . 6. And not to leave any occasion of trouble and difference among our Subjects, we have permitted and do permit to those of the Reformed Religion, to live and dwell in all the Cities and places of this our Kingdom and Countreys under our obedience, without being inquired after, vexed, molested, or compelled to do any thing in Religion, contrary to their Conscience, nor by reason of the same be searched after in houses or places where they live, they comporting themselves in other things as is contained in this our present Edict or Statute. 7. We also permit to all Lords, Gentlemen and other Persons, as well inhabitants as others, making profession of the Reformed Religion, having in our Kingdom and Countreys under our obedience, high Justice as chief Lord (as in Normandy) be it in propriety or usage, in whole, moiety, or third part, to have in such of their houses of the said high Justice or Fiefs, as abovesaid (which they shall be obliged to Nominate for their principall residence to our Bayliffs and chief Justice each in their jurisdiction) the exercise of the said Religion as long as they are Resident there, and in their absence, their wives or families, or part of the same. And though the right of Justice or whole Fief be controverted, nevertheless the exercise of the said Religion shall be allowed there, provided that the abovesaid be in actual possession of the said high Justice, though our Attorney Generall be a Party. We permitting them also to have the said exercise in their other houses of high Justice or Fiefs abovesaid, so long as they shall be present, and not otherwise: and all, as well for them, their families and subjects, as others that shall go thither. 8. In the Houses that are Fiefs, where those of the said Religion have not high Justice, there the said Exercise of the Reformed Religion shall not be permitted, save only to their own Families, yet nevertheless, if other persons, to the number of thirty, besides their Families, shall be

902  The Dutie of a King in His Royal Office by Sir Walter Raleigh

there upon the occasion of Christenings, Visits of their Friends, or otherwise, our meaning is, that in such case they shall not be molested: provided also, that the said Houses be not within Cities, Burroughs, or Villages belonging to any Catholick Lord (save to Us) having high Justice, in which the said Catholick Lords have their Houses. For in such cases, those of the said Religion shall not hold the said Exercise in the said Cities, Burroughs, or Villages, except by permission of the said Lords high Justices. 9. We permit also to those of the said Religion to hold, and continue the Exercise of the same in all the Cities and Places under our obedience, where it hath by them been Established and made publick by many and divers times, in the Year 1586, and in 1597, until the end of the Month of August, notwithstanding all Decrees and Judgments whatsoever to the contrary. . . . 16. Following the second Article of the Conference of Nerat, we grant to those of the said Religion power to build Places for the Exercise of the same, in Cities and Places where it is granted them. . . . 27. To the end to reunited so much the better the minds and good will of our Subjects, as is our intention, and to take away all complaints for the future; We declare all those who make or shall make profession of the said Reformed Religion, to be capable of holding and exercising all Estates, Dignities, Offices, and publick charges whatsoever, Royal, Signioral, or of Cities of our Kingdom, Countreys, Lands, and Lordships under our obedience, notwithstanding all Oaths to the contrary, and to be indifferently admitted and received into the same, and our Court of Parliament and other Judges shall content themselves with informing and inquiring after the lives, manners, Religion and honest Conversation of those that were or shall be preferred to such offices, as well of the one Religion as the other, without taking other Oath of them than for the good and faithful service of the King in the exercise of their Office. . . . Source: Edmund Everard. The Great Pressures and Grievances of the Protestants in France. London: Printed by E. T. and R. H. for T. Cockeril, 1681, 1.

The Dutie of a King in His Royal Office by Sir Walter Raleigh (1599) Sir Walter Raleigh (1552–1618), the English explorer and author, wrote this tract on the divine right of kings. The Dutie of a King in His Royal Office describes the power of the king as being equivalent to that of God. Raleigh also equates the king to a father, who is the head of his family. Raleigh is known more for his explorations and his military exploits than for his political activity, although he was a Protestant who took part in the French Wars of Religion on the Huguenot side. The state of monarchie is the supremest thing upon earth; for kings are not only Gods lieutenants upon earth, and sit upon Gods throne, but even by God himselfe they are called gods. There be three principall similitudes that ilustrate the state of monarchie: one taken out of the word of God; and the two other out of the grounds of policie and philosophie. In the scriptures, kings are called gods; and so their power, after a certaine relation, compared to the divine power. Kings are also compared to fathers of families: for a king is truly parens patriæ, the politique father of his people. And, lastly, kings are compared to the head of this microcosme of the body of man. Kings are justly called gods; for that they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power upon earth. For, if you will consider the attributes of God, you shall see how they agree in the person of a king. God hath the powere to create or destroy, make or unmake, at his pleasure; to give life or send death, to judge all, and not to be judged nor accountable to none; to raise low things, and to make high things low at his pleasure, and to God are both soule and body due. And the like power have kings: they make and unmake their subjects; they have powers of raising and casting down; of life and of death; judges over all their subjects, and in all causes, and yet accountable to none but God only. They have power to exalt low things, and abase high things, and make of their subjects like men at the chesse; a pawne to take a bishop or a knight, and to cry up or down any of their subjects, as they do their money. And to the king is due both the affection of the soule and the service of the body of his subjects. And, therefore, that reverend bishop here amongst you, though I heare, that by divers he

Edicts Issued by the Japanese Shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa  903

was mistaken, or not well understood, yet did he preach both learnedly and truly anent this point concerning the power of a king; for what he spake of a kings power in abstracto, is most true in divinitie: for to emperours, or kings that are monarches, their subjects bodies and goods are due for their defence and maintenance. But if I had been in his place, I would only have added two words, which would have cleared all; for, after I had told as a divine what was due by the subjects to their kings in generall all subjects were bound to relieve their king; so to exhort them, that, as we lived in a setled state of a kingdome, which was governed by his own fundamentall lawes and orders, that, according thereunto, they were now (being assembled for this purpose in parliament) to consider how to help such a king as now they had; and that according to the ancient forme and order established in this kingdome: putting so a difference between the generall power of a king in divinity and the setled and established state of this crown and kingdome. And I am sure that the bishop meant to have done the same, if he had not been straited by time, which, in re[s] pect of the greatnesse of the presence, preaching before me, and such an auditory, he durst not presume upon. As for the father of a familie, they had of old, under the law of nature, patriam postestatem, which was potestatem vitæ et necis, over the children or familie (I mean such fathers of families as were the lineall heires of those families whereof kings did originally come;) for kings had their first originall from them, who planted and spread themselves in colonies through the world. Now a father may dispose of his inheritance to his child[r]en at his pleasure; yea, even disinherit the eldest upon just occasion, and preferre the youngest, according to his liking; make them beggars or rich at his pleasure; restraine or banish out of his presence, as he finds them give cause of offence, or restore them in favour againe with the penitent sinner: so may the king deale with his subjects. And, lastly, as for the head of the naturall body, the head hath the power of directing all the members of the body to that use which judgement in the head thinkes most convenient. It may apply sharp cures, or cut off corrupt members, let blood in what proportion it thinkes fit, and as the body may spare, but yet is all this power ordained by God ad ædificationem, non ad destructionem; for although God have power, as well of destruction as of creation or mainte-

nance, yet will it not agree with the wisdome of God to exercise his power in the destruction of nature, and overturning the whole frame of things, since his creatures were made, that his glory might thereby be the better expressed: so were he a foolish father that would disinherit or destroy his children without cause, or leave off the carefull education of them; and it were an idle head that would, in place of physicke, so poyson or phlebotomize the body. Source: Sir Walter Scott. A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts, 2nd ed. London: Printed for T. Cadell and W. Davies, Strand, 1810, vol. 3: 260–261.

Edicts Issued by the Japanese Shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa: “Closed Country Edict” (1635) and “Exclusion of the Portuguese Edict” (1639) The Japanese benefited from trade with Western nations, primarily the Dutch and Portuguese, in the 16th and 17th centuries. But, however useful many of the trade goods were that the Japanese acquired from the West, many of the belief systems and values that Westerners also brought to Japan were viewed with suspicion by the authorities. The Japanese shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa (1543–1616) unified Japan under his rule in 1603 following the Battle of Sekigahara. His fear that Christianity and Western values would be a threat to his rule and to the unity of Japan led him to issue the following edicts, essentially expelling Westerners from Japan. The country was thus cut off from contact with the West until 1853, when American commodore Matthew Perry sailed a fleet of ships into Tokyo Bay and forcibly reopened Japan to Western trade and influence. Closed Country Edict of 1635   1. Japanese ships are strictly forbidden to leave for foreign countries.   2. No Japanese is permitted to go abroad. If there is anyone who attempts to do so secretly, he must be executed. The ship so involved must be

904  Edicts Issued by the Japanese Shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa

  3.   4.

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impounded and its owner arrested, and the matter must be reported to the higher authority. If any Japanese returns from overseas after residing there, he must be put to death. If there is any place where the teachings of padres is practiced, the two of you must order a thorough investigation. Any informer revealing the whereabouts of the followers of padres must be rewarded accordingly. If anyone reveals the whereabouts of a high ranking padre, he must be given one hundred pieces of silver. For those of lower ranks, depending on the deed, the reward must be set accordingly. If a foreign ship has an objection [to the measures adopted] and it becomes necessary to report the matter to Edo, you may ask the Omura domain to provide ships to guard the foreign ship. . . . If there are any Southern Barbarians who propagate the teachings of padres, or otherwise commit crimes, they may be incarcerated in the prison. . . . All incoming ships must be carefully searched for the followers of padres. No single trading city shall be permitted to purchase all the merchandise brought by foreign ships. Samurai are not permitted to purchase any goods originating from foreign ships directly from Chinese merchants in Nagasaki. After a list of merchandise brought by foreign ships is sent to Edo, as before you may order that commercial dealings may take place without waiting for a reply from Edo. After settling the price, all white yarns brought by foreign ships shall be allocated to the five trading cities and other quarters as stipulated. After settling the price of white yarns, other merchandise [brought by foreign ships] may be traded freely between the [licensed] dealers. However, in view of the fact that Chinese ships are small and cannot bring large consignments, you may issue orders of sale at your discretion.

14.

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Additionally, payment for goods purchased must be made within twenty days after the price is set. The date of departure homeward of foreign ships shall not be later than the twentieth day of the ninth month. Any ships arriving in Japan later than usual shall depart within fifty days of their arrival. As to the departure of Chinese ships, you may use your discretion to order their departure after the departure of the Portuguese galeota. The goods brought by foreign ships which remained unsold may not be deposited or accepted for deposit. The arrival in Nagasaki of representatives of the five trading cities shall not be later than the fifth day of the seventh month. Anyone arriving later than that date shall lose the quota assigned to his city. Ships arriving in Hirado must sell their raw silk at the price set in Nagasaki, and are not permitted to engage in business transactions until after the price is established in Nagasaki.

You are hereby required to act in accordance with the provisions set above. It is so ordered. Exclusion of the Portuguese, 1639 1. The matter relating to the proscription of Christianity is known [to the Portuguese]. However, heretofore they have secretly transported those who are going to propagate that religion. 2. If those who believe in that religion band together in an attempt to do evil things, they must be subjected to punishment. 3. While those who believe in the preaching of padres are in hiding, there are incidents in which that country [Portugal] has sent gifts to them for their sustenance. In view of the above, hereafter entry by the Portuguese galeota is forbidden. If they insist on coming [to Japan], the ships must be destroyed and anyone aboard those ships must be beheaded. We have received the above order and are thus transmitting it to you accordingly.

Excerpt from Samuel Rutherford’s Lex, Rex 905

The above concerns our disposition with regard to the galeota. With regard to those who believe in Christianity, you are aware that there is a proscription, and thus knowing, you are not permitted to let padres and those who believe in their preaching to come aboard your ships. If there is any violation, all of you who are aboard will be considered culpable. If there is anyone who hides the fact that he is a Christian and boards your ship, you may report it to us. A substantial reward will be given to you for this information. This memorandum is to be given to those who come on Chinese ships. [A similar note to the Dutch ships.] Source: David John Lu, ed. and trans. Japan: A Documentary History. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, 196–197. © 2001 M. E. Sharpe. Reproduced with the permission of the publisher. All rights reserved.

Excerpt from Samuel Rutherford’s Lex, Rex (1644) Lex, Rex (Law Is King) was written by Samuel Rutherford in 1644. The book was intended to be a defense of Scottish Presbyterianism’s influence on secular politics. Employing arguments from scripture, natural law, and Scottish law, Lex, Rex defends the rule of law, arguing that defensive wars can be considered just wars, even in the event of a preemptive war. Rutherford also advocates limited government, and he puts forth the “Two Kingdoms” theory of church-state relations. Although this theory advocates distinct realms of church and state, Rutherford opposed religious toleration. For the lawfulness of resistance in the matter of the king’s unjust invasion of life and religion, we offer these arguments. Arg. 1: That power which is obliged to command and rule justly and religiously for the good of the subjects, and is only set over the people on these conditions, and not absolutely, cannot tie the people to subjection without resistance, when the power is abused to the destruction of laws, religion, and the subjects. But all power of the law is thus

obliged, (Rom. xiii. 4; Deut. xvii. 18–20; 2 Chron. xix. 6; Ps. cxxxii. 11, 12; lxxxix. 30, 31; 2 Sam. vii. 12; Jer. xvii. 24, 25,) and hath, and may be, abused by kings, to the destruction of laws, religion, and subjects. The proposition is clear. 1. For the powers that tie us to subjection only are of God. 2. Because to resist them, is to resist the ordinance of God. 3. Because they are not a terror to good works, but to evil. 4. Because they are God’s ministers for our good, but abused powers are not of God, but of men, or not ordinances of God; they are a terror to good works, not to evil; they are not God’s ministers for our good. Arg. 2: That power which is contrary to law, and is evil and tyrannical, can tie none to subjection, but is a mere tyrannical power and unlawful; and if it tie not to subjection, it may lawfully be resisted. But the power of the king, abused to the destruction of laws, religion, and subjects, is a power contrary to law, evil, and tyrannical, and tyeth no man to subjection: wickedness by no imaginable reason can oblige any man. Obligation to suffer of wicked men falleth under no commandment of God, except in our Saviour. A passion, as such, is not formally commanded, I mean a physical passion, such as to be killed. God hath not said to me in any moral law, Be thou killed, tortured, beheaded; but only, Be thou patient, if God deliver thee to wicked men’s hands, to suffer these things. Arg. 3: There is not a stricter obligation moral betwixt king and people than betwixt parents and children, master and servant, patron and clients, husband and wife, the lord and the vassal, between the pilot of a ship and the passengers, the physician and the sick, the doctor and the scholars, but the law granteth, (l. Minime 35, de Relig. et sumpt. funer,) if these betray their trust commited to them, they may be resisted: if the father turn distracted, and arise to kill his sons may violently apprehend him, and bind his hands, and spoil him of his weapons; for in that he is not a father. . . . The servant may resist the master if he attempts unjustly [to] kill him, so may the wife do to the husband; if the pilot should wilfully run the ship on a rock to destroy himself and his passengers, they might violently thrust him from the helm. Every tyrant is a furious man, and is morally distracted, as Althusius said, Polit. c. 28, n. 30, and seq.

906  Excerpt from Samuel Rutherford’s Lex, Rex

Arg. 4: That which is given as a blessing, and a favour, and a screen, between the people’s liberty and their bondage, cannot be a given of God as a bondage and slavery to the people. But the power of king is given as a blessing and favour God to defend the poor and needy, to preserve both tables of the law, and to keep the people in their liberties from oppressing and treading one upon another. But so it is, that if such a power be given of God to a king, by which, actu primo, he is invested of God to do acts of tyranny, and so to do them, that to resist him in the most innocent way, which is self-defence, must be a resisting of God, and rebellion against the king, his deputy; then hath God given a royal power as uncontrollable by mortal men, by any violence, as if God himself were immediately and personally resisted, when the king is resisted, and so this power shall be a power to waste and de[s]troy irresistibly, and so in itself a plague and a curse; for it cannot be ordained both according to the intention and genuine formal effect and intrinsical operation of the power, to preserve the tables of the law, religion and liberty, subjects and laws, and also to destroy the same. But it is taught by royalists that this power is for tyranny, as well as for peaceable government; because to resist this royal power put forth in acts either ways, either in acts of tyranny or just government, is to resist the ordinance of God, as royalists say, from Rom. xiii. 1–3. And we know, to resist God’s ordinances and God’s deputy, formaliter, as his deputy, is to resist God himself, (1 Sam. viii. 7; Matt. x. 40,) as if God were doing personally these acts that the king is doing; and it importeth as much as the King of kings doth these acts in and through the tyrant. Now, it is blasphemy to think or say, that when a king is drinking the blood of innocents, and wasting the church of God, that God, if he were personally present, would commit these same acts of tyranny, (God avert such blasphemy!) and that God in and through the king, as his lawful deputy and vicegerent in these acts of tyranny, is wasting the poor church of God. If it be said, in these sinful acts of tyranny, he is not God’s formal vicegerent, but only in good and lawful acts of government, yet he is not to be resisted in these acts, not because the acts are just and good, but because of the dignity of his royal person. Yet this must prove that those who resi[s]t the king in these acts of tyranny, must resist no ordinance of God, but only resist him who is the Lord’s deputy, though not as the Lord’s dep-

uty. What absurdity is there in that more than to disobey him, refusing active obedience to him who is th[e] Lord’s deputy, not as the, Lord’s deputy, but as a man commanding besides his master’s warrant? Arg. 5: That which is inconsistent with the care and providence of God in giving a king to his church is not to be taught. Now God’s end in giving a king to his church, as the feeding, safety, preservation, and the peaceable and quiet life of his church. (1 Tim. ii. 2; Isa. xlix. 23; Psal. lxxix. 71). But God should cross his own end in the same act of giving a king, if he should provide a king, who, by office, were to suppress robbers, murderers, and all oppressors and wasters in his holy mount, and yet should give an irresistible power to one crowned lion, a king, who may kill ten hundred thousand protestants for their religion, in an ordinary providence; and they are by an ordinary law of God to give their throats to his emissaries and bloody executioners. If any say the king will not be so cruel, —I believe it; because, actu secundo, it is not possibly in his power to be so cruel. We owe thanks to his good will that he killeth not so many, but no thanks to the nature and genuine intrinsical end of a king, who hath power from God to kill all these, and that without resistance made by any mortal man. Yea, no thanks (God avert blasphemy!) to God’s ordinary providence, which (if royalists may be believed) putteth no bar upon the unlimited power of a man inclined to sin, and abuse his power to so much cruelty. Some may say, the same absurdity doth follow if the king should turn papist, and the parli[a]ment all were papists. In that case there might be so many martyrs for the truth put to death, and God should put no bar of providence upon this power, then more than now; and yet, in that case, the king and parliament should be judges given of God, actu primo, and by virtue of their office obliged to preserve the people in peace and godliness. But I answer, If God gave a lawful official power to king and parliament to work the same cruelty upon millions of martyrs, and it should be unlawful for them by arms to defend themselves, I should then think that king and parliament were both ex officio, by virtue of their office, and actu primo, judges and fathers, and also by that same office, murderers and butchers,—which were a grievous aspersion to the unspotted providence of God.

Declaration of Breda  907

Arg. 6: If the estates of a kingdom give the power to a king, it is their own power in the fountain; and if they give it for their own good, they have power to judge when it is used against themselves, and for their evil, and so power to limit and resist the power that they gave. Now, that they may take away this power, is clear in Athaliah’s case. It is true she was a tyrant without a title, and had not the right of heaven to the crown, yet she had, in men’s court, a title. For supposing all the royal seed to be killed, and the people consent, we cannot say that, for these six years or thereabout, she was no magistrate: that there were none on the throne of David at this time: that she was not to be obeyed as God’s deputy. But grant that she was no magistrate; yet when Jehoash is brought forth to be crowned, it was a controversy to the states to whom the crown should belong. 1. Athaliah was in possession. 2. Jehoash himself being but seven years old, could not be judge. 3. It might be doubted if Joash was the true son of Ahaziah, and if he was not killed with the rest of the blood royal. Two great adversaries say with us; Hugo Grotius . . . saith he dare not condemn this, if the lesser part of the people, and every one of them indifferently, should defend themselves against a tyrant, ultimo necessitatis proesidio. The case of Scotland, when we were blocked up by sea and land with armies: the case of England, when the king, induced by prelates, first attempted to bring an army to cut off parliament, and then gather an army, and fortified York and invaded Hull, to make the militia his own, sure is considerable. Barclay saith, the people hath .  .  . a power to defend themselves against prodigious cruelty. The case of England and Ireland, now invaded by bloody rebels of Ireland, is also worthy of consideration. I could cite hosts more. Source: Samuel Rutherford. Lex, Rex. London: Printed for John Field, 1644, 261–265.

Declaration of Breda (April 4, 1660) The Declaration of Breda, issued on April 4, 1660, was a proclamation by the English king Charles II (1630–1685) that provided general pardon for crimes committed by both soldiers and civilians who had opposed the royalist cause during the recent English Civil War. Pardon was necessary

for Charles, who had been in exile since the 1640s, to be accepted as lawful king. The declaration provided for the retention of property by those who had purchased or received it during the war, and for religious toleration. However, Parliament later chose to exclude non-Anglicans from holding positions of public office. Most importantly for the future of England, the declaration provided for the commissioning into royal service of the military forces that had served the republican government led by Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) in the 1650s. Charles, by the grace of God, King of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c. To all our loving subjects, of what degree or quality soever, greeting. If the general distraction and confusion which is spread over the whole kingdom doth not awaken all men to a desire and longing that those wounds which have so many years together been kept bleeding, may be bound up, all we can say will be to no purpose; however, after this long silence, we have thought it our duty to declare how much we desire to contribute thereunto; and that as we can never give over the hope, in good time, to obtain the possession of that right which God and nature hath made our due, so we do make it our daily suit to the Divine Providence, that He will, in compassion to us and our subjects, after so long misery and sufferings, remit and put us into a quiet and peaceable possession of that our right, with as little blood and damage to our people as is possible; nor do we desire more to enjoy what is ours, than that all our subjects may enjoy what by law is theirs, by a full and entire administration of justice throughout the land, and by extending our mercy where it is wanted and deserved. And to the end that the fear of punishment may not engage any, conscious to themselves of what is past, to a perseverance in guilt for the future, by opposing the quiet and happiness of their country, in the restoration of King, Peers and people to their just, ancient and fundamental rights, we do, by these presents, declare, that we do grant a free and general pardon, which we are ready, upon demand, to pass under our Great Seal of England, to all our subjects, of what degree or quality soever, who, within forty days after the publishing hereof, shall lay hold upon this our grace and favour, and shall, by any public act, declare their doing so, and that they return to the loyalty and obedience of

908  Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations

good subjects; excepting only such persons as shall hereafter be excepted by Parliament, those only to be excepted. Let all our subjects, how faulty soever, rely upon the word of a King, solemnly given by this present declaration, that no crime whatsoever, committed against us or our royal father before the publication of this, shall ever rise in judgment, or be brought in question, against any of them, to the least endamagement of them, either in their lives, liberties or estates or (as far forth as lies in our power) so much as to the prejudice of their reputations, by any reproach or term of distinction from the rest of our best subjects; we desiring and ordaining that henceforth all notes of discord, separation and difference of parties be utterly abolished among all our subjects, whom we invite and conjure to a perfect union among themselves, under our protection, for the re-settlement of our just rights and theirs in a free Parliament, by which, upon the word of a King, we will be advised. And because the passion and uncharitableness of the times have produced several opinions in religion, by which men are engaged in parties and animosities against each other (which, when they shall hereafter unite in a freedom of conversation, will be composed or better understood), we do declare a liberty to tender consciences, and that no man shall be disquieted or called in question for differences of opinion in matter of religion, which do not disturb the peace of the kingdom; and that we shall be ready to consent to such an Act of Parliament, as, upon mature deliberation, shall be offered to us, for the full granting that indulgence. And because, in the continued distractions of so many years, and so many and great revolutions, many grants and purchases of estates have been made to and by many officers, soldiers and others, who are now possessed of the same, and who may be liable to actions at law upon several titles, we are likewise willing that all such differences, and all things relating to such grants, sales and purchases, shall be determined in Parliament, which can best provide for the just satisfaction of all men who are concerned. And we do further declare, that we will be ready to consent to any Act or Acts of Parliament to the purposes aforesaid, and for the full satisfaction of all arrears due to the officers and soldiers of the army under the command of

General Monk; and that they shall be received into our service upon as good pay and conditions as they now enjoy. Given under our Sign Manual and Privy Signet, at our Court at Breda, this 4/14 day of April, 1660, in the twelfth year of our reign. Source: Samuel Rawson Gardiner, ed. The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625–1660. 3rd rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906, 465.

Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (July 8, 1663) This royal charter of 1663 established the American colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in the eyes of the English government. The document also provided a foundation for the Rhode Island colonial government, and outlined the rights granted to the inhabitants of that colony, among which are a very liberal interpretation of religious freedom. Drafted by Rhode Island’s agent in England, Dr. John Clarke, and then approved by King Charles II (1630– 1685) in July 1663, the charter was delivered to the colony the following November. After Captain George Baxter read the charter to the freemen of the colony on November 24, 1663, the Assembly voted that words of humble thanks be sent to the king, and a gratuity sent to Dr. Clarke and to Mr. Baxter. The text below consists of the opening paragraph of the charter, and the section granting religious freedom to the inhabitants of the colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. The actual charter is much longer, but these selections provide a glimpse of the importance that religious liberty played in the establishment of the colony. CHARLES THE SECOND, by the grace of God, King of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc., to all to whom these presents shall come, greeting: Whereas we have been informed, by the humble petition of our trusty and well beloved subject, John Clarke, on the behalf of Benjamin Arnold, William Brenton, William Codington, Nicholas Easton, William Boulston, John

Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations  909

Porter, John Smith, Samuel Gorton, John Weeks, Roger Williams, Thomas Olney, Gregory Dexter, John Cogeshall, Joseph Clarke, Randall Holden, John Greene, John Roome, Samuel Wildbore, William Field, James Barker, Richard Tew, Thomas Harris, and William Dyre, and the rest of the purchasers and free inhabitants of our island, called Rhode Island, and the rest of the colony of Providence Plantations, in the Narragansett Bay, in New-England, in America, that they, pursuing, with peaceable and loyal minds, their sober, serious and religious intentions, of godly edifying themselves, and one another, in the holy Christian faith and worship as they were persuaded; together with the gaining over and conversion of the poor ignorant Indian natives, in those parts of America, to the sincere profession and obedience of the same faith and worship, did, not only by the consent and good encouragement of our royal progenitors, transport themselves out of this kingdom of England into America, but also, since their arrival there, after their first settlement amongst other our subjects in those parts, for the avoiding of discord, and those many evils which were likely to ensue upon some of those our subjects not being able to bear, in these remote parties, their different apprehensions in religious concernments, and in pursuance of the aforesaid ends, did once again leave their desirable stations and habitations, and with excessive labor and travel, hazard and charge, did transplant themselves into the midst of the Indian natives, who, as we are informed, are the most potent princes and people of all that country; where, by the good Providence of God, from whom the Plantations have taken their name, upon their labor and industry, they have not only been preserved to admiration, but have increased and prospered, and are seized and possessed, by purchase and consent of the said natives, to their full content, of such lands, islands, rivers, harbors and roads, as are very convenient both for plantations and also for building of ships, supply of pipestaves, and other merchandise; and which lies very commodious, in many respects, for commerce, and to accommodate our southern plantations, and may much advance the trade of this our realm, and greatly enlarge the territories thereof; they having by near neighborhood to and friendly society with the great body of the Narragansett Indians, given them encouragement, of their own accord, to subject themselves, their people and lands, unto us; whereby, as is hoped, there

may, in due time, by the blessing of God Upon their endeavors, be laid a sure foundation of happiness to all America. And whereas, in theire humble addresse, they have ffreely declared, that it is much on their hearts (if they may be permitted), to hold forth a livlie experiment, that a most flourishing civill state may stand and best bee maintained, and that among our English subjects. with a full libertie in religious concernements; and that true pietye rightly grounded upon gospell principles, will give the best and greatest security to sovereignetye, and will lay in the hearts of men the strongest obligations to true loyaltye: Now know bee, that wee beinge willinge to encourage the hopefull undertakeinge of oure sayd lovall and loveinge subjects, and to secure them in the free exercise and enjovment of all theire civill and religious rights, appertaining to them, as our loveing subjects; and to preserve unto them that libertye, in the true Christian ffaith and worshipp of God, which they have sought with soe much travaill, and with peaceable myndes, and lovall subjectione to our royall progenitors and ourselves, to enjoye; and because some of the people and inhabitants of the same colonie cannot, in theire private opinions, conforms to the publique exercise of religion, according to the litturgy, formes and ceremonyes of the Church of England, or take or subscribe the oaths and articles made and established in that behalfe; and for that the same, by reason of the remote distances of those places, will (as wee hope) bee noe breach of the unitie and unifformitie established in this nation: Have therefore thought ffit, and doe hereby publish, graunt, ordeyne and declare, That our royall will and pleasure is, that noe person within the sayd colonye, at any tyme hereafter, shall bee any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in opinione in matters of religion, and doe not actually disturb the civill peace of our sayd colony; but that all and everye person and persons may, from tyme to tyme, and at all tymes hereafter, freelye and fullye have and enjoye his and theire owne judgments and consciences, in matters of religious concernments, throughout the tract of lance hereafter mentioned; they behaving themselves peaceablie and quietlie, and not useing this libertie to lycentiousnesse and profanenesse, nor to the civill injurye or outward disturbeance of others; any lawe, statute, or clause, therein contayned, or to bee

910  Withdrawing Religious Toleration for Huguenots: Louis XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes

contayned, usage or custome of this realme, to the contrary hereof, in any wise, notwithstanding. And that they may bee in the better capacity to defend themselves, in theire just rights and libertyes against all the enemies of the Christian ffaith, and others, in all respects, wee have further thought fit, and at the humble petition of the persons aforesayd are gratiously pleased to declare, That they shall have and enjoye the benefist of our late act of indempnity and ffree pardon, as the rest of our subjects in other our dominions and territoryes have; and to create and make them a bodye politique or corporate, with the powers and priviledges hereinafter mentioned. . . . Source: Ben Perley Poore, compiler. The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the United States. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1877, Part II: 1595–1597.

Withdrawing Religious Toleration for Huguenots: Louis XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) In 1685, the French king Louis XIV (1638–1715) revoked the Edict of Nantes by issuing the Edict of Fontainebleau, which ordered the destruction of Protestant churches, as well as the closing of Protestant schools. This edict made official the long-standing royal policy of persecuting Protestants, known as Huguenots, who did not convert to Catholicism. As a result of this officially sanctioned persecution, nearly one million Huguenots left France over the next two decades. They sought asylum in England, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and North America. King Henry the Great, our grandfather of glorious memory, being desirous that the peace which he had procured for his subjects after the grievous losses they had sustained in the course of domestic and foreign wars, should not be troubled on account of the R.P.R., as had happened in the reigns of the kings, his predecessors, by his edict, granted at Nantes in the month of April, 1598, regulated the procedure to be adopted with regard to those of the said religion, and the places in which they might meet for public wor-

ship, established extraordinary judges to administer justice to them, and, in fine, provided in particular articles for whatever could be thought necessary for maintaining the tranquillity of his kingdom and for diminishing mutual aversion between the members of the two religions, so as to put himself in a better position to labor, as he had resolved to do, for the reunion to the Church of those who had so lightly withdrawn from it. As the intention of the king, our grandfather, was frustrated by his sudden death, and as the execution of the said edict was interrupted during the minority of the late king, our most honored lord and father of glorious memory, by new encroachments on the part of the adherents of the said R.P.R., which gave occasion for their being deprived of divers advantages accorded to them by the said edict; nevertheless the king, our late lord and father, in the exercise of his usual clemency, granted them yet another edict at Nimes, in July, 1629, by means of which, tranquillity being established anew, the said late king, animated by the same spirit and the same zeal for religion as the king, our said grandfather, had resolved to take advantage of this repose to attempt to put his said pious design into execution. But foreign wars having supervened soon after, so that the kingdom was seldom tranquil from 1635 to the truce concluded in 1684 with the powers of Europe, nothing more could be done for the advantage of religion beyond diminishing the number of places for the public exercise of the R.P.R., interdicting such places as were found established to the prejudice of the dispositions made by the edicts, and suppressing of the bi-partisan courts, these having been appointed provisionally only. God having at last permitted that our people should enjoy perfect peace, we, no longer absorbed in protecting them from our enemies, are able to profit by this truce (which we have ourselves facilitated), and devote our whole attention to the means of accomplishing the designs of our said grandfather and father, which we have consistently kept before us since our succession to the crown. And now we perceive, with thankful acknowledgment of God’s aid, that our endeavors have attained their proposed end, inasmuch as the better and the greater part of our subjects of the said R.P.R. have embraced the Catholic faith. And since by this fact the execution of the Edict of Nantes and of all that has ever been ordained in favor of

Withdrawing Religious Toleration for Huguenots: Louis XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes  911

the said R.P.R. has been rendered nugatory, we have determined that we can do nothing better, in order wholly to obliterate the memory of the troubles, the confusion, and the evils which the progress of this false religion has caused in this kingdom, and which furnished occasion for the said edict and for so many previous and subsequent edicts and declarations, than entirely to revoke the said Edict of Nantes, with the special articles granted as a sequel to it, as well as all that has since been done in favor of the said religion. I. Be it known that for these causes and others us hereunto moving, and of our certain knowledge, full power, and royal authority, we have, by this present perpetual and irrevocable edict, suppressed and revoked, and do suppress and revoke, the edict of our said grandfather, given at Nantes in April, 1598, in its whole extent, together with the particular articles agreed upon in the month of May following, and the letters patent issued upon the same date; and also the edict given at Nimes in July, 1629; we declare them null and void, together with all concessions, of whatever nature they may be, made by them as well as by other edicts, declarations, and orders, in favor of the said persons of the R.P.R., the which shall remain in like manner as if they had never been granted; and in consequence we desire, and it is our pleasure, that all the temples of those of the said R.P.R. situate in our kingdom, countries, territories, and the lordships under our crown, shall be demolished without delay. II. We forbid our subjects of the R.P.R. to meet any more for the exercise of the said religion in any place or private house, under any pretext whatever. . . . III. We likewise forbid all noblemen, of what condition soever, to hold such religious exercises in their houses or fiefs, under penalty to be inflicted upon all our said subjects who shall engage in the said exercises, of imprisonment and confiscation. IV. We enjoin all ministers of the said R.P.R., who do not choose to become converts and to embrace the Catholic, apostolic, and Roman religion, to leave our kingdom and the territories subject to us within a fortnight of the publi-

cation of our present edict, without leave to reside therein beyond that period, or, during the said fortnight, to engage in any preaching, exhortation, or any other function, on pain of being sent to the galleys. . . . VII. We forbid private schools for the instruction of children of the said R.P.R., and in general all things whatever which can be regarded as a concession of any kind in favor of the said religion. VIII. As for children who may be born of persons of the said R.P.R., we desire that from henceforth they be baptized by the parish priests. We enjoin parents to send them to the churches for that purpose, under penalty of five hundred livres fine, to be increased as circumstances may demand; and thereafter the children shall be brought up in the Catholic, apostolic, and Roman religion, which we expressly enjoin the local magistrates to see done. IX. And in the exercise of our clemency towards our subjects of the said R.P.R. who have emigrated from our kingdom, lands, and territories subject to us, previous to the publication of our present edict, it is our will and pleasure that in case of their returning within the period of four months from the day of the said publication, they may, and it shall be lawful for them to, again take possession of their property, and to enjoy the same as if they had all along remained there: on the contrary, the property abandoned by those who, during the specified period of four months, shall not have returned into our kingdom, lands, and territories subject to us, shall remain and be confiscated in consequence of our declaration of the 20th of August last. X. We repeat our most express prohibition to all our subjects of the said R.P.R., together with their wives and children, against leaving our kingdom, lands, and territories subject to us, or transporting their goods and effects therefrom under penalty, as respects the men, of being sent to the galleys, and as respects the women, of imprisonment and confiscation. XI. It is our will and intention that the declarations rendered against the relapsed shall be executed according to their form and tenor.

912  Government and Religion in British Canada: The Quebec Act

XII. As for the rest, liberty is granted to the said persons of the R.P.R., pending the time when it shall please God to enlighten them as well as others, to remain in the cities and places of our kingdom, lands, and territories subject to us, and there to continue their commerce, and to enjoy their possessions, without being subjected to molestation or hindrance on account of the said R.P.R., on condition of not engaging in the exercise of the said religion, or of meeting under pretext of prayers or religious services, of whatever nature these may be, under the penalties above mentioned of imprisonment and confiscation. This do we give in charge to our trusty and well-beloved counselors, etc. Given at Fontainebleau in the month of October, in the year of grace 1685, and of our reign the forty-third. Source: James Harvey Robinson, ed. Readings in European History, 2 vols. Boston: Ginn, 1906, Vol. 2: 287–291.

Government and Religion in British Canada: The Quebec Act (October 7, 1774) Britain gained possession of New France (Canada) after the Seven Years’ War, or the French and Indian War (1756– 1763), as the conflict was known in America. The inhabitants of New France were French-speaking Roman Catholics. As new subjects of the British crown, they found themselves living under the dictates of Parliament, just like all members of the British Empire. The Quebec Acts, more formally known as the British North America Act of 1774, set forth the parameters of British control and established territorial boundaries, but most importantly, from a religious perspective, allowed the inhabitants of the province of Quebec to continue to practice Roman Catholicism. An Act for making more effectual Provision for the Government of the Province of Quebec in North America. WHEREAS his Majesty, by his Royal Proclamation bearing Date the seventh Day of October, in the third Year of his Reign, thought fit to declare the Provisions which had been made in respect to certain Countries, Territories,

and Islands in America, ceded to his Majesty by the definitive Treaty of Peace, concluded at Paris on the tenth day of February, one thousand seven hundred and sixty-three: And whereas, by the Arrangements made by the said Royal Proclamation a very large Extent of Country, within which there were several Colonies and Settlements of the Subjects of France, who claimed to remain therein under the Faith of the said Treaty, was left, without any Provision being made for the Administration of Civil Government therein; and certain Parts of the Territory of Canada, where sedentary Fisheries had been established and carried on by the Subjects of France, Inhabitants of the said Province of Canada under Grants and Concessions from the Government thereof, were annexed to the Government of Newfoundland, and thereby subjected to Regulations inconsistent with the Nature of such Fisheries: I

May it therefore please your most Excellent Majesty that it may be enacted; and be it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same: That all the Territories, Islands, and Countries in North America, belonging to the Crown of Great Britain, bounded on the South by a Line from the Bay of Chaleurs, along the High Lands which divide the Rivers that empty themselves into the River Saint Lawrence from those which fall into the Sea, to a Point in forty-five Degrees of Northern Latitude, on the Eastern Bank of the River Connecticut, keeping the same Latitude directly West, through the Lake Champlain, until, in the same Latitude, it meets the River Saint Lawrence: from thence up the Eastern Bank of the said River to the Lake Ontario; thence through the Lake Ontario, and the River commonly called Niagara and thence along by the Eastern and South-eastern Bank of Lake Erie, following the said Bank, until the same shall be intersected by the Northern Boundary, granted by the Charter of the Province of Pennsylvania, in case the same shall be so intersected: and from thence along the said Northern and Western Boundaries of the said Province, until the said Western Boundary strike the Ohio: But in case the said Bank of the said Lake shall not be found to be so intersected, then following the said Bank until it shall

Government and Religion in British Canada: The Quebec Act  913

arrive at that Point of the said Bank which shall be nearest to the North-western Angle of the said Province of Pensylvania, and thence by a right Line, to the said North-western Angle of the said Province; and thence along the Western Boundary of the said Province, until it strike the River Ohio; and along the Bank of the said River, Westward, to the Banks of the Mississippi, and Northward to the Southern Boundary of the Territory granted to the Merchants Adventurers of England, trading to Hudson’s Bay; and also all such Territories, Islands, and Countries, which have, since the tenth of February, one thousand seven hundred and sixty-three, been made Part of the Government of Newfoundland, be, and they are hereby, during his Majesty’s Pleasure, annexed to, and made Part and Parcel of, the Province of Quebec, as created and established by the said Royal Proclamation of the seventh of October, one thousand seven hundred and sixty-three. II

Provided always: That nothing herein contained, relative to the Boundary of the Province of Quebec, shall in anywise affect the Boundaries of any other Colony. III

Provided always, and be it enacted: That nothing in this Act contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to make void, or to vary or alter any Right, Title, or Possession, derived under any Grant, Conveyance, or otherwise nowsoever, of or to any Lands within the said Province, or the Provinces thereto adjoining; but that the same shall remain and be in Force, and have Effect, as if this Act had never been made. IV

And whereas the Provisions, made by the said Proclamation, in respect to the Civil Government of the said Province of Quebec, and the Powers and Authorities given to the Governor and other Civil Officers of the said Province, by the Grants and Commissions issued in consequence thereof, have been found, upon Experience, to be inapplicable to the State and Circumstances of the said Province, the Inhabitants whereof amounted, at the Conquest, to above sixty-five thousand Persons professing the Religion of the Church of Rome, and enjoying an estab-

lished Form of Constitution and System of Laws, by which their Persons and Property had been protected, governed, and ordered, for a long Series of Years, from the first Establishment of the said Province of Canada; be it therefore further enacted by the Authority aforesaid: That the said Proclamation, so far as the same relates to the said Province of Quebec, and the Commission under the Authority whereof the Government of the said Province is at present administered, and all and every the Ordinance and Ordinances made by the Governor and Council of Quebec for the Time being, relative to the Civil Government and Administration of Justice in the said Province, and all Commissions to Judges and other Officers thereof, be, and the same are hereby revoked, annulled, and made void, from and after the first Day of May, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five. V

And, for the more perfect Security and Ease of the Minds of the Inhabitants of the said Province, it is hereby declared: That his Majesty’s Subjects, professing the Religion of the Church of Rome of and in the said Province of Quebec, may have, hold, and enjoy, the free Exercise of the Religion of the Church of Rome, subject to the King’s Supremacy, declared and established by an Act, made in the first Year of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, over all the Dominions and Countries which then did, or thereafter should belong, to the Imperial Crown of this Realm; and that the Clergy of the said Church may hold, receive, and enjoy, their accustomed Dues and Rights, with respect to such Persons only as shall profess the said Religion. VI

Provided nevertheless: That it shall be lawful for his Majesty, his Heirs or Successors, to make such Provision out of the rest of the said accustomed Dues and Rights, for the Encouragement of the Protestant Religion, and for the Maintenance and Support of a Protestant Clergy within the said Province, as he or they shall, from Time to Time think necessary and expedient. VII Provided always, and be it enacted: That no Person professing the Religion of the Church of Rome, and residing in

914  Government and Religion in British Canada: The Quebec Act

the said Province, shall be obliged to take the Oath required by the said Statute passed in the first Year of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, or any other Oaths substituted by any other Act in the Place thereof; but that every such Person who, by the said Statute, is required to take the Oath therein mentioned, shall be obliged, and is hereby required, to take and subscribe the following Oath before the Governor, or such other Person in such Court of Record as his Majesty shall appoint, who are hereby authorized to administer the same; videlicet, I A.B., do sincerely promise and swear: That I will be faithful, and bear true Allegiance to his Majesty King George, and him will defend to the utmost of my Power, against all traitorous Conspiracies, and Attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his Person, Crown, and Dignity; and I will do my utmost Endeavor to disclose and make known to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, all Treasons, and traitorous Conspiracies, and Attempts, which I shall know to be against him, or any of them; and all this I do swear without any Equivocation, mental Evasion, or secret Reservation, and renouncing all Pardons and Dispensations from any Power or Person whomsoever to the contrary. So help me GOD. And every such Person, who shall neglect or refuse to take the said Oath before mentioned, shall incur and be liable to the same Penalties, Forfeitures, Disabilities, and Incapacities, as he would have incurred and been liable to for neglecting or refusing to take the Oath required by the said Statute passed in the first Year of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth. VIII And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid: That all his Majesty’s Canadian Subjects within the Province of Quebec, the religious orders and Communities only excepted, may also hold and enjoy their Property and Possessions, together with all Customs and Usages relative thereto, and all other their Civil Rights, in as large, ample, and beneficial Manner, as if the said Proclamation, Commissions, Ordinances, and other Acts and Instruments had not been made, and as may consist with their Allegiance to his Majesty, and Subjection to the Crown and Parliament of Great Britain; and that in all . . . Matters of Controversy, relative to Property and Civil Rights, Resort shall be had to the Laws of Canada, as the Rule for the Decision of the same; and all Causes that shall hereafter be instituted in

any of the Courts of Justice, to be appointed within and for the said Province by his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, shall, with respect to such Property and Rights, be determined agreeably to the said Laws and Customs of Canada, until they shall be varied or altered by any Ordinances that shall, from Time to Time, be passed in the said Province by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or Commander in Chief, for the Time being, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Legislative Council of the same, to be appointed in Manner herein-after mentioned. IX

Provided always: That nothing in this Act contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to any Lands that have been granted by his Majesty, or shall hereafter be granted by his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, to be holden in free and common Soccage. X

Provided also: That it shall and may be lawful to and for every Person that is Owner of any Lands, Goods, or Credits, in the said Province, and that has a Right to alienate the said Lands, Goods, or Credits, in his or her Lifetime, by Deed of Sale, Gift, or otherwise, to devise or bequeath the same at his or her Death, by his or her last Will and Testament; any Law, Usage, or Custom, heretofore or now prevailing in the Province, to the contrary hereof in any-wise notwithstanding; . . . such Will being executed either according to the Laws of Canada, or according to the Forms prescribed by the Laws of England. XI

And whereas the Certainty and Lenity of the Criminal Law of England, and the Benefits and Advantages resulting from the Use of it, have been sensibly felt by the Inhabitants, from an Experience of more than nine Years, during which it has been uniformly administered: be it therefore further enacted by the Authority aforesaid: That the same shall continue to be administered, and shall be observed as Law in the Province of Quebec, as well in the Description and Quality of the Offence as in the Method of Prosecution and Trial; and the Punishments and Forfeitures thereby inflicted to the Exclusion of every other Rule of Criminal Law, or Mode of Proceeding thereon, which did or might

Government and Religion in British Canada: The Quebec Act  915

prevail in the said Province before the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-four; any Thing in this Act to the contrary thereof in any respect notwithstanding; subject nevertheless to such Alterations and Amendments as the Governor, Lieutenant-governor, or Commander in Chief for the Time being, by and with the Advice and Consent of the legislative Council of the said Province, hereafter to be appointed, shall, from Time to Time, cause to be made therein, in Manner hereinafter directed. XII And whereas it may be necessary to ordain many Regulations for the future Welfare and good Government of the Province of Quebec, the Occasions of which cannot now be foreseen, nor, without much Delay and Inconvenience, be provided for, without intrusting that Authority, for a certain Time, and under proper Restrictions, to Persons resident there, and whereas it is at present inexpedient to call an Assembly; be it therefore enacted b~ the Authority aforesaid: That it shall and may be lawful for his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, by Warrant under his or their Signet or Sign Manual, and with the Advice of the Privy Council, to constitute and appoint a Council for the Affairs of the Province of Quebec, to consist of such Persons resident there, not exceeding twenty-three, nor less than seventeen, as his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, shall be pleased to appoint, and, upon the Death, Removal, or Absence of any of the Members of the said Council, in like Manner to constitute and appoint such and so many other Person or Persons as shall be necessary to supply the Vacancy or Vacancies; which Council, so appointed and nominated, or the major Part thereof; shall have Power and Authority to make Ordinances for the Peace, Welfare, and good Government, of the said Province, with the Consent of his Majesty’s Governor, or, in his Absence, of the Lieutenant-governor, or Commander in Chief for the Time being. [Repealed by the Constitutional Act, 1791] XIII Provided always: That nothing in this Act contained shall extend to authorize or impower the said legislative Council to lay any Taxes or Duties within the said Province, such Rates and Taxes only excepted as the Inhabitants of

any Town or District within the said Province may be authorized by the said Council to assess, levy, and apply, within the said Town or District, for the Purpose of making Roads, erecting and repairing publick Buildings, or for any other Purpose respecting the local Convenience and Oeconomy of such Town or District. XIV Provided also, and be it enacted by the Authority aforesaid: That every Ordinance so to be made, shall, within six Months, be transmitted by the Governor, or, in his Absence, by the Lieutenant-governor, or Commander in Chief for the Time being, and laid before his Majesty for his Royal Approbation; and if his Majesty shall think fit to disallow thereof, the same shall cease and be void from the Time that his Majesty’s Order in Council thereupon shall be promulgated at Quebec. XV Provided also: That no Ordinance touching Religion, or by which any Punishment may be inflicted greater than Fine or Imprisonment for three Months, shall be of any Force or Effect, until the same shall have received his Majesty’s Approbation. XVI Provided also: That no Ordinance shall be passed at any Meeting of the Council where less than a Majority of the whole Council is present, or at any Time except between the first Day of January and the first Day of May, unless upon some urgent Occasion, in which Case every Member thereof resident at Quebec, or within fifty Miles thereof, shall be personally summoned by the Governor, or, in his absence, by the Lieutenant-governor, or Commander in Chief for the Time being, to attend the same. XVII And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid: That nothing herein contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to prevent or hinder his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, by his or their Letters Patent under the Great Seal of Great Britain, from erecting, constituting, and appointing, such Courts of Criminal, Civil, and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction within and for the said Province of Quebec,

916  Treaty of Tripoli

and appointing, from Time to Time, the Judges and Officers thereof, as his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, shall think necessary and proper for the Circumstances of the said Province. XVIII. Provided always, and it is hereby enacted: That nothing in this Act contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to repeal or make void, within the said Province of Quebec, any Act or Acts of the Parliament of Great Britain heretofore made, for prohibiting, restraining, or regulating, the Trade or Commerce of his Majesty’s Colonies and Plantations in America; but that all and every the said Acts, and also all Acts of Parliament heretofore made concerning or respecting the said Colonies and Plantations, shall be, and are hereby declared to be, in Force, within the said Province of Quebec, and every Part thereof. Source: Danby Pickering, compiler. Great Britain: The Statutes at Large . . . [from 1225 to 1867]. Cambridge: Printed by Benthem, for C. Bathhurst, London, 1762–1869.

Treaty of Tripoli (January 3, 1797) The Treaty of Tripoli was signed between the nascent United States of America and the Muslim pasha of Tripoli, whose Barbary pirates had been attacking U.S. merchant vessels, as well as the merchant vessels of other nations. The Barbary pirates were among the first maritime forces confronted by the U.S. Navy. The 1797 treaty was only in force for a few years before the pasha demanded more tribute from the administration of American president Thomas Jefferson. This treaty is of interest to scholars of war and religion primarily due to Article 11, which states that the United States was not founded on the Christian religion. Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States of America and the Bey and Subjects of Tripoli of Barbary. ARTICLE 1. There is a firm and perpetual Peace and friendship between the United States of America and the Bey and subjects of Tripoli of Barbary, made by the free consent of both parties, and guaranteed by the most potent Dey & regency of Algiers.

ARTICLE 2. If any goods belonging to any nation with which either of the parties is at war shall be loaded on board of vessels belonging to the other party they shall pass free, and no attempt shall be made to take or detain them. ARTICLE 3. If any citizens, subjects or effects belonging to either party shall be found on board a prize vessel taken from an enemy by the other party, such citizens or subjects shall be set at liberty, and the effects restored to the owners. ARTICLE 4. Proper passports are to be given to all vessels of both parties, by which they are to be known. And, considering the distance between the two countries, eighteen months from the date of this treaty shall be allowed for procuring such passports. During this interval the other papers belonging to such vessels shall be sufficient for their protection. ARTICLE 5 A citizen or subject of either party having bought a prize vessel condemned by the other party or by any other nation, the certificate of condemnation and bill of sale shall be a sufficient passport for such vessel for one year; this being a reasonable time for her to procure a proper passport. ARTICLE 6 Vessels of either party putting into the ports of the other and having need of provissions or other supplies, they shall be furnished at the market price. And if any such vessel shall so put in from a disaster at sea and have occasion to repair, she shall be at liberty to land and reembark her cargo without paying any duties. But in no case shall she be compelled to land her cargo. ARTICLE 7. Should a vessel of either party be cast on the shore of the other, all proper assistance shall be given to her and her people; no pillage shall be allowed; the property shall re-

Treaty of Tripoli  917

main at the disposition of the owners, and the crew protected and succoured till they can be sent to their country.

interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries.

ARTICLE 8.

ARTICLE 12.

If a vessel of either party should be attacked by an enemy within gun-shot of the forts of the other she shall be defended as much as possible. If she be in port she shall not be seized or attacked when it is in the power of the other party to protect her. And when she proceeds to sea no enemy shall be allowed to pursue her from the same port within twenty four hours after her departure.

In case of any dispute arising from a notation of any of the articles of this treaty no appeal shall be made to arms, nor shall war be declared on any pretext whatever. But if the consul residing at the place where the dispute shall happen shall not be able to settle the same, an amicable referrence shall be made to the mutual friend of the parties, the Dey of Algiers, the parties hereby engaging to abide by his decision. And he by virtue of his signature to this treaty engages for himself and successors to declare the justice of the case according to the true interpretation of the treaty, and to use all the means in his power to enforce the observance of the same.

ARTICLE 9. The commerce between the United States and Tripoli,— the protection to be given to merchants, masters of vessels and seamen,—the reciprocal right of establishing consuls in each country, and the privileges, immunities and jurisdictions to be enjoyed by such consuls, are declared to be on the same footing with those of the most favoured nations respectively. ARTICLE 10. The money and presents demanded by the Bey of Tripoli as a full and satisfactory consideration on his part and on the part of his subjects for this treaty of perpetual peace and friendship are acknowledged to have been recieved by him previous to his signing the same, according to a reciept which is hereto annexed, except such part as is promised on the part of the United States to be delivered and paid by them on the arrival of their Consul in Tripoly, of which part a note is likewise hereto annexed. And no presence of any periodical tribute or farther payment is ever to be made by either party. ARTICLE 11. As the government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion,—as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion or tranquility of Musselmen,—and as the said States never have entered into any war or act of hostility against any Mehomitan nation, it is declared by the parties that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an

Signed and sealed at Tripoli of Barbary the 3d day of Jumad in the year of the Higera 1211—corresponding with the 4th day of Novr 1796 by JUSSUF BASHAW MAHOMET Bey SOLIMAN Kaya MAMET Treasurer GALIL Genl of the Troops AMET Minister of Marine MAHOMET Coml of the city AMET Chamberlain MAMET Secretary ALLY Chief of the Divan Signed and sealed at Algiers the 4th day of Argib 1211— corresponding with the 3d day of January 1797 by HASSAN BASHAW Dey and by the Agent plenipotentiary of the United States of America [Seal] Joel BARLOW

918  Treaty of Tripoli

[The “Receipt”]

fifty bolts canvas

Praise be to God &c—

four anchors

The present writing done by our hand and delivered to the American Captain OBrien makes known that he has delivered to us forty thousand Spanish dollars,—thirteen watches of gold, silver & pinsbach,—five rings, of which three of diamonds, one of saphire and one with a watch in it, One hundred & forty piques of cloth, and four caftans of brocade,—and these on account of the peace concluded with the Americans.

And these when delivered are to be in full of all demands on his part or on that of his successors from the United States according as it is expressed in the tenth article of the following treaty. And no farther demand of tributes, presents or payments shall ever be made.

Given at Tripoli in Barbary the 20th day of Jumad 1211, corresponding with the 21st day of Novr 1796—

Translated from the Arabic on the opposite page, which is signed & sealed by Hassan Bashaw Dey of Algiers—the 4th day of Argib 1211—or the 3d day of June 1797—by— Joel BARLOW

(Signed) JUSSUF BASHAW—Bey whom God Exalt

[Approval of Humphreys]

The foregoing is a true copy of the reciept given by Jussuf Bashaw—Bey of Tripoli—

To all to whom these Presents shall come or be made known.

(Signed) HASSAN BASHAW—Dey of Algiers.

Whereas the Underwritten David Humphreys hath been duly appointed Commissioner Plenipotentiary by Letters Patent, under the Signature of the President and Seal of the United States of America, dated the 30th of March 1795, for negotiating and concluding a Treaty of Peace with the Most Illustrious the Bashaw, Lords and Governors of the City & Kingdom of Tripoli; whereas by a Writing under his Hand and Seal dated the 10th of February 1796, he did (in conformity to the authority committed to me therefor) constitute and appoint Joel Barlow and Joseph Donaldson Junior Agents jointly and separately in the business aforesaid; whereas the annexed Treaty of Peace and Friendship was agreed upon, signed and sealed at Tripoli of Barbary on the 4th Of November 1796, in virtue of the Powers aforesaid and guaranteed by the Most potent Dey and Regency of Algiers; and whereas the same was certified at Algiers on the 3d of January 1797, with the Signature and Seal of Hassan Bashaw Dey, and of Joel Barlow one of the Agents aforesaid, in the absence of the other.

The foregoing is a literal translation of the writing in Arabic on the opposite page. JOEL BARLOW [The “Note ”] On the arrival of a consul of the United States in Tripoli he is to deliver to Jussuf Bashaw Bey— twelve thousand Spanish dollars five hawsers—8 Inch three cables—10 Inch twenty five barrels tar twenty five [barrels] pitch ten [barrels] rosin five hundred pine boards five hundred oak [barrels] ten masts (without any measure mentioned, suppose for vessels from 2 to 300 ton) twelve yards

Now Know ye, that I David Humphreys Commissioner Plenipotentiary aforesaid, do approve and conclude the said Treaty, and every article and clause therein contained, reserving the same nevertheless for the final Ratification of the President of the United States of America, by and with

President Abraham Lincoln’s Proclamation Declaring a National Fast Day  919

the advice and consent of the Senate of the said United States. In testimony whereof I have signed the same with my Name and Seal, at the City of Lisbon this 10th of February 1797. [Seal] DAVID HUMPHREYS. Source: Hunter Miller, ed. Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America. Vol. 2. Documents 1–40: 1776–1818. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1931.

President Abraham Lincoln’s Proclamation Declaring a National Fast Day (March 30, 1863) President Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865) signed this document on March 30, 1863, proclaiming a national day of fasting on April 30, 1863, during the height of the American Civil War. By the President of the United States of America. A Proclamation. Whereas, the Senate of the United States, devoutly recognizing the Supreme Authority and just Government of Almighty God, in all the affairs of men and of nations, has, by a resolution, requested the President to designate and set apart a day for National prayer and humiliation. And whereas it is the duty of nations as well as of men, to own their dependence upon the overruling power of God, to confess their sins and transgressions, in humble sorrow, yet with assured hope that genuine repentance will lead to mercy and pardon; and to recognize the sublime truth, announced in the Holy Scriptures and proven by all history, that those nations only are blessed whose God is the Lord. And, insomuch as we know that, by His divine law, nations like individuals are subjected to punishments and chastisements in this world, may we not justly fear that the awful calamity of civil war, which now desolates the land, may be but a punishment, inflicted upon us, for our pre-

sumptuous sins, to the needful end of our national reformation as a whole People? We have been the recipients of the choicest bounties of Heaven. We have been preserved, these many years, in peace and prosperity. We have grown in numbers, wealth and power, as no other nation has ever grown. But we have forgotten God. We have forgotten the gracious hand which preserved us in peace, and multiplied and enriched and strengthened us; and we have vainly imagined, in the deceitfulness of our hearts, that all these blessings were produced by some superior wisdom and virtue of our own. Intoxicated with unbroken success, we have become too self-sufficient to feel the necessity of redeeming and preserving grace, too proud to pray to the God that made us! It behooves us then, to humble ourselves before the offended Power, to confess our national sins, and to pray for clemency and forgiveness. Now, therefore, in compliance with the request, and fully concurring in the views of the Senate, I do, by this my proclamation, designate and set apart Thursday, the 30th. day of April, 1863, as a day of national humiliation, fasting and prayer. And I do hereby request all the People to abstain, on that day, from their ordinary secular pursuits, and to unite, at their several places of public worship and their respective homes, in keeping the day holy to the Lord, and devoted to the humble discharge of the religious duties proper to that solemn occasion. All this being done, in sincerity and truth, let us then rest humbly in the hope authorized by the Divine teachings, that the united cry of the Nation will be heard on high, and answered with blessings, no less than the pardon of our national sins, and the restoration of our now divided and suffering Country, to its former happy condition of unity and peace. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the City of Washington, this thirtieth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty seventh. By the President: Abraham Lincoln William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

920  Max Nordau’s Address to the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland Source: Frank Moore, editor. The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1868, Vol. 6: 490.

Max Nordau’s Address to the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland (August 29, 1897) Theodore Herzl (1860–1904) organized the first Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897. Prior to the Congress, Zionist activities had been initiated by several different groups, such as Hovevei Zion (lovers of Zion), with no central direction or political program. The Basel Congress was the foundation of a mass Zionist movement. Max Nordau (1849–1923), a physician and literary figure, was converted to Zionism by Theodore Herzl. Nordau’s writings were both iconoclastic and conservative, attacking nihilism, contemporary European art, and contemporary social and political behavior. At the first Zionist Congress, Nordau gave an opening speech on the condition of the Jewish people, which subsequently became a tradition at later Zionist congresses. This first speech outlined the condition of the Jews and the reasons for that condition as the Zionist movement saw it. Nordau did not prescribe a remedy, but, interestingly, he singled out England as the one country in the world in which Jewish emancipation appeared to be possible. He did not mention the United States. His speech focuses mostly on the condition of Western European Jews. The special reporters for individual countries will depict for you the condition of their brethren in the different states. Some of their reports have been submitted to me; others not. But even of the countries about which I learnt nothing from my collaborators, I have, partly from personal observation, partly from other sources, obtained some knowledge, so that I may, without presumption, undertake the task of reporting on the general situation of the Jews at the end of the 19th century. This picture can, on the whole, be painted only in one colour. Everywhere, where the Jews have settled in comparatively large numbers among the nations, Jewish misery prevails. It is not the ordinary misery which is probably

the unalterable fate of mankind. It is a peculiar misery, which the Jews do not suffer as human beings, but as Jews, and from which they would be free, were they not Jews. Jewish misery has two forms, the material and the moral. In Eastern Europe, North Africa, and Western Asia—those regions which shelter the vast majority, probably nine-tenths of our race—the misery of the Jews is understood literally. It is the daily distress of the body, anxiety for every following day, the painful fight for the maintenance of a bare existence. In Western Europe, the struggle for existence has been made somewhat lighter for the Jews, although of late the tendency has become visible even there to render it difficult for them again. The question of food and shelter, the question of the security of life, tortures them less; there the misery is moral. The Western Jew has bread, but man does not live on bread alone. The life of the Western Jew is no longer endangered through the enmity of the mob; but bodily wounds are not the only wounds that cause pain, and from which one may bleed to death. The Western Jew meant emancipation to be real liberation, and hastened to draw the final conclusions therefrom. But the nations made him fear that he erred in being so heedlessly logical. The magnanimous laws, magnanimously lays down the theory of equality of rights. But governments and Society exercise the practice of equality of rights in a manner which renders it the same mockery as did the appointment of Sancho Panza to the splendid position of Viceroy of the Island of Barataria. The Jew says naively: “I am a human being, and I regard nothing human as alien,” the answer he meets is: “Softly, your rights as a man must be enjoyed cautiously; you lack the right notion of honour, feeling for duty, morality, patriotism, idealism. You must, therefore, hold aloof from all vocations which make possession of these qualifications as conditions.” No-one has ever tried to justify these terrible accusations by facts. At most, now and then, an individual Jew, the scum of his race and of mankind, is triumphantly cited as an example, and contrary to all laws of logic, the example is made general. This tendency is psychologically correct. It is the practice of human intellect to invent for the prejudices, which sentiment has called forth, a cause seemingly reasonable. Probably wisdom has long been acquainted with

Max Nordau’s Address to the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland  921

this psychological law, and puts it in fairly expressive words: “If you have to drown a dog,” says the proverb, “you must first declare him to be mad.” All kinds of vices are falsely attributed to the Jews, because one wishes to convince himself that he has a right to detest them. But the pre-existing sentiment is the detestation of the Jews. II

I must utter the painful word. The nations which emancipated the Jews have mistaken their own feelings. In order to produce its full effect, emancipation should first have been completed in sentiment before it was declared by law. But this was not the case. The history of Jewish emancipation is one of the most remarkable pages in the history of European thought. The emancipation of the Jews was not the consequence of the conviction that grave injury had been done to a race, that it had been treated most terribly, and that it was time to atone for the injustice of a thousand years; it was solely the result of the geometrical mode of thought of French rationalism of the 18th century. This rationalism was constructed by the aid of pure logic, without taking into account living sentiments and the principles of the certainty of mathematical action; and it insisted upon trying to introduce these creations of pure intellect into the world of reality. The emancipation of the Jews was an automatic application of the rationalistic method. The philosophy of Rousseau and the encyclopedists had led to the declaration of human rights. Out of this declaration, the strict logic of the men of the Great Revolution deduced Jewish emancipation. They formulated a regular equation: Every man is born with certain rights; the Jews are human beings, consequently the Jews are born to own the rights of man. In this manner, the emancipation of the Jews was pronounced, not through a fraternal feeling for the Jews, but because logic demanded it. Popular sentiment rebelled, but the philosophy of the Revolution decreed that principles must be placed higher than sentiment. Allow me then an expression which implies no ingratitude. The men of 1792 emancipated us only for the sake of principle. As the French Revolution gave to the world the metric and the decimal systems, so it also created a kind of normal spiritual system which other countries, either willingly or unwillingly, accepted as the normal measure for their

State of culture. A country which claimed to be at the height of culture had to possess several institutions created or developed by the Great Revolution; as, for instance, representation of the people, freedom of the press, Jury, division of powers, etc. Jewish emancipation was also one of these indispensable articles of a highly cultured state; just as a piano must not be absent from a drawing-room even if not a single member of the family can play it. In this manner Jews were emancipated in Europe not from an inner necessity, but in imitation of a political fashion; not because the people had decided from their hearts to stretch out a brotherly hand to the Jews, but because leading spirits had accepted a certain cultured idea which required that Jewish emancipation should figure also in the Statute book. Only to one country does this not apply—England. The English people does not allow its progress to be forced upon it from without; it develops progress from its inner self. In England emancipation is a truth. It is not alone written, it is living. It had already been completed in the heart before legislation expressly confirmed it. Out of respect to tradition, one hesitated in England to abolish the legal restrictions of the Nonconformists, at a time when the English had already for more than an age made no difference in Society between Christians and Jews. Because, a great nation, with a most intense spiritual life, does not allow itself to be guided by any spiritual current or blunder of the time, in England, anti-Semitism is only noticeable in a few instances, and then only it has the importance of an imitation of Continental fashion. III

Emancipation has totally changed the nature of the Jew, and made him another being. The Jew without any rights did not love the prescribed yellow Jewish badge on his coat, because it was an official invitation to the mob to commit brutalities, and justified them in anticipation. But voluntarily he did much more to make his separate nature more distinct even than the yellow badge could do. The authorities did not shut him up in a ghetto, he built one for himself. He would dwell with his own, and would have no other relations but those of business with Christians. The word “Ghetto” is today associated with feelings of shame and humiliation. But the Ghetto, whatever may have been the

922  Max Nordau’s Address to the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland

intentions of the people who have created it, was for the Jew of the past not a prison, but a refuge. It is only historical truth if we say that only the Ghetto gave Jews the possibility to survive the terrible persecutions of the Middle Ages. In the Ghetto, the Jew had his own world; it was to him the sure refuge which had for him the spiritual and moral value of a parental home. Here were associates by whom one wished to be valued, and also could be valued; here was the public opinion to be acknowledged by which was the aim of the Jew’s ambition. To be held in low esteem by that public opinion was the punishment for unworthiness. Here all specific Jewish qualities were esteemed, and through their special development that admiration was to be obtained which is the sharpest spur to the human mind. What mattered it that outside the Ghetto was despised that which within it was praised? The opinion of the outside world had no influence, because it was the opinion of ignorant enemies. One tried to please one’s co-religionists, and their applause was the worthy contentment of his life. So did the Ghetto Jews live, in a moral respect, a real full life. Their external situation was insecure, often seriously endangered. But internally they achieved a complete development of their specific qualities. They were human beings in harmony, who were not in want of the elements of normal social life. They also felt instinctively the whole importance of the Ghetto for their inner life, and therefore, they had the one sole care: to make its existence secure through invisible walls which were much thicker and higher than the stone walls that visibly shut them in. All Jewish buildings and habits unconsciously pursued only one purpose: to keep up Judaism by separation from the other people and to make the individual Jew constantly aware of the fact that he was lost and would perish if he gave up his specific character. This impulse for separation gave him also most of the ritual laws, which for the everyday Jew is identical with his faith itself; and also other purely external, often accidental, marks of difference in attire and habits received a religious sanction only in order that they might be maintained the more surely. Kaftan, Peoth, Fur Cap and Jargon have apparently nothing to do with religion. But they feel that these ties alone offer them connection with the community without which an individual, morally, intellectually, and at last physically, cannot exist for any length of time.

That was the psychology of the Ghetto Jew. Now came Emancipation. The law assured the Jews that they were full citizens of their country. In its honeymoon it evoked also from Christians feelings which warmed and purified the heart. The Jews hastened in a species of intoxication, as it were, to burn their boa[t]s. They had now another home; they no longer needed a Ghetto; they had now other connections and were no longer forced to exist only with their co-religionists. Their instinct of self-preservation fitted itself immediately and completely to the new conditions of existence. Formerly this instinct was only directed toward a sharp separation. Now they sought after the closest association and assimilation in place of the distinction, which was their salvation. There followed a true mimicry, and for one or two ages the Jew was allowed to believe that he was only German, French, Italian, and so forth. All at once, twenty years ago, after a slumber of thirty to sixty years, anti-Semitism once more broke out from the innermost depths of the nations, and revealed to the highest of the mortified Jews his real situation, which he had no longer seen. He was still allowed to vote for members of parliament, but he was himself excluded from the clubs and the meetings of his Christian fellow-countrymen. He was allowed to go wherever he pleased, but everywhere he met with the inscription: “No Jews admitted.” He had still the right of discharging all the duties of a citizen, but the nobler rights which are granted to talent and for achievements in those rights were absolutely denied to him. Such is the existing liberation of the emancipated Jew in Western Europe. He has given up his specifically Jewish character; but the peoples let him feel that he has not acquired their special characteristics. He has Lost the home of the Ghetto; but the land of his birth is denied to him as his home. His countrymen repel him when he wishes to associate with them. He has no ground under his feet and he has no community to which he belongs as a full member. With his Christian countrymen neither his character nor his intentions can reckon on justice, still less on kindly feeling. With his Jewish countrymen he has lost touch: necessarily he feels that the world hates him and he sees no place where he can find warmth when he seeks for it. This is the moral Jewish misery which is more bitter than the physical, because it befalls men who are differently situated, prouder and possess the finer feelings.

Max Nordau’s Address to the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland  923

IV

Before the emancipation the Jew was a stranger among the peoples, but he did not for a moment think of making a stand against his fate. He felt himself as belonging to a race of his own, which had nothing in common with the other people of the country. The emancipated Jew is insecure in his relations with his fellow-beings, timid with strangers, suspicious even toward the secret feeling of his friends. His best powers are exhausted in the suppression, or at least in the difficult concealment of his own real character. For he fears that this character might be recognized as Jewish, and he has never the satisfaction of showing himself as he is in all his thoughts and sentiments. He becomes an inner cripple, and externally unreal, and thereby always ridiculous and hateful to all higher feeling men, as is everything that is unreal. All the better Jews in Western Europe groan under this, or seek for alleviation. They no longer possess the belief which gives the patience necessary to bear sufferings, because it sees in them the will of a punishing but not loving God. They no longer hope in the advent of the Messiah, who will one day raise them to Glory. Many try to save themselves by flight from Judaism. But racial anti-Semitism denies the power of change by baptism, and this mode of salvation does not seem to have much prospect. It is but a slight recommendation for those concerned, who are mostly without belief (I am not speaking naturally of the minority of true believers) that they enter with a blasphemous lie into the Christian community. In this way there arises a new Marrano, who is worse than the old. The latter had an idealistic direction—a secret desire for truth or a heartbreaking distress of conscience, and they often sought for pardon and purification through Martyrdom. The new Marranos leave Judaism with rage and bitterness, but in their innermost heart, although not acknowledged by themselves, they carry with them their own humiliation, their own dishonesty, and hatred also toward Christianity which has forced them to lie. I think with horror of the future development of this race of new Marranos, who are normally sustained by no tradition and whose soul is poisoned by hostility toward their own and strange blood, and whose self-respect is destroyed through the ever present consciousness of a fundamental lie. Others hope for the salvation from Zionism,

which is for them, not the fulfillment of a mystic promise of the Scripture, but the way to an existence wherein the Jew finds at last the simplest but most elementary conditions of life, that are a matter of course for every Jew of both hemispheres: viz, an assured social existence in a well meaning community, the possibility of employing all his powers for the developments of his real being instead of abusing them for the suppression and falsification of self. Yet others, who rebel against the lie of the Marranos, and who feel themselves too intimately connected with the land of their birth not to feel what Zionism means, throw themselves into the arms of the wildest revolution, with an indefinite arriere pense that with the destruction of everything in existence and the construction of a new world Jew-hatred may not be one of the precious articles transferred from the debris of the old conditions into the new. This is the history of Israel at the end of the 19th century. To sum it up in a word: The majority of the Jews are a race of accursed beggars. More industrious and more able than the average European, not to speak at all of the inert Asiatic and African, the Jew is condemned to the most extreme pauperism, because he is not allowed to use his powers freely. This poverty grinds down his character, and destroys his body. Fevered by the thirst for higher education, he sees himself repelled from the places where knowledge is attainable—a real intellectual tantalus of our non-mythical times. He dashes his head against the thick ice crusts of hatred and contempt which are formed over his head. Like scarcely any other social being—whom even his belief teaches that it is a meritorious and God-pleasing action for three to take meals together and for ten to pray together—he is excluded from the society of his countrymen and is condemned to a tragic isolation. One complains of Jews intruding everywhere, but they only strive after superiority, because they are denied equality. They are accused of a feeling of solidarity with the Jews of the whole world; whereas, on the contrary, it is their misfortune that as soon as the first loving word of emancipation had been uttered, they tried to pluck from their hearts all Jewish solidarity up to the last trace. Stunned by the hailstorm of anti-Semitic accusations, they forget who they are and often imagine themselves in reality the bodily and spiritual miscreants whom their deadly enemies represent them to be. Not rarely the Jew is heard to murmur that he must

924  “At the Battle of Nan Shan Hill” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk So¯en Shaku

learn from the enemy and try to remedy his feelings. He forgets, however, that the anti-Semitic accusations are valueless, because they are not based on criticism of real facts, but the effects of psychological law according to which children, wild men and malevolent fools make persons and things against which they have an aversion responsible for their sufferings. To Jewish distress no-one can remain indifferent, neither Christian nor Jew. It is a great sin to let a race to whom even their worst enemies do not deny ability, degenerate in intellectual and physical distress. It is a sin against them and against the work of civilization, in the interest of which Jews have not been useless co-workers. That Jewish distress cries for help. To find that help will be the great work of this Congress. Source: London Jewish Chronicle, ca. 1897. Also available at: MidEast Web, http://www.mideastweb.org/nordau1897.htm.

“At the Battle of Nan Shan Hill” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk So¯en Shaku (December 1904) The Japanese Buddhist monk Sōen Shaku served as a chaplain in the Japanese army during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Although nominally a pacifist, in keeping with the core tenets of Buddhism, Shaku would not renounce the unparalleled violence that the war had unleashed, claiming that it was more important to meet the enemy on the field of battle than to give way and accede to the enemy’s demands. This essay, which Shaku wrote after witnessing the Battle of Nan Shan Hill, was translated into English by Shaku’s student, Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, and was subsequently published in an American journal called The Open Court in December 1904. This essay not only presents a Zen Buddhist view of the horrors of warfare, but also serves as an example of how Zen Buddhism was co-opted in support of Japan’s militarism in the years prior to and during the Second World War. All that I can say is, “It beggars description!” Verily, it is the acme of brutality and recklessness conceived in this world of individualisation (ndinarupa). Even the fight between

the Asura and Sakrendra, the demons and the angels, witnessed by our Buddha, seems here to sink into insignificance. As far as my unaided eye can see, nature around me is calm. The Tai-lien Bay to the left and the Kin-chou Bay to the right, both as tranquil as mirrors, and above us and over the Nan-Shan Hill, where directly in our front the Russian fortifications stand, the sky expands in majestic serenity. Nothing suggests the awful carnage which there is enacted. Guns roar, bombs burst, but we do not see whence they come, and their knell only offsets the solemnitv of these peaceful surroundings. But when I look through a powerful field-glass, I behold the hillsides strewn with dead and wounded, and soldiers rush onward over these wretches, while the enemies on the hill are madly scrambling, stumbling, and falling. I shudder at the sight. Still more appalling is a visit to the battlefield after the fight. Yesterday, when I viewed Nan-Shan Hill from a distance, imagination lent enchantment to the spectacle, and at times the cannonade even impressed me with grandeur. But I am now confronting actualities—actualities whose terror and horror can never be forgotten. From the top of yonder hill, where, under the calm summer sky, nature smiled in beauty, I could form no true conception of the tragedy, which, as I see now, took place here in unparalleled fury and madness. What a strange paradox is this contrast—a most horrible catastrophe of human life happening in the most delightful surroundings! It makes me meditate again on the doctrine of our teacher. Buddhism provides us with two entrances through which we can reach the citadel of perfect truth. One is the gate of love (karund) and the other the gate of knowledge (prajnd). The former leads us to the world of particulars and the latter to the realm of the absolute. By knowledge we aspire to reach the summit of spiritual enlightenment; by love we strive to rescue our fellow-creatures from misery and crime. View the vicissitudes of things from the unity and eternity of the religious standpoint, the Dhamadhatu, and everything is one, is on the same plane, and I learn to neglect the worldly distinction made between friend and foe, tragedy and comedy, war and peace, samsdra and nirvana, passion (kleca) and enlightenment (bodhi). A philosophical calm pervades my soul and I feel the contentment of Nirvana. . . . For there is nothing as far as I can see, that does not reflect the glory of Buddha. Even

“At the Battle of Nan Shan Hill” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk So¯en Shaku  925

in the midst of this transcendent universality, however, my heart aches with a pain, undefinable yet insuppressible. Love for all sentient beings asserts itself, and that frigid indifference of the intellect gives away. And why was it necessary that the many horrors of this present war have come to pass? Why had those poor soldiers to sacrifice their lives? In every one of them a warm heart has been beating, and now they are all lying on the ground in piles, stiff and stark like logs. O Mother Earth! All these my fellow-creatures, it is true, are made of the same stuff of which thou art made. But do not their lives partake of something not of the earth earthy, altogether unlike thyself, and, indeed, more than mere gross matter? Are theirs not precious human souls which can be engaged in the works of peace and enlightenment? Why art thou so gravely dumb, when thou art covered with things priceless that are being dissolved into their primitive elements? In this world of particulars, the noblest and greatest thing one can achieve is to combat evil and bring it into complete subjection. The moral principle which guided the Buddha throughout his twelve years of preparation and in his forty-eight years of religious wanderings, and which pervades his whole doctrine, however varied it may be when practically applied, is nothing else than the subjugation of evil. To destroy the ninety-eight major and eightyfour thousand minor evils, that are constantly tormenting human souls on this earth, was the guiding thought of the Buddha. Therefore, every follower of the Buddha builds the great boat of love, launches it on the great ocean of birth and death, steers it with the great rudder of faith, and sails forth with a steadfast mind through the whirling tempest of egotistic desires and passions. No Buddhist will ever relax his energy, until every one of his fellow creatures be safely carried over to the other shore of perfect bliss. War is an evil and a great one, indeed. But war against evils must be unflinchingly prosecuted till we attain the final aim. In the present hostilities in which Japan has entered with great reluctance, she pursues no egotistic purpose, but seeks the subjugation of evils hostile to civilization, peace, and enlightenment. She deliberated long before she took up arms, as she was well aware of the magnitude and gravity of the undertaking. But the firm conviction of the justice of her cause has endowed her with

an indomitable courage, and she is determined to carry the struggle to the bitter end. Here is the price we must pay for our ideals—a price paid in streams of blood and by the sacrifice of many thousands of living bodies. However determined may be our resolution to crush evils, our hearts tremble at the sight of this appalling scene. Alas! How much dearer is the price still going to be? What enormous losses are we going to suffer through the evil thoughts of our enemy, not to speak of the many injuries which our poor enemy himself will have to endure? All these miserable soldiers, individually harmless and innocent of the present war, are doomed to a death not only unnatural, but even inhuman! Indeed, were it not for the doctrine of love taught by the Buddha, which should elevate every individual creature to the realm of a pure spirituality, we would, in the face of the terrible calamities that now befall us, be left to utter destruction and without any consolation whatever. Were it not for the belief that the bloom of truly spiritual light will, out of these mutilated, disfigured, and decomposing corpses, return with renewed splendor, we would not be able to stand these heart-rending tribulations even for a moment. Were it not for the consolation that these sacrifices are not brought for an egotistic purpose, but are an inevitable step toward the final realization of enlightenment, how could I, poor mortal, bear these experiences of a hell let loose on earth? The body is but a vessel for something greater than itself. Individuality is but a husk containing something more permanent. Let us, then, though not without losing tenderness of heart, bravely confront our ordeal. I came here with a double purpose. I wished to have my faith tested by going through the greatest horrors of life, but I also wished to inspire, if I could, our valiant soldiers with the ennobling thoughts of the Buddha, so as to enable them to die on the battlefield with the confidence that the task in which they are engaged is great and noble. I wished to convince them of the truths that this war is not a mere slaughter of their fellow-beings, but that they are combating an evil, and that, at the same time, corporeal annihilation rarely means a rebirth of soul, not in heaven, indeed, but here among ourselves. I believe I did my best to impress these ideas upon the soldiers’ hearts; and my own

926  “Buddhist View of War” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk So¯en Shaku

sentiments I express in the following stanza, one of the many poems composed on the field of battle: Here, marching on Nan-Shan. Storming its topmost crest, Have thousands of brave men With dragon valor pressed. Before the foe my heart Is calmed, composure-blessed. While belching cannons sing A lullaby of rest. Source: The Right Rev. Soyen Shaku, and Suzuki, Teitaro, trans. “At the Battle of Nan-Shan Hill.” The Open Court. 1904, Issue 12, Article 1.

“Buddhist View of War” by the Japanese Buddhist Monk So¯en Shaku (1904) Japanese Buddhist monk Sōen Shaku wrote this tract explaining a Buddhist view of warfare. Having seen warfare himself during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, Shaku was no stranger to the brutality of 20th-century combat. In this proclamation, Shaku explains that fighting is a necessary evil, and that the reason for fighting is to combat ignorance. While war might be necessary in the pursuit of worldly ends, Shaku emphasizes the Buddha’s compassion above all else. “THIS triple world is my own possession. All the things therein are my own children. Sentient or non-sentient, animate or inanimate, organic or inorganic, the ten thousand things in this world are no more than the reflections of my own self. They come from the one source. They partake of the one body. Therefore I cannot rest quiet, until every being, even the smallest possible fragment of existence, is settled down in its proper appointment. I do not mind what long eons it will take to finish this gigantic work of salvation. I work at the end of eternity when all beings are peacefully and happily nestled in an infinite loving heart.” This is the position taken by the Buddha, and we, his humble followers, are but to walk in his wake. Why, then, do we fight at all?

Because we do not find this world as it ought to be. Because there are here so many perverted creatures, so many wayward thoughts, so many ill-directed hearts, due to ignorant subjectivity. For this reason Buddhists are never tired of combating all productions of ignorance, and their fight must be to the bitter end. They will show no quarter. They will mercilessly destroy the very root from which arises the misery of this life. To accomplish this end, they will never be afraid of sacrificing their lives, nor will they tremble before an eternal cycle of transmigration. Corporeal existences come and go, material appearances wear out and are renewed. Again and again they take up the battle at the point where it was left off. But all the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas never show any ill-will or hatred toward enemies. Enemies—the enemies of all that is good—are indeed wicked, avaricious, shameless, hell-born, and, above all, ignorant. But are they not, too, my own children for all their sins? They are to be pitied and enlightened, not persecuted. Therefore, what is shed by Buddhists is not blood,—which, unfortunately, has stained so many pages in the history of religion,—but tears issuing directly from the fountain-head of lovingkindness. The most powerful weapon ever used by Buddha in the subjugation of his wayward children is the practice of nonatman (non-egotism). He wielded it more effectively than any deadly, life-destroying weapons. When he was under the Bodhi-tree absorbed in meditation on the nonatmanness of things, fiends numbering thousands tried in every way to shake him from his transcendental serenity; but all to no purpose. On the contrary, the arrows turned to heavenly flowers, the roaring clamor to a paradisiacal music, and even the army of demons to a host of celestials. And do you wonder at it? Not at all! For what on earth can withstand an absolutely self-freed heart overflowing with lovingkindness and infinite bliss? And this example should be made the ideal of every faithful Buddhist. Whatever calling he may have chosen in this life, let him be freed from ego-centric thoughts and feelings. Even when going to war for his country’s sake, let him not bear any hatred towards his enemies. In all his dealings with them let him practise the truth of nonatman. He may have to deprive his antagonist of the corporeal presence, but let him not think there are atmans, conquering each other. From a Buddhist point of view, the

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significance of life is not limited to the present incarnation. We must not exaggerate the significance of individuals, for they are not independent and unconditional existences. They acquire their importance and a paramount meaning, moral and religious, as soon as their fate becomes connected with the all-pervading love of the Buddha, because then they are no more particular individuals filled with egotistic thoughts and impulses, but have become love incarnate. They are so many representative types of one universal self-freed love. If they ever have to combat one another for the sake of their home and country,—which under circumstances may become unavoidable in this world of particularity,—let them forget their egotistic passions, which are the product of the atman conception of selfishness. Let them, on the contrary, be filled with the lovingkindness of the Buddha; let them elevate themselves above the horizon of the mine and thine. The hand that is raised to strike and the eye that is fixed to take aim, do not belong to the individual, but are the instruments utilized by a principle higher than transient existence. Therefore, when fighting, fight with might and main, fight with your whole heart, forget your own self in the fight, and be free from all atman thought. It is most characteristic of our religion, as we understand it, that while Buddha emphasized the paramount significance of synthetic love, he never lost sight of the indispensableness of analytical intellect. He extended his sympathy to all creatures as his own children and made no discrimination in his boundless compassion. But at the same time he was not ignorant of the fact that there were good as well as bad people, that there were innocent hearts as well as guilty ones. Not that some were more favored by the Buddha than others, but they were enabled to acquire more of the love of the Buddha. One rain falls on all kinds of plants; but they do not assimilate the water in the same fashion. Buddha’s love is universal, but our hearts, being fashioned of divergent karmas, receive it in different ways. He knows where they are finally led to, for his love is unintermittently working out their salvation, though they themselves be utterly unconscious of it. Above all things, there is the truth, and there are many roads leading to it. It may seem at times that they collide and oppose one another. But let us rest confident that finally every ill will come to some good.

Source: The Right Rev. Soyen Shaku and Suzuki, Teitaro, trans. “Buddhist View of War.” The Open Court. 1904: Issue 5, Article 2.

Issuance of Ottoman Fetva by Essad Effendi, Sheik-Ul-Islam in the Name of Sultan Mehmed V (November 1914) The Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on November 1, 1914, after having been attacked by Russia. Entering the war on the side of the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Ottomans found themselves at war with Russia, France, and Britain. The Allied powers had long feared the issuance of a Fetva because they worried that it might indeed be acted upon by Muslims throughout the world, especially in India and Egypt, which were both key components of the British Empire. Scholars have debated whether or not this Fetva was actually a product of the German government, attempting to spur the Ottomans into action in parts of the world where the Germans had had little ability to attack Britain or Russia. Although the Fetva was issued as a call to jihad, it was not received with enthusiasm and had little practical impact on the war’s outcome. If several enemies unite against Islam, if the countries of Islam are sacked, if the Moslem populations are massacred or made captive; and if in this case the Padishah in conformity with the sacred words of the Koran proclaims the Holy War, is participation in this war a duty for all Moslems, old and young, cavalry and infantry? Must the Mohammedans of all countries of Islam hasten with their bodies and possessions to the Djat? [Note: Jihad, Holy War.] Answer: “Yes.” The Moslem subjects of Russia, of France, of England and of all the countries that side with them in their land and sea attacks dealt against the Caliphate for the purpose of annihilating Islam, must these subjects, too, take part in the holy War against the respective governments from which they depend?

928  Balfour Declaration

Answer: “Yes.” Those who at a time when all Moslems are summoned to fight, avoid the struggle and refuse to join in the Holy War, are they exposed to the wrath of God, to great misfortunes, and to the deserved punishment? Answer: “Yes.” If the Moslem subjects of the said countries should take up arms against the government of Islam, would they commit an unpardonable sin, even if they had been driven to the war by threats of extermination uttered against themselves and their families? Answer: “Yes.” The Moslems who in the present war are under England, France, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro and those who give aid to these countries by waging war against Germany and Austria, allies of Turkey, do they deserve to be punished by the wrath of God as being the cause of harm and damage to the Caliphate and to Islam? Answer: “Yes.” Source: Charles F. Horne, ed. Source Records of the Great War. Vol. III. New York: National Alumni, 1923.

Balfour Declaration (1917) On November 2, 1917, British foreign secretary Arthur James Balfour (1848–1930) sent a letter to Walter Rothschild, Lord Rothschild (1868–1937), a leader of the British Jewish community, that made public British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Known as the Balfour Declaration, the letter led the League of Nations to give the Palestine Mandate to Britain in 1922. Foreign Office November 2nd, 1917 Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sym-

pathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. Yours sincerely, Arthur James Balfour Source: © The British Library Board, Add. 41178, f.3.

Pacem, Dei Munus Pulcherrimum, a Papal Encyclical Issued by Pope Benedict XV (May 23, 1920) Pacem, Dei Munus Pulcherrimum (Peace, Beautiful Gift of God) is a papal encyclical on peace and Christian reconciliation delivered by Pope Benedict XV (r. 1914–1922) at St. Peter’s, Rome, on May 23, 1920, the Feast of Pentecost, one and a half years after the end of the First World War. This encyclical was an attempt by the Vatican to reassert itself into the affairs of Europe and the world. The Vatican was not invited to participate in the deliberations leading to the Treaty of Versailles, which brought the First World War to an end, nor was there any Vatican involvement in the formation of the new League of Nations. Thus, Pacem, Dei Munus Pulcherrimum can be seen as an attempt to reclaim a role for the Vatican in international affairs. Venerable Brethren, Health and Apostolic Benediction. Peace, the beautiful gift of God, the name of which, as St. Augustine says, is the sweetest word to our hearing and the best and most desirable possession [1]; peace, which was

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for more than four years implored by the ardent wishes of all good peoples, by the prayers of pious souls and the tears of mothers, begins at last to shine upon the nations. At this We are indeed the happiest of all, and heartily do We rejoice. But this joy of Our paternal heart is disturbed by many bitter anxieties, for if in most places peace is in some sort established and treaties signed, the germs of former enmities remain; and you well know, Venerable Brethren, that there can be no stable peace or lasting treaties, though made after long and difficult negotiations and duly signed, unless there be a return of mutual charity to appease hate and banish enmity. This, then, Venerable Brethren, is the anxious and dangerous question upon which we wish to dwell and to put forward recommendations to be brought home to your people.

harm would accrue to the form and essence of the Christian life, which consists essentially in charity and the preaching of which is called the Gospel of peace. [2]

2. For Ourselves, never since, by the hidden designs of God, We were raised to the Chair have We ceased to do everything in Our power from the very beginning of the war that all the nations of the world might resume cordial relations as soon as possible. To that end We never ceased to pray, to repeat exhortations, to propose ways of arrangement, to try every means, in fact, to open by divine aid, a path to a just, honourable and lasting peace; and at the same time We exercised all Our paternal care to alleviate everywhere that terrible load of sorrow and disaster of every sort by which the immense tragedy was accompanied.

6. The Apostles, following in the steps of the divine Master, and conforming to His word and commands, were unceasing in their exhortation to the faithful: “Before all things have a constant mutual charity among yourselves”[4]. “But above all these things have charity which is the bond of perfection”[5]. “Dearly beloved, let us love one another for charity is God”[6]. Our brethren of the first Christian ages faithfully observed these commands of Jesus Christ and the Apostles. They belonged to different and rival nations; yet they willingly forgot their causes of quarrel and lived in perfect concord, and such a union of hearts was in striking contrast with the deadly enmities by which human society was then consumed.

3. And now, just as from the beginning of Our troubled pontificate the charity to Jesus Christ led Us to work both for the return of peace and to alleviate the horrors of the war, so now that comparative peace has been concluded, this same charity urges Us to exhort all the children of the Church, and all mankind, to clear their hearts of bitterness, and give place to mutual love and concord. 4. There is no need from us of long proof to show that society would incur the risk of great loss if, while peace is signed, latent hostility and enmity were to continue among the nations. There is not need to mention the loss of all that maintains and fosters civil life, such as commerce and industry, art and literature, which flourish only when the nations are at peace. But what is even more important, grave

5. You know well, and We have frequently reminded you of it, nothing was so often and so carefully inculcated on His disciple by Jesus Christ as this precept of mutual charity as the one which contains all others. Christ called it the new commandment, His very own, and desired that it should be the sign of Christians by which they might be distinguished from all others; and on the eve of His death it was His last testament to His disciples to love one another and thus try to imitate the ineffable unity of the three Divine Persons in the Trinity. “That they may be one as we also are one . . . that they may be made perfect in one”[3].

7. What has already been said in favour of charity holds good for the inculcation of the pardoning of injuries which is no less solemnly commanded by the Lord: “But I say to you, love your enemies; do good to them that hate you; pray for those that persecute you and calumniate you, that you may be the children of your Father who is in Heaven, Who maketh His sun to rise upon the good and the bad”[7]. Hence that terribly severe warning of the Apostle St. John. “Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer. And you know that no murderer hath eternal life abiding in himself.”[8] 8. Our Lord Jesus Christ, in teaching us how to pray to God, makes us say that we wish for pardon as we forgive others:

930  Pacem, Dei Munus Pulcherrimum, a Papal Encyclical Issued by Pope Benedict XV

“Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against Us.”[9] And if the observance of this law is sometimes hard and difficult, we have not only the timely assistance of the grace of Our Divine Redeemer, but also His example to help us to overcome the difficulty. For as He hung on the Cross He thus excused before his Father those who so unjustly and wickedly tortured Him: “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.”[10] We then, who should be the first to imitate the piety and loving kindness of Jesus Christ, whose Vicar, without any merit of Our own, We are; with all Our heart, and following His example, We forgive all Our enemies who knowingly or unknowingly have heaped and are still heaping on our person and Our work every sort of vituperation, and We embrace all in Our charity and benevolence, and neglect no opportunity to do them all the good in Our power. That is indeed what Christians worthy of the name ought to do towards those who during the war have done them wrong. 9. Christian charity ought not to be content with not hating our enemies and loving them as brothers; it also demands that we treat them with kindness, following the rule of the Divine Master Who “went about doing good and healing all that were oppressed by the devil”[11], and finished His mortal life, the course of which was marked by good deeds, by shedding His blood for them. So said St. John: “In this we have known the charity of God, because He hath laid down His life for us, and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren. He that hath substance of this world and shall see his brother in need and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him? My little children, let us love not in word nor by tongue, but in deed and in truth.”[12] 10. Never indeed was there a time when we should “stretch the bounds of charity” more than in these days of universal suffering and sorrow; never perhaps as today has humanity so needed that universal beneficence which springs from the love of others, and is full of sacrifice and zeal. For if we look around where the fury of the war has been let loose we see immense regions utterly desolate, uncultivated and abandoned; multitudes reduced to want of food, clothing and shelter; innumerable widows and orphans reft of everything, and an incredible number of enfeebled

beings, particularly children and young people, who carry on their bodies the ravages of this atrocious war. 11. When one regards all these miseries by which the human race is stricken one inevitably thinks of the traveller in the Gospel [13] who, going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, fell among thieves, who robbed him, and covered him with wounds and left him half dead. The two cases are very similar; and as to the traveller there came the good Samaritan, full of compassion, who bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, took him to an inn, and undertook all care for him; so too is it necessary that Jesus, of Whom the Samaritan was the figure, should lay His hands upon the wounds of society. 12. This work, this duty the Church claims as her own as heir and guardian of the spirit of Jesus Christ—the Church whose entire existence is a marvelously varied tissue of all kinds of good deeds, the Church, “that real mother of Christians in the full sense of the word, who has such tenderness of love and charity for one’s neighbours that she can offer the best remedies for the different evils which afflict souls on account of their sins.” That is why she “treats and teaches children with tenderness, young people with firmness, old people with great calm, taking account not only of the age but also the condition of soul of each.’’[14] It would be difficult to exaggerate the effect of many-sided Christian beneficence in softening the heart and thus facilitating the return of tranquility to the nations. 13. Therefore, Venerable Brethren, We pray you and exhort you in the mercy and charity of Jesus Christ, strive with all zeal and diligence not only to urge the faithful entrusted to your care to abandon hatred and to pardon offences; but, and what is more immediately practical, to promote all those works of Christian benevolence which bring aid to the needy, comfort to the afflicted and protection to the weak, and to give opportune and appropriate assistance of every kind to all who have suffered from the war. It is Our especial wish that you should exhort your priests, as the ministers of peace, to be assiduous in urging this love of one’s neighbour and even of enemies which is the essence of the Christian life, and by “being all things to all men’’[15] and giving an example to others, wage war everywhere on

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enmity and hatred, thus doing a thing most agreeable to the loving Heart of Jesus and to him who, however unworthy, holds His place on earth. In this connection Catholic writers and journalists should be invited to clothe themselves “as elect of God, holy and beloved, with pity and kindness.’’[16] Let them show this charity in their writings by abstaining not only from false and groundless accusations but also from all intemperance and bitterness of language, all of which is contrary to the law of Christ and does but reopen sores as yet unhealed, seeing that the slightest touch is a serious irritant to a heart whose wounds are recent. 14. All that We have said here to individuals about the duty of charity We wish to say also to the peoples who have been delivered from the burden of a long war, in order that, when every cause of disagreement has been, as far as possible, removed, and without prejudice to the rights of justice, they may resume friendly relations among themselves. The Gospel has not one law of charity for individuals, and another for States and nations, which are indeed but collections of individuals. The war being now over, people seem called to a general reconciliation not only from motives of charity, but from necessity; the nations are naturally drawn together by the need they have of one another, and by the bond of mutual good will, bonds which are today strengthened by the development of civilization and the marvellous increase of communication. 15. Truly, as We have already said, this Apostolic See has never wearied of teaching during the war such pardon of offences and the fraternal reconciliation of the peoples, in conformity with the most holy law of Jesus Christ, and in agreement with the needs of civil life and human intercourse; nor did it allow that amid dissension and hate these moral principles should be forgotten. With all the more reason then, now that the Treaties of Peace are signed, does it proclaim these principles as, for example, it did a short time ago in the Letter to the Bishops of Germany [17], and in that addressed to the Archbishop of Paris [18]. 16. And this concord between civilized nations is maintained and fostered by the modern custom of visits and meetings at which the Heads of States and Princes are ac-

customed to treat of matters of special importance. So then, considering the changed circumstances of the times and the dangerous trend of events, and in order to encourage this concord, We would not be unwilling to relax in some measure the severity of the conditions justly laid down by Our Predecessors, when the civil power of the Apostolic See was overthrown, against the official visits of the Heads of Catholic states to Rome. But at the same time We formally declare that this concession, which seems counselled or rather demanded by the grave circumstances in which to-day society is placed, must not be interpreted as a tacit renunciation of its sacrosanct rights by the Apostolic See, as it is acquiesced in the unlawful situation in which it is placed. Rather do we seize this opportunity to renew for the same reasons the protests which Our Predecessors have several times made, not in the least moved thereto by human interests, but in fulfilment of the sacred duty of their charge to defend the rights and dignity of this Apostolic See; once again demanding, and with even greater insistence now that peace is made among the nations that “for the Head of the Church, too, an end may be put to that abnormal condition which in so many ways does such serious harm to tranquility among the peoples.”[19] 17. Things being thus restored, the order required by justice and charity re-established and the nations reconciled, it is much to be desired, Venerable Brethren, that all States, putting aside mutual suspicion, should unite in one league, or rather a sort of family of peoples, calculated both to maintain their own independence and safeguard the order of human society. What specially, amongst other reasons, calls for such an association of nations, is the need generally recognized of making every effort to abolish or reduce the enormous burden of the military expenditure which States can no longer bear, in order to prevent these disastrous wars or at least to remove the danger of them as far as possible. So would each nation be assured not only of its independence but also of the integrity of its territory within its just frontiers. 18. The Church will certainly not refuse her zealous aid to States united under the Christian law in any of their undertakings inspired by justice and charity, inasmuch as she is herself the most perfect type of universal society. She

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possesses in her organization and institutions a wonderful instrument for bringing this brotherhood among men, not only for their eternal salvation but also for their material well-being to the sure acquisition of eternal blessings. It is the teaching of history that when the Church pervaded with her spirit the ancient and barbarous nations of Europe, little by little the many and varied differences that divided them were diminished and their quarrels extinguished; in time they formed a homogeneous society from which sprang Christian Europe which, under the guidance and auspices of the Church, whilst preserving a diversity of nations, tended to a unity that favoured its prosperity and glory. On this point St. Augustine well says: “This celestial city, in its life here on earth, calls to itself citizens of every nation, and forms out of all the peoples one varied society; it is not harassed by differences in customs, laws and institutions, which serve to attainment or the maintenance of peace on earth; it neither rends nor destroys anything but rather guards all and adapts itself to all; however these things may vary among the nations, they are all directed to the same end of peace on earth as long as they do not hinder the exercise of religion, which teaches the worship of the true supreme God.”[20] And the same holy Doctor thus addresses the Church: “Citizens, peoples and all men, thou, recalling their common origin, shalt not only unite among themselves, but shalt make them brothers.”[21] 19. To come back to what We said at the beginning, We turn affectionately to all Our children and conjure them in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ to forget mutual differences and offences and draw together in the bonds of Christian charity, from which none are excluded and within which none are strangers. We fervently exhort all the nations, under the inspiration of Christian benevolence, to establish a true peace among themselves and join together in an alliance which shall be just and therefore lasting. And lastly We appeal to all men and all peoples to join in mind and heart with the Catholic Church and through the Church with Christ the Redeemer of the human race, so that we may address to them in very truth the words of St. Paul to the Ephesians: “But now in Christ Jesus you who sometimes were afar off, are made nigh by the blood of Christ. For He is our peace, Who hath made both

one, and breaking down the middle wall of partition . . . killing the enmities in himself. And coming he preached peace to you that were afar off and peace to them that were nigh.”[22] 20. Nor less appropriate are the words which the same apostle addressed to the Colossians: “Lie not to one another: stripping yourselves of the old man with his deeds. And putting on the new, him who is renewed unto knowledge according to the image of Him that created it. Where there is neither Gentile nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free. But Christ is all and in all.”[23] 21. Meanwhile, trusting in the protection of Mary the Virgin Immaculate, who not long ago We directed should be universally invoked as “Queen of Peace,” as also in the intercession of the three Blessed to whom we have decreed the honour of saints, We humbly implore the Holy Ghost the Paraclete that He may “graciously grant to the Church the gifts of unity and peace”[24], and may renew the face of the earth by a fresh outpouring of His charity for the salvation of all. As in earnest of these heavenly gifts and as a pledge of Our paternal benevolence, We impart with all Our heart to you, Venerable Brethren, to all your clergy and people, the Apostolic Benediction. Source: The Christian Union Quarterly, Vol. X, No. 1, July, 1920: 201–210.

The Palestine Mandate (July 24, 1922) The League of Nations ratified the Palestine Mandate on July 24, 1922. In 1916, Britain and France were signatories to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the aim of which was to divide the Middle East between them into spheres of influence, with “Palestine” as an international enclave. The British had already made two essentially conflicting promises regarding the territory it was expecting to acquire in the Sykes-Picot agreement. In 1915, Britain had promised Hussein bin Ali, the sharif of Mecca (ca. 1853–1931) in Arabia, through their

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emissary and war hero T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) (1888–1935), independence for an Arab country covering most of the Arab Middle East in exchange for his support, while also promising to create a Jewish homeland in the territory then known as Palestine in accordance with the Balfour Declaration of 1917.

ARTICLE 1.

The Council of the League of Nations: Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations; confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate. ART. 2.

ART. 3. The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy. ART. 4. An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration to assist and take part in the development of the country. The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty’s Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home. ART. 5. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Power.

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ART. 6.

ART. 10.

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

ART. 7. The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine. ART. 8. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine. Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their nonapplication for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately reestablished in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned. ART. 9. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights. Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ART. 11. The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land. The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration. ART. 12. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits. ART. 13. All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the

The Palestine Mandate  935

Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed. ART. 14. A special commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council. ART. 15. The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief. The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. ART. 16. The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all

faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality. ART. 17. The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine. Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine. The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies. ART. 18. The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area. Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory,

936  The Palestine Mandate

conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

ART. 19.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department.

The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property. ART. 20. The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals. ART. 21. The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations. (1) “Antiquity” means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A. D. (2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat. Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed. (5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department. (6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest. (7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds. (8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find. ART. 22. English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic. ART. 23. The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

U.S. Congress Endorsement of the Balfour Declaration  937

ART. 24. The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report. ART. 25. In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18. ART. 26. The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. ART. 27. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate. ART. 28. In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully

honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities. The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League. Done at London the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two. Source: Harry Charles Luke, ed. The Handbook of Palestine. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1922, 281–290. Avail­ able online via The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale .edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp.

U.S. Congress Endorsement of the Balfour Declaration (September 21, 1922) In September 1922, the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate passed a joint resolution endorsing the Balfour Declaration, which had been passed by the British House of Commons in 1917. The Balfour Declaration promised British support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Although the U.S. congressional declaration likewise endorsed a Jewish homeland in Palestine, it failed to address the matter of demography and national rights for the Palestinian people. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled. That the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which will prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected. Source: Public Resolution No. 73, 67th Congress, Second Session.

938  Christianity in Nazi Germany: Karl Barth’s Theological Declaration of Barmen

Christianity in Nazi Germany: Karl Barth’s Theological Declaration of Barmen (1934) In 1934, the Theological Declaration of Barmen was adopted by Christians in Nazi Germany who opposed what had become known as the German Christian movement. In the view of theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968), and the view of all others who supported the Declaration of Barmen, the German Christians had corrupted not only church government but the very essence of the church itself by making it subservient to the state. The German Christian movement was also accused of introducing Nazi ideology into German Protestant churches; ideology that directly contradicted the Christian gospel. The Barmen Declaration rejected the subordination of the church to the state, and, in this case, specifically to Nazi Germany. 8.08 As members of Lutheran, Reformed, and United Churches we may and must speak with one voice in this matter today. Precisely because we want to be and to remain faithful to our various Confessions, we may not keep silent, since we believe that we have been given a common message to utter in a time of common need and temptation. We commend to God what this may mean for the interrelations of the Confessional Churches. 8.09 In view of the errors of the “German Christians” of the present Reich Church government which are devastating the Church and also therefore breaking up the unity of the German Evangelical Church, we confess the following evangelical truths: 8.10—1. “I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by me.” (John 14.6). “Truly, truly, I say to you, he who does not enter the sheepfold by the door, but climbs in by another way, that man is a thief and a robber. . . . I am the door; if anyone enters by me, he will be saved.” (John 10:1, 9.) 8.11 Jesus Christ, as he is attested for us in Holy Scripture, is the one Word of God which we have to hear and which we have to trust and obey in life and in death.

8.12 We reiect the false doctrine, as though the church could and would have to acknowledge as a source of its proclamation, apart from and besides this one Word of God, still other events and powers, figures and truths, as God’s revelation. 8.13—2. “Christ Jesus, whom God has made our wisdom, our righteousness and sanctification and redemption.” (1 Cor. 1:30.) 8.14 As Jesus Christ is God’s assurance of the forgiveness of all our sins, so, in the same way and with the same seriousness he is also God’s mighty claim upon our whole life. Through him befalls us a joyful deliverance from the godless fetters of this world for a free, grateful service to his creatures. 8.15 We reiect the false doctrine, as though there were areas of our life in which we would not belong to Jesus Christ, but to other lords—areas in which we would not need justification and sanctification through him. 8.16—3. “Rather, speaking the truth in love, we are to grow up in every way into him who is the head, into Christ, from whom the whole body [is] joined and knit together.” (Eph. 4:15,16.) 8.17 The Christian Church is the congregation of the brethren in which Jesus Christ acts presently as the Lord in Word and sacrament through the Holy Spirit. As the Church of pardoned sinners, it has to testify in the midst of a sinful world, with its faith as with its obedience, with its message as with its order, that it is solely his property, and that it lives and wants to live solely from his comfort and from his direction in the expectation of his appearance. 8.18 We reject the false doctrine, as though the Church were permitted to abandon the form of its message and order to its own pleasure or to changes in prevailing ideological and political convictions. 8.19—4. “You know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great men excercise authority over

British House of Commons Discussion Expressing Outrage Following the Zionist Terrorist Attack  939

them. It shall not be so among you; but whoever would be great among you must be your srvant.” (Matt. 20:25, 26.) 8.20 The various offices in the Church do not establish a dominion of some over the others; on the contrary, they are for the excercise of the ministry entrusted to and enjoined upon the whole congregation. 8.21 We reject the false doctrine, as though the Church, apart from this ministry, could and were permitted to give itself, or allow to be given to it, special leaders vested with ruling powers. 8.22—5. “Fear God. Honor the emperor.” (1 Peter 2:17.) Scripture tells us that, in the as yet unredeemed world in which the Church also exists, the State has by divine appointment the task of providing for justice and peace. [It fulfills this task] by means of the threat and exercise of force, according to the measure of human judgment and human ability. The Church acknowledges the benefit of this divine appointment in gratitude and reverence before him. It calls to mind the Kingdom of God, God’s commandment and righteousness, and thereby the responsibility both of rulers and of the ruled. It trusts and obeys the power of the Word by which God upholds all things. 8.23 We reject the false doctrine, as though the State, over and beyond its special commision, should and could become the single and totalitarian order of human life, thus fulfilling the Church’s vocation as well. 8.24 We reject the false doctrine, as though the Church, over and beyond its special commission, should and could appropriate the characteristics, the tasks, and the dignity of the State, thus itself becoming an organ of the State. 8.25—6. “Lo, I am with you always, to the close of the age.” (Matt. 28:20.) “The word of God is not fettered.” (2 Tim. 2:9.) 8.26 The Church’s commission, upon which its freedom is founded, consists in delivering the message of the free grace of God to all people in Christ’s stead, and therefore in the ministry of his own Word and work through sermon and sacrament.

8.27 We reject the false doctrine, as though the Church in human arrogance could place the Word and work of the Lord in the service of any arbitrarily chosen desires, purposes, and plans. 8.28 The Confessional Synod of the German Evangelical Church declares that it sees in the acknowledgment of these truths and in the rejection of these errors the indispensable theological basis of the German Evangelical Church as a federation of Confessional Churches. It invites all who are able to accept its declaration to be mindful of these theological principles in their decisions in Church politics. It entreats all whom it concerns to return to the unity of faith, love, and hope. Source: Arthur C. Cochrane. The Church’s Confession Under Hitler. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962, 237–242. Reprinted with permission.

British House of Commons Discussion Expressing Outrage Following the Zionist Terrorist Attack on the King David Hotel in Jerusalem (1946) Between the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the passage of a UN resolution calling for the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state on November 29, 1947, British soldiers and police in Palestine were targeted by Jewish Zionist terrorist organizations such as Haganah and Irgun. Haganah carried out violent attacks in Palestine— liberating interned immigrants, bombing railroads, sabotaging radar installations, and raiding British police bases. On July 22, 1946, Irgun bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. Ninety-one people died and 45 more were injured. An earlier attempt by Irgun to attack the hotel was foiled when Haganah learned of the plan and warned the British authorities. The following transcript is of the House of Commons discussion and deliberation on the attack, and expresses outrage against the Zionist terrorists responsible for the bombing.

940  British House of Commons Discussion Expressing Outrage Following the Zionist Terrorist Attack

Mr. Eden (by Private Notice) asked the Prime Minister whether he has any statement to make on the bomb outrage at the British Headquarters in Jerusalem. The Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee): Hon. Members will have learned with horror of the brutal and murderous crime committed yesterday in Jerusalem. Of all the outrages which have occurred in Palestine, and they have been many and horrible in the last few months, this is the worst. By this insane act of terrorism 93 innocent people have been killed or are missing in the ruins. The latest figures of casualties are 41 dead, 52 missing and 53 injured. I have no further information at present beyond what is contained in the following official report received from Jerusalem: It appears that, after exploding a small bomb in the street, presumably as a diversionary measure—this did virtually no damage—a lorry drove up to the tradesmen’s entrance of the King David Hotel and the occupants, after holding up the staff at pistol point, entered the kitchen premises carrying a number of milk cans. At some stage of the proceedings, they shot and seriously wounded a British soldier who attempted to interfere with them. All available information so far is to the effect that they were Jews. Somewhere in the basement of the hotel they planted bombs which went off shortly afterwards. They appear to have made good their escape. Every effort is being made to identify and arrest the perpetrators of this outrage. The work of rescue in the debris, which was immediately organised, still continues. The next-of-kin of casualties are being notified by telegram as soon as accurate information is available. The House will wish to express their profound sympathy with the relatives of the killed and with those injured in this dastardly outrage. The High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham, has returned to Palestine by air. As the House knows, His Majesty’s Government are at this moment in consultation with the Government of the United States with a view to arriving at proposals for a just settlement of the Palestine problem which will be placed before representatives of both Arabs and Jews. His Majesty’s Government have stated, and state again, that they will not be diverted by acts of violence from their search for a just and final solution of this problem. Mr. Eden: While associating myself and my hon. friends on this side of the House with the Prime Minister’s expres-

sions of horror at this dastardly and inexcusable outrage, and also with the words of sympathy he has expressed towards the relatives of those who lost their lives, I would like to put one question to him. I quite understand that the right hon. gentleman may not be able to give details, but we would like to be assured that the Government intend to take every step in their power here, and to provide the local authorities with any sanction they may need to take any steps in their power, to prevent, if possible, a recurrence of any such incident as this. The Prime Minister: Certainly. The right hon. gentleman will realise that I am awaiting a full report from the High Commissioner and the military authorities as to the steps that are required by them. Mr. Lipson: While associating myself with everything that the Prime Minister said, will he consider whether there is anything which the Jews in Great Britain, who are shocked by this murderous and senseless outrage, which brings dishonour and shame to the name of Jew, can do to help to put an end to such outrages, and in particular, will he call upon the religious and lay leaders of the Jews in this country, including the leaders of the Zionist organisation, publicly and unreservedly to condemn these dastardly outrages, and to pledge their full and loyal support to the Government in any action they may take to suppress them? The Prime Minister: Certainly, I will consider the suggestion of my hon. friend. Mr. Sydney Silverman: May I, first, associate myself with every word that my right hon. friend the Prime Minister has said about the criminal insanity of this outrage? May I, next, ask him whether there is any credible evidence or any direct evidence so far that the perpetrators of it were Jews? Thirdly, may I ask him whether he appreciates that the continued detention in Palestine without trial of almost every moderate and responsible leader inevitably leaves the field free to the terrorists? The Prime Minister: With regard to the first question, I have already stated that I have no information beyond what is given by the official report. It would be quite improper for me to try to make any conjecture beyond what I have got from the official report. As to the second part of the hon. gentleman’s question, it is quite incorrect to suggest that every responsible leader has been held in prison or anywhere else. I would say that the hon. Member does

UN Partition Plan for Palestine: UN Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine  941

an injustice to the members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency by suggesting that arrests made of a certain number of persons included the whole of the responsible leadership of Jewry. It is quite untrue. Colonel J. R. H. Hutchison: Will the Prime Minister take note that there are in this country hundreds of ex-officers and men trained with the resistance movements during the war, and, in order to further the admirable object which he has enunciated, will he consider using these people, who are well trained, to put down organisations of this kind, whether Arab or Jewish? The Prime Minister: I shall have to depend, in regard to that, on the advice of our military advisers who will, I am sure, ask for any forces they require. Earl Winterton: In view of the fact that the members of that most gallant force, the Palestine Police Force, are in some doubt about their terms of service, will the right hon. gentleman make it clear that the relatives of those killed and also those seriously wounded will receive exactly the same pensions as they would receive if they were killed in action, in view of the fact that they are fighting against as vile and treacherous a foe as the Nazis? The Prime Minister: I understand that is the position, but I would like to give a considered answer. Perhaps the noble Lord will put down a question to my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Mr. H. Hynd: In considering the suggestion made by the hon. and gallant Member for Central Glasgow (Colonel Hutchison), will the Prime Minister be careful not to set up anything like the “Black and Tans"? Mr. Gallacher: While joining in the strong expression of sympathy for the dependants of those who suffered as a consequence of this terrible outrage, may I ask the Government seriously to consider, in dealing with this problem of Palestine, the necessity of bringing about an independent Palestinian State where Arabs and Jews will have to cooperate together? The Prime Minister: As the hon. Member knows, we are now considering with representatives of the United States of America what should be the permanent solution, and we are making great progress in those talks. Major Legge-Bourke: Is the Prime Minister aware that a report has already been circulated in this country from General Barker showing that he has for some time desired

to take over the whole of the King David Hotel, and has been unable to do so, and in view of that will the Prime Minister initiate early inquiries; and will he also publicly disclaim any association of the Government with the statement, which was reported in the “Jewish Standard” of 12th July to have been made by the hon. Member for East Coventry (Mr. Crossman), advising Jews to go underground and oppose the airborne division by all means other than violence? The Prime Minister: With regard to the first point, I have not seen the statement by General Barker, but I am having an inquiry made into the position with regard to the King David Hotel. As for any statement of Government policy, that is made by responsible Ministers, and not by other individuals. Mr. Janner: Whilst expressing my deepest sympathy with those who have suffered and my horror at and condemnation of the dastardly actions which have been taken by these desperadoes, may I ask the right hon. gentleman if he is aware that these feelings are those of the Jewish communities of the world; that the Jewish Agency Executive and the National Council of Palestine Jewry have expressed similar sentiments and are desirous of suppressing those responsible as rapidly as possible? The Prime Minister: I have noted that statement and welcomed it. Source: HC Deb 23, July 1946, vol. 425. Hansard online: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1946 /jul/23/terrorist-outrage-jerusalem.

UN Partition Plan for Palestine: UN Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine (November 29, 1947) United Nations Resolution 181, the Partition Plan for Palestine, was a proposal developed by the United Nations that recommended the creation of independent Arab and Jewish states in Palestine and a separate entity known as the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem. The Partition Plan called for the elimination of the Palestinian

942  UN Partition Plan for Palestine: UN Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine

Mandate, the progressive withdrawal of British military forces from Palestine, and the establishment of clear and unambiguous boundaries between the new Jewish state, the new Arab state, and the city of Jerusalem. The new states would come into existence no later than October 1, 1948. UN Resolution 181 sought to address the conflicting objectives and claims of two competing movements—Arab nationalists and Palestinians on the one hand, and Jewish Zionists on the other. The resolution called for an economic union between the two newly proposed states, and, most importantly, for the protection of religious and minority rights. Immediately after adoption of the resolution by the UN General Assembly, the first Arab-Israeli war broke out, and as of 2016, the partition plan has not been implemented. UN Resolution 181 is repeatedly referred to in diplomatic negotiations as the necessary blueprint for a two-state solution in the Middle East. The General Assembly, Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session; Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364) 1/ including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee, Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations; Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948; Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below; Requests that (a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation; (b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation

in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. www.icsresources.org2 If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution; (c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution; (d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan; Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect; Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part I, Section B, paragraph 1 below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly. B 2/ The General Assembly Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed $2,000,000 for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine. Hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting 29 November 1947 [At its 128th plenary meeting on November 29, 1947, the General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of the above resolution [181 A], elected the following members of the United Nations Commission on Palestine: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and Philippines.]

UN Partition Plan for Palestine: UN Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine  943

PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION PART I—Future constitution and government of Palestine A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE 1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948. 2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948. The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the Mandate and to evacuate each area. The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure than an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948. 3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in parts II and III below. 4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period. B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE 1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible. 2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission; which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The

mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent coordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated. In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required. The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly. 3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in part II of this plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary. 4. The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of The Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission. If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations. 5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation. 6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State’s independence. 7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the

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establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local. 8. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes. This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia’s High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission. 9. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines. The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are: (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State. Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively. Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies. During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission. 10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The constitutions of the States shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include inter alia provisions for: (a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature; (b) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice,

are not endangered; (c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; (d) Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association; (e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders. 11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below. 12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions. 13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn. 14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue. The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless

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the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council. The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council. 15. The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously. C. DECLARATION A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain inter alia the following clauses: General Provision The stipulations contained in the declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them. Chapter 1—Holy Places, religious buildings and sites 1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired. 2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum. Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum. 3. Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time. 4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt

from taxation on the date of the creation of the State. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly’s recommendations. 5. The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full cooperation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State. Chapter 2—Religious and Minority Rights 1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all. 2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex. 3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws. 4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected. 5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality. 6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions. The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall

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continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights. 7. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings. 8. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession. Chapter 3—Citizenship, international conventions and financial obligations 1. Citizenship. Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting. Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside. 2. International conventions. (a) The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded. (b) Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine

shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court. 3. Financial obligations. (a) The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities. (b) These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States. (c) A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court. (d) Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holder and the State. Chapter 4—Miscellaneous provisions 1. The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances. 2. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement. D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT 1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to economic

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union and transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and co-operation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission. The Economic Union of Palestine 2. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be: (a) A customs union; (b) A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate; (c) Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways; inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and port and airports involved in international trade and commerce; (d) Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation; (e) Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities. 3. There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States. 4. The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organization and administration necessary to fulfil its functions. 5. The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board’s decisions shall be taken by a majority vote. . . . In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of that part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to co-operate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such

further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate. 7. In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be the planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project. 8. In regard to the joint currency system the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies. 9. So far as is consistent with paragraph 2 (b) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licenses, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that—to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources—each State shall have available, in any twelve months’ period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months’ period ending 31 December 1947. 10. All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State. 11. There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem. 12. The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule. 13. The following

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items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board: (a) The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services; (b) The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board; (c) The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine consisting of: (i) The service of the outstanding public debt; (ii) The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above. 14. After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State’s contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenues may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity. 15. All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority vote of the Joint Economic Board. 16. The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine’s export fair and equal access to world markets. 17. All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.

Termination, modification and interpretation of the undertaking

Freedom of transit and visit

When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

18. The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each state and the City shall control residence within its borders.

19. The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties. 20. During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly. 21. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the international Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement. E. ASSETS 1. The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to in section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated. 2. During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset. F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

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PART II—Boundaries A. THE ARAB STATE The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. Thence it follows the western boundary line of the villages of ‘Alma, Rihaniya and Teitaba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to join the Acre-Safad subdistrict boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of Es Sammu’i village and joins it again at the northernmost point of Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to the Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafr I’nan village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre sub-district boundary line, passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safad and Lubiya-Kafr I’nan roads. From south-west corner of Kafr I’nan village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias sub-district to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east. The boundary rejoins the Tiberias sub-district boundary at a point on the NazarethTiberias road south-east of the built-up area of Tur’an; thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the north-west corner of these lands, whence it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west corner, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection. The south-

western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of ‘Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north-eastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa ‘Amr to the south-eastern corner of Ramat Yohanan’. From here it runs due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa ‘AmrHaifa road, west of its junction with the road to I’Billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of I’Billin situated to the west of the I’BillinBirwa road. Thence along that boundary to its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village land of Tamra to the north-westernmost corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea. The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follows the western side of that road in a northwesterly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the sub-districts of Beisan, Nablus, and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub-district boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and Faqqu’a, to the boundary of the sub-districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point northeast of Nuris. Thence it proceeds first north-westwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zir’in and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, thence northwestwards along the district boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway. From here the boundary runs south-westwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh.Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El Buteimat. From here it follows the northern

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and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar’ara, rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi’Ara, and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Qaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya and Ras el Ein road to a point just east of Ras el Ein station, whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lydda and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south-west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the builtup area of Sarafand el’Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu el Fadil to the north-east corner of the lands of Beer Ya’Aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the north-east corner of El Na’ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and the southern boundary of ‘Innaba village. Thence it turns north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El Qubab, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusha, Seidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the north-eastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezin to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El Mismiya, El Kabira, and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi. From the southern point of intersection the boundary lines run north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunis and Minat el Qila, and southeastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a south-westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir, Es Sharqiya and Ibdis. From the south-

east corner of Ibdis village it runs to a point south-west of the built-up area of Beit ‘Affa, crossing the Hebron-El Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southwards along the western village boundary of El Faluja to the Beersheba sub-district boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of ‘Arab el Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the sub-districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab’ at a point situated one kilometre to the west of it. From here it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab’ and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometre, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the BeershebaHebron sub-district boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras Ez Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160. About five kilometres north-east of Ras ez Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea. The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat el Qila and Nabi Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit Tima. Thence it runs east of El Jiya across the village lands of El Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two kilometres, turning

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again in a south-westerly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the north-west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza’a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southernly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to Kh. el Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-El ‘Auja main road to the west of Kh. el Mushrifa. From there it joins Wadi El Zaiyatin just to the west of El Subeita. From there it turns to the north-east and then to the south-east following this Wadi and passes to the east of ‘Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi Ajrim and Wadi Lassan to the point where Wadi Lassan crosses the Egyptian frontier. The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Miqve Israel lands, to the north-west of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the north-east corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State. B. THE JEWISH STATE The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern) Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Trans­ jordan. It includes the whole of the Hula Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan sub-district, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends northwest, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State. The Jewish Section of the coastal plain extends

from a point between Minat et Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza sub-district and includes the towns of Haifa and TelAviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State. The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza sub-district, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the BeershebaHebron sub-district boundary line to Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State. C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part III, Section B, below). PART III—City of Jerusalem A. SPECIAL REGIME The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations. B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu’fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B). C. STATUTE OF THE CITY The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a

952  UN Partition Plan for Palestine: UN Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine

detailed Statute of the City which shall contain inter alia the substance of the following provisions: 1. Government machinery; special objectives. The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives: (a) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem; (b) To foster co-operation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents, having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities. 2. Governor and administrative staff. A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine. The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it. 3. Local autonomy. (a) The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration. (b) The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of a special town units consisting respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem. 4. Security measures. (a) The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; its neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or

activities shall be permitted within its borders. (b) Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-co-operation or interference of one or more sections of the population, the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration. (c) To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order and especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force. 5. Legislative organization. A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration. 6. Administration of justice. The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the City shall be subject to it. 7. Economic union and economic regime. The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decision of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory of the City. The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all members of the United Nations and their nationals. 8. Freedom of transit and visit; control of residents. Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within, the

UN Partition Plan for Palestine: UN Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine  953

borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council. 9. Relations with the Arab and Jewish States. Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connexion with the international administration of the City. 10. Official languages. Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required. 11. Citizenship. All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to part I, section B, paragraph 9, of this plan. The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory. 12. Freedoms of Citizens. (a) Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition. (b) No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex. (c) All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws. (d) The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected. (e) Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality. (f) The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions. The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such

educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights. (g) No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings. 13. Holy Places. (a) Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired. (b) Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum. (c) Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time. (d) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly’s recommendations. 14. Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine. (a) The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor. (b) With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitutions of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitutions of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected. (c) The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights

954  Statement by the Arab League upon the Declaration of the State of Israel

in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine. In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity. D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to reexamination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the regime of the City. PART IV—Capitulations States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem. Source: UN Resolution 181 (II). Available at: https://unispal .un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256 C330061D253

Statement by the Arab League upon the Declaration of the State of Israel (May 15, 1948) Upon the Israeli Declaration of Independence in May 1948, the states of the Arab League declared war on the new state

and issued the following declaration, in defiance of UN Resolution 181. The statement makes clear that the intent of the Arab invasion was to destroy the new Jewish state, and not just to defend the portions of Palestine allotted to the Palestinians under Resolution 181. Palestine was part of the former Ottoman Empire subject to its law and represented in its parliament. The overwhelming majority of the population of Palestine were Arabs. There was in it a small minority of Jews that enjoyed the same rights and bore the same responsibilities as the (other) inhabitants, and did not suffer any illtreatment on account of its religious beliefs. The holy places were inviolable and the freedom of access to them was guaranteed. The Arabs have always asked for their freedom and independence. On the outbreak of the First World War, and when the Allies declared that they were fighting for the liberation of peoples, the Arabs joined them and fought on their side with a view to realizing the