Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Volume 2 9781442683037

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COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN

VOLUME 2 VERBUM:

WORD AND IDEA INhgiAQUINAS

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www.utppublishing.com Bernard Lonergan Estate 1997 Printed in Canada ISBN 0-8020-4144-2 (cloth) ISBN 0-8020-7988-1 (paper) Reprinted 2005

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Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Lonergan, BernardJ.F. (BernardJoseph Francis), 1904-1984 Collected works of Bernard Lonergan Vol. 4, 2nd ed., rev. and aug. First ed. (1967) published separately. Vol. 5, 2nd ed., rev. and aug. First ed. (1980). Vol. 3, 5th ed., rev. and aug. First ed. (1957). Vol. 10. Revising and augmenting the unpublished text. Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: v. 2. Verbum : word and idea in Aquinas. ISBN 0-8020-4144-2 (v. 2 : bound) ISBN 08020-7988-1 (v. 2 : pbk.) I. Theology-2Oth century. 2. Catholic Church. I. Crowe, Frederick E., 1915II. Doran, Robert M., 1939- . III. Lonergan Research Institute. FV. Title. 6x891.L595 1988 230 088-093328-3 rev. The Lonergan Research Institute gratefully acknowledges the generous contribution of the MALLINER CHARITABLE FOUNDATION, which has made possible the production of this entire series. The Lonergan Research Institute gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance of the JESUITS OF LOYOLA, MONTREAL, provided by the Loyola Jesuits Special Fund, toward the publication of this volume of the Collected Works. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support for its publishing activities of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP).

C O L L E C T E D WORKS OF B E R N A R D

LONERGAN VERBUM: WORD AND IDEA IN AQUINAS edited by

Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran

Published for Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto by University of Toronto Press Toronto Buffalo London

Contents

Editors' Preface, FREDERICK E. CROWE / vii Introduction: Subject and Soul / 3 1

Verbum: Definition and Understanding / 12 1 The General Notion of an Inner Word / 13 2 Definition / 24 3 Quod Quid Est / 29 4 Insight into Phantasm / 38 5 Emanatio Intelligibilis / 46 6 Conclusion / 59

2

Verbum: Reflection and Judgment / 60 1 Composition or Division / 61 2 Judgment / 71 3 Wisdom / 78 4 Self-knowledge of Soul / 87 5 The Unity of Wisdom / 99 6 Conclusion / 104

3

Procession and Related Notions / 106 1 Procession / 107 2 Actus Perfecti / no 3 Pali / 116

vi

Contents

4 5 6 7 8 9

Potentia Activa / 121 Duplex Actio / 128 Species, Intelligere / 133 Object/ 138 Nature and Efficiency / 143 Conclusions / 148

4

Verbum and Abstraction / 152 1 The Analogy of Matter / 154 2 The Immateriality of Knowing / 158 3 Formative Abstraction / 162 4 Apprehensive Abstraction / 168 5 Sense and Understanding / 179 6 Conclusion / 186

5

Imago Dei / 191 1 Ipsum Intelligere / 192 2 The Necessity of Verbum / 199 3 £b Magis Unum / 204 4 Amor Procedens / 209 5 Via Doctrinae / 213 6 Epilogue / 222 Appendix / 229 Editorial Notes, FREDERICK E. CROWE / 253 Works of Lonergan Referred to in Editors' Preface and Notes / 263 Bibliography of the Works of St Thomas Aquinas / 267 Index of Concepts and Names, FREDERICK E. CROWE / 269 Index of Loci, ROBERT M. DORAN and JOHN DOOL / 291 Lexicon of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases, FREDERICK E. CROWE / 305

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Editors' Preface

The posthumous discovery in Bernard Lonergan's papers of his student writings of the 1930s1 has led us to revise considerably our view of the course of his life and career, and in particular of the place in it of the work presented here in a new edition. For some time the assumption prevailed that he had begun his academic life as a Thomist, with the five verbum articles marking the completion of this phase, and from that basis had gone on to incorporate into his thinking developments of the seven centuries that followed Thomas. But we know now that his interests in the 19305 were economic, political, sociological, cultural, historical, religious, rather than gnoseological and metaphysical. The latter aspects always figured largely in his thought - and in 1927 he had expressed an initial interest, which he never lost, in cognitional theory2 - but their context was found in thinkers like Hegel and Marx and Spengler, and somewhat later Toynbee, rather than in Aristotle and Thomas. The restoration of all things in Christ (Ephesians 1.10) was closer to a motto for him than 'thoroughly understand what it is to understand.' The human good proved to be more of a 1 A manila folder, which Lonergan numbered 713 in the organization of his papers and labeled simply 'History.' It contains unpublished student writings from 1935 on; we follow the custom of referring to it as File 713. 2 A letter Lonergan wrote to his Jesuit friend, Henry Smeaton, dated 20 June (1927). See also Caring about Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, Cathleen Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982) 45, 49, 51. (All letters referred to in these notes are to be found in the Lonergan Archives. Letters identified only by their date are from Lonergan to F. Crowe.)

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magnet than was cognitional theory. It was in the social order that the restoration would take place and the human good be realized, so there was a crying need for a summa sociological All this emerges from examination of his student writings. In the hindsight they provide, we are able to discover this early interest running like a thread through the period from the 1930s to the igSos, appearing in previously unnoticed ways in his writings and lectures. The need for a summa sociologica translates nearly forty years later into general statements like the following: 'There is the love that is loyalty to one's fellows: it reaches out through kinsmen, friends, acquaintances, through all the bonds - cultural, social, civil, economic, technological - of human cooperation, to unite ever more members of the human race in the acceptance of a common lot, in sharing a burden to be borne by all, in building a common future for themselves and future generations.'4 It translates in a much more specific way into - what may otherwise appear as a mere foible - his return to economics in the last years of his life.5 For this is found to form a close unity with his beginnings; the need remained what he had seen it to be fifty years earlier, the dialectic of history working itself out in the life of everyone but especially in the technological, economic, social, cultural, and religious spheres of human endeavor. Having said all this to put the present work in the perspective of Lonergan's life history I must complement it with an insistence on the foundational character of this verbum study. There are those who would rate it as the fundamental breakthrough in the history of his thought. Certainly, it holds a key position in sequence with the two masterpieces that followed it. If it is true that for a thorough understanding of Method in Theology^ we

3 'Panton Anakephalaiosis,' a paper in File 713 dated 28 April 1935, published in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 9:2 (October 1991) 139-72, at 156. 4 'Variations in Fundamental Theology,' a lecture of 1973 at Trinity College, Toronto, p. 10 of the autograph; see also p. 11 on 'the programs of economic, social, and ecological reformers.' (The lecture was repeated with some revisions at New Haven in 1974.) 5 This was his preoccupation from 1975 to 1983, while he was Visiting Distinguished Professor at Boston College; his courses there will be published as volume 15 of the Collected Works. We speak of a 'return' because his interest goes back to the 19305, and in 1944 he produced a manuscript 'Essay in Circulation Analysis,' which figured largely in his Boston College courses. 6 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Barton, Longman & Todd, and New York: Herder and Herder, 1972; 2nd ed., 1973; reprint of 2nd ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990, 1994, 1996).

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must go back to Insight: A Study of Human Understanding,1 it is also true that our understanding of Insight is greatly deepened by a grasp of the work on verbum; to see that, we have only to realize that the simple phrase 'insight and formulation,' 8 which is so central to Insight, encapsulates in three words the main point of the two hundred pages of verbum. i

Developing Acquaintance with Thomas Aquinas

So how did Lonergan get to the verbum study? To broaden the question, what led him from the general background of his early interests to invest eleven of the best years of his life (1938-49) in 'apprenticeship' 9 to Thomas Aquinas? The cause, it seems, was simply a happy accident. In the summer of 1938 he had finished the regular course of Jesuit formation and was awaiting the new academic year in order to proceed to Rome and begin, as mandated by his religious superiors, doctorate studies in philosophy. We do not know whether he had a specific topic in mind for a dissertation. We do know that his particular interest at this time was the philosophy of history, and though he did not hope to focus on that area immediately, 10 it seems likely that he would look for something in the circle of his interests at the time. Unexpectedly, however, and for reasons that had to do with the needs of the Gregorian University, where he was slated to teach on completion of his doctorate, he was switched from philosophy to theology." In consequence he arrived in Rome somewhat at a loss for a dissertation topic, and so readily accepted a suggestion of Professor Charles Boyer that he study a knotty question of divine grace in the writings of St Thomas.12 It was by this happy accident that Thomas came to dominate his 7 Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (London: Longmans, Green & Co., and New York: Philosophical Library, 1957; 2nd ed., 1958; 5th ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992). 8 Insight 298-302. Our references are to the 1992 edition. 9 I borrow the term from William Mathews, his biographer, who, however, applies it more widely: 'Lonergan's Apprenticeship 1904-46 ...,' Lonergan Workshop^ (1993) 43-8710 Letter to Henry Keane, his Provincial Superior, written from Milltown Park, Ireland, 10 August 1938: 'As philosophy of history is as yet not recognised as the essential branch of philosophy that it is, I hardly expect to have it assigned me as my subject during the biennium [of doctoral studies].' 11 Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection 266 (in 'Insight Revisited'). 12 Notes made by Lonergan in preparation for the defense of his dissertation, Lonergan Archives, Batch I-A, Folder 16.

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thinking for several years, while he finished his dissertation (1938-40),13 rewrote it for publication (1941-42),14 began that research into the Thomist intelligere which I will presently describe, and so came to write the verbum articles that became the present volume. What was Lonergan's acquaintance with Thomas in the fall of 1938? It does not seem to have been very extensive or profound. The philosophy taught at Heythrop College, England (1926-29), was not Thomist.15 His regency (1930-33), a period of teaching between philosophy and theology that was part of Jesuit training, was not a time of study. And when he was free to return to study in the summer of 1933, it was Augustine he worked on.16 At that point he did finally turn to Thomas and found him better than he had been led to believe,17 but there is no evidence of the fascination Thomas held for him after his doctoral work. But after two months of theology in Montreal at the College of the Immaculate Conception (where he was later to begin his career as professor of theology), his religious superiors transferred him to Rome to continue his basic theology (1933-37), and go on to a doctorate in philosophy at the Gregorian University.18 New influences now came into play. There was, to begin with, an article by Peter Hoenen (it is just possible that Lonergan had already read this before leaving Montreal): In !933 I had been much struck by an article of Peter Hoenen's in Gregorianum arguing that intellect abstracted from phantasm not only 13 He had finished his dissertation in 1940 and was waiting in Rome to defend it when the war took a sudden turn and his superiors at one day's notice ordered him back to Canada. In the turmoil of the times he did not defend the thesis until 1943, when the Gregorian University authorized the College of the Immaculate Conception in Montreal to hear his defense. The doctorate itself was not granted until 1946, when he was able to submit the required copies of his dissertation to the Gregorian. 14 Bernard Lonergan, 'St. Thomas' Thought on Gratia Operans,' Theological Studies 2 (1941) 289-324; 3 (1942) 69-88, 375-402, 533-78. Published in book form as Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. J. Patout Burns (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, and New York: Herder and Herder, 1971). 15 'Insight Revisited' 263. 16 Letter to Henry Keane, January 1935, p. 3. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.: 'At this juncture FT Hingston [then Provincial Superior] paid a flying visit to the Immaculate where I had begun my theology. I was to go to Rome. I was to do a biennium in philosophy.'

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terms but also the nexus between them. He held that that certainly was the view of Cajetan and probably of Aquinas ... So about 1943 I began collecting materials for an account of Aquinas' views on understanding and the inner word. The result was a series of articles that appeared in Theological Studies from 1946 to 1949.19 Other Roman influences are expressly acknowledged. I was sent to Rome for theology, and there I was subject to two important influences. One was from an Athenian, Stefanos Stefanu, who had entered the Jesuit Sicilian province and had been sent to Louvain to study philosophy at a time when Marechal taught psychology to the Jesuit students and the other professors at the scholasticate taught Marechal ... It was through Stefanu ... that I learnt to speak of human knowledge as not intuitive but discursive ... This view was confirmed by my familiarity with Augustine's key notion, veritas, and the whole was rounded out by Bernard Leeming's course on the Incarnate Word, which convinced me that there could not be a hypostatic union without a real distinction between essence and existence. This, of course, was all the more acceptable, since Aquinas' esse corresponded to Augustine's veritas and both harmonized with Marechal's view of judgment.20 There are some hints of Thomist influence in Lonergan's unpublished writings of the time. His letter to Henry Keane (Provincial Religious Superior) speaks confldendy of the errors of the Thomists and of his ability to prove them wrong out of Thomas himself.21 Three months later, in the carefully dated student writing Panton Anakephalaiosis ..., he uses a text

19 'Insight Revisited' 266-67. Note his criticism of Hoenen as using Scotist language: 'Hoenen's point that intellect abstracted both terms and nexus from phantasm was regarded as Scotist language, both terms and nexus belong to the conceptual order; what Aristotle and Aquinas held was that intellect abstracted from phantasm a preconceptual form or species of quod quid erat esse, whence both terms and nexus were inwardly spoken.' Ibid. 267. The Manning interview (see note 28 below) says: '... then about 1944 I started ... working on Thomas on verbum,' but the date 1943 occurs in a carefully written account rather than an interview. 20 'Insight Revisited' 265. 21 Letter to Keane (1935) 4.

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from Thomas as a motto; but, significantly, the text is not on cognitional theory but on the development of the human mind.*2 It does not appear, then, that up to 1938 Lonergan's acquaintance with Thomas was at all thorough or that he had yet developed his high regard for Thomas. All that changed with his doctoral studies, at the end of which he could write the moving paragraphs which conclude his articles on gratia operans^ then go on to pronounce a similar eulogy at the end of the verbum articles,24 and to speak in Insight of his 'years reaching up to the mind of Aquinas.' 25 With that we come to his study of Thomist cognitional theory and the actual preparation of the present work, which appeared first as a series of articles under the title 'The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,' 2h before being published in book form under the title VERBUM: Word and Idea in Aquinas.*7 2

The Genesis of Lonergan's Thought on Thomist Understanding

According to the title of the articles (neatly broadened in that of the book) the topic is verbum, the word, but one soon learns that the focus is really on the origin of the word or verbum in understanding or intelligere. There is a history to Lonergan's discovery of understanding, and it follows a curious course (curious, as running counter to our expectations), from Plato through Augustine to Aquinas and Aristotle. It begins with his reaction, during his philosophy studies at Heythrop College (1926-29), against the dominance of universal concepts: 'In philosophy I had no use whatsoever for all this talk about universals. A razor blade cuts anybody's beard, it is a universal.'2X The 'insight into phantasm' 22 Panton 139; the text on intellectual development quoted as a motto is Summa theologiae 1, q. 85, a. 3 c. 23 Grace and Freedom 139-45. 24 Theological Studies 10 (1949) 388-93; in the present book 222-27. 25 Insight 769. 26 Theological Studies 7 (1946) 349-92; 8 (1947) 35~79, 4°4~44; 1O U949) 3~4O, 359-9327 See below, note 55. 28 Interview with Paul Manning, 30 August 1978, p. 4 (transcript in Lonergan Archives). Several scattered statements help us trace Lonergan's reaction against universals, his discovery of intelligere in Augustine and Thomas, and his turn to work on the verbum.

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that would force universals to the sidelines was already implicit in a student essay of 1928,29 but it remained unthematized at the time. Newman was, of course, a strong positive influence, but in the area of real assent and judgment (Lonergan's reflective understanding and its word) rather than in that of direct understanding. 3 " It is ironic, or at any rate curious, given his opposition to Platonic knowing as confrontation, that it is through Plato, rather than through Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas, that he makes the specific discovery of understanding. Thus, he says of his conversion from nominalism: 'I believed in intelligence and I found concepts were overrated. When I found in Stewart's Plato's Doctrine of Ideas that an idea, for Plato, was like Descartes' equation for the circle, I was home. You get to the equation of the circle just by understanding.' S1 His dissertation took him from Augustine to Thomas in the history we

There was remote preparation when Lonergan was a pupil at Loyola College, 1918-22: 'I acquired great respect for intelligence' (Caring 142; on Caring see note 2 above). In 'Insight Revisited' we find: 'Augustine was so concerned with understanding, so unmindful of universal concepts, that I began a long period of trying to write an intelligible account of my convictions' (A Second Collection 265)In Caring: 'I did my dissertation on Aquinas ... Then I recalled that Augustine talked a lot about intelligere and that Thomas didn't talk much about universals — though knowledge of universals was supposed to be the be-all and end-all of science' (51). Ibid.: 'I was teaching the Sacrament of marriage ... and I wrote the article for Theological Studies ['Finality, Love, Marriage,' 1943] - After that I got interested in verbvim in Aquinas and worked at that for five years' (264). The materials Lonergan collected for the work are probably extant still in his card indices, not yet studied, in the Lonergan Archives. 29 'The Form of Mathematical Inference,' Blandyke Papers (student journal, handwritten, Heythrop College), no. 283 (January 1928) 126-37. 30 Lonergan's relation to Newman is a topic passim in the interviews published as Caring about Meaning: general influence in cognitional theory, 13-15; especially in regard to judgment, 45-46, 107; bvit Lonergan had his own input, ill; help from Newman in more personal way, 257. See also the references to Newman in the present volume, and our editorial notes to the Introduction and to chapter 2. 31 Caring 44. The book referred to is J.A. Stewart, Plato's Doctrine of Ideas (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1909). See also 'Insight Revisited' 264; Lonergan's interview with students and professors of McMaster University, 6 February 1973, p. 14; the Manning interview, 4: 'I found that Augustine never talked about universals, he is always talking about intelligere.'

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are tracking. As he reports in Caring: 'From Stewart I went to Plato and read a number of Platonic Dialogues, and then when I went to the Immaculate [College of the Immaculate Conception] to study theology I started reading Augustine there - the dialogues of Cassiciacum, the early dialogues. He was talking about intelligere all the time, you see. Later, after I had finished my dissertation on gratia operans I remembered that Thomas too talks a lot about intelligere and he hasn't much to say about universals! So I went to work on that.'32 The last and perhaps most important event in Lonergan's developing view on understanding is almost lost to history: his discovery in Aristotle of insight into phantasm. The repercussions of this discovery are many. A text from Aristotle on this act of insight will adorn the frontispiece of Insight: 'forms are grasped by mind in images,'33 or, 'the faculty of understanding grasps the forms in images,'34 to use two translations of Lonergan himself. Further, he will refer over and over to this great discovery made by Aristotle.35 But we have only meager data on Lonergan's own discovery of Aristotle's discovery, and what little we have reveals the curious fact that not only was Aristotle the last in the chain of discoveries that ran for Lonergan from Plato through Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, but the event itself is treated in the most casual manner: 'And I discovered, perhaps not then [that is, when he was reading Augustine], it was later on when I was doing the Verbum articles, you get the same thing in Aristotle.36 '... you get the same thing in Aristotle': this lone reference, oblique enough at that, records what we would suppose to have been a rather thrilling event in his intellectual history. At any rate some time during his 'apprenticeship' his early interest in 32 Caring 22. 33 Insight frontispiece: 'ta men oun eide to noetikon en tois phantasmasi noei'; Aristotle, De anima, III, 7, 43ib 2. '... forms are grasped by mind in images,' Insight (1992) 699-700. 34 Bernard Lonergan, Collection (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 138 (in 'Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought'). 35 Ibid.; see also 135. Ten times at least there is a similar reference in Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on INSIGHT (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); see p. 18: 'I believe that the fact of insight is explicitly and with complete universality acknowledged by Aristotle and determinative in Aristotle's thought'; ibid., 30: 'Aristotle's "matter and form" distinctionis tied right in with insight'; ibid., 31: 'Kant, Aristotle, and St Thomas all knew about insight'; and see pp. 48-52, 119, 199 n.24, 213, 238, 268, 290. 36 Manning interview, 24.

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cognitional theory revived. So he noticed now and later began to collect data in Thomas on intelligere and verbum to add to what he had found in Augustine, and so set out on the way to the verbum articles.37 The meaning these two masters gave to the term intelligere was quite remote from that of the universal concepts which so dominated Scholastic thinking. Thomism, of course, as study of the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, had had a checkered history. Somewhat in decline in the nineteenth century, it had received new stimulus from the encyclical letter Aeterni Patris issued by Pope Leo XIII in 1879, and it was flourishing strongly in Lonergan's youth. The new Thomism, however, differed from that of the great commentators of previous centuries. The advent of the historical approach in other fields of thought had deeply affected the study of Thomas too, and Lonergan was able to enter wholeheartedly into this new mentality. The first paragraph of his doctoral dissertation in its published form (Grace and Freedom), with its references to the historical studies of Schupp, Doms, Landgraf, and Lottin, provides the clearest possible evidence of what his own approach will be. Nevertheless, Thomism remained a doctrine, prescribed by the Roman Catholic Church to be taught in its seminaries, and here Lonergan found himself completely at odds with what was currently being taught in regard to cognitional theory. He labeled the latter conceptualism, a line of thought characterized by its concern with concepts, with the joining of concepts in propositions, and with the linking of propositions in syllogisms to give a logical system. What was lacking in this was the fertile source of it all: understanding, or insight into phantasm. And this lack was to be met with a new interpretation of Thomas deriving from his discovery of the real meaning of the Thomist intelligere. Lonergan records some of the Thomist elements that entered into his Insight: 'the distinctions between the understanding and the concept, and the reflective understanding and the judgement, and then between the question of value and the judgement of value ,..'38 There is also a general statement of his debt: 'Now it is true that I spent a great deal of time in the study of St. Thomas and that I know I owe a great deal to him.'39 But 37 "Insight Revisited' 267: 'So about 1943 I began collecting materials for an account of Aquinas' views on understanding and the inner word. The result was a series of articles that appeared in Theological Studies from 1946 to 1949.' 38 Caring 21. 39 A Second Collection 38 (in Theories of Inquiry: Responses to a Symposium' 33-42, the 1967 convention of the American Catholic Philosophical Association).

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beyond elements and general statements, there are specific consequences of fundamental significance. One of these is the resulting epistemology, quite different from one that supposes an intuition of being.40 But there were unexpected fruits of his apprenticeship in other areas, as he realized later; speaking of his eleven years of research on Thomas, he wrote late in life: 'it is from the mind set of research that one most easily learns what Method is about: surmounting differences in historicity.' 4 ' This fits into the wide context of his views on Thomas, when he refers to what Thomas did to meet the challenge of his time, and the bearing his achievement might have on the tasks of our time.42 3

The Articles in Theological Studies

The actual writing of the articles was rather long drawn out. In his course De methodo theologiae at the Gregorian University, Rome, 1963-64, when he wished to illustrate how rapidly work moves forward once one grasps the idea, Lonergan remarked that it took him a year to write the first verbum article, even after the data had been collected, and only two weeks to write the second.4H So from about 1943 (or perhaps 1944) he collected and tried to organize his material, and spent most of 1945 getting the first article the way he wanted it. One clue to the reason for the delay is found at the end of the first article: 'I have begun, not from the metaphysical framework, but from the psychological content of Thomist theory of intellect: logic might favor the opposite procedure but, after attempting it in a variety of ways, I found it 40 Understanding and Being 19: 'if you frankly acknowledge that intellect is intelligence, you discover that you have terrific problems in epistemology'; see 2OO, 216, 277, 293-94, 350-52, 359, and editorial note c to Discussion 2, p. 425. 41 Letter of 3 March 1980. This remark is to be taken very seriously; a context may be found in a student of culture who considerably influenced Lonergan, Christopher Dawson; see, for example, the latter's statement in his The Crisis of Western Education (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961) 113: 'Until a man acquires some knowledge of another culture, he cannot be said to be educated, since his whole outlook is so conditioned by his own social environment that he does not realize its limitations' - a view found passim in Dawson. 42 A Second Collection 44 (in 'The Future of Thomism,' a lecture of 1968); also A Third Collection (New York: Paulist Press, 1985) 51-53 (in 'Aquinas Today ...'). 43 Recorded in notes taken by Thomas Daly, p. 41; after all his material was collected, and indices made, Lonergan still struggled with the question, Where is one to begin?

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unmanageable.'44 The fact is, as it turned out, Lonergan was struggling not merely with the order of these articles but with the great turn from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis, from substance to subject, that will characterize his work from now on.45 A further delay shows up in the later articles, for the first three came out in quick succession, 1946-47, but the last two only two years later in 1949-4'1 With an exception to be noticed in our next section, there is no information about the course of publication; no letters are extant from the correspondence with the editors. There are backward-looking remarks in the 44 See below, at the end of chapter l, p. 59. Two items in the archival papers show traces of this struggle. The first, published here as an appendix, is a file (Batch I-B, Folder 13) of scattered pages with the title The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,' which is clearly an early draft of the first two articles. 48 pages remain of a total of 102: pp. l, 16-22, 60-72, 90-102 - these were kept in order — plus 73, 74, 75, and 77 excerpted, it seems, for use as scrap (some have Lonergan's scribbles on the back). They belong to two articles, for the footnotes reach number 270 at p. 75, but continue on p. 90 after the lost interval at number loo; further, starting a concluding summary on p. 100, he writes, 'The chief aim in this second part...' And he already envisaged more, for p. 102 has 'to be continued.' It is clear that this draft was written in the context of trinitarian doctrine: ' [I may] have given some of the evidence for the interpretation of Thomist Trinitarian theory at which I am aiming' (102); and see the last line of p. 99: 'The human analogy to the divine processions has gone up in metaphysical smoke' (with John of St Thomas et al.). The last point on p. 102 begins: 'Fourthly, there is the outstanding problem of the processio operati according to the will.' The second archival item showing signs of his struggle consists of notes (Lonergan's own, plus a report byj. Martin O'Hara) of a course on Thought and Reality that he gave at Thomas More Institute, Montreal, in the academic year 1945-46. Though we must allow for repetitions due to pedagogical reasons (questions raised in class, etc.) the notes do seem to show an oscillation between the cognitional and the ontological. In contrast, notes of a talk he gave at Regis College, Toronto, on 26 February 1947, entitled (probably) 'Nature of Intellect,' seem to follow the order of the articles he was just then writing. 45 He was to realize later that the move had already been made in Insight;see 'Insight Revisited' 277: 'while I still spoke in terms of a faculty psychology, in reality I had moved out of its influence and was conducting an intentionality analysis.' 46 Possibly a heavy teaching load was partly responsible for the delay of the last two articles. Lonergan does mention in regard to his years in Montreal that from 1940 on 'for six years I had considerable opportunities to add research and writing to my duties as a professor' (A Second Collection 266, in 'Insight Revisited'). From 1947 to 1953 he taught at Toronto, where the teaching load was at first heavier, especially in 1947-48.

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articles themselves that clarify his progress, but these we will see in their proper place. 4

The Articles in Book Form

The process leading up to the publication of the articles in book form some years later is better documented. Heavy demands soon depleted the stock both of the back issues of Theological Studies and of the generous supply of offprints that had been given to Lonergan. There was pressure on him, then, to reissue the articles, and his letters begin to discuss the possibility as far back as ig6o.47 But he had in mind to include the gratia operans articles along with the verbum set, and spoke in 1962 of issuing the pair as Two Thomist Studies.'48 Meanwhile Henri Niel had proposed a French translation of the articles to be done by M. Regnier (whose mother was English), assisted by students at the Jesuit philosophate in Chantilly (near Paris) .49 This project went forward with relative speed, the first article of 'La notion de verbe dans les ecrits de Saint Thomas d'Aquin' appearing in 1963, and the fifth in 1965.5° The following year Tour repondre a de nombreuses demandes,' the five articles were issued in book form.51 For this book Lonergan wrote an Introduction, sending it off to the translators in late 1964. Then in response to a 47 Letter of 26 September 1960. 48 Letter of 11 December 1962; in 1963 (letter of 9 June) he wrote, 'I have been thinking that the thing to do is to have "Two Thomist Studies" edited by you [F. Crowe].' 49 This had started as a project to translate Insight into French: letter of Henri Niel to Lonergan, lOjune 1960. That was still the primary intention two years later, but now Niel has added a proposal to have the verbum articles translated also (letter of 11 December 1962); in the end it was the articles that got done. I may note here that in 1952 an unpublished French translation, Le Concept de Verbum dans les Ecrits de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, had been made by Jacques Tremblay at Jean-de-Brebeuf College in Montreal; did this figure in the Regnier translation? was he aware of its existence? Lonergan himself had found some deficiencies in the Tremblay translation (letter of 25 May 1958), but does not specify what they were. 50 Archives de philosophic 26 (1963) 163-203, 570-620; 27 (1964) 238-285; 28 (1965)206-50,510-52. 51 La notion de verbe dans les ecrits de Saint Thomas d'Aquin. (Bibliotheque des Archives de Philosophic: Nouvelle serie 5.) Paris: Beauchesne, 1966.

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request received, he offered this introduction to Philippine Studies, where it appeared in 1965 with the illuminating title 'Subject and Soul.'52 The very next month Lonergan received a letter from David Burrell of the University of Notre Dame, offering to find collaborators there and put out the verbum articles in book form in English. Lonergan had some hesitation: This means separating from Gratia operans. I have my reasons for wanting them together, but though I see the moon I do not reach for it.'53 Soon, however, he was ready to accept the offer and wrote on i April to Burrell: 'Are you and your friends still ready to edit Verbum? If so, I shall send you a list of corrections (text and footnotes) that have accumulated over the years; also, an Introduction that I wrote for the French translation.'54 The work of Burrell and his team came out in 1967, under the title: VERBUM: Word and Idea in Aquinas. British publication of the Notre Dame work followed a year later under the same tide but with a number of new corrections (see our next section).55 5

The Text of the Present Edition

The foregoing history with its reference to various corrections and revisions gives some indication of the task before us, which is not merely to make Lonergan's original work available again, but also to document significant changes he made in it, and to put on record the history of the text. For this task the first need is a list of sources for the readings in our edition; it is rather long in relation to the results arrived at, and some sources make a negligible input to the text, but that latter fact has also to be recorded in order to close off useless lines of investigation. 52 Bernard Lonergan, 'Subject and Soul,' Philippine Studies 13 (1965) 576-85. Data on this request and Lonergan's response: letter of 29 December 1964. 53 Letter of l January 1965. Further, Lonergan felt the job was still mine if I wanted it, but I was quite content to leave the task to the University of Notre Dame team. 54 Letter to David Burrell of l April 1965. The 'list of corrections' will concern us later; it is the list that had already gone to Fr Regnier, for the same corrections (with one exception - also to be discussed later) appear in the French and the English. 55 Bernard Lonergan, VERBUM: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. David B. Burrell (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967; London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968).

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The first source is obvious enough: the work as it first appeared in Theological Studies in five articles spread over the years 1946-49. This, of course, is our basic text, and we would not expect it to be in itself a source of its own correction; but two factors complicate in an important way this simple picture. The first is Lonergan's revision of his own thought, as found in corrections internal to the articles themselves;5*' these we shall notice as we come to them in the text. The other is a rather surprising criticism of the way his footnotes were rearranged editorially in one of the articles.57 Next in importance are the marginally annotated offprints of his articles on which Lonergan recorded corrections to be made. There are two sets of these, each with his annotations. We shall designate the original articles as cv-A, the first set of offprints as cv-B, and the second set as CV-c. The main importance attaches to the set CV-B, which is the basis for the corrections made by Regnier and Burrell. 5X The second set, cv-C, has a few further corrections, made presumably when Lonergan did not have CV-B at hand. These two sets of corrections will be noticed, insofar as they rate a mention, as we come to them. Our third source is the French translation, as published in Paris by Archives de Philosophic, first as articles, then as a book.59 These show significant changes from the original English, but they are mostly omissions and so of no importance for the present purpose of establishing the text. It would, of course, be important for students of the French text to know the 5(1 For example, in the fifth article, Theological Studies 10 (1949) 372, note 59; the point is made again in Collection 144, note 4 (in 'Insight: Preface to a Discussion,' a paper of 1958 for the American Catholic Philosophical Association). Lonergan did not rewrite the faulty passage for the hook publication, but left it in place with this monitum. 57 Letter to David Burrell, l April 1965: 'There is one article (third or fourth), in which an over-zealous stylist at TS put my references in chronological order; they had been in order of relevance; if this is noticed in checking, it would be well to change order back to relevance.' (The evidence of the footnotes themselves suggests that it was the third article that was tampered with, but we have not imposed our guesses on the text.) There is also a second, rather sharper remark on the same point in an interview (Caring 102), indeed unusually sharp, given Lonergan's good relations with Theological Studies- see his laudatory remark later (ibid. 159). 58 It has been saved for us by Elizabeth and Mark Morelli, who received the set as a gift from Lonergan in the 1970s, and left it with us on loan for our present task of editing. 59 Reference to the Tremblay translation remains useful for the passages omitted by the Regnier team.

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situation, so I quote a letter Regnier sent to Lonergan with the translation of the first article: 'As suggested by Pere Niel I have left out the few references to Kant and shortened some paragraphs, but, of course, I shall rely entirely on your judgment. I have also omitted the introduction which was meant for theologians.'()() There is no record of Lonergan's reply; presumably he accepted Regnier's work.'" But there is in the translation at least one very significant change of a positive nature, an addition rather than an omission: the French has a precious note on cognitional acts with respect to being that curiously is not found in any of the three English publications.()2 This we shall notice in due course (see note 206 to chapter i). The University of Notre Dame edition of 1967 revises the text according to the 'list of corrections' Lonergan had sent the editors; it adds a Foreword by the editor and of course Lonergan's new Introduction. The British edition of this volume appeared the next year, with some differences from the American.(>:i Lonergan received two copies each of the British and American editions, and three of these have his marginal notations, the vast majority of which, however, are mere corrections of typos. A final source may be mentioned: the two publications in English of the new Introduction are a check on one another, and, in fact, its appearance as the article

60 Letter of M. Regnier to Lonergan, 12 May 1963. Three important references to Kant were indeed omitted, and there were other cuts here and there. 61 Lonergan again received not only offprints of his articles but the whole issue of Archives de Philosophic, in which the articles appeared; the latter reveal that he checked the first article, for the pages are cut and he made a marginal correction on p. 186; but the pages for the second, third, and fourth articles are not even cut (the fifth article is missing from Lonergan's set). The French book left unchanged some notes that refer back to the pages of the journal rather than to those of the book, a negligence that the editors apologetically admit. An insert lists some fifty errata; this presumably was due to the checking of the editors. Again, however, Lonergan himself did some casual checking of the book, at least of the Introduction, for his copy has corrections noted on pages iii and iv. 62 Page 44 of La notion ..., note 196. Let it also be noted on the positive side that the marginal corrections Lonergan noted on CV-B were faithfully followed in the French; presumably, the same set of corrections went to Paris and to Notre Dame. 63 To eliminate some puzzles future researchers might have, we may record the reason for these differences: Lonergan made a list of errata in the University of Notre Dame edition as soon as it appeared, and sent it to Bun ell, who was able to have fresh lines of print set up before the work was photographed for the lithography process in England.

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'Subject and Soul' in Philippine Studies confirms a minor correction that the sense itself required us to make in the English Introduction. A quite different line is not the investigation of sources for our reading of Lonergan, but the investigation of Lonergan's own sources for the verbum articles and of his other writings and lectures at the time. This is not a study to be squeezed into an editorial preface to Verbum, but a project for a doctoral dissertation. Nevertheless I may be permitted to indicate the wealth of material available. For example, there are in the Archives extensive notes on primary and secondary writings under such headings as Scotus,64 Writers on Verbum,65 imago Dei,66 Trinitarian History,67 Aristotelian/ Augustinian Conflict,68 Godfrey of Fontaine,69 and Varia on Aquinas70 files made presumably while Lonergan was researching the articles. There

64 Batch II, File Q. 65 Ibid. File 10. Much of this archival material consists of quotations laboriously typed out, but there are also reflections on the data collected, for example, a page headed, Why Aquinas did not hit off 'to ti en einai'; it runs in part as follows. 1. He did not investigate the Aristotelian text from the view-point of the usage of technical terms. There was no Bonitz index. Aquinas was not a philologist. He dealt with meanings: in immediate sentences; in the inter-relation of sentences, paragraphs, etc. 2. He was interested in the metaphysical aspects of the issues: Avicenna and Averroes. In epistemology he was interested predominantly in the relation between universal terms and reality, not in the intervening mechanism. He did not perhaps go in for introspection, and certainly he no more thought of introspective description than did Aristotle. 3. Now to hit off 'to ti en einai' is a matter of introspective description of the most exacting sort; the insight of understanding is 'pre-conceptual' and as such to put it into words is to transform it into the resultant concepts; it can be described only on the understanding, on the part of both writer and reader, that one is describing the principle of description before it causes description. This aspect is sufficiently plain from the account of 'verbum' 4. When to ti en einai is one of the four causes, Aq outright that it is form. But when it is principle of definition, the key to defining, the prior insight to the act of defining, it becomes the quod quid est or the quidditas (concrete or abstract general essence). 66 Batch II, File 16. 67 Ibid. File 41. 68 Ibid. File 42. 69 Ibid. File 43. 70 Ibid. File 48.

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are also extensive fragments of an early draft of his verbum study, and over six hundred index cards (5-by-8) detailing his research on Aquinas and Aristotle.71 And I should list the notes taken by Walter Principe on a course Lonergan gave at the Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto while he was writing the articles.72 There is no one way to handle these various sources. Simple typos are corrected without comment. Sometimes there is an editorial addition (in square brackets) to the footnotes. Sometimes the point at issue is important enough to rate an editorial note. 6

Other Editorial Tasks

Of other recurring editorial problems the first and greatest was that of handling Lonergan's numerous references to Thomas Aquinas (over fifteen hundred by rough count) and to Aristotle. The accuracy of the references was checked twice, first by Gregory Carruthers and then by Robert Doran. Fr Carruthers also provided invaluable assistance by photocopying every text of Aquinas to which Lonergan refers or which Lonergan quotes, and arranging these in a set of ordered files that made subsequent editing far easier than it would otherwise have been. The list of Thomas's works at the end of this volume indicates the edition or editions that we used in our editing. In the footnotes as well as in the list, we indicate first the title of a given work as assigned in the folio volumes of the Leonine edition, and then, where necessary, our shorthand way of referring to the work. For the texts of Aristotle we relied principally on Richard McKeon's edition of The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941). There is, too, the problem regularly found in the early Lonergan but more acutely experienced here, of what to do with his Latin and Greek phrases and quotations for a public that to such a large extent cannot handle those languages. Our decision (reached with some prodding from veteran Lonergan students) was to leave Lonergan the way we found him (the Greek, however, in roman transcription) with longer quotations translated in square brackets in the footnotes, and the shorter (except where there is special need) referred to a lexicon at the very end of the book. 71 See note 44 above, and Appendix below, pp. 229-52. 72 The seminar, conducted in the spring term of 1947, was on the trinitarian theology of St Thomas; Fr Principe's notes show links passim with the articles, sometimes explicitly.

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We also checked Lonergan's references to other authors, and where necessary added bibliographical data that might be of assistance to readers. In only a very few instances were we not able to locate the relevant references. Chapter tides, when missing in the original, are those of the 1967 edition. The titles of the subdivisions are those of the original articles, with one insignificant exception, though we cannot be sure they are Lonergan's own. For the details of editing we follow the now established policy of the Collected Works: spelling as in the Oxford American Dictionary; stylistic matters as in the Chicago Manual of Style; ML for Migne's Patrologia latina, and DB (DS) for the Denzinger Enchiridion; no change in Lonergan's gender usage; etc. As for the material at the back, we return to our practice of writing editorial notes where they seem helpful (the figures in square brackets at the end of each note refer to the relevant page of the text), adding a list of the works of Lonergan referred to in these notes as well as in this Preface. The usual index of names and subjects is supplemented by an index of Loci Thornistici and Loci Aristotelici, as was the case in the earlier edition. For a brief time we had hoped to include an appendix with all of the texts of Aquinas to which Lonergan refers, and we did in fact transcribe onto computer the texts for the first chapter and for part of the second, before realizing that the appendix would be far longer than the text itself and that the work of assembling the texts was starting to yield diminishing returns, at least as far as the purposes of the present volume are concerned. One important editorial task (we should rather say privilege) remains: that of thanking those who have contributed to this edition: Marcela Dayao, who typed the whole work onto computer; Elizabeth and Mark Morelli for the loan of those precious offprints on which Lonergan recorded his revisions; Gregory Carruthers, whose work is mentioned above; Philip McShane, who read the whole work in typescript, including this Preface, and provided advice on certain knotty problems; many others who contributed in various ways: Charles Hefling, Joseph Komonchak, Gerard Whelan, Marc Brousseau, John Dool, Robert Croken, Michael Shields, the library staff of Regis College (Toronto), and the late Walter Principe. Thanks, finally, to those who have made letters or interviews available to fill in Lonergan's history. FREDERICK E. CROWE (for the editors)

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Introduction: Subject and Soul'

In working out his concept of verbum Aquinas was engaged not merely in fitting an original Augustinian creation into an Aristotelian framework but also in attempting, however remotely and implicitly, to fuse together what to us may seem so disparate: a phenomenology of the subject with a psychology of the soul. The Aristotelian framework was impressive. First, it was a general theory of being, a metaphysics. Secondly, it was a general theory of movement, a physics in that now antiquated sense. Thirdly, it was a general theory of life, a biology. Fourthly, it was a general theory of sensitivity and intelligence, a psychology. Since in this framework the prior components are comprehensive, the later are not pure but cumulative. Because movements exist, physical statements are not just physical; they are determinations added to metaphysical statements. Because living things move, biological statements are not just biological; they are determinations added to metaphysical and physical statements. Because sentient and intelligent beings are alive, psychological statements are not purely psychological; they presuppose and employ and determine what already has been settled in metaphysics, physics, and biology. The use of such a framework gave Aristotelian thought its majestic coherence and comprehensiveness. The interlocking of each part with all the others precluded the possibility of merely patchwork revisions. As Professor Butterfield has observed, to correct Aristotle effectively, one must go beyond him; and to go beyond him is to set up a system equal in compre-

4

Introduction

hensiveness and more successful in inner coherence and in conformity with fact.1 Still, such attempts have been made and, indeed, in two quite different manners. There have been open repudiations of Aristotle, as in modern science and in much modern philosophy. There also has been the more delicate procedure of sublation1' that developed and transformed Aristotelian positions to the point where the incorporation of further and profounder doctrines became possible. Such was the method of Aquinas, and our immediate concern is to find in Aristotle the point of insertion for Augustinian thought. It is not difficult to discern. I distinguished above four components in the Aristotelian framework. I must hasten to add that, in a sense, the distinction between the third and fourth, between biology and psychology, is not as clear, as sharp, as fully developed as may be desired. For Aristotle's De anima is at once biological and psychological. It does not confuse plants, animals, and men. At the same time, it fails to bring out effectively the essential difference between an investigation of plant life and an investigation of the human mind; much less does it work out the methodological implications of that essential difference. The De anima is about soul. If the Platonic nauta in navi is suggestive of the subject, the Aristotelian soul is not. It is an inner principle, constituent of life. It is defined as the first act of an organic body.2 It is found in all organic bodies, in plants no less than in animals and men. Moreover, a single method is worked out for determining the differences of souls and so for investigating each species of the genus. Souls are differentiated by their potencies; potencies are known by their acts; acts are specified by their objects.^ But what is meant by an object? That is the decisive question. For the meaning given the term 'object' will settle the specification given acts; the specification of acts will setde the distinction between potencies; and the distinction between potencies will settle the essential differences between the souls of plants, animals, and men. A modern reader is apt to take it for granted that by an object Aristotle must mean the intentional term of a conscious act. But quite evidently Aquinas was of a different opinion. In his commentary he defines objects

1 The point is made repeatedly by Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800 (New York: The Free Press, 1966). 2 Aristotle, De anima, II, l, 412 b 4-5. 3 Ibid. II, 4, 4153 14-20.

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Introduction

in terms, not of intentionality, but of causality:1 an object is either the efficient or the final cause of the occurrence of an act in a potency.4 Nor is it easy to disagree with Aquinas. He goes beyond what is explicit in the text. But as the book of definitions in the Metaphysiics\\\reveals, Aristotle used his\ word for object, to antikeimenon, in a great variety of meanings. In the immediate context in the De anima he illustrates objects not only by the sensible and the intelligible, which are the intentional terms of conscious acts, but also by nutriment, which in the case of plants has not an intentional but only a causal relation to acts. It is at this point that there comes to light the problem to which I have already alluded. No one will complain that Aristotle did not employ introspective techniques in his study of plant life. But one could well complain if a method suitable for the study of plants were alone employed in the study of human sensitivity and human intelligence. If the objects of vegetative activity are causal, it remains that the objects of sensitive and intellectual activity are also intentional. If vegetative acts are not accessible to introspection, sensitive and intellectual acts are among the immediate data of consciousness; they can be reached not only by deduction from their objects but also in themselves as given in consciousness. Finally, when conscious acts are studied by introspection, one discovers not only the acts and their intentional terms but also the intending subject, and there arises the problem of the relation of subject to soul, of the Augustinian mens or animus to the Aristotelian anima. If in Scholastic circles such a Problematik is contemporary and indeed, for many, still novel, it is plain that neither Aristotle nor Aquinas handled the matter in a triumphantly definitive fashion. This is not to say, of course, that they anticipated positivists and behaviorists by systematically avoiding any use of introspection or any appeal to the data of consciousness. As we shall see, Aquinas explicitly appealed to inner experience and, I submit, Aristotle's account of intelligence, of insight into phantasm, and of the fact that intellect knows itself, not by a species of itself, but by a species of its object, has too uncanny an accuracy to be possible without the greatest introspective skill. But if Aristotle and Aquinas used introspection and did 4 Sententia libriDe anima, 2, lect. 6, §305 in the Marietti edition. [Henceforth our reference to the commentary on the De anima will be in the form In IIDe anima; the paragraph numbers that Lonergan gives are from the Marietti edition.] 5 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 1O.

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Introduction

so brilliantly, it remains that they did not thematize their use, did not elevate it into a reflectively elaborated technique, did not work out a proper method for psychology, and thereby lay the groundwork for the contemporary distinctions between nature and spirit and between the natural and the human sciences. It is time to turn to Augustine: a convert from nature to spirit; a person that, by God's grace, made himself what he was; a subject that may be studied but, most of all, must be encountered01 in the outpouring of his selfrevelation and self-communication. The context of his thought on verbum was trinitarian, and its underlying preoccupation was anti-Arian. It followed that the prologue to the fourth Gospel had to be freed from any Arian implication. To achieve this end Augustine did not employ our contemporary techniques of linguistic and literary history. He did not attempt a fresh translation of the Greek word logos, but retained the traditional verbum. Church tradition, perhaps, precluded any appeal to the Stoic distinction between verbum prolatum and verbum insitum.6 In any case he cut between these Stoic terms to discover a third verbum that was neither the verbum prolatum of human speech nor the verbum insitum of man's native rationality but an intermediate verbum intus prolatum. Naturally enough, as Augustine's discovery was part and parcel of his own mind's knowledge of itself, so he begged his readers to look within themselves and there to discover the speech of spirit within spirit, an inner verbum prior to any use of language, yet distinct both from the mind itself and from its memory or its present apprehension of objects. Though I cannot attempt here to do justice to the wealth of Augustine's thought or to the variety of its expression,7 at least it will serve to illustrate my meaning if, however arbitrarily, I select and briefly comment on a single passage. 6 On the distinction, Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theologische Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1942) 84, lines 12-14, in the section 'Der Logos in Griechentum und Hellenismus' by Hermann Kleinknecht [in English, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 4, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1967) 85]; M. Schmaus, Die psychologische Trinitdtslehre des hi. Augustinus (Munster: Aschendorff, 1927) 33 n. ll. On the tradition, see St Ambrose, Defide ad Gratianum Augustum libri quinque, IV, vii; ML 16, 631, §72; also DS 140, canon 8. 7 I would like in this connection to draw attention to a forthcoming work in the series, Analecta Gregoriana: S. Biolo, La coscienza nel 'De Trinitate'di S. Agostino. [Biolo's book appeared later as vol. 172 in the Analecta Gregoriana series (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1969); it was originally a doctoral dissertation directed by Lonergan.]

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Haec igitur omnia, et quae per se ipsum, et quae per sensus sui corporis, et quae testimoniis aliorum percepta scit animus humanus, thesauro memoriae condita tenet, ex quibus gignitur verbum verum, quando quod scimus loquimur, sed verbum ante omnem sonum, ante omnem cogitationem soni. Tune enim est verbum simillimum rei notae, de qua gignitur, et imago eius, quoniam de visione scientiae visio cogitationis exoritur, quod est verbum linguae nullius, verbum verum de re vera, nihil de suo habens, sed totum de ilia scientia de qua nascitur. Nee interest quando id didicerit, qui quod scit loquitur (aliquando enim statim ut discit, hoc dicit), dum tamen verbum sit verum, id est, de nods rebus exortum.8 In this passage, then, the Augustinian verbumis a nonlinguistic utterance of truth. It differs from expression in any language, for it is linguae nullius. It is not primitive but derived: gignitur, exoritur, nascitur. Its dependence is total: nihil de suo habens, sed totum de ilia scientia de qua nascitur. This total dependence is, not blind or automadc, but conscious and cognitive: quod scimus loquimur, de visione scientiae visio cogitationis exoritur; qui quod scit loquitur. Finally, this total dependence as conscious and known is the essendal

8 ['All these things, therefore, those perceived (by the human mind) through itself, and those perceived through the senses of its body, and those perceived by the witness of others, all these things which the human mind knows, it holds firmly established in the treasury of memory; from these is brought forth a true word when we utter what we know, but a word that is before all sound, (indeed) before all thought of sound. For then a word is most like the known thing from which it is brought forth and most an image of that thing, since from the vision of knowledge a vision of thought arises, which is a word of no language, a true word of a true thing, having nothing of its own, but everything from that knowledge from which it is born. Nor does it matter when the one who utters what he knows learned it - for sometimes he speaks as soon as he learns - provided however that the word is true, that is, having its origin in things known'] Augustine, De trinitate, XV, xii, 22; ML 42, 1075. [We add an English translation of Latin words and phrases in Lonergan's next paragraph: linguae nullius, of no language; gignitur, is brought forth; nascitur, is born; nihil de suo habens, having nothing of its own; sed totum de ilia scientia de qua nascitur, but everything from that knowledge from which it is born; quod scimus loquimur, we utter what we know; de visione scientiae visio cogitationis exoritur, from the vision of knowledge a vision of thought arises; qui quod scit loquitur, who utters what he knows; verbum simillimum rei notae, a word most like the known thing; imago eius, an image of [that thing]; verbum verum de re vera, a true word of a true thing; dum tamen verbum sit verum, id est, de notis rebus exortum, provided however that the word is true, that is, having its origin in things known.]

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Introduction

point. It makes no difference whether the verbum has its ground in memory or in recently acquired knowledge. What counts is its truth, its correspondence with things as known: verbum simillimum rei notae; imago eius; verbum verurn de re vera, nihil de suo habens, sed totum de ilia scientia de qua nascitur; dum tamen verbum sit verum, id est, de notis rebus exortum. Such, at least in one passage, is what Augustine had to say about verbum. Many more passages might be cited, and they would reveal him saying different things or the same things in a different manner. But sooner or later it would be necessary to advance from the simpler question of what he said to the more difficult question of what he meant. Since I am writing not a study of Augustine but an introduction to a study of Aquinas, I must leap at once to the more difficult question, though not to answer it in detail, but only to indicate the source from which the answer must proceed. A blind man may listen to a disquisition on color, but he is bound to find it obscure. A person who is deaf may read a book on music, but he will have a hard time deciding whether the author is talking sense or nonsense. In similar fashion it is only by introspection that one can discover what an introspective psychologist is talking about. If what Augustine had to say about verbum was true, then it corresponded exactly to what Augustine knew went on in his own mind. If what Augustine had to say about verbum was universally true, then it corresponds exactly to what Augustine knew goes on in any human mind. If one supposes Augustine to be right and, at the same time, entertains an admiration for Newman, one is going to ask whether the Augustinian couplet of memoria and verbum is parallel to Newman's couplet of illative sense and unconditional assent.c But if one desires to get beyond words and suppositions to meanings and facts, then one has to explore one's own mind and find out for oneself what there is to be meant; and until one does so, one is in the unhappy position of the blind man hearing about colors and the deaf man reading about counterpoint. About such matters Augustine was explicit. Unde enim mens aliquam mentem novit, si se non novit ? Neque enim ut oculus corporis videt alias oculos et se non videt... Mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic in corporearum per semetipsam. Ergo et semetipsam per se ipsam novit .. .9 9 ['For whence does the mind know some (other) mind, if it does not know itself? Nor (does it see) the way the eye of the body sees other eyes and does not see itself... Our mind itself therefore, as it gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so also (does it gather knowledge) of incorporeal things through itself. Therefore it knows itself too through itself] Ibid. IX, iii, 3; ML 42, 962 f.

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Introduction

Moreover, for Augustine, the mind's self-knowledge was basic; it was the rock of certitude on which shattered Academic doubt; it provided the ground from which one could argue to the validity both of the senses of one's own body and, with the mediation of testimony, of the senses of the bodies of others. So the passage we have quoted and explained begins with this threefold enumeration: quaeper se ipsum, et quae per sensus sui corporis, et quae testimoniis aliorum percepta scit animus humanus. The enumeration merely summarizes what had been set forth at greater length in the immediately preceding paragraph;10 and that paragraph, of course, only resumes a theme that is recurrent from Augustine's earliest writings on. Clearly enough, it was neither per sensus sui corporis nor by alienorum corporum sensus that Augustine knew of a verbum that was neither Latin nor Greek, neither sound nor even the thought of sound. The Augustinian affirmation of verbum was itself a verbum. For it to be true, on Augustine's own showing, it had to be totally dependent on what Augustine's mind knew through itself about itself. On the existence and nature of such knowledge Augustine had a great deal to say, and there is no need for us to attempt to repeat it here. Though it cannot be claimed that Augustine elevated introspection into a scientific technique, it cannot be doubted that he purported to report in his literary language what his own mind knew immediately about itself. So we come to Aquinas. Because he conceived theology as in some sense a science, he needed Aristotle, who more than anyone had worked out and applied the implications of the Greek ideal of science. Because his theology was essentially the expression of a traditional faith, he needed Augustine, the Father of the West, whose trinitarian thought was the high-water mark in Christian attempts to reach an understanding of faith. Because Aquinas himself was a genius, he experienced no great difficulty either in adapting Aristotle to his purpose or in reaching a refinement in his account of rational process - the emanatio intelligibilis - that made explicit what Augustine could only suggest. Because, finally, Aquinas was a man of his time, he had to leave to a later age the task of acknowledging the discontinuity of natural and of human science and of working out its

10 Ibid. XV, xii, 21; ML 42, 1073-75. [Translation of Latin in text: 'those things which the human mind perceives through itself, and those it perceives through the senses of its body, and those it perceives by the witness of others, all these things which the human mind knows']

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Introduction

methodological implications. For performance must precede reflection on performance, and method is the fruit of that reflection. Aquinas had to be content to perform. The present study is divided into five chapters, and the division is dictated by the quite different systematic contexts in which Thomist statements about verbum are involved. Already I have noted the cumulative character of Aristotelian categories, in which psychological statements presuppose biological, biological presuppose physical, and physical presuppose metaphysical. In a somewhat similar fashion Thomist statements about verbum will be theological in their primary intent; they will involve technical terms drawn from physics and metaphysics; their meaning will turn on metaphysical explanations of gnoseological possibility; and embedded in this structural complexity there will be a core of psychological fact. To reach even an approximation to what Aquinas meant, it is necessary to explore separately the several hermeneutical circles that in cumulative fashion are relevant to an interpretation. The first two chapters are concerned with the core of psychological fact. Aquinas identified verbum with the immanent terminal object of intellectual operation; he distinguished two intellectual operations, a first in answer to the question quid sit, and a second in answer to the question an sit. So we have a first chapter on verbum as definition, and a second on verbum as compositio vel divisio. Throughout the first two chapters the reader will be troubled by the recurrence of technical terms of a metaphysical or physical origin. Quite apart from any intrinsic difficulty they may offer, the determination of their meaning is enormously complicated, first, by Aristotle's efforts to adapt the Greek language to his own technical purposes, secondly, by the imperfect coincidence of the earlier Latin equivalents, mediated by Arabic culture, and the later fruits of direct translation from the Greek, and thirdly, for those who approach Aquinas through manuals and commentaries quite innocent of the methods of literary and historical research, by such interpreters' proclivity to smooth out linguistic oddities by giving free rein to their talent for speculative invention. The third chapter is an effort to cut through this jungle. Our fourth chapter deals with matters intermediate between metaphysics and psychology. Such is the doctrine of abstraction from matter. Such also are the relations between immateriality and knowledge. Finally, St Thomas's thought on verbum occurs, for the most part, in a trinitarian context. If Thomist philosophers, quite comprehensibly, are

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Introduction

reluctant to venture into this field, it remains that a historian must do so. St Thomas was a theologian. His thought on verbumwas, in the main, a statement for his technically minded age of the psychological analogy of the trinitarian processions. Its simplicity, its profundity, and its brilliance have long been obscured by interpreters unaware of the relevant psychological facts and unequal to the task of handling merely linguistic problems.11 So it is that our final chapter deals with the trinitarian meaning of imago Dei, and as there the many levels of our study come together, so there also, I hope, the reader will find some compensation for the heavy labor of ploughing through the preceding pages. In closing I should, perhaps, note that the present introduction is an afterthought written over fifteen years after the original text was completed and published in Theological Studies. May I take this occasion to thank Rev. John Courtney Murray, then as now editor of that review, for allowing this edition.

11 This may appear harsh, but I find no other explanation for the startling discrepancies that exist. In his account of intellectual procession no less eminent a theologian than L. Billot could write, 'Et simile omnino est in imaginatione' [see below, chapter l, note 2]. But St Thomas explicitly restricted the trinitarian analogy to the minds of rational creatures. Summa theologiae, l, q. 93, a. 6 c.: '... nee in ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem' [see below, chapter l, note 3]. See also Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 3, a. l; De veritate, q. 1O, aa. l and 7; Depotentia, q. 9, a. 9 ad fin.; Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. n.f

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

1 Verbum: Definition and Understanding'

It is almost a decade since M. T.-L. Penido published his 'Closes sur la procession d'amour dans la Trinite.'1 As the reader may recall, the article dealt with the speculative aspect of the second divine procession, passed in review the efforts of a very large number of theologians to attain a coherent statement, and found them all wanting. Briefly and bluntly, for Penido theologians on this issue fall into two classes: those who did not pretend to grasp the matter and those who did but failed to be convincing. The indictment is startling.b Let us turn at once to what may appear a quite different matter. In his account of intellectual procession, L. Billot remarked: 'Et simile omnino est in imaginatione.'* On its author's suppositions, this remark is quite accurate; for intellectual procession is conceived not as a peculiarity of intellect but as a necessary consequent in the metaphysical analysis of a cognitional act with respect to an object that may be absent; since these conditions are fulfilled not only in conception but also in imagination, the parallel is quite justified. But if one turns to the writings of St Thomas Aquinas, one would be very hard put to find any inkling of such a parallel; indeed, one would be led to deny its existence. For Aquinas distinguished between image and vestige of the

1 Maurilio T.-L. Penido, 'Closes sur la procession d'amour dans la Trinite,' Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses 14 (1937) 33-68. 2 ['And it is wholly the same in the imagination.'] Ludovicus Billot, DeDeo uno et trino (Rome: Gregorian University Press, iqio) ^^.

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Blessed Trinity; and image he found only in rational creatures and, indeed, only in their minds.3 Further, as is quite apparent from the scale of increasing capacity for reflection outlined in the Contra Gentiles*general metaphysical analysis of cognitional acts is not immediately relevant to Thomist trinitarian theory; the point made in that passage is to the effect that no sensitive potency reflects on itself; that human intellect does reflect on itself, but still man does not know himself by his essence; that angelic intellect is reflective, and, further, the angel knows himself by his essence but still the intentio intelkcta is not the essence; that in God alone is there perfect reflection, in which principle and term, essence and intentio intellecta, are identical. Quite clearly, this is not a theory of the procession of the Word in which imagination provides as good a starting point as intellect; it is a theory that extrapolates solely from the nature of rational consciousness. Let us now revert to Penido's contention, though only to ask a question. By definition, the will is a rational appetite. Might it not be that the procession according to the will is to be grasped only in terms of an analysis of rationality and rational consciousness? Might it not be that Penido found so many theologians unsatisfactory on this point for the very reasons that have just led us to discern a difference between Billot and Aquinas on intellectual procession, namely, neglect of what is peculiar to rational creatures? I believe these questions to be significant. It is to discuss them that I have undertaken the present inquiry into the concept of verbum in the writings of St Thomas. 1

The General Notion of an Inner Wordc

Etymology and biblical English both favor writing 'inner word' or simply 'word' as equivalent to the Thomist synonyms verbum interius, verbum cordis, 3 Summa theologiae, l, q. 93, a. 6 c.: '... nee in ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem' ['nor is there found an image of God in the rational creature except in the mind']. See Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 3, a. l; De veritate, q. 1O, aa. l and 7; Depotentia, q. 9, a. 9, c. ad fin. 4 Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, §§4-5 (ed. Leon., XV, 32a 37 - 32b 25). [Lonergan's way of locating texts in the Summa contra Gentiles changed as he wrote the verbum articles. In the first two articles, he refers to the folio edition of the Leonine text, in the manner contained in the round brackets in this note: the volume number (e.g., XV), page (32), column (a), and line (37). In the last three articles, he counts paragraphs in the Leonine manual edition. Where Lonergan gives the folio reference, we have retained it just as he gave it, but we have added to these references the paragraph numbers that later became his usual manner of referring to these texts; thus the '§§4-5' added here.]

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Verbum

verbum mentis, and, most common of all, simply verbum. The only complication arises in connection with the division of words into simple and compound. It is odd, indeed, to speak of a compound word and mean a sentence or judgment; but such speech will be rare; and the disadvantage of its oddity is outweighed, I think, by the convenience of having an English term for the main matter of the discussion.d The first element in the general notion of an inner word is had from a contrast with outer words - spoken, written, imagined, or meant. Spoken words are sounds with a meaning: as sounds, they are produced in the respiratory tract; as possessing a meaning, they are due to imagination according to Aristotle, or, as Aquinas seems to have preferred, to soul; it is meaning that differentiates spoken words from other sounds, such as coughing, which also are produced in the respiratory tract.5 Written words are simply signs of spoken words;6 the issue was uncomplicated by Chinese ideograms. A similar simplicity is the refreshing characteristic of the account of imaginatio vocis:7 a term that seems to embrace the whole mnemonic mass and sensitive mechanism of motor, auditory, and visual images connected with language. Finally, the outer word that is some external thing or action meant by a word is dismissed as a mere figure of speech.8 There is a twofold relation between inner and outer words: the inner word is an efficient cause of the outer; and the inner word is what is meant immediately by the outer. The aspect of efficient causality seems to be the only one noticed in the commentary on the Sentences: the inner word is compared to the major premise of a syllogism; the imagined word to the minor premise; and the spoken word to the conclusion.9 Later works do 5 InllDeanima, lect. 18, §4776 In Aristotelis libros Peri hermeneias, l, lect. 2, § 17: '... nomina et verba quae scribuntur, signa sunt eorum nominum et verborum quae sunt in voce' ['names and words that are written are signs of those names and words that are spoken']. [Henceforth our reference to this text will be in the form In I Peri herm.; the paragraph numbers that Lonergan gives are from the Marietti edition.] 7 Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. l sol. Summa theologian, l, q. 34, a. l c.

8 Summa theologiae, l, q. 34, a. l c.: 'Dicitur autem figurative quarto modo verbum, id quod verbo significatur vel efficitur; sicut consuevimus dicere, hoc est verbum quod dixi tibi, vel quod mandavit rex, demonstrato aliquo facto quod verbo significatum est vel simpliciter enuntiantis, vel etiam imperantis' ['Word is said figuratively in a fourth manner, of that which is meant or effected by a word: as we are accustomed to say, "This is the word that I told you of," or "This is the word the king commanded," as we point out the matter signified by the word in our remark or in the command.']. 9 Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. l sol.

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not deny this aspect10 but I think I may say that subsequently the whole emphasis shifted to the second of the two relations mentioned above. Repeatedly one reads that the inner word is what can be meant (significabile) or what is meant (significatum) by outer words, and inversely, that the outer word is what can mean (significativum) or what does mean (significant) the inner word.11 There is no doubt about this matter, though, frankly, it is just the opposite of what one would expect. One is apt to think of the inner word, not as what is meant by the outer, but as what means the outer; the outer word has meaning in virtue of the inner; therefore, the inner is meaning essentially while the outer has meaning by participation. That is all very true, and St Thomas knew it.12 But commonly he asked what outer words meant and answered that, in the first instance, they meant inner words. The proof was quite simple. We discourse on 'man' and on the 'triangle.' What are we talking about? Certainly, we are not talking about real things directly, else we should all be Platonists. Directly, we are talking about objects of thought, inner words, and only indirectly, only insofar as our inner words have an objective reference, are we talking of real things.13 The same point might be made in another fashion. Logical positivists to the contrary, false propositions are not meaningless; they mean something; what they mean is an inner word, and only because that inner word is false, does the false proposition lack objective reference.14 Such is the first element in the general notion of an inner word. It is connected with the well-known anti-Platonist thesis on abstraction that the mode of knowing need not be identical with the mode of reality, that 10 Efficient causality is mentioned in Super loannem, c. i, lect. l. 11 De veritate., q. 4, a. 2 c.: '... sive sit conceptio significabilis per vocem incomplexam ... sive per vocem complexam ...' ['whether it be a conception that can be meant by a simple word ... or one that can be meant by a complex word']; Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. ll, §6 (ed. Leon., XV, 32b 30 ff.): '... est quaedam similitudo concepta... quam voces exteriores significant; unde et ipsa intentio verbum interius nominatur, quod est exteriori verbo significatum' ['it is some conceived likeness ... which outer words mean; thus the intention itself is called an inner word, which is meant by the outer word']. See Depotentia, q. 8, a. l c.; q. 9, a. 5 c.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 27, a. l c.; q. 34, a. l c.; q. 85, a. 2, ad 3m; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9 c.; Super loannem, c. l, lect. l. 12 See De veritate, q. 4, a. l, ad 7m. 13 In I Peri herm., lect. 2, § 15. 14 Ibid., lect. 3, §31: '... haec vox "homo est asinus" est vere vox et vere signum; sed quia est signum falsi, ideo dicitur falsa' ['this expression "man is an ass" is truly a word and truly a sign; but because it is a sign of something false, therefore it is called false'].

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Verbum

knowledge may be abstract and universal though all realities are particular and concrete. It also is connected with the familiar Aristotelian statement that 'bonum et malum sunt in rebus, sed verum et falsum sunt in mente.'15 Because outer words may be abstract, and true or false, because real things are neither abstract nor true nor false, the immediate reference of their meaning is to an inner word. The second element to be considered is the nature of the correspondence between inner and outer words. Grammarians divide the latter into eight, or sometimes ten, parts of speech; of these the Aristotelian Peri hermeneias bothered to notice only nouns and verbs, and included both under the same rubric of the element of meaning.16 Aquinas, in his commentary, denied a point-to-point correspondence between inner and outer words, arguing that inner words correspond to realities, while outer words are the products of convention and custom, and so vary with different peoples.17 However, since the inner word is in the intellect, and since apprehension of the singular involves the use of a sensitive potency,18 it should seem that the correspondence of realities to inner words is, at best, like the correspondence between a function and its derivative; as the derivative, so 15 ['Good and evil are in things, but true and false are in the mind'] Sententia libri Metaphysicae, lib. 6, lect. 4, §§ 1230-31; see lib. 5, lect. 9, §§895-96 [henceforth our usage will be In VIMetaphys.; the paragraph numbers that Lonergan gives are from the Marietti edition]; Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. i sol.; De veritate, q. l, a. 2 c.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 16, a. i c. 16 The Aristotelian division is of conventionally significant sounds: if the parts have meaning, not merely per accidens as 'heat' in 'cheat,' there is a logos, which is subdivided into indicative, optative, imperative, etc.; if the parts have no meaning, the division is into names and verbs. See Aristotle, On Interpretation, 2-4 [2, l6a 19 - 4, l6b 35; in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941) 40-42]. 17 In I Peri herm., lect. 2, §§ 19, 21: '... ostendit passiones animae naturaliter esse sicut res per hoc quod sunt eaedem apud omnes ... [M]elius dicendum est quod intentio Aristotelis non est asserere identitatem conceptionis animae per comparationem ad vocem, ut scilicet unius vocis sit una conceptio, quia voces sunt diversae apud diversos: sed intendit asserere identitatem conceptionum animae per comparationes ad res ...' ['he shows that the passions of the soul are naturally like things, in that they are the same among all... Better, the intention of Aristotle is not to assert that conceptions of the soul have their identity in correspondence with an outer word, so that there would be one concept corresponding to each word, since outer words are different among different peoples: but he intends to assert that conceptions of the soul have their identity in correspondence to things'] See Aristotle, On Interpretation, i, i6a 5-8. 18 See, for example, Summa theologiae, l, q. 86, a. l, objection l, c., and ad 2m.

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the inner word is outside all particular cases and refers to all from some higher viewpoint. A third element in fixing the nature of the inner word is connected intimately with the preceding. What is the division of inner words? On this question, four major works of Aquinas and a large number of his commentators are silent.19 On the other hand, silence is no argument against positive statement. Four other works of recognized standing divide inner words into the two classes of definitions and judgments, and three of these recall the parallel of the Aristotelian twofold operation of the mind.20 Moreover, the De veritate argues that there is a processio operati in the intellect, though not in the will, on the ground that 'bonum et malum sunt in rebus, sed verum et falsum sunt in mente.' 21 This clearly supposes that the judgment is an inner word, for only in the judgment is there truth or falsity. On the other hand, while Aquinas does refer frequently to the inner word as a conceptio, conceptum, conceptus?2 one must not give this term its current exclusive connotation; Aquinas employed it to denote judgments.23 Finally, as stated above, the correspondence of inner words is mainly, not to outer words, but to reality; but reality divides into essence and existence; and of the two Aristotelian operations of the mind 'prima operatic respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius.'24 It seems beyond doubt that an 19 The four works are the Sentences, the Contra Gentiles — which, however, mentions definition but not judgment (l, c. 53; 4, c. ll), the Summa (but see i, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3m), and the Compendium theologiae. With regard to the commentators, it is simplest to note that Ferrariensis acknowledges the twofold inner word (In C. Gent., l, 53, §IV ad fin. - ed. Leon., XIII, 152). 20 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 c.; q. 3, a. 2 c.; Depotentia, q. 8, a. 1 c.; q. Q, a. 5 c.; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9 c.; Superloannem, c. l, lect. l. 21 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad ym. 22 Summa theologiae, l, q. 27, a. l; q. 34, a. 1; and passim. 23 See, for example, De veritate, q. ll, a. l c. '... primae conceptiones intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur ... sive sint complexa, vit dignitates, sive incomplexa, sicut ratio entis' ['the first conceptions of intellect, which are known immediately by the light of agent intellect... whether they be complex, as first principles, or simple, such as the concept of being ...' (Ratio is a difficult word to translate, and we will be translating it variously as concept, reason, intelligibility, essence, meaning, the what, nature, form, formality, formal property, object of thought, idea)]. 24 ['the first operation regards the quiddity of the thing; the second regards its existence'] Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. l, ad 7m. Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate, q, 5, a. 3 c. init. (ed. Mandonnet, III, no) [henceforth our reference will be in the form In Boet. De Trin. Lonergan refers to the Mandonnet edition of this work (see bibliography) until chapter 4, where he begins to use other editions on selected questions (see below, chapter 4, note 65).]

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account of the Thomist inner word has to be an account of judgments no less than of the formation of definitions.e A fourth element in the general notion of an inner word is that it supplies the object of thought. What is abstract, what is true or false is not, as such, either a real thing or a mere copy of a real thing. It is a product of the mind. It is not merely a product but also a known product; and as known, it is an object. The illuminating parallel is from technical invention. What the inventor comes to know is not some already existing reality; it is simply the idea of what will be a reality if financial backing and a demand on the market are forthcoming; and in itself, apart from practical economic considerations, the invention known by the inventor is merely an idea. Such ideas are the products and fruits of a thinking out, an excogitare: certain general principles are known; the inventor's task is to work out practicable applications, to proceed from the properties of uranium to the atomic bomb. A similar process of thought is involved in the plans of every architect, the prescription of every doctor, the reflective pause of every craftsman and mechanic before he sets to work. In invention, creative imagination is needed; in the practical arts, imagination moves in the worn grooves of custom and routine; but in both cases there is the same general form of intellectual process, for in both certain general principles are known, in both a determinate end is envisaged, in both the principles are applied to the attainment of the end, and in both this application leads to a plan of operations that as such is, not knowing what is, but only knowing the idea of what one may do. Aquinas was aware of this. Aristotle in his Metaphysics had analyzed such thinking things out and had arrived at the conclusion that the end, which is first in intention, is last in execution, whereas what is first in execution is last to be arrived at in the order of thought.25 But Aquinas was troubled with a problem that had not concerned Aristotle, namely, how to reconcile the simplicity of God with the infinity of ideas known by God. To solve this problem, he generalized the Aristotelian theorem on the practical arts. It is not merely the prescription of the doctor, the plan of the architect, the idea of the inventor that, in the first instance, is a product and object of thought. The same holds for every definition and everyjudgment. As such, the definition is abstract; as such, the judgment is true or false; but no real thing is abstract; and no real thing is true or false in the relevant sense of truth or falsity. The foregoing, I believe, is a key element in the Thomist concept of inner word. Its principal expression is to be found, not in trinitarian pas25 In VIIMetaphys., lect. 6, §§ 1405-10.

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sages, but in the discussions of the plurality of divine ideas. It would be premature to attempt a detailed study of this matter at once, for it pertains properly to an account of the Thomist position on natural human knowledge of a divine word. On the other hand, the reader is urged to review at once the Thomist texts on the issue. The brilliant treatment is in the De veritate (q. 3, a. 2 c.). Detailed treatment is in the Contra Gentiles 1 (cc. 46-54) with the central issue in chapter 53. In the Summa, I should say that Aquinas handled the matter automatically, as one does a question that has ceased to be a real problem.26 In the Sentences, on the other hand, though the essential elements of the solution are present,271 fail to detect the mastery and effectiveness of the later discussions; on this the reader may check by looking up the objections of Scotus,28 and asking himself whether Super I Sententiarum (d. 36, q. 2, a. 2 sol.) really meets them. Though the principal account of the definition and judgment as both product and object of thought is to be found in the discussion of the divine ideas, parallel affirmations are to be had in passages dealing explicitly with the inner word. The most downright affirmation is the insistence of the De potential that the inner word is 'primo et per se intellectum.' But this view is already present in the De veritate?0 On the other hand, the Contra Gentiles, though holding the same position, distinguishes between 'res intellecta' and 'intentio intellecta': the 'intentio' is the inner word whereas the 'res' is the external thing, and the difference between understanding the former and understanding the latter is the difference between logic or psychology and, on the other hand, metaphysics.31 As the term 'intentio' refers to the 26 Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, aa. 5-6; q. 15, aa. 1-3; see q. 27, a. l, ad 3m, which connects the plurality of ideas with the divine procession of the Word. 27 See Super I Sententiarum, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2m; d. 35, q. l, a. 2. 28 See In I Sent. (Op. Ox.), d. 35, q. unica, n. 7 (ed. Vives, X, 544). Scotus argues that the divine ideas cannot be accounted for by adding notional relations to the divine essence; for the object precedes the knowing, and relations that precede knowing are not notional but real. The argument does not touch Aquinas's real position, which is that the object as known is not prior and that the relations pertain only to the object as known. 29 Depotentia, q. 9, a. 5 c. 30 De veritate, q. 4, a. l c.: the inner word is 'id quod intellectum est' ['that which is understood'], 'ipsum interim intellectum' ['that which is interiorly understood'], 'id quod actu consideratur per intellectum' ['that which is actually considered by intellect']; see ibid., a. 2 c.: it is 'id ad quod operatic nostri intellectus terminatur, quod est ipsum intellectum, quod dicitur conceptio intellectus' ['that at which the operation of our intellect terminates, which is what is understood, what is called the conception of the intellect']. 31 Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. ll, §6 (ed. Leon., XV, 32b 33~39)-

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inner word, so also and more frequently does the term 'ratio': white and black are outside the mind, but the 'ratio albi' is only in the mind.32 To close the circle, one has only to recall that the divine ideas, as principles of production, are exemplars, but as principles of speculative knowledge, properly are named 'ratio.'33 A fifth element in the general notion of an inner word is that in it and through it intellect comes to knowledge of things. As this threatens to engulf us in the epistemological bog, a brief orientation now may save endless confusion later. A useful preliminary is to note that animals know, not mere phenomena, but things: dogs know their masters, bones, other dogs, and not merely the appearances of these things. Now this sensitive integration of sensible data also exists in the human animal and even in the human philosopher. Take it as knowledge of reality, and there results the secular contrast between the solid sense of reality and the bloodless categories of the mind. Accept the sense of reality as criterion of reality, and you are a materialist, sensist, positivist, pragmatist, sentimentalist, and so on, as you please. Accept reason as a criterion but retain the sense of reality as what gives meaning to the term 'real,' and you are an idealist; for, like the sense of reality, the reality defined by it is nonrational. Insofar as I grasp it, the Thomist position is the clearheaded third position: reason is the criterion and, as well, it is reason not the sense of reality - that gives meaning to the term 'real.' The real is what is; and 'what is' is known in the rational act, judgment. The first act of intellect is knowledge of the quod quid est, to ti estin, the 'What is it?' By definition, this knowledge involves neither truth nor falsity,34 for the reason that the question of truth or falsity is not as yet raised, because as yet one knows, not the thing, but only the idea of the thing, because as yet one is in a purely logical order.35 Hence, 'scientia est de aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo primo et principaliter, et sic scientia est de universalibus rationibus super quas fundatur. Alio modo est de aliquibus secundario, et quasi per reflexionem quamdam, et sic est de rebus illis 32 In VIMetaphys., lect. 4, § 1230. The frequently repeated 'ratio quam nomen significat est defmitio rei' ['the concept which the name signifies is the definition of the thing'] stems from In IVMetaphys., lect. 16, §733. The initial statement on 'ratio' is to be found in Super I Sententiarum, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3 sol. init. 33 Summa theologiae, i, q. 15, a. 3 c. 34 InlllDeanima, lect. 11, §746. Parallels are common: Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. l, ad 7m; Deveritate, q. i, a. 3; Summa theologiae, l, q. 16, a. 2; In W Metaphys., lect. 4, §§ 1231-36. 35 Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. i, ad 7m: '... quidditatis esse est quoddam esse rationis' ['the being of a quiddity is a certain being of reason'].

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quarum sunt illae rationes ... Ratione enim universal! utitur sciens et ut re scita et ut medio sciendi.'36 As long as one is dealing with ideas as ideas, there is properly no question of truth or falsity and no use of the inner word as a medium of knowledge. On the other hand, the second operation of intellect - by the very nature of its reflective character,37 by the very fact that it raises the question of truth, which is conformity between mind and thing38 - introduces the duality of idea and thing and makes the former the medium in and through which one apprehends the latter. Thus, our knowledge of God's existence is just our knowledge of the truth of the judgment 'Deus est.'39 And, while this knowledge differs from other knowledge in most respects, it does not differ in the respect now in question. For just as the inner word is a medium between the meaning of outer words and the realities meant,40 so also the inner word is a medium between the intellect and the things that are understood.41 36 ['... there are two ways in which knowledge is about something. In one way, and first and foremost, knowledge is about the universal concepts on which it is founded. In another way, and secondarily, and as it were through a certain reflection, knowledge is about those things of which there are those concepts ... For the knower uses a universal concept both as a thing known and as a medium of knowing'] In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 2, ad 4m (ed. Mandonnet, III, 107). This is not contrary to Summa theologiae, i, q. 85, a. 2, which treats of the informing species and not of the consequent verbum, except by contrast in the ad 3m. See q. 15, a. 2 c.: 'ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut quod intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quae est forma faciens intellectum in actu' ['the idea of the product is in the mind of the producer as that which is understood; but not as the species by which it is understood, which is the form bringing the intellect to act']. 37 On judicial reflection in general, see In VI Metaphys., lect. 4, § 1236; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 16, a. 2 c. Such reflection is pushed to the level of a critical problem in De veritate, q. l, a. 9 c. [In CV-C (see Editors' Preface) Lonergan changed 'the critical problem' to 'a critical problem.'] 38 De veritate, q. 1, a. l; Summa theologiae, l, q. 16, a. l; see Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. l sol.

39 Summa theologiae, l, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2m. 40 Depotentia, q. 9, a. 5 c.: '... vox exterior significat... conceptum intellectus quo mediante significat rem; ut cum dico "homo" vel "homo est animal"' ['the outer word means ... the concept of the intellect, through the mediation of which it means the thing; as when I say "man" or "man is an animal"']; De potentia, q. 8, a. l c.: '... vox enim exterior neque significat ipsum intellectum (the faculty), neque speciem intelligibilem, neque actum intellectus, sed intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem' ['the outer word does not mean the intellect nor the intelligible species nor the act of intellect but the conception of the intellect through the mediation of which it is related to the thing']. 41 De veritate, q. 3, a. 2 c.: '... quidditas ... compositio vel divisio ... quoddam operatum ipsius; per quod tamen intellectus venit in cognitionem rei exterioris'

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A sixth element in the general notion of an inner word is its necessity for an act termed intelligere, which, I believe, is to be taken as meaning 'understanding.'42 Quoad se, this necessity is universal, holding true in the case of God, of angels, and of men.43 However, so far as our natural knowledge of God goes, we cannot affirm that his understanding involves the procession of an inner word.44 Why that is so is to be explained, I believe, only by an exact grasp of the psychology of the inner word. A seventh element in the general notion is that the inner word of the human mind emerges at the end of a process of thoughtful inquiry,45 that,

['the quiddity (like) the composition or division (is) the product of the intellect, but through it the intellect comes to knowledge of the external thing']; De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3m: '... conceptio intellectus est media inter intellectum et rem intellectam, quia ea mediante operatio intellectus pertingit ad rem' ['the conception of the intellect mediates between the intellect and the thing understood, since through its mediation the operation of the intellect attains to the thing']; Depotentia, q. 8, a. l c.: '... conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem; propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format ut rem intellectam cognoscat' ['the conception of the intellect is ordered to the thing understood as to an end; since the reason that the intellect forms in itself the conception of the thing is this, that it might know the thing understood']; Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 53: '... ex hoc quod intentio intellecta sit similis alicui rei, sequitur quod intellectus, formando huiusmodi intentionem, rem illam intelligat' ['from the fact that the understood intention is similar to something we know, it follows that the intellect, by forming an intention of this kind, understands the thing']; Quaestiones quodlibitales, 5, a. 9, ad im: '... intellectus ... format verbum ad hoc quod intelligat rem' ['the intellect... forms a word for this purpose, that it might understand the thing']; Superloannem, c. l, lect. l: '... in ipso expresso et formato videt naturam rei intellectae' ['in (the word) expressed and formed it sees the nature of the understood thing']. 42 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 5m; Depotentia, q. 8, a. l; q. 9, a. 5; Summa theologiae, l, q. 27, a. 1 c. 43 Super loannem, c. l, lect. l. 44 Depotentia, q. 8, a. l, ad 12m; De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 5m; see Summa theologiae, l, q. 32, a. l, ad 2m. 45 Super loannem, c. l, lect. l: '... cvim volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam ratiocinando perveniam: et sic est in omnibus aliis quae a nobis intelliguntur: nisi forte in primis principiis, quae cum sint simpliciter nota, absque discursu rationis statim sciuntur. Quamdiu ergo sic ratiocinando intellectus iactatur hac atque iliac, necdum formatio perfecta est, nisi quando ipsam rationem rei perfecte conceperit: et tune primo habet rationem rei perfectae, et tune primo habet rationem verbi. Et inde est quod in anima nostra est cogitatio, per quam significatur ipse discursus inquisitionis, et verbum, quod est iam formatum secundum perfectam contemplationem veritatis' ['when I want to conceive the intelligibility of a stone, it is necessary

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until it emerges, we do not yet understand but are thinking in order to understand,46 that it emerges simultaneously with the act of understanding,47 that it is distinct from understanding,48 that it is a product and effect of the act of understanding,49 that it is an expression of the cognitional con-

46

47

48 49

that I come to it by a process of reasoning; and so it is in all other things that are understood by us, except perhaps in the case of first principles, which, since they are known simply, are known at once without any discursive reasoning process. Therefore as long as the intellect is thrown this way and that in a process of reasoning, its formation is not yet finished, not until it conceives the intelligibility of the thing perfectly; and only then does it have the intelligibility of the complete thing, and only then does it have the intelligibility of the word. And therefore it is that in our soul we have thinking, by which is meant the discursive process of inquiry, and we have a word, which is now formed according to the perfect contemplation of the truth.'] Depotentia, q. 9, a. 9 c.: 'Ipsum enim intelligere non perficitur nisi aliquid in mente concipiatur, quod dicitur verbum; non enim dicimur intelligere, sed cogitare ad intelligendum, antequam conceptio aliqua in mente nostra stabiliatur' ['The act of understanding has not reached its completion unless something is conceived in the mind, which is called the word; for we are not said to understand, but to think for the sake of understanding, before some conception is established in our mind']. There is a variant - 'cognoscere potius aliquid intelligendo' ['to know rather by understanding something'] to be found in the compilation of texts, mostly from Aquinas, under the title De intellectu et intelligibili, Opusc. LXIII (ed. Mandonnet, V, 377). For the distinction between intelligere proprie and intelligere communiter, see De veritate, q. l, a. 12 c. See Super III Sententiarum, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2 sol. l; Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 8, a. l c. Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 14, §3 (ed. Leon., XV, 563 5-10, 20-21): 'Similiter etiam verbum quod in mente nostra concipitur, non exit de potentia in actum nisi quatenus intellectus noster procedit de potentia in actum. Nee tamen verbum oritur ex intellectu nostro nisi prout existit in actu: simul autem cum in actu existit, est in eo verbum conceptum ... intellectus in actu nunquam est sine verbo' ['So too the word which is conceived in our mind does not pass from potency to act except insofar as our intellect passes from potency to act. But neither does the word arise from our intellect except insofar as it exists in act; but as soon as intellect exists in act, the word is conceived in it... the intellect in act is never without a word']. One may recite a definition by rote without understanding; but unless one really understands, one cannot define; and as soon as one understands, one has defined. Depotentia, q. 8, a. l c. and q. 9, a. 5 c. are the most insistent texts on this point. De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 c.: Tpsa enim conceptio est effectus actus intelligendi' ['The concept is the effect of the act of understanding']. See q. 3, a. 2; q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m; Summa theologiae, l, q. 34, a. l, ad 3m: '... intellectus hominis verbo, quod concipit intelligendo lapidem, lapidem dicit' ['the intellect of man, by the word which it conceives by understanding a stone, expresses the stone'].

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tent of the act of understanding,50 that the more perfect the one act of understanding, the more numerous the inner words it embraces in a single view.51 The problem here is twofold: (i) Does intelligere mean understanding? (2) What is understanding both in itself and in its expression? The contention of this study will be that Aquinas was speaking of understanding and that an interpretation in terms of general metaphysics misses the point; to follow Aquinas here, one must practice introspective rational psychology; without that, one no more can know the created image of the Blessed Trinity, as Aquinas conceived it, than a blind man can know colors.1 2

Definition

In the foregoing section we approached the Thomist concept of inner word in the omnivorous fashion of the fact collector. Under seven headings we 50 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 c.: '... aliquid expressum a notitia mentis' ['something expressed by the knowledge of the mind']. See Summa theologiae, l, q. 34, a. l c.: 'Ipse autem conceptus cordis de ratione sua habet quod ab alio procedat, scilicet a notitia concipientis' ['It is of the essence of the concept of the heart that it proceed from another, that is, from the knowledge of the one conceiving']. 51 Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. 4; q. 55, a. 3; q. 58, aa. 2-4; q. 12, aa. 8, 1O. Parallels to these texts abound; see also the series on the plurality of divine ideas (note 26 above). Briefly, there are two points. The first (Sententia libriEthicorum, l, lect. 11 ad fin.) is that Trincipium enim videtur esse plus quam dimidium totius. Quia scilicet omnia alia quae restant continentur in principiis. Et hoc est quod subdit, quod per unum principium bene intellectum et consideratum, multa fiunt manifesta eorum quae quaeruntur in scientia' ['A principle seems to be more than half of the whole, since all the rest is contained in the principles. And this is what he adds, saying that through one principle well understood and considered, many of those things that are sought in knowledge are made manifest']. The second is that a process of reasoning ends, not in the multiplicity of the process, but in a synthetic view of the whole (Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, a. 7 c.): '... procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones non simul utrumque considerant... Unde manifestum est quod, quando cognoscitur prirnum, adhuc ignoratur secundum. Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas; et tune cessat discursus' ['those proceeding from principles to conclusions do not consider the two simultaneously ... So it is clear that, when the first is known, the second is still not known. And thus the second is not known in the first, but from the first. But the term of the discursive process is reached when the second is seen in the first, after effects have been resolved into their causes: and then the discursive activity ceases']. Numerous texts on this matter have been collected byjulien Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio selon s. Thomas d'Aquin (Ottawa: Institut d'etudes medievales; Paris: Vrin, 1936) 247-80.

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listed most of the matter relevant to the inquiry, and in the references we supplied the reader with indicadons of the sources of fuller and more accurate information.5* From the catalogue there emerged our thesis, that we must begin by grasping the nature of the act of understanding, that thence we shall come to a grasp of the nature of inner words, their reladon to language, and their role in our knowledge of reality. Now understanding is of two kinds: there is the direct understanding, parent of the definition, in which the mind clicks, one gets the idea, one feels like shouting 'Eureka!' with Archimedes; there is also a reflective understanding, parent of judgment, in which one sees that one cannot but judge something to be so. Our first concern will be the former; our second chapter will deal with the latter; the third chapter will turn to the metaphysical analysis of intellect; the 52 It is to be observed that Aquinas discussed the inner word, not directly in his general treatments of intellect, but in trinitarian passages and in discussions of the plurality of divine ideas. I should say that the theological issues forced a development of the basic Aristotelian materials. Further, it is in the De veritateand in the discussion of the plurality of divine ideas (q. 3, a. 2) that the distinction between the twofold form or species is first enunciated effectively even though the general idea is not new (see Super I Sententiarum, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2m; d. 35, q. i, a. 2 sol.). Finally, though the idea of an inner word is basically the same in the Sentences and in later works, still, since the grip is not so firm, statements occur which hardly can be reconciled with the later position. The position is basically the same: a distinction is drawn between the act of understanding ('simplex intuitus intellectus in cognitione intelligibilis' ['the simple intuition of the intellect in the knowledge of the intelligible']) and the ordering of this intelligible to its manifestation; the inner word is some emanation from the intellect as making known (Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. i; Super IISententiarum, d. 11, q. 2, a. 3); it adds something like thought to the simple intuition of intellect (Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3m); it follows upon the intuition of intellect (ibid. q. 2, a. 3); it is the 'species concepta in qua est similitude eius quod dicitur' ['conceived species in which there is the likeness of that which is said'] and 'quaedam similitudo in intellectu ipsius rei intellectae' ['a certain likeness in the intellect of the thing itself that has been understood'] (ibid.); it follows upon some intellectual light - at least that of the agent intellect and of first principles; consequently, a conclusion is an inner word but not the principles themselves (d. 34, q. 2, a. unica, ad 2m). But I do not think that later Aquinas would have said that the 'species concepta interim' ['species inwardly conceived'] is not an inner word unless it is ordained to some manifestation (Super IISententiarum, d. 11, q. 2, a. 3 sol.), that it is not the divine essence as intellect or as understood, but as medium of understanding (Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. l, ad 4m), that it may be the operation of understanding as such (ibid., a. 2 sol. i). See J. Chenevert, 'Le verbum dans le Commentaire sur les Sentences de saint Thomas d'Aquin,' Sciences ecclesiastiques 13 (1961) 191-223; 359-90.

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fourth to issues that are at once metaphysical and psychological; the fifth to Thomist trinitarian theory. Such in outline is the plan.8 In his zeal to prick complacent bubbles of unconscious ignorance, Socrates made it a practice to ask people just what things are. What is virtue? What is moderation? courage? justice? What is science? On Plato's showing, Socrates had the formula for the sixty-four-dollar question,'1 but it was Aristotle who made capital of it. For Aristotle, it would seem, realized that the real catch was in the form of the question. It may be difficult to define this or that virtue; but what makes things hopeless is the difficulty of saying what one wishes to find out when one asks, even of the most familiar things, 'What is it?' Accordingly, one finds the second book of the Posterior Analytics opening with an attempt to fix the meaning of this type of question. Any question, we are told - and so any answer and any item of knowledge - can be listed under one of four headings. Either one asks (i) whether there is an X, or (2) what is an X, or (3) whether Xis Y, or (4) why Xis Y. The superficial eye will pair off the first two questions together and the last two; but the significant parallel is between the first and the third, and between the second and the fourth. In modern language the first and third are empirical questions: they ask about matters of fact; they can be answered by an appeal to observation or experiment. But the fourth question is not empirical; it asks for a cause or reason; and, at least in some cases, the second question is identical with the fourth, and hence it too is not empirical, but likewise asks for a cause or reason. Thus, 'Why does light refract?' and 'What is refraction?' are, not two questions, but one and the same. Again, to take Aristotle's stock example, 'What is an eclipse of the moon?' and 'Why is the moon thus darkened?' are, not two questions, but one and the same. Say that the earth intervenes between the sun and the moon, blocking off the light received by the latter from the former, and at once you know why the moon is thus darkened, and what an eclipse is. The second and fourth questions, then, ask about causes; but a cause supplies the middle term in the scientific syllogism; and if the cause exists, its consequent necessarily exists. Hence, all four questions are questions about the middle terms of scientific syllogisms. The first and third ask whether there is a relevant middle term; the second and fourth ask what the relevant middle term is.M 53 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, 2, 8gb 36 - Qua 34 (Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros Posteriorum analyticorum, 2, lect. i); any of the four causes may be a middle term (Posterior Analytics, II, 11, 94b 20-26; Aquinas, lect. 9). Aquinas (lect. l, § 408) remarked of the four questions: 'ad quae quattuor reduci potest quidquid est quaeribile vel scibile' ['to these four we can reduce whatever can be asked or whatever can be known'] and added that the four questions

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But this answer only raises a further question. Granted that we know what is meant by 'What is X?' when that question can be recast into an equivalent 'Why Vis X?' yet one may ask, quite legitimately, whether there always is a V. It is simple enough to substitute 'Why does light refract?' for 'What is refraction?' But tell me, please, what I am to substitute for 'What is a man?' or 'What is a house?' A good question needs a roundabout answer, and Aristotle considered that question good enough for the answer to be attempted, not in the Posterior Analytics, but only in the Metaphysics. Let us go back to Socrates. In the Meno he proved a reminiscence of the ideas by summoning a slave and questioning him about a diagram. Aristotle was impressed, more by the questions than by the alleged reminiscence, but most of all by the diagram.1 At least he made grasp of the intelligible a matter of insight into the sensible or the imagined.54 In the Posterior Analytics he remarked that, if a man were on the moon during its eclipse, he would not have to ask the first question - whether there is an eclipse - for the fact would be obvious; moreover, he would not even have to ask the second question - what an eclipse is - for that too would be obvious; he would see the earth cutting in between the sun and himself, and so at once would grasp the cause and the universal.55 Grasping the cause is, not an ocular vision, but an insight into the sensible data. Grasping the universal is the production of the inner word that expresses that insight. And, Aquinas explains, if one reached the universal from such brief acquaintance, that would be a matter of conjecturing that eclipses of the moon always occurred in that fashion.56 A similar point comes up in the Metaphysics, in the passage that is the source of Aquinas's repeated 'unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu.' Aristotle made this point from the instance of geometrical problems; they are difficult when the construction is merely in potency; but draw in the construction, and one solves the problem almost by inspection. Stare at a triangle as long as you please, and you will not be any nearer seeing that its three angles must equal two right assigned in the Topics are only subdivisions of the two empirical questions here considered. He employed the four questions in proving a natural desire for the beatific vision in the angels (Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 50). [Henceforth references to Aquinas's commentary on the Posterior Analytics will be given in the form In IIPost, anal.; the paragraph numbers that Lonergan gives are from the Marietti edition.] 54 Aristotle, De anima, III, 8, 432a 3-10; see also 7, 43ia 14, 43ib 2 (Aquinas, In III Deanima, lect. 13, §791; lect. 12, §§772, 777). 55 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, 2, goa 24-31 (Aquinas, In IIPost, anal, lect. l, §416). 56 In IIPost, anal., lect. l, §417.

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angles. But through the vertex draw a line parallel to the base, and the equality of alternate angles ends the matter at once.57 The act of understanding leaps forth when the sensible data are in a suitable constellation. We may now revert to our main problem - how to transform questions of the second type into questions of the fourth type in such ultimate and simple cases as, What is a man? What is a house? The clue lies in the fact of insight into sensible data. For an insight, an act of understanding, is a matter of knowing a cause.58 Presumably, in ultimate and simple cases, the insight is the knowledge of a cause that stands between the sensible data and the concept whose definition is sought. Though Aristotle's predecessors knew little of such a cause - for the cause in question is the formal cause59 - Aristotle himself made it a key factor in his system; and it was to the formal cause that he appealed when, in the Metaphysics, he attempted to settle the meaning of such questions as, What is a man? What is a house?60 The meaning is, Why is this sort of body a man? Why are stones and bricks, arranged in a certain way, a house? What is it that causes the matter, sensibly perceived, to be a thing? To Scholastics the answers are self-evident. That which makes this type of body to be a man is a human soul. That which makes these stones and bricks to be a house is an artificial form. That which makes matter, in general, to be a thing is the causa essendi, the formal cause.61 The Aristotelian formulation of understanding is the scientific syllogism (syllogismus faciens scire), in which the middle term is the real cause of the presence of the predicate in the subject. But the genesis of the terms involved in scientific syllogisms follows the same model: sense provides the subject, insight into sensible data the middle, and conceptualization the predicate, which is the term whose genesis was sought. There remains a final note. The core of meaning in questions of the second type has been determined by transposing them into questions of the 57 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 9, 10513 22-33 (In IXMetaphys., lect. 10, §§ 1888-93). 58 The Aristotelian analysis of understanding (epistasthai), Posterior Analytics, I, 2, 7lb 9-19 (In I Post, anal, lect. 4), is first its identification with knowing a cause and secondly its expression in scientific syllogism. The Posterior Analytics simply rings the changes on that analysis; the rest of the logical works serve to narrow attention down to it as to the essential; the nonlogical works apply it. Hence, I should say that to miss the point here is the most effective way of missing everything. 59 Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 7, 988a 18 - 988b 5 (In IMetaphys., lect. ll, esp. § 175); Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 10, 9933 11-24 (In IMetaphys., lect. 17, esp. §272). 60 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 17, 10413 9-32 (In VIIMetaphys., lect. 17, § 1649-51). 61 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 17, 10410 4-8 (In VIIMetaphys., lect. 17, §§ 1666-68).

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fourth type. 'What is a man?' is equivalent to 'Why is Va man?' - where V stands for the sensible data of a man, and the answer is the formal cause, the soul. Now this does not imply that one is to answer the question, What is a man? by the proposition, A man is his soul. That answer is patently false. The formal cause is only part of the whole, and part can never be predicated of the whole. The fallacy that leads to this false conclusion is that, while we have transposed 'What is X?' into 'Why Vis X?' we have yet to transpose the formal cause, which answers 'Why Vis X?' back to the answer of 'What is X?' That transposition is from formal cause to essence or quiddity. Neglect of this second transposition by Aristotle has led to considerable obscurity: for among the meanings of 'substance' Aristotle will write the causa essendi, the to ti en einai, the form.62 Very accurately Aquinas hit upon the root of the confusion: 'Essentia enim et forma in hoc conveniunt quod secundum utrumque dicitur esse illud quo aliquid est. Sed forma refertur ad materiam, quam facit esse in actu; quidditas autem refertur ad suppositum, quod significatur ut habens talem essentiam.'63 Questions of the second type ask about the suppositum: for example, What is a man? Transposed to the fourth type, they ask about the matter: for example, Why is this type of body a man? Common to both questions is inquiry into the quo aliquid est, which, relative to the matter, is the form, but relative to the suppositum, is the essence, that is, the form plus the common matter.64 3

Quod Quid Est

Quod quid est is a medieval attempt to find three Latin words corresponding to the Greek to ti estin; similarly, quod quid erat esse is a literal translation of to 62 E.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 8, ioi7b 10-16. 63 ['Essence and form are alike in this, that that by which something is said to be can be understood of both of them. But form is related to matter, which it brings to act; and quiddity is related to the supposit, which is identified as having such and such an essence'] In VMetaphys., lect. 10, §904. 64 There is a parallel ambiguity with regard to species (In VIIMetaphys., lect. 9, § !473): 'Sciendum tamen est, quod nulla materia, nee communis, nee individuata, secundum se, se habet ad speciem prout sumitur pro forma. Sed secundum quod species sumitur pro universali, sicut hominem dicimus esse speciem, sic materia communis per se pertinet ad speciem, non autem materia individualis in qua natura speciei accipitur' ['It must be noted, however, that no matter, whether common or individual, in itself pertains to the species taken as the form. But insofar as the species is taken as the universal - for example, as when we say that 'man' is a species - the common matter pertains per se to the species, but not the individual matter in which the nature of the species is received'].

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ti en einai; finally, quidditas is of medieval coinage and differs from the preceding as abstract from concrete. It will be convenient to refer to these five as Qv 7\, Q2, T2, and Q3 respectively. For our present intention is to write a note on the usage of these terms, and in that our purpose is to confirm the interpretation of Aristotle set forth in the preceding section. The argument here invoked is, then, just a challenge: such and such are the pieces of this jigsaw puzzle; put them together in some other fashion if you can. T"j and T2 are twists of the Greek language which Aristotle turned to technical account. Though they have distinct spheres of influence, still their connotations are closely related and their denotations overlap. That both terms exist is to be accounted for, I would suggest, by the fact that 7\ - the question of the second type - has its meaning defined by transposition to a question of the fourth type, while the answer to this fourth-type question is properly T2. Thus the principal meaning of 7\ is essence, and the principal meaning of T2 is form; of this difference Aristotle was aware, but his emphasis was not on the difference but on the radical equivalence. His argument was against the Platonists, who failed to grasp both insight into phantasm and the idea of formal cause, who consequently wished to derive essences 7\ - not from insight into the form of sensible objects, but from a noetic heaven. Such a controversial interest would suffice to direct attention away from sharp and perfect differentiation, which, in any case, is more the work of the textbook-writing pedant than of the original genius.65 T2 ranges in meaning from the concrete and individual form of a particular thing to the abstract core of identical meaning in a scientific term. To begin from the latter, we learn in the Topics that the idion is convertible with its subject but does not reveal the T2 of the subject,66 while the hows is both convertible with the subject and reveals the T2 of the subject, so that its criterion is an identity of meaning with the meaning of the subject term.67 At the same time we are warned that if one has the horismos, then one will have identity of meaning; but the converse does not hold.68 Now this negative criterion of T2 is employed in the Metaphysics; consideration 65 J.H. Newman put the point, not without a touch of exaggeration, when he wrote, 'It is the second-rate men, though most useful in their place, who prove, reconcile, finish, and explain.' [John Henry Cardinal Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (first publication, London, 1870; Lonergan is quoting from this edition, p. 374).] 66 Aristotle, Topics, I, 5, iO2a 18; I, 8, 1030 9-10; V, 3, I3ib 37 - 1323 9; V, 4, 1333 i, 6, 9. 67 Ibid. I, 4, loib 19, 21; I, 5, lOib 39. 68 Ibid. I, 5, iO2a 14-17. On definition and its relation to scientific syllogism, see Posterior Analytics, II, 8-10 (Aquinas, In IIPost, anal., lect. 7 & 8).

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of the candidacy of T2 for the role of substance opens with some logical exercises to the effect that 'being you' is not 'being a musician,' and 'being a surface' is not 'being white.'69 But T2 is also a frequent name for the formal cause of a particular thing: if particulars are discrete from their formal causes, they could neither be nor be known.70 Is this merely a blind leap from the remotely abstract to the concrete? Hardly, for the proof in the Physics that there are just four causes turns upon a consideration of material cause, efficient cause, final cause, and, no doubt, what is meant is the formal cause, but the only thing mentioned is 7\: the cause from which the geometer argues is the definition.71 A similar tendency is to be observed in other treatments of the four causes, though in the other treatments the formal cause is named not 7\ but T2.72 The naturalness of such transitions appears more clearly in Aristotle's environment and problems than in an abstract discussion held over twenty centuries later. Let us turn to these antecedents. Aristotle rebuked Democritus for advancing the statement that the morphe was revealed by shape and color; the shape and color of a fresh corpse are the shape and color of a man; but a fresh corpse is not a man.73 On the other hand, Empedocles was applauded more than once for his discernment in affirming that the substance and nature of a bone is, not some one of its elements, or all of them, but the proportion of their combination.74 The proportion is named logos and T2, and Aristotle's objection was that Empedocles should have held, not just bones, but all natures to be such. Aristotle himself, after explaining the meaning of 7\ in the Metaphysics, went on to remark that a syllable is not just its component vowels and consonants, that flesh is not just fire and earth; there is a further factor, which is not an 69 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 4, iO2Qb 13-23 (Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 3, §§ 1308-10). 70 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 6 (Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 5). 71 Aristotle, Physics, II, 7, lQ8a 14-18; see Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros Physicorum, II, lect. 10 ad fin., where Aquinas summarized the argument in terms of ontological form. [Subsequent references will be in the form In IlPhys.] 72 Aristotle, Physics, II, 3, I94b 16 - lQ5b 27 (Aquinas, In IlPhys., lect. 5); Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, 11, 943 20-36 (Aquinas, In IIPost, anal, lect. 9); Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 3, 9833 26-31 (Aquinas, In I Metaphys., lect. 4, §70); Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 2, 10133 27, b 23, b 33 (Aquinas, In VMetaphys., lect. 2, §764; lect. 3, §779; ibid., §786). 73 Aristotle, Departibus animalium, I, i, 64Ob 31-36. See also ibid. 6413 18-21; and De anima, II, l, 412 b 2O-22 (Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 2, §239). 74 Aristotle, Departibus animalium, I, i, 6403 20-24: Metaphysics, I, 10, 9933 17 (Aquinas, In I Metaphys., lect. 17, §272); see Aristotle, Physics, II, 2, 1943 2O (Aquinas, In IlPhys., lect. 4).

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element, but a principle and cause - a causa essendi - which in natural things is the nature.75 Thus, a sense is an accidental form, for a sense is to its sense organ as soul is to body;76 but though a form, a sense is also named the logos, or proportion, of the organ;77 and this is considered to account for the fact that violent light, sound, heat, and so on, injure not merely the sense organ but the sense as well, or again for the fact that, though plants are alive and may freeze, yet they do not feel cold because their matter is not in the right proportion.78 But the crowning sample is the Aristotelian triumph, the definition of soul: soul is the substance as form of a natural body potentially alive;79 it is the first entelechy of a natural body potentially alive,80 or of a natural and organic body;81 it is the substance according to reason82 and that is the T2 of a body of such a kind,83 for if an eye were an animal, its soul would be sight.84 But one must not be content with an empirical definition.85 Just as 'squaring the rectangle' may be defined empirically as finding a square equal in area to a given rectangle, or causally as finding the mean proportional between the unequal sides of the rectangle - where the former definition follows logically from the latter (for if A : C:: C: B, then AB= C 2 ) 86 - so too the soul may be defined empirically as the first act of a natural and organic body, but causally as the ultimate principle of our living, feeling, and thinking - where the former 75 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 17, iO4ib 11-32 (Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 17, 1672-80). 76 Aristotle, Deanima, II, l, 412b 17-24 (Aquinas, InllDeanima, lect. 2, §239). If the whole soul is in each of the parts, it might seem to follow from this Aristotelian position that each of the parts of an animal was equally an animal. Hence, when he wrote Super I Sententiarum, d. 8, q. 5, a. 3 sol., Aquinas seems to have considered the Aristotelian position silly, but had found a saving distinction by the time he wrote Summa theologiae, l, q. 76, a. 8, ob. 3 and ad 3m. (In the Ottawa edition, 'anima' instead of 'animal' - last word in objection seems a mere misprint.) 77 Aristotle,Deanima, II, 12,424327 (Aquinas, InllDeanima, lect. 24, §555); Aristotle, De anima, III, 2, 426b 7 (Aquinas, In IIIDe anima, lect. 2, §598). The significant word is, of course, not the translation 'proportion,' but the Greek logos. 78 Aristotle, De anima, II, 12, 4243 28 - 424b 3 (Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 24, §§556-57). 79 Aristotle, De anima, II, l, 4123 20. 80 Ibid, a 27. 81 Ibid, b 5. 82 Ibid, b 9: ousia gar he hata ton logon. 83 Ibid, b 9-ll; see Metaphysics, VII, 10, lO35b 14 (Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 10, §1484). 84 Aristotle, De anima, II, l, 4l2b 18. 85 Ibid. II, 2, 4133 12. 86 Ibid.; see Posterior Analytics, II, 8-10 (Aquinas, In II Post, anal, lect. 7 & 8).

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definition follows logically from the latter (for the ultimate principle of our living is the first act of our matter.)87 Hence the soul is not matter or subject, but logos tis an eie kai eidos;^ again, the soul is an entelechy and the logos of what potentially has such a nature.89 Now I think the main point is merely missed by anyone who sees in such passages no more than confused leaping back and forth between ontological and logical considerations. Why was Aquinas able to affirm that intellect penetrates to the inwardness of things? Only because Aristode had made his point, against the old naturalists and with some help from number-loving Pythagoreans and defining Platonists,90 that what is known by intellect is a partial constituent of the realities first known by sense. For the materialist, the real is what he knows before he understands or thinks: it is the sensitively integrated object that is reality for a dog; it is the sure and firm-set earth on which I tread, which is so reassuring to the sense of reality; and on that showing, intellect does not penetrate to the inwardness of things but is a merely subjective, if highly useful, principle of activity. To the Pythagoreans the discovery of harmonic ratios revealed that numbers and their proportions, though primarily ideas, nonetheless have a role in making things what they are; and for Aristode the ratio of two to one was the form of the diaposon.91 Socratic interest in definition reinforced this tendency,92 but the Platonist sought the reality known by thought, not in this world, but in another. Aristotle's basic thesis was the objective reality of what is known by understanding: it was a commonsense position inasmuch as common sense always assumes that to be so; but it was not a commonsense position inasmuch as common sense would not be able J to enunciate it or even to know with any degree of accuracy just what it means and implies. Aristode is the representative of unconscious common sense; but conscious common sense found voice in the eminent Catholic doctor and professor of philosophy whom I heard ask, 'Will someone please tell me what all this fuss is about ms?'k When, then, Aristotle calls the soul a logos, 87 Aristotle, De anima, II, 2, 4l4a 4-27 (Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 4, §§27175). It is not Aristotle but Aquinas that dots the I's and crosses the T's on the twofold definition of soul as an application of the pure theory of the Posterior Analytics. 88 Aristotle, De anima, II, 2, 4143 14. 89 Ibid. 27. 90 Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 8, g8gb 29 - 99Oa 12 (Aquinas, In IMetaphys., lect. 13, §§202-203); Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 7, g88a 34 - g88b 5 (Aquinas, In I Metaphys., lect. ll, §§175-78). 91 Aristotle, Physics, II, 3, I94b 27-28 (Aquinas, In IlPhys., lect. 5); Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 2, ioi3b 33 (Aquinas, In VMetaphys., lect. 3, §786). 92 Aristotle, Metaphysics, XIII, 4, iO78b 9-34. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

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he is stating his highly original position, not indeed with the full accuracy which his thought alone made possible, but in a generic fashion which suited his immediate purpose; and it is that generic issue that remains the capital issue, for the denial of soul today is really the denial of the objectivity of the intelligible,1 the denial that understanding, knowing a cause, is knowing anything real. Aquinas employed quod quid est, quod quid erat esse, and quidditas - Q15 Q2, and Q3. But Q2 occurs only rarely outside the Aristotelian commentaries,93 and even there the whole tendency is to identify it with Qr A discussion will begin with Q2 as its topic, and a few lines later the discussion will be about Q^94 and however disconcerting this may be, at least it accounts for the emergence of such intermediate forms as quod quid est esse and quid est esse.951 have attempted to put together a representative, if not exhaustive, account of Thomist usage by listing the references to T2 in Ross's index to the Metaphysics and checking the corresponding passages in the Thomist commentary. In some instances of T2 Aquinas employed, not so much either Qj or Q 2 or Qy but/oma or causa formalist In other instances of T2 Aquinas employed Q2 where the meaning of the latter is form, formal cause, formal principle, though this may be obscured or may be made doubtful by a later switch from form to essence. Thus, we are told that Q2 was not employed by Aristotle in his Categories, that it means 'neque ... genus neque species neque individuum, sed horum omnium formale principium.'97 More or less in this sense, Q 2 is generated only per acddens;98 it is

93 Le 'De ente et essentia'de s. Thomas d'Aquin, ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin (Kain, Belgium: Bibliotheque thomiste 8, 1926) c. i, p. 3. 'Et quia id per quod res constituitur in proprio genere uel specie est hoc quod significatur per diffinitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen essentie a philosophis in nomen quiditatis mutatur; et hoc est quod Philosophus frequenter nominal quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid' ['And since that through which a thing is constituted in its own genus or species is that which is meant by the definition that tells us what the thing is, thus it is that the word 'essence' is changed by philosophers into the word 'quiddity'; and this is also what the Philosopher frequently calls quod quid erat esse, that is, that through which a being exists with such and such a quiddity']. 94 For example, In VII Metaphys., lect. 3, §§ 1308-10; lect. 5, §§ 1363, 1366, 1378. 95 In IVMetaphys., lect. 7, §627; In VMetaphys., lect. 7, §864. 96 In I Metaphys., lect. 4, §70; lect. ll, § 175; lect. 17, §272. 97 ['neither genus nor species nor an individual but the formal principle of all these'] In VIIMetaphys., lect. 2, § 1275. Note that the question is the nature of substance; see § 1270, where the same term is taken as 'quidditas, vel essentia, sive natura rei' ['quiddity, or the essence or nature of a thing']. 98 Ibid. lect. 7, § 1421; but see § 1422, and lect. 15, § 1608.

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soul;99 it is the artist's idea;100 it is what pertains to form;101 it is proper to a single subject;102 it is a principle and cause.103 At the opposite pole, Q 2 ' s more or less the same as Qp and certainly it is not form, for it is predicable of the whole.104 In a passage in which Aristotle argued from the properties of 7\ to those of T2, Aquinas maintained a distinction between Q^ and 177 & n. 149, 180, 181, 186, 187, 189, 190, 195, 200, 201, 215, 219; infallibility in knowledge of, 75; object of intellect, 168,173-75, 200; as objective, 169 n. 96; prescinds from contingent existence, from individual matter, 200; takes us outside space and time, 75; transition from to res particularis existens, 2OO-2O1. See also Causa formalis; Insight; Questions; Understanding Quid rei, quid nominis (understanding of things, of names), 56 Quid sitDeus, 215, 219 Quod quid est, 29-38. See also Quid Rabeau, Gaston, 78-79 n. 82 Ratio: as abstract definition, meaning, inner word, 17 n. 23, 48, 155, 163, 164, 165; initial statement on, 20 & n. 32; particularis, 43; superior; 191; terminatur ad intellectum, 77 Rational consciousness: and procession of inner word, 47, 50-52, 59, 152, 188, 198 n. 28, 207, 223-24; and procession of love in will, 12, 13, 108-10, 152, 188, 205, 209-13. See also Emanatio intelligibilis Rationality, basic and derived, 47 Real, reality: appearance and, 82, 83, 95; Aristotle vs Bergson on, 113 n. 33; common sense on, 33; correspondence of mental with, 16-17 [of mental composition with r. c., 63]; distinction of essence and existence, 197 & n. 18; distinctions and metaphysics, 187; essences not the whole of, 115 (wa&oEssentialism); first principles of, 79; givenness is not the r., 99; inner word, truth, as medium between mind and, 21, 73; intellect knows its proportion to (knowledge

of), 86, 98, 201; judgment as knowledge of (of r., of esse, of truth), 20-21, 57,62,63, 78,93-94,97,150, 200-201; Kant and r. confined to field of possible experience, 57; knowledge of as objective, 33-34, 62, 79, 93 n. 164, 164; knowlege of precedes k. of subject, object, 99; meaning of, 20; mode of knowing, mode of r., 16; in movement incomplete, 112-13; not opposed to mental, 208; Plato on, 33, 155, 157; pure processions as, 208; reason, sense as criterion of, 20; truth and, 81-82; understanding knows objective r., 33; wisdom and knowledge of r. as r., 78. See also Realism Realism: dogmatic, 192; as immediate, 99; naive, 72, 99; pseudo, 140, 193 Reason (s): begins from understanding, 68-69, 7i; and concept of soul, 68; eternal, 101, 192, 197; as intellect, understanding in process, 44-45, 51, 63-68, 70-71, 77; r. in logic vs r. in developing understanding, 69; principle of sufficient r., 47-48; and progress in understanding, 68, 70-71, 153; terminates in understanding, 66-68, 71, 77; and theology, 9, 101, 213-22 Rectangle, squaring, 32 Reduction, resolution to first principles, See Resolutio in principia Reflection: and Aristotle's knowledge by identity, 84; and the critical problem, 2O n. 37, 87, 95-96; as duplication of ourselves, 99; of intellect on itself, 13, 86-87; in judgment, 74-75, 76-77; and knowledge as perfection, k. as of other, 85; perfect in God alone, 13; on phantasm for knowledge of singular, 40, 169, 170, 180, 188, 201; on phantasm vs conversion to p., 170-71;

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of sense incomplete, 86-87; and via iudicii, 74-75, 79 n. 82 Reflective and direct understanding, see Understanding Reims, Council of, 221 n. 136 Relation(s): and Aristotle's Metaphysics, 121-22; in God, 19 n. 28 (Scotus), 99, 108, 213-14; nonreciprocal real r. of scientia ad scibile, 184 n. 189 Resolutio in principia, its ambiguity, 73-75; as answer to questions, 77-78; as via iudicii, 74-75 Resultance, see Natural resultance Richard of St Victor, 221 n. 137, 222 Robilliard,J.-A., 109 n. 17 Roland-Gosselin, Marie-Dominique, 34 n. 93, 97 n. 193 Rondet, Henri, 66 n. 26 Ross, William David, 34, 112 n. 25, 116 n. 58, 165 n. 72 Rousselot, Pierre, 224 Roy, Lucien, 222 n. 145 Sabellius, 204 Scepticism of fourteenth century, 218 Schmaus, Michael, 6 n. 6, 199 n. 31, 212 n. 96, 213-14 & nn. 100 & 104, 217-18 n. 130 Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius, 212 n. 94 Scholastics, 5, 28, 83, 146, 202, 219 Schurr, Viktor, 221 n. 135 Science: and abstraction, 53; Aristotelian vs Platonist, 182; and coalescence of insights, 64-65; and conceptualism, 218; criteria of s. and mathematics, 76; habit of, 79, 153, 193; insight and modern s., 41 n. 129; and intellectualism, 219-20; as knowledge through causes (Aristotle), 218-19; natural s., human s., 6, 9-10; necessary s. of contingent, 163-65; as of necessary and universal, 163-67, 180;

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

theology as (Aquinas), 9, 219 (subalternated s. of God) Scientificum and ratiocinativum potencies, 49 Scotus, 109 & nn. 18-19, 148,195, 212 n. 96, 213 & nn. 97-98; and divine ideas, 19 n. 28; and divine processions as productions, 204 & n. 57; and insight, 38-39 & n. 126; and Kant, 38-39 & n. 126; and knowledge of singular, 43-44 n. 150; and spiritual look at universal, 195; on will and causes, 213. See also Crypto-Scotism Second act, see First act Self-diffusion of good and Trinity, 222 Self-knowledge: of mind, of soul, 9 (Aquinas), 8-9 (Augustine), 87-99, 180, 225; divine, see God; empirical awareness vs scientific grasp of, 88-90; empirical, scientific, normative, 101, 180; as habitual, 89; had from objects, acts, potencies, essence, 87-88, 101, 180; s.-k. and self-presence, 102-4; understanding source of, 88, 90, 225; and wisdom, 101-2 Self-possession, s.-expression of mind (inner word), 6-9, 23-24, 27, 38, 47, 50-51, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60-61,65, 70, 77, 78, 84, 88, 94, 105, 150, 153, 163, 174, 194, 1Q9, 2O2-3, 209, 221. See also Emanatio intelligibilis Sensation: as action, passion, 158; immateriality of, 146, 159-60; as moveri, 118-19 Sense: s. in act is the sensible in act, 83-84, 159, 192-93, 197 (see also Intellect in act); as criterion of reality, 20, 33; as criterion of science, 76; destroyed by violence, 32, 158-59; as form of organ, 32; needed for judgment, 75-76; reflects on itself, but incompletely, 86-87; true and false in

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s.-knowledge, 71, 86; s. and understanding, 41-42, 45-46, 159-61, 169, 172-73, 179-86 Sensible: abstraction from, 53-55, 76, 178; apprehended by sense, represented by imagination, illuminated and made intelligible by agent intellect, 179 Separate: Idea (Plato), 196; soul, knowledge in, 93, 170; substance (Aristotle), 46, 196 Separations and distinctions, 167, 187 Siger of Brabant, 197 n. 18 Sight and seeing as illustrating potency, act, 32, 56, 115, 125 n. 113, 128, 131, 160 & n. 39, 174, 185 Signs, names and spoken words as, 14, 163 Silvestri, Francesco, see Ferrariensis Similitude and knowledge, 71-72, 133, 159-61, 178, 187. See also Imago similitudinis Simon, Yves, 160 n. 45 Simonin, H.-D., 145 n. 225, 210 n. 87, 212 n. 90 Sin and its rationalization, 209 Singular (individual, particular): knowledge of, see Knowledge ... of particular; medieval Augustinians on, 192; Scotus on knowledge of, 43-44 n. 150; 'this' s. vs abstract s., 181-82 Snubness vs curvature, 156 Socrates, 26, 27, 33, 43, 59, 63, 81, 169, 180, 181; and the Academy, Aristotle, 59; and Callias, hi homines, 43; and interest in definition, 33; and question 'What?' 26; and reminiscence of ideas, 27 Sophist pretensions to philosophy, 80 Soul: in animal parts, 32 & n. 76; and body, 32-33; definition of, Aristotle's, 32-33 & n. 83 (Aquinas); kinds

of, 87, 138; as intellective, sensitive, vegetative, 4-5, 202-3; man and, 28, 33-34 & n. 87; reasoning to concept of, 68; self-knowledge of, 87-99, 138, 225; specification of through objects, acts, potencies, essence, 87-88, 101, 138; and subject, 3-11 Space: and Kant, 45; quod quid est takes us outside s. and time, 75. See also Hie et nunc; Irrelevant; Time Space-time continuum, 54 n. 196 Species, species: ambiguity of (form, universal), 133-34; as Aristotle's eidos, 133; s., essence, existence, 78-79 n. 82; s. of intellect, of its object, 5; and intelligere, 133-38; as known in phantasm, 174, 176, 182, 185, 188-89; as medium known on reflection, 177 n. 144 Species impressa, 192 Species quae, qua, in qua, 176-77, 178-79, 188 Specification: of act of will (vs exercise), 135 n. 166; of soul through objects, acts, potencies, essence, 87-88, 101, 138 Spengel, Leonardus, 182 n. 174 Spirit, Holy: 109 n. 20, 209-13; procession of as problem, 12-13; and spiration, 217. See also Procession (s) in God; Trinitarian theory; Trinity Stoics, 6 Stone, reasoning to definition of, 51-52, 68 Stufler, Johann, 121 & n. 88 Subject: conscious, 5, 184 (see also Awareness); grammatical s. and efficient cause, 118-19; metaphysical (of accidents, of change, of movement, of pati, of properties), 30-31, 37, 6l, 62, 63, 113, 117, 119, 122, 126, 128, 145, 147, 149, 154, 156, 158, l6l, 186,

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205; s., object and critical problem, 98-99; and soul, 3-11 Subjective and knowledge, 33, 73, 93 n. 164, 166,211 Substance, 35, 37; knowledge of, 63; and quod quid est, 31, 35, 37; various meanings in Aristotle, 29. See also Separate Sufficient: ground, known as s., 47; principle of s. reason, 47-48. See also Emanatio intelligibilis; Procession; Rational consciousness Supernatural, 66, 97, 101, 219, 221 & n. 137 Syllogism, 51; and learning, 66-67, 93-94; scientific, 26, 28 & n. 58, 37 Synthesis: of concepts, 63-65; in judgment, 61-71 (synthetic apprehension of motives for, 77); as posited, 62, 71 Szabo, Sadoc, 192 n. 5

Tambertus (for Albertus), 218 n. 130 Teacher, 194; divine, human t., 92. See also Via doctrinae Teresa (of Avila), 104 Term of discourse, reasoning, 67, 68, 71, 77; principle and t. in divine processions, 204-8 Themistius, Paraphrases, 182 n. 174 Theology: development of trinitarian, 220-22; faith and, 215; philosophy and, 221; reason and, 9, 101, 213-22; as science (Aquinas), 9, 219 (subalternated s. of God) Thing(s): animals know t., 2O; t. and formal cause, 37, 186-87; t.-in-itself, 71, 155, 157; parts of, 155-57, 187; quiddity of (quid rei, quid nominis), 56. See also Parts of definitions, of t. Thomas Anglicus, 212 n. 96 Thomas Aquinas (these references on matters marginal to doctrines; on doctrines see whole index). Aristotle

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

and T.: 9-10 (A. and Augustine), 43-44 n. 150 (his commentary, his own mind), 62 (his thought sometimes obscured by his use of A.), 117 n. 63 (lacked A.'s wealth of language), 127-28 (verbal difficulties in A. and Avicenna; see also 149), 165 (settles recurrent antinomy in A.), 174-75 (duality of object of intellect due to A.), 196-97 (debt to A. and Augustine in trinitarian theory). Interpretation of T.: 128 (misunderstanding of his metaphysics), 130 (anachronism in), 149 (wrong application of his metaphysics to his psychology), 152-53 (intellectual vs conceptualist; see also 163), 190 (inductive proof of anyone's i.), 211 (conceptualist complication of his view on love), 222-23 (data for his meaning in his written words), 223 (manuals ad mentem divi Thomae; effort needed to understand him), 224 (lexicography in), 226-27 (differs from development of Thomist doctrine). Method and thought of T.: 56 (introspection; see also 58, 86-87, 88, 104-5, no), 86-87 (epistemology), 104 (interest in nature), 108 (deference to Fathers), 115-16 (terminology not stereotyped), 128 (thought sometimes incomplete), 130 (fluid terminology), 181 n. 173 (perhaps did not advert to a difficulty), 199 (thought on verbum not mature in Sentences period), 204 (regularly writes as theologian), 213 (trinitarian theory in a class by itself), 226 (intellectualism made over from Aristotle's). Works of T.: 145 (2nd Paris period), 172 (Denaturaverbiintellectus not authentic), 176 n. 143 (errors by

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in facto esse), 214, 215. See also Dicere\ his editors; see also 217), 178-79 n. 149 Procession (on authenticity of a Quodlibet). See Trinity: not demonstrable by reason, also Development 204, 218; image of (rational creaThomas of Sutton, 211 n. 90 tures), 12-13, 24, 47, 59; introspecThomist vs Thomistic, 96, 148, 153 n. 5 tion and conception of, 24; proper Thompson, J.J., 41 n. 129 Three habits of speculative intellect names in, 216, 221; vestige of, 12-13, 47. See also Spirit, Holy; Trinitarian (intellect, wisdom, science), 79 theory; Word Time: an element in judgment, 76; and Truth, 15, 16, 17, 20-21, 61, 62, 63, 71, Kant, 45; and movement, 112-15; quod quid est takes us outside space 72, 73, 150, 166, 185-86; as application of abstract to sensible, 76; as corand t., 75. See also Hie et nunc; Irrelerespondence of mind and reality, 21, vant; Space-time continuum To ti estin, to ti en einai, 20, 29-38, 150, 63, 71-72, 81-82; as convertible with being, 113 n. 33; as correspondence 173,186 of mental with real composition, Totality, perfection as, 162 Transposing questions from type to 63; eternal (Augustine), 75-76, 85, 196-97; t. in intellect, good in things, type, 26-29 Triangle and insight, 27-28, 40 16, 17; t. and intellectual light, 93-94; as medium in quo reality is known, 73; Trinitarian theory, 6-9 (Augustine), 10-11 (Aquinas), 12-13, 78, 102, 104, naturally known t. touchstone for 105, 109, 136, 152, 204, 213-22; and other t, 74-75; as result of collaboracrux Trinitatis, 213-14, 22O; dogmatic tion, 81; relative vs immutable, 95; in development and, 220-22; essential second operation of intellect (judgand notional acts, persons, 198, ment) not first, 2O-21, 62, 71; t. as in 213-14, 216 n. 116, 217 n. 129, 220; a subject vs t. absolutely, 73; not in finis operationis, finis intentionis, 216 n. synthesis but in positing, 62; not in 116; potentia generandi, potentia spi'what', 21. See also Falsity; Judgment; randi, 216-17; processions (Word, Two levels Holy Spirit), 12-13, 19 n. 26, 98, 99, Two levels: of inner word (concept107-10 (109 & n. 20), 152, 191, definition, judgment-truth), 17198-99, 204-22 [pure p. as real, 208; 18, 60-61, 72, 78 n. 82, 93-94; and p. and relations, persons, notional two operations of intellect, 17, 57, acts (via doctrinae), 213-22; p. of 78 n. 82 [two o. regard quiddity Word as generation, 208]; psychologiand existence, 167]; and types of cal analogy, 214-17, 22O, 224 [found understanding (direct, reflective), only in rational creatures, 11 n. ll, 25, 60-61, 77-78, 80, 97, 150, 153, 12-13, 191-92, 206; and intellectual2Ol. See also Intelligere; Judgment; ism, 226; and mystery, 215-16, 219, Procession 22O]; and self-diffusion of good, 222; Two orders in study of a science, 74 and theology as science, 218-19; twofold ordering of t. concepts (in fieri, Ultimate concepts (potency and act),

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56-59. See also Naturally known concepts Understanding: and Albert the Great, 224; angelic, 38, 60-61, 70, 225; Aristotle's analysis of, 28 n. 58; u., concept, expression, 38, 6o-6l, 70; desire for, unlimited, 66; development of, 63-66, 70-71, 80, 98 (see also Insights ... coalescence of); divine, 66, 100, 197-99, 203-4, 208, 219, 222, 225; u. God by analogy (Vatican I), 215, 219; habitual, 5^Habit(s); identical with understood, 83-85, 159, 193, 196; and inner word, 22-24, 25, 47, 50-51, 152-53: instrumental causes of, 60-61; and intellect, 193-94; and intelligere, 22-24, 48-49, 152-53; as knowing the cause, 195-96; mediates (pivots) between data and concept, 38, 47-48, 88, 194, 195-96; knows objective reality, 33; and meaning, 222-23; object of (ens, phantasm, primary-secondary, quod quid est), 29-38, 41,45. 48-49, 59, 153, 188-89, 202-3; and posse, potens omnia fieri, 45, 47; as preconceptual, 57-58; as proper act of human soul, 90 n. 147, 225; reason as u. in process, 77; Scotus's view of, 39 n. 126; sense and, 41-42, 161, 169, 172-73, 179-86; of things, of names (quid rei, quid nominis), 56; u. Thomas Aquinas, 222-23; two kinds of, direct and reflective, 25, 60-61, 77, 80, 97, 150, 153, 201; of ultimate concepts, 56-59; u. understanding vs thinking thought, 46, 196, 226. See also Insight; Intellectual light; Intelligere; Judgment; Phantasm Unity, seeEo magis unurn; Multa per unum; Wisdom Universal: u. concept and immateriality of soul, 88-89; u. in instance vs u. as

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

u., 175, 189; as instrument for particular knowledge, 165-66; and knowledge of particular things, 43-44 & n. 150, 53, 163, 165-66, 175, 177, 178, 187, 189-90; sensitive apprehension of, 43 (see also Cogitativa; Ratio particularis); not subjective but objective, 166; u. vs understanding in extrapolation to other worlds, 46, 196; u. without the intentio universalitatis, 175, 189 Universale in particulari, 43 Universe known from start, 76, 92, 98, 1OO-1O1 Unum (ens, quid), 195; eo magis u., 204-8 Value and procession of love, 152, 209 Vandenbroucke, Francois, 222 n. 145 Vanier, Paul, 222 n. 142 Vatican I, 215 n. 112, 219 Verbeke, Gerard, 182 n. 174 Verbum: dicens v., 198; expressum ab alio, 199; interius (cordis, mentis), 13-14, 60; intusprolatum (Augustine), 6-9; and ipsum intelligere in trinitarian theory, 198-99; necessity of, 199-204; principium verbi, v., amor (Augustine, Aquinas), 191, 221 & n. 139; as proper name of Son, 216. See also Inner word; Self-possession, s.-expression; Word Verum etfalsum in mente, bonum et malum in rebus, 16, 17 Vestige vs image of Trinity, 12-13 Vetera novis augere et per/icere, 222, 226 Via compositionis, v. resolutionis, 73-74 Via doctrinae, 213-22, 226; and v. inventionis (on Trinity), 22O Via inventionis, via compositionis, via resolutionis, 74-75 Via iudicii, see Resolutio in principia Violent action vs natural, 146-47 Vital act (Augustinian) vs pati (Aristotelian), 211 n. 90

2QO

Index of Concepts and Names

Virtus: iudicativa, 60; spiritiva, 217 (see also Potentia generandi, spirdndf) Webert, Jordanus, 180-81 & n. 169 What? and why? questions, 26-29 What is it? and first act of intellect, 20-21 Whole greater than part, 70 Whole of science virtually contained in intellectual light, 76. See also Universe Will: in all who understand, 209; causes act of belief, 199 n. 33; can prevent intelligere, 199 n. 33; processio operati within, 137 n. 179 (see also Processio operationis, p. operati); procession (of love) in, 107-10, 152, 209-13; procession in w., in intellect not parallel, 108-10; a rational appetite, 13, 209; Scotus and cause in, 213; w. wills, though moved by God, 146-47 William of Ockham, 195 Willing: of end, of means, 137, 143, 146-47; as operation, 147 Wisdom, 78-87; acquired gradually, 100-101; duality of, 100-101; and epistemology, 78-83; and faith, 101; as first philosophy, 80, 82, 83, 99; and knowledge of causes, 79-81; and k. of ratio entis et non entis (being and notbeing), 57, 97; and k. of real (as real),

?8, 79, 99; and other virtues (art, prudence, science ...), 79, 80, 128-29, 150-51, 193; and right judgment, 78, 150-51; as science of sciences, 79, 80; and self-knowledge, 101-2; supernatural (gift of Spirit), 101; unity of, 99-104; validates principles and terms, 78-80,150-51 Wolfson, Harry A., 2O2 n. 45 Wonder, desire to know, inquiry, questions: 37, 105, 185; and agent intellect, intellectual light, 60-61, 185, 193; and data, 37, 185; and natural desire to see God, 27 n. 53, 48 & n. 164, 66, 92, 219; has understanding as goal, 105; source of all science and philosophy, 48, 81 Word in God, 13, 98, 152, 199; cannot be demonstrated by reason, 200-204; and divine ideas, 202; is perfect expression of ipsum esse, 207-8; procession of, 86, 98, 99 & n. 201. See also Dicere; Inner word; Trinitarian theory; Trinity; Verbum Word in human mind, see Inner word Wyser, Paul, 164 n. 65, 167 nn. 78-79, 168 n. 83, 175 n. 124 Yorke Smith, Leonora L., 103 n. 210

The Robert Mollot Collection

Index of Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

General references to whole works (or major parts) of Thomas Aquinas Compendium theologiae: 17 n. 19, 222 De malo: 143, 146 De natura verbi intellectus (spurious): 172 & n. 109 Depotentia: 19, 107, Hi n. 20, 126, 127,

Super L. BoethiiDe trinitate: 54 n. 194, 166, 175, 221 Super Libros Sententiarum: 14, 17 n. 19, 25 n. 52, 1O2, 107, 115, 117, 124, 126, 130, 131, 132, 142, 144, 145, 163, 174, 197, 199 & n. 31, 200, 216, 226 Specific references to texts of Thomas Aquinas

130, 135, 221-2

De spiritualibus creaturis: 128, 145 Deveritate: 17, 19, 49, lOl, 103, 107, 108-10, 130, 134, 174, 197, 200, 221 De virtutibus: 145 In Aristotelis libros Physicorum: 132 Sententia libriDe anima: 88, 95, 186 Summa contra Gentiles: 17 n. 19, 19, 68, 89, 107, 127, 130, 165, 174, 197, 206, 221 Summa theologiae: 17 nn. 19 and 22, 67, 102, 108, 127, 145, 163, 197, 204, 206-7, 213, 214,215, 226, 246 Primapars: 49, 128, 130, 165, 168-9, 172,173, 182 Prima secundae: 130, 143, 146

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Compendium theologiae: c. 49, l lO-l l n. 2O, 210 n. 86; c. 85, 90 n. 144; c. 104, 45 n. 155, 48 n. 164 De anima: a. l, ad urn, 173 n. 113; a. 2, 90 n. 144; a. 5 c., 90 n. 145, 93 nn. 165 and 169, 94 n. 172; a. 7, ad im, 45 n. 155; a. 12 c., 119 n. 76, 145 n. 222; a. 13 c-» 139 n. 188; a. 15, 170 n. 100; c., 42 n. 136, 171 n. 102,173 n. 113; ad 3m, 41 n. 133, 173 n. 113; ad 8m, 173 n. 113, 179 n. 158; ad gm, 93 n. 166; ad lorn, 179 n. 158; ad 2Om, 43 n. 142; a. 16 c., 171 n. 105; a. 17, 171 n. 106; a. 18 c., 171 n. 106; ad 5m, 65 n. 15; a. 20, 170 n. 101; c., 53 n. 192; ad im (2ae ser.), 180 n. 167, 181 n. 173

292

Index ol Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

De caritate: a. 2, ad 1701, 145 n. 225; a. 3, 145 n. 225 De ente et essentia: Proem., 57 n. 205; c. 1, 34 n. 93, 61 n. 5, 97 n. 193 De intellectu et intelligibili (opus spur.): 23 n. 46 De malo: q. 1, a. 5 c., 132 n. 151; q. 6, a. l c., 137 n. 179, 143 n. 205; ad 4m, 146 n. 232; ad 13m, 210 n. 87; ad 1401, 73 nn. 49 and 51; q. 16, a. 6, ad 4m, 50 n. 173; q. 16, a. 8, 42 n. 140; ad 3m, 42 n. 138; ad 7m, 88 n. 135, 89 n. 139; q. 16, a. 12 c., 94 n. 170; ad im, 93 n. 168; ad 2m, 93 n. 168, 146 n. 231 De natura verbi intellectus (opus spur.): 172 n. 109 Depotentia: q. l, a. l, 148 text; c., 125 text& n. 112, 126 n. 113, 135 nn. 163 and 168; ad im, 126 n. 114, 136 n. 170; q. 2, 222 n. 144; q. 2, a. 2 c., 126 n. 115, 136 n. 171; q. 3, a. 3, ad 2m, 148 n. 238; q. 3, a. 9, ad 22m, 160 n. 43; q. 3, a. 15 c., 120 n. 85, 130 n. 140; q. 3, a. 16 c., 216 n. 116; q. 5, a. 5 c., 121 n. 88; ad 14m, 130 n. 141, 131 n. 1 5°. 137 n. 177; q. 7, a. 10 c., 184 n. 189; q. 8, 222 n. 144; q. 8, a. 1, 22 n. 42; c., 15 n. 11, 17 n. 20, 21 n. 40, 22 n. 41, 23 n. 48, 77 n. 77, 108 n. 10, 130 n. HO, 135 "• 165, 136 n. 173, 200 n. 35, 222 n. 143; ad urn, 108 n. 14; ad 12m, 22 n. 44, 204 n. 54; q. 8, a. 3, ad 7m, 214 n. no; q. 9, 222 n. 144; q. 9, a. 5 c., 15 n. 11, 17 n. 20, 19 n. 29, 21 n. 40, 22 n. 42, 23 n. 48, 77 n. 77, 135 n. 165, 136 n. 173, 222 n. 143; q. 9, a. 9 c., 13 n. 3, 23 n. 46, 51 n. 178; ad 4m (lae ser.), 13011. 139; ad 8m (laeser.), 136 n. 174; ad 3111 (2ae ser.), 110 n. 2(); q. 1O, 222 n. 144; q. 10, a. l c., 108 n. 7, 114 n. 38, 130 n. 139; ad 8m, 108 n. 9; q. 10, a. 2 c., no n. 20; ad 4111, 110 n.

2O; ad 7m, 110 n. 20; q. 1O, a. 3, 214 n. 110; q. 10, a. 4 c., 110 n. 20; q. 10, a. 5 c., lion. 20 Derationibusfidei: c. 4, i l l n. 2() De spe: a. 3, 145 n. 225 De spiritualibus creaturis: a. 2, 90 n. 144; a. 8, ad 14111, 161 n. 54; a. 9, 182 n. 180; ad 6m, 78 n. 82, 135 n. 167, 178 n. 151; ad 15m, 180 n. 161, 185 n. 191; a. 10, 182 n. 180; c., 90 n. 145, 95 n. 176; ad 4m, 93 n. 169; ad 8m, 60 n. l, 95 n. 176; ad 14m, 182 n. 179; ad 15111, 89 n. 142; a. 11 c., 128 n. 125, 145 n. 222 De substantiis separatis; c. 3, 46 n. 159; c. 12, 196 n. 15 De unione Verbi incarnati: a. 5 c., 129 n. 129 De unitate intellectus (ed. Keeler): c. l, § 23, 160 n. 45; § 24, 160 n. 44; §§ 35-38, 161 n. 51; § 35, 160 n. 45; § 37, 160 n. 45; § 38, 160 n. 45; § 4«, 173 n. 113; §46, i6on. 45;c. 3, §§ 71-79, 90 n. 144; § 71, 130 nn. 135 and 140; § 74, 117 n. 65; c. 4, § 98, 183 n. 182; c. 5, § no, 178 n. 149; §111, 176 n. 136 De veritate: q. l, a. l, 21 n. 38, 57 n. 205; q. l, a. 2c., 16 n. 15; ad 4m, 58 n. 211, 96 n. 185; q. 1, a. 3, 2O n. 34; q. 1, a. 4, ad 5m, 95 n. 176; q. l, a. 9 c., 21 n. 37, 58 n. 210, 86 n. 125, 87 n. 126, 96 n. 183, 97 n. 195, 98 n. 198; q. 1, a. 12 c., 23 n. 46,37 n. 118, 48 n. 165, 68 n. 33, 75 n. 63, 173 n. 112; qq. 2-3, 66 n. 21; q. 2, a. 1, ad 9m, 48 n. 167; q. 2, a. 2, 246 text; c., 162 n. 57, 197 n. 22; q. 2, a. 3, 202 n. 47; ad im, 85 n. 12O; q. 2, a - 5 c., 53 n. 192; q. 2, a. 6 c., 41 n. 130, 174 n. 119, 180 n. 167, 181 n. 173, 183 n. 181; ad im, 53 n. 190, 55 n. 197, 179 n. 159; ad 3m, 89 n. 142; q. 2, a. 7, 63 n. 10; c., 63 n. 7; ad 5m, 49 n. 168; q.

The Robert Mollot Collection

293

Index of Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

3, a. 2, 19 text, 23 n. 49, 25 n. 52, 85 n. 121, 202 nn. 43 and 47; c., 17 n. 20, 21 n. 41, 77 n. 77, 135 n. 164, 136 n. 17 177 n. 149, 200 n. 34, 221 n. 140; q. a. 1 c., 19 n. 30; ad 7m, 15 n. 12; q. 4, a. 2, 221 n. 140; c., 15 n. ll, 17 n. 20, 19 n. 30, 23 n. 49, 24 n. 50, 50 n. 173 51 n. 174, 77 n. 77, 199 n. 32; ad 2m 99 n. 201; ad 3m, 22 n. 41, 200 n. 35 ad 4m, 136 n. 174; ad 5m, 22 nn. 4 and 44, 136 n. 174, 148 text, 204 n. 53 ad 7m, 17 n. 21, 23 n. 49, 107 n. 5, 109 n. 17, 132 n. 156, 133 n. 157, 137 180, 206 n. 65, 212 n. 91; q. 4, a. 4, ad 3m, 99 n. 201; q. 4, a. 5 c., 99 n. 201; 5, a. i c., 128 n. 126; q. 5, a. 9, ad 4m, 129 n. 128; q. 8, a. l, 48 n. 164; ad 14m, 142 n. 2Ol; q. 8, a. 6, 46 n. 15 c., 120 n. 78, 130 nn. 137 and 140, 14 n. 217; q. 8, a. 7, 46 n. 159; ad 4m ( ser.), 173 n. 112, 180 n. 162; q. 8, 10, 65 n. 20; q. 8, a. ll c., 44 n. 150, 161 n. 53; q. 8, aa. 14-15, 63 n. 10; q. 8, a. 14, 65 n. 15; c., 65 n. 17; ad 12m, 114 nn. 41 and 44, 115 nn. 49 and 50; q. 8, a. 15, 67 n. 29; c., 69 n. 34; ad 3m 114 n. 40; q. 10, a. i, 13 n.$; c., 72 nn. 45 and 47; ad 6m, 52 n. 183; q. 1O, 2, oh. 5, 103 n. 214; c., 53 n. 193, 1 n. 102, 197 n. 17; ad 5m, 103 n. 21 ad 7m (lae ser.), 41 nn. 131 and 135, 42 n. 137, 171-72 n. 108; q. 1O, a. 221 n. 138; c., 103 n. 213, 111 n. 2O; 10, a. 4 c., 181 n. 170; ad im, 177 144, 180 n. 162; q. 1O, a. 5 c., 53 n 189, 161 n. 53, 180 n. 167, 181 n. 17 186 n. 194; ad im, 181 n. 172; q. 10 6, 93 n. 167; c., 76 n. 74, 92 nn. 156 and 162; q. 10, a. 7, 13 n. 3, 221 n. 1 c., in n. 20; ad 2m, 103 nn. 211 and 212; q. 1O, a. 8, 89 nn. 138, 141, an 143; < •< 88 nn. 135 and 136, 95 n. 17

Collected Works of Bernard I onerqan

101 nn. 202 and 203, 180 n. 168; a im (lae ser.), 70 n. 41, 155 n. 20, 158 n. 27, 186 n. 193; ad 9m (lae ser.), 177 n. 144; ad 2m (2ae ser.), 177 n. 144; ad 10m (2ae ser.), 91 n. 153, 175 n. 125; ad urn (2ae ser.), 94 n. 174; 10, a. 9 c., 72 n. 46, 174 n. 119, 177 n. 144, 183 n. 181; ad im, 177 n. 144; ad 3m, 177 n. 144; ad 5m, 177 n. 144; ad lorn, 177 n. 144; q. 10, a. 10 c., 177 n. 149; q. 10, a. ll c., 174 n. 118; ad 4m, 177 n. 144; q. ll, a. 1 c., 17 n. 23, 95 n. 176; ad 3m, 58 n. 209, 96 n. 186; ad 13m, 92 n. 158; q. 12, a. l c., 74 n. 55; q. 12, a. 3 c., 121 n. 88; ad 2m, 75 n. 65, 76 n. 72; q. 12, a. 7 c., 95 n. 180; q. 12, a. 12 c., 95 n. 181; q. 14, a. l, 73 n. 53, 78 n. 82; c., 66 n. 22, 73 nn. 48 and 50, 173 n. 112; q. 14, a. 2, 48 n. 164; q 14, a. 3 c., 130 n. 140; q. 15, a. i, 66 n 27; q. 15, a. 2, ad 3m, 48 n. 165, 49 170, 173 n. 112, 180 n. 164; q. 15, a. c., 55 n. 74; ad im, 173 n. 112; q. 16, a l, ad 13m, 119 n. 73, 139 n. 187; q. a. 8, ad 3m, 93 n. 167; ad 4m, 41 n 134, 173 n. 113; q. 19, a. i, ob. 4, 179 n. 158; ob. 5, 179 n. 158; c., 42 n. 140 170 n. i(X); ad 4m, 179 n. 158; ad 5m 179 n. 158; q. 19, a. 2, 170 n. 101; q 2O, a. 5 c., 49 n. 169, 180 n. 163; q. 2 a. 2 c-., 210 n. 84; q. 22, a. 3 c., 121 n. 88; q. 22, a. 5, ad 8m, 121 n. 88, 13(1-7 n. 175, 197 n. 18; q. 22, a. 6, ad 4m, 7 n. 62; q. 24, a. 1, ad l8m, 75 n. 62; 25, a. 3c., 173 n. ll2;q. 26, a. l c., 117 nn. 67 and 68; q. 26, aa. 2-3, 118 n. 70; q. 26, a. 3, ad 4m, 119 n. 73; ad l8m, 101 n. 205 Derirtutibus in communi: a. l, ad 14m, 145 n. 227; a. 3 (., 145 n. 226; ad 119 n. 73; a. 12, ad 5m, 145 n. 227 //( Ari\totcli\ libros l)e caelo et mundo: c. 1,

294

Index of Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

lect. 3, § 4, 121 n. 88; lect. 19, § 4, 55 n. 197 In Aristotelis libros De generatione et corruptione: c. 1, lect. 10, § 2,116 n. 59; §7, 116 n. 59 In Aristotelis libros Peri hermeneias: prooemium, 78 n. 82; c. 1, lect. 2, 166 n. 76; § 15, 15 n. 13; § 17, 14 n. 6; §§ 19 & 21, 16 n. 17; lect. 3, 166 n. 76; §31, 15 n. 14; lect. 5, 61 n. 4, 78 n. 82; lect. 10, §5, 173 n. 112 In Aristotelis libros Posteriorum analyticorum: In I, lect. l, 78 n. 82; lect. 2, 67 n. 28; lect. 4, 28 n. 58; lect. 5, 57 n. 205; lect. 42, § 5, 180 n. 162; In II, lect. i, 26 n. 53; § 408, 26 n. 53; § 416, 27 n. 55; §417, 27 n. 56; lect. 5, §9, 173 n. 112; lect. 7, 30 n. 68, 32 n. 86; lect. 8, 30 n. 68, 32 n. 86; lect. 9, 26 n. 53, 31 n. 72; lect. 20, 43 nn - H3, 149, and 150 In Aristotelis libros Physicorum: In I, lect. 13. § 2, 154 n. 9, 156 n. 21; § 9, 154 n. 13; lect. 15, § 10, 154 n. 14; In II, lect. l, § 4, 121 n. 88, 135 n. 166; § 5, 122 n. 92; lect. 2, 122 n. 93; § l, 154 n. 10; §3, 155 n. 18; lect. 3, 55 n. 197; lect. 4, 31 n. 74; §6, 131 n. 145; §8, 125 n. 113; lect. 5, 31 n. 72, 33 n. 91; §§ 3-4, 155 n. 18; § 5, 108 n. 12, 143 n. 207, 144 n. 2li; lect. 10, 31 n. 71; §4, 129 n. 129; §15, 144 n. 213; In III, lect. 2, §3, 112 n. 28; § 5, 112 n. 28; lect. 4-5, 158 n. 28; lect. 4, § 6, 131 nn. 145 and 147; lect. 5, § 13, 132 n. 154; § 15, 132 n. 155; In IV, lect. 16-22, 112 n. 29; In V, lect. 2-4, 113 n. 30; lect. 4, § 2, 116 n. 58; In VI, lect. 5, 113 n. 31; §§ 11-16, 113 n. 34; lect. 8, § 5, 113 n. 32; § 15, 113 n. 34; lect. 12, 113 n. 31; In VII, lect. l, § 7, 114 n. 38; lect. 3, §§ 4-10, 143 n. 208; lect. 4, § 2, 116 n. 59; lect.

5-6, 116 n. 59; In VIII, lect. i, § 7, 114 n. 38; lect. 4-6, 113 n. 30; lect. 8, 125 n. 113, 144 n. 210; § 7, 121 n. 88; lect. 21, §9, 131 n. 147 In Psalmos, 33, v. 9, 104 n. 215 Quaestiones quodlibetales (vetus divisio): q. l, a. 9, 116 n. 55; q. 4, a. 9 c., 132 n. 153; q- 5, »• 9 c., 15 n. 11, 17 n. 20, 77 n. 77,136 n. 172,177 n. 149; ad im, 22 n. 41, 166 & n. 75, 2OO n. 35; ad 2m, 141 n. 198; q. 7, a. l, 93 n. 167; c., 177 n. 144; q. 7, a. 2, 65 n. 15; c., 177 n. 149; q- 7.a-10, ad 4m, 148 n. 237; q. 8, a. 4, 177 n. 149; q. 9, a. 9, 116 n. 55; q. 10, a. 5, 145 n. 222; q. 10, a. 7, 48 n. 164; c., 95 n. 176; ad 2m, 91 n. 150; q. 11, a. 4, n6n. 55 Sententia libriDe anima: In I, lect. 2, §§ 19-20, 160 n. 43; lect. 10, § 152, 89 n. 142; §§ 157-62,118 n. 70; § 159,160 n. 43; In II, lect. i, § 216, 125 n. 113; lect. 2, § 239, 31 n. 73, 32 n. 76, 125 n. 113, 160 n. 42; § 241, 160 nn. 42 and 43; lect. 4, §§ 271-75, 33 n. 87; § 272, 117 n. 65; §277, 145 n. 221; lect. 6, § 299, 138 n. 183; §§ 304-6, 138 n. 184; §§ 304-8, 87 n. 128; § 305, 5 n. 4, 139 n. 186; § 308, 87 n. 130, 180 n. 168; lect. 7, §§319-23, 147 n. 235; lect. 10, §350, 118 n. 70, 141 n. 190; §351, 160 n. 40; §356,113 n. 36, u8n. 7i;§357, 160 n. 40; lect. 11, 125 n. 113; §§36572, 118 n. 70; § 366, 145 n. 221, 160 n. 39; §§369-72, 114 n. 37; lect. 12, 125 n. 113; §373-74, 161 n. 50; §377, 160 n- 43; §382, 118 n. 70, 160 n. 39; lect. 13, §393,141 n. 191; §394, Hon. 189; §§ 395-98, 155 n. 16; §§ 396-98, 43 n. 149; lect. 14, §420, 155 n. 16; §425, 131 n. 148; lect. 18, § 477, 14 n. 5; lect. 19, §§483-86, 145 n. 221; lect. 24, § 551, 160 n. 41; §§ 551-54, 44 n. 150,

The Robert Mollot Collection

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Index of Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

146 n. 230, 161 n. 52, 162 n. 55; § 555, 32 n. 77; §§ 556-57, 32 n. 78; In III, lect. 2, § 591, 158 n. 31; §§ 591-96,158 n. 3»; § 592, H7 n. 65, 159 n. 34; §§ 594-96,158 n. 32; §§ 597-98,159 n. 33; § 598, 32 n. 77; lect. 4, §§ 634-35, no n. 20; lect. 7, §§675-76, 142 n. 1991 § 676, 118 n. 70; §§ 679-82,160 n. 43; §§684-88, 160 n. 43; §§687-88, 118 n. 70; §690, 89 n. 144, 225 n. 147; lect. 8, §§ 700-704, 42 n. 140; § 704,88 n. 132; §§ 705-16, 169 n. 92; §§ 70519, 48 n. 165; § 707, 175 n. 125; §§ 707-8, 55 n. 197; § 713, 40 n. 128, 88 n. 134, 169 n. 95; § 714, 55 n. 197; § 717, 48 n. 165, 169 n. 93; lect. 9, §720, n8n. 70, 142 n. 199; §721, 180 n. 168; § 722, 118 n. 70, 142 n. 199; §§ 724-25,180 n. 168; § 724, 88 n. 133, 90 n. 148; § 725, 99 n. 131; § 726,87 n. 129; lect. 10, 182 n. 180; § 728, 94 n. 171; § 729, 94 n. 172; §§ 730-3L 94 n. 173; §§ 732-33, 94 n. 174; §§ 734-39, 94 n. 175; §§ 737-39, 93 n. 169; § 739, 93 n. 168; lect. 11, 78 n. 82, 187 n. 195; § 724, 88 n. 133; § 725, 88 n. 131; § 726, 87 n. 129; § 746, 20 n. 34; §§ 747-49, 64 n. 13; § 749, 64 n. 14; §§ 749-51, 75 n. 68; § 762, 186 n. 192; lect. 12, §§ 765-66, 118 n. 70; § 766, 114 nn. 39,40 and 43,115 n. 48; §772, 27 n. 54; § 777, 27 n. 54, 175 n. 128, 179 n. 153; lect. 13, § 790, 58 n. 210, 96 n. 189, 97 n. 191; § 791, 27 n. 54; lect. 15, § 835, 143 n. 208 Sententia libri Ethicorum: In I, lect. 11 ad fin., 24 n. 51; In VI, lect. 2, 3, and 4, 129 n. 127; lect. 5, 68 n. 33, 79 n. 83, 80 n. 84, 80 n. 86; InX, lect 3, i l l n. 23; lect. 5, 112 n. 24, 114 n. 44, 115 nn. 49 and 50 Sententia libri Metaphysicae: In I, lect. 1,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

80 n. 88; §§ 2-4, 37 n. 119, 48 n. 164; § 19, 43 n. 144; § 23, 43 nn. 146 and H7; § 24, 43 nn. 146 and 147; § 29, 43 nn. 146 and 147; §30, 43 n. 145; lect. 2, 81 n. 89; lect. 3, 81 n. 90; § 54~55, 37 n. 119, 48 n. 164; § 56, 78 n. 81, 80 n. 87; §§66-67, 37 n. 119, 48 n. 164; lect. 4, § 70, 31 n. 72, 34 n. 96, 36 n. 115,81 n. 91; lect. 1O, §157, 40 n. 127, 55 n. 197; lect. 11, § 175, 28 n. 59, 34 n. 96; §§ 175-78, 33 n. 90; lect 13, § 202-3, 33 n. 90; lect. 17, § 272, 28 n. 59, 31 n. 74, 34 n. 96, 52 n. 180; In II, lect. i, §§ 275-76, 52 n. 182; § 275, 81 n. 96; § 276, 81 n. 97; § 277, 69 n. 36, 70 n. 40, 81 n. 98; § 278, 74 n. 54; § 285, 81 n. 99; §§ 287-88, 52 n. 181; §§ 292-98, 82 nn. 102 and 104; § 298, 82 n. 101; lect 3, 82 n. 103; lect. 4, 82 n. 103; § 328, 113 n. 35; lect. 5, 82 n. 105; In III, lect 1-15, 82 n. 106; In IV, lect 1-4, 82 n. 108; lect. 2, § 553, 70 n. 42; lect. 5-10, 82 n. no; lect 5, § 593, 78 n. 81, 82 n. 107; § 595, 82 n. 109,99 n. 199; lect 6, § 605, 57 n. 205, 69 n. 36, 70 n. 39, 78 n. 82; § 606, 83 n. 114; lect. 7,34 n. 95; § 625, 35 n. 104; § 627, 34 n. 95; lect. 11-15, 82 n. in; lect 14, § 698, 76 n. 72; lect. 15, §§ 708-9, 76 n. 72; lect. 16, 82 n. 110; § 733, 20 n. 32; lect. 17, 82 n. no; In V, lect. l22, 82 n. 112; lect. 2, § 764, 31 n. 72, 36 n. 115; §§ 765-70, 143 n. 207; lect. 3, § 779, 31 n. 72; § 786, 31 n. 72, 33 n. 91; lect. 7, § 864, 34 n. 95; lect. 9, 97 n. 193: §§889-96, 61 n. 5; §§895-96, 16 n. 15; lect. 10, § 902, 36 n. 116; § 904, 29 n. 63; lect. 14, §955, 121 n. 88, 122 nn. 90 and 91, 128 n. 122, 135 n. 166; lect 17, § 1020, 64 n. 13; §§ 1023-25, 122 n. 89; lect. 19, § 1048, 35 n. 104; lect. 20, §§ 1065-69, 117 n. 60; § 1066,

296

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lect. 3, § 1709, 35 n. 106; lect. 5, 120 n. 83; In VI, lect. 1, § 1145, 55 n. § 1760, 55 n. 197; In IX, 81 n. 93; lect. 197; § 1152, 129 n. 131; lect. 4, § 122526, 63 n. 9; § 1229, 65 nn. 16 and 17; 1, §§ 1776-77, 122 nn. 90 and 91; lect. 2, § 1788, 129 n. 131; lect. 5, § 1826, 56 § 1230, 20 n. 32; §§ 1230-31, 16 n. 15; n. 201; §§ 1827-29, 56 n. 202; § 1828, §§ 1231-36, 2O n. 34; § 1232, 78 n. 82; 35 n. ill; §§ 1828-29, 125 n. 113; §§ 1232-36, 72 n. 44; § 1236, 21 n. 37, § 1829, 128 n. 123; lect. 7, §§ 1844-45, 87 n. 127; In VII, 81 n. 92; lect. l, 123 n. 96, 146 n. 229; lect. 8, 130 n. § 1269, 35 n. 107; lect. 2, § 1270, 34 n. 135; § 1864, 120 n. 86; lect. 10, § 188897, 36 n. 117; § 1275, 34 n. 97; § 1284, 93, 28 n. 57; lect. 11, § 1896, 63 n. 9; 115 n. 17; § 1285, 154 n. ll; lect. 3, §§ 1897-1900, 37 n. 121; § 1898, 63 n. §§ 1308-10, 31 n. 69, 34 n. 94; § 1309, 35 n. 104; lect. 4,37 n. 120, 187 n. 19 8; §§ 1899-1900, 75 n. 68; §§ 1901-3, 63 n. 10; § 1904, 46 n. 159; InX, 81 n. §§ 1331-34, 35 n. 105; §§ 1339-41, 3 94; In XI, lect. 7, § 2253,129 n. 131; In n. 105; §§ 1352-55, 35 n. 105; lect XII, 81 n. 95; lect. 2, § 2436, 113 n. 35; 31 n. 70, 175 n. 130; § 1363, 34 n. 9 lect. 4, §§ 2468-72, 143 n. 207; lect. 7, 155 n. 19, 169 n. 94; § 1366, 34 n. 94 §§ 2519-20, 135 n. 166; lect. ll, 46 n. § 1378, 34 n. 94, 35 n. 104; lect. 6-8 158; 196 n. 15; § 2617, 196 n. 15 37 n. 122; lect. 6, § 1404, 35 n. 100; Summa contra Gentiles: Book l, c. 3, 52 n. §§ 1405-10, 18 n. 25; lect. 7, § 1421, 184; c. 44, § 5, 197 n. 23; cc. 45~48, n. 98; § 1422, 34 n. 98, 35 n. 104; lec 197 n. 24; cc. 46-52, 66 n. 21; cc. 468, §§ 1450-52, 37 n. 122; lect. 9-15, 54 54, 19 text; c. 47, § 5, 201 n. 42, 203 n. n. 194; lect. 9, §§ 1461-63, 156 n. 23; 50; cc. 48-55, 202 n. 47; c. 51, 85 n. § 1473, 29 n. 64, 36 n. 117, 133 n. 15 120; c. 53, 17 n. 19, 19 text, 22 n. 41, 187 n. 198; §§ 1474-81, 156 n. 23; lect. 85 n. 121, 202 n. 43; § 3, 162 n. 58, 165 10, §§ 1483-91, 157 n. 24; § 1484, 32 n. n. 73; c. 55, 65 n. 15; § 2, 65 n. 17; c. 83, 35 n. lio; § 1487, 35 n. 99, 35 n. 110; § 1490, 164 n. 64; § 1491, 35 n. 9 58, § 5, 173 n. 112; c. 72, § 7, 135 n. 166, 212 n. 90; Book 2, c. l, §§ 2-4, § 1493, 35 n. 104; §§ 1494-96, 55 n. 130 n. 144; § 3, 130 n. 139; § 4, 120 197; § 1496, 154 n. 12; lect. ll, §§ 1507-8, 55 n. 197; § 1519, 157 n. 79, 130 n. 138; § 5, 130 n. 138; c. 7, § 2, 127 n. 117; § 3, 127 n. 119; c. 9, § 3, lect. 12, § 1552, 52 n. 183; lect. 13, § 1567, 35 n. 101; § 1577, 35 n. 120 n. 81; § 5, 120 n. 81; c. 10, 126 n. lect. 15, 53 n. 191; § 1606, 36 n. 117; 114; § l, 127 n. 118; c. 23, §5, 130 n. § 1608, 34 n. 98; § 1626, 53 n. 191; lect. 140; c. 30, § 12, 126 n. 116, 147 n. 236; 16, §§ 1642-46, 46 n. 157; lect. 17, § 13, 126 n. 116, 144 n. 209; cc. 46-90, 68 n. 32; c. 46, § 2, 135 n. 166; c. 49, § 1648, 35 n. 103; § 1649, 35 n. 113; §§ 1649-51, 28 n. 60; §§ 1666-68, 28 n. § 8, 160 n. 43; c. 50, § 4, 160 n. 43; § 5, 61; §§ 1667-68, 35 n. 114; § 1668, 35 n. 162 n. 55; c. 55, § 10, 179 n. 154; c. 57, i°3; §§ 1669-71, 46 n. 156; §§ 1672160 n. 43, 161 n. 51; §8, 141 n. 193; c. 80, 32 n. 75; § 1678, 35 n. 103; In VIII, 59, § 14, 174 n. 120, 185 n. 191; c. 60, 81 n. 92; lect. l, § 1685, 35 n. 112; §8, 142 n. 202; c. 73, 43 n. 141; §§ 14§ 1686, 113 n. 35; § 1689, 155 n. 15; 16, 184 n. 186; §§26-28, 184 n. 186;

The Robert Mollot Collection

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Index of Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

§ 38, 42 nn. 139 and 140, 173 n. 11 174 n. 121,175 n. 126; c. 74, § 3, 171 107; c. 75, § 3, 178 n. 149; § 7, 178 149; § 13, 88 n. 135; cc. 76-78, 182 180; c. 76, § 15, 119 n. 74, 141 n. 194 § 17, 90 n. 145; c. 77, 91 n. 149. 93 169; c. 80, § 6, 173 n. 113; c. 81, § 6 173 n. 113; c. 82, 160 n. 43, 161 n. 51; §17, U4n. 38; c. 83, § 3i.45n. 15 58 n. 207, 69 n. 37, 96 n. 187; c. §8,179 n. 157; c. 93, §2, 175 n. 125; c 94, 45 n. 155; § 5, 179 n. 157; c. 96, n. 70; §§3-5, 179 n. 157; §3, 173 n H3; §§9-io, i79n. 160; c. 97, 90 147; § 3, 225 n. 149; c. 98, 58 n. 210, n. 20, 85 n. 119, 96 nn. 184, 188, a 190; §9, 179 n. 155; §§ 19-20,192 n. Book 3, c. 22, § 2, 119 n. 75; c. 23, 148 text; §4, 121 n. 88; §7, 121 n. 88; §8, 121 n. 88; § 9, 121 n. 88; c. 25, 48 n. 164; cc. 25-63, 48 n. 164; c. 41, 45 n. 155; §3,173 n. ii2;c.46,88n. 135,92 n. 155; c. 48, 48 n. 164, 52 n. 185; 52 n. 186; c. 50, 27 n. 53, 48 n. 164; 51, 66 n. 23; c. 52, 66 n. 26; c. 54, § 8 179 n. 156; c. 56, 45 n. 152, 48 n. 1 49-50 n. 172; § 5, 173 n. 112, 180 165; c. 63, 48 n. 164; c. 88, § 5, 135 166; c. 108, §4, 173 n. 112; c. ill, 12 n. 129; c. 112, § i, 129 n. 129; Book c. ll, 17 n. 19, 86 nn. 123 and 124, 99 n. 200; §§ 1-7, 206 n. 68, 222 n. 141; §§4-5, 13 n. 4; §6, 15 n. ll, 19 n. 31, 208 n. 77; § 7, 208 n. 79; § 11, 208 n. 78; § 17, 208 n. 78; c. 12, 99 n. 201; c. 14, § 3, 23 n. 47, 50 n. 173, 51 nn. 177 and 179; 107 n. 6, 153 n. 4; c. 19, 209 text; § 4, 210 n. 88, § 7, 210 n. 85, § 8, 110 n. 20, § 9, 210 n. 88; c. 24, § 12, 110 n. 20; c. 59, § 4, 137 n. 176 Summa theologiae, Prima pars: q. 1, a. 2, 215 n. 114; c.,63n. lO;q. 1, a. 30., 1

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

n. 189; q. 1, a. 6 c., 78 n. 80, 101 n 204; ad 2m, 1O1 n. 204; q. 1, a. 7, 21 n. 114; c., 140 n. 189; q. 1, a. 8 c., 10 n. 204; qq. 2-26, 213 n. 1O1; q. 2, a. c., 144 n. 212; q. 3, a. 4, ad 2m, 21 n 39, 62 n. 6, 73 n. 53; q. 5, a. 2 c., 57 n. 205; q. 9, a. 2 c., 144 n. 215; q. 12, a. l c., 48 n. 164, 215 n. 113; q. 12, a. 2, 160 n. 39; q. 12, a. 4, 168 n. 85; c., 169 n. 91; q. 12, a. 5, 160 n. 39; q. 12, aa. 8-10, 2O2 n. 47; q. 12, a. 8, 24 n. 51; ad 4m, 48 n. 164, 66 n. 24; q. 12, a. 10, 24 n. 51; q. 12, a. 11, ad 3m, 95 n. 176; q. 13, a. l c., 163 n. 63, 198 n. 28; q. 13, a. 11 c., 58 n. 208, 208 n. 80; q. 14, a. l, 246 text; q. 14, a. 2, 197 n. 25, 201 n. 41, 208 n. 82; c., 84 n. 115, 117 n. 65, 130 n. 139; q. 14, a. 3 c., 208 n. 81; q. 14, a. 4, 197 n. 25, 201 n. 41, 208 n. 82; c., 137 n. 181, 148 n. 240, 197 n. 17; 14, aa. 5-6, 19 n. 26, 66 n. 21, 202 n. 47, 203 n. 51; q. 14, a. 5, 19 n. 26, 202 n. 47, 203 n. 51; ad 2m, 85 n. 120; ad 3m, 135 n. 165, 203 n. 48; q. 14, a. 19 n. 26, 202 n. 47, 203 n. 51; q. 14, a 7 c., 24 n. 51, 68 n. 30; q. 14, a. 14, 63 n. 10; q. 15, aa. 1-3, 19 n. 26, 66 n. 202 nn. 43 and 47; q. 15, a. l, 66 n. 21 2O2 n. 47; q. 15, a. 2, 66 n. 21, 202 nn. 43 and 47; c., 21 n. 36, 85 n. 121, 136 n. 172, 166 n. 74; q. 15, a. 3, 66 n. 21; c., 20 n. 33; q. 16, a. l, 21 n. 38; c., 16 n. 15; q. 16, a. 2, 2O n. 34, 63 n. 12, 87 n. 127; c., 21 n. 37, 72 n. 44; q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m, 63 n. 11, 198 n. 26; q. 16, a. 6, ad im, 95 n. 176; q. 16, a. 7, 76 n. 69; q. 17, a. 2, ad im, 141 n. 195; q. 17, a. 3, 48 n. 165; ad im, 173 n. 112; q. 18, a. l c., 114 n. 42; q. 18, a. 2 c., 173 n. 112; q. 18, a. 3, ad im, 114 n. 45, 130 n. 140; q. 23, a. 2, ad im, 130 n. 14 q. 25, a. l, oh. 3, 127 n. 121; c., 108 n.

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13, 127 n. 120; ad im, 127 n. 119; ad 3m, 126 n. 114, 133 n. 157; qq. 587-29, 213 n. 103; q. 27, 2l6 n. 115; intr 213 n. 102; q. 27, a. 1, 17 n. 22; c., 15 n. 11, 22 n. 42, 46 n. 162, 108 n. 8, 13 n. 140, 204 nn. 56 and 6l, 206 n. 69 ad 2m, 206 nn. 66, 67, and 70, 207 75; ad 3m, 19 n. 26, 206 n. 71; q. 27, 2, ob. 2, 206 n. 71; c., 207 n. 72, 208 n. 76; ad 2m, 208 n. 78; ad 3m, 207 n. q. 27, a. 3 c., 130 n. 140, 207 n. 74; a 3m, no n. 20; q. 27, a. 5 c., 130 n. 141 n. 196; ad im, 108 n. 13, 204 n. ad 3m, 212 n. 92; q. 28, 2l6 n. 115; q. 28, a. 4 c., 108 n. 10, 130 n. 140; ad im, 108 n. 14; qq. 30-32, 214 n. 105; q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m, 22 n. 44, 204 n. 55, 2l8 n. 131; qq. 33-38, 214 n. 106; q. 33, a. l, ad im, 108 n. 9; q. 34, a. i, 17 n. 22; c., 14 nn. 7 and 8, 15 n. 11, 24 n. 50, 51 n. 175, 198 n. 27; ad 2m, 99 n. 201,136 n. 174, 138 n. 182, 148 n. 24 197 n. 17; ad 3m, 23 n. 49, 136 n. 174, 199 n. 29, 2OO n. 35, 203 n. 49; ad 4m, 99 n. 201; q. 34, a. 2, 2l6 n. 116; ad im, 208 n. 78; ad 4m, 199 n. 29, 217 n. 129; q. 35, a. 2, 2l6 n. 116; q. 36, a. 2 c., 110 n. 2O; q. 36, a. 4 c., 217 n. 122; ad im, 217 nn. 125 and 129; ad 7m, 217 n. 123; q. 37, a. l, 216 n. 116; ad 4m, 217 n. 129; q. 37, a. 2, ad 2m, 204 n. 58; ad 3m, 204 n. 59; q. 38, a. 2, 216 n. 116; q. 39, 214 n. 107; q. 40, 214 n. 108; q. 40, a. 4 c., 214 n. no; q. 41, 214 n. 109; q. 41, a. l, ad 2m, 108 n. 11, 132 n. 153; q. 41, a. 2, ad 3m, 217 n. 126; q. 41, a. 4 c., 217 n. 127; q. 4 a. 5, 217 nn. 128 and 129; sed con., 216 n. 118; c., 216 n. 119, 217 nn. 120 and 124; q. 41, a. 6, ad im, 217 121 and 129; q. 42, a. l, ad im, 144 216; q. 42, a. 3 c., 214 n. in; ad 2m,

214 n. Ill; q. 44, a. 2, 52 n. 180; q. 4 a. 4, ad im, 140 n. 189; q. 53, aa. 1116 n. 55; q. 53, a. l, ad 2m, 114 n. 42 116 n. 55; ad 3m, 116 n. 55; q. 54, aa 1-3, 197 n. 19; q. 54, a. l c., 120 n. 80 ad im, 94 n. 174; ad 3m, 130 n. 140; 54, a. 2 c., 130 n. 140; q. 54, a. 3 c., n. 124, 145 n. 222; q. 55, a. 3, 24 n. c., 65 nn. 19 and 20; q. 56, a. l c., 130 n. 140, 135 n. 166; q. 56, a. 2, ad 84 n. 116, 161 n. 54, 162 n. 56; q. 57, a l, ad 2m, 173 n. 112; q. 57, a. 2 c., 5 n. 190, 179 n. 159; q. 58, a. l, ad i 114 n. 42; q. 58, aa. 2-4, 24 n. 51, 63 10; q. 58, a. 5 c., 173 n. 112; q. 59, a. c., 144 n. 215; q. 62, a. l c., 48 n. 16 q. 67, a. 3 c., 173 n. 112; q. 75, a. 161 n. 46; c., 161 n. 49; ad 2m, 89 n. 142; ad 3m, 160 n. 43; q. 75, a. 3, 160 n. 43, 161 n. 51; q. 75, a. 6, 161 n. 51; q. 76, a. l c., 90 n. 144; q. 76, a. 2, ad 3m, 176 n. 136; q. 76, a. 4 c., 144 n 214; q. 76, a. 8, ob. 3, 32 n. 76; ad 32 n. 76; q. 77, a. l c., 145 n. 222; ad 4m, 144 n. 219; ad 7m, 52 n. 183; 77, a. 3 c., 120 n. 82, 140 n. 189; a 2m, 140 n. 189; ad 4m, 140 n. 189; 77, a. 5, ad 3m, 160 n. 43; q. 77, a. 145 n. 223; ad 2m, 147 n. 234; ad 145 n. 224, 177 n. 235; q. 78, a. 3 140 n. 189; ad 2m, 140 n. 189; 4, ob. 5, 43 n. 148, 93 n. 165, 18 185; c., 43 n. 148; ad 5m, 43 n. 148, n. 165, 184 n. 185; q. 79, 168 n. 84; 79, a. l c., 145 n. 222; q. 79, a. 2, 58 n. 210; c., 96 n. 184, 117 n. 67, 118 n. 69, 142 n. 203; q. 79, a. 3, 182 n. 180; 79, a. 4, 182 n. 180; ob. 5, 120 n. 84; c 90 n. 145; ad 3m, 182 n. 177, 184 183; ad 4m, 93 n. 169, 182 n. 178; 79, a. 5, ad 2m, 182 n. 179; q. 79, c., 58 n. 211, 96 n. 185, 182 n. 177;

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79, a. 8 c., 66 n. 27, 74 n. 56, 74~75 n. 173 n. 112, 187 n. 196; ad 3m, 168 n. 58, 153 n. 6; q. 79, a. 9 c., 74 n. 57; ad 85; q. 85, a. 6, 48 n. 165; c., 173 n. 11 3m, 49 n. 171; q. 79, a. 10, 196 n. 15; q. 85, a. 8, 48 n. 165, 168 n. 85, 170 ad 3m, 78 n. 80; q. 79, a. 12 c., 74~75 97; c., 168 nn. 88 and 89; q. 86, a. i, 40 n. 58; q. 82, a. 4 c., 135 n. 166, 212 n. 128, 180 n. 166; ob. i, 16 n. 18; c., 90; ad im, 140 n. 189; qq. 84-86, 1 16 n. 18, 170 n. 99, 175 n. 127, 182 n. n. 143; qq. 84-89, 168 n. 84; q. 84, 17 175; ad 2m, 16 n. 18; q. 86, a. 2, 168 n. text, 176 n. 143; q. 84, aa. 1-2, 176 85; q. 86, a. 3, 180 n. 166; c., 182 n 143; q- 84, a. 1 c., 176 n. 136; q. 84, a 176; q. 86, a. 4 c., 179 n. 159; q. 87, a 2 c., 159 n. 37, 162 n. 57, 176 n. 137; q. 1-4, 88 n. 135, 180 n. 168; q. 87, a 84, aa. 3-6, 176 n. 143; q. 84, a. 3 c., 89 n. 143; c., 52 n. 187, 161 n. 48; a 176 n. 138; q. 84, a. 4 c., 171 n. 10 3m, 46 n. 159, 84 n. 118,117 n. 65,15 176 n. 139; q. 84, a. 5, 95 n. 176; c., 85 n. 35, 181 n. 173, 185 n. 19; q. 87, a. n. 122, 176 n. 140; q. 84, a. 6, 160 ad 2m, 168 n. 85; q. 87, a. 3, 168 nn. 43; c., 92 n. 163, 176 n. 141; ad im, 85 and 87, 170 n. 97; c., 130 n. 136, n. 182; q. 84, aa. 7-8, 176 n. 143; q. 8 138 n. 185; q. 88, a. 1 c., 90 n. 146; a. 7, 40 n. 128, 42 n. 137, 48 n. 1 88, a. 2, ad 3m, 90 n. 147, 225 n. 1 168 n. 85,172 text; c., 38 n. 124, 163 n q. 88, a. 3, 168 n. 85; c., 168 nn. 87 61, 168 n. 90, 169 n. 96, 170 n. 98, 173 and 89, 170 n. 97; ad im, 95 n. 176; q. n. ill, 176 n. 142; ad 3m, 42 n. 138, 7 89, a. l c., 170 n. loo, 171 n. 107; ad n. 71; q. 84, a. 8, 168 n. 85; Sed con., im, 160 n. 43; ad 3m, 171 n. 107; q. 75 n. 67; c., 168 n. 86, 176 n. 143; ad 89, a. 4, 170 n. 101; q. 93, aa. 6-8, 221 2m, 75 nn. 64 and 66; q. 85, a. l, 168 n. 139; q. 93, a. 6 c., 13 n. 3, 192 n. 3; n. 85; ob. 5, 175 n. 127; c., 160 n. 42, q- 93. a. 7 c-> !Q1 text & n. l; ad 4m, 169 n. 91, 175 nn. 123 and 132, 176 n 102 n. 207; q. 97, a. 8, ad 3m, 104 n. 133; ad im, 175 n. 132, 178 n. 152, 1 2l6; q. 105, a. 5 c., 135 n. 166 Summa theologiae, Prima secundae: q. 3, text; ad 2m, 53 n. 188, 55 nn. 197 an a. 2, 132 n. 151; ad 3m, 12O n. 86, 130 199, 133 n. 160, 157 n. 25, 168 n. 8 nn. 139 and 140; q. 3, a. 8, 48 n. 164, 176 n. 134; ad 3m, 171 n. 103, 178 150, 185 n. 190; ad 4m, 184 n. 184; 66 n. 25; c., 48 n. 164, 92 n. 161, 97 n. 5m, 42 n. 137, 133 n. 161, 175 n. 1 196, 173 n. 112; q. 5, a. 6, ad 2m, 131 n. 148; q. 6, a. 4, 147 n. 233; ad 2 182 n. 175; q. 85, a. 2, 21 n. 36, c., 130 n. 140, 133 n. 159, 135 n. 166, 177 147 n. 233; q. 6, a. 5, 147 n. 233; q. 9 a. l c., 135 n. 166, q. 9, a. 3, 143 n. 144 and 146, 178 nn. 149 and 151, 1 n. 173, 185 n. 191; ad 2m, 163 n. 60, 205; c., 137 n. 179; q. 9, a. 4, 143 n. 205; ad im, 147 n. 233; ad 2m, 147 n. 166 n. 77, 175 n. 129; ad 3m, 15 n. 11, 233; ad 301, 147 n. 233; q. 9, a. 6, 143 17 n. 19, 134 n. 162, 141 n. 197, 172 n. 205; q. 10, a. l, ad 3m, 173 n. 11 no, 177 nn. 146 and 148; q. 85, a. 3 q. 18, a. 2, ad 3m, 139 n. 187; q. 22, a. 178 n. 149, 181 n. 173, 185 n. 191; l c., 117 n. 67, 118 n. 70; q. 23, a. 4 c., im, 163 n. 60, 166 n. 77, 175 n. 129; q. 137 n. 176; q. 26, a. 2 c., 137 n. 176; q 85, aa. 4-5, 63 n. 10; q. 85, a. 4, 24 27, a. 3 c., 116 n. 54; q. 29, a. 6, 44 n. 51, 65 n. 15; c., 203 n. 52; q. 85, a. 5 c

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15°; q- 31. a- 2, ad im, 114 nn. 42, 44, and 45, 115 n. 50; q. 31, a. 5 c., 120 n. 87, 130 n. 142, 173 n. 112; q. 49, a. 3, ad im, 132 n. 151, 146 n. 228; q. 50, a. 4, ad im, 173 n. 113; q. 57, a. 2, ad 2m, 80 n. 85; q. 57, a. 4 c., 130 nn. 142 and 144; q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m, 57 n. 203, 70 n. 40, 80 n. 84, 82 n. 113, 97 n. 192; q. 74, a. l c., 130 nn. 142 and 143; q. 94, a. 2 c., 57 n. 205; q. 109, a. l c., 95 nn. 177 and 178; q. ill, a. 2 c., 120 n. 77, 143 n. 204, 144 n. 216 Summa theologiae, Secunda secundae: q. 1, a. 2 c., 63 n. 10; q. 2, a. 1, 73 n. 53; q. 4, a. l, 48 n. 164; q. 8, a. l c., 23 n. 46, 68 n. 33, 173 n. 112; ad 2m, 67 n. 28, 75 n. 58; q. 45, a. l c., 78 n. 80, q. 45, a. 2, 78 n. 80; c., 101 n. 205; q. 45, a. 5, 78 n. 80; q. 171, a. 3 c., 95 n. 177; q. 172, a. 1, ad 2m, 76 n. 72; q. 173, a. 2 i#4 n. 187; q. 173, a. 3 c., 76 n. 72; ad 3m, 76 n. 72; q. 179,a1, ad im, 131 n. 149; ad 3m, 114 n. 38; q. 180, a. 6 c., 114 n. 38; ad 2m, 45 n. 152 Summa theologiae, Tertia pars: q. 9, a. 1 c., 132 n. 151; q. 9, a. 4 c., 132 n. 151; q. 1O, a. 3, ad 2m, 173 n. 112; q. 11, a. 2, ad im, 175 n. 127, 182 n. 175; q. 12, a. 2 (., 42 n. 140; q. 13, a. l c:., 131 n. 147; q. 15, a. 4 c., 118 n. 70; q. 21, a. l, ad 3m, 114 nn. 42 and 45; q. 32, a. 4 c . , 121 n. 88; q. 75, a. 5, ad 2m, 173 n. 112; q. 76, a. 7 < . , 173 n. 112 Super I Sententtarum: d. 2, q. 1, a. 3 sol., 2() n. 32, 56 n. 200, 163 n. 62; d. 3, q. 3, a. l, 13 n-3; d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 sol., 144 n. 218; ad 3111, 144 n. 219; ad 4m, 135 n. 168; d. 3, q. 4, a. 3 sol., 41 n. 131, 173 n. 113; d. 3, q. 4, a. 4 sol., 102 n. 209; d. 3, q. 4, a. 5 sol., 88 n. 135, 91 n. 151, 102 nn. 200 and 208; d. 3, q. 5, a.

l, ad im, 93 n. 167; d. 4, q. l, a. l, ad im, 111 n. 22, 114 nn. 40 and 43; d. 5, q. 1, a. 2 sol., 99 n. 2Ol; d. 6, q. 1, a. 3 sol., 2l6 n. 117; d. 7, q. 1, aa. 1-3, 2l6 n. 117; d. 7, q. l, a. l, ad 3m, 115 n. 52, 125 n. HO; d. 7, q. 2, a. l sol., 216 n. 117; ad 4m, 216 n. 117; d. 8, q. 3, a. l, ad 3m, 137 n. 178, 145 n. 220; ad 4m, 124 n. 104; d. 8, q. 3, a. 2 sol., 142 n. 199; d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3m, 132 n. 152; d. 8, q. 5, a. 3 sol., 32 n. 76; d. 10, q. 1, a. 5 sol., 111 n. 2O; d. 11, q. 1, a. l, ad 4m, 109 n. 2O; d. 12, q. l, a. l, ad 2m, 111 n. 2O; ad 3m, 111 n. 2O; d. 12, q. l, a. 3, ad 3m, 111 n. 20; d. 13, q. l, a. l sol., 107 n. 3; ad 3m, 107 n. 4; d. 13, q. 1, a. 2 sol., 111 n. 2O; d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2m, 107 n. 4; ad 4m, 111 n. 20; d. 14, q. l, a. l, ad 3m, 124 n. 104; d. 15, q- 5, a- 3, ad 4m, 119 n. 72; d. 19, q. 5, a. l sol., 16 n. 15, 21 n. 38; ad 2m, 57 n. 205; ad 7m, 17 n. 24, 20 nn. 34 and 35, 57 n. 204, 78 n. 82, 97 n. 194, 169-70 n. 96, 173 n. 112; d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, 76 n. 69; d. 2O, q. 1, a. l, ad 4m, 124 n. 107; d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2m, 19 n. 27, 25 n. 52; d. 27, q. 2, a. l, 25 n. 52; oh. 4, 177 n. 149; sol., 14 nn. 7 and 9, 109 n. 20, 177 n. 149; ad 3m, 25 n. 52; ad 4m, 25 n. 52; d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, oh. 4, 177 n. 149; sol. i, 25 n. 52; d. 27, q. 2, a. 3, 25 n. 52; d. 32, q. 2, aa. 1-2, 99 n. 201; d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2m, 25 n. 52; dd. 35-36, 66 n. 21; d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3m, 197 n. 20; d. 35, q. l, a. 2, 19 n. 27, 197 n. 21; sol., 25 n. 52, 178 n. 149; ad im, 85 n. 120; d. 35, q. l, a. 5, ad 3m, 124 n. 104; ad 4m, 132 n. 151; d. 36, q. 2, a. 2 sol., 19 text; d. 37, q. 4, a. l, ad im, 114 nn. 38 and 40; d. 37, q. 4, aa. 1-3, 116 n. 55; d. 40, q. 1, a. l, ad im, 120 n. 78, 130 nn. 137 and 140,

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135 n. 169; d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, ob. 3, 125 n. 109; sol., 124 n. 98; ad im, 124 n. 99, 126 n. 113, 135 n. 168; ad 2m, 124 n. 100; ad 3m, 115 n. 52, 125 n. i l l ; ad 4m, 124 n. 101; ad 5m, 124 n. 1O2; d. 42, q. 1, a. 2 sol., 124 nn. 1OO and 105; ad 4m, 124 n. 101; ad 5m, 124 n. 102; d. 43, q. 2, a. l, ad 3m, 124 n. 103 Super IISententiarum: d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4m, 124 n. 106; d. 3, q. l, a. l sol., 115 n. 51; d. 3, q. 1, a. 2 sol., 45 n. 152, 92 n. 160; d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, 65 n. 2O; d. 3, q. 3, a. 3 sol., 53 n. 191; d. 3, q. 3, a. 4, 65 n. 15; ad 4m, 94 n. 174; d. 7, q. l, a. l sol., 75 n. 61; d. 8, q. 1, a. 5 sol., 173 n. 113; d. 9, q. l, a. 8, ad im, 66 n. 27, 75 n. 59; d. ll, q. 2, a. l sol., 114 n. 40, 115 n. 53; d. 11, q. 2, a. 3 sol., 25 n. 52, 177 n. 149; d. 12, 128 n. 126; d. 13, q. 1, a. 3 sol., 173 n. 112; d. 14, q. l, a. 3 sol., 121 n. 88; d. 15, q. 3, a. l, ad 3m, 124 n. 108; d. 15, q. 3, a. 2 sol., 114 n. 40, 124 n. 108; d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, 90 n. 144; sol., 41 nn. 130 and 132, 94 n. 172, 178 n. 149; d. 20, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2m, 41 n. 130, 93 n. 164, 174 n. 121; ad 3m, 173 "• US; d. 23, q- 2, a. 2, ad 3m, 173 n. 113; d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad im, 41 n. 131, 174 n. 118; d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, 70 n. 40; sol., 69 nn. 34 and 36; d. 33, q. 2, a. 2, 48 n. 164 Super III Sententiarum: d. 3, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6m, 121 n. 88; d. 14, q. l, a. l sol. 2, 58 n. 210, 93 n. 167, 96 n. 184; sol. 2, ad 2m, 94 n. 174; sol. 3, 93 n. 167; d. 14, q. 1, a. 2 sol. 4, 65 nn. 15 and 17; sol. 4, ad irn, 65 n. 15; d. 14, q. 1, a. 3 sol. 2, 41 n. 131, 173 n. 113; sol. 3, 42 n. 140,45 n. 152; sol. 5, ad 3m, 42 n. 14 d. 15, q. 2, a. l, qc. 2, lOl n. 205; sol. l, 117 n. 66; sol. 2, 117 n. 66, 142 n.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

200; d. 18, q. l, a. l sol., 131 n. 146, 175 n. 125; d. 22, q. 3, a. 2 sol. l, 121 n. 88; d. 23, q. l, a. 2, 45 n. 151; sol., 48 n. 165, 173 n. 112; ad im, 177 n. 149; ad 3m, 88 n. 135, 89 n. 137, 138 185, 180 n. 168; d. 23, q. l, a. 4 sol. ad 4m, 128 n. 126; d. 23, q. 2, a. l, 4m, 92 n. 155; d. 23, q- 2, a. 2 sol. l, n. 60, 78 n. 82; sol. 3, 73 n. 53; d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad im, 69 n. 35; d. 26, q. l, a. sol., 118 n. 70; d. 27, q. 3, a. 1 sol., 173 n. 113; d. 31, q. 2, a. 1 sol. 2, 114 nn. 40 and 46, 115 n. 47, 116 n. 54; d. 31, q. 2, a. 4, ad 5m, 174 n. 118; d. 33, q. 2, a. 2 sol. 1, 128 n. 126; d. 35, q. 1, l sol., 128 n. 126; d. 35, q. 2, a. l, 10 n. 205; d. 35, q. 2, a. 2 sol. l, 23 n. 46 68 n. 33, 173 n. 112 Super IVSententiarum: d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 sol 2, ad 2m, 173 n. 112; d. 17, q. l, a. sol. 3, ad im, 114 nn. 38, 42, and 44 115 nn. 49 and 50; d. 43, q. l, a. l sol 3, 121 n. 88; d. 44, q. 3, a. l sol. 3, 118 n. 70; d. 49, q. 2, a. l, 48 n. 164; a 15m, 177 n. 144; d. 49, q. 2, a. 3 so 173 n. 112; d. 49, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3m, 4 n. 130, 45 n. 153, 178 n. 149; d. 49 2, a. 7, ad 6m, 173 n. 112; ad gm, 95 176; ad 12m, 43 n. 142; d. 49, q. 3, a. sol. l, ob. 2, 114 n. 46; sol. 3, 114 n 44, 115 nn. 49 and 50; d. 49, q. 3, a. sol., 131 n. 151, 137 n. 177; d. 50, q. a. l sol., 45 n. 153, 170 n. 1OO; d. 50, q I, a. 2 sol., 171 nn. 102 and 104, 174 118; d. 50, q. 1, a. 3, 170 n. 101; sol., 44 n. 150, 180 n. 167, 181 n. 173; im, 44 n. 150; d. 50, q. l, a. 4 sol., n. 192 Super Epistolas Pauli, In I (lor.: c. 1, lect. 3, 99 n. 201 Super loannem: c. 1, lect. l, 15 nn. loand II, 17 n. 20, 22 nn. 41, 43, and 45, 45

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n. 151, 51 nn. 176 and 177, 68 n. 31, 77 n. 77, 200 n. 35 Super librum BoethiiDe trinitate: q. 1, a. 3, ob. 3, 57 n. 205; c., 92 n. 159; ad im, 91 n. 152, 92 n. 157, 95 n. 176; q. 3, a. 1, 73 n. 53; ad 4m, 73 n. 52, 77 n. 79, 92 n. 154, 98 n. 197; qq. 5-6, 54 n. 194; q. 5, a. 2 c., 164 n. 65, 165 nn. 66 and 67, 179 n. 159; ad 2m, 173 n. 112, 175 n. 124; ad 4m, 21 n. 36, 165 n. 67; q. 5, a. 3, 55 n. 197, 78 n. 82, 156 n. 22; c.,

17 n. 24, 54 n. 194, 57 n. 204, 167 nn. 78 and 79,168 nn. 82 and 83; q. 6, a. 2 c., 41 n. 130, 55 n. 198, 76 n. 73,173 n. 113; ad 5m, 42 n. 137,43 n. 141,173 n. 113; q. 6, a. 3 c., 48 n. 166; q. 6, a. 4, 45 n. 155; c., 48 n. 166, 57 n. 205 Super librumDecausis: lect. 1, 135 n. 166; lect. 6, 173 n. 112 Super librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus: c. 2, lect. 4, § 191, 101 n. 205; c. 4, lect. 7, 114 nn. 38 and 42

References to Aristotle Categories: 34, 61, 117, 239; c. 2, la 17, 61 n. 2; c. 8, 8b28- loa 10, H7n. 6i;gb 27-34, 117 n. 62 Deanima: 4, 5, ill, 113-14, 149, 169; Book II, 87; Book III, 114, 158, 169, 173; I, c. 4, 4o8b 14, 89 n. 142; c. 5, 4093 19 - 41 la 7, 159 n. 38; n, c. i, 4i2a 10, 125 n. 113; 4i2a 20, 32 n. 79; 4i2a 22-27, 125 n. 113; 4i2a 27, 32 n. 80; 4i2b 4-5, 4 n. 2, 4i2b 5, 32 n. 81; 4l2b 9, 32 n. 82; 4l2b 9-11, 32 n. 83; 4l2b 17-24, 32 n. 76; 4i2b 18, 32 n. 84; 412b 2O-22, 31 n. 73; c. 2, 4133 12, 32 nn. 85 and 86; 4143 4-27, 33 n. 87; 4143 11, 117 n. 65; 4143 14, 33 n. 88; 4143 25, 145 n. 22i; 4Ha 27, 33 n. 89; c. 3, 414 b 32 - 4i5a 13, 138 n. 183; c. 4, 4153 14-20, 4 n. 3; 4153 14-22, 138 n. 184; 4l5b 8-28, 147 n. 235; c. 5, 4i6b33, ii7n. 64;4i6b35-4i7a2, 160 n. 40; 4173 14, 117 n. 64; 4173 1417, 113 n. 36; 4173 16, 113 n. 35; 4173 18, 160 n. 40; 4173 21 - 4183 6, 125 n. 113; 4l7b 2, 117 n. 64; 4l7b 2-7, 114 n. 37; 4i7b 14, H4 n. 37; 4170 16-19, 161 n. 50; 4i7b 22, 165 n. 68; c. 12, 4243 17-23, 160 n. 41; 4243 18, 113 n. 35; 4243 27, 32 n. 77; 4243 28 - 4240 3,

32 n. 78; in, c. 2, 425b 26 - 426a 26, 158 n. 30; 4263 4-6, 117 n. 65; 426b 7, 32 n. 77; c. 4, 4293 13-15, 142 n. 199; 4293 21-22,161 n. 47; 42gb 10-21,169 n. 92; 429b 22-25, 142 n. 199; 42gb 30 - 4303 2, 161 n. 47; 4303 3, 46 n. 159, 117 n. 65; 4303 3-4, 84 n. 118; 43Oa 35, 193 n. 8; c. 5, 4303 10-13, u? n. 64; 4303 20,117 n. 65; c. 6,43Oa 26, 187 n. 195; 43ob 5, 187 n. 195; c. 7, 431* 1, 117 n. 65; 4313 5-8, ill n. 21, 114 n. 39; 4313 6,113 n. 35; 4313 14, 27 n. 54, 41 n. 129, 174 n. 116; 4313 16, 174 n. 115; 43ib 2, 27 n. 54, 41 n. 129, 174 n. 117, 175 n. 128; 43ib 15-16, 168 n. 81; 43ib 17, 117 n. 65; c. 8, 43ib 22, 117 n. 65; 4323 3-10, 27 n. 54, 38 n. 123, 41 n. I29l432aio, 113^35 De caelo et mundo: m, c. 2, 3Olb 17-18, 123 n. 95 De generatione et corruptione: I, c. 7, 323b 17 - 3243 24, 144 n. 209; 324b 15, 144 n. 209 Departibus animalium: I, c. 1, 6403 20-24, 31 n. 74; 640b 31-36, 31 n. 73; 6413 18-21,31 n. 73 Ethics: II, c. 5, iiosb 20-23, 116 & n. 56; V, ill n. 22; VI, c. 2, ll^Qa 1Q. 12Q n.

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129; c. 3,11390 14-18,129 n. 127; c. 4, 28 n. 60; 10413 9 - iO4ib 9, 195 n. 1 11403 1-5, 129 n. 127; c. 5, 11400 iO4ib 4-8, 28 n. 61; iO4ib 7-8, 195 n. 2-4, 129 n. 127; IX, c. 9, 11703 29-34, 12; iO4ib 11-32, 32 n. 75; iO4ib 2589 & n. 140; X, ill n. 22; c. 3, 11733 27, 195 n. 12; K, c. l, 10463 9-16, 1 nn. 90 and 91; c. 6, iO48b 6-9,125 n. 29-34, in Sen. 23; c. 4, 11743 14-b 9, 112 n. 24 113; iO48b 18-34, 112 n. 25; c. 8, Metaphysics: 18, 27, 43, 121, 130, 167; iO49b 5-10, 146 n. 229; iO49b 5-11, Book I, 43; Book III, 165; Bookv, 1 123 n. 96; iO49b 9, 128 n. 123; 10503 25; Book IX, 114, 129-30; Book XI, 3-9, 129 n. 132; I050a 23-29, 129 n. 165; Book XIII, 165; I, c. 3, 9833 26-31, 133; 10503 30-37, 129 n. 134; c. 9, 10513 22-33, 28 n. 57; X, c. l, 10523 31 n. 72; 9833 30, 143 n. 207; 9843 27, 143 n. 207; c. 6, 987b 14-18, 40 n. 1 36, 187 n. 195; I052b 15, 187 n. 195; c. 7, 9883 18 - 988b 5, 28 n. 59; 9883 XI, c. l, iO5gb 26, 165 n. 68; c. 2, 34 - 988b 5, 33 n. 90; c. 8, g8gb io6ob 20-23, 165 n. 71; c. 3, 10613 28 - io6ib l, 168 n. 81; XII, c. 2, io69b 9903 12, 33 n. 90; c. 10,993* 11-24, 28 12, 116 n. 58; c. 4, iO7Ob 22, 143 n. n. 59; 993a 17, 31 n. 74; HI, c. 6, 10033 6-17, 165 n. 70; 10033 14-17, 165 n. 207; iO7Ob 28, 143 n. 207; c. 9, 10743 70; IV, c. 2, !OO4b 6, 116 n. 57; !OO4b 3-4, 193 n. 8; iO74b 34, 46 n. 158; c. 10, 116 n. 57; V, c. 2, 10133 27, 31 n. 10, 10753 34, 193 n. 8; xni, c. l, 10763 72; 10133 29-32,143 n. 207; ioi3b 23, 17-23, 40 n. 127; c. 3, iO77b 17-23, 31 n. 72; ioi3b 33, 31 n. 72, 33 n. 91; 168 n. 81; 10783 14-31, 55 n. 197; c. 4, i078b 9-34, 33 n. 92; io78b 25-28, 81 c. 8, ioi7b 10-16, 29 n. 62; ioi7b 1416, 195 n. 12; c. 10, 5 & n. 5; c. n. 100; c. 10, 10873 10-25, 165 n. 71; 10193 15-21, 122 nn. 90 and 91; 10193 XTV, c. l, 10883 32, 116 n. 58 On Interpretation: c. l, 163 5-8, 16 n. 17; 17, 123 n. 94; c. 15, iO2ia 15-18, 122 c. 2, 163 19 - 4, i6b 35, 16 n. 16; c. 3, n. 89; c. 21, I022b 15,116 n. 58; iO22b 15-21, 117 n. 60; VI, c. l, iO25b 19-26, i6b 19-25, 61 n. 3 129 n. 131; VII, c. 3, 10293 20, 154 n. Physics: 31, ill, 112, 113, 123, 130, 131, 11; 10293 26-33, 35 n. 108; c. 4, iO2gb 149, 158, 244; II, c. 1, 192b, 21-22, 122 12, 35 n. 109; I029b 13-23, 31 n. 69; c. n. 92; I92b 23, 123 n. 94; c. 2, I93b 23 6, 31 n. 70, 169, 175 n. 130; iO3ib 3-5, - 1943 18, 55 n. 197; 1943 20, 31 n. 155 n. 19, 169 n. 94; cc. 7-9, 37 n. 122; c. 3, I94b 16 - I95b 27, 31 n. 72; I94b cc. 10-11, 156 n. 22, 167 n. 80; cc. 1027-28, 33 n. 91; I94b 29-31, 143 n. 207; c. 7, 1983 14-18, 31 n. 71; HI, c. l, 15. 54 n. 194; c. 10, I034b 20 - iO35b 2013 10-14, 112 n. 27; c. 2, 2Oib 24i, 156 n. 23; I035b 2-10, 157 n. 24; 33, 112 n. 26; 2023 9, 131 n. 145; c. 3, 10350 14, 32 n. 83; I035b 14-32, 157 2O23 13, 128 n. 123; 2O23 22 - b 29, n. 24; I035b 27-30, 164 n. 64; 10363 8, 158 n. 28; 2023 23-24, 117 n. 63; V, c. 154 n. 12; 10363 13-26, 157 n. 26; c. 2, 2263 26, 116 n. 58; VII, c. 2, 2433 1611, iO36b 24-29,157 n. 24; c. 13, 18, 143 n. 208; VIII, c. 4, 2553 30 - b I038b 35, 165 n. 69; c. 15, losgb 27, 31, 125 n. 113 165 n. 68; c. 16, 10413 4, 195 n. 11; c. 17, 10413 9-10, 195 n. 12; 10413 9-32, Posterior Analytics: 26, 27, 28 n. 58, 43,

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45 & n. 152, 28 n. 58; I, c. 2, ?lb 9-19, 28 n. 58; c. 31, 87b 27 - 88a 4, 165 n. 68; n, c. 2, 8gb 36 - goa 34, 26 n. 53; goa 24-31, 27 n. 55; 8-10, 30 n. 68, 32 n. 86; c. ll, 943 20-36, 31 n. 72; 94b 20-26, 26 n. 53

Topics: 27 n. 53, 30; I, c. 4, loib 19 and 21, 30 n. 67; c. 5, loib 39, 30 n. 67; iO2a 14-17, 30 n. 68; iO2a 18, 30 n. 66; c. 8,103 9-10, 30 n. 66; V, c. 3, 131!) 37 - 1323 9, 30 n. 66; c. 4, 1333 i, 6, and 9, 30 n. 66

The Robert Mollot Collection

Lexicon of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases

Translations and/or explanations were sometimes given in a free style by Lonergan himself, amd we use these (indicated by 'L') when possible. Note that the lexicon sometimes repeats translations given above in text or notes. Latin Words and Prases a quo est principium motus: (that) from which comes the origin of motion [L: 'the Aristotelian definition of efficient cause'] acquisitio essendi: the acquisition of being actio: action, activity actio in passo: action (is) in the recipient actio manens in agente: action remaining in the agent actio secundum primam nominis impositionem importat originem motus: action in the primary use of the word means the origin of motion activum: active actu intelligibile: intelligible in act actualis intellectio: actual understanding actus: act actus essendi: act of being, of existing actus existentis in actu: act of something existing in act actus existentis in actu secundum quod huiusmodi: act of something existing in act insofar as it is in act actus imperfecti: act of an incomplete being [L: 'act of the incomplete'] actus perfecti: act of a complete being actus primus corporis naturalis organici: first act of a natural organic body ad intra: toward the interior

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

306

Index of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases

ad mentem Divi Thomae: according to the mind of St Thomas agere: to act, activity agibile: action that may be taken alia huiusmodi: other things of this sort aliquam actionem exercere: to exercise some activity amare: to love amari: to be loved amor: love amor dicitur transformare amantem in amatum, inquantum per amorem movetur amans ad ipsam rem amatarn: love is said to transform the one loving into the loved, insofar as the one loving is moved by love toward that thing which is loved amor procedens: love that proceeds amor procedit a mente: love proceeds from the mind an sit: is it? whether it is anima est quodammodo omnia: in a certain way the soul is all things anima separata: soul separated (from the body) appetere: to desire appeti: to be desired aspectus: look [L (active sense): 'gaze'] attingentia: an attaining attingentia obiecti: attaining an object audire: to hear auditus: hearing [L: 'the faculty'] bonum et malum sunt in rebus, sed verum et falsum sunt in mente: good and evil are in things but truth and falsity are in the mind bruta aguntur et non agunt: brutes are acted on and do not act causa ... quodammodo activa: cause ... in some way active causa essendi: cause of being causa formalis: formal cause causa materiae: cause of matter [i.e., giving matter a certain form; not to be confused with 'materia causae'] causae effectivae: effective causes causatum: something caused certitudo intellectus: certitude of intellect cogitare: to think cogitatio cogitationis: the thinking of thought cogitativa: the cogitative (faculty) [L: 'a sensitive potency ... which operates under the influence of intellect and prepares suitable phantasms'] cognoscens est ipsum cognitum, actu vel potentia: the knower is the known itself, in act or in potency

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307

Index of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases

cognoscere: to know communicabile (or communicabilis) multis: communicable to many conununis cursus iudicantium: the common run of those judging complexa: complex things complexa incomplexe: (knowing) complex things without complexity (in the knowing) compositio: composition compositio vel divisio: composition or division (of subject and predicate) conceptio: (mental) conception conceptio, conceptus, conceptum: conceiving, concept, what is conceived considerare: to consider consortium divintun: divine society conveniens appetitui: suited to the appetite creatio passiva: passive creation crede ut intelligas: 'believe that you may understand' [L] crux Trinitatis: the crucial question on the Trinity de ratione specie!: belonging to the idea of the species de ratione specie! circuli: belonging to the idea of the species, circle de ratione specie! hominis: belonging to the idea of the species, man definitio: definition determinatio intellectus ad unum: fixing the intellect on one (object) Deus est: God is, exists Deus operatur in omni operante: God is active in everything acting diaphanum: diaphanous dicens: speaking, the one speaking dicere: to speak, to utter (a word) dicere verbum: to utter a word directe apprehendit quidditatem carnis; per reflexionem autem, ipsam carnem: apprehends directly the quiddity of flesh; but apprehends by reflexion the flesh itself discernere: to discern disiecta membra: scattered members donum: gift duo spirantes: two who spirate duplex actio: twofold action duplex actus secundus: twofold second act duplex operatic: twofold operation, action eductio principiati a suo principio: the drawing forth from its principle of what is caused by the principle emanatio intelligibilis: intelligible emanation eminenter: eminently

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Index of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases

ens: being, a being, something that exists ens actu: an actually existing being ens, id quod est vel esse potest: being, that which is or can be ens in actu: being existing in act ens intelligibile: intelligible being ens quod: a being which ens reale: real being ens, ununi, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi: see separate entries for each entia quibus: beings by which eo rnagis unum: thereby more one, more unified eo magis unum, quo perfectius procedit: to the extent that it proceeds more perfectly, it is thereby more one (with that from which it proceeds); see also quanto perfectius procedit esse: to be, to exist, being, existence esse cognitum: known being (or, to be known) esse intellectum: to be understood, the fact of being understood [L: an extrinsic denomination of a thing that is understood] esse intelligibile: intelligible being esse intentionale: intentional being esse naturale: the being a thing has in the order of nature [as distinct Irom its being in the mind of a knower] esse obiectivum: objective being esse rei: being of a thing esse ... significat compositionem propositionis: to be ... signifies the combining (of subject and predicate) in a proposition est: is est autem amatum in arnante secundum quod amatur: the thing loved is in the one loving inasmuch as it is loved Est, Est: Yes, Yes (It is, It is) est simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse: 'is' said without qualification means being in actuality ex operibus eorum cognoscetis eos: from their woiks [scripture: 'fruits'] you will know them ex pede Herculem: (to know) the whole from the part [lit.: Hercules from his foot] excogitate: to think out [L: 'a thinking out'] exitus causati a causa: emergence of the thing caused l i m n the cause experieiitia consortii divini: experience of divine society fxpr«rssum ab alio f-xpi'-s^ed In a n o t h c t facere: to make facit intelligentem simpliciter: it makes a person intelligent without qualification factibile: something that can be made

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factio: a making factivum: a making agent forma: form forma accidentalis ... per quam producitur operatic: accidental form ... through which an operation is produced forma gravitatis: form of gravity forma intelligibilis: intelligible form forma naturalis: natural form formam in materia quidem corporal! individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia: form existing indeed individually in corporeal matter, but not in the way it is in such matter formido contradictorii: fear of the contradictory generans: the one generating habitudo: relationship habitus principiorum: habit of principles [L: 'habit of intellect'] hi homines: these men hie et nunc: here and now hie homo: this man hie homo intelligit: this man understands hoc enim animis omnium communiter inditum fuit, quod simile simili cognoscitur: for this is given innately in everyone's mind that like is known by like homo: man human!tas: humanity id quod amatur est hi amante secundum quod actu amatur: that which is loved is in the one loving insofar as it is actually loved idem est motus in imaginem et rem cuius est imago: movement lowaid th« iiii,.^'c is identical with movement toward the thing that is imaged imaginatio vocis: image of a (spoken) wo id imago: image imago Dei: image of God immobilia: immovable things in actu esse: to be in act in alio vel qua aliud: in another or as other hi facto esse: in (a state) of actual being (as opposed to becoming) in fieri: in (a state) of becoming (as opposed to being) in genere intelligibilium: in the genus of intelligible things in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intelligens et intellectum: in the immaterial order the one understanding and the thing understood are identical [L (Understanding and Being): 'in things that are without matter the one that understands and what is understood are identical'] hi obliquo: obliquely

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Index of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases

in ratione tnedii cognoscendi: belonging to the idea of a medium of knowing in recto: directly in Verbo: in the (eternal) Word incomplexa: things constituted simply incomplexe: without complexity indivisibilium intelligentia: see intelligentia indivisibilium intellectum: understood intellectual in actu secundo: understood in second act intellectus: intellect, the habit of understanding, the faculty of understanding [noun]; understood [participle] intellectus agens: agent intellect intellectus passivus: passive intellect intellectus possibilis: potential intellect intellectus ut terminus rationis: understanding as term of reasoning intelligens: intelligent, the one understanding intelligentia: 'understanding' [L] intelligentia indivisibilium: understanding of noncomposite things intelligentia intelligentiae: understanding of understanding intelligere: to understand [L: 'the principal meaning of intelligere is understanding'] intelligere est pati quoddam (est quoddam pati, quoddam pati est): to understand is to be changed (to receive an effect) in some way intelligere multa per unum: to understand many things through one intelligere proprie: understanding in the proper sense intelligibile: something intelligible intelligibile in actu: intelligible in act intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu: the intelligible in act is the intellect in act intelligibile in actu primo: intelligible in first act intentio: intention, mental word intentio intellecta: mental word understood intentio universalitatis: intention of universality ipse autem conceptus cordis de ratione sua habet quod ab alio procedat, scilicet, a notitia concipientis: but the interior concept has (the implication), as pertaining to its very idea, that it proceeds from another, namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving ipsum esse: being itself [used of God: subsistent being; used of human beings, has a reflexive sense] ipsum intelligere: understanding itself [used of God: subsistent understanding; used of human beings, has a reflexive sense] iudicium autem de unoquoque habetur secundum illud quod est mensura illius: but judgment is made about each thing according to that which is its measure lumen animae nostrae: the light of our soul

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materia causae: matter for a cause [see Summa theologiae i, q. 84, a. 6 c.: sense knowledge is not the total cause of intellectual knowledge but in a certain way is matter for the cause] materia communis: common matter materia designata (or materia signata): designated matter [that is, 'this' matter] materia individualis: individual matter materia intelligibilis: intelligible matter materia prima: prime matter materia sensibilis: sensible matter materia signata: see materia designata medium in quo: medium in which memoria: memory memoria, intelligentia, amor: memory, understanding, love modus enim actionis est secundum modum formae agentis: for the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the form of the agent modus essendi: mode of being mota et non movens: moved and not moving [transitive sense] motor: mover, moving agent motum esse: to be moved motus: movement motus existentis in actu: movement of a thing existing in act movens: moving [transitive sense] moveri: to be moved multa per unum: many things through one natura rei: the nature of a thing nee habent aliam operationem vitae nisi intelligere: nor have they (angels) any other vital activity besides understanding nomen mentis a mensurando est sumptum: the word 'mind' is taken from (the act of) measuring Non, Non: No, No non agunt: see bruta aguntur non soluni discens sed et patiens divina: not only learning divine things but also receiving them notionaliter diligere: to love understood in the notional sense notitia: knowledge obiectum commune intellectus: common object of (every) intellect obiectum proprium intellectus humani: proper object of human intellect omne agens agit sibi simile: everything acting produces something similar to itself omne illud in quo est aliquis ordo unius ex alio vel post aliud: everything in which there is some order of one thing from another or after another

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operari sequitur esse: activity follows being operatic: operation, activity, etc. [L: 'in many contexts it denotes the exercise of efficient causality ... also means simply "being in act" ...'] operatic consequens formam: activity following form operatic enim alicuius effectus attribuitur non mobili sed moventi: for the production of any effect is attributed not to the thing that can be moved but to the thing moving (it) operatic non activa sed receptiva: not an active operation but a receptive one operatic receptiva: receptive operation operatic sensus iam facti in actu per suarn speciem: operation of sense already brought to act by its species operation: the effect produced, the term reached [L: 'effect,or term'] opusculum: small (written) work origo motus: origin of movement pars animae intellectiva intelligit species a phantasmatibus abstractas: the intellective part of the soul understands species abstracted from phantasms pars materiae: part of the matter partes materiae: parts of the matter partes specie!: parts of the species participatio creata lucis increatae: created participation of uncreated light passio: passion, effect caused, movement produced pati: to be changed, moved, to receive, to suffer [L: 'In the Sentences some nine meanings ... distinguished ... the basic meaning is considered to be "alteration for the worse" ...'] pati communiter: pati in most general sense pati proprie: pati in proper sense pati quoddam: a kind of pati per: through, by per accidens: (occurring) by chance per modum amoris: by the mode of love per modum intelligibilem: by the intelligible mode per modum intelligibilis actionis: by the mode of intelligible action per modum voluntatis: by the mode of the will per se ipsum: by itself, of itself per se nota: see principia per se nota per similitudinem speciei: by the likeness of the species perfici: to be completed, perfected philosophia perennis: perennial philosophy pie, sedulo, sobrie: with piety, diligence, moderation [the correct order is 'sedulo, pie, et sobrie'] posse omnia fieri: to be able to become all things

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potens omnia facere: able to make all things potens omnia facere et fieri: able to make or become all things potentia: potency [L (on Avicenna's usage): 'a large number of meanings ... better rendered by "power" ... initially referred to powerful men'] potentia activa: active potency ['Aristotelian sense ... "efficient potency" ... Avicennist sense ... "active potency" ...'] potentia activa est principiium operationis in aliud sicut in effectum production, non sicut in materiam transmutatam: an active potency is a principle of operation on another as on the effect produced, not as on the matter that is changed potentia et actus: potency and act potentia generandi: potency to generate potentia motiva: potency that moves [transitive sense] potentia operativa: potency that operates potentia passiva: passive potency ['Aristotelian sense ... "receptive potency" ... Avicennist sense ... "passive potency" ...'] potentia spirandi: potency to spirate praemotio physica: physical premotion praxis: action (moral conduct) prima lux: first light (God) prima operatic respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius: the first operation regards the quiddity of the thing, the second regards its existence primo et per se cognitum: what is known first and of itself primo et per se intellectum: what is understood first and of itself principia per se nota: principles known of themselves, self-evident principles principium: principle principium actionis: principle of action principium activum: active principle principium activum motus: active principle of change principium actus intelligendi: principle of the act of understanding principium agendi in aliud: principle of acting upon another principium agendi in aliud secundum quod est aliud: principle of acting upon another insofar as it is other principium effectus: principle of an effect [L: 'amounts to a generalization of Aristotelian efficient potency'] principium effectus, operati, termini producti: principle of an effect, of something done, of a term produced principium essendi: principle of being principium et causa: principle and cause principium formale actionis: formal principle of action principium formale quo intellectus intelligit: formal principle by which intellect understands principium motus: principle of motion

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principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens: principle of motion and rest within the thing in which it occurs first and per se and not by accident [L: 'nature'] principium motus in eo in quo est motus: principle of motion in that in which the mo ton occurs [L: 'nature'] principium motus in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens: principle of motion in that in which the motion occurs first and per se and not by accident principium motus vel mutationis in alio inquantum est aliud: principle of motion or change in another insofar as it is other [L: 'the Aristotelian definition of efficent potency'] principium motus vel mutationis in alio vel qua aliud: principle of motion or change in another or as another [L: Aristotle's 'efficient cause'] principium operandi et praeter hoc ut principium operati: principle of operation and besides this as a principle of the thing produced by the operation principium operati: principle of a thing produced by an operation principium operationis: principle of operation principium operationis vel actionis: principle of operation or action principium transmutationis in aliud inquantum aliud: principle of change in another insofar as it is other principium variationis ab illo in aliud inquantum illud est aliud: principle of variation from one thing to another insofar as that is other [L: 'clearly the Aristotelian efficient potency'] principium verbi: principle of a word principium, verbum, amor: principle, word, love processio intelligibilis: intelligible procession processio operati: procession of something produced by an operation [L: 'the emergence of one thing from another'] processio operationis: 'the emergence of a perfection from (and in) what is perfected' [L] processiones intelligibiles: intelligible processions processu intelligibili: by intelligible procession producere verbum: to produce a word productivum: productive proprius actus fit in propria potentia: the act proper to a potency occurs in its proper potency propter quid: the reason why, the cause

qua: as quae: which quae est materia determinatis dimensionibus substans: which is the matter that is the subject of determinate dimensions [L: 'individual matter']

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quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens: any nature whatever is essentially being quale: such, of a certain kind (see also quid, quantum) quanto perfectins procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit: the more perfectly it proceeds, the more it is one with that from which it proceeds (see also eo magis unum) quantum: a certain quantity (see also quid, quale) quasi quamdam reflexionem: like a sort of reflexion quasi quidam motus: like a sort of motion quia: because [thus literally, but in a certain context it means 'that,' where knowing 'that' is distinguished from knowing 'why'] quia, ut puto, latuit eum: because, as I think, it escaped his notice quid: what quid est esse (rei): what the being (of a thing) is [see Aquinas on the Metaphysics, §864] quid nominis: what the name means [definition of the name] quid rei: what the thing is [definition of the thing] quid sit: what is it? what it is quid sit Deus: what God is quidditas: quiddity, essence quidditas formata: formed quiddity, essence conceived quidditas rei: quiddity of a thing quidditas rei materialis: quiddity of a material thing quidditas sive natura in materia corporal! existens: quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter quidditas sive natura rei materialis: quiddity or nature of a material thing quidditas sive natura rei materialis in materia corporali existens: quiddity or nature of a material thing existing in corporeal matter quidquid esse potest, intelligi potest: whatever can be can be understood quidquid movetur ab alio movetur: whatever is moved is moved by another quidquid recipitur: whatever is received quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur: whatever is received is received in the way proper to the receiver quo aliquid est: (that) by which something is quoad nos: in regard to us [in relation to our perception, etc.] quoad se: in regard to (what things are in) themselves quod quid erat esse: formal cause [approximately; L: 'essence or essential definition, but with a very special reference to the ground of essential definition, namely, the formal cause'] quod quid erat esse est substantia, et ratio significativa eius est definitio: the formal cause is substance, and the concept that signifies it is a definition quod quid est: what something is [L: 'is or corresponds to the essence or essential definition']

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quod quid est esse (rei): what the being (of a thing) is [see Aquinas on the Metaphysics, § 627] quoddam ... concreatum: something co-created quodammodo: in a way quomodo intelligenda sunt quae de Spiritu Sancto dicuntur? how are the things said about the Holy Spirit to be understood? ratio: cause, concept, definition, essence, form, formal property, formality, idea, intelligibility, meaning, nature, object of thought, reason, the what of a thing [any of above, according to the context] ratio albi: idea of white ratio definitiva rei: defining idea of a thing ratio ends et non entis: concept of being and not being ratio particularis: (faculty of) particular reason ratio quam significat nomen: concept which the name signifies ratio quidditativa rei: essential idea of a thing ratio rei: idea of a (certain) thing ratio superior: (faculty of) higher reason ratio terminatur ad intellectum: reason terminates in understanding [L: 'with the reasoning process successfully completed, understanding is achieved ... reasoning terminates in understanding inasmuch as inquiry eventually yields knowledge of essence ... reason is understanding in process ... reasoning ends up as an act of understanding'] ratiocinativum: reasoning faculty [L: 'the scientificum and the ratiocinativum; by the former we know the necessary; by the latter we know the contingent'] rationes: concepts [L: 'application of universal rationes to particular things'] recipere: to receive reductio ad principia: reduction to principles rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus sine quibus in reruni natura non existit: the thing as separated from the material conditions without which it docs not exist in reality res: thing res intellecta: thing understood res particularis: particular thing res particularis existens: an existing particular thing resolutio: resolution, reduction (to its elements) resolutio in imaginationem: reduction to the imagination resolutio in principia: reduction to principles resolutio in sensum: reduction to sense sapientia: wisdom sapientia genita: wisdom begotten

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sapientis enim est de nominibus non curare: for it is the mark of a wise person not to be fussy about words scientia: science scientificum: the faculty by which we know the necessary [see also ratiocinativum] secundum actionem intelligibilem: according to intelligible action secundum Aristotelis sententiam quam magis experimur: according to the view of Aristotle which agrees better with our experience secundum emanationem intelligibilem: according to intelligible emanation secundum modum cognitionis nobis expertum: according to the mode of cognition we experience secundum viarn doctrinae: according to the order used in teaching securitas affectus: security of affection sensibile in actu est sensus in actu: the thing sensed in act is the sense in act sensibile in actu est sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu: the thing sensed in act is the sense in act, and the intelligible in act is the intellect in act sensibilia communia: things that can be sensed in common [by a number of senses] sensibilia per se et propria: sensible things that are sensible per se and by the sense proper to them sensibilia propria: things that can be sensed by a sense proper to them sentire: to sense sicut actus imperfecti: as of an imperfect act sicut oritur actus ex actu: as act originates from act sicut potentia passiva sequitur ens in potentia, ita potentia activa sequitur ens in actu: as passive potency follows being in potency, so active potency follows being in act sicut rusticus cognoscit: the way a rustic person knows significabile: 'what can be meant' [L] significans: meaning (as participle) significativum: having a meaning [L: 'what can mean'] signiflcatum: 'what is meant' [L] simile omnino est in irnaginatione: it is exactly similar in the imagination simile simili cognoscitur: like is known by like simpliciter: simply, without qualification sine quo non: (a condition) without which there is no (act, procession) sophia: wisdom [L: 'understanding what is'] species: species species impressa: impressed species species in qua: species in which species intellecta: species understood species intelligibilis: intelligible species species intelligibilis quae: intelligible species which

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species qua: species by which

species qua intelligitur: species by which (a thing) is understood species quae: species which species quidem igitur intellectivum in phantasmatibus intelligit: the intellective faculty therefore understands species in phantasms species sensibilis: sensible species species sensibilis expressa: expressed sensible species substantial substance substantia, idest forma: substance, that is, form substantia rei quae est quod quid erat esse est principium et causa: the substance of a thing which is its formal cause is a principle and a cause superactiva: superactive supposition!: supposit [Scholastic term for the subject of all predications] syllogismus faciens scire: scientific or explanatory syllogism [giving knowledge] tendentia: a tending (toward) totum ens: total being (L: 'While God is totum ens without qualification, man is totum ens only quodammodo) wide principium motus: whence comes the principle of motion ['the primary source of the change': Phys. II, 3, I94b, 29 in the McKeon edition of Aristotle] unio: union unio, attingentia, tendentia: see those words universali in particular!: the universal in the particular unum: one unus spirator: one spirator ut puto: as I think velle: to will verbum: word

verbum cordis: interior word [literally, word of the heart] verbum intelligibiliter procedens: intelligibly proceeding word verbum interius: internal word verbum mentis: mental word verum: true (thing) vetera: old things vetera novis augere et perficere: to add to and perfect the old by means of the new via compositions: way (order) of composition, of synthesis via doctrinae: order of teaching via inventionis: order of discovery via inventionis vel inquisitionis: order of discovery or inquiry via iudicii: method of judging [L: 'has to do with the reflective activity of mind assaying its knowledge']

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via resolutionis: order of resolving [as resolving a proposition to first principles; in a second meaning, it is the same as via iudicii] videtur quod potentia generandi vel spirandi significet relationem et non essentiam: it seems that the potency to generate or spirate signifies a relation and not the essence virtus iudicativa: capacity to judge [L: has its main cause in 'agent intellect as spirit of critical reflection' ] virtus quaedam omnium scientiarum: a certain capacity containing all the sciences [L: said of wisdom as 'highest, architectonic science, a science of sciences'] virtus spirativa: capacity to spirate Greek Words and Phrases adiaireton: indivisible alloiosis: alteration anamnesis: a calling to mind arke kinetike: 'a principle of movement' [Metaphysics IX, 8, 10490 9, in McKeon edition of Aristotle] dunamis: power dunamis poietike kai pathetike: power that is (both) efficient and receptive eide: species (plural), forms eidos: species (singular), form energeia: act, operation energeia tou tetelesmenou: act of a completed thing energein: to operate episteme: grasping the implications of an idea horismos: definition horos: definition idiapathe: proper marks, characteristics [L: 'attributes or properties'] idion: property, peculiarity kineisthai: to be moved [L: 'being moved'] kinesis:'movement' [L] kinetikon: moving (causing motion) logos: word, thought, reason logos ti an eie kai eidos: 'ratio or formulable essence' [On the Soulii, 2, 4143 14, in McKeon edition of Aristotle]

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