Volume 18, Tome I: Kierkegaard Secondary Literature: Catalan, Chinese, Czech, Danish, and Dutch 9781472476227, 1472476220

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KierKegaard Secondary Literature tome i: cataLan, chineSe, czech, daniSh, and dutch

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources Volume 18, Tome I

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources is a publication of the Søren Kierkegaard research centre

General Editor Jon Stewart Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, University of Copenhagen, Denmark Editorial Board Finn gredaL JenSen KataLin nun peter ŠaJda Advisory Board Lee c. barrett maría J. binetti iStvÁn czaKÓ heiKo SchuLz curtiS L. thompSon

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature tome i: catalan, chinese, czech, danish, and dutch

Edited by Jon Stewart

First published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© Jon Stewart and the contributors 2016 all rights reserved. no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Jon Stewart has asserted his right under the copyright, designs and patents act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data a catalogue record for this book is available from the british Library The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for. iSbn 9781472476227 (hbk) cover design by Katalin nun

contents List of Contributors Preface Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations

ix xi xv xvii

I. Secondary Literature in Catalan Joan estelrich i artigues, Entre la vida i els llibres [between Life and books] Dolors Perarnau Vidal

3

begonya Sáez tajafuerce (ed.), Enrahonar. Quaderns de filosofia no. 29, 1998 Dolors Perarnau Vidal

7

II. Secondary Literature in Chinese Xin ru, 看哪，克尔凯郭尔这个人 [collected papers on Kierkegaard] Qi Wang

13

Qi wang, 走向绝望的深渊—克尔凯郭尔的美学生活境界 [unto the abyss of despair: a Study of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic Sphere of existence] Zizhen Liu

17

Qi wang, 生命与信仰——克尔凯郭尔假名写作时期基督教哲学思想研究 [Life and belief: a Study of christian philosophy in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings] Chingshun J. Sheu

21

Shaojun weng, 人的存在——“存在主义之父”克尔凯戈尔述评 [existence of the individual: Kierkegaard as “Forefather of existentialism”] Qi Wang

25

dachun yang, 沉沦与拯救——克尔凯戈尔的精神哲学研究 [perdition and Salvation: a Study of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of Spirit] Qi Wang

29

vi

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

III. Secondary Literature in Czech václav Fiala, Příkaz a skutek. Dialog o Kierkegaardovi [command and deed: a dialogue on Kierkegaard], Kateřina Marková

35

IV. Secondary Literature in Danish benny alex, Søren Kierkegaard. Et autentisk Liv: Kierkegaards lange og trange vej mod åndelig afklaring [Søren Kierkegaard: an authentic Life: Kierkegaard’s Long and narrow Path to Spiritual Clarification] Søren Bruun

41

Lars erslev andersen, Hinsides ironi. Fire essays om Søren Kierkegaard [beyond irony: Four essays on Søren Kierkegaard] Anne Louise Nielsen

45

Jacob bøggild, Ironiens tænker: Tænkningens ironi—Kierkegaard læst retorisk [the thinker of irony: the irony of thinking—Kierkegaard read rhetorically] Mads Sohl Jessen

49

Jørgen bukdahl, Søren Kierkegaard og den menige mand [Søren Kierkegaard and the common man] Gabriel Guedes Rossatti

55

niels Jørgen cappelørn, Joakim garff, and Johnny Kondrup, Skriftbilleder. Søren Kierkegaards journaler, notesbøger, hæfter, ark, lapper og strimler [written images: Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals, notebooks, booklets, Sheets, Scraps, and Slips of paper] Jon Stewart

59

henning Fenger, Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder. 9 kildekritiske studier i de kierkegaardske papirer, breve og aktstykker [Kierkegaard myths and Kierkegaard Sources: 9 Source-critical Studies in Kierkegaard’s papers, Letters and documents] Jon Stewart

65

eduard geismar, Søren Kierkegaard. Hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed, vols. 1–2 [Søren Kierkegaard: his Life and authorship, vols. 1–2] Andrés Roberto Albertsen

71

Contents

vii

arne grøn, Begrebet angst hos Søren Kierkegaard [the concept of anxiety in Søren Kierkegaard] Anne Louise Nielsen

81

arne grøn, Subjektivitet og Negativitet. Kierkegaard [Subjectivity and negativity: Kierkegaard] Anne Louise Nielsen

87

Jørgen husted, Wilhelms brev—Det etiske ifølge Kierkegaard [william’s Letter: the ethical according to Kierkegaard] Wenche Marit Quist

93

anders Kingo, Analogiens teologi. En dogmatisk studie over dialektikken i Søren Kierkegaards opbyggelige og pseudonyme forfatterskab [the analogy’s theology: a dogmatic Study on the dialectic in Søren Kierkegaard’s upbuilding and pseudonymous authorship] Anne Louise Nielsen

97

carl henrik Koch, En flue på Hegels udødelige næse eller om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham [a Fly on hegel’s immortal nose or on adolph peter adler and Søren Kierkegaard’s relation to him] Jon Stewart

103

Sejer Kühle, Søren Kierkegaards Barndom og ungdom [Søren Kierkegaard’s childhood and youth] Jon Stewart

109

K.e. Løgstrup, Opgør med Kierkegaard [controverting Kierkegaard] Bjørn Rabjerg

113

gregor malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard [dialectics and existence in Søren Kierkegaard] Jon Stewart

119

gregor malantschuk, Frihed og eksistens. Studier i Søren Kierkegaards tænkning [Freedom and existence: Studies in Søren Kierkegaard’s thinking] Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen

125

viii

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

Svend aage nielsen, Kierkegaard og Regensen. Kierkegaards forhold til F.C. Petersen, Poul Martin Møller, D.G. Monrad, Magnus Eiriksson, Carl Ploug, P.L. Møller, Hans Brøchner og J.C. Hostrup [Kierkegaard and regensen: Kierkegaard’s relation to F.c. petersen, poul martin møller, d.g. monrad, magnus eiriksson, carl ploug, p.L. møller, hans brøchner and J.c. hostrup] Jon Stewart

131

Kresten nordentoft, Kierkegaards psykologi [Kierkegaard’s psychology] Nathaniel Kramer

137

Kresten nordentoft, “Hvad siger Brand-Majoren?” Kierkegaards opgør med sin samtid [“what does the Fire chief Say?” Kierkegaard’s confrontation with his times] Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen

143

peter p. rohde, Et Geni i en Købstad. Et essay om Søren Kierkegaard [a genius in a Small town: an essay on Søren Kierkegaard] Gabriel Guedes Rossatti

149

heinrich roos, Søren Kierkegaard og Katolicismen [Søren Kierkegaard and catholicism] Christopher B. Barnett

153

paul v. rubow, Kierkegaard og hans Samtidige [Kierkegaard and his contemporaries] Jon Stewart

157

Johannes Sløk, Kierkegaard—humanismens tænker [Kierkegaard: the thinker of humanism] Christian Fink Tolstrup

161

Johannes Sløk, Da Kierkegaard tav. Fra forfatterskab til kirkestorm [when Kierkegaard Fell Silent: From the authorship to the attack on the church] Gabriel Guedes Rossatti

167

Johannes Sløk, Kierkegaards univers. En ny guide til geniet [Kierkegaard’s universe: a new guide to the genius] Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen

173

Contents

ix

peter thielst, Livet forstås baglæns, men må leves forlæns. Historien om Søren Kierkegaard [Life is understood backwards, but must be Lived Forwards: the Story of Søren Kierkegaard] Thomas Eske Rasmussen

179

niels thulstrup, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846 [Kierkegaard’s relation to hegel and Speculative idealism until 1846] Jon Stewart

185

bjarne troelsen, Manden på flydebroen. En fortælling om Søren Kierkegaard og det moderne menneskes tilblivelse [the man on the dock: a Story about Søren Kierkegaard and the origin of the modern person] Christian Fink Tolstrup

191

V. Secondary Literature in Dutch bernard delfgaauw, Kierkegaard. Waarheid en menselijkheid [Kierkegaard: truth and humanity] Wolter Hartog

199

udo doedens, In het teken van tegenspraak. Steekhoudende gedachten van Søren Kierkegaard [in the Light of contradiction: convincing thoughts of Søren Kierkegaard] Paul Cruysberghs

203

taeke dokter, De structuur van Kierkegaard’s oeuvre [the Structure of Kierkegaard’s Oeuvre] Wolter Hartog

207

Louis dupré, Kierkegaards theologie of de dialectiek van het christenworden [Kierkegaard as theologian: the christian dialectic of existence] Paul Cruysberghs

213

Johan Fetter, Inleiding tot het denken van Kierkegaard [introduction to Kierkegaard’s thought] Wolter Hartog

217

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Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

Frits Florin, Geloven als Noodweer. Het begrip “het religieuze” bij S. Kierkegaard [believing as Self-defense: the concept of “the religious” in S. Kierkegaard] Desiree Berendsen

219

etienne Laurentius gertrudis egbertus Kuypers, Spelen met beelden: Een theoretisch-kritische studie over de zin en de onzin van een christelijkreligieus-georiënteerde-pedagogie(k) onder auspiciën van S.A. Kierkegaard [playing with images: a theoretical critical Study about the Sense or nonsense of a christian-religious-orientated-pedagogy under the auspices of S.a. Kierkegaard] Paul Cruysberghs

223

cyril Lansink, Vrijheid en ironie: Kierkegaards ethiek van de zelfwording [Freedom and irony: Kierkegaard’s ethics of becoming oneself] Johan Taels

227

victor Leemans, Søren Kierkegaard Paul Cruysberghs

231

willem Leendertz, Sören Kierkegaard Wolter Hartog

235

wim r. Scholtens, Alle gekheid op een stokje. Kierkegaard als psycholoog [all Foolishness aside: Kierkegaard as a psychologist] Pieter Vos

241

Johan taels, Søren Kierkegaard als filosoof: De weg terug naar het subject [Søren Kierkegaard as philosopher: the way back to the Subject] Paul Cruysberghs

245

a.F.L. van dijk, Perspectieven bij Kierkegaard [perspectives in Kierkegaard] Wolter Hartog

249

hans van munster, De filosofische gedachten van de jonge Kierkegaard, 1831–1841 [the philosophical thoughts of the young Kierkegaard, 1831–1841] Wolter Hartog

253

hans van munster, Søren Aabye Kierkegaard Wolter Hartog

259

Contents

xi

maarten van rhijn, Sören Kierkegaard. Een indruk van zijn leven en denken [Søren Kierkegaard: an impression of his Life and thinking] Wolter Hartog

261

Karl verstrynge, De hysterie van de geest. Melancholie en zwaarmoedigheid in het pseudonieme oeuvre van Kierkegaard [hysteria of the Spirit: melancholy and heavy-mindedness in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship] Pieter Vos

263

peter vogelsang, Oprecht veinzen. Over Kierkegaards “Over het begrip ironie, vooral met betrekking tot Socrates” (1841) [Feigning Sincerely: on Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates (1841)] Paul Cruysberghs

269

pieter vos, De troost van het ogenblik: Kierkegaard over God en het lijden [the comfort of the moment: Kierkegaard on god and Suffering] Johan Taels

273

List of contributors Andres Roberto Albertsen, Luther Seminary, 2481 como avenue, St. paul, mn 55108, uSa. Christopher B. Barnett, villanova university, department of theology and religious Studies, Saint augustine center 241, 800 Lancaster avenue, villanova, pa 19085, uSa. Desiree Berendsen, corderius college, Lambert heijnricsstraat 23, 3817 er amersfoort, holland. Søren Bruun, Stenløse kirke, engholmvej 6, 3660 Stenløse, denmark. Paul Cruysberghs, Leuven university, institute of philosophy, Kardinaal mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, belgium. Wolter Hartog, Leuven university, institute of philosophy, Kardinaal mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, belgium. Nathaniel Kramer, brigham young university, department of comparative arts and Letters, 3008 JFSb, provo, ut 84602, uSa. Zizhen Liu, School of philosophy, 3rd Floor Fansun building, nankai university, weijin road nr. 94, nankai district, tianjin 300071, china. Kateřina Marková, Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Filozofická fakulta, Ústav filosofie a religionistiky, nám. Jana palacha 2, prague 1, 116 38, czech republic. Anne Louise Nielsen, aarhus university, department of culture and Society, department of theology, Jens chr. Skous vej 3, bygning 1453, 8000 aarhus c, denmark. Dolors Perarnau Vidal, Departament de Filosofia, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici B, Campus de la UAB, 08193 Bellaterrra (Cerdanyola del Vallès), barcelona, Spain. Wenche Marit Quist, c/o Søren Kierkegaard research centre, university of copenhagen, Farvergade 27 d, 1463 copenhagen K, denmark.

xiv

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

Bjørn Rabjerg, aarhus university, department of culture and Society, Jens chr. Skous vej 3, 3rd, 8000 aarhus c, denmark. Thomas Eske Rasmussen, Søren Kierkegaard research centre, university of copenhagen, Farvergade 27 d, 1463 copenhagen K, denmark. Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen, State university of new york at buffalo, department of philosophy, 135 park hall, buffalo, ny 14260, uSa. Gabriel Guedes Rossatti, universidade Federal de Santa catarina—uFSc, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Campus Universitário—Trindade—CEP 88.040–970—Florianópolis, Santa catarina, brazil. Chingshun J. Sheu, 1 roosevelt rd. sec. 1, daan dist., taipei city 10617, taiwan (republic of china). Mads Sohl Jessen, department of Scandinavian Studies, university of copenhagen, njalsgade 120, 2100 copenhagen S, denmark. Jon Stewart, Søren Kierkegaard research centre, university of copenhagen, Farvergade 27 d, 1463 copenhagen K, denmark. Johan Taels, antwerp university, prinsstraat 13, 2000 antwerp, belgium. Christian Fink Tolstrup, holte kirke, Solbakken 56, 2840 holte, denmark. Pieter Vos, protestant theological university, p.o. box 7161, 1007 mc amsterdam, the netherlands. Qi Wang, institute of philosophy, chinese academy of Social Sciences, 100732 beijing, china.

preface in recent years interest in the thought of Kierkegaard has grown dramatically. evidence of this can be seen in the rapid proliferation of conferences, seminars, workshops, and classes dedicated to his writings. This growth in interest is reflected in the explosion of articles and monographs that have been written about him. this body of secondary literature has expanded so quickly that it has become impossible for even the most conscientious scholar to keep pace. the problem of the explosion of secondary literature is made more acute by the fact that much of what is written about Kierkegaard appears in languages that most Kierkegaard scholars do not know. Kierkegaard has become a global phenomenon, and new research traditions have emerged in different languages, countries and regions. one result of this is that there are thriving traditions of Kierkegaard research that have developed in relative linguistic isolation. this means that scholars within those traditions have not always actively sought out the mainstream international Kierkegaard research as a discussion partner and instead have remained more local or national in their orientation. On the other side, it has been difficult for the mainstream research to be well informed about this material for the simple reason that it is impossible for any scholar to master all the languages of the world, and so, in the absence of translations, one is closed off from access to many works that might well be relevant for one’s research interests. the present volume is dedicated to trying to help, in some small part, to resolve these two problems in Kierkegaard studies. Its purpose is, first, to provide book reviews of some of the leading monographic studies in the Kierkegaard secondary literature so as to assist the community of scholars to become familiar with the works that they have not read for themselves. the aim is thus to offer students and scholars of Kierkegaard a comprehensive survey of works that have played a more or less significant role in the research. Second, the present volume also tries to make accessible many works in the Kierkegaard secondary literature that are written in the different languages and thus to give a glimpse into different and lesser-known research traditions. one of the main goals of the present series has been to bring together the Kierkegaard community and to help to integrate different scholars, methodologies, and traditions by bringing scholars from around the world into contact with one another. one goal of this volume is to help break the abovementioned linguistic and geographical isolation and to create a forum for a much larger international dialogue about Kierkegaard. the six tomes of the present volume present reviews of works written in catalan, chinese, czech, danish, dutch, english, Finnish, French, galician, german, greek, hebrew, hungarian, italian, Japanese, norwegian, polish, portuguese, romanian, russian, Slovak, Spanish, and Swedish.

xvi

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

the works selected for review in this volume were chosen in accordance with a number of different criteria. First, the work had to be a monograph-length study. these include single-author monographs as well as anthologies and collected volumes, and even special issues of journals. however, no articles have been included, although in some cases shorter monographs have been taken up. Second, the work to be reviewed had to have played some more or less meaningful role in Kierkegaard research at some point. this is, of course, not to say that every reviewed work had a major impact on the field. Third, it was decided that only those works would be reviewed that had not already been treated in volumes of the “reception” part of the present series. thus, for example, none of the works by Karl barth or emanuel hirsch appears in this volume since full articles are dedicated to these figures in the “Theology” volume of the “Reception” part of the series. In this way needless overlap in the different parts of the series was avoided. Fourth, no unpublished m.a. theses or ph.d. dissertations have been included, although many such reworked dissertations which appeared later at internationally known publishing houses have been included for review. the requirement was that the work under review be a published monograph. based on these criteria, a list of works in the different languages was developed and published on the homepage of the present series. Kierkegaard scholars then signed up to review the works that they saw on the list and in some cases made suggestions for new ones to be added. The reviews are all based on the first editions of the works and not on later reprints or translations, although the reviewers have been asked to mention these later editions as a part of the review. the idea here was to regard each work of the secondary literature as having its own history of reception, which began with the publication of the first edition. Thus, in order to tell the entire story, the reviewers were obliged to begin with the first edition. This principle follows that which was employed in the “reception” part of the present series, where the authors were instructed to trace the reception of Kierkegaard’s thought in the works of later thinkers, starting with the first editions, where that reception began. in accordance with the general idea of the “resources” part of this series, the present volume is conceived as a reference work, which students and scholars can use to quickly and expeditiously inform themselves about works in the secondary literature that they are unfamiliar with. For this reason, the reviews are written in clear, succinct, and accessible language. the reviewers were asked to present the author of the monograph, explaining his or her background, interests, and role in the field. They were then asked to give a general overview of the work: its main thesis, organization, content, and methodology. the goal has been to convey factual information in order to give the reader as clear of a picture as possible of the book in question. the reviewers were then requested to locate the work in the larger tradition of research to which it belongs and to try to convey what role it played in Kierkegaard studies at the time of its publication and thereafter. contrary to the standard practice in book reviews, we requested that the reviews refrain from engaging in polemics and avoid either uncritically praising the work or mercilessly criticizing it. the goal was, instead, simply to convey factual information about it to other scholars who are unfamiliar with it. with this said, however, the reviewers were still at their liberty to

Preface

xvii

present their own opinion about the reviewed work by explaining what they took to be its strengths and weaknesses. each review contains a list of “reviews and critical discussions” at the end. this list includes other reviews proper of the work under examination, but also references to critical accounts of the work in the secondary literature at large. thus the reader is able to use this list to go further with an investigation of the work under review and to seek out other opinions about it in addition to the ones presented by the reviewers in this volume. A project of this kind is in principle an infinite one, and we are under no illusion of having exhausted the vast body of Kierkegaard secondary literature with the six tomes presented here. the goal is simply to help in some small way to bridge the gap between the different traditions of Kierkegaard studies and to create a useful research resource. we would have very much liked to have included even more reviews and more works from different languages, but the undertaking was of course limited by the usual constraints of time and energy. the work for this volume has been ongoing for more than five years and represents the collaborative effort of a large number of Kierkegaard scholars in many different countries. it is our hope that, despite whatever shortcomings this volume may have, it will nonetheless serve as a useful tool for students, scholars and anyone at all interested in exploring the rich and ever-expanding world of Kierkegaard studies.

acknowledgments the present volume has been a massive undertaking, and many people have been involved in its production. I am particularly grateful to Sean Turchin who selflessly helped with the vast editorial work. he read through and corrected a large number of articles and corresponded with many of the authors about their work. this volume owes a great debt of gratitude to him. i am also thankful to Katalin nun for doing some of the electronic formatting for a number of the review articles. as usual, i am deeply grateful to Finn gredal Jensen and philip hillyer for doing the tedious proof-reading for this volume. i would also like to thank matthew t. nowachek for his outstanding bibliographical help. a special word of thanks is due to those reviewers who selflessly took it upon themselves to author a number of reviews so that the secondary literature in their languages would be adequately represented. in this regard, i would like to gratefully acknowledge the outstanding efforts of Joseph Ballan, Lee C. Barrett, Judit Bartha, María J. Binetti, Zuzana Blažeková, Matthew brake, paul cruysberghs, istván czakó, morten dahlback, claudine davidshofer, daniel m. dion, Frédéric dubois, aaron edwards, mélissa Fox-muraton, rafael garcía pavón, arthur bartholo gomes, alessandra granito, zoltán gyenge, erik m. hanson, wolter hartog, Joaquim hernandez-dispaux, carl S. hughes, Luke Johnson, Wojciech Kaftański, Christian Kettering, Andrew M. Kirk, Anders Kraal, nathaniel Kramer, Katarzyna Krawerenda-wajda, ulrich Lincoln, Laura Liva, Jesus Luzardo, olli mäkinen, thomas J. millay, marcia morgan, andrás nagy, anne Louise nielsen, matthew t. nowachek, michio ogino, azucena palavicini Sánchez, marcio gimenes de paula, dolors perarnau vidal, robert b. puchniak, Sarolta püsök, bjørn rabjerg, rasmus rosenberg Larsen, anita Soós, Leo Stan, curtis L. thompson, gerhard thonhauser, margherita tonon, andrew torrance, olli-pekka vainio, Juan evaristo valls boix, Silvia vignati, Qi wang, devon c. wootten, and Keisuke yoshida.

List of abbreviations Danish Abbreviations B&A

Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard, vols. 1–2, ed. by niels thulstrup, copenhagen: munksgaard 1953–54.

Bl.art.

S. Kierkegaard’s Bladartikler, med Bilag samlede efter Forfatterens Død, udgivne som Supplement til hans øvrige Skrifter, ed. by rasmus nielsen, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1857.

EP

Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer, vols. 1–9, ed. by h.p. barfod and hermann gottsched, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1869–81.

Pap.

Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vols. i to Xi–3, ed. by peter andreas heiberg, victor Kuhr and einer torsting, copenhagen: gyldendalske boghandel, nordisk Forlag, 1909–48; second, expanded ed., vols. i to Xi–3, by niels thulstrup, vols. Xii to Xiii supplementary volumes, ed. by niels thulstrup, vols. Xiv to Xvi index by niels Jørgen cappelørn, copenhagen: gyldendal 1968–78.

SKS

Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vols. 1–28, vols. K1–K28, ed. by niels Jørgen cappelørn, Joakim garff, Jette Knudsen, Johnny Kondrup, alastair mcKinnon and Finn hauberg mortensen, copenhagen: gads Forlag 1997– 2013.

SV1

Samlede Værker, vols. i–Xiv, ed. by a.b. drachmann, Johan Ludvig heiberg and h.o. Lange, copenhagen: gyldendalske boghandels Forlag 1901–06. English Abbreviations

AN

Armed Neutrality, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

AR

On Authority and Revelation, The Book on Adler, trans. by walter Lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1955.

ASKB

The Auctioneer’s Sales Record of the Library of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by h.p. rohde, copenhagen: the royal Library 1967.

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BA

The Book on Adler, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

C

The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

CA

The Concept of Anxiety, trans. by reidar thomte in collaboration with albert b. anderson, princeton: princeton university press 1980.

CD

Christian Discourses, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

CI

The Concept of Irony, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1989.

CIC

The Concept of Irony, trans. with an introduction and notes by Lee m. capel, London: collins 1966.

COR

The Corsair Affair; Articles Related to the Writings, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

CUP1

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 1, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

CUP2

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 2, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

CUPH Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by alastair hannay, cambridge and new york: cambridge university press 2009. EO1

Either/Or, part i, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1987.

EO2

Either/Or, part ii, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1987.

EOP

Either/Or, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin books 1992.

EPW

Early Polemical Writings, including From the Papers of One Still Living; Articles from Student Days; The Battle Between the Old and the New SoapCellars, trans. by Julia watkin, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

EUD

Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

List of Abbreviations

xxiii

FSE

For Self-Examination, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

FT

Fear and Trembling, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1983.

FTP

Fear and Trembling, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin books 1985.

JC

Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1985.

JFY

Judge for Yourself!, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

JP

Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, vols. 1–6, ed. and trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, assisted by gregor malantschuk (vol. 7, index and composite collation), bloomington and London: indiana university press 1967–78.

KAC

Kierkegaard’s Attack upon “Christendom,” 1854–1855, trans. by walter Lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1944.

KJN

Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, vols. 1–11, ed. by niels Jørgen cappelørn, alastair hannay, david Kangas, bruce h. Kirmmse, george pattison, vanessa rumble, and K. brian Söderquist, princeton and oxford: princeton university press 2007ff.

LD

Letters and Documents, trans. by henrik rosenmeier, princeton: princeton university press 1978.

LR

A Literary Review, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin books 2001.

M

The Moment and Late Writings, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

P

Prefaces / Writing Sampler, trans. by todd w. nichol, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

PC

Practice in Christianity, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1991.

PF

Philosophical Fragments, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1985.

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Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

PJ

Papers and Journals: A Selection, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin books 1996.

PLR

Prefaces: Light Reading for Certain Classes as the Occasion May Require, trans. by william mcdonald, tallahassee: Florida State university press 1989.

PLS

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by david F. Swenson and walter Lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1941.

PV

The Point of View including On My Work as an Author, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, and Armed Neutrality, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

PVL

The Point of View for My Work as an Author including On My Work as an Author, trans. by walter Lowrie, new york and London: oxford university press 1939.

R

Repetition, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1983.

SBL

Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1989.

SLW

Stages on Life’s Way, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1988.

SUD

The Sickness unto Death, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1980.

SUDP

The Sickness unto Death, trans. by alastair hannay, London and new york: penguin books 1989.

TA

Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age. A Literary Review, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1978.

TD

Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1993.

UD

Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1993.

WA

Without Authority including The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air, Two Ethical-Religious Essays, Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, An Upbuilding Discourse, Two Discourses at the Communion on

List of Abbreviations

xxv

Fridays, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997. WL

Works of Love, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1995.

WS

Writing Sampler, trans. by todd w. nichol, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

i. Secondary Literature in catalan

Joan estelrich i artigues, Entre la vida i els llibres [between Life and books]

barcelona: Llibreria catalonia 1926 (El ram d’olivera, vol. 2), xxvii + 344 pp.

Entre la vida i els llibres is a collection of critical essays on those figures by whom the author, Joan estelrich i artigues, felt most fascinated during his life. these are, in order of appearance, giacomo Leopardi, Søren Kierkegaard, Joan maragall, charloun rieu, Joseph conrad, and Jules romains. of these, Kierkegaard is the one who takes up the most space, with 155 out of a total of 344 pages, that is, almost half of the book. Joan Estelrich’s chapter on Kierkegaard is said to be the first extensive study on the dane in a non-germanic language;1 a previous version had already been published in installments in La Revista in barcelona between 1918 and 1919.2 nevertheless, this study went practically unnoticed when it appeared, and, in general, its importance as precursor to the Spanish Kierkegaard research has never been properly acknowledged. thus the work of Joan estelrich i artigues has remained both valuable and unfortunate. As early as the late first decade of the twentieth century, Joan Estelrich, a 22-year-old majorcan intellectual, wrote a few lines about a then unheard of danish writer, named S. Kierkegaard. Somehow prophesying the magnitude the work of the dane would acquire years later,3 he devoted himself to introducing this odd character to the catalan reader. one should keep in mind that at the time estelrich first published this work, Kierkegaard was almost unknown outside Denmark, especially in Spain, where his studies still had not appeared, and only a cursory Joan estelrich, “Kierkegaard en españa,” Destino, august 9, 1947, p. 9. Joan estelrich, “el sentiment tràgic de Søren Kierkegaard,” La Revista, vol. 4, nos. 74–9, 1918–19, pp. 4–7; pp. 354–7; 376–8; pp. 392–3; pp. 406–9; pp. 425–8. “Kierkegaard dins del pensament nòrdic,” La Revista, vol. 5, nos. 81–3, 1919, pp. 35–8; pp. 48–50; pp. 64–8. “Kierkegaard i unamuno,” La Revista, vol. 5, no. 84, 1919, pp. 83–4. “Bibliografia de S. Kierkegaard,” La Revista, vol. 5, no. 85, 1919, pp. 106–8. 3 as estelrich writes in a brief article on Kierkegaard: “among the few pleasures i have had, one is having glimpsed—nearly twenty years ago, alas! how the danish philosopher Kierkegaard would become fashionable in the modern world….now that he is in vogue, i fear for the integrity and faithfulness to the thought of Kierkegaard.” “retorn a Kierkegaard: Experiència i elogi de la solitud,” La Nostra Terra, no. 98, 1936, p. 132. 1 2

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translation of excerpts from Either/Or had been published.4 therefore the two essays plus the bibliographical note, which in 1926 would be reissued and slightly enlarged5 as the longest chapter of this book, Entre la vida i els llibres, have the merit and the originality of being the forerunners of a Spanish Kierkegaard reception that would still take many years to come. although it is true that miguel de unamuno discovered Kierkegaard and introduced him to estelrich, the latter went a bit further from the well-known intimate relation of the former, inasmuch as he tried to offer an objective view of the dane. in 1947, estelrich reports his discovery of Kierkegaard as follows: “[the reading of unamuno] incited me to take a direct approach to the work of the great danish writer. Despite the difficulties of the war, I obtained the German edition of Göttsched and Schrempf, plus the studies of brandes, høffding and some others; later i acquired the danish edition of the collected works.”6 in short, estelrich approached Kierkegaard through his books—not only through his life—became acquainted with the main trends of the international research, and made an effort to present the danish writer with rigor and faithfulness.7 unamuno, by contrast, kept Kierkegaard on a strictly personal level as the brotherly comfort he needed for his tormented soul.8 as the title of his books indicates, estelrich approached Kierkegaard between life and books. “this is a perfectly, overwhelmingly bookish book,” he explains in the preface, and then he adds: “for each line written, hundreds read before….as far as i am concerned, i claim humbly the right to issue a warning that when i say bookish i do not mean contrary to life. Quite the opposite: in the books, and particularly in the authors i talk about here, i have grasped the most intense life.”9 This is clearly the case for the first of Estelrich’s two essays on Kierkegaard. “Sören Kierkegaard, el més infeliç” is a purely poetic construction of the life of a man who impressed him so very deeply.10 even though the author goes through the main Kierkegaardian topics with the grace of the poet rather than the precision of the scholar, he still manages to present theses that would not be defended until years later, such as the importance that the literary aspect has in Kierkegaard’s work. only treating the pseudonymous works, he takes, however, no notice of the religious we are referring to Prosas de Sören Kierkegaard, trans. by Álvaro armando vasseur, madrid: américa 1918. estelrich rightly criticized this translation in his bibliography on Kierkegaard of 1919. 5 except for the bibliography, of which estelrich would give a limited version, deleting the extensive sections of studies and translations. 6 estelrich, “Kierkegaard en españa,” p. 9. 7 among the sources listed by estelrich, it is worth noting the inclusion of brandes, høffding, delacroix, Jeannine, and redaelli (Joan estelrich, Entre la vida i els llibres, barcelona: Llibreria catalonia 1926, p. 66). 8 it is a well-known fact that unamuno refers to Kierkegaard as his brother. in the preface to the danish translation of Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, he refers to how he “discovered a brother in him” and “decided to embrace his soul.” miguel de unamuno, Den tragiske Livsfølelse hos Mennesker og Folkeslag, trans. by Franz burghardt and axel thomsen, copenhagen: haase 1925, p. 5. 9 estelrich, “al lector,” in Entre la vida i els llibres, p. 10. 10 ibid., p. 66. 4

Joan Estelrich i Artigues

5

dimension of Kierkegaard’s writings, and the lyrical journey through Kierkegaard’s bio-bibliography becomes for this reason a bit incomplete. In contrast to the first essay, the second one, “Kierkegaard dins el pensament nòrdic,” is written with perfect objectivity11 and deals with those figures that were Kierkegaard’s predecessors, contemporaries, and successors. according to the author, this is only an erudite and better-documented piece,12 which introduces the reader to the literary, philosophical, and theological milieu of the danish golden age— something that even now seems to be an overlooked matter in Spanish Kierkegaard research.13 Finally, a bibliographical note, which clearly proves the time estelrich spent immersed in both primary and secondary literature, closes these essays. today, after so many years of Kierkegaard studies, these two pieces may not seem so valuable. after all, they come from an autodidactic essayist, whose style does not always meet the accepted academic standards. but in 1918—the year of publication of the first essay in La Revista14—these texts were certainly an overwhelming novelty, which immediately attracted the attention of other scholars outside of Spain. right after its reissue, daniel-rops and Jean cassou asked estelrich for permission to translate the essays into French.15 the project, unfortunately, was not realized, and the essays ended up having limited influence. be that as it may, estelrich’s contribution to Kierkegaard studies still remains valuable and has something interesting to offer to all those looking for a pleasant and well-written introduction to the danish author, especially if they happen to be catalan, since estelrich often seizes the opportunity to provide catalan readers with a special access to the dane. count arnau (as one of the roots for the myth of don giovanni) or the contrasting mediterranean character of ramon Llull are some of the examples estelrich uses as a resource both to bring Kierkegaard nearer to the catalan reader and to set catalan culture in the european context. he does the same thing with the language: in this regard, estelrich praises Kierkegaard not only for his masterly use of the mother tongue but also for the very fact of having chosen it, despite being, like catalan, a minority language. dolors perarnau vidal

ibid., p. 67. ibid. 13 Kierkegaard frente al hegelianismo (valladolid: universidad de valladolid 1996), by Jaime Franco barrio, would be the only exception. 14 Moreover, “the first of these essays about the fascinating figure of Søren Kierkegaard had to be—its elements being properly coordinated and amplified—a book for La Revista’s publication.” Entre la vida i els llibres, p. 65. 15 estelrich, “Kierkegaard en españa,” p. 9. 11

12

reviews and critical discussions alanís [Ferrà, miquel], “Juan estelrich,” El Día de Mallorca, may 14, 1926. a.m.b. [Santasusagna, Joaquim/prat, Jeroni], review in Revista del Centre de Lectura, nos. 155–6, 1926, pp. 204–5. [anonymous], review in Civtat, no. 3, 1926, p. 64. calderer, Lluís, “Kierkegaard a catalunya,” El pou de lletres, vol. F/6, 1997, p. 48. Cònsul, Isidor, “L’impuls vital de Joan Estelrich,” Avui cultura, 1996, p. 4. garcés, tomàs, review in La Publicitat, march 28, 1926. Graña, Isabel, “Joan Estelrich (1896–1958): Presència, acció i intervenció en la cultura catalana dels segle XX,” in estelrich, Joan, Entre la vida i els llibres, palma de mallorca/barcelona: universitat de les illes balears/publicacions de l’abadia de montserrat 1996 (Biblioteca Marian Aguiló, vol. 20), pp. v–xxvii. perarnau vidal, dolors, “a tribute to Joan estelrich i artigues,” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 49, 2005, pp. 9–11. — “Joan estelrich. L’oblidat precursor de l’estudi de Søren Kierkegaard,” Els Marges, no. 78, 2006, pp. 36–54. — and parcero oubiña, oscar, “Spain: the old and the new Kierkegaard reception in Spain,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome ii, Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 23–5. Pòrtulas, Jaume, “Joan Estelrich o les retòriques de l’humanisme,” Els Marges, no. 70, 2002, pp. 24–34. rosselló bover, pere, review in Llengua & literatura, no. 8, 1997, pp. 589–92. vall i Solaz, F. Xavier, “L’existencialisme als països catalans abans de la postguerra,” Revista de Catalunya, no. 112, 1996, pp. 156–64.

begonya Sáez tajafuerce (ed.), Enrahonar. Quaderns de filosofia, no. 29, 1998 (Barcelona: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), 185 pp.

devoted entirely to Kierkegaard, this was a special issue of the periodical Enrahonar, from the Department of Philosophy of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. The volume, edited by the catalan scholar begonya Sáez tajafuerce, aimed to present the international Kierkegaard research to the Spanish reader for the very first time. this is the reason why the contributions of this volume are written by some of the most renowned international scholars, offering their multiple and interdisciplinary views on the work of the dane. at the time of its appearance, this collective work provided the reader with a rich diversity of possible Kierkegaard interpretations that, in fact, were completely new and contrastive to the limited ones typical of Spanish circles, which were mainly historiographical or religious. thus begonya Sáez’s endeavor, which happened to be just a small step for a scholar closely linked to the international research, became a giant leap for Spanish scholarship, since it helped not only to open up new perspectives and methodologies of study but, most importantly, to put Spanish Kierkegaard research in contact with international research. this volume of Enrahonar became in this way a point of inflection in Spanish Kierkegaard studies, for, despite being composed of only foreign contributions, the project in itself already represented a new—more accurate and scholarly—way of approaching Kierkegaard in Spain, something that would finally turn out to be the standard for a number of Spanish scholars. the editor’s presentation, “Lectures de Kierkegaard,” gives a clue about how the volume is conceived and which kind of Kierkegaard approach we are going to deal with. giving a detailed account of the variety of existing Kierkegaaard readings, Sáez claims an “aesthetic” one which, heir to both the “structural” and “deconstructive” readings from andré clair and roger poole, respectively, is aware of both the discursive strategy (i.e., pseudonymity) and the narrative structure basic to Kierkegaard’s text: “under the epigraph ‘aesthetic reading’ one should include any philosophical, theological or literary reading that commits itself to the aesthetic stage and/or the aesthetic in Kierkegaard’s work as a discursive, communicative practice or task, which refuses the monovalence of a purely systematic, purely

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doctrinal or purely lyric task.”1 according to Sáez, this is evident from most of the articles featured in the volume, which are examples, at times even paradigmatic ones, of this kind of reading, inasmuch as they reconcile at the same time the form and content of Kierkegaard’s work. it is worth noting here that, from the standpoint of an aesthetic reading, the hermeneutical problem at stake in Kierkegaard’s authorship is no longer what the Kierkegaardian text means but how to read it, and this is the reason why it is so important to be aware of Kierkegaard as a writer in the first place and to pay attention to the literary role of his work. the monograph is divided into four sections: section one consists of four articles wholly concerned with the “ethical stage,” a disdained matter in Kierkegaard research, which Wilfried Greve, Arne Grøn, Hélène Politis, and Pia Søltoft, however, turn into “a fundamental core of meaning to be underlined in Kierkegaard’s work.”2 common to them all is also the “problematic reading” of the ethical they propose,3 which calls into doubt the rather “conventional” one, i.e., the one based merely on the theory of stages and the so-called authority of Judge william and his categories (“choice” [Valg] and “transparency” [Gjennemsigtighed]) to determine our understanding of Kierkegaard’s theory of the “ethical” as a “stage.” considering other frames of reference and pseudonyms of Kierkegaard such as the Postscript and Johannes climacus or The Concept of Anxiety and vigilius haufniensis, wilfried greve, and arne grøn develop a new concept of the “ethical” that undergoes a considerable transformation through the different voices of Kierkegaard’s authorship. by contrast, Hélène Politis and Pia Søltoft suggest a new Kierkegaardian ethical dialectic by means of an analysis of the Kierkegaardian critique of “the demand of the times,” in the case of politis, or the notion of “intersubjectivity,” closely related to Kierkegaard’s subjectivity, according to Søltoft’s view. Complementing the alternative Kierkegaard readings of the first section, several notes and brief articles are gathered in the second with a view to giving voice to the multifaceted Kierkegaard, although without trying to be exhaustive. Kierkegaard as “aesthetic” (Joakim garff) or “feuilleton” writer (george pattison), “apophatic theologian” (david Kangas), “philosopher” (darío gonzález), “pathologist” (alastair hannay), “iconographer” (hermann Schmid), “lover” (m. Jamie Ferreira), “greek” (Sophia Scopetea), “hegelian” (Jon Stewart), and “poet” (Sylvia walsh) are only 10 of the 16 facets the reader will encounter in this monograph; one is presented with a panoramic view, as broad as possible, of the multiple paths suggested by Kierkegaard’s authorship. this is followed by another section featuring an unpublished translation into catalan, namely, “a First and Last explanation,” in which Kierkegaard states in his own name that his pseudonymity does have an “essential basis in the production itself” and warns the reader against ascribing the views of the pseudonyms to his person. there is no doubt that this is a very suitable text to be included here, on account of the guidelines for reading Kierkegaard’s works that it supplies. begonya Sáez tajafuerce (ed.), Enrahonar, no. 29, 1998 (barcelona: universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), p. 13. 2 ibid., p. 14. 3 ibid. 1

Begonya Sáez Tajafuerce

9

Finally, section four offers practical information about gaining access to the thought and works of the danish thinker: on the one hand, news about the study and publication centers of Kierkegaard research around the world, on the other, a bibliographical scheme of the writings of Kierkegaard translated into Spanish, a very significant work carried out by Darío González. Intended to provide the reader with a quick general overview of the existing Spanish Kierkegaard translations in correspondence to the original danish titles, the “concordancia mínima de las obras de Søren Kierkegaard traducidas al español” is a must for all Spanish Kierkegaard scholars who want to avoid getting lost in the intricate and confused realm of the too often fragmentary and negligent Spanish versions. thus the scheme, which is organized according to the “date of publication,” “pseudonym,” and “internal divisions of some of the works,” represents a reference work useful to have available on the desk when it comes to working with Kierkegaard in Spanish-speaking Kierkegaard scholarship. it must be acknowledged that this monograph clearly changed the climate of Spanish Kierkegaard studies. To begin with, it put, for the very first time, the Spanish Kierkegaard research in contact with the international scene, which enabled Spanish scholars to consolidate their works by having access to what was taking place abroad. moreover, it expanded Spanish readings of the work of Kierkegaard, stressing the importance of the “aesthetic” one, which asked the reader to approach Kierkegaard as a rhetorician in the first place. Lastly, and thanks to González’s work, it also contributed to give an enlightening view of existing Spanish translations, which clarified once and for all a confused situation. in conclusion, this volume of Enrahonar should be regarded as the most important collective work ever produced in Spanish-speaking scholarship, only comparable to those which preceded it: Las publicaciones de Soren Kierkegaard de 18434 and El concepto de la Angustia: 150 años después,5 two monographs on Kierkegaard that, nevertheless, were limited to the study of just one or a few works and had a relatively small number of international contributions. dolors perarnau vidal

Leticia valadez (ed.), Las publicaciones de Søren Kierkegaard de 1843, special issue of Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, vol. 3, no. 5, 1993 (mexico city: universidad panamericana). 5 maría garcía amilburu (ed.), El concepto de la angustia: 150 años después, special issue of Thémata, Revista de Filosofía, vol. 15, 1995 (Seville: universidad de Sevilla). 4

reviews and critical discussions perarnau vidal, dolors and parcero oubiña, oscar, “Spain: the old and new Kierkegaard reception in Spain,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome ii, Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 50–1.

ii. Secondary Literature in chinese

Xin ru, 看哪，克尔凯郭尔这个人

[collected papers on Kierkegaard], Kaifeng: he’nan university press 2008, x + 156 pp.

Collected Papers on Kierkegaard comprises four papers written by Xin ru, a marxist scholar in western philosophy and former vice-president of the chinese academy of Social Sciences. The book was first published by He’nan University Press in Kaifeng in 2008. in order to understand the book better, one must kept in mind that Ru Xin wrote the very first Chinese research paper on Kierkegaard’s philosophy and thought in 1982, which was published in 1985 in a series of books entitled Critical Biographies of Famous Western Philosophers.1 the paper marked the beginning of Kierkegaard study in mainland china. as it is well known, china launched the open policy in the early 1980s. however, the progress of the new way of thinking was comparatively slow. even in the early 1990s, “idealism,” especially “subjective idealism,” was still considered as the enemy of “materialism” and labeled as “reactionary,” and religion was branded as “the opium of the people.” thus, to have Kierkegaard as an object of research was a courageous plan. in the preface of the book, Xin ru reviewed his encounter with Kierkegaard, which I think is not only significant for understanding the book itself, but also for understanding the history of the chinese reception of Kierkegaard.2 Xin ru was educated in western philosophy in 1956. owing to marxism, the study of western philosophy was for a long time dominated by the tradition of German idealism, especially Hegelian philosophy. Xin Ru first learned the name “Kierkegaard” when he read The Destruction of Reason by the hungarian marxist georg Lukács in the 1960s. nearly half a century later, Xin ru admitted that this book could only be viewed “historically,” since it was too politically influenced. From 1981 to 1982, Xin Ru was selected by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences as a member of the first group of Chinese Fulbright scholars to go to harvard university and work under the supervision of hilary putnam. the analytic philosopher immediately saw their differences in philosophical training and interests. thus he encouraged Xin ru to make the best use of the resources at 1 Xin ru, “克尔凯郭尔” [Kierkegaard], in 著名西方哲学家评传 [Critical Biographies of Famous Western Philosophers], vol. 8, ed. by hou hongxun and zheng yong, Ji’nan: Shandong people’s publishing house 1985, pp. 1–65. 2 Xin ru, 看哪，克尔凯郭尔这个人 [collected papers on Kierkegaard], Kaifeng: he’nan university press 2008, pp. i–vi.

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Qi Wang

harvard and pursue his own academic interests. that triggered Xin ru’s reading of Kierkegaard and nietzsche, whom he considered two representative philosophers after hegel. he collected as many english translations as possible of Kierkegaard’s works and the secondary literature published up to the 1980s, planning to do some indepth research later. but the plan failed, because he was promoted to vice-president of the chinese academy of Social Sciences after he came back from harvard, a time- and energy-consuming position that occupied him for nearly 20 years. instead of carrying on systematic study, he only wrote research papers in his spare time, touching on various aspects of Kierkegaard’s philosophy and thought. the current book is the result of his efforts. Xin Ru has proudly identified himself as a true Marxist who is conscious of existence and the peril of pseudo-marxism and dogmatism in various forms. unlike most international Kierkegaard scholars, Xin ru does not like Kierkegaard, because he takes Kierkegaard to be “a loser in life,” “a spiritual freak,” although he never denies that Kierkegaard was a sharp-minded thinker and talented writer.3 this conclusion is drawn mostly based on Kierkegaard’s attachment to religion, a point which has only a negative connotation in the mind of a marxist. with this line of thinking in mind, it is not hard to see that the first paper, “Kierkegaard: That Individual,” is actually a concise intellectual biography of Kierkegaard, which refers to walter Lowrie’s A Short Life of Kierkegaard and a german edition of Kierkegaard’s journals,4 but with a sharply critical tone. the merit Xin ru has given Kierkegaard is his contribution to the new orientation of contemporary philosophy and christian theology. however, he confesses that he is incompetent to make detailed comments on the latter.5 the second paper is entitled “young Kierkegaard on Socratic irony.”6 this is a detailed analysis of Kierkegaard’s master’s thesis, and it includes many references to Hegel. The paper argues that the young Kierkegaard was influenced by Hegel, but the paper goes much further, demonstrating that he was on his way to becoming a great thinker. the third paper discusses “Kierkegaard’s conception of existence and the theory of the three Spheres of existence” at some length. according to Xin ru, the concept of existence is the most important contribution of Kierkegaard to contemporary western philosophy. the Kierkegaardian conception of existence bears three features that distinguish it from previous views: (1) it is the individual’s subjective experience, and thus it can be seen as the subjective idealist point of view; (2) it bears a strong color of solipsism; (3) it is irrational, and on this point Kierkegaard differs fundamentally from hegel.7 as for the three spheres of existence, Xin ru concludes that Kierkegaard’s aesthetic sphere of existence is characterized by “immediacy.” on this point, Kierkegaard does not go beyond hegel’s critique of “sense certainty” in the Phenomenology of Spirit. moreover, his conception of the 3 4

1942. 5 6 7

ibid., p. v. walter Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard, princeton: princeton university press Xin ru, 看哪，克尔凯郭尔这个人 [collected papers on Kierkegaard], p. 58. ibid., pp. 59–89. ibid., pp. 91–7.

Xin Ru

15

aesthetic sphere of existence is a result of individualism and pessimism.8 next, the conception of the ethical sphere of existence shares several similarities with Kant and hegel, and the only difference is that Kierkegaard emphasizes the individual’s act of choosing.9 the paper maintains a strong critical attitude toward the religious sphere of existence. Xin ru writes, “Kierkegaard tries his best to make religious faith irrational, to unconditionally submit to christian faith in the spirit of antirationalism.”10 he thinks that Kierkegaard’s standpoint has almost ruined the value of his philosophy of existence, which aims at establishing religious faith, a totally mistaken path in the eyes of a marxist. however, Xin ru also points out that the biggest error of all kinds of pseudo- and dogmatist marxist conceptions lies in the fact that they have neglected the individual and the individual’s choice in history. and in this sense, Kierkegaard’s conception of existence is worthy of a full study.11 the last paper is entitled “Kierkegaard and hegelian philosophy”—a scholarly discussion that refers to thulstrup’s Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, James collins’ The Mind of Kierkegaard and Karl Löwith’s From Hegel to Nietzsche.12 according to the paper, Kierkegaard does have some general knowledge of hegel’s philosophy but he has made no profound study of it. Kierkegaard takes hegel as the target. however, his critique differs from what the left-wing hegelians did and focuses on hegel’s general principles of philosophy without giving any particular and detailed analysis of the comprehensive system of hegel.13 Xin ru agrees with Kierkegaard on his critique of hegel’s conception of the identity of thinking and being, and he believes that the critique strikes the “achilles’ heel” of speculative philosophy. but, due to his own idealist standpoint, Kierkegaard cannot solve the problem he has discovered. therefore, Kierkegaard’s critique of hegel cannot match up with that of marx.14 through his critique of hegel, Kierkegaard opens a new orientation for philosophy, which is irrational in essence and focuses on the individual’s existence, a philosophy which has had a profound influence on the Western social thought of the twentieth century. with that Xin ru takes the same standpoint as Karl Jaspers. all in all, Xin ru’s marxist Kierkegaard study touches many central problems in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, and its significance can only be fully understood when put in the intellectual history of contemporary china. Qi wang

ibid., pp. 97–105. ibid., pp. 105–6. 10 ibid., p. 115. 11 ibid., p. 117. 12 niels thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george L. Stengren, princeton, new Jersey: princeton university press 1980; James collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, chicago: regnery 1953; Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought, trans. by david e. green, new york: columbia university press 1964. 13 Xin ru, 看哪，克尔凯郭尔这个人 [collected papers on Kierkegaard], p. 128. 14 ibid., p. 155. 8 9

reviews and critical discussions wang, Qi, “china: the chinese reception of Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome iii, The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 103–23; see pp. 107–8.

Qi wang, 走向绝望的深渊— 克尔凯郭尔的美学生活境界 [unto the abyss of despair: a Study of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic Sphere of existence], beijing: chinese Social Sciences press 2000, iv + 182 pp.

Qi wang’s study, Unto the Abyss of Despair: A Study of Kierkegaard’s Aesthetic Sphere of Existence, was first published by the Chinese Social Sciences Press in 2000. this important work appeared as a volume in the series A Library of Doctoral Dissertations in Social Sciences in China, edited by Sheng hu and Xin ru.1 the publication was effectively a revised version of her dissertation. in the context of the history of philosophy, chinese scholars focus much of their attention on the manner in which Kierkegaard influenced existentialism. To put Qi wang’s book in its proper perspective in the reception of Kierkegaard in china, one should recall that at the time this book was published, the most popular work on Kierkegaard’s existence philosophy in china was Shaojun weng’s Existence of the Individual: Kierkegaard as “Forefather of Existentialism.”2 in this book Kierkegaard’s thoughts on existence and his influence on existentialism were introduced and analyzed. weng’s interpretation of the relationship between Kierkegaard and existentialism in this work expressed general views and outlines for the academic circle in china and served to entrench them further in the research. French existentialism and existentialist literature were especially popular from the 1980s until the end of twentieth century among chinese intellectuals; for in this transitional period during a time of reform, it was more and more important and urgent for individuals to focus on their existence. on this point, wang attempts to bring together Kierkegaard’s views on existence and French existentialist literature in her book. obviously, wang goes further than weng. her arguments start from one of the most significant categories of Kierkegaard—existence—and it is this concept Qi wang, 走向绝望的深渊—克尔凯郭尔的美学生活境界 [unto the abyss of despair: a Study of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic Sphere of existence], beijing: chinese Social Sciences press 2000. 2 Shaojun weng, 人的存在—“存在主义之父”克尔凯戈尔述评 [existence of individual: Kierkegaard as “Forefather of existentialism”], beijing: culture & art press 1989. 1

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that is the central theme of her work. in her study, wang uses philosophical and anthropological perspectives. She expands and explains the broad meanings of “aesthetics,” “the aesthetic sphere” or “aesthetic” and clarifies the misunderstandings in the chinese translations of them.3 “aesthetics” is not only a noun meaning a branch of philosophy, but it can also be an adjective, “aesthetic,” which means to experience some thing or object directly. in her analysis of “the aesthetic sphere” or “aesthetic” it is possible for wang to observe aesthetic aspects of individual existence. She selects Either/Or, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript and The Sickness unto Death as Kierkegaard’s main writings, which are intensively treated in her study. while wang treats Kierkegaard’s thought as philosophical descriptions of aesthetic aspects of individual existence, she selects the famous literary works of Jean-paul Sartre and albert camus to see how aesthetic aspects are expressed in twentieth-century French existentialism. There are five chapters in Wang’s book, which can be divided into three main parts. In the first and second chapters, the category of existence and the three spheres of existence are discussed, and these can be regarded collectively as the first part. in the third chapter, “nothingness,” the aesthetic sphere is analyzed, and in the fourth chapter irony and despair as rebellion are understood as the end result of the aesthetic sphere, which has similarities to and differences from the religious sphere regarding the point of aesthetic experience. In the fifth chapter, Wang examines Sartre’s conception of “nothingness” as well as camus’ use of “absurdity.” Wang consciously defines and carefully limits her work in this book. She selects and analyzes with caution key categories in Kierkegaard’s thought and French existentialism, such as immediacy, nothingness, irony, despair and so on. these analyses make her arguments in the whole work much more concrete and convincing in the chinese context of Kierkegaard’s studies. referring to aesthetic existence, wang attempts to bring Kierkegaard’s thought and modern existentialism into dialogue. She mentions faith as salvation from despair, which is one of the forms of the aesthetic sphere. but one can see her philosophical standpoint in this book, and in her arguments the religious sphere is not so strongly emphasized. in the context of existentialism, the aesthetic sphere of existence is interpreted and regarded as a lifestyle with infinite possibilities for the individual. when wang’s monograph appeared in 2000, it offered more concrete arguments and interpretations of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic sphere of existence. Under its influence, research on Kierkegaard from both aesthetic and philosophical perspectives would be, from then on, one of the main directions in chinese Kierkegaard studies. in this sense this work can be regarded as a landmark in Kierkegaard studies in china. zizhen Liu

3

wang, Unto the Abyss of Despair, p. 4.

reviews and critical discussions undetermined.

Qi wang, 生命与信仰——克尔凯郭尔假名写作 时期基督教哲学思想研究

[Life and belief: a Study of christian philosophy in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings], nanking: phoenix publishing & media group, Jiangsu people’s publishing house 2010, 303 pp.

building on her doctoral work1 and further studies in denmark, chinese Kierkegaard authority Qi wang aims in this work to study the christian philosophy presented in the pseudonymous works Either/Or, the Philosophical Fragments, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In the introductory chapter, Wang clarifies the concept of a Christian philosophy with reference to etienne gilson’s authoritative Spirit of Medieval Philosophy,2 as she often does throughout the book, and then notes the need for a more nuanced reading of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works than a straightforward acknowledgment of claims.3 chapter 1 is a close reading of Either/Or that first situates the work in Kierkegaard’s biographical timeline, including that of his intellectual development. by noting how the title is a response to the hegelian concept of synthesis, wang contrasts the then fashionable hegelianism with Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the Lebenswelt and its various subjective moods.4 She then explicates the basic tenets of ethico-religious existence: “absolute choice” and to “do one’s duty.”5 chapter 2 begins a close reading of the Lebensphilosophie of the Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript with a discussion of the danish title of the former and its connotations.6 the conclusion of this chapter is that 1 Qi wang, 走向绝望的深渊——克尔凯郭尔的美学生活境界 [unto the abyss of despair—Kierkegaard’s aesthetic Sphere of existence], beijing: zhongguo Shehui Kexue chubanshe 2000. 2 Qi wang, 生命与信仰——克尔凯郭尔假名写作时期基督教哲学思想研究 [Life and belief: a Study of christian philosophy in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings], nanking: phoenix publishing & media group, Jiangsu people’s publishing house 2010, p. 6. 3 ibid., pp. 17–19. 4 ibid., p. 29; p. 31. 5 ibid., p. 45; p. 49. 6 ibid., p. 61.

Chingshun J. Sheu

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meaning in the Lebenswelt is systematic only for god; it is necessarily fragmented for us.7 the following chapter offers a close reading of the ontology presented in these two works. wang explains the cryptic epigraph to the Philosophical Fragments —“better well hanged than ill wed”—as meaning that the unity of rationalism and christian belief in Kierkegaard’s denmark is a bad marriage that should be sundered.8 She then traces the Socratic-religious dyad back to tertullian’s division in De Praescriptione Haereticorum, posed in the question, Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis?9 the fourth chapter considers the christian ideas of the two books. wang opens this chapter with a lengthy explanation of the role of love in greek, christian, and contemporary western culture;10 she then explicates the centrality of the resurrection in christian thought. here, she notes that, unnoticed by other critics, Kierkegaard makes a Kantian distinction between understanding and reason, so that, for him, faith is not irrational but non-understandable,11 which leads to a comparison of Kierkegaard’s faith with Kant’s rational religion and derrida’s religion without religion.12 Starting from augustinian precepts of christian philosophy, wang then explains how history can be regarded as the product of freedom and the will.13 the second part of the book abstracts Kierkegaard’s concepts of christian philosophy from the first part’s close readings and presents them as a coherent whole. chapter 5 organizes Kierkegaard’s ideas into critiques of various strands of christian thought—systematic theology, natural theology, the biblical criticism of david F. Strauss, and the practical theology of n.F.S. grundtvig—each of which is preceded by a genealogical account. the next chapter constructively organizes Kierkegaard’s ideas of faith into four tenets: faith’s impossibility to be proven, its insurmountable uncertainty, faith as adventure, and faith as inwardness; wang concludes the chapter by explaining the key terms “leap,” “the absurd,” “moment,” and “passion.” the penultimate chapter explores Kierkegaard’s notion of dual existence from the perspectives of religiousness a and religiousness b. wang sees a tension in Kierkegaard’s thought manifested in his separation of these two levels;14 the final section attempts to combine the two perspectives into a coherent Christian lifestyle. it is apparent from the proportion of appropriated material from each level that she favors the former. a brief concluding chapter follows. chingshun J. Sheu

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

ibid., p. 72. ibid., pp. 82–3. ibid., p. 87. ibid., pp. 99–106. ibid., pp. 115–17. ibid., p. 124. ibid., pp. 133–9. ibid., pp. 288–9.

reviews and critical discussions wang, Qi, “the chinese reception of Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome iii, The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Receptions and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 103–24; see pp. 118–19.

Shaojun weng, 人的存在——“存在主义之父” 克尔凯戈尔述评

[existence of the individual: Kierkegaard as “Forefather of existentialism”], beijing: culture & art press 1989, vii + 242 pp.

Existence of the Individual: Kierkegaard as “Forefather of Existentialism” was written by Shaojun Weng and first published by Culture and Art Press of Beijing in 1989. it is one of those pocketbooks that sprang up around the middle of the 1980s, aiming at introducing the “new” western philosophy, thought and culture, although most of the schools or figures, such as Freud, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Sartre, as well as western marxist philosophers, had already become history in the west. after many years of cultural blockade, people in china in the 1980s suffered from a terrible intellectual hunger. they wanted to know more about different things in addition to marxist ideology. books were translated, compiled, and written in a rather short period of time, which quickly became bestsellers, although they might be regarded as below the academic standard today. Four years after ru Xin published the first Chinese research paper on Kierkegaard in 1985, Weng published this first introductory book on Kierkegaard, which added the dane’s name to the long list of hot western thinkers. in a three-page preface to the book, weng told a story, recalling his encounter with Kierkegaard. in 1987, a prestigious chinese university had invited a philosophy professor from abroad—neither of the names was mentioned—to give a series of lectures on Kierkegaard. the professor used titles such as “a contemporary Socrates,” “the most influential thinker for the twentieth century,” “a philosopher as profound as marx,” and “a revelation for heidegger and Sartre” to describe Kierkegaard, and this rhetoric immediately made Kierkegaard a hit on the campus. as a result, students rushed to the library for Kierkegaard’s works. however, they could only find a few English translations. In that way, Kierkegaard became a strange and mysterious figure in the minds of many young college students in China. This episode became the direct impetus for writing the book, with which weng aimed to

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offer an intellectual biography of Kierkegaard, a figure “whose way of thinking and writing is odd and strange for chinese readers.”1 weng was born in the 1940s and belongs to the generation who spent their youth in the cultural revolution. while he earned his living as an accountant in a small local factory in Shanghai, he taught himself philosophy, reading marx, hegel, and chinese philosophy. in 1978, when he heard the news from the radio that the chinese academy of Social Sciences was establishing a graduate school and starting to recruit graduate students after a long vacant period, he decided to try his luck and ultimately passed the entrance examination. weng thus became a graduate student of western philosophy at the age of 35, an average age, and, in fact, he was considered as “quite young” by his classmates. Life was hard at the time, because there was no campus. it turned out that 11 adults shared one dormitory room in a building belonging to the beijing workers union. the 1978 group of graduate students held prestige in both academic and political circles, probably because when they joined the school they were sophisticated. Studying english, reading the classics and hot debates became their daily routine. weng did not know english very well before he joined the school. but after three years of diligent study, he mastered the reading skills which prepared his way for Kierkegaard translation and research after he received his master’s degree and worked at the institute of philosophy at the Shanghai academy of Social Sciences in 1982.2 The above might, at first glance, seem off the subject. But without sufficient knowledge of the social and academic background of china in the 1980s, one cannot fully understand academic research during this period, and this includes the study of Kierkegaard. Existence of the Individual: Kierkegaard as “Forefather of Existentialism” is divided into nine chapters. chapter 1 is entitled “melancholic childhood,” chapter 2 “the great earthquake,” chapter 3 “regine,” and chapter 4 “trips to berlin.” From chapter 5 to the end, the book combines Kierkegaard’s life with his writings. in chapter 5, “choosing in Life,” weng discusses the early aesthetic works of Kierkegaard; chapter 6, “anti-hegel: the absurd as the philosophical theme,” centers on the two works by Johannes climacus; chapter 7, “description of man,” conclusively discusses Kierkegaard’s works after 1848; and chapter 8, “Fighting with the established church,” concludes Kierkegaard’s conception of christian faith through the anti-church episode. although the book does not offer any bibliography or sufficient footnotes, like most of the pamphlets published at the time, it is not hard to see that the format and content are mainly based on walter Lowrie’s A Short Life of Kierkegaard.3 the last chapter, chapter 9, “Forefather of existentialism,” is an exception, where weng makes a brief comparative study of Kierkegaard with Shaojun weng, 人的存在——“存在主义之父”克尔凯戈尔述评 [existence of the individual: Kierkegaard as “Forefather of existentialism”], beijing: culture & art press 1989, pp. 1–2. 2 Shaojun weng, 我读大专和考研的经历 [memoirs of climbing the educational Ladder], in 史林 [Shi Lin], supplementary issue 2011, pp. 122–32. 3 walter Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard, princeton: princeton university press 1942. 1

Shaojun Weng

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Schopenhauer and nietzsche, concluding that they are responsible for irrationalism in the philosophy of the nineteenth century.4 in fact, the comparative methodology is carried out through the entire book. as a result, weng actually offers a lot of fragmentary but insightful comments on Kierkegaard’s thought from his knowledge of both western and chinese philosophy. in this way, the book turns out to be more like what he has gained from reading Kierkegaard than an academic research book—a situation shared once again by most of the bestselling works published around the mid-1980s. the highlight is not in the nine chapters, but condensed in the 18-page “author’s concluding words,” placed at the end of the book.5 there weng tentatively makes a comparative study of Kierkegaard and zhuangzi, an ancient taoist philosopher, arguing their philosophies can be defined as irrationalism, regardless of whether they are western or eastern. according to weng, both Kierkegaard and zhuangzi are afraid of social changes and the development of science and technology; both blame rationalism for those changes. This conclusion is strongly influenced by the chinese version of marxist philosophy in that both Kierkegaard and zhuangzi can be regarded as “idealist philosophers,” who determine subjectivity as “mind” or “existence,” and who consequently fall into subjectivism and extremism. For the “idealist philosopher,” the essential task of the human being is to go deeper into his or her inner world. consequently, both philosophers are keen to explore the psychological state of the human being—Kierkegaard focuses on angst, despair, melancholy, and solitude; while zhuangzi focuses on 恬淡, a concept literally meaning “indifferent to fame and wealth and thereby able to keep a tranquil mind no matter what occasion.” moreover, both Kierkegaard and zhuangzi make a certain psychological state of human being the absolute. For zhuangzi, the absolute lies in 去知无己, which literally means “free from thought and then able to sit in forgetfulness”; for Kierkegaard, the absolute lies in faith, which requires passion in the highest degree. Considering the difficulty of the topic, Weng’s study is a bit simplified. However, since an English monograph on the similar topic The Sense of Antirationalism: The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard was published 11 years later,6 weng’s study can be seen as a pioneering work. Qi wang

Shaojun weng, 人的存在——“存在主义之父”克尔凯戈尔述评 [existence of the individual: Kierkegaard as “Forefather of existentialism”], pp. 205–6. 5 ibid., pp. 216–32. 6 Karen L. carr and philip J. ivanhoe, The Sense of Antirationalism: The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard, new york: Seven bridges press 2000. 4

reviews and critical discussions wang, Qi, “china: the chinese reception of Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome iii, The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 103–23; see pp. 114–16.

dachun yang, 沉沦与拯救—— 克尔凯戈尔的精神哲学研究 [perdition and Salvation: a Study of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of Spirit], beijing: people’s publishing house 1995, vi + 259 pp.

dachun yang’s monograph, Perdition and Salvation: A Study of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Spirit, was first published by the People’s Publishing House of Beijing in 1995. it was based on yang’s doctoral dissertation, “on Søren Kierkegaard’s concept of Spirit,” which was defended in 1992. in “author’s words,” yang confessed that his first encounter with the Hongs’ translation of Kierkegaard’s writings was totally by accident. he found Kierkegaard “peculiar but interesting.”1 the current book was only modified on the technical level, because after getting his Ph.D., Yang’s academic interest shifted to French post-modernism and deconstructionism. now a prominent professor in post-modern French philosophy in china, yang has not published a paper on Kierkegaard since then. in this way, the monograph can be seen as Yang’s first encounter with and final farewell to Kierkegaard at the same time. nevertheless, there are two important points about yang’s book in the history of the chinese reception of Kierkegaard. First, Perdition and Salvation is the very first monograph on Kierkegaard ever published in Mainland China. Earlier, the rather limited publications on Kierkegaard were introductory chapters or papers, which viewed Kierkegaard exclusively as the “forefather of existentialism.” Secondly, the book was the first to show an awareness of Kierkegaard’s “indirect communication,” though the discussion tends to be a little simplified. Yang suggested using Kierkegaard’s journals and papers as a “criterion” whenever there are contradictions in Kierkegaard’s writings, since he believed that the journals and papers are direct reflections of Kierkegaard’s personality and inner thoughts.2 although unconvincing, this solution is a positive attempt to solve the problem of the complexity of Kierkegaard’s authorship.

dachun yang, 沉沦与拯救——克尔凯戈尔的精神哲学研究 [perdition and Salvation: a Study of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of Spirit], beijing: people’s publishing house 1995, p. iii. 2 ibid., p. 25. 1

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From the very beginning, yang was ambitious to break the overwhelming “forefather of existentialism” cliché, trying to view Kierkegaard as “an authentic philosopher.” he followed international Kierkegaard studies in the 1990s and divided Kierkegaard’s writings into three different stages: the early stage being the aesthetic, the middle being philosophical, and the late being religious. he argued that despite the anti-systematic appearance, Kierkegaard’s writings embody a philosophical ontology: “a theory of being.”3 thus, yang’s aim was to reconstruct Kierkegaard’s philosophical system, using “spirit” as a key concept instead of “existence,” which had been much discussed in earlier studies in chinese. the term “spirit” might immediately remind us of hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, and yang did not deny the connection. yang dedicated the entire “introduction” to the discussion of the Kierkegaard–hegel relationship, indicating that Kierkegaard was not a frantic Hegel critic, as he seems to be or is defined to be. On the contrary, Hegel influenced Kierkegaard in a positive and essential way, especially with his dialectics.4 yang argued that both hegel and Kierkegaard accept dialectics as an essential principle, and their differences lie in the fact that hegel’s dialectics tends to be “objective,” while Kierkegaard’s is “subjective” and individualistic. hegel wants to solve the “contradictions” in the objective and universal process, and thus his dialectics is a “quantitative” “both/and,” while Kierkegaard wishes to solve the contradictions in the individual with the aid of the eternal. thus, the Kierkegaardian dialectics is a “qualitative” “either/or.”5 yang concluded that Kierkegaard’s criticism of hegel does not come from “theoretical considerations,” but from the aim to “give impetus to the existence of individual.”6 thus, Kierkegaard’s understanding of hegel is proportionate to the vehemence of his criticism. another reason for yang to choose “spirit” as the key concept came from his critical reading of two works from the secondary literature, namely, James collins’ The Mind of Kierkegaard and John elrod’s Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works.7 according to yang, both works take the “self” as the substance of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. but yang argued that the concept “self” is too static and not dynamic enough.8 he suggested substituting “spirit” for “self,” because the term “spirit,” although not a frequent term, is “omnipresent” in Kierkegaard’s writings.9 with the Kierkegaard–hegel relation in mind, yang presented his reconstruction in 5 chapters. The first chapter focuses on the definition and constitutive principle of “spirit.” in yang’s words, “spirit” in the Kierkegaardian context is “conservative.” nevertheless, the concept has embodied a series of “revolutionary changes,” which, first, can represent a break with Western philosophical traditions. Second, ibid., p. 32. the english translation is yang’s own. ibid., p. 14. 5 ibid., p. 15. 6 ibid., p. 16. 7 James collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, princeton: princeton university press 1983. John elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works, princeton: princeton university press 1975. 8 dachun yang, 沉沦与拯救——克尔凯戈尔的精神哲学研究 [perdition and Salvation: a Study of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of Spirit], p. 34. 9 ibid., p. ii. 3 4

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31

it influenced both existentialism and the Neo-Orthodox Movement in the twentieth century.10 Such a “revolutionary” concept, yang concluded, bears the main feature of “being irrational,” a term widely accepted and used to summarize contemporary western philosophy in the last two decades of the twentieth century in china, and the reason is probably due to the translation and publication of the work of the hungarian marxist philosopher georg Lukács, The Destruction of Reason.11 with “irrationality” as a guiding principle, Yang further clarified the Kierkegaardian “spirit” in the following aspects: (1) it indicates “an action of existence”; (2) it is not a rational action of cognition, but “an irrational action of feeling and will”; (3) it cannot be defined in the world-historical spheres, but only in the sphere of individuals; (4) the highest “spirit” can only be realized in the god-relationship.12 what is more, the Kierkegaardian “spirit” is “dialectically dynamic.” by striving among the dialectically contradictory categories, such as “finite-infinite,” “bodymind,” “necessity-possibility,” and “actuality-ideality,” the individual is in a constant process of constituting “spirit,” thus also in a process of “becoming oneself.”13 in the next four chapters, yang outlined Kierkegaard’s philosophy of spirit by using typical terms from german idealism. chapter 2 is entitled “subjective spirit,” where yang discusses the proposition “subjectivity is truth” raised in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript; chapter 4 discusses the “negative spirit,” i.e., “anxiety” and “despair”; chapter 5 deals with the “positive spirit,” namely, the ethical-religious development of “spirit.” between chapters 2 and 4, the aesthetic sphere of existence is included and depicted as a “loss of spirit,” where the “spirit” becomes alienated.14 it is not hard to see that yang’s understanding of Kierkegaard is somewhat hegelian. his original intention was to avoid the beaten track, but things did not turn out the way he wished. in the end, the discussion of “spirit” returns back to “existence.” in that respect, the book seems to be a case of seeking far and wide for what lies close at hand. Qi wang

ibid., p. 252. georg Lukács, 理性的毁灭 [the destruction of reason], trans. by wang Jiuxing, cheng zhimin, Xie weihe, Xie dikun, and Song zuliang, Ji’nan: Shandong people’s publishing house 1997. 12 dachun yang, 沉沦与拯救——克尔凯戈尔的精神哲学研究 [perdition and Salvation: a Study of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of Spirit], pp. 39–49. 13 ibid., pp. 51–71. 14 ibid., p. 149. 10 11

reviews and critical discussions wang, Qi, “china: the chinese reception of Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome iii, The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 103–23; see pp. 116–17.

iii. Secondary Literature in czech

václav Fiala, Příkaz a skutek. Dialog o Kierkegaardovi [command and deed: a dialogue on Kierkegaard], prague: orbis 1944, 152 pp.

when the czech journalist and historian václav Fiala published his travelogue on Scandinavia named Země fjordů a ság (the countries of Fjords and Sagas) in 1940,1 the chapter on Søren Kierkegaard was missing. From the beginning Fiala intended to design this chapter as a dialogue, and when he started to write down and elaborate upon a real dialogue on Kierkegaard, which he had with a friend sitting in front of the memorial for Kierkegaard in the royal Library garden in copenhagen in 1934, the text soon begun to fall out from the travelogue in both extent and tone. Fiala published the text a few years later in 1944, as a separate book, in only 75 copies. Command and Deed is a fictional dialogue between Paul and John, two friends who are sitting in front of the abovementioned Kierkegaard statue and having a philosophical discussion on Kierkegaard’s thought. the dialogue is far from being an academic treatment of Kierkegaard: John, who of the two men is more familiar with Kierkegaard, is said not be a philosopher, but a historian and simply someone who “has read Kierkegaard and thought about him.”2 through his voice Fiala presents his view of Kierkegaard, which is based on his own reading experience. (in the epilogue Fiala confesses that in order as much as possible to preserve his own view, he decided mostly to leave commentaries aside, even though, as he admits, by so doing he deprives himself of this and that which others said more originally and nicely.) in the course of the dialogue Fiala goes through several Kierkegaardian topics. in the first section he shows how Kierkegaard’s thought and feeling are connected with the events of his life. he recreates extensively Kierkegaard’s concept of christianity by going through Kierkegaard’s main objections against the established church. paul plays an advocatus diaboli, and on the background of his defense of the established church, Fiala lets Kierkegaard’s radical claims about christianity come to the fore. to the objection that in practice the church is forced to make concessions to the ideal 1 2

václav Fiala, Země fjordů a ság, prague: orbis 1940. václav Fiala, Příkaz a skutek. Dialog o Kierkegaardovi, prague: orbis 1944, p. 38.

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and cannot be accountable for one person’s particular failure, Fiala states firmly Kierkegaard’s deeply christian view that the church indeed should be responsible for the community, including the negligent individual.3 he contends that Kierkegaard’s religious critique, as destructive as it was, nevertheless had a positive aim. in the second section Fiala goes through some of the problems which occupied Kierkegaard: the nature of human existence and its types, man’s position in the world, his relationship to society, and the prospects of society as such. Fiala deals also with the legacy of antiquity in Kierkegaard’s thought: the fact that Kierkegaard felt reserved about the possibility and scope of rational cognition or the fact that he believed that rational cognition is relative, is presented as a heritage of antiquity. Kierkegaard’s belief that the aim of human knowledge is to learn that there is something which cannot be understood and what this something is, is put in connection with the Socratic wisdom that there are mysteries in the world which we cannot grasp. the thesis that subjectivity is truth, then, is understood as a Socratic heritage. Fiala underlines the upbuilding element which such truth has both for the individual and for society.4 in antiquity Fiala also locates the foundations of Kierkegaard’s classification of human types. when the two protagonists deliberate about the basic ethical question, how should i conduct myself?, they hit upon the nature of Kierkegaard’s ethics, which is based on faith: my action should be in accordance with my inner truth, which nevertheless can be and mostly is uncertain, and hence “only” a belief. more generally put, the world is impenetrable by thought, and hence i, who stand in opposition to the world with my subjective truth, must be helped by my faith. this is highlighted as the existential dimension of Kierkegaard’s thought. the dialogue lets the reader understand that, for Kierkegaard, ethics and religiousness are related: religion is the culmination of moral conviction. Fiala frequently clarifies Kierkegaard’s position by comparing him with or opposing him to other figures: for example, when he depicts Kierkegaard’s pain over his personal love for regine olsen as the source for both his poetical and philosophical creation, he refers to dante’s Divina Comedia.5 he compares Kierkegaard with descartes, when he explains his view of ethics and of the self, and with hegel, when he explains Kierkegaard’s view of historical development and his notion of a leap into being. when Fiala describes Kierkegaard’s religious position, he makes use of ernst troeltsch’s division of the types of christian teaching in his Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen.6 the czech reader is especially served when Fiala, in order to illustrate certain aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought, refers to some famous Czech personalities such as the “Moravian” brother Petr Chelčický, the poet Karel Hynek Mácha, or the composer Bedřich Smetana. John’s answers to paul are often direct quotations from Kierkegaard’s writings, but the book is by no means a detached compilation of Kierkegaardian sentences. Fiala’s personal, interested attitude shines through the whole work and his overall 3 4 5 6

ibid., p. 48. ibid., p. 71. ibid., pp. 26–7. ibid., pp. 54–61.

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personal evaluation of Kierkegaard is decidedly positive, even though he sometimes approaches Kierkegaard polemically, mostly in order to highlight the particularity of Kierkegaard’s attitude. polemical is, for example, the discussion of the degree to which Kierkegaard’s notion of christianity is his personal creed rather than the original gospel. (Fiala finally praises Kierkegaard for his wish also nowadays to regard the gospel as a moral norm.)7 Similarly, Fiala turns polemically towards Kierkegaard’s method of communication and regrets that Kierkegaard’s texts often leave the reader groping in the dark, in agreement with Karl Jaspers’ critique in his Die geistige Situation der Zeit.8 Fiala is well aware of the importance Kierkegaard has for the modern era, and he regrets that he is not as well known as he deserves, especially in the era of a “great spiritual crisis of our development”;9 recall that the book was written during world war ii. the dialogue does indeed reveal some degree of the melancholy of its author; however, it is written with an invigorating lightness and elegance. Just as Fiala sees Kierkegaard’s importance in his ability to bring philosophy closer to people who otherwise would not touch it,10 one can say that the value of Fiala’s book is that it can disclose the spiritual heritage of the danish philosopher to people who would never open an academic book on Kierkegaard. Kateřina Marková

7 8 9 10

ibid., pp. 50–3. ibid., pp. 124–31. ibid., p. 124. ibid., p. 134.

reviews and critical discussions Fiala, václav, Doslov [epilogue], in Command and Deed, prague: orbis 1944, pp. 137–52.

iv. Secondary Literature in danish

benny alex, Søren Kierkegaard. Et autentisk Liv: Kierkegaards lange og trange vej mod åndelig afklaring [Søren Kierkegaard: an authentic Life: Kierkegaard’s Long and narrow Path to Spiritual Clarification] copenhagen: c.a. reitzel and Scandinavia 1998, 120 pp.

in the series “Spiritual geniuses” whose goal, in the words of the publisher, is to introduce the public to some of the great geniuses of history, the lot has now fallen to Søren Kierkegaard. the book, which is introduced with “a personal preface,”1 is divided into two parts. The first part is entitled “Kierkegaard’s World” and consists of five short sections.2 here the reader is initiated into Kierkegaard’s life and work, a process undertaken in part by the author and in part by means of various interviews with a host of Kierkegaard researchers. the second part consists of “Selected texts from Kierkegaard’s works.”3 the book concludes with a chronology.4 At first glance, this book looks like an introduction to Kierkegaard’s life and thought, but even in the introductory preface, which has the character of a personal testimony, it becomes clear that the book has more to do with the author’s own journey of spiritual self-discovery than with “Kierkegaard’s long and narrow path to spiritual self-discovery.” the writer’s journey begins at the copenhagen city museum, where the mere viewing of Kierkegaard’s personal writing desk invokes in a most mysterious way a meeting with the genius himself: “in a fraction of a second, it felt as if i had left my body and entered into his body and mind, and i experienced an amazingly melancholic rapture, a kind of creative energy that did not come from me.”5 his subsequent readings of Kierkegaard’s authorship result in benny alex, Søren Kierkegaard. Et autentisk Liv: Kierkegaards lange og trange vej mod åndelig afklaring, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel and Scandinavia 1998, pp. 6–9. 2 ibid., pp. 13–69. 3 ibid., pp. 71–117. 4 ibid., pp. 118–19. 5 ibid., p. 7. 1

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the author’s crossing “great gaps found within the subterranean regions of the author’s soul.”6 and this, in all truth, is what the book is really about. it should come as no surprise, then, when the author declares without apology that the book aims at “an evangelical market.”7 by this, he admits that he is really using the Kierkegaardian text as a means and not as a goal. moreover, there is not even a hint of a genuine introduction to Kierkegaard’s thought. introducing others to Kierkegaard’s authorship is not a simple task, and it requires a certain critical distance, a distance which is here rather sadly lacking. the book has—apart from the interspersed interviews and some biographical information—an overwhelmingly subjective bias, revealing a certain incapacity on the part of the author to place himself in relation to the subjects at hand. the many—all too many—postcard-like illustrations are decidedly kitsch: the bible and the danish church hymnal (salmebog) arranged on a table with burning candles,8 sunflowers in verdant, blossoming meadows, and so on. All of these are graced by a host of selected quotations from Kierkegaard’s texts, and they are occasionally presented on pages where the background is composed of fragments from Kierkegaard’s manuscripts, enlarged and in color. the pages of illustrations stand in complete and sharp contrast to the book’s professed goal. not a single illustration recreates either the anxiety or the despair which are some of the book’s purported themes. it is also unfortunate that the book contains a number of factual inaccuracies. For example, Kierkegaard did not return from his first trip to Berlin in 1841,9 but in 1842, and Kierkegaard was not taken, in october of 1855, to Frederiksberg hospital10— which had not even been built yet—but to the old royal hospital, Frederiks hospital, on bredgade, now the danish museum of decorative arts. Furthermore, the references to Kierkegaard’s works are not precise and the reader can only with great difficulty find the quotations in their original contexts. In other words, the reader is left behind. he or she is given no possibility whatsoever of studying the text in its own proper environment. the author has eliminated the possibility for each individual reader to decide whether a quotation can tolerate being torn out of a larger context. the book was undoubtedly undertaken with good intentions, and the strong engagement of the author in the project is obvious, but this is not enough. this book ought not to be regarded as an introduction to Kierkegaard, but as a religious experience, which, almost by sheer coincidence, happens to involve Kierkegaard. apart from the interviews, the book lacks a critical approach, and thus Kierkegaard’s texts remain unmediated. whether the book will succeed in the “evangelical market” is for others to decide, but chances are good.11 Søren bruun

6 7 8 9 10 11

ibid. ibid., p. 9. ibid., p. 70. ibid., p. 38. ibid., p. 58, p. 119. ibid., p. 7.

reviews and critical discussions bruun, Søren, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 21, 2000, pp. 197–8.

Lars erslev andersen, Hinsides ironi. Fire essays om Søren Kierkegaard [beyond irony: Four essays on Søren Kierkegaard],

Ålborg: centertrykkeriet (Ålborg universitet) 1995 (Skrifter fra Nordisk Sommeruniversitet), 116 pp.

Hinsides ironi (beyond irony) was published in connection with Lars erslev andersen’s participation in the arrangements of the nordic Summer university, and it collects four independent essays on Kierkegaard which evolved in different contexts over the course of eight years. andersen makes it clear from the beginning that he has a double aim, namely, to present “deconstruction” as a modern textual theory in the tradition of especially derrida and paul de man and also and more importantly to present Kierkegaard’s rhetoric in a modern context. one indeed gets the feeling of a dedicated attempt to bring forth Kierkegaard as a thinker with huge potential into a modern debate on textual theory. In the first essay, “The Typewriter of Søren Kierkegaard,” Andersen classifies “the Kierkegaardian text” as “allegorical” since it consists of entwined text pastiches on philosophical and literary discourses driven by a “hermeneutics of misunderstanding.”1 This is related to the well-known Kierkegaardian artifices such as the use of pseudonyms, irony, and indirect communication. the allegorical text proves that a philosophical text uses as much rhetoric as a literary text does, and it opposes the romantic, organic text, such as, for example, those of grundtvig as well as the texts of the german idealists, by breaking down every coherence between text and reality, perception, and language. In this way Kierkegaard’s text can be classified as “modern” since the cognition lies in the production of the text. andersen, being well aware of Kierkegaard’s emphasis of the notion of existence, connects this to text performance since they both point toward ongoing production (negativity). the second essay treats the notion of “repetition” which refers back to an originality (“recollection”) as well as to the critique of this originality, namely, as “deconstruction,” that emphasizes the temporal distance and the productive movement: to take something back. andersen concludes that, for Kierkegaard, Lars erslev andersen, Hinsides ironi. Fire essays om Søren Kierkegaard, Ålborg: centertrykkeriet (Ålborg universitet) 1995 (Skrifter fra Nordisk Sommeruniversitet), p. 12.

1

Anne Louise Nielsen

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repetition means exactly this act: to be given and to take back, to produce and reproduce. in this way, Kierkegaard writes off metaphysics as well as the attitude of an aesthetic life, the autonomous subject as well as the tradition of the subjectis-dead, and he suggests a subject who is nothing but his relations, that is, who lets himself be written. the Kierkegaardian text accordingly corresponds to derrida’s notion of “dissemination,” which does not seek a fixed meaning but instead confirms the repeating play of the displacement of signs. andersen clearly understands key Kierkegaardian notions such as “existence,” “paradox,” and “the moment” as pure text performance. in the third essay andersen discusses whether Kierkegaard wrote an autobiography or a confession, referring primarily to The Point of View, the journals and also “a First and Last explanation” in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. andersen draws a coarse line from plato to Kierkegaard in as much as they both point to the relation between the level of meaning and the level of performance; or in the words of de man, the text production of meaning lies in the very loss of it.2 accordingly, the autobiographical text is the simultaneous loss and production of the self. andersen practically translates Kierkegaard’s distinction between recollection and repetition into the textual notions of closure and disclosure. Further, andersen simply adds on to this distinction the difficult dichotomy between recollection (as authentic) and memory (as inauthentic), understood as the self’s ambiguous reading and writing of itself. according to andersen, Kierkegaard cannot be understood as having written an autobiography since it is impossible to know whether he consciously staged himself, especially in The Point of View, or, if the deception of irony is actually repeated as a self-deception. Further, this is related to the fact that Kierkegaard refers to his own practice as a “seduction” of his reader. andersen does not comment on the “distance” and difference between deconstruction as modern textual theory and Kierkegaard’s personal dealing with real, broken existence but subsumes everything under the broad notion “interpretation.” one asks, would there be a self without it being produced in a text? Finally, in the last essay, andersen deals with the notion of irony and humor and refers back to the title of the book. the key theoretical framework is the question of the unification between essence and phenomenon. Andersen opposes the Kantian idea of an experience of beauty, free of interests with the hegelian conviction of reconciliation between man and nature, as a historical product of spirit. this reconciliation is the pivotal point in the attempt to restrain romantic irony since, for both Hegel and Kierkegaard, it is nothing but a hollow longing. Hegel defines irony as a displaced relationship of essence and phenomenon,3 and the key question is how and to what extent Kierkegaard “deconstructs” the notion of subjectivity. First, andersen interestingly points to the attempts to do this in The Concept of Irony, and even to failed attempts.4 Second, he points out two later Kierkegaardian key notions: earnestness and humor. earnestness, andersen states,5 does not refer to a christian 2 3 4 5

ibid., p. 59. ibid., p. 89 ibid., pp. 89–90. ibid., pp. 91–2.

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attitude but rather to the agreement between reader and writer about keeping the open space of interpretation. humor restrains and transcends irony by containing a deeper skepticism and thereby relating to sin instead of turning relative instances, such as the subject, into an absolute. andersen concludes that the uncanny categories of “a punishing god,” “sin,” and “guilt” serve a purely rhetorical function, namely, that of transgression, and he identifies this “rhetoric of discomfort” several times in the philosophical tradition, for example, in nietzsche’s dichotomy between the apollonian and the dionysian. all in all andersen’s book offers an extremely interesting and well-argued reading of Kierkegaard as well as a competent application of deconstruction as a textual approach. however, andersen pushes it to the limit by identifying Kierkegaard’s thinking as “a deconstruction avant le lettre,”6 and andersen himself seems to forget that a number of different traditions cross each other in the authorship of Kierkegaard. correspondingly, andersen continually emphasizes the same two or three Kierkegaard quotations to back up his argument; the most important of these is when climacus points to the relationship between existence and literary style.7 as indicated, andersen lumps together different categories, such as pseudonym, irony, humor, the moment, self, existence, god, sin, earnestness, and autobiography, and classifies them all as referring to a certain poetics or textual theory. the notions of “text” and “writing” are casually widened so that they refer directly to existence, and in this way andersen can very easily make the claim that Kierkegaard understands his own life as a text. reducing god to a metaphor and claiming that the christian language is just the only one available at Kierkegaard’s time seems to be unjust to an author who constantly emphasizes his fear of and wonder about god. in Kierkegaard’s eyes God seems to deconstruct mankind. the other half of Kierkegaard’s authorship, namely, the upbuilding discourses, seems at least to point in the same direction. the positive side of the lumping together of different traditions is the many introductions that andersen gives to a large number of thinkers such as derrida, paul de man, heidegger, husserl, nietzsche, Jean Paul, Benjamin, and Rorty. However, Andersen’s arrangement of classifications, for example, his distinction between three sorts of “repetition” corresponding to three sorts of reading strategies,8 seems contrived and points to his interest in textual theory rather than Kierkegaard. anne Louise nielsen

6 7 8

ibid., p. 43. ibid., p. 20; p. 38; p. 71. SKS 7, 85 / CUP1, 86. andersen, Hinsides ironi. Fire essays om Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 40–1.

reviews and critical discussions melberg, arne, review in Kritik, vol. 119, 1996, pp. 78–80.

Jacob bøggild, Ironiens tænker: Tænkningens ironi— Kierkegaard læst retorisk [the thinker of irony: the irony of thinking—Kierkegaard read rhetorically] copenhagen: museum tusculanum press 2002 (Teori & Æstetik, vol. 12), 274 pp.

Jacob bøggild (1963–) received his ph.d. in 1998 from roskilde university center with a thesis on Kierkegaard. this work was then published as a monographic study in 2002 under the title Ironiens tænker: Tænkningens ironi. Since 2012 bøggild has been professor at the hans christian andersen center at the university of Southern denmark.1 before that he was lecturer in danish Literature at the department of Nordic Studies at Aarhus University from 2002 to 2012. Influenced by Jacques derrida and paul de man, bøggild is one of the most distinguished close readers in the context of Danish literary deconstruction, which primarily flourished in the 1990s and early 2000s. he has never been dogmatic in his approach to deconstructive thinking, but has always maintained a broader commitment to the relationship between the ancient tradition of rhetoric and literary criticism as well as the study of the aesthetic formations of romantic and post-romantic european and danish literature. two overarching points of view determine bøggild’s study of Kierkegaard. First, he states that Kierkegaard’s dissertation The Concept of Irony is of fundamental importance to the understanding of the writings of Kierkegaard’s latter pseudonyms. Secondly, in order to understand how Kierkegaard’s indirect communication functions in his texts, one must, according to bøggild, understand his multilayered approach to irony and language.2 in his article on the reception history of The Concept of Irony from 2009 Steen tullberg shows that an awareness of possible ironic meanings in the dissertation has been part of the whole reading tradition in denmark from the

bøggild’s writing on hans christian andersen culminated with his Habilitation thesis (Disputats): Svævende Stasis. Arabesk og allegori i H.C. Andersens eventyr og historier, hellerup: Forlaget Spring 2012. 2 See Jacob bøggild, Ironiens Tænker: Tænkningens Ironi—Kierkegaard læst retorisk, copenhagen: museum tusculanums Forlag 2012 (Teori & Æstetik, vol. 12), p. 13. 1

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theologian Frederik helveg’s (1816–1901) article on “hegelianism in denmark” (1855) up until bøggild’s work.3 on bøggild, tullberg writes: Bøggild demonstrates chiefly how Kierkegaard continually dissociates himself from his texts. his readings have, as their epicenter, what bøggild calls the “marginality” and “reversibility” of Kierkegaard’s authorship: two aspects that are two sides of the same coin, but which he distinguishes for hermeneutic reasons. bøggild conceives of marginality in Kierkegaard’s work as a rhetorical phenomenon that is bound up in the book’s status of being both communicated and revoked at once. this is reminiscent of what Kierkegaard calls “double-reflection.” Reversibility has to do with Kierkegaard’s dialectic, that is, with the fact that many of the subjects that he treats (e.g., irony and anxiety) betray a distinct parallelism: they “cross one another.”4

i agree with tullberg that the importance of bøggild’s study primarily lies in his innovative and convincing readings of Kierkegaard’s ever more intense withdrawal from his own textual universe. while one could have wished for a more sustained theoretical discussion of the two central concepts of “marginality” and “reversibility,” bøggild’s use of the conceptual pair certainly works very well as a reading strategy. in his foreword bøggild suggests that “the most riddling aspect of Kierkegaard may well be the nature of his texts.”5 bøggild thereby wants to distance himself from the myth-making of the tradition of autobiographical readings. it is Kierkegaard’s own stance as an utterly complex ironic writer, the “a-topos”6 of his own anonymized identity as pseudonymous author that is the real point of interest for bøggild. while part of a specific Danish reception history, as shown by Tullberg, Bøggild’s study is also influenced by the “literary turn” in Kierkegaard studies in the Anglophone world, which emerged in the 1990s. especially roger poole’s ironical readings of Kierkegaard in The Indirect Communication from 1993 seem to have made an important impact on bøggild’s mode of thinking.7 discussing the subtitle of his study “reading Kierkegaard rhetorically,” bøggild acknowledges that he is inspired by paul de man, but not in any strict methodological sense.8 this seems fair. perhaps the real importance of de man, for bøggild, lies in the essay “autobiography as de-Facement” from The Rhetoric of Romanticism.9 according to bøggild, de man suggests that the reader, reading autobiographically, involves herself in a specular process that may have an alienating and bewildering effect. bøggild, rightfully i think, suggests that Kierkegaard had a rather complex understanding of the possible pitfalls of autobiographical readings. hinting at 3 Steen tullberg, “more than meets the eye: on the danish reception of On the Concept of Irony,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2009, pp. 355–72. 4 ibid., p. 363. 5 bøggild, Ironiens tænker: Tænkningens ironi—Kierkegaard læst retorisk, p. 11. 6 ibid. 7 roger poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication, charlottesville and London: university press of virginia 1993. 8 bøggild, Ironiens tænker: Tænkningens ironi—Kierkegaard læst retorisk, p. 12. 9 paul de man, “autobiography as de-Facement,” in his The Rhetoric of Romanticism, new york: columbia university press 1984, pp. 67–81.

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autobiographical “facts” in his texts may indeed have been a strategy of withdrawal on Kierkegaard’s part.10 The study is divided into four parts. The first part, ”Irony,” deals mainly with the concept or idea of irony as it is presented in The Concept of Irony. bøggild starts out by claiming that the lack of literary appreciation of Kierkegaard’s dissertation in terms of the history of danish reception is problematic. one exception is the important danish literary critic F.J. billeskov-Jansen (1907–2002), who in 1951 stated that Kierkegaard had “found his own literary style”11 in his dissertation. bøggild then moves on to discussing the main crux of both the danish and international reception of the work. is Kierkegaard’s use of hegelian thinking ironic or did he have, as Kierkegaard himself stated, an early hegelian phase of thinking? Following critics like Sylviane agacinski and Louis mackey and the aforementioned poole, bøggild argues that Kierkegaard is indeed ironic in his inclusion of hegelian thinking and concepts. as such, the danish thinker is already in his dissertation deeply opposed to any sort of hegelian systematized conceptuality and progressive understanding of world history. For example, bøggild argues that Kierkegaard profoundly understands the marginalizing effect the use of irony has for Socrates in opposition to hegel’s limited and reductive concept of Socrates’ mundane irony.12 In his reflections on the reversibility of Kierkegaard’s irony Bøggild interestingly points out that the notoriously difficult final chapter of Kierkegaard’s dissertation is highly polyphonic.13 In his final chapter of the first part Bøggild meditates on the affinities between the romantic irony of Friedrich von Schlegel and that of Kierkegaard and concludes that irony for Kierkegaard is not just a trope or figure, but “the missing ground—a condition.”14 reading Kierkegaard demands an ever present acknowledgment of the marginal, though decisive effect of irony. in the second part, “marginality,” bøggild sets out to explore how Kierkegaard positions himself in the margins in some of his first pseudonymous works Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Repetition and the latter Two Minor Ethical-Religious Essays. bøggild divides the second part into three chapters that deal with aesthetic, ethical and religious marginalization. in dealing with aesthetic marginalization bøggild pays nuanced attention to Kierkegaard’s concept of “the art of writing posthumous papers.” bøggild emphasizes the inherent idea of the marginal in Kierkegaard’s thinking on genre and the relationship between writer and text. indirectly opposed to the stereotypical understanding of Kierkegaard as misogynist, bøggild discusses Kierkegaard’s representations of woman/women in terms of ethical marginalization and sees their positive valorization in the author’s works, especially Fear and Trembling, as an ethical protection of the singular individual. interpreting religious marginalization, bøggild discusses the concept of the martyr in relation to Socrates, bøggild, Ironiens tænker: Tænkningens ironi—Kierkegaard læst retorisk, pp. 104–5. F.J. billeskov Jansen, Studier i Søren Kierkegaards litterære Kunst, copenhagen: rosenkilde and bagger 1951, p. 17. 12 bøggild, Ironiens tænker: Tænkningens ironi—Kierkegaard læst retorisk, p. 44. 13 ibid., p. 67. 14 ibid., p. 88. 10 11

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Kierkegaard himself and his pseudonym h.h., author of the piece “does a human being have the right to Let himself be put to death for the truth?” bøggild concludes that no stable fixture can be established when dealing with the controversial question of the possibility of becoming a martyr in Kierkegaard’s writings. In Part Three, “Reversibility,” Bøggild presents reversibility as a defining feature of Kierkegaardian dialectics. there is no hegelian Aufhebung of opposites, but endless reversibility in Kierkegaard’s thinking. In the opening chapter Bøggild finds a parallelism between the concept of irony in the dissertation and the concept of anxiety as vigilius haufniensis presents it in The Concept of Anxiety. both concepts involve seduction, the dizzying sense of a fall and a loss of control. one of the most valuable contributions to Kierkegaard research is bøggild’s readings of the figure of the chiasmus, which works on the textual level, as witnessed by Bøggild’s numerous examples of them in Kierkegaard’s writings, but also plays a crucial part in Kierkegaard’s version of true christianity, the paradox. bøggild’s highlighting of the intricacies of the chiasmus is a real help in understanding the rhetorical dynamism in Kierkegaard’s authorship, the unstoppable crossings between antithetical positions. bøggild’s last section is called “the point of view” and refers to Kierkegaard’s famous presentation of his own authorship The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Direct Communication, Report to History, published posthumously in 1859. bøggild argues that the text contains quite a few not so straightforward ironies and cannot be read as an autobiographical confession. bøggild ends his study by reflecting on Kierkegaard’s authorship as a great linguistic gift, but also a gift of a rather negative kind that contains the power to shake the reader’s certainty of her or his own identity. bøggild’s study is, together with Joakim garff’s Den Søvnløse,15 probably the most important work to emerge from the danish tradition of deconstructive readings of Kierkegaard. while garff’s study is closely related to the autobiographical relationship between Kierkegaard and regine, bøggild is more concerned with Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous stance as a maieutic christian writer. this stance necessarily involves a kind of writerly marginality, a sort of positioning of the authorial identity in a hidden place. bøggild’s demonstration of the importance of the chiastic and the marginal in Kierkegaard’s authorship remains valuable today as a penetrating interpretation of his incognito. mads Sohl Jessen

Joakim garff, “Den Søvnløse.” Kierkegaard læst æstetisk/biografisk, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1995.

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reviews and critical discussions hoffmeyer, mikkeline blatt, review in Reception, vol. 50, 2003, pp. 65–8. Kjældgaard, Lasse horne, “anvendt ironi, ironisk anvendt,” Politiken, book section, February 22, 2003, p. 7. Lindhardt, Jan, “Kierkegaards ironi,” Præsteforeningens blad, vol. 93 no. 12, 2003, pp. 240–2. Sellars, roy, “Kierkegaards ironier,” Kultur & Klasse, vol. 34, no. 101, 2006, pp. 203–6. tullberg, Steen, “more than meets the eye: on the danish reception of On the Concept of Irony,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2009, pp. 355–72. wennerscheid, Sophie, review in Skandinavistik, no. 34, 2004, pp. 174–5.

Jørgen bukdahl, Søren Kierkegaard og den menige mand [Søren Kierkegaard and the common man], copenhagen: munksgaards Forlag 1961 (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets populære Skrifter, nos. 9–10), 125 pp.

Jørgen bukdahl (1896–1982) was a lecturer and popular educator whose broad interests ranged from philosophy and religion to art and politics. the book under review grew out of a series of lectures held, quite likely around the 1950s, at the Søren Kierkegaard Society in copenhagen.1 the work was originally published at munksgaard in copenhagen in 1961, and a second edition followed in 1970,2 and a third edition in 1996.3 an english translation appeared in 2001.4 Søren Kierkegaard og den menige mand can be said to be a gem of a book, be it in terms of its methodology, style, erudition and, perhaps more fundamentally, (reading) fluency, as well as in terms of its fortune, in the sense of being a most important forerunner of socio-political studies related to the work of Kierkegaard. actually bukdahl’s book can be said to operate on at least two different levels: the first being that of its explicit thesis, and the second in the sense of advancing a group of methodological issues, which only with the passing of time would become acknowledged as important innovations. on the level of its explicit thesis, Søren Kierkegaard og den menige mand goes against the (then) established readings of Kierkegaard as an either apolitical or wholly individualist—in the sense of solipsistic—thinker.5 bukdahl quite convincingly 1 See Jørgen bukdahl, Søren Kierkegaard og den menige mand, copenhagen: munskgaards Forlag 1961 (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets populære Skrifter, nos. 9–10), p. 119; he himself does not mention when these lectures took place, though. 2 Jørgen bukdahl, Søren Kierkegaard og den menige mand, copenhagen: gyldendal 1970. 3 Jørgen bukdahl, Søren Kierkegaard og den menige mand, copenhagen: c. a. reitzels Forlag 1996. 4 Jørgen bukdahl, Søren Kierkegaard and the Common Man, trans. by bruce h. Kirmmse, grand rapids, michigan and cambridge, uK: william b. eerdmans publishing company 2001. 5 compare, for instance, with rohde’s introductory essay on Kierkegaard, produced around the same period and in the same context of bukdahl’s lectures and then book; indeed, rohde compares at one point Kierkegaard with Karl marx (bukdahl would do the same in his book, reaching completely different results, though; see more on this below), claiming then

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demonstrates the presence of a leitmotiv operating in Kierkegaard’s works from at least the Concluding Unscientific Postscript up to the very last issue of The Moment. this leitmotiv is specifically a “solidarisk engagement”6 on Kierkegaard’s part in relation to the “common man,” that is, to that part of humanity usually described in tracts of political philosophy or theory as either “the people” or, in a more rousseauian-marxist terminology, “the poor.” on the second and more profound level, Søren Kierkegaard og den menige mand is also quite interesting as well as important on account of its approach. bukdahl, displaying an enormous amount of knowledge concerning so-called golden age denmark, can be said to have been one of the very first Kierkegaard scholars to seriously invest in a contextual reading of the latter’s work; this, in turn, means that the Kierkegaard that comes to the surface in this book is, then, an author totally enmeshed in his own times, both shaping and being shaped by the general tendencies at work within his society, be they literary, political, or theological. bukdahl applies his erudition to inform the very structure of his book, as one can see from the titles of its chapters: (1) “Internal Self-Definition” (pp. 7–10); (2) “the way to myth and Fairy tale” (pp. 11–21); (3) “the Shadow of Lindberg” (pp. 22–8); (4) “the home on nytorv and the [religious] awakenings” (pp. 29–51); (5) “cultivation and [its] coteries” (pp. 52–64); (6) “the wise and the Simple” (pp. 65–73); (7) “reality’s trial by Fire” (pp. 74–99); (8) “the moment and the common man” (pp. 100–116); (9) “envoi” (pp. 117–18) and (10) “a crumb of a postscript” (pp. 119–21). indeed, since the work is as much a history of nineteenthcentury danish society as of Kierkegaard’s developing productivity within it, bukdahl pays close attention to the way different tendencies in the realms of literature, theology, economy, and politics came together in the broad struggle to emancipate the “common man” from the oppression the latter had been subjected to since times immemorial. as such, he starts with the years of romanticism (with henrik Steffens being acknowledged as a major source in terms of Kierkegaard’s appropriation of this movement). this is followed by a description in chapter 3 of the important figure of Jacob Christian Lindberg (1797–1857) and his theologicopolitical campaign in the 1830s for the emancipation of the “common man,” a campaign which would be taken up by Kierkegaard later in his production and which, consequently, makes of the latter a kind of heir of the former. the following chapters focus on, respectively, the relation the family Kierkegaard maintained towards the different strands of religious “awakening” movements (i.e., Lindberg as opposed to Grundtvig, and these two in turn as opposed to the official theology embodied in the State-church amalgam) (chapter 4); the tense relations Kierkegaard maintained throughout his authorship towards the “coteries of the cultivated,” embodied in turn in the figures of Heiberg, Mynster, and Martensen (Chapter 5); the “underground” social issues already present in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, i.e., the issue of “simplicity” as a first form of acknowledgment of the “common man” (Chapter that Kierkegaard, in contrast to marx, “accepted—and turned away from the affairs of this world” (peter p. rohde, Søren Kierkegaard. Et Geni i en Købstad, copenhagen: gyldendal 1962, p. 9). 6 bukdahl, Søren Kierkegaard og den menige mand, p. 121.

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6); the importance of the so-called “Corsair affair” in terms of Kierkegaard’s production, i.e., his “transformation” into a more and more fierce or outspoken “social critic” from this moment onwards (chapter 7). all of this culminates in chapter 8, which is devoted to the last years of Kierkegaard’s production and, thus, to his final attack on the church as it crystallized in his newspaper writings. Chapters 9 and 10 are of secondary interest only inasmuch as they function as a kind of coda (chapter 9, notably; chapter 10 being nothing but a postface). the book is then foremost about the gradual emergence of a social consciousness on the part of Kierkegaard as his production developed, particularly from the “Corsair affair” onwards. actually, this is only one of the book’s theses, which in turn means that there are many others, some either doubtful7 or problematic,8 others quite interesting as well as insightful. Steen tullberg has correctly spoken of the “combination of insight and passion” present in this work,9 while bruce Kirmmse has summed up both the wealth and complexity of bukdahl’s book quite nicely when he said that it “placed Kierkegaard splendidly in his times and provided a welcome respite from the ahistorical caricatures that had dominated the scene.”10 gabriel guedes rossatti

Such as the approximation between Kierkegaard and marx. bukdahl claims that, given the growing tendency against cultivation and the bourgeois upper class in favor of the people in Kierkegaard’s works from the Concluding Unscientific Postscript onwards, “Kierkegaard was more in step with the european revolution than anyone else in denmark… and to this extent one can say that he was on the same wavelength as marx and engels.” but then he continues: “nonetheless, from the very beginning he turned his back on mass political uprisings unless they were built on a revolutionary foundation that required each individual in the mass to relate to himself, as an individual, passionately to a shared and unifying idea” (bukdahl, Søren Kierkegaard og den menige mand, pp. 94–5). i sincerely doubt whether marx and engels would have seen Kierkegaard as one of “theirs,” since for them the notions of “revolution” and “class consciousness” were the sine qua non from which the communist form of society would spring up. 8 bukdahl does not question Kierkegaard’s own assumptions as regards his “social” position, i.e., he does not challenge the effectiveness of a strictly Christian approach to the “poverty issue” as embodied in the works or position of Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard’s— christian—approach to this issue may be seen as nothing other than (ineffective) “good will,” in the sense of, in Kierkegaard’s own words, providing “humane…consolation and gentleness” towards the “common man” (Kierkegaard quoted by bukdahl, Søren Kierkegaard og den menige mand, p. 86; doubts regarding Kierkegaard’s social consciousness have been voiced by Kresten nordentoft, “Hvad Siger Brand-Majoren?” Kierkegaards opgør med sin samtid, copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1973, p. 86). 9 Steen tullberg, “denmark: the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), p. 71. 10 bruce Kirmmse, “translator’s preface and acknowledgments,” in bukdahl, Søren Kierkegaard and the Common Man, p. viii. 7

reviews and critical discussions burgess, andrew, review of the english translation in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 23, 2004, pp. 228–31. cruysberghs, paul, Johan taels, and Karl verstrynge, “descriptive bibliography: recent Kierkegaard Literature: 2000–2004,” Tidschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 67, no. 4, 2005, pp. 767–814; see p. 773. Fenger, henning, review in Politiken, June 1, 1970. Kirmmse, bruce h., “translator’s preface and acknowledgments,” in Jørgen bukdahl, Søren Kierkegaard and the Common Man, trans. by bruce h. Kirmmse, grand rapids, michigan and cambridge, uK: william b. eerdmans publishing company 2001, pp. vii–ix. Kjær, holger, review in Berlingske Aftenavis, June 30, 1970. Kruuse, Jens, review in Jyllands-Posten, may 24, 1970. Lauer, dean, review of the english translation in Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review, vol. 43, 2004, pp. 175–7. Lauridsen, Johannes, review in Tidehverv, vol. 44, 1970, pp. 91–2. Lavoie, mathieu, review of the english translation in Laval Théologique et Philosophique, vol. 59, 2003, pp. 169–70. Lindhardt, p.g., review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4, 1962, pp. 116–17. malantschuk, gregor, review in Orbis Litterarum, vol. 18, 1963, pp. 91–3. perkins, robert L., review of the english translation in International Studies in Philosophy, vol. 35, 2003, pp. 181–2. ramløv, preben, review in Kristeligt Dagblad, July 14, 1970. thyssen, a. pontoppidan, review in Aarhuus Stiftstidende, may 20, 1970. tullberg, Steen, “denmark: the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), p. 71. walsh, Sylvia, review of the english translation in Philosophia Christi, vol. 4, 2002, pp. 585–7. wirth, Jason m., review of the english translation in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 57, 2003, pp. 387–9.

niels Jørgen cappelørn, Joakim garff, and Johnny Kondrup, Skriftbilleder. Søren Kierkegaards journaler, notesbøger, hæfter, ark, lapper og strimler [written images: Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals, notebooks, booklets, Sheets, Scraps, and Slips of paper], copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1996, 176 pp.

the work Skriftbilleder was published in 1996 by g.e.c. gad,1 the same publishing house that produced the new critical edition of Kierkegaard’s writings, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. in 2003 the well-known Kierkegaard scholar bruce h. Kirmmse published an english translation of this work with the title, Written Images: Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals, Notebooks, Booklets, Sheets, Scraps, and Slips of Paper.2 this translation appeared with princeton university press, the well-known publisher responsible for the hong translations and the new series, Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks. Kirmmse’s translation of Skriftbilleder follows more or less exactly the pagination and layout of the danish text, and thus this makes it easy to go back and forth between the original work and the english translation. the goals and nature of this work are closely connected with the context in which it arose. in 1994 the Søren Kierkegaard research centre at the university of copenhagen was established with a major grant from the danish national research Foundation. one of the main goals of the centre was to create the abovementioned critical edition of Kierkegaard’s writings. while previous collected works had broken up the material, this was to be the first collected edition of Kierkegaard’s corpus 1 niels Jørgen cappelørn, Joakim garff, and Johnny Kondrup, Skriftbilleder. Søren Kierkegaards journaler, notesbøger, hæfter, ark, lapper og strimler, copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1996. 2 niels Jørgen cappelørn, Joakim garff, and Johnny Kondrup, Written Images: Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals, Notebooks, Booklets, Sheets, Scraps, and Slips of Paper, trans. by bruce h. Kirmmse, princeton: princeton university press 2003.

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that contained the published works, the journals and notebooks, and the letters and documents. one of the main features of the new edition was the radical reorganization of the journals and notebooks. the old Papirer edition had in effect destroyed the continuity of Kierkegaard’s Nachlass by taking the individual journal entries out of their original contexts and reassembling them in an effort to create an absolute chronology and to organize the material in terms of certain thematic categories, such as theology, philosophy, and aesthetics. by contrast, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter proposed to restore Kierkegaard’s journals and notebooks to their original condition, so that the reader could see how his ideas developed. while the reproduction of the published works in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter did not, on the face of it, seem to offer much that was new, by contrast, the reproduction of the journals and notebooks seemed to promise something entirely different from the previous editions, virtually new Kierkegaard texts. it was in anticipation of the publication of the journals and notebooks in their new form in the new edition that the work Skriftbilleder was published. it was coauthored by three danish scholars who were intimately involved in the creation of the centre and the new danish edition: niels Jørgen cappelørn, Joakim garff, and Johnny Kondrup. all three were employed at the then new centre in different capacities, and all three were coeditors of Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. Johnny Kondrup was at the time the head of the philological department at the centre, while Joakim garff was in charge of the commentaries for the edition. niels Jørgen cappelørn was the director of the centre. Skriftbilleder was thus intended to cast a spotlight on Kierkegaard’s Nachlass, a part of the authorship, which traditionally had been generally neglected in Kierkegaard studies. The goal was to promote and profile this material in the new edition, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. the philologists at the centre were at the time working with the original manuscripts, and the authors wanted to give the reader a glimpse of this material, which was otherwise locked away in the Kierkegaard archive at the royal Library in copenhagen. So in addition to the narrative descriptions of the material, Skriftbilleder also contains a number of color pictures of the Kierkegaard’s manuscripts, journals, and notebooks and gives the reader a good sense of the kind of materials that are at issue. the illustrations clearly constitute one of the most successful aspects of the book, and this is hardly surprising since it was primarily conceived as a picture book. this aspect of the work no doubt played a central role in its being selected to be exhibited, along with other works, at the annual exhibition of the Society for book handwork in denmark in 1996. chapters 1 and 2 tell the story of the Nachlass. the journals and papers were discovered by Kierkegaard’s nephew Henrik Lund (1825–89), who was the first to catalogue them. they were eventually sent by Lund’s father to Kierkegaard’s elder brother peter christian Kierkegaard (1805–88), who was then bishop in aalborg. p.c. Kierkegaard published two of what appeared to be complete texts in the mass of posthumous material, that is, The Point of View for My Activity as an Author (1859) and Judge for Yourselves! (1876). he then handed over the job of editing the rest of his brother’s posthumous writings to hans peter barfod (1834–92), who was a jurist and newspaper editor without formal training in philology. after completing a detailed and exhaustive catalogue of Kierkegaard’s journals and papers, barfod, from

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1869 to 1877, published the first three volumes of this material in an edition simply called Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. barfod’s work was continued by the German philologist Hermann Gottsched, who published the last five volumes of the edition from 1879 to 1881.3 Skriftbilleder describes the mixed reception of the barfod–gottsched edition and gives the reader an insight into the problematic reputation that Kierkegaard had in denmark in the decades following his death.4 the account of the reception of this first edition of the journals seems to rely heavily on aage Kabell’s account in Kierkegaardstudiet i Norden; indeed, Skriftbilleder quotes exactly the same passages from contemporary reviews as Kabell does.5 after the death of p.c. Kierkegaard the Nachlass was transferred to the university Library and later to the royal Library, where it resides today. chapter 3, which constitutes the heart of the book, attempts to give the reader a sense of the nature and size of the material that is included in Kierkegaard’s Nachlass: the drafts of the published and unpublished works, the journals and notebooks, letters, biographical documents, loose papers, and the books from Kierkegaard’s own private library. it describes in meticulous detail how these materials are stored at the Kierkegaard archive at the danish royal Library. this is a clearly written overview, filled with anecdotes drawn from the materials. These include stories about regine olsen and Johan Ludvig heiberg that make for entertaining reading. there is an interesting discussion about Kierkegaard’s graphology or handwriting, which changed considerably through the years. an account is also given of the poor state of some of the materials due to the barbarous practices of barfod, who did his editorial work directly on the manuscripts, which he then submitted to the printer. this led to difficulties for later philologists, who could not distinguish between Barfod’s editorial comments and Kierkegaard’s own additions and corrections. even worse was the fact that after the materials were printed, Kierkegaard’s original manuscripts were discarded and lost, presumably at the printers. h.p. barfod (ed.), Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1833–1843, copenhagen: c.a. reitzels Forlag 1869. Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1844–1846, copenhagen: c.a. reitzels Forlag 1872. Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1847, copenhagen: c.a. reitzels Forlag 1877. h. gottsched (ed.), Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1848, copenhagen: c.a. reitzels Forlag 1880. Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1849, copenhagen: c.a. reitzels Forlag 1880. Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1850, copenhagen: c.a. reitzels Forlag 1880. Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1851–53, copenhagen: c.a. reitzels Forlag 1881. Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1854–55, copenhagen: c.a. reitzels Forlag 1881. For an account of this edition, see Steen tullberg, “b. the edition: Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer (1869–1881),” in his article, “denmark: the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2008 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 9–12. 4 Some of this material is recounted in the introduction to Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, vols. 1–11, ed. by niels Jørgen cappelørn, et al., princeton and oxford: princeton university press 2007ff., vol. 1, pp. vii–xv. 5 See cappelørn, et al. Skriftbilleder, pp. 53ff. aage Kabell, Kierkegaardstudiet i Norden, copenhagen: h. hagerrup 1948, pp. 124ff. 3

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The fourth and final chapter departs somewhat from the topic of the Nachlass and provides a sketch of Kierkegaard’s personal habits as a writer in general. this account could apply equally well to his published works and his Nachlass and thus has nothing intrinsically to do with the latter. here Kierkegaard’s obsession for writing, which resulted in his immense productivity, is explored. Further, entertaining accounts are given of his somewhat idiosyncratic work habits and of his relations to his personal secretaries, peter wilhelm christensen (1819–63) and israel Levin (1810–83). Finally, Kierkegaard’s relation to his writing tools is explored; this analysis reveals that he was very meticulous in his use of high quality paper and ink. Skriftbilleder is not a piece of critical research but rather aims merely to introduce the Nachlass in an accessible manner. it certainly succeeds in this goal, which is an important one given the fact that this part of the authorship remains not so well known even by scholars. Skriftbilleder is readable and informative for both the Kierkegaard specialist and the layman. one irritating feature about the work is that for some of the direct quotations it provides no references, leaving it to the reader to find the source.6 it is now some twenty years since the publication of Skriftbilleder, and some years after the publication of the journals and notebooks in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. at present the journals and notebooks are being translated into several major languages such as english, german, and French. despite all of this, sustained research interest in Kierkegaard’s Nachlass has still not yet materialized, at least not in the way that it could be hoped.7 researchers have still not taken up the Nachlass as an independent object of study, and the journals and notebooks continue to be used in a rather limited and ad hoc fashion in more or less the same way that they used to be back in the days of the Papirer edition. in this sense Skriftbilleder, despite its many virtues, has not produced any major resonance in the international research. nonetheless it is still a useful and informative book that belongs in the library of anyone seriously interested in Kierkegaard. Jon Stewart

See, for example, cappelørn, et al. Skriftbilleder, p. 30, p. 36. admittedly, the journals and notebooks were made the thematic topic of the Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook for 2003, but this journal is an organ of the Søren Kierkegaard research centre, and the selection of this theme can be seen as a part of the same general campaign to bring into focus this part of the authorship as the production of Skriftbilleder itself. one should also mention the recent work by Johnny Kondrup, which can be seen as a further development of the material presented in Skriftbilleder. See Johnny Kondrup, “Les manuscrits de Søren Kierkegaard,” Genesis. Manuscrits, recherche, invention, vol. 34, 2012, pp. 173–86.

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reviews and critical discussions dalton, Stuart, review of the english translation in Philosophy in Review, vol. 24, 2004, pp. 15–17. Jaurnow, Leon, review in Bogens Verden, 1997, pp. 41–3. Kingo, anders, review in Præsteforeningens Blad, no. 5, January 31, 1997, pp. 118– 19. møllehave, Johannes, “pennens dans over siderne,” Kristeligt Dagblad, november 28, 1996. pattison, george, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 19, 1998, pp. 151–2. Schroeder, Steven, review of the english translation in Essays in Philosophy: A Biannual Journal, vol. 6, no. 1, 2005, article 28 (no page numbers). Stewart, Jon, “the reception of Kierkegaard’s Nachlaß in the english-Speaking world,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2003, pp. 277–315; see pp. 279–80. tøjner, poul erik, “70.000 favne papir,” Weekendavisen, november 22, 1996. van der Liet, henk, review in Tijdschrift voor Skandinavistiek, vol. 18, no. 1, 1997, pp. 101–7.

henning Fenger, Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder. 9 kildekritiske studier i de kierkegaardske papirer, breve og aktstykker [Kierkegaard myths and Kierkegaard Sources: 9 Source-critical Studies in Kierkegaard’s papers, Letters and documents], odense: odense universitetsforlag 1976 (Odense University Studies in Scandinavian Languages and Literatures, vol. 7), 286 pp.

henning Fenger (1921–85) was an outstanding danish literary scholar, who, after holding lectureships in the Sorbonne and cambridge, returned to denmark, where he was professor at aarhus university from 1966 to 1972 and odense university from 1972 to 1974. his Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder was published in 1976.1 It was translated into English by George C. Schoolfield and published in 1980 under the title Kierkegaard: The Myths and their Origins. Studies in the Kierkegaardian Papers and Letters.2 the english translation takes some liberties with the title of the work, which in the original was simply “Kierkegaard myths and Kierkegaard Sources.” but the english title is better at conveying the actual content of the work than the original danish title. this translation for whatever reason omits the long final chapter entitled “P.L. Møller, H.P. Holst and Søren Kierkegaard until 1843.”3 Fenger’s book is a rather unusual one in that it is one of the very few works in the secondary literature dedicated not to one of Kierkegaard’s well-known published works but rather to his journals, notebooks, and Nachlass. Fenger’s study is somewhat technical and presupposes a certain degree of familiarity with the material. moreover, it goes into a number of philological issues in order to criticize

henning Fenger, Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder, odense: odense universitetsforlag 1976. 2 henning Fenger, Kierkegaard: The Myths and their Origins, trans. by george c. Schoolfield, New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1980. 3 Fenger, Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder, pp. 171–254. 1

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the editors of the Papirer edition4 as well as niels thulstrup’s reprint.5 despite its short length and general readability, this work is somewhat difficult to get a handle on. Fenger’s analyses, although interesting, are somewhat rambling, and it is not always so easy to discern the main issue. in his preface Fenger does not state in any very clear terms what the book is actually about; indeed, he does not even mention the Nachlass. It is only at the end of the first chapter that one learns that his goal is to explore “the extent to which the papers of the young Kierkegaard are fiction.”6 this can be regarded as the theme that runs through the entire work, although it drops out of sight periodically. Fenger’s thesis is that many of the entries in the journals and notebooks are in fact fictional sketches and thus should not be taken as historically or biographically factual. he uses this intuition to reexamine critically a number of hobbyhorses and standard views in Kierkegaard research. The general thesis of his first chapter, entitled “Kierkegaard as a Falsifier of history,” seems to be something to the effect that Kierkegaard intentionally attempted to lead his readers astray. in trying to make this claim, Fenger discusses a number of quite diverse topics, moving from the one to the other without any clear transitions. This thesis is, of course, rather general and does not specifically concern the Nachlass, although, to be sure, Fenger thinks that Kierkegaard attempts to mislead future readers of the Nachlass in much the same way that his pseudonyms in the published works attempt to confuse and mislead. the genuine discussion of the Nachlass itself begins in chapter 2, “Kierkegaard’s papers and Library.” here Fenger critically discusses the two main danish editions of the posthumous material. he is quite critical of the Papirer for the way in which the editors have rendered their edition difficult to use due to their reorganization of the material. Somewhat surprisingly, he defends the old barfod–gottsched edition,7 arguing that the editorial principles employed there were less heavy-handed and created a more coherent and readable text. Fenger’s chapter 3 treats the many, often far-fetched theories concerning Kierkegaard’s outward appearance as well as his physical and mental health. while one can occasionally find in the Nachlass complaints about specific ailments and vast amounts of material for psychological conjecture, Fenger seems primarily concerned with the secondary literature on the topic and with contemporary secondhand reports about Kierkegaard’s person. thus, this chapter does not make a careful study of any part of the Nachlass and seems not really to have much to do with it. this makes it stand out somewhat from the rest of the work. Fenger’s long chapter 4 is probably the best in the book and seems to represent his main argument with regard to the Nachlass. here he analyzes the famous 4 Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vols. i–Xi.3, ed. by peter andreas heiberg, victor Kuhr. and einer torsting, copenhagen: gyldendal 1909–48. 5 Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vols. i–Xi.3, ed. by peter andreas heiberg, victor Kuhr and einer torsting, 2nd supplemented edition by niels thulstrup, vols. Xii–Xiii, copenhagen: gyldendal 1968–70. 6 Fenger, Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder, p. 33 (Kierkegaard: The Myths and their Origins, p. 31). 7 Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer, vols. 1–9, ed. by hans peter barfod and hermann gottsched, copenhagen: c.a. reitzels Forlag 1869–81.

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gilleleje entries in the Journal AA, where Kierkegaard tells of his summer in north zealand and of his various excursions. Fenger’s argument is that these entries, some of which appear explicitly in the form of letters, are in fact a sketch for a novel in the form of letters. he argues that Kierkegaard had a number of contemporary models for this kind of work in goethe’s The Sufferings of Young Werder, Frederik christian Sibbern’s Efterladte Breve af Gabrielis, and various works by the danish poet and novelist Steen Steensen blicher (1782–1848). he claims further that these sketches are echoed in the “diapsalmata” in Either/Or and that these attempts in the genre of an epistolary novel can be seen as the forerunner to “guilty?/not guilty?” from Stages on Life’s Way. this claim is interesting since if Fenger is correct, then this interpretation would seem to imply that most all of the Gilleleje entries have a fictional element and thus cannot be read, as they almost invariably are, as autobiographical. Fenger is further highly critical of the editors of the Papirer edition for what he regards as the dubious dates that they assign to some of the entries.8 whether or not one ultimately agrees with Fenger in every detail is not important. the value of his provocative argument is that it enjoins the researcher and the philologist to caution when working with this material, which can no longer be taken at face value as straightforwardly autobiographical. in chapter 5 Fenger is concerned with refuting the main lines of niels thulstrup’s Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel.9 although there are a few pages at the beginning of the chapter that discuss the gilleleje entries and try to build on the analysis from the previous chapter,10 and although there are also brief accounts of “the battle between the old and the new Soap-cellars” from the Journal DD and the posthumous work, Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, this chapter is not primarily concerned with the Nachlass. Fenger’s highly justifiable criticism is aimed at thulstrup’s undifferentiated view that Kierkegaard had a uniformly negative relation to hegel throughout his career. Fenger’s thesis is that there are many signs that the young Kierkegaard in fact had a very positive view of hegel, and when the actual break came, it had less to do with hegel’s philosophy than with heiberg’s negative review of Either/Or in 1843.11 Fenger’s thesis is more suggestive than it is carefully worked out and documented. but it is entirely correct in its essentials and represents a refreshing corrective to thulstrup’s simplistic, caricatured picture. Some of Fenger’s insights can be said to anticipate some of the later research on the topic of hegel and Kierkegaard. the short chapter 6 is dedicated to the story of Kierkegaard’s much discussed relation to regine olsen. Fenger draws on some of the famous journal entries from Fenger, Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder, pp. 74–5; pp. 80ff. (Kierkegaard: The Myths and their Origins, pp. 86–7; pp. 93ff.). 9 niels thulstrup, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846, copenhagen: gyldendal 1967. in english: Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george L. Stengren, princeton: princeton university press 1980. 10 Fenger, Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder, pp. 109–11 (Kierkegaard: The Myths and their Origins, pp. 133–5). 11 Johan Ludvig heiberg, “Litterær vintersæd,” Intelligensblade, vol. 2, no. 24, march 1, 1843, pp. 285–92. See Fenger, Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder, p. 121 (Kierkegaard: The Myths and their Origins, p. 147). 8

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AA and EE, which seem to concern this relation, and tries to raise the suspicion that they too might be fictional. Unfortunately, this chapter is not very developed, and Fenger’s claims remain merely interesting suggestions for future research. chapter 7 concerns Kierkegaard’s trip to Jutland in the summer of 1840, which he recorded in the Notebook 5 and 6. here Fenger argues precisely as he did in chapter 4 regarding the trip to gilleleje and north zealand: he inveighs against the editors of the Papirer (who print the material in Pap. iii a 14–84) for taking these entries as historically and biographically veridical. by contrast, he claims Kierkegaard made this journey in part to collect material and ideas for his epistolary novel, again with the inspiration of blicher.12 Fenger thus challenges the datings of the entries, often in a rather technical way, in order to show that they can only be fictive. chapter 8, continuing some of the issues he discussed previously in chapter 6, returns to Kierkegaard’s relation to regine olsen. Fenger attempts to reconstruct Kierkegaard’s correspondence with regine and to follow the ups and downs of the relationship that accompanied it. he tries to argue that these letters from Kierkegaard look forward to “the diary of a Seducer” from Either/Or and “guilty?/not guilty?” from Stages on Life’s Way.13 Further, he draws a parallel between Kierkegaard’s treatment of regine and Johannes the Seducer’s treatment of cordelia.14 chapter 9, which does not appear in the english translation, is by far the longest chapter in the book. it concerns the young Kierkegaard’s relations to peder Ludvig møller (1814–65) and hans peter holst (1811–93). Fenger treats critically the claim, originally put forth by Frithiof brandt,15 that Kierkegaard used the allegedly reprobate møller as a model for the character of Johannes the Seducer in Either/Or. Fenger shows that there is precious little evidence to back up this view. the rest of the chapter deals with the writer hans peter holst, who was one of Kierkegaard’s fellow pupils at the School of civic virtue. this is a highly readable and interesting book in many ways, although it is too poorly organized and presupposes too much prior knowledge to be a useful introduction for beginners. its merits are primarily its lack of deference for much of the Kierkegaard secondary literature and the refreshing way in which it calls into question a number of standard views in the research. moreover, Fenger, in his willingness to criticize Kierkegaard’s positions and person, represents a highly useful opposition to the many Kierkegaard apologists of the era, not least of all niels thulstrup. with regard to the book’s main thesis about Kierkegaard’s purported epistolary novel, it must be said that Fenger does not adequately prove his case.16 he does, however, explore in a highly interesting manner what the potentially far12 Fenger, Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder, pp. 140ff. (Kierkegaard: The Myths and their Origins, pp. 173ff.). 13 Fenger, Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder, p. 161 (Kierkegaard: The Myths and their Origins, p. 200). 14 Fenger, Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder, pp. 165ff. (Kierkegaard: The Myths and their Origins, pp. 204ff.). 15 See Frithiof brandt, Den unge Søren Kierkegaard. En række nye bidrag, copenhagen: Levins & munksgaards Forlag 1929. 16 See the discussion in Søren bruun and Jette Knudsen, “critical account of the text” to Journal AA in SKS K17, 18–21 / KJN 1, 301–5.

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reaching consequences of such a view might be if it were taken to be proven. in a sense the bulk of the book is about drawing out these consequences, whereas Fenger’s case would have been better served if he had concentrated his energies on proving the original claim. Jon Stewart

reviews and critical discussions andreasen, uffe, review in Danske Studier, 1978, pp. 165–7. dewey, bradley, review of the english translation in Scandinavian Studies, vol. 54, 1982, pp. 173–5. brunius, teddy, review in Lier en boeg, vol. 2, 1976–77, p. 204. dunning, Stephen n., review of the english translation in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 50, no. 1, 1982, pp. 141–2. gill, Jerry h., review of the english translation in Theology Today, vol. 38, no. 2, 1981, pp. 270–1. greve, wilfried, review of the english translation in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 65, 1983, pp. 331–7. Jensen, povl Johannes, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 11, 1980, pp. 217–23. Koller, Kerry J., review of the english translation in Notre Dame English Journal, vol. 14, no. 2, 1982, pp. 161–3. norris, christopher, The Deconstructive Turn: Essays in the Rhetoric of Philosophy, London and new york: methuen press 1983, pp. 174–8. Sløk, Johannes, review in Dansk teologisk Tidsskrift, vol. 40, 1977, pp. 120–7. Stengren, george, review of the english translation in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 9, 1983, pp. 8–11. Stenström, thure, review in Samlaren, vol. 98, 1977, pp. 174–6. Stewart, Jon, “the reception of Kierkegaard’s Nachlaß in the english-Speaking world,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2003, pp. 277–315; see pp. 280–4. tullberg, Steen, “denmark: the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 3–120; see pp. 75–8.

eduard geismar, Søren Kierkegaard. Hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed, vols. 1–2 [Søren Kierkegaard: his Life and authorship, vols. 1–2], copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1926–28, 147 pp., 150 pp., 116 pp., 136 pp., 111 pp., 128 pp.

eduard geismar was born in 1871 and died in 1939. he was ordained as a pastor in the church of denmark in 1899 and served in different parishes until 1921. he married Lina ella margaretha clara v. przyjemska in 1900. From 1921 to his death, he was professor of Systematic theology at the Faculty of theology of the university of copenhagen. this work is a product of geismar’s intensely personal involvement with the life and authorship of Søren Kierkegaard from the time of his youth,1 which convinced him that “a faith, which is not a basis for action, which is not in effect through your existence, is not faith at all.”2 originally the work was published in six parts which followed one another, and later the parts were collected in two volumes each consisting of three parts. The first part, “Education towards the Call,” deals with Kierkegaard’s relationship to his father, his formal education, his relation to the intellectual movements of his time, and his failed engagement with regine olsen. the second part, “the poet of the Stages,” analyzes Kierkegaard’s so-called “first authorship,” which concluded at the end of 1845, and pays special attention to the pseudonymous Either/Or, Repetition, Fear and Trembling, and Stages on Life’s Way. the third part, “philosophy of Life,” contrasts hegel’s philosophy and view of christianity with Kierkegaard’s, and the there is a translation of this work into german made by geismar himself with the help of his wife: eduard geismar, Søren Kierkegaard. Seine Lebensentwicklung und seine Wirksamkeit als Schriftsteller, göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht 1929. the publication of the lectures delivered by geismar at princeton theological Seminary in the uSa can be considered a condensed form in english of the work under review: eduard geismar, Lectures on the Religious Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, minneapolis: augsburg publishing house 1937. geismar’s lectures in english were reprinted in the following book: The Portable Kierkegaard, ed. by Simon yee, vancouver: emerald Knight 2009. 2 eduard geismar, Søren Kierkegaard. Hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed, vols. 1–2, copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1926–28, part v, p. 50. 1

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pseudonymous Concluding Unscientific Postscript is the most quoted book. the fourth part, “martyr or poet,” starts from the end of 1845 and portrays the slow development of the thoughts which Kierkegaard would assert in his final attack on the church. The fifth part, “The Sole Truth that Builds Up is the One that Humiliates,” undertakes an in-depth study of the christian discourses published from 1847. the sixth part, “the attacker of the church,” is about the attack on the church triggered by martensen’s eulogy to bishop mynster and about Kierkegaard’s death and burial. one of the merits of geismar’s work is that the “whole Kierkegaard literature of the time” is critically read and made “accessible in a coherent popular account”―in particular the biographical studies of p.a. heiberg and the systematic theological work of torsten bohlin.3 geismar shows that neither Kierkegaard’s thoughts nor his beliefs were fully developed at the beginning of his authorship. Little by little, as he put his ideas in writing, they took shape and connected with what was going on in his life and educated him religiously. his broken engagement with regine prompted his engagement with god and was the experience from which would pour edifying thoughts4 as well as the poetic creativity5 for the rest of his life. with deep sympathy for all human beings,6 Kierkegaard would in the “upbuilding” discourses console others with the consolation he had received from god,7 and in the pseudonymous works give life to characters representative of the full diversity of life.8 geismar even claims that regine is the particular reader to whom Kierkegaard wrote Either/Or, Repetition, and Fear and Trembling through his pseudonyms and Two Upbuilding Discourses from 1843 under his own name.9 geismar sums up: “a stream of thoughts which originated from something entirely personal between Kierkegaard and regine, and which in all respects is imbued with personal experiences and conflicts, reaches world-historical dimensions, as it were without the conscious will of the author; only gradually will he realize the significance of it

aage henriksen, Methods and Results of Kierkegaard Studies in Scandinavia: A Historical and Critical Survey, trans. by annie i. Fausbøll, copenhagen: munksgaard 1951, p. 153. the works of p.a. heiberg he refers to are Bidrag til et Psykologisk Billede af Søren Kierkegaard i Barndom og Ungdom, copenhagen: o.b. wroblewski 1895; En Episode i Søren Kierkegaards Ungdomsliv, copenhagen and Kristiania: gyldendal 1912; Et Segment af Søren Kierkegaards Religiøse Udvikling. 1835, 1. Juni til 1838, 19. Maj: Psykologisk Studie, copenhagen and Kristiania: gyldendal 1918; and Søren Kierkegaards Religiøse Udvikling: Psykologisk Mikroskopi, copenhagen: gyldendal 1925. torsten bohlin’s work is Kierkegaards Dogmatiska Åskådning i dess Historiska Sammanhang, Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans diakonistyrelses bokförlag 1925. 4 geismar, Søren Kierkegaard. Hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed I–II, part i, pp. 130–1. 5 ibid., part i, pp. 135–7. 6 ibid., part ii, pp. 20–1. 7 ibid., part i, p. 131. 8 ibid., part i, p. 136. 9 ibid., part i, p. 138; part ii, pp. 6–7; pp. 22–3; pp. 28–44; pp. 51–6; pp. 60–81. 3

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all.”10 The Point of View, completed by Kierkegaard in 1848, is in geismar’s view “a uniquely reliable document.”11 geismar considers that Kierkegaard is “one of the thinkers who with the greatest energy lets the whole of life stem from the relationship with god.”12 religiousness has two layers: the one common to all humankind, which in the Postscript is called “religiousness a,” and the christian, which is called “religiousness b.” geismar insists that, according to Kierkegaard, christianity is adulterated if we want to gain access to it without going through “religiousness a.” a rich spiritual life is possible in the frame of “religiousness a.” it is in the frame of “religiousness a” that we can discover that there is an absolute difference between god and the human being and that we as human beings make the mistake of relating ourselves absolutely to what is only relative which entails suffering and consciousness of guilt. “religiousness a” is already an “act of daring” which “has something of the paradoxical as part of it.”13 “Religiousness B” is the “intensification” of “Religiousness A” which happens when the consciousness of sin brings the believer to grasp in faith the paradox “of something historical which cannot become historical”14 in spite of the possibility of offense. geismar knows that the pseudonym Johannes climacus says in Philosophical Fragments that “the connection with christ is effected exclusively through the news about the paradox,”15 and he also knows that when he became the “attacker of the church,” Kierkegaard arbitrarily set apart certain statements in the new testament and defended the view that christianity required precisely those words to be taken literally as the word of god.16 but geismar is convinced that he reflects the proper view of Kierkegaard when he says that “the life of the Christian is a continuous rhythm between the two kinds of religiousness; the relationship does not come to an end with the transition once and for all.”17 moreover, both the complication and the richness of life depends on the tense interaction between the two forms of religiousness.18 geismar accuses Karl barth and his danish friends who joined together around the periodical Tidehverv of neglecting the necessary tension between these two forms of religiousness.19 geismar holds that it is in the upbuilding discourses that Kierkegaard’s understanding of christianity is to be found,20 with the qualification that the discourses prior to Works of Love, to be accurate, were formulated out of “religiousness a,” corresponding to the fact that Kierkegaard, until 1846, was not in the proper sense of the word “a christian,” but “only in the religious process of becoming one.”21 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

ibid., part iii, p. 7. ibid., part iv, p. 74. ibid., part iii, p. 83. ibid., part iii, p. 71. ibid. ibid., part iii, p. 81. ibid., part vi, pp. 31–3. ibid., part iii, p. 80. ibid., part iii, p. 81; part vi, p. 32. ibid., part vi, pp. 32–3; pp. 112–13. ibid., part v, p. 50. ibid., part v, p. 107.

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Regarding the journals and papers, Geismar says that they reflect Kierkegaard’s changing mind and cannot provide documentary evidence of any of his fundamental ideas.22 but taking care to not speculate where he does not have any knowledge,23 Geismar does make use of the journals and papers in Part I to figure out what Kierkegaard meant regarding his “melancholy” and “the thorn in the flesh.” Geismar adds that when you have thought of something clever and incisive with which to refute him, you will often discover that Kierkegaard has already considered your objection in a journal entry, where he has articulated it clearer than you would have: “No argument has escaped his brilliant reflection.”24 geismar maintains that he as a person was under the grip of Kierkegaard when he chose to marry, to have children, to become a pastor in the church of denmark and to accept a faculty appointment at the university. and since Kierkegaard deliberately made the opposite choices, geismar cannot but ask himself time after time in this work whether an ascetic way of life and a negative relation to this world are integral to Kierkegaard’s thinking.25 geismar cannot give a conclusive answer. he shares Kierkegaard’s rejection of martin Luther’s teaching about the expression of god’s will through the naturally given orders or stations such as ministry, marriage, and secular authority.26 and he confesses that he has not experienced in himself nor seen with certainty in anybody else the new birth after having grown old,27 which the pseudonym constantin constantius called “repetition.”28 but he opts for keeping himself in relationship with christianity, fully aware that it only involves a continuous restlessness,29 because, in the words of Kierkegaard, to which he fully subscribes, “infinite humiliation and grace, and then a striving born of gratitude― this is christianity.”30 as geismar predicted,31 the main criticisms of his work arose among former students and friends involved with the periodical Tidehverv.32 what took him ibid., part v, p. 73. ibid., part i, p. 108. 24 ibid., part v, p. 73. 25 the occasion on which geismar exposes himself to greatest vulnerability is when he imagines a nightly dialogue between himself and the Crucified about how much he is freely willing to sacrifice out of love. See ibid., Part VI, pp. 47–9. 26 ibid., part vi, p. 61. See also paul althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther, philadelphia: Fortress press 1972, p. 36. 27 John 3:4. 28 geismar, Søren Kierkegaard. Hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed I–II, part vi, p. 107. 29 ibid. 30 ibid., part iv, p. 94; part vi, p. 108. SKS 24, 164, nb22:112 / JP 1, 993. 31 geismar, Søren Kierkegaard. Hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed I–II, part vi, p. 112. 32 there is an account in english of the debate originated by geismar’s work in Steen tullberg, “denmark: the permanent reception. 150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 33–40. Jens holger Schjørring (in “barth, geismar, tidehverv,” Dansk Teologisk 22 23

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unawares was the virulence of the criticisms. he was accused of projecting his own ideals and wishes onto his depiction of “religiousness a” and his portrayal of christ, of making the ideals of “religiousness a” surmountable, of being naïve and escapist in the belief that it is possible to cope successfully with the difficulties of existence, of supporting the doctrine of synergism, of having a pietistic ideal of perfection, and of practicing a mental and spiritual exhibitionism. Kristoffer olesen Larsen, in a profound and well-articulated reply,33 denounced geismar as a pseudo-hegelian, who neglected the crucial importance of the decision in the moment.34 none of his critics showed any appreciation for the fact that geismar committed his whole person to the issues addressed in his books (and not least in this work on Kierkegaard), nor for the fact that he was never satisfied or done with any subject.35 geismar was, on the contrary, always receptive to other points of view and tried to give an account of them in a loyal way. his critics also ignored that an ethics without content was as inconceivable to geismar as the possibility of making a decision without bearing the responsibility for previous choices, and that his main matter of concern was not personal perfection, but the danger of nationalism and of another world war,36 the social differences between rich and poor, the fight for justice,37 and the challenge of what he called “modern naturalism,” where a law of necessity rules, which suffocates personal life, makes christianity impossible, ensnares us with the power of what is assumed without question, and pervades the leading thoughts of the time.38 appearing to many in denmark as a failed Kierkegaard scholar, in 1936 geismar traveled to the uSa as a visiting lecturer, giving “a powerful impetus to american Tidsskrift, vol. 39, no. 2, 1976, pp. 73–105) places the debate in the context of the whole authorship of geismar. 33 Kristoffer olesen Larsen, “noget om afgørelsen i Øjeblikket,” in I Ansvar og i Tro. K. Olesen Larsen 1899–1999, vols. 1–2, ed. by peder olesen Larsen, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1999, vol. 1, pp. 115–62. 34 what olesen Larsen understands as “pseudo-hegelianism” is to agree with hegel regarding the divinization of the human, but to demand a moral transformation of existence. See ibid., p. 144. 35 n.h. Søe, Dansk Teologi siden 1900, copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1965, p. 106. 36 it is characteristic of geismar that in 1934 he broke with emanuel hirsch after a long partnership and collaboration in Kierkegaard research that had been able to prevail over certain political disagreements, but could not withstand hirsch’s active support of the nazi regime and much less hirsch’s attempt to integrate Kierkegaard’s ideas into the framework of nazism. See Jens holger Schjørring, “geismar og brunner. nogle sider af diskussionen om den politiske etik i trediverne,” Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift, vol. 39, no. 3, 1976, pp. 166–76; pp. 183–6. See also heiko Schulz, “germany and austria: a modest head Start: the german reception of Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 344–7. in addition, Jens holger Schjørring, Theologische Gewissensethik und Politische Wirklichkeit. Das Beispiel Eduard Geismars und Emanuel Hirschs, göttingen: vandenhoeck und ruprecht 1979. 37 geismar, Søren Kierkegaard. Hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed I-II, part iv, p. 50; part v, pp. 36–9; part vi, p. 46. 38 ibid., part iii, p. 6.

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Kierkegaard scholarship, which was then in its initial stages.”39 those lectures in the uSa were also translated into Japanese as late as 1978 in order to counteract the pervasive influence in Japan of Karl Barth’s biased appropriation of Kierkegaard. andrés roberto albertsen

n.h. Søe, “geismar,” in The Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, copenhagen: reitzel 1981 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8), p. 217. See also note 1 for the details about the publication of his lectures in the uSa. 39

reviews and critical discussions aalders, w.J., review of the german translation in Nieuwe Theologische Studiën, vol. 11, no. 1, 1928, pp. 25–6; vol. 11, no. 8, 1928, pp. 249–50; vol. 12, no. 7–9, 1929, p. 275. alker, e., review of the german translation in Literarischer Handweiser, vol. 66, no. 6, 1930, p. 418. ammundsen, valdemar, review in Kirke og Folk, vol. 3, no. 3, 1927, pp. 73–83; vol. 5, 1929, pp. 46–52 and pp. 71–83. barrett, Lee c., “the uSa: From neo-orthodoxy to plurality,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome iii, The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 233–5 and pp. 244–5. bohlin, torsten, review in Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift, vol. 6, no. 1, 1930, pp. 83–90. bohlin, torsten, review of the german translation in Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, vol. 49, no. 3, 1930, pp. 247–55. bretteville Jensen, S., review in Kirke og Kultur, vol. 33, no. 12, 1926, p. 632; vol. 34, no. 7, 1927, p. 448; vol. 34, no. 12, 1927, pp. 629–31. bukdahl, Jørgen, Tordenvejret og Gentagelsen, copenhagen: gyldendal 1974, pp. 16–47, pp. 155–76. diem, hermann, Die Existenzdialektik von Sören Kierkegaard, zollikon-zurich: evangelischer verlag 1950, § 15 ein zugeständnis, pp. 106–19, and note 18, pp. 135–7. (english translation: Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Existence, trans. by harold Knight, edinburgh: oliver and boyd 1959, chapter 15: “an admission,” pp. 111–24 and appendix 1, pp. 208–11.) Faber, hermann, review of the german translation in Deutsche Literaturzeitung, vol. 49, no. 27, 1928, pp. 1299–1300; vol. 52, no. 16, 1931, pp. 724–6. geismar, eduard, “verdsligt Kald” [reply to hedvig reinhard], Tidehverv, vol. 2, 1928, pp. 117–18. — “dr. reinhard som kritikker,” Tidehverv, vol. 3, 1929, pp. 81–3. — “er Forudsætningen virkelighed? bemærkninger til K. olesen Larsens artikler om S. Kierkegaard i tidehverv 1932,” Tidehverv, vol. 7, no. 1, 1933, pp. 13–14. (reprinted in Søren Kierkegaard læst af K. Olesen Larsen, vols. 1–2, ed. by vibeke olesen Larsen and tage wilhjelm, copenhagen: gad 1966, pp. 74–5.) — “et svar og et spørgsmål” [reply to K. olesen Larsen], Tidehverv, vol. 7, 1933, pp. 50–1. — “Kierkegaard-Studien I–II, by emanuel hirsch [review],” Teologisk Tidsskrift for den Danske Folkekirke, vol. 6, no. 1, 1935, pp. 39–76.

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— [review of emanuel hirsch’s Kierkegaard-Studien –-II], Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, vol. 55, nos. 1–2, 1936, pp. 424–9. gierens, m., review of the german translation in in Scholastik, vol. 5, 1930, pp. 404–6. hackmann, h., review of the german translation in Nieuw Theologisch Tijdschrift, vol. 17, 1928, pp. 86–7 and pp. 162–3; vol. 18, 1929, pp. 62–3 and pp. 382–3; vol. 19, 1930, pp. 165–6. heje, n.i., “i anledning af professor geismars sidste bog,” Tidehverv, vol. 3, 1929, pp. 135–6. henriksen, aage, Methods and Results of Kierkegaard Studies in Scandinavia: A Historical and Critical Survey, trans. by annie i. Fausbøll, copenhagen: munksgaard 1951, pp. 153–6. himmelstrup, Jens, “ ‘den Store Jordrystelse.’ Lidt dansk historik i hovedlinjer,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4, 1962, pp. 18–27. hirsch, emanuel, review in Theologische Literaturzeitung, vol. 52, no. 3, 1927, pp. 60–2. — review of the german translation in Theologische Literaturzeitung, vol. 54, no. 10, 1929, pp. 224–30. hørbo, John w., “guds dom eller menneskets resignation?” Tidehverv, vol. 52, 1978, pp. 25–36. Kochheim, gustav, review of the german translation in Eckart, vol. 4, no. 5, 1928, p. 228; vol. 4, no. 12, 1928, pp. 524–6. Liebert, arthur, review of the german translation in Kantstudien, vol. 38, nos. 3–4, 1933, pp. 452–4. miltitz, monica von, review of the german translation in Die Schöne Literatur, vol. 28, no. 12, 1927, p. 559. olesen Larsen, Kristoffer, “et Stykke Krigspsykose,” Tidehverv, vol. 1, no. 9, 1927, pp. 129–36. (reprinted in Kristoffer olesen Larsen, At være menneske. Udvalgte Arbejder I, ed. by Johannes horstmann and v. olesen Larsen, copenhagen: gad 1967, pp. 29–43.) — “Søren Kierkegaard. Noget om Afgørelsen i Øjeblikket―samt en Bemærkning til e. geismars Kierkegaards-værk,” Tidehverv, vol. 6, 1932, no. 7, pp. 99–107; no. 8, pp. 118–23; no. 9, pp. 148–55; no. 10, pp. 165–71. (reprinted in Søren Kierkegaard læst af K. Olesen Larsen, vols. 1–2, ed. by vibeke olesen Larsen and tage wilhjelm, copenhagen: gad 1966, vol. 1, pp. 21–73, and in I Ansvar og i Tro. K. Olesen Larsen 1899–1999, vols. 1–2, ed. by peder olesen Larsen, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1999, vol. 1, pp. 115–62 (with an introduction by anders Kingo and Sten vedstesen on pp. 115–19). — “Svar til professor geismar,” Tidehverv, vol. 7, no. 2, 1933, pp. 28–31. (reprinted in Søren Kierkegaard læst af K. Olesen Larsen, vols. 1–2, ed. by vibeke olesen Larsen and tage wilhjelm, copenhagen: gad 1966, vol. 1, pp. 76–81.) — “Svar” [reply to eduard geismar], Tidehverv, vol. 7, no. 3, 1933, pp. 51–2. reinhard, hedvig Laura, “askese,” Tidehverv, vol. 1, 1927, pp. 162–5. — “verdsligt Kald,” Tidehverv, vol. 2, 1928, pp. 99–102. — “gensvar i,” Tidehverv, vol. 2, 1928, pp. 133–6. — “gensvar ii,” Tidehverv, vol. 2, 1928, pp. 150–5.

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— “gensvar iii,” Tidehverv, vol. 3, 1929, pp. 36–48. — “gensvar iv,” Tidehverv, vol. 3, 1929, pp. 61–4. — “opgør,” Tidehverv, vol. 3, 1929, pp. 76–80. — “Svar til professor geismar,” Tidehverv, vol. 3, 1929, pp. 84–5. rimestad, c., “eduard geismars værk om Søren Kierkegaard,” Gads Danske Magasin, 1928, pp. 281–9. rodemann, w., review in Kirchliche Zeitschrift, vol. 52, 1928, p. 143. — review of the german translation in Kirchliche Zeitschrift, vol. 52, 1929, p. 247; vol. 53, 1930, p. 47. ruttenbeck, walter, Sören Kierkegaard. Der christliche Denker und sein Werk, berlin: trowitzsch 1929, passim. Saathoff, a., review of the german translation in Monatsschrift für Pastoraltheologie, vol. 25, no. 11, 1929, pp. 271–2. Schjørring, Jens holger, “barth, geismar, tidehverv,” Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift, vol. 39, no. 2, 1976, pp. 73–105. — Theologische Gewissensethik und politische Wirklichkeit. Das Beispiel Eduard Geismars und Emanuel Hirschs, göttingen: vandenhoeck und ruprecht 1979, passim. — “Kierkegaard und die dänische theologie der zwanziger und dreißiger Jahre,” in Die Rezeption Søren Kierkegaards in der Deutschen und dänischen Philosophie und Theologie. Vorträge des Kolloquiums am 22. und 23. März 1982, ed. by heinrich anz, poul Lübcke and Friedrich Schmöe, münchen; copenhagen: Fink 1983, pp. 171–85. Søe, niels hansen, Dansk teologi siden 1900, copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1965, pp. 105–15. — “geismar,” in The Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, copenhagen: reitzel 1981 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8), pp. 215–21. Stallmann, martin, review of the german translation in Die Christliche Welt, vol. 42, no. 19, 1928, pp. 928–9. Swenson, david F., and Lillian marvin Swenson, Something about Kierkegaard, minneapolis: augsburg publishing house 1945, pp. 207–53. tullberg, Steen, “denmark: the permanent reception. 150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 33–40. warmuth, Kurt, review of the german translation in Theologische Literatur-Blatt, vol. 49, no. 25, 1928, pp. 405–6; vol. 51, no. 10, 1930, pp. 152–3; vol. 51, no. 19, 1930, p. 297. wundt, max, review of the german translation in Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, vol. 31, nos. 3–4, 1934, pp. 46–7.

arne grøn, Begrebet angst hos Søren Kierkegaard

[the concept of anxiety in Søren Kierkegaard], copenhagen: gyldendal 1993, 165 pp.

arne grøn’s Begrebet angst hos Søren Kierkegaard was published in 1993 and represents one of the first works in the secondary literature dedicated primarily to The Concept of Anxiety. The book seems to have filled a felt need since it was subsequently translated into english, german, and dutch.1 divided into 10 chapters, this short work offers, in a pedagogical way, a thematic introduction to Kierkegaard’s main thoughts. as noted, grøn takes his point of departure in The Concept of Anxiety, which he considers as a principal work and, despite its difficulty, as the best introduction to Kierkegaard’s thoughts. grøn at the same time reads The Concept of Anxiety closely and draws parallels to other works since anxiety is actually only the introduction to the deeper question of what it means to be a human being. According to Grøn, anxiety at first sounds like something to avoid, but in Kierkegaard’s eyes man must actually learn to be anxious in the right way since anxiety opens up to a deeper concern. A first determination is to compare anxiety to fear. whereas fear has a special object, the object of anxiety is “nothing.” interestingly, anxiety is related to the aspect of time in that man can be anxious about the future, although it seems to be more precisely the person’s imagination about the future that causes anxiety. anxiety more precisely refers to an ambiguous situation that can be compared to dizziness and which refers to the fact that man’s self-relationship is at stake. grøn illustrates this with experiences of growing up or growing old. it is connected to the aspect of time as the tension between the threat of losing oneself (becoming another) and the possibility of becoming oneself. the premise for having anxiety at all, grøn demonstrates, is that man himself is a complex synthesis of body and soul, of the eternal and the temporal. the important element is the third part, namely, the spirit or “the moment” that unites the two sides. correspondingly, the life task of man is “to grow together.”2 consequently, anxiety is connected to arne grøn, The Concept of Anxiety in Søren Kierkegaard, trans. by Jeanette b.L. Knox, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2008. Angst bei Søren Kierkegaard. Eine Einführung in sein Denken, trans. by ulrich Lincoln, Stuttgart: Klett-cotta 1999. Vrijheid en angst. Inleiding tot het denken van Søren Kierkegaard, trans. by Frits Florin, budel: damon 2008. 2 arne grøn, Begrebet angst hos Søren Kierkegaard, copenhagen: gyldendal 1993, p. 22. 1

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freedom since man in anxiety discovers his own freedom as a possibility and so has to take a position on it. Grøn refers to the “definition” of anxiety in The Concept of Anxiety, namely, anxiety as “the possibility of the possibility.”3 So anxiety is a self-experience. in this situation there exists the possibility of a disproportion in the synthesis if man refuses to recognize what he already is. correspondingly, the life task is to get rid of anxiety. Grøn more precisely distinguishes between two levels of anxiety: first, as the possibility of freedom and, second, as the self-relationship that is not free. the second level refers to the concept of original sin that concerns the difficult question of guilt. grøn demonstrates how anxiety can be understood as the “middle term” between sin (reality) and iniquity (a predisposition/possibility, namely, as the accumulated sin of the generations), referring back to the way that anxiety “grasps” a person. Sin, by contrast, Kierkegaard claims is a “qualitative leap” or “the Fall of man,” which man must bear full responsibility for. According to Grøn, Kierkegaard’s reflections on “innocence” can be compared to childhood, in which there is a special knowledge in ignorance, namely, modesty. the Fall thus expresses the moment in which man becomes aware of himself, which is not a one-off event since man again and again loses consciousness of himself. this knowledge is further the sexual awareness in which the person’s own “history” begins. however, according to grøn, the Fall is not the end of anxiety since the reality of sin cannot last and causes anxiety in the same way as “the iniquity” increases anxiety. in other words, the ambiguity appears in new and more reflected forms, namely, as an anxiety about evil and an anxiety about the good. the former refers to the situation in which a human being cannot free himself from a former guilt and is anxious about making the same mistake again. in this way the person’s act in repentance and anxiety is delayed, which only causes a new guilt and a new repentance and increases anxiety. anxiety about the good, by contrast, is the situation in which man keeps himself from “healing.” Kierkegaard names this “the demonic.” Still, it is clear that this is connected to the good, and thus even the demonic points toward the possibility of freedom. grøn demonstrates the general meaning of anxiety as it refers to the selfrelationship in which man is not only bodily singled out but which also concerns the way a person relates to his past or every new situation he encounters. in this way it plainly refers to existence, and grøn refers to the Philosophical Fragments as well as to the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, in which climacus asks this question and indicates that there are several ways in which to exist, including not asking the question at all, which constitutes the greatest danger of the time. grøn shows how climacus understands existence as a becoming self-relationship and importantly states a postponed self-awareness by saying that man is untruth. this refers back to The Concept of Anxiety since also here man only escapes the unfree situation by the power of truth. grøn points to passion, as the outwardly directed difference that really concerns a person, and inwardness, as the simultaneous personal acquisition and evasion of other people. however, both phenomena actually point to the fact that man must relate to what he already is.

3

ibid., p. 23.

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anxiety is also closely connected to the concept of choice. in light of The Concept of Anxiety, grøn rejects the idea of the free will since The Concept of Anxiety does not refer to a choice among different options but to the choice of freedom and one’s own self. According to Grøn, this is also reflected in Either/Or: against a’s undecided existence in which real anxiety is not given the chance to break through, b accentuates the importance of choosing oneself. more precisely, b chooses himself in repentance and so chooses to receive himself. grøn also connects this “double movement” to Fear and Trembling, namely, as a religious movement. according to grøn, it is clear that The Concept of Anxiety, in accordance with The Sickness unto Death, understands freedom as the existing, self-relating subject. it is thus a normative understanding of freedom. grøn presents a thorough analysis of The Sickness unto Death, in which he unfolds the meaning of negative phenomena, such as the despair of the infinite, the finite, weakness and defiance, and he connects them all to anxiety. according to grøn, the point of both anxiety and despair is that man has to lose himself, namely, his strong assertion of himself, in order to win himself. in this way man must go through the negative to become free. one of grøn’s main points is that, according to Kierkegaard, the individual is also very strongly entangled with other human beings. “history” thus refers to man’s ethical task of becoming himself, but it also refers to the interest in the history of other individuals. according to grøn, Kierkegaard sharply differentiates “the universal” from the ethical since the individual can never be considered as something universal due to his own personality. the responsibility common to all mankind, however, connects the individual to other people, expressed in the phenomena of conscience and sympathy. by contrast, cowardice is to associate with other people but without really acknowledging them. Grøn further makes a distinction between first and second order ethics, and he connects the latter with not only the individual’s problem of his own sinful existence but also with the commandment of christian charity and demonstrates their deep connection: “you must love yourself in the way you love your neighbor as you love him as yourself.”4 the danger of shutting oneself off to love is the greatest danger at all. grøn discusses the relationship between the ethical and the religious in Kierkegaard by pointing to the idea in The Sickness unto Death of the self being grounded in god. inspired by Works of Love, grøn elaborates the god relationship as the fact that man always begins in the depth of love since god has always acted before man. in this way god can be understood simply as possibility or as the person’s belief that everything is possible. whereas The Sickness unto Death sets out this answer to despair more explicitly, The Concept of Anxiety only indicates that anxiety saves a person through faith. grøn connects this to faith in the paradox in Fear and Trembling, namely, as the absurd situation in which god became man and accentuated the task of man relating to himself. the experience of anxiety, according to grøn, points to man’s task of becoming spirit in contrast to the danger of becoming anonymous or “spiritless.” the phenomenon of anxiety, however, reveals the person, and thus, according to Grøn, Kierkegaard’s reflections on anxiety are extremely modern. 4

ibid., p. 133.

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this work sticks so closely to the primary text that in places it is virtually a paraphrase. This from time to time makes it difficult to know what is really at stake in the analysis. this is further exacerbated by the fact that there is no engagement whatsoever with the secondary literature (although grøn includes suggestions for further reading). Furthermore, the downside of an introductory, analytic work is that the distinctive marks of the different works are overlooked. For example, grøn does not reflect in any way on the more complex relationships of the pseudonyms. All the same, grøn, in a competent and clear way, presents Kierkegaard’s key concepts by not only referring to a great number of passages in Kierkegaard’s works but also by illustrating the difficult thoughts in everyday experiences and language. anne Louise nielsen

reviews and critical discussions Summer, richard, review in Scandinavia, vol. 37, 1998, pp. 99–101. theunissen, michael, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 18, 1996, pp. 225–8.

arne grøn, Subjektivitet og negativitet. Kierkegaard [Subjectivity and negativity: Kierkegaard], copenhagen: gyldendal 1997, 443 pp.

Subjektivitet og Negativitet, arne grøn’s habilitation thesis on Kierkegaard, is a thorough and impressive thematic investigation of the concept of “the self.” grøn’s primary motivation is that nobody has managed to put an end to the idea of a self-reliant subject, which was rooted in the idea of Kierkegaard as the “father of existentialism.” Moreover, Grøn calls for a systematic reflection on the notion of the self, and so he lines up all the well-known concepts such as “decision,” “existence,” “self,” and “individual.” correspondingly, he refers to the most important pseudonymous works and includes quotations from the upbuilding discourses as well as Kierkegaard’s journals. grøn characterizes his own method as dialectical phenomenology in the sense that the phenomenon is the self who takes up a certain position. according to grøn, Kierkegaard’s theory of subjectivity is not to be found in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript since climacus has a tendency to accentuate “the decision” in such a way that the problem of subjectivity disappears. by contrast, The Sickness unto Death depicts the self by means of an account of the failed self, and so this work constitutes grøn’s main text. grøn stresses three important aspects in order to characterize the self. it is (1) processual (the self relates to itself) and relational (the self is that which relates to itself), (2) non-substantial, and (3) non-ideal. these three aspects can be summed up in Grøn’s definition: “Self is that which relates to itself as it admits itself to itself.”1 that is, only this kind of self reveals that a self exists at all. Self-relationship is self-experience, and self is a substance but only through the self-relationship. through three methodological steps grøn emphasizes (1) subjectivity as a problem, (2) the negative method, and (3) an intimate relation between normativity and negativity. grøn more precisely picks up two key characteristics in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript; namely, a subject is striving and self-relating. then he sums them up in a third, namely, the idea of man as a (self-relating) synthesis between the infinite and the finite. This self-relating synthesis captures three important aspects in man: man as a “middle-creature,” subjectivity as a problem (the life task is to unite the two sides), and finally man’s experience of being an other to himself. the 1

p. 18.

arne grøn, Subjektivitet og negativitet. Kierkegaard, copenhagen: gyldendal 1997,

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last aspect points to a structural otherness, which is built into the self-relationship on several levels: first, man has seminal corporeal and temporal experiences, for example, in puberty or death, in which man is outside himself. that proves that man is a “postponed” structure, which points to the second level of negativity: the possibility of a disproportion in the synthesis. on a third level grøn challenges the general opinion of Kierkegaard as a non-community thinker by pointing to man’s fundamental entanglement with other human beings. consequently, the self is a structure based on recognition and confirmation. Finally, on a fourth level Grøn points to the category of passion as an experience of being simultaneously outside oneself and disclosed as oneself. grøn states Kierkegaard’s true interest as ethical; more precisely, he is interested in how to respond to having oneself as a life task, which includes acknowledging another person’s individuality. this can be summed up in the conception conscience. however, grøn’s main thesis is twofold: the ethical accentuation must be extended with a paradoxical accentuation; self-relationship contains an implicit relationship to god, and that is ethical in the way that its (ethical) assumption of itself breaks down. or to phrase it more formally: ethics turns into “second order ethics.” grøn, however, realizes the risk of indicating an “anthropological proof of god,”2 especially when referring to anti-climacus’ idea of the self as pointing to god as its ground. but grøn demonstrates that anti-climacus, on the contrary, in a gliding thought movement shows that only the despairing individual points to the existence of god.3 in other words, Kierkegaard’s method is diagnostic, and grøn points to anti-climacus’ clear revealing of the subject being before God in the second half of The Sickness unto Death. also climacus states the subject as “untruth,” which, according to grøn, reveals climacus’ talk about “pure passion” as directionless. on the contrary, the paradox breaks the passion so that the subject is shown back to his own difficult task of keeping the synthesis together. Therefore, passion, as intensified subjectivity, is actually a decision against the lack of it. this critical situation is the consciousness of sin, namely, as the situation where the subject must postulate god. grøn more precisely defines consciousness of sin as a postponed consciousness, that is, the subject has inevitably lost his identity and must be given one. consequently, for grøn all talk about sin points to Kierkegaard’s special eye for the dialectical interplay between the will, the self, and the consciousness, namely, the “willed” eclipse of cognition. grøn sums it up in what he calls “the anthropological main thesis”: in a human being there is an aversion to know the truth.4 grøn also focuses on “positive” phenomena such as faith, courage, and openness. he especially emphasizes the decision of faith as a receptive experience since it refers to the broken self-assertion and dialectically reveals the inner of the heart. but why then talk about “decision,” grøn asks. because the individual needs to acquire the decision of faith, and most importantly, he must be willing passionately to lose all reason since reason only maintains the subject as a sinner. here we arrive at 2 3 4

ibid., p. 293. ibid., p. 296. ibid., p. 331.

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grøn’s few christological hints, expressed as a “dialectic of sight”: from Christian Discourses grøn picks up the concept of reconciliation as “god looking at another (christ) instead of at you.”5 according to grøn, this structure should be mirrored in the relationship to the neighbor by overlooking his sins. grøn more precisely identifies a “negative look of recognition” in Kierkegaard starting in 1846,6 in which a human being, through his jealous, arrogant or submissive look, controls another human being. against this personal reduction, the religious perspective points to an already relating self. in the same way grøn uses a religious vocabulary as he points to man’s illusionary power over life itself, mainly in Works of Love and Judge for Yourself!. one of grøn’s interpretations is a twofold structure of despair in The Sickness unto Death; the first refers to negative phenomena such as restlessness, escape, and defiance, and the second, which only appears in the margin, refers to the situation where a person knows that there is absolutely no hope left. grøn proves Kierkegaard’s awareness of this deadly despair by pointing to his “double determination”: a subject exists as spirit.7 more precisely, “the individual,” according to grøn, is the category of the authorship since the individual must become the one who he already is.8 the contrasting negative possibility is to be anonymous, that is, to live without regret and responsibility. grøn ends his analysis by asking the question whether the negative possibility of total indetermination exists?9 grøn’s own main thesis delivers the negative answer: In this very attempt the person is already determined by himself. accordingly, Kierkegaard’s original method consists in not only measuring negative phenomena against the eternal but also diagnostically showing the already existing negativity, namely, as an “indifferent power” that hides itself10 and so grøn states his final thesis: the possibility of being non-spirit is already a determination of being spirit, that is, of being a subject.11 anti-climacus clearly presupposes an already self-relating subject, who is the very subject addressed in The Sickness unto Death. on a critical note, one must remark that grøn turns Kierkegaard’s scattered reflections on subjectivity into a general position of ethical subjectivity in which Grøn’s main affirmation is the already self-relating subject. In other words Grøn turns Kierkegaardian truth-seeking into descriptive psychology. he claims that the true theme of The Sickness unto Death is the conception of the self—which is also his own main theme—and hereby downplays the meaning of the religious and the openness.12 For grøn, revelation, “the word” and everyday communication seem to constitute the same phenomenon. paradoxically, at the same time he asserts clear Lutheran statements, for example, that a human being is both justified and condemned,13 but without any kind of reference. altogether grøn’s text has a 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

ibid., p. 347. ibid., p. 348. ibid., p. 391. ibid., pp. 391–2. ibid., p. 402. ibid., p. 410. ibid., p. 417. ibid., p. 377. ibid., p. 362.

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tendency to be self-referential. For example, he does not acknowledge Kierkegaard’s remarkable method of indirect communication and its different meaning in the pseudonymous works and claims that this method “only” reveals a general ethical premise for communication.14 Also Grøn does not reflect on the consequence of choosing a late work as his main text. however, he importantly settles accounts with some parts of the philosophical tradition, for example, by stating the Kierkegaardian subject is a being in time (against heidegger’s criticism) and is entangled with other human beings (against Løgstrup’s criticism). but he also admits that Kierkegaard’s accentuation of the single individual is at the cost of a lack of a notion of the interrelationship between human beings. all in all this work represents an important contribution to Kierkegaard studies concerning the conception of the self in the field of philosophical psychology and phenomenology. anne Louise nielsen

14

ibid., p. 250.

reviews and critical discussions dehs, Jørgen, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 20, 1999, pp. 292–8. hansen, Leif bork, review in Fønix, vol. 21, no. 4, 1997, pp. 26–36. olesen, ole, review in Præsteforeningens Blad, vol. 87, 1997, pp. 1086–92. Søltoft, pia, “med negativiteten som nøgle,” in Studier i Stadier. Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets 50-års Jubliæum, ed. by Joakim garff, tonny aagaard olesen, and pia Søltoft, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1998, pp. 354–60.

Jørgen husted, Wilhelms brev— Det etiske ifølge Kierkegaard

[william’s Letter: the ethical according to Kierkegaard], copenhagen: gyldendal 1999, 307 pp.

Jørgen husted resolved to present an ethics which is accessible by and applicable for the modern individual who wishes to be able to explicate and gain a deeper understanding of the central existential themes that the individual faces. this is at the same time a comprehensive, admirable, and difficult task, which Husted carries out with both persistence and substantial breadth of view. the central aspect of modern ethics which husted offers the existing person anno 2000 is, as the title reveals, from Either/Or, namely Judge william’s letter to a entitled, “the balance between the esthetic and the ethical in the development of the personality.” Wilhelms Brev—Det etiske ifølge Kierkegaard is a representation of william’s search for the answer to the question, “what is a human being to do in life?”1 and with this search, husted’s book is a reading and reinterpretation of the main Kierkegaardian themes which the letter brings into focus. husted’s book can thus be viewed as an introduction to william, the authorship’s only explicit ethicist, which is carried out by continual references to descartes, Kant, hedonism, utilitarianism, existentialism (Sartre), and the recent moral philosophy of Thomas Nagel, Griffin, and others. Wilhelms Brev is framed by questions such as, “what is the good life?,” “what does it mean to live an aesthetic life?,” “what is freedom?” these questions are answered through a dialogue between william and representatives of the positions mentioned above, and husted thus argues that william is capable of expressing a convincing and coherent view of what it means to be a human being. husted articulates this view in order to illuminate what he takes to be the most important ethical Kierkegaardian issue: the task of choosing oneself. At first glance, Husted makes william’s position seem reliable and insightful, but one might ask if any of the themes husted uses to characterize william’s position with, point over and above themselves. when william tries to make the despairing aesthete face the

1 Jørgen husted, Wilhelms brev—Det etiske ifølge Kierkegaard, copenhagen: gyldendal 1999, p. 19.

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consequences of his fragile condition and stresses that “i, too, have despaired,”2 or when he describes repentance as a task that already lies in his past, it is difficult to know how to understand his persistent claim that the task is to become oneself. if despair is brought to an end, existence is no longer in movement and the individual is no longer becoming. william thus seems to be done with the assignment, that is, his subjectivity, before he ought to be. generally, william possesses a tranquility that one would not expect from an existing person who is pulled between finitude and infinitude, temporality and eternity, freedom and necessity. Assessor William thus separates himself from Kierkegaard’s other thinkers of existence such as vigilius haufniensis, Johannes climacus, and anti-climacus by focusing more on the right movement and path to the self than on the wrong way(s). there seems to be good reasons for this, for since william has completed the movement, he is obviously aware of what that is all about. the problem is that even william’s own analysis raises doubts about what the judge has really done and what he really knows. the book is therefore—without explicitly wanting to be so—a contribution to an ongoing discussion about whether the meaning of the ethical in Kierkegaard’s authorship can be derived from reading a single work such as Either/ Or (or parts of it), which thereby is said to be understood on its own terms, or whether the relationship between first and second ethics causes a human ethic to break down from within, and thus whether a first ethic contains the premises of a second ethic as a precondition. in the light of this question, there may be good reasons for going behind william and the self-interpretation he formulates—there might be more to william’s letter than meets husted’s eye. the book is presented as a reading of the letter on its own terms, and husted has no doubt that the reader is thereby also presented with Kierkegaard’s view of the ethical: “behind the following interpretation of william’s position lies the understanding that this position is Kierkegaard’s account of what one can say about the issue from a universal human point of view—the ethical [point of view]”3 and he stresses that “the ethical is capable of standing on its own feet in the strictly human sphere. it does not need god, heaven or hell. it is a kingdom in itself.”4 nevertheless husted acknowledges that there is more to be said, for “beyond the ethical, a totally different world of experiences seems to open up, even experiences that demand that one set aside or even eliminate the ethical and thereby eliminate ‘the teleological’ in the single individual.”5 the question now becomes whether the rest of the authorship really stresses something “beyond the ethical.” the question is whether the ethical is a kingdom in itself or whether one must rather speak of a qualification of the ethical by which it is allowed to retain what Husted calls an “embarrassing superstructure”6 of a dogmatic character, which thus ends the resemblance of william’s ethical position to a Kierkegaardian ethic. Either/ Or itself raises this possibility with william’s admission of a lasting darkness in 2 3

own.) 4 5 6

SKS 3, 200 / EO2, 208: ogsaa jeg har fortvivlet. husted, Wilhelms brev—Det etiske ifølge Kierkegaard, p. 13. (all translations are my ibid., p. 181. ibid., p. 285. ibid., p. 181.

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existence: “but even the person in whose life this movement occurs most calmly and peacefully and at the right time will still always retain a little repression, but this is linked to something much deeper, to hereditary sin and is rooted in this, that no human being can become transparent to himself.”7 in spite of the fact that Judge william has reached “the other side” of despair and now stands in the right selfrelationship—even “possesses himself”8—he cannot gain self-transparency. this tension allows one to ask what husted does not ask of william’s ethical standpoint: does william actually suspect that there are more conditions of existence than his otherwise so convincing rhetoric seems to express and, in extension of this idea, does william himself provide the point of departure for an ethic that points beyond Either/Or, an ethic in which a thematizing of the self also implies a differently qualified thematizing of the self’s relationship to God, an ethic in which the human viewpoint—that “the individual is the absolute”9—does not lead to self-harmony but rather to something completely different, that is, despair. this does not change the fact that Wilhelms Brev is in many ways a sympathetic beginning, which in a modern and sober tone of voice, that does not risk—or allow a hope—of seduction, carefully orients its reader to a large number of the Kierkegaardian concepts. The danger lies, as implied, in the risk that the first ethic will close upon itself and that the reader will thereby not be urged to carry on with that significant part of the authorship which emphasizes that there is more to be said about being a self which relates to itself. in husted’s depiction, Kierkegaard is both accessible and understandable and is very likely to seem reasonable and amenable to a modern reader, that is, according to husted, a reader who is not familiar with religious concepts and dogmatic theology. the reader is, however, left with the suspicion that that which makes any Kierkegaardian ethic really interesting—comforting and challenging for both the modern as well as the “outdated” reader—is precisely the authorship’s thematizing of intractable existential difficulties and demands— difficulties and demands which might not seem to be immediately accessible and reasonable to a modern human being, but which hardly can be characterized as just being reserved only for uncommon or “outmoded” readers. wenche marit Quist

7 8 9

SKS 3, 184 / EO2, 190. SKS 3, 221 / EO2, 233. husted, Wilhelms brev—Det etiske ifølge Kierkegaard, p. 279.

reviews and critical discussions tudvad, peter, review in Kristeligt Dagblad, april 20, 1999. Quist, wenche marit, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 22, 2002, pp. 256–9.

anders Kingo, Analogiens teologi. En dogmatisk studie over dialektikken i Søren Kierkegaards opbyggelige og pseudonyme forfatterskab [the analogy’s theology: a dogmatic Study on the dialectic in Søren Kierkegaard’s upbuilding and pseudonymous authorship], copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1995, 511 pp.

anders Kingo’s habilitation thesis is a remarkable and independent piece of research, which bears the subtitle “a dogmatic Study on the dialectic in Søren Kierkegaard’s upbuilding and pseudonymous authorship.” as early as the late 1980s Kingo published The Upbuilding Discourse1 and The Pseudonymous Discourse,2 which prefigures his main thesis that there is a substantial distinction between the two kinds of works. according to Kingo, the upbuilding thinking is set in the category of the positive reality anchored in god, whereas the pseudonymous thinking presents the negative possibilities of existence. consequently, Kingo understands the upbuilding discourse as the constant in Kierkegaard’s authorship, namely, from “ultimatum” in 1843 until The Unchangeability of God in 1855.3 at the focal point of the book stand Kingo’s three main theses: (1) to prove that all the discourses are a function of the christian paradox, (2) to settle accounts with the so-called “theory of stages,” and (3) to prove Kierkegaard’s distinct “theology of analogy” concerning the relationship between the human and christianity, namely, as placed in the tension between barth and bultmann, in particularly referring to Jüngel’s “analogy of advent.” Kingo’s main premise is that he believes that Kierkegaard intends to communicate a certain message, namely, that an individual should choose himself “with the stress of eternity.”4 consequently, Kingo dismisses all traditional scholarly approaches anders Kingo, Den opbyggelige tale, copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1987. anders Kingo, Den pseudonyme tale, copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1988. 3 anders Kingo, Analogiens teologi. En dogmatisk studie over dialektikken i Søren Kierkegaards opbyggelige og pseudonyme forfatterskab, copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1995, p. 104. 4 ibid., p. 9. 1 2

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such as metaphysics, phenomenology, ontology, modern existence philosophy, and also christological dogmatics. according to Kingo, Kierkegaard does not ask for the truth of christianity but instead poses the question of how i can become a christian. In proving this special Kierkegaardian dialectics, Kingo avoids the task of finding his own analytical tool or text-immanent method, and in his first chapter he points to the notion of analogy (ana: movement from the bottom up and logi: relationship). rooted in aristotle’s principle of analogia proportionalis, the notion reflects on how two incompatible entities can be kept together by a similarity (note, as bottom up), for example, from creature to creator. correspondingly, Kierkegaard deals with how existence and spirit can be kept together without mixture and without separation as Kingo phrases it in the words of the chalcedonian credo. the principle of analogy thus refers to the difficult question about “the beginning,” and Kingo states that christianity (as proclaimed) supplies its own condition, namely, “the god in time,”5 who immediately validates existence as spirit and vice versa. this functions as a “paradoxical tautology,” which contains two movements, first, an absolute, categorical one and, second, the analytical exposition of it. consequently, Kingo argues, all questions concerning human autonomy make no sense in accordance to Kierkegaard, who may be called an “existence theologian.” his anthropology is classical protestant in the sense that vis-à-vis god man is always in the wrong and the determination of spirit is at the same time law and grace. a general theory of analogy, Kingo stresses, is, however, not to be found in Kierkegaard. even though Socrates is frequently indicated as an analogy to christ, climacus in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript clearly states that in the break of the paradox there is absolutely no analogy.6 Kingo rephrases this by saying the paradoxical tautology is its own analogy, the transcendental that.7 in this way Kierkegaard can be said to deal with the problem in classical analogy thinking, namely, that the qualitative difference between god and man is unclear. Kingo argues that in contrast to Jüngel’s idea of “nearness” between god and man, Kierkegaard claims at the same time absolute non-identity and absolute identity between god and man. concerning the non-identity, Kierkegaard thus sides with barth in his reckoning with classical analogy thinking, whereas concerning the identity, Kierkegaard counters the danger of the anthropologization of god. therefore, he rejects the notion of analogy but keeps the principle, namely, as the analogy of the paradoxical tautology, which, by contrast, differentiates him from bultmann’s existential thinking. Kingo specifies this by stating that Kierkegaard’s original reformatory, analogy-dialectical thinking is set on the anthropological level, namely, as the transition from “the old adam” to “the new adam.”8 correspondingly, Kierkegaard’s “dogmatics” is that the individual’s relationship to god is exclusively bound to the human being Jesus of Nazareth, signifying that the individual must find the “analogy” to eternity in the temporal.

5 6 7 8

See SKS 7, 520–1 / CUP1, 573. See SKS 7, 517 / CUP1, 569. Kingo, Analogiens teologi, p. 153. ibid., p. 158.

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Kingo sums up his idea of analogy by presenting six theses: analogy (1) as possibility, (2) as understanding, (3) as castigation, (4) as hermeneutics, (5) as consciousness of sin, and (6) as dialectical being.9 through these theses Kingo demonstrates the applicability of the notion by pointing to the interrelation of form and content in Kierkegaard: through the human analogy it is shown how man in his encounter with the paradox is turned into “possibility” for christianity. the analogy principle, belonging to the region of the mind, humbly understands that it does not understand faith; correspondingly, analogy and faith parallel sin and grace on an existential level. analogy, furthermore, shows the close relationship between philosophy and theology since christianity does not claim anything about man that, for example, a Socrates could not know, but christianity creates everything anew. Finally, analogy reflects Kierkegaard’s extraordinary method of “indirect communication” and his open, poetical style. analogy thus is “dialectical being” in which faith remains the paradox that it is. this is related to Kingo’s view of the “theory of stages” since the problem here is that it determines the transition to a christian existence which, however, remains only “a possibility” and does not allow for a change of category. Kingo argues for a “stageless being” contrary to the analogous forms of existence in the stages. the “stageless being,” Kingo further elaborates, is a nihilism for God, that is, man wants to be in the helplessness of selfdenial just as he does in love.10 in his second chapter Kingo focuses on “Kierkegaard’s categorical one-sidedness” which means that his notions only exist as events, for example, spirit is to become spirit, and the transition itself is the focal point.11 in this way Kierkegaard’s idea of “category” as the complete aristotelian contrast means: existentially to stay in the particular. Kingo accentuates the categories of eternity, spirit, and sin as existential categories and argues that “the decision” is set between the yardstick of spirit and that of the world; not dualistically between the eternal and the temporal. this points further to the category of “the leap” as the opposite of an absolute beginning or an absolute nihilism of values. most important, however, is the category of “the individual” that shows how Kierkegaard is neither an ontologist nor a revelation theologian. against the speculative tendency of thinking “the individual” as a general concept, Kierkegaard makes clear that this category can never be recognized but only realized. Kingo points to the “unnamed subject,” namely as the subject whom god addresses.12 Sola scriptura is clearly a principle of Kingo, and in the third chapter he expounds what he calls existential analogies in both the pseudonymous and upbuilding works. in general Kingo demonstrates his theses by textual examples or by means of presentations of intellectual debates in Kierkegaard research. Finally, he dedicates his fourth and final chapter to, first, an examination of the historical consequences of Kierkegaard’s thinking and, second, an inquiry of “true” and “false” analogy

9 10 11 12

ibid., pp. 162–98. See ibid., p. 103 and p. 112. ibid., p. 235. ibid., p. 311.

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thinking.13 regarding the former, Kingo most importantly claims, especially against Kresten nordentoft’s idea of a clear change, that Kierkegaard, in the struggle against the church in 1854–55, actually argues the same thing that he did in the upbuilding works dating back from 1843, namely, that christianity always causes an offense. regarding analogy thinking, Kingo states that a false analogy is to claim the possible recognition of the world as a parable since then analogy turns into identity or “works of justice.”14 Kierkegaard, by contrast, demonstrates that only christ, as a part of the world, is capable of stating the world as a parable, and so the world as a totality turns into an analogy. in other words, analogy must remain comparison and not likeness, present and not possession/content. analogy is man’s (inadequate) tool for talking about god and correspondingly for indicating what it means to become a Christian. Kingo finally claims that Kierkegaard mainly differs from Barth by calling attention to the acts of god through faith in contrast to barth, who tries to explain god through faith. that is, Kierkegaard’s deep incarnation thinking makes him talk christologically about existence, not christologically about god. the radical theological consequence, according to Kingo, is that god is god only to the Godless, who cannot really say anything about god. altogether Kingo offers an extremely well-argued interpretation of Kierkegaard, which, however, has a tendency of being theoretically heavy in its expression. Kingo’s courage to call into question some of the firmly established views in Kierkegaard scholarship is very refreshing and important, in particular, the tendency to regard the upbuilding discourses as secondary to the pseudonymous works. on a critical note, one must remark that the consequence of Kingo’s method is that he overlooks the vivid ambiguity in Kierkegaard’s thinking and presumes that Kierkegaard expresses himself always straightforwardly and coherently throughout his whole authorship, which is simply not the case. For example, Kingo’s main thesis builds very strongly on a single note in which Kierkegaard reflects on the relationship between the pseudonymous and the upbuilding writings.15 also Kingo instinctively places Kierkegaard inside a certain theological tradition, for example, when he states that the stages are stages of sin, corresponding to Jewish forms of piety.16 Finally, Kingo reads Kierkegaard firmly through Lutheran theology, and this premise could be made more explicit. anne Louise nielsen

13 14 15 16

ibid., pp. 469–70. ibid., p. 476. ibid., p. 97. ibid., p. 131.

reviews and critical discussions deuser, hermann, “guds almagt og menneskets frihed. opposition ved anders Kingos forsvar for sin Kierkegaard-disputats,” Fønix, vol. 19, no. 4, 1995, pp. 39–54. bramming, torben, review in Kredsen, vol. 61, no. 2, 1995, pp. 89–102. bruun, Søren, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 18, 1996, pp. 230–8. garff, Joachim, review in Weekendavisen/Bøger, may 24, 1995. grøn, arne, review in Præsteforeningens Blad, 27, 1995, pp. 590–4. — “Kierkegaard’s forudsætning,” Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift, vol. 58, 1995, pp. 267–90. harbsmeier, eberhard, review in Fønix, vol. 19, no. 4, 1995, pp. 61–4. holm, Kjeld, review in Morgenposten, June 9, 1995. Kampmann, bo walther, Øjeblik og tavshed—Læsninger i Søren Kierkegaard’s forfatterskab, odense: odense universitetsforlag 2002, pp. 20ff. Kingo, anders, “mod gud altid at have uret,” Fønix, vol. 19, no. 4, 1995, pp. 55–60. — “et forsvar i bakspejlet,” Kristeligt Dagblad, June 7, 1995. Lindhardt, Jan, review in Jyllandsposten, may 29, 1995. raahauge, anders, review in Kristeligt Dagblad, may 31, 1995. vedstesen, Sten, review in Tidehverv, vol. 69, 1995, pp. 143–8.

carl henrik Koch, En flue på Hegels udødelige næse eller om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham [a Fly on hegel’s immortal nose or on adolph peter adler and Søren Kierkegaard’s relation to him], copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1990, 240 pp.

carl henrik Koch was professor of philosophy at the university of copenhagen before his retirement in 2007. he is without doubt the leading international authority on philosophy in the danish golden age. he has a broad portfolio of publications on the history of philosophy and danish philosophy in the nineteenth century. on november 23, 1990 he defended his habilitation thesis (in danish, disputats), with the intriguing title En flue på Hegels udødelige næse eller Om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham, that is, A Fly on Hegel’s Immortal Nose or On Adolph Peter Adler and Søren Kierkegaard’s Relation to Him.1 as the title indicates, the work treats the controversial pastor adolph peter adler (1812–69), whom Kierkegaard scholars know from The Book on Adler. as is well known, the source of the controversy was adler’s claim to have received a revelation from Jesus christ, and this is one of the things that exercised Kierkegaard most about him. however, Koch shows that there was much more to adler than just this single well-known episode that eventually cost him his position as pastor. the work goes through adler’s life and development chronologically and treats in some detail Kierkegaard’s analysis of him. it argues that Kierkegaard’s preoccupation with adler ran deeper than heretofore supposed and that adler had an enduring influence on Kierkegaard’s thought. After the introduction, which presents Adler’s life and writings briefly in outline, the work begins in chapter 2 with a highly useful overview of the movement of danish hegelianism, in which adler played an important role. at the time when Koch wrote this, there was very little literature available on this subject. carl henrik Koch, En flue på Hegels udødelige næse eller Om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1990.

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chapter 3 treats adler’s master’s thesis, The Isolated Subjectivity in its Most Important Forms from 1840.2 Koch argues that this work evidences adler’s early adherence to hegel’s philosophy. here adler criticizes the works of the philosopher Frederik christian Sibbern and the poet-philosopher poul martin møller, both of whom were known at the time as critics of hegel. Koch maintains that adler represents a form of right hegelianism that Kierkegaard later attacks in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. it is claimed that it is this picture of hegelianism that in part formed Kierkegaard’s image of hegel. chapter 4 explores a series of short works by adler spanning the years 1840–42. Johan Ludvig heiberg was a well-known defender of hegel at the time, and his works on hegelian logic were quite appreciative. however, he allowed himself to correct hegel on an oversight concerning the development of the logical categories in the triad of being, nothing, becoming. adler then criticizes heiberg’s correction and defends hegel’s actual position. Koch also treats adler’s criticism of the theologian h.n. clausen, who was critical of hegel’s philosophy of religion. this polemic must be seen against the backdrop of martensen’s highly popular lectures about hegel’s philosophy that were presumably the real target of clausen’s criticism. in chapter 5 Koch treats adler’s most hegelian work, his Popular Lectures on Hegel’s Objective Logic, which was published in 1842.3 this book is a detailed commentary of a part of hegel’s Science of Logic. adler’s work is quite dialectical and some of hegel’s more complicated analyses and transitions are illuminated with useful explanations and examples. Koch contends that here again we find a model for Kierkegaard’s conception of hegel that is subject to criticism in the Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. chapter 6 is dedicated to adler’s collection Some Sermons, where the revelation is announced.4 Koch analyzes adler’s account of his revelation and, surprisingly, draws a line that connects this with hegel’s philosophy of religion, even though an important part of the revelation was that adler was purportedly commanded to burn his hegelian works and thus to break from hegelianism. adler’s understanding of the Fall, argues Koch, anticipates some aspects of Kierkegaard’s famous analysis a year later in The Concept of Anxiety. chapter 7 follows the story of adler’s troubles with the danish State church due to his claim to have had a revelation. this was a long, drawn-out process that ran its course over several years and culminated in adler being sacked from his position. this chapter goes into detail about the role of bishop mynster in the matter. Koch claims that mynster misunderstood adler’s position in a fundamental manner. chapter 8 is dedicated to Kierkegaard’s analysis of adler. Koch goes into detail about the personal relation that the two had, dating back to a fairly early period. Koch argues that, contrary to popular belief, it was not so much adler’s revelation that exercised Kierkegaard, but rather adler’s profusion of publications in 1846. 2 adolph peter adler, Den isolerede Subjectivitet i dens vigtigste Skikkelser. Første Deel, copenhagen: trykt i det berlingske bogtrykkeri 1840. 3 adolph peter adler, Populaire Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1842. 4 adolph peter adler, Nogle Prædikener, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1843.

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Kierkegaard took this to be incommensurable with having had a revelation. Koch explores Kierkegaard’s criticism of adler in depth, and argues that ultimately his criticisms are unpersuasive. the conclusion emphasizes the claim that has been argued for in many of the preceding chapters, namely, that adler can be seen as an important missing link between hegel and Kierkegaard. while it is uncertain how much of hegel Kierkegaard read directly, there can be no doubt that he read adler’s works at length, and so it is plausible to infer that an important part of his picture of hegel’s philosophy came from adler. the work contains at the end a detailed bibliography of the works by adler, and an exhaustive bibliography of works on adler. these are useful resources for Kierkegaard scholars to be aware of. this is an outstanding and highly readable study. it is a textbook case for the strengths of source-work research. Koch has combed through all of the possible sources including archival material for any and all information about Kierkegaard and adler. he is thus able to document meticulously every step in his argumentation. To fully appreciate the historical significance of this work, one must realize that it appeared in the same year as bruce h. Kirmmse’s Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark.5 Kirmmse’s work is, of course, well known for its useful overview of Kierkegaard’s relations to individual figures in the Golden Age, such as Mynster, martensen, grundtvig, and heiberg. but Koch’s work takes this a step further insofar as it dedicates a full monograph-length specialized study to adler, one of Kierkegaard’s most important Danish sources. Not only is this the first monograph on adler, but it is also a true pioneering effort in source-work research on Kierkegaard and his danish contemporaries. one can also gain a greater appreciation for Koch’s achievement when one contrasts it with niels thulstrup’s Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846, which was published in 1967.6 thulstrup’s work was heavily ideological and apologetic. he was determined to prop Kierkegaard up on a pedestal at any cost, and as a result his analyses of the relation of Kierkegaard to hegel are highly distorted, despite the appearance of being based on source-work research. by contrast, Koch’s work is entirely sober and nonpartisan. he clearly and objectively lays out the issue based on the information that he has garnered from the sources and then analyzes this accordingly without any presupposed agenda. the result is a highly readable and informative account of the important relations of Kierkegaard, adler, and hegel. this is an outstanding work that was ahead of its time. it should be translated into one of the major languages so that it can enjoy a wider reception that it so richly deserves. although this is a book about adler and

bruce h. Kirmmse, Kierkegaard and Golden Age Denmark, bloomington and indianapolis: university of indiana press 1990. 6 niels thulstrup, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846, copenhagen: gyldendal 1967. in english as Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george L. Stengren, princeton: princeton university press 1980. 5

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thus, strictly speaking, not a piece of Kierkegaard secondary literature, nonetheless it contains a goldmine of information that is immensely relevant for Kierkegaard studies. Jon Stewart

reviews and critical discussions bertung, birgit, “Søren Kierkegaards syn på ‘den generiske differents.’ Kritik af en klat fra c.h. Kochs Flue på Hegels udødelige næse,” Fønix, vol. 15, no. 1, 1991, pp. 22–30. grøn, arne, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 15, 1991, pp. 157–9. hansen, Leif bork, review in Præsteforeningens Blad, vol. 81, 1991, pp. 10–13. Kemp, peter, “La sobriété éthique selon Le Livre sur Adler de Søren Kierkegaard” in Søren Kierkegaard. Pensée et problémes de éthique, ed. by anne-christine habbard and Jacques message, Lille: presses universitaires du Septentrion 2009, pp. 331–49. Koch, carl henrik, “en replik,” Fønix, 15, no. 2, 1991, pp. 105–7. — “en replik til Leif bork hansen,” Præsteforeningens Blad, vol. 20, 1991, pp. 414–15.

Sejer Kühle, Søren Kierkegaards Barndom og Ungdom [Søren Kierkegaard’s childhood and youth], copenhagen: aschehoug 1950, 211 pp.

Sejer Kühle (1886–1957) was a danish literary historian, who was widely respected as one of the pioneering figures in the field of Kierkegaard’s biography. From 1931 to 1935 he published in five installments “Nogle Oplysninger om Søren Kierkegaard 1834–38” in the Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift.1 in this work he criticizes Frithiof brandt’s Den unge Søren Kierkegaard.2 Kühle also published some other short biographical works on Kierkegaard and his family.3 all of these were preliminary studies for Kühle’s main work, Søren Kierkegaards Barndom og Ungdom, which was published by aschehoug in 1950.4 upon its publication the book immediately attracted great attention. as the title suggests, it is largely a biographical account of the first part of Kierkegaard’s life. The work is divided into an introduction and 9 unnumbered chapters. there is a sixteen-page summary of the work in english, which is printed at the end and paginated with roman numerals. The first chapter is dedicated to Kierkegaard’s parents and primarily his father, michael pedersen Kierkegaard. it recounts the story of how m.p. Kierkegaard as a young man came from Sædding in Jutland to become an apprentice for his uncle in the hosier business. when he grew up, he went into business for himself and became quite prosperous. His first wife Kirstine Nielsdatter Røyen died in 1796 after Sejer Kühle, “nogle oplysninger om Søren Kierkegaard 1834–38, i,” Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift, 9th series, vol. 4, 1931, pp. 253–63. “nogle oplysninger om Søren Kierkegaard 1834–38, ii,” Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift, 9th series, vol. 5, 1932, pp. 150–6. “nogle oplysninger om Søren Kierkegaard 1834–38, iii,” Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift, 9th series, vol. 5, 1932, pp. 198–214. “nogle oplysninger om Søren Kierkegaard 1834–38, iv,” Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift, 9th series, vol. 6, 1933, pp. 163–72. “nogle oplysninger om Søren Kierkegaard 1834–38, v,” Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift, 10th series, vol. 2, 1935, pp. 19–25. 2 Frithiof brandt, Den unge Søren Kierkegaard. En række nye bidrag, copenhagen: Levens & munksgaards Forlag 1929. 3 Sejer Kühle, “Søren Kierkegaards Fader,” in Gads Danske Magasin, 1943, pp. 468–80, and “Søren Kierkegaard og den heibergske Kreds,” Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift, 12th series, vol. 2, 1947, pp. 1–13. 4 Sejer Kühle, Søren Kierkegaards Barndom og Ungdom, copenhagen: aschehoug 1950. 1

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only two years of marriage, leaving him with no children. in 1797 he married ane Sørensdatter Lund, with whom he would have a number of children including Søren. chapters 2 and 3 explore Kierkegaard’s childhood and time at the School of civic virtue in copenhagen. here his complex relation to his father is investigated. Kühle draws on narratives given in Kierkegaard’s works, such as Johannes climacus’ account of his upbringing or Judge william’s recollections of his time as a schoolboy, and takes these to be accurate autobiographical reflections of Kierkegaard’s own life. to his credit, he also makes use of more reliable sources of information such as Frederik welding’s recollections, where he recalls Kierkegaard when he was a pupil at the School of civic virtue. Kühle also draws fairly extensively on material from the journals, which is not always easy to interpret as straightforwardly autobiographical. chapter 3 goes into some detail about the ways in which m.p. Kierkegaard tried to instill in Søren a deep christian religiosity. it is claimed that it was from this time in his youth that he came to conceive of his life as a form of suffering, a thorn in the flesh. the fourth chapter looks at Kierkegaard’s initial years as a student at the university of copenhagen, which he entered in the fall of 1830. Kühle explains the religious context in copenhagen at the time in connection with the grundtvigian movement, which Kierkegaard’s brother, peter christian found attractive. Kühle also discusses the influence of Hegel and Schleiermacher on the young Kierkegaard. Hans Lassen martensen’s lectures and tutorials played an important role in fostering this interest. the famous gilleleje journal entries are discussed, and Kühle understands them as Kierkegaard’s attempt to find himself. He calls into question Kierkegaard’s commitment to christianity at this early period. The fifth chapter continues this story with a focus on the literary milieu during the time that Kierkegaard was a student at the university. The author first looks at Peter Engel Lind, who had an influence on Kierkegaard’s early article “Another Defense of woman’s great abilities.” there is also an account of Kierkegaard’s relation to the discussions going on at the Student association. drawing on material from his previous article, Kühle explores the young Kierkegaard’s relation to Johan Ludvig heiberg and the literary circle surrounding the heiberg family.5 there is also an analysis of Kierkegaard’s friendship with his neighbor on nytorv, poul martin møller. the philosopher Frederik christian Sibbern was also close to the young Kierkegaard for a time, but their relationship became more and more distant as Kierkegaard grew older. Kühle explores Kierkegaard’s relation to hans christian andersen in connection with From the Papers of One Still Living. in this chapter the author takes up again his polemic with Frithiof brandt’s Den unge Søren Kierkegaard. Kühle argues that brandt’s study is not grounded in the sources but rather is too much the result of the author’s rich imagination. Kühle draws extensively on henrik hertz’s memoirs, Stemninger og Tilstande, as a source text for the young Kierkegaard.6 chapter 6, “relations to his home,” traces the events in the Kierkegaard house during the mid-1830s. the family experienced the death of two of Kierkegaard’s sibling and their mother. Kühle also traces Kierkegaard’s strained relations with his 5 6

Kühle, “Søren Kierkegaard og den heibergske Kreds.” henrik hertz, Stemninger og Tilstande, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1839.

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elder brother peter christian. during this period Kierkegaard was spending large amounts of money and incurring debts, which his father had to cover for him. but at some point he seems to have had some kind of religious experience that turned him back to christianity, a development which gave him peace of mind after a turbulent time. The seventh chapter investigates Kierkegaard’s final years at the university. It was apparently the death of his father in 1838 that prompted Kierkegaard to prepare conscientiously for his final examinations for his degree. The death of Michael pedersen Kierkegaard is the occasion for a discussion of the purported family curse that all of his children would die before him. but now that he was dead, while Søren and peter christian were still alive, the story was in need of reinterpretation. it is in this context that Kierkegaard experienced the great earthquake that he mentions in his journals.7 The final chapter attempts to draw some qualified conclusions about the character traits from youth that continued to be relevant in Kierkegaard’s later years. one of these is his melancholy, which plagued him throughout his life. moreover, Kierkegaard’s understanding of christianity as synonymous with suffering set up the basic framework for his break with mynster and the danish State church. the work ends with a discussion of The Concept of Irony and Either/Or. Søren Kierkegaards Barndom og Ungdom occupies an important place in the development of danish source-work studies. Kühle is very self-conscious about his methodology and tries to orient himself on what he finds in the sources. He does not shy from criticizing others who fail to base their conclusions on the source material. but his work suffers from the same shortcoming of other works of source-work research, namely, the tendency to get lost in the details. there does not seem to be any overarching vision or general thesis about Kierkegaard that the book wants to convey. the introduction does not even cover two full pages. the author seems content simply to attack what he takes to be individual misunderstandings and misconceptions concerning Kierkegaard’s biography. in any case, his thoroughness was rewarded by the great attention that the work attracted. it is a shame that he did not have the opportunity to continue his study to the rest of Kierkegaard’s life. Jon Stewart

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SKS 27, 291–2, papir 305:3 / JP 5, 5430.

reviews and critical discussions anonymous, The Times Literary Supplement, London, 1950, p. 697. brix, hans, review in Berlingske Aftenavis, June 28, 1950. Frederiksen, emil, review in Berlingske Tidende, august 26, 1950. henriksen, aage, review in Meddelelser fra Søren Kierkegaard-Selskabet, vol. 2, copenhagen: munksgaard 1950, nos. 3–4, pp. 45–9. holm, Søren, review in Aalborg Stifts Kongelig allene privilegerede Addresse-Avis og Avertissementstidende, august 8, 1950. Jensen, zakarias, “Fadrens død var ‘Jordrystelsen’ i Kierkegaards Liv,” Ekstrabladet, march 15, 1950. Johansen, niels Kaas, review in Information, august 4, 1950. neiiendam, henrik, review in Ekstrabladet, august 3, 1950. nielsen, christian, review in Møns Dagblad, august 2, 1950. nielsen, Frederik, review in Social-Demokraten, July 6, 1950. paludan, Jacob, review in Nationaltidende, July 16, 1950. pedersen, olaf, review in Randers Dagblad og Folketidende, december 15, 1950. Sløk, Johannes, review in Kristeligt Dagblad, September 25, 1950. Stangerup, hakon, review in Fyens Stiftstidende, august 8, 1950.

K.e. Løgstrup, Opgør med Kierkegaard

[controverting Kierkegaard], copenhagen: gyldendal 1968, 173 pp.

Knud ejler Løgstrup’s Opgør med Kierkegaard (controverting Kierkegaard)1 from 1968 marks the conclusion of 20 years of dispute in danish existential theology and philosophy concerning the understanding and legitimacy of certain tendencies in Kierkegaardian thought. the dispute began with Løgstrup’s german lectures on Kierkegaard and heidegger in berlin in 1950,2 and it intensified through the 1950s and ’60s. Opgør med Kierkegaard was reissued as a photographic reprint in 1994, followed by a slightly revised third edition in 2005 containing a postscript by Svend andersen. in 2013 a critically revised fourth edition was issued with a new postscript by Svein aage christoffersen. in the two latter editions references to Kierkegaard’s works have been supplemented with references to Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter (the 2005 edition only partially). a german expanded translation and edition was released in the same year as the Danish first edition, Auseinandersetzung mit Kierkegaard.3 Opgør med Kierkegaard differs in a very important sense from the earlier work from 1950; whereas in 1950 Løgstrup offered an internal critique of Kierkegaard in the form of a correction of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the infinite demand as the inner sense of responsibility, he now, in 1968, announces a comprehensive external critique of what he perceives as “the tendency and consequence of [Kierkegaard’s] understanding of christianity.”4 here Løgstrup underscores the topic: Kierkegaard’s understanding of christianity, that is, his theology. this is yet another important difference, indicative of the development of his criticism compared to the work from 1950. whereas in 1950 Løgstrup was concerned with Kierkegaard as philosopher specifically, he now turns his attention to Kierkegaard as theologian.

the danish word opgør is not easy to translate. it comes from accounting (where it means to settle an account or a balance sheet), and it also means having a controversy. the expression “to settle a score” comes close. 2 published as K.e. Løgstrup, Kierkegaards und Heideggers Existenzanalyse und ihr Verhältnis zur Verkündigung, berlin: erich blaschker verlag 1950. 3 K.e. Løgstrup, Auseinandersetzung mit Kierkegaard, trans. by rosemarie Løgstrup, munich: ch. Kaiser 1968. this work was part of the series, Kontroverse um Kierkegaard und Grundtvig, vols. 1–3, ed. by götz harbsmeyer and K.e. Løgstrup, vol. 2. 4 K.e. Løgstrup, Opgør med Kierkegaard, copenhagen: gyldendal 1968, p. 9. 1

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Løgstrup identifies what he perceives as four specific problems in Kierkegaard’s understanding of christianity, addressing each separately in the book’s four parts. in the preface he also makes it clear that he intends to use his exposition and critique of Kierkegaard to argue for his own, opposing view. part i, “christianity without the historical Jesus,” deals with the foundation of faith. Here Løgstrup focuses on Kierkegaard’s definition of faith as paradoxical (referencing Either/Or, Philosophical Fragments, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and Practice in Christianity) and thus incommensurable with knowledge and understanding. the god-man is a paradox, meaning that Jesus’ time on earth is not of importance to faith; of sole importance is the statement that the first congregation believed in his existence. conversely, according to Løgstrup, for faith to be legitimate it must rest on understanding, and here understanding of the historical Jesus is a necessary condition. this is a main point in Løgstrup’s critique of what he perceives as Kierkegaard’s fideism or anti-intellectualism; understanding the life of Jesus presents us with a frame for understanding our own lives, though this does not necessarily lead to faith, only to its possibility. In Part II, “The Sacrifice,” Løgstrup turns to the question of Christian existence, its form and content. Focus in this part is on the meaning and interpretation of suffering, and here lies what must be seen as the fundamental disagreement with Kierkegaard. referencing Judge for Yourself! in particular (but also the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Practice in Christianity, For Self-Examination and The Moment) Løgstrup presents what he perceives as Kierkegaard’s nihilism and leveling of human mundane existence. Kierkegaard’s approval of imitatio Christi together with his nihilism leads not only to a fundamental disregard of earthly value and meaning, but, crucially, to an inhuman instrumentalization of one’s fellow man, with the other serving only as a means for suffering and thus for faith, and my obligation being to serve the other in a similar manner. Løgstrup offers a replacement for what he labels Kierkegaard’s extensive concept of sin, namely, intensive sin. extensive sin is all encompassing, which means it is ontological in the sense that being as a whole is engulfed in it. Intensive sin, on the contrary, confines evil and sin to a part of existence without judging existence as a whole. this leads Løgstrup to his main concept (and new addition) in his critique of Kierkegaard, the sovereign expressions of life. these ontological phenomena (and their counterparts, the encircling thoughts and emotions) are presented in part iii, “The Infinite Movement.” Løgstrup’s point of departure is a critique of Kierkegaard’s analysis of immediacy (or immediate existence), referencing in particular Fear and Trembling but also very importantly The Sickness unto Death (and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript).5 the so-called sovereign expressions of life are Løgstrup’s term for the part of existence not undermined by sin. their counterpart, but direct opposite, is man’s own encircling thoughts and emotions. where man has to take responsibility for the evil caused by his selfish nature, he cannot take responsibility for the possibilities in existence for suspending his selfishness. These possibilities, the sovereign expressions of life, are fundamental phenomena in social life, and Løgstrup names trust and mercy as prime examples; as examples of encircling 5

Jean-paul Sartre’s play, Le Diable et le bon Dieu is also used extensively.

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thoughts and emotions Løgstrup names resentment (feeling insulted), envy, jealousy, and hatred. it is crucial to the understanding of Løgstrup’s position to keep in mind that while we ourselves are the cause of the encircling thoughts and emotions (they are our feelings and emotions), we are actually not the cause of the sovereign expressions of life; i am not the cause of “my” being merciful or trusting nor of “my” love towards friends and family. mercy, love and trust are, according to Løgstrup, social possibilities within interrelated and interdependent human life, and when these phenomena overtake us, we are actually released from our confinement within our own reflecting and resentful selves; immediacy is the key to really being ourselves. Kierkegaard’s extensive concept of sin blinds him to the sovereign expressions of life (hiding them within conformity), but Løgstrup’s intensive concept of sin places sin solely within the human, selfish self, that is, within man’s own agency, within our own will. our own will and agency (encircling thoughts and emotions) are exactly what the sovereign expressions of life liberate us from; in immediate concern for the other we are released from our selfish selves by the other, according to Løgstrup. Following this analysis, Løgstrup takes a step back in part iv, “the nothingness,” to scrutinize the ontology or understanding of existence implied by Kierkegaard’s theology. inherent in Kierkegaard’s philosophy and theology is nihilism, both epistemically (concerning the connection between understanding and existence) and axiologically (concerning value in human existence). Kierkegaard, according to Løgstrup, is an epistemological nihilist because his emphasis on the paradox of faith means that he leaves no space in human existence for any real knowledge concerning existence. Similarly, he argues that Kierkegaard’s ontology leaves no room for true values in existence. therefore, Kierkegaard is in fact what nietzsche termed, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, a Hinterweltler (backworldsman), effectively removing all value and meaning from existence and placing it “on the other side,” outside of existence. this, however, not only leads to a false understanding of christianity (theology) but also to a false analysis of human existence (philosophy). Løgstrup’s Opgør med Kierkegaard received severe criticism almost immediately upon its release. in a 1969 talk,6 gregor malantschuk completely denied the relevance of the book, highlighting the following central point: “apparently influenced by modern existentialist thought, Løgstrup invents so much content in the terms negativity and nothingness in Kierkegaard that Kierkegaard’s clear intentions totally disappear.”7 in a similar vein, Løgstrup’s critique has often been labeled idiosyncratic since it is aimed at (a) a specifically fideist interpretation of Kierkegaard as well as (b) nihilist tendencies in Kierkegaard. malantschuk is aware of this, but being a Kierkegaard exegete, he sees it only as an error on Løgstrup’s side. however, malantschuk’s critique could be missing the point of Løgstrup’s agenda, since Opgør med Kierkegaard can also be understood as the conclusion of 20 years of controversy with one danish Kierkegaardian theologian in particular, Kristoffer olesen Larsen, who modeled an existentialist theology on his reading of

it was later published in gregor malantschuk, “Løgstrups opgør med Kierkegaard,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 163–81. 7 ibid., p. 176. 6

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Kierkegaard.8 This theology, where both the fideist and nihilistic lines of thought are strongly present, was highly influential in Denmark in the 1950s and 1960s in the theological and ecclesiastical movement Tidehverv, of which olesen Larsen was a central figure. In Løgstrup’s Preface to the series containing the German edition of Opgør med Kierkegaard,9 he provides a context for his critique of Kierkegaard stating that contemporary existential theology’s use of Kierkegaard stifles important existential problems. this suggests that Løgstrup’s critique is aimed mainly at the existential theological Kierkegaard interpretation of his time, although this matter is still being debated. bjørn rabjerg

olesen Larsen’s Kierkegaard interpretation is published in Søren Kierkegaard læst af K. Olesen Larsen, vols. 1–2, ed. by vibeke olesen Larsen and tage wilhjelm, copenhagen: gad 1966. 9 Kontroverse um Kierkegaard und Grundtvig, vols. 1–3, ed. by götz harbsmeyer and K.e. Løgstrup, Das Menschliche und das Christliche, munich: ch. Kaiser 1966, vol. 1. 8

reviews and critical discussions andersen, Svend, “ ‘i umiddelbarheden begynder det’—Løgstrups opgør med Kierkegaard,” Slagmark, vol. 42, 2005, pp. 63–75. bramming, torben, Livsmod på Guds ord, copenhagen: anis 1999, pp. 59–83. — Tidehvervs historie, copenhagen: anis 1993, pp. 76–84. bukdahl, Jørgen K, “nihilisten Kierkegaard,” in his Om Søren Kierkegaard. Artikler i udvalg, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1981, pp. 202–9. — “Løgstrup og Kierkegaard,” Om Søren Kierkegaard. Artikler i udvalg, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1981, pp. 210–14. bultmann, rudolf, “reply to K.e. Løgstrup,” The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, new york: harper & row 1966, pp. 268–71. christoffersen, Svein aage, “eksistensteologi og humanism—om konteksten for Løgstrups oppgjør med Kierkegaard,” in Livtag med Den etiske fordring, ed. by david bugge and peter aaboe Sørensen, aarhus: Klim 2007, pp. 117–39. gøtke, povl, “recent Scandinavian Literature on Works of Love,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 1998, pp. 232–44. grøn, arne, “Subjektivitet og livsytring,” Fønix, vol. 4, 1994, pp. 194–212. — “Suverænitet og negativitet. Løgstrups opgør med Kierkegaard,” Kredsen, vol. 2, 1994, pp. 32–51. — Subjektivitet og negativitet, copenhagen: gyldendal 1997, p. 36; pp. 47–8; and pp. 208–9. — “Livsytring, person, situation. Løgstrup og subjekiviteten,” in Løgstrups mange ansigter, ed. by david bugge, pia rose böwadt and peter aaboe Sørensen, copenhagen: anis 2005, pp. 27–42. hansen, Knud, review in Præsteforeningens Blad, vol. 59, 1969, pp. 49–57. Kemp, peter, “den religiøse lidenskab. Sløk mellem Kierkegaard og Løgstrup,” in Mig og evigheden. Johannes Sløks religionsfilosofi, ed. by Lars Sandbeck, copenhagen: anis 2007, pp. 23–47. malantschuk, gregor, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 163–81. nordentoft, Kresten, Kierkegaards psykologi, copenhagen: hans reitzels Forlag 1972, pp. 99–100; p. 158; pp. 232–4; p. 319; p. 459; p. 464; pp. 467–71. rabjerg, bjørn, “Løgstrups kritik af Kierkegaard: den uendelige kvalitative forskel på fortabelse og kærlighed,” Res Cogitans, vol. 1 no. 4, 2007, pp. 20–58. — “Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard og undertegnede, eller undertegnede alene,” Dansk Kirketidende, vol. 165, no. 1, 2013, pp. 10–13. — “Suveræne livsytringer og kredsende tanker og følelser—en kritisk udfoldelse af deres karakteristika: Løgstrups ontologiske differens ii,” Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift, vol. 77, no. 4, 2014, pp. 258–75.

Schmidt, Kirsten marie, “et bidrag til diskussionen af Løgstrups opgør med Kierkegaard—med henblik på kærlighed og tilværelsestolkning,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 14, 1988, pp. 70–84. Smidt hansen, bent, review in Tidehverv, vol. 42, 1968, pp. 52–4. Sørensen, villy, “Løgstrups opgør med Kierkegaard,” in his Mellem Fortid og Fremtid. Kronikker og kommentarer, copenhagen: gyldendal 1969, pp. 117–26. Stokes, patrick, “Kierkegaardian vision and the concrete other,” Continental Philosophy Review, vol. 39, 2007, pp. 393–413. wind, h.c., “die rezeption Kierkegaards in der neueren dänischen theologie,” Text & Kontext, ed. by heinrich anz et al., copenhagen and munich: wilhelm Fink verlag 1983 (Sonderreihe, vol. 15), pp. 187–209.

gregor malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard

[dialectics and existence in Søren Kierkegaard], copenhagen: hans reitzels Forlag 1968, 356 pp.

the book Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard was published in 1968 by the well-known ukrainian-danish Kierkegaard scholar gregor malantschuk (1902–78).1 the work was translated by the author’s friends howard and edna hong and appeared in english under the title Kierkegaard’s Thought in 1971.2 in 1984 it appeared in a Japanese translation by masaru otani.3 this work is unabashedly hailed by its american translators as “the best book currently available on Kierkegaard in any language.”4 The study consists of three long chapters, the first two of which are dedicated in a sense to Kierkegaard’s journals and the third to the published works. the stated goal of this book is to identify the “dialectical coherence” and the underlying “comprehensive plan” behind Kierkegaard’s vast and heterogeneous authorship.5 although malantschuk rarely mentions secondary literature and focuses almost exclusively on the primary texts, his polemical stance seems to be aimed against those who would deny that there is any such unity in Kierkegaard’s authorship and who thus attempt to interpret individual works in isolation from the other ones and from the Nachlass. this investigation aims to demonstrate, so to speak, the logos in the chaos, and the unity in the plurality. The first chapter, entitled “Anthropological Contemplation,” explores Kierkegaard’s various studies in the early journals and tries to show how Kierkegaard “gradually moved away from the objective branches of knowledge toward a steadily gregor malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, copenhagen: hans reitzels Forlag 1968; 2nd ed. c.a. reitzel 1990. 2 gregor malantschuk, Kierkegaard’s Thought, trans. by howard v. and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1971; 2nd ed. 1974; 3rd ed., milwaukee: marquette university press 2003. 3 gregor malantschuk, キェルケゴールの弁証法と実存 [Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard], trans. by masaru otani, osaka: toho-shuppan 1984. 4 malantschuk, Kierkegaard’s Thought, p. vii. 5 malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 11 (Kierkegaard’s Thought, pp. 5–6). 1

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stronger emphasis on the subjective elements which bear on man’s existential development.”6 taking a tip from one of Kierkegaard’s entries,7 malantschuk claims that the unifying theme of these early investigations is authentic “anthropological contemplation.”8 these anthropological studies take many forms and cover many different fields: “mythology, esthetics, anthropology, philosophy, philosophy of religion, ethics, and—first and last—theology.”9 one could also add psychology, which is treated in some detail, although it does not appear on the list. in this initial chapter, malantschuk examines these different headings in turn on the basis of various passages from the journals. Some of the headings are further subdivided; for example, under “philosophy” the author treats Kierkegaard’s relations to individual philosophers, such as hegel, J.g. Fichte, i.h. Fichte, and Kant,10 as well as specific philosophical problems, such as ontological issues, the problem of freedom, and the boundary between metaphysics and ethics.11 disappointingly, malantschuk’s analyses in this initial chapter are rather superficial due presumably to the fact that he wants to give an overview of the material. he thus frequently quotes from Kierkegaard’s journals and notebooks, but rarely explores the quoted material in any detail. what is most unfortunate is that malantschuk’s methodology undermines his ultimate goal of demonstrating the unity of the material. by running through so much and such varied material so quickly, he simply reinforces the perception that there is no continuity. this is exacerbated by the fact that the discussions following the individual themes are not always clearly demarcated but rather blurred together. this can be seen already from the list of themes that he gives (quoted above). it seems rather odd, for example, that philosophy, philosophy of religion, ethics, and aesthetics are listed as separate topics. on the usual understanding, the latter three are thought to be individual branches of philosophy and not discrete topics. these problems are further aggravated in the english translation; while in the original danish text the long chapters are broken up into individual sections, the english translation has for some reason eliminated the section headings and breaks, presenting the reader with a long continuous block of text. the decision of the translators to leave out these section breaks renders the English text considerably more difficult to follow and to orient oneself in than the original Danish original. In any case, in this first chapter little evidence is given for the continuity that this work wants to demonstrate. on the contrary, the reader is simply given a very quick overview, which would hardly facilitate an understanding of the material if the reader were not already familiar with it ahead of time. the malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 12 (Kierkegaard’s Thought, p. 7). 7 SKS 27, 234, papir 264:3 / JP 1, 37. 8 malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 18 (Kierkegaard’s Thought, p. 12). 9 malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 20 (Kierkegaard’s Thought, p. 14). 10 malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 60–9 (Kierkegaard’s Thought, pp. 58–68). 11 malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 69–99 (Kierkegaard’s Thought, pp. 69–101). 6

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original claim to show how Kierkegaard “moved away from the objective branches of knowledge” and toward the subject is never demonstrated. While Chapter 1 is concerned with specific themes in Kierkegaard’s early journals and notebooks, chapter 2 is concerned to sketch what malantschuk regards as Kierkegaard’s dialectical method. the hidden premise in this discussion is that Kierkegaard developed rather early a single method, which he used consistently in his authorship from then on. malantschuk chooses to give an account of this method not based on the published works, as one might expect, but rather on the journals and notebooks, due presumably to the fact that he wishes to show how Kierkegaard developed this method there in large part prior to the beginning of the published authorship. the analyses in this chapter are considerably better developed than in the previous one. here one can see more clearly malantschuk’s own line of interpretation in contrast to chapter 1, which had more the look of a simple inventory of themes and topics of interest to Kierkegaard. the second chapter begins with a brief discussion of the concept of consistency, which is hailed as central to Kierkegaard’s method.12 this, however, cannot be regarded as any particular revelation since presumably any sound method will strive for consistency, and any method that fails to do so could hardly be regarded as credible. malantschuk then sketches what he regards as the method in terms of Kierkegaard’s attempt to see different elements in terms of an organic unity. he is careful to note that this is not to be confused with hegel’s method since “the goal for all Kierkegaard’s dialectical efforts…is simply and solely organic unity and not systematic unity.”13 the attempt to distinguish the two thinkers on this point, however, collapses when one recalls that hegel frequently claims that systematic unity is precisely organic unity14 and compares the development of the system of philosophy with that of an organic entity.15 the goal of the method, claims malantschuk, is to see the different kinds of organic unities at all different levels of human existence.16 he claims, “Kierkegaard seeks to embrace the total actuality of the subject within ever new perspectives until he finds an exhaustive interpretation of malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 103ff. (Kierkegaard’s Thought, pp. 105ff.) cf. also Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 158ff. (Kierkegaard’s Thought, pp. 163ff.). 13 malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 108 (Kierkegaard’s Thought, p. 111). 14 See, for example, hegel The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, ed. and trans. by h.S. harris and walter cerf, albany, new york: State university of new york press 1977, p. 103: “philosophy, as a totality of knowledge produced by reflection, becomes a system, that is, an organic whole of concepts, whose highest law is not the intellect, but reason.” 15 See Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by a.v. miller, oxford: clarendon press 1977, p. 2. The Philosophy of History, trans. by J. Sibree, new york: willey book co. 1944, p. 18. The Encyclopaedia Logic. Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. by t.F. gerats, w.a. Suchting, and h.S. harris, indianapolis: hackett 1991, § 161, addition. 16 malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 115–16 (Kierkegaard’s Thought, pp. 118–19). 12

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all the issues related to this actuality.”17 once again, it is not clear how malantschuk takes this to be different from hegel’s project, which also aims to give an exhaustive account of the subject at all the different levels. perhaps the most astonishing of all is malantschuk’s account of what he calls “interdependent concepts” or “coupled concepts.”18 here he claims that an original feature of Kierkegaard’s method is to see conceptual pairs such as “temporal-eternal,” “necessity-freedom,” “finite-infinite,” as dialectically related to one another.19 as every introductory student knows, it is the very hallmark of hegel’s dialectic that complementary concepts of this kind cannot be regarded on their own but must be conceived in their necessary relation to one another. what is astonishing is that malantschuk sees Kierkegaard’s conception of dialectic not as derivative from hegel, as it clearly is (at least on this point), but rather as polemically aimed against hegel. Malantschuk claims that these “coupled concepts” represent the first aspect of the methodology, which he designates as “latitudinal.” the “longitudinal” aspect contains the movement of these categories through different stages. He identifies three different elements of this second aspect of the method: (1) “the changes which emerge during the subject’s movement through the different levels and positions toward christianity,”20 (2) the “theory of the leap,”21 and (3) “the law of repetition.”22 once again, these are all understood in contrast to hegel, although Kierkegaard derived much of the inspiration for the concept of the leap and of repetition from hegel himself. a third element of the dialectical method, in addition to the latitudinal and the longitudinal, is introduced with the term “the depth perspective.”23 this seems to be concerned with the relation to the individual in contrast to an objective body of knowledge. malantschuk claims that Kierkegaard is interested in arriving at a complete, exhaustive view of the subjective actuality of the human being in contrast to other philosophers who regard things from a larger, more abstract perspective where the experience of the individual is diminished or reduced to irrelevance. malantschuk continues with a detailed account of Kierkegaard’s development of his theory of stages in the journals and notebooks.24 this is used presumably as an

malantschuk, Thought, p. 120). 18 malantschuk, Thought, p. 129). 19 malantschuk, Thought, p. 129). 20 malantschuk, Thought, p. 132). 21 ibid. 22 malantschuk, Thought, p. 135). 23 malantschuk, Thought, p. 136). 24 malantschuk, Thought, pp. 144–5). 17

Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 117 (Kierkegaard’s Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 126 (Kierkegaard’s Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 126 (Kierkegaard’s Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 128 (Kierkegaard’s Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 131 (Kierkegaard’s Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 132 (Kierkegaard’s Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 140 (Kierkegaard’s

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illustration of the method as it has been sketched. once again there is a conscious and consistent effort to distance Kierkegaard’s theory of stages from that of hegel. towards the end of the chapter malantschuk tries to answer a potential objection to his interpretation. by claiming that Kierkegaard’s method is concerned to give an exhaustive account of the human subject and represents a unity in the authorship, malantschuk might seem to be ascribing to him a system or some form of systematic thinking, which, as is well known, Kierkegaard clearly rejects. malantschuk tries to respond to this charge by pointing out what he regards as significant differences between hegel’s system and Kierkegaard’s thinking.25 the problem with his defense is that the elements of difference that he mentions are rather general and only indirectly concerned with the methodology that he spends so much time sketching. certainly no one would claim that hegel and Kierkegaard are completely in harmony on everything in their thought, and certainly it is not difficult to find places where they diverge; but the original question has to do with Kierkegaard’s dialectical methodology and its similarity with that of hegel. on this point, there can be no question that the method which malantschuk sketches based on the journals and notebooks has profound similarities with hegel’s. Further, these similarities have significant implications for the conception of philosophy as a system; indeed, for hegel, the dialectical method and system are necessarily related. The third and final chapter treats these same issues in Kierkegaard’s entire published authorship. needless to say, this is a very ambitious and very long chapter. on the whole, the dialectical method that malantschuk wants to ascribe to Kierkegaard remains rather scattered; however, individual elements of it are clear enough. the problem is that most of these are well known to be key aspects of hegel’s dialectical methodology, which Kierkegaard is often thought to have been in a polemic with. this complicated and problematic relation is not adequately addressed. despite the enthusiastic claims made about this work, it does not seem to have had any long-term influence on the field. Although there are still people today who argue for some kind of systematic unity in Kierkegaard’s diverse writings, it is unclear if they take their inspiration from this work. Kierkegaard’s Thought can, however, be lauded as one of the first and even today very few books that dedicates a significant amount of space to an analysis of Kierkegaard’s journals and notebooks. Jon Stewart

malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 164–7 (Kierkegaard’s Thought, pp. 169–72). 25

reviews and critical discussions arendt, rudolph, review in Berlingske Aftenavis, September 26, 1968. bukdahl, Jørgen K., review in Information, august 19, 1968. Fenger, henning, review in Politiken, June 17, 1968. gudmundsen, per, review in Aktuelt, February 28, 1968. holm, Søren, review in Berlingske Tidende, July 3, 1968. Lindhardt, p.g., review in Jyllands-Posten, march 4, 1968. Søe, n.h., review in Kristeligt Dagblad, July 24, 1968. — review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 7, 1968, pp. 196-200. Stewart, Jon, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, new york: cambridge university press 2003, pp. 7–8. — “the reception of Kierkegaard’s Nachlaß in the english-Speaking world,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2003, pp. 277–315; see pp. 286–92. tullberg, Steen, “denmark: the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 3–120; see pp. 61–2.

gregor malantschuk, Frihed og eksistens. Studier i Søren Kierkegaards tænkning

[Freedom and existence: Studies in Søren Kierkegaard’s thinking], ed. by niels Jørgen cappelørn and poul müller, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1980, 263 pp.

the danish theologian and philosopher gregor malantschuk’s (1902–78) work, Frihed og eksistens. Studier i Søren Kierkegaards tænkning, is a collection of eighteen articles that malantschuk wrote and published between the years 1940 and 1979. niels Jørgen cappelørn and paul müller selected the articles for the compendium, which forms an important supplement to malantschuk’s books on Søren Kierkegaard. most of the articles were initially delivered as short lectures during the meetings at the official Danish Kierkegaard Society (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabet), where malantschuk, among other prominent Kierkegaard scholars, served as a board member from 1951 until his death. malantschuk is one of the few danish Kierkegaard scholars who have had multiple works translated from Danish to English, and as a result he made a significant impact on the anglo-american reception of Kierkegaard’s philosophy and theology. malantschuk also engaged in a long-lasting friendship and professional partnership with the iconic Kierkegaard translators howard v. hong and edna h. hong, which led to malantschuk’s enormous contribution during the publication of Søren Kierkegaard’s Papers and Journals,1 where malantschuk provided the volumes with extensive terminological descriptions. the ukrainian born malantschuk came to denmark from germany in 1934 only months after finishing his doctorate in philosophy. At that time Malantschuk’s philosophical interests and life-views paired well with his primary studies of arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich nietzschesurely, at that time, malantschuk was far from the christian message he later came to embrace in Kierkegaard. thus, it was Kierkegaard’s interpretation of christianity that became malantschuk’s pathway

Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, vols. 1–6, ed. and trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, assisted by gregor malantschuk, bloomington and London: indiana university press 1967–78. 1

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to a religious life, a lifestyle that he had scorned at a young age.2 it is probably accurate to say, then, that malantschuk’s writings primarily constitute a sincere and fundamentally christian interpretation of Kierkegaard’s corpus. and this collection of articles is a testimony of malantschuk’s impassioned devotion to this task. the articles in the book are organized in a chronological order, which gives the reader a rare insight into the nature of malantschuk’s attention and approach to Kierkegaard’s corpus; this approach seeks to capture and argue for an overall coherence in Kierkegaard’s thoughts (gennemtænkt helhedsopfattelse),3 instead of emphasizing the many dichotomies and contradictions we find in Kierkegaard. Surely, the latter approach had indeed been the most dominant before malantschuk’s time.4 Malantschuk’s method, which is clearly reflected in this collection of articles, was to pick out theoretical cornerstones in Kierkegaard’s thinking (often explicitly expressed in Kierkegaard’s journals), and thereafter demonstrate how these insights could clarify our understanding of the many themes we find in Kierkegaard’s works. Perhaps this great variety of themes we find in Kierkegaard’s corpus inspired malantschuk to set up an equally creative range of themes represented in these eighteen articlesone of the more appreciative features of this work. an example of this creative approach could be the short article, “Søren Kierkegaard som eksperimenterende psykolog” (Søren Kierkegaard as experimental psychologist)5 from 1953, where malantschuk portrays Kierkegaard as a master of observation, or as malantschuk prefers: a master-spy (mesterspion). malantschuk argues that it was not only Kierkegaard’s abilities to reason that made him one of the most celebrated existential thinkers, but just as much his keen talent for observing people and his surroundings. another interesting example of this thematic creativity we find in Malantschuk’s article from 1955, “Kierkegaard og Nietzsche” (Kierkegaard and nietzsche),6 where malantschuk argues for a profound similarity between Kierkegaard and nietzsche’s philosophy, namely, their mutual focus on the individual in relation to the expected rise of nihilism in the aftermath of modernity. although malantschuk had earlier been a great admirer and proponent of nietzsche’s philosophy, Kierkegaard’s religious outline, however, is here portrayed as a positive answer to the scattered and dissolved world-view that nietzsche left behind.7 Kierkegaard’s Christianity, then, is justified in opposition to the nihilistic wasteland we find in, for example, Nietzsche’s The Gay Science and Kierkegaard’s similar apocalyptic prophecy in A Literary Review of Two Ages. the introductory note in the book is a brief portrayal of malantschuk’s in many ways fascinating life story. See gregor malantschuk, Frihed og eksistens, studier i Søren Kierkegaards tænkning, ed. by niels Jørgen cappelørn and poul müller, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1980, pp. 7–9. 3 ibid., p. 17. 4 See Steen tullberg, “the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 3–120, here p. 62. 5 malantschuk, Frihed og eksistens, studier i Søren Kierkegaards tænkning, pp. 32–7. 6 ibid., pp. 60–72. 7 ibid., pp. 71–2. 2

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it is especially this relentless defense of Kierkegaard’s christianity that repeats itself throughout the eighteen articles in this compendium. one of the more potent expressions of this is malantschuk’s 1971 article, “Løgstrups opgør med Kierkegaard” (Løgstrup’s confrontation with Kierkegaard),8 which is malantschuk’s well-known and somewhat fierce response to K.E. Løgstrup’s definitive rejection of Kierkegaard’s christianity. in this article malantschuk argues that Løgstrup, the internationally renowned theologian, had not only misunderstood and misinterpreted Kierkegaard, but that there was a fundamental difference between Løgstrup and Kierkegaard’s depiction of the human nature.9 an admirable feature about this collection is that malantschuk, because of his thorough familiarity with Kierkegaard’s corpus, is able to trace and form some unique theories about Kierkegaard’s theological and philosophical inspiration. For example, in “pælen i Kødet” (the thorn in the Flesh)10 from 1940, Kierkegaard’s understanding of rapture (henrykkelse) is linked with paul’s 2 corinthians. another example is “Frihedens dialektik hos Søren Kierkegaard” (the dialectics of Freedom in Søren Kierkegaard)11 from 1949, where Kierkegaard’s concept of reality (virkelighed) is described as the central insight that conclusively founds Kierkegaard’s opposition to the dominant hegelian philosophy. also, in the 1959 article, “Søren Kierkegaard og poul m. møller” (Søren Kierkegaard and poul m. møller),12 malantschuk investigates an alternative theory about why Kierkegaard dedicated his The Concept of Anxiety to his esteemed teacher at the university of copenhagen, poul m. møller. here malantschuk depicts The Concept of Anxiety as Kierkegaard’s way of elaborating on møller’s most original thought, namely, møller’s article from 1837, “thoughts on the possibility of proofs of immortality.”13 and lastly, in the article, “begrebet erindring og dets aspekter i Søren Kierkegaards Forfatterskab” (the concept of recollection and its aspects in Søren Kierkegaard’s authorship)14 from 1966, malantschuk surveys the consequences of Kierkegaard’s rejection of plato’s Phaedo, and immanuel Kant’s a priori character of recollection (erindring). in Kierkegaard’s view, malantschuk argues, recollection must be understood as a self-relation to the content of memory.15 individually, all of the eighteen articles reveal the originality of malantschuk’s work as a scholar. in my opinion, however, malantschuk’s article from 1968, “Søren Kierkegaard og den kollaterale tænkning” (Søren Kierkegaard and the collateral thinking),16 stands out as one of the better pieces in this collection. here malantschuk takes up Kierkegaard’s relation to his professor at the university of copenhagen, F.c. Sibbern, in order to underline and highlight an often ignored philosophical connection between the two. here, malantschuk turns to Sibbern’s 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

ibid., pp. 177–95. ibid., p. 194. ibid., pp. 11–18. ibid., pp. 19–31. ibid., pp. 101–13. ibid., p. 103; p. 113. ibid., pp. 128–40. ibid., p. 133. ibid., pp. 162–76.

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idea about the collateral, that is, the interrelated connection and inseparable unity of feelings, perception, and will. For Sibbern this was an inextricable condition of human nature, and Malantschuk reveals how this view is clearly reflected and expressed in the base of Kierkegaard’s theoretical outline.17 although Kierkegaard’s relation to Sibbern has later been thoroughly documented (for example in carl henrik Koch’s article from 2009),18 i still believe that malantschuk’s article can be seen as an interesting supplement to this important story about Kierkegaard’s main intellectual impulses. Overall, the articles ought to be seen first of all as an exegetical contribution to the field of Kierkegaard studies. Indeed, Malantschuk’s sole purpose with these articles was to represent and understand Kierkegaard as a thinker—and in this light malantschuk certainly succeeded in setting an example of distinguished scholarly work. rasmus rosenberg Larsen

ibid., pp. 163–5. carl henrik Koch, “Frederik christian Sibbern: ‘the lovable, remarkable thinker, councilor Sibbern’ and ‘the political Simple-peter Sibbern,’ ” in Kierkegaard and his Danish Contemporaries, tome i, Philosophy, Politics, and Social Theory, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 229–60. 17 18

reviews and critical discussions undetermined.

Svend aage nielsen, Kierkegaard og Regensen. Kierkegaards forhold til F.C. Petersen, Poul Martin Møller, D.G. Monrad, Magnus Eiriksson, Carl Ploug, P.L. Møller, Hans Brøchner og J.C. Hostrup [Kierkegaard and regensen: Kierkegaard’s relation to F.c. petersen, poul martin møller, d.g. monrad, magnus eiriksson, carl ploug, p.L. møller, hans brøchner and J.c. hostrup], copenhagen: graabroødre torv’s Forlag 1965, 154 pp.

Founded in 1623, regensen college is a part of the history of the university of copenhagen. both a residence hall and a place where lectures and dissertation defenses were given, it was an important center for academic life for many years. Some of the leading figures of the Danish Golden Age were residents of Regensen or Regenianser. being a member of regensen involved participating in a number of customs and ceremonies that still continue to this day. the college is located just opposite the round tower, and unknowing tourists walk past it blindly. it is a red brick building that encloses a beautiful large courtyard. the book Kierkegaard og Regensen can hardly be counted as a piece of mainstream Kierkegaard research. written by a loyal Regenianser, it can be regarded in many ways as a piece of local history. the author, Sven aage nielsen, was not a Kierkegaard scholar but rather a pastor in toreby on Lolland from 1966 to 2008. he notes that in some ways the idea behind this work recalls the famous caricature of Kierkegaard in the Corsair entitled “the world revolves around Søren Kierkegaard,” where one sees the round tower, the church of our Lady, and other important copenhagen landmarks all in orbit around Kierkegaard. the thesis of this work is, so to speak, that regensen college can be regarded as a central point of focus for Kierkegaard’s life, around which he constantly orbits. he knew a number of members of regensen and important episodes in his life took place there. this

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main thesis is a rather forced claim, as will be seen in the following. more important, however, is that this can be seen as a valuable work for source-work studies since it traces important relations that Kierkegaard had to different figures of the Golden age with whom he was in constant discussion. the book begins with a brief foreword by the literary scholar F.J. billeskov Jansen. then in his own preface the author explains that the inspiration for the work came during a celebration of the 150-year jubilee of Kierkegaard’s birth that was observed at regensen in 1964. he points out that Kierkegaard mentions regensen directly in Either/Or,1 but despite this, the important role of the college in Kierkegaard’s life has not been fully appreciated. this is followed by a series of eight chapters, which illuminate Kierkegaard’s relations to the different residents of regensen. chapter 1 serves as an introduction. the author points out the important location of regensen in the old city of copenhagen. it is surrounded by or lies in close proximity to the university, the church of our Lady, and many other important sites that Kierkegaard regularly visited. many of Kierkegaard’s friends and acquaintances were residents of regensen and important events such as the oral defense of the dissertation of his brother peter christian Kierkegaard took place there. the author speculates that Kierkegaard met with the philologist Frederik christian petersen (1786–1859) at regensen. petersen was a member of Kierkegaard’s dissertation committee and at the same time the dean of regensen college. chapter 2 explores poul martin møller’s (1794–1838) time at regensen and his relation to Kierkegaard. the author recounts a number of anecdotes about møller’s residency at regensen. he then outlines in some detail the friendship that developed between møller and Kierkegaard many years later. it is claimed that møller exercised an enormous influence on Kierkegaard on a number of different points. The author recalls Kierkegaard’s deferential dedication of The Concept of Anxiety to møller. the argument about the connection between regensen and Kierkegaard seems a bit tenuous in this chapter. although there can be no doubt that møller was an important influence on Kierkegaard, Møller’s stay at Regensen was a three-year stint from 1813 to 1815, at a time when Kierkegaard was but an infant. in chapter 3 the author looks at the creation of the Student union and the activity of some of its leading figures: the poet Christian Winther (1796–1876) and the theologian ditlev gothard monrad (1811–87). the meeting that resulted in the founding of the Student union took place in regensen’s courtyard, under the shadow of the round tower. this chapter traces the development of the young Kierkegaard’s political sympathies in connection with his relation to his fellow student monrad, who later became an important politician. chapter 4 is dedicated to Kierkegaard’s relation to the controversial icelandic theologian magnus eiriksson (1806–81), who resided at regensen from 1832 to 1836. eiriksson was known for his violent polemics against leading intellectual figures such as Martensen and Grundtvig. He also saw himself in some ways as an ally of Kierkegaard and in others as a critic. eiriksson earned his living by tutoring students of theology, and when he saw his customers disappear due to his all too public polemics, he found himself in serious pecuniary distress. in his hour of need 1

SKS 2, 368 / EO1, 379.

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he applied to Kierkegaard for help, but his request was denied. here again the connection to regensen is a bit tenuous. Kierkegaard did not have any deep personal relation to eiriksson as is evidenced by his rebuff of the latter’s request. although Kierkegaard was somewhat interested in eiriksson’s criticisms of the leading danish theologians and churchmen of the day, it is not clear what any of this has to do with regensen college. Carl Ploug (1813–94) is the main figure in Chapter 5. Kierkegaard and Ploug knew each other as students at the university of copenhagen. many years later ploug was the editor of the periodical The Fatherland together with Jens Finsteen giødwad (1811–91) as his coeditor. Kierkegaard was on good terms with both men, and it was in The Fatherland that he published his polemical attack on the Corsair. here again the question arises about what any of this has to do with regensen college other than the fact that ploug happened to live there as a student starting in 1833. chapter 6 explores Kierkegaard’s relation to his enemy from the Corsair controversy, the literary scholar peder Ludvig møller (1814–65), who resided at regensen from 1834 to 1837. the author traces møller’s studies at the university and speculates that møller must have attended some of the same lectures as Kierkegaard. Later møller published articles in the Corsair along with his own journal of aesthetics, Gæa. a detailed account is given of the controversy between Kierkegaard and the Corsair that is well familiar to Kierkegaard scholars. chapter 7 treats two important residents of regensen, who played a role in Kierkegaard’s life: hans brøchner (1820–75) and Jens christian hostrup (1818–92). it is noted that Kierkegaard’s relative brøchner resided at regensen starting in 1836, and the author supposes it likely that Kierkegaard visited him there often. it is rightly noted that Brøchner exerted a profound influence on Danish thought in the second half of the nineteenth century before Kierkegaard became a major international figure. A less famous resident of Regensen Jens Christian Hostrup is introduced. His claim to fame was to have written a student comedy, which features Kierkegaard as one of the characters. The brief Chapter 8 reconfirms the thesis that Regensen played a major role in Kierkegaard’s life. but the claim is reformulated somewhat to say that Kierkegaard had ties to and interacted regularly with a number of different residents of regensen. This is followed by a brief postscript “Regensen and Søren Kierkegaard.” This fivepage account discusses the reception of Kierkegaard at regensen. the author names different residents of regensen who turned into Kierkegaard scholars or made some important use of him in their works. These include well-known figures such as Jens himmelstrup, Søren holm, and F.J. billeskov Jansen. at the end of the book the reader might well ask the question: So what? is there really any substantial point in the fact that Kierkegaard was acquainted with a number of people who at one point in their lives were residents of regensen college? if there is, then it has not really been demonstrated. the only thing that one can conclude is that regensen had a rich academic climate that fostered some of the great spirits of the golden age, and since Kierkegaard was a part of the golden age intellectual milieu and copenhagen was so small, it was natural that he knew a number of these people. but beyond this, it is not clear that there is any wider point to extracted. the author might have been better off dropping the regensen

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motif or at least letting it fall into the background and instead simply focusing on Kierkegaard’s varied relations to the individual figures. The individual analyses are interesting and informative and could certainly stand on their own. Jon Stewart

reviews and critical discussions Lehmann, Johannes, review in Historiske Meddelelser om København, 1966, pp. 203–5.

Kresten nordentoft, Kierkegaards psykologi

[Kierkegaard’s psychology], copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1972, x + 522 pp.

Kresten nordentoft’s Kierkegaards psykologi was first published in 1972 by g.e.c. gad in copenhagen, and republished in a second edition in 1995. Six years after its original publication in danish it was translated by bruce Kirmmse and published by duquesne university press as volume seven in the duquesne Studies psychological Series.1 duquesne’s interest in the volume is perhaps not surprising since the university established a doctoral program in existential psychology in 1962, which represents the burgeoning interest in north america at that time in the connection between psychology, phenomenology, and existentialism. nordentoft’s work is a substantial volume, running to 522 pages in the original danish and 408 pages in english. the volume represents a major contribution and is an impressively comprehensive analysis of Kierkegaard’s psychology, as idiosyncratic and profoundly insightful as it was. indeed, Kierkegaard’s psychology, as nordentoft has it, resembles little of what psychology would become even in the decades after Kierkegaard’s death, leaving nordentoft to weave together a fascinating web of “literary, ethical, social, philosophical and theological” themes that together make up Kierkegaard’s psychology.2 Kresten nordentoft himself was neither a psychologist nor a historian of psychology, but rather a literary researcher and lecturer at aarhus university for much of his academic life. his interest in Kierkegaard spans two other major monographs, “Hvad siger Brand-Majoren?” Kierkegaards opgør med sin samtid (1973) [“what does the Fire chief say?” Kierkegaard’s confrontation with his times], viewed by nordentoft as a companion volume to Kierkegaards psykologi, and Søren Kierkegaard (1977).3 1 Kresten nordentoft, Kierkegaard’s Psychology, trans. by bruce h. Kirmmse, pittsburgh: duquense university press 1978. there are some differences between the danish and english volumes which nordentoft and Kirmmse note in the introduction to the translation. in general, the differences reside mainly in the introductions and the recognition that the original danish and the english are being written to two very different audiences. the rest of the book is more or less the same. 2 Kresten nordentoft, Kierkegaards psykologi, copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1972, p. xvii. 3 Kresten nordentoft, “Hvad siger Brand-Majoren?” Kierkegaards opgør med sin samtid, copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1973 and Søren Kierkegaard. Bidrag til kritikken af den borgerlige selvoptagenhed, copenhagen: dansk universitets presse 1977.

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his purpose in all three is to situate Kierkegaard and his thought in and amongst a history of ideas, both european and danish. nordentoft begins Kierkegaards psykologi with a quotation from Kierkegaard’s papers: “psychology is what we need, and above all, expert knowledge of human life and sympathy with its interests. thus, here there is a problem the solution of which must precede any talk of rounding out a christian view of life.” 4 the quotation sums up well the orientation of Nordentoft’s book. The task at hand is to define just what Kierkegaard means by psychology as both a knowledge of human life and in sympathy with it while also keeping in mind that Kierkegaard’s conception of psychology functions as a kind of groundwork ultimately leading to a christian view of life. nordentoft is quite careful here and throughout the book to point out that not only is such a view rather particular to Kierkegaard but also deeply personal. Kierkegaard’s conception of psychology has everything to do with a psychological analysis of himself. Such a realization, however, does not necessarily lead to a psychoanalysis of Kierkegaard. this has already been done and done quite often. what makes Kierkegaard’s own psychological analysis relevant is that he did not stop with himself but extrapolated this diagnosis to humanity in general. nordentoft is not uncritical of such an endeavor, and one certainly hears echoes of a similar criticism directed toward Freud. however, Kierkegaard’s awareness of the problems such self-diagnosis raises (also not unlike Freud) provides a rich and provocative example of a self coming to terms with itself. The first section of the book, briefly explored above, lays the groundwork for what it means to call Kierkegaard a psychologist. the next seven sections take up a number of themes and topics in Kierkegaard’s work that orbit the psychological and taken together form the basic structure of Kierkegaard’s psychology. the first of these sections, titled “When a Child is to be Weaned…” takes a human developmental approach and focuses on childhood and more particularly the experience of separation and anxiety. the second takes up a notion that Kierkegaard arrived at in The Concept of Anxiety, that of the individual’s relationship to the race. the primary category under exploration here is the Fall insofar as it is that which befalls both the individual and everyone else. if the Fall is the primary category here, it is sin as a consequence of the Fall that is introduced and will then be traced in various ways throughout the rest of the book. the third section returns to the human development approach and explores Kierkegaard’s philosophical anthropology in terms of a psychological anthropological model. here nordentoft addresses ideas such as consciousness, freedom, and becoming. the fourth section is related to the anthropological model insofar as it introduces the psychological model of identity and selfhood as inherently conflict based. Nordentoft employs a rich and diverse range of philosophers, thinkers, and psychologists throughout the volume as points of similarity and divergence from Kierkegaard’s thought. in this section, Freud becomes the primary interlocutor. the concept of sin is given primary focus in the sixth section titled “the continuity of Sin” and in the seventh section it is despair. both of these categories form the pathological nucleus at the heart of Kierkegaard’s psychology for 4

p. xvii in the english translation. See Pap. v b 53, 29, p. 119 for the original danish.

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nordentoft, and of course the twin works The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death are the primary texts for such an exploration. what is remarkable about nordentoft’s study is the breadth of material from Kierkegaard’s corpus he draws from. an interest in Kierkegaard and psychology almost necessitates that one go directly to The Concept of Anxiety or The Sickness unto Death. nordentoft, however, while certainly drawing from these two central texts, also draws liberally from many of Kierkegaard’s works including his journals and papers. the effect of this is a much more complete and rounded picture of Kierkegaard’s psychology and not the sometimes dubious exercise of comparing Kierkegaard with other thinkers and psychologists or fitting Kierkegaard into various psychological schools or theories. though one may wonder if the insistence on psychology as a term really gets at what Kierkegaard is doing, one also cannot help but feel that one has been given a very thorough and compelling reading of the Kierkegaardian corpus. The final section, titled “Fundamental recovery,” argues that Kierkegaard’s psychology ultimately reaches an impasse that is both an obstacle to self-identity but also the central realization of Kierkegaard’s psychology: the basic nothingness of the human being. psychology calls for a recognition of this as ultimately therapeutic. nordentoft also, however, and in the final analysis, suggests that Kierkegaard offered a way around the problem, namely love. consistent throughout the work is its reference to the christian world-view and nordentoft’s book in conclusion folds his observations and critique into what he sees at bottom as the only thing that rescues the self from itself: the possibility of love. Nordentoft’s book may well be the definitive statement on Kierkegaard’s psychology. certainly it aims large in this respect. one might, however, think of other works in this regard that also loom large. J. preston cole’s The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud, also reviewed in this volume, is one of these and predates nordentoft’s by only a year.5 nordentoft’s book is no doubt a forerunner of two books that appeared in 1995: c. Stephen evans’ Søren Kierkegaard’s Christian Psychology and harvey Ferguson’s Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity.6 the english translation also mentions a review article from 1955 titled “Søren Kierkegaard in american psychology” as evidence that the view of Kierkegaard as a psychologist had already made its way to the u.S. well before the arrival of nordentoft’s book.7 nordentoft and Kirmmse themselves trace the view of Kierkegaard as a kind of psychologist to around the 1930s in europe with those who were interested in pursuing an existential psychology. the attraction of existential psychology was its critique of the conventional natural-scientific explanations of the human behavior held by psychoanalysis and experimental psychology that had ignored the historical J. preston cole, The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud, new haven and London: yale university press 1971. 6 c. Stephen evans, Kierkegaard’s Christian Psychology: Insight for Counseling and Pastoral Care, vancouver, british columbia: regent college bookstore 1995 and harvie Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity: Søren Kierkegaard’s Religious Psychology, London and new york: routledge 1995. 7 erik Skinhøj and Kirsten Skinhøj, “Søren Kierkegaard in american psychology,” Acta Psychiatrica et Neurologica Scandinavica, vol. 30, 1955, pp. 315–25. 5

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character of existence. rollo may’s The Meaning of Anxiety and its consideration of Kierkegaard as an existential psychologist is also cited in Kirmmse’s translation as a formative influence on Nordentoft’s book.8 while the landscape of Kierkegaard studies has certainly changed since the publication of nordentoft’s volume, it nevertheless remains a constant reference point in the contemporary literature on Kierkegaard. perhaps there is no greater endorsement for its continued significance than its republication in 1995 by Hans reitzel. nordentoft himself died in 1982, but his magnum opus continues to serve as one of the most important analyses of Kierkegaard’s conception of psychology. And not just in Kierkegaard studies, but also in fields as wide-ranging as religious studies, existential psychotherapy, and sociology. nordentoft’s book is not only comprehensive in its treatment and lucid in its writing but also broad in its references. michael plekon, in a review dating from 1981, notes that nordentoft’s study is an important work not only for “Kierkegaard specialists but especially for all those in the humanities concerned with the interpretation of modernity and the peculiar dilemmas of the self in the modern world.”9 that it is a book that speaks to any and all willing to enter into the complexities of its thought is its signal contribution. nathaniel Kramer

rollo may, The Meaning of Anxiety, new york: ronald 1950. michael plekon, “beyond existentialist caricatures: new views of Kierkegaard. a review of recent translations and Studies,” Human Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, 1981, p. 95. 8 9

reviews and critical discussions bang, Jørgen, review in Aarhus Stiftstiende, September 21, 1972. bejerholm, Lars, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 363–7. Kloeden, wolfdietrich von, review in Theologische Literaturzeitung, vol. 98, 1973, pp. 853–9. Krarup, vilhelm, review in Tidehverv, vol. 48, 1974. p. 96. Lønning, per, review in Tidsskrift for teologi og kirke, vol. 44, 1973, pp. 61–62. Lübcke, poul, review in Politiken, February 16, 1973. Lund, torkil, review in Dansk Seminarieblad, vol. 59, 1973, no. 4, pp. 65–6. nielsen, Flemming chr., review in Jyllands-Posten, January 26, 1973. nøjgaard, niels, review in Præsteforeningens Blad, vol. 63, 1973, pp. 218–19. plekon, michael, “beyond existentialist caricatures: new views of Kierkegaard. a review of recent translations and Studies,” Human Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, 1981, pp. 87–95. Søe, n.h., review in Kristeligt Dagblad, october 10, 1972. theunissen, michael, review in Philosophische Rundschau, vol. 20, 1973, pp. 305– 6. thulstrup, niels, review of the english translation in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 11, 1980, pp. 271–4.

Kresten nordentoft, “Hvad siger Brand-Majoren?” Kierkegaards opgør med sin samtid

[“what does the Fire chief Say?” Kierkegaard’s confrontation with his times], copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1973, 295 pp.

the danish literary scholar Kresten nordentoft’s (1938–82) book, “Hvad siger Brand-Majoren?” Kierkegaards opgør med sin samtid, is a textual exploration of Kierkegaard’s socio-political views. although nordentoft throughout the book brings Kierkegaard’s writings into dialogue with a number of well-known politicalphilosophical ideas, his book is not an attempt to construct a political-ideological scheme from Kierkegaard’s writings. instead, his book is an exemplary attempt to identify and disclose what motivated Kierkegaard’s reaction to the political atmosphere of his time—and especially Kierkegaard’s shocking outrage against the danish State church (kirkekampen). nordentoft’s book was published in 1973, less than a year after the publication of his acclaimed magnum opus, Kierkegaards psykologi,1 and in 1977 nordentoft published his third, and unfortunately also his last, book on Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard, bidrag til kritikken af den borgerlige selvoptagethed.2 nordentoft’s contribution to Kierkegaard studies would probably have been much larger, had he not suffered from years of illness and a premature death in 1982. despite nordentoft’s relatively brief presence in the danish scholarly milieu, his work has made a significant impact on the Danish Kierkegaard reception. Among contemporary Danish scholars, Nordentoft’s books are still considered to be some of the finest substantial resources.3 For the same reason, nordentoft’s books on Kierkegaard are 1 Kresten nordentoft, Kierkegaards psykologi, copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1972. in english: Kresten nordentoft, Kierkegaard’s Psychology, trans. by bruce h. Kirmmse, pittsburgh: duquesne university press 1978. 2 Kresten nordentoft, Søren Kierkegaard, bidrag til kritikken af den borgerlige selvoptagethed, copenhagen: dansk universitets presse 1977. 3 cf. Steen tullberg, “the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 3–120, here pp. 73–5.

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mainly directed towards his academic peers, and they would perhaps be held to be too comprehensive and involved for a cursory reader. indeed, nordentoft’s work as a researcher is renowned for its thoroughness and remarkable sense for detail and context—and his work “Hvad siger Brand-Majoren?” is certainly no exception. the main text of the book is divided into three chapters that each corresponds to a specific time period or phase in Kierkegaard’s life, which makes the book a chronological representation of Kierkegaard’s seemingly paradoxical transformation from a conservative monarchist to a self-proclaimed revolutionary martyr of his time. In the first phase (Chapter 1, covering 1836–46) Nordentoft focuses on the perspectives from Kierkegaard’s magister thesis from 1841 The Concept of Irony, and his 1846 publication Two Ages: A Literary Review, where Kierkegaard describes modernity as a destructive age of individual emancipation and societal leveling. in the second phase (chapter 2, covering 1847–51) nordentoft portrays the years leading up to the publication of Practice in Christianity in September 1850. this phase constitutes the early beginning of Kierkegaard’s polemical position toward the State church, which he had been a relentless supporter of throughout his life. in this period Kierkegaard is engaged with tangible political ideas, forming his opinions on socialism and the liberal democratic movement that spread through europe during those years—a movement that he did not perceive as progress due to his distaste for the press and mob opinions. Kierkegaard certainly remained anti-democratic throughout his life. in the third phase (chapter 3, covering 1852–55) nordentoft narrows his attention to the events leading up to Kierkegaard’s period as an activist, namely, his late outburst against the State church, which starts with the articles in the newspaper Fædrelandet during 1854 and culminates with the pamphlet series The Moment from 1855. as a conclusion, the three chapters are followed by a postscript, in which nordentoft not only brings forth his own insightful considerations on Kierkegaard’s political views, but also places them in a critical relation to the secondary literature of nordentoft’s contemporaries. however, an equally interesting aspect is that nordentoft also ties the book together with his earlier and more famous work Kierkegaards psykologi. the conclusion, or postscript, generates an outstanding overview of the complexity of reading Kierkegaard politically, a feature which nordentoft believes has been predominantly concealed by his contemporaries (especially georg Lukács and K.e. Løgstrup).4 the strength and originality of nordentoft’s thesis, besides his careful use of excerpts of Kierkegaard’s writings, is that he manages to detect an intimate and ideological correlation amongst the aforementioned three phases. indeed, the three phases can be seen as a change in motives and attitudes, instead of an irrational and paradoxical change of fundamental socio-political beliefs. nordentoft’s conclusion is that Kierkegaard may actually have been surprisingly consistent in his underlying ideological beliefs. now, it is another question whether or not one thinks Kierkegaard’s political views are sound. certainly, nordentoft does what he can to 4 nordentoft, “Hvad siger Brand-Majoren?” Kierkegaard’s opgør med sin samtid, pp. 262–3; p. 266.

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maintain his unbiased position, although he momentarily finds it hard to disguise his dislike of Kierkegaard’s narrow-minded self-absorbedness, and at times paranoid hysteria.5 the main event of the book is Kierkegaard’s late outspoken battle against the State church. in the secondary literature Kierkegaard has often been accused of being motivated by an irrational vanity and blind rage.6 thus, it is exactly here that nordentoft’s thesis reveals its strength, namely, by disclosing the ideological link between Kierkegaard’s early and late political views. again, this should not be misunderstood as nordentoft’s way of running an apologetic campaign on Kierkegaard’s behalf, but merely a textual documentation of how Kierkegaard grounded and justified his scandalous actions months before his death.7 it is Kierkegaard’s early prophecy in his 1846 publication A Literary Review of Two Ages8 that nordentoft posits as the original inspiration for Kierkegaard’s late and short-lived activist period.9 the Kierkegaard of 1846, a conservative traditionalist, sees modern times (i.e., modernity) as a movement with the goal of destabilizing and conclusively subverting the hierarchical structures of society. the result of this leveling of society is the complete emancipation of the individual, that is, a removal of the individual’s immediate self-identification. In Kierkegaard’s world, it is the vertical structures of society that posit the primordial self-understanding. Kierkegaard’s prophecy of modernity, then, is best understood as a diabolical nightmare, a story about how a liberal movement turns society into an existential wasteland and impersonal hell.10 Kierkegaard is imagining a society where people’s identities are robbed under the disguise of modern liberation. however, in a peculiar way Kierkegaard’s prophecy is not only his worst nightmare, but also his paradoxical hope. the communal collapse grounds the possibility of a rudimentary and more earnest self-understanding, and conclusively a more genuine concept of religion. in the subverted society of post-modernity the individual’s relation to god can no longer be posited through the institution of christianity, that is, the State church (which has now perished). instead, the religious life must be pursued on a primitive subjective level.11 what turned out to be a diabolical nightmare has now, according to the prophecy, spawned the possibility of a new beginning of an authentic christian era. in the period from 1848 to 1850 Kierkegaard gradually starts to develop his skepticism towards the authority of the State church. when Kierkegaard in 1850 publishes his polemical criticism of the State church, namely, his Practice in Christianity, his intention, Nordentoft holds, was to put the church officials ibid., p. 64; p. 113; p. 125; p. 134; p. 139; p. 142; p. 241. ibid., p. 244; p. 257. 7 Sometimes nordentoft even refers to his thesis as experimental. See ibid., p. 113. 8 the theoretical foundation of the prophecy is further anticipated in Kierkegaard’s magister thesis from 1841 The Concept of Irony. 9 Kresten nordentoft, “Hvad siger Brand-Majoren?” Kierkegaard’s opgør med sin samtid, p. 66. 10 ibid., p. 59. 11 ibid., pp. 61–2. 5 6

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to a test.12 If the State Church officials were willing to admit that they needed to revitalize the importance of christianity, by disconnecting from the democratization and standardization of the institution (and society as such), a process that had led the institution away from the doctrines of The New Testament,13 Kierkegaard would then have been able to maintain his belief and trust in the State church. however, when an official admission from the State Church officials was lacking, Kierkegaard interpreted it as the final proof for an irreversible corruption and exploitation of its congregation.14 nordentoft reads this as the key incident that now removes Kierkegaard’s neutrality—a neutrality that had been armed all the time. From then on Kierkegaard openly committed himself to the destruction of the State church, above all with his publication of the pamphlet series The Moment in 1855. historically, Kierkegaard’s personal vendetta against the State church was, according to nordentoft, nothing more than a glib happening (et slag i dynen).15 certainly, Kierkegaard’s actions were seen as a disgrace in the provincial copenhagen, but there can be no doubt that he had imagined (or dreamed of) a larger impact. instead, it turned out that Kierkegaard’s disturbance died with him, and, as nordentoft remarks, the danish State church is still around today. Nordentoft’s thesis holds that Kierkegaard’s final goal was to contribute to the downfall of the State church. it is the prophecy from his earlier Two Ages: A Literary Review that Nordentoft here suggests was Kierkegaard’s definitive motivation. In his vanity and stubbornness, Kierkegaard may have seen himself as martyr who was doing something for the greater good, namely, clearing the historical road for the rectification of a sincere and earnest practice of Christianity.16 This brings me to a final comment on Nordentoft’s choice of title for his book. Kierkegaard compared himself to the fire chief (Brand-Majoren) who saw his task as setting on fire what needed to be got rid of. History, Kierkegaard held, was a process that only contributed to a shadowing of the initial truth through gossiping and nonsensical, idle talk. Sometimes history needed to be filtered, and this was the task for the pyromaniac fire chief. The Kierkegaard of The Moment was the pyromaniacal fire chief, the person who was not part of history, but the (only) person who was able to relate properly to it.17 rasmus rosenberg Larsen

12 13 14 15 16 17

ibid., pp. 162–3. ibid., p. 184. ibid., pp. 165–8. ibid., p. 241. ibid., p. 242. ibid., pp. 216–219.

reviews and critical discussions gudmundsen, per, review in Aktuelt, June 1, 1973. Larsen, emil, review in Metodistkirkens Ugeblad, vol. 100, 1973, p. 148. Lønning, per, review in Tidsskrift for teologi og kirke, vol. 44, 1973, pp. 209-10. Lübcke, poul, review in Politiken, September 22, 1973. madsen, ellen a., review in Vestkysten, June 6, 1974. mortensen, viggo, review in Information, February 4, 1974. nielsen, Flemming christian, review in Jyllands-Posten, may 12, 1973. Søe, n.h., review in Kristeligt Dagblad, June 15, 1973. tullberg, Steen, “the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 3–120; see pp. 73–5.

peter p. rohde, Et Geni i en Købstad. Et essay om Søren Kierkegaard [a genius in a Small town: an essay on Søren Kierkegaard],

oslo: norske Studentersamfunds Kulturutvalg 1956, 49 pp.

peter p. rohde’s (1902–78) Et Geni i en Købstad. Et essay om Søren Kierkegaard (a genius in a Small town: an essay on Søren Kierkegaard), was originally published in norway in 1956 under the auspices of the norwegian Students’ Society culture committee,1 and later republished in denmark under the slightly revised title, Søren Kierkegaard. Et Geni i en Købstad.2 rohde, whose more profound intellectual orientation was marxism, is acknowledged as one of denmark’s leading twentiethcentury intellectuals, one who was particularly engaged in the fight against Nazism. as regards his works on Kierkegaard, while producing a four-volume compilation of the latter’s journals and notebooks,3 rohde received an invitation to update the so-called Samlede Værker originally edited by a.b. drachmann, J.L. heiberg, and h.o. Lange.4 Et Geni i en Købstad appeared in denmark as a kind of supplement volume to this edition. As the original title has it, it is first and foremost an essay on Kierkegaard, which means it is intended to be a general introduction to major aspects or topics present in the work of the danish philosopher. in fact, Et Geni i en Købstad itself was produced and originally published in a context in which such popular introductions to the work of Kierkegaard thrived,5 and thus one can surmise that, on the one hand, its diffusion peter p. rohde, Et Geni i en Købstad. Et essay om Søren Kierkegaard, oslo: norske Studentersamfunds Kulturutvalg 1956. 2 peter p. rohde, Søren Kierkegaard. Et Geni i en Købstad, 2nd ed., copenhagen: gyldendal 1962. 3 Søren Kierkegaards Dagboger, vols. 1–4, selected and ed. by peter p. rohde, copenhagen: thaning & appel 1961–64. 4 Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Værker, vols. 1–19, 3rd ed., ed. by peter p. rohde, copenhagen: gyldendal 1962–64. 5 this context has been well described by Steen tullberg in his “denmark: the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 70ff. 1

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must have been quite extensive, while, on the other hand, its long-term influence must have been rather weak, if not non-existent. in terms of its structure, the book is divided into nine different small chapters bearing the following titles: (1) “prelude” (pp. 7–9); (2) “the Father—or Faith” (pp. 10–13); (3) “regine—or the poetic activity” (pp. 14–20); (4) “the philosophical authorship in a nutshell” (pp. 21–35); (5) “goldschmidt—or the collision with the world” (pp. 36–9); (6) “mynster—martensen—or the collision with the church” (pp. 41–5); (7) “Existential Thought” (pp. 46–50); (8) “An Unscientific Psychology” (pp. 51–58), and lastly (9) there appears a very succinct bibliography under the title “Concluding Unscientific Bibliography” (pp. 59–61). as seen, the work is fundamentally built upon a biographical method in which Kierkegaard’s activity as a writer or thinker is incessantly related to certain personalities who either lived with him or came into his life. in this sense, a rather too automatic or direct cause–effect relationship between such persons and Kierkegaard’s ideas is to be seen at work throughout this otherwise fine—in the sense of elegant— little book. rohde, in fact, claims that “the father…made of him a believer, regine… made of him a poet [digter]; the author and journalist…goldschmidt…became the occasion for his contempt of the world, both bishops mynster and martensen, in the same manner for Kierkegaard, became personifications of the perverted ‘christendom.’ ”6 another long-standing cliché that the work maintains is that of an apolitical Kierkegaard, as when rohde compares Kierkegaard with Karl marx, claiming that the former, in contrast to the latter, “accepted—and turned away from the affairs of this world.”7 this view, happily, has since long been either debunked or mitigated. the work has its merits, though. From the structure of the book, one can see that its major chapters are the fourth (“the philosophical authorship in a nutshell”— the longest one in the book), seventh (“existential thought”), and eighth (“an Unscientific Psychology”). As regards the fourth, it is a succinct compilation and explanation of Kierkegaard’s major concepts or (structuring) ideas such as “subjectivity,” “truth,” “pseudonymity,” “the individual,” the three stages of existence, “the paradox,” “choice,” “anxiety,” “despair,” and “faith.” rohde’s more profound claim in this, as well as in chapters 7 and 8, is that Kierkegaard’s thought is “unusual for our time,”8 in the sense that it should be characterized as an “unscientific psychology,” understood in turn as an open-ended and, more fundamentally, humane description of the experiences of the soul. in other words, rohde’s main argument is that, in contrast to the psychology of the twentieth century which worked towards “positivism” and “determinism”9—he actually names it “behaviorism” (adfærdslære) now and then10—Kierkegaard’s understanding of psychology points rather towards existentialism. he explains, “Kierkegaard is the progenitor of all existentialist thinkers. He was the first in more recent times who most consciously strived to 6 7 8 9 10

rohde, Et Geni i en Købstad. Et essay om Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 10–11. ibid., p. 10. ibid., p. 40. cf. ibid., p. 19. cf. ibid., pp. 42ff.

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think existentially, consequently to make us understand backwards while living forward.”11 rohde, thus, insists that Kierkegaard’s psychology is not something that has to do either with theology or with a thing of the past. Let its terminology sound as alien as it may to our ears, the important thing, though, is that it has really become psychology, [i.e.] a description of the soul on a valid foundation. in this sense, modern psychology can learn much from Kierkegaard, seeing that the scientific psychology of our time may be scientific enough, only it is not psychology. It is…a doctrine of behavior, belonging under the sciences of nature and whose consequence is that there is no fundamental difference between a human being and an animal.12 this makes the Kierkegaard who appears in rohde’s small introduction a humane psychologist who can teach our “scientific psychology and a deterministic life-view” how to “reach a comprehension of human life and the world, according to which one can live.”13 gabriel guedes rossatti

Ibid., p. 39. It is quite interesting, in this sense, to find in Rohde’s book a rather different description of Kierkegaard’s relation to grundtvig, usually portrayed as one of either enmity or sheer distance; rohde, in truth, does not deny the differences between the two, although he tends to highlight the similar existential approach between them. according to Rohde, Grundtvig should be envisaged as “another significant religious personality…at that same time in denmark…who earnestly attempted to think existentially” (ibid., p. 39). 12 ibid., p. 44. 13 ibid., p. 46. 11

reviews and critical discussions helweg, hjalmar, review in Politiken, January 29, 1957. rubow, paul v., review in Berlingske Aftenavis, January 12, 1957. tullberg, Steen, “denmark: the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), p. 70.

heinrich roos, Søren Kierkegaard og Katolicismen [Søren Kierkegaard and catholicism],

copenhagen: munksgaards Forlag 1952, (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populære Skrifter, vol. 3), 58 pp.

heinrich roos’ study, Søren Kierkegaard og Katolicismen, was first published in 1952 by munksgaards Forlag in copenhagen. in addition to the usual textual apparatuses, it included a supplement (Tillæg), which catalogued the catholic literature in Kierkegaard’s library. two years later, newman press—an american publishing house, which has since been acquired by paulist press—issued an english translation of roos’ work.1 the latter edition added a short bibliographic section, “the works of Kierkegaard in english translation.” Roos begins by setting—briefly, yet interestingly—the mise-en-scène of his theme. “the question about Søren Kierkegaard’s relation to catholicism,” he writes, “was already supplied by his contemporaries.”2 indeed, as roos goes on, Kierkegaard’s polemics against Danish Lutheranism not only influenced secular humanists such as georg brandes (1842–1927) but also persons such as the danish author and priest, hans peter Kofoed-hansen (1813–93), who joined the catholic church in 1887.3 the example of Kofoed-hansen, in addition to that of more famous figures such as Cardinal John Henry Newman (1801–90) was not lost on a number of early interpreters of Kierkegaard. they reasoned that, had he lived longer, Kierkegaard might have converted to catholicism as well.4 roos continues with an overview of early catholic responses to Kierkegaard, noting that some of the best catholic thinkers of the twentieth century—philosophers such as alois dempf (1891–1982) and theologians such as henri de Lubac (1896– 1991)—were attracted to the dane’s thinking. however, this discussion quickly gives way to a survey of Kierkegaard’s own knowledge of catholicism. roos maintains, albeit with little evidence, that there was a “gap” in Kierkegaard’s reading

heinrich roos, Søren Kierkegaard and Catholicism, trans. by richard m. brackett, westminster, maryland: newman press 1954. 2 heinrich roos, Søren Kierkegaard og Katolicismen, copenhagen: munksgaards Forlag 1952 (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populære Skrifter, vol. 3), p. 7. all translations from this title are my own. 3 ibid. 4 ibid., p. 8. 1

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of catholic literature, particularly of patristic and Scholastic sources.5 he is more detailed in his demonstration of Kierkegaard’s appreciation of two modern catholic thinkers, Johann adam möhler (1796–1838) and Joseph von görres (1776–1848). The implication is that these two figures, and possibly other Catholic intellectuals and/or ideas, may have influenced Kierkegaard more than is commonly held. As Roos frankly admits, “this question, as far as i can see, is still not properly investigated.”6 the ambiguity of roos’ background material is repeated in his evaluation of Kierkegaard’s writings themselves. on the one hand, he locates a number of catholic sympathies in Kierkegaard. the most obvious one, he notes, is Kierkegaard’s trenchant and relentless criticism of protestantism—an “attack” that falls upon a range of protestant personages and principles, from martin Luther (1483–1546) to sola scriptura.7 yet, Kierkegaard’s stance is not merely negative; rather, he lauds catholicism’s stress on christlike holiness and on the “accentuation of the will’s cooperation in the appropriation of salvation.”8 there are also understated, if nevertheless crucial, catholic tendencies in Kierkegaard’s thinking. roos points out that the analogy of being (analogia entis)—a principle of catholic thought, frequently associated with thomas aquinas (1225–74), which uses the doctrine of creation as a basis for locating a correspondence between god and creatures—is embedded in Kierkegaard’s theological anthropology.9 For Kierkegaard, as for aquinas, divine omnipotence does not annul human freedom, but, rather, establishes and vivifies it. but that is not all. Kierkegaard’s understanding of apostolic communication, with its concomitant emphases on authority and obedience, overlaps with catholic views on apostolicity and holy orders.10 and roos rightly notes that this stress on the objective proclamation of christian faith accounts for Kierkegaard’s often overlooked insistence on doctrinal truth. “in Kierkegaard, therefore, we can observe a certain tendency to replace the protestant fides qua (the feeling of faith) with the catholic fides quae (the contents of faith),”11 he writes. and yet, for roos, such catholic proclivities do not mean that Kierkegaard can be identified with Catholicism, for the Dane also exhibits certain “anti-Catholic tendencies.”12 roos lists a number of these propensities—from Kierkegaard’s skepticism about the value of “proving” god’s existence13 to his disinterest in the “purely critical question about christ’s historical existence”14—but ultimately they can be gathered under an umbrella term, “anti-intellectualism.”15 by this expression, it is worth adding, roos is not only (or even primarily) referring to Kierkegaard’s well-known criticism of hegelian philosophy. indeed, roos acknowledges, “catholic 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

ibid., p. 11. ibid., p. 10. See ibid., pp. 18ff. ibid., p. 28. ibid., pp. 29–31. ibid., pp. 32–6. ibid., p. 32. ibid., p. 37. ibid., pp. 39–40. ibid., p. 41. ibid., p. 37.

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thought could follow [Kierkegaard] a long distance on this path.”16 rather, roos wants to accentuate a Kantian trend in Kierkegaard’s thinking, which, as he sees it, predisposes the Dane to fideism. In short, Kierkegaard “thinks that knowledge does not have any significance for our way to faith,” whereas “Catholicism, precisely in the clash with Hegelianism on one side and fideism on the other, thinks that an introductory knowledge lies prior to faith, which demonstrates faith’s presuppositions, namely, god’s existence and revelation’s historical facticity.”17 the trouble with this conclusion—and this critique could be applied to roos’ work as a whole—is that it is hastily drawn. roos himself concedes that mitigating instances can be found in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. The Sickness unto Death roots the self in the prior transcendence of god and, in doing so, “presupposes [the] causal thinking”18 explicit in thomas’ “Five ways.” and where roos chides Kierkegaard for seeming to reduce christianity to a subjectivistic “existential philosophy,”19 he nevertheless fails to square this accusation with the claim mentioned above—namely, that Kierkegaard stresses fides quae creditur in addition to fides qua creditur. one, indeed, gets the impression that roos decided on Kierkegaard’s so-called “anticatholic tendencies” in advance. that is not to say that such tendencies do not exist in Kierkegaard. it is to contend, however, that his so-called “anti-intellectualism” is not as straightforward as roos would suggest. Yet, in the end, these flaws are probably inevitable in a book as short as Søren Kierkegaard og Katolicismen. undoubtedly, roos intended this work to serve as a catalyst for future studies, and in that it is successful, flagging key points of overlap and tension between Kierkegaard and catholicism. what is surprising is that, more than half a century later, many of the issues raised by roos remain under-explored. christopher b. barnett

16 17 18 19

ibid. ibid., p. 39. ibid., p. 40. ibid., p. 47.

reviews and critical discussions anonymous, review in Bogens Verden, vol. 34, no. 8, 1952, p. 407. anonymous, review of the english translation in Thought, vol. 30, no. 116, 1956, pp. 158–9. brackett, richard m., S.J., review of the english translation in Thought, vol. 29, no. 115, 1955, pp. 620–1. brophy, Liam, review of the english translation in Social Justice Review, vol. 47, no. 11, 1955, p. 388. delfgaauw, bernhard, “de Kierkegaard-Studie in Scandinavie,” Tijdschrift voor philosophie, vol. 17, 1955, pp. 523–30. dijnes torben, review in Næstved Tidende, September 13, 1952. Fabro, cornelio, review in Rassegna di scienze filosofiche, vol. 2, 1953, pp. 287–9. — review in Euntes Docete, vol. 6, no. 2, 1953, pp. 275–6. Frederiksen, emil, review in Berlingske Tidende, September 2, 1952. hansen, Knud, review in Vejle Amts Folkeblad, october 7, 1952. hejll, richard, review in Den enskilde. Tidskrift för de ensamma, vol. 11, no. 2, 1955, pp. 26–7. holm, Søren, review in Aarhuus Stiftstidende, September 26, 1952. martensen, hans L. review in Scholastik, vol. 29, 1954, pp. 130–1. neiiendam, henrik, review in Ekstrabladet, august 27, 1952. nielsen, Frederik, review in Social-Demokraten, July 27, 1953. nøjgaard, niels, review in Aalborg Amtstidende, June 8, 1953. pedersen, olaf, review in Randers Dagblad og Folketidende, august 23, 1952. rest, walter, “ausländische werke über Kierkegaard,” Catholica, vol. 9, 1952–53, pp. 150–1. r.F.c., review in Dominicana, vol. 40, no. 1, 1956, pp. 61–2. roesen, i.m., review in Jydske Tidende, august 31, 1952. rohde peter p., review in Information, September 10, 1952. rubow, paul v., review in Berlingske Aftenavis, September 20, 1952. Schindler, peter, review in Catholica, vol. 9, no. 3, 1952, pp. 138–9. Søe, n.h., “Kierkegaard og Katolicismen,” Meddelelser fra Søren Kierkegaard Selskabet, vol. 4, no. 1, 1952, pp. 4–6. thulstrup, niels, review in Kristeligt Dagblad, august 18, 1952, ukkola, helge, “Kierkegaard katolisen kevaamana,” Teologinen aikakauskirja, no. 4, 1953, pp. 224–37.

paul v. rubow, Kierkegaard og hans Samtidige [Kierkegaard and his contemporaries], copenhagen: gyldendalske boghandel, nordisk Forlag 1950, 67 pp.

paul v. rubow (1896–1972) was an important danish literary historian and philologist. in 1921 he made a name for himself with his habilitation thesis, Dansk litterær Kritik i det nittende Aarhundrede indtil 1870,1 a work which was later reprinted under the title Heiberg og hans Skole i Kritiken.2 afterwards he worked for many years as Lecturer for danish Language and Literature at the Sorbonne in paris. he returned to the university of copenhagen in 1930 and quickly became a professor in the department of nordic philology, where he made a distinguished career for the next several decades. From then on he published an impressive series of books on different topics. in the fall of 1850 he produced a series of short articles on Kierkegaard in the danish newspaper Berlingske Aftenavis.3 these articles formed the basis for the short book Kierkegaard og hans Samtidige or Kierkegaard and His Contemporaries.4 this was the beginning of a series of short works on Kierkegaard that included Goldschmidt og Kierkegaard, from 1952 and Kierkegaard og Kirken, from 1955.5 as the title indicates, the goal of Kierkegaard og hans Samtidige is to trace Kierkegaard’s diverse relations to his Golden Age contemporaries. In the first few pages rubow explains how Kierkegaard was writing primarily for his local danish audience and addressing issues that were relevant for denmark at the time. For this reason, rubow argues, it makes good sense to try to understand his thought as developing in interaction with his danish contemporaries. while this methodological account is a bit superficial, it is a succinct and elegant argument for the importance 1

1921.

paul v. rubow, Dansk litterær Kritik indtil 1870, copenhagen: Levin & munksgaard

paul v. rubow, Heiberg og Hans Skole i Kritiken, copenhagen: gyldendal 1953. paul v. rubow, “Søren Kierkegaard og hans Samtidige i–iv,” in Berlingske Aftenavis, September 12, September 22, october 3, october 10, 1950. paul v. rubow, “hans L. martensen: Kierkegaard og hans religiøse Liv,” in Berlingske Aftenavis, november 28, 1950. paul v. rubow, “Kierkegaard og Filosofferne,” in Berlingske Aftenavis, october 18, 1950. 4 paul v. rubow, Kierkegaard og hans Samtidige, copenhagen: gyldendalske boghandel, nordisk Forlag 1950. 5 paul v. rubow, Goldschmidt og Kierkegaard, nye litterære studier, copenhagen: gyldendal 1952. Kierkegaard og Kirken, copenhagen: gyldendal 1955. 2 3

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of source-work research in Kierkegaard studies. but as the short length of the work makes clear, the actual source-work research cannot take place in any detail in this study. instead, rubow seems rather to aim simply to give a general overview of Kierkegaard’s life and relations to famous contemporaries. The work is divided into five short chapters, which are organized around specific groups of people which Kierkegaard interacted with. Chapter 1 focuses on figures who played a role in shaping the ideas of the young Kierkegaard. in this context the author mentions Johan Ludvig heiberg, thomasine gyllembourg, Jakob peter mynster, goethe, poul martin møller, Frederik christian Sibbern, rasmus nielsen, Steen Steensen blicher, and the little known peter michael Stilling. but each of these figures is only touched on very briefly. chapter 2 is entitled “Jews and christians” and includes brief accounts of Kierkegaard’s secretary israel Levin and the polemical icelandic theologian magnus Eiriksson, who vocally criticized leading religious figures during the Golden Age and even applied to Kierkegaard for financial assistance. The second half of the chapter is dedicated to a discussion of hans Lassen martensen, which is the longest in the book.6 rubow traces the animosity between Kierkegaard and martensen and rightly notes the complex dialectical relation between the two. while they had much in common, they approached the central issues of christianity with an entirely different tone and style. rubow attempts to highlight the main points of criticism on both sides. chapter 3 is dedicated to the important personalities in connection with Kierkegaard’s conflict with the Corsair. here an analysis is given of meir goldschmidt and peder Ludvig møller. rubow rightly points out that these two men were among Kierkegaard’s first supporters and, in sharp contrast to Heiberg, enthusiastically hailed Either/Or as an important work. but unfortunately, according to rubow, instead of embracing them, Kierkegaard nourished a kind of personal bitterness that led to the well-known conflict.7 rubow argues that the Corsair was not the cheap tabloid or the paradigm case of yellow journalism that it is always portrayed to be. instead, he characterizes it as a both a humorous and courageous work in the socialpolitical climate of the day. the chapter sketches with a remarkably fair tone the main moments in Kierkegaard’s famous conflict with the journal. It is difficult to see the continuity or guiding theme in Chapter 4, although it is fairly short. it begins with some brief words about Kierkegaard’s relation to golden Age literature and figures such as Staffeldt, Oehlenschäger, Heiberg, and Ingemann. then an equally brief account is given of Kierkegaard’s love of music and theater. rubow then transitions to an analysis of Kierkegaard’s use of the bible as literature. next he takes up some motifs of the life of Kierkegaard as a young student, mentioning his lethargy with regard to his studies, the death of his father and the great earthquake. the chapter is rounded out with a brief account of Kierkegaard’s theological studies and his relation to the movements of right and left hegelianism. The final chapter is dedicated to philosophers. Here Rubow talks about Kierkegaard’s reading of tennemann’s history of philosophy (ASKB 815–826). he 6 7

rubow, Kierkegaard og hans Samtidige, pp. 26–33. ibid., p. 35.

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also mentions the importance of heiberg’s On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age (ASKB 568) and Johann eduard erdmann’s Vorlesungen über Glauben und Wissen als Einleitung in die Dogmatik und Religionsphilosophie (ASKB 479). hegel and Schleiermacher and adler are also touched upon. hamann is portrayed as a philosophical figure who positively influenced Kierkegaard, and Rubow especially singles out his Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten (although instead of Denkwürdigkeiten he writes Mærkværdigheder).8 this then leads him to a concluding discussion of plato and Socrates, and he rightly notes the importance of the latter as an explicit model for Kierkegaard. The book abruptly ends with no conclusion or final reflection of any kind. It is not hard to find places in the text where it is clear that this work was written for a broad audience and not for an academic one. this makes the work in many ways highly superficial. It only briefly touches on the figures mentioned and gives the most general of characterizations of their relevance for Kierkegaard. there are no deeper analyses and more thoroughgoing research is entirely absent, despite the plea for understanding Kierkegaard in the context of his age. nonetheless this can be seen as a pioneering work in the field of source-work research in Kierkegaard studies. Today it is too superficial to be of any scholarly use, and readers are better served by referring to works such as bruce h. Kirmmse’s Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark,9 and the volumes Kierkegaard and his Danish Contemporaries in the present series.10 But Rubow’s work can still serve as a kind of model for the difficult task of making source-work research accessible for a wider audience. Jon Stewart

ibid., p. 62. bruce h. Kirmmse, Kierkegaard and Golden Age Denmark, bloomington and indianapolis: university of indiana press 1990. 10 Kierkegaard and his Danish Contemporaries, tome i, Philosophy, Politics and Social Theory, tome ii, Theology, iii, Literature, Drama and Aesthetics, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 7). See also Kierkegaard and his Contemporaries: The Culture of Golden Age Denmark, ed. by Jon Stewart, berlin and new york: walter de gruyter 2003 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 10). 8 9

reviews and critical discussions gundel, Sven, review in Jyllandsposten, december 26, 1950. Jensen, zakarias, “teologerne har gjort Kierkegaard til en honnigkage,” Ekstrabladet, november 30, 1950. Jespersen, Kristian, review in Roskilde Dagblad, december 20, 1950. nielsen, Frederik, review in Social-Demokraten, december 21, 1950. rohde, peter p., review in Information, January 30, 1951. Stangerup, hakon, review in Fyens Stiftstidende, december 18, 1950. thulstrup, niels, review in Meddelelser fra Søren Kierkegaard-Selskabet, vol. 3, copenhagen: munksgaard 1951, no. 2, p. 110.

Johannes Sløk, Kierkegaard—humanismens tænker [Kierkegaard: the thinker of humanism], copenhagen: hans reitzel 1978, 239 pp.

Johannes Sløk’s (1916–2001) Kierkegaard—humanismens tænker appeared for the first time in 1978 and was published in a second edition in 1993. The new edition is unaltered. Sløk, though, remarks that he fully supports his first edition and only in retrospect regrets not having gone into an investigation of semiotics and the technological development that has become a new threat to the freedom of humanity.1 the surprising reference to humanism in the title refers to Sløk’s critical thesis against any kind of speculation.2 as a more tacit reference it takes its bearings from an ongoing discussion within the theological-philosophical sphere in denmark that began around 1950. Sløk’s colleague at the theological Faculty, professor K.e. Løgstrup (1905–81), was, at the beginning of the 1950s, engaged in a discussion with the vicar and Kierkegaard researcher, Kristoffer olesen Larsen (1899–1964), about the relationship between natural love and christian love.3 Sløk took part in that discussion with a polemical article in the journal Tidehverv.4 this discussion took shape when Løgstrup published his famous Den etiske Fordring in 1956,5 and in 1995 this second edition appeared in a new printing. the same year the book was published in a French translation, Kierkegaard, penseur de l’humanisme, trans. by else-marie Jacquet-tisseau, paris: Éditions de l’orante 1995 (Bibliothéque Kierkegaardienne) with an introduction by henri-bernard vergote, pp. 9–25. 2 anders moe rasmussen takes this up in his critical survey, “Kierkegaards eksistenstænkning som idealismekritik” in Philosophia, Århus: philosophia 1988, vol. 17, nos. 3–4, pp. 129–47. Sløk responded to rasmussen in “Supplerende bemærkninger” in Philosophia, Århus: philosophia 1988, vol. 17, nos. 3–4, pp. 149–50. 3 K. olesen-Larsen, Søren Kierkegaard læst af K. Olesen-Larsen, vols. 1–2, ed. by vibeke olesen Larsen and tage wilhjelm, copenhagen: g.e.c. gad 1966, vol. 1 “artikler fra ‘tidehverv,’ ” pp. 227–53 (with summaries in english, pp. 269–75). For a detailed analysis of this early discussion, and reference to Løgstrup’s articles, see Svein aage christoffersen, “eksistensteologi og humanisme—om Konteksten for Løgstrups oppgjør med Kierkegaard” in Livtag med Den etiske Fordring, ed. by david bugge and peter aaboe Sørensen, Århus: Klim 2007, pp. 117–39. 4 Johannes Sløk, “polemik mod professor Løgstrup,” in Tidehverv, 1950, pp. 51–6. 5 K.e. Løgstrup, Den etiske fordring, 2nd ed., copenhagen: gyldendalske boghandel / nordisk Forlag a.S 1991 [1956]. english translation: The Ethical Demand, trans. by theodor i. Jensen, philadelphia, Fortress press 1971, 2nd ed., notre dame and London, university of 1

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pointed out the anthropological issue as his point of departure for his critique of Kierkegaard. the discussion was shaped around the general theme of humanism, understood as what is basically human over against christianity—an issue that emerges from time to time in different forms. in the quarrel between Løgstrup and his existentialist opponents among Kierkegaard researchers, K. olesen-Larsen and Sløk, the dualism between christianity and humanism became the point of intersection. Løgstrup intensified his critique in Opgør med Kierkegaard,6 where he presented his alternative to Kierkegaard’s anthropology, the famous and well-known anthropological identification: “The sovereign manifestations of life” (de suveræne livsytringer).7 These are defined as the basic anthropological elements of human existence as such. the manifestations of life take somebody by surprise, and in so doing they are different from mere feelings, since a person is not able to control them or perhaps even observe them. Løgstrup considers his sovereign manifestations of life—of which the most important are trust (tillid) and mercy (barmhjertighed)—to be a valid alternative to Kierkegaard’s anthropology. trust and mercy are fundamental to human beings. these are not things that should be learned or chosen. they are already there and show themselves almost independent of the person himself. So, when Sløk uses the notion of “humanism” in a book that responds to Løgstrup’s encounter with Kierkegaard, this is not something that he has simply plucked out of thin air. when Sløk now in Kierkegaard—humanismens tænker picks passion (Lidenskab) as a key notion in Kierkegaard’s anthropology it is possible to interpret it as an extended defense, or response to Løgstrup’s encounter with Kierkegaard. passion in Sløk’s interpretation should be seen as a Kierkegaardian identification of Løgstrup’s sovereign manifestations of life.8 this is the context in which Sløk’s study appears. Kierkegaard—humanismens tænker was well received. n.h. Søe (1895–1978) reviewed it in Kierkegaardiana quite straightforwardly by giving an overview of the main points.9 he proclaims the book to have a “lasting value,” which is true in the sense that it is considered a major work in danish on Kierkegaard’s anthropology. For some reason the book was again reviewed in Kierkegaardiana two years notre dame press 1997. german translation: Die Ethische Forderung, trans. by rosemarie Løgstrup, tübingen: mohr Siebeck 1959. 6 K.e. Løgstrup, Opgør med Kierkegaard, copenhagen: gyldendal 1968. (german translation: Auseinandersetzung mit Kierkegaard, vol. 2 of Kontroverse um Kierkegaard und Grundtvig, ed. by K.e. Løgstrup and götz harbsmeier, munich: chr. Kaiser 1968. (this german edition includes an extra chapter “epilog über die existenztheologie.”) 7 K.e. Løgstrup, Opgør med Kierkegaard, 3rd ed., copenhagen: gyldendal 2005, pp. 100–112. 8 this is ole morsing’s observation in “Sløk og Løgstrup” in Et menneske lades ikke i ro—facetter af Johannes Sløks forfatterskab, ed. by paw hedegaard amdisen, Lars gorzelak pedersen, and morten riis, Århus: aarhus universitetsforlag 2006, pp. 40–60; p. 50. 9 n.h. Søe, “Johannes Sløk: Kierkegaard—humanismens tænker. en studiebog” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 11, 1980, pp. 250–54. paul müller had a substantial review, “Kierkegaard—humanismens tænker,” in Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift, copenhagen: gad 1979, vol. 42, pp. 66–74.

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later by hermann deuser.10 deuser points out the strength of the book as a “good introduction,” which is “brilliantly written.”11 perhaps the label “introduction” is misleading and fails to see at least two important issues about Kierkegaard— humanismens tænker, which i consider good reasons to continue to keep the book in mind.12 The first issue to point out is, as already mentioned, the fact that Kierkegaard— humanismens tænker is an answer to Løgstrup’s Opgør med Kierkegaard. this fact seems to have been missed or neglected, and because of this it deserves to be reinforced in the Kierkegaard debate, or at least in the Løgstrup–Kierkegaard reception.13 a second issue to take notice of is the fact that Sløk rehabilitates the notion of passion as a key idea in Kierkegaard’s thinking. passion is the key notion for Sløk. in order to argue for Kierkegaard as a humanistic thinker, Sløk obviously focuses on his anthropology. Sløk outlines Kierkegaard’s idea of the individual understood as having a goal, aiming at eternity. passion is, as Johannes climacus displays, in fact plagued by the human contradiction. Since human beings are what they are about to be, movement is fundamental to human beings. This need for movement, passion, only fits into the anthropology if the first assumption is that an individual is not already what he or she is supposed to be, but is in his or her way to become this. at this point Sløk sees his disagreement with Løgstrup peak. Løgstrup’s “sovereign manifestations of life” are based upon a different presupposition, namely, that the manifestation is in itself sovereign. therefore, the human being is already at his or her goal, so to speak, and there is no need for passion or striving. although Kierkegaard’s discussion of passion ends in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript with a qualified passion, Sløk brings “passion” to Works of Love and connects it to the desire of love (kærlighedens trang). in doing so Sløk engages with Løgstrup’s “polemical epilogue” from Den etiske Fordring, his encounter with Works of Love.14 as opposed to Løgstrup who created a “theological school,” Sløk never really did the same. He influenced conspicuous theologians,15 but his most important study of Kierkegaard has not been subject of any comprehensive analysis. arne grøn is, as far as i am aware, alone in paying attention to Sløk’s writings on passion on a larger scale.16 hermann deuser, “Sløks humanismus. Johannes Sløk: Kierkegard—humanismens tænker. En studiebog,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 12, 1982, pp. 103–5. 11 ibid., p. 103. 12 perhaps a translation into english would make sense as well. 13 peter Kemp and ole morsing both point out this connection. 14 the “polemical epilogue” was for some reason not included in the 1971 translation of The Ethical Demand. it is included, though, in the second edition from 1997. 15 For instance, Kjeld holm, Lidenskab og Nærvær, copenhagen: aros 1993. niels grønkjær, Den nye Gud, copenhagen: anis 2010. Svend bjerg, Århusteologerne, P.G. Lindhardt, K.E. Løgstrup, Regin Prenter og Johannes Sløk. Den store generation i det 20. århundredes danske teologi, copenhagen: Lindhardt & ringhof 1994. 16 arne grøn, Subjektivitet og Negativitet: Kierkegaard, copenhagen: gyldendal 1997. 10

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we can conclude that Kierkegaard—humanismens tænker was an important contribution to a major discussion in the danish Kierkegaard interpretation, which has reinforced a central Kierkegaardian concept, passion. the contribution of this work has not been sufficiently recognized. christian Fink tolstrup

reviews and critical discussions deuser, hermann, “Sløks humanismus. Johannes Sløk: Kierkegaard–humanismens tænker. En studiebog,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 12, 1982, pp. 103–5. grøn, arne, Subjektivitet og negativitet: Kierkegaard, copenhagen: gyldendal 1997, pp. 197–202. hansen, Klaus Kvorning, review in Philosophia, vol. 9, nos. 1-2, 1980, pp. 140-2. holm, Kjeld, review in Præsteforeningens Blad, vol. 68, 1978, pp. 321-5. Kemp, peter, “den religiøse lidenskab. Sløk mellem Kierkegaard og Løgstrup” in Mig og evigheden. Johannes Sløks religionsfilosofi, ed. by Lars Sandbeck, copenhagen: anis 2007, pp. 23–47. — “une controverse voilée sur Kierkegaard: l’opposition K.e. Løgstrup-Johannes Sløk,” Kairos, vol. 10, 1995, pp. 215–29. Lindhardt, Jan, Johannes Sløk. Modernismens teolog, copenhagen: anis 2002, pp. 67–76. morsing, ole, “Sløk og Løgstrup” in Et menneske lades ikke i ro—facetter af Johannes Sløks forfatterskab, ed. by paw hedegaard amdisen, Lars gorzelak pedersen, and morten riis, Århus: aarhus universitetsforlag 2006, pp. 40–60. mortensen, viggo, review in Information, January 16, 1978. müller, paul, review in Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift, copenhagen: gad 1979, vol. 42, pp. 66–74. rasmussen, anders moe, “Kierkegaards eksistenstænkning som idealismekritik,” Philosophia, Århus: philosophia 1988, vol. 17, nos. 3–4, pp. 129–47. Sløk, Johannes, “Supplerende bemærkninger,” Philosophia, Århus: philosophia 1988, vol. 17, nos. 3–4, pp. 149–50. (response to anders moe rasmussen’s critique in Philosophia, vol. 17). Søe, n.h., review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 11, 1980, pp. 250–4. vergote, henri-bernard, “introduction” in Sløk’s Kierkegaard, penseur de l’humanisme, trans. by else-marie Jacquet-tisseau, paris: Éditions de l’orante 1995 (Bibliothéque Kierkegaardienne), pp. 9–25.

Johannes Sløk, Da Kierkegaard tav. Fra forfatterskab til kirkestorm

[when Kierkegaard Fell Silent: From the authorship to the attack on the church], copenhagen: hans reitzel Forlag 1980, 137 pp.

Johannes Sløk (1916–2001) was a danish theologian with a decided interest in the philosophical tradition known as “humanism,” and Kierkegaard was certainly among the authors he cherished the most. the book under review is one of the works Sløk devoted to Kierkegaard’s thought throughout a long and productive career. it is, thus, not only the work of an expert, but more properly the work of someone who, on account of a most intimate contact with Kierkegaard’s thought throughout many decades, managed, so to speak, to get inside the structure behind the latter’s thought. When Kierkegaard Fell Silent: From the Authorship to the Attack on the Church (the translation of the title) could be described as a “phenomenologico-structuralist” piece of research, in the sense that Sløk’s main interest is, as said above, to get into Kierkegaard’s own mental “mechanics,” into its very “structure.”1 Sløk’s main intention is to illuminate what led Kierkegaard from his “authorship” (understood as the period of his book writing and publishing) to the kirkestorm (that is, the final attack on the Danish Church as it took place in his final newspaper writings from 1854–55). given this, he draws upon Kierkegaard’s private papers and, more particularly, his annotations produced between the years 1851 and 1854 (the socalled “years of silence,” in the sense that Kierkegaard, one of the most prolific authors the world has ever seen, decided not to publish books during this period or after it). Sløk does this in order to see if one could wrench from this material the “secret” behind both the “self-silencing” and, more specifically, the attack itself. In this he brilliantly succeeds. in sum, throughout the greatest part of the book Sløk follows a historical-diachronic approach to Kierkegaard’s annotations produced in between the “authorship” and the “attack on the church,” engaging in what could be called “close readings” of a selection of them.

indeed, since the terms “mechanics,” “structure,” “function,” “conceptual framework,” and “conceptual world,” among others, are used quite a few times throughout the book, i will not bother quoting such passages.

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As regards its structure, the book is divided into five chapters (apart from an unnumbered short introduction entitled “the problem” (pp. 7–10)) (i) “the theory of [Self-]cultivation [theoridannelse] in the authorship” (pp. 11–40); (ii) “the implicit theory of Society” (pp. 41–52); (iii) “the turn” (pp. 53–78); (iv) “christianity” (pp. 79–121) and (v) “the meaning of the attack” (pp. 122–37). chapter i is the most difficult for the reader to grasp, inasmuch as it is there that Sløk’s very personal as well as profound appropriation of Kierkegaard’s “conceptual framework” is most prominent. (it should be mentioned that he hardly quotes Kierkegaard in this entire chapter). Indeed, Sløk rushes headlong into a difficult, problematic “structure” present throughout Kierkegaard’s work, that is, his understanding of the constitution, that is, the self-cultivation of a human being. Sløk’s main idea here is that throughout the authorship proper there is an implicit understanding of human life, in the sense that it is supposed to establish itself in a dialectical relationship towards both the world and god. with that said, Sløk’s intention here is to highlight the role these two instances or, as he puts it, “functions” play in Kierkegaard’s thought in the authorship, stressing at the same time the importance of concepts such as “earnestness” and “validity” in such a schema. this is an important, albeit somewhat arid chapter, in the sense that Sløk lays down the conceptual foundation which will make the rest, if not the gist of his research more fully comprehensible. chapter ii is also fundamentally devoted to the authorship and as such also functions as the groundwork upon which Sløk can build in his research proper. the main idea here is that, notwithstanding the fact that Kierkegaard was not and never intended to be a proper political philosopher, there is an implicit understanding of society and politics scattered throughout his work, though, one that is fundamentally “conservative in the sense of burke,”2 by which he means that the notion of hierarchy is fundamental to Kierkegaard’s understanding of social relations. Sløk, indeed, draws attention to the importance of concepts such as “authority” and “obedience” in the authorship, and how these, in turn, are connected to the function of the church. chapter iii, in turn, marks the shift to the subject proper of the book, that is, the turn which took place in Kierkegaard’s thought from 1848 onwards. in this sense, while it still deals with the period of the “authorship,” it nevertheless analyzes the beginning of the “process”3 which would eventually lead to the attack. Fundamentally, thus, the idea here is that the European revolutions of 1848 and more specifically their consequences in denmark led Kierkegaard not only to engage more directly with democracy, but also to envisage the collectivity known as “the poor” as a worthy subject of consideration; this, in turn, means that poverty and suffering more and more became normative values, if not more exactly “signs of the relationship towards god” in Kierkegaard’s mind.4 other than such developments, Sløk shows how mynster (on account of his not exercising authority in 1848) became more and more an important matter of consideration on Kierkegaard’s part, and consequently how the later very important notion of “admission”—which he would insistently Johannes Sløk, Da Kierkegaard tav. Fra forfatterskab til kirkestorm, copenhagen: hans reitzel 1980, p. 49. 3 ibid., p. 53. 4 ibid., p. 69. 2

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demand first from Mynster and then second from all Christians, in the near future— took place in his thought.5 chapter iv is the longest in the book and the most important. Sløk shows how important transformations in the meaning of christianity were brought about after 1848 in Kierkegaard’s thought. indeed, if in the “authorship,” Sløk claims, “christianity” implied a (somewhat feasible) dialectical relationship from the part of the individual towards both the world and god, one that implied “earnestness” and “validity” (gyldighed) so that one could, in the process of self-cultivation, eventually “go back to the world,” then after Practice in Christianity a new emphasis is put on the idea of “colli[ding] with the world.”6 this, in turn, implies that god’s “function” changed in Kierkegaard’s thought throughout these years, inasmuch as from an “ontological foundation for the human existence,”7 it eventually became a “definitive or exclusive determination,”8 in the sense of becoming a radically contradictory, if not literally inimical contrast to both the world and human beings.9 according to Sløk, thus, from around Practice in Christianity onwards Kierkegaard starts to stress Jesus’ life, deeds and, more particularly, suffering as patterns for the development of the truly christian life. all of this eventually leads to christianity becoming associated with values such as denial, suffering, and selfmortification—in Kierkegaard’s expression, “to die to the world” (at afdø)—in his (from then on private) writings. it is, in sum, a desperate,10 fanatically monomaniac11 somber Kierkegaard that appears around this period, this being the period of “silence” properly speaking. chapter v, then, describes the last phase in this process of increasing desperation, isolation, and aggressiveness on the part of Kierkegaard in relation to his contemporaries, and more specifically the church. Sløk does not address the attack itself, that is, he does not engage in an article by article analysis of the last published writings by Kierkegaard; rather, he once again pursues the internal logic of the affair, its conceptual structure, and, in this sense, he is mainly interested in stressing the transformations the concept of “the individual” was subject to throughout Kierkegaard’s entire production: from the category that eventually made possible the establishment of society, it becomes in the very final articles the “absolute contrast to all collectivities, to the category of ‘the crowd.’ ”12 Sløk reaches, thus, the verdict that there are at least “two Kierkegaards”13 as regards his (or their (sic)) understanding of christianity, with the latter arriving at a position which is fundamentally untenable, for he makes “christianity unrealizable in the life of a human being.”14 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

cf. ibid., pp. 72–8. ibid., p. 83, my emphasis. ibid., p. 97. ibid., p. 98. cf. ibid., p. 106. cf. ibid., p. 98. cf. ibid., p. 108. ibid., p. 129. ibid., p. 120. ibid., p. 125.

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To summarize, this is a most fundamental work in the field of Kierkegaard studies. It is the only work which specifically addresses the very important “silent years” of 1851–54, as well as the “final attack.” Other than this, it is a work of such erudition and sympathy towards the work of Kierkegaard that one wonders whether Sløk did not, so to speak, incarnate him while writing it, for such is the ease with which he handles some of the most hidden, as well as problematic “structures” and “functions” behind his thought. all in all, one can only say that it is a real shame that this work has never been translated into a major language such as english. gabriel guedes rossatti

reviews and critical discussions mortensen, viggo, review in Information, august 11, 1980. müller, paul, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 12, 1982, pp. 106-14. plekon, michael, review in Scandinavian Studies, vol. 54, 1982, pp. 264–6.

Johannes Sløk, Kierkegaards univers. En ny guide til geniet

[Kierkegaard’s universe: a new guide to the genius], viby: centrum 1983, 127 pp.

in denmark, Johannes Sløk’s (1916–2001) Kierkegaards univers. En ny guide til geniet is undeniably one of the most celebrated general introductions to Søren Kierkegaard’s life and philosophy. Sløk’s book was first published in 1983,1 and then again in 1990, 1996, and 2013. the 2013 edition was released in celebration of Kierkegaard’s 200th anniversary, and includes a foreword by the danish bishop Kjeld holm (Sløk’s friend and former student).2 the main text in all four editions is identical to Sløk’s original manuscript from 1983. in 1990 the book was translated into german by ulrich panzer under the title Christentum mit Leidenschaft, ein WegWeiser zur Gedankenwelt Søren Kierkegaard,3 and further translated into english in 1994 by Kenneth tindall under the title Kierkegaard’s Universe: A New Guide to the Genius.4 the book is divided into twelve short chapters, which constitute a chronological pathway into Kierkegaard’s universe, starting with his initial ideas in Either/Or and leading up to his vocal and fierce conflict with the Danish State Church. Sløk opens with an overall introduction to Kierkegaard’s writings and his historical background (chapters 1–2), and then he guides the reader into Kierkegaard’s foundational views on human existence in relation to individuality, society, freedom, and passion (Chapters 3–4). The first four chapters essentially serve as a background for understanding Kierkegaard’s stage theory (i.e., aesthetic, ethical and religious life), which Sløk elegantly depicts in the subsequent three chapters, avoiding making the stage theory itself the dominating aspect of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, as is Johannes Sløk, Kierkegaards univers. En ny guide til geniet, viby: centrum 1983. Johannes Sløk, Kierkegaards univers. En ny guide til geniet, copenhagen: Lindhardt og ringhof 2013. 3 Johannes Sløk, Christentum mit Leidenschaft, ein Weg-Weiser zur Gedankenwelt Søren Kierkegaard, trans. by ulrich panzer, munich: Kaiser 1990. 4 Johannes Sløk, Kierkegaard’s Universe: A New Guide to the Genius, trans. by Kenneth tindall, copenhagen: danish cultural institute 1994. 1 2

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typical in such introductions (chapters 5–7). the second half of the book deals with Kierkegaard’s view on the religious life in relation to the concepts of individuality, politics, and religious culture (chapters 8–12). it is probably not the title of the book, as much as the name of the author, which has drawn people’s attention to this work. in denmark, Sløk is considered to be one of the most important and prolific scholars of Danish theology and philosophy. He is typically portrayed as one of the four so-called “aarhus theologians,” together with regin prenter, p.g. Lindhardt, and the more internationally renowned K.e. Løgstrup. however, Sløk deviated in many ways from his colleagues’ viewpoints, both professionally and personally. he was an unorthodox thinker and a jovial provocateur—often involved in impassioned debates with his contemporaries, and especially Løgstrup, his dear friend and superior at aarhus university.5 Kierkegaard’s philosophy had a direct and indirect influence on most, if not all, of Sløk’s own ideas. it was above all the questions about human existence that stood at the forefront of Sløk’s interests and work as an intellectual. indeed, Sløk was not just a theologian, but also a fearless existentialist, promoting the well-known existentialist proverb that life essentially is absurd. Sløk found in Kierkegaard’s christianity an existential response to how to deal with this profound absurdity of human life.6 thus, the reader should perhaps be on the alert when reading Sløk’s guide to Kierkegaard’s work, namely, alert that Kierkegaard would now be presented more as a thinker akin to his existentialist successors, such as Simone de beauvoir, Jean paul Sartre, and albert camus, instead of being presented as an original innovator in theology and philosophy. although this suspicion is probably not entirely ungrounded, i still believe that Sløk’s book constitutes one of the better and unbiased introductions to Kierkegaard’s thought. indeed, Sløk’s book has become a bestseller and a popular companion among danish high school seniors, undergraduates, and laymen. on top of that, i believe it to be somewhat accurate that Sløk’s book could be seen as a legacy, a legacy that reflects how the Danes today perceive their most famous philosopher.7 Sløk’s book is overall an attempt to make it easier to read Kierkegaard’s works, and therefore not a book for people who are already well-versed specialists, as Sløk puts it.8 according to Sløk, the problem with Kierkegaard is that he is outrageously hard to read.9 it is outrageous because Kierkegaard, in Sløk’s opinion, does very little to make himself clear and understandable. and it is exactly here that Sløk offers his help. unlike many other introductions to Kierkegaard, Sløk works his See ole morsing, Løgstrup og Sløk, aarhus: Klim 2011. See Johannes Sløk, Kierkegaard—humanismens tænker, copenhagen: hans reitzel 1993. See also Johannes Sløk, Moralen der blev væk, viby: centrum 1993. 7 indeed, Sløk’s interpretation of Kierkegaard deviates from some of the more rigorous exclusive theological understandings of Kierkegaard’s work, at Sløk’s time represented by, for example, harald høffding and K.e. Løgstrup. See Steen tullberg, “the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 3–120. 8 Sløk, Kierkegaards univers, p. 11. 9 ibid., p. 7. 5 6

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way chronologically through Kierkegaard’s large corpus, almost entirely without direct citations of Kierkegaard’s writings. Instead, Sløk writes fluently about the underlying and central motives of Kierkegaard’s agenda. one of the more appreciative aspects of Sløk’s book, which i believe is different from many other canonical introductory works, is that it starts by taking a step back from Kierkegaard’s actual writings. This is an incredibly difficult thing to do, but Sløk was capable of doing this due to his profound familiarity with Kierkegaard’s corpus. as a result of this method, the reader quickly reaches a deeper awareness of Kierkegaard’s motives, but also a broader perspective on Kierkegaard’s project as a whole. For example, in the first 29 pages Sløk constantly reflects on, and returns to, what he believed to be the underlying motives and structures of Kierkegaard’s (indeed peculiar) philosophy, instead of going head-on into Kierkegaard’s own convoluted definitions. a central theme for Sløk is that Kierkegaard’s agenda was to explicate what it actually means to be a human being, namely, what it means to be living authentically. according to Sløk, Kierkegaard does this by analyzing the concrete life (det faktiske konkrete menneskeliv), that is, how human beings actually live their lives.10 this approach generates a consistent and fundamental narrative, which makes it easier to understand the key concepts we find in Kierkegaard’s universe, such as individuality, society, choice, freedom, selfhood, despair, passion, earnestness, religion, and christendom. it is especially Kierkegaard’s idea and depiction of the philistine (spidsborgeren) that Sløk sees as the starting-point from where a healthy understanding of the Kierkegaardian concepts should develop. the philistine attitude is the precondition of all human beings. the philistine is the dispassionate and uninterested person, who carries on with his business as the norms of society dictates. he is merely an entity in a larger cybernetic system; the philistine lives his life by convention, as a part of a machine.11 the philistine is lost in his own great self-deception, and has not yet realized his human nature, that is, has not yet become self-aware.12 the intimate discovery of passion (lidenskab) is the beginning of every human being’s potential salvation, since with passion comes individuality, a concept that the philistine lacks and is so crucial for a proper interpretation of Kierkegaard.13 For Sløk passion therefore becomes a key notion for understanding the difference between the aesthetic, ethical, and religious life. Sløk even speculates as to whether one can see all of Kierkegaard’s work as a task of baptizing the passions.14 despite the consistent and insightful outline of the book, one cannot help noticing that Sløk pays unusually little attention to three of Kierkegaard’s central works: The Concept of Irony, The Concept of Anxiety, and The Sickness unto Death. and perhaps for the same reason, Sløk’s treatment of the concepts of irony, anxiety, and despair seems to be out of balance with the importance that these concepts 10 11 12 13 14

ibid., pp. 20–1. ibid., pp. 30–31 ibid., p. 27. ibid., p. 45. ibid., p. 46.

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are granted in today’s international interpretation of Kierkegaardian philosophy.15 however, a generous reading of Sløk’s book would probably suggest that going into details with these three incredibly intricate concepts would indeed turn Sløk’s book into a specialists-only read, which was exactly what Sløk endeavored not to do. rasmus rosenberg Larsen

See K. brian Söderquist, The Isolated Self: Irony as Truth and Untruth in Søren Kierkegaard’s On the Concept of Irony, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 2007 (Danish Golden Age Studies, vol. 1), arne grøn, Begrebet angst hos Søren Kierkegaard, copenhagen: gyldendal 1994, and michael theunissen, The Concept of Despair, trans. by barbara harshav and helmut illbruck, princeton: princeton university press 2005. 15

reviews and critical discussions Lübcke, poul, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 13, 1984, p. 176. tullberg, Steen, “the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 3–120; pp. 71–4.

peter thielst, Livet forstås baglæns, men må leves forlæns. Historien om Søren Kierkegaard [Life is understood backwards, but must be Lived Forwards: the Story of Søren Kierkegaard], copenhagen: gyldendal 1994, 308 pp.

Livet forstås baglæns, men må leves forlæns. Historien om Søren Kierkegaard was published by gyldendal in the autumn 1994. this popular introduction to Søren Kierkegaard was written by the danish editor and m.a. in philosophy, peter thielst (b. 1951).1 having turned out to be a commercial success, it was released in Swedish and norwegian translations the following year, and in Finnish and dutch in 1999.2 in 2004 the book was reissued in danish, this time published by the author.3 Sold in more than 80,000 copies, Livet forstås baglæns, men må leves forlæns marks the boom of a wide Kierkegaard interest in denmark in the 1990s.4 peter thielst, Livet forstås baglæns, men må leves forlæns. Historien om Søren Kierkegaard, copenhagen: gyldendal 1994. (2nd ed., 1996). Page references follow the first edition. 2 peter thielst, Man förstår livet baklänges—men måste leva det framlänges, historien om Søren Kierkegaard, trans. by carla wiberg, Stockholm: rabén & Sjögren 1995; peter thielst, Historien om Søren Kierkegaard, livet forstås baklengs—men må leves forlengs, trans. by Knut Johansen, oslo: gyldendal norsk Forlag 1995 (the norwegian publishing house gyldendal has nowadays no formal relationship with gyldendal in denmark); peter thielst, Elämä ymmärretään taaksepäin, mutta se täytyy elää eteenpäin: Kertomus Søren Kierkegaardista, trans. by torsti Lehtinen, helsinki: werner Söderström 1999; peter thielst, Het verhaal van Søren Kierkegaard. Roman over het leven van een filosoof, trans. by mariska aikema, aletta hofstee, and heleen Kerkhof, baarn/antwerpen: Fontein/houtekiet 1999. the book was also put out on audio cassette for danish public libraries: peter thielst, Livet forstås baglæns, men må leves forlæns. Historien om Søren Kierkegaard, copenhagen: gyldendal Lydbøger 1995. 3 peter thielst, Livet forstås baglæns, men må leves forlæns. Kierkegaard. En guldalderhistorie, helsinore: det lille Forlag 2004. minor corrections are made, and the modern revision of Kierkegaard’s texts is carried out more gently, see ibid., p. 283. 4 The sales figures are given on the web site of Det lille Forlag, www.detlilleforlag.dk. For the Kierkegaard trend in the 1990s, see Steen tullberg, Søren Kierkegaard i Danmark, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 2006, pp. 115–16. 1

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the idea for the book originated from the managing director of gyldendal, who suggested to thielst that he should write an easily understood book about Kierkegaard.5 at this point thielst had already written a number of popular introductions on philosophical topics. inspired by the new danish bible translation in 1991, thielst had put forward in a newspaper article that also danish classics, like for instance hans christian andersen and Kierkegaard, ought to be translated into contemporary danish.6 it is a paradox, thielst argued, that danes, especially in the younger generation, have difficulties understanding Kierkegaard because of his antiquated language from the danish golden age, while foreigners have easier access to the philosopher through translations in a modern language. in the preface of Livet forstås baglæns, men må leves forlæns thielst formulates his object: “this book is an attempt to get around the man and his works to show that our difficult world thinker is neither as starry eyed nor as difficult as rumored…”7 “however, the reason why Kierkegaard still communicates directly with us is because he speaks precisely about what is common to all humans, the existential: the interaction between consciousness, feelings and identity.”8 thielst aims to “bring those branches of Kierkegaard’s philosophy into focus that make sense now. and that is certainly a lot, even though the christian and edifying parts of the authorship are kept in the background.”9 Furthermore thielst hopes that the Kierkegaard quotations and extracts throughout the book “will deepen the impression of the man and his times and will encourage the readers to throw themselves into his authorship.”10 thielst’s book is a chronologically told biography on Kierkegaard with commentaries on his most famous works. it is based on material from a wide range of unnamed Kierkegaard studies colored with excerpts from various Kierkegaard texts and testimonials.11 the book has an informal tone, the philosophical and theological terminology is reduced to a minimum, and society and geography in nineteenth-century copenhagen are vividly described. Kierkegaard is depicted as a bright, slightly odd man with interests and abilities in the spheres of thinking and dispute, who starts his adult life in Sturm und Drang and evolves into religious bitterness. Michael Kierkegaard and Regine Olsen figure as the actual reasons for Kierkegaard’s activity, the former as the creator of his life-long spleen, the latter as his muse. his early works are given much attention, and summaries and brief

Lars henrik aagaard, “Kierkegaard vil forføre os,” Berlingske Tidende, october 14, 1994 and Lisbeth wissing, “Kierkegaard for gymnasiaster,” Gymnasieskolen vol. 21, 1994, p. 15. 6 peter thielst, “ordene i tornysteret,” Politiken, January 5, 1993. 7 thielst, Livet forstås baglæns, p. 12. 8 ibid., p. 13. 9 ibid., p. 13. 10 ibid., p. 13. 11 ibid., pp. 304–6. the source material consists of Søren Kierkegaard, Samlede Værker, by peter p. rohde, vol. 1–20, 3rd ed., copenhagen: gyldendal 1962–64, Pap. (2nd ed.), B&A, and Steen Johansen, Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard (2nd ed.), copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1980. 5

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analysis are given by the author.12 the concept of stages is presented as the core of Kierkegaard philosophy,13 whereas Kierkegaard’s christian faith and concepts are described as significant for his age and not himself.14 thielst didactically explains the central Kierkegaard terminology, for example, “the ethical,”15 “anxiety,”16 and “subjectivity.”17 For some of these terms etymological explanations are given,18 others are translated with an alternative word known from contemporary spoken danish, for example, “consciousness” (bevidsthed) instead of the Kierkegaard’s “spirit” (ånd).19 in explaining complicated points thielst constructs examples from the supposed everyday life of his reader, thus improving Kierkegaard’s words, when he finds them too difficult to understand in their own right.20 throughout the book Kierkegaard’s thoughts are held up against challenges for people today. thielst is an engaged and entertaining writer with an eye for his age and his reader. Kierkegaard stands out as an ordinary human being whose thoughts are indeed relevant today. when thielst disengages what is practical and usable from what is abstract in Kierkegaard’s thought, the philosopher appears approachable and of eternal importance. His worldwide significance as the defender of the individual and father to existentialism seems obvious. as an introduction to Kierkegaard for a wide audience far from academic circles the book has proved its value. Written as a popular Kierkegaard book, with no firm base in research, it naturally comes up short. the fact that the Kierkegaard quotations are edited and cited in thielst’s modern danish results in a Kierkegaard book containing no original Kierkegaard text at all. there is a general lack of method in the examination of the sources: the excerpts from books, journals, papers, and testimonials are arbitrarily selected in order to present the man and his philosophy. Sometimes even the distinction between thielst’s and Kierkegaard’s voice and thoughts is hard to detect.21 Certain interpretations are superficial and obscure, with a doubtful support in the sources,22 and the frequent new critical approach to Kierkegaard’s texts narrows the perspectives and reduces their layers.23 So, the book offers more straight answers to Kierkegaard’s texts than tools to crack them open. the interpretation of Either/Or takes up 30 pages, the chapters on Works of Love and The Sickness unto Death less than 10 pages each. the edifying works are treated in two minor chapters. 13 thielst, Livet forstås baglæns, pp. 114–18; pp. 224–30 and passim. 14 e.g. ibid., p. 137. 15 ibid., pp. 116–17. 16 ibid., pp. 188–9. 17 ibid., pp. 219–22. 18 e.g. ibid., p. 117. 19 ibid., p. 185. 20 e.g. ibid., p. 115. 21 e.g. ibid., pp. 267ff. 22 e.g. ibid., p. 43 and p. 265 on modern psychology’s presumed view of Kierkegaard, and thielst p. 216 the comparison between Kierkegaard’s journal entry dealing with envy and the phenomenon jantelov, a term molded by the danish-norwegian writer aksel Sandemose (1899–1965), describing codified social oppression. 23 e.g. ibid., p. 253. 12

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there are no forerunners similar to Livet forstås baglæns, men må leves forlæns. reviving Kierkegaard through a modernization of his language belongs to a special Danish field of popular studies, of which Thielst is the foremost representative. The close biographical attention to Kierkegaard and the avowed dissociation from his intent and view of himself resembles georg brandes’ aims in his biography from 1877.24 with the general outlook in the account and the ambition to make Kierkegaard accessible for laymen the book is a part of the tradition in which the biographies of Johannes hohlenberg25 and Joakim garff26 are written. thomas eske rasmussen

georg brandes, Søren Kierkegaard. En kritisk fremstilling i grundrids, copenhagen: gyldendal 1877. 25 Johannes hohlenberg, Søren Kierkegaard, copenhagen: h. hagerups Forlag 1940. 26 Joakim garff, SAK—Søren Aabye Kierkegaard. En biografi, copenhagen: gads Forlag 2000. 24

reviews and critical discussions aagard, Lars henrik, “Kierkegaard vil forføre os,” Berlingske Tidende, october 14, 1994. andersen, Jens, “Kierkegaards brødrister,” Weekendavisen, october 21, 1994. arendt, rudolph, “Folkebog om Kierkegaard,” Kristeligt Dagblad, october 14, 1994. Bach, Henrik, “Sørens form og figur,” Litteraturmagasinet Standart, vol. 5, 1994– 95, p. 34. billeskov Jansen, F.J., “velkommen magister thielst,” Politiken, october 24, 1994. bøggild, Jacob, “Forfatteren er død—formidleren leve!,” BUM, Børne- og ungdomslitteraturmagasinet, vol. 13, no. 3, 1995, pp. 28–30. bredsdorff, thomas, “Forlæns salto,” Politiken, January 26, 1997. büttner, anke, “Søren is like you and me…,” Danish Literary Magazine vol. 7, 1994, danish children’s Literature, p. 7. davidsen, andreas, “genskrivning af Kierkegaard,” Kristeligt Dagblad, January 26, 1995. enger, dorthe, “Sørens verden og vores?,” Gymnasieskolen vol. 23, 1994, pp. 16–17. garff, Joakim, review in Kierkegaardiana vol. 18, 1996, pp. 249–53. handesten, Lars, “Søren Kierkegaard for hele folket,” Berlingske Tidende, october 14, 1994. højlund, niels, “hva’ nu magister Kierkegaard,” Ekstra Bladet, october 19, 1994. holm, Søren, “et banalt bedrag,” Tidehverv, 1995, pp. 111–13. moe, helene, “den lette vej til Kierkegaard,” Kristeligt Dagblad, october 14, 1994. nielsen, Flemming christian, “danser med Kierkegaard,” Morgenavisen JyllandsPosten, october 14, 1994. olesen, merete møller, “Kierkegaard for lægmænd,” Information, october 18, 1994. thielst, peter, “danser med Kierkegaard,” Bogens Verden, 1994, pp. 322–4. wissing, Lisbeth, “Kierkegaard for gymnasiaster,” Gymnasieskolen, vol. 21, 1994, pp. 15–17.

niels thulstrup, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846 [Kierkegaard’s relation to hegel and Speculative idealism until 1846], copenhagen: gyldendal 1967, 354 pp.

one of the most important works in the history of the reception of the issue of the Kierkegaard–hegel debate was Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846 published in 1967 by the professor of theology at the university of copenhagen, niels thulstrup (1924–88). this work was a habilitation thesis (Disputats) at the Faculty of theology. in 1980 an english translation appeared under the title Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, and there were also german and Japanese translations.1 prior to this study thulstrup had published Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel. Forschungsgeschichte,2 a book which evaluates the secondary literature on the issue up until about 1960 and can be seen as a kind of introduction to Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel. thulstrup begins by exploring the historical sources of hegelianism in denmark during Kierkegaard’s time and then goes on to trace chronologically the various loci in which key words, such as “Hegel” or “Hegelianism,” appear, first in the Papirer and later in Kierkegaard’s published works. the strength of this book lies clearly in its historical setting of the stage of the issue in the first few chapters. Although the historical aspect of the relation is treated fairly thoroughly until 1842, the actual philosophical account of hegel in Kierkegaard’s mature works is rather cursory; for example, the final chapter purports to analyze among other things, Either/Or, Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of Anxiety, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. thulstrup’s compressed account in that chapter in no way does justice to these difficult texts and is disproportionate when considered in relation to the niels thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george L. Stengren, princeton: princeton university press 1980. german translation: Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel und zum spekulativen Idealismus 1835–1846, Stuttgart: verlag w. Kolhammer 1972. Japanese translation: キェルケゴールのヘーゲルへの関係, trans. by masaru otani, osaka: toho-shuppan 1980. 2 niels thulstrup, Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel. Forschungsgeschichte, Stuttgart: verlag w. Kohlhammer 1969. 1

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amount of time he spends on Kierkegaard’s unpublished writings and lesser known early works. it appears that thulstrup embarked on the ambitious project of working through everything Kierkegaard wrote and, due to the enormous mass of material, was unable to get past the year 1842. He thus added a perfunctory final chapter to give the appearance of at least having worked up to the crucial year 1846. as the title indicates, there is not even the pretence of an account of The Sickness unto Death or anything else published by Kierkegaard after 1846. thulstrup’s main claim with regard to the question of Kierkegaard’s relation to hegel can be seen in its most concise form in his introduction where he designates the following as the central thesis of the book: “hegel and Kierkegaard have in the main nothing in common as thinkers, neither as regards object, purpose, or method, nor as regards what each considered to be indisputable principles.”3 after completing his account of the historical material, thulstrup proceeds to go through Kierkegaard’s corpus passage for passage, trying to demonstrate how the thought found there is fundamentally at odds with hegel’s on each and every issue. For instance, with regard to their respective views on the philosophy of religion, thulstrup writes: “there is an absolute opposition between the viewpoints of hegel and Kierkegaard on the relation between philosophy and christianity.”4 Later he claims that “the incompatibility [sc. of Kierkegaard’s thought] with speculative philosophy of religion is insurmountable.”5 on a similar note, he declares further that the “theory of stages, which is suggested in The Concept of Irony, is also in total discord with hegel’s philosophy.”6 thulstrup summarizes Kierkegaard’s references to hegel in the Papirer from 1842 to 1845 as follows: “Kierkegaard immediately states on every relevant point his fundamental disagreement with hegel.”7 in reference to Pap. v, thulstrup writes: “the disharmony was fundamental, and it appears at any point that Kierkegaard pounced on in hegel.”8 thus, thulstrup neither wavers from his main thesis nor allows any counterevidence to weaken or qualify it in any way. thulstrup fails to recognize the many points, especially in the works of young Kierkegaard, where Hegel’s positive influence is in evidence. Indeed, it is not difficult to find passages where Kierkegaard in fact is quite receptive to Hegel’s thought and even inspired by it. Kierkegaard’s teacher, Frederik christian Sibbern, speaks offhandedly of Kierkegaard’s “hegelian period.”9 moreover, in a journal niels thulstrup, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846, copenhagen: gyldendal 1967, p. 21 (Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, p. 12). 4 thulstrup, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel, p. 78 (Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, p. 82). (my emphasis.) 5 thulstrup, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel, p. 179 (Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, p. 209). (my emphasis.) 6 thulstrup, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel, p. 224 (Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, p. 260). (my emphasis.) 7 thulstrup, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel, p. 254 (Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, p. 296). (my emphasis.) 8 thulstrup, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel, p. 270 (Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, p. 315). (my emphasis.) 9 h.p. barfod (ed.) “indledende notiser,” in his Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1833–1843, copenhagen: c.a. reitzels Forlag 1869, pp. lii–liii. See also Encounters 3

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entry from 1850, which refers back to this period, Kierkegaard openly speaks of his discipleship to hegel at that time: Influenced as I was by Hegel and whatever was modern, without the maturity really to comprehend greatness, i could not resist pointing out somewhere in my dissertation that it was a defect on the part of Socrates to disregard the whole and only consider individuals numerically. what a hegelian fool i was!10

given thulstrup’s thesis of the absolute discontinuity in the thought of the two men, he is at some pains to explain away Kierkegaard’s confession that he was “a hegelian fool.” thulstrup is quick to dismiss passages like this or even to label them ironic, lest Kierkegaard might be seen to have taken something positive from hegel. thulstrup’s own unbending and undifferentiated position ultimately undercuts the very purpose of his comparative study since it leaves him no room for real comparison or contrast. he mechanically goes through Kierkegaard’s published works and Papirer trying to demonstrate that hegel and Kierkegaard constitute the antipodes of nineteenth-century thought. by the all too consistent insistence on his thesis, which is formulated in such an extreme manner, thulstrup unwittingly renders his investigation considerably less interesting than it might otherwise have been. one wonders how a study on Kierkegaard’s relation to hegel can be useful or interesting if in the final analysis there is in fact no real relation. If, indeed, Kierkegaard and hegel share absolutely nothing in common, then no comparison is possible in the first place. thulstrup represents one of the most pronounced examples of an unfortunate tendency in Kierkegaard scholarship at the time that was interested more in apologia than research. For example, he reviles hegel by referring to him sarcastically throughout the work as “the master.” thulstrup’s general attitude is in evidence in his discussion of The Concept of Irony where he writes: “we can also, as several scholars and interpreters have done, doubt the correctness of Kierkegaard’s self-proclaimed discipleship to hegel in this book…because we cannot imagine that such a shrewd genius as Kierkegaard could possibly have let himself be taken in by hegel.”11 one can see here a clear case of question begging in the portrayal of hegel as a seducer of youth who was unable to dupe the astute Kierkegaard. this sort of disposition puts all critical thinking into abeyance, prejudices every meaningful issue ahead of time, and can hardly be said to be in accordance with honest and serious scholarship.12 it is obvious that to approach the matter in this way prohibits one from seeing the relation as an honest dialogue between two equal interlocutors. the goal of scholarship in the with Kierkegaard: A Life as Seen By His Contemporaries, trans. and ed. by bruce h. Kirmmse, princeton: princeton university press 1996, p. 217. 10 SKS 24, 32, nb21:35 / JP 4, 4281. Translation slightly modified. 11 thulstrup, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel, p. 184 (Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, p. 214). 12 See henning Fenger Kierkegaard: The Myths and their Origins, trans. by george c. Schoolfield, New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1980, p. 132: “It appears to me that [thulstrup’s] main thesis was the point of departure for [his] work…and not the objective result of an unbiased investigation.” See also ibid., p. 149.

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history of philosophy should be to understand what is at issue philosophically in the authors under examination and not to erect a monument for a thinker who one has already decided ahead of time was in sole possession of truth and wisdom. while the general tendency of regarding Kierkegaard’s position as a straightforward campaign against hegel was around long before thulstrup’s day, he was the one who crystalized it, giving it its clearest, most unambiguous formulation; moreover, his work aimed explicitly to ground it by means of a scholarly investigation of the issue. thus, in a sense he can be said if not to have established, then to have grounded in scholarship the paradigm in mainstream research for understanding Kierkegaard’s relation to hegel. thulstrup’s work, for all of its outward appearance of being a piece of history of philosophy, has thus hindered Kierkegaard research from making headway towards an understanding of his philosophical sources. the idea of Kierkegaard’s radical originality brings with it the notion that he relied on no previous thinkers. Thulstrup’s oversimplified interpretation firmly ensconced his ideological view in the research community and led to a quasi-official Kierkegaard orthodoxy, which for years has stood in the way of a more critical examination of the matter. thulstrup’s investigation told the Kierkegaard research community at the time what it wanted to hear, that is, that Kierkegaard was an uncompromising critic of hegel, and the issue was cut and dried. after thulstrup’s work the matter seemed to be more or less decided, and there seemed to be no reason to look into it more closely. Fortunately, since thulstrup’s time there have been at least a few dissenting opinions who have wished to see the matter with nonpartisan eyes. outstanding later studies by scholars such as mark c. taylor and Stephen dunning have pointed in new directions and shown clearly the ideological nature of thulstrup’s work.13 it is astonishing that it has taken so long for Kierkegaard studies to come out from under the long shadow of thulstrup’s book. Jon Stewart

For example, mark c. taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, berkeley: university of california press 1980. Stephen dunning, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness, princeton: princeton university press 1985.

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reviews and critical discussions arendt, rudolph, review in Berlingske Aftenavis, may 31, 1967. bukdahl, Jørgen K., review in Præsteforeningens Blad, vol. 58, 1968, pp. 653–6. comstock, w. richard, review of the english translation in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 49, no. 4, 1981, pp. 736–7. crites, Stephen, review of the english translation in The Journal of Religion, vol. 64, no. 3, 1984, pp. 386–8. dunning, Stephen n., review of the english translation in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 14, no. 1, 1983, pp. 59–60. elrod, John w., review of the english translation in The Owl of Minerva, vol. 12, no. 2, 1980, pp. 6–7. Fenger, henning, review in Politiken, may 25, 1967. — “hegel, Kierkegaard og niels thulstrup,” in his Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder, odense: odense universitetsforlag 1976, pp. 109–22. (in english: “hegel, Kierkegaard, and niels thulstrup,” in his Kierkegaard: The Myths and their Origins, trans. by George C. Schoolfield, New Haven and London: yale university press 1980, pp. 132–49.) hesseldahl, evald, review in Den danske Realskole, vol. 69, 1967, pp. 628–30. holm, Søren, review in Nordisk tidskrift för vetenskap, konst och industri, vol. 44, 1968, pp. 68–81. Kemp, peter, “teologiens fremtid i danmark,” in Teologiens krise til debat, ed. by Laurits Lauritsen, copenhagen: vintens Forlag 1974, pp. 134–42. Lindhardt, p.g., review in Jyllands-Posten, may 30, 1967. poole, roger c., review in Scandinavica, vol. 7, no. 2, 1968, pp. 143–7. rasmussen, aage gottschalck, review in Fyns Tidende, June 9, 1967. Schultz, Jørgen, review in Kristeligt Dagblad, June 1, 1967. Sløk, Johannes, review in Aarhus Stiftstidenden, June 1, 1967. Stengren, george L., review in Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 10, 1972, pp. 366–70. Stenström, thure, review in Samlaren, vol. 89, 1968, pp. 169–71. Stewart, Jon, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, new york: cambridge university press 2003, pp. 14–27. — “the reception of Kierkegaard’s Nachlaß in the english-Speaking world,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2003, pp. 277–315; see pp. 292–4. tullberg, Steen, “denmark: the permanent reception—150 years of reading Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome i, Northern and Western Europe, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 3–120; see pp. 60–1.

bjarne troelsen, Manden på flydebroen. En fortælling om Søren Kierkegaard og det moderne menneskes tilblivelse [the man on the dock: a Story about Søren Kierkegaard and the origin of the modern person], copenhagen: anis 1997, 236 pp.

the man on the dock is a character, sketched in the journals,1 whose odd behavior not only makes him the object of laughter for some of those who observe him in passing, but with his leap into the lake, a lawbreaker as well. the peculiarity of his behavior is grounded in the fact that he leaps into the water to save a ladybug floating on the surface, a creature whose shadow on the bottom of the lake he initially spied indirectly while looking through binoculars. the story is interesting to troelsen because it thematizes the dilemma which, according to the author, the aesthete a faces and to some extent Kierkegaard himself faces. in any case, this dilemma is one of the many themes treated in the book, here the dilemma of the freedom of passion versus the restriction of reflection. The problem at issue is whether it is possible for one to imagine an infinite reflection, a passion which is not immediate, and a reflection which is not finite. Kierkegaard’s answer is “yes!,” but according to troelsen, the problem remains unsolved inasmuch as the poetic attempts Kierkegaard makes to isolate the dilemma break down, and he remains within it. the dilemma comes into shape as a “partially poetic representation” of the issue which is supplemented with a kind of commentary.2 Kierkegaard exhibits this tendency in the antigone sketch in Either/ Or, to which aesthete a adds commentary, and “guilty/not guilty,” for which Frater taciturnus acts as commentator. the narrative about the man on the dock is a similar poetic attempt to capture the dilemma in a character, but remains a mere attempt since the man never makes it out of the fitting room, but remains boxed up as a SKS 18, 209–10, JJ:217 / KJN 2, 192–3. bjarne troelsen, Manden på flydebroen. En fortælling om Søren Kierkegaard og det moderne menneskes tilblivelse, copenhagen: anis 1997, p. 147. 1 2

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sketch in the journals. the grotesque dimension of the dilemma resides in the fact that through imagination a triviality can occupy one absolutely, as shown in the imbalance between the meaninglessness of the ladybug and the passion of the rescue. according to my understanding of troelsen’s book, including the interpretation of the sketch from the journals, the book’s title points a critical finger at Kierkegaard himself, or at least at Kierkegaard’s project, which he views as unstable, alternating between states of balance and imbalance. The figure of the man on the dock is additionally interesting to Troelsen since Kierkegaard here provides a sketch of the modern person who is not able to fulfill the requirements demanded by either the aesthetic or the ethical life. his beautiful intention of saving the ladybug is honored with public laughter, and the police officer rewards his sacrificial efforts by arresting him for jumping “into the water where it is not allowed.”3 thus, “he places himself beyond the rules of society without being able to appeal to a higher universal purpose which could justify such an action. he is thereby beyond ‘the ethical.’ ”4 troelsen suggests that we ought to understand the man as a martyr since he brings himself to the brink of the law and receives no sympathy from his observers. troelsen makes further comparisons between the story of abraham in Fear and Trembling and Kierkegaard’s own story, specifically noting that Kierkegaard sacrificed his relationship to Regine because of apparent inner passion or prompting. in his book, troelsen offers a series of interpretations of selected texts taken primarily from The Concept of Irony, Either/Or, The Concept of Anxiety, and Stages of Life’s Way, interpretations which are commendable since they present the various pseudonymous authors and the various fictional characters in an often accessible new light. By highlighting the Kierkegaardian figures with observations from sociological, biological, and historical perspectives, troelsen is successful at creating a dialogue between the literary work, Kierkegaard, and the age to which he belongs. and while the result of troelsen’s effort is not always especially sophisticated, it is nonetheless very refreshing and intriguing and makes the book a nice introduction to Kierkegaard and his work. troelsen, for example, considers the form of pietism, which was not an insignificant part of Kierkegaard’s religious experience at home, in part to be a consequence of a breakdown from a collective to an individual form of consciousness. this breakdown is compared to the transition from the collective way of life in small rural communities to the more independent way of life on isolated farms, a transition which resembles the sort Kierkegaard’s father experienced.5 as early as the introduction, the author points out the virtue in representing Kierkegaard not as an arbitrary and isolated poet-philosopher, but as a thinker who has a decisive relationship to his time and context. therefore, as the subtitle announces, close attention is paid to Søren’s father, ex-girlfriend, and his poetphilosopher colleagues. This goes for the local figures—Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Poul SKS 18, 209, JJ:217 / KJN 2, 193. troelsen, Manden på flydebroen. En fortælling om Søren Kierkegaard og det moderne menneskes tilblivelse, p. 150. 5 ibid., p. 36. 3 4

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møller, hans christian andersen—and those further away: Kant and hegel. one might here wonder what nietzsche is doing in such company. the subtitle to troelsen’s book sets up a relationship between Kierkegaard and the origin of the modern person, which raises some questions. one might ask how successful troelsen is at creating a single story from two different ones, namely, Kierkegaard’s and the modern person’s. is Kierkegaard’s story identical with that of the modern person, or is Kierkegaard’s project a part of the story of the origin of modernity? it is my opinion that troelsen assumes and wants to demonstrate the latter. and he is successful in presenting Kierkegaard in such a way that the reader experiences him as a poet in relation to his work, and as a Københavner in the process of becoming a modern. it is among other things this portrayal of Kierkegaard’s reluctant relationship to romanticism—a dependence upon as well as resistance against—which will be very informative for the general reader. a story (fortælling) is a record of a series of events, which among other things attempts to synthesize significant events and historical processes. Troelsen, the historian of ideas and secondary school teacher, is able to create such a synthesis in a fashion which is both exciting and instructive, which makes the book absolutely worthy of recommendation for those not intimately familiar with romanticism and who would like an interesting introduction, or to those would like an introduction to Kierkegaard’s work in general. implied above is the idea that troelsen has written a book for the layperson and that professionals will search in vain for new research conclusions or for dialogue with Kierkegaard research in general. it is written in a style that makes it interesting and easy as it unfolds, but superficial and presumptuous as a contribution to Kierkegaard research; it would thus be a shame to place it in the research genre since the book has so many other good qualities. the history of ideas approach is exciting because it draws from so many different disciplines, and offers such a nuanced point of departure. it has the drawback however, that the investigation can quickly become so diluted that the conclusions are hardly as nuanced. theological questions, for example, are coupled together with assertions which work as a part of the narrative, but are not persuasive. among other places, this is the case in troelsen’s reference to “this world” in the chapter on “temporality” which, in my opinion, suffers under the broad strokes of his brush. troelsen writes: “new testament christianity rejects without hesitation or modification ‘this world’ which lies under the power of sin and the devil….”6 the quotation marks around the words “this world” saves his claim, for “the world” in itself is not rejected by christianity, the new testament, or Kierkegaard. it is a nuance of this sort which Kierkegaard himself treats with great care, and because it is the tension in such concepts which makes them relevant and educational for him, one expects the same in a book about Kierkegaard. the same broad and uneven brush seems to have been used in the last chapter in which troelsen, with The Point of View of My Work as an Author in hand, divides the authorship into “the pseudonymous works and the edifying works,” and asserts that they “fit together as the law and the

6

ibid., pp. 197–8.

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gospel in pauline and Lutheran theology.”7 it is perhaps not quite so simple. in “a glance at a contemporary effort in danish Literature” in an appendix to Concluding Unscientific Postscript, one reads, “that which is decisive for the christian-religious is not found in the upbuilding discourses….”8 despite the above criticism, i commend troelsen for his unburdened interpretation, which does not ideologize or remold Kierkegaard to fit him into any particular genre or school. there is room for the strange, lopsided, incomprehensible, and ridiculous Søren next to the brilliant, relevant, humorous, and edifying Kierkegaard. christian Fink tolstrup translated by K. brian Söderquist

7 8

ibid., p. 235. SKS 7, 246 / CUP1, 271.

reviews and critical discussions Jensen, Søren, review in Dansk Kirketidende, vol. 150, 1998, pp. 26–8. olesen, ole, review in Præsteforeningens Blad, vol. 87, 1997, pp. 1244–6. tolstrup, christian, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 20, 1999, pp. 319–22.

v. Secondary Literature in dutch

bernard delfgaauw, Kierkegaard. Waarheid en menselijkheid [Kierkegaard: truth and humanity], Kampen: Kok agora 1995, 100 pp.

this work collects three essays, preceded by an introduction to Kierkegaard’s life and work, by one of the most important philosophical advocates of Kierkegaard in the Low countries, bernard delfgaauw. despite the many articles he wrote on Kierkegaard, and the many books he published on philosophy in general, the author never published a book on Kierkegaard in particular. In fulfillment of the author’s wish, the essays, which had already appeared in various journals and collections, were posthumously republished in this work. the introduction gives a clear overview of the events in Kierkegaard’s life, his main works and thoughts. In the first essay, Delfgaauw offers a close reading of the passage at the beginning of the second paragraph of the second chapter of the second part of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and a clear interpretation of the main claims of Kierkegaard’s Johannes climacus, namely, that “truth is subjectivity.”1 delfgaauw gives an illuminating exposition of climacus’ argument that every act of thinking presupposes a resolution of faith (in the broad sense), and therefore, is grounded in a concrete subject. the second essay presents a comparison or, better, a juxtaposition of Kierkegaard and marx. delfgaauw argues that in their rejection of political liberalism, both thinkers have mistakenly rejected democracy, confusing it with capitalism. in his criticism, marx has underestimated the danger of the tyranny of the masses with regard to individual freedom, while Kierkegaard has underestimated the socialeconomic basis necessary to facilitate such a freedom. therefore, delfgaauw argues for democracy as a kind of synthesis between Kierkegaard’s stress on the need for the development of individuals and marx’s stress on the need for political and socialeconomic theory. The final essay explores Kierkegaard’s category of the “single individual” and examines the question of whether the charge of individualism is justified. Delfgaauw answers this question in the negative on the basis of a reflection upon his own incorporation of Kierkegaard’s thought—he calls this the “basal method.”2 although this method is a bit peculiar, delfgaauw argues very intelligently that to SKS 7, 173 / CUP1, 189. bernard delfgaauw, Kierkegaard. Waarheid en menselijkheid, Kampen: Kok agora 1995, pp. 79–80.

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be a single individual essentially means to be aware of one’s own responsibility and with that, one’s responsibility towards other individuals. therefore, he concludes, Kierkegaard’s category of the single individual leads to just the opposite of individualism, namely, societal responsibility. in short, delfgaauw’s monograph is more than just another introduction to Kierkegaard’s thought. it challenges the reader to think along with Kierkegaard, and at the same time it performatively demonstrates how this can be done in an exemplary way. wolter hartog

reviews and critical discussions Struyker boudier, c.e.m., review in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 58, 1996, p. 605. Cornet, Pascal, “Uniform maar ongelijkwaardig. Drie recente filozofiemonografieën,” Standaard der Letteren, march 14, 1996. van de maele, romain John, review in Kruispunt, vol. 165, 1996, pp. 55–7.

udo doedens, In het teken van tegenspraak. Steekhoudende gedachten van Søren Kierkegaard

[in the Light of contradiction: convincing thoughts of Søren Kierkegaard], zoetermeer: meinema 2005, 120 pp.

udo doedens, who wrote a ph.d. thesis on Kierkegaard in 1999 (Het eenvoudige leven volgens Søren Kierkegaard), is a protestant pastor in holland. the present work is an edited collection of Kierkegaard excerpts mainly taken from the journals. as an editor doedens had no scholarly ambitions, but wanted to offer material for personal meditation. the selection, divided into fourteen topics, each preceded by a short introduction, linking Kierkegaard’s text to contemporary life experiences, is primarily meant to be upbuilding and religiously inspiring. the title of the book (literally, “the sign of contradiction”) refers to Luke 2:34, where Simeon says about the child Jesus that he will be a σημεῖον ἀντιλεγόμενον, “a sign which will be spoken against.” this highlights the paradoxical character of christ, and the Kierkegaard quotations are described as dealing with “radicality, suffering, and self-denial, with the unique character of Jesus christ and the particularity of christianity, but also with eternity, love, and enduring joy.”1 while introducing the themes, doedens shows how Kierkegaard can be an antidote to twenty-first century consumer society. We should not expect the consolation “of creamy chocolate, soft toilet paper, or robust Suvs,”2 he suggests, nor should we expect confirmation from our life partners. What we learn from Kierkegaard is to become a self, a singular individual, who is capable of devoting his life to what Kierkegaard calls the absolute or the eternal. “the worries and the interests that weigh on the calculating civilian, the self is protected from by the only thing he cares about: the eternal, the absolute.”3

udo doedens, In het teken van tegenspraak. Steekhoudende gedachten van Søren Kierkegaard, zoetermeer: meinema 2005, p. 7. 2 ibid., p. 10. 3 ibid., p. 11. 1

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being confronted with a selection of Kierkegaard texts, each of which is introduced by a meditation that is presented from an explicitly christian standpoint, is not usual for the contemporary reader. whereas quite a lot of the Kierkegaard books today have a tendency to hide the christian dimension of Kierkegaard’s authorship, doedens has the courage to take it seriously. one is tempted to put doedens in line with dorothea glöckner, who is a pastor as well, a german pastor working in denmark. in 2012 she published an anthology of Kierkegaard texts entitled Predigen mit Kierkegaard.4 doedens did not have the intention of giving a hand to preachers in need of inspiration, but his anthology is pervaded with the same spirit as that of dorothea glöckner. one has the feeling that the book is meant primarily for a particular public: that of (protestant) christians feeling unhappy with the developments of contemporary culture and searching for an alternative. however, the non-protestant or non-christian readers should not think too easily that the texts are no concern to them. the book contains a modest bibliography and a list of references (based on the Papirer edition of the journals and papers, and the gyldendal edition of the Samlede Værker). paul cruysberghs

dorothea glöckner, Predigen mit Kierkegaard, göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht 2012. the book is a translation and adaptation of a book published in danish by andreas davidsen and John w. hørbo, Søren Kierkegaard og Søndagsteksterne, vols. 1–2, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1995.

4

reviews and critical discussions beukes, Johann, review in Hervormde teologiese studies, vol. 64, no. 2, 2008, pp. 1099-1101.

taeke dokter, De structuur van Kierkegaard’s oeuvre [the Structure of Kierkegaard’s Oeuvre], assen: van gorcum 1936, 164 pp.

this monograph represents the second serious study in the dutch-speaking world which is solely dedicated to Kierkegaard. Just as the previous study, by willem Leendertz,1 taeke dokter prepared his research while serving as a pastor (in the reformed church of Kolham), and he too defended his ph.d. thesis at the theological Faculty of the State university of groningen. being stimulated by his supervisor, the famous dutch philosopher of ethics and religion, w.J. aalders, to do his ph.d. on Kierkegaard, dokter was not that enthusiastic initially, but he reports that he soon came to enjoy the topic once he got started.2 it is quite possible that his enthusiasm was stirred by the move that he made, indirectly inspired by the influence of Barth’s dialectical theology, from an anthropocentric to a theocentric point of view in theology, though dokter acknowledges that there is a wide gap between Kierkegaard and dialectical theology. this applies even more to the other contemporary strand which claims to take its inspiration from Kierkegaard, the so-called “philosophy of existence,” in which at most an echo of his thought can be heard.3 dokter’s methodology and approach to Kierkegaard’s authorship is entirely different from that of his predecessor. whereas Leendertz’ approach was aimed at avoiding the trap of systematizing Kierkegaard’s thought at all costs in order to reach the core of his existential philosophy and his personality, dokter states that Kierkegaard’s main thought, the idea of existence, cannot be approached by any scholarly dissertation, because “it is not appropriate for a piece of academic writing

willem Leendertz, Sören Kierkegaard, amsterdam: a.h. Kruyt 1913. taeke dokter, De structuur van Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, assen: van gorcum 1936, p. 7. 3 dokter aims his criticisms in particular at Karl Jaspers, who neglects the telos of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. in the attached theses for his doctoral defense, dokter also objects to the assertion of his supervisor, w.J. aalders, that there is a “profound and far-reaching agreement in [Kierkegaard’s and Jaspers’] ‘sense of life’ and in [their] philosophical attitude.” See w.J. aalders, “het woord existentie in het modern wetenschappelijke spraakgebruik,” in Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, amsterdam: noordhollandsche uitgeversmaatschappij 1933 (Afdeling Letterkunde, serie A, vol. 75, no. 2), p. 34.

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to be dominated by the existential impetus.”4 dokter emphasizes that Kierkegaard’s thought wants to be either inwardly appropriated or annoyingly rejected. his aim is, therefore, to let Kierkegaard speak and to allow his appeal for inward appropriation to be heard, by giving a systematic, “descriptive-interpretative” topography of his authorship,5 leading towards the essence of its existential message and meaning. the existential nature of Kierkegaard’s thought also implies, according to dokter, that it cannot be judged on the basis of academic-systematic standards, but solely by way of an immanent, logical, and aesthetic critique. dokter’s study of the “structure of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre” is itself clearly structured as well. in the order of the chapters, the book deals with: “i. the motive”; “ii. the method”; “iii. the Form”; “iv. the Signature”; and “v. the ground” of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. In the first chapter, Dokter distinguishes between a private, individual motive, and a social motive, but he notices, in a third step, that there is a correspondence between these two motives, in that Kierkegaard discovers the “aesthetic-religious” and the “speculative-theological” characteristics of his age to be present within himself as well, preventing him from becoming a christian. Dokter argues that in fighting against the aestheticism and speculation of his age, Kierkegaard fights these characteristics within himself and, in doing so, aims to move from the “fantastical” aesthetic, as well as the analogous sphere of speculation, to the real sphere of religious existence.6 in the second chapter, dokter pays attention to Kierkegaard’s maieutic strategy, from the point of view of his activity as an author, and subsequently, examines how this maieutic strategy is developed throughout two similar movements: the movement from the aesthetic, via the ethical to the religious, and from the speculative, via the ethical to the religious. dokter emphasizes that the lower spheres are not annulled but, rather, are structurally subordinated and taken up into the higher spheres, ultimately the sphere of religiousness b, which grants them their proper place. in the following chapter, Dokter argues, after making clear that Kierkegaard himself fulfills his central task to draw attention to the christian faith as a special kind of poet, that each of the three different series of writings has the appropriate form to realize the maieutic intention and method: the purely pseudonymous, aesthetic-philosophical writings are foreign to Kierkegaard himself and aim to deceive the readers into the truth of the christian faith by way of the strategy of indirect communication. the ethical-religious writings, in contrast, all bear Kierkegaard’s name and are more direct, although they still have a “poetical” character; they are only indirect, dokter argues, insofar as they make clear that their message still requires an ethical decision on the part of the reader. Kierkegaard’s final writings speak without reserve and are covered by the “total existence of the author,” dokter states, without explaining

4 dokter, De structuur van Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, p. 11. dokter does not mention the work of his predecessor once, while he must have known of its existence. possibly then, these remarks might be read as an implicit criticism of Leendertz’s approach. 5 ibid., p. 12. 6 ibid., p. 26.

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however, how this relates to Kierkegaard’s earlier statement that he speaks “without authority.”7 dokter continues in the fourth chapter by examining Kierkegaard’s category of the “single individual” (den Enkelte), which he takes to be of pivotal importance for Kierkegaard’s writings in a double sense. This is the key, first, for understanding the aim of his authorship, namely, to form single individuals, and, as a consequence, also for understanding Kierkegaard’s function as the subject of the authorship, which requires him to be a single individual himself as well, according to dokter. the latter has to be taken into consideration, he argues, since Kierkegaard’s activity as an author is inherently connected with his personal “pneumatic, psychophysical, and social existence.”8 on the basis of this assertion, dokter undertakes a rather peculiar move. in making rigid “the dynamics of the single individual,”9 in this case Kierkegaard, by way of a cold systematic approach “into the scientific state of aggregation,”10 he tries to trace Kierkegaard’s opinion on marriage and his struggle with it, in order to determine the ethical significance of the single individual. In a subsequent move, he tries to trace Kierkegaard’s dogmatic opinions as well, in order to determine his religious significance, and in a third move, he examines Kierkegaard’s view on the difference between church and society, in order to determine the social significance of the single individual. not only does it remain unclear, however, how this approach might reveal the significance of Kierkegaard’s category of the single individual, dokter’s attempt to explain Kierkegaard’s writings on the basis of his own opinions and experiences seems to be in explicit contrast with the indirect method of the pseudonymous writings as well (in which, as Kierkegaard puts it, “there is not a single word by me”).11 a more appropriate approach, it would seem, would be to go the other way around, by explaining and situating Kierkegaard’s opinions and experiences as a single individual by means of the interpretative framework which has been set out by the different pseudonyms throughout the pseudonymous writings. Also in the final chapter, on the categorical structure of the faith relationship as the “ground” of Kierkegaard’s authorship, dokter does not take into account the indirect character of the pseudonymous writings any more, although he previously set this out so consistently. in discussing the “moments of faith,” the “paradoxical nature of faith,” and the “existential character of faith” respectively,12 he refers to the writings of all of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms without differentiating them, and attributes their views directly to Kierkegaard. as a result, his discussion becomes not only confusing and, at times, self-contradictory, but it also retains the character of an objective discussion of Kierkegaard’s dogmatic opinions, which he then tries to bring into contemporary theological and philosophical debates. dokter does acknowledge that, as soon as Kierkegaard’s thoughts on existence are systematically presented, they cannot be considered as his any more; his philosophy of existence is rather aimed 7 8 9 10 11 12

ibid., p. 60. ibid., p. 81. ibid. ibid. SKS 7, 750 / CUP1, 626. dokter, De structuur van Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, p. 121; p. 129; p. 148.

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at self-destruction in order to point to existence itself. however, he believes that he manages to escape the mockery of Kierkegaard—that the “systematic abbreviation of the pathological elements of life is a sheer ludicrousness”13—by not claiming to offer a reproduction of, but rather an introduction to, his oeuvre. nevertheless, he fails to give an adequate account or explanation of the interdependence of content and form in Kierkegaard’s existential thought. this having been said, however, dokter certainly succeeds in his aim, especially in the first three chapters, to offer an at that time well-needed overview of the complex structure of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. as an extra recourse, he attached a helpful, extensive table of (the structure of) Kierkegaard’s writings, as well as a short index of names. in contrast to his predecessor, willem Leendertz, dokter does not make use of any other sources than the second critical edition of Kierkegaard’s writings, as well as the then still incomplete edition of the Papirer (complemented by the old edition of the Efterladte Papirer). rather, he gives an immanent reading of Kierkegaard writings, which he then situates, as was said, in contemporary theological and philosophical debates. this might also explain why he did not make use of Leendertz’s dissertation, although it remains highly remarkable that he does not even mention the work of his colleague once. Leendertz himself, in the only review written on this publication, does not seem bothered by this, but instead criticizes dokter on the most obvious points, namely, that he neglects the existential aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought, by systematizing and unifying his entire oeuvre from the retrospective point of view of his activity as an author—an issue which would also continue to be a central point of discussion in the dutch Kierkegaard reception from then on.14 wolter hartog

13 14

SKS 6, 413 / SLW, 446. willem Leendertz, review in Stemmen des Tijds, vol. 26, no. 1, 1937, pp. 525–7.

reviews and critical discussions Leendertz, willem, review in Stemmen des Tijds, vol. 26, no. 1, 1937, pp. 525–7.

Louis dupré, Kierkegaards theologie of de dialectiek van het christen-worden [Kierkegaard as theologian: the christian dialectic of existence], utrecht: het Spectrum and antwerp: Standaard 1958 (Theologische bibliotheek), 229 pp.

Louis Dupré spent most of his professional life in the United States, first at georgetown university and, from 1973 on, at yale university in the religious Studies department. he is a well-known marx and Kierkegaard scholar, and wrote some important books on modernity, the enlightenment and, recently, on romanticism. his book on Kierkegaard’s theology, originally published in dutch, but later translated into english,1 was the first monograph in Dutch entirely devoted to Kierkegaard’s theology. Just like his fellow countryman victor Leemans, Louis dupré learned danish in order to read Kierkegaard’s works in his mother tongue. one of the merits of his book is, indeed, that he not only refers to german, French, italian, dutch, and english, but also to the danish Kierkegaard literature. there is no bibliography in the book, but there is a register of persons, which includes the scholars mentioned in the footnotes. as suggested by the subtitle of the book (The Dialectics of Becoming a Christian) dupré shows how there is an inner dialectics in the development of Kierkegaard’s thought. his book is a reconstruction of that dialectics. after an introductory biographical chapter that links Kierkegaard’s education and engagement with regine to his religious conceptions (chapter 1), dupré proceeds systematically, focusing first of all on the notion of sin, maybe the key notion for an adequate understanding of Kierkegaard’s theological thought (chapter 2). dupré next introduces the notions of judgment and grace (chapter 3), that of faith (chapter 4), and the imitation of christ (chapter 5). the book concludes with Kierkegaard’s protest against the church (chapter 6). throughout the work dupré carefully examines Kierkegaard’s writings, regularly discussing the question of Kierkegaard’s Lutheran orthodoxy and his relationship with catholicism, quite a hot item in the late 1950s in catholic Flanders (the dutch-speaking part of belgium) and holland.

1

Louis dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, new york: Sheed and ward 1963.

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dupré argues in his book that sin is the main category through which Kierkegaard became conscious of the crucial opposition between hegelianism and christianity. Sin indeed cannot be grasped conceptually and escapes any philosophical approach. philosophy would try and understand sin in its universality, that is, as a possibility, whereas evil is essentially actual and individual. dupré deals extensively with hereditary sin and with torsten bohlin’s thesis that Kierkegaard’s theology of sin is at variance with orthodox Lutheranism on two points: (1) that since the fall the human being is no longer free to do the good and avoid sin; (2) that, independently of any conscious sin, the human being falls under god’s judgment and is declared to be as guilty as for a personal mistake.2 according to dupré, the second objection can be refuted by referring to the distinction between a conception of hereditary sin based on divine revelation, on the one hand, and a merely psychological approach, such as in The Concept of Anxiety, on the other hand. As for the first thesis, Dupré admits that Kierkegaard in The Concept of Anxiety unorthodoxly affirms that personal responsibility presupposes freedom, although anxiety appears to imply unfreedom. this unfreedom however, is essentially caused by freedom. after having dealt extensively with the problem of hereditary sin, dupré deals with the structure of the act of sinning, and with despair, when sin is considered as a situation (The Sickness unto Death). the chapter on judgment and grace continues the discussion of Kierkegaard’s conception of human existence as sin. considering that the opposite of sin is not virtue but faith, dupré links the subjective attitude of faith to divine grace. he claims that Kierkegaard discovered divine grace only in his later years and that he did not write particularly much about grace as such.3 dupré describes how the consciousness of sin and repentance leads to a religious consciousness of guilt and to the position of standing alone before god. referring to the story of Job, dupré examines the qualitative gap between god and the sinful human being, and then brings in the gospel of suffering, where suffering connected with the consciousness of guilt and self-destruction becomes the source of religious joy. accepting that god loves the human being in this suffering itself is the highest testing of faith. at the same time it teaches us that everything depends on our faith in divine grace. Faith is the subject of the fourth chapter. dupré stresses both the subjective and the dialectical character of faith. in line with hegel’s conception of dialectics, he argues that subjectivity has to objectify itself. objectivity itself, however—and this is no longer hegelian—does not belong to the human’s essence, and, as a consequence, the human being has to give it up time and again in order to turn back to itself. it is only while giving up any objectivity that the objectivity of the godrelationship is safeguarded. the only possibility of an objectively right relationship to god consists in a continuous giving up of all objective content. “over against god only the extreme subjectivity constitutes the most objective experience of my own essence as a creature.”4 Thus the act of faith meets objectivity in its final destination, Louis dupré, Kierkegaards theologie of de dialectiek van het christen-worden, utrecht: het Spectrum; antwerp: Standaard 1958 (Theologische bibliotheek), p. 74. 3 ibid., p. 85. 4 ibid., p. 141. 2

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but this is the case already, claims dupré, in its point of departure as well since the pure subjectivity of the act of faith is only possible on the basis of a given content of faith that remains the same all the time. the dialectics of faith brings dupré to the paradoxical character of faith reaching its zenith in the absolute paradox. the latter is primarily based on the absolute distinction between god and human being because of sin, which is the entire responsibility of the human being. in spite of god’s complete alterity, god enters into contact with the human being in the person of Jesus christ. here again dupré refers to sin as the initial point of reference in order to understand Kierkegaard as a theologian. the only proof of the truth of christianity consists in living according to it. therefore the imitation of christ is the “logical” continuation of dupré’s analysis of Kierkegaard’s theology. it could have been the concluding chapter of his book as well, but dupré preferred to add a concluding chapter on Kierkegaard’s position over against the church. he concludes, indeed, by stressing that Kierkegaard is a consistent protestant, who continued protesting against a (protestant) church, which in spite of being essentially based on protest, had re-established itself. “Kierkegaard has continued protesting in a universal protestantism: he protested against everything, also against protesting itself,” dupré argues.5 in line with a hegelian interpretation of dialectics, dupré suggests that Kierkegaard’s attitude was not merely negative, but that it became positive again. On the final question of whether Kierkegaard, on the basis of such a negation of negation, did not move in the direction of catholicism, dupré’s answer is negative: according to him, the catholic church cannot accept the dialectical principle except within its own presuppositions. “dialectical christianity indeed is not the catholic one,” he concludes.6 dupré agrees with the Jesuit heinrich Roos, affirming that Kierkegaard’s relationship towards Catholicism was one of “an antipathetic sympathy and a sympathetic antipathy.”7 paul cruysberghs

5 6 7

ibid., p. 226. ibid., p. 227. ibid.

reviews and critical discussions delfgaauw, bernard, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 3, 1959, pp. 110–11. Fransen, piet, review in Bijdragen, vol. 20, 1959, pp. 213–14. Leendertz, willem, review in Nederlands theologisch tijdschrift, vol. 13, 1958–59, pp. 312–13. möller, Johann bernard wilhelm, review in Nederlandse katholieke stemmen, vol. 57, 1961, pp. 194–7. nota, Johannes hille, review in Streven, vol. 12, no. 2, 1959, p. 692. Walgrave, Jan Hendrik, “Godskennis en godsdienstfilosofie,” in Tijdschrift voor filosofie, vol. 26, 1964, pp. 534–6. willems, boniface ad, review in Tijdschrift voor geestelijk leven, vol. 15, no. 2, 1959, pp. 442–3.

Johan Fetter, Inleiding tot het denken van Kierkegaard [introduction to Kierkegaard’s thought],

assen: uitgeverij born 1953 (Hoofdfiguren van het menselijk denken [main Figures of human thought], vol. 11), 48 pp.

this very short introduction to the thought of Kierkegaard was published as part of the series Main Figures of Human Thought, which aimed to meet the general need for a “first orientation in the main currents and figures of the age.”1 in accordance with this, the author gives a very broad overview of Kierkegaard’s “abnormal” life and his “extraordinary” writings in less than 50 small pages.2 it was reprinted in a second (1954) and third (1960) edition. it is not clear which translations the author used, because he does not mention any of the already existing dutch translations at that time, while he quotes Kierkegaard at length in dutch in some places. other references are also lacking, but one may assume that Fetter primarily relied on secondary literature, which he lists as recommended literature at the end of the book. in particular he refers to the studies of previous dutch Kierkegaard scholars, such as willem Leendertz, taeke dokter, J. Sperna weiland, and bernard delfgaauw. Since the little book is easy to read for laymen, it was well received in religious circles, as shown by the journals in which the reviews appeared. on a scholarly level, however, it had and has nothing to contribute to the already existing studies. wolter hartog

1

p. 1.

2

Johan Fetter, Inleiding tot het denken van Kierkegaard, assen: uitgeverij born 1953, ibid., p. 6.

reviews and critical discussions bijlsma, r., review in In de Waagschaal, vol. 8, 1952–53, p. 254. Lekkerkerker, a.F.n., review in Kerk en Theologie, vol. 4, 1953, p. 141. peursen, c.a. van, “existentieel getij,” Wending, vol. 11, 1956–57, pp. 561–72.

Frits Florin, Geloven als Noodweer. Het begrip “het religieuze” bij S. Kierkegaard [believing as Self-defense: the concept of “the religious” in S. Kierkegaard], Kampen: agora 2002, 294 pp.

Frits Florin’s book is situated on the borderline of the philosophy of religion and religious studies. he defended this study as a ph.d. dissertation at the erasmus university rotterdam in 2002. the central question is cultural, philosophical and sociological in nature: is authentic religiosity still possible in today’s post-modern society? From Kierkegaard’s works and in confrontation with thinkers such as habermas, derrida, and adriaanse, who help him to point out today’s post-theistic context, the author tries to demonstrate that it is. although it might be anachronistic to approach Kierkegaard with such contemporary questions, it is also inescapable from an existential point of view. For, as Florin demonstrates, Kierkegaard’s aim is to make his reader “attentive,” that is, to bring the reader into a position in which he must make an existential decision. moreover, if someone of the philosophical stature of Kierkegaard makes religious striving the ground of his thinking, what then may be the meaning of “the religious” for our existence? can we conceive of religion in such a way that a human being can no longer hide himself behind the powers of the higher, which deprives one of the necessity to think for oneself? although Florin approaches Kierkegaard with these topical questions, he also takes a broad historical perspective, with ample attention to biographical and psychological aspects, as well as to sociological and cultural information and contexts. the reason is that Kierkegaard is always very conscious of the (polemical) context in which he writes. For the modern reader it is important to be well acquainted with this context. Furthermore, the study is based on Kierkegaard’s writings from his early period up until the final months of his life—a period which is neglected all too often. According to Florin, in the final year of his life Kierkegaard gave himself over to expressions of extreme misogyny in some very bitter texts. The starting point of reflection is that in the Western world the religious has to a great extent become a matter of individual choice, a private decision that does not necessarily include any bonds with a religious institution or social group. Florin defends the view that Kierkegaard was the first thinker who explicated clearly

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and radically this development. at the center of Kierkegaard’s anthropology is individuation, the task to become a self, to develop oneself towards being spirit. Kierkegaard clarifies the religious character of becoming oneself in terms of relating oneself in the midst of all temporal conditions to the eternal. the relation between the temporal and the eternal constitutes human freedom and thereby human responsibility. For the space that comes into being in the relation between a human being and the eternal is freedom. a human being who is wrapped up in time and therefore cannot look from a distance at what he himself is doing, cannot be free. it is everyone’s personal task to realize this freedom. it goes without saying that this freedom implies a huge responsibility, the responsibility to take on one’s own life for oneself and to relate to one’s own finiteness. The individual, who is willing to do this, cannot let himself drift in the masses. according to Kierkegaard, the best way to develop an individual self is to become a christian. Florin analyses climacus’ distinction between the not-yet christian religiosity of religiousness a and the paradoxical religiosity b of christianity. in the incarnation the eternal itself has become temporal. becoming a christian requires realizing “contemporaneity,” a repetition of this possibility created by christ. it is here that thinking stops. here reason collides with the paradox. Interestingly, at this point Florin draws attention to a surprising affinity with rhineland mysticism of the middle ages. Kierkegaard’s christian religiosity is closely connected to dominican medieval mysticism and with negative theology. Mainly via the influence of pietistic writers like Johann Arndt and Gerhard Tersteegen, Kierkegaard had acquaintance with eckhart, tauler, and others. Florin demonstrates this acquaintance by pointing to a number of themes they have in common, especially the “negative” approach toward religiosity and the ethical consequences of a religious experience. both eckhart and Kierkegaard emphasize that it is essential for a mystical or religious experience to return to the world where everyone’s own responsibility must be realized in freedom. it may be clear that for Kierkegaard an individual cannot fulfill this responsibility straightaway, with the result that one becomes guilty. this guilt originates from one’s knowledge of the eternal that cannot be reached and can only be neutralized by this same eternal, which asks for a “leap”: “thinking collides with the unthinkable, not in the sense of a logical contradiction, but as its own limit. thinking cannot overcome this border on its own. there is the religious domain, to which only the leap into faith can gain access.”1 nevertheless, according to Florin, Kierkegaard does not advocate fideism. Religion has concrete existential meaning since it is related to the conquest over despair, as anti-climacus points out. in this sense, believing is “self-defense” (dutch, noodweer), a limitterm that designates that believing has to do with overcoming despair and crossing borders. if faith is self-defense and refers to a crossing of borders, then faith is not rationally explicable, but can only be experienced as personal existential experience. the last sentence of Florin’s book is: “in this study we have tried, with the help of Kierkegaard, to open up the religious domain in such a way that it will not be seen as arbitrary, as an absurd construction and as obviously irrelevant—as many 1 Frits Florin, Geloven als Noodweer: Het begrip ‘het religieuze’ bij S. Kierkegaard, Kampen: agora 2002, p. 125.

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contemporaries appear to hold.”2 instead, the religious is a human, meaningful, humane, and sensible possibility. Supposedly, Florin convinces especially those people who already tended to agree with him. contemporaries who see religion as an absurd construction will not be convinced of the opposite by Kierkegaard, who himself holds that believing entails an absurd paradox. desiree berendsen

2

ibid., p. 267.

reviews and critical discussions paul cruysberghs, Johan taels, and Karl verstrynge, “descriptive bibliography: recent Kierkegaard Literature 2000–2004,” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 67, 2005, pp. 767–814; see p. 793.

etienne Laurentius gertrudis egbertus Kuypers, Spelen met beelden: Een theoretisch-kritische studie over de zin en de onzin van een christelijkreligieus-georiënteerde-pedagogie(k) onder auspiciën van S.A. Kierkegaard [playing with images: a theoretical critical Study about the Sense or nonsense of a christian-religious-orientated-pedagogy under the auspices of S.a. Kierkegaard], assen and maastricht: van gorcum 1987, 300 pp.

this book is a doctoral thesis, defended at the university of utrecht in 1987. in the netherlands it is required that doctoral theses be published before the public defense. this is a situation which is quite different from a thesis published afterwards. most of the time the latter is less voluminous and a bit more book-like than the original text. this work has the appearance of being a bit too much like a thesis. this is a pity since its theme is quite original. it deals with education, a topic that still remains rather unexplored in Kierkegaard research. but the author is not interested in Kierkegaard as such. his main aim is to investigate how far a christian education is possible, particularly an education oriented by the evangelic idea of a Kingdom of heaven (Rijk Gods), which the author wants to interpret in terms of liberation (as in liberation theology). rather than appealing to dogmatics, the author wants education to be based on dialogue and experience. in that context Kierkegaard is expected to function as an experienced guide. according to Kuypers, Kierkegaard wanted to show the way to the Kingdom of heaven by “the implicit pedagogical category of

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‘making aware’ (at gjøre opmærksom på).”1 by making people aware of a possible way of reaching a new attitude to life, Kierkegaard opened the perspective, Kuypers suggests, of “a society of justice and love.”2 via Kierkegaard the author therefore hopes to find criteria for deciding about the sense or non-sense of a Christian educational project. In a first chapter the doctorandus focuses on Kierkegaard’s critique of culture culminating in his critique of systematic philosophy and scientific knowledge. instead of relating Kierkegaard’s criticism immediately to hegel, as most authors do, Kuypers prefers to deal with descartes and Kant, both representing a rational approach to reality and to life. as a consequence they ignore the human being as an individual. in contrast with descartes and Kant, Kierkegaard’s theory of the stages is described as a pedagogical project, which shows how education deals with “the laying bare of possibilities in which self-development is seen as a task.”3 the stages are read by Kuypers, quite surprisingly, as “a normal progression in life,” whereby the aesthetic stage is connected with spontaneity and playfulness, the ethical with responsibility and duty, and the religious with caring and acceptance. “thus the relation with children is based on caring for the well-being of the child, because it is a movement from playing to the acceptance of responsibility as a duty.”4 in the second chapter Kuypers shows that both Kierkegaard’s polemics against contemporary culture and the alternative he suggests have existential value, also for our time. he considers, indeed, Kierkegaard’s corrective to the culture of his time to present also for us the “hope of a liberating power of salvation which seems to be able to overcome evil.”5 in the third chapter Kuypers focuses on Kierkegaard’s anthropological-theological perspective on human existence. making the belgian catholic theologian edward Schillebeeckx his ally, he stresses that a christian way of life requires both a transcendental and a social dimension, and that both dimensions are present in Kierkegaard as well (as in the christian love of the neighbor). The fourth and final chapter of the thesis represents the core of Kuypers’ argument. it describes “an existential-phenomenological-emancipation-pedagogy.”6 also here Schillebeeckx is a companion, together with a number of dutch educational thinkers such as martinus Jan Langeveld and antonius Johannes beekman, on the one hand, and the american valerie polakow-Suransky, on the other. in this explicitly pedagogical chapter, however, Kierkegaard disappears from the discussion. the latter indeed was only introduced “as a kind of guide, directed towards the search for building materials for a better, human society.”7 1 etienne Laurentius gertrudis egbertus Kuypers, Spelen met beelden: Een theoretischkritische studie over de zin en de onzin van een christelijk-religieus-georiënteerdepedagogie(k) onder auspiciën van S.A. Kierkegaard, assen and maastricht: van gorcum 1987, p. 7. 2 ibid. 3 ibid., p. 74. 4 ibid., p. 77. 5 ibid., p. 96. 6 ibid., p. 298. 7 ibid., p. 238.

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it should be clear that Kuypers’ dissertation is not a monograph on Kierkegaard. it makes use of Kierkegaard as a source of educational inspiration. as such, the socalled Kierkegaardian basis remains somewhat schematic and self-willed, but at the same time it offers a way of “doing something” with Kierkegaard’s anthropology and theology in quite a creative way. paul cruysberghs

reviews and critical discussions undetermined.

cyril Lansink, Vrijheid en ironie: Kierkegaards ethiek van de zelfwording [Freedom and irony: Kierkegaard’s ethics of becoming oneself], Leuven: peeters 1997, xxiii + 314 pp.

Lying at the heart of Lansink’s Kierkegaard study—that is, his ph.d. thesis in philosophy at radboud university nijmegen—is the question of the postmodern condition of ethics: how, in an era when religious-metaphysical frameworks have lost their general legitimacy and an objective moral standard is no longer selfevident, can the notion of the good life continue to be appealing?1 In Kierkegaard’s ethical-religious thought, Lansink finds a plentiful source of inspiration for deciphering the “existential grammar” of this postmodern condition. Kierkegaard, he argues, approaches the moral crisis of man not so much in terms of the loss of certainty once afforded by a moral or religious tradition as in terms of each human being’s anxiety for their own freedom: the anxiety to accept this concrete life as one’s own. Lansink connects this ambiguous attitude of individuals towards their own freedom with a dual conception of the notion of irony, as described by Kierkegaard. he puts forward the hypothesis that irony can be a symptom of evasion of commitment through one’s own freedom as well as an expression of such commitment.2 irony can manifest itself either improperly or authentically in moral freedom. in the former case, it embodies an attitude of (aesthetic) noncommitment, revealing human beings’ inadequacy when it comes to the question of the good life. in the latter, it is an expression of their appropriation of this (ethical-religious) freedom. Lansink is quite unequivocal about the limitations of his study: although he has studied both Kierkegaard’s early work and his later writings, his interpretation takes no account of the development in Kierkegaard’s thought. and while he pays ample attention to the ethical-religious perspective of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, he abstracts from its specifically Christian aspects.3

cyril Lansink, Vrijheid en ironie: Kierkegaards ethiek van de zelfwording, peeters: Leuven 1997, pp. xiii–xxiii (“introduction”). 2 ibid., p. xviii. 3 ibid., pp. xx–xxi. 1

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Freedom and Irony consists in five chapters and a conclusion. Lansink begins with an analysis of the different forms of irony that Kierkegaard distinguishes in his dissertation The Concept of Irony.4 he argues that Kierkegaard’s account of the relationship between “romantic irony” and “controlled irony” foreshadows his subsequent notions regarding the relationship between irony and freedom. “romantic irony” denies the factical aspect of moral human freedom by retreating to a merely “poetic reality.” “controlled irony” recognizes that “the ethical earnestness of life is not opposed to irony, but actually contains it.”5 in the second chapter, starting from the existential notions and analyses that climacus presents in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the author discusses Kierkegaard’s view on how to understand the ethical task of the single human being to become oneself.6 he also considers the consequences of ethical passion for philosophical discourse and the original manner in which Kierkegaard incorporates this into his philosophical oeuvre. in the next two chapters, Lansink demonstrates how, from Kierkegaard’s perspective, an ethical attitude can be either evaded or embraced. he argues that the fact that human beings can purposely deny their purpose finds expression in a despairing aesthetic attitude to life.7 using concepts from Either/Or and The Sickness unto Death, including the notions of boredom, bourgeois mentality, melancholy, improper irony, and despair, he astutely describes different expressions of the inability to become oneself, whereby the disregarded desire for moral freedom reveals itself negatively, as it were. to Kierkegaard, he asserts, the religious-transcendental origin and destination of man continues to manifest itself, even if this life tries to understand itself in terms of an ideology of autonomous self-determination. The reversal of this perspective finds expression in an attitude whereby one’s choice for one’s own freedom is carried through, and whereby one accepts the ethicalreligious categories and consequences that this entails.8 here, too, “authentic” irony has its place, Lansink argues, so long as it occupies the middle ground between the unethical absolutization of a given finite reality and the cynical “trivialization of all finite attachments.”9 In the final chapter, starting from an analysis of concepts from Works of Love, such as trust, faith, and love as a commandment, Lansink makes a case for the recognition of the intersubjective nature of Kierkegaard’s ethics.10 although an ethical outlook on life presupposes an individual choice, this does not preclude the moral affirmation of the other in love. In this context, too, Lansink elucidates the fundamental role of irony.

4 5 6 7 8 9 10

ibid., pp. 1–30. ibid., p. 29. ibid., pp. 31–67. ibid., pp. 69–113. ibid., pp. 115–205. ibid., p. 204. ibid., pp. 207–78.

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in his conclusion, Lansink revisits some of the central themes of his study as he considers Kierkegaard’s own life in the light of his ethics.11 Kierkegaard, he argues, demonstrates in exemplary fashion how greatness and impotence of thought can go hand in hand. the life that the philosopher of ethical existence lived would appear to provide substance for his notion that the assignment of thought is life and that life requires the assignment of thought. Lansink employs a lucid, attractive, and sometimes even literary style. with this study, he shows himself to be not only an astute but also a creative reader of Kierkegaard. on a number of occasions, he intersperses his argumentation with personal reflections, whereby he connects Kierkegaard’s existential analyses with everyday experiences or current trends, as well as frequent literary references. For example, halfway through his book, he devotes a dozen pages to a discussion of max Frisch’s novel Stiller (1954), which ties in closely with Kierkegaard’s themes of selfdenial and self-affirmation.12 unlike in Flanders, dutch scholarly interest in Kierkegaard has largely been fed by a lively protestant background and faith. until two or three decades ago, Kierkegaard was seen there as a theologian and a christian thinker, much more so than as a philosopher. Not only was Lansink one of the first Dutch scholars to write a dissertation in philosophy on Kierkegaard, but he also picked a universal theme: Kierkegaard’s moral psychology. his book succeeded, alongside a number of other Kierkegaard studies since the 1990s (particularly some doctoral dissertations), in demonstrating in an engaging way the continued relevance of Kierkegaard’s more general existential and philosophical themes. Johan taels

11 12

ibid., pp. 279–304. ibid., pp. 148–58.

reviews and critical discussions verstrynge, Karl, review in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 60, no. 3, 1998, pp. 609– 10.

victor Leemans, Søren Kierkegaard, antwerp and amsterdam: Standaard 1956 (Filosofische bibliotheek), 177 pp.

victor Leemans was a Flemish philosopher, sociologist, and politician, who was initially a schoolteacher, but who studied later on both in berlin and münster, and in paris (École des hautes Études Sociales), where he received his ph.d. during the german regime in belgium, from 1940 to 1944, he held different administrative positions such as that of secretary general of economic affairs and of the selfemployed, and afterwards, of foreign commerce. in spite of having been put in jail during the repression after the war, Leemans was cleared of collaboration in 1948. he started a political career as a representative of the christian people’s party in brussels and, later on, for the european union, in Strasbourg. most of his numerous writings dealt with sociological and economic topics, but in 1956 he published a book on Kierkegaard, and in 1962 one on the young marx and the marxists. Leemans’ book on Kierkegaard is one of the first ones in Dutch that are based on the authentic danish texts, and not, as was usual up to then, on german translations. its primary ambition was not to enter into discussion with philosophers or theologians, who were influenced by Kierkegaard, but just to find out what Kierkegaard himself had said in the Samlede Værker and the Papirer. as alphonse de waelhens wrote in his introductory essay, the book “subjects itself without reservations to the author it explores.”1 Leemans, indeed, mainly stuck to Kierkegaard’s own authorship, explaining how “he saw the problems of his time and how he posed them.”2 the book is the result of ten years of studying (from 1947 on) and of many discussions with eminent philosophers such as peter wust, dominicus m. de petter, and alphonse de waelhens. in thirteen chapters Leemans deals with the whole of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, from his polemics with andersen to the struggle with christendom in the pamphlets The Moment. in spite of his modest ambitions in the introduction of the book, limiting his scope to what Kierkegaard himself had said and nothing more, Leemans deals with possible and real influences like that of Max Stirner (who followed Schelling’s berlin lectures in 1841 together with Kierkegaard, Leemans claims), Johann georg hamann, Johann eduard erdmann, carl daub, and bruno bauer, and, of course, alphonse de waelhens, “inleiding,” in victor Leemans, Søren Kierkegaard, antwerp and amsterdam: Standaard-boekhandel 1956 (Filosofische bibliotheek), p. 8. 2 Leemans, Søren Kierkegaard, p. 15. 1

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Fichte, Schelling, and hegel. but there are some references to later authors as well. while dealing with Kierkegaard’s rejection of the natural sciences, Leemans brings in maurice blondel and alfred north whitehead, and he ends his book with a reference to rilke, who, just like chestov and unamuno, and Leemans himself, learned danish to be able to read Kierkegaard in his mother tongue. Leemans never goes deeply into Kierkegaard’s relationship to these authors (or vice versa), but the least one can say is that his remarks are to the point most of the time. as a principle Leemans’ own opinions remain at the background, but in the last sentence of the book he shows his own reticence over against an author he seemed to admire. after having pointed out that Kierkegaard has appealed to a wide diversity of people, to the snob (interested only in “the diary of the Seducer”), the pietist, the speculative thinker, and the agitator, the pastor from the countryside and the spiritual reformer of the metropolis, the freethinker and the orthodox christian, he concludes: “For all these people he [Kierkegaard] has been a wake-up person; to be a mentor however, he was too melancholic, too whimsical and too dialectical.”3 here Leemans shows his typically catholic reserve towards a thinker who seemed to be unable to free himself from the demonia of an everlasting solitude. “his [Kierkegaard’s] huge tragedy was,” Leemans says, “to be born outside the one christian tradition [read, catholicism] and the continuity, which not only teaches the believer how he has to believe but also what the content of faith is, in order to proclaim, in complete submission, that christian ‘subjectivity’ is the truth.”4 this quotation from the end of chapter 6 shows the book’s age. in spite of proclaiming that it just wants to find out Kierkegaard’s own thoughts, it cannot avoid showing the author’s own catholic orthodoxy. while dealing with Kierkegaard, it does not really care about the pseudonyms either. without systematically discussing the different perspectives of each pseudonymous work, it has problems establishing a recognizable line (or break) in Kierkegaard’s development. the monograph contains an index of persons and of subjects, but it does not contain a bibliography, although the footnotes show the author’s familiarity with the important (mainly) german scholars of the time. in spite of its manifest shortcomings, the book functioned as a honest and well-informed introduction to Kierkegaard in a period that reading Kierkegaard in danish was still uncommon in the dutch-speaking world. paul cruysberghs

3 4

ibid., p. 174. ibid., p. 105.

reviews and critical discussions berger, herman, “Kroniek van het wijsgerig leven in nederland. boeken verschenen van 1953 tot en met 1956,” Studia catholica, vol. 32, 1957, pp. 29–60. Bomhoff, Jacobus Gerardus, “Bij de honderdjarige sterfdag van de Deense filosoof. Kierkegaard: levend denken en strijdbaar geloof,” Vrij Nederland, vol. 16, June 16, 1956. de petter, domincus maria, review in Tijdschrift voor philosophie, vol. 18, 1956, pp. 701–2. delfgaauw, bernard, review in Algemeen Nederlands tijdschrift voor wijsbegeerte en psychologie, vol. 49, 1957, pp. 315–16. geerts, walter, review in Band: Tijdschrift voor Vlaams kultuurleven, vol. 17, 1958, p. 79. Meijers, Jan Andries, “Het filosofische denken,” De groene Amsterdammer, august 4, 1956. nota, Johannes hille, review in Bijdragen, vol. 18, 1957, p. 213.

willem Leendertz, Sören Kierkegaard, amsterdam: a.h. Kruyt 1913, 315 pp.

during the 100th jubilee year of Kierkegaard’s birth, willem Leendertz published the first doctoral dissertation on Kierkegaard in the Dutch-speaking world. He prepared his research on the small dutch island of ameland, where he used to be a mennonite pastor, and he defended his thesis at the theological Faculty of the State university of groningen, under the supervision of isaac van dijk, who had already been involved in the first translations of a selection of Kierkegaard’s writings.1 the publication, simply entitled Sören Kierkegaard, represents the first serious and comprehensive study of Kierkegaard’s life and thought in the dutch-speaking world. Five years before, Leendertz himself, reacting against the generally hostile climate against Kierkegaard in the Low countries, but in particular, against a review of the first translated selection of Kierkegaard’s writings by the theological Professor tjeerd cannegieter,2 had defined the conditions that should be met in order to “get closer to Kierkegaard”3 as a fulfillment of his doctoral exam. To write a “serious Kierkegaard study,”4 he argued, one should have a comprehensive knowledge of, first of all, Kierkegaard’s complete authorship (and not only what appears in translation, like prof. cannegieter), as well as its context, that is, european romanticism, and danish culture, literature, and language. Secondly, one should have a substantial interest in Kierkegaard and not only in particular aspects of his thought, like the authors of two of the most important danish studies on Kierkegaard: georg brandes

1 Keur uit de werken van Søren Kierkegaard, trans. by regina chantepie de la Saussaye, introduced by isaäc van dijk, haarlem: de erven F. bohn 1905, 2nd ed., 1906; Nieuwe Keur uit de werken van Søren Kierkegaard, trans. by regina chantepie de la Saussaye, introduced by isaac van dijk, haarlem: de erven F. bohn 1911. 2 tjeerd cannegieter, “Kierkegaard, Keur uit de werken van…,” Teyler’s Theologisch Tijdschrift, no. 4, 1906, pp. 267–83. 3 willem Leendertz, Hoe komt men dichter bij Kierkegaard? [how does one get closer to Kierkegaard?], groningen: n.p. 1908. in between these publications, Leendertz wrote an extensive review of the first Dutch translations of a selection of Kierkegaard’s works, translated by regina chantepie de la Saussaye and introduced by his future advisor, isaac van dijk: willem Leendertz, “Kierkegaard in Nederland, bespreking van de Keur (2e dr. 1906) en de Nieuwe Keur (1e dr. 1911),” in Stemmen voor Waarheid en Vrede, vol. 48, 1911, pp. 849–88. 4 Leendertz, Hoe komt men dichter bij Kierkegaard?, p. 2.

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(1879),5 who reduced Kierkegaard’s religious significance to his psychology and focused solely on his literary significance, and Harald Høffding (1902),6 who paid insufficient attention to the religious background of Kierkegaard’s thought, according to Leendertz. In contrast to them, moreover, one should have affinity with Kierkegaard’s thought, which implies, according to Leendertz, that one cannot be a rationalist, and above all, that one should be a christian. whereas the latter requirements, especially the last one, could be considered as conducive to “getting closer to Kierkegaard,” they are obviously quite questionable as necessary qualities that should be met by anyone wanting to write a “serious Kierkegaard study” (which is not to say that acknowledging these qualities in Kierkegaard himself would not be imperative). interestingly, Leendertz leaves these conditions aside in his final doctoral dissertation, possibly keeping them for himself in order to ensure the academic quality of his research or, maybe, in order to enact these qualities performatively in his dissertation itself. instead, in his introduction he now focuses on the dangers of “systematizing,” “dogmatizing,” and “psychologizing” Kierkegaard’s thought. in order to avoid these dangers, Leendertz sets out to “give an exposition of his religious-philosophically grounding ideas [grondgedachten],”7 not in order to reveal their interdependence, since that would mean falling into the first trap of systematizing, but “thinking and poetizing [denkend en dichtend], to let him pass before our eyes, i.e., exposing [Kierkegaard’s] activity as an author, pointing out the grounding ideas there, explaining the meaning of the thoughts revealed.”8 this descriptive task, the writing of what we nowadays would call a philosophical biography, occupies Leendertz in the first and longest part of his book. this part describes Kierkegaard’s life, in connection with his authorship, in eleven chapters, ranging from “Kierkegaard’s youth,” and “Student days,” via the writing of the “First pseudonymous Series,” the “continuation” thereof, to the “Conflict with the Corsair,” the writing of the “Second pseudonymous Series,” and finally, “The Outburst [against Christendom],” including his death and closing with his epitaph.9 Throughout these chapters, Leendertz certainly meets the first condition, which he formulated five years before, of having a comprehensive knowledge of Kierkegaard’s overall authorship and the danish language, since he bases himself solely upon the first Danish critical edition of Kierkegaard’s writings (Samlede Værker), the first volumes of the Papirer, and the Efterladte Papirer, with regard to which he is nevertheless appropriately critical. moreover, Leendertz demonstrates an incredible knowledge of contemporary danish as well as german scholarship, making use of as many secondary sources as available, for example, Koch’s 5

1879. 6

1902.

georg brandes, Sören Kierkegaard. Ein literarisches Charakterbild, Leipzig: barth harald høffding, Sören Kierkegaard als Philosoph, 2nd ed., Stuttgart: F. Frommann

willem Leendertz, Sören Kierkegaard, amsterdam: a.h. Kruyt 1913, p. 2. Leendertz, Sören Kierkegaard, p. 5. 9 Leendertz emphasizes that “Kierkegaard’s main philosophical writing,” the Concluding Unscientific Postscript should be considered as the center and turning point with respect to both biography and literary work. ibid., p. 158. 7 8

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publication of the correspondence between Kierkegaard and emile boesen (1901).10 Leendertz even takes into account Kierkegaard’s own sources, like trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen. he dialogues continuously with the important secondary literature of that time—in addition to the aforementioned monographs of georg brandes (1879), and harald høffding (1902), also with the works of rosenberg (1898),11 monrad (1909),12 and p.a. heiberg (1912).13 Leendertz’s obvious sympathy with Kierkegaard results into a devotional loyalty to him as well, especially when it concerns Kierkegaard’s intentions or his selfproclamations with regard to the nature and structure of his authorship. when he considers p.a. heiberg’s hypothesis about the cause of Kierkegaard’s “thorn in the flesh,” for example, namely, that it was caused by a visit to a brothel,14 he admits that it sounds plausible, but nevertheless refrains from passing judgment, and gives Kierkegaard the benefit of the doubt by arguing that the “most plausible is sometimes still not actual.”15 and if it would turn out to be true after all, he states: “the ‘repenting’ Kierkegaard would be just another augustine, continually seeking the forgiveness of sins.”16 with regard to georg brandes’ questioning of the preliminary nature of the design for the pseudonymous authorship, Leendertz points to Kierkegaard’s statements in The Point of View for My Work as an Author about the providence of god, which explains the teleological unity of the pseudonymous writings from the start. in addition, Leendertz defends Kierkegaard against four objections by harald høffding against what he sees as Kierkegaard’s exclusion of any psychological explanation in favor of freedom, the leap, and the ethicalreligious decision. Leendertz objects that the psychological and the ethical are just two different points of view, which cannot be aligned with one another, and states that høffding loses himself in abstract reasoning, whereas Kierkegaard has chosen the primacy of existence and, on this basis, has secured the reality of (human) freedom. Finally, Leendertz defends Kierkegaard over against rosenberg’s charge of individualism and argues that the difference between the two lies in the latter’s neglect of sin. Since Leendertz does not give clear arguments for his defense of Kierkegaard, the first part of his book has a somewhat idolatrous character. Moreover, since he paraphrases rather than explains Kierkegaard’s thought, the first part could better be characterized as a paraphrasing overview of Kierkegaard’s writings in the context of his life. only in the much smaller, second part, does Leendertz go a step further by approaching Kierkegaard by means of what he calls an “immanent critique,” which carl Koch, Soren Kierkegaard og Emil Boesen. Breve og Indledning. Med et Tilling, copenhagen: Karl Schonbergs Forlag 1901. 11 p.a. rosenberg, Søren Kierkegaard, hans Liv, hans Personlighed og hans Forfatterskab. En Vejledning til Studiet af hans Vaerker, copenhagen: Karl Schonbergs Forlag 1898. 12 olaf peder monrad, Sören Kierkegaard: Sein Leben und seine Werke, Jena: diederichs 1909. 13 p.a. heiberg, En Episode i Soren Kierkegaards Ungdoms liv, copenhagen and Kristiania: gyldendal 1912. 14 ibid. 15 Leendertz, Kierkegaard, pp. 19–20. 16 ibid., p. 20. 10

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is supposed to serve Kierkegaard by bringing out his personality.17 what follows is a contextualization of Kierkegaard’s personality and guiding thoughts within the main currents of his age, that is, romanticism, hegelianism, and Socratic thought. these three “spiritual powers” are inherent parts of Kierkegaard’s personality,18 Leendertz argues, but he aims to overcome especially the first two powers, with the help of the third, the Socratic maieutic, and by means of a genuine, christian way of existence. this shows, Leendertz concludes, that Kierkegaard’s statements cannot be employed in an isolated way, such as the “Kierkegaard-zealots,”19 as he calls them, tend to do, but that it should be acknowledged that behind these texts, there is a thinker who represents a cure to overcome the three spiritual powers which are still present today. at the time of its publication, Leendertz’s study was well received and widely applauded, especially within the dutch, protestant community.20 Since it did not yet lead to a definite breakthrough of Kierkegaard research in the Low countries, the monograph remained the most important authority on Kierkegaard for over twenty years. although this study did not contribute anything new to the international Kierkegaard studies, it is praiseworthy that Leendertz did engage in the most important discussions in the secondary literature at that time.21 and while his monograph, from a contemporary perspective, can no longer compete with the scholarly quality of the best studies of today, it may still, a one hundred years later, serve as a very solid and easily accessible first introduction to Kierkegaard’s life and thought in dutch. wolter hartog

ibid., pp. 5–6; pp. 255–6. ibid., p. 310. 19 ibid., p. 314. 20 See the numerous reviews of the book, listed by gerard dick van den bos, Sporen van Kierkegaard. De Nederlandstalige Kierkegaardliteratuur tussen 1880 en 1930, ph.d. thesis, university of nijmegen 1989, pp. 109–13. all reviews listed in general are descriptive and laudatory in nature. 21 more than thirty years later, Leendertz wrote a substantial overview article in an international journal, but it still has the same introductory, paraphrasing character: willem Leendertz, “Søren Kierkegaard: an interpretation,” Mennonite Quarterly Review, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 203–31. 17 18

reviews and critical discussions anonymous, review in Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis, new series, vol. 10, no. 1, martinus nijhoff 1913, p. 370. anonymous, review in Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, december 4, 1913. bos, gerard dick van den, Sporen van Kierkegaard. De Nederlandstalige Kierkegaardliteratuur tussen 1880 en 1930, ph.d. thesis, university of nijmegen 1989, pp. 88–9; 109–13. groenewegen, herman ysbrand, review in Theologisch Tijdschrift vol. 49, 1915, pp. 168–9. L.S. (chantepie de la Saussaye, regina), review in Onze Eeuw, vol. 13, no. 3, 1913, pp. 472–4. Leeuw, gerardus van der, review in Theologische Literaturzeitung (Leipzig), vol. 7, 1915, pp. 163–4. melle, L.a. van, review in Theologische Studiën, vol. 31, no. 6, 1913, pp. 465–6.

wim r. Scholtens, Alle gekheid op een stokje. Kierkegaard als psycholoog [all Foolishness aside: Kierkegaard as a psychologist], baarn: ten have 1979, 138 pp.

in the 1970s and 1980s, the carmelite father wim r. Scholtens operated as an important and influential Kierkegaard translator and interpreter in the Netherlands. he served a broad public of Kierkegaard readers with valuable translations of various works, such as Fear and Trembling, For Self-Examination, Judge for Yourself!, and Johannes Climacus or De omnibus dubitandum est, as well as with compilations of journal entries, aphorisms, prayers, and other fragments from Kierkegaard’s authorship, providing them with insightful introductory explanations. Alle gekheid op een stokje may be regarded as his most extensive study on Kierkegaard, though it too contains many quotations and fragments from Kierkegaard’s works. in this book Scholtens describes Kierkegaard as an “experimental psychologist,” 1 who is engaged in real life issues, and defends this claim against the misunderstanding of Kierkegaard as a thinker of existential interiority who had problems in dealing with the surrounding world and fellow human beings. Scholtens starts his book with a biographical and introductory chapter on Kierkegaard’s practice as a “psychologist.” yet, Scholtens does not offer a psychological study about Kierkegaard’s personality but searches for the relevance of Kierkegaard’s observations for the actual theme of “mental health.”2 because Scholtens is not a psychologist himself, he keeps close to Kierkegaard’s own “project” which may—following Kierkegaard’s early description—be characterized as “anthropological contemplation.”3 the central aim of Kierkegaard’s authorship is to help “to understand oneself in one’s concrete existence,” to find an answer to the question “what it means to be a human being,” or psychologically translated: “what does it mean to be free and how should the human being deal with (un)freedom?”4 wim r. Scholtens, Alle gekheid op een stokje. Kierkegaard als psycholoog, Baarn: ten have 1979, p. 7. 2 ibid., p. 51. 3 SKS 27, 234, papir 264:3 / JP 1, 37. 4 Scholtens, Alle gekheid op. een stokje, p. 24. 1

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according to Scholtens, Kierkegaard may be seen as operating on the borders between concept and phenomenon, practice and theory, observation and methodological analysis. he elaborates his “project” in a complex combination of introspection, sharp observation of psychological phenomena, and rigorous analysis of the human condition. the starting point is that in self-understanding one not only comes to know oneself, but that “if one knows one, one knows everyone”—Scholtens refers to terence’s dictum unum moris omnes.5 on the one hand, this implies a human equality of all people, and, on the other hand, it means that objective knowledge about the human being without self-knowledge would be inadequate and illusory. Scholtens succeeds in holding together these different angles of Kierkegaard’s approach by including in his analysis both abstract, compact-schematic “psychological” works, such as The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death, and concrete observations of other more literary pseudonymous works as well as relevant journal entries. in describing the human being’s condition from Kierkegaard’s perspective, Scholtens pays attention both to what he calls the “harmony model” (a “hygienics”) and to the “conflict model” (a “pathology”).6 the former consists of Kierkegaard’s anthropological scheme of the self as a dynamic synthesis of opposed qualities and the existential task of each individual to relate to each of the opposites of the physical and the psychical, necessity and possibility, the temporal and the eternal. a psychologically healthy human being precisely is someone who succeeds in holding together these and other oppositions. Kierkegaard’s “pathology” encompasses a rich description and interpretation of all the stages of despair and anxiety in which people fail to realize this existential task. Scholtens focuses on the psychological meaning of spiritlessness, consisting of “chaotic spiritlessness” on the one hand and “structured spiritlessness” on the other. the author elaborates the chaotic variant by referring to mrs. waller in A Literary Review as someone who is both anybody and everybody and lacks any substance.7 he also interprets the self-love as depicted in Works of Love and Either/Or in terms of chaotic spiritlessness, for instance the “love” of the “powerless person” who adoringly worships “the all-powerful man”8 and thereby shows “domination by dependency” and creates for himself a dependent identity.9 Structured spiritlessness is explained in terms of fate and guilt (in the pagan oracle and the Hebrew sacrificial ritual respectively), based on Vigilius Haufniensis’ analysis in The Concept of Anxiety. Finally, Scholtens gives a lively picture of how Kierkegaard describes the conformist civilian, the philistine, and the objective thinker, who by striving to “become like everyone else”10 all refuse to relate to their own self and to become spirit. Scholtens comes to some interesting observations and conclusions. For instance, “the crisis and a crisis in the Life of an actress” is analyzed as a short but brilliant 5 6 7 8 9 10

ibid., p. 21. ibid., p. 35. SKS 8, 52–3 / TA, 53. SKS 9, 128 / WL, 125. Scholtens, Alle gekheid op. een stokje, p. 74. ibid., p. 91.

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work on the meaning of psychological and existential metamorphoses in the practice of acting, which are basically returns to one’s origin, akin to what the psychiatrist tries to achieve in his counseling practice.11 Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s concept of “spirit” is used as a critique of modern psychology in which the human being is reduced to his physical-psychological constitution. Sometimes Scholtens tries to actualize Kierkegaard a bit too much, for example, in his attempts to demonstrate that Kierkegaard is a forerunner of “psycho-analytic social criticism”12 and “depth psychology,”13 or that Kierkegaard has already said what psychologists in the twentieth century would demonstrate. in the end, the book is not so much a contribution to concise exegesis of Kierkegaard’s writings as it is an attractive and well-informed introduction to Kierkegaard’s “psychology,” both in the context of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre as a whole—of which Scholtens is definitely a great expert—and in the context of the social, political, and psychological actuality of Scholtens’ own time. the author’s engagement and personal touch in communication with the reader makes it also of existential interest. pieter vos

11 12 13

ibid., pp. 50–1. ibid., p. 56. ibid., p. 107.

reviews and critical discussions van as, h.h.J., “nieuw boek over deense christen-schrijver: Kierkegaard als psycholoog schouwde vooral naar binnen,” Reformatorisch Dagblad, July 21, 1979, p. 2.

Johan taels, Søren Kierkegaard als filosoof: De weg terug naar het subject [Søren Kierkegaard as philosopher: the way back to the Subject], Leuven: Leuven university press 1991, 170 pp.

Johan taels, one of the most dedicated belgian Kierkegaard scholars, who defended in 1987 an excellent ph.d. thesis on the subject of repetition in Kierkegaard, without ever having published it (which is quite a pity), did publish an interesting book on Kierkegaard’s notion of subjectivity a few years after the defense of his dissertation. in spite of the fact that the book on Kierkegaard as a Philosopher focuses on just one basic theme, it has functioned for many years as the best introduction to Kierkegaard available in the dutch-speaking world, and it is a pity that up to now the author has not found the time to publish a (revised) reissue of the book. as a matter of fact the book was not intended to be a general introduction, although it functioned as such. it is indeed a monograph dealing with Kierkegaard’s, mainly Johannes climacus’, conception of subjectivity. this explains why the reader will not find in depth information on topics that appear in Either/Or or even The Sickness unto Death, just to name a few. no, this is mainly a book on climacus, with an explicit interest in philosophical issues, in particular that of subjectivity. in line with this perspective, the author deals extensively with the question of what it means to be a pseudonymous author. he pays a lot of attention to indirect communication and to the distinction between knowing (at kenne) and being able (at kunne), as explained by Kierkegaard in his project of “Lectures on the dialectic of ethical and ethical-religious education.” while trying to “approach Kierkegaard’s own position as close as possible and to interpret him as much as possible with the help of indications procured by himself,”1 taels shows how Kierkegaard engages in a polemic against a modern conception of subjectivity, which makes the human being into “the point of reference of all that is.”2 he reads Kierkegaard’s oeuvre as a bastion against this conception of a modern autonomous subject, unmasking it as being abstract and imaginary. while objectifying the world, modernity “reduces the Johan taels, Søren Kierkegaard als filosoof: De weg terug naar het subject, Leuven: Leuven university press 1991, p. 22. 2 ibid., p. 20. 1

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human being to a recipient of knowledge and science, makes it into an isolated and fragmentary being, [and] detaches it from the connection with the community, with nature, with the cosmos.”3 taels thus considers Kierkegaard as a prophetic thinker, anticipating later thinkers, such as husserl, heidegger, Levinas, the structuralists, and the post-modernists. Kierkegaard’s alternative consists in stressing concrete subjectivity: “the more a human being goes into his own subjectivity and realizes its deepest possibilities, the more he also becomes a universal subject: connected with the whole community, with the whole world, with god as the ground of all actuality.”4 thus the Kierkegaardian subject appears to be the contrary of the “isolated and isolating modern subject,” as interpreted by traditional Kierkegaard scholarship.5 after having explained Kierkegaard’s strategy on communicating indirectly in the first part of his book, Taels goes deeper into Kierkegaard’s conception of the human subject under the heading: “Subjectivity is the truth.” he stresses that existence must be understood as a dialectical process that has to result in a god relationship. taels refuses to consider Kierkegaard’s conception of god as the totally unknown, or totally other. “he [Kierkegaard] is not at all a decretalist or theonomic positivist who believes that all physical, logical and ethical laws have been established by the free decisions of god, and that the reasons for these decisions will never be known by us.”6 he argues, rather, that the relationship between god and the human being is one of “true confidentiality and mystic intimacy.”7 however, this intimacy can never be expressed or explained in objectifying terms. it is clear that Kierkegaard has a non-objective, subjective conception of truth, which is valid for any existential truth, but the more, of course, for religious and, in particular christian-religious truth. The final chapters of the book deal more explicitly with the question of faith and reason (chapter 9) and the relationship of philosophy and spirituality (chapter 10). Taking his point of departure in the distinction of first and second philosophy made in The Concept of Anxiety, taels links faith to the concreteness of history, more particularly to the intrusion of the eternal into the temporal. in his interpretation the latter is already present in the ethical sphere, but in a more eminent sense it appears in the christian god-man. For taels, faith is not opposed to knowing: it is “knowledge in an eminent sense.”8 “it is knowledge of actuality in its unique ontological structure, in its concrete historical shape.”9 in that perspective even the first philosophy based on immanent rationality presupposes the second one, since it presupposes the presence of a concrete historical actuality, something it cannot prove itself. the author concludes his chapter by claiming that without faith no form of knowledge is possible. in that perspective Kierkegaard would agree with anselm’s maxim: credo ut intelligam. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

ibid., p. 21. ibid. ibid. ibid., p. 98. ibid. ibid., p. 147. ibid.

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in the last chapter the author opposes again the objective and the subjective thinker, while identifying the latter with the spiritual thinker. whereas the objective thinker distinguishes carefully the (f)actual and the normative, causality and teleology, the spiritual or subjective thinker, considering that existence is always a dynamic whole of facts and values, does not accept this disjunction. therefore, Taels concludes by affirming that “the subjective thinker understands that everyone who knows himself, meets god; that anyone who becomes himself, is fertile for the whole community; yes, that precisely anyone who is subjective in the highest degree, has to be objective in the highest degree as well.”10 paul cruysberghs

10

ibid., p. 139.

reviews and critical discussions cruysberghs, paul, review in Tijdschrift voor filosofie, vol. 54, 1992, pp. 548–9. Krüger, peter, review in De Uil van Minerva, vol. 9, no. 2, 1992–93, pp. 127–9. Summers, richard, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 16, 1993, pp. 156–9. vanden berghe, eric, “hooggeprezen werk over Søren Kierkegaard,” in De Standaard, march 28, 1992. vanden berghe, eric, review in Filosofie, vol. 2, no. 3, 1992, p. 17.

a.F.L. van dijk, Perspectieven bij Kierkegaard [perspectives in Kierkegaard], amsterdam: h.J. paris 1940, 135 pp.

this work, published in 1940, consists of four separate essays on the themes of (a) time, (b) the Single individual, (c) Love, and (d) Faith, primarily in Kierkegaard, but also in connection with hegel, nietzsche, and heidegger. it is introduced by the philosopher of ethics and religion w.J. aalders (1870–1945), who was well known in The Netherlands. He explains that, despite their “non-scientific character,” these “cultural-philosophical” essays cannot be characterized as dilettante,1 thereby already suggesting, however, that they at least arouse the suspicion of being dilettante. In the first essay, Van Dijk discusses the relation between Kierkegaard and hegel. instead of opposing the two on the basis of the standard distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, he tries to overcome their opposition by posing the heideggerian question to the relation between being and time. on the basis of a superficial examination of several obvious differences between Kierkegaard and hegel, such as their different estimation of the system, of identity, and of dialectics, he concludes that Kierkegaard’s critique, even his weapon of irony, is impotent against hegel’s system, because the system simply absorbs any critique into itself; it simply becomes a part of the systematic whole. with regard to the question of movement, Van Dijk argues that Kierkegaard’s remark “that Hegel has not justified the category of transition, makes no sense,”2 because it does recognize the mystical element in hegel’s explanation of the transition as a “night” or “birth.”3 nevertheless, according to him, Kierkegaard does point out the weak spots in hegel’s treatment of time. the prevalence of history in hegel, by which the present now and the future are drawn back into the whole of the past and the distinction between past, present, and future evaporates, is corrected in Kierkegaard’s concepts of contemporaneity, the moment, and repetition. in attributing to the moment the possibility of change, the author gives primacy to the future. van dijk concludes, in bringing the two thinkers finally together with Heidegger, that each of these philosophers has dealt with the question of time in his own authentic way of thinking, which cannot be pushed aside. nevertheless, the question of time should be questioned time and again. w.J. aalders, “preface,” in a.F.L. van dijk, Perspectieven bij Kierkegaard, amsterdam: h.J. paris 1940, pp. 5–6. 2 van dijk, Perspectieven bij Kierkegaard, p. 18. 3 ibid., p. 19. 1

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in the second essay, van dijk turns to the notion of the “single individual,” on the basis of which Kierkegaard, he claims, can be aligned with the later nietzsche, as well as with marx and Stirner. despite the great differences between Kierkegaard and nietzsche, he argues, their notion of the single individual corresponds on the basis of a threefold sense of solitude: (1) solitude in their own way and sense of life, (2) solitude as a result of the impossibility of communicating the individual way of existence directly, and (3) the resulting necessity of using masks, by way of poetry and pseudonymity. in addition, over against their notion of the single individual, they put forward their concepts of the mass and the herd, respectively. in opposition to the mass, the individual should strive for an exceptional position. For Kierkegaard, the ultimate consequence of this striving is the martyr, who offers himself to god by way of the absurd, whereas for nietzsche, the ultimate single individual is represented in the concept of the Übermensch, which offers a new interpretation of transcendence and another absurd substitute for god. the third essay offers a discussion of the role of love in Kierkegaard’s thought and life. on the basis of the assumption that love is liberating, van dijk distinguishes in Kierkegaard’s life three stages of love that lead towards absolute and redemptive love: (a) love in relation to a woman, (b) love in relation to the woman as idea, and (c) love in relation to the idea. although these stages do not run parallel to the respective stages of existence—the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious— Van Dijk explains that together they contain all of these aspects. The first stage is the stage of sensual and erotic love, in Kierkegaard’s case the love for regine. Kierkegaard does not condemn this kind of love in itself as sin, as augustine seemed to do, but in his particular case, it did end up in an unhappy love. the second stage is a negative stage, in which Kierkegaard tries to liberate himself from his love for regine in an aesthetic way, by means of poetry and irony. the third stage leads through despair and melancholy towards the recognition of Kierkegaard’s own guilt, which shows, according to van dijk, that Kierkegaard’s struggle with love has been a religious struggle from the beginning. his repentance leads to the ultimate love for god, and thus it leads to faith, in which the most absolute form of love, neighborly love, is demanded. The issue of faith is the topic of the fourth and final essay, in which Van Dijk tries to bring everything together. after discussing the role of the paradox and of reflection with regard to the object of faith (fides quae creditur), he turns to the act of faith itself (fides qua creditur), in order to argue that Kierkegaard eventually fell prey to his own conception of faith as an action and a dialectical unity of interiority and exteriority. in accusing christendom, Kierkegaard openly claimed to know what it is to be a christian and, accordingly, must be judged by his own measure, according to van dijk. in light of this measure, he argues that Kierkegaard did not act according to his own belief that faith is suffering. however, according to van dijk there is another notion of faith at work in Kierkegaard, namely, faith as grace. this kind of faith requires, above all, that the believer refrain from acting and that he patiently wait for god’s graceful act. this sense of faith characterized Kierkegaard’s life more than his own emphasis on faith as action, van dijk concludes, and made his life into a fruitful instrument in god’s hand.

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all in all, it can be said that van dijk offers some interesting perspectives on Kierkegaard’s thought, and especially, touches on some interesting issues, in particular the theme of time in connection to hegel, and the notion of the single individual in connection with nietzsche. in his essays, he relies primarily on the critical editions of the primary texts available at that time, but only makes limited use of secondary literature. “mr. van dijk goes his own way,” as aalders already announced in his introduction.4 in going his own way, however, he sometimes clearly misses the point of Kierkegaard’s thought, for example, with regard to Kierkegaard’s critique of hegel’s treatment of motion, and the lack of ethics in his system.5 in addition, although van dijk touches on numerous interesting themes, his conclusions are never fully and clearly worked out. as he himself indicates at the end of his final essay, he has “kept questions open when an answer would have to be forced into a particular direction.”6 as a result, the essays suffer from a lack of clarity and “sharp definitions,” as one of the early reviewers puts it,7 and, therefore, they tend towards being dilettante indeed. but although we cannot really speak of any scholarly contribution here, the essays remain worthwhile to read in order to “think along with the author” on the issues which he discusses, as yet another reviewer puts it.8 wolter hartog

aalders, “preface,” p. 6. van dijk, Perspectieven bij Kierkegaard, pp. 18–119; pp. 25–6. 6 ibid., p. 132. 7 w.F. goltermann, review in Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte en Psychologie, vol. 34, 1940, pp. 93–4. 8 r.h. bremmer, review in Vox Theologica, vol. 13, 1941–42, p. 46. 4 5

reviews and critical discussions bremmer, r.h., review in Vox Theologica, vol. 13, 1941–42, p. 46. goltermann, w.F. review in Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte en Psychologie, vol. 34, 1940, pp. 93–4. m. (K.h. miskotte?), review in Eltheto, vol. 95, 1940–41, pp. 83–4. robbers h., review in Studiën, vol. 134, 1940, p. 518. van rhijn, maarten, review in Algemeen Weekblad voor Kerk en Christendom, vol. 16, no. 44, 1939–40. westendorp boerma, n., review in Nieuwe Theologische Studiën, vol. 30, 1941, pp. 86–7.

hans van munster, De filosofische gedachten van de jonge Kierkegaard, 1831–1841 [the philosophical thoughts of the young Kierkegaard, 1831–1841], arnhem: van Loghum Slaterus 1958, 166 pp.

this study was prepared as a doctoral dissertation at the Katholieke universiteit Leuven and is yet another sign of the growing interest of catholic scholars from the dutch-speaking world in Kierkegaard’s thought during the 1950s.1 after his ordination as a Franciscan priest in the netherlands, hans van munster was commissioned to study philosophy at the higher institute of philosophy in Leuven, where he received his doctoral degree (cum laude) on the basis of this study of the philosophical thoughts of the young Kierkegaard. in preparation of this research, which is primarily based on Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, van munster also published the first Dutch translation of a selection of Kierkegaard’s journals.2 the motive of this study is based on a saying, by the dutch historian Johan huizinga, that “nothing has more value for the history of a spiritual movement than the personal formation of its representatives.”3 accordingly, van munster argues, a better view on Kierkegaard’s formative years will provide a better understanding not only of the later and more mature thought of Kierkegaard himself but also of See the other two major studies of catholic and Flemish origin, which were published in the same period: Leemans, victor, Søren Kierkegaard. Met een introductie van Alphonse De Waelhens, 2nd ed. antwerp: Standaard boekhandel 1956; Louis dupré, Kierkegaards theologie of dialektiek van het christen-worden, utrecht: het spectrum, antwerp: Standaard boekhandel 1958. 2 Søren Kierkegaard. Een keuze uit zijn dagboeken, trans. by hans van munster, Utrecht: Spectrum 1957. In the subsequent years, van Munster also published the first Dutch translation of The Sickness unto Death: Over de vertwijfeling. De ziekte tot de dood, trans. by hans van munster and alle Klaver, utrecht and antwerp: het spectrum 1958. up until his death in 2008, he prepared a translation of over 90 discourses of Kierkegaard. Some 21 of them, those written between 1843 and 1845, have already been published: Søren Kierkegaard, Opbouwende toespraken, trans. by hans van munster, revised by annelies van hees, udo doedens and pieter vos, budel: damon 2011. 3 hans van munster, De filosofische gedachten van de jonge Kierkegaard, 1831–1841, arnhem: van Loghum Slaterus 1958, p. 5. 1

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the two movements of which he is considered the first and main representative, namely, dialectical theology and existentialism. in his introduction, van munster clearly delineates Kierkegaard’s formative period on the basis of the date of his first journal notes, which were written during his first year at university (terminus a quo), and the date of the defense of his dissertation, September 29, 1841 (terminus ad quem)—a period in which he made the most decisive decisions of his life, and during which he completed the period of his formation. the selection of texts naturally follows from the delineation of this period: (1) parts i, ii, and a selection from part iii of the Papirer, of which the missing parts are supplemented by barfold’s and gottsched’s Efterladte Papirer, and the letters, as published in niels thulstrup’s Breve og aktstykker vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard, and as partly translated into german by emmanuel hirsch;4 (2) the published texts, including the newspaper articles, the review of hans christian andersen, From the Papers of One Still Living, and the dissertation, On the Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates. Since the subject of this study is restricted to the philosophical thoughts of the young Kierkegaard, van munster acknowledges that there is some ambiguity with regard to the meaning of philosophy. after all, he rightly points out, for Kierkegaard, “every theological issue has its philosophical problematic, and every philosophical belief hides a theological standpoint.”5 therefore, van munster employs a rather broad definition of philosophy, namely, “thoughts about the place and direction of human existence insofar as it does not explicitly depart from revelation.”6 with regard to the method of approaching these early philosophical thoughts, the author tries to avoid the pitfall of approaching Kierkegaard’s provisional and immature thought from the viewpoint of his later, more mature and well-developed thought, but indicates that, at some points, it is necessary to clarify the early positions with the help of the later texts. In the first chapter, Van Munster gives an account of Kierkegaard’s early life, in which he emphasizes the great influence of his father’s Pietism, followed by an impression of the intellectual climate during his time at university. with the help of valdemar ammundsen’s Søren Kierkegaards Ungdom,7 he offers a reconstruction of Kierkegaard’s schedule of classes, on the basis of which he traces what he considers to be the most influential figures on Kierkegaard’s early thought, namely: philipp marheineke, Friedrich Schleiermacher, henrik nicolai clausen, hans Lassen martensen, Frederik christian Sibbern, nikolai Frederik Severin grundtvig, and Jakob christian Lindberg. in doing so, van munster points out Kierkegaard’s proximity to, and distance from, each of these figures. He demonstrates the positive influence that Sibbern had on Kierkegaard’s separation of philosophy and theology, and shows that Kierkegaard’s criticism of hegelianism was not so much aimed at Hegel himself, but rather at figures like Martensen, who mistakenly claimed to “move 4 Søren Kierkegaard, Briefe, vol. 25, section 35, in Gesammelte Werke, vols. 1–28, ed. by emmanuel hirsch, düsseldorf and cologne: e. diederich 1950–69. 5 van munster, De filosofische gedachten, p. 10. 6 ibid. 7 valdemar ammundsen, Søren Kierkegaards ungdom. Hans slægt og hans religiøse udvikling, copenhagen: g.e.c. gads 1912.

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beyond hegel.”8 in addition to this overview, van munster offers a non-exhaustive list of the philosophical, as well as romantic literature, which Kierkegaard read, and concludes that Kierkegaard probably did not read hegel before 1840.9 in the next chapter, van munster traces the various issues which occupied Kierkegaard in the period from the fall of 1834 to the spring of 1837. he distinguishes the following five themes: (1) the problem of the unity of opposites, (2) the problem of truth, (3) the relation between christianity and philosophy, (4) Kierkegaard’s “journalistic” engagement between 1834 and 1836, and (5) his encounter with the hegelians. these issues are selected on the basis of the chronological order in which the themes appear in Kierkegaard’s notes and discussed with reference to a very specific selection of the notes concerned. The same applies to the third chapter, which discusses the main issues that appear in Kierkegaard’s journals from the spring of 1837 to September of 1841, namely: (1) irony and humor, (2) the issues concerning the “book against andersen,” (3) Kierkegaard’s thought on religion, and (4) his critique of Adler’s first book. In the fourth chapter, Van Munster eventually turns to Kierkegaard’s dissertation, and argues that in it “the thoughts, with which he had hitherto been struggling, are taken up and reformulated again.”10 this means, he argues, that just like Kierkegaard’s early thoughts, this writing can be characterized neither as hegelian nor as explicitly anti-hegelian. although there is an unmistakable dependency on hegel with regard to the conception of Socratic and romantic irony, the major difference is that, for hegel, the historical development of an eternal concept is significant on the level of successive generations, whereas for Kierkegaard, the history of an idea only has significance insofar as it affects the concrete and single individual in his task of self-realization.11 in his concluding remarks, van munster argues indeed that the meaning of the concrete human person preoccupied Kierkegaard in his thoughts from the summer of 1835 onwards at least until his dissertation (and of course much longer after that). More specifically, Kierkegaard was occupied from the beginning onwards with the problem of how the positive, eternal essence of the human being, as a duality of opposites, can be realized—how opposites can be brought and thought together without mediating them into a higher unity. in line with this, philosophy became a way for Kierkegaard to discover what is within oneself, in order to be able to realize it, and to incite others—indirectly—to do so as well. Finally, van munster concludes, the journal notes from this period reveal that Kierkegaard has continuously been occupied with the relation between philosophy and revelation—a problem that was central to almost all of his major influences as well: from Marheineke to Schleiermacher, and from clausen to Sibbern and martensen. van munster argues that Kierkegaard came to consider the relation between philosophy and revelation a mutual one: revelation presupposes philosophical self-reflection, and after the

8 9 10 11

van munster, De filosofische gedachten, p. 46. ibid., pp. 58–9. ibid., p. 122. ibid., pp. 144–6.

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appropriation of this revelation through faith, there is room again for something like a Christian philosophy as a reflection on being a Christian.12 the study of van munster offers a clear view on the early development of Kierkegaard’s thought, which in turn sheds an interesting light on his later writings. it is built on a clear methodology and makes excellent use of the sources available at that time: danish, german, French, and english, as well as dutch. therefore, it may come as no surprise that his efforts were widely applauded in the dutchspeaking philosophical and theological world, in particular by the “nestor” of the dutch Kierkegaard study, willem Leendertz, who praised it as an enrichment of the Kierkegaard literature.13 it was also lauded by Joannes walgrave, who urged that these kinds of efforts should be continued.14 we can only conclude that this very specialized and quite unusual attempt to examine the philosophical thoughts of the young Kierkegaard in their own right, remains valuable up to this day, although it is definitely due for an upgrade. wolter hartog

12 13

p. 229.

ibid., pp. 154–7. willem Leendertz, review in Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift, vol. 13, 1958–59,

Joannes H. Walgrave, “Godskennis en godsdienstfilosofie,” Tijdschrift voor filosofie, vol. 26, 1964, p. 534. 14

reviews and critical discussions nota, Johannes hille, review in Bijdragen: tijdschrift voor filosofie en theologie, vol. 19, 1958, p. 447. Leendertz, willem, review in Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift, vol. 13, 1958–59, pp. 228–9. Walgrave, Joannes H., “Godskennis en godsdienstfilosofie,” Tijdschrift voor filosofie, vol. 26, 1964, pp. 531–72; see pp. 531–4.

hans van munster, Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, tielt, den haag: Lannoo 1963, 125 pp.

this introduction to the thought of Kierkegaard, by hans van munster, appeared in 1963 as part of a predominant catholic series on “thinkers about god and world.” it gives a fair and accessible account of Kierkegaard’s life and the development of his thought, which is for the most part based on van munster’s doctoral research entitled Philosophical Thoughts of the Young Kierkegaard, published a few years before.1 in contrast to his earlier writing, however, this work does not have any scholarly pretensions, as van munster explains in the preface; the objective is to edify in a Kierkegaardian sense. much is claimed, but little is proven. moreover, he makes no use of secondary sources, and the references to Kierkegaard’s writings are limited. therefore, the readers with a scholarly interest in Kierkegaard should be redirected to his previous work. The general emphasis of this book is largely influenced by the author’s doctoral dissertation as well. The first chapter discusses Kierkegaard’s life in its context, with an emphasis on the influence of the Pietism of his father, on the one hand, and the intellectual climate at university, on the other. the overview is supplemented with a discussion of the pseudonymous writings, the religious writings, the Corsair affair, and the final attack upon the church. The subsequent chapter discusses the stages of existence, which van munster reconstructs in six phases: immediacy, irony, the aesthetic phase, the ethical phase, the ethical-religious, and the christian religious phase. chapter three discusses Kierkegaard’s conception of faith, again in dialogue with marheineke, Martensen, and Schleiermacher in particular. In the final chapter, Van Munster briefly discusses Kierkegaard’s christology, his notion of contemporaneity, and imitation. Van Munster’s writing shows a great affinity with Kierkegaard’s thought. he certainly succeeded in his aim to write a clear and accessible introduction to Kierkegaard’s thought. that this introduction is indeed accessible for the average reader is shown by the numerous, mainly positive reviews, which appeared in many theological, literary, and church journals. therefore, the book can still be helpful for someone who wishes to become acquainted with Kierkegaard’s thought. readers with a scholarly interest, however, should turn to van munster’s previous work, or to the other available dutch introductions. wolter hartog hans van munster, De filosofische gedachten van de jonge Kierkegaard, 1831–1841, arnhem: van Loghum Slaterus 1958.

1

reviews and critical discussions colette, Jacques, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 5, 1964, pp. 144–5. Florin, Frits, review in Kultuurleven, vol. 31, 1964, p. 225. Lekkerkerker, arie Frederik nelis, review in Kerk en Theologie, vol. 15, 1964, pp. 166–7. Linde, Simon, van der, review in Theologia Reformata, vol. 7, 1964, p. 40. Loenen, Johannes hubertus mathias marie, review in De Nieuwe Mens, vol. 17, 1965–66, pp. 191–2. oranje, Leendert, review in Vox Theologica, vol. 35, 1965, p. 99. ploegmakers, erich, review in Carmel, vol. 16, 1964, p. 300. poncelet, alfred, review in Streven, vol. 18, no. 2, 1965, p. 720. Schippers, reinier, review in Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift, vol. 64, 1964, pp. 78–9.

maarten van rhijn, Sören Kierkegaard. Een indruk van zijn leven en denken [Søren Kierkegaard: an impression of his Life and thinking], baarn: bosch en Keuning 1941, 56 pp.

this book consists of seven short essays on Kierkegaard’s life and thought, which the author wrote for the christian weekly Algemeen weekblad voor Kerk en Christendom. initially, he reports, they were written for the “educated reader,” but since he got positive feedback from many readers, he decided to publish them together for a more general audience. the author, maarten van rhijn, is one of the last explicit representatives of the movement of ethical theology, which became increasingly influenced by the dialectical theology of Karl Barth. The first two chapters are dedicated to Kierkegaard’s life and discuss his youth, his engagement, and the events in his later life, respectively. they mainly consist of the wellknown biographical anecdotes. in the third chapter, van rhijn explains Kierkegaard’s assertion that “truth is subjectivity,” by arguing that subjective truth is distinguished from objective truth on the basis of the personal impact it has on the human being. he reduces its meaning, however, just as he does the meaning of Kierkegaard’s notion of existence, solely to the impact that the revelation of god in christ, as the paradox of time and eternity, is supposed to have. His explanation of this paradox in the final chapter, moreover, is restricted to the barthian understanding of it. although this concept of the paradox is unbiblical, van rhijn argues, both Kierkegaard and barth have used it by way of their unbiblical philosophy, that is, “with the help of beelzebub,” to chase away the demons of an unbiblical religion, that is, an immanent hegelian conception of religion.1 van rhijn himself has been so kind to write the only review ever written on his own book, in which he shortly sets out its content and his intentions. however, because of the fact that van rhijn discusses Kierkegaard’s thought in a debate that is very specific for the time in which it took place, his book will not be of much interest for contemporary readers. wolter hartog 1 maarten van rhijn, Sören Kierkegaard. Een indruk van zijn leven en denken, baarn: bosch en Keuning 1941, p. 55.

reviews and critical discussions van rhijn, maarten, review in Nieuwe Theologische Studiën, vol. 25, 1942, p. 157.

Karl verstrynge, De hysterie van de geest. Melancholie en zwaarmoedigheid in het pseudonieme oeuvre van Kierkegaard [hysteria of the Spirit: melancholy and heavy-mindedness in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship], Leuven: peeters 2003, xiii + 402 pp.

Karl verstrynge’s study—the book version of his ph.d. thesis defended at the department of philosophy of the catholic university of Leuven—is devoted to the theme of melancholy (danish, Melancholi, dutch, melancholie) and heavymindedness (danish, Tungsind, dutch, zwaarmoedigheid) in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship. Whereas the former appears to designate those figures that lack consciousness or have it only in a limited sense, the latter is especially manifest in those who have proceeded in self-consciousness and in becoming a self. in interpreting melancholy in terms of the process of becoming oneself, this study offers not only a philosophically important contribution to the interpretation of a Kierkegaardian key concept, but also to the understanding of Kierkegaard’s teleological vision of the nature and development of the self. despite the fact that melancholy belongs to the core themes of both Kierkegaard’s work and personal life experience, he nowhere offers an explicit and systematic treatment of the concept, which makes it difficult to present a coherent conceptualization. moreover, with the exception of mccarthy’s short article1 and Fergusson’s monograph on melancholy and modernity,2 the theme has not been treated seriously in the history of Kierkegaard research.3 Verstrynge’s study rightly claims to fill this gap. vincent mccarthy, “ ‘melancholy’ and ‘religious melancholy’ in Kierkegaard,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10, 1977, pp. 152–65. 2 harvey Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity: Søren Kierkegaard’s Religious Psychology, London and new york: routledge 1995. 3 Karl verstrynge, “ ‘hysteria of the Spirit’: on melancholy in Kierkegaard,” in Immediacy and Reflection in Kierkegaard’s Thought, ed. by paul cruysberghs, Johan taels, and Karl verstrynge, Leuven: universitaire pers 2004 (Louvain Philosophical Studies, vol. 17), pp. 143–58; p. 143. 1

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The first part of the monograph offers a historical exposition of the concept from antiquity to modernity in its many aspects and great diversity of meanings. the author emphasizes the impossibility of dealing with melancholy as a static concept, the semantics of which can be rendered unambiguously. every new appearance of melancholy in history is qualitatively distinguished from former appearances. verstrynge highlights that in the traditional greek approach melancholy appeared to emanate from a perverted “black bile,” being the only one of the four humors that did not refer to a real substance and hence remained a fictitious entity. In Christian medieval thought, melancholy was classified as the pernicious and most irrational of the seven deadly sins, “acedia,” which referred to the spiritual rejection of divine grace and no longer to the bodily fluids. According to Verstrynge, the spiritualization of the concept reached its climax in modernity, now designating a fashionable and widespread “joy of grief”—Schwermut in german, Tungsind in danish, in english translated as the somewhat uncommon “heavy-mindedness”—often interpreted as “sadness without cause” and on a deeper existential level as the situation where man mourns the existential loss of his natural unity with reality. in this latter sense, melancholy was considered as an essential part of the modern subject and as belonging to the heart of the conditio humana grounded in an unsolvable human deficit. verstrynge argues that the multiplicity of the historical features attributed to the concept of melancholy is reflected in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre. on the one hand, Kierkegaard’s treatment is close to the modern idea of melancholy as self-conscious experience of the subject, that in reflection is fundamentally turned inward and thrown upon itself through the loss of transcendence. on the other hand, Kierkegaard firmly opposes the aesthetic experience of melancholy of the modern age by referring to a religious frame of meaning that brings him close to the medieval understanding of melancholy in terms of sin. this dichotomy can only be understood if the various forms of melancholy are interpreted as different stages in an overall “anthropological scheme.” in order to make possible a coherent reading of the particular instances in which Kierkegaard deals with melancholy, verstrynge develops in the second part of his monograph an interpretation of the teleological structure of both the pseudonymous authorship and the anthropological scheme. to demonstrate the teleological structure of the writings he analyzes Kierkegaard’s own interpretations of his authorship. although Kierkegaard was what his pseudonym petrus minor in The Book on Adler called an “essential author” devoted to the authentic communication of “essential knowledge” between author and reader, this direct claim is at the same time in tension with the entire indirect method of his authorship.4 verstrynge nevertheless concludes that Kierkegaard’s authorship is teleological in nature, directed toward authentic religious existence, as the end of the upward movement of the self. the author takes anti-climacus’ The Sickness unto Death as the key to understand the teleological structure of the self. it indeed offers an anthropological scheme that incorporates all previous existential interpretations throughout Kierkegaard’s works: the self as a 4 Karl verstrynge, De hysterie van de geest: Melancholie en zwaarmoedigheid in het pseudonieme oeuvre van Kierkegaard, Leuven: peeters 2003, pp. 58–71.

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synthesis that relates itself to itself and rests transparently in god. the teleological structure can be conceived as a succession of intensifications of consciousness in which the self gradually reflects upon itself and gains an adequate idea of its own condition. verstrynge interprets both anti-climacus’ hyper-christian status and the final perfection and realization of the self, including the God-conception, as “regulative” (in the Kantian sense of the word), which may not be described as “actuality,” “constitution,” or “objectivity.” authentic selfhood consists of the willingness for redemption from despair, not so much in actually overcoming it. although this interpretation may do justice to Kierkegaard’s critical stance toward every objectifying and totalizing grasp of existence, the question remains whether this reading does not make authentic christian existence impossible at all, which would undermine its (religious) reasonability and in the end even the motivation to strive for it at all. in anti-climacus’ Practice in Christianity, as well as in the upbuilding discourses, christian life as following the paradigm of christ appears to be a critical but real possibility to be actualized, which seems to mean more than “as if” it were realizable, as verstrynge puts it elsewhere.5 bearing in mind anti-climacus’ anthropological framework, verstrynge distinguishes in the third and final part of his study between two basic forms of melancholy, that also reflect a distinction that was detected in the historical outline. The first form is situated on the level of the unconscious synthesis of the self that does not relate itself to itself and can be considered as an immediate or “substantial” form of melancholy (Melancholi). the second form is linked with the synthesis as relating itself to itself and hence is in the realm of consciousness (Tungsind). in a concise analysis,6 verstrynge spells out how the various appearances of melancholy and heavy-mindedness in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works may be interpreted as stages of progressing despair and self-consciousness in the anthropological scheme. Melancholi as a pre-conscious perspective functions in the various “immediate erotic stages” of the aesthetic in Either/Or.7 the ethicist considers these forms of melancholy as “hysteria of the spirit,” which occurs at the moment that immediacy is “ripe” and the spirit requires a higher form but is not yet able to gather itself together out of this immediacy.8 in Repetition the type of melancholy Kierkegaard ascribes to the young man balances between a merely substantial (Melancholi) and a more conscious (Tungsind) form: although he has obtained selfconsciousness, he nevertheless fails to relate himself to himself adequately because of a misrelation to actuality; he simply “has no facticity.”9 in Stages on Life’s Way we find the most intensive form of melancholy. Verstrynge demonstrates that Quidam suffers from Tungsind as “inclosing reserve,” which appears as an “anticipation of a higher life,”10 coming close to what anti-climacus calls “the consciousness of sin,” Karl verstrynge, “the perfection of the Kierkegaardian Self in regulative perspective,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2004, pp. 473–95; p. 493. 6 verstrynge, De hysterie van de geest, pp. 240–382. 7 SKS 2, 81ff., 83ff., 89ff. / EO1, 75ff., 78ff., 84ff. 8 SKS 3, 183 / EO2, 188–9. 9 SKS 4, 95 / R, 229. 10 SKS 6, 397 / SLW, 428. 5

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yet without enabling the transcendent reality of spirit to break through. melancholy is now the impossibility of the spirit to lift oneself out of the isolation engendered by an infinite reflection. verstrynge convincingly concludes that there is one constant in the variety of appearances of Kierkegaard’s concept of melancholy: in each case the self is confronted with the possibility of a higher stage, but at the same time is prevented from breaking through. pieter vos

reviews and critical discussions undetermined.

peter vogelsang, Oprecht veinzen. Over Kierkegaards “Over het begrip ironie, vooral met betrekking tot Socrates” (1841) [Feigning Sincerely: on Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates (1841)], groningen: peter F. vogelsang 1999, 556 pp.

this book is a thesis, defended at the State university of groningen (holland) in 1999. it was published by the author on his own, as a part of the requirements of the defense. concentrating on Kierkegaard’s own thesis, the author focuses mainly on its form. because of the hegelian character of this form, hegel is omnipresent in vogelsang’s thesis. its main questions are: “how does Kierkegaard deal with hegel? and why does he do so in such a special manner? what is the role of Socrates in this dealing with hegel? and what does Kierkegaard do with hegel’s conception of Socrates?”1 vogelsang’s basic thesis is, quite surprisingly, that The Concept of Irony is an experiment of indirect communication.2 instead of making use of a pseudonym, however, Kierkegaard writes incognito. he communicates, vogelsang argues, with the hegelians through hegel’s philosophy. according to the author, hegelianism has become an obsession for Kierkegaard (already in 1841!), because it prevents us from becoming true christians. although vogelsang admits that christianity does not appear explicitly in The Concept of Irony, he claims that making room for the proper character of christianity is the main ambition of the book. this is the deeper motive of Kierkegaard’s polemics with hegelianism: “to show hegelianism its place, or to make it disappear into nothingness.”3 Kierkegaard shows hegel’s philosophy in its full glory in order to make it disappear in irony. in the end, however, Kierkegaard himself appears showing that he himself as a hegelian is not really a hegelian. peter vogelsang, Oprecht veinzen. Over Kierkegaards “Over het begrip ironie, vooral met betrekking tot Socrates” (1841), groningen: peter F. vogelsang 1999, p. 11. 2 ibid., p. 17. 3 ibid. 1

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the author offers a detailed reading of the text looking for any form of (indirect) reference to Hegel. In the first part he starts with an investigation of Danish Hegelianism and anti-hegelianism, and Kierkegaard’s reaction to it. then he chronologically examines the development of Kierkegaard’s concept of irony including the role of Socrates, dealing particularly with poul møller’s conception of irony and of Socrates, and with hamann’s Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten, considered by Kierkegaard as a striking example of indirect communication. Vogelsang concludes this first part with references to Kierkegaard’s polemical newspaper articles and to his polemics with andersen in From the Papers of One Still Living. the second part of the thesis examines the different interpretations of The Concept of Irony and goes deeper into the structure of Kierkegaard’s dissertation. as for the possible hegelian character of the division of the dissertation on the basis of the pattern possibility-actuality-necessity, vogelsang is very formal: “that there would be a Hegelian pattern that unmistakably refers to hegel’s terms, plus the way of making use of it, is based on nothing.”4 instead of trying to interpret the triad as moments of a conceptual analysis, the author focuses on the division between concept and phenomena, since this is, according to him, the true perspective of Kierkegaard’s thesis. the third part is entirely devoted to the question of how the three forms of manifestation of irony (the content) can fit into the forms (structures) developed earlier (in the second part). the thesis concludes with Kierkegaard’s own conception of irony, confronting it with current conceptions such as those of richard rorty and Jacques derrida. paul cruysberghs

4

ibid., p. 175.

reviews and critical discussions undetermined.

pieter vos, De troost van het ogenblik: Kierkegaard over God en het lijden [the comfort of the moment: Kierkegaard on god and Suffering], baarn: ten have 2002, 287 pp.

the main theme of pieter vos’ study—which started out as a ph.d. thesis at the protestant theological university of Kampen—is the relation of the suffering human being to god. on the basis of a sharp and accurate analysis of Kierkegaard’s principal pseudonymous and edifying works, vos demonstrates that Kierkegaard is not looking to answer the question of the origin of evil in relation to god—as in classic theodicy—but that his concern lies with how the suffering human being is able to cope with evil and to endure suffering in the presence of god. in other words, Kierkegaard turns the theoretical question of “why?” into an existential question of “How?”: How can I bear suffering and cope with the evil that afflicts me and others? in the introductory chapter, vos elaborates extensively on his approach and methodological starting points.1 he quite rightly notes that the topic of suffering, which occupies such a prominent place in Kierkegaard’s writings, has drawn rather little attention in the secondary literature, and that it has never been studied in relation to Kierkegaard’s oeuvre as a whole. with his book, vos aims to achieve a twofold goal. First and foremost, he intends to contextualize Kierkegaard’s conception of suffering in the history of classical and modern theodicy, and to elucidate its specificities and relevance. in addition, he endeavors to demonstrate that the full richness of Kierkegaard’s ethical-religious thought only becomes apparent if one reads and interprets his pseudonymous works and upbuilding discourses in conjunction: “the upbuilding discourses are not merely a more or less superfluous complement to the pseudonymous works, as is often assumed; rather, as an essential component, they are constitutive for the meaning of the oeuvre as a whole. the pseudonymous work only assumes its full significance in conjunction with the upbuilding.”2 this methodological premise runs like a thread through the book and indeed constitutes one of its greatest merits. vos applies it in, among other things, his interpretation pieter vos, De troost van het ogenblik: Kierkegaard over God en het lijden, baarn: ten have 2002, pp. 20–74. 2 ibid., pp. 17–18. 1

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of Kierkegaard’s “indirect communication.”3 he argues that many Kierkegaard studies fail to distinguish adequately between the indirect communication of the pseudonymous works and the method and register of the upbuilding discourses. the latter also contain a form of indirect communication, but without the parodies, polemics, and thought-experiments of the pseudonyms. the indirectness is, rather, connected with the character of faith. both its content and its method are expressed in inversions and paradoxes, in irony and humor, and in the notion of appropriation. in the subsequent four chapters, vos presents a systematic analysis of his main theme. the starting point of each of these chapters is the tense relationship between pairs of existential notions, which he considers to be constitutive for Kierkegaard’s conception of suffering: the tension between tragedy and guilt (chapter 2),4 between temporality and eternity (chapter 3),5 between imitation and salvation (chapter 4),6 and between contingency and freedom (chapter 5).7 in each instance, he complements his thematic approach with a chronological perspective, thereby also taking due account of the dialectical movement and evolution in Kierkegaard’s thought, from his early to his later pseudonymous and upbuilding works. to exemplify the gist of vos’ interpretation, let us consider two key arguments in his study, one from chapter 2, the other from chapter 5. in chapter 2, vos argues that when Kierkegaard refers to man’s existential struggle with evil, he tends to do so in terms of “tragic fate” on the one hand and human responsibility in the form of “guilt and sin” on the other.8 however, this by no means implies that Kierkegaard causally connects suffering and personal guilt. on the contrary, he emphasizes the salutary nearness of god who forgives in the midst of tragedy and suffering. For that matter, Kierkegaard’s critique of the modern theodicy of Leibniz and hegel runs along similar lines: here, too, he opposes the notion of god’s omnipotence as a superlative of human power.9 god’s providence, so he argues, consists in his renunciation of his omnipotence in an absence that leads paradoxically to nearness. being provident, god is close to the suffering human being, which makes the suffering less tragic than it was. in chapter 5, vos connects various threads from the previous chapters in the question of how the suffering human being can learn to endure his suffering in the tension of contingency and freedom.10 to Kierkegaard, suffering stems from freedom insofar as it is caused by one’s own fault or by the fault of others. in the former case, the suffering human being faces the challenge of having to prevent or combat the evil that he is at risk of or is already enduring. in the latter, the question arises of whether and how the suffering human being, in spite of suffering, is able to retain or regain a degree of freedom. in his upbuilding discourses, Kierkegaard describes 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

ibid., pp. 61–8. ibid., pp. 75–115. ibid., pp. 116–60. ibid., pp. 161–208. ibid., pp. 209–36. ibid., pp. 77ff. ibid., pp. 105ff. ibid., pp. 209ff.

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(mostly christian-inspired) attitudes and virtues that may help the suffering human being to cope with suffering and to endure it in freedom before god: patience, courage, meekness, and confidence or trust. These virtues are connected both to a form of freedom in the suffering and to a liberating, imitative action for the benefit of the other. meekness is, in Kierkegaard’s view, the most characteristic of christian virtues, consisting in a protest against violence in the form of nonviolence and in the way of “the persecuted truth.” The final part of Vos’ study consists in a number of “Concluding Observations.”11 Here Vos enquires into the significance of Kierkegaard’s thought for our secular society, particularly in relation to how we cope with suffering and our interpretation of evil. although many today reject theism, so he argues, the atheist protest still shares the onto-theological assumptions of the theodicy. after all, the starting point was that if god really existed, evil would have to serve some purpose. Kierkegaard’s thought, by contrast, through his existential and kenotic conception of god, offers a genuine way out of the thought-structure of modern theodicy: god’s nearness takes place indirectly, in the appeal to imitate the nonviolent way of Jesus christ. De troost van het ogenblik is, in every sense, an erudite and outstanding Kierkegaard study. the book not only deals with “Kierkegaard’s ideas about god and suffering,” but it also paints a thorough and qualified picture of Kierkegaard’s thought and writings. in fact, i think this is true of most of the academic works on Kierkegaard to have been published in the Low countries over the past two decades or so. thanks to a greater familiarity with Kierkegaard’s oeuvre as a whole, most authors go beyond discussing specific topics, styles, and perspectives in Kierkegaard’s individual works and also pay due attention to the “dialectical coherence” of topics and texts throughout his writings. vos may take credit—alongside his colleague udo doedens12—for recognizing the significance of the upbuilding discourses for the substantive richness of Kierkegaard’s philosophical and theological thought, thereby enhancing our insight into the diversity-in-unity that characterizes Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. Johan taels

ibid., pp. 237–61. udo doedens, Het eenvoudige leven volgens Søren Kierkegaard, baarn: ten have 1999. an early precursor of vos and doedens is Louis dupré, whose excellent Kierkegaard study likewise refers extensively to the upbuilding discourses. See Louis dupré, Kierkegaards Theologie of de dialectiek van het christen-worden, utrecht: het Spectrum; antwerp: Standaard 1958 (theologische bibliotheek). (english translation: Kierkegaard as Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence, new york: Sheed and ward 1963). 11

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reviews and critical discussions paul cruysberghs, Johan taels, and Karl verstrynge, “descriptive bibliography. recent Kierkegaard Literature: 2000–2004,” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 67, no. 4, 2005, p. 795.